AUTOPOIESIS IN ORGANIZATION THEORY AND PRACTICE
ADVANCED SERIES IN MANAGEMENT
Previous Volumes: Organizations as Learning Systems: ‘‘Living Composition’’ as an Enabling Infrastructure MARJATTA MAULA Complex Systems and Evolutionary Perspectives on Organizations: The Application of Complexity Theory to Organizations ED. EVE MITLETON-KELLY Managing Imaginary Organizations: A New Perspective on Business EDS. BO HEDBERG, PHILIPPE BAUMARD AND A. YAKHLEF Systems Perspectives on Resources, Capabilities and Management Processes EDS. JOHN MORECROFT, RON SANCHEZ AND AIME´ HEENE Tracks and Frames: The Economy of Symbolic Forms in Organizations K. SKOLDBERG Autopoiesis in Organization Theory and Practice EDS. RODRIGO MAGALHA˜ES AND RON SANCHEZ
AUTOPOIESIS IN ORGANIZATION THEORY AND PRACTICE EDITED BY
RODRIGO MAGALHA˜ES Kuwait-Maastricht Business School, Kuwait and Technical University of Lisbon, Portugal
RON SANCHEZ Copenhagen Business School, Denmark and National University of Singapore, Singapore
United Kingdom North America Japan India Malaysia China
Emerald Group Publishing Limited Howard House, Wagon Lane, Bingley BD16 1WA, UK First edition 2009 Copyright r 2009 Emerald Group Publishing Limited Reprints and permission service Contact:
[email protected] No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, transmitted in any form or by any means electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without either the prior written permission of the publisher or a licence permitting restricted copying issued in the UK by The Copyright Licensing Agency and in the USA by The Copyright Clearance Center. No responsibility is accepted for the accuracy of information contained in the text, illustrations or advertisements. The opinions expressed in these chapters are not necessarily those of the Editor or the publisher. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN: 978-1-84855-832-8 ISSN: 1877-6361 (Series)
Contents
List of Contributors PART I
INTRODUCTION
1. Autopoiesis Theory and Organization: An Overview Rodrigo Magalha˜es and Ron Sanchez PART II
vii
3
PERSPECTIVES ON AUTOPOIESIS THEORY
2. Outlining the Terrain of Autopoietic Theory John Brocklesby
29
3. Overcoming Autopoiesis: An Enactive Detour on the Way from Life to Society Ezequiel A. Di Paolo
43
4. Innovation and Organization: An Overview from the Perspective of Luhmann’s Autopoiesis Tore Bakken, Tor Hernes and Eric Wiik
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5. Autopoiesis and Organizations: A Biological View of Social System Change and Methods for Their Study Chris Goldspink and Robert Kay
89
6. Autopoiesis and Critical Social Systems Theory Christian Fuchs and Wolfgang Hofkirchner
111
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Contents PART III
APPLICATIONS OF AUTOPOIESIS IN ORGANIZATION THEORY
7. Productive Misunderstandings between Organization Science and Organization Practice: The Science–Practice Relation from the Perspective of Niklas Luhmann’s Theory of Autopoietic Systems David Seidl 8. Plugging the Theoretical Gaps: How Autopoietic Theory Can Contribute to Process-Based Organizational Research John Brocklesby 9. An Autopoietic Understanding of ‘‘Innovative Organization’’ Tore Bakken, Tor Hernes and Eric Wiik PART IV
133
149
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APPLICATIONS OF AUTOPOIESIS IN ORGANIZATION PRACTICE
10. Information in Organizations: Rethinking the Autopoietic Account Ian Beeson
185
11. Autopoiesis and the Evolution of Information Systems Marleen Huysman, Heico van der Blonk and Edu Spoor
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12. The Autopoiesis of Organizational Knowledge, Learning, and Memory Steffen Blaschke
215
13. Autopoiesis: Building a Bridge between Knowledge Management and Complexity Robert Kay and Chris Goldspink
233
14. Autopoiesis as the Foundation for Knowledge Management Paul Parboteeah, Thomas W. Jackson and Gillian Ragsdell 15. Autonomous Cooperation — A Way to Implement Autopoietic Characteristics into Complex Adaptive Logistic Systems? Michael Hu¨lsmann, Bernd Scholz-Reiter, Philip Cordes, Linda Austerschulte, Christoph de Beer and Christine Wycisk 16. The Autopoiesis of Decisions in School Organizations: Conditions and Consequences Raf Vanderstraeten
243
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List of Contributors
Linda Austerschulte
Jacobs University Bremen, Bremen, Germany
Tore Bakken
Norwegian School of Management, Oslo, Norway
Ian Beeson
University of the West of England, Bristol, UK
Steffen Blaschke
University of Bamberg, Bamberg, Germany
John Brocklesby
Victoria University of Wellington, Wellington, New Zealand
Philip Cordes
Jacobs University Bremen, Bremen, Germany
Christoph de Beer
University of Bremen, Bremen, Germany
Ezequiel A. Di Paolo
University of Sussex, Brighton, UK
Christian Fuchs
University of Salzburg, Salzburg, Austria
Chris Goldspink
Incept Labs, Sydney, Australia
Tor Hernes
Copenhagen Business School, Copenhagen, Denmark
Wolfgang Hofkirchner
Vienna University of Technology, Vienna, Austria
Michael Hu¨lsmann
Jacobs University Bremen, Bremen, Germany
Marleen Huysman
VU University Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Thomas W. Jackson
Loughborough University, Loughborough, UK
Robert Kay
University of Technology, Sydney, Australia
Rodrigo Magalha˜es
Kuwait-Maastricht Business School, Kuwait and Technical University of Lisbon, Lisbon, Portugal
Paul Parboteeah
Loughborough University, Loughborough, UK
Gillian Ragsdell
Loughborough University, Loughborough, UK
viii
List of Contributors
Ron Sanchez
Copenhagen Business School, Copenhagen, Denmark and National University of Singapore, Singapore
Bernd Scholz-Reiter
University of Bremen, Bremen, Germany
David Seidl
University of Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland
Edu Spoor
VU University Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Heico van der Blonk
University of Groningen, Groningen, The Netherlands
Raf Vanderstraeten
Ghent University, Ghent, Belgium
Eric Wiik
Norwegian School of Management, Oslo, Norway
Christine Wycisk
University of Bremen, Bremen, Germany
PART I INTRODUCTION
Chapter 1
Autopoiesis Theory and Organization: An Overview Rodrigo Magalha˜es and Ron Sanchez
We human beings are not rational animals; we are emotional, languaging animals that use the operational coherences of language, through the constitution of rational systems, to explain and justify our actions, while in the process and without realizing it, we blind ourselves about the emotional grounding of all the rational domains that we bring forth. (Humberto Maturana, 1988, p. 787)
1 Introduction This introductory chapter elaborates some of the key ideas which shaped the concept of this book. The overriding idea is that autopoiesis theory has the potential to provide a unifying framework for the study of organizational phenomena in the 21st century. Although organization studies have recently had no shortage of new paradigms and approaches — such as postmodernism, phenomenology, ethnomethodology, reflexivity, and critical theory — the field seems to be expanding in ways that make it increasingly difficult to comprehend, especially for the uninitiated. In the 1950s and 1960s, open systems theory, together with sociological systems theory, was enormously influential in providing a coherent framework for the study of organizations and their environments. These approaches were in important respects motivated by ideals of order, stability, and predictability. So influential were they that the paradigm they defined is still prevalent today. Although today’s organizations and their environments are often characterized by transformation, emergence, much unpredictability, and a strong emphasis on people, the systems approach to understanding organizations is still not being conveyed in a coherent manner, especially to students and managers. The reason for this, in our view, is the
Autopoiesis in Organization Theory and Practice Advanced Series in Management, 3–25 Copyright r 2009 Emerald Group Publishing Limited All rights of reproduction in any form reserved ISSN: 1877-6361/doi:10.1108/S1877-6361(2009)0000006002
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lack of a unifying framework for explaining a spectrum of organizational phenomena, from stable to highly dynamic organizations and environments. Autopoiesis is a concept developed through the pioneering work of Maturana and Varela (1980, 1992) in biology, primarily as a construct which enabled a distinction to be made between living and nonliving systems. The concept and its postulates have slowly been gaining ground and generating enthusiasm among many scientific communities. For Fritjof Capra, for example, Maturana and Varela’s book The tree of knowledge (1992) contains no less than the ‘‘outlines of a unified scientific conception of mind, matter and life’’ (on book’s back cover). King (1993) suggests that autopoiesis is developing into a new theoretical paradigm in the social sciences, and von Krogh and Roos (1995b) suggest that autopoiesis offers the basis for a new general systems theory. We believe that the organization of the future needs an epistemology (i.e., a theory of organizational knowledge) which is radically different from epistemologies that have guided organizational thinking hitherto, and that autopoiesis theory, with due adaptations, can furnish such an epistemology. In this chapter we begin by providing a brief overview of the key tenets of autopoiesis theory applied to organizational settings. Next, we discuss the organization of the future, starting with the external pressures that are increasingly being exerted on social organizations of all types and inducing them to undertake new kinds of transformations. This chapter identifies important challenges facing organizational thinkers, now and in the foreseeable future, that exist not only as the result of the external pressures, but also as a consequence of internal developments in organization science and theory. The chapter concludes with an overview of the topics addressed by the contributors to this volume.
2 Key Tenets of Autopoiesis Theory Applied to the Study of Organizations For many people, the adoption and use of concepts from autopoiesis theory in organizational analysis is uncontroversial. However, some organization scholars are reluctant to adopt autopoiesis concepts or theory because of concerns as to whether organizations really are autopoietic systems (Mingers, 2002, 2004). Thus, while some authors choose to apply autopoiesis theory to organization studies following strict ontological principles, others are less convinced theoretically and treat autopoiesis as a metaphorical perspective. The controversy between these two approaches is somewhat surprising given the freedom with which metaphors are used in much organizational theorizing (Morgan, 1997). The reluctance that many authors show in applying autopoiesis to social settings may be partly due to the fact that both Maturana and Varela stated in their writings that autopoiesis is not a social theory. From his personal contacts with Humberto Maturana, Zeleny (2007) has added a further perspective, suggesting that the creators of autopoiesis were so careful in pointing out that the theory should be left out of the
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social domain because of the political climate of Chile in the 1970s. Zeleny suggests that Maturana and Varela may have been apprehensive about the misuse by the prevailing political powers of the mechanistic nature of their theoretical propositions in the biological sciences in the social sphere. Nevertheless, in the following, we provide an overview of the principal applications of autopoiesis theory in organizational settings.
2.1
Organization and Structure
In the organizational world, there are forces which are informal, enduring, and hard to change (e.g., cultural norms), and others which are formal, often ephemeral, and more amenable to adoption (e.g., processes, procedures, and tasks). The latter are inevitably influenced and shaped by the former. In organizational theory and research, these two kinds of forces are usually treated separately, because it is often very difficult to reconcile them, although from the point of the practitioner, this is always disappointing. Autopoiesis theory, however, offers organizational theorists and researchers new possibilities to address such disparate organizational phenomena in a much more integrated fashion. Take the concepts of organization and structure, for example. Within the autopoietic perspective, organization means necessary relationships or network of rules that govern relations between system components and that thereby define the system conceptually. Structure means the actual relations between the components that integrate the system in practice and that satisfy the constraints placed by the organization. Using the tenets of autopoietic theory, Zeleny (2005) interprets organizations as networks of interactions, reactions, and processes identified by their organization (network of rules of coordination) and differentiated by their structure (specific spatio-temporal manifestations of applying the rules of coordination under specific conditions or contexts). Following these definitions, Zeleny argues that the only way to make organizational change effective is to change the rules of behavior (i.e., the organization) first, and then change processes, routines, and procedures (i.e., the structure). He explains that it is the system of the rules of coordination, rather than the processes themselves, that defines the nature of recurrent execution of coordinated action (recurrence being the necessary condition for learning to occur). He states: ‘‘Organization drives the structure, structure follows organization, and the observer imputes function’’ (ibid, p. 197). Espejo, Schumann, Schwaninger, and Bilello (1996) adopt similar terminology, but instead of organization they refer to an organization’s identity as the element that defines any organization, explaining that it is the relationships between the participants that create the distinct identity for the network or the group. Organization is then defined as ‘‘a closed network of relationships with an identity of its own’’ (ibid, p. 75). Like Zeleny, Espejo et al. (1996) also see the organization’s structure as being the differentiating factor. While organizations may share the same kind of identity, they are distinguished by their structures. People’s relationships form routines, involving roles, procedures, and uses of resources that constitute stable
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forms of interaction. These allow the integrated use and operation of the organization’s resources. The emergent routines and mechanisms of interaction then constitute the organization’s structure. Hence, just like any autopoietic entity, organizations as social phenomena are characterized by both an organization (or identity) and a structure. The rules of interaction established by the organization and the execution of the rules exhibited by the structure form a recursive bond. The adoption of autopoietic notions of organization and structure by conventional organization theory may create exciting new opportunities to establish theoretical and practical links between the structurally determined or ‘‘engineered’’ parts of an organization, such as its business processes, and the emergent properties arising from the actions and interactions of human actors that jointly shape the organization’s identity. Our understanding of the heterogeneous engineering (Law, 1987) of the multitude of soft and hard aspects of social organizations can greatly benefit from an elaboration of this dichotomy and the ways in which the two dichotomous parts interact and influence each other. We return to this point below.
2.2
Operational Closure, Self-Referentiality, and Recursivity
An autopoietic system is defined as a system that is generated through closed organization processes of production such that the same organization of processes is reproduced through the interactions of its own products (components). Thus, the organization of components and component-producing processes may remain relatively invariant through the interactions and turnover of components. If an organization (the specified relations between components or processes) were to change substantially, there would not necessarily be a change in that system’s identity. What would change is the system’s structure (its particular manifestation in the given environment) within the degrees of freedom allowed by the specified relations between components. In this way, the development of a system’s structure is done recursively. In order to enable the evolution of structure through such recursive behavior — which is the essence of autopoiesis — the autopoietic system needs to be operationally closed (Zeleny, 2003). Mingers (2001) argues that although autopoiesis cannot be applied as a whole to social theory, there are some key principles of autopoiesis that are applicable, namely the principle of an organization’s operational closure. This argument is based on the assumption that throughout the entire hierarchy of systems proposed by Boulding (1956), all levels of systems exhibit characteristics of organizational closure. As we have explained above, in autopoiesis the main requirement for identifying living, autonomous systems is not the existence of a set of inputs and outputs, but an internal coherence that results from the interconnectedness of a system’s inputs and outputs (Varela, 1984). In this respect, organizational closure ‘‘requires some form of selfreference, whether material, linguistic, or social, rather than the more specific process of self-production’’ [emphasis added] (Mingers, 2001, p. 111). Organizational closure and self-referentiality are criteria that unequivocally define social systems. The various institutional systems and subsystems that make up a
Autopoiesis Theory and Organization: An Overview
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social system become closed domains of communication, autonomous and independent, while maintaining strong forms of interdependence (structural couplings) because they rely on each other to perform many societal functions. Interactions between subsystems are often quite well defined, for example, in business organizations. Communications about the environment may give rise to strategic marketing communications that, in turn, trigger communications among product development, capital budgeting, and production subsystems. Such communication activity arises from interactions among organizational actors that may enhance or constrain further communication activity. Understanding organizational closure is one of the most important insights that an autopoietic perspective can bring to organizational analysis. The influence of open systems theory has sometimes helped to popularize the notion that organizations are wholly open systems. However, there is host of organizational phenomena that cannot be explained as open systems phenomena, but that can be explained through autopoietic systems theory’s concept of organizational closure. Organizational culture, for example, cannot be adequately explained by invoking the principles of open systems theory. In more practical terms, an understanding of the closed and recursive nature of its broader social system is crucial for an organization’s actors to understand the environmental impacts of the organization’s activity. Organizational closure also provides the conceptual and practical foundation for studying the systemic feedback loops that writers such as Argyris (1977), Senge (1990), and Sanchez and Heene (1996) have reinterpreted for the managerial world.
2.3
Structural Coupling
Goldspink and Kay (2004) suggest that autopoiesis also provides the basic concepts for understanding the mechanics of sociality and therefore of organizations. They state: Humans exist in and through domains, which are the product of their structural coupling with an environment. This environment is the world around them, including other humans, and exists both physically and causally. As humans enter into reciprocal interaction over time there emerges, as a consequence of structural coupling, a certain alignment of their behaviors, including their linguistic behaviors. Hence we can refer to the resulting domain as a consensual domain. This domain now forms the basic unit of social analysis, and exists in a causal sense but not in a physical one. (ibid, p. 605)
Human beings are autopoietic, which means that as individuals we are all operationally closed. To illustrate, we have all experienced occasions when no matter what we say and explain to our dialoguing counterpart, he or she is unable to comprehend our point of view. This situation can last for a few minutes, or hours, or may endure for years and even lifetimes. Operational closure can be observed in our daily interactions at work, in the shopping mall, and in the family. The only way to overcome autopoietic closure is by building structural couplings. The nature and degree of structural coupling that emerges when two or more individuals interact is a
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defining feature of the macro system of invisible rules and procedures that characterize social institutions. Organizational closure, however, should not be confused with the notions of ‘‘closed’’ and ‘‘open’’ systems from traditional systems theory. Maula (2006) argues that openness and closure are not only simultaneous phenomena, but they also necessitate each other. In other words, there are no environmentally ‘‘closed’’ systems. An organizational closed system cannot be completely closed to its environment, because it cannot be completely unresponsive to environmental signals and perturbations. Organizational closed systems are therefore closed with respect to their own organization and structure, but they may nevertheless maintain intense interactions with the environment. Through recurrent environmental signals, perturbations, and triggers, a system becomes coupled to its environment. Such coupling is achieved through changes in the system’s structure, even while the organization remains autonomous and closed (Zeleny, 2003). Structural coupling is an essential concept in understanding the decentralized networked organization. The concept of coupling provides the basis for understanding how an organization may be fragmented in time and space while retaining its unity as a system. This autopoietic concept has a direct counterpart in the organizational terminology created by Weick (1976) when he refers to ‘‘loose coupling.’’ He asserts that organizations are loosely coupled systems and defines loose coupling as ‘‘a situation in which elements are responsive but retain evidence of separateness and identity’’ (Orton & Weick, 1990, p. 203). In autopoietic terminology, ‘‘responsiveness’’ refers to compensating actions in response to perturbations from the environment. ‘‘Separateness and identity’’ refer to the maintenance of the network of interactions that defines the organization of the system. Orton and Weick (1990) further propose loose coupling in organizational design requires more modularity in organizational design (Sanchez & Mahoney, 1996), a broader range of requisite variety (Ashby, 1956), and greater behavioral discretion. They also suggest that an organization’s compensatory mechanisms for loose coupling may include enhanced leadership, focused attention, and shared values. The implications of the notions of structural coupling and loose coupling for organization theory are very significant. They underpin the representation of organizations as composites for which words such as bricolage or assemblage are increasingly being used as descriptors (Ciborra and Associates, 2000).
2.4
Language and Languaging
Von Krogh and Roos (1995b) made one of the most significant contributions to integrate autopoiesis into management theory and research. In so doing, they advanced an anticognitivist position in the organizational knowledge debate. They reject the notion that knowledge is a given and that the task of organizational systems is to represent it as accurately as possible. Instead, they argue that knowledge is embodied in human beings and that representations of the world in the human mind
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come forth as a result of actions or observations by human beings. This point is illustrated by the often cited statement by Maturana and Varela (1992), ‘‘Knowledge is what brings forth a world.’’ The following passage from von Krogh and Roos (1995b, p. 52) exemplifies this crucial issue: Imagine that you are about to enter an office that is new to you. Your experience (knowledge) tells you to take an initial sweeping look in order to locate the reception desk, your assumed point of entry into the inner circles of the office. Having located what you believe is the reception desk (world) you take the first steps towards the desk. In doing this you get a glimpse of a corridor on your right-hand side in which you see a door and on which you locate a name plate (world). You recognize the name on the door to be the person you are supposed to visit (knowledge).
The ideas that the world is brought forth in knowledge and that knowledge is not abstract but is embodied in human action frame the discussion about individual versus organizational knowledge (Sanchez, 2001; Sanchez & Heene, 2006). Von Krogh and Roos (1995b) argue that the bridge between socialized and individualized knowledge is achieved by means of language. Language is what allows action to be coordinated in the organization, and such coordination is achieved through organizational members making useful distinctions about the organization (an important form of organizational learning). The first and broadest distinction is the concept of ‘‘organization’’ itself. Linguistically, the organization has to be distinguished from its environment. The emergence in social interactions of a new entity, in this case the organization, presupposes a languaging capability. Organizational members conceive of the organization they are working for through language, and from this very broad distinction (i.e., the organization from the environment), finer distinctions can start to be made. For example, there will be linguistic distinctions associated with the concept of ‘‘product’’ in a given organization. In this way, an organization develops its own languaging process and resulting language that conveys its own system of meaning. An organization’s language-enabled system of meaning, in turn, develops its own autopoiesis. ‘‘Languaging’’ is the expression used by Maturana and Varela (1980, 1992) to denote the act of using language. Given its dynamic nature, languaging fulfils a dual but conflicting function. On one hand, because languaging contributes to creating a unique identity for an organization (e.g., language is integral to its culture), languaging can be instrumental in bringing about change. On the other hand, language is important in maintaining the status quo and may thereby be a source of resistance to change, given the self-referential nature of autopoietic systems. Hence, ‘‘to allow for rules and languaging that give way for effective action’’ (von Krogh & Roos, 1995b, p. 101) is one of the main goals for and functions of socialized organizational knowledge. Von Krogh and Roos (1995a) suggest that knowledge development in organizations comes about through the innovative use of old and new words and concepts — for example, through managerial efforts to shape language development in an organization.
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2.5
Emotions and Emotioning
One form of communication in organizations is the conversations that can take place between two or more persons. When conversations happen and become recurrent among the same group of people, a social network, group, or community is formed. Conversations allow a structuration process (Giddens, 1984) to evolve, and once the structure of the network is formed, conversations become organizationally closed and self-referential. Metaphorically speaking, conversations have embedded in them the genetic code of a social network, through the three elements of structure — signification, domination, and legitimation (Giddens, 1984). The internal dynamics, roles, and values of networks, groups, and communities develop through conversations. Hence, for a newcomer to become part of a group — a behavioral domain — he/she has to learn, through participation, the group’s genetic code and his/her role that is implicit in it. In this way, the social individual becomes structurally coupled to the social network. Social membership means accepting the unwritten rules of a group and (thereby) being accepted by the group.1 Without mutual acceptance on some basis, cooperation and social action are not possible. Social boundaries, social norms, and emerging social practices transcend the individual and remain even after individuals have departed. Particular members may join or leave, but the social organization carries on. Moreover, organizations are based on self-transcendence — the reaching out beyond one’s own existence in order to create shared understandings with others. In empathizing with colleagues or customers in the process of socialization, the boundaries between individuals are diminished. In the process of committing to a group and becoming part of the group, the individual transcends the boundaries of the self. In the process of internalizing organizational knowledge, individuals cross the boundaries and enter the domain of the group or an organization (Nonaka et al., 2001). The notion of boundaries of social systems implies a complementary notion of organizational contexts. Context can be understood as a situation in which individuals, work teams, or an organizational unit exerts a significant influence on internal and external interpersonal relationships. Kakabadse and Kakabadse (1999, p. 7) assert that ‘‘the power of context is substantial, for context helps form the attitudes and perspectives individuals hold about life, work, people, and organization.’’ Viewed through the lens of autopoiesis theory, the notion of organizational context can be seen in a new light. Maturana (1988) argues that emotions form the background for the embodiment of all our knowledge and thus cannot be separated from logical thought in everyday action. For Maturana, emotions are the ingredient 1
Maturana (1988) argues that decisions about acceptance and rejection by groups are likely to be emotional rather than rational – i.e., emotions are the ingredient that makes social phenomena possible, through mutual acceptance (love, in his terminology). Sanchez suggests (here), however, that this view may also reflect Maturana’s Latin cultural context in Chile, and that other cultural contexts may emphasize more rational bases for acceptance or rejection of members by social groups (e.g., trust among managers in a network of frequently transacting firms, commitment to adhere to the norms of a professional group, and a recognized common interest in a coordinated community response to an opportunity or threat).
Autopoiesis Theory and Organization: An Overview
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that makes all social phenomena possible, through mutual acceptance. However, in our western-style management we have evolved a paradigm that encourages the separation of logic and emotion. One of the earlier voices to denounce this state of affairs was Selznick (1957, p. 80): ‘‘The importance of values is affirmed but the choice of goals and of character-defining methods is banished from the science of administration.’’ However, this situation may be changing — for example, through the emergence of the idea of karma capitalism (which we will revisit further on) as exemplified by the notions of soft power and smart power put forward by Nye (2008). Such movements suggest that there is a renewed perception of the importance of intangible elements like attitudes, emotions, and values in the workplace. The merging of the economic and emotional contexts of firms, for example, is at the heart of the holistic representation of firms in new strategic management theory (Sanchez & Heene, 2004).
3 Organizations and Organizing in the Future In this section we propose a view of the organization of the future in two important dimensions. First, we consider external pressures at the macro level that will increasingly exert a force for change for all types of organizations. Second, we suggest some major internal organizational challenges that both organizational researchers and practitioners will be challenged to face in the foreseeable future. Of course, both the external pressures and the internal organizational challenges are interrelated (see Figure 1).
3.1
New External Pressures
James March (2007) suggests that the field of organization studies may be entering a fourth ‘‘invasion’’ era characterized by the growing influence of information technologies and biological advancements on social life and by the earth’s declining ability to sustain the current conduct of the rapidly growing human species.2 We agree with this broad assessment and suggest that four trends will be decisive in shaping the organization of the future:
2
The earth’s declining capacity to sustain the current practices of the human species; New kinds of capitalism, leading to the individualized corporation; Technical and social networking as the basis for decentralized, autonomous organizational forms; A world fuelled by ubiquitous, real-time data and information.
The previous critical landmarks according to March (2007) were (1) the Second World War; (2) the social and political protests of the 1960s and early 1970s; and (3) the collapse of the Soviet Empire and the triumph of the markets.
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Sustainability of the Earth External pressures
Search for new organizational paradigm
The networking nature of organizing and organizations
Practice turn, trans -disciplinarity and multi-disciplinarity New epistemological approaches inspired on nonlinearity and complexity
The integration of the social and the technological architectures
Technical and Social Networking
New Kinds of Capitalism
Organizational trends
Ubiquitous, real-time information
Figure 1: Major external pressures and key challenges of the organization of the future.
In particular, we suggest that the environmental issues associated with global warming are bound to have a marked effect on many aspects of organizations and organizational life. A central challenge for organization researchers therefore will be to understand how organization studies can contribute toward a world that is sustainable, not only in business terms, but more fundamentally in terms of the survival of the human species. The role of organizations in dealing with the earth’s declining ability to sustain the human species will depend to a large degree on the approaches and concepts adopted by organizations’ managements on a global scale. A related trend is the emergence of new attitudes and values in capitalism as a basis for economic organization, as exemplified by the development known as karma capitalism. The growing awareness of environmental issues that at least some corporations have been displaying in recent years is helping to bring about a new business ethos, which can be characterized as a more socially, environmentally, and morally concerned approach to business. In the past many companies would bow only to the demands of their shareholders and customers; increasingly, however, companies are forced to consider their impact on everyone with a direct or indirect interest. Growing numbers of business scholars are advising executives to pursue broader purposes than just making money and are urging companies to take a more holistic approach to business, taking into account the needs of shareholders, employees, customers, society, and the environment (Sanchez & Heene, 2004). Developments like karma capitalism reflect the convergence of many global trends. The Nobel Peace award to Muhammad Yunus for promoting micro credit as a new
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form of capitalism for the very poor also reflects these trends. However, capitalism is also changing from within the firm, often leading to dramatic changes in the relationship between the firm and the individual. Such changes are captured in the notion of The individualized corporation as proposed by Ghoshal and Bartlett (1998). More than ever before in some firms, the individual worker is becoming the center of management concerns. This trend is due to the ongoing shift in the economy from traditional industries based on manual workers to new enterprises based on knowledge workers who are now the crucial asset in many businesses. At the same time, while many corporations can no longer guarantee employment, growing numbers of knowledge workers no longer need or are even concerned about guaranteed employment. As a result, the nature of the bond between the organization and its employees is changing radically, and the notion of a ‘‘moral contract’’ between a firm and its employees is beginning to replace legal contracts as the basis for employment (Ghoshal & Bartlett, 1998). The organizational world is also being transformed by phenomena that run counter to the traditional command and control model of organization. Although the idea of the ‘‘networked organization’’ has been a topic of discussion for a couple of decades, we are now entering an era in which we can observe real decentralized, autonomous, networked organizations on a global scale. What is important in this development is that not only organizations as institutions are able to network with other organizations, but people are now able to network person-to-person as never before. Internet and mobile telecom technologies are enabling people to meet and to coordinate their activities in ways that are profoundly affecting their lives, both professional and private. Perhaps the best example of the positive potential of a global, decentralized, autonomous, networked organization is the World Wide Web. However, other examples such as Al-Qaeda, where individual networking capabilities seem to play a predominant role in organizing, show that such developments are not limited to corporate or high-tech domains. Both examples not only follow a decentralized, networked form, but also lack any kind of conventional management structure. In a similar manner, the Linux phenomenon has no formal structure, employees, or budgets, and its product is free. Yet Linux is already posing a serious threat to the largest software firms in the world (Hernes & Bakken, 2003). Networking (individual and institutional) is of course intimately related to the proliferation of information technology (IT) in human society. Ever faster enterprise LANs, telephony over IP data networks (VOIP), mobile telephony, home networks, and Internet access in automobiles, planes, and trains are all having a major impact on an organization’s and an individual’s capability to transmit information. As citizens of the world, we are increasingly surrounded by real-time or near real-time data and information. When an ice sheet breaks loose in the Arctic, citizens of Africa learn about it a few minutes later. If a car breaks down in Outer Mongolia, the manufacturer’s assistance services in Europe will be alerted instantaneously. Online DNA data is being used by international police forces to solve crimes in a fraction of the time it took to solve similar crimes in the past. An even greater effect of IT than the ubiquity of information is its ability to represent large chunks of organizational life as information. Balanced scorecards,
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dashboards, value added analytics, customer relationship management systems, early warning systems, trend monitoring, and knowledge management are examples of systems that facilitate representation of many aspects of an organization. The ever increasing capability to collect, organize, transmit, and use information anywhere is bringing the notion of the real-time enterprise into reality (Kuhlin & Thielmann, 2005). There is a growing realization, however, that organizations need to harness such information by developing more sophisticated representational techniques to enable hitherto unthinkable levels of organizational self-awareness (Magalha˜es, Sousa, & Tribolet, 2008).
3.2
New Internal Organizational Challenges
3.2.1 New Epistemological Approaches Inspired by Non-linearity and Complexity. Complexity research has its roots in long-standing traditions in economics (Adam Smith’s hidden hand), natural evolution (Darwin’s blind watch making), neuropsychology (Hebb’s cell assembly), and computation (von Neumann’s selfreproducing automata). From the point of view of the social sciences, complexity theory does not try to make detailed predictions, but rather raises new kinds of questions and possible organizational actions. Analyzing social systems from a complexity perspective does not ensure the derivation of specific outcomes, but may ‘‘foster an increase in the value of populations over time, whether populations are livestock, technical innovations, or new strategies for business competition’’ (Axelrod & Cohen, 2000, p. 19). Experiments in artificial intelligence, for example, have shown that emergence and self-organization are implicate order phenomena which follow a bottom-up, parallelprocessing, distributed-control logic in which local interactions within populations of semiautonomous entities are usually governed by a system of simple rules. When recursively applied to individual behaviors and interactions among the components of a system, unpredictable global behavioral patterns may be observed under certain conditions. Human waiting queues often exhibit, at least temporarily, the voluntary self-organization characterized by its own specific behaviors, rules of conduct, choice of interpersonal distance, and modes of communication. In short, as has been suggested by Gell-Mann, we are able to observe ‘‘surface complexity arising out of deep simplicity’’ (Lewin, 1992, p. 14). In organizations the situation is analogous — i.e., whatever phenomenon one wishes to study will always be dependent upon a higher-level context, which in turn has dynamic links with the event under scrutiny. In effect, one needs to understand how individual components contribute to the behavior of a holistic organizational context, but it is also crucial to understand how the context influences the behavior of each individual component. As a case in point, consider how a system of local trading agents develops prices that cause global inventories to clear or how companies form networks of trust that ensure individual customers’ loyalty and continued growth (Axelrod & Cohen, 2000).
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Autopoiesis has a counterpart in the cognitive sciences — enacted cognition — which may also be considered part of the complexity paradigm. Autopoiesis and enacted cognition are interrelated because in explaining the evolution of living organisms, autopoiesis invokes the notion of enacted cognition (Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 1991) to suggest how human beings understand the world and how knowledge is formed. For Varela et al. (1991), cognition cannot be understood without ‘‘common sense,’’ by which they mean our physical and social history, the mutual co-specification between the knower and the known or between the subject and the object. They use the term enactment to denote interpretation or the act of bringing forth meaning from a background of understanding. They adopt a nonobjectivist view of knowledge, in which knowing is the result of an ongoing interpretation process that emerges from our ability to understand and which enables us to make sense of our world. The notion of the embodiment of cognition has been strongly influenced by the philosophy of European thinkers such as Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Foucault, who since the beginning of the 20th century have challenged one of the most entrenched suppositions of our scientific heritage — i.e., the rationalists’ view of the world as independent from the knower. The application of complexity concepts and theory to economics, management, and organization has attracted a great deal of interest and generated a large number of academic communications (see, for example, the specialized journal Emergence: Complexity & Organization, E:CO). At the risk of oversimplifying the issue, we mention the key conclusions from one of the earliest investigations in the field. Trisoglio (1995) posits that economics and much of management theory is based on reductionist, linear, and equilibrium-centered models of the world. Although they may be simple, such models would be seriously misleading as descriptions of a ‘‘reality’’ that is manifestly often nonlinear. Economies and organizations routinely manifest the properties of nonlinear and chaotic systems, exhibiting creation of both order and disorder as well as pattern and regularity. The link between autopoiesis, complexity, and social organizations has been described by Goldspink and Kay (2004): Autopoiesis provides a model of how phenomena (which we may now call social phenomena) emerge from the complex (and non-linear) interplay between the heterogeneous (in having unique ontogenies) agents (people) which make it up. Complexity then allows us to explain the resulting dynamics by describing the generative processes that link empirical observation and causal actuality. Social systems can be seen as a specific class of complex systems and it is autopoiesis which clarifies the distinguishing characteristics of this class, in particular the linguistic/reflexive character of social agents. (ibid, p. 615)
3.2.2 The Search for a New Organizational Paradigm. The situation in organization science/studies today is that the overwhelming majority of textbooks used in graduate and postgraduate courses convey linear, reductionist representations of organizations that are typical of what we might call the old paradigm. An example is the book by Scott and Davis (2007) which undertakes to bring together much of the accumulated wisdom in rational, natural, and open systems views of organizations. Although warning about the dangers of clinging too much to the past when trying to
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move toward the future, these authors nevertheless present an overview of organization theory that offers a fairly simplistic divide between the old (closed systems) and the new (open systems); see Table 1. As is demonstrated by continuing organizational failures in every area of activity, open systems theories have not ‘‘solved’’ the problems of organizations. One reason for this may be the current relative neglect of ‘‘old fashioned’’ closed systems approaches, according to the summary of schools of thought expounded by Scott and Davis (2007). Although open systems have brought crucial advances in organizational thinking — especially in fostering new understanding of the contingent nature of organizational designs — the open systems view still has major unresolved problems. Behind this state of affairs may be the way that the open systems framework has been utilized by the research community in the organizational sciences. Almost three decades ago, Pondy and Mitroff (1979) pointed out that ‘‘we have seriously misunderstood the nature of open systems and have confused them with natural or control systems’’ (ibid, p. 22), and that ‘‘organization theorists seem to have forgotten that they are dealing with human organizations, not merely disembodied structures in which individuals play either the role of in-place metering devices (y) or the role of passive carriers of cultural values and skills’’ (ibid, p.17). These comments by Pondy and Mitroff were early warnings about the inherent limitations of an emerging new organizational paradigm. Three decades later, however, these problems persist. So, why is change moving so slowly? Is the debate between open versus closed systems ended? Why do we find it so hard, as an intellectual community, to move away from overly simplistic input–output organizational models — as if the issue of the interchange between the organization and its environment were clear-cut and unproblematic? Given the current institutionalization of organization studies, can autopoiesis theory play a role in renewing systems theory as applied to organization studies? 3.2.3 The Turn Toward Practice, Transdisciplinarity, and Multidisciplinarity. Organization theory is paradigmatic because of its deep (and sometimes unrecognized) underlying assumptions. The organization — a concept — can be researched from a considerable number of perspectives, as Morgan’s (1997) metaphors amply illustrate. A tendency within the field has therefore been to adopt multiparadigm or transdisciplinary research approaches that do not favor any one approach. Gibbons et al. (1994) suggested that there are two opposing modes of knowledge production in society. Mode 1 refers to the traditional practices of science and research focused on developing and testing theories about the social world, while Mode 2 focuses on developing ideas that have relevance and can be applied in contemporary organizations. Many proponents hold a view that the organization sciences are moving toward Mode 2, and that they need to be not only more transdisciplinary but also more problem-oriented. The turn toward Mode 2 for knowledge production comes with a strong assumption that a similar turn is under way in the theories of organization and strategy (Whittington, 2006). However, as we are well aware, an organization is a social construction that cannot be engineered as neatly as a bridge or a molecule.
1900–1930, Rational models
1930–1960, Natural models
Conflict Models (Gouldner, 1954)
Human Relations (Mayo, 1945)
Cooperative Systems (Barnard, 1938)
Human Relations (Whyte, 1959)
Administrative Theory (Fayol, 1949)
Scientific Management (Taylor, 1911) Decision Making (Simon, 1945/ 1997) Bureaucratic Theory (Weber, 1947)
Closed systems models
Table 1: The conventional wisdom of organization theory. Levels of analysis
Social Psychological
Structural
Ecological
Source: Scott and Davis (2007).
1970–, Natural models
Open systems models
1960–1970, Rational models
Organizing (Weick, 1979)
Socio-technical Systems (Miller & Rice, 1967)
Bounded Rationality (March & Simon, 1958) Contingency Theory (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967) Comparative Structure (Woodward, 1965; Pugh et al., 1969; Blau, 1970)
Transaction Cost (Williamson, 1975)
Knowledge-Based (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995)
Organizational Ecology (Hannan & Freeman, 1977) Resource Dependence (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) Institutional Theory (Selznick, 1949; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983)
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Organizational engineering has to be carried out with an understanding of organization as complex systems made up of a wide variety of elements. These elements may be subsumed into two major categories: the natural and the intentional (McKelvey, 1997). The natural are the human, behavioral, action-oriented, and mostly intangible elements that are often problematic to model formally but that cannot be ignored in any attempt to model an organization. The intentional elements are the man-made, rational, planning-driven, and mostly tangible elements that interact with the natural elements in an organization. In line with advances in many of the sciences, McKelvey (1999) argues for a ‘‘model-centered’’ organization science in which research would be bifurcated into two types of activity. On one hand, idealized models of organized or organizing activity would be devised and tested and, on the other hand, descriptive analyses and case studies would be carried out in order to compare ‘‘the isomorphism of the model’s idealized processes/structures with that portion of real-world phenomena’’ (ibid, p. 18). Models do not attempt to explain real-world behavior; they only attempt to explain ‘‘model’’ behavior. In order to make models meaningful and useful to realworld organizations, idealized models must be validated against real-world phenomena. This, in turn, requires a transdisciplinary research disposition. Can autopoietic epistemology inspire and frame a transdisciplinary research disposition? Can it provide the much needed bridge between the hard and the soft sides of the organization sciences? 3.2.4 The Networked Nature of Organizations and Organizing. Increasingly, organizations are being conceptualized as networks with no substance except a system defined by its knowledge (Von Krogh & Roos, 1995b). The knowledge of the organization can also be conceptualized as a network, put together in the following manner (Hanseth, 2004): (1) Individual ‘‘pieces’’ of knowledge are related and interdependent. (2) Different individuals (or actors) adopt the same ‘‘piece’’ of knowledge and that ‘‘piece’’ becomes embedded into organizational routines. (3) As individuals (or actors) and routines are linked together, they become interdependent, and thus begin forming the network. One of the key characteristics of the networking perspective is the interactions that organizational members design and develop in seeking to communicate with other organizational members. Through interactions, organizational members perform socially embedded (i.e., role-based) actions and build relationships at a variety of levels (local, group, intergroup, organization, and interorganization). The relational nature of organizational life and the conception of an organizational member as a social actor are also features of actor-network theory (ANT), an important landmark in contemporary organization theory. As tool for understanding crucial organizational concepts, the network concept can be explained as follows:
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[the network] has the same relationship with the topic at hand as a perspective grid to a traditional single point perspective painting: drawn first, the lines might allow one to project a three-dimensional object onto a flat piece of linen; but they are not what is to be painted, only what has allowed the painter to give the impression of depth before they are erased. (Latour, 2005, p. 131)
ANT can be seen as a systematic way to bring out the network infrastructure that is usually omitted in ‘‘heroic’’ accounts of scientific and technological achievements (Ryder, 2008). ANT views social change as an emergent process that is initiated and guided by actors with specific interests and strategies and describes the progressive constitution of a network in which both human and nonhuman actors assume identities according to prevailing strategies of interaction. In this sense, organizational life is heterogeneously engineered, after an expression coined by Law (1987). Instead of characterizing the technological world as a neat set of homogenously engineered, cause-and-effect relationships, Law describes it as the result of the activity of myriad dynamic networks, comprised of multiple actors possessing many different attributes, interests, and goals. Besides ANT, other approaches have been put forward that are consistent with the networked view of organizational life. Another relevant example is social capital (Burt, 1997; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998; Adler & Kwon, 2002) which holds that the source of the organizational capacity to create value is the interactions between individuals or between firms, rather than the individuals themselves. According to this view, knowledge about what products systems produce is becoming less important than knowledge about how systems produce themselves — i.e., how systems renew their own ability and capacity to produce (Zeleny, 2003). Given the considerable degree of convergence between the networked approaches to organization and the tenets of autopoietic theory, can autopoiesis become a more encompassing organizational theory of networks? 3.2.5 The Integration of Social and Technological Architectures in Organizations. Ever since the 1960s, increasing volumes of data have been reduced to text and stored in computers’ memories, making it possible to retrieve, combine, recombine, condense, and transmit data with the greatest of ease. The maturity and pervasiveness of this IT-supported capability raises the issue of the impact of information technologies on organizations to a new level of debate. Managing data has given way to managing information, and the increasing availability of information in organizations is now leading to increasing interest in managing knowledge. Data, information, and knowledge are all concepts relevant to information systems (IS). So, what is an IS? Symons (1991, p. 186/187, emphases added) has suggested the following definition: a complex social object which results from the embedding of computer systems into an organization (y) where it is not possible to separate the technical from the social factors given the variety of human judgments and actions, influenced by cultural values, political interests and participants’ particular definitions of their situations intervening in the implementation of such a system.
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This understanding of ‘‘information system’’ opens up a host of new possibilities for the deployment, use, and management of IT in organizations. In the world of business strategy, there is a general recognition that the ‘‘positions’’ of companies in a competitive market do not assure that they can maintain sustainable advantage. In the ‘‘knowledge economy,’’ both manufacturing and service organizations require an ongoing stream of new capabilities to sustain competitive success. The ability of a company to mobilize and exploit its intangible assets has become far more important than investing in and managing physical, tangible assets (Wernerfelt, 1984, 1995; Conner, 1991; Barney, 1991; Grant, 1991; Mahoney, 1995; Conner & Prahalad, 1996). Intangible assets enable organizations to develop customer relationships, retain the loyalty of existing customers, serve new segments more effectively and efficiently, introduce innovative products and services, produce customized products with high quality, low cost, and short lead times, and mobilize employee skills and motivation for continuous improvement. However, following the trend of fragmentation among the sciences in general, organization, information, and systems are commonly treated as independent aspects of organizations that are divorced from each other both in theory and practice. As a result, IS/IT development, implementation, and management are often presented as separate issues from strategic analysis, organizational development, or change management. This discrete treatment of interdependent phenomena places severe limitations not only on the development of multidisciplinary approaches in organization theory, but also on the search for solutions to the practical problems that both management and IS specialists face on a daily basis. In order to move forward, we have to abandon the ‘‘either–or’’ mindset. The problem of integrating IS/IT and the organization cannot be solved by either organization theory or computer science working alone. Similarly, it is pointless to argue about whether organizations are socially engineered or socially constructed. Organizations have to be seen, studied, and managed from both perspectives. We believe that an ‘‘either–or’’ mentality has been a major obstacle to the development of organizational thinking in the 20th and 21st centuries. Magalha˜es (2004) proposes that the problem can only be solved through the adoption of a holistic perspective, founded upon the following assumptions:
(1) Organizations are complex adaptive systems where efficient, effective, and sustainable growth and development depends upon the constant production of new internal knowledge. (2) As in complex adaptive systems, the transformation of organizations often starts from small innovations found at the fringes of the system’s central core of activity. (3) Innovations and new knowledge are partly associated with the implementation and management of IS/IT. (4) IS/IT-related innovations and new knowledge creation are often found at the fringes of the organization’s central core of activity. (5) Organizations need to adopt new managerial theories and practices in order to discover and benefit from the knowledge assets found at their fringes, including new IS/IT-related knowledge (ibid, p. 225).
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In effect, new knowledge assets are to be found in an organization’s social architecture (management systems, structures, performance measures, processes, and culture) as well as in its technical architecture (information and communication infrastructure and applications). These two types of architecture are often considered the pillars of the competitive advantage of companies (Prahalad & Krishnan, 2008), and together these two architectural perspectives are redefining the principles and rules of organizational design and engineering. Hence, the challenge is for new integrated research approaches to be launched in which there is an equal contribution from organization and IT theorists. An appropriate context for such research can be found in the holistic approaches proposed by the complexity framework, including autopoiesis theory and enacted cognition.
4 Conclusion In spite of the growing interest in autopoiesis and autopoietic systems in organizations over the last 10 or 15 years, such interest has not made its way into the textbook domain. In the 1960s, open systems theory, a breakthrough in the biological sciences (Von Bertalanffy, 1950), made its way into the organization sciences through the seminal work of Katz & Kahn (1966) and has held a dominant position ever since. Many of the tenets of open systems now need to be revisited, but so far there has not been an alternative perspective as powerful or influential in organization theory. Although autopoiesis has been heralded by many as a new systems theory, it has not yet achieved the same kind of impact as open systems thinking, in large part because there is no clear-cut agreement among organization scholars regarding the role or the place of autopoiesis in organization science. Nevertheless, there has been a considerable amount of literature on autopoiesis in organization studies, a selective summary of which has been presented in this chapter. While some authors have adhered to the qualified approach of Luhmann, others have taken autopoiesis straight from the realm of the biological sciences to organization studies, and have even combined it with other approaches. The result has been a number of proposals, some cautioning observation and interpretation, others supporting analysis and direct intervention, but none attempting to elaborate an integrated or comprehensive approach. In this volume, we have set ourselves the challenge of moving the possibilities for theoretical integration forward and of placing autopoiesis alongside other mainstream approaches in organizational thinking. To this end, five questions encapsulating the trends at the forefront of contemporary organizational thinking were posed to the authors included in this volume:
(1) Can autopoiesis provide the backdrop for a new organizational paradigm? (2) Framed within the complexity paradigm, can autopoiesis provide the metalanguage for a new theory of organization and management?
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(3) What might be the role of autopoiesis in the turn toward a focus on practice and transdisciplinarity in organizational thinking? (4) How might autopoiesis theory lend further support to the views supporting the networked nature of organizations and organizing? (5) Given its holistic nature, can autopoiesis provide a suitable framework for the integration of IT/IS into social organizations? The invited authors responded in a variety of ways to these questions, and the result is the present volume of original and peer-reviewed papers. The editors hope that the ideas presented here will provide the basis for establishing autopoiesis as an innovative intellectual lever for the study of organizations.
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Senge, P. (1990). The fifth discipline: The art and practice of the learning organization. London: Century Business. Simon, H. (1997). Administrative behavior. New York: The Free Press. Symons, V. J. (1991). Impacts of information systems: Four perspectives. Information and Software Technology, 33(3), 181–190. Taylor, F. W. (1911). The principles of scientific management. New York: Harper & Brothers. Trisoglio, A. (1995). Managing complexity. Unpublished working paper presented at the Strategy and Complexity Seminar, London School of Economics, London. Varela, F. J. (1984). Two principles of self-organization. In: H. Ulrich & G. J. B. Probst (Eds), Self organization and management of social systems. New York, NY: Springer Verlag. Varela, F. J., Thompson, E., & Rosch, E. (1991). The embodied mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Von Bertalanffy, L. (1950). The theory of open systems in physics and biology. In: F. E. Emery (Ed.), Systems thinking. Harmondsworth: Penguin. Von Krogh, G., & Roos, J. (1995a). Organizational epistemology. Basingstoke: Macmillan. Von Krogh, G., & Roos, J. (1995b). Conversation management. European Management Journal, 13(4), 390–394. Weber, M. (1947). The theory of social economic organizations. London: Oxford University Press. Weick, K. E. (1976). Educational organizations as loosely coupled systems. Administrative Science Quarterly, 21, 1–19. Weick, K. E. (1979). The social psychology of organizing. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. Wernerfelt, B. (1984). A resource-based view of the firm. Strategic Management Journal, 5, 171–180. Wernerfelt, B. (1995). The resource-based view of the firm: Ten years after. Strategic Management Journal, 16, 171–174. Whittington, R. (2006). Completing the practice turn in strategy research. Organization Studies, 27(5), 613–634. Whyte, W. F. (1959). Man and organization. Homewood, IL: Richard D. Irwin. Williamson, O. E. (1975). Markets and hierarchies: Analysis and antitrust implications. New York: Free Press. Woodward, J. (1965). Industrial organization: Theory and practice. New York: Oxford University Press. Zeleny, M. (2003). Knowledge and self-production processes in social systems. In: F. ParraLuna (Ed.), Systems sciences and cybernetics, encyclopedia of life support systems (EOLSS), UNESCO. Oxford: Eolss Publishers. Zeleny, M. (2005). Human systems management: Integrating knowledge, management and systems. Singapore: World Scientific Publishing. Zeleny, M. (2007). Personal conversation during the 9th International Conference on Enterprise Information Systems, June 12–16, Funchal, Madeira.
PART II PERSPECTIVES ON AUTOPOIESIS THEORY
Chapter 2
Outlining the Terrain of Autopoietic Theory John Brocklesby
1 Introduction ‘‘y hmmm, let’s have a quick look y he opened the suitcase y holy Jesus!, he said y legs!’’ – W.S. Burroughs from Spare Ass Annie and Other Tales
Although Maturana and Varela’s idea of autopoiesis is not new to organization studies — it has hovered around the margins of the field for several decades — it has yet to enter the mainstream of organizational thinking. One can debate the reasons for this; however, it is almost certainly the case that the complexity and scope of the idea has been one of the main impediments to its wider take-up. The basic concept of autopoiesis is straightforward enough; it refers to the idea that some systems arise through a circular process in which they ‘‘self-produce’’ their own components. If these components are molecular, the result is a particular class of system that we describe as ‘‘biological’’ or ‘‘living.’’ Beyond this relatively simple idea, for example when the domain of application extends from biological to social systems, or from molecular to abstract components, and when one adds into the mix the broader set of ideas and concepts that people tend to associate with the term autopoiesis, the terrain becomes infinitely more challenging and complex. Here the extended concept, i.e., what is often referred to as ‘‘autopoietic theory (Whitaker, 1996),’’ spans a broad range of topics as diverse as cognition, language, epistemology, emotion, social organizations, culture, human relationships, and ethics, to name but a few. Given this breadth, gaining a sense of what the theory, in its developed form, really is, and where one might best start in trying to understand it, presents a significant challenge. This is especially so for those scholars who are accustomed to thinking in reductionist terms and who prefer to develop specialist expertise or understanding in one or two key areas. Even for those who take a more holistic approach, understanding the complete set of ideas at once, in all its finery, is a daunting prospect. Autopoiesis in Organization Theory and Practice Advanced Series in Management, 29–41 Copyright r 2009 Emerald Group Publishing Limited All rights of reproduction in any form reserved ISSN: 1877-6361/doi:10.1108/S1877-6361(2010)0000006003
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Maturana and Varela’s distinctive writing style compounds the problem. As John Mingers (1995, p. 2) notes, common words such as ‘‘organization,’’ ‘‘structure,’’ and ‘‘conversation’’ are employed in very uncommon ways, and there is a predilection to communicate ‘‘a density of ideas y expressed with almost mathematical sparseness.’’ Once one becomes accustomed to this style of writing it can be highly effective. Initially though, it makes for hard going, and this does not help in getting the message across. Of the various secondary accounts of autopoiesis that are available, Mingers’ (1995) text has almost certainly had the greatest impact in terms of removing much of the mystique surrounding the area. However, even this work has its limitations. Mingers acknowledges that the breadth and coherence of autopoietic theory is one of its great strengths. Yet his main project was to delve into various controversies surrounding specific aspects of the theory, such as the question of applying autopoiesis to social systems and organizations, and to evaluate applications within various areas of professional practice such as the law, therapeutic practice, information systems, and artificial intelligence. Mingers did not specifically set out to show how the various elements ‘‘fit together’’ in a coherent whole. Hence, gaining a sense of this coherence from this particular source is by no means easy; it requires a degree of cross-referencing and synthesizing that some readers will not have the time or perhaps the inclination to do. Against this background, the following chapter presents an account of what I currently take to be ‘‘autopoietic theory.’’ It is a ‘‘high level’’ view, one that combines the various biological aspects with the derivative human and phenomenological aspects. Arguably the latter present the greatest opportunities for connecting autopoietic theory with issues that are of interest to organization scholars. In order to draw attention to key concepts, these are highlighted, italicized, and presented in uppercase. Thereafter, the chapter presents just enough detail to enable organizational scholars to gain a sense of what the area is all about and, when read in conjunction with the other contributions to this volume, to think about how autopoiesis and autopoietic theory does and might further contribute.
2 A Skeleton Outline of Autopoietic Theory In its developed form, autopoietic theory provides an explanation of what happens when, as biological and social beings, human beings ‘‘observe.’’ That is, when humans make distinctions, utter cognitive statements about their worlds, explain their experiences, and act on these. In formulating his ‘‘THEORY OF THE OBSERVER,’’ Maturana invites us to look to the conditions that interfere with observing to provide a broad clue as to what the key components to such an explanation might be. Thus, he claims that since any interference with either biology or language impedes observing, these are pivotal explanatory components. It is on this basis that ‘‘AUTOPOIETIC THEORY’’ arises as a comprehensive and coherent explanation of what these two elements involve, how they arise, and, importantly, how they interact.
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Drilling down, it arises as an explanation of the nature of (biological) living systems, of how — through social processes — basic language capabilities arise, of how these become more fully developed in living systems that possess a nervous system, and — in human beings — of observing as something that happens ‘‘as a manner of living in language’’ (Maturana, 1993).
2.1
Biology and Physiology
Extrapolating from the basic proposition that biology and language generate the phenomenon of observing, Maturana (see, e.g., Maturana, 1988, p. 63) claims that there are two ‘‘PHENOMENAL DOMAINS’’ involved. Propositions relating to the first of these originate in experimental work on color vision carried out in the early 1960s (see Maturana, Lettvin, McCulloch, & Pitts, 1960; Maturana, Uribe, & Frenk, 1968; Maturana, 1970). Subsequently, this led Maturana and Varela to reject the prevailing idea that the nervous system is open to information from the environment, and that human cognition mimics the symbol-based operation of computers. In these experiments (and as an example), it was found to be possible to identify direct correlations between the configuration of external wavelengths of light and activity on the retina of the eye, and between activity in the optic nerve and subjects’ verbal descriptions of color. It was not possible, however, to establish such a link between cellular activity on the retina and activity in the optic nerve. This leads to the proposition that no external stimulus acting on the nervous system can determine an organism’s experience of it. Experience corresponds to neuronal activity; it does not correspond to external perturbations. Thus, whereas popular opinion takes the view that the nervous system is open to environmental inputs, Maturana claims that it is closed, autonomous, and circular. He further claims that the sensory and effector surfaces of the nervous system have a dual character. They operate as elements of the organism and as elements of the nervous system. Acting as components of the organism they operate in the interactions of the organism in its medium, but acting as components of the nervous system they operate in its closed dynamics. This means that the organism as a systemic totality interacts with the medium, but the nervous system as a component part does not. An important consequence of this is the understanding that there is no ‘‘outside’’ to the internal components of the nervous system; there are only internal correlations of neuronal activity. Notions such as ‘‘inside’’ and ‘‘outside’’ require the existence of an observer who can see both and explain changes in one in terms of the other. The nervous system, says Maturana, is an example of a ‘‘COMPLEX UNITY,’’ i.e., an ‘‘entity’’ or ‘‘system’’ that an observer decomposes to focus not just on it, but also on its component parts. All such entities, he suggests, are subject to the principle of ‘‘STRUCTURE DETERMINISM.’’ That is, ‘‘y everything that happens in them happens as a structural change determined y either in the course of their own internal dynamics or triggered but not specified by the circumstances of their interactions’’ (Maturana, 1990, p. 13).
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Logically, the circularity and closure of the nervous system means that it cannot work with representations. Cognition, therefore, cannot be taken to involve the brain processing symbols that stand for external elements, manipulating representations and then computing a response that is adequate in the light of prevailing circumstances. On this account, although we frequently speak as if we know about the ‘‘real world’’ and can accurately perceive the ‘‘things’’ in it, this is a biological impossibility. Instead of characterizing an object (e.g., ‘‘that tree is green’’) according to what are thought to be its intrinsic characteristics, we do so on the basis of ‘‘what happens to us,’’ through experiences, as the object is ‘‘brought forth.’’ This is the basis for Maturana’s claim that human beings do not exist in the physical space; instead that the physical space exists through human beings. Extending the key notion of circularity, Maturana and Varela sought to relitigate the age-old question of what is meant by the term ‘‘living’’ (Maturana & Varela, 1980). Eventually this led to the claim that all living systems are autopoietic or selfproducing, i.e., they are: ‘‘networks of molecular production such that the molecules produced, through their interaction, generate the network that produced them and specify its extension’’ (Maturana, 1993). Life then is constituted through a dynamic, through a particular closed and circular ‘‘manner of relating’’ of molecules. The term ‘‘AUTOPOIESIS’’ describes what Maturana and Varela describe as the ‘‘ORGANIZATION’’ of living systems. In other words it describes that which is invariant and common to all living systems. When used in this context, ‘‘organization’’ refers to the nature of relationships between components of an entity. As long as these relationships are conserved, the entity maintains its class identity. The ‘‘STRUCTURE’’ of the entity refers to the tangible manifestation of these relationships, i.e., it describes how they appear in phenomena that are perceived to belong to that class identity. In addition whereas class identity is conserved, the concrete manifestation of this can change over time. Thus, when the term autopoiesis is used in the molecular domain, to refer to the ‘‘organization of the living,’’ its structural embodiment across the full range of biological phenomena that we refer to as ‘‘living’’ is subject to infinite diversity and constant change over time. At first sight, the idea that living systems are structure-determined, that they have an autonomous autopoietic organization, and, that the nervous system — if there is one — is closed to information from the outside world presents serious difficulties in accounting for the manifest adaptability of most living systems. Conventionally, the environment is seen as the primary source of adaptation and change. Thus, in human beings, adaptation is taken to arise as a result of the nervous system’s ability to construct and manipulate environmental representations and, on the basis of these, to act with intent. On this ‘‘COGNITIVIST’’ view, adaptation is very easy to explain. In contrast, as we have already said, autopoietic theory claims that the nervous system is not open to external information; indeed it regards this as biologically impossible. So, if adaptation is not about building representations of the ‘‘outside world’’ and then acting on these, what mechanism is involved? In answering this question, it is helpful to look at what autopoietic theory has to say about the main sources of change in living systems. Essentially there are three of these. Firstly, there is change that arises conditional upon the flow of matter through
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the system (e.g., food, water, air quality, etc.). Secondly, there is change that results from internal dynamics such as metabolic processes and aging. Thirdly — and in the context of this discussion — the most important source of change occurs through a process known as ‘‘STRUCTURAL COUPLING.’’ Maturana and Varela employ this term to refer to situations in which it is possible to observe some sort of ‘‘fit’’ between the living system and the medium. When there are recurrent interactions between an organism and what an observer would regard as its environment, or between one organism and another, structure-determined changes occur in both. In other words, the two structures change congruently, each one according to its own structure determinism. Through this process, the structure of the organism, at any point in time, contains a record of previous interactions. As long as the system survives, i.e., as long as there is conservation of autopoiesis and adaptation, external interactions trigger structural change. Structural coupling, then, is a key mechanism for change in a living system during its lifetime. In human beings, it is also the basis of learning. Whereas cognitivism tends to emphasize the response of the system to its environment, and posits a primarily one-way information flow, the idea of structural coupling implies a much more complex interdependent relationship. It says that when one system perturbs the other, the structure of the perturbed system can change. However, this is not adaptation as cognitivism construes it. Where a change does occur in response to an environmental perturbation, it is because the particular change that occurs is a pre-existing feature, or one possible state, of the system’s structure. The perturbation only triggers it. Turning now to cognition, structural coupling generated by the demands of autopoiesis plays the role that conventional wisdom attributes to having a representation of the world. Traditionally, as I have said, we have come to regard cognition as a process that has the brain manipulating representations of the external world. For organisms that possess a nervous system, this sounds eminently plausible. But what about organisms that are not endowed with a nervous system? How is it that they are often just as well adapted to their medium? And does the absence of a nervous system mean that these organisms are not ‘‘cognitive’’ beings? Of course it is possible to answer the first of these questions using cognitivist logic. Thus, an observer might regard physical movement in a single cell unity such as an amoeba — as it surrounds a source of nourishment in its medium — in terms of the amoeba having somehow ‘‘perceived’’ its environment and having ‘‘computed’’ an appropriate response (see Maturana & Varela, 1987, p. 147). Yet this is unsatisfactory since these functions imply the presence of a nervous system and the ability to develop representations which the amoeba clearly cannot do. Despite this, under normal circumstances, the amoeba’s behavior is adequate in its domain of existence; it is adapted to its medium. One could even say that it is a ‘‘cognitive being’’ that has the capacity ‘‘to know’’ albeit not in a conventional humanistic sense. On this account, cognition is inextricably linked to structural coupling which in turn is linked to biology. The physical movement of the amoeba does not involve perception. Instead, there is a process in which changes in the chemical composition
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of the medium trigger changes at the sensory surface of the amoeba. This sets up an internal dynamic that results in the amoeba altering its position relative to whatever in the medium is triggering change. It is this logic that leads to the conclusion that, in its most basic form, cognition is not a mentalistic phenomenon. Rather, it is ‘‘effective action’’ (‘‘COGNITION ¼ EFFECTIVE ACTION’’) in a defined domain of existence (see Maturana & Varela, 1987, p. 29). This process involves the whole organism and is not limited to what might happen in the nervous system or brain if these exist. If an observer sees a unity behaving adequately in some defined domain then we can surmise that it ‘‘knows’’ relative to whatever criteria the observer applies in making the necessary judgment. In this sense cognition equates to the whole process of living. The abstract thinking that goes on in human beings is but a special case of what is a much broader phenomenon (see Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 1991 for a detailed extension of this argument). In human beings, this linking of cognition with structural coupling provides a distinctive take on the increasingly popular idea that cognition is an integral part of our normal everyday mindful and unmindful activity. According to this line of thought, action that looks like adaptation to an observer, and which the representationalist perspective would explain in mentalistic terms, is merely the system operating in a relationship of structural coupling with a medium. The distinctive contribution of autopoietic theory then is to allege that cognition has to do with the process of living, which, in turn, is inextricably linked to structural coupling. This turns on its head reductionist conceptions of cognition that equate, for example, the mind with the brain and/or limit it to conscious thought. Instead, it asserts that the brain is merely one of many structures through which the mind operates. Such then are the basic distinctions that pertain to the first of the two domains that are central to Maturana’s systemic account of observing. To summarize, we can say that living systems are self-producing systems of molecular production which operate in a dynamic structural coupling with a medium. In the case of human beings, the basic biological character of the nervous system is critically important since it makes observing possible, and it has implications for the what and the how of observing in specific instances. However, it is in the second phenomenological domain, that of relations and interactions with a medium, where observing, and behavior more generally, takes place.
2.2
Relations and Interactions
Biology is clearly necessary and important in understanding how people operate as observers. However, observing is not a biological phenomenon. It takes place in, and belongs to the second phenomenal domain, that of social relations and interactions. Maturana’s explanation of the development of observing in human beings extends the idea of a living system structurally coupled to a medium to that of structural coupling between two or more living systems. It is in the relational space between
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these structurally coupled systems that the key mechanism that allows observing to take place occurs. This process is referred to as ‘‘LANGUAGING.’’ The idea of languaging describes a process in which the fundamental aspect is behavior. It is not, as conventional wisdom would have it, the speech act itself. In order to explain this, it is necessary to revisit the concept of structural coupling. According to Maturana when we observe two or more structurally coupled entities ‘‘in language’’ with each other, what we see is a behavioral process. Using his terminology we see an initial ‘‘coordination of action’’ between the two entities, followed by a further coordination of the two actions. Consider the following: a parent in the company of strangers looks disapprovingly at his/her misbehaving child; the child immediately ceases to misbehave. Alternatively, consider the owner of a dog whose whistle attracts the attention of the dog that brings it ‘‘to heel.’’ In both cases, there is an initial coordination of action: the child’s gaze falls upon the parent and the dog’s falls upon the owner. Next, both the child and the dog do something on the consequences of what is done. In both cases, there is a further coordination of the now already-coordinated actions. This leads to the basic contention that the minimum operation that is involved in language is a ‘‘COORDINATION OF A COORDINATION OF ACTION.’’ On this definition it follows that a rudimentary form of languaging is possible even in organisms that do not possess a nervous system, and/or in those with a nervous system, but which are incapable of abstract thought in the manner of human beings. Much learned animal behavior such as the courtship, nest building, and chick rearing behavior of birds, or the ‘‘dance’’ of bees, is of this basic type (see Mingers, 1995, p. 78). However, to the extent that there is no abstract thought involved in these activities, and in order to differentiate it from more complex forms of languaging, Maturana refers to this as ‘‘LINGUISTIC CONSENSUAL BEHAVIOR.’’ Where there is an advanced nervous system, the languaging potential of the organism is increased dramatically. In simple terms, the intrusion of a nervous system severs the direct link between sensory and motor surfaces of the organism. That having occurred, although the sensory surface can and does perturb the nervous system, the nervous system begins to interact with itself. Activity within the nervous system thus becomes the object of further activity, which becomes — ad infinitum — the object of further activity and so on. This process (see Mingers, 1995, pp. 73–79, for a fuller description) provides the basis for a massive expansion in the cognitive capability of the nervous system that, in human beings, culminates in abstract thought. Because we human beings have such a capacity, and because we live our lives completely immersed in the full complexity of language, it is hard for us to see that, in its minimum form, languaging involves such a simple act as a coordination of an already-coordinated set of actions. Thus, we tend to describe language in semantic terms, i.e., involving a transmission of information from one organism to another that embodies some meaning. However, when — in a relationship of structural coupling — one organism coordinates its actions with another and there is a further coordination, then we have the basic dynamic that culminates in languaging.
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Neither action is necessarily determined by meaning; rather they are both a consequence of the dynamics of structural coupling. Further recursions of this basic coordination of actions result in language becoming increasingly complex and sophisticated, especially, as I have just said, in organisms such as human beings that are endowed with a sophisticated nervous system. Here, in networks of structural coupling, human beings use words as linguistic distinctions to coordinate actions. Through this process objects become tokens for highly specific behavioral coordinations. In his classes and public seminars, Maturana uses a number of examples to illustrate this process. The designation ‘‘taxi,’’ for instance, connotes the coordinated and linked actions that are involved in carrying someone from one place to another, in a motor vehicle, in return for the payment of money. The same idea pertains to more abstract entities such as ‘‘justice’’ or ‘‘democracy’’; these too are constituted by and anchored in concrete behaviors. Over time, having arisen through the aforementioned process, the anchoring of objects in actions tends to be forgotten. Thus, ‘‘y objects take place as distinctions of distinctions that obscure the co-ordination of actions that these co-ordinate’’ (Maturana, 1988, p. 47). At this point in time, to all intents and purposes objects and entities become ‘‘in-themselves,’’ which — of course — is how we tend to live them. Once objects have arisen, other developments are possible. We can make distinctions of distinctions and this allows abstract concepts to arise. Meaning then arises as patterns of relationships among descriptions. And once we have objects, we can carry out the operation that allows us to refer to ourselves. Thus, we can become self-aware and self-conscious. Fundamentally, because language is rooted in behavior, which is a relational phenomenon, and because the agreements to symbolize behavioral coordinations through tokens occur in networks of structural coupling, language is a relational phenomenon. Even our so-called ‘‘inner world’’ of solitary reflection and consciousness arises determined by our existing structure, which is a record of previous interactions and structural couplings. It could even be said that that which we describe as the mind is a social, not an anatomical or biological, phenomenon. From this perspective, the key point is that language cannot be reduced to speech acts and to abstract mentalistic processes. Although abstract processes are important to human beings, fundamentally language is relational and is anchored in behaviors. Although language might appear to us as being about symbols, fundamentally it is about doing. Entities and objects correspond to ‘‘doings,’’ and language is a flow of coordinations of coordinations of action. And this is a process that arises in our network of structural couplings, i.e., in our relationships with other people. As we coordinate our actions in different ways, as we make new distinctions, and as we come up with new tokens, we are continually weaving linguistic networks with other people. And languaging, says Maturana, is what humans do. It is the total immersion in language, as a manner of living together, that constitutes the human being as the class of living system that it is. Human beings, he claims, are not basically different from other animals, ‘‘y all that is peculiar to us is that we live in conversations’’ (Maturana, 1993b, p. 47).
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In summary, combining the two key components involved in Maturana’s explanation of observing creates the understanding that when human beings observe phenomena they do so as living systems first and as languaging beings second. As living systems we are two things: firstly, we are an aggregation of an infinitely large number of individual autopoietic systems; secondly, we are structure-determined entities that exist in a relationship of structural coupling with a medium. As human beings we are living systems that live our lives totally immersed in the social phenomenon which is language.
2.3
The Relationship between the Two Domains
The precise nature of how these two domains interact is not often acknowledged, or I suspect, fully understood. Key to this is Maturana’s insistence that phenomena must be understood in terms that pertain to it and not in terms that pertain to some other component or domain. This is critically important when it comes to understanding observing and in understanding human behavior more generally. Observing, as we have seen, happens through the mechanism of language. Logically then, since language is a relational phenomenon it cannot be taken to be a process through which the brain manipulates symbols, nor is it reducible to the operation of the nervous system. The same can be said about observing activities that take place ‘‘in language,’’ for example thinking and explaining. These need to be explained in relational terms and not biologically. From this we can further deduce that since ‘‘objects’’ arise in language, notions such as ‘‘self,’’ ‘‘the mind,’’ ‘‘personality,’’ etc. are also relational. As such they arise in, and vary according to the relational circumstances of the moment. They are not ‘‘inscribed’’ in the bodyhood of the individual concerned. Remove the relational context and to all intents and purposes they do not exist. All that is left is a dehumanized biological entity. On this logic ‘‘behavior’’ too is something that arises out of the interaction between the biological entity and the medium. Consider, for example, the nature of the ‘‘behavior’’ or ‘‘act’’ that results from an anatomically generated movement in a particular direction of someone’s arm. This depends wholly upon the medium with which the arm interacts and the prevailing relational circumstances. Identical anatomical movements can generate very different ‘‘behaviors’’ depending upon the physical and social context of its interaction with the medium. Just as a nervous system is necessary for speech acts to take place but language is not explainable simply through reference to the nervous system, so too anatomy and physiology is necessary for ‘‘behavior’’ to occur, but it is the interaction with the medium that makes a behavioral act ‘‘what it is.’’ This illustrates one of the key features of autopoietic theory. Although the biological and relational domains are separate and independent phenomenal domains, they are nonetheless inextricably intertwined as components of a larger systemic whole.
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John Brocklesby y bodyhood and manner of operating as a totality are intrinsically dynamically interlaced; so that none is possible without the other, and both modulate each other in the flow of living. The body becomes according to the manner (in which) the living system operates as a whole, and the manner (in which) the organism operates as a whole depends on the way (in which) the bodyhood operates. (Maturana, 1997, p. 2; see also Maturana, 2003)
It follows then that when someone has any sort of relational encounter — when they reflect on an issue (in isolation or with others), when they participate in a conversation, they do so with a built-in predisposition to act in a particular way. The biological structure of the system contains a record of past interactions, and the physiological and emotional predispositions of the moment delimit the range of possibilities. However, what happens during that relational encounter depends upon what happens in the relational context. As a conversation proceeds, as its flow of languaging and emotioning unfolds, people see and do things differently; as someone reflects upon an issue their biological processes and mood impact upon what they do. Biology then impacts upon but does not determine what happens in the relational domain. At the same time relational encounters impact upon but do not directly imprint themselves upon biology. At one extreme, an acrimonious exchange between two people may increase the blood pressure of the people concerned. Longer term, if the exchanges are repeated it could trigger cardiovascular disease; one of the participants might even suffer a heart attack and die. At the other extreme, using various meditation techniques and through processes of ‘‘self-talk,’’ someone might learn how to reduce muscular and nervous tension to good long-term effect. In both there is a structural transformation of the system in line with changes in relational circumstances and in the medium itself. Indeed, this is the basis for evolutionary development and learning. However, such changes are always subject to the system’s structure determinism.
2.4
From Biology and Social Relations to Phenomenology and the Derivative Epistemology
The issue here is how the epistemology of autopoietic theory, which again is often handled as a separate discrete topic or aspect, arises out of, and relates, the biological and social components of the work as a whole. Fundamentally, for both Maturana and Varela, ‘‘knowing’’ is a biological issue since, as we have seen, cognition is inextricably tied to the process of living and structural coupling between the organism and the medium. Varela et al.’s (1991) concept of ‘‘ENACTION’’ or ‘‘EMBODIED COGNITION’’ further develops this basic idea. Knowledge, they submit, is constituted in our actions. As an individual confronts new situations various experiences are gained through thinking, sensing, and moving. This means that the way we experience (and ‘‘bring forth’’) the world is very much an active construction involving the whole body. Effective action depends upon having a body with various sensorimotor and orienting capacities that allow an agent to act, perceive, and sense in distinctive ways.
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The first and most fundamental point then is that cognition is an integral part of normal everyday activity and extends beyond the brain to encompass the whole body. Cognition, as Mingers (1995) rightly puts it, ‘‘is not detached cogitation, but situated practical action.’’ However, epistemology refers to the grounding and underpinnings of knowledge that, in human beings, emanate from more conventional language-based processes of understanding and explaining the world. For Maturana, what human beings ‘‘know’’ about their worlds depends, moment by moment, upon the precise nature of whatever ‘‘EXPLANATORY DOMAIN’’ is operational for that observer. An explanatory domain is an explicit or, more commonly perhaps, an implicit frame of reference that is defined at the very moment in which an observer distinguishes a particular area of experience, and then explains it. Such domains are constituted through the particular criteria that the observer applies in his/her listening in accepting a generative statement relevant to the area of experience as valid. Because there are as many domains of explanation as there are generative processes and validity criteria, it follows that there is a ‘‘MULTIVERSE’’ of equally legitimate realities. Because the nervous system is closed and circular, and because we are subject to the principle of structure determinism we human beings cannot know in a transcendental sense, and there is therefore no single ‘‘universe.’’ Maturana describes action undertaken in the awareness that an observer only explains experiences and not some independent reality, as the observer placing ‘‘OBJECTIVITY IN PARENTHESES.’’ This ‘‘explanatory path’’ invokes a particular dynamic of interpersonal relations. Statements made in the name of objectivity and ‘‘truth,’’ i.e., in the explanatory path ‘‘OBJECTIVITY WITHOUT PARENTHESES,’’ can easily imply a demand for obedience. Such cognitive statements, says Maturana, ‘‘y are implicit claims of a privileged access to an objective independent reality and are, hence, demands for obedience’’ (Maturana, 1988, p. 61). In contrast, if a speaker gives up on the idea of an independent reality, he or she must take responsibility for statements and present these ‘‘y as invitations to enter in the same domain of reality as the speaker’’ (Maturana, 1988, p. 62), where there is full disclosure of the basic premises and coherences that give the statement validity. Finally, Maturana’s notion of ‘‘CONVERSATION’’ is central in further understanding the linkage between biological and social processes, and people’s explanations and actions. When used in this context, ‘‘conversation’’ refers to a dynamic braiding of ‘‘languaging,’’ which we have already discussed, and what he refers to as ‘‘EMOTIONING.’’ Maturana describes the latter as ‘‘bodily dispositions for actions’’ (Maturana, 1988, p. 42). Importantly, as conversations flow through an interweaving of distinctions and emotions, experiences and explanations alter. While the structure of the observer imposes limits on what is and what is not possible, it is the nature of the conversation and its flow that determines the outcome. As people shift from one emotional state to another, changes take place in what they will and will not do. People behave differently, they see differently, and, importantly, they describe and interpret things differently according to the prevailing emotion. Moreover, languaging and emotioning are braided, each process affecting
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the other. This can be seen in everyday conversations where the specific distinctions that people use invoke an emotional response and where distinctions used reflect the emotion of the moment. Maturana uses the term ‘‘CONSENSUAL DOMAIN’’ to describe these networks of structural coupling that are the site for conversations. In these contexts people learn their emotioning and their languaging with people to whom they are structurally coupled, and, through recurrent interactions, structural patterns become conserved. The picture is further complicated on account of the bodyhood of the observer being at the intersection of not one, but many different conversations within and across different structural couplings. Each one of these has its own braided flow of distinctions and emotions that have been learned through recurrent interactions over time and which alter subject to the dynamic flow of the conversation. This means that just as thoughts and descriptions within a single conversation are subject to change depending upon the flow of the conversation, they can also alter as the observer shifts from one conversation to another.
3 Conclusion In this chapter, I have attempted to provide a broad account of the developed form of autopoietic theory as I currently see it. This account has sought to describe in relatively straightforward terms the various components and aspects of autopoietic theory and demonstrate how these synthesize into a highly distinctive way of thinking that has much to offer scholars from other fields of inquiry. As I noted at the outset, autopoietic theory has already made some in-roads within the broad territory of organization studies. The aim now is to take this work to another level, to generate more interest and clarity in anticipation that autopoietic theory can play a much stronger role in organization studies than it has to date.
References Maturana, H. (1970). Biology of cognition. In: H. Maturana & F. Varela (Eds), Autopoiesis and cognition. Dordrecht: Reidel. Maturana, H. (1988). Reality: The search for objectivity or the quest for a compelling argument. Irish Journal of Psychology, 9, 25–82. Maturana, H. (1990). Science and daily life: The ontology of scientific explanations. In: W. Krohn, G. Kuppers & H. Nowotny (Eds), Selforganization: Portrait of a scientific revolution (pp. 12–35). Dordrecht: Kluwer. Maturana, H. (1991). Response to Jim Birch. Journal of Family Therapy, 13, 375–393. Maturana, H. (1993). Videotaped seminar on language and cognition. Melbourne: St. Kilda. Maturana, H. (1997). Metadesign. Available at: http://www.inteco.cl/articulos/metadesign.htm Maturana, H. (2003). Autopoiesis, structural coupling and cognition: A history of these and other notions in the biology of cognition. Available at: http://www.matriztica.org/1290/ article-28335.html
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Maturana, H., Lettvin, J., McCulloch, S., & Pitts, W. (1960). Anatomy and physiology of vision in the frog. The Journal of General Physiology, 43, 129–175. Maturana, H., Uribe, G., & Frenk, S. (1968). A biological theory of relativistic color coding in the primate retina. Archives of Biological and Medical Experiments, 1, 1–30. Maturana, H., & Varela, F. (1980). Autopoiesis and cognition: The realization of the living. Dordrecht: Reidel. Maturana, H., & Varela, F. (1987). The tree of knowledge — The biological roots of human understanding. Boston, MA: Shambala. Mingers, J. (1995). Self-producing systems — Implications and applications of autopoiesis. New York, NY, and London: Plenum Press. Varela, F., Thompson, E., & Rosch, E. (1991). The embodied mind — Cognitive science and human experience. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Whitaker, R. (1996). The Observer Web: The Internet Nexus for Autopoiesis and Enaction, available at: http://www.enolagaia.com/AT.html
Chapter 3
Overcoming Autopoiesis: An Enactive Detour on the Way from Life to Society Ezequiel A. Di Paolo
1 Introduction Modern organic metaphors for society have run parallel to the very idea of sociology as a science, starting with Comte and Spencer’s use of the term ‘‘social organism’’ (Comte, 1830–42; Spencer, 1897). These metaphors provide a self-renewing source of debate, analogies, and disanalogies. Processes of social regulation, conservation, growth, and reproduction provoke an irresistible epistemic resonance and make us lose little time in offering explanations resembling those of biological regulation, conservation, growth, and reproduction. The phenomenon has not been restricted to metaphor-hungry social scientists: the final chapter of W. B. Cannon’s The wisdom of the body (1932) is called ‘‘Relations of biological and social homeostasis.’’ Attempts to apply a modern theory of living organisms — the theory of autopoiesis (Maturana & Varela, 1980) — to social systems are but the latest installment in this saga. Despite the appeal of the organic metaphor, there are good reasons to remain skeptical of these parallels. ‘‘Because every man is a biped, fifty men are not a centipede,’’ says G. K. Chesterton (1910) ironically in his essay against the medical fallacy. Doctors may disagree on the diagnosis of an illness, he says, but they know what is the state they are trying to restore: that of a healthy organism (implying, admittedly, a rather unproblematic concept of health). In social systems, a ‘‘social illness’’ confronts us with precisely the opposite situation: the disagreement is about what the healthy state should be. In asking about the health of an organism, we ask about its norms, about the logic of integration by which its components are reciprocally means and purposes of a unity, and about how this unity enters into relations with its milieu. The question is: Is such logic applicable to social systems? Georges Canguilhem (who already in 1951
Autopoiesis in Organization Theory and Practice Advanced Series in Management, 43–68 Copyright r 2009 Emerald Group Publishing Limited All rights of reproduction in any form reserved ISSN: 1877-6361/doi:10.1108/S1877-6361(2009)0000006004
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used the term autopoetique to define the character of living organisms, see Canguilhem, 1965) contrasts biological history with the history of societies: The biological evolution of organisms has proceeded by means of stricter integration of organs and functions for contact with the environment and by means of a more autonomous internalization of the conditions of existence of the organism’s components and of what Claude Bernard calls the ‘‘internal environment.’’ Whereas the historical evolution of human societies has consisted in the fact that collectivities less extensive than the species have multiplied and, as it were, spread their means of action in spatial externality and their institutions in administrative externality, adding machines to tools, stocks to reserves, archives to traditions. In society the solution to each new problem of information or regulation is sought in, if not obtained by, the creation of organisms or institutions ‘‘parallel’’ to those whose inadequacy, because of sclerosis and routine, shows up at a given moment. Society must always solve a problem without a solution, that of the convergence of parallel solutions. Faced with this, the living organism establishes itself precisely as the simple realization – if not in all simplicity – of such a convergence. (Canguilhem, 1991/1966, pp. 254–255)
There is something definitely not organic about human societies; something inherently artificial, and attempts to cast them into an organic mold seem to entail a return to a nonhuman form of life. We should not find it surprising that organic and holistic views of society have fuelled the ideology of totalitarianisms (Harrington, 1996). For this reason, and for the emphasis that the theory of autopoiesis puts on the concept of the boundary as an essential determinant of self-production, one of its founders, Francisco Varela, distanced himself from attempts to directly apply autopoiesis beyond the strictly biological domain (Varela, 1989; Protevi, 2008). The cells in our bodies are the perfect slaves; their successful rebellion ends up killing them and us. As is the fate of attempts to describe the social, the autopoietic perspective has soon acquired a prescriptive character, in many cases explicitly so. However, the contemporary discourse on flexible modes of production, self-organization, and fluidity for the ethical, opportunity-creating, postindustrial organization has little in common with a straightforward application of the idea of autopoiesis. Far from being an eco-friendly, postmodern, almost new-age model for social institutions, autopoiesis is a ruthless concept. Nothing would be better for a strictly autopoietic company than to quickly install its local version of Fordism and promote consumerism, compartmentalizing the activities of replaceable ‘‘components’’ that, as they are devolved to the milieu at the end of the day, can fuel the machinery by consuming its products. The very facts that the nature of the social is sought in nature, that parallel solutions are the incompatible manifestations of different societal norms, that a conception of is readily turned into a conception for, and that the negative implications of a theory could be a source of worry for an intellectual are the facts we need to account for, in other words, the fact that social normativity (and consequently human subjectivity) seems of a different, less cohesive, and more malleable kind than organic normativity. If there were such a thing as plain and simple social autopoiesis, we would never question it. And yet, we witness the patterns of societal reproduction, of quasi-order, and the networks of communications and exchange closing up on themselves, regenerating the very organizing conditions that give rise to them. And there are at any given time,
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but changing with time, societal norms and underlying injunctions that we do not question. Contrary to what it might seem at this point, I do believe that it is possible to advance on an understanding of human social systems by starting from the theory of autopoiesis. However, it requires a detour, not a direct mapping; this paper merely starts along this path. It requires understanding cognition and its relation to life. In recent years, the effort has been increased in attempts to explore the continuity between life and mind by taking seriously the autonomy of the organism and the experience of the cognizer. This approach began in the work of Varela himself and his colleagues (Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 1991) and was complemented by efforts in different disciplines including neuroscience, biochemistry, philosophy of biology, cognitive science, and artificial life, leading to what now may be loosely called an enactive approach to cognition (Thompson, 2007). Attempts to ground mind in life have revealed a need to develop the theory of autopoiesis by disclosing important distinctions that remain unthematized in the original literature (the version to which most of the work on social autopoiesis reverts). If nothing else, these distinctions will simply add to the toolbox of systemic concepts that may be deployed to approach social systems. But, more likely, they may introduce changes in the very questions that drive this research. My purpose here will be to expound the potential of developments in embodied and biologically grounded approaches to cognition to drive these changes. It will be an unsatisfactory paper in many respects. Risking, and almost certainly achieving, a degree of unfairness, I will not go into any detailed exegesis of the rich literature on social autopoiesis. This is a sin that my list of references will verify. The reason for this is solidarious with a second shortcoming: I will not, strictly speaking, develop in full the passage from life to human mind and from human minds to the social. To do this with the care it deserves is beyond the scope of this paper (and of this single author). Moreover, the very direction of this ‘‘passage’’ will soon come into question. I will instead present some themes that become apparent (and sometimes recur) when attempting to reach, from the departure point of autopoiesis, relatively more modest but still quite tall targets such as the concepts of normativity, agency, and autonomy. In this way I seek to make a good out of two wrongs. By remaining at the ‘‘lower ends’’ of the history of transitions in life and mind (i.e., by not quite reaching the complex stages of human beings and even less those of human social institutions), I intend to focus on those aspects of a systemic and biologically grounded approach to cognition that move beyond the theory of autopoiesis and yet remain (slightly) neutral with respect to the social autopoiesis debates. The point being that, in my opinion, many such discussions will simply dissolve as we begin to explore how autopoiesis is extended into an enactive theory of cognition.
2 Bare Autopoiesis The theory of autopoiesis is presented as a biology of cognition. Cognitive science, we must recognize, has since its inception in the 1950s been badly in need of theoretical
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grounding. This is not to say that cognitive science has lacked a theory. The computational/representational view of the mind (or cognitivism, according to which cognition is essentially information processing that occurs in the brain) has dominated the field since its beginning and has developed to a very sophisticated degree. However, this view has been strongly criticized over the last two decades from different fronts (robotics, phenomenology, cognitive linguistics, and situated artificial intelligence, to name a few). The general gist of these criticisms is that observing cognitive systems ‘‘in the wild’’ often throws a very different picture to that of cognitivism, one where complex, causally spread processes encompassing the brain, the body, and the environment self-organize in opportunistic ways to produce appropriate performance under tight temporal constraints. These observations do not fit well the computational/representational picture, as they demand a deeper understanding of the autonomy and identity of a cognitive system. However, criticisms of cognitivism have so far remained like an asteroid belt of negativity around a computational gravity pit into which cognitive science keeps falling again and again. This situation has sometimes resulted in the paradoxical adoption of critical terminology, words like embodiment or dynamics, as a makeover for essentially quite classical views of cognition. What is still lacking is a theoretical core that is rich enough (though not necessarily simple or easy to sell) so as to nucleate these criticisms and at the same time offer a novel positive alternative by thematizing the blind-spots of cognitivism into genuine research questions. Hence, what some people have called the enactive approach has, at its most radical (Varela et al., 1991; Thompson, 2007), turned to the theory of autopoiesis as its conceptual nucleus. It soon became clear that planet enaction would not hold together and provide a hospitable surface to migrate into unless a proper look was cast at its autopoietic core. It is a mistake to take the theory of autopoiesis as originally formulated as a finished theory (a trap that is easy to fall into because of the rather decisive and muscular language with which the theory is presented in the primary literature — it reads as if ‘‘love it or leave it’’ is the only choice). And yet, several researchers have recently come to the realization that, as a theory of life and as theory of cognition, autopoiesis leaves many important questions unanswered. In particular, several essential issues that could serve as a bridge between life and mind (like a proper grounding of teleology and agency) are given scant or null treatment in the primary literature, and questions about important biological phenomena such as health are not even raised. We must break free from the binary choice in order to make progress, and must do so in more than one sense. We must be able to criticize autopoiesis constructively and soften up its edges so as to create a more fertile theory that holds dear to the most radical and richest ideas of the original formulation and at the same time allows for the fact that these ideas do not explain everything and must be elaborated and/or complemented in order to be useful for the study of cognition (and social systems). We must also go beyond binary choices in the very recognition that the phenomena that autopoiesis has problems with are precisely the biological, cognitive, and social phenomena that are best understood not in binary but in graded and comparative terms: values, meaning, norms, pathologies, and temporality.
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In the original formulation autopoiesis refers to an organizational property of living systems: their physical self-production and self-distinction. This is proposed as the defining property of life. Once we observe a system we should in principle be able to ascertain whether it is autopoietic or not. In fact, autopoiesis is also used as the property that determines the identity of the system. The only way in which time enters into the theory is by the notion of conservation (i.e., invariance within a time interval). The system will always undergo structural changes while maintaining the condition of autopoiesis as long as autopoiesis is conserved. Otherwise, it disintegrates (a phrase that recurs in the primary literature). The only reason why this tautological assertion is of any interest is that the very identity of the system is given (although this is still the observer’s choice) through the self-distinction introduced by autopoiesis. However, here the theory starts to rely on intuitions. Since it is not specified at all in the definition of an autopoietic system how this conservation of autopoiesis happens, the theory is often complemented by appeals to metaphors. An autopoietic system is like a homeostatic system, whereby the homeostatic variable is its own organization. A close examination of the definition does not strictly lead to this conclusion. A homeostatic system connotes a notion of active monitoring and reaction to perturbations that challenge the homeostatic variables. This may indeed be the case in certain autopoietic systems. But the definition does not rule out fortuitous, nonadaptive conservation of autopoiesis the case of a system that, without any compensatory mechanisms, just happens to be in a situation where its selfproduction is unaffected — maybe short-lived, maybe very fragile, but autopoietic nonetheless. This problem, the nonentailment from the set-theoretic notion of conservation to the dynamical notion of homeostasis, underlies many of the problems we find when we try to understand interactive and relational phenomena like teleology, temporality, agency, sociality, and normativity (Di Paolo, 2005). These have been the concern of enactive cognition since its inception in the later work of Francisco Varela. Part of this work can be read as attempts to reconcile the set-theoretic logic of autopoietic theory with the gradedness of concepts such as significance, norms, and values (e.g., Varela, 1997). His contention was that an autopoietic system, by the very fact that it is autopoietic, casts a veil of significance on its world. It distinguishes encounters as good or bad for autopoiesis (Weber & Varela, 2002). I believe this analysis can indeed be made of actual living systems but not from the plain fact that they are autopoietic. Varela’s favorite example was bacteria swimming up a chemical gradient. It is their very organization (as well as their behavior) that points us observers to the fact that sugar is significant to these organisms, while other chemicals are neutral or noxious. It also seems as if more of it is better than less. This is not a fact of the matter of the same kind as that describing a chemical reaction. This is relational fact, which is impossible to appreciate unless we have an organism present to whom the effects of the chemical encounter on the processes of self-construction and self-distinction make sense differentially, i.e., as being more or less good or bad. The project is that of a naturalization of values and norms, leading eventually to a naturalization of intentionality. It strikes at a persistent blind-spot in cognitive science: a grounded notion of agency and meaning. However, the proposal cannot be
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easily reconciled with the primary literature on autopoiesis. To make it work, Varela must introduce notions such as ‘‘breakdowns’’ in autopoiesis, which may be major or minor (Varela, 1991), thus running against the conservation doctrine. Intuitive as such a notion sounds, it makes no sense since autopoiesis is an all-or-nothing property. Autopoiesis as such does not come in degrees (Maturana & Varela, 1980, p. 94). Otherwise, all the talk about conservation simply evaporates (can a system conserve only a part of its autopoiesis?). We simply cannot derive from the axioms of autopoiesis that an autopoietic system will attempt to improve a situation that leads to the future loss of autopoiesis. This would break the assumption of structural determinism by linking knowledge about past events, or about what has occurred to others, in conjunction with the system’s current state with a reference to a future condition — a heresy. And yet, this is precisely what being a cognizer is all about. How, then, to reconcile autopoiesis and cognition?
3 Autopoiesis Plus It would seem as if the conservation doctrine of autopoietic theory is at the root of the problem. However, the set-theoretic analysis based on organizational properties (as opposed to only structural ones) is one of the strongest contributions of the theory. To get rid of it by softening the concept of autopoiesis (making it something relative and capable of partial breakdowns) amounts to reverting to a hazy view of living systems as being defined by a list of properties (growth, reproduction, responsiveness, etc.), the very view that autopoietic theory is trying to overcome. Moreover, such a move would do a biologically grounded theory of cognitive systems no favors since differences in cognitive performance or cognitive capability would be too easily married to essentially metabolic differences. The cognitive domain would not be grounded in autopoiesis but reduced to it. This reduction would be unable to provide explanations of how some cognitive engagements could ever find or produce meaning in situations that do not immediately affect metabolism and yet may have future consequences for it (such as a predator spotting the snow prints recently left by a prey). Within the terms of the problem we must attempt a solution that will provide the required property for a grounding of cognition that complements bare autopoiesis: a property that should (1) come in degrees, (2) respond differentially to different situations according to their consequences for the organism, (3) sometimes malfunction, (4) obey the axiom of structural determinism, and yet (5) allow the living system to alter its present operations with respect to nonactualized situations. As external observers we can recognize and evaluate structural differences in autopoietic systems that bear on their future continuity. We can make distinctions that result in measurable events and have predictable consequences. We know when a sick organism has a few hours or days to live. We can indeed point to structural breakdowns in its realization of autopoiesis. We also know it is still alive during this
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process. Similarly, we can distinguish organisms living through risky or comfortable situations. Of course, none of these distinctions is perfect or absolute (the sick organism might recover, the risk of a situation might be illusory, or its comfort belied by imminent but unperceivable danger). We as observers may normatively modulate our actions when we make such distinctions. So it seems as if beneath the all-ornothing viability condition given by the conservation doctrine lies a space of graded and qualitative structural differences from which norms may be extracted by the observer; e.g., it is generally better to avoid risky situations than to seek them, health is better than sickness, and so on. What is required therefore is, not for us observers, but for the organism itself to be able to generate such norms while it is still alive and to regulate its operations accordingly within the space of structural options that corresponds to the conservation of autopoietic organization. This is the property of adaptivity. Autopoietic systems exist far from equilibrium and must tolerate the natural entropic trends by remaining energetically and materially open. In other words, they are robust in that they can sustain a certain range of perturbations as well as a certain range of internal structural changes without losing their autopoiesis. These ranges are defined by the organization and current state of the system and are here referred to as its viability set (we can sometimes measure some aspects of this set, for instance, in variables that must be kept within certain bounds, like blood temperature in mammals). If the trajectory of states approaches the boundary of viability and crosses it, the system dies. The viability set is assumed to be of finite measure, bounded, and possibly time-varying. Robustness implies endurance but not necessarily adaptivity, which is a special manner of being tolerant to challenges by actively monitoring perturbations and compensating for their tendencies. Adaptivity is defined as (after Di Paolo, 2005, p. 438): a system’s capacity, in some circumstances, to regulate its states and its relation to the environment with the result that, if the states are sufficiently close to the limits of its viability, 1. tendencies are distinguished and acted upon depending on whether the states will approach or recede from these proximal limits and, as a consequence, 2. tendencies that approach these limits are moved closer to or transformed into tendencies that do not approach them and so future states are prevented from reaching these limits with an outward velocity.
An adaptive autopoietic system is able to operate differentially in (at least some) situations that, were they left to develop without any change, would lead to loss of autopoiesis. Importantly, while this property is perfectly operational, it is not implied in the definition of autopoiesis. It is an elaboration that allows us to recover the homeostatic interpretation. A breakdown, for the system, is simply the severity of a negative tendency (a tendency of states to approach the proximal limits of viability) distinguished and measured by the amount of regulative resources that it demands to compensate for it with or without plastic restructuring of the system. A breakdown will typically, but not exclusively, be the result of external perturbations, and in
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addition to responding to them, adaptivity may allow organisms the possibility of avoiding some risky situations and seeking preferable ones. Autopoietic systems that are not just robust but also adaptive possess enough operational mechanisms to distinguish the different implications of different, but still viable, paths of encounters with the environment. If sense-making requires the acquisition of ‘‘a valence which is dual at its basis: attraction or rejection, approach or escape’’ (Weber & Varela, 2002, p. 117), a sense-making system requires, apart from the norm given by self-construction, access to how it currently stands against the all-or-nothing barrier given by that norm. An autopoietic system operating as a consequence of contemporaneous states must be able to recognize in those states, and only in them, the tendencies that relate it as a whole to the potential loss of its own viability. It must also be able to act appropriately on those tendencies. This is the basis for a regulation of organismic operation in normative terms, including how the organism regulates as a whole unity its interactions with the environment. Such normative engagement with the virtual consequences of current tendencies is the hallmark of cognition (though as we shall see, not all norms refer back to the logic of metabolism). Adaptivity is the operative concept that allows us to link autopoiesis (or more precisely as we shall see, autonomy) with cognition. Additionally, it also helps us to make explicit several other biological phenomena while remaining within the framework of autopoietic theory. These are more extensively discussed in Di Paolo (2005). For instance, when adaptive mechanisms operate at the physical boundary of an organism so as to regulate its coupling with the environment, we move from structural coupling (essentially a symmetrical concept whereby system and environment influence each other without loss of viability) to behavior (an asymmetrical concept where the organism originates the regulation of structural coupling). This behavioral regulation allows us to define certain adaptive autopoietic systems as agents. In addition, adaptivity helps us make better sense of the temporality of living systems. As I said before, in autopoietic theory, time enters only abstractly in the notion of conservation (i.e., invariance during a time interval of unspecified duration). But because adaptivity is about distinguishing tendencies of change and reverting them under strict time constraints, it opens up a temporal dimension. This dimension may have very different properties depending on the complexity of the adaptive mechanisms involved but, by the very nature of adaptivity, it already implies the properties of minimal granularity (an adaptive response has the structure of an act, it may succeed or fail, but a minimal time span is required for this), directionality (if you were to invert the flow of time, an autopoietic system would still conserve autopoiesis, but an adaptive system would become dysfunctional), rhythmicity (single adaptive events are self-extinguishing, and precarious circumstances lead to their reactivation), and historicity (because adaptivity is not prescriptive, it may result in a neutral drift through equally viable, nonrisky states; this in itself may lead to the progressive inner structuring of these viable conditions so that adaptive mechanisms will act differently as a consequence of the system’s experience). None of these properties can be deduced from bare autopoiesis (Di Paolo, 2005).
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One further important aspect of this emerging picture is that only thanks to adaptivity can we speak of organismic dysfunction, stress, fatigue, maladaptation, and pathology. Autopoiesis in the conservation view is blind to such phenomena since they all occur while the system is still autopoietic, but adaptivity provides a measure for them. Indeed, it is possible to define these phenomena in terms of failures of adaptivity such as the exhaustion of adaptive resources, malfunction of regulation, loss of adaptive buffering provoking the activation of extreme regulation, disharmonious activation of conflicting adaptive mechanisms, and so on. Thus, by re-establishing an adapted state, possibly through the simultaneous repair of adaptive processes and change in the range and kind of acceptable relations with the environment, a successful cure may well redefine rather than simply restore the organism’s own normativity. Health, from this perspective, is very different from a statistical species-specific correlation of normality, and there are consequently many ways of being healthy (Canguilhem, 1991/1966; Goldstein, 1995/1934).
4 Norms of Life As we have seen, it is possible to expand the conceptual reach of the theory of autopoiesis by introducing the idea of adaptivity. However, we are still far from having explored this new avenue thoroughly enough to fruitfully connect it with social systems. There are still problems with grounding sense-making in adaptive autopoiesis (e.g., what about values that are underdetermined by metabolism? Isn’t the possibility of adaptive dysfunction an indicator of a merely contingent connection between life and cognition?). Addressing these problems implies adopting a wider perspective, one that permits us to thematize the autonomy of the cognitive domain over its metabolic substrate. It is important to understand this move, because a similar one will be needed in the passage to social systems. The first point that needs to be addressed is the logic that links an autonomous process of precarious identity generation and the normative, teleological, valueladen relation between this identity and its medium. Adaptive autopoiesis is but one instance (perhaps the most fundamental) where we witness this link at work. By means of analytical and existential arguments, Hans Jonas has explored precisely this logic (Jonas, 1966). The fact that metabolism sustains a dynamic form of identity (not coinciding with its material constitution at any given time except at the time of death) allows an organism to become free. This freedom is expressed in the capability of the organism to engage with its medium in terms of the significance of a situation, thus contributing to its continuing dynamical autonomy and even opening up the possibility of novel value-making. However, this freedom is allowed by very strict and specific material needs. It is a needful freedom. Rather than being paradoxical, this concept of freedom avoids the problem of determinism by operating on the relation of mediation between the self-sustaining identity and the ‘‘target’’ of its cognitive engagements. In that sense, an autonomous process of identity-generation (like autopoiesis) is, as we have seen above, potentially able, thanks to its structure, to
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determine what sort of access it has (if any) to the norms that describe its different modes of viability. This access may be less or more mediated (the difference, say, between reacting with aversion to contact with hot surface vs. planning our movements so as to avoid touching it, both of which are examples of adaptive regulation). Jonas’ contention is that in the history of life, novel forms of increasingly mediated engagements have appeared allowing for more freedom at the cost of more precariousness. A good example, but not the only one, is provided by animality, where a new order of values is found with the arrival of motility and the coemergence of perception, action, and emotion. By putting a distance and a time lapse between the tensions of need and the consummation of satisfaction, the temporality of adaptivity is ‘‘spatialized.’’ Animals can appreciate right now the danger that is impinging on them from a distance. This is the origin of a special relation with the world, that of perception and action, which is charged with internal significance, and hence with the development of an emotional dimension (what might have been an inner life of need and satisfaction now becomes rich in possibilities such as fear, desire, apprehension, distension, tiredness, curiosity, etc.). But this comes at a cost of more severe energetic demands (allowing the necessary fast and continuing movement across varying environmental conditions without replenishment for long periods) and novel forms of risk. Jonas identifies other such transitions, for instance, those afforded by a complex visual system or the capacity to make images. It is clear that no intrinsic gain is implied at the metabolic level by expanding the realm of freedom at the cost of increased precariousness. However, he says, ‘‘the survival standard is inadequate for an evaluation of life’’ (Jonas, 1966, p. 106). He goes on: It is one of the paradoxes of life that it employs means which modify the end and themselves become part of it. The feeling animal strives to preserve itself as a feeling, not just a metabolizing entity, i.e., it strives to continue the very activity of feeling: the perceiving animal strives to preserve itself as a perceiving entity – and so on. Without these faculties there would be much less to preserve, and this less of what is to be preserved is the same as the less wherewith it is preserved. (ibid)
Effectively, such transitions inaugurate a domain that feeds back on itself; they imply a new form of life, not just in a metaphorical sense, but in the strict sense of a novel process of identity generation underdetermined by metabolism. But how is this possible? Can we make sense of this in terms of bare autopoiesis? The problem of how to connect the constructive and the interactive aspects of living organization is already inherent in the phrasing of autopoietic theory. This difficulty is hard to appreciate (let alone resolve) from within the terms of theory. The problem is the impossibility of crossing the operational and the relational domains. The first pertains to the functioning of the autopoietic network so that it constitutes a unity (a composite system), the second to the relations that such a unity enters into in its structural coupling with the environment (e.g., see Maturana, 2002). For all the logical accountancy that this separation into so-called ‘‘non-intersecting domains’’ affords, the authors have not dwelled on the problem that this separation brings, i.e., a systemic analogue to mind–body dualism. In effect, the theory of autopoiesis
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says nothing about how relational interactions and internal compensations are coordinated. They just happen to be or there is no autopoietic system. So, in this specific interpretation (irreducibility as nonintersection), autopoietic theory is strictly Cartesian in a way that Jonas is trying to avoid.1 The Malebranchean solution, —i.e., a divine intervention to ensure that body and mind, being nonintersecting substances, remain in coordination — is today represented by appeals to evolution, an appeal pregnant in the phrase ‘‘otherwise it disintegrates.’’ Evolution takes care of sieving out those unhappy organisms for which the two domains are uncoordinated. The major problem that is apparent with this solution is that the relation between the two domains is purely contingent. It happens to be like this because it has helped the system survive. This falls short of grounding the cognitive in the systemic. For, without denial of the role of evolution, it is clear that grounding mind in life requires establishing the necessary links between phenomena in these two domains. What an organism is and what it does are not properties external to each other. By contrast, the Jonasian solution is that a transition to a sustained new form of value-making (such as in animality or image-making) modifies the very organizational conditions that made transition possible. It either changes the form of identity generation that sustains the new interactive domain, or indeed it establishes a new form of autonomous identity (the feeling animal, the perceiving animal, etc.). Despite the problem just highlighted with autopoietic theory, the idea of other forms of autonomy in terms of operationally closed dynamics apart from autopoiesis is indeed an acceptable possibility. The theory highlights the operational closure of the nervous system (Maturana & Varela, 1980, p. 127), and Varela has suggested that other domains may possess similar forms of autonomy, albeit not in terms of relations of material production. Such could be the case of conversations and social interactions (Varela, 1979, 1991, 1997). However, what is left unsaid is in what ways can such identities relate to one another. The transformative relations between constructive and interactive aspects of autonomy leading in themselves to a novel form of identity cannot be directly addressed by autopoietic theory. This is simply because a logical barrier is put between the two domains and because an emphasis on conservation of autopoiesis obscures the possibility of a structural becoming of novel forms of organization encompassing both constructive and interactive aspects of the living.
1
The intention behind the distinction between domains is clear: to prevent any attempt at reducing phenomena across domains. Given that one is a domain that is established by the presence of a whole unity and its relations to its environment, there are good systemic reasons to distinguish those relations from constitutive processes that give rise to the unity. To reduce phenomena across these domains is to confuse things, to search for the speed of the car inside its engine. This is a strong point that should be preserved. The problem, however, is introduced by the term ‘‘non-intersecting.’’ This implies strict separability whereas in fact, non-reducibility does not imply isolating the phenomena between domains. In this way, it is indeed possible for explanations in domain A to depend on phenomena in domain B, but not exclusively so; a powerful engine helps us make sense of the speed of the car even if we cannot deduce the latter exclusively from the former. Where we must be careful is in the form that such a dependence takes since any relation across domains will always be a relation of modulation or constraint, and not of determination.
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We can now understand why the transitions in mediacy described by Jonas (and several others not made explicit by him) have an irrevocable character. They are authentic births of new lifeforms. These new lifeforms may relate to the metabolic substrate and other lifeforms in a variety of ways, calling for veritable topology of processes of identity generation (intersecting, embedded, hierarchical, shared, etc.). It is also an open possibility that the dependence on a form of life so much modifies the basic autonomy of metabolism that the higher identity essentially intervenes in the very condition of organizational closure of autopoiesis (at least temporarily in the case of vivipary or indefinitely as in cases of permanent medical intervention). We shall return to the last possibility later. However, a proper treatment of these problems is beyond the scope of this paper. It will be important to remark that, from a systemic perspective, the relation between different self-sustaining processes enabled by a substrate of autopoiesis need not be one of perfect harmony and that, on the contrary, the inherent regulative tendencies of sophisticated processes of identity generation are likely to enter into conflict even with basic metabolic values. I have proposed that habits should be seen as such autonomous structures (encompassing partial aspects of the nervous systems, physiological and structural systems of the body, and patterns of behavior and processes in the environment) (Di Paolo, 2003, 2005). And habits, as we know, can be ‘‘bad.’’ The question is that as self-sustaining structures, they are never bad for themselves, but for some other identity (typically, in the case of humans, a combination of the metabolic and socio-linguistic self).
5 The Enactive Approach to Social Cognition I have dwelled on the complex issues that emerge from attempting to answer questions about cognition in connection with autopoietic theory partly in order to demonstrate the difficulties inherent in such a task. The warning should be clear: exporting and expanding the concept of autopoiesis is never an easy ride. I will now sketch more specifically how the enactive approach has been applied to questions in social cognition. For the enactive view, cognition is an ongoing and situated activity shaped by life processes, self-organization dynamics, and the experience of the animate body. This approach is based on the mutually supporting concepts of autonomy, sense-making, embodiment, emergence, and experience (Di Paolo, Rohde, & De Jaegher, forthcoming; Thompson, 2005, 2007). In this perspective, the properties of living and cognitive systems are part of a continuum and relate to each other in mutually constraining ways. What provisionally could be designated as an ontological ordering (from life to mind) ends up overcoming itself into more complex inner relationships through which mind may have a life of its own and constrains the domain of metabolism that gives rise to it (a point that we shall elaborate later). We could expect, in principle, a similar situation if we consider the relations between life, mind, and society. Only recently has an enactive view been proposed to account for general
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aspects of micro-level social interactions. And indeed the general picture partly repeats itself. Of the five core ideas, the concepts of embodiment and experience have received much attention. I will not discuss them in detail here (see Di Paolo et al., forthcoming and references therein). We define sense-making as the engagement of a cognitive system with its world in terms of significance or value. Action and perception as well as affective processes are forms of sense-making. It is an activity binding affect and cognition together at the very origins of mental life. This is in contrast to the more traditional view of organisms receiving information from their environment in a more or less passive manner and then processing it in the form of internal representations, which are invested with significant value only after such processing. Natural cognitive systems do not build ‘‘pictures’’ of their world (accurate or not). They engage in the generation of meaning in what matters to them according to the logic laid by their self-sustaining identity. They enact a world. The notion of sense-making grounds in biological organization a relational and affect-laden process of regulated exchanges between an organism and its environment. Sense-making is connected with the regulatory capacities of an organism, but more generally with the presence of a process of identity generation. This is the idea of autonomy that we adapt from (Varela, 1979) to include a requirement of precariousness (see also Di Paolo, 2009). Accordingly, an autonomous system is defined as a system composed of several processes that actively generate and sustain an identity under precarious circumstances. In this context, to generate an identity is to possess the property of operational closure. This is the property that among the conditions affecting the operation of any constituent process in the system there will always be one or more processes that also belong to the system. And, in addition, every process in the system is a condition for at least one other constituent process, thus forming a network. In other words, there are no processes that are not conditioned by other processes in the network, which does not mean, of course, that external processes cannot also influence the constituent processes, only that such processes are not part of the operationally closed network as they do not depend on the constituent processes. Similarly, there may be processes that are influenced by constituent processes but do not themselves condition any of them and are therefore not part of the operationally closed network. In their mutual dependence, the network of processes closes upon itself and defines a unity that regenerates itself (in the space where these processes occur). Precarious circumstances are those in which isolated constituent processes will tend to run down or extinguish in the absence of the organization of the system in an otherwise equivalent physical situation. In other words, individual constituent processes are not simply conditioned (e.g., modulated, adjusted, modified, or coupled to other processes), but they also depend for their continuation on the organizational network they sustain; they are enabled by it and would not be able to run isolated. We shall return to a discussion of the concept of autonomy. As we have seen, similar constitutive and interactive properties have been proposed to emerge at different levels of identity-generation, including sensorimotor and neuro-dynamical forms of autonomy (Thompson, 2007; Di Paolo et al., forthcoming; Varela, 1979, 1997).
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The notion of emergence has had a revival over the last three decades with the advent of the sciences of complexity. Beyond the debates about the possibility of ontological emergence (Kim, 1999; Silberstein & McGeever, 1999), there is a pragmatic application of the term that stems from the well-understood phenomenon of self-organization, which has served to remove the air of mystery around emergence in order to bring it back in line with a naturalistic project. Emergence is used to describe the formation of a novel property or process out of the interaction of different existing processes or events (Thompson, 2007; Thompson & Varela, 2001). In enaction, a relatively strong sense of emergence is often implied (in our case, the sense is slightly stronger than Thompson’s). Accordingly, in order to distinguish an emergent process from simply an aggregate of dynamical elements, two things must hold: (1) the emergent process must have its own autonomous identity, and (2) the sustaining of this identity and the interaction between the emergent process and its context must lead to constraints and modulation to the operation of the underlying levels. The first property indicates the identifiability of the emergent process whose characteristics are enabled but not fully determined by the properties of the component processes. The second property refers to the mutual constraining between emerging and enabling levels (sometimes described as circular or downward causation). Based on these core ideas, an enactive theory of social cognition would be concerned with defining the social in terms of the embodiment of interaction, in terms of shifting and emerging levels of autonomous identity, and in terms of joint sensemaking and its experience. This is in contrast to defining the problem space of the social as the expansion of a very narrow, but dominant, perspective that focuses only on a problem that might be caricaturized as that of figuring out someone else’s intentions; because of the detached manner in which this is supposed to happen, we have called this a Rear Window approach to the social (De Jaegher & Di Paolo, 2007). Many embodied criticisms of cognitivist theories of social cognition still sometimes fall into some version of this individualism (cf., Gallagher, 2001, 2005; Hutto, 2004; Klin, Jones, Schultz, & Volkmar, 2003). This removed cognitive problem belongs indeed to a theory of social understanding, but it has unfairly defined the flavor of most of the field at the expense of downplaying the role of more engaged forms of interaction. The ‘‘social,’’ in today’s social cognition, is defined as a matter of degree (it is nothing but a cognitively more complex domain). The enactive perspective approaches the question of social understanding by means of two nontraditional starting moves: first, by providing the tools that allow us to recognize the interaction process as establishing in itself an emerging autonomous domain, and second, by specifying how the activity of sense-making is shaped by interaction to the point that its very nature may change to become a joint activity. By these two moves, the door is open for the autonomy of the micro-social, a bridge between social cognition and macro-level social structures. For the first move, we borrow the concept of coordination from dynamical systems theory. Coordination is the nonaccidental correlation between the behaviors of two or more systems that are in sustained coupling, or have been coupled in the past, or have been coupled to another, common, system. A correlation is a coherence in the
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behavior of two or more systems over and above what is expected, given what those systems are capable of doing. For instance, observing a lot of people in a main city square, some standing and some walking, is a coherence of behavior. However, it is hardly surprising since we expect people to walk or stand in such situations (as opposed to hover above the ground, which is not possible, or crawl, which is not usual). However, if we found that they are all facing the same direction, this would be a correlation. It is unlikely, though not impossible, that this would be accidental, however, if we were to discover a common source (a giant TV screen) for this correlation, then this is a case of coordination. Of course, coupling itself is often a source of coordination, a well-known fact in physical and biological systems (Kelso, 1995; Kuramoto, 1984; Winfree, 2001). Coordination is to be expected under a variety of circumstances and does not generally require the postulation of a dedicated mechanism underlying it. It is, on the contrary, often quite hard to avoid. For instance, when asking two people to avoid synchronous oscillations while swinging a pendulum with their arms, Schmidt and O’Brien (1997) found that their oscillations were independent (uncoordinated) when not looking at each other, but presented strong tendency to synchronize when they were allowed to look at each other. Such synchrony is a form of absolute coordination: two series of events are perfectly entrained. Relative coordination, in contrast, has a much wider range of possibilities (Kelso, 1995), as there are no such transitions from one strictly coherent state to another. Systems in relative coordination do not entrain perfectly. Instead they show phase attraction, which means that they tend to go near perfect synchrony, and move into and out of the zone that surrounds it. This is a common phenomenon in biology (Haken & Ko¨pchen, 1991). Of course, coordination may be more than entrainment. Many cases of appropriately patterned behavior, such as mirroring, anticipation, imitation, etc., are general forms of coordination according to our definition. Several researchers in social science have recognized the importance of different forms of coordination for understanding social interaction, e.g., the tradition championed by figures such as Erving Goffman, Harvey Sacks, and others (see, e.g., Goffman, 1972, 1983; Sacks, 1992; Sacks, Schegloff, & Jefferson, 1974). A whole field of study is dedicated to uncovering behavioral coordination in interaction going under different labels such as interaction studies, conversation analysis, and gesture analysis (see Schiffrin, 1994). Similarly, the coregulation of different kinds of social spaces during interaction has been the interest of social science since at least the work of Edward T. Hall (1966) and Adam Kendon (1990). From the enactive perspective, the concept of coordination helps us to understand social interaction as an ongoing process with a space–time structure and organizational properties. In most approaches that care to define it, social interaction is simply the spatiotemporal coincidence of two agents that influence each other (e.g., Goffman, 1972, p. 1; Schutz, 1964, p. 23). We must move from this conception toward an understanding of how a history of coordination demarcates the interaction as an identifiable pattern with its own role to play in the process of social understanding. In the social domain, patterns of coordination can directly influence the continuing disposition of the individuals involved to sustain or modify their encounter.
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In this way, what arises in the process of coordination (e.g., gestures, utterances, changes in intonation, etc.) can steer the encounter and facilitate its continuation. The unraveling of these dynamics itself influences what kinds of coordination are likely to happen. This is due to the fact that the interactors are highly plastic systems that are susceptible to being affected by the history of coordination. When this mutual influence is in place (from the coordination onto the unfolding of the encounter and from the dynamics of the encounter onto the likelihood to coordinate), we say that we are in the presence of a social interaction. This emergent level is sustained and identifiable. In accordance with the core ideas of enaction, the above description is nothing less than that of an emergent and autonomous process. It is, however, typically a fleeting one. Even though normal social encounters, for instance conversations, may only last a few minutes, our point is that during that period they may organize themselves according to the two avenues of influence just described: the agents sustain the encounter, and the encounter itself influences the agents and invests them with the role of interactors. The interaction process emerges as an entity when social encounters acquire this operationally closed, precarious organization. It constitutes a level of analysis not reducible to individual behaviors. This perspective bypasses the circularity that arises from preconceiving individuals as ready-made interactors. Individuals coemerge as social agents with the social process. This brings us to the second requirement for calling an interaction properly social. Not only must the process itself enjoy a temporary form of autonomy, but the autonomy of the individuals as interactors must also remain unbroken (even though the interaction may enhance or diminish the scope of individual autonomy). If this were not so, if the autonomy of one of the interactors were destroyed, the process would reduce to the cognitive engagement of the remaining agent with his nonsocial world. The ‘‘other’’ would simply become a tool, an object, or a problem for his individual cognition.2 In (De Jaegher & Di Paolo, 2007), we propose the following definition of social interaction: Social interaction is the regulated coupling between at least two autonomous agents, where the regulation is aimed at aspects of the coupling itself so that it constitutes an emergent autonomous organization in the domain of relational dynamics, without destroying in the process the autonomy of the agents involved (though the latter’s scope can be augmented or reduced). (p. 493)
The autonomy of a social interaction is best exemplified by a situation where the individual interactors are attempting to stop interacting, but where the interaction self-sustains in spite of this. Such a situation occurs sometimes when two people walk 2 There may be a social motivation and social consequences to the act of destroying someone else’s autonomy, but the act itself does not in itself constitute an case of inter-action. The definition of social interaction is aimed at capturing the fact that the other is not fully constituted as a cognitive object by my own actions, but sometimes plays along with them, and sometimes not and this is the crux of the problem of social cognition, the shift backwards and forth between these conditions and the unobjectifiable character of the other.
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along a narrow corridor in opposite directions. In order to get past each other, they must adopt complementary positions by shifting to the left or to the right. Sometimes they happen to move into mirroring positions at the same time creating a symmetrical coordinated relation. Due to the spatial constraints of the situation, such symmetry favors an ensuing shift into another mirroring position (there are not so many more moves available). Coordinated shifts in position, then, sustain a property of the relational dynamics (symmetry) that all but compels the interactors to keep facing one another, thus remaining in interaction (despite, or rather thanks to, their efforts to escape from the situation). In addition, the interaction promotes individual actions that tend to maintain the symmetrical relation. Coordinated sideways movements conserve symmetry, and symmetry promotes coordinated sideways movements. While it lasts, the interaction shows the organization described above in terms of the mutual influence between individual actions and relational dynamics. It becomes clear that interaction is not reducible to individual actions or intentions but installs a relational domain with its own properties that constrains and modulates individual behavior. (Anyone who has reluctantly participated in a self-fuelling argument will immediately appreciate the parallels.) An immediate consequence of this perspective is that if the regulation that sustains a social interaction happens through coordination patterns, and if those patterns affect the movements — including utterances — that are the tools of individual sensemaking, then social agents can coordinate their sense-making during interaction, resulting in participatory sense-making: the interactive coordination of intentional activity, whereby new domains of sense-making may appear that were unavailable to each solitary individual. Participatory sense-making describes in fact a qualitative spectrum of involvement, going from the mere modulation of meaning by physical aspects of the interaction (e.g., delays on a video-conferencing line that affect the fluidity of a conversation and might be sometimes interpreted meaningfully) to intentional regulation of activity between interactors (orientation, teaching) and to cases where the proper act of sensemaking is only completed by joint action (leading potentially to the creation of new meaning). We have seen that individual sense-making possesses the structure of a regulative act. There is an intention in this regulation and, if successful, the conditions that gave rise to this act are extinguished. Consider in contrast a simple social act such as the act of giving. It already has a different structure. A single person cannot complete it because it requires acceptance from another. In a study of mother–infant interaction, Fogel (1993) describes a filmed session between a 1-year-old baby and his mother that captures possibly the baby’s first act of giving. The baby extends his arms and holds it relatively stationary only to gently release the object as the mother’s hand approaches. The object is released only as the mother gently pulls it. Assuming for a moment that the infant is the initiator of the act, we realize that he must create an opening by his action that may only be completed by the action of the mother. The giving involves more than orientation of the mother’s sense-making; it involves a request for her not only to orient toward the new situation, but also to create an activity that will bring the act to completion — in other words, to take up
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the invitation for an intention to be shared. This invitation may go unperceived and the act frustrated. But this is not the same as the situation in which the invitation is perceived and declined. The two situations are different from the perspective of the mother, and this difference confirms that an invitation to participate is experienced as a request to create an appropriate closure of a sense-making activity that was not originally hers. To accept this request is to produce the ‘‘other half of the act,’’ bringing it to a successful completion. When we remove the simplifying assumption that the infant intentionally originated the act, we open up the possibility for even richer degrees of participation. The act may then indeed result from a ‘‘coregulation’’ that emanates from previous aspects of the interaction, as Fogel proposes. A certain movement extending the object in the direction of the mother, without yet intending to give it, may now be opportunistically invested with a novel meaning through joint sense-making. Latent intentions become crystallized through the joint activity so that not only the completion of the act is achieved together, but also its initiation. This sketch hardly does justice to the richness of social interaction, but it highlights the novel aspects of the enactive focus. There is no unified account that can encompass the whole range of social capacities from primary intersubjectivity to the highest reaches of human language and social cognition. The enactive approach has potential to advance on some of these problems. What this approach does ensure, in contrast to noninteractive proposals, is an explicit two-way link between individual and social processes, leaving open the possibility for individual cognitive skills to have dual or even purely social developmental origins. This is a strictly closed avenue for approaches that are not properly interactive. Social skills, under the enactive view, are by definition relational. Although agents can have different individual potentials for entering into an interaction, this potential is modulated and transformed by actual interactions. This is an implication of having established the autonomy of the interactional domain. At the same time, the social domain remains social as long as individual autonomy is not lost. This already offers a sharp contrast with some attempts to apply the idea of autopoiesis to social systems. This dialogue, the mutual modulation and potential ongoing conflict between autonomies, is not typically discussed in such attempts. But it is precisely a focus concern that comes from defining the social domain in enactive terms. Under this view, the individual and social autonomies are not presented as mutually exclusive starting points from a methodological standpoint. An enactive social science is concerned with what goes on at the interface between these different forms of autonomy.
6 Reduplication, Life-Support, Life/Mind The enactive approach to life and mind, as presented above, is only now starting to turn to the multiplicity of social phenomena. Consequently, at this point it can say very little that is of direct relevance to specific problems in social science and organization theory. What is possible at this stage, however, is to make explicit some general systemic implications of this approach in the hope that they will expand
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and/or complement the dialogue between systemic approaches to life and social science beyond the bare bones of autopoietic theory. This should help prevent sterile debate around what might turn out to be false problems. Interestingly, as we shall see, such reflections turn back into a richer understanding of closure and temporality at the cognitive and metabolic levels. It could be said that our approach has proceeded by disclosing some hidden potentialities that remained unexpressed in the theory of autopoiesis: the possibility of adaptive autopoiesis leading to active homeostasis as opposed to passive conservation; the possibility of adaptive regulation of structural coupling leading to agency and a cognitive relation to the world; the possibility of spatializing the intentional temporality of sense-making into action, perception, and emotion; the possibility of emergent and overlapping processes of identity generation; and the possibility of autonomous social interaction and participatory sense-making. Our interpretation of these developments has so far been positive. They are previously unthematized potentialities that do not break with the basic tenets of autopoietic theory. There is, however, another route for theoretical development that moves from these potentialities back to the core of autopoiesis. This route produces a shift of perspective such that autopoietic theory moves from being a theory of (all) the living to being a moment that allows us to grasp the phenomena of life and mind. By this very development, this moment is overcome (aufgehoben in the Hegelian sense) leading to a more encompassing perspective. It is my firm belief that social systems thinking will benefit much more directly from this sublated view of life than from bare autopoietic theory. The element that is added to our theoretical toolbox by this turn from the higher forms of identity back into the enabling layers of metabolism is the same kind of tool that may be used to dispel much of the discomfort that work on social autopoiesis still provokes due to its lack of a proper analysis of the relations between the social, the cognitive, and the metabolic levels of autonomy. The ‘‘negative’’ development is best examined as a possibility pregnant in the concepts of operational closure, precariousness, and interactive autonomy. This is shown at the simplest level of a single autopoietic organism, but a similar analysis may be repeated in its central points for all the other possibilities described above where we have seen new forms of autonomy emerging, especially for the case of the autonomy of social interactions.
6.1
Reduplication
According to our definition, operational closure is an ensemble property of a network of processes. The ‘‘network’’ aspect referred to is that defined by the interdependence between these processes (i.e., relations of constraint and parametrical coupling). The system is precarious: the absence of the network of relations leads individual processes to their termination. The network closes up on itself: the relations of conditioning between processes are circular. Thus, the network defines an identity. An important implication of precariousness is that were the organization to be removed (its closure ‘‘opened-up’’), the resulting system would not be stable. This, we
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must notice, is not an implication of the concept of closure as presented in autopoietic theory. The condition of precariousness is not made explicit. All that the theory says is that if the organization is transformed into a nonautopoietic one, the autopoietic system ceases to exist. Nothing is said about what remains of those processes that were once components of an autopoietic system. Precariousness is the additional condition that if autopoiesis were lost, the processes that acted as its components would also cease. The requirement of precariousness is again an addendum that reduces the wider set of general closure as introduced in the primary literature. It brings in an inherent dynamical element that we have seen is absent in the original formulation. Even though precariousness and adaptivity do not bear a logical relation (it is possible for a precarious autopoietic system not to be adaptive, or for an adaptive one not to be precarious), they are in factual terms solidarious concepts. It is indeed precariousness that installs the conditions upon which adaptivity, for which there would seem otherwise to be scarcely any need, becomes a useful strategy in the history of life. It is, as we have seen, the combination of precarious autonomy and adaptivity that lays the ground for a cognitive relation with the world. Adaptivity is a more sophisticated form of achieving conservation of autopoiesis. The norms of selfconservation are initially duplicated in the mechanisms of adaptive conservation. They pass from being norms available only to an external observer to being norms available to the autopoietic system itself. If we now consider a precarious, adaptive autopoietic system which has also turned into an agent because of its capability to regulate structural coupling, we may ask what is the effect of such regulation on the metabolic, self-constructing substrate that gives rise to it. The effect, at the beginning at least, cannot be other than reduplication. That is, regulation of coupling subserves metabolism and extends its adaptive powers to the boundary conditions of its own operation. But the ends remain the same. To see this more clearly, let us consider the alternatives for the environmental conditions affecting the viability of bare autopoiesis. Since the system is precarious, there are, by definition, no conditions available to its structural processes by which they would survive on their own in the absence of the closed network (there may have been such conditions in the remote past, but now they have disappeared — this is something to keep in mind in what follows). But once operational closure is in place, the space of possible environmental or boundary conditions is divided into two: viable conditions and inviable conditions. The first is the subset of conditions in which the closed system, given its current structure, would remain viable without eliciting a dangerous approach to the boundaries of the viability set — in principle, this situation might be maintained indefinitely; the second is the complementary subset of conditions. It seems obvious that any durable, barely autopoietic system should have access to situations (internal states, dynamical flows) in which the set of viable conditions is not an empty set; otherwise the system cannot be autopoietic as it would inevitably cross the boundary of viability. What happens with the appearance of agency? Adaptive regulation of coupling reveals the structure of the inviable set. The complement of a set of conditions that guarantee viability is not just the set of conditions that simply negate viability (although such ‘‘lethal’’ conditions are included in it). This set includes conditions
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under which the system is inviable in the long term but not necessarily immediately destroyed — in other words, conditions under which the system is in a ‘‘dangerous’’ transient moving toward its boundary of viability. Agency allows the system to cope with a portion of such dangerous conditions (conditions, as we have seen, that are also cognitively evaluated as dangerous by the system itself by this very coping). It does so by regulating structural coupling in such a way that a dangerous condition is not allowed to subsist long enough to lead the system to destruction. A temporal dimension is introduced in the set of environmental conditions. The severity of these conditions becomes a matter of degree, which is ‘‘measured’’ by of the adaptive regulation deployed to cope with them. Sometimes the regulation at the level of agency can be so reliable as to allow quite a durable persistence in dangerous conditions. As an example, consider the water boatman, one of several species of insects able to breathe underwater by trapping air bubbles (plastrons) in the tiny hairs of the abdomen. The bubbles refill with oxygen due to the differences in partial pressure provoked by respiration and potentially can work indefinitely (see, e.g., Thorpe, 1950). They allow the insect to spend time underwater for longer periods thanks to a mediated regulation of environmental coupling (which is nevertheless riskier than normal breathing). The regulation of coupling (agency) takes the form of maintaining an external structure that directly supplements a vital function in an environmental condition that belongs to the unviable subset.
6.2
Life-Support
Up to this point, agency ‘‘plays along’’ with metabolism without fundamentally altering its systemic properties. It reduplicates its operation by extending in the interactional domain the logic of adaptive conservation of viability. Let us now suppose that the structure of the system is allowed to change while conserving its autopoietic organization (as a consequence of codrifting in the conservation of structural coupling). Agency is in principle no obstacle to this process, which is clearly identified in the original theory. But the distinction of degree in the severity of nonviable conditions that is enabled by agency opens up a radically novel possibility to this process of structural drift. What if the system were to change its structure (while remaining autopoietic) and find itself in a situation where all environmental conditions are inviable? Could this system subsist with an empty set of viable external conditions? Thanks to its active regulation of structural coupling, the answer is that this is indeed possible. All that such system needs to do is to activate its interactive regulation in order to move well in time from one dangerous transient into another that gives it further chances of regulative response (for instance, because it is slower or allows the system to renew some of its resources). The operation would soon have to be repeated and the system would be constantly buying time for itself (imagine a water boatman that moves permanently to an underwater environment by finding the means to renew its external air bubbles). Agency, thus, contains within itself the radical possibility of performing a function of life-support (in the sense given to this term in the medical field). The constructive
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and interactive domains do intersect. Precariousness acquires a higher order; not only are the constitutive metabolic processes unable to continue in the absence of the closed network of relations, but the network itself is unable to remain closed in the absence of the interactive regulation that it originally gave rise to. But, following Jonas, so does freedom acquire a higher order. The set of conditions under which life thrives is now extended so that the transformed metabolism/agent is now able to survive situations in which all possible conditions would lead to its destruction if it had remained only metabolism. And, again following Jonas, as the means that modify the end themselves become part of it, interactive life may acquire a closure of its own. It becomes autonomous by self-organizing plasticity and behavior into habits. It also becomes normative, not only by (a) filling in with its own norms a ‘‘metabolically neutral’’ space of values and conserving a higher form of life that is enabled by metabolism, as we have already suggested (see also Di Paolo, 2005), but also by (b) potentially driving metabolism to depend on this new form of life. For while the possibility of option (a) is always present, the normativity it introduces is only constrained by that of metabolism — this normativity should not contravene the latter’s viability. New norms, in this case, relate to autopoiesis in a contingent way (like a strong preference in terms of taste between two kinds of food of similar nutritional value). In other words, such norms are metabolically indifferent. This case alone would not be sufficient to understand why the Jonasian transitions would be irrevocable. However, in case (b) metabolism itself changes fundamentally due to the possibilities afforded by autonomous agency. Normativity in the interactive domain is now not entirely contingent and will bear an inner relation to the normativity of metabolism (e.g., a preference for a certain taste in food changing metabolism so that it actually becomes more nutritious; you are what you prefer to eat). Agency in this case does more than downward-regulate metabolism; it ‘‘downward-constitutes’’ it. (In the imaginary case of the permanently underwater insect, this could take the form of the development of a metabolic accommodation to other gases dissolved in the water apart from oxygen followed by a subsequent specialization in diet enabled only because of this new metabolic adaptation). So we can appreciate that it is within the potentialities of agency to alter the domain of viability of metabolism so as to allow it to subsist in conditions that would otherwise be inviable. However, this very alteration can potentially allow metabolism to drift into previously inaccessible situations in which all conditions are inviable, as long as it remains under the self-scaffolded life-support of agency. In strict terms, such a system would be alive but not operationally closed in and of itself, i.e., as a composite network of processes whose operation regenerates the network and defines it as a unity. It is alive inasmuch as these very same conditions still verify. But these conditions obtain thanks to the system’s actions in the relational domain in which the unity as a whole enters. This relational domain becomes not a contextual, enabling (and essentially contingent and external) condition for the conservation of life, but a necessary, active, and operational process flowing from the relations subtended by the whole unity into the constitution of the composite system. In other words, the system is alive and not sensu stricto autopoietic. It functions as a life/mind unity — the self-sustaining structures of the interactive domain (habits)
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become mutual renditions (not just external coordinations) between the psychic and the somatic.
6.3
Life/Mind
We can see that, as suggested above, the development of autopoiesis in enactive theory leads to a view of life and mind in which autopoiesis itself (interpreted in its traditional sense) is divested from its self-sufficiency as a definition of all life. Instead, it becomes an initiating moment in such a definition to which we must critically return. Not all known forms of life sublate metabolism in the way I have described, but arguably many do. In particular, most animal forms are unable to survive in their habitat without appropriate and highly specialized sensorimotor skills (not to mention their dependence, in many cases, on appropriate social support). Only in situations that never obtain in their habitat (lab situations), would such forms be able to subsist metabolically were they to be even partially deprived from their agential powers (and by this very fact they already become different lifeforms). Life/mind overcomes the self-sufficient, closed logic of metabolic conservation by conserving itself through means that are not purely metabolic. In this way, the remnants of dualism hidden behind the nonintersection of the operational and the relational domains in autopoietic theory are dispelled without rejecting this distinction but by overcoming it and conserving it. The consequences of this sublation of autopoiesis are significant (and largely unexplored). One immediate consequence is that cases where life turns into life/mind are those characterized by potential inner conflict and interactive restlessness. We immediately are forced to turn to a more dynamic view of life and cognition. A life/mind cannot ever stay quiet and on the spot for too long (the quietness of phenomena like hibernation belies the exertion required in accumulating sufficient energy and durable safe conditions to survive the winter). A life/mind requires a novel economy of effort and strategizing as part of its very essence. It is in effect what we witness in most animal life. And this strategizing leads to a life of decision-making, struggling, and the constant possibility of inner conflict (apart from conflict with others) and of imbalances between lacks and excesses (now not only as a pathological case, but as a foundational possibility of this mode of being). Eventually, death itself might be inherent to life/mind, although this is at this point speculative.3
3
Isn’t the inevitability of death related to the situation whereby all environmental conditions are inviable? If so, perhaps death comes as a consequence of the sublation of autopoiesis in life/mind. Notice the difference between any autopoietic system that ceases to exist because it faces an inviable condition, but for which the set of viable condition remains not empty (a prokaryote cell might in principle reproduce ad infinitum if the external conditions are maintained stable, but can of course die as soon as a negative intervention is made in its medium or directly on it) and those life/mind systems for which all conditions are inviable and yet subsist thanks to life-support. Maybe the organizational precariousness of such systems puts them in a situation where death is unavoidable since they have no ‘‘stable home’’ except death.
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7 Conclusion The logic of the return from the higher to the lower — the life-support of agency that turns into the agency of life-support; the scaffold that modifies the terrain upon which it is assembled — is generally lacking in systemic approaches to social systems (and up to this point cognitive science has been in no better position). If we open up a channel through which behavior plastically inscribes itself in the body, so then might social interactions and so could social institutions. Once this possibility is understood in systemic terms, some concomitant questions that arise in debates about whether social systems are or not autopoietic (where are the boundaries?, what is a component?) stop making sense. Such questions form part of an ineffectual discourse and inevitably lead back to the dichotomies of structuralist vs. individual actor perspectives on society. Overcoming a parallel dichotomy in the relation between metabolic and agential normativity should help us surmount the opposition between social structures and individual subjectivity. The notion of a transition in identity generation is the key operative concept introduced by the enactive approach. It overlays autopoietic ideas with an inherently dynamical dimension and redefines it as a biology of transformation, not just conservation. The substrate of the social is not just the space of meaning (communications, exchange) but also its inscription in living agencies, artifacts, and oblique structuring of habits, which can only be uncovered through genealogical as well as systemic analysis. We can envision a systemic approach to social science whose mission would be to reveal an ecology of different social lifeforms and their transitions, conflicts, and transformations. Some social lifeforms might be similar to the extracellular matrix in multicellular organisms or bacterial biofilms, an active medium that structures and is structured by the activity of social actors, something resembling Bourdieu’s habitus (Bourdieu, 1990). Such a form is a soft machine with a receding horizon. It makes little sense to characterize it in terms of boundaries, distinctions, and components. The nature of this kind of social lifeform is such that any attempt at a distinction immediately brings forth a wider background of significance and processes in relations never closed upon themselves. Other forms are less diffuse. Self-managed businesses (a phenomenon with many manifestations throughout history but that that has peaked in countries like Argentina and Venezuela over the last 10 years, born out of desperate need, strong communal support, and institutional instability or reform) can in many cases be seen as single exemplars of several transitions in emergent identities (with the attendant expansion of both freedom and precariousness). In their history from bankruptcy to profit-making self-management, they undergo a transformation from an externally supported, almost ascriptional identity which at best is able to sustain a relation of self-distinction — an in-itself — through a process of ‘‘de-grammaticalization’’ of labor, a re-signification of individual and collective activity, and a devolution of responsibility to workers and the community at large, so as to become a for-itself — a cause. Such entities might indeed be a closer social analogue not to ruthless bacteria, but to some higher form of life/mind.
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What the enactive approach invites us to do is to see in life, mind, and society, not single unifying notions but multiplicities of events, entities, relations, and processes. These are organized, they are not chaotic, hence the value of systems thinking, but they induce a break from the mythology of stability, boundaries, and conservation. By contrast, the enactive approach foregrounds a discourse of transformations, freedom, precariousness, identities, norms, negativity, temporality, sense-making, and re-inscriptions of meaning in matter and bodies — all notions largely absent in autopoietic theory but not incompatible with it.
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Kendon, A. (1990). Conducting interaction: Patterns of behavior in focused encounters. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kim, J. (1999). Making sense of emergence. Philosophical Studies, 95, 3–36. Klin, A., Jones, W., Schultz, R., & Volkmar, F. (2003). The enactive mind, or from actions to cognition: Lessons from autism. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society London B Biological Sciences, 358, 345–360. Kuramoto, Y. (1984). Chemical oscillations, waves and turbulence. Berlin: Springer. Maturana, H. (2002). Autopoiesis, structural coupling and cognition: A history of these and other notions in the biology of cognition. Cybernetics and Human Knowing, 9, 5–34. Maturana, H., & Varela, F. J. (1980). Autopoiesis and cognition: The realization of the living. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing. Protevi, J. (2008). Beyond autopoiesis: Inflections of emergence and politics in the work of Francisco Varela. In: B. Clarke & M. Hansen (Eds), Emergence and embodiment: Essays in neocybernetics. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Sacks, H. (1992). Lectures on conversation (Volumes I and II). Oxford: Blackwell. Sacks, H., Schegloff, E. A., & Jefferson, G. (1974). A simplest systematics for the organization of turn-taking for conversation. Language, 50, 696–735. Schiffrin, D. (1994). Approaches to discourse. Oxford: Blackwell. Schmidt, R. C., & O’Brien, B. (1997). Evaluating the dynamics of unintended interpersonal coordination. Ecological Psychology, 9, 189–206. Schutz, A. (1964). Studies in social theory. Collected papers II. The Hague: Nijhoff. Silberstein, M., & McGeever, J. (1999). The search for ontological emergence. The Philosophical Quarterly, 49, 182–200. Spencer, H. (1897). The Principles of Sociology, 3 vols. New York, NY: D. Appleton and Co. Thompson, E. (2005). Sensorimotor subjectivity and the enactive approach to experience. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 4, 407–427. Thompson, E. (2007). Mind in life: Biology, phenomenology, and the sciences of mind. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Thorpe, W. H. (1950). Plastron respiration in aquatic insects. Biological Review, 25, 344–390. Varela, F. J. (1979). Principles of biological autonomy. North Holland, New York, NY: Elsevier. Varela, F. J. (1991). Organism: A meshwork of selfless selves. In: A. I. Tauber (Ed.), Organism and the origin of the self (pp. 79–107). Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Varela, F. J. (1997). Patterns of life: Intertwining identity and cognition. Brain and Cognition, 34, 72–87. Varela, F. J., Thompson, E., & Rosch, E. (1991). The embodied mind: Cognitive science and human experience. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Weber, A., & Varela, F. J. (2002). Life after Kant: Natural purposes and the autopoietic foundations of biological individuality. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 1, 97–125. Winfree, A. T. (2001). The geometry of biological time. London: Springer. Varela, F. J. (1989). Reflections on the circulation of concepts between a biology of cognition and systemic family therapy. Family Process, 28, 15–24. Thompson, E., & Varela, F. J. (2001). Radical embodiment: Neural dynamics and consciousness. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 5(10), 418–425.
Chapter 4
Innovation and Organization: An Overview from the Perspective of Luhmann’s Autopoiesis Tore Bakken, Tor Hernes and Eric Wiik
‘‘Everything could be different’’ and ‘‘almost nothing can I change’’ – Niklas Luhmann
1 Introduction Few words in modern society have become as positively charged as the word innovation. Of course, premodern societies were also innovative in their way. Still, technology, ideas, and organizational forms have changed over time, and it is only in modern society that innovation has become almost mandatory; that is to say, ranked uppermost in society’s value system. ‘‘Be innovative!’’ has become an imperative in modern society. Niklas Luhmann viewed innovative processes (understood as social change or renewal) not from an action-theoretical perspective, i.e., as the result of an intervention into a social system with the structural changes that go with it, but rather from the perspective of self-referential processes of systems where change in structures are interpreted as changes in communicative events (Ereignisse). Innovation can thus be understood as structural changes where systems react to events in the environment with a changed connectivity between communications (Luhmann, 1984, 470ff.). In action-theoretical studies, however (Joas, 1992; Giddens, 1990), it has been argued that Luhmann’s theory of autopoietic systems prevents a satisfactory understanding of the phenomenon of innovation because it operates with a subjectless action concept that cannot explain learning and innovation processes. The acting subjects that provide the occasion for changed expectations are not co-thematized, which leaves the theory indefinite apropos the question why new structures appear.
Autopoiesis in Organization Theory and Practice Advanced Series in Management, 69–88 Copyright r 2009 Emerald Group Publishing Limited All rights of reproduction in any form reserved ISSN: 1877-6361/doi:10.1108/S1877-6361(2009)0000006005
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According to these arguments, Luhmann’s theory is relevant only to the study of routines and not to innovative processes (cf. Beckert, 1997, p. 347). But can autopoietic systems not be creative and innovative? Or does the biological roots of the concept and notions such as ‘‘structural determinism’’ and ‘‘structural states’’ make it impossible to capture ‘‘the new’’ in the system’s dynamics? The aim of the following discussion is to outline the theory of autopoietic systems, as it pertains to action theory and the understanding of the phenomenon of innovation. This will be elucidated by examining how systems theory combines concepts of (1) the old and the new, (2) the real and the possible, and (3) the redundant and the variable.
2 The Old and the New 2.1
The Concept of Autopoiesis
Autopoietic systems are cognitively oriented systems where ‘‘events’’ appear in the light of a historically arising structure and its state (what Maturana calls ‘‘structure states’’). Experience is therefore always an important concept in autopoietic systems and becomes in a sense a link between the system’s history and its possible future. With the organizationally required conservatism with which a cognitive system operates, an increasing number of possibilities become actualized, even if in the light of complementary experiences they cannot be satisfied. This means that the production of the radically new cannot be ruled out, but depends on the selfreferential, autopoietic system’s mode of operation. This two-sidedness is expressed in Varelas’s (1979) definition of autopoietic systems: An autopoietic system is organized (defined as a unity) as a network of processes of production (transformation and destruction) of components that produces the components that: (1) through their interactions and transformations continuously regenerate and realize the network of processes (relations) that produces them: and (2) constitute it (the machine) as a concrete unity in the space in which they exist by specifying the topological domain of its realization as such a network. (p. 13)
According to such a definition, the new becomes a construction that must be seen as a communicative and socially produced relationship; and not as a ‘‘Ding an Sich.’’ A posited ‘‘mechanics’’ that can explain the new in this sense is more closely connected with the self-referential character of autopoietic systems. It is in this sense that such systems are cognitive systems. Different reality constructions lead to different (new) action and descriptions, which in turn lead to a differentiation process in the treatment of similar objects. Examples are differentiation between the scientific disciplines but also the transformation of techniques and technologies between different subsystems — e.g., that continuous change in rocket technology and space research depends upon other subsystems developing new materials that can tolerate heat, which then in turn can be transformed back into space research. Such processes can be described as innovation processes.
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In the following discussion, we will attempt to show how social systems, as a result of their organization,1 are conservative systems, while they at the same time produce social changes, e.g., in the form of innovations due to the fact that they are operative constructions. In order to understand the phenomenon of innovation one needs the concept of ‘‘irritations.’’2 Autopoietic systems allow themselves to be ‘‘irritated’’ by their environment, and this produces new combinatory modes, i.e., innovations. It is in this context, as we will see later, that decisions become so important, as they can serve to accelerate the process. Maturana, Varela, and Uribe (1982) have developed a simulation model for cellular autopoiesis that helps explain how an autopoietic system works. In this simulation model (based on biological autopoiesis), they show how the cell is constantly renewed and changed over time. It is the spontaneous production of an autopoietic unit, in other words, that this formalized model will illustrate. Framed in the terminology of Wittgenstein, one might perhaps say that autopoiesis represents a new language play that can serve to distance the problem from ontological questions connected to what nature’s essence is. If we then introduce the predicate ‘‘produce oneself,’’ then it becomes a part of the language play’s grammar (Wittgenstein, 1967) that determines which organisms can be described. Through the lens of autopoiesis, the concept of the new can thus be seen as first and foremost a new language: a new language play establishes a new grammar, and thus new ways of seeing things that can open the way for new combinations, i.e., prepare us to think innovatively.3 This enables a new access to reality: a new language play establishes an area for descriptions that are different in relationship from the old; it demarcates a new context for observation so that new phenomena become clear, which under the old way of looking at things were not. This is how the language play can be made into the logical primacy, and not the ontology that stands in the shadow of the language play or is constituted by it. The grammar of the language play thus defines the space for possible experiences that are described in the language play, such that the language play creates a basis for distinctions, i.e., a basis for that which is described as self-organizing, autopoietic, and so on. In this way, one can say that the limits of 1
According to Maturana and Varela, the notion of ‘‘organization’’ indicates the identity of a unity, that is to say, what kind of class/group it belongs to. The identity of the unity tells us something about the relations between the components/parts which define the composite unity of that class/group. The notion refers to the relations between the components which have to be invariant in order to maintain the identity of the unity. Luhmann did not apply Maturana/Varela’s biological notions of organization and structure, as he felt they had little relevance for sociology. 2 In Maturana’s language it is called perturbations. 3 In systems theoretical constructivism ‘‘the new’’ is a kind of emergent order: ‘‘Emergence, in its ‘classical’ meaning, refers to the rise of new levels of being (life as opposed to inanimate nature or of spirit as opposed to life), which in no way may be derived or predicted or explained by turning to the properties of an underlying level. This is why they are perceived as ‘unexpected,’ ‘surprising,’ etc. A modern version of emergence is the rise of, through microscopic interactions at a microscopic level, new qualities that cannot be derived (causally explained, formally derived) from the properties of the components, although they consist solely of the interaction between these components’’ (Krohn & Kru¨ppers, 1992, p. 389 own translation).
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experience lie in the grammar of our experience concepts, i.e., in the language play with which we describe our experience. For Luhmann, there is never any question of a direct analogy between social systems and organisms. Instead he takes the roundabout way of ‘‘generalization and respecification’’ (Luhmann, 1995). There are thus differences with the autopoiesis concept of Maturana/Varelas in two respects: (1) Luhmann’s non-organic autopoiesis considers the reproductive processes as ‘‘temporalized.’’ While organisms’ autopoiesis operates with elements (e.g., cells’ organization and operation) which timewise remain relatively constant, social autopoiesis as well as the autopoiesis of consciousness are based on units (communication and thoughts) that have the character of ‘‘events’’: as soon as they take place they vanish.4 A problem thus arises with the connectivity of an event, which is solved with the help of meaning. This leads to a further specification of the autopoiesis concept. (2) For in structures and processes that are organized according to meaning, external sizes such as system limits and environment also become included in the analysis in a more cogent way (as we shall see, this will have significance for the understanding of innovation, which requires precisely that one disturb autopoiesis’s network). Limits and environment presume meaning for the system, which means that such systems can operate internally with the difference between system and environment. Meaning thus makes it possible for co-interpretation of references not only to the system itself, but also to the system’s environment. The observer can now, to a greater degree, choose what should be attached importance to, the system or the environment. Meaning thus gives support to an evolutionary gain that lies in the capacity to make new combinatory possibilities of closure and environment openness in the system. In this sense, Luhmann allows for operationally closed systems to be open in a new way: closure and openness are no longer seen as opposites. The difference between system and environment is applied system internally as a principle for obtaining information. The operation that promotes this identityconstitutive acknowledgement is observation, and within Luhmann’s system theory, this is understood as marking a difference. In their difference-form systems observe themselves as environment. This relationship between simultaneous environment dependence and independence in systems can be described by the terms mode and event. The systems are independent of their environment as regards their special mode of self-government (this is how they acquire their identity), but dependent when it comes to events in the environment perceived as information. But this opening is always relativized: in its observations, the observing system constructs the observed object from its own perspective. Information is therefore always a self-production of the system, and not a fact in the environment that stand independently of observers. This has consequences for the study of innovation processes. Instead of, as for Maturana/Varela, the observer being ‘‘captured’’ by the system (i.e., constituted 4
This distinction is emphasized by Dirk Baecker (2000): ‘‘But Maturana and Varela use the relative static notion of ‘component.’ Luhmann’s notion of event sheds light over a moment’s disappearance, like a reproductive moment to the creation of the situation — and in this way we can leave the sociology’s use of the notions of intention and action.’’ (p. 126)
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within a separate domain isolated from the autopoietic system that can thus exist only in an ad hoc relation to it), the observer generates the system by drawing a distinction. By placing the observer at the starting point, Luhmann opens the system to alternative constructions. The activity itself that produces the system formation can now be seen more openly. The mechanism for closure can now be shifted from how perceptions function (Maturana et al., 1982) to how the systems’ codes function. The autopoiesis concept in Luhmann’s version thus becomes interesting because it provides a means for understanding how the new is produced (Bakken & Hernes, 2003, 2008). At the same time, the concept of autopoiesis makes an interesting contribution to a better understanding of the interplay between the old and the new in innovation processes. Starting with the autopoiesis concept, we can now bring in a more ‘‘playful attitude’’ to the phenomenon of the new. It is no longer necessary to accept a value system that states that everything new is better than that which existed before.5
2.2
The Old and the New
So how does one explain this in sociological terms? We gain little by explaining phenomena in the modern organizational world from the standpoint that there exist inner tendencies in organizations that lead toward more rational, improved states or innovations, and that management’s task is to nurture these tendencies. Sociology, on the other hand, is better off inquiring into the relationship between organization and society. But why the preference for the new in society? We need to go all the way back to the early modern society of the 1600–1700s, or the period after the discovery of the printing press, to find a decisive break (cf. Luhmann, 1995). It was then that the old 5
Luhmann (1997) shows that a shift from what to how questions gives a better description of the new. ‘‘The beautiful world is no longer an object of religious admiration, accompanied by the practical problems of finding ones path. The ways in which the world manifests itself gives rise to the question of how the world came into being and how similar effects can be obtained [erzeugt] y If we know how to produce something, it may be possible, on the basis of this, to vary [our] goals and decide to create unknown phenomena. The ‘neuzeitliche’ science formulated its understanding of nature based on references to methods and experiments; but even the art of governing started with the question of how to obtain dominance [Herrshaft] and remain in positions of power’’ (p. 520). The German cybernetics and philosopher Gotthard Gu¨nther (1980) is also highlighting this, though in a little bit more Hegelian tone: ‘‘In the old classical conception of the world [Weltbild], which, to be sure, was rich in content, but had a total contextural simplicity, nothing truly and really new could come into existence y Nothing (totally) new newness y cannot manifest itself within a given contexture. And since Hegel, right or wrong, interpreted nature as a closed contexture, nature cannot, according to him, generate anything really new within this contexture. The trivial passage from one content to the next will at the most produce subaltern ‘news,’ like the ones we find in the changing world of fashion y The genuinely new, which holds up to the philosophical scrutiny, requires a change in content as well as a switch of contexture. Thus, not only the first negation is involved, but the second as well’’ (pp. 197–198, vol. 3, own translation). That is to say, the really new demands not only changes in content but also a change in perspective.
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Latin term novus — which basically meant deviation — was temporalized. And thus the new became a time concept in the sense of receiving attention if it deviates from what came before. This marked a break with the old aristocratic society where age and origin was decisive, also for all contemporary orientation. In principle one was expected to know one’s place and all innovation was regarded as deviation. With the growing functional differentiation of the 1600–1700s came a radical change that swept through all the functional subsystems. Within art originality became prized; genius and the ability to create new works were preferred over the cultivation of memory as it applied to known stories and known picture configurations. Within the sciences the real meaning of research turned toward innovation, and the same was true of all technical development. Education became subject to comprehensive reforms, particularly in Protestant schools, and within the economy all was now geared to new markets where one demonstrated one’s success with new and improved products. While the various functional areas may have different degrees of preference for newness, there is nevertheless a general tendency to prefer the new over the old. To be sure, there still exist reservations toward novelty; throughout the entire 1700s, there was no shortage of warnings against unrest, especially among weak government officials. Even so, and often described by sociologists, with an increasing functional differentiation came a shift in orientation from deviation to novelty. The problem of deviation was set up against the normative area in society, especially in the law courts. And by virtue of its positive shift it may change, but until such time as it does, one cannot offend against it without incurring sanctions. The mode of thinking sketched here has long had the support of sociological theory, but mostly in the light of the theory of differentiation understood as the division of labor as Adam Smith prescribes, whereby differentiation operates on the premise that society develops toward constantly increasing rationality, as well as increased production within all sectors, not only in the form of better resource exploitation within the economy, but also in politics in the form of increased democracy, etc. There is a one-sidedness in this way of thinking, and it is to this that Luhmann directs his criticism: the hope of increased rationality as a result of the social division of labor is today no longer tenable (Luhmann, 1995). We need a new conception of functional differentiation, claims Luhmann, and it must be extended to include function-systems’ autonomy in the sense of operative closure and self-regulation. There no longer exists an external authority or an Archimedean point that stands independent of the systems. This is well known from Luhmann’s commentaries and will not be pursued further here. Our point is that when Luhmann speaks of operative closure, this in no way means causal closure. Indeed quite the opposite. The causal interdependencies increase because each functional system is dependent upon the others functioning. In addition, the respective systems’ problems can be exported to other systems. Politics can have problems that it cannot solve politically, whereupon a legal clause is made with the expectation that the constitutional law courts will solve the problem; and often the courts then send the problem back to politics and so on. This is somewhat how the economic system thinks when it comes to ecological regulations: my company cannot
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comply with certain environmental demands voluntarily, and therefore a government regulation must be set in place to ensure fair competition; the ecology cannot be made dependent upon the goodwill of a particular company manager. What is impossible and possible in a particular functional system has a causal effect on the other functional systems. This means — and this is relevant to the question of innovation — that the irritation potential in modern society increases.6 As a consequence there is a steady increase in the combination of closure and causal openness. Here there is always misunderstanding in regard to the concept of autopoiesis, namely that operative closure means at the same time causal isolation. That is to say, that the economic system should be able to stand alone, and not be bothered about what goes on in the family, what happens in politics or the courts, etc. The point is that operative closure makes a precise distinction between operative closure and causal dependence/independence. These points must be held strictly separate from each other if we are to understand which self-irritation and which form of problem-passing is taking place in the society without an absolute authority being able to regulate the use of resources. Under conditions of functional differentiation, operative closure means that in a causal relationship greater independence and greater dependence are made possible simultaneously, precisely because the complexity of society increases. In what way can organizations’ potential for irritations be increased, and how can this affect our understanding of innovations? The advantage of using the concept of irritation is that what is coming cannot be known in advance; that is to say, how the system is to prepare itself for irritations — innovatively or conservatively. This remains an open question. Modern organizations can contribute by changing the ways in which they see innovations, not as preferred ways of changing structures but as irritations where something is done in an agitated way, and it remains an open question what comes out of this. What then is irritation? The concept differentiates itself from information in that while information means a surprise in the same way as irritation, information is more the understanding of a defined surprise. One knows what possibilities one has, or one has a horizon of possible events and makes a selection to judge if this is a hint or a surprise, i.e., information. Irritation, on the other hand, is an undefined surprise that is based on the environment (or more precisely system to system), yet remaining a product of the system itself. When the fire alarm goes off it is not the surroundings that are irritated but the fire brigade. The question poses itself thus: Where is the fire? And how extensive is it? In this way the problem is brought over into categories, and it is then one gets the rule in Bateson’s sense: ‘‘Information is a difference that makes a difference.’’ Organizations have the ability to react to the modern society through specification and diversification in regard to irritation. In this way irritation is always calculated into the environment. There is a fire out there, not in the fire station, but the job of 6
Cf. Luhmann (1997): ‘‘Accordingly, irritation is a systems state that stimulates continuation of the autopoietic operations of a system. But as a simple irritation it leaves open the question of whether structures must be changed as well; i.e. whether new learning processes will be initiated by additional irritations or whether the system is counting on that the irritations, in time, will disappear by themselves, since they are only a one-time event’’ (p. 790, own translation).
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extinguishing the blaze is effected by internal programs. This happens in much the same way in corporate consultancy. Here also in recent years one has become more open to the use of therapeutic and constructivistic measures where one proceeds from a problem area in the organization that is poorly or cursorily defined — one proceeds from an irritation, so to speak. Even though irritations (and information) are constructed internally, they oscillate constantly between self-reference and heteroreference, i.e., with conceptions that one in the organization cannot call clearly defined or predictable. From this kind of thinking, in regard to the relationship between the new and the old (in an autopoietic sense), one can according to Luhmann (2000) conclude that: The unconditional support of innovation (in its positive sense) should be replaced by a recommendation, given the continuous absorption of uncertainty that takes place anyway, to maintain and nurse the irritability of the organization. On the one hand, this is a paradoxical principle, since irritation means a reestablishment of uncertainty. On the other, paradoxes too are included in this recommendation, since the very intention of communicating paradoxes is to irritate. Thus inventiveness is in no way excluded. Nor has any pre-decision been made as to the extent or radicalness of inventiveness [y] However, irritations are not only rewarding in the form of innovation, it is first of all because they provoke a decision, and second because even untried and rejected innovations (‘for which the time is still not ripe’) are stored in the systems memory. (pp. 219–220, own translation)
We can now adopt a more reflexive attitude to innovation. In this way Luhmann can dismiss old European descriptions of novelty and innovation as an unambiguous rationalization tool. This is a way of thinking that expresses not only the relationship between the old and the new, but also its kindred problem, namely the relationship between the real and the possible.
3 From A Sense of Reality to A Sense of the Possible When Luhmann was awarded the Hegel prize in 1989, Robert Spaemann made the following characterization in his tribute: Luhmann’s ideal type is not homo oeconomicus, politicus or sociologicus, but rather ‘‘the man without qualities’’ in the way of the great novel by Robert Musil. In his book Musil depicts the consequences a plural social world has upon the individual who becomes a ‘‘plural I,’’ as expressed through the main character Ulrich. Such a social world demands that the individual make a choice. The individual is no longer confronted by a fate-determined social world but by a multiplicity of choices, as if he or she stands before a multiplicity of realities: that which was once perceived as a whole must now be seen as a system of variables. And it is the same fragmentation that the individual is exposed to. In his studies of Musil and The Man without Qualities, sociologist P. L. Berger (1988) has demonstrated what consequences Musil’s position has for the modern subject: It is becoming y increasingly more difficult to regard the ‘‘I’’ as the center of a single individual’s actions. Instead, these actions are now regarded as events, which, without the doing of the individual, befalls him, and which may be explained by either exterior (social) or interior (organic or psychic) causes. The Cartesian ‘‘I,’’ that used to proclaim its ‘‘cogito ergo sum,’’ has been
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dissolved in a Machian stream of thingliness [Dinghaftigkeit]. The modern subjectivity erodes itself, so to speak. (p. 135, own translation)
In The Man without Qualities, Musil depicts the ideological confusion and collapse that characterized the final years of the Austro-Hungarian double-monarchy from 1913 to 1914. A lack of substance and overall vision marked the picture of the times, the officer and the civil servant are stuck in their ‘‘partial values’’ and have lost their sense of the possible. The novel’s main character — Ulrich, the man without qualities — should not be seen as without character; he is above all the man of possibilities. He is not immobilized in a determined role but, rather, he is open and creative, he sees reality as hypothesis, he lives in the conjunctive, he experiments.7 But if there is such a thing as a sense of reality — and no one will doubt that it has its raison d’eˆtre — then there must also be something that one can call a sense of possibility. Anyone possessing it does not say, for instance: Here this or that has happened, will happen, must happen. He uses his imagination and says: here such and such might, should or ought to happen. And if he is told that something is the way it is, then he thinks: Well, it could probably just as easily be some other way. (Musil, 1979, p. 12, vol. 1)
It is the next step’s ethics that Musil aspires to: an exacting way to be a person. One might also use the term ‘‘self-creating,’’ where the direction is not fixed. Not the strategic, but the tactical is in focus. This sense of the possible, moreover, runs strongly in German romantics like Fichte and Schelling who operate with their indeterminate person who bears the mark of being ‘‘not yet’’; or the art which in a manner of speaking approaches the ‘‘uncreated creating.’’ In the same way as Musil, Luhmann also takes to task all forms of substance thinking. As the central character in Musil’s novel Ulrich says ‘‘The world has not only one meaning, it has uncountable meanings’’ and ‘‘the one binding truth disintegrates into hundreds of relative truths,’’ it is therefore natural that mathematics’ absence of substance becomes the yardstick for Musil’s central character: ‘‘One and the same case has a hundred sides, each side a hundred relationships.’’ In the same way mathematics (especially that of Spencer Brown) takes a central position in Luhmann’s system theory, and from the standpoint of Whitehead and the pragmatists Luhmann also rejects the substance school of thought. When Whitehead in Process and Reality (1978) seeks to understand what ‘‘process’’ is, he rejects Kant’s substance-oriented logic that indeed stands as a special instance of one-sided predicate logic. Process — Whitehead says — can only be understood from ambiguous predicates. An ‘‘event’’ — or that something happens — is without substance, and a subject–predicate logic must therefore be undergone because it is one-sided, i.e., the notion that we are dealing with an unalterable subject that initiates changes must be abandoned. 7
The story tells that Ulrich’s interest for technological innovations almost became an ideological fashion: ‘‘From the first moment when he entered the engineering lecture room, Ulrich was feverishly biased. What does one still want with the Apollo Belvedere when one has the new lines of a turbo-dynamo or the smoothly gliding movements of a steam engine’s pistons before one’s eyes?’’ (Musil, 1979, p. 37, vol. 1).
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It is precisely this process aspect that Karl Weick wishes to clarify, and this with a view toward organizations. Like the autopoiesis concept, he seeks to show how organizations operate, and he does this by seeing evolutionary concepts such as variation, selection, and retention as processes. Instead of using the word variation, Weick applies the term enactment8 to describe the active role the organization plays in the production (Gestaltung) of its relevant environment. Organizational processes are thus the distinctive feature of being mutually influenceable (interdependent) as well as ‘‘loosely coupled.’’9 For multiple realities, in turn, cause loosely coupled systems because individuals share few variables, share weak variables, and differ in their perceptions of covariation among these variables. The existence of multiple realities is not just a byproduct of enactment: it is the major consequence of bounded rationality. (Weick, 1982, p. 385)
With the term enactment one can now describe organizational innovations and their processes in a more satisfactory way because endogenous and exogenous factors can be thematized together. An innovation now becomes understood as an active ‘‘production,’’ i.e., as an organizational activity where the surrounding, partly uncertain environment (e.g., the wants of the customer) gives a ‘‘new’’ Gestalt. With a ‘‘product innovation’’ an organization ‘‘produces’’ its customer base anew. A novelty in the form of an innovation is thus not to be seen as a reaction of an organization to a demand from the environment, but rather an active variation. An enacting organization can choose that which it deems meaningful to continue actively to constitute relevant environments like before, or it can choose to do things differently. It can thus profit an organization to increase the variation by ‘‘producing’’ its environments (one acts differently from before), or by reducing its environment (one acts exactly like before). This is what Weick (1969) calls doing choice: ‘‘Knowing what I know now, should I act differently?’’ (p. 60). This means that relevant environments are called in a different way in an innovation process. Different departments in an organization can thus have a different influence on this active constitution. The concept ‘‘loose coupling’’ clarifies the simultaneous presence of certain, unambiguous, rationally plannable and the more uncertain, ambiguous, non-rationally plannable aspects in relation to innovation processes. The concept points out that many parts of an organization operate simultaneously according to set plans, but that others do not, and this accentuates that these parts can develop a separate identity from the organization. Certain parts of the organization can be described as loosely coupled with other parts, and can thus adjust locally to environments without affecting the rest of the organization. 8 The notion has a strong biological basis and is different from symbolism and ‘‘connectionism’’ because it is a more radical interpretation of the network models: The autonomy of the construction of the system and its order and information is emphasized. It is underlined that the development of complex systems is open where the organisms in a way enact their complementary environment. This point is also made in the theory of autopoietic systems. 9 Cf. Weick (1982): ‘‘Loose coupling exists if (1) A affects B (suddenly rather than continuously), (2) occasionally (rather than constantly), (3) negligibly (rather than significantly), (4) indirect (rather than direct), and (5) eventually (rather than immediately)’’ (p. 380).
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Precisely this process aspect, if one re-specified it for systems in general, is also what Luhmann is at pains to describe. But processes here are to be understood as irreversible events.10 Process is concerned with likely/unlikely events, something which makes the concept sensitive to all forms of risk problematic (cf. Luhmann, 1991). It becomes a way of dealing with complexity: the system can orientate itself to differences and link their operations to them. This is temporalizing of complexity, i.e., the system’s elements cannot base themselves on repetition or routine, but must change according to internal and external demands. It must be prepared for the fact that something else is joining the fray (connection operations). The system can only actualize ‘‘instant’’ connections, and from moment to moment it produces new situations where repetition or change is possible. This is autopoietic systems’ way of functioning: systems of this kind are therefore inherently restless, they are exposed to an ‘‘endogenous’’ dynamic, and they compel themselves constantly to learn structures that are compatible with this. In this respect one can say that autopoietic systems are produced from unstable elements that vary over short periods of time, or indeed that when it comes to events they have no independent duration, but already within their own production vanish. In this way systems with temporalized complexity are continually left to disintegrate. Based on this experience of temporalized complexity, Luhmann made the meaning concept the very basis of his system theory. That which constitutes meaning for Luhmann is not, as for Weber, the significance in events, but rather a difference, namely the difference between actuality and possibility. Luhmann thinks that an autopoietic, self-referential system cannot have a stabile basis, and the system’s operations can therefore only be a departure point for further operations. Every operation consists in ‘‘drawing a distinction’’ and calls forth further markings of one side of the distinction. At a particular instant something is indicated (actualized) while at the same time pointing toward other meanings. That which at a given instant in time prevails is thus unstable, it will break off or collapse, and it compels us to select from the domain of the possible something new that can be actualized in the next instant if the autopoiesis is to be continued. Meaning is thus a continual actualization of possibilities. The measure for what is to be done is no longer the perfect, but the possible. At any given moment there is a reference to a horizon or a surplus of further possibilities, which cannot all be actualized at the next moment. Consequently one must select. The connections that are not selected, however, do not disappear, but are maintained as possibilities, i.e., they can be actualized at a later moment. This means that a system can permit errors, go back to the point of departure, and choose another road. The possibilities are after all inexhaustible. In this way the unstable and the restless compel a system into continual self-change, i.e., to become self-innovatory. According to this difference between actuality and possibility one can say with Luhmann that ‘‘everything could be different.’’ But at the same time, no matter how much one chooses, the together-possible (co-possible) will always exceed the togetherrealizable (compatible). The romantic ‘‘everything could be different’’ can quickly
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This contrary to structures which make time reversible.
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become melancholy resignation: ‘‘and almost nothing can I change’’ (Luhmann, 1971, p. 44).11 But this is the modern risk society’s paradox: the difficulty of changing something is due quite simply to the tempo and the dynamics of risk society. The risk society is driven forward at such a high tempo that it has become unchangeable in a way fraught with risk. We know this from organizational theory: no programming of larger changes is in a position to relate to the incalculable complexity the programs are involved in (cf. Luhmann, 2000, 330ff.).
4 The Next Step can Only be Determined through Decision For Luhmann innovation cannot be regarded as a value concept,12 but as a contra-inductive decision-making process y, a decision-making process that decides different from (would otherwise have been) expected, and thereby changes expectations. (Luhmann, 1978, p. 64)
Innovations are possible only to the extent that decision-making processes are able to come up with implementable alternatives. The first step toward such a shift is to study organizational changes from an evolutionary theoretical perspective rather than from a planning theoretical perspective. This is not only because an evolutionary theoretical approach operates with a more complex use of concepts, but also because value concepts can be studied in their functional context through such a perspective, i.e., studied on the level of self-descriptions of organizational systems. Value concepts cannot give a complete picture of the actual operations or structures of an organization. With Brunsson (2002) one could say that such concepts organize political modes of speaking, but by no means describe the reality they deal with. For Luhmann (1996) it is a question not only of seeing decisions as a choice from within a range of alternatives, but also to broaden that perspective. In addition one must ask how alternatives are arrived at in a world that is as it is, i.e., how is it possible through a decision to bring about something that was not there before in a world where what happens, happens, and where what does not, does not? Luhmann’s concern consists in relating decision making to the time dimension. This means that we need to assume a difference between past and future, and this at the same time makes a difference between what is past and what is future. The decision causes this difference as a result of the decision to turn out differently from how it would have turned out if one had not taken a decision, it ‘‘causes,’’ or better: the change of the difference is attributed to the decision, however, much the actual inscrutabilities and the complex causal relationships race by. The decision thus makes itself visible by attributing to itself, and in this way past and present can be treated equally. States that are as they are, or which are becoming that which they are becoming to be, break 11
This back and forth between a romantic sense of possibilities and a more skeptical orientation is typical in Luhmann’s authorship. 12 Values are contrafactic stabilized expectations. According to Luhmann they are (1973, p. 40) not very fruitful in modern organizations. Values prevent us from grasping the cognitive aspects in organizations.
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up into differences. And this makes possible a reentry of time into time.13 The past and future time horizons thus become seen in relation to each other and therefore integrated. It matters not in the slightest that a decision cannot change the past or determine the future. And despite this there begins, thanks to the reentry of time into time with every decision, a new history. The future thus for us becomes unknown. But the future’s unknowability is at the same time the greatest resource for the decision, and indeed a precondition for organizations as such, for decisions base themselves on the fact that no one knows what the future holds. One can set goals because one does not know how things will look in relation to what the future will bring. Of course we can come up with some relatively stable assumptions; e.g., that the Oslo fjord will continue to exist. But the existence or nonexistence of the Oslo fjord is not really an area for decisions. Although when one plans a tunnel under the Oslo fjord one produces a niche for the future’s unknowability, and again thanks to the reentry of time into time one is able certainly to take decisions. The more the society is prepared to recognize niches of this kind, the more obvious it will become in the future that decisions become more transitory. But when with these decisions there always begins a new history, the decision perspectives intensify the unknown aspect of decisions. As opposed to natural and cultural philosophers since Bacon and Vico, history is just as fully unpredictable because it is created by people. And it is on the cards that this happens not only through information, but also through imagination. Decisions make themselves dependent on surprises because they are surprises. They can change expectations by being contra-inductive — i.e., innovative. Again: ‘‘Everything could be different’’ and ‘‘almost nothing can I change.’’ This paradox is typical for organizational systems, for organizational systems show more than other systems this two-sidedness of redundancy and variation (cf. Ahlemeyer, 1997; Ashby, 1956; Bateson, 1972).
5 Redundancy and Variation 5.1
Organization as Redundancy
Organizations reduce contingency by creating redundancy. With Wittgenstein (1967) one can say that symbolic generalizations (cf. Parsons and Luhmann) can be understood as ‘‘rules’’ because a rule is followed not only once: To obey a rule, to make a report, to give an order, to play a game of chess, are customs (uses, institutions). To understand a sentence means to understand a language. To understand a language means to be master of a technique. (y199, p. 81)
With Luhmann (1997) one can say that redundancy is to be understood as ‘‘the repetition of the same in other situations’’ (p. 791). The hallmark of organizations as opposed to other social systems is membership, i.e., access and egress. 13
The notion of reentry (Spencer Brown) is based on the semantics of deparadoxation.
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Through membership it is possible to separate the system’s behavioral requirements from members’ behavioral motives, at the same time as those with the help of the organizational mechanism can be linked together in a relatively lasting way. With the help of membership rules organizations succeed, unlike functional systems, to produce specific modes of behavior ‘‘The soldiers march, the clerks file, the ministers rule — irrespective of whether it suits them in a given situation’’ (Luhmann, 1975, p. 12, own translation). Organizations are set up for problem solutions of a relatively lasting nature. It is this that Paul Watzlawick (1985) has called ‘‘more of the same,’’ and which is to be seen as the tendency of organizational systems to defend their identity by opposing changes in structure and rules. Even when one encounters maximal disturbance organizational systems tend to avoid utilization of counterproductive formulas (innovative solutions) in favor of utilizing ‘‘more of the same.’’ The hypothesis is that because of their distinctive system typology organizations tend to resist changes. The problem solutions are set up toward the future because historically they have been successful. In Luhmann’s language use organizations are autopoietic in the sense that they recursively produce and reproduce the decisions they consist of. These decisions have the character of being ‘‘events,’’ and as always this means that as soon as they appear they disappear. As decisions continually vanish, they allow themselves to a small degree to change, and provide only the occasion for the production of new decisions, for which the same conditions apply. It is perhaps not so strange then that organizations have problems with learning and change, flexibility and innovations, precisely because they have so many built-in defense mechanisms to counter the new. We see this every day in government administration, large businesses, hospitals, political parties, universities, etc. It is in this sense that one can say that innovations in organizations, from a structural standpoint, are unlikely. Therefore, ‘‘no system exists in an entropic state of complete indeterminacy of the following moment’’ (Luhmann, 1988, p. 172, own translation). This also applies for systems with high structural complexity. In their decision making organizations orient themselves from structures that have already been decided. Such structures are what one might call ‘‘non-problematical decision premises,’’ and have the function of safeguarding and easing the constant stream of decision making (Luhmann, 2000, p. 224).14 If employees at all times were to remain up to speed on everything new, this would, e.g., impair their ability to orient themselves in the market in a more regular manner, which of course is essential if an organization is to survive. The most important forms for such decision premises are decision programs (goal and conditional programs), the laying down of communication channels, job positions, etc. 14
Cf. Luhmann (2000): ‘‘But they [the decision premises] focalize the communication on the differences that have been established in the decision premises. This makes it probable that one will observe future decisions with regard to these preset premises, from a viewpoint of consideration/non-consideration and conformity/ deviance, rather than unfolding the complete complexity of the situation anew every single time’’ (p. 224, own translation).
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In this respect system structures can be seen as condensations of successful problem solutions, and there is therefore no reason not to have ‘‘more of the same.’’ Hence, when organizations meet new problems they will very often attempt to solve them with existing problem-solving programs. When antennas are set up for program execution in organizations, critical, program-changing information is perceived first and foremost as disturbance-producing and of no connective importance. This refers to an important difference in organizations that are built up hierarchically: there is a difference between decisions that are taken within the framework of the decision premises and decisions about the decision premises. Employees in touch with the market and customers are disposed toward carrying out the programs and not changing them. Structure-critical information often fails to reach levels in the organization that can take decisions over structure changes. In this respect the term redundancy can describe why innovations are unlikely.
5.2
Organization as Variation
Even so, we know that organizations innovate. When organizations are regarded as social systems with recursive decision production, it means not merely programming, routine and selective rigidity, but it also accentuates changes in such decision premises. Programs can be changed; expertise and communication channels can be worked out anew; job positions can be redefined or done away with, etc. The innovation rate in the modern economy is intense when one thinks of new products and the increasing production diversity (Baecker, 2007). Indeed, today the supply rate has increased so markedly that demand cannot keep pace with it. US studies show that customers can no longer tell the difference between new and the old cars when they attend motor shows. In this way the time one has to adapt to new products grows shorter and shorter. The same is true for computers. Too much re-adaptation leads to time loss for computer users. Experience and familiarity are also benefits. This is why big companies have become so concerned with ‘‘compatibility’’ between product generations. New concepts must to a large degree base themselves on the old, and in this way one meets a problem in ‘‘pre-announcement.’’ Trade fairs not only exhibit new products, but also announce the products for the next generation that will contain all the improvements not yet incorporated into the new products being launched. In this way novelty is imagined into the future, something that can have unfortunate consequences: this form of temporalizing leads to the collapse of market mechanisms through the distortion of purchasing decisions.15 This dynamic stems not first and foremost from the organizational systems but rather from the functional systems, especially the economic functional system that is set up for the feedback mechanism profit and loss, and where the market through the 15 It is this kind of problem which has forced Japanese trade authorities to require the producers to lengthen the production cycles among the chip producers, and in this way lower the speed of innovation. But of course, this demands institutional regulations (more distinct rules of the game). But this is not easy to gain.
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prices becomes a highly effective mechanism for reducing the complexity when it comes to resources, motivation, needs, decisions, and products for a manageable format. The market forms an environment that provides effective mechanisms for evaluating results and decisions and for learning from mistakes. Organizations see and calculate connections for their own operations and utilize the complexity of the environment to transform uncertainty into risk in the form of investment risk, purchasing risk, payment risk, etc.16 This is also expressed internally in organizations through change projects running concurrently, which every day challenge secure structures and demand new orientations. This holds out the prospect of an exchange of patterns and structures that compels organizational members to accept more and more of the new. But how can this be understood through system theory terms? To understand innovations in organizations it is above all important to connect with evolution theory. For Luhmann (1997), the different components of evolution (variation, selection, re-stabilization) become linked to the different components of autopoiesis (p. 413ff.). The term variation takes in ‘‘coincidence,’’ ‘‘innovation,’’ and ‘‘enactment’’; selection refers to ‘‘elimination,’’ ‘‘adaptation,’’ and ‘‘rebuilding’’; and re-stabilization encompasses ‘‘reproduction’’ and ‘‘institutionalization.’’ Evolutionary variation challenges the action theorist’s conception that change is linked to the actions of strongly motivated individuals. Variation for Luhmann means that the elements within a system vary, i.e., it is the communications that vary. Variation consists of a divergent reproduction of the elements through the system’s elements, i.e., in an unexpected, surprising communication. This also takes in ‘‘coincidence,’’ which here should not be seen as causal-theoretical, or, as for Hegel, as a counter-term for necessity. For Luhmann, coincidence should be seen as a form of coherence between system and environment that evades the system’s synchronization (control, systematization). No system — or organizational system — can control for all causalities. In Luhmann’s sense coincidences should be seen as a system’s ability to take advantage of ‘‘events’’ that are not produced by the system itself (i.e., not in autopoiesis’s network). They are at once possibilities, chances, and dangers. They can be constructive while also destructive. They can turn out to be ‘‘order from noise,’’ or as structural connections that channel irritations from the environment. Even so, variation falls into place under the system’s autopoiesis; it ensures that the communication continues — if one with freer connective possibilities and an inherent tendency toward conflict. But like all operative elements in dynamic systems, communication and deviant communication (innovation) are situationally determined and rapidly lose their meaning. The concept of variation therefore gives no answer to the question of why great epoch-making ideas and inventions arise, for evolution makes no great leaps, even though in retrospect others might observe it as doing so. The social reality is extremely conservative and does not negate the
16 Cf. Luhmann (2000): ‘‘The function systems proceed from inclusion, exclusion is unplanned and, so to speak, just happens. In organizations, the opposite is the case. Here, everyone is excluded — membership is not a natural right — since inclusion must proceed in a highly selective fashion’’ (p. 392, own translation).
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existing in favor of the unknown, if chances for consensus are not proven or even tested for the same situation. A variation can therefore make it through in favorable cases, but it is not possible to pose the question of why things should be so and not otherwise. Selection. This relates to the system’s structures or the communication-controlled expectations that govern through the media. A meaning basis is chosen that is expectation producing and that works to condense, and innovations are rejected that are not considered suitable as guidelines for the continuing communication. When variation and selection are ‘‘coincidentally’’ linked, one can develop a theory of evolutionary selection separately. It arrives here and there at a structural innovation ‘‘whatever its causes,’’ as Parsons says. Every variation has a compulsory selection as a result. The system selects the existing state and not innovations, such that the system can only remember and compare. When it comes to the ‘‘unlikely likelihood’’ one can say that variation occurs constantly, first when an ‘‘event’’ is selected until a condensed structure turns up something unlikely, namely a marked deviation from the original state. Re-stabilization. This refers to the state of the evolutionary system after a positive or negatively charged selection. It is a question of durability in a social system differentiation. The innovated structures must at a point in time fit in with the system and be made compatible with their relationships with their environment. In 1789 the Paris uprising was observed as ‘‘revolution’’ and this later had consequences for the development toward a representative democracy. The codification of the legal system, the liberation of an economic system with its own forces, the secularization of religion, and the privatization of the extended family can be seen as re-stabilizations of the revolutionary innovations. But revolution can also be harnessed negatively, as in Prussia where one ended up with a re-stabilization of a culture-state program for schools and colleges. Therefore, variations can vanish unobserved, while selections are normally held on to in a system memory. However, the point here is that a rejected variation in the long run can have greater effect than an implemented innovation. In any event, the term re-stabilization represents sequences for building in structural changes in a structurally determined operational system, and this bases itself on an insight that this happens through variations and selections, and always through the system’s own operations. In every case selection (positively or negatively) leads to an increase in the system’s complexity and therefore the system must react with re-stabilizations. Banks are examples of re-stabilizations of the money economy, and burst the old maxim about reciprocity. The ‘‘new-time’’ state earns its re-stabilization from a long-prepared political centralization. Re-stabilization always carries with it a stability principle, but always with an additional solution: that which will abolish atomic power stations are confronted by the question: How will we generate power another way? With the transition from the re-stabilization function to functional systems stability becomes a dynamic principle and indirectly a central stimulus for variation. Functional systems remain prepared for change under the condition of functional equivalence and a net superiority of possible new forms.
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Also, while they do not themselves initiate innovations, they have a high potential for reacting to innovations with innovations. This applies to a greater extent if within functional systems organizations are formed that can change themselves and their decision-making practices through decisions. Luhmann (1997) describes this in the following way: As early as the pronounced stratified order of the middle ages corporations, such as churches, monasteries, orders, cities, guilds and universities, assumed innovative functions — at first because they, thanks to their corporative stability, could maintain themselves as member communities outside the system of estate. Society had already started experimenting with forms of dynamic stability, that were not anticipated in its form of differentiation. But exactly this division of labor between the corporations also implied that their potential for innovation remained restricted to themselves and, in the transition to the modern world, they were perceived as rather rigid and inflexible [institutions]. The system of estates and corporations was gradually replaced by the order of organizations in functional systems; only then the primary societal subsystems were given the opportunity to develop a conditioned dynamic stability. (p. 493, own translation).
In the course of this evolutionary process the functional systems realign their mode of selection more and more toward fundamentally unstable criteria. Provided the channeling of the re-stabilization takes place within organizations, i.e., through decisions, resistance toward novelty will also be produced.
6 Conclusion In today’s climate of forced dynamic and social change there runs the classic solution pattern in organizations, namely the reproduction of ‘‘more of the same’’ problem: the same — that is to say the repetition of a pattern — at the same time embraces change of the pattern by allowing for the growth of new emergent structures. Innovations are thus important even though they have their limitations (seen from a system-theoretical perspective). But innovation can only assume the form of being a disturbance of experience and routine, and in this sense innovation is unlikely (Luhmann, 2000, p. 162). Proposals for innovations almost by necessity invoke conflicts, and it would be foolish of organizational sociologists not to emphasize the importance of precisely these aspects of the reality. Every innovation or reform is about ‘‘creating or utilizing previously unrecognized social spaces’’ the organizational theorist P. Herbst observed (cf. Herbst, 1976, p. 48). These empty spaces will no doubt be formally unregulated areas in an organization. But we can ask with Luhmann if such empty spaces still exist, and if all reform and innovatory work in organizations to an increasingly greater degree is no more than the entering of already occupied spaces. It is therefore perhaps time to reflect upon the question: How will organizations in the future endure with their self-inflicted innovations? In a follow-up chapter in this volume, we carry out a deeper exploration of the topic launched in this chapter by setting the theme of autopoietic understanding of
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‘‘innovative organization’’ against more traditional views from the literature on innovation in organizations.
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Chapter 5
Autopoiesis and Organizations: A Biological View of Social System Change and Methods for Their Study Chris Goldspink and Robert Kay
1 Introduction Many approaches to understanding organization change approach ‘‘the organization’’ as a relatively static entity. Punctuated equilibrium models have also become popular, but here too the notion of unfreeze–change–refreeze suggests change as an exception — a break with the more normal stability upon which organizational control is predicated (Taplikis, 2005). By contrast, Tsoukas and Chia (2002, p. 570) have argued that ‘‘Change must not be thought of as a property of organization. Rather, organization must be understood as an emergent property of change. Change is ontologically prior to organization — it is the condition of possibility for organization.’’ Intuitively we agree with their position. However, it raises some significant questions for practitioners, principal among them: If change is constitutive of the organization rather than something which managers can control, then to what extent can change be subject to strategic influence? The problem implied by this question can be resolved to some extent by appreciating that it is change at one level which influences stability at another. We typically refer to this phenomenon using the concept of ‘‘emergence.’’ The concept has however been criticized as a cover all — used to appear to explain what we cannot currently explain in scientific terms (Clayton & Davies, 2006). It is here then that the micro–macro problem takes hold. Emergence remains particularly controversial when applied to social science (Sawyer, 2001, 2005). The reason is that the m