Argumentation in Science Education: Perspectives from Classroom-Based Research
Sibel Erduran • María Pilar Jiménez-Al...
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Argumentation in Science Education: Perspectives from Classroom-Based Research
Sibel Erduran • María Pilar Jiménez-Aleixandre Editors
Argumentation in Science Education Perspectives from Classroom-Based Research
Sibel Erduran University of Bristol United Kingdom
ISBN 978-1-4020-6670-2
María Pilar Jiménez-Aleixandre Universidade de Santiago de Compostela Spain
e-ISBN 978-1-4020-6669-6
Library of Congress Control Number: 2007938905 © 2007 Springer Science + Business Media B.V. No part of this work may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, microfilming, recording or otherwise, without written permission from the Publisher, with the exception of any material supplied specifically for the purpose of being entered and executed on a computer system, for exclusive use by the purchaser of the work. Printed on acid-free paper. 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 springer.com
Dedication
To my parents, Ayten Erduran, whose life was evidence of compassion, courage and intellectual curiosity, and Erol Erduran, whose wisdom, intellect and humour justify his being the greatest educator I have known. (S. E.) To my parents, María Pilar Aleixandre-Parra, who left me as heritage the thirst for knowledge, and Miguel Jiménez-Gan, who taught me that all claims should be reasoned and justified. (M. P. J.-A.)
Preface
Our conversations about arguments began in Nashville in the Spring of 1996 in Richard Duschl’s doctoral seminar that we were both attending, Marilar Jiménez-Aleixandre as a visiting scholar at Vanderbilt University. Jiménez-Aleixandre and Duschl were designing authentic problems in genetics for the University of Santiago de Compostela-based RODA project aimed at engaging high school students in argumentation. Erduran and Duschl had been working on Project SEPIA extending their work in Pittsburgh schools to the design of curricula that support epistemological aspects of scientific inquiry including argumentation. In that spring we attended a NARST session in St Louis, where Gregory Kelly, Steven Druker and Catherine Chen presented a paper about argumentation. As a consequence, a symposium about argumentation was organised (possibly the first of its kind) at the 1997 NARST meeting in Chicago, including papers from Kelly and colleagues and from Jiménez-Aleixandre, Bugallo and Duschl. The symposium was attended, among others, by Rosalind Driver, who had just submitted an application for funding of an argumentation project based at King’s College London, a project Erduran would incidentally work on after Driver’s untimely death. From this time frame in the 1990s to the present day, argumentation studies in science education have increased at a rapid pace, from stray papers for which we were unable to find an appropriate strand in a conference, to a wealth of research base exploring ever more sophisticated issues. Our intention in this book is to provide an account of the state-of-the-art research in the field. We are grateful to the leading scholars who contributed to the book and who engaged with us in productive interactions during the last two years. We are indebted to Larry Yore for plenty of good advice and to University of Santiago de Compostela who supported Erduran’s visit to Santiago for one month, allowing us to work through the final stages of editing. We would finally like to acknowledge our respective universities (University of Bristol and University of Santiago de Compostela) as well as our publishing editor, Harmen van Paradijs at Springer for their support throughout the production of this book.
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This volume illustrates how argumentation in science education is involved in a variety of research studies and teaching sequences. Argumentation is involved in studies on communication, discourse, learning particularly those on high order thinking process, and epistemology as a component of the nature of science with internal and external perspectives, on citizenship education and more specifically those concerning socio-scientific issues. This list is impressive and at the same time heteroclite; then the question of how argumentation is situated in science education is raised. A way of characterising this situation is to consider how argumentation intervenes in science education, as a component of teaching content or as a teaching process and how it is involved in education goals. More specifically argumentation can be (1) a part of the knowledge to be taught included in an official curriculum; (2) a way to help students to better understand the knowledge to be taught. These two aspects do not intervene in the science education goals with the same status. Consequently they do not have to be legitimated by the society or accepted by schools, teachers, students and their parents similarly. Moreover a part of argumentation as proposed by some of the authors of this book is not necessarily scientific argumentation, but also a citizen’s argumentation and so it is beyond the disciplinary goals of education. Again, these different goals cannot be legitimated in the same way. Analysing these different integrations of argumentation in science teaching and their associated goals allow us to be aware of the risks of limiting these integrations to interesting “experimental or innovative teaching sequence”. For durable introduction of argumentation in science education. I propose two aspects to take into account: ● ●
The processes of legitimising argumentation in science education The question of legitimising the citizenship education that is beyond the current acknowledged disciplines
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Processes of Legitimating Argumentation in Science Education In order to analyse these processes we use the theory of ecology of knowledge constructed by the French researcher Chevallard (1991). This theory is based on a view on knowledge. Knowledge “lives” within groups of people. These groups can be very diverse such as a class, a scientific community of researchers, a scholarly society, or a group of people dealing with environmental questions. The term “knowledge” in this perspective has a broad meaning: it is not limited to content, but includes paradigms, the embedded epistemology and also skills. A basic statement is that the meaning of a given element—like a formula, a principle or a description of an experiment—is not exactly the same when this element is used by different groups; each group constructs a “specific” knowledge. For Chevallard (1991), there is a fundamental reason for this specificity of meaning in a given group; this meaning is based on the relations between this element of knowledge and the other elements; in other words an element is not isolated but included in a set of knowledge. When an element (or subset of elements) is dissociated from the set in which it takes its meaning for a group (e.g., Genetically Modified Organisms, GMO, in the set of genetics for a group of biologists), and reinserted in another set that lives in a different group (GMO in a high school classroom), its meaning is necessarily modified. This modification of meaning due to change of groups in which “lives” an element of knowledge is named transposition. Another basic statement is that knowledge involved in a curriculum should have a referent elsewhere than in the educational system. In traditional curriculum, the teaching goal of a discipline like biology, chemistry, or physics, is the acquisition of this discipline and the referent knowledge is the scientific knowledge of the scholarly communities. These communities legitimate the curriculum in the society eyes in a country. In vocational schools, legitimacy is mainly based on the professional communities. However nowadays, legitimacy from scientific communities can become less straightforward to the extent that science is put in question in our occidental societies (see for example ROSE results at students’ level, Sjøberg, 2005), and that citizenship education is valued. Legitimacy processes involving reference to scientific knowledge on the one hand and distance between the referent knowledge and the curriculum (transposed knowledge) on the other hand should be differentiated. For example two physics curricula can have the same referent knowledge in physics, be legitimated in societal eyes and, in the same time, include rather different contents. Transposition can correspond to a few or very deep modifications between the referent knowledge and the knowledge to be taught. On the basis of this approach, I raise the question of the place of argumentation in the legitimacy process of a curriculum. How argumentation, as a part of the knowledge to be taught or of teaching processes is legitimated? To study this question with the theory of ecology of knowledge, I propose to look for the type of teaching contents or curricula in which argumentation is involved,
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and to analyse their reference in legitimacy processes. As mentioned previously argumentation is involved in a variety of teaching contents with different goals. The overview given in the first chapter of this book (Jiménez-Aleixandre and Erduran) specifies them. Three main types of goals can be distinguished: developing students’ knowledge and skills on the nature of science, developing students’ citizenship in particular in the case of socio-scientific issues, and favouring learning, more specifically developing higher order thinking, in particular argumentation. In some countries, these different types of goals have started to be introduced in the official curriculum, in other countries they are forward thinking recommendations mainly done by researchers in science education and/or teachers. Whatever their status, the question of the references taken for these goals and their associated teaching content is raised. Let us take the case of introducing “nature of science” in the teaching content. Its reference is easy to determine: the scientific disciplines and their epistemology. In fact, in comparison to traditional teaching, the reference is the same or is only extended. Reference is the same if we consider that the difference with traditional curriculum is due to the transposition process. In traditional teaching, nature of science is eliminated through this process. To specify what is eliminated, we refer to Tseitlin and Galili’s (2005) analysis of a scientific discipline. They propose to decompose a discipline into three domains: nucleus, body and periphery. In the transposition process, the nucleus (“fundamental principles, paradigm and claims of meta-disciplinary nature”, p. 243) is eliminated whereas the “body” is kept. The body incorporates “established knowledge, each item of which is based on the principles contains in the nucleus” (p. 243). Their analysis of standard physics textbooks confirms that these books mainly (and sometimes only) present “the body” of the discipline. In this framework, introducing nature of science into curricula means to introduce the nucleus (“fundamental principles, paradigm and claims of meta-disciplinary nature”, p. 243). This usual elimination of the nucleus in the transposition process is frequently justified by considering that it is not understandable by students and difficult to teach and to assess. Reference is extended towards two directions, first epistemology of science to analyse the “nucleus” and second sociology of science. This last case happens, when, in nature of science, the social practice of researchers is included as many authors of this book do it, in particular in reference to works of sociologists like Latour (Latour & Woolgar, 1979). Then, another scholarly society is involved: sociology of science. This extension could be rejected by the “hard” scientist communities, which consequently will not legitimate this new knowledge to be taught. The goal associated to socio-scientific issues is less traditional because the main reference comes from the society and citizens problems, and not from the scholarly societies acknowledged to create and validate scientific knowledge. Legitimating such teaching goals is not easy; it assumes a consensus in the society of the country or the state, at the level where curriculum is decided. Nowadays this consensus is not obvious to reach in our society (Legardez & Simonneaux, 2006). Astolfi (2005) underlines that the ideological diversity in our contemporary societies makes risky
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the debate of socio-scientific issues. The question is raised to know if socio-scientific issues make running a risk to split up educational system to the extent that people have diverse and even contradictory expectations about it. The question of what can or cannot be debated in classrooms is opened and not easily answered nowadays. Argumentation is a way to get some distance vis-à-vis socio-scientific issues and thus helps to“a pragmatic arbitration of contradictories ideologies” (ibid. p.9). The case of argumentation as “higher order thinking” is different from the others to the extent that, in the process of transposition, hypotheses on learning are involved. For example, Duschl (this book) makes explicit that these leaning hypotheses are introduced on the basis of “newer ideas and beliefs in cognitive and social psychology [that] speak to the importance of instructional sequences/units that seek outcomes related to students’ reasoning and communication in science contexts.” In fact, this case includes processes of teaching (involving high order thinking) and teaching contents either relative to nature of science or socio-scientific issues. This case makes the legitimacy process rather complex because the types of referent knowledge are multiple, in particular psychology and science education, physics, chemistry or biology, sociology, and each community of scientists can only legitimate some components of the teaching content. Only the representatives can legitimate the whole teaching content (in democratic societies). This case is complex and the durability of such teaching contents is questionable. My hypothesis would be that, for durability, the teaching practices and teaching content have to be strongly implemented in the different components of the school system (teacher training, programme, school practice, evaluation, etc.). In that case, teacher training and teaching resources are crucial. This book tackles these questions of designing teaching and learning environments including computer-enhanced learning environments, and more specific tools that can be used and accepted by teachers and students. A large range of tools, without forgetting assessment, and teacher training are necessary for durable implementation of argumentation in science education.
The Case of Legitimating Citizenship Education Argumentation is a key element involved not only in the “scientific culture” of the citizen but more largely in a trans-disciplinary view of culture. To elaborate the knowledge to be taught leading to a scientific culture of the citizen, it is necessary to go beyond the scientific disciplines. Examples like the social questions of GMO, mobile phones, or black tide, involve economics, safety, and other issues. In some teaching perspectives, science is no more the goal but becomes a tool to help student to understand societal problems. Figure F.1 illustrates the three different goals discussed previously with two examples. The first example deals with a teaching project situated within scientific domains of which goals are mainly related to “higher order thinking” and to nature of science (Duschl, this book). The second case deals with teaching projects directly
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linked with a main societal event: black tide of Prestige in Galicia (JiménezAleixandre, 2006); the teaching goals come from the society, and the same society legitimates them. These examples show different distances between the goals and the teaching content designed to reach their goals. Let us note that, in traditional disciplinary curricula, the goals and the contents are similar, for example biology, chemistry or physics are taught with the goal of students’ acquisition of these disciplines. In both examples of Fig. F.1, scientific disciplines are only “tools” to reach goals. In the first example, as we state in the first part, the references are disciplinary in terms of “nucleus” including epistemology of science and their legitimacy also includes learning hypotheses. In the second example the society legitimates its own reference and teaching content as tools to reach the goal refer to scientific knowledge. In this second example the general goal deals with citizen culture. Sciences become tools to teach trans-disciplinary knowledge. In fact, most of the chapters of this book include more or less explicitly a component of citizen culture. The second case is illustrative of many studies that have to manage two views of argumentation: as scientific social practice and as social practice in the society. Let us note that for the second view, usually there is no reference to argumentation as a branch of rhetoric, which could be a part of the culture and then be included in a pluri-disciplinary teaching content. A reason could be that the legitimacy of argumentation as a component of the scholarly discipline had difficulty during the 19th and first part of the 20th century and restarted to be developed after the Second World War “not only in French language (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca) and in English (Toulmin), but also in German” (Plantin, 2005, p.14). In science education, researchers in their analyses use these scholar studies, as this book shows. But these research works on argumentation are not used as reference for curricula or innovative teaching content introducing argumentation with scientific literacy goal. 1.SEPIA (Duschl, this book)
Goal Goal of a teaching sequence (or a part of a curriculum)
Tool (to reach the goal) For a teaching sequence (or a part of a curriculum)
Referent communities
Scientific reasoning Ability to reason about explanations, experiments, and models
Making exercise for healthy heart,etc. includes scientific content, reasoning, and higher thinking processes
For goal: Scholarly societies in epistemology and experimental sciences, and in psychology and science education For tools: Scholarly societies in experimental sciences, etc.
2. Black Tide (Jimenez Aleixandre, 2006) Close environment of the students should be made intelligible to them
Using environment and its problems as objects and resources for learning Many different types of activities and actions, some are teaching activities in science (physics, chemistry, biology)
For goal: The society that decides the goal. For tools: A diversity of referents depending on the tools. Scholarly societies in experimental sciences, etc.
Fig. F.1 Two cases of analysis of teaching sequences (or learning environment) in terms of goals and teaching tools, and the referent communities from where they came
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For the two examples given in Fig. F.1, the teacher’s classroom management needs a rather high level of analysis of the different components involved in the studied situation and a certain level of competency on each of these components (e. g., epistemology, several experimental sciences). Figure F.2 shows that, when a social situation is more or less directly “imported” into the classroom, the teacher has a huge responsibility; it has to do most of the transposition in order that this transposed situation should be relevant not only for students’ learning but also for what the society recognises as being worthwhile to teach at school. Among these multiple charges, the teacher has the responsibility to help the students to make clear (when possible) the different criteria to accept or reject arguments pertaining to experimental sciences, epistemology, or everyday life. Several contributions of this book propose typologies or categories of arguments; they illustrate that it is not easy to establish criteria to differentiate arguments. The concept of transposition helps us to make explicit the heavy teacher charge (Fig. F.2). At the same time, nowadays introducing social knowledge and practice of debates as referent and as goal in curricula is a current tendency, however it addresses difficult questions that should be taken into consideration to be successful. Studies on argumentation in science education clearly contribute to make explicit and propose elements to implement curricula with such goals. This book shows how argumentation is a very rich domain to investigate and contributes to improve science education. It is divided into three sections. The first section, devoted to argumentation foundations includes a very well informed overview (Jiménez-Aleixandre and Erduran, Chapter 1), which should constitute a reference for future research in our community. Chapter 2 presents a basic component of studying argumentation in science education: the cognitive (Garcia-Mila and Andersen), and Chapter 3 deals with methodological foundations (Erduran). The last chapter of this section (Sandoval and Millwood, Chapter 4) pertains to the epistemological component by tackling the challenging question of relation between students’ argumentation and their epistemological ideas and their epistemic practices.
Referent knowledge or practice
Knowledge and practice of scientific communities
Social knowledge and practice of debates by experts people, politics,
Transposition done by researchers and teachers in science education (tools, teaching sequence, etc.)
Most of the transposition has to be done by the teacher on the spot. Possibly some tools, or preparation with researchers and/or teachers
Classroom debate on a socio-scientific issue
Fig. F.2 References of arguments involved during a classroom debate (scientific, social). These different arguments can appear quasi-simultaneously
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The second section deals with teaching and learning argumentation. In Chapter 5, Jiménez-Aleixandre discusses the features of learning environments that promote argumentation in science classrooms and the necessity of work on design to develop argumentation. Chapter 6 (Kølsto and Ratcliffe) deals with the social aspects of argumentation, approaching the context in which argumentation is involved in classroom and the social aspects of the teaching goals. The two other chapters concern the nature and quality of students’ argumentation. Kelly, Regev and Prothero, in Chapter 7, identify and analyse the nature of the claims being made by the student writers and how these claims are developed as the lines of reasoning supporting a thesis. Chapter 8 (Duschl) deals with the quality of argumentation and epistemic criteria on the basis of the analysis of students argumentation discourse and epistemic criteria used by middle school students. The third section entitled argumentation in context includes four chapters introducing the readers to a large range of contexts for argumentation in science education. Chapter 9 (Simmoneaux) of this section is devoted to students’ argumentation skills on socio-scientific issues like GMO in relation to the teacher’s role. Chapter 10 (Zeidler and Sadler) deals with socio-scientific framework in the perspective of engaging students to reason about moral issues. In Chapter 11, the research field on the role of computer in education is involved. Clark, Stegmann, Weinberger, Menekse and Erkens present the case of computer-enhanced learning environments to support students’ argumentation with fruitful results and perspectives. Chapter 12 (Zohar) deals with science teacher education a professional development in argumentation that is a crucial component in the introduction of argumentation in the teaching and learning of science. Andrée Tiberghien
References Astolfi, J. P. (2006). Les questions vives en question? In A. Legardez & L. Simonneaux (Eds.), L’école à l’épreuve de la réalité. Enseigner les questions vives (pp. 9–12). Paris: ESF éditeur. Chevallard, Y. (1991). La transposition didactique (2ème ed.). Grenoble, France: La Pensée Sauvage. Jiménez-Aleixandre, M. P. (2006). Les personnes peuvent-elles agir sur la réalité? La théorie critique et la marée noire du Prestige. In A. Legardez & L. Simonneaux (Eds.), L’école à l’épreuve de la réalité. Enseigner les questions vives (pp. 105–117). Paris: ESF éditeur. Legardez, A., & Simonneaux, L. (2006). L’école à l’épreuve de la réalité. Enseigner les questions vives. Paris: ESF éditeur. Plantin, C. (2005). L’argumentation; histoire, théories et perspectives. Paris: PUF. Sjøberg, S. (2005, 8–11 March). Young people and science: Attitudes, values and priorities. Evidence from the ROSE project (pdf) (Paper presented at the EU’s Science and Society Forum 2005, Brussels). Available at http://www.ils.uio.no/english/rose/publications/english-presentations. html. Tseitlin, M., & Galili, I. (2005). Physics teaching in the search for its self: from a physics-discipline to a physics-culture. Science and Education, 14(3–5), 235–261.
Contents
Preface ...............................................................................................................
vii
Foreword ...........................................................................................................
ix
Part I
Argumentation Foundations
Chapter 1
Argumentation in Science Education: An Overview ............... María Pilar Jiménez-Aleixandre and Sibel Erduran
3
Chapter 2
Cognitive Foundations of Learning Argumentation ............... Merce Garcia-Mila and Christopher Andersen
29
Chapter 3
Methodological Foundations in the Study of Argumentation in Science Classrooms ..................................... Sibel Erduran
47
What Can Argumentation Tell Us About Epistemology? ............................................................................. William A. Sandoval and Kelli A. Millwood
71
Chapter 4
Part II
Research on Teaching and Learning Argumentation
Chapter 5
Designing Argumentation Learning Environments................. María Pilar Jiménez-Aleixandre
91
Chapter 6
Social Aspects of Argumentation .............................................. Stein Dankert Kolstø and Mary Ratcliffe
117
Chapter 7
Analysis of Lines of Reasoning in Written Argumentation ............................................................................ Gregory J. Kelly, Jacqueline Regev, and William Prothero
137
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Contents
Chapter 8
Part III
Quality Argumentation and Epistemic Criteria .................... Richard A. Duschl
159
Argumentation in Context
Chapter 9
Argumentation in Socio-Scientific Contexts........................... Laurence Simonneaux
Chapter 10
The Role of Moral Reasoning in Argumentation: Conscience, Character, and Care ............................................ Dana L. Zeidler and Troy D. Sadler
Chapter 11
Chapter 12
Technology-Enhanced Learning Environments to Support Students’ Argumentation...................................... Douglas B. Clark, Karsten Stegmann, Armin Weinberger, Muhsin Menekse, and Gijsbert Erkens
179
201
217
Science Teacher Education and Professional Development in Argumentation .............................................. Anat Zohar
245
Author Biographies .........................................................................................
269
Author Contact Details ...................................................................................
275
Author Index....................................................................................................
281
Subject Index ...................................................................................................
289
Chapter 1
Argumentation in Science Education: An Overview María Pilar Jiménez-Aleixandre and Sibel Erduran
Charles Darwin once described On the Origin of Species as “one long argument”. This sentence can be viewed as embodying several of the different dimensions of argumentation discussed in this book. On the one hand, it provides evidence, coming from someone with undisputable authority, on argument being an integral part of the construction of scientific knowledge. On the other hand, when applied to the outstanding piece of scientific thinking that is On the Origin of Species, the description combines two aspects of argumentation. The first aspect relates to the justification of knowledge claims, by marshalling converging lines of reasoning (see Kelly, Regev, & Prothero, this book), theoretical ideas and empirical evidence toward a claim. Darwin weaved together population theory from Malthus, or uniformitarianism from Lyell, with empirical data gathered in his voyage to Central and South America in his bold claim of the theory of natural selection. A second aspect of argumentation has to do with argumentation as persuasion, in Darwin’s case as an attempt to convince an audience, composed both of scientists and of the general public, that the animals and plants had changed, that the species living on Earth descended from other species instead of having being created all at a time. Darwin was well aware that the task of persuading his contemporaries was not an easy one, such awareness being one of the reasons for delaying the publication of his book for about twenty years. In fact a joint presentation by Darwin and Wallace in the Linnean Society in 1858 stirred little interest, and the president of the Society summarised the year as one that “has not indeed been marked by any of those striking discoveries which at once revolutionize science” (Beddall, 1968, pp 304–305). However, one year later, the publication of Darwin’s book launched a great controversy, corresponding yet to another aspect of argumentation, as debate among two parties with contrasting positions on a subject. Argumentation, in whatever sense it is conveyed, is an integral part of science and we argue it should be integrated into science education. In this chapter, we present an overview of a line of research in science education whose main purpose has been exactly such attempts to make argumentation a component of instruction and learning. Indeed the field on argumentation in science education has been receiving growing attention in recent years. Firstly we outline a rationale for why should we, teachers or science educators, promote argumentation in science classrooms. Second we discuss different meanings of argumentation and some S. Erduran and M. P. Jiménez-Aleixandre (eds.), Argumentation in Science Education. © Springer 2007
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approaches to its study, particularly those relevant for science education. In the third section we turn our attention to an overview of some themes from international policies for science curricula that provide a context and a rationale for the inclusion of argumentation in science education worldwide. We conclude the chapter with a brief link to some of the earlier work that formed the foundation of argumentation studies in science education. Overall, our discussion illustrates the theoretical, empirical and policy level conceptualisations in the study of argumentation in science education which point to the significance of research in this area.
Why Argumentation in the Science Classroom? In recent years, a growing number of studies are focusing on the analysis of argumentation discourse in science learning contexts (e.g., Driver et al., 2000; Jiménez-Aleixandre et al., 2000; Kelly & Takao, 2002; Zohar & Nemet, 2002). These works draw, among others, from two related frameworks. One framework is related to science studies highlighting the importance of discourse in the construction of scientific knowledge (Knorr-Cetina, 1999; Latour & Woolgar, 1986) and consequences for education (Boulter & Gilbert, 1995; Erduran et al., 2004; Pontecorvo, 1987). A second framework is the sociocultural perspective (Vygotsky, 1978; Wertsch, 1991) which points to the role of social interaction in learning and thinking processes, and purports that higher thinking processes originate from socially mediated activities, particularly through the mediation of language. To these could be added an interest in democratic participation, which requires debate among different views rather than acceptation of authority. The implication is that argumentation is a form of discourse that needs to be appropriated by students and explicitly taught through suitable instruction, task structuring and modelling. From these approaches a view can be derived about science learning in terms of the appropriation of community practices that promote the modes of communication required to sustain scientific discourse (Kelly & Chen, 1999; Lemke, 1990; Mason, 1996). Such a view stands in contrast to the traditional views of science learning that focus only on outcomes such as problem-solving, concept learning or science-process skills. Science learning is thus considered to involve the construction and use of tools that, like argumentation, are instrumental in the generation of knowledge about the natural world (Kitcher, 1988). Argumentation plays a central role in the building of explanations, models and theories (Siegel, 1995) as scientists use arguments to relate the evidence they select to the claims they reach through use of warrants and backings (Toulmin, 1958). The case made is that argumentation is a critically important discourse process in science, and that it should be promoted in the science classroom (Duschl & Osborne, 2002; JiménezAleixandre et al., 2000; Kelly et al., 1998; Zohar & Nemet, 2002). A significant question, however, is why argumentation deserves to be promoted in the context of science learning. Put more specifically, what is the rationale for introducing argumentation in science learning?
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Andrée Tiberghien (this book) frames this question in the theory of “didactic transposition” (from the French transposition didactique, where didactic does not have the standard English meaning of traditional approach, but the less charged significance of the original Greek “related to teaching”, common to most Indo-European languages). Tiberghien discusses the external referents for the legitimisation of argumentation, distinguishing two aspects: one it’s about the place of argumentation in science education and the other about the connections between argumentation and citizenship education. She summarises the place of argumentation in science education in terms of three goals: knowledge about nature of science; developing citizenship and developing higher order thinking skills. With an approach complementary to Tiberghien’s exploration of external referents, in this section we elaborate on the rationale for argumentation appealed to from within the educational community, and particularly the science education community. We propose that there are at least five intertwined dimensions or potential contributions from the introduction of argumentation in the science classrooms: ●
●
●
●
●
Supporting the access to the cognitive and metacognitive processes characterising expert performance and enabling modelling for students. This dimension draws from the situated cognition perspective and the consideration of classrooms as communities of learners (Brown & Campione, 1990; Collins et al., 1989). Supporting the development of communicative competences and particularly critical thinking. This dimension draws from the theory of communicative action and the sociocultural perspective (Habermas, 1981; Wertsch, 1991). Supporting the achievement of scientific literacy and empowering of students to talk and to write the languages of science. This dimension draws from language studies and social semiotics (Kress et al., 2001; Norris & Phillips, 2003; Yore et al., 2003). Supporting the enculturation into the practices of the scientific culture and the development of epistemic criteria for knowledge evaluation. This dimension draws from science studies, particularly from the epistemology of science (Leach et al., 2003; Sandoval, 2005). Supporting the development of reasoning, particularly the choice of theories or positions based on rational criteria. This dimension draws from philosophy of science (Giere, 1988; Siegel, 1989, 1995, 2006) as well as from developmental psychology (Kuhn, 1991, 1993).
These contributions influence one another, although they are discussed separately, for the clarity of discussion. It has to be noted that by qualifying these contributions as potential we imply that their achievement is not necessarily warranted by the introduction of argumentation in the classroom. We acknowledge that the execution of these dimensions in the science classroom require a coordinated, complex and systematic set of pedagogical, curricular and assessment initiatives, among others. Table 1.1 summarises the dimensions and the perspectives or bodies of knowledge framing the dimensions.
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Table 1.1 Contributions of argumentation and perspectives framing contributions Potential contributions of argumentation Drawing from Making public and modelling cognitive processes Developing communicative competences, critical thinking Achieving scientific literacy; talking and writing science Enculturation into scientific culture; developing epistemic criteria Developing reasoning and rational criteria
Situated cognition; communities of learners Theory of communicative action; sociocultural perspective Language studies; social semiotics Science studies; epistemology Philosophy and developmental psychology
When pointing out the different fields or perspectives from which science education draws in promoting argumentation in the classroom, the implication is not that this is a one-way relationship. We believe that science education itself, through studies on argumentation, holds the potential to inform these perspectives in their disciplinary settings as well, leading to truly interdisciplinary investigations of argumentation. In other words, we contend that reciprocal contributions between these “feeding fields” and science education are desirable and fruitful in the production of knowledge in the field of argumentation studies.
Making Cognitive Processes Public: Argumentation and Situated Cognition Constructivist perspectives view learning as a process of knowledge construction. A seminal piece of work supporting this claim was produced by Collins et al. (1989) who proposed to organise teaching as cognitive apprenticeship where knowledge and skills learning are integrated in their social and functional contexts. This proposal is related to Lave and Wenger’s (1991) notion of situated learning, conceiving learning as increasing participation in a community of practice. Cognitive apprenticeship seeks to relate these knowledge and skills to their use in the real world. As Collins and colleagues point out, current pedagogical practices make invisible the key aspects of expertise, paying little or no attention to the processes through which experts acquire or use knowledge while performing complex or real tasks, for instance higher order processes. Applying the notion of apprenticeship to skills that are cognitive in nature requires internalisation of external processes. However in current educational contexts neither the teacher nor the students have access to the cognitive processes of each other, thus rendering impossible the observation or modelling of these processes. It may be noted that cognitive processes are made public through language and that natural language is both a tool and an obstacle for building scientific knowledge.
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Brown and Palincsar (1989) base their proposal of guided cooperative learning in Vygotsky’s (1978) notion of the social genesis of individual comprehension and in Toulmin’s (1958) argumentation structure. These authors point to the role of collaboration in providing models of cognitive processes, as the thinking strategies are performed in public, modelling what then has to be performed privately. Argumentation in the context of classrooms where students are participants in a community of learners (Brown & Campione, 1990; Mason, 1996) may thus support the development of higher order cognitive processes (one of the goals for science education mentioned by Tiberghien, this book), given that reasoning becomes public and students are expected to explicitly back their statements with evidence and to evaluate alternative options or explanations.
Developing Communicative Competencies and Critical Thinking Both critical theory and sociocultural perspectives view educational and mental processes in connection with their social and historical contexts. The critical theory conceived in the Frankfurt School can be described as a reflection on the relationships among social goals, means and values. For critical theory the goal of technical progress cannot be placed higher than democracy, and education is assigned a central role in social transformation. Carr and Kemmis (1986) contrast critical rationality and technical rationality, the latter being a perspective that views all problems as technical issues, depriving people from the capacity of controlling the world around them, with the consequence of diminishing the capacities of reflection and modification of situations by means of action. For Jürgen Habermas (1981) critical theory is a form of self-reflective knowledge that expands the scope of autonomy, thus reducing domination. In his theory of communicative action Habermas distinguishes four types of social actions: (a) teleological, or goal oriented; (b) norms regulated (c) dramaturgical, or a performance in front of an audience constituted by the participants in the interaction; and (d) communicative, oriented to understanding one another in order to coordinate planned actions. Language and communicative competencies play a central role in communicative action: people reflect about themselves and about the world, and share these explanations with others. The theory of communicative action gives people pre-eminence over structures, assigning them the potentiality to develop actions directed to social change. As Kelly (2005) notes, in Habermas’ framework, individual shifts to a social epistemic subject whilst reason is centred on communicative action and norms for argument are shared. The perspectives of critical theorists contribute to a view of classrooms as places for communication. The acknowledgement of the importance of communication, of the relevance of language in knowledge construction, pointed out by Vygotsky (1978), is contributing to new lines of work in science education about the role of language in science learning, for instance in meaning making (Mortimer & Scott, 2003).
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Given the theoretical precedence of the role of communication in education, it is essential to pay a closer look at the development of students’ communicative competencies. The need for promoting critical thinking has been advocated from different philosophical and psychological positions. From a philosophical perspective, Ennis (1992) defines critical thinking as reasonable reflective thinking focused on deciding what to believe in or do, and provides a set of criteria for assessing it. For Siegel (1992) a critical thinker refers to an educational ideal, and he emphasises the rationale for the assessment component of critical thinking and the disposition of critical thinkers to seek evidence for their beliefs. Understood as the search for evidence, critical thinking would be closely related to developing rational criteria, a position also maintained by some cognitive psychologists like Kuhn who explains the development of scientific reasoning as the coordination of theory and evidence (Kuhn, 1991; Garcia-Mila & Andersen, this book). But although critical thinking from the perspective of critical theory entails contrasting theories and beliefs with evidence, it also has a component related to the issue of emancipation. Furthermore critical thinking from this perspective is related to developing the capacity to criticise discourses which contribute to the reproduction of asymmetrical relations of power (Fairclough, 1995), or as Paulo Freire (1970) put it, to empowering students to understand the society around them and their own capacity to transform it. Teachers creating environments where students engage in argumentation about socio-scientific issues (see for instance Simonneaux, this book) include, among their goals, the development of critical thinking. Such critical thinking is related to the development of citizenship (Tiberghien, this book), of educating citizens that are critical thinkers, in the sense not only of a commitment to evidence, but also of an empowerment for critical rationality, the capacity to reflect on and influence social issues of relevance for their lives. Critical thinking can further be framed relative to scientific scepticism, as a tool for confronting pseudoscience and credulity.
Achieving Scientific Literacy: Talking and Writing Science The recent focus on the role of spoken and written language in science learning seeks to redress an overemphasis on the recipe-like empirical (laboratory experiences) and rote mathematical (formulae) components of scientific knowledge in the classroom. Such change of focus cannot be seen as a return to rote-memory learning or use of textbooks as sole resources, in so far as it is rooted in a notion of the interpretative use of language and in the recognition of the importance of meaning construction (Mortimer & Scott, 2003). Norris and Phillips (2003) advocate the centrality of reading (interpreted as inferring meaning from text) and writing in learning science. In a similar vein, Yore et al. (2003) demand attention to the literacy component of science literacy, such as, for instance, critical reading of different sources, or participation in debates and argumentation among other
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modes of communication and communicative resources in the science classroom (Kress et al., 2001). Lemke (1990) drew attention to the centrality of talk in science learning and to the need of promoting students’ true dialogue or “talking science”, a way of learning the language of science. Lemke’s approach, grounded in the work of Mikhail Bakhtin (1986) who conceived communication as a social phenomenon, considers both scientific talking and scientific writing as social practices. The focus on discourse means an exploration of the features of texts that have rhetorical significance (Myers, 1990). Texts can be viewed as part of the social processes involved in the production of scientific knowledge, of the negotiations of the place and value of a claim in the structure of scientific knowledge given that science writing cannot be seen as reporting, but as construction of scientific facts (Myers, 1990). By engaging in argumentation students learn to talk and write the languages of science (see for instance Kelly et al., this book; Mason, 1998), including the rhetorical features (Kelly & Bazerman, 2003; Martins et al., 2001) such as persuasion in argumentation.
Enculturation in the Practices of Scientific Culture: Developing Epistemic Criteria Learning science involves epistemic apprenticeship, the appropriation of practices associated with producing, communicating and evaluating knowledge (Kelly & Duschl, 2002). Kelly (2005) defines epistemic practices as the specific ways members of a community propose, justify, evaluate and legitimise knowledge claims within a disciplinary framework. With a focus on the science classroom, epistemic practices are defined by Sandoval and Reiser (2004) as the cognitive and discursive practices involved in making and evaluating knowledge, practices related to students’ development of epistemological understanding. This epistemological understanding is viewed by Garcia-Mila and Andersen (this book) as cognitive foundation for argumentation. Leach and colleagues (2003) proposed teaching interventions aimed to foster epistemic understanding. Their studies are set in the context of an agenda exploring epistemic goals and practices, of a shift of focus on processes rather than on end products of science learning. The appropriation by students of practices of the scientific community or the enculturation in the scientific culture is related to students’ understanding of scientific epistemology—what in the literature is known as personal epistemologies. Kelly (2005) points to the social nature of the science epistemology, as epistemic criteria for justifying and evaluating knowledge are developed as social norms in a given community. Fostering students’ appropriation of the epistemic practices of the scientific community is related to the goal of developing students’ knowledge and skills about the nature of science proposed by Tiberghien (this book). Sandoval (2005) distinguishes among students’ formal and practical epistemologies, the former being beliefs about professional science, the latter about their own practices
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with inquiry. Sandoval highlights an important reason for promoting the development of sophisticated epistemologies: the effective participation in policy decisions and the interpretation of scientific claims relevant for their lives, claiming that such outcomes are crucial for democracy. We see this dimension of epistemic understanding associated with the meaning of critical thinking discussed earlier. Argumentation, with its emphasis on justification of claims and on the coordination among claims and evidence, may support the development of epistemic criteria and more generally the enculturation in the practices of the scientific community. The relationships among argumentation and epistemology are discussed in detail in Sandoval and Millwood, and the development of epistemic criteria in Duschl (both chapters in this book).
Developing Reasoning and Rational Criteria In a way, it could be argued that the development of the capacity of choosing among theories or positions is part of the development of epistemic criteria discussed in the previous section. For some authors, as already mentioned, rationality and critical thinking are treated as being almost synonymous. However, the ongoing controversy in science education as well as in philosophy of science (sometimes referred to as “science wars”) locates rationality, epistemology and radical constructivism, among other issues as pivotal in relation to science learning. The “science wars” debate, as Peters (2006) puts it in his editorial for the special issue on philosophy of science education in Educational Philosophy and Theory, has been silenced in many occasions or publicised by means of a biased account, as in the Sokal affair. Incidentally, it may be noted that as the Hwang case sadly proves, scientific journals (Science, no less), and not only social studies journals, can be successfully hoodwinked into publishing forgery. Although these debates exceed the scope of this chapter, we consider the concept of rationality relevant for our purposes particularly in relation to science education and argumentation. First, it has to be noted that issues surrounding rationality are complex issues, where different perspectives can be seen in a continuum, rather than in extreme black or white irreconcilable sides. We (the authors of this chapter) contemplate science both as a rational enterprise and as a social construction. There is no denying that scientific research is influenced by ideology, power or commercial interests. For instance, the issue of gender is tightly related to critiques of science, particularly given that perspectives of women and other marginalised sectors are conventionally underrepresented. But, as the feminist Sandra Harding (1991) argues, recognising sociological or cultural relativism does not entail epistemological relativism but rather a search for the most objective knowledge claims. In other words “A feminist standpoint epistemology requires strengthened standards of objectivity” (p. 142) leading to less distorted beliefs in natural phenomena. If we agree that science is, or ideally should be, a rational enterprise then how can we define its rationality? For Siegel (1989, 2006) literature fails to distinguish
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three different questions about rationality. According to Siegel the central question is: What counts as evidence for some scientific hypothesis or procedure? In other words, Siegel sees rationality of science as being grounded in a commitment to evidence. On the other hand Siegel conceives of critical thinking as the educational cognate of rationality, involving consistency, impartiality and fairness. Siegel’s perspective on rationality has not gone unnoticed nor uncriticised. For instance, Finocchiaro (2005) criticises Siegel’s identification of critical thinking as rationality, proposing instead the notion of reasoning aimed at interpretation, evaluation or self-reflective presentation of arguments (critical reasoning) or methodological reflection. As discussed above, our own perspective is grounded on rationality as commitment to evidence whilst at the same time-sharing some of the tenets of the critical theory. In particular, we contend that critical theories enrich Siegel or Finocchiaro definitions by including the reflection about social environment and the potential to transform society. In terms of a philosophical referent, the resulting perspective could be rooted in the idea about the unfinished project of modernity (Habermas, 1997, 1981). For Habermas the modernity project, formulated by the Enlightenment, is based on rationality and its lack of vigour means, not that the Enlightenment goals should be discarded, but that they have not be achieved. In summary, it can be said that the epistemic criteria developed to choose among theories or positions are rational criteria and their development may be supported by argumentation. In Fig. 1.1 we summarise some potential contributions of argumentation to the goals of science education implied by our discussion so far.
Higher order cognitive processes
Enculturation in scientific culture
supports
supports
involves
Rhetorical moves
involves
as
persuasion
Theory choice
Developing epistemic criteria
Public reasoning
involves
enables by involves
as
Argumentation involves
justification
involves
connected
connected
Reflection about themselves & world
Talking & writing science
Commitment to evidence
rationality
supports
supports
a component of
Scientific literacy
a component of
emancipation
Fig. 1.1 Potential contributions from argumentation
Critical thinking
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Science education is conventionally seen as addressing goals of two sorts, which can be summarised as “science for all” and “science for prospective scientists”. Our position is that argumentation can contribute to both goals. More particular goals of contributing to the development of higher order cognitive processes, enculturation into scientific practices and epistemological understanding are also represented in the figure. From the discussion so far some may be tempted to conclude that argumentation is a solution to most science education problems. This is not an implication that we wish to project. Rather we conceive of argumentation, on the one hand as a solution for some learning problems, to the extent that it helps students learn things that are hard to learn except through argumentation (e.g., evaluating evidence) and on the other hand as holding the potential to help us better understand and support the learning processes in the science classroom.
Meanings of Argument For the purposes of this book it is important to clarify what we mean by argument. Is argument a statement or a process? Does an argument need to be produced by an individual or can it be co-constructed across individuals? Is argument always related to a dialogical context or can it take place internally in individuals’ minds? With respect to the last question, we agree with Billig (1987) who, in discussing the Greek philosopher Protagoras’ position on argument, points out that argument has both an individual and a social meaning: “The individual meaning refers to any piece of reasoned discourse. As one articulates a point of view, one can be said to be developing an argument” (p. 44). The social meaning is that of a dispute or debate between people opposing each other with contrasting sides to an issue. In other words, an argument can be either an inner chain of reasoning or a difference of positions between people and, as Kuhn (1993) notes, there is a link between the two. Social argumentation is a powerful vehicle for developing the higher order thinking that we call internal argumentation. In other words, social dialogue offers a way to externalise internal thinking strategies embedded in argumentation. Not all authors would agree with this double meaning as, for instance, van Eemeren and Grootendorst (2004) restrict the meaning of an argument to the social one: “Argumentation is a verbal, social and rational activity aimed at convincing a reasonable critic of the acceptability of a standpoint by putting forward a constellation of propositions justifying or refuting the proposition expressed in the standpoint” (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004, p. 1). For Plantin (personal communication) this definition, while apparently emphasising social aspects, adopts an entirely individual perspective. Perhaps both positions can be partly reconciled if, as Kuhn and Udell (2003) propose, we use the terms argument for the product, statement or piece of reasoned discourse and argumentation or argumentative discourse for the social process or activity, discussed in more detail in Garcia-Mila and Andersen (in this book). About the individual versus co-constructed production,
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we consider that both cases are possible, as illustrated in some empirical studies in other chapters. From the different meanings of argumentation, at least two that are combined in van Eemeren and Grootendorst definition, are relevant for the science classroom context: argumentation as knowledge justification and argumentation as persuasion. We see this distinction related to two types of text construction discussed by Myers (1990, p. 103): scientific arguments, referenced in evidence, and narratives that function by persuasion. In science, knowledge construction is linked to knowledge justification, and claims should be related either to a path of logical clauses or to data and evidence from different sources (or to both). Hence, argumentation in scientific topics can be defined as the connection between claims and data through justifications or the evaluation of knowledge claims in light of evidence, either empirical or theoretical. Scientific claims are thus differentiated from opinions. Driver et al. (2000), Duschl and Osborne (2002) and Kuhn (1992), among others, suggest that science education should promote argumentation as one of the dimensions of learning science, and of the enculturation in the scientific discourse. Garcia-Mila and Andersen (this book) claim a broader relevance for argumentation, viewing it as a process aimed at the rational resolution of questions and involved in general knowledge acquisition. Other authors from philosophy have defined argumentation mainly in reference to justification. For instance according to Finocchiaro (2005) an argument is “an instance of reasoning that attempts to justify a conclusion by supporting it with reasons or defending it from objections” (p. 15). Argumentation as persuasion can be defined as the process of convincing an audience (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004). Acknowledgement of the role of discursive practices in the construction of scientific knowledge suggests that discourse has to be considered as being relevant for the appropriation of scientific culture by students. For Driver et al. (2000) the interpretation of argumentation as discursive practice is involved in the process of reaching agreement on acceptable claims or courses of action. Acknowledging the role of discourse does not mean that it is not possible to develop criteria for evaluating knowledge claims. We agree with Siegel (1989) and Driver et al. (2000) that argumentation is a rational process that relies on the rigorous application of knowledge evaluation criteria. Our review of the meaning of argumentation will benefit from an historical overview of argumentation studies, as for instance, presented by Plantin (1996, 2005). For Plantin a turning point in these studies was the publication in 1958, of seminal work by Toulmin (1958) as well as Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca. On the focus on argumentation by these books, Plantin concurs, was a move towards legitimisation of a field discredited because of its association with rhetoric. Plantin sees the discredit of rhetoric in France at the end of the nineteenth century as being related to the prevalence of positivist views. The historical method was considered to yield legitimate knowledge whereas rhetoric, conceived as persuasion and even associated with trickery with words, was deemed not scientific, leading to the disappearance of the teaching of rhetoric from the French universities. After the Second World War, the ideological context changed. The emergence of argumentation studies can be interpreted as a reflection of the increasing attention at rationality of discourse
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as well as an attempt to promote “the construction of a democratic rational discourse, rejecting totalitarian Nazi or Stalinist discourses” (Plantin, 2005, p. 15; our translation). The life story of Chaïm Perelman (a scholar of Jewish origin) who contributed to the defence of Belgian Jews during the war, lends further support to the influence of the post-war context for the importance of rhetoric and rationality. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1958) subtitle their book as “the new rhetoric,” and define argumentation theory as the study of discursive techniques that allow for the trigger or increase of adherences to proposed theses. The rationale they construct has the purpose of achieving value judgements, and consists of discursive techniques or tools that enable the justification of decisions or choices. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca distinguish persuasive from convincing argumentation, the former being addressed to a particular audience whereas the latter addresses any rational being and is universal in nature. It has to be noted that there is a long tradition of argumentation and rhetoric studies in French exemplified by the seventeenthcentury work Logic or the Art of Thinking (Arnauld & Nicole, 1992), also known as the Port-Royal Logic, work that Finnocchiaro (2005) regards as a precursor of argumentation and informal logic studies. Arnauld and Nicole treatise deals with issues such as the relationship between truth and intelligibility, or the principles of reasoning relevant to the discovery and justification of contingent truths. More recently, in the last decades of the twentieth century, several interesting studies on argumentation were produced in France derived from the field of language sciences. For instance, Anscombre and Ducrot (1983) emphasise the role of language in argumentation whilst Grize (1982) focuses on cognitive processes, providing a framework that is used by several French science education researchers (Buty & Plantin, in press). Unfortunately, there is paucity of English translations of the seminal historical texts as well as of the educational research in argumentation. One example of argumentation analysis using Grize’s ideas is the work of Simonneaux (this book). The argumentation model or scheme of Stephen Toulmin (1958) can be seen as a move towards the study of argumentation as it is practised in the natural languages, and therefore away from the schemes of formal logic. Insofar as the relationships between formal logic and logic in the natural discourse are concerned, we agree with Hintikka (1999) that formal logic remains inadequate for inferences leading to new discoveries: “the truths of formal logic are mere tautologies or analytical truths without substantial content and hence incapable of sustaining any inferences leading to new and even surprising discoveries” (p. 25). For Díaz and Jiménez-Aleixandre (2000) the implication is that while it could be used to represent or analyse established knowledge, formal logic is not an adequate framework to interpret discourse in situations where new knowledge is being generated. In situations consisting of natural discourse, for instance when solving a problem in the science classroom or laboratory, many propositions could be not correct or even fallacious from the perspective of formal logic, while at the same time constituting fruitful steps in the construction of knowledge. Toulmin himself sought to describe argumentation in practice and thereby challenge the notion of deductive validity.
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He made a distinction between idealised notions of arguments as employed in mathematics and the practice of arguments in linguistic contexts, which, for him, should have close ties with epistemology. Toulmin was committed to a procedural interpretation of argumentation form as opposed to the rigid idea that all arguments have the form of “premises to conclusions”. Any justification of a statement or set of statements is, for Toulmin, an argument to support a stated claim. In other words, he places the validity of an argument in the coherence of its justification. In Toulmin’s model of argument, sometimes referred to as Toulmin’s Argument Pattern or TAP, an argument needs to make appeals to data, warrants, backings and qualifiers. Such appeals are context dependent. (For applications of Toulmin’s work in the analysis of classroom data on argumentation, see Erduran in this book). Examining the form of arguments from different fields (e.g., law, science and politics), Toulmin was able to discern that some elements of arguments are the same while others differ across fields of inquiry. Toulmin termed the elements of arguments that are similar across fields as being field-invariant features of arguments whereas those elements that differed were called field-dependent features. Data, claims, warrants, backings, rebuttals and qualifiers are field-invariant, while “what counts” as data, warrant or backing are field-dependent. Thus, appeals to justify claims used to craft historical explanations would not necessarily be the same kind of appeals used to support claims for causal or statistical-probabilistic explanations. The flexibility of Toulmin’s model to function in both field-dependent and field-invariant contexts provides an advantage for understanding and evaluating the arguments posed by students in science. Toulmin’s work has received much criticism. Plantin (2005), for instance, argues that Toulmin’s scheme is a model of rationale discourse adequate primarily for a monologue, although he appreciates the inclusion of the modal qualifier that can be conceived as the introduction of an element of dialogue. In science education some authors (e.g., Duschl, this book) have pointed to the inadequacies of TAP to account for dialogic argumentation, proposing instead the use of other models such as Walton’s (1996) as being more appropriate for the study of classroom discourse. Walton (1996) frames his dialectical approach to argumentation in informal logic. For Walton (1989) in order to analyse argumentative discourse on controversial issues in natural language a number of questions must be taken into account, as for instance careful attention to language or the ability to deal with vagueness and ambiguity, and the researcher must be prepared to unravel the main line of argument from long exchanges among two or more people. Walton points out that in this dialectical approach the question–answer context of an argument is brought forward and an argument is seen as a part of an interactive dialogue of two (or sometimes more) people reasoning together. Walton’s (1996) argumentation schemes for presumptive reasoning are grounded on presumption as a practical notion that is used to enable a dialogue or an action to go ahead on a provisional basis. So it may be that not all the evidence that would be needed to reach a definite claim or option (or course of action) is available. Walton also offers an interesting
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distinction about explicit and implicit commitments of participants in a dialogue. He sees the commitment set of each participant as divided in two sides: a light side, a set of propositions known, or in view, to all the participants, and a dark side, a set of propositions not known to, or visible to, some or all of the participants. This dark side represents the implicit commitments. (Walton’s emphasis, Walton, 1996, p. 26)
This distinction has been used by Jiménez-Aleixandre, Agraso and Eirexas (2004) in their analysis of students’ arguments about an oil spill. Walton’s typology of argumentation schemes can be interpreted also as a typology of justifications or warrants, or as a typology of appeals.
International Policies, Science Curricula and Argumentation Apart from academic rationales for the promotion of argumentation in science education, there are policy level indications that argumentation as a skill is important worldwide. Computing technologies and trends in globalisation have contributed to a renewed vision that citizens across the world need to deal with a vast set of information and be able to evaluate such information. A significant aspect of such skills is the ability to argue with evidence. Internationally the phrasing of the national science curricula has begun to incorporate more of an emphasis on the need to teach students the skills of interpreting, evaluating and debating information. In addition, international comparative studies such as the Third International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS) have offered a rationale and support for reform needed in many countries. Likewise, the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) has been a driving force in the advancement of skills such as the ability to coordinate evidence and claims. PISA is an internationally standardised assessment that was jointly developed by participating countries and administered to 15-yearolds in schools. The survey was implemented in 43 countries in the first assessment in 2000, in 41 countries in the second assessment in 2003, in 57 countries in the third assessment in 2006 and 62 countries have signed up to participate in the fourth assessment in 2009. Tests are typically administered to between 4,500 and 10,000 students in each country. The PISA Assessment Framework, although does not mention argumentation as a term, explicitly emphasises the role of evidence in the reaching of conclusions: An important life skill for young people is the capacity to draw appropriate and guarded conclusions from evidence and information given to them, to criticize claims made by others on the basis of the evidence put forward, and to distinguish opinion from evidencebased statements. Science has a particular part to play here since it is concerned with rationality in testing ideas and theories against evidence from the world around. (OECD, 2003, p. 132)
Furthermore, there is emphasis on the role of knowing and applying of processes to select and evaluate information and data (p. 133). Indeed the very definition of scientific literacy is framed in terms of evidence-based conclusions (p. 137).
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Scientific literacy is envisaged as involving three main processes: (a) describing, explaining and predicting scientific phenomena; (b) understanding scientific investigation; (c) interpreting scientific evidence and conclusions. An example assessment framework incorporating the third strand is given in Appendix A. Across the world, there is an increasing trend to incorporate ideas about how scientific knowledge construction occurs and how argument can contribute to the process of scientific knowledge construction. In the United States, American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) and the National Research Council (NRC) have been strong advocates and supporters of reform (AAAS, 1993; NRC, 1996). For example, the “Science as Inquiry Standard” emphasises the importance of students’ understanding of how we know what we know in science. In the United Kingdom, the importance of argument, the justification of claims with evidence, is recognised as an educational goal through the Ideas and Evidence (DfES/QCA, 2004) and How Science Works (QCA, 2007) components of the National Science Curriculum. The basic position underlying these components of the curriculum is that students should leave schooling with a deeper sense of the nature of scientific knowledge—how ideas are produced, evaluated and revised in science. In upper secondary schooling at Key Stage 4, the Qualifications and Curriculum Authority states that: “How science works” focuses on the evidence to support or refute these ideas and theories. The evidence comes from the collection and creative interpretation of data, both of which need to be considered. Consequently, in order to understand how science works, learners need skills such as practical collection of data, working safely, presenting scientific information; they need to understand the power of science to explain phenomena, the way understanding of science changes over time and the applications of contemporary scientific developments. (QCA, 2007)
In the new Spanish National Curriculum for secondary schooling the relevance of the use of evidence and of argumentation is emphasised both in the general definition of basic competencies and in the description of goals in the science subjects. For instance the basic “Competency about knowledge and interaction with the physical world” states that: This competency . . . enables to engage in rational argumentation about the consequences of one or another way of life, and to adopt a stance towards a healthy life both physically and mentally (. . .) This competency makes possible to identify questions or problems and to draw conclusions based on evidence, with the goal of understanding and making decisions about the physical world and about the changes produced by human activity in the environment, the health and people’s quality of life. (MEC, 2007, p. 687; our translation)
The description of the contributions of science to the basic competencies also highlights “a particular way of constructing discourse, aimed at argumentation” (MEC, 2007, p. 692) and includes the skill of argumentation among the general objectives of science education for compulsory secondary school, from 12 to 16 years. In the secondary science curriculum in South Africa, one of the learning outcomes focuses on the nature of science and its relationships to technology, society and environment. Here the expectation is that:
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M. P. Jiménez-Aleixandre and S. Erduran The learner is able to identify and critically evaluate scientific knowledge claims and the impact of this knowledge on the quality of socio-economic, environmental and human development. It is important for learners to understand the scientific enterprise and, in particular, how scientific knowledge develops. (Department of Education, 2003, p. 14)
Furthermore, the South African science curriculum acknowledges a philosophy of science that places the tentative nature of science at the forefront of instruction, highlighting the value of evidence in the building of scientific knowledge: Scientific knowledge is tentative and subject to change as new evidence becomes available and new problems are addressed. The study of historical, environmental and cultural perspectives on science highlights how it changes over time, depending not only on experience but also on social, religious and political factors. (Department of Education, 2003, p. 11)
In Turkey, the national reform efforts have promoted informed citizenship where individuals make evidence-based judgements in their everyday lives including issues that relate to science. Some of the middle-school curricular goals specify in particular the role of argumentation as well as students’ role in the construction of scientifically valid points of view: ● ●
●
To encourage students’ argumentation and evaluation of alternative ideas To mediate debates and activities in a way so as to allow for the possibility of students’ own constructions of scientifically accepted views and mindsets … To encourage students’ skills in generating hypotheses and alternative interpretations in explaining phenomena (MEB, 2005, p. 15, our translation)
The work on argumentation directly relates to the following two standards in the Turkish National Curriculum which lists one of the aims of science education as helping students (a) gain skills in research, reading and debate whereby learners are involved in new knowledge construction; and (b) understand the nature of science and technology as well as the relationship between science, technology, society and environment. In Israel, the Harari report (Tomorrow 98, 1992) by the committee appointed by the Ministry of Education to examine the state of science, mathematics and technology instruction, under the leadership of Harari, cites that greater comprehension of the importance of science and technology knowledge helps pupils make decisions regarding national and international issues. Science and technology teaching is aimed at recognising the possibilities and limitations of both disciplines when applying them to problem-solving. These courses develop smart consumer thinking and behaviour by using a decision-making process when selecting a product or a system. In Australia, the Curriculum Council of Western Australia (1998) recommends that: Typically, students learn to plan investigations using scientific knowledge to select or adapt equipment where necessary. They should learn to appreciate the value of doing exploratory work to refine the investigation process and use appropriate ways to record and display their data, draw their conclusions and interpret them in the light of current scientific knowledge. Students need time at the end of investigations to allow for the recognition of
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confirming and refuting evidence and sources of possible errors, as well as to attempting to correct them. (p. 235)
Even though this document does not explicitly state the use of argument in science education, the language involving the use of data drawing conclusions from data as well as the recognition of confirming and refuting evidence implicitly points to the features of argument and argumentation. In numerous science-education policies across the world, the trends highlight the significance of making science relevant to students’ lives through links to technology, society and environment. Taiwan has developed new Science and Life Technology Curriculum Standards (SaLTS) for Grades 1–9 (Chang, 2005). SaLTS feature a systematic way for developing students’ understanding and appreciation of individual–society–nature interactions. The role of evidence typically tends to play out in these arguments in informed citizenship although there is also indication that the role of evidence, debate and argument in scientific knowledge growth is also acknowledged. Often however the link to argumentation is not explicit except for some policy documents such as the National Education Standards (Curriculum Guidelines) for Grade 1–9 in Science and Technology Discipline in Taiwan: Students will gain related knowledge and skills through learning science and scientific inquiry; meanwhile, they will think scientifically and use what they have learned to solve problems for them having been used to do discussions and argumentation according to scientific methods. Students will therefore realize the nature of knowledge and form a habit of valuing evidence and reasoning through scientific inquiry frequently. When facing and dealing with problems, students will try to understand them and solve them with a positive attitude of curiosity and exploration. We call it “scientific and technological literacy” including all the knowledge, viewpoints, abilities, attitudes and applications discussed above. The main goal of learning in science and technology discipline is to foster our citizens’ scientific and technological literacy. (translated document)
In other cases such as the Chilean National Science Curriculum, the notions of argumentation and justification are contextualised in particular examples embedded in problem-solving tasks such as the one reproduced in Appendix B (MEC, 2004, p. 41). The National Curriculum for General Science in Pakistan (NCGS, 2006) promotes an inquiry-based curriculum where there is an emphasis on skills such as the ability to provide evidence for conclusions: Inquiry requires students to describe objects and events, ask questions and devise answers, collect and interpret data and test the reliability of the knowledge they’ve generated. They also identify assumptions, provide evidence for conclusions and justify their work. (p. 59)
As the preceding overview of the worldwide reform efforts in science-education policy illustrates, there is an increasing emphasis on resting the science curriculum on a more appropriate balance between science process and citizenship skills, and factual or content knowledge of science. The main rationale for the inclusion of argumentation in the science curriculum has been twofold. First, there is the need to educate for informed citizenship where science is related to its social, economic, cultural and political roots. Second, the reliance of science on evidence has been
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problematised and linked in the context of scientific processes such as investigations, inquiries and practical work. The advance of such efforts is a signal that the science teaching needs to change to match the needs of citizens as well as scientists. The inclusion of the assessment of argumentation in the PISA framework is an encouraging signal that acknowledges the significance of argumentation as an important skill. Likewise the presence of worked out examples of argument-based tasks in National Curricula such as the Chilean Science Curriculum would provide an impetus to the adoption of argumentation at the level of the classroom. Despite such efforts at the level of international policies about the science curriculum, the systemic uptake of argumentation work in everyday science classrooms remains minimal. One of the key challenges to implementing argumentation in everyday classrooms is the lack of transformation of policy recommendations to educational practice. The gap between research, policy and practice, a familiar problem in educational research (e.g., Hargreaves, 1996) is perpetuated by the fact that few research projects have extended the findings to a larger scale of teaching and learning scenarios, for instance through translation of their research to professional development of new teachers. The Nuffield-funded IDEAS project aimed to bridge this gap where school-based research into teaching and learning of argumentation has been applied to the design of a professional development programme involving exemplars video clips of argumentation teaching and learning, and resources for supporting pupils’ argumentation in the science classroom (Osborne et al., 2004). The production of research-based professional development programs, on the other hand, have highlighted the importance of giving both in-service and pre-service science teachers the opportunities to engage in tasks that are meaningful in their teaching contexts (e.g., Simon et al., 2006; Taber, 2006). The Key Stage Three Strategy of the Department for Employment and Skills (DfES) in the United Kingdom supported a network of projects to enable “ideas and evidence” to be a component of initial teacher training (e.g., Erduran, 2006). By inviting universitybased researchers to participate in a policy-driven initiative to support initial teachers’ training in this area, the DfES extended the national policy on “Ideas and Evidence” to the research arena. The outcome of the project included a resource pack for Initial Teacher Training (ITT) providers subsequently funded by the Gatsby Charitable Foundation. These resources have been adapted for ITT in other national contexts (e.g., Turkey) in an effort to make argumentation a component of pre-service teacher education (Erduran et al., 2006).
From Early Argumentation Studies to Future Directions The policy level rationales for the inclusion of argumentation in science education have accompanied, if not somewhat in a delayed fashion, the theoretical and empirical justifications for why argumentation is needed in science education.
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Most international policies began to emphasise the role of evidence and justifications in scientific inquiry since late 1990s. The first studies about argumentation in science classrooms explored, since at least the 1980s, knowledge construction along with the social dimensions of argumentation such as the role of authority and leadership in group dynamics. For instance, Russell (1983) used Toulmin’s (1958) scheme to analyse teachers’ questions in terms of their role in the development of arguments framed either in rational (evidence) or traditional (status) authority concluding that traditional authority was prevalent. Eichinger et al. (1991), in their study about 6th graders discussing which water state is appropriate to transport water in a space ship, combined argument analysis with the exploration of social interactions. These researchers suggested that the students reached a consensus about adequate claim and justification, not because of a deep understanding, but because one of the leaders decided to support the only student who offered an adequate justification. The role of ethnicity, though an understudied research area in relation to argumentation, has received some attention contributing to the cultural studies of argumentation. Stephen Druker (2000) analysed the influence of practices and resources originated out of school in the argumentation strategies of Indonesian students belonging to two ethnic groups, finding higher frequency of agreement in the Javanese, related to a culture which places great value in social harmony. Jiménez-Aleixandre et al. (2000) explored the influence of the school culture in the production of arguments by secondary school students. Cultural and sociological studies of argumentation promise an exciting new research domain where issues such as power and gender can be investigated and conceptualised for argumentation in science classrooms. Another potential direction of future research is interdisciplinarity where argumentation is studied from a wider range of theoretical and empirical perspectives. An example would be collaborations among researchers in linguistics, philosophy and science education so as to inform how argumentation can be better situated in schooling. We began our chapter with a reference to Darwin’s “long argument”. Perhaps it is appropriate to end it by expressing the hope that argumentation will be commonplace in science classrooms. The teaching of evolution remains under challenge 150 years after the publication of On the Origin of Species. Argumentation will empower students for distinguishing claims made on scientific grounds from those based solely on tradition and authority. Acknowledgements We would like to thank the following colleagues for their help in locating policy documents: Ying-Shao Hsu, Merle Hodges, Rachel Mamlok-Naaman, John Loughran, Dilek Ardac and Gerardo Moenne. M. P. Jiménez-Aleixandre work about argumentation is part of a project funded by the Spanish Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia (MEC), partly funded by the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), code SEJ2006-15589C02-01/EDUC. We are grateful to William Sandoval, Merce Garcia-Mila, Gregory Kelly, Isabel Martins, Christian Plantin and Andrée Tiberghien for their useful suggestions to the first draft of this chapter.
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Knorr-Cetina, K. (1999). Epistemic cultures: How the sciences make knowledge. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Kress, G., Jewitt, C., Ogborn, J., & Tsatsarelis, C. (2001). Multimodal teaching and learning: The rhetorics of the science classroom. London: Continuum. Kuhn, D. (1991). The skills of argument. New York: Cambridge University Press. Kuhn, D. (1992). Thinking as argument. Harvard Educational Review, 62, 155–178. Kuhn, D. (1993). Science as argument: Implications for teaching and learning scientific thinking. Science Education, 77, 319–337. Kuhn, D., & Udell, W. (2003). The development of argument skills. Child Development, 74(5), 1245–1260. Latour, B., & Woolgar, S. (1986). Laboratory life: The construction of scientific facts. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Lave, J., & Wenger, E. (1991). Situated learning: Legitimate peripheral participation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Leach, J., Hind, A., & Ryder, J. (2003). Designing and evaluating short teaching interventions about the epistemology of science in high school classrooms. Science Education, 87(3), 831–848. Lemke, J. (1990). Talking science: Language, learning and values. Norwood, NJ: Ablex. Martins, I., Mortimer, E., Osborne, J., Tsatsarelis, C., & Jiménez Aleixandre, M.P. (2001). Rhetoric and science education. In H. Behrendt, H. Dahncke, R. Duit, W. Gräber, M. Komorek, A. Kross, & P. Reiska (Eds.), Research in science education—Past, present and future (pp. 189–198). Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic. Mason, L. (1996). An analysis of children’s construction of new knowledge through their use of reasoning and arguing in classroom discussions. International Journal of Qualitative Studies in Education, 9(4), 411–433. Mason, L. (1998). Sharing cognition to construct scientific knowledge in school contexts: The role of oral and written discourse. Instructional Science, 26, 359–389. Milli Egˇitim Bakanligˇi, Turkey (2005). Ilkögˇretim fen ve teknoloji ders ögˇretim programi (6, 7 ve 8. siniflar). Ankara: Author. Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia, Republic of Chile (MEC). (2004). Estudio y comprensión de la naturaleza. Santiago de Chile: Author. Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia, Spain (MEC). (2007). Real Decreto 1631/2006 Enseñanzas mínimas educación secundaria obligatoria. Boletín Oficial del Estado, 5 January, 677–773. Ministry of Education, Pakistan. (2006). National Curriculum for General Science. Grades IV– VIII. Islamabad: Author. Mortimer, E. F., & Scott, P. H. (2003). Meaning making in secondary science classrooms. Maidenhead, UK: Open University Press. Myers, G. (1990). Writing biology. Texts in the social construction of scientific knowledge. Madison, UK: University of Wisconsin Press. National Research Council. (1996). National science education standards. Washington, DC: National Academy Press. Norris, S. P., & Philips, L. M. (2003). How literacy in its fundamental sense is central to scientific literacy. Science Education, 87, 224–240. Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (2003). PISA Assessment Framework— Mathematics, reading, science and problem solving knowledge and skills. Paris: Author. Osborne, J., Erduran, S., & Simon, S. (2004). Ideas, evidence and argument in science. London: King’s College London. Perelman, C., & Olbrechts-Tyteca, L. (1958). Traité de l’argumentation. La nouvelle rhétorique. Bruxelles: Éditions de l’Université de Bruxelles. (The new rhetoric: A treatise on argumentation. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1969). Peters, M. A. (2006). Editorial. Special issue—Philosophy of science education. Educational Philosophy and Theory, 38(5), 579–584. Plantin, C. (1996). L’Argumentation. Paris: Éditions du Seuil.
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Plantin, C. (2005). L’Argumentation. Histoire, théories et perspectives. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Pontecorvo, C. (1987). Discussing for reasoning: The role of argument in knowledge construction. In E. de Corte, H. Lodewiijks, R. Parmentier, & R. Span (Eds.), Learning and instruction: Vol. 1, European research in an international context (pp. 239–250). Oxford: Pergamon Press and Leuven University Press. Qualifications and Curriculum Authority (2007). How science works. Retrieved on March 26 from www.qca.org.uk. Russell, T. L. (1983). Analyzing arguments in science classroom discourse: Can teachers’ questions distort scientific authority? Journal of Research in Science Teaching, 20, 27–45. Sandoval, W. A. (2005). Understanding students’ practical epistemologies and their influence on learning through inquiry. Science Education, 89(4), 634–656. Sandoval, W. A., & Reiser, B. J. (2004). Explanation-driven inquiry: Integrating conceptual and epistemic scaffolds for scientific inquiry. Science Education, 88, 345–372. Siegel, H. (1989). The rationality of science, critical thinking and science education. Synthese, 80, 9–41. Siegel, H. (1992). On defining “critical thinker” and justifying critical thinking. In H. A. Alexander (Ed.), Philosophy of education, 1992. Proceedings of the forty-eighth annual meeting of the Philosophy of Education Society (pp. 72–75). Urbana, IL: Philosophy of Education Society. Siegel, H. (1995). Why should educators care about argumentation? Informal Logic, 17(2), 159–176. Siegel, H. (2006). Epistemological diversity and education research: Much ado about nothing much? Educational Researcher, 35(2), 3–12. Simon, S., Erduran, S., & Osborne, J. (2006). Learning to teach argumentation: research and development in the science classroom. International Journal of Science Education, 28(2–3), 235–260. Taber, K. (Ed.) (2006). Ideas and evidence in science education. Special issue, School Science Review, 87. Tomorrow 98 (1992). Report of the superior committee on science, mathematics and technology in Israel. Jerusalem: Ministry of Education and Culture (English Edition, 1994). Toulmin, S. (1958). The uses of argument. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Vygotsky, L. S. (1978). Mind in society. The development of higher psychological processes. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Walton, D. N. (1989). Informal logic: a handbook for critical argumentation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Walton, D. N. (1996). Argumentation schemes for presumptive reasoning. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. Wertsch, J. (1991). Voices of the mind: A sociocultural approach to mediated action. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Yore, L. D., Bisanz, G. L., & Hand, B. M. (2003). Examining the literacy component of science literacy: 25 years of language arts and science research. International Journal of Science Education, 25(6), 689–725. Zohar, A., & Nemet, F. (2002). Fostering students’ knowledge and argumentation skills through dilemmas in human genetics. Journal of Research in Science Teaching, 39(1), 35–62.
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Appendix A Example from PISA Assessment Framework on Interpreting Scientific Evidence and Conclusions (OECD, 2003, p. 144). Science Example 2.2 Suppose that on one stretch of narrow road Peter finds that after the lane lines are painted the traffic changes as below. Speed Position Distance apart
Traffic moves more quickly Traffic keeps nearer edges of road No change
On the basis of these results it was decided that lane lines should be painted on all narrow roads. Do you think this was the best decision? Give your reasons for agreeing or disagreeing. Agree: _____ Disagree: _____ Reason: ____________________ Scoring and comments on Science Example 2.2 Full Credit Code 1: Answers that agree or disagree with the decision for reasons that are consistent with the given information. For example: ●
● ●
Agree because there is less chance of collisions if the traffic is keeping near the edges of the road, even if it is moving faster Agree because if traffic is moving faster, there is less incentive to overtake Disagree because if the traffic is moving faster and keeping the same distance apart, this may mean that the drivers do not have enough room to stop in an emergency.
No Credit Code 0: Item type: Process: Concept: Situation:
Answers that agree or disagree without specifying the reasons, or provide reasons unrelated to the problem. Open-constructed response Interpreting scientific evidence and conclusions (Process 3) Forces and movement Science in technology
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Appendix B Argumentation embedded in problem-solving task (MEC, 2004, p.41). Unit 2: Change and conservation in phenomena involving chemical reactions They boil an egg in water for about 5 to 6 minute, let it cool and cut it carefully. They analyse the changes that happened and discuss: ● ● ● ●
●
●
●
If they could get back the hard boiled egg to its initial condition by cooling it If the change occurred inside the egg is reversible or irreversible If the phenomenon of decoction is physical or chemical What properties of the egg have changed? (mainly aspect, consistency, colour of white and yolk and taste) Whether they can justify their arguments to affirm or deny that the egg suffered a change of state and became solid What properties of the egg did not change? (shape, colour and aspect of the shell) If the eggshell experienced a chemical or physical change and how can they justify their answer
Chapter 2
Cognitive Foundations of Learning Argumentation Merce Garcia-Mila and Christopher Andersen
The goal of the present chapter is to provide a cognitive analysis of the competencies involved in argumentation: the psychological processes involved in argumentation, how these processes develop, and most importantly, given the scope of the present book, how this development relates to science learning. For the latter, we need to situate the role of argumentation in science learning, and this is the focus of the first section of the chapter, where the case of the importance of argumentation in the new approaches of science will be made. Argumentation, however, is a very broad, multidisciplinary, and polisemic term, and thus is used differently within and between disciplines. The second section is an attempt to clarify the term. We will devote the third section to concretizing which aspects of argumentation specifically relate to science education, in order to make a cognitive analysis of these aspects in the fourth and fifth sections. Finally, the last section addresses what the literature says about scaffolding argumentation. In other words, we will try to answer the questions science educators may pose in order to deal with argumentation in their science classes: What are the main difficulties students meet when they engage in argumentation? What should we expect from young children in an elementary class in terms of their competencies to argue? In what ways are these competencies different when we compare elementary with secondary school students? What are they built upon? What is the role of metacognition in their development? Our underlying main claim is that argumentation is a process involved in general knowledge acquisition, regardless of whether it is individual silent learning or collaborative learning, and following Siegel (1989) it is aimed at the rational resolution of questions, issues, and disputes.
Science, Science Learning, and Argumentation Whatever the discipline (philosophy, sociology, linguistics, anthropology, psychology, education, etc.), there is widespread consensus among science analysts that science is not the unequivocal and uncontested knowledge generated by a direct reading of nature that the positivist perspective used to claim. Instead, science is seen as a social construction that results from inquiry processes (planning and S. Erduran and M. P. Jiménez-Aleixandre (eds.), Argumentation in Science Education. © Springer 2007
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performing experiments), as well as from communication and public scrutiny processes among the scientific community that lead to discussions addressed to resolve controversies and reach consensus. Scientific discursive practices such as assessing alternatives, weighing evidence, interpreting texts, and evaluating the potential validity of scientific claims are all seen as essential components in constructing scientific arguments, which are fundamental in the progression of scientific knowledge (Latour, 1987; Latour & Woolgar, 1986). Socio-constructivists such as Lemke stress that to understand how scientists elaborate their view of the world, we must understand how they exchange ideas and how they change their opinions in response to evidence: that is, the way they use cultural resources to make meaning, analyzing the progressive sequence of what they say, the diagrams they draw, the equations they write, and see the effect of all this on making meanings. According to this, to learn science is not to know what the last generation of scientists thinks of the world, but to find out how each new generation of scientists re-elaborates our view of the world (Lemke, 2002). Thus, the goal of science education should be to prepare the students to use this combination of cultural resources described significantly and appropriately. Though this perspective of science is widely held by researchers in science education, it has not been reflected in the practice of science education. As Driver, Newton, & Osborne (2000) clearly describe the situation, “Science in schools is commonly portrayed from a ‘positivist perspective’ as a subject in which there are clear ‘right answers’ and where data lead uncontroversially to agreed conclusions” (p. 288). As a consequence, science knowledge is seen as a “finished” product that must be learned as literally as possible. As a result, there is increasing attention being drawn by science education researchers to the mismatches between the nature of science and the teaching of science. “Given the socially constructed nature of scientific knowledge, we must give a much higher priority than is currently the case to discursive practices in general and to argument in particular” (Driver et al., 2000, p. 297). Along this line but from the developmental psychology perspective, Kuhn (2005) establishes the goal of science education as promoting a way of thinking in which inquiry and argument are two central skills. There, current approaches to science education establish more or less explicitly the importance of argumentation in the acquisition of scientific knowledge among science students.
The Many Meanings of Argumentation Despite this consensus, the concept of argumentation involves diverse meanings. Since these different uses of the concept directly affect the psychological processes involved, we need to clarify the concept in order to discuss the cognitive foundations underlying the learning of argumentation. Argumentation has a long tradition as an object of study and analysis, although it has not yet resulted in a universally accepted theory (van Eemeren et al., 1996). It has been studied from diverse
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disciplines with different criteria of analysis not necessarily shared even within the discipline. As an example of this disparity, arguments can be defined according to a validity criterion; some authors may require deductive validity exclusively provided by formal syllogistic reasoning (Copi, 1972), while others radically critical of this classical position regard argument as a justified assertion whose validity is provided by the coherence of the justification (Toulmin, 1958). Within this coherence, “warrants” play a central role in the justification by connecting data with claims, but they allow qualifying adverbs such as “usually,” “presumably,” which would clearly lead to an invalid deductive argument from the syllogistic reasoning perspective.1 In contrast, for those who claim that argumentation is the art of persuasion, the quality criteria should be soundness, plausibility, and persuasiveness of the audience, in addition to deductive validity (Chinn & Anderson, 1998; Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969). In addition to this lack of consensus in the criteria for validity of arguments, there are other aspects in the way argumentation is conceptualized that are also controversial. In this sense, different authors would conceptualize argument differently according to its position along criteria continua such as product–process, individual–social, internal–external, oral–written, rhetoric–dialogical, and formal–informal, with the consequent implications for a psychological analysis. For example, can any inner deliberation (as an individual internal silent process that leads to a justified assertion) be considered an argument? Or does it need a juxtaposition of two opposing assertions in a dialogue between two people who hold opposing views, supported by justifications with rebuttals that address the other’s view by means of a counterargument? Van Eemeren et al.’s (1996) pragmadialectical approach seems very clear in this respect. They claim that argumentation is approached with four basic metatheoretical or methodological premises in the sense that they concern how one ought to set about studying argumentation: externalization, socialization, functionalization, and dialectification. Their commonly cited definition shows this position: A verbal and social activity of reason aimed at increasing (or decreasing) the acceptability of a controversial standpoint for the listener or reader, by putting forward a constellation of propositions intended to justify (or refute) the standpoint before a rational judge. (p. 5) But argumentation does not consist of a single individual privately drawing a conclusion: It is part of a discourse procedure whereby two or more individuals who have a difference of opinion try to arrive to an agreement. (p. 277)
In contrast with this position, and for the sake of fulfilling the chapter goal of providing a cognitive analysis of the skills involved in argumentation, we will take a different position and answer this question using Kuhn’s (1991, 2005) approach to argumentation. Along with Billig (1987), Kuhn’s main claim to address this issue is that what makes a justification process a real (reasoned) argument is the possibility to conceive of alternatives (opposing assertions correctly justified) that bear
1 See van Eemeren (1996) concerning the ambiguity with which Toulmin establishes the validity of an argument.
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on the possibility of the assertion to be wrong. This whole process requires a weighing process to reach a justified position. It is in this sense that the individual internal process that leads to an assertion with accompanying justification can be considered an argument, because it implicitly contains a full dialogic argument as that defined in a broad sense, with social (dialogic) and individual (rhetorical) argument closely connected: An individual constructs an argument to support a claim. The dialogic process in which two or more people engage in debate of opposing claims can be referred to as argumentation or argumentive discourse to distinguish it from argument as product. Nonetheless, implicit in argument as product is the advancement of a claim in a framework of evidence and counterclaims that is characteristic of argumentive discourse. (Kuhn & Franklin, 2006, p. 979)
Subscribing Kuhn’s and Billig’s position, Anderson et al. (2001) illustrate the assumption of reasoning as a process of argumentation and thus fundamentally dialogical by appealing to Bakhtin’s (1934, 1981) idea of the multiple voices in the thinkers’ minds that represent contrasting perspectives on an issue. Kuhn’s integration of Billig’s view into a psychological analysis provides a methodological framework to look at the rational activities that extend from the individual reasoning process of a child trying to build a theory to the social reasoning involved in public debates to reach consensus. Departing from Kuhn’s distinction, the internal weighing process of positive and negative evidence that leads to choosing a given assertion over others is considered an “implicit full dialogic argument.” Kuhn’s claim facilitates us in the task of analyzing the reasoning process involved in learning science. Science learning, as well as any learning mediated by discursive practices, would require (among other skills more closely related to inquiry) a set of argumentation skills. These skills could be both intrapsychological, that is, internal, individual, but implicitly dialogic, and interpsychological, that is, external, social, and explicitly dialogic. These two types of skills, though not identical, share a core of psychological processes. The argumentation involved in public debates, such as those held in science classrooms, needs an additional set of skills related to the presence of an audience in addition to the intrapsychological dialectical process of weighing positive and negative evidence to make a justified claim. Our analysis of argumentation will start with a look at what the literature says about the use (or lack) of all these skills among our students, to proceed to the cognitive analysis of the difficulties associated with such use.
Science Students and Argumentation There is a move among science education researchers toward the analysis of argumentation in science classroom environments with the goal to investigate students’ ability to argue and the difficulties they experience when they engage in argumentation. What are the students’ interactive argument skills in a classroom debate? How do they argue when they are organized in small groups or in pairs? Despite the methodological
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difficulty inherent in this research, their results point in the same direction as those generated by research in developmental psychology: that is, students have difficulty engaging with another’s statements. They tend to make their own claims without addressing their opponent’s claim. In addition, they use simple claims to make their disagreement explicit, without taking into consideration alternative views that would potentially generate counterarguments or rebuttals. For example, Pontecorvo and Girardet (1993) worked with 9-year-olds arguing in small groups. They showed a high majority of utterances addressed to espousing their own claims and justifications of them, ignoring the partner’s claims. Results with older students paint a similar picture. Jiménez-Aleixandre et al. (2000) analyzed argumentation in a 9th-grade genetics class and found that most of the claims offered in a discussion were unrelated to the rest of the elements in the argument. Beyond these weaknesses specific to argumentation in discursive practices (Anderson et al.,1997, 1998, 2001; Candela, 2002; Duschl & Osborne, 2002; Erduran et al., 2004; Jiménez-Aleixandre et al., 2000; Jiménez-Aleixandre & Pereiro-Muñoz, 2002; Kelly & Chen, 1999; Kelly & Crawford, 1997; Osborne et al., 2004; Pontecorvo & Girardet, 1993; Reznitskaya et al., 2001), the abovementioned studies and others show a set of skills that need to be in place in sound argumentive reasoning, be it either external in a public debate or internal in scientific reasoning such as the construction of two-sided arguments or the distinction between data and explanation in support of other claims (Brem & Rips, 2000; Kuhn, 1991; Kuhn et al., 1997; Perkins, 1985; Voss & Means, 1991). The lack of these skills, reported in both the science education (Chinn & Brewer, 1998; Driver et al., 2000) and in the developmental literature (Kuhn et al., 1988, 1995), leads to strong confirmation biases either selecting evidence to confirm prior theories or assessing it differently (or even ignoring it), according to whether it confirms or disconfirms prior theories, jumping to conclusions before enough evidence is available, etc. In the following sections, we will return to these problems, approaching them from the psychological processes involved. Argumentation involved in discursive practices will be analyzed as interpsychological argumentation, while argumentation involved in individual scientific reasoning will be analyzed as intrapsychological argumentation. Our claim is that they share the core cognitive requirements involved in inferential thinking. To engage in sound argumentive practices, apart from the skills to address the strengths and weaknesses of the audience by connecting arguments, counterarguments and rebuttals, the scientific reasoning skills need to be in place as well. On the other hand, according to the Vygotskian (1981) perspective, interpsychological practices are essential to develop scientific reasoning.2 For expository purposes, they will be addressed in separate sections.
2
See Hickman’s thoughts on differences between individual and collective argumentation with respect to structures and processes and how they can function as a developmental mechanism (Hickman, 1987) and Anderson et al. (2001) for an empirical analysis on this issue.
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Interpsychological Argumentation This section argues that the essence of argumentation in discursive practices is an externalized explicit dialectical activity, where two or more minds engage in a debate through a series of claims, counterclaims, and rebuttals. As Hickman (1987) puts it, “Usually they (argumentations) consist of a sequence of utterances whose content may—but need not—enter the argument to be developed. However, an argumentation only succeeds if the participants manage to develop a joint argument that is collectively accepted as an answer to the quaestio” (p. 232). The main components of argumentation (claim, counterclaim, and rebuttal) are familiar to anyone who has seen a political debate. But as we have seen, despite the familiarity of the structure, both students and adults have difficulty engaging effectively in argumentation. Skilled argumentation has two goals: (1) to secure commitments from the opponent that can be used to support one’s own argument, and (2) undermine the opponent’s position by identifying and challenging weaknesses in his/her argument (Walton, 1989). Felton and Kuhn (2001; Felton, 2004), based on Walton (1996) and van Eemeren et al. (1996), provide a framework to analyze interactive arguments. They establish three goals the speaker must address in argumentation: (1) to identify the premises necessary to justify a claim, (2) to identify unwarranted claims in the partner’s argument in order to undermine them, and (3) to rebut or neutralize challenges that the partner advances against his or her argument. Involved in this is the ability to direct discourse with questions, critiques, and rebuttals, with the challenge of being able to lead the process of “competitively co-constructing an argument in the context of discourse,” that is, to be aware of which discourse strategies address their partner’s reasoning (Felton, 2004, p. 37). The understanding of such goals and the application of effective strategies to meet these goals are, according to Felton (2004; Felton & Kuhn, 2001), the two parameters in the analysis of the development of argumentive discourse.3 When one wants to undermine the opponent’s claim, she or he needs to think of her or his weaknesses and regain the strength of the claim. Thus, to study development of argumentive discourse strategies, the analysis must focus on the progress from simple forms of arguments such as “disagree” (where the goal is to expose one’s own point of view, without addressing the opponent’s claim) to the use of counterarguments and rebuttals (where the two goals mentioned above—awareness of the partner’s weaknesses and a move to regain the strength of one’s own claim—are addressed). These argumentive discursive strategies were analyzed from a developmental perspective (Felton & Kuhn, 2001). They compared adolescents’ and adults’ peer dialogues on the topic of capital punishment and found that the adolescents did not tend to take the audience into consideration and thus did not adapt their discourse. More concretely, they reported how adults used counterarguments more often than adolescents, and how their discourse also showed more moves to weaken the opponents’ claim. 3 See Felton and Kuhn’s (2001) system of categories for the analysis of strategies in argumentive discourse.
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The adolescents’ poorer performance in addressing the opponents’ discourse could be interpreted in terms of their difficulties in the construction of arguments themselves. In its most basic conception, argumentation involves producing justified claims, producing counterarguments, and rebutting counterarguments. In producing justified claims, several alternative theories must be coordinated with evidence in order to choose the evidence that best fits the justification of one of the theories. This may happen not only in explicit dialogic debates, but also in written argumentive texts or in individual verbal interviews. Along this line, there is some work in which verbal interviews are used to analyze the construction of arguments in its dialogic form (Means & Voss, 1996). Kuhn (1991) compared adolescents and adults’ ability to offer a valid supporting argument for a given claim (i.e., why prisoners return to crime when they are released), as well as offer counterarguments and rebuttals for that claim. Only onethird of the adolescent sample versus one-half of the adults were able to provide a justified claim. In addition, very few subjects in both samples were able to succeed in producing counterarguments or rebuttals. Similarly, Means and Voss (1996) analyzed 5th to 11th and 8th to 12th-grade children’s (in two different studies) oral protocols generated in response to given topics (for instance, questions about drugs effects and drugs use). Protocols were analyzed according to the number of reasons, qualifiers, counterarguments, and type of argument structure. They also report a relatively poor performance in generating the different elements of arguments. As stated by the authors (Voss & Van Dike, 2001), this appears to be in conflict with other research that shows that when young children engage in disputes, rather than ending them with a “no” response, they arrive at a mutually acceptable alternative proposition (Eisenberg & Garvey, 1981; Stein & Miller, 1993). To reach this primitive kind of consensus, children must be able to generate counterarguments. Other studies show that as early as 5 years of age children can produce justifications and rudimentary forms of counterarguments (Anderson et al., 1997). In fact, as Piaget suggested, quarrels about actions, such as common disputes for a toy, precede genuine verbal arguments, which are produced at around 7 or 8 years (Billig, 1987). Then, how can these different results be explained? The following section tries to answer this question by analyzing the psychological processes involved in the argumentive reasoning required in both the external social argumentation and the internal individual one.
Intrapsychological Argumentation Difficulty in engaging in effective argumentation begins with difficulty in formulating an effective argument. In this section, we will focus on the internal dialectical coordination between theories, evidence, and methodologies4 that defines scientific 4 Moshman adds “methodologies” to Kuhn’s definition of scientific thinking as “the consciously controlled coordination between theory and evidence,” which according to our view gives a new emphasis by adding the assessment of (or at least a reflection of) the methods used to generate data.
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reasoning (Kuhn & Franklin, 2006; Moshman, 1998). Research on scientific reasoning has a long tradition in cognitive psychology (Zimmerman, 2000). This research has focused on either inquiry skills (i.e., the processes involved in experimental design to generate evidence to submit theories to testing) or on inference skills (i.e., the process involved in the interpretation and evaluation of different sources and types of evidence to reach conclusions, and the consideration of alternative explanations of the data in an internal dialogue), or more recently, on both simultaneously. These inference skills are the ones addressed in this section with particular attention to their relation to knowledge acquisition. To make the analysis of the processes involved in argumentation, and how they develop, we take Moshman’s (1998) distinction between “inference,” “thinking,” and “reasoning.” He establishes that inference, defined as the generation of new cognitions from old, is normally performed automatically and unconsciously from a very early age. In contrast, thinking is defined as an advanced form of inference in the sense that is involves a deliberate coordination of one’s inferences to serve one’s purposes as the thinking involved in justifying a claim or testing a hypothesis (Moshman, 1995). Finally, Moshman defines reasoning as an advanced form of thinking that appears when thinking is evaluated with respect to how well it serves the purposes of the thinker: Over the course of development, thinkers increasingly make such evaluations themselves and attempt to improve their inferential activities. Recognizing that some thought processes are more justifiable than others, they increasingly construct standards of rationality and apply these to their own thinking. To the extent that an individual attempts to constrain his or her thinking on the basis of self-imposed standard of rationality, we may say the individual is engaged in reasoning. Reasoning, then, is epistemologically self-constrained thinking. (Moshman, 1998, p. 953)
These different cognitive processes differ in terms of the degree of rationality involved. Our claim for the developmental analysis that proceeds is that thinking in Moshman’s sense will be related to the justification of a claim, while reasoning will be related to argumentation. The dialectical coordination between theory, evidence, and methodologies is involved in the process of thinking, while reasoning involves, in addition to the former, the process of coordinating multiple claims in a framework of evaluating multiple alternatives and evidence (Kuhn, 1991). As the literature organized around conceptual change shows (Carey, 1985; Carey & Smith, 1993; Keil, 1998; Vosniadou & Verschaffel, 2004), children from an early age construct implicit theories that are constantly reviewed in their interaction with the world, but this construction is not intentionally addressed to seek knowledge: instead, it is unconscious. Thus, while automatic inferences are made from a very early age, the deliberate efforts to constrain thinking in order to generate a justified conclusion in a debate is a late development milestone. Let us imagine we are in preschool class. When Maria (3-year-old) knows that a hidden classmate could be a girl or a boy, and it is not a girl, she concludes that he is a boy. Can we say that she made the inference p or q, not p; therefore q? (example adapted from Moshman, 1998, p. 956). In other words, can we say that she was
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thinking deductively or she simply made an inference? In fact, did she intend to reach a conclusion? Did she know that she had made an inference or that her conclusion followed necessarily from her premises? According to the analysis made above, “logical inference gives rise to logical thinking as children become increasingly purposeful in the application and coordination of such rules of logic. Logical thinking, in turn gives rise to logical reasoning as individuals increasingly grasp the epistemic properties of logical rules” (Moshman, 1998, p. 956). The latter is only possible when, according to Piaget, thought itself becomes an object of cognition, and it is not attained until the formal operational stage, not before adolescence. Just then is when a mind, for instance, should be able to think of a validity of a proposition regardless of whether it is true or false. Adolescents on average outperform children in tasks aimed at assessing these competencies, but their performance varies greatly among adolescents, and is also far from reaching ceiling. This variability has been shown to strongly depend on the type of task. The previous example shows a case of argumentation based on syllogistic reasoning, and it clearly illustrates Moshman’s distinction between inference, thinking, and reasoning. Current literature shows that arguments that involve pure logic reasoning are very rare in everyday argumentation (Hickman, 1987). Let us see another example where argument may be present. Imagine a science class with the intent to show the concept of flotation and density. Is it appropriate to use a demonstration of a system in which children infer the causality of different balls (big or small, plastic or lead, blue or red) to result in sinking or floating? In this task, children should be able to isolate a cause that is presented in a combined manner (i.e., red, lead, big ball). The evaluation of the evidence generated by this demonstration is one of Piaget’s competencies supposed to develop along with the above-mentioned deductive thinking. However, a study with a simpler form of this task shows that, as early as four, children can identify the isolate cause in a multivariable context (Schultz & Gopnik, 2004). Nevertheless, when in a causal reasoning task like this, the child or the adult has theoretical expectations, the evaluation of evidence becomes a much harder job. Our own work (Kuhn et al., 1992, 1995) as well as others’ (Cheng & Novick, 1992; Chinn & Brewer, 2001; Klaczynski, 2000; Klahr, 2000) show how easy it is for the adolescent and even the adult to ignore evidence that contradicts their expectations or to interpret it either partially, recognizing only those data that fit their expectations; or differently, according to whether it confirms or disconfirms their prior theories; or even more biased, distorting the data to make it fit. Isn’t this a case in which the thinker must set an internal dialogue between what the evidence is showing, what theory derives from it, and what his or her own prior theory says in order to decide which one is most valid, in relation to the coherence between data and theory and also, assessing the methodology used to reach such evidence (for instance, awareness of the need to generate controlled comparisons)? This is exactly the case of dialectical argumentation raised above that should be based on the conscious coordination between theory, evidence, and methodology. Developmental research shows progress in this conscious coordination from middle childhood to early adulthood (Kuhn et al., 1988). This is not much novelty,
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but what’s important is, again, the high variability not only between subjects, but also within a single subject. This has been seen in microgenetic studies in which multiple strategies from less to more valid coexist. Within different ages, individuals display a variety of different reasoning strategies, ranging from less to more effective. Over time, what changes is the frequency of usage of these strategies, with a general decline over time in the usage of less effective strategies and increase in the use of more powerful ones (Kuhn et al., 1995). This high variability is not only seen among preadolescents. When adults are asked to engage in a complex task involving coordination of multiple factors, valid inferences are not always within the subject’s competence. Yet, the more important finding is that even when a valid inference is used, it is not consistently applied. This finding highlights the fact that a metacognitive component is needed to explain this variability in scientific reasoning. The distinction between knowing how to execute a strategy versus understanding its significance and still having the competence to distinguish between different sources of knowledge are metacognitive competencies required for the conscious differentiation and coordination of theory and evidence. When individuals lack this conscious control, they tend to merge theory and evidence into a single representation of the way things are. Such control requires an epistemological understanding, which is a metalevel of knowing how one knows (Kuhn, 2001). Getting specific to argumentation and the learning of science, these competencies include the distinction between the (natural) world and the knowledge of that world (Driver et al., 2000). The former exists (as an assumed reality), while the latter is constructed by our minds (as a human construction). A further step is then to become aware of the sources of one’s knowledge and how one gets to know. Therefore, before effective arguments can be constructed, there are epistemological and cognitive precursors that need to be in place. Argument has implied conventions of strength of argument, and there are developmental differences that prevent the understanding of these strengths. This leads to the cognitive requirements and precursors of argumentation. By conceptualizing argumentation as the internal dialogue involved in the coordination of theories and evidence, we can draw on Kuhn and Pearsall’s (2000) analysis of the origins of this process. First, the theoretical claim must be recognized as falsifiable. Second, the evidence must be recognized as means of falsifying a theoretical claim. And third, theory and evidence must be recognized as distinct epistemological categories. These three requirements are the foundations which epistemological understanding is based on and developed from. The understanding of knowing and the nature and limits of knowledge in the sense of the actions involved in its justifiability is addressed in Perry’s (1970) classic work with college students (Hofer & Pintrich, 2002), and developmentally in Hofer and Pintrich (1997). Results of this research show that there are different stages that represent the sequence of epistemological understanding. However, regardless of the number of stages proposed by the authors, they all suggest an invariable sequence that goes from a dualistic (right or wrong) and objectivist (scientific knowledge is true knowledge validated by scientific research) conception of knowledge to a more subjectivist and relativistic view,
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according to which knowledge is generated by a personal construction that ends up being contextualized and relative, in the sense that not all constructions show the same validity. This research has acquired considerable relevance with the new field that works with preschoolers in the search of the epistemic origins: the Theory-ofmind approach (Flavell, 1999; Perner, 1991). Kuhn and Franklin (2006) connect these two bodies of research, integrating them in a developmental pattern of the epistemic cognition. The resulting product is a developmental pattern with four steps, according to how the products of knowing are understood: Realist as copies, Absolutist as facts, Multiplist as opinions, and Evaluatist as judgments. In the realist level, children consider assertions to be copies of an external reality, with knowledge coming from an external source, which make critical thinking unnecessary. This level does not meet any of the above-mentioned criteria for coordinating theory and evidence. Around the end of the preschool years, children begin to recognize that mental representations are products of the mind, and that they do not necessarily mirror external reality, thus becoming susceptible of falsification (Absolutist level). At this level, the representation of reality can be right or wrong, and critical thinking is the means by which assertions and reality can be compared and assessed. This is the basis from which scientific reasoning can emerge. Nevertheless, much progress is still needed to jump into reasoning as argumentation. From the ability to distinguish between generalizations and data, which according to some developmental research (Ruffman et al. 1993; Sodian et al., 1991) appears as early as six, to the metatheoretical understanding required to consciously coordinate theories, evidence, and methodology, there is a long-term development that gets consolidated during the adolescent years. Adolescents discover that people can disagree: knowledge consists of freely chosen opinions rather than facts, clearly generated by the human mind and uncertain, which makes critical thinking irrelevant. It corresponds to the multiplist level of epistemological understanding, represented by the adolescent’s feeling that “Because everyone has the right to their opinion, all opinions are equally right.” In order to advance to the fourth category of epistemological understanding, adolescents must add to this the feeling that “some opinions are more right than others to the extent that they are better supported by argument and evidence” (Kuhn, 2005, p. 32). This thinking is represented by the Evaluatist level, in which assertions are judgments that can be evaluated to build arguments. Research on the development of epistemological understanding shows that the last step is not universally acquired, with its acquisition related to the amount of specific knowledge (Kuhn et al., 2000). In a developmental study, these authors found that the most common pattern in adolescents and adults was the multiplist. Given that for the multiplist any claim is as valid as any other, there is no point at engaging in an argument. This is how Kuhn explains the low performance achieved by students when they are asked to participate in debates. Research, on the other hand, shows a positive correlation between high levels of epistemological understating and argumentation, and more concretely, with learning science: If facts can be ascertained with certainty and are readily available to anyone who seeks them, as the absolutist understands, or, alternatively, if any claim is as valid as any other,
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M. Garcia-Mila and C. Andersen as the multiplist understands, there is little reason to expend the intellectual effort that argument entails. One must see the point of arguing to engage in it. This connection extends well beyond but certainly includes science, and in the field of science education a number of authors have made the case for the connection between productive science learning and a mature epistemological understanding of science as more than the accumulation of facts. (Kuhn & Franklin, 2006)
The coordination of theory, evidence, and methodology along the adolescent years facilitating the implicit internal dialogue (argumentation) is thus a metacognitive achievement. Using Piaget’s terms, it entails mental operations on mental operations. Contrary to their depiction of second-order operations emerging at adolescence, however, it has been recognized that metacognitive thinking about one’s thought begins to develop much earlier. Thus, rather than studying when they developmentally appear, the problem becomes that of analyzing how they can be fostered, and how these fostering conditions can be applied in the classroom environments.
What Does Research Say about Scaffolding Argumentation? The main claim of this chapter is that argumentation involves a set of core processes: the coordination of theory, evidence, and methodology that are common in the internal dialogic argumentation involved in scientific reasoning and the external dialogic argumentation involved in science discursive practices, both of them essential in science learning. Also there is a set of strategies specific to discursive practices, those that deal with Walton’s (1989) argumentation schema, as stated above. The key developing factor is metacognition (Kuhn, 2005; Kuhn et al., 1995) in its diverse forms (see above), either metastrategic (understanding the significance of using a given strategy versus simply being able to execute it) or metacognitive awareness (the ability to bracket one’s own prior theory and view alternatives), closely related to the epistemological competence to distinguish between different sources of knowledge. Also, specific for social debates, the arguer must be aware that one of the implicit goals in the argument is to undermine the partner’s claims (Felton, 2004). According to this, environments that foster any of metacognition types are hypothesized to enhance argumentation. Metacognition can be developed explicitly, by practices that promote explicit reflection. In this sense, there is some research that shows the effectiveness of such reflection in promoting argumentation. Felton (2004) for instance, had 7th and 8th graders work with their peer advisers on their previous dialogue guided by a checklist that helped them to identify the different elements in the debate and their quality. He had an experimental condition, where participants engaged in the dialogue and paired reflection, and the control condition, where participants engaged only in dialogue. He found that experimental group participants showed greater advances in argumentive discourse than the control group, with the conclusion that practice and reflection is more effective than practice alone (see Kuhn, 2005; Duschl, this book an instructional program to develop argument skills, and the lesson plans
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in Quinn, 1997). Other studies in science education also show this benefit (Osborne et al., 2004; Zohar & Nemet, 2002). Metacognition also can be fostered in an implicit manner. For instance the practice provided in microgenetic studies shows a development of the scientific reasoning strategies being practiced thanks to the parallel development of the metacognition involved (Kuhn et al.1995; Kuhn & Pearsall, 1998). This improvement is also observed when this methodology is used to analyze development of argumentive discourse strategies, not only in the quality of the arguments constructed by the individual, but also in the quality of the argumentive discourse generated in peer dialogues (Kuhn et al., 1997). Anderson and his colleagues (Anderson et al, 1997, 1998), under the collaborative learning paradigm, also show how extended engagement in argumentive discourse enhanced performance Metacognition can also be implicitly fostered by means of writing activities. Writing has been hypothesized in the classic educational literature to be an epistemic tool (Bereiter & Scardamalia, 1987). In this sense, writing would allow the representational redescription (Karmiloff-Smith, 1992) to explain learning. This concept attempts to account for the way in which children’s representations become progressively more subject to manipulation and flexible, for the emergence of conscious access to knowledge and theory building (p. 17). Despite the numerous studies devoted to analyze the role of writing in learning science (see the movement called the “writing-to-learn in science” (Klein, 2000; Prain & Hand, 1996; Rivard, 1994), few are devoted to scientific reasoning, and still fewer to argumentation as the external social dialogue, in spite of its potential role, clearly stated by Resnick (1987), as a cultivator and an enabler of higher order thinking, She claims that writing provides the occasion to think through arguments and to master forms of reasoning and persuasion. Our own work provides some results about the benefits of writing on scientific reasoning when students work individually (Garcia-Mila & Andersen, 2007; Garcia-Mila et al., 2006). More specifically related to argumentation strategies involved in oral discourse, Kuhn and Udell (2003) report clear benefits of writing by providing a set of cards that facilitated the external representation of ideas, making the argument–counterargument–rebuttal structure explicit. From an ethnographic perspective, Kelly and Chen (1999) analyze oral and written discourse processes in high school physics. They claim that by engaging in creating scientific papers, they make an appropriation of the scientific discourse. Finally, the most implicit manner to enhance metacognition is by oral utterances themselves. This is an underlying claim present throughout the chapter in the studies reviewed. Does the interpsychological form of argumentation enhance intrapsychological argumentation? This raises the issue of whether argumentation practices in small groups (or pairs) in the classroom, that is argumentation in its social form, may scaffold the internal dialog required in scientific reasoning. Despite the methodological difficulties (see Erduran, this book) that this analysis carries, there are several studies that show the benefits of participation in social dialogic argumentation in students’ individual arguments, thanks to the externalization that discursive practices require (Felton, 2004; Pontecorvo & Girardet, 1993; Reznitskaya et al., 2001). Vygotsky’s sociocultural approach to learning has extensively shown the
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benefits of peer collaboration in learning, under the assumption that differences in expertise (either in specific, strategic, or metacognitive knowledge) lead to the coconstruction of knowledge by means of negotiation through language. Taking Vygotsky’s perspective, the point made here is that when this learning is generated by argumentation, either in its internal or external dialogic forms, the externalization of the dialectical processes required in a public argumentation plays an essential role in the development of argumentation (Kuhn, 1991, Moshman, 1998). It is in this sense that science classroom activities should provide an epistemological and dialogical environment—far from the positivist conception of science—that fostered the awareness of how science progresses and most important, the value and need of arguing in the process of science knowledge construction (Osborne et al., 2004).
References Anderson, R. C., Chinn, C., Chang, J., Waggoner, M., & Yi, H. (1997). On the logical integrity of children’s arguments. Cognition and Instruction, 15, 135–167. Anderson, R. C., Chinn, C. A., Waggoner, M., & Nguyen, K. (1998). Intellectually stimulating story discussions. In J. Osborn & F. Lehr (Eds.), Literacy for all (pp. 170–196). New York: Guilford. Anderson, R. C., Nguyen-Jahiel, K., McNurlen, B., Archoudidou, A., Kim, S., Retznitskaya, A., et al. (2001). The snowball phenomenon: Spread of ways of talking and ways of thinking across groups of children. Cognition and Instruction, 19, 1–46. Bakhtin, M. M. (1934, 1981). The dialogic imagination. In M. Holquist (Ed.) C. Emerson & M. Holquist (Trans.). Austin, TX: University of Texas Press. Bereiter, C., & Scardamalia, M. (1987). The psychology of written composition. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. Billig, M. (1987). Arguing and thinking: A rhetorical approach to social psychology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Brem, S., & Rips, L. (2000). Explanation and evidence in informal argument. Cognitive Science, 24, 573–604. Candela, A. (2002). Evidencias y hechos: La construcción social del discurso de la ciencia en el aula. In M. Benlloch (Ed.), La educación en ciencias. Ideas para mejorar su práctica. Barcelona, Spain: Paidos. Carey, S. (1985). Conceptual change in childhood. Cambridge, MA: Bradford/MIT Press. Carey, S., & Smith, C. (1993). On understanding the nature of scientific knowledge. Educational Psychologist, 28, 235–251. Cheng, P., & Novick, L. (1992). Covariation in natural causal induction. Psychological Review, 99, 365–382. Chinn, C. A., & Anderson, R. C. (1998). The structure of discussions that promote reasoning. Teachers College Record, 100, 315–368. Chinn, C. A., & Brewer, W. (2001). Models of data: A theory of how people evaluate data. Cognition and Instruction, 19, 323–393. Chinn, C. A., & Brewer, W. F. (1998). An empirical test of a taxonomy of responses to anomalous data in science. Journal of Research in Science Teaching, 35, 623–654. Copi, I. M. (1972). Introduction to logic (4th ed.). New York: Macmillan. Driver, R., Newton, P., & Osborne, J. (2000). Establishing the norms of scientific argumentation in classrooms. Science Education, 84, 287–312.
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Duschl, R. A., & Osborne, J. (2002). Supporting and promoting argumentation discourse in science education. Studies in Science Education, 38, 39–72. Eemeren, F. H. van, Grootendorst, R., Henkemans, F. S., Blair, J. A., Johnson, R. H., Krabbe, E. C. W., et al. (1996). Fundamentals of argumentation theory: A handbook of historical backgrounds and contemporary developments. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. Eisenberg, A. R., & Garvey, C. (1981). Children’s use of verbal strategies in resolving conflicts. Discourse Processes, 4, 149–170. Erduran, S., Simon, S., & Osborne, J. (2004). TAPping into argumentation: Developments in the application of Toulmin’s argument pattern for studying science discourse. Science Education, 88, 915–933. Felton, M. (2004). The development of discourse strategies in adolescent argumentation. Cognitive Development, 19, 35–52. Felton, M., & Kuhn, D. (2001). The development of argumentive discourse skills. Discourse Processes, 32, 135–153. Flavell, J. (1999). Cognitive development: Children’s knowledge about the mind. Annual Review of Psychology, 50, 21–45. Garcia-Mila, M., & Andersen, C. (2007). Developmental change in notetaking during scientific inquiry. International Journal of Science Education, 29, 1035–1058. Garcia-Mila, M., Rojo, N., & Andersen, C. (2006). Etude de cas: Prise de notes et recherche scientifique (Case study: Notetaking and scientific research). Lettre d’Airdif, 37(2), 15–18. Hickman, M. (1987). Social and functional approaches to language and thought. Orlando, FL: Academic Press. Hofer, B., & Pintrich, P. (1997). The development of epistemological theories: Beliefs about knowledge and knowing and their relation to learning. Review of Educational Research, 67, 88–140. Hofer, B., & Pintrich, P. (Eds.) (2002). Epistemology: The psychology of beliefs about knowledge. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. Jiménez-Aleixandre, M. P., Bugallo Rodríguez, A., & Duschl, R. (2000). “Doing the lesson” or “doing science”: Argument in high school genetics. Science Education, 84, 757–792. Jiménez-Aleixandre, M. P., & Pereiro Muñoz, C. (2002). Knowledge producers or knowledge consumers? Argumentation and decision making about environmental management. International Journal of Science Education, 24, 1171–1190. Karmiloff-Smith, A. (1992). Beyond modularity. A developmental perspective on cognitive science. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Keil, F. C. (1998). Cognitive science and the origins of thought and knowledge. In D. Kuhn & R. S. Siegler (Eds.), Handbook of child psychology: Vol. 2, Cognition, perception, and language (5th ed., pp. 341–413). New York: Wiley. Kelly, G. J., & Chen, C. (1999). The sound of music: Constructing science as sociocultural practices through oral and written discourse. Journal of Research in Science Teaching, 36, 883–915. Kelly, G. J., & Crawford, T. (1997). An ethnographic investigation of the discourse processes of school science. Science Education, 81, 533–559. Klaczynski, P. (2000). Motivated scientific reasoning biases, epistemological beliefs, and theory polarization: A two process approach to adolescent cognition. Child Development, 71, 1347–1366. Klahr, D. (2000). Exploring science: The cognition and development of discovery processes. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. Klein, P. D. (2000). Elementary students’ strategies for writing-to-learn in science. Cognition and Instruction, 18, 317–348. Kuhn, D. (1991). The skills of argument. New York: Cambridge University Press. Kuhn, D. (2001). How do people know? Psychological Science, 12, 1–8. Kuhn, D. (2005). Education for thinking. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Kuhn, D., Amsel, E., & O’Loughlin, M. (1988). The development of scientific thinking skills. San Diego: Academic Press.
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Kuhn, D., Cheney, R., & Weinstock, M. (2000). The development of epistemological understanding. Cognitive Development, 15, 309–328. Kuhn, D., & Franklin, S. (2006). The second decade: What develops (and how)? In W. Damon & Richard M. Lerner (Series Eds.), D. Kuhn & R. Siegler (Vol. Eds.), Handbook of child psychology: Vol. 2, Cognition, perception, and language (6th ed., pp. 953–993). Hoboken, NJ: Wiley. Kuhn, D., Garcia-Mila, M., Zohar, A., & Andersen, C. (1995). Strategies of knowledge acquisition. Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development, 60(4, Serial No. 245). Kuhn, D., & Pearsall, S. (1998). Relations between metastrategic knowledge and strategic performance. Cognitive Development, 13, 227–247. Kuhn, D., & Pearsall, S. (2000). Developmental origins of scientific thinking. Journal of Cognition and Development, 1, 113–129. Kuhn, D., Schauble, L., & Garcia-Mila, M. (1992). Cross-domain development of scientific reasoning. Cognition and Instruction, 9, 285–327. Kuhn, D., Shaw, V., & Felton, M. (1997). Effects of dyadic interaction on argumentive reasoning. Cognition and Instruction, 15, 287–315. Kuhn, D., & Udell, W. (2003). The development of argument skills. Child Development, 74, 1245–1260. Latour, B. (1987). Science in action: How to follow scientists and engineers through society. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Latour, B., & Woolgar, S. (1986). An anthropologist visits the laboratory. In B. Latour & S. Woolgar (Eds.), Laboratory life: The construction of scientific facts (pp. 83–90). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Lemke, J. L. (2002). Enseñar todos los lenguajes de la ciencia: palabras, símbolos, imágenes y acciones. In M. Benlloch (Ed.), La educación en ciencias: Ideas para mejorar su práctica (pp. 159–185). Barcelona, Spain: Paidós. Means, M., & Voss, J. (1996). Who reasons well? Two studies of informal reasoning among students of different grade, ability, and knowledge levels. Cognition and Instruction, 14, 139–178. Moshman, D. (1995). Reasoning as self-constrained thinking. Human Development, 38, 53–64. Moshman, D. (1998). Cognitive development beyond childhood. In D. Kuhn & R. Siegler (Eds.), Handbook of child psychology: Vol. 2, Cognition, perception, and language (5th ed., pp. 947– 978). New York: Wiley. Osborne, J., Erduran, S., & Simon, S. (2004). Enhancing the quality of argumentation in school science. Journal of Research in Science Teaching, 41, 994–1020. Perelman, C., & Olbrechts-Tyteca, L. (Eds.) (1969). The new rhetoric: A treatise on argumentation (2nd ed. Original work published in 1958 ed.). Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press. Perkins, D. (1985). Post-primary education has little impact upon informal reasoning. Journal of Educational Psychology, 77, 563–571. Perner, J. (1991). Understanding the representational mind. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. Perry, W. (1970). Forms of intellectual and ethical development in the college years. New York: Holt, Rinehart, & Winston. Pontecorvo, C., & Girardet, H. (1993). Arguing and reasoning in understanding historical topics. Cognition and Instruction, 11, 365–395. Prain, V., & Hand, B. (1996). Writing for learning in secondary science: Rethinking practices. Teaching and Teacher Education, 12, 609–626. Quinn, V. (1997). Critical thinking in young minds. London: David Fulton Publishers. Resnick, L. (1987). Education and learning to think. Washington, DC: National Academy Press. Reznitskaya, A., Anderson, R., McNurlen, B., Nguyen-Jahiel, K., Archoudidou, A., & Kim, S. (2001). Influence of oral discussion on written argument. Discourse Processes, 32, 155–175. Rivard, L. P. (1994). A review of writing-to-learn in science: Implications for practice and research. Journal of Research in Science Teaching, 31, 969–983.
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Ruffman, T., Perner, J., Olson, D., & Doherty, M. (1993). Reflecting on scientific thinking: Children’s understanding of the hypothesis-evidence relation. Child Development, 64, 1617–1636. Schultz, L., & Gopnik, A. (2004). Causal learning across domains. Developmental Psychology, 40, 162–176. Siegel, H. (1989). The rationality of science, critical thinking and science education. Synthese, 80(1), 9–42. Sodian, B., Zaitchick, D., & Carey, S. (1991). Young children’s differentiation of hypothetical beliefs from evidence. Child Development, 62, 753–766. Stein, N. L., & Miller, C. A. (1993). The development of memory and reasoning skill in argumentive contexts: Evaluating, explaining and generating evidence. In R. Glaser (Ed.), Advances in instructional psychology. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. Toulmin, S. (1958). The uses of argument (Updated edition ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Vosniadou, S., & Verschaffel, L. (2004). Extending the conceptual change approach to mathematics learning and teaching. Learning and Instruction, 42, 445–451. Voss, J. F., & Means, M. (1991). Learning to reason via instruction in argumentation. Learning and Instruction, 1, 337–350. Voss, J. F., & Van Dike, J. A. (2001). Argumentation in psychology: Background comments. Discourse Processes, 32(2&3), 89–111. Vygotsky, L. S. (1981). The genesis of higher mental functions. In J. Wertsch (Ed.), The concept of activity in Soviet psychology (pp. 144–188). Armonk, NY: Sharpe. Walton, D. N. (1989). Dialogue theory for critical thinking. Argumentation, 3, 169–184. Walton, D. N. (1996). Argumentation schemes for presumptive reasoning. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. Zimmerman, C. (2000). The development of scientific reasoning skills. Developmental Review, 20, 99–149. Zohar, A., & Nemet, F. (2002). Fostering students’ knowledge and argumentation skills through dilemmas in human genetics. Journal of Research in Science Teaching, 39, 35–62.
Chapter 3
Methodological Foundations in the Study of Argumentation in Science Classrooms Sibel Erduran
“Every discourse, even a poetic or oracular sentence, carries with it a system of rules for producing analogous things and thus an outline of methodology.’’ Jacques Derrida
Ask anyone who has done work on argumentation in science classrooms what their primary concern has been in this line of research, and they will most likely respond with one word: methodology. Most likely they will then begin to ask you if you have figured out how to distinguish data from warrants. The questions will continue: can theoretical statements be data? If a warrant is not explicitly stated, can it still be assumed that it is part of the argument? Indeed the study of argumentation in the science classroom raises significant methodological questions. What counts as an argument in children’s talk anyhow? What is the unit of analysis of argument and of argumentation in classroom conversations? What criteria drive the selection and application of coding tools? What justifies the choice of one methodological approach over another? What does a particular methodological approach enable us to do and how does it do so? While in one sense, such methodological questions are about the reliability and validity of methodological tools for the analysis of arguments (e.g., Duschl et al., 1999), in another sense they are questions about the very nature and function of methodologies for a line of research that challenges positivist characterizations of scientific knowledge stripped off of the cultural, affective, economical and personal contexts and processes of science. In a review of literature on the use of methodologies in science education, Kelly et al. (1998) observed incongruities between theoretical perspectives and methodological approaches adapted in studies on the Nature of Science. Although the bodies of literature informing the Nature of Science studies used multiple methodological orientations, the majority of the empirical Nature of Science studies used either survey instruments or interviews, without observational data of teachers and students. The state of affairs in the case of argumentation might present an example of an opposite trend where, roughly two decades later since argumentation has taken root in science education, our methodological work remains heavily focused on observational data at the expense of surveys and interviews. It is worthwhile to note that concentrating on quantitative analyses of argumentation does not necessarily imply a contradiction between methodological and theoretical orientations of science education. Quantitative analyses S. Erduran and M. P. Jiménez-Aleixandre (eds.), Argumentation in Science Education. © Springer 2007
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address different questions from those raised by detailed analyses of classroom talk. For instance, “what correlations are there between power relations in classrooms and the ability to argue scientifically?” is a question that begs a methodological orientation based on quantitative methods whilst at the same time empowering the sociological processes of science in the classroom. This chapter will trace issues related to such methodological questions surrounding the study of argumentation in science classrooms particularly in an effort to provide a rationale for what methodological approaches enable science education researchers to accomplish and how. For example, methodological tools need to be refined enough to generate a set of indicators for the quality of arguments generated in the learning environment (Erduran et al., 2004). A further emphasis of the chapter will be on the application of particular theoretical frameworks (e.g., Toulmin, 1958; Walton, 1999) as well as the generation of categories from data-driven approaches (Sandoval & Reiser, 2004; Maloney & Simon, 2006). In so doing, the chapter will problematize the adaptation of theoretically and empirically grounded perspectives as methodological approaches, and it will investigate some challenges that such approaches can pose. Finally, the role of methodological innovations in contributing to the knowledge base in science education will be explored. In particular, the case of Stephen Toulmin’s (1958) work will be used to illustrate what contribution the adaptation of his framework on argument has made to knowledge in science education. A significant body of argumentation literature in science education has been based on Toulmin’s work (e.g., Erduran et al. 2004; Jiménez-Aleixandre et al., 2000). It is interesting to note that even though science education as a field remains minimally influenced by philosophical analyses (Scerri, 2002), the uptake and impact of Toulmin’s framework on argument (particularly as a methodological tool) has mirrored trends within philosophy itself. In “A Citation-Based Reflection on Toulmin and Argument”, Ronald P. Loui (2005) uses citation counts to measure the influence of Toulmin’s work. He reports that citations in the leading journals in the social sciences, humanities and science and technology put Toulmin and his works in the top 10 among philosophers of science and philosophical logicians of the 20th century. Thus, he concludes, Toulmin’s Uses of Argument, and work in general, have been essential contributions to 20th-century thought. Even though there has been no quantitative measures of the impact of Toulmin’s work in science education, qualitatively it would be difficult to disagree with the position that Toulmin’s work has influenced the work of many science educators has had in the literature. Prevalence of Toulmin’s work in application to the study of argumentation in science classrooms (e.g., Erduran et al., 2004) will be used as a case example of how methodological approaches can contribute to the development of knowledge in science education.
Analysis of Argumentation in School Science In the 2003 Conference of the European Science Education Research Association, I was asked to be a discussant for a session titled “Communication and Discourse Analysis in the Science Classroom.” The session included five papers and used a range of theoretically driven analytical frameworks for the study of discourse in science
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classrooms. The work from a couple of these presentations has subsequently been published. Jiménez-Aleixandre and Pereiro Muñoz (2005) used Toulmin’s framework to study students’ interactions in small groups. Castells et al. (2007) used Perelman’s Theory of Argumentation to frame teacher–student interactions from both epistemological and communicative perspectives. Marquez, Izquierdo and Espinet (2006) used Halliday’s model of Functional Grammar to interpret communicative and linguistic aspects of teachers’ actions. Piccinini and Martins (2005) used Kress and colleagues’ semiotic modes to interpret teacher–student interactions. Scott and Mortimer (2005) drew on sociocultural perspectives including the work of Lev Vygotsky to study a range of interactions in the classroom including student–student interactions. An overarching theme across these papers was the assumption that there are teaching and learning situations that can be captured in semiotic interactions and that the study of semiotic interactions can inform and improve science education. This conference session embodies some of the methodological issues in the study of argumentation particularly the adaptation of a certain theoretical stance from a leading scholar in a related field such as philosophy and linguistics. In a similar spirit as the ESERA session, literature on argumentation in science education has witnessed the adaptation of theoretical perspectives for methodological use (Erduran et al., 2004; Zohar & Nemet, 2002; Jiménez-Aleixandre et al., 2000) as well as the generation of analytical tools from a more grounded approach (Sandoval & Reiser, 2004; Maloney & Simon, 2006). The particular rationalization of these tools is done relative to the context of the research in which the tool was used and the purpose of the study. In the next few sections, I will review some of these approaches. In particular, I will illustrate how studies have focused on the analysis of (a) evidence and justifications; (b) epistemic practices and criteria; (c) arguers and the nature of arguments; and (d) participation in discussions, as criteria for defining and confining the analytical boundaries for argumentation in the science classroom.
Evidence and Justifications Zohar and Nemet (2002) modified Toulmin’s Argument Pattern (TAP) based on the work of Means and Voss (1996) to evaluate the quality of written arguments generated by students based on structure and content. Zohar and Nemet define an argument as consisting “of either assertions or conclusions and their justifications; or of reasons or supports” (p. 38). Strong arguments have multiple justifications to support a conclusion that incorporate relevant, specific and accurate scientific concepts and facts. Weak arguments consist of individual non-relevant justifications. Conclusions that do not include some type of justification are not considered arguments. Zohar and Nemet also collapsed Toulmin’s data, warrants and backings into a single category to sidestep many of the reliability and validity issues associated with Toulmin’s framework, an approach also employed by Erduran et al. (2004). The criteria for the classification of justifications were (a) no consideration of scientific knowledge, (b) inaccurate
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scientific knowledge, (c) non-specific scientific knowledge (we need to do more tests before we can reach a conclusion), or (d) correct scientific knowledge. Zohar and Nemet’s framework does not evaluate the accuracy of the claim itself. As a result, their framework works better when used to analyze arguments generated in the context of socio-scientific issues rather than in the context of scientific debates. In response to socio-scientific dilemmas that Zohar and Nemet studied, valid opposing claims can be made from multiple perspectives. However, when arguments are scientific, claims are explanatory conclusions or descriptive frameworks. In our work (Erduran et al., 2004), we developed two methodological approaches for the analysis of discourse from whole class and small group discussions. First, we adapted TAP for the purposes of coding data that originate from whole-class conversations where successive implementation of lessons can be traced for their improved quality of argumentation. Here we have traced the frequency of TAP profiles from the same lessons that were implemented a year apart by the same teachers. Comparison of the results held the potential to investigate whether or not there was an improvement in the employment of argumentation across different lessons. Our purpose was not to report on statistically significant outcomes since our sample size was small (i.e., two lessons per teacher and no control lessons) but rather our aim was to describe a methodology that can be of use to future researchers in the quantification of arguments to test the effectiveness of interventions based on argumentation. Our analysis provided a qualitative indication also of how teachers’ specific discourse practices compare and thus how appropriate feedback can be crafted to facilitate particular teachers’ implementation of argumentation. For example, the distribution of TAP profiles across the two years was very similar for each teacher but different between teachers. The tool we have developed, then, provided us with an insight into how teachers’ engagement in argumentation compares and where in discourse more emphasis is needed to improve the quality of argumentation. We were also able to trace cross- and within-teacher variations in how argumentation was implemented (Simon et al., 2006). Given the research evidence that teachers’ practices improve when they are empowered by reflection and understanding on their teaching actions (e.g., Loucks-Horsley et al., 1998) such insight could help create powerful strategies for more effective implementation of traditionally unfamiliar discourse forms such as argumentation. A further outcome of our methodological approaches was a scheme reproduced in Table 3.1 where argumentation is assessed in terms of levels of the quality of oppositions or rebuttals in the student discussions in small-group format (Erduran et al., 2004). In this approach, we have focused on those instances where there was a clear opposition between students and assessed the nature of this opposition in terms of the strength of the rebuttals offered. We perceived the presence of a rebuttal as a significant indicator of quality of argumentation since a rebuttal, and how it counters another’s argument forces both participants to evaluate the validity and strength of that argument. Research evidence (e.g., Kuhn, 1991) suggests that the cognitive skill of argument is, to some extent, founded on an understanding of how
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Table 3.1 Analytical framework used for assessing the quality of argumentation (Erduran et al., 2004) Level 1: Level 1 argumentation consists of arguments that are a simple claim versus a counterclaim or a claim versus a claim. Level 2: Level 2 argumentation has arguments consisting of a claim versus a claim with either data, warrants or backings but do not contain any rebuttals. Level 3: Level 3 argumentation has arguments with a series of claims or counterclaims with either data, warrants or backings with the occasional weak rebuttal. Level 4: Level 4 argumentation shows arguments with a claim with a clearly identifiable rebuttal. Such an argument may have several claims and counterclaims. Level 5: Level 5 argumentation displays an extended argument with more than one rebuttal.
to rebut an opposer’s point of view. In this sense, students’ ability to formulate strong rebuttals is a significant goal for the teaching of argumentation. We thus traced the quality of argument by focusing on the presence or absence of rebuttals. For instance, when there was opposition between students but the opposition consisted of only counterarguments that were unrelated, we perceived this to be low-level argumentation. In other words, in these cases, there was no indication of an understanding of a rebuttal in terms of its relation to challenging the validity of the evidence and justifications offered. There was simply no reference to the components of the argument maintained by the opposition. When, however, the rebuttal was in direct reference to a piece of evidence (data, warrants or backings) offered, thereby engaging with a presented argument, we considered this instance to be representative of higher level argumentation. In this methodological approach, we have thus emphasized the use of rebuttals and developed a strategy for using TAP as a measure of interactive discourse.
Epistemic Practices and Criteria Kelly and Takao (2002), and Takao and Kelly (2003) developed a method to analyze longer and complex written arguments by examining term papers produced by students enrolled in an oceanography course. The term paper required students to support an abstract theoretical conclusion based on multiple data representations. The arguments generated by these students often contained multiple propositions in order to support their particular explanatory conclusion. Kelly and Takao’s analytic framework focused on the relative epistemic status of these propositions and how these propositions were linked together by the author to form a persuasive argument. In order to develop this framework, Kelly and Takao relied heavily on rhetorical studies of science writing (e.g., Bazerman, 1988; Latour, 1987). To analyze an extended rhetorical argument using this framework, propositions are identified and then sorted based on epistemic level. These epistemic levels are defined by discipline-specific constructs and reflect a general distinction between lower level descriptions of data and epistemologically higher level appeals to theories within the particular domain. Once classified, Kelly and Takao determine how these propositions are linked
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together and use this information to produce a graphical representation of an argument that shows how students coordinate propositions in their writing. Sandoval and Millwood (2005) have developed a framework for judging the quality of scientific arguments generated by students. Rather than examining arguments based on the field-invariant structural components of arguments, these authors’ coding scheme attempts to assess how well students generate arguments based on fielddependent criteria. Specifically, Sandoval and Millwood’s coding scheme assesses two dimensions of scientific arguments. First, conceptual quality measures how well the individual has (a) articulated causal claims within a specific theoretical framework, and (b) warranted these claims using available data. Second, epistemological quality measures how well the individual has (a) cited sufficient data in warranting a claim, (b) written a coherent causal explanation for a given phenomenon, and (c) incorporated appropriate rhetorical references when referring to data. A strength of Sandoval and Millwood’s framework is that it can determine if students can generate an argument that explains a particular observed phenomenon using a specific theory, such as natural selection. Furthermore, their framework provides information about the epistemological criteria students use when generating arguments as an end product of their own inquiry and how these criteria align with the criteria used within particular scientific domains. Sandoval and Millwood’s scheme suggests that constructing high-quality arguments requires a conceptual understanding of relevant scientific theories and their application to a specific problem as well as an epistemic understanding of the criteria for high-quality arguments. These authors argue for the importance of the latter component because the manner in which students incorporate and refer to data in their writing reflects their implicit epistemological commitments about the nature and role of data in the generation and evaluation of scientific knowledge. For example, Sandoval and Millwood’s (2005) analysis indicates that students are able to apply their understanding of natural selection to generate an argument that is consistent with the major tenets of natural selection. However, the overall pattern of warrant and evidence citation suggests that although students understand the importance of linking evidence and claims, students tend to rely on a single piece of data when supporting a particular claim. As a result, students often do not include a comparison of data from multiple sources when warranting a claim where when such comparisons are needed. Sandoval’s earlier work (Sandoval, 2003) also indicates that students often interpret data incorrectly even though they can articulate a specific explanation in terms of a guiding theory. A key contribution of Sandoval and colleagues’ analytical frameworks is the observation that field-dependent criteria are important in the analysis of arguments.
Arguers and Nature of Arguments Zembal-Saul et al. (2003) developed a rubric to analyze pre-service teachers’ arguments (Table 3.2). The rubric consisted of four main categories: causal coherence and structure; evidence; justifications and evaluations. In a qualitative case study,
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Table 3.2 Rubric for analyzing pre-service teachers’ arguments (Zembal-Saul et al., 2003) 1. Causal Coherence/Causal Structure (a) A network representation of causal relations was constructed based on students’ explanations. (b) Description of the causal sequence (i) Do explanations articulate specific cause-and-effect relationships? (ii) Are causal relationships logically connected? (iii) Are causal relationships and their connections explicitly stated? (iv) Do they consider the possibility of more than one cause (multiple causal lines)? (c) Do they consider the possibility of multiple factors interacting to produce a phenomenon? (d) Does the causal structure reflect domain-specific principles (e.g., selective pressure, change in frequency traits in population, initial variation, differential survival)? 2. Evidence (a) Is there evidence to support each claim? (b) Is the evidence relevant to the claim? (c) Do they make valid inferences from data? (d) Do they use principles of knowledge within the domain? (e) Do they sort data in appropriate ways (e.g., based on population characteristics such as sex and age)? (f) In which cases do they have more or less pieces of data linked as supporting evidence? What distinguishes parts that are supported with several pieces of evidence and those that are not? (g) Do they tend to use individual data or representations of population patterns such as graphics? In what circumstances do they use different kinds of evidence? (h) Do they tend to use qualitative data or quantitative data to support their claims? In what circumstances do they use different kinds of evidence? (i) How do they describe their pieces of evidence (e.g., annotation box in software)? Do such descriptions vary depending on the type of evidence (e.g., graphs, field notes)? (j) Is it possible to identify any changes in these aspects across the unit (e.g., when do they start to use a type of evidence?)? 3. Data justifications (a) Do students provide justification for why data is relevant to support a claim? (b) What kind of justification do they use? (c) Are there particular instances in which justification is absent/present? 4. Thinking about their explanations (evaluating their explanations) (a) How do they categorize their explanations (e.g., accepted completely; accepted with changes)? (b) How do they justify this categorization?
pre-service science teachers enrolled in their advanced methods course participated in a complex, data-rich investigation. Fundamental to the investigation was the use of the Galapagos Finches software and an emphasis on giving priority to evidence and constructing evidence-based arguments. The primary sources of data were the electronic artifacts generated in the Galapagos Finches software environment and the videotaped interactions of both pairs as they investigated the data set, constructed and revised their arguments, engaged in peer review sessions, and presented
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their arguments to the class at the end of the unit. One of the outcomes of the case study was that using the software pre-service science teachers consistently constructed claims that were linked to evidence from the investigation. Another outcome was that although pre-service science teachers consistently grounded their arguments in evidence, they still exhibited a number of limitations reported in the literature. Hogan and Maglienti (2001) developed a coding scheme for rating participants’ overall judgment of a conclusion (Table 3.3). These researchers examined the criteria that middle school students, non-scientist adults, technicians, and scientists used to rate the validity of conclusions drawn by hypothetical students from a set of evidence. The groups’ criteria for evaluating conclusions were considered to be dimensions of their epistemological frameworks regarding how knowledge claims are justified, and as such how they are integral to their scientific reasoning. Quantitative and qualitative analyses revealed that the responses of students and non-scientists differed from the responses of technicians and scientists, with the major difference being the groups’ relative emphasis on criteria of empirical consistency or plausibility of the conclusions. Lawson (2003) argues that science educators should focus their efforts on helping students learn how to generate the type of arguments that are used and valued by scientists rather than focusing on a more general account of argument structure. From his perspective, the goal of developing an argument in science is to “determine which of two or more proposed alternative explanations (claims) for a puzzling observation is correct and which of the alternatives are incorrect” (p. 1389). This process requires the generation of an argument that consists of not only a tentative explanation that may be correct but also includes how this explanation was tested based on the generation of specific predictions and the analysis of evidence. Lawson describes this type of argument as a hypothetico-predictive argument. According to Lawson, this type of argument, which evaluates the validity of alternative explanations based on hypothetico-deductive reasoning, is much more convincing than arguments that rely on evidence, warrants, and backings to convince
Table 3.3 Coding of conclusions (Hogan & Maglienti, 2001) Level Description 0 1
2 3
4
Does not mention any relevant strengths and weaknesses of the conclusion. Mentions some relevant strengths and weaknesses of the conclusion, but not the major ones. Also uses agreement with personal inferences or views as a basis for judging the conclusion. Mentions some strengths and weaknesses of the conclusion, but not the major ones. Does not base judgments on agreement with personal inferences or views. Mentions the major strengths and weaknesses of the conclusion, but also uses agreement with personal inferences or views as a basis for judging the conclusion. Mentions the major strengths and weaknesses of the conclusion. Does not base judgments on agreement with personal inferences or views.
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others of the validity of a claim because it can provide evidence for one explanation and at the same time provide evidence against another. The process of constructing a hypothetico-predictive argument begins with an observation that provokes a casual question and the generation of one or more tentative explanations. Once generated, these explanations must be tested in order to establish their validity. To test the validity of an explanation, one must begin by assuming that the explanation is correct. Next, one must imagine a test that, together with the explanation, should produce one or more specific observable results. The words, “if/and/then” are used to link the explanation and the imagined test to the prediction. Once a test is planned and conducted, the observed results constitute evidence. This evidence is then compared with the prediction. This match or mismatch of evidence and prediction can then be used to draw a conclusion regarding the validity of the explanation. Lawson indicates that the overall quality of this type of argument should be evaluated based on its deductive validity rather than the presence and strength of warrants, which he contends, is the same criterion used by scientists to assess the quality of arguments generated by the scientific community.
Participation in Discussions Maloney and Simon (2006) developed a coding system to show different approaches to engaging in discussion. The system, termed a “Discussion map”, was designed to identify the nature and extent to which children engaged in sustained argumentation dialogue. The construction of these maps was initially informed by the work of Chinn and Anderson (1998), who used “argument networks” to analyze the structure of discourse of children in small groups as they discussed issues raised by stories (not scientific in nature). One of the major problems encountered in the use of argument networks was of a practical nature; a transcript that was 4 pages in length produced an argument network that required 13 pages. However, the construction of argument networks identified the need for some diagrammatic representation of the discourse, as the diagrams demonstrated clearly the varying patterns of discussion for the different activities. For example, they showed whether the arguments put forward were discussed by the group or ignored, and whether arguments were followed by the presentation of a new claim. For opposing arguments, the diagrams indicated whether the evidence was examined to evaluate the opposing claims or whether claims were just accepted and not challenged. The diagrams also showed which children were taking part in the discussions. As a result of this pilot work and the developing clarity about the requirements to aid analysis, the “Discussion Map” was devised to capture all these features in a more economic way. A Discussion Map is constructed through identifying key episodes of “talk” that include argumentative discussion using evidence. These episodes are termed “Argument”, “Review”, and “Clarification”. A fourth category of talk was needed to complete the transcript analysis, so that the Discussion Map captures the
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intervals and frequency of the key episodes of talk—this fourth category includes all other types of discourse and is termed “Other Talk”.
Trends in the Literature on Analysis of Argumentation The preceding review of literature is not intended to be exhaustive and thus cannot be used as a definitive source for analytical perspectives on argument in science education. However, it is noteworthy to state that the pattern in the use of analytical frameworks to study argumentation in school science has tended to emphasize the qualitative aspects of the structure of an argument and the processes of argumentation. Given the labor-intensive nature of analysis of classroom and group talk, this observation is not surprising. In our work (Erduran et al., 2004) we attempted to develop quantitative measures of the quality of argumentation and yet it is unlikely that our methodological approach can be realistically adapted for large-scale studies. Neither should they be if the questions that such methodology targets make large-scale quantitative measures meaningless. Consider the task of a biochemist who is interested in the particular features of a protein, perhaps how certain amino acid sequences might dictate the function as an enzyme. It would be meaningless to generalize or to quantify the features of such sequences to all enzymes given their particular functions. In other words, it is the particular nature of the object of study that is of interest and that guides the research question. Whilst it is important to focus on discourse to illustrate the nature of argumentation and reasoning (for further reference on a review of analytical approaches, see Clark et al., in press), it is equally important to introduce methodological approaches that aim at addressing different questions, particularly questions that seek understanding of correlations and associations. For instance, a question such as “is there a significant impact of argument skills on subject knowledge in science?” would necessitate that tools are generated and applied to data to measure both argument skills and subject knowledge, and that the joint use of these tools can be justified. Furthermore a significant deficit in the literature remains which is the paucity of research on quantitative analysis of argumentation, not at the level of conversational analysis but at the level of conceptual categories that are of significance to science education. For example, there is limited understanding of how teachers’ beliefs about pedagogical values of discussions might correlate with their emphasis in their teaching of argumentation. Likewise there are no measures of teachers’ and students’ attitudes and beliefs about the role of argument in science and in science education. One exception to this overall pattern is the work of Sampson and Clark (2006) who have developed a questionnaire to assess the correlation between argumentation skills and understanding of the nature of science. Overall, however, the trends in the literature point to the challenges that researchers have experienced in the qualitative analyses of argumentation in the science classroom which is the focus of our discussion in the next section.
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Coding Arguments: Challenges and Compromises A major issue in the study of argumentation in either written or verbal data is the unit of analysis. What becomes of the boundary markers of the data where arguments begin and end? Decisions have to be made regarding how the data will be split and subsequently how the chunks will be categorized and interpreted. Is an argument located within one person’s argument or would a set of statements still count as the components of an argument even if the talkers may not have intended them to be part of a bigger whole? Let us explore such questions taking on a definition of argument based on Toulmin’s work. Toulmin’s Argument Pattern (TAP) (Fig. 3.1) illustrates the structure of an argument in terms of an interconnected set of a claim; data that support that claim; warrants that provide a link between the data and the claim; backings that strengthen the warrants; and finally, rebuttals which point to the circumstances under which the claim would not hold true. More specifically, a claim is an assertion put forward publicly for general acceptance. Data and warrants are the specific facts relied on to support a given claim. Backings are generalizations making explicit the body of experience relied on to establish the trustworthiness of the ways of arguing applied in any particular case. Rebuttals are the extraordinary or exceptional circumstances that might undermine the force of the supporting arguments. Toulmin further considers the role of qualifiers as phrases that show what kind of degree of reliance is to be placed on the conclusions, given the arguments available to support them. (Toulmin’s framework will be discussed in more detail in a later section of this chapter.) Despite its use as a framework for defining argument, the application of TAP to the analysis of classroom-based verbal data has yielded difficulties. The main difficulty has been in the clarification of what counts as claim, data, warrant and backing. Kelly et al. (1998) applied TAP to the analysis of student dyadic spoken discourse. This study identified the potential uses of Toulmin’s method but also
Fig. 3.1 Toulmin’s argument pattern (Toulmin, 1958)
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highlighted some methodological problems. The authors found that organizing student discourse into Toulmin’s argument components required careful attention to the contextualized use of language. According to Kelly and his colleagues, while the Toulmin model makes distinctions among statements of data, claim, warrant and backing, the scheme is restricted to relatively short argument structures and the argument components pose ambiguities. Statements of claims can serve as a new assertion to be proven or can be in service to another claim, thus acting as a warrant. In a subsequent study, Kelly and Chen (1999) modified Toulmin’s model by drawing on the work of Latour (1987). They thus considered the epistemic status of students’ claims in their writings and sorted these according to the model presented by Latour. This form of analysis allowed for the consideration of claims at multiple levels of theoretical generality and matched well with the categorical description of transactional use of language. Other researchers (see Duschl this book) have preferred to use other analytical tools such as Douglas Walton’s scheme on presumptive reasoning, justifying their choice on the ambiguity surrounding the key features of TAP in application to real discourse. Let’s illustrate the difficulties encountered in the coding of arguments using TAP with an example. The episode comes from our published work (Erduran et al., 2004) conducted in a middle school in London where we explored children’s argumentation in whole class discussions. The students were asked to evaluate a set of statements regarding the phases of the moon. Teacher Student Teacher Student Teacher Student
Statement A, “The moon spins around, so the part of the moon that gives out light is not always facing us.” Julian, A? The moon doesn’t give out light. Right, so that’s why A is wrong. That’s true. How do you know that? Because the light that comes from the moon is actually from the sun. He is saying the light that we see from the moon is actually a reflection from the sun. How do we know that? Because the moon is blocked by the. . . . . .
In our earlier work, we have used this example to illustrate how we resolved some of the issues involved in coding. I will reconstruct this example here to illustrate some of the key challenges that we faced in coding arguments in our work. In this example, one could consider the statement “The moon spins around” as a piece of data that supports the claim “So the part of the moon that gives out light is not always facing us.” One could also argue, however, that the student’s choice of “A” (the statement on the card) is the main claim. In other words, “A is right” can be considered an implicit claim that is challenged by the next claim “The moon doesn’t give out light.” Deciding which of statements to take as a claim (i.e., “The moon spins around” or “A is right”) can thus become problematic. Examining the use of words such as “so” and “because” can help resolve some ambiguities. Indeed, the use of the operative word “so” which itself is implied in Toulmin’s definition (for reaching conclusions from data) makes the first case described highly convincing. In other words, there is little doubt that there is a claim and a justification, whatever the precise nature of this justification might be
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or indeed whichever statement (“The moon spins around” or “The part of the moon that gives out light is not always facing us”) is taken to be the main claim. The use of the next statement “The moon doesn’t give out light” as a rebuttal creates an opposition to the justification used in the primary argument. The student’s further elaboration of reasoning in “Because the light that comes from the moon is actually from the sun” is an effort for a justification of the rebuttal. Viewed in this way, ambiguities about what counts as claim, data, rebuttal and so on can be resolved. Even though all the statements above can be considered as claims in themselves, in the course of the reasoning, they can be positioned to be data or rebuttal relative to the main claim that creates an impetus for the generation of the subsequent statements. Indeed many aspects of an argument can be considered “nested” where, for instance, data of one argument could count as a claim for another argument. Resolving such differences in coding is not a matter specific to analysis of argument. Establishing clearly defined and codable categories is a major issue in qualitative data analysis in general. As in any kind of analysis, a significant issue is that the categories have to be tight enough to be able to capture what we want them to capture. The nature of codes and the strategy for coding will depend on the purpose of the investigation as well as the questions that the research is trying to address. For the purposes of coding, the researcher would need to specify the instructions for new coders so as to ensure that reliable coding can occur. For example, in the preceding episode, a researcher may make a decision that the statement cards will be treated as main claims relative to which all other statements will be positioned. Apart from ambiguities in what counts as a claim, data and warrant, other challenges exist for the coding of arguments. For instance, if the components of an argument are repeated, can we establish that a new argument is not introduced to count as another argument? Can we establish the role and function of such repetition in conversation? What if the student says a bit more in a sequence of talk? Would spatially separate but seemingly related statements count as parts of the same argument and add to the original argument? The researcher will also need to create boundaries and rules for such cases. A further issue is the nature of evidence used as data, warrants and backings. Can theoretical statements count as evidence or should evidence be empirically based? Can opinions, beliefs, ideas and values count as evidence? Is there a difference between what counts as evidence in scientific and socio-scientific contexts? The source of the components of the argument—i.e., whether or not they are empirical and theoretical—presents another problem for coding arguments. Researchers might be interested in examining the validity of arguments relative to the use of evidence. In certain respects the use of empirical evidence might be more favorable than theoretical evidence. In others, theoretical statements might be the only source of evidence, for instance, the use of the atomic theory in arguments about why a chemical reaction takes place in a particular way and not in another fashion. A further challenge in the study of argumentation in science education is the extent to which codes of arguments can frame pedagogical and learning aspects of argumentation. Zembal-Saul et al.’s (2003) rubric for analyzing teachers’ arguments rests heavily on their understanding and use of argument structure and process. In our work on the professional development of science teachers to include argumentation in their teaching, we developed a hierarchy of codes that are intended to capture the pedagogical
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strategies underlying argumentation episodes (Simon et al., 2006). The subsequent investigation was to identify how the teacher might be promoting the implementation and learning of such concepts. For example, playing the role of devil’s advocate could be considered as a pedagogical strategy that promotes the use of justifications. In both of these example cases, concepts such as evidence, claim and justification—central to the definition of argument—guided the focus on the text for analysis. In other words, an implicit entry point into the transcripts to examine teaching behaviors was a definition of argument. It is difficult to imagine what other entry point or a guiding framework could be used for this purpose other than a definition of argument. The precise intention is to seek to understand the nature of argumentation be it from a pedagogical, learning or any other point of view. What this observation does point to is the significance of which definition of argument is being used for pedagogical purposes and how such a choice on argument can dictate the analysis sought beyond just a definition of argument.
Revisiting Toulmin: Contributions of Methodology to Knowledge in Science Education There is little doubt that Toulmin’s seminal book The Uses of Argument, first published in 1958, has guided much research in science education. The preceding discussions provide evidence to this observation. I personally have been influenced by Toulmin’s work for several years starting with the work we did in early 1990s in Pittsburgh schools on promoting scientific inquiry (Duschl, this book). Ever since, I made numerous attempts to contact Toulmin in the Department of Anthropology at the University of Southern California which have not yielded a response. I wanted to ask Toulmin himself what he thought about the way in which science educators have considered and adapted his work for educational purposes—a question that may be of interest to other researchers to pursue as well. Toulmin’s model has been appropriated, adapted and extended by researchers not only in science education but also in the fields of speech communications, philosophy and artificial intelligence. One issue of the journal Argumentation in 2005 brought together the best contemporary reflection in these fields on the Toulmin model and its current appropriation. The volume included 24 articles by 27 scholars from 10 countries. The papers extended or challenged Toulmin’s ideas in ways that make fresh contributions to the theory of analyzing and evaluating arguments. Collectively, they represent the only comprehensive book-length study of the Toulmin model. They point the way to new developments in the theory of argument, including a typology of warrants, a comprehensive theory of defeaters, a rapprochement with formal logic, and a turn from propositions to speech acts as the constituents of argument. As an illustration of his framework of argument, Toulmin (1958) discusses the claim that Harry is a British subject. The claim can be supported by the datum that Harry was born in Bermuda. That there is a connection at all between datum and claim is expressed by the warrant that a man born in Bermuda will generally be a
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British subject. In turn the warrant can be supported by the backing (that there are certain statutes and other legal provisions to that effect). The warrant does not have total justifying force, so the claim that Harry is a British subject must be qualified: it follows presumably. Moreover there are possible rebuttals, for instance when both his parents were aliens, or he has become a naturalized American. Verheij (2005) argues that since the appearance of Toulmin’s book, the following ideas have found increasing support in different research communities (under the direct influence of Toulmin or independently): (a) in argumentation, the warrants of arguments (in the sense of inference licenses) can be at issue and their backings can differ from domain to domain; (b) arguments can be subject to rebuttal in the sense that there can be conditions of exception; (c) arguments can have qualified conclusions. (d) other kinds of arguments than just those based on the standard logical quantifiers and connectives (for all x, for some x, not, and, or, etc.) need to be analyzed; (e) determining whether an argument is good or not involves substantive judgments and not only formal logic. In the next sections, I will review some of the contributions of Toulmin’s work to themes related to science education including expert–novice studies, problemsolving, scientific reasoning, and theoretical representations and frameworks. My purpose here is to provide some examples of how a theoretically informed definition of argument can yield methodological approaches, which in turn can contribute to knowledge in the field of science education.
Contributions to Expert–Novice Studies and Problem-Solving Cognitive scientist James Voss (2005) regarded the application of the Toulmin model as a success in the sense of providing a tool that produced a reasonable structure to complex protocols thereby enabling the study of expert reasoning in different domains. Voss used Toulmin’s framework in the analysis of verbal protocols obtained during the solving of ill-structured problems. The research Voss conducted involved experts on the Soviet Union indicating how they would improve the USSR’s poor agricultural productivity. Each expert was asked to assume he or she was Head of the Soviet Ministry of Agriculture and was asked how agricultural productivity could be improved. Each person responded orally, thus providing a “think aloud” protocol, the account being tape-recorded. For the analysis the Toulmin model was extended in order to enable description of lines of argument found in protocols as long as 10 paragraphs. Results included that (a) while the protocol was comprised of a large number of specific arguments, the analytical approach enabled the tracing of a solver’s line of argument; (b) on occasion datum and backing were difficult to distinguish; (c) warrants essentially were not stated, although substantial backing was provided. However, as perhaps would be expected, the Toulmin model did not provide for delineation of components of the problem-solving process. A second analysis assuming a “higher level” problem-solving structure and a “lower level” argument
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structure produced an integrated problem-solving—argumentation structure depicting how reasoning is used in relation to particular task goals. Finally, at a more general level, problem-solving was considered as a classical rhetorical structure. According to Voss what was especially gratifying was the reasonably clear lines of argument that were obtainable. Furthermore, the analysis led to other questions such as the nature of the protocol differences found not only among people of different knowledge but also among different experts. With respect to the actual coding of the protocols, Voss and colleagues experienced some difficulty determining whether a given statement was datum or backing, especially when a signal word such as “because” did not occur. A second finding was that, within their scoring system, the warrant of an argument was almost never stated. Following Toulmin (1958) as well as Hample (1977) and Govier (1987), statement of the warrant would make the argument logically valid. However someone who is solving a problem may only be interested in providing support for the claim and thus is concerned with backing, not deductive purity. Voss indicates that the main shortcoming of the Toulmin model relates to the goal of studying solving ill-structured problems. While providing a means to isolate lines of argument, the Toulmin model did not provide information concerning the problem-solving process. One could of course argue that the Toulmin analysis was not designed for this purpose. Voss and colleagues did conduct a second analysis in an effort to enhance our understanding of the problem-solving process (Voss et al., 1983). They assumed the existence of a “higher level” problem-solving structure that included the elements of the previously described information processing model. The protocol data were analyzed in relation to this structure, and the argument structure then became “lower level” with respect to the problem-solving structure. Moreover, two sets of operators were used in the analysis, one in reference to the problem solving structure and the other in relation to the reasoning or argument structure. The operators for the former were state constraint, state sub-problem, state solution, interpret problem statement, evaluate, and summarize. For the latter the operators were state argument, state assertion, state fact, present specific case, state reason, state outcome, compare and/or contrast, elaborate and/or clarify, state conclusion, and state qualifier. This analysis was of particular interest because it showed how specific arguments were employed in argument sequences or “nests of arguments” which in turn were employed in relation to higher-order problem-solving goal structures. The contents of the problem-solving structure constitute an argument. In particular, the solver is faced with a question or problem and the representation phase essentially involves an analysis aimed at providing a statement of the cause(s) of that problem, with problem history often being part of this analysis. A solution is then proposed (usually experts prefer an overall solution whereas novices tend to list specific sub-problem solutions) and the remainder of the solution phase consists of justification of that solution. Thus, the solution is the claim, the datum consists of the causal factors, and the solution development constitutes backing. In agreement with Toulmin, this solving process places emphasis upon
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justification (e.g., Van Eemeren et al., 1996). In the spirit of expert–novice studies, future analytical approaches will be enriched with foci on the development of expertise in science subject knowledge (e.g., Erduran, in press) and pedagogical content knowledge (e.g., Erduran & Dagher, in press). In other words, methodological frameworks that help investigate how science domain-specificity and levels of pedagogical competence relate to professional development will further contribute to the literature on expert–novice studies.
Contributions to Scientific Reasoning A genuine and radical deviation from standard logic is required by Toulmin’s notion of rebuttals although Toulmin hardly elaborates on the nature of rebuttals, a key reason why science educators such as ourselves (Erduran et al., 2004), for instance, have deviated from a formal definition of rebuttal in making TAP applicable for data analysis where rebuttals were involved. As Toulmin puts it, rebuttals involve conditions of exception for the argument (Toulmin, 1958; p. 101). Apparently, for Toulmin, rebuttals can have several functions. For instance, rebuttals can “indicate circumstances in which the general authority of the warrant would have to be set aside” (p.101), but can also be (and for Toulmin apparently equivalently) “exceptional circumstances which might be capable of defeating or rebutting the warranted conclusion” (p. 101). On p. 102, he also speaks about the applicability of a warrant in connection with rebuttals. In other words, Toulmin speaks of the defeat (or rebutting) of the conclusion, of the applicability of the warrant and of the authority of the warrant, in a rather loose manner, without further distinction. Toulmin is unclear about the relation of these seemingly different situations. Here the three will be distinguished, in a way that naturally fits the reconstruction of the other elements of Toulmin’s scheme above, as follows. If we look at the warrant–data–claim part of Toulmin’s scheme there are five statements that can be argued against (Verheij, 2005): 1. 2. 3. 4.
The data D The claim C The warrant W The associated conditional “If D, then C” that expresses the bridge from datum to claim. 5. The associated conditional “If W, then if D, then C” that expresses the bridge between warrant and the previous associated conditional. Verheij (2005) argues that reasons against any of these statements can be seen as a kind of rebuttal of an argument that consists of warrant, data and claim (Fig. 3.2). The first three are straightforward, and are clearly different. An argument against the datum that Harry was born in Bermuda (for instance by claiming that Harry was born in London) differs from an argument against the claim that Harry is a British subject (for instance by claiming that Harry has become a naturalized
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Fig. 3.2 Types of rebuttals (Verheij, 2005)
American) and from an argument against the warrant that a man born in Bermuda will generally be a British subject (for instance by claiming that those born in Bermuda are normally French). An argument against the fourth kind of statement (the first associated conditional) can be regarded as an attack on the connection between data and claim. Such attacks have been characterized as “undercutting defeaters” by Pollock (1987). Harry having become a naturalized American could be an argument against the connection between Harry being born in Bermuda and Harry being a British subject. An argument against the fifth kind of statement can be regarded as an attack against the warrant’s applicability: normally the warrant can justify the conditional that connects data and claim, but since there is a rebuttal, the warrant does not apply. In other words, when the associated conditional if W, then if D, then C, is not justified, the warrant, which normally gives rise to a bridge between data of type D and claim of type C, does not give rise to such a bridge for the actual data D and claim C at hand. For instance, Harry’s parents both being aliens could well be an argument against the applicability of the warrant that a man born in Bermuda will generally be a British subject. The three situations to which Toulmin attaches the term rebuttal (defeat of the conclusion, of the applicability of the warrant and of the authority of the warrant) are among these five kinds of rebuttals (the second, fifth and third, respectively). The other two kinds of rebuttals of a warrant–data–claim argument (i.e., the first and fourth kind) are apparently not mentioned by Toulmin (Verheij, 2005). Despite the limitations of Toulmin’s framing of rebuttals, his outline of the role of rebuttals as well as the subsequent criticisms of his work in this respect have paved the way to establishing more dialogical patterns in classroom conversations in the science classroom. In our own work (Erduran et al., 2004) we designed a methodological approach where rebuttals were used as an indicator of improved reasoning (Table 3.1). Conversation with rebuttals, are, however, of better quality than those without given that individuals who engage in talk without rebuttals remain epistemologically unchallenged. The reasons for their belief are not questioned and are simply opposed by a counterclaim that may be more or less persuasive but is not a substantive challenge to the original claim. At its worst, such arguments are reducible simply to the enunciation of contrasting belief systems.
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For instance, given that beliefs rely on justifications using data and warrants, a confrontation between a creationist and a Darwinist without any attempt to rebut the data or the warrants of the other would have no potential to change the ideas and thinking of either (Erduran et al., 2004). Only arguments, which rebut these components of argument can ever undermine the belief of another. Oppositional episodes without rebuttals, therefore, have the potential to continue forever with no change of mind or evaluation of the quality of the substance of an argument. Thus, arguments with rebuttals are an essential element of better quality arguments and demonstrate a higher level capability with argumentation. Furthermore, rebuttals can also be considered as a measure of conversational engagement. In other words, if one of the goals of promoting argumentation in science lessons is to engage learners in dialogical conversation where they can not only substantiate their claims but also refute others’ with evidence, then the presence of rebuttals in conversation can act as an indicator of sustained engagement in argumentation discourse.
Contributions to Theoretical Representations and Frameworks The analysis of arguments is often hard, not only for researchers but also for students and teachers. It is no surprise that for a technology-based task, one of my student teachers used a picture of me and sent me to space in an astronaut suit, labeling the photograph “in space, no-one can hear you argue!” A variety of tools and techniques have emerged from the theory of argumentation and critical thinking pedagogy that aim to help in the task of analysis (Reed & Rowe, 2005). Our work with pre-service science teachers (e.g., Erduran, 2006; Erduran et al., 2006) has led to the production of support tools including writing frames which help structure as well as evaluate arguments. One of the most common and intuitive of these tools is diagramming, by which the abstract form of an argument can be identified and seen at a glance, and according to which it is then possible to analyze more closely the relationships between an argument parts, for example Figs. 3.1 and 3.2. The utility of argument diagramming is seen in its almost universal adoption in the teaching of critical thinking and argumentation skills, as well as its deployment in various practical tools employed where complex argumentation is used as part of professional discourse. There is a wide range of diagramming techniques, some very general, some tailored to particular domains, for instance ARGUMED (Verheij, 2003a) and DEFLOG (Verheij, 2003b) systems. A key technique used in various pedagogic and professional applications of argumentation theory is the “box-and-arrow” approach of identifying atomic components of an argument, and then indicating links between them with arrows. One of the first proponents of the approach in a pedagogic context was Beardsley (1950), and little has changed since then. In addition to identifying relationships of support between atoms in an argument, Reed and Rowe (2005) observe that the scheme has become refined to also identify four distinct ways in which compounds can be formed: as serial argument (in which one statement supports another, which
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in turn supports a third); convergent argument (in which two or more statements independently support a third); linked argument (in which two or more statements jointly support a third) and divergent argument (in which two or more statements are supported by a third). Complex argumentation (including verbal and written argumentation) can be constructed through arbitrarily complex combinations of these forms. Rather than viewing arguments as essentially just more or less complex binary relationships of support, Toulmin framed arguments as six-part complexes, comprising the Data, Warrant, Claim, Backing, Rebuttal, Qualifier. Though the starting point was jurisprudential, the resulting theory and its subsequent application are very general, and a Toulmin-style approach, including diagrams of argument components, is widespread in the literature including science education literature (e.g., JiménezAleixandre et al., 2000; Simon et al., 2006). An important observation is that whatever the theoretical framework, be it Toulmin’s or another author’s, diagramming is much more than just ways of drawing pictures. Diagramming embodies many theoretical assumptions and conclusions, and works as a way of summarizing and applying substantial theories as practical tools that are simple and easy to understand.
Concluding Remarks In this chapter I presented an overview of some methodological approaches in the study of argumentation in science classrooms. My review raises more questions than it provides answers. Some of the key challenges of qualitative research methods including the definition of the unit of analysis, and reliability and boundary markers within verbal as well as written data apply to argumentation analysis too. In this sense, the difficulties that science educators have experienced in applying Toulmin’s framework to classroom conversations are not unique to Toulmin’s framework as it is often claimed (e.g., Duschl, this book; Kelly & Takao, 2002). An analytical tool derived from whatever theoretical or grounded framework will have its limitations in application, and it will not answer many questions. The case of the difficulties researchers have experienced in the application of Toulmin’s work in science education, in my view, is more representative of underspecification of the boundary markers that generate coding tools rather than an inherently limited feature of the framework itself. I have chosen to concentrate on Toulmin’s work as an example to illustrate how his work has contributed to both the methodology and theory of knowledge in science education. My choice of Toulmin’s framework is based on the observation that it has guided and influenced many researchers in the field. While other frameworks such as the work of Walton (1996) remain promising as methodological tools (Duschl, this book), there is not substantial work at the present time to warrant and attribute their contribution to methodology in the study of school science argumentation.
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Many methodological challenges remain in addressing aspects of argumentation in the classroom that are understudied. In our work (Simon et al., 2006) we generated a preliminary typology for the classification of pedagogical strategies in the teaching of argumentation. Extension of our results to more definitive pedagogical models will necessitate the development of new tools of analysis of teaching. Extending the analysis of argumentation from verbal to more multimodal contexts where other representations (including gestures) can be regarded as components of argument also promises a fruitful territory for methodological studies. Likewise methodologies will need to be developed to be sensitive enough to capture issues at different levels of education including primary, secondary and tertiary students’ and teachers’ argumentation. A significant gap in the literature concerns those aspects of the complex classroom environments including the sociological, political and psychological structures and processes that mediate argumentation in school science. Interdisciplinary investigations using science studies approaches (e.g., Duschl et al., 2006) promise a fruitful territory where new methodological approaches can be generated. It is noteworthy, however, that in the true spirit of argumentation, methodological questions will continue to challenge our understanding of teaching and learning processes thereby offering the potential to contribute to knowledge in science education. Acknowledgments I would like to thank Douglas Clark, Merce Garcia-Mila, María Pilar Aleixandre-Jiménez and William Sandoval for feedback on this chapter. Data from Erduran et al. (2004) were from a project supported by the UK Economic and Social Research Council grant number R000237915.
References Bazerman, C. (1988). Shaping written knowledge: The genre and activity of the experimental article in science. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press. Beardsley, M. C. (1950). Practical logic. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. Castells, M., Enciso, J., Cerveró, J. M., López, P., & Cabellos, M. (2007). What can we learn from a study of argumentation in the students’ answers and group discussion to open physics’ problems? In R. Pinto & D. Couso (Eds.), Contributions from science education research. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Springer. Chinn, C. A., & Anderson, R. C. (1998). The structure of discussions that promote reasoning. Teachers College Record, 100(2), 315–368. Clark, D., Sampson, V., Weinberger, A., & Erkens, G. (in press). Analytic frameworks for assessing dialogic argumentation in online learning environments. Educational Psychology Review. Duschl, R., Erduran, S., Grandy, R., & Rudolph, J. (2006). Guest editorial. Science Studies and Science Education, 90(6), 961–964. Duschl, R., Ellenbogen, K., & Erduran, S. (1999). Understanding dialogic argumentation among middle school science students. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Educational Research Association, Montreal, April 1999. Erduran, S. (in press). Breaking the law: Promoting domain-specificity in chemical education in the context of arguing about the Periodic Law. Foundations of Chemistry.
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Erduran, S., & Dagher, Z. (2007). Exemplary teaching of argumentation: A case study of two middle school science teachers. In R. Pinto & D. Couso (Eds.), Contributions of Science Education Research. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Springer Erduran, S. (2006). Promoting ideas, evidence and argument in initial teacher training. School Science Review, 87(321), 45–50. Erduran, S., Ardac, D., & Yakmaci-Guzel, B. (2006). Learning to teach argumentation: Case studies of pre-service secondary science teachers. Eurasia Journal of Mathematics, Science and Technology Education, 2(2), 1–14. Erduran, S., Simon, S., & Osborne, J. (2004). TAping into argumentation: Developments in the application of Toulmin’s argument pattern for studying science discourse. Science Education, 88, 915–933. Eemeren, F. H., Grootendorst, R., & Snoeck Henkemans, F. (1996). Fundamentals of Argumentation Theory, Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. Govier, T. C. (1987). Problems in argument analysis and evaluation. Providence, RI: Foris. Hample, D. (1977). The Toulmin model and the syllogism. Journal of the American Forensic Association, 14, 1–9. Hogan, K., & Maglienti, M. (2001). Comparing the epistemological underpinnings of students’ and scientists’ reasoning about conclusions. Journal of Research in Science Teaching, 38(6), 663–687. Jiménez-Aleixandre M.P., & Pereiro Muñoz, C. (2005). Argument construction and change when working on a real environmental problem. In K. Boersma, M. Goedhart, O. De Jong, & H. Eijkelhof (Eds.), Research and the quality of Science Education (pp. 419–431). Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Springer. Jiménez-Aleixandre, M. P., Bugallo Rodríguez, A., & Duschl, R. A. (2000). “Doing the lesson” or “doing science”: Argument in high school genetics. Science Education, 84(6), 757–792. Kelly, G.J., Chen, C., & Crawford, T. (1998). Methodological considerations for studying science-in-the-making in educational settings. Research in Science Education, 28(1), 23–50. Kelly, G., Drucker, S., & Chen, K. (1998). Students’ reasoning about electricity: Combining performance assessment with argumentation analysis. International Journal of Science Education, 20(7), 849–871. Kuhn, D. (1991). The skills of argument. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Latour, B. (1987). Science in action: How to follow scientists and engineers through society. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Lawson, A. (2003). The nature and development of hypothetico-predictive argumentation with implications for science teaching. International Journal of Science Education, 25(11), 1387–1408. Loui, R. P. (2005). A citation-based reflection on Toulmin and argument. Argumentation, 19, 259–266. Loucks-Horsley, S., Hewson, P., Love, N., & Stiles, K. E. (1998). Designing professional development for teachers of science and mathematics. Thousand Oaks, CA: Corwin Press. Maloney, J., & Simon, S. (2006). Mapping children’s discussions of evidence in science to assess collaboration and argumentation. International Journal of Science Education, 28(15), 1817–1841. Marquez, C., Izquierdo, M., & Espinet, M. (2006). Multimodal science teachers’ discourse in modeling the water cycle, Science Education, 90 (2), 202–226. Means, L.M., & Voss, J.F. (1996). Who reasons well? Two studies of informal reasoning among children of different grade, ability and knowledge levels. Cognition and Instruction, 14(2), 139–178. Piccinini, C. L., & Martins, I. (2005). Comunicação Multimodal na sala de aula de Ciências. Ensaio Pesquisa em Educação em Ciências, 6(1), 1–14. Pollock, J. L. (1987). Defeasible reasoning. Cognitive Science, 11, 481–518. Reed, D., & Rowe, G. (2005). Translating Toulmin diagrams: Theory neutrality in argument representation. Argumentation, 19, 267–286.
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Sampson, V., & Clark, D. B. (2006). The development and validation of the Nature of Science as Argument Questionnaire (NSAAQ). Paper presented at the National Association of Research in Science Teaching Conference, San Francisco, April. Sandoval, W. A., & Millwood, K. A. (2005). The quality of students’ use of evidence in written scientific explanations. Cognition and Instruction, 23(1), 23–55. Sandoval, W. A., & Reiser, B. J. (2004). Explanation driven inquiry: Integrating conceptual and epistemic scaffolds for scientific inquiry. Science Education, 88(3), 345–372. Scerri, E. (2003). Philosophical confusion in chemical education research. Journal of Chemical Education, 80(5), 468–474. Simon, S., Erduran, S., & Osborne, J. (2006). Learning to teach argumentation: Research and development in the science classroom. International Journal of Science Education, 28(2–3), 235–260. Takao, A. Y., & Kelly, G. J. (2003). Assessment of evidence in university students’ scientific writing. Science & Education, 12(4), 341–363. Toulmin, S. (1958). The uses of argument. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Verheij, B. (2005). Evaluating arguments based on Toulmin’s scheme. Argumentation, 19, 347–371. Verheij, B. (2003a). Artificial argument assistants for defeasible argumentation. Artificial Intelligence, 150, 291–324. Verheij, B. (2003b). DefLog: On the logical interpretation of prima facie justified assumptions. Journal of Logic and Computation, 13, 319–346. Voss, J. (2005). Toulmin’s model and the solving of ill-structured problems. Argumentation, 19, 321–329. Voss, J. F., Greene, T. R., Post, T. A., & Penner, B.C. (1983). Problem solving skill in the social sciences. In G. H. Bower (Ed.), The psychology of learning and motivation: Vol. 17, Advances in research and theory (pp. 165–213). New York: Academic Press. Walton, D.N. (1996). Argumentation schemes for presumptive reasoning. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. Zembal-Saul, C., Munford, D., Crawford, B., Friedrichsen, P., & Land, P. (2002). Scaffolding preservice science teachers’ evidence-based arguments during an investigation of natural selection. Research in Science Education, 32, 437–463. Zohar, A., & Nemet, F. (2002). Fostering students’ knowledge and argumentation skills through dilemmas in human genetics. Journal of Research in Science Teaching, 39(1), 35–62.
Chapter 4
What Can Argumentation Tell Us About Epistemology? William A. Sandoval and Kelli A. Millwood
Who, besides scientists, engages in what we would call scientific argumentation? When? For what purpose? As calls for argumentation to take a central place in science instruction increase (Driver et al., 2000; Duschl & Osborne, 2002; Kuhn, 1993b), answers to these questions become more important. There are two key claims for engaging students in scientific argumentation. One is that argumentation is a central practice of science, and thus should be at the core of science education. The other is that understanding the norms of scientific argumentation can lead students to understand the epistemological bases of scientific practice. We are more interested in this second claim. We think it unlikely that people who do not practice science are likely to engage in truly scientific argumentation. At the same time, we see everyday contexts all around us where people might apply scientific arguments to further other kinds of arguments. For example, using arguments about global climate change to argue for or against particular energy policies or even personal consumer decisions. Consequently, the focus of our studies has been to understand how students’ practices of scientific argumentation reflect their understanding about science: about what makes a claim scientific, and how such criteria are related to methods that scientists use to generate and to warrant claims. Thus, our studies of students’ efforts at scientific argumentation are aimed at helping us to understand students’ epistemological ideas about science. Hence, what can argumentation tell us about epistemology?
Epistemology and Practice Epistemology is the branch of philosophy concerned with the study of knowledge. Philosophers of science have been concerned with outlining an epistemology of science—the logical and philosophical grounds upon which scientific claims are advanced and justified. This move itself presupposes that scientific knowledge and the processes of its construction are potentially different from other forms of knowledge and knowing. Scientific epistemology is a description of the nature of scientific knowledge, including the sources of such knowledge, its truth value, S. Erduran and M. P. Jiménez-Aleixandre (eds.), Argumentation in Science Education. © Springer 2007
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scientifically appropriate warrants, and so forth. Psychologists take this notion of epistemology and internalize it, defining personal epistemology as the set of beliefs that individuals hold about the nature of knowledge and its production. Thus, psychologists speak of the scientific epistemologies held by individuals. In science education, research into students’ epistemological ideas has occurred under the name of NOS (Nature of Science) research. The move to studying the epistemological ideas that students may have about science by studying how they make scientific arguments is quite recent.
Epistemics of Argumentation One of the aims of research on argumentation in science education is to get students to argue like scientists. Broadly, the goal is to get students to use evidence to support claims that they make. Clearly, this coordination of claims and evidence raises inherently epistemological questions. What counts as a claim? What counts as evidence? How do you decide what sort of evidence supports, or refutes, a particular claim? How are individual claims organized to produce a coherent argument? What kinds of coordination of claims and evidence make an argument persuasive? How one answers these questions through a specific argument, whether consciously asked or not, may reflect epistemological notions about claims, evidence, and other forms of knowledge and their production. Student argumentation has been studied across a range of age levels in two basic contexts, oral and written argumentation (see Duschl, this book; Kelly et al., this book). Oral argumentation has almost exclusively been studied within contexts of collaborative inquiry or problem-solving. Researchers have construed the dialogue that students engage in during such collaborations as argument, and analyses have thus focused on the epistemic moves that students make during such conversations. One finding that has emerged from these studies is that students commonly advance claims without providing explicit justifications (or warrants) for those claims (Erduran et al., 2004; Jiménez-Aleixandre et al., 2000; Kelly et al., 1998; Resnick et al., 1993). These studies show that claims are justified only when they are challenged, and even then not always. Claims are often offered without relation to other elements in an ongoing argument (Jiménez-Aleixandre et al., 2000). Furthermore, students can provide warrants for claims in a number of ways, including appeals to both empirical evidence and hypothetical or theoretical ideas (Kelly et al., 1998). Argumentation has also been studied through examinations of student writing, and again across a number of age and grade levels. As with analyses of oral argumentation, analyses tend to focus almost exclusively on the structure of students arguments, with various efforts to try and capture argument quality. As with studies of oral argumentation (e.g., Erduran et al., 2004; JiménezAleixandre et al., 2000), researchers have applied Toulmin’s (1958) argument structure (e.g., Bell & Linn, 2000). Kelly and Takao have developed a scheme
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of assigning “epistemic levels” to students’ written arguments that distinguish increasing levels of epistemic complexity in student writing (Kelly & Takao, 2002; Takao & Kelly, 2003). In our own prior work, we have examined the levels of empirical evidence that students provide to justify particular claims (Sandoval, 2003; Sandoval & Millwood, 2005). Most of these studies show how students fail to produce sufficiently scientific arguments through their writing, while at the same time, writing arguments seems to help students learn important scientific ideas (Bell & Linn, 2000; Sandoval, 2003). Students seem to have similar issues in writing arguments as they do in oral argument. For instance, students often fail to provide sufficient warrants for their written claims (Sandoval, 2003; Sandoval & Millwood, 2005). Further, they often fail to make explicit the links between data and claims about data, a finding common to Sandoval’s studies and to those by Kelly and Takao (Kelly & Takao, 2002; Takao & Kelly, 2003). Taken as a whole, research on students’ practices of argumentation suggests the complexity of appropriately coordinating causal claims with evidence. Of course, at issue is what exactly it means to coordinate claims and evidence appropriately. For instance, within professional science contexts the claims that need to be explicitly warranted are only those that have yet to be accepted. Thus, students’ failure to warrant particular claims is not inherently “unscientific,” but may simply reflect their belief that those claims are already believed. The analyses of oral argumentation mentioned above show that students do, in fact, provide warrants when claims are contested, as scientists themselves do. Issues of claim-evidence coordination in written arguments, on the other hand, may indicate that students do not see the rhetorical task of a scientific argument as one of persuasion. The tight coupling of evidence and claims that we take for granted in scientific arguments reflects a rhetorical effort to persuade readers of the preferability of an argument. Such rhetorical strategies are not simply social, but may be necessary to make novel ideas comprehensible (Kitcher, 1991).
Limits to “Practice Studies” This is to say that the kinds of argumentation that students do, and do not, perform in school science contexts are some messy reflection of epistemological ideas they may have about the nature of claims (about the natural world) and the kinds of evidence or other justifications that make such claims believable. We say messy, however, because there are a number of other factors, besides epistemological, that might influence student argumentation. Consequently, while studies of students’ practices of argumentation are important, they are not sufficient to help us understand the epistemological ideas that students bring to bear during such work, or how such work develops those ideas. Even studies that look at students’ practices in detail have to make quite speculative inferences on how students interpret the purposes of their activity (cf., Sandoval & Morrison, 2003).
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Kelly in particular has argued that the focus of research should be on students’ sense making practices, either through traditional or inquiry-oriented instruction (Kelly et al., 1998; Kelly & Duschl, 2002). Certainly, the development of certain practices that can be labeled as scientific is a main goal of recent reforms. Kelly’s perspective on science is strongly influenced by science and technology studies (STS), which argue that practice is the key feature to emphasize in science because science is a practice. Yet, most students will not really engage in science as a practice. Rather, as citizens they must be able to reflect upon scientific knowledge claims as they relate to personal or policy decisions. It is far from clear that simply engaging in practices of authentic science leads to such reflective ability. In fact, available evidence suggests that this is unlikely (see Sandoval, 2005). Studies of practice in themselves do not provide enough of a window onto students’ epistemological ideas about science, because there are many possible ideas that might motivate particular practices. We have recently laid out a theoretical perspective on epistemological beliefs that we call practical epistemologies (Sandoval, 2005). This theory proposes that students develop highly contextualized epistemological ideas as a result of their practical experiences trying to understand and explain the world they live in. We further propose that such epistemological beliefs drive, at least in part, people’s efforts to explain new situations. That is, one’s ideas about what counts as a satisfactory explanation—plausibility, fit with what you already know, standards of evidence, etc.—influence one’s attempts to create explanations. This theory is an attempt to explain the evidence (reviewed by Sandoval, 2005) that students’ epistemological beliefs appear to vary, in content and apparent sophistication, depending upon the context in which they are elicited, as well as the apparent paradox that students’ practices of science are often more sophisticated than their expressed beliefs about science. Our view is similar to other proposals that epistemological beliefs are fragmentary and deployed as resources (Hammer & Elby, 2002) or repertoires (Bell & Linn, 2002). We believe that one promising way to investigate how such practical epistemological beliefs influence argumentation, and science learning more generally, is to augment studies of students’ practice with techniques to identify epistemological beliefs directly.
Students’ Ideas about Warranting Claims Here we describe a recent study we undertook to test the viability of the practical epistemologies theory. We decided to look specifically at students’ ideas about how to warrant claims. We started with such a project because of the historical interest both in science education and developmental psychology in how students coordinate claims with evidence (see for instance Kelly et al., this book; GarciaMila & Andersen, this book). We also expected that whatever ideas students hold about how they know particular claims, and why they believe them, could be straightforwardly assessed by asking students about them. That is, while asking
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students about professional science has often been problematic (see Sandoval, 2005), we expected that students could explain their own work.
Setting We conducted this study in a Grade 7 classroom in an urban middle school in Los Angeles; 33 students participated (20 boys, 13 girls), with their teacher. This school is in a middle-income community of the city, with a study population that is 75% Caucasian, 14% Latino, 10% Asian-American, and 1% African-American; and 12% of the students received free or reduced lunches. We explored students’ ideas about warranting claims within the context of a three week science unit called Sensing the Environment (Griffis & Wise, 2005). This unit explores plant adaptation to the environment, focusing on topics of photosynthesis and transpiration and plants’ evolutionary adaptations to climates to manage these processes. This unit is part of a curriculum development project that is producing curriculum units that frame student inquiry around data sets collected by remote sensor networks developed and deployed by the Center for Embedded Networked Sensing (CENS, cens.ucla.edu). One of the aims of the project is to study how students’ argumentation practices develop through scaffolded instructional experiences, and to examine the effects that such inquiry may have on their ideas about the nature of science. Students began the unit by looking at a picture of some local mountains and being asked what they noticed (a version of this picture is shown on the right of Fig. 4.1). Students noticed that the plants in the photo look different from each other, and in this way the teacher posed the question, “Why do plants look different?” This provided the guiding question for the unit. Following a series of laboratory activities in which students explored photosynthesis and transpiration, students finished the unit by conducting an investigation into the relations between plant leaf structure (mainly size) and environmental factors using an online environment shown in Fig. 4.1. Students worked in groups of two or three to explore how differences in temperature, humidity, and light intensity affected leaf size. The online investigation involved a series of steps through which students made decisions about what data to analyze. From a series of pull down menus, students decided which of the three environmentally different areas to investigate, how to aggregate the data (average, maximum, minimum), and over what time frame (hourly, daily, or weekly). They were then able to generate graphs of the type shown in Fig. 4.1. To the right of the graph is a leaf gallery depicting images of leaves in area 1. Beneath the graph is a comparison option that allowed students to add an additional area (station) or environmental variable to the graph. In addition to comparing environmental variables in different areas graphically, students could calculate the average leaf size within an area. By clicking on the individual leaves on the screen (e.g., in area 1, Fig. 4.1), students could obtain an enlarged image of the selected leaf in addition to its name and surface area. In order
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Fig. 4.1 Data query interface to Sensing the Environment online tool
to find the average surface area of all the leaves in a particular area, students had to manually average the various surface areas of the leaves. They could then use this data in addition to the graphs they created to look for patterns between leaf size and environmental trends. Students looked for patterns in these data to figure out why plants look different. An example of a pattern that a group of students noticed is that the leaves in area 1 are smaller on average than the leaves in area 3, and the temperature in area 1 is higher than the temperature in area 3. These data can be used to support the claim that plants have smaller leaves in hotter areas. A separate tab in the interface presented students with a series of questions to guide their investigations. These questions helped students to generate causal ideas about why plants look different and also aided them in writing their final explanations. Students were instructed to answer these questions as they proceeded through their investigations. After their collaborative investigations, which lasted three classroom periods for approximately 135 minutes, individual students synthesized the data they had analyzed to write an explanation for the question of why plants look different. Individual students were able to print out their group responses to the guiding questions and then write an explanation using the information from the guiding questions. Before students wrote their explanation, they were given a rubric and they discussed what elements should be included in the explanation. After writing their essays, students reviewed their own and three of their peers’ explanations, using this rubric.
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The rubric students were given, designed by study teachers, provided a highly structured set of rules for their essays. These included repeating the guiding questions that students had been given in the online environment, with instructions to make sure that they had been answered. These were followed with instructions for what is known in the United States as the common five-paragraph essay: an introductory paragraph, three body paragraphs that should address each of the climate areas investigated, and a concluding paragraph where students were instructed to make a general claim about why plants look different. Additionally, students were instructed that their essays should demonstrate that they: had learned key concepts; identified appropriate variables; searched the data for “patterns, anomalies, relationships”; and presented data-based arguments. We point out that in this version of the unit there was no discussion of just what, exactly, a “data-based argument” might look like. In this sense, this study is a replication of an earlier study (Sandoval & Millwood, 2005), and provides a baseline understanding of students’ evidentiary standards.
What Students Do and What They Say We used a variety of methods to understand both students’ practices of warranting claims and their ideas about that practice. We analyzed the contents of students written essays to determine how they warranted their written claims. Following the end of the unit, each of the 33 students in the class was individually interviewed about their essay. Finally, students completed a version of the Views of Nature of Science (VNOS) questionnaire (Lederman et al., 2002) modified for students of this age range, known as POSE (Perspectives On Scientific Epistemology; Abd-ElKhalick, 2002). Our aim in triangulating across these data sources was to answer two questions. First, did students express beliefs about their own written work that might explain their actual practices of using data to warrant claims? Second, were these expressed beliefs about their own work related to their expressed ideas about how scientists warrant claims?
Warrants in Written Arguments We collected the essays written by all 33 students in this classroom. Students’ explanations were analyzed with a scheme adapted from Sandoval and Millwood (2005). The first part determined if the student articulated the four main conceptual claims targeted through the unit: the function of a leaf, the structure of a leaf, environmental variations that affect leaf structure and function, and the differential fitness of structural (size) variations in leaves under varied environmental conditions. A student could score one point for each articulated claim, for a maximum of four points. As with our earlier analyses, students could receive a point for articulating a claim as long as the stated claim could be interpreted as pertaining to one of the four ideas
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in the coding scheme. Such claims did not have to be correct, however. Our aim was not to see how many students got the right answer, but to understand how students warranted the claims that they made. The second part of the scheme analyzed the warrants students provided for their articulated claims. All of the claims, except function, had a four-level scheme to assess how well the student warranted their claim. Warrants for claims about leaf function were not scored for two reasons. One, leaf functions—photosynthesis and transpiration—were extensively explored prior to the online investigation and could safely be taken as shared knowledge in the classroom and consequently not likely to need a warrant (cf., Latour, 1987, and his analysis of warrants in scientific articles). Second, there were no available data in the online environment to support or refute particular claims for leaf function, so students had no opportunity to provide specific warrants for such claims. For the other claims in our argument structure, students could receive a score from 0—providing no warrant, to 3—providing a “full” warrant, as described in Table 4.1. A higher score indicated that students’ warrants for claims were more like scientists’. Note that claims for differential fitness were not warranted through citing data, but by citing the appropriate scientific principle that explains the available data—what is known as the photosynthesis– transpiration compromise: the more surface area a leaf has, the more photosynthesis it can do. At the same time, however, a larger surface area increases the rate of transpiration (the process by which plants draw water through their roots—as water evaporates through the leaf surface this creates a vacuum pump to draw water through the plant). If a plant transpires too quickly in a hot or sunny climate it can dry out and burn. Since students had explored the processes of photosynthesis and transpiration independently prior to this investigation, we expected that at least some of them should be able to use the compromise as a justification for their claims. While we did not require that the claims that students articulated be correct, our scoring of warrants required that warrants be appropriate for each claim. For example, if a student made a claim about leaves in area 2 being the biggest, but only
Table 4.1 Coding Scheme Used to Score Warrants in Students’ Written Arguments Environmental Differential Function Structure Variation Fitness 0 N/A 1
2
3
No relevant warrant given Leaf size data one environmental Use principle of either given for only variable given, transpiration or photosynthesis one area from only one area Leaf size given two or more variables Use principle of photosynthesis– for two areas compared from two transpiration compromise or more areas Leaf size given All three variables Use photosynthesis–transpiration for all three systematically compromise and principle that plant will try to maximize areas compared across all three areas leaf size
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provided data about the leaf sizes in area 1 that would be scored as 0 for the structure claim. Similarly, if a student made a claim about the leaves in one area being larger than those in another, but the data showed that, in fact, those leaves were smaller, then that claim would be scored as unwarranted (a score of 0). As already mentioned, we collected and scored all of the individual essays written by students in this class, 33 in all. The combined argument score could range from 0 to 13 (4 points for articulating all target claims, plus 9 points for fully warranting the last 3 claims). The mean total score for explanations was 6.30 (SD = 3.40). The mean articulation score was 2.78 (SD = 1.22) and the mean warrant score was 1.95 (SD = 2.45). The majority of students articulated all of the claims, but most students did not provide warrants for their claims (see Fig. 4.2). Approximately 79% of the students provided a warrant for their structure claim, and most of these were full warrants— comparing leaf sizes across all three available areas. Yet, only 33% of the students provided a warrant for environmental variation, and 18% of the students provided a warrant for differential fitness. In contrast to our previous study (Sandoval & Millwood, 2005), students here were not likely to warrant the claims they made in their explanations, despite a similar level of instruction about the need for data to support claims. It may be that there is some developmental explanation, as the students in this study were slightly younger (by 2 years, their age being 12–13) than the students in that previous study. Given the evidence available of much younger children using evidence to support claims (Lehrer & Schauble, 2006), this explanation seems unlikely.
100 90 80
% of Students
70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0
Structure No Warrant
Environmental Variation Some Warrant
Key Warrant
Fig. 4.2 Percentage of warranted claims in written student arguments
Differential Fitness Full Warrant
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It could be that this problem was simply harder than our earlier problems in natural selection. Yet, this problem is structurally isomorphic to those problems. Here, students needed to identify variations in a single trait—leaf size—and relate those to variations in environmental conditions leading to differential fitness. In those other problems, students had to select from among a number of possible traits the one that produced differential fitness. On the other hand, in those problems fitness was directly shown through individual survival, whereas in this problem the idea of survival was only implied by the distribution of particular plants across a geographic range. That is, students did not see large-leafed plants die on the hot, sunny slope, they only saw that the plants that grew on that slope had small leaves. Also, if students did not really understand how the photosynthesis–transpiration compromise might affect individual plant survival, then they could not have cited it as evidence for their claims. Still, if students lacked this understanding, it also stands to reason that they would have more difficulty articulating claims of variation and differential fitness than they did.
Ideas about One’s Own Warrants A third possible explanation for the lack of supplied warrants in students’ written arguments is that they may have felt that evidence was unneeded for some reason. We examined this by asking students, during a semi-structured interview, to describe why they did or did not believe their claims. In the week following the unit, individual students were pulled out of class and interviewed by the second author for about 30 minutes. In this interview, students were shown their written argument and were asked to highlight (using a marker) all of the claims they made. First, the interviewer asked students what they thought a claim was, then she provided a definition of a claim, and after that the student was asked to highlight all of their claims. When they were done, the student was asked to indicate which of their highlighted claims they were most sure of, and why. They were then asked which of the claims they were most uncertain of, and why. These two questions thus provide an idea of the standards students applied to judge certainty of their own claims—or what makes a good warrant. Finally, students were asked to describe the “best way to convince someone of something in science.” This question was an attempt to find out whether or not students applied the same ideas about their own claims to what might loosely be considered scientific persuasion. We used the phrase “in science” to try to get students to think about persuading someone outside of their science class, although we cannot be sure that this is how students interpreted the phrase. Four codes emerged from students’ responses that characterized their expressed beliefs about how to warrant a claim—authority, causal, empirical, and factual (see Table 4.2). The authority code was used when the student warranted their claim by citing a source of authority, such as their teacher, science class, book, etc. For example, a student said she was certain of her claim, “because that is what we were talking about in science class and my teacher said it.” Causal codes included times
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Table 4.2 Codes Derived for Students’ Expressed Beliefs about how to Warrant a Claim Code Definition Authority Causal Empirical
Factual
Student reason explicitly states source of authority or lack thereof for uncertain claims. Sources may include: teacher, science class, book, Internet, etc. Student reason is based on a theoretical concept, or explanation of a theoretical concept. Student reason is citing some kind of empirical evidence, or lack of empirical evidence for uncertain claims. Can include: research from CENS website, data/graphs, results from experiment, etc. Student reason is repeating their original claim by using the exact same words, paraphrasing, or rephrasing. Student asserts that their claim is a fact.
when students cited a specific scientific idea, or simply appealed to causal explanation, as in a student saying that they would convince someone in science by, “I’d explain to them why it happens and show them graphs and stuff.” This statement also includes an empirical warrant, by appealing to graphs. Note, therefore, that single responses could possibly receive more than one code. Factual codes were simply assertions that the stated claim was a fact, or an explicit appeal to “facts,” as in convincing someone of something in science by, “ tell[ing] them a lot of facts about it.” When asked how they were certain of a particular claim, why they were uncertain of one, or how to best persuade someone “in science,” most students appealed to empirical warrants. In the certain and persuasion contexts, more than half of the students cited an empirical warrant, and just under half of the students did so in the uncertain context (we note, though, that more than half of the students interviewed denied being uncertain about any of their claims). We also found that students tended to prefer a particular kind of warrant for all of these contexts. If a student cited authority as the reason for being certain of a claim, they tended to cite a lack of authority for being uncertain. We computed a preferred warrant for each student by looking to see whether or not they appealed to the same type of warrant in 2 or more of the 3 contexts. As can be seen in Fig. 4.3, empirical warrants were overwhelmingly preferred by students, Χ2(5, N = 33) = 30.21, p <.001. Notice that five students had multiple preferred warrants, meaning that they gave more than one warrant in more than one context (like the example given above for causal and empirical warrants). Of these five, four expressed empirical as one of their preferred warrants. Comparing these data to students’ written arguments, we see a discrepancy. More than half of the students said that empirical warrants were how they knew they were certain of their claims, although fewer than 25% of them cited any evidence for their claims of environmental variation or differential fitness. What is going on here? There are a number of factors. First, we looked at the claims that students cited as the ones they were most certain of. We found that these claims were comprehensive, somewhat general, claims that could be induced from the data that students had looked at and their prior lab experiences in the unit. These were
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Fig. 4.3 Percentage of preferred warrants across contexts
claims like the following, “Plants are adapted to the environments that they live in,” or, “plants have to balance photosynthesis and transpiration in order to survive.” Consequently, there is a mismatch between what our content analyses considered claims and what students highlighted as claims. This leads to a second type of mismatch, one of specificity. Our analyses of warrants looked for specific kinds of data, or appeals to principle, that could support specific claims related to a target conceptual framework we imposed on students’ written work. Their personal warrants, their sources of belief in what they perceived as the important claims in their written work, were synthetic and generalized. That is, students appealed to the collection of data that they had looked at as providing the warrant for their general claims. On the one hand, this is a perfectly legitimate way of reasoning. On the other hand, it might be argued that it is less than ideal as scientific practice because it does not trace the specific contributions from particular data and their role in the larger story. We have to point out, however, that our findings do not permit us to say that students cannot produce such a trace, only that they do not seem to do so spontaneously, at least not in the contexts that we provided for them. (As an aside, this can explain the differences in warranting seen in students’ written work here as compared to Sandoval & Millwood, 2005. In that earlier study, students were explicitly encouraged to articulate their explanations in the same terms as our coding scheme. Here, however, we applied the coding scheme post hoc to students’ written work.) We did find, however, that students who expressed a preference for empirical warrants in their interviews were more likely to provide warrants in their explanations,
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t = −2.76, p <.01. Overall, students averaged 2 (out of 9) on their warrant scores, but students who preferred empirical warrants scored, on average, 4 out of 9. We take this to mean that these students have a productive epistemological belief, empirical evidence provides the best warrant for claims, that they can also apply to their own work.
Ideas about Scientists’ Warrants We queried students’ ideas about how scientists warrant their claims by administering the POSE questionnaire prior to the start of the unit. We knew going in that this instrument was likely to be problematic, given the historical issues with such assessments (Kelly et al., 1998; Lederman et al., 1998). Still, we wanted to have some assessment of these students’ ideas about what scientists do independent of their own scientific work, and preferred to use a validated instrument. POSE is intended by its developers to provide an overall view of students’ views of the nature of science as either naïve or informed, or as in transition from naïve to informed. Our initial analyses suggested that all of our students held naïve views, so we decided to look thematically at students’ responses to questions that asked them how scientists used evidence. Here we present only those data that relate to students’ ideas about how scientists use evidence to support claims. These were garnered from students’ responses to a general question about why scientists collect evidence or data, and a series of more specific questions about how scientists know dinosaurs really existed, how they know what dinosaurs looked like, and how it might be possible for scientists to disagree about the cause of dinosaur extinction. Responding to how scientists know that dinosaurs existed and what they looked like, 80% of students mentioned a specific type of evidence, either “bones” or “fossils” Nearly 10% just said “evidence,” and another 10% left blank responses. None of these responses was more than a word or two, and included no discussion of how “fossils” or “evidence” were used to support claims about dinosaurs. Responding to the question of why scientists collect evidence, students gave very general responses familiar from the literature in this area. One response was of the general “to find an answer” type, given by about 40% of students. Another response was of the type “to test an idea,” also given by about 40% of students. As seen by other researchers in this area (reviewed by Sandoval, 2005), such responses are quite typical for students of this age. Just over 10% of the students did not respond to this question.
Discrepancies across Contexts In looking across these data sources, what can we say about students’ epistemological beliefs about warranting scientific claims? A majority of students said that empirical evidence was how they knew (or did not know) a claim, very few of them
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actually provided such evidence in their own work, while an overwhelming majority of them appealed to specific forms of evidence as the reason that scientists know things. Looking more closely, there are a number of discrepancies, or at least gaps, in students’ talk across their own and scientists’ contexts, and in comparison to their own work. First, there is the apparent discrepancy between students’ expressed opinion that their certainty about their own claims comes largely from empirical evidence, but they were unlikely to explicitly use those data in their written explanations. We think, however, that this is not a discrepancy, or an inconsistency, between expressed belief and practice, as much as an indication of the difficulty of the practice of writing arguments. Those students with a preference for empirical warrants were significantly more likely to provide such warrants in their written work. This suggests that the preference for empirical warrants is productive for generating data-based arguments, but is not in itself sufficient to enable students to marshal appropriate warrants for claims. As we mentioned before, one issue may be that our analyses of claims and warrants occurred at a finer scale than students’ own analysis during their interviews. Regardless of that, preferring evidence for your claims does not necessarily help you to find that evidence or make sense of it. Rather, it simply suggests that you are likely to mention it in your argument. A related issue that we have not addressed is that of audience. In this intervention, the explicit audience for students’ written arguments is their teacher, and includes a few other students who reviewed their work. Ultimately, even these reviews are for the teacher. Consequently, there is not much motivation to provide explicit evidence beyond the stated demand to do so as part of the task. There is no rhetorical demand for producing evidence, as it really plays no role in persuading someone of the viability of your own explanation. That is, it is quite reasonable for these students to presume that their teacher knows “the answer” to this question, and their responsibility as students is to produce that answer. While providing evidence was an explicit task demand, students may have seen it as secondary to coming to the correct conclusion. With respect to how students talked about the evidence for their own claims compared to how they talked about scientists’ evidence for claims, we see that in both contexts students understand that scientists want “evidence,” and have some notions of what kind of evidence is appropriate. It appears to us that differences in knowledge about exactly that issue—what sorts of evidence are appropriate for making what sorts of claims—explains the differences in students’ responses to POSE and to our interview questions. We really cannot presume that students understand anything about the scientific study of dinosaurs other than the common knowledge that scientists use fossil evidence to make claims about them. Moreover, we cannot accurately infer that students lack an understanding of the epistemic role of evidence, fossils in this case, in making claims about dinosaurs simply because their only response is “fossils.” This is because the survey itself is ambiguous about its own rhetorical demands, an issue we return to below. Students are better able to talk about the specific evidence they have for their own claims because they are
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much more familiar with both the data and the claims. Thus, it may not be an epistemological difference but a domain difference. This remains an open question.
Dilemmas of Studying Epistemology Our theory of practical epistemology (Sandoval, 2005) asserts that students’ epistemological beliefs are developed through their own epistemic practices of making and evaluating knowledge claims. This view leads to the prediction that students may have different epistemological beliefs guiding their own practices of knowledge making than the ones accessed through interrogations of their opinions about scientific practice. Our findings here provide qualified support for the prediction, and thus for the theory itself. Far more students cited specific empirical evidence as the warrant for scientific claims about dinosaurs than cited empirical evidence as the reason that they knew something. Conversely, none of the student responses to how scientists know something mentioned authority, or a general causal explanation, or simply asserted the scientific claim as a fact. While a majority of students could be seen to prefer empirical warrants for themselves and for scientists, a significant minority of students appealed to other sources of warrant in their own work. This supports the common sense idea that students do not see their work in their science classes as necessarily related to what scientists do. If so, it is both an accurate conclusion, since science classes in fact rarely do resemble legitimate scientific work, and an inevitable one, as how in the world would most students get any idea what scientists actually do? We realize that these findings provide only modest support for the theory of practical epistemologies, and raise many more questions than they answer. For us, these questions break down into questions of research methodology and instructional strategy. We focus here on the methodological issues (see Erduran, this book), as they are most pertinent to the aims of this book to outline future directions for research.
How Can We Study Epistemology? Science educators have been studying children’s ideas about science for about sixty years, and yet there is still limited understanding of how those ideas develop over time and through instruction. We know that most preadolescent students make no distinction between data and claims, and that most adolescents come to see the relation as simplistic—data show claims definitively right and wrong (see Sandoval, 2005). The issues with asking students’ their views on epistemology with written survey instruments, whether they include closed or open-ended questions, are well documented (Kelly et al., 1998; Lederman et al., 1998). Interviews are similarly troublesome (Sandoval & Morrison, 2003). Such questioning seems inherently
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limited because of the obvious disadvantage students are at: we want to know how they understand what “real” scientists do even though we know that they have had no opportunities to see such a thing. The alternative to asking students about what scientists do is to study what they themselves do when they learn science. Lederman et al. (1998) made this argument on methodological grounds, proposing that formal assessments would always underestimate what students know or believe. Kelly et al. (1998) made the argument both on methodological and theoretical grounds, marrying a sociocultural view of learning with a sociological view of science inspired by Latour and others to argue that a practice-oriented view of science requires analyzing students’ practices of sense-making in science and comparing them to scientific practices. The problem with a practice-only tack to studying epistemology is that looking at what students do is insufficient to explain why they do it. The approach we have described here is motivated directly by this problem: the patterns of performance in students’ written arguments do not in themselves illuminate students’ motives, including the goals they are pursuing and their ideas about how to satisfy those goals. What we have reported here noticeably lacks any talk of students’ goals. We actually did ask students about their goals and found that those goals are, unsurprisingly, school oriented, a result consistent with the work reported by JiménezAleixandre et al. (2000). Thus, our questions about certainty are instead an attempt to understand their views on how these goals are met. We find in this project, however, that we run into the same dilemma that we and others have had with more formal assessments of epistemology. The problem is that students are not very articulate about how particular pieces of data support specific claims. Sandoval (2005) argued that studies of practice should include analyses of the artifacts that students’ produce during science learning, and the discourse they engage in during the development of those artifacts. The findings we have reported here follow one of those recommendations directly—to compare properties of the artifacts that students create—in this case written arguments—and students’ perceptions about how to evaluate their own artifacts. Our conclusions solidify a finding from prior research—that a majority of students prefer empirical evidence as the best warrant for a scientific claim. At the same time, we found out that a large minority of students appeal to other sources, including a notion of authority that lacks an explicit locus of that authority (i.e., the teacher is the authority because she is the teacher, not because she presents a persuasive argument herself). The other warrants offered were vague appeals to causality, and a “factual” restatement of claims that reflects what has typically been considered the conflation of claims and evidence (e.g., Kuhn, 1993a). We remain unsatisfied with these findings, however, as taking us only one step further to understanding the explicit epistemological commitments that students have. Our interview protocol, for example, failed to uncover students’ explanations for why particular pieces of evidence made good warrants. One obvious next step is to develop probes that can encourage students to go beyond stating the sources of their belief (e.g., about certain or uncertain claims) to include their ideas about why those sources provide a desirable level of justification.
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On the other hand, efforts to study epistemology through classroom discourse have to go further than they have to create instructional contexts in which epistemological commitments are made explicit. Our view of current research on argumentation is that these efforts, including our own, aim to put students in situations where they must make explicit epistemic decisions. That is, they have to choose the kinds of data to collect, or choose among possible interpretations of data, or choose between competing claims. All of these kinds of decisions are important decisions for students to have to make. They are central to any thorough understanding of scientific practice, and are implicated in improved student learning of scientific ideas. Still, as our study and others (reviewed by Sandoval, 2005) have shown, the need to make epistemic decisions is not accompanied by a need to make explicit the epistemological justifications that underlie those decisions. Interventions that engage students in epistemic practices, such as constructing and evaluating arguments, should also include more explicit epistemological discourse. Such a discourse would comprise the practice that is most of value studying for students’ epistemological beliefs. We remain convinced that in order to develop a more useable theory of epistemological development requires research on the epistemological ideas that students actually use while they learn and reflect on their learning—what we call practical epistemologies. Such an agenda clearly must focus on studying the learning practices that are likely to engage students’ underlying epistemological beliefs, as fragmented and tacit as they may be. Argumentation is one such practice. An important direction for research on argumentation to move in is to link students’ practices of argumentation with their criteria for arguments and their reasons for arguing in science class. An agenda that can span practice and ideas about practice will lead to the development of better theory, which will in turn lead to better science education. Acknowledgments The study reported in this chapter is from the doctoral dissertation of the second author, under supervision of the first author, and was supported by a predissertation fellowship from NIMH. This work has also been supported by NSF award ESI-0352572 and through the Center for Embedded Networked Sensing (CENS), NSF CCR-0120778. The views and opinions expressed here are our own and do not necessarily reflect the views of these agencies. We are grateful to Melissa Cook, Deborah Fields, Suna Ryu, and other members of our research apprenticeship group for their helpful discussions of earlier drafts of this paper. We also thank Fouad Abd-el-Khalick for providing POSE.
References Abd-El-Khalick, F. (2002). The development of conceptions of the nature of scientific knowledge and knowing in the middle and high school years: A cross-sectional study, Paper presented at the annual meeting of the National Association for Research in Science Teaching. New Orleans, LA. Bell, P., & Linn, M. C. (2000). Scientific arguments as learning artifacts: Designing for learning from the web with KIE. International Journal of Science Education, 22(8), 797–817. Bell, P., & Linn, M. C. (2002). Beliefs about science: How does science instruction contribute? In B. K. Hofer & P. R. Pintrich (Eds.), Personal epistemology: The psychology of beliefs about knowledge and knowing (pp. 321–346). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
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Driver, R., Newton, P., & Osborne, J. (2000). Establishing the norms of scientific argumentation in classrooms. Science Education, 84, 287–312. Duschl, R. A., & Osborne, J. (2002). Supporting and promoting argumentation discourse in science education. Studies in Science Education, 38, 39–72. Erduran, S., Simon, S., & Osborne, J. (2004). TAPping into argumentation: Developments in the application of Toulmin’s argument pattern for studying science discourse. Science Education, 88, 915–933. Griffis, K., & Wise, J. (2005). Sensing the environment. Los Angeles, CA: Center for Embedded Networked Sensing, University of California. Hammer, D., & Elby, A. (2002). On the form of a personal epistemology. In B. K. Hofer & P. R. Pintrich (Eds.), Personal epistemology: The psychology of beliefs about knowledge and knowing (pp. 169–190). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. Jiménez-Aleixandre, M. P., Bugallo Rodríguez, A., & Duschl, R. A. (2000). “Doing the lesson” or “doing science”: Argument in high school genetics. Science Education, 84, 757–792. Kelly, G. J., Chen, C., & Crawford, T. (1998). Methodological considerations for studying science-in-the-making in educational settings. Research in Science Education, 28(1), 23–49. Kelly, G. J., Druker, S., & Chen, C. (1998). Students’ reasoning about electricity: Combining performance assessments with argumentation analysis. International Journal of Science Education, 20(7), 849–871. Kelly, G. J., & Duschl, R. A. (2002). Toward a research agenda for epistemological studies in science education, Paper presented at the annual meeting of NARST 2002. New Orleans, LA. Kelly, G. J., & Takao, A. (2002). Epistemic levels in argument: An analysis of university oceanography students’ use of evidence in writing. Science Education, 86, 314–342. Kitcher, P. (1991). Persuasion. In M. Pera & W. R. Shea (Eds.), Persuading science: The art of scientific rhetoric (pp. 3–27). Canton, MA: Science History Publications. Kuhn, D. (1993a). Connecting scientific and informal reasoning. Merrill-Palmer Quarterly, 39(1), 74–103. Kuhn, D. (1993b). Science as argument: Implications for teaching and learning scientific thinking. Science Education, 77(3), 319–337. Latour, B. (1987). Science in action. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Lederman, N. G., Abd-El-Khalick, F., Bell, R. L., & Schwartz, R. S. (2002). Views of nature of science questionnaire: Toward valid and meaningful assessment of learners’ conceptions of nature of science. Journal of Research in Science Teaching, 39(6), 497–521. Lederman, N. G., Wade, P. D., & Bell, R. L. (1998). Assessing the nature of science: What is the nature of our assessments? Science & Education, 7, 595–615. Lehrer, R., & Schauble, L. (2006). Scientific thinking and science literacy. In W. Damon, R. Lerner, K. A. Renninger, & I. E. Sigel (Eds.), Handbook of child psychology, 6th ed., Vol. 4: Child psychology in practice. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley. Resnick, L. B., Salmon, M., Zeitz, C. M., Wathen, S. H., & Holowchak, M. (1993). Reasoning in conversation. Cognition and Instruction, 11(3&4), 347–364. Sandoval, W. A. (2003). Conceptual and epistemic aspects of students’ scientific explanations. Journal of the Learning Sciences, 12(1), 5–51. Sandoval, W. A. (2005). Understanding students’ practical epistemologies and their influence on learning through inquiry. Science Education, 89, 634–656. Sandoval, W. A., & Millwood, K. A. (2005). The quality of students’ use of evidence in written scientific explanations. Cognition and Instruction, 23(1), 23–55. Sandoval, W. A., & Morrison, K. (2003). High school students’ ideas about theories and theory change after a biological inquiry unit. Journal of Research in Science Teaching, 40(4), 369–392. Takao, A., & Kelly, G. (2003). Assessment of evidence in university students’ scientific writing. Science & Education, 12(4), 341–363. Toulmin, S. (1958). The uses of argument. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Chapter 5
Designing Argumentation Learning Environments María Pilar Jiménez-Aleixandre
Teacher: Pupils: Teacher:
Look, now there is a person, Moncho (researcher) who is studying this classroom, right? Well: Could he do it if he took any of us out of the classroom? No, no What does he want? He wants to study the whole class… with children, walls, tables, what is performed…. The same happens with the pond… looking only to a newt, waiting for it to grow, to mate… it would be impossible to get an idea of the pond.
How can we support pupils’ engagement in argumentation? Should argumentation be explicitly taught or rather embedded in the learning tasks? Which design principles are related to the goal of promoting argumentation in the science classroom? Are they the same as design principles for constructivist learning environments? How can research explore these features of learning environments supporting argumentation? The above excerpt (Jiménez-Aleixandre et al., 2005) comes from a 4th-grade classroom (9–10-year-olds), during the process of jointly planning a field trip by teacher and pupils, including decisions about topics to be studied and methods to study them. The teacher uses an analogy between ecology and classroom studies that is the reverse of another analogy found in educational papers (see for instance Doyle, 1977) that propose viewing the classroom as a complex system of relationships and interactions similar to the relationships in ecosystems. Here the presence of the researcher, Ramón López, in the classroom is used to exemplify both the need for an approach to the pond as a whole and of doing it in the field. Implicit in the teacher analogy between the classroom and the pond is the goal of promoting pupils’ reflection about their own learning processes and about the ways of constructing knowledge concerning the pond. The use of this analogy can be seen as connected to the third, fourth and fifth questions formulated in the first paragraph, the last concerning research about argumentation learning environments, a research tightly interwoven with the design principles aimed at promoting argumentation, the subject of the third and fourth questions. These design principles intend, among other goals, that pupils reflect about their own learning. The relationships among designing environments to promote argumentation and investigating them can be connected to the impact on some science educators, like myself, initiating
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research about argumentation at the beginning of the 1990s, of Brown’s (1992) notion of design experiments, of studying learning “in the blooming, buzzing confusion” of classrooms. It is interesting to note that in this same year of 1992, during a postdoctoral study with Peter Hewson at the University of Wisconsin, I had been inside the 4th-grade class taught by Sister Gertrude Hennessey, where I witnessed a kind of design experiment: how children were encouraged to think aloud about physics problems and their own learning, and were even able to use the conceptual change language to talk about the intellectual status of their own ideas (4th-Grade Students, 1992; Hennessey, 1991). This is an indication that the methods used to study conceptual change (at least by some of the authors of this notion), and the learning goals pursued are part of a continuum with the classroom studies exploring argumentation and other epistemic practices. It has to be acknowledged that, twenty-five years ago, Posner et al., (1982) proposed that the students were the ones who had to decide whether the conditions for conceptual change—that is the epistemic status or, in their own terms, the intellectual status, of their own ideas; whether they were or not intelligible, plausible, fruitful or unsatisfactory—were met. Although it may be said that the idea of conceptual change has been, in Toulmin’s terms, ecologically successful, some of its proposals have been overlooked or distorted, for instance, as Hewson and Thorley (1989) pointed out, it is a distortion to consider that these conditions are met because the teacher judges it to be so from responses about scientific content. Pupils’ reflection about their ideas and their learning is a relevant component of environments designed to promote epistemic practices, as argumentation. Hewson (1985) also drew attention toward the role of the students’ epistemological commitments, or evaluative standards, in learning science, for if students are not committed to consistency, generalizability or the relevance of explanatory power, they would not feel the need for a change of status in their ideas. It can be noted that students’ first commitment may be to criticize each other’s inconsistencies or irrelevant remarks. Epistemological commitments are part of the development of epistemological understanding, crucial for argumentation (see Garcia-Mila & Andersen, this book). This chapter discusses the features of learning environments that promote argumentation in science classrooms through a review of reported research. As it has been noted (Kuhn, 1992), although the development of argumentation skills is a desirable goal, most school environments do not favor it. In the first section theoretical perspectives framing research about learning in real-life contexts are outlined. In the second section, design principles related to the goal of promoting argumentation are discussed. Then the attention is turned to two types of contexts from which this chapter draws: in the third section to classrooms where argumentation has been explicitly taught, and in the fourth to classrooms where it has not been taught, but is embedded in the learning tasks and classroom climate. The chapter ends outlining some educational implications.
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Social Constructivism as a Rationale for Classroom-Based Research on Argumentation Learning argumentation and other epistemic practices makes part of the goals of constructivist science classrooms, and is grounded on social constructivist views of learning. Ann Brown (1992) suggested that one of the greatest challenges for educational research in the 1990s was the design, implementation and evaluation of teaching sequences and set, as a high-level goal, building communities of learners in the classroom (Brown & Campione, 1990), in which students take charge of their own learning. She called these classroom studies aimed to engineer learning innovations “design experiments”. For Brown this was a way to reconcile the tensions between two goals, contributing to a theory of learning and to practice. Such approach emphasizes the connections among the curriculum designed, taught and learned, among educational research and educational innovation and contrasts with a long tradition of psychological research, and in general educational research, studying cognitive processes or educational questions in conditions as controlled as possible. As Salomon (1993) noted, the study of complex phenomena under tightly controlled conditions assumes that the phenomenon is the same in these conditions and in real-life circumstances, treating cognition as possessed and residing in the heads of individuals, while the examination of people in real-life problem-solving situations suggests that they “appear to think in conjunction or partnership with others and with the help of culturally provided tools and implements” (Salomon, 1993, p. xiii; italics in the original). For Brown (1992) classroom life is synergistic and it is difficult to study any one aspect independently from the whole system. This does not mean that laboratory studies have little value, but rather than laboratory and classroom-based studies have different objectives and complement each other. Brown brilliantly deconstructed one of the criticisms challenging the validity of intervention studies, the Hawthorne effect, or the fact that any intervention may have a positive effect merely because of the attention of the researchers to the participants. Revising the original study, Brown found that one of the conditions for improvements to occur was that workers perceived that they were in control of the conditions of their work, arguing that this perception of control, or real control, was what she intended in the classroom, with pupils taking charge of their own learning, an issue that will be traced in the next section. The relevance accorded to control by the students of their own learning and thinking is consistent with cognitive psychology approaches (see Garcia-Mila & Andersen, this book) that, on the one hand, see evaluative thinking as the higher category in epistemological understanding, the level in which claims (products of knowing) can be evaluated according to whether they are more or less supported by evidence (Kuhn, 2005); and on the other, conceive advanced forms of thinking as the capacity to evaluate thinking “with respect to how well it serves the purposes of the thinker” (Moshman, 1998, p. 953). For Moshman this advanced form of thinking is reasoning, defined as the deliberate application of epistemic constraints to one’s own thinking.
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Classrooms conceived as communities of learners or intentional learning environments (both names are used by Brown and colleagues) draw from the situated cognition approach. Brown et al. (1993) explicitly link their proposal to Bourdieu’s (1972) notion of communities of practice and to Lave and Wenger (1991) perspective of learning as increasing participation in communities of practice, situated in a certain activity, context and culture. Lave and Wenger’s approach highlights, rather than the cognitive processes involved, the kind of social engagements that provide the proper context for learning to take place. This emphasis on social interaction as an essential component of both cognitive development and learning is rooted in the work of the Russian cultural-historical theorists, Vygotsty, Luria and Leont’ev. Many social processes related to psychological functions are communicative, and Wertsch (1991), weaving together Vygotsky’s and Bakhtin’s notions, points out that both authors coincide in the idea that communicative human practices give origin to the psychological functions of individuals. To Vygotsky (1978) and Luria we owe also the idea of mediation, conceiving human action as mediated by tools and signs: higher mental processes have its origin in activities socially mediated. The distributed cognitions approach draws from this school of thought and expands some of its notions, as the activity systems, including their collective dimension (Cole & Engeström, 1993) alongside with tools (both physical and symbolic), subject and object. The role of social interaction in the development of higher thinking skills and the collective dimension of activity systems are relevant both for the design of learning environments to support argumentation and for the research about them, for argumentation is viewed as a social process or activity. Distributed intelligence is seen by Pea (1993) rather as a heuristic framework for raising and addressing theoretical and empirical questions about mind, culture, symbol systems and human thought, that a theory. For Pea, the consideration of knowledge as socially constructed has to be extended to the interaction among thinking and artefacts, so intelligence may also be distributed for use in designed artefacts as physical tools, representations or computers. A development of Vygotsky and Bakhtin notions of words as tools for thinking and communication as a social phenomenon, into an instrument for research and classroom planning, is Mortimer and Scott’s (2003) work about communicative approaches in the classroom, with the aim of exploring the links between classroom talk, meaning construction and learning. Mortimer and Scott see meaning making and understanding as dialogic processes. The meaning of dialogic, based on Bakhtin, is that attention is paid to more than one point of view, to more than one “voice”: the teacher explanation can be dialogic if she or he refers to students’ ideas, irrespective of being uttered by only one person. The personal process of meaning making is also viewed as a dialogue, for instance between old and new ideas or voices, played in the individual’s mind. These authors borrow from Sutton (1992) the notion of the development of the scientific story as a persuasive process leading to the constitution of a thinking community. Mortimer and Scott’s analytical frame to plan and study teaching sequences proposes to think about science teaching and learning in terms of the social language of school science, of the Bakhtinian idea of speech genre (Bakhtin, 1986), or distinctive patterns of language used in specific contexts, distinguishing between the multifarious genres of everyday language and
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the multifarious speech genres of school science, characterized by rhetorical devices such as asking questions or repeating statements. The students must not only recognize them, but also learn how to participate using them. These notions are relevant for studying and supporting argumentation, which, understood as knowledge evaluation, involves dialogic activity and can also be viewed as persuasion; on the other hand, if argumentation is part of the speech genres of science, it should be part of the speech genres of school science. It may be said that, since the beginning of the 1990s, a substantial part of science education research has shifted from surveys towards the study of classroom discourse, of students’ and teacher’s talk, of the processes—sometimes slow and painful—of negotiation, reasoning, meaning making. The role of language and communication (either spoken or written) in the classroom, and in the construction of scientific knowledge, has been recognized. As discussed in Jiménez-Aleixandre and Erduran (this book) teaching organized as cognitive apprenticeship requires making cognitive processes public, something that could be supported by argumentative practices, where students are required to publicly justify their knowledge claims. From this outline of some approaches framing research about argumentation, I will now turn to the design principles informing its introduction in the science classroom.
Design Principles for Appropriating the Practice of Argumentation Design principles are guidelines expressing the goals for the learning outcomes, the classroom activities and the teaching strategies. It is important to clarify how are the design principles aimed at supporting argumentation related to the design principles and goals for constructivist learning environments. Learning the practice of argumentation in science classrooms cannot be viewed as an objective disconnected from learning science, on the contrary, it makes part of the goals of constructivist science classrooms, where the roles of students are to be knowledge producers (Jiménez-Aleixandre & Pereiro, 2002), teachers, mentors (Brown et al., 1993); the roles of teachers are to scaffold their progressive assumption of responsibility (Reigosa & Jiménez-Aleixandre, 2007), to model and guide inquiry; and the criteria for assessment are publicly shared (Duschl, this book). So, if learning environments designed to support argumentation can be described as a type of constructivist learning environments, the question is which features in them are specific for argumentation purposes. In this chapter it is claimed that these features are related to the development of epistemic practices (Sandoval & Reiser, 2004), and in particular to the evaluation of knowledge. In this section the underlying design principles of classrooms seeking to promote argumentation, in connection with constructivist classrooms, are outlined around six main issues: role of students, role of teacher, curriculum, assessment, metacognition and communication approach, all revolving around knowledge evaluation. The issues, illustrated with instances from argumentation studies, are not independent, but forming part of a systemic whole (Brown, 1992). These six
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Fig. 5.1 The argumentation snowflake. Summary of design principles
design principles are represented in Fig. 5.1 in the argumentation “snowflake”. Why a snowflake? Not only because it possesses hexagonal symmetry, but also because it is beautiful, as elegant arguments should be, and grows around a first particle of ice at its center, here occupied by knowledge evaluation.
Active Producers of Justified Knowledge Claims: The Role of Students Constructivist classrooms are centered on the students who, in them, have to develop control of their own learning, acting as knowledge producers rather than as consumers of knowledge produced by others. Being in control is central for
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promoting argumentation and it is connected to an environment that requires from the students the performance of epistemic practices, defined by Kelly (2005) as proposing, justifying and evaluating (we may add criticizing) knowledge claims. According to Resnick (1989) the use of strategies to construct new knowledge depends on whether or not people view themselves as being in charge of their learning. This can be framed in the notion of intentional learning (Bereiter & Scardamalia, 1989), learning actively desired and controlled by the learner. Bereiter and Scardamalia suggest that “the skills a student will acquire in an instructional interaction are those required by the student’s role in the joint cognitive process” (op cit p. 383). In the case of argumentation, it would mean that for the students to develop argumentative competencies, like justifying a claim or evaluating claims made by others, these competencies should be required for their role in the classroom. The implication would be that learning environments designed to promote argumentation should engage students in knowledge evaluation practices. In argumentative contexts students are required, among others, to perform several or all of the following: To generate products or answers, in the form of proposals, claims, solutions, experimental designs, or artifacts, for questions and problems (e.g., Baker, 2002; Ergazaki & Zogza, 2005; Jiménez-Aleixandre & Pereiro, 2002; Kelly et al., 1998; Kolstø & Mestad, 2005). To choose among two or more competing explanations or theories (e.g., Kenyon et al., 2006; Osborne et al., 2004a) about a phenomenon; or among several alternatives or courses of action (e.g., Kortland, 1996; Patronis et al., 1999; Ratcliffe, 1996; Schweizer & Kelly, 2005; Zohar & Nemet, 2002), alternatives that could have been generated by themselves. To back their claims or choices with evidence (e.g., Osborne et al., 2004a; Sandoval & Reiser, 2004), which may adopt various forms: to select data, empirical or hypothetical, appropriate for supporting their claims (e.g., JiménezAleixandre et al., 1999; Mortimer & Scott, 2003); to examine experimental evidence in the light of previous prediction (e.g., Mason, 1996); to draw on their knowledge in order to generate justifications and to articulate reasons for supporting a claim (e.g., Kelly & Takao, 2002; Sandoval & Millwood, this book). To develop knowledge evaluation competencies, to use criteria to distinguish good from poor arguments (e.g., Jiménez-Aleixandre et al., 2004; Osborne et al., 2004a; Zohar & Nemet, 2002); to evaluate the significance of pieces of evidence (e.g., Hogan & Maglienti, 2001; Kenyon et al., 2006); to share standards for argued points of view (Kortland, 1996, 2001). To talk science and write science: to discuss the design of their pathways to solve experimental problems (e.g., Jiménez-Aleixandre & Reigosa, 2006; Kelly et al., 1998); to formulate hypotheses and design experiments to test them (Ergazaki & Zogza, 2005; Kolstø & Mestad, 2005); to agree upon group reports (e.g., Patronis et al., 1999); to produce research papers (see Kelly et al., this book). To attempt to persuade others or to reach an agreement with their peers, for instance about socio-scientific issues as the contribution of humans to global warming (Schweizer & Kelly, 2005), the production of transgenic fishes (Simonneaux,
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this book), or the management of wolfs (Mork, 2005), or about ecological relationships (Kuhn & Reiser, 2007), or about their own behavior towards wildlife in a field trip (Jiménez-Aleixandre et al., 2005). These roles of students are related: they generate products, choose among them, back their choices with evidence, use criteria to evaluate the significance of the evidence and report the process. As a summary, in argumentative contexts, students are active producers of justified knowledge claims and efficient critics of others’ claims.
Scaffolding the Development of Epistemological Understanding: the Role of Teachers Constructivist teaching and learning place the students at the center of instruction, but this does not mean that in a classroom conceived as a community of learners the teacher has the same role as the students (Brown et al., 1993), on the contrary, the teacher directs research and steers the learning goals. He or she has authority (Mortimer & Scott, 2003), which does not mean an authoritarian stance, for these perspectives are explicitly anti-authoritarian, but being responsible for justifying why inadequate options are inadequate. Learning is viewed as a process of social participation (Lave & Wenger, 1991), which requires modeling and coaching. In Vygotsky’s terms the teacher is the more able peer, providing scaffold for the students’ performances and promoting their assumption of responsibility (Reigosa & Jiménez-Aleixandre, 2007). Tasks and responsibilities are distributed among the participants in the community (Cole & Engeström, 1993). In argumentative environments the teachers take on roles as, for instance, the following: To model and guide inquiry for, as discussed below about curriculum, inquiry and argumentation goals are complementary, and inquiry contexts provide appropriate environments for argumentation to take place. For Brown et al. (1993) the teacher models scientific inquiry so “Children witness teachers learning, discovering, doing research, reading, writing, and using computers as tools for learning, rather than lecturing, managing, assigning work, and controlling the classroom exclusively” (Brown et al. 1993, p. 207). To encourage students to provide evidence to justify a position (e.g., Simon et al., 2006); to ask open questions aimed at eliciting justifications (e.g., JiménezAleixandre et al., 2005; Simon et al. 2006), such as “Why do you think that?” “How do we know it?”; to challenge ideas pointing out its limitations or inconsistencies (e.g., Mason, 1996; Mork, 2005). To develop and provide criteria for the construction and evaluation of arguments and argument components, either as prompts (Osborne et al., 2004a) or as a written rubric (Sandoval & Reiser, 2004). Some instances of criteria are: for arguments, good arguments include true, reliable and multiple justifications, refer to alternative arguments and rebut them (Zohar & Nemet, 2002); for evidence, appropriate evidence is specific and came from data not from opinion (Kenyon et al., 2006).
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To translate epistemic goals related to argumentation into their oral contributions. Some instances of argumentation processes reflected in teacher utterances coded by Simon et al. (2006) are: talking and listening; knowing meaning of argument; constructing arguments; evaluating arguments or counterarguing and debating. To encourage students’ reflection about their positions, about changes in positions as a consequence of the teaching sequence or the debates, and about the reasons underlying that change (e.g., Jiménez-Aleixandre & Pereiro, 2005; Simon et al., 2006). These roles are related: teachers model inquiry and, as part of it, encourage the use of evidence and students’ reflection, and provide criteria for evidence. In summary, in classrooms promoting argumentation teachers have to scaffold the development of epistemological understanding. Zohar (this book) discusses how teachers can develop the capabilities related to teaching argumentation.
Inquiry and Argumentation Instruction as Cognitive Apprenticeship: The Curriculum Kuhn (2005) places inquiry and argumentation at the center of a thinking curriculum. An inquiry perspective has consequences not only for the curriculum, but also for the roles of students and teachers. Sandoval and Reiser (2004) view inquiry instruction as a cognitive apprenticeship into scientific practice, pointing out that inquiry-based efforts “must emphasize that the processes scientists value for generating and validating knowledge emerge from epistemological commitments to what counts as scientific knowledge” (Sandoval & Reiser, p. 345). Some of the features of curriculum in argumentative contexts are discussed below. The curriculum is organized around authentic activities (Brown et al., 1989), as in projects SEPIA (see Duschl, this book), or RODA (Jiménez-Aleixandre & Pereiro, 2002), dilemmas drawn from real life (Zohar & Nemet, 2002), because the students’ performances in them would create an appropriate environment for argumentation, which in standard classrooms is not likely to occur. Authentic activities are these that constitute problems, not just rhetorical questions, for instance an unexpected obstacle encountered in a process of genetic engineering (Ergazaki & Zogza, 2005); that are relevant, or perceived as relevant for the lives of the students, as the controversial issue of wolfs in Norway (Mork, 2005) or cloning (Sadler & Zeidler, 2005); that require to be solved using inquiry procedures (Kolstø & Mestad, 2005; Kuhn & Reiser, 2007). Brown et al. (1993) discuss what should authentic and inauthentic mean in school science classrooms, pointing out that, to suggest, as Brown et al. (1989) do, enculturation of students in the cultures of science (mathematics, etc.) practitioners, is romantic, as teachers are not practitioners themselves. A. Brown et al. propose instead that schools should be communities where students learn to learn, teachers model intentional learning, and
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graduates of such communities would be people who have learned how to learn in many domains, who know how to go about gaining new knowledge. An interesting distinction is made by Sandoval and Reiser (2004), who propose a focus on engaging students in the reasoning and discursive practices of scientists, which does not necessarily mean the exact activities of professional scientists. Curriculum structured as problem solving provides an environment for students to productively engage in investigations (e.g., Eichinger et al., 1991; Kelly et al., 1998) and apply their knowledge to solve the problem. Tasks are designed in order to produce a diversity of outcomes, to involve considering a plurality of explanations. Diversity is grounded in a view of knowledge as socially constructed through challenges brought about by differences in perspective (Pea, 1993). This diversity supports the evaluation of alternatives and students’ engagement in argumentation, for instance in projects SEPIA (Duschl, this book), RODA (JiménezAleixandre & Pereiro, 2002, 2005) or IDEAS (Osborne et al., 2004). Proposals, solutions or alternatives generated have, as a consequence of design, different epistemic statuses and these can undergo modifications along the process. Baker (2002) proposes five conditions for argumentative interactions to take place: a diversity of proposals (solutions, methods to obtain them); proposals or solutions distributed across interlocutors; proposals having, from the point of view of participants, different epistemic statuses, as for instance more or less plausible, true, believable, acceptable; the requirement, inherent to the instructional context, to choose between them; and finally, in order to resolve the problem of choice, “the interlocutors establish links between them and other proposals, called arguments and counterarguments, the creation of which potentially modify the epistemic statuses of the initial proposals” (Baker, 2002, pp. 306–307). Baker further proposes a second way in which the epistemic statuses of proposals can be modified, to transform their meaning using discursive operations, meaning negotiations. Depth is preferred over breadth, recurrence over fragmentation (Brown, 1992; Brown et al., 1993). For instance in project SEPIA conceptual goals are kept to a limited number so as to facilitate the adoption of epistemic criteria to assess knowledge claims (Duschl, this book). Resources are designed to support the development of scientific epistemic practices. A particular case is the use of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) to support argumentation. Pea (1993) claims that the use of ICT has to be incorporated to the design principles of innovative classrooms, on the grounds that tools serve as artefacts of distributed intelligence, with affordances such as science visualization, or augmenting intelligence through external representational systems. Sandoval and Reiser (2004) discuss the ways in which Explanation Constructor, a software tool, supported students’ inquiry and provided epistemic forms for students’ expression of their thinking and for communicating evaluation criteria. For instance, students had to select specific pieces of data as evidence and link them to specific causal claims, so the distinction between claim and evidence is made both in the representations used and in the students’ manipulation of those representations. A detailed discussion of the role of information technology in supporting argumentation is found in Clark et al. (this book).
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In summary, the curriculum in argumentative contexts is structured as solving authentic problems, which generate a diversity of outcomes with different epistemic statuses, and uses resources that support epistemic practices. The goal is to engage students in inquiry, in the discursive practices of scientists.
Sharing of Criteria and of the Authority to Evaluate: Assessment For Brown et al. (1993) maintaining standards of accountability while at the same time keeping the social contract with students, who are encouraged to view themselves as co-equals participants in a community is a difficult tightrope to walk. These authors’ approach is to allow students to participate in the assessment process as much as possible. Two dimensions of evaluation have to be taken into account, the students’ participation in the assessment of the instruction process and the sharing of criteria to evaluate knowledge. Some features of assessment in argumentative contexts are: The participation of students in the assessment of the goals of the teaching sequences (e.g., López & Jiménez-Aleixandre, 2002) as they had participation in the decisions about the content to be studied, the methods of study and the norms related to it. López and Jiménez-Aleixandre characterize the teachers’ performance in their study in this respect as sharing with the pupils the authority to evaluate. Sharing of criteria for the assessment of students’ products and performances, which in the SEPIA project is carried through a discourse strategy labelled “assessment conversation” (Duschl, this book). Developing criteria for evaluating claims (see e.g., Jiménez & Pereiro, 2002; Kenyon et al., 2006; Kortland, 1996). Making cognitive processes public: Brown et al. (1993) discuss dynamic assessment methods grounded in the Vygotskian zone of proximal development, being one of its features the externalization of mental events via discussion formats. Making external processes that are carried out internally may support cognitive apprenticeship. In argumentative contexts students are required to make explicit the evidence for their claims (e.g., Mason, 1996). The use of portfolio as a part of the assessment (e.g., Duschl, this book; Jiménez-Aleixandre & Pereiro, 2002) facilitates the students’ reflection on their own learning, comparing their initial proposals, claims or justifications with their current ones. The use of multiple ways for students to display their competence as science learners, to demonstrate knowledge, beyond taking written examinations. As Crawford (2005) argues, what counts as knowing is an interactional accomplishment among participants and, as her case study shows, a teacher can construct a learning environment in which multiple discourse practices are valued as knowing science. Some instances of this communicative repertoire are: explaining visual representations, taking the role of teacher, solving problems, explaining phenomena or questioning data.
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As a summary, in argumentative contexts teachers and students share both the public criteria for assessment and the authority to evaluate through portfolio and different instances of a communicative repertoire.
Monitoring Thinking and Learning: Regulation, Reflection and Metacognition A central claim in this chapter is that a specific feature of argumentation learning environments is the evaluation of knowledge claims, and therefore that their goals should include the development of epistemological understanding to the level of evaluative thinking. Knowledge evaluation practices are intentional and require a high degree of reflection about thinking. The monitoring by students of their own thinking and learning processes can occur at different stages, from reflection to metacognition and epistemic cognition (Kitchener, 1983). Monitoring comprehension can be viewed as a basic competency for learning science. The process of noticing and fixing difficulties when reading science texts has been studied by Otero (2002; Otero & Campanario, 1990) who found that students have difficulties in detecting contradictions contained in a short paragraph. Some researchers distinguish two components in comprehension monitoring: evaluation, that is, noticing the comprehension problem, and regulation, or the process of repairing it. However, for Otero (2002) these two phases are not independent of each other. Although these studies are not related to argumentation, they point to the difficulties encountered in developing regulation processes in science education. Conceptual change is also related to regulation; in this case of the intellectual status of the learner’s ideas, and some studies have examined the difficulties of students when confronted with anomalous data that contradict their theories (Chinn & Brewer, 1993). Metacognition is thinking about thinking. According to Zohar (2004) it is used in two different senses: metacognitive knowledge, that is, what one knows about cognition, and metacognitive control processes, or the use of that knowledge to regulate cognition. Metacognition, strictu sensu, is documented only when students make explicit references to their thinking and knowing processes. Although sometimes students’ references to their ideas are characterized as metacognitive, here a distinction is drawn among reflection upon one’s learning and explicit awareness of the significance of thinking strategies. In argumentative environments these practices include for instance: Students’ reflections about the character of the knowledge that they have been asked to extend and apply in decision-making (Kortland, 2001); this reflection is built in the task. Students’ metaconceptual awareness of their ideas, for instance about their initial conceptions, the reasons for it and conceptual change (Mason, 1996); or about the differences among their positions at the beginning and the end of the teaching sequence and about the data influencing the change (Jiménez-Aleixandre & Pereiro, 2005; Mason, 1998).
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Students’ metacognitive reflections for instance about the argumentation standards (Zohar & Nemet, 2002); or about the advantages of learning by themselves in contrast with being told something (Jiménez-Aleixandre et al., 2005). Students’ epistemic reflections about the evaluation of scientific explanations, the causal coherence of their claims, their fit with available data (Sandoval & Reiser, 2004), in this study both tools and tasks create opportunities for this reflection. As a summary, in argumentative environments students are engaged in reflection about their knowledge and their thinking and learning processes.
Collaborating in a Dialogic and Interactive Setting: The Communicative Approach Talk and other modes of communication are a central dimension of science classrooms. Mortimer and Scott (2003) analytical framework for communicative approach locates classroom talk along two continua: interactive to noninteractive, depending on the participation of students; and dialogic to authoritative, depending on the attention paid to different points of view or voices (dialogic), or the absence of it (authoritative). These two dimensions can be found in all four combinations in science classrooms and, for Mortimer and Scott, in any teaching sequence there should be variation in communicative approach. Acknowledging this diversity, it seems that argumentation would be supported in contexts where interactive and dialogic approaches dominate over non-interactive or authoritative ones. Some features of these classrooms could be: Collaborative learning, grounded in approaches viewing knowledge as socially constructed and cognition as distributed. It has at least two dimensions: designing and organising forms of collaboration, as reciprocal teaching or the jigsaw method, and establishing a community of discourse in a collaborative atmosphere, where discussion, questioning, evaluating, criticism are the mode rather than the exception (e.g., Brown et al., 1993; Mason, 1996). Collaborative discourse allows participants to negotiate meanings, explanations and standards for evidence (e.g., Kelly et al., 1998; Sandoval & Reiser, 2004). Interactive contexts where argumentative interactions may take the form of attempts to convince, of negotiation of choices, or of cooperative explorations of a dialogical space of solutions (Baker, 2002). The discourse in a classroom which has as a goal promoting argumentation can be characterized as interactive and dialogic (Mork, 2005). Cooperative efforts resulting in the co-construction of arguments (e.g., JiménezAleixandre & Pereiro, 2005; Jiménez-Aleixandre et al., 2000; Mason, 1996) with inputs of several participants. Communicative approaches in argumentative contexts can be summarized as interactive and dialogical, establishing a community of discourse.
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These six issues are forming part of a whole, as represented in Fig. 5.1, their different dimensions combining in a synergistic way to support argumentation in science classrooms. The students take on these roles of knowledge producers because the curriculum (task, resources, etc.) requires them to do so. They are supported in them by the teachers’ performances and modeling. The collaborative and dialogic approach provides an adequate context for sharing evaluation criteria. Reflection about knowledge and about learning is built in the tasks. As a summary, argumentation is a skill that is learned through practice. Argumentative environments are a type of constructivist learning environments and share many characteristics with them, but they feature an emphasis on the evaluation of (scientific) knowledge claims.
Promoting Argumentation through Explicit Teaching The focus of the previous section is on the common features shared by a number of learning environments, as documented in argumentation studies. In other dimensions these contexts exhibit a considerable diversity. One is the target students, ranging from primary (e.g., Eichinger et al., 1991; López & Jiménez, 2002; Mason, 1996) to secondary, in a majority of studies, and university (e.g., Kelly & Takao, 2002; Sadler & Zeidler, 2005). Another difference is in the choice between fostering argumentation through explicit formal teaching or by designing an environment in which argumentation competencies are embedded in the classroom culture and learning tasks. It is worth noting that these two options are complementary, as classrooms where argumentation is taught are also environments where the design principles involve the development of argumentation skills. On the other hand there is a continuum of practices that may count as teaching argumentation, from the formal introduction of rubrics about argument components, structure, or quality, to requiring students to justify their claims, although some authors would describe the second as teaching and others as not teaching argumentation. And it has to be acknowledged that the focus of a number of studies is on reporting argumentation rather than on how to promote it. This section discusses some instances of explicit teaching of argumentation and the next, classroom environments fostering it mainly through design. One of the first studies exploring the effect of teaching argumentation in science classrooms was Kortland’s (1996, 2001) doctoral dissertation about secondary school students’ (aged 13–14) decision-making on waste issues. A first trial of the teaching sequence showed the limitations of the students’ arguments, and additional activities were designed for the second year of the study, with the purpose of “have students arrive at the formulation of the requirements an argued point of view should met” (Kortland, 2001, p. 95). The tasks required students to criticize several arguments about the choice of a milk container and, from these criticisms, to derive the requirements of a well-argued position. It proved to be extremely difficult, and the students were not able to produce the requirements. The comparison of the
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argumentations patterns before and after the intervention showed a limited effect on the quality of the student’s argumentation, although some improvement was found on the validity and clarity of the criteria used in order to make the choice. Kortland (1996) attributed this limited effect to the lack of attention paid to ensuring students’ reflection on their own arguments. With a stronger emphasis on reasoning patterns, Zohar and Nemet (2002) examined the outcomes of a unit integrating explicit teaching of argumentation with genetics content. Argumentation skills were addressed in a lesson focused on argument structure and on criteria for distinguishing between good and bad arguments, and in the context of each genetics dilemma. The 12-hours teaching sequence created intensive opportunities to exercise these skills (Zohar, 2004). Three qualitative categories were used for the assessment of argumentation skills: (a) the capacity to formulate an argument, defined as a conclusion supported by at least one relevant justification; (b) the number of justifications; (c) the structure of the argument, the branching of reasons (see Zohar, 2004, p. 67 for a detailed description). Zohar and Nemet (2002) reported the enhanced performances of the students in the experimental group, both in biological knowledge and in argumentation. The improvement in argumentation skills was extended to transfer to everyday dilemmas. The authors interpret the significant gains produced by only one lesson about argument structure as supporting Kuhn’s (1991) contention that argumentation skills (at least implicitly) are initially present, although not fully developed, and that the educational challenge is to reinforce them. Zohar and Nemet explain the changes, on the one hand as the effect of metacognitive thinking, defined as being conscious of generalizations, principles and standards of one’s reasoning processes; and on the other for the changes in what was valued in the culture of these science classes. A study with a focus on teaching argumentation was conducted by Osborne et al. (2004a) over two years, its first phase having as a goal to develop materials and strategies to support argumentation in the classroom, as well as teachers’ development with teaching it (Simon et al., 2006). In the second phase, teachers taught nine lessons involving argumentation, and the progression in students’ capabilities along the year was assessed, and contrasted with the capabilities in control groups. The teachers’ use of argumentation experienced significant development and the quality of students’ argumentation improved. The methodological developments for argumentation analysis are discussed in Erduran (this book). For Osborne et al. introducing argumentation requires a shift in the nature of classroom discourse, changes both in the epistemological and social structures of the classrooms. About the epistemological structure, they propose strategies that have at its core the requirement to consider plural accounts rather than singular explanations of phenomena. About the social structure, to foster student–student interactions and dialogic discourse, these authors have developed a set of frameworks that enable to generate argument-based lessons. Some instances are: ●
Experiment report: Students are given a record of another student’s experiment and conclusions, written in a way that could clearly be improved, and asked to produce ways to improve it and explain why.
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Competing theories: Students are introduced to a physical phenomenon and offered two competing explanations together with a range of pieces of evidence that may support one of the theories, both or neither. They are asked to evaluate each piece and use it to argue for one of the explanations.
A further outcome of this study with the goal of supporting teachers’ competence in teaching argumentation (Simon et al., 2006), is the IDEAS project for professional development, a programme which produced a set of video-based resources for teacher training (Osborne et al., 2004b). In a study examining the use of evidence in written arguments, Kelly and Takao (2002) analyzed scientific papers by university students. The oceanography course was also an intensive writing course, including instruction about the technical paper genre, for instance how scientists select a problem, how evidence is used to support a theory or model, or how observations are separated from interpretations. The specific challenges posed by written arguments and the outcomes of the study, in the wider context of a research programme, are discussed in Kelly et al. (this book). In a perspective linking argumentation to inquiry instruction viewed as cognitive apprenticeship into scientific practice, Sandoval and Reiser (2004) reported the use of a learning environment scaffolding epistemic aspects of inquiry and guiding students in the construction and evaluation of scientific explanations. This work has been extended, in one direction by Sandoval and Millwood (this book), with an exploration of students’ practical epistemologies and use of evidence. In a related direction, Reiser and colleagues (Kenyon et al., 2006; Kuhn & Reiser, 2007) enhanced the instructional framework to support students’ epistemological understanding and reasoning about evidence. Kenyon et al. aimed to provide students with tools—in the format of epistemological criteria—on which to base their evaluations of knowledge claims. Argumentation was fostered both by explicit instruction, rubrics and sample questions, and by being embedded in the design of activities (L. Kuhn, personal communication). The authors attempted to get the rubric produced by the 7th-grade students, but this proved too difficult, and finally the teacher gave them criteria for claim, evidence and reasoning—that were turned into a scoring rubric used by students to assess their quality. These difficulties of the students in producing criteria are consistent with Kortland (2001) results discussed above. As an instance, the criteria for evidence are: the evidence (a) is specific; (b) came from data, not opinion; (c) there is enough; and (d) supports the claim. In a study exploring the potential relationship between the practice of scientific argumentation and traditional classroom practices, Kuhn and Reiser (2007) compare classroom interactions in contexts that do and do not explicitly support argumentative discourse, concluding that although scaffolds such as teacher and written prompts can positively influence students’ argumentative products, these supports have less influence over the process of argumentative discourse, which is more heavily influenced by the existing classroom culture, such as the ways in which the teacher responds to student ideas.
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The efforts of different research teams in developing and implementing computerbased learning environments to promote argumentation are reviewed by Clark et al. (this book). From this review of representative studies on explicit teaching of argumentation, some patterns could be discerned. First, the need for extended time, either repeated argumentation sessions during a term (Osborne et al., 2004a), or activities in a long teaching sequence (Kelly & Takao, 2002; Kenyon et al. 2006; Kortland, 1996; Kuhn & Reiser, 2007; Zohar & Nemet, 2002): argumentation needs practice. Second, although the development of criteria by the students seems a desirable goal, it proves to be extremely difficult (Kenyon et al., 2006; Kortland, 2001): in this, as in other dimensions, the teacher’s scaffolding plays a crucial role. Third, in all the cases explicit teaching of argumentation was coupled with support through teacher’s strategies, task design and classroom climate; some authors argue that one strong influence (Zohar & Nemet, 2002) or even the strongest one shaping argumentative discourse (Kuhn & Reiser, 2007) was the classroom culture. Studies about argumentation promoted through particular classroom cultures are examined in the next section.
Promoting Argumentation through Classroom Culture and Intellectual Ecology In a number of argumentation studies the results show students engaged in argumentative reasoning and, in the absence of explicit teaching of argumentation, the question arises about what dimensions in the task, teacher strategies, classroom climate, or a combination of these, may promote their argumentation competencies. We (Jiménez-Aleixandre et al., 2005) have framed this question in Toulmin’s (1972) notion of intellectual ecology, defined by him as coexisting ideas and features of the social or physical situation that provide a range of opportunities for intellectual innovation. Some instances of argumentation promoted through a particular intellectual ecology and classroom culture are discussed below. A seminal classroom study about argumentation in science is Eichinger et al. (1991) with 6th-grade pupils, which combined the examination of argumentation analysis, scientific content and social norms. Working in small groups, students had to decide about which state (i.e., solid, liquid, gas) was better suited to transport water in a space ship. They had previously studied the relevant concepts, weight, volume, molecular structure of water in its three states, but all the pupils except Emily had great difficulties to apply them to solve a practical problem. The authors contend that, although the outcomes may seem an instance of social construction of knowledge, for the students, without the teacher’s intervention, progressed from random proposals to a relatively sophisticated argument supported in the justification about volume, the agreement was strongly influenced by social interactions. After the two leaders maintained opposed positions—one of them decided to support Emily, the student who advanced the appropriate justification.
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A longitudinal study of elementary pupils’ reasoning and knowledge construction from 4th to 5th grades in Italy, is reported by Mason (1996, 1998), with a focus on the role of oral and written discourse. Data were gathered in five classrooms where innovative learning contexts were designed as part of an environmental education project having as a goal conceptual change. Primary school pupils engaged in argumentation processes and epistemic operations, took responsibility for their knowledge claims, supported them with reasons and warrants, appealed to counterevidence, and reflected metacognitively (Mason, 1996). Some features of the classroom environment were: the pupils were encouraged to reflect about their own understanding in written reports, to compare and evaluate ideas about ecology; the teachers promoted argumentative reasoning and, through their interventions in the debates, favored the structuring of the cooperative thinking processes; the classroom discourse was dominated by true dialogue; the organization in small groups promoted a learning community characterized by collaboration and public sharing of ideas. The author concludes that in classroom discussions the students can practice reasoning skills and that “Deeply involved in taking charge of their own processes of knowledge construction, students enter a kind of cognitive apprenticeship to scientific reasoning and argumentation” (Mason, 1996, p. 431). Part of a research programme collecting ethnographic data during three academic years in a high school physics classroom, a study by Kelly et al. (1998) examined the use of evidence, the range of warrants and the conditions leading to warranted arguments while students completed electricity performance assessments in pairs in a laboratory. The students were not given opposing views nor told to argue, but rather the naturally occurring conversations were studied. The authors see conceptual ecology (this name, rather than “intellectual ecology”, has been circulating in the conceptual change literature) as constructed among the participants, including current knowledge, epistemological commitments, analogies and metaphors. In this course the students acquired data using computers, and designed, tested and presented scientific projects (e.g., technological devices, scientific papers or posters). Three dimensions of warrants emerged from the analysis: (a) strategies, for instance direct justification through a warrant, or subsequent justification, offering a second argument as warrant; (b) referents, empirical or hypothetical; and (c) types, declarative or comparative. About the conditions leading to warranted arguments, the more frequent were data, either anomalous or expected; claims by a partner, including challenges; and questions. Kelly and colleagues suggest that supposed common knowledge could make warranting unnecessary. They also found both instances of conclusions consistent with canonical science, but reached through faulty warrants, and of warrants consistent with science used in support of incorrect claims, suggesting the need for an analysis more connected to subject-matter (as for instance undertaken in Kelly et al., this book). The RODA (ReasOning, Debate, Argumentation) project evolved from examining the balance among the cultures of “doing school” and “doing science” in the classroom discourse, and the effect of tasks which required reasons for claims on argumentation development, in a context where it had not been taught (JiménezAleixandre et al., 2000), to exploring, through classroom studies, the connections
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among argumentation and different dimensions of science learning, concept construction, designing experiments in the laboratory, development of attitudes. For instance Jiménez-Aleixandre et al. (1999) examined the process of data construction by high school students in a microscope task requiring them to identify an unknown sample: the students interpreted and reinterpreted their observations in the process of appealing to empirical data to back their claims. The authors compared the students’ actions with other groups working in standard microscope assignments, noting for instance the interactions with sources of knowledge in books and notebooks, not observed in standard laboratory sessions. Results from a longitudinal study about argumentation and environmental education in primary school from 4th to 6th grades (9–12 years), also part of RODA, are reported in several papers. The methodological approach of the classroom and of the whole school attributed a great share of responsibility to pupils, from classroom organization, and issues to be studied to the evaluation of the goals of teaching sequences (López & Jiménez-Aleixandre, 2002). The process of transformation of proposals for their own code of behavior in a field trip, showing the pupils engaged in true dialogue, and the teacher strategies for encouraging pupils’ taking charge of their learning and reorienting the debates, is discussed in JiménezAleixandre and López (2001). The quality of 4th-grade students’ arguments along 10 sessions is analyzed in Jiménez-Aleixandre et al. (2005), and given the sophistication of arguments including rebuttals, the question arises of what features in the classroom environment supported the development of argumentative competencies. To examine it, we use Toulmin’s (1972) notion of intellectual ecology and propose four intertwined dimensions in it: (a) pedagogical, including categories as teacher’s style and strategies (showing interest in pupils’ proposals, reformulating them), classroom climate, placing responsibility in the hands of students, sharing the authority to evaluate; (b) cognitive and metacognitive, including students’ reflections about their control of learning, about learning as a holistic process, about the process of inference, challenges of book authority, reflections on uncertainty; (c) communicative, including interactive and dialogic interactions, analogies and metaphors; and (d) social, including the influence of leadership, competition and cooperation in the co-construction of arguments. It is suggested that the sustained enculturation in this particular school and classroom culture provided the adequate environment for argumentative competencies to develop. The notion of intellectual ecology can be fruitful for studying these complex environments. A classroom study focusing on high school students’ argumentation about a socio-scientific problem of environmental management is reported in JiménezAleixandre and Pereiro (2002, 2005). During 17 sessions the students, distributed in jigsaw groups, worked with real data sets, maps, technical projects and scientific reports in order to produce their own reports about the pros and cons of sewage network in a polluted wetland. They were required to support their claims, to critically process different sources of data and authority, and to reflect on the changes in their ideas from the beginning of the unit, referring to the data relevant in producing the changes (Jiménez-Aleixandre & Pereiro, 2005). The results show how they articulated relevant ecological and technical concepts with environmental values in
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constructing warrants, and how their criteria for evaluating claims became more refined and specific along the unit. The relevance of engaging students in life-size problems for their enculturation in a knowledge producing community is suggested. Another instance of RODA classroom studies is the exploration of the process of construction of meanings for the concept of neutralization, as it is used as a cognitive tool to solve a titration problem in the laboratory (Jiménez-Aleixandre & Reigosa, 2006), in term of contextualizing practices across epistemic levels, as for instance translating observational to theoretical language, or using concepts as resources to frame anomalous data. An autobiographical study about the teacher’s role in the management of argumentative role-play debates is reported in Mork (2006). A web-based teaching programme about wolves was used to achieve the goals of learning about ecology, about different viewpoints and solutions to the problem, and of practising argumentation. Working during six lessons, the students were required to deal with contradictory evidence and to provide justifications for their claims. Some types of teacher’s interventions identified in the study are: to model how to behave in a debate, to challenge the accuracy of the information provided by the students, to extend the range of topics introduced by the students, to get the debate back on track, to rephrase students’ statements, and to promote participation. The author suggests the use of this typology as a guiding tool for teachers when promoting argumentative debates. These are a few instances of studies about classroom environments promoting argumentation, and others are discussed by their authors in a number of chapters of this book (e.g., Duschl; Kelly et al.; Kolstø and Ratcliffe; Sandoval and Millwood; Simonneaux; Zeidler and Sadler). From this review, some patterns emerge, concurrent with the ones discussed in the case of explicit teaching. First, the relevance of extended time, sometimes involving sustained work along several years, as evidenced in longitudinal studies. Second, the role of the teacher’s support. Third, the students taking responsibility of their learning processes and knowledge claims (e.g., Jiménez-Aleixandre & López, 2001; Mason, 1996). Fourth, the students’ involvement in using data, designing projects, writing reports (e.g., Jiménez-Aleixandre & Pereiro, 2002; Kelly et al., 1998), and more generally in problem-solving and decision-making in small group. Fifth, the ways in which socio-scientific issues are appropriate to develop argumentation (Mork, 2006). Sixth, the students were encouraged to reflect about their own understanding and change in ideas and positions (e.g., Jiménez-Aleixandre & Pereiro, 2002; Mason, 1996).
Discussion: Engineering Cognitive Apprenticeship in Argumentation The analytical review of studies providing empirical evidence on the design of learning environments effective in promoting argumentation, both through explicitly teaching it and through promoting it by means of explicit design and by creating an
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appropriate classroom culture, shows that besides a variety in the perspectives and in the features of the classrooms, there are a number of shared characteristics that suggest recommendations for teachers and science educators seeking to engineer cognitive apprenticeship in argumentation. A first implication I would draw is about what roles do we require from students in argumentation environments: these studies point to students developing argumentation skills because these were required for their role in the learning process (Bereiter & Scardamalia, 1989). So, in general, argumentative competencies have an appropriate environment to develop in classrooms designed as learning communities where students work in authentic problems and are engaged in using data, collecting evidence, or producing reports; where students are protagonists of their own learning, features shared with other constructivist learning environments. And, in particular, in argumentation learning environments, students are engaged in supporting knowledge claims with evidence, evaluating claims, developing criteria for this evaluation, and other activities related to knowledge evaluation. A second suggestion concerns the relevance of involving students in reflection and metacognitive thinking, encouraging them to compare their ideas and positions with alternative ones, or to evaluate the change in them and the causes behind this change. As discussed in Garcia-Mila and Andersen (this book), it has been claimed that developing metacognition is a key factor in the coordination of theory and evidence. They also point to the effectiveness of combining practice (as characterized in the previous paragraph) with reflection. A third implication is the need for extended engagement in argumentative discourse. Argumentation needs to be practised for some time in different contexts, and anecdotal activities do not provide enough opportunities for reflection. A fourth implication is about the teachers’ support to students’ development of epistemological understanding. The teachers model argumentation and inquiry, provide criteria for the evaluation of knowledge, translate epistemic goals into their contributions. From the examination of studies promoting argumentation by explicit teaching of argumentation, as for instance explicit discussion about the criteria for evaluating arguments, and by explicit design of tasks, teacher strategies and classroom culture, it seems that their effects are difficult to separate. Studies about explicit teaching of argumentation as Zohar and Nemet (2002) and Kuhn and Reiser (2007), point to the influence of a classroom culture valuing the support of claims with evidence; for Kuhn and Reiser the classroom culture was the strongest influence. It can be claimed that both explicit teaching of argumentation and an intellectual ecology constructed in the classroom around knowledge evaluation, contribute to the development of argumentative competencies or, in Mason (1996) words, to students entering a cognitive apprenticeship to scientific reasoning and argumentation. Designing learning environments to support argumentation in science classrooms is not an easy task. But potential contributions from argumentation, such as externalizing cognitive processes, developing critical thinking, supporting the development of epistemic criteria, and other discussed in Jiménez-Aleixandre and
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Erduran (this book), may be worth the challenge. Argumentation can so contribute to the scientific education of learners and also to their education as citizens. Acknowledgments Work supported by the Spanish Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia (MEC), partly funded by the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), code SEJ2006-15589-C0201/EDUC. The author gratefully acknowledges the work of Marta Agraso, Joaquín Díaz, Fins Eirexas, Ramón López, Cristina Pereiro and Carlos Reigosa, members of the RODA research group. Thanks to Christopher Andersen, Sibel Erduran, Merce Garcia-Mila, Stein Dankert Kolstø, Christian Plantin and William Sandoval for their valuable feedback on earlier versions of this chapter.
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Chapter 6
Social Aspects of Argumentation Stein Dankert Kolstø and Mary Ratcliffe
Studies on students’ argumentation, particularly on science-related issues, show that social dimensions influence argumentation (Grace, 2005; Kolstø, 2006; Mercer, 2000; Solomon, 1992). The purpose of this chapter is to explore some of these social aspects and discuss their legitimacy and possible consequences for teaching argumentation in science education. The scope for our exploration is the social aspects of argumentation in science-related issues. We conceptualise argumentation as a goal directed social practice embedded in different types of dialogues (Walton, 1998). The nature of argumentation will be discussed from both a philosophical and an empirical point of view. In addition, we will also relate the discussion to social aspects of science in order to clarify the context in which students’ argumentation on scientific matters are embedded. We define an argument as a claim supported by a justification. The characteristics of justifications are not included in our definition, as the quality of the justification, according to the nature of arguments, is to be judged by the debaters. In their seminal article “Establishing the norms of scientific argumentation in classrooms”, Driver et al. (2000) identified two main reasons for teaching argumentation in science education. Firstly, it is important to convey to students an adequate image of science, especially to show the socially constructed nature of scientific knowledge. Such social construction emphasises science teaching as a discursive practice and encourages argumentation in science. Secondly, it is regarded as critical that young people are enabled to construct and to analyse arguments related to the social applications and implications of science. Specifically, this involves the ability to engage with claims from the frontiers of science involved in controversial socio-scientific issues (see Chapter 12 by Simonneaux for an elaboration on this aspect). In line with this twofold justification, we will focus on two main types of contexts in the science classroom where students might get involved in argumentation. Firstly, there are scientific issues which, to some extent, are detached from possible social implications (e.g., when students discuss possible interpretations of their experiments). Secondly, there are issues where the science is involved in a social debate. Typically, such issues concern personal or political decision-making related to health and environmental controversies. Examples here are the climate issue and genetic testing. In addition there are issues related to science policy (e.g., what S. Erduran and M. P. Jiménez-Aleixandre (eds.), Argumentation in Science Education. © Springer 2007
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research to allow or to support). Both types of issues are influenced by the social aspects of the conduct of science. In this chapter we will argue that scientific argumentation does involve certain social aspects and that to some extent this might explain the presence of social aspects involved in students’ argumentation in science-related issues. Our main thesis is that the influence of social dimension on students’ argumentation in relation to scientific claims is legitimate and desirable. Thus social dimensions should be a focus in science teaching. In some contexts this includes the critical use of arguments from scientific experts. We also argue that the accuracy of students’ argumentation will prosper from increased insight into social aspects of science, because of the importance in contextualising science issues.
Argumentation as a Social Activity We start by discussing the implicit claim in the title of this chapter, the assertion that arguments have social aspects. Van Eemeren et al. (1996) state that there are three generally recognised forms of argument: analytical, rhetorical and dialectical. Analytical arguments belong to the domain of formal reasoning. Formal reasoning is concerned with the logical structure of arguments, and whether a conclusion follows logically from given premises. However, scholars have claimed that formal logic is inadequate for describing argumentation in science (Walton, 1992) and irrelevant for inclusion in science teaching (Driver et al., 2000) and will therefore not be discussed here. Reasoning which does not employ formal logic is denoted as informal reasoning. Thus informal reasoning employs rhetorical and dialectical forms of arguments. Rhetorical forms of argumentation refer to arguments used in monological situations where an orator employs discursive techniques in order to persuade an audience. In contrast, dialectical forms of arguments are involved in dialogues involving two or more discussants. Argumentation in informal reasoning therefore apparently exists in two forms: individualistic or social. The individualistic meaning relates to rhetorical and other situations where an individual formulates a point of view. The social meaning of argument refers to a dispute between people. However, we will nevertheless claim that all argumentation is basically social, as rhetorical arguments expect an audience. This view is supported by Billig (1996) who claims that the existence of two meanings of “argument” signifies the importance of the possibility of contradiction when exploring questions. This focus on contradiction, Billing states, was probably first noticed by the ancient Greek philosopher Protagoras who claimed that in all questions both pro and con arguments can always be found. From this assertion he concludes that any single opinion or “individual argument” is controversial, and thus actually or potentially a part of a social argument. Consequently, we will take the view that argumentation is basically social and operates in a social context. Our question is therefore not whether social aspects influence debaters’ argumentation,
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but what these social aspects are, and how they influence on argumentation in science-related issues? This basically social function of arguments is apparent in science where the authors of scientific articles carefully build up arguments using the kind of rhetorical devices valued and accepted in science. However, this individualistic practice serves a social function as each paper is a contribution to a debate among colleagues in a scientific community. Moreover, consensual conclusions on facts, models and theories in science will be backed by arguments produced by several contributors, and based on the judgement of a scientific community as a whole. Consequently, argumentation in science has a social purpose and an ultimate goal: contributing to the collective development and judgement of scientific knowledge claims and the identification of reliable and consensual descriptions of nature. When designing curricula and activities in science teaching aiming at fostering skills in argumentation, we need to take this social and goal-directed purpose of argumentation into account. However, argumentation might have different social goals in different contexts and situations. In the next section, we will have a closer look at different social goals and their relevance for science teaching. We will also present examples of how science students in different contexts construed the social goal of their argumentation.
Argumentation and Types of Dialogues Whether debaters might meet face-to-face, through texts or by other means, an argument is always made in a context where debaters exchange views. Such exchange of views is what characterises dialogues (Walton, 1998). Therefore, arguments are embedded in dialogues, and this dialogical and social context will influence the characteristics of arguments put forward. In order to understand social aspects of arguments we therefore need to take into account social aspects of dialogues. Studies of students’ argumentation in dialogues on scientific and other issues have revealed that students’ dialogues may take different forms. Studying small group discussions Mercer (2000) identified three different types of discourse; disputational, cumulative and exploratory talk. Disputational talk is competitive in nature, differences of opinion are stressed rather than solved. It is characterised by exchanges of claims, challenges and counterclaims, with students defending their own point of view. Cumulative talk is characterised by agreement, and typically features repetitions, confirmations and elaborations. Exploratory talk involves presentation of points of view backed up by arguments and critically but constructive discussions about each other’s ideas. In her study on science students’ discussions of the types of management of wolves to implement politically in Norway, Mork (2006) found all these kinds of talk represented. She also claimed the need for an additional version of disputational
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talk which she calls reasoned disputational and is characterised by claims supported by a reason. From her excerpts it is evident that all arguments are put forward in response to other utterances, and thus occur in a social context where all participants have their own roles, agendas and expectations, and interpretations of what characterises appropriate contributions. Focussing on arguments as embedded in dialogues with different goals, Walton (1998) presents a classification of dialogues which attempts to cover all kinds of argumentative interactions (see Duschl, this book for an extended discussion of Walton’s categories). Walton defines dialogue as “a normative framework in which there is an exchange of arguments between partners reasoning together in turn-taking sequence aimed at a collective goal” (p. 30). He claims the existence of five different types of dialogues, characterised, among other attributes, by different goals: persuasion dialogue (e.g., critical discussion), information-seeking dialogue (e.g., interview and expert-consultation), negotiation dialogue (e.g., deal-making), inquiry dialogue (e.g., scientific inquiry and public inquiry) and eristic dialogue (e.g., quarrel). Walton’s types of dialogues are analytical categories and he does not claim the empirical existence of these in their pure form. Also, in a discussion there might be one or several shifts between types of dialogues, with accompanying shifts in goals pursued. Although there are slight differences, Walton’s concept of persuasion dialogue has clear resemblances with Mercer’s Disputational talk and Costello and Mitchell’s (1995) competing type of argument. Moreover, the goal involved in inquiry type of dialogue is not very different from the purpose of Mercer’s Cumulative talk and Costello and Mitchell’s consensual type of argument. In our discussions we will use Walton’s analytical categories due to their claimed applicability to describe dialogues involved in different disciplines, including science. Given these different patterns of dialogue, science teachers may need to be conscious about the kind of dialogue they want their students to engage in, and to design the educational context accordingly. Additionally, if we want to convey to students an adequate image of science, we need to identify characteristics of argumentative discourses in science. Although students may engage in all categories of Walton’s dialogue, we would argue that two in particular are important as representations of scientific practices. The critical discussion as a type of persuasion dialogue and scientific inquiry as a type of inquiry dialogue are of social interest in our context, due to their possible relevance for describing scientific discourses. In a persuasion dialogue in general the goal of each party is to persuade the other party to accept an assertion, using, as premises, data and ideas that the other party has accepted as decision-base. In a critical discussion, as a specific type of persuasion dialogue, the goal is to solve a conflict of opinion by means of rational, or reason based, argumentation (Walton, 1998). The method of critical inquiry is to look at arguments on both sides and raise critical questions of these, in order to identify the strength of the arguments involved. The participants typically proceed by question and reply. Participation in a critical discussion presupposes a willingness to change view in light of good arguments. If a debater is not open to change his opinion she has in fact shifted the dialogue into
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an eristic dialogue (e.g., quarrel) (Walton, 1992). In an eristic dialogue the defining goal is to win and not to test the strength of arguments. In a scientific inquiry the goal is for the participants collectively to establish or demonstrate a particular scientific claim based on scientific criteria established in a scientific community (Walton, 1998). The method of scientific inquiry is therefore to collect all relevant evidence, scrutinise this evidence and through collaboration and argumentation identify conclusions that are firmly supported by theory and evidence. The goal of identifying a conclusion implies a need to restrict the ongoing critical questioning in order to proceed towards a result. Which kinds of dialogues are practised in science then? Walton (1998) argues that the presentation of scientific results in scientific papers to some extent does have the characteristics of scientific inquiry as a type of dialogue. However, science at the laboratory stage, where researchers work together to identify, discuss and test different possible phenomena and explanations/hypothesis, probably has other characteristics. At this stage of scientific knowledge production the discussion is probably best described as alternating periods of scientific inquiry and critical discussion among collaborators. In addition, sociological studies of science indicate that disputes in the public sphere between scientists on competing theories are best characterised as persuasion dialogues or critical discussions (Latour, 1987; Martin & Richards, 1995). Researchers’ analyses (Costello & Mitchell, 1995; Walton, 1998) provide us with the insight that humans employ different kinds of dialogues for achieving different type of goals. Their analyses inform us that argumentation is embedded in different types of dialogues and also in a wider context which influence the kind of goals, and thus kind of arguments which are put forward.
Scientific Inquiry and Critical Discussion in the Science Classroom Based on the idea of arguments as embedded in goal-directed dialogues, what might be the consequence for the teaching of argumentation in science? Referring to Aristotle, Walton (1992, Chapter 1) claims that, due to its goal and method, participation in critical discussion does not presuppose subject-matter specialisation on behalf of the participant asking critical question. Participants might, however, need information from experts and thus shifts to periods of expert-consultation dialogue can occur. Such expert-consultation improves the level of the critical discussion, but in general critical discussion might be practised at any level of expertise. Participation in a scientific inquiry dialogue, however, does presuppose knowledge of relevant subject matter. This is so because alternative explanations or hypothesis need to be developed and explored, and also need to be based on, or at least not contradict, established theories in the relevant field of knowledge. The claim about different demands on subject knowledge has an immediate consequence for science education. If we want students to practise a critical discussion,
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the depth and breadth of their knowledge-base may be at any level, and this level might be decided by the teacher. We might even decide that the students shall include expert-consultation dialogues and gather the necessary information and decide on the level or quality of the critical discussion themselves. In addition, we might want to train students in drawing evidence-based conclusions on scientific questions or decisions on socio-scientific issues and making their arguments available for others to inspect. This implies performing inquiry types of dialogues, which presupposes a more extensive knowledge-base. There might therefore be three relevant kinds of dialogues for developing increased competence in examining scientific and socio-scientific issues through science education: critical discussion; expert-consultation dialogues; scientific inquiry dialogues. In a study conducted in a science class, 14-year-old students were presented with a decision-making task—what materials would they use for making window frames? They were given some information about the common materials used—aluminium, PVC, softwood, hardwood (Ratcliffe, 1996). The peer group discussions had the elements of persuasive dialogue with a small amount of critical reflection. For example, although pupils were able to comment on the advantages and disadvantages of materials (though not systematically) the dominance of one individual’s view could sway others without much thought. A typical exchange between three boys, represented here as pseudonyms Eliot, Simon and Gurwant shows how Eliot develops his initial solution with the acceptance of the other two boys. Eliot: Simon: Eliot: Gurwant: Eliot: Gurwant: Simon: Gurwant: Simon:
I think we should use PVC (for the material). But, look it’s expensive. But I think it will last a long time. I think we should change the windows. Yes—as I said, change the windows to PVC. OK, because this will be the most efficient. And it will be cheaper in the long run. PVC will be the most efficient. OK (writing) we have chosen PVC because it is cheaper in the long run.
The students had no systematic introduction to the nature of critical reasoning— suggesting that presentation and critique of arguments might be beneficial in their development of skilful and critical dialogue. Eliot’s ability to persuade his peers might be explained as based on his charisma, or his peers’ wish of “just getting the task done”. It is relevant to ask whether a different design of the task, involving higher demands on justified conclusions on all alternatives, could have stimulated students to enter into an inquiry type of dialogue and thus explore the issues in more depth. Alternatively, the design could seek to stimulate a critical discussion, making it social naturally for peers to challenge (e.g., Eliot’s arguments and point of view). Whatever design is chosen, students may need explicit training in the skills of critical evaluation. In the summary discussion, the teacher asked one group their views after he had spent a little time with the group trying to explain how individual actions can accumulate and affect others:
6 Social Aspects of Argumentation Liam:
Teacher: Keith: Michael: Teacher: Michael: Teacher: Liam: Teacher: Michael:
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Well we thought we’d go for uPVC ‘cos it’s quality and if you buy the softwood you’ve got to keep maintaining it. It would cost more and you’d probably end up paying as much as you’d pay for the uPVC anyway. Did the environmental effects have any bearing on your decision? A little bit. Yeh, just a very little bit. So that helped sway you away from hardwood? Oh yeh, but we still think that cutting down one more trees for our bedroom window is not going to make that much difference. OK, do you all agree with that. Yes. You didn’t take my points about you’re just a drop in the ocean but with lots of other drops have a large effect. Yes, we considered that but don’t think we make much difference.
This exchange suggests egocentric values are dominant in adolescents and students would require considerable evidence to shift to a more balanced viewpoint. In this case values shared among the students were used to judge the relevance of arguments proposed by the teacher. Arguments by peers may be accepted more easily or defended more robustly according to group dynamics—the impact of social relationships within a group can have a bearing on the course of the argument. Scientific evidence itself may not sway the position of individuals. This example indicates the need for challenging the range of arguments and knowledge students draw upon, including students’ views, through critical discussion. However, it also exemplifies the need for developing deep insight into an issue (e.g., through scientific inquiry), in order to become aware of arguments related to the needs and consequences for others. A further challenge is that the teacher needs to monitor the discussions and judge whether he or she has to interrupt in order to make important considerations present in a dialogue. This point is supported by Grace (2005) who found that students are able to engage in critical dialogue and have their views influenced by reasoning presented by others. In both these examples of students’ argumentation their knowledge-base is incomplete and to some extent naïve, yet this does not necessarily prevent some critical discussion from taking place. However, the students were asked to make a decision, which implies performing an inquiry through identifying reliable knowledge and values and drawing a defensible conclusion. When we want students to practise an inquiry type of dialogue, an extended knowledge-base is a prerequisite. This might for instance imply that if we want students to use argumentation in the development of explanations and reports based on their own experiments, or develop decisions as in the case above, it is wise to identify subject areas where the students have a sufficient knowledge base. If different types of discussions exist, the learning environment has to be designed to facilitate the particular kind of dialogue and arguments sought. The possible influence of the teaching strategy used became evident in a study exploring learning about social aspects of science (Kolstø & Mestad, 2005). Students in two science classes were given the research question “Why do people walk around in circles in fog and snowy weather?”. The expectation was thus that students
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would engage in inquiry dialogue. Working in groups the students identified a hypothesis, designed and carried out an experiment and made a written report. Thereafter the student groups in the different science classes exchanged reports, and were supposed to engage in critical discussions about the quality of experimental design and result using a learning management system (Luvit). Even though several groups did discuss aspects of the methods used, several groups focussed on defending their own report, as in the following example (Mestad, 2003, p. 83, our translation): Group 1: Group 2:
Therefore we think that the method/procedure used by group five … was poor. The fact is that it will not be accurate if you are drawing up where. … We did the drawing as accurate as we could, and yours were not that accurate either.
Instead of critical discussions these students shifted into some kind of eristic dialogue where the main goal was to defend own results and reputation. One possible reason for this is the teacher’s decision to identify the two classes as two competing research institutions. The idea of competition and own institution’s reputation in the public sphere therefore might have made some students to construe the dialogue and its goals in terms of institutional interests. Our conclusion so far is that the social context including learning environment and teaching strategies influences the kind of dialogues the students’ practices and the kind of arguments used. In the next section we turn to the social aspects of knowledge claims.
Social Aspects of Claims: Disputability and Flexibility of Scientific Knowledge Claims Toulmin (1958) defines arguments as claims supported by a justification. In this section we explore the social aspects of argumentation further by examining the fate of claims. The fate of a claim advanced in a dialogue depends on what the other dialogue partners do with that claim. In a critical discussion, the goal is to convince the other party. If a claim is stated, and no one criticises that claim, it is implicitly accepted as true or probable. Thus the arguer can use that claim as a basis for further arguments. In a scientific inquiry, the goal is to prove or make probable a description, a theory or an interpretation. A sub-goal is to identify knowledge-claims on which this main claim can be built. Consequently, claims put forward will either, through critique, be judged unreliable, or enter the knowledge-base for the inquiry. Therefore, when a claim is presented, its faith in the further discussion depends upon its reception: is it accepted or is it questioned? This reception might of course be influenced by the justifications provided. However, a claim’s reception is also influenced by the debaters’ views on the question “What claims are debatable?”. One possible answer is that claims from experts are not debatable. This understanding was found in a study by Kolstø (2006) where 16-year-old students were interviewed about their views on the issue of power transmission lines and the fear that these might cause increased risk of childhood leukaemia. The analysis revealed
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that the validity of certain knowledge claims was taken for granted. To take but one example, during the teaching sequence the students were shown a copy of some figures from a leaflet made by a local power company. The figures showed, among other things, the strength of the magnetic field, measured in microtesla (µT), at different distances both from lines and cables. The magnetic field strength were shown to be considerably weaker from underground cables than from overhead lines (0.1 vs. 2.5 µT at a distance of 20 meters) except for very small distances (5 vs. 11.2 µT at zero distance at ground level). Whether pupils were in favour of underground cables (as most students were) or not, they all seemed to take for granted that the both these and other numbers presented were trustworthy. Furthermore, this information was often taken as a base for arguments and personal decisions on the issue. A reason that claims were accepted without further inspection might be because they were produced by scientists. Alternatively they were trusted as they had the “fingerprint” of truly scientific facts: exact figures! In general, students’ ideas about the nature of scientific knowledge probably influence students’ views on whether scientific claims might be criticised. Several studies have revealed that many students holds naïve positivistic conceptions of the nature of science (Lederman, 1992). Such conceptions imply that when a quantity is measured (magnetic field strength in the study above), a new and undisputable fact about nature results. Historically science is seen as value free and objective. This view implies that scientific results are not debatable, but constitute an objective knowledge-base for discussions on non-scientific aspects of issues. The students might therefore experience conflict when asked to debate scientific claims. A more adequate understanding of the nature of science might make it possible for students to evaluate what scientific claims to accept as reliable, and what claims to criticise for being provisional. An awareness of the importance of critique and argumentation in science is probably important to increase students’ understanding of the disputability of scientific knowledge claims. This includes insights into the varying reliability of scientific knowledge-claim, as to whether they are claims from the frontiers of science, core science, or science in the process of gaining support within the relevant scientific community. However, even consensual science might become controversial if applied in contexts where some actors dispute its applicability (Kolstø, 2001b). The issue of power transmission lines mentioned above is a case in point. The claim that scientific knowledge ruled out any possibilities for a causal link between the magnetic fields involved and the development of leukaemia was challenged by epidemiological studies and later also by new theories on possible causal mechanisms (Tynes, 1996). At the other end of the scale, not all students are uncritical to expert statements and scientific jargon. Common utterances like “They try to blind you with science” and “Speak English!” indicate that many students are aware of the need to understand a claim or an argument in order to evaluate its strength or reliability. This critical attitude should be acknowledged by the science teacher as valuable as it can help students maintain a critical stance when a claim is hard to understand (e.g., due to lacking subject-knowledge).
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Awareness of the potential disputability of all kinds of claims, including contextualised use of core science, is important for full participation in debates on scientific and socio-scientific issues. Hence it will help the processes of argumentation if science teachers are aware of their students’ conceptions of the nature of science and are able explicitly to develop their understanding of the nature of scientific claims. Common observations and also some research findings (Kolstø, 2006; Solomon, 1992) suggest that students do not always make claims clear and defend these using data. On the contrary, students sometimes use vague and flexible terms, and often only hint at a point of view. Examples here are the use of phrases like “sort of”, “maybe”, “as far as I understand …”, and the use of understatements. Also, some students, when indicating personal opinions, include qualifiers (“as long as”) and guarding phrases like “not sure” and “I think” as in the following example (from Kolstø, 2006): Interviewer: Student:
Are you telling me that you thought it was difficult to arrive at an opinion? I was not sure, but as long as there is a risk, I think it is reasonable that life itself has to be chosen before money. (p.6)
In her study Solomon (1992) analysed 17-year-old students’ discussions of socioscientific issues presented on television. She reports that it was rare to find anything resembling the “if …”, “then …” of logical propositions. In their place we found rhetoric. This form of talk is marked by positive examples, estimates of likelihood, and the processes of “showing” how things might be in different contexts. (p. 438)
This, she says, implies that the students used the form of argument which historically has been compared to “the open hand”, in contrast to the “closed fist” of logic (Billig, 1996), which implies that the statement is based on presumptions and not watertight logic. Based on the different ways of expressing views described above one might claim that these students are lacking courage and ability to make clear statements and justify these. However, it is also possible to interpret such expressions as indicating an awareness of the need to make it possible to change opinion in light of new knowledge and arguments. If a clear opinion is stated, and evidence for this to be the correct point of view is put forward, then you have to admit that you were wrong if, due to new arguments, you want to change you view. Consequently, there are social costs involved. However, if you use vague and flexible terms in your utterances, you might make slight shifts in your point of view without expressing a change of opinion. If you do not have a clear opinion at the outset of the discussion, as is often the case in complex issues, then this strategy is perfectly rational. It makes it possible to change views and evaluate arguments at low cost. Consequently, this strategy makes it easier to take new arguments and evidence into serious consideration, thus fulfilling the ultimate goal of rational argumentation. This open and flexible strategy has similarities with the consensual type of argumentation which Costello and Mitchell (1995) state is evoked when the purpose of the argumentation is to discover common perspectives or build arguments and decisions together. The flexible strategy is therefore not at odds with the
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purpose of scientific inquiry. Probably this flexibility also exists in dialogues between members of a scientific research team. The insight that might be drawn from this discussion is that participators in dialogues in science-related issues in addition to epistemic purposes also pursue social purposes. Thus, in order for an epistemic dialogue to function social purposes also have to be fulfilled. The consequence for science education is that the flexible talk of many students should not be discouraged in science inquiry activities, although the need for a conclusion in the end should not be concealed. Nevertheless, the flexible strategy is at odds with the purpose of critical discussion as such dialogues presuppose a willingness to make confrontational questions and statements. In a critical discussion it is also important to know what points of view the different participants hold in order to know what points of view to criticise. Once again, it is therefore paramount that the science teacher is conscious about what kind of dialogue he or she wants to promote, and teach and design activities accordingly.
Social Aspects of Justifications The role of a justification in an argument is to underpin the claim put forward. According to Toulmin (1958), such justifications involve the use of data. In Toulmin’s layout of arguments, data is a generic term which refers to all kinds of evidence that might be used by an arguer to support a claim. In support of factual and causal claims, factual evidence involving empirical or theoretical statements is often used (Wood, 2000). However, the reliability of data presented is in general disputable, and this represents a challenge which also involves social aspects. Scientific knowledge and research findings might be used as data when justifying claims in arguments on science-related issues. In fact, we might define a scientific argument as an argument where the justification involves scientific research results, irrespective of whether the argument involves a claim of fact, cause, value or policy. The source of scientific information might be a student’s own observation or second-hand scientific knowledge. However, ultimately scientific knowledge builds on information from scientists. In principle, even the student’s observations typically builds on interpretations guided by scientific concepts and models learned through trust in the teacher and science textbook. Arguers using scientific knowledge in their argumentation have seldom inspected possible underlying evidence by themselves. Consequently, the use of scientific knowledge in a dialogue often implies the use of argument from experts’ authority. Rational argumentation implies, by definition, argumentation based on evidence, at the expense of basing arguments on expert authority (Siegel, 1988). Also ideals of individual judgement and cognitive autonomy point away from reliance on experts (Walton, 1997). It is nevertheless possible to argue that the use of argument from experts’ authority is perfectly rational.
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Firstly, the time it would take to inspect available evidence in all decision-making situations could be considerable. Experts in general, and scientific experts in particular, are involved in a range of personal and political/collective decisions. You might discuss with a friend whether to follow your doctor’s advice on a health issue, or discuss with a motor mechanic who states that your car needs a new carburettor. In socio-scientific controversies, like climate issues and use of food additives, the complexity and the knowledge demands are no less. To some extent you might ask the expert to indicate the evidence base for their advice. However, at some point you have to trust their knowledge, observations and judgement if you do not want to spend considerable time learning the subject matter and skills involved. Bingle and Gaskell (1994) take an even more radical point of view and claims that “only scientists themselves have access to the standards which are necessary to make an evaluation of what they do” (p. 198). In his discussion, Hardwig (1985) concludes that non-experts are frequently epistemically dependent on experts, a conclusion also approved by Siegel (1988). Secondly, not trusting the expert’s knowledge and judgement might be considered impolite, and might be regarded as cantankerous. Thirdly, progress and effectiveness in modern societies is partly due to specialisation and division of labour. The number of specialisations within science and other knowledge domains is immense. This specialisation has made the development of deep insight into narrow branches of science possible. The demand that rational debaters need to reject arguments from expert authority is therefore hardly rational. However, the use of arguments from experts’ authority implies trust in the expert and his or her scientific insights. An urgent question is therefore whether scientists’ knowledge claims are always reliable.
Scientific Results and Reasons for Peer Acceptance One example of students’ discussion of their own data, indicates the strong belief that students have in their own abilities to generate valid and reliable data. It also shows how students expect scientists to validate their findings. The example comes from the implementation in one school of an activity designed to help students understand the conduct and ethics of science (Fullick & Ratcliffe, 1996). Small groups of 15-year-old students were set the task of producing, within a time limit, the maximum voltage they could in an electrochemical cell, given access to a variety of metals. One member of each group acted as an observer to report how the “researchers” conducted themselves. Class discussion, which followed, was intended to draw out and discuss aspects of scientists’ conduct. The focus is not the “traditional” one of reaching consensus on “what science have we learnt from this experiment?” but rather illustrating the features of how scientists might deal with: different research groups having different findings; evaluation of evidence; peer review; traits of scientific conduct. Students thus had an opportunity to engage in persuasive and critical dialogue about the validity and reliability of their results.
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Although the class came to an agreement that the combination of magnesium and copper gave the highest voltage, there was no agreement, nor (intriguingly) curiosity, on the part of students as to the size of the voltage. Students argued for their original results as correct, being reluctant to repeat the experiment, and regardless of their inability to replicate the result in front of the class: Rob: Teacher: Tom: Teacher:
Miss, you saw that 2.08 (volts) (protesting at having to do the experiment again in front of the class). Well, I did that once but no-one else did. I saw it but it’s like making a food product—you’ve got to be able to do it again, haven’t you. Say, Rob, you were presenting a big speech to a group of scientists from all over the world and you said I’ve use copper and magnesium and got 2.08 V from it—and they thought wow this is going to solve the energy crisis. They go away believing you, test their results and find you actually totally made it up, you’d lose your credibility rather quickly wouldn’t you.
The teacher does not really believe the reliability of high reading on the voltmeter (2.08 V being higher than the theoretical possible value) but exposes that implicitly rather than explicitly. So there are hidden aspects to the exchange: the students have confidence in their experiments—they read the voltmeter as 2.08 V but the teacher thinks it should not be possible. The ensuing discussion centred on how scientists’ results gain credibility. Most students argued for data validated by joint observation (video camera, other scientists’ observing) rather than by “standard techniques” of presentation of repeated readings, estimation of errors etc. The teacher in her leading of the discussion focussed on the way students had selected materials. Students were making judgements about the results using their own values of “fairness” and confidence, or otherwise, in their practical ability: Teacher: Rob: Nick: Rob: Nick: Teacher: Rob: Becky:
This group did exactly the same as yours but got different results. Yeh, but was it on the same poles? And was it the same amount of acid and did it have bits in? And was it the same beaker? And the same magic powers? Now Becky’s not happy with this because she thinks she’s done it carefully. Hers was rubbish. Ours was higher than theirs—they couldn’t show theirs even when they tried to. (exchange continues at length each arguing why their result is correct)
This exchange shows that students bring their own values to bear in making the judgement as to what they will accept as correct—with “fairness” being interpreted in a number of ways. Teachers might expect students to accept fully the fundamental scientific truths they dispense (i.e., a belief in the teacher’s authority as scientific expert). However, the exchange in terms of acceptance of experimental results suggests students are prepared to argue for their own cause regardless of any perceived authority of the teacher: Teacher: Rob: Teacher: Tom:
You say you got 2.08 volts. Prove it. You saw it. I did but Becky didn’t. I saw it.
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S. D. Kolstø and M. Ratcliffe She might not believe you. There’s three witnesses. It’s up to them whether they believe you. There’s the teacher—you’ve got to believe the teacher. Not necessarily. I never believe the teacher.
The teacher may be seen as being the expert in scientific knowledge, but, in the eyes of these adolescents, not a strong influence on students’ opinions. However, the students and the teacher might have construed the goal of the task differently. The teacher wants the students to practice the norms in science, which includes ability to replicate an experimental result on demand. The students operate within an everyday discourse where it is not custom, or natural, to do things twice when the problem is already solved. Thus they prefer to use their own values and criteria when judging the adequacy of justifications. Students may need to have their prejudices exposed. Values clarification can be an important goal of peer discussion if it is explicitly identified and practised by the teacher. The example thus shows that the epistemological issue of reliability can involve social aspects as trust, values and social custom. There is also an additional lesson to be learned from this case. At first glance, it might look like the students’ arguments are hardening, as they stick to their point of view in spite of the teacher’s repeated challenge. Thus it looks like they are making a shift from a critical discussion, where all participants are committed to being open-minded, into an eristic dialogue, where arguments and views are fixed. However, although the teacher has a counterargument (the theoretical possible value is lower than the reported one), it is not provided to the students. The students consequently conclude that the burden of proof has not shifted and they do not see why they need to provide additional arguments. Based on their justifications they regarded the claim as trustworthy. This account of the dialogue exemplifies the importance of the teacher’s awareness of the characteristics of a critical discussion when this is what she wants to facilitate. However, does replicability automatically ensure that a result is reliable? Historically, scientific knowledge has, by definition, been regarded as neutral and objective (Ziman, 2000). However, today constructivist conceptions of science prevail and with them the principle that scientific knowledge claims are bounded by the cultural context in which they are generated. Thus results at the frontiers of science are not always readily accepted by the scientific community, as they can conflict with the expectations and beliefs of other scientists. How then, is science able to sort out which new concepts and models are valid and reliable? To explain the existence of reliable and uncontroversial scientific knowledge, many scholars point to the presence of social processes in science. These processes involve publication of research reports where arguments supporting a factual claim are presented; peer review prior to publication to evaluate whether the quality is sufficient, and critique of each other’s hypothesis, methods and results (Ziman, 2000). Through these social processes some concepts or explanations become supported by a consensus within the relevant scientific community. Such consensus is believed to reflect the
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community’s judgement of agreement between concepts and empirical data. Importantly, this image of science implies that argumentation and critical examination, including expert disagreement, is crucial for the development of scientific knowledge. However, it also implies that the reliability of scientific knowledge varies from controversial frontier science to consensual core science. This varying reliability represents a challenge for students’ use of scientific research results in argumentation.
Students’ Evaluation of Science Experts’ Reliability The arguments above indicate the need for activities through which students can explore the ways in which scientists validate and share their findings. Students may have naïve views about the generation of scientific truths. The question about the reliability of scientific knowledge claims is also reflected in students’ handling of science involved in science-related issues. Students who have interpreted scientists’ utterances and expert disagreement in terms of interests, integrity and possible incompetence have been reported in several studies (Driver et al., 1996; Gaskell, 1994; Kolstø, 2001a; Ratcliffe, 1999). Equally, some students have also been found to accept information from scientists without evaluation (Kolstø, 2001a; Ratcliffe, 1999). Teaching activities could usefully focus on clarifying, with students, criteria that might be used to judge the trustworthiness of the experts, in accordance with Walton’s (1997) discussion of the issue. This implies a need to include a critical discussion on the reliability of the science expert when using arguments from experts. Walton (1997, p. 211) states that the examination of experts’ views need to focus on six crucial aspects related to the experts’ claim to competence: Is the utterance within the scientist’s field of expertise? Is the cited expert really an expert? How authoritative is the expert? Is he, for example, recognised by colleagues as an outstanding expert? If several scientists disagree on the matter, are several experts consulted? Is supporting evidence available, and the utterance in accordance with this evidence? Is the expert’s utterance clear and intelligible, and correctly interpreted?
In addition, due to possible influence of vested interest and financially and institutional bindings, it is also necessary to judge the expert’s personal reliability. This implies a focus on whether the expert scientist is biased, is honest, and is conscientious (Walton, 1997, p. 217). Consequently, social knowledge needs to be evoked in the evaluation of data used in arguments from experts (Bingle & Gaskell, 1994; Kolstø, 2001a; Norris, 1995). The lists of questions above might leave the impression that if a scientist is found to be competent and personal reliable, then the scientific research results and judgements he or she contributes are neutral and objective knowledge. However, the question of the neutrality and objectivity of scientific knowledge claims is further complicated by the complex role of criteria and interest in science.
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When evaluating scientific arguments, knowledge claims and competing theories, scientists are believed to use scientific criteria (Ziman, 2000). However, when not all criteria are fulfilled, and when the quality of evidence varies, different scientists might weigh criteria and arguments differently. Longino (1990) claims that in their evaluation of competing scientific theories, scientists’ background assumptions influence their judgement. She argues that this is unavoidable due to the underdetermination of scientific theories by empirical data (for examples see AbdEl-Khalick, 2003; Kolstø et al., 2006). As shown in examples earlier in this chapter, students may come to similar biased views in their interpretation of arguments by peers and others. The challenge associated with the application of scientific criteria implies that expert disagreement and argumentation are both legitimate and normal in science. This also supports the claim that the reliability of scientific knowledge depends on its ability to withstand criticism based on scientific norms and the strength of the consensus that supports it (Bingle & Gaskell, 1994; Ziman, 2000). Furthermore, Aikenhead (1994) claims that science has been undergoing a process of “socialisation” whereby “Government, industry, and the military have become the dominant patrons of scientific activity” (p. 16). Focussing on this and other changes, Ziman (2000) states that academic science has evolved into post-academic science. Today science is not only basic research practised at universities to fill gaps in a discipline’s theoretical foundation. The typical scientist is not independent, but has become an employee or a contractor. The typical scientist thus works either in industry or governmental agencies, or has to make dispositions that might give him research contracts. The question thus arises as to whether scientists’ research agendas and judgement, and even interpretation of data, might be influenced by affiliation and vested interests. There are examples of how the asbestos, tobacco and oil industry managed to provide research which could be used as arguments against the claims that asbestos, smoking and lead in petrol represented risks to human health. In addition it is important to be aware that “neutral” and reliable scientific knowledge might be produced according to a specific agenda, and functions to strengthen certain arguments in a dispute. The dilemma, which became apparent in the three industries above, is that some actors can better afford to initiate research projects likely to produce results which strengthen their own arguments. Moreover, Collingridge and Reeve (1986) argue that scientists involved in controversies tend to be more critical towards evidence supporting antagonists’ arguments than towards evidence on which their own conclusions are based. For example, Geddis (1991) described the controversy between the United States and Canada on the source of acid rain. In this case, there was at first a lack of consensus on whether the evidence for the source of the acid rain was conclusive or not, due to difference in demands for certainty by each party. The discussion above implies that trust in a science expert’s competence and integrity is not sufficient. Claims from the frontiers of science (and in principle also consensual science), even though they are developed according to accepted standards, might be influenced by background assumptions, and the research questions might have been formulated, and funded, according to a specific agenda. Post-academic
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science is in general not separable from social needs and power relations because of the interactions between science and society. A consequence of the above discussion is that the teaching of argumentation in relation to scientific issues needs to build on an awareness of social aspects of science. In a study by Kolstø et al. (2006) trainee science teachers were asked to judge the reliability of scientific claims in articles on the Internet related to a science-related issue. The participants were university students, and the study therefore indicates the relevance of different kinds of knowledge to those with deeper scientific insights than school students normally have. The study concludes that the students drew upon, among other things, their knowledge of possible interests of institutions providing scientific information, and also an appreciation of a source’s critical attitude. In addition, they used their knowledge of how to recognise competence (relevance of education and current occupation) and an expert’s prestige in science, academic standard of place of publication, and their awareness of the role and importance of consensus in science. Thus the knowledge base they used included more than scientific content knowledge. Evaluation of arguments based on expert authority is therefore demanding, as several aspects have to be taken into account. School science can be portrayed, in textbooks and by science teachers, as authoritarian, without giving any insight into the supporting evidence. However, scientists’ judgements are always made in social contexts, under conditions of underdetermination and influenced by background assumptions. A thoughtful evaluation of scientific claims, therefore presupposes a demand for, and an evaluation of, underpinning evidence and contextual aspects. In order for students to enter into evaluation of the reliability of expert utterances, it is essential that students realise that arguments from science experts are not always hard evidence. As with arguments from experts’ authority in general, scientists’ claims represent soft evidence as they have to be critically discussed in order to determine an argument’s strength. Consequently, it is important that the learning activities allows for inclusion of arguments from science experts, and at the same time stimulate critical discussions of the strength of these arguments. This conclusion is in accordance with Norris’ (1995) judgement that “pupils need to be taught that the object of their scepticism should be the believability of experts, not the evidence supporting scientific knowledge claims” (p. 216). However, in order for students’ critical discussions to be thorough, some insight into the characteristics of post-academic science is a prerequisite. Social aspects of science therefore need to be included in school science.
Concluding Remarks In this chapter we have emphasised that argumentation is a social activity and that arguments are used in different types of goal directed dialogues. Our focus has been to explore how some social aspects influence argumentation in scientific issues. We have discussed how dialogue in science classrooms has the potential to mirror
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argumentation in science as practised. We have focussed on how students’ practices and conceptions impact on their possibility to participate in argumentation. As a framework for the discussion, we have used Walton’s (1998) concepts of dialogues and Toulmin’s (1958) concept of arguments. We have clarified how scientific inquiry and critical discussion describe dialogue types used in science, and can also feature in some science classrooms. We believe that an increased awareness of these two types of dialogues has potential for improving the teaching of argumentation in science. Firstly, they may fulfil the two main goals for including argumentation in science teaching: the development of an understanding of the nature of science; the ability to consider socio-scientific issues thoughtfully. As science involves both collaborative development of arguments and critical scrutinising of knowledge claims, insight into the two types of dialogues implies an adequate image of science. Confronted with socio-scientific issues, students need skills in developing insight and argument, as well as the ability to ask critical questions of experts and to antagonists in dialogues. Secondly, the two types of dialogue provide conceptions of the contexts of argumentation, and thus a framework for purposeful design of teaching and learning activities. As indicated, scientific inquiry presupposes insight into the topic (or inclusion of information seeking dialogues), while critical discussion might be practised without specialised knowledge. We have identified some specific challenges for the teaching of argumentation in students’ construal of the rules and goals of the discussion in which arguments are embedded. Critical discussion might be weakened when students accept claims based on the arguer’s charisma or other characteristics instead of critically scrutinising claims. In addition, the judgement of the relevance of arguments involves social aspects, and this is a challenge when the students dismiss arguments which do not support their egocentric values. In our discussion, we have related arguments to their function in dialogues, and indicated that the social aspect of dialogues can facilitate the identification of social aspect of arguments. Using Toulmin’s framework, we have specifically focussed on social aspects of claims and justifications. We have claimed, on the one hand, that practices like the use of indistinct and flexible claims and arguments from experts’ authority are legitimate under some conditions. On the other hand, we have claimed that some of students’ practices and conceptions restrict their possibility to participate in thoughtful and rational argumentation. Examples here are the disputability of scientific knowledge claims and the importance of evaluating experts’ reliability. Our discussions indicate that insight into the norms and social dimensions of science and the characteristics of post-academic science Ziman (2000) is a prerequisite for the analysis and the development of adequate arguments in science-related issues. The complexity of the context of argumentation, involving: types of dialogues and goals, evaluation of experts’ reliability, science(-)society interactions and students’ interpretations of the purpose of different activities, indicates that a teacher’s awareness of this complexity might be important for the development of students’ learning. However, to support science teachers’ use of argumentation, more insight into ways of facilitating the learning of argumentation in different types of dialogues is desirable.
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Chapter 7
Analysis of Lines of Reasoning in Written Argumentation Gregory J. Kelly, Jacqueline Regev, and William Prothero
Written texts play an important role in the activity systems generating knowledge in professional and educational settings. Empirical studies of the social construction of scientific knowledge in scientific and school settings have identified a range of purposes, uses, and genres of written communication (Kelly & Chen, 1999; Knorr-Cetina, 1999). The persuasive discourse of written argument is one such type of written communication that has played a significant role in the development of scientific knowledge (Bazerman, 1988; Gross, 1990). As noted by Yore et al. (2006), written communication provides a means to articulate evidence, warrants, and claims; reflect on proposed ideas; critique the scientific work of others; and establish proprietorship of intellectual property. An important dimension of science learning is the ability to use, assess, and critique evidence (Hodson, 2003; Yore et al., 2003). This ability includes understanding the relationships among questions, data, and claims, as well as how these relationships can be organized to formulate evidence for a given task and audience (Wallace et al., 2004). While the use of evidence in reasoning is a noted goal of scientific inquiry, little research has focused on the difficulties students may have integrating data with text to formulate coherent arguments. This chapter examines specific rhetorical demands necessary to prepare a successful scientific argument. The theoretical framework for this study incorporates research of writing to learn science and argumentation in science. We investigate these issues in a technology-rich university oceanography course designed for undergraduate non-science majors. The objective of this chapter is to identify and analyze the nature of the claims being made by the student writers and how these claims are developed as the lines of reasoning supporting a thesis. These analyses illustrate ways that large-scale earth data-sets can be used to prepare students to examine and employ evidence in scientific and socio-scientific domains. Drawing from the fields of argumentation theory and rhetoric of science as well as previous studies of an ongoing research program, specific epistemic and rhetorical criteria are developed and applied for the purposes of assessing the strength of the students’ arguments. These criteria were brought to bear on two types of writing tasks with differing rhetorical demands. In one case, the students use geological data to develop and sustain theoretical arguments regarding plate tectonics. In a second application, the students consider broader earth-climate issues, using similar evidence-based argumentation practices, S. Erduran and M. P. Jiménez-Aleixandre (eds.), Argumentation in Science Education. © Springer 2007
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yet with less specific task requirements. Through application of the epistemic and rhetorical criteria, we identify ways that scientific argumentation can be analyzed with respect to individual student writers. We discuss implications for uses of argumentation in science instruction, particularly as related to socio-scientific issues.
Argument in Science and Schools An emerging literature in science education dedicated to the application of argumentation to educational processes has identified the importance of students’ learning how to use, evaluate, and critique evidence. Broadly speaking, argumentation refers to the ways that evidence is used to persuade a reasonable critic of the merits or lack thereof of a standpoint or position (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2003). Analytic tools are emerging to consider how to assess students’ uses of evidence in the context of science inquiry. This literature identifies a need for creating disciplinespecific, ecologically valid measures of the strength of students’ arguments given the specific task constraints (Erduran et al., 2004; Kelly & Takao, 2002, Sandoval & Millwood, 2005; Takao & Kelly, 2003). Furthermore, how students reason about socio-scientific issues has been shown to be tied to issues of evidence use, the nature of science, and students’ conceptual understanding (Sadler, 2004). While most studies of student argumentation have focused on spoken discourse (Driver et al., 20