Argumentation in Science Education: Perspectives from Classroom-Based Research
Sibel Erduran • María Pilar Jiménez-Aleixandre Editors
Argumentation in Science Education Perspectives from Classroom-Based Research
Sibel Erduran University of Bristol United Kingdom
ISBN 978-1-4020-6670-2
María Pilar Jiménez-Aleixandre Universidade de Santiago de Compostela Spain
e-ISBN 978-1-4020-6669-6
Library of Congress Control Number: 2007938905 © 2007 Springer Science + Business Media B.V. No part of this work may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, microfilming, recording or otherwise, without written permission from the Publisher, with the exception of any material supplied specifically for the purpose of being entered and executed on a computer system, for exclusive use by the purchaser of the work. Printed on acid-free paper. 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 springer.com
Dedication
To my parents, Ayten Erduran, whose life was evidence of compassion, courage and intellectual curiosity, and Erol Erduran, whose wisdom, intellect and humour justify his being the greatest educator I have known. (S. E.) To my parents, María Pilar Aleixandre-Parra, who left me as heritage the thirst for knowledge, and Miguel Jiménez-Gan, who taught me that all claims should be reasoned and justified. (M. P. J.-A.)
Preface
Our conversations about arguments began in Nashville in the Spring of 1996 in Richard Duschl’s doctoral seminar that we were both attending, Marilar Jiménez-Aleixandre as a visiting scholar at Vanderbilt University. Jiménez-Aleixandre and Duschl were designing authentic problems in genetics for the University of Santiago de Compostela-based RODA project aimed at engaging high school students in argumentation. Erduran and Duschl had been working on Project SEPIA extending their work in Pittsburgh schools to the design of curricula that support epistemological aspects of scientific inquiry including argumentation. In that spring we attended a NARST session in St Louis, where Gregory Kelly, Steven Druker and Catherine Chen presented a paper about argumentation. As a consequence, a symposium about argumentation was organised (possibly the first of its kind) at the 1997 NARST meeting in Chicago, including papers from Kelly and colleagues and from Jiménez-Aleixandre, Bugallo and Duschl. The symposium was attended, among others, by Rosalind Driver, who had just submitted an application for funding of an argumentation project based at King’s College London, a project Erduran would incidentally work on after Driver’s untimely death. From this time frame in the 1990s to the present day, argumentation studies in science education have increased at a rapid pace, from stray papers for which we were unable to find an appropriate strand in a conference, to a wealth of research base exploring ever more sophisticated issues. Our intention in this book is to provide an account of the state-of-the-art research in the field. We are grateful to the leading scholars who contributed to the book and who engaged with us in productive interactions during the last two years. We are indebted to Larry Yore for plenty of good advice and to University of Santiago de Compostela who supported Erduran’s visit to Santiago for one month, allowing us to work through the final stages of editing. We would finally like to acknowledge our respective universities (University of Bristol and University of Santiago de Compostela) as well as our publishing editor, Harmen van Paradijs at Springer for their support throughout the production of this book.
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This volume illustrates how argumentation in science education is involved in a variety of research studies and teaching sequences. Argumentation is involved in studies on communication, discourse, learning particularly those on high order thinking process, and epistemology as a component of the nature of science with internal and external perspectives, on citizenship education and more specifically those concerning socio-scientific issues. This list is impressive and at the same time heteroclite; then the question of how argumentation is situated in science education is raised. A way of characterising this situation is to consider how argumentation intervenes in science education, as a component of teaching content or as a teaching process and how it is involved in education goals. More specifically argumentation can be (1) a part of the knowledge to be taught included in an official curriculum; (2) a way to help students to better understand the knowledge to be taught. These two aspects do not intervene in the science education goals with the same status. Consequently they do not have to be legitimated by the society or accepted by schools, teachers, students and their parents similarly. Moreover a part of argumentation as proposed by some of the authors of this book is not necessarily scientific argumentation, but also a citizen’s argumentation and so it is beyond the disciplinary goals of education. Again, these different goals cannot be legitimated in the same way. Analysing these different integrations of argumentation in science teaching and their associated goals allow us to be aware of the risks of limiting these integrations to interesting “experimental or innovative teaching sequence”. For durable introduction of argumentation in science education. I propose two aspects to take into account: ● ●
The processes of legitimising argumentation in science education The question of legitimising the citizenship education that is beyond the current acknowledged disciplines
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Processes of Legitimating Argumentation in Science Education In order to analyse these processes we use the theory of ecology of knowledge constructed by the French researcher Chevallard (1991). This theory is based on a view on knowledge. Knowledge “lives” within groups of people. These groups can be very diverse such as a class, a scientific community of researchers, a scholarly society, or a group of people dealing with environmental questions. The term “knowledge” in this perspective has a broad meaning: it is not limited to content, but includes paradigms, the embedded epistemology and also skills. A basic statement is that the meaning of a given element—like a formula, a principle or a description of an experiment—is not exactly the same when this element is used by different groups; each group constructs a “specific” knowledge. For Chevallard (1991), there is a fundamental reason for this specificity of meaning in a given group; this meaning is based on the relations between this element of knowledge and the other elements; in other words an element is not isolated but included in a set of knowledge. When an element (or subset of elements) is dissociated from the set in which it takes its meaning for a group (e.g., Genetically Modified Organisms, GMO, in the set of genetics for a group of biologists), and reinserted in another set that lives in a different group (GMO in a high school classroom), its meaning is necessarily modified. This modification of meaning due to change of groups in which “lives” an element of knowledge is named transposition. Another basic statement is that knowledge involved in a curriculum should have a referent elsewhere than in the educational system. In traditional curriculum, the teaching goal of a discipline like biology, chemistry, or physics, is the acquisition of this discipline and the referent knowledge is the scientific knowledge of the scholarly communities. These communities legitimate the curriculum in the society eyes in a country. In vocational schools, legitimacy is mainly based on the professional communities. However nowadays, legitimacy from scientific communities can become less straightforward to the extent that science is put in question in our occidental societies (see for example ROSE results at students’ level, Sjøberg, 2005), and that citizenship education is valued. Legitimacy processes involving reference to scientific knowledge on the one hand and distance between the referent knowledge and the curriculum (transposed knowledge) on the other hand should be differentiated. For example two physics curricula can have the same referent knowledge in physics, be legitimated in societal eyes and, in the same time, include rather different contents. Transposition can correspond to a few or very deep modifications between the referent knowledge and the knowledge to be taught. On the basis of this approach, I raise the question of the place of argumentation in the legitimacy process of a curriculum. How argumentation, as a part of the knowledge to be taught or of teaching processes is legitimated? To study this question with the theory of ecology of knowledge, I propose to look for the type of teaching contents or curricula in which argumentation is involved,
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and to analyse their reference in legitimacy processes. As mentioned previously argumentation is involved in a variety of teaching contents with different goals. The overview given in the first chapter of this book (Jiménez-Aleixandre and Erduran) specifies them. Three main types of goals can be distinguished: developing students’ knowledge and skills on the nature of science, developing students’ citizenship in particular in the case of socio-scientific issues, and favouring learning, more specifically developing higher order thinking, in particular argumentation. In some countries, these different types of goals have started to be introduced in the official curriculum, in other countries they are forward thinking recommendations mainly done by researchers in science education and/or teachers. Whatever their status, the question of the references taken for these goals and their associated teaching content is raised. Let us take the case of introducing “nature of science” in the teaching content. Its reference is easy to determine: the scientific disciplines and their epistemology. In fact, in comparison to traditional teaching, the reference is the same or is only extended. Reference is the same if we consider that the difference with traditional curriculum is due to the transposition process. In traditional teaching, nature of science is eliminated through this process. To specify what is eliminated, we refer to Tseitlin and Galili’s (2005) analysis of a scientific discipline. They propose to decompose a discipline into three domains: nucleus, body and periphery. In the transposition process, the nucleus (“fundamental principles, paradigm and claims of meta-disciplinary nature”, p. 243) is eliminated whereas the “body” is kept. The body incorporates “established knowledge, each item of which is based on the principles contains in the nucleus” (p. 243). Their analysis of standard physics textbooks confirms that these books mainly (and sometimes only) present “the body” of the discipline. In this framework, introducing nature of science into curricula means to introduce the nucleus (“fundamental principles, paradigm and claims of meta-disciplinary nature”, p. 243). This usual elimination of the nucleus in the transposition process is frequently justified by considering that it is not understandable by students and difficult to teach and to assess. Reference is extended towards two directions, first epistemology of science to analyse the “nucleus” and second sociology of science. This last case happens, when, in nature of science, the social practice of researchers is included as many authors of this book do it, in particular in reference to works of sociologists like Latour (Latour & Woolgar, 1979). Then, another scholarly society is involved: sociology of science. This extension could be rejected by the “hard” scientist communities, which consequently will not legitimate this new knowledge to be taught. The goal associated to socio-scientific issues is less traditional because the main reference comes from the society and citizens problems, and not from the scholarly societies acknowledged to create and validate scientific knowledge. Legitimating such teaching goals is not easy; it assumes a consensus in the society of the country or the state, at the level where curriculum is decided. Nowadays this consensus is not obvious to reach in our society (Legardez & Simonneaux, 2006). Astolfi (2005) underlines that the ideological diversity in our contemporary societies makes risky
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the debate of socio-scientific issues. The question is raised to know if socio-scientific issues make running a risk to split up educational system to the extent that people have diverse and even contradictory expectations about it. The question of what can or cannot be debated in classrooms is opened and not easily answered nowadays. Argumentation is a way to get some distance vis-à-vis socio-scientific issues and thus helps to“a pragmatic arbitration of contradictories ideologies” (ibid. p.9). The case of argumentation as “higher order thinking” is different from the others to the extent that, in the process of transposition, hypotheses on learning are involved. For example, Duschl (this book) makes explicit that these leaning hypotheses are introduced on the basis of “newer ideas and beliefs in cognitive and social psychology [that] speak to the importance of instructional sequences/units that seek outcomes related to students’ reasoning and communication in science contexts.” In fact, this case includes processes of teaching (involving high order thinking) and teaching contents either relative to nature of science or socio-scientific issues. This case makes the legitimacy process rather complex because the types of referent knowledge are multiple, in particular psychology and science education, physics, chemistry or biology, sociology, and each community of scientists can only legitimate some components of the teaching content. Only the representatives can legitimate the whole teaching content (in democratic societies). This case is complex and the durability of such teaching contents is questionable. My hypothesis would be that, for durability, the teaching practices and teaching content have to be strongly implemented in the different components of the school system (teacher training, programme, school practice, evaluation, etc.). In that case, teacher training and teaching resources are crucial. This book tackles these questions of designing teaching and learning environments including computer-enhanced learning environments, and more specific tools that can be used and accepted by teachers and students. A large range of tools, without forgetting assessment, and teacher training are necessary for durable implementation of argumentation in science education.
The Case of Legitimating Citizenship Education Argumentation is a key element involved not only in the “scientific culture” of the citizen but more largely in a trans-disciplinary view of culture. To elaborate the knowledge to be taught leading to a scientific culture of the citizen, it is necessary to go beyond the scientific disciplines. Examples like the social questions of GMO, mobile phones, or black tide, involve economics, safety, and other issues. In some teaching perspectives, science is no more the goal but becomes a tool to help student to understand societal problems. Figure F.1 illustrates the three different goals discussed previously with two examples. The first example deals with a teaching project situated within scientific domains of which goals are mainly related to “higher order thinking” and to nature of science (Duschl, this book). The second case deals with teaching projects directly
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linked with a main societal event: black tide of Prestige in Galicia (JiménezAleixandre, 2006); the teaching goals come from the society, and the same society legitimates them. These examples show different distances between the goals and the teaching content designed to reach their goals. Let us note that, in traditional disciplinary curricula, the goals and the contents are similar, for example biology, chemistry or physics are taught with the goal of students’ acquisition of these disciplines. In both examples of Fig. F.1, scientific disciplines are only “tools” to reach goals. In the first example, as we state in the first part, the references are disciplinary in terms of “nucleus” including epistemology of science and their legitimacy also includes learning hypotheses. In the second example the society legitimates its own reference and teaching content as tools to reach the goal refer to scientific knowledge. In this second example the general goal deals with citizen culture. Sciences become tools to teach trans-disciplinary knowledge. In fact, most of the chapters of this book include more or less explicitly a component of citizen culture. The second case is illustrative of many studies that have to manage two views of argumentation: as scientific social practice and as social practice in the society. Let us note that for the second view, usually there is no reference to argumentation as a branch of rhetoric, which could be a part of the culture and then be included in a pluri-disciplinary teaching content. A reason could be that the legitimacy of argumentation as a component of the scholarly discipline had difficulty during the 19th and first part of the 20th century and restarted to be developed after the Second World War “not only in French language (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca) and in English (Toulmin), but also in German” (Plantin, 2005, p.14). In science education, researchers in their analyses use these scholar studies, as this book shows. But these research works on argumentation are not used as reference for curricula or innovative teaching content introducing argumentation with scientific literacy goal. 1.SEPIA (Duschl, this book)
Goal Goal of a teaching sequence (or a part of a curriculum)
Tool (to reach the goal) For a teaching sequence (or a part of a curriculum)
Referent communities
Scientific reasoning Ability to reason about explanations, experiments, and models
Making exercise for healthy heart,etc. includes scientific content, reasoning, and higher thinking processes
For goal: Scholarly societies in epistemology and experimental sciences, and in psychology and science education For tools: Scholarly societies in experimental sciences, etc.
2. Black Tide (Jimenez Aleixandre, 2006) Close environment of the students should be made intelligible to them
Using environment and its problems as objects and resources for learning Many different types of activities and actions, some are teaching activities in science (physics, chemistry, biology)
For goal: The society that decides the goal. For tools: A diversity of referents depending on the tools. Scholarly societies in experimental sciences, etc.
Fig. F.1 Two cases of analysis of teaching sequences (or learning environment) in terms of goals and teaching tools, and the referent communities from where they came
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For the two examples given in Fig. F.1, the teacher’s classroom management needs a rather high level of analysis of the different components involved in the studied situation and a certain level of competency on each of these components (e. g., epistemology, several experimental sciences). Figure F.2 shows that, when a social situation is more or less directly “imported” into the classroom, the teacher has a huge responsibility; it has to do most of the transposition in order that this transposed situation should be relevant not only for students’ learning but also for what the society recognises as being worthwhile to teach at school. Among these multiple charges, the teacher has the responsibility to help the students to make clear (when possible) the different criteria to accept or reject arguments pertaining to experimental sciences, epistemology, or everyday life. Several contributions of this book propose typologies or categories of arguments; they illustrate that it is not easy to establish criteria to differentiate arguments. The concept of transposition helps us to make explicit the heavy teacher charge (Fig. F.2). At the same time, nowadays introducing social knowledge and practice of debates as referent and as goal in curricula is a current tendency, however it addresses difficult questions that should be taken into consideration to be successful. Studies on argumentation in science education clearly contribute to make explicit and propose elements to implement curricula with such goals. This book shows how argumentation is a very rich domain to investigate and contributes to improve science education. It is divided into three sections. The first section, devoted to argumentation foundations includes a very well informed overview (Jiménez-Aleixandre and Erduran, Chapter 1), which should constitute a reference for future research in our community. Chapter 2 presents a basic component of studying argumentation in science education: the cognitive (Garcia-Mila and Andersen), and Chapter 3 deals with methodological foundations (Erduran). The last chapter of this section (Sandoval and Millwood, Chapter 4) pertains to the epistemological component by tackling the challenging question of relation between students’ argumentation and their epistemological ideas and their epistemic practices.
Referent knowledge or practice
Knowledge and practice of scientific communities
Social knowledge and practice of debates by experts people, politics,
Transposition done by researchers and teachers in science education (tools, teaching sequence, etc.)
Most of the transposition has to be done by the teacher on the spot. Possibly some tools, or preparation with researchers and/or teachers
Classroom debate on a socio-scientific issue
Fig. F.2 References of arguments involved during a classroom debate (scientific, social). These different arguments can appear quasi-simultaneously
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The second section deals with teaching and learning argumentation. In Chapter 5, Jiménez-Aleixandre discusses the features of learning environments that promote argumentation in science classrooms and the necessity of work on design to develop argumentation. Chapter 6 (Kølsto and Ratcliffe) deals with the social aspects of argumentation, approaching the context in which argumentation is involved in classroom and the social aspects of the teaching goals. The two other chapters concern the nature and quality of students’ argumentation. Kelly, Regev and Prothero, in Chapter 7, identify and analyse the nature of the claims being made by the student writers and how these claims are developed as the lines of reasoning supporting a thesis. Chapter 8 (Duschl) deals with the quality of argumentation and epistemic criteria on the basis of the analysis of students argumentation discourse and epistemic criteria used by middle school students. The third section entitled argumentation in context includes four chapters introducing the readers to a large range of contexts for argumentation in science education. Chapter 9 (Simmoneaux) of this section is devoted to students’ argumentation skills on socio-scientific issues like GMO in relation to the teacher’s role. Chapter 10 (Zeidler and Sadler) deals with socio-scientific framework in the perspective of engaging students to reason about moral issues. In Chapter 11, the research field on the role of computer in education is involved. Clark, Stegmann, Weinberger, Menekse and Erkens present the case of computer-enhanced learning environments to support students’ argumentation with fruitful results and perspectives. Chapter 12 (Zohar) deals with science teacher education a professional development in argumentation that is a crucial component in the introduction of argumentation in the teaching and learning of science. Andrée Tiberghien
References Astolfi, J. P. (2006). Les questions vives en question? In A. Legardez & L. Simonneaux (Eds.), L’école à l’épreuve de la réalité. Enseigner les questions vives (pp. 9–12). Paris: ESF éditeur. Chevallard, Y. (1991). La transposition didactique (2ème ed.). Grenoble, France: La Pensée Sauvage. Jiménez-Aleixandre, M. P. (2006). Les personnes peuvent-elles agir sur la réalité? La théorie critique et la marée noire du Prestige. In A. Legardez & L. Simonneaux (Eds.), L’école à l’épreuve de la réalité. Enseigner les questions vives (pp. 105–117). Paris: ESF éditeur. Legardez, A., & Simonneaux, L. (2006). L’école à l’épreuve de la réalité. Enseigner les questions vives. Paris: ESF éditeur. Plantin, C. (2005). L’argumentation; histoire, théories et perspectives. Paris: PUF. Sjøberg, S. (2005, 8–11 March). Young people and science: Attitudes, values and priorities. Evidence from the ROSE project (pdf) (Paper presented at the EU’s Science and Society Forum 2005, Brussels). Available at http://www.ils.uio.no/english/rose/publications/english-presentations. html. Tseitlin, M., & Galili, I. (2005). Physics teaching in the search for its self: from a physics-discipline to a physics-culture. Science and Education, 14(3–5), 235–261.
Contents
Preface ...............................................................................................................
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Foreword ...........................................................................................................
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Part I
Argumentation Foundations
Chapter 1
Argumentation in Science Education: An Overview ............... María Pilar Jiménez-Aleixandre and Sibel Erduran
3
Chapter 2
Cognitive Foundations of Learning Argumentation ............... Merce Garcia-Mila and Christopher Andersen
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Chapter 3
Methodological Foundations in the Study of Argumentation in Science Classrooms ..................................... Sibel Erduran
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What Can Argumentation Tell Us About Epistemology? ............................................................................. William A. Sandoval and Kelli A. Millwood
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Chapter 4
Part II
Research on Teaching and Learning Argumentation
Chapter 5
Designing Argumentation Learning Environments................. María Pilar Jiménez-Aleixandre
91
Chapter 6
Social Aspects of Argumentation .............................................. Stein Dankert Kolstø and Mary Ratcliffe
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Chapter 7
Analysis of Lines of Reasoning in Written Argumentation ............................................................................ Gregory J. Kelly, Jacqueline Regev, and William Prothero
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Chapter 8
Part III
Quality Argumentation and Epistemic Criteria .................... Richard A. Duschl
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Argumentation in Context
Chapter 9
Argumentation in Socio-Scientific Contexts........................... Laurence Simonneaux
Chapter 10
The Role of Moral Reasoning in Argumentation: Conscience, Character, and Care ............................................ Dana L. Zeidler and Troy D. Sadler
Chapter 11
Chapter 12
Technology-Enhanced Learning Environments to Support Students’ Argumentation...................................... Douglas B. Clark, Karsten Stegmann, Armin Weinberger, Muhsin Menekse, and Gijsbert Erkens
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Science Teacher Education and Professional Development in Argumentation .............................................. Anat Zohar
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Author Biographies .........................................................................................
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Author Contact Details ...................................................................................
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Author Index....................................................................................................
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Subject Index ...................................................................................................
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Chapter 1
Argumentation in Science Education: An Overview María Pilar Jiménez-Aleixandre and Sibel Erduran
Charles Darwin once described On the Origin of Species as “one long argument”. This sentence can be viewed as embodying several of the different dimensions of argumentation discussed in this book. On the one hand, it provides evidence, coming from someone with undisputable authority, on argument being an integral part of the construction of scientific knowledge. On the other hand, when applied to the outstanding piece of scientific thinking that is On the Origin of Species, the description combines two aspects of argumentation. The first aspect relates to the justification of knowledge claims, by marshalling converging lines of reasoning (see Kelly, Regev, & Prothero, this book), theoretical ideas and empirical evidence toward a claim. Darwin weaved together population theory from Malthus, or uniformitarianism from Lyell, with empirical data gathered in his voyage to Central and South America in his bold claim of the theory of natural selection. A second aspect of argumentation has to do with argumentation as persuasion, in Darwin’s case as an attempt to convince an audience, composed both of scientists and of the general public, that the animals and plants had changed, that the species living on Earth descended from other species instead of having being created all at a time. Darwin was well aware that the task of persuading his contemporaries was not an easy one, such awareness being one of the reasons for delaying the publication of his book for about twenty years. In fact a joint presentation by Darwin and Wallace in the Linnean Society in 1858 stirred little interest, and the president of the Society summarised the year as one that “has not indeed been marked by any of those striking discoveries which at once revolutionize science” (Beddall, 1968, pp 304–305). However, one year later, the publication of Darwin’s book launched a great controversy, corresponding yet to another aspect of argumentation, as debate among two parties with contrasting positions on a subject. Argumentation, in whatever sense it is conveyed, is an integral part of science and we argue it should be integrated into science education. In this chapter, we present an overview of a line of research in science education whose main purpose has been exactly such attempts to make argumentation a component of instruction and learning. Indeed the field on argumentation in science education has been receiving growing attention in recent years. Firstly we outline a rationale for why should we, teachers or science educators, promote argumentation in science classrooms. Second we discuss different meanings of argumentation and some S. Erduran and M. P. Jiménez-Aleixandre (eds.), Argumentation in Science Education. © Springer 2007
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approaches to its study, particularly those relevant for science education. In the third section we turn our attention to an overview of some themes from international policies for science curricula that provide a context and a rationale for the inclusion of argumentation in science education worldwide. We conclude the chapter with a brief link to some of the earlier work that formed the foundation of argumentation studies in science education. Overall, our discussion illustrates the theoretical, empirical and policy level conceptualisations in the study of argumentation in science education which point to the significance of research in this area.
Why Argumentation in the Science Classroom? In recent years, a growing number of studies are focusing on the analysis of argumentation discourse in science learning contexts (e.g., Driver et al., 2000; Jiménez-Aleixandre et al., 2000; Kelly & Takao, 2002; Zohar & Nemet, 2002). These works draw, among others, from two related frameworks. One framework is related to science studies highlighting the importance of discourse in the construction of scientific knowledge (Knorr-Cetina, 1999; Latour & Woolgar, 1986) and consequences for education (Boulter & Gilbert, 1995; Erduran et al., 2004; Pontecorvo, 1987). A second framework is the sociocultural perspective (Vygotsky, 1978; Wertsch, 1991) which points to the role of social interaction in learning and thinking processes, and purports that higher thinking processes originate from socially mediated activities, particularly through the mediation of language. To these could be added an interest in democratic participation, which requires debate among different views rather than acceptation of authority. The implication is that argumentation is a form of discourse that needs to be appropriated by students and explicitly taught through suitable instruction, task structuring and modelling. From these approaches a view can be derived about science learning in terms of the appropriation of community practices that promote the modes of communication required to sustain scientific discourse (Kelly & Chen, 1999; Lemke, 1990; Mason, 1996). Such a view stands in contrast to the traditional views of science learning that focus only on outcomes such as problem-solving, concept learning or science-process skills. Science learning is thus considered to involve the construction and use of tools that, like argumentation, are instrumental in the generation of knowledge about the natural world (Kitcher, 1988). Argumentation plays a central role in the building of explanations, models and theories (Siegel, 1995) as scientists use arguments to relate the evidence they select to the claims they reach through use of warrants and backings (Toulmin, 1958). The case made is that argumentation is a critically important discourse process in science, and that it should be promoted in the science classroom (Duschl & Osborne, 2002; JiménezAleixandre et al., 2000; Kelly et al., 1998; Zohar & Nemet, 2002). A significant question, however, is why argumentation deserves to be promoted in the context of science learning. Put more specifically, what is the rationale for introducing argumentation in science learning?
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Andrée Tiberghien (this book) frames this question in the theory of “didactic transposition” (from the French transposition didactique, where didactic does not have the standard English meaning of traditional approach, but the less charged significance of the original Greek “related to teaching”, common to most Indo-European languages). Tiberghien discusses the external referents for the legitimisation of argumentation, distinguishing two aspects: one it’s about the place of argumentation in science education and the other about the connections between argumentation and citizenship education. She summarises the place of argumentation in science education in terms of three goals: knowledge about nature of science; developing citizenship and developing higher order thinking skills. With an approach complementary to Tiberghien’s exploration of external referents, in this section we elaborate on the rationale for argumentation appealed to from within the educational community, and particularly the science education community. We propose that there are at least five intertwined dimensions or potential contributions from the introduction of argumentation in the science classrooms: ●
●
●
●
●
Supporting the access to the cognitive and metacognitive processes characterising expert performance and enabling modelling for students. This dimension draws from the situated cognition perspective and the consideration of classrooms as communities of learners (Brown & Campione, 1990; Collins et al., 1989). Supporting the development of communicative competences and particularly critical thinking. This dimension draws from the theory of communicative action and the sociocultural perspective (Habermas, 1981; Wertsch, 1991). Supporting the achievement of scientific literacy and empowering of students to talk and to write the languages of science. This dimension draws from language studies and social semiotics (Kress et al., 2001; Norris & Phillips, 2003; Yore et al., 2003). Supporting the enculturation into the practices of the scientific culture and the development of epistemic criteria for knowledge evaluation. This dimension draws from science studies, particularly from the epistemology of science (Leach et al., 2003; Sandoval, 2005). Supporting the development of reasoning, particularly the choice of theories or positions based on rational criteria. This dimension draws from philosophy of science (Giere, 1988; Siegel, 1989, 1995, 2006) as well as from developmental psychology (Kuhn, 1991, 1993).
These contributions influence one another, although they are discussed separately, for the clarity of discussion. It has to be noted that by qualifying these contributions as potential we imply that their achievement is not necessarily warranted by the introduction of argumentation in the classroom. We acknowledge that the execution of these dimensions in the science classroom require a coordinated, complex and systematic set of pedagogical, curricular and assessment initiatives, among others. Table 1.1 summarises the dimensions and the perspectives or bodies of knowledge framing the dimensions.
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Table 1.1 Contributions of argumentation and perspectives framing contributions Potential contributions of argumentation Drawing from Making public and modelling cognitive processes Developing communicative competences, critical thinking Achieving scientific literacy; talking and writing science Enculturation into scientific culture; developing epistemic criteria Developing reasoning and rational criteria
Situated cognition; communities of learners Theory of communicative action; sociocultural perspective Language studies; social semiotics Science studies; epistemology Philosophy and developmental psychology
When pointing out the different fields or perspectives from which science education draws in promoting argumentation in the classroom, the implication is not that this is a one-way relationship. We believe that science education itself, through studies on argumentation, holds the potential to inform these perspectives in their disciplinary settings as well, leading to truly interdisciplinary investigations of argumentation. In other words, we contend that reciprocal contributions between these “feeding fields” and science education are desirable and fruitful in the production of knowledge in the field of argumentation studies.
Making Cognitive Processes Public: Argumentation and Situated Cognition Constructivist perspectives view learning as a process of knowledge construction. A seminal piece of work supporting this claim was produced by Collins et al. (1989) who proposed to organise teaching as cognitive apprenticeship where knowledge and skills learning are integrated in their social and functional contexts. This proposal is related to Lave and Wenger’s (1991) notion of situated learning, conceiving learning as increasing participation in a community of practice. Cognitive apprenticeship seeks to relate these knowledge and skills to their use in the real world. As Collins and colleagues point out, current pedagogical practices make invisible the key aspects of expertise, paying little or no attention to the processes through which experts acquire or use knowledge while performing complex or real tasks, for instance higher order processes. Applying the notion of apprenticeship to skills that are cognitive in nature requires internalisation of external processes. However in current educational contexts neither the teacher nor the students have access to the cognitive processes of each other, thus rendering impossible the observation or modelling of these processes. It may be noted that cognitive processes are made public through language and that natural language is both a tool and an obstacle for building scientific knowledge.
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Brown and Palincsar (1989) base their proposal of guided cooperative learning in Vygotsky’s (1978) notion of the social genesis of individual comprehension and in Toulmin’s (1958) argumentation structure. These authors point to the role of collaboration in providing models of cognitive processes, as the thinking strategies are performed in public, modelling what then has to be performed privately. Argumentation in the context of classrooms where students are participants in a community of learners (Brown & Campione, 1990; Mason, 1996) may thus support the development of higher order cognitive processes (one of the goals for science education mentioned by Tiberghien, this book), given that reasoning becomes public and students are expected to explicitly back their statements with evidence and to evaluate alternative options or explanations.
Developing Communicative Competencies and Critical Thinking Both critical theory and sociocultural perspectives view educational and mental processes in connection with their social and historical contexts. The critical theory conceived in the Frankfurt School can be described as a reflection on the relationships among social goals, means and values. For critical theory the goal of technical progress cannot be placed higher than democracy, and education is assigned a central role in social transformation. Carr and Kemmis (1986) contrast critical rationality and technical rationality, the latter being a perspective that views all problems as technical issues, depriving people from the capacity of controlling the world around them, with the consequence of diminishing the capacities of reflection and modification of situations by means of action. For Jürgen Habermas (1981) critical theory is a form of self-reflective knowledge that expands the scope of autonomy, thus reducing domination. In his theory of communicative action Habermas distinguishes four types of social actions: (a) teleological, or goal oriented; (b) norms regulated (c) dramaturgical, or a performance in front of an audience constituted by the participants in the interaction; and (d) communicative, oriented to understanding one another in order to coordinate planned actions. Language and communicative competencies play a central role in communicative action: people reflect about themselves and about the world, and share these explanations with others. The theory of communicative action gives people pre-eminence over structures, assigning them the potentiality to develop actions directed to social change. As Kelly (2005) notes, in Habermas’ framework, individual shifts to a social epistemic subject whilst reason is centred on communicative action and norms for argument are shared. The perspectives of critical theorists contribute to a view of classrooms as places for communication. The acknowledgement of the importance of communication, of the relevance of language in knowledge construction, pointed out by Vygotsky (1978), is contributing to new lines of work in science education about the role of language in science learning, for instance in meaning making (Mortimer & Scott, 2003).
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Given the theoretical precedence of the role of communication in education, it is essential to pay a closer look at the development of students’ communicative competencies. The need for promoting critical thinking has been advocated from different philosophical and psychological positions. From a philosophical perspective, Ennis (1992) defines critical thinking as reasonable reflective thinking focused on deciding what to believe in or do, and provides a set of criteria for assessing it. For Siegel (1992) a critical thinker refers to an educational ideal, and he emphasises the rationale for the assessment component of critical thinking and the disposition of critical thinkers to seek evidence for their beliefs. Understood as the search for evidence, critical thinking would be closely related to developing rational criteria, a position also maintained by some cognitive psychologists like Kuhn who explains the development of scientific reasoning as the coordination of theory and evidence (Kuhn, 1991; Garcia-Mila & Andersen, this book). But although critical thinking from the perspective of critical theory entails contrasting theories and beliefs with evidence, it also has a component related to the issue of emancipation. Furthermore critical thinking from this perspective is related to developing the capacity to criticise discourses which contribute to the reproduction of asymmetrical relations of power (Fairclough, 1995), or as Paulo Freire (1970) put it, to empowering students to understand the society around them and their own capacity to transform it. Teachers creating environments where students engage in argumentation about socio-scientific issues (see for instance Simonneaux, this book) include, among their goals, the development of critical thinking. Such critical thinking is related to the development of citizenship (Tiberghien, this book), of educating citizens that are critical thinkers, in the sense not only of a commitment to evidence, but also of an empowerment for critical rationality, the capacity to reflect on and influence social issues of relevance for their lives. Critical thinking can further be framed relative to scientific scepticism, as a tool for confronting pseudoscience and credulity.
Achieving Scientific Literacy: Talking and Writing Science The recent focus on the role of spoken and written language in science learning seeks to redress an overemphasis on the recipe-like empirical (laboratory experiences) and rote mathematical (formulae) components of scientific knowledge in the classroom. Such change of focus cannot be seen as a return to rote-memory learning or use of textbooks as sole resources, in so far as it is rooted in a notion of the interpretative use of language and in the recognition of the importance of meaning construction (Mortimer & Scott, 2003). Norris and Phillips (2003) advocate the centrality of reading (interpreted as inferring meaning from text) and writing in learning science. In a similar vein, Yore et al. (2003) demand attention to the literacy component of science literacy, such as, for instance, critical reading of different sources, or participation in debates and argumentation among other
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modes of communication and communicative resources in the science classroom (Kress et al., 2001). Lemke (1990) drew attention to the centrality of talk in science learning and to the need of promoting students’ true dialogue or “talking science”, a way of learning the language of science. Lemke’s approach, grounded in the work of Mikhail Bakhtin (1986) who conceived communication as a social phenomenon, considers both scientific talking and scientific writing as social practices. The focus on discourse means an exploration of the features of texts that have rhetorical significance (Myers, 1990). Texts can be viewed as part of the social processes involved in the production of scientific knowledge, of the negotiations of the place and value of a claim in the structure of scientific knowledge given that science writing cannot be seen as reporting, but as construction of scientific facts (Myers, 1990). By engaging in argumentation students learn to talk and write the languages of science (see for instance Kelly et al., this book; Mason, 1998), including the rhetorical features (Kelly & Bazerman, 2003; Martins et al., 2001) such as persuasion in argumentation.
Enculturation in the Practices of Scientific Culture: Developing Epistemic Criteria Learning science involves epistemic apprenticeship, the appropriation of practices associated with producing, communicating and evaluating knowledge (Kelly & Duschl, 2002). Kelly (2005) defines epistemic practices as the specific ways members of a community propose, justify, evaluate and legitimise knowledge claims within a disciplinary framework. With a focus on the science classroom, epistemic practices are defined by Sandoval and Reiser (2004) as the cognitive and discursive practices involved in making and evaluating knowledge, practices related to students’ development of epistemological understanding. This epistemological understanding is viewed by Garcia-Mila and Andersen (this book) as cognitive foundation for argumentation. Leach and colleagues (2003) proposed teaching interventions aimed to foster epistemic understanding. Their studies are set in the context of an agenda exploring epistemic goals and practices, of a shift of focus on processes rather than on end products of science learning. The appropriation by students of practices of the scientific community or the enculturation in the scientific culture is related to students’ understanding of scientific epistemology—what in the literature is known as personal epistemologies. Kelly (2005) points to the social nature of the science epistemology, as epistemic criteria for justifying and evaluating knowledge are developed as social norms in a given community. Fostering students’ appropriation of the epistemic practices of the scientific community is related to the goal of developing students’ knowledge and skills about the nature of science proposed by Tiberghien (this book). Sandoval (2005) distinguishes among students’ formal and practical epistemologies, the former being beliefs about professional science, the latter about their own practices
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with inquiry. Sandoval highlights an important reason for promoting the development of sophisticated epistemologies: the effective participation in policy decisions and the interpretation of scientific claims relevant for their lives, claiming that such outcomes are crucial for democracy. We see this dimension of epistemic understanding associated with the meaning of critical thinking discussed earlier. Argumentation, with its emphasis on justification of claims and on the coordination among claims and evidence, may support the development of epistemic criteria and more generally the enculturation in the practices of the scientific community. The relationships among argumentation and epistemology are discussed in detail in Sandoval and Millwood, and the development of epistemic criteria in Duschl (both chapters in this book).
Developing Reasoning and Rational Criteria In a way, it could be argued that the development of the capacity of choosing among theories or positions is part of the development of epistemic criteria discussed in the previous section. For some authors, as already mentioned, rationality and critical thinking are treated as being almost synonymous. However, the ongoing controversy in science education as well as in philosophy of science (sometimes referred to as “science wars”) locates rationality, epistemology and radical constructivism, among other issues as pivotal in relation to science learning. The “science wars” debate, as Peters (2006) puts it in his editorial for the special issue on philosophy of science education in Educational Philosophy and Theory, has been silenced in many occasions or publicised by means of a biased account, as in the Sokal affair. Incidentally, it may be noted that as the Hwang case sadly proves, scientific journals (Science, no less), and not only social studies journals, can be successfully hoodwinked into publishing forgery. Although these debates exceed the scope of this chapter, we consider the concept of rationality relevant for our purposes particularly in relation to science education and argumentation. First, it has to be noted that issues surrounding rationality are complex issues, where different perspectives can be seen in a continuum, rather than in extreme black or white irreconcilable sides. We (the authors of this chapter) contemplate science both as a rational enterprise and as a social construction. There is no denying that scientific research is influenced by ideology, power or commercial interests. For instance, the issue of gender is tightly related to critiques of science, particularly given that perspectives of women and other marginalised sectors are conventionally underrepresented. But, as the feminist Sandra Harding (1991) argues, recognising sociological or cultural relativism does not entail epistemological relativism but rather a search for the most objective knowledge claims. In other words “A feminist standpoint epistemology requires strengthened standards of objectivity” (p. 142) leading to less distorted beliefs in natural phenomena. If we agree that science is, or ideally should be, a rational enterprise then how can we define its rationality? For Siegel (1989, 2006) literature fails to distinguish
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three different questions about rationality. According to Siegel the central question is: What counts as evidence for some scientific hypothesis or procedure? In other words, Siegel sees rationality of science as being grounded in a commitment to evidence. On the other hand Siegel conceives of critical thinking as the educational cognate of rationality, involving consistency, impartiality and fairness. Siegel’s perspective on rationality has not gone unnoticed nor uncriticised. For instance, Finocchiaro (2005) criticises Siegel’s identification of critical thinking as rationality, proposing instead the notion of reasoning aimed at interpretation, evaluation or self-reflective presentation of arguments (critical reasoning) or methodological reflection. As discussed above, our own perspective is grounded on rationality as commitment to evidence whilst at the same time-sharing some of the tenets of the critical theory. In particular, we contend that critical theories enrich Siegel or Finocchiaro definitions by including the reflection about social environment and the potential to transform society. In terms of a philosophical referent, the resulting perspective could be rooted in the idea about the unfinished project of modernity (Habermas, 1997, 1981). For Habermas the modernity project, formulated by the Enlightenment, is based on rationality and its lack of vigour means, not that the Enlightenment goals should be discarded, but that they have not be achieved. In summary, it can be said that the epistemic criteria developed to choose among theories or positions are rational criteria and their development may be supported by argumentation. In Fig. 1.1 we summarise some potential contributions of argumentation to the goals of science education implied by our discussion so far.
Higher order cognitive processes
Enculturation in scientific culture
supports
supports
involves
Rhetorical moves
involves
as
persuasion
Theory choice
Developing epistemic criteria
Public reasoning
involves
enables by involves
as
Argumentation involves
justification
involves
connected
connected
Reflection about themselves & world
Talking & writing science
Commitment to evidence
rationality
supports
supports
a component of
Scientific literacy
a component of
emancipation
Fig. 1.1 Potential contributions from argumentation
Critical thinking
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Science education is conventionally seen as addressing goals of two sorts, which can be summarised as “science for all” and “science for prospective scientists”. Our position is that argumentation can contribute to both goals. More particular goals of contributing to the development of higher order cognitive processes, enculturation into scientific practices and epistemological understanding are also represented in the figure. From the discussion so far some may be tempted to conclude that argumentation is a solution to most science education problems. This is not an implication that we wish to project. Rather we conceive of argumentation, on the one hand as a solution for some learning problems, to the extent that it helps students learn things that are hard to learn except through argumentation (e.g., evaluating evidence) and on the other hand as holding the potential to help us better understand and support the learning processes in the science classroom.
Meanings of Argument For the purposes of this book it is important to clarify what we mean by argument. Is argument a statement or a process? Does an argument need to be produced by an individual or can it be co-constructed across individuals? Is argument always related to a dialogical context or can it take place internally in individuals’ minds? With respect to the last question, we agree with Billig (1987) who, in discussing the Greek philosopher Protagoras’ position on argument, points out that argument has both an individual and a social meaning: “The individual meaning refers to any piece of reasoned discourse. As one articulates a point of view, one can be said to be developing an argument” (p. 44). The social meaning is that of a dispute or debate between people opposing each other with contrasting sides to an issue. In other words, an argument can be either an inner chain of reasoning or a difference of positions between people and, as Kuhn (1993) notes, there is a link between the two. Social argumentation is a powerful vehicle for developing the higher order thinking that we call internal argumentation. In other words, social dialogue offers a way to externalise internal thinking strategies embedded in argumentation. Not all authors would agree with this double meaning as, for instance, van Eemeren and Grootendorst (2004) restrict the meaning of an argument to the social one: “Argumentation is a verbal, social and rational activity aimed at convincing a reasonable critic of the acceptability of a standpoint by putting forward a constellation of propositions justifying or refuting the proposition expressed in the standpoint” (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004, p. 1). For Plantin (personal communication) this definition, while apparently emphasising social aspects, adopts an entirely individual perspective. Perhaps both positions can be partly reconciled if, as Kuhn and Udell (2003) propose, we use the terms argument for the product, statement or piece of reasoned discourse and argumentation or argumentative discourse for the social process or activity, discussed in more detail in Garcia-Mila and Andersen (in this book). About the individual versus co-constructed production,
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we consider that both cases are possible, as illustrated in some empirical studies in other chapters. From the different meanings of argumentation, at least two that are combined in van Eemeren and Grootendorst definition, are relevant for the science classroom context: argumentation as knowledge justification and argumentation as persuasion. We see this distinction related to two types of text construction discussed by Myers (1990, p. 103): scientific arguments, referenced in evidence, and narratives that function by persuasion. In science, knowledge construction is linked to knowledge justification, and claims should be related either to a path of logical clauses or to data and evidence from different sources (or to both). Hence, argumentation in scientific topics can be defined as the connection between claims and data through justifications or the evaluation of knowledge claims in light of evidence, either empirical or theoretical. Scientific claims are thus differentiated from opinions. Driver et al. (2000), Duschl and Osborne (2002) and Kuhn (1992), among others, suggest that science education should promote argumentation as one of the dimensions of learning science, and of the enculturation in the scientific discourse. Garcia-Mila and Andersen (this book) claim a broader relevance for argumentation, viewing it as a process aimed at the rational resolution of questions and involved in general knowledge acquisition. Other authors from philosophy have defined argumentation mainly in reference to justification. For instance according to Finocchiaro (2005) an argument is “an instance of reasoning that attempts to justify a conclusion by supporting it with reasons or defending it from objections” (p. 15). Argumentation as persuasion can be defined as the process of convincing an audience (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004). Acknowledgement of the role of discursive practices in the construction of scientific knowledge suggests that discourse has to be considered as being relevant for the appropriation of scientific culture by students. For Driver et al. (2000) the interpretation of argumentation as discursive practice is involved in the process of reaching agreement on acceptable claims or courses of action. Acknowledging the role of discourse does not mean that it is not possible to develop criteria for evaluating knowledge claims. We agree with Siegel (1989) and Driver et al. (2000) that argumentation is a rational process that relies on the rigorous application of knowledge evaluation criteria. Our review of the meaning of argumentation will benefit from an historical overview of argumentation studies, as for instance, presented by Plantin (1996, 2005). For Plantin a turning point in these studies was the publication in 1958, of seminal work by Toulmin (1958) as well as Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca. On the focus on argumentation by these books, Plantin concurs, was a move towards legitimisation of a field discredited because of its association with rhetoric. Plantin sees the discredit of rhetoric in France at the end of the nineteenth century as being related to the prevalence of positivist views. The historical method was considered to yield legitimate knowledge whereas rhetoric, conceived as persuasion and even associated with trickery with words, was deemed not scientific, leading to the disappearance of the teaching of rhetoric from the French universities. After the Second World War, the ideological context changed. The emergence of argumentation studies can be interpreted as a reflection of the increasing attention at rationality of discourse
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as well as an attempt to promote “the construction of a democratic rational discourse, rejecting totalitarian Nazi or Stalinist discourses” (Plantin, 2005, p. 15; our translation). The life story of Chaïm Perelman (a scholar of Jewish origin) who contributed to the defence of Belgian Jews during the war, lends further support to the influence of the post-war context for the importance of rhetoric and rationality. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1958) subtitle their book as “the new rhetoric,” and define argumentation theory as the study of discursive techniques that allow for the trigger or increase of adherences to proposed theses. The rationale they construct has the purpose of achieving value judgements, and consists of discursive techniques or tools that enable the justification of decisions or choices. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca distinguish persuasive from convincing argumentation, the former being addressed to a particular audience whereas the latter addresses any rational being and is universal in nature. It has to be noted that there is a long tradition of argumentation and rhetoric studies in French exemplified by the seventeenthcentury work Logic or the Art of Thinking (Arnauld & Nicole, 1992), also known as the Port-Royal Logic, work that Finnocchiaro (2005) regards as a precursor of argumentation and informal logic studies. Arnauld and Nicole treatise deals with issues such as the relationship between truth and intelligibility, or the principles of reasoning relevant to the discovery and justification of contingent truths. More recently, in the last decades of the twentieth century, several interesting studies on argumentation were produced in France derived from the field of language sciences. For instance, Anscombre and Ducrot (1983) emphasise the role of language in argumentation whilst Grize (1982) focuses on cognitive processes, providing a framework that is used by several French science education researchers (Buty & Plantin, in press). Unfortunately, there is paucity of English translations of the seminal historical texts as well as of the educational research in argumentation. One example of argumentation analysis using Grize’s ideas is the work of Simonneaux (this book). The argumentation model or scheme of Stephen Toulmin (1958) can be seen as a move towards the study of argumentation as it is practised in the natural languages, and therefore away from the schemes of formal logic. Insofar as the relationships between formal logic and logic in the natural discourse are concerned, we agree with Hintikka (1999) that formal logic remains inadequate for inferences leading to new discoveries: “the truths of formal logic are mere tautologies or analytical truths without substantial content and hence incapable of sustaining any inferences leading to new and even surprising discoveries” (p. 25). For Díaz and Jiménez-Aleixandre (2000) the implication is that while it could be used to represent or analyse established knowledge, formal logic is not an adequate framework to interpret discourse in situations where new knowledge is being generated. In situations consisting of natural discourse, for instance when solving a problem in the science classroom or laboratory, many propositions could be not correct or even fallacious from the perspective of formal logic, while at the same time constituting fruitful steps in the construction of knowledge. Toulmin himself sought to describe argumentation in practice and thereby challenge the notion of deductive validity.
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He made a distinction between idealised notions of arguments as employed in mathematics and the practice of arguments in linguistic contexts, which, for him, should have close ties with epistemology. Toulmin was committed to a procedural interpretation of argumentation form as opposed to the rigid idea that all arguments have the form of “premises to conclusions”. Any justification of a statement or set of statements is, for Toulmin, an argument to support a stated claim. In other words, he places the validity of an argument in the coherence of its justification. In Toulmin’s model of argument, sometimes referred to as Toulmin’s Argument Pattern or TAP, an argument needs to make appeals to data, warrants, backings and qualifiers. Such appeals are context dependent. (For applications of Toulmin’s work in the analysis of classroom data on argumentation, see Erduran in this book). Examining the form of arguments from different fields (e.g., law, science and politics), Toulmin was able to discern that some elements of arguments are the same while others differ across fields of inquiry. Toulmin termed the elements of arguments that are similar across fields as being field-invariant features of arguments whereas those elements that differed were called field-dependent features. Data, claims, warrants, backings, rebuttals and qualifiers are field-invariant, while “what counts” as data, warrant or backing are field-dependent. Thus, appeals to justify claims used to craft historical explanations would not necessarily be the same kind of appeals used to support claims for causal or statistical-probabilistic explanations. The flexibility of Toulmin’s model to function in both field-dependent and field-invariant contexts provides an advantage for understanding and evaluating the arguments posed by students in science. Toulmin’s work has received much criticism. Plantin (2005), for instance, argues that Toulmin’s scheme is a model of rationale discourse adequate primarily for a monologue, although he appreciates the inclusion of the modal qualifier that can be conceived as the introduction of an element of dialogue. In science education some authors (e.g., Duschl, this book) have pointed to the inadequacies of TAP to account for dialogic argumentation, proposing instead the use of other models such as Walton’s (1996) as being more appropriate for the study of classroom discourse. Walton (1996) frames his dialectical approach to argumentation in informal logic. For Walton (1989) in order to analyse argumentative discourse on controversial issues in natural language a number of questions must be taken into account, as for instance careful attention to language or the ability to deal with vagueness and ambiguity, and the researcher must be prepared to unravel the main line of argument from long exchanges among two or more people. Walton points out that in this dialectical approach the question–answer context of an argument is brought forward and an argument is seen as a part of an interactive dialogue of two (or sometimes more) people reasoning together. Walton’s (1996) argumentation schemes for presumptive reasoning are grounded on presumption as a practical notion that is used to enable a dialogue or an action to go ahead on a provisional basis. So it may be that not all the evidence that would be needed to reach a definite claim or option (or course of action) is available. Walton also offers an interesting
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distinction about explicit and implicit commitments of participants in a dialogue. He sees the commitment set of each participant as divided in two sides: a light side, a set of propositions known, or in view, to all the participants, and a dark side, a set of propositions not known to, or visible to, some or all of the participants. This dark side represents the implicit commitments. (Walton’s emphasis, Walton, 1996, p. 26)
This distinction has been used by Jiménez-Aleixandre, Agraso and Eirexas (2004) in their analysis of students’ arguments about an oil spill. Walton’s typology of argumentation schemes can be interpreted also as a typology of justifications or warrants, or as a typology of appeals.
International Policies, Science Curricula and Argumentation Apart from academic rationales for the promotion of argumentation in science education, there are policy level indications that argumentation as a skill is important worldwide. Computing technologies and trends in globalisation have contributed to a renewed vision that citizens across the world need to deal with a vast set of information and be able to evaluate such information. A significant aspect of such skills is the ability to argue with evidence. Internationally the phrasing of the national science curricula has begun to incorporate more of an emphasis on the need to teach students the skills of interpreting, evaluating and debating information. In addition, international comparative studies such as the Third International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS) have offered a rationale and support for reform needed in many countries. Likewise, the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) has been a driving force in the advancement of skills such as the ability to coordinate evidence and claims. PISA is an internationally standardised assessment that was jointly developed by participating countries and administered to 15-yearolds in schools. The survey was implemented in 43 countries in the first assessment in 2000, in 41 countries in the second assessment in 2003, in 57 countries in the third assessment in 2006 and 62 countries have signed up to participate in the fourth assessment in 2009. Tests are typically administered to between 4,500 and 10,000 students in each country. The PISA Assessment Framework, although does not mention argumentation as a term, explicitly emphasises the role of evidence in the reaching of conclusions: An important life skill for young people is the capacity to draw appropriate and guarded conclusions from evidence and information given to them, to criticize claims made by others on the basis of the evidence put forward, and to distinguish opinion from evidencebased statements. Science has a particular part to play here since it is concerned with rationality in testing ideas and theories against evidence from the world around. (OECD, 2003, p. 132)
Furthermore, there is emphasis on the role of knowing and applying of processes to select and evaluate information and data (p. 133). Indeed the very definition of scientific literacy is framed in terms of evidence-based conclusions (p. 137).
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Scientific literacy is envisaged as involving three main processes: (a) describing, explaining and predicting scientific phenomena; (b) understanding scientific investigation; (c) interpreting scientific evidence and conclusions. An example assessment framework incorporating the third strand is given in Appendix A. Across the world, there is an increasing trend to incorporate ideas about how scientific knowledge construction occurs and how argument can contribute to the process of scientific knowledge construction. In the United States, American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) and the National Research Council (NRC) have been strong advocates and supporters of reform (AAAS, 1993; NRC, 1996). For example, the “Science as Inquiry Standard” emphasises the importance of students’ understanding of how we know what we know in science. In the United Kingdom, the importance of argument, the justification of claims with evidence, is recognised as an educational goal through the Ideas and Evidence (DfES/QCA, 2004) and How Science Works (QCA, 2007) components of the National Science Curriculum. The basic position underlying these components of the curriculum is that students should leave schooling with a deeper sense of the nature of scientific knowledge—how ideas are produced, evaluated and revised in science. In upper secondary schooling at Key Stage 4, the Qualifications and Curriculum Authority states that: “How science works” focuses on the evidence to support or refute these ideas and theories. The evidence comes from the collection and creative interpretation of data, both of which need to be considered. Consequently, in order to understand how science works, learners need skills such as practical collection of data, working safely, presenting scientific information; they need to understand the power of science to explain phenomena, the way understanding of science changes over time and the applications of contemporary scientific developments. (QCA, 2007)
In the new Spanish National Curriculum for secondary schooling the relevance of the use of evidence and of argumentation is emphasised both in the general definition of basic competencies and in the description of goals in the science subjects. For instance the basic “Competency about knowledge and interaction with the physical world” states that: This competency . . . enables to engage in rational argumentation about the consequences of one or another way of life, and to adopt a stance towards a healthy life both physically and mentally (. . .) This competency makes possible to identify questions or problems and to draw conclusions based on evidence, with the goal of understanding and making decisions about the physical world and about the changes produced by human activity in the environment, the health and people’s quality of life. (MEC, 2007, p. 687; our translation)
The description of the contributions of science to the basic competencies also highlights “a particular way of constructing discourse, aimed at argumentation” (MEC, 2007, p. 692) and includes the skill of argumentation among the general objectives of science education for compulsory secondary school, from 12 to 16 years. In the secondary science curriculum in South Africa, one of the learning outcomes focuses on the nature of science and its relationships to technology, society and environment. Here the expectation is that:
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M. P. Jiménez-Aleixandre and S. Erduran The learner is able to identify and critically evaluate scientific knowledge claims and the impact of this knowledge on the quality of socio-economic, environmental and human development. It is important for learners to understand the scientific enterprise and, in particular, how scientific knowledge develops. (Department of Education, 2003, p. 14)
Furthermore, the South African science curriculum acknowledges a philosophy of science that places the tentative nature of science at the forefront of instruction, highlighting the value of evidence in the building of scientific knowledge: Scientific knowledge is tentative and subject to change as new evidence becomes available and new problems are addressed. The study of historical, environmental and cultural perspectives on science highlights how it changes over time, depending not only on experience but also on social, religious and political factors. (Department of Education, 2003, p. 11)
In Turkey, the national reform efforts have promoted informed citizenship where individuals make evidence-based judgements in their everyday lives including issues that relate to science. Some of the middle-school curricular goals specify in particular the role of argumentation as well as students’ role in the construction of scientifically valid points of view: ● ●
●
To encourage students’ argumentation and evaluation of alternative ideas To mediate debates and activities in a way so as to allow for the possibility of students’ own constructions of scientifically accepted views and mindsets … To encourage students’ skills in generating hypotheses and alternative interpretations in explaining phenomena (MEB, 2005, p. 15, our translation)
The work on argumentation directly relates to the following two standards in the Turkish National Curriculum which lists one of the aims of science education as helping students (a) gain skills in research, reading and debate whereby learners are involved in new knowledge construction; and (b) understand the nature of science and technology as well as the relationship between science, technology, society and environment. In Israel, the Harari report (Tomorrow 98, 1992) by the committee appointed by the Ministry of Education to examine the state of science, mathematics and technology instruction, under the leadership of Harari, cites that greater comprehension of the importance of science and technology knowledge helps pupils make decisions regarding national and international issues. Science and technology teaching is aimed at recognising the possibilities and limitations of both disciplines when applying them to problem-solving. These courses develop smart consumer thinking and behaviour by using a decision-making process when selecting a product or a system. In Australia, the Curriculum Council of Western Australia (1998) recommends that: Typically, students learn to plan investigations using scientific knowledge to select or adapt equipment where necessary. They should learn to appreciate the value of doing exploratory work to refine the investigation process and use appropriate ways to record and display their data, draw their conclusions and interpret them in the light of current scientific knowledge. Students need time at the end of investigations to allow for the recognition of
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confirming and refuting evidence and sources of possible errors, as well as to attempting to correct them. (p. 235)
Even though this document does not explicitly state the use of argument in science education, the language involving the use of data drawing conclusions from data as well as the recognition of confirming and refuting evidence implicitly points to the features of argument and argumentation. In numerous science-education policies across the world, the trends highlight the significance of making science relevant to students’ lives through links to technology, society and environment. Taiwan has developed new Science and Life Technology Curriculum Standards (SaLTS) for Grades 1–9 (Chang, 2005). SaLTS feature a systematic way for developing students’ understanding and appreciation of individual–society–nature interactions. The role of evidence typically tends to play out in these arguments in informed citizenship although there is also indication that the role of evidence, debate and argument in scientific knowledge growth is also acknowledged. Often however the link to argumentation is not explicit except for some policy documents such as the National Education Standards (Curriculum Guidelines) for Grade 1–9 in Science and Technology Discipline in Taiwan: Students will gain related knowledge and skills through learning science and scientific inquiry; meanwhile, they will think scientifically and use what they have learned to solve problems for them having been used to do discussions and argumentation according to scientific methods. Students will therefore realize the nature of knowledge and form a habit of valuing evidence and reasoning through scientific inquiry frequently. When facing and dealing with problems, students will try to understand them and solve them with a positive attitude of curiosity and exploration. We call it “scientific and technological literacy” including all the knowledge, viewpoints, abilities, attitudes and applications discussed above. The main goal of learning in science and technology discipline is to foster our citizens’ scientific and technological literacy. (translated document)
In other cases such as the Chilean National Science Curriculum, the notions of argumentation and justification are contextualised in particular examples embedded in problem-solving tasks such as the one reproduced in Appendix B (MEC, 2004, p. 41). The National Curriculum for General Science in Pakistan (NCGS, 2006) promotes an inquiry-based curriculum where there is an emphasis on skills such as the ability to provide evidence for conclusions: Inquiry requires students to describe objects and events, ask questions and devise answers, collect and interpret data and test the reliability of the knowledge they’ve generated. They also identify assumptions, provide evidence for conclusions and justify their work. (p. 59)
As the preceding overview of the worldwide reform efforts in science-education policy illustrates, there is an increasing emphasis on resting the science curriculum on a more appropriate balance between science process and citizenship skills, and factual or content knowledge of science. The main rationale for the inclusion of argumentation in the science curriculum has been twofold. First, there is the need to educate for informed citizenship where science is related to its social, economic, cultural and political roots. Second, the reliance of science on evidence has been
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problematised and linked in the context of scientific processes such as investigations, inquiries and practical work. The advance of such efforts is a signal that the science teaching needs to change to match the needs of citizens as well as scientists. The inclusion of the assessment of argumentation in the PISA framework is an encouraging signal that acknowledges the significance of argumentation as an important skill. Likewise the presence of worked out examples of argument-based tasks in National Curricula such as the Chilean Science Curriculum would provide an impetus to the adoption of argumentation at the level of the classroom. Despite such efforts at the level of international policies about the science curriculum, the systemic uptake of argumentation work in everyday science classrooms remains minimal. One of the key challenges to implementing argumentation in everyday classrooms is the lack of transformation of policy recommendations to educational practice. The gap between research, policy and practice, a familiar problem in educational research (e.g., Hargreaves, 1996) is perpetuated by the fact that few research projects have extended the findings to a larger scale of teaching and learning scenarios, for instance through translation of their research to professional development of new teachers. The Nuffield-funded IDEAS project aimed to bridge this gap where school-based research into teaching and learning of argumentation has been applied to the design of a professional development programme involving exemplars video clips of argumentation teaching and learning, and resources for supporting pupils’ argumentation in the science classroom (Osborne et al., 2004). The production of research-based professional development programs, on the other hand, have highlighted the importance of giving both in-service and pre-service science teachers the opportunities to engage in tasks that are meaningful in their teaching contexts (e.g., Simon et al., 2006; Taber, 2006). The Key Stage Three Strategy of the Department for Employment and Skills (DfES) in the United Kingdom supported a network of projects to enable “ideas and evidence” to be a component of initial teacher training (e.g., Erduran, 2006). By inviting universitybased researchers to participate in a policy-driven initiative to support initial teachers’ training in this area, the DfES extended the national policy on “Ideas and Evidence” to the research arena. The outcome of the project included a resource pack for Initial Teacher Training (ITT) providers subsequently funded by the Gatsby Charitable Foundation. These resources have been adapted for ITT in other national contexts (e.g., Turkey) in an effort to make argumentation a component of pre-service teacher education (Erduran et al., 2006).
From Early Argumentation Studies to Future Directions The policy level rationales for the inclusion of argumentation in science education have accompanied, if not somewhat in a delayed fashion, the theoretical and empirical justifications for why argumentation is needed in science education.
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Most international policies began to emphasise the role of evidence and justifications in scientific inquiry since late 1990s. The first studies about argumentation in science classrooms explored, since at least the 1980s, knowledge construction along with the social dimensions of argumentation such as the role of authority and leadership in group dynamics. For instance, Russell (1983) used Toulmin’s (1958) scheme to analyse teachers’ questions in terms of their role in the development of arguments framed either in rational (evidence) or traditional (status) authority concluding that traditional authority was prevalent. Eichinger et al. (1991), in their study about 6th graders discussing which water state is appropriate to transport water in a space ship, combined argument analysis with the exploration of social interactions. These researchers suggested that the students reached a consensus about adequate claim and justification, not because of a deep understanding, but because one of the leaders decided to support the only student who offered an adequate justification. The role of ethnicity, though an understudied research area in relation to argumentation, has received some attention contributing to the cultural studies of argumentation. Stephen Druker (2000) analysed the influence of practices and resources originated out of school in the argumentation strategies of Indonesian students belonging to two ethnic groups, finding higher frequency of agreement in the Javanese, related to a culture which places great value in social harmony. Jiménez-Aleixandre et al. (2000) explored the influence of the school culture in the production of arguments by secondary school students. Cultural and sociological studies of argumentation promise an exciting new research domain where issues such as power and gender can be investigated and conceptualised for argumentation in science classrooms. Another potential direction of future research is interdisciplinarity where argumentation is studied from a wider range of theoretical and empirical perspectives. An example would be collaborations among researchers in linguistics, philosophy and science education so as to inform how argumentation can be better situated in schooling. We began our chapter with a reference to Darwin’s “long argument”. Perhaps it is appropriate to end it by expressing the hope that argumentation will be commonplace in science classrooms. The teaching of evolution remains under challenge 150 years after the publication of On the Origin of Species. Argumentation will empower students for distinguishing claims made on scientific grounds from those based solely on tradition and authority. Acknowledgements We would like to thank the following colleagues for their help in locating policy documents: Ying-Shao Hsu, Merle Hodges, Rachel Mamlok-Naaman, John Loughran, Dilek Ardac and Gerardo Moenne. M. P. Jiménez-Aleixandre work about argumentation is part of a project funded by the Spanish Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia (MEC), partly funded by the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), code SEJ2006-15589C02-01/EDUC. We are grateful to William Sandoval, Merce Garcia-Mila, Gregory Kelly, Isabel Martins, Christian Plantin and Andrée Tiberghien for their useful suggestions to the first draft of this chapter.
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Knorr-Cetina, K. (1999). Epistemic cultures: How the sciences make knowledge. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Kress, G., Jewitt, C., Ogborn, J., & Tsatsarelis, C. (2001). Multimodal teaching and learning: The rhetorics of the science classroom. London: Continuum. Kuhn, D. (1991). The skills of argument. New York: Cambridge University Press. Kuhn, D. (1992). Thinking as argument. Harvard Educational Review, 62, 155–178. Kuhn, D. (1993). Science as argument: Implications for teaching and learning scientific thinking. Science Education, 77, 319–337. Kuhn, D., & Udell, W. (2003). The development of argument skills. Child Development, 74(5), 1245–1260. Latour, B., & Woolgar, S. (1986). Laboratory life: The construction of scientific facts. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Lave, J., & Wenger, E. (1991). Situated learning: Legitimate peripheral participation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Leach, J., Hind, A., & Ryder, J. (2003). Designing and evaluating short teaching interventions about the epistemology of science in high school classrooms. Science Education, 87(3), 831–848. Lemke, J. (1990). Talking science: Language, learning and values. Norwood, NJ: Ablex. Martins, I., Mortimer, E., Osborne, J., Tsatsarelis, C., & Jiménez Aleixandre, M.P. (2001). Rhetoric and science education. In H. Behrendt, H. Dahncke, R. Duit, W. Gräber, M. Komorek, A. Kross, & P. Reiska (Eds.), Research in science education—Past, present and future (pp. 189–198). Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic. Mason, L. (1996). An analysis of children’s construction of new knowledge through their use of reasoning and arguing in classroom discussions. International Journal of Qualitative Studies in Education, 9(4), 411–433. Mason, L. (1998). Sharing cognition to construct scientific knowledge in school contexts: The role of oral and written discourse. Instructional Science, 26, 359–389. Milli Egˇitim Bakanligˇi, Turkey (2005). Ilkögˇretim fen ve teknoloji ders ögˇretim programi (6, 7 ve 8. siniflar). Ankara: Author. Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia, Republic of Chile (MEC). (2004). Estudio y comprensión de la naturaleza. Santiago de Chile: Author. Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia, Spain (MEC). (2007). Real Decreto 1631/2006 Enseñanzas mínimas educación secundaria obligatoria. Boletín Oficial del Estado, 5 January, 677–773. Ministry of Education, Pakistan. (2006). National Curriculum for General Science. Grades IV– VIII. Islamabad: Author. Mortimer, E. F., & Scott, P. H. (2003). Meaning making in secondary science classrooms. Maidenhead, UK: Open University Press. Myers, G. (1990). Writing biology. Texts in the social construction of scientific knowledge. Madison, UK: University of Wisconsin Press. National Research Council. (1996). National science education standards. Washington, DC: National Academy Press. Norris, S. P., & Philips, L. M. (2003). How literacy in its fundamental sense is central to scientific literacy. Science Education, 87, 224–240. Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (2003). PISA Assessment Framework— Mathematics, reading, science and problem solving knowledge and skills. Paris: Author. Osborne, J., Erduran, S., & Simon, S. (2004). Ideas, evidence and argument in science. London: King’s College London. Perelman, C., & Olbrechts-Tyteca, L. (1958). Traité de l’argumentation. La nouvelle rhétorique. Bruxelles: Éditions de l’Université de Bruxelles. (The new rhetoric: A treatise on argumentation. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1969). Peters, M. A. (2006). Editorial. Special issue—Philosophy of science education. Educational Philosophy and Theory, 38(5), 579–584. Plantin, C. (1996). L’Argumentation. Paris: Éditions du Seuil.
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Plantin, C. (2005). L’Argumentation. Histoire, théories et perspectives. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Pontecorvo, C. (1987). Discussing for reasoning: The role of argument in knowledge construction. In E. de Corte, H. Lodewiijks, R. Parmentier, & R. Span (Eds.), Learning and instruction: Vol. 1, European research in an international context (pp. 239–250). Oxford: Pergamon Press and Leuven University Press. Qualifications and Curriculum Authority (2007). How science works. Retrieved on March 26 from www.qca.org.uk. Russell, T. L. (1983). Analyzing arguments in science classroom discourse: Can teachers’ questions distort scientific authority? Journal of Research in Science Teaching, 20, 27–45. Sandoval, W. A. (2005). Understanding students’ practical epistemologies and their influence on learning through inquiry. Science Education, 89(4), 634–656. Sandoval, W. A., & Reiser, B. J. (2004). Explanation-driven inquiry: Integrating conceptual and epistemic scaffolds for scientific inquiry. Science Education, 88, 345–372. Siegel, H. (1989). The rationality of science, critical thinking and science education. Synthese, 80, 9–41. Siegel, H. (1992). On defining “critical thinker” and justifying critical thinking. In H. A. Alexander (Ed.), Philosophy of education, 1992. Proceedings of the forty-eighth annual meeting of the Philosophy of Education Society (pp. 72–75). Urbana, IL: Philosophy of Education Society. Siegel, H. (1995). Why should educators care about argumentation? Informal Logic, 17(2), 159–176. Siegel, H. (2006). Epistemological diversity and education research: Much ado about nothing much? Educational Researcher, 35(2), 3–12. Simon, S., Erduran, S., & Osborne, J. (2006). Learning to teach argumentation: research and development in the science classroom. International Journal of Science Education, 28(2–3), 235–260. Taber, K. (Ed.) (2006). Ideas and evidence in science education. Special issue, School Science Review, 87. Tomorrow 98 (1992). Report of the superior committee on science, mathematics and technology in Israel. Jerusalem: Ministry of Education and Culture (English Edition, 1994). Toulmin, S. (1958). The uses of argument. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Vygotsky, L. S. (1978). Mind in society. The development of higher psychological processes. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Walton, D. N. (1989). Informal logic: a handbook for critical argumentation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Walton, D. N. (1996). Argumentation schemes for presumptive reasoning. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. Wertsch, J. (1991). Voices of the mind: A sociocultural approach to mediated action. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Yore, L. D., Bisanz, G. L., & Hand, B. M. (2003). Examining the literacy component of science literacy: 25 years of language arts and science research. International Journal of Science Education, 25(6), 689–725. Zohar, A., & Nemet, F. (2002). Fostering students’ knowledge and argumentation skills through dilemmas in human genetics. Journal of Research in Science Teaching, 39(1), 35–62.
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Appendix A Example from PISA Assessment Framework on Interpreting Scientific Evidence and Conclusions (OECD, 2003, p. 144). Science Example 2.2 Suppose that on one stretch of narrow road Peter finds that after the lane lines are painted the traffic changes as below. Speed Position Distance apart
Traffic moves more quickly Traffic keeps nearer edges of road No change
On the basis of these results it was decided that lane lines should be painted on all narrow roads. Do you think this was the best decision? Give your reasons for agreeing or disagreeing. Agree: _____ Disagree: _____ Reason: ____________________ Scoring and comments on Science Example 2.2 Full Credit Code 1: Answers that agree or disagree with the decision for reasons that are consistent with the given information. For example: ●
● ●
Agree because there is less chance of collisions if the traffic is keeping near the edges of the road, even if it is moving faster Agree because if traffic is moving faster, there is less incentive to overtake Disagree because if the traffic is moving faster and keeping the same distance apart, this may mean that the drivers do not have enough room to stop in an emergency.
No Credit Code 0: Item type: Process: Concept: Situation:
Answers that agree or disagree without specifying the reasons, or provide reasons unrelated to the problem. Open-constructed response Interpreting scientific evidence and conclusions (Process 3) Forces and movement Science in technology
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Appendix B Argumentation embedded in problem-solving task (MEC, 2004, p.41). Unit 2: Change and conservation in phenomena involving chemical reactions They boil an egg in water for about 5 to 6 minute, let it cool and cut it carefully. They analyse the changes that happened and discuss: ● ● ● ●
●
●
●
If they could get back the hard boiled egg to its initial condition by cooling it If the change occurred inside the egg is reversible or irreversible If the phenomenon of decoction is physical or chemical What properties of the egg have changed? (mainly aspect, consistency, colour of white and yolk and taste) Whether they can justify their arguments to affirm or deny that the egg suffered a change of state and became solid What properties of the egg did not change? (shape, colour and aspect of the shell) If the eggshell experienced a chemical or physical change and how can they justify their answer
Chapter 2
Cognitive Foundations of Learning Argumentation Merce Garcia-Mila and Christopher Andersen
The goal of the present chapter is to provide a cognitive analysis of the competencies involved in argumentation: the psychological processes involved in argumentation, how these processes develop, and most importantly, given the scope of the present book, how this development relates to science learning. For the latter, we need to situate the role of argumentation in science learning, and this is the focus of the first section of the chapter, where the case of the importance of argumentation in the new approaches of science will be made. Argumentation, however, is a very broad, multidisciplinary, and polisemic term, and thus is used differently within and between disciplines. The second section is an attempt to clarify the term. We will devote the third section to concretizing which aspects of argumentation specifically relate to science education, in order to make a cognitive analysis of these aspects in the fourth and fifth sections. Finally, the last section addresses what the literature says about scaffolding argumentation. In other words, we will try to answer the questions science educators may pose in order to deal with argumentation in their science classes: What are the main difficulties students meet when they engage in argumentation? What should we expect from young children in an elementary class in terms of their competencies to argue? In what ways are these competencies different when we compare elementary with secondary school students? What are they built upon? What is the role of metacognition in their development? Our underlying main claim is that argumentation is a process involved in general knowledge acquisition, regardless of whether it is individual silent learning or collaborative learning, and following Siegel (1989) it is aimed at the rational resolution of questions, issues, and disputes.
Science, Science Learning, and Argumentation Whatever the discipline (philosophy, sociology, linguistics, anthropology, psychology, education, etc.), there is widespread consensus among science analysts that science is not the unequivocal and uncontested knowledge generated by a direct reading of nature that the positivist perspective used to claim. Instead, science is seen as a social construction that results from inquiry processes (planning and S. Erduran and M. P. Jiménez-Aleixandre (eds.), Argumentation in Science Education. © Springer 2007
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performing experiments), as well as from communication and public scrutiny processes among the scientific community that lead to discussions addressed to resolve controversies and reach consensus. Scientific discursive practices such as assessing alternatives, weighing evidence, interpreting texts, and evaluating the potential validity of scientific claims are all seen as essential components in constructing scientific arguments, which are fundamental in the progression of scientific knowledge (Latour, 1987; Latour & Woolgar, 1986). Socio-constructivists such as Lemke stress that to understand how scientists elaborate their view of the world, we must understand how they exchange ideas and how they change their opinions in response to evidence: that is, the way they use cultural resources to make meaning, analyzing the progressive sequence of what they say, the diagrams they draw, the equations they write, and see the effect of all this on making meanings. According to this, to learn science is not to know what the last generation of scientists thinks of the world, but to find out how each new generation of scientists re-elaborates our view of the world (Lemke, 2002). Thus, the goal of science education should be to prepare the students to use this combination of cultural resources described significantly and appropriately. Though this perspective of science is widely held by researchers in science education, it has not been reflected in the practice of science education. As Driver, Newton, & Osborne (2000) clearly describe the situation, “Science in schools is commonly portrayed from a ‘positivist perspective’ as a subject in which there are clear ‘right answers’ and where data lead uncontroversially to agreed conclusions” (p. 288). As a consequence, science knowledge is seen as a “finished” product that must be learned as literally as possible. As a result, there is increasing attention being drawn by science education researchers to the mismatches between the nature of science and the teaching of science. “Given the socially constructed nature of scientific knowledge, we must give a much higher priority than is currently the case to discursive practices in general and to argument in particular” (Driver et al., 2000, p. 297). Along this line but from the developmental psychology perspective, Kuhn (2005) establishes the goal of science education as promoting a way of thinking in which inquiry and argument are two central skills. There, current approaches to science education establish more or less explicitly the importance of argumentation in the acquisition of scientific knowledge among science students.
The Many Meanings of Argumentation Despite this consensus, the concept of argumentation involves diverse meanings. Since these different uses of the concept directly affect the psychological processes involved, we need to clarify the concept in order to discuss the cognitive foundations underlying the learning of argumentation. Argumentation has a long tradition as an object of study and analysis, although it has not yet resulted in a universally accepted theory (van Eemeren et al., 1996). It has been studied from diverse
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disciplines with different criteria of analysis not necessarily shared even within the discipline. As an example of this disparity, arguments can be defined according to a validity criterion; some authors may require deductive validity exclusively provided by formal syllogistic reasoning (Copi, 1972), while others radically critical of this classical position regard argument as a justified assertion whose validity is provided by the coherence of the justification (Toulmin, 1958). Within this coherence, “warrants” play a central role in the justification by connecting data with claims, but they allow qualifying adverbs such as “usually,” “presumably,” which would clearly lead to an invalid deductive argument from the syllogistic reasoning perspective.1 In contrast, for those who claim that argumentation is the art of persuasion, the quality criteria should be soundness, plausibility, and persuasiveness of the audience, in addition to deductive validity (Chinn & Anderson, 1998; Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969). In addition to this lack of consensus in the criteria for validity of arguments, there are other aspects in the way argumentation is conceptualized that are also controversial. In this sense, different authors would conceptualize argument differently according to its position along criteria continua such as product–process, individual–social, internal–external, oral–written, rhetoric–dialogical, and formal–informal, with the consequent implications for a psychological analysis. For example, can any inner deliberation (as an individual internal silent process that leads to a justified assertion) be considered an argument? Or does it need a juxtaposition of two opposing assertions in a dialogue between two people who hold opposing views, supported by justifications with rebuttals that address the other’s view by means of a counterargument? Van Eemeren et al.’s (1996) pragmadialectical approach seems very clear in this respect. They claim that argumentation is approached with four basic metatheoretical or methodological premises in the sense that they concern how one ought to set about studying argumentation: externalization, socialization, functionalization, and dialectification. Their commonly cited definition shows this position: A verbal and social activity of reason aimed at increasing (or decreasing) the acceptability of a controversial standpoint for the listener or reader, by putting forward a constellation of propositions intended to justify (or refute) the standpoint before a rational judge. (p. 5) But argumentation does not consist of a single individual privately drawing a conclusion: It is part of a discourse procedure whereby two or more individuals who have a difference of opinion try to arrive to an agreement. (p. 277)
In contrast with this position, and for the sake of fulfilling the chapter goal of providing a cognitive analysis of the skills involved in argumentation, we will take a different position and answer this question using Kuhn’s (1991, 2005) approach to argumentation. Along with Billig (1987), Kuhn’s main claim to address this issue is that what makes a justification process a real (reasoned) argument is the possibility to conceive of alternatives (opposing assertions correctly justified) that bear
1 See van Eemeren (1996) concerning the ambiguity with which Toulmin establishes the validity of an argument.
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on the possibility of the assertion to be wrong. This whole process requires a weighing process to reach a justified position. It is in this sense that the individual internal process that leads to an assertion with accompanying justification can be considered an argument, because it implicitly contains a full dialogic argument as that defined in a broad sense, with social (dialogic) and individual (rhetorical) argument closely connected: An individual constructs an argument to support a claim. The dialogic process in which two or more people engage in debate of opposing claims can be referred to as argumentation or argumentive discourse to distinguish it from argument as product. Nonetheless, implicit in argument as product is the advancement of a claim in a framework of evidence and counterclaims that is characteristic of argumentive discourse. (Kuhn & Franklin, 2006, p. 979)
Subscribing Kuhn’s and Billig’s position, Anderson et al. (2001) illustrate the assumption of reasoning as a process of argumentation and thus fundamentally dialogical by appealing to Bakhtin’s (1934, 1981) idea of the multiple voices in the thinkers’ minds that represent contrasting perspectives on an issue. Kuhn’s integration of Billig’s view into a psychological analysis provides a methodological framework to look at the rational activities that extend from the individual reasoning process of a child trying to build a theory to the social reasoning involved in public debates to reach consensus. Departing from Kuhn’s distinction, the internal weighing process of positive and negative evidence that leads to choosing a given assertion over others is considered an “implicit full dialogic argument.” Kuhn’s claim facilitates us in the task of analyzing the reasoning process involved in learning science. Science learning, as well as any learning mediated by discursive practices, would require (among other skills more closely related to inquiry) a set of argumentation skills. These skills could be both intrapsychological, that is, internal, individual, but implicitly dialogic, and interpsychological, that is, external, social, and explicitly dialogic. These two types of skills, though not identical, share a core of psychological processes. The argumentation involved in public debates, such as those held in science classrooms, needs an additional set of skills related to the presence of an audience in addition to the intrapsychological dialectical process of weighing positive and negative evidence to make a justified claim. Our analysis of argumentation will start with a look at what the literature says about the use (or lack) of all these skills among our students, to proceed to the cognitive analysis of the difficulties associated with such use.
Science Students and Argumentation There is a move among science education researchers toward the analysis of argumentation in science classroom environments with the goal to investigate students’ ability to argue and the difficulties they experience when they engage in argumentation. What are the students’ interactive argument skills in a classroom debate? How do they argue when they are organized in small groups or in pairs? Despite the methodological
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difficulty inherent in this research, their results point in the same direction as those generated by research in developmental psychology: that is, students have difficulty engaging with another’s statements. They tend to make their own claims without addressing their opponent’s claim. In addition, they use simple claims to make their disagreement explicit, without taking into consideration alternative views that would potentially generate counterarguments or rebuttals. For example, Pontecorvo and Girardet (1993) worked with 9-year-olds arguing in small groups. They showed a high majority of utterances addressed to espousing their own claims and justifications of them, ignoring the partner’s claims. Results with older students paint a similar picture. Jiménez-Aleixandre et al. (2000) analyzed argumentation in a 9th-grade genetics class and found that most of the claims offered in a discussion were unrelated to the rest of the elements in the argument. Beyond these weaknesses specific to argumentation in discursive practices (Anderson et al.,1997, 1998, 2001; Candela, 2002; Duschl & Osborne, 2002; Erduran et al., 2004; Jiménez-Aleixandre et al., 2000; Jiménez-Aleixandre & Pereiro-Muñoz, 2002; Kelly & Chen, 1999; Kelly & Crawford, 1997; Osborne et al., 2004; Pontecorvo & Girardet, 1993; Reznitskaya et al., 2001), the abovementioned studies and others show a set of skills that need to be in place in sound argumentive reasoning, be it either external in a public debate or internal in scientific reasoning such as the construction of two-sided arguments or the distinction between data and explanation in support of other claims (Brem & Rips, 2000; Kuhn, 1991; Kuhn et al., 1997; Perkins, 1985; Voss & Means, 1991). The lack of these skills, reported in both the science education (Chinn & Brewer, 1998; Driver et al., 2000) and in the developmental literature (Kuhn et al., 1988, 1995), leads to strong confirmation biases either selecting evidence to confirm prior theories or assessing it differently (or even ignoring it), according to whether it confirms or disconfirms prior theories, jumping to conclusions before enough evidence is available, etc. In the following sections, we will return to these problems, approaching them from the psychological processes involved. Argumentation involved in discursive practices will be analyzed as interpsychological argumentation, while argumentation involved in individual scientific reasoning will be analyzed as intrapsychological argumentation. Our claim is that they share the core cognitive requirements involved in inferential thinking. To engage in sound argumentive practices, apart from the skills to address the strengths and weaknesses of the audience by connecting arguments, counterarguments and rebuttals, the scientific reasoning skills need to be in place as well. On the other hand, according to the Vygotskian (1981) perspective, interpsychological practices are essential to develop scientific reasoning.2 For expository purposes, they will be addressed in separate sections.
2
See Hickman’s thoughts on differences between individual and collective argumentation with respect to structures and processes and how they can function as a developmental mechanism (Hickman, 1987) and Anderson et al. (2001) for an empirical analysis on this issue.
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Interpsychological Argumentation This section argues that the essence of argumentation in discursive practices is an externalized explicit dialectical activity, where two or more minds engage in a debate through a series of claims, counterclaims, and rebuttals. As Hickman (1987) puts it, “Usually they (argumentations) consist of a sequence of utterances whose content may—but need not—enter the argument to be developed. However, an argumentation only succeeds if the participants manage to develop a joint argument that is collectively accepted as an answer to the quaestio” (p. 232). The main components of argumentation (claim, counterclaim, and rebuttal) are familiar to anyone who has seen a political debate. But as we have seen, despite the familiarity of the structure, both students and adults have difficulty engaging effectively in argumentation. Skilled argumentation has two goals: (1) to secure commitments from the opponent that can be used to support one’s own argument, and (2) undermine the opponent’s position by identifying and challenging weaknesses in his/her argument (Walton, 1989). Felton and Kuhn (2001; Felton, 2004), based on Walton (1996) and van Eemeren et al. (1996), provide a framework to analyze interactive arguments. They establish three goals the speaker must address in argumentation: (1) to identify the premises necessary to justify a claim, (2) to identify unwarranted claims in the partner’s argument in order to undermine them, and (3) to rebut or neutralize challenges that the partner advances against his or her argument. Involved in this is the ability to direct discourse with questions, critiques, and rebuttals, with the challenge of being able to lead the process of “competitively co-constructing an argument in the context of discourse,” that is, to be aware of which discourse strategies address their partner’s reasoning (Felton, 2004, p. 37). The understanding of such goals and the application of effective strategies to meet these goals are, according to Felton (2004; Felton & Kuhn, 2001), the two parameters in the analysis of the development of argumentive discourse.3 When one wants to undermine the opponent’s claim, she or he needs to think of her or his weaknesses and regain the strength of the claim. Thus, to study development of argumentive discourse strategies, the analysis must focus on the progress from simple forms of arguments such as “disagree” (where the goal is to expose one’s own point of view, without addressing the opponent’s claim) to the use of counterarguments and rebuttals (where the two goals mentioned above—awareness of the partner’s weaknesses and a move to regain the strength of one’s own claim—are addressed). These argumentive discursive strategies were analyzed from a developmental perspective (Felton & Kuhn, 2001). They compared adolescents’ and adults’ peer dialogues on the topic of capital punishment and found that the adolescents did not tend to take the audience into consideration and thus did not adapt their discourse. More concretely, they reported how adults used counterarguments more often than adolescents, and how their discourse also showed more moves to weaken the opponents’ claim. 3 See Felton and Kuhn’s (2001) system of categories for the analysis of strategies in argumentive discourse.
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The adolescents’ poorer performance in addressing the opponents’ discourse could be interpreted in terms of their difficulties in the construction of arguments themselves. In its most basic conception, argumentation involves producing justified claims, producing counterarguments, and rebutting counterarguments. In producing justified claims, several alternative theories must be coordinated with evidence in order to choose the evidence that best fits the justification of one of the theories. This may happen not only in explicit dialogic debates, but also in written argumentive texts or in individual verbal interviews. Along this line, there is some work in which verbal interviews are used to analyze the construction of arguments in its dialogic form (Means & Voss, 1996). Kuhn (1991) compared adolescents and adults’ ability to offer a valid supporting argument for a given claim (i.e., why prisoners return to crime when they are released), as well as offer counterarguments and rebuttals for that claim. Only onethird of the adolescent sample versus one-half of the adults were able to provide a justified claim. In addition, very few subjects in both samples were able to succeed in producing counterarguments or rebuttals. Similarly, Means and Voss (1996) analyzed 5th to 11th and 8th to 12th-grade children’s (in two different studies) oral protocols generated in response to given topics (for instance, questions about drugs effects and drugs use). Protocols were analyzed according to the number of reasons, qualifiers, counterarguments, and type of argument structure. They also report a relatively poor performance in generating the different elements of arguments. As stated by the authors (Voss & Van Dike, 2001), this appears to be in conflict with other research that shows that when young children engage in disputes, rather than ending them with a “no” response, they arrive at a mutually acceptable alternative proposition (Eisenberg & Garvey, 1981; Stein & Miller, 1993). To reach this primitive kind of consensus, children must be able to generate counterarguments. Other studies show that as early as 5 years of age children can produce justifications and rudimentary forms of counterarguments (Anderson et al., 1997). In fact, as Piaget suggested, quarrels about actions, such as common disputes for a toy, precede genuine verbal arguments, which are produced at around 7 or 8 years (Billig, 1987). Then, how can these different results be explained? The following section tries to answer this question by analyzing the psychological processes involved in the argumentive reasoning required in both the external social argumentation and the internal individual one.
Intrapsychological Argumentation Difficulty in engaging in effective argumentation begins with difficulty in formulating an effective argument. In this section, we will focus on the internal dialectical coordination between theories, evidence, and methodologies4 that defines scientific 4 Moshman adds “methodologies” to Kuhn’s definition of scientific thinking as “the consciously controlled coordination between theory and evidence,” which according to our view gives a new emphasis by adding the assessment of (or at least a reflection of) the methods used to generate data.
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reasoning (Kuhn & Franklin, 2006; Moshman, 1998). Research on scientific reasoning has a long tradition in cognitive psychology (Zimmerman, 2000). This research has focused on either inquiry skills (i.e., the processes involved in experimental design to generate evidence to submit theories to testing) or on inference skills (i.e., the process involved in the interpretation and evaluation of different sources and types of evidence to reach conclusions, and the consideration of alternative explanations of the data in an internal dialogue), or more recently, on both simultaneously. These inference skills are the ones addressed in this section with particular attention to their relation to knowledge acquisition. To make the analysis of the processes involved in argumentation, and how they develop, we take Moshman’s (1998) distinction between “inference,” “thinking,” and “reasoning.” He establishes that inference, defined as the generation of new cognitions from old, is normally performed automatically and unconsciously from a very early age. In contrast, thinking is defined as an advanced form of inference in the sense that is involves a deliberate coordination of one’s inferences to serve one’s purposes as the thinking involved in justifying a claim or testing a hypothesis (Moshman, 1995). Finally, Moshman defines reasoning as an advanced form of thinking that appears when thinking is evaluated with respect to how well it serves the purposes of the thinker: Over the course of development, thinkers increasingly make such evaluations themselves and attempt to improve their inferential activities. Recognizing that some thought processes are more justifiable than others, they increasingly construct standards of rationality and apply these to their own thinking. To the extent that an individual attempts to constrain his or her thinking on the basis of self-imposed standard of rationality, we may say the individual is engaged in reasoning. Reasoning, then, is epistemologically self-constrained thinking. (Moshman, 1998, p. 953)
These different cognitive processes differ in terms of the degree of rationality involved. Our claim for the developmental analysis that proceeds is that thinking in Moshman’s sense will be related to the justification of a claim, while reasoning will be related to argumentation. The dialectical coordination between theory, evidence, and methodologies is involved in the process of thinking, while reasoning involves, in addition to the former, the process of coordinating multiple claims in a framework of evaluating multiple alternatives and evidence (Kuhn, 1991). As the literature organized around conceptual change shows (Carey, 1985; Carey & Smith, 1993; Keil, 1998; Vosniadou & Verschaffel, 2004), children from an early age construct implicit theories that are constantly reviewed in their interaction with the world, but this construction is not intentionally addressed to seek knowledge: instead, it is unconscious. Thus, while automatic inferences are made from a very early age, the deliberate efforts to constrain thinking in order to generate a justified conclusion in a debate is a late development milestone. Let us imagine we are in preschool class. When Maria (3-year-old) knows that a hidden classmate could be a girl or a boy, and it is not a girl, she concludes that he is a boy. Can we say that she made the inference p or q, not p; therefore q? (example adapted from Moshman, 1998, p. 956). In other words, can we say that she was
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thinking deductively or she simply made an inference? In fact, did she intend to reach a conclusion? Did she know that she had made an inference or that her conclusion followed necessarily from her premises? According to the analysis made above, “logical inference gives rise to logical thinking as children become increasingly purposeful in the application and coordination of such rules of logic. Logical thinking, in turn gives rise to logical reasoning as individuals increasingly grasp the epistemic properties of logical rules” (Moshman, 1998, p. 956). The latter is only possible when, according to Piaget, thought itself becomes an object of cognition, and it is not attained until the formal operational stage, not before adolescence. Just then is when a mind, for instance, should be able to think of a validity of a proposition regardless of whether it is true or false. Adolescents on average outperform children in tasks aimed at assessing these competencies, but their performance varies greatly among adolescents, and is also far from reaching ceiling. This variability has been shown to strongly depend on the type of task. The previous example shows a case of argumentation based on syllogistic reasoning, and it clearly illustrates Moshman’s distinction between inference, thinking, and reasoning. Current literature shows that arguments that involve pure logic reasoning are very rare in everyday argumentation (Hickman, 1987). Let us see another example where argument may be present. Imagine a science class with the intent to show the concept of flotation and density. Is it appropriate to use a demonstration of a system in which children infer the causality of different balls (big or small, plastic or lead, blue or red) to result in sinking or floating? In this task, children should be able to isolate a cause that is presented in a combined manner (i.e., red, lead, big ball). The evaluation of the evidence generated by this demonstration is one of Piaget’s competencies supposed to develop along with the above-mentioned deductive thinking. However, a study with a simpler form of this task shows that, as early as four, children can identify the isolate cause in a multivariable context (Schultz & Gopnik, 2004). Nevertheless, when in a causal reasoning task like this, the child or the adult has theoretical expectations, the evaluation of evidence becomes a much harder job. Our own work (Kuhn et al., 1992, 1995) as well as others’ (Cheng & Novick, 1992; Chinn & Brewer, 2001; Klaczynski, 2000; Klahr, 2000) show how easy it is for the adolescent and even the adult to ignore evidence that contradicts their expectations or to interpret it either partially, recognizing only those data that fit their expectations; or differently, according to whether it confirms or disconfirms their prior theories; or even more biased, distorting the data to make it fit. Isn’t this a case in which the thinker must set an internal dialogue between what the evidence is showing, what theory derives from it, and what his or her own prior theory says in order to decide which one is most valid, in relation to the coherence between data and theory and also, assessing the methodology used to reach such evidence (for instance, awareness of the need to generate controlled comparisons)? This is exactly the case of dialectical argumentation raised above that should be based on the conscious coordination between theory, evidence, and methodology. Developmental research shows progress in this conscious coordination from middle childhood to early adulthood (Kuhn et al., 1988). This is not much novelty,
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but what’s important is, again, the high variability not only between subjects, but also within a single subject. This has been seen in microgenetic studies in which multiple strategies from less to more valid coexist. Within different ages, individuals display a variety of different reasoning strategies, ranging from less to more effective. Over time, what changes is the frequency of usage of these strategies, with a general decline over time in the usage of less effective strategies and increase in the use of more powerful ones (Kuhn et al., 1995). This high variability is not only seen among preadolescents. When adults are asked to engage in a complex task involving coordination of multiple factors, valid inferences are not always within the subject’s competence. Yet, the more important finding is that even when a valid inference is used, it is not consistently applied. This finding highlights the fact that a metacognitive component is needed to explain this variability in scientific reasoning. The distinction between knowing how to execute a strategy versus understanding its significance and still having the competence to distinguish between different sources of knowledge are metacognitive competencies required for the conscious differentiation and coordination of theory and evidence. When individuals lack this conscious control, they tend to merge theory and evidence into a single representation of the way things are. Such control requires an epistemological understanding, which is a metalevel of knowing how one knows (Kuhn, 2001). Getting specific to argumentation and the learning of science, these competencies include the distinction between the (natural) world and the knowledge of that world (Driver et al., 2000). The former exists (as an assumed reality), while the latter is constructed by our minds (as a human construction). A further step is then to become aware of the sources of one’s knowledge and how one gets to know. Therefore, before effective arguments can be constructed, there are epistemological and cognitive precursors that need to be in place. Argument has implied conventions of strength of argument, and there are developmental differences that prevent the understanding of these strengths. This leads to the cognitive requirements and precursors of argumentation. By conceptualizing argumentation as the internal dialogue involved in the coordination of theories and evidence, we can draw on Kuhn and Pearsall’s (2000) analysis of the origins of this process. First, the theoretical claim must be recognized as falsifiable. Second, the evidence must be recognized as means of falsifying a theoretical claim. And third, theory and evidence must be recognized as distinct epistemological categories. These three requirements are the foundations which epistemological understanding is based on and developed from. The understanding of knowing and the nature and limits of knowledge in the sense of the actions involved in its justifiability is addressed in Perry’s (1970) classic work with college students (Hofer & Pintrich, 2002), and developmentally in Hofer and Pintrich (1997). Results of this research show that there are different stages that represent the sequence of epistemological understanding. However, regardless of the number of stages proposed by the authors, they all suggest an invariable sequence that goes from a dualistic (right or wrong) and objectivist (scientific knowledge is true knowledge validated by scientific research) conception of knowledge to a more subjectivist and relativistic view,
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according to which knowledge is generated by a personal construction that ends up being contextualized and relative, in the sense that not all constructions show the same validity. This research has acquired considerable relevance with the new field that works with preschoolers in the search of the epistemic origins: the Theory-ofmind approach (Flavell, 1999; Perner, 1991). Kuhn and Franklin (2006) connect these two bodies of research, integrating them in a developmental pattern of the epistemic cognition. The resulting product is a developmental pattern with four steps, according to how the products of knowing are understood: Realist as copies, Absolutist as facts, Multiplist as opinions, and Evaluatist as judgments. In the realist level, children consider assertions to be copies of an external reality, with knowledge coming from an external source, which make critical thinking unnecessary. This level does not meet any of the above-mentioned criteria for coordinating theory and evidence. Around the end of the preschool years, children begin to recognize that mental representations are products of the mind, and that they do not necessarily mirror external reality, thus becoming susceptible of falsification (Absolutist level). At this level, the representation of reality can be right or wrong, and critical thinking is the means by which assertions and reality can be compared and assessed. This is the basis from which scientific reasoning can emerge. Nevertheless, much progress is still needed to jump into reasoning as argumentation. From the ability to distinguish between generalizations and data, which according to some developmental research (Ruffman et al. 1993; Sodian et al., 1991) appears as early as six, to the metatheoretical understanding required to consciously coordinate theories, evidence, and methodology, there is a long-term development that gets consolidated during the adolescent years. Adolescents discover that people can disagree: knowledge consists of freely chosen opinions rather than facts, clearly generated by the human mind and uncertain, which makes critical thinking irrelevant. It corresponds to the multiplist level of epistemological understanding, represented by the adolescent’s feeling that “Because everyone has the right to their opinion, all opinions are equally right.” In order to advance to the fourth category of epistemological understanding, adolescents must add to this the feeling that “some opinions are more right than others to the extent that they are better supported by argument and evidence” (Kuhn, 2005, p. 32). This thinking is represented by the Evaluatist level, in which assertions are judgments that can be evaluated to build arguments. Research on the development of epistemological understanding shows that the last step is not universally acquired, with its acquisition related to the amount of specific knowledge (Kuhn et al., 2000). In a developmental study, these authors found that the most common pattern in adolescents and adults was the multiplist. Given that for the multiplist any claim is as valid as any other, there is no point at engaging in an argument. This is how Kuhn explains the low performance achieved by students when they are asked to participate in debates. Research, on the other hand, shows a positive correlation between high levels of epistemological understating and argumentation, and more concretely, with learning science: If facts can be ascertained with certainty and are readily available to anyone who seeks them, as the absolutist understands, or, alternatively, if any claim is as valid as any other,
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M. Garcia-Mila and C. Andersen as the multiplist understands, there is little reason to expend the intellectual effort that argument entails. One must see the point of arguing to engage in it. This connection extends well beyond but certainly includes science, and in the field of science education a number of authors have made the case for the connection between productive science learning and a mature epistemological understanding of science as more than the accumulation of facts. (Kuhn & Franklin, 2006)
The coordination of theory, evidence, and methodology along the adolescent years facilitating the implicit internal dialogue (argumentation) is thus a metacognitive achievement. Using Piaget’s terms, it entails mental operations on mental operations. Contrary to their depiction of second-order operations emerging at adolescence, however, it has been recognized that metacognitive thinking about one’s thought begins to develop much earlier. Thus, rather than studying when they developmentally appear, the problem becomes that of analyzing how they can be fostered, and how these fostering conditions can be applied in the classroom environments.
What Does Research Say about Scaffolding Argumentation? The main claim of this chapter is that argumentation involves a set of core processes: the coordination of theory, evidence, and methodology that are common in the internal dialogic argumentation involved in scientific reasoning and the external dialogic argumentation involved in science discursive practices, both of them essential in science learning. Also there is a set of strategies specific to discursive practices, those that deal with Walton’s (1989) argumentation schema, as stated above. The key developing factor is metacognition (Kuhn, 2005; Kuhn et al., 1995) in its diverse forms (see above), either metastrategic (understanding the significance of using a given strategy versus simply being able to execute it) or metacognitive awareness (the ability to bracket one’s own prior theory and view alternatives), closely related to the epistemological competence to distinguish between different sources of knowledge. Also, specific for social debates, the arguer must be aware that one of the implicit goals in the argument is to undermine the partner’s claims (Felton, 2004). According to this, environments that foster any of metacognition types are hypothesized to enhance argumentation. Metacognition can be developed explicitly, by practices that promote explicit reflection. In this sense, there is some research that shows the effectiveness of such reflection in promoting argumentation. Felton (2004) for instance, had 7th and 8th graders work with their peer advisers on their previous dialogue guided by a checklist that helped them to identify the different elements in the debate and their quality. He had an experimental condition, where participants engaged in the dialogue and paired reflection, and the control condition, where participants engaged only in dialogue. He found that experimental group participants showed greater advances in argumentive discourse than the control group, with the conclusion that practice and reflection is more effective than practice alone (see Kuhn, 2005; Duschl, this book an instructional program to develop argument skills, and the lesson plans
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in Quinn, 1997). Other studies in science education also show this benefit (Osborne et al., 2004; Zohar & Nemet, 2002). Metacognition also can be fostered in an implicit manner. For instance the practice provided in microgenetic studies shows a development of the scientific reasoning strategies being practiced thanks to the parallel development of the metacognition involved (Kuhn et al.1995; Kuhn & Pearsall, 1998). This improvement is also observed when this methodology is used to analyze development of argumentive discourse strategies, not only in the quality of the arguments constructed by the individual, but also in the quality of the argumentive discourse generated in peer dialogues (Kuhn et al., 1997). Anderson and his colleagues (Anderson et al, 1997, 1998), under the collaborative learning paradigm, also show how extended engagement in argumentive discourse enhanced performance Metacognition can also be implicitly fostered by means of writing activities. Writing has been hypothesized in the classic educational literature to be an epistemic tool (Bereiter & Scardamalia, 1987). In this sense, writing would allow the representational redescription (Karmiloff-Smith, 1992) to explain learning. This concept attempts to account for the way in which children’s representations become progressively more subject to manipulation and flexible, for the emergence of conscious access to knowledge and theory building (p. 17). Despite the numerous studies devoted to analyze the role of writing in learning science (see the movement called the “writing-to-learn in science” (Klein, 2000; Prain & Hand, 1996; Rivard, 1994), few are devoted to scientific reasoning, and still fewer to argumentation as the external social dialogue, in spite of its potential role, clearly stated by Resnick (1987), as a cultivator and an enabler of higher order thinking, She claims that writing provides the occasion to think through arguments and to master forms of reasoning and persuasion. Our own work provides some results about the benefits of writing on scientific reasoning when students work individually (Garcia-Mila & Andersen, 2007; Garcia-Mila et al., 2006). More specifically related to argumentation strategies involved in oral discourse, Kuhn and Udell (2003) report clear benefits of writing by providing a set of cards that facilitated the external representation of ideas, making the argument–counterargument–rebuttal structure explicit. From an ethnographic perspective, Kelly and Chen (1999) analyze oral and written discourse processes in high school physics. They claim that by engaging in creating scientific papers, they make an appropriation of the scientific discourse. Finally, the most implicit manner to enhance metacognition is by oral utterances themselves. This is an underlying claim present throughout the chapter in the studies reviewed. Does the interpsychological form of argumentation enhance intrapsychological argumentation? This raises the issue of whether argumentation practices in small groups (or pairs) in the classroom, that is argumentation in its social form, may scaffold the internal dialog required in scientific reasoning. Despite the methodological difficulties (see Erduran, this book) that this analysis carries, there are several studies that show the benefits of participation in social dialogic argumentation in students’ individual arguments, thanks to the externalization that discursive practices require (Felton, 2004; Pontecorvo & Girardet, 1993; Reznitskaya et al., 2001). Vygotsky’s sociocultural approach to learning has extensively shown the
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benefits of peer collaboration in learning, under the assumption that differences in expertise (either in specific, strategic, or metacognitive knowledge) lead to the coconstruction of knowledge by means of negotiation through language. Taking Vygotsky’s perspective, the point made here is that when this learning is generated by argumentation, either in its internal or external dialogic forms, the externalization of the dialectical processes required in a public argumentation plays an essential role in the development of argumentation (Kuhn, 1991, Moshman, 1998). It is in this sense that science classroom activities should provide an epistemological and dialogical environment—far from the positivist conception of science—that fostered the awareness of how science progresses and most important, the value and need of arguing in the process of science knowledge construction (Osborne et al., 2004).
References Anderson, R. C., Chinn, C., Chang, J., Waggoner, M., & Yi, H. (1997). On the logical integrity of children’s arguments. Cognition and Instruction, 15, 135–167. Anderson, R. C., Chinn, C. A., Waggoner, M., & Nguyen, K. (1998). Intellectually stimulating story discussions. In J. Osborn & F. Lehr (Eds.), Literacy for all (pp. 170–196). New York: Guilford. Anderson, R. C., Nguyen-Jahiel, K., McNurlen, B., Archoudidou, A., Kim, S., Retznitskaya, A., et al. (2001). The snowball phenomenon: Spread of ways of talking and ways of thinking across groups of children. Cognition and Instruction, 19, 1–46. Bakhtin, M. M. (1934, 1981). The dialogic imagination. In M. Holquist (Ed.) C. Emerson & M. Holquist (Trans.). Austin, TX: University of Texas Press. Bereiter, C., & Scardamalia, M. (1987). The psychology of written composition. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. Billig, M. (1987). Arguing and thinking: A rhetorical approach to social psychology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Brem, S., & Rips, L. (2000). Explanation and evidence in informal argument. Cognitive Science, 24, 573–604. Candela, A. (2002). Evidencias y hechos: La construcción social del discurso de la ciencia en el aula. In M. Benlloch (Ed.), La educación en ciencias. Ideas para mejorar su práctica. Barcelona, Spain: Paidos. Carey, S. (1985). Conceptual change in childhood. Cambridge, MA: Bradford/MIT Press. Carey, S., & Smith, C. (1993). On understanding the nature of scientific knowledge. Educational Psychologist, 28, 235–251. Cheng, P., & Novick, L. (1992). Covariation in natural causal induction. Psychological Review, 99, 365–382. Chinn, C. A., & Anderson, R. C. (1998). The structure of discussions that promote reasoning. Teachers College Record, 100, 315–368. Chinn, C. A., & Brewer, W. (2001). Models of data: A theory of how people evaluate data. Cognition and Instruction, 19, 323–393. Chinn, C. A., & Brewer, W. F. (1998). An empirical test of a taxonomy of responses to anomalous data in science. Journal of Research in Science Teaching, 35, 623–654. Copi, I. M. (1972). Introduction to logic (4th ed.). New York: Macmillan. Driver, R., Newton, P., & Osborne, J. (2000). Establishing the norms of scientific argumentation in classrooms. Science Education, 84, 287–312.
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Duschl, R. A., & Osborne, J. (2002). Supporting and promoting argumentation discourse in science education. Studies in Science Education, 38, 39–72. Eemeren, F. H. van, Grootendorst, R., Henkemans, F. S., Blair, J. A., Johnson, R. H., Krabbe, E. C. W., et al. (1996). Fundamentals of argumentation theory: A handbook of historical backgrounds and contemporary developments. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. Eisenberg, A. R., & Garvey, C. (1981). Children’s use of verbal strategies in resolving conflicts. Discourse Processes, 4, 149–170. Erduran, S., Simon, S., & Osborne, J. (2004). TAPping into argumentation: Developments in the application of Toulmin’s argument pattern for studying science discourse. Science Education, 88, 915–933. Felton, M. (2004). The development of discourse strategies in adolescent argumentation. Cognitive Development, 19, 35–52. Felton, M., & Kuhn, D. (2001). The development of argumentive discourse skills. Discourse Processes, 32, 135–153. Flavell, J. (1999). Cognitive development: Children’s knowledge about the mind. Annual Review of Psychology, 50, 21–45. Garcia-Mila, M., & Andersen, C. (2007). Developmental change in notetaking during scientific inquiry. International Journal of Science Education, 29, 1035–1058. Garcia-Mila, M., Rojo, N., & Andersen, C. (2006). Etude de cas: Prise de notes et recherche scientifique (Case study: Notetaking and scientific research). Lettre d’Airdif, 37(2), 15–18. Hickman, M. (1987). Social and functional approaches to language and thought. Orlando, FL: Academic Press. Hofer, B., & Pintrich, P. (1997). The development of epistemological theories: Beliefs about knowledge and knowing and their relation to learning. Review of Educational Research, 67, 88–140. Hofer, B., & Pintrich, P. (Eds.) (2002). Epistemology: The psychology of beliefs about knowledge. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. Jiménez-Aleixandre, M. P., Bugallo Rodríguez, A., & Duschl, R. (2000). “Doing the lesson” or “doing science”: Argument in high school genetics. Science Education, 84, 757–792. Jiménez-Aleixandre, M. P., & Pereiro Muñoz, C. (2002). Knowledge producers or knowledge consumers? Argumentation and decision making about environmental management. International Journal of Science Education, 24, 1171–1190. Karmiloff-Smith, A. (1992). Beyond modularity. A developmental perspective on cognitive science. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Keil, F. C. (1998). Cognitive science and the origins of thought and knowledge. In D. Kuhn & R. S. Siegler (Eds.), Handbook of child psychology: Vol. 2, Cognition, perception, and language (5th ed., pp. 341–413). New York: Wiley. Kelly, G. J., & Chen, C. (1999). The sound of music: Constructing science as sociocultural practices through oral and written discourse. Journal of Research in Science Teaching, 36, 883–915. Kelly, G. J., & Crawford, T. (1997). An ethnographic investigation of the discourse processes of school science. Science Education, 81, 533–559. Klaczynski, P. (2000). Motivated scientific reasoning biases, epistemological beliefs, and theory polarization: A two process approach to adolescent cognition. Child Development, 71, 1347–1366. Klahr, D. (2000). Exploring science: The cognition and development of discovery processes. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. Klein, P. D. (2000). Elementary students’ strategies for writing-to-learn in science. Cognition and Instruction, 18, 317–348. Kuhn, D. (1991). The skills of argument. New York: Cambridge University Press. Kuhn, D. (2001). How do people know? Psychological Science, 12, 1–8. Kuhn, D. (2005). Education for thinking. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Kuhn, D., Amsel, E., & O’Loughlin, M. (1988). The development of scientific thinking skills. San Diego: Academic Press.
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Kuhn, D., Cheney, R., & Weinstock, M. (2000). The development of epistemological understanding. Cognitive Development, 15, 309–328. Kuhn, D., & Franklin, S. (2006). The second decade: What develops (and how)? In W. Damon & Richard M. Lerner (Series Eds.), D. Kuhn & R. Siegler (Vol. Eds.), Handbook of child psychology: Vol. 2, Cognition, perception, and language (6th ed., pp. 953–993). Hoboken, NJ: Wiley. Kuhn, D., Garcia-Mila, M., Zohar, A., & Andersen, C. (1995). Strategies of knowledge acquisition. Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development, 60(4, Serial No. 245). Kuhn, D., & Pearsall, S. (1998). Relations between metastrategic knowledge and strategic performance. Cognitive Development, 13, 227–247. Kuhn, D., & Pearsall, S. (2000). Developmental origins of scientific thinking. Journal of Cognition and Development, 1, 113–129. Kuhn, D., Schauble, L., & Garcia-Mila, M. (1992). Cross-domain development of scientific reasoning. Cognition and Instruction, 9, 285–327. Kuhn, D., Shaw, V., & Felton, M. (1997). Effects of dyadic interaction on argumentive reasoning. Cognition and Instruction, 15, 287–315. Kuhn, D., & Udell, W. (2003). The development of argument skills. Child Development, 74, 1245–1260. Latour, B. (1987). Science in action: How to follow scientists and engineers through society. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Latour, B., & Woolgar, S. (1986). An anthropologist visits the laboratory. In B. Latour & S. Woolgar (Eds.), Laboratory life: The construction of scientific facts (pp. 83–90). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Lemke, J. L. (2002). Enseñar todos los lenguajes de la ciencia: palabras, símbolos, imágenes y acciones. In M. Benlloch (Ed.), La educación en ciencias: Ideas para mejorar su práctica (pp. 159–185). Barcelona, Spain: Paidós. Means, M., & Voss, J. (1996). Who reasons well? Two studies of informal reasoning among students of different grade, ability, and knowledge levels. Cognition and Instruction, 14, 139–178. Moshman, D. (1995). Reasoning as self-constrained thinking. Human Development, 38, 53–64. Moshman, D. (1998). Cognitive development beyond childhood. In D. Kuhn & R. Siegler (Eds.), Handbook of child psychology: Vol. 2, Cognition, perception, and language (5th ed., pp. 947– 978). New York: Wiley. Osborne, J., Erduran, S., & Simon, S. (2004). Enhancing the quality of argumentation in school science. Journal of Research in Science Teaching, 41, 994–1020. Perelman, C., & Olbrechts-Tyteca, L. (Eds.) (1969). The new rhetoric: A treatise on argumentation (2nd ed. Original work published in 1958 ed.). Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press. Perkins, D. (1985). Post-primary education has little impact upon informal reasoning. Journal of Educational Psychology, 77, 563–571. Perner, J. (1991). Understanding the representational mind. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. Perry, W. (1970). Forms of intellectual and ethical development in the college years. New York: Holt, Rinehart, & Winston. Pontecorvo, C., & Girardet, H. (1993). Arguing and reasoning in understanding historical topics. Cognition and Instruction, 11, 365–395. Prain, V., & Hand, B. (1996). Writing for learning in secondary science: Rethinking practices. Teaching and Teacher Education, 12, 609–626. Quinn, V. (1997). Critical thinking in young minds. London: David Fulton Publishers. Resnick, L. (1987). Education and learning to think. Washington, DC: National Academy Press. Reznitskaya, A., Anderson, R., McNurlen, B., Nguyen-Jahiel, K., Archoudidou, A., & Kim, S. (2001). Influence of oral discussion on written argument. Discourse Processes, 32, 155–175. Rivard, L. P. (1994). A review of writing-to-learn in science: Implications for practice and research. Journal of Research in Science Teaching, 31, 969–983.
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Ruffman, T., Perner, J., Olson, D., & Doherty, M. (1993). Reflecting on scientific thinking: Children’s understanding of the hypothesis-evidence relation. Child Development, 64, 1617–1636. Schultz, L., & Gopnik, A. (2004). Causal learning across domains. Developmental Psychology, 40, 162–176. Siegel, H. (1989). The rationality of science, critical thinking and science education. Synthese, 80(1), 9–42. Sodian, B., Zaitchick, D., & Carey, S. (1991). Young children’s differentiation of hypothetical beliefs from evidence. Child Development, 62, 753–766. Stein, N. L., & Miller, C. A. (1993). The development of memory and reasoning skill in argumentive contexts: Evaluating, explaining and generating evidence. In R. Glaser (Ed.), Advances in instructional psychology. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. Toulmin, S. (1958). The uses of argument (Updated edition ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Vosniadou, S., & Verschaffel, L. (2004). Extending the conceptual change approach to mathematics learning and teaching. Learning and Instruction, 42, 445–451. Voss, J. F., & Means, M. (1991). Learning to reason via instruction in argumentation. Learning and Instruction, 1, 337–350. Voss, J. F., & Van Dike, J. A. (2001). Argumentation in psychology: Background comments. Discourse Processes, 32(2&3), 89–111. Vygotsky, L. S. (1981). The genesis of higher mental functions. In J. Wertsch (Ed.), The concept of activity in Soviet psychology (pp. 144–188). Armonk, NY: Sharpe. Walton, D. N. (1989). Dialogue theory for critical thinking. Argumentation, 3, 169–184. Walton, D. N. (1996). Argumentation schemes for presumptive reasoning. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. Zimmerman, C. (2000). The development of scientific reasoning skills. Developmental Review, 20, 99–149. Zohar, A., & Nemet, F. (2002). Fostering students’ knowledge and argumentation skills through dilemmas in human genetics. Journal of Research in Science Teaching, 39, 35–62.
Chapter 3
Methodological Foundations in the Study of Argumentation in Science Classrooms Sibel Erduran
“Every discourse, even a poetic or oracular sentence, carries with it a system of rules for producing analogous things and thus an outline of methodology.’’ Jacques Derrida
Ask anyone who has done work on argumentation in science classrooms what their primary concern has been in this line of research, and they will most likely respond with one word: methodology. Most likely they will then begin to ask you if you have figured out how to distinguish data from warrants. The questions will continue: can theoretical statements be data? If a warrant is not explicitly stated, can it still be assumed that it is part of the argument? Indeed the study of argumentation in the science classroom raises significant methodological questions. What counts as an argument in children’s talk anyhow? What is the unit of analysis of argument and of argumentation in classroom conversations? What criteria drive the selection and application of coding tools? What justifies the choice of one methodological approach over another? What does a particular methodological approach enable us to do and how does it do so? While in one sense, such methodological questions are about the reliability and validity of methodological tools for the analysis of arguments (e.g., Duschl et al., 1999), in another sense they are questions about the very nature and function of methodologies for a line of research that challenges positivist characterizations of scientific knowledge stripped off of the cultural, affective, economical and personal contexts and processes of science. In a review of literature on the use of methodologies in science education, Kelly et al. (1998) observed incongruities between theoretical perspectives and methodological approaches adapted in studies on the Nature of Science. Although the bodies of literature informing the Nature of Science studies used multiple methodological orientations, the majority of the empirical Nature of Science studies used either survey instruments or interviews, without observational data of teachers and students. The state of affairs in the case of argumentation might present an example of an opposite trend where, roughly two decades later since argumentation has taken root in science education, our methodological work remains heavily focused on observational data at the expense of surveys and interviews. It is worthwhile to note that concentrating on quantitative analyses of argumentation does not necessarily imply a contradiction between methodological and theoretical orientations of science education. Quantitative analyses S. Erduran and M. P. Jiménez-Aleixandre (eds.), Argumentation in Science Education. © Springer 2007
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address different questions from those raised by detailed analyses of classroom talk. For instance, “what correlations are there between power relations in classrooms and the ability to argue scientifically?” is a question that begs a methodological orientation based on quantitative methods whilst at the same time empowering the sociological processes of science in the classroom. This chapter will trace issues related to such methodological questions surrounding the study of argumentation in science classrooms particularly in an effort to provide a rationale for what methodological approaches enable science education researchers to accomplish and how. For example, methodological tools need to be refined enough to generate a set of indicators for the quality of arguments generated in the learning environment (Erduran et al., 2004). A further emphasis of the chapter will be on the application of particular theoretical frameworks (e.g., Toulmin, 1958; Walton, 1999) as well as the generation of categories from data-driven approaches (Sandoval & Reiser, 2004; Maloney & Simon, 2006). In so doing, the chapter will problematize the adaptation of theoretically and empirically grounded perspectives as methodological approaches, and it will investigate some challenges that such approaches can pose. Finally, the role of methodological innovations in contributing to the knowledge base in science education will be explored. In particular, the case of Stephen Toulmin’s (1958) work will be used to illustrate what contribution the adaptation of his framework on argument has made to knowledge in science education. A significant body of argumentation literature in science education has been based on Toulmin’s work (e.g., Erduran et al. 2004; Jiménez-Aleixandre et al., 2000). It is interesting to note that even though science education as a field remains minimally influenced by philosophical analyses (Scerri, 2002), the uptake and impact of Toulmin’s framework on argument (particularly as a methodological tool) has mirrored trends within philosophy itself. In “A Citation-Based Reflection on Toulmin and Argument”, Ronald P. Loui (2005) uses citation counts to measure the influence of Toulmin’s work. He reports that citations in the leading journals in the social sciences, humanities and science and technology put Toulmin and his works in the top 10 among philosophers of science and philosophical logicians of the 20th century. Thus, he concludes, Toulmin’s Uses of Argument, and work in general, have been essential contributions to 20th-century thought. Even though there has been no quantitative measures of the impact of Toulmin’s work in science education, qualitatively it would be difficult to disagree with the position that Toulmin’s work has influenced the work of many science educators has had in the literature. Prevalence of Toulmin’s work in application to the study of argumentation in science classrooms (e.g., Erduran et al., 2004) will be used as a case example of how methodological approaches can contribute to the development of knowledge in science education.
Analysis of Argumentation in School Science In the 2003 Conference of the European Science Education Research Association, I was asked to be a discussant for a session titled “Communication and Discourse Analysis in the Science Classroom.” The session included five papers and used a range of theoretically driven analytical frameworks for the study of discourse in science
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classrooms. The work from a couple of these presentations has subsequently been published. Jiménez-Aleixandre and Pereiro Muñoz (2005) used Toulmin’s framework to study students’ interactions in small groups. Castells et al. (2007) used Perelman’s Theory of Argumentation to frame teacher–student interactions from both epistemological and communicative perspectives. Marquez, Izquierdo and Espinet (2006) used Halliday’s model of Functional Grammar to interpret communicative and linguistic aspects of teachers’ actions. Piccinini and Martins (2005) used Kress and colleagues’ semiotic modes to interpret teacher–student interactions. Scott and Mortimer (2005) drew on sociocultural perspectives including the work of Lev Vygotsky to study a range of interactions in the classroom including student–student interactions. An overarching theme across these papers was the assumption that there are teaching and learning situations that can be captured in semiotic interactions and that the study of semiotic interactions can inform and improve science education. This conference session embodies some of the methodological issues in the study of argumentation particularly the adaptation of a certain theoretical stance from a leading scholar in a related field such as philosophy and linguistics. In a similar spirit as the ESERA session, literature on argumentation in science education has witnessed the adaptation of theoretical perspectives for methodological use (Erduran et al., 2004; Zohar & Nemet, 2002; Jiménez-Aleixandre et al., 2000) as well as the generation of analytical tools from a more grounded approach (Sandoval & Reiser, 2004; Maloney & Simon, 2006). The particular rationalization of these tools is done relative to the context of the research in which the tool was used and the purpose of the study. In the next few sections, I will review some of these approaches. In particular, I will illustrate how studies have focused on the analysis of (a) evidence and justifications; (b) epistemic practices and criteria; (c) arguers and the nature of arguments; and (d) participation in discussions, as criteria for defining and confining the analytical boundaries for argumentation in the science classroom.
Evidence and Justifications Zohar and Nemet (2002) modified Toulmin’s Argument Pattern (TAP) based on the work of Means and Voss (1996) to evaluate the quality of written arguments generated by students based on structure and content. Zohar and Nemet define an argument as consisting “of either assertions or conclusions and their justifications; or of reasons or supports” (p. 38). Strong arguments have multiple justifications to support a conclusion that incorporate relevant, specific and accurate scientific concepts and facts. Weak arguments consist of individual non-relevant justifications. Conclusions that do not include some type of justification are not considered arguments. Zohar and Nemet also collapsed Toulmin’s data, warrants and backings into a single category to sidestep many of the reliability and validity issues associated with Toulmin’s framework, an approach also employed by Erduran et al. (2004). The criteria for the classification of justifications were (a) no consideration of scientific knowledge, (b) inaccurate
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scientific knowledge, (c) non-specific scientific knowledge (we need to do more tests before we can reach a conclusion), or (d) correct scientific knowledge. Zohar and Nemet’s framework does not evaluate the accuracy of the claim itself. As a result, their framework works better when used to analyze arguments generated in the context of socio-scientific issues rather than in the context of scientific debates. In response to socio-scientific dilemmas that Zohar and Nemet studied, valid opposing claims can be made from multiple perspectives. However, when arguments are scientific, claims are explanatory conclusions or descriptive frameworks. In our work (Erduran et al., 2004), we developed two methodological approaches for the analysis of discourse from whole class and small group discussions. First, we adapted TAP for the purposes of coding data that originate from whole-class conversations where successive implementation of lessons can be traced for their improved quality of argumentation. Here we have traced the frequency of TAP profiles from the same lessons that were implemented a year apart by the same teachers. Comparison of the results held the potential to investigate whether or not there was an improvement in the employment of argumentation across different lessons. Our purpose was not to report on statistically significant outcomes since our sample size was small (i.e., two lessons per teacher and no control lessons) but rather our aim was to describe a methodology that can be of use to future researchers in the quantification of arguments to test the effectiveness of interventions based on argumentation. Our analysis provided a qualitative indication also of how teachers’ specific discourse practices compare and thus how appropriate feedback can be crafted to facilitate particular teachers’ implementation of argumentation. For example, the distribution of TAP profiles across the two years was very similar for each teacher but different between teachers. The tool we have developed, then, provided us with an insight into how teachers’ engagement in argumentation compares and where in discourse more emphasis is needed to improve the quality of argumentation. We were also able to trace cross- and within-teacher variations in how argumentation was implemented (Simon et al., 2006). Given the research evidence that teachers’ practices improve when they are empowered by reflection and understanding on their teaching actions (e.g., Loucks-Horsley et al., 1998) such insight could help create powerful strategies for more effective implementation of traditionally unfamiliar discourse forms such as argumentation. A further outcome of our methodological approaches was a scheme reproduced in Table 3.1 where argumentation is assessed in terms of levels of the quality of oppositions or rebuttals in the student discussions in small-group format (Erduran et al., 2004). In this approach, we have focused on those instances where there was a clear opposition between students and assessed the nature of this opposition in terms of the strength of the rebuttals offered. We perceived the presence of a rebuttal as a significant indicator of quality of argumentation since a rebuttal, and how it counters another’s argument forces both participants to evaluate the validity and strength of that argument. Research evidence (e.g., Kuhn, 1991) suggests that the cognitive skill of argument is, to some extent, founded on an understanding of how
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Table 3.1 Analytical framework used for assessing the quality of argumentation (Erduran et al., 2004) Level 1: Level 1 argumentation consists of arguments that are a simple claim versus a counterclaim or a claim versus a claim. Level 2: Level 2 argumentation has arguments consisting of a claim versus a claim with either data, warrants or backings but do not contain any rebuttals. Level 3: Level 3 argumentation has arguments with a series of claims or counterclaims with either data, warrants or backings with the occasional weak rebuttal. Level 4: Level 4 argumentation shows arguments with a claim with a clearly identifiable rebuttal. Such an argument may have several claims and counterclaims. Level 5: Level 5 argumentation displays an extended argument with more than one rebuttal.
to rebut an opposer’s point of view. In this sense, students’ ability to formulate strong rebuttals is a significant goal for the teaching of argumentation. We thus traced the quality of argument by focusing on the presence or absence of rebuttals. For instance, when there was opposition between students but the opposition consisted of only counterarguments that were unrelated, we perceived this to be low-level argumentation. In other words, in these cases, there was no indication of an understanding of a rebuttal in terms of its relation to challenging the validity of the evidence and justifications offered. There was simply no reference to the components of the argument maintained by the opposition. When, however, the rebuttal was in direct reference to a piece of evidence (data, warrants or backings) offered, thereby engaging with a presented argument, we considered this instance to be representative of higher level argumentation. In this methodological approach, we have thus emphasized the use of rebuttals and developed a strategy for using TAP as a measure of interactive discourse.
Epistemic Practices and Criteria Kelly and Takao (2002), and Takao and Kelly (2003) developed a method to analyze longer and complex written arguments by examining term papers produced by students enrolled in an oceanography course. The term paper required students to support an abstract theoretical conclusion based on multiple data representations. The arguments generated by these students often contained multiple propositions in order to support their particular explanatory conclusion. Kelly and Takao’s analytic framework focused on the relative epistemic status of these propositions and how these propositions were linked together by the author to form a persuasive argument. In order to develop this framework, Kelly and Takao relied heavily on rhetorical studies of science writing (e.g., Bazerman, 1988; Latour, 1987). To analyze an extended rhetorical argument using this framework, propositions are identified and then sorted based on epistemic level. These epistemic levels are defined by discipline-specific constructs and reflect a general distinction between lower level descriptions of data and epistemologically higher level appeals to theories within the particular domain. Once classified, Kelly and Takao determine how these propositions are linked
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together and use this information to produce a graphical representation of an argument that shows how students coordinate propositions in their writing. Sandoval and Millwood (2005) have developed a framework for judging the quality of scientific arguments generated by students. Rather than examining arguments based on the field-invariant structural components of arguments, these authors’ coding scheme attempts to assess how well students generate arguments based on fielddependent criteria. Specifically, Sandoval and Millwood’s coding scheme assesses two dimensions of scientific arguments. First, conceptual quality measures how well the individual has (a) articulated causal claims within a specific theoretical framework, and (b) warranted these claims using available data. Second, epistemological quality measures how well the individual has (a) cited sufficient data in warranting a claim, (b) written a coherent causal explanation for a given phenomenon, and (c) incorporated appropriate rhetorical references when referring to data. A strength of Sandoval and Millwood’s framework is that it can determine if students can generate an argument that explains a particular observed phenomenon using a specific theory, such as natural selection. Furthermore, their framework provides information about the epistemological criteria students use when generating arguments as an end product of their own inquiry and how these criteria align with the criteria used within particular scientific domains. Sandoval and Millwood’s scheme suggests that constructing high-quality arguments requires a conceptual understanding of relevant scientific theories and their application to a specific problem as well as an epistemic understanding of the criteria for high-quality arguments. These authors argue for the importance of the latter component because the manner in which students incorporate and refer to data in their writing reflects their implicit epistemological commitments about the nature and role of data in the generation and evaluation of scientific knowledge. For example, Sandoval and Millwood’s (2005) analysis indicates that students are able to apply their understanding of natural selection to generate an argument that is consistent with the major tenets of natural selection. However, the overall pattern of warrant and evidence citation suggests that although students understand the importance of linking evidence and claims, students tend to rely on a single piece of data when supporting a particular claim. As a result, students often do not include a comparison of data from multiple sources when warranting a claim where when such comparisons are needed. Sandoval’s earlier work (Sandoval, 2003) also indicates that students often interpret data incorrectly even though they can articulate a specific explanation in terms of a guiding theory. A key contribution of Sandoval and colleagues’ analytical frameworks is the observation that field-dependent criteria are important in the analysis of arguments.
Arguers and Nature of Arguments Zembal-Saul et al. (2003) developed a rubric to analyze pre-service teachers’ arguments (Table 3.2). The rubric consisted of four main categories: causal coherence and structure; evidence; justifications and evaluations. In a qualitative case study,
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Table 3.2 Rubric for analyzing pre-service teachers’ arguments (Zembal-Saul et al., 2003) 1. Causal Coherence/Causal Structure (a) A network representation of causal relations was constructed based on students’ explanations. (b) Description of the causal sequence (i) Do explanations articulate specific cause-and-effect relationships? (ii) Are causal relationships logically connected? (iii) Are causal relationships and their connections explicitly stated? (iv) Do they consider the possibility of more than one cause (multiple causal lines)? (c) Do they consider the possibility of multiple factors interacting to produce a phenomenon? (d) Does the causal structure reflect domain-specific principles (e.g., selective pressure, change in frequency traits in population, initial variation, differential survival)? 2. Evidence (a) Is there evidence to support each claim? (b) Is the evidence relevant to the claim? (c) Do they make valid inferences from data? (d) Do they use principles of knowledge within the domain? (e) Do they sort data in appropriate ways (e.g., based on population characteristics such as sex and age)? (f) In which cases do they have more or less pieces of data linked as supporting evidence? What distinguishes parts that are supported with several pieces of evidence and those that are not? (g) Do they tend to use individual data or representations of population patterns such as graphics? In what circumstances do they use different kinds of evidence? (h) Do they tend to use qualitative data or quantitative data to support their claims? In what circumstances do they use different kinds of evidence? (i) How do they describe their pieces of evidence (e.g., annotation box in software)? Do such descriptions vary depending on the type of evidence (e.g., graphs, field notes)? (j) Is it possible to identify any changes in these aspects across the unit (e.g., when do they start to use a type of evidence?)? 3. Data justifications (a) Do students provide justification for why data is relevant to support a claim? (b) What kind of justification do they use? (c) Are there particular instances in which justification is absent/present? 4. Thinking about their explanations (evaluating their explanations) (a) How do they categorize their explanations (e.g., accepted completely; accepted with changes)? (b) How do they justify this categorization?
pre-service science teachers enrolled in their advanced methods course participated in a complex, data-rich investigation. Fundamental to the investigation was the use of the Galapagos Finches software and an emphasis on giving priority to evidence and constructing evidence-based arguments. The primary sources of data were the electronic artifacts generated in the Galapagos Finches software environment and the videotaped interactions of both pairs as they investigated the data set, constructed and revised their arguments, engaged in peer review sessions, and presented
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their arguments to the class at the end of the unit. One of the outcomes of the case study was that using the software pre-service science teachers consistently constructed claims that were linked to evidence from the investigation. Another outcome was that although pre-service science teachers consistently grounded their arguments in evidence, they still exhibited a number of limitations reported in the literature. Hogan and Maglienti (2001) developed a coding scheme for rating participants’ overall judgment of a conclusion (Table 3.3). These researchers examined the criteria that middle school students, non-scientist adults, technicians, and scientists used to rate the validity of conclusions drawn by hypothetical students from a set of evidence. The groups’ criteria for evaluating conclusions were considered to be dimensions of their epistemological frameworks regarding how knowledge claims are justified, and as such how they are integral to their scientific reasoning. Quantitative and qualitative analyses revealed that the responses of students and non-scientists differed from the responses of technicians and scientists, with the major difference being the groups’ relative emphasis on criteria of empirical consistency or plausibility of the conclusions. Lawson (2003) argues that science educators should focus their efforts on helping students learn how to generate the type of arguments that are used and valued by scientists rather than focusing on a more general account of argument structure. From his perspective, the goal of developing an argument in science is to “determine which of two or more proposed alternative explanations (claims) for a puzzling observation is correct and which of the alternatives are incorrect” (p. 1389). This process requires the generation of an argument that consists of not only a tentative explanation that may be correct but also includes how this explanation was tested based on the generation of specific predictions and the analysis of evidence. Lawson describes this type of argument as a hypothetico-predictive argument. According to Lawson, this type of argument, which evaluates the validity of alternative explanations based on hypothetico-deductive reasoning, is much more convincing than arguments that rely on evidence, warrants, and backings to convince
Table 3.3 Coding of conclusions (Hogan & Maglienti, 2001) Level Description 0 1
2 3
4
Does not mention any relevant strengths and weaknesses of the conclusion. Mentions some relevant strengths and weaknesses of the conclusion, but not the major ones. Also uses agreement with personal inferences or views as a basis for judging the conclusion. Mentions some strengths and weaknesses of the conclusion, but not the major ones. Does not base judgments on agreement with personal inferences or views. Mentions the major strengths and weaknesses of the conclusion, but also uses agreement with personal inferences or views as a basis for judging the conclusion. Mentions the major strengths and weaknesses of the conclusion. Does not base judgments on agreement with personal inferences or views.
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others of the validity of a claim because it can provide evidence for one explanation and at the same time provide evidence against another. The process of constructing a hypothetico-predictive argument begins with an observation that provokes a casual question and the generation of one or more tentative explanations. Once generated, these explanations must be tested in order to establish their validity. To test the validity of an explanation, one must begin by assuming that the explanation is correct. Next, one must imagine a test that, together with the explanation, should produce one or more specific observable results. The words, “if/and/then” are used to link the explanation and the imagined test to the prediction. Once a test is planned and conducted, the observed results constitute evidence. This evidence is then compared with the prediction. This match or mismatch of evidence and prediction can then be used to draw a conclusion regarding the validity of the explanation. Lawson indicates that the overall quality of this type of argument should be evaluated based on its deductive validity rather than the presence and strength of warrants, which he contends, is the same criterion used by scientists to assess the quality of arguments generated by the scientific community.
Participation in Discussions Maloney and Simon (2006) developed a coding system to show different approaches to engaging in discussion. The system, termed a “Discussion map”, was designed to identify the nature and extent to which children engaged in sustained argumentation dialogue. The construction of these maps was initially informed by the work of Chinn and Anderson (1998), who used “argument networks” to analyze the structure of discourse of children in small groups as they discussed issues raised by stories (not scientific in nature). One of the major problems encountered in the use of argument networks was of a practical nature; a transcript that was 4 pages in length produced an argument network that required 13 pages. However, the construction of argument networks identified the need for some diagrammatic representation of the discourse, as the diagrams demonstrated clearly the varying patterns of discussion for the different activities. For example, they showed whether the arguments put forward were discussed by the group or ignored, and whether arguments were followed by the presentation of a new claim. For opposing arguments, the diagrams indicated whether the evidence was examined to evaluate the opposing claims or whether claims were just accepted and not challenged. The diagrams also showed which children were taking part in the discussions. As a result of this pilot work and the developing clarity about the requirements to aid analysis, the “Discussion Map” was devised to capture all these features in a more economic way. A Discussion Map is constructed through identifying key episodes of “talk” that include argumentative discussion using evidence. These episodes are termed “Argument”, “Review”, and “Clarification”. A fourth category of talk was needed to complete the transcript analysis, so that the Discussion Map captures the
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intervals and frequency of the key episodes of talk—this fourth category includes all other types of discourse and is termed “Other Talk”.
Trends in the Literature on Analysis of Argumentation The preceding review of literature is not intended to be exhaustive and thus cannot be used as a definitive source for analytical perspectives on argument in science education. However, it is noteworthy to state that the pattern in the use of analytical frameworks to study argumentation in school science has tended to emphasize the qualitative aspects of the structure of an argument and the processes of argumentation. Given the labor-intensive nature of analysis of classroom and group talk, this observation is not surprising. In our work (Erduran et al., 2004) we attempted to develop quantitative measures of the quality of argumentation and yet it is unlikely that our methodological approach can be realistically adapted for large-scale studies. Neither should they be if the questions that such methodology targets make large-scale quantitative measures meaningless. Consider the task of a biochemist who is interested in the particular features of a protein, perhaps how certain amino acid sequences might dictate the function as an enzyme. It would be meaningless to generalize or to quantify the features of such sequences to all enzymes given their particular functions. In other words, it is the particular nature of the object of study that is of interest and that guides the research question. Whilst it is important to focus on discourse to illustrate the nature of argumentation and reasoning (for further reference on a review of analytical approaches, see Clark et al., in press), it is equally important to introduce methodological approaches that aim at addressing different questions, particularly questions that seek understanding of correlations and associations. For instance, a question such as “is there a significant impact of argument skills on subject knowledge in science?” would necessitate that tools are generated and applied to data to measure both argument skills and subject knowledge, and that the joint use of these tools can be justified. Furthermore a significant deficit in the literature remains which is the paucity of research on quantitative analysis of argumentation, not at the level of conversational analysis but at the level of conceptual categories that are of significance to science education. For example, there is limited understanding of how teachers’ beliefs about pedagogical values of discussions might correlate with their emphasis in their teaching of argumentation. Likewise there are no measures of teachers’ and students’ attitudes and beliefs about the role of argument in science and in science education. One exception to this overall pattern is the work of Sampson and Clark (2006) who have developed a questionnaire to assess the correlation between argumentation skills and understanding of the nature of science. Overall, however, the trends in the literature point to the challenges that researchers have experienced in the qualitative analyses of argumentation in the science classroom which is the focus of our discussion in the next section.
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Coding Arguments: Challenges and Compromises A major issue in the study of argumentation in either written or verbal data is the unit of analysis. What becomes of the boundary markers of the data where arguments begin and end? Decisions have to be made regarding how the data will be split and subsequently how the chunks will be categorized and interpreted. Is an argument located within one person’s argument or would a set of statements still count as the components of an argument even if the talkers may not have intended them to be part of a bigger whole? Let us explore such questions taking on a definition of argument based on Toulmin’s work. Toulmin’s Argument Pattern (TAP) (Fig. 3.1) illustrates the structure of an argument in terms of an interconnected set of a claim; data that support that claim; warrants that provide a link between the data and the claim; backings that strengthen the warrants; and finally, rebuttals which point to the circumstances under which the claim would not hold true. More specifically, a claim is an assertion put forward publicly for general acceptance. Data and warrants are the specific facts relied on to support a given claim. Backings are generalizations making explicit the body of experience relied on to establish the trustworthiness of the ways of arguing applied in any particular case. Rebuttals are the extraordinary or exceptional circumstances that might undermine the force of the supporting arguments. Toulmin further considers the role of qualifiers as phrases that show what kind of degree of reliance is to be placed on the conclusions, given the arguments available to support them. (Toulmin’s framework will be discussed in more detail in a later section of this chapter.) Despite its use as a framework for defining argument, the application of TAP to the analysis of classroom-based verbal data has yielded difficulties. The main difficulty has been in the clarification of what counts as claim, data, warrant and backing. Kelly et al. (1998) applied TAP to the analysis of student dyadic spoken discourse. This study identified the potential uses of Toulmin’s method but also
Fig. 3.1 Toulmin’s argument pattern (Toulmin, 1958)
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highlighted some methodological problems. The authors found that organizing student discourse into Toulmin’s argument components required careful attention to the contextualized use of language. According to Kelly and his colleagues, while the Toulmin model makes distinctions among statements of data, claim, warrant and backing, the scheme is restricted to relatively short argument structures and the argument components pose ambiguities. Statements of claims can serve as a new assertion to be proven or can be in service to another claim, thus acting as a warrant. In a subsequent study, Kelly and Chen (1999) modified Toulmin’s model by drawing on the work of Latour (1987). They thus considered the epistemic status of students’ claims in their writings and sorted these according to the model presented by Latour. This form of analysis allowed for the consideration of claims at multiple levels of theoretical generality and matched well with the categorical description of transactional use of language. Other researchers (see Duschl this book) have preferred to use other analytical tools such as Douglas Walton’s scheme on presumptive reasoning, justifying their choice on the ambiguity surrounding the key features of TAP in application to real discourse. Let’s illustrate the difficulties encountered in the coding of arguments using TAP with an example. The episode comes from our published work (Erduran et al., 2004) conducted in a middle school in London where we explored children’s argumentation in whole class discussions. The students were asked to evaluate a set of statements regarding the phases of the moon. Teacher Student Teacher Student Teacher Student
Statement A, “The moon spins around, so the part of the moon that gives out light is not always facing us.” Julian, A? The moon doesn’t give out light. Right, so that’s why A is wrong. That’s true. How do you know that? Because the light that comes from the moon is actually from the sun. He is saying the light that we see from the moon is actually a reflection from the sun. How do we know that? Because the moon is blocked by the. . . . . .
In our earlier work, we have used this example to illustrate how we resolved some of the issues involved in coding. I will reconstruct this example here to illustrate some of the key challenges that we faced in coding arguments in our work. In this example, one could consider the statement “The moon spins around” as a piece of data that supports the claim “So the part of the moon that gives out light is not always facing us.” One could also argue, however, that the student’s choice of “A” (the statement on the card) is the main claim. In other words, “A is right” can be considered an implicit claim that is challenged by the next claim “The moon doesn’t give out light.” Deciding which of statements to take as a claim (i.e., “The moon spins around” or “A is right”) can thus become problematic. Examining the use of words such as “so” and “because” can help resolve some ambiguities. Indeed, the use of the operative word “so” which itself is implied in Toulmin’s definition (for reaching conclusions from data) makes the first case described highly convincing. In other words, there is little doubt that there is a claim and a justification, whatever the precise nature of this justification might be
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or indeed whichever statement (“The moon spins around” or “The part of the moon that gives out light is not always facing us”) is taken to be the main claim. The use of the next statement “The moon doesn’t give out light” as a rebuttal creates an opposition to the justification used in the primary argument. The student’s further elaboration of reasoning in “Because the light that comes from the moon is actually from the sun” is an effort for a justification of the rebuttal. Viewed in this way, ambiguities about what counts as claim, data, rebuttal and so on can be resolved. Even though all the statements above can be considered as claims in themselves, in the course of the reasoning, they can be positioned to be data or rebuttal relative to the main claim that creates an impetus for the generation of the subsequent statements. Indeed many aspects of an argument can be considered “nested” where, for instance, data of one argument could count as a claim for another argument. Resolving such differences in coding is not a matter specific to analysis of argument. Establishing clearly defined and codable categories is a major issue in qualitative data analysis in general. As in any kind of analysis, a significant issue is that the categories have to be tight enough to be able to capture what we want them to capture. The nature of codes and the strategy for coding will depend on the purpose of the investigation as well as the questions that the research is trying to address. For the purposes of coding, the researcher would need to specify the instructions for new coders so as to ensure that reliable coding can occur. For example, in the preceding episode, a researcher may make a decision that the statement cards will be treated as main claims relative to which all other statements will be positioned. Apart from ambiguities in what counts as a claim, data and warrant, other challenges exist for the coding of arguments. For instance, if the components of an argument are repeated, can we establish that a new argument is not introduced to count as another argument? Can we establish the role and function of such repetition in conversation? What if the student says a bit more in a sequence of talk? Would spatially separate but seemingly related statements count as parts of the same argument and add to the original argument? The researcher will also need to create boundaries and rules for such cases. A further issue is the nature of evidence used as data, warrants and backings. Can theoretical statements count as evidence or should evidence be empirically based? Can opinions, beliefs, ideas and values count as evidence? Is there a difference between what counts as evidence in scientific and socio-scientific contexts? The source of the components of the argument—i.e., whether or not they are empirical and theoretical—presents another problem for coding arguments. Researchers might be interested in examining the validity of arguments relative to the use of evidence. In certain respects the use of empirical evidence might be more favorable than theoretical evidence. In others, theoretical statements might be the only source of evidence, for instance, the use of the atomic theory in arguments about why a chemical reaction takes place in a particular way and not in another fashion. A further challenge in the study of argumentation in science education is the extent to which codes of arguments can frame pedagogical and learning aspects of argumentation. Zembal-Saul et al.’s (2003) rubric for analyzing teachers’ arguments rests heavily on their understanding and use of argument structure and process. In our work on the professional development of science teachers to include argumentation in their teaching, we developed a hierarchy of codes that are intended to capture the pedagogical
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strategies underlying argumentation episodes (Simon et al., 2006). The subsequent investigation was to identify how the teacher might be promoting the implementation and learning of such concepts. For example, playing the role of devil’s advocate could be considered as a pedagogical strategy that promotes the use of justifications. In both of these example cases, concepts such as evidence, claim and justification—central to the definition of argument—guided the focus on the text for analysis. In other words, an implicit entry point into the transcripts to examine teaching behaviors was a definition of argument. It is difficult to imagine what other entry point or a guiding framework could be used for this purpose other than a definition of argument. The precise intention is to seek to understand the nature of argumentation be it from a pedagogical, learning or any other point of view. What this observation does point to is the significance of which definition of argument is being used for pedagogical purposes and how such a choice on argument can dictate the analysis sought beyond just a definition of argument.
Revisiting Toulmin: Contributions of Methodology to Knowledge in Science Education There is little doubt that Toulmin’s seminal book The Uses of Argument, first published in 1958, has guided much research in science education. The preceding discussions provide evidence to this observation. I personally have been influenced by Toulmin’s work for several years starting with the work we did in early 1990s in Pittsburgh schools on promoting scientific inquiry (Duschl, this book). Ever since, I made numerous attempts to contact Toulmin in the Department of Anthropology at the University of Southern California which have not yielded a response. I wanted to ask Toulmin himself what he thought about the way in which science educators have considered and adapted his work for educational purposes—a question that may be of interest to other researchers to pursue as well. Toulmin’s model has been appropriated, adapted and extended by researchers not only in science education but also in the fields of speech communications, philosophy and artificial intelligence. One issue of the journal Argumentation in 2005 brought together the best contemporary reflection in these fields on the Toulmin model and its current appropriation. The volume included 24 articles by 27 scholars from 10 countries. The papers extended or challenged Toulmin’s ideas in ways that make fresh contributions to the theory of analyzing and evaluating arguments. Collectively, they represent the only comprehensive book-length study of the Toulmin model. They point the way to new developments in the theory of argument, including a typology of warrants, a comprehensive theory of defeaters, a rapprochement with formal logic, and a turn from propositions to speech acts as the constituents of argument. As an illustration of his framework of argument, Toulmin (1958) discusses the claim that Harry is a British subject. The claim can be supported by the datum that Harry was born in Bermuda. That there is a connection at all between datum and claim is expressed by the warrant that a man born in Bermuda will generally be a
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British subject. In turn the warrant can be supported by the backing (that there are certain statutes and other legal provisions to that effect). The warrant does not have total justifying force, so the claim that Harry is a British subject must be qualified: it follows presumably. Moreover there are possible rebuttals, for instance when both his parents were aliens, or he has become a naturalized American. Verheij (2005) argues that since the appearance of Toulmin’s book, the following ideas have found increasing support in different research communities (under the direct influence of Toulmin or independently): (a) in argumentation, the warrants of arguments (in the sense of inference licenses) can be at issue and their backings can differ from domain to domain; (b) arguments can be subject to rebuttal in the sense that there can be conditions of exception; (c) arguments can have qualified conclusions. (d) other kinds of arguments than just those based on the standard logical quantifiers and connectives (for all x, for some x, not, and, or, etc.) need to be analyzed; (e) determining whether an argument is good or not involves substantive judgments and not only formal logic. In the next sections, I will review some of the contributions of Toulmin’s work to themes related to science education including expert–novice studies, problemsolving, scientific reasoning, and theoretical representations and frameworks. My purpose here is to provide some examples of how a theoretically informed definition of argument can yield methodological approaches, which in turn can contribute to knowledge in the field of science education.
Contributions to Expert–Novice Studies and Problem-Solving Cognitive scientist James Voss (2005) regarded the application of the Toulmin model as a success in the sense of providing a tool that produced a reasonable structure to complex protocols thereby enabling the study of expert reasoning in different domains. Voss used Toulmin’s framework in the analysis of verbal protocols obtained during the solving of ill-structured problems. The research Voss conducted involved experts on the Soviet Union indicating how they would improve the USSR’s poor agricultural productivity. Each expert was asked to assume he or she was Head of the Soviet Ministry of Agriculture and was asked how agricultural productivity could be improved. Each person responded orally, thus providing a “think aloud” protocol, the account being tape-recorded. For the analysis the Toulmin model was extended in order to enable description of lines of argument found in protocols as long as 10 paragraphs. Results included that (a) while the protocol was comprised of a large number of specific arguments, the analytical approach enabled the tracing of a solver’s line of argument; (b) on occasion datum and backing were difficult to distinguish; (c) warrants essentially were not stated, although substantial backing was provided. However, as perhaps would be expected, the Toulmin model did not provide for delineation of components of the problem-solving process. A second analysis assuming a “higher level” problem-solving structure and a “lower level” argument
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structure produced an integrated problem-solving—argumentation structure depicting how reasoning is used in relation to particular task goals. Finally, at a more general level, problem-solving was considered as a classical rhetorical structure. According to Voss what was especially gratifying was the reasonably clear lines of argument that were obtainable. Furthermore, the analysis led to other questions such as the nature of the protocol differences found not only among people of different knowledge but also among different experts. With respect to the actual coding of the protocols, Voss and colleagues experienced some difficulty determining whether a given statement was datum or backing, especially when a signal word such as “because” did not occur. A second finding was that, within their scoring system, the warrant of an argument was almost never stated. Following Toulmin (1958) as well as Hample (1977) and Govier (1987), statement of the warrant would make the argument logically valid. However someone who is solving a problem may only be interested in providing support for the claim and thus is concerned with backing, not deductive purity. Voss indicates that the main shortcoming of the Toulmin model relates to the goal of studying solving ill-structured problems. While providing a means to isolate lines of argument, the Toulmin model did not provide information concerning the problem-solving process. One could of course argue that the Toulmin analysis was not designed for this purpose. Voss and colleagues did conduct a second analysis in an effort to enhance our understanding of the problem-solving process (Voss et al., 1983). They assumed the existence of a “higher level” problem-solving structure that included the elements of the previously described information processing model. The protocol data were analyzed in relation to this structure, and the argument structure then became “lower level” with respect to the problem-solving structure. Moreover, two sets of operators were used in the analysis, one in reference to the problem solving structure and the other in relation to the reasoning or argument structure. The operators for the former were state constraint, state sub-problem, state solution, interpret problem statement, evaluate, and summarize. For the latter the operators were state argument, state assertion, state fact, present specific case, state reason, state outcome, compare and/or contrast, elaborate and/or clarify, state conclusion, and state qualifier. This analysis was of particular interest because it showed how specific arguments were employed in argument sequences or “nests of arguments” which in turn were employed in relation to higher-order problem-solving goal structures. The contents of the problem-solving structure constitute an argument. In particular, the solver is faced with a question or problem and the representation phase essentially involves an analysis aimed at providing a statement of the cause(s) of that problem, with problem history often being part of this analysis. A solution is then proposed (usually experts prefer an overall solution whereas novices tend to list specific sub-problem solutions) and the remainder of the solution phase consists of justification of that solution. Thus, the solution is the claim, the datum consists of the causal factors, and the solution development constitutes backing. In agreement with Toulmin, this solving process places emphasis upon
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justification (e.g., Van Eemeren et al., 1996). In the spirit of expert–novice studies, future analytical approaches will be enriched with foci on the development of expertise in science subject knowledge (e.g., Erduran, in press) and pedagogical content knowledge (e.g., Erduran & Dagher, in press). In other words, methodological frameworks that help investigate how science domain-specificity and levels of pedagogical competence relate to professional development will further contribute to the literature on expert–novice studies.
Contributions to Scientific Reasoning A genuine and radical deviation from standard logic is required by Toulmin’s notion of rebuttals although Toulmin hardly elaborates on the nature of rebuttals, a key reason why science educators such as ourselves (Erduran et al., 2004), for instance, have deviated from a formal definition of rebuttal in making TAP applicable for data analysis where rebuttals were involved. As Toulmin puts it, rebuttals involve conditions of exception for the argument (Toulmin, 1958; p. 101). Apparently, for Toulmin, rebuttals can have several functions. For instance, rebuttals can “indicate circumstances in which the general authority of the warrant would have to be set aside” (p.101), but can also be (and for Toulmin apparently equivalently) “exceptional circumstances which might be capable of defeating or rebutting the warranted conclusion” (p. 101). On p. 102, he also speaks about the applicability of a warrant in connection with rebuttals. In other words, Toulmin speaks of the defeat (or rebutting) of the conclusion, of the applicability of the warrant and of the authority of the warrant, in a rather loose manner, without further distinction. Toulmin is unclear about the relation of these seemingly different situations. Here the three will be distinguished, in a way that naturally fits the reconstruction of the other elements of Toulmin’s scheme above, as follows. If we look at the warrant–data–claim part of Toulmin’s scheme there are five statements that can be argued against (Verheij, 2005): 1. 2. 3. 4.
The data D The claim C The warrant W The associated conditional “If D, then C” that expresses the bridge from datum to claim. 5. The associated conditional “If W, then if D, then C” that expresses the bridge between warrant and the previous associated conditional. Verheij (2005) argues that reasons against any of these statements can be seen as a kind of rebuttal of an argument that consists of warrant, data and claim (Fig. 3.2). The first three are straightforward, and are clearly different. An argument against the datum that Harry was born in Bermuda (for instance by claiming that Harry was born in London) differs from an argument against the claim that Harry is a British subject (for instance by claiming that Harry has become a naturalized
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Fig. 3.2 Types of rebuttals (Verheij, 2005)
American) and from an argument against the warrant that a man born in Bermuda will generally be a British subject (for instance by claiming that those born in Bermuda are normally French). An argument against the fourth kind of statement (the first associated conditional) can be regarded as an attack on the connection between data and claim. Such attacks have been characterized as “undercutting defeaters” by Pollock (1987). Harry having become a naturalized American could be an argument against the connection between Harry being born in Bermuda and Harry being a British subject. An argument against the fifth kind of statement can be regarded as an attack against the warrant’s applicability: normally the warrant can justify the conditional that connects data and claim, but since there is a rebuttal, the warrant does not apply. In other words, when the associated conditional if W, then if D, then C, is not justified, the warrant, which normally gives rise to a bridge between data of type D and claim of type C, does not give rise to such a bridge for the actual data D and claim C at hand. For instance, Harry’s parents both being aliens could well be an argument against the applicability of the warrant that a man born in Bermuda will generally be a British subject. The three situations to which Toulmin attaches the term rebuttal (defeat of the conclusion, of the applicability of the warrant and of the authority of the warrant) are among these five kinds of rebuttals (the second, fifth and third, respectively). The other two kinds of rebuttals of a warrant–data–claim argument (i.e., the first and fourth kind) are apparently not mentioned by Toulmin (Verheij, 2005). Despite the limitations of Toulmin’s framing of rebuttals, his outline of the role of rebuttals as well as the subsequent criticisms of his work in this respect have paved the way to establishing more dialogical patterns in classroom conversations in the science classroom. In our own work (Erduran et al., 2004) we designed a methodological approach where rebuttals were used as an indicator of improved reasoning (Table 3.1). Conversation with rebuttals, are, however, of better quality than those without given that individuals who engage in talk without rebuttals remain epistemologically unchallenged. The reasons for their belief are not questioned and are simply opposed by a counterclaim that may be more or less persuasive but is not a substantive challenge to the original claim. At its worst, such arguments are reducible simply to the enunciation of contrasting belief systems.
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For instance, given that beliefs rely on justifications using data and warrants, a confrontation between a creationist and a Darwinist without any attempt to rebut the data or the warrants of the other would have no potential to change the ideas and thinking of either (Erduran et al., 2004). Only arguments, which rebut these components of argument can ever undermine the belief of another. Oppositional episodes without rebuttals, therefore, have the potential to continue forever with no change of mind or evaluation of the quality of the substance of an argument. Thus, arguments with rebuttals are an essential element of better quality arguments and demonstrate a higher level capability with argumentation. Furthermore, rebuttals can also be considered as a measure of conversational engagement. In other words, if one of the goals of promoting argumentation in science lessons is to engage learners in dialogical conversation where they can not only substantiate their claims but also refute others’ with evidence, then the presence of rebuttals in conversation can act as an indicator of sustained engagement in argumentation discourse.
Contributions to Theoretical Representations and Frameworks The analysis of arguments is often hard, not only for researchers but also for students and teachers. It is no surprise that for a technology-based task, one of my student teachers used a picture of me and sent me to space in an astronaut suit, labeling the photograph “in space, no-one can hear you argue!” A variety of tools and techniques have emerged from the theory of argumentation and critical thinking pedagogy that aim to help in the task of analysis (Reed & Rowe, 2005). Our work with pre-service science teachers (e.g., Erduran, 2006; Erduran et al., 2006) has led to the production of support tools including writing frames which help structure as well as evaluate arguments. One of the most common and intuitive of these tools is diagramming, by which the abstract form of an argument can be identified and seen at a glance, and according to which it is then possible to analyze more closely the relationships between an argument parts, for example Figs. 3.1 and 3.2. The utility of argument diagramming is seen in its almost universal adoption in the teaching of critical thinking and argumentation skills, as well as its deployment in various practical tools employed where complex argumentation is used as part of professional discourse. There is a wide range of diagramming techniques, some very general, some tailored to particular domains, for instance ARGUMED (Verheij, 2003a) and DEFLOG (Verheij, 2003b) systems. A key technique used in various pedagogic and professional applications of argumentation theory is the “box-and-arrow” approach of identifying atomic components of an argument, and then indicating links between them with arrows. One of the first proponents of the approach in a pedagogic context was Beardsley (1950), and little has changed since then. In addition to identifying relationships of support between atoms in an argument, Reed and Rowe (2005) observe that the scheme has become refined to also identify four distinct ways in which compounds can be formed: as serial argument (in which one statement supports another, which
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in turn supports a third); convergent argument (in which two or more statements independently support a third); linked argument (in which two or more statements jointly support a third) and divergent argument (in which two or more statements are supported by a third). Complex argumentation (including verbal and written argumentation) can be constructed through arbitrarily complex combinations of these forms. Rather than viewing arguments as essentially just more or less complex binary relationships of support, Toulmin framed arguments as six-part complexes, comprising the Data, Warrant, Claim, Backing, Rebuttal, Qualifier. Though the starting point was jurisprudential, the resulting theory and its subsequent application are very general, and a Toulmin-style approach, including diagrams of argument components, is widespread in the literature including science education literature (e.g., JiménezAleixandre et al., 2000; Simon et al., 2006). An important observation is that whatever the theoretical framework, be it Toulmin’s or another author’s, diagramming is much more than just ways of drawing pictures. Diagramming embodies many theoretical assumptions and conclusions, and works as a way of summarizing and applying substantial theories as practical tools that are simple and easy to understand.
Concluding Remarks In this chapter I presented an overview of some methodological approaches in the study of argumentation in science classrooms. My review raises more questions than it provides answers. Some of the key challenges of qualitative research methods including the definition of the unit of analysis, and reliability and boundary markers within verbal as well as written data apply to argumentation analysis too. In this sense, the difficulties that science educators have experienced in applying Toulmin’s framework to classroom conversations are not unique to Toulmin’s framework as it is often claimed (e.g., Duschl, this book; Kelly & Takao, 2002). An analytical tool derived from whatever theoretical or grounded framework will have its limitations in application, and it will not answer many questions. The case of the difficulties researchers have experienced in the application of Toulmin’s work in science education, in my view, is more representative of underspecification of the boundary markers that generate coding tools rather than an inherently limited feature of the framework itself. I have chosen to concentrate on Toulmin’s work as an example to illustrate how his work has contributed to both the methodology and theory of knowledge in science education. My choice of Toulmin’s framework is based on the observation that it has guided and influenced many researchers in the field. While other frameworks such as the work of Walton (1996) remain promising as methodological tools (Duschl, this book), there is not substantial work at the present time to warrant and attribute their contribution to methodology in the study of school science argumentation.
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Many methodological challenges remain in addressing aspects of argumentation in the classroom that are understudied. In our work (Simon et al., 2006) we generated a preliminary typology for the classification of pedagogical strategies in the teaching of argumentation. Extension of our results to more definitive pedagogical models will necessitate the development of new tools of analysis of teaching. Extending the analysis of argumentation from verbal to more multimodal contexts where other representations (including gestures) can be regarded as components of argument also promises a fruitful territory for methodological studies. Likewise methodologies will need to be developed to be sensitive enough to capture issues at different levels of education including primary, secondary and tertiary students’ and teachers’ argumentation. A significant gap in the literature concerns those aspects of the complex classroom environments including the sociological, political and psychological structures and processes that mediate argumentation in school science. Interdisciplinary investigations using science studies approaches (e.g., Duschl et al., 2006) promise a fruitful territory where new methodological approaches can be generated. It is noteworthy, however, that in the true spirit of argumentation, methodological questions will continue to challenge our understanding of teaching and learning processes thereby offering the potential to contribute to knowledge in science education. Acknowledgments I would like to thank Douglas Clark, Merce Garcia-Mila, María Pilar Aleixandre-Jiménez and William Sandoval for feedback on this chapter. Data from Erduran et al. (2004) were from a project supported by the UK Economic and Social Research Council grant number R000237915.
References Bazerman, C. (1988). Shaping written knowledge: The genre and activity of the experimental article in science. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press. Beardsley, M. C. (1950). Practical logic. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. Castells, M., Enciso, J., Cerveró, J. M., López, P., & Cabellos, M. (2007). What can we learn from a study of argumentation in the students’ answers and group discussion to open physics’ problems? In R. Pinto & D. Couso (Eds.), Contributions from science education research. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Springer. Chinn, C. A., & Anderson, R. C. (1998). The structure of discussions that promote reasoning. Teachers College Record, 100(2), 315–368. Clark, D., Sampson, V., Weinberger, A., & Erkens, G. (in press). Analytic frameworks for assessing dialogic argumentation in online learning environments. Educational Psychology Review. Duschl, R., Erduran, S., Grandy, R., & Rudolph, J. (2006). Guest editorial. Science Studies and Science Education, 90(6), 961–964. Duschl, R., Ellenbogen, K., & Erduran, S. (1999). Understanding dialogic argumentation among middle school science students. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Educational Research Association, Montreal, April 1999. Erduran, S. (in press). Breaking the law: Promoting domain-specificity in chemical education in the context of arguing about the Periodic Law. Foundations of Chemistry.
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Erduran, S., & Dagher, Z. (2007). Exemplary teaching of argumentation: A case study of two middle school science teachers. In R. Pinto & D. Couso (Eds.), Contributions of Science Education Research. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Springer Erduran, S. (2006). Promoting ideas, evidence and argument in initial teacher training. School Science Review, 87(321), 45–50. Erduran, S., Ardac, D., & Yakmaci-Guzel, B. (2006). Learning to teach argumentation: Case studies of pre-service secondary science teachers. Eurasia Journal of Mathematics, Science and Technology Education, 2(2), 1–14. Erduran, S., Simon, S., & Osborne, J. (2004). TAping into argumentation: Developments in the application of Toulmin’s argument pattern for studying science discourse. Science Education, 88, 915–933. Eemeren, F. H., Grootendorst, R., & Snoeck Henkemans, F. (1996). Fundamentals of Argumentation Theory, Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. Govier, T. C. (1987). Problems in argument analysis and evaluation. Providence, RI: Foris. Hample, D. (1977). The Toulmin model and the syllogism. Journal of the American Forensic Association, 14, 1–9. Hogan, K., & Maglienti, M. (2001). Comparing the epistemological underpinnings of students’ and scientists’ reasoning about conclusions. Journal of Research in Science Teaching, 38(6), 663–687. Jiménez-Aleixandre M.P., & Pereiro Muñoz, C. (2005). Argument construction and change when working on a real environmental problem. In K. Boersma, M. Goedhart, O. De Jong, & H. Eijkelhof (Eds.), Research and the quality of Science Education (pp. 419–431). Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Springer. Jiménez-Aleixandre, M. P., Bugallo Rodríguez, A., & Duschl, R. A. (2000). “Doing the lesson” or “doing science”: Argument in high school genetics. Science Education, 84(6), 757–792. Kelly, G.J., Chen, C., & Crawford, T. (1998). Methodological considerations for studying science-in-the-making in educational settings. Research in Science Education, 28(1), 23–50. Kelly, G., Drucker, S., & Chen, K. (1998). Students’ reasoning about electricity: Combining performance assessment with argumentation analysis. International Journal of Science Education, 20(7), 849–871. Kuhn, D. (1991). The skills of argument. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Latour, B. (1987). Science in action: How to follow scientists and engineers through society. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Lawson, A. (2003). The nature and development of hypothetico-predictive argumentation with implications for science teaching. International Journal of Science Education, 25(11), 1387–1408. Loui, R. P. (2005). A citation-based reflection on Toulmin and argument. Argumentation, 19, 259–266. Loucks-Horsley, S., Hewson, P., Love, N., & Stiles, K. E. (1998). Designing professional development for teachers of science and mathematics. Thousand Oaks, CA: Corwin Press. Maloney, J., & Simon, S. (2006). Mapping children’s discussions of evidence in science to assess collaboration and argumentation. International Journal of Science Education, 28(15), 1817–1841. Marquez, C., Izquierdo, M., & Espinet, M. (2006). Multimodal science teachers’ discourse in modeling the water cycle, Science Education, 90 (2), 202–226. Means, L.M., & Voss, J.F. (1996). Who reasons well? Two studies of informal reasoning among children of different grade, ability and knowledge levels. Cognition and Instruction, 14(2), 139–178. Piccinini, C. L., & Martins, I. (2005). Comunicação Multimodal na sala de aula de Ciências. Ensaio Pesquisa em Educação em Ciências, 6(1), 1–14. Pollock, J. L. (1987). Defeasible reasoning. Cognitive Science, 11, 481–518. Reed, D., & Rowe, G. (2005). Translating Toulmin diagrams: Theory neutrality in argument representation. Argumentation, 19, 267–286.
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Sampson, V., & Clark, D. B. (2006). The development and validation of the Nature of Science as Argument Questionnaire (NSAAQ). Paper presented at the National Association of Research in Science Teaching Conference, San Francisco, April. Sandoval, W. A., & Millwood, K. A. (2005). The quality of students’ use of evidence in written scientific explanations. Cognition and Instruction, 23(1), 23–55. Sandoval, W. A., & Reiser, B. J. (2004). Explanation driven inquiry: Integrating conceptual and epistemic scaffolds for scientific inquiry. Science Education, 88(3), 345–372. Scerri, E. (2003). Philosophical confusion in chemical education research. Journal of Chemical Education, 80(5), 468–474. Simon, S., Erduran, S., & Osborne, J. (2006). Learning to teach argumentation: Research and development in the science classroom. International Journal of Science Education, 28(2–3), 235–260. Takao, A. Y., & Kelly, G. J. (2003). Assessment of evidence in university students’ scientific writing. Science & Education, 12(4), 341–363. Toulmin, S. (1958). The uses of argument. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Verheij, B. (2005). Evaluating arguments based on Toulmin’s scheme. Argumentation, 19, 347–371. Verheij, B. (2003a). Artificial argument assistants for defeasible argumentation. Artificial Intelligence, 150, 291–324. Verheij, B. (2003b). DefLog: On the logical interpretation of prima facie justified assumptions. Journal of Logic and Computation, 13, 319–346. Voss, J. (2005). Toulmin’s model and the solving of ill-structured problems. Argumentation, 19, 321–329. Voss, J. F., Greene, T. R., Post, T. A., & Penner, B.C. (1983). Problem solving skill in the social sciences. In G. H. Bower (Ed.), The psychology of learning and motivation: Vol. 17, Advances in research and theory (pp. 165–213). New York: Academic Press. Walton, D.N. (1996). Argumentation schemes for presumptive reasoning. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. Zembal-Saul, C., Munford, D., Crawford, B., Friedrichsen, P., & Land, P. (2002). Scaffolding preservice science teachers’ evidence-based arguments during an investigation of natural selection. Research in Science Education, 32, 437–463. Zohar, A., & Nemet, F. (2002). Fostering students’ knowledge and argumentation skills through dilemmas in human genetics. Journal of Research in Science Teaching, 39(1), 35–62.
Chapter 4
What Can Argumentation Tell Us About Epistemology? William A. Sandoval and Kelli A. Millwood
Who, besides scientists, engages in what we would call scientific argumentation? When? For what purpose? As calls for argumentation to take a central place in science instruction increase (Driver et al., 2000; Duschl & Osborne, 2002; Kuhn, 1993b), answers to these questions become more important. There are two key claims for engaging students in scientific argumentation. One is that argumentation is a central practice of science, and thus should be at the core of science education. The other is that understanding the norms of scientific argumentation can lead students to understand the epistemological bases of scientific practice. We are more interested in this second claim. We think it unlikely that people who do not practice science are likely to engage in truly scientific argumentation. At the same time, we see everyday contexts all around us where people might apply scientific arguments to further other kinds of arguments. For example, using arguments about global climate change to argue for or against particular energy policies or even personal consumer decisions. Consequently, the focus of our studies has been to understand how students’ practices of scientific argumentation reflect their understanding about science: about what makes a claim scientific, and how such criteria are related to methods that scientists use to generate and to warrant claims. Thus, our studies of students’ efforts at scientific argumentation are aimed at helping us to understand students’ epistemological ideas about science. Hence, what can argumentation tell us about epistemology?
Epistemology and Practice Epistemology is the branch of philosophy concerned with the study of knowledge. Philosophers of science have been concerned with outlining an epistemology of science—the logical and philosophical grounds upon which scientific claims are advanced and justified. This move itself presupposes that scientific knowledge and the processes of its construction are potentially different from other forms of knowledge and knowing. Scientific epistemology is a description of the nature of scientific knowledge, including the sources of such knowledge, its truth value, S. Erduran and M. P. Jiménez-Aleixandre (eds.), Argumentation in Science Education. © Springer 2007
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scientifically appropriate warrants, and so forth. Psychologists take this notion of epistemology and internalize it, defining personal epistemology as the set of beliefs that individuals hold about the nature of knowledge and its production. Thus, psychologists speak of the scientific epistemologies held by individuals. In science education, research into students’ epistemological ideas has occurred under the name of NOS (Nature of Science) research. The move to studying the epistemological ideas that students may have about science by studying how they make scientific arguments is quite recent.
Epistemics of Argumentation One of the aims of research on argumentation in science education is to get students to argue like scientists. Broadly, the goal is to get students to use evidence to support claims that they make. Clearly, this coordination of claims and evidence raises inherently epistemological questions. What counts as a claim? What counts as evidence? How do you decide what sort of evidence supports, or refutes, a particular claim? How are individual claims organized to produce a coherent argument? What kinds of coordination of claims and evidence make an argument persuasive? How one answers these questions through a specific argument, whether consciously asked or not, may reflect epistemological notions about claims, evidence, and other forms of knowledge and their production. Student argumentation has been studied across a range of age levels in two basic contexts, oral and written argumentation (see Duschl, this book; Kelly et al., this book). Oral argumentation has almost exclusively been studied within contexts of collaborative inquiry or problem-solving. Researchers have construed the dialogue that students engage in during such collaborations as argument, and analyses have thus focused on the epistemic moves that students make during such conversations. One finding that has emerged from these studies is that students commonly advance claims without providing explicit justifications (or warrants) for those claims (Erduran et al., 2004; Jiménez-Aleixandre et al., 2000; Kelly et al., 1998; Resnick et al., 1993). These studies show that claims are justified only when they are challenged, and even then not always. Claims are often offered without relation to other elements in an ongoing argument (Jiménez-Aleixandre et al., 2000). Furthermore, students can provide warrants for claims in a number of ways, including appeals to both empirical evidence and hypothetical or theoretical ideas (Kelly et al., 1998). Argumentation has also been studied through examinations of student writing, and again across a number of age and grade levels. As with analyses of oral argumentation, analyses tend to focus almost exclusively on the structure of students arguments, with various efforts to try and capture argument quality. As with studies of oral argumentation (e.g., Erduran et al., 2004; JiménezAleixandre et al., 2000), researchers have applied Toulmin’s (1958) argument structure (e.g., Bell & Linn, 2000). Kelly and Takao have developed a scheme
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of assigning “epistemic levels” to students’ written arguments that distinguish increasing levels of epistemic complexity in student writing (Kelly & Takao, 2002; Takao & Kelly, 2003). In our own prior work, we have examined the levels of empirical evidence that students provide to justify particular claims (Sandoval, 2003; Sandoval & Millwood, 2005). Most of these studies show how students fail to produce sufficiently scientific arguments through their writing, while at the same time, writing arguments seems to help students learn important scientific ideas (Bell & Linn, 2000; Sandoval, 2003). Students seem to have similar issues in writing arguments as they do in oral argument. For instance, students often fail to provide sufficient warrants for their written claims (Sandoval, 2003; Sandoval & Millwood, 2005). Further, they often fail to make explicit the links between data and claims about data, a finding common to Sandoval’s studies and to those by Kelly and Takao (Kelly & Takao, 2002; Takao & Kelly, 2003). Taken as a whole, research on students’ practices of argumentation suggests the complexity of appropriately coordinating causal claims with evidence. Of course, at issue is what exactly it means to coordinate claims and evidence appropriately. For instance, within professional science contexts the claims that need to be explicitly warranted are only those that have yet to be accepted. Thus, students’ failure to warrant particular claims is not inherently “unscientific,” but may simply reflect their belief that those claims are already believed. The analyses of oral argumentation mentioned above show that students do, in fact, provide warrants when claims are contested, as scientists themselves do. Issues of claim-evidence coordination in written arguments, on the other hand, may indicate that students do not see the rhetorical task of a scientific argument as one of persuasion. The tight coupling of evidence and claims that we take for granted in scientific arguments reflects a rhetorical effort to persuade readers of the preferability of an argument. Such rhetorical strategies are not simply social, but may be necessary to make novel ideas comprehensible (Kitcher, 1991).
Limits to “Practice Studies” This is to say that the kinds of argumentation that students do, and do not, perform in school science contexts are some messy reflection of epistemological ideas they may have about the nature of claims (about the natural world) and the kinds of evidence or other justifications that make such claims believable. We say messy, however, because there are a number of other factors, besides epistemological, that might influence student argumentation. Consequently, while studies of students’ practices of argumentation are important, they are not sufficient to help us understand the epistemological ideas that students bring to bear during such work, or how such work develops those ideas. Even studies that look at students’ practices in detail have to make quite speculative inferences on how students interpret the purposes of their activity (cf., Sandoval & Morrison, 2003).
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Kelly in particular has argued that the focus of research should be on students’ sense making practices, either through traditional or inquiry-oriented instruction (Kelly et al., 1998; Kelly & Duschl, 2002). Certainly, the development of certain practices that can be labeled as scientific is a main goal of recent reforms. Kelly’s perspective on science is strongly influenced by science and technology studies (STS), which argue that practice is the key feature to emphasize in science because science is a practice. Yet, most students will not really engage in science as a practice. Rather, as citizens they must be able to reflect upon scientific knowledge claims as they relate to personal or policy decisions. It is far from clear that simply engaging in practices of authentic science leads to such reflective ability. In fact, available evidence suggests that this is unlikely (see Sandoval, 2005). Studies of practice in themselves do not provide enough of a window onto students’ epistemological ideas about science, because there are many possible ideas that might motivate particular practices. We have recently laid out a theoretical perspective on epistemological beliefs that we call practical epistemologies (Sandoval, 2005). This theory proposes that students develop highly contextualized epistemological ideas as a result of their practical experiences trying to understand and explain the world they live in. We further propose that such epistemological beliefs drive, at least in part, people’s efforts to explain new situations. That is, one’s ideas about what counts as a satisfactory explanation—plausibility, fit with what you already know, standards of evidence, etc.—influence one’s attempts to create explanations. This theory is an attempt to explain the evidence (reviewed by Sandoval, 2005) that students’ epistemological beliefs appear to vary, in content and apparent sophistication, depending upon the context in which they are elicited, as well as the apparent paradox that students’ practices of science are often more sophisticated than their expressed beliefs about science. Our view is similar to other proposals that epistemological beliefs are fragmentary and deployed as resources (Hammer & Elby, 2002) or repertoires (Bell & Linn, 2002). We believe that one promising way to investigate how such practical epistemological beliefs influence argumentation, and science learning more generally, is to augment studies of students’ practice with techniques to identify epistemological beliefs directly.
Students’ Ideas about Warranting Claims Here we describe a recent study we undertook to test the viability of the practical epistemologies theory. We decided to look specifically at students’ ideas about how to warrant claims. We started with such a project because of the historical interest both in science education and developmental psychology in how students coordinate claims with evidence (see for instance Kelly et al., this book; GarciaMila & Andersen, this book). We also expected that whatever ideas students hold about how they know particular claims, and why they believe them, could be straightforwardly assessed by asking students about them. That is, while asking
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students about professional science has often been problematic (see Sandoval, 2005), we expected that students could explain their own work.
Setting We conducted this study in a Grade 7 classroom in an urban middle school in Los Angeles; 33 students participated (20 boys, 13 girls), with their teacher. This school is in a middle-income community of the city, with a study population that is 75% Caucasian, 14% Latino, 10% Asian-American, and 1% African-American; and 12% of the students received free or reduced lunches. We explored students’ ideas about warranting claims within the context of a three week science unit called Sensing the Environment (Griffis & Wise, 2005). This unit explores plant adaptation to the environment, focusing on topics of photosynthesis and transpiration and plants’ evolutionary adaptations to climates to manage these processes. This unit is part of a curriculum development project that is producing curriculum units that frame student inquiry around data sets collected by remote sensor networks developed and deployed by the Center for Embedded Networked Sensing (CENS, cens.ucla.edu). One of the aims of the project is to study how students’ argumentation practices develop through scaffolded instructional experiences, and to examine the effects that such inquiry may have on their ideas about the nature of science. Students began the unit by looking at a picture of some local mountains and being asked what they noticed (a version of this picture is shown on the right of Fig. 4.1). Students noticed that the plants in the photo look different from each other, and in this way the teacher posed the question, “Why do plants look different?” This provided the guiding question for the unit. Following a series of laboratory activities in which students explored photosynthesis and transpiration, students finished the unit by conducting an investigation into the relations between plant leaf structure (mainly size) and environmental factors using an online environment shown in Fig. 4.1. Students worked in groups of two or three to explore how differences in temperature, humidity, and light intensity affected leaf size. The online investigation involved a series of steps through which students made decisions about what data to analyze. From a series of pull down menus, students decided which of the three environmentally different areas to investigate, how to aggregate the data (average, maximum, minimum), and over what time frame (hourly, daily, or weekly). They were then able to generate graphs of the type shown in Fig. 4.1. To the right of the graph is a leaf gallery depicting images of leaves in area 1. Beneath the graph is a comparison option that allowed students to add an additional area (station) or environmental variable to the graph. In addition to comparing environmental variables in different areas graphically, students could calculate the average leaf size within an area. By clicking on the individual leaves on the screen (e.g., in area 1, Fig. 4.1), students could obtain an enlarged image of the selected leaf in addition to its name and surface area. In order
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Fig. 4.1 Data query interface to Sensing the Environment online tool
to find the average surface area of all the leaves in a particular area, students had to manually average the various surface areas of the leaves. They could then use this data in addition to the graphs they created to look for patterns between leaf size and environmental trends. Students looked for patterns in these data to figure out why plants look different. An example of a pattern that a group of students noticed is that the leaves in area 1 are smaller on average than the leaves in area 3, and the temperature in area 1 is higher than the temperature in area 3. These data can be used to support the claim that plants have smaller leaves in hotter areas. A separate tab in the interface presented students with a series of questions to guide their investigations. These questions helped students to generate causal ideas about why plants look different and also aided them in writing their final explanations. Students were instructed to answer these questions as they proceeded through their investigations. After their collaborative investigations, which lasted three classroom periods for approximately 135 minutes, individual students synthesized the data they had analyzed to write an explanation for the question of why plants look different. Individual students were able to print out their group responses to the guiding questions and then write an explanation using the information from the guiding questions. Before students wrote their explanation, they were given a rubric and they discussed what elements should be included in the explanation. After writing their essays, students reviewed their own and three of their peers’ explanations, using this rubric.
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The rubric students were given, designed by study teachers, provided a highly structured set of rules for their essays. These included repeating the guiding questions that students had been given in the online environment, with instructions to make sure that they had been answered. These were followed with instructions for what is known in the United States as the common five-paragraph essay: an introductory paragraph, three body paragraphs that should address each of the climate areas investigated, and a concluding paragraph where students were instructed to make a general claim about why plants look different. Additionally, students were instructed that their essays should demonstrate that they: had learned key concepts; identified appropriate variables; searched the data for “patterns, anomalies, relationships”; and presented data-based arguments. We point out that in this version of the unit there was no discussion of just what, exactly, a “data-based argument” might look like. In this sense, this study is a replication of an earlier study (Sandoval & Millwood, 2005), and provides a baseline understanding of students’ evidentiary standards.
What Students Do and What They Say We used a variety of methods to understand both students’ practices of warranting claims and their ideas about that practice. We analyzed the contents of students written essays to determine how they warranted their written claims. Following the end of the unit, each of the 33 students in the class was individually interviewed about their essay. Finally, students completed a version of the Views of Nature of Science (VNOS) questionnaire (Lederman et al., 2002) modified for students of this age range, known as POSE (Perspectives On Scientific Epistemology; Abd-ElKhalick, 2002). Our aim in triangulating across these data sources was to answer two questions. First, did students express beliefs about their own written work that might explain their actual practices of using data to warrant claims? Second, were these expressed beliefs about their own work related to their expressed ideas about how scientists warrant claims?
Warrants in Written Arguments We collected the essays written by all 33 students in this classroom. Students’ explanations were analyzed with a scheme adapted from Sandoval and Millwood (2005). The first part determined if the student articulated the four main conceptual claims targeted through the unit: the function of a leaf, the structure of a leaf, environmental variations that affect leaf structure and function, and the differential fitness of structural (size) variations in leaves under varied environmental conditions. A student could score one point for each articulated claim, for a maximum of four points. As with our earlier analyses, students could receive a point for articulating a claim as long as the stated claim could be interpreted as pertaining to one of the four ideas
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in the coding scheme. Such claims did not have to be correct, however. Our aim was not to see how many students got the right answer, but to understand how students warranted the claims that they made. The second part of the scheme analyzed the warrants students provided for their articulated claims. All of the claims, except function, had a four-level scheme to assess how well the student warranted their claim. Warrants for claims about leaf function were not scored for two reasons. One, leaf functions—photosynthesis and transpiration—were extensively explored prior to the online investigation and could safely be taken as shared knowledge in the classroom and consequently not likely to need a warrant (cf., Latour, 1987, and his analysis of warrants in scientific articles). Second, there were no available data in the online environment to support or refute particular claims for leaf function, so students had no opportunity to provide specific warrants for such claims. For the other claims in our argument structure, students could receive a score from 0—providing no warrant, to 3—providing a “full” warrant, as described in Table 4.1. A higher score indicated that students’ warrants for claims were more like scientists’. Note that claims for differential fitness were not warranted through citing data, but by citing the appropriate scientific principle that explains the available data—what is known as the photosynthesis– transpiration compromise: the more surface area a leaf has, the more photosynthesis it can do. At the same time, however, a larger surface area increases the rate of transpiration (the process by which plants draw water through their roots—as water evaporates through the leaf surface this creates a vacuum pump to draw water through the plant). If a plant transpires too quickly in a hot or sunny climate it can dry out and burn. Since students had explored the processes of photosynthesis and transpiration independently prior to this investigation, we expected that at least some of them should be able to use the compromise as a justification for their claims. While we did not require that the claims that students articulated be correct, our scoring of warrants required that warrants be appropriate for each claim. For example, if a student made a claim about leaves in area 2 being the biggest, but only
Table 4.1 Coding Scheme Used to Score Warrants in Students’ Written Arguments Environmental Differential Function Structure Variation Fitness 0 N/A 1
2
3
No relevant warrant given Leaf size data one environmental Use principle of either given for only variable given, transpiration or photosynthesis one area from only one area Leaf size given two or more variables Use principle of photosynthesis– for two areas compared from two transpiration compromise or more areas Leaf size given All three variables Use photosynthesis–transpiration for all three systematically compromise and principle that plant will try to maximize areas compared across all three areas leaf size
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provided data about the leaf sizes in area 1 that would be scored as 0 for the structure claim. Similarly, if a student made a claim about the leaves in one area being larger than those in another, but the data showed that, in fact, those leaves were smaller, then that claim would be scored as unwarranted (a score of 0). As already mentioned, we collected and scored all of the individual essays written by students in this class, 33 in all. The combined argument score could range from 0 to 13 (4 points for articulating all target claims, plus 9 points for fully warranting the last 3 claims). The mean total score for explanations was 6.30 (SD = 3.40). The mean articulation score was 2.78 (SD = 1.22) and the mean warrant score was 1.95 (SD = 2.45). The majority of students articulated all of the claims, but most students did not provide warrants for their claims (see Fig. 4.2). Approximately 79% of the students provided a warrant for their structure claim, and most of these were full warrants— comparing leaf sizes across all three available areas. Yet, only 33% of the students provided a warrant for environmental variation, and 18% of the students provided a warrant for differential fitness. In contrast to our previous study (Sandoval & Millwood, 2005), students here were not likely to warrant the claims they made in their explanations, despite a similar level of instruction about the need for data to support claims. It may be that there is some developmental explanation, as the students in this study were slightly younger (by 2 years, their age being 12–13) than the students in that previous study. Given the evidence available of much younger children using evidence to support claims (Lehrer & Schauble, 2006), this explanation seems unlikely.
100 90 80
% of Students
70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0
Structure No Warrant
Environmental Variation Some Warrant
Key Warrant
Fig. 4.2 Percentage of warranted claims in written student arguments
Differential Fitness Full Warrant
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It could be that this problem was simply harder than our earlier problems in natural selection. Yet, this problem is structurally isomorphic to those problems. Here, students needed to identify variations in a single trait—leaf size—and relate those to variations in environmental conditions leading to differential fitness. In those other problems, students had to select from among a number of possible traits the one that produced differential fitness. On the other hand, in those problems fitness was directly shown through individual survival, whereas in this problem the idea of survival was only implied by the distribution of particular plants across a geographic range. That is, students did not see large-leafed plants die on the hot, sunny slope, they only saw that the plants that grew on that slope had small leaves. Also, if students did not really understand how the photosynthesis–transpiration compromise might affect individual plant survival, then they could not have cited it as evidence for their claims. Still, if students lacked this understanding, it also stands to reason that they would have more difficulty articulating claims of variation and differential fitness than they did.
Ideas about One’s Own Warrants A third possible explanation for the lack of supplied warrants in students’ written arguments is that they may have felt that evidence was unneeded for some reason. We examined this by asking students, during a semi-structured interview, to describe why they did or did not believe their claims. In the week following the unit, individual students were pulled out of class and interviewed by the second author for about 30 minutes. In this interview, students were shown their written argument and were asked to highlight (using a marker) all of the claims they made. First, the interviewer asked students what they thought a claim was, then she provided a definition of a claim, and after that the student was asked to highlight all of their claims. When they were done, the student was asked to indicate which of their highlighted claims they were most sure of, and why. They were then asked which of the claims they were most uncertain of, and why. These two questions thus provide an idea of the standards students applied to judge certainty of their own claims—or what makes a good warrant. Finally, students were asked to describe the “best way to convince someone of something in science.” This question was an attempt to find out whether or not students applied the same ideas about their own claims to what might loosely be considered scientific persuasion. We used the phrase “in science” to try to get students to think about persuading someone outside of their science class, although we cannot be sure that this is how students interpreted the phrase. Four codes emerged from students’ responses that characterized their expressed beliefs about how to warrant a claim—authority, causal, empirical, and factual (see Table 4.2). The authority code was used when the student warranted their claim by citing a source of authority, such as their teacher, science class, book, etc. For example, a student said she was certain of her claim, “because that is what we were talking about in science class and my teacher said it.” Causal codes included times
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Table 4.2 Codes Derived for Students’ Expressed Beliefs about how to Warrant a Claim Code Definition Authority Causal Empirical
Factual
Student reason explicitly states source of authority or lack thereof for uncertain claims. Sources may include: teacher, science class, book, Internet, etc. Student reason is based on a theoretical concept, or explanation of a theoretical concept. Student reason is citing some kind of empirical evidence, or lack of empirical evidence for uncertain claims. Can include: research from CENS website, data/graphs, results from experiment, etc. Student reason is repeating their original claim by using the exact same words, paraphrasing, or rephrasing. Student asserts that their claim is a fact.
when students cited a specific scientific idea, or simply appealed to causal explanation, as in a student saying that they would convince someone in science by, “I’d explain to them why it happens and show them graphs and stuff.” This statement also includes an empirical warrant, by appealing to graphs. Note, therefore, that single responses could possibly receive more than one code. Factual codes were simply assertions that the stated claim was a fact, or an explicit appeal to “facts,” as in convincing someone of something in science by, “ tell[ing] them a lot of facts about it.” When asked how they were certain of a particular claim, why they were uncertain of one, or how to best persuade someone “in science,” most students appealed to empirical warrants. In the certain and persuasion contexts, more than half of the students cited an empirical warrant, and just under half of the students did so in the uncertain context (we note, though, that more than half of the students interviewed denied being uncertain about any of their claims). We also found that students tended to prefer a particular kind of warrant for all of these contexts. If a student cited authority as the reason for being certain of a claim, they tended to cite a lack of authority for being uncertain. We computed a preferred warrant for each student by looking to see whether or not they appealed to the same type of warrant in 2 or more of the 3 contexts. As can be seen in Fig. 4.3, empirical warrants were overwhelmingly preferred by students, Χ2(5, N = 33) = 30.21, p <.001. Notice that five students had multiple preferred warrants, meaning that they gave more than one warrant in more than one context (like the example given above for causal and empirical warrants). Of these five, four expressed empirical as one of their preferred warrants. Comparing these data to students’ written arguments, we see a discrepancy. More than half of the students said that empirical warrants were how they knew they were certain of their claims, although fewer than 25% of them cited any evidence for their claims of environmental variation or differential fitness. What is going on here? There are a number of factors. First, we looked at the claims that students cited as the ones they were most certain of. We found that these claims were comprehensive, somewhat general, claims that could be induced from the data that students had looked at and their prior lab experiences in the unit. These were
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Fig. 4.3 Percentage of preferred warrants across contexts
claims like the following, “Plants are adapted to the environments that they live in,” or, “plants have to balance photosynthesis and transpiration in order to survive.” Consequently, there is a mismatch between what our content analyses considered claims and what students highlighted as claims. This leads to a second type of mismatch, one of specificity. Our analyses of warrants looked for specific kinds of data, or appeals to principle, that could support specific claims related to a target conceptual framework we imposed on students’ written work. Their personal warrants, their sources of belief in what they perceived as the important claims in their written work, were synthetic and generalized. That is, students appealed to the collection of data that they had looked at as providing the warrant for their general claims. On the one hand, this is a perfectly legitimate way of reasoning. On the other hand, it might be argued that it is less than ideal as scientific practice because it does not trace the specific contributions from particular data and their role in the larger story. We have to point out, however, that our findings do not permit us to say that students cannot produce such a trace, only that they do not seem to do so spontaneously, at least not in the contexts that we provided for them. (As an aside, this can explain the differences in warranting seen in students’ written work here as compared to Sandoval & Millwood, 2005. In that earlier study, students were explicitly encouraged to articulate their explanations in the same terms as our coding scheme. Here, however, we applied the coding scheme post hoc to students’ written work.) We did find, however, that students who expressed a preference for empirical warrants in their interviews were more likely to provide warrants in their explanations,
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t = −2.76, p <.01. Overall, students averaged 2 (out of 9) on their warrant scores, but students who preferred empirical warrants scored, on average, 4 out of 9. We take this to mean that these students have a productive epistemological belief, empirical evidence provides the best warrant for claims, that they can also apply to their own work.
Ideas about Scientists’ Warrants We queried students’ ideas about how scientists warrant their claims by administering the POSE questionnaire prior to the start of the unit. We knew going in that this instrument was likely to be problematic, given the historical issues with such assessments (Kelly et al., 1998; Lederman et al., 1998). Still, we wanted to have some assessment of these students’ ideas about what scientists do independent of their own scientific work, and preferred to use a validated instrument. POSE is intended by its developers to provide an overall view of students’ views of the nature of science as either naïve or informed, or as in transition from naïve to informed. Our initial analyses suggested that all of our students held naïve views, so we decided to look thematically at students’ responses to questions that asked them how scientists used evidence. Here we present only those data that relate to students’ ideas about how scientists use evidence to support claims. These were garnered from students’ responses to a general question about why scientists collect evidence or data, and a series of more specific questions about how scientists know dinosaurs really existed, how they know what dinosaurs looked like, and how it might be possible for scientists to disagree about the cause of dinosaur extinction. Responding to how scientists know that dinosaurs existed and what they looked like, 80% of students mentioned a specific type of evidence, either “bones” or “fossils” Nearly 10% just said “evidence,” and another 10% left blank responses. None of these responses was more than a word or two, and included no discussion of how “fossils” or “evidence” were used to support claims about dinosaurs. Responding to the question of why scientists collect evidence, students gave very general responses familiar from the literature in this area. One response was of the general “to find an answer” type, given by about 40% of students. Another response was of the type “to test an idea,” also given by about 40% of students. As seen by other researchers in this area (reviewed by Sandoval, 2005), such responses are quite typical for students of this age. Just over 10% of the students did not respond to this question.
Discrepancies across Contexts In looking across these data sources, what can we say about students’ epistemological beliefs about warranting scientific claims? A majority of students said that empirical evidence was how they knew (or did not know) a claim, very few of them
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actually provided such evidence in their own work, while an overwhelming majority of them appealed to specific forms of evidence as the reason that scientists know things. Looking more closely, there are a number of discrepancies, or at least gaps, in students’ talk across their own and scientists’ contexts, and in comparison to their own work. First, there is the apparent discrepancy between students’ expressed opinion that their certainty about their own claims comes largely from empirical evidence, but they were unlikely to explicitly use those data in their written explanations. We think, however, that this is not a discrepancy, or an inconsistency, between expressed belief and practice, as much as an indication of the difficulty of the practice of writing arguments. Those students with a preference for empirical warrants were significantly more likely to provide such warrants in their written work. This suggests that the preference for empirical warrants is productive for generating data-based arguments, but is not in itself sufficient to enable students to marshal appropriate warrants for claims. As we mentioned before, one issue may be that our analyses of claims and warrants occurred at a finer scale than students’ own analysis during their interviews. Regardless of that, preferring evidence for your claims does not necessarily help you to find that evidence or make sense of it. Rather, it simply suggests that you are likely to mention it in your argument. A related issue that we have not addressed is that of audience. In this intervention, the explicit audience for students’ written arguments is their teacher, and includes a few other students who reviewed their work. Ultimately, even these reviews are for the teacher. Consequently, there is not much motivation to provide explicit evidence beyond the stated demand to do so as part of the task. There is no rhetorical demand for producing evidence, as it really plays no role in persuading someone of the viability of your own explanation. That is, it is quite reasonable for these students to presume that their teacher knows “the answer” to this question, and their responsibility as students is to produce that answer. While providing evidence was an explicit task demand, students may have seen it as secondary to coming to the correct conclusion. With respect to how students talked about the evidence for their own claims compared to how they talked about scientists’ evidence for claims, we see that in both contexts students understand that scientists want “evidence,” and have some notions of what kind of evidence is appropriate. It appears to us that differences in knowledge about exactly that issue—what sorts of evidence are appropriate for making what sorts of claims—explains the differences in students’ responses to POSE and to our interview questions. We really cannot presume that students understand anything about the scientific study of dinosaurs other than the common knowledge that scientists use fossil evidence to make claims about them. Moreover, we cannot accurately infer that students lack an understanding of the epistemic role of evidence, fossils in this case, in making claims about dinosaurs simply because their only response is “fossils.” This is because the survey itself is ambiguous about its own rhetorical demands, an issue we return to below. Students are better able to talk about the specific evidence they have for their own claims because they are
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much more familiar with both the data and the claims. Thus, it may not be an epistemological difference but a domain difference. This remains an open question.
Dilemmas of Studying Epistemology Our theory of practical epistemology (Sandoval, 2005) asserts that students’ epistemological beliefs are developed through their own epistemic practices of making and evaluating knowledge claims. This view leads to the prediction that students may have different epistemological beliefs guiding their own practices of knowledge making than the ones accessed through interrogations of their opinions about scientific practice. Our findings here provide qualified support for the prediction, and thus for the theory itself. Far more students cited specific empirical evidence as the warrant for scientific claims about dinosaurs than cited empirical evidence as the reason that they knew something. Conversely, none of the student responses to how scientists know something mentioned authority, or a general causal explanation, or simply asserted the scientific claim as a fact. While a majority of students could be seen to prefer empirical warrants for themselves and for scientists, a significant minority of students appealed to other sources of warrant in their own work. This supports the common sense idea that students do not see their work in their science classes as necessarily related to what scientists do. If so, it is both an accurate conclusion, since science classes in fact rarely do resemble legitimate scientific work, and an inevitable one, as how in the world would most students get any idea what scientists actually do? We realize that these findings provide only modest support for the theory of practical epistemologies, and raise many more questions than they answer. For us, these questions break down into questions of research methodology and instructional strategy. We focus here on the methodological issues (see Erduran, this book), as they are most pertinent to the aims of this book to outline future directions for research.
How Can We Study Epistemology? Science educators have been studying children’s ideas about science for about sixty years, and yet there is still limited understanding of how those ideas develop over time and through instruction. We know that most preadolescent students make no distinction between data and claims, and that most adolescents come to see the relation as simplistic—data show claims definitively right and wrong (see Sandoval, 2005). The issues with asking students’ their views on epistemology with written survey instruments, whether they include closed or open-ended questions, are well documented (Kelly et al., 1998; Lederman et al., 1998). Interviews are similarly troublesome (Sandoval & Morrison, 2003). Such questioning seems inherently
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limited because of the obvious disadvantage students are at: we want to know how they understand what “real” scientists do even though we know that they have had no opportunities to see such a thing. The alternative to asking students about what scientists do is to study what they themselves do when they learn science. Lederman et al. (1998) made this argument on methodological grounds, proposing that formal assessments would always underestimate what students know or believe. Kelly et al. (1998) made the argument both on methodological and theoretical grounds, marrying a sociocultural view of learning with a sociological view of science inspired by Latour and others to argue that a practice-oriented view of science requires analyzing students’ practices of sense-making in science and comparing them to scientific practices. The problem with a practice-only tack to studying epistemology is that looking at what students do is insufficient to explain why they do it. The approach we have described here is motivated directly by this problem: the patterns of performance in students’ written arguments do not in themselves illuminate students’ motives, including the goals they are pursuing and their ideas about how to satisfy those goals. What we have reported here noticeably lacks any talk of students’ goals. We actually did ask students about their goals and found that those goals are, unsurprisingly, school oriented, a result consistent with the work reported by JiménezAleixandre et al. (2000). Thus, our questions about certainty are instead an attempt to understand their views on how these goals are met. We find in this project, however, that we run into the same dilemma that we and others have had with more formal assessments of epistemology. The problem is that students are not very articulate about how particular pieces of data support specific claims. Sandoval (2005) argued that studies of practice should include analyses of the artifacts that students’ produce during science learning, and the discourse they engage in during the development of those artifacts. The findings we have reported here follow one of those recommendations directly—to compare properties of the artifacts that students create—in this case written arguments—and students’ perceptions about how to evaluate their own artifacts. Our conclusions solidify a finding from prior research—that a majority of students prefer empirical evidence as the best warrant for a scientific claim. At the same time, we found out that a large minority of students appeal to other sources, including a notion of authority that lacks an explicit locus of that authority (i.e., the teacher is the authority because she is the teacher, not because she presents a persuasive argument herself). The other warrants offered were vague appeals to causality, and a “factual” restatement of claims that reflects what has typically been considered the conflation of claims and evidence (e.g., Kuhn, 1993a). We remain unsatisfied with these findings, however, as taking us only one step further to understanding the explicit epistemological commitments that students have. Our interview protocol, for example, failed to uncover students’ explanations for why particular pieces of evidence made good warrants. One obvious next step is to develop probes that can encourage students to go beyond stating the sources of their belief (e.g., about certain or uncertain claims) to include their ideas about why those sources provide a desirable level of justification.
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On the other hand, efforts to study epistemology through classroom discourse have to go further than they have to create instructional contexts in which epistemological commitments are made explicit. Our view of current research on argumentation is that these efforts, including our own, aim to put students in situations where they must make explicit epistemic decisions. That is, they have to choose the kinds of data to collect, or choose among possible interpretations of data, or choose between competing claims. All of these kinds of decisions are important decisions for students to have to make. They are central to any thorough understanding of scientific practice, and are implicated in improved student learning of scientific ideas. Still, as our study and others (reviewed by Sandoval, 2005) have shown, the need to make epistemic decisions is not accompanied by a need to make explicit the epistemological justifications that underlie those decisions. Interventions that engage students in epistemic practices, such as constructing and evaluating arguments, should also include more explicit epistemological discourse. Such a discourse would comprise the practice that is most of value studying for students’ epistemological beliefs. We remain convinced that in order to develop a more useable theory of epistemological development requires research on the epistemological ideas that students actually use while they learn and reflect on their learning—what we call practical epistemologies. Such an agenda clearly must focus on studying the learning practices that are likely to engage students’ underlying epistemological beliefs, as fragmented and tacit as they may be. Argumentation is one such practice. An important direction for research on argumentation to move in is to link students’ practices of argumentation with their criteria for arguments and their reasons for arguing in science class. An agenda that can span practice and ideas about practice will lead to the development of better theory, which will in turn lead to better science education. Acknowledgments The study reported in this chapter is from the doctoral dissertation of the second author, under supervision of the first author, and was supported by a predissertation fellowship from NIMH. This work has also been supported by NSF award ESI-0352572 and through the Center for Embedded Networked Sensing (CENS), NSF CCR-0120778. The views and opinions expressed here are our own and do not necessarily reflect the views of these agencies. We are grateful to Melissa Cook, Deborah Fields, Suna Ryu, and other members of our research apprenticeship group for their helpful discussions of earlier drafts of this paper. We also thank Fouad Abd-el-Khalick for providing POSE.
References Abd-El-Khalick, F. (2002). The development of conceptions of the nature of scientific knowledge and knowing in the middle and high school years: A cross-sectional study, Paper presented at the annual meeting of the National Association for Research in Science Teaching. New Orleans, LA. Bell, P., & Linn, M. C. (2000). Scientific arguments as learning artifacts: Designing for learning from the web with KIE. International Journal of Science Education, 22(8), 797–817. Bell, P., & Linn, M. C. (2002). Beliefs about science: How does science instruction contribute? In B. K. Hofer & P. R. Pintrich (Eds.), Personal epistemology: The psychology of beliefs about knowledge and knowing (pp. 321–346). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
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Driver, R., Newton, P., & Osborne, J. (2000). Establishing the norms of scientific argumentation in classrooms. Science Education, 84, 287–312. Duschl, R. A., & Osborne, J. (2002). Supporting and promoting argumentation discourse in science education. Studies in Science Education, 38, 39–72. Erduran, S., Simon, S., & Osborne, J. (2004). TAPping into argumentation: Developments in the application of Toulmin’s argument pattern for studying science discourse. Science Education, 88, 915–933. Griffis, K., & Wise, J. (2005). Sensing the environment. Los Angeles, CA: Center for Embedded Networked Sensing, University of California. Hammer, D., & Elby, A. (2002). On the form of a personal epistemology. In B. K. Hofer & P. R. Pintrich (Eds.), Personal epistemology: The psychology of beliefs about knowledge and knowing (pp. 169–190). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. Jiménez-Aleixandre, M. P., Bugallo Rodríguez, A., & Duschl, R. A. (2000). “Doing the lesson” or “doing science”: Argument in high school genetics. Science Education, 84, 757–792. Kelly, G. J., Chen, C., & Crawford, T. (1998). Methodological considerations for studying science-in-the-making in educational settings. Research in Science Education, 28(1), 23–49. Kelly, G. J., Druker, S., & Chen, C. (1998). Students’ reasoning about electricity: Combining performance assessments with argumentation analysis. International Journal of Science Education, 20(7), 849–871. Kelly, G. J., & Duschl, R. A. (2002). Toward a research agenda for epistemological studies in science education, Paper presented at the annual meeting of NARST 2002. New Orleans, LA. Kelly, G. J., & Takao, A. (2002). Epistemic levels in argument: An analysis of university oceanography students’ use of evidence in writing. Science Education, 86, 314–342. Kitcher, P. (1991). Persuasion. In M. Pera & W. R. Shea (Eds.), Persuading science: The art of scientific rhetoric (pp. 3–27). Canton, MA: Science History Publications. Kuhn, D. (1993a). Connecting scientific and informal reasoning. Merrill-Palmer Quarterly, 39(1), 74–103. Kuhn, D. (1993b). Science as argument: Implications for teaching and learning scientific thinking. Science Education, 77(3), 319–337. Latour, B. (1987). Science in action. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Lederman, N. G., Abd-El-Khalick, F., Bell, R. L., & Schwartz, R. S. (2002). Views of nature of science questionnaire: Toward valid and meaningful assessment of learners’ conceptions of nature of science. Journal of Research in Science Teaching, 39(6), 497–521. Lederman, N. G., Wade, P. D., & Bell, R. L. (1998). Assessing the nature of science: What is the nature of our assessments? Science & Education, 7, 595–615. Lehrer, R., & Schauble, L. (2006). Scientific thinking and science literacy. In W. Damon, R. Lerner, K. A. Renninger, & I. E. Sigel (Eds.), Handbook of child psychology, 6th ed., Vol. 4: Child psychology in practice. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley. Resnick, L. B., Salmon, M., Zeitz, C. M., Wathen, S. H., & Holowchak, M. (1993). Reasoning in conversation. Cognition and Instruction, 11(3&4), 347–364. Sandoval, W. A. (2003). Conceptual and epistemic aspects of students’ scientific explanations. Journal of the Learning Sciences, 12(1), 5–51. Sandoval, W. A. (2005). Understanding students’ practical epistemologies and their influence on learning through inquiry. Science Education, 89, 634–656. Sandoval, W. A., & Millwood, K. A. (2005). The quality of students’ use of evidence in written scientific explanations. Cognition and Instruction, 23(1), 23–55. Sandoval, W. A., & Morrison, K. (2003). High school students’ ideas about theories and theory change after a biological inquiry unit. Journal of Research in Science Teaching, 40(4), 369–392. Takao, A., & Kelly, G. (2003). Assessment of evidence in university students’ scientific writing. Science & Education, 12(4), 341–363. Toulmin, S. (1958). The uses of argument. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Chapter 5
Designing Argumentation Learning Environments María Pilar Jiménez-Aleixandre
Teacher: Pupils: Teacher:
Look, now there is a person, Moncho (researcher) who is studying this classroom, right? Well: Could he do it if he took any of us out of the classroom? No, no What does he want? He wants to study the whole class… with children, walls, tables, what is performed…. The same happens with the pond… looking only to a newt, waiting for it to grow, to mate… it would be impossible to get an idea of the pond.
How can we support pupils’ engagement in argumentation? Should argumentation be explicitly taught or rather embedded in the learning tasks? Which design principles are related to the goal of promoting argumentation in the science classroom? Are they the same as design principles for constructivist learning environments? How can research explore these features of learning environments supporting argumentation? The above excerpt (Jiménez-Aleixandre et al., 2005) comes from a 4th-grade classroom (9–10-year-olds), during the process of jointly planning a field trip by teacher and pupils, including decisions about topics to be studied and methods to study them. The teacher uses an analogy between ecology and classroom studies that is the reverse of another analogy found in educational papers (see for instance Doyle, 1977) that propose viewing the classroom as a complex system of relationships and interactions similar to the relationships in ecosystems. Here the presence of the researcher, Ramón López, in the classroom is used to exemplify both the need for an approach to the pond as a whole and of doing it in the field. Implicit in the teacher analogy between the classroom and the pond is the goal of promoting pupils’ reflection about their own learning processes and about the ways of constructing knowledge concerning the pond. The use of this analogy can be seen as connected to the third, fourth and fifth questions formulated in the first paragraph, the last concerning research about argumentation learning environments, a research tightly interwoven with the design principles aimed at promoting argumentation, the subject of the third and fourth questions. These design principles intend, among other goals, that pupils reflect about their own learning. The relationships among designing environments to promote argumentation and investigating them can be connected to the impact on some science educators, like myself, initiating
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research about argumentation at the beginning of the 1990s, of Brown’s (1992) notion of design experiments, of studying learning “in the blooming, buzzing confusion” of classrooms. It is interesting to note that in this same year of 1992, during a postdoctoral study with Peter Hewson at the University of Wisconsin, I had been inside the 4th-grade class taught by Sister Gertrude Hennessey, where I witnessed a kind of design experiment: how children were encouraged to think aloud about physics problems and their own learning, and were even able to use the conceptual change language to talk about the intellectual status of their own ideas (4th-Grade Students, 1992; Hennessey, 1991). This is an indication that the methods used to study conceptual change (at least by some of the authors of this notion), and the learning goals pursued are part of a continuum with the classroom studies exploring argumentation and other epistemic practices. It has to be acknowledged that, twenty-five years ago, Posner et al., (1982) proposed that the students were the ones who had to decide whether the conditions for conceptual change—that is the epistemic status or, in their own terms, the intellectual status, of their own ideas; whether they were or not intelligible, plausible, fruitful or unsatisfactory—were met. Although it may be said that the idea of conceptual change has been, in Toulmin’s terms, ecologically successful, some of its proposals have been overlooked or distorted, for instance, as Hewson and Thorley (1989) pointed out, it is a distortion to consider that these conditions are met because the teacher judges it to be so from responses about scientific content. Pupils’ reflection about their ideas and their learning is a relevant component of environments designed to promote epistemic practices, as argumentation. Hewson (1985) also drew attention toward the role of the students’ epistemological commitments, or evaluative standards, in learning science, for if students are not committed to consistency, generalizability or the relevance of explanatory power, they would not feel the need for a change of status in their ideas. It can be noted that students’ first commitment may be to criticize each other’s inconsistencies or irrelevant remarks. Epistemological commitments are part of the development of epistemological understanding, crucial for argumentation (see Garcia-Mila & Andersen, this book). This chapter discusses the features of learning environments that promote argumentation in science classrooms through a review of reported research. As it has been noted (Kuhn, 1992), although the development of argumentation skills is a desirable goal, most school environments do not favor it. In the first section theoretical perspectives framing research about learning in real-life contexts are outlined. In the second section, design principles related to the goal of promoting argumentation are discussed. Then the attention is turned to two types of contexts from which this chapter draws: in the third section to classrooms where argumentation has been explicitly taught, and in the fourth to classrooms where it has not been taught, but is embedded in the learning tasks and classroom climate. The chapter ends outlining some educational implications.
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Social Constructivism as a Rationale for Classroom-Based Research on Argumentation Learning argumentation and other epistemic practices makes part of the goals of constructivist science classrooms, and is grounded on social constructivist views of learning. Ann Brown (1992) suggested that one of the greatest challenges for educational research in the 1990s was the design, implementation and evaluation of teaching sequences and set, as a high-level goal, building communities of learners in the classroom (Brown & Campione, 1990), in which students take charge of their own learning. She called these classroom studies aimed to engineer learning innovations “design experiments”. For Brown this was a way to reconcile the tensions between two goals, contributing to a theory of learning and to practice. Such approach emphasizes the connections among the curriculum designed, taught and learned, among educational research and educational innovation and contrasts with a long tradition of psychological research, and in general educational research, studying cognitive processes or educational questions in conditions as controlled as possible. As Salomon (1993) noted, the study of complex phenomena under tightly controlled conditions assumes that the phenomenon is the same in these conditions and in real-life circumstances, treating cognition as possessed and residing in the heads of individuals, while the examination of people in real-life problem-solving situations suggests that they “appear to think in conjunction or partnership with others and with the help of culturally provided tools and implements” (Salomon, 1993, p. xiii; italics in the original). For Brown (1992) classroom life is synergistic and it is difficult to study any one aspect independently from the whole system. This does not mean that laboratory studies have little value, but rather than laboratory and classroom-based studies have different objectives and complement each other. Brown brilliantly deconstructed one of the criticisms challenging the validity of intervention studies, the Hawthorne effect, or the fact that any intervention may have a positive effect merely because of the attention of the researchers to the participants. Revising the original study, Brown found that one of the conditions for improvements to occur was that workers perceived that they were in control of the conditions of their work, arguing that this perception of control, or real control, was what she intended in the classroom, with pupils taking charge of their own learning, an issue that will be traced in the next section. The relevance accorded to control by the students of their own learning and thinking is consistent with cognitive psychology approaches (see Garcia-Mila & Andersen, this book) that, on the one hand, see evaluative thinking as the higher category in epistemological understanding, the level in which claims (products of knowing) can be evaluated according to whether they are more or less supported by evidence (Kuhn, 2005); and on the other, conceive advanced forms of thinking as the capacity to evaluate thinking “with respect to how well it serves the purposes of the thinker” (Moshman, 1998, p. 953). For Moshman this advanced form of thinking is reasoning, defined as the deliberate application of epistemic constraints to one’s own thinking.
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Classrooms conceived as communities of learners or intentional learning environments (both names are used by Brown and colleagues) draw from the situated cognition approach. Brown et al. (1993) explicitly link their proposal to Bourdieu’s (1972) notion of communities of practice and to Lave and Wenger (1991) perspective of learning as increasing participation in communities of practice, situated in a certain activity, context and culture. Lave and Wenger’s approach highlights, rather than the cognitive processes involved, the kind of social engagements that provide the proper context for learning to take place. This emphasis on social interaction as an essential component of both cognitive development and learning is rooted in the work of the Russian cultural-historical theorists, Vygotsty, Luria and Leont’ev. Many social processes related to psychological functions are communicative, and Wertsch (1991), weaving together Vygotsky’s and Bakhtin’s notions, points out that both authors coincide in the idea that communicative human practices give origin to the psychological functions of individuals. To Vygotsky (1978) and Luria we owe also the idea of mediation, conceiving human action as mediated by tools and signs: higher mental processes have its origin in activities socially mediated. The distributed cognitions approach draws from this school of thought and expands some of its notions, as the activity systems, including their collective dimension (Cole & Engeström, 1993) alongside with tools (both physical and symbolic), subject and object. The role of social interaction in the development of higher thinking skills and the collective dimension of activity systems are relevant both for the design of learning environments to support argumentation and for the research about them, for argumentation is viewed as a social process or activity. Distributed intelligence is seen by Pea (1993) rather as a heuristic framework for raising and addressing theoretical and empirical questions about mind, culture, symbol systems and human thought, that a theory. For Pea, the consideration of knowledge as socially constructed has to be extended to the interaction among thinking and artefacts, so intelligence may also be distributed for use in designed artefacts as physical tools, representations or computers. A development of Vygotsky and Bakhtin notions of words as tools for thinking and communication as a social phenomenon, into an instrument for research and classroom planning, is Mortimer and Scott’s (2003) work about communicative approaches in the classroom, with the aim of exploring the links between classroom talk, meaning construction and learning. Mortimer and Scott see meaning making and understanding as dialogic processes. The meaning of dialogic, based on Bakhtin, is that attention is paid to more than one point of view, to more than one “voice”: the teacher explanation can be dialogic if she or he refers to students’ ideas, irrespective of being uttered by only one person. The personal process of meaning making is also viewed as a dialogue, for instance between old and new ideas or voices, played in the individual’s mind. These authors borrow from Sutton (1992) the notion of the development of the scientific story as a persuasive process leading to the constitution of a thinking community. Mortimer and Scott’s analytical frame to plan and study teaching sequences proposes to think about science teaching and learning in terms of the social language of school science, of the Bakhtinian idea of speech genre (Bakhtin, 1986), or distinctive patterns of language used in specific contexts, distinguishing between the multifarious genres of everyday language and
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the multifarious speech genres of school science, characterized by rhetorical devices such as asking questions or repeating statements. The students must not only recognize them, but also learn how to participate using them. These notions are relevant for studying and supporting argumentation, which, understood as knowledge evaluation, involves dialogic activity and can also be viewed as persuasion; on the other hand, if argumentation is part of the speech genres of science, it should be part of the speech genres of school science. It may be said that, since the beginning of the 1990s, a substantial part of science education research has shifted from surveys towards the study of classroom discourse, of students’ and teacher’s talk, of the processes—sometimes slow and painful—of negotiation, reasoning, meaning making. The role of language and communication (either spoken or written) in the classroom, and in the construction of scientific knowledge, has been recognized. As discussed in Jiménez-Aleixandre and Erduran (this book) teaching organized as cognitive apprenticeship requires making cognitive processes public, something that could be supported by argumentative practices, where students are required to publicly justify their knowledge claims. From this outline of some approaches framing research about argumentation, I will now turn to the design principles informing its introduction in the science classroom.
Design Principles for Appropriating the Practice of Argumentation Design principles are guidelines expressing the goals for the learning outcomes, the classroom activities and the teaching strategies. It is important to clarify how are the design principles aimed at supporting argumentation related to the design principles and goals for constructivist learning environments. Learning the practice of argumentation in science classrooms cannot be viewed as an objective disconnected from learning science, on the contrary, it makes part of the goals of constructivist science classrooms, where the roles of students are to be knowledge producers (Jiménez-Aleixandre & Pereiro, 2002), teachers, mentors (Brown et al., 1993); the roles of teachers are to scaffold their progressive assumption of responsibility (Reigosa & Jiménez-Aleixandre, 2007), to model and guide inquiry; and the criteria for assessment are publicly shared (Duschl, this book). So, if learning environments designed to support argumentation can be described as a type of constructivist learning environments, the question is which features in them are specific for argumentation purposes. In this chapter it is claimed that these features are related to the development of epistemic practices (Sandoval & Reiser, 2004), and in particular to the evaluation of knowledge. In this section the underlying design principles of classrooms seeking to promote argumentation, in connection with constructivist classrooms, are outlined around six main issues: role of students, role of teacher, curriculum, assessment, metacognition and communication approach, all revolving around knowledge evaluation. The issues, illustrated with instances from argumentation studies, are not independent, but forming part of a systemic whole (Brown, 1992). These six
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Fig. 5.1 The argumentation snowflake. Summary of design principles
design principles are represented in Fig. 5.1 in the argumentation “snowflake”. Why a snowflake? Not only because it possesses hexagonal symmetry, but also because it is beautiful, as elegant arguments should be, and grows around a first particle of ice at its center, here occupied by knowledge evaluation.
Active Producers of Justified Knowledge Claims: The Role of Students Constructivist classrooms are centered on the students who, in them, have to develop control of their own learning, acting as knowledge producers rather than as consumers of knowledge produced by others. Being in control is central for
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promoting argumentation and it is connected to an environment that requires from the students the performance of epistemic practices, defined by Kelly (2005) as proposing, justifying and evaluating (we may add criticizing) knowledge claims. According to Resnick (1989) the use of strategies to construct new knowledge depends on whether or not people view themselves as being in charge of their learning. This can be framed in the notion of intentional learning (Bereiter & Scardamalia, 1989), learning actively desired and controlled by the learner. Bereiter and Scardamalia suggest that “the skills a student will acquire in an instructional interaction are those required by the student’s role in the joint cognitive process” (op cit p. 383). In the case of argumentation, it would mean that for the students to develop argumentative competencies, like justifying a claim or evaluating claims made by others, these competencies should be required for their role in the classroom. The implication would be that learning environments designed to promote argumentation should engage students in knowledge evaluation practices. In argumentative contexts students are required, among others, to perform several or all of the following: To generate products or answers, in the form of proposals, claims, solutions, experimental designs, or artifacts, for questions and problems (e.g., Baker, 2002; Ergazaki & Zogza, 2005; Jiménez-Aleixandre & Pereiro, 2002; Kelly et al., 1998; Kolstø & Mestad, 2005). To choose among two or more competing explanations or theories (e.g., Kenyon et al., 2006; Osborne et al., 2004a) about a phenomenon; or among several alternatives or courses of action (e.g., Kortland, 1996; Patronis et al., 1999; Ratcliffe, 1996; Schweizer & Kelly, 2005; Zohar & Nemet, 2002), alternatives that could have been generated by themselves. To back their claims or choices with evidence (e.g., Osborne et al., 2004a; Sandoval & Reiser, 2004), which may adopt various forms: to select data, empirical or hypothetical, appropriate for supporting their claims (e.g., JiménezAleixandre et al., 1999; Mortimer & Scott, 2003); to examine experimental evidence in the light of previous prediction (e.g., Mason, 1996); to draw on their knowledge in order to generate justifications and to articulate reasons for supporting a claim (e.g., Kelly & Takao, 2002; Sandoval & Millwood, this book). To develop knowledge evaluation competencies, to use criteria to distinguish good from poor arguments (e.g., Jiménez-Aleixandre et al., 2004; Osborne et al., 2004a; Zohar & Nemet, 2002); to evaluate the significance of pieces of evidence (e.g., Hogan & Maglienti, 2001; Kenyon et al., 2006); to share standards for argued points of view (Kortland, 1996, 2001). To talk science and write science: to discuss the design of their pathways to solve experimental problems (e.g., Jiménez-Aleixandre & Reigosa, 2006; Kelly et al., 1998); to formulate hypotheses and design experiments to test them (Ergazaki & Zogza, 2005; Kolstø & Mestad, 2005); to agree upon group reports (e.g., Patronis et al., 1999); to produce research papers (see Kelly et al., this book). To attempt to persuade others or to reach an agreement with their peers, for instance about socio-scientific issues as the contribution of humans to global warming (Schweizer & Kelly, 2005), the production of transgenic fishes (Simonneaux,
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this book), or the management of wolfs (Mork, 2005), or about ecological relationships (Kuhn & Reiser, 2007), or about their own behavior towards wildlife in a field trip (Jiménez-Aleixandre et al., 2005). These roles of students are related: they generate products, choose among them, back their choices with evidence, use criteria to evaluate the significance of the evidence and report the process. As a summary, in argumentative contexts, students are active producers of justified knowledge claims and efficient critics of others’ claims.
Scaffolding the Development of Epistemological Understanding: the Role of Teachers Constructivist teaching and learning place the students at the center of instruction, but this does not mean that in a classroom conceived as a community of learners the teacher has the same role as the students (Brown et al., 1993), on the contrary, the teacher directs research and steers the learning goals. He or she has authority (Mortimer & Scott, 2003), which does not mean an authoritarian stance, for these perspectives are explicitly anti-authoritarian, but being responsible for justifying why inadequate options are inadequate. Learning is viewed as a process of social participation (Lave & Wenger, 1991), which requires modeling and coaching. In Vygotsky’s terms the teacher is the more able peer, providing scaffold for the students’ performances and promoting their assumption of responsibility (Reigosa & Jiménez-Aleixandre, 2007). Tasks and responsibilities are distributed among the participants in the community (Cole & Engeström, 1993). In argumentative environments the teachers take on roles as, for instance, the following: To model and guide inquiry for, as discussed below about curriculum, inquiry and argumentation goals are complementary, and inquiry contexts provide appropriate environments for argumentation to take place. For Brown et al. (1993) the teacher models scientific inquiry so “Children witness teachers learning, discovering, doing research, reading, writing, and using computers as tools for learning, rather than lecturing, managing, assigning work, and controlling the classroom exclusively” (Brown et al. 1993, p. 207). To encourage students to provide evidence to justify a position (e.g., Simon et al., 2006); to ask open questions aimed at eliciting justifications (e.g., JiménezAleixandre et al., 2005; Simon et al. 2006), such as “Why do you think that?” “How do we know it?”; to challenge ideas pointing out its limitations or inconsistencies (e.g., Mason, 1996; Mork, 2005). To develop and provide criteria for the construction and evaluation of arguments and argument components, either as prompts (Osborne et al., 2004a) or as a written rubric (Sandoval & Reiser, 2004). Some instances of criteria are: for arguments, good arguments include true, reliable and multiple justifications, refer to alternative arguments and rebut them (Zohar & Nemet, 2002); for evidence, appropriate evidence is specific and came from data not from opinion (Kenyon et al., 2006).
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To translate epistemic goals related to argumentation into their oral contributions. Some instances of argumentation processes reflected in teacher utterances coded by Simon et al. (2006) are: talking and listening; knowing meaning of argument; constructing arguments; evaluating arguments or counterarguing and debating. To encourage students’ reflection about their positions, about changes in positions as a consequence of the teaching sequence or the debates, and about the reasons underlying that change (e.g., Jiménez-Aleixandre & Pereiro, 2005; Simon et al., 2006). These roles are related: teachers model inquiry and, as part of it, encourage the use of evidence and students’ reflection, and provide criteria for evidence. In summary, in classrooms promoting argumentation teachers have to scaffold the development of epistemological understanding. Zohar (this book) discusses how teachers can develop the capabilities related to teaching argumentation.
Inquiry and Argumentation Instruction as Cognitive Apprenticeship: The Curriculum Kuhn (2005) places inquiry and argumentation at the center of a thinking curriculum. An inquiry perspective has consequences not only for the curriculum, but also for the roles of students and teachers. Sandoval and Reiser (2004) view inquiry instruction as a cognitive apprenticeship into scientific practice, pointing out that inquiry-based efforts “must emphasize that the processes scientists value for generating and validating knowledge emerge from epistemological commitments to what counts as scientific knowledge” (Sandoval & Reiser, p. 345). Some of the features of curriculum in argumentative contexts are discussed below. The curriculum is organized around authentic activities (Brown et al., 1989), as in projects SEPIA (see Duschl, this book), or RODA (Jiménez-Aleixandre & Pereiro, 2002), dilemmas drawn from real life (Zohar & Nemet, 2002), because the students’ performances in them would create an appropriate environment for argumentation, which in standard classrooms is not likely to occur. Authentic activities are these that constitute problems, not just rhetorical questions, for instance an unexpected obstacle encountered in a process of genetic engineering (Ergazaki & Zogza, 2005); that are relevant, or perceived as relevant for the lives of the students, as the controversial issue of wolfs in Norway (Mork, 2005) or cloning (Sadler & Zeidler, 2005); that require to be solved using inquiry procedures (Kolstø & Mestad, 2005; Kuhn & Reiser, 2007). Brown et al. (1993) discuss what should authentic and inauthentic mean in school science classrooms, pointing out that, to suggest, as Brown et al. (1989) do, enculturation of students in the cultures of science (mathematics, etc.) practitioners, is romantic, as teachers are not practitioners themselves. A. Brown et al. propose instead that schools should be communities where students learn to learn, teachers model intentional learning, and
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graduates of such communities would be people who have learned how to learn in many domains, who know how to go about gaining new knowledge. An interesting distinction is made by Sandoval and Reiser (2004), who propose a focus on engaging students in the reasoning and discursive practices of scientists, which does not necessarily mean the exact activities of professional scientists. Curriculum structured as problem solving provides an environment for students to productively engage in investigations (e.g., Eichinger et al., 1991; Kelly et al., 1998) and apply their knowledge to solve the problem. Tasks are designed in order to produce a diversity of outcomes, to involve considering a plurality of explanations. Diversity is grounded in a view of knowledge as socially constructed through challenges brought about by differences in perspective (Pea, 1993). This diversity supports the evaluation of alternatives and students’ engagement in argumentation, for instance in projects SEPIA (Duschl, this book), RODA (JiménezAleixandre & Pereiro, 2002, 2005) or IDEAS (Osborne et al., 2004). Proposals, solutions or alternatives generated have, as a consequence of design, different epistemic statuses and these can undergo modifications along the process. Baker (2002) proposes five conditions for argumentative interactions to take place: a diversity of proposals (solutions, methods to obtain them); proposals or solutions distributed across interlocutors; proposals having, from the point of view of participants, different epistemic statuses, as for instance more or less plausible, true, believable, acceptable; the requirement, inherent to the instructional context, to choose between them; and finally, in order to resolve the problem of choice, “the interlocutors establish links between them and other proposals, called arguments and counterarguments, the creation of which potentially modify the epistemic statuses of the initial proposals” (Baker, 2002, pp. 306–307). Baker further proposes a second way in which the epistemic statuses of proposals can be modified, to transform their meaning using discursive operations, meaning negotiations. Depth is preferred over breadth, recurrence over fragmentation (Brown, 1992; Brown et al., 1993). For instance in project SEPIA conceptual goals are kept to a limited number so as to facilitate the adoption of epistemic criteria to assess knowledge claims (Duschl, this book). Resources are designed to support the development of scientific epistemic practices. A particular case is the use of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) to support argumentation. Pea (1993) claims that the use of ICT has to be incorporated to the design principles of innovative classrooms, on the grounds that tools serve as artefacts of distributed intelligence, with affordances such as science visualization, or augmenting intelligence through external representational systems. Sandoval and Reiser (2004) discuss the ways in which Explanation Constructor, a software tool, supported students’ inquiry and provided epistemic forms for students’ expression of their thinking and for communicating evaluation criteria. For instance, students had to select specific pieces of data as evidence and link them to specific causal claims, so the distinction between claim and evidence is made both in the representations used and in the students’ manipulation of those representations. A detailed discussion of the role of information technology in supporting argumentation is found in Clark et al. (this book).
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In summary, the curriculum in argumentative contexts is structured as solving authentic problems, which generate a diversity of outcomes with different epistemic statuses, and uses resources that support epistemic practices. The goal is to engage students in inquiry, in the discursive practices of scientists.
Sharing of Criteria and of the Authority to Evaluate: Assessment For Brown et al. (1993) maintaining standards of accountability while at the same time keeping the social contract with students, who are encouraged to view themselves as co-equals participants in a community is a difficult tightrope to walk. These authors’ approach is to allow students to participate in the assessment process as much as possible. Two dimensions of evaluation have to be taken into account, the students’ participation in the assessment of the instruction process and the sharing of criteria to evaluate knowledge. Some features of assessment in argumentative contexts are: The participation of students in the assessment of the goals of the teaching sequences (e.g., López & Jiménez-Aleixandre, 2002) as they had participation in the decisions about the content to be studied, the methods of study and the norms related to it. López and Jiménez-Aleixandre characterize the teachers’ performance in their study in this respect as sharing with the pupils the authority to evaluate. Sharing of criteria for the assessment of students’ products and performances, which in the SEPIA project is carried through a discourse strategy labelled “assessment conversation” (Duschl, this book). Developing criteria for evaluating claims (see e.g., Jiménez & Pereiro, 2002; Kenyon et al., 2006; Kortland, 1996). Making cognitive processes public: Brown et al. (1993) discuss dynamic assessment methods grounded in the Vygotskian zone of proximal development, being one of its features the externalization of mental events via discussion formats. Making external processes that are carried out internally may support cognitive apprenticeship. In argumentative contexts students are required to make explicit the evidence for their claims (e.g., Mason, 1996). The use of portfolio as a part of the assessment (e.g., Duschl, this book; Jiménez-Aleixandre & Pereiro, 2002) facilitates the students’ reflection on their own learning, comparing their initial proposals, claims or justifications with their current ones. The use of multiple ways for students to display their competence as science learners, to demonstrate knowledge, beyond taking written examinations. As Crawford (2005) argues, what counts as knowing is an interactional accomplishment among participants and, as her case study shows, a teacher can construct a learning environment in which multiple discourse practices are valued as knowing science. Some instances of this communicative repertoire are: explaining visual representations, taking the role of teacher, solving problems, explaining phenomena or questioning data.
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As a summary, in argumentative contexts teachers and students share both the public criteria for assessment and the authority to evaluate through portfolio and different instances of a communicative repertoire.
Monitoring Thinking and Learning: Regulation, Reflection and Metacognition A central claim in this chapter is that a specific feature of argumentation learning environments is the evaluation of knowledge claims, and therefore that their goals should include the development of epistemological understanding to the level of evaluative thinking. Knowledge evaluation practices are intentional and require a high degree of reflection about thinking. The monitoring by students of their own thinking and learning processes can occur at different stages, from reflection to metacognition and epistemic cognition (Kitchener, 1983). Monitoring comprehension can be viewed as a basic competency for learning science. The process of noticing and fixing difficulties when reading science texts has been studied by Otero (2002; Otero & Campanario, 1990) who found that students have difficulties in detecting contradictions contained in a short paragraph. Some researchers distinguish two components in comprehension monitoring: evaluation, that is, noticing the comprehension problem, and regulation, or the process of repairing it. However, for Otero (2002) these two phases are not independent of each other. Although these studies are not related to argumentation, they point to the difficulties encountered in developing regulation processes in science education. Conceptual change is also related to regulation; in this case of the intellectual status of the learner’s ideas, and some studies have examined the difficulties of students when confronted with anomalous data that contradict their theories (Chinn & Brewer, 1993). Metacognition is thinking about thinking. According to Zohar (2004) it is used in two different senses: metacognitive knowledge, that is, what one knows about cognition, and metacognitive control processes, or the use of that knowledge to regulate cognition. Metacognition, strictu sensu, is documented only when students make explicit references to their thinking and knowing processes. Although sometimes students’ references to their ideas are characterized as metacognitive, here a distinction is drawn among reflection upon one’s learning and explicit awareness of the significance of thinking strategies. In argumentative environments these practices include for instance: Students’ reflections about the character of the knowledge that they have been asked to extend and apply in decision-making (Kortland, 2001); this reflection is built in the task. Students’ metaconceptual awareness of their ideas, for instance about their initial conceptions, the reasons for it and conceptual change (Mason, 1996); or about the differences among their positions at the beginning and the end of the teaching sequence and about the data influencing the change (Jiménez-Aleixandre & Pereiro, 2005; Mason, 1998).
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Students’ metacognitive reflections for instance about the argumentation standards (Zohar & Nemet, 2002); or about the advantages of learning by themselves in contrast with being told something (Jiménez-Aleixandre et al., 2005). Students’ epistemic reflections about the evaluation of scientific explanations, the causal coherence of their claims, their fit with available data (Sandoval & Reiser, 2004), in this study both tools and tasks create opportunities for this reflection. As a summary, in argumentative environments students are engaged in reflection about their knowledge and their thinking and learning processes.
Collaborating in a Dialogic and Interactive Setting: The Communicative Approach Talk and other modes of communication are a central dimension of science classrooms. Mortimer and Scott (2003) analytical framework for communicative approach locates classroom talk along two continua: interactive to noninteractive, depending on the participation of students; and dialogic to authoritative, depending on the attention paid to different points of view or voices (dialogic), or the absence of it (authoritative). These two dimensions can be found in all four combinations in science classrooms and, for Mortimer and Scott, in any teaching sequence there should be variation in communicative approach. Acknowledging this diversity, it seems that argumentation would be supported in contexts where interactive and dialogic approaches dominate over non-interactive or authoritative ones. Some features of these classrooms could be: Collaborative learning, grounded in approaches viewing knowledge as socially constructed and cognition as distributed. It has at least two dimensions: designing and organising forms of collaboration, as reciprocal teaching or the jigsaw method, and establishing a community of discourse in a collaborative atmosphere, where discussion, questioning, evaluating, criticism are the mode rather than the exception (e.g., Brown et al., 1993; Mason, 1996). Collaborative discourse allows participants to negotiate meanings, explanations and standards for evidence (e.g., Kelly et al., 1998; Sandoval & Reiser, 2004). Interactive contexts where argumentative interactions may take the form of attempts to convince, of negotiation of choices, or of cooperative explorations of a dialogical space of solutions (Baker, 2002). The discourse in a classroom which has as a goal promoting argumentation can be characterized as interactive and dialogic (Mork, 2005). Cooperative efforts resulting in the co-construction of arguments (e.g., JiménezAleixandre & Pereiro, 2005; Jiménez-Aleixandre et al., 2000; Mason, 1996) with inputs of several participants. Communicative approaches in argumentative contexts can be summarized as interactive and dialogical, establishing a community of discourse.
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These six issues are forming part of a whole, as represented in Fig. 5.1, their different dimensions combining in a synergistic way to support argumentation in science classrooms. The students take on these roles of knowledge producers because the curriculum (task, resources, etc.) requires them to do so. They are supported in them by the teachers’ performances and modeling. The collaborative and dialogic approach provides an adequate context for sharing evaluation criteria. Reflection about knowledge and about learning is built in the tasks. As a summary, argumentation is a skill that is learned through practice. Argumentative environments are a type of constructivist learning environments and share many characteristics with them, but they feature an emphasis on the evaluation of (scientific) knowledge claims.
Promoting Argumentation through Explicit Teaching The focus of the previous section is on the common features shared by a number of learning environments, as documented in argumentation studies. In other dimensions these contexts exhibit a considerable diversity. One is the target students, ranging from primary (e.g., Eichinger et al., 1991; López & Jiménez, 2002; Mason, 1996) to secondary, in a majority of studies, and university (e.g., Kelly & Takao, 2002; Sadler & Zeidler, 2005). Another difference is in the choice between fostering argumentation through explicit formal teaching or by designing an environment in which argumentation competencies are embedded in the classroom culture and learning tasks. It is worth noting that these two options are complementary, as classrooms where argumentation is taught are also environments where the design principles involve the development of argumentation skills. On the other hand there is a continuum of practices that may count as teaching argumentation, from the formal introduction of rubrics about argument components, structure, or quality, to requiring students to justify their claims, although some authors would describe the second as teaching and others as not teaching argumentation. And it has to be acknowledged that the focus of a number of studies is on reporting argumentation rather than on how to promote it. This section discusses some instances of explicit teaching of argumentation and the next, classroom environments fostering it mainly through design. One of the first studies exploring the effect of teaching argumentation in science classrooms was Kortland’s (1996, 2001) doctoral dissertation about secondary school students’ (aged 13–14) decision-making on waste issues. A first trial of the teaching sequence showed the limitations of the students’ arguments, and additional activities were designed for the second year of the study, with the purpose of “have students arrive at the formulation of the requirements an argued point of view should met” (Kortland, 2001, p. 95). The tasks required students to criticize several arguments about the choice of a milk container and, from these criticisms, to derive the requirements of a well-argued position. It proved to be extremely difficult, and the students were not able to produce the requirements. The comparison of the
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argumentations patterns before and after the intervention showed a limited effect on the quality of the student’s argumentation, although some improvement was found on the validity and clarity of the criteria used in order to make the choice. Kortland (1996) attributed this limited effect to the lack of attention paid to ensuring students’ reflection on their own arguments. With a stronger emphasis on reasoning patterns, Zohar and Nemet (2002) examined the outcomes of a unit integrating explicit teaching of argumentation with genetics content. Argumentation skills were addressed in a lesson focused on argument structure and on criteria for distinguishing between good and bad arguments, and in the context of each genetics dilemma. The 12-hours teaching sequence created intensive opportunities to exercise these skills (Zohar, 2004). Three qualitative categories were used for the assessment of argumentation skills: (a) the capacity to formulate an argument, defined as a conclusion supported by at least one relevant justification; (b) the number of justifications; (c) the structure of the argument, the branching of reasons (see Zohar, 2004, p. 67 for a detailed description). Zohar and Nemet (2002) reported the enhanced performances of the students in the experimental group, both in biological knowledge and in argumentation. The improvement in argumentation skills was extended to transfer to everyday dilemmas. The authors interpret the significant gains produced by only one lesson about argument structure as supporting Kuhn’s (1991) contention that argumentation skills (at least implicitly) are initially present, although not fully developed, and that the educational challenge is to reinforce them. Zohar and Nemet explain the changes, on the one hand as the effect of metacognitive thinking, defined as being conscious of generalizations, principles and standards of one’s reasoning processes; and on the other for the changes in what was valued in the culture of these science classes. A study with a focus on teaching argumentation was conducted by Osborne et al. (2004a) over two years, its first phase having as a goal to develop materials and strategies to support argumentation in the classroom, as well as teachers’ development with teaching it (Simon et al., 2006). In the second phase, teachers taught nine lessons involving argumentation, and the progression in students’ capabilities along the year was assessed, and contrasted with the capabilities in control groups. The teachers’ use of argumentation experienced significant development and the quality of students’ argumentation improved. The methodological developments for argumentation analysis are discussed in Erduran (this book). For Osborne et al. introducing argumentation requires a shift in the nature of classroom discourse, changes both in the epistemological and social structures of the classrooms. About the epistemological structure, they propose strategies that have at its core the requirement to consider plural accounts rather than singular explanations of phenomena. About the social structure, to foster student–student interactions and dialogic discourse, these authors have developed a set of frameworks that enable to generate argument-based lessons. Some instances are: ●
Experiment report: Students are given a record of another student’s experiment and conclusions, written in a way that could clearly be improved, and asked to produce ways to improve it and explain why.
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Competing theories: Students are introduced to a physical phenomenon and offered two competing explanations together with a range of pieces of evidence that may support one of the theories, both or neither. They are asked to evaluate each piece and use it to argue for one of the explanations.
A further outcome of this study with the goal of supporting teachers’ competence in teaching argumentation (Simon et al., 2006), is the IDEAS project for professional development, a programme which produced a set of video-based resources for teacher training (Osborne et al., 2004b). In a study examining the use of evidence in written arguments, Kelly and Takao (2002) analyzed scientific papers by university students. The oceanography course was also an intensive writing course, including instruction about the technical paper genre, for instance how scientists select a problem, how evidence is used to support a theory or model, or how observations are separated from interpretations. The specific challenges posed by written arguments and the outcomes of the study, in the wider context of a research programme, are discussed in Kelly et al. (this book). In a perspective linking argumentation to inquiry instruction viewed as cognitive apprenticeship into scientific practice, Sandoval and Reiser (2004) reported the use of a learning environment scaffolding epistemic aspects of inquiry and guiding students in the construction and evaluation of scientific explanations. This work has been extended, in one direction by Sandoval and Millwood (this book), with an exploration of students’ practical epistemologies and use of evidence. In a related direction, Reiser and colleagues (Kenyon et al., 2006; Kuhn & Reiser, 2007) enhanced the instructional framework to support students’ epistemological understanding and reasoning about evidence. Kenyon et al. aimed to provide students with tools—in the format of epistemological criteria—on which to base their evaluations of knowledge claims. Argumentation was fostered both by explicit instruction, rubrics and sample questions, and by being embedded in the design of activities (L. Kuhn, personal communication). The authors attempted to get the rubric produced by the 7th-grade students, but this proved too difficult, and finally the teacher gave them criteria for claim, evidence and reasoning—that were turned into a scoring rubric used by students to assess their quality. These difficulties of the students in producing criteria are consistent with Kortland (2001) results discussed above. As an instance, the criteria for evidence are: the evidence (a) is specific; (b) came from data, not opinion; (c) there is enough; and (d) supports the claim. In a study exploring the potential relationship between the practice of scientific argumentation and traditional classroom practices, Kuhn and Reiser (2007) compare classroom interactions in contexts that do and do not explicitly support argumentative discourse, concluding that although scaffolds such as teacher and written prompts can positively influence students’ argumentative products, these supports have less influence over the process of argumentative discourse, which is more heavily influenced by the existing classroom culture, such as the ways in which the teacher responds to student ideas.
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The efforts of different research teams in developing and implementing computerbased learning environments to promote argumentation are reviewed by Clark et al. (this book). From this review of representative studies on explicit teaching of argumentation, some patterns could be discerned. First, the need for extended time, either repeated argumentation sessions during a term (Osborne et al., 2004a), or activities in a long teaching sequence (Kelly & Takao, 2002; Kenyon et al. 2006; Kortland, 1996; Kuhn & Reiser, 2007; Zohar & Nemet, 2002): argumentation needs practice. Second, although the development of criteria by the students seems a desirable goal, it proves to be extremely difficult (Kenyon et al., 2006; Kortland, 2001): in this, as in other dimensions, the teacher’s scaffolding plays a crucial role. Third, in all the cases explicit teaching of argumentation was coupled with support through teacher’s strategies, task design and classroom climate; some authors argue that one strong influence (Zohar & Nemet, 2002) or even the strongest one shaping argumentative discourse (Kuhn & Reiser, 2007) was the classroom culture. Studies about argumentation promoted through particular classroom cultures are examined in the next section.
Promoting Argumentation through Classroom Culture and Intellectual Ecology In a number of argumentation studies the results show students engaged in argumentative reasoning and, in the absence of explicit teaching of argumentation, the question arises about what dimensions in the task, teacher strategies, classroom climate, or a combination of these, may promote their argumentation competencies. We (Jiménez-Aleixandre et al., 2005) have framed this question in Toulmin’s (1972) notion of intellectual ecology, defined by him as coexisting ideas and features of the social or physical situation that provide a range of opportunities for intellectual innovation. Some instances of argumentation promoted through a particular intellectual ecology and classroom culture are discussed below. A seminal classroom study about argumentation in science is Eichinger et al. (1991) with 6th-grade pupils, which combined the examination of argumentation analysis, scientific content and social norms. Working in small groups, students had to decide about which state (i.e., solid, liquid, gas) was better suited to transport water in a space ship. They had previously studied the relevant concepts, weight, volume, molecular structure of water in its three states, but all the pupils except Emily had great difficulties to apply them to solve a practical problem. The authors contend that, although the outcomes may seem an instance of social construction of knowledge, for the students, without the teacher’s intervention, progressed from random proposals to a relatively sophisticated argument supported in the justification about volume, the agreement was strongly influenced by social interactions. After the two leaders maintained opposed positions—one of them decided to support Emily, the student who advanced the appropriate justification.
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A longitudinal study of elementary pupils’ reasoning and knowledge construction from 4th to 5th grades in Italy, is reported by Mason (1996, 1998), with a focus on the role of oral and written discourse. Data were gathered in five classrooms where innovative learning contexts were designed as part of an environmental education project having as a goal conceptual change. Primary school pupils engaged in argumentation processes and epistemic operations, took responsibility for their knowledge claims, supported them with reasons and warrants, appealed to counterevidence, and reflected metacognitively (Mason, 1996). Some features of the classroom environment were: the pupils were encouraged to reflect about their own understanding in written reports, to compare and evaluate ideas about ecology; the teachers promoted argumentative reasoning and, through their interventions in the debates, favored the structuring of the cooperative thinking processes; the classroom discourse was dominated by true dialogue; the organization in small groups promoted a learning community characterized by collaboration and public sharing of ideas. The author concludes that in classroom discussions the students can practice reasoning skills and that “Deeply involved in taking charge of their own processes of knowledge construction, students enter a kind of cognitive apprenticeship to scientific reasoning and argumentation” (Mason, 1996, p. 431). Part of a research programme collecting ethnographic data during three academic years in a high school physics classroom, a study by Kelly et al. (1998) examined the use of evidence, the range of warrants and the conditions leading to warranted arguments while students completed electricity performance assessments in pairs in a laboratory. The students were not given opposing views nor told to argue, but rather the naturally occurring conversations were studied. The authors see conceptual ecology (this name, rather than “intellectual ecology”, has been circulating in the conceptual change literature) as constructed among the participants, including current knowledge, epistemological commitments, analogies and metaphors. In this course the students acquired data using computers, and designed, tested and presented scientific projects (e.g., technological devices, scientific papers or posters). Three dimensions of warrants emerged from the analysis: (a) strategies, for instance direct justification through a warrant, or subsequent justification, offering a second argument as warrant; (b) referents, empirical or hypothetical; and (c) types, declarative or comparative. About the conditions leading to warranted arguments, the more frequent were data, either anomalous or expected; claims by a partner, including challenges; and questions. Kelly and colleagues suggest that supposed common knowledge could make warranting unnecessary. They also found both instances of conclusions consistent with canonical science, but reached through faulty warrants, and of warrants consistent with science used in support of incorrect claims, suggesting the need for an analysis more connected to subject-matter (as for instance undertaken in Kelly et al., this book). The RODA (ReasOning, Debate, Argumentation) project evolved from examining the balance among the cultures of “doing school” and “doing science” in the classroom discourse, and the effect of tasks which required reasons for claims on argumentation development, in a context where it had not been taught (JiménezAleixandre et al., 2000), to exploring, through classroom studies, the connections
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among argumentation and different dimensions of science learning, concept construction, designing experiments in the laboratory, development of attitudes. For instance Jiménez-Aleixandre et al. (1999) examined the process of data construction by high school students in a microscope task requiring them to identify an unknown sample: the students interpreted and reinterpreted their observations in the process of appealing to empirical data to back their claims. The authors compared the students’ actions with other groups working in standard microscope assignments, noting for instance the interactions with sources of knowledge in books and notebooks, not observed in standard laboratory sessions. Results from a longitudinal study about argumentation and environmental education in primary school from 4th to 6th grades (9–12 years), also part of RODA, are reported in several papers. The methodological approach of the classroom and of the whole school attributed a great share of responsibility to pupils, from classroom organization, and issues to be studied to the evaluation of the goals of teaching sequences (López & Jiménez-Aleixandre, 2002). The process of transformation of proposals for their own code of behavior in a field trip, showing the pupils engaged in true dialogue, and the teacher strategies for encouraging pupils’ taking charge of their learning and reorienting the debates, is discussed in JiménezAleixandre and López (2001). The quality of 4th-grade students’ arguments along 10 sessions is analyzed in Jiménez-Aleixandre et al. (2005), and given the sophistication of arguments including rebuttals, the question arises of what features in the classroom environment supported the development of argumentative competencies. To examine it, we use Toulmin’s (1972) notion of intellectual ecology and propose four intertwined dimensions in it: (a) pedagogical, including categories as teacher’s style and strategies (showing interest in pupils’ proposals, reformulating them), classroom climate, placing responsibility in the hands of students, sharing the authority to evaluate; (b) cognitive and metacognitive, including students’ reflections about their control of learning, about learning as a holistic process, about the process of inference, challenges of book authority, reflections on uncertainty; (c) communicative, including interactive and dialogic interactions, analogies and metaphors; and (d) social, including the influence of leadership, competition and cooperation in the co-construction of arguments. It is suggested that the sustained enculturation in this particular school and classroom culture provided the adequate environment for argumentative competencies to develop. The notion of intellectual ecology can be fruitful for studying these complex environments. A classroom study focusing on high school students’ argumentation about a socio-scientific problem of environmental management is reported in JiménezAleixandre and Pereiro (2002, 2005). During 17 sessions the students, distributed in jigsaw groups, worked with real data sets, maps, technical projects and scientific reports in order to produce their own reports about the pros and cons of sewage network in a polluted wetland. They were required to support their claims, to critically process different sources of data and authority, and to reflect on the changes in their ideas from the beginning of the unit, referring to the data relevant in producing the changes (Jiménez-Aleixandre & Pereiro, 2005). The results show how they articulated relevant ecological and technical concepts with environmental values in
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constructing warrants, and how their criteria for evaluating claims became more refined and specific along the unit. The relevance of engaging students in life-size problems for their enculturation in a knowledge producing community is suggested. Another instance of RODA classroom studies is the exploration of the process of construction of meanings for the concept of neutralization, as it is used as a cognitive tool to solve a titration problem in the laboratory (Jiménez-Aleixandre & Reigosa, 2006), in term of contextualizing practices across epistemic levels, as for instance translating observational to theoretical language, or using concepts as resources to frame anomalous data. An autobiographical study about the teacher’s role in the management of argumentative role-play debates is reported in Mork (2006). A web-based teaching programme about wolves was used to achieve the goals of learning about ecology, about different viewpoints and solutions to the problem, and of practising argumentation. Working during six lessons, the students were required to deal with contradictory evidence and to provide justifications for their claims. Some types of teacher’s interventions identified in the study are: to model how to behave in a debate, to challenge the accuracy of the information provided by the students, to extend the range of topics introduced by the students, to get the debate back on track, to rephrase students’ statements, and to promote participation. The author suggests the use of this typology as a guiding tool for teachers when promoting argumentative debates. These are a few instances of studies about classroom environments promoting argumentation, and others are discussed by their authors in a number of chapters of this book (e.g., Duschl; Kelly et al.; Kolstø and Ratcliffe; Sandoval and Millwood; Simonneaux; Zeidler and Sadler). From this review, some patterns emerge, concurrent with the ones discussed in the case of explicit teaching. First, the relevance of extended time, sometimes involving sustained work along several years, as evidenced in longitudinal studies. Second, the role of the teacher’s support. Third, the students taking responsibility of their learning processes and knowledge claims (e.g., Jiménez-Aleixandre & López, 2001; Mason, 1996). Fourth, the students’ involvement in using data, designing projects, writing reports (e.g., Jiménez-Aleixandre & Pereiro, 2002; Kelly et al., 1998), and more generally in problem-solving and decision-making in small group. Fifth, the ways in which socio-scientific issues are appropriate to develop argumentation (Mork, 2006). Sixth, the students were encouraged to reflect about their own understanding and change in ideas and positions (e.g., Jiménez-Aleixandre & Pereiro, 2002; Mason, 1996).
Discussion: Engineering Cognitive Apprenticeship in Argumentation The analytical review of studies providing empirical evidence on the design of learning environments effective in promoting argumentation, both through explicitly teaching it and through promoting it by means of explicit design and by creating an
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appropriate classroom culture, shows that besides a variety in the perspectives and in the features of the classrooms, there are a number of shared characteristics that suggest recommendations for teachers and science educators seeking to engineer cognitive apprenticeship in argumentation. A first implication I would draw is about what roles do we require from students in argumentation environments: these studies point to students developing argumentation skills because these were required for their role in the learning process (Bereiter & Scardamalia, 1989). So, in general, argumentative competencies have an appropriate environment to develop in classrooms designed as learning communities where students work in authentic problems and are engaged in using data, collecting evidence, or producing reports; where students are protagonists of their own learning, features shared with other constructivist learning environments. And, in particular, in argumentation learning environments, students are engaged in supporting knowledge claims with evidence, evaluating claims, developing criteria for this evaluation, and other activities related to knowledge evaluation. A second suggestion concerns the relevance of involving students in reflection and metacognitive thinking, encouraging them to compare their ideas and positions with alternative ones, or to evaluate the change in them and the causes behind this change. As discussed in Garcia-Mila and Andersen (this book), it has been claimed that developing metacognition is a key factor in the coordination of theory and evidence. They also point to the effectiveness of combining practice (as characterized in the previous paragraph) with reflection. A third implication is the need for extended engagement in argumentative discourse. Argumentation needs to be practised for some time in different contexts, and anecdotal activities do not provide enough opportunities for reflection. A fourth implication is about the teachers’ support to students’ development of epistemological understanding. The teachers model argumentation and inquiry, provide criteria for the evaluation of knowledge, translate epistemic goals into their contributions. From the examination of studies promoting argumentation by explicit teaching of argumentation, as for instance explicit discussion about the criteria for evaluating arguments, and by explicit design of tasks, teacher strategies and classroom culture, it seems that their effects are difficult to separate. Studies about explicit teaching of argumentation as Zohar and Nemet (2002) and Kuhn and Reiser (2007), point to the influence of a classroom culture valuing the support of claims with evidence; for Kuhn and Reiser the classroom culture was the strongest influence. It can be claimed that both explicit teaching of argumentation and an intellectual ecology constructed in the classroom around knowledge evaluation, contribute to the development of argumentative competencies or, in Mason (1996) words, to students entering a cognitive apprenticeship to scientific reasoning and argumentation. Designing learning environments to support argumentation in science classrooms is not an easy task. But potential contributions from argumentation, such as externalizing cognitive processes, developing critical thinking, supporting the development of epistemic criteria, and other discussed in Jiménez-Aleixandre and
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Erduran (this book), may be worth the challenge. Argumentation can so contribute to the scientific education of learners and also to their education as citizens. Acknowledgments Work supported by the Spanish Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia (MEC), partly funded by the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), code SEJ2006-15589-C0201/EDUC. The author gratefully acknowledges the work of Marta Agraso, Joaquín Díaz, Fins Eirexas, Ramón López, Cristina Pereiro and Carlos Reigosa, members of the RODA research group. Thanks to Christopher Andersen, Sibel Erduran, Merce Garcia-Mila, Stein Dankert Kolstø, Christian Plantin and William Sandoval for their valuable feedback on earlier versions of this chapter.
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Chapter 6
Social Aspects of Argumentation Stein Dankert Kolstø and Mary Ratcliffe
Studies on students’ argumentation, particularly on science-related issues, show that social dimensions influence argumentation (Grace, 2005; Kolstø, 2006; Mercer, 2000; Solomon, 1992). The purpose of this chapter is to explore some of these social aspects and discuss their legitimacy and possible consequences for teaching argumentation in science education. The scope for our exploration is the social aspects of argumentation in science-related issues. We conceptualise argumentation as a goal directed social practice embedded in different types of dialogues (Walton, 1998). The nature of argumentation will be discussed from both a philosophical and an empirical point of view. In addition, we will also relate the discussion to social aspects of science in order to clarify the context in which students’ argumentation on scientific matters are embedded. We define an argument as a claim supported by a justification. The characteristics of justifications are not included in our definition, as the quality of the justification, according to the nature of arguments, is to be judged by the debaters. In their seminal article “Establishing the norms of scientific argumentation in classrooms”, Driver et al. (2000) identified two main reasons for teaching argumentation in science education. Firstly, it is important to convey to students an adequate image of science, especially to show the socially constructed nature of scientific knowledge. Such social construction emphasises science teaching as a discursive practice and encourages argumentation in science. Secondly, it is regarded as critical that young people are enabled to construct and to analyse arguments related to the social applications and implications of science. Specifically, this involves the ability to engage with claims from the frontiers of science involved in controversial socio-scientific issues (see Chapter 12 by Simonneaux for an elaboration on this aspect). In line with this twofold justification, we will focus on two main types of contexts in the science classroom where students might get involved in argumentation. Firstly, there are scientific issues which, to some extent, are detached from possible social implications (e.g., when students discuss possible interpretations of their experiments). Secondly, there are issues where the science is involved in a social debate. Typically, such issues concern personal or political decision-making related to health and environmental controversies. Examples here are the climate issue and genetic testing. In addition there are issues related to science policy (e.g., what S. Erduran and M. P. Jiménez-Aleixandre (eds.), Argumentation in Science Education. © Springer 2007
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research to allow or to support). Both types of issues are influenced by the social aspects of the conduct of science. In this chapter we will argue that scientific argumentation does involve certain social aspects and that to some extent this might explain the presence of social aspects involved in students’ argumentation in science-related issues. Our main thesis is that the influence of social dimension on students’ argumentation in relation to scientific claims is legitimate and desirable. Thus social dimensions should be a focus in science teaching. In some contexts this includes the critical use of arguments from scientific experts. We also argue that the accuracy of students’ argumentation will prosper from increased insight into social aspects of science, because of the importance in contextualising science issues.
Argumentation as a Social Activity We start by discussing the implicit claim in the title of this chapter, the assertion that arguments have social aspects. Van Eemeren et al. (1996) state that there are three generally recognised forms of argument: analytical, rhetorical and dialectical. Analytical arguments belong to the domain of formal reasoning. Formal reasoning is concerned with the logical structure of arguments, and whether a conclusion follows logically from given premises. However, scholars have claimed that formal logic is inadequate for describing argumentation in science (Walton, 1992) and irrelevant for inclusion in science teaching (Driver et al., 2000) and will therefore not be discussed here. Reasoning which does not employ formal logic is denoted as informal reasoning. Thus informal reasoning employs rhetorical and dialectical forms of arguments. Rhetorical forms of argumentation refer to arguments used in monological situations where an orator employs discursive techniques in order to persuade an audience. In contrast, dialectical forms of arguments are involved in dialogues involving two or more discussants. Argumentation in informal reasoning therefore apparently exists in two forms: individualistic or social. The individualistic meaning relates to rhetorical and other situations where an individual formulates a point of view. The social meaning of argument refers to a dispute between people. However, we will nevertheless claim that all argumentation is basically social, as rhetorical arguments expect an audience. This view is supported by Billig (1996) who claims that the existence of two meanings of “argument” signifies the importance of the possibility of contradiction when exploring questions. This focus on contradiction, Billing states, was probably first noticed by the ancient Greek philosopher Protagoras who claimed that in all questions both pro and con arguments can always be found. From this assertion he concludes that any single opinion or “individual argument” is controversial, and thus actually or potentially a part of a social argument. Consequently, we will take the view that argumentation is basically social and operates in a social context. Our question is therefore not whether social aspects influence debaters’ argumentation,
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but what these social aspects are, and how they influence on argumentation in science-related issues? This basically social function of arguments is apparent in science where the authors of scientific articles carefully build up arguments using the kind of rhetorical devices valued and accepted in science. However, this individualistic practice serves a social function as each paper is a contribution to a debate among colleagues in a scientific community. Moreover, consensual conclusions on facts, models and theories in science will be backed by arguments produced by several contributors, and based on the judgement of a scientific community as a whole. Consequently, argumentation in science has a social purpose and an ultimate goal: contributing to the collective development and judgement of scientific knowledge claims and the identification of reliable and consensual descriptions of nature. When designing curricula and activities in science teaching aiming at fostering skills in argumentation, we need to take this social and goal-directed purpose of argumentation into account. However, argumentation might have different social goals in different contexts and situations. In the next section, we will have a closer look at different social goals and their relevance for science teaching. We will also present examples of how science students in different contexts construed the social goal of their argumentation.
Argumentation and Types of Dialogues Whether debaters might meet face-to-face, through texts or by other means, an argument is always made in a context where debaters exchange views. Such exchange of views is what characterises dialogues (Walton, 1998). Therefore, arguments are embedded in dialogues, and this dialogical and social context will influence the characteristics of arguments put forward. In order to understand social aspects of arguments we therefore need to take into account social aspects of dialogues. Studies of students’ argumentation in dialogues on scientific and other issues have revealed that students’ dialogues may take different forms. Studying small group discussions Mercer (2000) identified three different types of discourse; disputational, cumulative and exploratory talk. Disputational talk is competitive in nature, differences of opinion are stressed rather than solved. It is characterised by exchanges of claims, challenges and counterclaims, with students defending their own point of view. Cumulative talk is characterised by agreement, and typically features repetitions, confirmations and elaborations. Exploratory talk involves presentation of points of view backed up by arguments and critically but constructive discussions about each other’s ideas. In her study on science students’ discussions of the types of management of wolves to implement politically in Norway, Mork (2006) found all these kinds of talk represented. She also claimed the need for an additional version of disputational
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talk which she calls reasoned disputational and is characterised by claims supported by a reason. From her excerpts it is evident that all arguments are put forward in response to other utterances, and thus occur in a social context where all participants have their own roles, agendas and expectations, and interpretations of what characterises appropriate contributions. Focussing on arguments as embedded in dialogues with different goals, Walton (1998) presents a classification of dialogues which attempts to cover all kinds of argumentative interactions (see Duschl, this book for an extended discussion of Walton’s categories). Walton defines dialogue as “a normative framework in which there is an exchange of arguments between partners reasoning together in turn-taking sequence aimed at a collective goal” (p. 30). He claims the existence of five different types of dialogues, characterised, among other attributes, by different goals: persuasion dialogue (e.g., critical discussion), information-seeking dialogue (e.g., interview and expert-consultation), negotiation dialogue (e.g., deal-making), inquiry dialogue (e.g., scientific inquiry and public inquiry) and eristic dialogue (e.g., quarrel). Walton’s types of dialogues are analytical categories and he does not claim the empirical existence of these in their pure form. Also, in a discussion there might be one or several shifts between types of dialogues, with accompanying shifts in goals pursued. Although there are slight differences, Walton’s concept of persuasion dialogue has clear resemblances with Mercer’s Disputational talk and Costello and Mitchell’s (1995) competing type of argument. Moreover, the goal involved in inquiry type of dialogue is not very different from the purpose of Mercer’s Cumulative talk and Costello and Mitchell’s consensual type of argument. In our discussions we will use Walton’s analytical categories due to their claimed applicability to describe dialogues involved in different disciplines, including science. Given these different patterns of dialogue, science teachers may need to be conscious about the kind of dialogue they want their students to engage in, and to design the educational context accordingly. Additionally, if we want to convey to students an adequate image of science, we need to identify characteristics of argumentative discourses in science. Although students may engage in all categories of Walton’s dialogue, we would argue that two in particular are important as representations of scientific practices. The critical discussion as a type of persuasion dialogue and scientific inquiry as a type of inquiry dialogue are of social interest in our context, due to their possible relevance for describing scientific discourses. In a persuasion dialogue in general the goal of each party is to persuade the other party to accept an assertion, using, as premises, data and ideas that the other party has accepted as decision-base. In a critical discussion, as a specific type of persuasion dialogue, the goal is to solve a conflict of opinion by means of rational, or reason based, argumentation (Walton, 1998). The method of critical inquiry is to look at arguments on both sides and raise critical questions of these, in order to identify the strength of the arguments involved. The participants typically proceed by question and reply. Participation in a critical discussion presupposes a willingness to change view in light of good arguments. If a debater is not open to change his opinion she has in fact shifted the dialogue into
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an eristic dialogue (e.g., quarrel) (Walton, 1992). In an eristic dialogue the defining goal is to win and not to test the strength of arguments. In a scientific inquiry the goal is for the participants collectively to establish or demonstrate a particular scientific claim based on scientific criteria established in a scientific community (Walton, 1998). The method of scientific inquiry is therefore to collect all relevant evidence, scrutinise this evidence and through collaboration and argumentation identify conclusions that are firmly supported by theory and evidence. The goal of identifying a conclusion implies a need to restrict the ongoing critical questioning in order to proceed towards a result. Which kinds of dialogues are practised in science then? Walton (1998) argues that the presentation of scientific results in scientific papers to some extent does have the characteristics of scientific inquiry as a type of dialogue. However, science at the laboratory stage, where researchers work together to identify, discuss and test different possible phenomena and explanations/hypothesis, probably has other characteristics. At this stage of scientific knowledge production the discussion is probably best described as alternating periods of scientific inquiry and critical discussion among collaborators. In addition, sociological studies of science indicate that disputes in the public sphere between scientists on competing theories are best characterised as persuasion dialogues or critical discussions (Latour, 1987; Martin & Richards, 1995). Researchers’ analyses (Costello & Mitchell, 1995; Walton, 1998) provide us with the insight that humans employ different kinds of dialogues for achieving different type of goals. Their analyses inform us that argumentation is embedded in different types of dialogues and also in a wider context which influence the kind of goals, and thus kind of arguments which are put forward.
Scientific Inquiry and Critical Discussion in the Science Classroom Based on the idea of arguments as embedded in goal-directed dialogues, what might be the consequence for the teaching of argumentation in science? Referring to Aristotle, Walton (1992, Chapter 1) claims that, due to its goal and method, participation in critical discussion does not presuppose subject-matter specialisation on behalf of the participant asking critical question. Participants might, however, need information from experts and thus shifts to periods of expert-consultation dialogue can occur. Such expert-consultation improves the level of the critical discussion, but in general critical discussion might be practised at any level of expertise. Participation in a scientific inquiry dialogue, however, does presuppose knowledge of relevant subject matter. This is so because alternative explanations or hypothesis need to be developed and explored, and also need to be based on, or at least not contradict, established theories in the relevant field of knowledge. The claim about different demands on subject knowledge has an immediate consequence for science education. If we want students to practise a critical discussion,
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the depth and breadth of their knowledge-base may be at any level, and this level might be decided by the teacher. We might even decide that the students shall include expert-consultation dialogues and gather the necessary information and decide on the level or quality of the critical discussion themselves. In addition, we might want to train students in drawing evidence-based conclusions on scientific questions or decisions on socio-scientific issues and making their arguments available for others to inspect. This implies performing inquiry types of dialogues, which presupposes a more extensive knowledge-base. There might therefore be three relevant kinds of dialogues for developing increased competence in examining scientific and socio-scientific issues through science education: critical discussion; expert-consultation dialogues; scientific inquiry dialogues. In a study conducted in a science class, 14-year-old students were presented with a decision-making task—what materials would they use for making window frames? They were given some information about the common materials used—aluminium, PVC, softwood, hardwood (Ratcliffe, 1996). The peer group discussions had the elements of persuasive dialogue with a small amount of critical reflection. For example, although pupils were able to comment on the advantages and disadvantages of materials (though not systematically) the dominance of one individual’s view could sway others without much thought. A typical exchange between three boys, represented here as pseudonyms Eliot, Simon and Gurwant shows how Eliot develops his initial solution with the acceptance of the other two boys. Eliot: Simon: Eliot: Gurwant: Eliot: Gurwant: Simon: Gurwant: Simon:
I think we should use PVC (for the material). But, look it’s expensive. But I think it will last a long time. I think we should change the windows. Yes—as I said, change the windows to PVC. OK, because this will be the most efficient. And it will be cheaper in the long run. PVC will be the most efficient. OK (writing) we have chosen PVC because it is cheaper in the long run.
The students had no systematic introduction to the nature of critical reasoning— suggesting that presentation and critique of arguments might be beneficial in their development of skilful and critical dialogue. Eliot’s ability to persuade his peers might be explained as based on his charisma, or his peers’ wish of “just getting the task done”. It is relevant to ask whether a different design of the task, involving higher demands on justified conclusions on all alternatives, could have stimulated students to enter into an inquiry type of dialogue and thus explore the issues in more depth. Alternatively, the design could seek to stimulate a critical discussion, making it social naturally for peers to challenge (e.g., Eliot’s arguments and point of view). Whatever design is chosen, students may need explicit training in the skills of critical evaluation. In the summary discussion, the teacher asked one group their views after he had spent a little time with the group trying to explain how individual actions can accumulate and affect others:
6 Social Aspects of Argumentation Liam:
Teacher: Keith: Michael: Teacher: Michael: Teacher: Liam: Teacher: Michael:
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Well we thought we’d go for uPVC ‘cos it’s quality and if you buy the softwood you’ve got to keep maintaining it. It would cost more and you’d probably end up paying as much as you’d pay for the uPVC anyway. Did the environmental effects have any bearing on your decision? A little bit. Yeh, just a very little bit. So that helped sway you away from hardwood? Oh yeh, but we still think that cutting down one more trees for our bedroom window is not going to make that much difference. OK, do you all agree with that. Yes. You didn’t take my points about you’re just a drop in the ocean but with lots of other drops have a large effect. Yes, we considered that but don’t think we make much difference.
This exchange suggests egocentric values are dominant in adolescents and students would require considerable evidence to shift to a more balanced viewpoint. In this case values shared among the students were used to judge the relevance of arguments proposed by the teacher. Arguments by peers may be accepted more easily or defended more robustly according to group dynamics—the impact of social relationships within a group can have a bearing on the course of the argument. Scientific evidence itself may not sway the position of individuals. This example indicates the need for challenging the range of arguments and knowledge students draw upon, including students’ views, through critical discussion. However, it also exemplifies the need for developing deep insight into an issue (e.g., through scientific inquiry), in order to become aware of arguments related to the needs and consequences for others. A further challenge is that the teacher needs to monitor the discussions and judge whether he or she has to interrupt in order to make important considerations present in a dialogue. This point is supported by Grace (2005) who found that students are able to engage in critical dialogue and have their views influenced by reasoning presented by others. In both these examples of students’ argumentation their knowledge-base is incomplete and to some extent naïve, yet this does not necessarily prevent some critical discussion from taking place. However, the students were asked to make a decision, which implies performing an inquiry through identifying reliable knowledge and values and drawing a defensible conclusion. When we want students to practise an inquiry type of dialogue, an extended knowledge-base is a prerequisite. This might for instance imply that if we want students to use argumentation in the development of explanations and reports based on their own experiments, or develop decisions as in the case above, it is wise to identify subject areas where the students have a sufficient knowledge base. If different types of discussions exist, the learning environment has to be designed to facilitate the particular kind of dialogue and arguments sought. The possible influence of the teaching strategy used became evident in a study exploring learning about social aspects of science (Kolstø & Mestad, 2005). Students in two science classes were given the research question “Why do people walk around in circles in fog and snowy weather?”. The expectation was thus that students
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would engage in inquiry dialogue. Working in groups the students identified a hypothesis, designed and carried out an experiment and made a written report. Thereafter the student groups in the different science classes exchanged reports, and were supposed to engage in critical discussions about the quality of experimental design and result using a learning management system (Luvit). Even though several groups did discuss aspects of the methods used, several groups focussed on defending their own report, as in the following example (Mestad, 2003, p. 83, our translation): Group 1: Group 2:
Therefore we think that the method/procedure used by group five … was poor. The fact is that it will not be accurate if you are drawing up where. … We did the drawing as accurate as we could, and yours were not that accurate either.
Instead of critical discussions these students shifted into some kind of eristic dialogue where the main goal was to defend own results and reputation. One possible reason for this is the teacher’s decision to identify the two classes as two competing research institutions. The idea of competition and own institution’s reputation in the public sphere therefore might have made some students to construe the dialogue and its goals in terms of institutional interests. Our conclusion so far is that the social context including learning environment and teaching strategies influences the kind of dialogues the students’ practices and the kind of arguments used. In the next section we turn to the social aspects of knowledge claims.
Social Aspects of Claims: Disputability and Flexibility of Scientific Knowledge Claims Toulmin (1958) defines arguments as claims supported by a justification. In this section we explore the social aspects of argumentation further by examining the fate of claims. The fate of a claim advanced in a dialogue depends on what the other dialogue partners do with that claim. In a critical discussion, the goal is to convince the other party. If a claim is stated, and no one criticises that claim, it is implicitly accepted as true or probable. Thus the arguer can use that claim as a basis for further arguments. In a scientific inquiry, the goal is to prove or make probable a description, a theory or an interpretation. A sub-goal is to identify knowledge-claims on which this main claim can be built. Consequently, claims put forward will either, through critique, be judged unreliable, or enter the knowledge-base for the inquiry. Therefore, when a claim is presented, its faith in the further discussion depends upon its reception: is it accepted or is it questioned? This reception might of course be influenced by the justifications provided. However, a claim’s reception is also influenced by the debaters’ views on the question “What claims are debatable?”. One possible answer is that claims from experts are not debatable. This understanding was found in a study by Kolstø (2006) where 16-year-old students were interviewed about their views on the issue of power transmission lines and the fear that these might cause increased risk of childhood leukaemia. The analysis revealed
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that the validity of certain knowledge claims was taken for granted. To take but one example, during the teaching sequence the students were shown a copy of some figures from a leaflet made by a local power company. The figures showed, among other things, the strength of the magnetic field, measured in microtesla (µT), at different distances both from lines and cables. The magnetic field strength were shown to be considerably weaker from underground cables than from overhead lines (0.1 vs. 2.5 µT at a distance of 20 meters) except for very small distances (5 vs. 11.2 µT at zero distance at ground level). Whether pupils were in favour of underground cables (as most students were) or not, they all seemed to take for granted that the both these and other numbers presented were trustworthy. Furthermore, this information was often taken as a base for arguments and personal decisions on the issue. A reason that claims were accepted without further inspection might be because they were produced by scientists. Alternatively they were trusted as they had the “fingerprint” of truly scientific facts: exact figures! In general, students’ ideas about the nature of scientific knowledge probably influence students’ views on whether scientific claims might be criticised. Several studies have revealed that many students holds naïve positivistic conceptions of the nature of science (Lederman, 1992). Such conceptions imply that when a quantity is measured (magnetic field strength in the study above), a new and undisputable fact about nature results. Historically science is seen as value free and objective. This view implies that scientific results are not debatable, but constitute an objective knowledge-base for discussions on non-scientific aspects of issues. The students might therefore experience conflict when asked to debate scientific claims. A more adequate understanding of the nature of science might make it possible for students to evaluate what scientific claims to accept as reliable, and what claims to criticise for being provisional. An awareness of the importance of critique and argumentation in science is probably important to increase students’ understanding of the disputability of scientific knowledge claims. This includes insights into the varying reliability of scientific knowledge-claim, as to whether they are claims from the frontiers of science, core science, or science in the process of gaining support within the relevant scientific community. However, even consensual science might become controversial if applied in contexts where some actors dispute its applicability (Kolstø, 2001b). The issue of power transmission lines mentioned above is a case in point. The claim that scientific knowledge ruled out any possibilities for a causal link between the magnetic fields involved and the development of leukaemia was challenged by epidemiological studies and later also by new theories on possible causal mechanisms (Tynes, 1996). At the other end of the scale, not all students are uncritical to expert statements and scientific jargon. Common utterances like “They try to blind you with science” and “Speak English!” indicate that many students are aware of the need to understand a claim or an argument in order to evaluate its strength or reliability. This critical attitude should be acknowledged by the science teacher as valuable as it can help students maintain a critical stance when a claim is hard to understand (e.g., due to lacking subject-knowledge).
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Awareness of the potential disputability of all kinds of claims, including contextualised use of core science, is important for full participation in debates on scientific and socio-scientific issues. Hence it will help the processes of argumentation if science teachers are aware of their students’ conceptions of the nature of science and are able explicitly to develop their understanding of the nature of scientific claims. Common observations and also some research findings (Kolstø, 2006; Solomon, 1992) suggest that students do not always make claims clear and defend these using data. On the contrary, students sometimes use vague and flexible terms, and often only hint at a point of view. Examples here are the use of phrases like “sort of”, “maybe”, “as far as I understand …”, and the use of understatements. Also, some students, when indicating personal opinions, include qualifiers (“as long as”) and guarding phrases like “not sure” and “I think” as in the following example (from Kolstø, 2006): Interviewer: Student:
Are you telling me that you thought it was difficult to arrive at an opinion? I was not sure, but as long as there is a risk, I think it is reasonable that life itself has to be chosen before money. (p.6)
In her study Solomon (1992) analysed 17-year-old students’ discussions of socioscientific issues presented on television. She reports that it was rare to find anything resembling the “if …”, “then …” of logical propositions. In their place we found rhetoric. This form of talk is marked by positive examples, estimates of likelihood, and the processes of “showing” how things might be in different contexts. (p. 438)
This, she says, implies that the students used the form of argument which historically has been compared to “the open hand”, in contrast to the “closed fist” of logic (Billig, 1996), which implies that the statement is based on presumptions and not watertight logic. Based on the different ways of expressing views described above one might claim that these students are lacking courage and ability to make clear statements and justify these. However, it is also possible to interpret such expressions as indicating an awareness of the need to make it possible to change opinion in light of new knowledge and arguments. If a clear opinion is stated, and evidence for this to be the correct point of view is put forward, then you have to admit that you were wrong if, due to new arguments, you want to change you view. Consequently, there are social costs involved. However, if you use vague and flexible terms in your utterances, you might make slight shifts in your point of view without expressing a change of opinion. If you do not have a clear opinion at the outset of the discussion, as is often the case in complex issues, then this strategy is perfectly rational. It makes it possible to change views and evaluate arguments at low cost. Consequently, this strategy makes it easier to take new arguments and evidence into serious consideration, thus fulfilling the ultimate goal of rational argumentation. This open and flexible strategy has similarities with the consensual type of argumentation which Costello and Mitchell (1995) state is evoked when the purpose of the argumentation is to discover common perspectives or build arguments and decisions together. The flexible strategy is therefore not at odds with the
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purpose of scientific inquiry. Probably this flexibility also exists in dialogues between members of a scientific research team. The insight that might be drawn from this discussion is that participators in dialogues in science-related issues in addition to epistemic purposes also pursue social purposes. Thus, in order for an epistemic dialogue to function social purposes also have to be fulfilled. The consequence for science education is that the flexible talk of many students should not be discouraged in science inquiry activities, although the need for a conclusion in the end should not be concealed. Nevertheless, the flexible strategy is at odds with the purpose of critical discussion as such dialogues presuppose a willingness to make confrontational questions and statements. In a critical discussion it is also important to know what points of view the different participants hold in order to know what points of view to criticise. Once again, it is therefore paramount that the science teacher is conscious about what kind of dialogue he or she wants to promote, and teach and design activities accordingly.
Social Aspects of Justifications The role of a justification in an argument is to underpin the claim put forward. According to Toulmin (1958), such justifications involve the use of data. In Toulmin’s layout of arguments, data is a generic term which refers to all kinds of evidence that might be used by an arguer to support a claim. In support of factual and causal claims, factual evidence involving empirical or theoretical statements is often used (Wood, 2000). However, the reliability of data presented is in general disputable, and this represents a challenge which also involves social aspects. Scientific knowledge and research findings might be used as data when justifying claims in arguments on science-related issues. In fact, we might define a scientific argument as an argument where the justification involves scientific research results, irrespective of whether the argument involves a claim of fact, cause, value or policy. The source of scientific information might be a student’s own observation or second-hand scientific knowledge. However, ultimately scientific knowledge builds on information from scientists. In principle, even the student’s observations typically builds on interpretations guided by scientific concepts and models learned through trust in the teacher and science textbook. Arguers using scientific knowledge in their argumentation have seldom inspected possible underlying evidence by themselves. Consequently, the use of scientific knowledge in a dialogue often implies the use of argument from experts’ authority. Rational argumentation implies, by definition, argumentation based on evidence, at the expense of basing arguments on expert authority (Siegel, 1988). Also ideals of individual judgement and cognitive autonomy point away from reliance on experts (Walton, 1997). It is nevertheless possible to argue that the use of argument from experts’ authority is perfectly rational.
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Firstly, the time it would take to inspect available evidence in all decision-making situations could be considerable. Experts in general, and scientific experts in particular, are involved in a range of personal and political/collective decisions. You might discuss with a friend whether to follow your doctor’s advice on a health issue, or discuss with a motor mechanic who states that your car needs a new carburettor. In socio-scientific controversies, like climate issues and use of food additives, the complexity and the knowledge demands are no less. To some extent you might ask the expert to indicate the evidence base for their advice. However, at some point you have to trust their knowledge, observations and judgement if you do not want to spend considerable time learning the subject matter and skills involved. Bingle and Gaskell (1994) take an even more radical point of view and claims that “only scientists themselves have access to the standards which are necessary to make an evaluation of what they do” (p. 198). In his discussion, Hardwig (1985) concludes that non-experts are frequently epistemically dependent on experts, a conclusion also approved by Siegel (1988). Secondly, not trusting the expert’s knowledge and judgement might be considered impolite, and might be regarded as cantankerous. Thirdly, progress and effectiveness in modern societies is partly due to specialisation and division of labour. The number of specialisations within science and other knowledge domains is immense. This specialisation has made the development of deep insight into narrow branches of science possible. The demand that rational debaters need to reject arguments from expert authority is therefore hardly rational. However, the use of arguments from experts’ authority implies trust in the expert and his or her scientific insights. An urgent question is therefore whether scientists’ knowledge claims are always reliable.
Scientific Results and Reasons for Peer Acceptance One example of students’ discussion of their own data, indicates the strong belief that students have in their own abilities to generate valid and reliable data. It also shows how students expect scientists to validate their findings. The example comes from the implementation in one school of an activity designed to help students understand the conduct and ethics of science (Fullick & Ratcliffe, 1996). Small groups of 15-year-old students were set the task of producing, within a time limit, the maximum voltage they could in an electrochemical cell, given access to a variety of metals. One member of each group acted as an observer to report how the “researchers” conducted themselves. Class discussion, which followed, was intended to draw out and discuss aspects of scientists’ conduct. The focus is not the “traditional” one of reaching consensus on “what science have we learnt from this experiment?” but rather illustrating the features of how scientists might deal with: different research groups having different findings; evaluation of evidence; peer review; traits of scientific conduct. Students thus had an opportunity to engage in persuasive and critical dialogue about the validity and reliability of their results.
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Although the class came to an agreement that the combination of magnesium and copper gave the highest voltage, there was no agreement, nor (intriguingly) curiosity, on the part of students as to the size of the voltage. Students argued for their original results as correct, being reluctant to repeat the experiment, and regardless of their inability to replicate the result in front of the class: Rob: Teacher: Tom: Teacher:
Miss, you saw that 2.08 (volts) (protesting at having to do the experiment again in front of the class). Well, I did that once but no-one else did. I saw it but it’s like making a food product—you’ve got to be able to do it again, haven’t you. Say, Rob, you were presenting a big speech to a group of scientists from all over the world and you said I’ve use copper and magnesium and got 2.08 V from it—and they thought wow this is going to solve the energy crisis. They go away believing you, test their results and find you actually totally made it up, you’d lose your credibility rather quickly wouldn’t you.
The teacher does not really believe the reliability of high reading on the voltmeter (2.08 V being higher than the theoretical possible value) but exposes that implicitly rather than explicitly. So there are hidden aspects to the exchange: the students have confidence in their experiments—they read the voltmeter as 2.08 V but the teacher thinks it should not be possible. The ensuing discussion centred on how scientists’ results gain credibility. Most students argued for data validated by joint observation (video camera, other scientists’ observing) rather than by “standard techniques” of presentation of repeated readings, estimation of errors etc. The teacher in her leading of the discussion focussed on the way students had selected materials. Students were making judgements about the results using their own values of “fairness” and confidence, or otherwise, in their practical ability: Teacher: Rob: Nick: Rob: Nick: Teacher: Rob: Becky:
This group did exactly the same as yours but got different results. Yeh, but was it on the same poles? And was it the same amount of acid and did it have bits in? And was it the same beaker? And the same magic powers? Now Becky’s not happy with this because she thinks she’s done it carefully. Hers was rubbish. Ours was higher than theirs—they couldn’t show theirs even when they tried to. (exchange continues at length each arguing why their result is correct)
This exchange shows that students bring their own values to bear in making the judgement as to what they will accept as correct—with “fairness” being interpreted in a number of ways. Teachers might expect students to accept fully the fundamental scientific truths they dispense (i.e., a belief in the teacher’s authority as scientific expert). However, the exchange in terms of acceptance of experimental results suggests students are prepared to argue for their own cause regardless of any perceived authority of the teacher: Teacher: Rob: Teacher: Tom:
You say you got 2.08 volts. Prove it. You saw it. I did but Becky didn’t. I saw it.
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S. D. Kolstø and M. Ratcliffe She might not believe you. There’s three witnesses. It’s up to them whether they believe you. There’s the teacher—you’ve got to believe the teacher. Not necessarily. I never believe the teacher.
The teacher may be seen as being the expert in scientific knowledge, but, in the eyes of these adolescents, not a strong influence on students’ opinions. However, the students and the teacher might have construed the goal of the task differently. The teacher wants the students to practice the norms in science, which includes ability to replicate an experimental result on demand. The students operate within an everyday discourse where it is not custom, or natural, to do things twice when the problem is already solved. Thus they prefer to use their own values and criteria when judging the adequacy of justifications. Students may need to have their prejudices exposed. Values clarification can be an important goal of peer discussion if it is explicitly identified and practised by the teacher. The example thus shows that the epistemological issue of reliability can involve social aspects as trust, values and social custom. There is also an additional lesson to be learned from this case. At first glance, it might look like the students’ arguments are hardening, as they stick to their point of view in spite of the teacher’s repeated challenge. Thus it looks like they are making a shift from a critical discussion, where all participants are committed to being open-minded, into an eristic dialogue, where arguments and views are fixed. However, although the teacher has a counterargument (the theoretical possible value is lower than the reported one), it is not provided to the students. The students consequently conclude that the burden of proof has not shifted and they do not see why they need to provide additional arguments. Based on their justifications they regarded the claim as trustworthy. This account of the dialogue exemplifies the importance of the teacher’s awareness of the characteristics of a critical discussion when this is what she wants to facilitate. However, does replicability automatically ensure that a result is reliable? Historically, scientific knowledge has, by definition, been regarded as neutral and objective (Ziman, 2000). However, today constructivist conceptions of science prevail and with them the principle that scientific knowledge claims are bounded by the cultural context in which they are generated. Thus results at the frontiers of science are not always readily accepted by the scientific community, as they can conflict with the expectations and beliefs of other scientists. How then, is science able to sort out which new concepts and models are valid and reliable? To explain the existence of reliable and uncontroversial scientific knowledge, many scholars point to the presence of social processes in science. These processes involve publication of research reports where arguments supporting a factual claim are presented; peer review prior to publication to evaluate whether the quality is sufficient, and critique of each other’s hypothesis, methods and results (Ziman, 2000). Through these social processes some concepts or explanations become supported by a consensus within the relevant scientific community. Such consensus is believed to reflect the
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community’s judgement of agreement between concepts and empirical data. Importantly, this image of science implies that argumentation and critical examination, including expert disagreement, is crucial for the development of scientific knowledge. However, it also implies that the reliability of scientific knowledge varies from controversial frontier science to consensual core science. This varying reliability represents a challenge for students’ use of scientific research results in argumentation.
Students’ Evaluation of Science Experts’ Reliability The arguments above indicate the need for activities through which students can explore the ways in which scientists validate and share their findings. Students may have naïve views about the generation of scientific truths. The question about the reliability of scientific knowledge claims is also reflected in students’ handling of science involved in science-related issues. Students who have interpreted scientists’ utterances and expert disagreement in terms of interests, integrity and possible incompetence have been reported in several studies (Driver et al., 1996; Gaskell, 1994; Kolstø, 2001a; Ratcliffe, 1999). Equally, some students have also been found to accept information from scientists without evaluation (Kolstø, 2001a; Ratcliffe, 1999). Teaching activities could usefully focus on clarifying, with students, criteria that might be used to judge the trustworthiness of the experts, in accordance with Walton’s (1997) discussion of the issue. This implies a need to include a critical discussion on the reliability of the science expert when using arguments from experts. Walton (1997, p. 211) states that the examination of experts’ views need to focus on six crucial aspects related to the experts’ claim to competence: Is the utterance within the scientist’s field of expertise? Is the cited expert really an expert? How authoritative is the expert? Is he, for example, recognised by colleagues as an outstanding expert? If several scientists disagree on the matter, are several experts consulted? Is supporting evidence available, and the utterance in accordance with this evidence? Is the expert’s utterance clear and intelligible, and correctly interpreted?
In addition, due to possible influence of vested interest and financially and institutional bindings, it is also necessary to judge the expert’s personal reliability. This implies a focus on whether the expert scientist is biased, is honest, and is conscientious (Walton, 1997, p. 217). Consequently, social knowledge needs to be evoked in the evaluation of data used in arguments from experts (Bingle & Gaskell, 1994; Kolstø, 2001a; Norris, 1995). The lists of questions above might leave the impression that if a scientist is found to be competent and personal reliable, then the scientific research results and judgements he or she contributes are neutral and objective knowledge. However, the question of the neutrality and objectivity of scientific knowledge claims is further complicated by the complex role of criteria and interest in science.
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When evaluating scientific arguments, knowledge claims and competing theories, scientists are believed to use scientific criteria (Ziman, 2000). However, when not all criteria are fulfilled, and when the quality of evidence varies, different scientists might weigh criteria and arguments differently. Longino (1990) claims that in their evaluation of competing scientific theories, scientists’ background assumptions influence their judgement. She argues that this is unavoidable due to the underdetermination of scientific theories by empirical data (for examples see AbdEl-Khalick, 2003; Kolstø et al., 2006). As shown in examples earlier in this chapter, students may come to similar biased views in their interpretation of arguments by peers and others. The challenge associated with the application of scientific criteria implies that expert disagreement and argumentation are both legitimate and normal in science. This also supports the claim that the reliability of scientific knowledge depends on its ability to withstand criticism based on scientific norms and the strength of the consensus that supports it (Bingle & Gaskell, 1994; Ziman, 2000). Furthermore, Aikenhead (1994) claims that science has been undergoing a process of “socialisation” whereby “Government, industry, and the military have become the dominant patrons of scientific activity” (p. 16). Focussing on this and other changes, Ziman (2000) states that academic science has evolved into post-academic science. Today science is not only basic research practised at universities to fill gaps in a discipline’s theoretical foundation. The typical scientist is not independent, but has become an employee or a contractor. The typical scientist thus works either in industry or governmental agencies, or has to make dispositions that might give him research contracts. The question thus arises as to whether scientists’ research agendas and judgement, and even interpretation of data, might be influenced by affiliation and vested interests. There are examples of how the asbestos, tobacco and oil industry managed to provide research which could be used as arguments against the claims that asbestos, smoking and lead in petrol represented risks to human health. In addition it is important to be aware that “neutral” and reliable scientific knowledge might be produced according to a specific agenda, and functions to strengthen certain arguments in a dispute. The dilemma, which became apparent in the three industries above, is that some actors can better afford to initiate research projects likely to produce results which strengthen their own arguments. Moreover, Collingridge and Reeve (1986) argue that scientists involved in controversies tend to be more critical towards evidence supporting antagonists’ arguments than towards evidence on which their own conclusions are based. For example, Geddis (1991) described the controversy between the United States and Canada on the source of acid rain. In this case, there was at first a lack of consensus on whether the evidence for the source of the acid rain was conclusive or not, due to difference in demands for certainty by each party. The discussion above implies that trust in a science expert’s competence and integrity is not sufficient. Claims from the frontiers of science (and in principle also consensual science), even though they are developed according to accepted standards, might be influenced by background assumptions, and the research questions might have been formulated, and funded, according to a specific agenda. Post-academic
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science is in general not separable from social needs and power relations because of the interactions between science and society. A consequence of the above discussion is that the teaching of argumentation in relation to scientific issues needs to build on an awareness of social aspects of science. In a study by Kolstø et al. (2006) trainee science teachers were asked to judge the reliability of scientific claims in articles on the Internet related to a science-related issue. The participants were university students, and the study therefore indicates the relevance of different kinds of knowledge to those with deeper scientific insights than school students normally have. The study concludes that the students drew upon, among other things, their knowledge of possible interests of institutions providing scientific information, and also an appreciation of a source’s critical attitude. In addition, they used their knowledge of how to recognise competence (relevance of education and current occupation) and an expert’s prestige in science, academic standard of place of publication, and their awareness of the role and importance of consensus in science. Thus the knowledge base they used included more than scientific content knowledge. Evaluation of arguments based on expert authority is therefore demanding, as several aspects have to be taken into account. School science can be portrayed, in textbooks and by science teachers, as authoritarian, without giving any insight into the supporting evidence. However, scientists’ judgements are always made in social contexts, under conditions of underdetermination and influenced by background assumptions. A thoughtful evaluation of scientific claims, therefore presupposes a demand for, and an evaluation of, underpinning evidence and contextual aspects. In order for students to enter into evaluation of the reliability of expert utterances, it is essential that students realise that arguments from science experts are not always hard evidence. As with arguments from experts’ authority in general, scientists’ claims represent soft evidence as they have to be critically discussed in order to determine an argument’s strength. Consequently, it is important that the learning activities allows for inclusion of arguments from science experts, and at the same time stimulate critical discussions of the strength of these arguments. This conclusion is in accordance with Norris’ (1995) judgement that “pupils need to be taught that the object of their scepticism should be the believability of experts, not the evidence supporting scientific knowledge claims” (p. 216). However, in order for students’ critical discussions to be thorough, some insight into the characteristics of post-academic science is a prerequisite. Social aspects of science therefore need to be included in school science.
Concluding Remarks In this chapter we have emphasised that argumentation is a social activity and that arguments are used in different types of goal directed dialogues. Our focus has been to explore how some social aspects influence argumentation in scientific issues. We have discussed how dialogue in science classrooms has the potential to mirror
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argumentation in science as practised. We have focussed on how students’ practices and conceptions impact on their possibility to participate in argumentation. As a framework for the discussion, we have used Walton’s (1998) concepts of dialogues and Toulmin’s (1958) concept of arguments. We have clarified how scientific inquiry and critical discussion describe dialogue types used in science, and can also feature in some science classrooms. We believe that an increased awareness of these two types of dialogues has potential for improving the teaching of argumentation in science. Firstly, they may fulfil the two main goals for including argumentation in science teaching: the development of an understanding of the nature of science; the ability to consider socio-scientific issues thoughtfully. As science involves both collaborative development of arguments and critical scrutinising of knowledge claims, insight into the two types of dialogues implies an adequate image of science. Confronted with socio-scientific issues, students need skills in developing insight and argument, as well as the ability to ask critical questions of experts and to antagonists in dialogues. Secondly, the two types of dialogue provide conceptions of the contexts of argumentation, and thus a framework for purposeful design of teaching and learning activities. As indicated, scientific inquiry presupposes insight into the topic (or inclusion of information seeking dialogues), while critical discussion might be practised without specialised knowledge. We have identified some specific challenges for the teaching of argumentation in students’ construal of the rules and goals of the discussion in which arguments are embedded. Critical discussion might be weakened when students accept claims based on the arguer’s charisma or other characteristics instead of critically scrutinising claims. In addition, the judgement of the relevance of arguments involves social aspects, and this is a challenge when the students dismiss arguments which do not support their egocentric values. In our discussion, we have related arguments to their function in dialogues, and indicated that the social aspect of dialogues can facilitate the identification of social aspect of arguments. Using Toulmin’s framework, we have specifically focussed on social aspects of claims and justifications. We have claimed, on the one hand, that practices like the use of indistinct and flexible claims and arguments from experts’ authority are legitimate under some conditions. On the other hand, we have claimed that some of students’ practices and conceptions restrict their possibility to participate in thoughtful and rational argumentation. Examples here are the disputability of scientific knowledge claims and the importance of evaluating experts’ reliability. Our discussions indicate that insight into the norms and social dimensions of science and the characteristics of post-academic science Ziman (2000) is a prerequisite for the analysis and the development of adequate arguments in science-related issues. The complexity of the context of argumentation, involving: types of dialogues and goals, evaluation of experts’ reliability, science(-)society interactions and students’ interpretations of the purpose of different activities, indicates that a teacher’s awareness of this complexity might be important for the development of students’ learning. However, to support science teachers’ use of argumentation, more insight into ways of facilitating the learning of argumentation in different types of dialogues is desirable.
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Chapter 7
Analysis of Lines of Reasoning in Written Argumentation Gregory J. Kelly, Jacqueline Regev, and William Prothero
Written texts play an important role in the activity systems generating knowledge in professional and educational settings. Empirical studies of the social construction of scientific knowledge in scientific and school settings have identified a range of purposes, uses, and genres of written communication (Kelly & Chen, 1999; Knorr-Cetina, 1999). The persuasive discourse of written argument is one such type of written communication that has played a significant role in the development of scientific knowledge (Bazerman, 1988; Gross, 1990). As noted by Yore et al. (2006), written communication provides a means to articulate evidence, warrants, and claims; reflect on proposed ideas; critique the scientific work of others; and establish proprietorship of intellectual property. An important dimension of science learning is the ability to use, assess, and critique evidence (Hodson, 2003; Yore et al., 2003). This ability includes understanding the relationships among questions, data, and claims, as well as how these relationships can be organized to formulate evidence for a given task and audience (Wallace et al., 2004). While the use of evidence in reasoning is a noted goal of scientific inquiry, little research has focused on the difficulties students may have integrating data with text to formulate coherent arguments. This chapter examines specific rhetorical demands necessary to prepare a successful scientific argument. The theoretical framework for this study incorporates research of writing to learn science and argumentation in science. We investigate these issues in a technology-rich university oceanography course designed for undergraduate non-science majors. The objective of this chapter is to identify and analyze the nature of the claims being made by the student writers and how these claims are developed as the lines of reasoning supporting a thesis. These analyses illustrate ways that large-scale earth data-sets can be used to prepare students to examine and employ evidence in scientific and socio-scientific domains. Drawing from the fields of argumentation theory and rhetoric of science as well as previous studies of an ongoing research program, specific epistemic and rhetorical criteria are developed and applied for the purposes of assessing the strength of the students’ arguments. These criteria were brought to bear on two types of writing tasks with differing rhetorical demands. In one case, the students use geological data to develop and sustain theoretical arguments regarding plate tectonics. In a second application, the students consider broader earth-climate issues, using similar evidence-based argumentation practices, S. Erduran and M. P. Jiménez-Aleixandre (eds.), Argumentation in Science Education. © Springer 2007
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yet with less specific task requirements. Through application of the epistemic and rhetorical criteria, we identify ways that scientific argumentation can be analyzed with respect to individual student writers. We discuss implications for uses of argumentation in science instruction, particularly as related to socio-scientific issues.
Argument in Science and Schools An emerging literature in science education dedicated to the application of argumentation to educational processes has identified the importance of students’ learning how to use, evaluate, and critique evidence. Broadly speaking, argumentation refers to the ways that evidence is used to persuade a reasonable critic of the merits or lack thereof of a standpoint or position (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2003). Analytic tools are emerging to consider how to assess students’ uses of evidence in the context of science inquiry. This literature identifies a need for creating disciplinespecific, ecologically valid measures of the strength of students’ arguments given the specific task constraints (Erduran et al., 2004; Kelly & Takao, 2002, Sandoval & Millwood, 2005; Takao & Kelly, 2003). Furthermore, how students reason about socio-scientific issues has been shown to be tied to issues of evidence use, the nature of science, and students’ conceptual understanding (Sadler, 2004). While most studies of student argumentation have focused on spoken discourse (Driver et al., 2000; Jiménez-Aleixandre et al., 2000; Sadler, 2004) written argument poses unique possibilities and challenges for science education (Rivard & Straw, 2000; Wallace et al., 2004). Some unique opportunities of writing in science are as follows. First, writing offers the possibility of creating author-generated and publicly available texts that can serve as a basis for personal reflection, intersubjective scrutiny, and multiple revisions. Students may learn science from writing the papers, reading those of others, and offering formal reviews of other students’ work. Second, writing brings arguments to closure and allows the rhetorical aspects to stand the test of evaluation over time. The evolution of an author’s position allows the author and readers to learn from the emerging evidence embedded in the text. Third, writing provides a potentially useful strategy to engage students in the social and cognitive practices of evidence formation (Kelly & Bazerman, 2003). Writing tasks can be constructed using the disciplinary resources of data and investigative tools to acculturate students into disciplinary knowledge, norms, and practices. Written argument also poses pedagogical challenges. First, the development of written argument requires many general as well as task-specific language skills (Kelly & Bazerman, 2003). Written argument requires students to draw on diverse knowledge and practices, including conceptual knowledge specific to the scientific discipline, rhetorical knowledge specific to the genre conventions of the discipline and writing task, and linguistic knowledge of lexicon and grammar (Halliday & Martin, 1993). Furthermore, scientific practices are not universal (e.g., KnorrCetina, 1999), but specific to units of various levels, for example, disciplines,
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research areas, laboratories, classrooms) (Halliday & Martin, 1993; Kelly & Green, 1998; Myers, 1990). Because of the diversity of science and writing, student writing needs to be sensitive to task-specific features of the local educational and disciplinary contexts (Kelly & Bazerman, 2003). Second, written argument in science entails persuading a critical community of peers. The persuasive use of evidence poses challenges for science writers. Rhetorical studies of science have identified the importance of the ways that knowledge claims (and authors of such claims) are held accountable to public standards (Bazerman, 1988; Gross, 1990). Forwarding knowledge claims in a persuasive form often entails recognizing ways to make evidence clear to the audience, limiting the theoretical import of such claims, using citations to build intellectual and epistemic alliances, and making claims credible to critical communities of peers (Latour, 1987; Myers, 1990; Pinch, 1986). Formulating evidence in such a manner requires that the author recognize those aspects of persuasion that are situationally specific as well as those that are constrained by the norms of the genre conventions (Gieryn, 1999). To write in this way, students need to have command of the key concepts of a field, understand features of the specific genre, and recognize the level of detail required to make a persuasive case (Kelly et al., 2000). Third, engaging in scientific inquiry involves participating in a community with the common sociocultural practices (Kelly & Green, 1998; Wenger, 1998). In this case, students need to develop their individual communicative skills in the context of collective activity. Such activities often include specific ways of observing, inferring, referencing, speaking and so forth, and are increasingly directed around inscription devices and other technologies. Thus, cognition is distributed in space and time; applying knowledge involves becoming a member of a group and being part of a communal engagement with the material world (Goodwin, 1995). To the extent that educational processes seek to reproduce some aspects of science, this communal engagement entails high levels of accountability between detailed findings and general idea claims, particularly as applied to uses of argument in the written form (Bazerman, 1988; Kelly & Bazerman, 2003; Myers, 1990).
Studies of Written Argumentation in University Oceanography The study presented in this paper builds on work over the past 10 years in which cycles of research, development, and application have been conducted between course developer and programmer, William Prothero (third author), and an evolving educational research team, led by Greg Kelly (first author). The cycle includes studies of the framing of the earth science knowledge and writing characteristics (Kelly et al., 2000), of students’ uses of evidence (Kelly & Bazerman, 2003; Kelly & Takao, 2002; Takao & Kelly, 2003), and applications to changes in pedagogy (Takao et al., 2002). The educational research has sought to demystify the knowledge and practices entailed in writing scientific arguments and to contribute to a series of tools aimed at mediating the knowledge and practices.
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As the current study builds on previous cycles of research, development, and application, we provide a brief review of previous results. An early study examined the framing of oceanography through instruction by the course professor, teaching assistants, and associated tools for writing (Kelly et al., 2000). This study identified ways teachers and students served as social mediators of the relevant disciplinary knowledge through the everyday practices associated with teaching and learning oceanography. Specifically, two thematic stances toward scientific writing emerged in the course. First, writing in science was presented as a practice that required an understanding of the reasons, uses, and limitations of written knowledge specific to the discipline. Situating writing in a broader context identified the contextual values (Longino, 1990) of the discipline of oceanography, as articulated in this case. Second, writing in science was presented as being shaped by a community’s procedures, practices, and norms. These procedures, practices, and norms are internal to the workings of science, and are thus identified as constitutive values (Longino, 1990). Such internal constitutive values related to writing include expectations about uses of data, standards for evidence, uses of references, and form, sequence, and structure of the text and other genre conventions. While this study identified social practices associated with inquiry and writing in science, there nevertheless remained questions about the students’ perspective on such issues and the students’ appropriation of the presented practices in their own writing. The second study introduced an initial analytic tool to assess the university oceanography students’ use of evidence in writing (Kelly & Takao, 2002). Drawing from rhetorical studies of science writing and studies of argumentation in science education, a model for assessing students’ arguments was used to analyze the relative epistemic status of propositions in students’ written texts. The model is shown in Fig. 7.1
Fig. 7.1 Schematic of argument structure and assessment criteria
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and described in detail in a subsequent section of this chapter. The argumentation model introduced identified a disciplinary-specific progression of epistemic level of claims. Each student’s use of statements of varying epistemic level was compared with holistic assessments of the writing by the professor and the teaching assistants. Results were then compared across the 24 students’ papers analyzed. Argumentation analysis, focusing on the epistemic level of claims, identified features of students’ appropriation of scientific discourse, but left unanswered key questions concerning the inference logic and reasoning chains in the formulation of scientific argument. By considering the epistemic level of claim without identification of how these claims were bound together in a larger argument, Kelly and Takao (2002) could account for only part of the overall rhetorical task. Thus, new methodological procedures were required for further specification of student engagement in scientific reasoning through writing in this genre—procedures we elaborate in the current study. A third study examined differences in how populations with different geological knowledge assessed evidence in student writing. This study used interviews with course instructors (professor and graduate student teaching assistants), oceanography students, and a sample of undergraduate students not enrolled in the course. In this case, the interviews sought to assess the interviewees’ views regarding the writing of a high scoring paper and a low scoring paper from a previous academic year. Through these interviews Takao and Kelly (2003) found that while all three populations were able to recognize distinct differences between the two papers, only the course professor could articulate the key differences in the argumentation structure for the student high scoring and low scoring papers, particularly concerning the use and relationship of statements of different epistemic levels. The other interviewees (i.e., graduate student instructors, oceanography students, and non-science undergraduates) showed little difference in articulating reasons for variation in quality of science writing and were not able to identify key features leading to success. The fourth study (Kelly & Bazerman, 2003) developed analytical procedures to make explicit how features of written argument are signalled through linguistic cues. In this study two papers (chosen as high quality by the instructor—Prothero, third author) were analyzed in great detail. Five key features of argumentation as represented in this genre were identified. First, the arguments showed a hierarchical arrangement within the logic of the genre structure (i.e., the students introduced and maintained use of key conceptual terms, combining these terms with specific geographical terms over the course of the varied rhetorical demands of the extended argument). Second, analysis of lexical cohesions revealed multiple cohesive links across the majority of the sentences forming the complete argument set in the technical paper. Third, sentences at the boundaries of sections and subsections tended to have denser cohesive links with other sections of the paper and tended to tie together semantic items of multiple epistemic levels. Fourth, the epistemic status of the claims made varied according to the rhetorical needs of the differing sections, defined by the genre structure. For example, the introduction, interpretations, and conclusions showed the greatest levels of generality, while the description of methods and observations were most specific. Fifth, often repeated (theoretical) terms built up cohesive density and thematic saliency, as they were
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associated with other (data-orientated) terms in different sections of the paper. For example, theoretical terms were introduced early in the arguments, were made relevant through their application in reference to the interpretation of specific data inscriptions.
Key Features of Geological Argumentation The model for our argumentation analysis has been constructed through a series of theoretical and empirical investigations. Our model began originally with an application of Toulmin’s (1958) layout of arguments (Kelly et al., 1998). While this layout of argument makes visible the importance of the theoretical backdrop supporting a move from data to a claim, the application of Toulmin’s model to spoken and written discourse has typically been found insufficient to capture the complexity of dialogic reasoning (Erduran, this book; Erduran et al., 2004; Jiménez-Aleixandre et al., 2000). Most notably for the purposes of this chapter is that the oceanography students studied here are not attempting to make a single move from data to a claim. Rather, through a series of claims about varied data sources they attempt to build a complex argumentation structure. Therefore, the model was extended to include a consideration of the various epistemic levels of claims (i.e., degree of abstractness of knowledge claims) (Kelly & Chen, 1999; Latour, 1987; Myers, 1990) and more particularly the epistemic level of claim specific to the disciplinary context of the argument (Kelly & Takao, 2002; Takao & Kelly, 2003). Furthermore, geological reasoning requires developing independent, converging lines of inquiry (Ault, 1998). A schematic of the model is presented in Fig. 7.1. This model distributes out students’ statements into a set of lines of reasoning (beginning at the bottom) based on reference to empirical data and into epistemic levels—from grounded, low inference claims to claims with progressively more theoretical import. The model has proved some usefulness for certain features of the students’ argument (e.g., distribution of claims across levels of generality) and the relationship of component parts to overall argument strength (e.g., ratio of theoretical claims to data representations). However, a number of questions have been raised by the authors of the model (Kelly & Bazerman, 2003; Kelly & Takao, 2002) and others working on similar argumentative fields of science writing in schools (Sandoval & Millwood, 2005). Two concerns relevant to the current study are the ways that the substantive knowledge of the argument is assessed in terms of the inferential reasoning of the writers (based on a normative point of view) and how rhetorical features of the arguments serve to shape the evidentiary substance of the overall argument. These issues are particularly difficult given the range of topics of the student arguments and the even larger possible data sources. These concerns regarding the formulation of argument are addressed in the following manner. We consider two epistemic criteria regarding the thesis statement (solvability, support) and three epistemic criteria regarding the lines of reasoning
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developed by the students (convergence, sufficiency, and validity). Based on previous work (Kelly & Bazerman, 2003; Takao & Kelly, 2003), we were able to identify some of the rhetorical features of the student arguments valued by the disciplinary experts (coherence, coordination, progressive construction). These features, described below, served as the basis for the current analysis. Students need to pose a solvable research question, or thesis statement. Finding out what can be answered with the available data becomes an early hurdle for formulating a strong argument. The thesis statement must be clear, of manageable scope, and be potentially supportable by evidence. For the cases studied, multiple lines of reasoning are needed to make the case persuasively. For example, for students to claim that a subduction zone exists at some geographical area they may develop lines of reasoning around topology, earthquake locations and depths, and volcano locations. Three additional epistemic criteria can be brought to bear on the assessment of the thesis. The lines of reasoning need to converge in a manner that is supportive of the thesis. As the writers are marshalling more than one type of data, these data sources need to each provide some evidence to the overall argument. The argument needs to be structured with interdependence such that the lines of reasoning are mutually supportive. The lines of reasoning need to be sufficient, given the scope of the thesis. The academic tasks (described subsequently in detail in “educational context”) required students to make complex arguments regarding the theory of plate tectonics and the earth’s climate. The nature of the tasks required that the lines of reasoning developed show that they have enough evidence to support the thesis against alternative interpretations. The lines of reasoning need to be constructed with valid inferences. This criterion may seem the most obvious. However, our previous studies noted that the validity of a student’s line of reasoning was not easily unpacked by varied readers (Takao & Kelly, 2003). The question of validity, like convergence and sufficiency, is highly audience-dependent. In the given tasks, the students were not only required to state true statements about the given geographical areas, rather they were required to make a sound argument that provided evidence for a true statement about the chosen area. Finally, there is a global question about whether the central thesis has been supported by the evidence provided. The problem for the writers was deciding how to marshal evidence, not state conclusions. Nevertheless, a strong argument makes a persuadable case that the thesis is supported by the evidence marshaled. In addition to these five epistemic criteria, there are three rhetorical criteria for developing a sound argument. First, the student writers need to develop a progressive construction of evidence. The students need to build to larger claims through progressive articulation of smaller-level, lower inference claims. This is shown schematically on Fig. 7.1 as the ties across the epistemic levels of claims (shown on the vertical dimension). This progressive construction of evidence entails learning what sorts of inferences can be made about particular inscriptions, and then how low inference claims can be brought together to support more theoretical
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claims. The analysis of students’ progressive construction of argument across epistemic levels is examined in studies by Kelly & Takao (2002; Takao & Kelly, 2003). Second, the student writers need to develop coherence across and within lines of reasoning. Coherence is ultimately a matter of readers’ construction of meaning (Kelly & Bazerman, 2003). Nevertheless, this meaning is likely cued through subtle textual hints. Assessing coherence may be aided by several formal linguistic techniques of cohesion (Halliday & Hasan, 1976). Our previous studies have identified cues such as indexical references (e.g., “this”), substitutions (e.g., pronouns), and lexical cohesion, specifically use of reiteration—the repeating use of the same word or word root (e.g., volcano, volcanic)—and collocation—the association of lexical items that regularly co-occur (e.g., plate and tectonic) (Kelly & Bazerman, 2003). The ties across claims, shown schematically in Fig. 7.1 as links, represent cohesion. Third, the student writers need to coordinate evidence across epistemic levels that make explicit how particular inscriptions or claims provide evidence for higher order, more generalized claims. This concerns how well the students are able to draw data into explicit arguments. This involves making claims at multiple layers of epistemic generality (i.e., progressive construction of evidence), but doing so in ways that draw on data identified previously showing relevance for subsequent explanatory arguments. The progressive construction feature is represented in Fig. 7.1 as the coherent links that “trace” the lines of reasoning from data to thesis.
Educational Context We now turn to research for this chapter drawn from a course taught at a large research university in southern California that integrates science, technology, and writing toward the goal of developing a scientifically literate citizenry. The course included from 80 to 120 students each quarter of the academic year, and satisfied both the general education quantitative science requirement and the university general education writing requirement. Students attended three hours of lecture and three hours of lab each week. Several content themes were treated in this oceanography course including ocean basins, plate tectonics, earth’s atmosphere, oceans and world climate, waves and beaches, and world fisheries. Course activities were organized about these topics. For each topic, students worked in groups to view the scientific and socioscientific issues from the perspective of a specific country. The final culminating activity was a mock Earth Summit. As a member of the Earth Summit, students joined a “Country Group” and took on the role of a science advisor who was requested to present the point of view of their country as it related to the course themes of geological hazards and changes in the earth’s climate. Throughout the course, all writing and in-class presentations were done from the perspective of
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the chosen country. Through a process of exploring real earth data sets, students identified major science issues related to their country. Students were required to gather relevant data, write scientific position papers, and discuss and present their findings to their peers. In order to successfully complete the inquiry assignments students needed to form an understanding of their country’s unique perspective in the Earth Summit. There were indications that using the Earth Summit metaphor to guide oceanography instruction provides a context that stimulated student interest. Specifically, in-class presentations encouraged discussion of how point of view affects policy based on scientific relevance. Thus, through the dialogue the global consequences of local and regional policies were illustrated. The overall educational aim of this course is to increase science literacy among the general student population. This aim is operationalized through goals that include developing relevant understanding of scientific phenomenon, analyzing scientific claims made in the media, and developing an awareness and appreciation of the dynamic interplay between science and society. Specific strategies have been designed that model classroom activities after those of practicing scientists, policy analysts, and citizens. Developing student writers of science required instruction and tools specifically designed to scaffold written arguments. These social and symbolic mediators served to initiate students into the particular epistemic practices valued by the instructor (Kelly et al., 2000). Epistemic practices are the specific ways members of a community propose, justify, evaluate, and legitimize knowledge claims within a disciplinary framework (Kelly, 2005). The series of activities and experiences have been designed to support the writing and inquiry tasks. We briefly describe these mediating social practices and artifacts (Kelly, 2005; Kozulin, 2003) to document the learning opportunities afforded by the educational experience. Specifically, the writing assignments were supported by weekly online assignments including homework, multiple choice quizzes, thought questions, mini-studies, class presentations during lab, and small group discussions. For example, prior to attending lecture, students were expected to access the online server, complete the assigned reading, and answer short thought questions that required the students to demonstrate their understanding of the topics to be discussed in class. These thought questions were evaluated by the course professor and the teaching assistant and allowed the instructors to assess student understanding. Additional opportunities to guide students’ understanding of the course themes occurred during lecture when students answer short questions of the day at the beginning of class. These questions gave students the opportunity to engage with course material, discuss their questions with peers, and promote dialogue between themselves and the professor. In addition to the independent work that students completed from home or in class, students were also given opportunities to work collaboratively by completing group investigations and group presentations in lab section meeting. This ongoing flow between independent and collaborative work provided the opportunity to support the investigations required of each student. Consistent with the goal of developing students’ abilities to use, assess, and critique evidence, the course professor provided detailed instruction and a series of mediating artifacts to support the work of writing the two required scientific papers.
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These supports, which were available in the course reader, on the course website, and again on the online writer, provided students with an outline of the format for the technical paper, including descriptions and examples of each section of the paper. Additional texts were available to students in the course reader and at a course website that detailed the rhetorical tasks and offered guidance toward completing the inquiry assignments. Students used these resources in addition to the information provided to them throughout the course via the CD-ROM, course lectures, laboratory sections, and the course textbook. A central task of representing their country at the Earth Summit was the production of the two technical papers. These papers, focused on geological hazards and the earth’s climate, required the integration of real earth data into systematic arguments supporting a central thesis. The first of the two papers required students to select a country and develop a scientific argument characterizing the geological features in terms of plate tectonic activity. Students were expected to explore the geological hazards, given the conditions established through the application of plate tectonic theory and uses of relevant data, in terms of the political, social, and economic impacts such hazards posed for their country. Student arguments were supposed to be evidence-based, requiring students to include geological data, such as earthquake location and depth, volcanic location, and depth profiles, captured from the interactive CD-ROM. The point of the paper was not to merely offer a characterization of the geology of a country (a conclusion), but to make an argument with relevant data regarding the theory of plate tectonics for the specified region. The second writing assignment allowed students to select an earth climate issue affecting their focus country. In this case, the students were expected to employ the same evidence-based argumentation practices as in the first paper. Students were required to include earth data that is available from a variety of sources, although students primarily used data available on the Internet and from the computer visualization program, WorldWatcher (Edelson, 2001). This task offered more freedom of choice of topic. The range of suggested topics included climate biozones, precipitation patterns, pollution, wind patterns, ocean circulation patterns (e.g., effect on local weather), effects of global warming on a particular country, what a country adds or does not add to global warming, ice cap melting and sea level changes, yearly events (e.g., monsoon and other seasonal events), effects of El Niño and La Niña, ozone hole effects, variations in precipitation (drought/deluge), volcanic eruptions affecting local conditions (e.g., Mt. Pinatubo eruption), and changes in albedo (deforestation, melting ice caps). The range of the topics and the sort and types of data relevant to the task rendered this task considerably more open for the student writers. In order to meet the university writing requirement, both papers combined had to total 1800 words. Papers are approximately 6–10 pages of double-spaced text, including numerous hyperlinked data inscriptions drawn from the multiple data-sets provided by the CD-ROM, Internet, and/or WorldWatcher. The enhanced learning environment, created by the use of the EarthEd software, provided students multiple tools for creating scientifically sound arguments
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regarding the point of view of their chosen country. More information about the CD-ROM may be found at http://EarthEdOnline.org/.
Research Context and Methods of Data Analysis The study draws from student papers that were available from three consecutive implementation of the oceanography course (Spring 2003, Winter 2004, Spring 2004). The primary data used for our analysis were the student produced written arguments in the form of the two technical papers. We took a random sample of 15 authors for each of the two writing assignments. We were able to access the papers in electronic form complete with hyperlinks to all inscriptions (data diagrams, graphs, maps, models, photographs). This analysis was informed by other relevant course artifacts as described earlier such as the online course webpage, the course laboratory manual, samples of student work collected during participation in course activities, and informal interviews with participants. Our research approach consists of three components, oriented around analysis of the eight epistemic and rhetorical criteria for science writing, as defined in this disciplinary and educational context. First, we examined the structure of the arguments. This was done by tracing the rhetorical moves made on each data inscription included by the student authors. Each inscription was identified and a code was entered into an Excel spreadsheet. We noted whether each inscription was acted upon by the student, including the extent to which the inscriptions were inserted, identified, and described in the descriptive portion of the student papers (labelled “observations” following the prescribed convention) and the extent to which these same inscriptions were inserted, identified, described, made relevant, and used as a warrant in the students’ explanation (labelled “interpretations” following the prescribed convention). These charts were created for each student argument (n = 15 times 2 papers) to readily identify the lines of reasoning and the empirical support marshalled by the student authors. The number of data inscriptions, models, and other figures was identified and tabulated. Second, in order to assess the epistemic criteria for each paper we identified the thesis statement and lines of reasoning, based on the structural analysis and carefully rereading each paper. Through this process of reading we rated each paper on a set of 17 questions, show in column three of Table 7.1. For each dimension the students’ argument was rated on a scale from 0 (non-existent) to 4 (excellent). This level gradation was chosen to match the specificity that can be reasonably deciphered given the built-in ambiguity of the writing tasks. This analysis was done for both papers (plate tectonics, earth’s climate) for each of the 15 students across two analysts. We next build factors related to the eight criteria mentioned early regarding the normative assessment of argument strength. These eight criteria were operationalized by building factors from the 17 questions posed of the student arguments, as follows:
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1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.
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Solvable research question or thesis statement (Questions 1, 2) Lines of reasoning that are convergent (Question 5) Lines of reasoning that are sufficient (Questions 3, 4, 10) Lines of reasoning that are built with valid inferences (Question 16) Progressive construction of evidence (Questions 6, 7, 8) Coherence across and within lines of reasoning (Questions 12, 13, 14) Coordinated evidence across epistemic levels (Questions 9, 11, 15) Thesis is supported (Question 17)
Third, based on the initial quantitative results across the 30 papers we chose 4 papers, for which there was high inter-rater reliability and variation in adherence to the genre conventions, in order to examine variation in task engagement in detail. These cases are presented in the results section. By diagnosing the ways that students are both able to write evidence-based arguments as well as ways they fail to do so, we derive instructional implications.
Results We present our findings in two parts. First, we examine trends across the 30 papers. Second, we present case studies generated by close scrutiny following quantitative assessments.
Trends across Papers There was a general pattern for the student writers regarding the strength of their arguments across the two writing assignments. Two patterns are evident. First, there were more papers scoring high (averaging between 3 or 4 points per question for criteria shown in Table 7.1) for the plate tectonics paper as compared to the earth’s climate paper. The distribution of student scoring categories for the plate tectonics paper was 7 high, 3 mid-range, and 5 low; while the distribution of student scoring categories for the earth’s climate paper was 4 high, 5 mid-range, and 6 low. Through the sequence of writing the plate tectonics paper and then the earth’s climate paper only two students scored in a higher category on the earth’s climate paper, 8 remained in the same scoring category, and 5 scored in a lower category. Second, across the two writing assignments, there was a clear difference in the number of data inscriptions between poorly argued papers and well argued papers. Low scoring papers averaged 4.4 inscriptions per paper, while high scoring papers averaged 9.7 inscriptions per paper. While there is considerable variation among the high scoring papers, the general pattern holds that poorly evidenced papers used less data. This seems to be a rather obvious conclusion,
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Table 7.1 Analyses Criteria and Student Scores for Two Writing Tasks (Plate Tectonics (PT) and Earth’s Climate (EC) Papers) for Four Case Studies (0 = Minimum, 4 = Maximum) Scores for Four Cases Dimensions of Analysis
Student Writer 1
Feature of Arguments
PT
EC
PT
EC
PT
EC
PT
EC
3
3
4
4
3
4
3
4
4
3
4
4
4
3
2
4
1
1
4
4
4
2
2
3
3
0
4
4
4
2
3
3
1
0
4
4
3
1
1
2
1
1
4
4
4
3
2
3
1
1
4
4
4
2
2
4
1
1
4
4
4
1
2
3
2
1
4
4
4
3
3
4
0
0
4
4
3
1
1
2
0
0
4
4
4
0
1
3
1
0
4
4
4
0
0
3
1
0
4
2
4
1
0
3
1
0
4
3
4
0
0
2
1
0
4
4
4
1
0
3
1 1 23 L
1 1 13 L
4 4 68 H
4 4 65 H
4 4 65 H
1 1 26 L
2 2 26 L
3 2 51 H
Thesis
#
Questions posed of student arguments
1 Is the thesis clearly stated? 2 Does the thesis show solvability? Reasoning 3 Are there multiple Structure lines of reasoning? 4 Are the lines of reasoning plausible given the scope of the thesis? 5 Do the lines of reasoning converge to a conclusion? Observational 6 Are appropriate data Evidence representations inserted? 7 Are data representations identified? 8 Are data representations described? 9 Are the data used relevant? 10 Are the data potentially sufficient? Explanatory 11 Are the data Evidence identified (explicitly)? 12 Are the data described as part of the explanation? 13 Are the data used to describe a ` mechanism? 14 Are the data used to support an explanation? 15 Is the relevance of the data clearly identified? 16 Are the inferences valid? Conclusion 17 Is the thesis supported? Total score = Score category:
Student Writer 2
Student Writer 3
Student Writer 4
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given the goal of producing arguments based on empirical data. Indeed, the overall correlation of number of data inscriptions and total score was r = 0.74 for the plate tectonics paper and r = 0.70 for the earth’s climate paper. Nevertheless, the use of inscriptions alone does not make a strong argument. In one of the cases described below, a student created a significantly better argument for the second paper (earth’s climate) with only one additional inscription.
Examination of Individual Cases The four cases chosen for closer analysis represent four ways in which the student authors differentially adhered to the normative conventions of the genre as defined by this task. The overall scores for these four writers across the two papers are presented in Table 7.1. A breakdown of the epistemic and rhetorical criteria is presented in Table 7.2. Student writer 1 was categorized as writing weak arguments for both the plate tectonics and earth’s climate paper (coded LL). Student Writer 2 wrote strong arguments in both cases (coded HH). Student Writer 3 wrote a strong argument for the plate tectonics paper, but was not able to do so in the context of the more loosely defined earth’s climate paper (coded HL). Student Writer 4 showed the greatest improvement of all writers from the plate tectonics paper to the subsequent earth’s climate paper (coded LH). Student Writer 1 argued in the plate tectonics paper that there is a subduction zone along the west coast of Mexico. This thesis was well posed and potentially supportable. However, the student author considered only a limited amount of data (earthquake and volcano locations). The absence of elevation profiles to support the Table 7.2 Scores of Four Student Cases along Criteria for Argument Strength by Factors (0 = Minimum, 4 = Maximum) for Plate Tectonics (PT) and Earth’s Climate (EC) Papers Student Student Student Student Writer 1 Writer 2 Writer 3 Writer 4 Criterion
PT
Number of inscriptions: data, models Thesis statement (solvable research question) Convergent lines of reasoning Sufficient lines of reasoning Valid inferences for lines of reasoning Progressive construction of evidence Coherence across and within lines of reasoning Coordinate evidence across epistemic levels Support for thesis Overall rating category score (low, medium, high)
EC
PT
EC
PT
2, 0 2, 0 3.50 3.00
6, 1 4.00
8, 0 15, 3 5, 0 4.00 3.50 3.50
5, 0 6, 2 2.50 4.00
1.33 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
0.67 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00
4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00
4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 3.00
2.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 0.00
1.00 0.33
4.00
4.00 4.00 1.33
1.33 3.33
1.00 1.00 L L
4.00 H
4.00 4.00 1.00 H H L
2.00 2.00 L H
3.67 3.00 4.00 4.00 4.00
EC
1.67 1.00 1.00 2.00 0.33
PT
EC
2.67 2.00 3.00 3.33 2.67
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minor claim of a characteristic trench and earth depth profiles left the lines of reasoning sparse. The author was left making high inference claims about characteristics of subduction zones in general with little or no data from the actual geographic location. The argument was thus comprised of claims of high epistemic level without the needed coherence, coordination, and progressive construction of data as evidence—this is evidenced in Table 7.2 for Student Writer 1, PT column. Interestingly, the thesis is essentially true, but lacking the expected evidentiary support expected for the task at hand. Student Writer 1 offered a similar argument for the earth’s climate paper. In this case, the student writer identified as a thesis that Mexico has a water and air pollution problem. Much of the paper focused on the production of CO2 gas. However, there was only one relevant data inscription (along with photographs of smoggy cities). Even this one piece of data was not used well; it was not described in a way that connected the pollution thesis to its relevance. Student Writer 2 offered well-argued positions in both papers. Across the epistemic and rhetorical criteria, this student scored high (see Table 7.2). In the plate tectonics paper the student argued that Japan lies on a convergent boundary. The case was made by reference to six inscriptions (two of which included multiple profiles) referring to elevation, earthquake, and volcanic data. Importantly, the data were argued as evidence through the rhetorical progresses of making coherent claims, coordinating data and claims across epistemic levels, and progressively building the case with explicit reference to previously established claims. See Table 7.2, column Student Writer 2, PT. A similarly organized argument was made for the earth’s climate paper in which the student writer examined the contribution of Japan to CO2 emissions and thus global warming. Multiple data inscriptions were presented regarding population density, CO2 emissions, and surface temperature. As in the previous case, the student scored high on the epistemic and rhetorical criteria, see Table 7.2 column Student Writer 2, EC. The next two cases are particularly interesting as in both cases the student writer scored significantly different across the two tasks. In the first case, Student Writer 3 was able to create a substantially supported argument for the plate tectonics paper, but was much less able to do so for the earth’s climate paper. So what was different? Table 7.2 (column Student Writer 3, PT & EC) offers some clues. For both papers the student was able to create a reasonable thesis statement (regarding the geology and greenhouse emissions and their consequences for the United States). In the plate tectonics paper the student developed multiple lines of reasoning, including the use of earthquake locations and depth profiles across multiple areas, volcano locations, and elevation profiles. These lines of reasoning were tied to the thesis through the coherence, coordination, and progressive construction of evidence typical of well-formulated arguments (see Table 7.2, column Student Writer 3, PT). The earth’s climate paper was not able to make the case for the thesis. The thesis was considerably broader: “Emission of greenhouse gases leads to the greenhouse effect, temperature and climate change, and environmental disaster.” Given this thesis, one problem with the overall argument is the relationship of the thesis to the data. The thesis refers specifically to the United States, as specified in the assignment.
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But the data are for CO2 emissions worldwide. Little of the data are tied specifically to the US contribution to CO2 and thus global warming (one inscription stands without comparison to global data offered subsequently). Furthermore, only one graph is presented regarding temperature (for global temperature as correlated to CO2 emissions). Thus, the lines of reasoning are not sufficient—there is little information about temperature and climate change. The lines of reasoning are not fully valid as the thesis refers to the United States, while the data refer to global variables. These are shortcomings of the epistemic criteria. Similarly, the student was not able to coordinate the claims and develop coherence (see scores for coherence and coordination on Table 7.2). The data are generally identified, described, and shown to be relevant by the writers; however, the interpretations do not make reference to data, but rather speculate on the ills of global climate change. Interestingly, this sort of argument is not beyond the scope of the specific task. Rather, this speculation would need to be supported by the data presented to be evidence based, and not just opinion or unjustified conclusions. The fourth case we present is the student that showed greatest improvement from the first paper (plate tectonics) to the second paper (earth’s climate). For the plate tectonics paper the student writer attempted to make the case that Vietnam is located on the Eurasian plate and that the boundaries of this plate are the Philippine and the Indo-Australian plates. In addition the student set up the argument to include the possibility of underwater earthquakes and flooding due the topography of Vietnam. This broad thesis statement showed some ambiguity and this may have set the stage for a poorly formulated argument. The author developed lines of reasoning based on elevation profiles, earthquake locations and depth profiles, and volcanic locations. The results presented in Table 7.2 (column Student Writer 4, PT) again offer some insight into the diagnosis of the weaknesses of the argument. The argument was rated low for developing sufficient lines of reasoning, coherence, and coordination. While the lines of reasoning were plausible (the case could have been made with these types of data), for locating Vietnam on a particular plate, there was little offered regarding the underwater earthquakes and possible flooding. There were also weaknesses in the rhetorical presentation of the data in the argument. The relevant earth data was not coherently tied to the students’ interpretations. One way to characterize the issue is that the student made high-level claims about the geological data concerning the location of Vietnam on its plate, without making explicit the ways that such data could count as evidence. For the earth’s climate paper the student was able to marshal evidence for the central thesis regarding the weather patterns of Vietnam in relation to the monsoon seasons. Data were presented regarding wind patterns, rain, and temperature. In this case, the rhetorical features of a strong argument were present. The student was able to draw on data inscriptions and identify, describe, and base explanations on these inscriptions across the paper sections and epistemic level of claim. For this paper, unlike the plate tectonics paper, the student’s interpretations make explicit reference to data and build from descriptions of the inscriptions to mechanisms for changes in the seasonal weather patterns for Vietnam. See Table 7.2, column Student Writer 4, EC.
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Summary of Analysis From reading the 8 papers by the four authors in the case studies, and the remaining 22 papers, we are able draw some conclusions about patterns in the data. Wellevidenced arguments tended to be focused in scope, convergent, and explicit. In these papers, students demonstrate an understanding of the unique rhetorical demands of the scientific paper. Argumentation strategies employed by student writers include the use of multiple and converging lines of evidence based on valid inferences. Furthermore, these lines of reasoning are well identified and annotated in the text. Data entered as observations were explicitly referenced later in the paper as students extended their arguments through their interpretations drawn directly from their data. Generally, these students clearly illustrated the relevance of the data to their overall argument, using the data as warrants. Poorly evidenced arguments can be of three sorts. The first sort of argument suffers from vague reference to supporting data. These examples include students who used converging lines of evidence, which were both identified and described in the text, but were only referred to generically in the interpretation section. For example, a student might refer to “the data” or to “the volcanoes” without explicitly directing the reader to the data they had previously presented. Furthermore, while the relevance of the data to the students’ argument was evident, the reader was required to make interpretations regarding the relationship between the students’ evidence and their argument. The second sort of poorly evidenced arguments were those who may have used multiple data references and/or converging lines of evidence yet failed to create an argument based on this evidence. In this case, the data presented did not fit coherently with the argument; there was a mismatch between the thesis statement and the putative evidence supporting it. The third sort were those arguments written by students who referenced intangible evidence, including minimal data. In this case, the interpretations were based on evidence that was not presented to the reader. These student writers tended to use textual references in place of data.
Discussion In this chapter, we referred to a variety of issues regarding the uses of argument in science education. First, we discuss the value of demystifying the epistemic and rhetorical features of scientific arguments. We use the study to consider how to contribute to research on argumentation. Second, we consider the differences in the student writing given the differential complexity of the two tasks. Variation in the students’ abilities to argue the two cases may confound their learning through the engagement with the tasks with a change in the task demands. Third, we discuss some unique contributions of tools and argumentative supports provided from the oceanography course. Fourth, we discuss the broad issue of preparing students to engage with socio-scientific issues.
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In the study presented, we sought to move beyond studies that examine the claims and relevant evidence for student arguments to consider the argumentative structure and the ways that epistemic criteria may be brought to bear on the assessment of student writing. The rationale for the two writing assignments in this course derives from the need for citizens to develop the skills of using, assessing, and critiquing evidence in scientific arguments. In other words the goal is to address this need through numerous opportunities to use, assess, and critique evidence in scientific arguments. We have argued that to formulate an evidence-based argument students need to pose a research question, develop multiple lines of reasoning that are sufficient, convergent, and supported by valid inferences across epistemic level of claims. The highly organized student writing samples varied in the ways that data were tied to the central thesis argued by the student author. Through close examination of the four cases, we noted variation in the ways that writers developed cohesion across claims, coordinated claims across epistemic levels, and constructed their arguments from data. These rhetorical features (coherence, coordination, and progressive construction) offer insight into how argumentation can be taught to students. Our analysis seeks to make visible epistemic practices of science not readily available to students. These ways of proposing, justifying, evaluating, and legitimizing knowledge claims are embedded in a particular community and are social knowledge, learned through participation (Kelly, 2005; Kelly & Green, 1998). Second, for the second writing task involving the earth’s climate, students were required to work in a broader problem space. The topics and range of data were more varied and potentially more complicated. Our analysis identified how students struggled more in the second context adhering to the argument conventions. However, given the broader nature of the task, and the range of possible ways to attempt to complete the task, the lack of equally tight evidential arguments in not surprising. The earth’s climate papers did, however, show evidence of adherence to the genre, use of data, and respect for evidence. The extent of the student learning is confounded by the change in the task demands—these demands were purposely changed to support the course goals and challenge the students to argue in a new arena. Third, in reading Sadler’s (2004) comprehensive review of socio-scientific argumentation, we noticed that few of the studies cited required students to use large-scale data sets, and fewer still provided discipline-specific, mediational tools to support argumentation. Nevertheless, Zohar and Nemet (2002) identified ways that support for argumentation can lead to improved results. This suggests much potential for use of complex data-sets and importantly, developing ways of supporting argumentation through research and development. The developmental cycles supporting our work on written argument have identified the potential for students to engage in situations where they can pose open-ended, researchable questions, pursue such questions (without the inconvenience of contrived answers, known to the teacher) to their logical end, and be held accountable to their claims by peers and instructors. A continued research direction remains the development of tools that can mediate the knowledge and practices of science and offer students ways of understanding that transfer to other, similar socio-scientific contexts.
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Fourth, we discuss how argumentation may be related to students’ decisionmaking. Research to date has tried to identify how uses of argumentation support socio-scientific decision-making or how students’ conceptions of the nature of science influence their decisions regarding socio-scientific issue (for review see, Sadler, 2004). While our study does not attempt to measure changes in students’ decision-making, we have offered a unique approach to the issue of developing sophistication regarding socio-scientific issues. The rationale for the course, along with associated mediational tools, is to inculcate some relevant epistemic practices—ways of proposing, evaluating, critiquing knowledge claims from a disciplinary point of view—through engagement with rich data-sets and social circumstances where evidence is valued. The educational process included learning the epistemic practices associated with creating sound arguments through the first major writing assignment (plate tectonics) before entering into a situation where science meets social issues more directly (such as global warming). Thus, the students had a set of disciplinary practices that could be brought to bear on the more complex and nebulous task of the earth’s climate. Fifth, the uses of argumentation in university teaching may support greater uses of written communication in secondary classrooms. Secondary science programs often set expectations for curricula choices, instructional strategies, and assessment techniques based on university entrance requirements. Examples of evidence use and scientific genres in university courses, such as this oceanography course, may model reasoning processes and epistemic practices that can be emulated in secondary education. Such examples provide support for writing for learning science in secondary education where little is known about how “secondary teachers use scientific genres, their goals and purposes for using these genres, their expectations for student products” (Keys, 1999, p. 128). Argumentative discourse may be one strategy among a range of writing processes that support writing for learning science (Prain, 2006). Furthermore, the connections across the range of spoken and written discourses in secondary and tertiary science education remain an area of importance for discourse-oriented research as cognitive and epistemic learning is embedded in and mediated through social interaction and cultural practices (Kelly, in press).
Conclusion Drawing on research emphasizing the importance of written communication for the development of scientific knowledge in schools and other settings, we propose providing opportunities to develop and practice argumentation strategies to prepare students to engage in socio-scientific practices extending beyond the scope and limitations of the undergraduate classroom. Specifically, we maintain that, given opportunities to evaluate, interpret, and use data within a specified rhetorical task, students may be able to apply their ability to use evidence-based argumentation strategies regarding broader topics as active citizens (Cross & Price, 1999; Jenkins,
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1999). While previous research regarding science and writing has focused on how and why writing can be used to enhance learning opportunities for students of science, our work extends the current paradigm by documenting specific epistemic and rhetorical strategies that students can employ to successfully prepare an evidence-based scientific argument. Acknowledgment Research and development for this project is supported by a grant from the National Science Foundation, Division of Undergraduate Education (NSF# 0231414). An earlier version of this paper was presented at the annual meeting of the National Association for Research in Science Teaching, Dallas, TX, April 4–7, 2005.
References Ault, C. R. (1998). Criteria of excellence for geological inquiry: The necessity of ambiguity. Journal of Research in Science Teaching, 35, 189–212. Bazerman, C. (1988). Shaping written knowledge: The genre and activity of the experimental article in science. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press. Cross, R. T., & Price, R. F. (1999). The social responsibility of science and the public understanding of science. International Journal of Science Education, 21, 775–785. Driver, R., Newton, P., & Osborne, J. (2000). Establishing the norms of scientific argumentation in classrooms. Science Education, 84, 287–312. Edelson, D. C. (2001). Learning-for-use: A framework for the design of technology-supported inquiry activities. Journal of Research in Science Teaching, 38, 355–385. Eemeren, F. H. Van, & Grootendorst, R. (2003). A systematic theory of argumentation: The pragma-dialectical approach. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Erduran, S., Simon, S., & Osborne, J. (2004). TApping into argumentation: Developments in the application of Toulmin’s argument pattern for studying science discourse. Science Education, 88, 915–933. Gieryn, T. F. (1999). Cultural boundaries of science: Credibility on the line. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Goodwin, C. (1995). Seeing in depth. Social Studies of Science, 25, 237–274. Gross, A. (1990). The rhetoric of science. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Halliday, M. A. K., & Hasan, R. (1976). Cohesion in English. Longman: London. Halliday, M. A. K., & Martin, J. R. (1993). Writing science: Literacy and discursive power. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press. Hodson, D. (2003). Time for action: Science education for an alternative future. International Journal of Science Education, 25, 645–670. Jenkins, E. W. (1999). School science, citizenship and the public understanding of science. International Journal of Science Education, 21, 703–710. Jiménez-Aleixandre, M. P., Bugallo Rodríguez, A., & Duschl, R. A. (2000). “Doing the lesson” or “doing science”: Argument in high school genetics. Science Education, 84, 757–792. Kelly, G. J. (in press). Discourse in science classrooms. In S. Abell & N. Lederman (Eds.), Handbook of research on science education. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. Kelly, G. J. (2005). Inquiry, activity, and epistemic practice. Paper presented at the Inquiry Conference on Developing a Consensus Research Agenda, sponsored by the National Science Foundation. Rutgers University, New Jersey, February. http://www.ruf.rice.edu/∼rgrandy/ NSFConSched.html. Kelly, G. J., & Bazerman, C. (2003). How students argue scientific claims: A rhetorical-semantic analysis. Applied Linguistics, 24(1), 28–55.
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Kelly, G. J., & Chen, C. (1999). The sound of music: Constructing science as sociocultural practices through oral and written discourse. Journal of Research in Science Teaching, 36, 883–915. Kelly, G. J., Chen, C., & Prothero, W. (2000). The epistemological framing of a discipline: Writing science in university oceanography. Journal of Research in Science Teaching, 37, 691–718. Kelly, G. J., Druker, S., & Chen, C. (1998). Students’ reasoning about electricity: Combining performance assessments with argumentation analysis. International Journal of Science Education, 20, 849–871. Kelly, G. J., & Green, J. (1998). The social nature of knowing: Toward a sociocultural perspective on conceptual change and knowledge construction. In B. Guzzetti & C. Hynd (Eds.), Perspectives on conceptual change: Multiple ways to understand knowing and learning in a complex world (pp. 145–181). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. Kelly, G. J., & Takao, A. (2002). Epistemic levels in argument: An analysis of university oceanography students’ use of evidence in writing. Science Education, 86, 314–342. Keys, C. W. (1999). Revitalizing instruction in scientific genres: Connecting knowledge production with writing to learn in science. Science Education, 83, 115–130. Knorr-Cetina, K. (1999). Epistemic cultures: How the sciences make knowledge. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Kozulin, A. (2003). Psychological tools and mediated learning. In A. Kozulin, B. Gindis, V. S. Ageyev, & S. M. Miller (Eds.), Vygotsky’s educational theory in cultural context (pp. 15–38). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Latour, B. (1987). Science in action: How to follow scientists and engineers through society. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Longino, H. E. (1990). Science as social knowledge: Values and objectivity in science inquiry. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Myers, G. (1990). Writing biology: Texts in the social construction of scientific knowledge. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press. Pinch, T. (1986). Confronting nature. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: R. Reidel. Prain, V. (2006). Learning from writing in secondary science: Some theoretical and practical implications. International Journal of Science Education, 28, 179–201. Rivard, L. P., & Straw, S. B. (2000). The effect of talk and writing on learning science: An exploratory study. Science Education, 84, 566–593. Sadler, T. D. (2004). Informal reasoning regarding socioscientific issues: A critical review of research. Journal of Research in Science Teaching, 41, 513–536. Sandoval, W. A., & Millwood, K. A. (2005). The quality of students’ use of evident in written scientific explanations. Cognition and Instruction, 23, 23–55. Takao, A. Y., & Kelly, G. J. (2003). Assessment of evidence in university students’ scientific writing. Science & Education, 12, 341–363. Takao, A. Y., Prothero, W., & Kelly, G. J. (2002). Applying argumentation analysis to assess the quality of university oceanography students’ scientific writing. Journal of Geoscience Education, 50(1), 40–48. Toulmin, S. (1958). The uses of argument. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Wallace, C. S., Hand, B., & Prain, V. (2004). Writing and learning in the science classroom. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic. Wenger, E. (1998). Communities of practice: Learning, meaning, and identity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Yore, L. D., Bisanz, G. L., & Hand, B. M. (2003). Examining the literacy component of science literacy: 25 years of language arts and science research. International Journal of Science Education, 25, 689–725. Yore, L. D., Florence, M. K., Pearson, T. W., & Weaver, A. J. (2006). Written discourse in scientific communities: A conversation with two scientists about their views of science, use of language, role of writing in doing science, and compatibility between their epistemic views and language. International Journal of Science Education, 28, 109–141. Zohar, A., & Nemet, F. (2002). Fostering students’ knowledge and argumentation skills through dilemmas in human genetics. Journal of Research in Science Teaching, 39, 35–62.
Chapter 8
Quality Argumentation and Epistemic Criteria Richard A. Duschl
The language of science is not exclusively the enunciation of terms and concepts, facts and laws, principles and hypotheses. The language of science is closely related to the restructuring character of scientific claims about method, goals, and explanations, a character firmly established in the history, philosophy and sociology of science (Duschl, 1994; Duschl & Hamilton, 1997; Hodson, 1985). Language of science is a discourse that critically examines and evaluates the numerous and at times iterative transformations of evidence into explanations (Duschl & Grandy, 2007). Thus, as this edited volume on argumentation demonstrates, educational researchers are focusing on ways to understanding the language of science and to support dialogic argumentation in science classrooms. Shifting the dominant focus of teaching from what we know (e.g., terms and concepts) to a foci that emphasizes how we know what we know and why we believe what we know (e.g., using criteria to evaluate claims) requires a different classroom culture and discourse environment. Consider for a moment what’s involved when science teaching and learning are formatted around argumentation practices. First, scientific knowledge claims include information about theory (what knowledge is important), method (what strategies for obtaining and analyzing data are appropriate), and goals (what outcomes are sought and how can we determine if the outcome has been attained). A curriculum, instruction, and assessment design challenge is providing teachers and students with tools that help them build on nascent forms of argumentation to develop more sophisticated and rational scientific knowledge claims. Equally important, as Siegel (1995) argues, is the need to address the development of criteria students employ to determine the “goodness”, the normative status, or epistemic forcefulness of reasons for belief, judgment and action. Engagement in argumentation discourse also requires appropriation of criteria and of evidence for the evaluation of arguments (Kuhn, 1993). Driver et al., (1996), White and Fredericksen (1998) and Duschl (2000) each point to the importance of students seeing scientific inquiry as epistemological and social processes in which knowledge claims can be shaped, modified, restructured, and at times, abandoned. Thus, learners need to have opportunities to discuss, evaluate, and debate the processes, contexts, and products of inquiry. Such discussions and debates expose the members of the community to each others’ ideas, opinions, sources of evidence, S. Erduran and M. P. Jiménez-Aleixandre (eds.), Argumentation in Science Education. © Springer 2007
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and reasoning. These discourse processes also make thinking visible to participants. Such visibility can, in turn, provide a powerful mediation or formative assessment opportunity. Herein lies the importance of locating robust argumentation frameworks that will provide the appropriate level of details for guiding the development of students’ argumentation practices. The feedback on thinking can come from the students themselves as well as the teacher. But it is the teacher that sets the agenda for mediating the learning environment that can support formative assessments on pupils’ scientific thinking and reasoning. The challenge of teaching higher level thinking for teachers is fundamentally one of managing the ideas and information that are generated by students (see Zohar, this book). The adoption and development of argumentation frameworks has gained in importance over the last two decades as researchers and curriculum developers seek ways to either nurture dialogic discourse in classrooms or to analyze the development of students’ reasoning with evidence and theory. When looking across the various available options for argumentation frameworks one sees that there are issues regarding the “grain size” of information being sought and used (Sampson & Clark, 2006; Duschl & Osborne, 2002). Toulmin (1958), for example, distinguished between field-dependent and field-independent forms of argumentation with the latter focusing on the general patterns of arguments involving claims, warrants, backings, rebuttals, qualifiers and conclusions. The question asked by Sampson and Clark (2006) in a review of 5 different frameworks for examining rhetorical argumentation is “How does any framework inform us about the quality of students’ argumentation?” This is an important question and one that is taken up in this chapter. Specifically, argumentation while common among many cultures and communities, when played out in science argumentation discourse has particular rules for “what counts” for knowledge building. Such knowledge building rules represent the epistemic demands (Sampson & Clark, 2006), epistemic resources (Hammer & Elby, 2003), epistemic actions (Pontecorvo & Girardet, 1993) and the practices of epistemic communities (Duschl & Grandy, 2007). Thus, as stated above, when thinking about argumentation discourse in classrooms, there is a need to have tools that can support or scaffold students’ participation in argumentation discourse and, importantly, teachers’ assessment of the students’ argumentation. Sampson and Clark (2006) review 5 frameworks used for the assessment of argument: ●
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Toulmin’s Argument Pattern in science education research (Erduran et al., 2004; Jiménez-Aleixandre et al., 2000; Kelly et al., 1998); Zohar and Nemet’s modification of Toulmin (Zohar & Nemet, 2002); Kelly and Takao’s framework examining the epistemic status of propositions (Kelly & Takao, 2002; Takao & Kelly, 2003); Sandoval’s framework for examining the conceptual and epistemic quality of arguments (Sandoval, 2003; Sandoval & Millwood, 2005); and Lawson’s framework for examining the hypothetic-deductive validity of arguments (Lawson, 2003).
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The focus of the review was “(a) illustrating the logic and assumptions that have pervaded research in the field, (b) summarizing the constraints and affordances of these different approaches, and (c) making recommendations for new directions” (p.655). The analyses were conducted with lenses examining the epistemological criteria used by each of the 5 frameworks. What Sampson and Clark report is that the extant frameworks do not get down to a precise level of epistemic criteria: Unfortunately, … the majority of the analytical methods that have been developed to assess and characterize the nature of the rhetorical arguments … have provided very little information about how the rhetorical arguments generated by students reflect these criteria” (p 659).
There remain concerns about the quality of argumentation and reasoning that can emerge if more refined epistemic criteria are not introduced to students. Sampson and Clark proposed 5 criteria for examining the quality of scientific arguments (pp. 658–660): 1. Examine the nature and quality of the knowledge claim—analytical methods should focus on the types of claims made by students and the ability to coordinate claims with available evidence. 2. Examine how (or if) the claim is justified—students need to learn to provide empirical evidence but also need to learn what kinds of evidence are needed to warrant an argument. 3. Examine if a claim accounts for all available evidence—students tend to not focus on the patterns in data but rather give priority to single pieces of evidence that support personal beliefs. 4. Examine how (or if) the argument attempts to discount alternatives—more than one claim may be an acceptable explanation for a phenomenon, students need to learn how to challenge weaknesses in alternative explanations. 5. Examine how epistemological references are used to coordinate claims and evidence—students need to learn how to justify/evaluate the ways evidence is gathered and interpreted, students do not examine the design of investigations or the methods used to obtain evidence. A promising framework not reviewed by Sampson and Clark is Walton’s (1996) argumentation schemes for presumptive reasoning. My claim is that the Walton framework can help address most of the 5 criteria put forth by Sampson and Clark. The theoretical framework for the adoption of argumentation discourse that is presented in the next section is developed from three studies employing 9 of Walton’s categories to examine student discourse. The initial study to use Walton categories (Duschl et al., 1999) was grounded in an evaluation of Project SEPIA. Sibel Erduran and I worked on the design, piloting and implementation of the group interview protocols. Sibel Erduran conducted the group interviews. Kirsten Ellenbogen and I coordinated and implemented the analysis of the group interviews. The Walton analytical scheme was also used to analyze discourse first in a study of computer-supported classroom science learning (Goldman et al., 2002); and second in a study of argumentation discourse used in extended writing
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responses on A-level course examinations (Osborne et al., 2002) In the rest of this chapter, I will describe the use of Walton’s framework for the assessment of middle school students’ argumentation. First I will provide a rationale for the theoretical background to the research programme, Project SEPIA, that has led to the design of learning environments to support argumentation in middle school science classrooms.
Theoretical Framework on Argument A trend in science education is the move away from the implementation of discrete single lessons that seek outcomes related exclusively or predominately to students’ concept learning regarding facts and principles. There is new focus on knowledge use with an emphasis on the coordination of evidence and explanation or of observation and theory (NAEP, 2006). Traditionally, science education learning goals have oscillated between content and process emphases. New understanding of learning derived from the learning sciences (Bransford et al., 1999; Duschl et al., 2006; Pellegrino et al., 2002; Sawyer, 2006) are emphasizing the importance of supporting the development of complex reasoning among learners. According to Bransford et al (1999) research over the past 30 years has contributed five themes that have changed our conceptions of learning: 1. Memory and Structure of Learning—how learners develop coherent structures of information; 2. Analysis of Problem Solving and Reasoning—how learners acquire skills to search a problem space and then use these strategies; 3. Early Foundations—assessing infants’ early learning is causing us to rethink the skills and abilities children bring with them to school; 4. Metacognitive Processes and Self-regulatory Capabilities—how learners engage in self-monitoring and executive control of one’s performance; 5. Cultural Experience and Community Participation—how learners become attuned to the constraints and resources, the limits and possibilities, that are involved in the practices of communities. In science education, the development of reasoning often has an evaluative component with respect to the examination of evidence and explanation. New policies speak to the importance of instructional contexts that seek outcomes related to students’ reasoning and communication in science contexts. In the United Kingdom, the policy recommendations in the document Beyond 2000 (Millar & Osborne, 1998) suggest formatting science instruction such that goals relating to a public understanding of science and ideas-about-science are addressed and not squelched by concept learning. In the USA, the National Science Education Standards (NRC, 1996, 2001) make Inquiry, Unifying Themes and Principles, Science in Social and Personal Perspectives and Nature of Science four of the eight content goals. In short,
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the message internationally evidenced by other worldwide policies in science education (Jiménez-Aleixandre & Erduran, this book) is that there is more to science learning than knowing facts and principles. The message is that in addition to a focus on students’ learning about what we know, science education needs to also focus students’ attention on how we know what we know and why we choose to believe it over alternatives. The how and the why focus requires adoption of dialogic discourse processes, of which argumentation is a part, in order to engage learners in the epistemic practices involving the selection of evidence for the development of scientific explanations. Argumentation has three generally recognized forms: analytical, dialectical, and rhetorical (van Eemeren et al, 1996). Analytical arguments are grounded in the theory of logic and include, as examples, material implications, syllogisms, and fallacies. Essentially in the analytical approach an argument proceeds inductively or deductively from a set of premises to a conclusion. For analytical arguments of categorization, the form is the syllogism: All men are mortals; Socrates is a man; Therefore, Socrates is mortal. For analytical arguments of causation, the form is material implication: If p then q; p; Therefore q. Dialectical arguments are those that occur during discussion or debate and involve reasoning with premises that are not evidently true. Dialectical arguments are a part of the informal logic domain. Rhetorical arguments, on the other hand, are oratorical in nature and are represented by the discursive techniques employed to persuade an audience. In contrast to the other two forms of argument where the consideration of evidence is paramount, rhetorical arguments stress knowledge of audience. In science, there is general agreement that all three forms of argument are used as theories are refined and justified but dialectical and analytical owing to the focus on evidence are more exacting and representative of high quality scientific argumentation. Designing learning environments to facilitate and promote argumentation is a complex problem given that the discourse of science involves the three different forms of argumentation. The central role of argumentation in doing science is supported by both psychologists (Kuhn, 1993) and philosophers of science (Siegel, 1995). Argumentation is seen as a reasoning strategy and thus also comes under the general reasoning domains of informal logic and critical thinking as well. Given the wide use of Toulmin’s Argument Pattern (TAP) (Toulmin, 1958) as a model of evidence-to-explanation transformation process, some further exploration is warranted. A generic representation of the TAP discourse model from data to conclusions is depicted in Fig. 8.1. Toulmin posits that the quality of an argument can not be judged by form alone (e.g., modus ponens, modus tollens, material implication). Rather, the content and context of an argument (i.e., the evaluation of arguments as they occur in practice) are critically important for determining what counts as data, warrants, and backings. For this reason, Toulmin introduced the idea of argumentation field. The field frames the content for the argument. Thus, the content of an argument will be composed of both fielddependent and field-independent elements.
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D
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since W R on account of B D=data, W=warrants, B=backings, Q=qualifiers, R=rebuttal, C=conclusions Fig. 8.1 Toulmin’s argument pattern (Toulmin, 1958)
The difficulty of using TAP, discussed above by Sampson and Clark, as a template though is the interpretations one allows or accepts for the inclusion or exclusion of claims about the data, the warrants, the backings, the qualifiers, the rebuttals and the conclusions. One problem with TAP according to van Eemeren (1996) “is the vagueness, ambiguity, and sometimes even inconsistency in his use of key terms (…) Toulmin gives the impression that the terms field of argument, topic, and discipline are synonymous”(p 155, italics in original). In other words, what one chooses to monitor and against what criteria shapes the evaluation of the discourse. The issue is related to learners’ knowledge of the field within which the argumentation task is occurring. The task is further complicated since the knowledge of the field is often that which is held by a community of inquiries. But it is here at the level of making decisions about “what counts” where science is properly done and, subsequently, where classroom discourse and assessments should focus. That is, the focus should be on epistemic contexts. Thus, the question to raise with respect to TAP is how effective is it at helping students and teachers ascertain “what counts”. The issue that arises with TAP is what is the appropriate level of detail that should be expected for the reasons given to make an argument. The TAP uses very general and broad categories (e.g., data, warrants, backings, rebuttals, qualifiers, conclusions) to characterize arguments. A closer examination of argumentation discourse reveals that statements frequently make “appeals” to specific positions like appeal to authority or appeal to analogy. The examination of the content or focus of the “appeals” enables an analysis that gets closer to the epistemic criteria being used to establish and justify the quality and strength of the argument. Walton’s audience for his 1996 book was the legal community and in particular law students preparing for the presentation of cases. Over 20 categories
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of “appeals to”-type argumentation moves are put forth. Of these, 9 were judged to be relevant to features of middle school science classroom discourse (see Table 8.2). The rationale for using Walton’s scheme is that if the goal is to improve students’ scientific reasoning, then a more nuanced and detailed framework is needed to monitor and guide how students are employing evidence in the construction of explanations. The Walton schemes for presumptive reasoning, I believe, provide such details. The adoption of the Walton presumptive reasoning schemes facilitates employment of frameworks for the analysis of argumentation discourse in science classrooms. Dialogue logic occurs during dialectical argumentative exchanges, like that which occurs during collaborative small group science investigations and assessment conversations (Duschl & Gitomer, 1997) as well as asynchronous computersupported communication environments. During a dialogue a proponent may carry any number of changing commitments as the burden of proof shifts during an exchange. In a dialogue context, the sources of evidence employed to shift burden of proof are much more extensive than those employed in analytical contexts. Rescher (1976, 1977), and more recently Walton (1996), maintain that dialectical argumentation is grounded in burden of proof, presumption, and plausibility. Walton (1996) defines presumptive reasoning as that reasoning which occurs during a dialogue when a course of action must be taken and all the needed evidence is not available. Such reasoning is not based solely on knowledge and probability but instead focuses on shifting presumption (e.g., burden of proof) onto the other dialogue participants. Such a scenario of reasoning from a partial set of experiences and evidence reflects quite well what typically occurs in middle school science classrooms.
A Study of Argumentation Discourse in Middle School Science Classrooms The next sections of the chapter report the initial research study (Duschl et al., 1999) that assessed the quality of argument ation by students participating in SEPIA classrooms using Walton’s framework for presumptive reasoning. First, a brief overview of the SEPIA instruction and assessment models is provided. Next, is a section on methods and data sources used in the study. Here the discussion reports on efforts to initially try and use TAP with “Appeals to” categories as the analytical framework. Owing to difficulties presented above, TAP was abandoned and Walton adopted as the analytical framework for discourse coding. Results are then presented followed by a last section that discusses conclusions of the study and implications for the use of frameworks that seek to quality argumentation by promoting consideration of epistemic criteria.
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SEPIA—Science Education through Portfolio Instruction and Assessment The design of SEPIA curricula is a blending of guidelines from cognitive psychology and philosophy of science (Duschl & Gitomer, 1991; Gitomer & Duschl, 1995; Goldman, et al., 2002). A general goal is to develop scientific reasoning. The specific goals are to develop students’ ability to reason about explanations, experiments, and models. Three units were developed, Vessels with the epistemic goal of evaluating causal explanations; Acids & Bases with the epistemic goals of evaluating chemical models; Earthquakes & Volcanoes with the epistemic goals of evaluating scientific arguments. Many years into the effort, the teachers, researchers and advisors working on Project SEPIA feel the approach proceeds from five key features: 1. The topic of investigation is an authentic question or problem that has some consequence to the lives of the children. 2. Conceptual goals are kept to a limited number so as to facilitate an understanding and adoption of epistemic criteria that assess the accuracy and objectivity of knowledge claims. 3. Assessment of students’ understandings and ideas proceeds from assignments that are designed to produce a diversity of outcomes. 4. Both the criteria for the assessment of students’ products and performances and the products and performances themselves are publicly shared employing a direct teaching discourse strategy labeled an ‘assessment conversation’. 5. The depth of student understanding is assessed and communicated employing a portfolio process. The principal focus for SEPIA units is on epistemic goals as learning outcomes. Such goals seek to develop students’ understanding of the structure of knowledge for the purposes of proposing and evaluating knowledge claims grounded to the evidence from the inquiry. Hence, epistemic goals seek to establish the criteria or rules upon which decisions and choices are made, for example, “what counts”. Epistemic goals establish the ground rules to construct and evaluate scientific arguments, scientific explanations, models or theories, scientific experiments and scientific hypotheses.
Methods and Data Sources Seventeen triads of middle school students participated in a structured 45–60 minute long interview. The task for the group was to review and then provide constructive feedback for the improvement of a science fair project. Students were seated in front of the science fair poster—a three panel cardboard presentation on buoyancy and flotation including pictorial representations of the investigations done by a 7th-grade student. Interview protocols were designed, reviewed, piloted
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and revised. There were three components of the interview. First, a warm-up activity that involved students cooperatively constructing tangram figures was used. This was done to encourage group work and group decision-making in particular. Second, a set of open-ended questions focusing on the format and content of the science fair project were presented. This was done to focus attention on the parts of the project showing the data table, the hypothesis being tested, the methods used and the conclusion statement. Finally, a set of questions focusing on the evidence and the claims made in the science fair project were presented to students. All sessions were video-taped, audio-taped and then transcribed. Transcripts of the sessions were reviewed for accuracy. The analysis below only examines the last (or third) section of the structured group interview for it is here that the use of epistemic criteria was most likely. Analysis of the group was the method of inquiry for the present study. Two argumentation schemes were trialed for the analysis of student discourse— Toulmin’s argument scheme and Walton’s argumentation schemes for presumptive reasoning. But in the end, for reasons described below, only the Walton schemes were used. The application of Toulmin’s model followed closely the procedures adopted by Pontecorvo and Girardet (1993) in a study of children’s group reasoning in the context of examining history book passages. These authors first analyzed the frame of discourse which identifies the general orientation of the discussion. The second level of analysis examines “reasoning sequences” in which particular epistemic actions are pursued. The final unit of analysis was the “idea unit”. Each idea unit was submitted to a double categorization (see Table 8.1). At the first stage, the unit was assigned to an argumentative operation and then it was assigned to an epistemic operation. For the “Appeal to” category the following list of options was provided by Pontecorvo and Girardet: analogy, exemplar cases or instances, conditions, rules or general principles, motives/intentions/goals, consequence/implications, authority Table 8.1 Operations used by Pontecorvo and Girardet (1993) Argumentative operations Epistemic operations Claim – Any clause that states a position. Definition – A statement about the essential nature of an event or about the meaning of a word, including a shift of meaning. Justification: Any clause that furnishes Categorization: When something is considered adequate grounds or warrants for a claim. as being a member of a class, including a shift of categorization. Concession: Any claim that concedes some- Predication: The action of asserting something thing to an addressee, admitting a point about a topic without any evaluative claimed in the dispute. dimension. Opposition: Any claim that denies what has Evaluation: The action of asserting something been claimed by another, with or without about a topic with an evaluative dimension. giving reasons. Counter-opposition: Any claim that opposes Appeal to: The action of supporting a claim by another’s opposition, which can be more appealing to something that the speaker or less justified. content considers relevant to the topic.
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Table 8.2 Argumentation Schemes for Presumptive Reasoning (Walton, 1996) Argument from: Definition Sign References to spoken or written claims are used to infer the existence of a property or occurrence of an event. Commitment A claims that B is, or should be, committed to some particular position on an issue, and then claims that B should also be committed to an action. Position to Know A has reason to presume that B has knowledge of, or access to, information that A does not have, thus when B gives an opinion, A treats it as true or false. Expert Opinion Reference to an expert source external to the given information. Evidence to Hypothesis Reference to premises followed by a conclusion. Correlation to Cause Infers a causal connection between two events from a premise describing a positive correlation between them. Cause to Effect Reference to premises that are causally linked to a noncontroversial effect. Consequences Practical reasoning in which a policy or course of action is supported or rejected because the consequences will be good or bad. Analogy Used to argue from one case that is said to be similar to another.
(expert, author, source), time, sociocultural context, spatial temporal context. Here we can see an extension of claims, warrants and backings by, in particular, the use of the “Appeals to” category. Nine of the 25 argumentation schemes proposed by Walton were selected for the second analysis. The selected schemes are presented in Table 8.2. As you will note there is some overlap between Walton’s categories and Pontecorvo and Girardet’s “Appeal to” categories. The difference is that we applied the 9 categories to the reasoning sequence or larger chunks of conversation, a level above the idea unit used by Pontecorvo and Girardet.
Results In contrast to the success Pontecorvo and Girardet (1993) had with applying Toulmin’s argument pattern to analyze group reasoning in a history context, we found that the analysis of discourse employing argumentative and epistemic operations to the idea unit in our data on science students did not adequately distinguish signal from noise. First, the idea units did not work well with the argumentative operations. The argumentative operations were too broadly defined which led to a large assignment of sentences and statements to generic categories without adequately accounting for the diversity that existed within the category. Consequently, distinguishing the structure and patterns of argument was difficult. Difficulties were also encountered with the assignment and analysis of epistemic operations. The dialecti-
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cal nature of the group interview made the assignment of analytic epistemic operations like definition, categorization, predication, evaluation, warrants, and backings rather awkward. At times it felt as if square pegs were being forced into round holes. There was more success at assigning the epistemic operations to the reasoning sequences than to the idea units. The use of Walton’s presumptive reasoning schemes more adequately fit the discourse structures (e.g., dialectical and rhetorical) and reasoning sequences of the group interview (see Table 8.3). Given the emphasis on dialogue, the appropriate unit of analysis was the reasoning sequence. The reasoning sequences is the conversation that takes place between group members when debating or argu-
Table 8.3 Adaptation of Walton’s Schemes for Presumptive Reasoning Argument from Definition Look for… Sign References to spoken or written claims are used References to the to infer the existence of a property or event. project. “look at this” “it shows” Commitment Suggests action should be taken. A claims that B Look for a request for is, or should be, committed to some particular action position on an issue, and then claims that B “should” “could” should also be committed to an action. Position to There is insufficient information to make a judgLook for opposition Know ment. Involves request for more information. A statement has reason to presume that B has knowledge of, or access to, information that A does not have. Expert Opinion Reference to an expert source (person, text, group “we did this before…” consensus, etc.) external to the given informa“the book says” tion. Supports a personal inference or point of view. Evidence to Reference to premises followed by conclusion. “I think…” “it looks Hypothesis Includes a hypothesis—a conjecture or generallike…” “it probizable prediction capable of being tested. (The ably would…” “if hypothesis can come as part of the “if” or the it had…” “then it “then” part of the argument.) would” Correlation to Infer a causal connection between two events. Often based on plauCause Characterized by an inferential leap, based sibility rather than on a natural law, but devoid of any reference probability to observational evidence. Cause to Effect Reference to premises that are causally linked to a “it will…” noncontroversial effect. Effect is an observable outcome, with no need for testing. “then it would be better” Consequences Practical reasoning in which a policy or action “it’s basically good” is supported/rejected on the grounds that the consequences will be good/bad. A statement about the value of the conclusion without any expressed concerns for the properties nor the events that comprise the full argument. Analogy Used to argue from one case that is said to be “like” or use of a similar to another. metaphor
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ing for, or against, a specific course of action or when evaluating a particular claim. There are multiple reasoning sequences in any given group discourse. The scoring of the transcripts was carried out by six individuals trained to use the presumptive reasoning categories. Confusions among scorers between either one or the other related categories (e.g., Sign, Commitment, Position to Know) prompted us to collapsed categories (e.g., Request for Information and Inference) for purposes of the analysis. For example, when looking at students discourse it was difficult to distinguish Cause to Effect from Consequence when the Effect (boat sinks) is a negative outcome. As a summary, the collapsed categories were as follows: ● ● ●
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Request for Information = Sign, Commitment, Position to Know Expert Opinion = Expert Opinion Inference = Evidence to Hypothesis, Correlation to Cause, Cause to Effect, Consequence Analogy = Analogy
Inter-rater reliability for the collapsed categories on two different transcripts was 90% and 84% respectively. The broad array of presumptive reasoning schemes employed by students, such as Argument from Sign and Argument from Consequences, suggests that the authentic argumentative practices of students reflect a blending of analytical, dialectical, and rhetorical devices. There are two prominent patterns that emerge from the analysis of the data. The first pattern is that the SEPIA groups in comparison to the non-SEPIA groups engage in a higher frequency of dialogic argumentation schemes in all categories of presumptive reasoning. The second pattern is that the rank order of argumentation schemes displayed by SEPIA and non-SEPIA (i.e., the average number of arguments per student group per scheme) are the same. The data suggest that a developmental corridor for argumentation would begin with the dialectical structures or patterns and build toward the analytical structures or patterns. Overall, the comparison between the average number of arguments per student group is 35 for SEPIA and 22 for non-SEPIA (Fig. 8.2). The data suggest that there is a treatment effect for SEPIA vs. non-SEPIA. Although our small sample does not support statistical significance, several patterns in the data are noteworthy (Fig. 8.3). One pattern is the higher frequency of inference schemes (14 versus 9) being employed by SEPIA groups as compared to non-SEPIA groups. Another pattern is the slightly higher frequency of requests for information schemes (18 versus 13) for SEPIA groups. The interpretation of the frequency data is seen as a positive indication that the curriculum, instruction, and assessment models that guide the design of SEPIA units are effective toward promoting presumptive reasoning discourse and do so in two important areas, for example, Requests for Information and Inferences. This in and of itself is not a surprising result given Duschl and Gitomer (1997) also report the success of SEPIA design features in getting students to communicate a diversity of ideas. What the results of the present suggest though is that there is a pattern of
Average # of Arguments per Student Group
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40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 SEPIA
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Fig. 8.2 Average number of arguments SEPIA vs. non-SEPIA students
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Fig. 8.3 Categories of reasoning schemes, SEPIA vs. Non-SEPIA
argumentation that the students employ. More importantly, the pattern is one that teachers and students could monitor and use to develop criteria for the evaluation of knowledge claims. For example, students can examine the arguments made and ascertain the kinds of evidence and premises being used or not used. An understanding of how students engage in argumentation can promote reasoning about reasoning (i.e., metacognition). A second prominent pattern to emerge from the data is the similar ranking of argumentation schemes between SEPIA and Non-SEPIA students (Fig. 8.4). The rank correlation of argument schemes using the Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficient
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Fig. 8.4 Walton’s categories for SEPIA vs. non-SEPIA groups’ arguments
is 0.95. Regardless of the students’ prior experiences with learning environments, the structured interviews around the science fair project stimulated presumptive reasoning discourse. Asking students to evaluate and then give advice on how to improve a product exposes the evidence and premises as well as the beliefs and assumptions that the students employ. The high rank correlation reported in Fig. 8.3 is also seen as evidence that middle school age children have the cognitive and social tools to engage in presumptive reasoning on science topics. More specifically, the children are capable of employing a diversity of schemes with reference to an array of relevant evidence and premises. The data support Lemke’s (1991) claims about how discourse in science classroom can shift from conceptual to structural dynamics of language if the right context is provided.
Conclusions and Educational Implications The analysis employing the Walton scheme demonstrates that individuals bring a great deal more to argumentation than are identified by strict analytical logical schemes or rhetorical schemes like Toulmin’s Argument Pattern. Such refinements help provide frameworks for getting at the five criteria set down by Sampson and Clark (2006). Argumentation frameworks that employ more refined categories or “Appeals to” structures offer productive pathways for researchers to examine the quality of argumentation in terms of epistemic criteria. Augmentation of students’ discourse to promote critical thinking and reasoning would benefit by a shift from an emphasis on deductive and inductive argumentation schemes to an initial emphasis on the more natural dialogue logic found in dialectical contexts. Interventions in the form of formative feedback from teachers as well as engage-
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ment in authentic tasks and activities that promote various genres of discourse that employ argumentation would seem to be important for moving students along the “talking science” continuum (Lemke, 1990). Presumptive reasoning analyses seem to be a natural entry point for the assessment and development of student’s argumentation strategies. Moreover, it is appropriate to begin thinking about how the argumentation schemes for presumptive reasoning can be used as normative, “appeals to” categories within the TAP framework of warrants, backings, and rebuttals. It isn’t enough to only assert the frequency of warrants, backing, and rebuttals as a measure of student argumentation because the quality of argumentation will depend on various “Appeals to” types of evidence used by students and recognized by teachers. The decisions associated with making commitments and resolutions are guided by “the goodness, normative status or epistemic forcefulness, of candidate reasons for belief, judgment and action.” (Siegel, 1995; p 162). In addition to learning about what we know in science, science education programs need to also develop learners’ capacities to understand how we have come to know and why we believe what we know. Having this broader science education goal depends on students’ opportunities to engage in rendering decisions about the beliefs, judgments, and actions of inquiries conducted by fellow students. Driver, et al. (1996) emphasized the same idea when they wrote: “if it [school science] is to contribute effectively to improved public understanding of science, [it] must develop students’ understanding of the scientific enterprise itself (…) [s]uch an understanding, it is argued, is necessary for students to develop an appreciation of both the power and the limitation of scientific knowledge claims.” (p 1.) Argumentation provides a fruitful way to approach the analysis and interpretation of science classroom discussions and debates, especially for purposes of understanding how teachers and students engage in the construction and evaluation of scientific knowledge claims. Argumentation is a genre of discourse and an epistemological framework central to doing science (Driver et al., 2000; Kuhn, 1993; Lemke, 1990; Siegel, 1995). Whereas the final reports of science that appear in journals and textbooks typically portray science as purely analytical and logical, studies of science in the making (e.g., ethnographies of research groups) reveal that much of science involves dialectical and rhetorical argumentation schemes. Furthermore, as Toulmin (1958) has shown, the critical dynamics of the arguments (i.e., locating warrants, evidence, and reasons) seem to be field or domain dependent. Situating argumentation as a critical element in the design of inquiry learning environments both engages learners in the co-ordination of conceptual and epistemic goals and, for purposes of assessment, can help make thinking and reasoning visible. In this way, epistemic goals are not seen as additional extraneous aspects of science that are marginalized to single lessons or the periphery of the curriculum. Rather, the pursuit of epistemic goals and the establishment of epistemic criteria for the evaluation of science claims (e.g., Sandoval and Millwood, this book) can become a core component of argumentation practices used in science education.
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References Bransford, J., Brown, A., & Cocking, R. (1999). How people learn: Brain, mind, experience and school. Washington, DC: National Academy Press. [http://www.nap.edu] Driver, R., Newton, P., & Osborne, J. (2000). Establishing the norms of scientific argument in classrooms. Science Education, 84(3), 287–313. Driver, R., Leach, J., Millar, R., & Scott, P. (1996). Young people’s images of science. Philadelphia, PA: Open University Press. Duschl, R. A. (1996). Research on the history and philosophy of science. In D. Gabel (Ed.), Handbook of research on science teaching and learning (pp. 443–465). Macmillan: New York. Duschl, R. (2000). Making explicit the nature of science. In R. Millar, J. Leach, & J. Osborne (Eds.), Improving science education: Contributions from research (pp. 187–206). Philadelphia, PA: Open University Press. Duschl, R. A., & Gitomer, D. H. (1997). Strategies and challenges to changing the focus of assessment and instruction in science classrooms. Educational Assessment, 4(1), 37–73. Duschl, R. A., & Grandy, R. (Eds.) (2007). Establishing a consensus agenda for K-12 science inquiry. Rotterdam, The Netherlands: Sense Publishers Duschl, R. A., & Hamilton, R. J. (1997). Conceptual change in science and the learning of science. In B. Fraser & K. Tobin (Eds.), International handbook of science education (pp. 1047–1065). Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic. Duschl, R., & Osborne, J. (2002). Argumentation and discourse processes in science education. Studies in Science Education, 38, 39–72. Duschl, R., Ellenbogen, K., & Erduran, S. (1999). Understanding dialogic argumentation among middle school science students. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Educational Research Association, Montreal, April. Duschl, R., Schweingruber, H., & Shouse, A. (2007). Taking science to school: Learning and teaching science in grades K-8. Washington, DC: National Academy Press. [http://www.nap.edu] Eemeren, F. H. van, Grootendorst, R., Henkemans, F. S., Blair, J. A., Johnson, R. H., Krabbe, E. C. W., Plantin, C., Walton, D. N., Willard, C. A., Woods, J., & Zarefsky, D. (1996). Fundamentals of argumentation theory: A handbook of historical backgrounds and contemporary developments. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. Erduran, S., Simon, S., & Osborne, J. (2004). TApping into argumentation: developments in the application of Toulmin’s argument pattern for studying science discourse. Science Education, 88, 915–933. Goldman, S., Duschl, R., Williams, S. Ellenbogen, K., & Tsou, C. (2002). Interaction and discourse processes during computer mediated communication. In H. Van Oostendorp (Ed.), Cognition in a digital world. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. Hammer, D., & Elby, A. (2003). Tapping epistemological resources from learning physics. Journal of the Learning Sciences, 12, 53–91. Hofer, B. K., & Pintrich, P. R. (Eds.) (2002) Personal epistemology: The psychology of beliefs about knowledge and knowing. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. Hodson, D. (1985). Philosophy of science, science and science education. Studies in Science Education, 12, 25–57. Jiménez-Aleixandre, M. P., Rodrigues, A. B., & Duschl, R. A. (2000). “Doing the lesson” or “doing science”: Argument in high school genetics. Science Education, 84(6), 757–792. Kelly, G. J., & Takao, A. (2002). Epistemic levels in argument: An analysis of university oceanography students’ use of evidence in writing. Science Education, 86(3), 314–342. Kelly, G. J., Chen, C., & Crawford, T. (1998). Methodological considerations for studying science-in-the-making in educational settings. Research in Science Education, 28(1), 23–50. Kelly, G. J., & Crawford, T. (1997). An ethnographic investigation of the discourse processes of school science. Science Education, 81(5), 533–560. Kuhn, D. (1993). Science as argument. Science Education, 77(3) 319–337.
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Lawson, A. (2003). The nature and development of hypothetico-deductive argumentation with implications for science learning. International Journal of Science Education, 25(11), 1378–1408. Lemke, J. (1990). Talking science: Language, learning and values. Norwood, NJ: Ablex. Millar, R., & Osborne, J. F. (Eds.) (1998). Beyond 2000: Science education for the future. London: King’s College London. NAEP (2006). Science framework and specifications for the 2009 National Assessment of Educational Progress, Washington, DC. [http://www.nagb.org] National Research Council (1996). National standards for science education. Washington, DC: National Academy of Sciences Press. Osborne, J. Duschl, R., & Fairbrother, B. (2002). Breaking the mould? Teaching science for public understanding. London: The Nuffield Foundation. Pellegrino, J., Chudowsky, N., & Glaser, R. (2001). Knowing what student know. Washington, DC: National Academy Press. [http://www.nap.edu] Pontecorvo, C., & Girardet, H. (1993). Arguing and reasoning in understanding historical topics. Cognition and Instruction, 11(3&4), 365–395. Rescher, N. (1976). Plausible reasoning: An introduction to the theory and practice of plausible inference. Aspen, CO: Van Gorcum. Rescher, N. (1977). Dialectics: A controversy-oriented approach to the theory of knowledge. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. Sandoval, W. (2003). Conceptual and epistemic aspects of students’ scientific explanations. Journal of the Learning Sciences, 12(1), 5–51. Sandoval, W., & Millwood, K. (2005). The quality of students’ use of evidence in written scientific explanations. Cognition & Instruction, 23(1), 23–55. Sandoval, W., & Reiser, B. (2004). Explanation driven inquiry: Integrating conceptual and epistemic scaffolds for scientific inquiry. Science Education, 88(3), 345–372. Sampson, V., & Clark, D. (2006). Assessment of argument in science education: A critical review of the literature. In Proceedings of International Conference of the Learning Sciences 2006, Bloomington, IN. (pp. 655–661). Sawyer, R. (Ed.) (2006). The Cambridge handbook of the learning sciences. New York: Cambridge University Press. Siegel, H. (1995). Why should educators care about argumentation. Informal Logic, 17(2), 159–176. Takao, A., & Kelly, G. (2003). Assessment of evidence in university students’ scientific writing. Science & Education, 12(4), 341–363. Toulmin, S. (1958). The uses of argument. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Walton, D. N. (1996). Argumentation schemes for presumptive reasoning. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. White, B., & Frederiksen, J. (1998). Inquiry, modeling, and metacognition: Making science accessible to all students. Cognition and Instruction, 16, 3–118. Zohar, A., & Nemet, F. (2002). Fostering students’ knowledge and argumentation skills through dilemmas in human genetics. Journal of Research in Science Teaching, 39(1), 35–62.
Chapter 9
Argumentation in Socio-Scientific Contexts Laurence Simonneaux
This chapter examines some dimensions of argumentation in socio-scientific contexts from a perspective seeking to develop students’ understanding of the interdependence between science and society. The notion of socio-scientific issues as social dilemmas rooted in scientific domains and the notion of “socially acute questions” are discussed in the first section. The goal of improving students’ argumentation skills on socio-scientific issues poses particular challenges, which are examined in the second section. In the third section, the influence of different strategies on students’ argumentation about socio-scientific issues is traced. Organising debates on these issues raises many difficulties for teachers for example the management of uncertainty and controversies. The influence of teachers’ cultural and disciplinary identity and the question of neutrality are the focus of the fourth section.
The Notion of a Socio-Scientific Issue Many science educators believe that one of the goals of science education is to help students develop their understanding of how society and science are mutually dependent. The notion of “socio-scientific issues” (SSI) has been introduced as a way of describing social dilemmas impinging on scientific fields (Gayford, 2002; Kolstø, 2001a; Sadler, 2004; Sadler & Zeidler, 2004; Sadler et al., 2004; Zeidler et al., 2002). These are controversial issues on which competing views are held by different parties and which have implications in one or more of the following fields: biology, sociology, ethics, politics, economics and the environment. The controversial nature of socio-scientific issues is related to the degree of uncertainty involved in many issues. Early work on science studies made a distinction between science and technology. Science was considered as pure and basic whilst technology as an application of science. Contemporary perspectives view science and technology as highly interrelated. The neologism “technosciences” emphasizes the impact of research in everyday life in modern society and its potential controversial implications. When confronted with “technosciences” (no more considered as pure, but eventually influenced by affiliation and vested interests) and their possible environmental S. Erduran and M. P. Jiménez-Aleixandre (eds.), Argumentation in Science Education. © Springer 2007
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risks, science education has to examine the teaching of SSI. An important aim for science educators is to teach science content not only for students’ learning of science, but above all to empower them in their decision-making in their lives. In France, a connected field of research has been developed entitled “questions socialement vives” (Legardez & Alpe, 2001). The term can be translated as “socially acute questions”. These questions may be “socio-sociological” issues like globalization, immigration and unemployment, or socio-scientific issues. They are “acute” in three spheres: ●
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In society: Because they are in relation to the social practices of teachers and students, influenced by their social representations and their value systems. They are covered in the media and students have some knowledge of them. In research fields: There are competing points of view on them. In sciences, they are part of the frontier science; In classrooms: Because they are “acute” in the spheres of research and society. Teachers often feel that they are not capable of dealing with them.
This field of research is now explicitly involved in the new French curricula. The educational challenge is to enable students to develop informed opinions on SSI, to be capable of making choices with respect to preventive measures and to intelligent use of new techniques and, in a citizenship perspective, to be able to debate them. For this purpose, among other requirements, students have to understand the scientific content involved, including its epistemology, and they must be able to identify controversial topics and analyze social implications in economic, political and ethical terms. Given the increasing importance of SSI such as biotechnology or environmental problems, students will have to make thoughtful decisions on such issues and schools should thus prepare them to be informed citizens. For Morin (1998), these issues raise a crucial problem of cognitive democracy. SSI, in Morin’s terms, are “polydisciplinary”, transnational and in a context of increasing globalization, planetary in nature. He advocates for an education based on the necessity of reinforcing critical thinking by linking knowledge to doubt, by integrating particular knowledge in a global context and using it in real life, by developing individuals’ ability to deal with fundamental problems with which they are confronted in their own historical epoch. (Morin, 1998, p. 17)
The teaching of SSI involves dealing with problems that are complex, openended, ill structured and debatable. Sadler (2004) has critically reviewed studies on SSI addressing issues such as relationships between the nature of science (NOS), conceptualizations and decision-making (Bell & Lederman, 2003; Sadler et al., 2004; Zeidler, et al., 2002); the evaluation of information pertaining to SSI (Kolstø, 2001b; Korpan et al., 1997; Sadler et al., 2004; Tytler et al., 2001); and the influence of conceptual understanding on reasoning and argumentation (Fleming, 1986; Hogan, 2002; Tytler et al., 2001; Zeidler & Schafer, 1984). Aikenhead (2006) has extensively reviewed studies about teaching science in a
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perspective connecting with social concerns in students’ everyday life, an approach that Aikenhead calls humanistic and that he views as alternative to the way in which standard school science has been constructed.
Challenges of Argumentation on Socio-Scientific Issues Improving students’ argumentation on SSI poses particular challenges. On the one hand, these topics are controversial providing opportunities for differing views and for engaging in argumentation. On the other hand, the interdisciplinary nature of SSI requires students to bring together different domains. The influence of media and public debates on students’ argumentation in these contexts, the students’ difficulties for building their own autonomous discourse have also to be considered. There is a diversity of goals in dealing with SSI: to improve knowledge understanding, to contribute to citizenship education, to help students to make informed decision, to empower them to participate in debates, to help them to be able to deal with complexity, and to understand better the NOS. Teachers and researchers may focus on one or several of these goals while analyzing students’ argumentation, and consequently researchers will convey different theoretical backgrounds in socio-linguistic and ethno-methodology (Albe, 2005; Simonneaux & Simonneaux, 2005;), in argumentation theories (Erduran et al., 2004; JiménezAleixandre et al., 2000; Osborne et al., 2001), on socio-scientific reasoning (Sadler et al., 2006; Sadler & Donnelly, 2006), on morality and use of value (Kolstø, 2004, 2005; Sadler, 2004; Sadler & Donnelly, 2006), on the students’ use of evidence (Kolstø, 2004) and various methodologies. The question of how to promote and assess quality arguments is not a simple one. A legitimate answer relies on argumentation theories: the best criterion is the ability of students to built a counter-position. However, in the socio-linguistic and pragmatic fields, the use of different counter-positions, which reflects a multi-perspective analysis, can weaken an argument in an oral debate: it gives potential “weapons” to the opponent. Sometimes, the use of rhetorical strategies such as suspicion strengthens the impact of the argument, even with no supporting evidence. In a rubric developed by Sadler & Donnelly (2006) to assess the quality of argumentation on SSI, the criterion of rebuttal dealt with how well participants could rebut a counter-position in support of their own position. A rebuttal had to challenge the grounds of the counter-position, as participants may be able to address a counter-position but fail to challenge its grounds. A second set of criteria are position and rationale: the capacity to offer a coherent, logically consistent argument that included an explanation and rationale for the position taken. Consistent with Toulmin (1958) and recent efforts to assess argumentation (Erduran et al., 2004), they were interested in the extent to which participants could support their positions with grounds (i.e., data, warrants, or backings). A third criterion, multiple perspective-taking, assessed if the participants could think beyond their stated positions to consider perspectives counter to their own ideas. Another way
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to evaluate the quality of students’ argumentation is the socio-scientific reasoning described by Sadler et al. (2006). A high quality argumentation would reflect the recognition of the inherent complexity of the SSI under consideration, the examination of issues from multiple perspectives, the appreciation that this SSI is subject to ongoing inquiry and the expression of scepticism towards potentially biased information. The quality of argumentation can differ according to the teaching strategies (Simonneaux, 2001), and between oral and written situations (Simonneaux & Simonneaux, 2005; Jiménez-Aleixandre et al., 2006). Contextual variables have an impact on the quality of argumentation, some dimensions of argumentation are situated specific to the situation in which they are revealed.
The Influence of Media on Students’ Argumentation Knowledge can be developed during verbal exchanges in a debate. According to Vygotsky (1935), mental processes have social origins and the transition between interpersonal and intrapersonal occurs through gradual internalization of semiotic processes. Therefore if a class of students is involved in a debate this may lead to the construction of individual knowledge. The debate is intended to enable students to develop knowledge together or to co-construct it. The debate hinges on knowledge which is not given as input but which has to be constructed. However, on SSI, the media or their social milieu largely shapes the students’ line of reasoning. The goal would be to get them to distance themselves from arguments adopted from the media, encouraging them to think for themselves by analyzing the information available and then to express their own thoughts. Argumentation is an intrinsic part of learning as knowledge is gradually developed through informed debate.
The Interdisciplinary Nature of Argumentation in SSI With respect to SSI, the knowledge is not only controversial, but also involves a plurality of disciplines. Classroom debates on socially controversial issues, due to their very nature, cannot be limited to a single discipline. The knowledge involved constitutes what Fourez (1997) calls islets of rationality, which are interdisciplinary in nature. For the study of SSI in the classroom, Fourez suggests making students build islets of rationality within the scope of specific authentic projects. The islets, built to improve students’ decision-making, combine knowledge from different disciplines but this implies an epistemological reconstruction of the knowledge. The context and the fields of disciplines involved had to be defined in order to build up a debating situation in the classroom, as argumentation on SSI involves not only content but also social dimensions and values. Dolz and Schneuwly (1998) defined four dimensions to be taken into account when choosing a debating theme, some of
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which are specific of socio-scientific debates, and not necessarily of science debates: psychological, including motivation; cognitive; social, including ethical aspects; and pedagogical. During the last decades several studies have focused on the analysis of students’ decision-making and argumentation on SSI (Jiménez Aleixandre et al., 2000; Kolstø, 2001a; 2004; Kortland, 1996; Patronis et al., 1999; Sadler & Zeidler, 2004; Sadler et al., 2004; Zeidler, 2002; Zohar & Nemet, 2002). In my view in most of them, although not quoting Dolz and Schneuwly, these four dimensions are present. An instance of the different strands of knowledge involved in argumentation on SSI is Kolstø’s (2001a) study of students’ views on the trustworthiness of claims involved in a local SSI. He found that the students partly sought to evaluate science-related claims and partly took the trustworthiness of these for granted. The students focused on the source of information, using evaluation criteria like competence and potential conflict of interests. The knowledge and values used by students in their decision-making are the focus of a study about whether power transmission lines ought to be put underground to reduce the potential risk of leukaemia for children (Kolstø, 2004). The influence of students’ conceptualizations of the nature of science (NOS) on their analysis of global warming has been explored by Sadler et al. (2004). They found that interpretation and evaluation of conflicting evidence on this topic was influenced by a variety of factors related to NOS such as data interpretation and social interactions including individuals’ own articulation of personal beliefs and scientific knowledge. The focus on the development of a scientific culture for all has increased interest in socio-scientific issues. Debates are considered as a potential way for improving conceptual change (Sadler & Zeidler, 2005), or for epistemological apprenticeship and knowledge on NOS (Bell & Lederman, 2003) for which registers such as emotional, social or moral ones are relevant. Among the skills needed in such debates, Bell and Lederman mention the aptitude to recognize pseudo-scientific statements and to apply scientific knowledge in the “real world”. The importance of values in these debates is highlighted by Grace and Ratcliffe (2002) in a study about decisionmaking on biological conservation issues. The choice of the topic is important, as Sadler and Zeidler (2005) show that some topics encourage the use of an emotional register in detriment of a rational one.
Impact of Different Strategies on Developing Students’ Argumentation on SSI Different teaching strategies have been used in studies on how to improve students’ decision-making and argumentation on SSI. For instance Kolstø (2000) used the consensus project model. Zohar and Nemet (2002) used debates and decision-making about 10 moral dilemmas with personal consequences involving modern Genetics. Jiménez-Aleixandre and Pereiro (2002) used a fictitious consultancy on an environmental management project. One question to be taken into account when building
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up a debate in the classroom is the choice of the context. Placing students in specific contexts, for instance, a company, a village or a school, encourages them to take a stand, which would be more difficult in a decontextualized abstract problem. The context can be local or global, authentic or quasi-authentic (fictional but potentially real). The situations may take into account social groups (e.g., farmers, consumers), who are identified in terms of their socio-professional category, interests, motivation, questions or values. In this section I will examine the influence of different strategies in argumentation. First, I will focus on the type of discussion, either debate, where the students speak in their own names, or role-play, where they play a role to enable them to better identify with different points of view. Second, I will examine the influence on argumentation of a training based on interdiscursive analysis of contradictory discourses. Third the impact of a quasi-authentic situation about genetic screening will be reviewed and finally the impact of an authentic (and real) context of an oil spill will be presented.
Role-Play or Debate? In the context of the European Initiative for Biotechnology Education (EIBE), involving science educators from 17 European countries, and funded by the European Commission, we have worked on developing the content of biotechnology education for the purpose of educating students as future actors. EIBE aims included analyzing the ways in which practices, beliefs and values can influence acceptance of biotechnology, and fostering debate in society by developing forms of education that incorporate the personal, social, ethical, economic and environmental implications of biotechnology. A teaching unit on animal transgenesis was developed. We draw on Canadian studies on the production of giant transgenic salmon expressing a foreign gene for the growth hormone, dubbed Sumotori salmon after Japanese wrestlers. In a quasi-experimental study on the dynamics of argumentation about this Sumotori salmon module, we found that conventional debating enables more sophisticated argumentation than role-playing (Simonneaux, 2001). Although the situation was fictional, it was designed to be realistic and “quasiauthentic” so as not to reinforce students’ perceptions of biotechnology as somehow magical and all-powerful. To foster the multidisciplinary argumentation of students, we listed the economic, ecological, ethical, health, legal and political repercussions as seen by those concerned that we interviewed (e.g., researchers and fish farmers) A detailed presentation of the role-playing is found in Simonneaux (2001). The students were faced with a situation fictitious but realistic: they had to decide whether or not they agreed with the installation of a Sumotori genetically modified salmon farm in a seaside village, close to a fishing harbour. The local population is concerned about this project. A group including fishermen, consumers, conservationists, and traditional fish farmers form a committee to fight
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against the project. However, the Sumotori fish farmer rallied support from the owner of the canning factory and part of the local council. The Mayor organizes a debate with experts. Students acted out the roles of people taking part in this public debate and the teacher played the role of the Mayor. This role-playing performance has been compared with a conventional debate on the same topic. There were differences in the disciplinary fields and social references on which the students based their arguments. In the role-play, the disciplinary fields supporting the arguments were: economics, ecology, genetics, medicine and ethics. Politics, law and professional fields were absent. In the debate, the disciplinary fields supporting students’ arguments were: science, economics, ecology, politics and medicine. Law, ethics, genetics and professional fields were absent. Among all the studies we have conducted so far, this was the first in which changes of opinions were observed. Before and after formal and informal learning sequences on biotechnology, we had always found knowledge being appropriated without any changes of opinion. But in those situations, the students had not been asked to discuss the issues. Perhaps by expressing points of view and being confronted with opposing arguments students clarify their thoughts on a given subject (Barnes & Todd, 1977; Lewis et al., 1999). A certain number of indicators were quantified: duration of discussion, number of interventions absolute and per minute, number of teacher interventions and number of message units, that is the smallest units of linguistic meaning that reveal the ways actors construct their actions in a conversation (Kelly et al., 1998). Toulmin’s layout (1958) was used to analyze the students’ argumentation. In addition to the Toulmin’s components, others were added: challenge (Resnick et al., 1993), empirical and hypothetical data (Kelly et al., 1998), and opposition and concession (Sóñora et al., 2001). In order to analyze the complexity of debates, different discursive components borrowed from these or other authors were introduced as for instance: declaration, question, critical question, restarting, objection, agreement, avoidance, revealing gaps or uncertainty and value judgment. The debate is perceived as being a socio-discursive interactive event. Within this conceptual framework, language is considered as an activity and each linguistic action can support another action, for instance, a declaration can support an opposition. As the analysis of the argument episodes was developed, we refined our conceptual argument system in order to take into account the rhetorical schemes, which Breton (1996) does not consider as legitimate actions within argumentation as they prevent the discussion to go on. Rhetorical schemes are specific linguistic actions such as provocation, suspicion, promise, and irony. The following interaction illustrates a discussion using rhetoric. Gourmet:
Communication student: Gourmet: Communication student: Gourmet:
We’ve always eaten high quality fish. I don’t see why we should now start eating any old fish bred with human genes and mad cows. (Provocation) That’s the society we’re living in Sir! Society is making people sick nowadays! (Irony) Society is making progress! It’s not making much progress!
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The argumentation strategies were analyzed by making a distinction between simple arguments based on only one bit of evidence from multiple arguments consisting of several encapsulated bits of evidence or linear evidence. In the role-playing situation more interventions were made than during the debate. The students tried to slip in information or questions through the mouths of the individuals they were pretending to be. There was more discussion time in the debate than in the roleplaying. The role-playing was interrupted from time to time by the Mayor (the teacher), commenting on the usefulness of the Sumotori breed. Though supposed to remain neutral, the teacher could not prevent herself from giving her point of view. During the debate, not only did the students get involved in the debating topics suggested by the teacher but also they themselves suggested topics for debate. In the analysis of argument episodes, we have not been able to identify a canonical typical argument. Looking at dialogue has led us, first, to identify rhetorical schemes as well as axiological (value judgments) or prescriptive statements, and second, various types of linguistic actions that take place in exchanges (critical question, reformulated question, reminder, answer, objection, agreement, avoidance, revealing gaps or uncertainty). Table 9.1 compares the debate and role-play along different criteria. As seen in the table, during the debate, interventions were longer and more complex, 1.07 interventions per minute as opposed to 3.18 in the role-playing, and the arguments were more developed and based on valid data. In the role-playing students spoke for shorter periods of time, arguments were simple and sometimes based on invalid data (students interpreted incorrectly the information provided in the description of their role). During the debate the students used 35 multiple arguments, whereas in the role-playing, they only used 8. In the role-playing students tended to use more rhetorical schemes including irony and provocation (24 in 55 minutes as opposed to 2 for 94 minutes of debate). They were acting a role as best they could but their arguments were superficial and not based on their own point of view but on the description of the role they were playing. They did not necessarily agree with the opinions of the individual they were playing. In summary, the argumentation quality was higher in the debate than in the role-play.
Table 9.1 Comparison of the debate and the role-play (an Intervention is a Turn) Debate Role-playing Duration in minutes Number of interventions Number of interventions per minute Number of times the teacher intervened Number of student linguistic actions Number of arguments (containing at least one bit of evidence) Number of multiple arguments Number of invalid arguments (with respect to scientific disciplines or to information provided) Number of rhetorical schemes
94 101 1.07 35 242 36 35 2 2
55 175 3.18 16 296 35 8 8 24
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Impact of Interdiscursive Analysis of Contradictory Discourses on GMOs on Students Argumentation The effect of training on argumentation and in particular the effect of the analysis of argumentation of influential people with conflicting views, was examined in a quasi-experimental study with a class of 24 students in 12th grade. During the first stage students were given two texts expressing conflicting opinions and called upon to write their own opinion and to identify the information they wanted to obtain (i.e., pre-test). The students were then ranked according to their argumentation in terms of the number of valid arguments developed and the number of supporting arguments for a given point. In the second stage, the experimental group, composed of half of the “good (11) and bad (13) debaters” participated in a comparative analysis of two new texts with opposing views. The interdiscursive analysis attempted to study characteristics of the discourses as: Who is speaking? What stakes are involved? What is the context?—the argumentation developed, in terms of the type of argument, its validity, its powerfulness, whether it was justified; and to identify argumentation markers in the form of specific words. Students were taught to recognize modalizations, in other words a marker or a set of formal markers by which people express the extent of their agreement with the content of the discourse. Bronckart’s (1996) four categories of modalization were used: ●
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Logical: Judgments as to the degree of truth of the postulates; these are described as certain, possible, or probable. Deontic: Evaluate in terms of social values; the facts expressed are presented as (socially) acceptable, forbidden, necessary, or desirable. Appreciative: Subjective judgment; the facts expressed are presented as fortunate, unfortunate, strange according to the person evaluating. Pragmatic: Judge an aspect of the personal responsibility for a process; these concern capacity for action (the power to do something), intention (wanting to do something) and reasons (the justification for doing something).
In the third stage, both the experimental (10 students left) and the control group (11 students left) wrote their opinion on two new texts with conflicting views about the interaction between GMO (Genetically Modified Organisms) production and developing countries (post-test). A debate was then held. Almost half of the students in the experimental group, trained between pretest and post-test were found to have developed more sophisticated written arguments in terms of number of valid arguments and number of supporting arguments for a given point. The quality of the arguments in the control group did not vary. All forms of modalization were used. On the other hand the training did not appear to affect the quality of oral argumentation in the debate, which seemed to be influenced more by personal and social factors. The students who spoke out most during the debate and who developed the most valid argumentation were those who defined themselves, during our interviews with
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them, as the most “actively committed ecologists”, both from the experimental and the control group. According to Tutiaux-Guillon and Mousseau (1998) students having already a political implication integrated more content knowledge. Furthermore they developed much more sophisticated argumentation during oral debate than in their written texts. The students who did not take part in the oral debate were those with the lower academic results (in French, philosophy, biology and agronomy). The contents and disciplinary issues raised by students were analyzed with a double purpose: first to assess whether the debate improved the knowledge construction by giving an operational status to content and second to identify the discipline fields conveyed by the students and the quality of their content knowledge. Arguments relied on various disciplines: economy, politics, biology–ecology, and law. But some content knowledge was used only in an approximated way. In summary, the training was effective in improving the quality of written argumentation but not in improving the quality of the oral argumentation.
Students’ Argumentation and Co-construction of Knowledge about Genetic Screening in a Muslim Context Muslim Tunisian students have been confronted with a dilemma about prenatal screening for sickle cell anaemia (Chalghoumi & Simonneaux, 2006). It is a frequent disease in Tunisia where consanguine weddings are not rare. We wanted to assess the impact of a socio-ethical debate on students’ conceptual understanding, on the quality of their argumentation and on their decision-making. The students’ exchanges were analyzed with the “natural logic” of Grize (1996) relying on the analysis of the logic-discursive operations, which allows the construction, or reconstruction of a schematization. For Grize schematization is a discursive representation oriented towards a recipient that allows representing operations of objects and subjects. Through the discussion, objects evolve enriched by the addition of new terms and reformulations. This is the way of the co-construction of knowledge. At the end of the debate, most of the students accepted genetic screening, but were opposed to abortion (Fig. 9.1). In their decision-making, religious, social and ethical arguments were predominant over scientific arguments. The construction of reasoning about genetic screening and eventually abortion accounts for the dynamics of the debate. The students used their knowledge in genetics and genetic engineering and co-constructed notions (the objects) through their “collective schematization”. A pre–post test attests the learning of genetics and genetic engineering, which have been mobilized during the debate. But, unexpectedly, it attests also to a better understanding of genetics concepts that have not been used, as if this real world situation had improved the semantic reorganization of the knowledge learned previously.
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Prenatal screening
Abortion Reasoning taking into account 1. Properties
Method involving some risks
a. scientific knowledge
Acceptable
b. religious arguments
Deontologically tolerated
c. ethical arguments
Admissible to reassure the family
d. social arguments
acceptable
Positive connotation: It is reassuring
Forbidden Deontologically unacceptable Inadmissible because of the judgments of the society
2. Action scheme Evaluation of knowledge and arguments through students’ interactions 3. Relation Value judgement
unacceptable
Negative connotation: It is a sin
Fig. 9.1 Students’ reasoning about the objects: Prenatal screening and abortion. Inspired from the model of Grize
Impact of an Authentic Socio-Scientific Issue on Students’ Argumentation The arguments of 12th-grade students—evaluating scientists’ opposed predictions on the evolution of the Prestige oil spill, which hit the Galician coast in November 2002—have been analyzed by Jiménez-Aleixandre et al. (2004). The focus was on warrants used to support one or another position, on the articulation of scientific authority and empirical data from sources including their own experience. The authors focused on debates in small groups, about a controversy among scientists on the potential degradation of the oil before arriving to the shoreline versus the implausibility of that degradation in a short time, framed in a debate about the existence or not of a black slick. The analysis drew on Toulmin’s argument layout and Walton’s (1996) categories for experts’ arguments. Five out of six groups supported the scientist who predicted that the oil degradation was slow, and one criticized both. The students placed higher their own experience than the opinion of the scientist who predicted a quick degradation, whose status as expert was undermined by her affiliation to a tankers’ owner organization. The issue presented to the students is a real world issue, drawn from their immediate context, part of a controversy that shattered the Galician society. The task is designed in a cognitive apprenticeship perspective, seeking to relate knowledge and skills to their use in the real world. The authors agree with Aikenhead (1985) in assuming that processing scientific information involves political and moral judgments about, for instance, what
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constitutes an acceptable interpretation of evidence. Aikenhead (1985) discusses the ethical, ideological and cultural values related to the social context of science and the proposal of a spectrum or continuum of scientific issues from more to less “value laden”. For Jiménez-Aleixandre et al. the issue of the black slick under discussion falls close to the more value-laden end of the continuum. The debate is not simply a matter of how quickly or slowly the degradation would occur, but also involves contrasting environmental versus economical values hierarchies (as in the need or not of expensive antipollution barriers or ships), affective issues (as the identification of Galician people with the coast landscape), political stances (as the evaluation of the government management of the disaster), or even broader global issues as the use of oil or fossil fuels versus other renewable energy sources. We can summarize some outcomes about the impact of teaching strategies to develop students’ argumentation on SSI. Though the quality of argumentation is difficult to assess (Erduran, this book), it seems that the context, not only the contextualization of the issue, but also the teaching strategy has an impact on the students’ argumentation. According to Kolstø and Ratcliffe (this book), social context including learning environment and teaching strategies influences the kind of argument used. On SSI, argumentation can be justified using content knowledge in a more or less sophisticated way (multiple or simple justifications, plural or single disciplinary ones), but also, and often mainly on values. Focusing on content knowledge, Lewis and Leach (2006) show that the capacity to engage in reasoned discussion of applications of gene technology is influenced by the ability to recognize key issues, dependent of the understanding of relevant scientific knowledge. They found that the requisite scientific knowledge base is relatively modest and can be taught through brief teaching interventions. However knowledge about NOS should be a prerequisite for argumentation on SSI, for students being able to recognize that science is provisional and that SSI involve uncertainties and conceptual change may be improved through argumentation on SSI. Social and cultural values influence students’ argumentation on SSI. Moral and sometimes religious issues are taken into account by the students. Kolstø (2005) argues that students should be taught that science involves epistemic and social values. On SSI, evidence may be considered in different lights according to institutional interests. Are students capable to identify vested interests in experts’ positions? Argumentation on SSI should be considered in a multiple perspective way. According to Oulton et al. (2004), the purpose of teaching SSI is to promote students’ understanding of controversial issues, to develop students’ open mindedness, thirst for more information, and ability to identify bias and reflect critically. The latter goals are close to some characteristics of the socio-scientific reasoning described by Sadler et al. (2006). A relevant criterion to assess argumentation on SSI could be the ability to consider the issue in its complexity and from various levels of organization, for instance from local to global.
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Teachers’ Roles in Promoting Argumentation on Socio-Scientific Issues On acute and controversial issues, the impact of the teachers may be high. Two potential influences are analyzed; first the impact of disciplinary teachers’ identity, second the role they play during the debating situation.
Impact of Disciplinary Teachers’ Identity on Their Attitude towards Teaching SSI With the objective of examining the attitudes of teachers of different subjects (biology–ecology, history–geography, agricultural machinery, mathematics, physical sciences, animal and vegetal production) towards the teaching of SSI, a questionnaire was submitted to 183 pre-service and in-service teachers (Albe & Simonneaux, 2002). According to Ajzen’s (1991) theory of planned behavior, individuals’ intentions have a direct impact on their behavior, in this case on teachers’ practice. The teachers’ intentions depend on their positive or negative attitude towards the teaching of SSI, on their perception of socio-professional requirements, of the norms imposed by their environment, and of their own control over the educational practice. The results show that, overall, teachers are in favour of teaching that deals with controversial SSI, and at the same time revealed different factors of motivation and resistance concerning the introduction of SSI, depending on the subject taught and the teacher’s experience. All the teachers consider very important, “to encourage open-mindedness” (ranging from 74% for life science teachers to 50% for history and geography teachers) and “to help develop a critical mind” (from 71% for life science to 52% for agricultural machinery). Next in agreement about relevance, the teachers of life sciences, physical sciences, and history and geography agreed on the importance of “to educate students in citizenship”. On the other hand, teachers of agricultural machinery had the highest proportion of those who found the following three items to be not very important: “to educate students in citizenship”, “because they are socially important concerns” and “because they are relevant to current affairs”, an item for which answer percentages varied from 30% to 61%. Seventeen percent still considered that “to discuss the limits of scientific knowledge and the issues at stake” was not very important. For this last item there was even a smaller proportion (8%). of history and geography teachers who choose it as very important. Among the items with greatest range (from 25% to 54%) of different answers was also “to train students in debating skill”. Teachers of life sciences, followed by these of physics and chemistry, had the highest proportion of those who choose most items in the questionnaire as very important. Their intentions appear to be focused on the training of students as future
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citizens and on dealing with socially important issues in order to initiate students to the epistemology and sociology of scientific disciplines. However, teachers of agricultural machinery were not concerned with these last issues, although agreeing on the importance of introducing controversial scientific issues to develop students’ critical thinking. For teachers who seem to remain faithful to the productivist model in agriculture, the concept of sustainable development runs counter to a disciplinary culture in which the essential aim of teaching is to reduce operating costs through the use of complex technical equipment. Manpower is replaced by automated systems, and treatments are overdeveloped in order to intensify production, with no questions being asked about the environmental impacts of such practices (water and soil pollution, landscape change) or their economic consequences. Perhaps, for these teachers “preparing future generations” means providing enough food for future generations, or preparing them to use the most efficient technology, rather than to reflect on socially controversial scientific issues. For the great majority of the teachers, the norms imposed by their environment (i.e., parents, colleagues, the Ministry and curricula) are considered as “not very important” in relation to the teaching of controversial SSI. It appears that the teachers interviewed don’t feel much external pressure concerning the teaching of SSI. The teachers who appear to be most in favour of teaching controversial SSI are those who teach life sciences followed by those who teach physical sciences. The teachers of life sciences have emphasized how important it is to have enough time to prepare for and to lead a debate in the classroom in a multidisciplinary approach, but the physical sciences teachers, while apparently accepting the idea of a multidisciplinary approach, stress that it is important for them to master all of the disciplines involved which contradicts the idea of different teachers being involved in the same module. This study demonstrates the influence of the socio-professional and disciplinary culture of teachers. Sainsaulieu (1996) and Dubar (1991) have delved deeper into the building up of professional identities, which influence how teachers see their place in society. Dubar describes an identity-building process during which the worlds of work and employment combine with the world of formative experience to make up areas that are relevant in terms of the social identification of individuals. According to him, starting a course in a disciplinary field is a significant act of virtual identity. Should we agree with Cole (1990) Désautels and Larochelle (1994) in seeing teachers confined within behavior patterns that reflect compliance with the dominant culture? Or can we hope that teachers’ schemas can still evolve? However, teaching of this sort is rare in educational establishments. Even though science teachers claim to seek objectives that are humanist and—to a lesser degree—socio-epistemological, resistances were observed during their training. Teaching science means teaching facts and certainties and addressing these issues means venturing into registers which, teachers may feel, are not legitimately theirs. Conducting debates means wasting precious time and placing themselves at risk. Research at European level has shown that science and technology teachers feel responsible for teaching facts, but do not feel they have the required competence in social and ethical questions or in managing debates. Levinson and Turner
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(2001) summed up the main result from a large-scale survey in England and Wales as half of all science teachers interviewed feel that teaching science should be “value free”. This argues in favour of a multidisciplinary approach to the teaching of controversial SSI. Teaching SSI requires introducing ethics into science teaching, which is not unanimously agreed upon. Reiss (1999) discusses the arguments used, for instance opponents believe that the two areas are fundamentally different and rest on different concepts. Science does not rest upon values; it is objective and cannot be judged by ethical standards. Furthermore, science teachers are not trained to teach ethics. The arguments in favour of ethics teaching are socio-epistemological in nature: scientific knowledge is built up in specific social contexts, conditioned by the interests, motivations and aspirations of scientists and funding organizations and has aims, which may be considered good or bad. See Zeidler and Sadler (this book) for a discussion of the role of ethical reasoning in argumentation.
The Role of Teachers in Leading Debates: The Question of Neutrality Training teachers to lead debating situations poses particular problems. Leading debates involves managing emotions, which may come into play in potentially conflicting argumentation and hence being careful not to stop students from arguing. Not all science teachers feel capable of conducting this type of interdiscursive activity. Should we consider training science teachers to do this or should we develop interdisciplinary training with science teachers and teachers of humanities? We could train teachers by analyzing debates either conducted by other teachers or by themselves, One difficult issue is that of the neutrality of teachers leading the debates. For instance, in the Sumotori role-play the teacher was unable to remain neutral in performing the Mayor’s role. The following exchange shows that the students, when it came to voting, were aware of the impact of the teacher/mayor on their classmates: Mayor: Foodie: Switched-on communications student:
Foodie: Mayor:
Traditional fish farmer: Fish physiology researcher:
My concern is for the development of our village. Someone’s getting a bribe, we’ll take another vote. Right, who’s in favour? Nobody. Who’s against? If you’d done communications studies, Sir, you’d realise there’s a boss here who keeps the meeting in order. So who’s the boss? The Mayor of your village, Sir. I’m here because I’m responsible for our citizens’ welfare. We’ll take a final vote. Who’s in favour of the project? Five. Who’s neutral? Two. No, I didn’t raise my hand. You’re not allowed to influence people. Careful!
The student playing the part of the communications student put her finger on the institutional relationship with the teacher. Kelly (1986), one of the first researchers who
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considered using debates for classroom study of controversial issues, distinguishes four attitudes that teachers might adopt, exclusive neutrality, exclusive partiality, neutral impartiality and committed impartiality. Those in favour of exclusive neutrality believe that teachers should not broach controversial themes, that scientific discoveries are value free. They subscribe to a positivistic approach, which has been widely criticized. There are two main arguments against their position: first, teachers always convey values, if only through the examples they choose; second, one task assigned to schools in a democratic society is to train citizens capable of debating controversial scientific issues, which means that the school must stay in touch with real life. Exclusive partiality is characterized by the deliberate intention to bring students to adopt a specific point of view on a controversial issue. In this case, teachers ignore contradictory positions or brush them aside as insignificant. They believe that their mission is to provide students with intellectual certainties. Those in favour of neutral impartiality believe that students should debate controversial issues as part of their education to become citizens while teachers should remain neutral. For some supporters of this position, teachers should remain silent and neutral so as to maintain their authority and should not reveal their views, uncertainty or ignorance, while others believe they should remain neutral in order not to influence students’ argumentation. This position, which is nevertheless quite appealing, has been criticized. It is important that students have the opportunity of comparing their points of view to those of a role model adult such as the teacher. Moreover, as mentioned above, teachers always convey their values, albeit unconsciously and neutrality is an illusion. Concerning the position of committed impartiality, an apparently paradoxical position, teachers give their points of view while encouraging analysis of competing points of view on the controversial issues. This is the position recommended by Kelly, since students, who are encouraged to debate their teachers’ ideas by challenging their validity with no fear of sanctions, are then able to develop skills and courage for social commitment. According to Kelly, the balance between personal commitment and impartiality catalyses students’ ability to think and argue critically and to express themselves courageously. When students are treated as colleagues, they feel more grown up. However many authors continue to recommend that teachers remain neutral (Henderson & Lally, 1988, Reiss, 1993). Nevertheless, Oulton et al. (2004) defend the idea that teachers should explain their points of view while teaching, so that students become aware of the danger of teachers developing possibly biased arguments. It may be seen that students’ discourse may be more or less limited by the institutional role of the teacher leading the debate, as they might think it worthwhile to adopt the teacher’s opinion. In any case the students always try to determine teachers’ opinions throughout the debates and ask them to say what they think. One risk of teaching controversial issues might be that of indoctrinating students by presenting only one point of view. However it is probably impossible to defend different points of view in a balanced way and it is illusory for teachers to think they are being neutral. Finally, a fundamental point of this kind of teaching is that it makes students aware of the danger of biased thinking.
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An interesting question is how do the teachers perceive their role in the teaching of controversial SSI. We tried to examine it through a study with a sample of 55 teachers at agricultural training schools in France. First they responded to a closed questionnaire on NOS and the relations between sciences, technology and societies and to an open-ended questionnaire on the role of the teacher in the teaching of controversial SSI. Teachers’ opinions of the scientists were found to be positive (70%) or very positive (20%), and that scientific research is beneficial (70%), or very beneficial (20%) to society. All of them considered that scientific research produces provisional truth. But at the same time, 20% thought that it comes to the production of universal truths. 70% believed that scientific research produces risks and 85% that it produces uncertainties. 66% considered that research depends on the moral values of the scientists. Teachers believed that personal motivations affected the outcome of research: satisfying financial backers (81%), wanting to be the first to produce knowledge in their field (76%), getting personal satisfaction (67%), career ambitions (65%) or satisfying the employers (49%). Of these, 86% of the teachers believed that private financing influences research, 80% that research is influenced by public financing and 75% that it depends on policy orientations. Confirming the results of a previous study (Albe & Simonneaux, 2002) it was found that 52 out of 55 teachers believed that controversial SSI should be dealt with. The three teachers who thought that the SSI should not be dealt with justified their positions by saying respectively: “It’s up to them to see”; “It’s not our role”; “We don’t have time”. The positive responses of the teachers may be classified into three groups according to the number of times they were observed in discourse. For the first group the priority was that SSIs should be dealt with so that students could form their own opinions. For the second, that it was necessary to give students true scientific data, rectifying their mistakes, in order to develop students’ critical faculties, to train them to be future citizens, to develop their debating skills, to encourage their open-mindedness. For the third group it is teachers’ duty to inform students for reasons as: for their general culture, so that they may evaluate what is at stake, so that they can identify contradictory points of view, since these issues will affect the future of humanity, because the environment is complex, it has to be learnt through an interdisciplinary approach, or because it is part of the curriculum. In a second stage, 34 teachers from this sample took part in training on the teaching of SSI. Following the training, we handed out again their completed questionnaires, so that they might validate, invalidate, qualify or give more details concerning their previous answers. The training took place over periods of three to five days, including activities as: ●
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Participation in role-playing to overcome teachers’ perceptions about their difficulties for being implemented. Analysis of debates in classroom on controversial SSI. Analysis of stakes and controversies about some SSI. Interdiscursive analysis of contradictory discourses on SSI.
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Analysis of different actors’ conceptions and knowledge about controversial SSI. Presentation of the teachers’ role. Presentation of a method for building debates in the classroom. Conception of debating situations on SSI of their choice in small groups
Prior to training teachers adopted a neutral impartiality position. Following the training, they considered other positions, depending in particular on the issues; certain were destabilized and no longer know what the right position should be. And most of them accepted the idea of committed impartiality. They then brought into question the existence of absolute, objective and neutral knowledge after reflecting about the stakes and controversies related to SSI, but also because they realized that their colleagues had different points of view. They became aware of the impossibility of reducing SSI to mere scientific facts.
Discussion Classroom debates on controversial SSI have a different impact to that of debates on scientific notions in general. All debates have an epistemological importance in that they should enable students to understand NOS. One of the main goals of teaching SSI is to prepare future informed citizens. What is at stake in debates on SSI is a whole approach based on a loop dynamic between research and the evolution of society. SSI bring into question value systems and practices and even the symbolic foundations of society. They should thus be grasped in their “controversial” social and scientific dimensions. Students’ argumentation on SSI depends on the context developed in the teaching strategy. The type of strategy, the topic of the debate and the influence of personal and social factors influence students’ argumentation. Organising debates on SSI raises many difficulties for teachers: the questions of interdisciplinarity and complexity, the management of uncertainty and controversies, the importance of social implications, the management of potential intersubjective conflicts, the question of neutrality versus commitment of the teacher. Argumentation on SSI, due to their very nature, is not restricted to a single discipline or approach and it is necessary to analyze the contribution of various disciplinary teachers in the school settings. It is also important to consider the role of the teachers, in particular the status of their neutrality. The teachers who choose, in the last study presented here, a committed impartiality position may see their role as part of the socio-critical current. They did not wish to train politically committed people, for instance, future destroyers of GMO, but they believed that their job is to identify the quality of the sources used for debates, the limitations of facts and the social repercussions which would enable students to participate in debates as critical citizens. The observation that committed impartiality is chosen suggests that teachers will eventually be prepared to get involved in a cooperative approach
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with students based on the socio-constructivist theory, emphasising the importance for learning of interactions between students as well as students and teachers
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Hogan, K. (2002). Small groups’ ecological reasoning while making an environmental management decesion. Journal of Research in Science Teaching, 39, 341–368. Jiménez-Aleixandre, M. P., & Pereiro Muñoz, C. (2002). Knowledge producers or knowledge consumers? Argumentation and decision making about environmental management. International Journal of Science Education, 24 (11), 1171–1190. Jiménez-Aleixandre M. P., Agraso, M. F., & Eirexas, F. (2004). Scientific authority and empirical data in argument warrants about the Prestige oil spill. Paper presented at the National Association for Research in Science Teaching (NARST) annual meeting, Vancouver, Canada, April. Jiménez-Aleixandre, M. P., Bugallo Rodriguez, A., & Duschl, R. A. (2000). “Doing the lesson” or “Doing science”: Argument in high school genetics. Science Education, 84, 757–792. Jiménez-Aleixandre, M. P., Eirexas, F., & Agraso, M. F. (2006). Use of evidence in arguments about a socio scientific issue by 12th grade students: Choices about heating systems and energy sources. Paper presented at the National Association for Research in Science Teaching (NARST) annual meeting, San Francisco, April. Kelly, G. J., Druker, S., & Chen, C. (1998). Students’ reasoning about electricity: Combining performance assessment with argumentation analysis. International Journal of Science Education, 20, 849–871. Kelly, T. (1986). Discussing controversial issues: Four perspectives on the teacher’s role. Theory and Research in Social Education, 14, 113–138. Kolstø, S. D. (2000). Consensus projects: Teaching science for citizenship. International Journal of Science Education, 22, 6, 645–664. Kolstø, S. D. (2001a). Scientific literacy for citizenship: Tools for dealing with the science dimension of controversial socioscientific issues. Science Education, 85, 291–310. Kolstø, S. D. (2001b). To trust or not to trust… pupils’ ways of judging information encountered in a socioscientific issue. International Journal of Science Education, 23, 877–901. Kolstø, S. D. (2004). Students’ argumentation: Knowledge, values and decisions. In E. K. Henriksen & M. Odegaard (Eds.), Naturfagenes didaktikk—en disciplin i forandring? Det7. nordiske forskersymposiet om undervisning i naturfag i skolen (pp. 63–78). Kristiansand, Norway: Hoyskoleforlaget AS. Kolstø, S. D. (2005).The relevance of values for coping with socioscientific issues in science education. Paper presented at the ESERA conference 2005 in Barcelona, Spain. Korpan, C. A., Bisanz, G. L., Bisanz, J., & Henderson, J. M. (1997). Assessing literacy in science: Evaluation of scientific news briefs. Science Education, 81, 515–532. Kortland, K. (1996). An STS case study about students’ decision making on the waste issue. Science Education, 80, 673–689. Legardez, A., & Alpe, Y. (2001). La construction des objets d’enseignements scolaires sur des questions socialement vives: Problématisation, stratégies didactiques et circulations des savoirs, 4ème Congrès AECSE Actualité de la recherche en éducation et formation, Lille, France, September. Levinson, R., & Turner, S. (2001). Valuable lessons engaging with the social context of science in schools. London: Wellcome Trust. Lewis, J., Leach, J., & Wood-Robinson, C. (1999). Attitude des jeunes face à la technologie génétique. In L. Simonneaux (Ed.), Les biotechnologies à l’école (pp. 65–95). Dijon, France: Educagri éditions. Lewis, J., & Leach, J. (2006). Discussion of Socio-scientific Issues: The role of science knowledge. International Journal of Science Education, 28, 11, 1267–1288. Morin, E. (1998). Pourquoi et comment articuler les savoirs? Paris: PUF. Osborne, J., Erduran, S., Simon, S., & Monk, M. (2001). Enhancing the quality of argument in school science. School Science Review, 82 (301), 63–70. Oulton, C., Dillon, J., & Grace, M. (2004). Reconceptualizing the teaching of controversial issues. International Journal of Science Education, 26 (4), 411–424. Patronis, T., Potari, D., & Spiliotopoulou, V. (1999). Students’ argumentation in decision-making on a socio-scientific issue: Implication for teaching. International Journal of Science Education, 21, 745–754.
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Reiss, M. (1993). Science education for a pluralist society. Buckingham, UK: Open University Press. Reiss, M. J. (1999). Teaching ethics in science. Studies in Science Education, 34, 115–140. Resnick, L. B., Salmon, M., Zeitz, C. M., Wathen, S. H., & Holowchack, N. (1993). Reasoning in conversation. Cognition and Instruction, 11 (3&4), 347–364. Sadler, T. D. (2004). Informal reasoning regarding socioscientific issues: A critical review of research. Journal of Research in Science Teaching, 41 (5), 513–536. Sadler, T. D., & Donnelly, L. A. (2006). Socioscientific argumentation: The effects of content knowledge and morality. International Journal of Science Education, 28 (12), 1463–1488. Sadler, T. D., & Zeidler, D. L. (2004). The morality of socioscientific issued: Construal and resolution of genetic engineering dilemmas. Science Education, 88, 4–27. Sadler, T. D., &, Zeidler, D. L. (2005). Patterns of informal reasoning in the context of socioscientific decision making. Journal of research in Science Teaching, 42 (1), 112–138. Sadler, T. D., Barab, S. A., & Scott, B. (2006). What do students gain by engaging in socioscientific inquiry? Paper presented at the annual meeting of the National Association for Research in Science Teaching, San Francisco, CA, April 3–5. Sadler, T. D., Chambers, F. W., & Zeidler, D. L. (2004c). Student conceptualisations of the nature of science in response to a socioscientific issue. International Journal of Science Education, 26 (4), 387–410. Sainsaulieu, R. (1996). Identités et relations au travail, in identités collectives et changements sociaux. Education Permanente, 128, 187–192. Simonneaux, L. (2001). Role-play or debate to promote students’ argumentation and justification on an issue in animal transgenesis. International Journal of Science Education, 23 (9), 903–928. Simonneaux, L., & Simonneaux, J. (2005). Argumentation sur des questions socio-scientifiques. Didaskalia, 27, 79–108. Sóñora, F., Garcia Rodeja, I., & Brañas Perez, M. P. (2001). Discourse analysis: pupils’ discussions of soil science. Proceedings of the 3rd ERIDOB Conference (pp. 313–326). Santiago de Compostela, Spain: University of Santiago de Compostela. Tytler, R., Duggan, S., & Gott, R. (2001). Dimensions of evidence, the public understanding of science and science education. International Journal of Science Education, 23, 815–832. Toulmin, S. (1958). The uses of argument. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Tutiaux-Guillon, N., & Mousseau, M. J. (1998). Les jeunes et l’histoire. Paris: INRP. Vygotsky, L. S. (1985). Pensée et langage. Paris: Messidor. Walton, D. N. (1996) Argumentation schemes for presumptive reasoning. Mahwah, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum. Zeidler, D. L., & Schafer, L. E. (1984). Identifying mediating factors of moral reasoning in science education. Journal of Research in Science Teaching, 21, 1–15. Zeidler, D. L., Walker, K., Ackett, W., & Simmons, M. (2002). Tangled up in views: Beliefs in the nature of science and responses to socioscientific dilemmas. Science Education, 27, 771–783. Zohar, A., & Nemet, F. (2002). Fostering students’ argumentation skills through bioethical dilemmas in genetics. Journal of Research in Science Teaching, 39, 35–62.
Chapter 10
The Role of Moral Reasoning in Argumentation: Conscience, Character, and Care Dana L. Zeidler and Troy D. Sadler
The basic premise driving this work is fairly straightforward: that contextualized argumentation in science education may be understood as an instance of education for citizenship. If one accepts this premise, then it becomes essential to present to students the humanistic face of scientific decisions that entail moral and ethical issues, arguments and the evidence used to arrive at those decisions. Separating learning of the content of science from consideration of its application and its implications (i.e., context) is an artificial divorce (Aikenhead, 2006; Zeidler et al., 2006). A recent trend in science education has been the introduction of a research-based framework that encourages the carefully crafted inclusion of socio scientific issues (SSI) in order to promote a functional degree of scientific literacy (Zeidler & Keefer, 2003; Zeidler et al., 2005). SSI represent complex, ill-structured problems and tend to emerge from areas of cutting-edge research or “science-in-the-making” (Kolstø, 2001). They represent real problems, faced by scientists and other citizens, whose solutions remain undetermined and are not open problems merely in the context of classroom explorations. In this respect, SSI are authentic problems and provide ideal topics for argumentation. Furthermore, SSI can provide a forum for the contextualized use of argument-based pedagogies that provide settings for student exploration of moral issues which share constitutive relationships with SSI (i.e., moral elements contribute to the fabric and character of SSI). Unlike more traditional pedagogical approaches less grounded in the authentic practices of science, argumentation provides opportunities for students to engage in social negotiation of complex issues including deriving assessments of evidence, competing interests, and expected outcomes (Duschl & Osborne, 2002). Argumentation in socio scientific contexts also presents students with the challenge of making normative conclusions. That is, students are expected not just to make reasoned judgments of scientific data; they are challenged to consider what is right which necessarily entails normative ethical “oughts” and “shoulds.” This theoretical position on the place of morality in socio scientific education is supported with empirical findings which have documented how SSI stimulate student consideration of moral issues and implications with various age groupings including middle school, high school, and university (Fleming, 1986; Grace & Ratcliffe, 2002; Pedretti, 1999; Sadler, 2004a; Sadler et al., 2004; Sadler & Zeidler, 2004; Zeidler et al., 2002). S. Erduran and M. P. Jiménez-Aleixandre (eds.), Argumentation in Science Education. © Springer 2007
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The SSI movement focuses specifically on empowering students to consider how science-based issues and the decisions related to these issues, reflect, in part, the moral principles and qualities of virtue that encompass their own lives, as well as the physical and social worlds around them (Driver et al., 1996, 2000; Kolstø, 2001; Kolstø et al., 2006; Ratcliffe & Grace, 2003; Sadler, 2004; Zeidler et al., 2005). Hence, these researchers envision SSI education as necessarily compelling students to actively and reflectively reason about moral issues leading to the construction of moral judgments on scientific topics via social interaction and discourse (Simonneaux, this book). No doubt, for many readers of this chapter, this sounds intuitively appealing, if not a tall order to fill. The authors of this chapter, influenced by many researchers and educators in the field of science education, as well as others in the social sciences, have developed a multilayered research program to examine how aspects of moral reasoning and classroom argumentation move students toward greater epistemological understandings about scientific concepts as well as the nature of science. One aspect of our research has examined how elements of students’ argumentation including related aspects of fallacious errors in judgment play out in resolving what are essentially moral claims embedded in SSI (Walker & Zeidler, 2007; Zeidler, 1997; Zeidler et al., 1992, 2003). A second aspect of our research has focused on how variations in subject matter knowledge (i.e., science content knowledge) across different grade levels affect students’ reasoning on SSI (Sadler & Donnelly, 2006; Sadler & Fowler, 2006; Sadler & Zeidler, 2004, 2005b; Zeidler et al., 2002, 2005). A third venue of research has attempted to shore up and clarify aspects of theoretical and conceptual frameworks connected with SSI (Sadler, 2004a, b; Sadler et al., 2004; Sadler & Zeidler, 2005a; Zeidler, 1985; Zeidler & Keefer, 2003; Zeidler & Schafer, 1984). Central to all these studies is the importance placed squarely on understanding how students reason and react reflexively to variant evidence and beliefs. In doing so, we have sought to provide opportunities for students to negotiate and argue with others and ultimately reflect as they form judgments about controversial issues.
Ethics and Morality: Clarifying Key Terms Readers will have noticed that we used both “morals” and “ethics” (and their derivatives) in the preceding section, which begs the question: What is the difference between the two? In most modern contexts, including those pertinent for science education, ethics and morality are used interchangeably. In a fine-grained analysis of the terms, ethics typically refers to the branch of philosophy dealing with questions related to rights and normative judgments. However, this same discipline is also frequently referred to as “moral philosophy.” Colloquially, “morals” tend to be used in more personal contexts whereas “ethics” is frequently invoked in professional settings. However, one may appropriately discuss “personal ethics” although “professional morals” seems somewhat awkward. These are just linguistic
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conventions and do not represent ontologically disparate constructs. In this chapter we will more frequently employ “moral” and “morality” over “ethical” and “ethics” because these terms are consistent with the linguistic choices made by much of the literature that supports our arguments. However, the term “ethics” will be used when necessary to accurately represent the work and linguistic choices of other authors. For example, although Aristotle’s seminal volume could be described as addressing morality or ethics, its appropriate title is Nicomachean Ethics.
The Formation of Conscience: The Prudent Steps The education of a public is essentially a normative process and unavoidably a moral task insofar as decisions about desirable ends are inextricably linked to pedagogical means. It is one thing to ask, as in moral philosophy, what is the nature of the good? It is quite another to ask, how does one get that way? The latter question falls in the domain of moral education. To the extent that, as educators, we are concerned about guiding our students to question what is right, proper, and necessary, then we also need to provide the conditions necessary to develop character. To suggest that a central tenet of science education is the cultivation of scientifically literate citizens is to establish, a priori, a set of implicit norms about our roles as educators in fostering the formation of an “informed” public and subsequently the establishment of a collective social conscience. It is important to note that this process of normation does not prescribe rules of behavior (i.e., how one ought to behave); rather the process encourages individuals to think about what they ought to do. The difference is not merely semantic. While the former interpretation compels people to be compliant and obedient, the latter view is aimed at developing the formation of conscience through the exercise of reflexive judgment. Reflexive judgment, understood in this context, is primarily concerned with self-evaluation. “Did I do that well? How poorly did I perform? Could I have done that better?” While such questions are not ordinarily thought of as moral matters, they are concerned with a type of self-evaluation not unlike Flavell’s (1979, 1987) use of “metacognition” or Dewey’s (1910) notion of “reflective judgment.” We can think of this as thinking turned back on itself relative to one’s own gauge of virtue. Since virtue may be equated with excellence (Aristotle, 1998), one can argue that a virtuous life is one filled with deeds par excellence. The desire to consistently hold one’s actions up for internal scrutiny is a fundamental feature of conscience. That the formation of conscience can be the result of a normative process essential to education is advanced and advocated by Green (1999): “norm acquisition entails the formation of judgment in finding the fittingness of conduct to context” (p.195). It is important to note that Green’s notion of norm acquisition is not to be equated with what we typically mean by “socialization,” which only involves blind acquiescence to a social norm and does not entail any form of internal evaluation. In contrast, “. . . a social norm is a rule of conduct, not the formulation of a modal pattern of behavior. It does not describe how persons behave; rather, it prescribes
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how they think they ought to behave. … Social norms thus are paradigmatically rules of ‘ought’ and ‘should’ ” (Green, 1999, p.32). Hence, prior to our students engaging in scientific reasoning, becoming scientifically literate, or engaging in moral reasoning, we need to first provide them with the opportunity to exercise the reflexive nature of conscience—after which moral reasoning can have its day. Moral education, and its related forms of character education, therefore, presupposes the formation of conscience. To be clear, the claim advanced here is that conscience is a necessary but not sufficient condition for moral actions and moral character. The implications for science education are important, and the essential features of what is required are easy to overlook: a prerequisite for the cultivation of scientifically literate citizens is that students must first have a sense of conscience. In its absence, moral education becomes merely a well-intended exercise in a vacuum devoid of virtue. This is because any type of moral argument is lost on those who have not adequately established a sense of conscience inasmuch as such discourse presupposes the existence of conscience. This claim is at the heart of arguments advanced by Green (1985, 1988, 1999), and informed by other social philosophers (e.g., Bentham, 1907; Durkheim, 1961; Nisbet, 1966). However, Green (1988) further suggests that a precursor to conscience is prudence, and that prudence is, in its first and most fundamental sense, more primitive and natural than empathy or morality. Being prudent, in the sense of looking after one’s own interest, is not something that needs to be taught at all. Persons may need to be taught what is in their own interests, and they may even need to be taught how to pursue their own interests. But they do not need to be taught to pursue their own interests. Left alone, they will do that. Sometimes they will do it ineptly, sometimes shortsightedly, and sometimes with little self-knowledge. And, thus, they will make mistakes. . . . Being moral, seen in this way, requires education, but being prudent does not. This is one sense in which prudence is prior to morality. (p. 138, italics added)
While some may object to the characterization of prudence (i.e., self-interest) as being too primitive and may fault this view of human tendencies as being too brutish, we contend that attention to Green’s “brute facts” must be confronted as our starting point in the business of moral education and moral reasoning. To understand the first sense of prudence is to recognize the primacy of prudence; people in general, and students in particular, tend to seek things that they believe align with their own self-interests. However, an important pedagogical point not to be overlooked is that there is a second sense of prudence associated with foresight; it entails planning and is evaluative or reflective in nature. To plan ahead, to plot one’s next move, form practical judgments about public affairs and do it well also requires a sense of looking backward; examining one’s prior experiences and understanding them in contextual hindsight is necessary to contribute to a collective, socially shared ethics of memory (Margalit, 2002). (This is the reason Aristotle thought it difficult to teach ethics to the young for they did not have adequate experience for establishing a sense of history.) The importance of a collective memory may be understood in at least two related forms: (1) it requires cultivation of empathy about past humanity—a necessary
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condition to form emotive ties to the present and future; and (2) it provides a foundation of moral commitments to humanity (in contrast to parents, friends, people directly in our affairs) on which a general sense of care and morality is built. Reflective foresight then cannot be achieved without the ability to look backward— without attention to its counterpart of memory. Taken together, looking forward and looking backward are the yin and the yang of prudence. Classroom practice must acknowledge both senses of prudence; not to do so would risk the ability to engage in any meaningful discussion about moral or character education. Hence, lessons in prudence are our starting point for lessons in moral reasoning and moral education. But there is one more brute fact that needs our attention before we can see what such lessons may look like and what they entail: there can be no moral education without the functional presence of the “sacred” (Green, 1985, 1999). This may, at first, sound odd to science educators (and others) but if we consider a world in which nothing is sacred, then there can be no sense of outrage, no moral indignation, no sense of “crossing that line.” In such a world, there could be no moral education. Before we are misunderstood, it is important to note that being in the presence of the sacred does not require any acceptance of religion, God, Tao, or the like (although for many individuals this will certainly be the case). We merely wish to point out that there must be some symbol, some creed or personal code, some functional representation of the sacred present that can serve as an entry point into the educative normative process of transforming brutes into moral beings. For some, it may very well be a religious symbol of their faith. For others, it might be their cultural identity. Still others, it might take the form of a personal affront to their sense of self. Short of being a sociopath, even the most seemingly disengaged, unaffected student will bristle and stiffen up in their seat if the right button is pushed, or if the wrong line is crossed. Their functional equivalent of the sacred has been violated and a sense of righteous indignation is now evoked. It is at precisely this moment we can begin to attend to the educative development of conscience, moral reasoning and moral decision-making. The SSI framework we have proposed can help provide the conditions necessary to explore the acts of prudent behavior and cultivate conscience. In short, our intent for science lessons embedded in the SSI framework can be nothing short of finding what interests the students, what might evoke possible affronts to their sense of social order in the world, and provide the opportunity to examine past data or trends in order to make decisions or take stances about possible future consequences. During this process, buttons must be pushed, lines must be crossed and sensibilities must be challenged. In such a class, argumentation and discourse derived from students’ evaluation of mixed evidence serves as a conduit through which course content is made real and important to their lives. In this manner, argumentation becomes authentically contextualized and can serve as a foundation of education for citizenship. Furthermore, students are more likely to act on prudence that serves their interests. The fundamental importance of coming to grips with the self-serving notion of prudence as central in moral development is not lost on other moral psychologists and philosophers (Andre, 1987; Berkowitz et al., 1995).
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If we want students to think for themselves, then they need opportunities to engage in informal reasoning, discourse, argumentation, and practice utilizing evidencebased reasoning within their science classes. Accordingly, we must present topics that challenge students’ normative expectations and that compel them to engage one another in the resolution of differences existing among individuals via argumentation and discourse during face-to-face interactions. Such reasoning deals with what Rest et al. (1999) term issues of “micromorality.” Moral reasoning, then, may arise out of discourse and argument. It is, on the one hand, a type of technical competence whereby students can evaluate potential decisions with respect to how well those decisions attend to potential short- and long-term future consequences. But on the other hand, it extends beyond mere technical competence insofar as the student must consider how well their decisions attend to historic inequities; such decisions may then be said to be just, fair and equitable. Such reasoning, then, truly arises out of a special type of reflexive judgment that transcends technical competence in decision-making, because it adds to the formation of conscience and empathy, necessary in the larger picture of moral education, norm acquisition and character formation.
Caring and Creating Character: Emotive Considerations Contextualized argumentation understood as contributing to the cultivation of citizenship, while perhaps novel to many in science education, is consistent with other advocates involved in moral and character education (Berkowitz, 1985; Damon, 2002; DeRoche & Williams, 1998; DuBois, 1997). Aikenhead (2006) stresses the importance of citizen preparation and within the context of providing a humanistic perspective of science education, recognizes that scientific decisions cannot be made in the absence of moral reasoning and a concern for human values. While many definitions abound as to what character entails, a helpful description is offered by Berkowitz (2002) who suggests that character is bound by a set of psychological characteristics that collectively influence a student’s ability and inclination to do what is right—to function morally. These characteristics make up what he calls the “Moral Anatomy” of a person (Berkowitz, 1997). While any psychological theory may fall short of the complex nature of character (or moral reasoning), Berkowitz does provide an instructive venue to begin to think about the moral nature of individuals and suggests moral values, moral reasoning, moral emotion, moral identity and meta-moral characteristics (attributes that are not moral in and of themselves but support or add technical competence to moral functioning) that represent either behavior or character are gathered together to create the moral anatomy. In short, moral anatomy entails the capacity to think about right and wrong, experience moral emotions (guilt, empathy, compassion), engage in moral behaviors (sharing, donating to charity, telling the truth), believe in moral goods, demonstrate an enduring tendency to act with honesty, altruism, responsibility, and other characteristics that support moral functions. (Berkowitz, 2002, p. 48)
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Hence, we wish to emphasize that our pedagogical aims cannot be directed towards isolated parts of a student’s moral anatomy. Argumentation, without context relevant to students’ lives, is meaningless. Moral reasoning that ignores realworld evidence is fundamentally flawed. Science classrooms that deny emotive venues of discourse in the discussion of social-science issues curtail students’ personal development. The SSI framework we envision does provide for the possibility of attending to the holistic nature of moral growth. If the goal of any aspect of moral education can be nothing short of being moral, then providing for emotive, behavioral and cognitive features of development is essential in allowing students to develop character. The emphasis on contextualized, discipline-specific argumentation within the SSI framework, therefore, shows great promise in nurturing these features, and is consistent with other approaches using contextualized argumentation and authentic learning of scientific concepts (Erduran et al., 2005; Jiménez-Aleixandre & Pereiro, 2005; Ratcliffe, 1997; Zeidler et al., 2006; Zohar & Nemet, 2002). It has been advanced elsewhere that the justification of moral actions in general and decisions concerning socio scientific issues in particular depends on the quality of discussion, rhetoric, and argument concerning the normativity of different values (Zeidler & Keefer, 2003). Normative considerations of different values, in this case, refer to the idea that the values underlying a principle, rather than the principle itself, provide the measure for justification of actions (Raz, 1998). Such an approach is more consistent with “Care” orientations for resolving moral claims in contrast to relying solely on deontic (e.g., “Justice”) solutions. (For a more detailed discussion on Classical Theory and the Priority of Values Over Principles, see Zeidler & Keefer, 2003, pp. 24–27.) The implications of this claim go beyond strict rational evaluations of actions that sum “positives” and “negatives” to produce objective decisions. At the core of SSI is the necessity of accepting the use of rhetoric and emotive considerations as legitimate avenues in the exercise of argument. This allows for a more inclusive approach to practical rationality in the development of sociomoral discourse (Berkowitz et al., 1987) and also allows for “care” orientations in the resolution of moral cases. The emphasis on emotive factors in the pursuit of moral reasoning may at first blush seem at odds with objectivist or positivist views of scientific decision-making (e.g., Toulmin, 1958, 1972) and certainly goes further than normative models of decision-making that, while acknowledging values, tend to focus mainly on validity and clarity of technical criteria (e.g., Kortland, 1996). However, such emphases more adequately deal with how students become engaged in thinking about moral problems. Psychologists interested in moral reasoning recognize that students’ reasoning is greatly impacted by emotional and cognitive conflicts due to varying degrees of ambiguities and contradictions embedded in the values of culture and context. For example, Rest et al. (1999) advocate less exclusionary or restrictive models of moral reasoning that stress examining only content-free (cognitive) structures in favor of a “Four-Component Model” that includes psychological processes that give rise to actual moral behavior including: (1) Moral sensitivity (interpreting situations with empathetic considerations); (2) Moral judgment (evaluating
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actions from moral and normative perspectives); (3) Moral motivation (level of personal commitment to moral actions with due consideration to moral values in contrast to other values); and (4) Moral character (persistence and courage in pursuing a moral goal). This model, when coupled with Berkowitz’s “Moral Anatomy” (above) depicts the complex, multidimensional elements of moral reasoning and the importance in attending to all these elements, including normative values like empathy and care, in the pursuit of moral reasoning. The SSI framework, with its emphasis on evidence-based reasoning via sociomoral discourse and argumentation in context-enriched science classrooms can attend to these elements. In doing so students may exercise prudence and develop a sense of conscience through attention to emotive factors while attending to the scientific evidence and issues at hand. We have attempted to highlight the inherently moral nature of SSI and, by extension, identify a need for situating moral concerns in socio scientific argumentation contexts. If the arguments presented earlier in this chapter are taken seriously, and character education is seen as a legitimate goal of science education and SSI are used as a means of challenging the conscience of students, then discourse opportunities in science classrooms must allow for articulations of morality. However, the exploration of moral issues is not consistent with most traditional accounts of scientific practice, including scientific argumentation, nor is it a process normally situated in science classrooms. Scientific argumentation frameworks typically stress the articulation of reasoned positions based on empirical evidence. We certainly do not deny the significance of evidence for scientific argumentation, but the prioritization of empirical evidence tends to marginalize other factors which can contribute to the resolution of SSI including morality (Hughes, 2000). If negotiating SSI is to become central to classroom science activities, then the frameworks used to support and evaluate argumentation practices must be reconsidered. Standard argumentation frameworks may function well for student discourse relative to scientific contexts but they fail to account for the moral deliberations necessary in socio scientific contexts. To the degree that technological decisions that draw on scientific information impact the physical and social environment, the moral duties, obligations, commitments and the like must enter the discussion. To exclude morality in discussion reduces the realization of a functional understanding of scientific literacy. For example, Sandoval and Millwood (2005) offer a method for assessing the sufficiency of evidence and use of inscriptions to support claims in explorations of natural selection. Kelly and Takao (2002) consider the “epistemic status of propositions comprising students’ written texts” (p. 314) relative to an inquiry project in oceanography. The hierarchy of epistemic levels presented in this framework moves from observations such as simple data representations and the identification of topographical features to interpretive statements including context specific theory and general geological theory. Bell and Linn (2000) make use of a “Scaffolded Knowledge Integration” framework which prioritizes linking science concepts and student experiences from the world as they challenge students to consider the propagation of light. These studies provide only a few examples but represent
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a larger trend of argumentation frameworks which are effective for strictly scientific contexts but underserve socio scientific contexts because they fail to “make room” for the expression of morality. Our point here is that the frameworks that support the analysis of arguments in the studies just described cannot function effectively for socio scientific contexts because of the lack of attention paid to moral considerations. We are not suggesting that these individual studies are necessarily deficient because they fail to account for morality: they do not claim to address socio-scientific contexts. Finally, Kolstø et al. (2006) demonstrate that students can evaluate empirical and theoretical scientific claims and discern the quality of argument derived from such claims based on both internal criteria of the argument (e.g., quality of references related to the argument, consistency of claims contained in the argument, face validity of the argument, level of detail for evidence related to the argument), as well as criteria that focus on social aspects external to the claims (e.g., underlying interests that may influence the argument, personal valuerelated qualities connected to those proposing the argument, perceived authority of those advancing the argument). While the focus here is on argumentation in the context of considering scientific evidence, Kolstø et al. acknowledge the influence of social and personal values during the formulation of a given stance. However, the broader message of this chapter is to question the extent to which functional scientific literacy can be fostered without student opportunities to grapple with the moral issues underlying modern socio-scientific problems.
An Emergent Framework In recent work (Sadler, 2004a; Sadler & Zeidler, 2005a, b) we set out to specifically explore how morality contributed to the informal reasoning and argumentation of students negotiating SSI. We engaged groups of university students, both with extensive content knowledge relative to the SSI under discussion and with fairly underdeveloped understandings of science, in a series of interviews designed to: (a) elicit argumentation in response to six socio scientific scenarios related to gene therapy and human cloning; (b) stimulate self-analysis and description of the factors contributing to the claims an individual advanced; and (c) promote reflective analysis on how moral issues were prioritized relative to other considerations. From this work, a descriptive framework emerged which accounted for how varying factors, including moral considerations, were integrated to produce the argumentation patterns observed. The emergent framework highlighted three unique patterns of informal reasoning displayed in the argumentation elicited by genetic engineering issues (Sadler & Zeidler, 2005a). We described these patterns as being rational, emotive, and intuitive. The rational patterns were based on reason and logic. In these cases, participants justified their claims based on a reasoned analysis of the situations under consideration. The excerpt below, taken from a portion of an interview in which the participant
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discussed gene therapy for Huntington’s disease, provides an example of the rational pattern: I think that when you do that, when you use gene therapy to fix these problems, it is kind of artificial natural selection because naturally you would breed those genes out.… I guess in the case of Huntington’s disease, it [disease onset] comes on later so they have already reproduced…
In this response, the participant draws on scientific content knowledge to make a reasoned analysis of the implications of using gene therapy. This pattern was not reserved solely for considerations of science concepts and empirical evidence; it was also used to characterize rational expressions of morality. We saw parallels in the manners in which participants applied content-based knowledge with their use of moral principles. Moral principles were used as warrants for particular arguments in much the same way as genetics concepts. For example, in the excerpt below a participant relies on utilitarian moral perspectives to support his/her arguments in favor of therapeutic cloning. Right now, there is a black market for organs so if you could create an organ, then that would be justifiable. The ends justify the means kind of thing.
The emotive pattern was characterized by a care perspective where empathy and concern for others were the central features. The juxtaposition of the emotive pattern with the rational pattern should not be taken to imply that emotive reasoning was necessarily irrational. On the contrary, many of the emotive responses were quite rational, but these arguments were driven by care and emotions rather than a logical dissection of an argument. This pattern is consistent with work done relative to moral emotions, namely empathy and sympathy (Eisenberg, 2000), as well as feminist analyses of morality (e.g., Belenky et al., 1986; Gilligan, 1982). In the interview quotes below, we highlight two different classes of discourse subsumed by the emotive pattern. The first excerpt provides an example of a participant employing a care perspective in line with her lived experiences. In the second example, the participant assumes a broader perspective that takes into account the suffering of individuals beyond her own personal interactions. I can relate to this personally because my cousin who is very close to me—she and her husband have been trying to have a child for a very long time and they have been taking infertility drugs. For like 5 years they have not been able to have kids and I think that if that [reproductive cloning] was an option and it worked, then yeah, I think they should be able to do that. I think it [gene therapy] would be fine if it is going to help the baby…. If the disease is going to be detrimental to the human, then why not fix it at an early age…. If we have the ability to keep someone from suffering in the future, then why not? As far as someone thinking it is against the course of nature, I just think that is not a good enough excuse to let someone suffer.
The intuitive pattern was demonstrated by individuals who experienced, shared, and based their arguments on an immediate reaction to the socio scientific prompts. This pattern represents the manifestation of righteous indignation as characterized earlier in the chapter. Intuitive responses did not represent instances in which participants
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chose not to think about the issue or just could not think of anything to say. Rather, it characterized situations in which participants had an immediate, “gut level” reaction to a particular topic. Often, the intuitive pattern was followed by rational or emotive lines of evidence to support the original inclination, but these were clearly post hoc analyses. The quotes below provide examples of what this response looked like in the transcripts, but the text alone does not fully capture the strength of these responses. This discourse did not result from participant disengagement or obstruction. They felt strongly about certain issues but did not have rational lines of evidence or the expression of moral emotion to substantiate their positions. I just do not think that [reproductive cloning] is right. I do not really know why; it is just this feeling. I do not think it is a good idea. No! [Reproductive cloning should not be permitted.]… That is just wrong I think. It is basically like having another twin come after you. I do not think that is right.
At first blush, these arguments seem quite limited, and based on most accounts of scientific argumentation, are very underdeveloped. However, proponents of the social intuitionist theories on morality (e.g., Shweder & Haidt, 1993; Wilson, 1993) suggest that moral intuition is a valid approach to making moral judgments and actually represents the culmination of an individual’s social and cultural identities (Haidt, 2001). Haidt contends that most moral judgments are based on intuitions and moral reasoning and the application of moral principles are actually ex post facto processes used to bolster the initial intuition. Our findings do not suggest that any one pattern exclusively defines how an individual engages in discourse relative to a certain issue. In fact, participants tended to integrate patterns in both coordinated and conflicted ways as they negotiated issues and came to support a particular position. The work just presented provides a descriptive framework to account for how individuals approached socio scientific argumentation and how moral concerns were embedded in their reasoning. The framework itself does not provide a basis for assessing the quality of socio scientific arguments. We are not suggesting that all arguments which are encompassed by any of the three patterns are necessarily equally meritorious; however, we reject the notion that arguments motivated by any one pattern are necessarily weaker or stronger than those represented by another pattern. Assignment to any one of these descriptive categories does not carry an a priori evaluation. We recognize each of these patterns as ways in which students authentically approach SSI and believe it appropriate to value them accordingly. If we intend to use SSI as vehicles for making meaningful connections to the lives of students and as platforms for the development of character as advocated in the initial sections of this chapter, then it is important to acknowledge and make room in the curriculum for the ways in which students relate to these issues. The framework offered here is descriptive rather than evaluative. In order to assess the quality of arguments or note changes in argumentation practices, we have developed and applied rubrics that are primarily structural (Sadler & Donnelly, 2006; Sadler & Fowler, 2006; Sadler & Zeidler, 2005b). We explore how effectively students are able to formulate argument structures such as claims,
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counterclaims and rebuttals. Our analyses have drawn from the contributions of Toulmin (1958) and Kuhn (1991, 1993) and are consistent in terms of their focus on argument structures, as opposed to specific scientific content, with other projects aimed at assessing and enhancing argumentation in school science environments (Erduran et al., 2004; Newton et al., 1999; Osborne et al., 2004). Structural assessments are particularly important for argumentation in socio scientific contexts because they allow for the evaluation of process and do not force judgments on the basis of values expressed in arguments. It would be inappropriate for educators or researchers to impose evaluative decisions on the content of a moral position; however, educational programs and research focused on promoting argumentation and character development should attend to how well students are able to articulate coherent and internally consistent arguments, recognize potential threats to positions and counter-positions, and form rebuttals. Despite the seeming mismatch between some aspects (viz., intuitive and emotive patterns) of the descriptive framework we have presented with standard accounts of scientific reasoning, we did not find significant differences in the quality of argumentation, as conceptualized using the structural assessment strategy just discussed, among arguments characterized by each of the three patterns (Sadler & Zeidler, 2005b). Participants offering positions representative of the intuitive and emotive patterns were just as likely as those offering positions representative of the rational pattern to perform well in terms of their ability to recognize counterpositions and attend to rebuttals. Furthermore, participants who knew a great deal about science and genetics (i.e., upper division biology majors who performed very well on a genetics instrument) and participants who knew very little about science and genetics (i.e., upper division non-science majors who performed very poorly on the same genetics instrument) displayed similar patterns in terms of their reliance on rational, emotive, and intuitive arguments with respect to genetic engineering issues. We have documented differences in argumentation quality between individuals, with advanced understandings of science content relative to the argumentation contexts, and individuals with less developed understandings, but those differences are not associated with how and the extent to which individuals invoke moral principles, emotions and intuitions (Sadler, 2004b; Sadler & Fowler, 2006; Sadler & Zeidler, 2005b).
Pedagogical Implications Framing socio-scientific argumentation in the manner advocated herein provides a forum for students to approach issues in authentic and personally meaningful ways. However, if the goal is to enhance argumentation practices and promote character development, then simply providing an avenue in which intuitive, emotive and rational ideas can be expressed cannot be the ultimate outcome. Educators need to move students beyond their initial reactions and claims, not as a means of necessarily changing those views, but as a means for encouraging critical reflection. Having
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advocated the position that educators need to allow for and encourage moral reasoning (construed broadly to include emotions and intuitions), we certainly do not support science teachers assuming a role in which they actively promote a particular value system. However, we do see encouraging students to explore the inspirations, assumptions and implications of their value systems as a responsibility that teachers should assume. Teachers may accomplish these tasks by (a) highlighting the significance of argumentation in scientific and socio scientific contexts, (b) providing opportunities for students to engage in these argumentation practices, (c) emphasizing the connections between science and morality especially with respect to SSI, and (d) scaffolding students efforts to engage in critical reflection of their own positions and argument patterns as well as those of their peers. The recommendations just enumerated for engaging students in argumentation and critical reflection in socio scientific contexts match well with Green’s (1999) vision of moral education. Just as Green advocates the cultivation of conscience, we propose a socio scientific issue framework wherein students are confronted with real world science with the capacity to engage, inspire the contemplation of content and evidence and, when done well, challenge ill-structured or conflicting beliefs. Breaching the functional presence of the sacred and the subsequent discourses that emerge may afford new opportunities for science educators to contribute to student development of conscience, character, and care.
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Wilson, J. Q. (1993). The moral sense. New York: Free Press. Zeidler, D. L. (1985). Hierarchical relationships among formal cognitive structures and their relationship to principled moral reasoning. Journal of Research in Science Teaching, 22(5), 461–471. Zeidler, D. L. (1997). The central role of fallacious thinking in science education. Science Education, 81(4), 483–496. Zeidler, D. L., Applebaum, S., & Sadler, T. D. (2006). Using socioscientific issues as context for teaching content and concepts. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Association for Science Teacher Education. Portland, Oregon, January. Zeidler, D. L., & Keefer, M. (2003). The role of moral reasoning and the status of socioscientific issues in science education: Philosophical, psychological and pedagogical considerations. In D. L. Zeidler (Ed.), The role of moral reasoning on socioscientific issues and discourse in science education (pp. 7–38). Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic. Zeidler, D. L., Lederman, N. G., & Taylor, S. C. (1992). Fallacies and student discourse: Conceptualizing the role of critical thinking in science education. Science Education, 75(4), 437–450. Zeidler, D.L., Osborne, J., Erduran, S. Simon, S., & Monk, M. (2003). The role of argument and fallacies during discourse about socioscientific issues. In D.L. Zeidler (Ed.), The role of moral reasoning on socioscientific issues and discourse in science education (pp. 97–116). Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic. Zeidler, D. L., Sadler, T.D., Applebaum, S., Callahan, B., & Amiri, L. (2005). Socioscientific issues in secondary school science: Students’ epistemological conceptions of content, NOS, and ethical sensitivity. Paper presented at the 78th annual meeting of the National Association for Research in Science Teaching, Dallas, TX. Zeidler, D. L., Sadler, T. D., Simmons, M. L., & Howes, E.V. (2005). Beyond STS: A researchbased framework for socioscientific issues education. Science Education, 89(3), 357–377. Zeidler, D. L., & Schafer, L. E. (1984). Identifying mediating factors of moral reasoning in science education. Journal of Research in Science Teaching, 21(1), 1–15. Zeidler, D. L., Walker, K. A., Ackett, W. A., & Simmons, M. L. (2002). Tangled up in views: Beliefs in the nature of science and responses to socioscientific dilemmas. Science Education, 86(3), 343–367. Zohar, A., & Nemet, F. (2002). Fostering students’ knowledge and argumentation skills through dilemmas in human genetics. Journal of Research in Science Teaching, 39(1), 35–62.
Chapter 11
Technology-Enhanced Learning Environments to Support Students’ Argumentation Douglas B. Clark, Karsten Stegmann, Armin Weinberger, Muhsin Menekse, and Gijsbert Erkens
Technology-enhanced learning environments offer a range of features to facilitate active learning through evidence-based argumentation (e.g., Fabos & Young, 1999; Kollar et al., 2005; Marttunen & Laurinen, 2001; Pea, 1994; Roschelle & Pea, 1999; Schellens & Valcke, 2006). This chapter examines the affordances of these environments, the research behind their development, and the expected benefit of technology-enhanced argumentation. We discuss environments specifically developed for science education as well as other environments that have strong relevance for argumentation in science education. We organize our discussion around two main categories of support for argumentation: facilitating collaborative argumentation and facilitating the construction of individual arguments and contributions. After discussing representative features for supporting argumentation within online environments, we discuss the integration of subsets of these features within four environments in alignment with the specific pedagogical goals and theoretical commitments of their developers. Finally, we discuss future directions for research on argumentation and learning in technology-enhanced environments.
Facilitating Collaborative Argumentation We first focus our discussion on features and structures designed to support collaboration and interaction in technology-enhanced environments. In this section, we discuss potential affordances in terms of (a) modes of communication, (b) group composition, (c) co-creation and sharing of artifacts, and (d) awareness tools.
Modes of Communication Online learning environments incorporate both asynchronous and synchronous collaborative communication interfaces that can potentially promote and support interactions between students.
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Asynchronous Modes. Many online learning environments incorporate opportunities for asynchronous online collaboration and discussion. Temporal persistence and asynchronism may foster engagement in high-quality argumentative processes (e.g., de Vries et al., 2002; Pea, 1994). Asynchronous communication facilitates task-oriented discussions and individual knowledge construction by allowing participants time to reflect, understand, and craft their contributions and responses (Kuhn & Goh, 2005; Marttunen, 1992; Schellens & Valcke, 2006). This expanded time allows students to construct and evaluate textual arguments more carefully than in face-to-face environments (Joiner & Jones, 2003; Marttunen & Laurinen, 2001). The text-based nature of these asynchronous online environments (as opposed to speech-based) can supplement the construction of complex and well-conceived arguments (e.g., de Vries et al., 2002). Recent computer-mediated communication techniques, such as blogs and wikis, also allow the construction of non-sequential arguments in hypertext (Carter, 2003; Wolfe, 1995). Asynchronous modes may also potentially provide more equitable access and participation for students engaging in argumentation than face-to-face settings because of simultaneous access and participation opportunities (Hsi & Hoadley, 1997). Asynchronous modes that allow anonymous contributions may increase this equitable access and participation (Hsi & Hoadley, 1997). Synchronous Modes. Other online learning environments, such as CONNECT and TC3 (Text Composer, Computer-supported & Collaborative), offer text-based synchronous chat facilities to support the collaborative process. Task-oriented synchronous chat affords simultaneous deliberation and coordination as students work together on a shared artifact, such as a co-constructed text (de Vries et al., 2002; Janssen et al., 2006). Current research suggests that providing ways for students to coordinate resources and negotiate how to proceed with a task in this manner can foster productive collaborative learning (Barron, 2003; Pfister, 2005; Rogoff, 1998). Besides facilitation of coordination and negotiation, synchronous chat may also allow immediate feedback on argumentation and thus facilitate co-construction of argumentation sequences. Munneke et al. (2007) found in a comparative study between synchronous and asynchronous modes that students in the synchronous chat condition argued in a more elaborated and deep way than students using the asynchronous forum on the same argumentative writing task. However, in contrast to their hypothesis, students using the asynchronous forum produced more accurate argumentative texts. In summary, asynchronous and synchronous modes offer different affordances. Asynchronous modes of communication allow learners to participate more equitably and to spend more time on constructing well-conceived and elaborate arguments, whereas synchronous modes of communication can deliver a higher degree of joint elaboration and construction of arguments but place higher demands on learners’ ability to interpret challenging conceptual material.
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Group Composition Strategic composition of groups can maximize the likelihood of successful interactions. Organization of heterogeneous groups based on a variety of learner characteristics (e.g., prior knowledge, gender, opinions) can expose learners to a broad bandwidth of perspectives and resources. Technology can distribute these resources, analyze student characteristics, and compose groups of students accordingly. Clark and Sampson (2005, 2007, in press), for example, developed the Personally Seeded Discussion Interface to organize students with different perspectives on a topic into asynchronous discussion forums using the students’ ideas as the initial seed comments. This example is discussed in greater detail later in this chapter. Similarly, Jermann and Dillenbourg (2003) designed the ArgueGraph script, which identifies students’ opinions through a questionnaire and then represents the students’ positions on a graph. The software then matches pairs of opposing opinions with the largest distance on the graph into groups to construct and exchange arguments and counterarguments. Throughout this process, the software dynamically represents changes in the participants’ positions on the graph. Jermann and Dillenbourg (2003) showed that groups composed in this manner demonstrated an increased engagement in the processes of argumentation and learning. Likewise, environments can also distribute and redistribute roles and activities to individual group members to facilitate collaborative argumentation independent of learners’ actual perspectives. In a problem-oriented online learning environment, for example, the assignment and rotation of the roles of “case analyst” and “constructive critic” with prompts to support typical activities of those roles has been shown to facilitate knowledge acquisition (Weinberger et al., 2005).
Co-Creation and Sharing of Artifacts Some online learning environments encourage collaboration through the co-creation and sharing of intellectual artifacts that present or visualize arguments (e.g., Kirschner et al., 2003). Students in these environments therefore create, modify, and share permanent external representations of their ideas and arguments with one another. Producing these external representations engages students in proposing, supporting, evaluating, and refining their ideas. Furthermore, external representations can help learners identify faulty or incomplete lines of argumentation and elicit task-relevant knowledge (Fischer et al., 2002). This type of collaboration extends beyond simply sharing or combining ideas; it requires students to engage in a process of dialogic argumentation. For example, the CONNECT environment (Confrontation, Negotiation, and Construction of Text) enables students to cocreate a text through interfaces that structure the nature of the task and promote communication between the students (de Vries et al., 2002). Similarly, the TC3 environment provides separate source materials for the individual group members,
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chat functionality, a shared argumentation map, and a shared text construction space (Erkens et al., 2003). Another example of a tool designed to foster dialogic argumentation through the co-construction of an intellectual artifact is the DUNES system (Schwarz & Glassner, in press). This tool encourages students to engage in dialogic argumentation as they co-construct a rich argumentation map in which shapes represent types of contributions (e.g., information, argument, comment, or question) and arrows between shapes show connections (with solid arrows signifying support and dashed arrows signifying opposition). In summary, the co-creation and sharing of artifacts can facilitate argumentation by guiding learners’ attention toward argumentation gaps and elicit task-relevant knowledge (Fischer et al., 2002; Suthers & Hundhausen, 2001). This approach includes tools that enable collaborative writing as well as tools that support the collaborative creation of argumentation maps.
Awareness Tools Environments can incorporate tools to increase group members’ awareness of the nature and quality of contributions and participation within the group. These tools can increase students’ awareness, for example, of the number of words students contribute, the number of comments made, or the connections established in terms of who has spoken to whom (e.g., Erkens & Janssen, 2006; Dillenbourg, 2002). Increased awareness of information may facilitate productive dialogic argumentation because students understand how various individuals are participating in a discussion (Jermann et al., 2001) and participants can modify the ways they engage in argumentation (Hesse, 2007). The sections later in this chapter about the VCRI and CASSIS environments provide additional discussion and specific examples of these awareness tools. In summary, awareness tools represent a new approach to facilitating collaborative argumentation. These tools support the self-regulating capacities of collaborative learners. Students are made aware of possible strengths and deficits regarding the group’s collaborative activities and of possible gaps in the group’s argumentation. Based on this feedback, students can self-correct their collaborative argumentation accordingly. The quality of the feedback provided obviously represents a critical variable in effectiveness of this approach.
Facilitating the Construction of Individual Arguments and Contributions In addition to scaffolding students’ collaboration in argumentation, technology can also provide specific supports for students as they craft their arguments and contributions. Researchers have developed a wide range of features to support students
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in these processes. We structure our discussion of these features in terms of access to data, evaluation of data, and argument construction.
Access to Data Science education places strong emphasis on “data.” Many phenomena, however, prove inaccessible, inappropriate, or impractical for investigation in a traditional classroom context. Technology-enhanced learning environments can provide access to data to facilitate students’ investigations and thus argumentation. One approach involves embedding resources in knowledge bases without predefined access order or sequence. These knowledge bases can be generated by the students themselves as in CSILE (Scardamalia & Bereiter, 1994) or by curriculum developers or teachers as in WISE (Linn et al., 2003). These knowledge bases may range from glossaries or reports of experiments to recordings of experiments or simulations. With the help of index pages or search engines, students can search and use these resources to support their claims or critique the arguments of others. Kolodner et al. (1997), for example, built an indexed case library that students search for examples and facts as evidence for their arguments about specific issues. To support students’ examination of counterarguments to their own line of argumentation, the case library provides and indexes alternative solutions. Kolodner et al. (1997) showed that the case library supported students’ construction of counterarguments and refined learners’ understanding of what makes a good argument. Students with high prior argumentative skills derived the most benefit from this environment. Enriched representations can also provide significant interrelated information to students (Fisher & Larkin, 1986). Online learning environments can, for example, incorporate media-rich representations of the learning task, materials that enhance the authenticity of the learning task, and contextual anchors to facilitate student learning (Bransford et al., 2000; Cognition and Technology Group at Vanderbilt, 1997). These environments can challenge students to identify the relevant problem information within complex problem cases and then create an appropriate solution strategy using these materials. Students can also collect evidence for their argumentation by observing rich representations. Visualizations and simulations may allow students to explore aspects of the subject matter to support a specific claim, thereby potentially increasing the persuasiveness of their arguments (Oestermeier & Hesse, 2000). In summary, technology environments can increase students’ access to rich data in support of their argumentation. This access may involve structured knowledge bases, unstructured knowledge bases, media-rich representations, visualizations, and other formats. In all cases, students require activity structures with sufficient scaffolding to support successful interactions resulting in the integration of this data into their arguments.
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Evaluation of Data Environments can provide specific functionality to help students analyze the data in terms of its meaning and its relevance to their arguments. Early work of this type was conducted with the SenseMaker tool within the KIE and WISE environments (Bell, 1997, 2004; Bell & Linn, 2000). This work showed that students’ understanding of the core issues, evidence, and arguments benefited from working with a tool that helped them analyze the conflicting pieces of evidence at the core of a debate. The VCRI environment discussed in the second half of this chapter provides another example of these diagramming functionalities. Related to this work, the BGuILE environment helps students design and practice scientific inquiry through investigation, refine their own explanations and reasoning, and critique other students’ explanations (Reiser et al., 2001). The BGuILE environment integrates dynamic visualizations and outlining environments to help students learn, understand, and integrate new and complex knowledge and concepts that students might not otherwise address (Reiser, 2002). These supports for conducting scientific analysis of data in support of argumentation are also discussed in greater detail in the second half of this chapter. In summary, students benefit not only from access to data but also from access to scaffolding in the evaluation of that data. Technology-enhanced environments can support students in creating sound arguments through this analytical scaffolding.
Argument Construction Technology can also directly support students’ construction of arguments and dialogic contributions. These approaches can help students build thoughtful wellconstructed arguments in rhetorical as well as dialogic contexts. One approach focuses on structural elements. For example, Belvedere supports students’ construction of sound arguments through a Toulmin-inspired graphical template of the structural components of an argument (Suthers & Hundhausen, 2003). While support of the evaluation of data is a key feature of tools like Belvedere, these tools can also facilitate the construction of sound arguments by visualizing respective claims, relevant evidences, and possible qualifications (Fischer et al., 2002; Kirschner et al., 2003; Suthers & Hundhausen, 2001). A similar approach builds on a scripted cooperation perspective. Developers create scripts to guide students through argumentative processes. These scripts can specify, sequence, and assign roles and activities for students (Fischer et al., 2007; Weinberger, 2003). For example, the script of Kollar et al. (in press) supports collaboration by prompting learners to provide arguments that consist of claims, data, and warrants. This scripted cooperation approach is also used to structure dialogic exchange following the idea of dialectics (Hegel, 1965) and argumentative knowledge construction (Leitão, 2000).
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A further example of scripting the construction of individual comments is the work of Clark and Sampson (2005, 2007, in press) discussed later in this chapter. Clark and Sampson provide a series of pull-down menus from which students choose a combination of sentence fragments to craft their opening claim within the argument to ensure that students’ conceptions of a phenomenon focus on the salient issues and involve sufficient elaboration so that other students notice differences and want to discuss them. In summary, technology-enhanced environments can directly support students’ construction of arguments and individual contributions within larger dialogic contexts. These supports can focus on specific structural elements, core content ideas, or even the role of a contribution within the larger framework of the argument.
Environmental Integration of Multiple Features While we have discussed environmental affordances in terms of individual categories, most technology-enhanced environments integrate multiple features to support argumentation. Designers therefore have flexible and broad palettes of features with which to create complex integrated activity structures. The resulting environments can be thought of as cognitive tools that shape how people think about accomplishing a task because they have a strong influence on the ways people attempt to accomplish a task (Hutchins, 1995; Norman, 1990, 1993). This is particularly true when tasks require individuals to gather, organize, communicate, or make sense of information (Reiser, 2002). According to Norman, when cognitive tools are used to represent and manipulate information, these tools become vehicles through which people interact with the subject matter. Thus, the nature of the task emerges through the interactions of people, subject matter, and tools. In this section we examine how four environments, TELS: Probing Your Surroundings, BGuILE, CASSIS, and VCRI, have integrated different subsets of features based on the designers’ theoretical commitments and pedagogical goals.
TELS: Probing Your Surroundings The TELS: Probing Your Surroundings project (Clark, 2004) focuses on helping students investigate the scientific concepts of thermal equilibrium and conductivity. Probing was developed within the Technology Enhanced Learning for Science (TELS) online environment and integrates standard features from TELS with custom software to support students’ data collection, explanation creation, and argumentation. The goal of Probing involves helping students understand challenging science concepts by supporting their reconciliation of these concepts with their everyday experiences.
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Design principles and goals. The structure of Probing focuses on a sequence of four stages. The Predict and Observe phases of the design focus on facilitating students’ investigation of the data that will be discussed. The Explain phase focuses on helping students construct explanations (referred to in the project as “principles”) to describe patterns in the data that they have collected or found in light of other evidence from their classroom and homes. The Critique phase focuses on creating groups of students who have produced different principles to describe the data and facilitating online discourse among the students where they critique each other’s principles in light of the evidence and work toward consensus through scientific argumentation. The overarching goals of the design thus focus on students’ understanding of the scientific concepts as well as the nature of scientific argumentation. Integration of features to instantiate design principles and goals. Students work in pairs with one computer for each pair. They begin the Predict phase by making predictions about the temperature of everyday objects around them in the classroom. Students record this information in data tables and notes that they can access at any time during the project. The goal of this phase involves engaging the students in active reflection upon their prior ideas and experiences to provide a foundation to guide students’ subsequent investigations as well as to facilitate their re-examination and revision of these initial ideas during the project. In the Observe phase, students use thermal probes and computer simulations to investigate the temperatures of the objects from the Predict phase. This Observe phase attempts to help students recognize possible conflicts between their predicted ideas and the actual phenomena. From an argumentation perspective, the goal of the Observe phase focuses on providing students with access to rich data and evidence with which to engage in argumentation about the phenomena under investigation. In the Explain phase, students create explanations (which the project calls “principles”) to describe patterns they have discovered in the data. Students use a webbased interface to construct their principle from a set of predefined phrases and elements using a pull-down menu format (Fig. 11.1). The predefined phrases include common ideas and misconceptions that students use to describe heat flow and thermal equilibrium. These phrases were identified through the misconceptions and conceptual change literature (e.g., Clough & Driver, 1985; Erickson & Tiberghien, 1985; Harrison et al., 1999) and a thermodynamics curriculum development project (Clark, 2006; Lewis, 1996; Linn & Hsi, 2000). This principle creation process serves multiple purposes. Students often have difficulty generating a detailed explanation of a phenomenon (deVries et al., 2002). Students also have difficulty focusing on the aspects of a phenomenon that experts would consider relevant (Chi et al., 1981, 1982). The pull-down format addresses both of these issues by ensuring that the students’ explanations of a phenomenon focus on the salient issues and are sufficiently elaborated so that other students notice differences and want to discuss them. The pull-down menu format also provides data to the software for assigning students to discussion groups with other students who have constructed different explanations.
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Fig. 11.1 TELS Principle Maker interface
Finally, during the Critique phase of the design, students debate and evaluate the validity of each group’s principle. Each pair of students has their principle placed into an asynchronous discussion forum as an initial seed comment. The decision to use student-generated principles as the seed comments was based on research that suggests that the social relevance of an activity, and student interest in it, can be increased by having students discuss their own ideas and the ideas of their classmates (Hoadley, 1999; Hoadley & Linn, 2000). The discussions develop around the different perspectives represented in the seed comments, ideally through a process of comparison, clarification, and justification. Research in Probing. Current research using the Probing environment investigates issues surrounding optimal group organization, initial discussion parameters, and students’ incorporation of evidence into their argumentation. In terms of group creation, the research focuses on the contribution of the group creation process to subsequent argumentation. In terms of initial discussion parameters, the research focuses on the impact of incorporating students’ own principles as the starting comments
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for the discussions rather than a balanced set of generic prompts carefully chosen to represent a range of the key ideas and misconceptions that students typically express. In terms of students’ incorporation of evidence into their argumentation, the research focuses on the degree and manner in which students incorporate evidence from the experiments and simulations into their argumentation.
BGuILE: Biology-Guided Inquiry Learning Environments The BGuILE environment helps middle school and high school students design and practice scientific inquiry through investigation, create, and refine their own explanations and reasoning, and critique other students’ explanations (Reiser et al., 2001; Tabak et al., 1999). Students work collaboratively to explain scientific phenomena such as how natural selection changes a species, how antibiotics affect bacteria, or how endangered animal species like the Florida Panther can be saved. All of these projects involve computer-based scenarios and classroom activities in which students conduct real scientific investigations (Tabak et al., 1999). Design principles and goals. The design of BGuILE focuses on building connections between domain-general supports for scientific reasoning and domainspecific supports for rational and critical approaches related to scientific inquiry. The goal involves encouraging students to develop questions, construct explanations, and engage in scientific investigation and argumentation in a domain-specific manner. In other words, not only does the design of BGuILE explicitly represent domain-general scientific-reasoning strategies within the structure of the activities and software, the design of BGuILE also strives to help students understand domain-specific versions of these strategies. This domain-specific support is based on an analysis of scientific work in the target domain and the articulation of an investigation model that reflects key questions, principles, relationships, and work processes in the target domain. Domain-specific scaffolds are then designed to reflect this investigation model. For example, when BGuILE prompts students to make comparisons in The Galapagos Finches (Fig. 11.2), BGuILE simultaneously helps students understand the types of comparisons that a biologist would make. More specifically, BGuILE focuses on four primary strategic design principles: explanation-driven inquiry, explicit representations of theories and strategies, integration of classroom and technology supported learning activities, and ongoing reflection (Reiser et al., 2001). BGuILE organizes instruction around “strategic tools” and “strategic artifacts.” Strategic tools are tools that “students use to access, analyze, and manipulate data to make the implicit strategies of the discipline visible to students” (Reiser et al., p. 276). Strategic artifacts are defined as “the work products that students create to represent the important conceptual properties of explanations and models in the discipline” (p. 276). Integration of features to instantiate design principles and goals. Explanationdriven inquiry is the first strategic design principle of BGuILE. The motivation of this principle involves scaffolding students’ construction of explanations that state
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Fig. 11.2 Comparing populations in the BGuILE Galapagos Finches project
rational, causal mechanisms and justify the gathered data. Sandoval & Reiser (2004) explain this idea as: Explanation-driven inquiry entails a shift both in the nature of students’ work in the classroom and their underlying view of that work. Accomplishing this shift requires tools that shape the ways that students construct the products of their work, curricular activities that emphasize the valued criteria of these products, and teaching practices that support students’ understanding of these criteria and help to connect their inquiry experiences to core disciplinary theories. (p. 4)
As an example, in The Galapagos Finches, students learn about natural selection by exploring variations in the populations of plants and animals on the Galapagos Islands. Students collect data about the animals and conditions as part of this exploration. Data might include, for example, population levels, beak sizes, plant diversity, and weather conditions from different seasons across several years. According to the explanationdriven inquiry principle, students’ explanations should develop causal relationships explaining the data in relation to natural selection. The teacher and the software help students in the process of determining what constitutes acceptable explanations and powerful evidence in scientific argumentation across these activities (Tabak & Reiser, 1997; Tabak, 1999; Reiser et al., 2001; Sandoval & Reiser, 2004).
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Explicit representation of theories and strategies. The software tools that students use and the types of artifacts they construct should explicitly represent and model appropriate strategies and theoretical frameworks (Reiser et al., 2001). The domain-specific supports are incorporated in all phases of the inquiry—analysis as well as synthesis. The domain-specific supports therefore exist in the questionsbased interface for data collection and analysis, in the data log for data analysis and organization/synthesis, and in the explanation constructor for synthesis and explanation articulation. Students, for example, construct their explanations, organize their investigations, and insert evidence using ExplanationConstructor, which is an electronic journal embedded in the learning environments (Sandoval & Reiser, 2004). This software is similar to SenseMaker (Bell & Linn, 2000) or CSILE (Scardamalia & Bereiter, 1994). The major difference between ExplanationConstructor and the other collaborative argumentation environments is that it includes the fundamental pieces of the disciplinary structure in the explanation guides (Reiser, 2002). Integration of classroom and technology-supported learning activities. The first key criterion for this principle dictates that design should integrate existing learning activities that are already components of standard curriculum used in schools within the new activities and software. Basing activities on prior experiences of both students and teachers maintains the connection between existing practices and the new activities. For example, BGuILE takes two important but relatively discrete activities from a typical curriculum and then modifies and integrates them into one activity as part of a project based investigation (Reiser et al., 2001). The second major criterion for this principle dictates that activities should progress in an organized and gradual way to support students’ successful engagement in scientific inquiry. This progression depends on the students’ prior knowledge, grade levels, and the complexity of the subject. For example, high school biology curricula should incorporate more complicated graphical data than middle school curricula (Reiser et al. 2001). Ongoing reflection. According to this principle, designers should have two goals. First, they should encourage students to frequently evaluate their own explanations, evidence, assumptions, and results. Second, designers should provide options for students to compare and critique others’ findings and explanations. Students should then resolve possible differences among explanations through discussions. ExplanationConstructor, for example, helps students record and review their own work. Other BGuILE environments, like TB Lab or Florida Panther, have specific tools to assist students in managing their collected data and inferences. The Data Log (see Fig. 11.3), for example, allows students to record the date, time, category, and “nature of comparison” in notes related to their data (Reiser et al., 2001). Data Log thus helps students organize and classify their data throughout the investigation. These records in Data Log subsequently help students as they craft their explanations in the ExplanationConstructor journal. Finally, students use ExplanationConstructor to compare and evaluate each others’ explanations and findings (Reiser et al., 2001). Throughout the scientific inquiry, students continuously have the opportunity to reevaluate their work and discuss each others’ work in a collaborative manner.
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Fig. 11.3 BGuILE Data Log
Research in BGuILE. Research on students’ classroom artifacts suggests that BGuILE successfully engages students in inquiry into detailed and complex problems (Reiser et al., 2001). “Most groups of students are able to arrive at reasonably welljustified explanations and models and can recount the evidence on which their explanations are based” (Reiser et al., 2001, p. 295). The integration of classroom and technology supported learning activities, or synergy of supports (Tabak, 2004), seems to be particularly productive in helping lower-achieving students reach inquiry performance that reflects the sophistication of higher-achieving students (Tabak, 2000). Particular teacher moves and the emphasis on evidence-based explanation-driven inquiry can also create more symmetry between teacher and student roles, which can have positive consequences for a sense of efficacy in science as well as content and skill achievement (Tabak & Baumgartner, 2004). BGuILE research also focuses on inferential validity in terms of the causal coherency of students’ explanations (Sandoval, 2003; Sandoval & Millwood, 2005). According to these analyses, students’ explanations are predominantly coherent even though they sometimes use illogical inferences to justify their positions. Finally, research on specific BGuILE software tools, such as the ExplanationConstructor, underscores the efficacy of these tools in supporting scientific inquiry through argumentation and helping students express their reasoning and beliefs in meaningful ways (Sandoval &Reiser, 2004).
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CASSIS: Computer-Supported Argumentation Supported by Scripts The CASSIS environment (Computer-supported Argumentation Supported by Scripts—experimental Implementation System) was developed as part of a research project on collaboration scripts by Weinberger et al. (2007). The scripts under investigation targeted several different collaborative learning processes, such as participation (Weinberger et al., 2001), epistemic activities (Weinberger et al., 2005), transactivity (Weinberger, 2003), and argumentation (Stegmann et al., 2004). The argumentative collaboration scripts combine two theoretical perspectives: supporting students’ construction of sound arguments in alignment with Toulmin’s model of argumentation (Toulmin, 1958) and structuring the dialogic exchange in alignment with the ideas of Leitão (Leitão, 2000). Design principles and goals. CASSIS fosters argumentation through collaboration scripts (i.e., instructional plans) that specify and sequence collaborative learning activities. When needed, these scripts assign various activities to the individual learners (Kobbe et al., in press). Collaboration scripts typically focus on activities that researchers associate with deeper cognitive elaboration and therefore knowledge acquisition but learners seldom perform correctly (King, 2007). High-quality argumentation has been regarded as such an activity (e.g., Baker, 2003; Kuhn & Goh, 2005; Leitão, 2000). The quality of argumentation can be described by at least two dimensions: the crafting of sound arguments and the structuring of the dialogic exchange (Weinberger & Fischer, 2006). Focusing on the crafting of sound arguments puts more emphasis on individual components of a single argument (Toulmin, 1958), such as the explicit occurrence of reasons (van Eemeren, 2003; Voss et al., 1983). Focusing on the structuring of the dialogic exchange, the emphasis is on mutual reference during argumentation, such as arguments that counter the arguments of a learning partner (Jermann & Dillenbourg, 2003; Resnick et al., 1993). Integration of features to instantiate design principles and goals. Within the environment, students collaboratively discuss short problem cases. The three students in each discussion group collaborate from different locations using a customized asynchronous text-based discussion board. The main interface includes three areas: instructions in the upper left corner, a visualization of the current case in the lower left corner, and the online discussion for the current case. The interface allows the students to exchange text messages that resemble emails. Learners can either start a new topic by posting a new message or reply to earlier messages. Each message consists of a subject line, author information, date, time, and the message body. The learning environment sets the author, date, and time automatically. The learners enter the subject line and the body of the message. The script for the construction of single arguments organizes a student’s argument within the comment creation interface of the discussion board (see Fig. 11.4). This script builds on a simplified Toulmin model (Toulmin, 1958) by providing input text boxes for a claim, grounds, and qualifications. Each text box of the interface is
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Fig. 11.4 Single argument script for CASSIS
completed by the learners. By clicking the command button (“Add”) to submit the comment, the contents of the three input text boxes are combined into a prespecified textual structure of the argument. Learners are not limited to using the three input text boxes for constructing single arguments. Students can write questions, comments, or expressions of emotion directly into the main input text box. The script for the construction of argumentation sequences guides students through Leitão’s specific argument–counterargument–integration pattern by presetting the subject of each posted message automatically depending on its position in the progression of the discussion thread. The first message in a chain is labeled “Argumentation.” The answer to an argument is automatically labeled as “Counter Argumentation.” The reply to a counterargument is labeled as “Integration.” The next message is again labeled “Counterargument,” then “Integration,” and so on. In this way, discussion follows the path of Leitão’s model. Research in CASSIS. The research conducted with CASSIS investigates how computer-supported collaboration scripts can facilitate argumentative knowledge construction in online discussions. Argumentative knowledge construction focuses on the construction of domain-specific and domain-general knowledge through collaborative argumentation. With the help of CASSIS, the mutual relations between individual cognitive processes, collaborative argumentation, and knowledge acquisition are examined. Therefore, argumentative knowledge construction is analyzed with respect to epistemic activities, the formal quality of argumentation, and social modes of co-construction including transactivity (i.e., learners’ mutual reference in online discussions.) The research findings demonstrate that the investigated scripts do have the desired main effects. For instance, the script for the construction of single
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arguments actually helps learners to construct more sound single arguments and learners acquire knowledge about the construction of single arguments. Some scripts, however, have unwanted side effects. An epistemic script, for example, facilitated learners in solving the learning task but had detrimental effects on knowledge acquisition. Current projects aim to implement the automated analysis of natural discourse corpora (see Dönmez et al., 2005) in CASSIS to achieve realtime adaptivity of collaboration scripts. The analysis of the contributions of the individual learners will be used to fade scripts in or out.
VCRI: Virtual Collaborative Research Institute The VCRI is the core environment of the Computerized Representation of Coordination in Collaborative Learning (CRoCiCL) project which concentrates on joint visualizations and collaborative learning by inquiry (Janssen et al., 2006). The VCRI was developed from the earlier mentioned TC3 environment. The VCRI is a multiplatform groupware environment designed for students ranging from primary school to college level working collaboratively with specialized tools for specific tasks (Jaspers & Broeken, 2005). The VCRI has approximately twenty special software tools, such as Chat, Participation, Debate, Planner, Cowriter, Forum, Diagrammer, and Shared Space (Broeken, 2006). While much of the research in VCRI has not focused on science content, the features and design offer much to support scientific argumentation. Design principles and goals. Although each group member appears to work individually, the What You See Is What I See (WYSIWIS) design principle of the VCRI allows students to share all tools except their personal notes. All members work on one task and/or a product synchronously or asynchronously. According to this design principle, using the same interface provides very efficient and effective collaboration across group members. During the collaborative inquiry, each group member can edit the content of the tool simultaneously to provide the sense of “real life collaboration even in cyberspace” (Jaspers & Broeken, 2005, p. 2). In terms of goals, the main purpose of the CRoCiCL project focuses on exploring the “effects of visualization of social aspects of collaboration processes in CSCL [computersupported collaborative learning]” (Jaspers & Broeken, 2005, p. 1). As part of this goal, the VCRI therefore focuses on participation awareness tools to help students visualize the participation and contributions of their group’s members. Integration of features to instantiate design principles and goals. Groups of two to four students work through a series of approximately eight lessons in a standard VCRI session. During this time, almost all software tools of the program are used and shared by group members. Argumentation and collaboration are encouraged heavily by Cowriter, Chat, Shared Space, Participation, and Debate tools. The Cowriter is a shared word processor and collaborative text editor that allows students to create and/or edit the text simultaneously. This tool helps students write one document collaboratively through synchronous discussions. The proposed
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changes in the text are directly visible to all group members and the users can instantly give feedback to each other’s edits. Also, teachers have access to the documents written by groups in the Cowriter. Therefore, teachers can observe the progress of the groups and respond the group members if necessary (Janssen et al., 2006; Broeken, 2006). The Chat tool is a text-based collaborative tool that allows students to communicate in a simple but well-organized manner. Students use the Chat tool to interact with group members by instant messaging for real-time online meetings. The chat history of students is stored and can be reread at any time (Janssen et al., 2006; Broeken, 2006). The Shared Space is a special and advanced version of the Chat tool—it provides the same functionality but also includes visualizations, records the time interval of messages, and analyzes all messages sent by users (Janssen et al., 2006; Broeken, 2006). For example, the Shared Space tool saves the old topic and starts a new topic if group members do not submit messages for more than 59 seconds (Janssen et al., 2006; Broeken, 2006). Also, the Shared Space analyzes all messages using the Dialogue Act Coding (DAC) filter. Based on this online automatic coding, the Shared Space tool assesses whether the message suggests agreement or disagreement (Janssen et al., 2006; Broeken, 2006). Based on this analysis, the Shared Space dynamically represents the varying degree of discussion or agreement within the chat for the group. The Participation tool determines the participation rates of the group members in terms of the degree to which each group member engages in the group’s interaction. Each student is represented by a sphere. The distance of a sphere to the group’s center indicates the number of messages sent by the student, compared to the other group members. The size of a sphere indicates the average length of the messages sent by a student in comparison with the other group members (Fig. 11.5). Participation within groups can be compared across the overall class community (Janssen et al., 2006). Similar to other tools, the Participation tool was also designed according to WYSIWIS principle. Each group member can monitor others’ participation rates and compare his or her effort to that of other group members. This tool measures the contribution of the group members quantitatively without inferences about the quality of the participation (Broeken, 2006; Janssen et al., 2006). However, Broeken (2006) states that quantity of participation is also important and that high participation is essential to maintaining superior collaboration among group members. The new Debate tool represents an argument visually as a battlefield of different standpoints (Fig. 11.6). With this shared tool, students specify the arguments they have found in external information sources and state whether each argument supports or rebuts one of the core positions. The Debate draws an instant diagram of “the complexity and the argumentative power of each position” (Broeken, 2006, p. 8). The complexity is visualized by the width of the frame around arguments and positions while the argumentative power is visualized by the interval between the center and location of arguments. Supporting contributions advance a position as a whole toward the center flag, whereas rebuttals retract the position. This allows users to evaluate how strongly the positions are supported. In this way, the Debate
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Fig. 11.5 VCRI participation tool
Fig. 11.6 VCRI debate tool
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tool is expected to allow students to better evaluate different positions in authentic and complex contexts. Research in VCRI. Research in the VCRI focuses on ways to support coordination processes between students as they collaborate on a project in a virtual groupware environment. Students need to coordinate their activities and their thinking in order to achieve their goals. From the perspective of the VCRI group, coordination involves three main processes: activation and sharing of knowledge and skills through participation in the collaboration process, creation of a common frame of reference through building awareness of differences and similarities in viewpoints and perspectives, and negotiation and coming to agreement through comparing and evaluating arguments and shared decision-making. The Participation tool, the Shared Space, and the Debate tool are meant to represent and support student’s coordination processes on these three levels.
Concluding Comments and Future Directions Learning environments currently include a broad range of specific instructional features to promote argumentation that can potentially facilitate active learning beyond what can be achieved in more traditional learning environments (Fabos & Young, 1999; Fischer, 2001; Marttunen & Laurinen, 2001; Pea, 1994; Roschelle & Pea, 1999; Schellens & Valcke, 2006). Major research questions and opportunities, however, require future investigation. One promising core area for future work involves expanding upon one of technology-enhanced environments’ greatest potential strengths—the ability to adapt scaffolding to meet the individual needs of students. A classic challenge in education involves the ratio of instructors to learners. As a result of this ratio, which is often sub-optimal in educational settings, learners frequently do not receive individualized customization of their learning experience. While research on groupwork and collaborative work has developed social structures to provide individualized attention to students in traditional face-to-face settings (e.g., Cohen, 1994), technology offers the opportunity to greatly enhance this process. All four of the example environments detailed in this chapter provide certain initial steps in this direction. BGuILE individualizes students’ experiences by allowing students to conduct inquiry as they choose and provides significant supports for them in analyzing the data through this process. In this sense, BGuILE does not customize scaffolding or the experience depending on the actions or contributions of the individual learner. Instead, BGuILE scaffolds students in pursuing directions of their choosing. The TELS Probing project includes access to data and supports for analysis, though not to the degree found in BGuILE. The contribution of Probing with respect to individualization and customization of the learners’ experience focuses more heavily on the capability of the environment to organize students into groups with others who have expressed different initial positions with respect to the phenomena under investigation. The analytic heuristic employed by the
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environment operates on values connected to the individual sentence fragments to assess an overall rating to each student’s initial position. The heuristic can include logical and mathematical operators to determine values. The system does an effective job of placing students with others who have said something “different” even though the system could not reliably determine actual quality for summative assessment purposes. The approach therefore allows core customization of the activity structure by the technology based on the students’ actions and contributions. The VCRI environment provides customization in terms of participant awareness functionality. The VCRI, for example, provides students feedback on the number of contributions they make in comparison to other members of their group or to members of other groups in the class. Furthermore, the VCRI environment gives students feedback about group dynamic processes in terms of discussion and agreement. This participatory and group dynamic information is not only conveyed to the collaborating students but also to the teachers that supervise them. Future studies will focus on ways to support teachers in their supervision and coaching of collaborative learning. The CASSIS environment stands to make one of the most cutting-edge steps in this area of customization and individualization by incorporating latent semantic analysis technology to drive customization of scaffolding. The CASSIS group has already demonstrated that such technology can code students’ comments with essentially the same reliability as trained human coders. A next possible step could focus on integrating the technology in real-time into their environment to provide real-time feedback to learners or to actively modify levels and types of scaffolding. So what does the future hold for technology-enhanced argumentation environments? As mentioned above, the opportunity to build intelligence into environments offers great potential affordances. By “intelligent environments” we refer to environments that have analytical real-time capabilities to support collaboration and arguments. How might incorporating intelligent analytical tools in real-time increase the power of online environments? In the first section of this chapter we discussed the features and affordances of environments in terms of two main categories: facilitating collaborative argumentation and facilitating the construction of arguments and contributions. Embedding intelligent real-time analytical capabilities into environments could certainly enhance the affordances of both categories. Real time analytical capabilities could, for example, facilitate deep elaboration during individual argument construction or facilitate more equitable participation. Similarly, powerful opportunities will evolve in terms of enhancing participants’ awareness of their positions, the ideas of others, and the quality of their argumentation. The organization of group composition could function based on nuanced analyses of students’ positions. Environments could even shift groupings to introduce missing perspectives or critiques. Analytical capabilities might suggest specific data, visualizations, or experiments for students to consider in light of the arguments they construct. For example, a novice might get more hints than an expert. Providing customized access to data could also help students strengthen or reconsider their positions. The environment might, for example, present evidence
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for the opposite position relative to the current position of a learner. Similar types of affordances might help students rethink their evaluation of data by providing new tools or perspectives. The VCRI Debate tool, for example, could compare the debate representations that groups construct to those made by other groups or to “expert” representations. This automatically derived comparative information could help students revise their representations. Clearly these supports could extend beyond structural issues into core conceptual issues regarding the content. These future affordances will raise many important research questions beyond developing valid methods for measuring the quality, quantity, and nature of contributions. Future research will also need to consider carefully how to act on this information. How should instructional supports adapt to the information? How many suboptimal arguments, for example, should be required to trigger the “fading in” of a script? How many intermediate steps should be included between full instructional support and full freedom? The potential benefits of increasing the intelligence of technology-enhanced argumentation environments (i.e., environments that have analytical real-time capabilities to support collaboration and arguments) are not limited to students. By integrating analytic frameworks to automate the logging and coding of students’ actions and interactions in real-time, future versions of these environments could also provide teachers with better tools to monitor and scaffold multiple small groups of students working simultaneously on projects within their classes. Such environments might also model argumentation practices for the teachers themselves by helping the teachers interpret the argumentation practices of their students within the environment. Research has demonstrated that teachers’ understandings of argumentation and pedagogical practices surrounding argumentation often do not reflect optimal levels of expertise for supporting students engaging in argumentation (Driver et al., 2000; Osborne et al., 2004). Technology-enhanced environments might provide a vehicle for supporting teachers’ pedagogical practices as well as enhancing teachers’ understanding of these pedagogical processes and the nature of argumentation. In addition to research and development on the activity structures, features, and technology, other core issues require careful consideration in terms of practical as well as theoretical issues. Among the most important of the practical issues is the question of transfer of argumentation abilities from technology-enhanced environments to traditional unscaffolded contexts. While research on these environments has demonstrated their potential to successfully scaffold students in argumentation, few studies have examined issues of transfer into other contexts (e.g., Stegmann et al., 2004; Kollar et al., 2005). The value of these environments hangs heavily on their ability to support students’ internalization of argumentation skills. Research on transfer should therefore play a central role in the advancement of the field. In terms of theoretical issues, ongoing fundamental research needs to focus on core frameworks for argumentation and the analysis of argumentation in science education contexts. Sophisticated “intelligent” technology will provide little value unless it builds upon solid theoretical approaches to helping learners understand
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and engage in argumentation. Similarly, sophisticated “intelligent” analytic technologies will provide little value unless they build on solid theoretical approaches for analyzing argumentation. As our understandings of argumentation and the potential affordances of technology grow, with these caveats considered, we will have increasing opportunities to customize and individualize feedback and curricular structures in real-time to better support learners and teachers engaging in argumentation in classrooms around the world. Acknowledgments The work for this chapter was partially funded by the US National Science Foundation (REC-0334199: TELS: The Educational Accelerator: Technology-Enhanced Learning in Science), the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG; FI 792/2-2), and the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (nr. 411-02-121: CRoCiCL project).
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Chapter 12
Science Teacher Education and Professional Development in Argumentation Anat Zohar
What do teachers (pre-service teachers as well as in-service teachers) need to know in order to be able to implement argumentation processes proficiently in their classrooms? What implications does that body of knowledge have for teacher education (TE) and professional development (PD) programs? Let us take a look at the reflections of a teacher who had taught (what she considered to be) a successful argumentation lesson in a ninth grade biology class. The teacher provided guidance to a group of four students who engaged in an argumentation activity about moral dilemmas in human genetics (Zohar & Nemet, 2000). A typical problem with students’ initial reasoning in this unit is that they tend to form unwarranted opinions, ignoring alternative points of view. When they do justify their opinions, they tend to avoid cardinal justifications that involve the ethical sides of the issue, and thus to circumvent the focus of the dilemma. In her analysis of part of a lesson in which she provided guidance to her students, the teacher reported that before her intervention, students expressed their opinions in a loud voice, did not justify their opinions and did not listen to each other. A dramatic change took place following her intervention: students started to phrase the dilemma in terms of principled bio-ethical considerations, justify their opinions, refute each other’s arguments, and explain why other people’s opinions may be wrong. The guidance that has been successful in bringing about such a high-level discussion may seem an easy thing to do. Therefore, we should pay attention to the teacher’s report of what she had felt during the process of guiding her students (Zohar, 2004a, p. 146): Indeed I had a dilemma about how I should respond and I had thought carefully about every word and sentence that I have said—how not to let them see what I’m thinking while making this group of students think, leading them toward a desired way of thinking. What question or sentence I should add in order to broaden their view beyond what they had already achieved in their conversation. I think that this part of the lesson (and also the rest of the lesson) is successful because students were able to deal successfully with my demands, formulated by questions such as:“ why? What are your assumptions?” etc. Students had stopped for a minute, thought, re-phrased their arguments, made distinctions between claims and their justifications, and even managed to refute each other’s arguments as they responded to each other.
This teacher’s reflection upon the process she went through indicates that her successful guidance had not been part of some “automatic” behavior. Instead, it
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required a clear goal, intensive thinking, and a high-level of self-awareness. How can we develop teachers’ and pre-service teachers’ capabilities to engage in such high-level instruction? Teaching argumentation, like the teaching of other issues that pertain to current educational reforms, stretches and challenges teachers’ thinking capabilities (Fishman et al., 2003). In order to be able to respond to the unexpected events that characterize lessons that are rich in thinking and argumentation, teachers must be able to teach in an intelligent, flexible and resourceful way that cannot be embedded in curriculum materials or scripted into instructional routines (Carpenter et al., 2004). A deep knowledge of the principles of the educational reform is necessary for successful and thoughtful enactment. Such knowledge must go beyond the acquisition of a fixed set of teaching skills (Loef-Frank et al., 1998). Accordingly, implementing argumentation practices in a traditional classroom involves much more than adopting a new curriculum because it requires a deep change. Argumentation implies shifting away from the role of the teacher as an authority figure providing right answers (Simon et al., 2006) and moving towards the role of the teacher as a facilitator. As such, it implies a fundamental pedagogical shift. The goal of this chapter is to examine the means and the conditions for such a shift. My attempt to consider effective means for PD and TE in this context leans on (at least) three different groups of studies on teachers’ learning: (a) studies addressing the broad context of making the transition from instruction centering on knowledge transmission to instruction centering on knowledge construction; (b) studies addressing the specific context of teaching higher order thinking; and (c) studies addressing the even more specific context of teaching argumentation. Since the goal of this chapter is to discuss teachers’ learning in the context of argumentation, I will obviously attend extensively to studies from the third group. Unfortunately, until recently, very little work has been done specifically about TE and PD in the field of argumentation, perhaps because teaching argumentation has only recently become a widespread and common educational goal. There are therefore only a limited number of sources that address argumentation in TE and PD programs. Nevertheless, a larger body of work exists in the broader area of teaching higher order thinking. Since argumentation processes consist of activities that are considered higher order thinking activities, that larger body of work is relevant for this chapter and will be addressed here as well. Studies addressing the broad context of making the transition from instruction centering on knowledge transmission to instruction centering on knowledge construction are also relevant for this chapter because the transition from traditional instruction to teaching argumentation usually consists of a shift from teacher-centered learning environment to a learning environment in which students are active learners who construct their own knowledge (see Jiménez-Aleixandre, this book). Although I would like to emphasize the relevance of these studies for the issues discussed here, they are too numerous to be reviewed here systematically and I will cite them only occasionally in response to specific points raised throughout this chapter (for an extended review see Zohar, 2004a, Chapter 6).
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Subject Matter Knowledge and Pedagogical Content Knowledge (PCK) in the Context of Argumentation As many studies show, familiarity with whatever it is that one is supposed to teach is a necessary condition for instruction. Another necessary condition for sound instruction is familiarity with appropriate teaching methods. There is a large body of literature that, following Lee Shulman’s work, addressed various components of teachers’ knowledge and distinguished (among other things) between subjectmatter knowledge, general pedagogical knowledge and pedagogical content knowledge (PCK). However, since the classic discourse in this area usually applies to teaching concepts rather than to teaching thinking skills, the meaning of these components of teachers’ knowledge is not straight forward when we try to apply it to the context of teaching thinking. The term used in the literature for whatever it is that one is supposed to teach is subject-matter knowledge (e.g., Cocharn & Jones, 1998; Shulman, 1986, 1987; Wilson et al., 1987). But because of the unique nature of thinking strategies this concept is confusing when the focus of our attention is on teaching thinking strategies rather than on teaching facts and concepts. Although according to Shulman subject matter knowledge includes substantive knowledge (the explanatory structures or paradigms of the field) and syntactic knowledge (the methods and processes by which new knowledge in the field is generated), content knowledge (the knowledge of specific facts and concepts) is also an essential component. When we focus on teaching thinking strategies, the traditional meaning of content knowledge is not at the core of our educational agenda. Therefore, in order to avoid confusion and to delineate the unique nature of teaching thinking strategies, I prefer in this context to substitute the term “subject-matter knowledge” with the term “knowledge of thinking strategies.” How sound is teachers’ intuitive (or informal) knowledge of thinking strategies in general and of argumentation strategies in particular? Several previous studies show that in-service and pre-service teachers’ initial reasoning skills are often faulty (e.g., Bransky et al., 1992; Brownell et al., 1993; Jungwirth, 1987, 1990, 1994). Teachers can rarely provide a clear explanation of what critical thinking is, explain major concepts in thinking (e.g., assumption, inference or implication) or provide a clear conception of the critical thinking skills they see as the most important for their students to develop (Paul et al., 1997). In my own studies, however, I found that teachers have initial varying degrees of strategic knowledge regarding different categories of thinking patterns (Zohar, 2004a). Various sources of information (interviews, classroom observations and written activity sheets) revealed that at the beginning of a professional development course about teaching for thinking, science teachers were, by and large, already familiar with and proficient with what is traditionally identified as scientific inquiry strategies (e.g., defining a research question, planning experiments, describing experimental results, drawing conclusions and controlling variables). Teachers’ familiarity with these strategies may have been generated by their own science studies and by their teaching experiences.
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However, I also found that teachers were not proficient with what is traditionally identified as critical thinking skills such as identifying tautologies and assumptions. Teachers were also often incapable of constructing arguments and counterarguments. In a more specific study designed to explore pre-service science teachers’ knowledge of argumentation strategies the researchers state that very little is known about how science teachers and pre-service science teachers engage in scientific argumentation (Zembal-Saul et al., 2002). In that study, four pre-service teachers were examined as they used a software that enabled scientific inquiry about evolution, emphasizing the need to construct evidence-based arguments. Unlike previous studies described in the literature, the participants in this study consistently supported their claims with evidence, thereby indicating that the design of the software scaffolds teachers’ argumentation construction. However, their arguments still displayed a number of limitations: their arguments lacked complexity, and sometimes did not include alternative causes. Two of the student-teachers never combined different types of evidence for any one claim, and all four student-teachers used inadequate sampling of evidence making hasty conclusions or generalizations. In addition, severe limitations were found in the participants’ knowledge of evolution which was the scientific topic of the investigation. Consequently, they were consistently unable to determine “what counts as evidence” within the context of the investigation. Although we certainly need more data concerning this issue before any sound generalizations can be made, we should bear in mind that it is unrealistic to expect teachers to adopt argumentation routinely during instruction if they do not themselves develop sound understanding of argumentation (Zembal-Saul, 2002). These findings therefore indicate that PD and TE programs for teaching argumentation should attend to the participants’ knowledge of argumentation strategies. A second component of teachers’ knowledge which is significant for the present chapter is pedagogical content knowledge (PCK). PCK is a blend of pedagogical knowledge and subject-matter knowledge that is specific to each teaching topic (e.g., Adams & Krockover, 1997; Cocharn & Jones, 1998; Gess-Newsome, 1999; Kennedy, 1990; Loughran et al., 2000; Shulman, 1986, 1987; Van Driel et al., 1998; Wilson et al., 1987; Zeidler, 2002). In the context of teaching higher order thinking, the classic conceptual distinction made in the literature between pedagogical content knowledge and general pedagogical knowledge is fuzzy and unclear. Part of the difficulty in aligning teachers’ knowledge in the context of teaching thinking with the prevalent concepts used in the literature is related to the debate among scholars regarding the question of whether thinking strategies are general or content specific. Teaching thinking according to the infusion approach (i.e., integrating the teaching of thinking with the teaching of specific contents) assumes that thinking skills have some elements that are general and other elements that are content specific. This notion presents an innate difficulty in referring to the pedagogical knowledge teachers have in this field as either pedagogical content knowledge (that tends to be embedded in specific subject-matters), or as general pedagogical knowledge (that tends to be independent of specific subject-matters). It seems that because of the special nature of the type of knowledge under consideration the existing constructs
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are problematic. I had therefore suggested addressing teachers’ pedagogical knowledge in relation to instruction of higher order thinking by using a special term: pedagogical knowledge in the context of teaching higher order thinking (Zohar, 2004a). This term fits well with the term “knowledge of thinking strategies” explained earlier, and highlights the fact that pedagogical knowledge in this field has some unique characteristics. At the same time this term does not imply a commitment to treat this knowledge as either content-specific or general. Teachers’ lack of pedagogical strategies to support students’ argumentation have been identified as a major barrier to routine application of argumentation in school science (Driver et al., 2000; Zeidler, 1997; Zembal-Saul, 2002), thereby emphasizing the significance of attending to this issue in PD and TE programs. In order to consider the pedagogical knowledge in the context of argumentation that should be addressed in such programs, I will describe in the following sections several studies that characterized elements of pedagogical knowledge in the context of higher order thinking that seem particularly relevant to argumentation.
Transition from Pedagogies of Knowledge Transmission to Pedagogies of Knowledge Construction Adequate learning activities designed to engage students in thinking and argumentation may be a necessary but not a sufficient condition for a learning situation in which students have to think for themselves. Another necessary condition is appropriate pedagogical knowledge in the context of teaching higher order thinking. Teachers’ knowledge in this context was explored during a PD course designed to teach higher order thinking (Zohar, 2004a, b). It may be useful to portray the findings from this study by contrasting the views of teachers who held a transmission of knowledge model of instruction with the views of teachers who held a more constructivist model of instruction. Teachers who viewed teaching thinking through the lenses of a pedagogy of knowledge transmission believed that teaching thinking consists of transmitting rules and algorithms that are required for solving thinking problems. Curriculum and learning materials rather than the student were viewed as being in the center of learning. Presenting problems that required students’ independent thinking was believed to be an inappropriate teaching strategy because it brought about frustration and confusion. Therefore, teachers lowered the cognitive demands of thinking tasks by “spoon feeding” students with the correct answers, or by presenting algorithms for solving problems, thereby eliminating all opportunities for students’ independent thinking. On the other hand teachers who viewed teaching thinking through the lenses of a pedagogy of knowledge construction believed that teaching thinking consists of inducing a process. The student rather than curriculum and learning materials were viewed as being in the center of learning. Presenting problems that required students’ independent thinking were believed to be a valuable teaching strategy because it may bring about meaningful learning. Therefore, teachers preserved
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the high cognitive demands of thinking tasks rather than lowering them. In the context of one specific thinking task in which quantitative data were collected concerning these two contradictory views, 63% of the teachers held the transmission of knowledge view towards teaching thinking and only 22% of the teachers held the knowledge construction approach (Zohar, 2004b). Previous researchers (e.g., Ball, 1990; Brewer, 1993; Wilson, 1990) showed that when teachers encounter learning materials based on theories they are not familiar with, they have no choice but to adopt an “algorithmic ” approach that may result in attention to superficial aspects of the program while neglecting its core. While teaching various science topics, a transmission of knowledge pedagogy may lead to rote learning and to the acquisition of inert knowledge. However, when this pedagogy is used for teaching thinking, students’ opportunities to engage in active thinking are reduced because of the reduction in the cognitive level of the tasks. In such cases, although teachers may administer learning activities that were specifically designed to make students think, they may go through the activities without actually engaging students in any active thinking. The implications for TE and PD programs are that courses designed to prepare teachers to instruction of higher order thinking cannot simply focus exclusively on teaching elements that are related directly to instruction of higher order thinking. According to these findings, elements of pedagogical knowledge regarding instruction of higher order thinking seem to be tightly related to teachers’ underlying theories of instruction. Therefore, TE and PD programs in this field cannot ignore such basic instructional theories.
Teachers’ Beliefs about Low Ability Students and Instruction of Higher Order Thinking In recognizing the revival of efforts to teach higher order thinking skills, Resnick (1987) claimed that these efforts are different in a fundamental way from past efforts that had similar aspirations. As opposed to the past when only a small, elite segment of the population had the opportunity to enjoy such efforts, today’s efforts are geared towards ALL students. It is a new challenge, says Resnick, to develop educational programs that assume that all individuals, not just an elite, can become competent thinkers. This idea is reflected in current science education curricula in several countries that emphasize the need to prepare all students for the challenges of the 21st century (Millar & Osborn, 1998; Nuffield Curriculum Centre, 2002; American Association for the Advancement of Science, 1993; National Research Council, 1996). The aspiration of making thinking, problem solving and argumentation a target for all our student population has several sources. Changes in technologies and in the job market result in a lesser demand for blue-collar workers and in an increased demand for more sophisticated, highly literate workers. But regardless of these changing demands that are external to the educational system, the contemporary
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changing views of teaching and learning within the educational system itself, viewing active thinking as a means for meaningful learning and understanding, also require that thinking and problem solving be taught to all students. This theoretical stance raises a question regarding its practical feasibility. Can low ability (LA) students benefit from programs that foster higher order thinking? Empirical evidence shows that the response to that question is positive. For instance, in a recent article that reviews four separate programs geared towards instruction of higher order thinking in science classes, Zohar and Dori (2003) compared the gains of LA and high ability (HA) students. The findings show that by the end of each of the four programs, students with high academic achievements gained higher on various measures of thinking than their peers with low academic achievements. However, students of both sub-groups made considerable progress with respect to their initial score. In one of the four programs the net gain of LA students was significantly higher than for HA students. In the context of the present chapter it is important to note that one of the four programs addressed the teaching of argumentation. These studies strongly suggest that it is indeed fruitful for teachers to encourage students of all academic levels to engage in tasks that involve higher order thinking in general, and argumentation in particular. Nevertheless, empirical studies show that teachers often stick to the view implying that teaching of thinking should take place mainly with HA students. Raudenbush et al. (1993) describe a number of studies (e.g., Metz, 1978; Oakes, 1985; Page, 1990) reporting that teachers in classes of high-achieving students are substantially more likely to emphasize higher order thinking processes than teachers in classes of low-achieving students. Raudenbush and colleagues suggest the following hypothesis: the higher the academic track of a class, the more likely a teacher will be to report an emphasis on teaching for higher order thinking in that class. This hypothesis was supported by research findings. A regression analysis revealed a powerful effect of track on higher order objectives in all disciplines but particularly in mathematics and science, showing that the same teacher tends to emphasize more higher order thinking when teaching students of higher academic achievements than when teaching students of lower academic achievements. Other related studies concentrated on teachers’ theories and beliefs. The literature show that teachers’ theories and beliefs have strong implications for the way they practise teaching (e.g., Brickhouse, 1990; Clark & Peterson, 1986; Hashweh, 1996; Nespor, 1987). Thus, the belief that goals related to instruction of higher order thinking is beyond the abilities of low-achieving students may have enormous instructional consequences. According to this belief, when teaching low-achieving students, teachers should stick to instruction on the level of lower-cognitive activities. The consequences of that belief might be that low-achieving students would be deprived precisely from tasks requiring higher order thinking, that are so crucial for their development. Thus, teachers’ beliefs in this context might become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Since such beliefs are likely to influence teachers to expose mainly highachieving students to tasks requiring higher order thinking skills, the gap between low and high-achieving students will only grow wider.
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Gaining a more profound understanding of teachers’ theories and beliefs about higher order thinking skills carries considerable educational significance. Such significance provided the background for a study that aimed at investigating the patterns of teachers’ beliefs regarding low-achieving students in relation to instruction of higher order thinking (Zohar et al., 2001). The findings show that only 20% of the teachers who were interviewed believed that higher order thinking is an equally appropriate goal for all students. 45% of the teachers believed that higher order thinking is a totally inappropriate educations goal for LA students. Rather, they believed that these students should be taught by a transmission of knowledge approach. The most common reason for this view was that teachers believed the cognitive demands of tasks requiring higher order thinking were beyond the capabilities of LA students. Another common belief was that LA students would become frustrated by such tasks. Interestingly, such beliefs were equally common among teachers who had participated in in-service courses for teaching higher order thinking, and among teachers who had never participated in such courses. This finding implicates that teachers’ participation in an in-service course about teaching higher order thinking is not related to their beliefs about LA students and teaching thinking (Zohar et al., 2001). The complexity of teachers’ beliefs in this area was further demonstrated in a more recent study (Warburton & Torff, 2005) in which practicing secondary teachers completed a questionnaire that taps teachers’ beliefs about high critical thinking activities and low critical thinking activities for high- and low-advantage students. The findings showed that teachers rated both high and low critical thinking activities as more effective for high-advantaged learners than for low-advantaged learners, producing a strong advantage effect similar to the tracking effect (Raudenbush et al., 1993) and achievement effect (Zohar et al., 2001) previously observed. Torff (2005) shows that pre-service education seems a fruitful time for promoting changes in teachers’ beliefs in this context. These findings have important implications for TE and PD programs in the context of higher order thinking in general and argumentation in particular. The idea that the goal of teaching higher order thinking is appropriate for ALL students should be discussed explicitly. Suggestions for teaching this issue include the following: (a) to expose teachers’ intuitive beliefs; (b) to undermine the belief that that higher order thinking is not appropriate for LA students by reviewing current learning theories and by presenting empirical research findings showing the considerable gains of LA students in programs geared towards teaching thinking; (c) to provide practical suggestions about how to mediate, for LA students, learning activities for thinking. The final suggestion calls for further elaboration. As shown earlier, teachers’ belief that the cognitive demands of thinking tasks are beyond the capabilities of LA students is one of the reasons that causes teachers to give up altogether on teaching thinking to LA students. Teachers are certainly right in their observation that LA students often find thinking tasks to be too difficult, and become frustrated by them. However, rather than giving up on the educational goal of teaching thinking to LA students, it is possible to preserve that goal by providing appropriate
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mediation. Such mediation may consist of several means: providing modeling and/ or scaffolding for solving thinking tasks; breaking up large or comprehensive tasks into smaller units (sometimes it is advised to require of the student to think only about part of those units while providing solutions for the rest); providing hints, clues and probes for answering thinking questions, making some “open ended” tasks less open (e.g., instead of asking a student to provide evidence for a certain claim, the teacher may provide several alternative pieces of evidence and ask the student which one is better and why that is so); and providing metastrategic guidance (see below). The level of difficulty of mediated tasks may vary according to the students’ level. However, the teacher must make sure that despite the mediation the student is still challenged to engage in active thinking rather than being “spoon fed” the correct answer because active thinking is precisely the factor that contributes to gains in students’ thinking.
The Nature and Development of Teachers’ Metacognitive Knowledge in the Context of Teaching Higher Order Thinking and Argumentation Metacognition is a complex concept with many components that are relevant to instruction of higher order thinking (e.g., Adey & Shayer, 1994; Chen and Klahr, 1999; Lin & Lehman, 1999; Ross, 1988; Schoenfeld, 1992; Toth et al., 2000; White & Fredericksen, 1998, 2000). In the present context I would like to highlight the significance of two specific components of metacognition that are particularly relevant to the teaching of argumentation. The first is Meta-Strategic Knowledge (MSK) and the second is epistemological meta-knowing.
Meta-Strategic Knowledge and Argumentation When people are engaged in activities that require reasoning, or more specifically, when they are engaged in activities that require argumentation, they tend to be immersed in the particular details of the cases they are considering and to ignore their deep logical structures. They are usually also unaware of the general nature of the thinking patterns they are using and of the criteria for evaluating them. In other words, when people are engaged in reasoning on a cognitive level, while using various thinking strategies, they tend to ignore the meta-level of knowledge regarding these thinking strategies. MSK provides awareness of the meta-level knowledge pertaining to thinking strategies by directing our attention to the general structures that are embedded in specific situations and contexts. It seems to have a regulative significance for our thinking because it may give us regulative advice about how to apply correct cognitive processes to specific, contextually rich situations that are often “messy” in terms of their underlying general structures.
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More formally, MSK is defined as general knowledge about the cognitive procedures that are being manipulated. It consists of the following abilities: making generalizations and drawing rules regarding a thinking strategy; naming the thinking strategy; explaining when, why and how such a thinking strategy should be used, when it should not be used; what are the disadvantages of not using appropriate strategies, and what task characteristics call for the use of the strategy (Kuhn, 1999; Zohar, 2006). Theoretical considerations suggest that MSK is important for students’ thinking and for their ability to transfer thinking skills across domains. Therefore, instead of waiting for MSK to develop spontaneously, it makes sense to try and teach it as an explicit instructional goal with the prediction that such teaching may affect students’ thinking on the cognitive and metacognitive levels. In two recent studies, I had examined that prediction in an empirical way. The two studies had a similar design, but the first took place in a controlled laboratory setting (Zohar & Peled, submitted) while the second took place in an authentic classroom setting (Zohar & Ben David, in press). In both studies participants were divided into an experimental and control group. Students from both groups engaged in tasks that required the use of a thinking strategy, but only students in the experimental group received treatment that consisted of explicit instruction of MSK regarding the strategy. In addition, students were classified according to their academic level as either low academic achievers (LA) or high academic achievers (HA). The study thus had a total of 4 experimental sub-groups in a 2 × 2 design: HA experimental sub-group, HA control sub-group, LA experimental sub-group and LA control sub-group. The findings showed dramatic developments in the experimental students’ strategic and metastrategic thinking following instruction. The effect of the treatment was preserved in transfer and retention tasks. However, the most dramatic finding was the strong effect of explicit teaching of MSK on low-achieving students. Following the MSK treatment students from the LA experimental sub-group gained more than students from all other sub-groups. Although their initial scores were low, their post-test scores, and their scores in the transfer and retention tests were even higher than the scores of students from the HA control sub-group. These two studies therefore strongly support the view that making MSK explicit in the classroom is a fruitful way to teach higher order thinking skills, and that it is especially valuable for students with low academic achievements. Since MSK is significant in teaching to think, it is important that teachers would be able to apply this knowledge in the course of instruction. Teachers therefore need to be familiar with MSK that applies to various thinking strategies and to the pertinent pedagogical knowledge that would enable them to apply this knowledge in the course of instruction. Thus, in the particular context of teaching argumentation teachers need not only engage their students in constructing arguments and counterarguments and in providing evidence, but also in explicit discussions about the general characteristics of sound argumentation: the components of an argument, the nature of evidence, when do we need to use arguments, criteria for evaluating good and bad arguments and so forth.
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Several points about applying MSK in the classroom needs to be considered: First, in the classroom, MSK has a strong linguistic component that can be put into words, that is, formulated as statements that may be individually and socially negotiated. A second point is that because the knowledge involved in MSK is highly abstract, it cannot be taught in a disconnected way, but must be strongly supported by experience. Addressing MSK in the classroom thus involves a constant transition between the level of concrete experiences in which students reason about various specific problems, and the level of general, abstract rules. Otherwise MSK cannot be taught in a meaningful way. In teaching argumentation, the idea is to move constantly between two levels of cognitive activities: a cognitive level that consists of engaging in active argumentation about specific, contextually rich issues and a metastrategic level that addresses rules and generalizations about argumentation. Third, teachers need to know how to model the use of argumentation structures in a variety of specific circumstances. Finally, they need to know how to provide opportunities for students to articulate the general cognitive processes they apply during argumentation. Do teachers have the knowledge needed in order to be able to apply MSK in the context of higher order thinking successfully in the classroom? In my own work, I addressed this question in two studies (Zohar, 1999, 2006) that took place in the context of professional development courses. The goal of the courses was to help teachers adopt the Thinking in Science Classroom (TSC) project which was designed to foster higher order thinking strategies as part of junior high school science learning (Zohar, 2004). Both studies showed that teachers’ initial metastrategic knowledge is lacking, and is unsatisfactory for sound teaching of higher order thinking skills. Classroom observations and individual interviews indicated that teachers often engaged their students in thinking activities without being aware of the general aspects of the thinking strategies they involve and without being able to articulate these thinking patterns. In the more recent of these studies, I followed a group of 14 science teachers, centering on their developing MSK. The teachers participated in a PD program that took place as part of the TSC project during a whole school year (Zohar, 2006). The study consisted of two case studies documenting the individual development patterns of two teachers and of a more quantitative study assessing the development of the 14 teachers as a group. The findings evaluated the feasibility of fostering MSK in PD courses and refined the definition of the types of knowledge teachers need in order to address MSK successfully in their classrooms. The findings showed that a professional development course can indeed help teachers make considerable progress with respect to the knowledge that is required for applying MSK in the classroom. The main findings are the following: The educational significance of metacognition in general, and of MSK in particular was a new body of knowledge that most teachers encountered during the course for the first time. Following the course, most teachers showed a considerable development in their MSK as compared to the beginning of the course. The pattern of teachers’ development in this context was found to be individual and dependent upon each teacher’s prior knowledge. In contrast to the findings from an assessment that took
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place prior to the course, most teachers at the end of the course were aware of the thinking strategies they had been addressing in their classroom, and were able to name correctly most or all of these strategies. They also improved their use of the “language of thinking” as compared with the beginning of the course, and used “thinking words” extensively in the classroom, indicating that thinking became a target of classroom discourse. In terms of the types of knowledge teachers need in order to address MSK successfully in their classrooms, the study confirmed the need for solid strategic and metastrategic knowledge of thinking skills. Although teachers did seem initially to have considerable implicit MSK regarding some thinking strategies (particularly those related to scientific inquiry), this knowledge was insufficient for the purpose of teaching thinking in a sound and focused way. The study showed that in order to facilitate such teaching it is necessary to transform the implicit metastrategic knowledge into explicit metastrategic knowledge that can be mediated through the language of thinking. In other words, teachers could not use their metastrategic knowledge in the classroom, unless it was explicit, that is, unless they knew the names of the thinking strategies and their components, and were able to verbalize when, why and how to use them in the process of reasoning about specific cases. Only when the relevant meta-level strategic knowledge was indeed explicit, it became accessible for instructional purposes. It is therefore imperative for PD in the context of teaching higher order thinking to address MSK in an explicit way.
Epistemological Meta-Knowing Epistemological meta-knowing is concerned with the way individuals conceptualize knowing and knowledge. Understanding the epistemic characteristics of arguments to justify claims, states Kuhn (1999, 2001), builds on conceptual development at the most fundamental epistemological level of what it means to know something. Kuhn argues that epistemological understanding of what knowing consists of progresses through three developmental levels which she refers to as absolutist, multiplist and evaluative. At the absolutist level, the products of knowing are objective facts that are certain, and derive their truth either from an external reality which they depict or from a source of authority. At the multiplist (also called relativist) level, which becomes prevalent at adolescence, knowledge is conceptualized as opinions, freely chosen by their holders as personal possessions and accordingly not open to challenge. Because everyone has a right to their opinions, all opinions are equally right. Only a minority of people progress to the final, evaluative epistemology, in which all opinions are not equal and knowing is understood as a process that entails judgment, evaluation and argument. Only people in the evaluative stage understand how informed opinions are based upon the weighing of alternative claims in a process of reasoned debate and understand the depth of argumentation as a process involving alternative views and evidence. The fact that most people never progress to the evaluative stage may be a critical factor in accounting for the
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limited argumentative reasoning ability that people display because without an epistemological understanding of their value, the incentive to engage in profound argumentation is likely to be lacking (Kuhn, 1993). Therefore, the critical role that the development of epistemic understanding may play in the teaching and learning of argumentation is obvious. Nevertheless, this issue had not yet been addressed systematically in the literature about teaching and learning argumentation. We still need to investigate whether and under what circumstances, can science educators foster epistemic understanding in the course of teaching argumentation, and what would be the effects of such understanding on students’ argumentation abilities. In addition, we need to examine how this issues plays out in pre-service and in-service teachers’ thinking, and in what ways it should be addressed in TE and PD courses that are geared towards teaching argumentation.
Teacher Education and Professional Development Courses in Higher Order Thinking Professional Development in CASE Several recent studies discussing the preparation of teachers and prospective teachers for instruction of higher order thinking and argumentation provide illuminating ideas about practices in this field. Adey (2004, 2006) summarizes findings from studies of PD programs that were run as part of the CASE project (Cognitive Acceleration in Science Education) since 1991. The model of CASE may be summarized as resting on three main “pillars”: cognitive conflict, social construction and metacognition. Regarding metacognition Adey (2006) stresses that it is a difficult issue for teachers: Becoming conscious of one’s own thinking makes more likely the transfer of a schema from one context to another. For example, having solved a problem involving proportionality, if the learner is now encouraged to explicate the type of thinking she has been using, and to give it a name-proportional—then it becomes easier subsequently to apply this type of thinking in new contexts. Encouraging students to be more metacognitive is one of the more difficult tasks for cognitive acceleration teachers. (Adey, 2006, p. 50)
Adey emphasizes several lessons that emerged from the CASE experience: (a) Teachers who teach higher order thinking must have an understanding of the underlying principles and almost always need to re-engineer their classroom methods. Therefore, PD cannot offer a “quick fix”, or a set of simple tactics that a teacher can follow from printed material (or videos) alone. The human interaction provided in a course is necessary. Moreover, PD programs in this field take a long time and anyone who desires to make a real change in schools has to be prepared to invest the cost and effort of PD programs lasting months if not years. A one-day PD, states Adey (2006) is a total waste of money. Intensity and longevity are therefore necessary components
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of PD in this field; (b) In order to have a significant impact on teachers, it is important for PD programs to go into the schools. Coaching is a critical process in assisting teachers to implement in their own classrooms approaches they have studied in PD sessions back in their own classrooms. In CASE coaching proved to be an essential ingredient of the PD course; (c) Teachers welcome an introduction to the theory as a justification of what they are asked to do. They also want to see some evidence of the effects of the new approach they are learning. The PD program therefore needs to have a component in which the underlying theory would be explained and research results about the affects of the program would be presented; (d) The style of the PD program should reflect the pedagogy of the project itself. Thus the PD should aim to provide the teachers with some thinking challenges, to encourage them to talk and listen to each other and to reflect on how (and why) their own perspectives are, changing.
Professional Development in the TSC Project In the TSC (Thinking in Science Classroom) project which aims to teach higher order thinking and argumentation, knowledge of thinking skills on a strategic and on a metastrategic level consisted of an important teaching goal (Zohar, 2004a). Thus, sustained opportunities to deepen and expand teachers’ knowledge were provided when teachers were asked to engage some of the TSC learning activities “as if they were students” and when additional learning activities were presented briefly. Throughout the courses, teachers were treated as learners in a manner consistent with the program’s view of how teachers should treat students as learners. Much of the learning during the courses took place in small groups, characterized by lively discussions among peers. Teachers were stimulated to engage in active thinking. The courses’ leaders demonstrated the role of facilitators rather than of transmitters of information. Finally, great care was taken to create a social environment that will encourage and support individual thinking so that teachers would feel comfortable to explore their thinking and express their ideas. The courses also adopted the principle that PD in this field cannot offer a “quick fix”, so that the duration of most courses was 56 academic hours. In the first part of each course, the leader took a more active part, while in the latter parts of the course the learners took a more active part. Learners were most active during two workshops: a reflective workshop and a creative workshop that together constituted approximately 50% of the course. The idea for the reflective workshop stemmed from the notion that coaching is indeed necessary for successful implementation. The TSC project however, did not have the kind of financial resources that might have enabled its team to provide individual coaching to many teachers all over the country. One option might have been to cut down drastically on the number of participants in the courses. This would have enabled the TSC team to use the available resources for giving more intensive support to a much smaller group of teachers. But one of the principles of
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the project was to develop a model that would be practical in educational settings that are unlikely to have ample resources, and thereby to be practical for wide implementation. Otherwise, that model may work in a few selective settings, but would have a limited value for the educational system at large. Because the solution for this dilemma may be helpful to other practitioners who struggle with similar concerns, I will describe it in some detail. Following the first part of the course that presented the TSC approach, teachers received an assignment that consisted of trying out “thinking lessons” in their classrooms. In addition, they were asked to do some reflective writing about their teaching experiences. Their written reflections would later form the basis for reflective workshops, providing support for teachers during the first months in which they struggled with teaching thinking (for a more detailed description see Zohar, 2004a). In the assignment each teacher was asked to teach “thinking” lessons and to write structured reports. Regarding several of these lessons, they were asked to use a SelfReport Questionnaire that referred to various aspects of their lessons, including specific problems and difficulties they had encountered during instruction. Regarding additional lessons teachers were asked to write a more detailed reflection. They were asked to record that lesson, review the recorded tape and choose two “thinking” events—a successful and unsuccessful one. Then they were asked to transcribe the parts of the lesson that pertain to these two events, and to reflect upon them in writing in light of some guiding questions. These written materials then served as “cases” that were discussed in depth during reflective workshops. Teachers reported that the reflective workshops were extremely valuable in the process of implementing the ideas of the TSC project in their classrooms. In a second type of workshops (i.e., creative workshops) teams of teachers were asked to prepare new “thinking” activities in science topics that they were about to teach. Apart from producing new learning activities, creative workshops made teachers realize that it is not beyond their capability to design their own, original thinking activities, thereby demonstrating that designing new thinking activities may become part of routine lesson planning. Creative workshops, however, had another, implicit, goal—sharpening teachers’ understanding of what the TSC project is all about. This goal was obtained by focusing explicitly on the “thinking” objectives of the newly created activity, by the need to discuss what types of assignments would contribute to students’ thinking, and by teachers’ mutual criticism of the activities they have designed.
Teacher Education and Professional Development Programs in Argumentation Several recent TE and PD programs centered specifically on argumentation rather than on thinking in general. Milka and Leena (1998) described a teaching experiment in Finland to develop critical thinking and argumentation skills in a university
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course using both face-to-face and e-mail settings with advanced students of education. For 10 weeks half the students engaged in face-to-face seminar discussions; the remaining students participated by exchanging e-mail messages. Preliminary results found that face-to-face discussions evoked the most counter argumentation. E-mail discussions were more structured and included more argumentative opinions. However, unlike face-to-face discussions, e-mail did not develop oral argumentative skills. Results suggest the value of a mixed approach, combining face to face and e-mail discussing. Osana and Seymour (2004) implemented a cognitive apprentice learning community in a class of pre-service teachers to enhance their argumentation and critical thinking skills about complex, educational problems. These researchers also developed a detailed rubric to measure students’ conception and use of evidence and their ability to consider alternative perspectives. Qualitative data analysis revealed that the students who participated in the intervention improved in their ability to concentrate on conceptions of evidence when judging a vexed issue and developed more sophisticated ideas about evidence. AdurizBravo et al. (2005) discuss the design of a 4-hour instructional unit examining scientific argumentation with prospective biology teachers. The unit is structured in three activities that include individual paper and pencil tasks followed by smallgroup and plenary discussions. The unit has been put into practice on three occasions with 30 student teachers, but data collection regarding its effectiveness has only now begun. Avraamidou and Zembal-Saul (2005) emphasize the potential role of science methods courses and of specific university coursework in developing prospective teachers’ pedagogical content knowledge (PCK). These researchers center on what they view as pivotal to teaching argumentation: giving priority to evidence. This view is based on the notion presented earlier, according to which argumentation requires a focus on “how evidence is used in science for the construction of explanations, and what are the criteria used in science to evaluate the selection of evidence and the construction of explanations” (Duschl & Osborne, 2002, p. 40). Through an in-depth case analysis of one first year elementary teacher, Avraamidou and ZembalSaul (2005) show that the teacher’s practices, knowledge, and beliefs appeared to be in line with contemporary views of science education that emphasize teaching science as inquiry with a central role for evidence. An analysis of videotaped classroom observations showed that the teacher’s PCK regarding giving priority to evidence consisted of three components: providing students with opportunities to collect evidence; providing students with opportunities to record and represent evidence; and providing students with opportunities to construct evidence-based explanations. Analysis of interviews showed that the teacher’s understanding of scientific inquiry and of the use of evidence in the construction of scientific claims was influenced by her elementary science methods course and by several specific university coursework. This finding is significant as it illustrates that critical experiences during preparation to teach can enhance a teacher’s ability to apply pedagogical knowledge that is required in the context of teaching argumentation. The researchers call for incorporating specifically designed learning activities in both TE and PD programs that support teachers in experiencing science as argument and
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explanation themselves while enhancing their specialized knowledge for giving priority to evidence. An additional perspective that is relevant to the current review even though it does not discuss a specific example of TE or PD addresses the central role of fallacious thinking in argumentation. Zeidler (1997) centers on the view of argumentation as dialogic reasoning and social thinking. He draws a parallel between conceptual change and argumentation in the sense that personal beliefs and theories are constantly challenged in both. In dialogic argumentation students are constantly involved in dissonant discourse in which one person’s beliefs and evidence may be incongruous (in conflict) with those of another. Zeidler (1997) explains that teachers need to realize that students will find ways to protect their prior beliefs against the position held by others. Their way for doing so would be similar to students’ responses to anomalous data they encounter when learning science concepts, according to the model presented previously by Chinn and Brewer (1993): ignoring, rejecting, excluding, holding in abeyance, reinterpreting, making peripheral changes and making a theory change. In fact, the claim is that a student’s beliefs and convictions about moral, ethical, or personal opinions are every bit as rigid, perhaps even more so, than their pre-instructional beliefs about various scientific phenomena. Thus, if the goal of teachers is to have students arrive through discourse at a mutually satisfying position to resolve competing claims, they need to attend to the various pitfalls and fallacies along the way. Zeidler (1997) defines five categories of logical fallacies that students employ to preserve their prior beliefs during argumentation: validity concerns, naïve conceptions of argument structure, effects of core beliefs on argumentation, inadequate sampling of evidence and altering representation of argument and evidence. He argues for the importance of educating teachers about the role of fallacious thinking in argumentation and provides samples of students’ discourse exhibiting these fallacies. The practical suggestion for TE and PD is to discuss such samples of students’ discourse as a way to introduce them to students’ fallacious reasoning patterns. Zeidler (1997) also stresses the importance of engaging teachers in the practice of active construction of arguments. This is significant in argumentation in general, and in argumentation about socio-scientific issues that involve moral and affective issues (Zeidler et al., 2005) in particular. An elaborate and thoroughly researched example of a systematic PD program whose goal was to teach argumentation is presented by Simon et al. (2006) and Osborne et al. (2004). These researchers stress that the adoption of any new approach that promotes the use of argumentation in the classroom would require a shift in the nature of the discourse in science lessons. The researchers therefore view the focus of the professional development of teachers as the development of a new class culture that would support the practice of oral discussion and the encouragement of students to supply evidence to support their claims. In order to incorporate argumentation routinely into their classroom culture teachers would thus need to adopt a new discourse. The PD course consisted of 12 teachers who participated in 9 half-day workshop meetings during the first year of the project. Because the project’s team appreciated
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the need for teachers’ ownership for the curricular innovation, they worked together with the teachers in the process of developing argumentation activities and learning strategies. The first step involved a set of materials drawn from the literature and the project team’s ideas for teachers to use with students. From these they produced a series of generic frameworks which included the following: competing theories, constructing an argument, understanding an argument, interpreting experimental data, and predicting, observing and explaining phenomena. Under the guidance of the project team, and using these frameworks, teachers developed their own science argumentation activities. Working together they developed a lesson format for a socio-scientific activity (i.e., an invitation for students to decide whether a new zoo should be funded) that was to initiate teachers’ use of argumentation, and also used for assessment purposes (see below). Teachers were asked to devote one lesson per month (a total of nine lessons during the year) to teaching argumentation. During the project meetings, they reported these activities to the whole group of teachers, and reflected upon them. The workshop meetings thus also provided opportunities for teachers to discuss activities and share their experiences. Therefore, although there was no coaching in the sense described earlier by Adey (i.e., tutors did not in fact go into teachers’ classrooms for coaching purposes) the PD did have a component in which teachers could reflect upon their practical experiences by giving teachers an opportunity to reflect upon their experiences and get feedback from tutors and peers. To help teachers understand the perspective of argumentation used by the project team, Simon and colleagues introduced Toulmin’s Argument Pattern (TAP) to the teachers. TAP is an analytical model for argumentation proposed by Toulmin (1958) (see Erduran, this book). It consists of claims, data, warrants, qualifiers, backings and rebuttals. To support teachers in their use of argumentation the project team focused on the development of three pedagogical aspects: (1) The organization of student activity within a lesson structure (whole-class exposition, small-group discussion, role-play, and group presentation); and, (2) The use of appropriate questions to promote argumentation, such as: “How do you know?”, “Why do you think that?”, “Can you think of another argument for your view?”, and, “Can you think of an argument against your view?” (3) In order to support the process of student writing teachers were presented with writing frames that were essentially a set of prompts such as “My argument is . . . .”, “My reasons are that . . . .”, or “I would convince someone who does not believe me by . . . .”. Thus the workshops were devoted to very tangible strategies for supporting the process of argumentation and the construction of arguments through both oral and written work. Although Simon et al. (2006) do not conceptualize their work by using the theoretical framework described earlier as metastrategic knowledge, in effect several components of MSK has a pivotal role in their theoretical scheme. The TAP model is used as a general, explicit model of the cognitive procedures that are being addressed throughout the unit and as such provides an explicit awareness of the type of cognitive procedures being used in specific instances. The use of the oral questions to promote argumentation, as well as the use of the writing probes described in the previous paragraph direct teachers’ (and then also students’) attention to the
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underlying general, logical components of argumentation, such as the need to explain how and why one knows, to support arguments with reasons, or to think about alternative arguments and to support them. These probes in effect make explicit the “how” component of MSK regarding argumentation, that is, it highlights and directs teachers’ and students’ attention to how sound argumentation should be carried out in the classroom. Still, additional components of MSK are not described as an explicit component of the PD course. The description provided by Simon et al. (2006) of how teachers actually implement the unit in their classrooms, illustrated how several components of MSK can actually be addressed in science classrooms. Teachers modeled argumentation by giving students examples of arguments, they asked students to define an argument, and asked why argumentation is a valuable thing. Some teachers had clear goals that focused on the evaluation of arguments. By doing so they either emphasized that having evidence is important or they focused on the nature of the evidence in referring to what makes a strong argument. For instance, Lucy, one of the teachers asked: Lucy: Naomi [a student]:
When do you have an argument that you are doing? Let’s sum up, what is an argument and why is it a valuable thing, Naomi? Stating your point of view. (Simon et al., 2006, p. 151)
Lucy’s question tries to take students beyond defining and modeling arguments towards a reflection on the value of arguments, thereby reinforcing the meaning of argument. However, the students’ response is rather limited. More successful examples of using components of MSK in classroom discourse are illustrated when Simon et al. describe how some teachers asked their students to evaluate arguments. In the context of the zoo lesson, Sarah explicitly elicited students’ responses about how to make their arguments strong: Sarah:
Student: Sarah: Student: Sarah: Student: Sarah: Student:
and we are trying to think this morning about what sorts of things will make a good argument. How are you going to persuade this agency that yes, the zoos should be opened? You need to put forward strong arguments or, if you don’t want it, strong arguments against the Zoo. So what sorts of things do you think you need to make a good argument? How are you going to make your argument strong? By backing them up. By backing them up, what do you mean by that, Emma? How can, what do you mean by backing them up? You say how and why. Alan, I just heard a word from you, what did you say? evidence. Evidence. Giving evidence to support, what, your ideas? Your views? Evidence and ideas to back it. Should it just be opinions and feelings or should it be . . . .? facts.… (Simon et al., 2006, p, 154)
Some teachers also found it important to encourage reflection on the students’ process of argumentation. For instance, Lucy asked a student to explain how she had persuaded another student to change her opinion. These citations illustrate how various components of MSK are expressed in classroom practice. However, data described by Simon et al. (2006) indicate that
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not all teachers addressed meta-level knowledge in their classrooms. It can be suggested that addressing all the components of MSK explicitly during the PD course, and also thinking together with the teachers about oral and written instructional means for addressing these knowledge components in the classroom, may contribute to make it an even more salient component in the learning and teaching of argumentation.
Summary and Conclusions In order to teach argumentation, teachers need to have sound knowledge of argumentation strategies (i.e., they need to be proficient in carrying out high-level argumentative activities including adequate use of evidence), and to be immune to the various pitfalls and fallacies involved in argumentation. They also need to have a sound pedagogical knowledge in the context of teaching argumentation. Pedagogical knowledge in the context of teaching thinking and argumentation is tightly related to teachers’ underlying theory of instruction. Therefore, it is not enough for TE and PD programs in this field to center on specific elements of teaching argumentation because it is necessary to also address more fundamental issues that pertain to a pedagogy of knowledge construction. In addition, such programs need to pay attention to teachers’ knowledge and beliefs about teaching thinking to low-achieving students and to metacognitive issues pertaining to argumentation, particularly to MSK and to epistemological meta-knowledge. It is also imperative to discuss practical means for addressing these metacognitive issues in the classroom. Since teaching argumentation requires a fundamental shift in the pedagogies that teachers use, TE and PD programs must be of a considerable duration. The program must provide support and feedback as teachers undertake their first steps in teaching argumentation. Coaching is recommended, but if budget constraints do not allow for personal coaching, it is imperative that the program would provide an environment that would support reflection and feedback regarding actual classroom experiences. It is also recommended to involve teachers in the construction of learning activities that foster argumentation in order to promote ownership and to sharpen the understanding of educational goals. The style of the program should in itself reflect the pedagogies of teaching argumentation, that is, teachers should have ample opportunities to engage in challenging argumentation concerning various topics. It is advisable to include in the program the theoretical components that would explain the underlying principles and goals. In this chapter, I draw on studies from the wider domain of TE and PD for teaching higher order thinking as well as on the few studies that exist in the more specific domain of teaching argumentation in order to portray the current ideas about TE and PD programs in the context of argumentation. These studies present the rationale, principles and composition of programs in this field. Although some studies have shown considerable developments in teachers’ knowledge and
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in their classroom practices following PD and TE programs, we are still missing rigorous studies that would provide evidence for the relative contribution of the various components of the programs discussed earlier. Even more importantly, we still need studies that would connect elements of teachers’ learning in the context of argumentation to students’ learning outcomes. I may therefore conclude by saying that the field of teachers’ learning in the context of argumentation is only now emerging and therefore there is still much work to be done by future researchers in this field.
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Author Biographies
Christopher Andersen is an administrator in the Office of Research at Ohio State University. A K-12 classroom teacher turned developmental psychologist; his professional activities focus around translating psychology research into educational practice. His research explores inquiry and reasoning across the curricula, focusing on the role of metacognition in their development. This work uses the metacognitive control theory-evidence differentiation and coordination as a common theoretical framework for examining areas as disparate as science, drama, and hypermedia. Before assuming his faculty position at the OSU, he worked in the development of curriculum, multimedia, and educational television, and as a museum educator. Douglas Clark is an assistant professor of science education at Arizona State University as well as an associate director of ASU’s Center for Research on Education in Science, Mathematics, Engineering, and Technology. Clark completed his doctoral and postdoctoral work at UC Berkeley and his masters and teaching credential at Stanford. Clark’s recent publications and in-press work include articles in Cognition & Instruction, Educational Psychology Review, International Journal of Science Education, Journal of the Learning Sciences, and the Journal of Research in Science Teaching. His current research continues to investigate supporting students’ conceptual change processes through argumentation in technology-enhanced environments. In particular his work studies the role of social relevance in environment design. Richard Duschl is a professor of science education and a member of the Center for Cognitive Sciences at Rutgers. He held the Chair of Science Education at King’s College London 1999–2004. He completed his Ph.D. from the University of Maryland in 1983. His research examines using history and philosophy of science for science education. The goal is to understand inquiry and epistemic communities. The inquiry classroom focus is on argumentation discourse processes that lead to scientific decisions. With NSF support, his research has led to new ideas about formative assessment strategies learners/teachers can use to make scientific thinking visible. He was editor of Science Education and Chair of the 2006 US National Research Council committee report Taking Science to School.
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Author Biographies
Sibel Erduran is a senior lecturer in science education at the University of Bristol. She has been an educational researcher at the University of Pittsburgh, Vanderbilt University, and King’s College, University of London. She received her Ph.D. in Science Education and Philosophy from Vanderbilt University, MSc in Food Chemistry from Cornell University, and BA in Biochemistry from Northwestern University. She taught high school chemistry and middle school science in northern Cyprus. She serves on the Editorial Board of the International Journal of Science Education among other journals and is the Co-Editor of Science Studies Section of Science Education Journal. She received the best paper award from NARST as well as a range of grants including those from the Spencer Foundation, Fulbright Program, Economic and Social Research Council, Nuffield Foundation, and Gatsby Foundation. Gijsbert Erkens is an associate professor at the Research Centre of Learning in Interaction of the Department of Pedagogical and Educational Sciences of Utrecht University in the Netherlands. Trained as an educational psychologist, he is involved in research on interaction and learning of students collaborating on learning tasks. His research has focused for the past ten years on the development of groupware environments for computer supported collaborative learning (CSCL), on the analysis of dialogues in learning, and on the facilitation of collaborative argumentative writing. Merce Garcia-Mila is a professor of psychology and education in the School of Psychology, Department of Developmental and Educational Psychology, at the University of Barcelona. Trained in cognitive psychology, education, and chemistry, her research examines scientific reasoning from a developmental perspective. She has particular interest in argumentation, the development of strategies of experimental design, and the mediating role of external representations such as diagrams and graphs in science learning. María Pilar Jiménez-Aleixandre is a professor of science education in the University of Santiago de Compostela. A former high school biology teacher, involved in innovation, she was part of the first batch of Spanish researchers completing doctoral dissertations in science education around 1990 and building a community around this field in Spain. Her research explored conceptual change in evolution and then moved to argumentation in science classrooms, with particular attention to two contexts, problem-solving in the laboratory, and environmental and socio-scientific issues. She has served in the executive committee of ESERA and currently serves on the editorial boards of Science Education and Journal of Research in Science Teaching. Gregory Kelly is a professor of science education at Penn State University. He is a former Peace Corps Volunteer and physics teacher. He received his Ph.D. from Cornell in 1994. His research focuses on classroom discourse, epistemology, and science learning. This work has been supported by grants from Spencer Foundation and the National Science Foundation. Greg teaches courses concerning the uses of history, philosophy, sociology of science in science teaching; teaching and learning
Author Biographies
271
science in secondary schools; and qualitative research methods. He serves as Editor for the journal Science Education. Stein Dankert Kolstø is an associate professor in science education at the University of Bergen where he works with science teacher education. He majored in physics and holds a doctoral degree in science education. He has published several articles on the inclusion of socio-scientific issues in the science curriculum. In specific, he has written about students argumentation on socio-scientific issues and the fostering of critical thinking and social responsibility through science education. He is also writing about using practical work to increase students understanding of scientific expertise, the nature of science, and the nature of scientific controversy. Muhsin Menekse is a doctoral student at the Department of Curriculum and Instruction with a specialization in Science Education at Arizona State University. He graduated from Bogazici University with an integrated BS and MS degree in Teaching Physics where he worked as a teaching assistant in the Physics Department. Muhsin is currently working as a graduate research assistant under the supervision of Dr. Douglas Clark. His research interests include conceptual change of naïve ideas about science and argumentation in computer collaborative supported learning environments. Kelli A. Millwood is an associate at Metiri Group and a research associate for the Institute of Educational Sciences Regional Educational Laboratory in the MidAtlantic. Her research focuses on students’ argumentation practices, students’ understanding of the nature of science, inquiry-based instruction, and integrating technology into classroom practice to build students’ 21st-century skills. William Prothero is a professor emeritus of Earth Sciences at the University of California, Santa Barbara. He received a Ph.D. in Physics from the University of California, San Diego in 1967 and has done research in ocean bottom seismology, seismology, and education. He has served on NSF Review Committees and the advisory board of DLESE, “Digital Library for Earth Science Education.” His current work focuses on creating online resources to support scientific writing. This work is supported by a grant from the National Science Foundation. Bill is currently working on a CDROM and online project titled: “Learning With Data Workshop,” which is scheduled for release in April 2007. Mary Ratcliffe is a professor of science education and head of the School of Education at the University of Southampton. She has taught in comprehensive schools and been Chair of the Association for Science Education. She was part of the Evidence-based Practice in Science Education network (with colleagues from the universities of York, Leeds, and King’s College, London). Her research interests are in the teaching of socio-scientific issues and the development of effective learning and assessment practice on which she has written widely. Research projects have included evaluations of new teaching programmes, innovative professional development and assessment of “ideas-about-science”.
272
Author Biographies
Jacqueline Regev is currently serving as the coordinator of New Teacher Supervision and Support for General and Special Education with Project Pipeline TEACH. Prior to this, Ms. Regev has served as an instructor for Project Pipeline and other local universities in the San Francisco Bay Area. She is a former California public school teacher, consultant, and writer. Troy D. Sadler, Ph.D. is an assistant professor of science education at the University of Florida. He has earned degrees in biology and science education from the University of Miami, the University of Florida, and the University of South Florida. After conducting research in genetics at both the University of Miami and Harvard University, Troy turned his attention to high school science teaching. He currently works with pre-service science teachers and graduate students in science education. His research relates to argumentation and reasoning in the context of socio-scientific issues and apprenticeship models of teaching and learning. William A. Sandoval is an associate professor in the Graduate School of Education & Information Studies at the UCLA. His research focuses on science inquiry learning environments, teachers’ and students’ understanding of inquiry, and the nature of science, and design-based research methods in education. He was a contributing author of the US National Research Council report, America’s Lab Report, a study of the status and vision for laboratory experiences in high school science. Dr. Sandoval serves on the editorial boards of the Journal of the Learning Sciences, and Science Education, and reviews for a number of major journals. Laurence Simonneaux is a professor at the École Nationale de Formation Agronomique in France. She is head of a research department in Science and Agronomy Education. She led several research programmes on biotechnology education and socio-scientific issues in education. Her academic background is agronomy and her Ph.D. relates to formal and informal education on animal biotechnology. She has coordinated several books dealing with argumentation and the teaching of socio-scientific issues. Karsten Stegmann is a research fellow at the Chair of Education and Educational Psychology at the Ludwig-Maximilian University (LMU), Munich (Germany), where he is currently completing his doctoral work. His research revolves around collaborative knowledge construction through argumentation in interactive learning environments. He examines the mutual relations between individual cognitive processes, collaborative argumentation, and knowledge acquisition. Thereby, he focuses on facilitating argumentative knowledge construction by means of computer-supported socio-cognitive scaffolding (e.g., computer-based collaboration scripts). With respect to methodology, Karsten is interested in contributing to the development of methods for efficient and valid analyses of collaborative learning in terms of measuring cognitive processes during collaboration, sequence analyses, automatic coding of natural language data, and quantification of knowledge convergence.
Author Biographies
273
Andrée Tiberghien completed her Ph.D. in Condensed Matter Physics from the University of Paris 6 in 1972. She started her research in science education with studies on students’ conceptions in several domains (electricity, heat, temperature, light). Currently her research work is focused on classroom practices and the evolution of students’ knowledge during teaching sequences. She is in charge of a database project on video recordings of teaching and training situation (ViSA). She contributes since more than 10 years to a research-development group of researchers and teachers to produce teaching resources. She was a member and vice-chair of the International Commission of Physics Education (ICPE) of the International Union of Pure and Applied Physics (IUPAP). She is a member of the scientific committee of the National Institute of Pedagogical Research (INRP). She is a member of the science expert group of PISA 2006 and 2009. She is a member of editorial advisory boards of International Journal of Science Education, Revue Francaise de Pédagogie, and ASTER. Armin Weinberger is a scientific assistant and lecturer at the Chair of Education and Educational Psychology, Department of Psychology, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität (LMU), München, Germany, and leader of the EU-funded European Research Team CoSSICLE (Computer-Supported Scripting of Interaction in Collaborative Learning Environments, Kaleidoscope Network for Excellence) dealing with specification and formalization of CSCL scripts. Weinberger completed his doctoral work at the LMU Munich, has worked at the Knowledge Media Research Center, and lectured at the LMU Munich and the University of Tübingen. His research interests include argumentative knowledge construction, computer-supported collaborative learning, collaboration scripts, cross-cultural education, and methodological issues in small group learning. Weinberger’s recent publications include articles in Instructional Science, Computers & Education, and Learning and Instruction. Dana L. Zeidler, a professor of science education, is the Program Coordinator of Science Education in the Department of Secondary Education, College of Education at the University of South Florida. Zeidler serves on the Executive Board for the National Association for Research in Science Teaching and was the Conference Chair for the 2007 Association for Science Teacher Education International Conference. He has recently served as editor for a comprehensive book on The Role of Moral Reasoning on Socioscientific Issues and Discourse in Science Education. His research interests are aligned with topics associated with socio-scientific issues. Anat Zohar is an associate professor at the School of Education in the Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel. In September 2006 she has been nominated as Director of Pedagogical Affairs in the Israeli Ministry of Education. She received all her academic degrees from the Hebrew University: BA in biology and philosophy, MSc in Genetics, and a Ph.D. in science education. Her research interests include the development of students’ and teachers’ thinking; inquiry learning; the role of metacognition in teaching inquiry and higher order thinking; gender issues in science education; and gender issues in gifted education.
Author Contact Details
Christopher Andersen The Ohio State University Office of Research and Office of Outreach and Engagement 400 Stillman Hall, 1947 College Road Columbus OH 43210 USA Tel: +1-614-688-3041 Fax: +1-614-688-3884 E-mail:
[email protected] Douglas Clark College of Education, Payne 203F Arizona State University Tempe, AZ 85287-0911 USA Fax: 480 727 6558 E-mail:
[email protected] Richard Duschl Rutgers University Graduate School of Education 10 Seminary Place New Brunswick, NJ 08901 USA Tel: (732) 932-7496 ext. 8111 E-mail:
[email protected]
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Sibel Erduran University of Bristol Graduate School of Education 35 Berkeley Square Bristol BS8 1JA UK Tel: +44 (0) 117 331 4242 Fax: +44 (0) 117 928 7110 E-mail:
[email protected] Gijsbert Erkens Heidelberglaan 1, 3584 CS Utrecht Martinus J. Langeveldgebouw Room Number: H079 Mailing Address: Postbus 80.140, 3508 TC Utrecht THE NETHERLANDS Fax: 030 2532352 E-mail:
[email protected] Merce Garcia-Mila Facultat de Psicologia Campus Mundet, Edifici Ponent, Passeig de la Vall d’Hebron, 171 08035 Barcelona SPAIN Tel: 34+933125833 E-mail:
[email protected] María Pilar Jiménez-Aleixandre Av. Xoan XXIII s.n. Universidade de Santiago de Compostela 15782 Santiago de Compostela SPAIN Tel: 34+981563100 ext 12005 Fax: 34+981572681 E-mail:
[email protected] Gregory Kelly 148 Chambers Building College of Education The Pennsylvania State University University Park, PA 16802-3205 USA E-mail:
[email protected]
Author Contact Details
Author Contact Details
Stein Dankert Kolstø Department of Physics and Technology University of Bergen Allégaten 55, N-5007 Bergen NORWAY Tel: + 4 -55 58 48 39 Fax: + 47-55 58 94 40 E-mail:
[email protected] Muhsin Menekse College of Education, Payne 203F Arizona State University Tempe, AZ 85287-0911 USA Fax: 480 727 6558 E-mail:
[email protected] Kelli A. Millwood Metiri Group 600 Corporate Pointe Suite 1180 Culver City, CA 90230 USA Office: 310.945.5157 Cell: 310.462.1642 Fax: 310.645.0782 William Prothero Earth Education Online and University of California Santa Barbara 2106 Las Canoas Road Santa Barbara, CA. 93105, USA Mary Ratcliffe School of Education University of Southampton Highfield Southampton SO17 1BJ UK Tel: +44 (0)23 8059 3061 E-mail:
[email protected]
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278
Author Contact Details
Jacqueline Regev 1791 Tulare Avenue Richmond, CA 94805 USA Tel: 510-237-5224 Troy D. Sadler School of Teaching & Learning College of Education University of Florida 2403 Norman Hall PO Box 117048 Gainesville, FL 32611 USA Tel: 352-392-9191 ext 279 Fax: 352-392-9193 E-mail:
[email protected] William A. Sandoval UCLA Graduate School of Education & Information Studies 2339 Moore Hall 405 Hilgard Avenue Los Angeles, CA 90095-1521 USA Tel: (310) 794-5431 E-mail:
[email protected] Laurence Simonneaux École Nationale de Formation Agronomique de Toulouse-Auzeville BP 22687, 2 route de Narbonne 31326 Castanet Tolosan cedex FRANCE Tel: +33 (0) 5 61 75 32 32 Fax: +33 (0) 5 61 75 03 09 E-mail:
[email protected] Karsten Stegmann Ludwig-Maximilians Universität München Lehrstuhl für Empirische Pädagogik und Pädagogische Psychologie Leopoldstrasse 13 80802 München GERMANY Fax: 089-2180-15640 Email:
[email protected]
Author Contact Details
Andree Tiberghien Université Lumière Lyon2 5, Av. Pierre Mendès-France CP 11, 69676 BRON Cedex FRANCE Tel: +33 (0)4 37 37 62 94 Fax: +33 (0)4 37 37 62 65 E-mail:
[email protected] Armin Weinberger Ludwig-Maximilians Universität München Lehrstuhl für Empirische Pädagogik und Pädagogische Psychologie Leopoldstrasse 13 80802 München GERMANY Fax: 089-2180-15640 E-mail:
[email protected] Dana L. Zeidler College of Education Dept of Secondary Education University of South Florida 4202 East Fowler Ave., EDU162 Tampa, FL 33620-5650 USA Tel: (813) 974-7305 Fax: (813) 974-3837 E-mail:
[email protected] Anat Zohar The Hebrew University of Jerusalem School of Education Mt. Scopus Jerusalem 91905 ISRAEL Tel: 02-588-1368 E-mail:
[email protected]
279
Author Index
A Abd-El-Khalick, F., 77, 132 Ackett, W. A., 216 Adams, P. E., 248 Adey, P. S., 253 Aduriz-Bravo, A., 260 Agraso, M. F., 16 Aikenhead, G. S., 132, 180, 181, 189, 190, 201, 206 Ajzen, I., 191 Albe, V., 177, 191, 195 Alpe, Y., 180 Althof, W., 213 Amiri, L., 216 Amsel, E., 43 Andersen, C., 9, 12, 13, 29–42, 74, 92, 93, 111 Anderson, C. W., 22, 112 Anderson, R. C., 31–33, 35, 41, 55 Andre, J., 205 Andriessen, J., 241 Anscombre, J-C., 14 Ansel, E., 266 Applebaum, S., 216 Archoudidou, A., 42, 44 Ardac, D., 21 Aristotle, 121, 203, 204 Arnauld, A., 14 Ault, C. R., 142 Avraamidou, L., 260
B Baker, M., 97, 100, 103, 230 Bakhtin, M. M., 9, 32, 94 Ball, D. L., 250 Barab, S. A., 113, 119 Barnes, D., 185 Barron, B., 218
Bartell, T., 267 Bazerman, C., 9, 51, 137–139, 141–144 Beardsley, M. C., 65 Bebeau, M. J., 215 Beddall, B. G., 3 Behrend, J., 266 Belenky, M. F., 210 Bell, P., 72–74, 208, 222, 228 Bell, R. L., 180, 183 Ben David, A., 254 Bentham, J., 204 Bereiter, C., 41, 97, 111, 221, 228 Berkowitz, M. W., 205–208 Berry, A., 266 Best, S., 266 Billig, M., 12, 31, 32, 35, 118, 126 Bingle, W. H., 128, 131, 132 Bisanz, G.L., 25, 157, 198 Bisanz, J., 198 Bokhorst, F., Bonan, L., 265 Boulter, C., 4 Bourdieu, P., 94 Brañas, M. P., 199 Bransford, J., 162 Bransky, J., 247 Brem, S., 33 Breton, P., 185 Brewer, J. T., 250 Brewer, W. F., 33, 261 Brickhouse, N. W., 251 Broeken, M., 232, 233 Bronckart, J-P., 187 Brown, A. L., 5, 7, 92–95, 98–101, 103 Brown, J. S., 99 Brownell, G., 247 Brownell, N., 247 Bruhn, J., 239 Buckingham Shum, J., 240
281
282 Bugallo, A., 23, 43, 68, 88, 113, 156, 198 Buty, C., 25
C Callahan, B., 216 Campanario, J. M., 102 Campione, J. C., 5, 7, 93 Candela, A., 33 Carey, S., 36 Carpenter, T. P., 246 Carr, C. S., 240 Carr, W., 7 Carter, G., 218 Castells, M., 49 Cavalli-Sforza, V., 238 Chalghoumi, T. N., 188 Chambers, F. W., 199, 215 Chang, C. Y., 19 Chang, J., 42 Chen, C., 4, 33, 41, 58, 137, 142 Chen, Z., 253 Cheney, R., 44 Cheng, P., 37 Cheong, Y. F., 267 Chi, M. T. H., 224 Chinn, C. A., 31, 33, 37, 55, 261 Chion, A. L., 265 Chudowsky, N., 175 Clark, C. M., 251 Clark, D. B., 56, 217–238 Clinchy, B. M., 213 Clough, E. E., 224 Cobb, P., 265 Cocharn, K. F., 247, 248 Cocking, R., 174 Cohen, E. G., 235 Cole, A. L., 192 Cole, M., 94, 98 Collingridge, D., 132 Collins, A., 5, 6 Copi, I. M., 31 Costello, P. J. M., 120, 121, 126 Crawford, B., 69, 268 Crawford, T., 33, 101 Cross, R. T., 155
D Damon, W., 206 Darwin, C., 3, 21 David, Y. M., 22, 112 Degani, A., 268 DeRoche, E. F., 206
Author Index Désautels, J., 192 De Voss, W., 267 De Vries, E., 218, 219, 224 Dewey, J., 203 Díaz, J., 14 Dillenbourg, P., 219, 220, 230 Dillon, J., 198 Doherty, M., 45 Dolz, J., 182, 183 Dönmez, P., 232 Donnelly, L. A., 181, 202, 211 Dori, Y. J., 251 Doyle, W., 91 Driver, R., 4, 13, 30, 33, 38, 71, 117, 118, 131, 138, 159, 173, 202, 224, 237, 249 Druker, S. L., 21 Dubar, C., 192 Dubois, J. M., 206 Ducrot, O., 14 Duggan, S., 199 Duguid, P., 112 Durkheim, E., 204 Duschl, R. A., 9, 33, 71, 72, 74, 95, 99–101, 110, 159–173, 201, 260
E Edelson, D. C., 146 Eemeren, F. H. van, 12, 13, 30, 31, 34, 63, 118, 138, 163, 164, 230 Eichinger, D. C., 21, 100, 104, 107 Eirexas, F., 16 Eisenberg, A. R., 35 Eisenberg, N., 210 Elby, A., 74, 160 Elder, L., 267 Ellenbogen, K., 161 Engeström, Y., 94, 98 Ennis, R. H., 8 Erduran, S., 3–21, 33, 41, 47–67, 72, 85, 95, 105, 112, 138, 142, 160, 161, 163, 181, 190, 207, 212, 262 Ergazaki, M., 97, 99 Erickson, G., 224 Erkens, G., 217–238 Ertl, B., 242 Espinet, M., 49
F Fabos, B., 217, 235 Fairbrother, B., 175 Fairclough, N., 8
Author Index Felton, M., 34, 40, 41 Feltovich, P. J., 238 Fennema, E., 266 Finocchiaro, M. A., 11, 13 Fischer, F., 219, 220, 222, 230, 235 Fisher, C., 221 Fishman, B. J., 246 Flavell, J. H., 203 Fleming, R., 180, 201 Florence, M. K., 157 Fourez, G., 182 Fowler, S., 202, 211, 212 Franklin, S., 32, 36, 39, 40 Fredericksen, J. R., 253 Freire, P., 8 Friedrichsen, P., 69, 268 Fullick, P., 128
G Galli, L. G., 265 Garcia-Mila, M., 8, 9, 12, 13, 29–42, 74, 92, 93, 111 Garcia-Rodeja, I., 22, 199 Garvey, C., 35 Gaskell, P. J., 128, 131, 132 Gayford, C., 179 Geddis, A. N., 132 Gertzog, W. A., 114 Gess-Newsome, J., 248 Giere, R., 5 Gieryn, T. F., 139 Gilbert, J., 4 Gilligan, C., 210 Girardet, H., 33, 41, 160, 167, 168 Gitomer, D. H., 165, 170 Glaser, R., 22, 45, 112, 115, 175, 197, 238 Glassner, A., 220 Goh, W. L., 218, 230 Goldberger, N. R., 213 Goldman, S., 161, 166 Goodwin, C., 139 Gopnik, A., 37 Gott, R., 199 Govier, T. C., 62 Grace, M., 183, 202 Grandy, R., 159, 160 Gräsel, C., 239 Grayson, D. J., 239 Green, J., 139, 154 Green, T. F., 203–205, 213 Griffis, K., 75
283 Grize, J. B., 14, 188, 189 Grootendorst, R., 12, 13, 138 Gross, A., 137, 139 Gunstone, R., 266
H Habermas, J., 5, 7, 11 Hadass, R., 265 Haidt, J., 211 Halliday, M. A. K., 138, 139, 144 Hamilton, R. J., 159 Hamlyn, J., Hammer, D., 74, 160 Hample, D., 62 Hand, B. M., 25, 157 Harari, H., 18 Harding, S., 10 Hardwig, J., 128 Hargreaves, D., 20 Harrison, A. G., 224 Hasan, R., 144 Hashweh, M. Z., 251 Hegel, G. W. F., 222 Henderson, J., 194 Hennessey, G., 92 Hesse, F., 220, 221 Hewson, M. G., Hewson, P. W., 92 Hickman, M., 33, 34, 37 Hind, A., 24 Hintikka, J., 14 Hoadley, C., 225 Hodson, D., 137, 159 Hofer, B. K., 87, 88, 174 Hogan, K., 54, 97, 180 Holowchack, N., 199 Howes, E. V., 216, 268 Hsi, S., 218, 224 Hughes, G., 208 Hundhausen, C. D., 220, 222 Hutchins, E., 223
I Izquierdo, M., 49
J Jadallah, E., 265 Janssen, J., 218, 220, 232, 233 Jaspers, J., 232 Jenkins, E. W., 155 Jermann, P., 219, 220, 230
284 Jewitt, C., 24 Jiménez-Aleixandre, M. P., 3–21, 33, 48, 49, 66, 72, 86, 91–112, 138, 142, 160, 163, 181–183, 189, 190, 207, 246 Joiner, R., 218 Jones, A. L., 247, 248 Jones, M. G. Jones, S., 218 Jungwirth, E., 247
K Kahn, J. P., 213 Kanselaar, G., 239–242 Kaput, J., 265 Karmiloff-Smith, A., 41 Keefer, M., 201, 202, 207 Keil, F. C., 36 Kelly, G. J., 3, 4, 7, 9, 33, 41, 47, 51, 57, 58, 72–74, 83, 85, 86, 97, 100, 103, 104, 106–108, 110, 137–156, 160, 185, 208 Kelly, T., 193 Kemmis, S., 7 Kennedy, M., 248 Kenyon, L., 97, 98, 101, 106, 107 Keys, C. W., 155 Kim, S., 42, 44 King, A., 230 Kirschner, P. A., 219, 222 Kitchener, K. S., 102 Kitcher, P., 4, 73 Klaczynski, P., 37 Klahr, D., 37, 253 Klein, P. D., 41 Knorr-Cetina, K., 4, 137, 138 Kobbe, L., 230 Kollar, I., 217, 222, 237 Kolodner, J. L., 221 Kolstø, S. D., 97, 99, 110, 117–134, 179–181, 183, 190, 201, 202, 209 Korpan, C. A., 180 Kortland, K., 97, 101, 104, 105, 107, 183, 207 Kozulin, A., 145 Kress, G., 5, 9, 49 Krockover, G. H., 248 Kuhn, D., 5, 8, 12, 13, 30–42, 50, 71, 86, 92, 93, 99, 105, 159, 163, 173, 212, 218, 230, 254, 256, 257 Kuhn, L., 98, 99, 106, 107, 111
L Lally, V., 194 Land, P. S.,
Author Index Larkin, J. H., 221 Larochelle, M., 192 Latour, B., 4, 30, 51, 58, 78, 86, 121, 139, 142 Laurinen, L., 217, 218, 235 Lave, J., 6, 94, 98 Lawson, A., 54, 55, 160 Leach, J., 5, 9, 190 Lederman, N. G., 77, 83, 85, 86, 180, 183 Leena, L., 259 Legardez, A., 180 Lehman, J. D., 253 Lehrer, R., 79 Leitão, S., 222, 230, 231 Lemke, J. L., 30 Leone, A. J., 241 Leont’ev, A. N., 94 Lesgold, A., 238 Levinson, R., 192 Lewis, E. L., 224 Lewis, J., 185, 190 Lin, X., 253 Linn, M. C., 72–74, 221, 222, 224, 225, 228 Loef-Frank, M., 246 Longino, H. E., 132, 140 López, R., 91, 101, 104, 109, 110 Loucks-Horsley, S., 50 Loughran, J., 248 Loui, R. P., 48 Love, N., 68 Lubezky, A., 265 Lund, K., 239 Luria, A. R., 94 Lyell, C., 3 Lynn-Blanton, M., 265
M Maglienti, M., 54, 97 Maloney, J., 48, 49, 55 Malthus, T., 3 Mandl, H., 239, 240, 242, 243 Margalit, A., 204 Marquez, C., 49 Martin, B., 121 Martin, J. R., 138, 139 Martins, I., 9, 49 Marttunen, M., 217, 218, 235 Marx, R. W., 266 Mason, L., 4, 7, 9, 97, 98, 101–104, 108, 110, 111 McClain, K., 265 McNurlen, B, 42, 44 Means, M., 33, 35
Author Index Meinardi, E., 259 Menekse, M., 217–238 Mercer, N., 117, 119, 120 Mestad, I., 97, 99, 123, 124 Metz, M. H., 251 Milka, A., 259 Millar, R., 162, 250 Miller, C. A., 35 Millwood, K. A., 10, 52, 71–87, 97, 106, 110, 138, 142, 160, 173, 208, 229 Milroy, P., 266 Mitchell, S., 120, 121, 126 Monk, M., 198, 216 Morin, E., 180 Mork, S. M., 98, 99, 103, 110, 119 Morrison, K., 73, 85 Mortimer, E. F., 7, 8, 49, 94, 97, 98, 103 Moshman, D., 35–37, 42, 93 Mousseau, M. J., 188 Muehlenbrock, M., 240 Mulhall, P., 266 Mulry, G., 213 Munford, D., 69, 268 Munneke, L., 218 Myers, G., 9, 13, 139, 142
N Narvaez, D., 215 Nemet, F., 4, 41, 49, 50, 97–99, 103, 105, 107, 111, 154, 160, 183, 207, 245 Nespor, J., 251 Newman, S. E., 22, 197 Newton, P., 29, 212 Nguyen, K., 42 Nicole, P., 14 Nisbet, R. A., 204 Norman, D. A., 223 Norris, S. P., 5, 8, 131, 133 Novick, L., 37
O Oakes, J., 251 Oestermeier, U., 221 Ogborn, J., 24 Olbrechts-Tyteca, L., 13, 14, 31 O’Loughlin, M., 43 Olson, D., 45 Osana, H. P., 260 Osborne, J., 4, 13, 20, 30, 33, 41, 42, 71, 97, 98, 100, 105–107, 160, 162, 181, 201, 212, 237, 260, 261 Oser, F., 213
285 Otero, J., 102 Oulton, C., 190, 194
P Page, R. N., 251 Palincsar, A. S., 7 Patronis, T., 97, 183 Paul, R. W., 247 Pea, R. D., 94, 100, 217, 218, 235 Pearsall, S., 38, 41 Pearson, T. W., 157 Pedretti, E., 201 Peled, B., 254 Pellegrino, J., 162 Pereiro, C., 33, 48, 95, 97, 99–103, 109, 110 Perelman, C., 13, 14, 31, 49 Perkins, D., 33 Perner, J., 39 Perry, W., 38 Peters, M. A., 10 Peterson, P. L., 251 Pfister, H. R., 218 Phillips, L. M., 5, 8 Piaget, J., 35, 37, 40 Piccinini, C., 49 Piette, J., 213 Pinch, T., 139 Pintrich, P. R., 38 Plantin, C., 12–15 Pollock, J. L., 64 Pontecorvo, C., 4, 33, 41, 160, 167, 168 Posner, G. J., 92 Potari, D., 114, 198 Prain, V., 41, 155 Prangsma, M., 239 Price, R. F., 155 Protagoras, 12, 118 Prothero, W., 3, 137–156
Q Quinn, V., 41
R Ratcliffe, M., 92, 117–134, 183, 201, 202, 207 Raudenbush, S. W., 251, 252 Raz, J., 207 Reed, D., 65 Rees, E., 238 Reeve, C., 132 Regev, J., 3, 137–156 Reigosa, C., 95, 97, 98, 110
286 Reiser, B. J., 9, 48, 49, 95, 97–100, 103, 106, 107, 111, 222, 223, 226–229 Reiss, M., 194 Rescher, N., 165 Resnick, L. B., 72, 185, 230 Rest, J., 206, 207 Retznitskaya, A., 42 Richards, E., 121 Richert, A., 267 Rips, L., 33 Rivard, L. P., 41, 138 Rogoff, B., 218 Rojo, N., 43 Roschelle, J., 217, 235 Rosé, C. P., 239 Ross, J. A., 253 Rowan, B., 267 Rowe, G., 65 Rua, M. J., Rudolph, 67 Ruffman, T., 39 Russell, T. L., 21 Ryder, J., 24
S Sadler, T. D., 99, 104, 110, 138, 154, 155, 179–183, 190, 193, 201–213 Sainsaulieu, R., 192 Salmon, M., 88, 199 Salomon, G., 93 Sampson, V., 56, 160, 161, 164, 172, 219, 223 Sandoval, W. A., 5, 9, 48, 49, 52, 71–87, 95, 97–100, 103, 106, 110, 138, 142, 160, 208, 227–229 Sawyer, R., 162 Scardamalia, M., 41, 97, 111, 221, 228 Scerri, E. R., 48 Schafer, L. E., 180, 202 Schauble, L., 79 Schellens, T., 217, 218, 235 Schneuwly, B., 182, 183 Schoenfeld, A., 253 Schultz, L., 37 Schwartz, R. S., 88 Schwarz, B. B., 220 Schweingruber, H., 174 Schweizer, D. M., 97 Scott, B., 199 Scott, P. H., 7, 8, 49, 94, 97, 98, 103 Seymour, J. R., 260 Shaw, V., 44, 240 Shouse, A., 174 Shulman, L. S., 247, 248
Author Index Shweder, R. A., 211 Siegel, H., 4, 5, 8, 10, 11, 13, 29, 127, 128, 159, 163, 173 Simmons, M. L., 216, 268 Simon, S., 20, 48–50, 55, 60, 66, 67, 98, 99, 105, 106, 246, 261–263 Simonneaux, J., 181, 182 Simonneaux, L., 179–197 Slotta, J. D., 240, 241 Smith, B. K., 241 Smith, C., 36 Snoeck Henkemans, F., 43, 68, 136 Sodian, B., 39 Sokal, A., 10 Soller, A., 240 Solomon, J., 117, 126 Sóñora, F., 185 Spiliotopoulou, V., 114, 198 Spillane, J. P., 242 Stegmann, K., 217–238 Stein, N. L., 35 Steinmuller, F., 241 Stiles, K. E., 68 Straw, S. B., 138 Strike, K. A., 114 Suthers, D., 220, 222 Sutton, C., 94
T Tabak, I., 226, 227, 229 Taber, K., 20 Takao, A., 4, 51, 66, 73, 97, 104, 106, 107, 138–142, 144, 160, 208 Tal, R. T., 266 Tarule, J. M., 213 Taylor, 216 Thoma, S. J., 215 Thorley, R., 92 Tiberghien, A., 5, 7–9, 224 Todd, F., 185 Torff, B., 252 Toth, E. E., 253 Toulmin, S., 4, 7, 13, 14, 21, 31, 48, 57, 60, 63, 72, 107, 109, 124, 127, 134, 142, 160, 173, 181, 185, 230, 262 Treagust, D. F., 239 Treasure-Jones, T., 242 Tsatsarelis, C., 24 Tsou, C., 174 Turner, S., 192 Tutiaux-Guillon, N., 188 Tynes, T., 125 Tytler, R., 180
Author Index U Udell, W., 12, 41
V Vaaknin, E., 268 Valcke, M., 217, 218, 235 Van Dike, J. A., 35 Van Driel, J. H., 248 Veerman, A. L., 242 Verheij, B., 61, 63–65 Verloop, N., 267 Verschaffel, L., 36 Vosniadou, S., 36 Voss, J. F., 33, 35, 49, 62, 230 Vygotsty, L. S., 94
W Wade, P. D., 88 Waggoner, M., 42 Walker, K. A., 202 Wallace, A. R., Walton, D. N., 15, 16, 34, 40, 66, 117–121, 127, 131, 134, 161, 162, 164, 165, 167–169, 172, 189 Warburton, E., 252 Wathen, S. H., 88, 199, 241 Weaver, A. J., 157 Weinberger, A., 217–238 Weiner, A., 238 Weinstock, M., 44 Wenger, E., 6, 94, 98, 139
287 Wertsch, J. V., 94 White, B. Y., 253 Williams, M. M., 206 Williams, S., 174 Wilson, J. Q., 211 Wilson, S. M., 250 Wise, J., 75 Wolfe, C. R., 218 Wood, N. V., 127 Wood-Robinson, C., 198 Woolgar, S., 4, 30
Y Yakmaci-Guzel, B., 23, 68 Yi, H., 42 Yore, L. D., 5, 8, 137 Young, M. D., 217, 235
Z Zaitchick, D., 45 Zeidler, D. L., 99, 104, 110, 179, 180, 183, 193, 201–213, 249, 261 Zeitz, C. M., 88, 199 Zembal-Saul, C., 52, 53, 59, 249, 260 Ziman, J., 130, 132, 134 Zimmerman, C., 36 Zogza, V., 97, 99 Zohar, A., 4, 41, 49, 50, 97–99, 102, 103, 105, 107, 111, 154, 160, 183, 207, 245–265
Subject Index
A Absolutist, 39, 256 Activity structure, 221, 223, 236, 237 Alternative theories, 34 Appeals to analogy, 164 to authority, 164 to evidence, 72, 173 to information, 16, 168 Argument(s), 3, 7, 12, 13, 15, 17, 19–21, 30, 31 analytical, 118, 163 backing, 54, 61, 160, 163, 164 claim, 3, 4, 6, 10, 13, 15, 21, 29–33 coherence, 31, 52 content, 34, 49, 62, 105, 107, 182, 192, 201, 205, 212 data, 63, 64, 66, 77, 84, 127, 221 discursive, 14, 30, 32–34, 40, 117, 184 divergent, 66 evaluation, 52, 96, 98, 133, 159, 163, 189, 263 evidence-based, 53, 148, 248 field-dependent features, 15 field-invariant features, 15 individual, 41, 217, 220 interactive, 34 linked, 66 parts, 65 persuasive, 51, 72, 86 qualifier, 15, 35, 160, 164 quality, 52, 65, 181 rebuttal, 33–35, 41, 50, 59, 61, 63–65, 109, 160, 164 rhetorical, 118, 161, 163 serial, 65 structure, 7, 35, 54, 56, 59, 62, 65, 72, 78, 105 validity, 15, 31, 59, 160, 187, 209, 261
warrant, 4, 5, 15, 16, 34, 54, 57–64, 66 written, 49, 51, 73, 77, 78, 80, 81, 84, 86, 106, 145 Argumentation cognitive requirements, 33, 38 dialectical, 15, 34, 37, 42, 118, 163, 165, 170 internal, 12 meaning of, 13 skills, 31, 56, 65, 92, 104, 105, 111, 259 social, 12, 35 strategies, 21, 41, 158, 155, 173, 186, 247, 248, 264 supporting it, 13, 153 Argumentation learning environments, 91, 102, 111 Argumentation markers, 187 Argumentation theory, 14, 65, 137 Argumentative competencies, 97, 109, 111 Argumentative knowledge construction, 222, 231, 278, 279 Argumentative operations, 168 Argumentive discourse strategies, 34, 41 Argumentive reasoning, 33, 35 Assessment, 5, 8, 16, 17, 20, 26, 35, 83, 86, 95 Assessment conversation, 101, 165, 166 Asynchronous Communication, 218 Attitudes, 19, 56, 109, 191, 194 Authentic activities, 99 Authentic science, 74 Awareness tools, 217, 220, 232
B Beliefs, 8–10, 56, 59, 65, 72, 74, 77, 80, 81 Biotechnology, 180, 184 Boundary markers, 57, 66 Brute facts, 204, 205
289
290 C Care, 205, 207, 208, 210, 213, 258 Care orientation, 207 Case studies, 148, 149, 153, 254 Character, 159, 201, 203–208, 211–213 Character education, 204–206, 208 Citizenship, 5, 8, 18, 19, 180, 181, 191, 201, 205, 206 Claim(s) , 3, 6, 9, 13, 21, 29, 31–35, 38, 39, 41 justified, 32, 35 unwarranted, 34, 77 Classroom-based studies, 91–93, 107–109 Classroom culture, 104, 106, 107, 109, 111, 159, 261 Classroom discourse, 15, 87, 95, 105, 108, 164, 165, 256, 263 Climate change, 71, 151, 152 Coding, 47, 50, 52, 54, 55, 57–59, 62, 66, 78, 82 Cognition, 5, 6, 8, 18, 19, 29, 36, 37, 40, 41 Cognitive apprenticeship, 6, 95, 96, 99, 101, 106, 108, 110, 111, 189 Cognitive demands, 249, 250, 252 Cognitive practices, 138 Cognitive precursors, 38 Cognitive tools, 223 Coherence, 15, 31, 37, 52, 53, 103, 147, 144, 147, 150, 151 Collaboration, 7, 21, 42, 72, 96, 103, 108, 121, 218–220, 222 Collaborative learning, 29, 41, 103, 218, 230, 232, 236, 238 Committed impartiality, 194, 196 Communication, 4, 7–9, 12, 30, 48, 60, 94–96, 100 Communicative action, 5–7 Communicative approach, 94, 103 Communicative competencies, 7–8, 29 Communities of learners, 5, 6, 93, 94 Communities of practice, 94 Community practices, 4 Competencies, 7, 8, 17, 30, 37, 38, 97, 104, 107 Competing theories, 106, 121, 132, 262 Complexity, 67, 73, 128, 134, 142, 153, 181, 182, 185, 190, 196 Conceptual change, 36, 92, 102, 108, 183, 190, 224, 261 Conceptual change, conditions for, 92, 102 Conclusions, evaluation of, 54 Confirmation bias, 33 Conflict of interests, 184 Conscience, 203–206, 208, 213 Conscious control, 35, 38
Subject Index Constitutive values, 140 Constructivist learning environments, 91, 95, 104, 111 Contextual values, 140 Controversies, 30, 117, 128, 132, 179, 195, 196 Coordination evidence & theories, 8, 35, 37, 38, 40, 72, 73, 111, 143, 151 Counterarguments, 33–35, 51, 100, 219, 221, 248, 254 Counterclaim, 33, 34, 51, 64, 119, 212 Criteria, 5, 6, 8–10, 13, 31, 39, 47, 49, 51, 52 Critical discussion, 120–124, 127, 130, 131, 133, 134 Critical rationality, 7, 8 Critical theory, 7, 8, 11 Critical thinking, 5–8, 10, 11, 39, 65, 111, 163, 172, 180, 192 Cumulative talk, 119, 120 Curriculum, 17–20, 75, 93, 95, 96, 98–101, 104, 159, 160, 170
D Data, 3, 13, 15–19, 30, 31, 33, 35, 36, 39 access, 221, 222, 224, 226, 233, 235, 236, 256 analysis, 59, 63, 147, 228, 260 construction, 109 empirical, 3, 97, 109, 131, 132, 142, 150, 189 inscription, 142, 146–148, 150–152 interpretation, 17, 87, 142, 183 Debates, 8, 10, 18, 32, 35, 39, 40, 50, 99, 108–110, 126, 159, 173 Decision-making, 18, 102, 104, 110, 117, 121, 128, 155, 167, 180 Deduction, 14, 31, 37, 163, 172 Deductive reasoning, 54 Design experiments, 92, 93, 97 Design principles, 91, 92, 95, 96, 100, 104, 224, 226, 230, 232 Dialectic, 15, 31, 32, 34–37, 42, 118, 163, 165, 169, 170 Dialectical activity, 34 Dialectical coordination, 35, 36 Dialogic, 12, 15, 31, 32, 35, 40–42, 64, 65, 94–96 Dialogic/dialogical, 12, 15, 31, 32, 35, 40–42, 64, 65 Didactic transposition, 5 Discourse process, 4, 41, 160, 163 Discourse, 4, 8, 9, 12–15, 31, 32, 34, 35, 40, 41
Subject Index Discursive practices, 9, 13, 30, 32–34, 40, 41, 100, 101 Discussion maps, 55 Disputability of knowledge claims, 124, 125, 134 Disputational talk, 119, 120 Distorting, 37, 92 Distributed cognitions, 94 Diversity of outcomes, 100, 101, 166 Domain general norms, 163, 226, 231 Domain-specific norms, 51–53, 226, 228, 231 Dualistic, 38 Dynamic visualizations, 222
E Egocentric values, 123, 134 EIBE, 184 Emancipation, 8, 11 Empathy, 204, 206, 208, 210 Empower, 5, 8, 21, 48, 50, 180, 181, 202 Enculturation, 5, 6, 9–13, 99, 109, 110 Enlightenment, 11 Environmental education, 108, 109 Environmental problems, 180 Environmental risks, 132, 179–180 Epistemic(s), 5–7, 9–11, 37, 39, 41, 49, 51, 52, 58, 72, 73 actions, 160, 167 apprenticeship, 9 cognition, 38, 102 commitments, 52, 86, 87, 92, 99, 108 communities, 160, 275 criteria, 5, 6, 9–11, 100, 111, 142, 143, 147, 152, 154 decisions, 87 demands, 160 levels, 51, 73, 110, 141–144, 148, 151, 154, 208 moves, 72 operations, 108, 167–169 practices, 9, 49, 51, 85, 87, 92, 93, 95, 97, 100 rules, 37, 160, 166 status, 51, 58, 92, 100, 101, 140, 141, 160, 208 subject, 7 understanding, 9, 10, 52, 257 Epistemological, 9, 10, 12, 36, 38–40, 42, 49, 51, 52, 54 beliefs, 74, 83, 85, 87 commitments, 52, 86, 87, 92, 99, 108 criteria, 52, 106, 161 ideas, 71–74, 87 justifications, 87
291 meta-knowing, 253, 256, 257 notions, 72 precursors, 38 reconstruction, 182 understanding, 9, 12, 38–40, 92, 93, 98, 99, 102, 106, 111, 202 Epistemology(ies), 5, 6, 10, 15, 71, 77, 86 personal, 9, 72 practical, 9, 74, 85, 87, 106 Ethical, 180, 183, 184, 188–190, 192, 193, 201, 203 Ethics, 128, 179, 185, 193, 202–204 Evaluating claims, 97, 101, 110, 111 Evaluation, 5, 11, 13, 18, 36, 37, 52, 65, 93, 95 Evaluation criteria, 13, 100, 104, 183 Evaluatist, 39 Evaluative epistemology, 256 Evaluative standards, 10, 92 Evaluative thinking, 93, 102 Evidence, 3, 4, 7, 8, 10–13, 15–21, 30, 32, 33, 35–40, 42 commitment to, 8, 11 empirical, 3, 59, 72, 73, 81, 83–59, 86, 110, 208, 210 theoretical, 59 Evolution, 21, 138, 189, 248 Expert authority, 127, 128, 133 Expert reliability, 131, 134 Explanation constructor, 100, 228, 229 Explanations, 4, 7, 15, 35, 53–55, 74, 76, 77, 79, 82 Exploratory talk, 119 Externalization, 31, 41, 42, 101
F Fallacious thinking, 216 Falsification, 39 Field dependent, 15, 52, 160 Field invariant, 15, 52 Frontier science, 117, 125, 130–132, 180
G Geology, 146, 151 Global warming, 97, 146, 151, 152, 155, 183
H Hawthorne effect, 93 Higher order cognitive processes, 7, 11, 12 Higher order thinking, 5, 12, 41, 246, 248–258, 264
292 I ICT, 100 IDEAS, 20, 100, 106 Induction, 163, 173 Inference(s), 14, 36, 38, 53, 54, 73, 143, 148, 153, 154 Inferential reasoning, 142 Informal reasoning, 118, 206, 209 Initial teacher training, 20 Inquiry, 10, 15, 17, 19, 21, 29, 30, 32, 36, 52 Instructional program, 40 Intellectual ecology, 107–109, 121 Intellectual status of ideas, 92, 102 Intentional learning, 94, 97, 99, 112 Interactive, 15, 32, 34, 50, 95, 102, 108, 144, 182 Interdisciplinary, 6, 67, 181, 182, 193, 195 Interdiscursive analysis, 184, 187, 195 Interpsychological, 32–34, 41
J Justification, 3, 10, 11, 13–17, 19–21, 31–33, 35 Justification of knowledge claims, 3, 13, 54, 95–98
K Knowledge, 3–10, 13, 14, 17–21, 29, 30, 36, 38–42, 47–50, 52 Knowledge bases, 221 Knowledge co-construction, 188–189 Knowledge construction, 6, 7, 13, 17, 18, 21, 42, 108, 188, 218, 222 Knowledge evaluation, 5, 13, 95–97, 102, 111, 132 Knowledge evaluation competencies, 97, 111 Knowledge producers, 95, 96, 104
L Language, 4–9, 14, 15, 19, 42, 58, 92, 94, 95, 120 Language, interpretative use, 8 Language of science, 9, 159 Latent semantic analysis, 236 Learning, 3, 4, 6–10, 12, 13, 17, 19, 20, 29, 30, 32 Learning as knowledge construction, 6 Learning science, 8, 9, 13, 19, 32, 39, 41, 92, 95, 102, 155, 162, 260 Learning to learn, 41, 99, 100 Learning, situated, 6 Learning tasks, 91, 92, 104
Subject Index Lexical, 141, 144 Logic, formal, 14, 15, 60, 61, 118, 162
M Making choices, 180 Meaning making, 7, 94, 95 Mediation, 4, 94, 154, 160, 253 Metacognition, 29, 40, 41, 95, 96, 102, 201, 171, 203, 253, 255, 257 Metacognitive awareness, 40, 102 Metacognitive competences, 38 Metacognitive control processes, 102 Metacognitive knowledge, 42, 102, 153 Metaconceptual awareness, 96, 102 Metastrategic, 40, 153–256, 258, 262 Metastrategic knowledge (MSK), 253–256, 262–264 Meta-strategic thinking, 254, 256 Metatheoretical understanding, 39 Methodology coherence with theory, 37, 40 grounded approach, 49 qualitative, 48, 52, 54, 56, 59, 66 quantitative, 47, 48, 54, 56 tools, 47, 48 Microgenetic, 38, 41 Micromorality, 206 Modelling argumentation, 4–6, 262, 263 Monitoring learning processes, 102 Moral anatomy, 206–208 argument, 204 character, 204, 206, 208 education, 203–205, 207, 213 issues, 201, 202, 208, 209 judgments, 190, 202, 211 motivation, 208 philosophy, 202, 203 reasoning, 202, 204–208, 211, 213 Morality, 181, 201–206, 208–211, 213 feminist account, 210 our-component model, 207–208 social intuitionist accounts, 211 Multiple strategies, 38 Multiplist, 39, 40, 256
N Nature of science (NOS), 5, 9, 17, 18, 30, 47, 56, 72, 75, 77 Neutrality, 131, 179, 193, 194, 196 Nicomachean Ethics, 203 Normativity, 207
Subject Index Norms of scientific argumentation, 71, 117, 207
O Objectivist, 38, 207 Oceanography, 51, 106, 137, 139–142, 144, 145, 147, 153, 155, 208 Open-ended problems, 85, 154, 167, 195
P Pattern emotive, 210, 212 intuitive, 210, 211 rational, 209, 210, 212 Pedagogical content knowledge, 63, 247, 248, 260 Peer assessment, 34, 41 Peer collaboration, 42 Persuasion, 3, 9, 11, 13, 31, 41, 73, 80, 81, 95, 120, 139 Philosophy of science, 5, 10, 18, 166 PISA, 16, 20 Post-academic science, 132–134 Premises, 15, 31, 34, 37, 118, 120, 163, 168, 169, 171 Presumptive reasoning, 15, 58, 161, 165, 167–170, 172, 173 Problem solving, 4, 18, 19, 61–63, 71, 93, 100, 110, 162, 250 Problems, ill-structured, 61, 62, 180, 181 Professional development, 20, 60, 63, 106, 245, 247, 255, 257–261 Prudence, 204, 205, 208 Pseudo-scientific, 8, 183 Psychology, developmental, 5, 6, 30, 33, 74
R Rationality, 7, 8, 10, 11, 13, 14, 16, 36, 182, 207 Realist, 39, 56, 184, 248 Real-time customization, 233, 236–238 Reasoning strategies, 38, 41, 227 Reasoning, 3, 5–8, 10–15, 19, 31–41, 54, 56, 58, 59, 61 Reasoning, presumptive, 15, 58, 161, 165, 167–170, 172, 173 Reasoning, scientific, 8, 33, 36, 38–41, 54, 61, 63–65, 108, 111, 141 Rebut, 34, 51, 65, 98, 181 Rebuttals, 15, 31, 33–35, 50, 51, 57, 61, 63–65, 109, 160
293 Rebutting, 35, 63 Reflection, 7, 11, 13, 35, 40, 48, 50, 58, 60, 73 Reflective judgment, 202, 203 Regulation processes, 102 Relativist, 38, 256 Reliability, 19, 47, 49, 66, 125, 127–134, 148, 171, 236 Reliability, 19, 45, 47, 64, 122, 124–131, 145, 166, 236 Representational redescription, 41 Rhetoric, 9, 11, 13, 14, 31, 32, 51, 52, 62, 73 Rhetoric of science, 137 Rhetorical, 9, 11, 32, 51, 52, 62, 73, 84, 95, 99, 118 Rhetorical strategies, 73, 156, 181 RODA, 99, 100, 108–110, 112 Role-play, 110, 184–186, 193, 195, 262 Role of students, 18, 95–98 Role of teachers, 98, 193
S Scaffolding, 29, 38–42, 96, 98, 107, 213, 220, 222, 226, 235 Science education, 3–7, 9–21, 29, 30, 32, 40, 42, 47–49, 56 Science in the making, 19, 173, 201 Science studies, 4, 5, 47, 67, 179, 247 Scientific discourse, 4, 13, 41, 120, 141 Scientific knowledge, 3, 4, 6, 8, 9, 13, 17–19, 30, 39, 49 Scientific literacy, 5, 6, 8, 9, 11, 16, 17, 201, 208, 209 Scientific reasoning, 8, 33, 36, 38–41, 54, 61, 62–65 Scripted cooperation, 222 Second-order operations, 40 SEPIA, 99–102, 160, 162, 165, 166, 170–172 Shared artefact, 218 Shared representation, 78, 95, 123, 166, 232, 235 Situated cognition, 5–7, 94 Social context, 118–120, 124, 133, 190, 193 dilemmas, 179 practices, 9, 140, 145, 180 reasoning, 32 Socialisation of science, 132 Socially acute questions, 179, 180 Socially mediated activities, 4 Sociocultural perspective, 4, 5, 7, 48 Socio-scientific issues (SSI), 8, 50, 97, 110, 117, 122, 126, 134, 138, 153 Strategic knowledge, 247, 253
294 Subjectivist, 39 Syllogism, 163 Syllogistic reasoning, 31, 37 Synchronous communication, 217, 218
T Talking science, 8–9, 173 Teacher education, 20, 245–265 Teacher strategies, 107, 109, 111 Teachers’ disciplinary identity, 179 Teaching argumentation, 98, 104–106, 246, 248, 254, 257, 262, 264 Teaching strategy, 123, 190, 196, 249 Teaching for thinking, 247 Technology-enhanced environments, 217–238 Technosciences, 163 Theoretical frameworks, 48, 228 Theoretical representations, 61, 65 Theory of mind, 39 Thinking, 3–8, 10–12, 14, 18, 30, 33, 35–37, 39–42, 65 Thinking patterns, 247, 253, 255 Thinking processes, 4, 108, 251 Thinking strategies, 7, 12, 102, 247–249, 253–256 Thinking tasks, 249, 250, 252, 253 TIMSS, 16 Toulmin’s Argument Pattern, 15, 48, 57, 160, 163, 164, 168, 172, 262
Subject Index Transfer, 105, 154, 237, 254, 257 True dialogue, 9, 108, 109
U Uncertainty, 109, 179, 185, 186, 194, 196 Undercutting defeaters, 64 Underdetermination of theories, 132
V Validity, deductive, 14, 31, 55 Values, 7, 56, 59, 109, 123, 128, 129, 134, 136, 140 Values hierarchies, 190 Virtue, 202–204
W Warrants, 4, 15, 16, 31, 47, 49, 51, 54, 55, 57, 59 causal, 52, 81, 84, 100 difference from data, 59, 83 empirical, 81–85 factual, 81, 86 from authority, 63 typology of, 16, 60 Writing, 6, 8, 9, 11, 51, 52, 58, 65, 67, 71 Writing science, 6, 8 Written argumentation, 66, 72, 137–139, 142, 144, 188 Written communication, 137, 155
