America's First Women Philosophers: Transplanting Hegel, 1860-1925 (Continuum Studies in American Philosophy)

AMERICA'S FIRST WOMEN PHILOSOPHERS

Continuum Studies in American Philosophy: Dorothy G. Rogers, America's First Women Philosophers Thorn Brooks and Fabian Freyenhagen, eds., The Legacy of John Rawls

AMERICA'S FIRST WOMEN PHILOSOPHERS TRANSPLANTING HEGEL, 1860-1925

DOROTHY G. ROGERS

continuum LONDON

•

NEW YORK

Continuum The Tower Building, 11 York Road, London SE1 7NX 15 East 26th Street, New York, NY 10010 © Dorothy G. Rogers 2005 Ail rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. ISBN: HB: 0-8264-7475-6 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Rogers, Dorothy D. America's first women philosophers: transplanting Hegel, 1860-1925 / Dorothy G. Rogers. p. cm. — (Continuum studies in American philosophy) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-8264-7475-6 1. Women philosophers—United States—History. 2. Concord School of Philosophy. 3. St. Louis Philosophical Society (Saint Louis, Mo.) 4. Idealism, American. I. Title. II. Series. B905. R58 2005 191-dc22

2004056177

Typeset by Aarontype Limited, Easton, Bristol Printed and bound in Great Britain by Antony Rowe Ltd, Chippenham, Wilts

In honour of my foremothers Arlene (Libby) Rogers 1930-2001 Alva (Ring) Libby 1907-1982

Thelma (Chadwick) Rogers 1905-1998

Fannie (Rowell) Ring 1866-1919

Florence (Leighton) Chadwick 1877-1961

Mary Elizabeth (Carter) Rowell 1836 1908

Ruth (Underwood) Leighton 1853-1912

Mary Jane (Friend) Carter 1809-ca. 1862

Elmira (Phinney) Underwood 1827-1893

Mary/Molly (Allen) Friend 1772-?

Ruth (Tyrer) Phinney 1791/92-1863

Joanna (Thorndike) Allen 1746-1833

Ruth (Goodale) Tyrer 1754-1815

Rebecca (Dodge) Thorndike ca. 1720-?

Betsy (?) Goodale ca. 1730-?

Contents

Acknowledgements Introduction

vii 1

1

The legacy of American idealism

15

2

Susan Blow: philosophy in education

47

3

Anna Brackett: feminist philosopher—educator

73

4

Paraprofessional philosophy stage I: Grace Bibb, Ellen Mitchell, and the Concord School of Philosophy

97

5

Paraprofessional philosophy stage II: Eliza Read Sunderland and Lucia Ames Mead

119

6

Marietta Kies: private virtue in public life

138

Bibliography

162

Index

171

Acknowledgements

I first embarked on this project after consulting with James Schmidt, my dissertation adviser at Boston University. With a copy of William Goetzmann's volume and a note reading "Bingo! See chapters on Susan Blow and Anna Brackett," he directed me toward the St. Louis Hegelians and a very exciting research project. I thank him formally here, along with the following people who helped make this book possible. I thank my editor at Thoemmes Press, Philip de Bary, for his enthusiasm for this project and for his helpful comments and guidance along the way. Cornelis de Waal, of the Peirce Edition Project, University of Southern Illinois, Carbondale, deserves thanks as well for his editorial wisdom and support at an earlier stage of the project. Dina Young, archivist at the Missouri Historical Society, and Charles Brown, of the St. Louis Mercantile Library, provided me with access to a wealth of material on the St. Louis movement. Jean Gosebrink, archivist at the St. Louis Public Library, Lois Waniger, of the Carondelet Historical Society in St. Louis, and Madeline Mullin, archivist at the Countway Library at Harvard Medical School all supported my efforts to locate Susan Blow's correspondence. Material related to Anna Brackett was provided by Marilyn Manzella and Marilyn Coombs of the alumni office at Framingham State College, and Carol Foster at the college's library. Dierdre Hollingshed, Greta Ober-Beauchesne, and Aleks Stankovic, of the American Association of University Women, made heroic efforts to learn more about the ACA/AAUW scholarship established in Brackett's name. Diane Kaplan cheerfully provided me with access to correspondence from Brackett and other women in the Thomas Davidson Papers at the Sterling Library, Yale University. Many are to be thanked for helping to locate important information about Ellen Mitchell: Steve Fisher, archivist at the University of Denver; Judy Haven, of the Onondaga (NY) Historical Association; Sandy Steck, of the Onondaga County Public Library; Anita Wright of the Cortland County (NY) Historical Society; and my friend Glynis T. Hawkins, formerly of Boston University, for energetically conducting on-site research at the Denver Public Library, thus unearthing important archival material. I am grateful to the Bentley Historic Library at the University of Michigan for a generous travel grant to peruse the Eliza Jane Read Sunderland Papers.

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Acknowledgements

Karen Jania was especially helpful in guiding me through Sunderland's material and other sources in the University's archival holdings. A great number of people deserve recognition for guiding me to material on Marietta Kies. Patricia Albright, of Mt. Holyoke College conducted patient and diligent searches for material on Kies, providing me with the most definitive data available on her. Erin Davis, Butler University archivist, discovered important material on Kies as well. Marica Moss and Leslie Wilson, archivists at Concord Free Public Library, guided me through the Concord School papers. Carol Jarvis and Janice Braun, archivists at Mills College, provided valuable pieces of information. John Simpson, of the University of Michigan, conducted on-site research prior to my visit to Ann Arbor. Ginny Kiefer, of Colorado College, and Bill Roberts and Raymond Stokes, of the Bancroft Library, UC Berkeley, also provided assistance. Friend and colleague James A. Grandison, of Oakland, California, conducted on-site research at the Bancroft Library as well. Robert Miller, town historian of Putnam, Connecticut, and long-time admirer of William Torrey Harris, took great interest in Kies and was helpful in locating local sources of information on her. Kies family descendants Herb Corttis, Kristin Orr, and Betty Richards provided helpful anecdotes about Kies and her family. Much thanks goes to Marlayna Schmidt for finding the time to read and edit the entire text. I also thank Ira L. Smith for reading and commenting on some chapters, both old and new. More importantly, I thank Ira for his support and companionship.

Introduction

This is the first philosophical examination of the women of the St. Louis and Concord idealist movements — Susan Blow (1843—1916), Anna Brackett (1836-1911), Grace Bibb (1842-1912), Ellen Mitchell (1838-1920), Eliza Sunderland (1839-1910), Lucia Ames Mead (1856-1936), and Marietta Kies (1853—99) - both individually and as a group. The St. Louis Philosophical Movement (1866-80) and the Concord School of Philosophy (1879-88) were two branches of the same idealist movement which attempted to adapt German thought (primarily Hegel) to the American context; or "to make Hegel talk English," as its leader, William Torrey Harris (1835-1909), described the group's objective. Toward this end, Harris and his colleagues applied their philosophical ideas to practical matters: social and political concerns - education in particular. Many members of the movement during its early years in St. Louis, therefore, were educators in the public school system, and the majority of these were women. Although their influence waned greatly after the turn of the twentieth century, the lives and works of the men of the St. Louis and Concord movements were relatively well chronicled over the years. Biographies were published on four of the men in the movement, and over a dozen books or theses discuss their influence or aspects of their theory. In addition, there are over thirty articles and book chapters discussing the men and their ideas. The women who were part of these movements, on the other hand, have largely been ignored by historians of philosophy in America. Aside from this book, the following have been devoted to a discussion of America's first women idealists: one thesis, one booklet, and one fairly lengthy unpublished manuscript; sixteen articles and book chapters. And the majority of these works focus on Susan Blow in particular and her educational theory/ One plausible reason for the near exclusion of women from the historical exploration of the American idealist movement is the fact that their work focused almost solely on education. As educational theory joined the several social sciences in becoming disciplines distinct from philosophy in the late 1800s, both the women idealists and their ideas were set aside by students of philosophy. Two are still recognized as important educators, but their theoretical work has never been admitted into the philosophical canon. Another likely explanation for their exclusion is the fact that they were women. This is not simply to charge philosophers and philosophical historians

2

Introduction

since 1900 with sexism. It is instead to point to a very significant reality in the professional development of women philosophers during this period: namely, academic opportunity. Although "female seminaries" where young women could get a degree of academic training came into being in the 1820s and 1830s, more nearly equal educational opportunities did not become widely accessible until the 1870s when a number of state universities became coeducational. Even then, the more elite institutions barred admission to women. Therefore, the women discussed here did not have access to the duties, benefits, and privileges that come with entrance into the halls of higher knowledge. Susan Blow and Lucia Ames Mead had no formal education to speak of, but instead were privately tutored. The education of Anna Callender Brackett, Grace C. Bibb, and Ellen M. Mitchell ended at the secondary school level, although this almost certainly included "normal school" training for each. Only Eliza Sunderland and Marietta Kies completed bachelor's degrees, and both went on to earn Ph.D.s. Unfortunately, even late twentieth-century feminist historians did not encounter the St. Louis and Concord women, perhaps because they were not political activists, although some were on the periphery of the suffrage movement. Yet these were accomplished women who participated in the early stages of the development of idealism in the US, and they deserve more attention than they have had in the past. Thus this book. However, discussing the women alone would be to tell only half the story. Therefore, the book begins with a discussion of the St. Louis movement as a whole and its later incarnation in New England at the Concord School of Philosophy. Chapter One gives brief descriptions of the male leaders of the movement in St. Louis and Concord: William Torrey Harris (1835-1909), Henry C. Brockmeyer (1826-1906), Denton J. Snider (1841-1925), George H. Howison (1834-1916), Thomas Davidson (1841-1900), Louis Soldan (1842-1908), and George S. Morris (1840-89). It might disappoint some readers that I have chosen to begin with a chapter on the male contemporaries of America's first women idealists. Yet, as with all thinkers, the women in St. Louis and Concord did not create their ideas ex nihilo, but instead were part of an intellectual community. Furthermore, while the women were quite well known in their day, their male contemporaries received more lasting attention, thus more information is available about them than is the case with the women under discussion here. Therefore, this book necessarily opens with a look at those traditionally considered the "true leaders" of America's early idealist movement: the men. This points to a problem that constantly presented itself throughout my research on this group of women. Not only did male historians fail to chronicle the lives and work of this group; the women themselves failed to leave a decent paper trail. None of the women published a work comparable to Denton Snider's memoirs. None produced an intellectual/biographical sketch of any of

Introduction

3

her female contemporaries. And the letters and unpublished manuscripts of this group have rarely been preserved. Only Susan Blow and Eliza Sunderland collected and preserved their correspondence, providing a few valuable references to women in their philosophical circles. Thankfully, because men in the St. Louis movement were such good promoters and archivists, letters to Harris from Ames Mead, Susan Beeson, Bibb, and Blow; letters to Davidson from Beeson, Bibb, Brackett, Mitchell, and Caroline K. Sherman; and just two letters from Kies to Howison also remain. Particularly in St. Louis where the movement began, philosophy was thought to have practical significance, and education was its main focus. Not only was Harris the founder and editor of the nation's first journal devoted exclusively to philosophy, the Journal of Speculative Philosophy (1867—93), he was also a principal in, and then superintendent of, the St. Louis public school system (1859-67; 1867-80), an active member of the National Education Association (1872-1909), an officer of the American Social Science Association (ca. 1870—1900), organizer and primary lecturer of the Concord School of Philosophy (1879—88), and finally US Commissioner of Education (1890-1906). Other men in the movement were also committed to both philosophy and its practical applications. Each was either a member of the St. Louis Philosophical Society or a contributor to the Journal of Speculative Philosophy (JSP). In most cases, they were involved in both of these projects. To cite some examples, Soldan, Snider, and Davidson taught in the public schools in St. Louis. Soldan was also a member of, and leader in, the National Education Association. Both Soldan and Davidson joined the Missouri Equal Suffrage League with Harris. Brockmeyer practiced law and held public office for a period of time. It was through the Philosophical Society, and an elite sub-group of it, the Kant Club, that the St. Louis group did its most theoretical work. JSP grew out of this group, as did Harris's works on Hegel, Hegel's Doctrine of Reflection and Hegel's Logic. Chapter 1 discusses in more detail what role Harris and other men played in the St. Louis Philosophical Society, in JSP, and at the Concord School. It also indicates when and in what manner each of them influenced, or were influenced by, the women in this study. Chapter 2 discusses the life and work of Susan Blow, who contributed to the life of the St. Louis movement as a philosopher—practitioner. As director of the kindergarten program in St. Louis, the nation's first successful free public kindergarten, Blow developed a pedagogical theory in which play is the best means of fostering the intellectual and moral growth of children. This, she maintained, involves a dialectical process in which a child is faced with opposition in the form of the role or character that he or she has chosen to assume. While in this role, the child is estranged from himself or herself. The child then

4

Introduction

"returns" from the role to the original self that faced this opposition, and grows from what has been learned about his or her own abilities. In addition, Blow intertwined her theory of childhood education with a theory of motherhood that is completely compatible with the Hegelian view of women as outlined in the Philosophy of Right — that is, as more subjective, consumed with love for their children, and fully actualized in the home. In her view, women are undoubtedly the first educators. Early childhood education is both their natural responsibility and their special skill. Yet, maternal instinct is not enough to educate a child: systematization of methods is needed. To effect this systematization, Blow established a kindergarten training school and classes for mothers. By professionalizing childhood education in this way, Blow helped make it into a legitimate career. Thus the maternal instinct that she believed to be inherent in women's nature moved from the private sphere of home and family into the public realm. And in this sense, she departed from Hegel's ideal. Chapter 3 looks at Anna Brackett, another pedagogical theorist, who focused on the other end of the learning continuum: higher education. Drawing on the theory of Hegel's disciple, Karl Rosenkranz (1805—79), Brackett adopted the Hegelian view of education as a process of the unfolding of the self, of the self-development of the individual. This process takes place in stages, which requires that different methods be used to teach students at different cognitive levels. Literature plays the same role for older children in Brackett's view that play does in Blow's scheme for kindergarteners, only on a more conscious level. That is, it initiates a dialectical process of selfestrangement and return by introducing a child to a world different from his or her own, and then allowing the child to "return" to his or her own world, yet with a broader understanding of his or her surroundings. The important twist to Brackett's theory, however, is in its application to women specifically. As principal of the St. Louis Normal School (for teacher training), Brackett was responsible for the education of, almost exclusively, young women. And, in stark contrast to Blow, she denies that women have any natural inclinations toward the care and nurture that Blow believes makes women especially well suited for the teaching profession. Instead, in Brackett's view it is because of women's social role that they often choose to become educators. On this point, Brackett also challenges Hegel's view of women as wholly internal and subjective. In her understanding, women through education — are able to cross into the public realm, becoming individuated and rational beings. In this sense, Brackett is not only an educational philosopher, but also a feminist theorist, dissenting as she did from traditional views of women as more suited to work in the private sphere. In Chapter 4, I discuss two women whose careers mark the first stage of paraprofessional philosophy — i.e., the transition from the avocation of the

Introduction

5

amateur scholar to the vocation of the professional academic. Grace Bibb and Ellen Mitchell were active in both the St. Louis and Concord branches of the movement. Bibb regularly attended meetings of the Philosophical Society and Kant Club in St. Louis. She also gave regular reports on the activities of the St. Louis circle in the Western Review (1875—80), an educational and literary periodical. Ellen Mitchell attended St. Louis Philosophical Society meetings, led a women's philosophy and literature discussion group, and hosted meetings of the Pen and Pencil Club in her home in St. Louis. Both Bibb and Mitchell routinely made the trip to Massachusetts to attend the Concord School in the summer, as did many women who were active in the movement in St. Louis. Mitchell was also one of only a handful of women to lecture at the Concord School of Philosophy (1887). In her work Mitchell demonstrates a better acquaintance than Bibb with Hegel, although she did not develop an original theory, as did Blow, Brackett, Ames Mead, and Kies. Theoretically, both Mitchell and Bibb authored feminist pieces, which point to an openness to progressive ideas within the St. Louis and Concord circles. Bibb's and Mitchell's careers took shape during the first stage of what I have termed paraprofessional philosophy in that, like others in the idealist movement, they focused primarily on the practical applications of philosophy to educational, social, and political life. Yet unlike others in the movement who were content to teach in the public schools, Bibb and Mitchell sought to enter the professional academic world of the university. Unfortunately, although they were serious students of philosophy who held positions in academia for short periods of time, they were limited in their ability to succeed there because of changes in the discipline in this era. Academic pedigree became increasingly important in philosophy in the last third of the nineteenth century. Since neither Bibb nor Mitchell had advanced academic degrees, they were surpassed by a younger generation of academically credentialed philosophers. Aside from short stints in the academy, both Bibb and Mitchell were teachers, public lecturers, and social critics whose audience was almost exclusively female. Chapter 5 focuses on Eliza Sunderland and Lucia Ames Mead. Neither Sunderland nor Ames Mead was connected to the idealist movement in St. Louis, but both attended the Concord School, at least intermittently. And both contributed to the expansion of the idealist movement. Sunderland was a leader in women's and religious circles, holding offices in the Women's Western Unitarian Conference and the Association for the Advancement of Women. A feminist, Sunderland was active in the suffrage movement and a proponent of higher education for women. Ames Mead was also active in women's organizations, helping to found the Women's Peace Party and Women's International League for Peace and Freedom. Also a Unitarian,

6

Introduction

she was active in liberal religious circles, though not to the same extent as Sunderland. Sunderland wrote and lectured on the value of religious freedom, on the comparative study of religion, and on women's rights and higher education. Ames Mead wrote almost exclusively on pacifism. Sunderland and Ames Mead represent the second stage of paraprofessional philosophy. Sunderland had earned a doctorate in the field, but was shut out of academia because of a bias against hiring women in full-time faculty positions. Ames Mead considered an academic career, but ultimately decided against it because she was committed to applying ideas to real world concerns. In both cases, the academic philosophical world was becoming one that told women "you do not belong" — either implicitly or explicitly. Sunderland and the majority of the twenty other women who earned doctorates in philosophy between 1880 and 1900 were denied positions in coeducational colleges and universities simply because they were women. Ames Mead and others like her found the academic life too specialized and narrow in focus. They wanted an environment that allowed them to apply their theories, not merely to debate them on the abstract level. In this sense they, too, were paraprofessional philosophers. Like the majority of those in the American idealist movement, both focused on the practical applications of philosophy to educational, social, and political life. But in Sunderland's case, this is because she was forced to do so by academia's refusal to allow women into its world at this point in time. Ames Mead represents the more typical pattern as women intellectuals became more numerous. The academic world was simply too confining for them. The sixth and final chapter is devoted to Marietta Kies, who ventured beyond the public school classroom, both literally and figuratively. Like Sunderland, Kies was among the few women who earned a Ph.D. in the 1880s and 1890s. Somewhat younger than Sunderland, she did gain access to academia, where she developed her interest in political philosophy and authored two books on the subject before her early death at the age of forty-five. Kies hardly addressed "women's issues" at all. Instead she seemed to assume women's participation in the public realm - with the exception of voting rights, which she believed should be limited to a narrow range of issues for women. What Kies did do, however, was put forth a theory of altruism in contrast to egoism as a valid ethical principle in the political and economic realm. This is a very bold move, because Hegel himself had upheld the view of civil society as the realm in which individuals are free to pursue their egoistic interests and wants. Yet Kies built a system that anticipated many recent feminist theories of care. In fact, her theory approximates what some contemporary feminists have suggested is missing from the Western political philosophical tradition.

Introduction

7

On being philosophical enough Just how philosophical were the members of the St. Louis and Concord circles? According to Leidecker's biography of Harris, very. In fact, Leidecker prophesied that Harris, if not his colleagues, would grow in renown in American intellectual history over time (see the preface to Leidecker's biography, Yankee Teacher}. So far this has not been the case, even though the institutional structuring of schools that Harris introduced is almost synonymous with the meaning of "education" in the US today. Why? Because Harris and his group of followers were dedicated to the idea that philosophy is a practical enterprise. For them, philosophical principles and concepts could and should be applicable to everyday life. In their pre-professional, or perhaps more accurately, paraprofessional philosophical framework, they did not develop the sort of overarching, systematic philosophy that their ideal philosopher, Hegel, did. And as the discipline became a professional academic field after the turn of the twentieth century, the American idealists were left behind. Yet there is no shortage of the purely philosophical in the works of any given member of Harris's group - the women being no exception to this general rule. Blow and Brackett applied a Hegelian dialectic of self-estrangement and return to the education of children and youth. Blow ventured somewhat further than Brackett into philosophy proper, commenting on the nature of the individual, the design of the cosmos, and God as Person, for example. In fact, she considered her last chapter of Educational Issues in the Kindergarten the most important in the book. The chapter's title? "Three World Views," which consisted of nothing less than an examination of the superiority of idealism over atomism and pragmatism. Bibb and Mitchell each developed feminist theories that show strains of idealist influence. Mitchell tried her hand at philosophy proper with her Study of Greek Philosophy, but like Harris and G. S. Morris, she was less inclined to posit theories of her own than to review theories of others, namely Hegel and Zeller. (Unlike her male contemporaries, unfortunately, Mitchell was harshly criticized for this approach, and was even accused of dilettantism. This is discussed in Chapter 4.) Sunderland and Ames Mead were committed to both feminism and religious liberalism. Sunderland's was a more maternal feminism than that of Brackett, Bibb, Mitchell, or Ames Mead, but she believed strongly in improving access to educational opportunities for women. Her more philosophical work was unpublished, so in a sense it was also untested. Ames Mead gravitated more toward Kant than Hegel - Kant's theory of peace in particular. She rejected a purely philosophic life in the academy in order to devote herself

8

Introduction

to pacifist theory and activism, and incorporated her feminist and philosophic thought into her pacifism. While we do not find in Kies as much metaphysical inquiry as in Blow's work, the ideas that she does present come in a much more comprehensive and systematic format than do those of her contemporaries. Therefore, perhaps the works of Kies and Blow fall more legitimately under the heading "philosophy" than does the work of the other women in this book. Yet, I am inclined to question comprehensiveness and system as the two primary criteria for deeming a thinker a philosopher, particularly when considering pre-twentieth-century women. I make this rather bold rejection for two reasons. First, women's intellectual explorations were limited in this period. They could write, teach, discuss, and often attend meetings with male colleagues, certainly. But, regardless of their intellectual ability, women had limited educational opportunities and were often confined to certain areas of inquiry: education in Blow's and Brackett's cases; religion or aesthetics in other cases'. Such intellectual confinement was due partly to historical circumstances, which helped shape the expectations of women, and partly to the choices made by the women themselves. It is true that the women in Harris's circle had chosen the particular branches of thought that they then became well-known experts in. Susan Blow chose kindergarten education as a means to attaining "spiritual motherhood". Anna Brackett clearly had a rather overt feminist agenda in promoting normal school training for young women. Still, in this period, women had very few career options — if they were to pursue a career at all. So these women made "choices" within a very narrow range of options. Perhaps Marietta Kies and Lucia Ames Mead, who were a full fifteen to twenty years younger than the original group of thinkers in St. Louis, demonstrate most clearly that, with even a slight shift in social norms over time, women had begun to venture beyond the branches of philosophy that had been considered acceptable for them when Harris, et al. had begun their philosophical project. In short, given the historical and social context in which these women were working, even their choice to remain within certain intellectual confines may have resulted more from the "closing of the tops of the chimneys," as Brackett described their limited educational and professional opportunities, than from free choice. Do I assert a mere sociological determinism then, suggesting that social forces predetermined these women's professional development and thus excuse their philosophical lack of system? To an extent, yes, I do. At the same time, however, I recognize that within the social constructs in which they were operating, the St. Louis and Concord women made choices and their male colleagues provided them with opportunities that catapulted them far beyond their female peers in intellectual and professional achievement. In this sense,

Introduction

9

it is to their credit that they chose philosophical work at all. The fact that their philosophies were not as comprehensive or systematic as others is incidental. This leads to a second observation regarding the understanding of philosophy as mandating comprehensiveness and system. The exclusion of women like those in this study from the philosophical canon has necessarily contributed to the shape that canon has taken. The points of emphasis, structure of arguments, and form of conclusions reached are both a result of, and subsequently a cause of, these women's exclusion from the American philosophical canon: What is acceptable as philosophical thought has taken on a distinctly different tone than might have otherwise been the case; because of this tone, these women's interests have been deemed too unphilosophical to be canonized. This is not to say that because they were women the ideas of Blow and her colleagues were of an inherently different quality. It is rather to concede that as women their experiences were different. Thus their contributions to the development of philosophy as a discipline were of a different character than many though certainly not all - of their male counterparts. In fact, Leidecker's erroneous prophecy regarding the impact of Harris and his colleagues points directly to this same issue. Although he was (obviously) male, Harris's concerns, and his tendency to focus on practical applications of philosophy rather than solely on its theoretical development, resulted in the de-emphasis (if not the exclusion) of him in the canon. Similarly, Denton Snider and Thomas Davidson have not been given the attention they deserve, because their intellectual interests crossed disciplinary boundaries and thus did not fit into what came to be deemed "philosophy" in the twentieth century. Had philosophy developed only slightly differently over the course of the last one hundred years, Harris and his colleagues — male and female — might have continued to hold a more prominent place, and thus to have given a different shape to philosophical discussion, than what we have seen until very recently. Discussion of the philosophical-ness of these women's philosophies is necessary, simply because theirs is a body of work that has not been examined prior to the publication of this book. Even among historians of philosophy who discuss the work of women in the discipline, questions arise as to what can be counted as philosophy. Do we include Louisa May Alcott or Rebecca Harding Davis, both of whose novels conveyed important ideas about women and social stratifications within society? Probably not, otherwise what is to prevent us from placing Mark Twain and Henry James under the heading "philosopher"? Perhaps, then, Ann Bradstreet's moral injunctions to her son can be counted? After all, Aristotle's ethics were intended as a guide for his son to follow - clearly there is no question as to whether Aristotle is a philosopher. Well then, let's explore this question further: Is Anna Maria van Schurman a philosopher or merely, in her own phrasing, a "Learned Maid"? Soren Kierkegaard presents a similar dilemma, repeatedly referring to himself as a "mere

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Introduction

poet," eschewing the title "philosopher" (although most likely as an inside joke between him and his more sympathetic readers). We can see then that the title "philosopher" is not without a degree of ambiguity, be it in reference to a man or to a woman. Furthermore, there is no doubt that the women under discussion here certainly were philosophers and, as my readers will discover, that their ideas are in many ways applicable today, both within and outside of the halls of the academy.

The feminism question A good part of my decision to embark on this project lay in the fact that these thinkers are women. The idea of recovering the works of women appealed to me for personal as well as academic reasons, both of which I would call feminist. When I began my research, I was certain that, as women, Blow and her colleagues would point to a new way of looking at Hegel, particularly regarding his configuration of the intersections of the public and private realms in the Western philosophical tradition. And in many instances, this hypothesis proved to be correct. Susan Blow7's kindergarten theory blurred the distinction between a woman's maternal role in the home and her professional educative role in the school. Brackett took the professionalization of education a step further, and advocated the higher education of women, particularly teachers. This meant that she dismissed Hegel's understanding of women's nature, which in turn relegated them to that most natural of human institutions, the family circle. More dramatically still, Marietta Kies reinterpreted Hegel's notion of civil society in such a way as to incorporate altruism into the mix, dethroning egoism as the operative ethical principle for "industrial relations" — i.e., the business world. Minor and peripheral figures also made contributions to the development of early American idealism, although more as participants and implementers than as theoreticians. Yet, is the fact that these were women interpreting and applying Hegel to the American context sufficient reason to call them or their interpretations "feminist"? As with any historical analysis, importing contemporary ideas into theories of times past is naive, if not misleading. First we have to determine what we mean by this term, when it originated, to what degree it has evolved, and whether our current standards of what is "feminist" are applicable to this bygone age. This is not a particularly easy task, but certainly not an insurmountable one, either. Without attempting to give a full account of the history of the "first wave" of feminism, I think it will be helpful to give at least a little background on this movement. The first wave of feminism in this country is generally thought to have begun with the first women's rights convention held at Seneca Falls, New

Introduction

11

York, in 1848. The term "feminism" itself was not operative at this time, however. In fact, according to the Oxford English Dictionary, the word "feminism" was first coined in the 1850s, and until the 1880s it was used in the sciences to refer to feminine sex characteristics in plant and animal life. Its current meaning, connoting pro-female ideas and practices, started to develop in the 1890s, then became more widely used between 1900 and 1920. Even so, a concept of women's rights had developed even before Seneca Falls and was invoked as a reason for enacting the New York Married Women's Property Act in 1836 which allowed a woman to retain power over her assets after marriage rather than being required to entrust them to her husband, which had been the case until that time. This was the first in a long series of social and political changes that were made as the push for women's rights gained strength and momentum throughout the nineteenth and into the twentieth century. Then as now, however, not all feminist advocates were in agreement about the meaning of the term "women's rights." Many concentrated almost exclusively on increased access to the public realm: to (higher) education, broadened employment options, pay equity, and the rights to vote and to hold public office. Others focused on ways to better women's private lives: relaxed divorce laws, child custody reform, and temperance legislation, for example. But the first-wave feminist movement had one overarching theme. It sought to draw attention to injustices done to women primarily because they were women, and to remedy those injustices through social and political change. And although we second-wave feminists often disagree about the goals to be attained or the issues to be emphasized much as our first-wave foremothers did, feminism today continues to seek to end injustices to women. Therefore, this is the way in which I use the term "feminist" throughout this discussion: as a commitment to improving women's situation when they have been excluded because of their gender. So the initial answer to the question of whether the women in this study and their works were feminist must be both "yes" and "no". Certainly for women to pursue educational and professional equity with men at this point in history was in some sense to be feminist. The dual emphasis of education and employment had been part of the first-wave feminist agenda since its origins in the 1840s, after all. Although the subjects in this study had come of age more than a quarter of a century later, neither equal education nor full employment of women was anywhere near to having become a reality. So sheerly in terms of their practical achievements, these women embodied feminist principles. However (and this is an extremely important "however"), even though an early twenty-first century reader might see feminist implications in the lives and works of these women, it is not quite appropriate to label all of them "feminists." Susan Blow, a very conventional woman, was raised in upper class society and forbidden by her father to work. Therefore, she served in her

12

Introduction

position in the St. Louis school system as a volunteer, accepting no pay for eleven years. This she did despite holding the title "Director of the Kindergarten" and reporting directly to the school board herself rather than to Harris, the school superintendent. In addition, while her systematization of early childhood education may have had the effectTof professionalizing the "women's work" of educating children, she herself never explicitly stated this as her objective. In fact, Blow did not have a commitment to feminism as I have defined that term. She was opposed to two primary feminist causes for which her contemporaries fought: voting rights and equal employment opportunity. Further, there is no evidence that she made any efforts to improve women's educational opportunities, win them pay equity, or improve their lot in marriage. In fact, Blow's theoretical work was based on an understanding of women as maternal and most readily fulfilled by their work in the domestic realm - i.e., the home. It may even be that Blow would take offense at being referred to as a "feminist." Anna Brackett, Grace Bibb and Ellen Mitchell, on the other hand, were quite intentional about incorporating feminist ideas into their work. Education was itself a feminist process for Brackett, taking a young girl out of the family circle and sowing in her the seeds of independence and self-sufficiency as it did. Her strategic omission or outright rejection of certain beliefs of Hegel and his disciple Rosenkranz regarding the characteristics of men and women, then, can readily be called "feminist." So too with Bibb, Mitchell, Sunderland and Ames Mead. All were self-consciously and explicitly feminist, like Brackett. In fact, it would be a misrepresentation of the work of each of these three women not to recognize their commitment to feminism. When we look at Kies, however, we are back in the feminist quandary that Blow puts us in. Kies attained the highest level of education of any of the women in this group, earning a Ph.D. from the University of Michigan in 1891. As an alumna of Mt. Holyoke College and one of the first women to earn a doctoral degree in philosophy, she was clearly a proponent of higher education for women, in practice, if not in theory. Yet Kies devoted virtually no time to discussing women or women's issues in her written work. In fact, the aspect of her theory that is most enchanting to current feminists — the idea of "justice" and "grace" as complementary principles — is void of any reference to gender. In one sense Kies's "grace," or altruism, anticipates the "ethic of care" that Carol Gilligan's In a Different Voice indicated might emerge if women were admitted into moral/ethical discourse. Kies wishes to correct the perception that "justice" is the only valid principle for ethical decision making in the business world. But its complement, "grace," is a principle she imports from the church, not the ladies' parlor. Furthermore, Kies too was unfriendly to women's suffrage. While she conceded that an abstract right to vote did exist for women, she maintained that on the practical level women

Introduction

13

should cast a ballot only on matters of concern to them: education, temperance, or perhaps labor issues, for example. So to call Kies a feminist would also be a misrepresentation of her life and thought, despite the fact that today's feminists might find her ideas particularly instructive and appealing. Throughout this discussion then, I have tried to do three things in addressing "the feminist question." First, I have tried to use the term "feminism" consistently, and hope to have done so successfully. Second, I have tried to use the broad categories "liberal" and "maternal" feminism in order to compare each woman's ideas about women to those that are prevalent today. Liberal feminism grows out of the Western individualist tradition and focuses on women's similarities to men. It generally emphasizes women's equal access to social goods that are routinely allotted to men. Maternal feminism insists that women do differ from men, focusing on women's (natural) nurturing and caretaking tendencies which grow out of their ability to bear children. Nineteenth-century maternal feminists often argued for a greater role in public life for women, based on the principle that they could use their caretaking and nurturing qualities to help clean up the social and political orders. At the same time, however, I have tried to apply the term "feminist" to a particular thinker only if she herself would have been likely to have considered herself a part of feminism's first wave. Third, I have tried to point out when one of these women's thoughts or actions have had feminist implications, based on the way we see women's situation today. In this last case, I by no means intend to impose concepts on my subjects that they were not aware of or may even have been hostile to. For example, I suggest that Susan Blow's kindergarten work had feminist implications in that it turned what had been considered maternal instinct into a professional skill. However, I do not mean that she consciously sought to bring about a change in women's status in the professional world, only that her work had the effect of doing so. As with all people who live on the cusp of great social change, the deeds of these women had unforeseen consequences, some of which served to facilitate what came to be feminist goals over time. So then, when I have ventured into pointing out feminist implications of a woman's work, I have tried to do so with care. With any luck, I have succeeded in maintaining consistency and faithfulness to each woman's view of her work and in presenting it effectively.

Notes 1.

2.

Short memorial or biographical sketches have been produced, and in some cases the St. Louis and Concord women have been recognized for their practical work, but they have not been discussed as philosophical thinkers. Of the twenty-eight individuals who were active in the St. Louis movement, sixteen were public school teachers. Ten of these were women.

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Introduction

3. One book and one manuscript discuss Blow's life and work. Ten articles and book chapters also focus on Blow. 4. This section was prompted by discussion of the problem of distinguishing between philosophers, essayists, and poets, especially among women, in earlier historical periods at the Seventeenth-Century Women Philosophers conference held at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, November 7-9, 1997. 5. "Liberal" and "maternal" feminism are the terms I use for the two main branches of feminist thought. Recently, maternal feminists have charged that a focus on the similarity of women to men has provided only formal equality for women, and that women's difference from men requires social and political change in order to give women true access to goods that are denied them simply by virtue of the fact that they are women. These two branches of feminism have also been called "liberal" and "cultural" feminism (by legal theorist Robin West) and "equity" and "gender" feminism (by former philosophy professor Christina HoffSommers).

Chapter 1 The legacy of American idealism

My Dear Prof. Howison, Mrs. Cheney has written to me the result of her interview with you. I had been thinking for some time that I would write to you about the matter. I very much wish that an arrangement could be made by which I could do some teaching at the University. Of course, in order to take the Ph.D. from the Univ. of Mich. I have given a good deal of time and money to advanced work in Philosophy. It seems as if the Univ. of California might join in what seems to be at least a partial movement to allow women to teach in co-educational institutions. You know Stanford University has a lady on the Faculty as Assistant Professor, and the new Chicago University has one as Dean of the Faculty and perhaps another one in another department. Would you be willing, for the sake of the cause, to have me make an application to the Board of Regents to become a Fellow in Philosophy with some teaching duties? You know in order to inaugurate anything a little unusual a little agitation of the subject is necessary . . . When Marietta Kies petitioned George Holmes Howison for an academic appointment at the University of California, Berkeley, in June 1892, she knew that he would take her aspirations seriously and do what he could to help. Kies (1853—99) was one of the most successful women in American idealism, the first genuinely philosophical movement in the nation, through which the works of the German thinkers Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831), Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814), Wilhelm Friedrich Joseph von Schelling (1775-1854), Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), and others were translated and interpreted. It is best characterized as a pre-pragmatic philosophical movement, with its members working to apply philosophical concepts to real-world social and political issues. With many of the members of the movement working as public school educators in its early years, pedagogy was one of its central concerns. Marietta Kies set herself apart from the majority of her female colleagues by editing an introduction to philosophy and authoring two original works of

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political philosophy. Other women idealists remained within the more "feminine" areas of philosophy: aesthetics, pedagogy, or feminism. Ednah Dow Cheney (1824—1904), to whom Kies refers in her letter to Howison, was one of these women. Kies's elder by a generation, Cheney was a later transcendentalist who caught on to the new idealist movement late in life, as did fellow New Englanders Julia Ward Howe and Elizabeth Palmer Peabody. The bulk of Cheney's lectures and writings were on art and literature; Howe's was on feminism. Following the lead of Elizabeth Palmer Peabody, others in Kies's circle of idealists focused primarily on education. My work focuses on women in the idealist movement - Marietta Kies, Susan Blow, Anna Brackett, Grace Bibb, Ellen Mitchell, Eliza Sunderland, and Lucia Ames Mead - because they were central to the success of this first attempt at genuinely philosophical thought in this country, thus helping to set the stage for professional academic philosophy in America. Kies further distinguished herself by being one of few in the idealist movement — male or female — to earn a Ph.D. in philosophy (University of Michigan, 1891). Howison, the most academic of the men in their circle, was the right person to go to for support. Howison had been an active member of the movement since its early days in St. Louis in the 1860s. He taught at Washington University in St. Louis until the early 1870s, when he moved to the east coast to teach at Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Howison was a candidate for a position at Harvard at one point, a position that he lost to Josiah Royce. In 1884 Howison became a faculty member at the University of California, and by 1892, when Kies wrote her letter, he was chair of philosophy at Berkeley. Howison was also a longtime friend of Kies's primary mentor, William Torrey Harris, with whom he staged frequent good-natured (but heated) debates at meetings of the Philosophical Union at Berkeley. Married to a feminist himself, Howison was supportive of women's equality. Like Harris and other men and women in the movement, he was a member of local and national women's rights organizations as well as a vocal supporter of education and employment opportunities for women. Perhaps more importantly, both Howison and Harris did a great deal to help women in their circle advance professionally. Howison mentored both male and female students at UC Berkeley and granted women equal membership in the Philosophical Union, several of them presenting papers there. As editor of the first philosophy periodical in the US, the Journal of Speculative Philosophy, Harris had been publishing the writings of women since 1867. Kies was not successful in her bid for an academic position at Berkeley in 1892—93. Instead, she spent the year in Leipzig and Zurich, quite likely on Howison's recommendation, and a few years later gained a position at a smaller coeducational institution, Butler College in Indianapolis (1896-9). Yet,

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given the prospects for women academics at the time, Kies's experience counts as a victory. Among the 20 women who completed doctoral work in philosophy before 1900, nearly two-thirds held academic positions, the majority of them long-term full-time appointments, but almost all of them at women's colleges. Kies was the second woman with a Ph.D. in philosophy to teach full-time at a coeducational institution prior to 1900. The first woman with a doctorate in the discipline, May Preston Slossen (Cornell, 1880), held a fulltime position briefly at Hastings College in Nebraska. One of Kies's colleagues in the idealist movement, Ellen M. Mitchell, taught philosophy full-time at the University of Denver before the turn of the century (1890-92), even though she had not acquired a doctoral degree. Two other women Ph.D.s taught at coeducational institutions after 1900: Eliza Ritchie (Cornell, 1889), who made the transition from Wellesley (1889-99) to Dalhousie (1900-ca. 1920) and Christine Ladd-Franklin, who could gain only periodic part-time teaching assignments at Johns Hopkins because of the university's policy against hiring women faculty at that time. Kies's relatively accelerated rate of success was directly related to her participation in the progressive idealist philosophical movement, which began in St. Louis, Missouri, in the 1860s and by the 1880s had spread to other parts of the country. Her story and that of other women idealists has not previously been told. Their careers and contributions, essential to the development of intellectual life in America, provide a key to understanding the genealogy of women's and feminist thought in America.

The Role and Influence of the St. Louis Movement (1860-1880) The rise of the St. Louis philosophical movement marked a turning point in American intellectual history. Consisting of educators, regional and national policy makers, and social critics who were enamored with German idealism, members of the movement published the nation's first philosophy periodical, the Journal of Speculative Philosophy, where the first English translations and interpretations of Hegel, Fichte, Schelling, and others appeared. Through the journal and the professional and paraprofessional organizations they formed, the St. Louis idealists ushered discussion of German thought into American discourse. William Torrey Harris (1835-1909) was the driving force behind the St. Louis movement, and he saw German idealism as uniquely suited to address contemporary social and political concerns. He motivated others in his circle by insisting that their mission was "to make Hegel talk English." That is, he wanted to adapt German thought to the American context, to

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apply it to education, social reform, and political life. When he first encountered Hegel's thought in 1857, Harris believed that the dialectic would lead to a resolution of the impending conflict between North and South: the struggle between individual states and the union would lead to synthesis in which unity within diversity would prevail. In leading the St. Louis group in its explorations of German idealism, Harris also set a new standard for philosophical inquiry. Although he admired the New England transcendentalists, he recognized that they lacked a degree of academic rigor as well as a systematic approach. Therefore, he and his associates dedicated themselves to reading original idealist works in German, rather than relying on English commentaries as the majority of their more famous forerunners had done. The St. Louis group began studying Hegel's Science of Logic in earnest in the 1860s and continued with a weekly study group at Harris's home on The Phenomenology of Mind. Members of the group also studied Hegel's Philosophy of History, Philosophy of Nature, History of Philosophy, Philosophy of Right, and Philosophical Propaedeutic. By surpassing the transcendentalists in academic rigor and philosophical system, Harris and his colleagues marked the transition from philosophy as an avocation to philosophy as a vocation. The inquisitive layperson yielded to the paraprofessional thinker who then would make way for the academic philosopher. Most of the idealists in St. Louis remained at the paraprofessional stage — a middle ground between lay inquiry and academic analysis. They developed a powerful mix of philosophical theory and practice, but rarely advanced to the "pure" philosophy of the academy. Later incarnations of the movement in Chicago and Concord saw a more academically minded set of thinkers enter the idealist discussion. Harris and his associates were prominent in St. Louis, a busy metropolis in the 1860s and 1870s. With a major port on the Mississippi River, St. Louis was a host city for a significant number of immigrants, particularly from Germany. It rivaled Chicago in influence and prestige until the mid 1880s when Chicago firmly established itself as the second largest city in the US. But during the years that the St. Louis philosophers were establishing their movement, there was a great deal of growth and intellectual ferment in their city. Consequently, many of them gained national recognition for their role in the movement. The majority of the group's members were educators in the public school system who made pedagogical theory a main branch of St. Louis thought. As superintendent of the St. Louis public school system (1867-80), Harris himself was credited with educational innovations, such as instituting the graded school system, advocating equal education for African-Americans, and promoting the coeducation of women and men. He became a leading figure in the educational world, holding various offices in the National Education Association and later was appointed US Commissioner of Education (1890-1906).

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For nearly every aspect of his educational work, Harris gave a philosophical explanation, and his philosopher-educator colleagues in St. Louis shared his views. Although it may seem strange today that one of the nation's first groups of philosophers came out of this context, intellectual life had a very different character in the nineteenth century. Institutions of higher education were still dominated by religious leaders and religious ideals, and many ideas were considered too radical to admit into the academy. In the early 1800s, for instance, Harvard was beset by controversy when religious liberals were twice appointed to the institution's presidency. The intermingling of moral, theological, and political concerns continued throughout the first half of the nineteenth century, and the country's most elite institutions - Harvard, Yale, and Princeton - shied away from teaching German philosophy, deeming Kant and other modern thinkers "subversive of morality." As late as 1851, a Harvard professorship was denied to an "especially outspoken Unitarian Whig." This intellectual environment was enough to make Harris disenchanted with his study at Yale, and he dropped out toward the end of his third year to pursue his interest in German thought. After leaving Yale, he took what was for him the next step intellectually, the application of philosophy to real-world concerns, leaving his formal education unfinished. The most prominent female philosopher-educators in St. Louis were Susan E. Blow (1843-1916), Anna C. Brackett (1836-1911), and Grace C. Bibb (1842-1912). Blow directed the kindergarten program in St. Louis, the nation's first continuous free public kindergarten system, and published five books on the philosophy of early childhood education. Brackett was the first woman in the US to be appointed principal of a secondary school, directing the St. Louis normal school in its early years. She was also a feminist who applied the educational theory of Hegel's disciple Karl Rosenkranz to women and girls. Bibb was a feminist who also taught in the normal school. She played largely an administrative role in the movement, facilitating the movement's work behind the scenes as a contributor to the Western Review, its educational and literary publication. She also produced a few works of early literary criticism. By 1880, Harris, Howison, Brackett, and others had left St. Louis and had begun introducing the movement to other parts of the country. In Concord, Massachusetts, Harris founded the Summer School of Philosophy and Literature (1879—88), providing a vastly different setting from St. Louis for the development of idealism. In contrast to the busy metropolitan life that Harris and his associates lived in the 1860s and 1870s, Concord offered a quiet refuge. The town itself was a well-established gathering place of the intelligentsia of Boston (just twenty miles to the southeast) and had been home to Alcott, Emerson, Hawthorne, Thoreau, and Fuller. As the School's title suggests, its focus was not on education, but on philosophy proper and nascent literary

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theory. Yet equal educational opportunity was an outgrowth of the School. At a time when women's educational efforts were often truncated by policies that barred them from graduate programs. Concord School sessions were open to them. Women with intellectual aspirations attended the School faithfully and studied with one or more of the prominent lecturers there. Ellen M. Mitchell (1838-1920), for example, studied with Denton Snider and William Rounsville Alger. Mitchell, a member of the St. Louis movement, led her own women's philosophy discussion group there in the 1860s and 1870s. By 1880, she had moved to Denver where she led another women's group. Mitchell was also a feminist, and she lectured at several women's meetings and national congresses. As a younger contemporary of Blow, Brackett, Bibb, and Mitchell, Marietta Kies did not become associated with Harris and his circle until he established the Concord School, where she studied with both him and George Sylvester Morris. For Mitchell and Kies, entry into the professional academic world followed from their association with the prominent male intellectuals at the School. As a result of her study at Concord, Mitchell published A Study of Greek Philosophy in 1891 while teaching at the University of Denver. While studying at the Concord School, Kies began doctoral work at the University of Michigan, published An Introduction to the Study of Philosophy, and taught at Mt. Holyoke College (then Seminary) and Colorado College. After the School's demise, she taught at Mills College and Butler University. With a critical mass of the idealists in St. Louis working as teachers, education was a dominant concern for Harris and his colleagues. Yet the group was also attuned to religious, political, and social issues, and it is in this arena that it distinguished itself as a body of independent thinkers. None of the members of the St. Louis circle fit neatly into the right, left, or center columns when considered as Hegelians. On some issues, St. Louis thinkers were center-right Hegelians. Harris and Blow, for instance, were religiously orthodox. Blow, a Presbyterian, was considerably more observant than Harris, a Congregationalist. Blow also saw education as a way of inculcating the "correct" moral values in children. On the other hand, others in their circle, such as Denton Snider, Thomas Davidson, and Ellen Mitchell along with Anna Brackett, were religious radicals by just about any standard. Davidson all but established his own "un-religion" with the Fellowship of the New Life, the predecessor of the Fabian Society and an endeavor that Blow found to be objectionable at best. Each of these four ~ Snider, Davidson, Brackett, and Mitchell - had close ties to one or all of the most progressive religious groups of the day: the Free Religious Association, Ethical Culture Society, Unitarians, or Universalists. Religiously then, these members of the St. Louis circle could easily be called left Hegelians. With the exception of Blow, each of those mentioned would best fit under the left or left-center Hegelian heading in regard to social and political issues.

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Harris, Davidson, and Louis Soldan all supported the feminist movement along with other progressive causes. Thomas Davidson and Marietta Kies went even further. With ties to the Christian Socialist movement, Kies advocated the institution of a welfare state. Both she and Davidson, then, belong in the left Hegelian column politically. Similarly, given the strong identification of Brackett, Bibb, and Mitchell with all aspects of the feminist movement, it is fair to label them left Hegelians as well. Both Anna Brackett and Grace Bibb espoused many feminist causes, such as pay equity and voting rights for women. Ellen Mitchell shared these views and even went so far as to condemn prostitution from a feminist standpoint. Thus, members of the movement took philosophy seriously as a means of infusing life with purpose and effecting change in the world. In Snider's words, they sought "to give a rational account of [their] vocation . . . [to] philosophize [their] practical life and not wander into the regions of mere speculation." A number of St. Louis organizations grew out of the group's efforts to bridge the gap between theory and practice: the State Teachers' Association, the Art Society, the Public School Library Association, the Pedagogical Society, the Pen and Pencil Club, the Aristotle Club, the Kant Club, and the Philosophical Society. But Harris in particular was strongly committed to the group working out its theories so as to inform its practices. After the Philosophical Society had been meeting for a year, Harris convinced its members to begin publishing a journal. The Society produced the Journal of Speculative Philosophy (JSP),,the first periodical devoted solely to philosophy in the United States (1867—93). The breadth and depth of philosophical discussions in the Journal helped establish the St. Louis group as philosopher—practitioners worthy of attention both at home and abroad.

Three themes in early idealism: education/Bildung, self-estrangement, self-activity Three major philosophical themes dominate throughout the works of the St. Louis circle members. The first is of education/culture or Bildung. By focusing on education in the early years of the movement, Harris and his colleagues were more true to Hegel's thought than is at first apparent. The concept of Bildung held great currency, particularly in the heyday of the St. Louis movement. Not easily translated into English, this German term is a hybrid of "education" and "culture." The St. Louis idealists identified it with the acculturation or cultivation of the individual, particularly of the child or the youth, and they infused the concept of "culture" into American educational discourse. Various branches of their movement, such as the Art Society and Public Library Association, also brought "culture" to adults, a reflection of

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the St. Louis group's faith in the ability of the human mind to grow and develop beyond childhood. The German Hegelian Karl Rosenkranz (1805-79) saw the St. Louis group's focus on education as prototypically Hegelian, exclaiming in a letter to Harris that Hegel would have rejoiced in him.9 St. Louis circle members modeled their educational ideas after Hegel. Harris translated a number of Hegel's Nuremberg lectures on education, and Anna Brackett translated Rosenkranz's Pddagogik als System, both of which were published in JSP. In her original works, Susan Blow wrote on the relation of education to the development of Spirit in a child, a notion she derived from The Phenomenology of Spirit. 10 Harris, Blow, Brackett, and Marietta Kies each agreed with Hegel's assertions in The Philosophy of Right that children have a right to be educated, that parents have a responsibility to ensure this, and that society has a duty to provide adequate education should parental efforts fall short. 11 This idea naturally flowed into the concept of Bildung - education/culture - that was central to the educational enterprise in St. Louis. In their view, it would be failing both children and society if the imparting of Bildung did not take place. Education was also a process through which the reconciliation of the individual and society could be accomplished. For the St. Louis idealists, society was meant to foster rather than to stunt individual growth. The St. Louis group shared Hegel's objection to the view of education put forth in Rousseau's Emile in which a child is to be kept away from the corrupting forces of society. Hegel insisted that "pedagogical experiments in removing people from the ordinary life of the present and bringing them up in the country (cf. Rousseau's Emile} have been futile, because one cannot successfully isolate people from the laws of the world." In fact, in Hegel's view education in isolation was not education at all, but was instead a form of savagery. Similarly, the St. Louis idealists saw the growth of an individual as possible only within society and education as a civilizing, even humanizing, force. No individual could be truly educated in isolation, apart from society; no society could attain true culture without educated individuals. Contrary to Rousseau, Harris and his colleagues believed that only by rehearsing the feats of our predecessors, by being schooled in human conventions, and by aspiring to reach human ideals are individuals truly educated. Harris and Blow were particularly insistent on this point. 13Brackett went further in applying Hegel to the American context, by infusing a bit of American individualism into this idea. She, Harris, and Snider had a strong sense of the role of the individual in society, one that became instrumental in establishing a norm within the St. Louis movement. 14 Perhaps more significant is Brackett's dismissal of traditional understandings of women as meant for work in the home, which were clearly in place in Hegel's works. Such a dismissal indicates that Brackett didn't take all social convention as worthy of reinforcement.

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A second major theme of St. Louis idealism is its application of the idea of self-estrangement and return to the educational process, which descends directly from Hegel. The St. Louis group characterized literature as an educational tool that helps to distance youth from themselves and the world with which they are familiar, thus introducing "the other" in the form of an entirely different set of circumstances from those facing them. Confronted with otherness in this way, youth encounter an opposition that calls for them to look at their own situation in a new way. They then "return" from their studies with a transformed consciousness. Susan Blow and Anna Brackett relied heavily on this aspect of Hegel's thought for their own theories of education. As director of the St. Louis kindergarten, Blow saw children's play as approximating this same process: through play young children create an alternative reality in which they too are faced with otherness, and thus a form of self-estrangement. When the play has ended, they are also enriched by their experience. Brackett agreed with Hegel's view of the role of classical literature, although along with Rosenkranz she believed classic children's stories could also suffice. In addition, as a feminist responsible for the education of primarily young women at the normal school, she applied this idea to women's and girls' education. Closely related to the idealist understanding of education as a process of selfestrangement and return is the third major theme, the idea of "self-activity." This term first came into use with Harris's translation of The Philosophical Proptedeutic, and St. Louis circle members invoked it regularly. The term in question is Selbsttatigkeit. Harris tried to adhere as closely as possible to Hegel's language, rendering the statement Der Geist aber nach seiner Selbsttatigkeit innerhalb seiner selbst und in Beziehung auf sich, unabhangig von der Beziehung auf Anderes, wird in der eigentlichen Geisteslehre oder Psychologic betrachtet. this way in English: "But the Mind, according to its self-activity within itself and in relation to itself, independent of all relation to others, is considered in the Science of Mind proper, or 'Psychology'." The term "self-activity" stuck and was appropriated by not only Harris's immediate circle of associates, but by others as late as 1909. Harris and his followers came to associate the term "self-activity" with Hegel's Begriff, the Notion or Concept, as evidenced here in an excerpt from Harris's, Hegel's Logic: "Begriff" as self-activity is possibility of all determination, the universal; as active determiner opposed to passive possibility of being determined, it is cause (causa efficiens)Sopposed to matterE (causa materialis] and this duality is particularity. . . . It is individual or singular when considered as annulling this opposition or antithesis of active subject and passive object . . .

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In Harris's view, Hegel's greatest insight was his recognition of the power of individuality to annul the opposition between subject and object and thus to render knowledge a relation of the two, rather than the power of one over the other. Plato, Aristotle, and the Scholastics had an idea of substantive separate, "but its relation to the universal and particular was not seen so perfectly as Hegel saw it," in Harris's view. Over time, "self-activity" came to refer to both the self-determinative power of the Absolute as a wholly independent, self-motivated and motivating force and that same power (to the degree that it exists) in human beings as the creatures that most nearly share in the attributes of God. Although the question of whether the Absolute can be equated with God is a point of debate among Hegel scholars themselves, most members of the St. Louis group held this view. Susan Blow in particular had a strong sense of the theological sense of the term "Absolute," as well as of "Spirit." In fact, her later thought was dominated by an understanding of the Absolute as a personal divine being, expressed most fully by the Christian religion through the incarnation of Jesus. It was in this sense, linking the Absolute/Spirit to the "self-activity" that is engendered by education, that the St. Louis idealists most frequently used the term, because human self-activity was for them central to the educative process. Blow was particularly fond of the term as it applied to early childhood education. Harris, Blow, and Kies also discussed self-activity as it applied to larger philosophical issues, such as social policies regarding labor laws, the relation of humanity to the Divine, and the nature of the Trinity.

The migration to Concord Harris initiated a session of the Concord School of Philosophy and Literature (1879—88), even before he returned east to live. The transcendentalists Ralph Waldo Emerson and Amos Bronson Alcott had long dreamed of establishing a public forum for the discussion of ideas in Concord. Yet it took Harris's administrative know-how to make their dream a reality. Had either Emerson or Alcott established such a school, it would have reflected their Platonist leanings, but as the main organizer and a primary lecturer, Harris put Hegelian idealism at the center of the Concord School program. 20 Both its newness and its practical applications made idealism appealing to the Concord audience, and the personal charisma that lecturers like Harris, Snider, and Davidson brought to the School contributed to its popularity. Given Harris's nearly evangelical approach to philosophy, it is not surprising that the movement caught on, not only in Concord, but elsewhere. Denton Snider colorfully described Harris's zeal in discussing philosophy: "I have seen him force some new insight of his . . . upon an unwilling listener whom he had cornered and

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who could not in decency get away. This was one of his best traits and it gave him in the long run a personal influence which was unique." Fully one-half of the 200 or so people attending the Concord School in any given year were women who used it as a means to advanced higher education. While college and university level coeducation of the sexes was more common by the 1880s, only a handful of institutions allowed women to study at the graduate level. By contrast, women had the opportunity to study under some of the most prominent intellectual figures of the day at Concord. These included thinkers from the older generation of transcendentalists (Frederic Henry Hedge, Thomas Wentworth Higginson, Julia Ward Howe, Elizabeth Peabody, Emerson, and Alcott); from the new class of academic philosophers (Nicholas Murray Butler (Columbia), William James (Harvard), James McCosh (Princeton), George Sylvester Morris (Michigan), and Noah Porter (Yale)); and from Harris's circle of paraprofessional philosophers (Snider, Davidson, Howison, and Soldan). Initially, plans were in place for Blow and Brackett to lecture at Concord. Such plans never materialized for Blow because of her health problems in the 1880s. It is unclear why Brackett never lectured at Concord, perhaps simply because her busy schedule as the principal at her own private school for girls made it impossible to do so. The chance to study for even a short time alongside many of the greatest names in American intellectual life at the time was an opportunity that many women were loathe to miss. As noted, Ellen Mitchell and Marietta Kies capitalized on it, becoming the first women in the St. Louis and Concord circles to publish works on philosophy proper, rather than educational theory, after completing their study at the Concord School. St. Louis circle members William Torrey Harris Harris is generally considered the leader of the St. Louis circle. He was born in Connecticut and educated at Yale, and went west during a period of expansion in the region, just prior to the Civil War. Arriving in St. Louis in the summer of 1857, he struggled financially and emotionally for nearly a year, trying to establish himself by offering lessons in shorthand, half-heartedly engaging in pen- and book-selling schemes, and generally fending off depression as he increasingly began to fear he would not be able to make his way alone in the West. 3 His Yale education was his only asset, so he worked as a private tutor for some prominent families to earn money. He also had the foresight to take the teachers' examination soon after his arrival in the city, even though he considered teaching a last resort. He dreaded the idea of managing a classroom of unruly little children and said as much in his journal

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after receiving an early offer to teach: "The opportunity to teach school is not a very agreeable thing, I must confess. I could do better selling Protean pens." But he finally felt forced to submit himself to this indignity after receiving several letters from his parents on the subject, repeated job offers by public school officials impressed with his score on the teachers' exam, and consideration of his depleting funds. A few days prior to teaching his first class, he wrote "I do wish I had some other way to earn money than by teaching."25 He was not enthusiastic about starting a career as a teacher, but it would ultimately lead him to a position of prominence that he was unable to foresee at the time. Harris became active in St. Louis community life almost immediately after his arrival, joining the city's Philosophical and Literary Society, an eclectic group with an intense interest in spiritualism, Swedenborgianism, phrenology, and other unconventional schools of thought. He had always been on the vanguard of thought in New England, but was considered fairly conservative within this group. To his own surprise, he found himself actually defending many orthodox religious positions in the group's meetings. Despite some points of disagreement with members of the Society, however, Harris threw himself into this little community, becoming its secretary. Then, after the group's meeting in January 1858, he met Henry Brockmeyer, who shared many of his views.27 There was an immediate intellectual connection between them, and their meeting made the founding of the Philosophical Society, and thus the St. Louis Philosophical Movement, possible. Henry Brockmeyer (and thefounding of the St. Louis Philosophical Society)

Some historians credit Henry Brockmeyer (1826—1906) with being the true leader of the St. Louis movement, and in some ways this could be defended.28 Brockmeyer came to the US as a teenager sometime in the 1840s, reportedly to escape his parents' tyrannical tendencies, but political turmoil in his native Prussia may have also been a contributing factor. Once in the US, Brockmeyer attended Brown College (now Brown University) where he studied the works of Hegel and other German idealists, later introducing Harris to their ideas. Harris and Snider both considered Brockmeyer an inspired genius, even though "Brock" as they called him, was unable to articulate his ideas in writing. As Snider put it, "the cream got quite skimmed off the top" of Brockmeyer's thought when he tried to commit his thoughts to paper. Harris relied on Brockmeyer to translate Hegel's Science of Logic and tried, unsuccessfully, to get it published. Presumably this is because Brockmeyer's translation was too literal. Unlike the articulate and persuasive Harris, Brockmeyer had little patience with conventions of English grammar and syntax, so he confounded rather than elucidated Hegel's ideas. Nor did he have the

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organizational or administrative know-how of Harris. He could be gruff and inconsiderate. He shunned propriety and didn't care if he shocked or offended his audience when he spoke. In later years, Harris decided against inviting Brockmeyer to lecture in New England for fear he would "spill over into some diablery, or even profanity," as he had once done "in reply to Miss Bracket!."31 In spite of his eccentricities, Brockmeyer rose to prominence in public life after the Civil War as a lawyer, state legislator, and then lieutenant governor. Yet he also had a reclusive streak. When he and Harris first met, Brockmeyer hadjust emerged from a seclusion that made Thoreau's "flight to his shanty on Walden Pond" look like "an inconsequential lark."' He had built a small shack for himself deep in the forest, became proficient enough at hunting and fishing to sustain himself, and spent his time reading and contemplating philosophical questions. He had only relatively recently tired of this lifestyle and taken a job at a foundry when he met Harris, but he took on the same lifestyle again years later, after his political career had come to a close. It was Brockmeyer's ability to alternate between the roles of the common man, intellectual elite, and public figure that attracted Harris and others to sit at the foot of this colorful leader and teacher. The meeting of Harris and Brockmeyer in 1858 was a significant moment in the St. Louis movement, but it would be eight years before the founding of the St. Louis Philosophical Society proper. Between 1858 and 1860, Harris began a systematic study of Hegel with Brockmeyer's help. He and two friends, George Stedman and John Watters, commissioned Brockmeyer to translate Hegel's Logic for publication, striking a bargain in which they funded his stay in a room in downtown St. Louis. Brockmeyer slept on a pallet on the floor, and worked on the translation. The arrangement worked well for all involved. The Civil War broke out shortly after the translation was finished, however, and Brockmeyer signed up to fight for the Union forces. The publishing plan was deferred. Harris, who was left with one glass eye after a childhood accident, was exempt from fighting, so continued his work in the public schools. Harris continued to study Hegel during the war, but he also made a number of adjustments to his professional and personal life. In December 1858 he married Sarah Bugbee, a woman he had been courting while at Yale, and they began their family shortly thereafter. In 1859 he was promoted to principal of a new consolidated school. Harris appreciated this step up in the educational hierarchy, but it also meant accepting a considerably larger administrative burden. While Harris and his circle spent whatever free time they had discussing the war as Hegel's dialectic in action, and speculating that some sort of reconciliation could and must come about in order for history to manifest the realization of Spirit, they were not yet at liberty to make their philosophical inquiry more formal. This waited until after the war had ended and the Philosophical Society was established in 1866.

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The Philosophical Society's statement of purpose points to its real-world focus: it was an organization "for the promotion of Speculative Philosophy and its application.",33nly months after the organization of the Society, this purpose was amended to be even more specific: . . . in order to encourage the Study and development of Speculative Philosophy, to foster an application of its results to Art, Religion, and Science, and to establish a philosophical basis for the professions of Medicine, Divinity, Law, Politics, Education, Fine Arts, and Literature. 34 Those present at the first few meetings of the society were as follows: William Torrey Harris; Henry Brockmeyer; Denton Jacques Snider; George Holmes Howison; John Walters, a professor at the State Medical College; Britton A. Hill and Gabriel Woerner, each of whom were lawyers; and J. Z. Hall.35 These men were the "directors" of the Society — the active members who approved, by vote, the nomination of all new members. There was also an associate member category, and some of the movement's most active participants were brought into the fold with this status. Thomas Davidson and Louis Soldan, for instance, were associate members. In addition to Harris, Denton Snider, George H. Howison, Thomas Davidson, and Louis Soldan were Society members who became important characters in the lives and work of the women in this study. Denton Snider

Denton Snider (1841—1925) was a high school teacher and Harris's good friend and admirer. As a literary theorist and self-described "writer of books," Snider's chronicling of the group's growth and development and characterizations of its members in his work The St. Louis Movement in Philosophy is an invaluable resource. Closely associated with Harris in St. Louis and then later when Harris became a national figure, Snider described his friend as one of the most industrious people he had ever known. 37 Harris was unquestionably the group's leader in Snider's view as the chief implementer of its many ideas and visions for change. Snider's first love was literature, and he wrote a number of books and essays of early literary criticism. He resisted editing his work to meet publishers' demands, as Harris and others in the circle - even the independently minded Davidson — were content with doing. When he had trouble finding a publisher who would print his thoughts as they stood, he simply printed his work privately under the name Sigma Publications. One historian of the St. Louis movement, Cleon Forbes, characterizes Snider as a kind and gentle man with a love for music and literature. Even so,

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based on Snider's own account, he also had his prejudices. He admitted outright that Thomas Davidson grated on his nerves, intellectually as well as personally. There is also evidence that he had difficulty accepting women as equals. He had a complex and competitive relationship with Susan Blow, to be discussed in the next chapter. He also failed to acknowledge his female cofounders of the annual literary schools he was so proud of in Milwaukee and Chicago in the 1880s and 1890s. Elizabeth Harrison, Caroline K. Sherman, and Mary Beedy were deeply involved in bringing these schools into being, but Snider gave them little credit for their contributions. 39 George Holmes Howison

George Holmes Howison's (1834-1916) participation in the St. Louis philosophical movement was shorter-lived than the other main characters, largely because he left St. Louis in 1871. But his position as a professor at Washington University made his involvement with the circle important to the group's philosophical development. According to the record book that Harris maintained for the Philosophical Society in its early years, Howison was an active member of it, presiding over meetings in the absence of Brockmeyer, the group's chair, and making presentations periodically. He was also one of the first to learn of Harris's plan to produce a journal: "We are going to have a German philosophical magazine," [said Harris] . . . "We don't propose to print it. We are going to make the papers and read them here [at Philosophical Society meetings], and put them away in a tin box.'?,40 When Harris's plans for the journal became more concrete, Howison was assigned to a committee "to make final adjustments" to the relationship between the Society and the Journal of Speculative Philosophy.4'1 In addition, Harris kept close ties with Washington University throughout his years in St. Louis, attending lectures frequently and later giving lectures of his own, periodically or in a short series. This was at the beginning of a long friendship in which Howison and Harris mutually influenced each other, although certainly not always coming to agreement. Over time, Howison's thought diverged considerably from Harris's, but the two maintained a friendly relationship, and intellectually continued to influence one another. Harris invited Howison to lecture at the Concord Summer School, which Howison did occasionally. In turn, Howison extended invitations to Harris to speak at meetings of the Philosophical Union he established at the University of California, where he taught from 1884 until his retirement in 1916. Susan Blow and Howison certainly knew each other, and Blow sided with Harris in their main

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philosophical dispute - monism versus pluralism. Howison invited Marietta Kies to become a member of the Philosophical Union as soon as she arrived in the Bay Area to teach at Mills College in 1891. Louis Soldan Louis Soldan (1842—1908), an even-tempered man who was non-partisan in his philosophical views, was one of the few neutral parties in the Philosophical Society's debates over the merits of Hegel versus other thinkers. He was also a popular lecturer among women's groups because he was so refined and polite.42 Like Brockmeyer and some others in the St. Louis movement (Gabriel Woerner and Alfred Kroeger, for example), he was born in Germany. He was also well-schooled in German thought and, unlike Brockmeyer, was able to articulate it clearly, producing a number of translations of Hegel for publication in JSP. Soldan's main focus, however, was on education. He was first a teacher in the St. Louis high school, then principal of the normal school (succeeding Anna Brackett) and high school, and finally the superintendent of the St. Louis schools. Soldan had a close working relationship with Harris, even after the latter had left St. Louis in 1880, corresponding with him until Soldan's death in 1908. During this time, they worked together to plan National Education Association meetings and eagerly recommended each other for speaking engagements. Most of Soldan's lectures and writings centered on education. He outlined the best ways to teach subjects like math and reading, discussed the theory and practice of normal school training, and did his best to maintain a neutral position in the "culture studies" debate. This last issue grew out of the enthusiasm the St. Louis group had for the German concept of Bildung — culture/education. If education was to cultivate and/or acculturate students, the liberal arts had to be central in their view. Others pointed out that practical training for life beyond the school was also a form of acculturation that could not be ignored. As the debate evolved over time, it developed into a controversy over the merits of a liberal arts curriculum versus teaching the mechanics of learning in early education and of specialized training in later years. Harris was decidedly on the "culture studies" side of the debate, while another St. Louis figure, Horace H. Morgan, was on the special training side. Soldan deftly played the middle, noting that extremes in either case could do little more than cause harm to the student. He did his best to integrate the two while principal of the St. Louis normal school. After Anna Brackett left St. Louis, Soldan became principal of the normal school and Grace Bibb became the assistant principal. Bibb and Soldan worked well together and continued their association after she left St. Louis to direct the normal department at the University of Missouri in Columbia.

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Soldan recruited both Bibb and Harris to serve on at least one committee of the National Education Association (NEA) when he was its president. Bibb also regularly attended and reported on the NEA meetings in the Western Review during Soldan's tenure. His relationship with Anna Brackett, however, was strained. Because she strongly disagreed with the school board's approach to normal school training, she resigned as principal of the school in 1872. When Soldan then assumed leadership of the school, he instituted many of the changes that Brackett objected to. Interestingly, Grace Bibb's relationship with Brackett was unharmed by these events. Davidson and Soldan were also fairly close. In letters to Harris, Soldan expresses a great deal of concern for Davidson, the "wandering scholar" of the St. Louis movement. Probably this was partly due to their very different approaches to life and work. Soldan had a slow but steady and methodical approach to his work while Davidson was often brilliant and inspired but sporadic in his performance. Davidson's well-being was frequently on Soldan's mind, according to his correspondence with Harris. Yet Soldan could also be critical of him, declaring on at least two occasions that he believed Davidson was on the wrong track intellectually. 45 Thomas Davidson Although he never held a permanent academic position, Thomas Davidson (1840 99) was a prolific writer, and his work centered more narrowly on philosophy than did that of many of his St. Louis contemporaries. He was primarily a Greek scholar who, like Snider and Soldan, taught in the high school. Because of his interest in the ancients, many of his articles inJSP,,most of his presentations before the Philosophical Society, and later his lectures at the Concord School were on Aristotle. Davidson also had an interest in the modern thinkers with whom so many of his St. Louis colleagues were intrigued. His contributions to JSP include translations of Schelling, Trendelenburg, and Rosenkranz, as well as the introduction to Hegel's Encyclopedia. Later in life, Davidson became a good friend and correspondent of Josiah Royce, who often visited his summer school at "Glenmore," modeled after the Concord School, which he set up in the Adirondack Mountains of New York. Davidson and Harris were so close that Harris named his daughter Edith Davidson Harris. The origin of her middle name is obvious, and her first name comes from Davidson's suggestion, "the fair-haired saxon Edith." 46 This is not to suggest that the two were always in agreement philosophically. In fact, some of their clashes were said to have been "worth going miles to hear." Davidson was a pluralist like Howison; Harris was committed to monism. As time went on, Davidson also deviated from orthodox theology considerably, founding the "Fellowship for the New Life," a quasi-religious

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network grounded in humanist ideals. With close ties to the leaders of the Ethical Culture and Fabian societies, Davidson's 1883 lecture on the New Life in London triggered the founding of the Fabian Society there.48 While Harris did not share Davidson's progressive quasi-religious views, neither did he strongly object to them. Susan Blow, on the other hand, was committed to orthodox trinitarian Christianity and reported to Harris that she was "repelled by [Davidson's] little pamphlets on the New Life."49 Davidson and Brackett had a close friendship. When they were both in St. Louis, they exchanged books as well as ideas, studied and wrote together, edited each other's work, and occasionally spoke mockingly of certain subgroups or members of the movement. One of these was the Pedagogical Society, which had really just gotten underway when Brackett left St. Louis in 1872; another was Soldan and the normal school.J° From Brackett's perspective at least, she and Davidson were part of an "exclusive little group" from which others were to be barred if at all possible. Their friendship continued when first Brackett and then Davidson moved to New York in the 1870s. Both developed strong social networks in New York City and were deeply involved in aspects of intellectual life there. The nature of their relationship will be explored further in Chapter Three. Other women corresponded extensively with Davidson, including three St. Louis circle members - Mary Beedy, Grace Bibb, Ellen M. Mitchell and one Concord School lecturer, Caroline K. Sherman. Each of them exchanged ideas with Davidson, and Sherman and Mitchell included him on the schedule of lectures for their women's groups each year. Sherman's correspondence is particularly enlightening in the period leading up to the 1893 Columbian Exposition in Chicago. As the representative from the Woman's Branch to the all-male committee for philosophy and science at the Exposition, she turned to Davidson for support in ensuring that women lecturers would be included on the philosophy program. What I wish to say to you is this - that no woman is appointed on the [philosophy] Committee. Some of the members of the Woman's Branch of the Congress censured me that I did not see to it that at least one woman was appointed on the Committee to arrange the programme. . . . [I answered] that on any Committee of which Dr. Harris and Prof. Davidson were members, full justice would be done to women. So I ask that two women be given places on the programme if two women can be found who will be a credit to themselves, to the audience, and above all to philosophy. . . . You will do the best you can as advocate for women. The largest part of the audience will consist of women and they will not be satisfied if men alone take active parts. 5

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This letter clearly shows that we need not read into historical facts, such as Davidson's membership in the Missouri Suffrage Association, to determine that he was truly supportive of women's issues. His female contemporaries knew that both he and Harris could be counted on to represent them when needed - so that they could then represent themselves at a major event in American intellectual life. At the same time that Davidson ran his successful summer school in the Adirondacks, he joined Jacob Schiff s efforts to provide adult education programs to Jewish immigrants on New York City's lower east side, offering an evening lecture series he called "The Breadwinners' College." One of the few non-Jews involved in this project, Davidson was an extremely popular lecturer who inspired great young thinkers like Morris Rafael Cohen and Felix Frankfurter. They, in turn, became influential in American public life long after Davidson's early death from cancer in 1899, and attributed much of their success to the education they gained under Davidson's tutelage. 5

George Sylvester Morris

George Sylvester Morris (1840—89) was never in St. Louis, but instead corresponded with Harris, contributed to JSP, and lectured at the Concord School. Like Davidson, Morris was quite accomplished despite an early death. He taught at Johns Hopkins University and later the University of Michigan, wrote articles for JSP on Trendelenburg, translated Uberweg's history of philosophy, and published a paraphrase of Hegel's Philosophy of Right, at that time not yet translated. Morris lectured at the Concord School, and like Howison, as a university professor he helped bring prestige to this summer program. In addition, it is clearly no accident that Marietta Kies, a participant in the Concord School, was also a student of Morris's at the University of Michigan. Harris wrote a letter of recommendation for her entry into Michigan's graduate program, addressing it to Morris, and Kies began her doctoral work there in 1888. Morris was praised for his egalitarian treatment of female students - an exception to the rule at Michigan at that time. His influence on Kies will be discussed in Chapter 5.

The evolution of idealism in St. Louis Harris and his colleagues formally established the St. Louis Philosophical Society early in 1866, and the group immediately began distinguishing its own brand of idealism from that of the transcendentalists. Alcott was one of

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the group's first invited guest speakers, and Snider recounts cutting him short after having grown tired of listening to the cryptic phrases that he read "in a rather sepulchral voice, as if [they] were issuing from the sacred cave." The discussion had zigzagged about in all sorts of twists and turns above and below the surface. . . . I rose to my feet and gave expression to the only remark I made during the evening: "Gentlemen, I may be permitted to state my interpretation of this last saying: its hidden meaning is, in my judgment, that only an Alcott can rightly interpret an Alcott. That being the case, we all had better now go home." At this rather un-Orphic deliverance little tidbits of tee-hees fluttered round the circle as the people sprang up and began to take their hats, while Orpheus himself looked at me somewhat oracularly, I thought, and shut impatiently his map of oracles.56 Similarly, Snider and Brockmeyer confronted Emerson regarding his dislike for Hegel. It was Hegel's emphasis on "system" that Emerson objected to — the very same thing that most appealed to the St. Louis group. During their discussion, it became clear to Snider that Emerson was in essence saying "that we were on the wrong track, that it would be better for us to study Emerson than Hegel." Harris tried to smooth over their differences of opinion, but was unsuccessful. Emerson simply replied with "a condescending smile of courteous contempt",57nd later told a friend of Howison's that "the Louis philosophers rolled me in the mud.",58hallenges of this sort to Emerson and Alcott, two thinkers who had come to typify New England thought, were more than simply symbolic gestures. Instead, they embodied a true parting of the ways between two schools of thought in America: transcendentalism and idealism. There were several positive advances in the group's thought as well - it did not only define itself in contrast to its transcendentalist predecessors. In the year of the Society's founding, participants demonstrated a propensity for what has come to be called Process Thought..59 The question of the relation the real and the ideal, which they saw as being at the core of this discussion, was in fact a matter of a relational process of becoming: . . . the totality of any "somewhat" existing is not merely the extant result, the real side, but the union of this with the ideal potential, nature, in theform of a process; Neither the abstract ideal nor the immediate real, being the true actual, but the relation of the two in the becoming. The notion of "becoming" was not new to Harris, Brockmeyer, and others in the group, and continues to hold currency among Hegelians today. Yet the union of becoming, process, and relation in this early discussion in St. Louis anticipates many twentieth-century American process philosophers, thus

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demonstrating the philosophical foresight of Harris and his followers. Susan Blow developed these ideas somewhat further in her later work, although she warned against developing a cosmology in which God becomes an impersonal force. A later meeting in the group's first year featured a discussion of personality as a metaphysical concept. This idea was introduced by Alcott, who posited that "Personality [is] the fundamental principle which should be the origin of all." The group's discussion "turned principally to Personality" and its relation to the Absolute. Alfred Kroeger was singled out as the one member who maintained that Personality could not be the "form of the Absolute" because it is necessarily free of predicates.61 The discussion progressed little beyond this point, but Howison in particular later became a strong proponent of personalism, and Susan Blow would side with Harris on the necessarily monistic nature of Personality, contra Howison's pluralism. Since this discussion took place within the St. Louis circle well before personalism became a clearly outlined and recognized movement early in the twentieth century, the movement can be credited with advancing personalist theory at an early stage. 62 Part of the reason that the Philosophical Society was so influential was that, with Harris as its leader, it was very good at self-promotion. A charismatic and friendly person, Harris invited both close friends and luminaries he had not yet met into the St. Louis philosophical circle by granting them associate and auxiliary membership in the St. Louis Philosophical Society. These included Amos Bronson Alcott and Ralph Waldo Emerson; John B. Stallo, an Ohio Hegelian; Henryjames, Sr., the writer; I. H. Fichte, the German philosopher and son of J. G. Fichte; and Karl Rosenkranz, Hegel's disciple. Virtually all accepted Harris's invitation, and the work of the Society gained the esteem and recognition of some of the intellectual world's most admired members. The Philosophical Society succeeded to a greater degree than many had expected because these invited members represented all branches of Hegelianism. Prior to Harris's organization of the St. Louis circle, right-wing Hegelians, like I. H. Fichte and Jacob Bernays, had no impetus to ally themselves with those from the left-wing, like Willich and Feuerbach. Center Hegelians, like Rosenkranz and Thaulow, also appear to have kept their distance, until Harris invited them into his American consortium of Hegelians. But from Harris's point of view, they were all simply Hegelians, leaders in German philosophical thought who had something of value to bring to his idealist project. As noted earlier, Harris and his followers tended to defy strict adherence to the Hegelian categories. In some areas, like religion and perhaps educational theory itself, Harris and certainly Blow fit into the center or center-right column. Rosenkranz's claim that Hegel would have rejoiced over Harris would certainly support this categorization. 63 Yet in other regions, such as

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social and political theory, Harris himself was more of a center-left Hegelian and his colleagues, like Davidson, Brackett, and Kies, were left to far-left Hegelians. Did Harris have secret designs to unify Hegelians across the spectrum? Perhaps. Perhaps not. One thing is clear, however: Harris did invite members at all levels to contribute to his Journal of Speculative Philosophy. Regardless of whose idea the associate and auxiliary member plan was, it certainly helped to facilitate the distribution of JSP to a wide range of thinkers, including an international audience. The Journal of Speculative Philosophy was meant to present idealist thought to the English-speaking public and encourage its application to society as a whole. But if Denton Snider's account of the founding of JSP is accurate, Harris also had a personal reason for launching the journal: the editors of the North American Review rejected his article on the philosophy of Herbert Spencer as too abstruse. Snider describes the scene colorfully: [Its] editor, Charles Eliot Norton, I believe, wrote to him a disparaging letter, in substance declaring the article unfathomable, unreadable and especially unliterary. To a group of us assembled at Brockmeyer's office, Harris read this letter with sarcastic comments which made us all laugh; then he jumped up, clenched his fist and brought it down defiantly upon the empty air, saying: "Now I am going to start a Journal myself!" This he did at once, the first number appeared in January, 1867, with the condemned article among others. 6 Not incidentally, Snider believed that Harris's decision to publish JSP was premature. The group would have done better, he thought, to let its ideas mature so that it could produce a better product. Although he found Harris "a little heady" in founding JSP at this early date, Snider conceded that it was "indeed the most famous and striking philosophical product of our movement, thanks to the tireless activity and daring of its editor."

The women of the St. Louis movement Women were not officially recognized as members of the Society, although they frequently attended its meetings and contributed both original articles and translations to JSP. Harris kept a record of Society meetings, which notes the attendance of particular women in only a handful of cases. More frequently, they were listed en masse at the end of the attendance list as "ladies and guests." Women active in the movement, such as Mary E. Beedy, Susan V. Beeson, and Anna C. Brackett are listed by name in the attendance records

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of the Society, but Susan Blow and Grace Bibb are known to have attended meetings as well. Given that Harris, Davidson, and Soldan were supporters of equality for women in education, employment, and political participation, the failure of the leadership of the Philosophical Society to grant full membership to women was a result of a deeply ingrained prejudice that was innocent enough, but no less exclusionary than an intentional bias would have been. Yet there is no evidence that an issue was made of women's membership one way or the other. The women did not petition for membership, even when the Society reorganized in 1871. If they had drawn attention to the issue, it is likely that Harris and his colleagues would have reconsidered their policy regarding membership. While it is difficult to trace the level of participation of women within the Philosophical Society, information is available outside of Harris's Record Book. For instance, Snider considered Susan Blow to be one of the movement's leading members. Appropriately, Blow contributed a translation of Goeschel on immortality as a series in JSP. As the most conservative of the St. Louis women, it is fitting that she contributed work on one of the more right-wing of Hegel's disciples. Blow also published a book-length study of Dante and five books on kindergarten education. As one of the first American theorists on early childhood education, she worked wdth Harris in the public schools and invited him and other members of the St. Louis circle to lecture at her kindergarten training school. She continued to correspond with Harris long after they had both left St. Louis, until his death in 1909. Due to the close working relationship she had with Harris and the importance of her published works to the movement, Blow's life and work will be discussed in its own chapter. Anna Brackett was active in the St. Louis philosophical movement as a whole, as a frequent contributor to JSP and member of the elite Kant Club, where the St. Louis group's most intensive philosophical work took place. She was also a member of the Art Society, the Pedagogical Society, and the Teachers' Association, all of which grew out of the Philosophical Society. Brackett strongly advocated women's rights and was associated with the St. Louis Women's Club, a progressive group whose agenda encouraged women to be more assertive, career oriented, and public minded. In an 1871 meeting of the Women's Club, she presented a paper on Margaret Fuller that was later published in the Radical.^1 Brackett wrote poetry in the early volumes of JSP before graduating to short translations and then a full translation and exposition of Rosenkranz's theory. She contributed to JSP far more than any other woman, and more than many men, working closely with Harris on the journal, particularly in its earliest years. She also published both edited and original works of her own apart from her work on JSP, so she too has a chapter devoted to her alone.

38

America's First Women Philosophers

Other women present less definitive records of involvement within the St. Louis philosophical circle, although they did contribute to JSP. One of these, Ellen M. Mitchell, wrote a critique of Schopenhauer and an analysis of Plato for JSP, and each of these show signs of Hegel's influence on her thought. In addition, she wrote a short introduction to Greek philosophy, which relied too heavily on Hegel; as critics noted, it is a near paraphrase of Hegel's thoughts on the same. Like Brackett, Mitchell was a feminist and often spoke to women's groups. She made two presentations at women's congresses, one on philosophy, the other on prostitution from a feminist perspective. Finally, she was associated with Harris both in St. Louis and later at the Concord School of Philosophy where in 1887 she lectured along with Thomas Davidson on Aristotle. Grace G. Bibb had somewhat different qualifications. She was a member of the Pedagogical Society, and the State Teachers' and National Education associations. Along with Brackett, she was also a member of the Kant Club. She wrote feminist pieces in the St. Louis Journal of Education and in a sister publication of JSP, The Western Review. Bibb attended the Concord School of Philosophy and corresponded with Harris for a number of years. Both Mitchell's and Bibb's writings are decidedly more feminist than philosophical, but for this very reason they demonstrate that the St. Louis circle was a feminist-friendly group. Although Mitchell and Bibb did not publish as extensively as Blow and Brackett did, they do have relevance to the overall focus of the St. Louis movement. Therefore one chapter is devoted to the two of them together. Eliza Sunderland became associated with the idealist movement in the late 1880s, after central figures in the group had left St. Louis and when JSP was on the wane. Sunderland lived and worked in Ann Arbor, Michigan, where her husband was a Unitarian minister on the University of Michigan campus. In the 1880s, she began studying with George Sylvester Morris and John Dewey at Michigan and became acquainted with the works of Kant and Hegel. It is not clear if Sunderland knew Harris and other men in the St. Louis and Concord branches of the movement, but she did know Anna Brackett, Ellen Mitchell, Marietta Kies, and Lucia Ames Mead. Like Brackett, Mitchell, Ames Mead, Sunderland was a feminist, and the bulk of her published work is on religion, with the rest focusing on women's issues. She produced several introductory lectures on the thought of nineteenth-century philosophers for students at the University of Michigan, but they were not published in her lifetime. Lucia Ames met Harris and his circle through her brother, Charles Ames, and the two siblings attended the Concord School together. Later, she married Edwin Doak Mead, a friend of Harris and a contributor to JSP. As a young woman, Ames Mead corresponded with Harris and, as a result of his

The Legacy of American Idealism

39

encouragement, considered studying philosophy at an advanced level. She decided against it, however, because even Harris's brand of philosophy was too removed from the practical world to be useful to her. Kant's theory of perpetual peace, however, she found to be compelling. After she discovered this work, she wrote numerous articles and several books on pacifism, international cooperation, and arbitration, extending the influence of the idealist movement into the twentieth century. Sunderland and Ames Mead were both connected to, yet independent from, the idealist movement in St. Louis and Concord. They cast the net of idealist thought wider and to a younger female audience — Sunderland as a teacher and mentor in the Unitarian church and at the University of Michigan, Ames Mead as an activist/theorist who helped make women's voting rights, the Women's Peace Party, and the League of Nations a reality. Like Sunderland and Ames Mead, Marietta Kies was not associated with the movement in St. Louis. Instead, she studied with Harris at the Concord School of Philosophy, compiling his lectures into one volume, An Introduction to the Study of Philosophy, and on Harris's recommendation, she attended the University of Michigan where she studied (alongside Eliza Sunderland) under George S. Morris and John Dewey. Like Ames Mead, Kies's work was in political theory, although she did not engage in social activism to any degree, as Ames Mead did. She wrote her dissertation at the University of Michigan on political altruism, publishing it as The Ethical Principle, which she reworked and expanded in her most important work, Institutional Ethics. Kies's political theories show a familiarity with Hegel's theory of the state as outlined in The Philosophy of Right, a book that was first interpreted for an English-speaking audience by Morris.

Conclusion Both the St. Louis movement and its later incarnation at Concord contributed to the development of American philosophy. They also provided a venue for women to develop feminine (if not always feminist) theory and practice. The most talented among these women thrived in the educational-philosophical environment in St. Louis. Susan Blow, Anna Brackett, and Grace Bibb developed their educational theories and established themselves as national figures. The Concord School offered an opportunity for women to go beyond the world of educational philosophy into philosophy proper: aesthetics, social theory, and political philosophy. Concord was described as "the dream of a life" by Ellen Mitchell, no doubt because it provided educational opportunities that women were hard-pressed to find elsewhere. Better still, men at the Concord School actively engaged women in post-lecture discussions as equals,

40

America's First Women Philosophers

not as auxiliary participants or spectators.68 It was in this context that Mitchell was able to prepare and publish her only major work in philosophy and that Ames Mead and Kies were able to develop their political theories. Yet it would be misleading to suggest that the benefits of women's participation flowed in only one direction — intellectual goods issuing from the movement to the women in that movement. The women in St. Louis and later at Concord contributed to the development of idealism in this country at least as much as they benefited from the progressive leadership that Harris provided to make their participation in it possible. In fact, while the ideas of each of the three major women discussed here are consistent with Hegel's philosophy as a whole, each also makes important amendments to or adaptations of it that are significant. Susan Blow, for instance, wedded Froebel's method to Hegel's theory, which resulted in a systematic, idealist approach to children's education that stressed individual development without neglecting the importance of community values. By professionalizing early childhood education, Blow also (perhaps inadvertently) justified women's increased participation in the public realm. Hegel, meanwhile, envisioned women as most fully realized within the confines of home and family — within the private realm. Similarly, Brackett's application of Hegel's philosophy to education, via Rosenkranz, made for a structured approach to secondary education that was true to Hegel's understanding of education as the unfolding of Spirit. At the same time, however, Brackett quite intentionally applied this theory to women, reconfiguring the Hegelian understanding of women as inherently natural and subjective creatures. Finally, Kies conformed well to Hegel's theory of the state, until she introduced altruism into the mix - and within the quintessentially egoistic world of business relations. Her own perspective cast Hegel's thought in an altogether different hue, yet without undermining it completely. This is not to understate the degree to which Harris and his male contemporaries influenced and supported the work of Blow, Brackett, and other female colleagues. Though living in an era that assumed male authority, the male leadership of the St. Louis circle accepted the philosophic work of women as equal to its own. American women idealists of the late nineteenth century undoubtedly recognized and benefited from this enabling force. Susan Blow, who held Harris in high esteem, completely dismissed her own central role in establishing St. Louis's kindergarten program in the history that she wrote on kindergarten education in America. Harris dominates her chronicle, which may accurately reflect Blow's own sense of his importance to her life's work, even as that narrative decision diminished her own legacy and perhaps helped perpetuate the notion that nineteenth-century women thinkers were primarily followers, rather than co-travelers with or even leaders of men. Was it gratitude, social convention, or something else that guided Blow's

Motes to Chapter 1

41

hand as she revisited her own accomplishments? There is real complexity and richness in assessing the social and intellectual relationship between the men and women of the St. Louis circle. Ultimately, however, the point of this study is not to dwell on past omissions or to champion one gender over the other. It is instead to outline, analyse, and assess the value of the contributions of this particular group of women to American philosophical history, contributions that for too long have been ignored, overlooked, or misunderstood.

Notes 1.

Marietta Kies to George Holmes Howison, June 15, 1892, in George Holmes Howison Papers, Bancroft Library archives, University of California, Berkeley. The "Mrs. Cheney" Kies refers to is Ednah Dow Cheney, later member of the New England Transcendentalist movement, aesthetician, and women's rights activist. Two of the women faculty referred to are Mary Downing Sheldon Barnes (1850-98) and Alice Freeman Palmer (1855-1902), both of whom were historians and were among the first women to attend the University of Michigan (Sheldon 1871-74 and Palmer 1872-76). The third woman is yet to be identified. Barnes and Palmer became academic rivals when Palmer was hired to replace Sheldon in the history department at Wellesley College in 1879. After this slight, Sheldon took time oflf to travel in Europe, teaching at the Oswego State Normal School in upstate Nov.' York when she returned in 1882. In 1892, she accepted a position in the history department at Stanford where her husband had become chair of education the previous year. She held this position until 1897 when she became ill with heart disease, dying of the illness in 1898. Palmer became Wellesley's president in 1881, a position she held until 1892 when she took the dean of faculty position at the University of Chicago. She held this job for only three years, leaving academic life to focus on writing and lecturing on women's rights. 2. Lois Caswell Howison was not a women's rights activist, but was vocal in her advocacy of women's rights within the academic circles she traveled in. 3. Members of the St. Louis movement were not the very first proponents of idealism in America. The earliest were Frederick A. Rauch (1806-41) and Francis Lieber (1800—40), whose early deaths diminished their impact on American thought. Rauch, a student of Hegel, arrived in this country in 1831 and was president of Marshall College in Pennsylvania from 1836 until his death. Lieber had come to America in 1827, teaching at the University of South Carolina and later at Columbia College. A group of Ohio Hegelians, three of whom were Germanborn, also preceded the St. Louis group's study of Hegel by about a decade: John B. Stallo, Peter Kaufmann, August Willich, and Moncure Conway. The circle of thinkers in St. Louis had greater influence overall, however, because of their publishing know-how and systematic application of idealist principles to real-life issues, education and political life in particular.

42 4.

5.

6.

7.

8. 9. 10.

11.

12. 13.

Notes to Chapter 1 Harris's mission was reported in such terms by Denton J. Snider in The St. Louis Movement in Philosophy (St. Louis, MO: Sigma, 1920), 279. Goetzmann suggests this was the shared mission of Harris and Brockmeyer. See William H. Goetzmann, ed., The American Hegelians: An Intellectual Episode in the History of Western America (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973), 3. The transcendentalists relied primarily on the translation of Cousin's Introduction to the History of Philosophy for their knowledge of both Kant and Hegel, after having found Coleridge's discussion of them too abstruse. Frederic Henry Hedge is one exception, as he had read the German idealists in the original. See J.H. Muirhead, "How Hegel Came to America," Philosophical Review, 37:227-8 (1928). Hedge also introduced Margaret Fuller and James Freeman Clarke to the German language and to German thought, meeting with them regularly in 1830 to read Goethe and Schiller together. Fuller developed a deep interest in Goethe's work, but it is unclear whether she and Clarke read German philosophy along with the literature that they had discovered. See Margaret Fuller: From Transcendentalism to Revolution, by Paula Blanchard (Boston: Addison-Wesley, 1987), 66-70. The well-documented effort of the St. Louis group to translate Hegel's Science of Logic is chronicled in Herbert Spiegelberg's transcription of Harris's Record Book for the Philosophical Society in the archives of the St. Louis Historical Society. See Kurt Leidecker, Yankee Teacher (New York: Philosophical Library, 1946), for information on Harris regarding the following: the founding of the kindergarten, 270—1; the graded school system and uniform curriculum, 181-2, 270, 280; a library cataloging system, 277-8; normal schools, 281; music and art education, 275-6; education for African-American students, 1 73-4; and the coeducation of women, 265-6. See Muirhead, "Hegel to America," 234. For a discussion of the religious controversies taking place at Harvard at this time, see A Stream of Light: A Short History of American Unitarianism, Conrad Wright (Boston: Skinner House Books, 1989), 8-11; 35-7. Denton Snider, A Writer of Books (St. Louis, MO: Sigma Publishing, 1910), 317. Rosenkranz's letter to Harris, November 26, 1873; cited in Leidecker, Yankee Teacher, 352. Phenomenology of Spirit, §28, A.V. Miller, trans. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), 16-17, in which Hegel claims that education "regarded from the side of universal Spirit . . . is nothing but its own acquisition of self-consciousness." Hegel's fuller discussion of human knowledge as a phase of Spirit occurs in §§26~30. See especially Philosophy of Right, [S. W. Dyde, trans.] (London: George Bell and Sons, 1896), §174, Addition; §175; §187, Note, (in which education or culture Bildung - is called a form of liberation); §239. Philosophy of Right, §153, Addition. See also §194, Note, for Hegel's claim that isolation is a form of savagery. Susan Blow offers an extended criticism of Rousseau's view of education, calling it a form of atomism in Symbolic Education (New York: D. Appleton, 1918), 5—15, a criticism that Harris applauded in his preface to the book.

Notes to Chapter 1 14.

43

See Frances Harmon, The Social Philosophy of the St. Louis Hegelians Ph.D. thesis (Columbia University, 1943), especially 8-11. 15. See Hegel's Philosophical Propaedeutic, §5 [in Johannes Hoffmeister, ed., Hegels Numberger Schriften, Sdmtliche Werke, Band XXI (Leipzig: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1938), 201]. 16. See William Torrey Harris, "Outlines of Hegel's Phenomenology," Journal of Speculative Philosophy, 3:166 (1869). Years later, Harris also used the term "selfactivity" in translating "Sichselbstbewegens." See Harris, Hegel's Logic (Chicago: S.C. Griggs, 1890), 77. 17. More recent translators have chosen to refer to "Mind as spontaneously active within itself." See Millicent MacKenzie (who used the term "self-activity" throughout her work), Hegel's Educational Theory and Practice (London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., Ltd., 1909). [Reprinted by Greenwood Press, Westport, CT, 1970.] Luqueer in Hegel as Educator (1896) also used the term, as did W.N. Hailmann in his translation of Friedrich Froebel's Education of Man (1892) for the International Education Series, of which Harris was editor. The modern translation given above is by A. V. Miller in The Philosophical Proptedeutic, Michael George and Andrew Vincent, eds., (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), 57. 18. Harris, Hegel's Logic, 161. 19. Ibid. 20. Emerson and Alcott were aged by this time; in fact both died during the years of the School's sessions, 1882 and 1888, respectively. Franklin B. Sanborn deserves credit for helping Harris establish the Concord School, serving as its treasurer throughout its existence. 21. See A Writer of Books 312; see also 392. 22. When the Concord School began, only four universities had opened graduate programs to women. By the School's end in 1888, that number had increased to ten and reached thirty by the close of the nineteenth century. See Walter Crosby Eells, "Earned Doctorates by Women in the Nineteenth Century," Bulletin of the American Association of University Professors, vol. 42, no. 4, 645-51 (Winter 1956). 23. For a description of this difficult time in Harris's life, see Leidecker, Yankee Teacher, 81-8; 97-106. Although perhaps half-jokingly, Harris even mentioned suicide at one point, writing in a letter to his family, "[I won't] commit suicide or get married until I have discharged my duties to others." 24. Leidecker, 148-52. 25. Leidecker, 151. 26. The Philosophical and Literary Society is a different organization from that which Harris established with Henry C. Brockmeyer in 1866, the Philosophical Society. Sometimes there is confusion over this, however. For instance, George Howison's biographers seem to have confused the two groups. See John Wright Buckham and George Malcolm Stratton, George Holmes Howison: Philosopher and Teacher (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1934), 49-50. 27. Henry A. Pochmann, New England Transcendentalism and St. Louis Hegelianism (New York: Haskell House, 1970), 10-11. As a note, Brockmeyer was indifferent to the

44

28. 29.

30. 31. 32. 33.

34. 35.

36. 37. 38. 39.

40. 41.

42.

Notes to Chapter 1 spelling of his name, thus it appears at times as "Brokmeyer" and others "Brockmeyer." I have chosen the spelling used by Snider and Harris. Cleon Forbes, "The St. Louis School of Thought," Missouri Historical Review, 25:95(1931). Sources have not been clear on the date of Brockmeyer's departure. Forbes places it at 1848, claiming that Brockmeyer was exiled with other German intellectuals, including Carl Schurz (p. 90), citing a letter from C.H. Calhoun. Pochmann (p. 8) places it at 1844, prior to the Prussian revolution, claiming that Brockmeyer left to escape militaristic oppression. Forbes, 95. Snider, St. Louis Movement, 282. See also Forbes, 97, 100. Henry A. Pochmann, New England Transcendentalism, 9. Harris kept a faithful record of the meetings of the Philosophical Society in its early years - 1866-71. While the Philosophical Society's record book is not complete, it does provide the group's statement of purpose, names of participants, and topics addressed. See William Torrey Harris, Record Book of the St. Louis Philosophical Society, page 4 for the statement of purpose. Emphasis is mine in the section quoted. [Transcribed from the original shorthand text and with an introduction and notes by Herbert Spiegelberg, Missouri Historical Society Archives, St. Louis, Missouri.] Harris, Record Book, 14-15. Harris, Record Book, 4, 5, 8. With the exception of Walters, Hill, and Hall, the men listed appear regularly in histories of the movement. Snider, St. Louis Movement, 359, provides information about Watters's occupation; Spiegelberg provides an endnote regarding Hill, Record Book, 115. I have not been able to learn more about Hall. One of Snider's autobiographical works is entitled A Writer of Books. Snider, St. Louis Movement, 383. Ibid. 357-8; 549; 567. Ibid. 520; 569. Snider referred to these schools as the greatest "practical" (versus theoretical) achievements of his life, because in his view he was responsible for both the planning and the implementation of the Literary School. However, Elizabeth Harrison paints a picture in which Snider's role is much more peripheral, even though she expresses deep admiration for him as an intellectual. Compare Snider's account (St. Louis Movement, 532; 572) to Elizabeth Harrison's ("Western Pioneering in Culture," in Sketches Along Life Road, Carolyn Sherwin Bailey, ed. (Boston: Stratford, 1930), 77-80). Buckham and Stratton, George Holmes Howison, 50. Also on this committee were Brockmeyer and Alfred Kroeger, along with Messrs Jones and Bernays, about whom little information is available. See Harris, Record Book, 57 (January 4, 1867). Anna Brackett provided valuable editing assistance on JSP, but there is no record of her or any other woman participating on the Society's JSP committee. See Snider, St. Louis Movement, 33-4 regarding Soldan's neutrality and 342 regarding his popularity with women's groups. Soldan's tendency to mediate

Notes to Chapter 1

43.

44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49.

50.

51. 52. 53. 54.

55. 56.

45

between opposing ideas is also reflected in the position he took on the "culture studies" debate, discussed below. See Western Review, 1: 118-19 (February 1876), giving the synopsis of the discussion at the Pedagogical Society meeting in December 1875. See also Western Review, 1: 176—7 (April 1876), summarizing Soldan's paper to the Teachers Association, again on the "culture studies" question. Soldan, Letter to Harris, October 8, 1880. Soldan, Letters to Harris, February 1882 and February 1883. Leidecker, 346. Henry R. Evans, "William Torrey Harris: An Appreciation," in William Torrey Harris, Edward L. Schaub, ed. (Chicago: Open Court, 1936), 2. Harry W. Laidler, A History of Socialist Thought (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1927), 215, 233-4. Susan E. Blow, Letter to William Torrey Harris, November 16, 1885, Susan Blow Papers, Archives and Special Collections, Missouri Historical Society, St. Louis, Missouri. See Brackett's Letter to Davidson, May 18, 1872, regarding the Pedagogical Society. See Brackett's Letter to Davidson, September 21, 1873, regarding Soldan and the normal school. Brackett, Letter to Davidson, undated - probably 1867-8. Sherman, Letter to Davidson, October 27, 1892, in Thomas Davidson Papers, Sterling Library Archives, Yale University. See Lawrence Cremin, American Education: The Metropolitan Experience (New York: Harper Row, 1988), 61 7-20. George Sylvester Morris, trans., A History of Philosophy from Thales to the Present Time, vols. I and 11, by Friedrich Uberweg (1826-71) (New York: Charles Scribner and Company, 1871 and 1873). [This translation appeared in five editions, as late as 1900. It was also published by Hodder and Stoughton of London.] George Sylvester Morris, Hegel's Philosophy of the State and of History (Chicago: S.C. Griggs, 1887). Harris, letter to Morris, ca. 1884. In James B. Angell papers, Bentley Library Archives, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. Snider, Writer of Books, 335-7.

57.

Ibid. 330-32.

58.

Buckham and Stratton, George Holmes Howison, 54. There is no record of other visits to St. Louis by Emerson between 1867 and 1871 in the Society's Record Book. Since Howison had left St. Louis by 1870, this has to have been the same meeting of which Emerson speaks here. I use the term Process Thought to refer to the tradition established primarily by Alfred North Whitehead and his followers Charles Hartshorn and Lewis Ford. The central idea in process thought is that reality, including God or the Absolute, consists in a process of becoming; it is not static, but continuously evolving. Harris, Record Book, 21. Quotation marks around "somewhat" added for clarity; emphasis is also mine. Harris, Record Book, 48.

59.

60. 61.

46 62.

63. 64. 65. 66.

67.

68.

Notes to Chapter 1 Personalism's most famous adherents were Edgar Brightman (1884—1953) and Borden Parker Bowne (1847-1910), both of whom were professors at Boston University in the early part of the twentieth century. The movement had a journal entitled The Personalist (1920—79), which became the Pacific Philosophical Quarterly in 1980. Susan Blow favored a monistic personalism, rather than the pluralistic version Howison espoused. Yankee Teacher, 351-2. Snider, Writer of Books, 326. Ibid. 326-8. Harris's Record Book notes the presence of women active in the St. Louis movement on pages 49, 79, and 93. Bracket! also appears in the Record Book as the only woman contributor to the fund to bring Emerson to St. Louis in 1867. See Harris, Record Book, 85. Other women listed in the Record Book include Miss Smit, Miss King, Miss Child, and Miss Harris; and Mrs. Harris, Mrs. Kroeger, Mrs. Lowry, Mrs. Barnett, Mrs. Allen, and Mrs. Sturgeon. Miss Harris was probably William's sister Sarah, and Mrs. Harris his wife. Mrs. Allen may have been the Mrs. Allen who was an associate of Rebecca Hazard the suffragist, both of whom were likely associates of Anna Brackett. See Harris, Record Book, 49. Remnants of the Women's Club remain, and its early mission statements show its commitment to strengthening women's role in public life. See the Women's Club papers at the Missouri Historical Society Archives, St. Louis, Missouri. Brackett's address was published as "Margaret Fuller Ossoli," in the Radical, 9: 354 (1872). See Ellen M. Mitchell, "Concord School of Philosophy," in Free Religious Index, September 23, 1880,147.

Chapter 2 Susan Blow: philosophy in education

Susan Blow's life and pedagogical practice Susan Elizabeth Blow (1843-1916) was the most prominent woman of the St. Louis philosophical movement. She was mentioned by name by more historians of the movement than any of its other female participants. Her contemporary Denton Snider recognized her as one of the four major figures in the circle, along with William Torrey Harris, Henry Brockmeyer, and himself. Another historian declares that Blow "may almost be called the heroine of the St. Louis School of Thought." Attention to Blow is certainly deserved, on both the practical and theoretical levels. Her practical contribution to the St. Louis movement was in overseeing the first successful kindergarten program in the United States, which she established in 1872. She is still remembered in education circles for this work, in fact. Blow's kindergarten not only provided a valuable public service to St. Louis, it also gave professional status to the care and nurture of young children - it had been a private matter until that time. Alongside the kindergarten, Blow established a training school for potential teachers. The ideas she developed during this time appear in Symbolic Education (1894), Kindergarten Education (1904), and Educational Issues in the Kindergarten (1908). On a theoretical level, Blow contributed to the St. Louis group's emphasis on pedagogy. For her, pedagogy and philosophy were in a constant dialogue. She viewed pedagogy through a philosophical lens and philosophy through a pedagogical lens. Yet she sometimes devoted entire sections in her writings to philosophy proper, so much so that her pedagogical work appears to have been a cloak for her larger philosophical interests. The final chapter of her last book, Educational Issues in the Kindergarten, zeroed in on "Three World Views" - naturalism, pragmatism, and idealism — and their value. And while she did tie this discussion to her pedagogy, her ideas stand on their own as philosophy proper. Blow participated to an extent in the local and national teachers' organizations, of which Harris was a prime mover. However, her involvement here does not rival others in the St. Louis circle, such as Anna Brackett and Grace Bibb, both of whom spoke fairly frequently before these bodies. She put more energy, and on occasion money, into participating in the national and worldwide expositions that won the St. Louis public school system such recognition.

48

America's First Women Philosophers

Still, while Blow's work is the best chronicled of any of the women of the St. Louis circle, this is not to say that adequate attention has been paid to her in histories of the movement. Blow's practical work was in education, but she was also a theorist who saw herself as expounding idealism — Hegel in particular. As will be true of the other idealist women, some background information about Blow and her work in St. Louis is necessary in order to put her theoretical work into context. Susan Blow's origins cannot be called humble. Her father, Henry T. Blow, was a successful businessman and prominent Missouri politician, and one of the state's most avid Unionists during the Civil War. In fact, Henry and his brother Taylor were instrumental in helping Dred Scott attempt to gain his freedom prior to the infamous US Supreme Court ruling. Peter Blow, Susan's grandfather, had held legal rights over Dred Scott at one point. Later his ownership was transferred to another family who refused to give Scott his freedom, despite the fact that he had been living in a free state for a number of years. Henry and Taylor helped Scott file the lawsuit that eventually was taken to the US Supreme Court. When the Court ruled that as a slave Scott could not be deemed a citizen and therefore had no right to freedom, Henry and Taylor arranged to have his ownership transferred back to the Blow family. The Blows then granted freedom to Scott and his family. The Blow family's wealth and prominence provided Susan with many advantages, of course. Her father seemed particularly interested in the quality of her formal education, and sent her to a private girls' school, Miss Haines's school in New York City. Blow herself later said that while Miss Haines had a "comprehensive mind," she was not "thorough." Still, Haines's school provided Susan with enough of an educational grounding to continue to study on her own after her formal education had ended. Among the list of books Blow reported having read as a young adult isj. H. Stirling's Secret of Hegel, the same volume later used by the Philosophical Society in its more intensive study.

Discovering Froebel Some of Henry Blow's political appointments called for travel, which provided Susan with a set of valuable opportunities. After the Civil War, Henry was appointed minister to Brazil, where the entire family spent a year, with Susan acting as his secretary. Susan's sister, Nellie, developed a love interest over the course of their stay in Brazil, which resulted in an invitation to Europe by the Russian dignitary whom she later married. It was on the family's European tour that Susan Blow first encountered the thought of Friedrich Froebel (1782-1852), a German theorist of early childhood education. And

Susan Blow

49

understanding Froebel's educational method is essential to understanding Blow and her role in the St. Louis movement. Froebel's system consists of using common objects and activities — which he called "gifts" and "occupations" — to instruct young children/ Froebel's goal was to develop in children many of the same skills we identify as important today: manual dexterity, observation, and original thought. Other objectives were also part of Froebel's system that are foreign, at least to Western education today, such as to fortify children's will power and to introduce an understanding of causal relations so that they can begin to develop their "self-active" powers. As noted in Chapter 1, "self-activity" is a recurring theme for the St. Louis Hegelians. In this particular case, it simply points to children's growing ability to recognize themselves as conscious decision makers who can not only determine their own actions, but also act in such a way as to have an effect on other beings and objects around them. Froebel's gifts and occupations are an important part of his system which Blow saw as his "practical response to the cravings of childhood,"6 and which she implemented fully in her own kindergarten work. But these tangible manifestations of Froebel's theory are connected to a series of songs, games, and "plays" in his work Mother Play, which Blow translated and commented on. Each of Froebel's "plays" and games are familiar parent-child activities, such as the "All-Gone Song" and "Peek-a-Boo." The "All-Gone Song" teaches children there are limits to food, toys, and play periods. "Peek-a-Boo" shows children that a parent will return after an absence. In a non-threatening way, both introduce children to the fact that no one person or thing is constantly present. 7 "Falling-Falling," in which a child falls or jumps into an adult's arms, simulates Hegel's idea of estrangement and return: with each "fall" the child is momentarily "estranged" from, then suddenly reacquainted with, the same adult. Mother Play features over forty such activities, each of which Blow took seriously and worked to adapt to her understanding of Hegel's larger educational and philosophical ideals.

Froebel and Hegel The St. Louis circle as a whole is known to have been a movement in which Hegel is the central figure. So how does Blow's use of Froebel come into play? In her own exposition of idealism, Blow did not indicate when she was speaking as a Froebelian, as opposed to a Hegelian, because she did not see the need to distinguish between the two. They were completely compatible in her view. And in some ways, this makes sense. Although Froebel and Hegel may not have known each other, they were part of the same movement and were influenced by the same people.8 Of course, Hegel knew Schelling

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personally and was well acquainted with Fichte's work. Froebel had noted Schelling's influence on his thought (although it is not clear whether he actually studied under him at Jena). He later established a long friendship with Schelling's disciple, Karl Christian Friedrich Krause. In addition, both Froebel's wife and two longtime friends had studied under Fichte and Schleiermacher in Berlin. And all three - his wife and friends - shared Froebel's vision for an educational system based on the highest human ideals, which they tried to put into practice at Froebel's school in Kelihau. So the working out of idealism as a school of thought was something that both Hegel and Froebel were party to — Hegel as an intellectually active force, Froebel as a student and practitioner. Both were exposed to an intellectual environment in which Bildung — education/culture was a central concept. Among the romantics and idealists that the two associated with, this term was used to convey more than a superficial attainment of taste and/or propriety. Instead, Bildung involved a noble and ennobling process of bringing a person's higher self to fruition. However, while both shared this common understanding of the role Bildung could (and should] play in the life of the individual, in the final analysis Froebel was by no means the philosopher that Hegel was. In fact, Froebel was influenced as much by romanticism as by idealism. He had a poetic appreciation of the beauty of nature and an intuition that the spirit of the universe is an organic whole. He did not create a system of how that beauty is made manifest or how that organic whole communicates its truths, as Hegel did. Even so, Froebel was adept at putting together a method with which to teach and to introduce Bildung into the life of his students, even if he did not present it as a system. And this is why Blow could espouse both Hegel and Froebel simultaneously: Froebel provided the method and Hegel the theory that shed light on, and justified the use of, that method. Blow built on Froebel's interpretation of children's "plays" and games, making them more pedagogically significant. For instance, "Falling-Falling" in Froebel's view was primarily about developing physical strength and building trust between parent and child. The additional meaning of the game as simulating self-estrangement and return is Blow's Hegelian reading of the game's deeper purpose. Metaphorically speaking then, Blow uses Hegel's theory as the city plan, and Froebel's methods as the buildings within that city. So well do the two complement each other in Blow's understanding that they barely need to be distinguished. Blow discovered Froebel after she had already become acquainted with Hegel's thought, and this was largely because of her family's social standing. It was unseemly for a young woman in Blow's social circles to be too well educated or employed. She was expected to be well read certainly, and to acquire good taste, but in order to be a good wife and mother, not to gain prestige or recognition. So, while Henry Blow had ensured that his daughter was

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educated, for many years he forbade her to pursue a career. Later in life Susan attributes her father's stance toward women and work as the reason for her own relatively late start in the professional world: Had my father permitted, I should have gone into some definite work long before I did, but I would never have done anything against his wish, and I remember definitely saying to myself that I would get ready for work, and when the right moment came God would show the work. — Christ waited till he was thirty/ Blow herself was nearly thirty when she encountered Froebel's theory, which led to the opportunity for her to become director of the St. Louis kindergarten system. This in turn led to her acquaintance with William Torrey Harris and the St. Louis circle. Yet because of her position of privilege, Blow worked as kindergarten director without pay so that she would have a status that was more like a missionary than a spinster school teacher. As Margaret Hilliker noted, Blow's success came "more or less in spite of her family and •.• "10 position.

Founding the kindergarten Only a cursory glance at the origins of the kindergarten in St. Louis would suggest that William Torrey Harris was solely responsible for its development and implementation. Harris's biographer, Kurt Leidecker, for instance, gave him most of the credit for establishing the kindergarten. He mentions Blow, but her central role at the ground level is not given nearly enough recognition. St. Louis circle historian Cleon Forbes acknowledged Blow's participation in implementing the kindergarten, but he implied that she was vague on the theory behind it. Similarly, in Charles Perry's centennial tribute to Harris, the author actually quotes Susan Blow's memorial address honoring her colleague, but then continues on with citations of Harris's comments on kindergarten education, completely passing over Blow's own expertise in this area. We can forgive these men their oversights to a large degree, because they were products of their time and were eager to chronicle Harris's life and work. It is more distressing to see that Blow wrote herself out of the history of the kindergarten in America, giving Harris complete credit for its founding and development. In the history of the movement that Nicholas Murray Butler had asked her to write, Blow does not even hint that she played any part in establishing the St. Louis kindergarten program. It is true that Blow was greatly assisted by Harris, particularly in the kindergarten's very early

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stages. Harris himself had taken an interest in pre-primary education before Blow met with him to discuss the idea in 1871. Yet it is also the case that Blow was an adept organizer, strong leader, and competent theorist who was at the center of getting the project up and running. In short, it takes a much closer look at the St. Louis circle to get a clear picture of the high level of Blow's involvement in the movement. Blow's objectives in providing kindergarten education were distinct from those of Harris. For Harris, education was a civilizing force. In the first year of the project, he cautioned the school board not to expect an advance in intelligence as much as the formation of good habits in kindergarten children. This in itself is a valuable function for education to serve, and the pre-primary years are an optimum time to do so, thought Harris, because good habits are more easily formed between the ages of three and six than six and nine. 16 In large measure, Harris's goal in pushing for education to begin at a younger age was to extend the period of time they spent in school. He had very little hope that parents would be willing to extend their children's education at the upper age levels. After all, this was the point at which children in working class and agricultural households actually became useful to their parents. Harris knew and understood this, and thought that the kindergarten could bring culture, discipline, and good moral and mental habits to the masses at an earlier age, thus producing better citizens. For Blow, on the other hand, education facilitated the gradual process of the unfolding of the self. It awakened a young mind to the universal truths that await discovery. The "gifts" of Froebel's system did more than acquaint children with the material world. They drew the child's attention to properties of the objects around them. The child then could be introduced to contrasts between one object and another, then the relations between objects, and finally to the universal truths that lay behind those objects. This would not occur in the first year of a child's education, of course. But kindergarten was a crucial step in the initiation of this process. Similarly, the plays and games in kindergarten classes were more than recreation. They were exercises in trust-building and cooperation. Kindergarten education might indeed have a civilizing power, as Harris believed, but this was not its most important function for Blow. Neither Blow nor Harris explicitly acknowledged their different emphases. Perhaps this is because the two views were so very complementary in practice. Blow's kindergarten programs could facilitate exactly the kind of growth she thought necessary. All the while, Harris would congratulate her for producing such fine, well-mannered children who would, no doubt, grow to be even finer citizens. The two views by no means mutually exclude each other. If they were consciously aware of their respective foci, it is unlikely either would have objected to the other's view. Harris was concerned more with education's role in society, Blow on its importance in individual development and personal

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relations. In the end, however, they are just two aspects of the same Hegelian pedagogy, because a good society is made of good individuals and vice versa. Today, early childhood education is so much a part of our social experience that it is difficult to imagine how very revolutionary the kindergarten ideal was at the time. Yet in its day it was among the most innovative of methods. Education at this time, when not conducted haphazardly by a series of tutors in the home, consisted of a very rigid set of practices. Students often had to memorize long passages from classic works of literature, some of which (or likely most of which) they didn't understand. The main concern most teachers had in the classroom was with keeping order, enforcing discipline by whatever means necessary, and virtually drilling information into their charges' heads. It is no surprise that generally children under seven years old were considered too young to endure the trials of school life. Blow's kindergarten by contrast, allowed a degree of freedom and exploration, yet in a controlled environment. Before she introduced her first kindergarten class, it was unheard of for a teacher to encourage play and incorporate observation of real flowers and plants in a garden on the grounds of the school. But this is what Blow did, successfully applying Froebel's methods in conjunction with Hegel's theory. In this way, she worked with children's natural tendency toward play and creativity, rather than against it.

The move toward theory: teacher training and mothers' classes Blow, who was described as an extremely quick-minded and insightful woman by contemporaries, could not be content with kindergarten teaching alone. In 1877, she went to Europe to study under Froebel expert Baroness Marenholz von Bulow and returned to St. Louis prepared to open the first training school for kindergarten teachers in the US.18 At first, Blow's teacher training classes focused on the technical skills needed in the kindergarten classroom. Similar to our practicum model today, teachers in training would attend classes, then take what they learned directly to a kindergarten classroom, instructing children in drawing, painting, or other learning exercises. Teaching in general was not approached in so systematic a fashion in Blow's day. Primary teachers received less training than secondary instructors did. In fact, Blow's student Elizabeth Harrison noted that she was lucky to have received six month's of training, as most teachers studied only two or three weeks at a summer institute. Given the newness of the kindergarten, and no doubt their new-found access to a bona fide profession, the women in Blow's school approached their work with a passion. In Denton Snider's words, they were like "modern missionaries . . . on their own soil" who were "aflame with zeal and sacrifice for a noble cause."*"

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By 1880, Blow determined that her students needed more than just technical training, so she introduced literature into her teacher training program. She began expanding her lectures to include literature, philosophy, and religion. She also invited others in the St. Louis circle to offer their own courses of lectures in an attempt to help her students attain more "culture."21 Blow's kindergarten training program became as much a community lecture series as a teacher training school at this point. Lectures were open to the public and were very well attended. In fact, it was not unusual for as many as 200 people to attend any given lecture. 22 Audiences of this magnitude gave Blow herself, as well as her colleagues, welcomed recognition. Alongside the addition of literary and philosophical lectures for would-be kindergarten teachers, Blow established a teacher certification program for teachers in St. Louis schools. This was a component of teacher education that was rarely in place in most school districts, but was clearly needed as kindergarten programs began to spring up around the country. Blow set up a committee to draw up certification criteria, and this group introduced a two-level system. Teachers could be certified to instruct children or to train kindergarten teachers. In each case the candidate needed a recommendation from their immediate supervisor in the kindergarten classroom to which they were assigned, the approval by vote of the Kindergarten Society (a group of the directors of all the kindergartens in St. Louis), and approval of the Board ofEducation. 23 From a feminist perspective, it is clear that Blow's advanced teacher training classes were valuable to her as a means for her to expand intellectually herself. This is not to say that she feigned belief in the relevance of the ideas she and her colleagues discussed in these classes. She was just as committed as any member of the movement to imparting Bildung — culture — to her students. But at the same time, the teacher training classes allowed her to instruct students in classic works of literature, explore her own ideas, and engage in discourse with colleagues on a regular basis. Given her contemporaries' high estimation of her intelligence, it would be surprising if Blow did not yearn to continue expanding her mind in such a way once she had mastered Froebel's theories. What else should we expect from someone who early in life was deemed "too bookish, as displaying quite too much erudition for a woman"? 24

Personal and professional challenges In 1875, Blow presented a paper at the Normal School Association meeting, entitled "The Kindergarten: Its Aims, Purposes, and Results," in which she outlined the theory behind Froebel's methods and listed the benefits of kindergarten education. After this we find Blow presenting award-winning

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kindergarten displays at the American centennial exposition in Philadelphia and then at the Paris exposition two years later, both of which won her a great deal of recognition. During the first event, the nation was experiencing a serious economic depression, so Blow volunteered to cover all expenses for her presence at the exposition as well as for materials for the display. This ended up being a good investment for Blow, as she was given an award from the US Centennial Commission "for excellence of work and for the establishment of kindergartens as a part of the public school system." In Paris too, Blow's display was highly commended. 25 Perhaps most important in regard to this second event is the fact that the American kindergarten system received international recognition, and Blow along with it. Her success continued into the early 1880s, even after her good friend and colleague William Torrey Harris had left St. Louis and many other members of the movement had moved on to other ventures. As late as 1883, Louis Soldan wrote to Harris that "Miss Blow is working with her usual wonderful energy, and has a large class of ladies studying Dante with her."26 But it was around this time that Blow became ill with Graves' disease, which went undiagnosed for several years. The impact of this illness on Blow's life and work cannot be overstated. While Snider spoke of it as a sort of tragic-heroic malady that was somehow brought on by a "long private trouble which colored her whole life,"27raves' disease, or hyperthyroidism, can have devastating physical and emotional effects. For much of the 1880s and into the 1890s, she suffered severe headaches, eye problems, bouts of nervousness, and an inability to concentrate. Worse still, her primacy in the St. Louis school system began to waver just as the disease was taking hold. In 1884 Blow decided to take a year off in the hope that she would recover from her as-yet-undiagnosed illness. When she was unable to return the next year, the school board had appointed Mary McCullough director of the kindergarten without soliciting Blow's input. This in itself was an offense, but added to it was the fact that she had recommended Laura Fisher for the position, her good friend and an instructor in Blow's teacher training classes. A number of Blow's supporters, including Fisher, resigned in protest, and the school board became divided over the matter. Amid professional turmoil, Blow experienced personal loss and her illness worsened. In 1880, her brother John died. In 1885 her brother-in-law, the husband of her sister Nellie to whom she was very close, died. The same year her sister Lucretia died in childbirth, leaving Susan with the responsibility of helping to raise her sister's four children, all of whom were under five years old. By 1886-7, Graves' disease hit Blow full-force.28 Her diet was greatly restricted, and she continued to suffer with headaches and vision problems. This year, too, she had a "heavy collision with the [School] Board,"29 and if Snider's assessment of the situation is accurate, she nearly forced the

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dismantling of the entire kindergarten system, rather than concede defeat. But by this time, the consensus in St. Louis was that Blow, not her opponents, was at fault. 30 Despite the grim outlook for Blow's continued career in St. Louis, she still imagined that she would be able to resume work when she regained her health. After a great deal of coaxing by Harris and Laura Fisher, in 1888 she agreed to go to Boston for medical treatment. Here she met with James Jackson Putnam, a Harvard medical school professor and practicing physician, who diagnosed the problem and began appropriate treatments. By 1891 she was beginning to recover, and Putnam advised her to try writing to help make the transition into working again. She began public speaking again in 1896. She first spoke in Cazenovia, New York, where she had moved in 1889 to be near her sister. A small group of thirty gathered to hear her at this meeting. Two years later, she spoke in Boston and New York to crowds of three and six hundred, respectively. For the next twenty years of her life, Blow continued to hold public speaking engagements, and for a time held a position lecturing at Columbia Teachers College in New York. She also published five books outlining her theory of early childhood education. Her friendship with William Torrey Harris remained strong. He would visit in Cazenovia whenever he traveled through the area, and they continued to correspond until his death in 1909. Blow's illness lasted more than a decade, changing her life dramatically. But without this halt to her kindergarten work, we might not have evidence of its theoretical underpinnings, because she'd have had no reason to shift her focus from practice to theory. When her illness had begun to subside, Harris urged her to put her ideas on the kindergarten into print. This resulted in the publication of Symbolic Education in 1894, her magnum opus on kindergarten theory.

St. Louis circle connections Blow was at the forefront of developing the St. Louis brand of Hegelianism and attended Philosophical Society meetings regularly. She was also an active member of the St. Louis Art Society, and of the regional and national teachers' associations. Other than her translations of Goeschel, however, she did not contribute to the JSP. Blow did not share the feminist sympathies of many of her St. Louis circle women colleagues, so she was not a member of the Missouri Equal Suffrage Association, the national suffrage groups, or the St. Louis Woman's Club. She was, most likely, a member of the Wednesday Club, along with Sue Beeson and Amelia Fruchte. Blow must have known Anna Brackett, Mary Beedy, and Grace Bibb well, as all were involved with the public schools, though it is not possible to determine if she had a close relationship with any

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of them. In short, though Blow's life is significantly better documented than most of the women of the St. Louis circle, there are still gaps regarding her relationships with other members of that circle. There is one exception, however: her competitive relationship with Denton Jacques Snider.

"Quite too much erudition"? - Snider's perspective Snider provides several lengthy descriptions of Blow in his history of the St. Louis movement. Even though accounts of their interactions are from Snider's point of view, it is clear that their relationship was intense and quite complex. Snider, an intelligent man with a great deal of insight into the workings of the St. Louis circle, felt threatened by Blow, who easily matched his own intelligence. Still, his assessment of Blow's character sheds light on her personality. It also gives clues as to how a woman with Blow's intellectual talents was seen by at least one man in her day. Snider recounts having learned from Blow's German tutor that her "culture was too reflective, too philosophical, too much inclined to the abstract and logical rather than to the poetic and emotional."32 His first mention of having met Blow himself was at the opening of the Concord School of Philosophy in 1879. The next year Blow invited him to give his lectures on Sophocles to her kindergarten training class, which were followed up with lectures on Homer and Herodotus in the following two years. Snider gave Blow's classes priority over his other speaking engagements. Yet he betrayed a degree of resentment toward Blow for holding a position of authority over him, remarking that his first course of lectures on Sophocles was a test he had to pass before Blow would allow him to present more challenging material. He noted wryly, "I was the teacher, but she was the ruler." On one level. Snider admired Blow's intelligence and leadership ability, as his characterization of her commanding presence clearly demonstrates: No sooner had Miss Blow entered ... than every eye in the room seemed suddenly pulled toward her, announcing her at once to be the center of that company. . . . Here was the heroine, and everybody present, in spite of a little female jealousy perhaps, acknowledged secretly her supremacy I the teacher being therein foremost. She knew well her peculiar power; when I aimed my eye-shot at her — and I could not help it — following it up with my words, her naturally red face turned redder with a defiant smile, and flashed a response which I traced thus as writ in her features: Come on, I am ready. But on another level, Snider casts Blow's self-possession and intellectual acuity as a serious character flaw: "it lay in her deepest spirit to subordinate."35

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Examples like these abound throughout Snider's account of his interactions with Blow. He expresses awe at Blow's power, mixed with resentment and even a feeling of being threatened by her. Her requests he treats as commands. When Blow asked him to speak on Faust, for example, Snider believed he had no choice but to "obey the summons."36 Similarly, conflicts with her became banishments; the chance for reconciliation was tantamount to redemption. In a sense then, perhaps Snider was not criticizing Blow as much as mocking his own acquiescence, his own fearfulness of her. To the modern feminist reader Snider's attraction/repulsion to Blow appears to grow out of a sexism, unintended as this may have been. At times he seemed to have objected to Blow's commanding presence not only because she was powerful, not only because she was intellectual, but because she was a powerful and intellectual woman. And despite the fact that he was a liberalminded person overall, Snider does seem to have had a problem with strongwilled women. Caroline K. Sherman, who worked closely with Snider at the Chicago Literary School in the 1880s, commented on a conflict that had developed between Snider and a colleague of hers in the Chicago Women's Club. Describing the two as being "at swords points," Sherman made a telling observation: I like Mr. Snider and consequently am all the more sensitive to his faults especially the one which leads him to take it for granted that his audience is superlatively ignorant and that childish illustrations are needed to make his ideas clear to t h e m . . . . In this age of books, woman's clubs, etc., etc., women are not so ignorant or so dull of apprehension as Mr. Snider assumes. It would be unfair, of course, to hold a nineteenth-century man to a twenty-first-century standard of gender equality. At the same time, however, it is clear that Snider's sometimes negative slant on Blow's behavior grew out of a male bias that was commonplace in his day. This is not to say that Blow was always an altogether congenial and easy-going person. In fact, she and Snider had a serious rift in their friendship, presumably because she could not accept his classical/humanistic outlook. Snider himself interprets Blow as expecting him to fall in line with Harris intellectually, and a later St. Louis circle historian adopts this idea as well. Yet, this is something of a misperception. At the time, around 1883-4, Harris was beginning to develop an interest in Eastern (Indian) thought, and some contemporaries were accusing him of being a pantheist. Blow, in contrast, was becoming increasingly intrigued with Roman Catholicism and later would consider conversion. Blow was certainly able to think independently and did on these theological points and more. She may have disagreed with Snider, but a need to align herself— and others — intellectually with Harris was not the issue.

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The rift that grew out of their diverging views grew into a full-blown conflict. Snider's account illustrates his tragic-heroic view of her: I dared throw an eye-bolt at Miss Blow, behind which every glance in the class fell into line . . . Miss Blow turned on me and broke out into decided passionate exception to what I had said. . .. She whipped the air with her pointed index, her face almost boiled, and her voice was at times pitched to a height which made it grate screechy. She seemed to feel that my interpretation was a personal attack, though I said nothing of the sort, whatever I may have looked.39 Even though he recounts this incident over thirty years after it occurred and with the knowledge that her illness was becoming pronounced at this time, Snider seemed to have no compassion for Blow. Instead he still paints a picture in which she is acting out a mythic truth, brought on by her own willfulness. Later, when she declined to reconcile with him, Snider wove this into his mythic view of Blow's innate tragic flaw. Of course she would defy him with this "Grand Refusal," Snider concluded, just as in the ultimate act of defiance, she would turn her back on St. Louis where she had accomplished her greatest work. Furthermore, although Snider believed that she alone had the power to resurrect the St. Louis circle after so many of its members had departed, this too she refused to do, continuing on with her work in the east instead. In a sense, of course, Snider was right. By the 1890s, Blow did turn her back on St. Louis. After moving to New York and recovering from her illness, she settled into a life of publishing and lecturing, refining her theory and attempting to integrate more of Hegel into it as she went along. And thankfully so for us. We now have the benefit of being able to peruse her work, assess its value, and inquire into what Hegelianism, as developed by one nineteenth-century woman, looks like.

Blow as a pedagogical theorist: the meaning of The Mother Play "There is no philosophy for the young woman to be compared with the philosophy [of the] mother's plays and games with her children." Friedrich Froebel's Mother Play was Blow's sourcebook. She drew on it in setting up her own kindergarten classes early in her career. When she left the St. Louis school system, she continued to hold it in high esteem and produced two analyses of it: Commentaries on Froebel's "Mother Play" and Letters to a Mother on the Philosophy ofFroebel..In two other books Blow developed her own

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pedagogical theory based on Froebel: Symbolic Education, her first effort to discuss educational theory, and Educational Issues in the Kindergarten, her final major publishing effort. Both Harris and Blow agreed that, while the gifts and occupations were important, Froebel's plays and games were the really strong point of his theory. Through these exercises the child "ascends from the world of Nature to the world of humanity; from the world of things to the world of selfactivity." " Blow stressed that they are not simply an arbitrary grouping of activities, but instead a logical series of steps intended for the instruction, not merely the amusement, of young children. This is because Froebel saw the value of children's traditional games and recognized the "deposit of unconscious reason," in them. At the same time, he did not simply accept them uncritically, but instead "preserved what was good and omitted what was crude and coarse in these products of instinct." Since Froebel had been influenced by idealism, it is not surprising that he would view children's traditional forms of play as a sort of cumulative record of the instructional wisdom that had been passed down through the ages. Blow agreed with this view, maintaining that traditional games help children explore society's "wider life." Teachers are free to update or adapt the games Froebel describes, to keep them relevant to children's experience. For children in an urban setting, for example, "Nest with Birdlings" can become "Cat with Kittens," or "Mowing Grass" can become "Sweeping the Room." The point is to maintain the spirit of Froebel's system.

Some kindergarten errors By 1908, when Blow published Educational Issues in the Kindergarten, many kindergarten teachers, in her view, were taking too much liberty with their interpretations of Froebel. Blow identified three serious departures from Froebel's system that were detrimental to children. The first she referred to as the "concentric" approach.46 This is a method in which an idea or symbol is chosen at random and lessons and activities centered around it. One example of the concentric kindergarten that Blow found especially dreadful was a series of lessons on Abraham Lincoln in which the ever important element of play was entirely missing. The children were not encouraged to transform themselves into birds and butterflies through their power of imagination, as in Froebel's system. Instead their teacher lectured to them about Lincoln and forced these "little victims of the concentric program" to re-enact a "dreary drama: as their moralizing teacher implored them to emulate his example.",47The fact that play was almost entirely absent from this exercise was its biggest flaw.

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Furthermore, it tried to convey ideas that are too complex for young children to grasp. Blow repeatedly insisted that Froebel's method does not teach children explicit moral principles, but it does communicate deep truths to children on an unconscious level. In Symbolic Education Blow stated this particularly well: It must not be supposed, even for a moment, that Froebel explains to the child the meaning of his symbolic representations. . . . [He] knows that the mind may be trusted to universalize its ideas, and leaves to its own alchemy the transmutation of the symbol into the reality symbolized. Blow objected to another kindergarten method that is the complete converse of the concentric program. This is the "free-play" kindergarten, the name of which belies its focus. Its biggest error is that, while it provides some structure, it does so with virtually no system within this structure. All the children may count buttons simultaneously, for example, or all get a chance to write on the board, but each activity is detached from the other and no effort is made "to lead the children to build better, draw better, model better, or do anything better than they were originally able to do."49 In short, the free-play kindergarten really amounts to a play school, rather than a genuine kindergarten, and therefore it fails to serve one of its main functions: to bridge the gap between family and school. A third flawed early childhood educational method is really a type of concentric approach, and this Blow terms the "industrial" kindergarten, or socialized school. While this method is a vast improvement over the free play kindergarten, Blow believed that ultimately industrial education fails, because it turns education into a means, not an end in itself. It also confuses the role of the school and civil society. She acknowledged John Dewey as a proponent of this approach and quoted him extensively from School and Society throughout the second chapter of Educational Issues in the Kindergarten. Dewey and his followers believed that childhood education should be linked to social goals and should familiarize children with the world of work. She cites an industrial kindergarten that taught children about the uses of the potato. The children helped to dig, clean, peel, and cook the vegetable. They then learned how to make starch and even to use the starch on doll clothes. This all sounds useful enough as a series of educational exercises, but in Blow's view, it is completely misguided. The industrial program confuses the role of the school with that of civil society. Along with Hegel, Blow saw civil society as the realm in which individuals perform actual duties and engage in work relations with each other for mutual gain.50 The school, on the other hand, is its own reason for being. Education is its only aim. Students should not be encouraged to look for reward or other external incentives, but should be

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taught to seek growth and achievement for its own sake. In Blow's view, Dewey's educational program failed to do this. We may disagree with Blow's characterization of Dewey's ideas, but this is the charge she made against him because she saw it as a grave pedagogical error.

Professionalizing motherhood Blow recognized that in a sense there was nothing new about the Froebelian system. After all, mothers played "Falling-Falling" and "Peek-a-Boo" with their children long before Froebel wrote Mother Play, and they continued to do so even when they were unfamiliar with his work. What was new about Froebel is that he made the natural mother-child relationship systematic. In this way he succeeded in "vitalizing ... with clear consciousness and persistent purpose [that which] maternal instinct has always blindly and intermittently attempted." Froebel's systematic approach to childhood education benefited mothers as much as it did children — at least in Blow's appropriation of Froebel. It allowed women to see their games and activities with children in a different light, and to use these activities to foster growth. What could even be called revolutionary about Blow's interpretation of Froebel is that it not only affirmed women's nurturing role, but also took that role seriously in both practice and theory. From a practical point of view, mothers' games with their children had become a professional enterprise. Theoretically, they were analyzed in the five volumes that Blow had written, almost inadvertently, as philosophy specifically for women. Yet Froebel's songs and games did not encourage self-sacrifice by a mother for her child. As Blow reminded her readers, the notion that "mother and child should have a common life does not . . . imply that they should always be together. ... No sensible person will accept the sentimental theory that the mother should be her child's sole and constant companion."52 Not only does a woman have interests of her own to pursue, an overly dependent child will lack self-development. Children must learn to accept separation from their mothers, or they will fail to experience the process of self-estrangement and return that Blow saw as essential to human growth. Instead, games such as "Falling-Falling" taught both mother and child that children do not need to be inseparable from their mothers. Both mother and child benefited from accepting this lesson and integrating it into their lives, in reality as well as in play. While Blow's interpretation of Froebel widened women's sphere considerably by professionalizing the private work of early childhood education, generally speaking her view of women was conventional. She saw women primarily as caretakers and lamented women's struggle for suffrage. The vote

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would only harm women by subjecting them to the "industrial" realm. She would rather have women focus their attention on their domestic role, since the home was where they could realize their potential more fully. Blow's idealization of motherhood had its roots in both Froebel and Hegel. Froebel idealized childhood, in part because his own was so dreadful. His mother died when he was an infant, and his step-mother treated him very badly, referring to him in the third person rather than addressing him directly, for instance, while she showered her own son with affection. In childhood, an individual is innocent, free, and near to bursting with potentiality in FroebePs view. And play is to children "what the pure air and wide expanse on the mountain-top are" in nature: the manifestation of the inner soul. Blow shared these views, but joined to them Hegel's emphasis on the importance of the family as the foundation of society. And in Hegel's understanding, a woman finds "her full substantive place" in the family in her role as wife and mother. j5 Again, rather than choose one thinker's ideas over the other, Blow integrated the two into a theory of her own, insisting on the importance of both child and mother simultaneously. She saw the family as an institution that grew out of children's need for care, and even went so far as to call "the little child . . . pioneer of the process which created human institutions." Blow did more than simply romanticize childhood, as Froebel did. She made women central to the care and nurture of children, and in a substantive way. In this sense, she appended onto child rearing responsibility for the healthy development of society's foundational institution, the family. It is clear that Blow had more in common with her maternal feminist counterparts than with those who espoused liberal feminism. She certainly ascribed to the romantic notion of "women's sphere" that was so valorized in the mid nineteenth-century writings of women like Sarah J. Hale, Lydia Sigourney, Catharine Beecher, and the later work of Gail Hamilton. The liberal feminists of her day believed that even though differences between the sexes do exist, these are not substantial enough to justify making sharp distinctions between them in most cases. In contrast, Blow's theory of the relation of mother and child and their respective roles in the family place her in the maternal feminist column. Like many conservative-leaning nineteenthcentury women, she believed women are inherently different from men and considered that difference worthy of reverence. Therefore, she insisted that more schools were needed that instructed women in homecraft and childcare. Such schools would not only properly educate women in Blow's view, they would also regenerate all of human life by "enhancing the sanctity and uplifting the ideals of family life."5/ A critically important characteristic of play is that it allows children to reproduce the world and thus to begin to understand it. Much of children's spontaneous play involves creating an imaginary world, but one that is based

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on the real world around them. They play "store," "nursery," "railroad," "school," or any other number of imitative games. Each time children may play different roles, or a certain child may prefer to perfect the same role. But, in Blow's view, the purpose behind the play is not only to "try on" each social role, but actually to aim at an ideal — if not an ideal society, then certainly an ideal self. The influence of Hegel's thought on Blow is clear, for play is a process of self-objedification. Before a child engages in play, he or she begins with at least a nascent understanding of who his or her "self" is and chooses to take on another persona that takes him or her out of that original self. The child thus becomes another temporary self that expresses thoughts and feelings, some of which might be shared in common with the original self, some of which might be vastly different. During play, the child has new experiences which inform his or her image of the original self when play has ended. At its most fundamental level then, children's play involves the Hegelian process of self-estrangement and return in embryonic form. Yet in The Philosophy of Right Hegel disparaged the play theory of education because it discourages growth and development. In Hegel's words, play theory "sees childishness itself as already inherently valuable" and "debases serious things." In light of this, how can Blow's theory of play be deemed Hegelian? Blow makes no explicit mention of Hegel's criticism on this point, but as noted above was critical of what she called the "free play" kindergarten. In the free play setting, children were left entirely to their own whims, their play and activity perhaps organized, but not directed toward intellectual or moral growth. She was as distressed as Hegel was by methods of education in which play was used to "make [children] satisfied with the way they are" rather than spur them on to growth. In this sense, Blow's theory matched Hegel's, even though she did not address this problem directly by making reference to his views on the matter. Blow's understanding of play parallels Brackett's view of the role of literature in the self-development of youth, which she develops in her application of Hegel's thought to educational theory.61 For Brackett, the purpose of children's literature is to allow youth to go outside themselves, imagine that they are kings or conquerors, then to return to their everyday experience with a new perspective on themselves and the world around them. Brackett remains true to Rosenkranz in her translation of Pedagogics as a System, adapting Hegelian education theory to the American context. Blow does the same with kindergarten theory. From Blow's perspective, children's love of play is not simply an accidental property they have acquired, but is a necessity for their self-development —just as literature is for older children, and works of art or products of labor for the adult. Play is the process through which the child objectifies himself or herself. Through play, children recognize both objects and ideals outside of themselves and appropriate them for their own use. The

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imaginary world thus created facilitates the development of children's sense of self via the process of self-estrangement and return.

Mind's self-activity Blow's theory of early childhood education illustrates her understanding of the self-creative dimension of human intellect - or as she might say, human selfactivity — in adults as well as children. Because the mind is an active entity, it is able to seek out and internalize knowledge. The mind is naturally selfactive, and therefore seizes the data before it. Froebel's method encouraged mothers and teachers to present this data in a systematic way, thus facilitating the development of a child's mind. Yet individuals by nature are prone not only to creative self-activity, but also to self-annihilation which for Blow is integrally tied to the process of estrangement and return. Very young children's self-estrangement is facilitated by playful imaginings; that of their somewhat older peers by exposure to fairy tales; youth by acquaintance with the classics. In the positive sense, they all are thus allowed to venture far beyond their usual paths through the magic of story. In the negative sense, by placing themselves in the role of the main characters, they engage in a process of self-annihilation, conquering along with their heroes the wickedness within: "It is by slaying caprice that he attains rational will, by renouncing opinion that he gains truth, by crucifying selfishness that he conquers selfhood."62 Later in life, religious belief can serve as an avenue for self-annihilation in other forms. Eastern religions strive to surrender the self to the One, although ultimately Blow sees these religions as misguided. Christianity has more nearly perfected the process of selfannihilation through the incarnate Christ, in Blow's view. But what positive role can self-annihilation play? Certainly learning about other personalities, cultures, places, and times can do no harm. Even metaphorically killing inner demons makes sense from a psychological point of view. But unless we keep in mind the Hegelian project in which Blow wishes to participate, all this talk of self-annihilation reads as mere gibberish. Of course the answer to this question is that self-annihilation — Hegel's notion of negation - must be supplemented by return to the self in order for the dialectical process to be complete. Just as the child begins with an original self, "tries on" a new self through imagination in play, then returns to the original self yet with a new perspective on the nature of this first self due to their playtime experience, the adult also enters into a process of estrangement (or annihilation) and return in which they too are transformed. In the individual's relation to the natural and social orders, Blow maintains that by "wandering away from himself into . . . seemingly foreign realms, the individual for the first

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time finds himself at home."63 On the metaphysical level, she describes the process in this way: Mind reveals itself as a process of estrangement and return, a selfdiremption into specific ideas and energies, and a return into itself by the reintegration of its dirempted elements into the unity of consciousness.64 In all cases, the process of self-creation, self-annihilation, and what we might call self-synthesis, the individual is simultaneously active and receptive; each one of these two qualities is impotent without the other. The fact that all of these phases of individual development grow out of the self-active nature of the mind is significant, of course, because it implies that there is a "self" which is able to be active. This observation necessarily ushers in a consideration of self-consciousness and thus of intentionality within the subject. After all, while it is natural for the mind to undergo a synthesis of the self, it is by no means automatic. Instead, the very process of self-estrangement assumes the subject's ability to stand apart from itself and consider the self as object. In fact, it is a prerequisite of self-activity that the self, having objectified itself, is now able to determine its own course of action. This is familiar Hegelian parlance, but how does it play itself out in Blow's theory? First, it means that in every individual, the will and the intellect are intimately linked. In the act of self-objectification, the process of making oneself into an object is an act of the will; the process of recognizing this process as a process of self-objectification is an act of the intellect. These are not two separate acts, but one act with two phases. Thus the educator must aim to stimulate both will and intellect concurrently so students can both reflect on the information at hand and will themselves to integrate it into their intellectual lives. With very young children, this is done merely through instilling in them good personal habits and introducing them to social conventions, primarily through play. As children grow, both intellect and will can be instructed more directly. Further, the process of self-objectification is an ongoing, not a one-time, event. The self creates and re-creates itself while both will and intellect assimilate new information and pursue higher levels of knowledge. This is why Blow and her colleagues so faithfully adhere to their educational hierarchy: at different stages of life not only different material, but also more challenging methods of instruction, are necessary. In addition, both enable the pupil to gather a larger and more complex body of knowledge and thus to assimilate more information. This will become clearer in the chapter on Anna Brackett, but it is true for Blow as well. Furthermore, while the process of selfobjectification takes place within the individual, this is not to say it is a wholly subjective process with no metaphysical implications:

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Self-consciousness is the knowing of the self by the self, and this implies both the distinction of subject and object and the recognition of their identity. The life of the spirit is therefore an endless process of self-diremption and of reintegration of its dirempted elements into the synthetic unity of consciousness. Its history is an endless flight from itself in order to find itself. Since Blow also claims that self-consciousness is "the form of spirit" and "spirit makes the world,"67 it is clear that each individual is participating in a metaphysical process when he or she engages in the process of self-objectification and thereby becomes a self-conscious being. Therefore, the individual human spirit shares with God in bringing about the "unity of consciousness" of which Blow speaks. Individual self-consciousness as derived from universal selfconsciousness, then, is part of the world-making consciousness. Conclusion Today an educational theory as lofty as Blow's is rare. Rarer still is the inclusion of God and the human spirit in educational discourse. Yet this was just the beginning of Blow's integration of philosophy and educational theory. In the final chapter of her last book, Educational Issues in the Kindergarten, she went into rather extended discussions of the shortcomings of naturalism and pragmatism. She then outlined her own understanding of idealism — "the only philosophy which adequately interprets . . . educational procedure."68 At some points, Blow even ventured further into the philosophical, cautioning against process thought, for instance, and making her own case for personalism. And while distinctions between disciplines were somewhat more fluid at the time of Blow's writing (1906-07), her immersion in philosophy seems to have been considered unusual (or as she herself notes, perhaps outdated) then as well. In fact, Blow felt the need to justify herself in print, as well as in a private letter to Putnam: I suppose it will really seem ridiculous to most people to have a discussion of naturalism and pragmatism and idealism in a book on kindergarten practice. And yet I am very sure that behind every error of practice has been an error in philosophy.70 Of course, some may not have understood Blow's educational philosophy, which may be part of the reason her contribution to the St. Louis movement received less attention than that of her male colleagues. However, for Blow it was not at all ridiculous to apply Hegel's theory to the education of very young children, using Froebel's method as a vehicle. Nor was this an unreasonable notion to the hundreds of women Blow instructed and

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inspired. In fact, this may have been Blow's greatest contribution to the St. Louis movement. She made idealism not only intelligible, but also applicable to a concrete set of circumstances. In Blow's view, her system made manifest the rationality that Hegel claimed permeated all of life; and in as unlikely a place as the kindergarten classroom. Infusing so much meaning into the development of little children in itself was an important achievement. Of equally great import is the fact that in Blow's system the power of directing and eliciting that development became not only women's responsibility, but their professional skill. Had Blow developed more strictly philosophical work, historians of philosophy may have recognized her, even as her younger contemporaries Mary Whiton Calkins (1863-1930) and Christine Ladd Franklin (1847-1930) were acknowledged as philosophers in histories of American thought. But Blow chose instead to tuck her philosophical ideas away in books on educational theory, with titles like Commentaries ofFriedrich Froebel's Mother Play, Letters to a Mother, andEducational Issues in the Kindergarten — the readers of which were primarily women. Thus, as the strength of the St. Louis movement faded, those familiar with Blow's work were less and less likely to be professional philosophers, or even students of philosophy. And Blow was effectively omitted from the philosophical canon. Yet this philosophy that professional philosophers left behind has a good deal to offer, perhaps primarily because it was a philosophy for women by a woman. This is also the case with the work of Blow's colleague Anna Brackett, as applied to higher education for women.

Notes 1. 2.

3.

4.

5.

See Snider, St. Louis Movement, 301; and Cleon Forbes, "The St. Louis School of Thought," Missouri Historical Review, 25:619. Scott died just a year later, in 1858. See Joseph Menius, Susan Blow: Mother of the Kindergarten (St. Clair, MO: Page One Publishing, 1993) 15-16. Regarding Henry Blow's Unionism in general, see ibid. 21. Hilliker, The Blow Family, Address to Carondelet Women's Club, February 7, 1955, 9A, citing 1892 letter to William Torrey Harris from Carondelet Historical Society. Menius, 29-30. Unfortunately, Susan's romantic life did not fare so well. She had fallen in love with a man named Coyle, a colonel during the Civil War, but her family considered a general, John Parker Hawkins, better suited for her and sabotaged her relationship with Coyle. She balked in regard to Hawkins, however, and remained unmarried. See Menius, 24. The first gift consists of six soft balls through which children learn about changeability as well as the exertion offeree. The second gift consists of a sphere, a cylinder, and a cube, each of which has properties that increase children's

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understanding of the world by acquainting them with experiences of color, position, and direction. Steps three and four of Froebel's system introduce his occupations: weaving, cutting, folding, and nurturing plants and animals. Each of these activities is intended to teach children about the elements of life, both organic and inorganic. In steps five and six, children move on to more advanced occupations, experimenting with different forms of creating and building to increase their artistic power. They now draw, weave, and paint as well as use sticks, rings, peas, and clay to make figures and models. See Blow, Symbolic Education, 127-8. 6. Blow, Symbolic Education, 127. 7. Blow, Letters to a Mother on the Philosophy of Froebel (New York: D. Appleton, 1898), 296. 8. From 1799, when Froebel began attending classes at the university in Jena, until 1818, when Hegel accepted a faculty position in Berlin, the comings and goings of the two consisted of a series of near misses. Froebel left Jena in the spring of 1801, just before Hegel went there to teach in the fall. Both were in Bamberg, but again missed each other, although this time by three years: Froebel was there 1803--04, Hegel 1807-08. Then in Berlin, where Froebel was a curator in the museum of minerology from 1812-16, he turned down an offer for a faculty position the same year Hegel also decided on an offer in Heidelberg rather than Berlin. Hegel would later go to Berlin in 1818, of course, where good friends of Froebel's, Wilhelm Middendorff and Heinrich Langethal, were students. But even here, the potential for linking Froebel to Hegel himself is unfulfilled. Shortly after meeting them (in 1814), Froebel discovered his love for education and convinced his friends to join him in Greishaim where he established the "Institute for Universal German Education" in 1817. (It was later moved to Kelihau.) This was a school for children aged five to twelve primarily, despite its grandiose name. The next year, Froebel married Henrietta Wilhelmine Hoffmeister, whom he had met through Middendorff and Langenau. See Emilie Michaelis and H. Keatley Moore, trans, and ed., Autobiography of Friedrich Froebel (Syracuse: C.W. Bardeen, 1889), 35-40, 102-04, 120-24. 9. Hilliker, Blow Family, 11. 10. Hilliker, Blow Family, 9A. We can't ignore the fact that it was Blow's social position that made it possible for her to work for free, and by doing so she set an unfortunate precedent that other women — perhaps less fortunate than she - were then led to follow. See Hilliker, Blow Family, 16; Leidecker, 270-71. 11. Leidecker, 270. 12. Forbes, 25:619; 25:88; 25:295. 13. Charles M. Perry, "William Torrey Harris and the St. Louis Movement in Philosophy," in William Torrey Harris 1835-1935, Edward L. Schaub, ed. [papers presented in commemoration of Harris at the centennial of his birth at the meeting of the Western Division of the American Philosophical Society] (Chicago: Open Court, 1936), 39. 14. Susan E. Blow, Kindergarten Education, Monographs on Education in the United States, Nicholas Murray Butler, ed. (Albany: Lyon 1900) [originally presented at the Paris Exposition, 1900], 5-7.

70 15.

16. 17. 18.

19. 20. 21.

22. 23. 24. 25.

Notes to Chapter 2 Elizabeth Palmer Peabody had started a public kindergarten a decade earlier in Boston, but with limited success. It was shut down after just a few years, due to the Boston school board's refusal to continue funding it. In 1870 she encouraged Harris to institute the kindergarten in St. Louis. Harris seemed genuinely interested in pursuing the kindergarten experiment, recommending that early childhood education methods be incorporated into teaching in the primary grades. After a committee appointed by the school board visited a play school in New Jersey, but found no evidence of bona fide kindergarten methods elsewhere in this country, the decision was made for St. Louis to be the first to introduce the kindergarten to America. See Blow, Kindergarten Education, 3; Hilliker, The Life and Work of Susan Blow, unpublished manuscript in the collection of the Carondelet Historical Society, 1-4, 13. Other kindergartens soon followed the St. Louis model in the 1880s and 1890s: in San Francisco, by Kate Douglas Wiggin; in Chicago by Elizabeth Harrison and a Mrs. Putnam; in La Porte, Indiana, by a Dr. Hailman; and in Milwaukee, founder unknown. See Kate Douglas Wiggin, My Garden of Memory (Boston: Hough ton Mifflin, 1923), 130-33 and Elizabeth Harrison, Sketches Along Life's Road (Boston: Stratford Company, 1930), 60-76. Hilliker, Life and Work, 20. Hilliker, Life and Work, 5. Forbes, 25:620. Von Bulow was an associate of Froebel; see The Autobiography of Fnednch Froebel, Emilie Michaelis and H. Keatley Moore, trans, and ed. (Syracuse: C.W. Bardeen, 1889), 143. Elizabeth Harrison, Sketches Along Life's Road, Carolyn Sherwin Bailey, ed. (Boston: Stratford Company, 1930), 65. Snider, St. Louis Movement, 319. Snider offered lectures on Sophocles the first year, Homer the second, and Herodotus the third. See Snider, St. Louis Movement, 316. Harris lectured at Blow's school after he left St. Louis — even as late as 1887. See also Susan Blow, Letter to William Torrey Harris, March 1887 (specific date unavailable) from Susan Blow Papers, Archives of the Missouri Historical Society, St. Louis. Elizabeth Harrison expressed her surprise at walking into a room of 200 people at her first kindergarten training class. See Harrison, 61. See Hilliker, Blow Family, 16, and Menius, 39. Snider, St. Louis Movement, 295. On Blow's commendations at these expositions, see Leidecker, 375—6. An additional unforeseen outcome of Blow's work was her influence on Frank Lloyd Wright, whose aunts both studied kindergarten theory during this time, although it isn't possible to determine whether they were students under Blow. Perhaps at their suggestion, Wright's mother attended the Philadephia Exposition and was so impressed with the display Blow presented that she adopted Froebelian teaching method and practice. Years later, Wright attributed the development of his spatial abilities as an architect to the influence of the Froebel blocks he played with as a child. See Meryle Secrest, Frank Lloyd Wright (New York: Knopf, 1993), 58-61, 70, 121.

Notes to Chapter 2 26. 27. 28.

29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38.

39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51.

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Louis Soldan, Letter to William Torrey Harris, October 17, 1883, William Torrey Harris Papers, Archives of Missouri Historical Society, St. Louis. Snider, St. Louis Movement, 324. Susan van Ausdal, "Case Study in Educational Innovation: The Public Kindergarten in St. Louis 1870-1900," unpublished dissertation (Southern Illinois University at Edwardsville, July 1985), 237-8. Susan V. Beeson letter to William Torrey Harris, January 14, 1887. Snider, St. Louis Movement, 584; 576-7. Hilliker, Blow Family, 20. Snider, St. Louis Movement, 296. Ibid. 315. Ibid. 297. Ibid. 347. Ibid. 347. Sherman, Letter to Davidson, September 28, 1886, in Thomas Davidson Papers, Sterling Library Archives, Yale University. Snider, St. Louis Movement, 325; Charles M. Perry, "William Torrey Harris and the St. Louis Movement in Philosophy," in William 'Torrey Harris, Edward L. Schaub, ed. (Chicago: Open Court, 1936), 30. Ibid. 349. Ibid. 576, 581-4. William Torrey Harris, introduction to Susan Blow's Commentaries on Froebel's "Mother Play", xv. Ibid. xiii. Blow, Kindergarten Education, 38; Commentaries, 24. Blow, Symbolic, 120. Ibid. 122; 167-9. Ibid. 245-7; Educational Issues, 1-33. Blow, Educational Issues, 6. Blow, Symbolic, 105; She expresses this same idea in Commentaries, 22-3 and Letters, 189. Blow, Educational Issues, 156. Ibid. 336-7. Blow, Symbolic, 104-5; 128.

52. Ibid. 229. 53.

54.

55.

56.

Blow, Letter to James Jackson Putnam, June 10, 1909, James Jackson Putnam Papers, Special Collections, Countway Library, Harvard Medical School, Boston, MA. Friedrich Froebel, The Education of Man, H.N. Hailmann, trans. (New York: D. Appleton, 1885), §49-50, 118-20. [Reprinted by Augustus M. Kelley, New York, 1970.] See Hegel, Philosophy of Right, §§158-80, and Phenomenology of Spirit, §§450-52. Froebel also values the family, but does not discuss it as fully as Hegel does. See Froebel, The Education of Man, §86. Blow, Kindergarten Education, 44.

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57. Ibid. 43-4. 58. Blow, Symbolic, 113-14. 59. Philosophy of Right, §175. As noted by Allen Wood in the modern edition of this work, elsewhere Hegel mentions two German educational theorists by name in regard to this problem: Johann B. Basedow and Joachim H. Campe. See The Philosophy of Right, Allen Wood, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 440. 60. Philosophy of Right, §175, 61. Rosenkranz's theory will be discussed more fully in the next chapter on Anna Brackett who translated his Pedagogik als System, Hegel discusses the importance of classical literature in young adult education in his first Nuremberg address. See Frederic Ludlow Luqueer's translation of Hegel's 1809 Nuremburg address in his Hegel as Educator (New York: Macrnillan, 1896), 157-8. 62. Blow, Symbolic, 40-41. 63. Ibid. 38. 64. Blow, Commentaries, 111. 65. In Blow's words, the self must produce "itself as object and behold... itself in this objectification." See Blow, Commentaries, 8—9. 66. Blow, Commentaries, 6. 67. Ibid. 6. 68. Blow, Educational Issues, xiv. 69. Blow, Letter to James Jackson Putnam, August 1, 1908, Special Collections, Countway Library, Harvard Medical School. 70. Blow, Letter to James Jackson Putnam, May 17, 1908. Blow makes a statement to this same effect in the preface to this book. Educational Issues, xiv.

Chapter 3 Anna Brackett: feminist philosopher-educator

Anna Callender Brackett: an introduction Shortly after her death, Anna Brackett (1836-1911) was described as "one of the most remarkable educators known among women," but her name is unfamiliar today. A quick glance at her achievements shows that her current obscurity is undeserved. She was the first woman in the US to be appointed principal of a secondary school, the St. Louis Normal School in 1863. She was one of very few women to serve as the editor of a professional journal, the Boston-based Journal of Education.3'She authored several articles in both this journal and another by the same name in St. Louis, as well as popular pieces for Harper's Monthly, Century Magazine, and the short-lived St. Louis Ladies' Magazine. Brackett proved herself philosophically as well. She translated the work of Karl Rosenkranz in JSP, and played a major role in the life of the journal, both as a regular contributor and as an editorial assistant to William Torrey Harris. Her translation of Rosenkranz's Pedagogics as a System for JSP appeared as a series of articles in 1872, which she later published in one volume. She also authored original works that expanded on Rosenkranz's theory and applied it to women. "Sex in Education" and the title essay in The Education of American Girls were Brackett's response to arguments against male—female coeducation, which the Association of Collegiate Alumni (now AAUW) commissioned her to edit. Brackett provides a clear case in which theory and practice were united. As principal of the St. Louis Normal School, which was populated by women, Brackett's pedagogical theory informed her feminism and vice versa. Little is known about Brackett's family and childhood. Records show that she was the oldest of five children born to Caroline L. and Samuel E. Brackett, a dry-goods merchant. 3 Like many women of relative privilege, Anna had a good education, attending Mr. Abbot's school, an elite private school in Boston, before she entered the state normal school at Framingham, Massachusetts. ' She taught at Framingham for a few years before moving on to a normal school in Charleston, South Carolina, in 1861. When the Civil War hit, she was forced to return to Boston via St. Louis where she became acquainted with William Torrey Harris and the philosophical movement there. A year and a half later she returned to begin work as the principal of the city's normal school.

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The St. Louis Normal School was young and rather troubled when Brackett assumed responsibility for it. Established in 1857, it was barely up and running before it had to close periodically during the Civil War.8 Shortly after the school re-opened, it had to merge with the high school due to a lack of available leadership and the poor national and regional economy. St. Louis's policy of free education even had to be suspended during this time at all educational levels. By the 1862~3 school year when Brackett arrived, two recent normal school graduates were acting as its interim principal and vice-principal. With Brackett in charge, the school was able to become a separate institution again and its tuition-free policy was re-instated. Brackett effectively ran the St. Louis Normal School for nearly ten years, but increasingly found herself at odds with the school board. The Board's interest in the normal school was primarily pragmatic. It was a training school that was to produce teachers for the grade schools — and quickly — in a city experiencing a population boom. The Board was eager to increase the number of students in the normal school so that the city could train its own teachers, thus attaining educational self-sufficiency. And to some degree the plan worked. The number of normal school graduates each year increased from 10-15 when Brackett first began as principal in 1863 to 30-35 toward the end of her stay in 1872. But due to the typical career path of young women in this era, normal school graduates generally gave up their positions in the public schools when they married or were lured away to other cities where the St. Louis teacher training program was well known and coveted. So despite the increase in teachers in the district schools there was an increased rate of turnover, leaving nearly one hundred teaching positions open each year. Brackett did not have objections to the board's pragmatic view of the role of the normal school. But she did insist that the normal school also had its ownpurpose, distinct from that of any other of the St. Louis schools. As early as 1864, she tried to point out diplomatically that students need to do more than attend the normal school to be fully prepared teachers - they needed to complete their studies: "There seems to exist a belief... that all that is necessary for an appointment as a teacher, is admission to the Normal School." With so many teaching vacancies, many normal students were able to take a fulltime position and begin earning an income, rather than finish their studies. Brackett wanted to prepare teachers for work in the local schools, but she also had a higher aim: to introduce students to the science of education. Normal students needed to know the subject they were teaching as well as "to know the knowing of it." This required that students have a strong base of knowledge — one that was too often lacking in students who entered the normal school. Therefore, Brackett added algebra, geometry, and Latin to

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the normal school curriculum. 13 This made it comparable to a high school education. In 1867, she also strongly urged the school board to require an entrance exam for admission to the school, a proposal that finally gained approval in 1872.

The Normal School — teaching as a prof ession

In Brackett's view, teacher training needed to be more than simply a secondary education. Teaching is a profession, such as law or medicine, that "is developed in the special direction of teaching." 15 In order to distinguish the normal school from the high school, Brackett went beyond simply upgrading the school's curriculum. She fought for changes that make teaching a profession. One such change had important implications, both for teaching as a profession and for the women who pursued it: an increase in the age of admission from 16 to 18 years old. She made her argument on two grounds. First, admission at a young age meant less academically prepared students. As with any other profession, a solid liberal arts education is needed before a person prepares for special study. Second, younger students lacked maturity — intellec tually and otherwise. This made it difficult for them to understand education as a science, the knowing of their own knowledge. In Brackett's words: "The average girl at 16 is only a child, and when she enters the Normal School fresh from Grammar School... she suddenly and unexpectedly finds herself baffled and discouraged" by abstract pedagogical theories. 16 From a feminist standpoint, Brackett's interest in increasing the age of admission had two effects. First, it put women in the teaching profession on an equal intellectual plane with their male counterparts. Under Brackett's plan the normal school became a type of higher education to which women just happen to be attracted, rather than an alternative high school for girls. Teachers got the same education as lawyers, doctors, or theologians. In addition they gained the special knowledge of their chosen field. Second, admitting more mature normal students ensured that educators would not be children themselves, serving as glorified babysitters. Instead, they would enter their field with competence and confidence in their abilities, in the manner worthy of a professional. Keeping in mind the fact that even the strong-minded Susan Blow volunteered her time as director of the St. Louis kindergarten program, it is clear that Brackett's repeated call for professionalizing education was no small step. There would be no more "little lady in the classroom" if Brackett had her way. It took Brackett four years to convince the school board to implement this one change - nearly half the period of time that she worked in the St. Louis schools. She first called for an age increase in 1867, but it was not implemented until 1871. 17

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Harris, idealism, and teaching method

In the early 1860s Brackett experimented with a pedagogical theory developed in Oswego, New York, called "objects lessons." The theory involved simple observation of an object and reflection on its characteristics, in contrast to the common reading and recitation method that was the norm in classrooms at that time. This might involve inquiring into its composition, potential uses, or contrasts in appearance with other objects. It could be a natural or a manufactured object, as long as it stimulated student inquiry. Brackett was convinced of the value of object lessons at first. "Some teaching of this kind should be found in all schools," she said, as it "possesses a power of awakening and interesting which no mere book recitation can have."18 By 1868, however, it became "a serious question . . . how much of this system of teaching we shall adopt in our training school."19 Whence the shift? In her 1868 report to the school board, Brackett indicated that "object lessons" were dangerous pedagogically because they relied too heavily on empirical data. Brackett agreed with Blow that empirical teaching methods can help very young children learn about the world around them. After all, Froebel's "gifts" and "occupations" made ordinary objects and activities into learning tools. Yet the issue for Blow was that sense objects are a means to an end, not an end in themselves. The end of empirically based teaching method is to help children discern the physical properties of common objects so they can learn to recognize relations between objects. This will increase their powers of sense perception, their comprehension of the forces governing the material world and, ultimately, their intuition of speculative truths. Blow believed an over-reliance on sense objects, however, to be detrimental to children. She disapproved of one overzealous follower of Pestalozzi, for example, who cited a list of forty-six foods that a kindergarten child should be able to identify by taste or smell — presumably because he believed this test a valuable indicator of learning. But in Blow's view this exercise did little more than "assail the nostrils of infancy with a bewildering variety of perfumes and stenches."20 Brackett agreed with Blow that a method that is dependent on empirical information fails students, because it considers objects before concepts, words before ideas. According to the American idealist pedagogical project, it is a mistake to remain within the realm of sense objects in classroom instruction. Children and youth cannot comprehend single objects in isolation, but instead need a conceptual framework, a system of relations, in which to fit these objects. Object lessons gave children no means by which to make connections between isolated facts and events: they were expected to analyze before making the needed syntheses that would make this analysis possible. The method lacked "true generalizing power," a detriment to students that would lead to arbitrariness in teaching methods.

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Not surprisingly, Harris also had reservations about the object method, discussing its dangers in his superintendent's report to the board the same year. Harris charged that the method "completely inverts the relation of the knower to the known," and that schools needed to teach students to be "free . .. from the thralldom of the senses and arrive at clear reflection and comprehensive reasoning." 22 Incorporating an attack on Pestalozzian theory into his discussion, Harris clearly had no tolerance for object lessons. In contrast, Brackett was more moderate in her critique, recognizing the validity of object lessons, on occasion and in small doses. She also believed that normal school students should be made familiar with its methods, as well as its limits. William Torrey Harris became superintendent of the St. Louis schools at roughly the halfway point of Brackett's tenure as normal school principal from 1867 on. The two worked closely and held the same vision for normal education. Harris recognized the distinction between the normal school and other secondary schools and he recognized Brackett's effective leadership of the school. He also echoed Brackett's insistence that teaching requires management and leadership skills that need to be taught, "not merely theoretically, but as a sort of second nature - a feeling, an instinct, which will not rest content until it has brought order out of chaos."24 Along with Brackett, Harris favored the coeducation of boys and girls. In 1867 Brackett and her lifelong companion, Ida Eliot, accompanied Harris to a lecture in Boston where he shocked his audience by declaring that coeducation was both natural and necessary, in part because gender distinctions were vanishing. Soldan and normal school ideals

Brackett resigned as principal of the normal school shortly after curriculum changes were enacted despite her opposition. Her letter of resignation only thinly veiled her anger and included a word of caution: "The history of normal schools [in large cities] . . . will go to show .. . that unless very carefully guarded they have been gradually destroyed as distinctive schools." Her words proved to be prophetic. Years later, the normal school was subsumed into the high school under Louis Soldan, Brackett's immediate successor as principal. By all accounts, Soldan had an agreeable personality, but Brackett held bitter feelings toward him after her departure. Just over a month after her resignation, she asked Davidson to convey a message for her: Tell Mr. Soldan when you see him that I have not forgotten my promise to go to the Normal School for him but have not time now except on Saturday when they are not in session — alas! how can I fulfill my promise then? 27

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Writing from New York, where she and Eliot had begun setting up a private girls' school, she clearly would have been unable to make this one-day engagement. Over a year later, alluding to another change to the normal school that she disagreed with she quipped, "Mr. Soldan must be well satisfied."28

On "womanly qualities" Brackett's 1866 assertion that teaching requires not simply training but professional education demonstrates how closely connected her normal school theory was to her feminism. Teaching is a profession, on a par with other professions; therefore, the normal school had a unique educational purpose that paralleled other professional schools: No other can take its place or do its work, any more than a medical school can teach law, or a theological seminary, medicine. We are required, not only to cultivate all womanly qualities and to develop mental, moral, and physical powers, but beyond this, to call out and train certain qualities of mind indispensable to a good teacher; and regulations and methods are needed for this end, which would be out of place in a High or Grade School. Once again, Brackett insisted that teaching be taken seriously. But why is this significant from a feminist point of view? Even at this point in educational history, teaching was a female-dominated profession. Brackett knew this and was aware of the gender bias that negatively impacted teacher education. So, while she did speak of cultivating "all womanly qualities" in teachers, unlike many of her contemporaries, she did not believe that women, by nature, were better suited for teaching than for other professions. In today's terms, Brackett would be a "liberal" rather than a "maternal" feminist. Even though Brackett here invokes the term "womanly qualities" and later even concedes that teaching can be an apprenticeship for domestic life, her primary convictions did not lie with promoting women's difference from men, or in nineteenth-century terms, women's sphere. Instead, Brackett's view was that women are essentially the same as men, but their social roles have restricted them in certain ways. Therefore, she was a pragmatist regarding women in the workforce. Women had certain characteristics that benefited them in their work as educators: compassion and the ability to encourage and nurture students, for example. They also brought to their educational work certain weaknesses — sentimentalism, over-subjectivity, and an inability to relate to both students and colleagues in a businesslike manner.31 Yet Brackett's view these strengths and weaknesses were not due to anything

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innate in women's nature, but resulted from force of habit. And she said as much before her colleagues at the National Education Association (NEA). In her 1872 address to the NEA, Brackett discussed teaching as a femaledominated profession. She gave statistics showing that women outnumbered men in the profession two to one. Further, she predicted that this trend would continue in the future - even in secondary and higher education. She also noted that women had been extremely successful in the field, claiming that in the states in which women made up the overwhelming majority of educators, the quality of education was the highest. But Brackett also recognized that women needed to receive more training in the management and decisionmaking skills required of them as teachers — skills that men took for granted. While a young man had been taught self-reliance, a young woman found that when she became a teacher she was "forced, for probably the first time, upon her own responsibility, able to shelter herself behind no one from the consequences of her own actions." With training and practice, the obstacles that women faced because they had been sheltered so much of their lives could be overcome/ In fact, in the same address Brackett noted that women were increasingly managing not only classrooms but entire schools, and quite successfully at that, an indication that they did possess administrative ability.36 Here we see Brackett's tendency toward the "liberal" rather than the "maternal" branch of feminism. Women may have needed to do extra work to get up to speed with men and join the workforce, as teachers or in some other capacity, but they could attain the same level of success. The only "difference" between men and women for Brackett was that women were so unused to having professional responsibilities that, in order to compete with men, they had to abide by rules they were unfamiliar with. Such rules seemed strict and inflexible to women at first, yet it is in the students' best interest to require that they abide by such rules: [because of] the immense advantage to a woman, as to a man, of an independent self-supporting occupation, no one can more strongly desire [than I do] .. . that every young girl . . . shall be afforded the opportunity of [employment] in so honorable a position as that of a teacher . . . and that she shall not be sent back home, a dependent on the work of others. 37 In the end, for Brackett women have the same characteristics as men - they "are wonderfully alike, after all."38 Clearly reconfiguring the Hegelian idea that women were innately meant to be bound to hearth and home, she wanted women to have the same opportunities as men, so they could reap the same benefits as men did when they left the safety of home and family as young adults to become active members of the public realm — i.e., civil society. Women simply needed to develop the same habits as men in order to get there.

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As previously noted, women were not formally considered members of the St. Louis Philosophical Society, even though many attended meetings regularly, and women's presence at Society meetings was not always recorded with accuracy. But Brackett "took a leading part in the activities of St. Louis, being an active member of the Kant Club, and was one of the most aggressive leaders in the philosophical debates."39 She is mentioned just twice in the Society's record book, once at a lecture by Amos Bronson Alcott, which she later reported on in the Commonwealth, and a second time as the only woman among twenty-six "subscribers" to an upcoming lecture by Ralph Waldo Emerson in St. Louis. Emerson was impressed by Brackett, who reminded him of Margaret Fuller, his friend and one of America's first truly feminist thinkers. Her contribution to the fund to bring him to St. Louis speaks of both her financial independence and her commitment to the work of the Society. "A most vigorous suffragist," Brackett was a member of the first organization in the nation established solely to promote women's voting rights, the Missouri Woman's Suffrage Association (1867—86). The region's most prominent women's rights leaders — Rebecca Hazard, Phoebe Couzins, and Virginia Minor - were members of this organization, as were both men and women in the St. Louis movement — Mary Beedy, Thomas Davidson, Amelia Fruchte, William Torrey Harris, and Louis Soldan..40Brackett was involved in the St. Louis Woman's Club, whose statement of purpose was revolutionary at the time: [To recognize] the value of the frequent interchange of thought and experience among women, [and to] associate ourselves for mutual improvement and a more thorough statement of all questions vital to the interest of Woman. The Woman's Club began with a focus on domestic life, proposing options such as cooperative housekeeping. Later its discussions centered on themes regarding public life, such as women's role in maintaining peace, the right of married women to work in the schools, and the need for female guardians in women's prisons and asylums. Brackett addressed the Woman's Club at least once, presenting a paper on Margaret Fuller that was also published in the Radical in December 1871. The tone of this address suggests that feminist sensibilities among the Club's membership must have been fairly well developed, because Brackett opens her lecture with forceful language about social expectations of women: It is not necessary for one who speaks of Margaret Fuller to defend her from any charge of weakness or want of power. The charge comes from the other

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quarter, as it does usually to any woman who, by outward circumstance or inner choice, is forced to show . . . the energy of a full life.... No one doubted her courage, or firmness, or faithfulness, or patience; but they said she was "masculine" and then there was no more to be said . . .

Return to the East Coast Brackett's St. Louis years ended on something of a sour note, due to her disagreement with the school board about the proper way to educate teachers at the normal school. Shortly after moving to New York City in 1872, Brackett published an edited volume entitled The Education of American Girls, This book brought her to the attention of the editors of the New England Journal of Education, which led to her position as the journal's New York editor. She began publishing articles on women's issues in popular journals at this time as well. As early as 1874, she began convincing her good friend Davidson to move to the East Coast as well. She let him know about potential job openings, wrote him letters of introduction, offered suggestions for gaining an audience for public speaking engagements, and spoke to prominent people on his behalf — including Oliver Wendell Holmes, Sr.44 By 1879, she had succeeded. Davidson relocated to New York and was involved in the cultural and intellectual life of the city until his death in 1899. In New York, Brackett opened a private school for girls with Ida Eliot, which provided instruction to thirty to forty students at all age levels in its first year. She thoroughly enjoyed this new educational venture. The school, she said, was "a wonderful success, far surpassing our most sanguine expectations," a success that "amazes everyone, ourselves included."4J Over fifty years later, Brackett was still remembered for holding such high educational standards that students in her school's preparatory program were automatically admitted to Vassar College. Perhaps more importantly for Brackett's sense of well-being at the time, the school in New York was a much-needed change — both for her and for Eliot, her long-time companion.

"Miss E. and I" Ida Eliot's role in Brackett's life merits attention, because the two were almost certainly domestic partners. Brackett and Eliot shared housing when both were in St. Louis, and they regularly attended social events together. When Brackett resigned from the St. Louis Normal School, Eliot, her vice-principal, also resigned and joined her in New York to open the girls' school. Wrhile in New York, the two shared a home and vacationed together in New Hampshire

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and Vermont. In addition, many of Brackett's references to Eliot regularly included her as one would include a spouse. Commenting on the quarters they shared in St. Louis, Brackett quipped, "our room is our castle," the new house in New York was "our house," and the school, "our school." Brackett's poem "Very Simple" (reproduced in Kendall, p. 14) provides further evidence that she had a committed, romantic relationship with Eliot: How did I know that she loved me? I opened the door And sunlight flashed o'er and o'er: Sudden it broke Before I spoke From forehead, and eyes, and trembling lips, From even the delicate finger-tips That she laid in my hand so free. How did I know that I loved her? I opened the door, And music throbbed through me o'er and o'er Sudden it woke, Before I spoke, In head, and heart and bewildered brain, So sweet, so sweet, it was almost pain, As I gave my hand to her. Brackett also adopted and raised two children with Eliot, Hope (b. 1770) and Bertha (b. 1775/6). In letters to Davidson, Brackett proudly announced the addition of Hope into their life together: "We have, i.e., Miss Eliot and I, adopted a little protege of Miss E's — a little girl now three years old ... our little Daisy . . . [whose] real name is Hope." And perhaps only half jokingly, she told Davidson that she wanted him to teach Greek to the child before she learned any other foreign language. Brackett and Eliot ensured that Hope got a good education at their school, then sent her to the University of Michigan to study, where she boarded with Eliza Sunderland's family. They chose Michigan because both firmly believed that the coeducation of the sexes was important, despite the fact that they educated only girls at their own school. Unfortunately, no information is available about their choice of a school for Bertha's higher education. Brackett lived in New York and maintained a summer home in Stowe, Vermont, until her death in 1911. A group of former students established a scholarship in her name through the Association of Collegiate Alumni, now the American Association of University Women (AAUW). Today the scholarship

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has been subsumed under AAUW's grants and fellowships program - an apt tribute to a woman who not only advanced women's educational opportunity, but promulgated the feminist theory that established the basis for that opportunity as well.

Brackett's philosophical feminism Once Brackett's St. Louis period was behind her, she quickly moved on from her normal school work to explicating her understanding of idealism in terms of feminism — and vice versa. In fact, by 1874 she had published her edited work, The Education of American Girls, in which her own long essay by the same name appeared, an essay which applied Rosenkranz's theory of education to girls and women in particular. She also authored another essay in the same work, "Sex in Education," in which she debunked a number of theories about the dangers of coeducation. But before reviewing this aspect of Brackett's thought, it is important to locate her on the intellectual map, as such, and to review the source and nature of her idealism. As noted earlier, Brackett had returned east before the St. Louis circle began its most in depth work on Hegel in 1874. However, she certainly was exposed to Hegel's thought before this, as over a dozen translations of selections of his writings appeared in JSP in the first five volumes alone — from the Phenomenology and the larger Logic to the Philosophy of History and the Proptedeutic. Furthermore, she was familiar with other German idealists, such as Fichte and Schelling, as well as with the work of commentators on each of these thinkers: James Hutchinson Stirling, Franz Hoffman, A. Vera, and — most important for this discussion — Karl F. Rosenkranz; for each of these men also contributed to JSP and/or corresponded with Harris and his colleagues.

A defense of idealism The first evidence of Brackett's acquaintance with Hegel in her published works is an 1871 article in JSP, "An Analysis of an Article on Hegel," in which she summarizes J.E. Cabot's defense of idealism, published in 1868 in the North American Review. " This article has its strengths and provides us with insights into the development of Brackett's thought. For instance, Brackett gives a listing of the major topics that Cabot covers. She then paraphrases or provides long quotations to explain specific points of his argument. Finally, this brief review also reads as an endorsement of Cabot's views, which in turn are very much in support of Hegelian idealism. However, although it would be

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rewarding to be able to say that Brackett offers profound insights and greatly illuminates the thought of one of her contemporaries, this is not the case. This article stops short of "analysis" in any real sense of that term. Yet, depending on the extent of control William Torrey Harris exercised as editor of JSP, this may have been all that Brackett was expected to do. Whatever the reason for the brevity of this article, unfortunately, it is not philosophically significant, nor is it as ambitious as her other works in educational theory. Pedagogics as a system

Brackett's real effort was channeled into translating and expanding on Rosenkranz, Hegel's younger contemporary and disciple, who applied Hegel's philosophy to education. Rosenkranz's Pddagogik als System first appeared in English in JSP as a series of articles, beginning in 1872. The system is itself Hegelian in style, outlined as a triad with each member then also being broken down into threes. Part one explains the "general idea" of education in terms of (1) its nature, (2) its form, and (3) its limits. Part two addresses the "special elements" of education as (1) physical, (2) intellectual, and (3) moral.50 Finally, in part three Rosenkranz discusses at length the "particular systems" of education as (1) national, (2) theocratic, and (3) humanitarian. Brackett translated the entire work in volumes six through eight of JSP.35 But in her paraphrase of it five years later she omitted part three — a Hegel-style philosophical-historical analysis of the various types of education and their manifestations within different cultures and epochs which would have been of little use to educational practitioners in the field. The Pedagogics was really an early text in cognitive development. Infants and young children are in the "perceptive" or "intuitive" stage of cognition. A child's thinking is "concealed from him, because it is unconscious." [§84, JSP15:38] Formal education by nature is very limited at this stage, because intuitive learning is almost entirely based on outside forces. [§84, JSP15:39] In line with the educational theory that Blow was exploring at this time, Rosenkranz noted that educators should allow time for play at this stage, because play is a sort of material-gathering activity children use to gain knowledge of the world. [§84, JSP15:38] Children aged 6 to 12 are in the "conceptual" stage, and begin to identify and classify objects of perception, combine perceptions into objects of imagination, and understand abstract signs and symbols. [§91, JSP15:43] Reading is an essential component of education at this stage, and literature plays the same role here that play does for younger children. Adventure, myth, and travel stories take the child out of himself or herself to places unknown. This fosters a sense of his or her own "otherness" in the world and builds appreciation for a world outside of the self.

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The final stage - applicable to teenagers and young adults — is the thinking stage in which "the mind attains a sort of universality, for it is [no longer] bounded or limited by any definite present object." [§100, JSP15:50] A student is now in his or her "logical epoch," able to see necessary connections within universal ideas. [§100, JSP15:50] This is the work of the true Thinking Activity that Rosenkranz believed to be the pinnacle of education. Even though Rosenkranz's stages interrelate as a hierarchy, the "lower" stages are never annihilated, but are subsumed into the next. And in this regard Rosenkranz is very much like Hegel. Furthermore, at every stage of the cognitive process, perception, conception, and thinking are constantly in play. The mature thinker may be more able to inform his or her perception wdth pure thought, but perception still plays a vital role in the development of knowledge. This is likely the reason Brackett continued to incorporate the Object Lesson method into her teaching in St. Louis to a degree. It is only a naive empiricism that Brackett objected to as an idealist, one that assumes that unmediated perceptions are possible. As Rosenkranz made clear, there is no reason to dismiss empirical teaching methods altogether. Feminist pedagogics

Brackett made some important feminist innovations to the idealism she was immersed in with her colleagues in St. Louis. She considered women thoroughly capable of reaching the highest levels of cognitive development, whereas Hegel did not. Hegel actually claimed that "women can ... be educated, but their minds are not adapted to the higher sciences, philosophy, or certain of the arts." This would mean that women are incapable of being educated beyond Rosenkranz's conceptual stage. But any inabilities to compete intellectually that women displayed was simply a result of poor education in Brackett's view. Along with Rosenkranz, Brackett assumed equality of the sexes in cognitive development. The result was her long essay in the edited volume by the same name, "The Education of American Girls." Brackett published The Education of American Girls in 1874 and, in a letter to Davidson, indicated that she was excited about the project. Updating him on a number of new developments in her life, seemingly hastily she wrote, " — have agreed with a NY publisher to edit a woman's book on Girls' Education."54 In this work, she collected essays from members of the female intelligentsia of the day, three of whom were also associated with the idealist movement: Mary Beedy, St. Louis public school teacher and Philosophical Society participant; Ednah D. Cheney, lecturer on aesthetics at the Concord School; and Caroline H. Dall, literary figure and member of the American Social Science Association, of which Harris was secretary. As noted earlier, Brackett wrote two of the essays in this volume, a piece on sex and education, as well as the title essay.

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The latter is for the most part an application of Rosenkranz's pedagogical theory to women and girls. In The Education of American Girls, Brackett observes that generally a young girl is guided through the "perceptive" stage of Rosenkranz's system. She then moves to the "conceptual" stage, beginning to see objects in their relations to each other, and developing her power of imagination. These first two steps of the learning process are foundational, and in Brackett's view no girl can excel later in life without having attained them. However, an education that stops at the conceptual stage is inadequate. Yet this was generally the case for women at this time. They were given a solid primary and adequate secondary education, but after this their education screeched to a halt: The cause of the trouble lies, not in their nature, but in their education, [which] is proved by the fact that wherever women have received a thorough training these "charming and bewildering" feminine characteristics . . . are not found. 5 The solution is to ensure that women are thoroughly educated. Undereducated and untrained in abstract thinking, women would indeed become the arbitrary and capricious creatures that Hegel warned of, if - heaven forbid! - they were to become active in public affairs. Well educated, women were fully capable of being teachers or leaders in any field of their choosing. Girls and thefamily circle As a follower of both Rosenkranz and Hegel, Brackett understood the importance of the home, and thus of the family, in educating children in their earliest years. Both of these thinkers saw the family as an organic relation based on natural bonds of love and mutual affection between parent and child. Thus the nature of family life is such that its members do not have a distinct and separate existence, but are a unity that has unified aims and interests. Therefore members of a family need not petition for "rights" or compete with each other for status or esteem. Brackett agreed that the love and nurture an individual receives within the family is indispensable. The education the family provides is also essential to growth and development. But while she didn't question the HegelRosenkranz idealization of the role of the family, she did make a feminist amendment to it. Namely, she pointed out that, because girls are often confined to only the family circle, their intellectual and moral development suffers. They do not get the chance to assert their independence or to compete with others in order to gain the confidence and skills needed to succeed in public life. Young men, on the other hand, enter into civil society, the realm in

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which, as Hegel observed, individuals are separated from the family, thus becoming independent persons.57 Without the chance to test themselves outside the confines of home and family, girls face two dangers. First, they may grow to be ineffective in the public realm and reinforce the stereotype of the incompetent woman. Second, and of more danger to their personal wellbeing, they are vulnerable to exploitation by others. This argument is at the heart of Brackett's call for coeducation, especially in the teenage and young adult years. She noted that opposition to coeducation, "implied [more] than appears on the surface; for, in reality, co-education and higher education for women are almost synonymous terms."5 Coeducation helps women as well as men achieve the American ideal of individual self-determination. Sex and education

Women's delicate health and emotional fragility were invoked in the nineteenth century as justification for denying them educational and employment opportunities. Brackett addresses this argument full force on more than one occasion. In one case, she explicitly objected to Rosenkranz's claim that physical education was not important for girls. In both the translation and paraphrase of his Pedagogics Brackett renders Rosenkranz's words similarly: Gymnastics are not so essential for girls. In its place, dancing is sufficient, and gymnastics should be employed for them only where there exists any special weakness or deformity, when [exercise] may be used as a restorative 5 or preservative. They are not to become Amazons. In the translation, Brackett lets this comment pass, but in her paraphrase, she does not remain silent on this matter. 60 This is not surprising, as Brackett is said to have been a rather accomplished equestrian, and in her popular writings she advocated improvements in women's health and physical fitness generally. Here she addressed the issue head on, following Rosenkranz's objectionable statement with her own feminist commentary, which she placed in brackets in order to distinguish it from the main text: The German idea of a woman's whole duty - to knit, to sew, and to obey implicitly - is perhaps accountable for what Rosenkranz here says of exercise as regards girls. We, however, who know that the most frequent direct cause of debility and suffering in our young women is simply and solely a want of muscular strength, may be pardoned for dissenting from his opinion, and for suggesting that dancing is not a sufficient equivalent for the more violent games of their brothers. We do not fear to render them

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Amazons by giving them more genuine and systematic exercise, both physically and intellectually.61 Brackett's essay "Sex in Education" was a response to a recent work by an anti-feminist contemporary, and provides a fairly extensive commentary on women's role and rights. In Sex and Education, or A fair chance for the girls, Harvard medical school professor Edward H. Clarke warned that coeducation posed dangers to women's health and well-being.62 In her response, Brackett shared the feminist frustrations of a number of first-wave feminists, insisting that "woman is not merely a 'cradle'." In fact, To God, the brain of a woman is as precious as the ovary and uterus, and as he did not make it impossible for her to think clearly when the uterus is in a congested state . . . no more did he design that the uterus should not be capable of healthy and normal action while the brain is occupied with a regular 6 amount of exercise.6 So then, although women's reproductive capacity may have been ordained by God, their intellectual ability was also part of his design: the two need not mutually exclude each other. Furthermore, women's physical difference from men is not meant to set them apart from men as rational agents in the world. In this way, Brackett demonstrates that in today's terms she would be more aptly termed a liberal than a maternal feminist, because she states quite clearly that women's reproductive function does not, and was not meant, to limit them. Strains of Brackett's idealism show themselves in this discussion in that she presents the person as a unified whole with aims and purposes beyond their physicality, which naturally imposes certain limits on them — regardless of their sex. Again, she rejects a view of women that relegates them to "merely so many material organs." The implication here, of course, is that, for many traditionalists, women's concrete, physical existence constitutes the whole of their existence. But for Brackett, women's intellectual/spiritual nature must also factor into "the woman question." In this sense, Brackett is engaged in another version of her arguments against hyper-empiricism, objections that she voiced during her normal school period. The issue under consideration is different, but the underlying philosophical reasoning is the same: women are not to be seen simply as physical entities in the world, functioning as "cradles," as Brackett puts it. Instead, their bodies are to be seen as physical manifestations of the spiritual being that is at the core of each woman's selfhood. The body is important, to be sure; but the body isn't all that there is to any particular women's existence in the world. The debate about female physiology and the accompanying need to protect women's health points to another matter that Brackett addresses: women's

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control over their own health and well-being. Even if women's health is put in jeopardy by increased activity in the public sphere (a claim that Brackett rejects), the solution to the problem should be determined by women, not men. By contemporary feminist standards, her stance on this issue is quite tame. Yet a full forty years before women's health activists like Margaret Sanger began their work, Brackett defines women's health as a gender issue. She notes that while men generally agree with Dr. Clarke's claims, women "condemn [them], denying his premises, disproving his clinical evidence ... and protesting against his conclusions."64 The discrepancy between men's and women's perspectives on this matter, however, has its root, not in mere speculation by women, but in facts that they themselves have gathered, both in personal experience and in the medical field. And in Brackett's view, it is only appropriate that this should be the case: "This is a woman's question [and] women themselves are the only persons capable of dealing with it." 6 When a girl begins to experience "great excitation of the imagination" at puberty, Brackett maintains that it is "the duty of the mother, who is in this department the proper educator, to speak earnestly, fully, and plainly to the girl of the mysterious process of reproduction." 66 In a sort of inverse parallel to her discussion of the over-valuing of women's bodies over their minds, Brackett notes here that focusing on sexual education is not equivalent to "quit[ting] the physical for the moral side" of girls' education. Rather, it is simply to encourage a valuing of the body as a part of the whole, because sexual education is the "ground where, more than any other, body and soul, matter and spirit, touch each other." By pointing to the intersection of mind with body in this way, Brackett hopes to prevent the neglect of the first and the denigration of the second. Once mothers accept their daughters' sexual education as part of their maternal duty, girls will be fully educated, and thus show "less prudery and 6 more real modesty."6 Yet modesty (which for Brackett is more like selfpossession and self-respect than shyness about one's sexuality) is an important character trait that all girls should develop. In fact, she speaks of the dangers to girls who lack the necessary self-possession and confidence in themselves. One example in particular is the damage that results when young women are too devoted to an older man. On first reading, Brackett seems to be little more than the typical repressive Victorian, fearful of anything that hints at sexual attraction. Yet a closer look shows that she is both critiquing feminine naivete and condemning sexually manipulative men - what today might even qualify as sexual harassment. There are many men in middle life against whose character no whisper has ever dared to raise itself, men of culture and power, men of strong personal "magnetism" . . . who often attract the most idolatrous admiration

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of young girls and young women. They may do this at first unconsciously; but they are pleased by it finally, and seem to enjoy being surrounded, as it were, by a circle of young incense-bearers.69 The fellows who attract such an entourage may see no harm in it, and the casual observer may agree. But for Brackett, this sort of interaction with women too young to determine their own path, yet too old to be satisfied with girlish occupations, results in real damage to the admirer. Brackett's language is quaint, but the reality she expresses is a contemporary one. Young women's spirit is only "half-conscious and just awakening" in this time of life; they are vulnerable and full of a longing that they do not understand. Brackett recognizes that it is normal for people in this stage of life to try to find an outlet for their half-conscious desires, but this can become damaging when a girl is drawn to this sort of man. She becomes unable to exercise the self-possession that Brackett so highly values, as the adored older man's influence over her reduces her to "a most unnatural and morbid state." 7 Brackett fails to describe exactly what happens to a young lady when she falls into this "morbid state." Yet it no doubt includes everything from forlorn sighs of unrequited love on the family veranda to sexual self-surrender to a man who wields his influence over her. Based on the tone of Brackett's discussion, I do not think it is overreaching to suggest it is the latter. What she addresses here (albeit in overly polite Victorian terms) is emotional manipulation at best, sexual coercion at worst. After all, Brackett does not say that the man's character is good, only that no one has questioned it — or has dared to question it. In addition, today's feminists have a whole host of terms and concepts to call on that Brackett was not at liberty to invoke. She describes a man with a sort of "magnetism" who simply is not aware of his own seductive power. Today's feminists might see him as a man quite aware of his power and even more willing to exploit it. Brackett describes the young women as spontaneously and voluntarily being drawn to this man. Contemporary feminists might see women who are unable to do anything other than "volunteer" to submit to his advances. Because of Brackett's restraint, it would be folly to speculate further than this as to her meaning. We can safely say, however, that, largely because the women she is concerning herself with are young and inexperienced, and therefore lacking in full agency, she believed that the responsibility lay on the man to defuse the situation. A truly respectable man would not allow such attractions to develop. Instead he would "by the force of loyalty to the simple Right, persistently and quietly. .. and effectually repel, all such tribute."The man who does not decline the attentions of young women, on the other hand "is responsible for much harm, and must answer for much unhappiness."71 But, again, while the man with the magnetic personality bears responsibility for his actions, ultimately the solution lies in education. First, a mother

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must adequately teach her daughter, not only about the mechanics of reproduction, but about the emotional side of sexuality as well. If a girl "can go fearlessly to her mother with all her thoughts and fancies, foolish though they be ... she is as safe ... as if fenced about with triple walls of steel." It is refreshing to note that Brackett seems to have carried out precisely this policy with her own daughters. While Hope was boarding with Eliza Sunderland's family, Brackett made it clear that she was "not ignorant about the birth of children," because she had all of her questions answered "from a very young age" and "withouthesitation."1'3' Brackett also held that a girl's education must be wide-ranging. Both her family and her teachers must help her build confidence in herself and her abilities. Then she will be less vulnerable to influence by others and will not be in danger of falling prey to those whom she sees as stronger than herself: Make her feel that she is a responsible being, accountable only to God and her own rational judgment for her action ... give her such a mental training that she shall feel that she is capable of taking her life in her own hand. 74 In Brackett's view, in everything — from the earliest recognition of objects in infancy to the most complex of human relationships in adulthood - education is key. For women, the acquisition of knowledge has added import: it both frees individual women from their social constraints and brings women together in common cause: "One result is marked; from all sections of the country, women heretofore knowing each other only by reputation, or not at all, are being bound together by a common interest in a sense never before known ..." ^ Achieving unity among women is a theme that runs throughout Brackett's career on both the practical and theoretical levels. In her normal school work and theory, as an NEA member, as a suffrage advocate, and in her writings, Brackett continually worked to heighten women's professional status, to impress upon women the importance of seeking goals of their own, and to encourage women to encourage and support each other — as professionals, and more importantly as full human beings.

Conclusion Many feminists in this period shared Brackett's concerns about women's role in society. So in some sense, she could be seen as simply one member of a movement whose work was consistent with that of other liberal feminists of the nineteenth century. However, Brackett was not a feminist activist, but a feminist theorist. Furthermore, her solidly philosophical base makes her work one of the better examples of early feminist theory.76

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Brackett's feminism informed her philosophy and vice versa. In her view, the clearly directed intellect could attain knowledge and thereby participate in Spirit's unfolding in the world. This has many implications for a Hegelian, of course, not the least of which is that, educated to the "logical" stage, the stage of true "Thinking," the individual is no longer bound to the merely sensible. This in turn means that he or she is able to conceive of Right, and thus can be a truly ethical member of society. But as Brackett was well aware, often women could not participate in the process of attaining the knowledge necessary to become ethical in this sense. Therefore, she posited a theory of her own, specifically for and about women. Adhering firmly to her liberal feminist beliefs, Brackett demonstrated that, given the same educational opportunities, women could attain the same levels of understanding as men, and participate just as fully in the social order. This is Brackett's contribution to the St. Louis movement. By translating Rosenkranz, a disciple who aimed to accurately present Hegel's pedagogical theory, she provided the closest facsimile possible of Hegel's own educational theory. Her translations were widely read and reissued several times. Thus educators throughout the US were exposed to the Hegelian notion of individual knowledge as part of a greater, spiritual process that is the ground of all possible knowledge. But by applying this theory to women, Brackett established the theoretical basis for dissolving educational barriers to women. Women came to be seen as fully capable of initiation into this intellectualspiritual process. They too were able to become active members of civil society and even of the state. The rather dusty and un-feminist notions that Brackett should have derived from Hegel about women's deficiencies were left aside. In their stead were her own very feminist, very equitable ideas about women's right to education. This is what Brackett and her St. Louis colleagues agreed was the only form that a responsible idealist educational theory could take. Brackett introduced her readers to precisely this feminist idealism. Her colleagues Grace Bibb and Ellen Mitchell shared her views.

Notes 1. Notable Women of St. Louis, 70. 2. Missouri Historical Review, 5:187; 34:237. 3. Maria Francis Lundgren, "Anna Callender Brackett: Editor, Essayist, Poet," Iowa State University master's thesis, 1989, 14. 4. This publication was edited 1870-71 by Mary Nolan and Christine Smith, neither of whom seem to have had connections with the St. Louis Philosophical Movement. Brackett contributed an article for what was probably a regular

Notes to Chapter 3

5.

6.

7. 8. 9.

10. 11. 12. 13.

14.

15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24.

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feature entitled "Woman and Work" in one of the two copies I was able to locate (perhaps the only copies extant). The family had enough resources to hire a woman from Ireland as a household servant, a practice not uncommon for members of the middle class in that era. This and other information about Brackett's family is from Boston City Directories, 1838-42 and the US Census, Boston, MA, 1850. Register of the State Normal School, 1839—89, Framingham State College, from Archives and Special Collections, Whittemore Library, Framingham State College. See also Edith Kendall, Anna C, Brackett, In Memoriam (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1915), 1. "Superintendent's Report," St. Louis Public School Annual Report, June 1863. "Principal's Report," St. Louis Public School Annual Report, 1869, 34—5. The interim co-principals were Sarah Platt and Ann Forsyth. See "Principal's Report," St. Louis Public School Annual Report, 1869, 35-6, and "Superintendent's Report," 1863. See also, "Principal's Report," St. Louis Public School Annual Report, 1872, 39 and "Principal's Report," St. Louis Public School Annual Report, 1864, 23. "Superintendent's Report," St. Louis Public School Annual Report, 1866, 15-16. "Principal's Report," St. Louis Public School Annual Report, 1864, 23. Journal of Education (St. Louis), vol. 3, no. 6 (1871) p. 4. Geometry was added and textbook changes made in 1864; Latin was added in 1868. See "Principal's Report," St. Louis Public School Annual Report, 1864, 22 and 1868, 19. It is possible that entrance exams were introduced prior to 1872, but not reported. See Brackett's discussion of entrance exams in "Principal's Report," St. Louis Public School Annual Reports, 1867, 20 and 1872, 34. "Principal's Report," St. Louis Public School Annual Report, 1871, 52. "Principal's Report," St. Louis Public School Annual Report, 1869, 40-41. See "Principal's Report," St. Louis Public School Annual Report, 1867, 21 and 1871, 49, respectively. "Principal's Report," St. Louis Public School Annual Report, 1864, 24. "Principal's Report," St. Louis Public School Annual Report, 1868, 21-2. See Susan Blow, Letters to a Mother, 194. "Principal's Report," St. Louis Public School Annual Report, 1868, 25-6. "Superintendent's Report," St. Louis Public School Annual Report, 1868,90,94. Harris's full discussion of Object Lessons runs from 90-95 of this annual report. "Principal's Report," St. Louis Public School Annual Report, 1868, 26. In 1867 Harris proposed that a state normal school be established, and by 1870 an agreement had been made with the University of Missouri at Columbia, which established a normal school in 1872. Grace Bibb was the first woman dean of the University's normal school and the only woman to hold this position for the school's first one hundred years. For more on Harris's agreement with Brackett on the purpose of normal school education, see Leidecker, 295-6 and "Superintendent's Report," St. Louis Public School Annual Report, 1870, especially page 42.

94 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32.

33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40.

41. 42. 43. 44.

45. 46.

Notes to Chapter 3 Leidecker, 266. "Principal's Report," St. Louis Public School Annual Report, 1872, 39. Anna C. Brackett, Letter to Thomas Davidson, May 13, 1872. AnnaC. Brackett, Letter to Thomas Davidson, September 21, 1873. "Principal's Report," St. Louis Public School Annual Report, 1866, 15-16. Proceedings of the National Education Association, 1872, 185. Proceedings of the National Education Association, 1872, 185—6. Established in 1857, this was an organization which did not grant women ft ill membership until 1866, and which continued to have a constitutional provision barring women from presenting papers at its annual meetings until 1870. Worm :n were required instead to have their papers read by the NEA secretary or anothi er man in the organization. See the constitution as printed in the Proceedings of tl ic National Education Association, 1857-70. It is possible that in practice women were admitted to full membership earlier than 1870, as the constitution was mot printed in each year's proceedings. Proceedings of the National Education Association, 1872, 184. Proceedings of the National Education Association, 1872, 186. Socio-economic class cannot be ignored here. The women Brackett was referrir ig to were most likely of the middle and upper middle classes. Proceedings of the National Education Association, 1872, 184. "Principal's Report," St. Louis Public School Annual Report, 1871, 50-51. Brackett, The Education of'American Girls, 82. "Woman Educator is Dead," obituary from the archives of the State Historic al Society of Missouri, Columbia, MO (title of newspaper unknown). While other women's organizations had been established to address a number • of women's issues, the Missouri Woman's Suffrage Association was the first in tHe nation to focus solely on voting rights. For evidence of Hazard's and Beedy 's roles in the suffrage movement see The History of Woman Suffrage, compiled by El izabeth Cady Stanton, Susan B. Anthony, and Matilda Joslyn Gage (vol. 3, 59E>605). On William Torrey Harris's and Thomas Davidson's membership in tlie Missouri Woman Suffrage Association, see Hyde and Conard, eds., Encyclopealic History of St. Louis (New York: Sothern History Company, 1899), 2529. Phoebe Couzins was the first woman in Missouri to earn a law degree. Virginia Minor filed a lawsuit in which she charged she had a constitutional right to vote, base ;d on the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Min or v. Happersett, 88 US (21 Wall) 162, (1875). Woman's Club statement of purpose (1874), from "Woman's Club Papers," Mi ssouri Historical Society Archives. Capitalization and italics in original. Hyde and Conard, 2522. Brackett, "Margaret Fuller," 354. Anna C. Brackett, Letters to Thomas Davidson, November 21, 1872; December 20, 1872 (recounting meeting with Holmes); December 14, 1873; September 1 0, 1875; and August 29, 1879. Anna C. Brackett, Letter to Thomas Davidson, November 5, 1872. Dictionary of American Biography (1929), 546-7.

Notes to Chapter 3 47.

48. 49. 50. 51.

52.

53. 54. 55. 56.

57.

58. 59. 60.

61. 62.

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For those not familiar with the term, "domestic partnership" has come into use in recent years to describe long-term, committed homosexual relationships, and serves well to shift emphasis in same-sex relationships from sexuality alone to the relationship as a whole. I use it here in this sense. Brackett's relationship with Eliot was previously noted by Maria F. Lundgren, "Anna Callender Brackett: Educator, Essayist, Poet," master's thesis, Iowa State University, Ames, IA, 1989, 2. Anna G. Brackett, Letters to Thomas Davidson, December 14, 1873 and March 1, 1874. JSP,, 5:38-48. This breakdown of categories for education is not original to Rosenkranz: Kant used the same set-up, for example, in his theory of education. An exception is the sections on sexual education which were greatly condensed in both the paraphrase and the translation. In both her translation and paraphrase of Rosenkranz, Brackett omits much of his discussion of sex education: the translation in JSP includes §§72-4 on sex education, but then jumps to §80 on intellectual education. Yet she addresses many of these issues in her own works, "The Education of American Girls" and "Sex in Education." Much of Brackett's discussion is in proper Victorian language, but she does venture into difficult areas, such as dysmenorrhae [AmG67], and male sexually predatory behavior [AmG67-9]. References are to Brackett's paraphrase of the Pedagogics,B because this work makes more apparent instances in which she offers her own interpretations. Citations in brackets give the section number and JSP volume and page number for the paraphrase (example: [§84, JSP15:38] refers to section 84 of the paraphrase, which appears in vol. 15, page 38 in JSP). Philosophy of Right, § 166 Addition. Anna C. Brackett, Letter to Thomas Davidson, December 14, 1873. Emphasis and capitals are in original. AmG 103. Quote marks are added to reflect Brackett's overall tone on this point in her discussion. Interestingly, in her paraphrase of the Pedagogics, Brackett omits Rosenkranz's mention of the importance of familial bonds as well as his condemnation of the the Platonic obliteration of them. Philosophy of Right, §238. Again, it is not clear if Brackett was familiar with this work first-hand, but she certainly was aware of the general argument, and that it had been applied only to men to this point. SexEd 374. JSP 7:54; section 66 of Rosenkranz's Pedagogics. This stands in rather stark contrast to Brackett's failure to make any critical commentary on Rosenkranz's endorsement of corporal punishment, a method of discipline to which both she and Harris were opposed. JSP 14:198-9. Edward Hammond Clarke, Sex and Education, or A fair chance for the girls (Boston: J.R. Osgood, 1873). Clarke had long argued against women's higher education,

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63.

64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73.

74. 75. 76.

77.

Notes to Chapter 3 claiming that they were emotionally and physically unsuited for it, particularly during menstruation. Many feminists raised objections to this work. Julia Ward Howe also edited a work, Sex and Education (Boston: Roberts, 1874) in response to Clarke in the same year. In fact, because Clarke's theory had been so influential, the newly established Association of Collegiate Alumnae (now AAUW) commissioned a study to combat claims of this sort - nine years after Clarke's book had appeared. ACA surveyed over 2,000 college-educated women asking them to assess their own health and well-being. Sixty per cent said their education had no negative effects on them. See Roberta Frankfort, Collegiate Women: Domesticity and Career in Turn-of-the-Century America (New York: New York University Press, 1977), 87-8. See SexEd 378-9. Many women in this era were agitating for changes in women's social status, and reforming the Victorian understanding of women as delicate but valuable reproductive vessels was certainly on their agenda. Like Brackett, many first-wave feminists were comfortable supporting the emotional aspect of women's mothering abilities. At the same time, they were often critical of the way in which this translated into biological determinism. SexEd 390. SexEd 388. AmG61. AmG62. AmG63. AmG 68. AmG 69. AmG 69. AmG 69. Brackett letters to Sunderland, January 14, 1888 and January 23, 1888, in Eliza Jane Read Sunderland Papers, Bentley Historic Library Archives, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor [emphasis in original]. Here the discussion is about dress in particular as a form of displaying femininity, as well as a form of expressing sexuality [SexEd 382]. SexEd 390-91. Women like Julia Ward Howe, Elizabeth Peabody, and Ednah Cheney, while accomplished and learned, did not have the same sort of background in philosophy that Brackett and other St. Louis women did. See §209, Addition, Philosophy of Right.

Chapter 4 Paraprofessional philosophy stage I: Grace Bibb, Ellen Mitchell, and the Concord School of Philosophy

Women and the Concord School The dream of a life is realized here. , . . Notwithstanding the chivalrous homage paid to woman in this school... the higher ground upon which he meets her intellectually implies mutual recognition, a tacit rather than expressed acknowledgment of her peculiar excellences.1 Grace G. Bibb and Ellen M. Mitchell were among the scores of female participants in the St. Louis idealist movement who made the pilgrimage to Massachusetts each year to attend lectures at the Concord Summer School of Philosophy and Literature between 1879 and 1888. By attending the School, these women took part in an important educational experiment. They witnessed the cross-pollenization of two important American philosophical movements: New England transcendentalism and their own St. Louis idealism. They also helped communicate philosophical ideas to a broad audience — primarily in education and other professional circles. For these reasons, theirs was a paraprofessional philosophy. Their philosophic training in the early years of the idealist movement was as rigorous as that of any intellectual in that era. They studied philosophy for both personal enrichment and professional gain. They found the insights it provided into life's deepest questions to be enriching. They also saw its practical applications in educational, social, and political life. As the idealist movement grew and gained momentum in its later years, women began to gain access to higher education, but not at the elite institutions. Graduate degrees, teaching fellowships, and funding for study abroad at the nation's best schools were commonly reserved for men. Therefore, no matter how well a woman mastered philosophic argument and discourse, she did not have the academic pedigree necessary to become a professional philosopher. Instead she was routinely closed out of academic philosophical circles as the discipline became a profession. Therefore, Grace Bibb, Ellen Mitchell, Eliza Sunderland, Lucia Ames Mead, and others like them were paraprofessional philosophers. They were serious students of philosophy, but rarely worked within the halls of the academy. Instead, they were teachers, public lecturers, social critics, and/or political analysts whose audience was almost exclusively female.

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The Concord School opened the doors of opportunity to a number of women. It was accessible to anyone with an interest in philosophy who was willing to pay its $10 tuition. Yet, as noted in Chapter 1, among its lecturers were some of America's first professional academic philosophers: Nicholas Murray Butler (Columbia), William James (Harvard), James McCosh (Princeton), and Noah Porter (Yale). As the School focused more on literature toward the end of its existence, professional academic philosophy started to become the norm, and the paraprofessional work of women like Bibb and Mitchell would in turn remain at the periphery of the development of philosophy as a discipline in the US.

Grace C. Bibb Grace C. Bibb (1842-1912) is the only woman in the St. Louis circle known to have regularly attended meetings of the Kant Club, the elite sub-group of the Philosophical Society that devoted itself far more to Hegel than to Kant. In fact, it was this group that studied in depth Hegel's Phenomenology and Science of Logic and discussed Harris's work on Hegel, including his doctrine of reflection and his logic generally, about which Harris later authored books. To have been included in this inner circle, Bibb clearly had to have had close connections to others in the St. Louis movement, and her later correspondence with Harris indicates that this was indeed the case. She wrote to update him on her professional life after she left St. Louis in 1878, asked for his recommendations on reading material, and read and commented on his recent work. 2 Bibb had strong associations with other members of the St. Louis circle. She knew Blow well enough to correspond with her, at least "on a little matter of business." She also knew Anna Brackett and respected her as a senior colleague. She spoke of Brackett's "wise administration" of the normal school in a Journal of Education article, and years later still relied on Brackett's paraphrase of Rosenkranz in her own teaching work.4 Despite the facts that Brackett's departure from St. Louis was somewhat bitter and Bibb succeeded Brackett's partner, Ida Eliot, as assistant principal of the normal school, there is no evidence of any animosity between the two. Bibb was a frequent contributor to both the Journal of Education (St. Louis) and the Western Review. As a member of the Normal School Association, she often presented papers at association meetings. Therefore, Bibb reached a broader audience than did many of her female colleagues. And this professional exposure in the academic hierarchy in turn led her to the position of dean of the normal department at the University of Missouri at Columbia. She would be the only woman in that position at UM Columbia until 1939, nearly seventy years after the department was established. While Bibb held

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this position for only five years, apparently leaving because she chose to marry, it was work that she thoroughly enjoyed. She reported to Harris: My work here proves thus far quite as pleasant as I could have hoped, . . , The president has very kindly assisted me in bringing the Department into order - entirely at my own request, but says he regards each Professor as supreme within his own department. 7 Given the tone of Bibb's letters during her tenure at the University of Missouri, her experience of being dean was rewarding until at least 1881 when there is a three-year gap in her correspondence with Harris. Just prior to this break in Bibb's communication, she had become increasingly involved in the National Education Association. In fact, under Soldan as president of the NEA, who had appointed Harris to the NEA's Council of Education, Bibb was invited to be a member of the Pedagogics and Colleges Committee, of which Harris was chair. This was an invitation that Bibb was predisposed to accept, although she did inquire into whether it was a working committee (as opposed to an advisory group, presumably).8 Bibb admitted that she missed her career after she moved to Nebraska with her groom, Thomas Sudborough. When she resumed correspondence with Harris in 1884, she confided she was trying to use her time . . . in literary work, missing as I do, very much, the school work which had become almost second nature - so much indeed do I miss it that I think were exactly the right position offered, I should take it even though it involved absence from home part of the year .. ,9 She turned to reading and writing about Rousseau at this time, whose Emile she had taught while at the University of Missouri. Even though Harris and his colleagues were not fond of Rousseau, he suggested that Bibb might publish her work on this thinker in JSP or contribute to his International Education Series (IES). ° This series of texts includes a number of works considered important at the time, including Blow's Symbolic Education and Letters to a Mother and Brackett's paraphrase of the Pedagogics. It would clearly have represented an intellectual victory for Bibb to have her name added to the IES list of contributors, and she acknowledges this forthrightly: I think your Educational Series offers me the opportunity to do some work that I have had in mind for three or four years past... believe that I appreciate your kindness in this as I gratefully remember your encouragement of my literary efforts in former years.1

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Yet seemingly without explanation, Harris abandoned the idea. Given Harris's own harsh criticisms of Rousseau, this is not altogether surprising, especially since Bibb's letters give no hint of distaste for, or disagreement with, Rousseau. It is possible, then, that Bibb's approach was not to Harris's liking, that she failed to deliver the same sort of condemnation of Rousseau that he himself would have produced. In any case, Bibb's last mention of the project was a rather apologetic inquiry into why she hadn't heard from Harris — not to rush him, she assured, but simply in case her previous letter had been lost. Since only one-way correspondence - from Bibb to Harris - is available, there is no way to know for certain if Harris provided an adequate response to explain the situation. Two things are clear, however: first, although Harris did issue a republication of Rousseau's Emile with a foreword by a male contemporary, William H. Payne, there is no work about Rousseau by Bibb among the volumes in the IES; second, Bibb's cautious request for an update on the status of her long-sought opportunity to publish a work on Rousseau was her last letter to Harris. Such an abrupt end to their correspondence suggests that the abandonment of this project created a rift between the two of them. The handful of articles that Grace Bibb left behind were largely literary analyses, such as an essay on the English novel and discussions of Thomas Arnold and William Thackeray, all of which were published in the Western Review. She also wrote a defense of normal school education for the journal Education, which echoes many of Anna Brackett's views. For the purposes of this discussion however, two pieces in which she demonstrates her feminist leanings are of interest: "Lady Macbeth: A Study in Character" and "Women as Teachers." Feminist writings: on Lady Macbeth Bibb's essay on Lady Macbeth at first appears to be a maternal feminist defense of her character. Recognizing that previous scholars have charged Lady Macbeth with being ambitious for power, Bibb excuses this character flaw as one that is simply an outgrowth of her feminine qualities. Bibb claims that "personal ambition is not by any means ... a characteristic of women," [290]12 because women are incapable of pursuing their own interests. Lady Macbeth's aspirations are not for herself as much as they are for her husband; hers is a type of ambition, but one that is feminine in nature in that it is "in large measure unselfish." [291] So it would seem that Bibb believes Lady Macbeth has been misunderstood in part because a male standard of behavior has been applied. She is to be judged for her evil acts, certainly, but differently than she would be judged if she were a man, because her motive is a peculiarly feminine motive: to achieve happiness not for herself, but for her husband. Furthermore, this feminine

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motive might be thought to arise spontaneously from Lady Macbeth's very nature, to be simply a peculiarly feminine form of evil. Yet Bibb draws on the same sort of liberal feminist understanding of femininity that Bracket! does in relation to women's role in the working world. In Bibb's view, the injustices done to Lady Macbeth simply because she was a woman explain her passion for more power for her husband, and thus for herself. Lady Macbeth, Bibb notes, had aspirations for her husband in part because she could not have them for herself: "a separate royalty would have been as impossible in aspiration, as [in] reality." [290] And even though, as the granddaughter of the king, Lady Macbeth had as much claim to the throne as did Duncan, this "diadem, always just beyond grasping,5' [291] was withheld from her, simply because she was female. Even worse, the wrong she felt was allowed to ferment because, as a woman, she had nothing to divert her mind "from its contemplation by active duties of any wide range." [291] Finally, Lady Macbeth had no female friendships to rely on; she was a woman of a "strong nature [who] suffers in silence,"[291] isolated and alone in a world ruled by men over whom she could exercise no power . . . with the exception, of course, of her husband. Yet despite the constraints placed on her because of her gender, Lady Macbeth rebelled against her plight and thus made a departure "from the governing influences of her sex" in a manner that is decidedly masculine [295]. Women's crimes, Bibb claims, most often grow out of an emotional response — passion, jealousy, or revenge — to a concrete experience of wrong. Yet Lady Macbeth "resolves upon assassination as the most direct means to an end, calmly, deliberately, with no personal wrongs to avenge." [295] Bibb implies that this evidence of her determination is almost to be admired, particularly in contrast to her husband's lack of will. At the same time, her accompanying "subordination of the individual," namely herself, "to the family" via her attempt to aid in her husband's advancement "lends a color of womanliness to her association with the crime" [295], in Bibb's view. Bibb's article on Lady Macbeth was followed in a later issue of the Western Review that same year by Snider's analysis of the play. Snider was the St. Louis circle member admired most for his literary analysis, of Shakespeare in particular. Offering a much more orthodox interpretation of the evils of Lady Macbeth, toward the close of his essay Snider declares outright that the somewhat prevalent notion of making love the mainspring of Lady Macbeth's actions and of seeing in her the tender, devoted wife who committed the most horrible crimes merely out of affection for her husband is ridiculous and is, in my judgment, contradicted by the whole tenor of the play. ... To be wife is clearly not her highest ambition, that she is already; but it is to be the queen. [609]

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It is neither necessary nor appropriate in this discussion to argue Snider's point versus Bibb's. But it is important to note that Bibb's argument was more subtle - and not surprisingly, more feminist - than Snider recognized. While she did claim that Lady Macbeth acted out of love, she does not mean to say that this is the same tender devotion that Snider implies. Bibb's argument is that Lady Macbeth's actions were due in large part to her derivative status. She was a wife and saw herself as such, but she could never be queen unless Macbeth were king. Bound to an understanding of herself as one with her husband, then, Lady Macbeth was driven to help him seek what he himself shrank from attaining. Despite Snider's harsh criticism of Bibb's perspective, she was not discouraged from making more attempts at literary analysis. In fact, this was the second of five other essays she wrote for the Western Review. As none of these are particularly feminist, and certainly not philosophical, they are not discussed in this chapter, however. Feminist writings: on women as teachers In a piece that is unquestionably feminist, and a tinge philosophical, "Women as Teachers," Bibb recognizes that "an essential element of the teacher's character" is sympathy, 1 and that this is a stereotypically feminine character trait. Yet sympathy does not amount merely to emotional connection with another nor to compassion toward them. For Bibb, broadly defined, sympathy includes the ability to transcend one's own experience and enter into a relationship of understanding with another. In her view "the truly educative mind possesses a peculiar power of placing itself inside the circle of another's consciousness" in order to instruct the student. Many of the greatest educators — Pestalozzi, Arnold, and Mann, for example — possessed a sympathy of this sort, and for this reason were able to break down the barriers that often exist between teacher and student, which is really a barrier between mind and mind in the end. Given women's tendency to be better schooled in exercising sympathy, however, they are more likely to be able to meet "the sympathetic needs of the child," particularly in the primary grades.15 But Bibb insists that women are equally capable of teaching at the higher levels and of assuming administrative positions. In her view, women not only have the same degree of competency for high school teaching as men do, they are often also more responsible and their teaching methods just as philosophical. Bibb recognizes that resistance to women teaching in the higher grades has been strong, yet she muses: It would indeed be little wonder if woman were an instructive worker merely, what lesson have the cycles of her cathay taught her? To weave and spin, to keep strict guard upon the maids, to sit at home?16

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While in Bibb's view advances in women's education have been made, the long history of encouraging women to remain secluded in the home continues to have its effects. Like Brackett then, Bibb would be better termed a "liberal" rather than maternal feminist, as she believes that when women shy away from, or are rejected for, teaching positions in the higher grades, social role expectations are at the root of the problem. Despite increased educational access for women, there remain in Bibb's words, "influences affecting disadvantageously the intellectual conditions of women which the experimental opening of the doors of a few colleges will not remove." 1 Chief among such "influences" is parents' hesitance to provide their daughters with a solid education. Since girls and young women are not properly schooled, even the brightest among them produce few original thoughts. Instead, they engage in "idle re-discovery and valueless restatement," because few even "know ... where originality is no longer possible." Even so, some women overcome a great number of obstacles, continue to grow intellectually, and thus are able to do their work in the schools well — not merely "as well as a man, for there are many men . .. whose work would be a poor criterion for that of any woman of ability — but absolutely well."1 Yet women who transcend the obstacles before them find themselves beset with constant fault-finding and charges that they are "too set in their ways."3 This is particularly true for the few women who attain leadership positions. Bibb considers such criticism unjust, and points to a number of women educational administrators who have carried out their work with the greatest of success. In doing so, she invokes the name of the venerable Ralph Waldo Emerson who praised the St. Louis schools in which women held both teaching and leadership positions. More important to this discussion, however, Bibb refers to the St. Louis Normal School "whose plan and organization have been the work of a woman" 22 — namely Anna C. Brackett — and which produced an army of young women ... who have carried into their work an exactness, a knowledge of the limits of methods, as well as of their use, a love of truth, an enthusiasm, to which we stand today deeply indebted and upon which we may rely as a material guarantee of future prosperity.2 Brackett and others like her provide proof that women are competent to be administrators as well as teachers. As noted earlier, this article is of more value for what it tells us about Bibb's feminism than as evidence of her philosophy. Yet there are traces of St. Louis idealism in this short piece. Like Brackett, Bibb sees education as a process of awaking the human mind to the truths that it is in its nature to discover. "All true education is subjective," Bibb declares, "the power is within the mind of the pupil; the work of the instructor is to excite dormant powers, to furnish

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avenues for the roused activities, and to guide these activities into the channels presented."24 And like Blow, Bibb sees education as in part a replication of the human experience within each individual. The challenge the teacher faces is "to incite the intellectual and moral faculties to such growth that, by their absorption of the entire being, the lower and baser elements may die."25 Yet, beyond these glimpses of two of American idealism's educational doctrines, Bibb offers little philosophical insight, although her affinity with Brackett's feminism is worth noting.

Ellen Mitchell Ellen Mitchell (1838-1920) was born to Edwin R. and Harriet H. Smith in Geddes, New York, near Syracuse. Little information about her early life or education is available, but we do know that she was educated at Homer Academy in upstate New York, which still exists as a private high school. At the time Mitchell attended the Academy it was considered an institution of higher learning and offered a teacher training program. After graduating from Homer in 1859, she taught in the public schools in Cairo, Illinois, where she lived with her uncle and his family until 1865 when she went to St. Louis to pursue a writing career, using the pen name Ella Ellwood. Mitchell seems to have had a troubled personal life. She had been married by the time she finished at Homer Academy, graduating as "Ellen M. Slade," not under her maiden name "Smith." Yet she appears to have already been widowed or separated from her husband, because she was not listed as "Mrs. Slade" (with husband's name in the blank) as was the convention in identifying married women in this period. In addition, during her stay in Cairo she was plagued by scandal, as she had fallen in love with Joseph W. Mitchell, a man only recently separated from his wife. Although the two sought refuge in St. Louis where they had arranged to meet in order to escape Ellen's disapproving relatives, the scandal followed them there when Mitchell's wife tracked him down and sued for divorce, charging him with abandonment and adultery. In the court case that ensued, a number of his intimacies with Ellen were printed on the front page of a local paper.2 Both the court case involving the divorce and the media's treatment of it focused on Ellen's conduct and character. In the newspaper, she is alternately referred to by her pen name, Ella Ellwood, and mockingly called "the poetess", "Sappho", and "Mitchell's Angel." The reporter descended upon juicy tidbits divulged in the maid's testimony such as Joseph Mitchell's late night visits to Ellen's boarding house and the telltale discovery of a pair of suspenders among the bed linens during a routine morning cleaning. 2

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Interesting too is the fact that the newspaper so eager to recount these lurid tales was the St. Louis Democrat, a competitor of the newspaper Ellen Mitchell wrote for as "Ella Ellwood," the Missouri Republican.29 It is difficult to determine how this scandal affected Ellen Mitchell's relationships with others in the St. Louis circle. But this was a progressive group, and shortly before this scandal Harris had dismissed the charge that his advanced philosophical views fostered an environment in which a teacher on Harris's staff was encouraged to have an affair. Given the sensational level of reporting in the St. Louis Democrat, Harris and his group were likely to have dismissed the matter as a private one between Ellen and her soon-to-be-husband, Joseph Mitchell. Even so, there is no evidence that she ever taught in St. Louis, but focused instead on writing fiction and poetry immediately upon arriving in the city under the Ellwood name. She then shifted to feminist and philosophical writing as Mrs. Ellen M. Mitchell after Joseph's divorce was final. Work in St. Louis and Concord Mitchell's name does not appear among any of the lists of members of the major organizations connected to the St. Louis circle. Since she was no longer teaching after 1865, this is not particularly surprising. As we have seen, for women teaching was the main thoroughfare to the philosophical world in St. Louis. Yet it is a bit disappointing that Mitchell is not mentioned in reports on other offshoots of the Philosophical Society - the Kant Club or Art Society, for example. Similarly, records of the Missouri women's suffrage organization do not list Mitchell as a member, even though she was a strong supporter of the women's rights movement. Still it is clear that Mitchell had connections to the St. Louis movement. A group in which she and her husband were central figures, the Pen and Pencil Club, met occasionally in the Mitchell home, and she made at least two presentations to the group, one on De Quincey, the other on Elizabeth Barrett Browning. Grace Bibb attended its meetings and submitted updates of the group's activities to the Western Review, declaring that Mitchell's presentation on De Quincey was "one of the most enjoyable of the season." Mitchell also led "a little band of women" in St. Louis that "used to assemble every week to study and discuss the problems of philosophy."32 After she left St. Louis, Mitchell contributed two articles to JSP, on Schopenhauer and Plato. Mitchell was one of just a handful of women to lecture at the Concord School of Philosophy, and on this count is unique among her female colleagues. She not only participated in both the St. Louis and Concord branches of the movement, but played an active role in developing them as well. Her Concord lecture was favorably reviewed in the newspapers and recognized for its feminist insights. She began to publish her more philosophical

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work after this lecture and held a full-time appointment as a lecturer at the University of Denver shortly after the Concord School had closed in 1888. Work in Denver and Syracuse In 1878-9, Mitchell relocated to Denver, Colorado, in the hope that the mountain air would improve her husband's declining health. Joseph Mitchell died in February 1879, but Ellen remained there for the next fifteen years, teaching at the high school, writing, and leading a women's philosophy group. She also became an active member of the prestigious Denver Fortnightly Club (DFC, 1882-97), a women's discussion group that still exists today and for which records are available. Archival material shows that Mitchell chaired a number of DFC committees over the years, served as vicepresident for a term, and presented a number of papers. While the papers themselves are no longer extant, their topics provide us with at least a sense of Mitchell's intellectual focus: lectures on the philosophy of history in 1882—3; philosophy of art in 1883-4; political ethics in 1889-90; transcendentalism in 1891-2; and Phidias and Plato in 1893.34 Perhaps more importantly in regard to this study, Mitchell introduced women to idealist thought. Yet unlike many of her contemporaries, Mitchell's philosophical effort was not confined to the relatively informal forum of women's groups, nor even to the elementary or high school classroom.35 In fact, Mitchell distinguishes herself as the only woman in the St. Louis branch of the idealist movement to move into the professional academic world in philosophy as a faculty member at the University of Denver. A younger colleague, Marietta Kies, was the only woman in the Concord branch of the movement to do the same. Mitchell's Denver years were her most active, philosophically speaking. Prior to her university appointment, she authored two articles in JSP and published her Study in Greek Philosophy. While there are no archival holdings to verify whether her courses at the university reflect a strong influence by Hegel, her Study of Greek Philosophy certainly demonstrates her Hegelianism, so much so as to be nearly a synopsis of the Hegelian point of view. At the same time, at the University of Denver, Mitchell was also among a handful of professors to offer a series of special lectures, outside of their regular classroom teaching. Mitchell's series consisted primarily of literary analysis, which culminated with a summary lecture entitled "The Philosophy of Literature.""3 Given the fact that she credits, among others, Denton Snider with influencing and supporting her academic work, it is not surprising that Mitchell focused heavily on literature at this stage in her career. Snider, after all, was devoted to literature and considered a master of literary analysis by his colleagues. In addition, as noted earlier, distinctions between the literary and the

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philosophical were more fluid during this period than they are currently. Mitchell and her colleagues, then, would have seen such work as legitimately within the philosophical realm, as is particularly evident from the courses of lectures offered at the Concord Summer School of Philosophy ... and Literature, as it was officially named. Mitchell left Denver in the mid 1890s and returned to the Syracuse area where she lived with her aging mother. Now nearing sixty years old, Mitchell was considered a wise older woman and had a fairly large following who attended her women's Round Table discussions. By this time, she focused almost exclusively on literature, perhaps partly by choice, but perhaps also based on the interests of her audience. Local newspapers often boasted of Mitchell's accomplishments, both within Syracuse and beyond when she gave lectures in Boston or New York City. Geographically, Mitchell, Blow, and Brackett were in relatively close proximity to each other: Blow was now in Cazenovia, and at times in New York City for speaking engagements, and Brackett was in New York City. But it is not possible to determine if the three were in contact. In any case, Mitchell had settled into yet another comfortable niche and remained there until her death in 1920 at the age of 81. Philosophical and feminist work Mitchell published a fair amount of material, including literary analyses of Dante, Faust, and Homer; a booklet entitled "The Hidden Soul of Harmony," which aims to be literary analysis but really amounts to an inspirational text; and several philosophical works discussed here: two articles in JSP, one lecture at the Concord School, two lectures at women's congresses, and one book, A Study of Greek Philosophy.

Mitchell in the Journal of Speculative Philosophy Mitchell's contributions to JSP include a critique of Schopenhauer, entitled "The Philosophy of Pessimism," and a Hegelian interpretation of Plato, "The Platonic Dialectic." A reading of "The Philosophy of Pessimism" shows Mitchell to share Blow's philosophical views. Blow and others in the idealist movement resisted philosophical systems that grew out of the skeptical tradition. They were not interested in determining what is not true, possible, or real. Blow in particular was critical of theories that value human reason and judgment over the truth conveyed to us by the natural, God-given world. Such theories, they thought, were based on negations of reality; distrust of divine truths. Instead, they favored thinkers like Hegel who sought to build positive theories that draw on the givens in both our natural and supernatural world. In this short essay, Mitchell joins her idealist contemporaries by

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critiquing Schopenhauer,38 who she believes has created a system in which the choice between negation and affirmation lies solely with the individual. This renders genuine Being absent of will; thus, there can be no Absolute to ground reality. Pessimists like Schopenhauer have established "an irrational unconscious impulse" as the supreme force in life. Much like Blow's criticism of Eastern thought, Mitchell declares that Schopenhauer's ideas present a vacuous and futile philosophy, destined in the end to nihilism. Thankfully however, because of its inherent flaws, pessimism's influence will be limited: What is the future of pessimism? ... We have but to see how it contradicts itself, how it distorts ... the purest and highest of all spiritual forces - love . . . Standing halfway between realism and positivism, pessimism merely proves how impossible it is to banish from thought that Divine Idea of the Absolute which has been the strength and consolation of man throughout . 39 the ages. It is clear from the opening of Mitchell's article on the Platonic dialectic that she has been well steeped in Hegelianism. In fact, much as is the case in her volume on Greek philosophy, this article amounts primarily to a Hegelian reading of the Platonic dialogues. While Mitchell demonstrates her familiarity with both Hegel and his nineteenth-century interpreters in this short essay, there is little here that could be called original. As a distillation of Hegel's thought for more popular consumption, it may have served a purpose in its day, however, and given its brevity this may have been its primary intent. The study of Hegel Mitchell's lecture, "A Study of Hegel," can be counted as a success on two fronts for the purposes of this discussion. First, it demonstrates that she had a respectably clear understanding of Hegel's thought. Second, the venue at which it was presented, the 1884 Congress of Women in Baltimore, shows us that, like Blow and Brackett, Mitchell made philosophy accessible to women. Blow's kindergarten theory was intertwined with discussions of the nature of the soul and the structure of the universe. Brackett's advocacy of higher education for women was justified by Hegel's philosophical system as she understood it. Written by women and primarily for women, the works of both thinkers introduced female readers to the world of ideas - albeit in a somewhat clandestine fashion, particularly in Blow's case. Mitchell participates in this project as well. In "A Study of Hegel," she too presents philosophy to women who might not otherwise have encountered it. At the same time, she stands apart from Blow and Brackett in that she does so without subterfuge. Hegel is her topic, and an overview of Hegel's thought is what she gives.

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Since in printed form Mitchell's presentation is only seventeen pages long, it is not surprising that it doesn't address any one aspect of Hegel's thought in depth. Yet it does touch on a number of matters that were of concern to Hegel: nature, art, and religion among them. More significantly, it lingers on topics that were considered important by Harris and others in the St. Louis movement. Nearly six pages, for instance, are devoted to the relation of mind to nature, subject to object. [2-5; 10-11] Mitchell follows a quotation from Hegel on this topic with an explanation of her own: We communicate with the outward world through the organs of sense; but the impressions received by this means are confused and unrelated, and do not of themselves constitute knowledge, until they have been referred to the unifying power of thought. [2] Mitchell continues by trying to demonstrate that there is a unity behind all finite objects that makes them recognizable to us. Yet she leans toward subjective idealism on this point, and is thus in danger of distorting Hegel's thought. She asks, "What is it that enables me to compare the separate impressions produced yesterday and to-day, discovering an identity underneath differences?" and offers her own answer: "thought, the thinking ego, something not given by sense, which remains steady amid the flux of impressions." [2-3] Unfortunately, given the quick overview that Mitchell provides, she doesn't offer more clarity on this matter. But in this one area she deviates somewhat from St. Louis idealism, particularly from that of Blow who was very aware of Hegel's insistence that the mind must not be said to stand apart from the world as Mitchell here implies. Instead, for Blow sense impressions themselves are unified in the Absolute; it is not merely the individual human mind, but the underlying structure of the universe that makes sense data cohere. Also interspersed throughout this essay are references to another matter that was of concern to Harris and his followers: the relation of the individual to society. [5~6; 11 — 12; 15] In line with her colleagues, Mitchell maintains that an isolated individual existing apart from the social order is an impossibility, "an absolute non-entity." [5] In fact, social institutions play a critical role in individual self-determination in Mitchell's view: I must lose this single, separate self of mine in the larger self of the family, of the state, of the race in order to attain spiritual growth and development. The social institutions that surround me, instead of limiting my freedom, enable me to transcend all that is narrow and selfish, to identify myself with other human beings and make their life my own. [6] Here we can see the separate emphases of Blow and Brackett in combination. Blow's early childhood education theory relies heavily on children's

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incorporation of previous human achievements into their own sense of selfhood. Brackett favors setting aside individual eccentricities in favor of shared social values. Mitchell, in this brief statement of the relation between self and society, unites the two. Furthermore, she doesn't lapse into a misunderstanding of Hegel as she does on the matter of the relation of mind and nature. Finally, as is also true of Blow and Brackett, Mitchell makes her own critiques of overly empirical methods of inquiry along the way. [8, 9] However, these consist of even briefer statements that give little sense of whether Mitchell shared the strong convictions about this matter that Harris and Blow held. Mitchell's clearest statement on this point is simply this: "The spirit that works through nature first attains true freedom, conscious individuality in man. This is a result which it is impossible for materialistic theories to explain ..." [8] Unfortunately, beyond this she relies on Caird's commentary on the matter, quoting him at length. By doing so Mitchell points to her tendency to rely on secondary sources rather than to develop her own thoughts on philosophical problems. Interestingly enough, Mitchell makes only one reference to the educational process, although she attaches it more closely to Hegel's thought than either Blow or Brackett does. "Mind itself," she declares, "must pass through a process of development before it reaches what Hegel calls universal or rational self-consciousness." [9] So despite the fact that Mitchell was fairly removed from education for a number of years, she seems to have been acquainted with the American idealist understanding of its theoretical grounding. At the same time, she herself did not make educational theory a priority. In this sense, she stands apart from Blow and Brackett and also represents another approach to interpreting Hegel. Mitchell's essay makes frequent references to interpreters of Hegel, such as Gaird, Stirling, Green, and, of course, Harris. In the positive sense, this shows that she kept abreast of the literature and was able to integrate it into her own thought. Negatively speaking, however, this belies Mitchell's tendency toward an over-reliance on the thought of others. One damning example is the fact that Hegel's famous claim "the real is rational" she attributes not to the German thinker, but to Caird, his interpreter. [2] Finally, and a step removed from the essay itself, the very existence of this work speaks of Mitchell's fairly close working relationship with William Torrey Harris. On two occasions she refers to Harris's Concord School lectures. [7, 14] She also directly acknowledges Harris's influence within the text of the essay, saying he is the one "to whom I with many others am largely indebted for any knowledge I possess of Hegelian philosophy" [14]. Clearly such a public statement of confidence in and reliance upon Harris speaks to a close working relationship between the two. In addition, Harris must have

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had some level of appreciation for Mitchell's abilities as demonstrated by this booklet, because he valued it enough to keep it as a part of his library until his death. 42 Mitchell's Concord lecture In her lecture "Friendship in Aristotle's Ethics" at the Concord School, Mitchell again seems to have given more of a summary than an original interpretation, with one important exception — a feminist commentary on relationships between men and women. As noted above, although the actual text of Mitchell's lecture is not available, she probably provided the synopsis of her presentation that the press relied on for their reports on the School's events. Four such synopses of Mitchell's lecture appear in print, and each presents the same basic outline of her discussion. However, there are slight variations among them that hint at Mitchell's feminist leanings. The first report of Mitchell's lecture comes from the Boston Post, and it is significant more for what it does not say about her presentation than for what it does say. The Post tells us that Mitchell gave an overview of the ancients' analysis of friendship and that this overview included her mention of the distinction between friendship and love. The article then reports Mitchell as having said that perfect friendship is based on equality. However, ellipses in this section of the article indicate that it omitted parts of Mitchell's speech and, based on readings of other reports on this lecture, what was omitted seems to have been a fairly feminist critique of relations between the sexes. Two other news reports, for instance, indicate that Mitchell's discussion of friendship versus love included a critique of the status of women in the ancient world. Since women were "too subordinate and too inferior to man to be his friend in the divinest sense of the word," their contribution to a relationship, whether in friendship or in marriage, was negligible. Given this low estimation of women, it is no surprise that the Greeks denigrated marriage. Yet Mitchell encouraged her audience to aim for a higher ideal in which genuine friendship is incorporated into the marital relation: I would not undervalue a sympathetic marriage, but that of friendship is as high or higher. [The fact] that the Greeks neglected the one [marriage] and exalted the other [friendship] is no reason [to] reverse the case, and act as if a rich and tender intimacy . . . were not possible . . . between men and women. 45 A fourth news report from the Evening Transcript elaborates more on this point: "true love includes friendship and transcends it. It is friendship glorified. . . .

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The present ideal is to perfect [marriage] and make the latter [between men and women] possible."4 This last article goes further than the previous two in its discussion of the relationship of justice and equality. In an unequal relationship, such as that between the Greeks and their gods in the ancient world, there can be no true friendship because "one gives more than the other and there is a consequent absence of justice." The same problem plagued male—female interaction in the ancient world, and according to this reporter Mitchell believed it continued to plague men and women in her day: It is this lack of equality ... which prevented friendships between opposites in sex, the men standing towards the women, it is to be presumed, somewhat as the gods did toward the men! This idea has not quite disappeared yet, though we are growing out of it gradually." 4 It is true that these statements give us only hints of Mitchell's feminism. In fact, with only a quick first reading of any one of the synopses of this lecture, its feminist hue might pass us by. Given the context out of which Mitchell was operating, however, it is clear that she would have been at liberty to incorporate a bit of feminist analysis into her discussion. Mitchell's lecture was followed by a lecture by Davidson who, along with Harris and others, engaged in "long and excellent discussion" of her lecture. " Harris and Davidson, as has already been noted, were both advocates of the feminist cause. Both were members of the Missouri Woman's Suffrage Association and Harris later wrote essays on equal employment and education for women. Mitchell is unlikely to have received pressure from either of these two to curtail her feminist sentiments, then. And since each of them had built up a following of loyal admirers at the Concord School over the years, there is a good chance that those in attendance were of a like mind.

Concerning the "fallen woman"

We needn't rely on Mitchell's Concord School lecture alone for evidence of feminism. An earlier 1874 speech at the World Congress of Women in Chicago stands as a confirmation of her commitment to feminist ideals. While other women addressed prostitution during this period, it was not commonly discussed, even among feminists. 50 In "A Plea for the Fallen Woman," Mitchell declares that the problem of prostitution is rooted in women's inequality. She maintains that with more career options women would be less likely to reach the levels of degradation and poverty that drive them to prostitution [3], Yet, even given the few branches of employment that women do have, the wages

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they receive are so low that they can barely support themselves. This latter situation she blames specifically on men, quoting the madam of a brothel whom she purports to have interviewed: "as long as men pay reluctantly the smallest wage for the longest day's work of hard labor, and pay the highest demanded in these houses, they will be continued." [3] Mitchell then quickly moves to an indictment of double standards for sexual behavior. According to her observations, "a man may have as many loves as he has neckties, wear them as lightly, change them as often, cast them aside as easily as the last," and it neither affects his social standing, nor endangers his primary relationship with a woman. But if a woman should do the same, her male partner "proclaims her disgrace to the world — to the pitiless world . . . if she turn desperate and defiant... we call her brazen and other words our lips should never utter." [4] Given Mitchell's experience during the divorce scandal seven years earlier, she may be drawing on her own experience to an extent in this lecture. She was likely to have been considered a bit scandalous by those in "polite society" herself. As mentioned above, most of the testimony in the court case "Mitchell v. Mitchell" consisted of long, involved narratives about the unscrupulous behavior of "the poetess" Ella Ellwood, a.k.a. Ellen Slade, nee Ellen M. Smith. It is true that Joseph Mitchell's first wife testified against him and indicted his behavior. Yet in the court's zeal to prove him an adulterer, it called Ellen's very character into question. What sort of woman, after all, would be willing to entertain a gentleman late in the evening? If Mitchell does make her plea for the "fallen woman" based on an experience in which she may have been ostracized, it is not surprising that she would encourage her listeners to "insist upon equal purity of life for men as well as women." [9] Unfortunately, Mitchell does not develop her feminist theory further. Yet her writings show that she, along with Brackett, Bibb, Sunderland, and Ames Mead, had strong feminist convictions that were integrated into their intellectual work. This in turn demonstrates that feminism was a welcome component to St. Louis thought as a whole, and that various arms of this paraprofessional philosophy even facilitated feminism's propagation. A Study of Greek Philosophy Mitchell's most philosophical work, A Study of Greek Philosophy (1891), was a product of her work with women's study groups over the course of time. The bits and pieces of evidence that exist about her presentations to these groups show that when not addressing women's issues or venturing into political philosophy, as was the case in her presentations to the Denver Fortnightly Club, Mitchell explicated the Hegelian view on the ancients, their patterns of thought, and their applications to the modern situation. It is likely to have

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been at the Concord School that she drew her notes from these lectures together and compiled her most ambitious work. Yet there was a fundamental problem with this work, and one that goes right to the core of a divide that still exists in philosophy today. Mitchell's Study was a popular piece, which drew heavily on Hegel and Zeller. In fact, the work relied so heavily on these two authors as to be nearly a paraphrase of their ideas. At least one reader noted that this work was less than groundbreaking scholarship and wrote a condemnatory review of it in the Philosophical Review. William A. Hammond (1868—1938) criticized the work as one that "smacks strongly of dilettantism," so much so that "it is unserviceable for pedagogical 3 purposes."5 He faults Mitchell for relying too heavily on secondary sources rather than offering her own interpretations. It seems that Mitchell's "Study" of Greek Philosophy,, as he referred to it, didn't make the cut, as such, because it "presents nothing new in matter or original in treatment." In Mitchell's defense, while she falls short of sharp insight in this volume, she does not claim originality, but rather acknowledges her "general indebtedness to Zeller and Hegel" for her interpretation of the Greeks: I have consulted all the accessible authorities, but have relied chiefly on the histories of Greek philosophy by Zeller and Hegel. The greater part of Zeller's work is to be found in an English translation, but not that of Hegel, with the ... exception [of Harris's translations of Hegel on Plato and Aristotle]. 2 It is significant that Hegel's History of Philosophy was not to appear in English translation until 1892, the year after Mitchell's Study was published. Keeping this in mind, Mitchell does present much that is "new" to the reading public that is unable to study Hegel's work in German. Furthermore, through a bibliography, which precedes the main text of the book, Mitchell both provides her readers with other sources to consult and informs them of thinkers other than Zeller and Hegel who influenced her thought on this topic. Yet Hammond's criticism points to a great philosophical divide. Twentythree years her junior, Hammond was an up-and-coming academic philosopher who was to become a professor at Cornell. His own book on Plato's theory of virtue in the third and fourth books of the Republic was published in the same year that his review of Mitchell's Study appeared. His was the new, young class of thinkers ushering in the era of philosophy as a profession. Mitchell was a member of an earlier class of philosopher—practitioners who tied ideas to action, theory to practice. Hers was a waning ideal: that of the public intellectual for whom contemplation was an avocation, not (necessarily) tied to their livelihood, and certainly not divorced from everyday life. His was the ascending vision of what philosophy was to become: a well-defined discipline, insulated from the outside world within the halls of the academy.

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Conclusion The divide between Mitchell and Hammond was a multi-layered one that points to the challenges facing women philosophers in this period. In part it was a function simply of the age difference between the two and their differing understandings of philosophy — past, present, and future. In part, the divide was a product of the disjunction between theory and practice within the discipline, which was becoming more prevalent in this period. The philosophies of Bibb and Mitchell were dynamic and engaging, drawing on their work with women in discussion groups and in activist circles. Such a philosophy was a perfectly natural and intellectually sound entity in their view. But the emerging class of academic philosophers like Hammond may not have recognized their work with women's groups as "philosophical" at all. The transcendentalist ideal that women in the idealist movement emulated, that of the armchair philosopher who possessed both breadth of knowledge and depth of insight, was becoming less and less acceptable within academic circles. Branches of thought once considered to be under the rubric of philosophy — anthropology, psychology, sociology, and political science — had already begun to break off from philosophy proper and claim an intellectual turf of their own. Philosophy was becoming extremely serious about itself as it worked to become distinct from the new social sciences, while the social sciences did the same. Hammond's harsh criticism of Mitchell demonstrates that she ended up crossing the road at just the wrong time. Just over fifteen years earlier, George Sylvester Morris had published a paraphrase of Hegel's ideas in The Philosophy of the State and of History, and he was applauded for doing so. Three years before Mitchell's Study was published, Kies compiled Harris's lectures and essays, a work for which she too was praised. But Mitchell was off, both in her timing and in her estimation of the audience she was writing for. The women's groups she had spent so much of her time and energy on over the years may well have appreciated this work. The academic audience, however, was more exacting. This shift in expectations, along with barriers to women's entrance into the professional, academic philosophical world, helped shape the philosophies of Sunderland, Ames Mead, and Kies as well. Notes 1. 2.

Ellen M. Mitchell, "The Concord School of Philosophy," Free Religious Index, September 23, 1880, 147. See Grace C. Bibb, Letters to William Torrey Harris, October 6, 1878 and April 11,1880, in William Torrey Harris Papers, Archives of the Missouri Historical Society, St. Louis.

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3. Bibb, Letter to William Torrey Harris, April 14, 1879. 4. See Grace C. Bibb, "Women as Teachers," Journal of Education (St. Louis), vol. 6, no. 1, p. 3 (January 1873). Also see Bibb's letter to Harris in which she mentions a recent shipment of Brackett's paraphrase for use in the normal department at the University of Missouri, October 6, 1878. 5. In the Western Review Bibb is reported to have presented the following papers to these groups: "Grammar as a Course of Study" [vol. 1, p. 324 (1875)]; "Individuality and the Public Schools" [vol. 2, p. 175-6 (1876)]; and "Culture" [vol. 2, p. 238-40 (1876)]. 6. See Jonas Viles, The University of Missouri Centennial History (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1939). 7. Bibb, Letter to William Torrey Harris, October 6, 1878. 8. See Louis Soldan letter to William Torrey Harris, October 8, 1880, regarding Soldan's presidency of the NEA and his appointment of Harris, with Bibb listed as a potential committee member. See Bibb's letter to Harris inquiring into the nature of the committee, May 3, 1881. 9. Bibb, Letter to Harris, January 28, 1884. 10. For some of the group's criticisms of Rousseau, see Blow's discussion of Rousseau as an atomist, and Harris's criticism of Rousseau and Pestalozzi, referred to earlier in this study. For Harris's invitation to Bibb to publish on Rousseau, see her letters to Harris, January 28, 1884 and February 7, 1884, William Torrey Harris Papers, St. Louis Historical Society Archives. 11. Bibb, Letter to Harris, February 7, 1884. 12. Citations in this section are from Bibb, "Lady Macbeth: A Study in Character/' Western Review, vol. 1 (1875). 13. Bibb, "Women as Teachers," Public Education Document, 3. This essay was originally published in the Journal of Education (St. Louis) and was made a part of the Public Education series, along with Brackett's "How not to do it: the Art of Questioning." 14. "Women as Teachers," 3. 15. "Women as Teachers," 3. 16. "Women as Teachers," 6. 17. "Women as Teachers," 6. 18. "Women as Teachers," 7. 19. "Women as Teachers," 7—8. 20. "Women as Teachers," 8. 21. "Women as Teachers," 8. 22. "Women as Teachers," 9. 23. "Women as Teachers," 9. 24. "Women as Teachers," 2. 25. "Women as Teachers," 2-3. 26. Homer Academy college catalogue for 1859, made available by the Cortland County Historical Society. 27. Information about the divorce scandal is from records of the St. Louis Civil Courts, case -#"3724, which includes testimony of Mary A. Mitchell, Joseph

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28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33.

34.

35. 36. 37. 38.

39. 40. 41.

42. 43.

44. 45.

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Mitchell's estranged wife; Wade L. Smith and Anna Smith, Ellen's uncle and aunt; and Amanda Williams, the maid in Ellen's boarding house. My thanks to Melvina Conley, Archivist, 22nd Judicial Circuit of Missouri, St. Louis, for her good-natured help in finding this information. St. Louis Democrat, May 17, 1867. Missouri Republican, May 17, 1867. Leidecker, 353. Western Review, 1:395 and 1:189, respectively (1875). Mitchell, A Study of Greek Philosophy (Chicago: S. C. Griggs, 1891), v. I must thank my good friend Glynis T. Hawkins of Denver for her expert sleuthing to discover this material in the Western History Collection, Denver Public Library. It is possible that Mitchell and Kies were associated with each other during this period. Both had been attending the Concord School by this time, and Kies was teaching relatively nearby in Colorado Springs in 1882/3-84/5. Mitchell's lectures on the philosophy of history in 1882~3 and her later lecture on political ethics in 1889-90 (the period of time during which Kies would have been beginning to research and write her book The Ethical Principle) suggests that they were working on many of the same issues, and perhaps even working together on these issues. She did teach in a Denver high school in the late 1880s, however. City Directory of Denver, 1880-88. University of Denver college catalogues, 1890-94, in special collections of the University of Denver library. From Onondaga County Historical Society clippings file, giving reports of Mitchell's lectures. Blow also expressed distaste for ideas that leaned toward nihilism. Mitchell also discusses Hartmann in this essay. Yet since this is only a very brief part of the article and Schopenhauer is a more important figure in philosophy today, I have not included this section of her essay in my discussion. Mitchell, "The Philosophy of Pessimism," Journal of Speculative Philosophy, 20:194 (1886). This essay was reprinted in A Study of Greek Philosophy. See "A Study of Hegel," presented to the Congress of Women in Baltimore, 1884 (n.p., n.d.). Citations giving page numbers of the printed version of the lecture will follow quotations. The copy of "A Study of Hegel" available to me was a gift to Brown University from Harris's library, given by his children after his death. These news reports (dated July 26 and July 27, 1887) are from the scrapbooks of W7illiam Torrey Harris, Concord Free Library; not all of the newspapers are named. Unnamed newspaper with article entitled "Field Day for Philosophy." Two unnamed newspapers use this quotation, which suggests that it is from Mitchell's own synopsis. The first is the article entitled "Field Day for Philosophy," the second "The Philosophers' Picnic," which even indicates that it is quoting Mitchell's own words.

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From the Boston Evening Transcript. Ibid. Ibid. This feminist insight comes immediately after material that is also reported by other newspapers. The first half of this Evening Transcript story, in which this quoted material appears, follows quite closely the outline of other news reports of Mitchell's speech. But the author of this article states that she has added her own commentary to the discussion. After this quoted section in the report, then, the text of the report - though very feminist - is most likely not representative of Mitchell's lecture. 49. Ibid. 50. Frances Willard of the Woman's Christian Temperance Union, for example, addressed this difficult issue in the 1870s [see Karen Greenspan, Timetables of Women's History (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), 265]; so too did Victoria Claflin Woodhull and her sister, Tennessee Claflin, in their newspaper, Woodhull & Claflin''s Weekly [see Miriam Schneir, Feminism: The Essential Historical Writings (NY: Vintage Books, 1994), 143]. 51. William A. Hammond, review of A Study of Greek Philosophy, in The Philosophical Review, 1:211-13(1892). 52. Mitchell, Greek Philosophy, vi.

Chapter 5 Paraprofessional philosophy stage II: Eliza Read Sunderland and Lucia Ames Mead

Women idealists beyond Concord Eliza Sunderland (1839-1910) and Lucia Ames Mead (1856-1936) both came to the idealist movement late and represent new developments within it. Sunderland helped idealism expand and evolve into a more genuinely philosophical movement, keeping one foot in the academic philosophical world and one in the paraprofessional world of applied ideas for several years after earning her degree. Ames Mead never earned academic credentials in philosophy. Instead, like Harris, she carried on the idealist quest by applying philosophy to concrete social and political issues. Sunderland had connections to academics related to the idealist movement - George Sylvester Morris, John Dewey (who had not yet fully rejected idealism when Sunderland knew him), and Marietta Kies. Ames Mead was close to philosophicalpractitioners - Harris, Jane Addams, and also John Dewey (who had begun espousing pragmatism when Ames Mead was acquainted with him). The two women knew each other as feminists, religious leaders, and public intellectuals. And both remained paraprofessional philosophers all their lives: Sunderland because the halls of academe were not fully open to her; Ames Mead, because she found practical work more fulfilling than purely philosophical speculation.

Eliza Sunderland: life and work Dear Sir: Mr. Tufts is going to vacate his place in Michigan University. ... I have studied and recited two terms with Mrs. Sunderland in the department in which Mr. Tufts has been a teacher, and I know that Mrs. Sunderland is second only to Dr. Dewey, the head of the department. Why should she not be an instructor in that department? Could anything be brought to bear as to bring this thing about?2 As one of just twenty women to earn a doctorate in philosophy between 1880 and 1900, Eliza Jane Read Sunderland was among a select group. Yet

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achieving this level of academic distinction did not translate into achieving status among her male colleagues in academe. In both 1891 and 1894, letters of support were written and petitions circulated urging the University of Michigan administration to appoint Sunderland to vacant philosophy faculty positions. But the university had a policy against hiring women in this era, and Sunderland was passed over both times, forcing her to make her way as a paraprofessional in the discipline. The wife of a minister, Jabez T. Sunderland, Eliza Sunderland was essentially her husband's co-pastor at their liberal Unitarian church on the University of Michigan campus. She was an accomplished public speaker and leader of women's organizations. She was a founder and president of the Women's Western Unitarian Conference (1882-7), vice president of the Association for the Advancement of Women (1886—91), and a member of the Michigan Equal Suffrage Association (1887-92), the Michigan State Federation of Women's Clubs (1897^1900), and the National Alliance of Unitarian and Other Liberal Christian Women, She was one of many to lecture at the Congress of Representative Women sessions at the Chicago World's Fair in 1893, but one of only two women invited to speak at the men's sessions on philosophy and science (the other was Julia Ward Howe). A third lecture at the 1893 World's Fair, "The Importance of the Study of Comparative Religion," took place at the World's Parliament of Religions, and won Sunderland a great deal of respect and recognition beyond the women's circles in which she was already well known. This lecture is among the many essays and addresses that Sunderland published in pamphlet form on religion, ethics, and women's rights. She published just one book, James Martineau and His Greatest Book (1905), a discussion of Martineau's Study of Religion, which she co-authored with her husband. A considerable number of introductory lectures on philosophy and religion produced during her time at the University of Michigan were left unpublished. Sunderland was born in 1839 in Huntsville, Illinois, to Amasa and Jane (Henderson) Read, both of whom were committed Quakers. Despite her father's early death, Sunderland received a good education for a woman in this period, attending a girls' school in Abingdon, Illinois, until the age of 15. She then taught in local Illinois schools herself until 1863 when she was accepted into Mount Holyoke Seminary, which at the time was the college of choice for women in the United States. Although she was offered a teaching position at Mount Holyoke upon graduating, she was unable to accept it due to family issues that today are unknown, so she returned to Illinois to teach at a high school in Aurora. In two years, she was promoted to principal of the high school, joining Anna Brackett as one of the first women in the country to head a secondary school.

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Sunderland maintained a surprisingly steady career path for a married woman in this era. After her marriage in 1871 and the birth of their three children (Gertrude, 1873; Edson, 1875; Florence, 1877), Jabez was offered a pastorate on the University of Michigan campus. Shortly after the move to Ann Arbor in 1878, Eliza resumed teaching at the high school level. By the mid 1880s, Sunderland began taking classes at the University of Michigan, earning a second bachelor's degree, in philosophy, in 1889. She then went on to earn a doctorate in philosophy at Michigan one year after her fellow idealist Marietta Kies (Ph.D., 1891). Sunderland and Kies were among just four women who studied philosophy at the graduate level at Michigan prior to 1900.3 Sunderland came to the idealist movement well after the St. Louis group had dispersed, establishing schools and lecture series at both Concord and Plymouth, Massachusetts, as well as in Milwaukee, Wisconsin; Indianapolis, Indiana; Chicago, Illinois; the San Francisco bay area; Denver, Colorado; and both upstate and metropolitan New York. But as a student of George Sylvester Morris and John Dewey at the University of Michigan in the late 1880s, she was exposed to a more disciplined approach to the study of philosophy. She took several courses with Dewey when his pragmatist philosophy was just beginning to emerge, as well as with Henry Carter Adams, who was becoming well known as a political economist. Sunderland's class notes reflect a clear sense of the historic development of philosophy — political philosophy in particular — as well as an interest in applying it to the contemporary context. She also took a course on the history and philosophy of religion with James Tufts. Perhaps because she was so deeply immersed in religion in her personal life, she developed an interest in the intersections between philosophy and religion as she studied for the doctorate. Therefore, she emphasized the moral aspects of philosophical thought, an emphasis reflected in her doctoral thesis on Kant and Hegel. Due to the influence of Dewey and other Michigan faculty, however, Sunderland did not share with her St. Louis and Concord contemporaries a passion for advocating Hegel's thought. Her dissertation presented a balanced view of the thought of both Kant and Hegel, noting their strengths and weaknesses, but not championing one over the other. In short, Sunderland had a broader, more academic approach to philosophy than did her idealist predecessors in St. Louis. Associations with other idealists There is no evidence that Sunderland knew Harris or other men in the St. Louis branch of the idealist movement; she did not contribute any articles to JSP nor have any books included in Harris's International Education Series. Yet, she clearly had close professional relationships with both George

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Sylvester Morris and John Dewey while both men were at the University of Michigan. The Sunderlands' church often hosted university-related events, and the faculty-student discussion group, the Unity Club, met there regularly to debate social, political, and philosophical issues of the day. Morris, Dewey, and Adams were frequent guest speakers at these and Unity Club meetings as well as other gatherings that took place at the church. After Morris's sudden death of pneumonia in the winter of 1889, Sunderland studied primarily with Dewey and Adams, picking up strains of Dewey's early pragmatic thought and ultimately writing her dissertation under his guidance. It is clear that Sunderland knew and corresponded with several women in the idealist movement, most obviously Marietta Kies, Caroline Miles Hill, and Alice Graves, with whom she studied at Michigan. Hill, who earned a Ph.D. alongside Sunderland in 1892, took a fellowship at Bryn Mawr after completing her degree, and wrote several letters to Sunderland during this time. Even though Hill mentions Kies only briefly in these letters, it is clear that the two women knew Kies well and that both Sunderland and Hill respected her intellectually. Hill's letters to Sunderland also detail the contrast between the tone of the Michigan campus for women and her new set of experiences at Bryn Mawr. Alice Graves echoed these sentiments years later when asked to reflect on George Sylvester Morris as a professor and mentor to women at Michigan. The university was a hostile place for women at that time, according to both Hill and Graves. It was a young and coeducational institution, but in many ways it was still a men's institution. Graves expressed the sense that the majority of male students resented women's presence on campus and that male professors exacerbated that resentment by displaying dismissive attitudes toward women, their academic abilities, and their contributions in the classroom. Morris and Dewey were two valued exceptions to the rule whom both Hill and Graves appreciated. Both men encouraged women's participation in the classroom and gave their academic work serious consideration and constructive criticism. When the second campaign to appoint Sunderland to a faculty position at Michigan was underway - a position that Dewey was vacating to go to Chicago — Dewey himself wrote a favorable letter of recommendation on her behalf. With Morris's death in 1889 and Dewey's departure in 1894, two valuable advocates for women were lost. In the end, only three women Sunderland, Hill, and Kies - earned Ph.D.s in philosophy at Michigan in the nineteenth century. After Dewey's departure, there were no women doctoral graduates in the discipline until after the turn of the twentieth century. Sunderland also knew Anna Brackett and Ellen Mitchell, both of whom wrote at least occasional letters to her. Brackett's daughter, Hope, boarded with Sunderland's family during the 1887-8 academic year, when Sunderland was just starting to resume her studies at the University of Michigan and Hope

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attended the university as a first-year student. Brackett and Sunderland corresponded fairly regularly this year. Often Brackett simply apologized for being late with Hope's monthly room and board money, but she also discussed Hope's academic progress as well as her social and personal development. Brackett wrote to Sunderland about Hope's knowledge of both sex and death, for instance. She explained that Hope had been told about reproduction at an early age, so there was no need for Sunderland to tread lightly on this topic. Death was another matter, Brackett said, because it involved so many unknowns and Hope had no personal experience of it. Mitchell wrote to Sunderland just a handful of times, but these letters provide valuable evidence of an intellectual community of women. In one such letter Mitchell commented on a book she had sent Sunderland - her own Study of Greek Philosophy, a book "inspired by the sympathy and friendly cooperation of sister-women."5 She sent it to Sunderland, she said, in the belief that it would be of interest to another woman in the field.

Second only to Dr. Dewey: Sunderland's theoretical work

A large portion of Sunderland's written work about half of it — focused on the history and philosophy of religion. Considerably less was devoted to philosophy proper. She spent even less time writing on women's role and rights. In fact, just under ten per cent of her writings focused on women at all. Yet her support for the achievement of women is as central to understanding her life and work as it is for understanding Anna Brackett and Grace Bibb. Sunderland's social and political work on behalf of women consumed a great deal of her time and energy, and she was a valuable teacher and mentor to scores of women at the University of Michigan during the twenty years she and her husband spent there. Furthermore, she did write and lecture on women's role and rights, starting with an early essay on higher education for women (ca. 1875) and ending with lengthy testimony on women's voting rights before the Connecticut state legislature late in life (1909). In contrast to Brackett, however, Sunderland espoused a maternalistic view of women and their role in society, then used that view to argue for their increased participation in public life. In an undated essay "What Agencies Should Employ Women for the Uplift of Society?" for instance, Sunderland argued that, aside from their vitally important work as wives and mothers, women are especially well suited to work in what are now referred to as the helping professions: as religious reformers, as educators, and as social welfare advocates. In "Vocations and Avocations for Wfomen" and "Woman as an Economic Factor in American Life," she expanded this argument. While never proposing that women should be relegated solely to the home, Sunderland

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nevertheless insisted that their maternal, caretaking work has inherent value, deserves recognition, and makes real contributions to public and economic life. Sunderland refined her maternalism in 1893 with her lecture at the Chicago World's Fair, "Higher Education and the Home." Education does, to some degree make women unfit for domestic life, Sunderland said, but this simply means that some adjustments had to be made to the educational and social structure as it then stood. Since the home is the foundation of society, public schools, colleges, and universities need to begin to play a different role for both males and females. Elementary schools need to provide better moral and physical education, so as to develop good, responsible citizens. Secondary schools and colleges need to reshape their curriculum, so that there is a more direct relationship between courses in the sciences, economics, and psychology and "the practical laboratory of the home and of society."6 Then, Catharine Beecher-like, Sunderland asserted that the home will rise in importance and public esteem. Women's more efficient housekeeping, as a result of having been well educated, will allow them more time for volunteer work, writing, or the pursuit of a profession. Sunderland further projected that men's relation to the home and to society would also be enhanced by improving the connection between education and domestic and social life, but in this address, she is concerned only with establishing how women's education will inform their life and work. She offered no concrete examples of how this would take place for men. Sunderland gave a number of other lectures on women's roles and rights during her many years of involvement in both religious and secular women's organizations, but they did not appear in print. Her final — and lengthy — discussion of women's rights comes in the form of her 1909 testimony before the Connecticut legislature in which she argues for women's suffrage. First, Sunderland noted, voting is "a right guaranteed to all citizens of a Republic ... a government 'of the people, by the people, and for the people.' " Next, women worked alongside men in the nation's greatest conflicts — the American Revolution and Civil War - thus helping to win freedom and unity as a people. In addition, women need the vote to protect themselves from unjust laws enacted by men for whom women's needs and interests are not a priority. Sunderland gave several examples: the ban on women jurors; unjust property, inheritance, and child custody laws; and sex-based wage laws. Finally, voting rights will heighten women's moral and intellectual stature, both as individuals and within society. In this essay, Sunderland tempered her maternalistic leanings considerably. She focused not on the good women can do in the home as wives and mothers, but instead on an enhanced public role for them. Unfortunately, there are no hints from Sunderland's other writings to shed light on how and why she shifted away from her maternal feminist stance to the more egalitarian/liberal feminism we see in her Connecticut legislature address.

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Her work on comparative religions and women's role in them may have been one factor. The intensified struggle for women's voting rights at the time she gave this address may well have been another. Sunderland's lecture to the Congress of Women at the 1893 World's Fair was just one of three she gave at this major, months-long event. She also lectured at the Philosophy and Science Department and at the Parliament of World Religions. The last of these two lectures won her a great deal of recognition as a public intellectual, among men as well as women. In "The Importance of the Study of Comparative Religions," Sunderland focused more on the similarities among religions than on what makes them valuable and distinctive in their own right. Her insights were largely anthropological. Religion in all of its forms is: (1) one of the highest forms of culture, (2) based in morality, (3) grounded in a sense of personal and communal duty, (4) a relation between the human and the divine, and (5) a natural attribute of humanity. Studying other religions is valuable in her view because it helps us to understand and appreciate our own religion more thoroughly. Sunderland tried to avoid placing Christianity at the top of a hierarchy of religions, as was so common in this era. In fact, she questioned why so many people were amused by a Muslim group's announcement that it planned to evangelize in the Chicago area. Was it because they saw Islam as inherently inferior to the Christian religion that dominates in the United States? If so, she asked her audience to consider Christianity's failure to curb any number of social vices, such as crime, infidelity, and intemperance, and to consider the possibility that Islam would be more successful in combatting these vices. Less probing in her long discussion of Judaism, she falls into the common Christian supercessionist assumption — that Christianity made a radical departure from Judaism at the time of Jesus and is now a religion vastly superior to it: "How long the journey from the early tribal sacrificial, magical, unmoral, fetish, holy place, human sacrifice worship of the early Semites, including the Hebrews, to the universal fatherhood and brotherhood religion of the Sermon on the Mount and the golden rule." Though familiar with the anthropological research on Semitic tribes and culture in the ancient world in her discussion of Judaism, Sunderland clearly had not yet encountered early work on the historical Jesus and Jewish theological developments in the era just prior to the advent of Christianity, though a rich body of literature in this area of Christian theology existed in her day. She would have benefited greatly from an understanding of the long-standing balance between law and love, justice and compassion represented in the figures of Moses and Aaron, respectively. Her ability to provide a fairer comparison between Christianity and Judaism also would have been heightened if she'd known more about the Pharasaic/rabbinic tradition of which Jesus and his predecessor Hillel the Elder were almost certainly a part.2

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Sunderland's inability to see beyond the typical Christian supercessionist view that was prevalent in this era is predictable, because she was relatively conservative theologically. In a debate over the religious identity of Unitarianism, she and her husband took the traditionalist view. The denomination had been known for its liberalism since its founding in the US during the American Revolution. By the mid 1880s, it was so open to theological skepticism and dissent that Sunderland and others began to fear that it was becoming a vacuous belief system. She and her husband disagreed so strongly with other denominational leaders, like Jenkin Lloyd Jones, who embraced this radical and growing liberalism, that they founded their own periodical, Unitarian Monthly, to combat the influence of Jones's Unity magazine. Eliza and Jabez Sunderland used the Monthly as a venue to express their view that their liberal denomination needed to return to its Christian and theistic roots. In the end, the Sunderlands lost the debate. In the name of religious freedom, the denomination refused to make the sort of statement of faith that the Eliza and her husband favored. The denomination also failed to embrace the conservative claim that its Christian roots were central to its contemporary belief system.9 Sunderland wrote several introductory lectures on philosophy and religion, none of which were published in her lifetime. She also produced a doctoral dissertation that demonstrated a real grasp of the two most influential German philosophers in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries: "Man's Relation to the Absolute according to the Philosophy of Kant and of Hegel." Her dissertation represents a bridge between St. Louis Hegelianism and the broader forms of idealism that developed in Concord, Glenmore, and New York. In this work, she reviewed the arguments in Kant's three Critiques, and, consistent with the St. Louis branch of the idealist movement, criticizes his hyperindividualism. Also consistent with St. Louis thought, Sunderland displayed an emerging personalism when she focused on Hegel's claim that God is "the absolute Person" and that "personality is universality." Focusing on God as Person is an inclination also present in Susan Blow's writings, and it grew into a full-blown school of thought in Boston in the early twentieth century. 11 A strength of Sunderland's dissertation, and what makes her stand apart from her St. Louis idealist colleagues, however, is the way in which it simply pointed to the strengths and weaknesses in both Kant and Hegel. She did not take sides, as the St. Louis group had tended to do, championing Hegel over Kant or vice versa. Instead, she maintained that their two systems of thought are complementary: Each thinker bases his theory of things upon the utterance of human reason, each gives to the reason both on its theoretical and practical side a creative power, each looks for the absolute unity in an absolute reason; hence each is

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rationalistic and spiritualistic. And their differences which seem on the face of them so great, prove on closer scrutiny to be only differences of degree. The year before Sunderland wrote her dissertation, her name had been put forward by graduate students and colleagues as a candidate for a philosophy faculty position that was soon to be left vacant by James H. Tufts. Since she lacked the doctoral degree at that time, however, it would have been understandable if the administration at Michigan found her an unfit candidate for the job- W were it not for the fact that neither of the two men hired that year, George H. Mead and Albert H. Lloyd, held a Ph.D. at the time of appointment. In 1894, after having completed her degree, Sunderland again encountered sex bias. John Dewey was leaving the university, and her supporters put her name forward once more. Dewey himself wrote her a letter of recommendation: It is simple justice to Mrs. Sunderland to state that she more than earned her degree. Whether one considers the range of ground covered, the mass of facts acquired, the grasp and assimilation of those facts, the power of stating them in well-arranged and clear terms, the power of bringing out their moral and practical bearing, Mrs. Sunderland's work appears equally admirable. In case Mrs. Sunderland should care ever to take up the work of instruction in philosophy, I feel sure that she would succeed thoroughly in it. For such work, I can recommend her with the utmost confidence. 12 Yet again, the university stood by its policy against hiring women faculty, and again appointed a male, George Rebec, who had not yet earned a doctoral degree. But Sunderland was not one to let external circumstances hold her back. In the fall of 1894, faculty position or no faculty position, she offered a series of introductory philosophy lectures at the Unitarian church for her Bible students, the majority of whom were also University of Michigan students. She called the series "The Religious Thought of the Great Thinkers and Writers of the Nineteenth Century," and it featured the canonical figures in philosophy and religion at the time: Kant, Hegel, Schleiermacher, Schopenhauer, Lotze, von Hartmann, Comte, Mill, Spencer, and Martineau. Each of the lectures provided at least a bit of the biography of each thinker, then discussed his work within his philosophical and religious context. As a body of work, this series demonstrates how well versed Sunderland was in the academic philosophy of her day and time, despite her status as a paraprofessional in the discipline.

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America's First Women Philosophers Lucia Ames Mead: pacifist theorist

Like Sunderland and Marietta Kies, Lucia Ames Mead became part of the idealist movement in its later years. In the late 1870s, she had begun corresponding with William Torrey Harris and reading philosophy under his direction. Kant's work interested her the most, particularly his moral and political philosophy. Rejecting the prospect of pursuing an academic career, Ames Mead nevertheless incorporated philosophy into her life. She became enamored with Kant's Theory of Perpetual Peace and by midlife was a core member of the anti-war movement, writing numerous books, pamphlets, and articles on pacifist theory, pedagogy, and activism, among them "A Primer of the Peace Movement" (1904), Patriotism and the Mew Internationalism (1906), "Patriotism and Peace: how to teach them in the schools" (1910), Swords and Ploughshares (1912), The Overthrow of the War System (1915), and Law or War (1928). Unlike many activists whose understanding of pacifism was not as well-grounded theoretically as Ames Mead's was, she remained a pacifist throughout World War I. In fact, she made an even stronger stance for peace after this war, calling for US support of the effort to establish a world court and league of nations. A feminist, Ames Mead was a founding member of the Women's Peace Party (1915) and the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (1922). Like Sunderland, Ames Mead was devoted to the liberal Protestant Unitarian denomination of which she was a member, though she was not as deeply involved in denominational politics as Sunderland was. She was also, in collaboration with May Wright Sewall and Jane Addams, a chief organizer and speaker at women's peace conferences in the early twentieth century, the largest of which was the 1914 International Conference of Women Workers to Promote Permanent Peace in San Francisco, "Women, World War, and Permanent Peace." Ames Mead's arguments on behalf of peace were not maternalistic. Instead Ames Mead, a liberal feminist, like Brackett, Bibb, and Mitchell, argued for pacifism from a humanistic point of view. The connection between feminism and pacifism for her was social/political. Women may have more of an understanding of the damage caused by war and thus more motivation to work for peace. But this is because of the position they are in as wives, mothers, daughters, or sisters of the war dead and/or as teachers of the next generation, not because of anything inherent in their nature as women.

Family life and education Lucia Ames Mead was born in 1856 in Boscawen, New Hampshire, to Nathan and Elvira (Coffin) Ames. Her mother died of illness during the Civil War,

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and the family relocated to Chicago where Lucia remained until she was 14 years old. In 1870, she moved back to New England, living with her older brother, Charles, who introduced her to the intellectual and cultural life of Boston. Having a talent for music, she studied with some of the top musicians of the day and became an accomplished pianist. She then established herself as a piano teacher, which provided her w ? ith the career and financial independence that other women in her generation often lacked. 13 Ames Mead took advantage of this independence, pursuing the things that interested her — literature, the arts, and philosophy. She wrote several books, beginning with a book for children and a fictional version of her own memoirs in 1888 and 1889, respectively. She then became deeply involved in the peace advocacy that would consume her until the end of her life, authoring and editing several major works on pacifism, along with a number of pamphlets on the subject, between 1899 and 1928. Ames Mead took her own path in regard to home and family. Since she was able to earn her own living, she was under no compulsion to marry. Although for years she had been friendly with one of her brother's closest friends, Edwin Doak Mead, the two did not marry until Ames Mead was 42 years old and they did not have any children. Once they were married, however, Lucia and Edwin were a model intellectual/activist couple. 14 They traveled, studied, wrote, and lectured together, devoting themselves to working out their pacifist theory, though both were also committed to religious liberalism and women's rights, about which they also wrote and lectured. While Ames Mead was relatively well educated for a woman in this era, she did not attain the same level of advanced formal training in philosophy as Sunderland and Kies. Instead, she was largely tutored by her brother, who had been educated at Amherst College and later became a prominent editor and publisher. Charles had discovered St. Louis idealism early on, when he read the very first issue of JSP in 1867 and was immediately taken with Harris's criticism of Herbert Spencer's overly mechanistic theory of evolution. Charles began to correspond with Harris in St. Louis, and the two became good friends over time. Lucia was only a child when Charles first discovered St. Louis idealism, but as she grew into her teens and twenties, her brother introduced her, not only to Harris's ideas but to the man himself. Harris served as a teacher and mentor to Lucia, much as he did to Marietta Kies. Ames Mead attended the Concord School of Philosophy regularly, listening to Harris's lectures, among others. She also organized a Saturday lecture series, featuring Harris, to supplement his Concord School lectures in the summer. Eventually this series evolved into one that she ran in Harris's absence in the winter. The world of ideas was clearly something that Ames Mead thrived within and valued. Yet relatively early in her study of Kant and Hegel, she wrote to Harris that, while she was tempted to pursue purely academic work in

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philosophy, she believed the application of ideas to the everyday world and its problems was more important than studying ideas for their own sake. This moment of clarity and conviction when she was just 22 years old foreshadowed her future work in pacifist theory and peace advocacy, which began in earnest in the late 1890s, just prior to the Spanish—American War.

Idealist connections

Ames Mead was well known within turn-of-the-century feminist and pacifist circles. Jane Addams, May Wright Sewall, and Emily Green Balch were among her closest friends, and all of them moved in both of these circles. While Addams certainly knew of Harris through her friend and colleague John Dewey, of the three only Sewall had clear connections to Harris and the idealist movement, having written an article in JSP in the 1880s. The clearly feminist-minded women in the idealist movement - Brackett, Bibb, Mitchell, and Sunderland — were not close to Ames Mead. They were either aging and becoming less involved in public and intellectual life, as was the case with Brackett and Bibb, or were too focused on their own intellectual work, as with Mitchell and Sunderland, to have come into contact with Ames Mead and her pacifist theory/activism. Kies, whose theory of altruism has several points of connection with Ames Mead's pacifism, had already died of tuberculosis when Ames Mead entered her most productive period at the turn of the century. Even though Marietta Kies and Ames Mead attended the Concord School together, there is no evidence that they were close or even relatively well acquainted.

The evolution of American pacifism

In 1895, the businessman Albert Smiley organized a meeting to promote peace and international arbitration at his resort in the Catskill Mountains, which took place annually and came to be known as the Lake Mohonk Conference on International Arbitration. He invited Ames Mead to the conference in 1897, where she presented a paper on educating the public about peace advocacy. From that point on, she committed herself to pacifism — particularly to the practical, diplomatic ways of attaining and sustaining peace in an increasingly complex world. Ames Mead was not simply an activist, however, but a pacifist theorist whose ideas were grounded in Kant's Theory of Perpetual Peace, a work she read in the 1870s while under the tutelage of William Torrey Harris. The Mohonk conferences provided an appropriate venue for Ames Mead to develop her pacifist theory because, like Smiley, the sponsor of

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the conferences, she was not an absolute pacifist but instead favored international arbitration. The pacifist movement in America started in earnest as early as 1815, with the founding of peace organizations in New York and Massachusetts by David Low Dodge and Noah Webster, respectively. In 1828, William Ladd established the first national organization of this sort, the American Peace Society. The movement was soon populated by religiously minded people who objected to violence in any form, and preached a doctrine of nonresistance — i.e., absolute non-violence even when under attack. During the period of Indian removals and the war against Mexico, peace activists continued to take an absolutist stance, denouncing US imperialism and aggression. The Civil War presented more of a dilemma for pacifists. Slavery itself was a form of violence and must be ended. But was war the only way of ending it? Many took the position that slavery not only could but must be ended using peaceful means. Others believed that an evil as great as slavery might be the one thing that could justify a war. The Civil War turned some pacifists into strategic militarists: war had indeed been the only way to end slavery, and the sacrifice was well worth it. Others became converts to a stronger sense of pacifism, because they'd been so horrified by the killing of Americans by Americans as a means of ending the violence of slavery. By the 1870s, there were several different strains of pacifism in the US, Julia Ward Howe famously tied the quest for peace to feminism with her 1870 proclamation for a "mother's day for peace," which we now celebrate simply as Mother's Day. Other forms of pacifism began to develop as well. The brand that Lucia Ames Mead and her colleagues espoused was known as "practical" pacifism, which, based on Kant's Perpetual Peace, focused on establishing rules for diplomacy and engagement when there is a disagreement or conflict between nations, and for setting up a system of international arbitration in the event that nations reach the brink of war. Thus, the Mohonk participants with whom Ames Mead began to work in 1897 were largely business people, clergy, and intellectuals who wanted to help establish and encourage diplomatic ways to achieve peace. They were not idealists or religionists who envisioned a day in which all armed conflicts would cease to exist. The key to a peaceful world for Ames Mead and her newfound colleagues was international arbitration, through both a world court and an international alliance of nations - what would become the League of Nations, and later the United Nations. Ames Mead knew Perpetual Peace well, as did others in the peace-through-arbitration movement, including her female colleagues May Wright Sewall and Emily Green Balch, as well as the male pacifists she came to know. In fact, the publisher Hamilton Holt, who was active in the peace movement beginning in the 1890s, cited Kant in his 1915 address to the American Branch of the League to Enforce Peace.16

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Ames Mead's pacifist theory As noted, Ames Mead authored several books and numerous pamphlets and articles on peace, basing her pacifist theory on Kant's Theory of Perpetual Peace, The most theoretical of these works were Patriotism and the New Internationalism (1906), Swords and Ploughshares (1912), and Law or War (1928). In each of these works, Ames Mead at least mentions the importance of educating children and young adults about the theory and practice of pacifism, but this issue is front and center in Patriotism and the Mew Internationalism. She opens this work by defining patriotism, debunking the myth that the ultimate act of loyalty to one's country consists of sacrificing one's life for it in time of war. Instead, she emphasizes the importance of a day-to-day commitment to helping the cultural and civic life of the homeland thrive by working hard and helping to improve health, education, and social welfare: Teach the child that the farmer, the miller, the baker, the doctor, the nurse, and the health board, the fireman, the policeman, the teacher, preacher, and mother are serving their country — even more than the man who makes guns or uses them. Teach [children] that these men and women are fighting the famine, fire, disease, ignorance, and sin, which are the only real enemies we have and are vastly more destructive than any foe that ever threatened us in arms. 1 She praises curricular initiatives in both America and Europe that work toward this end by outlining the elements of pacifist ideals, thus helping students become the peacemakers of the future. This effort can and should extend to post-secondary education, with negotiation and arbitration as a possible course of study for college students. In both Patriotism and the Mew Internationalism and Swords and Ploughshares, Ames Mead ties anti-imperialism to her pacifist stance. While there are some instances in which American and European ventures in the developing world have helped improve economic and social conditions in that nation, overall imperialism has been nothing more than another form of domination and violence. And the concept that the subordination of "lesser" civilizations is natural or even necessary is hopelessly flawed. World leaders who hold this view seem to have forgotten that Moses or St. Paul had ever affected human wills; that Columbus, Copernicus, Gutenberg, Watt and Morse had done anything to emancipate man from the brute limitations in time and space and experience; that Homer, Shakespeare, Phidias, Raphael, Beethoven and ten thousand other God-gifted beings had wrought miracles and lifted millions on their shoulders.18

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The solution to ending this and other forms of violence is to overcome the "anarchical international condition [that] occasions the exhibitions of greed, arrogance and injustice" around the globe. In short, world governments must establish a rational system of international cooperation to make and maintain peace. To realize such a system, the leaders of these governments needed to establish world bodies to mediate when disagreements arise between nations (what became the World Court at The Hague) and also provide a means for interchange and engagement among nations to help prevent disputes from arising in the first place. The concept of rationality runs throughout all of Ames Mead's works. In fact, she was nearly as critical of peace activists with a Utopian peace-and-love vision as she was of avid militarists. In both cases, the element of rationality was missing and failed to avert the real life perils that thousands of people faced in wartime: There has been much ineffective talk about brotherly love, relegating it to some far-off day for the end of war. It confounds disputes with war. Disputes, racial, financial, religious, and national, will break out for an indefinite time . . . Our problem is to settle these disputes when they arise even more than to prevent their arising. Shall it be by conciliation or judicial decision, or shall it be by explosives destroying conscripts who on both sides are . . . innocent? 20 Ames Mead herself favored a practical pacifism, which she worked out in a four-phase theory of peace: (1) peace as internationalism; (2) pacificistic action as patriotic action; (3) absolute rejection of war as an option; (4) peace through education. Of the four, phases (1) and (4) stand out as the most significant for Ames Mead. They also most clearly demonstrate her appropriation of Kant's theory. Peace, altruism, and internationalism were almost inextricably linked for Ames Mead. She sharply criticized the common notion of patriotism as nationalistic pride. This is a phenomenon she'd seen expressed in American xenophobia as waves of immigrants from Central Europe and the Mediterranean came to the US, and one that was also increasingly present in the Balkan region as pre-World War I tensions were percolating. It was a misguided ideal of patriotism, Ames Mead insisted, because it was based on nothing but hatred and fear of the Other (as we would say today) in order to heighten our image of our nation and ourselves. Less surprised than repulsed by this phenomenon, Ames Mead acknowledged that patriotism had been "confounded with pride and prejudice, bragging and bunting and relic-hunting." 21 Her intent was to help reshape, or even to redefine, the meaning of the word "patriotism" so that it represented, instead of simply the willingness to go to war (or "to kill Spaniards" as one child offered as a definition of the word), a deep commitment to bettering the plight of others.

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Ames Mead agreed with Kies on this point. Only a deeply rooted altruism, embedded in the principles of society itself, could help to realize this sort of patriotism. This would entail a uniform and equitable social/political structure to ensure the welfare of all — fair housing, adequate sanitation, excellen education, empowering labor practices, and a just penal system. For Ames Mead, it was in taking action to better others in these ways that an individual becomes truly patriotic. Ames Mead's vision for patriotic behavior didn't end at nurturing society on the domestic front. It also extended to the cosmopolitanism that Kant addressed in Perpetual Peace. Ames Mead was encouraged by and enthusiast about the proliferation of international congresses and organizations in her time, meeting to collaborate on everything from agricultural production, to educational theory, to the expansion of Kant's theories of peace. She drew on the American experience after the destruction of the Civil War to underscore the promise and value of this new development: Today, the citizens of all our states and of every land need a like emancipation from an outgrown theory which would make them set apart any fraction of the globe and say . . . "I am first of all a Russian, or a Frenchman, a German or an American." . . . [Each of us is] first of all a human being, a citizen of the world, one member in a brotherhood which includes mankind. 22 Her understanding of the individual as a member of the world community motivated Ames Mead. That is why she remained committed to helping arrange international congresses on peace, which had begun to meet in earnest in 1899. It also accounts for why she believed so strongly that a world body, organized around the idea of ensuring lasting peace around the globe, would ultimately succeed in at least alleviating the damage done by war — and per haps of making war a thing of the past. A strength of Ames Mead's work was that she simply refused to accept common notions of political right, just war, and international conflict and the inevitability of war in the end. Instead, she redefined the terms war and peace, reinforced the idea that political "right" cannot take precedence over humanitarian good when mediating conflicts, rejected the idea that any war could be truly just, and insisted that systems of mediation can make international conflicts manageable, if not obsolete. Hers was a philosophic model that would be given credibility by one of the twentieth century's most famous pacifists, Mohandas Gandhi, whose practice of nonviolent resistance taught the world something new about the limits of imperialism and the power of peaceful, resourceful community action.

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In regard to women's philosophy and political/social theory, Ames Mead's concern with education is important. Susan Blow, Anna Brackett, and Grace Bibb grounded their idealism in pedagogy, after all. In this sense, pedagogical theory was the branch of philosophy through which women were able to enter the discipline throughout the nineteenth century. Therefore, this aspect of Ames Mead's work represents an important strain of thought that can and should be considered more prominent than it often is. Furthermore, her ideas have real potential for being applied today. What if pacifism is one of the virtues that can be taught? The curricula she developed nearly a century ago, then, might indeed hold promise for us as we address our contemporary problems with both violence at home and international terrorism.

Conclusion The paraprofessional philosophies of Sunderland and Ames Mead illustrate just how differently women's theories developed as American philosophy became increasingly professionalized and women were largely excluded from contributing to its development. Sunderland demonstrated competence in the field, avoiding many of the pitfalls Mitchell had fallen into, but was barred from professional academic life because she was female. Even so, she established her own intellectual terrain, making a name for herself as a dynamic lecturer on issues related to women, religion, and, to some degree, philosophy. Ames Mead presents a different case. She opted not to enter the purely academic world, because its rather narrow focus was too confining for her. Instead she worked to apply the theories she'd encountered to critically important national and international policy matters. In both cases, the philosophies that resulted were concrete and applied, rather than abstract and theoretical. Sunderland's work cannot be understood apart from her feminist and religious commitments. Ames Mead's ideas cannot be evaluated outside of the pacifist circles she helped to create and sustain. Both women made sure to engage in purely academic philosophical work along the way, but without an appropriate venue for such work, there was little incentive for either of them to develop any abstract philosophical systems or even to more fully develop the arguments they advanced in their practical work. Therefore, they had every reason to remain paraprofessional philosophers, helping to build a genealogy of women's thought, while being written out of the history of the discipline in the end. A whole generation of women with academic credentials would have to emerge before women's philosophy could be developed in the academy, beginning with intellectual innovators like Marietta Kies.

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Notes to Chapter 5 Notes

1.

I use "Ames Mead" as the surname for Lucia Ames Mead in order to help distinguish her from other famous "Meads" as well as to recognize her surname from birth until her marriage in 1898 at the age of 42. 2. Lucinda Hinsdale Stone quoting an unnamed female student at the University of Michigan in a letter to James Angell, president of the university, October 19, 1891. In James B. Angell Papers, Bentley Historic Library Archives. 3. Caroline Miles completed the degree the same year as Sunderland, but her career withered after her marriage to Thomas Hill sometime after 1896. Alice Graves ended her study of philosophy at master's level, though she maintained ties to the idealist movement and provided valuable commentary late in her life on her study with George Sylvester Morris and her experience at the University of Michigan generally. 4. As discussed, Harris established the Concord School of Philosophy. Henry Carter Adams ran a summer school in Plymouth. Denton Snider set up schools and lectures in Milwaukee and Chicago with the assistance of Elizabeth Harrison, Caroline K. Sherman, and Mary Beedy. May Wright Sewall organized women's programs in Indianapolis. Elizabeth Harrison developed courses on education for women in San Francisco. George Holmes Howison ran an academic forum at the University of California, Berkeley. Ellen Mitchell held women's discussion sessions, first in Denver, and then in Syracuse. Thomas Davidson hosted a summer program in the Adirondacks and coordinated an evening adult education program for immigrants in lower Manhattan. Susan Blow lectured at the new Teacher's College, Columbia University. 5. Ellen M. Mitchell's letter to Sunderland, December 4, 1891, in Eliza Jane Read Sunderland Papers, Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. 6. Sunderland, "Higher Education and the Home," address presented at the Women's Congress, World's Columbian Exposition, 1893, and published in The World's Congress of Representative Women, Chicago, 1893, May Wright Sewa ed.,322. 7. Sunderland, "The Importance of the Study of Comparative Religions," in The World's Congress of Religions: the addresses and papers delivered before the parliament,

8.

August 25-October 15,1893 (Chicago: Monarch Book Company, 1894), 301. As early as 1835, David FriedrichStrauss's.Da.y/.^wJe.s-M {The Life of Jesus) recognized the mytho-poetic character of New Testament literature and pointed to parallels to, and transpositions of, the prophetic writings of the Hebrew Scriptures with the gospel texts. By the middle of the century, this discussion had expanded and become even more sophisticated. See Karl Heinrich Weizsacker, Untersuchungen die evangelische Geschichte, ihre Quellen und den Gang ihrer Entwicklung (Studies in the Gospel History, its Sources and the Progress of its Development), (Gotha, 1864); and Strauss, Der Christus des Glaubens and der Jesus der Geschichte (The Christ of Faith and the Jesus of History), (Berlin, 1865).

Motes to Chapter 5 9. 10.

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See A Stream of Light: A Short History of American Unitarianism, by Conrad Wright (Boston: Skinner House Books, 1989), 84-92. In 2003, Sunderland's philosophical works were finally put into print as part of Thoemmes Press's "History of American Thought" series, in a four-volume set, which I edited. See Dorothy Rogers, ed. The Women of the St. Louis Idealist Movement 1860-1925, volume four.

1 1.

The two most prominent Boston Personalists were Borden Parker Bowne (1847 1910) and Edgar Sheffield Brightman (1884-1953), both of whom taught at Boston University in the early twentieth century. The movement was active into the 1950s, with Walter Muelder (1907-2004), dean of the university's school of theology, espousing this school of thought as well.

12.

John Dewey to James Angell, June 23, 1894, in James Angell Papers, Bentley Historical Library archives.

13.

See Lucia Ames Mead (1856-1936) and the American Peace Movement, by John M. Craig (Lewiston, NY: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1990).

14.

According to John Craig, shortly after the outbreak of World War I, Edwin Mead was caught in a struggle for the leadership and identity of the World Peace Foundation - a struggle which he lost. This precipitated his severe emotional breakdown. He suffered from migraine headaches, insomnia, and a poor appetite and sometimes spent entire days crying out in pain and despair. Despite attempts to diagnose and treat the problem, he did not recover until after the war ended. Other than this years-long period of anguish for both Edwin as he struggled against his malady and Lucia as she strived to be a helpful and supportive mate, the couple had a good relationship. In the 1920s and 1930s, Edwin returned to his normal, productive and politically involved self, and the two grew into their elder years together.

15.

Lucia Ames Mead to William Torrey Harris, September 20, 1878 in William Torrey Harris Papers, Houghton Library archives, Harvard University. Proceedings of the conference of the League to Enforce Peace, Independence Hall, Philadelphia, June 17, 1915. Ames Mead, Teaching Patriotism and Justice, presentation to the American Instit of Instruction in Montreal, July, 1907, published by the American Peace Society, 3 and 5. Lucia Ames Mead, Patriotism and the New Internationalism (Boston: Ginn & Company, 1906), 47-8. Ibid. 45.

16. 1 7.

18. 19. 20.

Lucia Ames Mead, "The Sole Remedy for War," World Unity Magazine, reprint -#"12, n.d. [ca. 1935], page 4.

21.

Patriotism and the New Internationalism, 4.

22.

Ibid. 37.

Chapter 6 Marietta Kies: private virtue in public life

Introduction to Marietta Kies Marietta Kies (1853—99) stands apart from her women idealist colleagues in a number of ways. Like Ames Mead, she was younger than the majority of the women idealists by an average of fifteen years, so was barely beginning her academic career at Mt. Holyoke Seminary when Harris returned east in 1880. Thus she was not involved with the development of idealism in its earliest days as a member of the paraprofessional philosopher—educator class in St. Louis. Yet Kies's youth played in her favor. Since her career was getting underway on the East Coast just as Harris et at. were setting up the Concord School, she was party to this incarnation of the idealist movement. This gave her access to professional academic philosophers, access that her older female colleagues did not have — at least not at the same early stage in their careers Like Sunderland, Kies was one of only twenty women in the US to earn a doctoral degree in philosophy. Like Mitchell and Bibb, she is among a relatively small number of women in the late nineteenth century who held faculty positions at the college and university levels; in Kies's case these included Colorado College, Mt. Holyoke Seminary, Mills College, and Butler University. Kies's published work focused on social and political philosophy, rather than education as with Blow, Brackett, and Bibb.

Family, early life, and education Kies grew up in Killingly, in the northeast corner of Connecticut, which neighbors William Torrey Harris's home town of Putnam. As a young child Kies could not have known Harris personally, because he was away at Yale a year or two after her birth and had already gone west in 1857 when she'd have been only three-and-a-half years old. However, with a combined population of 5,500—6,500 in the 1860s, Putnam and Killingly were not terribly large towns. Harris was from a large family with sisters Kies's age, Anna Rebecca (1847-73), Mary Jane (1851-1908), and Ellen Elizabeth (1856-87), each of whom also studied at Mt. Holyoke. In addition, the church that Marietta and

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her family attended also claimed Harris as a member. There is no written evidence that Kies knew Harris before attending the Concord School, but living in such close proximity to the Harris family is likely to have meant that Kies's mentoring by Harris started much earlier than the written record shows. Kies taught in the local schools where she had also been a student until she began her studies at Mt. Holyoke in 1878. In 1882, she was offered a position as a faculty member at Colorado College in Colorado Springs where she taught for three years. Her return east in June, 1885, brought with it a period of stability and professional growth. She accepted a position at Mt. Holyoke in which she taught ethics and mental and moral philosophy until 1891. Mt. Holyoke allowed her leave-time to study with Harris at the Concord School, which culminated in her collection of his lectures and writings in An Introduction to the Study of Philosophy. While continuing to teach Mt. Holyoke, she entered the University of Michigan for graduate study, her application supported by a letter of recommendation from Harris to George Sylvester Morris: Dear Professor Morris: I add a post-scriptum (to my letter) in regard to a Miss Kies who has taught philosophy at Mt. Holyoke Seminary (South Hadley, Mass.) for three years and has studied under my direction. She has proved an apt student in the essential problems of philosophy and has succeeded remarkably to interest her pupils in the topic. She wishes to study at Ann Arbor the coming Autumn with a view to obtaining the degree of Ph.D. and will write you with regard to it (if she has not already done so). All I have to say is that I consider her a doctor and a doctor in the sense that she has insight [not into agnosticism but) into the positive results of philosophy, and makes great intellectual progress from year to year in skill in handling philosophical subjects, and promises to become a famous teacher of such matters. She has not as yet made any considerable study of the history of philosophy and will be greatly benefitted by a sojourn at Ann Arbor. I hope that you will find it possible to assign her some theme for a thesis and give her a Ph.D. degree upon it in due course of time. Sincerely Yours, W.T.Harris 1 Kies studied with Morris for a year at Michigan until his sudden death from pneumonia, then with H. C. Adams and John Dewey, graduating with a Ph.D. in 1891.

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Kies in the academy In Michigan, Kies was part of a lively and intellectually stimulating environment — one that had been open to women for nearly twenty years when she became a student there. Dewey, Morris, and Adams were each involved in student life, holding classes at their homes and leading various clubs and discussion groups. Adams, for instance, led a political economy club and was a popular lecturer. Dewey lectured often to the Unity Club and could draw a crowd of 200 or more. Morris, who was said to have been "in perfect sympathy in every respect with [the] opinions and methods" of Dewey, was a founding faculty member of the University's Philosophical Society, a group open to women as well as men. In fact, one female member of the Society, Alice Graves, was among those who signed the group's tribute to him after his death in 1889. Years later she remembered Morris as a professor who was egalitarian in his treatment of women students: In a University where one heard a good deal of crude and opinionated talk about "co-eds," the scholarly atmosphere of the lecture-room was never disturbed by any self-consciousness on the part of the women. . . . even in the small gatherings that sometimes assembled in his library for special discussions, there was never any visible change of attitude toward us.' Graves's criticism of attitudes toward women at the University overall deserves a bit of attention at this point, because Morris, Dewey, and Adams may well have been the exception to the rule. Just prior to Kies's enrollment at Michigan, certain efforts had been made to better accommodate women students. A Ladies Reading Room had been opened at the library and specific hours had been set aside for women to exercise at the school's gymnasium, for example. But this is not to say that the learning environment was altogether welcoming. Caroline Miles Hill, who graduated with a Ph.D. in philosophy the year after Kies, expressed her ambivalent feelings about the male dominant atmosphere there when she was a student: I think my first memory of Ann Arbor is the feeling of great emancipation of being now out in the real world where I could find a bigger family with an enlarging self. . . . [But] here men were a very different proposition and society was something into which you did not go unless a man took you or unless you belonged to a sorority . . . I deeply resented the social situation at Ann Arbor and the attitude towards women . . . Woman's Suffrage may have changed the attitude towards women; the Women's Halls [dormitories] must have changed the feeling of [being] the outsider.7

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Although Kies's career seems to have been going smoothly at Mt. Holyoke, in 1891 —2 she was recruited by another women's institution, Mills College, in Oakland, California, to be the successor to its president, Susan Tolman Mills. Unfortunately, Mills was unhappy with Kies's teaching methods and treated her "despicably," dismissing her "completely without cause," according to one contemporary, after her first year with the institution. She had difficulty finding another college-level teaching position, even after appealing to Ednah Dow Cheney and George Holmes Howison for help. With resistance to hiring women faculty so prevalent in this period, Howison was not able to help Kies secure a research or teaching position, but he is likely to have helped her arrange study abroad in Germany and Switzerland, as he had his male students at the University of California, Berkeley. Kies spent the 1892-3 academic year in Leipzig and Zurich before taking a job as the principal of a high school in Plymouth, Massachusetts. In 1896, Kies returned to higher education, arriving on the campus of Butler College with two other young faculty members who were also new to the institution, Edward Scribner Ames and Jacob Forrest. The three received high praise: It has been a subject of congratulation that we have been able to secure the services of three additional professors whose degrees represent extensive study in the best universities in this country and abroad, and whose personal worth give assurance of long usefulness in Butler College.9 Kies was singled out as someone who would help to strengthen the English department, which was being restructured. She was to be a professor of rhetoric, a position that came with the responsibility of coaching the debate team, and Kies seems not only to have done this part of her job well, but also to have enjoyed it. According to her colleagues, she was a born teacher, and regularly spent extra hours devoting herself to this aspect of her work with the students, 10 even contributing articles to the student newspaper praising the debate team and testifying to the importance of persuasive discourse. Better still, she was recognized by her superiors for both her success in, and commitment to, this extracurricular work. Other para-academic tasks, however, did not earn Kies additional recognition, nor certainly extra compensation, perhaps largely because it was taken as given that a professor - particularly a female professor would make certain contributions to the Butler community. First, Kies offered a regular Bible study for female students as part of the College's YWCA group. 12 This is not terribly surprising, given the more pervasive influence of religion during this time period. Yet there is no evidence that male professors were expected to devote this extra time to male students. It may be, of course, that a clergy member was designated to fulfill this duty for male students. Since very few

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women were ordained at this time, no such person would have been available to attend to female students' training. 13 It is also interesting and very telling to note that women faculty were expected to alternate with the wives of faculty members to host "at home days" for students. These seem to have been "tea and cookies" sorts of meetings, complete with entertaining parlor games, that were scheduled for two hours every weekday in the late afternoon or evening. Kies's designated time slot was the second and fourth Friday evening, and on at least one occasion she featured a parlor game in which "The Mt. Holyoke Wreath" was the prize. 14 But despite the clue this tidbit of information gives us about Kies's personality and sense of connection to Mt. Holyoke, it can't help but grate on one's nerves from a feminist perspective. Both male and female faculty were expected to take on a leadership role and to be models of conduct within the community. And, based on reports of various "at home days" in Butler's student newspaper, both students and hosts thoroughly enjoyed the chance to socialize. Yet from a twenty-first century point of view, it is wearisome indeed to see this quasi-caretaking role thrust upon certain faculty members simply because they were female. As one of few women in academia at the time, however, practices that segregated women and men were part of Kies's day-to-day experience, and hosting two "at home days" per month was certainly less harmful than some forms that discrimination between the sexes could take. For instance, when Kies was hired at Butler, she was placed in the English department, even though her work at Michigan had been in political philosophy and she had studied under well-respected philosophers.15 On the other hand her colleague Edward Ames, who was her junior by several years and someone with little teaching experience, was offered a place in the philosophy department without a second thought. It is tempting to speculate about how Kies felt about being relegated to English, what has generally been considered a more feminine field, after teaching philosophy at Mt. Holyoke for seven years. Yet the considerably lower pay that Kies received compared to her male faculty colleagues was likely to have been of more immediate concern. And Kies experienced this in conjunction with being passed over for a promotion later in her career at Butler. As professor of rhetoric, Kies was also considered an "assistant" to Flora Bridges whom we might call the chair of the English department, although this title was not used uniformly at this time. During the 1896 7 academic year, however, Bridges was struck with an illness of some sort and was unable to assume her regular duties. Kies seems to have picked up some of Bridges' responsibilities, and was thanked for it in the meeting minutes of the college's board of directors, but there is no mention of corresponding compensation. Further, when it came time to make a decision about how to fill the gap left by Bridges at the year's end, the board passed

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over Kies and instead appointed William D. Howe to chair the English department. Kies was to remain in the assistant position. Had Howe been older or appreciably more experienced, such a decision would be understandable. Yet at this point in his career, Howe had not even received his doctoral degree. Granted, he was a Harvard Ph.D. candidate, and this alone has spoken volumes throughout American history. Even so, Howe's curriculum vitae shows him to have had far less experience than Kies. He had completed his bachelor's degree only four years earlier and had very little teaching experience, holding two fellowships since completing his master's work. The board decided, however, to hire Howe as chair at a salary of $ 1,100, compared i

o

to the $800 Kies would continue to receive as assistant. Both of these incidents point to a cycle of sexism that it was virtually impossible for women in Kies's era to escape. Certainly her personal and professional history was "remarkable" in the words of one memorialist, particularly since she had come "from a home where she had absolutely no encouragement intellectually." 19 If her background was as impoverished as it appears to have been and her family life troubled, which her parents' divorce in 1882 suggests, it is remarkable that she achieved all that she did. But the simple fact of the matter is that the male colleagues who received promotions and higher salaries, while she remained behind to double as a professor and "at home" day hostess, had earned both their graduate and undergraduate degrees from Johns Hopkins, the University of Chicago, Yale, and as mentioned, Harvard, none of which granted graduate degrees to women until after Kies had completed her doctoral work at Michigan. So when decision-makers chose Howe or Ames over Kies for more prestigious posts, there was a ready-made explanation: these gentlemen had a more impressive educational record. But equal higher education for women was hard to come by when Kies entered the academic world, which means that she had no access to the very institutions whose degrees would help her to gain higher status positions. In short, if Anna Brackett was correct when she declared that no women's college, no matter how good it is, is as good as most men's universities, Kies's deck was stacked against her from the start. Kies had developed a severe cough just prior to taking the professorship at Butler in 1896; this proved to be a case of tuberculosis, which later took her life. She had always been a hard worker according to friends, a character trait that may have turned out to be almost literally suicidal in this case. Over the course of her three years at Butler, she seems to have maintained a demanding workload despite her illness, but by 1899 she was in dire need of rest. She was able to carry out her plan to complete the school year, and even to travel to Colorado where she hoped to be able to recover at the home of her cousin, Edwin Davis. But this was the limit to which she could extend herself, and just under a month after she left Butler, Kies died at the age of 45.

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Connections with the St. Louis circle and at Concord Kies does not seem to have had close ties to the other women Hegelians in this study, although she was familiar with at least some of their published work. She was certainly familiar with Susan Blow's Study of Dante and Brackett's 1893 edition of Rosenkranz's Pedagogics, The Philosophy of Education, citing b considered this colleague's work worthy of attention, since she used points made by Blow to illustrate ideas of her own about moral acts and human nature. In the case of Brackett's work, however, Kies focused on Harris's introduction and commentary to the book, rather than on the concepts Brackett conveyed, emphasized, or dismissed in this or earlier editions of the Pedagogics. Kies simply drew on this and other selections from Harris's publications and lectures and arranged them in a sequence in her Introduction to the Study of Philosophy, arriving at what was considered a more comprehensive theory than Harris had developed on his own. Of those among the circle of St. Louis women, Susan Blow, at least, was familiar with Kies's Introduction to the Study of Philosophy, which she cited in Sy bolic Education. Aside from the fact that Kies was Harris's student at the Con cord School, there are no definitive links between her and the women who had picked up on Hegel's thought earlier in St. Louis. Mitchell, Bibb, Blow, Ames Mead, and others, of course, were all present at some of the Concord lectures, but with attendance as high as 200 250, the majority of whom were women, there is no guarantee that Kies would have become close to any of them. Yet Kies was certainly a known entity in the world of philosophy at this time — among both men and women in the group — because she was among three women suggested to be lecturers at the Columbian Exposition in Chicago in 1893. Caroline K. Sherman, liaison between the Woman's Branch and the Philosophy and Science Committee of the Exposition, suggested Kies as a possible lecturer at the event. Other than Sunderland, an active member of the movement to whom Kies is likely to have been close is Alice A. Graves, a peripheral member of the St. Louis circle who wrote one promising, although brief, article in JSP. Graves attended the Concord lectures, but more importantly she studied with Kies at the University of Michigan and, as noted above, was a student of George S. Morris. And Kies is almost certain to have known her in this context. Given the barriers to women's education in this era, it is unlikely that more than a handful of the approximately 175 students in the "Literary Department" at this time were women. Furthermore, with their shared interest in philosophy and the thought of Hegel, Graves and Kies were certain to have been in classes together and thus perhaps to have known each other fairly well. As was also the case with Blow and Brackett during their years in the St. Louis public school system, however,

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it isn't possible to determine the extent of Kies's friendship with Graves, only that they were sure to have been acquainted.

Philosophical work Kies's two original works are The Ethical Principle and Institutional Ethics, tw works of political philosophy that contrast "justice" with "grace" and suggest how the two might be used to complement each other in society. The first book, The Ethical Principle, was submitted for her Ph.D. thesis at the Universit of Michigan in 1891. The second, published in 1894, was essentially a rewrite of the first, but with some extremely important additions: on the school, the family, the administration of law, and the role of the church in society. Justice, grace, and the "Ethical Principle" In many ways, Kies's Ethical Principle is a late twentieth-century feminist's dream come true. For in this little volume is an alternative to the picture of political life as drawn by the classical liberal tradition: a society of relative equals in which "justice" reigns supreme. Drawing on Hegel (an unlikely candidate from the perspective of many contemporary feminists ), Kies presents another way to view society, and social and political progress. "Grace," Kies suggests, in which altruism takes precedence over self-interest, is an equally valid principle of political action. Better still from a feminist point of view, Kies does not attempt to debunk justice completely, but instead is comfortable asserting two truths simultaneously: justice and grace are not competing but rather are complementary principles in Kies's understanding. The justice of which Kies speaks is an idea familiar enough to anyone acquainted with modern Western political thought. It is the principle via which each individual obtains his or her due and is "the fundamental principle of individuality" [EP 1]. It is the responsibility of each person to assert his/her own rights and render unto others what is rightfully theirs. In the realm of justice, the individual "thinks, feels and acts, and receives the like in kind, nothing better, nothing worse" [EP 1-2]. Society is by and large an aggregate of individuals in a system that holds justice as primary, and social happiness is roughly equal to the sum of the happiness of all individuals within society. To Kies, this is a mistaken notion, and one that she believes can be repaired by infusing grace into political theory. Given her ties to the Christian Socialist movement, there is no doubt that Kies used the term "grace" purposefully. In Christian theology, the word has great import, of course. It speaks to the undeserved gift of salvation that God bestowed upon human beings through Jesus, God incarnate. It is both the gift

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of salvation itself— i.e., the rescue from eternal damnation — and the proces of redemption/regeneration. It also has come to be a shorthand term for divine love. Interestingly, however, Kies does not expound a theology-rich political theory as many in the Christian Socialist movement did. Instead, she simply invokes the term "grace" — perhaps partly for its novel implications in this context - and continues on with her political theory. Furthermore, she defines and contextualizes the term early in the work. Whereas the process injustice excludes the yielding of one's own for the sake of another, the process of self-sacrifice, of grace, is in its very nature the yielding of one's own immediate thoughts for self for those of, and in reference to, another. [EP 2] Kies is not simply one of many women thinkers in this period to endorse a heavy-handed Christian doctrine of self-sacrifice (particularly by women). This is not the case at all. In fact, later in the work Kies carefully distinguishes between the altruism that she espouses and self-sacrifice for self-sacrifice's sake [EP 12]. Attempts at martyrdom are self-centered in Kies's view, because true altruism takes others as its object: it does not merely seek self-denial as an end in itself. Furthermore, she does not even hint toward a gender dichotomy in her analysis of justice and grace. At no point in her discussion does she suggest that altruism is more readily sought, achieved, or understood by women than by men. 25 Instead, the grace of which Kies speaks is a principle applicable to men and women alike, and which may originate in the private sphere, but which can and should be exported to the public realm. The "ethical principle" - i.e., altruism - is an ideal which may be unattainable, and this Kies recognizes explicitly [EP 15-16]. Yet it is an ideal that one should pursue, because although humans are finite creatures, their thoughts and ideals are infinite and therefore of a divine nature. In fact, ultimately Kies will say that the reason altruism is the highest stage in her ethical hierarchy is because it is most closely modelled after the Christian religion hence the word "grace" to describe the highest stage of ethical thinking - and as such links the human and the divine. As a preface to her assertion that it is within the province of the state to enforce altruism as a policy, Kies outlines three "attitudes that society presents to the individual" as models for behavior: (1) the principle of individualism, i.e., justice as discussed above; (2) an extreme socialism, in which individual rights "intersect at too many points" and obliterate individuality; and (3) true socialism, or helpfulness, in which individuals recognize that assisting the weak will benefit the whole [EP 40-2]. The last of these is clearly Kies's preferred social "attitude," although she notes that this would be a voluntary self-sacrifice by the strong on behalf of the weak. The rational state

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must have two corresponding classes of laws in place to ensure that the correct social attitude prevails. Kies calls the first set of laws "protective," and she recognizes that they guard freedom in the negative sense. That is, protective legislation ensures non-interference by other individuals and/or by the state in the pursuit of individual happiness. But there is also a class of "constructive" laws which are not only protective in the negative sense, but are "also positively helpful to one or more classes of society." These laws go beyond preventing one individual or group from harming another, but assert state power to promote the goals of members of a particular class, individually or collectively [EP 45—6]. This distinction by itself is neither new, nor particularly significant; the distinction between positive and negative laws was made well before Kies's time and has continued to be a helpful political philosophical tool since. What is significant, however, is the way in which Kies uses this distinction to advance her theory as a whole. In Kies's understanding, protective legislation provides only the thinnest layer of security from outside interference for each individual as an equal among equals. It does nothing to nurture individual human potential nor the growth of an entire class of people. Examples of protective legislation include laws against trespass, theft, and assault as well as those requiring payment of taxes. In the first case, individuals are prohibited from harming each other, thus advancing self-interest in the Hobbesian sense: each individual, in being guarded against the too-aggressive actions of another, is able to pursue his/her own egoistic goals. In the second, each person is required to fulfill his or her obligation to the government; a promotion of self-interest in the utilitarian sense: the sacrifice of a relatively small amount by each results in a wealth of resources for the whole, allowing the whole (the state) to continue to provide a veil of protection for each individual. Protective legislation not only supports but promotes the pursuit of self-interest, and therefore is based on the principle of justice, in Kies's view. The second set of protective laws might be thought to be a constructive provision in that by paying taxes each individual is contributing to the betterment of all. Yet in Kies's system, this level of self-sacrifice isn't sufficient to be considered constructive. Constructive laws are more proactive than this. Examples of such are laws establishing a progressive income tax and those that prohibit monopolies [EP 52]. In contrast to merely being required to pay taxes, and thus each contributing to the betterment of the whole on a minimal level, a progressive income tax recognizes economic inequities in society and places the burden of contributing to the financial well-being of the state on the wealthy. It actually requires that a certain level of altruism be enforced so that the state can "provide to a reasonable extent for the needs of its poor and unfortunate classes" [EP 65]. And Kies's rationale is typically Hegelian:

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society is an organic unity, and suffering by any of its members harms society as an entity. Similarly, in Kies's view the existence of monopolies is to be curbed by constructive legislation. Yet, she doesn't go into the details of how these constructive laws are to be enacted. This may be due to the fact that at the time she was writing, the labor and anti-trust movements were beginning to gain force, and she assumed knowledge on the part of her readers. The Baltimore and Ohio railroad strike of 1877 initiated a series of labor strikes, culminating with the Pullman strikes in 1896. Similarly, the outcry against trusts and monopolies had gained strength in the country at this time, and was being debated as the Sherman Bill in Congress during the 1889-90 session, the year before Kies wrote this book. Kies's readers would certainly have been familiar with the social unrest that she was referring to, then, even if they didn't agree with her assessment of the situation: the excessive greed and monopolies in ownership of the present time can be successfully replaced by a system more nearly injustice to all only by changing the thought of the nation on this question. [EP 52] Once public opinion had been changed, "just and lasting laws" would follow, and society will have attained "the higher plane of thought" [EP 52] in which the principle of grace will have primacy. It is interesting to note that for Kies grace functions on two levels. In one sense it is an ideal to be aspired to in private life. We are all better people, in Kies's view, when we keep the needs of others primary and relinquish our own selfish interests. By putting others first, we receive "reflected good" — the ben efit of seeing our own altruistic act result in someone else's joy or success. But as is clear from her rather strong statements about the nature of constructive laws, it is clear that Kies sees grace as being necessary as a public ethic as well. In fact, she cites several examples beyond those given above in which government can - even must - enact altruistic policies. In the railroad industry, sanitation policy, education and labor law, and penal reform, government has been called upon to enact not merely protective, but constructive legislation. And state leaders' willingness to do so indicates that the intimate connection and relation of all members of society is more clearly understood than in preceding centuries; it [also] indicates that the public has an interest in classes in society that are suffering injustice for others, and in those who are weak, poor, and unfortunate. [EP 72-3] As was common for thinkers in her era, Kies believed that societal development is progressive, that her era was more advanced than those previous, and that following eras would advance even further. She also asserts that

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constructive legislation demonstrates an advancement in society's "ethical education" and that ultimately coercion will become unnecessary as a means to realizing the principle of grace in the world. [EP 73] Kies quite consciously limits her discussion to the "so-called field of competitive industrial activity," [EP 97] precisely because it is usually considered the domain of self-interest. Regarding the extent to which Kies remains true to Hegel's thought, this is an especially important point. After all, in The Philosophy of Right, Hegel makes it clear that civil society is characterized by individualism and self-interest, recast as a system of wants. 26 And in The Phenomenolo of Spirit Hegel indicates that a formal and abstract "virtue" that tries to subvert individuality within civil society is bound to fail, even to contradict itself, because it is the very nature of individuality to assert itself in this realm. 7 For this reason, it is interesting to see how Kies in one sense adopts and in another defies Hegel's claims about how a "rabble" - i.e., a mass of poor citizens - is to be dealt with in modern societies. Hegel recognized that contingent factors are often the cause of poverty, and this condition leaves them "with the needs of civil society . . . [which] at the same time [has] taken from them the natural means of acquisition." 28 Yet Hegel was perplexed about how exactly to address the needs and wants of a "rabble," should such a class arise. He noted that private charity alone could not adequately make provisions for the poor, but should be supplemented with a system of public assistance. At the same time, however, if a system for public welfare becomes too effective, and the poor were to be sustained at an acceptable standard of living, they "would be ensured [a livelihood] without the mediation of work [which] would be contrary to the principle of civil society and the feeling of self-sufficiency and honour among its individual members."' This problem was both an inevitable outcome of the success of commerce in the industrial world, and an irreconcilable contradiction within it. Hegel could see only two approaches to such a situation: to "leave the poor to their fate" and force them into public begging, as was the practice in England in Hegel's day, or to expand the domestic economy by means of foreign trade and colonialism. The first option, begging, provides "the most direct means of dealing with poverty, and particularly with the renunciation of shame and honour"; the second, pursuit of gain, motivates individuals to overcome the obstacles presented by traversing both land and sea. In a sense, colonialism is an expanded version of the natural growth of industry for Hegel. Once a nation's internal expansion had reached its limits, naturally, it had to turn to prospects in other lands to ensure a livelihood for its own people. Hegel makes suggestive statements in which he comes very close to advocating state action to ensure the welfare of the whole, yet he falls short in the end. He recognizes the reciprocal relationship that the individual and society

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participate in, for instance maintaining that, as members of the public, individuals have a right not to be cheated by producers. And he entrusts the regulation of such businesses to the public authority [PR §236]. Yet, this is the same public authority that is responsible for maintaining roads and bridges, public utilities and other necessities of community life. This still amounts to protective measures only, not the truly altruistic constructive measures that Kies is calling for. In Kies's view, when competition harms one or more of civil society's members, the state as the manifestation of reason in the ethical world must by its nature rectify the situation. For certain spontaneous, competitive forces within civil society to damage and possibly even to destroy the organism as a whole would be irrational, after all. Looked at this way, Kies is taking Hegel's acknowledgement of the problem of the welfare of the poor one step further. She is playing out what it means for the state to be rational in regard to the industrial powers that dominated in her day; and this is to enforce altruism. A quote from Kies herself supports my interpretation: The voice of the organic whole, speaking through representatives who see the needs and correct relations of the different individual groups, demands that one class in society who will not voluntarily give up privileges which their position in society enables them to get, must be compelled to act as if they saw the good of others and the true interests of all classes. [EP 79] The big strength that Kies brings to the dilemma that Hegel would have left us with is this: she focuses not on the poor and what government should or should not do for them, but on the wealthy and powerful and what the state can legitimately demand of them to help improve the plight of the less fortunate. Given the fact that Kies's main project is to explicate her theory of altruism, this makes sense. Her questions were not "What might we expect the poor to do for themselves? What will make them better, more productive citizens?" Instead, she asked: "What can we ask of the commercial powers and well-todo in order to alleviate the effects of poverty? How can we ensure that large powerful forces in society do not impinge on the rights and interests of those of minimal means and influence?" At the same time, Kies recognizes that there need to be limits to state action. Kies declares that "in many relations of society, assistance from the state other than protective laws is unnecessary, [and] when equilibrium can be preserved without it, [state action] only corrupts and destroys the individuality of the assisted class" [EP 95—6]. Based on this statement, then, it is clear that Kies does agree with Hegel's understanding of civil society operating spontaneously as the realm of individualism. But when a corporate body, such as the cotton or woolen industry, amasses so much power as to obliterate the

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autonomy of those beholden to it - whether for goods, services, or employment - then the state must intervene, check the industry's power, and provide safeguards against it on behalf of weaker forces. Since "the will of man is essentially freedom," neither industrial forces, nor state power should infringe upon that freedom. In fact, in Kies's view, when the state take[s] away from any individual or class rights that are inherent in the personality of man, just then the state begins a process of the destruction of its members, and so begins a process of [its own] dissolution and death. [EP 91 ] Again, the state, as reason made manifest must act in a rational manner. It wou be as irrational for the state to overstep its bounds and thereby undermine individual freedom as it would to fail to act and allow individual freedom to be annihilated. It is significant that Kies is committed to altruistic action by the state. She rejects outright the common conservative suggestion that natural altruistic impulse will become manifest as private charitable organizations and that this can adequately address the ills of society. "Spontaneous private charity," Kies insists, is not "definite and systematized" [EP 87]. Therefore, it won't ensure that the weaker members of society are provided for. Instead altruism is to be promoted through the enactment of rational laws: Since the true aim of a nation is . . . to secure a harmonious development of all its members, any legislation which wilfully violates or ignores the rights of any class or group of producers, or forgets to secure the good of an oppressed class, cannot in the long run prove to be correct legislation. [EP 86] "Correct legislation" by a rational state requires exactly the kind of monitoring described above. It must ensure that one force does not acquire so much power that it undermines the free development of individuals. In this way the state protects the natural and continuous development of the whole. At the same time, the state mustn't overreact to what are simply the normal workings of society by restricting freedoms of any one individual (even when that individual is a corporation) or group. The state must pass just, rational laws that will avoid both extremes. But in Kies's view, the "laws that time has proved to be most beneficial to society have place [d] the good of society before private immediate good to the individual" [EP 91]. Therefore, in her view it is better to err on the side of grace rather than of justice. In actual practice, however, justice and grace do in fact complement each other rather than compete. In fact, there are three ways to approach industrial relations: (1) from the point of view of self-interest (justice); (2) from the point

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of view of altruism (grace); or (3) from the point of view of economy and environment (pragmatism). [EP 103] Kies goes through a number of examples of how a decision-maker would address real-life problems, depending on the perspective he or she takes. In all cases, the "economic man" would act according to self-interest, the "ethical man" would base his decision on altruism, and the "practical man" would do his best to strike a balance between egoistic/ economic interests and altruistic considerations. The commentary Kies laces within this extensive list of examples demonstrates that her own position is more moderate than much of her earlier discussion has suggested. For instance, she points out that, given a chance to purchase a large tract of farm land, the standard altruistic approach might in fact not be the best route to take. Certainly it isn't ethical for the "economic man" to buy up all he can in order to exploit them as "bonanza farms" [EP 110]. Yet neither is it as noble as it might seem for the "ethical man" who "realizes that it is necessary . . . that an opportunity be given for [individuals] . . . to exercise [their] own energy upon [their] own material environment" to sell the land in small parcels at reasonable prices or to lease it long-term for cooperative farming. More beneficial overall is the "practical man's" decision to aim for the mean between these two extremes in Kies's view. He realizes that it would be a waste of capital and of resources to divide the land up among several owners. This is because he understands that a large farm is more efficient and will yield more opportunities for labor for working people. A "concentration of means is necessary" in this case, so the "practical man" would carry on large-scale farming, but would hire workers at reasonable wages and carry on business dealings in an ethical manner [EP 110~l 3]. Kies uses this dialectic of ethics to firmly establish her point: "the ethical principle" — i.e., grace or altruism — is in fact operative, even in business a industry. Furthermore, altruism needn't have harmful economic effects, but can support enhanced productivity in many instances. Finally, altruism may even come to be relied on more fully in the future. In closing, Kies declares that the "economic man" of Mill's conception has become the "practical man" of present writers through the recognition of the fact that men in business relations are moved by motives other than that of self-interest . . . and the "practical man" of future generations will . . . resemble the ethical man of the present. [EP131] Kies on the family Kies added entire chapters to Institutional Ethics that give us important information about her thought as well as clues about the ways in which Hegel was appropriated by her idealist contemporaries — Harris, et at. Regarding th

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family, Kies gives a standard Hegelian description for the most part. She describes the family as being the foundation of both the church and the state, notes that its origin is in the monogamous union of a man and woman, and indicates that in marriage these two people in essence become one. Yet there are also important departures from Hegel in Kies's discussion of the family. First, the only hint that a woman is more suited for activity in the private sphere comes in Kies's discussion of the education of children. Here she notes that the duty of raising and educating children lies equally with the mother and father, although "the necessary division of labor and duties between the father and mother . . . [and] the early direction of infant life necessarily devolves upon the mother." [EP 69~70] On this point, there is a similarity between Kies and Brackett. We see Kies denying the existence of maternal instinct, per se. Early in a child's life, of course, biology does play a role and thus requires that a mother take a more active part in child rearing than a father does. But this is merely a matter of the need for a "division of labor", in Kies's estimation, not due to anything inherent in masculinity versus femininity. This claim closely parallels Brackett's declaration that many of women's difficulties with mastering professional duties lay in their socialization, rather than in their nature. Yet Kies also recognizes that women do tend to be more likely to care for young children. In this sense she echoes Susan Blow's thought in that Kies credits women with providing children's early education and serving as a bridge between home and school. "The intelligent answers of the mother to the thousand queries and wonders of the young mind prepare the way for the more definite and extended instruction of the school" [IE 70]. Within the home, mothers also teach their children to set aside their own selfish wants — to share, join i family chores and the like. Thus they develop a habit of altruism early in life [IE 70—71 ]. This, as we have seen, is vitally important to society as a whole, in the American idealists' view, and therefore is an invaluable service that women render to the state. In her discussion of the importance of the moral lessons learned in the home, however, Kies departs from Hegel even further. And this particular departure indicates that she is more interested in recognizing the prevalence of American individualism in her own theory than in being true to Hegel. The offending statement is this: "In the collision of wills in the household, one cannot assert all his own peculiarities and particular wishes. One must learn to respect the rights and privileges of others" [IE 71]. But for Hegel, within the family there is no need to suppress individual wants and desires, because the family relatio is such that within it all members are one body, their needs one need, and their interests a unity of interests. Individual will need not assert itself in the family, and "rights" and "privileges" are a foreign notion in this natural relation, which is ruled by love and affection. The contest of individual personalities

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that Kies seems to be alluding to occurs within civil society, but not within the family circle in Hegel's scheme. In The Philosophy of Right, Hegel's discussion on the family is guided b (1) his concept of marriage; (2) his understanding of the nature of women; and (3) his distinction between public and private life. In one sense, the marriage relation and its natural outgrowth, the family, is an ethical relation for Hegel - it is love made objective. It is through the marriage contract that what would be a merely subjective relation of love/affection becomes objective, an ethically significant and public relationship. Yet because marriage is characterized by love, it is a natural, internal relation in which each person gives up his/her individuality, thus becoming a unity, one person. [PR §158; 162] Once a family grows and children come into the picture, their individuality, too, is subsumed into the unity that is the family. [PR §158] A person exists not as an individual, but as a member of the family for Hegel, or as one contemporary feminist has put it, the family is "an unindividuated community." Members of the family may have particularity, but not a fully realized and rational individuality. Furthermore, any rights that one of these un-individuated individuals can claim are rights as a member o the family (most obviously against entitites within civil society that threaten the family unit), not as individuals. A person has individual rights only within civil society. But Kies is writing for a different time and culture from Hegel's. Her recognition a few pages later that individualism has too strong a grip on the family reflects her awareness that the reality is that the family simply does not function as a unity in most cases. Therefore, she gives her late nineteenth-century audience a more realistic picture of their familial relationships while at the same time pointing them toward the ideal. The absolute ideal of complete self-development in and through others has not been reached in the family... and the attempt to adjust private personal rights to those of others will always be attended with more or less struggle and friction . . . Instead of Aristotle's "social unity" in the family, in this century the individual has become the center and end of all activity.... The idea of personality as true individuality has degenerated into that of individualism, and as such, has been a destructive agency. [IE 78] Still, it is not clear that Kies's ideal of the family is genuinely Hegelian. Along with other feminist interpreters, in my reading of Hegel the family is an institution in which individuation is not only non-existent, but unnecessary. Kies sees the family as a unit, but a unit in which members' self-development is realized (which assumes a certain level of individuation has already been

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achieved) and personal rights are set aside for the good of all (which assumes an assertion of rights in the first place). Furthermore, following Morris's example, Kies ignores gender distinctions as they relate to individual selfrealization in the family versus civil society. All family members, whether fathers, mothers, brothers, or sisters, have the same expectation placed upon them by Kies. For Hegel, on the other hand, the family may indeed play a role in preparing young people to enter into civil society, but it is only within civil society that they become truly individuated — where they are torn away from family tie to fend for themselves in the world. But, again, as noted by other contemporary feminists, this is true only for men. "In the private dimension of ethical life [children] gain experience of a noncontractual association and so are prepared - or, rather, men are prepared - for participation in the universal public sphere of the state." The home is where women are fully actualized i Hegel's view. There is no need for young women to tear themselves away from the family circle and fend for themselves in civil society. Instead, each young girl, remaining in the realm of feeling that is the domain of the family, will realize her potential in the warmth of hearth and home. She will then transpose that self-realization to another domestic setting when she becomes a wife and mother herself. There is no need for a woman to ever achieve full indivi duation in Hegel's system. She will always remain a member of the family circle, never an independent individual. Another contemporary feminist discussion puts this particularly well: From the ethical household, the husband goes forth into the world of public affairs as its representative, leaving the wife to serve the needs of the (his) household. The feminine life revolves entirely around the private relationships of the family and the duties that these relationships entail. Not a part of the "transcendent" activities of civil society and the state . . . the woman never achieves recognition as an individual 34 Given the different historical contexts in which the two thinkers were writing, of course, this lack of fit of Kies's understanding of the family with Hegel's is not terribly surprising. After all, she was writing at a time when the women's movement had begun to gain some rights for women, even within marriage. So it is likely that women had begun to voice competing interests within the family circle much more in Kies's time than they had at the time of Hegel's writing. In fact, although Kies does not often voice strong feminist sympathies or address this issue as directly (or as vehemently) as Brackett does, she does recognize that some critics have claimed that women's higher education would damage the family. And it only seems appropriate that Kies, one of the relatively few women who had achieved such a high level of education in this era, should denounce this claim:

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The attitude of independence that woman is enabled to hold, because of her educational and industrial emancipation, changes necessarily the relations of husband and wife. No longer compelled to marry in order to obtain a livelihood, many fear that women will be unwilling to enter the marriage relation, and so the family lose its fundamental place as an institution. . . . [Yet] no amount of education will keep a woman from loving the man who approaches her ideal in his intellectual and spiritual qualities. [IE 83] Furthermore, in Kies's view, "a marriage based upon a corresponding degree of development in the masculine and feminine mind" reaches a "higher ethical principle than that based upon obedience and servitude." 35 So Kies's apparent failure to match Hegel's ideal of the family may really have been closer to a re-assessment of its accuracy — and its appropriateness give women's increased autonomy, which she applauded both in private and public life — than a deficient understanding of the family's role in his system. Kies on " The woman question" On the administration of justice, Kies again complies quite closely with Hegel's thought. The one exception is her discussion of women's rights. While she stopped short of promoting women's suffrage, Kies nevertheless departed from Hegel by advocating limited political rights for women. Efforts by the women's movement to win voting rights during this time period were misguided, according to Kies, because expression of opinion by the ballot is only one step of a complex act of the members of the state. Whether these ballots shall be cast by all the men of the state, or by the men and women, is a matter of expediency. [IE 211] In Kies's view, it is not particularly expedient for women to vote along with men, because the act of casting a ballot is just the culminating act in a long process of public discourse and debate. Kies thinks it is sufficient for women to participate in political life only up to this level: they can discuss policy, bu not enact it. Her reasoning is common among the more conservative women o her day: "The voice of woman has a power in forming public opinion when unhampered by the duty of voting and ambition for office-holding, [a power that] would be . . . lost, were her work directed in exactly the same channels as that of men" [IE 211 ]. Kies does not deny that women have the abstract right to vote; abstractly speaking, women have at least as much of a right to vote as men do. But of course for a Hegelian, an abstract right is not particularly valuable or meaningful. In her view, women's concrete situation in life was more important. They were already able to join in public discourse on matters of

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interest to them, and thereby they influenced the outcome of elections. So how would voting serve to further advance their interests? Kies answers her own question with another question, and one that reintroduces her justice/grace distinction into the discussion. She asks: Are women needed to enact and execute both protective and constructive laws? [IE 211] Protective laws, of course, guard individual freedoms. That is, they ensure the liberties of life, property, etc., for persons as persons. In this sense protective laws pertain to both men and women equally. Kies concludes, then, that women do not need to vote on protective measures, because their interests in this regard are no different from men's! [IE 212] It is essential here to keep in mind Kies's distinction between protective and constructive laws. The first prohibit a violation of others' rights, the second regulate the form that individual endeavors can take. Constructive laws are somewhat different then, although Kies's logic takes a puzzling turn. She breaks constructive laws into two groups: fundamentally constructive laws and special constructive lawrs. It may be that many fundamentally constructive laws, such as those regarding property and contract, had indeed discriminated against women in the past, but Kies asks, have these discriminations been against women as women, or against ignorance and weakness and consequent danger of mismanagement? Do not the many changes in laws giving more nearly equal opportunities to women, in part answer this question? If so, can not other changes be made more effectively and with less detriment to the other interests of society than by the direct vote of women at the polls? [IE 212] The answer in Kies's view is that in the past fundamentally constructive laws did in fact simply mean to shield women from the harm that their lack of experience in managing their own affairs might have brought. She also believes that at the time of her writing women's lot had improved, that society's natural evolution had brought about a change in public opinion and thus in laws, and that women's status could continue to improve in the future, sans voting rights. Improving women's education would do more to help them advance in society than the ability to vote would, in Kies's understanding. But there are still special constructive laws to consider. These address social concerns, such as education and temperance questions, and sanitation, the regulation of some industries, children's homes and prisons [IE 214-16]. Kies's criterion generally is that "where women are the object of interest" they should be granted voting privileges, but their participation in even these matters will not be "an unmixed good." Along with many women in her day, Kies worried that "the same qualities that are developed in men through participation in some phases of political life will be fostered in women"

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[IE 216—17]. Kies feared that women would turn social concerns into avenues for political gain, and she cites some underhanded tactics by the Women's Christian Temperance Union as an example of the sort of maneuverings that women would begin participating in. Kies's conservatism on this issue is surprising in one sense. After all, Harris, who clearly influenced her, was not only an advocate of women's rights generally, but was also a strong supporter of suffrage. Other members of the St. Louis circle and participants at the Concord School with whom she is almost certain to have been associated also were supportive of the feminist cause. In another sense, however, Kies was more true to Hegel regarding the matter of women's rights than her idealist contemporaries who favored suffrage and other feminist causes. Like the conservative counter-feminists Sarah J. Hale, Catherine Beecher, and Gail Hamilton, Kies believed that women's entrance into politics or other aspects of public life would disrupt the organic unity of society as it stood.36

Conclusion Grace is most fully realized in the church in Kies's view. Yet Kies also insists that in the church as well as in the state, grace and justice do and must play a role. Of the church she says "justice, although the fundamental principle of all existence and all institutions, should remain latent in the Church as a background as it were, for the manifestation and revelation of grace" [IE 248]. Regarding the state, Kies celebrates the fact that the emergence of "true socialism" demonstrates a growing "recognition of the fact that there is opportunity for the exemplification of both justice and grace" in the political world [IE 269]. Kies hoped to show that all of the institutions of society ~ the family, school, business, church, and government — constitute an integrated, organi whole, not a set of disconnected social entities. So for these seemingly antagonistic institutions (in the American context in which church and state are separate) to embody complementary principles closes the circle in her view. Kies made an important contribution to the American philosophical canon on a number of levels. First, she made Hegel's theory concrete and applied it to some very important social and political questions of her day. She also took a bold stance on how to address poverty and social welfare. In this sense, she aided in Harris's mission to "make Hegel talk English," in an area that none of her female Hegelian contemporaries did. Her theory of "justice" and "grace" is valuable for political philosophy today as well. In the past two decades, feminist thinkers have made serious and substantive critiques of traditional political and moral theory, charging it with gender bias. Another model of political and ethical action is needed in order to include women in

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the dialogue, these feminists have claimed. What we find in Kies is precisely this sort of model, yet one that doesn't completely dismiss the tried and somewhat true patriarchal theory of old. Kies's theory of altruism is not the only one in the political philosophical canon, of course, but it is one that succeeds in bridging many gaps, and for this reason alone, it deserves critical attention.

Notes 1. Harris's letter to Morris, no date (probably Spring, 1888, before Kies entered Ann Arbor in September, 1888) in James B. Angell Papers, Bentley Historic Library Archives, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. The asterisk marks a phrase that Harris inserted, which is unclear, possibly: " . . . year to year — andpro gress in - skill . . . " 2. The University of Michigan began admitting women in 1869. 3. Information about campus clubs and events are from the Michigan Argonaut, a stu dent paper. 4. Michigan Argonaut, vol. 5, p. 71 (December 1886). 5. R.M. Wenley, The Life and Work of George Sylvester Morris (New York: Macmilla, 1917), 302-3. 6. Michigan Argonaut, vol. 4, (May 1886); vol. 5, p. 55 (November 1886). 7. Caroline Miles Hill, response to 1921 Alumnae Survey, Bentley Historical Library Archives, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. 8. Kies complained of Mills's treatment of her to Howison. See her June 15, 1892, letter to Howison in George Holmes Howison Papers, Bancroft Library archives, University of California, Berkeley. Ethel Coldwell, a faculty member at Mills College from 1890 until 1912, noted that Kies's dismissal was unjustified. See her letter to a Mr. James, professor of botany at Mills, January 3, 1944, in Mills College Archives, Oakland, California. 9. Butler University Archives, Minutes of the Board of Directors of Butler College, July 14, 1897, p. 317-18. 10. Rev. Sherberne S .Mathews, "Memorial Sermon," In Memoriam: Marietta Kies, A.M., Ph.D. (Boston: Frank Wood (printer), n.d.). 11. Butler Collegian, vol. 13, no. 9, p. 337-41 (June 1898). 12. Mathews, Memoriam, 31; Butler Collegian, vol. 12, no. 4, p. 155 (January 1897). 13. Antoinette Brown Blackwell was the first woman ordained in any protestant denomination in America, by the Congregational church in 1853. Others followed, but at a fairly slow pace. Olympia Brown and Phebe Hanaford, Universalists; Lucretia Mott, a Quaker; and Anna Howard Shaw, a Methodist were among the few women ordained between 1860 and 1890. 14. Butler Collegian, vol. 13, no. 2, p. 78 (November 1897). 15. This assigning of a professor to departments other than those for which they were trained was not uncommon. Howison and Royce each experienced this. Yet in each of their cases this occurred earlier, by a decade or more, when higher education was (even) less systematic than it was in Kies's case.

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16. Butler University Special Collections, college yearbook, "The Drift," 1899. At this point in his career, Ames had taught as a fellow at the University of Chicago, after studying with Dewey and Mead. 17. Butler College, Minutes of the Board of Directors, July 14, 1897, p. 316. 18. Butler College, Minutes of the Board of Directors, April 12, 1899, p. 387, gives Prof. Howe's salary; Minutes for April 13, 1898, p. 356 gives Kies's. 19. S. Sherberne Mathews' Letter to James B. Angell, from File on Marietta Kies, Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan. 20. Johns Hopkins awarded its first doctoral degree to a woman in 1893; Yale in 1894; Chicago in 1895. Harvard did not grant advanced degrees to women until well into the twentieth century - in fact, Mary Whiton Calkins went to her grave without being conferred with the degree, because she refused to accept a Ph.D. from RadclifFe, arguing that her work was with Harvard professors, therefore she deserved a Harvard degree. 21. Memoriam, p. 40-42. 22. See Institutional Ethics, 41 and 95. 23. Sherman's criticism was that Kies was too loyal a disciple of Harris to merit inclusion on the program. Her comments on other women and their merits as lecturers/ philosophers is informative: "I ask that two women be given places on the programme if two women can be found who will be a credit to themselves, to the audience, and above all to philosophy. Names have been suggested by various members of the Advisory Council — Mrs. Julia Ward Howe's reputation, tact and popularity, etc., would render her acceptable to an audience, while her age and acknowledged merit along certain lines would free her from the close criticism that another might received. On the other hand many are tired of Mrs. Howe, think that younger women might share opportunity, etc., etc. Gertrude Garrigues has been named. I object to her voice and mannerism, and she might work so hard to have her paper profoundly Hegelian there might be danger of swamping herself. Miss Kies has been named, but she is so obviously a disciple of Mr. Harris that her work seems like an echo. Ellen Mitchell has merit, but she does not arouse an audience. What she says is apt to fall cold, although it may be good . . . " See Sherman's letter to Davidson, October 27, 1892, in Thomas Davidson Papers, Sterling Library Archives, Yale University. Interestingly, Josiah Royce, made the same criticism of Kies in a brief, but not wholly unfavorable, review of her book The Ethical Principle in The International Journal of Ethics, 2:51 Royce himself presented a paper at the Chicago Exposition and, as a close associate of Harris, may have had input into program planning. It is likely that his and Sherman's views on Kies influenced or were influenced by each other, and that their agreement confirmed that Kies should not be chosen as one of the two women's representatives on the program. Julia Ward Howe and Eliza Sunderland, a fellow doctoral recipient at Michigan, were the women finally selected for this purpose. 24.

See especially Patricia Jagentowicz Mills, ed., Feminist Interpretations ofG.W.F. Hegel (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1996).

Notes to Chapter 6 25.

26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32.

33.

34. 35.

36.

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This stands in contrast to contemporary feminists whose theories have asserted that gender difference is at the root of moral or ethical decision-making. It is ironic that, without so much as hinting at gender difference, Kies has spontaneously arrived at the type of moral theory that, a full ninety years later, Carol Gilligan suggested might evolve if different (i.e., women's) voices were allowed into the moral/political dialogue. See especially Philosophy of Right, §187, 188, and the Addition to 184. See Philosophy of Spirit, §389 and 392. PR, §241. PR, §242, including Note. PR, §245. P/2, §246-8. See Heidi M. Ravven, "Has Hegel Anything to Say to Feminists?" in Feminist Interpretations of G.W.F. Hegel, Patricia Jagentowicz Mills, ed. (Pennsylvania Pennsylvania State University Press, 1996), 248-9, n. 26. This and other key essays in the Mills edition provide important insights into the problems with Hegel's view of women and/or their role in the family from a feminist perspective. See also Mary O'Brien, "Hegel: Man, Physiology, and Fate," Carol Pateman, "Hegel, Marriage, and the Standpoint of Contract" (cited below), and Shari Neller Starrett, "Critical Relations in Hegel: Woman, Family, and the Divine." See also Jeffrey A. Gauthier, Hegel and Feminist Social Criticism (Albany: SUNY Press, 1997). See PR, §238, regarding civil society tearing members away from family ties; See PR, § 164 and § 166 regarding women as fully actualized in the home. The contemporary feminist being quoted here is Pateman, "Hegel, Marriage, and the Standpoint of Contract," in Feminist Interpretations ofG. W. F. Hegel, Patricia Jagentowi Mills, ed., 215. Emphasis is mine. See• Gauthier, Hegel and Feminist Social Criticism, 122. Kies, Institutional Ethics, 84. Carol Pateman has expanded on Kies's insight on this point, declaring that women's status as subordinates to men make marriage, as Hegel framed it, an irrational, even internally contradictory contractual relationship, because male/female relationships are more akin to the master/slave relationship than that of equals. See Pateman, especially pages 213—19. See any number of "Editor's Table" columns in issues of Godey's Lady's Book (1836-78) Sarah J. Hale, ed. See also Catharine Beecher; The True Remedy for the Wrongs of Women (Boston: Phillips, Sampson, and Co., 1851); Woman's Professi as Mother and Educator with Views in Opposition to Woman Suffrage (Philadelphia:

G. Maclean, 1872); also see Gail Hamilton [nee Mary Abigail Dodge], Woman's Worthand Worthlessness (New York: Harper & brothers, 1872).

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Kiel, Akademische Buchhandlung. Townsend, Harvey Gates. (1968), "Philosophy in St. Louis," Philosophical Ideas in t United States, Harvey Gates Townsend, New York: Octagon Books. Van Ausdal, Sarah J . (1985), Case Study in Educational Innovation: The Public Kindergarten

in St. Louis, 1870—1900, doctoral thesis, Southern Illinois University. Watson, John. (1975), "Idealism and Social Theory: A Comparative Study of British and American Adaptations of Hegel, 1860-1914," Ph.D. thesis, University of Pennsylvania. Weiss, Beverly J. (1996), "Footprints in the Sands of Time: A Notable American Woman: Anna C. Brackett," The Echo [alumni publication of Framingham State College], 17:2. Wenley, Robert. (1917), The Life and Work of George Sylvester Morris, New York:

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Index

Absolute (see also God, Spirit) 24, 45n, 108, 109 Adams, Henry Carter 121,122,136n, 139,140 Addamsjane 119,128,130 Aesthetics 8, 16 Alcott, Amos Bronson 19, 24, 25, 33-34, 35, 43n 80 Alcott, Louisa May 9 Alger, William Rounsville 20 Allen, Beverly 46n Altruism 6, 12, 39, 134, 145-152, 153, 159 American Association of University Women 78,96n American Branch of the League to Enforce Peace 131 American Peace Society 131 American Social Science Association 3, 85 Ames Mead Lucia 1,2,3, 5, 8, 16, 40 and Concord School 39 and education 135 and Eliza Sunderland 38 and feminism 6-8,39,113,115,119, 128-130, 133 and Marietta Kies 134 and pacifism 129,130-135 and paraprofessional philosophy 97 and religion 129 and St. Louis idealist movement 39, 119,128 and the Concord School 130 and William Torrey Harris 38-39, 119,128, 129 at the Concord School 144 family and career 128-129 Ames, Charles 38-39,129 Ames, Edward Scribner 141, 143, 160n Amherst College 129 Angell, James 136n

Anthony, Susan B. 94n Aristotle Club 21 Aristotle 9,24,31,38 Arnold, Thomas 100,102 Art Society 21,37,56,105 Association for the Advancement of Women 5, 120 Balch, Emily Green 130,131 Barnes, Mary Downing Sheldon 41 n Beecher, Catharine 63, 124, 158 Beedy, Mary 36, 80, 85, 94n 136n and Snider 29 and Thomas Davidson 32 Beeson Susan 3, 36, 56 Begriff, 23 Bernays Jacob 35 Bibb, Grace 1,2,3,5,16,20,47,92, 93,105, 107, 123 and Anna Brackett 30-31,98,101 and Denton Snider 101-102 and education 135,138 and William Torrey Harris 100 and Kant Club 98 and Louis Soldan 30-31, 99, 116n and paraprofessional philosophy 97-98 and St. Louis idealist movement 37, 38,97 and Susan Blow 56, 98 and Thomas Davidson 32 and William Torrey Harris 38, 99 at the Concord School 38, 144 at University of Missouri 30 educational theory of 39 feminism of 5,7,12,19,21,38, 100-104, 113, 138 philosophy of 115 Bildung [seealso Culture) 21, 22, 30, 42n, 50, 54 Blackwell, Antoinette Brown 159n

172

Index

Blow, Susan 1, 2, 3, 5, 9, 16, 20, 107, 109,136n and Anna Brackett 56 and child development 22 and Denton Snider 29, 37, 55, 57-59 andeducation 109-110,135,138 and empiricism 76 and feminism 10, 11-12 and George Holmes Howison 29-30 and Grace Bibb 56, 98 and Graves' Disease 55—56 and Marietta Kies 144,153 and personalism 35,46n 67,126 and process thought 35, 67 and self-activity 24 and St. Louis idealist movement 37, 47, 56, 67-68 and Thomas Davidson 32 and William Torrey Harris 37, 51-52,55-56,58, 110 at the Concord School 25 criticism of John Dewey 62 education of 48, 50-51 educational theory of 23, 39-40, 48-53,64-67,84, 104 family of 48 Hegelianism of 35, 37 interpretation of Froebel 60—64 kindergarten theory of 3, 7, 8, 13, 19, 37,47,51-55 kindergarten work of 4, 10, 11-12, 75 on motherhood 4, 62-63 on women's issues 62—63 religious views of 20, 32, 58 teacher training program of 53-54, 57 understanding of Spirit 24, 67 on pragmatism 7, 47, 67 view of women 56 work on Dante 37 works 99 Blow, Henry T. 48, 50, 68n Boston University 46n, 137n Bowne, Borden Parker 46n, 137n Brackett Anna 1,2,3,5,16, 20, 38, 47, 66, 68, 92n, 107, 143 and Eliza Sunderland 38, 120, 122-123 and empiricism 76 and Grace Bibb 30-31,98,101

andJSP,44n and Louis Soldan 30-31,32,7 7-78 on Margaret Fuller 37, 80-81 and Marietta Kies 144, 153, 155 and St. Louis idealist movement 73, 83 and St. Louis Philosophical Society 36-37, 46n, 80 and St. Louis School Board 81 and Susan Blow 56 and teaching as a profession 75, 78 and Thomas Davidson 32, 77, 81 and William Torrey Harris 37,73 Anna, and Ida Eliot 81 -83 at the Concord School 25 education of 73 educational theory of 4, educational theory of 4, 7, 8, 23, 39-40, 64, 73, 76, 84-86, 100, 109-110, 135, 138 family 73,81-83 feminism of 4, 8, 12,19, 21, 22, 23, 37, 38, 73, 78-81, 85-91, 88-92, 95n, 104, 113, 128 Hegelianism of 36 normal school work of 74-78, 77, 91, 98,103 on women's higher education 10,12 religious views of 20 translations of Rosenkranz 22,37, 64 view of education 103 view of the family 86-87 Bradstreet, Anne 9 Breadwinners' College 33 Bridges, Flora 143 Brightman, Edgar Sheffield 46n, 137n Brockmeyer 2, 3, 30 and Anna Brackett 27 and Ralph W?aldo Emerson 34 and St. Louis idealist movement 26-28 in Civil War 27 Brown University 26 Brown, Olympia 159n Browning, Elizabeth Barrett 105 BrynMawr 122 Bugbee, Sarah 27 Bulow, Baroness Marenholz von 53, 70n

Index Butler College 16-17,20, 138, 141, 143 Butler, Nicholas Murray 25, 51, 98 Cabot, James Elliot 83-84 Caird, Edward 110 Calkins, Mary Whiton 68, 160n Care, feminist ethic of 6, 12 Catholicism 58 Cheney, Ednah Dow 16, 41n, 85, 96n, 141 Chicago Literary School 29, 58 Chicago Women's Club 58 Chicago, idealism in 18 Christian Socialism 21,145-147 Christianity 24,32,125-126 Civil society 6,61, 79, 86-87, 92, 150, 154-155, 161n Civil society 6 (see also public sphere) Civil War 27, 48, 73, 74, 131, 134 Clarke, Edward Hammon 88, 89, 95n96n Clarke, James Freeman 42n Cohen, Morris Rafael 33 Coldwell, Ethel 159n Colorado College 20, 138, 139 Columbia College 41 n Columbia University 25, 98 Columbia University, Teacher's College 56, 136n Columbian Exposition ( e W o r l d ' s Fair, Chicago) Commentaries on Friedrich Froebel's Mother

Play (Blow)

68

Commentaries on Froebel's'Mother Play'

(Blow) 59 Comte 127 Concord Summer School of Philosophy and Literature 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 18, 19, 33,38,39, 106, 107, 121, 126 and'Glenmore' 31 and feminism 158 and St. Louis idealism 24 and women's higher education 20 Ellen Mitchell at the 97, 111-112, 144 George Holmes Howison at the 29 Grace Bibb at the 97,144 Lucia Ames Mead at the 38-39, 144 Marietta Kies at the 138, 144 Susan Blow at the 57

173

Thomas Davidson at the 31, 112 William Torrey Harris at the 110 women at the 5, 8, 25, 32, 38, 39-40, 85,98, 105, 106, 130 Congregationalism 20 Congress of Representative Women 120 Constructive laws 147-149, 150, 157 Conway, Moncure 41 n Cornell University women at 17 Couzins, Phoebe 80, 94n Craig, John 137n Culture [see also Bildung) Culture 21,22,30,50,52,54 Dalhousie University 17 Dall, Caroline H. 85 Dante, Alighieri 37, 55, 107 Davidson, Thomas 2, 3, 9, 80, 136n, 160n and adult education 33 and Anna Brackett 32,77,81,82 and Denton Snider 29 and Fellowship of the New Life 20 andfeminism 21, 32-33, 37, 94n, 112 and Jacob Schiff 33 and Josiah Royce 31 and Louis Soldan 31 and St. Louis idealist movement 31-32 and St. Louis Philosophical Society 28 and Susan Blow 32 and William Torrey Harris 31-32 at the Concord School 24-25, 38, 112 Hegelianism of 36 religious views of 20 Davis, Edwin 143 Davis, Rebecca Harding 9 Denver Fortnightly Club 106, 113 Deweyjohn 130, 140, 160n Dewey, and Eliza Sunderland 127 and Lucia Ames Mead 119 and Marietta Kies 139 and Marietta Kies 39 and Eliza Sunderland 38, 119, 121, 122, 127 and women students 122 Susan Blow's criticism of 62

174

Index

Dodge, David Low 131 Dred Scott case 48

Fisher, Laura 55, 56 Forbes, Cleon 28,51 Ford, Lewis 45n 73 Forrestjacob 141 81 Framingham State Normal School 73 83 Frankfurter, Felix 33 Free Religious Association 20 Froebel, Friedrich 48-49, 54, 59-60, 63,65,67,76 Blow's interpretation of 50, 60-64 and Hegel 49-50, 53, 69n Fruchte, Amelia 56, 80 Fuller, Margaret 19, 37, 42n 80

Education of American Girls (Brackett) Education of American Girls (Brackett) Education of American Girls (Brackett) Education of American Girls (Brackett) 85-86 Education 1,3,16,21,22, and pacifism 132 and self-activity 24 for African Americans 18 of women 25, 97, 103 {see also Women's higher education) in St. Louis idealist movement 35 Gage, Matilda Joslyn 94n role of self-estrangement in 23 Gandhi, Mohandas 134 women's role in 4 Garrigues, Gertrude 160n Educational Issues in the Kindergarten (Blow) German idealism 1 German thought 1, 15, 17-18, 19, 26, 7, 47, 60, 67, 68 Educational theory 1 (see also 30, 35, 42n, 83 Gilligan, Carol 12, 16In pedagogy) Glenmore, summer school at 31 Egoism 6, 152 (see also self-interest) God (see also Absolute, Spirit) 24, 45n, Eliot, Ida 77, 78, 95n, 98 and Anna Brackett 81-83 67 Ellwood, Ella (see Ellen Mitchell) 104, Goeschel 37,56 Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von 42n 113 Grace 12, 145, 148-149, 151, 157, 158 Emerson, Ralph Waldo 19, 24, 25, 34, Graves, Alice 122, 136n 140,144 35, 43n, 46, 80, 103 Greek philosophy 38 Emile (Rousseau) 22,99,100 Green, Thomas H. 110 Empiricism 76, 85, 88, 109, 110 Encyclopedia of Logic (Hegel) 31 Hale, Sarah J. 63,158 Ethical Culture Society 20, 32 HalLJ. Z. 28 Ethical Principle (Kies) 39, 117n, 145, Hamilton, Gail 63,158 160n Hammond, William P. 114-115 Fabian Society 20, 32 Hanaford, Phebe 159n Family 10, 12, 63, 86, 95n, Harris, William Torrey 1,2,3, 7, 8, 25-26, 34, 36, 80,110, 130, 136n 152-153-156,158, 161n and American Social Science Faust 107 Association 85 Fellowship of the New Life 20, 31-32 and Anna Brackett 37,73 Feminism 2,6,7,8,10-13,16,17,20,38 and Charles Eliot Norton 36 Feminism, liberal 13, 14n, 63, 78-79, and Civil War 27 88,91,92, 103, 124, 128 and Concord School 24-25 Feminism, maternal 7, 13, 14n, 63, and education 20, 52, 77 78-79,88, 100, 103, 123-124, 128, and Eliza Sunderland 38,121 153 and Ellen Mitchell 38, 111 Feuerbach, Ludwig 35 and empiricism 76 Fichte, Johann Gottlieb 15, 17, 35, 50, and feminism 18, 21, 32-33, 37, 40, 83 94n, 112, 158 Fichte, Immanuel Hermann 35

175

Index and George Holmes Howison 16, 29-30 and George Sylvester Morris 33 and Grace Bibb 38,99,100 and Louis Soldan 116n and Lucia Ames Mead 38-39, 119, 128,129 and Marietta Kies 20, 33, 39, 115, 129, 138-139,160n and process thought 35 and self-activity 24 and Susan Blow 12,37,51-52, 55-56,58, 110 and Thomas Davidson 31-32 as leader of the St. Louis idealist movement 3,9,16,17-19, 27-28, 33-34, 36, 83, 84, 109 interpretation of Hegel 21, 23-24, 35-36,98, 152 religious views of 20, 26 Harris, Anna Rebecca 138 Harris, Edith Davidson 31 Harris, Ellen Elizabeth 138 Harris, Mary Jane 138 Harris, Sarah 46n Harris, Sarah Bugbee 46n Harrison, Elizabeth 68,70n 136n Harrison, Elizabeth, and Snider 29, 44n Harrison, Elizabeth, and Susan Blow 53 Hartmann, Eduard von 127 Hartshorn, Charles 45n Harvard University 16, 19, 25, 98, 143, 160n Hastings College 17 Hawthorne, Nathaniel 19 Hazard, Rebecca 46n Hazard, Rebecca 80, 94n Hedge, Frederic Henry 25, 42n Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich 1,3,7, 15, 26, 59, 63-64, 83-85, 98, 106, 107-108, 109, 110, 115, 121, 127, 129, 144, 156 and civil society 61 and education 4, 19, 22, 23, 67, 68, 92 and Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling 49-50 and Friedrich Froebel 49-50, 53 Emerson's view of 34

interpretations of 5,17-18,21, 23-24, 37, 38,49, 92,98, 113, 145, 147-150, 152-153, on civil society 6 view of the family 153-155 view of women 4, 10, 12,, 22, 40, 79, 85-87, 154-155, 156, 158, 161n Hegel's Doctrine of Reflection (Harris) Hegel's Logic (RanRIS) 3,233

3

Hegelianism, branches of 20—21, 35 Hegelians, Ohio 41 n Herodotus 57 Higginson, Thomas Wentworth 25 Hill, Britton A, 28 Hill, Caroline Miles 122, 136n, 140 Hill, Thomas 136n History of Philosophy (Hegel)

18

Hoffman, Franz 83 Holmes, Oliver Wendell, Sr. 81 Holt, Hamilton 131 Homer 107 Homer 57 Howe, Julia Ward 16, 25, 96n, 120, 131,160n Howe, William D. 143 Howison, George Holmes 2,3,15,16, 33, 136n, 141, 159n and feminism 16 and Marietta Kies 15-17, 30, 41n and personalism 35, 46n and Ralph Waldo Emerson 34 and St. Louis idealist movement 19, 28, 29-30 and Susan Blow 29-30 and William Torrey Harris 29-30 at the Concord School 25, 29 Howison, Lois Caswell 41 n In a Different Voice (Gilligan)

Indian removal policy Institutional Ethics (Kies) Institutional Ethics (Kies) Institutional Ethics (Kies)

12

131 144, 145 152 39

International Education Series

99, 121

Introduction to the Study of Philosophy (Kies) 20,39,139,144 Islam 125 James Martineau and His Greatest Book

(Sunderland)

120

176

Index

James, Henry Sr. 9,35 James, William 25, 98 Johns Hopkins University 17, 33, 143, 160n Jones, Jenkin Lloyd 126

Hegelianism of 36 interpretation of Hegel 147-150, 152-153, 156 Kindergarten 3, 10, 11, 13, 68, 70n

Journal ofEducation (Boston) 73 Journal of Education (St. Louis) 38, 93n, Journal of Speculative Philosophy, 3, 17, 21,

Kindergarten teacher training 4, 53-54 Krause, Karl Christian Friedrich 50 Kroeger, Alfred 30, 35

22, 30, 31, 33, 56, 73, 83, 84, 99, 105, 106, 107, 121, 129, 144 and Anna Brackett 37 Harris as editor of 16,29,36 women as contributors to 36^38 Judaism 125-127 Justice 12, 145, 147, 151, 156, 157, 158

Ladd, William 131 Ladd Franklin, Christine 17, 68 Lady Macbeth 100-102 Law or War (Ames Mead) 128, 132 League of nations 39,128,131 Leidecker, Kurt 7,51

98, 100

Kindergarten Education (Blow)

47

Letters to a Mother on the Philosophy ofFroebel

Kant Club 3,5,21,37,38,80,105 Kant, Immanuel 7, 15, 19, 39, 98, 121, 126,127,129, 130-134 Kaufmann, Peter 41 n Kierkegaard, Soren 9 Kies, Marietta 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 8, 20, 22, 24, 39, 115, 121, 129 altruismof 10,12,130,145-152 and Anna Brackett 144,153,155 and Christian Socialist movement 21 and Ednah Dow Cheney 141 and Eliza Sunderland 38, 119, 122 and Ellen Mitchell 117n and feminism 6,12-13,155-158 and George Holmes Howison 15-17, 30,41n 141 and George Sylvester Morris 20, 33, 39 and Henry Carter Adams 139 and John Dewey 39,139 and Lucia Ames Mead 134, 135 and St. Louis idealist movement 15-16,39,128, 138, 144 and Susan Blow 144,153 and Susan Tolman Mills 159n and William Torrey Harris 20, 33, 39,115, 129, 138-139, 144 at Butler College 16-17,143 at Mills College 30,141 at the Concord School 20, 25, 130, 138, 139, 144 at the University of Michigan 20, 140 education of 12,16,138,139

(Blow) 59, 68, 99 Lieber, Francis 41 n Literature 4, 16, 19, 23, 28, 54, 64, 65, 72n, 84, 98, 100-102, 106-107, 129 Lloyd, Albert H. 127 Lotze, Rudolf Hermann 127 Mann, Horace 102 Marshall College 41 n Martineau, James 120, 127 Massachusetts Institute of Technology 16 McCosh, James 25,98 McCullough, Mary 55 Mead, Edwin Doak 38-39, 129, 137n Mead, George Herbert 127, 160n Mead, Lucia Ames {see Ames Mead, Lucia) Mexican War 131 Michigan Equal Suffrage Association 120 Michigan State Federation of Women's Clubs 120 Mill, John Stuart 127 Mills College 20, 30, 138, 141, 159n Mills, Susan Tolman 141, 159n Milwaukee, literary school in 29 Mind {see also Spirit) 23-24, 110 Minor, Virginia 80, 94n Missouri Equal Suffrage Association 3,56 Missouri Woman's Suffrage Association 80,94n,105,112

Index Mitchell, Ellen 1,2,3,5,16, 38, 39, 92, 104, 106, 107, 110, 115, 136n, 138, 160n and Denton Snider 20 and Eliza Sunderland 38, 122-123 and Marietta Kies 117n and paraprofessional philosophy 97, 98, 135 and Pen and Pencil Club 5 and St. Louis idealist movement 97, 109 and Thomas Davidson 32 and William P. Hammond 114-115 and William Rounsville Alger 20 and Wrilliam Torrey Harris 38 and women's discussion groups 5, 20, 105, 106, 107, 115 at the Concord School 25,105, 111-112, 144 at the University of Denver 17, 20 family and education 104 feminism of 5, 7, 12, 20, 21, 38, 111-113,128 on prostitution 21,38,112-113 religious views of 20 Mitchell, Joseph \\T. 104,106,113 Monism, 30, 31 Morgan, Horace H. 30 Morris, George Sylvester 2, 7, 25, 33, 115, 136n, 144 and Eliza Sunderland 38, 119, 121, 122

and Marietta Kies 20, 33, 39 and William Torrey Harris 33, 139 and women students 33,122 at the University of Michigan 140 Mother Play (Froebel) 49,59,62 Motherhood (see also Feminism, maternal) 4,62-63 Mott, Lucretia 159n Mt. Holyoke Seminary 12, 20, 120, 138, 138, 139, 142 Muelder, Walter 137n National Alliance of Unitarian and Other Liberal Christian Women 120 National Education Association 3, 18, 30, 31,38, 79, 91, 94n 99, 116n Nolan, Mary 92n

111

North American Review 83 Norton, Charles Eliot 36 Object lessons 76-77, 85, 93n Overthrow of the War System (Ames Mead) 128 Pacifism {see also Lucia Ames Mead) 6,39, 132, 133, 135 Padagogik als System (Rosenkranz) 22, 84 Palmer, Alice Freeman 41 n Parliament of World's Religions 125 Pateman, Carol 16In Patriotism 132-134 Patriotism and the New Internationalism (Ames Mead) 128,132 Payne, William H. 100 Peabody, Elizabeth Palmer 16, 25, 70n, 96n Pedagogical Society 21,32,37,38 Pedagogics as a System (Brackett, trans.) 64, 73, 84, 87, 95n, 99 Pedagogy 3,16,47 Pen and Pencil Club 5, 21, 105 Perpetual Peace (Kan 128 Perry, Charles 51 Personalism 24, 35, 46n, 67, 126, 137n Pestalozzi, Johann Heinrich 76,77, 102, 116n Phenomenology of Spirit (Hegel) 18, 83, 98,149 Phidias 106 Philosopher, definition of 9-10, 14n Philosophical Propaedeutic EGEL 18,223, 83 Philosophical Society in St. Louis {see St. Louis Philosophical Society) Philosophical Society, University of Michigan 140 Philosophical Union (University of California, Berkeley) 16, 29-30 Philosophy of Education (Bracket 144 Philosophy of History (Hege 18,83 Philosophy of Nature (Hegel 18 Philosophy of Right (Hegel) 4, 18, 22, 33, 39, 64, 95n, 149, 154 Philosophy of the State and of History (Morris, manuscript) 115 Philosophy, academic 5, 6, 7, 16, 18, 97, 98, 106, 115, 119, 135, 138

178

Index

Philosophy, paraprofessional 4, 5, 6, 7, 97-98,113,119,120, 127,135, 138 Philosophy, practical application of 5, 6,7,9,36,39,97, 119 Phrenology 26 Plato 24, 38, 105, 106, 107-108 Play, in education 3, 23, 49, 50, 52, 53, 60, 63-64, 65, 66, 84 Pluralism 30,31,35 Porter, Noah 25, 98 Poverty 147-148, 149, 158 Pragmatism 7, 15, 47, 67, 121, 152 Presbyterianism 20 Princeton University 19,25,98 Private life 4, 10-11, 146, 148, 153, 154, 156 Process thought 34-35, 45n, 67 Prostitution 21, 38, 112-113 Protective laws 147,150,157 Public life 4, 6, 87, 89, 146, 148, 154, 156, 158 Putnam, James Jackson 56, 67 Quakerism 120 Quincey de, Thomas

105

Radcliffe College 160n Rauch, Frederick A. 41n Rebec, George 127 Religion 5-6, 8, 19, 35, 38, 119, 125-127, 129, Ritchie, Eliza 17 Rosenkranz, Karl 4, 19, 22, 23,31, 35, 37, 40, 64, 73, 84-86, 92, 98, 100 view of women 12,87 Rousseau 22, 99-100, 116n Royce, Josiah 16, 31, 159n, 160n Sanborn, Franklin B. 43n Sanger, Margaret 89 Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von 15, 17,31,49-50,83 Schiff, Jacob 33 Schiller, Johann Christoph Friedrich 42n Schleiermacher, Friedrich Ernst Daniel 50,127 Schopenhauer, Arthur 38,105,107, 108, 127 Schurman, Anna Maria van 9

Schurz, Charles 44n Science of Logic (Hegel 18, 26, 27, 83., 98 Secret of Hegel (Stirling) 48 Selbsttatigkeit [see also Self-activity) 23-24 Self-activity, in St. Louis idealism (see also Selbsttatigkeit) 49, 60, 65, 66 Self-estrangement, in St. Louis idealism 23, 49, 62, 64-66 Self-interest, (see also egoism) 145, 147, 149, 151 Seneca Falls Women's Rights Convention 10 Sewail, May Wright 128, 130, 131, 136n Sexual education 89-91, 95n Sexual harassment 89-91 Shaw, Anna Howard 159n Sherman, Caroline K. 3, 29, 32, 58, 136n, 144, 160n Sigourney, Lydia 63 Slossen, May Preston 17 Smiley, Albert 130 Smith, Christine 92n Snider, Denton Jacques 2,3,9,21, 28-29,31,53,57, 136n and Amos Bronson Alcott 33-34 and Caroline K. Sherman 58 and Ellen Mitchell 20 and Grace Bibb 101-102 and Susan Blow 29,37,55,57-59 and Thomas Davidson 29 at the Concord School 24-25 literary schools of 44n religious views of 20 Socialism (see also Christian Socialism) 158 Soldan, Louis 2, 3, 25, 28, 30-31, 80 and Anna Brackett 30-31,32, 77-78 and feminism 21,37 and Grace Bibb 30-31,99 and Susan Blow 55 and Thomas Davidson 31 and William Torrey Harris 31, 116n Sommers, Christina Hoff 14n Sophocles 57 Spencer, Herbert 36, 127, 129 Spirit (see also Absolute, God, Mind) 24, 27,40,67,92

Index

179

Study of Greek Philosophy (Mitchell) 7, 20, St. Louis idealism 1,2,3, 5, 7, 17, 20, 106, 107, 113, 123 22, 38, 68,85, 92n, 129 Sudborough, Thomas 99 and Anna Brackett 73, 83, 92 Suffrage {see women's rights movement) and Concord School 24 Sunderland, Eliza 1, 2, 3, 5, 16, 82, 125, and education 7, 13n 16, 18 129,160n and Eliza Sunderland 121, 126, 128 and Alice Graves 122 and Ellen Mitchell 97,109 and Anna Brackett 38, 91, 122-123 and feminism 7,21,158 and Caroline Miles Hill 122 and George Sylvester Morris 33 and Ellen Mitchell 38, 122-123 and Grace Bibb 38, 97 and feminism 5-6, 7, 38, 113, 115, and Louis Soldan 30-31 and Lucia Ames Mead 128 119 and Marietta Kies 39, 128, 144 and George Sylvester Morris 38, 119 and Susan Blow 56, 67-68 and John Dewey 38,119 and Thomas Davidson 31—32 and Lucia Ames Mead 38, 119, 135 and William Torrey Harris {see Harris, and Marietta Kies 38, 119,122 and religion 5-6, 38, 119, 121, 123, William Torrey) founding of 26—28 125-127 womenin 8,36-41,106 and St. Louis idealist movement 38, St. Louis Ladies' Magazine 73 39, 119, 121, 126, 128 education and career of 120, 121, St. Louis Normal School 19, 30, 73, 74, 81 127,136n, 138 St. Louis Philosophical and Literary maternalistic view of women Society 26,43n 123-124 St. Louis Philosophical Society 3, 21, Sunderland, Jabez T. 120, 121, 126 48,98, 105 Swedenborgianism 26 and Anna Brackett 37 Swords and Ploughshares (Ames and Thomas Davidson 28, 31 Mead) 128, 132 and George Holmes Howison 28, 29 Symbolic Education (Blow) 47, 56, 60, 9 and William Torrey Harris 27-28 144 and Denton Snider 28-29 and Louis Soldan 28 Thackeray, William 100 Thaulow, Gustav 35 founding of 27-28 growth of 35 Theory of Perpetual Peace (Kan 130, , 131, 132 women in 36, 46n, 80, 85 St. Louis public schools 1,3,5,7, 15, 18, Thoreau, Henry David 19,27 Transcendentalism 16, 18, 24—25, 47,54,55,56, 103 33-34, 41n, 97, 106, 115 St. Louis Women's Club 37, 56, 80 Trendelenburg, Friedrich 31, 33 Stallo, JohnB. 35,41n Tufts, James H. 119,121,127 Stanford University 15, 41 n Twain, Mark 9 Stanton, Elizabeth Cady 94n State Teachers' Association 21, 37, 38 State The 92,155 Uberweg, Friedrich 33 and social welfare 146-147, 150-151 Unitarianism 5, 19, 20, 38, 39, 120, 126, Stedman, George 27 127, 128 Stirling, James Hutchinson 48,83, United Nations 131 110 Unity Club (Michigan) 122, 140 Stone, Lucinda Hinsdale 136n Universalism 20 Strauss, David Freidrich 136n University of California at Berkeley 15, Study of Dante (Blow) 144 16,141

180

Index

University of Chicago 15, 41n, 122, 143, 160n University of Denver 17,20,106 University of Michigan 12, 15, 16, 20, 25, 33, 38, 39, 82, 120, 121, 122, 123, 127, 136n, 139-140, 143, 144, 159n, 160n University of Missouri, Columbia 30, 93n, 98-99 University of South Carolina 41 n

Women philosophers 1-2, 6, 16, 97, 106, 120, 127, 138, 142 Women's Congress, Baltimore 108 Women's Congress, Chicago 112 Women's higher education 2, 6, 7—8, 15-18, 20, 25, 37, 39, 43n, 50, 63, 90-92,97, 119, 121,123,139,143, 155-156 Women's International League for Peace and Freedom 5, 128 Women's Peace Party 5, 39, 128 Women's philosophy groups 5, 20, 105, Vassar College 81 106, 107 Vera, Augusto 83 Women's rights movement 5, 6, 10-13, 21,62-63, 91, 105, 123-125,140, Washington University 16,29 155-156 Watters, John 27, 28 Women's Western Unitarian Webster, Noah 131 Conference 5, 120 World court 128,131,133 Wednesday Club 56 World's Fair (Chicago) 32, 120, 124, Weizsacker, Karl Heinrich 136n Wellesley College 41 n 125, 144, 160n World's Fair (Paris) 55 West, Robin 14n Western Review, 5, 19, 31, 38, 98, 100, 101, World's Fair (Philadelphia) 55 World's Parliament of Religions 120 105 Wright, Frank Lloyd 70n Whitehead, Alfred North 45n Wiggin, Kate Douglas 70n Yale University 25, 27, 98, 138, 143, Willard, Frances 118n 160n Willich, August 35, 41 n Yankee Teacher (Leidecker) 7 Woerner, Judge Gabriel 28,30 Woman's Christian Temperance Union Zeller, Eduard 7 118n,158