Beliefs and Concepts

Beliefs and Concepts: Comments on Brian Loar, "Must Beliefs Be Sentences?" Gilbert Harman PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, Vol. 1982, Volume Two: Symposia and Invited Papers. (1982), pp. 654-661. Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0270-8647%281982%291982%3C654%3ABACCOB%3E2.0.CO%3B2-9 PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association is currently published by The University of Chicago Press.

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/about/terms.html. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at http://www.jstor.org/journals/ucpress.html. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission.

JSTOR is an independent not-for-profit organization dedicated to and preserving a digital archive of scholarly journals. For more information regarding JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

http://www.jstor.org Sat May 12 00:32:27 2007

G i l b e r t Harman Princeton University

I t is i m p o r t a n t n o t t o o v e r l o o k t h e r o l e o f c o n c e p t s i n thought. B e l i e f s , d e s i r e s , and o t h e r a t t i t u d e s i n v o l v e t h e u s e of c o n c e p t s . Your b e l i e f t h a t you b a t h e i n w a t e r i n v o l v e s c o n c e p t s of s e l f , w a t e r , and b a t h i n g . These c o n c e p t s a r e a r t i c u l a t e d i n a c e r t a i n way i n y o u r be1 i e f . They would o c c u r i n a d i f f e r e n t way i n t h e m o r e s u r p r i s i n g b e l i e f t h a t w a t e r b a t h e s i n you! These two p o s s i b l e b e l i e f s i n v o l v e t h e s a m e c o n c e p t s b u t i n d i f f e r e n t ways, j u s t a s t w o s e n t e n c e s m i g h t make u s e of t h e same w o r d s i n d i f f e r e n t orders. C o n c e p t s a r e t o b e l i e f s and o t h e r a t t i t u d e s a s words a r e t o s e n t e n c e s . I n t h i s r e s p e c t , a s y s t e m of c o n c e p t s and t h e i r p o s s i b l e c o m b i n a t i o n s a r e l i k e a l a n g u a g e of t h a c r g h t . I t is s o m e t i m e s s u g g e s t e d t h a t w o r d s h a v e meaning b e c a u s e o f t h e way t h e y a r e u s e d ; t h e meaning of a word is i t s u s e i n t h e language. R y l e 11953, 1?61! o b s e r v e s t h a t i t would be a mistake t o t r y t o extend t h i s i d e a d i r e c t l y t o sentences. T h e r e a r e i n d e f i n i t e l y many s e n t e n c e s . O b v i o u s l y , most o f them a r e n e v e r u s e d a t a1 1 , a n d most s e n t e n c e s t h a t a r e used a r e used o n l y once. Sentences do n o t n o r m a l l y h a v e r e g u l a r u s e s i n t h e way t h a t w o r d s do. S e n t e n c e s h a v e meaning b e c a u s e of t h e w o r d s t h e y c o n t a i n and A u s e t h e o r y of t h e way t h e s e w o r d s a r e p u t t o g e t h e r . meaning h a s t o s u p p o s e i t i s w o r d s and ways o i p u t t i n g w o r d s t o g e t h e r t h a t h a v e meaning b e c a u s e o i t h e i r u s e s , n o t sentences. S i m i l a r l y , i t is c o n c e p t s t h a t have u s e s o r f u n c t i o n s o r r o l e s i n t h o u g h t , n o t t h e p o s s i b l e a t t i t u d e s i n which t h o s e

P S A 1982,

Copyright

Volume 2, pp. 654-661 @ 1 9 8 3 by t h e P h i l o s o p h y of

Science Association

concepts occur. There are indefinitely many possible

attitudes. Most possible attitudes are never taken by

anyone, and most attitudes that are at some point taken by

someone are taken by someone only once. Possible beliefs,

desires, and other attitudes d o not normally have regular

uses or functions or roles that make them the possible

attitudes they are. Consider, for example, what use o r role

or function there might be for the possible belief of yours

that you bathe in Coca Cola. This belief would have a

certain content, but n o obvious use or role or function.

The content of a belief does not derive from its own role or

function but rather from the uses of the concepts it

exercises.

Let u s consider some examples of roles concepts play

which can make them the concepts they are. Logical concepts

represent a particularly simple case because their functions

are entirely a matter of their roles in reasoning,

connecting thoughts by relations of immediate or obvious

psychological impl ication and immediate or obvious

psycho1 ogi cal inconsi stency.

These notions, oi psychologicai impl ication and inconsistency far a person S, might be partly explained a s iollows. If P and R immediately imply 8 for S , then, i + S accepts P and R and considers whether 8, S i s strongly disposed t o accept G too, unless S comes to reject P or R . if U and
PJow we can say that a concept C expresses logical conjunction if it serves to combine two thoughts P and i3 to form a third thought C C P I G > , where the role oi Z i s entirely characterized in terms oi the principles of "conjunction introiuction" and "conjunction elimination". in other

words, F and Cf o b v i o u s l y and i m m e d i a t e l y i m p l y , a n d a r e immediate obvious psychological i m p l i c a t i o n s o f , CCP,Cf?. S i m i l a r l y , a concept N e x p r e s s e s l o g i c a l negation i+ it a p p l i e s t o a thought P t o form a second thought NCP) and t h e N ( P ) is r o l e of H can b e c h a r a c t e r i z e d e n t i r e l y a s f o l l o w s : o b v i o u s l y i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h P a n d i s i m m e d i a t e l y i m p l i e d by a n y t h i n g else t h a t i s o b v i o u s l y i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h P a n d v i c e v e r s a , t h a t is, a n y t h i n g o b v i o u s 1 y i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h N i p ? immediately i m p l i e s P . < I am i n d e b t e d t o S c o t t S o a m e s f o r p o i n t i n g o u t t h i s l a s t c l a u s e is n e e d e d . ) I n t h e s a m e way, c o n c e p t s e x p r e s s o n e o r a n o t h e r t y p e of l o g i c a l q u a n t i f i c a t i o n i f t h e i r f u n c t i o n is e n t i r e l y g i v e n by r e l e v a n t p r i n c i p l e s of g e n e r a l i z a t i o n a n d i n s t a n t i a t i o n . The f u n c t i o n s of l o g i c a l c o n c e p t s c a n b e s p e c i f i e d " s o l i p s i s t i c a l l y " , i n t e r m s o i t h e i n n e r workings of o n e ' s conceptual system, without r e f e r e n c e t o t h i n g s i n t h e " e x t e r n a l world". But t h i s i s n o t t r u e f o r t h e f u n c t i o n s of o t h e r concepts. Concepts i n c l u d e i n d i v i d u a l c o n c e p t s and g e n e r a l c o n c e p t s , where an i n d i v i d u a l concept f u n c t i o n s i n c e r t a i n c o n t e x t s t o p i c k o u t an o b j e c t i n t h e e x t e r n a l world t o which a g e n e r a l c o n c e p t a p p l i e s , t o e n a b l e o n e t o h a n d l e t h e o b j e c t a s a t h i n g of t h e a p p r o p r i a t e s o r t . (Cf. I t is an i m p o r t a n t f u n c t i o n of S t r a w s o n 1974, pp. 42-51. i t h e c o n c e p t of iood, f o r example, t h a t i n c e r t a i n c i r c u m s t a n c e s one can r e c o g n i z e something a s food, t h i s recognition enabling one t o t r e a t t h a t thing appropriately ( D e n n e t t 1959, p. 73). a s +mod by e a t i n g i t . I t is sometimes s u g g e s t e d t h a t w e need t o d i s t i n g u i s h i n n e r and o u t e r a s p e c t s of c o n c e p t u a l r o l e , c o u n t i n g o n l y t h e i n n e r s o l i p s i st i c a i 1 y s p e c i f i a b l e s i d e a s c o n c e p t u a l r o l e p r o p e r , t a k i n g t h e o u t e r a s p e c t s t a b e p a r t of c o n t e x t . f h e s u g g e s t i o n i s t h a t a t h e o r y o f t h e c o n t e n t a+ a t t i t u d e s must h a v e two p a r t s , t l i a t h e o r y o i c o n c e p t u a l r o l e p r o p e r , s o l i p s i s t i c a l l y c o n c e i v e d , a n d ( 2 ) a t h e o r y of c o n t e x t t h a t would i n d i c a t e how c o n t e n t i s a f u n c t i o n o f i n n e r c o n c e p t u a l ral e a n d o u t e r c o n t e x t . B u t t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n i s u n m o t i v a t e d a n d t h e s u g g e s t i o n is unworkable. The d i s t i n c t i o n is unmotivated b e c a u s e t h e r e is n o n a t u r a l b o r d e r between i n n e r and o u t e r . Should t h e i n n e r realm be t a k e n t o i n c l u d e e v e r y t h i n g i n t h e l o c a l environment t h a t can b e perceived, o r should i t s t o p a t t h e s k i n , t h e n e r v e ends, t h e c e n t r a l nervous system, t h e b r a i n , t h e c e n t r a l p a r t of t h e b r a i n , o r w h a t ' ? T h e s u g g e s t i o n i s u n w o r k a b l e b e c a u s e , f o r most c o n c e p t s , i n n e r c o n c e p t u a l r o l e can o n l y b e s p e c i f i e d i n t e r m s of c o n c e p t u a l r o l e i n a wider s e n s e , namely t h e f u n c t i o n a c o n c e p t h a s i n c e r t a i n c o n t e x t r i n r e i a t i o n t o t h i n g s i n t h e s o - c a l l e d " e x t e r n a l world". i s a r m a n 1973, p p . 62-65: 1982!.

T o b e sure, there are cases of illusion in which o n e

mistakes something else for food. From a solipsistic point

of view, these cases may b e quite similar t o veridical

cases, but clearly the cases nf mistake are not cases that

bring out the relevant function of the concept of food.

They are cases of misfunctioning. We can see these a s cases

of mistake precisely because the function of concept of food

is specified with reierence t o real and not just apparent

fnod.

What about the further suggestion that an account of inner conceptual role, concei ved sol ipsi stical 1y, might b e supplemented with an account of truth conditions? There are several things wrong with this suggestion. First, a 5 I have already observed, there are n o prospects for the autonomous theory of inner conceptual role, sol ipsistical 1y conceived, t o which the account aC truth conditions i s t o b e attached. Second, an account oi truth conditions i s not going t o b e suif icient t o d o the work required, Cor reasons that should be boringly familiar. (See, e,g., Harman 1974; Faster 1975. ! In particular, how are the tr~!th conditions t o b e specif ied? There seem t o b e two possibilities. The first i s that truth conditions are assigned to beliefs by virtue of the theory"s implying clauses of the form, "Eelief h i s true if and only if C , '' Then the probiem is that the same theory will also imply indefinitely many resuits of the form " C if and only if D," where " C " and "D" are not synonymous, s o the theory will imply indefinitely many "incorrect" clauses a* the form "Belie* b i s true if and only if D." So, adding an account of truth conditions t o an account of inner concfptual role, sol ipsi sti call y conceived, wi 11 not in general b e sufficient t o determine meaning if truth canditions are specified in this way. ?he problem ir, in other words, that speriiying truth condi tinns in this way does not distinguish among be1 iefs that are equivalent in relation to the principles of the theory. This i s relevant to ioar's proposal. Consider the beliefs expressibie in English ar "Jones i s Smith's mother." Let ur ronfine ourselves t o beliefs of this sort which all have the same conceptual role in ioar's sense, i .e., inner conceptual role soiipsistically conceived. Still there will be differences depending on who is referred t o a s "Jones" and who i s referred t o a s "Smith". Loar proposes to account for these differences in terms of differences in truth cnndi tions rather than in terms of differences in canceptuai role. However there are indefinitely many di ff erent possible belieis of this sort in which "Jones" happens to name a male. If we iollow k.:ripke i1972) in supposing that no male i s the mother af Smith in any possible world, then all these latter beliefs have the sane truth conditions

(i.e., no truth conditionsi according t o Loar"s theory.

Since these beliefs have the same conceptual roles and the

same truth conditions in ioar's system, none of these

indeiinitely many beliefs can be distinguished in his

system.

S o much for that way of understanding truth conditions

which takes equivalent beliefs t o have the same truth

conditions. My point is that will not b e sufficient t o

distinguish between beliefs with the same inner conceptual

role sol ipsisticall y conceived. The other porsibi 1 ity is t o

a1 low that equivalent be1 ief s might have different truth

conditions. The trouble with this possibility i s that truth

conditions then become things very much like meanings or

contents and are no longer specifiable by usual Tarski-type

theories of truth. It is unclear how this appeal t o truth

conditions might offer any benefit to the theory of content

beyond the tautology that a theory of contest must include

an account of content.

It amazes me that in the face of such well known difficulties the idea i s still taken seriously that an account of truth conditions might play an important role in a theory of content or that the content of a belief can be represented by a set of possible worlds. No reason has ever been offered for this suggestion, except for the irrelevant point that content and truth conditions must be the same since t o know the content of a belief i s t o know its truth conditions. Clearly, if you know what the content of a belief is, you ought t o know its truth conditions, since you have available the general schema " ' S ' i s true if and only if S " . Eut this i s a trivial point about truth, not a deep point about content. T o b e sure, in my view the content of a concept i s

determined by the way in which the concept functions in

paradigm or standard cases in which nothing goes wrong. In

such cases, one has true beliefs that lead one t o act

appropriately in the light of one's needs and other ends.

Rut an account of correct functioning i s not itself a full

account of the truth of belief s, since belief s can be true

by accident in cases where there is some misf unctioning.

And, a s I have been stressing, there are no serious

prospects for a theory of content that combines an account

of truth conditions with an account of something else like

inner conceptual role sol ipsisticall y conceived.

Let me now turn t o a final question, actually a pseudo

questian, I think. The question i s this: taking attitudes

a s psychological states, must w e think of these states a s

themselves containing parts that correspond t o the concepts

exercised by the attitudes? Must w e suppose there i s a

"state constituent" representing conjunction which all

c o n j u n c t i v e be1 i e f s s h a r e , and s i m i l a r l y f o r o t h e r c o n c e p t s ? Loar h o l d s t h a t o u r o r d i n a r y c o n c e p t i o n of b e l i e f and o t h e r a t t i t u d e s d o e s n e t r e q u i r e s u c h a s u p p o s i t i on a n d t h e r e f o r e d o e s n o t r e q u i r e a l a n g u a g e of t h o u g h t . ioar a g r e e s w e must s u p p o s e t h a t a l l c o n j u n c t i v e b e l i e f s h a v e s o m e t h i n g i n common, a n d s i m i l a r l y t h a t a l i n e g a t i v e b e l i e f s h a v e s o m e t h i n g i n common, b u t t h i s h e s a y s is n o t t o s u p p o s e t h a t a1i c o n j u n c t i v e o r n e g a t i v e b e l i e f s have a c o n s t i t u e n t H e says t h a t conjunctive o r negative b e l i e f s i n camman. m i g h t h a v e c e r t a i n " s e c o n d o r d e r p r o p e r t i e s i n common" w i t h o u t having any " f i r s t o r d e r , s t r u c t u r a l p r o p e r t i e s i n comman. " I f i n d t h e i s s u e h e r e q u i t e obscure, l i k e t h e question w h e t h e r t h e p r i m e f a c t o r s of a number a r e c a n s t i t u e n t s o f t h e number o r n o t . 611 numbers t h a t h a v e t h r e e a s a p r i m e f a c t o r h a v e s o m e t h i n g i n common. Do t h e y h a v e a f i r s t a r d e r s t r u c t u r a l p r o p e r t y i n common o r o n l y a s e c o n d o r d e r property? This does not s t r i k e m e a= a w e i l defined issue, a n d I f e e l t h e same way a b o u t i o a r ' s i s s u e , b u t l e t m e t r y a few t h o u g h t s . P e r h a p s i o a r would h a v e u s s u p p o s e t h a t a r e l a t i o n a+ n e g a t i o n might h o l d between two b e l i e f s w i t h a u t t h e r e b e i n g a n y t h i n g t h a t d e t e r m i n e s w h i c h b e l i e f is t h e n e g a t i v e o n e , and s i m i l a r l y f o r o t h e r c o n c e p t s . F o r e x a m p l e , f o r t h e case of c o n j u n c t i o n let u s s a y t h a t P h a s t h e " r e l a t i o n of conjunction" t o a n d R i f a n d o n l y i f 12 a n d R t o g e t h e r Then o b v i o u s l y i m p l y and a r e o b v i o u s l y i m p l i e d by P . p e r h a p s w e a r e t o s u p p o s e b e l i e f P can have t h e r e l a t i o n of c o n j u n c t i o n i n t h i s s e n s e t o i2 a n d R w i t h o u t a n y t h i n g d i s t i n g u i s h i n g t h e c a s e i n w h i c h P h a s t h e s t r u c t u r e "0 a n d R" f r o m t h a t i n w h i c h P d o e s n o t h a v e t h a t s t r u c t u r e b u t instead a n d R h a v e t h e r e s p e c t i v e s t r u c t u r e s , "P o r -3" a n d "P o r not 3"; S i m i l a r l y +or o t h e r concepts. T h i s s e e m s promising u n t i l one r e a l i z e s t h a t t h e s e s u p p o s i t i o n s s i m p l y amaunt t o t h e s u p p o s i t i o n t h a t e q u i v a l e n t b e l i e f s c a n n o t b e d i s t i n g u i s h e d , so t h a t " n o t n o t P" c a n n o t b e d i s t i n g u i s h e d f r o m P, "P a n d Q " c a n n o t b e d i s t i n g u i s h e d f r o m " n e i t h e r n o t F n o r n o t a " , a n d sa e n . If t h e But t h e n i t is e a s y t o reject t h e s e s u p p o s i t i o n s . i s s u e is whether t h e r e can b e t w o d i f f e r e n t b u t l o g i c a l l y e q u i v a l e n t b e l i e f s , t h e answer is o b v i o u s l y " Y e s . " S o i t is c l e a r t h a t t h i s i s n o t haw i o a r i n t e n d s t h e i s s u e t o b e understood. i o a r s a y s t h a t t h e i s s u e c o n c e r n s e x p l a n a t i o n and h i s r e m a r k s s u g g e s t h e t a k e s t h e i s s u e t o b e which of t h e is i t ( 1 ) t h a t t h e f o l l o w i n g p o s s i b i l i t i e s is c o r r e c t : sentence-like s t r u c t u r e s a t t i t u d e s have h e l p e x p l a i n f u n c t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s among a t t i t u d e s o r is i t i Z ! t h a t t h e

functional relations among the attitudes help explain why we assign sentence-like structures to the attitudes? But this i i ) and ( 2 ) are can't be the right way t o pose the issue. not exciusive alternatives. Any reasonable theory wi i l a l l ~ wthat people often accept conclusions b e c a u s e the conclusions are instances of general irations they accept. This i s to allow that beliefs can have the quantified structure of general izations and that this can explain certain functianal relations among belief s. And any reasonable theory wi l i allow that we determine what structures attitudes have by considering functional relations among attitudes. S o any reasonable theorv will accept both < I ! and ( 2 ) . The only other relevant issue i can think of here i s that of indeterminacy. Perhaps there are many different sets of "analytical hypotheses" that account for the facts. On one set of hypotheses, 2 would b e a simpler belief than P , and P would be the explicit negation of G. On a different set of analytical hupotheses things would be reversed and U would be the explicit negation of P . Nothing would determine which belief really contained the explicit negation I myself independently of one or another set of hypotheses. doubt that this particular indeterminacy holds, but I can understand the issue. However, i d o not see why the existence of such indeterminacy would cast doubt on the notion that thought involves a system of concepts ar language oi thought. Relative t o a given set of analytical hypotheses, there wi l l indeed b e a particular system oi concepts or language of thought. T o say such an account is relative t o a set of analytical hypotheses i s not t o say there is an adequate nonreiative account of thought that dispenses with any system of concepts or language of thought.

&ef e r e n c e s D e n n e t t , D a n i e l C. ( 1 9 6 9 ) . C o n t e n t and C O ~ S C ~ O U S ~ ~ S SL, o n d o n : Rout1 edge and Kegan Paul. F o s t e r , J.A.

(1976). "Meaning a n d T r u t h Theory." I n T r u t h and Essavs i n SeaantE d i t e d by G a r e t h E v a n s a n d J o h n McDowell. Oxford: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press. Pages 1-32.

Harman, G i l b e r t . ( 1 973). U n i v e r s i t y Press.

Thourrht,

P r i n c e t o n , New J e r s e y :

Princeton

---------------.

(1974). "Meaning and S e m a n t i c s . " I n Semantics and New philosoohv, E d i t e d by Milton K. Munitz and P e t e r K. Unger. York: New York U n i v e r s i t y Press. Pages 1-16.

---------------.

(1982). " C o n c e p t u a l R o l e S e m a n t i c s . J o u r n a l o f Formal Lorriq 23: 242-256.

J o t r e Dame

Kripke, S a u l . (1972). "Naming and Necessity." I n Semantics of Natural &wuaae, E d i t e d by Donald D a v i d s o n a n d G i l b e r t Harman. Dord r e c h t , Holland: D. Reidel. Pages 253-355. Loar, Brian. ( 1983). "Must B e l i e f s Be Sentences?" I n pIsA 1987 Volume 2 . E d i t e d by P.D. A s q u i t h a n d T. N i c k l e s . East Lansing, Michigan: Philosophy o f S c i e n c e Association. Pages 627-643. Ryle, G i l b e r t . ( 1953). "Ordinary Language." _The P h i l o s o ~ h i c a l R e v i e y 62: 167-186. ( A s r e p r i n t e d i n Ryle (1971). Pages 301-318.)

------------- .

(1961). "Use, Usage, and Meaning. I." p r o c e e d t h e A r i s t o t e l i a n S o c i e t y Supplementary Volume 3 5 : 223-230. r e p r i n t e d i n Ryle (1971). Pages 407-414 .)

-------------.

1 Hutchinson.

Strawson, P.F. London:

1

(1974). Methuen.

of (A s

C o l l e c t e d P a ~ e r s , V o l u m e 11.

London:

S u b i e c t and P r e d i c a t e i n L o g i c a n d

Grammar.