British Conservatism: The Philosophy and Politics of Inequality (International Library of Political Studies)

Peter Dorey is Reader in Politics at Cardiff University. He has published widely on the contemporary history of the Conservative Party, including The Conservative Party and the Trade Unions (1995), The Major Premiership: Politics and Policies under John Major, 1990–97 (editor, 1999) and British Conservatism and Trade Unionism, 1945–1964 (2008).

P1: PHB

Trim: 138mm × 216mm

IBBK019-01

IBBK019-Serieslist-Demis

Top: 1in

Gutter: 1in

ISBN: 978 1 84885 226 6

April 23, 2010

INTERNATIONAL LIBRARY OF POLITICAL STUDIES Series ISBN: 978 1 84885 226 6 See www.ibtauris.com/ILPS for a full list of titles 42. Democracy or Autocracy in Algeria: Political Change, Civil War and the Islamist Movement Noura Hamladji

47. Constructing Political Islam as the New Other: America and its Post-War on Terror Politics Corinna Mullin

978 1 84885 334 8

978 1 84885 268 6

43. The Emergence of Nationalist Politics in Morocco: The Rise of the Independence Party and the Struggle Against Colonialism after World War II Daniel Zisenwine

48. Choosing the Labour Leader: Labour Party Leadership Elections from Wilson to Brown Timothy Heppell 978 1 84885 381 2

49. Conservative Politics in the Age of Reform: From Pitt the Younger to Sir Robert Peel, 1780-1850 Richard A. Gaunt

978 1 84885 323 2

44. Fundamentalism in the Modern World Vol 1: Fundamentalism, Politics and History: The State, Globalisation and Political Ideologies Ulrika M˚artensson, Jennifer Bailey, Priscilla Ringrose and Asbjørn Dyrendal (Eds)

978 1 84885 437 6

50. The Labour Party in Britain and Norway: Elections and the Pursuit of Power between the World Wars David Redvaldsen

978 1 84885 330 0

978 1 84885 540 3

45. Fundamentalism in the Modern World Vol 2: Fundamentalism and Communication: Culture, Media and the Public Sphere Ulrika M˚artensson, Jennifer Bailey, Priscilla Ringrose and Asbjørn Dyrendal (Eds)

51. Revolution and Reform in Russia and Iran: Modernisation and Politics in Revolutionary States Ghoncheh Tazmini 978 1 84885 554 0

52. Media and Politics in Latin America: Globalization, Democracy and Identity Carolina Matos

978 1 84885 331 7

46. Welfare Policy under New Labour: The Politics of Social Security Reform Andrew Connell

978 1 84885 612 7

978 1 84885 389 8

ii

19:10

British Conservatism The Politics and Philosophy of Inequality Peter Dorey

Published in 2011 by I.B.Tauris & Co Ltd 6 Salem Road, London W2 4BU 175 Fifth Avenue, New York NY 10010 www.ibtauris.com Distributed in the United States and Canada exclusively by Palgrave Macmillan 175 Fifth Avenue, New York NY 10010 Copyright © 2011 Peter Dorey The right of Peter Dorey to be identified as the author of this work has been asserted by the author in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patent Act 1988. All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations in a review, this book, or any part thereof, may not be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the publisher. International Library of Political Studies 33 ISBN 978 1 84511 352 0 A full CIP record for this book is available from the British Library A full CIP record for this book is available from the Library of Congress Library of Congress catalog card: available Printed and bound in India by Thomson Press (India) Camera-ready copy edited and supplied by the author

In loving memory of P. A.T. King

Contents

List of Tables Acknowledgements

ix xi

Introduction

1

1 How Conservatives Explain and Justify Inequality

5

2 One Nation Conservatism: Bounded Inequality

49

3 Neo-liberal Conservatism: Unlimited Inequality

111

4 Post-Thatcherism: Towards a Civic Conservatism

165

5 Explaining Public Acceptance of Inequality

197

Conclusion

239

Notes Bibliography Index

251 255 267

List of Tables

2.1 Distribution of personal post-tax income in Britain between 1949 and 1976–77 (per cent) 2.2 Distribution of wealth, 1924–73 (per cent) 5.1 Response to question about how company decision-making should be conducted (percentage citing) 5.2 The perceived legitimacy of financial differentials between manual workers and businessmen [sic]/lawyers (percentage citing) 5.3 Most salient types of inequality (percentage citing) 5.4 Working-class attitudes to importance of reducing income inequalities (percentage citing)  5.5 Proportion of workers, in each country, who believed that it was very important to reduce the gap between the rich and the poor 5.6 Working-class support for different methods of reducing inequality (percentage citing) 5.7 Differentiated working class support for the Conservative Party since 1964 5.8 Working-class individuals voting Conservative, by ward (per cent) 5.9╇ Views about the causes of poverty, 1986–2006 (percentage of respondents citing) 5.10╇ Perceptions about which section of British society has the toughest time in Britain today 5.11╇ Public preferences if additional money was available for social security 5.12╇ Views on influence of background and the availability of opportunities

108 109 203 203 204 205 206 206 210 214 229 233 234 235

Acknowledgements

There are two important groups of people to whom I would like to express my genuine gratitude and sincere thanks in connection with this book. First, I would like to thank the editorial staff at I.B.Tauris who commissioned this book, and then consistently provided me with unfailing encouragement and support in writing it. In particular, I would like to express my appreciation to Lester Crook, Joanna Godfrey and Maria Marsh. Second, I am very grateful to academic colleagues who kindly read drafts of this book, namely Mark Garnett, Richard Hayton, Tim Heppell, Kevin Hickson, Peter Kerr, Kieron O’Hara and David Seawright. I greatly appreciate the time and trouble they took, and the sage advice and feedback they offered, which I have incorporated as far as possible. Needless to say, any deficiencies which remain are entirely my own, for which I accept full responsibility.

Introduction

In his 2005 study, Kevin Hickson noted that, among many writers who have sought to identify the key elements of Conservative philosophy, the crucial importance of inequality has often been overlooked or insufficiently emphasised (Hickson, 2005: 178). This apparent oversight might be because although the core belief in the inevitability and necessity of inequality is invariably subsumed within other aspects of Conservatism, on closer inspection, it can be seen as a connecting thread or common characteristic permeating virtually all of them. Indeed, it may be that inequality is so deeply ingrained in Conservative philosophy and politics that it is virtually taken for granted, and thus not normally deemed to warrant particular consideration; it is the other elements of Conservatism which have attracted most scholarly attention. One Conservative writer, Maurice Cowling, claimed that ‘The Conservative conception of a social structure not only assumes that marked inequalities are inevitable, but also declines to justify them because their inevitability makes justification un-necessary’, although he did concede that ‘To decline justification of the principle is not to say that there cannot be discussion of the content’(Cowling, 1978: 11). Occasionally, though, the Conservative belief in inequality is ascribed such importance that it is actually acknowledged to constitute the key or defining difference between Conservatism and other ideologies, most notably socialism. Thus, for example, David Willets has asserted that ‘The intellectual battleground between conservatives and socialists is over economic inequality – differences in income and wealth’ (Willetts, 1992: 111). Elsewhere, Bennett, King and Nugent (1977: 9) argue that in politics generally ‘The Left is egalitarian, the Right is elitist’ and, as such, ‘We tend to find not only anti-egalitarianism on the Right, but also the associated ideas of hierarchy, leadership, elitism.’

2

British Conservatism

Indeed, the centrality of inequality to the politics and philosophy of Conservatism is such that Hickson suggests ‘Rather than seeing the Conservative Party as being about statecraft’, as some academics have tended to do, ‘it would be better to see it as being marked by an underlying commitment to inequality’, with statecraft being ‘better seen as the way in which the Conservative Party has successfully pursued its ideological objectives at any one time’ (Hickson, 2005: 183–4). Elsewhere, two other academic experts on British Conservatism have suggested that: Conservatism may be deemed the intellectual justification of inequalities in society and the preservation of the privileges that such inequalities entail … This is the essence of the Conservative Party’s role – to formulate policy that conserves a hierarchy of wealth and power, and to make this intelligible and reasonable to a democracy. (Norton and Aughey, 1981: 47) Not dissimilarly, the Conservative philosopher Roger Scruton has noted how ‘Conservatives instinctively incline to the belief that resentment [of the rich by the less well-off] is appeased, not by equality, but by the “validating” of inequality’ (Scruton, 1980: 100). Meanwhile, in the late 1970s, even before she became Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher’s emphasis on maximising liberty was causing some apprehension for Peregrine Worsthorne, because he believed that what Britain really needed was greater authority, order and stability. This, he explained, derived from an urgent need to ensure enough stability and continuity to prevent tomorrow’s aspirants to power pushing themselves upward so fast that nobody can rule in an orderly and civilised fashion. In other words, Conservatism is about resisting over-speedy renewal of the ruling class … This is a difficult task since this involves winning popular support for inequality; establishing the fact that some people should have more influence over public affairs than others and that it is necessary to sustain an economic and social system to make this possible … Conservatism has … to admit the truth – that they are about satisfying the needs of the strong. (Worsthorne, 1978: 141–3) In similar vein, a non-Conservative academic writer has noted the extent to which Conservatism can be depicted as the ‘ideology of dominant social and political groups’ who are concerned ‘to make the existing authority

Introduction

3

structure acceptable by representing it as a just characteristic of human existence (Eccleshall, 1977: 62, 66), while Leach observes that a key task of Conservatism has been ‘to persuade the majority with little or no property to accept the existing distribution of property’ (Leach, 1996: 117). The purpose of this study, therefore, is to examine the vital importance of inequality within British Conservatism, both as a defining feature of Conservative philosophy, and also as a source of debate within the Party itself, mainly as to the degree of inequality which Conservatives ought to promote or permit. The role of inequality in Conservative philosophy, and the intellectual rationale and sources upon which Conservatives rely in justifying inequality, are delineated in Chapter 1. The next two chapters then examine the manner in which this core belief has nonetheless underpinned debates in the Conservative Party over the degree of inequality which is permissible or necessary. Chapter 2 examines how One Nation Conservatives have been concerned to keep inequality within certain (albeit unspecified) limits, not least to facilitate social cohesion and political stability and to ensure that capitalism retains popular legitimacy among ‘subordinate classes’. Chapter 3 focuses on the counterarguments of those who we define as Conservative (economic) neo-liberals, for whom no limits are to be placed on inequalities arising from individual endeavour or corporate success, subject only to the rule of law. For Conservative neo-liberals, vast differences in incomes and concomitant disparities of wealth are not to be deprecated or viewed as problematic, but signify a healthy and vibrant market economy, and a society providing maximum individual liberty. Of course, we are fully aware that not all Conservatives can be categorised as either ‘One Nation’ or ‘neo-liberal’; many are what might be termed ‘centrists’ (see, for example, Garnett, 2005; Maude, 2005) or pragmatists, and often constitute a large proportion of the party. For example, in his study of the parliamentary Conservative Party towards the end of Margaret Thatcher’s premiership, Philip Norton noted that those MPs and Ministers who could be categorised as ‘the Right’ constituted about 19 per cent of the party in Parliament, while 18 per cent could be classified as ‘damps’ or ‘wets’ (more or less the One Nation strand). This left 63 per cent of Conservative MPs and Ministers who were generally neither, and who were effectively ‘loyalists’ who would endorse whichever Conservative leader was adjudged most likely to ensure the party’s electoral success (Norton, 1990). However, in intra-party debates over the degree of inequality which is deemed desirable, necessary or tolerable the main protagonists have aligned themselves primarily with one of the two ‘strands’ of Conservatism delineated in

4

British Conservatism

chapters 2 and 3, and hence it is these two ‘strands’ who are the main focus of much of this study. Chapter 4 explores the debates and developments in the Conservative Party since Margaret Thatcher’s resignation in November 1990. It will be emphasised that initial expectations of a revival of One Nation Conservatism, raised when the seemingly more emollient John Major succeeded Thatcher, were not realised, for the party broadly persevered with a neo-liberal market-driven approach to politics. Only after a third successive general election defeat in 2005, followed a few months later by David Cameron’s election as Conservative leader, has there been a more general acknowledgement that ‘markets are not enough’, whereupon a number of senior Conservatives have sought to devise a form of ‘civic Conservatism’. This purports to be concerned to eradicate poverty and tackle social deprivation, both of which are acknowledged to have increased in Britain since the 1980s, but insists that solutions should be sought through promoting or reviving intermediate institutions, or what Edmund Burke termed society’s ‘little platoons’, rather than expanding the role of government and the State. Chapter 5 will consider why the British public has been so sanguine about the existence of considerable socio-economic inequalities, with the working class evincing little, if any, interest in socialist politics and Left-wing parties advocating equality. In this respect, we will address a crucial observation once made by Maurice Cowling (1978: 9–10), who noted that while Conservatives ‘want … the sort of freedom that will maintain existing inequalities or restore lost ones’, it should not be overlooked that such freedom is wanted not only by those who benefit from inequalities of wealth, rank and education, but also by enormous numbers of people who, while not partaking in the benefits, recognise that inequalities exist and, in some obscure sense, assume that they ought to … it is something to which they are accustomed. This chapter will examine particular aspects of working class and lower middle class acceptance of socio-economic inequality, as well as more general reasons why British society has often tolerated poverty and major inequalities of earnings, and thus eschewed more radical political doctrines and parties promoting equality. This of course, has been enormously advantageous to the Conservative Party, and has often enabled it to claim that its opposition to egalitarianism and socio-economic equality is widely shared by many, if not most, British people.

1 How Conservatives Expl ain and Justify Inequalit y

As we noted in the Introduction, Conservatism can readily be understood as a philosophy which is largely concerned to offer a defence, or even advocacy, of socio-economic inequality. In so doing, it seeks simultaneously to justify the fact that a small minority enjoys far higher incomes and wealth than the majority of the population, while convincing the population that they too benefit, indirectly at least, from living in a society characterised by a highly unequal distribution of wealth, even though their own incomes might be very modest. In so doing, Conservatism is concerned to depict inequality as natural and inevitable, a fact of life which cannot be altered, and which should therefore be readily accepted, rather than viewed as a problem to be eradicated. Of course, as we will note in chapters 2 and 3, Conservatives disagree slightly over whether or not the gap between rich and poor should be subject to some kind of limit to ensure social cohesion and political stability, but regardless of such differences, all Conservatives are emphatic that inequality per se is both desirable and necessary. In so doing, Conservatives readily cite a wide range of normative, historical and empirical factors by way of explaining and legitimising inequality of incomes and wealth, and thereby strongly refute the egalitarian claims of their socialist critics and adversaries. Ultimately, Conservatism seeks to convince ‘the people’ that equality is undesirable and unattainable, and that any attempt at creating an equal society would be doomed to fail, albeit causing immense misery and suffering in the process. Indeed, a starting point for many Conservatives is the premise that equality is incompatible with human nature itself.

6

British Conservatism

Human nature Although all political philosophies and ideologies are predicated upon particular assumptions about ‘human nature’, it has been argued that ‘Conservatism is more directly a theory of human nature than either liberalism or socialism’ (Berry, 1983: 53). However, whereas liberalism and socialism both derive from an optimistic view of human nature – the former deeming people to be rational and capable of developing reason (or capable of behaving rationally if social or structural impediments are absent) and a capacity for peaceful self-government, and the latter assuming humans to be social or co-operative creatures, but who are made to behave selfishly, and thus corrupted, by capitalism and its intrinsic inequalities – Conservatism entails a more pessimistic or, its proponents would argue, ‘realistic’ view of human nature, one which eschews the liberal and socialist optimism that societies are moving (or capable of moving) ineluctably towards an improved state of affairs. As one Conservative MP explained relatively recently: Liberals are committed to the idea that because man is essentially rational, unfettered and unrestrained, he will, for the most part, act rationally. Conservatives know that this is not so. We appreciate that man is fallen, frail and faulted … Which is why law and authority … are so important to Conservatives – they are all that separate us from anarchy. (Hayes, 2005: 5–6) Consequently, Conservatism does not share the teleological conception of societal development or human progress subscribed to by liberals and socialists. Instead, Conservatives would generally endorse Michael Oakeshott’s claim that ‘In political activity … men sail a boundless and bottomless sea; there is neither harbour for shelter nor floor for anchorage, neither startingplace nor appointed destination’ (Oakeshott, 1967: 127, emphasis added). If ideologies such as liberalism and socialism do believe in such a teleology, Conservatives maintain, then it is because the adherents of such ideologies have an overly optimistic or dangerously naive view of human nature. Furthermore, liberals and socialists are deemed to advance visions of how they believe society ought be reconstituted, thereby implying that current arrangements are somehow wrong or need to be changed. This is not to say that Conservatives completely reject the potential for societal development and improvement, but when these occur they are the natural and spontaneous consequence either of individuals voluntarily pursuing opportunities which entail new inventions or ways of creating wealth, or of



How Conservatives Explain and Justify Inequality

7

unforeseen circumstances; they are not predestined or shaped by an ideological blueprint, nor do they derive from an assumption that the status quo is inherently deficient or defective (see, for example, Boothby et al. 1927: 11–12; Bryant, 1929: 2). Hence the Conservative conception that social change occurs, or ought only to occur, organically and incrementally. This apparent Conservative eschewal of abstract theory in favour of pragmatic empiricism – broadly accepting what is, rather than what could or ought to be – and its role in defending and legitimising inequality by rejecting egalitarian doctrines, will be returned to below. For Conservatives, inequality is ultimately rooted in human nature itself, and manifests itself in two discrete ways. First, Conservatives point to the way in which individual characteristics and qualities, such as ability, ambition, aptitude, intelligence, strength and so forth, are unevenly distributed throughout society. It is deemed axiomatic that individuals ‘are not equal in strength, cleverness, creativity, character or interest. Nor do they have equal needs or requirements’ (Allison, 1984: 77). On the contrary, David Willetts has referred to ‘the fundamental inequalities of the natural order: inequalities in looks, in intelligence, in talents … We are not equally good singers or runners. We have different aptitudes’ (Willetts, 1992: 111). As such, Conservatives have consistently maintained that the ‘inequalities which socialists regard as accidental are the natural result of the inequalities of human nature’ (Mallock, 1898a: 372). Conservatives are therefore adamant not only that inequalities in wealth and material possessions reflect ‘a natural and just distribution determined by effort, achievement and ability’, but also, as a consequence, that ‘inequality in possessions is not to be deprecated, but to be accepted as natural, even desirable’ (Norton and Aughey, 1981: 35). With some people innately possessing more ambition, intelligence or talent than others, for example, so will the unequal distribution of such characteristics inevitably result in an inherently unequal society: ‘Since some people have more ability and a greater opportunity to acquire property than others, there are bound to be economic and social inequalities … because success brings inequality’ (Conservative Party, 1976: 17–18). Or as Chris Patten expressed it: ‘The unequal distribution of property is in part a result of the unequal distribution of talent among individuals, in part of the random operation of chance and in part of heredity … human beings do not have equal abilities’, and thus ‘Conservatives do not believe that absolute equality is attainable’ (Patten, 1983: 12). Similarly, Timothy Raison emphasised that ‘absolute equality will be elusive as long as men persist in having markedly different talents and abilities’ (Raison, 1964: 38); by ‘as long as’, he evidently

8

British Conservatism

meant in perpetuity Meanwhile, Keith Joseph and Jonathan Sumption (1979: 51) observed that ‘Inequality is a state of affairs which results when the aptitudes of men are allowed to manifest themselves in natural differences’, while Harold Macmillan emphasised the extent to which ‘Human beings, widely various in their capacity, character, talent and ambition, tend to differentiate at all times and in all places’ (Macmillan, 1966: xviii). This strong emphasis on the differing abilities and varying attributes of human beings is also a reflection of the methodological individualism which underpins much Conservative philosophy, whereby society is viewed as the manifestation or product of the millions of individuals within it, because ‘individuals are prior to societies. A society of autonomous individuals is the natural condition of mankind’ (Joseph and Sumption, 1979: 100). Hence Margaret Thatcher’s famous assertion (although very often, only the first part is quoted) that ‘there’s no such thing as society. There are individual men and women and there are families’ (Woman’s Own, 31 October 1987). Furthermore, this Conservative conception of human nature also constitutes a form of ‘biological essentialism’, where inequality is attributed, ultimately, to people’s biological, physiological and mental composition: ‘nature, or genetics, are extremely important in determining people’s capacities’ (Allison, 1984: 77). Thus, Eccleshall explains, Conservatives are convinced that inequalities are a natural consequence of differing human attributes and characteristics, and, as such, ‘do not signify the exploitation of the poor by the rich: they simply mirror the immutable facts of human biology’ (Ecceshall, 1984: 90). Of course, this perspective is the exact opposite of the more materialist conception, particularly associated with Marxism, whose structuralist perspective views individuals as ‘products’ of their society, as ‘agents’ who are ‘bearers of relations’, and which therefore underpins the Marxist conviction that if the socio-economic structure can be changed, then so too can human conduct and relationships, thereby making equality a feasible objective. Needless to say, Conservatives totally reject such a premise as a dangerous illusion, the pursuit of which will inevitably result in tyranny and totalitarianism. Second, Conservatives hold that individuals are motivated primarily by acquisitiveness and self-interest. It is thus deemed entirely natural that most individuals, most of the time, desire to increase their incomes or wealth, own property, and obtain more material possessions with which to imbue their lives with greater enjoyment or comfort: ‘the desire of acquisition is still the dominant incentive of human enterprise and human labour’ (Boothby et al., 1927: 17). Or as Keith Joseph and Jonathan Sumption observed over



How Conservatives Explain and Justify Inequality

9

fifty years later: ‘Men are so constituted that it is natural to them to pursue private rather than public ends … The duty of governments is to accommodate themselves to this immutable fact about human nature … Men have a natural right to their ambitions’ (Joseph and Sumption, 1979: 100–1). This acquisitiveness and pursuit of self-interest is, Conservatives insist, totally incompatible with the socialist vision of altruistic and co-operative individuals living harmoniously in a society based on equality. Yet Conservatives also maintain that what ostensibly appears to be individual selfishness can, and often does, indirectly and inadvertently, benefit society as a whole. This premise was famously illustrated, in 1776, by Adam Smith (later to become an intellectual doyen of Conservative neo-liberals from the 1970s onwards), when he explained that ‘It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest’ (Smith, 1986: 119), a quote which Keith Joseph approvingly cited 200 years after Smith (Joseph, 1976: 59). The butcher and baker do not respectively sell meat and bread because they are concerned to prevent starvation among the populace, but because this is how they have chosen to earn their living and make money for themselves. In so doing, however, their pursuit of economic self-interest has a beneficial and utilitarian social outcome, and thus Conservatives do not perceive an intrinsic or inevitable contradiction between individual acquisitiveness and societal benefit; on the contrary, the two are often yoked together, albeit in a totally unplanned manner. Somewhat more recently, the Conservative philosopher Roger Scruton has emphasised that a ‘free market’ economy is a guarantee of national wealth, and the best way to maintain or raise the ‘standard of living’, by ensuring that each man, pursuing his own material well-being, has the incentive to pursue the well-being of the whole. And if that is so, then … ‘socialism’ or ‘public ownership’ … must necessarily deprive the citizen of that material incentive upon which the nation depends for its prosperity. (Scruton, 1984: 95) This, incidentally, is why Conservatives view ‘the market’ as providing a spontaneous order, an economic system whose very flexibility, and responsiveness to entrepreneurial activity and consumer demand, are held to be far more effective at satisfying human wants and generating wealth than any economic system devised de novo by well-intentioned political theorists, or controlled and planned by a supposedly benevolent state and its bureaucratic agents (see, for example, Joseph, 1975: 7–8).

10

British Conservatism

However, Conservatives also argue that because individuals are different – unequal – in their abilities and talents, their pursuit of self-interest will inevitably yield varying degrees of success. Some will enjoy great success, and consequently acquire huge fortunes, while others will be characterised by the modesty of their achievements and thus of their financial rewards. And some, of course, will fail entirely in their endeavours, or perhaps not even try. In these ways, therefore, Conservatives contend that human nature (along with circumstances often beyond human or political control) unavoidably fosters inequalities, disparities which reflect individual differences in acumen, intelligence, motivation and talent, and varying degrees of success in applying them. Consequently, Conservatives insist that inequality is an inevitable and immutable fact of life, and therefore reject the vision of a better society promulgated by doctrines such as liberalism and socialism. For Conservatives, if human nature is such that individuals are naturally both unequal in their attributes, and motivated primarily by self-interest or acquisitiveness, then it logically follows that there can be no moving inevitably towards a better model of society, or even the creation of a new society. Hence the Conservative insistence that all political doctrines which seek to create an equal society are utopian, and reflect the naivety of their proponents who seemingly fail to understand or accept human nature. Whereas ‘the Radical’ is convinced that they can eradicate ‘the existing flaws in existing ways of life’, along with ‘the cruelty, the suffering’, the Conservative perceives that ‘their roots are deep in human nature’ (Bryant, 1929: 2), and as ‘human nature is not perfectible … government has no business to seek to alter it’ (Gilmour, 1978: 158). Conservatives do not go so far as to argue that nothing can be done about cruelty and injustice, but unlike ‘the Radical’, they do not believe that these traits can be entirely removed from human society; they can be placed under the rule of law, so that their worst excesses might be curbed, but they can never be wholly eradicated. As such, whereas its opponents tend to view Conservatism as a pessimistic or fatalistic philosophy, or even as an ideology based on the material selfinterest of the rich (or ‘ruling class’), Conservatives consider themselves to be ‘realists’ in their conception of human nature, and the implications which logically flow from this: ‘This … explains the strong negativism in conservatism as a political doctrine. It is at its most articulate when voicing its opposition to policies which require that individuals do re-create themselves; that they do discard that which has made them what they are’ (Berry, 1983: 64). Furthermore, Conservatives are emphatic that the pursuit of equality – in accordance with ideologies such as socialism – is not only doomed to fail but



How Conservatives Explain and Justify Inequality

11

will also result in tyranny, as the would-be architects of an equal society seek to curb or suppress the inequalities inherent in human nature. Or, as Keith Joseph and Jonathan Sumption (1979: 99) explained, ‘if the personalities of men are such that inequality is natural to them, and their personalities cannot be fundamentally changed, then it must follow that the degree of coercion required to create a quite unnatural degree of equality would be very great indeed’. Similarly, David Hume once argued that even if material possessions were to be distributed evenly throughout society and among all individuals, people’s ‘different degrees of art, care and industry’ would ‘immediately break that equality’ (Hume, 1975: 194), the clear implication being that, in such circumstances, equality would have to be restored through oppressive state action. This, incidentally, is why Conservatives insist that equality and liberty are incompatible, as we will discuss below. Theological basis of inequality In maintaining that inequality is intrinsic to human nature, and that ‘man’ was originally created by God, it is not surprising that some Conservatives believe that inequality is ultimately God-given. This particular Conservative perspective holds that ‘the world [is] an ordered, hierarchical whole in which everything, including man, has had a place ascribed to it by God, who created the universe’ (O’Sullivan, 1976: 22), hence Hearnshaw’s (1933: 28) assertion that a Conservative often ‘tends to accept the ancient Christian view that all legitimate authority is … divine in origin’. Many Conservatives, therefore, would once have endorsed the statement in one of the original verses in the hymn All Things Bright and Beautiful, which decreed that: The rich man in his castle, the poor man at his gate, God made them, high and lowly, and ordered their estate. In this respect, inequality is clearly pre-ordained: ‘The creator of the world seems to have aimed, not at Equality, but at the widest possible diversity of creatures’ (Bryant, 1929: 8). Although in a more contemporary secular age, Conservatives are less inclined than they once were to attribute their beliefs explicitly to Christianity, it has still been noted that: ‘There is indeed a strong connection between conservative ideology and religious belief … Many Conservatives have … associated their political principles with their Christian faith’ (Leach, 1996: 112–13). A Conservative belief in God as the creator of the world and mankind thus underpins the belief in the naturalness of hierarchy which is itself obviously a form of inequality. Again, this link might be less explicitly stated today in a

12

British Conservatism

liberal democratic and ostensibly meritocratic society – even Conservatives will be disinclined to state explicitly that particular individuals are ‘born to rule’, perhaps preferring instead to refer to their ‘natural leadership skills’ – but it has nonetheless long constituted another element of the Conservative belief in, and justification of, inequality, and is reflected in the old aphorism: ‘God bless the squire and his relations, and keep us in our proper stations.’ However, the notion that people have their ‘proper stations’ in life is rather at odds with the contemporary Conservative advocacy of opportunities and social mobility, even though social mobility clearly implies a hierarchy which some individuals strive to climb. Consequently, even though Conservatives might attribute the origins of inequality ultimately to God and deem it to be legitimised by religion, the contemporary endorsement of hierarchy and the necessity of leadership is generally couched in more secular terms,1 and buttressed by reference to historical and empirical evidence. Following on from this, a close link has often been posited between the Conservative Party and the Church, particularly the Church of England. For example, writing in 1755, Samuel Johnson claimed that a Tory ‘adheres to the ancient constitution of the State and the apostolical hierarchy of the Church of England’ (quoted in Quinton, 1978: 9). Meanwhile, Hearnshaw’s delineation of key Conservative principles included ‘the religious basis of the state’ and ‘the divine source of legitimate authority’ (Hearnshaw, 1933: 27, 28), while another Conservative writer claimed that: ‘Men must follow either light or darkness. Religion supplies the light’ (Northam, 1939: 68). Enshrined in this Conservative perspective of the theological account of the naturalness and immutability of inequality are three further aspects which bolster the professed links between Conservatism, religion and inequality. First, it has been suggested that inequalities will be more readily acceptable to individuals, especially those not endowed with significant riches, if the unequal distribution of material resources and rewards is viewed as ultimately deriving from ‘divine command’ or willed by what Scruton (1984: 171) refers to as ‘the transcendent Being’, rather than being a consequence of bureaucratic or political – i.e. human – decisions and allocation. Second, in rendering inequalities more explicable or morally acceptable, a belief in God also ‘enables people to direct their most powerful dissatisfactions away from the ruinous hope of changing things, to a more peaceable hope of being one day redeemed from the need to do so’ (Scruton, 1984: 170). Hence Conservatives might allude to the Biblical aphorism that: ‘It is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle, than for a rich man to enter into the kingdom of God’ (Matthew 19:24). Meanwhile, the less well-off are offered the possibility of a better after-life by virtue of working



How Conservatives Explain and Justify Inequality

13

hard and displaying due deference and respect to their apparent superiors (including, of course, the wealthy) in this world. Third, there is the widely-held Conservative belief in the doctrine of ‘original sin’, with man’s ‘fall’ traced back to Adam and Eve. For example, Hearnshaw claimed that Conservatism … can be traced right back to the Garden of Eden itself. In that visionary abode of bliss, Adam was the person who represented the conservative qualities of contentment and stability. Eve was the innovator, eager for novelty, ready for reckless experiment, liable to be led away by any such seductive slogan as ‘Eat more fruit’ or ‘Free Fig Leaves for All’. (Hearnshaw, 1933: 20) Hearnshaw also suggested that ‘the devil who, in the form of a serpent, tempted Eve’ may have been ‘the nearest approximation, possible … to the ideas of Karl Marx’ (Hearnshaw, 1933: 20), while Viereck (1950: 44–5) suggested that Conservatism constitutes the ‘political secularization of the doctrine of original sin’. Consequently, one Conservative writer decreed that ‘man cannot be made good by Acts of Parliament. Man’s goodness ultimately depends on the things of the Spirit’ (Northam, 1939: 61). Such perspectives have ensured that the Conservative ‘view of the nature of man’ is in essence … a pessimistic view, closely akin to (and indeed for some Conservatives, inspired by) that of orthodox Christianity. Man is sinful, imperfect and on this earth, imperfectible, prone to wickedness and all manner of evil doing’, and although he had a capacity to reason sufficient to set him apart from ‘the beasts … his individual resources in this regard are pathetically inadequate and gravely to be distrusted. (Mackenzie and Silver, 1968: 21–2) This latter aspect of Conservative pessimism (or realism) about man’s cognitive limitations was eloquently expressed by Burke, when he asserted that We are afraid to put men to live and trade each on his private stock of reason, because we suspect that the stock in each man is small, and that individuals would do better to avail themselves of the general bank and capital of nations and ages. (Burke, 2004: 183)

14

British Conservatism

Such individual cognitive limitations, coupled with the unequal distribution of other personal attributes, clearly manifests itself, Conservatives maintain, in the hierarchical structures of all organisations, including society itself, and the necessity for suitably qualified (in terms of their personal qualities and skills) individuals to provide leadership for the majority. The necessity and inevitability of hierarchy and leadership The Conservative conception of human nature, coupled with the a priori belief in the unequal distribution of various human characteristics and talents, strongly underpins an insistence on the vital importance of leadership and authority in society, which both reflects and further reinforces inequality. According to a former Director of the Conservative Research Department: ‘In any group of men [sic] pursuing a common purpose, whether it be a nation or a family, a factory or a farm, there must be those who exercise authority, and those who obey’ (Clarke, 1947: 14). This reflects a Conservative conviction that ‘Authority is always necessary in society and authority entails inequality’ because ‘Someone … gives orders and others obey them’, a state of affairs which ‘reflects the manner in which ‘Conservatives have faith in the natural leadership of certain groups or individuals’. For Conservatives, such inequality is ‘rooted in both natural and political circumstances’, and is therefore ‘nothing to be ashamed of. It cannot be eradicated’ (Vincent, 1992: 69). Or as Berry has observed: ‘Hierarchy is the order of nature, and as such is ubiquitous’ (Berry, 1983: 61). One particularly trenchant Conservative argument concerning the naturalness and necessity of hierarchy and leadership, and inter alia against socialism and equality, was articulated by W. H. Mallock, in several books which he wrote between 1882 and 1919. Mallock strongly refuted the Marxist argument that workers under Capitalism are exploited because the wages they are paid represent only a small proportion of the market or exchange value of the goods that they produce, with the ‘surplus value’ then being appropriated by the employer. Instead, Mallock insisted that the real source of labour value and wealth creation was ability, innovation and leadership, these vital qualities only being possessed or exercised by a small minority in any society. On one occasion, Mallock asserted that ‘Labour in itself is no more the cause of wealth than Shakespeare’s pen was the cause of writing “Hamlet”’, by which he meant it was the playwright’s intelligence and creativity which led him to write such exalted plays and sonnets: his pen was the means, not the cause, of Shakespeare’s success (Mallock, 1882: 84). As Barnes explains, Mallock was adamant that ‘The principle producer of wealth, therefore, is not labour but ability … Ability is the



How Conservatives Explain and Justify Inequality

15

faculty which directs labour, which produces inventions, devises methods, supplies imagination, organizes production and distribution, and maintains order.’ Crucially, Mallock insisted that ‘ability cannot be redistributed by legislation’ (Barnes, 1994: 334). Ultimately, therefore, Mallock saw superior intelligence and cognitive skills, manifested through innovation or leadership, as the prerequisite of wealth creation, rather than physical labour (what might, more colloquially, be termed ‘brain over brawn’). Higher productivity and improved efficiency were the key to increased prosperity and material progress, which the working classes so heavily depended upon for continued sources of employment and better wages, but these could only be ensured by according due respect and reward to ‘the process of directing and co-ordinating the divided [individual] labour of others’, by ‘a separate group’ who provided the ‘function of the directive faculties’ (Mallock, 1908: 16, 17, emphasis in original). This apparent need for hierarchy and leadership had been clearly recognised by Burke when he insisted that ‘Good order is the foundation of all good things … the people, without being servile, must be tractable and obedient … the magistrate must have his reverence, the laws their authority. The body of the people … must respect the property of which they cannot partake’ (Burke, 2004: 372). Similarly, Mallock insisted that The lesson to be taught is this, that every civilization, in respect of wealth, government and self-defence, is due to the co-operation of unequals – of the few who lead and give orders, and of the many who follow and obey; that this fact reflects in itself in the general configuration of society; and that in proportion as the masses of any country neglect it, they will … lose what they have in their efforts to seize more. (Mallock, 1918: 376–7) It is not surprising, therefore, that some Conservatives were originally apprehensive about the spread of democracy in the final third of the nineteenth century, for this seemed incompatible with the exercise of leadership and political rule by a wise or experienced minority. However, it was not solely this apparent incompatibility between leadership based on hierarchy and minority rule on the one hand, and formal political equality and majority rule on the other, which vexed some Conservatives in the latter half of the nineteenth century. There was also considerable concern in some quarters that democracy might result in the newly enfranchised masses, via their elected representatives, seizing the property and wealth of the minority, doubtless in the name of ‘equality’.

16

British Conservatism

Thus did Sir Henry Maine, writing two years after the 1884 Reform Act had further extended the franchise to some of the working class, express his anxiety that the development of democracy might presage a ‘process of legislating away the property of one class and transferring it to another’ (Maine, 1886: 106). On the other hand, some Conservatives feared that not extending democracy to ‘the masses’ might result in the latter turning to greater radicalism, or even revolution, either of which would almost certainly entail an attack on the propertied classes. As we will note in the next chapter, the solution to this constitutional conundrum was sought in the development of One Nation Conservatism, which explicitly endeavoured to attract electoral support from sections of the working class by promoting piecemeal social reform in order to improve their living and working conditions. It was envisaged that this would serve simultaneously to inculcate the newly enfranchised masses with the norms and values of parliamentary democracy, and thereby steer them away from any flirtation with revolutionary doctrines or activities, while also pre-empting any assault on the rich, by ensuring that the propertied elite displayed a paternalistic concern for the material well-being of the ‘lower orders’. This certainly did not mean any acceptance of equality, but it did entail an acknowledgement that socio-economic inequalities needed to be kept within boundaries or limits (albeit not clearly defined or specified) if they were to be accepted as legitimate by the rest of society. The gravest danger to the propertied classes did not reside in democracy per se, but in the flagrant disregard for the plight of the poorest by those with property and abundant riches. It was in such disregard that the seeds of revolution were most likely to germinate, and which therefore rendered it vital that enlightened political leaders engaged in the ‘pursuit of the necessary social cohesion to underpin governance’ (Barnes, 1994: 339). As Benjamin Disraeli, who is widely credited with being the progenitor of One Nation Conservatism, remarked, in 1848: ‘The palace is not safe, when the cottage is not happy’ (quoted in Monypenny and Buckle, 1929: 709). Meanwhile, parliamentary democracy itself also served to protect existing patterns of authority and power, to some degree, because the voters elected representatives to make laws and policies on their behalf: it was certainly not a form of direct democracy, nor were MPs expected to act as delegates. Consequently, Leo Amery (1947: 21, 19) could proudly assert that what Britain had developed was a system of ‘government of the people, for the people, with, and not by, the people’, which thereby ensured that ‘the emphasis lies on the strength and stability of government’. Or, as the eminent American political scientist Joseph Schumpeter suggested, contemporary liberal



How Conservatives Explain and Justify Inequality

17

democracy is not so much ‘government by the people’ as ‘government approved by the people’ (Schumpeter, 1943: 246). Thus was parliamentary democracy rendered compatible with traditional Conservative conceptions of authority, hierarchy and leadership. Formal political equality was skilfully grafted onto a socio-economic system which was, and continued to be, characterised by extensive inequality. Indeed, a number of political scientists have subsequently characterised parliamentary or liberal democracy as a system of ‘democratic elitism’, constituting what Schumpeter described as ‘an institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote’. Accordingly, Schumpeter explains, ‘Democracy means only that the people have the opportunity of accepting or refusing the men (sic) who are to rule them’, but having so chosen their parliamentary representatives in an election, the voters ‘must respect the division of labour between themselves and the politicians they elect. They must not withdraw confidence too easily between elections, and they must understand that, once they have elected an individual, political action is his business, and not theirs’ (Schumpeter, 1943: 269, 284–5, 295). The dual emphasis in such models of democracy is on the stability of the political system and the dominance of governmental (executive) authority, with ‘the people’ largely confining themselves to either re-electing or replacing the governing party every four to five years. As such, the health of the body politic is largely predicated on, and proven by, the relative passivity of ‘the masses’. What appears to be apathy can be interpreted as a reflection of broad satisfaction with the extant situation, or at least a willingness to wait until the general election in order to replace an unpopular or incompetent governing party (Morris-Jones, 1954). Conversely, the spread of political activism can signify growing mass discontent, which might prove far more of a threat to the political system than a universal suffrage exercised once every four to five years. Whereas some nineteenth-century Conservatives feared that property and wealth were threatened by democratisation and its emphasis on majority rule, the twentieth century engendered a concern that ‘the masses’ now posed a potential threat to parliamentary or liberal democracy itself, due to an apparent susceptibility to demagogues, populism and other forms of extremist or ‘anti-system’ political leaders or parties. These dangers are particularly acute in times of serious economic crisis or rapid social change, when chronic instability and a profound sense of anomie might prompt the masses to turn to a strong leader or apparent saviour to restore order, even if this results in the destruction of liberty and parliamentary democracy.

18

British Conservatism

To avoid such a scenario, Conservatism insists that wise political leadership and statecraft are absolutely vital, and these qualities or skills are precisely those which many senior Conservatives have been uniquely associated with (see, for example, Bulpitt, 1986; Gamble, 1974: passim). Consequently, while some Conservatives had originally felt trepidation about the development of parliamentary democracy, their twentieth-century heirs saw themselves as its most reliable defenders or guarantors. Democracy rendered wise political leadership more important than ever, a point strongly emphasised, in the 1970s, by a senior Conservative politician, Lord Hailsham (1978: 83). Furthermore, in accordance with the Conservative emphasis on empiricism (discussed below), it has been claimed that effective political leadership cannot be based upon ‘the theoretical speculations of … thinkers’, but in ‘historically accumulated social experience’, which was most likely to be vested in those individuals who ‘have acquired extensive practical experience of politics’ (Quinton, 1978: 16–17). Such experience, it has been suggested, is most likely to exist ‘among members of a long established ruling class’ (Minogue, 1967: 195). Again, therefore, we can see how Conservatives have melded democracy and elitism, and ensured that a system based on formal political equality nonetheless venerates strong political leadership – provided, of course, that it is the ‘right’ leadership. Liberty versus equality In defending and justifying inequality, Conservatism has posited a sharp distinction between the two values or objectives of liberty and equality, which are deemed to be mutually exclusive. Notwithstanding the Conservative insistence that equality is unattainable anyway, the ‘liberty versus equality’ dichotomy hears Conservatives insist that equality is (or would be, if it were attainable) wholly inimical to the maintenance of liberty and freedom. Indeed, Conservatives are adamant that even pursuing the alleged chimera of equality will pari passu diminish liberty. It is, essentially, deemed to be a zero-sum relationship, whereby greater equality must mean less liberty, while less equality means more liberty. According to the American neo-liberal economist, Milton Friedman, whose ideas seemingly influenced many senior Conservatives from the late 1970s onwards: ‘One cannot be both an egalitarian … and a liberal’ because, inevitably, ‘equality comes sharply into conflict with freedom’ (Friedman, 1962: 195). In this context, Conservatism venerates liberty infinitely more than equality of incomes or wealth. While Conservatives readily endorse such principles as equality before the law and before God, and some of them endorse equality of opportunity (discussed below), they are all unequivocally



How Conservatives Explain and Justify Inequality

19

opposed to economic equality, firmly believing that liberty is both far more desirable in principle, and much more readily attainable in practice. Indeed, it could be argued that a defining difference between Conservatism and socialism is the emphasis placed on the two values or principles, with Conservatives privileging liberty, and socialists prioritising equality. However, whereas socialists tend to argue that liberty without equality is often meaningless in reality (the tramp and the tycoon are both at liberty to dine at the Ritz, but only one of them can afford to do so in an unequal society such as Britain), Conservatism holds that the enactment of legislation or implementation of policies intended to achieve greater socioeconomic equality must inevitably entail corresponding curbs on individual liberty. Furthermore, such curbs will, Conservatives maintain, invariably be far more invidious than the inequalities which they are supposed to be eradicating. For Conservatives, the pursuit of equality is destructive of liberty for two inter-related reasons. First, to minimise or eradicate inequalities it would be necessary to impose restrictions on the liberty of those individuals deemed to be attaining more than their ‘fair share’, or who were adjudged to be utilising their wealth to purchase goods and services which others could not afford. For example, if a socialist administration somehow sought to prohibit private education on the grounds that this perpetuated elitism or class inequalities, then, a Conservative would retort, this would constitute a major restriction on the liberty or freedom of those parents who wished to send their children to a private school, and who were both willing and able to pay for such an education. It would also, in effect, entail the state stipulating how individuals could, and could not, spend their incomes or wealth, because it would be endeavouring to prevent the purchase of particular goods or services by some individuals, on the grounds that others could not afford them. Following directly on from this Conservative objection to the illiberal character and consequences of egalitarianism is the argument that the pursuit of equality would inevitably entail a massive increase in the size and power of the state, in order to identify and eradicate the myriad sources of inequality regularly manifesting themselves. According to Hume, if any society or government sought to establish equality, then ‘the most rigorous inquisition’ would inevitably be invoked in order ‘to watch every inequality on its first appearance’, whereupon there would invariably follow ‘the most severe jurisdiction to punish and redress it’. In such circumstances, Hume warned, the degree of political surveillance and state action entailed in seeking to suppress every manifestation of nascent inequality would

20

British Conservatism

‘soon degenerate into tyranny’ (Hume, 1975: 194). Similarly, a more contemporary Conservative intellectual observed that the pursuit of equality would necessitate ‘strong governmental action, which plainly diminishes the liberty of the citizen’ (Gilmour, 1978: 176), although Maurice Cowling candidly acknowledged that what Conservatives really want ‘is the sort of freedom that will maintain existing inequalities or restore lost ones’ (Cowling, 1978: 9). One other aspect of the ‘liberty versus equality’ debate which needs to be emphasised is the distinction which has variously been drawn between ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ liberty. The former generally refers to the freedom or liberty to be able do something, such as to partake in particular activities or pursue chosen goals. This notion of ‘positive liberty’ – ‘freedom to …’ – is widely associated with socialists and social democrats, who have often argued that liberty is only meaningful if individuals can actually afford to purchase or pay for the goods and services which they want. To the extent that they are unable to afford them, then their liberty is, in practice, restricted. On this basis, therefore, a socialist or social democrat would argue that the tramp has, in reality, much less freedom to dine at the Ritz than the tycoon, because of his/her lack of financial resources. Consequently, to tell the tramp that s/he is as free as the tycoon to eat at such an esteemed restaurant is both meaningless and deeply offensive. In short, socialists and social democrats argue that in a capitalist society, the enormous disparities in incomes and wealth means that the freedom to do and buy certain things is also highly unequal: the rich enjoy rather more liberty than the poor, because the latter’s choices are limited by lack of material resources and ability to pay for various goods and services. This, of course, logically leads socialists and social democrats to insist that only by pursuing equality, via state intervention and redistributive policies, will the poor genuinely be able to start making the same kind of choices that the rich can already afford to make: greater equality will pari passu lead to more liberty. Against this conception of ‘positive’ liberty, Conservatives have subscribed to a notion of ‘negative’ liberty, whereby freedom is defined as the absence of externally imposed constraints on individual choices and actions. In this regard, individuals are deemed to be at liberty to the extent that other people or institutions do not directly prevent them from pursuing their own interests or spending their money how they choose. Obviously, Conservatives will accept that some restrictions on liberty are necessary, most notably through the rule of law, and also via legally enforceable contracts, to prevent individuals from pursuing their own interests in a criminal or coercive



How Conservatives Explain and Justify Inequality

21

manner (such as theft or blackmail, for example), but beyond these minimal restrictions, liberty is said to be maximised to the extent that institutional or political restrictions are minimised: ‘Freedom consists in the absence of external coercion, and no man is unfree unless other people intentionally use coercion to prevent him from doing something which he is able and willing to do, and could be done without encroaching on the freedom of others.’ However, because inequality is deemed entirely natural and inevitable, rather than being deliberately created by humans themselves, then ‘if it is not a contrivance of men, it is not coercion, and it is not a denial of liberty’ (Joseph and Sumption, 1979: 49, 51). Meanwhile, Willetts has argued that limited resources do not in themselves constitute a lack of liberty: ‘Nobody is banning us from having lunch at the Ritz; we are free to do so; it is just that we cannot afford it’ (Willetts, 1992: 116). This, of course, is one of the reasons why Conservatism, especially its neo-liberal variant (as discussed in Chapter 3), advocates a limited state. Conservatives insist that the more the state intervenes in economic and social affairs, the more it will, either intentionally or inadvertently, impinge upon and limit individual liberty (Willetts, 1992: 117). People will be prevented from making various choices and decisions, either because the state expressly forbids them to do so, or because the extensive provision of stateowned public services, such as education and health, coupled with high taxation, hinders their ability to choose to pay for private provision of such services. State intervention, often linked to the pursuit of equality, is thus deemed to restrict the choices which people are able or allowed to make, and as such, denies them true liberty. Crucially in this context, Conservatives are adamant that low incomes or poverty do not signify a lack of liberty, because neither the state, nor other institutions or individuals, are directly preventing the poor from making certain choices, or determining how they must spend their, admittedly limited, incomes; they are still ‘free’ to decide whether to eat ‘junk food’ or buy healthier fresh fruit and vegetables. Similarly, they can choose whether to spend their wages or welfare benefits on beer, cigarettes, and National Lottery tickets, or to forego these in preference for books, an occasional visit to the theatre (perhaps by taking advantage of concessionary offers or cheaper ‘stand-by’ seats), or enrolling on a course at a local college or evening class (and perhaps gaining thereby a qualification or two which might also enhance their employment or career prospects, and inter alia their future earnings). Of course, Conservatives would not attempt to deny that the rich can afford to make certain choices which are beyond the financial means of

22

British Conservatism

the poor, or could, with regard to the above examples, afford alcohol and cigarettes and books and regular trips to the theatre (quite probably sitting in the best seats, too); they would not need to choose between one or the other. Nonetheless, Conservatives insist that the limited resources, and thus restricted practicable choices, experienced by the less well-off do not signify a lack of liberty, hence Joseph and Sumption’s assertion that ‘poverty is not unfreedom’ (1979: 47). This, Conservatives maintain, is partly because incomes generally reflect individual abilities and attributes, in which case, the less well-off presumably are less industrious, successful or talented than the rich, whereupon their limited resources or lack of wealth are not attributable to coercion; no one per se is actually or deliberately making them poor. Indeed, following on from this last point, a Conservative might cite as a second reason why ‘poverty is not unfreedom’ (viz. negative liberty) that earnings and incomes are ultimately determined by ‘the market’, which is deemed to be natural and spontaneous, and operates according to immutable and intrinsic laws and processes, such as those of supply and demand, ‘natural price’ and so on, which are impersonal and impartial; they are not created or imposed by any individual or institution, and as such are morally neutral. Consequently, according to this logic, a poor person is not unfree, because no one is actually preventing them from doing the things they might wish to do, but cannot afford to do. Wealth creation is more beneficial to the poor than wealth redistribution In accordance with their conviction that capitalism is the only economic system capable of effectively generating growth and prosperity in a manner which is compatible with individual liberty, and which also provides the necessary incentives and rewards, Conservatives have always insisted that wealth creation is far more conducive to tackling poverty and improving the material conditions of the poor than governmental attempts at redistributing wealth, particularly on the basis of abstract or utopian conceptions such as equality or fairness. Part of the rationale for this firm conviction can be discerned in Adam Smith’s 1776 classic text, The Wealth of Nations, in which, as we noted earlier, he articulated the thesis that in a market economy, the lawful pursuit of individual self-interest invariably and naturally serves the wider common or societal good. Acquisitive behaviour yielded amenable outcomes, and what might ostensibly appear to be selfishness actually served utilitarian ends. Through the individual pursuit of private profit and financial gain, the greatest happiness of the greatest number would be attained, for all citizens



How Conservatives Explain and Justify Inequality 23

would benefit from a prosperous society derived from profitable, private, economic activity. Virtually the same point was reiterated 200 years later, in the Conservative Party’s policy document The Right Approach, which asserted that ‘if the able and enterprising are discouraged from the creation of wealth, the poor and the weak will suffer’, for egalitarianism ‘by levelling down … dries up the springs of enterprise and endeavour, and ultimately means there are fewer resources for helping the disadvantaged’ (Conservative Party, 1976: 13). The following year, a senior Conservative pointed out that economic growth necessitates ‘the payment of higher salaries to industrial managers, but this is a small price to pay for the great gains in welfare which can result from economic advance’ (Walker, 1977: 20). As also noted earlier, a similar line of argument had been enunciated at the end of the nineteenth century, when W. H. Mallock claimed that material progress derived, in large part, from the innovations and initiatives of ‘great men’, which then benefited the rest of society: ‘the great man is the vera causa of progress’. However, if such individuals are deprived of their wealth or higher remuneration, then their willingness to generate new sources of wealth will dissipate, whereupon the rest of society, particularly the labouring masses, will experience a decline in their material standards and employment opportunities (Mallock, 1898b: 274 and passim). Or as Harold Macmillan expressed it, several decades later, ‘it is only [by] giving their heads to the strong and to the able that we shall ever have the means to provide real protection for the weak and for the old’ (Macmillan, 1966: xviii). Following on from such arguments, Conservatives also point to the empirical and historical evidence of the last 200 years or so, during which time the societies which have attained the greatest prosperity and enjoyed the highest living standards have been those based on the capitalist mode of production. In this regard, Conservatives maintain that: the gap between the rich ands poor is justified by the fact that even the poorest wretches are better off in a free-market system, where they benefit from all the improvements in the quality of life it makes possible, than they would be any place else. That the rich and the poor do not share equally in the enjoyment of these improvements is of no consequence. (Newman, 1984: 136) Indeed, one prominent contemporary Conservative has invoked the decidedly non-Conservative philosopher John Rawls in defence of socio-economic

24

British Conservatism

inequality. Referring explicitly to Rawls’ (1971: 303) claim that ‘All social primary goods – liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, and the basis of self-respect – are to be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution of any or all of these goods is to the advantage of the least favoured’, David Willetts (1992: 112) insists that the unequal distribution of wealth most certainly does benefit the least well-off, because unequal rewards and remuneration provide both the incentives for wealth creation (on which employment, prosperity and welfare provision ultimately depend), and facilitates the ‘trickle down’ of that wealth. Without these processes, Conservatives insist that the poor would be considerably worse off: ‘Industry alone creates the wealth which pays for social welfare … a profitable, efficient and thriving industry is the precondition of a humane, compassionate and civilised society’ (Joseph, 1975: 7; see also Joseph, 1976: 61; Gilmour, 1978: 188). A slightly different line of argument in support of the free market was advanced by Milton Friedman, whose economic ideas proved so influential on Conservative neo-liberals from the late 1970s onwards. He claimed that ‘capitalism leads to less inequality than alternative systems … the development of capitalism has greatly lessened the extent of inequality’, and thereby ‘reduced the extent of poverty in any absolute sense in the capitalistic countries of the West’ (Friedman, 1962: 168, 190). Similarly, a One Nation Conservative has insisted that the mechanisms of the capitalist society ‘have produced more wealth for the alleviation of hardship than has ever been produced by collectivist systems’ (Patten, 1983: 30). By contrast, Conservatives have routinely insisted that it has been those ‘socialist’ regimes professing their commitment to equality which have invariably been characterised by the very ‘immiseration of the working class’ which Marx predicted would become an increasing feature of capitalism. There is no point in pursuing wealth distribution, Conservatives argue, if the means and mechanisms of wealth creation are destroyed or neglected, because there will be little or no wealth to distribute. Or, as Conservatives sometimes express it, those who would deter wealth creation in the name of equality would ‘destroy the well-being of the better-off without any compensatory benefits to the poor’. Indeed, it is claimed that ‘to the extent that confiscatory rates of tax discourage the creation of wealth, the poor are actually worse off than they would be in a society of sharp contrasts’, because the inevitable consequence of making any ‘increase in man’s productive effort less rewarding’, due to punitive rates of taxation, will be ‘to diminish the wealth-creating propensity of any society’ (Joseph and Sumption, 1979: 23; see also Gilmour, 1978: 179).



How Conservatives Explain and Justify Inequality 25

A further argument advanced by Conservatives against wealth redistribution in the pursuit of equality concerns the mobility of capital as compared to the relative immobility of labour. Capital or big business, upon which the overwhelming majority of workers ultimately depend for their employment and livelihoods, is often capable of relocating abroad in order to secure the higher profit margins or shareholder value which accrue, to a significant extent, from lower labour costs or/and taxes. Consequently, if a company’s managers or directors considers that profitability is being threatened or actually eroded by the redistributive policies (such as higher taxes on high earners, higher rates of corporation tax and/or a high statutory minimum wage) pursued by a socialist or social democratic government, then the decision might well be taken to relocate the company overseas, whereupon thousands, or maybe even tens of thousands, of workers in Britain will lose their jobs. Yet quite apart from immigration controls operated by other countries, it would simply not be feasible or practicable for these newly redundant workers similarly to relocate, en masse, to another country in search of alternative employment, higher wages or/and greater equality. Consequently, Conservatives have variously warned that left-leaning governments concerned primarily with pursuing wealth redistribution, rather than prioritising wealth creation, are likely to provoke responses from capital or wealthy individuals which will gravely damage the material interests of low-paid workers themselves. In such circumstances, Conservatives will not blame the business community for its decision to close down its British operations in order to relocate overseas, nor will capital be accused of selfishness or lack of patriotism. Such decisions will be deemed an entirely rational response, in accordance with commercial considerations and in the context of ‘market’ criteria, to the ‘anti-business’ policies of the ‘socialist’ government motivated by ‘the politics of envy’. Nor would such an exodus be confined to capital in the form of companies and corporations: many entrepreneurs, innovators and other individual creators of wealth would also be likely to follow suit, and take their skills and talents to countries where they will be viewed with rather less envy, and consequently taxed less punitively. Indeed, ‘the more equality is striven for … the larger the exodus will become’ (Gilmour, 1978: 179). Such warnings were evident in the (third) Marquess of Salisbury’s 1883 article, ‘Disintegration’ which was published in The Quarterly Review, where he expressed his apprehension about the potential combined impact of democratisation, the rise of party government and growing demands for social reform, on the stability of Britain’s political system, and the durability of its constitution faced with such pressures. One of Salisbury’s main

26

British Conservatism

concerns pertained to the potential threat to the rich posed by the growth of ‘Radicals’ claiming to act on behalf of the poor, for the likely consequence Salisbury averred, was that the poor themselves would suffer the most. He meant that the Radical ‘does not tell his disciples how it is possible they should live if industry languishes, or how industry and enterprise can flourish if men once conceive the fear, that the harvest of wealth which they or theirs have sown, and reaped, and stored, may perchance be wrested from them by the politician’ (quoted in Smith, 1972: 356). Such a warning was echoed, in the early twentieth century, by Lord Hugh Cecil, who prophesied that if it was ever thought that property or wealth was in danger of being seized, in order to redistribute it to the poor, then ‘The apprehension of confiscation would oblige people to export or to conceal their wealth, and the uncertainty whether the accumulations of wealth in the future would be respected, would be fatal to the enterprise and confidence that enable commerce and industry to prosper’ (Cecil, 1912: 197). Hence the Conservative insistence that ‘you cannot make the poor richer by making the rich poorer. You can only make the poor richer by making everyone richer’ (Joseph and Sumption, 1979: 23, 222; see also Joseph, 1976: 75). Market allocation of incomes is better than political determination Although Conservatives insist that inequality is derived ultimately from human nature, they also argue that the manner in which individuals’ innately different abilities and achievements attract correspondingly different rewards, most notably in the guise of remuneration, is through the mechanism of ‘the market’. The ‘price’ that an individual can secure for their skills or talent is, or ought to be, dependent on its market value, which in turn will be inextricably linked to the laws of supply and demand. A rare but much sought after skill will naturally attract greater reward, invariably in the form of a higher salary or other mode of remuneration, than an ability which is commonplace among large numbers of people, and which therefore means that employers can usually fill job vacancies quickly, without any need to offer high wages or salaries. Meanwhile, those with rarer, and thus much sought after skills or talents, are also likely to enjoy higher status and social esteem. For Conservatives, therefore, the innate differences in personal qualities and characteristics deriving from human nature are reflected in the different levels of financial reward which ‘the market’ naturally allocates, and which ensures that society overall is characterised by inequalities of income and wealth. Indeed, some Conservatives have occasionally claimed that the combination of natural differences in human attributes, and the ‘natural’ laws of



How Conservatives Explain and Justify Inequality 27

the market, serve to make poverty inevitable and thus unavoidable, a perspective evident in Burke’s reference to ‘the innumerable servile, degrading, unseemly, unmanly, and often most unwholesome and pestiferous occupations, to which by the social economy so many wretches are inevitably doomed’ (Burke, 2004: 271). Of course, for Conservatives who viewed the world through a strong theological lens – perhaps sharing Burke’s view, expressed in his 1795 exposition, Thoughts and Details on Scarcity, that ‘the laws of commerce’ are ‘the terms of nature and consequently the laws of God’ (quoted in Norton, 1996: 79) – then the plight of these ‘wretches’ might also have been interpreted as a reflection of God’s will, in which case, their suffering might eventually earn them salvation in the ‘next world’. Indeed, Burke himself enunciated this view when he remarked that when ordinary people ‘find, as they commonly do, the success [or their labour] disproportionate to the endeavour, they must be taught their consolation in the final proportions of eternal justice’ (Burke, 2004: 372). For Conservatives, therefore, markets render socio-economic inequalities inevitable, while morality not only serves to legitimise them but can offer the poor the promise of future salvation. Following on from this account of how ‘the market’ naturally rewards differing human capabilities, thereby reflecting and reinforcing socio-economic inequality, Conservatives also argue that it is far better to accept this market determination of incomes and its attendant inequalities than to pursue the political determination of wages and salaries on the basis of abstract concepts or normative principles such as ‘fairness’ or ‘social justice’. Needless to say, for Conservatives, any attempt by the state to determine the level of pay which each individual receives in order to achieve equality is both wrong in principle, and unattainable in practice. It would be wrong in principle, Conservatives insist, both because this would constitute an attempt at circumventing the operation of the market, and interfering with the immutable laws of supply and demand, and also because it would constitute an attempt at preventing individuals from acquiring or earning more in accordance with their superior or more successfully applied skills and effort. Not only would this be grossly unfair to such talented or experienced individuals, and effectively a denial of their liberty to deploy their talents as they choose, and be remunerated accordingly, it would also be inimical to society in general, because those individuals might then decide that it is not financially worthwhile deploying their skills and talents if they are not going to be properly rewarded. This would ultimately lead to economic stagnation and a decline in wealth creation, whereupon the poor and the ‘lower orders’ would suffer the most, due

28

British Conservatism

to less employment, lower wages and fewer resources for funding welfare provision. However, there are two other crucial reasons, pertaining primarily to practicability, which Conservatives advance against the political determination of earnings or incomes. First, quite apart from the impossibility of avoiding the consequences of market forces and the laws of supply and demand, Conservatives insist that it would also be impossible – as well as totally undesirable anyway – for politicians or/and civil servants to attempt to determine the wage or salary which ought to be paid to each individual according to their occupation, or the apparent contribution towards society. Unless the state was to adopt a disastrous and illiberal – and, ultimately futile – policy of simply deciding that every individual should be paid exactly the same income, regardless of their occupation, then any political attempt at applying notions of ‘fairness’ or ‘social justice’ to earnings would entail attributing a specific monetary sum to each occupation. Yet, if the guiding principle was fairness or social value (of an occupation) – either or both of which would need to be clearly defined – then this would inevitably entail political or bureaucratic judgements about the value or contribution to society of each occupation. As Keith Joseph argued, in a 1975 speech at the London School of Economics, on the theme of ‘the tyranny hidden in the pursuit of equality’, there is ‘no way of assessing such intangibles as merit or effort without giving someone arbitrary and discretionary powers to decide who is worth how much. Who is to judge?’ (quoted in Halcrow, 1989: 105), while Angus Maude had earlier insisted that ‘it is almost impossible to define social justice objectively’ (Maude, 1969: 129) . Even if some august body was established to determine ‘fairness’, how, a Conservative would enquire, would the ‘correct’ level of pay for a bus driver be agreed upon, for example, and how would this then be compared to the ‘appropriate’ earnings to be awarded to a teacher or a shop assistant? Unless all three were to be paid exactly the same, any difference in remuneration would oblige the politicians and/or bureaucrats to explain and justify the variations. Of course, any such variations would themselves entail entrenching existing inequalities, or introducing new ones. As such, Conservatives are convinced that any attempt at determining earnings on the basis of such values or criteria as equality, fairness and/ or ‘social usefulness’ would be doomed to fail. Moreover, if all individuals received a wage or salary determined by government or state administrators, ostensibly on the grounds of some notion of ‘fairness’ or ‘social justice’, then, Conservatives warn, individuals would have little incentive or motivation to work harder and become more productive, unless they were personally to



How Conservatives Explain and Justify Inequality 29

receive additional remuneration in return for their enhanced performance – in which case, they would be earning more than their work colleagues, and thus re-establishing inequality of incomes. This latter point would be particularly pertinent with regard to productivity deals or other modes of performance-related pay, and would lead back to a key Conservative justification for differences in remuneration, namely that some individuals will naturally be more industrious or successful than others, and therefore inevitably earn higher incomes or deservedly be rewarded with larger bonuses. Indeed, according to this perspective, such circumstances would militate against the equalisation of earnings even within a specific occupation, yet alone between markedly different (and thus non-comparable) occupations, because even when a specific wage or salary is agreed for a particular occupation, some employees are likely to produce a higher output, or sell more of their company’s products or services, or maybe volunteer to work additional hours. Are these employees, a Conservative would ask, to be denied the additional pay that their extra work, hours or success ought to warrant? Either exactly the same level of remuneration is imposed on all the employees, in order to ensure equality, in which case, those who have produced more, sold more, or otherwise worked harder or longer will be denied the financial rewards that their additional labours ought to receive (and which were, presumably, readily available to their colleagues, if they too had chosen to work more industriously or opted to do overtime), or they will be duly remunerated, but thereby create, perpetuate or reinforce differences of income within a single occupation or industry. While Conservatives (as we note below) are deeply sceptical of attempts by the Left to equate egalitarianism with ‘social justice’ (see, for example, Willetts, 1992: 112), they would certainly insist that it was unjust and unfair that individuals who worker harder, longer or more productively should be denied correspondingly higher pay or other material rewards. Indeed, some Conservatives would doubtless cite such a scenario as clear evidence that the pursuit of equality in accordance with notions of social justice itself precipitates unjust outcomes, and unfair treatment of those who are more industrious or innovative. This then reinforces the Conservative argument for rejecting political attempts at determining wages and salaries on the basis of pursuing equality, and, instead, leaving employees’ remuneration to be determined by ‘the market’ or other morally neutral commercial criteria. Yet there is another important reason why Conservatives emphatically reject the notion that a government committed to egalitarianism or ‘fairness’ could itself decide what wage or salary ought to be paid to each individual

30

British Conservatism

or occupational category, namely that this would create or exacerbate social resentment and threaten political authority. The argument here is that if wages and salaries were politically determined, then the state would itself become the target of resentment from aggrieved individuals or occupational groups who were convinced that they were not being awarded a level of remuneration commensurate with their perceived talent or effort. They would demand to know why they were deemed only worth a wage or salary of £x, whilst another occupational group had been awarded £y. Such a scenario, Conservatives maintain, would simultaneously fuel social resentment between different occupations and sections of society – and doubtless create resentments which have not previously existed – while also fostering widespread resentment of the government which had itself decided what each individual or occupation was worth in terms of remuneration. Indeed, Lord Hailsham confessed that he was ‘not fond of the expression “social justice”’, largely because ‘it is commonly used by those whose interest is to foster envy, hatred and malice, and all the uncharitableness between the social classes’ (Hailsham, 1978: 117). To some extent, such problems manifested themselves during the 1960s and 1970s, when successive governments enacted incomes policies, primarily in order to curb inflation, but with the notable consequence that wage negotiations and any ensuing pay disputes became politicised, and increasingly made government ministers the target of workers or trade unions who felt that they had been treated unfairly. Now, of course, it might be countered that different earnings and incomes between individuals and occupational groups might be just as likely to generate resentment regardless of how wages and salaries are determined, but, crucially, Conservatives insist that inequalities are far more readily and widely accepted if they arise from market allocation rather than political determination. This reflects the Conservative faith in the moral neutrality of ‘the market’, operating according to the immutable and impersonal laws of supply and demand, whereupon a lower wage or salary is far more likely to be accepted by an employee than if their meagre remuneration was ascribed by a group of politicians or a committee of civil servants. Put another way, from a Conservative perspective, ‘the market’ serves to depersonalise and depoliticise economic issues, and in so doing tends to render the ensuing inequalities in earnings and incomes more acceptable and legitimate, even to those who might otherwise be expected to express dissatisfaction with their relatively low remuneration. As Hayek (whose ideas, along with those of Friedman, proved so influential on many senior Conservative neo-liberals from the late 1970s) explained, the allocation of earnings, incomes and wealth through market mechanisms ‘can be



How Conservatives Explain and Justify Inequality

31

neither just nor unjust, because, the results are not intended or foreseen, and depend on a multitude of circumstances not known in their totality to anybody’ (Hayek, 1976: 70). Or as he later expressed it, because incomes, in a free society, are determined via the natural mechanisms of the free market, it is ‘meaningless to call this spontaneous order unjust … It is simply not capable of bearing such an attribute. Only human actions can be just or unjust’ (Hayek, 1988: 52; see also Cecil, 1912: 182). Many Conservatives share Hayek’s rejection of social justice,2 particularly in so far as these are deemed to entail a commitment to egalitarianism in the guise of ‘fairness’. According to Arthur Bryant, when ‘the Radical’ is asked what s/he means when s/he demands justice, the usual answer ‘is Equality’ (Bryant, 1929: 7) At the very least, it is rather more difficult to attack ‘the market’ than it is politicians or civil servants; the market is not merely impersonal, it is also invisible, even though the consequences of its operation can clearly be discerned. In many respects, this corresponds to Burke’s observation that utopian promises of equality constitute ‘a monstrous fiction, which, by inspiring false ideas and vain expectations into men destined to travel in the obscure walk of laborious life, serves only to aggravate and embitter that real inequality, which it never can remove’ (Burke, 2004: 124). Some Conservatives have also discerned a paradox in the Left’s attempts to posit a direct link between equality and social justice. For example, Cecil argued that ‘For the State to intervene directly to regulate the amount of wealth which an individual may be permitted to acquire seems to involve injustice’, because ‘Even if it were true that poverty be the effect of injustice, it would not be right to relive it by confiscating property’, for that would be ‘to commit one injustice for the sake of remedying another … To carry out, then, the enrichment of the poor by the impoverishment of the rich … would not be just’, quite apart from being impracticable (Cecil, 1912: 187, 197). Such views were evidently shared by Gilmour, who observed that ‘Since men are unequal, they can only be made equal, economically, by being treated unequally’ (Gilmour, 1978: 176). In other words, some Conservatives maintain that to pursue equality on the basis of social justice would itself mean treating some people (those who would otherwise have deservedly earned or acquired more) unjustly and unequally. Conservatism as an empiricist philosophy This is not the occasion on which to embark upon a debate about whether Conservatism is non-ideological, as most Conservatives insist (see, for example, Cecil, 1912: ch. 1; Gilmour, 1969: 84–5; 1978: 121, 132; Oakeshott, 1967: 168–96), or is actually an ideology just as much as any other political

32

British Conservatism

doctrine with an ‘ism’ suffixed to it, and a clear or relatively consistent set of objectives about the purpose of government and the type of society they wish to defend or promote (see, for example, Eccleshall, 1977; 1984: 80–1; Green, 2002: passim; Vincent, 1992: 58–83). Instead, our purpose is to examine the implications, vis-à-vis inequality, of Conservatism’s own claim to constitute a philosophy which is largely empirical and experiential. The first aspect of Conservatism’s avowed empiricist philosophy which underpins its emphatic rejection of equality is the eschewal of ‘abstract’ political doctrines or principles, of which ‘equality’ (invariably linked to the ideology of socialism) is viewed as a prime example. As Benjamin Disraeli expressed it via one of the characters in his 1844 novel, Coningsby: ‘How limited is human reason … We are not indebted to the Reason of man for any of the great achievements which are the landmarks of human action and human progress.’ Instead, he averred that ‘Man is only truly great when he acts from the passions’ (Disraeli, 1989: 262). Not dissimilarly, a subsequent One Nation Conservative leader, Stanley Baldwin, observed that ‘the English … are less open to the intellectual sense than the Latin races’ (Baldwin, 1926: 2). Against allegedly utopian political creeds promoting a ‘good society’, Conservatism prides itself on what it deems to be its common sense, practical wisdom, realism and scepticism about what can be achieved politically. As Sir Robert Peel declared in a 1838 speech: ‘By Conservative principles, we mean the maintenance of our settled institutions in Church and State, and also the preservation and defence of that combination of laws, of institutions, of usages, of habits and of manners which has contributed to mould and form the character of Englishmen.’ The implication that a general conservatism is intrinsic to the human character is evident in Lord Hugh Cecil’s assertion that ‘Distrust of the unknown, and preference for experience over theory, are deeply seated in all minds’, such that ‘Human nature shrinks from’ new developments, or at least views them with profound scepticism, although he does acknowledge that if such distrust of the new or unknown is extreme, then it may impede natural necessary progress (Cecil, 1912: 9, 12). Twelve years later, Austen Chamberlain informed the House of Commons that: I profoundly distrust logic when applied to politics, and all English history justifies me … It is because instinct and experience alike teach us that human nature is not logical, that it is unwise to treat political institutions as instruments of logic [and] that is in wisely refraining



How Conservatives Explain and Justify Inequality 33 from pressing conclusions to their logical end that the path of peaceful development and true reform is really found. (House of Commons debates, 5th series, vol. 182, col. 313)

Not dissimilarly, the four young Conservative authors of a 1927 book entitled Industry and the State (which we discuss in the next chapter) asserted that ‘The Conservative point of view may be defined as being made up of four ingredients: symbolism, empiricism, continuity and realism’, and added that ‘the imposition of a theoretical system is … wasteful of the evolutionary possibilities of existing institutions’ (Boothby et al. 1927: 11). Meanwhile, Hearnshaw explained that Conservatism is primarily a defensive creed: it aims at preserving and safeguarding the old, the familiar, the beloved, the well-tried … conservatism bases its appeal on existing fact or historical record … of displaying the merits of things as they have been and are … Further, conservatism springs from contentment; it tends to tranquillity and to a desire to be left alone; it is frequently either satisfied with things as they are, or apprehensive that any change will be a change for the worse … it assumes the existence, continuance and general adequacy of established institutions. (Hearnshaw, 1933: 7, 8) Another example was provided during the following decade, just a few months after the end of the Second World War, in a statement explicitly delineating the principles of Conservatism – for which a young Margaret Roberts (later Thatcher) was a co-author – which asserted that: Conservatism as an attitude of mind is usually compared to the doctrinaire approaches to politics in the form of ‘instinct v. reason’ or ‘rough common-sense v. intellectualism’ … the fundamental promises of the logical systems [of political thought] such as … the revolutionary ‘all men are equal’ are purely emotional a priori statements, while Conservatism is based on beliefs that have proved valuable in history … The Conservative denies that reason can give necessarily correct answer to the dilemmas of society … and is inevitably sceptical of man’s ability to produce, by logic alone, a statement of either the ideal state or the future course of events. â•… The essential corollary to intellectual scepticism is an empirical approach to practical problems … It implies that, faced with any

34

British Conservatism

particular problem, the following propositions will be considered in reaching a decision: (i) Past experience is the basis for working out any policy. (ii) The known workable is preferable to the theoretical improvement. (iii) For making judgements, traditional values should be used instead of general dogmas. (iv) Concrete particulars are a better basis than general ideas (Thatcher MSS, Oxford University Conservative Association, Policy Sub-Committee Report, Michaelmas Term 1945) A particularly eloquent summation of this aspect of Conservative empiricism was provided, in the 1960s, by Michael Oakeshott, when he explained that To be conservative, then, is to prefer the familiar to the unknown, to prefer the tried to the untried, fact to mystery, the actual to the possible, the limited to the unbounded, the near to the distant, the sufficient to the superabundant, the convenient to the perfect, present laughter to utopian bliss … The man of conservative temperament believes that a known good is not to be lightly surrendered for an unknown better … he has no impulse to sail uncharted seas … to wish for or to look for something else … or what may be. (Oakeshott, 1967: 169, 172, 173, 168) A decade later, Ian Gilmour proudly proclaimed that: Conservatives are not afflicted with an abstract love of humanity [as socialists apparently are] … They proceed empirically, while always remembering that society is not a laboratory for social experiments … they … proceed from observed facts of behaviour … Facts are more telling than abstractions … Free from utopian fantasies … Tories are not blinded by delusions of an idealized past or a future paradise. They can look at the present as it is, and then in the light of experience seek to improve it. (Gilmour, 1978: 159) The same year saw Quinton assert that ‘the kind of knowledge that is needed for the successful management off human affairs, is not be found in the theoretical speculations of isolated thinkers, but in the historically accumulated social experience of the community as a whole’ (Quinton, 1978: 16–17. See also Feiling, 1930: 8).



How Conservatives Explain and Justify Inequality 35

One of the most recent reiterations of this stance is Oliver Letwin’s assertion that ‘A Conservative disposition is … sceptical about the ability of the state to pull levers and make things happen; and it means always trying to address what is conceived as the present rather than some millenarian dream’ (Letwin, 2009). Now this anti-intellectual, empiricist approach reinforces the Conservative rejection of equality in four discrete ways. First, both the historical and present-day existence of inequality ensures that Conservatism, strongly concerned with tradition and empirical reality (rather than some unknown or utopian future), readily accepts inequality as ‘given’; it is an a priori feature of ‘the actual’ and ‘the known’, and thus an incontrovertible fact, the evidence for which cannot be refuted: ‘there is scarcely any instance in recorded history in which mankind has experienced it [equality]’ (Joseph and Sumption, 1979: 89). As such, the fact that all hitherto human societies have been characterised by inequality is, to the Conservative observer, incontrovertible evidence that inequality is natural and inevitable, and thus immutable. Conservatives have therefore strongly refuted the assumption of socialists and other ‘progressives’ that equality is somehow natural, and that it is merely particular economic modes of production, most notably capitalism, and an exploitative ‘ruling class’, which cause inequality and poverty. Given that every society, beyond perhaps the smallest or most rudimentary, in human history has been characterised by marked socio-economic inequalities, Conservatives have suggested that this is surely proof that it is inequality which is natural, not the equality which some political theorists or philosophers have attributed to some imagined pre-modern ‘state of nature’. Second, the Conservatives’ respect and reverence for existing institutions also strongly inclines them, as far as practicably possible, to the defence, maintenance and protection of those organisations and associated social or political arrangements. Now, if these reflect and reinforce a society characterised by socio-economic inequality, and concomitant forms of hierarchy and authority relations, then a Conservative is unlikely to seek to change them to any significant degree. Indeed, the longer they have existed or evolved, then the greater will be the respect which Conservatives generally display towards them, for their very longevity and durability will be deemed proof of their efficacy and utility. Furthermore, such long-lasting institutions and other social or political arrangements will enshrine accumulated wisdom and experience which can be utilised to shape current processes and practices. This, of course, provides part of the explanation for Conservative reverence for institutions such as the Monarchy, Parliament, the family, and the judicial system.

36

British Conservatism

It needs to be emphasised, though, that most Conservatives are not totally averse or resistant to change, although a minority of ‘reactionaries’ will often bitterly resent change, to the extent of wishing to turn back the clock to an apparently halcyon ‘Golden Age’ which they are convinced used to exist. For such ‘reactionaries’, virtually all changes in the name of ‘progress’ are to be regretted and, if at all possible, resisted, either because of their intended purpose, or because of the practical consequences. Most Conservatives, though, acknowledge that change is inevitable and thus unavoidable, and that ‘turning back the clock’ is as impracticable and utopian as the Socialist vision of an equal and harmonious society to be attained in the future. As such, the vast majority of Conservatives would heartily concur with Burke’s oft-quoted maxim that ‘A state without some means of change is without the means of its conservation’ (Burke, 2004: 106). Adaptation is necessary in order to prevent atrophy, but those changes which are deemed to be necessary also need, as far as practicably possible, to be incremental and piecemeal, and not based upon abstract principles or pure reasoning. Moreover, the ultimate objective of pursuing change must be to strengthen the institution being reformed, and enhance its effectiveness or efficiency, which will usually ensure its long-term survival. To give but one example, it was the Conservative Party which legislated, in 1958, to allow for the creation of Life Peers in the House of Lords, and in so doing, rescued the Second Chamber from possible atrophy, while also deflecting some criticism away from the hereditary peers and ‘backwoodsmen’, most of whom just happened to be Conservatives (Dorey, 2009a). This reform rejuvenated the House of Lords, metaphorically pouring new wine into an old bottle, and thereby enhanced its legitimacy and longevity, at a time when it was in danger either of obsolescence, or potential abolition (by a future Labour government). Third, this empiricist approach is reflected and reinforced by another aspect of Conservatism, and one which further underpins its eschewal of equality, namely its rejection of abstract or apparently rational political principles as the basis for creating either a new society, or governing an existing one. In this regard, this ‘Tory dislike of abstract theorizing’ (Gilmour, 1978: 111) logically leads them to dismiss the notion of a new, future, society, based on equality (or, indeed, any other abstract principle). Such notions are deemed to be derived from a naive or over-optimistic faith in the potential for a new social order to be established on the basis of abstract principles or a political blueprint derived from normative theories. For Conservatives, Marxism and socialism are the archetypal doctrines or ideologies which naively – and, ultimately, dangerously – believe that an equal, and



How Conservatives Explain and Justify Inequality 37

co-operative, socio-economic system can be constructed anew by applying ideas and analyses derived from the works of Karl Marx and the subsequent theoreticians who have sought to interpret or update his critique of capitalism, and inter alia devise programmes or strategies for the revolutionary ‘emancipation’ of the so-called proletariat. Moreover, whereas Marxism enshrines the notion of historical inevitability, whereby societies proceed through discrete stages of economic development or modes of production, until capitalism is ultimately succeeded by socialism en route to communism (the final or ‘highest’ stage of societal and historical development), Conservatism emphatically rejects, as we noted at the outset, a teleological conception of human history and societal development. For while Conservatives fully accept, as we have just acknowledged, that societies do change and evolve, these changes will never entail a transition towards equality, for all the reasons we have discussed so far. In this respect, a Conservatives might say of inequality what Sherlock Holmes once said of (and to) Dr. Watson, namely that he was ‘the one fixed point in a changing age’. In refusing to accept that inequality is ultimately derived from human nature, and is also the natural consequence and corollary of a free society in which differently endowed individuals develop their particular abilities and talents to differing degrees, Marxism is accused by Conservatives of paving the way for tyranny, on the grounds that all human or economic differences will have to be ruthlessly suppressed in order to enforce equality. By being based on an ostensibly ‘scientific’ understanding of society in which ‘inevitable’ laws and tendencies are identified, Marxism – just as much as an ideology like Fascism – stands accused of being unable to tolerate any individual deviation from the theoretical blueprint which is to shape the new social order. If people fail (or refuse) to behave in the manner required – which, Conservatives insist, is inevitable, because of human nature – then they will be forced to behave in the prescribed manner, or severely punished. Hence the Conservative insistence that all attempts at creating ‘better’ societies on the basis of abstract principles and concepts are doomed to fail, although the proponent of such utopias will remain convinced that their logical premises must, by definition or deductive reasoning, be correct. In this context, the Conservative intellectual and former Cabinet Minister, Ian Gilmour, noted that Marxism purports to be scientific, and disagreement is therefore impermissible. It knows all the answers, and no other answers are tolerated. There is only one truth … but politics are not mathematics, and people are

38

British Conservatism

not numbers. And any attempt to treat them as such, and any claim by leaders to be in possession of an all-embracing truth leads infallibly to tyranny. (Gilmour, 1978: 192) One particular reason why Conservatives insist that ideologies, apparently derived from abstract principles or theoretical premises, are doomed to fail is precisely that the proponents of such ‘utopias’ fail to understand human nature. Certainly, Conservatives criticise supposedly ‘rationalist (radical) minds’ which refuse to acknowledge that ‘People are not malleable fodder, nor are they … algebraic symbols that can be manipulated at will’ (Berry, 1983: 59). Conservatives criticise Marxism and other ‘utopian’ ideologies for totally misunderstanding the essence of human nature and thereby subscribing to the absurdly naive belief that people can be fundamentally changed, and their behaviour refashioned, as a consequence of creating a different material reality. That such experiments in social engineering will fail to elicit the expected changes in individual behaviour, Conservatives argue, is largely why regimes based on ideological schema inevitably and rapidly degenerate into tyranny, as the political leaders desperately try to force individuals to behave in the ‘appropriate’ manner, commensurate with the professed goals of the new regime. It is irrelevant, Conservatives insist, whether the principles or objectives proclaimed by a political doctrine or ideology are ostensibly laudable or superficially attractive; the crucial criterion is what the practical consequences actually are of applying those abstract principles. Given the characteristics and consequent imperfectability of human nature, Conservatives insist that the practical application can only end in failure or tyranny, or both. As Joseph and Sumption argue: Political ideas … must be tested by their results. And if those results are disagreeable, then however exalted or noble the principle on which they purport to be based, the principle ought to be discarded … the fact that a particular political scheme corresponds with abstract ideas of justice is not a good reason for putting it into practice. (Joseph and Sumption, 1979: 43) These observations and experiences are naturally assumed by Conservatives to vindicate their professed non-ideological, empiricist approach to government and politics, and their emphatic eschewal of political doctrines and programmes promising a better society on the basis of abstract concepts



How Conservatives Explain and Justify Inequality 39

or theoretical models. Thus did the (third) Marquess of Salisbury assert that ‘A gram of experience is worth a ton of theory’ (quoted in Pinto-Duschinsky, 1967: 51), while a former Conservative Attorney-General and Lord Chancellor, F. E. Smith, insisted that Conservatism was concerned with ‘the facts of life as they are’ (Smith, 1913: 45), and Ian Gilmour asserted that ‘Facts are more telling than abstractions’ (Gilmour, 1978: 159), not withstanding that purported ‘facts’ are invariably open to interpretation and thus contestation, not least by social scientists and politicians themselves. Meanwhile, White insisted that ‘Conservatism is less a political doctrine than a habit of mind, a mode of feeling, a way of living’ (White, 1950: 1), and Gillian Peele has emphasised the extent to which Conservatives have usually ‘distrusted the application of abstract doctrines to politics and have preferred instead to follow the dictates of common sense and experience’ (Peele, 1976: 13). Much more recently, Oliver Letwin has argued that although ‘there is a recognisable Conservative disposition … politics is not a question of translating an ideology into results’, but of tackling ‘real life problems’ in a practical and pragmatic manner (Letwin, 2008: 71). A fourth aspect of Conservative empiricism which eschews equality is that no free society has ever been characterised by or achieved genuine equality; historically all human societies have enshrined inequalities, and ‘belief in the possibility of Equality is not based either on history or experience’ (Bryant, 1929: 7). Certainly, Conservatives are quick to point out that those societies which have proclaimed equality (most notably the pre1990 regimes in the Soviet Union and other East European countries which called themselves ‘Communist’) have invariably enshrined the worst of both worlds: they have engendered marked inequalities of their own, with new political and state elites merely replacing, and thereupon enjoying the privileges of, those whom they overthrew (as allegorised in George Orwell’s Animal Farm, or analysed in Milovan Djilas’ 1957 book The New Class), while simultaneously totally suppressing individual liberty, along with economic and political choice, and thereby ensuring the total subordination of the people to the state. Certainly, it was widely acknowledged (not only by Conservatives) that in the old Soviet Union, political elites and other senior state personnel invariably received markedly higher incomes than ordinary workers, and largely as a consequence, also enjoyed privileged access to the best schools and universities for their children, and vastly better housing, as well as second homes or ‘dachas’, which facilitated weekend retreats in the countryside. Ian Gilmour once claimed (in the late 1970s) that: ‘Income differentials in Britain are … much less than in Soviet Russia’ (Gilmour, 1978: 179).

40

British Conservatism

In this respect, Conservatives could argue that the ruthless destruction of liberty had not even yielded the avowed goal of equality: totalitarian tyranny existed in tandem with (or actually underpinned) sundry forms of significant inequality, and thereby vindicated the Conservative insistence on the incompatibility of liberty and equality, whereby the goal of equality can only be pursued at the expense of liberty, as individuals are coerced into (professed or purported) equality by the State and its sundry agents. In either case, though, the evidence and experiences provided by avowedly egalitarian regimes are readily cited by Conservatives as further confirmation of their essentialist belief in the naturalness and necessity of inequality. Either these regimes have achieved their professed goal of equality (at least, of sorts), but only at the expense of individual freedom and liberty, and the ruthless suppression of all creativity and dynamism among talented individuals (which itself eventually results in the regime’s own stagnation and ultimate collapse, but only after untold suffering inflicted upon the people over many years, or even decades); or these avowedly egalitarian societies have still enshrined extensive inequalities – in spite of their ideological stance or official pronouncements – which is thus deemed irrefutable proof that inequality can never be eradicated. Ultimately, therefore, Conservatives insist that the tragic and often tyrannical experience of such societies shows equality to be a dangerous chimera, destructive both of individual freedom and of the long-term socio-economic health of the societies themselves. Enhancing opportunities, not equalising outcomes In firmly rejecting either the desirability or possibility of creating an equal society, Conservatism has instead expressed its support for increasing the opportunities available to people to move up the social hierarchy or/and maximise their earnings and wealth, to the extent that some Conservatives actually advocate equality of opportunity. However, the extent to which seeking to maximise opportunities for individuals can be viewed as promoting equality of opportunity is a moot point among Conservatives themselves. For example, in 1976, an eminent Conservative historian claimed that ‘The Conservative Party has never stood for “equality”. It stands for equality of opportunity – a very different concept’ (Blake, 1976: 10, emphasis in original). Yet many Conservatives insist that genuine equality of opportunity is itself unattainable: in an inherently unequal society, in which individuals are themselves innately endowed differently in terms of ability, creativity, industriousness, intelligence and so on, it is impossible to ensure that everyone



How Conservatives Explain and Justify Inequality

41

will start their lives from the same point, and with exactly the same life chances. Thus did Mallock, at the end of the nineteenth century, argue that ‘no equalisation of opportunity which goes beyond the abolition of arbitrary and unequal impediments would tend to increase the number of those exceptional men whose productive faculties are really of the first order’, a point he sought to illustrate by pointing out that ‘Any workman’s boy, for example … has now in England, before he is fifteen, more educational opportunities than Shakespeare had in all his lifetime. But the number of Shakespeares has not appreciably increased’ (Mallock, 1898b: 331). Somewhat more recently, it was argued that ‘Complete equality of opportunity could only be achieved by taking children away from their parents and bringing them up in baby farms’ (Gilmour, 1978: 151), yet quite apart from the inhumane immorality and totalitarian implications of so doing, even this would not obviate the innate differences between them, which would presumably become increasingly apparent as they became older. Meanwhile, the Party’s 1976 policy document, The Right Approach, emphasised that Conservatives were committed to ‘enhancing opportunities’, rather than advocating equality of opportunity, while reiterating that ‘Since some people have more ability … than others, there are bound to be social and economic inequalities (Conservative Party, 1976: 17–8). However, one reason why Conservatives advocate either equality of opportunity, or simply wider opportunities, is their conviction that the ensuing inequalities (as some individuals, having ostensibly begun ‘the race’ from the same starting line as the other competitors, will run further or faster than the others) will acquire more legitimacy and wider acceptability. Indeed, such Conservatives could depict this as signifying that Britain was a genuine meritocracy or open society, whereby those who eventually acquired higher incomes, status and/or wealth could clearly be seen to have earned their success through genuine effort or talent. In turn, their evident success would presumably provide an example or inspiration for others to follow. Certainly, during the 1980s, Margaret Thatcher and Norman Tebbit especially came to symbolise a new generation of Conservative parliamentarians, who had not been born into wealth or privilege but had ascended from relatively modest social backgrounds by dint of sheer hard work and determination to succeed (hence the poignant title of Tebbit’s 1988 autobiography, Upwardly Mobile). By the same token, however, those who apparently declined to avail themselves of the opportunities available to them would only have themselves to blame if they then achieved limited success in life. They would have no reason to feel resentment towards those more successful than themselves,

42

British Conservatism

nor grounds for claiming that ‘the system’ was unfair. This, of course, is a perspective closely linked to the Conservative emphasis on individual responsibility, whereby people have to accept the consequences of their choices and decisions, and the actions and consequences which emanate from these, rather than blame others. If some people ‘choose’ not to avail themselves of the opportunities apparently available to them, then, Conservatives would insist, they have no justification for subsequently bemoaning their limited incomes or lowly social position in an unequal society. It is also worth noting that recruitment of especially talented individuals from outside or below the current elite serves to replenish the leadership, again metaphorically pouring new wine into old bottles. This can ensure that the elite does not become (or is not perceived to become) too remote or out of touch with the rest of society, and thereby retains its legitimacy while also minimising the likelihood that a counter-elite will seek to overthrow the current leaders. As Parry explains, this process of elite replenishment or recruitment can serve as ‘a conservative force’, because it enables ‘the ruling class to be renewed and rejuvenated by being brought into contact with the interests and aspirations of the ruled. By this means, the ablest among those ruled are recruited for the ruling class, thus preventing a decline in the quality of leadership it provides’ (Parry, 1969: 39; see also Bottomore, 1966: ch. 3; Sartori, 1965: ch. 6). Viewed from this perspective, the change in the composition and character of the Conservative Party which occurred during the 1970s and 1980s, and which I discuss in Chapter 3, could be seen as a good example of this process. The rise to seniority of Conservatives like Margaret Thatcher and Norman Tebbit, who emanated from less privileged social backgrounds than previous generations of ‘Tory Grandees’ and aristocrats, reflected a view in some quarters of the Party that the erstwhile leadership had become out of touch, not only with the British people and their concerns, but also with many ordinary Conservative Party members themselves. The rise through the Party’s parliamentary ranks of these more meritocratic individuals helped to ‘reconnect’ the Conservative Party with the world beyond Westminster, and regain the political initiative from Labour. Their recruitment and elevation also enabled the Conservative Party to ‘prove’ that Britain was an open and meritocratic society, and that hardworking or talented individuals could or would enjoy social mobility and economic improvement. Indeed, Conservatives were fond of claiming that the biggest obstacle to such social advancement for individuals from more humble backgrounds was not the defence of class privileges or snobbery which the Party’s enemies accused it of perpetrating, but the very



How Conservatives Explain and Justify Inequality 43

egalitarianism promoted by the Labour Party, and socialists in general. Conservatives advanced this counter-attack by pointing to Labour’s ideological hostility towards grammar schools, which have often been seen, by their defenders, as a route through which intelligent children from poor backgrounds can attain the educational success which is often a prerequisite of pursuing prestigious careers and inter alia achieving social mobility and higher incomes. Similarly, Conservatives denounced the first (1997–2001) Blair government’s 1997 abolition of the Assisted Places Scheme, which the first (1979–83) Thatcher government had introduced in 1980, to enable bright children from low-income families to go to a private school. In both instances, Conservatives argued that in attacking perceived privileges or apparent obstacles to greater equality of opportunity in education, Labour’s egalitarianism was itself deeply detrimental to the life chances of the poorer pupils which the Party claimed to be most concerned to assist; by seeking to prevent them from going either to a grammar school, or by abolishing the Assisted Places Scheme, Labour was actually denying the brightest children from working-class backgrounds the opportunity to be educated alongside, and mix with, pupils from more middle-class families. In so doing, Conservatives would argue, Labour was actually reinforcing social inequalities in schooling, albeit in the name of equality. Instead, therefore, such Conservatives have expressed their support for widening opportunities to those who do not possess, or have ready access to, the high earnings or wealth which would enable them to pay for various privileges, such as a ‘good’ education. In this regard they wish, according to Gilmour, to encourage and nurture all talents: ‘Everybody should have a chance to get on in the world and ride as high as his [sic] abilities permit’ (Gilmour, 1978: 151). Meanwhile, Conservatives insist that even if genuine equality of opportunity was feasible, by somehow obviating the disadvantages associated with a poorer family background, then the innate differences in individual abilities and talents would still yield unequal outcomes or results. Admittedly, some of those who excelled would doubtless be talented individuals from poorer social backgrounds, whose full potentiality might not otherwise have been fully nurtured, but the overall consequences would still be a society in which different individuals achieved differing degrees of success and reward. In this regard, Joseph and Sumption (1979: 30) insisted that ‘anyone who accepts that all individuals are not capable of the same achievements … must also agree that perfect equality of opportunity will give rise to very striking inequalities of results.’

44

British Conservatism

Challenging the motives or stance of egalitarians One final means by which Conservatives have variously defended socioeconomic inequalities has been to question the motives of those advocating equality. In so doing, Conservatives have often impugned the motives of egalitarians, implying they are not always motivated by genuine altruism, compassion or fairness but by other, rather less noble, characteristics, with three negative attributes usually being cited. First, there is the common allegation that many egalitarians are motivated largely by the ‘politics of envy’. According to Keith Joseph, for example, it is frequently the case that ‘the attitudes and motives that nourish egalitarian politics’ are ‘pursuit of power, envy of those who are different, passion for domination’, these ‘adding up to a hatred of diversity. Of such motives are tyrants made’ (Joseph, 1976: 79), while Chris Patten claimed that ‘envy’ of the rich and successful was ‘often the bed-fellow of egalitarianism’ (Patten, 1983: 93; see also Brittan, 1983: 71–2; Gilmour, 1978: 176). Similarly, Harold Macmillan alleged that ‘to deny the bold, the strong, the prudent and the clever the rewards and privileges of exercising their qualities is to enthrone in society the basest of human attributes: envy, jealously and spite’ (Macmillan, 1966: xviii). Thus did Stanley Baldwin characterise communism as a ‘gospel founded on hate’, although this at least ensured that such a doctrine would never ‘seize the hearts of our people … there will never in this country be a Communist Government’ (Baldwin, 1926: 59). Sometimes, Conservatives claim, advocacy of equality (often masquerading as a concern with ‘social justice’) derives from straightforward envy of the rich and economically successful by those who have not fared so well in life. However, it is alleged that sometimes ‘the politics of envy’ is deliberately promoted by those who are not poor themselves but who purport, ideologically or politically, to be on the side of the poor, and thus want to generate support for egalitarianism. In such circumstances, it is suggested that middle-class socialists and social democrats have sought to promote ‘the politics of envy’ when it has not hitherto existed, and thereby cynically provoke class conflict for their own political objectives. Thus did the Conservatives’ 1979 election manifesto accuse the Labour Party of ‘practising the politics of envy’, whereupon ‘they have set one group against another in an often bitter struggle to gain a larger share of a weak economy’ (Conservative Party, 1979: 6). As such, many Conservatives believe that it is not the existence of social classes and socio-economic inequalities per se which are socially divisive or politically destabilising, but that ‘divisions are caused by those (such as socialists) who calculatedly foment antagonism between classes by use of the destructive force of envy’ (Biddiss, 1987: 3).



How Conservatives Explain and Justify Inequality 45

The second Conservative charge sometimes levelled against egalitarians is that the latter are prompted by feelings of guilt (or, as Margaret Thatcher contemptuously termed it, ‘bourgeois guilt’), due to their own considerable wealth or high earnings. Such sentiments are deemed to foster the notion that the rich ought to devise means by which some wealth is distributed, or re-distributed, to the less well-off in society, whereupon the better-off will feel a little less uncomfortable or embarrassed about their own riches. As one academic author on Thatcherism observed, the pre-1979 ‘concern for equality’ in Britain had often been particularly prevalent ‘among the ranks of a bien pensant bourgeoisie perhaps mildly remorseful about its own advantages’ (Biddiss, 1987: 2). Consequently, as we will note in the next chapter, the ‘bourgeois guilt’ allegedly harboured by One Nation Conservatives has consistently led them to support policies which will keep inequalities within tolerable limits, even though these are never specifically defined. They have been concerned to ensure that the gap between the rich and poor does not become too wide (notwithstanding the difficulty of defining or identifying what constitutes ‘too wide’), and have therefore endorsed various economic, industrial and social policies intended to ‘humanise’ the operation and outcomes of the market economy, and ensure that ownership of property and wealth is matched by corresponding obligations and responsibilities to the less privileged and least well-off. By contrast, Chapter 3 will show how Conservative neo-liberals have rejected such ‘bourgeois guilt’, and confidently articulated a vision of British society in which high earnings, property ownership and wealth in general are a consequence of individual success, accruing from such characteristics as entrepreneurial skills, hard work, innovation, judicious investment and/ or successful risk-taking. If such economic fortunes have accrued to individuals as a deserved consequence of their acumen, endeavours and skills, Conservative neo-liberals insist, then they should not feel morally obliged, nor be compelled by redistributive governmental policies, to transfer some of their high earnings or acquired wealth to the less well-off. On the contrary, such Conservatives suggest that the sense of obligation should flow the other way, with the less well-off being grateful and respectful to the economically successful for creating the wealth and prosperity on which their own livelihoods and material well-being depend. This last point reflects the Conservative neo-liberal view that the less welloff are indirectly aided by the rich through the ‘trickle down’ effect, whereby the expenditure and investment of the wealthy percolates downwards and outwards to the rest of society, and thereby generates employment and

46

British Conservatism

finances welfare provision. Consequently, from this perspective, a successfully functioning market economy obviates the need for a comprehensive or universal (as opposed to minimal or residual) welfare state, while at the same time the rich should not feel ‘bourgeois guilt’, because their economic success automatically benefits the rest of society without the need for directly redistributive policies by the state. Again, therefore, Conservative neo-liberals especially would insist that the pursuit of self-interest spontaneously benefits the rest of society, just as Adam Smith had expounded back in 1776. The third way in which Conservatives have sometimes attacked egalitarians is by accusing them of hypocrisy, particularly when advocates of equality have themselves been notably well-off. This line of attack has invariably been pursued against those left-wing or Labour advocates of equality who have nonetheless emanated from privileged backgrounds, or otherwise benefited from privileges not normally enjoyed by the less well-off (see, for example, Gilmour, 1978: 176). Often implicit in such Conservative allegations of hypocrisy against ‘middle-class socialists’ is the question of why these affluent egalitarians do not volunteer to share their own wealth or material possessions with the poor, and thereby put their money where their mouths are, or lead by personal example? This Conservative insinuation that many middle-class socialists are hypocrites who seemingly want other people’s money to be redistributed to the poor, but not their own, is also evident in the attacks on Labour politicians who have benefited from a privileged education but who nonetheless passionately promoted comprehensive schools. Thus did Margaret Thatcher inform the 1977 Conservative conference that ‘People from my sort of background needed grammar schools to compete with children from privileged homes like [then Labour Ministers] Shirley Williams and Anthony Wedgewood Benn’. Meanwhile, Keith Joseph wryly noted that the penniless Karl Marx was only able to immerse himself in the British Museum Reading Room for several years, to write works such as Das Kapital , because ‘he was supported by one of the large number of owners of wealth in a free society. He was supported for 25 years by a Manchester business family called [Friedrich] Engels’ (Joseph, 1976: 63–4). In similar vein, Ian Gilmour gleefully pointed out that ‘in the early fifties, Tribune [a weekly Left-wing Labour publication] was financed by very rich Socialists, as was Sir Harold Wilson’s private office in the seventies’ (Gilmour, 1978: 150). We can see, therefore, that Conservatives do not simply refute the egalitarian claims of their socialist critics by insisting on the naturalness and necessity of inequality, they also challenge the underlying motives of those



How Conservatives Explain and Justify Inequality 47

on the Left who advocate equality. Against the socialist allegation that Conservatives are guilty of selfishness and self-interest in defending inequality, Conservatives readily retort that in demanding equality many socialists seem to be strongly motivated by envy rather than by altruism or genuine concern for the poor. Conclusion We have discussed several core or defining tenets of Conservatism, but what connects all of them is the extent to which they provide Conservatives with arguments which can be marshalled to defend, justify and legitimise socio-economic inequality and inter alia reject the counter-arguments of egalitarians and socialists. Indeed, Hickson has rightly emphasised that ‘there is one idea that is common to all [Conservatives] and is notable as a continuous unifying principle within the Conservative Party, and that is inequality’ (Hickson, 2005: 192). Furthermore, the claims and characteristics which we have identified in this chapter have provided Conservatives with a philosophy and set of arguments that have successfully convinced millions of ordinary British people that inequality is both desirable or necessary, and which, in different ways and to varying degrees, benefits virtually everyone, even the less well-off themselves (if only because they would allegedly suffer even more from the consequences of socialism and the pursuit of equality). Individual Conservatives will variously emphasise or prioritise particular aspects of Conservative philosophy, of course, and will also interpret or apply them slightly differently, which is an important reason why One Nation Conservatives and Conservative neo-liberals have somewhat differing views about how far inequality should be permitted to develop, what the balance should be between the state and the market, and the extent to which the rich have obligations towards the poor. Yet in spite of such differences, which have underpinned some of the internal debates and power struggles within the Conservative Party since the nineteenth century (but particularly since the late 1970s), these differences have rarely become so deep or divisive as to threaten the overall unity of the Conservative Party, and certainly not when compared to other, much more, divisive issues which have affected the party, such as ‘Free Trade vs. Tariff Reform’ in the early twentieth century, or Britain’s relationship with Europe since the 1980s. Whatever their stance has been on such contentious issues, all Conservatives have broadly agreed on the desirability, inevitability and necessity of socio-economic inequality, and in this context, their common enemy is egalitarian doctrines like socialism and Marxism.

2 One Nation Conservatism Bounded Inequality

While all Conservatives have readily subscribed to the justifications and explanations of inequality delineated in the previous chapter, there has always existed a One Nation strand of British Conservatism which firmly believes that the gap between rich and poor, although entirely natural and inevitable, should nonetheless be kept within limits. What constitutes these ‘limits’, and how they are to be defined or measured, has never been clearly stated. There was certainly no formula by which it could be calculated and proven that the gap between rich and poor had reached the bounds of acceptability or decency, but One Nation Conservatives have always been convinced that allowing ‘too much’ inequality to become established would be morally reprehensible and politically dangerous. As a leading proponent of One Nation Conservatism during the late twentieth century explained, although ‘Conservatives do not believe that absolute equality is attainable’, their belief in fairness means that ‘there are extremes of inequality which they would not be prepared to tolerate’ (Patten, 1983: 12). A core feature of One Nation Conservatism is that the wealthy have responsibilities and a ‘duty of care’ to the less well-off in British society, a perspective sometimes characterised as noblesse oblige or Tory paternalism. As Ian Gilmour (1978: 151) explained: ‘The Tory emphasis on authority and loyalty has always ruled out the [laissez-faire] night-watchman state. Loyalties have to be won, and authority has to earn respect. No partnership can be real, if no benefits flow from it.’ For One Nation Conservatives, this has meant that those enjoying wealth, power or/and privileges ought also to ensure that they show concern and compassion towards the ‘lower orders’, and ensure that the latter are never left too far behind, or that the

50

British Conservatism

gap between the top and the bottom of British society, in socio-economic terms, becomes too wide. Inequality is certainly natural and necessary, but there are (undefined) extremes beyond which it becomes unacceptable, to the extent that it behoves those in positions of power or privilege to rectify the imbalance. As such, One Nation Conservatives have generally endorsed, and sometimes directly promoted, social reform and welfare provision to ameliorate the material conditions of the poor. Indeed, it has been claimed that ‘State provision for welfare is fully in accordance with Conservative principles. The welfare state is a thoroughly Conservative institution … Conservatives did so much to bring it into existence’, and as such, it is ‘Only Liberal ideologues, not Conservatives, [who] see something fundamentally wrong with the welfare sate as such’ (Gilmour, 1978: 152), although on occasions, and certainly by the late 1970s, some One Nation Conservatives were wondering if the welfare state had become too large or generous, and perhaps needed to be pruned somewhat. Yet what is notable about One Nation Conservatism in general is the extent to which it has sought to avoid blaming the poor for their low incomes and socio-economic deprivation, precisely because of the a priori belief that inequality is natural, necessary and unavoidable. Now, while all Conservatives accept this premise about inequality, many are also inclined to blame the poor, or at least some of the poor, for their plight or position. In other words, some Conservatives simultaneously argue that inequality is a natural and immutable fact of life, yet at the same time, seek to pathologise poverty by claiming that it is largely the fault of the poor themselves: they are deemed to be morally depraved, rather than materially deprived. By contrast, One Nation Conservatism, while fully acknowledging that some individuals might be the authors of their own misfortune, has tended to avoid blaming the poor en masse for their plight. Instead, One Nation Conservatives have broadly accepted that because inequality is innate and inevitable, then it is unreasonable to blame the less well-off for their lowly socio-economic position. While wholly recognising that some people do achieve success and become rich through hard work, One Nation Conservatives accept that this will invariably be a minority, and that most people will work hard for modest rewards, and never become particularly well-off. As such, they should not be viewed negatively or blamed for their lack of material resources. Furthermore, some One Nation Conservatives have, it seems, tacitly adopted a ‘There but for the grace of God go I’ perspective when looking at those who are much less wealthy or privileged than themselves. These

One Nation Conservatism

51

Conservatives have been willing to concede, if only to themselves, that they were ‘lucky’ to have been born into a rich family or other form of social privilege, or were fortunate in being provided with the opportunities to acquire wealth and property, and that it was, perhaps, chance, fate or God’s will that ensured they themselves had not been born into poverty instead. Consequently, such Conservatives have tended to show a degree of humility towards the less well-off, often to the extent of accepting some responsibility or moral obligation for improving the material conditions of the poor. In so doing, One Nation Conservatives have pursued a strategy of ‘enlightened self-interest’; concern for the less well-off reflected genuine Christian or humanitarian concern about the plight of the poor, but it was also derived from cognisance that it was in the interests of the rich themselves to pacify the ‘lower orders’, lest the latter sought to challenge, or even overthrow, the existing socio-economic system. Indeed, by supporting measures and policies to alleviate poverty and deprivation, and thereby pre-empt potential revolution, One Nation Conservatives have recognised that the legitimacy of capitalism, and indeed of inequality itself, would be enhanced by ensuring that the wealthiest accepted some responsibility for improving the conditions of the poorest. In this respect, as Vincent has emphasised, ‘The purpose of one nation conservatism is to consolidate hierarchy, rather than to remove it’, precisely by ensuring ‘that the poor no longer pose a threat to the established order’ (Vincent, 1992: 88). One other important aspect of One Nation Conservatism which needs to be emphasised is precisely the manner in which ‘the nation’ is prioritised in its discourse, whereas the Conservative Party’s political opponents have been depicted as concerned with narrower, more selfish interests. For example, in the late nineteenth century, One Nation Conservatives depicted Liberals or Whigs as being primarily concerned with rapacious individualism, while in the early twentieth century, the emergence of a New Liberalism (concerned with social reform) led to Liberals being accused of promoting class-based politics. Of course, with the displacement of the Liberal Party by the Labour Party, and its formal espousal (more especially after 1918) of socialism, One Nation Conservatives readily portrayed Labour as being a party which promoted the interests of one class (the working class) above those of the rest of the community, and in so doing, sowing seeds of division and disunity. By contrast, One Nation Conservatives presented their Party as the only one which represented the interests of the (British) nation above all else, and thereby offered salvation from the twin evils of selfish individualism and class envy, both of which were naturally deemed to be diametrically

52

British Conservatism

opposed to the maintenance of an organic society characterised by national unity, shared values and social harmony (see, for example, Butler, 1914: 26; Gilmour, 1978: 166–8; O’Sullivan, 1976: 100; Seawright, 2010: 3–6). This is not to say that One Nation Conservatives have denied the existence of social classes – after all, Disraeli spoke eloquently about the existence of ‘two nations’, namely the rich and the poor, as we will note shortly – but they insist that their interests are not irreconcilable. On the contrary, One Nation Conservatism insists upon the mutual and reciprocal nature of the relationship between different social classes, which is then reflected and reinforced through ‘the nation’. Of course, all Conservatives will claim to represent and defend ‘the nation’ more than other political parties, and so this is one of the sources of debate and disagreement in the Conservative Party between One Nation Conservatives and various of their colleagues, particularly the economic neo-liberals, whose emphasis on individualism has invariably been a source of anxiety to the adherents of One Nation Conservatism, even though Conservative neo-liberals also insist on their commitment to ‘the nation’ and promotion of patriotism. Needless to say, this was a debate which became sharper during the 1980s and early 1990s, when Thatcherite neo-liberalism displaced One Nation Conservatism as the dominant ideological variant within the Party. The Disraelian origins of One Nation Conservatism The antecedents of One Nation Conservatism are widely credited to Benjamin Disraeli, who became (Conservative) Prime Minister for nine months in 1868, and then from 1874 to 1880. While he fully acknowledged the new opportunities and wealth generated by the industrial revolution, Disraeli was deeply concerned at the socio-economic deprivation which it also wrought. Indeed, on one occasion, his condemnation of the degree and depth of poverty which he observed in mid nineteenth-century Britain could just as readily have been articulated by Karl Marx, for Disraeli confessed that he had long been aware that there was something rotten in the core of our social system. I had seen that while immense fortunes were accumulating, while wealth was increasing to a superabundance, and while Great Britain was cited throughout Europe as the most prosperous nation in the world, the working classes, the creators of wealth, were steeped in the most abject poverty and gradually sinking into the deepest degradation. (Quoted in Monypenny and Buckle, 1929: 629)

One Nation Conservatism

53

As an author, Disraeli elaborated upon this concern in his 1845 novel, Sybil – or The Two Nations, with one passage proving particularly poignant: ‘Well, society may be in its infancy’, said Egremont, slightly smiling, ‘but, say what you like, our Queen reigns over the greatest nation that ever existed.’ â•… ‘Which nation?’ asked the younger stranger, ‘for she reigns over two.’ â•… The stranger paused. Egremont was silent, but looked inquiringly. â•… ‘Yes’, resumed the younger stranger after a moment’s interval, ‘Two nations; between whom there is no intercourse and no sympathy; who are as ignorant of each other’s habits, thoughts and feelings, as if they were dwellers in different zones, or inhabitants of different planets, who are formed by a different breeding, are fed by a different food, are ordered by different manners, and are not governed by the same laws.’ â•… ‘You speak of—’ said Egremont, hesitatingly. â•… ‘The Rich and the Poor.’ (Disraeli, 1995: 58, capitalisation in the original) Of course, like all Conservatives, Disraeli entirely accepted that inequality was inherent and inevitable in all modern societies, but he was very disturbed by the sheer scale of inequality which he observed, and in particular, the degree of poverty which this entailed. While inequality was a natural and necessary feature of the maturing capitalist system, One Nation Conservatives like Disraeli were convinced that the wealthiest sections of society ought to accept a responsibility for alleviating the conditions of the least well-off. Such responsibility was deemed to be the natural corollary of the rights and privileges which ‘property’ enjoyed in a society which enshrined and venerated private property ownership. For Disraeli, the degree of poverty which he witnessed in Britain was, in large part, attributable to a failure or refusal by the propertied classes and aristocracy (like Lord Marney in Sybil) to accept that they had duties and responsibilities to those much less well-off than themselves. Furthermore, Disraeli’s insistence that ‘Property’ had responsibilities was accompanied, in a speech in Shrewsbury in 1843, by an assertion that ‘Labour’ also has its rights as well as its duties; and when I see masses of property raised in this country which do not recognise that principle; when I find men making fortunes by a method which permits them (very often in a very few years) to purchase the lands of the old territorial

54

British Conservatism

aristocracy of the country, I cannot help remembering that those millions are accumulated by a mode which does not recognise it as a duty ‘to endow the Church, to feed the poor, to guard the land, and to execute justice for nothing.’ And I cannot help asking myself, when I hear of all this misery, and of all this suffering; when I know that evidence exists … of a state of demoralisation in the once happy population of this land … I cannot help suspecting that this has arisen because property has been permitted to be created and held without the performance of these duties. (Quoted in Greenleaf, 1983: 207–8) Disraeli reiterated this perspective the following year, via a character in another of his novels, Coningsby (1989: 430), when he remarked: What we want, sir, is … to establish great principles which may maintain the realm and secure the happiness of the people. Let me see authority once more honoured … let me see property acknowledging, as in the old days of faith, that labour is his twin brother, and that the essence of all tenure is the performance of duty … It has variously been observed that in its insistence that the rich and privileged had a duty to accept some responsibility for the material welfare of the less well-off or ‘lower orders’, and in its concomitant advocacy of reciprocal rights and responsibilities, One Nation Conservatism partly harked back to the pre-industrial, pre-capitalist, feudal era, in which inequalities and associated power relations nonetheless enshrined reciprocal duties and mutual obligations, not least of which was ‘The hereditary landlord, acknowledging his responsibilities to his tenants and labourers’ (Mackenzie and Silver, 1968: 29). Indeed, some One Nation Conservatives, on occasion, explicitly acknowledged this connection themselves, and although they do not seek to ‘turn back the clock’ – on the contrary, they are generally viewed (and view themselves) as the most progressive or forward-thinking of Conservatives – they have noted approvingly how the feudal social structure facilitated a strong degree of mutual obligation and reciprocity which contrasted starkly and, in many respects, favourably, with the individualism and alienation which commonly pervaded capitalist societies. As Disraeli himself commented: Now, if we have any relics of the feudal system, I regret that not more of it is remaining … What is the fundamental principle of the

One Nation Conservatism

55

feudal system … ? It is that the tenure of all property shall be the performance of its duties. Why, when the Conqueror carved out parts of the land, and introduced the feudal system, he said to the recipient: ‘You shall have the estate, but you shall do something for it: you shall feed the poor; you shall endow the Church, you shall defend the land in case of war; and you shall execute justice and maintain truth to the poor for nothing.’ (Quoted in Patten, 1983: 13) Certainly, some One Nation Conservatives, while supportive of capitalism and ‘the market’ in general, were nonetheless somewhat uneasy that human relationships were increasingly reduced to what Marx had termed the ‘cash nexus’, a mere economic transaction for goods, labour or services between two people, without any wider or deeper social relationships or mutual obligations between individuals, beyond their immediate family. As we will note below, many twentieth-century Conservatives sought partially to overcome this form of alienation by exhorting employers to show a greater concern for the well-being of their employees, at least in the workplace itself, while Conservative governments evinced similar interest in the material well-being of the masses in general. Yet as we have already mentioned, One Nation Conservatism was also motivated by a sense of self-interest, in that it was seeking to defend the socio-economic system by ensuring that certain (unspecified) limits were placed on extremes of inequality, so that the working classes did not sink too deeply into poverty, lest this prompted insurrection. Furthermore, as Greenleaf has correctly noted, in promoting various measures of social reform in the 1860s and 1870s, Disraeli and his senior colleagues were not motivated solely by a paternalistic philosophy, vitally important and influential though this was, because there was also ‘undoubtedly an element of political expediency involved’ (Greenleaf, 1983: 213), in the guise of electoral considerations. The 1867 Reform Act extended the parliamentary vote to much of the skilled or more affluent sections of the male working class (most middle-class men having already been enfranchised in 1832), which therefore meant that competing political parties increasingly felt obliged to offer something by way of social reform in order to attract the support of this newly enfranchised section of society, and thereupon integrate them. Meanwhile, Allison (1984: 21) has noted that Disraeli’s determination to ameliorate the harsh material conditions of much of the working class was both ‘because they threatened society, but also because it was morally right to do so.’

56

British Conservatism

Certainly, during the latter third of the nineteenth century, this imperative to respond constructively to the expanding industrial working class reflected a wider concern among Britain’s socio-economic and political elites about the spread of revolutionary ideas and social movements through parts of Europe, most notably Marxism and Syndicalism. In this context, granting the vote to the more prosperous or skilled working class in 1867 (it was extended further in 1884, adding about 1.75 million extra male voters to the British electorate – women were not enfranchised until 1918 and 1928) was itself part of a strategy to incorporate them into the British system of parliamentary democracy and inculcate them with the values of constitutionalism, thereby greatly reducing the potential appeal of more revolutionary or foreign political doctrines. Of course, it also reflected an assumption among One Nation Conservatives that the skilled working class especially, by virtue of its generally higher occupational status and/or wages, was more likely to eschew radicalism and embrace constitutional politics. Thus did a Times editorial (18 April 1883), on the second anniversary of Disraeli’s death, observe how ‘In the inarticulate mass of the English populace … [Disraeli] discerned the Conservative workingman as the sculptor perceives the angel prisoned in a block of marble.’ However, the extension of the franchise rendered it imperative that the Conservative Party henceforth offered various policies which could attract the support of sections of the working class, and thereby instil in them a sense that they had a material stake in the existing socio-economic system, and would thus have too much to lose by jeopardising or rejecting it, while also acculturating them to the norms and values of constitutional and parliamentary politics. To this end, and wholly in accordance with his avowed commitment to improving ‘the condition of the people’, Disraeli’s 1874–80 premiership witnessed the enactment of a range of early welfare measures and ‘permissive’ legislation vis-à-vis the trade unions, most notably the 1874 Factory Act, the 1875 Artisans Dwellings Act, the 1875 Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act, the 1875 Employers and Workmen Act, the 1875 Public Health Act and the 1876 Education Act. These measures were subsequently eulogised as ‘the most notable instalment of social reform undertaken by any single government of the century … It gave the working class everything for which they had striven at the 1874 general election’ (Smith, 1967: 217), while Gilmour observed that Disraeli’s 1874–80 Government ‘carried through more social reform than any other government in the nineteenth century’ (Gilmour, 1978: 83–4). Elsewhere, the enactment of such measures has been described as ‘an application of benevolent feudalism to an industrial age’ (Kopsch, 1970: 28).

One Nation Conservatism

57

With regard to the 1875 Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act and the 1875 Employers and Workmen Act (both of which placed the trade unions and their activities on a secure legal foundation), Disraeli proudly informed Queen Victoria that ‘We have settled the long and vexatious contest between Capital and Labour’ (quoted in Monypenny and Buckle, 1929: 711). This boast was affirmed by another of Disraeli’s biographers, who adjudged that these two Acts ‘satisfactorily settled the position of labour for a generation’ (Blake, 1969: 555). However, political scientists and historians have subsequently questioned the extent to which such measures constituted a genuine programmatic shift towards One Nation Conservatism, or were instead, while undoubtedly enlightened and progressive in ethos, motivated first and foremost by immediate electoral considerations, following the enfranchisement of the skilled working class. Even Smith, quoted above, nonetheless deemed that the social reforms enacted in the first half of the 1870s were ‘empirical, piecemeal … dealing with problems as and when they were pushed into prominence by their inherent size and urgency, by agitation and the pressure of public opinion … and the exigencies of party politics’ (Smith, 1967: 257; see also Coleman, 1988: 147; Kopsch, 1970: 27); and Gamble has suggested that ‘Disraeli’s role in creating the new Conservative party has been much exaggerated’ (Gamble, 1974: 17). Meanwhile, Seawright refers to the ‘mythology’ which has developed around Disraeli’s role and legacy in promoting One Nation Conservatism (Seawright, 2005: 70–6; 2010: 4–8), a myth cultivated and perpetuated to the present day by the lineage of self-proclaimed One Nation Conservatives, who invoke Disraeli’s name in reverence and awe and who are wont to cite him in order to bestow added credence and credibility to their policy proposals, or, more generally, their approach to the art of government and statecraft. After all, as Smith’s observation in the previous paragraph intimated, Disraeli was generally pragmatic in his approach to enacting legislation to protect or improve the material and working conditions of ordinary people. His willingness to see the state accept some responsibility for rectifying ‘market failure’ or the worst excesses of untrammelled laissez-faire capitalism was balanced by his concern to ensure that measures of social reform did not inflict ‘injury on the wealth of the nation’ (quoted in Gilmour, 1978: 83). His stance seemed to be very similar to that enunciated by a senior official in the Tory Reform Group a century later, when he explained that ‘neither the Tory Left nor anyone else in the Party would advocate government intervention for its own sake’, but ‘Tory progressives … support the essentially pragmatic, flexible approach’ which sometimes ‘requires the government to

58

British Conservatism

intervene positively’, and which therefore considers the Party’s economic neo-liberals to be almost as dogmatic and ideological in their hostility to the state as socialists are in apparently venerating it (Russel, 1978: 16–7). Incidentally, the question of balance – how far should the state intervene, and at what point does such intervention impede the operation of ‘the market’ and the process of wealth creation? – has been a consistent source of debate within British Conservatism, not just between One Nation Conservatives and the party’s economic liberals, but also among One Nation Conservatives themselves, particularly during the 1950s, as we will note in due course. Yet even if somewhat exaggerated, and perhaps subject to a little hyperbole subsequently by some of his Conservative admirers, we should not underestimate the extent to which Disraeli imbued British Conservatism with a paternalistic element which was willing to reject unadulterated laissez-faire and economic neo-liberalism, and which ascribed to the rich and privileged a moral and political duty to help ‘elevate the condition of the people’, through tackling the negative consequences of capitalist industrialisation. The crucial word in this context is ‘elevate’, for as Disraeli himself explained, there were two sorts of equality: [T]he equality that levels and destroys, and the equality that levels and creates. It is this last, the sublime, this celestial equality, that animates the laws of England. The principle of the first equality, base, terrestrial, gallic and grovelling, is that no-one should be privileged; the principle of English equality is that everyone should be privileged. (Disraeli, 1835: 204–5) Disraeli’s perspective concerning the need to pacify and integrate the industrial working class was evidently shared subsequently by Lord Randolph Churchill, who observed that if the ‘labour interest’ felt confident that it could achieve its legitimate industrial objectives through existing political institutions and processes, then it would be happily reconciled to Britain’s constitutional system and parliamentary democracy. If, however, labour became convinced that it could not obtain its objectives through the existing political framework, and that the ‘Constitutional’ [Conservative] Party regularly showed itself to be much more sympathetic to the rights of capital and owners of private property, then ‘the labour interest’ might be persuaded that the existing constitutional system was intrinsically defective, and thereby seek to replace it altogether (quoted in Churchill, 1906: 458–60).

One Nation Conservatism

59

Although Churchill, in accordance with One Nation Conservative philosophy, certainly did not venerate the state, he readily conceded that the democracy of Britain is continually making fresh demands on the State, that the democracy expects the State to perform duties which in former days the State was allowed to leave to private enterprise, and I recognise that the tendency of modern social reform must tend to check any hopes of a large decrease in our civil expenditure. (Quoted in Greenleaf, 1983: 221) The other prominent advocate of progressive social reform in the late nineteenth century was Joseph Chamberlain, for although he had previously been a Liberal MP for Birmingham, he was among those Liberal Unionists who seceded from the Party in 1886, over the issue of Irish Home Rule, and joined the Conservatives. By this time, though, Chamberlain had already become ‘impatient with Gladstone’s reluctance to engage in comprehensive social reconstruction’, and sought to fuse his vision of progressive social reform with that of Disraelian Conservatism (Eccleshall, 1990: 122). Indeed, he too viewed social reform not only as humane and morally virtuous but as a means of forestalling support for socialism among the recently enfranchised working class, and to this end, he urged his new Conservative colleagues to accept ‘all practicable proposals for still further ameliorating the condition of the great masses of the population’, including shorter working hours for industrial workers, arbitration tribunals to resolve industrial disputes, old age pensions, labour [employment] exchanges, and the empowering of local authorities to provide cheap public transport and loans to enable workers to purchase their homes (Eccleshall, 1990: 122; Greenleaf, 1983: 226). Chamberlain was convinced that ‘The politics of the future are social polices … how to secure the greatest happiness of the greatest number, and especially those whom all previous legislation and reform seem to have left very much where they were before’ (quoted in Greenleaf, 1983:226). He was also a supporter of Tariff Reform (see below), insisting that economic laissez-faire and international free trade were incompatible with elevating the conditions of the people through progressive social reform, because of the additional costs that the latter necessarily entailed. Early twentieth-century advocacy of One Nation Conservtaism During the first four decades of the twentieth century, a number of notable individuals and groups within the Party endeavoured to advance One Nation Conservatism, albeit with varying degrees of success. Certainly,

60

British Conservatism

during the first two decades of the new century, the Conservatives’ parliamentary leadership, Lord Salisbury, Arthur Balfour and Andrew Bonar Law, evinced little interest in actively pursuing the type of social reforms instigated by Disraeli, and subsequently advocated by Lord Randolph Churchill and Joseph Chamberlain. On the contrary, they tended to view ‘Conservatism as a rearguard action against social reform’ (Gilmour, 1978: 31). One early twentieth-century progenitor of One Nation Conservatism was Arthur Steel-Maitland, who was appointed Conservative Party chairman in 1911, whereupon he almost immediately became ‘very much the driving force’ behind the Unionist Social Reform Committee (USRC) – discussed below – which held its first meeting in February 1911, and whose prime purpose was to develop a constructive Conservative approach to social policy, although its actual founder had been F. E. Smith (Green, 2002: 75), an Attorney-General and, later, Lord Chancellor. As with many One Nation Conservatives, Steel-Maitland’s strong sense of noblesse oblige and a concomitant desire to improve the material and working conditions of ordinary working people seemed to derive, in large part, from his social background and position, for as well as having been educated at Oxford, he was also a landowner, and married a wealthy heiress, all of which seemed to imbue him with a strong sense of public duty and paternalism towards those who, through no fault of the own, were less fortunate in their material conditions and circumstances. One early example of such concern was his appointment as a Special Commissioner to the Royal Commission on the Poor Laws, which was established by the newly elected Liberal Government in 1906. Two decades later, while serving as Minister of Labour in Stanley Baldwin’s 1924–29 Conservative Government, Steel-Maitland disguised himself as a ‘down-and-out’ and visited Labour [employment] Registries and dole queues in order to gain a keener insight into the problems experienced by the poor (Green, 2002: 75). This exercise reinforced his conviction that unemployment was a major cause of poverty, that the poor were not necessarily to blame for their enforced idleness, and that the state therefore needed to develop a more constructive approach towards economic and employment issues, while the Conservative Party sought to do likewise with regard to social policy. To these ends, as well as supporting tariff reform in order to protect British jobs and raise revenues, via tariffs on imports, which could then be invested in social programmes without the need to raise taxes, Steel-Maitland recommended or endorsed the enactment of such measures as Wage Boards to regulate the pay of workers in notoriously low-paid ‘sweated trades’ (such as textiles), improved apprenticeship schemes, in order to improve the skills

One Nation Conservatism

61

of young workers (which would then increase their chances of obtaining regular and reasonably-paid employment in adult life), partnership in the workplace and a National Insurance contributions scheme (similar to that introduced in 1911) to provide some basic material assistance to the sick and genuinely unemployed (Steel-Maitland, 1908: passim). Steel-Maitland also recommended a minimum wage, whose level would ‘be fixed by reference too … the minimum necessary for subsistence according to existing ideas’ (Steel-Maitland, 1908: 374). In expressing his support for a minimum wage, Steel-Maitland declared: ‘We … have given up the old theory that the State should no longer interfere with industry at all. That has been relegated to the rubbish basket’ (House of Commons Debates, ser. 5, vol. 24, col. 1896). Meanwhile, the USRC had been formed in the wake of the Conservatives’ 1910 election defeat, whereupon senior figures such as Steel-Maitland and F. E. Smith insisted that the party needed to place renewed emphasis on social policy, having spent the previous four years bitterly opposing the Liberal government’s measures of social reform, and Lloyd George’s 1909 ‘People’s Budget’ which sought to finance this ambitious social programme by imposing higher taxes on property and wealth. Having lost three consecutive general elections within five years (1906, January 1910 and December 1910), and alert to the potential electoral threat posed by the Labour Party which had been formed in 1906, more prescient and paternalistic Conservatives recognised the importance of imbuing social reform with the priority and prominence which it had previously been granted under Disraeli’s leadership. However, the formation of the USRC also reflected dissatisfaction in parts of the Conservative Party with the extent to which intra-party debates had recently been dominated by the issue of ‘free trade versus tariff reform’.1 It was in this context that the USRC was established, with more than 35 of its 60 or so members being Conservative MPs, many of whom had first been elected in the 1910 general election.2 Among the Conservative parliamentarians belonging to the USRC, chaired by F. E. Smith, were Stanley Baldwin, Lord Henry Bentinck and Arthur Steel-Maitland, all of whom were to become more prominently associated with One Nation Conservatism during the 1920s especially. With both the nascent Labour Party and the thrice-elected Liberal government explicitly appealing to the working class, there was a recognition that ‘Conservatism divorced from its historic policy of social reform had no chance whatever in the country’ (Hewins, 1929: 251). Yet it was also deemed essential that a Conservative social programme should offer a clear alternative to anything being offered by Labour or the Liberals, rather than be seen merely to imitate them. Thus did F.

62

British Conservatism

E. Smith urge the Conservatives to devise a ‘third alternative’, one which was distinct from either ‘Radical-Socialism’ or ‘Whig-Individualism’, both of whom, in their respective ways, sought to foster class conflict between rich and poor for partisan purposes: ‘The laissez-faire Conservative or Whig wishes the State to do nothing: the Socialist … wishes the State to touch everything, and to touch it in the wrong way. The modern Conservative, like the old Tory, wants the State to touch some things, but to touch them in the right way.’ To this end, Smith exhorted his Conservative colleagues to craft a social programme which would harmonise class interests, and thereby foster national unity (Smith, 1913: 23–6). In other words, Smith was urging the Conservatives ‘to link the conception of State Toryism with the practice of Social Reform’ (Smith, 1913: 46). In adumbrating the case for this mode of Conservatism, Smith approvingly cited the studies, published by Charles Booth and Seebohm Rowntree between 1889 and 1901, concerning the hitherto unacknowledged degree of poverty in London and York respectively, and which confirmed that much of this destitution could not be blamed on individual failings or fecklessness among the poor. Evidently harbouring a Disraelian abhorrence at the persistence and scale of such poverty (which had already assumed particular poignancy at the turn of the century when it became apparent that many of the British troops conscripted to fight in the 1899–1901 Boer War were in poor physical condition), Smith was adamant that ‘A contented proletariat should be one of the first objects of enlightened Conservative policy’, for he deemed it ‘evident that the party, to whom stability and content are vital, is far more deeply concerned to restore happier conditions than the party which lives upon discontent and the promulgation of class hatred’. Yet, he emphasised, ‘no appeal is possible to those great ideals of patriotism which the [Conservative] Party must always make, if the persons to whom they are addressed are living lives empty of amenity and void of hope’ (Smith, 1913: 17). The previous year had heard a call by Pierse Loftus for a return to what he deemed to be ‘genuine … Toryism’, entailing a Disraelian alliance of upper and working classes, in order to restore ‘the great tradition of aristocratic service against all the snares of Plutocracy’ (Loftus, 1912: 11, 114). In seeking to steer the Conservative Party towards a more constructive and paternalistic social policy, the USRC operated on the assumption that ‘We have in this country now outlived that curious philosophic conception of the relations between the State and the individual which finds … its most powerful exponents … in … Herbert Spencer and Cobden’, which held that ‘the duty of the State was limited to the action of the policeman’, while society was ‘in industrial disputes, as in other matters, bound to do nothing

One Nation Conservatism

63

but to keep the ring and let the strongest party win, so long as there was no public disturbance’. This ‘old Cobdenite and laissez-faire view that the conditions of wages, health, housing, and labour among the vast majority of the population of this country was the concern of private individuals and of private contract has long since been abandoned’, and consequently, it was ‘incontestably the right and duty of statesmanship’ to intervene to improve the conditions of the people (Hills et al., 1914: 3, 4, 5). In this context, a June 1914 report by the USRC’s committee on industrial unrest contained a ‘Foreword’ by F. E. Smith, in which he emphasised that the Conservative Party had routinely sought to protect the working class from ‘the oppressions of the Manchester school of [economic] Liberalism, which … regarded men as brute beasts whose labour could be bought and sold at the cheapest price irrespective of all other considerations’ (Hills et al., 1914: vii). The USRC ultimately enjoyed mixed success, for although some of its policy proposals were included in the Conservatives’ 1914 Campaign Guide, in anticipation of an imminent general election, there remained considerable antipathy to constructive social reform on the Conservative Right. Certainly, the party’s leader from 1911 to 1921, Andrew Bonar Law, ‘did not favour social reform’ (Gilmour, 1978: 16), a stance underpinned by the exigencies of the First World War, followed by the highly contentious and politically divisive issue of Irish Home Rule. The USRC disbanded in August 1914, as political attention was naturally focused on the First World War, and although there were attempts to revive it in 1917, as part of the preparations for post-war reconstruction, these efforts were to no avail. However, some of the members sustained their commitment to One Nation Conservatism on a more individual basis, most notably Lord Henry Bentinck, who explicitly advocated ‘Tory democracy’. Bentinck seemed to symbolise many of the personal characteristics associated with noblesse oblige and the concomitant advocacy of One Nation Conservatism. He was a landowner, and had been educated at Eton and Oxford University. His half-brother, meanwhile, was the sixth Duke of Portland. He had also served as a colonel during the Boer War (Eccleshall, 1990: 149), where he would have been ideally placed to observe the poor physical condition and malnutrition of many working-class conscripts, who lived in conditions of poverty and deprivation back in Britain. In the penultimate year of the war, following the appointment (by Lloyd George, the Liberal leader and Prime Minister in the Coalition government) of several businessmen to ministerial posts, Bentinck spoke of a growing suspicion that ‘the people are being asked to fight, not in order to make the world safe for democracy … but in order that our captains of industry and our

64

British Conservatism

great commercial men may get a monopoly when the War is over’. He thus sought to remind his fellow Conservatives, in clear echoes of Disraeli, that their purpose should not be to multiply the number of peerages, baronetcies, and under-secretaryships, but to promote the welfare and happiness of the people, and that the best way of defending property was for property to realise that labour is its twin brother, and that the essence of all tenure is the performance of duty. (House of Commons Debates, ser. 5, vol. 93, col. 2029) Between 1910 and 1929, during which time he was Conservative MP for the industrial constituency of South Nottingham (having also been this constituency’s MP between 1895 and 1906), Bentinck made numerous parliamentary speeches in similar vein, in which he advocated improved employment conditions for manual workers, coupled with a statutory minimum wage and a scheme of comprehensive national insurance to provide material assistance in times of unemployment, and less punitive approaches to tackling juvenile crime and delinquency. He also called for a state-subsidised programme of house building, in order to provide low-cost homes for the working class (Eccleshall, 1990: 149–50). Bentinck explicated his vision of ‘Tory Democracy’ in a book with this very title in the year that the First World War ended. Not only did his Tory Democracy enshrine what Eccleshall has characterised as ‘a eulogy to philanthropists such as Sadler and Shaftesbury’ (Eccleshall, 1990: 131), while quoting favourably from Disraeli too, it also provided a similarly effusive summation of the work of the USRC, which Bentinck claimed had endeavoured ‘to keep alight the Disraelian tradition’. Bentinck argued that ‘The industrial revolution and its subordination of the individual to the mechanical pursuit of wealth is a horrible nightmare’, and he therefore fully endorsed the work of the USRC, and the policies proposed in the reports of it six sub-committees, hoping that these would provide the foundations for a wide-ranging programme including adequate social security, an enlightened penal policy, a public health system guaranteeing a decent environment at home and at work, wider provision of agricultural small-holdings, and state supervision of industry to enforce a minimum wage, shorter hours and workers’ participation in managerial decisions. (Bentinck, 1918a: 98; see also Bentinck, 1918b)

One Nation Conservatism

65

In accordance with the enlightened self-interest which strongly informed One Nation Conservatism, Bentinck insisted that only if their material interests and needs were acknowledged would industrial workers remain wedded to capitalism and constitutional politics. Thus did he seek to persuade the House of Commons (or, rather, his fellow Conservatives), in 1924, that the only way to prevent strikes and industrial unrest, and to safeguard the institutions of this country, is to identify those institutions with the welfare of the people … If we are to fight Communism, we must see that wages and conditions of labour in our industries are such as will commend those industries to the people of this country. (House of Commons Debates, ser. 5, vol. 175, col. 681) To these ends, Bentinck favoured closer links and communication between the so-called two sides of industry, employers and employees, or management and workers, and co-partnership or profit-sharing schemes, so that workers would feel that their efforts were being properly acknowledged and duly rewarded, which, in turn, would foster greater loyalty both to their particular company or industry, and to Capitalism in general. The advocacy of such schemes was subsequently to become a key feature of One Nation Conservatism in the 1950s, as we will note below. Meanwhile, Stanley Baldwin’s position as a One Nation Conservative has perhaps not been fully appreciated, due, in large part, to the fact that the 1926 General Strike occurred during his first term as Prime Minister, followed by the 1927 Trades Disputes Act. Both episodes did much to reinforce trade union suspicion that the Conservatives were ‘the Party of employers’, and that it was therefore instinctively hostile to the interests of ordinary workers. Yet two factors should be borne in mind in this context. Firstly, when in 1925, a Conservative backbencher introduced a Private Members’ Bill to replace ‘contracting out’ of the trade union political levy by ‘contracting in’ (a proposal bitterly opposed by the trade unions and the Labour Party), Baldwin himself intervened during the Second Reading debate to call for the Bill to be abandoned in the name of industrial peace. In so doing, Baldwin explained: We have our majority. We believe in the justice of this Bill, but we are going to withdraw our hand, and are not going to push our political advantage home at a moment like this. We are not going to fire the

66

British Conservatism

first shot, for we want to create peace, and create an atmosphere in which people can come together. (House of Commons Debates, ser. 5, vol. 181, col. 840) Towards the end of 1925, the (fourth) Marquess of Salisbury reflected upon Baldwin’s stance over the Political Levy Bill, and argued that Baldwin had done more than anyone else to further the cause of peace and goodwill in industry. Had Baldwin allowed the Bill to reach the statute book, Lord Salisbury claimed, then there would have been no chance of securing such peace, or of fostering greater trust between the Conservative Party and the trade unions (The Times 7 December 1925). Baldwin himself subsequently informed King George V that ‘If there was one mission more than another which … it has been my dearest wish to fulfil, it was to lessen the misunderstandings which threaten industrial strife’ (quoted in Williamson and Baldwin, 2004: 31). Baldwin’s professed commitment to industrial peace seemed to ring rather hollow the following year, when his Conservative government forcefully denounced a strike by several key trade unions acting in support of coal miners, who were fighting attempts by the mine owners to cut their pay and increase their working day, apparently in order to enhance the international competitiveness of the coal industry, which was struggling to compete with cheaper coal being exported from Germany and Poland. Baldwin alleged that the General Strike was not an ordinary industrial dispute, but a direct, politically motivated attack on the British constitution and parliamentary democracy, and an attempt to coerce the community. Nor was his One Nation philosophy, and concomitant belief in industrial peace and partnership, immediately apparent when, in response to the General Strike, his government introduced the 1927 Trades Disputes and Trade Union Act. This placed significant statutory curbs on the trade unions, and thus entered left-wing mythology as a vindictive piece of anti-working-class legislation intended to emasculate the trade unions. Yet Baldwin (and other One Nation Conservatives, most notably Harold Macmillan and Arthur Steel-Maitland) recognised that the Bill represented the absolute minimum that their Conservative colleagues would tolerate, and as such, Baldwin and like-minded ministers had to resist strong pressure from the Party’s right wing for an even more draconian and repressive legislation against the trade unions. Had it not been for this pressure, Baldwin would have been content with a simpler, shorter Bill which confined itself to outlawing general strikes per se (notwithstanding problems of definition over the point at which a strike

One Nation Conservatism

67

ceased to be an industrial dispute, and became a strike intended to coerce the government or the whole British people) and prohibiting intimidation (of those workers refusing to join or otherwise support a strike). Baldwin’s lack of enthusiasm for the Trade Disputes Bill was shared by his Minister of Labour, Arthur Steel-Maitland, who was convinced that, rather than embark on a course of vengeance, true political courage and statesmanship would entail a peace initiative, which would appeal to moderate men on all sides: ‘We cannot wield a sword in one hand – even if it be in reality but the phantom of a sword – and at all convincingly proffer an olive branch in the other (quoted in Young, 1952: 121). Certainly, Steel-Maitland was concerned that a seemingly vindictive anti-trade union Bill, enacted by the Conservative government in the immediate aftermath of the General Strike, might alienate moderate trade unionists, and drive them towards the Left. Consequently, while acknowledging the necessity of trade union legislation, as represented by the 1927 Trades Dispute Act, Baldwin, SteelMaitland and other ‘progressive’ or One Nation Conservatives resolved that this should be accompanied by a more constructive and conciliatory initiative, which would thereby counterbalance what the trade unions perceived to be the wholly punitive character of the Act. In this context, they sought to give added impetus to the promotion of industrial partnership between the ‘two sides of industry’, for although this vision had variously been expounded by One Nation Conservatives during the first quarter of the twentieth century, actual progress had often been slow and sporadic. The aftermath of the General Strike, and the consequent passage of the Trade Disputes Act, were therefore deemed to provide an excellent opportunity for more actively promoting industrial partnership, hence Baldwin’s 1927 declared hope that employers and trade unions would soon be able to develop a more harmonious relationship, thereby banishing industrial warfare to the past (The Times, 14 June 1927). In similar vein, the Minister of Labour, Arthur Steel-Maitland, in a speech to the Movement for Industrial Peace, claimed – even as the Trade Disputes Bill was wending its way through Parliament – that there could be no lasting business efficiency without cooperation between the two sides of industry (The Times, 2 December 1926), a point also emphasised by (the fourth) Lord Salisbury (The Times, 28 January 1928). It was this concern which largely underpinned the 1927–33 MondTurner talks (for succinct accounts, see Lovell and Roberts, 1968: 103–14; McDonald and Gospel, 1973; Taylor, 2000: 44–8), which Steel-Maitland himself had played a low-key role in promoting, although it is also important to note that some senior trade union leaders were themselves keen to

68

British Conservatism

pursue a more constructive approach to industrial affairs in the aftermath of the General Strike. In particular, the TUC’s General Secretary, Walter Citrine, was convinced that it was in the interests of the organised working class to respond positively to initiatives intended to foster industrial partnership, in spite of their hatred of the 1927 Act, professed hostility to the existing capitalist system and formal (albeit often rhetorical) commitment to socialism. The first of many meetings in what became known as the Mond-Turner talks took place in January 1928, in response to an invitation to the TUC’s General Council from a group of major employers, led by Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI) chairman and Conservative MP (but former Liberal), Sir Alfred Mond. The TUC leadership had agreed to participate on condition that the talks would be wide-ranging and therefore go beyond the usual topics covered by collective bargaining. What senior trade unionists like Citrine and Ernest Bevin were interested in were discussions that would include economic matters and industrial management in general; nothing was to be ruled out of bounds. On this basis, the TUC’s General Council endorsed the talks by 18 votes to 6 (with the left proving to be the most implacable opponents of such class collaboration), thereby heralding several years of meetings between senior TUC officials and employers, these discussions sometimes taking place on weekly basis, at least initially (Lovell and Roberts, 1968: 104). In spite of the amicability and goodwill with which these talks were generally conducted, and the fact that there was clearly some common ground between the TUC participants and the employers’ counterparts – such as the support for a more permanent and official forum in the guise of a National Industrial Council and/or National Economic Council – the Mond-Turner talks ultimately proved inconclusive, primarily because of insufficient support and less enlightened views among other major employers (most notably those represented by the Federation of British Industry and the National Confederation of Employers’ Organisations) and sundry trade unions, all of whom sought jealously to guard their autonomy. While the Mond-Turner talks were in progress, another notable Conservative initiative at promoting industrial partnership, in the context of a more general rejection of economic laissez-faire, was being developed by a group of younger Conservatives, of whom Harold Macmillan was to prove the most prominent and prolific (eventually becoming, three decades later, Conservative leader and Prime Minister). In the aftermath of the 1926 General Strike, and against the backdrop both of the following year’s Trades Disputes and Trade Union Act and the ‘olive branch’ of the Mond-Turner

One Nation Conservatism

69

talks, Macmillan and three young Conservative co-authors articulated their own proposals, via a book entitled Industry and the State, for a political approach which steered a way ‘between the two extremes, Marxian Socialism and complete “laissez-faire”‘. While naturally rejecting Socialism, the authors also insisted that ‘The policy of “laissez-faire” never formed an integral part of Conservative or Tory policy … during the last century … Today it would be a sombre gospel of despair, unlikely to commend itself to the thoughtful.’ Furthermore, there was no longer ‘any economic justification for it … for the laws of supply and demand are no longer automatic’. Yet it was also claimed that ‘unrestricted Individualism’ should be rejected, for this too ‘offends against continuity’, and as such, was ‘antagonistic to Conservative principles’ (Boothby et al., 1927: 20, 29, 19, 18). They thus added their collective voice to those of their colleagues who were calling for partnership schemes, both between Capital (employers) and Labour (employees) in the workplace, and between government and industry in general. The former type of partnership was intended to eradicate class conflict in the workplace, and thereby give practical effect to the philosophy of One Nation, by ensuring that workers felt more valued and listened to by their employers, in which case, employees were more likely to develop a stronger allegiance to the company or industry in which they were employed. This would render employees less susceptible to left-wing propaganda about ‘exploitation’ of the workers by capitalist bosses, and the associated promotion of a ‘them and us’ mentality by those who were ideologically or politically motivated to foment class conflict and industrial unrest in the workplace. Instead, One Nation Conservatives envisaged that partnership between employers and employees in the workplace would yield a happier workforce and more harmonious industrial relations. Until or unless such partnership could be established, there would continue to be considerable ‘distrust and discontent … among the wage-earners’ due largely to the fact that material improvements in workers’ conditions of employment (such as higher wages and shorter working hours) had not generally been matched by a corresponding improvement in their industrial status: ‘At the root of the problem lies a psychological and not a financial grievance’ (Boothby et al., 1927: 26). Not only would industrial partnership do much to overcome such grievances, and enhance the industrial status and self-esteem of wage earners, it would also foster improved industrial performance and higher output (as workers identified themselves more closely and contentedly with the company or industry in which they were employed), and thereby contribute towards the strengthening of the British economy. This purported link

70

British Conservatism

between poor industrial relations and workers’ alienation or perceived lack of status was to be strongly reiterated when One Nation Conservatives again advocated industrial partnership schemes during the 1950s – by which time, many of them, not least Macmillan himself, had risen to ministerial rank, and were thus able to lend added authority to their promotion of copartnership schemes, albeit always insisting that these could not be enforced via legislation. Macmillan continued to promote a ‘middle way’ between laissez-faire capitalism and state socialism for the rest of his active political life. He wrote several books, pamphlets and tracts during the 1930s, in which he elaborated upon the themes and proposals adumbrated in Industry and the State. For example, in 1933, he published Reconstruction: A Plea for a National Policy, in which he recommended that each industry should be overseen by an industrial council, in order to coordinate economic activity in the difference sectors of the British economy, and provide for some regulation of prices. These industrial or sectoral councils would, in turn, operate under the aegis of a Central Economic Council, comprising representatives from the various sectoral industrial councils, relevant Ministries and outside experts, which would be responsible for more general national-level economic coordination. This was intended not to compel industries and companies to behave in a particular way but to show them the advantages of doing so, and enable them to see how their ensuing actions could contribute towards the modernisation and increased efficiency or competitiveness of the British economy. In many respects, this approach could be seen as a forerunner of the penchant for indicative planning which became politically popular in Britain in the early 1960s, in the context of economic modernisation and enhancing the competitiveness of British industry. It would also mean that individual companies or industries would be less likely to face ‘the prisoner’s dilemma’ of having to make a decision based on a potentially erroneous assumption about what their counterparts were intending to do. Instead, coordination via the Central Economic Council would facilitate a regular exchange of information so that the participants would have a much better understanding of what other companies or industries were intending to do, while also appreciating the wider impact or consequences of their own action and decisions. Although Macmillan was certainly not advocating direct state control – the state’s role was to be an enabler or facilitator, which would seek to encourage, exhort and educate – his approach constituted a clear repudiation of the classic neoliberal premise that the only information which economic agents need is that signalled by market processes, most notably what goods and services

One Nation Conservatism

71

consumers are purchasing, and at what price, with the apparently immutable laws of supply and demand ultimately determining production, costs, sales and profitability. Macmillan elaborated on these policy proposals and the rationale underpinning them in his 1938 book, The Middle Way, the title itself making it crystal clear that he was seeking to chart a course between the two extremes of laissez-faire capitalism and state socialism. Macmillan was convinced that such a mode of industrial partnership was essential if British industry and the wider economy were to modernise and prosper, because the alternative, as he had argued five years earlier, would continue to be ‘a conglomeration of policies pursued by separate units of industry, commerce or finance operating in isolation from one another’ (Macmillan, 1933: passim). He was therefore more convinced than ever that what Britain required was ‘a half-way house between a Free Capitalism and complete State Socialist planning’, and a system which would provide an attractive and realistic alternative to either ‘a leap forward into the twenty-first century or retreat into the nineteenth’. This ‘new synthesis of Capitalist and Socialist theory’ would facilitate a ‘peaceful evolution from a free capitalism to a planned Capitalism’, and as such, would be perfectly ‘in accordance with the traditional English principles of compromise and adjustment’ (Macmillan, 1938: 185–6). Macmillan’s advocacy of this ‘middle way’ was imbued with special significance during the 1930s for two particular, overlapping, reasons. First, much of the decade was dominated by the ‘Great Depression’, an economic collapse precipitated by the 1929 Wall Street Crash in the United States, but whose disastrous repercussions reverberated across the Atlantic. In Britain, this resulted in three million people unemployed and the ensuing ‘Jarrow Marches’. This calamity further convinced Macmillan and numerous other (relatively young) Conservative MPs that laissez-faire capitalism and unregulated ‘market forces’ were no longer (assuming that they had been previously) adequate as a means of ensuring economic prosperity and stability, and of satisfying the populations’ material needs. The other factor which imbued Macmillan’s advocacy of a ‘middle way’ with special significance during the 1930s was the developing political situation in mainland Europe. On the one hand, it was becoming increasingly evident that the 1917 Russian Revolution was rapidly degenerating into a new tyranny, purportedly in the name of socialism and equality, particularly under Stalin’s totalitarian dictatorship. On the other hand, the economic collapse and ensuing mass hardship precipitated by the Wall Street Crash was fuelling the rise of fascism in parts of western Europe, a development

72

British Conservatism

which was itself exacerbated by a fear of Marxism and socialism among some of those who were most anxious about losing their wealth or social status due to unprecedented economic collapse. Although Britain was largely spared the immediate threat of fascism, at least of a home-grown variety (Oswald Mosley’s British Union of Fascists notwithstanding), and also witnessed little discernible increase in support for the far left, developments on the continent nonetheless convinced Macmillan and fellow One Nation Conservatives that the failings of laissez-faire capitalism obliged them to devise a new economic model which would provide a credible alternative to both unfettered market forces and total state control. Only if the Conservatives developed such a system, Macmillan believed, would the long-term future and stability of capitalism and parliamentary democracy be secured. That there was no immediate indigenous threat from the extremes of fascism and Marxism should not lead Conservatives to be complacent about the future stability of the Britain’s economic and political system. In accordance with the Disraelian tradition, Macmillan was fully cognisant that the loyalties of subordinate classes had to be earned, and then constantly reciprocated or rewarded by those who enjoyed privileges and/ or exercised power. Indeed, in his novel Coningsby, Disraeli had observed: ‘Man is made to adore and to obey: but if you will not command him, if you give him nothing to worship, he will fashion his own divinities, and in a chieftain find his own passions’ (Disraeli, 1989: 262). This was evidently a concern which Macmillan wholly shared. However, as Eccleshall has noted, although the post-1931 Conservativedominated National [Coalition] Government did introduce some piecemeal economic and social reforms which could be warmly welcomed by One Nation Conservatives, it did so ‘without embracing Macmillan’s concept of managed capitalism’ (Eccleshall, 1990: 182). It was not until the 1940s, both during and then in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, that the ideas canvassed by Macmillan and other One Nation Conservatives acquired greater credence, and were accordingly given added impetus. The exigencies of the war effort from 1940 onwards heralded a significant increase in state regulation of the British economy, including the central direction of labour and manpower to where there were serious shortages, or where the production of essential supplies was deemed most urgent. Yet this unprecedented degree of command and control was nonetheless pursued without invoking nationalisation per se, and seemed, tacitly at least, to reflect the ‘middle way’ which Macmillan especially had recently been canvassing: state coordination and direction of an economy which

One Nation Conservatism

73

nonetheless remained largely based on private ownership of companies and most industries. The other facet of the wartime coalition which served to enhance the influence of the One Nation Conservatives was the increasing attention directed towards social policy, for even in the midst of the war, some ministers and senior civil servants were contemplating the type of measures and reforms which post-war reconstruction ought to entail. Sir William Beveridge’s November 1942 report, Social Insurance and Allied Services, recommended a significant expansion of the welfare state and rationalisation of the largely un-coordinated, ad hoc plethora of local, public and voluntary bodies providing material assistance to the poor and destitute (with corresponding regional variations in scope and standards). In many respects the Beveridge Report provided a focal point for One Nation Conservatives who were seeking to persuade more of their colleagues that this was, ethically and electorally, the direction in which the Party ought to move. To this end, 1943 witnessed the formation of the Tory Reform Committee, one of whose founders, Thelma Cazalet-Keir, later recalled that a major impetus for its formation had been ‘to encourage the Government to act on Sir William Beveridge’s recommendations’, for these ‘had not been received with undiluted enthusiasm by the Conservatives’. Yet the forty or so Conservatives who comprised the Tory Reform Committee were ‘quite determined not to return to the economic and social policies prevailing between the wars’, and in this regard, ‘we gave our brand of Conservatism the blessed label “progressive”’ (Cazalet-Keir, 1967: 142–3; see also Hoffman, 1964: 40–2; Jeffreys, 1991: 112–38; Kopsch, 1970: 43–63; Ramsden, 1995: 38–49). Or as Hugh Molson (1845: 245), another of its co-founders explained: Disraeli’s Young England in the 1840s, Lord Randolph Churchill’s Tory Democracy in the 1880s, and F. E. Smith’s Conservative Social Reform Committee about 1910, were precedents for what the Tory Reform Committee has tried to do since 1943. (Molson, 1945: 245) Even if it did not necessarily deploy Macmillan’s term, the Tory Reform Committee was clearly an exponent of a ‘middle way’, and often approvingly cited Keynes, to the extent that Hugh Molson provocatively asserted that ‘to follow Adam Smith in the age of Keynes is like adhering to Ptolemaic astronomy after Copernicus’ (Molson, 1945: 250). Even more pointedly, Lord Hinchingbrooke declared that

74

British Conservatism

True Conservative opinion is horrified at the damage done to this country since the last [1914–18] war by ‘individualist’ businessmen, financiers and speculators ranging freely in a laissez-faire economy and creeping unnoticed into the fold of Conservatism to insult the party with their vote at elections … and to injure the character of our people. It would wish nothing better than that these men should collect their baggage and depart. True Conservatism has nothing whatever to do with them and their obnoxious policies. (Hinchingbrooke, 1944: 21; see also Molson, 1945: 249) In the same year, Quinton Hogg insisted that: This twentieth century society demands a measure of control to prevent chaos. The price of ignoring this need is unemployment, cut-throat competition, unbalanced economy, unjust distribution of wealth, slums, ignorance, bitterness, squalor and in the end [class] war … They [the working class] have no hostility to private profit as such. But they do not understand why law should give profits priority over their needs. (Hogg, 1944: 80–81) Consequently, the Tory Reform Committee developed a number of reports and policy proposals, these addressing such issues as aviation, agriculture, coal, education, housing, land use, war pensions and workmen’s compensation (Eccleshall, 1990: 183; Greenleaf, 1983: 256; Hoffman, 1964: 41). The Committee also urged the Conservative Party to commit itself, via the utilisation of Keynesian techniques of demand management, to the postwar pursuit of full employment (Tory Reform Committee, 1943: 8–12, 15–16; 1945; see also Addison, 1975: 232–3; Molson, 1945: 245–8). It has been claimed that ‘The central notion linking members of the Tory Reform Committee was the rejection of the values and policies of business Conservatism, of doctrinaire laissez-faire’, so that, ‘Like some aristocratic party spokesman outside the Committee, Tory Reformers stressed the necessity of accepting state action and private enterprise as complementary’ (Hoffman, 1964: 41–2). This view is supported by Bernard Braine’s emphasis that what was now required was ‘a synthesis between the two extremes’ of individualism and collectivism, ‘so that to the direction provided by the State can be added the immense motive power of individual enterprise’ (Braine, 1948: 115; see also Hogg, 1944: 43–4). Similarly, John Boyd-Carpenter (1950: 11) urged the Conservative Party to adopt a ‘central

One Nation Conservatism

75

position between the extremes of Manchester and Moscow’.3 In this respect, what was envisaged seemed to be a mode of economic management similar to that advocated by Harold Macmillan, for, as Molson explained, The individualists who protest against controls are anarchists who are blind to the need for a planned direction … The Tory Reform idea is that the Government should plan a framework within which industries … would have their allotted task … but that the fullest possible freedom should be left to individuals to exercise their own judgement in the day-to-day management of their business … We do not think the Government should manage all industry, but equally it cannot leave it to sink or swim. (Molson, 1945: 249) Those Conservatives who had become convinced between the late 1920s and early 1940s of the virtues and efficacy of greater state coordination of economic affairs, industrial partnership and a more comprehensive or universal system of social welfare, would have felt simultaneously disappointed yet vindicated by the result of the 1945 general election, for while they would have regretted the emphatic victory by the Labour Party, they would nonetheless have viewed this as confirmation that the British electorate had little desire for a laissez-faire economy and a minimalist welfare system. In this respect, the Conservative Party’s defeat in 1945 election served to vindicate those One Nation Conservatives who were calling for a ‘middle way’. Indeed, some of them wondered whether the scale of Labour’s victory signified a more substantive or long-term shift to the left in British politics (see, for example, Hinchingbrooke, 1946; Hogg, 1945; Macmillan, 1946), in which case, it clearly behoved the Conservative Party to reconsider, if not its principles, then, at least, how they could best be applied to post-war Britain, and thereupon be translated into contemporary policies. Or as Rab Butler expressed it, alluding to Robert Peel’s 1832 Tamworth Manifesto: ‘As in the days of Peel, the Conservatives must be seen to have accommodated themselves to a social revolution’ (Butler, 1971: 133). It was in this context that One Nation Conservatives, some of whom had now risen to senior positions in the post-war Conservative Party (thereby enabling them to exert greater influence on ideological orientation and policies), pursued a dual strategy of advancing a revisionist account of the Party’s history, while committing it more explicitly to economic coordination and strategic oversight (albeit still denouncing state control and interference), industrial partnership and social reform. The articulation of a revisionist

76

British Conservatism

account of Conservative history entailed downplaying the Party’s earlier commitment to economic laissez-faire and concomitant antipathy to welfarism, and emphasising instead the extent to which the Conservatives had always accepted a constructive role for the state in curbing the excesses of ‘the market’ and extremes of inequality between the rich and the poor. Thus did ‘Cub’ Alport assert that the Conservative Party ‘has never been frightened of using the power of the state to improve social condiÂ�tions, to organize economic effort, and to provide collective services’ (Alport, 1946: 14), while future Conservative leader Anthony Eden informed delegates at the Conservatives’ 1947 conference that ‘We are not a party of unbridled, brutal capitalism, and never have been. Although we believe in personal responsibility, and personal initiative in business, we are not the political children of the laissez-faire school. We opposed them decade after decade.’ The same year heard Quintin Hogg (later Lord Hailsham) claim that the Conservative Party had, for a long time, been highly critical of laissez-faire capitalism because it entailed ‘an ungodly and rapaÂ�cious scramble for illgotten gains, in the course of which the rich appeared to get richer and the poor poorer’ (Hogg, 1947: 51). In undertaking this re-writing of its history and reappraisal of its policies, the post-1945 Conservative Party was particularly concerned to attract the support or trust of four discrete sections of British society beyond its traditional or core supporters. First, there was a conscious attempt at making the Party more attractive to floating or politically non-aligned voters, particularly those who certainly did not consider themselves to be socialists, but who were fearful that the return of a Conservative government would presage the dismantling of the welfare state, a return to the mass unemployment of the inter-war years, and renewed industrial strife or class conflict in the workplace. Second, the Conservatives were seeking to win the trust of sections of the working class who had hitherto viewed the party as somehow hostile to ‘the workers’, especially those sections of the skilled working class who did not already vote Conservative. The focus on attracting more support from the skilled working class derived from a strategic calculation that it was among skilled workers that a revulsion against Labour’s egalitarianism goals and redistributive policies would increasingly manifest itself, as these workers witnessed the erosion of their wage differentials vis-à-vis semi-skilled or unskilled manual workers. Once these skilled industrial workers became disillusioned with Labour policies (if they were not so already), then the Conservative Party would be able to attract their support by promoting the party’s belief in pay differentials and economic rewards for talent, hard

One Nation Conservatism

77

work and individual initiative or effort (Conservative Party Archives [CPA], CRD 2/7/6, Sub-Committee on Political Education, ‘Report of the Working Party to the Approach to the Industrial Worker’, 20 July 1950). In short, the Conservatives hoped to convince skilled workers that they would be better served politically and thus better off financially, under a Conservative government than a ‘socialist’ Labour administration. However, this approach also meant that the Conservative Party would need to accept that it would probably not be able to secure the votes of more than 40 per cent of industrial workers, due to the slightly greater proportion of semi-skilled and unskilled workers among the working class as a whole. Indeed, it was alleged that as much as ‘30% of the working population is of mentality which will only respond to a “something for nothing” type of policy’, and for the Conservatives to pledge ‘the sort of policy which would satisfy the shiftless and idlers would be to antagonise the more selfreliant workers’ (CPA, Conservative Research Department [CRD] 2/7/6, Sub-Committee on Political Education, ‘Report of the Working Party on the Approach to the Industrial Worker’, 20 July 1950). The third section of British society whose trust the Conservatives sought to win after 1945 was the trade unions. It was hoped that by publicly committing itself to a more constructive and conciliatory relationship with organised labour, the enmities of the inter-war years, particularly with regard to the 1926 General Strike, the consequent 1927 Trade Disputes Act, and the mass unemployment of the 1930s, could be superseded by more harmonious relations between the Conservatives and trade unions. The patriotism displayed by the trade unions as part of the war effort, followed by the scale of Labour’s victory in 1945, persuaded many Conservatives that they had little to gain – but much to lose – by treating the trade unions as a ‘class enemy’. If the Conservative Party was to prosper in the second half of the twentieth century, then it had to acknowledge ‘the forward march of labour’, and seek a rapprochement with the trade unions, particularly as trade union membership increased from 4.8 million in 1935, to 6.5 million in 1940 and thence to 9 million in 1950. The Conservative Party simply could not afford, electorally, to be openly hostile towards such a vastly expanded and numerous socio-economic constituency. In this context, One Nation Conservatives offered a revisionist account of the party’s approach to trade unionism, emphasising the measures which nineteenth-century Conservative governments had enacted to benefit legitimate trade unionism, such as the 1824–25 repeal of the Combination Acts, the 1859 Molestation of Workmen Act, and the two aforementioned 1875 Acts passed during Disraeli’s premiership.

78

British Conservatism

It was not just that a Conservative government might not be able to govern without the cooperation of the trade unions, but that public fear of renewed ‘class war’ might be sufficient to prevent the Conservatives from being elected in the first place. It was largely to allay such anxieties that the Conservative’s backbench parliamentary labour committee emphasised that Organized labour has won its place as a full partner in the state to be consulted equally at governmental level … the trade-union movement has now firmly established itself as one of the three interests that support our industrial fabric, namely: labour, management and government. The Conservative party regards the existence of strong and independent trade-unionism as an essential safeguard of freedom in an industrial society. It must be the purpose of a Conservative government to strengthen and encourage trade-unions. (CPA, Advisory Committee on Policy [ACP], 3/1 (1951)13, ‘Report of the Trade Union Problems subcommittee’, 2 May 1951)4 The fourth section of British society who the Conservatives were targeting by revising their history and policies after the 1945 election defeat comprised academic and cultural elites, and opinion-formers. This reflected concern that the Conservatives were not viewed favourably by intellectuals, many of whom, Alport lamented, had previously ‘been singled out by the Liberals, socialists and communists as being a most important element in the struggle to mould public opinion’, while the Conservative Party had ‘always underestimated the sort of people known as the intelligentsia’. Yet it was these people, namely ‘the professional classes, school and university teachers, writers, scienÂ�tists, economists’, who were more readily ‘captured by the Fabian Society and who today dominate the Socialist party’. If the Conservative Party continued to ignore them, then ‘they will have no alternative but to gravitate towards the left as they did between the wars’ (Alport, 1946: 21). Although the attempt at appealing to floating and working-class voters on the one hand, and intellectuals on the other, might have suggested distinctive approaches to different audiences, Conservative advocates of a newer, more progressive, approach treated them as inextricably linked, for as Leo Amery argued, there ‘can be no permanent revival of Conservatism without a positive alternative policy to the policy of the socialist left … a clear and comprehensive restatement [of Disraeli’s principles] in the light of present-day conditions’ (Amery, 1946: 5). Also urging clarification of Conservative principles were delegates at the Party’s 1946 annual conference, who demanded a ‘statement giving, in fuller

One Nation Conservatism

79

detail, the principles and programme of the party’. It was in response to such demands that Winston Churchill established an industrial policy committee, whose membership comprised five members of the Conservative front bench, namely Rab Butler (who also chaired it), Oliver Lyttelton, Harold Macmillan, David Maxwell-Fyfe, and Oliver Stanley, while Conservative backbenchers were represented by Sir Peter Bennett, David Eccles, Derrick Heathcoat-Amory, and James Hutchinson. As Ramsden has noted, ‘the composition of the Committee as a whole ensured that things would move in a progressive direction’ (Ramsden, 1980: 109), for most of these figures emanated from the progressive or ‘One Nation’ wing of the parliamentary Conservative Party. What the industrial policy committee produced, in 1947, was The Industrial Charter, which largely provided the intellectual basis of the Conservative Party’s approach to economic affairs, industrial relations and trade unionism for the next 17 years. Selling 2.5 million copies in the first three months of publication, The Industrial Charter has variously been described as ‘the most important post-war policy document produced by the Conservatives’ (Lindsay and Harrington, 1979: 151), ‘an early milestone’ in the Conservative party’s ‘adaptation to post-1945 politics’ (Taylor, 1994: 513), ‘a decisive moment in Conservative post-war history’ (Gilmour and Garnett, 1997: 34), and ‘the most memorable concesÂ�sion a free enterprise party ever made to the spirit of Keynesian economics’ (Howard, 1987: 135). The Industrial Charter opened with a brief statement of ‘economic values’, which acknowledged the need to devise ‘a system of free enterprise which … reconciles the need for central direction with the encouragement of individual effort’, and which would serve to eradicate unemployment while also maximising ‘the security of our social and industrial system’, and seeking to improve the status of ‘the worker … as an individual personality’ through governmental action (Conservative and Unionist Central Office, 1947: 3–4). This introduction was then followed by three substantive sections, the first of which provided a short critique of the problems and immediate objectives of basic industries in the immediate aftermath of the war. To its admirers in the Conservative Party, The Industrial Charter was ‘the pioneer of “the middle way”’ (CPA, CRD 2/7/1, Fraser to Clarke, 8 January 1948), and one newspaper columnist, writing under the pen-name ‘Crossbencher’, observed that Harold Macmillan ‘once wrote a political treatise called The Middle Way. This is the second edition’ (Sunday Express, 15 May 1947), although one suspects that this was not intended as a compliment. Much more fulsome was the depiction offered by the Conservative MP John Boyd-Carpenter, who asserted that the principles and policies enshrined in

80

British Conservatism

The Industrial Charter provided the Party with a ‘central position between the extremes of Manchester and Moscow’ (Boyd-Carpenter, 1950: 11).5 David Eccles explained, in a speech to Conservative candidates adopted for the next general election, that the choice was not between Soviet-style socialist planning and the economic laissez-faire favoured by the Conservative’s ‘anti-planners’, but between the centralised, top-down planning promoted by socialists, and the more ‘constructive’ Conservative approach which uses ‘the methods of freedom in operating our plans’. Ultimately, Eccles emphasised, the objection was not to planning per se, but ‘to the particular aims and methods of Socialist planning’ (CPA, CRD 2/7/29, ‘Forward from the Industrial Charter’, 26 January 1948). Eccles too was attempting to depict The Industrial Charter as a moderate, ‘middle way’ alternative between the extremes of right and left. Not surprisingly, Rab Butler was particularly effusive in his praise, characterising The Industrial Charter as a concerted attempt by the Conservative Party to ‘counter the charge and the fear that we were the party of industrial go-as-you-please and devil-take-the-hindmost, that full employment and welfare state were not safe in our hands’ (Butler, 1971: 146), and in so doing, serving ‘to prove that the Conservatives were human’ (CPA, ACP (54), 19th meeting, 18 June 1954). In this respect, one Conservative historian has emphasised that the objectives of The Industrial Charter were ‘to weld together the Liberal tradition of free enterprise with the … Tory concept of interventionism’ and, thereby provide the Conservative Party with ‘a new Tamworth manifesto’ (Ramsden, 1980: 110). Some proponents also explicitly cited Disraeli’s Sybil, and the need to overcome ‘two nations’ or, in this context, ‘two sides’ of industry, by promoting a ‘united effort in a common cause’ (CPA, CRD 2/7/1, Michael Fraser, ‘The Industrial Charter’, December 1947). Meanwhile, one Conservative constituency activist was so enthused by The Industrial Charter that he deemed it ‘the finest document ever produced by the party’, and suggested that it might well ‘produce an additional 3 million votes at the next election,’ while also urging the Conservative leadership to ‘stand by for converts’ (CPA, CRD 2/7/30 (1), Day to Butler, 12 May 1947). To those on the party’s right who denounced The Industrial Charter as quasi-socialist (see the next chapter), Macmillan’s response was characteristically and loftily dismissive, declaring that when the Conservative’s right-wing claimed that The Industrial Charter was not Tory policy, what they really meant was that ‘they wish it were not Tory policy’, pointedly adding that ‘Fortunately, their wishes cannot be granted’ (Macmillan, 1969: 306). In similar vein, Rab Butler later recalled with evident glee how he, along with

One Nation Conservatism

81

other ‘progressive’ Conservatives, ‘managed in one way or another to upset the right-wing or country-squire element’ in the party (Butler, 1982: 96). Certainly, many Conservative grass-roots members considered it ‘good … to find that there are Progressives in the Party’, fearing that they were ‘in far greater danger of being sabotaged by our own right wing than of being defeated … by the Socialists’. The danger facing the party, such Conservatives warned, was ‘to be held back by these reactionaries on our Right’ (CPA, CRD 2/7/30 (1), Verity to Butler, 24 May 1947). A similarly delighted Macmillan explained that ‘Between the two wars there was always a progressive element in the party; but it never dominated the party. Now it has seized the control, not by force or palace revolution, but by the vigour of its intellectual and spiritual power’ (Tory Challenge, November 1947). Three years after the publication of The Industrial Charter, the Party leadership’s apparent commitment to effecting One Nation Conservatism seemed to be buttressed by the formation of the eponymous One Nation Group. This was a Conservative backbench ‘ginger group’ formed immediately after the party had only narrowly lost the 1950 general election, which has been described as ‘probably the most famous and significant of the many groups that have proliferated since 1945’, this accolade being earned ‘due to its longevity and to the high proportion of its members who rose to ministerial office’, these including Robert Carr, Ian Gilmour, Edward Heath and Iain Macleod. Indeed, Carr, Heath and Macleod were among the nine original founders of the One Nation Group, along with Cuthbert ‘Cub’ Alport, Richard Fort, Gilbert Longden, Angus Maude, Enoch Powell and John Rodgers (Garnett and Hickson, 2009: 29–30; Seawright, 2005: 72–5; 2010: 9; Walsh, 2000: 184, 187). Of course, one or two of these figures, most notably Angus Maude and Enoch Powell, were later to become associated with Conservative neo-liberalism, which trenchantly rejected the One Nation approach, but in 1950 all of these founder members were agreed that, having lost two consecutive general elections (albeit only narrowly in the case of the second), the party urgently required a more constructive and coherent approach to social reform to convince voters that the recently established Beveridgian welfare state would not be endangered by a Conservative government. The framework of such an approach was provided in the Group’s first publication, simply called One Nation, in which the nine founder members outlined what they believed should be the Conservative Party’s approach to social policy in the 1950s, with individual chapters addressing specific topics such as care of the elderly, education, health, housing, industrial relations and wealth redistribution.

82

British Conservatism

The last of these chapters is of particular interest to us in the context of our focus on Conservatism and inequality, and it is in this chapter especially that some of the ambiguities which various commentators have discerned in One Nation are clearly evident. In particular, while acknowledging both the inevitability and efficacy of some wealth redistribution from rich to poor through the combined impact of progressive taxation and social security payments to individuals, it was suggested that the balance between wealth creation and wealth redistribution had now tilted too far towards the latter, to the extent that the continued creation of wealth upon which redistribution and ‘the future well-being of … the poorest’ depended was in jeopardy, although the consequent call for a reduction in taxation focused primarily on death and estate duties. It was also suggested that ‘inducements instead of deterrents [should be] offered to wealth to accept responsibility in any sector’, thereby safeguarding ‘the independence of private beneficence’ and incentives to create wealth, both of which would otherwise be endangered by too much state provision of social welfare, particularly if financed by punitive rates of taxation. These assertions seem to be somewhat at odds with the common image of One Nation Conservatism as a proponent of state action to alleviate excessive inequality and social problems which cannot be eradicated by the market – indeed, which may be caused by market failure. However, it needs to be reiterated that One Nation Conservatives were not egalitarians and still believed firmly in the naturalness and necessity of socio-economic inequality, and thus were anxious that post-war social reforms and welfarism might be pushed too far, due to Labour’s professed egalitarianism. It was therefore emphasised that whereas Labour’s socialist objectives imbued its social policy with universalist principles and provision of ‘an average standard’ in the name of equality, Conservatives aimed to help those most in need, while also providing ‘a minimum standard, above which people should be free to rise as far as their industry, their thrift, their ability or their genius may take them’. Moreover, this was deemed to reflect a Conservative principle that the strong should help the weak, whereas socialists allegedly wanted to weaken the strong in the misguided belief that this would strengthen the weak (One Nation Group, 1950: 9). It should also be noted that while many One Nation Conservatives, particularly Macmillan, did envisage an enhanced role for the state in economic and social affairs, they also believed, like Disraeli, that many social problems could and should be tackled by ‘intermediate institutions’, such as private bodies, charities and voluntary organisations, for example, with the state only directly intervening when other modes of intervention had either failed,

One Nation Conservatism

83

or were not forthcoming in the first place. They were always concerned to maintain a balance – a middle way – between individual endeavour and central direction, and between private initiatives and political intervention, and One Nation Conservatives did not accept that if they occasionally criticised the state for having been extended too far, or claimed that tax levels had been raised too high, that this somehow signalled a dilution or abandonment of their commitment to materially assisting and supporting the poorest and weakest in society. They still remained fully committed to elevating the condition of the people through a judicious blend of private and public measures, and with the intention always being to ‘level up’ the poor, not ‘level down’ the rich (as Labour was accused of wanting to doÂ� in pursuit of equality). However, another reason for the seemingly circumspect character of One Nation’s approach to social reform, and its intimation that things had already gone too far, was the eclecticism of its authors, for as we have already noted, some of them later became closely associated with the Conservative neo-liberal backlash against One Nation Conservatism, and as such, the eclecticism which existed in the One Nation Group from the outset meant that publications such as One Nation invariably enshrined something of a compromise between its members, while also seeking to strike ‘a balance between a qualified acceptance of the state’s role in social provision, and the need to foster greater competition and freedom in order to generate the wealth that could pay for that provision’ (Walsh, 2000: 194). In this important respect, One Nation was broadly consistent with the progressive philosophy enshrined three years’ earlier in The Industrial Charter, for both tracts sought to pilot a ‘middle way’ between laissez-faire and collectivism (Garnett and Hickson, 2009: 30). Meanwhile, in his elegant biography of ‘Cub’ Alport, Mark Garnett notes that the latent differences between some of the members of the One Nation Group were initially kept in check because of the extent to which they had a clearly identifiable target in attacking Clement Attlee’s Labour government, particularly the scale of economic intervention and social provision which it pursued, ostensibly in the name of egalitarianism and socialism. By directing their collective fire against the policies of the Labour government in 1950, the One Nation Group was able to avoid a more detailed, and potentially divisive, discussion about how much inequality they were prepared to tolerate or promote, and how low (or high) their ‘minimum standard’ of material assistance and support for the poor would be set. Similarly, Garnett observes that although the One Nation Group expressed a clear preference for private provision over state provision as far as practicably possible, this belied the

84

British Conservatism

fact that ‘some members regarded this as a dogmatic principle while others based their views on pragmatic considerations’, yet these underlying differences did not become fully evident until several years later, in the context of changed circumstances (Garnett, 1999: 105). In similar vein, Macleod’s biographer noted that in spite of the genuflections towards self-reliance and targeting of welfare provision, ‘there is a world of difference between, on the one hand, the Tory acceptance of the welfare state that underpinned One Nation and its authors’ wish to make it work more effectively, and, on the other hand, the laissez-faire rejection of state provision that increasingly influenced Conservative thinking on the welfare state during the 1980s’ (Shepherd, 1994: 63). One Nation Conservatism in practice, 1951–78 Consequently, what is perhaps most notable when looking back at the 1951–64 Conservative governments is the contrast between some of the party’s rhetoric about ‘setting the people free’ and advocating greater individual self-reliance, and the reality of the actual policies which it pursued or sustained in office, many of which constituted a significant degree of continuity with what the Conservatives inherited from the 1945–51 Labour governments. As one academic expert on the welfare state has noted, for example, the period from 1951 to 1964 ‘was not an era of significant social policy change. What is remarkable about it … is the extent to which it was a period of continuity for social policy’ (Hill, 1993: 46). Meanwhile, in his studies of the 1951–55 Churchill government, Anthony Seldon has observed the extent to which this administration ‘was remarkable perhaps above all for its consensus approach in most areas of policy, and for its continuity with policies pursued by the Attlee government’ (Seldon, 1989: 67; see also Seldon, 1981: passim; Ramsden, 1977: 423). Crucially, though, whereas Labour often linked its economic and social policies to professed egalitarian or socialist objectives (however loosely and flexibly defined), One Nation Conservatives viewed them in terms of ‘humanizing’ and thus legitimising capitalism, with Butler among those in the Party who was ‘convinced that Keynesian policy towards the economy was a secure foundation for … the survival of capitalism’, and as such, the prevalent Conservative approach in the first two decades after 1945 ‘was not to challenge the broad consensus of popular agreement on economic policy that had arisen in the 1940s, but to impart a distinctly Conservative emphasis within that area of agreement’ (Ramsden, 1977: 431). This partly explains why the years immediately following the 1947 publication of The Industrial Charter heard the Conservatives call for a scaling back of state

One Nation Conservatism

85

control and a commitment to ‘set the people free’, although these calls were largely concerned with the ongoing dismantling of war-time controls and rationing, which the party accused Labour of being too tardy in removing. Certainly, the Party’s election victory in 1951 did not presage a major repeal of the economic and social polices enacted by the Attlee administrations. On the contrary, those measures which were reversed or terminated were notable precisely because they were the exception to the retentionist rule. For example, the 1951–55 Conservative government only denationalised two of the industries which Labour had taken into public ownership, namely iron and steel, in 1953, and road haulage the following year, and even then, the former was subject to strategic supervision in the guise of an Iron and Steel Board. The other nationalised industries remained publicly owned, right through until the 1980s and 1990s. Although the One Nation Conservatives had not advocated public ownership per se, the existence of a mixed economy, albeit one in which 80 per cent of the economy remained in private hands, was one which they could broadly accept, not least because it seemed commensurate with Macmillan’s ‘middle way’ vision of the state providing general or strategic coordination of the activities of a predominately private sector economy; government would establish the broad parameters or a framework of national needs and objectives, while leaving the majority of firms relatively free to conduct their business on a day-to-day basis. In effect, this was a system which sought to meld political oversight with predominantly private ownership, except where an industry was deemed to be too strategically important to be left in private hands, or was unattractive to the private sector due to lack of profitability, in which case One Nation Conservatives could pragmatically acknowledge a case for direct state intervention in the guise of public ownership. This last aspect especially reflected the One Nation Conservatives’ particular interpretation of Conservatism’s professed non-ideological and flexible character, a philosophy which readily governs according to immediate circumstances rather than on the basis of theory or dogma, and which also seeks a consensual approach as far as is feasible, which in turn would buttress overall social stability and cohesion and ultimately foster national unity. These values meant that while One Nation Conservatives were committed to private ownership of companies and industries in principle, and thus wholly in accordance with Conservative philosophy, they could, in particular contexts or on certain occasions, accede to the nationalisation of a particular industry, albeit with little enthusiasm. As Lord Kilmuir subsequently explained:

86

British Conservatism

We had to face up to the problem that, much as we dislike nationalization and its top-heavy monopolies and inefficient consequences, there might still be an argument for leaving certain industries – particularly those in the nature of public utilities – nationalized, rather than having them for ever being the shuttlecock of every change of the party in power. (Kilmuir, 1964: 163) Thus has one commentator remarked that, in spite of the Conservatives’ formal commitment to private enterprise, and the party’s various pledges in opposition (between 1945 and 1951) with regard to reducing the role of the state in economic affairs and ‘setting the people free’ from controls and regulations, ‘the main thing to stress is how little was done … either to change the existing structures or to clarify the relationship between the government and the state-owned corporations’ (Gourvish, 1991: 121). Along with maintaining the bulk of the mixed economy which they inherited from the Attlee governments, the post-1951 Conservative governments also adhered to the commitment to full employment, the maintenance of which One Nation Conservatives viewed as a prime objective for several reasons. It was widely acknowledged, across most of the political spectrum, that high unemployment was bad for the individuals concerned, and bad for society itself, not least because it meant that human resources and skills were lying idle and possibly atrophying, when they could be utilised for the benefit of the British economy. Certainly, the influence of Keynesianism fostered the view among mainstream politicians that governments could – and thus should – regulate aggregate demand in a manner which made full employment attainable. This rendered unacceptable the widely held prewar view that periodic unemployment was an economic fact of life, which governments could do little to prevent overall, at least not without jettisoning a predominantly laissez-faire approach or endorsing widespread wage cuts to price workers back into work. This latter stance reflected a common Conservative view that a major cause of unemployment was excessive pay among industrial workers, in which case their wages needed to be adjusted – downwards – to reflect market conditions and the greater supply of labour vis-à-vis demand for labour in a recession. Needless to say, this perspective tended to downplay structural causes or accounts of mass unemployment and, instead, blamed it on particular one-off events or the actions of irresponsible workers and trade unions. Three further reasons also informed the One Nation Conservatives’ commitment to full employment after 1945, one of which was recognition that

One Nation Conservatism

87

the welfare state, which they also endorsed (see below), largely depended on full employment, not only because this would obviously minimise the demand for social security payments, most notably those pertaining to unemployment, but because only maximum employment would generate sufficient income tax and National Insurance revenues to fund social security from cradle to grave, along with ‘free’ education and the NHS. It was also widely accepted that full employment was electorally popular, in which case, any political party which failed publicly to commit itself to this policy objective was thought likely to be emphatically rejected by the voters. Finally, a number of senior One Nation Conservatives, most notably Macmillan himself, recalled witnessing the misery and hardship endured by many of their constituents during the ‘Great Depression’ of the 1930s, and were therefore determined that there should be no repeat of such experiences. One key problem with full employment, though, was that it enhanced the bargaining power of the trade unions, and consequently yielded growing concern about the inflationary impact of annual wage increases. Of course, one response might have been to abandon full employment, in order to weaken the trade unions or instil a fear of job losses into employees, and certainly, there were Conservative neo-liberals (and some Treasury mandarins) who would have welcomed a switch to such a policy. However, for the reasons just delineated, any abandonment of the commitment to full employment, particularly one which deliberately aimed to increase unemployment as a means of reducing wages or weakening the trade unions, was anathema to the One Nation Conservatives who dominated most Conservative policy-making throughout the 1950s and 1960s, and even into the mid 1970s. Not only were One Nation Conservatives opposed to higher unemployment on ethical or compassionate grounds (i.e., the human misery and material deprivation which would be caused), they were also, as ever, concerned about the legitimacy and stability of the existing socio-economic order. Their perspective was reflected in the observation of Brendan Sewill, who had been Special Assistant to the Chancellor of the Exchequer and former Director of the Conservative Research Department, that, if we were to rely on monetary policy alone, only permanent depression could keep inflation at bay. If the inescapable result of such a policy were permanent mass unemployment, it would be clear to all and sundry that the capitalist democratic system had failed. (Sewill 1975: 40)

88

British Conservatism

This was certainly a concern which One Nation Conservatives shared, and which increased during the 1970s, when rising unemployment and inflation was accompanied by growing demands in the Conservative Party, encouraged further by New Right academics and associated think tanks, for a shift to economic neo-liberalism, as discussed in the next chapter. In this context, One Nation Conservatives increasingly warned that deliberately allowing unemployment to rise, as a consequence of applying monetarist policies and cutting public expenditure in order to curb inflation and weaken the trade unions, would threaten the efficacy and survival of capitalism and parliamentary democracy themselves. In order to reconcile the seemingly inherent tension between full employment and inflationary wage pressures derived from increased workers’ confidence (about the security of their jobs) and trade union bargaining strength, One Nation Conservatives pursued three other initiatives in order simultaneously to encourage greater ‘responsibility’ by industrial workers, and also foster the closer ties between Capital and Labour (industrial workers) which would themselves contribute immeasurably towards the development one ‘one nation’, both in the workplace, and in Britain more generally. The first approach was the One Nation Conservatives’ advocacy of industrial partnership, as enunciated in The Industrial Charter, which was intended, among other tings, to overcome the feelings of alienation and lack of self-worth which many workers apparently experienced, and which were assumed to underpin the type of grievances which sporadically flared into strikes or other forms of industrial action. These negative sentiments were also assumed to be routinely encouraged and exploited by Communists for their own political ends (see, for example, CPA, CRD 2/7/39 (2), Watkinson to Butler, 6 July 1951). The development of industrial partnership was thus intended to help the industrial worker ‘to comprehend the social importance of his job and so of himself ’ (CPA, CRD 2/7/14 (IRC 21), ‘Problems of Social Balance in Industry’, 15 November 1955), while simultaneously heralding an end to ‘us and them’ attitudes between management and labour, or what Anthony Eden once referred to as ‘the ‘Maginot line’ mentalÂ�ity in industry’ (quoted in Conservative Research Department, 1956: 10), and what Sir William Robson Brown termed ‘a form of inverse apartheid’ (House of Commons Debates, ser. 5, vol. 636, col. 1931). It was anticipated that industrial partnership would foster more harmonious industrial relations deriving from greater trust between employers and workers, and ultimately help to establish a form of ‘one nation’ in the workplace (One Nation Group, 1950: 72–6, 78).

One Nation Conservatism

89

Crucially, though, advocacy of industrial partnership by One Nation Conservatives certainly did not presuppose any equality between employers and employees – managerial authority remained sacrosanct: ‘we do not intend any Sovietisation which would transfer the authority of management to a committee’ (CPA, CRD 2/7/32, Greenwell to Butler, 5 January 1948; see also CPA, CRD 2/7/1, Hutchinson to Fraser, 22 July 1948) – but it did envisage increased communication and consultation between management and labour. This, of course, was perfectly in accordance with the One Nation Conservative approach to reducing inequality (but definitely not pursuing equality per se) by ‘levelling up’ the status of industrial workers, not ‘levelling down’ that of the employers and managers. Hierarchy and inequality would certainly remain, but would not be as wide or as deep as previously, and as such, would enjoy greater acceptance or legitimacy among a supposedly more contented, and ultimately more productive, workforce (it being assumed that happy workers are also harder workers). In this regard, one can also discern echoes of feudalistic relations between leaders and led, with employers expected to show concern for those they employed. At a wider level, it was also envisaged that industrial partnership would provide workers ‘with a practical insight into the working of the free enterÂ�prise system’ (CPA, ACP (55) 39, I.R.C 18, ‘Co–Partnership – 1955’, 21 October 1955; see also CPA, CCO 4/2/83, Douglas to Kaberry, 14 November 1955), thereby further guiding industrial workers away from the siren calls of the left. Second, the early 1960s heralded a new Conservative approach to promoting industrial partnership, for whereas the emphasis had hitherto been on closer and more regular consultation between employers and employees, or management and trade unions, the new initiative – which was in addition to, not instead of, partnership in the workplace – entailed a formal institutional partnership between trade unions, employers’ representatives and ministers at the very highest level. To this end, in 1962, Macmillan and his chancellor, Selwyn Lloyd, established the National Economic Development Council (NEDC) – originally to have been called either the National Economic Advisory Council or Coordination of Economic Resources – a tripartite body in which the three institutional partners would meet, on a regular basis, to consider ways in which the performance of the British economy could be improved, and thereby foster increased industrial productivity and a higher rate of economic growth. The antecedents of the NEDC can be discerned in Macmillan’s 1933 proposal of a Central Economic Council as we noted earlier. Macmillan was fully aware that this neo-corporatist forum would be viewed with deep disdain by the economic neo-liberals on the Conservative

90

British Conservatism

right, an expectation which was fully realised when the relevant Cabinet discussions revealed ‘a rather interesting and quite deep divergence of view between Ministers, really corresponding to whether they had old Whig, Liberal, laissez-faire traditions, or Tory opinions, paternalists, and not afraid of a little dirigisme’ (Macmillan, 1973: 37). However, Macmillan emphasised that the Conservative Party ‘has always consisted of a number holding the laissez-faire tradition, but of an equal number in favour of some direction’, and that as such, we should not ‘be afraid of a switch over towards more direction.’ Certainly, Macmillan sought to pre-empt right-wing objections by defiantly declaring that ‘I have no fear of it because these were the policies I recommended before the war’, mischievously adding that ‘I shall be able to claim, like Disraeli, that I have educated my Party’ (NA PREM 11/3841, Macmillan to Lloyd, 15 July 1961). A month later, when a lead article in the Daily Telegraph criticised the growing political and civil service enthusiasm for economic planning, Macmillan dismissed this as the ‘usual carping’ by the paper, and reiterated that the government should persevere. We might even, Macmillan suggested, ‘devise something on the French basis which could be Conservative or “Middle Way” and would dish the Whigs’. As to the resistance which his chancellor was likely to face from a Treasury ‘which is still extremely laissez-faire by tradition’, Macmillan’s advice was an emphatic ‘do not let this deter you’ (NA PREM 11/3841, Macmillan to Lloyd, 14 August 1961), subsequently reiterating that ‘I do not think we need to be too alarmed by right-wing criticisms which are really heirs of the Liberal laissez-faire policy’, and which are thus naturally disapproving of ‘our pragmatic approach’ (NA PREM 11/4314, Macmillan to Lloyd, 28 August 1961). Support for this new approach was proffered by Quintin Hogg, on the grounds that ‘Private enterprise as our fathers knew it, and socialism, have both failed’ (PREM 11/4071, Hogg [later Lord Hailsham] to Macmillan, 8 June 1962). The notion of a tripartite or neo-corporatist forum such as the NEDC was clearly discernible in the 1959 Conservative manifesto’s pledge that a re-elected Conservative government would invite trade union leaders and employers’ representatives to discuss jointly the industrial relations problems which the country was likely to encounter during the next five years (Craig, 1970: 189), although as Macmillan’s above comment indicates, the antecedents can be traced back to his advocacy of The Middle Way. Certainly, another One Nation Conservative subsequently spoke approvingly of this institutional innovation by characterising it as ‘a recognizable sketch of his grand design of the 1930s’ (Gilmour, 1978: 246; see also Gilmour and Garnett, 1997: 167; Walker, 1977: 26, 28).

One Nation Conservatism

91

However, the ministers most closely involved – Macmillan as Prime Minister, Edward Heath as Minister of Labour and Selwyn Lloyd as Chancellor – soon agreed that any such talks ought to be more comprehensive in scope than merely identifying specific industrial relations problems and securing agreed solutions. Consequently, it was formally agreed that the proposed tripartite meetings should encompass a range of industrial and economic issues, not least because industrial relations problems could not be isolated from these wider societal issues; on the contrary, they invariably reflected them, and sometimes caused or exacerbated them. It therefore made little sense to hold tripartite talks about ways of improving industrial relations without simultaneously discussing how Britain’s economic and industrial performance could also be improved. The NEDC was not formally concerned with determining wages, or stipulating what level of pay was reasonable or affordable, but ministers did anticipate that through these tripartite meetings, trade union leaders would learn the ‘economic facts of life’, and consequently appreciate the need for moderating their annual pay claims. In this respect, the NEDC was not directly concerned with imposing wage restraint on industrial workers and trade unions, but with educating them as to the need for such restraint, which it was hoped would be accepted voluntarily. However, it was also acknowledged that such awareness might take a little time to develop, perhaps after several meetings of the NEDC, so in tandem with establishing this neo-corporatist forum in 1962, ministers began pursuing a third strategy to underpin the party’s formal commitment to full employment, namely incomes policies to curb ‘excessive’ wage increases, although always in the hope that these would pave the way for a longer-term, but voluntary, system for securing agreements on pay restraint by industrial workers and trade unions. The recourse to incomes policies reflected the prevalent view during this period concerning cost-push inflation, whereby employers and companies raised prices in order to finance wage increases, whereupon trade unions sought higher pay to offset the increased cost of living occasioned by those price increases. Ministers hoped that incomes policies, in tandem with the ‘educative’ role of forums such as the NEDC (teaching trade union leaders the economic facts of life), would tackle this problem. Furthermore, it was envisaged that if wages increases could be jointly agreed via incomes policies, then this would also obviate the additional problem of ‘pay leap-frogging’, whereby a wage increase obtained by one trade union prompted other trade unions to seek a higher claim (than they might otherwise have done) in order to ‘keep up’, or protect pay differentials (for a full discussion of the Conservative recourse to incomes

92

British Conservatism

polices between 1961 and 1964, and then during 1972–73, see Dorey, 2001a: ch. 3 and 5; 2009b: ch. 6). There was seemingly a temporary departure from this One Nation approach at the beginning of the 1970s, when Edward Heath led the Conservatives to victory in the 1970 election, pledging a much more marketorientated, ostensibly neo-liberal, approach to tackling Britain’s economic and industrial problems and fostering greater competiveness. This entailed pledges to reduce state intervention in the economy, lower income tax, cut public expenditure (which would also entail imposing strict pay limits on public sector workers) and curb the power of the trade unions. However, this ‘Selsdon Man’ programme (so named because it had been formally endorsed by the Shadow Cabinet in January 1970, at a special meeting held at the Selsdon Park Hotel, Surrey) proved to be a rather short-lived affair, to the extent that early 1972 witnessed the Heath government hurriedly seek a return to the consensual, neo-corporatist approach of the early 1960s, as ministers recoiled from the likely prospect of unemployment reaching one million (assumed to be politically unacceptable at that juncture) and bitter trade union opposition both to the government’s Industrial Relations Act (which was further undermined by several high-profile judicial decisions which went against the government) and its attempts at imposing curbs on public sector pay. With hindsight, though, the assumption that ‘Selsdon Man’ constituted a sharp break with the former One Nation approach and a shift towards proto-Thatcherite economic neo-liberalism has been disputed, with a member of the Tory Reform Group asserting, in 1978, that The Macmillan-Butler tradition was continued by Edward Heath … Despite the myth of Selsdon Man, a myth built up by Harold Wilson [Labour Party leader from 1963 to 1976] and now perpetuated by many Tories determined to try and brand him as some sort of Tory renegade, Heath was never a right-winger. The policies with which the party won the 1970 election were certainly radical but never reactionary. (Russel, 1978: 11) Russel’s defence of Heath was echoed by Ian Gilmour, who observed that although ‘The Conservatives moved slightly to the Right from 1964 to 1970 … they did not depart from the consensus’ (Gilmour, 1978: 21), a point he later reiterated when, in a chapter co-authored with Mark Garnett, he emphasised ‘Heath was not a follower of Hayek and Friedman in 1970

One Nation Conservatism

93

and he was no socialist in 1972’ (Garnett and Gilmour, 1996: 82). Not dissimilarly, Kavanagh has suggested that ‘Heath had a managerial view of government; its job was to intervene in industry and social welfare, where there was a proven need’, and as such, in spite of the ‘Selsdon Man’ rhetoric in 1970, Heath ‘represented continuity with many of the “one nation” principles associated with Eden, Macmillan and R. A. Butler’ (Kavanagh, 1989: 217). There has also been disagreement over the extent to which the swift abandonment of ‘Selsdon Man’ at the beginning of 1972 constituted a ‘U-turn’, for whereas Kavanagh (1989: 218, 232) is among those who refer to Heath’s ‘spectacular policy U-turns’, others, such as Garnett and Hickson claim that ‘he had actually done no such thing’ (2009: 173), while Gilmour and Garnett (1996: 82) suggest that Heath’s alleged ‘complete U-turn’ was something of a myth which derived from media misrepresentation, but one which subsequently ‘proved useful for Thatcherites wishing to discredit Heath’. Of course, if it is maintained that the apparent radicalism or neo-liberal character of Selsdon Man was greatly exaggerated, or even misrepresented, by Heath’s political critics or opponents, then it also becomes easier to accept that the policy shifts of early 1972 did not really constitute ‘U-turns’ after all, but pragmatic changes enacted in response to circumstances. In reverting back to an explicitly consensual and neo-corporatist approach, Heath insisted that there had to be ‘a more sensible way’ of tackling Britain’s economic and industrial problems, while one of his closest colleagues, Douglas Hurd, acknowledged that neither the Conservative Party nor the country could prosper by setting one class against another, however many war-like telegrams the party’s grass-roots members and supporters sent to Central Office (Hurd, 1979: 105). Meanwhile, the Chancellor, Anthony Barber, informed the Conservatives’ 1972 conference that while the government’s approach undoubtedly entailed some interference with market forces – the Cabinet had, by this time, nationalised Rolls Royce to save it from bankruptcy, and had also directly intervened to save Upper Clyde Shipbuilders from bankruptcy, fearing that redundancies would precipitate civil unrest on Clydeside, and resorted to incomes policies – this was vastly preferable to the rampant inflation (then running at 8 per cent) and escalating unemployment which would otherwise ensue. To those Conservative neo-liberals who were arguing that the best cure for inflation was to curb the money supply and cut public expenditure, Peter Tapsell retorted that this would merely serve to compound Britain’s economic problems, by precipitating further bankruptcies, higher unemployment and postponed investment. Such ‘unacceptable social and

94

British Conservatism

economic costs’ rendered it essential that the government relied upon an incomes policy, rather than a drastic reduction of the money supply, as its chief weapon in the battle against inflation (House of Commons Debates, ser. 5, vol. 845, col. 878), a perspective also articulated by one of Tapsell’s backbench colleagues, David Knox (ibid.: col. 1107). Tapsell subsequently claimed that it would ‘never again be possible anywhere in the Western world efficiently to maintain an industrialised parliamentary democracy without an incomes policy’ (House of Commons Debates, ser. 5, vol. 914, cols. 1236–42), a view echoed by Edward Heath himself, after he had been replaced by Margaret Thatcher as Conservative leader in 1975, whereupon he asserted that incomes policies were ‘concerned with the practical questions of running the economy and choosing the “least worst” of the options before us’, before reiterating his view that ‘policies which allow unemployment to rise to levels of 3 million or more, and which in effect marginalise the trades unions’ are hardly likely ‘to promote long-term economic, social or political stability’ (Heath, 1998: 571, 731; see also House of Commons Debates, ser. 5, vol. 891, cols.1707–8). Similar views were expressed by Heath’s erstwhile Employment Secretary, Robert Carr (1975), and several other One Nation Conservatives during the mid to late 1970s, such as Reginald Maudling (1978: 266–7), James Prior (Conservative News, October 1978), Peter Walker (1977: 67, and House of Commons Debates, ser. 5, vol. 909, cols. 495–501), William Whitelaw (Conservative Party Archives, Leader’s Consultative Committee, 1/3/1, LCC (74) 8, undated but circa April 1974 and LCC (74) 10, 1 May 1974). However, to their Conservative proponents, incomes policies were not just a vital policy tool with which to pursue full employment and lowinflation economic growth via a partnership with organised labour, they were also sometimes viewed as a means of tackling poverty and helping the lowest paid. This was because some incomes polices deliberately enshrined provisions to permit slightly higher wage increases for low-paid than were permitted for better-off employees. In other words, although they were primarily a mode of economic management to control inflation (on the basis that increasing unit labour costs prompted employers and companies to increase their prices accordingly, whereupon trade unions would then press for another pay increase to keep up with the increased cost of living experienced by their members), incomes policies often enshrined an element of social justice. For example, one of the incomes policies introduced by the Heath government, in April 1973, stipulated that pay increases would be limited to 4 per cent plus £1 per week increase (this at a time when a manual labourer would have earned approximately £25 per week), this cash

One Nation Conservatism

95

sum clearly being worth more to a low paid worker than someone on a high salary. This was succeeded, in November 1973, by an incomes policy which permitted a cash sum (as opposed to percentage) pay increase, which again would have been worth rather more, proportionally, to a low-paid worker. Again, this was wholly in accordance with the One Nation Conservatives’ approach to tackling poverty and extremes of inequality by raising the incomes of the poorest – elevating the condition of the people – rather than levelling down by directly taking money away from the rich (as they would accuse Old Labour of seeking to do) to transfer to the poor. However, One Nation Conservatives did accept some forms of indirect wealth redistribution, in the guise of a comprehensive welfare state, for this was predominantly financed from general taxation, which was levied at rather higher rates on the better-off. This was something which One Nation Conservatives were generally rather more sanguine about than their neoliberal colleagues, even if they did routinely warn that the tax burden was approaching the limits of acceptability or feasibility. For example, writing in 1978, Ian Gilmour averred that ‘taxation is too high’, yet he also acknowledged that once the principle of progressive taxation was accepted, ‘there is no clear stopping point at which it can be said that to go beyond that point would be intolerable’. However, like many Conservatives, especially of the One Nation variant, Gilmour readily accepted that ‘common sense and equity surely point to some degree of progression in taxation’, and in so doing, he quoted Adam Smith’s assertion that ‘it is not unreasonable that the rich should contribute to the public expense, not only in proportion, but something more than in that proportion’ (Gilmour, 1978: 115). Social policy and the welfare state One of the key aspects of the 1945–51 Labour governments’ programme which the Conservative Party broadly maintained until 1979 was the welfare state, although there were almost constant debates among Conservatives over the extent to which social policy should be the responsibility of the state, rather than individuals and/or their families, voluntary bodies and charities. Naturally, the party’s neo-liberals and individualists – as we will see in the next chapter – were antipathetic towards a comprehensive welfare state and its extensive, publicly funded system of social security ‘from cradle to grave’, but for much of this period these critics were marginalised and muted, due to the dominance of One Nation Conservatives in the higher echelons of the Party. Even though they themselves were not wholly uncritical about aspects of the welfare state, particularly when Labour was in office, during which time the Conservative opposition was inclined publicly

96

British Conservatism

to denounce many ‘socialist’ policies for their detrimental impact on the economy, individual liberty and self-reliance, as well as their alleged objective of pursuing equality, what was most notable about the One Nation Conservatives during the three decades immediately following the Second World War was the extent to which they maintained the broad framework of the welfare state and concomitant social polices which they inherited from Labour in 1951, and generally increased aggregate spending on social policies. Rhetorical criticism of the scope and scale of welfare provision was rarely matched by actual repeal or reversal of such social measures when the Conservatives were in government. As Harriet Jones has noted, although the party’s 1950 and 1951 election campaigns pledged to ‘set the people free’ and liberate private enterprise from a decade of wartime – and then Labour’s post-1945 – controls and regulations, the reality was that a combination of relative economic prosperity (which facilitated steadily increasing tax revenues with which to fund social policies) and electoral considerations throughout the 1950s, meant that ‘the [Conservative] party was able to postpone a confrontation over welfare in the 1950s, and … was never forced to develop a coherent general strategy for change’ (Jones, 1996: 243). Instead, the dominant approach appears to have been one of consolidating many of the reforms implemented by the Attlee governments, to the extent that there was remarkably little repeal or reversal of Labour’s social and welfare polices following the Conservatives’ election victory in 1951. Certainly, the narrowness of the Conservatives’ electoral victory in 1951, when the party won a 17 seat parliamentary majority (even though Labour had actually polled just over a quarter of a million more votes than the Conservative party), hardly constituted a clear mandate to embark upon an extensive reversal of the Attlee government’s 1945–51 economic and social reforms, regardless of the ostensibly neo-liberal rhetoric about ‘setting the people free’ which had preceded the election. Of course, it might have been assumed that a more emphatic electoral victory in 1955, and then again in 1959, would have been interpreted as a clearer mandate, and therefore heralded a more determined programme of welfare retrenchment, but the aforementioned economic prosperity seemed to deprive such a programme of the requisite urgency or necessity. Indeed, there was some concern that reversion to a more neo-liberal approach might have jeopardised the generally benign economic conditions over which the Conservatives presided during the 1950s, and even when concern did increase during the latter half of the decade about the size of wage increases and inflation, the response of much of the party’s leadership, as we have just noted, was to exhort trade

One Nation Conservatism

97

unions and employers to exercise greater moderation with regard to seeking pay and price increases, while also reiterating the potential benefits of industrial partnership in the modern workplace in order to foster more trust between management and workers. Furthermore, there was some recognition that pursuing cutbacks in welfare provision – the social wage – might prompt the trade unions to seek even higher wage increases by way of compensation. Meanwhile, even when the Conservatives did win larger parliamentary majorities in 1955 and 1959, most of the leadership viewed this as an electoral endorsement of the party’s record in the preceding term of office – retrospective judgement by the voters – when ministers had done little to dismantle the welfare state. In this respect, most of the party’s leadership assumed that their electoral popularity was itself partly due to confidence and trust they had established among voters that the welfare state was safe in Conservative hands, and as such, ministers were ‘keenly aware … of the need to maintain the fragile consensus which it had constructed with the electorate, in order to distance Conservatism from memories of the interwar years’ (Jones, 1996: 249). Consequently, instead of embarking upon a systematic programme of welfare cuts, in accordance with the principles of individualism and selfreliance, many senior Conservatives confined themselves to emphasising that they viewed the welfare state as a means of alleviating poverty and providing opportunities to become self-reliant and successful, not as a means of creating a more equal society. In this respect, the Conservative leadership endeavoured simultaneously to persuade slightly anxious voters that it was committed to the welfare state, while seeking to reassure more committed Conservatives that their party certainly did not share Labour’s apparent view that the welfare state was a vehicle for pursuing equality. Similarly, ministers sought to distinguish the Conservative approach to welfare provision from Labour’s by emphasising the need for greater selectivity and targeting of social security benefits vis-à-vis those in greatest or most genuine need, rather than maintaining Labour’s universalist principles and its provision of benefits as of right. One particular aspect of the Conservative approach to poverty during the 1950s and early 1960s which needs to be emphasised, because it reflects the influence of One Nation Conservatism on the party’s social and welfare policies, was the use of ‘relative poverty’ as the criterion adopted, not ‘absolute poverty’. Whereas the latter concept – generally utilised by Conservative neo-liberals or right-wingers – defines poverty as a lack of resources sufficient to afford life’s basic material necessities (primarily food, clothing, domestic

98

British Conservatism

fuel and shelter), and thus constitutes a minimalist definition, One Nation Conservatives utilised the concept of ‘relative poverty’, whereby the level of poverty was defined in relation to the material well-being of other sections of society. This definition, and its policy implications, were explained via a ministerial committee on Social Services, in 1960, which explained that There was not necessarily any difference between the concept of need and the concept of sharing in the expanding wealth of the country. There could be no absolute definition of need. It was a constantly changing concept and depended on what was generally accepted by the community at the time as a minimum standard of living. As society became more prosperous, so did this minimum rise. (NA, CAB 134/2533, SS (60) 7th Meeting, 8 April 1960) In other words, as living standards and prosperity increased, so too did expenditure on welfare provision, to ensure that the (relatively) poor did not fall too far behind the affluent majority. For example, in 1958 and 1959, various social security benefits were increased above the rate of inflation, while the Conservatives’ 1969 and 1964 manifestos both pledged that social security claimants would continue to ‘share in the higher standards produced by an expanding economy’ (Lowe, 1996: 259). However, alongside the combined influence of relatively propitious economic circumstances, the adoption of ‘relative poverty’ as the criterion of measurement, electoral support for much of the welfare state and the prominence of One Nation Conservatives among much of the Conservative leadership during the 1950s, it is also highly likely that many aspects of the post-1945 welfare state became relatively entrenched due to the phenomenon of ‘path dependency’. This is a concept which refers to the process whereby particular polices and programmes both become embedded and develop a momentum or trajectory which renders it extremely difficult for politicians to repeal or radically reform them (Pierson, 1994: passim; see also Thornton, 2009: 34–5). Many aspect of the welfare state seemed to be characterised by ‘path dependency’ from 1945 onwards, not only because millions of voters became major beneficiaries of the NHS, education system, pensions and a host of social security benefits at various stages in their lives, but also because these services, as part of the public sector, employed large numbers of civil servants and other professional staff with, arguably, a vested interest in defending, or even extending, the welfare state (Hill, 1993: 50–1). Thus has Helen Fawcett noted that, once the Beveridge-inspired social reforms associated with the creation of the welfare

One Nation Conservatism

99

state had been implemented by the 1945–50 Labour government, they ‘proved extremely hard to either abandon, ameliorate or reform’ (Fawcett, 1996: 22), thereby illustrating the veracity of Rose and Davies’ claim that ‘Policymakers spend far more time living with the consequences of inherited commitments than with making choices which reflect their own initiatives’ (Rose and Davies, 1994: 4). Furthermore, ministers soon realised that if they were to start imposing cuts in one sphere of the welfare state, then there would invariably be a series of negative repercussion and knock-on effects in other spheres; a form of (dys)functional spill-over. For example, cutting the rate of, or reducing eligibility for, unemployment benefit paid to the jobless would invariably result in more claims for other, means-tested or ‘top-up’, benefits instead, so that welfare costs would merely be transferred between departments, rather than cut overall; Peter would be robbed merely to pay Paul. Or as Rab Butler noted in early 1957, with regard to another aspect of welfare provision, and having ruled out various proposed savings as impracticable: ‘Nor is it worth trying to get a couple of million quid from increasing the charges for dentures … [this] would increase the demand for higher rates of retirement pensions’ (NA PREM 11/1805, Macleod to Macmillan, 31 January 1957). Indeed, it was the Cabinet’s refusal, in January 1958, to accept the Treasury’s demand for cuts in welfare expenditure, most notably Child Benefit and the education budget, which prompted the resignation of the Chancellor, Peter Thorneycroft, and his two Treasury Ministers, Nigel Birch and Enoch Powell. Although some One Nation Conservatives did become slightly more concerned about the affordability of the welfare state and concomitant level of taxation in the context of Britain’s sluggish economy in the 1960s, they invariably shied away from promoting significant retrenchment, particularly when the likely implications or consequences were more carefully considered, a point emphasised by Lowe (1996: 255–7). In this context, it is worth noting that at the end of the Conservatives’ thirteen years in office, the Cabinet Secretary was informing the Prime Minister, Alec Douglas-Home, that ‘An increase in public expenditure – and therefore in tax – is not necessarily a bad thing, in so far as it provided better social benefits for the less fortunate members of the community and eliminates the grosser disparities of wealth’ (NA PREM 11/4778, [Burke] Trend to Douglas-Home, 8 April 1964; see also Macleod’s comments in the Cabinet on 20 December 1962, NA CAB 128/36, C.C. (62) 75th conclusions; CPA, CRD 3/7/26/3, TPC [Tax Policy Committee] (63) 3). It was not until the 1970s that One Nation Conservatives faced more serious pressure to rethink the party’s approach to social security and

100

British Conservatism

welfare provision, and were obliged to concede that the scale and costs of such services and support needed to be curbed somewhat. This revised approach had been signalled in the party’s 1970 manifesto pledge to extend selectivity with regard to social security entitlement, as part of a more general commitment to curbing the seemingly inexorable post-war increase in public expenditure, while also facilitating cuts in direct taxation. Yet many of these commitments were soon jettisoned when Heath performed his alleged U-turn, whereupon ‘social policy expenditure leapt ahead’ (Hill, 1993: 89), to the extent that one Conservative politician and author subsequently claimed that the ‘Selsdon Man’ label never accurately corresponded to the government’s social policy during the early 1970s (Raison, 1990). Yet even when the Heath government did introduce some new means-tested welfare benefits, most notably Family Income Supplement (FIS) with the laudable intention of helping low-income households with children, these were often in addition to existing welfare provision, rather than instead of. As such, welfare expenditure during Heath’s premiership increased at an average of almost 5 per cent per annum, which was slightly higher than the corresponding figure for the 1951–64 Conservative governments. Admittedly, social security rose by just 3 per cent, compared to 4.9 per cent between 1951 and 1964, but spending on personal social services rose by an annual average of 5 per cent between 1970 and 1974, compared to 3.1 per cent during the 1951–64 administrations (Hill, 1993: 110, 49). For the remainder of the decade, with the party back in opposition, the One Nation Conservatives were placed in an increasingly awkward political position, seemingly caught between the 1974–79 Labour government’s enforced (due to dire economic circumstances and the financial stipulation attached to an IMF loan) curbs on social expenditure, and the Conservative neo-liberals’ increasingly confident, and occasionally strident, attacks on social policy. In this context, One Nation Conservatives found themselves simultaneously denouncing Labour’s incompetence and irresponsibility, while viewing with growing apprehension the apparent enthusiasm with which some of their own Conservative neo-liberal colleagues were preparing to impose welfare cuts. While One Nation Conservatives were willing to acknowledge that aspects of social policy and the welfare state warranted reappraisal, particularly in the context of serious economic stringencies, they were nonetheless concerned that a Thatcher government would go too far, effectively throwing the baby out with the bath water. Trevor Russel (1978: 102) apparently expressed the perspective of many One Nation Conservatives when he commented, in 1978, that

One Nation Conservatism

101

there is a threat that it [a Thatcher Government] will try to put through … hard-nosed and aggressive social policies – ones which, if successful, could prove damaging, even destructive, to the Welfare State … True, reforms are necessary and overdue – but the fear must be that an unashamedly Right-wing Tory Government will make changes to the advantage of the minority – those who can cope for themselves all right – at the expense of the rest, for whom the present Welfare State system has become, for all its inadequacies, indispensable. As we will see in the next chapter, these fears were well-founded, yet by this time, the One Nation Conservatives often found it difficult to prevent either the increasingly confident and resolute Thatcherite attack on the welfare state itself, or various other associated economic and social measures which were clearly intended, directly or indirectly, to widen the gap between the rich and then poor, and thereby make Britain a much more unequal society than it already was. One Nation Conservatism in retreat, 1979–97 The intellectual dominance of Thatcherite economic neo-liberalism in the Conservative governments during the 1980s created the impression that the One Nation Tories had either been totally replaced or strongly outnumbered. This, though, would be an over-simplification or over-exaggeration, for, as Philip Norton’s superb analysis of the ‘ideological’ views of Conservative parliamentarians revealed (Norton, 1990), there was almost a numerical parity between the number of Conservative MPs and ministers who could broadly be characterised as Thatcherites during the 1980s (19 per cent), and those who could be categorised as ‘damp’ or ‘wet’ (18 per cent) – the latter was the derogatory term that Margaret Thatcher herself invoked against the One Nation Conservatives, who were generally critical of much of Thatcherism. Certainly, Ian Gilmour – who was definitely and proudly in the latter category – looked back over the 1980s and argued that ‘the Thatcherite treatment of the poor was unforgiveable’, adding that ‘Those who are effectively excluded from the benefits of society cannot be expected to remain passive indefinitely’ (Gilmour, 1992: 276). This classic statement of One Nation Conservative concern that excessive inequality, and desperation born of deprivation, might precipitate social unrest and political instability was echoed by Edward Heath’s warning that ‘A peremptory neo-liberal attachment to the free market and individualism spreads insecurity and fear like wildfire’, and he accordingly insisted that governments had a duty ‘to moderate the often harsh effects of change upon individuals and

102

British Conservatism

families’. In this regard, Heath recalled that during the course of the 1980s he ‘became convinced that we needed something akin to Roosevelt’s New Deal in 1930s America’, but, clearly, such an initiative was at odds with ‘the dogma that barked on the Right’ (Heath, 1998: 600, 598, 589). Such concern would doubtless have been strengthened by the urban riots which affected some British cities during the summer of 1981; while One Nation Conservatives certainly would not have exonerated such violence and destruction, they would nonetheless have seen them as a manifestation of anger or alienation by some of those suffering most from rising unemployment and curbs on social security, whereas Thatcherites were inclined to portray such social unrest as sheer lawlessness and wickedness, and a consequence of the lack of discipline or respect for property and authority which had been encouraged by the ‘permissive revolution’ of the late 1960s. However, while not particularly numerically weak vis-à-vis the Thatcherites in the parliamentary Conservative Party, the One Nation Conservatives were disadvantaged in several ways during Margaret Thatcher’s premiership, and were therefore unable to prevent the deliberate pursuit of increased inequality and the widening gap between the rich and the poor. First, the One Nation Conservatives were intellectually debilitated for two closely related reasons, one of which was that their ideas had largely prevailed in the Conservative Party throughout much of the twentieth century, and particularly after 1945, and consequently many of their neo-liberal colleagues deemed them almost as culpable as the Labour Party for the mounting economic and social problems which Britain faced by the 1970s, for the One Nation Conservatives were accused of failing to reverse the apparently egalitarian and interventionist measures which they inherited from defeated Labour governments. In so doing, they had seemingly allowed the left to determine the political agenda and concomitant policies, without ever launching a serious Conservative counter-attack. As we will see in the next chapter, Keith Joseph was to term this the ‘ratchet effect’. The other intellectual disadvantage which hindered the One Nation Conservatives throughout the 1980s (and into the early 1990s) was precisely the confidence and vigour of the New Right and its espousal of economic neoliberalism. This offered Conservative adherents of this alternative approach a clear intellectual framework in which to operate, one which simultaneously provided an apparently persuasive critique of the causes of Britain’s economic and social problems, and a series of policy prescriptions to tackle them. By contrast, the One Nation Conservatives were unable to counter this more explicitly ideological approach and its associated paradigm shift, precisely because they had always prided themselves on being non-ideological,

One Nation Conservatism

103

and on governing pragmatically according to circumstances, although their neo-liberal counterparts in the Party sometimes implied that this was largely what they were doing; applying practicable and sensible solutions, albeit to new problems and changed circumstances. Nonetheless, there was no contemporary counterpart or equivalent to Milton Friedman, Friedrich Hayek or Adam Smith who One Nation Conservatives could cite or summon in developing a counter-response to the New Right’s economic neo-liberalism, yet harking back to Disraeli merely seemed to emphasise, in the eyes of their neo-liberal parliamentary colleagues, how backward-looking, intellectually bankrupt and out-of-touch the One Nation Conservatives were – notwithstanding that Adam Smith predated him by a century. Besides, Thatcherites occasionally pointed out that Disraeli himself had not actually been an advocate of state intervention per se in economic and social affairs but had often envisaged that social problems and poverty would be ameliorated primarily through action undertaken by non-state actors, such as voluntary bodies and charities, and philanthropists. Consequently, instead of offering a clear alternative, the opposition of One Nation Conservatives to various neo-liberal policies often manifested itself in exhortations to be more careful and to proceed more slowly; they urged more caution and moderation in the pursuit and implementation of what soon became known as Thatcherism. Needless to say, such pleas were invariably viewed as manifestations of cowardice by those who were contemptuously viewed as ‘yesterday’s men’, or, in Norman Tebbit’s view, ‘the weaker willed, the craven-hearted, and the embittered failures amongst the Conservative Party’ who ‘hoped she [Margaret Thatcher] would go away and let them go back to their old ways’ (Tebbit, 1988: 180). The intellectual weaknesses of the One Nation Conservatives were compounded by corresponding organisational disadvantages, for they did not enjoy the support of think tanks even remotely comparable to those which buttressed the New Right. The groupings to which the One Nation Conservatives tended to belong or seek inspiration from, most notably the long-standing Tory Reform Group, the Lollards (renamed the Macleod Group in 1995) and the short-lived Centre Forward group (formed by Francis Pym in 1984), were no match for the intellectual confidence and organisational strength of New Right think tanks and Conservative Party backbench groupings, such as the Adam Smith Institute, the Centre for Policy Studies and the Selsdon Group, for example.. However, there was a further intellectual weakness which hindered the One Nation Conservatives in the early 1980s, namely that they too partly accepted some of the New Right’s critique of contemporary Britain,

104

British Conservatism

particularly with regard to excessive trade union power, punitive rates of taxation and an over-extended welfare state. However, although One Nation Conservatives broadly agreed, for example, that trade union power needed to be curbed, they did not envisage or want the relentless legislative assault on organised labour which the Thatcher and Major governments pursued, and which yielded no fewer than six Acts of Parliament to weaken the unions (and with a seventh pledged in the Conservatives’ 1997 manifesto). Indeed, even by the mid 1980s, several One Nation Conservatives averred that the Thatcher Governments’ were going too far in their ideological hostility towards, and ensuing legislative attacks on, the trade unions, and ought – having curbed the worst excesses of trade union power via the 1980 and 1982 Employment Act, and the 1984 Trade Union Act, whilst also having defeated the 1984–85 miners’ strike – subsequently to be pursuing a more constructive relationship with moderate trade union leaders (see, for example, Baldry, 1985: 10–11; Heath, 1998: 586; Meyer, 1990: 167; Prior, 1986: 255; Pym, 1985: 160–2, 182). Similarly, although most One Nation Conservatives could acknowledge that the welfare state had become too costly and unwieldy by the late 1970s, they did not anticipate or advocate the sheer scale and evident zeal of welfare reform and cutbacks which the Thatcher and Major governments implemented, and which played a significant role in fuelling the growing gulf between the rich and the poor. In this respect, One Nation Conservatives shared the concern expressed by Norman St John-Stevas, who pointed out that while ‘there is no alternative to cutting back public expenditure’, and that ‘the consequences of reducing inflation are bound to be painful’, there was also ‘plenty in our traditional Conservative philosophy that we can draw upon to alleviate that pain’. After all, he emphasised, ‘The achievement of strength through misery has never … been a Tory doctrine’ (St John Stevas, 1984: 119, 120). In similar vein, Ian Gilmour looked back at the Thatcher premiership and observed that whilst some of the reforms enacted during the 1980s had undoubtedly been ‘necessary and valuable’, they had often entailed or exacerbated ‘heavily regressive taxation, neglect of the poor, an ideological devotion to the market and excessive dedication to business and financial interests’ (Gilmour and Garnett, 1997: 361). What compounded the One Nation Conservatives’ intellectual and organisational weakness in the 1980s, and thereby further prevented them from successfully resisting neo-liberal policies (and inter alia widening inequalities) was the manner in which Margaret Thatcher managed her cabinets, particularly with regard to the appointment of posts and allocation of portfolios. It is not quite true, as has often been assumed, that Thatcher

One Nation Conservatism

105

steadily replaced the One Nation Conservatives, to the extent of wholly establishing a cabinet of loyalists. Yes, she did dismiss some prominent One Nation Conservatives during the first half of the 1980s (most notably Ian Gilmour, and Francis Pym), while others resigned (like Michael Heseltine in January 1986), but even at the end of her premiership, a number of senior Conservatives who were generally associated with One Nation Conservatism were still in the Cabinet, a point acknowledged by one of Thatcher’s closest allies, Norman Tebbit (1991: 20). What did reduce their influence, though, along with their aforementioned intellectual and organisational weakness, was the manner in which Thatcher skilfully appointed her most loyal or like-minded economic neo-liberal colleagues to the key ministries, particularly those whose remit was primarily or wholly economic, while tending to allocate less high-profile or influential (and in her eyes, less important) ministerial posts to One Nation Conservatives. For example, fellow neo-liberals were appointed to the Treasury (Geoffrey Howe, and then Nigel Lawson), the Department of Trade and Industry (whose Secretaries of State during the 1980s included Keith Joseph, Cecil Parkinson, Norman Tebbit and Nicholas Ridley) and the Department of Employment (after James Prior had been removed in September 1981), where Norman Tebbit was appointed to accelerate the trade union reform programme which a recalcitrant Prior had stalled over. By contrast, ministers who were widely associated with One Nation Conservatism were largely appointed to such posts as Secretary of State for the Environment ( Michael Heseltine, Chris Patten),6 Secretary of State for Agriculture (Peter Walker, John Selwyn Gummer), Secretary of State for Northern Ireland (James Prior, Douglas Hurd) and Secretary of State for Wales (Nicholas Edwards, Peter Walker). Not only were these posts viewed, at least by Thatcher and her coterie of neo-liberal acolytes, as less politically or strategically important with regard to the 1979–90 Conservative governments’ economic and industrial objectives, but some of these positions also entailed their ministerial occupants spending considerable time away from London, in Belfast (the Northern Ireland Secretary), Brussels (most notably the Secretary of State for Agriculture, for regular discussions over reform of the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy, when he was not visiting Britain’s farmers out in the shires) and Cardiff (the Welsh Secretary). In other words, these posts often seemed to be allocated to One Nation Conservatives in order to keep them both politically and geographically marginalised, thereby further reducing their influence on key government policies. Consequently, as Douglas Hurd later lamented, ‘there was no concerted effort by any group of ministers to challenge the Prime Minister’s version

106

British Conservatism

of events and policies’ after Thatcher’s first (1981) cabinet re-shuffle. However, he, and one or two other senior colleagues, readily acknowledged that, although ‘Individualism and the associated emphasis on wealth creation were a necessary component of modern Conservatism’, they were by no means the only aspects of Conservatism: ‘It was not enough to maximise personal wealth’, and as such, there was a danger that ‘The fruits of economic success could turn sour unless we brought back greater social cohesion’ (Hurd, 2003: 364). Nor surprisingly, perhaps, when John Major replaced Margaret Thatcher as Conservative Party leader and Prime Minister in November 1990, many of those Conservatives who shared Hurd’s concerns and philosophy envisaged that there would now be a revival of One Nation Conservatism, thereby proving that Thatcherism had been an aberration. After all, as Sir Anthony Meyer (who had been a ‘stalking horse’ challenger to Thatcher’s leadership in 1989) emphasised, ‘the Conservative Party for the past 150 years has been much closer to the kind of [One Nation] ideas that I uphold than to those which have held sway for the last ten years’ (Meyer, 1990: 179), while, as early as 1985, Julian Critchley was depicting Thatcherism’s domination of the Conservative Party as ‘the longest hijack in the world’ (Critchley, 1985: 120). It was not that Major was expected to repeal or reverse key policies from the 1980s, but there was a general expectation or hope that a more constructive and conciliatory approach would henceforth be pursued, and an olive branch offered to various sections of British society who had been disregarded or demonised throughout the 1980s, such as the poor and the trade unions. After all, Major himself spoke of his desire to ‘create a nation at ease with itself ’, and some of those who had previously discussed politics and policies with him on a one-to-one basis, such as Maurice Fraser, one of his former Special Advisers, concluded that he was ‘squarely on the liberal/left of the [Conservative] Party, emotionally and intellectually’ (quoted in Seldon, 1997: 133), an assumption shared by Edward Heath (1998: 594). Furthermore, upon becoming Conservative leader and Prime Minister, Major had claimed that his ‘political hero’ was Iain Macleod, although Major’s biographer believed that it was primarily Macleod’s personal qualities and oratory, rather than his actual philosophy and politics, which Major most admired (Seldon, 1997: 133). Certainly, in terms of rhetoric and articulation, Major’s initial language and tone were much less shrill and strident than Thatcher’s had been, and this apparent emollience further raised expectations among his colleagues that Thatcher’s resignation would precipitate a revival of One Nation Conservatism.

One Nation Conservatism

107

Yet what was perhaps most notable about the Major premiership was precisely that these initial expectations of a return to One Nation Conservatism did not materialise. For a variety of reasons which we do not have time or space to explicate here, John Major’s 1990–97 governments persevered with a succession of broadly Thatcherite policies until its catastrophic election defeat in 1997. Regardless of Major’s more emollient style and initial rhetoric, the rightwards ideological trajectory was largely sustained, with absolutely no abatement of the government’s Euroscepticism, hostility towards trade unions and employment rights (unless these were workers’ rights against trade unions), disdain for the ‘undeserving poor’ (single mothers were subject to particular opprobrium and moral finger-wagging, especially via an ill-fated ‘Back to Basics’ campaign), pay curbs or ‘freezes’ in – and continued open hostility towards – the public sector, further ‘marketisation’ of education and health and more privatisation of key industries, most notably British Coal and the railways, in 1994 and 1996 respectively (for an overview of policies pursued during Major’s premiership, and their Thatcherite ethos, see Dorey, 1999a). Thus did Ian Gilmour ruefully reflect that ‘Major kept to the Thatcherite path; in many ways, indeed, his Government became even more right-wing than hers’ (Gilmour and Garnett, 1997: 362). Meanwhile, as a consequence, inequality continued to increase, thereby maintaining the reversal of the pre-1979 trend towards a slight reduction in the gap between the rich and the poor, which One Nation Conservatives themselves had presided over. Conclusion Partly as a consequence of policies pursued by One Nation-dominated Conservative governments (interchanging with Labour Administrations, of course) during the first three decades after 1945, this period witnessed a slight reduction in the degree of inequality which had existed in Britain during the first half of the twentieth century. As Table 2.1 illustrates, there was a discernible decline in the share of post-tax incomes of the richest 1 per cent between 1949 and 1976–77, from 6.4 per cent to 3.5 per cent, while the top 10 per cent saw their share of post-tax income decline from just over 27 per cent to 22.4 per cent. However, it was mainly those in the middle income cohorts who benefited from an increase in their share of post-tax incomes, while those towards the bottom hardly seemed to benefit at all. In other words, although the gap between the richest and poorest narrowed, this was largely due to a relative decline in the post-tax income of the rich, rather than an overall increase in the incomes of the poorest.

108

British Conservatism

Table 2.1╇ Distribution of personal post-tax income in Britain between 1949 and 1976–77 (per cent) 1949

1954

1964

1970–71 1974-75 1976–77

Top 1 per cent

â•⁄ 6.4

â•⁄ 5.3

â•⁄ 5.3

â•⁄ 4.5

â•⁄ 4.0

â•⁄ 3.5

0–10 per cent

27.1

25.3

25.9

23.9

23.2

22.4

21–20 per cent 21–30 per cent 31–40 per cent 41–50 per cent 51–60 per cent 61–70 per cent 71–80 per cent 81–90 per cent 91–100 per cent

14.5 11.9 10.5 â•⁄ 9.5 â•⁄ n/a â•⁄ n/a â•⁄ n/a â•⁄ n/a â•⁄ n/a

15.7 13.3 10.3 â•⁄ 9.1 â•⁄ 8.3 â•⁄ 6.4 â•⁄ n/a 11.6 â•⁄ n/a

16.1 12.9 11.1 â•⁄ 8.8 â•⁄ 8.0 â•⁄ 5.6 â•⁄ 5.1 â•⁄ 6.5 â•⁄ n/a

15.9 13.3 11.2 â•⁄ 9.5 â•⁄ 7.8 â•⁄ 6.5 â•⁄ 5.2 â•⁄ 6.6 â•⁄ n/a

15.8 13.2 11.4 â•⁄ 9.4 â•⁄ 7.8 â•⁄ 6.4 â•⁄ 5.3 â•⁄ 4.4 â•⁄ 3.1

15.9 13.4 11.3 â•⁄ 9.4 â•⁄ 7.9 â•⁄ 6.8 â•⁄ 5.2 â•⁄ 4.6 â•⁄ 3.1

Source: Rubinstein, 1986: 80.

However, when we consider changes in the distribution of wealth (as opposed to just post-tax incomes), a slightly different picture emerges. Table 2.2 shows that while the richest 5 per cent of the population owned just over 80 per cent of the wealth in Britain during the 1920s, their share had fallen to just under 52 per cent by 1973. Meanwhile, the bottom 80 per cent (admittedly, an excessively broad category) enjoyed an increase in their share of wealth from 6.4 per cent in the late 1920s to 18.5 per cent in 1970. How much of this was actually partaken in by the poorest 10 or 20 per cent of the population is unclear. Nonetheless, many commentators have acknowledged that post-1945 Britain did become slightly more equal prior to the end of the 1970s, and that this trend occurred under Conservative and Labour governments alike. Certainly, throughout this period, One Nation Conservatives had been ascendant in the Conservative Party, and often saw themselves as maintaining a lineage which could be traced back to Disraeli, through Lord Randolph Churchill and Joseph Chamberlain, the Unionist Social Reform Committee, Stanley Baldwin, and the Tory Reform Committee, and with Harold Macmillan giving practical effect, in the late 1950s and early 1960s, to the economic and social policies he had been advocating since the late 1920s. For all of these Conservatives, there were limits to how far ‘the market’ should be permitted to prevail, and how wide the gap between the rich and

One Nation Conservatism

109

Table 2.2╇ Distribution of wealth, 1924–73 (per cent) 1924–30 1936 1951–56 1960

1965

1970

1973

57.7 80.1

53.0 77.0

40.9 66.7

35.1 60.9

31.9 56.8

28.2 54.0

27.4 51.9

Top 10 per cent 87.9 Top 20 per cent 93.6 Bottom 80 per cent â•⁄ 6.4

86.0 96.2 â•⁄ 7.8

77.4 83.6 16.4

73.4 85.0 15.0

70.3 85.4 14.6

65.4 81.5 18.5

64.1 â•⁄ n/a â•⁄ n/a

Top 1 per cent Top 5 per cent

Source: Rubinstein, 1986: 95.

the poor should be allowed to grow, although they were definitely not egalitarians, as evinced by their consistent denunciation of the Labour Party’s professed commitment to equality. There was no clear or agreed point at which they could say ‘this is far enough’, but they were nonetheless agreed that if inequality became too deep, or the poor became too numerous (definitions or measurements not withstanding), then the legitimacy of the economic and political system – capitalism and constitutional parliamentary democracy – might be undermined, and thereupon precipitate serious social unrest or even a direct challenge from those advocating revolution. As such, those who sought to defend ‘the market’ and private property ownership had also to acknowledge that the state had a role to play in facilitating a balance between the different social classes, and in ensuring social harmony. This also required that the rich and privileged accepted certain duties and responsibilities towards the poor, as part of the ‘ransom’ that property had to pay for its own protection and long-term security. This, indirectly at least, meant viewing poverty in ‘relative’, rather than ‘absolute’ terms, so that as the affluent became better off, or the rich became richer, so ameliorative action would be required to ensure that the poorest did not fall behind. Tackling poverty was not a one-off initiative to raise the incomes of the poorest to a bare subsistence level, but an ongoing process of elevating the condition of the people, so that the gap between the rich and the poor did not become too wide again. Creating and maintaining One Nation, and thereby preventing the re-emergence of two nations, was an ongoing process, albeit one which nonetheless entailed constant debate, both among One Nation Conservatives themselves, and with their neoliberal colleagues in the Conservative Party, over the appropriate degree of government intervention required, the level of social support necessary, and the relationship between the state and the individual. As such, One

110

British Conservatism

Nation Conservatives have constantly sought to develop a political position – a middle way – which distances them both from Labour’s formal egalitarianism and alleged desire to ‘level down’ in the name of equality, while also crafting a mode of Conservatism which is distinct from the economic laissez-faire and unrestrained individualism that Conservative neo-liberals hanker after, and the unbounded inequality which these give rise to. Until the late 1970s, they seemed to have succeeded.

3 Neo -liberal Conservatism Unlimited Inequality

As the twentieth century progressed, ‘neo-liberal’ Conservatism was increasingly marginalised as a consequence of the prevalence of the One Nation ethos in the parliamentary party, particularly from the 1940s to the mid 1970s. By ‘neo-liberalism’, we mean those Conservatives (both in the party itself and among their intellectual acolytes among what became known, during the 1970s, as the New Right) who were free market fundamentalists; they believed that ‘the market’ and individual or private endeavour were the only viable or feasible means of wealth creation and resource allocation, and were therefore inclined to attribute most economic problems not to ‘market failure’ but to governmental refusal to allow ‘the market’ to operate naturally, free from political interference. In many respects, Conservative neo-liberals subscribed to the ‘purest’ view of the tenets of Conservatism which we discussed in Chapter 1, for whereas the stance of their One Nation colleagues was effectively ‘Yes, we believe in the supremacy of the market and the naturalness of inequality, but—’, for the party’s neo-liberals the features of Conservative philosophy pertaining to inequality did not need qualifying in principle or tempering in practice. According to the party’s neo-liberals, part of the mid-twentieth-century political interference with ‘the market’, under Conservative and Labour governments alike, was due to the alleged obsession with egalitarianism and equality which had apparently become entrenched among intellectual and political elites in post-war Britain. In this context, Conservative neo-liberals were widely viewed, not least by their own One Nation colleagues, as atavistic

112

British Conservatism

relics nostalgically hankering after some mythical nineteenth century golden age of economic liberalism, laissez-faire and rugged self-help individualism. However, during the final third or so of the twentieth century, Conservative neo-liberals made remarkable progress, emboldened intellectually and politically by the rise of the New Right in Britain and the United States, to the extent that many of their ideas and principles – not least that the pursuit of equality had gone too far – acquired the status of political orthodoxy, whereupon the One Nation Conservatives were themselves seemingly discredited and disregarded. Indeed, this reconstituted or revived neo-liberalism become so dominant and apparently unanswerable from the 1970s onwards that the Labour Party itself was eventually obliged to ‘re-invent’ itself as ‘New Labour’ whereupon it too embraced ‘the market’ and private sector solutions to many political or social problems. Conservative neo-liberalism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries We noted in the previous chapter how, during the latter third of the nineteenth century and into the early twentieth century, several prominent Conservatives advanced the case for social reform in order to ‘elevate the condition of the people’, and in so doing, developed what has generally become known as One Nation Conservatism. Yet many Conservatives remained strongly wedded to the pure principles of ‘the market’ and individualism, and therefore viewed the development of One Nation Conservatism with considerable disdain. Such was their concern over the development of One Nation Conservatism that it seemed as if Conservative neo-liberals were engaged in an intellectual and political battle not only with the Liberal Party and, after 1906, the Labour Party but also with some of their party colleagues who, it seemed, were conceding far too much ground to nascent collectivism and socialism in their concern to attract electoral support from the newly enfranchised working class. Consequently, the case for a more constructive and progressive Conservatism or ‘Tory Democracy’ which would tackle extremes of inequality and help the poor, as canvassed by prominent party figures such as Benjamin Disraeli, Lord Randolph Churchill, F. E. Smith and Lord Bentinck, prompted some of their more right-wing colleagues trenchantly to restate the case for economic liberalism, laissez-faire and robust individualism, and inter alia reiterate unequivocally the naturalness and necessity of inequality. In so doing, they also imbued poverty with a moral dimension, for many of the poor were blamed or deemed personally culpable for their plight, and consequently considered undeserving of political sympathy or social reform. This reflected the unadulterated individualism of these neo-liberal

Neo-liberal Conservatism

113

Conservatives: in a society based on individualism, in which economic rewards and success were derived from hard work and success, then ipso facto those individuals who lived in poverty had only themselves to blame. Poverty was attributed to individual failings and deficiencies, not to social or structural factors, and as such, should not be viewed as a problem to be tackled by the state. On the contrary, as will become evident, neo-liberals were adamant that political intervention to help the poorest in society would merely compound the poor’s alleged indolence and lack of moral fibre, while simultaneously deterring the industriousness and innovation upon which wealth creation and economic progress ultimately depended. This Conservative neo-liberal counter-attack against the development of One Nation Conservatism during the latter part of the nineteenth century and the early part of the twentieth century did not consist merely in a robust restatement of the fundamental Conservative belief in ‘the market’ and wealth creation, vitally important though these aspects were, but often depicted economic competition and rugged individualism as the natural basis and guarantor of human evolution and societal progress. This particular perspective partly reflected the influence which Charles Darwin and Herbert Spencer seemingly exercised over some Conservative neo-liberals during the late nineteenth century, for the publication, in 1859, of Charles Darwin’s The Origin of Species, with its analysis of natural evolution and development through struggle and adaptation, was followed 25 years later (in the year in which another tranche of working-class men were enfranchised) by Herbert Spencer’s The Man versus the State. According to one academic commentator, Darwin’s thesis enabled Spencer to add ‘a gloss of natural selection to his evolutionary individualism’ (Eccleshall, 1990: 154), whereupon he coined the phrase ‘the survival of the fittest.’ Spencer applied Darwin’s core arguments and observations to human society and economics, whereupon he claimed that societal progress largely derived from unfettered competition, with the most successful thus propelling society forwards. The obverse, of course, was that those who could not compete successfully would be left behind, and remain, or become, poor. In this regard, Spencer believed, human society and the free market economy mirrored the processes of natural selection and struggle which characterised the animal kingdom, and which ensured that the weakest or least adaptable creatures ultimately died out. In viewing such a trend as natural, and thus positing a link between biological and economic processes, while also maintaining that such struggle was essential to wealth creation and societal progress, Spencer naturally abhorred what he considered to be state intervention to help the poor. He considered such paternalism to constitute a

114

British Conservatism

misguided and ultimately futile attempt at perpetuating the ‘survival of the unfittest’, but it was also adjudged dangerous, because it was tantamount to interfering with nature. He thus averred that Of man, as of all inferior creatures, the law by conformity to which the species is preserved, is that among adults, the individuals best adapted to the conditions of their existence shall prosper most, and that individuals least adapted to the conditions of their existence shall prosper least – a law which, if uninterfered with, entails survival of the fittest, and spread of the most adapted varieties … we see that, ethically considered, this law implies that each individual ought to receive the benefits and the evils of his own nature and consequent conduct: neither being prevented from having whatever good his actions normally bring him, nor allowed to shoulder off on to other persons whatever ill is brought to him by his actions. (Quoted in Greenleaf, 1983: 64) The clear implication is that those who are successful should be entitled fully to enjoy the fruits of their labours, while those who have not been successful should not be compensated by appropriating the rewards attained by others. In short, Spencer’s perspective was vehemently hostile to egalitarianism and wealth redistribution, and, indeed, to social reform in general. Any interference with the liberties of successful individuals, or any appropriation, by the state, of their lawfully acquired wealth or property, would constitute a far greater social evil than the poverty which such intervention aimed to ameliorate. In this context, we can appreciate how ‘the application of Darwinian views in the social sphere gave a powerful boost to laissez-faire capitalism in the late nineteenth century’ (Mason, 1980: 573). Consequently, Spencer looked with abhorrence at the late-nineteenthcentury development of paternalism and social reform – which he termed ‘coercive philanthropy’ (quoted in Greenleaf, 1983: 76) – and feared that a new politics was manifesting itself whereby Benefits are not to be bought by men with the money their efficient work brings them … but benefits are given irrespective of effort expended: without regard to their deserts, men shall be provided at the public cost with free libraries, free local museums, etc.; and from the savings of the more worthy shall be taken by the tax-gatherer means of supplying the less worthy who have not saved. (Quoted in Greenleaf, 1983: 72)

Neo-liberal Conservatism

115

On another occasion, Spencer claimed that attempts by the state and associated public bodies to tackle apparent social problems merely encouraged dependency among those sections of society who were already morally or physically enfeebled, and thus compounded, rather than solved, their deficiencies: ‘State-superintendence’ fostered ‘national enervation’, and transformed each individual into ‘a grown-up baby with [a] bib and papspoon’ (quoted in Greenleaf, 1983: 75). Elsewhere, Spencer complained that ‘the incapables, perpetually helped … are ever led to look for more help, are ready supporters of schemes which promise them this or the other benefit by State agency, and ready believers of those who tell them that such benefits can be given, and ought to be given’ (Spencer, 1884: 30). Such concerns about welfare dependency among the apparently least deserving or most irresponsible sections of society were to be strongly reiterated from the late 1970s onwards, as we will note in due course. For many Conservatives subscribing to this vision of unfettered competition and rugged individualism as the driver of socio-economic progress, the logical conclusion was that state intervention to ameliorate poverty and deprivation was not merely unwarranted but would actually prove harmful to all concerned. Such intervention, in the guise of social reform, would constitute a form of material gain for those whose impoverishment was deemed to derive from individual failings and personal fecklessness, to the extent that the state would effectively be rewarding the weakest and thus the most worthless sections of the population for their indolence, ignorance and immorality. Moreover, in so doing, it would be disbursing wealth created or earned by the most dynamic or industrious individuals in society: the rich and the successful would be punished and deprived of their hard-earned wealth and rightful property in order to finance the idle, the imbecilic and incompetent. Not only was this abhorrent to some Conservative neo-liberals on ethical or moral grounds, it was also maintained that such paternalism and wealth redistribution would ultimately yield three disastrous practical consequences. First, the ‘least valuable’ sections of the population would not merely be enabled to survive, due to the support proffered by the state or other philanthropic agencies, but would probably increase in number, because, as Spencer warned, Blind to the fact that under the natural order of things, society is constantly excreting its unhealthy, imbecile, slow, vacillating, faithless members, these unthinking, but well-meaning, men [paternalists and social reformers of all political hues] advocate an interference which

116

British Conservatism

not only stops the purifying process, but even increases the vitiation – absolutely encourages the multiplication of the reckless and incompetent by offering them unfailing provision, and discourages the multiplication of the competent and provident by heightening the difficulty of maintaining a family. And thus, in their eagerness to prevent the really salutary sufferings that surround us, these sigh-wise and groan-foolish people bequeath to posterity a continually increasing curse. (Quoted in Greenleaf, 1983: 77) Consequently, the overall intellectual and genetic calibre or quality of the British population would be weakened, as would the national economy, because an increasing proportion of the country’s people would be of this depraved or feckless type, whereupon they would consume ever-increasing amounts of national wealth in the guise of welfare and other forms of publicly funded support intended to eradicate poverty. The clear implication of such critiques was that responding sympathetically to the poor through paternalistic social reform actually risked financial ruination for society as a whole, because the numbers of the poor, and thus their ‘need’ for material assistance, would inexorably increase. Put another way, those late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century Conservative neoliberals who were influenced by ‘Spencerism’ and Social Darwinism tended to argue that governmental attempts at alleviating poverty were not only doomed to failure but would probably exacerbate poverty, because the affected individuals would henceforth flourish numerically, whereas previously their numbers would have been checked or limited by natural processes and ‘survival of the fittest’. Lord Balfour of Burleigh was among those Conservatives who, in 1908, insisted not only that it was ‘impossible’ to eradicate poverty, but that as ‘there are some [people] who are bad, who are idle … may be immoral, and who, at any rate, will not work … these must be and ought to be poor’ (quoted in Judge, 1908: 15). Although such explicit Social Darwinism became less prevalent or prominent among Conservative neo-liberals during the course of the twentieth century, it did occasionally manifest itself in public speeches or statements, as was the case in 1931, when Dorothy Crisp,1 in her book The Rebirth of Conservatism, denounced paternalism and social reform, as promoted by One Nation Conservatism, on the grounds that [T]hose who sink to slum life are without doubt … the weakest and least desirable of the population … Today, the unfit are preserved at the expense of the fit, the deserving pay for the maintenance of the

Neo-liberal Conservatism

117

undeserving, and physically, mentally and morally, there is a levelling down of the whole race. (Crisp, 1931: 8, 81, 83; quoted in Eccleshall, 1990: 165) Two years later, F. J. Hearnshaw even went as far as to claim that a true Conservative ‘sees hope in eugenic reform; in the segregation or sterilisation of the unfit … He would gladly see a smaller population in Britain, provided its standard were [sic] higher’ (Hearnshaw, 1933: 303–4), although it should be emphasised that very few other Conservatives, even those subscribing to Social Darwinism and ‘survival of the fittest’, explicitly advocated such extreme eugenicist measures, even if they were implicit in their analysis and conclusions about some of the poor and destitute. However, the concerns expressed by Dorothy Crisp were echoed four decades later, in Keith Joseph’s 1974 speech in Birmingham, when he observed that The balance of our population, our human stock, is threatened … A high and rising proportion of children are being born to mothers least fitted to bring up children into the world and bring them up … Some are of low intelligence, most of low educational attainment. They are unlikely to be able to give children the stable emotional backgrounds, the consistent combination of love and firmness, which are more important than riches. They are producing problem children … Yet these mothers … single parents, from classes four and five [socioeconomic groups D and E], are now producing a third of all births. (Quoted in Halcrow, 1989: 83) The furore which immediately followed Joseph’s speech was such that, shortly afterwards, he declined to offer himself as a candidate to challenge Edward Heath for the leadership of the Conservative Party, whereupon Margaret Thatcher successfully stood instead. The extent to which the Conservative Party subsequently promulgated and actively pursued economic neo-liberalism under her leadership (and beyond), including the deliberate promotion of greater inequality, will be discussed later in this chapter. Meanwhile, back in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, the second argument advanced by Conservative neo-liberals against paternalism and state-sponsored social reform was that the rest of society would experience a decline in prosperity, due to the disincentives to previously industrious and talented individuals who would otherwise have continued creating wealth and providing employment opportunities. Here was a classic restatement of

118

British Conservatism

the more general Conservative principle, as noted in Chapter 1, that wealth creation is of greater importance than wealth redistribution, because the latter depends upon the former anyway. Consequently, if wealth creation is hindered, or those who perform this vital economic function are not permitted to enjoy the rewards of their successful endeavours, then the rest of society will suffer from the consequent decline in entrepreneurial activity and economic dynamism, to the extent that ‘the whole nation would be rapidly reduced to penury’ (Lord Balfour of Burleigh, quoted in Judge, 1908: 15). This was deemed to be almost inevitable if the state forcibly appropriated, primarily via taxation, the wealth generated by the most skilful and talented individuals, in order to provide material relief to the least industrious and laziest members of society. Indeed, in this context, W. H. Mallock insisted, as we noted in Chapter 1, that the labouring masses depended upon the innovation and leadership provided by the industrious and economically successful minority, without whom there would be little employment, progress or prosperity, but merely ‘a mass of undifferentiated and undirected manual labourers’ who would be ‘as helpless as a flock of shepherdless sheep’ (Mallock, 1898b: 161, 380). The third reason why some Conservative neo-liberals sought to resist pressure for social reform and the alleviation of poverty was the professed fear that this would precipitate a drift towards full-blooded socialism or even communism. Clearly, such concerns contrasted starkly with the perspective of One Nation Conservatives, for whom social reform was a means of pre-empting the development of working-class support for anti-capitalist political doctrines and parties, yet for Conservative neo-liberals – foreshadowing Friedrich Hayek’s 1944 warning about economic regulation and welfare provision presaging ‘the road to serfdom’ and the exponential eradication of individual liberty – the enactment of measures to ameliorate the material conditions of the poor was politically dangerous, quite apart from the predicted ruinous economic consequences which we have just discussed. The expressed concern of Conservative neo-liberals was that once the state began to intervene in economic and social affairs in a misguided attempt at helping the poor, so intervention would become cumulative – hence Spencer’s warning, via a chapter entitled ‘The Coming Slavery’, in his The Man versus the State – for two particular, but closely related, reasons. First, because poverty was apparently immutable and unavoidable, it could never be eradicated (see for example, the 1908 speech to the British Constitution Association by Lord Balfour of Burleigh, quoted in Eccleshall, 1990: 168), yet in refusing to accept this ‘cardinal social fact’ of inequality (Mallock, 1898: 315), social reformers would be driven constantly to extend their

Neo-liberal Conservatism

119

intervention in economic and civil society in a relentless, but ultimately futile, search for remedies. In this respect, Conservative neo-liberals and their ilk were convinced that there was no ‘middle way’ between individualism and collectivism, for ‘if you once desert the solid ground of individual freedom, you can find no resting place till you reach the abyss of Socialism’ (Dicey, 1885: 467). Thus did another Conservative neo-liberal, in the first decade of the twentieth century, condemn measures of social reform, such as free meals for poor children, old age pensions and the regulation of working hours and other employment conditions, as providing ‘a sheer godsend to every Socialist on the stump’ (Garvin, 1907: 51; see also Benn, 1928: 16). The second reason why many Conservative neo-liberals feared that social reform to tackle poverty would lead to ever-increasing state intervention, and ultimately precipitate the destruction of liberty and the free market economy, was because it was envisaged that the poor themselves would develop a reliance on such support and assistance, and thereby expend even less effort in practising Smilesian self-help. Thus did Lord Balfour of Burleigh warn that ‘the spread of ideas of a socialist type threatens to destroy the moral fibre of our people, and if these ideas are allowed to grow and develop, the result must be the destruction of … self-help’, because ‘if no one was allowed to become extremely poor … if they were to be relieved from the fear of hunger … it is quite clear that many people will do no work at all’. Yet it was precisely ‘those elements in human character that make for inefficiency and decay’ to which ‘Socialism appeals’, although it is important to emphasise that Balfour believed that Conservative paternalists and social reformers were culpable in the development of such ‘socialist’ ideas and reforms (quoted in Eccleshall, 1990: 167, 169). Consequently Hearnshaw condemned the apparent drift towards collectivism and welfarism, insisting that ‘no permanent improvement [of the condition of the people] can come about by means of indiscriminate charity, or promiscuous doles, or any other device that debilitates, demoralises and degrades’. The only way to secure the improvement of the material and moral conditions of the people and simultaneously ensure societal progress was to foster ‘intelligent self-help, cultivated ability … better physique, elevated character’ (Hearnshaw, 1933: 303). In the latter third of the nineteenth century, many of these arguments were advanced in the context of democratisation, as the vote was granted to sections of the male working class, a trend which many Conservatives viewed with grave apprehension. Whereas One Nation Conservatives were confident that the working class could be incorporated into the existing system, and thereby inculcated with the values of constitutional politics and capitalist economics, other Conservatives and rugged individualists were

120

British Conservatism

often fearful that the enfranchised working class might, sooner or later, use its newly acquired vote to support a political party (even though there did not exist one at that time) committed to the abolition of private property and individual liberty. This fear was certainly one which Lord Salisbury harboured, for he observed that ‘Wherever democracy has prevailed, the power of the State has been used in some form or other to plunder the well-to-do classes for the benefit of the poor’ (quoted in Leach, 1996: 114). Certainly, there was some concern that state intervention, in the guise of social reform, would steadily increase as a consequence of electoral competition between the main political parties for working class votes. This anxiety was clearly articulated by Herbert Spencer, when, in the year (1884) that more working-class men were enfranchised, he warned that Every candidate for Parliament is prompted to propose or support some new piece of ad captandum legislation. Nay, even the chiefs of parties – those anxious to retain office and those to wrest it from them – severally aim to get adherents by outbidding one another. Each seeks popularity by promising more than his opponent has promised. (Spencer, 1884: 31) A similar critique was advanced almost a century later, when Samuel Brittan referred ominously to ‘the economic consequences of democracy’, whereby competition for votes led the main political parties to offer more social policies, or higher expenditure on such programmes, than their electoral rivals. This, Brittan averred was irresponsible, and ultimately economically ruinous; in yielding ever-increasing state intervention and public expenditure, political democracy was undermining the very market economy upon which it ultimately rested (Brittan, 1977; see also Brittan, 1983: 3–21; Bacon and Eltis, 1976: 93–116). In so doing, parties and governments were relentlessly raising public expectations and demands on governments to deliver or provide more benefits and services (King, 1975), yet in so doing, they were likely to ‘stir up expectations only to disappoint them’, which ran the ‘risk of the whole system snapping under the strain’ (Brittan, 1983: 17). Many of the above late-nineteenth century arguments concerning the debilitating economic, moral and social consequences of social reform and state intervention to ameliorate poverty were forcefully enunciated in the inter-war years by Ernest Benn, who became a prominent advocate of economic liberalism after a 1921 visit to the United States, to the extent that, in 1926, he was directly involved in the launch of the Individualist Movement, which established, in the same year, the Individualist Bookshop in order to

Neo-liberal Conservatism

121

disseminate publications which promoted laissez-faire political economy and associated principles or critiques, including Spencer’s aforementioned The Man versus the State (Abel, 1960: 43–5). Meanwhile, whereas many One Nation Conservatives were aristocrats or ‘grandees’ who had enjoyed privileges which, directly or indirectly, inculcated the values of noblesse oblige, Benn proudly described himself as ‘a middle-class person who has had middle-class success’, which seemed to bolster his strong belief in rugged individualism and self-help. He also confessed to holding ‘a full-blooded, die-hard Tory point of view’ (Benn, 1949: 8–9, 160–1), this self-description being intended to differentiate his mode of Conservatism from that of the One Nation Conservatives who, he believed, were virtually colluding with collectivists and socialists in their support for state regulation of economic affairs and social reform (Abel, 1960: 131, 136). On one occasion, Benn asserted that ‘In the ideal state of affairs, no one would record a vote in an election until he or she had read the eleven volumes of Jeremy Bentham and the whole of the works of John Stuart Mill, [and] Herbert Spencer’ (Benn, 1927: 13), while Samuel Smiles and his philosophy of self-help were also eulogised (Benn, 1949: 92–3). Naturally, Benn was vehemently opposed to state intervention in economic and social affairs, believing that political regulation of the economy would seriously damage the dynamism and competition which efficiency, progress and wealth creation were dependent upon (Benn, 1925: passim), while welfare reforms would sap moral fibre and weaken individual (and, ultimately, national) character. Indeed, he complained that due to the welfare state, it was ‘almost true to say that there is no need for personal character or individual conscience … on the contrary, in many respects honesty is a positive handicap’. In this regard, he bemoaned the welfare state’s encouragement of ‘moral laxity’ and ‘silver-spooning’, which sustained or even encouraged ‘the unfit in human material’ (Benn, 1953: 23–9; see also Benn, 1930: 32, 107 and ch. 13). Benn fully shared the view of various other Conservative individualists and neo-liberals that state intervention was exponential and would lead inexorably to totalitarianism. He strongly believed that all of these problems were partly created, and certainly exacerbated, by the pursuit of equality, a pursuit which seemed to acquire increasing importance during the middle third of the twentieth century. Not surprisingly, therefore, Benn looked askance at the expansion of state intervention wrought by the Second World War and the legacy this would bequeath, and this anxiety was naturally shared by various other Conservatives, such as David Stelling (1943), Sir Herbert Williams and Sir Waldron Smithers. Their concerns were reflected in the 1943 creation,

122

British Conservatism

by Sir Spencer Summers, of the Progress Trust (Greenleaf, 1983: 306–7), which was intended to act as a counterweight to the 1943 creation of the Tory Reform Committee, whose ethos and favoured policies (as noted in the previous chapter) were precisely those most abhorred by Conservative neo-liberals, individualists and Social Darwinists. Conservative neo-liberalism from 1945 to the mid 1970s Barely two years after the end of the Second World War, Conservative neo-liberals and individualists like Smithers were provided with a new target for their denunciation of collectivism and paternalism, namely The Industrial Charter (Conservative and Unionist Party, 1947), which, as we noted in the previous chapter, accepted a much greater role for the state in economic and industrial affairs. This was naturally anathema to many Conservative neo-liberals, with Sir Waldron Smithers denouncing The Industrial Charter at the party’s 1947 conference as ‘milk-and-water socialism’. Indeed, he subsequently penned a 22-page tract – entitled Save England – replete with portentous Old Testament referÂ�ences and quotations, bitterly condemning The Industrial Charter for ‘its compromises with socialism and communism’, and warning that ‘acceptance or rejection of the charter by the party is a matter of life and death for Britain, and therefore the whole world’ (CPA, CRD 2/7/29, Sir Waldron Smithers, Save England: ‘Industrial or Magna Charter: The Conservative Industrial Charter Attacked – On Principle, July 1947). Smithers’ unequivocal hostility was evidently shared by the Conservative Party member who wrote to Central Office to complain that The Industrial Charter ‘paves the way for the complete triumph of socialism and probably, sooner or later, the communist State’ (CPA, CRD 2/7/30 (1), Cooke to Butler, 20 May 1947). At the very least, it was condemned for displaying ‘far too much agreement with … Socialist principles’ (CPA, CRD 2/7/30 (2), Marshall to Butler, 19 May 1947). For such Conservative neo-liberals and diehard individualists, The Industrial Charter provided irrefutable proof ‘that the infiltration troops of Leftism, the “Progressive” Conservatives, have captured Central Office’ and have ‘abandoned the idea of fighting Socialism in favour of gradual surrender to Collectivism under Conservative patronage’ (CPA, CRD 2/7/29, Jackson to Butler, June 1947). Indeed, the Conservative Party Archives (at the Bodleian Library in Oxford) include three large files full of such paranoid proclamations and deranged diatribes submitted to Central Office, and often addressed directly to Rab Butler (CPA, CRD 2/7/29, CRD 2/7/30 (1) and CRD 2/7/30 (2), letters submitted on various dates in May–July 1947). The Conservative leadership did seem to acknowledge some of the concerns of the party’s neo-liberals following the publication of The Industrial

Neo-liberal Conservatism

123

Charter, because the 1949 policy statement The Right Road for Britain pledged to ‘set the people free’, while the Conservatives’ 1950 election manifesto declared that while the party was committed to providing a social security safety net ‘below which none shall fall’, it also wanted to ensure that each individual ‘must be encouraged to rise to the utmost limit of his ability’, and to this end, a Conservative government would ‘encourage instead of penalising those who wish to create from their own efforts more security for themselves and their families’. The 1950 manifesto also enshrined the pledge that ‘We shall foster the ancient virtue of personal thrift’, while also promising a reduction in taxation (Craig, 1970: 131). Meanwhile, the Conservatives’ 1951 election manifesto insisted that ‘there should be the freest competition’, and to this end, the party emphasised its commitment to ‘reducing to the minimum possible all restrictive practices on both sides of industry’, while also calling a halt to any further nationalisation (Craig, 1970: 145). Yet what was perhaps most notable about the 1951–64 Conservative governments, as noted in the previous chapter, was the extent to which they consolidated and built upon many of the economic, industrial and social policies they inherited from the 1945–51 Labour governments, most of which entailed a much more activist, interventionist or regulatory state. For example, only the iron and steel industry and road haulage were denationalised by the 1951–55 Conservative government, and there were no further de-nationalisations by the subsequent two (1955–59 and 1959–64) Conservative governments. Indeed, as Garnett and Gilmour note, throughout ‘these thirteen years of Conservative rule, the post-war priorities of full employment … and an adequately funded welfare state were never seriously endangered’ (Garnett and Gilmour, 1996: 81), a state of affairs which later led the Institute of Economic Affairs to complain that ‘none of the three political parties questioned the fundamental economic rationale of state welfare financed substantially by taxes’ (Harris and Seldon, 1977: 41). In many respects, therefore, there seemed to be something of a disjuncture between some of the Conservative leadership’s rhetoric concerning the need to rein back the post-1945 state in order to restore greater liberty to individuals and revive the market economy, and the policies that Conservative ministers generally enacted or adhered to in practice. Ultimately, it would have been the Conservative neo-liberals, rather than their One Nation colleagues, who would have been most concerned about the broad trajectory of their party’s policies during the 1950s and early 1960s. After all, the One Nation Conservatives themselves seem to occupy many of the most prominent positions in the government or at the party’s Central Office.

124

British Conservatism

Following Ernest Benn’s death in 1954, the cudgels on behalf of economic neo-liberalism were increasingly taken up by Enoch Powell, particularly in the 1960s, when his advocacy of a return to free market economics and individual liberty from the ever-expanding state became both more eloquent and more urgent, due to his growing alarm about the direction of post-war British politics in general, and that of the Conservative Party in particular. Although Powell would become publicly (in)famous for his criticism of immigration (as symbolised by his 1968 ‘rivers of blood’ speech in Wolverhampton), his real importance – and arguably his strongest influence, to the extent that influence can be evaluated – derived from his vigorous advocacy of economic neo-liberalism and unequivocal veneration of the free market, in a period when political orthodoxy in Britain, as largely accepted by the One Nation Conservatives who dominated the higher echelons of the party, promoted governmental regulation of the economy, not least to rectify or pre-empt alleged market failure, and viewed the welfare state as a vital means of preventing the emergence of excessive socio-economic inequalities, and thereby fostering greater social cohesion. Enoch Powell sometimes seemed to be speaking sotto voce in his highly articulate advocacy of a return to free market economics during the 1960s, and his increasingly trenchant criticism of the Conservative leadership’s acceptance of economic intervention and social welfarism. Powell considered this new orthodoxy to be intellectually flawed, economically unsustainable, socially ruinous and politically dangerous. For example, speaking in the late 1960s, Powell observed that Today, an enormous and steadily increasing dead weight of organization and constraint pins the nation down. It is an incubus which has grown so steadily and with such acceptance that most people are scarcely conscious of its deadening presence … There is the great and growing host of organizations advising, exhorting, cajoling, planning, interfering with our industry and commerce. There is the system of a welfare state designed to promote uniformity and eliminate all scope for choice and initiative. There is the range of policies, from incomes and prices to industrial location, which aim at averaging everything and everybody. No wonder so many people say: ‘This is the way of the world; there is no escaping it, no reversing it, so let us acquiesce …’. But it is not the way of the world. The world swirls by, leaving us behind, with an adventurous, achieving spirit, that contrasts with the atmosphere of Britain. (Powell, 1969: 77)

Neo-liberal Conservatism

125

In this context, Powell felt compelled to remind them that: Whatever else the Conservative Party stands for, unless it is the party of free choice, free competition and free enterprise, unless – I am not afraid of the word – it is the party of capitalism, then it has no function in the contemporary world, then it has nothing to say to modern Britain … we are a capitalist party. We believe in capitalism. When we look at the astonishing material achievements of the West, at our own high and rising physical standard of living, we see these things as the result, not of compulsion or government action or the superior wisdom of the few, but of that system of competition and free enterprise, rewarding success and penalising failure, which enables every individual to participate, by his private decisions, in shaping the future of his society. Because we believe this, we honour profit competitively earned; we respect the ownership of property great or small; we accept the differences of wealth and income without which competition and free enterprise are impossible. (Powell, 1969: 18) Yet Powell was evidently concerned that some of his Conservative colleagues had lost sight of the party’s historic role as the active and enthusiastic proponent of capitalism, the market and individualism, to the extent that he felt compelled to warn that if they chose to ‘go on adding more elements of state control to the large accumulated load the nation already carries … there will soon be no longer a real role in this country for the Tory Party’ (Powell, 1969: 79). Alongside Powell, the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA) think tank, established in 1955, also developed a robust neo-liberal critique of aspects of the post-war consensus, with particular attention focused on the costs and alleged inefficiencies of public services and state-owned monopolies. Like Powell, though, the IEA was something of a voice in the political wilderness at the time, and thus exerted little discernible influence, although various of the proposals which it canvassed, particularly greater private sector provision of, and ‘consumer’ choice in, services such as education and health, and the introduction of vouchers so that individuals could ‘shop around’ for the school or hospital of their choosing, were, much later, either enacted by the Conservative governments of the 1980s and 1990s, or at least (especially in the case of education vouchers) given serious and sympathetic consideration by ministers. The hopes of Conservative neo-liberals were again raised at the very end of the 1960s and start of the 1970s, when the party, under Edward Heath’s

126

British Conservatism

leadership, appeared to adopt a programme which placed much greater emphasis on reducing the economic role of the state, curbing public expenditure, and tackling trade union power. It was on this ‘Selsdon programme’ that the Conservatives successfully contested the 1970 general election. Yet within two years, baulking at rapidly rising unemployment and growing trade union hostility and non-co-operation, Heath abandoned this new approach, and hastily reverted back to the interventionist and neo-corporatist policies which had prevailed previously. Needless to say, many Conservative neo-liberals were incandescent at this betrayal, and it was in this context that, in 1973, some of them formed the Selsdon Group, to campaign for a return to the principles and policies on which the party had fought the 1970 election. The Conservative neo-liberal revival in the latter half of 1970s Having seemed to be in inexorable decline during the middle third of the twentieth century, Conservative neo-liberalism experienced a remarkable renaissance during the final quarter of the century, although by this time, ironically, Enoch Powell had quit the Conservative Party to become a Unionist MP in Northern Ireland. There were three particular reasons for the revival of neo-liberalism during the second half of the 1970s. First, there was a growing sense of crisis in Britain during the 1970s, whereby a plethora of apparently interlinked and mutually reinforcing economic, social and political problems raised doubts about the continuing efficacy of Keynesian economics and the Beveridgian welfare state. In this context, Powell’s earlier arguments were seen, particularly among a growing number of generally younger Conservative MPs, to have a credence and credibility they had previously appeared to lack. Second, but inextricably linked to the previous point, there was a coalescing of intellectuals and think tanks whose concepts or critiques of post-war British economics and politics collectively constituted the New Right, from which Conservative neo-liberalism drew much of its ideological inspiration and also some of its personnel, either as MPs and (subsequently) ministers, or as Special Advisers in government departments and the Prime Minister’s Policy Unit (now Directorate). Among the most prominent individuals promulgating the intellectual attack on the principles and policies of the post-war consensus were the Austrian philosopher, Friedrich Hayek, the American economist, Milton Friedman, and Keith Joseph himself, who claimed that it was his experiences in the 1970–74 Heath government which finally made him realise the extent to which the post-war Conservative Party had lost sight of its core principles (as explained below). Other prominent individuals who promulgated critiques and counter-proposals which became associated

Neo-liberal Conservatism

127

with the New Right and/or Conservative neo-liberalism during the 1970s and 1980s included journalists such as Samuel Brittan, Paul Johnson and Alfred Sherman, and senior academics such as Norman Barry, Maurice Cowling, John Gray, Brian Griffiths, Patrick Minford, Kenneth Minogue and Shirley Letwin. Their analyses and arguments were buttressed and articulated by a plethora of think tanks (Cockett, 1994; Denham and Garnett, 1998; James, 1993; Stone, 1996), most notably the Selsdon Group, the Centre for Policy Studies (Harris, 1996; Sherman, 2005) – established in 1974 by Keith Joseph and Margaret Thatcher themselves – and the Adam Smith Institute, founded in 1977 (Heffernan, 1996). The Institute of Economic Affairs also acquired much greater prominence from the 1970s onwards (Letwin, 1992: 79–83; Muller, 1996). The ideas and concepts articulated by the individuals and institutions of the burgeoning New Right seemed, in the judgement of many Conservative politicians, intellectuals, journalists and sections of the British public, to offer a plausible explanation of the sundry problems Britain was encountering in the 1970s; they seemed to chime with what was being directly observed and daily experienced in Britain during this time. Third, the rise of the New Right and Conservative (economic) neo-liberalism both reflected and reinforced the decline of One Nation Conservatism, and the increasing displacement of its erstwhile proponents in the Conservative Party, a trend which really gathered pace once the Conservatives were in office during the 1980s. This is not to say that the One Nation Conservatives were entirely removed or replaced, or that their ideas were totally eviscerated, but that, by the 1980s, many of those who could still be classified as One Nation Conservatives lacked the intellectual confidence and organisational cohesion which their neo-liberal colleagues enjoyed from the mid 1970s onwards. Changing membership of the parliamentary Conservative Party These developments were reinforced by the changing composition of the parliamentary party itself, as the paternalistic One Nation grandees were steadily replaced or marginalised by a newer, younger cohort of MPs and shadow ministers who were disdainful and dismissive of their parliamentary colleagues’ erstwhile concern to keep inequality within limits on the grounds of social justice and political stability. In fact, there were two discrete reasons why this new cohort of Conservative parliamentarians, who became more numerous and intellectually confident from the 1970s onwards, eschewed the paternalism and noblesse oblige of their One Nation colleagues.

128

British Conservatism

First, by virtue of being younger, they had not experienced or directly witnessed (or, at least, had not been adults during) the key events of British politics during the first half of the twentieth century, namely the First and Second World Wars, and the ‘Great Depression’ of the 1930s, with its mass unemployment and widespread socio-economic deprivation. Whereas these events had exerted a profound impact on many older, more paternalistic Conservatives (as we noted in the previous chapter), and thus underpinned or reinforced some of their concern about the material welfare of the ‘lower orders’ and the concomitant need to elevate the condition of the people, these events, and the consequent shaping of political values or objectives, had not normally been directly experienced by the cohort of Conservative MPs who swelled the party’s parliamentary ranks from the 1970s onwards, or who, having entered the House of Commons from 1959 onwards, acquired greater seniority in the party during the following decades, to the extent of sitting on the (Shadow) Front Bench, and thereby playing a notable role in shaping Conservative policies. For example, while 51 per cent of Conservative MPs had been under 50 years old in the 1955 general election, in the 1979 election this figure had increased to 62 per cent, and the number of Conservative MPs under 40 years of age increased from 16.6 per cent in 1955 to 24.7 per cent in 1979. These changes were a partial consequence of a concerted attempt by Conservative Central Office during the mid 1960s, following the party’s 1964 and 1966 election defeats, both to rejuvenate its parliamentary ranks and to modernise its public image, especially as the Labour Party had won these two elections under the relatively youthful leadership of Harold Wilson, who seemed at that time to symbolise a new meritocratic ethos in British society. In comparison some Conservative officials felt that their party was increasingly viewed as out of date and out of touch, a perception doubtless underpinned by the image of its ‘knights of the shires’ and aristocratic grandees, who were seemingly redolent of the long departed, sepia-tinged Edwardian era, and thus wholly ill-suited to lead the party and govern Britain in an era of rapidly increasing scientific and technological progress, in which social deference seemed to be declining. For some of these newer or younger Conservatives, the patrician paternalism of Harold Macmillan – a biography of whom was actually titled The Last Great Edwardian (Hutchinson, 1980) – personified this apparently outdated approach to political leadership and the art of government. According to Lord Coleraine, for example, Macmillan was ‘unable to clear his mind of these tragic memories’ [the mass unemployment and associated economic hardships and social misery of the 1930s], to the extent that they

Neo-liberal Conservatism

129

‘must certainly have clouded his judgement, for the problems which he was called upon to face, twenty and twenty-five years later, were very different’ (Coleraine, 1970: 110). This new generation of Conservative MPs had not had their formative political views shaped by the same circumstances and experiences as many of the One Nation Tories, and were therefore rather dismissive of the previous generation’s preoccupation with preventing unemployment, tackling ‘excessive’ inequality through wealth redistribution via high levels of income tax on the rich, and universal welfare provision, and also with their frequently yielding to trade union claims for ‘excessive’ pay claims on behalf of low-paid workers. It was not only the changing age profile of the Conservative Party from the 1960s onwards which elicited a change in its ideological outlook during the 1970s and 1980s. The educational and socio-occupational backgrounds of many of these newer, younger MPs were also of signal importance in accounting for the decline of paternalism. Educationally, the Conservative Party became less dominated by MPs who had attended the most exclusive public schools. For example, whereas 22 per cent of the 1964 parliamentary intake had attended Eton and 6 per cent had been to Harrow, only 12 per cent of Conservative MPs elected in 1983 were Etonians and just 3 per cent were Harrovians. Also in notable decline during the 1970s and 1980s was the number of Conservative MPs who had been educated at any public school, or Oxbridge. In 1966, 81 per cent of Conservative MPs had been educated at public school, compared to 68 per cent of the 1987 intake. During the same period, the number of Conservative MPs who had been to Oxford or Cambridge universities declined from 57 per cent to 44 per cent. Meanwhile, the number of new Conservative MPs who had been educated at a public school and Oxbridge fell from 51 per cent in 1966 to 37 per cent by 1987. By contrast, the number of all Conservative MPs who had not been to a public school and also went to a non-Oxbridge university increased from 7 per cent in 1964 to 18 per cent in 1983, while among new Conservative MPs, the figures were 9 per cent and 30 per cent respectively. The significance of such trends is that the most prestigious public schools generally sought to inculcate their pupils with a sense of public duty, and also inculcated to varying degrees the values of noblesse oblige. Their pupils were made aware that they enjoyed privileges unavailable to the majority of ordinary people, and that they ought therefore to display a sense of humility: with privileges came certain responsibilities. As the number of Conservative parliamentarians who had once been to Britain’s top public schools declined

130

British Conservatism

during the 1970s ands 1980s, so too did the corresponding sense of public service and duty of care towards the less well-off in British society. Instead, many of the new cohort of Conservative MPs, who had not received such a privileged education, with its inculcation of values pertaining to humility and public duty, tended to display a rather less compassionate view towards many of Britain’s poor. Having themselves emanated from somewhat more humble or ordinary social backgrounds than the Tory ‘knights of the shires’, some of these newer, younger Conservatives were rather contemptuous of the principle of noblesse oblige, with its assumptions that the rich and successful ought, in return for their privileges and wealth, to be concerned with the material well-being and social welfare of the poor, and thereby ensure that the latter were not left too far behind, or that the gulf between the haves and have-nots did not become too wide. On the contrary, many of these new, generally younger and relatively less privileged Conservatives perceived themselves to be products of a meritocracy; their achievements had, they believed, been attained through hard work, individual effort, self-restraint, and sobriety: they signified what sociologists would call ‘deferred gratification’. Consequently, many of these more meritocratic Conservatives from middle or lower-middle class social backgrounds did not feel much, if any, sense of compassion and obligation towards the ‘less well-off’. They were not encumbered by what Margaret Thatcher dismissively termed ‘bourgeois guilt’, or what Keith Joseph labelled ‘debilitating compassion’ (Joseph, 1978: 100). Believing particularly strongly in individualism, many of these Conservatives effectively adopted the view that if they had succeeded solely through a hard work and personal effort, then there was little reason why others could not similarly excel. Failure to do so, or at least make the effort, could not (or should not) be blamed on poverty, society or ‘the system’; the individual alone was ultimately responsible for his/her choices and achievements (or lack of ). Another aspect of the changing character of the Conservative Party from the 1960s onwards which reinforced this transition from paternalistic noblesse oblige to petit-bourgeois individualism and morality was the change in occupational or professional backgrounds of its MPs. The less aristocratic character of its members was reflected and reinforced by the greater diversity and thus somewhat more socially representative occupational backgrounds of Conservative MPs from the 1960s onwards, for although the parliamentary party continued to be heavily staffed by businessmen, lawyers and professionals, there were a number of subtle shifts within these categories. For example, one study has noted that those Conservative MPs

Neo-liberal Conservatism

131

emanating from the world of business were ‘decreasingly drawn from the ranks of captains of industry, as in earlier Parliaments of the [twentieth] century, and increasingly from among company executives or self-employed businessmen’ (Criddle, 1994: 160–1). Certainly, the proportion of Conservative MPs who had been company directors prior to entering Parliament fell from just over 33 per cent in 1970 to 25 per cent in 1983, and to just 11 per cent among new Conservative MPs. At the same time, there was a notable increase in the number of Conservatives who had previously worked in finance (accountancy, banking, insurance and so on), these increasing from 6 per cent in 1955 to 17 per cent by 1983. Meanwhile, the party’s contingent of lawyers experienced an increase in the number of solicitors, and a corresponding decrease in the number of barristers, a shift which was particularly notable among first-time Conservative MPs, among whom the proportion of solicitors increased from 10 per cent in 1970 to 25 per cent in 1983. One other clearly discernible occupational shift was the decline in the party’s ‘knights of the shires’, for whereas 36 Conservative MPs in 1959 had been farmers and/or landowners, their number had fallen to just 10 by 1992. Thus did Criddle (1994: 161), in his analysis of the changing composition of the parliamentary Conservative Party, observe how these changes ‘mirrored … the switch of electoral power from the shires to the suburbs: from estate owners to estate agents’. These occupational changes were often disparaged by One Nation Conservatives and those of a more patrician or paternalistic outlook, some of whom lamented that ‘the Tory party in the Thatcher age has become irredeemably middle class’ (Montgomery-Massingberd, 1986: 22), reflecting the extent to which the man on the grouse moor has been replaced by a cardealer on the Kingston bypass (Critchley, 1992: 58), accompanied by ‘the garigistes, the estate agents and the speculative builders who [have] made the Tory party their own’ (Critchley, 1994: 195). Now, while there is absolutely no a priori reason why someone from a grammar or comprehensive school, a non-Oxbridge university, and/or a career as a solicitor, self-employed businessman or financier, cannot also hold paternalistic values which underpin concern about ‘excessive’ socioeconomic inequalities, the fact seems to be that such paternalism tends to be rather less pronounced or prevalent among such individuals emanating from these backgrounds and careers, and certainly, the changing composition of the parliamentary Conservative Party from the 1960s onwards was accompanied by a clear shift away from the noblesse oblige associated with the One Nation Tories. Increasingly, it seems, many of the newer or younger

132

British Conservatism

cohort of Conservatives from relatively more humble backgrounds had much less sympathy or concern for the less well-off. Like many ‘self-made’ men and women, their general view was that as they had succeeded through their own efforts or initiatives, other citizens could similarly have improved their material circumstances or employment prospects if they too had taken advantage of the opportunities available to them by developing their talents and working hard. Crucially, for many of these newer Conservatives, the welfare state was a major part of the problem, for it was apparently undermining the work ethic and the virtue of self-help and self-improvement, and instead fostering a culture of dependency. Thus did Rhodes Boyson claim that The moral fibre of our people has been weakened. The State which does for its citizens what they can do for themselves is an evil state; and a state which removes all choice and responsibility from its people … will create the irresponsible society. No-one cares, no-one saves, no-one bothers – why should they when the state spends all its energies taking money from the energetic, successful and thrifty to give to the idle, the failures and the feckless. (Boyson, 1971: 5) Such views reflected and reinforced the wider, whole-hearted and unequivocal embracing of capitalism among many new or younger Conservatives. Whereas Edward Heath had once acknowledged an ‘unacceptable face of Capitalism’, the growing number of ‘more aggressively minded’ Conservative neo-liberals in the party from the 1960s onwards, and who progressed up the parliamentary ranks during the 1970s and 1980s, seemed to believe that ‘capitalism doesn’t have an unacceptable face’ (Roth, 1984:36). These developments and the concomitant change in ideological outlook, led a One Nation Conservative to lament, near the end of the 1970s, that ‘in recent years, the Conservative party has become less patrician, less grand’, having experienced a ‘process of petit-embourgeoisement’ which ‘has served to narrow the horizons of the Party’ (Critchley, 1978: 467; see also Thomas, 1984: 161). Later, Critchley wryly observed that ‘as Mrs Thatcher has gone up in the world, so the [Conservative] Party has come down in it’ (Critchley, 1990: 2), for it had ‘moved closer to nature’ and ‘businessmen with flat provincial accents … small town surveyors and estate agents, the politically active middle class which began taking over the constituency parties have now taken over Parliament itself ’ (Critchley, 1985: 29, 50). Or as a leading British political scientist observed, ‘self-made professional politicians from

Neo-liberal Conservatism

133

the city and the suburbs, took over from the products of political families and possessors of landed estates’, thus reflecting and reinforcing ‘the general shift from patricians to … meritocrats’ (Kavanagh, 1990: 256). In some respects, the changing composition of the parliamentary Conservative Party from the 1970s onwards was merely a reflection of wider changes in the socio-economic structure of British society, in which the middle classes seemed to be inexorably expanding, and both the working classes and the aristocracy were seemingly contracting (the Labour Party was also becoming more middle-class – and thus less proletarian – during this time, with a university education becoming the norm, and an increasing number of its MPs having attended Oxbridge). In this respect, the changing educational and socio-economic backgrounds of the main political parties seemingly reflected the dual processes of embourgeoisment and meritocracy, with both main parties endeavouring to modernise their membership and public image. However, in the case of the Conservative Party, the changing background of its MPs and the parallel shift towards economic neo-liberalism were part of a more general ‘middle-class’ revolt in Britain during the 1970s, with the lower middle class or petit-bourgeoisie in particular increasingly angry about the combined impact of inflation, strikes, taxation, the extent to which the working class seemed to be ‘catching up’ or even overtaking the lower middle class in terms of earnings, welfare dependency and fraud, and the seemingly relentless drift towards corporatism, whereby big business, trade unions and governments (Conservative and Labour alike) jointly determined a wide range of policies. All of these developments seemed to be ‘squeezing out’ the lower middle class, thus prompting a growing sense of fear and resentment among many small business proprietors, family firms and the self-employed (a phenomenon to which we will return in Chapter 5). What seemed to compound this sense of grievance was a sense that these people especially had been betrayed by the 1970–74 Heath government, which had been elected on a ‘Selsdon Man’ programme, an ostensibly neoliberal programme which partly foreshadowed Thatcherism by a decade, but which, less than two years after being elected, hastily jettisoned this approach in the face of rapidly rising unemployment and bitter trade union opposition. In this respect, the hopes of the lower middle class were raised, then cruelly dashed, thereby reinforcing their sense of inexorable decline and imminent disappearance. As such, they felt that their plight had been compounded by their erstwhile political representatives, the Conservative Party. Certainly, the authors of a study of the middle class during this period noted that

134

British Conservatism

there were clear signs of widespread disaffection and belligerency by sections of the middle class who could traditionally be counted on for their Conservatism … Although these groups responded to specific legislative measures introduced by an incoming Labour government … they also displayed a marked disenchantment with the Conservative Party … Consequently, a number of Conservative leaders … argued that the ‘middle of the road collectivism’ of the Heath administration had alienated traditional supporters … The sight of widespread petit bourgeois disaffection with the Party … clearly set alarm bells ringing for many Conservatives. (King and Raynor, 1981: 219) For such disaffected Conservative supporters, the party’s changing character from the mid 1970s seemed to offer the apparently beleaguered middle class, particularly the petit-bourgeoisie, renewed hope, for not only did some of the newer or younger Conservative MPs emanate from similar backgrounds, many of them seemed to share or articulate exactly the same values and grievances, not least Margaret Thatcher herself, thereupon suggesting a natural political affinity. It must be emphasised, though, that at the time of her election as Conservative leader, in February 1975, Thatcher was not yet a Thatcherite (Blake, 1985: 321; Kavanagh, 1987: 199; King, 1985: 97), but she steadily became so subsequently. Her conversion continued apace during the latter half of the 1970s, partly because of her unhappy experiences in the Heath government, partly because of the ensuing intellectual influence of close colleagues like Keith Joseph, and the neo-liberal, anti-statist theories of Milton Friedman, Friedrich Hayek and Adam Smith, and partly because their ideas seemed to offer convincing explanations or accounts of the mounting problems facing Britain during the 1970s. Consequently, by the early 1980s, with the Conservatives having won the 1979 general election, one senior cabinet minister, John Nott, declared that ‘I am a nineteenth-century Liberal. So is Mrs Thatcher. That’s what this Government is all about’ (Guardian, 13 September 1982), an assertion from which Thatcher herself did not demur (see, for example, her 11 January 1996 Keith Joseph Memorial Lecture, entitled ‘Liberty and Limited Government, reproduced on the Thatcher Foundation website). For the growing number of Conservative neo-liberals, emboldened intellectually by the ideas and critiques adumbrated by the New Right, many of the economic problems being experienced by Britain during the 1970s were not due to ‘market failure’ or a ‘crisis of capitalism’, but were a consequence of successive post-war governments, Conservative and Labour alike, not

Neo-liberal Conservatism

135

allowing ‘the market’ to function freely, because of their misguided belief (encouraged by Keynes), that politicians and senior civil servants could regulate economic activity, and in so doing, attain various social and political objectives, such as full employment and greater equality. Yet the more that governments intervened in economic and social affairs, the more problems they apparently created, thereby prompting further interventions to rectify them – a trend clearly identified by Herbert Spencer, back in the 1880s (Spencer, 1884: 33). Certainly, Enoch Powell had previously expressed the concern of many Conservative neo-liberals when he asserted that when a politician seeks to discover ‘what it is that is stopping the profit motive from working’, they often discover that the problem ‘will turn out to be some interference or series of interferences for which he himself, or his predecessors, are responsible’ (quoted in Wood, 1965: 82), although the politician was then likely to conclude that further interference was necessary to tackle the original problem(s), thereby leading Britain further down the ‘road to serfdom’. According to this perspective, a fundamental problem in post-war Britain was not the alleged failure of capitalism and ‘the market’, but of the sundry attempts at supplanting or regulating capitalism; as such, it was deemed to be socialism or social democracy which had disastrously failed (see, for example, Thatcher, 1993: 566). It was in this context that Keith Joseph (1976: 20–21) argued that post1945 Britain had suffered from a ‘ratchet effect’ – although Lord Coleraine had advanced a similar, but less publicised or widely acknowledged, critique six years earlier (Coleraine, 1970) – whereby each Labour government dragged the country further to the left, through more state intervention in, or regulation of, the economy, higher taxation, controls on pay via incomes policies, and expansion of the welfare state, all of which were inextricably linked to Labour’s professed pursuit of equality. These leftward shifts, however, had not been reversed when Conservative governments replaced Labour, because the Conservatives had taken their name too literally; they had merely sought to conserve the status quo as they found it after a Labour government. Consequently, many Conservatives were themselves deemed to be culpable in this relentless shift left towards a state-controlled economy and egalitarian society, because they had not sought to turn back the clock and thereby ‘reverse the trend’. Indeed, in the year prior to Joseph’s exposition concerning the ‘ratchet effect’, Ronald Butt, a political commentator in The Times (20 October 1974), averred that: In the past decade, the whole vocabulary of political and social debate has been captured by the Left, whose ideology has fundamentally

136

British Conservatism

remained unanswered by the Conservatives. Where the Conservative Party has answered back, it has done so by conceding half the case that it should have been rebutting and has usually sought to appease the ‘trend’ … [The Conservative Party] … needs, even at the risk of being called reactionary, to react. With the language of politics so largely dominated by the Left, and with the intellectuals whose activities have so much influence on society mostly talking that language, the Conservative Party needs politicians with strong persuasive power and clear ideas who are utterly committed to the Conservatives’ historic role. Of course, the post-war Conservative governments which had allegedly succumbed to this ‘ratchet effect’ had been dominated by One Nation Tories. Joseph and Thatcher candidly acknowledged that they themselves had played a part in this process when they were ministers in Edward Heath’s 1970–74 Conservative administration, but Joseph subsequently claimed that, as a direct consequence of his experiences, ‘it was only in April 1974 that I was converted to Conservatism. I had thought that I was a Conservative, but I now see that I was not really one at all’ (quoted in Kavanagh, 1987: 117). Similarly, Thatcher claimed that her tenure as Education Secretary in the 1970–74 Heath government had likewise prompted her to reject the path of post-war British politics. In so doing, she acknowledged that ‘I must take my full share of responsibility for what was done under the [Heath] government’s authority’, which meant that Heath’s errors were also ‘our errors, for we went along with them’, but crucially, she quickly emphasised that ‘some of us (though never Ted, I fear) learned from these mistakes’ (Thatcher, 1995: 195–6; see also Redwood, 2005: 203). Meanwhile, some Conservatives who were subsequently to become close and loyal Cabinet colleagues of Margaret Thatcher during the 1980s added their voices to the growing neo-liberal denunciations of post-1945 Conservative governments for failing to reverse the interventionist policies which they inherited upon entering office. Nicholas Ridley, for example, declared that he had entered politics with the intention of reversing the policies enacted by Attlee’s 1945–50 Labour government (Ridley, 1991: 2), while Cecil Parkinson asserted that ‘the failure of the Conservative governments of 1951–64 to reverse the Attlee experiment was deplorable’ (Parkinson, 1992: 191). Consequently, for many newer, younger or recently ‘enlightened’ Conservatives , the response to the economic crisis afflicting Britain during the 1970s was to restate the case for a purer, unadulterated, mode of capitalism, in which

Neo-liberal Conservatism

137

‘the market’, and the laws of supply and demand, ultimately determined what was produced and sold, and at what price. The same laws and ‘market forces’ would also determine wages and salaries, thereby leading to the abandonment of incomes policies and governmental attempts at regulating incomes, either as a means of curbing inflation, or in order to achieve social objectives pertaining to the eradication of poverty, fairness and social justice. It was recognised that this would result in greater disparities in wages and salaries, and thus wider inequality, but instead of viewing this as an unfortunate but unavoidable by-product of allowing ‘the market’ to determine rates of pay, Conservative neo-liberals considered this to be a positive, and wholly desirable, outcome: it was not to be regretted or accepted reluctantly but warmly welcomed and enthusiastically promoted. However, it was also recognised that if ‘the market’ was to be the ultimate determinant of wages and salaries, and that this would lead to a widening gap between the higher and lower ends of the incomes scale, then a confident and convincing case had to be made as to why inequality was a virtue, not a vice, and how it would benefit everyone, even those whose incomes would inevitably and unavoidably lag behind. Restating the case for inequality In order to win support for, or legitimise, policies which would deliberately widen or deepen inequality, and thereby reverse the post-war trend towards a mildly more equal Britain, Conservative neo-liberals pursued a threepronged strategy. First, they sought to illustrate how the post-war pursuit of equality was itself a partial cause of Britain’s socio-economic problems, rather than a solution to them. In other words, it was necessary to start persuading ordinary British people that they were actually suffering, directly or indirectly, as a consequence of the alleged post-war obsession with promoting greater equality, which future chancellor Nigel Lawson claimed had become ‘the great bug bear of our time’ (Thatcher MSS, 2/1/1/42A, , Lawson to Thatcher, 3 October 1975). Or to put it another way: ‘A defence of inequality is therefore fundamental to the conservative-capitalist argument’ (Hoover and Plant, 1989: 50). Second, but following on from the first point, Conservative neo-liberals endeavoured to convince voters, particularly the majority in paid employment, that residual poverty (to the extent that its existence was acknowledged) was either attributable to the dysfunctional character of the welfare state itself, or was due to the individual failings of a minority of individuals. In the case of the former, then clearly the welfare state was no longer to be viewed as part of the solution but was itself a major part of the

138

British Conservatism

problem. In the case of the latter, then the implication was that some people were somehow immune to the welfare state’s avowed objective of alleviating poverty, thereby reaffirming a more general conservative premise that ‘the poor will always be with us’. Either way, though, Conservative neo-liberals were wont to argue that the comprehensive or universal post-war welfare state was not desirable or viable. Third, Conservative neo-liberals aimed to present the obverse of the first point, so that having persuaded people that egalitarianism was detrimental to their – and the country’s – material interests, and had actually damaged economic performance and hindered growth (on which greater prosperity and rising incomes depended), ordinary people could be persuaded not only that greater inequality was laudable and desirable in itself but that they themselves would benefit from living in a society in which those at the top earned much more, and the gap between rich and poor became wider. Of course, in practice, these three analytically discrete objectives were interlinked and overlapping. With regard to the first of these three objectives, Conservative neo-liberals argued that continued economic growth was being jeopardised by the suppression of differentials and punitive rates of taxation, both of which acted as disincentives to maintain or increase investment and create wealth, and yet the future employment and prosperity of the majority of people was dependent on precisely these activities. The post-war era, it was argued, had witnessed not only a diminution of liberty in the political and social spheres but an increasing decline in competiveness and wealth creation in the economic sphere, and to a large degree, a ‘chief culprit has been the modern thirst for equality’ (Green, 1987: 75). This perspective was clearly evident in Keith Joseph’s assertion that An egalitarian policy squeezing differentials, high direct taxation on nearly all levels, discouraging capital accumulation and transmission, narrowing the gap between the incomes of successful and unsuccessful, will discourage wealth creators … If we discourage enterprise, we shall rapidly descend to a national income far too small to maintain anything like our present standard of living, let alone improve the conditions of those who need it more. (Joseph, 1976: 75–6) Joseph reiterated this argument two years later, when he claimed that ‘The pursuit of equality has done, and is doing, more harm, stunting the incentives and rewards that are essential to any successful economy’, and, as a

Neo-liberal Conservatism

139

consequence, ‘We need to make the case against egalitarianism’ (Joseph, 1978: 105–6), which, among other things, meant confidently asserting the necessity for (greater) differentials in terms of pay between different groups of workers (Joseph, 1976: 77). Unless such a case was made, the pursuit of equality would continue to damage the British economy by impeding wealth creation and deterring entrepreneurship while also destroying international competitiveness. Yet until the case against egalitarianism was much more widely accepted, these economic problems would almost certainly invite yet more state intervention, and inter alia a further loss of liberty, while exacerbating Britain’s economic problems. This process threatened to push Britain even further down the ‘road to serfdom’, as governments sought to regulate virtually all forms of economic activity, while curbing competition and wealth creation, and overtaxing the economically successful in a futile attempt at promoting equality. Clearly, according to this perspective, state intervention in the economy and social affairs was not a solution but a major part of the problem. According to Conservative neo-liberals, the ultimate irony was that in this context, the people who would suffer most would be the very people who egalitarians (socialists and social democrats) claimed to want to help, namely the poor and less well-off. Thus Conservative neo-liberals vigorously reiterated the more general Conservative tenet that only by encouraging and facilitating wealth creation, and creating both an economic and political framework in which the economically successful and hard-working were rewarded, would the wealth be generated which could then be deployed to assist the less well-off, either through the creation of new jobs, or through additional expenditure on the ‘social wage’. In other words, as noted in Chapter 1, wealth creation was the prerequisite of wealth distribution. Second, the Conservative Party’s increasing (and increasingly confident) coterie of neo-liberals advanced a critique which blamed remaining pockets of poverty on the welfare state itself, because the welfare state had inadvertently fostered a dependency culture among the poor, thereupon resulting in what Sir Keith Joseph identified as a ‘cycle of deprivation’ (Halcrow, 1989: 51). This entailed the children of long-term welfare recipients themselves growing up to be similarly dependent on social security, largely because this was the lifestyle they had been socialised into from infancy. From this perspective, instead of preventing poverty, the welfare state prolonged and perpetuated it, or even made it permanent, and as such was actually detrimental to the material interests and moral economy of many of the poor themselves. However, it should be emphasised that the apparent link between the welfare state and residual poverty itself elicited a slight difference of opinion

140

British Conservatism

among Conservative neo-liberals, because whereas some of them were willing to acknowledge the continued existence of some poverty, inadvertently perpetuated by the welfare state, other proponents of neo-liberalism were adamant that poverty had been abolished in post-war Britain, partly due to the welfare state itself, coupled with erstwhile full employment and greater prosperity. What remained was inevitable inequality, not actual or ‘absolute’ poverty, because nobody was actually deprived of life’s basics, in terms of being unable to afford food, fuel (gas and electricity) and clothing. Nonetheless, this divergence of opinion among Conservative neo-liberals over whether poverty still existed did not lead to a more fundamental argument between them, because both perspectives led ineluctably to the same policy prescription, namely dismantling much of the welfare state. For those Conservatives who maintained that the welfare state actually perpetuated poverty and inter-generational cycles of deprivation, welfare retrenchment was a logical solution, and would liberate the poor from their lives of dependency on social security; it was necessary to be cruel to be kind (see, for example, Coleraine, 1970: ch. 7, for a trenchant critique of ‘the hoax of the welfare state’). Thus did the American sociologist George Gilder bluntly express it: ‘What the poor need most of all in order to succeed is the spur of their own poverty’ (Gilder, 1981: 118). Meanwhile, for those Conservatives who claimed that social security provision had eradicated absolute poverty, then the welfare state could be said to have achieved its objectives, and was now no longer necessary, at least in its extant form or structure. Either way, therefore, the New Right could argue that the welfare state urgently needed to be ‘rolled back’. Conservative neo-liberals, along with the party’s ‘social authoritarians’,2 also sought to garner support for an attack on the welfare state by reviving the Victorian distinction between the ‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’ poor (Thatcher, 1993: 627). The former category comprised individuals who were not deemed responsible for their economic hardship and professed need for welfare support, most notably the elderly struggling on old age pensions, and those citizens who were unable to undertake full-time employment due to physical disability or mental impairment. These two categories were therefore deemed worthy of welfare provision; they could not (and certainly should not) be blamed if they needed such assistance and support via the social security system. By contrast, Conservative neo-liberals and social authoritarians identified a rapidly growing category which they depicted as the ‘undeserving poor’, comprising of individuals whose socio-economic deprivation, or apparent need for welfare assistance, were largely deemed to have been self-inflicted

Neo-liberal Conservatism

141

through pursuing dissolute or disreputable lifestyles which were mostly, or even wholly, avoidable. Indeed, the growth of the ‘undeserving poor’ (later to become more commonly known as the ‘underclass’) was attributed largely to the welfare state itself, for a system of social security ‘from the cradle to the grave’ had apparently made it too easy or attractive for some individuals to opt, of their own free will and volition, for a life of welfare dependency. For many Conservative neo-liberals and social authoritarians, this category mainly comprised the unemployed, and single (or ‘lone’) parents, particularly young unmarried mothers. The unemployed were increasingly viewed as part of the ‘undeserving poor’ for two reasons. First, it was held that many of the jobless were choosing to become unemployed and live ‘on the dole’, due to the allegedly generous levels of social security benefits which they could receive as of right, and which therefore acted as a disincentive to remain in, or actively seek, paid employment. Such individuals were often depicted as being ‘work-shy’, or as representing a growing ‘why work?’ syndrome. It was in regard to such individuals that the term ‘voluntarily unemployed’ was coined, referring to people who were unemployed not because of a genuine lack of jobs or a physical inability to work but simply because they did not want to work, often due to the level and scope of welfare provision and social security benefits, which made unemployment too comfortable or tolerable for such people. The second reason why many of the unemployed were deemed to be part of the ‘undeserving poor’ was the Conservative neo-liberals’ premise that some of them had ‘priced themselves out of work’ by demanding (via the trade unions) excessive wage increases. According to this perspective, by compelling employers or companies to pay more than their market position or profit levels could realistically afford, ‘greedy’ workers or militant trade unions eventually undermined the profitability or commercial viability of the firms which employed them, ultimately causing bankruptcies and ensuing redundancies. To the New Right, if and when such workers consequently joined the ranks of the unemployed, they hardly warranted sympathy or generous support from the welfare state. Indeed, referring specifically to a northern city particularly affected by a loss or lack of jobs in the 1980s, one writer, Richard West, in The Spectator, provocatively alleged that ‘Unemployment in Liverpool, like famine in Africa, is almost entirely caused by human folly and wickedness’ (quoted in Loney, 1987: viii). Moreover, some Conservative neo-liberals suspected that the welfare state itself indirectly fuelled ‘excessive’ pay deals at the lower end of the income scale, because some employers felt obliged to pay more than they could

142

British Conservatism

realistically afford, either to dissuade their workers from opting for ‘the dole’ instead of remaining in low-paid employment, or to fill vacancies by making it financially worthwhile for the unemployed to join the firm’s workforce, rather than remain on social security. In either case, the wages which such employers felt obliged to pay in order to recruit or retain workers were ultimately determined by the levels of social security which these workers might otherwise choose to live on, rather than by ‘the market’. Moreover, such a scenario meant that every time a government increased social security benefits, some employers might feel compelled to increase wages accordingly, regardless of whether they could really afford to, lest the up-rated benefits tempted other employees to opt for a life ‘on the dole’ instead. Meanwhile, Conservative neo-liberals and social authoritarians alike viewed many single or lone parents, especially unmarried teenage mothers, as part of the growing number of ‘undeserving poor’, because it was assumed that many of them had either become pregnant outside marriage through personal irresponsibility or promiscuity and lax morals,3 or deliberately, in order to ‘jump the queue’ for local authority accommodation, coupled with eligibility for welfare support, which was assumed to be a more attractive option to some young women than undertaking low-paid employment.4 Indeed, as with many of the unemployed, some Conservatives deemed the welfare state itself to be partly responsible for creating such dependency or encouraging such immorality, not merely because it provided material support and housing for single parents, but because in so doing, it made becoming an unmarried mother a conscious and attractive choice for some women, particularly those with minimal educational achievements or occupational skills, and who would thus have been highly unlikely ever to attain well-paid employment. Furthermore, prescient Conservative neo-liberals and social authoritarians alike envisaged curbs in welfare provision would be rendered rather more electorally popular or politically legitimate if it was publicly presented that social security cutbacks vis-à-vis the ‘undeserving poor’ would enable more generous support to be provided for the ‘deserving poor’. This approach, it was envisaged, would render ‘reform’ of the welfare state more popular among the vast majority of the British electorate, while also subtly serving to foster a form of ‘divide and rule’, not only between those in paid employment and those reliant on the welfare state but among welfare recipients themselves. One other facet of the Conservative neo-liberals’ ideological counteroffensive against the welfare state was to argue that egalitarians had conflated the objective of eradicating poverty with the extension of equality. The

Neo-liberal Conservatism

143

argument here was that, although it had become widely assumed that poverty could only be eradicated by creating a more equal society, entailing a transferring of wealth from the rich to the poorest, the two were not inextricably linked. On the contrary, many Conservative neo-liberals maintained that, quite apart from the impossibility of achieving socio-economic equality anyway, there was no contradiction between tackling poverty and promoting greater inequality. They claimed that eliminating poverty and egalitarianism were too often assumed to be synonymous because of a faulty definition of poverty, wherein egalitarians invoked the notion of ‘relative poverty’ while the Conservative neo-liberals tended to refer to ‘absolute poverty’. In this context, ‘relative poverty’ referred to the incomes of the poorest in relation to other sections of society and their incomes, so that such poverty might be defined as an income of less than, say, 40 per cent of the average wage. According to many Conservatives, though, this was a weak, almost meaningless, definition, because it effectively meant that in any unequal society, the poorest would always be defined as suffering from poverty if their incomes or welfare benefits were less than a particular proportion of average earnings, regardless of how high their incomes or benefits were. Moreover, such a definition meant that every time average earnings increased, then unless the incomes of the poorest also increased to the same degree, then poverty would be deemed to have increased, because of the consequent widening of the gap between those on average earnings and those on lowest incomes. Rising prosperity would pari passu mean that, officially, poverty was increasing, even though the poorest would not have experienced any direct reduction in their incomes. Not surprisingly, Conservative neo-liberals deemed this definition of (relative) poverty, and its policy implications, to be arrant nonsense. Instead, the New Right and Conservative neo-liberals much preferred to couch such debates in terms of ‘absolute’ or ‘primary’ poverty, which enabled them either to claim that poverty had indeed been eradicated, or that what remained was due to individual, rather than systemic, failure (see, for example, Joseph, 1976: 61–2). Here, ‘absolute poverty’ referred to an individual’s inability to afford the basic essentials deemed necessary to satisfy material and physical needs, namely food, domestic fuel and clothing, and it was held that, with a welfare state in existence at least since 1945, no one was, or needed to be, in such a plight. Conservative neo-liberals certainly did not deny that some people struggled financially, and had to count every penny, but their hardship was not comparable, for example to that endured by many of the poor in nineteenth-century Britain. Consequently, to the extent that Conservative neo-liberals were willing to countenance a welfare state of any

144

British Conservatism

kind, it was undoubtedly one which ‘should be concerned not with justice or equality, but with minimum standards’ (Hoover and Plant, 1989: 51). For the New Right and Conservative neo-liberals, by simultaneously adopting the criterion of ‘absolute poverty’ and ascribing the residual welfare state the responsibility for ensuring a basic minimum income necessary for physical existence, the egalitarian objectives previously ascribed to welfare provision could be discarded, along with the concomitant redistributive policies, most notably high (direct) taxes. Provided that a minimum ‘safety net’ is ensured for the very poorest in society, albeit without it acting as a disincentive to seek work or rewarding indolence, then the degree of subsequent inequality in society should not matter. If the ‘deserving’ poor are guaranteed a basic income sufficient to pay for life’s basic or biological essentials, then, Conservative neo-liberals maintain, it should not matter how much those at the top are paid. As such, Conservative neo-liberals are adamant that a highly unequal society, with a very wide gap between the highest and lowest incomes, can still be devoid of (absolute) poverty, in which case, the degree of inequality, however great, should not be a cause of concern or condemnation. On the contrary, Conservative neo-liberals are wont to reiterate that welfare provision for the genuinely needy and deserving can only be afforded by virtue of wealth created, and taxes paid, by those accruing the highest incomes. In this context, inequality is not itself a cause of poverty, but actually a means of alleviating or preventing it, and as such, Conservatives, especially the party’s neo-liberals, are adamant that ‘you cannot make the poor richer by making the rich poorer. You can only make the poor richer by making everyone richer including the rich’ (Joseph and Sumption, 1979: 22; see also Joseph, 1976: 75). Put another way, Conservative neo-liberals have ingeniously tended to argue that poverty is itself a consequence of pursuing equality. Having argued both that the post-war ‘obsession’ with egalitarianism had yielded policies deeply damaging to the performance of the British economy and that the welfare state was rapidly fostering a ‘dependency culture’ while also undermining the traditional family, Conservative neoliberals and the New Right endeavoured to convince ordinary people that they would benefit, directly or indirectly, from greater socio-economic inequalities. Of course, in one important respect, this was the obverse of the critique of the damage allegedly caused to the British economy by the post-war pursuit of (greater) equality, but Conservative neo-liberals recognised that securing wider public support for economic and social policies which would deliberately foster much greater inequality required more

Neo-liberal Conservatism

145

than just an illustration of the negative effects of egalitarianism: a more positive case needed to be articulated which could persuade millions of potentially sceptical or anxious voters that greater inequality would actually prove beneficial to themselves. In this context, three discrete arguments were developed to persuade ordinary people that it was actually in their material interests to reject the post-war pursuit of egalitarianism, and embrace policies which would significantly increase the incomes of those at the top end of the income scale, and thus widen the gap between the rich and the poor. First, a trenchant case was advanced which portrayed wealth as the deserved consequence of hard work, risk-taking or bold initiative by highly-motivated and talented individuals. If some successful business people amassed multi-million-pound fortunes, or received 6- to 7-figure salaries, then this was their just reward. Instead of attracting criticism derived from ‘the politics of envy’, the acquisition of wealth and large salaries through such means should be lauded, and the successful individuals venerated as role models for others: they were ‘wealth creators’, without whom, a prosperous society could not survive. In achieving such success, these individuals had clearly shown what could be achieved through the application of hard work, personal motivation, skilfully responding to a ‘gap in the market’ and so forth, and as such could inspire other citizens to develop similar entrepreneurial skills and talents. Certainly, during the 1980s heyday of Conservative neo-liberalism, successful businessmen and self-made entrepreneurs were eulogised by Margaret Thatcher and many of her ministers, and sometimes acquired almost celebrity status. Second, Conservative neo-liberals reiterated the ‘trickle-down’ theory of wealth, which posited that even if riches were concentrated in the hands of a relatively small number of individuals, their expenditure or investments would ultimately percolate downwards in a manner which benefitted the majority of society, through economic growth, increased investment, higher employment and greater prosperity. Or as Hayek explained, back in 1960, If today … the relatively poor can have a car or refrigerator, an airplane trip or a radio, at the cost of a reasonable part of their income, this was made possible because in the past others with larger incomes were able to spend on what was then a luxury. The path of advance is greatly eased by the fact that it has been trodden before. It is because scouts have found the goal that the road can be built for the less lucky or less energetic … Even the poorest today owe their material well-being to the results of past inequality. (Hayek, 1960: 44)

146

British Conservatism

It was also variously noted that those who earned large salaries made a significant contribution to society through the taxes which they paid (notwithstanding the neo-liberal advocacy of tax cuts, discussed below), and which thus helped to fund the public services used by millions of ordinary people, along with welfare provision. The clear implication was that without the tax revenues accruing from individuals earning high salaries or other sources of taxable high incomes, the Treasury would have less monies to disburse, via the relevant departments, to the NHS or pensioners, for example. Alternatively, it might be necessary to increase the taxes paid by the majority of the population, thereby leaving them with less disposable income. Either way, therefore it was intimated that the majority of people benefited from the amount of taxes paid by the rich, and that this too was a form of ‘trickledown’, in the form of wealth distribution. The third argument developed by Conservative neo-liberals to present ordinary people with a positive case for reversing egalitarianism and promoting greater inequality was that by ‘rolling back the state’ and extending ‘the market’, many more citizens would be provided with opportunities to develop their talents or skills, and thereby acquire unprecedented material success and wealth themselves. Here too, of course, those who had already achieved such success as entrepreneurs and self-made businessmen/women were depicted as role models to emulate, as exemplars of what many other people could achieve if they were similarly dynamic, innovative and motivated. The image was thereby promoted of Britain as a genuinely open and meritocratic society, in which the possibility of becoming rich was available to virtually anybody, however humble their social origins or current economic circumstances. That some individuals successfully seized such opportunities, while others declined to do so, was deemed to justify or legitimise the ensuing inequalities, because the consequent disparities in earnings or incomes were attributable to the decisions or efforts of those concerned. If person x decided to take the risk of leaving a relatively secure, but low-paid job, in order to start their own business, and eventually became a multi-millionaire because of their success, then their former work colleague, person y, who decided to take the safer option of remaining a low-paid employee, should have no complaints, and certainly should not feel any resentment towards x. Both had been in the same situation, and had had exactly the same opportunity to leave and start their own business, but only x had evinced the courage or initiative to do so. His/her subsequent success was thus wholly deserved, and they ought not to feel any moral obligation towards those they had ‘left behind’; they had no need to be affected by ‘bourgeois guilt’.

Neo-liberal Conservatism

147

Needless to say, many Conservative neo-liberals viewed themselves in this way, as individuals from humble or modest origins who had successfully seized opportunities for self-advancement and material improvement, and who therefore felt that their subsequent successes were entirely deserved and enjoyed. They were thus exempt from noblesse oblige. After all, it was sometimes emphasised that Margaret Thatcher herself had been the daughter of a small shop-keeper in the provincial town of Grantham, in Lincolnshire, and thus personified the rise from petit-bourgeois origins by virtue of gritty determination, hard-work and asceticism. For example, in his excellent study of the development of Thatcherism, Kavanagh notes how the young Margaret Thatcher secured a place at Oxford University and, later, became a lawyer, by ‘dint of hard work, earnestness (she had little time for social frills) … She was obviously a very determined woman’, and both her academic and subsequent professional successes doubtless ‘confirmed the qualities that some identify as hardness – a belief that ability and hard work can enable a person to get to the top’ (Kavanagh, 1987: 198 see also Harris, 1988: 40–9; Young, 1990: 3–13; Young and Sloman, 1986: 12–21). Conservative neo-liberalism triumphant in the 1980s and 1990s Having won the 1979 general election, followed by two further emphatic victories in 1983 and 1987, the Conservative governments led by Margaret Thatcher enthusiastically pursued a number of related policies which were explicitly intended to reverse the post-war trend towards slightly greater equality. In particular, the Thatcher governments cut income tax, particularly for high earners (but simultaneously increased VAT, whose impact is regressive), restored ‘free collective bargaining’ and earnings’ differentials in the sphere of pay determination (albeit imposing strict curbs on public sector remuneration), placed legal restrictions on the trade unions and enhanced managerial authority in the workplace, to the extent of publicly endorsing employers who ‘stood firm’ against strikes, and curbed social security benefits in the guise of reforming the welfare state. The combined, and wholly intended, effect of these policies was that inequality increased significantly during the 1980s and beyond, which for Conservative neoliberals, of course, was a key measure of their success. Tax cuts One of the starkest means by which the Thatcher governments effected a reversal of post-war trends towards slightly greater equality was through the promised reduction in direct taxation. Reflecting the New Right and Conservative neo-liberal prognosis that Britain was over-taxed, and that

148

British Conservatism

much of this taxation was being appropriated to finance costly or counterproductive social and welfare programmes, Geoffrey Howe’s 1979 budget heralded a reduction in the top rate of income tax from 83 per cent to 60 per cent, while the basic, lower rate of income tax was cut from 33 per cent to 30 per cent. Income tax was reduced again in the 1988 Budget, when Chancellor Nigel Lawson cut the top rate to 40 per cent, and the basic rate to 25 per cent. Such cuts in income tax, particularly at the higher end, neatly accorded with the Conservative neo-liberals’ view that the erstwhile high levels of taxation were a disincentive for individuals to work harder or seek to better themselves materially, either of which would, it was assumed, improve the overall performance of the British economy, to the benefit of all, in terms of creating more wealth and jobs. These income tax reductions also derived from the Conservative neo-liberal conviction that the state was spending too much of its citizens’ money, and thereby preventing them from exercising individual choice and responsibility, particularly with regard to such policy areas as education, health, housing and pension provision. In all these areas, tax cuts, in tandem with ‘rolling back the state’ and ‘shrinking’ the public sector, were depicted as a major means by which individuals would enjoy greater disposable income, and therefore be able to afford to pay for private provision in terms of their children’s education, health-care for themselves and their family, becoming home-owners and investing/saving for their old age. In all these ways, it was claimed that many individuals would be freed from their previous dependency on the state, and thereby enjoy genuine liberty, meaning freedom from externally imposed constraints or dependency on others. Furthermore, it was variously intimated that by reducing overall dependency on the state, more assistance and support could be provided for the ‘deserving poor’. This also reflected a Thatcherite belief that if the state did less, then those tasks which it continued to undertake could be performed more effectively and efficiently. Clearly, the prime beneficiaries of these income tax cuts were those on the highest salaries: for someone on, say, £500,000, a reduction in income tax from 83 per cent to 40 per cent represented a massive increase in their net salary, certainly far more than the net increase enjoyed by someone on £8,000 following the reduction in their income tax from 33 per cent to 25 per cent. Ostensibly, the latter was still notably better off than before, and for many low-paid workers, a tax cut amounting to just a few pounds per week additional income might well have provided for a considerable improvement in their living standards and life-style, and thus elicited immense gratitude or relief, yet such improvements would nonetheless have

Neo-liberal Conservatism

149

been modest indeed when compared to the enormous increase in post-tax incomes enjoyed by top earners. We used the word ‘ostensibly’ for one particular reason, namely that some of the Treasury revenues foregone by the Thatcher governments as a consequence of cutting income tax were recouped by a corresponding increase in indirect taxation, most notably Value Added Tax (VAT). Indeed, the 1979 Budget which heralded the first tranche of income tax cuts also entailed the virtual doubling of VAT, from 8 per cent to 15 per cent. In so doing, the Thatcher government was simultaneously cutting a tax which was widely viewed as ‘progressive’ – both in that it was directly linked to earnings, and thus ability to pay (with the rich deemed able, and thus obliged, to pay rather more of their incomes to the Treasury), and also because it had widely been accepted as a key means of wealth redistribution, whereby the rich paid significantly more in direct tax, and thereby provided much of the revenue which governments then disbursed on public services and welfare provision – and increasing a tax whose impact was generally ‘regressive’. This was not only because VAT totally disregarded an individual’s earnings, and thus their ability to pay, but because its costs were borne disproportionately by the less well-off. For example, 15 per cent VAT imposed on an item or service costing £200 would add £30 to the price paid by the consumer, but that £30 would represent a significant proportion of a lowpaid worker’s wage, or an older person’s basic pension, whereas it would hardly be noticed by someone earning a £500,000 salary. Yet regardless of their vastly different incomes, both would be required to pay the same £30 VAT on their £200 purchase or charge for services provided. For a government so vehemently opposed to equality, VAT was a rather egalitarian form of taxation, in so far as everyone paid the same rate, regardless of income, although as we have just noted, its actual impact was highly unequal. Consequently, for many people, the overall tax burden actually increased during the 1980s, particularly if parallel increases in National Insurance (also deducted, at source, from each person’s wage or salary) are taken into account, as we will note below. Greater differences in earnings Of course, the widening gap between the rich and the poor which Conservative neo-liberals actively promoted during the 1980s and 1990s was not solely attributable to changes in taxation, significant though these certainly were. What also ensured that inequalities of wealth and income increased dramatically were several developments in the realm of pay determination and remuneration.

150

British Conservatism

As we have already noted, Conservative neo-liberals argued strongly that wages and salaries should be determined primarily by ‘the market’, whereby the supply of, and demand for, different types of labour and skills, coupled with what companies could afford, or were willing, to pay, effectively set the level of pay for each occupation. This also meant that subjective, value-laden or ideologically defined notions of ‘fairness’ or ‘social justice’ would be expunged from the sphere of pay determination, so that purely objective economic or impersonal ‘market’ criteria would determine wages and salaries. This would be reinforced by the Thatcher governments’ formal eschewal of incomes policies, which had been deployed by previous governments (Labour and Conservative alike, during the 1960s and 1970s), to curb inflation and also, foster greater fairness by devising formula which facilitated slightly more generous pay awards for the lowest paid, or exempted them from some pay curbs imposed on higher paid workers. Wages and salaries would thus be de-politicised, Conservative neo-liberals maintained, and thereby determined solely and wholly by economic or ‘market’ criteria. One inevitable, and wholly intended, consequence of allowing ‘the market’ to determine wages and salaries was that inequalities in earnings significantly increased throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Those with rare or much sought-after skills and talents were often able to secure much higher remuneration for their services, whereas less-skilled workers, or those who were in abundant supply, and thus easy to recruit or replace, often found their earnings increasing at a much lower, and slower, rate, and in some instances, even reduced outright. By contrast, while formally rejecting incomes policies, the Thatcher government’s determination to control public expenditure meant that public sector pay was often frozen, or only increased at the rate of inflation (and sometimes at a lower rate). Of course, this also doubtless reflected Conservative neo-liberal hostility towards the public sector per se, and certainly, ministers seemed to delight in being seen to ‘stand firm’ when faced by almost inevitable strikes by aggrieved public sector workers, who resented their treatment at the hand of the Thatcher governments. At the same time, by refusing to concede higher pay when faced with such industrial action, the Thatcher governments were not only evincing their determination to curb pay rises in the public sector, they were also seeking to embolden private sector employers, in the expectation that they too would more readily resist ‘excessive’ pay claims, particularly from their lower-paid employees. After all, ministers could hardly exhort other employers to ‘stand firm’ if the government itself was seen to capitulate when faced with industrial action, in support of higher pay, by its own public sector workers and their trade unions.

Neo-liberal Conservatism

151

Besides, it was variously suggested that for public sector workers, quite apart from being expected to be grateful that they still had a job in times of high unemployment, doing the best for their clients, pupils or patients should be viewed as reward enough in itself: those employed in the public sector should focus on job satisfaction, or satisfaction derived from their own apparent altruism and desire to serve others, rather than expect more generous financial rewards. Of course, such advice was never proffered to chief executives, company directors or so-called high-fliers in ‘the City’. The inevitable, and doubtless wholly intended, effect of such pay curbs in the public sector, though, was to widen the gap between the top and bottom of the incomes scale, as the pay of those on the lowest wages and salaries, often in the public sector, was repeatedly restrained, while no limits were imposed on the salaries of those in the highest echelons of the private sector, where very generous salary increases were usually justified according to ‘market’ criteria, or as the deserved reward for commercial success. Moreover, the low pay of many public sector workers was sometimes depicted by Conservative neo-liberals as exemplifying the alleged inefficiency of the public sector, and the apparent superiority of the private sector. Indeed, this perspective could then be invoked to persuade public sector workers that they would actually benefit from the privatisation or ‘contracting-out’ of the services or industries in which they were employed. Meanwhile, in order to enhance these changes in pay determination and the changes in the distribution of earnings, the Thatcher and Major governments steadily reduced the role and power of the trade unions (aided, of course, by high unemployment at various junctures), partly by enacting legislation which imposed curbs on their ability to engage in strike action or show solidarity for other groups of workers in conflict with their employers, and partly by eschewing neo-corporatist modes of policy-making, whereby trade union leaders had previously sat alongside employers’ representatives and ministers to discuss economic and industrial policies (Dorey, 1995, 1999b, 2001b, 2002a; Hanson, 1991; Marsh, 1992; McIlroy, 1991). The legislative curbs on the ability of trade unions to pursue industrial action in support of pay claims clearly weakened their bargaining position, and certainly, the overall trend from the mid 1980s onwards (by which time, three Acts had been passed to curb trade union activities) was for the number of strikes to diminish. The Thatcher governments’ programme of privatisation during the 1980s also served to weaken the trade unions, with Conservative neo-liberals recognising that the most powerful or militant trade unions were frequently those representing workers in the public sector and the nationalised

152

British Conservatism

industries. Their power was derived not only from the vital importance of their industries or services to the British economy and society but also from their privileged position as monopoly providers of these goods and services. This was deemed to make it relatively easy for such unions to ‘hold the country to ransom’, and thereby compel governments to accede to their demands when they flexed – or merely threatened to flex – their industrial muscle. As John Moore remarked while Financial Secretary to the Treasury in 1983: ‘Public sector trade unions have been extraordinarily successful in gaining advantages for themselves in the pay hierarchy by exploiting their monopoly collective bargaining position’ (quoted in Kay et al., 1986: 82). It was therefore envisaged that privatisation would not only provide a major means of ‘rolling back the state’, so that ministers did not become embroiled in the annual determination of pay for millions of public sector workers (either in terms of negotiations, or, when these had broken down, in resolving the ensuing industrial disputes) but it would also expose those employed in such industries to the alleged virtues of market forces and competition. Once in the private sector, Conservative ministers envisaged, workers would be compelled to recognise that their jobs and wages depended upon such criteria as competitiveness, customer satisfaction, effort, efficiency and their employers’ profitability, rather than on industrial militancy or political pressure. As Pitt explained, the Thatcher governments fully intended that privatisation would serve to ‘make staff aware of “profit” as a sine qua non of organisation viability in an open market situation’ (Pitt 1990: 69). It was also intended that this would encourage greater acceptance among such employees of the inevitability and necessity of having ‘the market’ determine levels of pay, which would then lead not only to more differentials and divergence between the incomes of different occupations and workers, but to a greater acceptance of these inequalities as natural or inevitable. What further weakened and marginalised the trade unions was the change in the nature of pay bargaining during the late 1980s and 1990s. Although the Thatcher governments initially promoted free collective bargaining (‘free’ from formal state involvement in pay determination, and ‘collective’ by virtue of being conducted on behalf of employees by the trade unions), towards the end of the 1980s ministers increasingly began extolling the alleged virtues of performance-related pay which, in turn, was accompanied by an advocacy of individualised pay awards for workers. Such determination of pay, it was claimed, would ‘reflect their own skills, efforts, capacities and circumstances’ rather than being ‘solely the outcome of some distant negotiation between employers and trade unions’. To achieve this objective, Conservative ministers were adamant that

Neo-liberal Conservatism

153

many existing approaches to pay bargaining, beloved of trade unions and employers alike, will need to change … In particular, ‘the going rate’, ‘comparability’, and ‘cost of living increases, are all outmoded concepts – they take no account of differences in performance, ability to pay or difficulties of recruitment, retention or motivation … National agreements … all too often give scant regard to differences in individual circumstances or performance. (Department of Employment, 1988: 18–24) The then Minister of State for Employment, Kenneth Clarke, had already signalled this shift the previous year, in a speech to the City University Business School, when he asserted that, If we can move to a system where pay increases are based primarily on performance, merit, company profitability, and demand and supply in the local labour market, we will dethrone once-and-for-all the annual pay round, and the belief that pay increases do not have to be earned. These arguments were confidently reiterated just two months before the Conservatives’ April 1992 general election victory, when a White Paper entitled People, Jobs and Opportunity declared that There is a new recognition of the role and importance of the individual employee. Traditional patterns of industrial relations, based on collective bargaining and collective agreements, seem increasingly inappropriate and are in decline. Many employers are replacing outdated personnel practices with new policies for human resource management which put the emphasis on developing the talents and capacities of each individual employee. Many are also looking to communicate directly with their employees rather than through the medium of a trade union or formal works council. There is a growing trend to individually negotiated reward packages which reflect the individual’s personal skills, experience, efforts and performance. (Department of Employment 1992: 6) Not only would individual pay determination further weaken and marginalise the trade unions, it would also, Conservative neo-liberals envisaged, instil in employees a cognitive and cultural acceptance that earnings were directly linked to their own efforts and talents, the clear implication being that those who earned more did so by virtue of harder work or greater personal success.

154

British Conservatism

This, of course, was intended to provide further legitimisation and approbation of greater inequalities derived from different levels of remuneration in the workplace. This advocacy of individualised pay bargaining was also, indirectly at least, facilitated by the Thatcher government’s increasing legislative curbs on the trade union closed shop, whereby compulsory union membership was, by 1990, outlawed (Dorey 2009c). By making it unlawful for trade unions to compel or require employees to become members as a condition of their employment the Conservatives further contributed to the overall decline in trade union membership during the 1980s and 1990s, and in so doing hastened the concomitant decline in collective bargaining. This was wholly commensurate with the avowed objective of extending individual pay bargaining, whereupon each employee would have to demonstrate to his/her employer or line manager that s/he warranted an increase in their wage or salary, rather than having an automatic annual pay increase negotiated on their behalf by a trade union. Also integral to the Thatcher and Major governments’ determination to extend the influence of the market so that it applied also to earnings, while also reducing the ‘burdens’ on employers, was the 1993 abolition of Wages Councils. These had originally been established in 1909, in order to provide some statutory protection to workers in industries especially characterised by low pay and/or ‘casual labour’ resulting in job insecurity. Conservative neo-liberals invariably viewed these as an impediment to the natural, market determination of wage levels. Indeed, to those who might criticise abolition of the Wages Councils on the grounds that this would result in a lower pay for the employees concerned, the neo-liberal response was likely to have been that this merely proved how such bodies had kept wages artificially high, and thus rendered some industries or sectors of the economy uncompetitive due to their unnecessarily or unsustainably high labour costs, thereby damaging employment prospects. In this context, it was intimated that if employers in such industries and services could henceforth pay the ‘market rate’ to their employees, rather than the ‘excessive’ rate stipulated by the Wages Councils, then they might actually be more able or willing to employ people, and thereby generate more employment. For affected employees, the trade-off was effectively that of lower pay in return for greater likelihood of a job, rather than an ‘unaffordable’ higher wage leading to few jobs or redundancies, due to companies being driven to bankruptcy by ‘excessive’ labour costs. In accordance with such perspectives, workers between the ages of 18 and 21 were removed from the jurisdiction of Wages Councils in 1986, although it was not until 1993 that these bodies themselves were finally abolished. It is also worth noting

Neo-liberal Conservatism

155

that a cognate development, in 1986, was the reduction in the staffing of the Factory Inspectorate, the body which was formally responsible for ensuring that employers abided by the rates of pay stipulated by the Wages Councils. A further means by which the Thatcher governments sought to curb the trade unions and reduce the bargaining strength of workers (particularly the low-paid) was by enthusiastically promoting ‘management’s right to manage’, whereby employers’ authority in their workplace was deemed absolute and inviolate. Managers should not have to avoid taking tough decisions, or feel obliged to seek costly compromises, due to fear of provoking the ire of the trade unions. Instead, employers should feel free to take whatever decisions or action they believe are in the best commercial interests of their company, industry or shareholders, and if this entails pay cuts or job losses, then the employees and trade unions should not seek to challenge such decisions. On the contrary they should appreciate that their employer is responding to ‘the market’ or other economic factors, and aiming to take decisions which are in the best interests of the company or industry, and inter alia in the long-term interests of those employed therein. If employees or their trade unions prevented the employer from imposing modest pay cuts or a few redundancies in order to improve the profitability or commercial viability of the company, then the consequence might be that the company would close down completely, or relocate overseas, in which case all the employees would find themselves out of work. In promoting ‘management’s right to manage’, the Thatcher governments made no pretence of adopting an impartial stance when serious industrial disputes occurred due to trade unions either seeking a pay increase, resisting pay cuts or opposing redundancies. On the contrary, in accordance with their advocacy of ‘management’s right to manage’, ministers openly encouraged affected employers to ‘stand firm’ against the ‘wreckers’ and ‘bully boys’ in the trade unions. Such encouragement was strongly echoed by much of the Conservative press, which invariably depicted the employers as courageous ‘little men’ seeking to stand-up to intimidation and ‘mob rule’ by ‘Luddite’ trade unions. Indeed, as part of their promotion of ‘management’s right to manage’, in order further to weaken the trade unions and secure the subordination of employees in the workplace, ministers sometimes appointed high-profile industrialists and managers precisely in the expectation that they would ‘take on’ the trade unions and recalcitrant employees, invariably by ‘shaking up’ inefficient industries and seeking to cut operational costs, of which wages were invariably a high proportion. In so doing, they would be assured of ministerial support. Thus did the 1980s witness the phenomenon of

156

British Conservatism

‘macho managers’, a new, often more confrontational, style of leadership in the workplace, as an integral part of a concerted attempt at reasserting managerial control, and restoring a clear hierarchy of relations, into the British workplace (Letwin, 1992: 40). For example, when, in 1981, Lord King was appointed to ‘take on British Airways’, his appointment was fully endorsed by Margaret Thatcher herself, for he was precisely ‘the sort of man she admired, a tough and determined bully, but very successful’ (Ridley, 1991: 45). The same could have been said about the early 1980s’ appointment of Ian MacGregor, first at British Steel, and then at the National Coal Board, for in both cases, he actively pursued a tough style of no-nonsense management in order to ‘rationalise’ the two industries, thereby resulting in many redundancies and closures. In both cases, MacGregor was given the full and public support of senior Conservative neo-liberals, including Thatcher herself, while the steel workers and coal miners who sought to resist these job losses were roundly condemned. Elsewhere, although Michael Edwardes had been appointed head of the car manufacturer, British Leyland, back in 1977, it was during the 1980s that he too increasingly began confronting the trade unions in that industry, in order to make it more competitive and efficient, whereupon he was similarly supported and encouraged by ministers. As Margaret Thatcher herself subsequently explained, ‘whatever we decided to do about BL would have an impact on the psychology and morale of British managers as a whole, and I was determined to send the right signals … we had to back Michael Edwardes’ (Thatcher, 1993: 114–5). Similar effusiveness and encouragement from Thatcherite ministers was bestowed upon newspaper owners who deliberately confronted the print unions during the 1980s, most notably Rupert Murdoch when he transferred the production of The Sun and The Times from Fleet Street to Wapping, and recruited non-union labour in the process. On such occasions, these press barons were eulogised by Conservative neo-liberals as astute, forward-thinking and innovative businessmen seeking valiantly to overcome the obstructiveness of backward-looking, change-resistant, ultra-conservative trade unions. In all of these ways, Conservative neo-liberals endeavoured to secure an interlinked and mutually reinforcing blend of legislative, organisational and cultural changes inside the British workplace, whereby inequalities of power, in the guise of managerial authority and the restoration of hierarchical relations, would replace the erstwhile emphasis on partnership between Capital and Labour (previously replicated at national level by a mode of neo-corporatism, albeit a rather weak variant), while, at the same time, inequalities and differentials in earnings would also be explicitly encouraged,

Neo-liberal Conservatism

157

thereby reversing the post-1945 emphasis on, and drift towards, egalitarianism, however mild or modest this had been practice. Important though these developments were, they were both aided and reinforced by wider industrial and economic changes which gathered pace during the 1980s and 1990s, namely the shift away from manufacturing industries and full-time, 9–5, ‘jobs-for-life’, towards the expansion of the service and tertiary sectors, with their greater propensity to offer part-time jobs or more flexible patterns of employment. A major consequence of these wider, occupational, changes was that many of these newer jobs were lowpaid or/and insecure, and this significantly reinforced the trend towards much wider inequalities of earnings throughout the 1980s and 1990s. For example, in 1979 (the year in which Margaret Thatcher became Prime Minister), 7.1 million people were employed in manufacturing industries, but by the final year of her premiership, this figure had fallen to 4.2 million – almost three million jobs in manufacturing had disappeared in 11 years. Although new jobs were ‘created’ during the 1980s and 1990s, these were often markedly different to those which had been displaced, or ‘outsourced’ overseas (as part of the relentless search for cheaper sources of labour or/ and lower taxes). For example, although the 1979–90 period witnessed an increase, from nearly 13.3 million to almost 15.2 million, in the number of people employed in the service sector, these jobs were often part-time, and thus invariably characterised by lower pay than full-time jobs. Clearly, this trend further contributed towards the increasing gulf between rich and poor which gathered pace during the 1980s and 1990s. While these more general developments in the British economy would have occurred under virtually any government, they certainly corresponded closely to the ideological objectives and values of Conservative neo-liberals especially, and as such, it can be argued that many of the above policies enacted by the Thatcher and Major governments ether facilitated or reinforced some of these more general structural changes in British industry and the economy. Welfare reform and retrenchment As noted earlier, the New Right, Conservative neo-liberals and the party’s social authoritarians all held strong objections to much of the welfare state, for a host of economic, moral and social reasons, and all of them shared a strong ideological objection to the egalitarian principles and notions of ‘social justice’ which underpinned many aspects of post-1945 social policy. Consequently, welfare ‘reform’, which almost always means retrenchment or reduction when invoked by politicians, was viewed as another means of

158

British Conservatism

reversing the post-war trend towards slightly more equality, while also offering scope for cutting public expenditure and restoring traditional morality or ‘Victorian values’. However, the Thatcher governments found it much more difficult to make direct cuts in welfare expenditure than they had envisaged, and by 1990 only spending on local authority (council) housing had yielded net reductions. Elsewhere, with regard to education, health and social security, aggregate expenditure increased throughout the 1980s, although the overall rate of increase did slow down over the course of the decade. In terms of our analysis concerning the Thatcher governments’ determination to reverse the post-war trend towards greater equality via the welfare state, it is the reforms of social security which are of most relevance, for this aspect of social provision entailed direct cash payments to the poorest sections of society, and thus reflected political or ideological judgements about what was the minimum income that people could, or should, live on if they were not in paid employment. Now while this had been the case ever since the Beveridgian welfare state was established in the latter half of the 1940s, it is clear that Conservative neo-liberals and social authoritarians adjudged many social security benefits to be too generous, and thus to contribute to the ‘dependency culture’ and ‘why work?’ syndrome. If the level of social security benefits paid to each individual could be reduced, then these alleged problems would both be tackled, while simultaneously achieving the wider goal of increasing socio-economic inequalities. Although overall expenditure on social security actually increased during the 1980s, this was largely occasioned by the massive increase in unemployment which neo-liberal economic policies prompted, particularly the early application of monetarism, the use of high interest rates in order to reduce the money supply (deemed to be the primary cause of inflation), and the determination to reduce industrial subsidies. However, the aggregate increase in social security expenditure masked notable changes to the welfare benefits paid to individuals, which undoubtedly contributed, as intended, to the widening gap between the rich and poor during the 1980s and 1990s. One of the first reforms of social security enacted by Thatcher governments was the ‘de-index-linking’ of social security benefits, including old age pensions (which was rather at odds with the former portrayal of pensioners as constituting the ‘deserving poor’). Hitherto, social security benefits had been increased each year in accordance with average earnings, which thereby ensured that the non-waged never fell too far behind those in employment in terms of incomes and material well-being, although this is not to deny that hardship still existed. By de-index-linking social security benefits, the first Thatcher government ensured that henceforth, each year’s

Neo-liberal Conservatism

159

increase would be in line with the official rate of inflation only, the rationale being that this was usually somewhat lower than the annual increase in average earnings, particularly pay in the private sector. Not only did this provide the government with scope for savings vis-à-vis individual social security claimants, it also ensured that the gap between those in work, and those out of work, would become a little wider each year. For example, if average earnings increased by 3.5 per cent, but inflation was only 2.5 per cent, then the savings accrued by the government would be matched, annually, by a 1 per cent in the gap between average earning and social security benefit levels. Over several years, this promised to yield not only considerable savings in public expenditure on welfare provision for the unemployed, but also a significant gap between the incomes of those in paid employment, and those who, for whatever reason, were among the non-waged. As such, whereas Supplementary Benefit (now Income Support), for a single person, was equivalent to about 61 per cent of average earnings in 1978, this had declined to 53 per cent by 1987 (Riddell, 1989: 155). A parallel reform was the 1982 abolition of the Earnings Related Supplement, which had hitherto been temporarily paid to many claimants who had just been made redundant, the actual amount varying according to how much they previously earned prior to losing their job. This additional social security payment had been intended to provide transitional assistance to such individuals, to help them adjust to the sudden and often significant reduction in income caused by having to switch from a possibly generous salary to surviving on Unemployment Benefit (now called Jobseekers’ Allowance). By abolishing the Earnings Related Supplement, the Thatcher governments not only intended to secure further financial savings5 and cuts in public spending (or, as it turned out, slow down the rate at which social security expenditure increased), but also remove a potential disincentive for the newly unemployed to seek an immediate return to work: the Earnings Related Supplement might have made it more attractive and financially viable for them to remain unemployed for a while, perhaps treating it as an extended holiday, rather than doing their utmost to seek employment immediately. Another curb on the amount of social security paid to individuals derived from the reform of Housing Benefit during the 1980s and 1990s, when claimants were increasingly required to live in ‘suitable’ accommodation with regard to their circumstances. For example, by the 1990s, rather than claim Housing Benefit for the rent on a one-bed-roomed flat, a single person in receipt of such financial assistance was expected to live in a shared house or bedsit, for which the rent would be considerably cheaper. At the same time, surveys would increasingly be conducted of the rents charged in

160

British Conservatism

different parts of a town or city, so that Housing Benefit claimants would be expected to find accommodation in a cheaper district or suburb. Furthermore, Housing Benefit was also reduced for those whose employment was sufficiently low-paid to render them eligible for with assistance with their rent, the precise amount being determined by a ‘taper’ or sliding scale based on each individual’s circumstances. In short, a formula was adopted based on post-tax earnings and weekly rent: the lower the claimant’s wage and the higher his/her rent (within reason), the more Housing Benefit s/he could claim, with the very lowest-paid sometimes eligible for almost 100 per cent rent via Housing Benefit. However, the Thatcher and Major governments presided over a deliberate revising of the formula used to determine the amount of Housing Benefit payable to each low-paid individual, so that they would receive a lower proportion of their full rent. Consequently, they would have to pay the difference out of their net pay, thereby leaving them with less money for other items of expenditure. Put another way, even those in low-paid employment found that, with Housing Benefit payments being curbed, their rent consumed a growing proportion of their take-home pay, thereby necessitating greater personal economies and hardships elsewhere, such as less money for food, fuel or clothes, for example, or an obligation to find cheaper accommodation. Alongside these initiatives to curb the amount of social security paid to individuals, the Thatcher and Major governments also imposed more stringent or punitive eligibility criteria on the unemployed, and these too served, if only indirectly, to widen the earnings gap between the highest earners and the low-paid. As well as paying a reduced rate of benefits to individuals who were deemed responsible for losing their jobs, such as having been sacked for disciplinary reasons (as opposed to being made redundant), unemployed claimants were subject to an increasing regime of individual monitoring by social security staff, whereby they had to prove that they were actively seeking work, and were expected to accept any job offered to them. Failure to satisfy these conditions would render them liable to cuts in their benefits. The key point here is that, as previously noted, many of the new jobs created in the 1980s and 1990s were in sectors of the economy characterised by part-time work and/or low pay. The unemployed were not permitted to ‘hold out’ for a better-paid job, or one which paid a salary comparable to that previously earned, but, instead, were increasingly required to accept whatever was available or offered. Furthermore, it seems reasonable to assume that some employers would offer lower wages than they might otherwise have done, on the grounds that however low the pay, many of the unemployed would virtually be compelled to accept such poorly paid employment, lest their benefits

Neo-liberal Conservatism

161

were cut. In other words, high levels of unemployment created a ‘reserve army of labour’, which, in turn, rather weakened the bargaining capacity of many workers – or would-be workers – and the trade unions. Thus the 1980s and 1990s were characterised by economic factors and welfare reforms which entailed ever higher salaries for some of those in the already well-paid occupations and professions, and curbs on the social security benefits paid to the unemployed and in very low-paid employment. Indeed, there were tax cuts for the rich, who apparently deserved to be rewarded, and welfare cuts for the poor, who presumably needed to be punished. This clearly contributed to the Conservative neo-liberals’ desire and determination to attack egalitarianism, and thereupon make Britain a much more unequal society. Growing inequality was not a by-product or unfortunate consequence of Conservative neo-liberal policies, it was wholly intended and consciously pursued. From that perspective, it was very successful. Growing inequality in the 1980s and 1990s Each of the above reforms and developments contributed, as intended, towards greater inequalities of incomes and wealth during the 1980s and 1990s, and their combined, cumulative, effect was considerable. With regard to the cuts in income tax, even commentators who were definitely not on the Left, such as Peter Riddell (the political editor of The Financial Times for much of the 1980), observed that these were ‘heavily biased towards the better-off … by far the largest gainers’, for whereas a single person earning the average male wage of £244 (at 1988–89 income levels) was £16 per week better off as consequence of income tax cuts, a worker earning five times this sum would have gained £270 per week. Put another way, the Thatcher governments’ income tax cuts meant that whereas those workers in the lowest 10 per cent of earnings paid £400 million less in income tax than they had in 1978–79, those workers in the top 10 per cent bracket saw their aggregate tax payments cut by £9.3 billion (Riddell, 1989: 152–3). Just to emphasise the unequal impact of these tax cuts, another set of figures was provided in a House of Commons answer, on 3 April 1990, which confirmed that whereas the income tax cuts for workers earning up to £10,000 per annum had represented an increase in their individual annual take-home pay of £320 (based on figures for 1989–90), the corresponding boost for those earning more than £70,000 was £36,310 (House of Commons Debates, ser. 6, vol.170, col. 525). However, for many of those on lower incomes, the monetary gain accrued from income tax cuts was obviated by the corresponding increases in indirect taxation, most notably purchase taxes such as VAT. As we noted

162

British Conservatism

earlier, because the same rate applied to all individuals, regardless of how much (or how little) they earned, the burden of higher indirect taxation fell disproportionately on the less well-off, and as such consumed a larger proportion of their incomes than those of high earners. Meanwhile, the overall tax burden, measured as a proportion of GDP, increased from 32.7 per cent in 1978–79 to 38.0 per cent in 1984 and 1985, before falling to 36.5 per cent in 1989 (Johnson, 1991: 292, table 25). In other words, the overall tax burden was almost 4 per cent higher in the penultimate year of Thatcher’s premiership than it had been when she entered 10 Downing Street in 1979. However, while changes in taxation clearly played a major role in widening the gap between rich and poor in Britain during the 1980s and 1990s, a parallel source of increasing inequality was the enormous increase in pay enjoyed by many of those who were already in receipt of high salaries. Indeed, various studies have attested to the fact that it was generally those who already received the highest salaries who enjoyed the largest pay increases during the 1980s (see, for example, Heath et al, 1991: 157; Kondylis and Wadsworth, 2007; Layard and Nickell, 1989: passim; Rentoul, 1987: 29–32), even while less well-paid workers were constantly being warned, by ministers, that ‘excessive’ pay rises would result in them ‘pricing themselves out of work’, and the trade unions were invariably castigated for their ‘greed’ and ‘selfishness’ in pursuing pay increases for their (often rather low-paid) members. As a consequence of these growing disparities in earnings, coupled with significant tax cuts for those on higher incomes and the regressive impact of increases in indirect taxation, the pre-1979 trend towards slightly greater equality was dramatically reversed. Those at the top saw their share of national incomes increase from 1979 onwards, while the share received by those at the bottom diminished. For example, whereas in 1974, the top 10 per cent of earners had seen their share of total post-tax incomes fall to just under 25 per cent, their share had increased to 35.2 per cent by 1997, almost back what it has been in 1937 (Atkinson and Salverda, 2003, table 3UK, reproduced in Hills, 2004: 27). Expressed another way, between 1979 and 1995, the incomes of the top 10 per cent increased by about 60 per cent, whereas the incomes of the bottom 10 per cent rose by just 10 per cent (Department of Social Security, 1997: Table A1; Hills, 2004: 21). Crucially, though, Conservative neo-liberals did not view these increasing disparities as problematic or regrettable. On the contrary, they adjudged these widening inequalities to be a natural and necessary consequence of a healthy free market economy and a vibrant society characterised by extensive individual liberty. Furthermore, they would point out that although the poorest 10 per cent experienced a decline in their overall share of national

Neo-liberal Conservatism

163

incomes, this should not be confused with an actual reduction in their individual incomes: their net incomes still rose during the 1980s and 1990s, but at a slower rate than those of the better off. Conclusion Conservative neo-liberals have tended to subscribe to a pure or more literal interpretation of the principles and precepts of Conservatism delineated in Chapter 1. They are much less willing to accept criticism of, or interference with, ‘the market’ than One Nation Conservatives; indeed, Conservative neo-liberals tend to assume that social problems are at least partly caused by state intervention in the operation of a free, private-enterprise economy and political interference with the apparently natural and immutable laws of supply and demand. Consequently, Conservative neoliberals invariably draw the conclusion that the solution to social problems is to be derived from minimising the role of the state in economic and social affairs, and thereby maximising individual liberty and opportunities for wealth creation. Whereas One Nation Conservatives tend to see poverty in relative terms, Conservative neo-liberals have generally defined poverty in ‘absolute’ or primary terms, whereupon they argue that the wealth generated by ‘the market’ or created by dynamic, industrious individuals has raised the incomes and living standards of all citizens, to the extent of eradicating virtually all (absolute or primary) poverty. To the extent that any poverty is acknowledged still to exist, Conservative neo-liberals invariably attribute this to individual, not market, failure. In this respect, Conservative neoliberals tend to pathologise poverty, deeming it to be a manifestation or consequence of deficiencies in the characters or personalities of the poor themselves. In this context, Conservative neo-liberals often assume that most poverty (to the extent that it is acknowledged still to exist) is caused by laziness, fecklessness or immorality among the poorest in society, especially those defined as the ‘undeserving’ poor’, namely the unemployed and single parents or unmarried mothers. Following on from this pathological view of poverty as something which is largely self-inflicted and derived from individual failings, Conservative neo-liberals have invariably been opposed to anything more than minimal social provision and only a residual welfare state. Anything more generous or comprehensive, they fear, and the very poorest in society will become acculturated to welfare support, and will be even less motivated to become independent and self-reliant. Indeed, ‘generous’ social provision to tackle pockets of poverty would make a life of indolence attractive to some of

164

British Conservatism

those in low-paid employment, thereby increasing the number of people dependent on the welfare state. In other words, Conservative neo-liberals are convinced that measures to help the poor will actually increase their number. This, in turn, would impose higher costs on the hard-working and responsible majority, in terms of higher taxes, to the extent that some of the most industrious or successful might decide to invest their capital overseas, emigrate themselves or at least find ways of avoiding some of their tax burden. In such circumstances, wealth creation would be impeded, Treasury revenues would decline and the people who would ultimately suffer the most would be the poor themselves. Hence the Conservative neo-liberal conviction that the best way of tackling residual poverty and helping the (deserving) poor is to allow the rich and successful to earn as much as they can, without limit, and keep the tax burden as low as practicably possible. In this respect, and unlike One Nation Conservatives, Conservative neoliberals do not believe that there is a point beyond which inequality becomes excessive, indefensible or reprehensible, nor do they believe that the rich should feel any moral obligation to the poor. On the contrary, the poor should respectfully look up to the rich, either in gratitude to them for creating the wealth which generates jobs and welfare provision for the less well off (via the much vaunted ‘trickle-down’ effect), or for being role models and exemplars of what can be achieved through acquiring and applying the ‘vigorous virtues’ of hard-work, individual initiative, self-reliance and restraint, and a strong desire for self-improvement.

4 Post-Thatcherism Towards a Civic Conservatism

When Margaret Thatcher was replaced by John Major as Conservative leader and Prime Minister in November 1990, there were expectations that the latter would presage a return to a form of One Nation Conservatism, and thereby heal the social and economic divisions wrought by 11 years of Thatcherite neo-liberalism. Yet such hopes were not realised, for the overall ideological trajectory and policy content of the Major governments was to the right, and effectively constituted a continuation, or even an intensification, of Thatcherism, even if Major’s tone and enunciation were somewhat less rebarbative and vituperative than those of his predecessor. After the 1997 election meltdown, the process was repeated on three further occasions by Major’s successors. William Hague, Iain Duncan Smith and Michael Howard each commenced their leadership tenure with a commitment to steering the Conservatives back to the centre ground, and pari passu modernising its philosophy, policies and personnel. Yet in each case, the commitment was swiftly abandoned when the party continued to flatline in countless opinion polls and suffered further heavy election defeats, whereupon the Conservative reverted to a right-wing populist stance, prioritising so-called ‘core vote’ issues like crime, Europe and immigration. Only after a third consecutive general election defeat, in 2005, which paved the way for the election of David Cameron as Conservative leader, has the Party seemingly crafted a more committed and convincing nonThatcherite approach, one which actually places considerable importance on tackling inequality, poverty and social disadvantage. Yet this approach did not begin with David Cameron, for even in the mid 1990s some senior Conservatives were beginning to address issues pertaining to social

166

British Conservatism

breakdown and fragmentation, and tacitly acknowledging that a decade of economic neo-liberalism had yielded a range of social problems. Indeed, a few Conservatives left the party during the 1990s, so concerned were they over the direction of its politics and policies, and their social consequences. The period since 1990 has therefore seen the Conservative party undergo a long and often painful period of renewal and reconfiguration (bearing some similarities with the transition undergone by the Labour Party between 1979 and 1997), as it has sought to move beyond Thatcherism and unadulterated economic neo-liberalism. The outcome, thus far, has been an increasing advocacy of ‘civic Conservatism’ which acknowledges the vital importance of social institutions – Edmund Burke’s ‘little platoons’ – in tackling societal problems such as poverty and social disadvantage. In so doing, the Conservatives have posited a sharp distinction between civic society and the state. Indeed, the new Conservative narrative depicts Thatcherism as over-relying on ‘the market’ to tackle social problems, while (New) Labour looks first and foremost to the state for solutions. The New Conservatism, though, purports to look to society itself, as constituted by a multiplicity of families, communities, voluntary bodies, charities and social enterprises, to tackle societal problems and thereby re-establish One Nation. Major ambiguities and increasing ideological tension, 1990–97 As we noted towards the end of Chapter 2, John Major’s replacement of Margaret Thatcher in November 1990 did not herald the revival of One Nation Conservatism that its adherents in the party had hoped for. Instead, neither of the ideological tendencies in the Conservative Party during the early 1990s was particularly happy with Major’s premiership; Thatcherites suspected that Major was not really ‘one of us’, and therefore needed to be subject to constant pressure to ensure that the flame of economic neoliberalism was not dimmed, while One Nation Conservatives were deeply dismayed at Major’s failure to translate his more emollient tone and pacific rhetoric into practice. Ultimately, though, as we emphasised in Chapter 2, the antipathy which Major was subjected to by many Thatcherites belied the fact that his premiership broadly sustained the trajectory of Conservative neo-liberalism and social authoritarianism. Concern for the poor and disadvantaged was conspicuous by its absence from most policies and public pronouncements, particularly the ill-fated ‘Back to Basics’ campaign which Major inaugurated at the Conservatives’ 1993 annual conference, in which condemnation, not compassion, was the leitmotiv. In this context, tensions in the parliamentary Conservative Party steadily increased from 1992 onwards, and although the European Union became



Post-Thatcherism

167

the most visible manifestation of intra-party disagreement and infighting, some Conservative MPs were primarily concerned about the government’s failure to show a more caring and constructive approach towards the less well off, whose numbers were growing as the gap between the rich and the poor continued to widen. Indeed, during the 1990s, these concerns became sufficient to prompt a few high-profile defections or resignations from the Conservative Party. One of the first such departures was that of Alan Howarth, who defected to the Labour Party in October 1995, regretting the seemingly relentless decline in the numbers and influence of One Nation Conservatives. Before the end of the year, Emma Nicholson followed Howarth’s example, albeit crossing the floor [of the House of Commons] to join the Liberal Democrats. In so doing, she lamented that she had ‘spent a long time trying to discover a different Conservative Party’ and hoping ‘that the one nation Conservative Party I cared for very much indeed still existed and was still in business … but it isn’t so’ (Nicholson, 1995: 16). Indeed, she insisted that it was the contemporary Conservative Party’s principles which had changed, not hers, to the extent that it was ‘not so much a case of my leaving the party, but the party leaving me … The Conservative Party is no longer the One Nation party I joined.’ One of the key principles which Nicholson specifically cited as having been abandoned by the Conservatives was ‘concern for the poor … this is sorely missing from the Conservative Government’ (Nicholson, 1996: 215). Virtually identical reasons and sentiments were expressed by Hugh Dykes, when he too defected from the Conservative Party to the Liberal Democrats, in September 1997. In so doing, he explained that I have always been a ‘One Nation’ Conservative, believing in social justice … it is not so much a case of me leaving the Conservative Party, but of the party leaving me … I have had growing concerns about the direction the Conservative Party has taken in recent years … Inside, I felt uneasy about the rightward drift of social policy, about the growing divisions in our society and about the increasingly harsh tone of government pronouncements. (Independent, 15 September 1997) The remainder of the decade also witnessed two more Conservative MPs defect to ‘New Labour’, the first of them being Peter Temple-Morris, who resigned from the Conservatives in November 1997, initially sitting as an Independent One Nation Conservative, before joining Labour in June 1998. At the end of the following year, Shaun Woodward, who had

168

British Conservatism

succeeded Douglas Hurd as Conservative MP for affluent Witney, crossed the floor to join Labour. Meanwhile, John Gray, an erstwhile academic proponent of the New Right philosophy from which Thatcherism imbibed, became increasingly dismayed by some of the practical consequences of the relentless pursuit of economic liberalism during the 1980s and 1990s, and consequently became highly critical of the social repercussions. So eloquent and incisive are some of Gray’s denunciations that one of them in particular deserves to be quoted at length: Market liberalism, as we have come to know it in Britain and elsewhere in the 1980s, fosters a privileging of choice and a cult of mobility that consort badly with the settled communities cherished by traditional conservatives. Indeed … market liberalism is, in its workings, ineluctably subversive of tradition and community … The social and cultural effects of market liberalism are, virtually without exception, inimical to the values that traditional conservatives hold dear. Communities are scattered to the winds by the gale of creative destruction … The dynamism of market processes dissolves social hierarchies and overturns established expectations. Status is ephemeral, trust is frail and contract sovereign. The dissolution of communities promoted by market-driven labour mobility weakens, where it does not entirely destroy, the informal social monitoring of behaviour which is the most effective preventative measure against crime. (Gray, 1995: 147, 149) Gray reiterated these concerns via a published debate (with David Willetts) over the future of Conservatism in the immediate aftermath of the 1997 election defeat, in which he insisted that the heavy emphasis on economic individualism and unbridled competition had served to weaken and destabilise the very social bonds and civic institutions which Conservatives had traditionally revered. As such, he now argued that Thatcherism had itself contributed significantly to social breakdown and polarisation (Willetts and Gray, 1997: 3–65). Or as E. H. H. Green subsequently observed, on the very final page of his wonderfully eloquent book on Ideologies of Conservatism, it became increasingly evident that ‘The individualist logic of the liberal market … carried the intrinsic possibility of a tendency not only to political individualism, but also to social individuation’, to the extent that ‘the emphasis on market relations which had informed much of the political, economic and social agenda of the 1980s and 1990s appeared to have



Post-Thatcherism

169

brought about the possibility of such a fracturing of social cohesion’. In this respect, ‘its implications were wholly at odds with the organicist emphasis on social association that had been such a marked feature of Conservative thought’ (Green, 2002: 290, emphasis in original). A slightly different perspective about the socially destructive impact of Thatcherism and economic neo-liberalism has been advanced by Peregrine Worsthorne, for although he is not generally categorised as a One Nation Conservative per se, he has nonetheless deprecated the decline of the British aristocracy and associated notions of public duty and service, which he clearly views with great regret, and, with equal sadness, has observed ‘the coarseness in the New Conservative ranks’ during the 1980s and 1990s. Similarly, he expresses considerable disdain towards many of those who might be categorised as the nouveaux riches, whose recently or rapidly acquired wealth had not been matched by either a corresponding cultural or intellectual enrichment, nor a sense of social responsibility and restraint. On the contrary, Worsthorne confesses that having lived for over a decade ‘betwixt Beaconsfield and Gerrards Cross’ [in affluent Buckinghamshire, south-east England], he was strongly ‘tempted to quote Matthew Arnold’s infamously snobbish observations on the Victorian philistines of his day’: Consider these people … their way of life, their habits, their manners, the very tones of their voice; look at them attentively; observe the literature they read, the things which give them pleasure, the words which come forth out of their mouths, the thoughts which make the furniture of their minds; would any amount of wealth be worth having with the condition that one was to become just like these people by having it. (Worsthorne, 2004: 13) Worsthorne argued that the rise of the nouveaux riches, who themselves reflected the emergence of a much more meritocratic and ostensibly classless society, was highly damaging to the interests of the poor, because getting rid of the last vestiges of the old social system – the system which produced so many enlightened and honourable men for public service – will most significantly weaken the war against poverty, which required, and still requires for its successful waging precisely the kind of enlightened, honourable public servants an increasingly classless society does not produce. (Worsthorne, 2004: 48–9)

170

British Conservatism

On the contrary, Worsthorne laments that ‘triumphant Capitalism’ has ‘no need to make use of the gentlemanly public-service ethics … “forget all that old-fashioned noblesse oblige claptrap and get your snouts in the trough with the rest of us” is now the triumphalist message from those who have achieved social mobility (Worsthorne, 2004: 199–200, italics in original). Worsthorne’s patrician disdain for some of the social consequences of excessive neo-liberalism, including its concomitant consumerist culture and conspicuous consumption during the 1980s and 1990s, is echoed in Scruton’s observation, in the 2001 edition of The Meaning of Conservatism (originally published in 1980, and with a second edition in 1984). He suggests that a new mode of social stratification has merged, based on ‘divisions of leisure’, rather than divisions of labour, and that Britain is now characterised by ‘in ascending order, the morons, the yuppies, and the stars [celebrities]. The first watch TV, the second make the programmes and the third appear on them.’ Furthermore, Scruton disdainfully observes, ‘the emotional and intellectual torpor induced by TV neutralizes the social mobility that would otherwise enable the morons to change their lot’ (Scruton, 2001: 169), which might provide a partial explanation for the blithe acceptance of gross inequality in contemporary Britain (a topic which we discuss in the next chapter): the masses are not resenting the super-rich (or at least, those who are glamour models, pop stars, soap opera actors, or Premier League footballers, as opposed to bankers and company directors) but worshipping them, and enthusiastically seeking – albeit on rather lower incomes – to emulate them. Celebrity imitation, not social mobility, has seemingly become the goal of many poorer people, and the criterion by which they judge themselves (and each other). Continued ideological uncertainty after the 1997 election defeat Following the Conservative Party’s heavy defeat in the 1997 general election, a few senior figures formerly associated with Thatcherism – most notably former Defence Secretary Michael Portillo and former Secretary of State for Social Security Peter Lilley – publicly acknowledged that the party now needed to develop a new, more constructive or socially tolerant approach. Yet there was a clear difference of interpretation in the Conservative Party over what had happened to the voters who had not supported it in the 1997 election. Some on the neo-liberal or Europhobic right were seemingly convinced that the party’s loss of four million votes from 1992 was attributable either to abstentions (presumably due to disappointment at Major’s alleged failure to be sufficiently Thatcherite and anti-European), or to erstwhile Conservative voters switching to James Goldsmith’s [EU]



Post-Thatcherism

171

Referendum Party, or UKIP. The logic of this perspective was, naturally, that the Conservative Party ought to respond to New Labour’s resounding victory by being unequivocally neo-liberal on economic issues and public services reform, and social authoritarian on social and moral issues: the Party needed to reaffirm its Thatcherite ethos, and its disillusioned supporters would return in droves. The flaw in this prognosis was that it was palpable nonsense, and seemed to reflect a form of delusional wishful thinking on the Thatcherite right. Instead, according to Nick Sparrow of ICM (the polling company commissioned by the Conservatives), barely a quarter of the party’s lost votes since 1992 was due to stay-at-home Tories or switches to anti-EU parties. Instead, the vast majority of lost Conservative votes – about 3.5 million – had switched to Labour and the Liberal Democrats (Bale, 2009: 56). Of course, cognisance of the latter might still have elicited a ‘no need to change’ stance, on the grounds that New Labour would soon reveal itself either to be ‘Old Labour’ in disguise, or prove to be economically incompetent and profligate, in which cases, these Conservative switchers would soon return to the Party, with little need for significant modernisation or moving onto the centre ground. Yet as the Blair governments’ poll leads held firm for the bulk of the first two terms, sufficient to ensure a second successive emphatic victory in the 2001 election, so did the Conservative opposition oscillate between moving towards the centre ground, in order to challenge New Labour directly on the territory it had seized since the mid 1990s, and reverting back to a decidedly right-wing populist stance, which heartened the unreconstructed Thatcherite right but singularly failed to win back those non-Thatcherite Conservatives who had deserted the party in 1997, let alone attract voters who had never previously voted Conservative. This ideological and strategic uncertainty and consequent political inÂ�consistency was first apparent during William Hague’s 1997–2001 tenure as Conservative leader (see Dorey, 2003, for an overview). Hague initially decreed that the party needed to challenge New Labour and the (first) Blair government for occupancy of the centre ground of British politics, in order to win back about four million lost voters. Yet barely a year later, during which time Labour had enjoyed clear and continuous opinion poll leads over the Conservatives (and with Blair viewed much more favourably than Hague by the voters on a range of policy issues and personal criteria), the Conservative Party tacked back to the right, and gave renewed priority to its former populist stance on issues such as asylum (seekers), crime, immigration and the European Union. This shift back to the right may have

172

British Conservatism

been seemingly vindicated by the Conservatives slightly improved performance in the 1999 European Parliament election, in which it had similarly advanced a strongly Euro-sceptic case. This, perhaps, convinced Hague and those around him that this was the best way of challenging New Labour after all (Bale, 2009: 57), notwithstanding that many voters view such elections as being of ‘second order’, thereby rendering the results a highly unreliable indicator as to how they will vote in the next general election. When this failed to yield any notable improvement in the Conservative Party’s performance and share of the vote in the 2001 general election, Hague was succeeded by Iain Duncan Smith, whereupon the ideological trajectory was repeated (Dorey, 2004). Smith initially insisted that the party had to move on from Thatcherism, and to this end, advocated what became known as ‘compassionate Conservatism’. This entailed an attempt at downplaying the erstwhile neo-liberal emphasis on economic issues and the associated conviction that ‘the market’ could provide the solution to virtually any problem, and, instead, placed greater emphasis on social issues and policies. Smith himself acknowledged that the party’s hitherto emphasis on free market economics had created a popular (mis)conception that the Conservatives ‘literally knew the price of everything and the value of nothing’, and consequently, it was necessary to give much greater attention to social policy and effective public services (Daily Telegraph, 6 October 2001). Yet when the Conservatives continued to flatline in the opinion polls, the party again shifted to the right, although Smith himself continued to evince considerable concern for the poor and socially disadvantaged, as we note below. In the meantime, though, the party’s repeated oscillation between advocacy of ‘compassionate Conservatism’ and hasty reversion back towards right-wing populism – sometimes characterised as an intra-party battle between ‘mods [modernisers] versus rockers’ (see, for example, Garnett, 2003; Garnett and Hickson, 2009: 164) – naturally confused voters about what precisely the Conservatives now stood for, and who they were primarily appealing to. Those erstwhile or potential Conservative voters who yearned for a return to the party’s One Nation ethos would have been greatly discomfited by the lurches to the right, while those Conservatives who wanted a renewed or reinvigorated Thatcherite approach would have been exasperated with the allusions to ‘compassionate Conservatism’ and the associated claims that there were, perhaps, limits as to how far the free market could be applied to social problems or public services. In spite of periodic rightwards shifts in the Party’s stance, with ‘core vote’ or populist issues such as immigration, asylum seekers and the EU repeatedly given greater prominence, other Conservatives seemed to share Smith’s



Post-Thatcherism

173

conviction that the party needed to embrace some of the concerns which had hitherto been widely viewed as ‘Labour issues’, most notably with regard to poverty and social exclusion. Although New Labour had placed great emphasis on these issues in the late 1990s, the continued growth in socioeconomic inequality which accompanied the Blair premiership persuaded some Conservatives that their party should audaciously champion the plight of those ‘left behind’ in New Labour’s Britain. In effect, the Conservatives were exhorted to rediscover their One Nation tradition, and accept that there were some social problems which could not be solved solely by promoting the free market and economic neo-liberalism. As one advocate of what was sometimes termed ‘compassionate Conservatism’ suggested, while the party was still trailing the Blair government in the opinion polls less than a year before the 2005 general election: ‘Wouldn’t the Tory Party had made more progress if it had focused on the stark gap between the haves and the have-nots?’ (Montgomerie, 2004: 36). By this time, Iain Duncan Smith had resigned as Conservative leader, to be replaced by Michael Howard. The latter also initially seemed to urge a more compassionate or centrist mode of Conservatism, yet Howard too reverted to right-wing populism (so-called ‘dog whistle politics’) as the 2005 election neared, and his party continued to trail Labour in countless opinion polls. As a consequence of the fact that Howard had been a senior and prominent minister in John Major’s cabinets he enjoyed a higher public profile than Hague and Smith had done, but in some respects this potential advantage actually proved to be an encumbrance, because his initial advocacy of centrist politics and Conservative modernisation appeared even less genuine and convincing, and was certainly out of character. Few people, either in the Conservative Party itself, or among the British electorate, seemed to have been convinced that Howard was a born again One Nation Conservative, so that when he reverted back to right-wing populism he was at least being true to himself. Towards a ‘civic Conservatism’ Yet while the 1997–2005 Conservative Party repeatedly lurched back to the right when its periodic advocacy of a more compassionate or centrist Conservatism failed to elicit any notable improvement in poll ratings and public popularity, a number of Conservatives were committed to devising a nonThatcherite mode of Conservatism, even whilst cognisant that this might take time, both to develop fully, and then to persuade the British electorate the party had genuinely modernised in its attitudes and policies. After all, a key problem with the instant espousal of ‘compassionate Conservatism’

174

British Conservatism

which followed the 1997 and 2001 election defeats was that it sounded so insincere and hasty. Voters were simply not persuaded that senior Conservatives who had, just months, or even weeks, earlier, been espousing neo-liberalism and/or social authoritarianism had suddenly undergone a Pauline conversion and thereupon been transformed into socially caring Conservatives. To make such claims made them and their party seem blatantly opportunistic, and motivated solely by short-term tactical considerations rather than genuine principles or long-term strategy. Consequently, more prescient Conservatives recognised that any serious and successful attempt at re-orientating the Conservative Party away from Thatcherism would take a little time. To those of their sceptical colleagues who might have warned that this longer-term approach would tacitly mean accepting a term or two in Opposition while a new mode of Conservatism was crafted, the ‘modernisers’ could retort that without such an exercise the party was likely to remain in opposition anyway, because mainstream voters were hardly clamouring for a return to pure Thatcherism. Although David Cameron has since become the public persona of this new mode of ‘compassionate Conservatism’, as we will discuss below, it is important to emphasise that a few other senior Conservatives were seeking to steer the Party away from Thatcherism some time before Cameron’s election as leader in December 2005. Indeed, one of them, David Willetts, was tentatively seeking to revise Conservatism even during John Major’s premiership, or at least to instigate a debate about the future trajectory of Conservative politics. Indeed, two academic experts on contemporary Conservatism have claimed that ‘David Willets’ contribution to Conservatism is more substantial than that of anyone else at a senior level in the Party since the downfall of Margaret Thatcher. He has been involved in all of the major debates over the future ideological direction of the Conservative party since then’ (Garnett and Hickson, 2009: 155). In so doing, Willetts began, cautiously, to acknowledge the need for a more constructive Conservative approach to tackling socio-economic deprivation and related social problems, rather than merely advocating further extension of free markets and continued reliance on the hitherto much vaunted ‘trickle down’ effect (for a full discussion of the development of Willetts’ post-1990 thinking, and the modification of his former ideological stance, concerning the appropriate relationship between markets, individuals and communities, see Garnett and Hickson, 2009: chapter 10). An indication of the extent to which he had begun to engage in a partial reexamination of aspects of contemporary Conservatism during the 1990s was revealed by the subtle shift, both in emphasis and tone, contrast between his



Post-Thatcherism

175

1992 book Modern Conservatism and his 1994 pamphlet, published by the Social Market Foundation, entitled Civic Conservatism. In both publications, Willetts insisted that there was no intrinsic contradiction or incompatibility between the free market and civil society, and as such, he emphatically rejected the allegations of critics (on the left, among some One Nation Conservatives, and from erstwhile supporters of the New Right who had since recanted) that the free market, relentless competition and robust individualism were destructive of the stable communities and social institutions which Conservatives had traditionally revered. However, closer examination of the two publications reveals that, whereas the emphasis in Modern Conservatism had been on the primacy of the free market, two years later Willetts seemed to ascribe somewhat greater importance to communities and civic institutions. Having privileged the economic sphere, Willetts now seemed willing to grant a slightly higher priority to the social sphere: there definitely was such a thing as society after all. In Modern Conservatism, Willets had insisted that civil society and communities needed free markets, not least because the alternative, state control, would itself destroy free and voluntary institutions. Only the minimal state associated with economic neo-liberalism could permit the flourishing of a range of intermediate institutions. So enthusiastic was Willetts about the free market that he looked back with evident distaste at Harold Macmillan’s The Middle Way, which he adjudged to constitute ‘the most vivid and depressing evidence of how much conservatism has shifted since [Lord] Salisbury’s day’, and whose interventionist economic policy proposals ‘would now be regarded as Bennite’ (Willetts, 1992: 30).1 In addition to arguing that a limited state permitted an array of civic institutions and voluntary associations to flourish, he also argued that the extension of home ownership ‘has given people new and stronger ties to their neighbourhood. Ownership and belonging go together’ (Willetts, 1992: 108), although this particular claim is perhaps not wholly convincing, given that, sociologically, home ownership has often been associated with ‘privatised’ individuals who are primarily family-centred, rather than active local citizens. Arguably, too, three decades of untrammelled neo-liberalism and individualism have transformed many people first and foremost into economic consumers instead of social citizens, more interested in another visit to a shopping centre than being active in their neighbourhood. Willetts continued to venerate the free market in his 1994 pamphlet, Civic Conservatism, but there was now a less triumphalist tone in eulogising economic neo-liberalism. Instead, Willetts now acknowledged that ‘we are not so confident’ about the ability of the free market to solve social problems or achieve

176

British Conservatism

non-economic objectives, to the extent that some Conservatives ‘have become wary of relying so heavily on the free market as we appeared to do in the 1980s’. Indeed, he confessed that there were probably ‘many good Conservatives who must be regarded as sharing’ Marx’s critique about the way in which ‘in modern capitalism, all relationships become “commodified”’. Willetts recognised that after 15 years of economic neo-liberalism and the relentless promotion of markets, even in what remained of the public sector, ‘Contract culture appears to have triumphed, and accountants rule; that leaves many traditional Conservatives feeling uneasy’. Even neo-liberals were apparently recognising that ‘the idea of the economic agent makes little sense unless that agent is embodied in a culture with a set of values’ (Willetts, 1994: 7, 54). It was in this context that Willetts suggested that the new challenge was ‘to formulate a coherent set of policies which shows that, as well as for the individual, there must be a role for collective action’, although he was quick to emphasise that ‘collective action does not necessarily mean state action’ (Willetts, 1994: 23; see also Willetts, 2002: 55). While avoiding specificity – this was, after all, a somewhat philosophical or speculative exposition, intended to contribute towards an intra-party debate over the future of (post-Thatcherite) Conservatism – Willetts referred to the need to reinvent society’s ‘little platoons’, by which he meant the range of intermediate institutions – a blend of local, private, public and voluntary organisations – which simultaneously stood between, yet indirectly linked, individuals and the state. In so doing, this would address a notable One Nation concern about Thatcherism which Ian Gilmour had articulated two years earlier, namely the manner in which it had eviscerated intermediate institutions, for ‘It is these buffers between the individual and the state which preserve liberty by preventing a direct confrontation between them. When they are swept away, tyranny or anarchy follows’ (Gilmour, 1992: 199). Similar arguments were being advanced a decade later, by Conservatives such as Damian Green, albeit no longer in the context of growing inequality under Thatcherism but in regard to ‘the divisions between the haves and the have-nots [which] are getting wider under New Labour’. He reiterated that markets alone were not enough, and that ‘Britain has obviously moved on from the era of radical individualism … we all have a large degree of interdependence’, and consequently it was vital for the Conservative Party to develop ‘a new intellectual settlement which will make us once again the guardians of the One Nation philosophy’. However, Green emphasised that while the Conservatives urgently needed to canvass more constructive policies to tackle social problems, most notably those of poverty and social disadvantage, this did not mean a revival of extensive state intervention.



Post-Thatcherism

177

Neither, though, would it suffice to keep rolling back the state: ‘What we need is a better state, not simply a smaller one’, one whose role vis-à-vis tackling poverty and related social problems would primarily be to promote and coordinate a range of non-state or sub-national institutions. This was neatly linked to a growing and parallel Conservative emphasis on localism, which, Green insisted, would provide ‘space for non-state institutions to flourish’ in the communities which suffered most from socio-economic deprivation and social disadvantage (Green, 2003: 5, 6). Also promoting a new Conservative approach, following the Blair government’s re-election in 2001, was Oliver Letwin, who began emphasising the need to revive ‘neighbourliness’ as part of a more general strategy to develop a form of ‘civic’ or communitarian Conservatism. In a series of speeches, Letwin argued that tackling the myriad social problems which existed in contemporary Britain required a multi-agency approach, encompassing a range of individuals and institutions, of which the state itself would constitute merely one part. Indeed, the state’s primary role would be to facilitate the necessary action by other agencies and civic bodies, including the voluntary sector, rather than directly seek to address these problems itself. After all, the New Labour state was deemed to be an integral part of the problem, and so ‘The object of policy must be to bolster those institutions’ which could create the neighbourly society through empowering communities and local citizens, and fostering greater individual and social responsibility (Letwin, 2003: 11). Another difference between the two parties which Letwin highlighted was that Labour invariably pursued ‘top-down’ strategies to social problems, whereas the Conservatives were urging ‘bottom-up’ responses. In terms of how this social deprivation and exclusion could be tackled, Letwin strongly emphasised the need for various social and civic institutions to foster solutions. In so doing, he was careful to avoid placing the responsibility on the state itself to solve these social problems (Letwin 2002: 45–51). Yet, Letwin argued, Labour’s approach, which assumes that Whitehall initiatives are the solution to any societal problem, erodes the professional power and authority of front-line staff who might otherwise be able to tackle some of the problems, while also disempowering local citizens and private individuals who might otherwise be prepared to confront lawbreakers and wrongdoers in their communities (Letwin, 2003: 41). The other key progenitor of a new mode of Conservatism prior to Cameron’s election as Party leader was Iain Duncan Smith, who, once he was freed from the constraints and responsibilities of being party leader, devoted himself to addressing poverty and social disadvantage. He has done so primarily through the Centre for Social Justice, which aims to ‘put social justice

178

British Conservatism

at the heart of British politics and to build an alliance of poverty-fighting organisations in order to see a reversal of social breakdown in the UK’. Inaugurated by Smith himself in 2004, the Centre for Social Justice is formally an independent (i.e. non-political) think tank – although some senior Conservatives sit on its Advisory Board, most notably William Hague, Oliver Letwin and David Willetts – whose sundry working groups and task forces attracted a range of individuals who have professional experience or knowledge of the issues they are investigating, or for which they are devising policy proposals. The Centre also operates a blog at www.povertydebate.com. For example, during 2007 and 2008 the Centre for Social Justice conducted research through ten working groups, each focusing on a specific issue or sphere of policy, namely: asylum; courts and sentencing; economic dependency; early years (children and families); family law; housing; lookedafter children (special needs); police reform; prison reform; youth and gang crime. Since its inauguration, this research has yielded 43 tracts and reports, these addressing such topics and themes as the causes of crime, children in care, gambling, good parenting, personal debt, the role of the voluntary sector and welfare dependency. One of the key themes developed by the Centre for Social Justice, and which has subsequently been adopted by the Conservative leadership in order to attack the Blair-Brown governments, is that of ‘Broken Britain’. Indeed, this theme acquired much greater prominence when David Cameron, shortly after becoming Conservative leader (see below), commissioned the Centre for Social Justice to undertake a major inquiry which would provide the basis for policies to promote social justice and tackle poverty. This inquiry, comprising three discrete phases, commenced with an evaluation of the nature and extent of social breakdown and poverty in Britain today, before then examining the causes of poverty. The third and final phase was to propose policies for tackling the inter-related problems of poverty, social breakdown and social exclusion. Comprising six working groups (one each on addictions, consumer debt, education, family, social justice and the voluntary sector), this particular project elicited the views of more than 50 practitioners and professionals working in cognate areas, and consulted over 2,000 organisations working in the social spheres under investigation. It also held public consultation exercises, totalling over 3,000 hours of hearings, in Birmingham, Brighton, Carlisle, Devon, Glasgow, London, Manchester and Wolverhampton. There were also a number of overseas visits to countries such as Holland, Sweden, and the United States to learn how they had tackled similar social problems. When this particular inquiry published its report Breakdown Britain, in December 2006, it delineated the scale and causes of poverty and social



Post-Thatcherism

179

exclusion in contemporary Britain and the economic and social impact, both on individuals themselves, and British society as a whole. In particular, Breakdown Britain highlighted the scale of alcohol and drug addiction (and the number of children living with parents who suffered from these addictions); the degree of crime committed by children while truanting; personal debt; the number of children raised in families living in poverty (defined as less than 40 per cent of the median income); increasing family breakdown; links between social class and single or very young parenthood and also between the high proportion (70 per cent) of young offenders who come from lone-parent families; the scale of educational failure in terms of limited (or no) qualifications obtained at school, coupled with increasing truancy, illiteracy and consequent unemployability, poverty and welfare dependency in adult life (Social Justice Policy Group, 2006: passim). Its next report, the 671-page Breakthrough Britain, was published in July 2007, and proposed a comprehensive array of policies to tackle the social problems highlighted seven months earlier in Breakdown Britain. Among some of the most notable of these policy proposals, under specific headings, were: (a) Family breakdown • Reform of the tax and benefits system to support and reward marriage. • A new Marriage and Relationship Institute. • More extensive ‘parenting education’ and counselling. • Strengthening ‘contact arrangements’ (vis-à-vis children) when parents separate or divorce. • ‘Front-loading’ Child Benefit to the early years. • A minister of cabinet rank with responsibility for representing the interests of families at the highest political level. • Enhanced support and training for professionals working with disadvantaged families or children. • Reform of social housing schemes, to make it easier for low-income families to acquire a financial stake in their homes; for example, extending rent-to-buy initiatives or shared equity schemes. (b) Economic dependency and worklessness • Enhanced obligation on the unemployed actively to seek work. • Greater decentralisation and contracting-out of employment services, with results-based payment schemes for these service providers. • Expecting lone parents to work once their children are in full-time education.

180

British Conservatism

(c) Educational failure • A ‘Home–School Charter’ stipulating the reciprocal rights and responsibilities of parents, pupils and teachers. • Encourage and help poorer parents to become more actively involved in their children’s educational development, partly through creating a ‘Home–School Support Champion’ in socio-economically deprived areas. • £500 annual credits for extra tutorial support and additional courses (such as music lessons) for pupils from disadvantaged backgrounds, conditional on their parents having fulfilled their obligations with regard to the Home–School Charter. • Make it easier for parents and the ‘third sector’ to establish new schools. • Reducing education bureaucracy so that schools can focus more on teaching properly. • Improved professional training for headteachers. • Introduce ‘family literacy classes’ to help parents who themselves have limited reading skills. • Extend and expand vocational courses, to reflect the diversity of pupils’ ability and motivation. • Encourage closer links between schools and local businesses and/or the community. (d) Addictions • Integrate addiction services to facilitate a more holistic approach. • More devolution of addiction services and support networks to reflect the problems prevalent in particular districts. • Develop special ‘drug courts’ to deal with drug addicts. • Increase tax on alcohol, both to deter excessive consumption, while also using the additional revenues to meet the social costs of alcohol abuse. • Reclassify cannabis from a Class C to a Class B drug. • Consider the introduction of random drug tests in schools, to identify pupils at risk. (e) Personal debt • Closer regulation of credit and other lending agencies, under the auspices of the Financial Services Authority. • Encourage and extent Credit Unions. • Strengthen customers’ rights vis-à-vis banks, via a statutory Bank Customers’ Charter.



Post-Thatcherism

181

• Review the operation of the social security benefits system, particularly aspects such as the Social Fund. • Provide more effective personal finance education. (f ) Third sector • Improve tax relief for donations to charities • Encourage young and socially excluded people to become more involved in voluntary work in their communities, in return for earning ‘credits’ which could then be exchanged for purchases, such as tickets for gigs. • Introduce volunteering schemes as part of the school curriculum for Year 9 pupils. • Reduce bureaucracy, streamline funding and increase devolution for/to the third sector and voluntary bodies. • Expand the role of the third sector in delivering public services at local level. • Establish a Minister of the Third Sector, who would sit in the Cabinet. • Establish a Third Sector Institute to provide greater coordination and strategic oversight of the plethora of third-sector organisations in Britain. While there is much which is commendable about some of these proposals, there are also two aspects which are particularly notable. First, they make no reference to the inequalities arising from enormous salaries, large bonuses and tax evasion at the top of the income hierarchy. The focus is entirely on those at the lower end of society, and ways of alleviating their problems but it does not make clear how this will do anything to reduce the inequalities caused by soaring salaries and bonuses in the City and the boardroom. Of course, one would not expect Conservatives to place curbs on earnings or bonuses in the private sector, but in the context of the party’s opposition also to increasing taxation of the super-rich it is difficult to see how the successful enactment of the proposals enshrined in Breakthrough Britain would do much, if anything, to reduce the gulf between the very rich and the very poor in contemporary Britain. Indeed, although there is undoubtedly plenty of decidedly un-Thatcherite compassion for the socially disadvantaged and excluded, and some constructive proposals, there also a tendency to pathologise some of the problems. In this respect, the poor apparently need to be helped to change their behaviour, or equipped to become more useful and employable members of society, but there is clearly no corresponding expectation that the super-rich should also modify their behaviour (by curbing their huge salaries and bonuses) or exercise greater social responsibility.

182

British Conservatism

Of course, the response of Conservative modernisers would doubtless be that by making the socially excluded more employable, this will provide pathways out of poverty via paid employment. However, this would be conveniently to overlook the extent to which poverty also affects many people who are in low-paid employment, and who therefore struggle materially to support themselves and their families. Furthermore, the approach of Breakthrough Britain seems tacitly to be viewing poverty in absolute terms, by virtue of its focus on lifting people out of deprivation and destitution through making them more employable. Although this might seem commensurate with the Disraelian goal of ‘elevating the condition of the people’, it should be seen in the context of David Cameron’s comments (see below) about the existence of relative poverty, whereby the incomes of the poor lag behind the earnings of the rest of society. As such, trying to ensure that the socially excluded can be materially or morally equipped to undertake jobs which might well be low-paid while those at the top continue to acquire ever higher earnings and bonuses each year will not tackle the relative poverty which many Conservative modernisers profess concern about. Even if all the proposals enshrined in Breakthrough Britain were successfully implemented, without corresponding action to deal with excesses at the top of the incomes hierarchy, inequality between the rich and the poor will continue to increase, thereby ensuring that, regardless of the Conservative modernisers’ genuflections towards One Nation Conservatism, Britain will remain two, increasingly divergent, nations. The second aspect of Breakthrough Britain which is particularly notable is the extensive role ascribed to the ‘third sector’. Quite apart from the series of proposals explicitly devoted to this sector, many of the proposals under other headings also ascribe a prominent role to voluntary bodies, charities, and other non-state organisations. This, of course, reflects the Conservative modernisers’ distinction between the state (which they identify with Labour’s ‘top-down’ approach to tackling – but consequently exacerbating – social problems) and society. As is made clear in Breakthrough Britain, in many spheres of social policy ‘services should be state determined but not state delivered’ (Social Justice Policy Group, 2007: 28). The analyses and proposals advanced in Breakthrough Britain seem wholly in line with the prognosis and philosophy which David Cameron has enunciated since being elected as Conservative Party leader, for he had from the outset been keen to emphasise that ‘At the next election, a whole generation of people will be voting who were born after Margaret Thatcher left office. So when it comes to tackling the big challenges our society faces, I won’t be the prisoner of an ideological past’ (Independent, 2 January 2006). Instead, Cameron frequently emphasised the need to reposition the Conservative Party on



Post-Thatcherism

183

the centre ground of British politics, for as he explained to delegates at the Party’s 2006 conference, this is ‘the ground on which political success is built … Not some bog on the fringes of debate’ (The Times, 2 October 2006). One particular aspect of Cameron’s professed commitment to tackling growing inequality, which Hickson has highlighted, has been the Conservative leader’s willingness to acknowledge the existence and importance of relative poverty, rather than the neo-liberal or Thatcherite notion of absolute poverty (Hickson, 2009: 357–60). Cameron made this clear in a November 2006 speech, in which he distanced himself from Thatcherism, by asserting that In the past, we used to think of poverty in absolute terms – meaning straightforward material deprivation … That’s not enough. We need to think of poverty in relative terms – the fact that some people lack those things which others in society take for granted. So I want this message to go out loud and clear – the Conservative Party recognises, will measure and will act on relative poverty. (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/6179078.stm, 24 November 2006) Significantly, though, in his plethora of references and pledges to tackling growing inequality and poverty, Cameron, like the other senior Conservative figures we have just referred to, has insisted that ‘there is such a thing as society, but it is not the same thing as the state’. Indeed, the phrase also appears in the introduction to the Built to Last statement of Conservative aims and values (Conservative Party, 2006), which encapsulated Cameron’s professed modernising agenda, and which was intended to provide the framework for a series of policy reviews undertaken during 2006. The repeated deployment of the phrase is (deliberately) significant and symbolic, because Margaret Thatcher famously declared that there was ‘no such thing a society’ (although it is often overlooked that she did immediately refer to the existence and vital role of families and communities). For many people, this phrase came to symbolise the rampant individualism and nihilistic ‘greed is good’ ethos of Thatcherite Britain during the 1980s, and so Cameron’s insistence that ‘there is such a thing as society’ has been widely viewed as an explicit repudiation of Thatcherism. It also seemed to place Cameron in the Disraelian tradition of One Nation Conservatism, for as we have noted in Chapter 2, although Benjamin Disraeli was not averse to using government legislation to tackle particular inequalities and deprivation, he believed that many social problems could and should be tackled, first and foremost, by non-state, civic institutions.

184

British Conservatism

However, in positing a clear distinction between ‘society’ and ‘the state’, Cameron was also able to distance the Conservative Party’s apparently more compassionate approach to tackling poverty and social exclusion from that of New Labour, which was still deemed to be instinctively state-centric and top-down in tackling societal problems. This was to become a recurring Cameron theme, as indicated by his speech to the 2008 Conservative conference, when he declared that: For Labour there is only the state and the individual, nothing in between. No family to rely on, no friend to depend on, no community to call on. No neighbourhood to grow in, no faith to share in, no charities to work in. No one but the Minister, nowhere but Whitehall, no such thing as society – just them, and their laws, and their rules, and their arrogance. You cannot run our country like this. Certainly, Cameron’s leadership seems to have heralded a decisive departure from Thatcherism with regard to the party’s approach to poverty, growing inequality and social disadvantage, as evinced by the effort expended in presenting the Conservatives as the party which will focus on the ‘dispossessed’ in British society, and in so doing, will also mend ‘Broken Britain’. It was perhaps significant that Cameron appointed Oliver Letwin as his coordinator of the policy review and modernisation exercise, given Letwin’s aforementioned advocacy of a revival of ‘neighbourliness’. Letwin has continued urging this newer, more compassionate, approach under Cameron, and in so doing has readily acknowledged that the Conservatives have hitherto been widely viewed as being concerned primarily with ‘those who can look after themselves, or the rich’. Thus Letwin has insisted that now ‘the focus of modern compassionate conservatism … is on those most in need … the unemployed, the homeless, the disabled, the refugee, the orphan, the drug addict’ (The Times, 17 March 2006; see also speech by Michael Heseltine, on tackling urban deprivation, cited in The Guardian, 8 April 2006). Letwin was adamant that ‘Conservatives have never been arid, atomistic, individualistic libertarians’ (Letwin, 2003: 44), nor, he insisted, had the party ever become Hayekians from the late 1970s (a refutation which echoed the claims of various senior Conservatives in the mid 1940s that the party had never been one of laissez-faire capitalism, as noted in Chapter 2). Instead, the Conservative governments of the 1980s and 1990s had implemented the economic measures and reforms which had become necessary to tackle the problems which the country was then faced with, whereas in the early twenty-first century, in spite of the 2008–09 recession (which Letwin



Post-Thatcherism

185

seemed to imply was a relatively short-term problem, rather than a serious defect of unregulated markets and competition which called into question the continued efficacy of economic neo-liberalism), the ‘biggest long-term challenge we face … is a social one … as great as the economic revolution that was required’ in the previous two decades. As a consequence of these economic reforms, Letwin explained, ‘we are now a rich country again. Yet a worrying proportion of the population has been left behind … a section of the population living in multiple deprivation’, a situation which he readily conceded was ‘morally wrong … there is something immoral about people being left behind’ (Letwin, 2009: 71, 73, 76). However, in accordance with this new Conservative emphasis on communities and localism, Letwin echoed Cameron in emphasising that ‘the responsibility of the state is to encourage corporations, individuals and communities to do things that are pro-social to help solve the problem of multiple deprivation’. It would also be necessary to establish ‘frameworks that persuade corporations to behave in a socially responsible way’. Yet in avoiding statist or statutory measures as far as possible, Letwin acknowledged that much of this new approach would be reliant on exhortation and persuasion ‘to encourage the social norms of giving’. This, he explained, was why the Conservative leadership had recently become interested in the concept of ‘nudge economics’,2 which he characterised as being ‘about giving a gentle push to society to move in a direction of greater responsibility, or greater coherence, or kindliness’ (Letwin, 2009: 76). Ultimately, Letwin maintained, social problems had to be tackled by ‘setting people – neighbourhoods, schools, hospitals, professionals, patients, pupils, teachers, everyone everywhere in this country – free to act, together or individually, with a helping hand from the State but without the dead hand of bureaucracy upon them’ (Letwin, 2003: 46). Throughout 2009, Cameron’s, Letwin’s and Smith’s endeavours to develop a ‘civic Conservatism’ as the primary means of tackling poverty and social exclusion, were given additional intellectual impetus by the work of an erstwhile academic, Phillip Blond. Until 2008 Blond had been a Senior Lecturer in Theology and Philosophy at Cumbria University, but a series of articles on what he termed ‘Red Toryism’ brought him to the attention of senior Conservatives, for whom he reportedly began writing speeches. He also became, in January 2009, head of the newly established ‘Progressive Conservatism’ project at Demos, a think tank which (although formally non-aligned to any political party) had hitherto been widely associated with New Labour and saw itself as a progenitor of progressive political ideas and policy proposals. However, he left Demos in August 2009, and established in November 2009 a new think tank, ResPublica.

186

British Conservatism

Blond (2009) insists that British politics is in the midst of a paradigm shift, for ‘just as 30 years ago we saw the end of Keynesianism’, today ‘We are witnessing the end of the neo-liberal project’, for whereas ‘1979 brought an end to the welfare state, 2009 will see an end to the market state, and the next [2010] election will, with the election of a Conservative government, usher in the birth of the civic state’ (Blond, 2009a: 1). Neo-liberalism and welfarism, along with 1960s libertarianism or ‘permissiveness’, have each played a major part in contributing towards Britain’s current ‘broken society’. According to Blond, contemporary Britain is suffering from nearly seven decades of excessive statism, liberalism and individualism, which have served to destroy civic institutions, community cohesion and social responsibility. Although statism is ostensibly incompatible with liberalism and individualism, Blond insists that all three have been pursued at various junctures since 1945, but with the same destructive consequences, and in this regard, he deems both the Left and the New Right culpable. In the first two decades immediately following the end of the Second World War, social democratic ideas prevailed, with Labour and Conservative governments alike relying extensively on state ownership and regulation of key industries, along with provision of public and welfare services. However, this top-down approach, particularly with regard to welfare provision, effectively disempowered individuals and communities, for it appropriated many roles and responsibilities which had previously been performed by a range of civic or intermediate (public, private or voluntary) bodies. Consequently, the primary beneficiaries or recipients of welfare, namely members of the working class, were transformed into passive recipients or subjects rather than active citizens, whereupon community identity and involvement often atrophied. Blond argues that when the post-1945 welfare state was established, it effectively ‘aborted all the pre-existing working-class societies, from the self-help societies to insurance societies, cooperative societies and all those ideas about working-class mutuality that are about … building social capital’ (quoted in Long, 2009: 5; see also Blond, 2009a: 1; Blond, 2009b: 81–2). Then, in the 1960s, Blond elaborates, alongside this economic and welfare statism emerged the social liberalism of the New or libertarian Left, which denigrated the allegedly bourgeois or patriarchal aspects of traditional morality and thus undermined the nuclear family and associated notions of sexual responsibility and restraint. Against this, a new approach was promoted which claimed to liberate individuals from purportedly outdated cultural constraints and sexual repression, but which, in practice, led to a society of ‘licentious pleasure-seeking drones’, whose legacy became today’s ‘dystopia of divided families, un-parented children and the lazy moral relativism of



Post-Thatcherism

187

the liberal professional elite’ (Blond, 2009c: 33: see also Blond, 2009a: 4; 2009b: 82–3). Ultimately, he argues, the counterculture of the 1960s, with its hedonism, emphasis on personal liberation and pleasure-seeking ‘really destroyed working class lives’ (quoted in Long, 2009: 5), thereby exacerbating the damage and disintegration already wrought by the welfare state. However, from the late 1970s, a different mode of liberalism triumphed, based on virtually untrammelled economic liberty, as promoted by Conservative neo-liberals, and eagerly enacted by the Thatcher and Major governments (and not seriously challenged by the subsequent 1997–2007 New Labour governments led by Tony Blair). Yet this too was based on a commitment to self-interested individualism and immediate gratification, albeit of an economic rather than a social, variety. While Thatcherism’s eulogisation of ‘Victorian values’ strongly suggested a robust repudiation of the libertarianism of the New Left, Blond insists that the Conservative governments of the 1980s and 1990s themselves promoted a socially damaging, and ultimately destructive, form of liberalism and the concomitant pursuit of self-interest, based on markets and materialism and a ‘rolling back of the state’. Both the New Left and the New Right thus prioritised the individual over the social. Yet Blond deems this to be only part of the problem, albeit a very important one, for whereas (Old) Labour extended the state in order to regulate the economy and provide social security from the cradle to the grave – even while enacting socially liberal or libertarian legislation – the Thatcher and Major governments ultimately exchanged public monopolies for private ones. They did so partly through the transfer of nationalised industries to the market sector and partly because, in practice, untrammelled competition in ‘the market’ invariably created or entrenched new monopolies, as various sectors became dominated by just a few companies who acted to ‘squeeze out’ or undercut potential rivals: ‘This market was far from the thousands of small investors envisaged by classical free-market liberals’ (Blond, 2009c: 34). Furthermore, instead of prompting a ‘trickle-down’ of wealth, in accordance with the claims of Conservative neo-liberals and New Right acolytes of Adam Smith, the market state of the 1980s and 1990s served to ensure that ‘wealth flowed upwards rather than downwards’, whereupon ‘the ability to transform one’s life or situation steadily declined’ (Blond, 2009a: 2.). In their own way, therefore, the market state and monopoly capitalism have disempowered individuals and fuelled social fragmentation just as the welfare state and left-wing libertarianism had previously done (Blond, 2009b: 83–7). In these regards, Blond suggests that the Old Left, the

188

British Conservatism

New Left, and the New Right, are all culpable for many of the debilitating economic and social problems afflicting Britain at the beginning of the twenty-first century. Meanwhile, the societal problems arising from the excesses of both social/ sexual and economic freedom, as venerated by the New Left and New Right respectively, actually resulted in increasing state activism and intervention. Britain has been bequeathed the worst of both worlds, Blond laments: a bureaucratic, centralised state that presides dysfunctionally over an increasingly fragmented, disempowered citizenry … The intermediary structures of a civilised life have been eliminated … Unlimited liberalism produces atomised relativism and state absolutism … the true left-right legacy of the post-war period is … a centralised authoritarian state and a fragmented and disassociative society. (Blond, 2009c: 33) One other vitally important and dysfunctional consequence of the market [economic] liberalism of the last three decades, Blond emphasises, has been the marked increase in inequality, and the ever-widening gulf between rich and poor, as wealth became increasingly concentrated in the hands of a small economic elite, the ‘super-rich’. This trend has both reflected, and been reinforced by, the entrenchment of private monopoly capitalism and dominance of big business, neither of which have been effectively challenged by recent governments, precisely because they have been in thrall to neo-liberal ideology. According to Blond: The benefits of Conservative liberalisation in the late 1980s accrued mainly to the top. The middle class saw its rise in income partly offset by more debt, while the poor sank relatively lower … the share of wealth (excluding property) enjoyed by the bottom 50 per cent of the population fell from 12 per cent in 1976 to just 1 per cent on 2003 … New Labour did little to reverse these trends. (Blond, 2009c: 35–6) These trends towards increasing societal fragmentation and a relentlessly widening gulf between the rich and the poor, have led Blond to call for a revival of One Nation Conservatism, ‘an old Tory dream of Macmillan … [and] Disraeli’ (quoted in Long, 2009: 5). To this purpose, Blond urges the Conservative Party to place a strong emphasis on ‘localism’ and ‘communitarian civic Conservatism’, the latter



Post-Thatcherism

189

concerned with creating or reviving Burke’s ‘little platoons’ – which Blond explicitly refers to (Blond, 2009c: 33) – of private, public and voluntary associations and institutions which have been destroyed by the lethal cocktail of bureaucratic statism, monopoly capital, nihilistic individualism and socio-cultural libertarianism. Like Disraeli, Blond believes that it is largely through intermediary institutions, rather than direct state intervention or top-down welfarism, that a Conservative government will be able to tackle socio-economic deprivation and disadvantage, and thereby elevate the condition of the people, although clearly, the state will sometimes need to provide a framework or ‘steer’ to facilitate appropriate policies. Wherever possible, though, measures to tackle poverty and social exclusion should be based on voluntary action and bottom-up initiatives, rather than statutory prescription and top-down imposition. Significantly, though, Blond acknowledges that ‘the current tax burden needs to be redistributed so that corporations and the individually wealthy pay a far fairer share of their income to the Treasury so that everybody else pays substantially less’, although he does not go so far as advocating higher rates tax on the rich or big business. Instead, he claims that ‘the tax loss to the treasury of the amount held in offshore tax havens by the individually rich amounts to at least £110 billion a year – roughly what it costs to finance the whole of the NHS. The loss from corporate tax avoidance is probably twice this figure’, and he therefore proposes an intergovernmental approach which would close the international tax loopholes which currently facilitate large-scale tax avoidance by the super-rich and British companies (Blond, 2009b: 89–90). Many of Blond’s ideas and initial policy proposals certainly seem compatible with those being enunciated by much of the Conservative leadership, not least David Cameron himself, and as such, there seems to be a strong mutual respect. Certainly, Oliver Letwin has averred that ‘Blond’s work is seminal because it focuses on how social responsibility can be built from the bottom up’, and thereby provide ‘a real progressive alternative to centralised bureaucratic control’. Letwin’s view that Blond is ’one of the most exciting thinkers around’ is evidently shared by another (albeit un-named) senior colleague of Cameron and George Osborne, who enthuses that ‘Blond opens up the debate with a completely new, radical, iconoclastic way of thinking’ (quotes in Long, 2009: 5). Civic Conservatism in a recession? Initially, much of this advocacy of civic or communitarian Conservatism was canvassed during the growth and prosperity of the late twentieth and early

190

British Conservatism

twenty-first centuries, although Blond’s arguments have been couched in the context of the post-2008 economic downturn. This has raised the question of whether Cameron’s espousal of this newer approach will withstand a period of economic stringencies and fiscal retrenchment. Certainly, critics seized upon Cameron and (shadow Chancellor) George Osborne’s calls for public expenditure to be reduced by 25 per cent in order to reduce the burgeoning budget deficit. Although Cameron and Osborne insisted that much of this sum would be recouped by cutting New Labour’s bloated quangocracy and its army of often well-paid middle management bureaucrats, thereby protecting front-line staff and services, many non-Conservatives were doubtful that such large cuts could be implemented without harming the poorest in society. Of course, Cameron and his fellow ‘compassionate’, ‘civic’ or ‘communitarian’ Conservatives would insist that there is no inherent contradiction between cutting public expenditure on the one hand, and promoting local or civic solutions on the other, while also tackling poverty. Indeed, during 2009, the argument was heard with increasing frequency, not least from Cameron himself, that cutting public expenditure and ‘shrinking the state’ is itself a prerequisite of promoting localism, reviving civic institutions, and fostering communitarian approaches to tackling social deprivation and exclusion (see, for example, Cameron, 2009a: 5). This, it was insisted would empower citizens, at local level, and thus enable them to wrest back control over their lives and communities from the bloated bureaucracy and ‘nanny state’ relentlessly imposed by the New Labour governments led by Tony Blair and Gordon Brown. Cameron elaborated on this theme in November 2009, when he delivered the Hugo Young Lecture (an annual event commemorating the late distinguished journalist and author) in London, in which he audaciously blamed growing inequality and increasing poverty on the state. Far from eradicating such social problems and injustices, Cameron alleged, New Labour’s ‘big government’ had exacerbated them, particularly as the expanding state eroded ‘personal and social responsibility’. Indeed, clearly echoing Phillip Blond, Cameron alleged that ‘the recent growth of the state has promoted, not social solidarity, but selfishness and individualism’ and ‘the greatest atomisation of our society’ (Cameron, 2009b: 30). Yet there are two problems with this emerging line of argument. First, it seems neatly to avoid the issue of how exactly such a mode of Conservatism would seriously tackle poverty and growing inequality, and the fact that some communities (such as some former mining communities in South Wales and parts of Yorkshire) have never really recovered, economically or socially, from



Post-Thatcherism

191

the deindustrialisation and pit closures of the 1980s. After all, Conservative neo-liberals during the Thatcher premiership similarly promoted ‘rolling back the state’ as a means of empowering individuals, and enabling a greater role for non-state organisations, such as charities, voluntary organisations, and private sector bodies in tackling social problems, yet it was precisely during these years that the gap between rich and poor began to widen again, having narrowed somewhat during the previous three decades. Non-state actors might be able to provide services and support to the poor and socially marginalised, but it is not yet clear how this, in itself, will reduce the gulf between the rich and poor, particularly as David Cameron’s Conservatives are highly unlikely to make a serious effort at curbing pay at the top, regardless of their occasional denunciation of bankers’ bonuses in the autumn of 2009. Furthermore, Cameron’s (Hugo Young) speech completely failed to acknowledge the major role of Conservative neo-liberalism in the 1980s and 1980s in explicitly encouraging individualism and deliberately fostering much greater inequality as a conscious ideological objective. His speech also spectacularly failed to mention the huge salaries and bonuses routinely awarded to business leaders and leading financiers or bankers, and their role in greatly fuelling inequality, as well as the role of the financial services sector in precipitating the post-2008 recession. To the extent that the post-1997 (New Labour) state could be said to be culpable for growing inequality and poverty, it could readily be argued that it singularly failed to curb – or even make any attempt to curb – the pay and bonuses of those at the top, while also refusing to impose tougher regulation or restrictions on the activities of on the banks and ‘the City’. Yet Cameron’s peroration was totally devoid of any suggestion that the growing gulf between rich and poor might be attributable to, or even have been caused by, ‘the market’ or greed at the top. Nor did he posit any connection between advocacy of greater personal responsibility and the behaviour of the ‘super-rich, particularly in routinely demanding or expecting enormous salaries or bonuses. It is as if Bram Stoker had written Dracula without any reference to vampires! Certainly, in condemning the apparent link between ‘big government’ and increasing poverty, Cameron’s speech provided no clue as to how reviving local communities and encouraging neighbourliness (however desirable in themselves) would actually prevent those at the top from continuing to receive the huge salaries and bonuses which were constantly widening the gap between the rich and poor, and preventing the latter from receiving a larger, and fairer, share of the country’s wealth. Localism might well prove to be more attractive or inspiring than New Labour’s top-down bureaucracy and statism, but it is just as likely to leave those at the top, the ‘super-rich’,

192

British Conservatism

free to continue acquiring more wealth, regardless of their economic success or the social value of their activities. Certainly, in an autumn 2009 speech to Policy Exchange, a Conservative think tank, Theresa May, the party’s Work and Pensions spokeswoman, argued that ‘solving poverty is about aspiration and skills, rather than extra financial help’ (The Times, 28 August 2009). As such, sceptics might wonder whether the increasing Conservative emphasis on ‘community’ and ‘localism’ is intended to divert attention (and anger) away from the ‘super-rich’ and multi-millionaires, thereby relieving pressure on a Conservative government to curb ‘excessive’ salaries and bonuses in the boardroom and ‘the City’. Meanwhile, current Conservative proposals with regard to taxation do not see likely to prove particularly beneficial to the poor. The much-vaunted proposal to raise the threshold at which inheritance tax becomes payable is hardly going to benefit the least well off, particularly those in rented housing, or who exercised their ‘right to buy’ their own council house, the market value of which is still likely to be lower than other forms of owneroccupied housing. Meanwhile, although income tax cuts could conceivably be weighted towards those on lower incomes, the record of the Thatcher governments clearly showed that income tax cuts can easily be designed to benefit the better off much more than the poor. Alternatively, Cameron’s Conservatives could decide to raise the threshold at which income tax become payable, thereby exempting millions of low-paid or retired people from paying income tax. However, attractive though such an option might initially appear, it would mean that some people would be entitled to claim benefits or enjoy public services which they were not contributing towards, which would conflict with the traditional Conservative abhorrence of people who ‘get something for nothing’, especially as it is the low-paid who are most likely to be recipients of social security payments, After all, it was ostensibly to tackle the apparent problem of poorer people enjoying access to public services and other ‘social goods’ whose costs they were not fully contributing towards that prompted the Thatcher government to introduce the ill-fated Community Charge or Poll Tax in 1989 (in Scotland) and 1990 (in England and Wales). At the same time, relieving some people from a requirement to pay income tax might seem to be at variance with ‘communitarian Conservatism’s’ vision of a renewed citizenship based on reciprocal rights and responsibilities, and the goal of reintegrating the poor and socially disadvantaged or excluded back into mainstream British society. There are two other tax changes which a Conservative Government might introduce, namely a reduction in corporation tax, and/or an increase in VAT. The former would doubtless be depicted as a means of increasing corporate



Post-Thatcherism

193

profitability, thereby enabling companies to reinvest more capital, and thus recruit more workers. This could be a particularly persuasive line of argument in the context of a recession entailing 3–4 million unemployed, and at a time when various companies have apparently been tempted to relocate to countries where corporation tax is lower. However, there is no guarantee that higher net profits accruing from lower rates of corporation tax will be channelled into creating new jobs, or that if jobs are generated, they will be sufficiently well-paid to benefit the poor. Certainly, many of the jobs created in Britain during the 1990s were often part-time and/or low paid, and did little to tackle poverty and growing inequality. Furthermore, as with the profits of various banks in late 2009, higher profits accruing from cuts in corporation tax might well be utilised to pay even higher salaries or bonuses to senior staff, rather than increase pay at the lower end of the organisational hierarchy, or cut prices for consumers, either of which would materially benefit ordinary people rather more than more pay increases or bonuses at the top. Meanwhile, the autumn of 2009 heralded media speculation that whichever party won the 2010 general election – the Conservatives were clear favourites, though, according to most opinion polls conducted through out the year – might resort to raising VAT to 20 per cent, as one way of tackling the growing public debt accruing from the economic downturn precipitated by the 2008–09 banking crisis. Yet as we noted in the previous chapter, the impact of VAT is regressive, because it invariably consumes a larger proportion of a poor person’s income than a wealthy person’s. If Cameron’s Conservatives do win the 2010 election, and then decide to raise VAT (rather than impose higher income tax on high earners), then this will almost certainly undermine or nullify other measures which they might conceivably introduce as part of their professed commitment to tackling poverty and inequality. However, there is a second problem concerning the modernising ‘project’ promoted by Conservatives such as Phillip Blond, David Cameron himself, Damian Green, Oliver Letwin and Iain Duncan Smith, namely that it is not evident that it is strongly supported by many others in the party, least of all the emphasis placed on tackling poverty and socio-economic disadvantage or exclusion. In this regard, Conservative ‘modernisers’ are engaged in a project not only to persuade the British electorate that the Conservatives are no longer ‘the nasty party’, but in an ongoing battle of ideas within the party against those who seemingly hope that it still is, or want it to be. There has been little open or sustained criticism thus far, at least, not about the emphasis on localism and ‘civic Conservatism’, partly because Conservative neo-liberals can readily interpret this as a continued rejection

194

British Conservatism

of the state and ‘big government’. However, it is doubtful if the unreconstructed right is as enamoured with the parallel emphasis on eradicating poverty and tackling the growing gulf between rich and poor in New Labour’s Britain, even if few in the party have yet criticised Cameron et alia in the manner that the Salisbury Review did in an editorial which claimed that ‘The great curse of contemporary Britain is the obsessional pursuit of equality by New Labour … Under the dishonest name of social justice, it is also favoured by “me-too” Mr Cameron, who has a firmer grasp of liberal fashion than of reality’ (‘Editorial’, Salisbury Review, 28/1, 2009: 4). Yet for Conservative neo-liberals the post-2008 economic situation is viewed as evidence of the urgent need to slash public expenditure and the services which much of this money is spent on, while also embarking on a new round of tax-cutting and privatisation to ‘shrink the state’. In other words, the contemporary crisis is deemed an ideal occasion for the Conservative Party to revert to a broadly neo-liberal Thatcherite approach, not to resuscitate Disraelian One Nation Conservatism. Furthermore, while Conservative ‘modernisers’ promote ‘civic’ or ‘compassionate’ Conservatism as a means of mending what they call ‘Broken Britain’, it scarcely seems credible that the right genuinely endorses the caring or socially inclusive approach to poverty and the poor which has been advocated by Cameron and his coterie. If they have not been particularly prominent or prolific in denouncing ‘compassionate Conservatism’, it is likely that this is a tactical form of self-restraint, born of a determination to ensure that Labour is defeated in 2010, a defeat which might be jeopardised by a new public display of Conservative disunity and factionalism. Those Conservatives who are aghast at the particular approach of Cameron et alia to social issues thus seem to have undertaken a tacit vow of sullen silence, or at least confined their reservations to fellow sceptics in private, rather than attack the party leadership openly. Of course, it might also be the case that some of these sceptical Conservative neo-liberals, rather like many Labour MPs under Tony Blair’s leadership in opposition from 1994 to 1997, privately hoped or believed that the talk of ‘modernisation’ was purely for public consumption in order to secure election victory and not something which its proponents seriously believed in to the extent of fully intending to enact when in Office. Conclusion Following the resignation of Margaret Thatcher in November 1990 the Conservative Party struggled to devise a clear and consistent approach to addressing growing inequality and poverty – to the extent that these were acknowledged to be a problem in the first place. Until David Cameron’s



Post-Thatcherism

195

election as Conservative leader, the party seemed to oscillate between advocacy of ‘compassionate Conservatism’ with hints of a revival of One Nation Conservatism, and reversion back to the neo-liberalism and individualism of the 1980s. In so lurching, the party seemed uncertain whether its priority was to shore up its core vote or to attract new sources of electoral support (or perhaps win back erstwhile supporters who were alienated by Thatcherism). The dilemma here was that policies designed to attract more centrist voters might well alienate the party’s core vote, the latter presumably favouring continued veneration of market fundamentalism and a ‘tough’ stance on social issues, both of which would militate against a more constructive or progressive approach to addressing excessive inequality and deepening poverty. This dilemma was compounded by the sheer scale of New Labour’s electoral success in 1997 and 2001, because the Conservatives were unsure whether they should respond by adhering to a quintessentially neo-liberal Thatcherite approach, and thus put ‘clear blue water’ between themselves and New Labour/the Blair governments, or challenge New Labour and Blairism directly on the centre ground. Of course, the latter strategy would entail a more substantive rethink or reorientation of many Conservative policies if voters were to be persuaded that the Conservatives were no longer ‘the nasty party’. Not until David Cameron’s December 2005 election as Conservative leader, however, (for how and why Cameron was elected as Conservative leader, see Denham and Dorey, 2006), was a more fundamental policy review inaugurated. Yet while this was in progress Cameron’s own perorations and pronouncements, echoed by some of his closest senior colleagues, signalled a shift away from Thatcherism (even to the extent of apologising for some Thatcherite policies, and acknowledging that they had either got certain things wrong, or gone too far). More than any of his post-Thatcher predecessors, Cameron seemed genuinely committed to reviving a One Nation mode of Conservatism, and placing much greater emphasis on tackling social problems such as poverty and social deprivation. In so doing, he was able to capitalise on the Blair–Brown government’s failure to tackle growing inequality and social fragmentation, or what Cameron (and others) termed ‘Broken Britain’. This concept of ‘Broken Britain’ was itself strongly associated with Iain Duncan Smith, and the sterling work undertaken by his Centre for Social Justice, which regularly published critiques and concomitant policy proposals based on its research into the problems of poverty and social exclusion. Through these, Smith and his colleagues at the Centre enthusiastically urged a variant of what David Willetts had originally termed civic Conservatism,

196

British Conservatism

entailing community or bottom-up approaches to tackling social problems and reviving disadvantaged communities, rather than relying heavily on topdown statist approaches, although state action was not entirely ruled out. These approaches were given an added impetus in 2009, through the plethora of speeches and articles which began emanating from Phillip Blond, who was also regularly interviewed in the quality press and political magazines. Coining the label ‘Red Tory’, Blond excoriated Old Labour (for its statist welfarism), the New Left (for its veneration of social and sexual libertarianism, which he blamed for destroying traditional families and settled communities) and the New Right (for the negative impact of untrammelled market forces, which had yielded an illiberal form of monopoly capitalism while also destabilising communities through rampant individualism and excessive inequality). The solution, Blond argued, was to be found in ‘civic’ or ‘communitarian’ Conservatism, entailing the promotion of localism and community-based enterprise: again, a bottom-up and voluntarist approach, rather than a statist approach, as far as practicably possible, although the state would help to facilitate, or give a ‘nudge’, to community-based or local initiatives. However, while many of these themes and initiatives might exude a superficial attractiveness, and strongly suggest that the Conservatives have finally freed themselves from the shackles of Thatcherism, they are still rather sketchy on exactly how localism and community enterprises will actually tackle inequality and eradicate poverty. Certainly, Cameron’s explicit rejection of ‘big government, and the party’s continued belief in the supremacy of ‘the market’ vis-à-vis the state or the public sector, makes it difficult to envisage how this new approach will halt, yet alone reverse or reduce, the enormous salaries and bonuses being routinely paid in ‘the City’ and company boardrooms, and which are constantly widening the gulf between the rich and poor in Britain today. Promoting localism, decentralisation and an enhanced role for the ‘third sector’ could be interpreted as a means of ensuring that a Conservative government can absolve itself of any responsibility or obligation to tackle growing inequality and relative poverty. Furthermore, the current economic downturn and ballooning public (government) debt have led the Conservatives to pledge significant cuts in public expenditure if they win the 2010 election, and, while the Conservatives insist that front-line staff will be protected (as opposed to New Labour’s army of bureaucrats and quangos), many commentators are intrigued as to how cutting public expenditure and freezing public sector pay (presumably as a quid pro quo for not cutting front-line jobs), while not curbing pay at the top nor raising income tax on the recipients of enormous salaries, will enable a Cameron government to tackle growing inequality and eradicate poverty.

5 Expl aining Public Acceptance of Inequalit y

In spite of the often marked degrees of inequality which have existed in Britain, and which were only very slightly reduced by Labour and One Nation-dominated Conservative governments between 1945 and 1979, significant disparities of wealth and incomes have not only been widely accepted by the vast majority of British people, but generally approved of. Historically, there has been remarkably little public questioning of, yet alone anger against (or envy of ), immense socio-economic inequalities. As a consequence, anti-capitalist and egalitarian political doctrines, most notably Marxism, have made little significant progress in Britain, least of all among the working class, who might intuitively have been expected to be favourably disposed towards a political ideology which offered to liberate them from ‘exploitation’ and ‘wage slavery’ by the bourgeoisie under capitalism. Indeed, since the extension of the franchise to most of the (male) working class in 1867 and 1884, the Conservative Party has proved to be the most successful political party in the world, having governed Britain, either alone or as the dominant partner in a coalition government, for two-thirds of the twentieth century. Crucially, the Conservative Party has consistently enjoyed the electoral support of between 25 per cent and 33 per cent of the British working class, a fact which has proved a source of fascination to sundry political scientists and psephologists, and a source of bewilderment and frustration to middle-class Marxists bemoaning the ‘false consciousness’ or ‘ideological mystification’ of a working class which has not shown the slightest interest in the self-appointed would-be leaders of a proletarian revolution. Even Marx himself, on occasion, lamented (via correspondence

198

British Conservatism

with Engels) the conservatism of the British working class and the equanimity with which it accepted the capitalist system which apparently exploited and impoverished so many of them. Certainly, whole books have been written on the phenomenon of ‘working-class Conservatives’, the most notable academic studies being by Mackenzie and Silver (1968) and Nordlinger (1967). Meanwhile, Robert Tressell’s The Ragged Trousered Philanthropists, originally published in 1914, is a literary classic, depicting unwavering deference among a group of painters and decorators, and their supine subservience to their employer, regardless of how harshly he treats them or cuts their wages. Their deference, and concomitant toleration of harsh treatment, is such that they view with suspicion and derision the one painter who tries, in vain, to persuade them that they would be much better off, and more humanely treated, under a socialist system. Although working-class electoral support for the Conservative Party is explicable on a wide variety of grounds (see Waller, 1994: 580–5 for a concise overview), we will focus primarily on those aspects which seem to be directly germane to the Conservative Party’s defence and promotion of inequality, most notably concepts such as deference, maintenance of economic differentials and defence of status distinctions, frames of reference, labour aristocracy and exposure to dominant value systems. Meanwhile, although Britain’s lower middle class or petit bourgeoisie, particularly those who are self-employed or who run small businesses, has traditionally experienced a precarious economic position, due to its vulnerability to financial stringencies, low profit margins and a frequent inability to compete on the same terms as larger companies, it has also been characterised by a vehement anti-egalitarianism, and often bitter opposition to the Labour Party. However economically weak or vulnerable it has often proven to be, the petit bourgeoisie has invariably identified itself, instinctively and ideologically, with the Conservative Party, and particularly more right-wing variants of Conservatism. While this eschewal of egalitarian or redistributionst politics might seem paradoxical or contradictory, given the lower middle-class’s insecure economic position and social status, it is largely because of its relatively weak position but perceived social importance or self-image that the petit bourgeoisie has traditionally been strongly antipathetic towards the Labour Party and the working class, either or both of which it fears might well finally destroy it. As such, the lower middle class has consistently looked to the Conservative Party to protect and save it from being driven to extinction by socialism or the rise of a strong working class. Indeed, the more precarious have been the economic

Explaining Public Acceptance of Inequality

199

circumstances or social position of the lower middle class, the more it has tended to look to the right to save it, and counter the (perceived) threat from the left. Yet, in one important respect, the petit-bourgeoisie and some of the skilled working class have tacitly shared a concern to defend their socio-economic position and status against the perceived threat from below. Sections of the skilled working class have often been anxious that egalitarianism will result in the rest of the working class somehow ‘catching up’ with, and becoming equal to, them. Yet the petit bourgeiosie is similarly fearful that the working class as a whole will, as a consequence of Labour’s professed commitment to egalitariansim or equality, ‘catch up’ with, or displace, the lower middle class. In this important respect, sections of the skilled working class and lower middle class alike have deemed the threat to their position and status, or even their very existence, to emanate from ‘below’, and as such, neither have been especially resentful of those above them in the social structure. Consequently, both strata have primarily been concerned to defend their economic interests and social status from those ‘below’ them, a concern which has tended to foster opposition to equality and socialist politics and, instead, encouraged support for Conservative pledges to defend inequality and restore differentials. One other factor which this chapter will discuss in order to explain the more general equanimity towards socio-economic inequality in Britain concerns the negative perceptions of the poor which many people share. What will become evident is that, far from attributing inequality and poverty to a dysfunctional or unjust economic system, namely capitalism, very many people in Britain have tended to blame the poor themselves, to a lesser or greater extent. In this context, those living in poverty are often considered culpable for their socio-economic deprivation and acute lack of material resources. Instead of attributing poverty and massive inequalities of wealth to ‘the system’ or the apparent greed of the rich, the poor themselves have often been (and often still are) blamed, due to enduring assumptions or prejudices about their ‘laziness’ or feckless lifestyles. Therefore, rather than poverty being viewed as structural or systemic in origin, it is often pathologised, depicted as something which occurs as a consequence of individual failings and inadequacies among the poor. Needless to say, the ideological and political implications of such a stance are often highly conservative; they are certainly not conducive to securing mass support for equality and wealth redistribution, particularly if it is commonly believed that this would effectively constitute ‘rewarding’ the poor for their perceived incompetence or indolence. Incidentally, it should not

200

British Conservatism

be assumed that such attitudes are confined solely to the middle class. On the contrary, some of the more affluent sections of the working class are not especially sympathetic to those who are materially worse off than themselves, as will become clear. Working-class acceptance of inequality The authors of a major mid-1970s study of social class and inequality in Britain suggested that ‘British labour might have been expected to be the first to produce an agenda for revolution’ (Westergaard and Resler, 1976: 381), and Marx himself certainly envisaged that a proletarian revolution was most likely to be inaugurated in Britain, as this was the country which first experienced the transition to capitalism via the industrial revolution, and inter alia the development of a bourgeoisie and a proletariat with apparently irreconcilable differences. Yet Marx’s expectations concerning Britain’s susceptibility to a socialist revolution were to be confounded, and interest in Marxism has largely been confined to a handful of academics and intellectuals, many of whom seem to harbour a highly romanticised image of the noble but downtrodden proletariat, whose lack of revolutionary socialist fervour is attributed, at least in part, either to ‘false consciousness’ perpetrated by what Louis Althusser (1977: 170–86) termed the ‘Ideological State Apparatus’, or to ‘betrayal’ by the apparently bourgeois social reformism and revisionism of the Labour Party. Other Marxist writers, though, have rejected the thesis of ‘Labour Party betrayal’, largely on the grounds that it has never been a genuinely socialist party anyway, its ‘ideology’ being better characterised as ‘labourism’ (see, for example, Miliband, 1961; Saville, 1973), not socialism. Undeterred, many contemporary Marxists still cling to the view that, sooner or later, a crisis of capitalism will galvanise the working class into becoming a class, not just ‘in itself ’, but ‘for itself ’, whereupon the veil of false consciousness will be lifted from its eyes, thereupon enabling it, for the first time, to realise that its ‘objective interests’ lay in overthrowing capitalism in order to establish socialism. Back in the real world, though, the British working class has generally evinced considerable equanimity about the existing socio-economic order and its enormous disparities of wealth and income. Indeed, throughout the twentieth century, up to 33 per cent of the working class voted Conservative in general elections, clearly indicating that millions of ordinary working people are certainly not in favour of a more equal society, but, instead, either tacitly accept or actively support the widely unequal distribution of incomes and wealth in Britain.

Explaining Public Acceptance of Inequality

201

Working-class deference One of the most common explanations for working-class Conservatism has been the phenomenon of ‘deference’, an account which emphasised the extensive support and respect for economic and socio-political elites which existed for much of the early and mid twentieth century (but perhaps rather less so from the late 1970s onwards) among sections of the British working class, and which sometimes manifested itself in support for the Conservative Party during successive general elections. The classic studies by Nordlinger (1967) and McKenzie and Silver (1968) illustrated the extent to which some of the working class revered individuals of higher educational attainment and social status, and accepted that such people were far better suited to govern the country than those of more modest and demographically representative socio-economic and educational backgrounds. Or, as McKenzie and Silver defined it, the deferential vote constituted ‘the abnegation by the working class of political leadership in favour of the socially superior, traditional and hereditary elites; belief in the intrinsic personal qualities of the elite; perception of the elite’s good will or indulgence as necessary for working class well-being’ (McKenzie and Silver, 1968: xi). This deference therefore effectively encouraged some manual workers to align themselves with the Conservative Party rather than with the ostensibly working-class Labour Party, on the grounds that the Conservative Party: have the best brains in the country. They are altogether more successful and brainy than the Labour [Party], and they have a great deal of experience behind them. They’ve a tradition of governing and leadership behind them for generations. (Anonymous respondent quoted in Mackenzie and Silver, 1968: 109) Other working class Conservative respondents in Mackenzie and Silver’s indepth series of interviews averred that the Conservatives ‘have been brought up to rule, to … leadership. They have been educated to a certain extent to take over’, and that the party constituted ‘the brains of the country. They know how to get things done. Everyone of them is a man you can look up to and respect’ (Mackenzie and Silver, 1968: 109). Conversely, these working-class Conservatives had a much less favourable perception of the Labour Party, and were singularly unimpressed by its professed role of providing parliamentary representation for the working class. Mackenzie and Silver quoted a respondent who alleged that ‘the Labour

202

British Conservatism

Party … haven’t the brains to run the country’, while another declared that ‘They are a poorer class and they might not fully understand how to rule, as it is so difficult for people who are not educated and most of them are not’ (Mackenzie and Silver, 1968: 110). Some political scientists were sceptical about this emphasis on deference as an explanation of working-class Conservatism on the grounds that it probably exaggerated the degree of working-class deference, while simultaneously conjuring images of servile, forelock-tugging, cap-doffing manual workers and farm labourers (Jessop, 1974; Parkin, 1967). Yet while the degree of deference to social and political elites might be disputed, the studies of Nordlinger, and Mackenzie and Silver did offer considerable convincing evidence to suggest that deference was certainly one important factor which encouraged some manual workers to support the Conservative Party rather than Labour. A somewhat different, but arguably no less important, form of deference can be discerned in the economic attitudes of the British working class, especially with regard to employers, high earners and the rich. These too have tended to encourage conservative views about the nature of socioeconomic inequalities and extant power relations in Britain, and thereby underpinned Conservative political allegiances among a sizeable minority of the working class. One notable study on this topic was Duncan Gallie’s (1983) Social Inequality and Class Radicalism in France and Britain, for, as the title clearly illustrates, this not only examined the attitudes of British workers towards various inequalities but placed them in comparative context, and therefore made it possible to glean whether British workers were more accepting or approving of workplace and wider socio-economic inequalities than their French counterparts. This, in turn, served to highlight contrasts in the political views and values of the British working class in comparison to other European workers. The extent to which many British workers harboured deferential attitudes towards management in the workplace became evident when Gallie’s study asked workers in Britain and France how key company decisions ought to be made, for as Table 5.1 illustrates, well over one-third of British workers believed that management ought to take such decisions alone, whereas only 6.5 per cent of French workers were similarly willing to grant managers such authority and autonomy. Although slightly more British than French workers believed that there ought to be consultation between management and employees and/or trade unions over key decisions, this was more than offset by the large number of workers in France (virtually three-quarters)

Explaining Public Acceptance of Inequality

203

Table 5.1╇ Response to question about how company decision-making should be conducted (percentage citing)

By management alone By consultation By joint agreement

British workers

French workers

38 22 40

â•⁄ 6.5 18.5 74.5

Source: Gallie, 1983: 61.

who believed that such decisions should be the product of joint agreement beween the two sides of industry. Crucially, with regard to the British working class’s broad acceptance of socio-economic inequality, Gallie’s study revealed the extent to which workers in Britain were rather more inclined to view the financial disparities between themselves and those ‘at the top’ as legitimate and warranted. As Table 5.2 illustrates, just over 45 per cent of British workers considered such differences to be ‘completely just’, whereas less than 10 per cent of their French counterparts were similarly accepting. By contrast, far more French workers than British workers thought that differences between high earners and manual workers should either be ‘less great’ or ‘much less great’ (the latter stance shared by a quarter of workers in France, compared to just 11 per cent of British workers). That a sizeable proportion of British workers were so approving of such earnings inequalities (particularly compared to workers in France), and only one in eleven believed that they ought to be ‘much less’, naturally had major implications for, or was perhaps a consequence of, the sanguine attitudes of many British workers towards economic inequalities more generally. One key question asked in Gallie’s study concerned the salience or significance Table 5.2╇ The perceived legitimacy of financial differentials between manual workers and businessmen [sic]/lawyers (percentage citing)

Are completely just Should be less great Should be much less great There should be no differences Source: Gallie, 1983: 57.

British workers

French workers

45.5 38 11 â•⁄ 5

â•⁄ 9.5 59.5 25 â•⁄ 5.5

204

British Conservatism

Table 5.3╇Most salient types of inequality (percentage citing)

Inter-class Intra-manual Lower white collar Race Other non-class Unclassifiable Percentage citing inter-class inequality as first response

British workers

French workers

35.5 32.5 â•⁄ 4 â•⁄ 7 17.5 â•⁄ 2.5 38.5

55 36.5 â•⁄ 0 â•⁄ 0.5 â•⁄ 4.5 â•⁄ 3 56

Source: Gallie, 1983: 38.

of different types of inequality, and as Table 5.3 indicates, this immediately revealed some interesting variations between British and French industrial workers. The most notable contrast concerned the different emphasis placed on inequalities between classes, for whereas slightly more than one-third of British workers mentioned this, rather more than half of French workers ascribed it importance. French workers were also slightly more inclined than their British counterparts to allude to the importance of differences within the working class as a source or manifestation of inequality. By contrast, British workers tended to ascribe greater significance to other types or sources of inequality. For example, whereas 7 per cent of British workers cited race as an important form of inequality, less than one per cent of French workers did so. Furthermore, 17.5 per cent of British workers mentioned non-class forms of inequality, compared to 4.5 per cent of their French counterparts. As Gallie emphasised, in contrast to French workers, ‘British perceptions of inequality were primarily concerned with inequalities either within the manual working class or with types of inequality that cut right across class boundaries’ (Gallie, 1983: 38), although we would point out that 4 per cent more French workers cited intra-manual inequalities than British workers. This caveat apart, Gallie was right to emphasise that, overall, French workers ascribed much more importance to inequalities between classes than did workers in Britain, for whom other factors were often deemed more significant. This might owe something to our previous point, concerning the extent to which British workers considered some disparities of earnings to be ‘completely just’, in which case, they would presumably be less inclined to view inter-class differences as important or problematic.

Explaining Public Acceptance of Inequality

205

Table 5.4╇ Working-class attitudes to importance of reducing income inequalities (percentage citing) ‘How strongly do you feel that greater effort should be made to reduce inequalities of incomes?’

British workers French workers

Strongly agree Agree Disagree Strongly disagree

28 40 16 â•⁄ 8

78 17 â•⁄ 1 â•⁄ 2

Source: Eurobarometer 11, April 1979 (reproduced in Gallie 1983: 70).

This deferential approach to earnings inequalities was further reflected in, or reinforced by, attitudes towards reducing inequality, for as Table 5.4 illustrates, British workers were rather more sanguine about the unequal distribution of incomes. For example, only 28 per cent of workers in Britain strongly agreed that more should be done to reduce inequalities of incomes, whereas 78 per cent of French workers expressed strong agreement. Also particularly noteworthy was the fact that 16 per cent of British workers disgreed that more should be done to reduce such inequalities, with a further 8 per cent ‘strongly’ disagreeing, compared to 1 per cent and 2 per cent of their French counterparts respectively. Put another way, almost a quarter of British workers disagreed, to varying degrees, with the proposition that ‘greater effort should be made to reduce inequalities of incomes.’ As Gallie himself observed, ‘[the] general impression that only a minority of British workers feel any real sense of grievance about the exisiting distribution of income and wealth between social classes seems well confirmed’ (Gallie, 1983: 72). The relative degree of equanimity evinced by the British working class with regard to socio-economic inequalities was further confirmed when a wider cross-national opinion poll was conducted, during the late 1970s, under the auspices of the European Commission’s ‘Eurobarometer’ attitude surveys. The results, illustrated in Table 5.5, showed that far fewer British workers considered it ‘very important’ to reduce extremes of inequality, compared to the workers in every other country surveyed. Thus, whereas only just over one-fifth of British workers considered it ‘very important to reduce the gap between the rich and the poor’, a third of workers in (what was then) West Germany, and over half of workers in the Netherlands, considered it so, while in both France and Italy, 62 per cent of workers endorsed this egalitarian proposition.

206

British Conservatism

Table 5.5╇ Proportion of workers, in each country, who believed that it was very important to reduce the gap between the rich and the poor Belgium Denmark France Ireland

Italy

Netherlands

UK

West Germany

46

62

52

21

33

39

62

48

Source: Eurobarometer polls conducted May 1976 and October–November 1978 (Reproduced in Gallie, 1983: 86).

Table 5.6╇ Working-class support for different methods of reducing inequality (percentage citing)

A government more favourable to workers ‘Naturally’, through economic growth ‘It will always be much the same’ Constitutional change

British workers

French workers

13.5 36 40 â•⁄ 9.5

36.5 16.5 29 13.5

Source: Gallie, 1983: 57.

As to how economic inequalities might be reduced, Table 5.6 shows that very few British workers endorsed the proposition that what was needed was a government which was ‘more favourable to workers’, whereas more than a third of French workers supported this option. Instead, 36 per cent of British workers (compared to 16.5 per cent of their French counterparts) averred that the most desirable or feasible way of reducing inequality was through the traditional method of fostering economic growth, thereby generating more wealth and prosperity. However, the single largest response among British workers concerned the proposition that ‘It will always be much the same’, a fatalistic perspective subscribed to by a remarkable 40 per cent of workers in Britain. Maintenance of differentials From the 1970s onwards, though, deference in British society seemed to be in decline, a trend confirmed by a plethora of political and sociological studies during this period (see, for example, Beer, 1982 : 119 : Kavanagh, 1980; Marsh, 1977: passim), yet working-class support for the Conservative Party showed no signs of diminishing. This strongly suggests that other factors were becoming more important, or perhaps had always been significant but had hitherto been overshadowed by the academic emphasis

Explaining Public Acceptance of Inequality

207

on the ‘deferential worker’. For example, far from being committed to equality or a significant redistribution of wealth, some sections of the working class are primarily concerned to maintain ‘differentials’, by which is meant their higher wages and social status or self-esteem vis-à-vis other workers. This has been a particular characteristic of the skilled working class or C2s in Britain, many of whom have jealously guarded their higher wages and status against less-skilled or unskilled manual workers (the D and E socio-economic categories). In this regard, the Labour Party’s avowed egalitarian principles and mildly redistributive policies have often prompted fear or resentment among some skilled workers because of the perceived threat to their own superior or more privileged socio-economic position in relation to the rest of the working class. Even when Labour’s advocacy of wealth redistribution and the need to reduce inequalities has emphasised the gap between rich and poor, the haves and the have-nots, industry ‘fat cats’ and ordinary working people, and so on, many skilled workers have interpreted the promotion of greater equality as a threat to their superior socio-economic position within the working class overall. In effect, what some of these skilled workers have tended to resent is not the wealthier middle and upper classes – whom they may well aspire to join or emulate – but the possibility that the unskilled and semi-skilled working class might ‘catch up’ with them, as a consequence of egalitarian or socialist policies. If this were to happen, then the skilled working class would find its own economic advantages and higher status undermined. Certainly, in a longer historical context, it is notable that many of the earliest trade unions and craft associations in Britain were formed largely to defend the higher wages and social status of such workers, and to protect them from attempts by employers to undercut them by employing less-skilled, and thus cheaper, workers. In the nineteenth and early twentieth century especially, the existence of a more skilled and financially better-off stratum among the working class led some Marxists to speak, often somewhat pejoratively, of a ‘labour aristocracy’. One of the first to do so was Frederick Engels, in his The Condition of the Working Class in England, which was first published, in Germany, in 1845. It was in the English edition, though, published in 1892, that Engels added a Preface in which he observed some of the developments which had occurred since the original publication. Among these, he noted, was the manner in which the material conditions and relative security of certain sections of the industrial working class had ‘remarkably improved’ since the book was first published.

208

British Conservatism

The prime beneficiaries of this improvement were craftsmen or skilled workers, such as engineers, carpenters, joiners and bricklayers, many of whom had been able to resist displacement or deskilling by employers as a consequence of technological developments and mechanisation. Consequently, Engels claimed that such workers ‘form an aristocracy among the working-class; they have succeeded in enforcing for themselves a relatively comfortable position, and they accept it as final’ (Engels, 1969: 31). The last point hints at the general conservatism of the ‘labour aristocracy’, because its members are naturally fearful that their privileged position will be challenged by other workers, and to this extent, they are susceptible to political appeals in defence of the status quo. One of the key studies of the labour aristocracy in nineteenth-century Britain was that provided by the Marxist historian Eric Hobsbawm, who noted how the concept developed in the middle of the century ‘to describe certain distinctive upper strata of the working class, better paid, better treated and generally regarded as more “respectable” and politically moderate than the mass of the proletariat’. Much of this labour aristocracy ‘merged with what may be loosely called the “lower middle class”, especially as an artisan or craftsman ‘was not under any circumstances to be confused with a “labourer”’ (Hobsbawm, 1964: 272, 274, 275). On the contrary, it is evident that this labour aristocracy perceived little or no connection between itself and the semi- or unskilled working class, and was anxious to maintain the perceived distinctions between itself and the mass of labourers, hence ‘it was no accident that some of the most conservative unions of the later nineteenth century’ (Hobsbawm, 1964: 301) were those representing those workers who were part of the labour aristocracy. In the twentieth century, of course, some of these artisans and craftsmen were finally de-skilled or displaced by mechanisation and other technological advances, but some sections of the working class continued to earn higher wages and enjoy higher social status or respect, certainly when compared to those industrial workers with limited skills or qualifications. Consequently, although the term ‘labour aristocracy’ is not commonly deployed today, there has nonetheless remained a strata of the working class which has sought to maintain the distinctions which it perceives between itself and the rest of the working class, and which has thus been highly sensitive and alert to any erosion of differentials, either in earnings or status. Indeed, in his magisterial social history of England since 1800, Harold Perkin (1989: 274) notes that ‘The inter-war working class, even more than its Victorian predecessors, had a prickly sensitivity to the nuances of status more refined than The Tatler or Country Life’.

Explaining Public Acceptance of Inequality

209

Time does not seem to have withered this ‘prickly sensitivity’, for the latter half of the twentieth century was characterised by growing resentment among some of the skilled working class at the extent to which less-skilled workers seemed to be ‘catching-up’ with them economically, primarily due to an erosion of pay differentials, coupled with the extent to which sundry incomes policies in the 1960s and 1970s enshrined formulae which sought to benefit the lowest paid by granting them slightly more generous wage increases. Even when such policies were implemented by a Labour government, ostensibly in the name of equality, fairness and some mild form of socialism, this did not render the ensuing erosion of differentials any more palatable to sections of the skilled working class. On the contrary, it tended to render them even more amenable to Conservative pledges, especially from the late 1970s and through the 1980s, to reject incomes policies, and once again allow pay to be determined by market criteria. This, it was enthusiastically envisaged, would once again enable individuals’ skills and effort to be more generously rewarded, and thereby restore the differentials which had been eroded partly as a consequence of post-war egalitarianism, and associated notions of ‘fairness’ and ‘social justice’. For some skilled workers at least, it seemed singularly unfair and unjust that they should endure a relative decline in their pay vis-à-vis less skilled workers, and so it was not too surprising that the May 1979 general election witnessed an 11 per cent swing to the victorious Conservatives among the skilled working class, many of whom were doubtless attracted by the party’s pledge to abandon incomes policies (and cut income tax), and instead restore free collective bargaining, whereupon pay could be linked much more closely to effort, skills and talent. However, although the swing to the Conservatives among the skilled working class was particularly notable in 1979, the greater propensity for these workers to vote Conservative was certainly not new or novel. On the contrary, as Table 5.7 illustrates, in every single general election since 1964, more skilled workers have voted Conservative than semi- or un-skilled workers. The Conservative lead among skilled workers vis-à-vis the semiand un-skilled working class fluctuated between 2 per cent (in 1970) and 10 per cent (1987), with an average lead of just over 6 per cent in these 12 general elections. Again, therefore, we can observe how sections of the skilled working class or vestiges of the labour aristocracy are somewhat more inclined to align themselves with the Conservative Party, and are generally antipathetic to egalitarian or anti-poverty policies which would erode the economic differences between themselves and the remainder of the working class. In this

210

British Conservatism

Table 5.7╇ Differentiated working class support for the Conservative Party since 1964 Year of general election

C2

DE

1964 1966 1970 1974 (Feb) 1974 (Oct) 1979 1983 1987 1992 1997 2001 2005

34 32 35 30 26 40 40 40 35 27 33 34

31 26 33 25 22 34 33 30 29 20 24 25

Source: statistics for 1964–92, Conley, 1994: 149; statistics for 1997, Leonard and Mortimore (extrapolated from MORI), 2001: 182; statistics for 2001, Dorey (extrapolated from MORI), 2002b: 16; statistics for 2005, Dorey (extrapolated from MORI), 2006: 151.

important respect, working-class ‘comradeship’ or ‘solidarity’ has frequently proved a chimera or Marxist fantasy. The skilled working class has often seemed much more resentful of the semi- or unskilled working class becoming better off and thus narrowing the differentials between the different strata within the working class, than it has of the rich or upper class. Thus did Mackenzie and Silver note that ‘Among working class Conservatives, the belief is widespread that that the working class is itself a source of excessive and greedy demands which threaten the delicate balance required between parts of society – a balance without which the working class would suffer the most’ (Mackenzie and Silver, 1968: 246). Frames of reference Another reason why much of the British working class has so consistently tolerated significant socio-economic inequalities is that its ‘frames of reference’ have often been rather narrow. The concept of a frame of reference was popularised academically, in 1966, by the sociologist Walter Runciman, when he was himself seeking to answer the question of why many of those on the lowest incomes seemed so acquiescent towards their economic deprivation, rather than questioning the scale of inequalities in British society, or

Explaining Public Acceptance of Inequality

211

even challenging the system which perpetuated them. Much of the answer, Runciman discovered, was that many individuals compare their situation to those in closest proximity to them, in their workplace and local community. This provided them with their ‘frame of reference’: their points of comparison, and the people against whom they judged themselves and their position in society. As such, in communities characterised by low incomes and considerable socio-economic deprivation, this often becomes accepted as ‘normal’, and thus as inevitable and immutable. The outcome is not so much class envy as it is class ennui, a fatalistic acceptance that this is how things have always been ‘for people like us’, and therefore how they will continue to be. This, of course, can establish something of a self-fulfilling prophecy: ‘if people have no reason to expect or hope for more … they will be less discontented with what they have, or even grateful simply to be able to hold on to it’, and as such, rather paradoxically, ‘poverty is the best guarantee of conservatism’ (Runciman, 1972 [but first published in 1966]: 10). In the same year, but quite independently of Runciman’s study, David Lockwood was noting that ‘for the most part, men visualize the class structure of their society from the vantage points of their own particular milieux, and their perceptions of the larger society will vary according to their experiences of social inequality in the smaller societies in which they live out their daily lives’ (Lockwood, 1966: 249). Ten years later, a major study of social class in Britain noted that ‘the boundaries of working class culture … act as limits on aspirations, ceilings to horizons’, and that British workers ‘have demanded relatively little of the world, because they have set their standards by reference, in the main, to their own, their neighbours’, their workmates’ and their fathers’ circumstances’ (Westergaard and Resler, 1976: 25) Rather more recently, the author (Irvin, 2008: 34) of a study of growing inequality in Britain and America, in pondering why there was such little public anger about the ever-widening gulf between the rich and the poor, suggested that most people are primarily concerned ‘with what is happening immediately around us; the world of the super-rich is simply too remote for most people to relate to.’ A somewhat similar perspective had been enunciated by Arthur Bryant, in his The Spirit of Conservatism, when he averred that: Conservatism regards the standard of living as a comparative thing, based on the outlook and customs of any given age and country … Men desire those conditions to which they are accustomed – and generally those which are slightly better. An English navvy wants the very best kind of food and accommodation to which he is used, yet he

212

British Conservatism

does not want those of an unfamiliar class: he does not feel at home in a Louis Quinze drawing room. (Bryant, 1929: 16–7) Several decades later, the Conservative philosopher, Roger Scruton, observed that ‘it is not the large inequalities that people resent, but the small ones. People do not suffer from the prosperity of others against whom they are not in the habit of measuring themselves. But the change in their position relative to their immediate fellows is deeply and keenly felt’ (Scruton, 1984: 100). This would provide a further explanation of the anxiety or resentment which some skilled workers feel if, or when, they perceive that less skilled workers are ‘catching up’ with them, but it also partly accounts for the more general antipathy which many manual workers feel when they suspect that others are being paid welfare benefits which they apparently do not deserve or need. As we will note below, it is not only the middle class which looks down disapprovingly at the ‘work-shy’ or undeserving poor apparently receiving ‘generous’ social security payments. The prevalence of ‘bourgeois’ values among the working class Although we have just noted several plausible reasons which would explain, to a considerable extent, why 25–33 per cent of the British working class has traditionally voted Conservative, there has still been a tacit assumption among many political scientists and psephologists that these working-class Conservatives are somehow ‘deviants’, because over half of the working class has usually voted Labour. Also implicit in the characterisation of workingclass Conservatives as political deviants is the assumption that they ought to be egalitarians or socialists committed to wealth redistribution from the rich to the poor, rather than actually supporting the party which explicitly defends socio-economic inequalities. However, Frank Parkin has intriguingly suggested that it might be argued that it is working-class Labour voters who are somehow ‘deviant’, because the values commonly associated with the Labour Party have ostensibly been at odds with the dominant values of British society and its key institutions. According to Parkin: Examples of such institutions would include the Established Church, the public schools and ancient universities, the élites of the military establishment, the press and the media, the monarchy and the aristocracy, and finally and most importantly, the institutional complex of private property and capitalist enterprise which dominates

Explaining Public Acceptance of Inequality

213

the economic sector … All of these could be said to embody values which are in close accord with the ideology of Conservatism, and which, conversely, are out of harmony with the value system of Socialism. Parkin, 1967: 280 Accordingly, Parkin suggested that the really pertinent question was not why some of the working class voted Conservative, but why so many industrial workers voted Labour, for in so doing, they appeared to be deviating from the dominant values and norms of British society? His main answer was that many Labour-voting industrial workers were largely immunised against the dominant values or societal norms by virtue of the sub-cultures and social milieux in which they lived or/and worked. What Parkin was referring to was ‘the [alternative] value system generated by working-class communities’, which were notable for their ‘class homogeneity … close-knit kinship networks, and friendship groups, and for the general collectivist values they tend to develop’. In other words, he argues that what was particularly notable about such working-class communities ‘is the common tendency they have of fostering and sustaining a set of norms and values which at many points run counter to those upheld by the dominant institutions and upper strata of society’. Consequently, Parkin (1967: 282, 283, 284) maintains that ‘it is not working class status in and of itself which is held to be the crucial determinant of Socialist voting, so much as workers’ access to a normative sub-system which provides the necessary buttresses against the dominant value system’. Conversely, those sections of the working class who ‘are not located in such a milieu … could be expected to provide one major source of the working class Conservative vote’. Indeed, Parkin cites various studies which verified this hypothesis, namely that when industrial workers live in more middle-class districts, the incidence of working-class Conservatism correspondingly increases since those workers are more liable to perceive themselves to be middle-class too (see, for example: Bealey et al., 1965: 183; Benney and Geiss, 1950: 327; Willmott and Young, 1960: 115); this is a matter of what is variously termed ‘self-assigned’ or subjective class, as opposed to objective or ‘ascribed’ (by social scientists or psephologists) class position. Further verification of this important phenomenon was provided by Heath, Jowell and Curtice’s seminal study of How Britain Votes, published in 1983, in which they analysed this neighbourhood effect on working-class political allegiances. As Table 5.8 clearly illustrates, working-class individuals living in predominantly middle-class electoral wards evinced a much

214

British Conservatism

Table 5.8╇ Working-class individuals voting Conservative, by ward (per cent)

Middle-class wards Mixed wards Working-class wards

North of England

South of England

46 31 20

49 40 19

Source: Extrapolated from Heath et al., 1985: 83.

higher level of Conservative support than those residing in working-class wards. Such analyses strongly suggest that not only will these aspirational or affluent workers be much more exposed to society’s dominant ‘bourgeois’ norms and values, but that they will often readily embrace and internalise them. Furthermore, in seeking to identify (and maybe even integrate) with their middle-class neighbours, such workers are also likely to be especially concerned to differentiate and distance themselves from the rest of the working class, particularly those whom they adjudge to be ‘rough’ or generally less respectable. Of course, the fact that they could afford to live in more middle-class wards itself strongly suggests that they enjoyed higher wages than most other industrial or manual workers, in which case, this too would probably reinforce a propensity to identify more with their middleclass neighbours. In this respect, we can again see the significance of ‘frames of reference’, as some industrial workers in more affluent districts seek to align themselves with their relatively affluent neighbours. In such circumstances, instead of envying their neighbours’ incomes and lifestyles, those sections of the working class who can afford to live in such districts seem more likely to admire, and even emulate, them. Indeed, for those skilled workers whose earnings are high enough to enable them to afford to reside in such neighbourhoods, this is likely to be perceived as evidence of their own success in having achieved social – and geographic – mobility, in having moved up and away from their poorer working-class origins. Also, having succeeded in differentiating themselves from the rest of the working class, these affluent workers are also likely to resent what they view as any subsequent erosion of differentials if other industrial workers start ‘catching up’ with them by virtue of securing significant wage increases or otherwise benefiting from egalitarian policies. Rather like many of the nouveaux riches, the pride which these more affluent workers naturally feel in their material success and newly achieved social status is often matched by an underlying sense of insecurity about the likely durability or security of their markedly improved socio-economic situation.

Explaining Public Acceptance of Inequality

215

Although perhaps difficult to prove empirically or statistically, it does seem plausible to suggest that it is among such groups that support will often be strongest, not merely for Conservatism in general, but for modes of (rather more right-wing or authoritarian) Conservatism which place a particularly strong emphasis on maintaining, or restoring, order and stability, and thus entrenching extant socio-economic inequalities and hierarchies. Certainly, it is among these newly affluent workers, doubtless feeling that they have finally ‘made it’ after years of hard work, struggle and saving money, that fear of socialism and wealth redistribution is likely to be most pronounced, thereby fuelling an apprehension that a Labour government might somehow take away their recent material gains or ‘level down’, in the name of equality. However, there is one other important structural factor which seems to have inculcated sections of the working class with the dominant values of British society instead of exposing them to an alternative or counter-culture which might have predisposed them to support Labour, and this is the nature of manual employment itself. Various studies have shown that certain types of working-class occupations, coupled with the size of the workplace in which they are undertaken, tend to be more conducive to fostering Conservative attitudes and allegiances among the workers employed therein. For example, it has been variously noted that manual workers employed in a small company are generally more likely to be Conservatives than those employed in a large firm or industry. This, Parkin explains, is because in small enterprises and firms, where men are involved in face-to-face relationships with managers or owners, there is tendency for paternalistic, master-servant relationships to develop which obstruct the growth of the collectivist and anti-capitalist ideologies that spawn … on the shop floor of large industrial enterprises. (Parkin, 1967: 287) This important factor was also emphasised by Margaret Stacey, whose study of working-class political views and allegiances in Banbury (Oxfordshire) discovered that workers employed in local or small, often family-owned firms, who thus had direct or face-to-face relationships with their employers, were virtually twice as likely to vote Conservative (or Liberal) than those workers employed in larger, more bureaucratic companies, in which managers and owners were more remote, and relationships were therefore more impersonal (Stacey, 1960: 46).

216

British Conservatism

It is highly likely that in smaller enterprises, where workers have such direct relationships and a close rapport with their employer, there is much less propensity to develop the ‘them-and-us’ attitudes which seem much more prevalent in larger, more impersonal, companies. Furthermore, workers in small or family-owned enterprises are more likely to be cognisant of the often narrow profit margins which such firms survive on, and this is likely to reduce or even pre-empt any sense that they are being poorly paid in relation to what their employer could afford. Indeed, given the often precarious economic circumstances and financial stringencies which characterise small firms, it is likely that many workers employed therein will be reluctant to vote Labour, because of fears or warnings (from their employer) that the party’s legislative proposals to improve the employment conditions of low-paid or part-time workers will impose unsustainable economic costs or bureaucratic burdens on their companies, quite possibly to the extent of prompting bankruptcies among small business, and thus redundancies among the very workers that Labour claims it wants to protect. Consequently, not only do the more paternalistic relations within small firms obviate or weaken any sense that the owner(s) and workers have what Marxists refer to as irreconcilable conflicts of interest, these bonds also seem to encourage the workers to identify themselves more closely with the firm, rather than developing a wider ‘class consciousness’ and non-Conservative political orientation. This would certainly correspond to Parkin’s thesis that ‘working-class voting behaviour is not a function simply of class position, but of the availability of normative sub-systems which deviate from the overall value system in politically significant ways’ (Parkin, 1967: 287). A similar correlation between the size of a workplace, the relationship with, or proximty of, the employers and political orientation, has been discerned with regard to farm labourers. Those employed on small or familyowned farms have generally been rather more inclined to vote Conservative than labourers employed on a large farm. Again, labourers employed on a small or family-owned farm are likely to enjoy a direct or paternalistic relationship with the farmer or landowner, which militates against the development of a wider or more general class consciousness, or ‘them-andus’ mentality. Consequently, these farm labourers are somewhat more likely to align themselves politically with the Conservative Party, regardless of the fact that such workers are often notoriously low-paid (see, for example, Lockwood, 1966: Parkin, 1967: 288). This Conservatism will almost certainly be reinforced if, as seems likely, these farm labourers also live in the small, rural communities in which they work, for non-urban districts and

Explaining Public Acceptance of Inequality

217

shires have always evinced a strong propensity to vote Conservative, which itself reflects also the more general social and cultural conservatism or ‘traditionalism’ of villages and small market towns (particularly when compared to larger towns and cities). Yet, impressive though Parkin’s thesis is, we would suggest that it rather exaggerates the extent to which working-class Labour voters actually reject the ‘dominant values’ of British society, for what is most notable ideologically about many Labour-supporting workers is just how limited their commitment to socialism actually is. As Mackenzie and Silver (1968: 246) noted, ‘certain important aspects of Conservative ideology are more widely diffused in the working class electorate than is suggested by the fact that only one-third of its voters typically support Conservative candidates in general elections’. Certainly, few working-class Labour voters have seemed to favour economic equality per se (nor, it should be emphasised, has the Labour party itself ); rather, they have generally endorsed the much more limited goal of a ‘fairer’ or less unequal society. They will often believe that the working class ought to receive a slightly larger slice of the national economic cake, and that those at the very top of the socio-economic hierarchy ought to make do with slightly less, but this perspective is still broadly accepting of inequalities of earnings and incomes overall. Certainly, in wanting a larger share of the national economic cake, few working-class Labour supporters are actually demanding that the cake should be sliced equally among all sections of society, let alone that the working class should have the largest portion, by virtue of providing the labour power which physically produces the commodities and goods from which profits and wealth are derived. Nor, for that matter, have working-class Labour voters usually been inclined to ask why they themselves are not determining how the national economic cake is divided: asking for a slightly larger slice is still tacitly accepting that someone else is responsible for deciding how the cake is sliced, and that this mode of determining wages and salaries is a normal or inevitable state of affairs. In short, we should not exaggerate the extent to which voting Labour constitutes a rejection of the dominant value system or ‘bourgeois ideology’, as opposed to a partial modification or tempering of it. After all, as one academic writer on ideology in British politics has noted, ‘workers wanted a party which would protect their trade union bargaining rights, raise their standard of living and provide certain benefits such as cheap public housing and free health care but not necessarily a party which would challenge the whole basis of the economic and social system’ (Leach, 1996: 151).

218

British Conservatism

The ‘conservative’ role of the trade unions Meanwhile, Britain’s trade unions have also evinced little serious interest in challenging capitalism and its inherent inequalities. True, they, or at least some of their leaders, will routinely denounce the ‘greed’ of ‘the bosses’, and demand higher wages for the workers, but to the extent that organised labour can be said to ‘maintain allegiance of a sort to a socialist vision … the allegiance is mainly rhetorical, and the vision hazy’. Instead, the practical day-to-day work of the trade unions (and the Labour Party, which they themselves founded, in 1906) has predominantly been ‘directed to a variety of objectives that fall well short of a challenge to the rule of capital’, and as such, the active pursuit of socialism and the attainment of genuine equality ‘is never on the agenda for today and tomorrow’ (Westergaard and Resler, 1976: 381). This was a point originally emphasised by Marx, when he observed that because they were ‘exclusively bent upon the local and immediate struggles with capital, the trade unions have not yet fully understood their power of acting against the system of wage slavery itself ’ (quoted in Miliband, 1977: 132; see also Marx and Engels, 1953: passim). In similar vein, Perry Anderson (1967: 278, 264–5) noted that ‘Trade unions have historically bargained for better terms for the sale of labour power; they have not been able to challenge the existence of the labour market itself ’, because they ‘are an essential part of a capitalist society’, they ‘do not challenge the existence of society based on a division of classes, they merely express it … by their nature, they … can bargain within the society, but not transform it’. Furthermore, trade unions have unwittingly, but perhaps unavoidably, contributed towards the perpetuation, entrenchment and legitimisation of socio-economic inequalities by virtue of seeking annual increases in the pay of their members, but not the working class as a whole. In this respect, regardless of their socialist rhetoric or hyperbole, the de facto day-to-day ideological perspective of most trade unions is that of labourism, a defining policy objective of which (as we noted earlier with regard to Labour’s predominant ideological stance) is the attainment of ‘a fair day’s pay for a fair day’s work’. Certainly, trade unions have never seriously sought a more significant equalisation of incomes (how exactly would they go about doing so anyway?), but have instead focused on the more immediate and practicable goal of securing higher pay for their particular craft, occupation, profession or sector of the economy. In this regard, trade unions and workers are effectively competing against each other when pursuing pay rises, rather than acting as a unified working class. This, of course, provides employers and

Explaining Public Acceptance of Inequality

219

politicians with ample opportunities for playing ‘divide and rule’ vis-à-vis the working class, a tactic with invariably conservative consequences, because it invariably pre-empts any potential unified action or wider solidarity. One other important way in which workers and their trade unions inadvertently or unavoidably contribute to and sustain socio-economic inequalities through annual pay bargaining is their traditional tendency to pursue percentage pay rises. Even if two separate occupational categories receiving different levels of pay are awarded the same percentage pay increase, the result will be to widen the gap between their earnings, for the simple reason that a 5 per cent pay rise for a worker on £10,000 per annum will be rather less, in actual cash terms, than a 5 per cent pay rise for a worker earning £20,000 per annum (£500 and £1,000 respectively). Yet this long-standing and almost universally accepted mode of pay determination also serves to acculturate the working class to the apparent naturalness or inevitability of socio-economic inequality. Meanwhile, as we noted earlier, skilled workers are often concerned to maintain or restore their differentials, so that if less-skilled workers obtain a notable pay increase, then the C2s are likely to pursue a correspondingly large pay claim that will once again re-establish their higher status, and distinguish them from most of the rest of the working class. Moreover, the concept of a ‘frame of reference’ is again useful in this context, because in pursuing pay claims, workers and trade unions tend to compare themselves to those in relative close proximity or positions of broad comparability, rather than to those receiving enormous salaries and bonuses at the top. Therefore, when a trade union seeks a pay increase based on ‘the going rate’, they are almost always alluding to what other broadly similar categories of workers are being awarded at that juncture; they are not usually seeking ‘the going rate’ in terms of the rather higher salary increases or bonuses usually being awarded to chief executives, company directors and senior bankers. Lower middle-class acceptance of inequality Meanwhile, the post-war pursuit of equality, however mild or hesitant, and the weakness of the British economy during the 1970s, fuelled growing anxieties and grievances among sections of the lower middle class, especially the self-employed and proprietors of small businesses. Of course, this petit bourgeoisie is generally fretful and prone to resentment at the best of times, due to its innate economic insecurity and seemingly constant status anxieties,1 but it too, like sections of the skilled working class, became especially embittered by the 1970s as a partial consequence of policies and problems associated with, or which could readily be attributed to, egalitarian and

220

British Conservatism

redistributive politics. In fact, such politics antagonised or alienated sections of the lower middle class in a number of discrete ways. First, there has often been a petit bourgeois resentment of rising workingclass living incomes in so far as they were perceived to entail a ‘catching up’ with the lower middle class which, like the skilled working class vis-à-vis the semi- or unskilled working class, was acutely concerned with status and a perception of its own social standing. In this context, higher wages for the class(es) below them were often viewed as a threat to their own perceived superiority or prestige, for embourgeoisement seemed to herald a blurring of the very class distinctions on which much of the lower middle class placed considerable social and cultural emphasis. Indeed, the apparent emergence of more affluent workers simultaneously served to fuel resentment among some of the lower middle class, and exacerbate the constant insecurity they felt about the perceived precariousness of their position by the late 1970s: many ‘petit bourgeois individuals and families felt that their place in society, their position of some substance, prestige and authority, was no longer secure’, and that they had ‘fared badly relative to other classes’ (Elliott et al., 1988: 267; see also Elliott and McCrone, 1982). Second, but inextricably linked to the first point, there was a more general lower middle-class resentment at the apparent strength of the working class, particularly through the trade unions, which the more individualist and relatively unorganised petit bourgeoisie could not really match. It was largely this strength which was deemed to underpin the increased earnings and prosperity of much of the working class, often to the chagrin of the selfemployed and proprietors of small businesses, who were generally unable to improve their own material position through such industrial and organisational leverage. After all, a self-employed person could hardly engage in strike action to secure a pay increase in the manner that trade unions and their members have variously done. In fact, the petit bourgeoisie often resented the strength of the organised working class for more direct or personal reasons, namely that small businesses and the self-employed tended to be more seriously damaged by industrial action and trade union militancy than many larger companies. Small businesses have often felt particularly aggrieved at trade union pressure for higher wages or other improvements in terms and conditions of employment (such as longer holidays or maternity leave, for example) because such firms often have much lower or less stable profit margins than larger companies, and therefore tend it to find it much more difficult to bear the additional economic costs of conceding either to trade union pressure or a statutory obligation to provide such increases. At the same time,

Explaining Public Acceptance of Inequality

221

and for precisely the same reasons, namely their small profit margins, small businesses have often been especially vulnerable to trade union strike action, in so far as the loss of production or halting of service provision will result in much more serious and immediate loss of revenues, quite possibly to the extent of imminent bankruptcy, whereas a large corporation might be able somehow to absorb the short-term costs of ‘sitting out’ a strike. Third, but again following on from the previous point, the petit bourgeoisie often felt aggrieved, prior to the 1980s, at the extent to which the size and strength of the trade unions on the one hand, and the development of big business on the other, were threatening to ‘squeeze out’ the lower middle class in the economic sphere, while simultaneously marginalising them in the political sphere. This trend reinforced lower middle-class concern about its own precarious position, and thus often made them anxious or aggrieved at the direction in which economic and political developments seemed ineluctably to be heading. The image was often invoked of the ‘little man’ or ‘little woman’ being crushed by the size and power of the trade unions on the one hand, and by the scale and strength of big business on the other: ‘Small capital is menaced from above and below’, for it ‘sits uneasily between the major classes of capitalist societies’ (Bechhofer and Elliott, 1981: 184). Or as another academic writer noted, the petit bourgeios is ‘afraid of being proletarianized’ from below, while being extremely vulnerable to ‘being ruined and eliminated by’ the large companies and monopolies above it (Poulantzas, 1978: 295). Indeed, the latter eventuality would almost certainly precipitate the former. In fact, as early as the 1960s, the Conservative Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan, was remarking on how some of Britain’s middle class ‘resent the vastly improved condition of the working classes, and are envious of the apparent prosperity & luxury of the rich’ (quoted in Green, 2002: 187, although he seemed to evince little sympathy towards their professed plight. On the contrary, it could plausibly be argued that Macmillan’s mode of One Nation Conservatism, particularly his penchant for a tripartite or neo-corporatist partnership between government, capital and (organised) labour, was exacerbating the trends which the middle class complained about, yet he did not evince much concern. On the contrary, Green suggested that Macmillan viewed the middle class itself as the ‘most active, if largely unseen, proponents of class envy … and as a consequence, he held a low opinion of them’ (Green, 2002: 187). In the context of the seemingly inexorable drift towards neo-corporatism during most of the 1960s and 1970s, it was mainly the self-employed and small businesses who felt themselves to be increasingly excluded from, and without a voice in, the corridors of power in Whitehall. This, in turn,

222

British Conservatism

exacerbated petit bourgeois resentment and hostility towards the working class, for these developments seemed to confirm that the latter was now deemed more politically important than the lower middle class. In the context of the dual trend towards deepening economic problems and a parallel drift towards neo-corporatist politics in search of a solution to these problems, the economically stricken, politically marginalised and socially insecure lower middle class sought to launch its own offensive against those classes and organisations who it blamed for its destitution and demise. Thus did the 1970s witness a burgeoning of pressure groups and associations to represent or articulate the anxieties and aspirations of the petit bourgeoisie, most notably the Middle Class Association (established in 1974 by the Conservative MP, John Gorst), the National Federation of the Self-Employed (NFSE), the Association of Self-Employed People (ASP) and the Independent Business Persons Association. The NFSE, for example, attracted 40,000 members in its first 10 months, many of whom were garage proprietors, hoteliers, owners of small businesses, self-employed professionals, shop-keepers and small builders (Elliott et al., 1988: 264–5). This bore out the observation of King and Raynor that it was the self-employed and small businesses who ‘formed the hub of several campaigns in the 1970s that aimed to correct, in their view, the overweening power of the trade unions and the predispositions of governments to favour larger concerns at the expense of the small entrepreneur’ (King and Raynor, 1981: 234). Many of the frustrations and resentments experienced by such people were expressed in Patrick Hutber’s 1977 book, The Decline and Fall of the Middle Class and How it Can Fight Back. Although he was discussing the plight of the middle class in general, many of the arguments he advanced, and some of the quotes he included (from respondents who had replied to an invitation Hutber had issued in his Sunday Telegraph column, asking them to convey their aspirations and anxieties to him), were specifically from, or apposite to, sections of the lower middle class, most notably the self-employed and small business proprietors. Hutber claimed that certain values were repeatedly articulated by his respondents, such as the importance of hard work, independence, thrift and so on (what Shirley Letwin deems, in relation to Thatcherism, as the ‘vigorous virtues’), and that similar grievances were commonly expressed, such as the burden of high taxation, government red-tape and bureaucracy and the ruinous impact of inflation, the latter often attributed to ‘excessive’ trade union wage increases. Ultimately, what these concerns collectively and cumulatively confirmed was the scale of middle-class anger and fear that they were being squeezed out of existence, and thus slowly dying (Hutber, 1977: ch. 2).

Explaining Public Acceptance of Inequality

223

Hutber himself also discussed the debilitating impact of egalitarianism – ‘we should recognise that the egalitarian intelligentsia is making war, upon the stability of society and upon the middle class’ (Hutber, 1977: 94, emphasis in original) – redistribution, and the seemingly relentless [1970s] drift ‘towards an unholy Government–TUC–CBI Corporate State-type alliance’, which prompted him to recommend the creation of a Ministry for the Middle Classes or Self-Employed, so that they too would have a regular voice to articulate their interests at the highest levels (Hutber, 1977: 121, 122). Chapter 6 of Hutber’s book, meanwhile, was entitled ‘The onslaught on the self-employed’. The proponents of this middle-class ‘fight back’ were provided with a cause célèbre in the guise of the 1976–77 Grunwick dispute, when George Ward, the proprietor of a small photo processing firm in north London (long before the advent of digital cameras!), was embroiled in a bitter industrial dispute which was accompanied by mass picketing – the picket line being joined, on one occasion, by three Labour ministers – because of his refusal to allow trade union membership in his company. Ward himself was widely depicted, especially by many Conservatives and ideologically aligned newspapers, as a martyr for the self-employed and small businesses, a ‘little man’ courageously ‘taking on’ the ‘big boys’ of the trade unions and the ‘bullies’ of the Left. He was thus venerated as a modern-day David seeking to slay Goliath, valiantly fighting, seemingly against very long odds, to defend managerial authority, and the right of small business proprietors to run their companies how they wished. In this regard, the Grunwick dispute also served to highlight another manifestation of petit bourgeois discontent, namely that as a consequence of trade union strength and employment protection legislation, coupled with hitherto high levels of employment, workers were no longer sufficiently respectful of managerial authority in the workplace. Deference by employees towards their employers seemed to be rapidly diminishing, as workers increasingly insisted on their statutory rights, and the trade unions apparently decided whether or not a decision or instruction by an employer was acceptable. As Elliott et al. observed in their study of the petit .bourgeoisie, there was a clearly discernible hostility to the working class among the petit bourgeoisie. What rankled most was the change in the actual relations of class that had occurred during the period of the long boom and the emergence of welfare capitalism. By the mid 1970s, it was plain that small employers could no longer count on the acquiescence of their workers in the

224

British Conservatism

day-to-day routines involving long-established patterns of superiority and inferiority, or in the assumptions about property’s rights and privileges. Workers no longer showed ‘proper’ respect, no longer deferred in any general way to petit bourgeois claims to status … the post-war boom had equipped ordinary, propertyless men and women with a new conception of their rights … and from time to time, an awareness of their collective power. (Elliott et al., 1988: 269; see also Bechhofer and Elliott, 1981: 197) Meanwhile, E. P. Thompson (1980: 39–48) wryly noted how more general middle-class resentment against the working class was exacerbated by growing industrial militancy during the 1970s, whereupon individual or domestic instances of inconvenience caused by strike action were exaggerated or rhetorically transformed into potential national emergencies or life-threatening situations, because ‘to mention the real occasions might seem petty’. Instead, it ‘was necessary to generalise these inconveniences into a “national interest”’, so that when ‘the grill faded [due to a power cut] with the fillet steak done on one side only … the raw fillet steak became an inert kidney machine’, and when ‘the fridge de-froze all over the soufflé’, it was depicted as ‘an unlit operating theatre’ in a hospital. By transforming temporary or trivial individual inconveniences into issues of national emergency or intimating that innocent lives were being placed at risk, the middle class could permit itself an outpouring of vitriol and invective against the ‘bolshie’ workers, but which would, in normal circumstances, have sounded impolite or indiscreet: ‘Let the power workers dim the street lamps, or even plunge whole districts into utter darkness, the lights of righteousness and duty burn all the brighter from 10,000 darkened drawing rooms in Chelsea or the Surrey hills.’ Yet once such industrial action and the associated inconvenience are over, Thompson noted, the workers, having been resoundingly excoriated for their greed or irresponsibility in striking for higher pay, will soon be forgotten about and once again be taken for granted by the middle class (until the next time they go on strike), while the latter’s professed concern, during the strike, about the plight of the old, the sick, the disabled and other vulnerable sections of society will similarly dissipate. The fourth aspect of egalitarianism and the post-war advocacy of greater equality which alienated the petit bourgeoisie was the extensive welfare state which this had engendered, with two particular aspects attracting the ire of the lower middle class. First, there was the ever-increasing cost of the welfare state, whose primary source of funding was taxation. One of the most common grievances among the self-employed and small business proprietors

Explaining Public Acceptance of Inequality

225

was (and still is) their conviction that they are over-taxed, and that this was/ is a major reason for their often precarious economic position and constant struggle to survive (Hutber, 1977: ch. 3 and 14). Such anxieties and resentment are likely to increase further in times of recession (as in the 1970s), when the number of small businesses facing bankruptcy invariably increases significantly. What sometimes compounds this petit bourgeois resentment at ‘excessive’ taxes is that they are generally unable to engage in the various tax avoidance schemes which are exploited by some big businesses and corporations. This can serve to exacerbate a lower middle-class perception that they adhere to the rules or abide by the letter of the law, and ‘play it by the book’, but then suffer unduly as a result, while those who ‘play the system’, be they welfare ‘scroungers’ below, or corporate tax-dodgers above, get away with it, and prosper as a result. This leads to the second aspect of petit bourgeois antipathy towards aspects of the welfare state, namely the extent to which it is deemed to have undermined the work ethic in Britain, and created an underclass for whom living on social security benefits is both financially feasible and attractive, certainly in comparison to working hard for a modest income. Whilst resentment against the ‘work-shy’ or ‘welfare scroungers’ is certainly not confined to the lower middle-class, they do seem particularly hostile towards many welfare recipients, due to a firm belief that many of the unemployed are simply lazy, and too willing to rely totally on social security benefits, rather than ‘standing on their own two feet’. For petit bourgeois adherents to this perspective, not only is the welfare state, and its army of ‘feckless’ dependents, a major reason why taxes are so high for those who do work, it also encourages moral values which are diametrically opposed to those of the lower middle class, the latter’s normative framework extolling the virtues of independence (from the state), self-reliance, hard work, initiative, entrepreneurism and deferred gratification. Clearly, therefore, many welfare recipients are adjudged by much of the petit bourgeoisie to represent the antithesis of such ‘vigorous virtues’, yet the former are perceived to be rewarded, via the welfare state and other people’s taxes, for their apparent indolence and often immoral lifestyles. What might also reinforce this petit bourgeois antipathy to many welfare dependents is that many of the self-employed or small business proprietors, alongside the financial precariousness and low profit margins which they consistently endure, often have to work long hours, with evenings and weekends often consumed by statutory paperwork. In a larger company, of course, matters pertaining to wages, accounts, tax returns, maintaining records or receipts for orders and so forth would be undertaken by

226

British Conservatism

the human resources or finance departments, for example, but for a selfemployed person or small business proprietor these tasks will usually be performed by the individual concerned, or perhaps their spouse. This is likely to reinforce a lower middle-class perception that they work harder or longer than most other people, yet do not receive the material rewards or wider respect that their endeavours deserve. Ideologically and politically, the petit bourgeoisie has not been attracted by socialist or social democratic advocacy of (greater) equality and wealth redistribution. Even though the lower middle class might occasionally quibble about the very high salaries or bonuses enjoyed by captains of industry or City financiers, they will often accept or assume that most of these are justified rewards for hard work, risk-taking or wealth-creation. Instead, it is sections of the working class and welfare recipients that the petit bourgeoisie has looked at with the most apprehension or antipathy, constantly fearful that they will either ‘sink down’ to the level of the working class, or that, as a consequence of trade union power and strike action, the working class will catch up with the lower middle class, so that the boundaries and distinctions between the two will become blurred. Consequently, the petit bourgeoisie has generally been concerned to retain or restore class inequalities and a socio-economic hierarchy, and as such has often constituted a highly conservative or reactionary political force. It has usually been profoundly anti-egalitarian and vehemently hostile to any form of socialism, even of the mildest social democratic variant. Instead, the petit bourgeoisie has often wanted (even if it would not usually publicly express it in such crude terms) to see the working class ‘put back in its place’, while also favouring a tough crack-down on welfare recipients. Negative attitudes towards the poor A more general reason why socio-economic inequalities have been so widely and consistently accepted in Britain, across the social classes, is that the poor themselves have often been viewed with scepticism or suspicion by many people, so that their plight and privations have not attracted the sympathy or support which might otherwise have been expected. Numerous attitude surveys and opinion polls have revealed that many British people believe that some of the poor are partly, if not primarily, to blame for their lowly position and limited material resources. These negative assumptions and stereotypes about the ‘undeserving’ poor (the apparently feckless and feeble-minded underclass, the ‘workshy’ unemployed and social security ‘scroungers’, poor people ‘who just can’t manage their money sensibly’, unmarried mothers getting pregnant in order be allocated a council flat,

Explaining Public Acceptance of Inequality

227

and so on) are so widely held that much of the British public is much less sympathetic towards the poor generally than might otherwise be expected. If the poor are often deemed culpable for their circumstances, or cannot cope anyway, then they will often not be considered deserving of public sympathy and improved resources funded by tax payers. Along with even more general assumptions or aphorisms, such as ‘the poor will always be with us’, negative and judgemental attitudes towards the less well off have meant that wide disparities of wealth, and recalcitrant pockets of poverty, have not usually been considered particularly problematic by the British public overall, certainly not to the extent of prompting any serious or systematic questioning of the economic system, or support for political parties promoting radical equality. On the contrary, the fact that the majority of British people have, for most of the last 150 years, experienced steadily rising incomes, and therefore improved standards of living (certainly better than each previous generation) and consumption of erstwhile luxury items, serves strongly to sustain a perception that if a minority of society has not shared in this prosperity, then it must be because of some deficiency specific to that minority. In this context, being poor is pathologised: it is attributed to the attitudes or aptitudes of those individuals who are poor or living in poverty, rather than being viewed as an inherent feature and consequence of the (capitalist) economic system itself. Such attitudes are not solely a manifestation of middle-class snobbery towards the poor, though. Among the working class, too, there have long been subjective distinctions between those who consider themselves to be ‘respectable’ (decent, hard-working, ‘salt-of-the-earth’ and so on), and those whom they adjudge to be ‘rough’, ‘nothing but trouble, that family’, or who ‘give the rest of us a bad name’ by virtue of their dissolute lifestyles, anti-social behaviour or failure to raise their children properly. Indeed, such antipathy among the ‘respectable’ working class towards the ‘undeserving’ poor is likely to be reinforced precisely because they will often live in close proximity to them, and may even have some of these disreputable individuals or ‘problem families’ as their neighbours, in which case, they will be directly and personally affected by the annoyance and nuisance caused by such people. In these circumstances, those who adjudge themselves to be ‘respectable’ working class are unlikely to have much sympathy for the ‘rough’ working class in their midst, and, indeed, are likely to resent measures of public policy intended to ‘help’ such people (particularly in the guise of increased social security payments), because this would seem to be a reward for immoral or indolent lifestyles. Moreover, the ‘respectable’ working class would doubtless

228

British Conservatism

be greatly irked to think that some of the taxes deducted from their hardearned wages were being spent on their ‘undeserving’ neighbours. This serves to recall the earlier point about ‘frames of reference’, whereby individuals’ perceptions of fairness are partly based on comparing themselves to those around them. As such, the ‘respectable’ working class will often be much more outraged if their ‘rough’ neighbour is suspected of having been allocated a better council house (possibly having ‘jumped the queue’), more generous welfare benefits, or other perceived ‘privileges’ or preferential treatment by virtue of being poor or otherwise ‘disadvantaged’, than they would be when reading or hearing about a huge salary increase or bonus being awarded to a company director or senior banker. These negative attitudes towards some of the poor mean that there is, to a considerable degree, a commonality of views between sections of the middle class and the ‘respectable’ working class, on this issue at least. Regardless of other cultural or political differences which might exist between them, antipathy towards the ‘undeserving’ poor is often felt by middle and ‘respectable’ working class alike, and has invariably been much more politically significant than any resentment of the rich. This shared antipathy also constitutes what pluralists call a ‘cross-cutting cleavage’, whereby social or political divisions which exist on some issues are countered by shared views or interests on others. These cross-cutting cleavages are deemed to provide an important source of overall social stability and cohesion, because they serve to ensure that there is no single, major, irreconcilable division in society which would totally destabilise it and render it ungovernable. Instead, even though two individuals or groups might disagree on one issue, they are likely to find themselves wholly agreeing on a separate issue, which usually means that the point of disagreement does not become socially destabilising or politically destructive. Various attitude surveys and studies have consistently revealed that antipathy towards the least well off frequently derives, as intimated above, from particular assumptions or (mis)conceptions about the poor and poverty, which seem to be widely shared throughout British society. Probably the most enduring negative attitude towards the least well off, and one which we have already alluded to, is the common assumption that people are often poor because of some individual defect, most notably laziness, although other deficiencies are sometimes cited, such as inability to manage their household budget properly, or spending their money on non-essentials, rather than prioritising food and fuel (electricity and gas). When poverty and socioeconomic deprivation are pathologised in this manner, as they so often are, then many of the poor are effectively blamed for their poverty, and therefore

Explaining Public Acceptance of Inequality

229

Table 5.9╇Views about the causes of poverty, 1986–2006 (percentage of respondents citing) Why do people live in poverty?

1986 1989 1994 2000 2003 2004 2006

Unlucky. Laziness/Lack of willpower. Injustice in society. Inevitable in modern life.

11 19 25 37

11 19 29 34

15 15 29 33

15 23 21 34

13 28 19 32

16 21 16 38

10 27 21 34

Source: Taylor-Gooby and Martin, 2008: 242.

become subject to condemnation rather than compassion. The poor are often deemed to be the authors of their own downfall and deprivation, by virtue of their alleged lack of industriousness, motivation or ‘moral fibre’. This assumption is evident in Table 5.9, which shows that when the public has been asked, under the auspices of the annual British Social Attitudes survey, why people live in poverty, laziness (or ‘lack of will power’) has been cited by between 19 per cent and 28 per cent of respondents between 1986 and 2006. Clearly, a significant minority of British people continue to blame the poor themselves for their socio-economic situation, rather than either structural factors pertaining to capitalism, or the ‘excessive’ wealth of the rich. Furthermore, although the precise figure has fluctuated since 1986, it did increase quite markedly during New Labour’s term of office, rising from 15 per cent in 1994 to 28 per cent in 2003, and while it fell back to 21 per cent the following year, it subsequently rose again, to 27 per cent in 2006. What is also notable about these figures is that about one-third of the British public consider poverty to be an ‘inevitable part of modern life’. By contrast, no more than 29 per cent have ever attributed poverty to ‘injustice in society’, and since 2000 that figure has fallen to 21 per cent or less. The fact that a majority of the British public routinely attributes poverty either to laziness, lack of willpower, bad luck or inevitability in modern society (‘the poor will always be with us’ again) not only serves to exonerate capitalism, ‘greed’ by the rich or low pay, it also means – as we will note below – that public support for more generous welfare benefits, and some other forms of wealth redistribution, is limited or heavily qualified. Additionally, the proportion of British people who tend to attribute poverty to laziness or lack of individual willpower is one of the highest in Europe: a Eurobarometer survey conducted in 2007 reported that only in Portugal did more people (nearly 30 per cent) cite ‘poverty/lack of willpower’ as the

230

British Conservatism

main cause of poverty, whereas in both France and the Netherlands it was less than 15 per cent, and in Sweden the figure was only 10 per cent (Sefton, 2009: 238; Eurobarometer 67.1, 2007). Even in 2009, when there was unusually widespread public disquiet in Britain about the relentlessly growing gap between the rich and poor, largely occasioned by the numerous reports of huge salaries and bonuses being paid to senior bankers and financiers in ‘the City’ (which even some Conservatives and pro-Conservative newspapers condemned as excessive or unwarranted), there nonetheless remained a tendency to blame the poor for their poverty. So, even while condemning ‘obscene’ earnings and bonuses for those at the top, many people were still somewhat unsympathetic to many of the poorest, largely due to a continued belief that they were, to a lesser or greater degree, responsible for their dire socio-economic circumstances. This persistently negative attitude towards the poor was probably partly fuelled by fairly regular but very unflattering newspaper reports about life on Britain’s ‘sink estates’, which were invariably characterised as rife with anti-social behaviour, chaotic and dysfunctional family relationships, drug abuse, feral children and adolescents, gang culture, vandalism and widespread welfare dependency. Such grim and grotesque depictions of Britain’s ‘underclass’ were reinforced by various television comedies and satirical shows, such as Little Britain and Shameless. While it is difficult to verify, it seems reasonable to assume that such graphic characterisations and caricatures of some of the poorest sections of society are hardly likely to elicit much sympathy from either ‘Middle England’ or the ‘respectable’ working class. On the contrary, such programmes seem likely to reinforce public disdain towards many of the poor. A second reason why the poorest in British society, even today, have not benefited from greater public sympathy, is the tendency for many people to over-estimate the level of social security payments. Regardless of how often or how graphically social scientists, charities, and one or two sympathetic newspapers might highlight the extreme difficulties which most welfare recipients face in trying to cope on Income Support, much of the British public still seems inclined to believe that social security benefits are ‘too generous’. For example, the 2004–06 British Social Attitudes surveys discovered that at least 50 per cent of respondents believed that welfare benefits for the unemployed were ‘too high’, thereby discouraging them from seeking work, whereas less than a quarter adjudged them to be ‘too low’ and thus a cause of hardship (Sefton, 2009: 239). Of course, a major reason why social security benefits are often deemed ‘too high’ is because many people believe that the amounts paid to claimants are much higher than they actually are.

Explaining Public Acceptance of Inequality

231

Furthermore, such attitude and assumptions mean that if the poor claim that they cannot cope on their lowly incomes, this is readily interpreted by others as evidence that the poor simply cannot manage their money properly – or are perhaps spending ‘too much’ of it on cigarettes, alcohol, junk food and ‘designer label’ clothing. For example, the Joseph Rowntree Foundation’s 2009 survey on attitudes to inequality found that of the 49 per cent of respondents who were opposed to increasing benefits for the poor, 67 per cent of them believed that the poor ‘could manage if they budgeted sensibly’, while 76 per cent of them averred that ‘the poor have only themselves to blame’ (Bamfield and Horton, 2009: 27). Such attitudes, of course, are hardly conducive to fostering egalitarian values and support for wealth redistribution from the rich to the poor, even when there is simultaneous condemnation of ‘excessive’ salaries and bonuses at the other end of the incomes hierarchy. A third reason why some of the poor, particularly welfare recipients, do not generally elicit greater public sympathy, or anger on their behalf, is the extent to which other sections of society believe (or are readily persuaded) that social security fraud is rife. Since 1998, the annual British Social Attitudes survey has consistently found that more than 80 per cent of respondents believe that ‘large numbers falsely claim benefits’ (TaylorGooby and Martin, 2009: 243). Again, sensationalist newspaper reports have doubtless done much to create widespread suspicion that many welfare recipients are receiving social security benefits which they are not really entitled to, do not genuinely need, or are working ‘cash-in-hand’ without declaring their earnings to social security staff. Meanwhile, in the 1990s, there was a moral panic about lone parents, especially unmarried mothers in their teens, who, it was often suggested or insinuated, deliberately became pregnant solely to become eligible, not only for social security benefits, but also for priority on local authority housing lists, an allegation variously made by former senior Conservative ministers (see, for example, Ridley, 1991: 91; Tebbit, 1991: 97). Such negative attitudes and assumptions about the poor tend to be highly conservative in their political implications, for not only do they encourage a fatalistic assumption that little can be done for the least well off (if ‘the poor will always be with us’, why bother trying to eradicate poverty or establish a more equal society?) but, to a significant extent, the widespread belief that many of the poor are largely responsible for their plight, or are ‘milking the system’ leads logically to the conclusion that little should be done to assist them, or ameliorate their material conditions. Otherwise, they will effectively be rewarded for their alleged indolence or immorality, and this,

232

British Conservatism

in turn, might well encourage others to opt for such a ‘lifestyle’, rather than maintaining their independence through individual endeavour and hard work. Thus did a major 2009 survey into public attitudes towards inequality (conducted against the backdrop of public concern over ‘obscene’ bonuses for bankers, and the more general emergence of the ‘super-rich’) reveal that only 29 per cent of respondents were in favour of increasing social security benefits, whereas 49 per cent were opposed to such a means of tackling poverty. Interestingly, 49 per cent were also opposed to imposing a maximum income, even though in a separate question, 75 per cent of respondents expressed the view that people earning £100,000 per annum were ‘overpaid’ (Bamfield and Horton, 2009: 27, 21, 16). It might be thought that there is a logical inconsistency – what psychologists would term ‘cognitive dissonance’ – between the belief that inequality is too great and that many of those at the top are over-paid, on the one hand, and on the other, the view that many of those at the bottom of the socio-economic hierarchy are largely to blame for their plight, and/ or that many claimants are receiving over-generous or undeserved welfare benefits. Yet part of the answer to this apparent paradox is evident in Table 5.10, which reveals that a considerably higher number of respondents perceived ‘people in the middle’ to be having ‘a tough time’ than they did the poor, due to the perception that the position of the latter is alleviated by welfare provision. Put another way, almost a quarter of respondents disagreed with the statement that the poor had a more difficult time than either those in the middle or the rich. In spite of the growing gap between the rich and the poor, it is those in the middle – or who subjectively locate themselves in the middle – who are deemed to be suffering the most, and while they are increasingly resentful of some of the rich – namely those whose high earnings or bonuses are deemed excessive or unwarranted – they have only limited sympathy for the poorest in society. It seems that what most aggrieves the middle class in Britain today is not primarily the gap between the rich and poor (even though this is deemed to be too wide), but the growing gap between the middle class and the ‘super-rich’. On this particular point, it is worth noting that when the household incomes of respondents became known, 86.5 per cent of those earning between £10,000 and £37,999 per annum in 2002–03 averred that inequality had become excessive, a stance shared by 84 per cent of respondents whose household income was less than £10,000 (Bromley, 2003: 79). Although the difference is admittedly marginal, it is nonetheless noteworthy that disapproval of growing socio-economic inequality is slightly more

Explaining Public Acceptance of Inequality

233

Table 5.10╇ Perceptions about which section of British society has the toughest time in Britain today Question: ‘Thinking about the situation of people in Britain today … how much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?:

‘Rich people at the top have a really tough time overall, because they work hard, with more stress and responsibility than other groups.’ ‘Ordinary people in the middle have a really tough time overall because they work hard, but without the rewards of the rich and without the benefits of the poor.’ ‘Poor people at the bottom have a really tough time overall, because they work hard, but without the rewards of the rich or the middle, and with more stress and anxiety than other groups.’

Agree (%)

Disagree (%) Neither agree nor disagree (%)

â•⁄ 7

75

15

79

10

â•⁄ 9

59

24

15

Source: Bamfield and Horton, 2009: 13

pronounced among those earning over £10,000 per annum than among those whose incomes are less. This perspective also seems to offer an explanation of public attitudes towards the role of governments in relation to inequality, for in spite of growing inequality – and increasing concern over this trend – the proportion of people who believe that ‘government should redistribute from better off to less well off’ declined from 51 per cent in 1994 to 34 per cent in 2006. During the same period, the number of people who agreed that ‘government should spend more on welfare for the poor’ fell from 50 per cent to 35 per cent (Taylor-Gooby and Martin, 2008: 246). As another author explained when examining the results of the 2005 British Attitudes Survey, ‘although most people think there is too much income inequality, only a minority explicitly favour redistribution or, at least, greater redistribution than occurs at present’ (Sefton, 2005: 6, emphasis in original).

234

British Conservatism

Table 5.11╇ Public preferences if additional money was available for social security 1st or 2nd preference (% citing) 1986 1989 1994 1996 2000 2003 2005 Old age pensions Disability benefits Child benefits Single parent benefits Unemployment benefits

64 58 23 18 22

67 60 30 16 25

64 57 34 14 26

71 55 30 13 26

74 61 33 18 12

78 55 38 15 10

80 52 39 15 â•⁄ 7

Source: Taylor-Gooby and Martin, 2008: 237

There are two discrete consequences of these attitudes. First, to the extent that people do favour increased government expenditure or (re)distribution, it tends to be on welfare services which are likely to be used by virtually everyone or their families at some stage in their lives, namely education and the NHS, rather than directly transferring money from the rich to the poor. Second, to the extent that people do support additional governmental expenditure on social security, as Table 5.11 illustrates, the distinctions between ‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’ poor are crystal clear. For example, whereas 80 per cent of respondents prioritised old age pensions for any additional public expenditure, and 52 per cent opted for disability benefits, only 15 per cent cited benefits for single parents, while higher benefits for the unemployed were the preference of a mere 7 per cent of respondents. A further reason why increasing disquiet over the growing gap between the rich and the poor has not translated into greater support for direct wealth redistribution or higher benefits for the unemployed concerns public perceptions about opportunities in contemporary Britain. As Table 5.12 shows, although 69 per cent of respondents acknowledged that opportunities are not equal, they nonetheless believed that there were sufficient opportunities for virtually everyone who is sufficiently motivated ‘to get on in life’. However, the responses seem somewhat inconsistent, for while 55 per cent of respondents averred that there are ‘good opportunities’ for people in contemporary Britain, regardless of social position or background, 55 per cent also deemed that many people were ‘disadvantaged’ by their social background, and thus had to work much harder than others to achieve success. However, it might be that many respondents, while willing to acknowledge that some citizens are rather more disadvantaged than others, or need to work much harder to succeed, nonetheless consider there to be ‘good opportunities’ regardless, even if they are not equally available or enjoyed.

Explaining Public Acceptance of Inequality

235

Table 5.12╇Views on influence of background and the availability of opportunities Question╇ Thinking about people’s chances of doing well in life, at school and at work, how much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

There are generally good opportunities in Britain today for people from all social groups and backgrounds. Opportunities are not equal in Britain today, but there is enough opportunity for virtually everyone to get on in life if they really want to. It comes down to the individual and how much you are motivated. Many people are disadvantaged because of their background, and have to work much harder than others of equal basic talent to overcome the obstacles they face. Many people are severely disadvantaged because of their background, and find it impossible, however hard they work, to overcome the obstacles they face.

Agree (%)

Disagree (%) Neither agree nor disagree (%)

55

26

17

69

14

14

55

22

21

30

44

24

Source: Bamfield and Horton, 2009: 24

Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the responses to this particular question is the fact that fewer than a third of respondents concurred that many people are ‘severely disadvantaged’ by their background, to the extent of finding it impossible to overcome the obstacles they face, regardless of how hard they work; 44 per cent flatly disagreed with such a proposition. If, as these responses suggest, it is not widely accepted that many people are too disadvantaged ever to succeed, then it logically followed that many of the poor will be suspected of not having fully availed themselves of the opportunities apparently available. Again, therefore, the plight of the poor is pathologised, for it is widely assumed that much of the fault lies with the individuals themselves, for not having tried hard enough, rather than with the socio-economic system itself.

236

British Conservatism

Conclusion At first glance, it might appear rather incongruous that a political party which is so strongly committed to defending socio-economic inequality should have prospered in a society which has been characterised by marked inequalities of wealth. Indeed, not only was the Conservative Party in government, either alone or as the dominant partner in a coalition, for two thirds of the twentieth century, it was also supported electorally by between 25 per cent and 33 per cent of the British working class. Yet the apparent incongruity soon dissipates on closer inspection. First, the British working class has generally been characterised by internal differences and divisions which have militated against ideological and political unity. Indeed, given that a sizeable minority have always voted Conservative, it is clear that being an industrial worker does not necessarily entail support for equality. On the contrary, we have seen that several factors have sustained support of the Conservative Party among some industrial workers, most notably deference (at least in the past), employment in a small enterprise where relations with their employer are often face-to-face, living in a predominantly middle-class district, and the extent to which they are concerned to maintain or restore ‘differentials’ vis-à-vis other sections of the working class. Yet even Labour voting industrial workers have generally been (small ‘c’) conservative in so far as they have primarily wanted better wages and conditions of employment, rather than outright equality. In other words, even among working-class Labour voters, there has been little, if any, serious questioning about the scale of socio-economic inequality in Britain or its legitimacy, and, as such, the prevalent ethos among much of the organised working class has been the ‘labourist’ (not socialist) commitment to ‘a fair day’s pay for a fair day’s work’. Meanwhile, the precarious existence and hardships routinely experienced by the lower middle class or petit bourgeoisie have certainly not led this stratum to favour (greater) equality. Far from it. The economic vulnerability of much of the petit bourgeoisie is generally countered by a strong sense of superiority in terms of social status and a determination to maintain its distance and distinction from the working class. Consequently, however much it has struggled economically to survive, the lower middle class has invariably been strongly anti-egalitarian, fearing that equality would destroy it once and for all. Certainly, the petit bourgeoisie has often lived in fear of being squeezed out of existence by more powerful economic forces and corporate entities. However, what much of the petit bourgeoisie has seemed most resentful or fearful of is that the working class is ‘getting above itself ’. Consequently,

Explaining Public Acceptance of Inequality

237

the lower middle class has invariably been a highly Conservative political entity, concerned to maintain or restore the differentials and inequalities which it believes have been eroded due to working class militancy, trade union power, and Labour’s apparent commitment to equality. Indeed, the more precarious the petit bourgeoisie adjudges its position to be, the more it seems to commit itself to forms of right-wing Conservatism which promise to restore order and stability, tackle the trade unions, reward hard work and individual endeavour, curb welfare provision and cut taxes. Finally, we have noted the extent to which poverty and the poor in Britain are often pathologised, so that low incomes or lack of material resources are attributed to individual failings or inadequacies, rather than structural or systemic factors. This effectively means that capitalism and the rich are rarely blamed for the fact that millions of citizens are poor or live in poverty. On the contrary, even in 2009, when there has been unprecedented public disquiet about excessive pay and bonuses in ‘the City’, and concern about the emergence of a ‘super-rich’ virtually breaking away from the rest of British society, there are still many people who attribute poverty to laziness, or other negative characteristics among the poor. In other word, a sizeable minority of people do not seem to acknowledge a connection between the enormous salaries and bonuses enjoyed by those at the top, and the povertylevel wages or welfare benefits endured at the bottom. Yet many people who do not blame the poor for their plight nonetheless consider poverty to be an unavoidable fact of modern life, and, while this at least exonerates the poor from blame for their low incomes and ensuing hardships, this perspective seems to imply a fatalistic acceptance of poverty. After all, if it is an unfortunate but unavoidable feature of modern society, then presumably little, if anything, can be done to eradicate poverty. Once again, therefore, the political implications seem highly conservative, and certainly seem to militate against wider or stronger public support for (greater) equality. Indeed, such assumptions about the poor seem to constitute a selffulfilling prophecy: if poverty is deemed to be an unavoidable feature of modern life, so that ‘the poor will always be with us’, then presumably there is little point in pursuing egalitarianism or promoting equality to eradicate it. On this basis, the poor will almost certainly always be with us, even as the rich continue getting richer

Conclusion

We have seen how socio-economic inequality is both a core, defining feature of British Conservatism, and yet simultaneously a source of debate among Conservatives over the amount or scale of inequality which is acceptable, desirable or necessary. All Conservatives believe in the inevitability and immutability of inequality, and can readily cite a plethora of both normative and empirical explanations and justifications to account for its existence and apparent necessity, yet there have nonetheless been constant debates among Conservatives over whether or not there are degrees of inequality which are excessive, and which therefore warrant political action to limit them. Such debates, in turn raise a host of questions about the role of the state, both in relation to ‘the market’, and the relationship between the state and the individual. The differences in perspective among Conservatives about the degree or scale of ‘acceptable’ inequality also reflect and reinforce different definitions of poverty, namely ‘absolute’ and ‘relative’ poverty. Although, as we noted in Chapter 1, there are theological accounts of inequality within Conservative philosophy, whereby inequalities are deemed to be God-given and thus pre-ordained, such explanations are less commonly cited in a more secular age. Instead, during the twentieth century, the main Conservative accounts of inequality were – and remain today – biological, economic, political and empirical. The biological explanation attributes socio-economic inequality to innate differences between individuals in terms of their attributes: ability, intelligence, motivation, skills, talent and so forth The application or utilisation of these naturally varying human characteristics and qualities consequently yields socio-economic inequalities as some individuals prove more successful than others, either because their particular skills are among the most sought after and economically valued, or because they deploy their specific attributes more skilfully. In either case, Conservatives maintain that such individuals will naturally,

240

British Conservatism

and quite rightly, achieve more and rise higher in the socio-economic hierarchy, as the economic importance or successful deployment of their key skills attracts corresponding material rewards and remuneration, most notably in the form of higher earnings and, over time, accrued wealth. Linked to this biological essentialist account of socio-economic inequality is the Conservative notion of human nature, for not only are humans deemed to possess different skills and talents, they are also said to be naturally acquisitive and primarily motivated by self-interest; most people are naturally competitive (rather than altruistic or cooperative). This, in turn, underpins the Conservative conception of individualism, whereby ‘society’ is constituted by millions of individuals each pursuing their own material interests and objectives, which therefore means that they are often competing against each other. Individualism and competition are thus inextricably linked in Conservative philosophy. However, rather than viewing such competition as socially destructive or destabilising, Conservatives tend to view it as creative and dynamic – albeit subject to the rule of law and adherence to legally enforceable contracts – and as the driver of economic progress and innovation. Yet, crucially, competition naturally entails winners and losers, and so Conservatives are adamant that as individuals compete against each other in applying their different skills and talents, this too will result in some people proving more successful than others, and thereby enjoying correspondingly greater economic rewards, as well as, in many instances, higher social status and respect. Hence the Conservative insistence that inequality is a direct reflection and consequence of human nature. While this provides Conservatives with a more contemporary secular account of inequality than the earlier theological explanation, both perspectives entail the same conclusion; that inequality is natural and unavoidable, and can therefore never be eradicated. Consequently, Conservatives insist that any attempt at creating a more equal society, as advocated by socialists (in their various guises), will be doomed to disastrous failure. These apparent attributes and characteristics of human nature and innate individual acquisitiveness are also held by Conservatives to underpin an economic system based, ultimately, on private property ownership, private enterprise and the rational pursuit of economic self-interest. In this crucial respect, whereas the left views individuals largely as products of the economic system, whereby capitalism is deemed to foster the allegedly negative characteristics of competitiveness and selfishness, thereby corrupting and destroying altruistic or cooperative inclinations, Conservatives are convinced that the capitalist economic system is itself derived from, and reflects, human nature, because it is driven by, and satisfies, peoples’ apparently



Conclusion

241

natural competiveness, and their innate desire to increase or maximise the amount of property (or other forms of wealth) which they covet. For Conservatives, therefore, far from being incompatible or in conflict (as socialists claim), capitalism and human nature fully complement each other, and are mutually reinforcing. Conservatives maintain that the inequalities which naturally accrue from capitalism are explicable and justifiable in at least four overlapping and reinforcing ways. First, the market economy upon which capitalism is based operates according to natural and immutable laws, most notably those of supply and demand, which serves to reward those individuals or companies who are most efficient or successful in providing or inventing the goods and services which consumers want. The higher demand (or sales) which results from such success then yields the revenue from which profits and higher earnings are derived. Second, Conservatives argue that capitalism and ‘the market’ constitute a spontaneous system devoid of coercion or exploitation, because individuals make their choices and pursue their decisions freely; consumers choose which individual or company to purchase from (usually on the basis of such criteria as cost, standard of service, quality or value for money), while workers enter into an employment relationship voluntarily, cognisant of the terms and conditions of employment prior to signing any contract. In either case, consumers and workers are free to go elsewhere if they are not happy with what they are being offered, and thus, Conservatives argue, capitalism and its market economy provide for maximum individual liberty, thereby avoiding or minimising coercion by the state. Third, the mechanisms and natural laws of ‘the market’ which foster socio-economic inequalities are nonetheless deemed to generate the wealth which is a prerequisite of employment, public services and welfare provision. Conservatives not only view the consequent inequalities of wealth as a natural and thoroughly deserved result of some individuals or companies proving more dynamic and successful than others but also as essential to ensuring the expenditure, investment, jobs and material assistance which the rest of society depends upon. In other words, Conservatives argue, leftwing (egalitarian) governments which prioritise wealth redistribution, and thus seek to limit or seize (primarily through ‘punitive’ taxation) high earnings and profits, will effectively kill the goose which lays the golden egg; they will deter the hard-working, the industrious, the skilful and the talented, and in so doing will ensure that less wealth is created, reducing the amount available for redistribution or social expenditure, so that everyone will be worse off, particularly the poor themselves. In this regard, Conservatives

242

British Conservatism

– especially neo-liberals – are adamant that the best way of tackling poverty and assisting the poor is by allowing the market to function with the minimal political interference, thereby enabling the hard-working and commercially successful to acquire or generate more wealth. In this regard, many Conservatives are wont to claim that allowing the rich to become even richer is the best way of ensuring that the poor also become richer – or, at least, better off than they would be under a regime committed to socioeconomic equality. Fourth, Conservatives hold that because earnings and wealth under capitalism are ultimately derived from or determined by the natural and impersonal laws of ‘the market’, the ensuing intrinsic socio-economic inequalities will be more readily accepted by the majority of the population than if they were the product of political or bureaucratic decisions about who deserved what. This last point, of course, links to the political account of inequality advanced by Conservatives, for if government or the state sought to determine earnings, presumably in accordance with the professed goals of equality, fairness and/or social justice, then this would not only entail interference with the ‘natural’ allocation of rewards and resources provided by ‘the market’ but it would also, Conservatives allege, cause widespread grievances, as individuals or particular groups of workers resented what they perceived to be the undervaluation of their work, especially when they were convinced that they, or their efforts, warranted rather higher remuneration than that ascribed by politicians or senior civil servants. The ensuing anger and complaints would render the state itself the target of widespread hostility and lobbying from aggrieved individuals, workers and trade unions, quite possibly resulting in a loss of political authority and legitimacy. Moreover, Conservatives insist, state determination of wages and salaries in pursuit of equality, fairness or social justice would entail ultimately impossible bureaucratic judgements, often of an apparently arbitrary character, about the relative monetary value or worth of each occupation and profession. For such reasons, along with their crucial belief that ‘the market’ is, in most instances, inherently superior to the state in generating and allocating wealth and satisfying people’s material needs, Conservatives have invariably insisted that the political determination of earnings and wealth (beyond public sector pay, of course, which has itself sometimes embroiled governments and ministers in bitter disputes with aggrieved employees) would invariably generate grievances and resentments which had not previously existed. Consequently, Conservatives have consistently maintained that the inequalities engendered by ‘the market’ are far more acceptable to the



Conclusion

243

majority of the population than would be any attempt by the state at enforcing more equal incomes. To buttress all of these arguments in defence of socio-economic inequalities, Conservatives have additionally cited extensive empirical evidence to show that all historical attempts at establishing (more) equal societies have ended in abject failure, quite often to the extent of yielding far worse injustices and iniquities than those attributed to capitalism by its left-wing critics. Of course, the former (pre-1990) Soviet Union and its East European satellite states afforded Conservatives the most obvious examples of the failure of ‘socialism’ and equality, due to these regimes’ economic inefficiency, lack of liberty and actual entrenchment of extensive inequalities (with the Communist leaders effectively transmogrifying into a new ruling class and thereupon enjoying exclusive privileges which were unavailable to the workers).1 Conservative allusion to such awful regimes has often served to persuade, or frighten, the majority of the British people that ‘there is no viable alternative’ to capitalism, and that whatever faults or failings the capitalist system might evince are infinitely preferable to the gross inefficiencies and destruction of liberty which would inevitably characterise a purportedly egalitarian system. Furthermore, to those who would insist that the old Soviet regime was not a genuine socialist state, Conservatives would swiftly ask: (a) why did the post1917 regime rapidly degenerate into such totalitarian tyranny, and (b) why are there no other or rather more attractive examples of egalitarian societies which the critics of capitalism can point to. For a Conservative, such questions would largely be rhetorical, because they would assume that almost any answer would further prove that equality is unattainable. After all, a Conservative might suggest that, as Karl Marx wrote his most important works in the 1840s and 1850s, this has given his disciples about 150 years in which to establish a genuinely equal society, thereby begging the question why, in all of this time, they have singularly failed to do so. Nonetheless, we have noted how Conservatism’s core belief in inequality has still provided scope for debates and disagreements over just how much inequality is tolerable or desirable. Whereas those commonly termed Conservative (economic) neo-liberals tend to believe that any degree of inequality is justified if it derives from the natural and spontaneous operation of ‘the market’, or is the outcome of individual success (via hard work, skilful deployment of one’s natural talents or wise investment of capital), those who are generally identified as One Nation Conservatives have acknowledged that the gap between the rich and the poor should not become excessive, although what precisely constitutes ‘excessive’ is not usually made explicit; there is no One Nation formula which states that an income which is x times greater

244

British Conservatism

than the lowest is not to be tolerated. Nonetheless, unlike their neo-liberal colleagues, One Nation Conservatives do baulk at the degree of inequality which invariably ensues if ‘the market’ is permitted to function completely untrammelled, and they do accept, like Edward Heath, former Conservative leader and Prime Minister (1970–74), that there is such a thing as ‘the unacceptable face of Capitalism’. As such, One Nation Conservatives have been concerned that if a Conservative government blithely presided over ‘too much’ inequality, or permitted the rich to show a callous and flagrant disregard for the poor, then the very legitimacy of capitalism and parliamentary democracy might well be undermined, as the materially disadvantaged or socially deprived become susceptible to political extremists and ideologues promising a better, fairer system. Certainly, in a revised edition of The Middle Way published in 1966, Harold Macmillan argued that ‘if capitalism had been conducted all along as if the theory of private enterprise were a matter of principle’ which ruled out any form of state intervention or social provision, then ‘we should have had a civil war long ago’ (Macmillan, 1966: 110). That said, because there is neither a precise point at which they will all agree that inequality has reached a tolerable limit, nor a formula for determining the acceptable ratio between high and low incomes, One Nation Conservatives are often involved in internal debate about whether socioeconomic inequality has become excessive, or whether the drive to reduce ‘excessive’ inequality has veered too far towards egalitarianism, so that the balance between the individual and the state has shifted too far towards the latter (as many Conservatives associated with the One Nation Group argued in the 1950s). This ambivalence doubtless reflects the One Nation Conservatives’ professed belief in the virtues of balance and moderation, which, in this context, naturally underpins a constant concern to avoid the extremes of ‘too much’ inequality’ on the one hand, and a drift too far towards egalitarianism on the other. As such, One Nation Conservatives are adamant that their concern to keep inequality within tolerable bounds is most definitely not to be confused with the pursuit of equality; they emphatically reject the latter, and, like all Conservatives, depict it as a utopian, but highly dangerous, chimera traditionally pursued by the Labour Party and sundry other socialists or social democrats. Accordingly Gilmour explained: ‘Conservatives do not favour the imposition of economic equality, but they can easily imagine a distribution of income that would be intolerable and would require adjustment’ (Gilmour, 1978: 114). However, although the Labour Party (more particularly, of course, prior to the advent of New Labour) did profess a formal commitment to



Conclusion

245

equality, in practice, most of its senior parliamentarians always seemed content merely to reduce the more extreme forms of inequality engendered by unfettered free market or neo-liberal capitalism, rather than pursue any serious equalisation of earnings, incomes and wealth. After all, it was Anthony Crosland, back in 1956, who was cautioning his Labour colleagues against further taxation of the rich or more nationalisation of privately owned companies and industries, and who was claiming that the most invidious forms of inequality remaining in Britain were largely social, rather than economic, in nature or origin. Nonetheless, Labour’s erstwhile formal advocacy of equality did provide the Conservatives with something of a straw (wo)man to attack, and enable One Nation Conservatives to depict themselves as the proponents of a ‘middle way’ between Labour’s ‘socialist’ equality on the one hand, and the Conservative neo-liberals’ willingness to tolerate ‘excessive’ inequality on the other. A further distinction between Conservative neo-liberals and One Nation Conservatives with regard to inequality concerns their differing definitions of poverty, as Hickson (2009) has noted, and also their accounts of its causes. Conservative neo-liberals tend to talk in terms of ‘absolute poverty’, which refers to a situation whereby individuals have insufficient money to pay for basic human necessities, most notably, food, clothing and domestic fuel. On this basis, Conservative neo-liberals generally maintain that such poverty has largely been eradicated in Britain, due to steadily rising prosperity (generated by ‘the market’) and welfare provision for those in most need; no one needs to be cold or hungry, according to this perspective. Once absolute poverty has been eradicated, Conservative neo-liberals tend to argue, then there should be no limit to how much industrious or innovative individuals can lawfully earn, particularly as their success will simultaneously serve to generate the wealth necessary to assist those still in genuine need: the ‘deserving’ poor. However, Conservative neo-liberals (and social authoritarians) do sometimes acknowledge that pockets of poverty remain, but in such instances this is often attributed to the dysfunctional lifestyles and values of those affected. In other words, to the extent that poverty is acknowledged to exist, it is often blamed on the ‘fecklessness’, ‘laziness’ or ‘immoral’ conduct of the poor themselves, many of whom are assumed to lack the ‘vigorous virtues’ of deferred gratification, hard work, independence, and self-reliance. Indeed, in such cases, Conservative neo-liberals have often been inclined to apportion considerable blame to the welfare state itself, claiming that ‘generous’ social security benefits make it too easy or attractive for some individuals to choose to become, or remain, unemployed, or, in the case of

246

British Conservatism

some young women with negligible educational qualifications and career prospects, become pregnant outside marriage. Rarely, if ever, will Conservative neo-liberals acknowledge that unfettered capitalism or low wages are themselves notable causes of poverty. Instead, such Conservatives will point to the ‘failings’ of the poor themselves, and the ‘failings’ of the welfare state, but will invariably refuse to acknowledge that poverty might be a manifestation of ‘market failure’, yet alone concede that it actually could be a consequence of the ‘natural’ operation of ‘the market’. Consequently, to the extent that poverty is acknowledged still to exist, Conservative neo-liberals will usually insist that the solution lies in further extending ‘the market’, and curbing welfare provision, the latter approach doubtless also being endorsed by ‘social authoritarian’ Conservatives seeking to ‘re-moralise’ the poor. Against such perspectives, One Nation Conservatives have generally viewed poverty in relative terms, whereby people are deemed to be impoverished if their incomes fall too far behind those of the rest of society. Defined in this manner, poverty is not simply about an inability to afford the basic material necessities of life, but means that some citizens cannot enjoy other forms of consumption, beyond food, clothing and domestic fuel, or partake in various social or cultural activities, due to their low incomes. This broader definition of poverty, defined in relation to the earning or lifestyles of the majority of the population, means that, unlike Conservative neoliberals, One Nation Conservatives are constantly concerned to ensure that the poorest do not fall too far behind the rest of society, and that they too enjoy a share of economic prosperity and rising living standards, rather than merely subsisting on the barest minimum for physical sustenance. Clearly, then, ‘elevating the condition of the people’ is an ongoing objective and task for One Nation Conservatives, for ‘relative poverty’ can never be said to have finally been abolished, a point emphasised by Gilmour (1978: 182). Meanwhile, One Nation Conservatives are willing to acknowledge that many of the poorest in society should not be blamed or deemed culpable for their plight. This is because, while not denying that a few people ‘milk the system’ with regard to social security provision, particularly if the welfare state becomes ‘too generous’, One Nation Conservatives recognise that many of the poor are decent, virtuous, people whose lack of material resources or wealth cannot be attributed towards individual failings or inadequacies. As such, One Nation Conservatives are generally more willing (than their neoliberal colleagues) to acknowledge the phenomenon of ‘market failure’, or even to concede that there are some socially important functions or services which the private sector will not consider sufficiently profitable or commercially viable to provide. In such circumstances, One Nation Conservatives



Conclusion

247

have been willing to endorse state intervention or provision, albeit primarily on the grounds of pragmatic necessity (as opposed to Labour’s alleged preference for governmental provision as a matter of ideological commitment and innate hostility towards the private sector). As Damian Green (2005: 214–5) has explained: A One Nation Conservative will regard it as a duty of government to take active steps to relieve poverty and its attendant social ills, and will not assume that an unfettered free market will perform this task. He or she will believe that individualism is not enough … One Nation Conservatism is not afraid to use state power, but will only use it as a last resort if it is clear that private resources will not suffice … One Nation Conservatism enables the Conservative Party to reach places and people it would otherwise fail to reach. It is vital to point out, though, that in endorsing state intervention ‘as a last resort’, Green expresses a preference for ‘the creation of a strong civil society through active measures to help family, voluntary and community action’ (Green, 2005: 214), a preference which Disraeli himself evidently shared. The advocacy of utilising these intermediate institutions or ‘little platoons’ to tackle poverty and social deprivation has proved a defining feature of ‘civic Conservatism’ in the first decade of the twenty-first century, for while many senior Conservatives now acknowledge that ‘markets are not enough’, they have continued to eschew the state as a solution to many societal problems, except as either a last resort, or as a facilitator and coordinator of ‘third sector’ organisations, such as charities, community groups, not-for-profit bodies, social enterprises and the voluntary sector. This mode of Conservatism acknowledges that poverty in Britain is a serious problem (both for the individuals directly affected, and for wider society in terms of the social and economic costs accruing from poverty-related problems), and also criticises New Labour for presiding over ever-increasing inequality and a growing gulf between the super-rich and the rest of society. Crucially, though, ‘civic Conservatives’ (who sometimes enthusiastically depict themselves as heirs of the Disraelian One Nation tradition) insist that mending ‘broken Britain’ and tackling the de facto exclusion of the poor from mainstream society, does not mean an enhanced role for the state or ‘big government’ – on the contrary, these are deemed to be a major part of the problem. The details of this new ‘civic Conservatism’ are still being fleshed out, as part of David Cameron’s ‘Conservative modernisation’ project’, aided by senior party figures such as Oliver Letwin, Iain Duncan Smith and David

248

British Conservatism

Willetts, and former academics such as Phillip Blond, but thus far the Conservative Party seems finally to have recovered much of the electoral support which it lost from the mid 1990s onwards. Of course, much of the Conservative Party’s revived popularity is due to the serious economic downturn which Britain has experienced since 2008, for which the incumbent New Labour government, led by Gordon Brown, has suffered an electoral backlash, even though many people blame ‘the City’ or senior bank(er)s for precipitating the financial collapse. Ostensibly, it might seem slightly incongruous that the Conservatives could win the 2010 general election when Britain is characterised by so much inequality and enormous concentrations of wealth in relatively few hands, but while many people are sometimes inclined to grumble about greed at the top, condemn the ‘undeserving rich’ and bemoan the huge salaries and bonuses reportedly being paid to some bankers, most people in Britain have rarely been overly angered by socio-economic inequality, and certainly not to the extent that they have seriously questioned the legitimacy of capitalism and parliamentary democracy. On the contrary, there has usually been widespread acceptance, and often approval of inequality, with many people (even Labour voters) seeming to accept, if only tacitly or almost subconsciously, the kinds of arguments which Conservatives have consistently advanced to justify considerable disparities of earnings and wealth. Moreover, there has often been rather more disapproval of the poor than of the rich, not least because of the extent to which the former have been viewed as largely responsible for their lack of material resources and wealth. In a form of cognitive dissonance, many British people have frequently failed to discern any connection between the huge salaries and concentrations of wealth accrued at the top of society, and the low wages and poverty prevalent at the bottom. Bankers aside, many of those on high incomes, or who have amassed great personal fortunes, have traditionally been revered and respected by much of the British public, if only on the grounds that ordinary people are heavily dependent on such business acumen, economic success and wealth creation for their own livelihoods and well-being. Admittedly, many ordinary people sometimes express, particularly when asked in attitude surveys or opinion polls, concern or unease about the scale of inequality in Britain, and it has variously been suggested that during the 1980s, when Margaret Thatcher was Prime Minister, public attitudes often veered towards social democratic values, in terms of a belief that governments should do more to tackle poverty and/or extremes of inequality, prioritise increased expenditure on public services over tax cuts, and generally make Britain a ‘fairer’ society (see, for example, Crewe, 1988 and



Conclusion

249

1989). Yet such attitudes fell far short of wanting equality per se, and certainly did not signify public support for full-blooded socialism. On the contrary, although these values were loosely defined as social democratic, many of them were not that dissimilar to the concerns and policy preferences being expressed in the late 1980s and 1990s by senior One Nation Conservatives, most notably Ian Gilmour; a concern that Thatcherism was allowing, or even actively encouraging, the gap between the rich and the poor to become too wide, and displaying a callous disregard for the swelling ranks of the poor (many of whom were deemed to be innocent victims of Thatcherism’s neo-liberal policies and/or deindustrialisation’s large-scale loss of manufacturing jobs). Such concerns, however, were accompanied by continued insistence that although they wished to constrain or limit extremes of inequality, and wanted to tackle poverty and social deprivation, and adopt measures to boost employment, One Nation Conservatives remained implacably opposed to socio-economic equality. Meanwhile, although older forms of deference might have declined (doubtless fuelled, in part, by the Thatcherite promotion of consumer rights and consumer sovereignty, whereby many individuals see themselves first and foremost as customers rather than citizens, and whereby human interactions and relationships are characterised primarily by what Marx referred to as ‘the cash nexus’), new forms of deference seem to have emerged among some of the poor, in the form of celebrity-worship. Certainly, one of the most remarkable features of contemporary Britain is the extent to which some of the poorest in society now deify super-rich glamour models, pop stars, professional footballers, ‘reality TV’ characters, and soap opera actors. There is little sense of anger or outrage among the poor that such celebrities ‘earn’ millions of pounds each year, and ostentatiously display their lifestyles of conspicuous consumption at every photo opportunity, while residing in a world of absolute luxury far removed from the lives of those who worship them. Indeed, instead of resenting these super-rich celebrities, many of the poor adopt them as role models to be emulated or imitated, the huge differences in incomes and consequent purchasing power notwithstanding. In a British society characterised by unprecedented levels of inequality and concentrations of wealth, super-rich celebrities have become the opium of the masses, to the extent that many of the least well off also seem to be the least interested in equality. Many of the poor might not be Conservatives per se, but their evident lack of interest in socialist ideas and egalitarian policies – indeed, in politics generally – is highly conservative in its consequences.

Notes

Chapter 1 1 Anthony Quinton has endeavoured to distinguish between the theological basis of Conservative philosophy, which ‘derives its conservative politics to some extent from religious premises’, and a rather more ‘secular tradition of conservative thinking’, although he readily acknowledges that both strands share a strong ‘belief in the moral imperfection of mankind’ (Quinton, 1978: 10, 11; see also Barnes, 1994: 320). 2 Although, of course, Hayek insisted that he was a liberal, not a Conservative (Hayek, 1960: 397–411). Nonetheless, many of his arguments and ideas pertaining to individualism, liberty, a market economy and the virtues of a limited state, along with his rejection of ‘social justice’ as the basis or purpose of public policy, have subsequently been enthusiastically adopted by many Conservatives, particularly neo-liberals, as we will clearly see in Chapter 3. 1

2

Chapter 2 ‘Free traders’, in accordance with economic neo-liberalism, strongly argued that enhanced competition and the removal of tariffs would yield lower prices, which would be particularly beneficial to those on low incomes. By contrast, ‘tariff reformers’ (or ‘protectionists’) maintained that ‘Tariff Reform is essentially a working-class question, because the custom of inundating our English market with foreign-made goods which is fostered by our system of Free Trade inevitably tends to throw the British workman out of employment [and] is bringing … disaster to our working-classes (Rolleston, 1908: 387; see also Green, 1996: 236–7; McDowell, 1959: ch. 4). The prevalence and intensity of this intra-party debate was, in some respects, comparable to the controversies engendered in the Conservative Party vis-à-vis the European Union in the 1990s, when there were echoes of the arguments over the respective merits and likely consequences of liberalisation and protectionism, and about which approach was in Britain’s best economic and political interests. This short account of the role of the Unionist Social Reform Committee draws upon Jane Ridley’s 1987 article on ‘‘The Unionist Social Reform Committee,

252

British Conservatism

1911–14: wets before the deluge’ in The Historical Journal, vol. 30, published by Cambridge University Press. 3 The ‘Manchester School’ had been enthusiastic advocates of economic laissezfaire in the nineteenth century. 4 See also CPA, Conservative Central Office [CCO] 503/2/21, Minutes of a special meeting between the [Conservative] National Trade Union Advisory Committee, and the [Conservative backbench] parliamentary labour committee, 26 July 1951. 5 An allusion to the ‘Manchester School’ of laissez-faire economics and the ‘night watchman’ state which had been prevalent for much of the nineteenth century among political elites and many commentators or opinion-formers. 6 In the 1980s, ‘the environment’ was not viewed as an important issue in the way that it has been since the 1990s. Also, the Department of the Environment’s main responsibilities during the 1980s were primarily with local government issues, housing, town planning, etc. In other words, it was primarily concerned with the ‘built environment’, rather than ‘the environment’ in today’s use of the term. Chapter 3 1 As well as being a trenchant Conservative neo-liberal and individualist who thus bitterly opposed state intervention in economic and social affairs, Dorothy Crisp subsequently became chair of the Housewives League, which had been formed in 1947 ‘to resist, not only the welfare policies of the Labour government, but creeping socialism within the Conservative Party’ (Eccleshall, 1990: 165, fn.27). Seemingly concerned that the post-war Conservative Party had apparently succumbed to collectivism and paternalistic social reform to help the least deserving members of society, Crisp informed some of her colleagues that she intended to create her own political party, and thence become Britain’s first woman Prime Minister (Campbell, 1987: 80). 2 ‘Social authoritarians’ were those Conservatives who were particularly concerned to restore social order and traditional morality, with much greater emphasis on empowering the police, encouraging courts to give longer prison sentences and promoting the heterosexual nuclear family and marriage. These Conservatives argued that, while Britain had been characterised by too much state intervention in economic affairs since 1945, there had been ‘too much freedom’ and excessive liberalism in the social and moral spheres, the outcome of which was a nihilistic hedonism and growing civil disorder, as exemplified by increasing divorce and family break-down, ‘alternative’ lifestyles, sexual ‘deviancy’ and licentiousness, rising crime, violence and vandalism, and general low-level lawlessness, increasing drug abuse, and declining respect for authority and the law (for a succinct exposition of the ‘social authoritarian’ thesis, see Worsthorne, 1978). Intriguingly, some prominent Conservatives, most notably Margaret Thatcher and Norman Tebbit, were simultaneously economic neo-liberals and social authoritarians, favouring more liberty in economic affairs, but more discipline in the social and moral spheres. Thus did Andrew Gamble (1994) entitle his book on ‘The Politics of Thatcherism’ as The Free Economy and the Strong State. 3 Needless to say, this perspective automatically deemed women to be responsible for unplanned or ‘out of wedlock’ pregnancies, rather than the men who got

Notes

253

them pregnant, although by the early 1990s, there was an acknowledgement that ‘absent fathers’ were a major part of the problem, and thus needed to accept much more financial, if not moral, responsibility for the child(ren) they had helped to create. 4 It is not the accuracy or veracity of such perspectives concerning ‘welfare mothers’ which is important here, but the extent to which these assumptions or prejudices were either held by many Conservative neo-liberals and social authoritarians, or were deliberately propagated in order to legitimise curbs on welfare entitlement. 5 In response to a parliamentary question on this issue, the relevant minister replied that the abolition of the Earnings Related Supplement would yield savings of £360 million in the financial year 1982–83 (House of Commons Debates, ser. 5, vol. 983, col. 396–7 Written Answers). 1

2

1

Chapter 4 This was a reference to Tony Benn, a former Labour MP and Cabinet Minister. Throughout the late 1970s and 1980s, Benn was a prominent Left-winger exhorting the Labour Party to be much more socialist (rather than propping up or rescuing Capitalism). As such, Benn became a bogey-man and hate-figure for the Conservatives, and was routinely demonised and denigrated in proConservative newspapers, who claimed that if he ever became Prime Minister, Britain would become a Soviet-style state. Today, though, in his dotage, he is widely respected as an elder statesman and raconteur, and the public talks he often gives around the country, particularly at Book Festivals, are invariably sold-out, with the audiences representing a broad range of political allegiances and views, including, it seems, Conservatives. ‘Nudge economics’ acquired some prominence in 2008, following the publication of a book entitled Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness. Written by two American academics, Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein, and published by Yale University Press, Nudge explained how individual and social behaviour could be improved through incentives and subtly steering people towards socially responsible choices, rather than relying on prescriptive or coercive, top-down, methods. At the time, many commentators discerned similarities with the approach being promoted by Cameron, Osborne and Willetts. Chapter 5 Hence Frank Bechhofer and Brian Elliott’s edited volume on The Petit Bourgeoisie (published in 1981 by Macmillan), was subtitled ‘Comparative Studies of the Uneasy Stratum’.

Conclusion 1 Of course, most socialists would counter that these characteristics were evidence that the Soviet regimes were not socialist. Indeed, some on the Marxist left, most notably the Socialist Workers Party, have always insisted that the old Soviet Union constituted a form of bureaucratic state capitalism, which actually mirrored many of the characteristics of Western capitalism, not least the exploitation of the workers by a self-serving economic and political elite

254

British Conservatism

which appropriated the majority of wealth for itself, and sent its children to the best schools and universities in lieu of them following their parents into the top jobs, yet all the while claiming that this system, and their decisions or actions, were in the interests of the masses, and also that the alternatives would be far worse!

Bibliography

Place of publication London, unless stated otherwise. Abel, Deryck (1960) Ernest Benn: Counsel for Liberty, Ernest Benn. Addison, Paul (1975) The Road to 1945: British Politics and the Second World War, Jonathan Cape. Allison, Lincoln (1984) Right Principles: A Conservative Philosophy of Politics, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Althusser, Louis (1977) Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays, 2nd edn, New Left Books. Alport, Cuthbert (1946) About Conservative Principles, Conservative Political Centre. Amery, Leo (1947) Thoughts on the Constitution, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Anderson, Perry (1967) ‘The limits and possibilities of trade union action’, in Robin Blackburn and Alexander Cockburn (eds), The Incompatibles: Trade Union Militancy and the Consensus, Harmondsworth: Penguin, pp. 263–80. Atkinson, A. B. and Salverda, W. (2003) Top Incomes in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom over the Twentieth Century (mimeo), Oxford: Nuffield College. Bacon, Roger and Eltis, Walter (1976) Britain’s Economic Problem: Too Few Producers, Basingstoke: Macmillan. Baldry, Tony (1985) ‘Time to talk’, Reformer, Summer. Baldwin, Stanley (1926) On England, Philip Allan. Bale, Tim (2009) ‘The Conservatives: trounced, transfixed – and transformed?’, in Terence Casey (ed.), The Blair Legacy: Politics, Policy, Governance and Foreign Affairs, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Bamfield, Louise and Horton, Tim (2009) Understanding Attitudes to Tackling Economic Inequality, Joseph Rowntree Foundation. Barnes, John (1994) ‘Ideology and factions’, in Anthony Seldon and Stuart Ball (eds), Conservative Century: The Conservative Party since 1900, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 315–45. Bealey, Frank, Blondel, Jean and McCann, W. P. (1965) Constituency Politics, Faber. Bechhofer, Frank and Elliott, Brian (1981) ‘Petty property: the survival of a moral economy’, in Frank Bechhofer and Brian Elliott (eds), The Petit Bourgeoisie: Comparative Studies of the Uneasy Stratum, Macmillan, pp. 182–200. Beer, Samuel (1982) Britain Against Itself, Faber. Benn, Ernest (1925) Confessions of a Capitalist, Ernest Benn. —— (1927) The Letters of an Individualist to ‘The Times’, 1921–1926, Ernest Benn. —— (1928) The Return to Laissez-Faire: The Case for Individualism, Ernest Benn.

256

British Conservatism

Benn, Ernest (1930) Account Rendered, Ernest Benn. —— (1949) Happier Days: Recollections and Reflections, Ernest Benn. —— (1953) The State the Enemy, Ernest Benn. Bennett, R.J. (1977) ‘The Conservative tradition of thought: a right wing phenomenon?’, in Neill Nugent, and Roger King (eds) (1977), The British Right: Conservative and Right Wing Politics in Britain, Saxon House. Benney, Mark and Geiss, Phyllis (1950) ‘Social class and politics in Greenwich’, British Journal of Sociology, 1/4: 310–27. Bentinck, Lord (Henry) (1918a) Tory Democracy, Methuen. —— (1918b) Industrial Fatigue and the Relations between Hours of Work and Output, with a Memorandum on Sickness, P. S. King. Berry, Christopher (1983) ‘Conservatism and human nature’, in Ian Forbes and Steve Smith (eds), Politics and Human Nature, Pinter, pp. 53–67. Biddiss, Michael (1987) ‘Thatcherism: concept and interpretations’, in Kenneth Minogue and Michael Biddiss (eds), Thatcherism: Personality and Politics, Macmillan, pp. 1–20. Blake, Robert (1969) Disraeli, University Paperbacks/Methuen. Blake, Lord (Robert) (1976) ‘A changed climate’, in Lord Blake and John Patten (eds), The Conservative Opportunity, Macmillan, pp. 1–12. —— (1985) The Conservative Party from Peel to Thatcher, Methuen. Blond, Phillip (2009a) The Civic State: Re-moralise the Market, Re-localise the Economy and Re-capitalise the Poor, ResPublica. —— (2009b) ‘Red Tory’, in Jon Cruddas and Jonathan Rutherford (eds), Is the Future Conservative?, Compass/Soundings/Lawrence & Wishart, pp. 79–90. Available online at http://www.soundings.org.uk/. —— (2009c) ‘Rise of the red Tories’, Prospect, 28 February: 32–36. —— (2009d) ‘The new Conservatism can create a capitalism that works for the poor’, The Guardian, 2 July. Boothby, Robert, Macmillan, Harold, Loder, John De V. and Stanley, Oliver (1927) Industry and the State: A Conservative View, Macmillan. Bottomore, Tom (1966) Elites and Society, Harmondsworth: Penguin. Boyd-Carpenter, John (1950) The Conservative Case, Wingate. Boyson, Rhodes (1971) ‘Down with the poor’, in Rhodes Boyson (ed.), Down With The Poor, Churchill Press, pp. 1–9. Braine, Bernard (1948) Tory Democracy, Falcon Press. Bristow, Edward (1975) ‘The Liberty and Property Defence League and individualism’, Historical Journal, 18: 761–89. Brittan, Samuel (1977) The Economic Consequences of Democracy, Temple Smith. —— (1983) The Role and Limits of Government: Essays in Political Economy, Temple Smith. Bromley, Catherine (2003) ‘Has Britain become immune to inequality?’, in Alison Park, John Curtice, Katarina Thomson, et al. (eds), British Social Attitudes: The 20th Report, Sage/National Centre for Social Research, pp. 71–92. Bruce-Gardyne, Jock (1974) Whatever Happened to the Quiet Revolution?, Charles Knight. Bryant, Arthur (1929) The Spirit of Conservatism, Methuen. Bulpitt, Jim (1986) ‘The discipline of the new democracy: Mrs Thatcher’s domestic statecraft’, Political Studies, 34/1: 19–39. Burke, Edmund (2004) Reflections on the Revolution in France, Penguin Classics (first published in 1790). Butler, Geoffrey (1914) The Tory Tradition, John Murray. Butler, Rab (1971) The Art of the Possible, Hamish Hamilton.



Bibliography

257

Butler, Lord (Rab) (1982) The Art of Memory, Hodder & Stoughton. Cameron, David (2009a) ‘The future of the Party’, Reformer, Summer. —— (2009b) ‘Big society can fight poverty. Big government just fuels it’, Guardian, 11 November. Campbell, Beatrix (1987) The Iron Ladies: Why do Women Vote Tory?, Virago. Carr, Robert (1975) ‘Incomes Policy’, Political Quarterly 46/4: 40–10. Cazalet-Keir, Thelma (1967) From the Wings, Bodley Head. Cecil, Lord Hugh (1912) Conservatism, Thornton Butterworth. Churchill, Winston (1906) Randolph Churchill, vol. 2, Macmillan. Clarke, David (1947) The Conservative Faith in the Modern Age, Conservative Political Centre. Cockett, Richard (1995) Thinking the Unthinkable: Think-Tanks and the Economic Counter-Revolution, 1931–1983, Fontana. Coleman, Bruce (1988) Conservatism and the Conservative Party in Nineteeenth Century Britain, Edward Arnold. Coleraine, Lord (1970) For Conservatives Only, Tom Stacey. Conley, Frank (1994) General Elections Today, 2nd edn, Manchester: Manchester University Press. Conservative and Unionist Party Central Office (1947) The Industrial Charter: A Statement of Conservative Industrial Policy. Conservative Party (1976) The Right Approach: A Statement of Conservative Aims. —— (1979) The Conservative Manifesto. —— (2006) Built to Last: The Aims and Values of the Conservative Party. Conservative Research Department (1956) Notes on Current Politics, 2: Economic and Industrial Affairs. Cowling, Maurice (1978) ‘The present position’, in Maurice Cowling (ed.), Conservative Essays, Cassell, pp. 1–24. Craig, F. W. S. (1970) British General Election Manifestos, 1900–1970, Chichester: John Stevens. Crewe, Ivor (1988) ‘Has the electorate Become Thatcherite?’, in Robert Skidelsky (ed.), Thatcherism, Chatto & Windus, pp. 25–49. —— (1989) ‘Values: the crusade that failed’, in Dennis Kavanagh and Anthony Seldon (eds), The Thatcher Effect, Oxford: University Press, pp. 239–50. Criddle, Byron (1994) ‘Members of Parliament’, in Anthony Seldon and Stuart Ball (eds), Conservative Century: The Conservative Party since 1900, Oxford University Press, pp. 145–67. Crisp, Dorothy (1931) The Rebirth of Conservatism, Methuen. Critchley, Julian (1978) ‘How to get on in the Conservative Party’, Political Quarterly, 44/4: 467–73. —— (1985) Westminster Blues, Elm Tree Books. —— (1990) The Palace of Varieties, Faber. Critchley, Julian (1992) Some of Us: People Who Did Well Under Thatcher, John Murray. —— (1994) A Bag of Boiled Sweets, Faber. Denham, Andrew and Dorey, Peter (2006) ‘A tale of two speeches?: the Conservative leadership election of 2005’, Political Quarterly, 77/1: 35–42. Denham, Andrew and Garnett, Mark (1998) British Think-Tanks and the Climate of Opinion, UCL Press. —— (2002) Keith Joseph, Chesham: Acumen. Department of Employment (1988) Employment for the 1990s, HMSO. —— (1992) People, Jobs and Opportunity, HMSO.

258

British Conservatism

Department of Social Security (1997) Households Below Average Income: A Statistical Analysis, 1979–1994/95, The Stationery Office. Dicey, Edward (1885) ‘The plea of a malcontent Liberal’, Fortnightly Review, 37. Disraeli, Benjamin (1835) Vindication of the English Constitution, Saunders & Otley. —— (1989) Coningsby, Harmondsworth: Penguin Classics (first published in 1844). —— (1995) Sybil, or The Two Nations, Wordsworth Classics (first published in 1845). Dorey, Peter (1995) The Conservative Party and the Trade Unions, Routledge. —— (ed.) (1999a) The Major Premiership: Politics and Policies under John Major, 1990– 1997, Basingstoke: Macmillan. —— (1999b) ‘No return to beer and sandwiches: trade union and employment policies under John Major’, in Peter Dorey (ed.), The Major Premiership: Politics and Policies under John Major, 1990–1997, Basingstoke: Macmillan, pp. 179–98. —— (2001a) Wage Politics in Britain: The Rise and Fall of Incomes Policies since 1945, Brighton: Sussex Academic Press. —— (2001b) ‘Margaret Thatcher’s taming of the trade unions’, in Stanislao Pugliese (ed.), The Thatcher Years: The Rebirth of Liberty?, Politico’s, pp. 71–85. —— (2002a) ‘Britain in the 1980s and 1990s: the redundancy of social partnership’, in Stefan Berger and Hugh Compston (eds), Social Partnership in the 1990s, Oxford: Berghahn, pp. 63–76. —— (2002b) ‘A lethargic landslide: the 2001 general election’, in Steve Lancaster (ed.), Developments in Politics, vol. 13, Ormskirk: Causeway Press, pp. 1–30. —— (2003) ‘Conservative policy under William Hague’ in Mark Garnett and Philip Lynch (eds), The Conservatives in Crisis: The Tories after 1997, Manchester: Manchester University Press, pp. 125–45. —— (2004) ‘The Conservative Party under Iain Duncan Smith’, in Steve Lancaster (ed.), Developments in Politics: An Annual Review, vol. 15, Ormskirk: Causeway Press, pp. 1–29. —— (2006) ‘The Conservative Party’s performance in the 2005 general election’, Representation, 42/2: 149–55. —— (2007) ‘A new direction or another false dawn? David Cameron and the crisis of British Conservatism’, British Politics 2/2: 137–66. —— (2009a) ‘Change in order to conserve: explaining the decision to introduce the 1958 Life Peerages Act’, Parliamentary History, 28/2: 246–65. —— (2009b) British Conservatism and Trade Unionism, 1945–64, Farnham: Ashgate. —— (2009c) ‘Between individual liberty and industrial order: Conservatives and the trade union closed shop, 1945–1990’, Contemporary British History, 23/2: 221–44. Eccleshall, Robert (1977) ‘English conservatism as ideology’, Political Studies, 25: 62–83. —— (1984) ‘Conservatism’, in Robert Eccleshall, Vincent Geoghegan, Richard Jay and Rick Wilford, Political Ideologies: An Introduction, Hutchinson, pp. 79–114. —— (1990) English Conservatism since the Restoration: An Introduction and Anthology, Unwin Hyman. Elliott, Brian and McCrone, David (1982) ‘The social world of petty property’, in Peter Hollowell (ed.), Property and Social Relations, Heinemann, pp. 111–30. Elliott, Brian, McCrone, David and Bechhofer, Frank (1988) ‘Anxieties and ambitions: the petit bourgeoisie and the New Right in Britain’ in David Rose (ed.), Social Stratification and Economic Change, Hutchinson, pp. 263–78. Engels, Frederick (1969) The Condition of the Working Class in England, Granada. Fawcett, Helen (1996) ‘The Beveridge straitjacket: policy formation and the problem of poverty in old age’, Contemporary British History 10/1: 20–42. Feiling, Keith (1930) What is Conservatism?, Faber.



Bibliography

259

Friedman, Milton (1962) Capitalism and Freedom, Phoenix Books/University of Chicago Press. Gallie, Duncan (1983) Social Inequality and Class Radicalism in France and Britain, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Gamble, Andrew (1974) The Conservative Nation, Routledge & Kegan Paul. Gammans, L. D. (1945) Facing the Facts, National Union of Conservative and Unionist Associations. Garnett, Mark (1999) Alport: A Study in Loyalty, Acumen. —— (2003) ‘A question of definition? Ideology and the Conservative Party, 1997–2001’, in Mark Garnett and Philip Lynch (eds), The Conservatives in Crisis: The Tories after 1997, Manchester: Manchester University Press, pp. 107–24. —— (2005) ‘Centre’, in Kevin Hickson (ed.), The Political Thought of the Conservative Party since 1945, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 51–68. Garnett, Mark and Gilmour, Lord [Ian] (1996) ‘Thatcherism and the Conservative tradition’, in Martin Francis and Ina Zweiniger-Bargielowska (eds), The Conservatives and British Society, 1880–1990, Cardiff, University of Wales Press, pp. 78–93. Garnett, Mark and Hickson, Kevin (2009) Conservative Thinkers, Manchester, Manchester University Press. Garvin, J. (1907) ‘Free trade as socialist policy’, National Review, 295. Gazeley, Ian (2007) ‘Manual work and pay, 1900–70’ in Nicholas Crafts, Ian Gazeley and Andrew Newell (eds), Work and Pay in 20th Century Britain, Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 55–79. Gilder, George (1981) Wealth and Poverty, New York: Basic Books. Gilmour, Ian (1969) The Body Politic, Hutchinson. —— (1978) Inside Right: A Study of Conservatism, Quartet. —— (1983) Britain Can Work, Oxford: Martin Robertson. —— (1992) Dancing with Dogma: Britain under Thatcherism, Simon and Schuster. Gilmour, Ian and Garnett, Mark (1997) Whatever Happened to the Tories? The Conservatives since 1945, Fourth Estate. Gourvish, Terry (1991) ‘The rise (and fall?) of state-owned enterprise’, in Terry Gourvish and Alan O’Day (eds), Britain since 1945, Basingstoke: Macmillan, pp. 111–34. Gray, John (1995) Enlightenment’s Wake: Politics and Culture at the Close of the Modern Age, Routledge. Gray, Robert (1981) The Aristocracy of Labour in Nineteenth-Century Britain, Macmillan. Green, Damien (2003) More Than Markets, Tory Reform Group. —— (2005) ‘One Nation’, in Kevin Hickson (ed.), The Political Thought of the Conservative Party since 1945, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 214–18. Green, David (1987) The New Right: The Counter Revolution in Political, Economic and Social Thought, Brighton: Harvester Wheatsheaf. Green, E. H. H. (1996) ‘The Conservative Party, the state and social policy, 1880–1914’, in Martin Francis and Ina Zweiniger-Bargielowska (eds), The Conservatives and British Society, 1880–1990, University of Wales Press, pp. 226–39. —— (2002) Ideologies of Conservatism: Conservative Political Ideas in The Twentieth Century, Oxford University Press. Greenleaf, W. H. (1983) The British Political Tradition, vol. 2: The Ideological Heritage, Methuen. Hailsham Lord (formerly Quintin Hogg) (1978) The Dilemma of Democracy, Collins. Halcrow, Morrison (1989) Keith Joseph: A Single Mind, Macmillan. Hanson, Charles (1991) Taming the Trade Unions, Macmillan.

260

British Conservatism

Harris, John (2009) ‘Phillip Blond: The man who wrote Cameron’s mood music’, The Guardian (Weekend Magazine), 8 August. Harris, Kenneth (1988) Thatcher, Weidenfeld & Nicolson. Harris, Michael (1996) ‘The Centre for Policy Studies: the paradoxes of power’, Contemporary British History, 10/2: 51–64. Harris, Ralph and Seldon, Arthur (eds) (1977) Not From Benevolence, Institute of Economic Affairs. Hayek, Friedrich (1944) The Road to Serfdom, Routledge & Kegan Paul. —— (1960) The Constitution of Liberty, Routledge & Kegan Paul. —— (1976) Law, Legislation and Liberty, vol. 2: The Mirage of Social Justice, Routledge & Kegan Paul. —— (1988) ‘The weasel word “social”’, in Roger Scruton (ed.), Conservative Thoughts: Essays from ‘The Salisbury Review’, Claridge, pp. 49–54. Hayes, John (2005) ‘Being Conservative’ in The Cornerstone Group of MPs, Being Conservative: A Cornerstone of Policies to Revive Tory Britain, pp. 3–10. Hearnshaw, F. J. C. (1933) Conservatism in England, Macmillan. Heath, Anthony, Jowell, Roger and Curtice, John (1985) How Britain Votes, Pergamon Press. Heath, Anthony, Curtice, John, Jowell, Roger, Evans et al. (1991) Understanding Political Change: The British Voter 1964–1987, Oxford: Pergamon. Heath, Edward (1998) The Course of My Life, Hodder & Stoughton. Heffernan, Richard (1996) ‘“Blueprint for a Revolution”?: the politics of the Adam Smith Institute’, in Michael Kandiah and Anthony Seldon (eds), Ideas and Think Tanks in Contemporary Britain, vol. 1, Frank Cass, pp. 73–87. Hewins, William (1929) The Apologia of an Imperialist, vol. 1, Constable. Hickson, Kevin (2005) ‘Inequality’, in Kevin Hickson (ed.), The Political Thought of the Conservative Party since 1945, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 178–94. —— (2009) ‘Conservatism and the poor: Conservative party attitudes to poverty and inequality since the 1970s’, British Politics 4/3: 341–62. Hill, Michael (1993) The Welfare State in Britain: A Political History since 1945, Aldershot: Edward Elgar. Hills, J. W., Ashley, W. J. and Woods, M. (1914) Industrial Unrest: A Practical Solution, Unionist Social Reform Committee. Hills, John (2004) Inequality and the State, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hinchingbrooke, Viscount (1944) Full Speed Ahead! Essays in Tory Reform, Simpkin Marshall. —— (1946) ‘The course of Conservative politics’, Quarterly Review, 284. Hobsbawm, Eric (1964) Labouring Men: Studies in the History of Labour, Weidenfeld & Nicolson. Hoffman, John (1964) The Conservatives in Opposition, Macgibbon & Kee. Hogg, Quinton (subsequently Lord Hailsham) (1943) ‘The New Conservatism’, The Spectator, 29 January. —— (1944) One Year’s Work, Hutchinson. —— (1945) ‘Too many Micawbers in the Tory Party’, Daily Mail, 11 September. —— (1947) The Case for Conservatism, Penguin. Hoover, Kenneth and Plant, Raymond (1989) Conservative Capitalism in Britain and the United States, Routledge. Howard, Anthony (1987) Rab: The Life of R. A. Butler, Jonathan Cape. Hume, David (1975) Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals, Oxford: Oxford University Press (first published in 1777).



Bibliography

261

Hurd, Douglas (1979) An End to Promises, Collins. —— (2003) Memoirs, Little, Brown. Hutber, Patrick (1977) The Decline and Fall of the Middle Class and How it Can Fight Back, Penguin. Hutchinson, George (1980) The Last Edwardian at No.10: An Impression of Harold Macmillan, Quartet Books. Irvin, George (2008) Super Rich: The Rise of Inequality in Britain and the United States, Cambridge: Polity. James, Simon (1993) ‘The ideas brokers: The impact of think tanks on British government’, Public Administration, 71/4: 491–506. Jeffreys, Kevin (1991) The Churchill Coalition and Wartime Politics, 1940–45, Manchester: Manchester University Press. Jessop, Bob (1974) Traditionalism, Conservatism and British Political Culture, George Allen and Unwin. Johnson, Christopher (1991) The Economy under Mrs Thatcher, 1979–1990, Harmondsworth: Penguin. Jones, Harriet (1996) ‘The Cold War and the Santa Claus syndrome: dilemmas in Conservative social policy-making, 1945–1957’, in Martin Francis and Ina Zweiniger-Bargielowska (eds), The Conservatives and British Society, 1880–1990, Cardiff, University of Wales Press, pp. 240–54. Joseph, Keith (1975) Why Britain Needs a Social Market Economy, Centre for Policy Studies. —— (1976) Stranded on the Middle Ground, Centre for Policy Studies. —— (1978) ‘Proclaim the message: Keynes is dead!’, in Patrick Hutber (ed.), What’s Wrong with Britain?, Sphere, pp. 99–106. Joseph, Keith and Sumption, Jonathan (1979) Equality, John Murray. Judge, Mark H. (ed.) (1908) Political Socialism: A Remonstrance, P. S. King. Kavanagh, Dennis (1980) ‘Political culture in Great Britain: the decline of the civic culture’, in Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba (eds), The Civic Culture Revisited, Boston, MA: Little, Brown & Co, pp. 99–106. —— (1987) Thatcherism and British Politics: The End of Consensus?, Oxford, Oxford University Press. —— (1989) ‘The Heath Government, 1970–1974’, in Peter Hennessy and Anthony Seldon (eds), Ruling Performance: British Governments from Attlee to Thatcher, Blackwell. —— (1990) Politics and Personalities, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Kavanagh, Dennis and Morris, Peter (1989) Consensus Politics: From Attlee to Thatcher, Oxford: Blackwell. Kay, John, Mayer, Colin and Thompson, David (eds) (1986) Privatisation and Regulation: The UK Experience, Oxford: Clarendon. Kilmuir, Lord (1964) Political Adventure, Weidenfeld & Nicolson. King, Anthony (1975) ‘The problem of overload’, British Journal of Political Science, 5. —— (1985) ‘Margaret Thatcher: the style of Prime Minister’, in Anthony King (ed.), The British Prime Minister, Macmillan. King, Roger and Raynor, John (1981) The Middle Class, 2nd edn, Longman. Kondylis, Florence and Wadsworth, Jonathan (2007) ‘Wages and wage inequality, 1970– 2000’, in Nicholas Crafts, Ian Gazeley and Andrew Newell (eds), Work and Pay in 20th Century Britain, Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 80–97. Kopsch, Hartmut (1970) The Approach of the Conservative Party to Social Policy during World War II, University of London PhD Thesis.

262

British Conservatism

Layard, Richard and Nickell, Stephen (1989) The Thatcher Miracle?, Centre for Labour Economics (London School of Economics), Discussion Paper No.343. Leach, Robert (1996) British Political Ideologies, 2nd edn, Hemel Hempstead: Prentice Hall/Harvester Wheatsheaf. Leonard, Dick and Mortimore, Roger (2001) Elections in Britain: A Voter’s Guide, Basingstoke: Palgrave. Letwin, Oliver (2002) ‘For Labour, there is no such thing as society, only the state’, in Gary Streeter (ed.), There is Such a Thing as Society: Twelve Principles of Compassionate Conservatism, Politico’s, pp. 39–51. —— (2003) The Neighbourly Society: Collected Speeches 2001–2003, Centre for Policy Studies. —— (2009) ‘From economic revolution to social revolution’, Alan Finlayson interviews Oliver Letwin MP, in Jon Cruddas and Jonathan Rutherford (eds), Is the Future Conservative?, Compass/Soundings/Lawrence & Wishart, pp. 71–8. Available online at http://www.soundings.org.uk/. Letwin, Shirley Robin (1992) The Anatomy of Thatcherism, Fontana. Lindsay, T. F and Harrington, M. (1979) The Conservative Party 1918–1979, Macmillan. Lockwood, David (1966) ‘Sources of variation in working-class images of society’, Sociological Review, 14/3: 249–67. Loftus, Pierse (1912) The Conservative Party and the Future: A Programme for Tory Democracy, Stephen Swift. Loney, Martin (1987) The Politics of Greed: The New Right and the Welfare State, Pluto Press. Long, Camilla (2009) ‘Phillip Blond: The red under Cameron’s bed’, The Sunday Times (News Review supplement), 18 October. Lovell, John and Roberts, B. C. (1968) A Short History of the TUC, Macmillan. Lowe, Rodney (1996) ‘The replanning of the welfare state, 1957–1964’, in Martin Francis and Ina Zweiniger-Bargielowska (eds), The Conservatives and British Society, 1880–1990, Cardiff, University of Wales Press, pp. 255–73. McDonald, G. W. and Gospel, Howard (1973) ‘The Mond-Turner talks, 1927–1933: a study in industrial co-operation’, Historical Journal, 16/4: 807–29. McDowell, R. B. (1959) British Conservatism 1832–1914, Faber. McIlroy, John (1991) The Permanent Revolution: Conservative Law and the Trade Unions, Spokesman. Mackenzie, Robert and Silver, Allan (1968) Angels in Marble, Heinemann. Macmillan, Harold (1933) Reconstruction: A Plea for a National Policy, Macmillan. —— (1938) The Middle Way, Macmillan. —— (1946) ‘Strength through – what?’, Oxford Mail, 26 January. —— (1966) The Middle Way, revised edition, Macmillan. —— (1969) Tides of Fortune, 1945–55, Macmillan. —— (1973) At the End of the Day, 1961–63, Macmillan. Maine, Sir Henry (1886) Popular Government, John Murray. Mallock, William Hurrell (1881) ‘A missing science’, Contemporary Review, XL. —— (1882) Social Equality: A Short Study in a Missing Science, 2nd edn, G. P. Putnam and sons. —— (1898a) ‘Mr. Herbert Spencer in self-defence’, Nineteenth Century, XLIV. —— (1898b) Aristocracy and Evolution: A Study of the Rights, the Origin, and the Social Function of the Wealthier Classes, A. & C. Black. —— (1908) A Critical Examination of Socialism, John Murray. —— (1918) The Limits of Pure Democracy, Chapman & Hall.



Bibliography

263

—— (1920) Memoirs of Life and Literature, Chapman & Hall. Malpass, Peter and Murie, Alan (1999) Housing Policy and Practice, 5th edn, Palgrave. Marsh, Alan (1977) Protest and Political Consciousness, Sage. Marsh, David (1992) The New Politics of British Trade Unionism, Macmillan. Marx, Karl and Engels, Frederick (1953) On Britain, Moscow, Foreign Languages Press. Mason, John W. (1980) ‘Political economy and the response to socialism in Britain, 1870–1914’, Historical Journal, 23: 565–87. Maude, Angus (1969) The Common Problem: A Policy for the Future, Constable. Maude, Francis (2005) ‘Centre’, in Kevin Hickson (ed.), The Political Thought of the Conservative Party since 1945, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Maudling, Reginald (1978) Memoirs, Sidgwick & Jackson. Meyer, Anthony (1990) Stand Up and Be Counted, Heinemann. Miliband, Ralph (1961) Parliamentary Socialism: A Study in the Politics of Labour, Merlin. —— (1977) Marxism and Politics, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Minogue, Kenneth (1967) ‘Conservatism’ in Paul Edwards (ed) The Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, New York: Macmillan, p. 195. —— (1989) The Egalitarian Conceit: False and True Equalities, Centre for Policy Studies. Molson, Hugh (1945) ‘The Tory Reform Committee’, New English Review, XI, July: 245–52. Montgomerie, Tim (2004) Whatever Happened to Compassionate Conservatism?, Centre for Social Justice. Montgomery-Massingberd, H. (1986) ‘Top and bottom of the Tory class’, The Spectator, 3 May: 9–12. Monypenny, William and Buckle, George (1929) The Life and Times of Benjamin Disraeli: Earl of Beaconsfield, vol. 2, John Murray. Morris-Jones, W. H. (1954) ‘In defence of apathy’, Political Studies, 2/1: 25–37. Muller, Christopher (1996) ‘The Institute of Economic Affairs: undermining the postwar consensus’, in Michael Kandiah and Anthony Seldon (eds), Ideas and Think Tanks in Contemporary Britain, vol. 1, Frank Cass, pp. 88–110. Newman, Stephen (1984) Liberalism at Wits’ End, Ithaca. Nicholson, Emma (1995) ‘Why I had to quit the Tories’, Observer Review, 31 December. —— (1996) Secret Society: Inside – and Outside – the Conservative Party, Indigo. Nisbet, Robert (1974) ‘The pursuit of equality’, The Public Interest, 35: 103–20. Nordlinger, Eric (1967) Working Class Tories, Macgibbon & Kee. Northam, Reginald (1939) Conservatism The Only Way, The Right Book Club. Norton, Philip (1990) ‘“The lady’s not for turning” but what about the rest? Margaret Thatcher and the Conservative Party 1979–89’, Parliamentary Affairs, 43/1: 41–58. —— (1996) ‘Philosophy: the principles of Conservatism’, in Philip Norton (ed.), The Conservative Party, Hemel Hempstead: Prentice Hall/Harvester Wheatsheaf, pp. 68–82. Norton, Philip and Aughey, Arthur (1981) Conservatives and Conservatism, Temple Smith. O’Sullivan, Noel (1976) Conservatism, J. M. Dent. Oakeshott, Michael (1967) Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays, Methuen. Orton, Michael and Rowlingson, Karen (2007) Public Attitudes to Economic Inequality, Joseph Rowntree Foundation. Osberg, Lars and Smeeding, Timothy (2006) ‘“Fair” inequality? An international comparison of attitudes to pay differentials’, American Sociological Review, 71/3: 450–73. Parkin, Frank (1967) ‘Working class Conservatives: a theory of political deviance’, British Journal of Sociology, 18: 278–90.

264

British Conservatism

Parkinson, Cecil (1992) Right at the Centre, Weidenfeld & Nicolson. Parry, Geraint (1969) Political Elites, George Allen & Unwin. Patten, Chris (1983) The Tory Case, Longman. Peele, Gillian (1976) ‘The Conservative Dilemma’, in Lord (Robert) Blake and John Patten (eds), The Conservative Opportunity, Macmillan, pp. 13–26. Perkin, Harold (1989) The Rise of Professional Society: England since 1880, Routledge. Pierson, Christopher (1996) ‘Social policy’, in David Marquand and Anthony Seldon (eds), The Ideas That Shaped Post-War Britain, Fontana, pp. 139–64. Pierson, Paul (1994) Dismantling the Welfare State: Reagan, Thatcher and the Politics of Retrenchment, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pinto-Duschinsky, Michael (1967) The Political Thought of Lord Salisbury, Constable. Poulantzas, Nicos (1978) Classes in Contemporary Capitalism, Verso. Powell, Enoch (1969) Freedom and Reality, Elliot Right Way Books. Prior, James (1986) A Balance of Power, Hamish Hamilton. Pym, Francis (1985) The Politics of Consent, Sphere. Quinton, Anthony (1978) The Politics of Imperfection, Faber & Faber. Raison, Timothy (1964) Why Conservative?, Harmondsworth: Penguin. —— (1990) Tories and the Welfare State, Macmillan. Ramsden, John (1977) ‘From Churchill to Heath’, in Lord [Rab] Butler (ed) The Conservatives: A History from their Origins to 1965, George Allen & Unwin. —— (1980) The Making of Conservative Party Policy, Longman, pp. 405–78. —— (1995) The Age of Churchill and Eden, 1940–57, Longman. Rawls, John (1971) A Theory of Justice, Harvard: Harvard University Press. Redwood, John (1995) ‘The Flame that Will not Die’, The Guardian, 16 January. —— (2005) ‘New Right’, in Kevin Hickson (ed.), The Political Thought of the Conservative Party since 1945, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 202–8. Rentoul, John (1987) The Rich Get Richer: The Growth of Inequality in Britain in the 1980s, Unwin. Riddell, Peter (1989) The Thatcher Decade: How Britain Has Changed During the 1980s, Basil Blackwell. Ridley, Jane (1987) ‘The Unionist Social Reform Committee, 1911–14: wets before the deluge’, Historical Journal, 30: 391–413. Ridley, Nicholas (1991) My Style of Government, Hutchinson. Rolleston, Sir John (1908) ‘The financial results of Free Trade’ in Lord Malmesbury (ed.), Unionist Policy: Studies in Unionist Policy, Francis Griffiths, pp. 377–400. Rose, Richard and Davies, Phillip, L. (1994) Inheritance in Pubic Policy: Change Without Choice in Britain, Yale University Press. Roth, Andrew (1984) Parliamentary Profiles, Parliamentary Profiles Services. Rubinstein, W. D. (1986) Wealth and Inequality in Britain, Faber. Runciman, Walter (1972) Relative Deprivation and Social Justice: A Study of Attitudes to Socio-economic Inequality in Twentieth-century England, Pelican Books. Russel, Trevor (1978) The Tory Party: Its Policies, Divisions and Future, Harmondsworth: Penguin. St John Stevas, Norman (1984) The Two Cities, Faber. St Loe Stachey, John (1908) Problems and Perils of Socialism: Letters to a Working Man, Macmillan. Sartori, Giovanni (1965) Democratic Theory, New York: Praeger. Saville, John (1973) ‘The ideology of Labourism’, in Robert Benewick, R. N. Berki and Bhikhu Parekh (eds), Knowledge and Belief in Politics, Allen & Unwin, pp. 213–26. Schumpeter, Joseph (1943) Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, George Allen & Unwin.



Bibliography

265

Scruton, Roger (1984) The Meaning of Conservatism, 2nd edn, Macmillan. —— (2001) The Meaning of Conservatism, 3rd edn, Palgrave. Seawright, David (2005) ‘One nation’, in Kevin Hickson (ed.), The Political Thought of the Conservative Party since 1945, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 69–90. —— (2010) The British Conservative Party and One Nation Politics, Continuum. Sefton, Tom (2005) ‘Give and take: public attitudes to redistribution’, in Alison Park, John Curtice, Katarina Thomson et al. (eds) British Social Attitudes: The 22nd Report, Sage/National Centre for Social Research, pp. 1–32. Sefton, Tom (2009) ‘Moving in the right direction? Public attitudes to poverty, inequality and redistribution’, in John Hills, Tom Sefton and Kitty Stewart (eds), Towards a More Equal Society? Poverty, Inequality and Policy since 1997, Bristol: Policy Press, pp. 223–44. Seldon, Anthony (1981) Churchill’s Indian Summer, Hodder & Stoughton. —— (1989) ‘The Churchill administration, 1951–1955’ in Peter Hennessy and Anthony Seldon (eds), Ruling Performance: British Governments from Attlee to Thatcher, Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 63–97. —— (1997) Major: A Political Life, Weidenfeld & Nicolson. Sewill, Brendon (1975) ‘A view from the inside: in place of strikes’, in Ralph Harris and Brendon Sewill, British Economic Policy 1970–74: Two Views, Institute of Economic Affairs, pp. 29–64. Sherman, Alfred (2005) Paradoxes of Power: Reflections on the Thatcher Interlude (ed. Mark Garnett), Exeter: Imprint Academic. Smith, Adam (1986) The Wealth of Nations, Harmondsworth: Penguin Classics (originally published in 1776). Smith, Frederick Edwin (1913) ‘State Toryism and social reform’, in Frederick Edwin Smith (ed.), Unionist Policy and Other Essays, Williams & Norgate. Smith, Iain Duncan/Social Justice Policy Group (2006) Breakdown Britain: Interim Report on the State of the Nation. —— (2007) Breakthrough Britain: Ending the Costs of Social Breakdown. Smith, Paul (1967) Disraelian Conservatism and Social Reform, Routledge & Kegan Paul. —— (1972) Lord Salisbury on Politics: A Selection from his Articles in the Quarterly Review, 1860–1883, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Social Justice Policy Group (2006) Breakdown Britain: Interim Report on the State of the Nation, Centre for Social Justice. —— (2007) Breakthrough Britain – Ending the Costs of Social Breakdown: Overview and Policy Recommendations to the Conservative Party, Centre for Social Justice. Spencer, Herbert (1884) The Man versus the State, Williams & Norgate. Stacey, Margaret (1960) Tradition and Change, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Steel-Maitland, Arthur (1908) ‘Labour’, in Lord Malmesbury (ed.), Unionist Policy: Studies in Unionist Policy, Francis Griffiths, pp. 335–76. Stelling, David (1943) Why I am a Conservative, Conservative Central Office. Stone, Diane (1996) ‘From the margins of politics: the influence of think tanks in Britain’, West European Politics, 19/4: 677–92. Streeter, Gary (2002) ‘Conservatives must change in order to help the vulnerable’, in Gary Streeter (ed.), There is Such a Thing as Society: Twelve Principles of Compassionate Conservatism, Politico’s, pp. 1–10. Taylor, Andrew (1994) ‘The Conservative Party and the trade unions since 1900’, in Anthony Seldon and Stuart Ball (eds), Conservative Century: The Conservative Party since 1900, Oxford University Press, pp. 499–543. Taylor, Ian (2003) Corporate Social Responsibility: Should Business be Socially Aware?, Tory Reform Group.

266

British Conservatism

Taylor, Ian (2000) The TUC: From the General Strike to New Unonism, Palgrave. Taylor-Gooby, Peter and Martin, Rose (2008) ‘Trends in sympathy for the poor’, in Alison Park, John Curtice, Katarina Thomson, Miranda Phillips, Mark Johnson and Elixabeth Clery (eds), British Social Attitudes: The 24th Report, Sage/National Centre for Social Research. Tebbit, Norman (1988) Upwardly Mobile, Weidenfeld & Nicolson. —— (1991) Unfinished Business, Weidenfeld & Nicolson. Thatcher, Margaret (1993) The Downing Street Years, HarperCollins. —— (1995) The Path to Power, HarperCollins. —— (1996) ‘Liberty and limited government’, Keith Joseph Memorial Lecture, available online at www.margaretthatcher.org/speeches/displaydocument.asp?docid=108353. Thomas, David (1884) ‘The new Tories’, New Society, 2 February: 159–61. Thompson, E. P. (1980) Writing by Candlelight, Merlin. Thornton, Stephen (2009) Richard Crossman and the Welfare State, I.B.Tauris. Tory Reform Committee (1943) Forward – By the Right, Tory Reform Committee. —— (1945) Tools for the Next Job, Tory Reform Committee. Viereck, Peter (1950) Conservatism Revisited: The Revolt Against Revolt, John Lehmann. Vincent, Andrew (1992) Modern Political Ideologies, Oxford: Blackwell. Walker, Alan (1982) Public Expenditure and Social Policy, Heinemann. Walker, Peter (1977) The Ascent of Britain, Sidgwick & Jackson. Waller, Robert (1994) ‘Conservative electoral support and social class’, in Anthony Seldon and Stuart Ball (eds), Conservative Century: The Conservative Party Since 1900, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 579–610. Walsh, Robert (2000) ‘The One Nation Group: a Tory approach to backbench politics and organization, 1950–55’, Twentieth Century British History, 11/2: 183–214. Westergaard, John and Resler, Henrietta (1975) Class in a Capitalist Society: A Study of Contemporary Britain, Penguin. Wheatcroft, Geoffrey (2005) The Strange Death of Tory England, Penguin/Allen Lane. White, R. J. (1950) The Conservative Tradition, Nicholas Kaye. Willetts, David (1992) Modern Conservatism, Harmondsworth: Penguin. —— (1994) Civic Conservatism, Social Market Foundation. —— (2002) ‘The new contours of British politics’, in Gary Streeter (ed.), There is Such a Thing as Society: Twelve Principles of Compassionate Conservatism, Politico’s, pp. 52–9. Willetts, David and Gray, John (1997) Is Conservatism Dead?, Profile Books. Williams, Herbert G. (1930) Why I am not a Socialist, The Anti-Socialist and Anti- Communist Union. Williamson, Philip and Baldwin, Edward (2004) Baldwin Papers: A Conservative Statesman, 1908–1947, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Willmott, Peter and Young, Michael (1960) Family and Class in a London Suburb, Routledge. Wood, John B. (ed.) (1965) A Nation Not Afraid – The Thinking of Enoch Powell, B. T. Batsford. Worsthorne, Peregrine (1978) ‘Too much freedom’, in Maurice Cowling (ed.), Conservative Essays, Cassell, pp. 141–54. —— (2004) In Defence of Aristocracy, HarperCollins. Young, G. M. (1952) Stanley Baldwin, Rupert Hart-Davis. Young, Hugo (1990) One of Us, Pan Books. Young, Hugo and Sloman, Anne (1986) The Thatcher Phenomenon, BBC Books.

Index

‘absolute poverty’ 97, 98, 143, 144, 182, 183, 239, 245 Adam Smith Institute 127 Addison, Paul 74 Allison, Lincoln 7, 8, 55 Alport, Cuthbert ‘Cub’ 76, 78, 81, 83 Althusser, Louis 200 Amery, Leo 16, 78 Anderson, Perry 218 aristocracy, decline of 169 Arnold, Matthew 169 Artisans Dwelling Act (1875) 56 Ashley, W. J. see Hills, J. W., Ashley, W. J. and Woods, M. Assisted Places Scheme 43 Atkinson, A. B. 162 Attlee, Clement 83, 84, 85, 86, 136 Aughey, Arthur 2, 7 ‘Back to Basics’ 107, 166 Baldwin, Edward 66 Baldwin, Stanley 32, 44, 60, 61, 65, 66, 67 Bale, Tim 171, 172 Balfour, Arthur 60 Balfour, Lord 116, 118, 119 Bamfield, Louise 231, 232 Barber, Anthony 93 Barnes, John 14, 16 Bechhofer, Frank 221 Benn, Ernest 120–1, 124 Benn, Tony 253n Bennett, R. J. 1 Bennett, Sir Peter 79 Bentinck, Lord Henry 61, 63, 64–5

Berry, Christopher 6, 10, 14 Beveridge Report 73, 81, 98 Beveridge, Sir William 73 Bevin, Ernest 68 Biddiss, Michael 44, 45 Birch, Nigel 99 Blair, Tony 43, 171, 177, 190, 194 Blake, Robert, (later Lord) 40, 57 Blond, Phillip 185–9, 196 Bonar Law, Andrew 60 Booth, Charles 62 Boothby, Robert, Macmillan, Harold, Loder, John de V. and Stanley, Oliver Industry and the State: A Conservative View 8, 33, 69 ‘bourgeois guilt’ 45, 46, 130, 146 bourgeois values 212–17 Boyd-Carpenter, John 74, 79, 80 Boyson, Rhodes 132 Braine, Bernard 74 Breakdown Britain (report 2006) 178–9 Breakthrough Britain (report 2007) 179–82 British Leyland 156 Brittan, Samuel 120 ‘Broken Britain’ 178, 184, 194, 195, 247 Bromley, Catherine 232 Brown, Gordon 190 Bryant, Arthur 10, 11, 31, 39, 211, 212 Built to Last (Conservative Party, 2006) 183 Burke, Edmund 13, 15, 27, 31, 36 Butler, R. A. (Rab) (later Lord) 75, 79, 80, 81, 84, 99

268

British Conservatism

Cameron, David: ‘compassionate Conservatism’ 174; Disraelian tradition 183; election to leadership 4, 165, 194, 195; modernisation of party 182–4, 247; reduction in public expenditure 190; rejection of Thatcherism 165, 183, 184, 195 Campaign Guide (Conservative Party, 1914) 63 Campbell, Beatrix 252n Capital (employers) 25, 57, 69, 88, 156 capitalism: and individualism 54; industrial unrest 65, 69; and inequality 3, 24, 35, 53, 109; and living standards 23; and Marxism 24; mobility of 25; and personal freedom 20, 22; rejection by TUC 68; as response to economic crisis 136; social mobility 170 see also laissez faire capitalism Carr, Robert 81, 94 Cazalet-Keir, Thelma 73 Cecil, Lord Hugh 26, 32 Central Economic Council 70, 89 Centre for Policy Studies 127 Centre for Social Justice 178, 195 Centre Forward group 103 centrism, Conservative 3, 173, 195 Chamberlain, Austen 32 Chamberlain, Joseph 59, 60 Child Benefit 99 Christianity and inequality 11–14 Church of England 12 Churchill, Lord Randolph 58, 59, 60 Churchill, Winston 79, 84 Citrine, Walter, General Secretary, TUC 68 ‘civic Conservatism’ 165–96: Cameron 165, 178, 183–5; Green 176–7; ideological tensions 166–73; Letwin 177; origin 4, 165–6; in recession 189–94; reduction of poverty 190; Smith 177–8; and ‘third sector’ 247; David Willetts 174–6 Civic Conservatism (Willetts) 175 Clarke, Kenneth 153 ‘class war’ 74, 78 coal mining 66, 104, 107, 156 Cockett, Richard 127 Coleraine, Lord 128, 129, 135 collective bargaining 209

collectivism 24, 74, 112, 122, 213 Combination Acts, repeal of (1824–26) 77 communism 37, 39, 44, 88, 89, 122 Community Charge (Poll Tax) 192 ‘compassionate Conservatism’ 172, 173, 174, 184, 194, 195 Condition of the Working Class in England , The (Engels) 207 Coningsby (Disraeli) 32, 54, 72 Conservative Party: changing membership 127–37; empiricism 7, 18, 31–40; General Election victory 1951 85; General Election victory 1959 96; General Election victory 1970 92, 126; General Election victory 1979 147, 209; industrial policy 79–81; internal debates 47; modernisation 166, 173–4, 182, 193; negativism 10; as non-ideological 85; party of capitalism 125; ‘progressive’ element 81; welfare state 95–101; and working class 197–200 Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act (1875) 56, 57 consumerism 170, 175 Cowling, Maurice 1, 4, 20 Craig, F. W. S. 90, 123 Criddle, Byron 131 Crisp, Dorothy 116, 117, 252n Critchley, Julian 106, 131 Crosland, Anthony 245 Curtice, John 213 ‘cycle of deprivation’ 139 Darwin, Charles 113, 114 Darwinism, Social 116, 117 Davies, Phillip L. 99 Decline and Fall of the Middle Class and How it Can Fight Back, The (Hutber) 222 democracy, establishment of 15–18 ‘democratic elitism’ 17 Demos (think tank) 185 denationalisation 85, 187 Denham, Andrew 127, 195 ‘deserving poor’ 144, 148, 158 Dicey, Edward 119 Disraeli, Benjamin: One Nation Conservatism 16, 52–9, 80;

Index paternalism 58, 72; social reform 56–7, 62, 64, 78, 103 Dorey, Peter 36, 151, 154, 172 Douglas-Home, Alec 99 Dykes, Hugh 167 Earnings Related Supplement 159, 253n Eccles, David 79, 80 Eccleshall, Robert: on Bentinck 63, 64; capitalism 72; Darwin 113; Housewives League 252n; inequality 3, 8; social reforms 59, 72, 74 economic downturn, 1970s 134, 136 economic downturn, 2008 190, 191, 193, 194, 248 Eden, Anthony 76, 88 education: Assisted Places Scheme 43; demand for cuts, 1958 99; expenditure increase, 1980s 158; freedom 19; grammar schools 43; ‘marketisation’ 107 Education Act (1876) 56 Edwardes, Michael 156 egalitarianism 1, 44–7, 111, 138, 145 elitism 1, 2 Elliott, Brian 220, 221, 222, 223, 224 empiricism 7, 18, 31–40 Employers and Workmen Act (1875) 56, 57 employment: full 86, 87; in manufacturing industry 157; new jobs as part-time/poorly paid 157, 160, 193; rights 64, 107 see also unemployment Engels, Frederick 207–8 equality 11, 18, 19, 39 European Union 166, 251n Euroscepticism 107, 172 Fabian Society 78 Factory Act (1874) 56 Factory Inspectorate 155 fascism, European 71, 72 Fawcett, Helen 98, 99 Federation of British Industry (FBI) 68 feudalism 54, 55, 89 floating voters 76 Fort, Richard 81 franchise, extension of C19 15–16, 56, 112, 119–20

269

free collective bargaining 152 Free Economy and the Strong State, The (Gamble) 252n free market economy: competition leading to lower prices 251n; Conservative philosophy 9, 22, 111, 113; effect on incomes 26–31; as morally neutral 30, 31; and Powell 124; as rewarding talent 27 Friedman, Milton 18, 24, 126 Gallie, Duncan 202–5 Gamble, Andrew 57, 252n Garnett, Mark: on Heath 92, 93; The Industrial Charter 79; Labour legislation 123; on Major 107; One Nation Group 81, 83, 84; Thatcher reforms 104; think tanks 127; on Willetts 174 Garvin, J. 119 General Election (2010) 193, 196, 248 General Strike (1926) 65, 66, 67, 68, 77 Gilder, George 140 Gilmour, Ian: Conservatism as nonideological 36; dismissal by Thatcher 105; on Disraeli 56, 60; effects of social reform 31; empiricism 34, 39; equality and reduction in freedom 20, 41; equality of opportunity 43; on Heath 92, 93; The Industrial Charter 79; Labour legislation consolidated 123; on Major 107; on Marxism 37, 38; ‘middle way’ 90; One Nation Conservatism 81, 244, 249; paternalism 49; pay differentials 39; progressive taxation 95; ‘relative poverty’ 246; on Thatcherism 101, 104; ‘third sector’ 176; wealth creation 24; wealth redistribution 24, 25; welfare state 50 Gourvish, Terry 86 grammar schools 43 Gray, John 168 ‘Great Depression’ 71, 128 Green, Damian 176, 247 Green, David 138 Green, E. H. H. 60, 168, 169, 221 Greenleaf, W. H. 55, 74, 122 Grunwick dispute (1976–77) 223

270

British Conservatism

Hague, William 165, 171, 172 Hailsham, Lord 18, 30 Halcrow, Morrison 139 Hanson, Charles 151 Harrington, M. 79 Harris, Michael 127 Harris, Ralph 123 Hayek, Friedrich 30, 31, 92, 118, 126, 145, 251n Hayes, John 6 Hearnshaw, F. J. C. 11, 12, 13, 33, 117, 119 Heath, Anthony 213 Heath, Edward: assessment of Major 106; and capitalism 132; incomes policies 94; industrial relations 91; leadership challenge 117; One Nation Conservatism 81, 101, 102; reversion to neo-corporatism 92, 93; ‘Selsdon programme’ 92, 93, 126; welfare expenditure increase 100 Heathcoat-Amery, Derrick 79 Heffernan, Richard 127 Heseltine, Michael 105 Hewins, William 61 Hickson, Kevin: definitions of poverty 245; and Heath 93; inequality 1, 2, 47, 183; One Nation Conservatism 81, 83; on Willetts 174 hierarchy, societal 14–18 Hill, Michael 84, 98, 100 Hills, J. W., Ashley W. J. and Woods, M. Industrial Unrest: A Practical Solution 63 Hills, John 162 Hinchingbrooke, Lord 73, 74 Hobsbawn, Eric 208 Hoffman, John 74 Hogg, Quintin 74, 76, 90 Hoover, Kenneth 137, 144 Horton, Tim 231, 232 Housewives League 252n Housing Benefit 159–60 housing, local authority 158 How Britain Votes (Heath, Jowell and Curtice) 213 Howard, Anthony 79 Howard, Michael 165, 173 Howarth, Alan 167 Howe, Geoffrey 148

human nature and inequality 6–11, 38, 240 Hume, David 11, 19, 20 Hurd, Douglas 93, 105, 106, 168 Hutber, Patrick 222–3, 225 Hutchinson, James 79 ideological uncertainty, 1990s 166–73 Ideologies of Conservatism (Green) 168 IEA (Institute of Economic Affairs) 123, 125, 127 income: distribution of 108T, 205; in free market economy 26–31, 149–57; policies 91–4, 209 Income Support (Supplementary Benefit) 159 individualism: as Conservative philosophy 8, 69, 106, 130, 168, 240; and poverty 112, 115; as outdated 176 Individualist Movement 120 industrial action 66, 88, 151 Industrial Charter, The (Conservative Party, 1947) 79–81, 83, 84, 88, 122 industrial partnerships 69, 70, 88–9, 97 Industrial Relations Act (1971) 92 industrialization 52, 56, 58, 64 Industry and the State (Boothby, Macmillan, Loder and Stanley) 33, 69, 70 inequality: acceptance of 1, 4, 197–200; centrality to Conservatism 2, 239; ‘frames of reference’ 210–12; importance of reducing 205T, 206T; increase in 104, 157–63; lower middle class acceptance 219–26; methods of reducing 206T; as ‘natural’ 5, 10–11, 14–18, 35, 112, 152; negative attitudes towards poor 226–35; neo-Liberal philosophy 137–47; pay differentials 206–10; reinforced by Conservative empiricism 35; slight reduction due to One Nation Conservatism 107; and social unrest 101, 102; theological basis 11–14, 27; and trade unions 218–19; types of 204T; working class acceptance 200–6, 212–17 inflation 30, 87, 88, 91, 93, 94, 96 inheritance tax 192 Institute of Economic Affairs see IEA ‘intermediate institutions’ see ‘third sector’

Index iron and steel industry 85 Irvin, George 211 James, Simon 127 Jessop, Bob 202 Jobseekers’ Allowance see Unemployment Benefit Jones, Harriet 96, 97 Joseph, Keith: anti-egalitarianism 138, 139; ‘debilitating compassion’ 130; empiricism 35, 38; importance of wealth creation 26; inequality as ‘natural’ 8, 11, 21, 43; ‘ratchet effect’ 102, 135, 136; rejection of income regulation 28; Social Darwinism 117; social welfare 24; taxation 24; wealth creation 144 Jowell, Roger 213 Kavanagh, Dennis 93, 133, 147 Keynes, John Maynard 135 Keynesian economics 74, 79, 84, 86 Kilmuir, Lord 85, 86 King, Anthony 120, 134 King, Roger 1, 222 Kopsch, Hartmut 56 Labour (employees) 25, 69, 88, 156 Labour Party: egalitarianism 82, 102, 109, 110; General Election victory 1945 75, 77, 78; General Election victory 1950 81; General Election victory 1964 128; General Election victory 1966 128; General Election victory 1997 171; General Election victory 2001 177; General Election victory 2005 4; as middle class 133; origin 61, 112; pursuit of equality 135, 209, 244–5; reform of party 112, 166, 200; unions 218; welfare state 95–7 ‘labourism’ 200, 218, 236 laissez-faire capitalism: and Darwinism 114; Disraeli 57, 58; Eden 76; industrial partnerships 68; opposition to social reform 63; rejection by Macmillan 69, 70, 71, 90; rejection of state intervention 62; and tariff reform 59; Tory Reform Group 74 Lawson, Nigel 137, 148 Leach, Robert 3, 11, 217

271

Letwin, Oliver 35, 39, 177, 184–5, 189 Letwin, Shirley 127, 156, 222 Liberalism 51, 59, 60, 61, 63, 112 liberty 18–22, 27, 40, 185 ‘Liberty and Limited Government’ (Thatcher lecture) 134 Lilley, Peter 170 Lindsay, T. F. 79 Lloyd George, David 61, 63 Lloyd, Selwyn 89, 91 localism 177, 188, 191, 192, 193, 196 Lockwood, David 211 Loder, John De V. see Boothby, Robert, Macmillan, Harold, Loder, John De V. and Stanley, Robert Loftus, Pierse 62 Lollards, the (later the Macleod Group) 103 Longden, Gilbert 81 Lovell, John 68 Lowe, Rodney 98, 99 Lyttelton, Oliver 79 MacGregor, Ian 156 Mackenzie, Robert 13, 54, 198, 201–2, 210, 217 Macleod, Iain 81, 84, 106 Macleod Group 103 Macmillan, Harold: capitalism 23; and ‘Great Depression’ 87; individualism 8; The Industrial Charter 80; industrial partnership 68, 69, 89; industrial policy committee 79; ‘middle way’ 70, 71, 72, 85, 90; One Nation Conservatism 66, 72, 82, 221, 244; as outdated 128; and progressives 81 see also Middle Way, The Maine, Sir Henry 16 Major, John: continuation of Thatcherism 107, 165, 166; defections from party 167; election to leadership 4, 106; increase in inequality 167; neoliberalism 4; reduction in power of unions 151 Mallock, W. H. 7, 14, 15, 23, 41 Man versus the State, The (Spencer) 113, 121 ‘Manchester School’ 252n ‘market forces’ 71, 136 Marsh, David 151

272

British Conservatism

Martin, Rose 231, 233 Marx, Karl 24, 55, 176, 200, 218, 249 Marxism 14, 36–8, 56, 72 Mason, John W. 114 Maude, Angus 28, 81 Maxwell-Fyfe, David 79 May, Theresa 192 McCrone, David 220 McIlroy, John 151 Meaning of Conservatism, The (Scruton) 170 meritocracy 12, 41, 42, 128, 133, 146, 169 Meyer, Sir Anthony 106 ‘middle way’ 70–3, 75, 79, 90, 119, 245 Middle Way, The (Macmillan) 71, 79, 90, 175, 244 miners’ strike (1984–85) 104 minimum wage 61, 64 Minogue, Kenneth 18 Modern Conservatism (Willetts) 175 Molestation of Workmen Act (1859) 77 Molson, Hugh 73, 75 Mond, Sir Alfred 67, 68 Mond-Turner talks (1927–1933) 67–8 monetarism 158 Moore, John 152 Morris-Jones, W. H. 17 Muller, Christopher 127 Murdoch, Rupert 156 National Confederation of Employers’ Organisations 68 National Economic Council 68 National Economic Development Council (NEDC) 89, 91 National Health Service see NHS National Industrial Council 68 National Insurance 61, 64 nationalisation 85, 86, 93, 123 NEDC see National Economic Development Council ‘negative liberty’ 20, 22 neo-corporatism 90, 91, 221 neo-liberalism 111–64; ‘absolute poverty’ 97, 144, 163; anti-egalitarianism 3, 161; changing background of Conservative MPs 127–37; dominance 101, 147; increasing inequality 137–47, 161–3, 188;

individualism 52; and New Right 102–3; origins 112–22; post World War II 122–6; rejection of state intervention 21, 118, 163; revival, 1970s 126–7; self-interest as beneficial to society 46; supply and demand163; tax cuts 147–9; welfare state100, 117–18, 157–61, 253n New Labour: bureaucracy 190; electoral success 195; and eradication of poverty 173; increase in inequality 176, 188, 191; origins 112; public attitude towards poverty 229; state intervention 166, 184; ‘top-down’ approach 177 New Right 11, 134, 168 Newman, Stephen 23 NHS (National Health Service) 87, 98, 107, 158 Nicholson, Emma 167 Nordlinger, Eric 198, 201, 202 Northam, Reginald 12, 13 Norton, Philip 2, 3, 7, 101 Nott, John 134 ‘nudge economics’ 185, 253n Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness (Thaler and Sunstein) 253n Nugent, Neill 1 Oakeshott, Michael 6, 34 One Nation (One Nation Group) 81, 82, 83 One Nation Conservatives 49–110; advocacy, early C20 59–84; and capitalism 84, 244; and coalition government 72, 73; commitment to full employment 86, 87; decline 101–7, 127; fear of revolution 51; industrial partnership 67, 69, 75; and inequality 49–52; and Major 106–7, 166; mid C20 84–95; as non-ideological 102; origins 16, 52–9; partial acceptance of ideas of New Right 103–4; in practice 84–95; prevalence in parliamentary party 111, 123; ‘relative poverty’ 97, 98, 163; revisionism 75–7; social policy 16, 50, 75, 82, 83, 87, 95–101; and trade unions 66; ‘wets’ 3 opportunity, equality of 18, 40–3, 235T

Index Origin of Species, The (Darwin)113 Osborne, George 190 O’Sullivan, Noel 11 Parkin, Frank 202, 212–13, 215, 217 Parkinson, Cecil 136 Parry, Geraint 42 paternalism: decline 127–31; and evolution 113, 114; One Nation Conservatives 49, 127–8; as response to threat of social unrest 16, 55, 216; Steel-Maitland 60; USRC (Unionist Social Reform Committee) 62 Patten, Chris 7, 24, 49 pay differentials 76, 138, 139, 149–57, 199, 203T, 206–10, 219 Peele, Gillian 39 pensions, old age 158 People, Jobs and Opportunity (White Paper, 1992) 153 performance-related pay 29, 152–4 Perkin, Harold 208 petit-bourgeoisie 133–4, 198–9, 219–26, 236 Petit Bourgeoisie, The (Bechhofer and Elliott) 253n Pierson, Paul 98 Pitt, Douglas 152 Plant, Raymond 137, 144 political stability 3, 5, 94, 127 ‘politics of envy’ 25, 44, 145 Poll Tax see Community Charge Portillo, Michael 170 ‘positive liberty’ 20 Poulantzas, Nicos 221 poverty: ‘civic Conservatism’ as response 4; ‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’ poor 140–2; escape via employment 182; as failure of ruling class 53; incomes policies 95; as inevitable 27, 118, 229; negative attitudes towards the poor 112, 199, 226–35; and reduction in inequality 107, 229T Powell, Enoch 81, 99, 124–5, 126, 135 privatisation 107, 125, 151, 152 Progress Trust, The 122 ‘Progressive Conservatism’ 73, 122, 185 property, private ownership 53, 54, 58, 109, 175, 192 ‘protectionists’ see Tariff Reform

273

Public Health Act (1875) 56 public sector: pay restraint 92, 107, 147, 150, 151, 196; reduction in size 148; trade unions 152 Pym, Francis 103, 105 Quinton, Anthony 18, 34, 251n ‘Radical -Socialism’ 62 ‘Radicalism’ 26, 31 railways 107 Raison, Timothy 7 Ramsden, John 79, 80 ‘ratchet effect’ 102, 135, 136 Rawls, John 23, 24 Raynor, John 134, 222 Rebirth of Conservatism, The (Crisp) 116 Reconstruction: A Plea for a National Policy (Macmillan) 70 ‘Red Toryism’ 185, 196 redistribution of wealth 22–6; and creation of wealth 24, 82; decline in popularity 231, 233, 234; effect on national economy 116; effect on society 115–16; as means of eradication of poverty 109T, 143; and middle class 223; and skilled working class 207; and taxation 25, 144, 241 Referendum Party 171 Reform Act (1867) 55 Reform Act (1884) 16 ‘relative poverty’ 97–8, 109, 143, 182, 246 Resler, Henrietta 200, 211, 218 ResPublica (think tank) 185 revolution, fear of 16, 55, 56, 109, 200 Riddell, Peter 159, 161 Ridley, Jane 251n Ridley, Nicholas 136, 156 Right Approach, The (Conservative Party) 23, 41 Right Road for Britain, The (Conservative Party) 123 Roberts, B. C. 68 Roberts, Margaret (later Thatcher) 33, 34 Robson-Brown, Sir William 88 Rodgers, John 81 Rolleston, Sir John 251n Rose, Richard 99 Roth, Andrew 132

274

British Conservatism

Rowntree, Seebohm 62 Runciman, Walter 210–11 Russel, Trevor 58, 92, 100, 101 Salisbury, Fourth Marquess of 60, 66, 67, 120 Salisbury, Third Marquess of 25, 39 Salverda, W. 162 Save England (Smithers) 122 Schumpeter, Joseph 16, 17 Scruton, Roger 2, 9, 12, 170, 212 Seawright, David 57, 81 Sefton, Tom 230, 233 Seldon, Anthony 84, 106 Seldon, Arthur 123 ‘Selsdon programme’ 92, 93, 126, 127, 133 Sewill, Brendan 87 Shepherd, Robert 84 Sherman, Alfred 127 Silver, Robert 13, 54, 198, 201–2, 210, 217 single parents 142, 231, 253n ‘sink estates’ 230 Smith, Adam 9, 22, 46, 73, 95 Smith, F. E. 39, 60, 62, 63 Smith, Iain Duncan 165, 172, 173, 177, 178, 195 Smith, Paul 56 ‘social authoritarianism’ 140–1, 142, 252n, 253n social cohesion 3, 5, 16, 106, 124, 169 Social Inequality and Class Radicalism in France and Britain (Gallie) 202–6 Social Insurance and Allied Services (1942) (Beveridge report) 73 ‘social justice’ 29, 30, 31 social policy 95–101 socialism: altruism 9; as ideology 32, 36, 37; importance of equality 19; and poverty 24; redistribution of wealth 20; as seen to have failed 135; state intervention 62; and TUC 68 Soviet Union 39, 71, 243, 253n Spencer, Herbert 113–15, 118, 120, 135 ‘Spencerism’ 116 Spirit of Conservatism, The (Bryant) 211, 212 St John-Stevas, Norman 104 Stacey, Margaret 215

Stanley, Oliver see Boothby, Robert, Macmillan, Harold, Loder, John De V. and Stanley, Oliver state intervention 58, 115, 119, 121, 124, 135 steel industry 85, 156 Steel-Maitland, Arthur 60, 66, 67 Stone, Diane 127 Summers, Sir Spencer 122 Sumption, Jonathan: empiricism 35, 38; equality of opportunity 43; importance of wealth creation 24, 26, 144; inequality as ‘natural’ 8, 11, 21; and liberty 22 Sunstein, Cass R. 253n Supplementary Benefit see Income Support supply and demand, laws of 22, 27, 69 Sybil – or The Two Nations (Disraeli) 53, 80 Syndicalism 56 Tapsell, Peter 93, 94 Tariff Reform 59, 60, 251n tax avoidance, corporate 189 taxation: Community Charge (Poll Tax) 192; corporation tax 25, 192; cuts for high earners161–2; death duties 82; direct 100, 147–9; effect on wealth creation 21, 24, 118; indirect 161–2; inheritance tax 192; progressive 95, 146, 149 Taylor, Andrew 79 Taylor-Gooby, Peter 231, 233 Tebbit, Norman 41, 42, 103, 252n Temple-Morris, Peter 167 Thaler, Richard H. 253n Thatcher, Margaret: Community Charge (Poll Tax) 192; control of public sector pay 150–2; empiricism 33, 34; free collective bargaining 152; increasing inequality 158, 161–2; modest background 41, 42, 134, 147; neo-liberalism 117, 147; reduction in power of unions 151, 154, 155; reforms of social security 158; regressive taxation 149; rejection of ‘society’ as concept 8; social authoritarianism 252n; Tory party as middle class 131

Index Thatcherism 101, 168, 174 ‘third sector’ (‘intermediate institutions’) 82, 176, 182, 189, 191, 196 Thompson, David 152 Thompson, E. P. 224 Thorneycroft, Peter 99 Thoughts and Details on Scarcity (Burke) 27 Ragged Trousered Philanthropists, The (Tressell) 198 ‘Tory Democracy’ 63, 64, 112 Tory Democracy (Bentinck) 64 Tory Reform Committee 73, 74, 75, 122 Tory Reform Group 103 totalitarianism 8, 37, 38, 40, 71, 121, 243 trade unions: annual pay awards 87, 219; assurance of pay differentials 207; closed shop 154; and Conservative Party 78, 104; criticism for pay demands 162; Grunwick dispute 223; and inequality 218–9; patriotism WWII 77; weakening of power 104, 107, 151, 161 Trades Union Congress (TUC) 68 Tressell, Robert 198 Tribune (journal) 46 ‘trickle down’ effect 45, 145, 164, 174, 187 TUC see Trades Union Congress Turner, Ben 67, 68 UKIP (United Kingdom Independence Party) 171 ‘underclass’ 141 ‘undeserving poor’ 141, 163, 228, 231 unemployment: as causing instability 86, 87; increase in 88, 126, 158; reduced power of unions 94, 161; ‘voluntarily unemployed’ 141 Unemployment Benefit (Jobseekers’ Allowance) 159 Unionist Social Reform Committee (USRC) 60–4, 251n

275

Upwardly Mobile (Tebbit) 41 urban riots (1981) 102 Value Added Tax (VAT) 149, 161, 192, 193 ‘Victorian values’ 158, 187 Viereck, Peter 13 Vincent, Andrew 14, 51 Wage Boards 60 Wages Councils 154, 155 Walker, Peter 23 Wall Street Crash (1929) 71 Walsh, Robert 81, 83 wealth creation 22–6, 82, 138, 139, 164 Wealth of Nations, The (Smith) 22 welfare state: affordability 99; cutbacks under Thatcher and Major 84, 104, 158; One Nation acceptance 84; ‘path dependency’ 98; public belief that fraud is widespread 231; reform157–61; residual poverty 137, 139; ‘safety net’ 123, 144; as undermining work ethic 121, 132 Westergaard, John 200, 211, 218 ‘wets’ (Conservative) 3, 101 ‘Whig-Individualism’ 62 White, R. J. 39 Willetts, David 1, 7, 21, 24, 174–6, 195 Wilson, Harold 92, 128 Woods, M. see Hills, J.W., Ashley, W. J. and Woods, M. Woodward, Shaun 167 working class: acceptance of inequality 200–6; and Conservative Party 197–8, 200–2, 210T, 215, 236; deference 201–6, 223, 249; extension of franchise 56, 112, 119–20; industrial workers 58, 213; lack of interest in socialist policies 4, 236; skilled workers 76, 77 World War I 63, 128 World War II 72, 121, 128, 186 Worsthorne, Peregrine 2, 169–70