AGRICULTURAL AND MINERAL COMMODITIES YEAR BOOK
AGRICULTURAL AND MINERAL COMMODITIES YEAR BOOK FIRST EDITION
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AGRICULTURAL AND MINERAL COMMODITIES YEAR BOOK
AGRICULTURAL AND MINERAL COMMODITIES YEAR BOOK FIRST EDITION
LONDON AND NEW YORK
First Edition 2002 This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2005. “To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.” © Europa Publications Limited 2002 11 New Fetter Lane, London EC4P 4EE, United Kingdom (A member of the Taylor & Francis Group) All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be photocopied, recorded, or otherwise reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any electronic or mechanical means without the prior permission of the copyright owner. ISBN 0-203-40355-X Master e-book ISBN
ISBN 0-203-41014-9 (Adobe eReader Format) ISBN 1-85743-150-2 (Print Edition) Editor: David Lea Commodity Surveys: Simon Chapman Assistant Editor: Annamarie Rowe
Foreword
This first edition of the Agricultural and Mineral Commodities Year Book aims to expand on the coverage given to commodities in three of Europa’s Regional Surveys of the World. The intention is to provide the reader with a knowledge of 40 of the world’s most widely traded commodities, and of the international context within which such trade takes place. All the commodities with a section in either Africa South of the Sahara, The Far East and Australasia, or South America, Central America and the Caribbean receive a more detailed assessment here, and seven new commodities (barley, lead, natural gas, phosphates, soybeans, wool and zinc) have been added. The book is divided into three parts. In Part One, three introductory essays, written by academics, assess aspects of the trade in commodities in the early 2000s. Prof. Donald MacLaren of the university of Melbourne writes on the importance of agricultural commodity trade in international relations, Dr Paul Crompton of the University of Western Australia examines developments in mineral and energy commodities, while Dr A.GaneshKumar of the Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research in Mumbai assesses the impact of multilateral trade agreements on food security. In Part Two, 40 Commodities are surveyed. Each chapter contains a brief physical description of the raw material, of its means of processing and of its uses, before detailing production and trade in all the relevant regions of the world and examining the path of prices for that commodity in the last few years. Finally, Part Three contains a directory of some major international organizations operating in or having influence on the agricultural and mineral commodity field. The regional groupings used in the surveys in Part Two generally correspond to those established in the Regional Surveys of the World series. However, in a number of cases statistics are compiled by organizations which divide the world differently—these variations are explained whenever they occur. In a time of increasing global trade and extreme volatility in the price of certain commodities, it is hoped that this book will prove a valuable assistance to the reader with an interest in the field, enabling an accurate impression of the world’s commodity trade to be obtained. October 2002
Acknowledgements
The editors gratefully acknowledge the interest, co-operation and advice of all who have contributed to this volume. In particular, we would like to thank Simon Chapman for his work on the commodity surveys, Andrew Thomas for his statistical expertise, and the editors of the relevant Regional Surveys of the World. We are indebted to a large number of organizations, including those below, for their assistance in the preparation of this book, and of previous relevant sections in other books: Association of Iron Ore Exporting Countries Association of Tin Producing Countries BP PLC British-American Tobacco Co Central Selling Organisation Centre Internacional de Agricultura Tropical Cobalt Information Centre COMMEX Malaysia Copper Development Association De Beers Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN Gill & Duffus Group PLC Gold Fields Mineral Services Ltd Institute of Petroleum International Cocoa Organization International Coffee Organization International Copper Study Group International Grains Council International Institute for Cotton International Iron and Steel Institute International Lead Zinc Study Group International Monetary Fund
International Primary Aluminium Institute International Rice Research Institute International Rubber Study Group International Sugar Organization International Tin Research Institute International Tea Committee International Tobacco Growers’ Association Johnson Matthey PLC Malaysian Oil Palm Growers’ Council Metal Bulletin The Silver Institute Unión de Países Exportadores de Banano United Coconut Association of the Philippines, Inc United Nations Conference on Trade and Development US Department of Energy US Geological Survey, US Department of the Interior Woolmark World Bank World Bureau of Metal Statistics World Nuclear Association
Sources for Agricultural Production Tables (unless otherwise indicated): FAOSTAT database collection, FAO. Source for Export Price Indexes: UN, Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, issues to May 2002.
Contents
PART ONE
Introduction Agricultural Commodity Trade in International Relations DONALD MACLAREN
PART TWO
2
Developments in World Mineral and Energy Markets PAUL CROMPTON
12
Food Security and the WTO Agreement on Agriculture A.GANESH-KUMAR
20
Commodity Surveys Aluminium and Bauxite
33
Banana
46
Barley
56
Cassava
62
Chromium
67
Coal
71
Cobalt
78
Cocoa
83
Coconut
91
Coffee
96
Copper
109
Cotton
120
Diamonds
127
Gold
136
Groundnut
148
Iron Ore
153
vii
Jute
159
Lead
164
Maize
171
Manganese
179
Millet and Sorghum
183
Natural Gas
187
Nickel
203
Oil Palm
212
Petroleum
217
Phosphates
240
Platinum
248
Rice
258
Rubber
265
Silver
273
Sisal
279
Soybeans
282
Sugar
291
Tea
306
Tin
314
Tobacco
322
Uranium
329
Wheat
334
Wool
341
Zinc
348
PART THREE Major Commodity Organizations Major Commodity Organizations
358
Abbreviations
asscn assoc ave C c. Chair. cu Dir Dir-Gen. Dr EC EEC EU etc. Exec. f. FAO g GDP Gen. Sec ha kg km lb m m. mem., mems mg
Association associate avenue Celsius circa Chairman/person/woman cubic Director Director-General Doctor European Communities European Economic Community European Union et cetera Executive founded Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations gram(s) Gross Domestic Product General Secretary hectare(s) kilogram(s) kilometre(s) pound metre(s) million member(s) milligram(s)
ix
mm n. a. org(s) Pres Publ., Publs Rd Repub. Sec. Sec.-Gen. sq st tel. UN US USA
millimetre(s) not available organization(s) President Publication(s) Road Republic Secretary Secretary-General square street telephone United Nations United States United States of America
The Contributors
Paul Crompton is Lecturer in Economics at the University of Western Australia. A.Ganesh Kumar is Associate Professor at the Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai. Donald MacLaren is Associate Professor in the Department of Economics at the University of Melbourne. International Telephone Dialling Codes To make international telephone calls to numbers appearing in this book, dial the international access code of the country from which you are calling, followed by the appropriate country code for the organization you wish to call (listed below, countries appearing in Part Three of this book only), followed by the area code (if applicable) and the telephone or fax number listed in the entry. Country
Code
Country
Code
Austria Bangladesh Barbados Belgium Canada Congo, Republic Côte d’Ivoire France Germany Indonesia Italy Japan Kenya Kuwait
43 880 1 246 32 1 242 225 33 49 62 39 81 254 965
Malaysia Mexico The Netherlands Nigeria Panama The Philippines Portugal Spain Switzerland Trinidad and Tobago United Kingdom United States of America Uruguay
60 52 31 234 507 63 351 34 41 1 868 44 1 598
PART ONE Introduction
Agricultural Commodity Trade in International Relations DONALD MACLAREN
Introduction Since the mid-20th century, international agricultural trade as a proportion of total merchandise trade has been in decline. Yet this diminishing relative economic importance has not been reflected in any decline in the significance of agricultural trade as a cause of tensions in international relations, particularly among the developed countries. Energy and mineral commodities may often attract more coverage in the media, as developments in, say, the petroleum or gold markets provide evidence of stark differences of opinion between producer and consumer countries, but these disputes often mirror those based on agricultural commodities. The most recent significant reminder of this was the lack of agreement between the European Union (EU) and the USA on agricultural matters which delayed the conclusion of the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) by some three years, from 1990 to 1993, and which came close to causing the Round to be aborted altogether. However, not all of the tensions have arisen among the developed countries, in particular between the EU, the USA and Japan. Despite agreement at the Fourth UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD IV) in 1976 to establish an Integrated Programme for Commodities which was intended to benefit developing countries through the manipulation of international commodity market prices, very little was accomplished over three years of discussion. Not only did the history of failed international commodity agreements militate against the success of the plan, but the unwillingness of the developed countries to underwrite the associated component of the Common Fund for Commodities ensured that, regardless of history, this particular attempt was not destined to succeed. More recently, it was evident during the prelude to the Ministerial Meeting of the World Trade Organization (WTO—the successor organization to GATT, created in 1994) in Doha (Qatar) in 2001 that many developing countries were dissatisfied with the trading arrangements for agricultural products that emerged from the Uruguay Round. To some extent this outcome was inevitable, given the lack of coalition-building and consensus amongst these countries about their own agenda. Today, they are determined to negotiate a better deal for themselves from of the so-called ‘Development Round’, which was initiated at Doha. However, it will remain unclear until much nearer to January 2005, when the
INTRODUCTION 3
Round is scheduled to conclude, whether or not the current tensions between the developed and developing countries over agricultural commodity trade will have been removed or at least significantly diminished. The definition of agricultural commodities for the purposes of measuring international trade flows is normally to regard them as those items which comprise Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) Sections 0 (Food and live animals), 1 (Beverages and tobacco), 2 (Crude material, excluding fuels) and 4 (Animal, vegetable oils and fats) but excluding Divisions 24, 25, 27 and 28. Over time, the proportion of bulk commodities in agricultural commodity trade has fallen from around 40% in the early 1970s to around 20% in the early 2000s. Given the relative lack of importance of bulk commodities in agricultural trade, but particularly in international merchandise trade, it is remarkable that tensions over trade distortions in bulk commodities should continue to persist disproportionately. The objective in this essay is to explain why international agricultural trade remains a source of substantial friction in international economic relations. Intuitively, it would be expected that a sector that, in the developed countries, contributes around 2% to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and to employment (compared with 21% to each in developing countries), and approximately 9% to exports, would not be important in international economic relations. This intuition, clearly, is incorrect. The outline is as follows. The economic case for freer trade, which under-pinned GATT from 1947 and, since 1995, has continued to guide the work of the WTO across a much broader economic front, is explained as a benchmark against which to judge what has actually happened in agricultural trade. However, since the inception of GATT, the agricultural sector and agricultural commodity trade have been treated differently from the manufacturing sector—it has never been accepted by all of the major participants that the principles of conventional economics should apply to this sector and to trade in agricultural products. The commodity-trade issues of importance to the developing countries revolve largely, but not exclusively, around access to the markets of the developed countries. However, despite the adoption of Part IV of GATT (designed to provide non-reciprocal benefits for developing countries’ primary exports) in 1964, and the introduction of the General System of Preferences (GSP—allowing preferential access for defined primary exports from developing countries to developed countries) by some developed countries in the 1970s, there remains considerable disquiet among developing countries at the efficacy of the slogan ‘trade not aid’ as it is practised by developed countries. The roots of these ongoing disputes and tensions are easy to identify, namely, the pursuit by developed-country governments of domestic agricultural policy objectives by policy instruments which, although varying amongst the major players, have been poorly selected to achieve the objectives sought and which have distorted trade to an unusual degree. In addition, new causes of tension are emerging in areas such as sanitary and phytosanitary measures, the use of growth hormones, genetically modified foods, food security and the provision of public goods, such as a pleasant rural landscape. These new causes of tension may be more difficult to reduce because market intervention by government has the potential on efficiency grounds to improve upon pure market outcomes. The current negotiations in the WTO were mandated by the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture to begin in 1999 on the issues deemed in 1993 to require further discussion and resolution. However, the agenda
4 AGRICULTURAL AND MINERAL COMMODITIES YEAR BOOK
has since been broadened beyond that which was required, to include issues referred to as non-trade concerns, for example, food safety and animal welfare. These concerns involve matters of interest to developed, developing and transition economies. The Case for Freer International Trade In the theory of international trade it is shown that, subject to some caveats, free trade maximizes a country’s income and that what is true for a single country is also true for the world economy. There is, however, the presupposition that maximizing national income through achieving economic efficiency is the only objective of trade policy. However, trade policy has an equity as well as an efficiency dimension—freer trade redistributes income by causing relative prices to change, thus making some individuals better-off and others worseoff. In principle, the gainers could compensate the losers to leave everyone better-off; in practice, such compensation requires some form of government mechanism and it is often not forthcoming. In the absence of compensation, the losers will lobby government for income support or will lobby to prevent trade liberalization from being implemented. The same political pressures accrue when the cause of falling prices is not the introduction of a policy of trade liberalization but the declining competitiveness of the domestic industry, relative to that of foreign suppliers. In an open economy, the use of the market mechanism, through price manipulation, to transfer income to those who lose from this decline depends upon breaking the direct link between the international and domestic markets. Once this link has been broken by instruments of trade policy, only then can domestic instruments be used effectively to achieve domestic objectives such as stability and security. Both of these objectives appear prominently in agricultural policy. In order to understand fully why governments do what they do in trade policy, instead of following the free-trade prescription of international economic theory or of supporting the incomes of those in declining sectors by direct means, the political economy of trade policy needs to be employed. There is no single model of political economy that is generally applicable, but in one group of models it is assumed that the government’s support for protection stems from a political-support motive. Policy-makers are assumed to pursue their own self-interest through balancing the political gains from supporting an industry, and the accompanying increased incomes in that industry, against the political losses which arise because there are losers, i.e. those who are paying the higher prices or the higher taxes. Since the gainers are relatively fewer in number than the losers, the gains per caput are more concentrated than are the losses for the many losers. Consequently, the positive influence on the voting intentions of the gainers exceeds the negative influence on the losers, who will have many other issues of political concern. Given this asymmetry, the decision for government to intervene is relatively straightforward. Of course, by the same logic, the decision to remove previously implemented income support is made more difficult because the political process has been captured by the lobby group. This simple idea can explain much of what has been and what continues to be observed in the agricultural policies of the developed countries. However, in some circumstances both gainers and losers may support intervention. This is apparent in the EU at the present time with respect to import bans on
INTRODUCTION 5
beef treated with growth hormone and to imports of genetically modified foods, where nonfinancial considerations have an impact on losers’ opinion. The empirical evidence suggests that governments focus almost exclusively on the gains for, or losses to, producers, ignoring the losses to consumers and taxpayers from intervention. Of course, this bias contrasts with the economic model in which all gains and losses are made part of the economy-wide calculation. Moreover, in international trade negotiations, the same focus is carried over. Trade negotiations are not about the economywide gains from freer trade but about making and receiving concessions with respect to protection in different sectors and the associated income changes for domestic producer groups in these sectors. Basically, the philosophy is mercantilist: exporting is good while importing is bad. Thus, there is an over-emphasis on trade concessions and an indifference towards the mutual gains to each economy from lower prices and greater choice for consumers. Agriculture in the GATT/WTO International trade tensions can be reduced bilaterally between the countries involved, they can be reduced through the formation of regional trading arrangements, or they can be solved through an international institution. The GATT was established in 1947 in order to provide a set of rules under which international trade would take place and which would constrain the ability of governments to act unilaterally in ways which harmed their trading partners. Part of that constraint was the existence of a dispute process, the aim of which was to resolve differences between trading partners that were not able to be solved bilaterally. Prior to 1995 the GATT was the most important institution through which trade tensions were dissipated when bilateral approaches had failed. That role was then assumed by the Dispute Settlement Mechanism in the WTO. The principle of ‘most-favoured-nation treatment’ (i.e. non-discrimination in trade) was fundamental from the start, together with reciprocal tariff concessions. The underlying aim of the GATT was to enable governments, through negotiation, to move the world economy towards free trade and full employment. This aim was largely achieved in the manufacturing sector but not for agriculture. From the outset, and largely at US insistence, it was recognized that agriculture was a special case and, consequently, some important exemptions were written into specific Articles to allow governments to intervene in agriculture and agricultural trade in ways which were banned for other products. For example, import quotas (Article XI) and export subsidies (Article XVI) were allowed for agricultural products but not for other goods. For other sectors, import tariffs were the only accepted instrument of trade protection. Thus agriculture remained largely outside the mainstream of trade liberalization in the GATT because tariffs were not the principal form of protection from imports. Hence, negotiations based upon the exchange of tariff concessions did nothing for agricultural trade. In effect, there were almost no constraints placed on the activities of governments in their desire to pursue their domestic agricultural policy objectives and to do so without taking into account the adjustment costs which their policy instruments imposed on their trading partners. This lack of external constraint and the lack of concern about the international effects of agricultural policies meant, inevitably, that there were conflicts between governments. These tended to
6 AGRICULTURAL AND MINERAL COMMODITIES YEAR BOOK
occur and to be more serious during periods of depressed market conditions, such as those of the mid-1980s. There have been a number of well-documented conflicts in international economic relations, some of which, with hindsight, bordered on the absurd. The most important and consistent source of irritation in agricultural trade has been the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the EU. The CAP was established as a replacement for the national agricultural policies of the six participants in the original European Economic Community (EEC—the precursor of the EU) and, while the original policy objectives, as set out in the Treaty of Rome (1957), may have been reasonable ones, especially in the context of the early postwar period, the instruments chosen in 1958 were deliberately designed to insulate the internal market from the international market in order to attain security of food supply and market stability. The effect of this insulation was to make international prices more volatile. At the same time, high domestic support prices increased domestic production and reduced the need for imports, even allowing surplus production which could only be exported into lower-priced international markets with the aid of export subsidies. The effect of reduced imports and higher exports lowered world market prices and reduced the market opportunities for commercial exporting countries, ceteris paribus. These subsidies were regarded by other exporters, such as Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the USA, as unfair and disruptive to their commercial interests, and food-importing developing countries found these subsidized imports disruptive to their domestic agriculture. Serious frictions began to surface in the late 1970s as the EU moved from being a net importer to being a net exporter of a number of commodities. The dispute over the use of export subsidies escalated in 1986 when the USA introduced a series of such subsidies, known as the Export Enhancement Program. Apart from the EU, the other two major players in international agricultural markets are Japan (although it is a passive player in agricultural trade negotiations), and the USA. For both, agriculture remains a special case. Japan, like the EU, has never conceded that free trade in agricultural products should be the ultimate goal in trade negotiations. On the other hand, since the 1960s the USA has vigorously pursued the free-trade agenda for its export commodities (such as wheat) but continues to be protectionist for import-competing commodities (such as sugar), just as Japan and the EU are. A further force, which emerged at the beginning of the Uruguay Round negotiations in 1986, was the Cairns Group of agricultural exporting countries (by 2002, the Group’s membership had expanded to 18 countries: Argentina, Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Fiji, Guatemala, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Paraguay, Philippines, South Africa, Thailand and Uruguay). This unlikely grouping was instrumental in ensuring that agriculture was firmly in the negotiating agenda in the Uruguay Round and for insisting at both the midterm review in 1988 and at the scheduled conclusion in 1990, that there would be no overall agreement without an agreement on agriculture. Their aim was to reduce distortions in international markets for agricultural commodities through increased market access, a reduction in domestic support and a ban on export subsidies. The actual outcome of the Agreement was weaker than the negotiating position adopted by these supporters of change but it was a substantial move towards bringing agriculture under the same rules-based constraints as those imposed on other sectors.
INTRODUCTION 7
It is instructive in understanding the tensions in international relations to which agricultural trade has given rise, to summarize the agricultural trade negotiations in each of the last three negotiating rounds in the GATT. This summary provides only a background. There have been a number of specific instances of acute tension but these are too many and too complex to discuss in this essay. In 1964, at the beginning of the Kennedy Round (1964–67) of trade negotiations in the GATT, the EEC and the USA disagreed fundamentally about the treatment of agriculture. The USA wanted negotiations on agriculture and manufactures to proceed together, thereby diminishing the extent to which agriculture would be treated as a special case. The EEC took the view that the CAP was newly established and that market forces would not be allowed to jeopardize its progress towards its objectives. The inability of these two major players to agree on the fundamentals of agricultural trade meant that little of substance emerged from the Round and agricultural trade in temperate zone products would remain distorted, with the attendant tensions. In addition, little emerged to improve the commodity-trade position of the developing countries: the introduction of what became known later as the Multifibre Agreement only made matters worse for exporters of textiles; and the price stabilization mechanism for wheat in the International Grains Agreement of 1967 was short-lived. In the initial years of the Tokyo Round (1973–79) the emphasis had shifted from negotiations about market access to concerns about the security of food supplies, as well as to the broader role of commodities in economic development. Central to food security, and to trade and development, was discussion on the potential role for international commodity agreements, or managed international commodity markets, to provide food security, to accelerate economic development and to help generate the foreign exchange necessary for food-importing developing countries. The latter required improved market access to developed country markets, that is to say, a reduction in their agricultural trade barriers and a reduction in their use of escalating tariff regimes on semi-processed and processed commodities. This necessary accommodation was not forthcoming. At the same time, schemes were introduced by some of the developed economies throughout the early-1970s through the GSP. The basic idea was to give developing countries non-reciprocal preferential access to developed country markets. However, the measures were not applied to the agricultural products that were regarded as ‘sensitive’ by the developed countries and which were the main exports of the supposed beneficiaries. Thus, they did little to advance the trade prospects which the receivers of these preferences might reasonably have expected. Therefore, despite the ‘special and differential treatment’ which was provided under Part IV of the GATT and upon which the developing countries sought to expand, almost nothing changed in policy terms during these negotiations, and commodity markets reverted to oversupply and depressed prices. In the Uruguay Round (1986–93), agriculture played a prominent part, although not until the eleventh hour, a constructive one. Apart from the WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures and the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, both of which affect agricultural trade, the principal outcome was the Agreement on Agriculture. The essential elements of this Agreement from the standpoint of reduced international tensions were the new constraints imposed through the three pillars of market access, domestic support and export assistance. Under market access, all non-tariff
8 AGRICULTURAL AND MINERAL COMMODITIES YEAR BOOK
barriers were converted to tariffs, bound against increase, and reduced over a six-year period according to a formula. In addition, in order to ensure the opening of markets to imports, tariff rate quotas (TRQs, the application of tariffs, or of higher tariffs, above a certain level of imports) were introduced. This mechanism, if anything, has added to tensions rather than reducing them. Domestic support was categorized into three so-called ‘boxes’ (amber, blue and green) ranked from most to least trade-distorting. Amber box policy instruments were to be reduced, again according to a formula. An aggregate measure of support, similar to the OECD’s Producer Support Estimate measure, was established in order to ensure compliance with the Agreement. A formula for the restriction of export subsidies was also agreed. Apart from the obvious benefits of a more liberal trading system, and the linking of domestic prices to international ones through the abolition of non-tariff barriers, the Agreement on Agriculture, to some extent, has broken the link between lobby groups and governments’ responses. Thus the Agreement has altered the political economy of agricultural policy in a direction which will reduce the tensions created by the traditional forms of market intervention. Nevertheless, despite these gains from more disciplined international markets, there remain some serious tensions, most of which involve either the USA or the EU, or both. The Roots of the (Intractable) Problem It is clear from the preceding discussion that the tensions in international economic relations caused by agricultural commodity trade have as their root, in most instances, government intervention in the domestic agricultural sector. The objectives of this intervention are many and they vary across countries and through time. Most objectives have little to do with economic efficiency and the correction of market failures; instead they are derived from a much broader agenda, including the necessity for political support. The explicit objectives include: providing farm families with a level and a stability of income which is more equitable than that provided by markets alone; conserving the social fabric of rural societies; controlling the rate at which the agricultural sector adjusts to changing comparative advantage; providing the research and development necessary to improve the sector’s productivity; ensuring the security of food supplies; and helping to make the sector more competitive in international markets. In order to achieve this substantial menu of objectives, a variety of policy instruments continue to be used. These may be categorized as: price policies (those which raise product prices or reduce the prices of inputs); structural policies (such as grants for farm amalgamations and early-retirement schemes for farmers); marketing policies (marketing boards and state trading enterprises); quantitative policies (TRQs, production quotas and area set-asides); legal (including regulations on the use of chemicals and hormones, and regulations on food standards and labelling); and miscellaneous (for example, the funding of research and development, direct and de-coupled income payments). Of these different categories of instrument, the most heavily used and the one considered to have done the greatest damage to international economic relations, is price policy. It is the most heavily used because it seems such an obvious form of intervention: raise the product price and producers’ incomes will rise. Moreover, from a political perspective, the gains to the
INTRODUCTION 9
gainers are obvious and the political reward instantaneous. In the longer term, however, the gainers are not necessarily the recipients. The beneficiaries are the owners of the fixed assets, the values of which rise with price support. The owners of farm land benefit but the users find that their costs of production rise, their incomes fall and there is then a demand for further increases in product prices to offset the increases in costs. Price-support programmes always increase production, they often decrease consumption and, therefore, in the context of international trade, they always increase exports or decrease imports. Either way, they distort international markets and they impede the ability of other countries to achieve their own agricultural-policy objectives without their having to resort to trade measures such as tariffs or export subsidies. In pursuing their objectives through price policies, governments have taken an inward-looking approach and have not considered as part of the costs of their policies the expenses they force onto other countries through the linkages formed by international markets. In such circumstances, international trade tensions are inevitable. This brief discussion provides the explanation why agricultural negotiations failed to deliver much benefit until the mid-1990s—prior to that point, governments had found it extremely difficult to wean themselves off price supports. However, since that time, the beginnings of change have been observed. It has now been broadly accepted that the best way to deliver income support to farm families (and to achieve such wider goals as the continuation of rural development), is through de-coupled income payments, that is to say, payments which are made without reference to levels of production. This mechanism does little to distort international markets, yet achieves many of these wider domestic objectives. Markets are allowed to work, domestic political support will continue and international tensions should be reduced. The Current State of Play The current agricultural negotiations in the WTO began in March 2000 and Phase 1 was completed a year later. During this Phase, Members were able to submit their proposals on the various issues which remained pending from the Uruguay Round, most notably those concerning market access, domestic support and export assistance. Phase 2 of the negotiations was completed in February 2002. In this Phase the issues for negotiation were developed further and new issues were proposed. There are now 21 headings, including, inter alia: market access (tariffs, TRQs, and state trading enterprises); domestic support (the amber-, blue- and green-box divisions have been retained); export assistance and restrictions (state trading enterprises, export subsidies, export credits, and export taxes); food aid; food safety; and trade preferences. Regular meetings are being held in the WTO Committee on Agriculture to discuss some of these issues with a view to having a draft document prepared by the end of 2002. The aim of this document would be to provide an overview of progress to date. In this so-called Modalities Phase, targets will be established for the three pillars in the WTO Agreement on Agriculture. Since the Doha Declaration in November 2001, the agricultural negotiations have been part of a single undertaking, which must be concluded in its entirety by 1 January 2005. The basic objective for the agricultural negotiations is, according to the WTO, ‘to establish a fair
10 AGRICULTURAL AND MINERAL COMMODITIES YEAR BOOK
and market-oriented trading system through a programme of fundamental reform’. These reforms are to include a fortification of the rules on government support for agriculture and the effects of that support in international markets, further limiting such support. In this Round, it would appear that developing and transition economies have sought solidarity in numbers, and have undertaken some coalition-building. In addition to groupings representing established international organizations such as the Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM) and the Cairns Group, there are a number of ad hoc groups arguing common positions for a number of countries. For example, since Doha, the WTO has seen the emergence of cohesive groups representing Africa, Developing Countries, Small Island States, and some Transition economies. It would be premature to speculate on how far the final outcome of these negotiations will get towards achieving the aim, as quoted above. Much will depend upon a confluence of interests of the disparate groups as well as upon the state of international agricultural markets during the negotiating period. It will also depend upon the compromises which may be necessary across the several different negotiating groups outside agriculture. Summary and Conclusions The objective in this chapter has been to explain why the relatively small value of agricultural trade in total merchandise trade bears so little relationship to the substantial tensions which it causes for international relations. Fundamentally, the explanation lies in the pursuit by the governments of the developed countries of policy objectives for their agricultural sectors. While these objectives seem reasonable when assessing each developed country in isolation, the price-policy instruments used to achieve them have tended to expand production, reduce consumption, restrict imports and expand exports. The comparative advantage of the (developing) food-exporting countries has been diminished and the comparative disadvantage of the (developed) food-importing countries has been offset in inappropriate ways. However, over the past decade both the EU and the USA have moved some of their farm income support away from these price policies and towards de-coupled direct payments. While it is usually easier for the governments of exporting countries to reduce support than it is for governments of importing countries, it is unusual for governments to have gone as far as have those in Australia and New Zealand. In these countries, support for agriculture is negligible, as such price-support mechanisms as existed, such as that for wool in Australia, have gradually been abandoned. Will other developed countries follow this lead? It is to be hoped that the souring of international relations that has arisen periodically as a result of agricultural protectionism will shortly be a thing of the past. However, while the traditional causes of these tensions are becoming less important, there remains plenty of scope for successors to emerge. As the current WTO negotiations on agriculture move toward their scheduled conclusion, it appears likely that such issues as consumer concerns about food safety and the role of agriculture in maintaining national heritage, may emerge as major impediments to future agreements, and thereby continue the tradition of agricultural commodity trade as a major source of tension in international relations.
INTRODUCTION 11
Bibliography and References Baldwin, R.E. Trade Policies in Developed Countries, in Jones, R.W. and Kenen, P.B. (Eds), Handbook of International Economics, Vol. 1 International Trade, North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1984. Brandt, W. North-South: A Programme for Survival (The Report of the Independent Commission on International Development Issues under the Chairmanship of Willy Brandt). Pan Books, London, 1980. Croome, J. Reshaping the World Trading System: A History of the Uruguay Round. World Trade Organization, Geneva, 1995. Hopkins, R.F. Developing Countries in the Uruguay Round: Bargaining under Uncertainty and Inequality, in Avery, W.P. (Ed.) World Agriculture and the GATT. Lynne Rienner Publishers, London, 1993. International Agricultural Trade Research Consortium. The Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture: An Evaluation. Commissioned Paper Number 9, Department of Applied Economics, University of Minnesota, St Paul, MN. [iatrcweb.org/Publications/commiss.html]. Josling, T.E. Agricultural Trade Policy: Completing the Reform, in Policy Analyses in International Economics, No. 53. Institute for International Economics, Washington, DC, 1998. Josling, T.E., Tangermann, S. and Warley, T.K. Agriculture in the GATT. Macmillan Press Ltd, London, 1996. Little, I.M.D. (1975) Economic Relations with the Third World—Old Myths and New Prospects, in Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Vol. XXII (3):223–235. Scottish Economic Society, Glasgow, 1975. Maizels, A. Selected Issues in the Negotiation of International Commodity Agreements: An Economic Analysis. TD/B/C.1/224, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Geneva, 1982. Murray, T. Trade Preferences for Developing Countries. John Wiley and Sons, New York, NY, 1977. OECD. Agricultural Policies in OECD Countries: Monitoring and Evaluation. Paris, 2002. Preeg, E.H. Traders in a Brave New World: The Uruguay Round and the Future of the International Trading System. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL, 1995. Warley, T.K. Western Trade in Agricultural Products, Part III in Shonfield, A. (Ed.) International Relations of the Western World 1959–1971, Vol. 1 Politics and Trade, Oxford University Press, London, for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1976. Winters, L.A. The So-Called “Non-Economic” Objectives of Agricultural Support, in OECD Economic Studies, No. 13 (Winter), pp. 237–266. OECD, Paris, 1990. World Bank. World Development Report. Washington, DC, annual. WTO. The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations: The Legal Texts. Geneva, 1995. Dispute Settlement—Status in brief of the disputes. Geneva, 2002. [www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/ dispu_e/dispu_status_e.htm]. WTO Agriculture Negotiations: The Issues, and where we are now. Geneva,2002. [www.wto.org/english/ tratop_e/agric_e/negs_bkgrnd00_contents_e.htm].
Developments in World Mineral and Energy Markets PAUL CROMPTON
Introduction The consumption of mineral and energy commodities is closely linked to the level of industrial activity. Given the geographical imbalances that exist in global industrial production, demand for these primary commodities is most heavily influenced by industrial activity within the developed economies of the USA, the European Union (EU) and Japan. In fact, these countries are responsible for the majority of global demand for these commodities. For example, they currently account for 44% of global crude steel consumption, 54% of oil consumption and 83% of uranium consumption. Furthermore, these countries remain a net importer of most commodities. An important feature of today’s global economy for mineral and energy markets is the high degree of correlation between business cycles across countries. Today, more than ever before, declines in commodities demand caused by slowing economic activity are likely to be transmitted across national boundaries. Not surprisingly, changes in the combined industrial production of the major markets mentioned above can exert significant pressure on world mineral and energy prices. Despite this, the countries of Asia, in particular the People’s Republic of China, Taiwan and the Republic of Korea (South Korea), continue to increase in importance within world markets. In the medium-to-longer term the developing countries of Asia, South America and Africa are likely to play a more important consumer role in global commodity markets. Market Trends In the 1990s and early 2000s, world mineral and energy markets have been subject to strong cyclical fluctuations in global economic growth. After a period of widespread weakness in economic activity in 1998 and 1999, strong global growth during the first three quarters of 2000 led to greater world consumption of all mineral and energy commodities and, given low levels of stocks, significant increases prices. For example, in the first three quarters of 2000 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) increased by 1.7% in the USA and by 1.2% in the EU (Japan, by contrast, in a prolonged period of economic stagnation, experienced GDP contraction of 0.5% in the same period). Much of this growth was driven by industrial production, which increased over this period by 2.8% in the USA, by 2.3% in the EU and
INTRODUCTION 13
Table 1: GDP Growth in 1999–2001, and forecasts for 2002–03 (%)
Source: OECD, OECD Economic Outlook No. 71, June 2002.
by 2.1 % in Japan. The associated strong demand for commodities was reflected in higher prices: copper prices increased by 4.3% in the same period, petroleum prices by 12.2% and zinc prices by 4.2%. In the final quarter of 2000, generally weaker demand for these commodities resulting from slower global economic growth resulted in lower average prices. These conditions continued in 2001, particularly in the world’s largest economy, the USA, placing further downward pressure on both the demand for commodities and prices, US GDP growth was 1.2% in 2001, compared with 4.1% in 2000—similar declines were experienced in many other member countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (see Table 1, below). The slowdown in growth was attributed to a decline in consumer spending, owing to widespread unease at the country’s economic prospects, with a resultant effect on the manufacturing sector. Furthermore, weakness in the US construction sector exacerbated the general weakness in commodity demand. In terms of industrial production, the USA experienced a 3.1 % decline during 2001. The figures for the member states of the EU, however, were mixed, with industrial production declining in Spain and the United Kingdom, while it improved in France and Germany. Japan’s continuing frailty was reflected in an 11 % decline in industrial production, reinforcing the trend in the USA. The impact of the economic slowdown experienced by many OECD economies in 2001 on mineral and energy markets was exacerbated by the adverse economic conditions experienced by many Asian countries, many still recovering from the continent’s economic crisis of 1998. For example, both Taiwan and Singapore fell into recession in 2001. In the former, GDP contracted by 1.9% in that year, while in the latter, which suffered from a marked reduction in demand for its exports, GDP declined by 2.4%. The global economic weakness in 2001 (exacerbated by global political uncertainty following the attacks on the USA in September and the subsequent ‘war on terrorism’) led to price decreases for a number of mineral and energy commodities, including 6.8% for aluminium, 12.9% for copper, 14.3% for petroleum and 21.3% for zinc. In the short term, prospects for mineral and energy markets are strongly dependent on the resumption of strong global growth, after the generally poor economic performance of 2001. Forecasters predicted that 2002 would witness a continuation of the previous year’s economic weakness, with concomitant weakness in minerals and energy demand and, therefore, prices. Of most importance to the short-term outlook is the ability of the USA
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economy to recover from the short and shallow economic downturn experienced in 2001. US economic activity was expected to stabilize early in 2002 and recover in the second half of the year, although a lack of public and institutional confidence in major corporations and in financial markets during the year was thought to be endangering this recovery. The OECD forecast GDP growth of 2.5% for the USA in 2002, while in most other OECD countries, GDP growth in 2002 was expected to remain close to 2001 levels (see Table 1). The countries of Asia are another source of optimism for global mineral and energy markets, with expected growth rates ranging between 3.5 to 7% in 2002 and beyond. This should result in further increases in the share of global minerals and energy consumption for the Asian region. For example, Asia should account for around 90% of the expected increase in world steel consumption in the years ahead. The general outlook for mineral and energy commodities in 2003 and beyond is good, with most OECD economies having moved past the economic woes of 2001. Global growth is expected to return to long-run trend levels of 2.5%–4% in the OECD, and 5–7% in Asia. The improving medium-term outlook for growth among OECD economies is being driven by current low real interest rates and supportive fiscal policies across the majority of countries. Growth in activity of this magnitude can be expected to reverse many of the commodity price decreases of 2001. Price outcomes, however, are likely to be equally influenced by levels of global supply, with significant increases in export volumes leading to a continuation of price weakness, despite stronger global demand. Of particular importance here are the exploration and development lags associated with expansions in mineral and energy production. As a consequence, such lags could be important in determining price outcomes. A number of uncertainties surround the outlook for global mineral and energy markets. The first is the economic performance of the Russian Federation, an important participant in many world commodity markets. For example, in 2001 Russia accounted for 20% of world aluminium trade and 10% of world copper trade, compared to 3% and 1%, respectively, for the Soviet Union in 1990. The Russian economy is expected to resume growth of around 4% annually in 2002 and beyond, after the turmoils of the 1990s. Economic growth of this magnitude will restrict Russia’s ability to maintain current export levels of raw materials, amid increasing domestic demand for mineral and energy commodities. The ongoing change in socioeconomic and geopolitical conditions will add uncertainty to the former Soviet Union’s impact on global commodity markets—the consequences of these continued reforms for domestic economic activity are difficult to predict, with the potential to expand or reduce demand for commodities. These conditions will also influence foreign perceptions of supply security and investment risks. The second source of uncertainty to global mineral and energy markets is the economy of the People’s Republic of China, which has become increasingly integrated into the global economy as exports to the USA, Europe and Asia continue to increase. Although growth prospects for the Chinese economy are good, as the development of such economic linkages suggest, it is not immune from future global economic downturns. Nevertheless, China should account for a significant portion of global growth in minerals and energy consumption over the medium term. Already China is a large importer and exporter of commodities, and changes in its demand or stocks can exert significant pressure on world
INTRODUCTION 15
markets. The uncertainty lies in China’s ability to satisfy commodity demand from domestic production, and, therefore, any associated reliance on imports. This import demand for commodities has historically been volatile. For example, steel imports into China have ranged between 5%–35% of domestic steel consumption in recent decades. At the same time, China has become an important international supplier of certain commodities. For example, the PRC is now the second-largest exporter of thermal coal behind Australia, with exports in 1999 of 79m. metric tons, although, again, future growth in domestic electricity requirements may well limit the extent to which coal export volumes from China can expand. In the 1990s the Chinese economy grew at an average annual rate of 10.7%, in real terms. This growth is expected to stabilize over the medium term, at around 7.5% annually. The success of the Chinese economy, however, is linked to reforms currently taking place in China. These include deregulation in the banking, telecommunications and insurance industries in accordance with World Trade Organization (WTO) membership regulations. Other reforms involve the transition of state-owned enterprises to privatesector ownership. For example, reforms in China’s energy sector involved an overhaul of the existing regulatory framework, with the regulation of the coal, power, oil and gas sectors separated from the government and made the responsibility of a series of independent regulatory bodies. The reform process is ongoing, most notably in the electricity and natural gas sectors. One important trend emerging in China is the recognition of both internal and external pressure to adopt less environmentally damaging energy sources such as natural gas. Energy Supply: A Global Challenge One of the more pressing challenges in the medium term will be meeting global energy demand, particularly in developing economies. There are abundant proven reserves of oil, natural gas, coal and uranium to meet global energy demand to 2020 and well beyond. The challenge, however, is in financing adequate levels of production, transformation, transportation and distribution of energy to match the rising demand. This is particularly important in developing countries, where the scale of the required investment will require substantial inflows of foreign capital. One option available to developing countries is the lowering of regulatory and market barriers to encourage joint ventures with foreign producers. This process is already underway, with Algeria, Egypt, Libya and Nigeria, among others, altering domestic policy to encourage foreign involvement in ‘upstream’ processing in their domestic petroleum industries. Similarly, Saudi Arabia has begun encouraging foreign investment in its ‘upstream’ natural gas industry. Furthermore, China and India will require substantial foreign investment in their respective coal industries to ensure demand in the medium term is satisfied. Increased global demand will result in increased international trade in energy products as regional imbalances between consumption and production continue to widen. For example, dependence on Middle East petroleum supplies is likely to rise, particularly among OECD member countries and in Asia. This growing joint reliance, however, does expose the
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international economy to the risk of price shocks or supply disruptions in producing countries. These concerns have been intensified by disruptions to natural-gas production in Indonesia. Such occurrences emphasize the importance of addressing longer term supplysecurity issues at a governmental level, a key outcome of which is likely to be technological development and environmental policies that will reduce the demand for traditional fuels. Over the medium term, coal is expected to remain the primary source of global energy supply, followed by petroleum. These commodities, therefore, will remain the most heavily traded energy sources on global markets. Given its environmental advantages, the demand for gas, particularly for new electricity-generation projects, is likely to continue its expansion of the 1990s and early 2000s. Nuclear, hydroelectric and other renewable sources are expected to maintain a constant proportion of global energy supply. The application of energy sources such as solar and wind power will continue to be restricted by the high relative cost of these alternatives. Exploration and Production Despite rising global consumption of mineral and energy commodities, the real prices of these commodities continue to decline over the longer term. The fundamental cause of this downward trend is the continual improvement in exploration, mining, processing and distribution technologies, and the consequent reduction in costs. In addition, governments in developing countries have sought to facilitate foreign participation in exploration and extraction projects. Despite this liberalization, global expenditure on exploration activities was volatile in the 1990s and early 2000s. For example, exploration expenditure on nonferrous metals increased from US $2,600m. in 1993 to $5,600m.in 1997, before declining as the turn of the century approached, reaching $2,200m. in 2001. Latin America has accounted for the largest portion of this increase in exploration expenditure, with spending increasing from $320m. in 1991 to $1,700m. in 1997. Despite the reduction in global expenditure since that time, Latin America still attracts more exploration expenditure than any other region, reflecting both good prospects for exploration and the relative political and economic stability of the region (although this was abruptly ended in the early 2000s, as the financial crisis in Argentina threatened to spread throughout the continent, and political upheaval damaged confidence in Venezuela). Africa and South-East Asia also accounted for significant portions of this global increase in expenditure, although these regions, particularly the former, experienced the greatest decline after 1997. Despite the importance of Africa and South-East Asia, Australia is the second largest spender on exploration. The changing patterns of global exploration expenditure are being reflected in the geographical location of production. For example, in 1980, South America accounted for 14% of global base-metal production—the corresponding figure for 2000 was 28%. Furthermore, Asia accounted for 38% of global coal production, this figure having risen from 27% in 1980. Despite Africa’s relatively large share of global exploration expenditure, its share of world production for most commodities declined as the end of the 20th century approached. For example, African gold production, which represented 59% of world production in 1980, accounted for only 22% in 2000. Similarly, the continent’s share of base-metal production also declined, from 13% to 4% over the same period. This
INTRODUCTION 17
trend reflects the continuing concern among investors at the high levels of risk present in the African mining industry. Industry Consolidation A feature of the 1990s and early 2000s in global mineral and energy markets, and one which is likely to remain prominent in the medium term, is the consolidation of operations through mergers and acquisitions. The economic objectives behind consolidation include reductions in capital requirements, synergy of operations and the need to acquire an adequate scale of operations to remain globally competitive. Industry rationalization, whereby financially vulnerable and small companies are acquired by their stronger competitors, is particularly strong among North American firms, primarily within each particular commodity industry. This is a reflection of the need to specialize and avoid the conglomeration trend evident in the US minerals industry of the 1960s and 1970s. Examples of this include the acquisition in 2000 of Reynolds Metals Co. by Alcoa Inc., so that the US aluminium sector is effectively controlled by a single company. Similarly, the US copper industry has undergone further consolidation in recent years with the acquisition in 1996 of Magma Copper Company by the Australian-owned BHP Minerals (which itself merged with the British concern Billiton, forming BHP Billiton, in 2001) and that of Cyprus Amax Minerals by Phelps Dodge Corporation in 1999. For European and South African firms, mergers and acquisitions are more likely to occur across commodities, reflecting the nature of their conglomerate, multicommodity companies. The minerals and energy industry is also expected to continue to globalize operations and management. This is required by the very nature of the industry, where deposits are geographically sparse. Expansion often drives exploration and discovery into new regions, often far away from initial operations. International Issues Tariff barriers continue to impact on international trade in mineral and energy commodities, despite continued growth in trade volumes and the gradual movement to more liberal trade policies throughout the world. National trade policies are increasingly taking on an outward focus, through multilateral and regional commitments, and new liberalizing initiatives. Indeed, since the introduction of the WTO in 1995, member countries have been committed to improving the transparency and openness of their trading environment. Nevertheless, tariffs on mineral and energy products continue to be a feature of international trade. The composition of trade in these products is also affected by tariff escalation, in which tariffs generally increase with the degree of processing. In many countries, unprocessed ores and fuels have no tariffs imposed, while trade in semi-processed and processed materials face significant tariff barriers. Typically these are in the range of 5%– 35%. Tariffs are generally highest in developing countries, a policy often defended on the basis of the need to protect local mineral and energy industries. In such countries, tariffs can be as high as 50%–80% for processed materials. Despite the progress made by the WTO, trade battles continue to occur. The most notable recent example occurred in March 2002, when the USA imposed a 30% tariff on
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imported steel products for a period of three years, in response to claims of the ‘dumping’ (sale to one country’s market of product below cost price) of steel in the USA by foreign producers, thereby damaging the domestic industry. Several countries lodged formal complaints with the WTO and threatened the USA with punitive trade sanctions in retaliation. A number of countries subsequently reached bilateral agreements with the US, mitigating the impact of the steel tariffs on their exports. For example, the Australian federal government successfully negotiated exemptions for 85% of Australia’s steel exports to the USA. Joint-venture agreements between producers and consumers have also become more commonplace. For example, the Korean steel conglomerate, Pohang Iron and Steel Co Ltd (POSCO), and BHP Billiton have entered a joint-venture agreement to produce iron ore from Western Australia’s Mining Area C. POSCO has agreed to purchase a minimum of 3m. metric tons of ore from the site annually, from 2003. A supply agreement has also be reached between Hamersley Iron and China’s leading steelmaker, Shanghai Baosteel Group, which involves the development of a new mining site in Western Australia’s eastern Ranges. Shanghai Baosteel, which holds a 46% stake in the project, has agreed to purchase 10m. tons of ore annually over the next 20 years, worth an estimated US $3,800m. in total. Joint ventures of this nature are an important component of risk diversification as producers move to secure supply over the longer term. The Kyoto Protocol Global mineral and energy markets will also be influenced over the medium to longer term by the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (‘Kyoto Protocol’), which is aimed at reducing global emissions of so-called ‘greenhouse gases’ (those gases that retain atmospheric heat and thus are considered to contribute to climate change). Key aspects of the Kyoto Protocol include emission targets, target timetables for developed countries and market-based mechanisms for meeting those targets. Emission targets are to be reached over a five-year budget period, from 2008–12. Emission levels vary on a country basis, yet as an example the target for the USA is to reduce emissions to 7% below the 1990 level. Emission targets include all six major greenhouse gases: carbon dioxide, nitrous oxide, methane, and three synthetic ozone-depleting chlorofluorocarbons. The delay in the commencement of the budget period in 2008 will allow companies time to commence the transition to improved energy efficiency and/or lower-carbon technologies. Reductions in emission target levels can be achieved through activities that reduce carbon levels, such as planting trees. This provides companies with low-cost opportunities to reduce emission targets. Other options include the joint implementation of project-based emission reductions in developing countries. Under this option, developed countries can use these emission reductions to contribute to their own domestic greenhouse-gas reduction targets. Central to the protocol is the development of an emission permit-trading system in which countries or companies can purchase the right to emit an amount of additional gas from countries that have kept emissions well below target levels. Such a system enforces the strong economic incentives necessary to reduce emissions, while providing medium-term flexibility to companies in minimizing the cost of the adjustment towards emission targets.
INTRODUCTION 19
For the Kyoto Protocol to be a success, the developed countries must adopt it and aim to meet their emissions targets. They must also appreciate that compliance with these targets is likely to impose significant financial costs on developed economies and occasion significant changes in world energy markets, in particular the location of energy-intensive production. However, nearly all developed countries have expressed some reservations as to the Protocol’s implications for the domestic economy, and some, most notably the USA, have rejected its implementation, claiming that the potential benefits did not justify the costs. Conclusion Following the abrupt end in the early 2000s to the sustained period of economic growth in many developed countries, most notably the USA, the outlook for mineral-commodity markets appears stronger in the medium term. The continuing expansion of the Chinese economy, together with the resumption of growth in other major consumer countries, such as Russia and the South-East Asian nations, following the economic difficulties experienced from the late 1990s, suggests that prices may improve. However, many of the countries mentioned thus far in this paragraph are also significant producers of commodities. Significant economic expansion could decrease the availability of production for export, thereby increasing costs for other consumer countries. It is the balance between these two demands that is of greatest importance to the mineral-commodity industry in a time of economic expansion. Political uncertainty in the Middle East makes the prospects for perhaps the most essential of all commodities, petroleum, more difficult to predict—a significant rise in the price of petroleum would prove a serious impediment to industrial production in the developed world. Meanwhile, the consolidation of the minerals and metals industry is expected to continue. As new resources are identified (for example, those of the Canadian north) and new extraction and processing technologies developed, the environmental concerns that arise out of mining activity are almost certain to be more widely aired. The international environmental agenda is expected to focus more on sustainable development in general, rather than on climate change per se, as it did in the 1980s and 1990s, and it is the interaction of these concerns with the increasingly liberal global trade regime that is of primary importance to producer companies and producer nations in the developing world.
Food Security and the WTO Agreement on Agriculture A.GANESH-KUMAR
Food security, trade liberalization and the World Trade Organization (WTO) have, in the early years of the 21st century, all been at the centre of various public and expert debates, among academics, policy-makers, in the media and in civil society at large, both at national and international levels. The views expressed are often as diverse as the participants in these debates and the particular situations they describe. Quite often, the various views expressed in these debates start from widely differing premises, even different notions of what constitutes food security, its links to international trade, the role of WTO in influencing food security, and so on. The purpose of this article is primarily to equip an interested reader with sufficient understanding of these issues so that s/he can follow these debates more intelligently. With this aim, the article begins with a widely accepted definition of food security, and presents some data on the state of affairs in this regard in different parts of the world. Then, a simple framework for understanding food security and its links to international trade is discussed. Finally, the article examines the provisions of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture and discusses its implications for food security. Defining Food Security The World Food Summit of 1996 declared that ‘food security exists when all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life’. This definition implies three conditions, viz., availability, access and adequacy, which must be satisfied in order to achieve food security. First of all, food must be available for people to consume close to where they normally reside. Secondly, people should have economic access to the available food; that is to say, they should have sufficient income to purchase food at the prevailing price. Finally, people should consume adequate food not merely to survive but in order to lead an active and healthy life. That is, they should get adequate and balanced nutrition. State of Affairs Quantitative assessment of the state of food security in a country or region has typically relied on certain summary measures. These include: per caput per day food availability (which includes domestic production, stocks and imports) in terms of energy (calories), protein, and fat. Both average levels and some measure of volatility (such as the statistical
INTRODUCTION 21
Table 1—Average Calories Per Caput Per Day
coefficient of variation) are typically examined. It must be noted that these availability measures capture only the supply side of food security. In order to assess the access and adequacy aspects of food security, it is necessary to examine some measures on the demand side for different sections of the population. In other words, one needs a measure that captures the influence of income distribution on the access and adequacy aspects. One such measure is the number of malnourished children under the age of five years. The fact that similar data for those over the age of five years are not widely calculated, at least, not according to standard criteria, is indicative of the way that the aspects of food security relating to access and adequacy are typically insufficiently quantified. Tables 1, 2 and 3, calculated using data from the FAO, present some information on the average level of food available per caput per day in terms of calories, grams of protein and of fat. These indicate that on average, food availability in developing countries as a group has improved over the past four decades. For the latter half of 1990s, roughly the period since the signing of the WTO agreements, the figures for both calories per caput per day and grams of protein per caput per day were about 30% higher than in the 1960s. Availability of fats has doubled over this same period. It is noteworthy that this improvement in food availability has come about even though population in the developing countries as a whole has more than doubled in the same time-scale, from about 2,600m. to over 5,700m. Despite this increase in food availability, on average developing countries continue to have less food per head in the early 2000s than was available in industrialized countries in the 1960s. Table 2—Protein (g per caput per day)
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Table 3—Fat (g per caput per day)
The picture of increasing food availability in developing countries as a whole, however, masks substantial differences between countries, indeed between regions. While the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean and South Asia have shown steady improvement over time (albeit at different pace), the countries of sub-Saharan Africa have seen a slight improvement only in the 1990s. While the group of nations termed as Net Food Importing Developing Countries (NFIDCs, defined by the WTO and 22 in number) has seen a steady improvement in food availability there has been hardly any improvement in the situation of the Least Developed Countries (LDCs, defined by the UN on grounds of income, human resources and economic diversification and currently numbering 49) as a group. It is worth noting that, on average, food availability in LDCs is far less than in NFIDCs. Turning to the volatility of food availability, the calculations based on the food availability statistics from which Tables 1, 2 and 3 were derived reveal that developing countries as a whole witnessed an increase in such volatility during the 1970s. Since then volatility in food availability in developing countries has declined. This decline was most substantial (by over one-half in case of calories and proteins and slightly less than one-half in case of fats) in the latter half of 1990s. Consequently, the difference in the variability of food supply between developing countries and industrialized countries has reduced dramatically by the late 1990s. As with the average level of food availability, the trends in the volatility of food availability across different regions and sub-groups of developing countries also show substantial variation. While Latin American and Caribbean countries and the countries of South Asia show a reduction in volatility, the situation has worsened in sub-Saharan Africa, although the level of volatility in the latter region is still less than that in the other two regions. How have domestic production and imports contributed to these changes in the food availability situation? Research has shown that bulk of the food available in developing countries comes from domestic production. Trends in food production per caput, however, display a similar diversity among developing countries. At a regional level, growth has been highest in the Latin American and Caribbean countries. The South Asian developing countries have also been witnessing a trend for growth in food production per head, albeit with some fluctuations. On the other hand, the situation in sub-Saharan Africa is a matter of
INTRODUCTION 23
Table 4—Malnourished Children under 5 years (millions)
Source: Diaz-Bonilla et al. (2002).
concern, with per-head food production in this region exhibiting a sustained decline from the 1960s until the mid-1980s, since when it has remained more or less stagnant. The situation with regard to the LDCs is similar to that of sub-Saharan Africa, whereas the NFIDCs and developing countries as a whole have witnessed growth in food production per caput over the period in question. Imports as a source of food for developing countries constituted only about 15% of domestic food production in the 1990s, while in the 1960s and 1970s this was about 10%. The ratio of food imports to total merchandise export, which can be considered as a measure of the total food bill, was in the range of 15%–20% in the early 1960s for most of the developing countries except those of South Asia. This proportion has declined dramatically over time for the developing countries as a whole, to slightly less than 5% in 2000. While for NFIDCs this ratio has not changed much over time, the LDCs have actually witnessed a rise in their food bill in recent decades. The situation across different regions also shows some variation. South Asia has seen the most dramatic decline in this ratio, from around 30%– 35% in the 1960s to around 5% by 2000. The Latin American and Caribbean countries have witnessed a more modest decline. In the case of sub-Saharan Africa, however, the ratio was roughly the same in 2000 as in the early 1960s. It may be noted that across all groups of developing countries and across all regions, total merchandise exports have grown over time. This implies that the differences in the evolution of the ratio detailed in this paragraph mainly reflect the trends in food imports. On the consumption side, data on the number of malnourished children show a similar picture of overall improvement in food security among developing countries, albeit with substantial differences across different regions (see Table 4). South Asia and East Asia account for the largest numbers of malnourished children, although both these regions have witnessed a steady decline in their number (except for a brief increase in the mid-1980s in South Asia). Latin America and the Caribbean witnessed a similar steady decline in the number of malnourished children. On the other hand, the figure for sub-Saharan Africa has actually increased, while in West Asia and North Africa, there is hardly any change. Thus, overall, the picture that emerges is one of improvement in the food security situation in developing countries as a whole, though the LDCs notably have witnessed a worsening of the situation. Across different regions, there has been an improvement in Latin
24 AGRICULTURAL AND MINERAL COMMODITIES YEAR BOOK
America and the Caribbean and in large parts of Asia, but the situation in sub-Saharan Africa remains a matter of concern. Food Security—A Development Problem Poverty is often the root cause of food insecurity, both at the national and household levels. It is the poor households within a country, or other economic grouping, which suffer from inadequate food consumption. The income levels of the poor are so low that, at the prevailing price, they cannot purchase sufficient quantities of food to meet their nutrition requirements to lead a healthy and productive life. Rich households, on the other hand, rarely face a threat to their food intake because they have sufficient income to purchase their food requirements, however high food prices may be. Thus, food insecurity at the household level can be observed even when there is sufficient food available in the country to meet the food requirements of all citizens. The solution, therefore, can readily be identified as an improvement in the income levels of the poor, through income transfer mechanisms and/or employment generation. This calls for sustained economic growth, which is one of the fundamental problems confronting developing countries. Food insecurity of poor households is often aggravated when there is food insecurity at the national level. Food security of a nation is threatened if there is insufficient food available in the country to meet the needs of a growing population. Frequently in developing countries, a particular region of a country is threatened by food insecurity, owing to climatic differences, poor transport infrastructure, political instability, a general lack of development relative to other areas, etc. Inadequate food availability results in a rise in food prices, which would force the poor to reduce their already low levels of food intake. Thus, national-level food insecurity translates into household-level food insecurity. The primary reason for national-level food insecurity is usually inadequate domestic food production. A whole host of developmental issues (such as the low asset-base of farmers, restricting the use of modern farm inputs and techniques, the low education- and skills-base of farmers and farm workers, environmental degradation; the poor state of rural infrastructure, the lack of marketing and storage facilities, weak rural institutions that allow the concentration of wealth, resources, power and access to government schemes in the hands of a small rural élite, etc.) are usually the fundamental reasons for inadequate food production. However, in some cases it is also the inappropriate and restrictive macroeconomic and agricultural policies prevailing in many developing countries that act as a serious disincentive for farming, resulting in low agricultural productivity and ultimately insufficient food production. The problem is essentially one of food management and food price stabilization at the macroeconomic level, rather than one of production, per se. If the domestic production shortfall is extreme (such as during a drought or famine) the government can take the responsibility of food distribution upon itself by imposing severe restrictions on the normal private channels of distribution. Such intervention may be feasible as a country affected by such calamity is now more likely to receive adequate international food aid and be in a position to return to a more normal situation more quickly. More typical, however, is the case when domestic production shortfalls are not drastic in magnitude but recurrent and incremental over time—in cases such as these, international
INTRODUCTION 25
food aid may not be so easily forthcoming. In such a situation, the government of a country can undertake food-price stabilization policies in order to protect the food security of the poor. One such action would be to release all or part of any food stocks that it may hold and/ or import food in order to bolster supply in the country and thereby stabilize food prices. However, if (as is often the case) the government does not have any/adequate food stocks and/or is unable to import sufficient quantities of food to meet the domestic shortfall, then the country would face a food security problem in the form of rising prices. Thus, successful management of national-level food security depends upon the ability of the government to undertake buffer stock and/or trade operations. This, in turn, depends on the availability of resources, including foreign-exchange reserves, and in poor countries these resources are often insufficient to be able to undertake a vigorous buffer stock operation or to import the necessary amount of food using foreign currency. The effect of the foreign-exchange constraint on a country would be exacerbated whenever events occurring elsewhere in the world result in an increase in food prices in the international market. For example, if crops fail in a distant rich nation (for example, as is widely predicted to happen to certain crops in Western and Central Europe following the floods of mid-2002) pressure is applied to world prices (either because food exports by the directly affected nation are reduced or because the nation becomes a net importer of food, or both) and hence to the ability of a developing nation to meet its food requirements given its foreign-exchange constraints. Unequal distribution of income and wealth across nations can, thus, result in some nations being foodinsecure even when at a global level sufficient food is available (just as some households may be food-insecure even when the country as a whole is food-secure). Essentially, the above examples show that poverty of households and nations is the fundamental threat to food security, and that, to a large extent, this is really a development problem, and must be recognized as such. Factors such as foreign-exchange constraints, domestic resource constraints, poor infrastructure, low domestic food production, rapid growth of population, etc., that render a nation food-insecure in the first instance or restrict its ability to become food secure, are in fact characteristics of a low level of economic development of a country. Most developing countries exhibit one or more of these characteristics. Although the immediate reason for food insecurity in particular developing countries and at different points in time could vary, the only long-term solution is sustained economic development in the poor countries of the world. Trade, Food Security and the WTO—Understanding the Linkages Trade can affect food security directly and indirectly. Food imports have a direct impact on food security, although this is not always beneficial to an importing country. In the shortrun, food imports will add to the domestic supply and help in the control of prices. However, this suppression of prices reduces the profitability of farmers and, thus, their income. Farmers may see this as a disincentive, and react by further reducing production. Thus, a situation can arise whereby ever greater amounts of imports are required over time to compensate for the shortfall in domestic food production. Again, this may not be sustainable in the medium- or long-run if the country in question frequently faces foreign-
26 AGRICULTURAL AND MINERAL COMMODITIES YEAR BOOK
exchange difficulties. In this regard, the political, social and demographic characteristics of the nation in question are of paramount importance. If the majority of the population in a nation live in urban areas and depend on non-agricultural activities for their livelihood (and hence are net-consumers of food), then food imports that reduce the price paid by consumers can be net-beneficial to the country. On the other hand, if the majority of the population in the country live in rural areas and are dependent on agriculture (and particularly food production) for their livelihood, such imports will reduce the profitability of farming, thereby threatening the agriculturalists’—and eventually the country’s—longterm food security. Indirectly affecting food security is the fact that trade (in both agriculture and manufactured products) can promote a country’s economic development. Expanding exports can help create employment opportunities which, in turn, will help increase household incomes, thereby improving those households’ food security. Growth in exports from developing countries will also strengthen the national foreign-exchange position, enabling the import of capital goods and technology that will help in improving productivity levels and, consequently, incomes. Besides, the improvement in the foreign-exchange position of these countries over the long-run would permit them to import more food, both habitually and in case of the emergencies outlined above, further increasing food availability and food security. Economists have long argued that in order to enjoy these long-run benefits of ‘trade-fordevelopment’, resulting ultimately in poverty reduction and enhanced food security, the various distortions in the world trade regime have to be removed. Such distortions are widespread across different commodities and sectors and can be found in both industrialized and developing countries. These distortions take many forms, from high tariffs that often escalate as a commodity moves up in the value-added chain, to domestic production and export subsidies, to quantitative restrictions (QRs). The latter can range from outright import bans on certain commodities, to quotas on imports, to specifying quality requirements that are extremely difficult for a poor developing country to achieve. Trade in agriculture was and continues to be subjected more than that in any other sector to these distortions. It is in this context that multilateral trade agreements (such as those made at the WTO) that seek to reduce or remove the distortions in the international trade regime have an important role to play. Among the series of agreements covering the different aspects of trade that form the WTO agreements, the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) is the most relevant to trade in agriculture and to food security in particular. The rest of this article focuses on the features of the AoA, followed by a discussion of the issues in the AoA that have a bearing on food security. Features of the AoA The main provisions of the AoA concern market access, domestic support and export subsidies. The Agreement specifies the requirements that all member countries must fulfil and provides for special and differential treatment for developing-country members. Market access: This includes tariffication, tariff reduction and access opportunities. Tariffication means that all non-tariff barriers (NTBs) such as quotas, variable levies,
INTRODUCTION 27
minimum import prices, discretionary licensing, state trading measures, voluntary restraint agreements, etc., are to be abolished and converted into an equivalent tariff—the so-called tariff bindings. Ordinary tariffs, including those resulting from the tariffication of the NTBs, are to be reduced by an average of 36% by developed countries over six years, and by 24% over 10 years by developing countries. The AoA also stipulates that minimum access equal to 3% (rising to 5% over six years) of domestic consumption in 1986–88 must be permitted at low tariff rates—the so-called tariff quota. The Agreement also contains a protective provision that allows imposition of an additional tariff whenever there are either import surges above a particular level (the so-called volume trigger) or the import price falls below the reference (1986–88) level (price trigger). The AoA also permits the maintenance of QRs for a limited time period by countries that face balance-of-payments problems. Domestic support: All domestic support measures in favour of agricultural producers that do not qualify under the various exemptions provided in the AoA (discussed below) are subject to reduction requirements. The various non-exempt forms of support provided in 1986–88 are to be measured by the total Aggregate Measure of Support (AMS). Ceilings on the AMS were then specified at 5% of the total value of agricultural production for developed countries, and 10% for developing countries—the so-called de minimis level. If the AMS exceeds this level, then the base-level support must be reduced by 20% in developed countries over six years (or, in developing countries, by 13.3% over 10 years). Most importantly, the AoA specifies reduction requirements only in aggregate terms— countries are left free to choose the products covered and the extent of support. Support measures that are exempt from reduction requirements (in fact expenditure on these measures can be increased without limit) are listed in the so-called ‘Green Box’, and are applicable to both developed and developing countries. The Green Box includes measures that have minimal trade-distorting effect (or none at all), are publicly funded, not involving transfers from consumers and not having the effect of providing a price support. These include many government services (such as research services, training, extension and advisory services, inspection services for health, safety, grading and standardization purposes, marketing and promotion services, infrastructural services, etc.), public stockholding programmes for food security, domestic food aid to sections of the population in need, and some direct payments to farmers not linked to production decisions, such as decoupled income support measures, income insurance and safety-net programmes, natural disaster relief, structural adjustment assistance programmes, and payments under certain environmental and regional assistance programmes. Besides these, the Agreement also allows exemptions to the so-called ‘Developmental Measures’ and ‘Blue Box’ Measures. The former are those instruments that have a ‘developmental effect’ in developing countries, and are also exempt from reduction requirements. These include direct and indirect measures that promote agricultural and rural development (such as investment subsidies, agricultural input subsidies to low-income/ resource-poor farmers, and domestic-support measures designed to encourage diversification away from growing illicit narcotic crops), and they have, since the conclusion of the AoA, been forming an integral part of the development programmes in developing countries.
28 AGRICULTURAL AND MINERAL COMMODITIES YEAR BOOK
Blue Box measures include direct payments under production-limiting programmes, as long as they are made on fixed areas and yield or a fixed number of livestock. Payments that are made on 85% or less of production in a defined base period also qualify for exemptions. The important point to note about the Blue Box payments is that production is still required in order to receive these payments, but the actual payments are not directly related to the current quantity produced. Industrialized countries are the primary beneficiaries of the Blue Box measures. Export subsidies: The AoA specifies reduction requirements on export subsidies, both in terms of expenditure and in terms of volume. Developed countries are required to reduce export-subsidy expenditure by 36%, and the volume entitled to export subsidy by 21%, both over six years. For developing countries, the percentage reductions specified are 24% (for expenditure) and 14% (for qualifying volume) over 10 years. The agreement also specifies that products not subject to export-subsidy reduction requirements are not to receive any such subsidy in the future. NFIDCs: The AoA also explicitly acknowledges the possible negative effects of its implementation in certain LDCs and NFIDCs, especially in terms of the availability of adequate supplies of basic foodstuffs from external sources on reasonable terms and conditions, including short-term difficulties in financing normal levels of commercial imports of basic foodstuffs. It provides for a number of mechanisms to ensure that the implementation of the Agreement does not adversely affect the availability of food aid at a level that is sufficient to meet the food needs of these countries. These include: a mechanism to review the aid requirement of these countries, provision of food aid increasingly in the form of grants, financial and technical assistance to improve agricultural productivity and infrastructure in these countries, differential treatment of these countries with regard to export credit and finance for short-term food imports. Food Security and the AoA—Issues of Concern Two sets of concerns on food security arise in the context of the AoA. The first stems from the implementation of the AoA and its failure to match the expectations of a liberal trade regime as a stimulant for economic development (and hence food security) in developing countries. The second set concern the adequacy of the various provisions of the AoA to promote food security, especially in those countries that are the most vulnerable. Implementation concerns: As mentioned above, food security is basically a problem of poor households and poor countries, and is essentially a development problem. To the extent the implementation of AoA has not resulted in the expected impetus to economic development in the developing countries, food security continues to be threatened in these countries. The main problem with the implementation of the AoA is that the barriers to agricultural trade emanating from the industrialized countries have remained in place (albeit with a change in character), as have the various trade-distorting domestic-support measures and export subsidies in these countries. It is by now well documented that, in the name of tariffication, certain industrialized countries have replaced the various non-tariff barriers to agricultural trade with very high tariff rates, often far exceeding the equivalent level tariff (a process termed by some as ‘dirty tariffication’). The high tariff rates have effectively
INTRODUCTION 29
excluded agricultural exports from developing countries. Consequently, the expected impetus to agricultural growth in developing countries has not been apparent. Further, the tariff rates in the industrialized countries tend to escalate as a commodity moves up the ladder in the processing chain. Thus, often a processed agricultural product (for example, chocolate) will attract a higher tariff than the raw materials (cocoa, in this example). Consequently, exports from developing countries continue to be in the form of raw materials, which fetch much lower returns. More importantly, the development of agroprocessing industries that can result in significant gains in productivity, employment and income in these countries continues to be impeded. The minimum access provision in the AoA, allowing imports of up to 5% of consumption at low tariff rates is no remedy to the high tariffs and, in any case, a number of countries have raised complaints that such quotas are unfairly distributed. Perhaps more disappointing is the continuation in the industrialized countries of the various domestic support measures permitted under the Blue Box exemptions. To the extent that these measures are directly related to production, it results in excess output. Conversely, developing countries are not in a position to provide such support and productivity and production levels remain low. Thus, there is a diversion of production from developing countries to developed countries, which is not conducive to economic development and food security in the former. Though export subsidies in the industrialized countries have declined in percentage terms, they remain significant, effectively distorting the prices of various agricultural products in the international market. This has raised many complaints of unfair competition, and acts as a major disincentive to farming in developing countries—as explained earlier, this has adverse consequences on food security in countries with a large agricultural and rural population. These concerns as to the inadequacies and imbalances in the AoA, and the questionable commitment of industrialized countries to genuine trade liberalization in agriculture that have led to the next round of trade negotiations being dubbed the ‘development round’. Inadequacies in the AoA: There are also concerns on whether the legal text of the AoA provides adequate flexibility to developing countries to pursue their food-security and developmental goals. Critics of trade liberalization and of the AoA argue that it is desirable to provide some level of trade protection for food security and rural development reasons, especially since the AoA allows industrialized countries to provide domestic support under the Blue Box exemptions, and reduction requirements on export subsidies under the AoA have not eliminated them. However, a study by Díaz-Bonilla, et al., summarizing these arguments, found that despite some of the problems in implementation of the AoA there was little merit in the major complaint. On the contrary, the AoA contains several features that can promote food security and agricultural development in the developing countries. For example, various Green Box measures mentioned earlier are available for promoting agricultural development and food security. Besides these, the AoA also allows countries to provide domestic support to agriculture (both product-specific and non-product-specific support) as long as such support lies within the de minimis level. What is perhaps required here is some allowance for food-insecure countries in the form of an enhanced de minimis level, or perhaps even the complete waiver of the de minimis restriction.
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Further, the Green Box also includes two measures that can be used specifically for food security purposes as long as they do not have the effect of providing price support to producers. The first of these measures is the use of stocks. The importance of food stocks in stabilizing food availability and thus protecting national-level food security is obvious from the analytical framework discussed earlier. As long as a country purchases stocks for foodsecurity purposes at the prevailing domestic market price it would not be violating the AoA provisions. Even if a country were to purchase stocks at some administered price instead of the market price, as long as the price support offered by the administered price is within the AMS limits, then such stocks are permissible under the AoA. In this case, the AoA may benefit from some additional text that automatically accords compliance to food-insecure countries that build food stocks up to some level (defined as some percentage of domestic consumption) for food security reasons. The second of these Green Box measures specifically for food security considerations is domestic food aid to sections of the population in need. Here too, the agreement allows publicly funded programmes that either directly provide food to the needy at subsidized rates (such as through ration shops) or through other income-transfer mechanisms (such as food stamps), or a combination of both. The more important issue perhaps lies in designing programmes that effectively target the needy and do not involve leakage of such food aid to the undeserving better-off sections of the population. The experience of many developing countries indicates that the latter is more of a problem than the provisions of the AoA per se. Adapting the existing AoA features and designing additional features specifically to meet the food security concerns of poor countries (such as those discussed above), however, presumes that the Agreement defines strict and objective criteria by which countries are identified to be food-insecure in order to allow special treatment. Herein perhaps lies a major inadequacy in the AoA. As mentioned earlier, the AoA recognizes four broad classifications of countries, namely, developed, developing, LDCs and NFIDCs. The agreement contains certain special provisions for the latter three groups, especially for the LDCs and NFIDCs. Díaz-Bonilla et al., however, have demonstrated that this classification is inadequate to address the different food security situations faced by various developing countries. Using cluster analysis and data on five indicators of food security (food production per caput, the ratio of total exports to food imports, consumption of calories per caput, consumption of proteins per caput and the rural/non-rural population share), they classify 167 countries (including industrialized and developing countries) into 12 distinct groups that differ in their food security profile. They found that while the current list of LDCs consists largely of countries that are food-insecure, many other food-insecure countries do not appear. Furthermore, they find that a third of the countries in the NFIDC group are not necessarily food-insecure, even though they are net importers of food. Finally, they find that the countries recognized as developing countries by the WTO are a heterogeneous grouping, both in terms of their food vulnerability and their relative development, and do not provide a sufficiently specific sample for discussions concerning food security. These findings suggest that the AoA should define food security using multiple but objective criteria, so that the differences in the food security situation across countries are better captured, and groups of countries facing a similar situation are properly identified. Further, it is equally important to appreciate that the food security situation of a country is
INTRODUCTION 31
dynamic and countries can move in and out of specific situations, and establish a programme of frequent evaluation of the food security situation in each developing country. Only when the food-insecure countries are properly identified can special treatment of these countries be provided for in the AoA. To conclude, we must return to the central premise of the essay—that food security is a problem for those afflicted by relative poverty and is a development issue. The only longrun solution is the successful promotion of economic development in the poor countries, providing adequate income for all to meet their food requirements. The historic experience of various developing countries has shown that an inward-looking, protectionist policy does not promote economic growth, whereas a liberal trade regime with appropriate domestic policies can promote economic growth and development. Multilateral trade agreements such as the WTO agreements seek to remove the various distortions that exist in the international trade regime. While the current set of agreements and their implementation has tremendous scope for improvement, the primary objective in future trade negotiations should be the removal of these anomalies, with a view to promoting economic growth and development in poor countries. Only this will help promote food security in the long-run. Bibliography and References Díaz-Bonilla, E. and Thomas, M. Trade and Food Security, in Díaz-Bonilla, E. and Robinson, S. (Eds), Shaping Globalization for Poverty Alleviation and Food Security, IFPRI 2020 Focus 8. International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, DC, 2001. Díaz-Bonilla, E., Thomas, M. and Robinson, S. Trade Liberalization, WTO and Food Security. IFPRI, TMD Discussion Paper No. 82. International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, DC, 2002. Díaz-Bonilla, E., Thomas, M. Robinson, S. and Cattaneo, A., Food Security and Trade Negotiations in the World Trade Organization: A Cluster Analysis of Country Groups, IFPRI, TMD Discussion Paper No. 59., International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, DC, 2000. FAO. Rome Declaration on World Food Security and World Food Summit Plan of Action. Rome, 1996. Madeley, J. and Solagral. The Impact of Trade Liberalisation on Food Security in the South: Literature Review. CIDSE Background Paper, 2001. [www.cidse.org/en/tgl/tradelibbgr01.htm]. Von Braun, J., Wobst, P. and Grote, U. Development Box and Special and Differential Treatment for Food Security of Developing Countries: Potentials, Limitations and Implementation Issues. Center for Development Research (ZEF), Discussion Paper, University of Bonn, 2002.
PART TWO Commodity Surveys
Aluminium and Bauxite
Aluminium (Al) is the most abundant metallic element in the earth’s crust, comprising about 8% of the total. However, it is much less widely used than steel, despite having about the same strength and only half of the weight. Aluminium has important applications as a metal because of its lightness, ease of fabrication and other desirable properties. Other products of alumina (aluminium oxide) are materials in refractories, abrasives, glass manufacture, other ceramic products, catalysts and absorbers. Alumina hydrates are used for the production of aluminium chemicals, as fire retardants in carpet backing, and as industrial fillers in plastics and related products. The major markets for aluminium are in transportation, building and construction, electrical machinery and equipment, consumer durables and the packaging industry, which in the late 1990s accounted for about 20% of all aluminium use. Although the production of aluminium is energy-intensive, its light weight results in a net saving of energy, particularly in the transportation industry. About one-quarter of aluminium output is consumed in the manufacture of transport equipment, particularly road motor vehicles and components, where the metal is increasingly being used as a substitute for steel. In the early 1990s steel substitution accounted for about 16% of world aluminium consumption, and it has been forecast that aluminium demand by the motor vehicle industry alone could more than double, to exceed 5.7m. tons in 2010, from around 2.4m. tons in 1990. Aluminium is of great value to the aerospace industry for its weight-saving characteristics and its low cost relative to alternative materials. Aluminium-lithium alloys command considerable potential for use in this sector, although the traditional dominance of aluminium in the aerospace sector was under challenge during the 1990s from ‘composites’ such as carbon-epoxy, a fusion of carbon fibres and hardened resins, whose lightness and durability can exceed that of many aluminium alloys. World markets for finished and semi-finished aluminium products are dominated by six Western producers—Alcan (Canada), Alcoa, Reynolds, Kaiser (all USA), Pechiney (France) and algroup (Switzerland). Proposals for a merger between Alcan, algroup and Pechiney, and between Alcoa and Reynolds, were announced in August 1999. However, the proposed terms of the Pechiney-Alcanalgroup merger encountered opposition from the European Commission, on the grounds that the combined grouping could restrict market competition and adversely affect the interests of consumers. The tripartite merger plan was abandoned in April 2000, in favour of a merger between Alcan and algroup, which was effected in
34 AGRICULTURAL AND MINERAL COMMODITIES YEAR BOOK
Production of Bauxite (crude ore, ’000 metric tons)
* Estimated production. †Dried equivalent of crude ore. Source: US Geological Survey.
October. The amalgamation of Alcoa and Reynolds was approved by the European Commission and the US Government in May 2000. The level of dominance of these major producers has, however, been reduced in recent years by a significant geographical shift in the location of alumina and aluminium production to areas where cheap power is available, such as Australia, Brazil, Norway, Canada and Venezuela. The Gulf states of Bahrain and Dubai, with the advantage of low energy costs, also produce primary aluminium. Since the mid-1990s Russia has also become a significant force in the world aluminium market (see below), and in April 2000 the country’s three principal producers announced their intention to combine into a single group representing about 75% of Russian aluminium production and approximately 10% of world output. Bauxite is the principal aluminium ore, but nepheline syenite, kaolin, shale, anorthosite and alunite are all potential alternative sources of alumina, although not currently economic to process. Of all bauxite mined, approximately 85% is converted to alumina (Al2O3) for the production of aluminium metal. The developing countries, in which 70% of known bauxite reserves are located, supply 45% of the ore required. The industry is structured in three stages: bauxite mining, alumina refining and smelting. While the high degree of ‘vertical integration’ (i.e. the control of successive stages of production) in the industry means that a significant proportion of trade in bauxite and alumina is in the form of intracompany transfers, and the increasing tendency to site alumina refineries near to bauxite deposits has resulted in a shrinking bauxite trade, there is a growing free market in alumina, catering for the needs of the increasing number of independent (i.e. non-integrated) smelters.
COMMODITY SURVEYS 35
The alumina is separated from the ore by the Bayer process. After mining, bauxite is fed to process directly if mine-run material is adequate (as in Jamaica) or is crushed and beneficiated. Where the ore ‘as mined’ presents handling problems, or weight reduction is desirable, it may be dried prior to shipment. At the alumina plant the ore is slurried with spent-liquor directly, if the soft Caribbean type is used, or, in the case of other types, it is ball-milled to reduce it to a size which will facilitate the extraction of the alumina. The bauxite slurry is then digested with caustic soda to extract the alumina from the ore while leaving the impurities as an insoluble residue. The digest conditions depend on the aluminium minerals in the ore and the impurities. The liquor, with the dissolved alumina, is then separated from the insoluble impurities by combinations of sedimentation, decantation and filtration, and the residue is washed to minimize the soda losses. The clarified liquor is concentrated and the alumina precipitated by seeding with hydrate. The precipitated alumina is then filtered, washed and calcined to give the product. The ratio of bauxite to alumina is approximately 1.95:1. The smelting of the aluminium is generally by electrolysis in molten cryolite. Because of the high consumption of electricity by the smelting process, alumina is usually smelted in areas where low-cost electricity is available. However, most of the electricity now used in primary smelting in the Western world is generated by hydroelectricity—a renewable energy source. The recycling of aluminium is economically, as well as environmentally, desirable, as the process uses only 5% of the electricity required to produce a similar quantity of primary aluminium. Aluminium recycled from scrap currently accounts for about 40% of the total aluminium supply in the USA and for about 30% of Western European consumption. With the added impetus of environmental concerns, considerable growth world-wide in the recycling of used beverage cans (UBC) was forecast for the 1990s. In the mid-1990s, according to aluminium industry estimates, the recycling rate of UBC amounted to at least 55% world-wide. Total world output of primary aluminium in 2000 was estimated at 24m. tons, of which Latin American producers accounted for about 2.2m. tons. The USA normally accounts for about one-third of total aluminium consumption (excluding communist and former communist countries). Although it is the world’s principal producing country (accounting for about 15% of global output of primary aluminium in 2000), the USA does not produce a surplus of ingots, and limits production to satisfy its domestic requirements for fabrication, while importing the remainder from low-cost producers elsewhere. The USA produces a very small amount of bauxite for domestic use. In 2000 Brazil was the world’s third-largest producer of bauxite (after Australia and Guinea). The country possesses extensive bauxite reserves in Minas Gerais state and in the Amazon region, where deposits of some 4,600m. tons have been identified. The country’s huge Albrás aluminium plant, which began operations in early 1986, achieved its installed production capacity of 150,000 tons per year in October. The plant was largely financed by Japan (which takes a share of its output). In mid-1999 work was completed on the expansion of the Pinda rolling-mill in Pindamonhangaba. The US $370m. expansion, which also included the largest recycling plant in South America, led to an increase in production from 120,000 tons per year to 280,000 tons per year. Brazil’s annual output of primary
36 AGRICULTURAL AND MINERAL COMMODITIES YEAR BOOK
aluminium was maintained at 1.2m. tons during 1992–99. However, almost all of the country’s smelters (in particular, the massive Alumar plant) are the subject of expansion proposals, and production could increase rapidly during the next few years, assuming a recovery in world prices and provided that the costs of energy supplies can be contained. Jamaica was the world’s fourth largest producer of bauxite in 2000. A production levy on the Jamaican bauxite industry, which has operated since 1974, provides an important source of government revenue. Production capacity was increased in the second half of the 1980s in order to supply the strategic mineral stockpiles of both the USA and the Soviet Union. However, as a result of depressed conditions in the international market (see below), sales of bauxite and alumina accounted for only 42.8% of total export earnings in 1997/98, and 43. 2% in 1998/99, compared with 63% in 1990. Measures to revitalize Jamaica’s bauxite and alumina industry were announced in July 1998 by representatives of the Government, industry and the trade unions. Output of bauxite in 2000 was 12.6m. tons, its highest level for 25 years, but production declined to 11.7m. tons in 1999, owing to the closure of a US refinery that used Jamaican ore. Plans to expand bauxite production and improve efficiency were under discussion in 2000. The economy of Suriname relies heavily on the mining and export of bauxite. In 1993 bauxite, alumina and aluminium accounted for 91.5% of Suriname’s annual export earnings, whereas in 1978 the corresponding proportion had been 83.8%. In 1998 exports of alumina and aluminium represented an estimated 80.5% of export receipts. Guerrilla activity disrupted the industry in the 1980s and 1990s, and the sector was also affected by adverse price movements in the international market. Venezuela’s aluminium industry achieved rapid growth in the 1980s, as a result of the availability of raw materials and cheap hydroelectric power. Aluminium production, based on imported alumina, subsequently overtook iron ore to become Venezuela’s main export industry after petroleum. The exploitation of bauxite reserves of 500m. tons was expected to enable Venezuela to produce 3.4m.–4.0m. tons of high-grade ore annually from mines in Bolivar State when output reached full capacity in 1992, by which time Venezuelan aluminium plants were to be supplied solely with local bauxite. According to the US Geological Survey (USGS), Venezuela’s aluminium production increased from 561,000 tons in 1992 to a record 634,000 tons in 1997, but subsequently decreased, to 585,000 tons in 1998 and 570,000 tons in 1999 and 2000. Aluminium’s contribution to the country’s export revenue was 5.2% in 1995, 3.3% in 1996 and 3.4% in 1997. In 1992 Venezuela’s production of bauxite ore exceeded 1m. tons. The subsequent expansion of the bauxite sector has been rapid; output advanced to 2.5m. tons in 1993, and rose to 5.1m. tons per year in 1997 and 1998. In 2000 Venezuela’s state-owned aluminium complex was reported to be undergoing further preparation for transfer to the private sector, following unsuccessful attempts in 1998 and 1999 to dispose of the Government’s 70% holding by auction. Guyana’s nationalized bauxite production industry is a major source of the country’s export revenue, providing 15.5% of total domestic exports in 2000. The state-owned Guyana Mining Enterprise Ltd (Guymine) implemented a programme of rehabilitation for the industry, which was adversely affected in the mid-1980s, and again in the early 1990s, by depressed conditions for bauxite on the world market (see below). The transfer of Guymine to the private sector commenced in 1996.
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In November 1998 a preliminary agreement was signed for the construction of a primary aluminium smelter, with an eventual capacity of 474,000 tons per year, at Point Lisas, Trinidad. It was envisaged that this development, with a projected cost of US $1,500m., would proceed in two stages. The first phase, with an annual capacity of 237,000 tons, was to be completed in 2002. Its metal output would, according to the proposals, be exported to Europe and North America. However, in early 1999, with international prices of aluminium at their lowest for about five years (see below), plans for the Trinidad smelter project were postponed. Guinea possesses more than one-quarter of the world’s known bauxite reserves, and is the world’s leading exporter of bauxite, ranking second only to Australia in terms of ore production. Bauxite and alumina exports dominate the Guinean economy, accounting for 58.7% of its external revenue in 1998. Some Guinean bauxite ore, which is of very high grade, is domestically processed into alumina, and some Guinean alumina is exported to Cameroon for refining. Cameroon has extensive bauxite deposits, estimated at some 1,200m. metric tons, but these await commercial exploitation. In 1996 Malawi began to seek international participation in the development of the country’s 29m. metric tons of bauxite reserves at Mulanje. By 2000, however, exploitation of these reserves, in which Mozambique has reportedly expressed interest, had still not commenced. Ghana’s bauxite reserves are estimated at 780m. tons. Although the country lacks an alumina refinery, it possesses a substantial aluminium smelter facility, located at Tema, which processes imported alumina. The smelter is operated by the Volta Aluminium Co (VALCO), which is 90% owned by Kaiser. However, in recent years severe drought has caused serious shortages of electricity for the VALCO smelter, and by mid-1998 only one of its five potlines was in operation. By 2000, however, the situation had improved, VALCO operating an average of four potlines in that year. Ghana’s output of primary aluminium declined from 152,000 tons in 1997 to about 56,000 tons in 1998, but recovered to an estimated 104,000 tons in 1999, and to a reported 156,000 tons in 2000. In December 1999 VALCO received a power allocation for 2000 and 2001 that would enable the smelter to operate four potlines in those years, enough to produce about 80% of its full capacity of 200,000 tons per year. Sierra Leone has estimated bauxite reserves of 100m. tons. Exploitation of the Mkanji deposits, in the Southern province, began in 1964, but was interrupted from early 1995 by guerrilla insurgency. In 2000 Alusuisse Group of Switzerland announced that it intended to sell the Sieromco bauxite mine. In 1992 the South African aluminium producer Alusaf announced plans to construct the largest smelter complex ever to be built in the Western world, with an annual capacity of 636,000 tons. These smelters, located at Richards Bay, entered production in 1995, and the eventual full utilization of this capacity would increase total African aluminium output by a significant margin. South Africa’s output of primary aluminium advanced from 195,000 tons in 1995 to 677,000 tons in 1998. Production was 679,000 tons in 1999, and, reportedly, 671,000 tons in 2000. A major aluminium smelter project in Mozambique was formally inaugurated in 1998, although the country is not a significant producer of bauxite. The Mozal smelter, located near Maputo, represents the largest single investment project in Mozambique, with an estimated cost of about US $1,300m. The first aluminium was cast at
38 AGRICULTURAL AND MINERAL COMMODITIES YEAR BOOK
the smelter in June 2000, six months ahead of schedule. Using alumina from Australia, Suriname and Brazil, the smelter was expected to reach its operational capacity in 2001, with an output of 250,000 tons per year, which was projected to advance to 253,000 tons per year by 2004. In Nigeria the Ikot Abasi primary aluminium smelter, with a capacity of 193,000 tons per year, entered production in late 1997, although it was operating at only 20% of capacity in late 1998 and had to suspend its operations temporarily in June 1999, owing to lack of working capital. Nigeria’s output of primary aluminium was 20,000 tons in 1998 and 16,000 tons in 1999. Aluminium consumption has been advancing significantly in East Asia and India in recent years. In the early 2000s the People’s Republic of China was high among the world’s major consumers of aluminium. Its requirements had been forecast to rise by about 60% in 1995– 2000, to 2.5m. tons annually by 2000. In the event, domestic consumption totalled 3.4m. tons in that year. The main consuming sectors in 2000 were construction, packaging, communications and transportation. China’s domestic aluminium production capacity has, meanwhile, undergone significant expansion in recent years, reaching 3.3m. tons at the end of 2000, an increase of about 18 % compared with 1999. By 2005 production capacity is expected to have increased to more than 4.2m. tons. However, demand is forecast to outstrip supply by a wider margin up to 2005, increasing China’s reliance on imports. In 1999 it was reported that China had 111 aluminium smelters, of which about 40 had been constructed in the preceding two years. In August 1999 the China Aluminium Corpn (Chalco) was established to assume responsibility for the management of aluminium production facilities formerly controlled by the State Bureau of Nonferrous Metals Industry. At that time the aluminium smelters operated by Chalco had a production capacity of about 1m. tons per year. Japan was the world’s leading importer of unwrought aluminium in the late 1990s. The country’s imports of refined aluminium (primary metal) totalled 2.9m. tons in 2000. Japan produces only small amounts of primary aluminium, but is a major producer of secondary metal (obtained by remelting waste or scrap). The country also has substantial rolling and extrusion facilities for aluminium fabrication, using secondary or imported metal. The Republic of Korea does not produce primary aluminium, but, like Japan, has facilities for the manufacture of rolled aluminium products. In 1999 Alcan and a local wiremanufacturing company formed a Korean-based joint venture, Alcan Taihan Aluminum Ltd, to market such products throughout the Asia-Pacific region. In 2000 Alcan became the leading Asian manufacturer of aluminium rolled products through the acquisition of Aluminium of Korea Ltd (Koralu). Australia is the world’s largest producer and exporter of bauxite and alumina. In 2001 the country accounted for 39% of the world’s bauxite production and, in 2000, for almost 32% of alumina output. Australia’s five bauxite mines produced 53.5m. metric tons of the ore in 2001: a decline of 0.6% on the 2000 total. The country’s six alumina refineries include the huge Worsley facility in Western Australia, reported to be probably the lowest-cost refinery in the world. Expansion of the Worsley plant, increasing its annual capacity from 1.7m. tons to 3.1m. tons (so making it the world’s largest alumina refinery), was completed in 2000. At that time Alcoa owned 56% of the Worsley refinery, but the company was required to dispose of this interest, among several assets, as a precondition, imposed by
COMMODITY SURVEYS 39
competition authorities, for its merger with Reynolds (see above). Australia’s output of alumina increased from 14.5m. tons in 1999 to 15.7m. tons in 2000. The country has extensive bauxite deposits in Western Australia, the Northern Territory and Queensland. Owing to the availability of bauxite and alumina (Australia’s bauxite reserves, estimated at 3, 800m. tons, account for 15.8% of the world’s identified reserves), and of low-cost power (vast coal resources), the country provides a desirable location for aluminium smelters. There are six smelters currently operating, with a combined output of 1.8m. tons of primary aluminium in 2000. Alcoa of Australia, the world’s largest alumina-producing company, operates one of these smelters, together with two bauxite mines and three alumina refineries. In 1999/2000 the aluminium industry was Australia’s third-largest export sector (behind coal and gold), with earnings that included $A3,400m. from sales of alumina and $A3,900m. from sales of aluminium ingots. New Zealand has a single aluminium smelter, commissioned in 1971 at Tiwai Point, near Invercargill, South Island. The plant is controlled by a subsidiary of the Australian company Comalco. A major expansion of the smelter was completed in 1996, increasing capacity to 313,000 tons of primary aluminium per year. In the late 1990s more than 90% of the smelter’s production was exported. India has the world’s sixth-largest bauxite reserves, estimated to be at least 1,400m. metric tons. Indian bauxite is of high quality (about 90% metallurgical grade), and production has generally increased in recent years. India’s estimated output of alumina increased from 1.9m. tons in 1999 to 2m. tons in 2000. About 60% of the country’s recoverable bauxite is in the eastern state of Orissa. The government-controlled National Aluminium Co (NALCO) is the main bauxite-producing company in India, with output reaching a record 2.9m. tons in the year to March 2001. An expansion plan, aiming to increase NALCO’s bauxite production to 4.8m. tons per year, was completed by mid-2000. At the same time, the company increased the annual capacity of its alumina refinery in Orissa from 800,000 tons to 1,050,000 tons. NALCO and the privately-owned Hindalco Industries Ltd are among the world’s lowest-cost producers of alumina and aluminium. In 1999 Hindalco decided to expand the annual capacity of its aluminium smelter at Renukoot, in Uttar Pradesh, by 100,000 tons (from its existing capacity of 242,000 tons). In mid-2000 a major new bauxite-alumina project was being prepared in Orissa by a joint venture involving Alcan, Norwegian interests and a Hindalco subsidiary. The scheme, involving an estimated investment of US $900m., envisages the establishment of a bauxite mine at Baphilimali, producing a projected 3.6m. tons of ore per year, and an alumina refinery in the Rayagada district, with a planned initial capacity of 1.2m. tons per year. Completion of the project is scheduled for 2005. Despite the inadequacy of the electric power supply, India has the potential to become one of the world’s leading aluminium producers. In 2000 the country’s seven smelters (including five in the private sector) had a combined annual capacity of 825,000 tons, while output of aluminium ingots in that year was about 560,000 tons. As part of its expansion plans in the late 1990s, NALCO was increasing the capacity of its smelter at Angul, in Orissa, from 218,000 tons to 345,000 tons. Work on this project was due to be completed by mid-2002. NALCO’s output in the year to March 1999 was only 146,205 tons (compared with 200,162 tons in 1997/98). In 1999/2000 NALCO’s production totalled 212,661 tons. During the same period Hindalco produced 250,751
40 AGRICULTURAL AND MINERAL COMMODITIES YEAR BOOK
tons. Including three smaller companies, the total output of India’s aluminium industry in 1999/2000 was a record 620,512 tons, mainly in the form of ingots. Indonesia has bauxite mines in western Kalimantan (Borneo) and in the Riau archipelago, east of Sumatra. The main producing area is Bintan Island (part of the Riau group), where bauxite has been mined since 1935. Bintan currently has three bauxite mines (controlled by PT Aneka Tambang), which produce ore for export. However, deposits at two of the mines are expected to be exhausted soon (observers now predict that extraction will cease there in 2003, economic circumstances having enabled the site to outlive earlier expectations of closure in 2001). Research into further potential sites in western Kalimantan is ongoing. Indonesia has one major aluminium smelter, capable of producing 225,000 tons per year. The plant forms part of the Asahan Development Project, along the Asahan river on the island of Sumatra. The establishment of the smelter, which began operating in 1982, was intended as the first stage of a fully integrated national aluminium industry. A Japanese consortium of smelters and trading concerns owns 59% of the venture, PT Indonesia Asahan Aluminium Co (PT Inalum), and takes a proportionate share of the plant’s output. Indonesia’s share of Asahan’s production is essential to the country’s domestic aluminium requirements. In 1998, however, severe drought conditions caused shortages of power at the associated hydroelectric plant, forcing a reduction in Asahan’s output. By November the smelter was operating at less than 40% of its capacity. Indonesia’s production of primary aluminium ingots declined from 216,000 tons in 1997 to an estimated 130,000 tons in 1998 and to only about 100,000 tons in 1999. In 2000 production recovered to an estimated 160, 000 tons. In 1999 the Government of Viet Nam was considering the development of bauxite deposits in Lam Dong Province, in which, with Gia Lai, Kon Tum and Dac Lac Provinces, the country’s substantial bauxite reserves are located. In March 2000, after completion of a study, new government plans to exploit these deposits were reported. The proposals involved the creation of a bauxite-aluminium complex in Lam Dong Province. In April the Government approved a planned joint venture with Pechiney to develop the Tan Rai bauxite deposits (estimated at 385m. tons) in Lam Dong. The project envisaged investment of an estimated US $589m. in the establishment of mining operations, an alumina refinery and an aluminium smelter. According to the plans, a further US $375m. would be spent on the construction of an associated hydroelectric plant to provide power for the project. It was expected that, if the scheme was approved after further study, work to establish the mine would begin in early 2001 and about 1.7m. tons of bauxite per year would be produced from 2004. Meanwhile, in 1997 the Vietnamese Government had agreed to a proposal by Daewoo Corpn of the Republic of Korea to survey bauxite reserves in Dac Lac Province. The proposals envisaged the eventual development, at a cost of about US $1,000m., of a mine and an alumina refinery. In 2001, according to the USGS, Russia’s reserves of bauxite totalled 250m. metric dry tons, the 10th largest in the world. Russian production of bauxite in that year amounted to an estimated 4m. tons—the country thus ranking jointly with Suriname as the eighth-largest producer world-wide—compared with 4.2m. tons in 1999. Russian production of primary aluminium totalled an estimated 3.2m. tons in 2001, a similar figure to that of 2000. Russia was the largest producer of primary aluminium in the world in 2001, and the second largest
COMMODITY SURVEYS 41
producer in the world, after the USA, in 2000. Russia depends on imported bauxite to meet its requirements for the production of primary metal. In the late 1990s more than 80% of primary aluminium produced was reportedly for export via so-called short-term tolling contracts between producers and brokers. During the course of the 1990s, as a consequence of a massive decline in domestic demand for aluminium manufactures, Russian production of primary aluminium became almost exclusively export-oriented. In 1999, according to the USGS, domestic consumption of aluminium totalled 500,000 tons of primary metal, and 40, 000–50,000 tons of secondary metal. Kazakhstan produced 3.7m. metric tons of bauxite in 2000 (ranked ninth in world terms), much of it destined for processing in Russia, some in Ukraine and in Tajikistan. Projects to refurbish aluminium-processing facilities in Armenia and Azerbaijan were underway in 2001. Ukraine is a significant producer of alumina, with output reported at 1. 4m. tons in 2000. There are some deposits of bauxite in Central and South-Eastern Europe and exploitation is greatest in Greece, where 2.0m. metric tons of bauxite was produced in 2000, and in Hungary (1.0m. tons). There is also some smelter capacity in this region, chiefly in Romania (which produced an estimated 175,000 tons of primary aluminium in 2000), Greece and Slovakia. Although there is little or no commercial bauxite extraction in Western Europe, the region is a significant producer of primary aluminium thanks to imports of bauxite and alumina from producer countries. There are aluminium production sites throughout the region—the largest producer is Norway (1.0m. metric tons in 2000, according to reports), followed by Germany (a reported 644,000 tons), France (a reported 441,000 tons) and Spain (a reported 366,000 tons). There are bauxite resources in Iran and Turkey. In the former country, bauxite extraction increased from an estimated 150,000 metric tons in 1996 to an estimated 1m. tons in 2000. Development of the country’s smelter capacity enabled production of primary aluminium to exhibit a more modest increase over the same period, reaching an estimated 140,000 tons in 2000. Bauxite production in Turkey recovered to 459,000 metric tons in 2000, roughly its 1998 level, following a sharp decline in production in 2000. Primary aluminium production, by contrast, remained relatively constant around the 60,000-ton mark throughout 1996/2000. Although world demand for aluminium advanced by an average of 3% annually from the late 1980s until 1994 (see below), industrial recession began, in 1990, to create conditions of over-supply. Despite the implementation of capacity reductions at an annual rate of 10% by the major Western producers, stock levels began to accumulate. The supply problem was exacerbated by a rapid rise, beginning in 1991, of exports by the Soviet Union and its successor states, which had begun to accumulate substantial stocks of aluminium as a consequence of the collapse of the Soviet arms industry. The requirements of these countries for foreign exchange to restructure their economies led to a rapid acceleration in low-cost exports of high-grade aluminium to Western markets. These sales caused considerable dislocation of the market and involved the major Western producers in heavy financial losses. Producing members of the European Community (EC, now the European Union—EU) were particularly severely affected, and in August 1993 the EC imposed quota arrangements, under which aluminium imports from the former Soviet Union were to be cut
42 AGRICULTURAL AND MINERAL COMMODITIES YEAR BOOK
by 50% for an initial three-month period, while efforts were made to negotiate an agreement that would reduce the flow of low-price imports and achieve a reduction in aluminium stocks (by then estimated to total 4.5m. tons world-wide). These negotiations, which involved the EC, the USA, Canada, Norway, Australia and Russia (but in which the minor producers, Brazil, the Gulf states, Venezuela and Ukraine were not invited to take part), began in October 1993. Initially, the negotiations made little progress, and in November the market price of high-grade aluminium ingots fell to an 11year ‘low’. Following further meetings in January 1994, however, a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was finalized on a plan whereby Russia was to ‘restructure’ its aluminium industry and reduce its output by 500,000 tons annually. By March the major Western producers had agreed to reduce annual production by about 1.2m. tons over a maximum period of two years. Additionally, Russia was to receive US $2,000m. in loan guarantees. The MOU provided for participants to monitor world aluminium supplies and prices on a regular basis. In March the EU quota was terminated. By July the world price had recovered by about 50% on the November 1993 level. The successful operation of the MOU, combined with a strong recovery in world aluminium demand, led to the progressive reduction of stock levels and to a concurrent recovery in market prices during 1994 and 1995. Consumption in the Western industrialized countries and Japan rose by an estimated 10.3% to 17.3m. tons, representing the highest rate of annual growth since 1983. This recovery was attributed mainly to a revival in demand from the motor vehicle sector in EU countries and the USA, and to an intensified programme of public works construction in Japan. Increased levels of demand were also reported in China, and in the less industrialized countries of the South and East Asia region. Demand in the industrialized countries advanced by 11% in 1994, and by 2.2% in 1995. Levels of world aluminium stocks were progressively reduced during 1994, and by late 1995 it was expected that the continuing fall in stock levels could enable Western smelters to resume full-capacity operation during 1996. In May stock levels were reported to have fallen to their lowest level since March 1993, and exports of aluminium from Russia, totalling 2m. tons annually, were viewed as essential to the maintenance of Western supplies. Meanwhile, progress continued to be made in arrangements under the MOU for the modernization of Russian smelters and their eventual integration into the world aluminium industry. International demand for aluminium rose by 0.2% in 1995 and by 0.8% in 1996. In 1997 aluminium consumption by industrialized countries advanced by an estimated 5.4%. This growth in demand was satisfied by increased primary aluminium production, combined with sustained reductions in world levels of primary aluminium stocks. Demand in 1998, however, was adversely affected by the economic crisis in East Asia, and consumption of aluminium in established market economy countries (EMEC) rose by only 0. 1%: the lowest growth in aluminium demand since 1982. However, consumption in the EMEC area increased by an estimated 3.9% in 1999, with demand for aluminium rising strongly in the USA and in much of Asia. Compared with 1998, growth in consumption was, however, reduced in Europe and Latin America. World-wide, the fastest-growing sector of aluminium demand in 1999 was the transport industry (the largest market for the metal), with consumption rising by about 9%. Demand was expected to remain strong in
COMMODITY SURVEYS 43
2000, with sales of motor vehicles predicted to continue rising, while world aluminium output was forecast to increase, as additional smelter capacity became available. Production of primary aluminium in the first six months of 2000 was about 4% above the level for the corresponding period in 1999. In 2000, according to analysis by Alcan, world shipments of aluminium products (both primary and secondary/recycled metal in the form of fabricated products, including castings; excluding the former Soviet Union, other Eastern bloc countries and the People’s Republic of China) of aluminium increased to 28.47m. metric tons. Flat-rolled products constituted the largest category of aluminium products consumed, and within that category can sheet accounted for more than 30% of total sheet, plate and foil shipments. Castings (used mainly in engines and transmissions of passenger cars and light trucks) accounted for 26% of all aluminium products consumed. The transportation sector accounted for 30% of all shipments and was the fastest-growing end-use market for aluminium products. Terrorist attacks perpetrated against targets in the USA in September 2001 diminished the prospects for recovery in 2002 of various sectors of the world aluminium industry, in particular those of the aerospace sector. Weak demand and falling prices, the result of poor economic conditions generally, were already the salient characteristics of markets in North America and Europe before the attacks occurred. In late 2001 it was thought likely that continued declines in aluminium markets would lead to the closure of some smelting facilities, the consequent reduction in production then triggering a sharp recovery in prices as a result of relatively low stocks held world-wide. In November 1993 the price of high-grade aluminium (minimum purity 99.7%) on the London Metal Exchange (LME) was quoted at US $1,023.5 (£691) per metric ton, its lowest level for about eight years. In July 1994 the London price of aluminium advanced to $1,529.5 (£981) per ton, despite a steady accumulation in LME stocks of aluminium, which rose to a series of record levels, increasing from 1.9m. tons at mid-1993 to 2.7m tons in June 1994. In November 1994, when these holdings had declined to less than 1.9m. tons, aluminium was traded at $1,987.5 (£1,269) per ton. In January 1995 the LME aluminium price rose to US $2,149.5 (£1,346) per ton, its highest level since 1990. The price of aluminium was reduced to $1,715.5 (£1,085) per ton in May 1995, but recovered to $1,945 (£1,219) in July. It retreated to $1,609.5 (£1,021) per ton in October. Meanwhile, on 1 May the LME’s holdings of aluminium were below 1m. tons for the first time since January 1992. In October 1995 these stocks stood at 523,175 tons, their lowest level for more than four years and only 19.7% of the June 1994 peak. Thereafter, stock levels moved generally higher, reaching 970,275 tons in October 1996. During that month the London price of aluminium fell to $1,287 (£823) per ton, but later in the year it exceeded $1,500. In March 1997 the London price of aluminium reached US $1,665.5 (£1,030) per ton. This was the highest aluminium price recorded in the first half of the year, despite a steady decline in LME stocks of the metal. After falling to less than $1,550 per ton, the London price of aluminium rose in August to $1,787.5 (£1,126). In that month the LME’s aluminium holdings were reduced to 620,475 tons, but in October they reached 744,250 tons. Stocks subsequently decreased, but at the end of December the metal’s price was $1, 503.5 (£914) per ton, close to its lowest for the year. The average price of aluminium on
44 AGRICULTURAL AND MINERAL COMMODITIES YEAR BOOK
the LME in 1997 was 72.5 US cents per lb, compared with 68.3 cents per lb in 1996 and 81. 9 cents per lb in 1995. The decline in aluminium stocks continued during the early months of 1998, but this had no major impact on prices, owing partly to forecasts of long-term oversupply. In early May the LME’s holdings stood at 511,225 tons, but later that month the price of aluminium fell to less than US $1,350 per ton. In June LME stocks increased to more than 550,000 tons, and in early July the price of the metal was reduced to $1,263.5 (£768) per ton. In early September the LME’s holdings decreased to about 452,000 tons (their lowest level since July 1991), and the aluminium price recovered to $1,409.5 (£840) per ton. However, the market remained depressed by a reduction in demand from some consuming countries in Asia, affected by the economic downturn, and in December 1998 the London price of aluminium declined to $1,222 (£725) per ton. For the year as a whole, the average price was 61.6 US cents per lb. During the first quarter of 1999 the aluminium market continued to be over-supplied, and in March the London price of the metal fell to US $1,139 (£708) per ton: its lowest level, in terms of US currency, since early 1994. Later that month the LME’s stocks of aluminium rose to 821,650 tons. By the end of July 1999 these holdings had been reduced to 736,950 tons, and the price of aluminium had meanwhile recovered to $1,433.5 (£902) per ton. Stock levels subsequently rose, but, following the announcement in August of proposed cost-cutting mergers among major producers (see above), the aluminium price continued to increase, reaching $1,626.5 (£1,009) per ton at the end of the year. The steady rise was also attributable to a sharp increase in the price of alumina in the second half of the year. Following an explosion at (and subsequent closure of) a US alumina refinery in July, the price of the material advanced from $160 per ton in that month to $400 per ton (its highest level for 10 years) in December. However, the average LME price of aluminium for the year (61.7 US cents per lb) was almost unchanged from the 1998 level. With alumina remaining in short supply, prices of aluminium continued to rise during the opening weeks of 2000, and in early February the London quotation reached US $1,743.5 per ton: its highest level for more than two years. However, the LME’s stocks of the metal also increased, reaching 868,625 tons later that month. The London price of aluminium declined to $1,413 per ton in April, but recovered to $1,599 in July. Throughout this period there was a steady decrease in LME holdings, which were reduced to less than 700, 000 tons in April, under 600,000 tons in May and below 500,000 tons in July. At the end of July aluminium stocks were 461,975 tons: only 53% of the level reached in February; and by the end of August they had fallen to 399,925 tons. In September prices continued to rise, reaching $1,644 per metric ton on 13 September, even though stocks fell steadily throughout the month, which they ended at 361,050 tons. Thereafter, in October and November, the London quotation for aluminium was somewhat weaker, falling to respective ‘lows’ in those months of $1,446 and $1,443. Stocks declined simultaneously, standing at 331,250 tons on 31 October, and 320,725 tons on 30 November. Prices strengthened in December, reaching a ‘high’ for that month of $1,632.5 per ton. The firmer quotation was accompanied by the beginning of a sustained rise in stocks of aluminium held by the LME. Having fallen to 298,925 tons on 18 December, stocks ended the month slightly higher, at 321,850 tons, than at the end of the previous month.
COMMODITY SURVEYS 45
Export Price Index for Aluminium (base: 1980=100)
At the end of January 2001 the London quotation rose to US $1,737 per metric ton, thus approaching the highest level recorded in 2000. By the end of January stocks had recovered to 394,075 tons. By the end of February LME holdings stood at 483,200 tons, and the London price had declined to $1,553 per ton. In both March and April, on a month-on-month basis, stocks fell, while prices were generally weaker, the London quotation reaching $1,540 on 27 April. May 2001 marked the beginning of a very substantial accumulation of stocks, which was to continue up to the time of writing, in July 2002. Although the London quotation rose as high as $1,586 on 4 May, prices fell precipitously in June-November, reaching a low of $1,243 on 7 November, but recovering to $1,430 at the end of that month. The sustained decline was attributed to slow economic growth world-wide, which had caused the market to be over-supplied, aggravated by the events in New York, USA, on 11 September. On 28 March 2002 LME stocks rose to 1,029,400 metric tons. The London quotation weakened in both April and May, falling to $1,318 on 23 May. In early June the price recovered to $1,398, while, at the end of that month, stocks of aluminium held by the LME totalled more than 1.2m. tons. Almost all the producers of primary aluminium outside Communist or former Communist countries are members of the International Primary Aluminium Instititute (IPAI), based in London. The IPAI’s membership comprises 39 companies, operating primary aluminium smelters in 24 countries, collectively representing substantially all of the Western countries’ production of primary aluminium. In 1993 the International Aluminium Committee was formed to represent most of the aluminium smelters in the former Soviet Union.
Banana
Although it is often mistakenly termed a ‘tree’, the banana plant, Musa Sapentium is, in fact, a giant herb. It grows to a height of 3 m–9 m (10 ft–30 ft) and bears leaves that are very long and broad. The stem of the plant is formed by the overlapping bases of the leaves above. Bananas belong to the genus Musa but the cultivated varieties are barren hybrid forms which cannot, therefore, be assigned specific botanical names. These banana hybrids, producing edible seedless fruits, are now grown throughout the tropics, but originally diversified naturally or were developed by humans in prehistoric times from wild bananas which grow in Indo-China. The plantain hybrid has grown in central Africa for thousands of years, and traders and explorers gradually spread this and other varieties to Asia Minor and East Africa; the Spanish and Portuguese introduced them to West Africa and took them across the Atlantic to the Caribbean islands and the American continent. However, the varieties now most commonly traded internationally were not introduced to the New World until the 19th century. The banana is propagated by the planting of suckers or shoots growing from the rhizome, which is left in the ground after the flowering stem, having produced its fruit, has died and been cut down. Less than one year after planting, a flowering stem begins to emerge from the tip of the plant. As it grows, the stem bends and hangs downwards. The barren male flowers which grow at the end of the stem eventually wither and fall off. The seedless banana fruits develop, without fertilization, from the clusters of female flowers further up the stem. Each stem usually bears between nine and 12 ‘hands’ of fruit, each hand comprising 12–16 fruits. Before it is ripe, the skin of the banana fruit is green, turning yellow as it ripens. To obtain edible white flesh, the skin is peeled back. The process of fruiting and propagation can repeat itself indefinitely. In commercial cultivation the productive life of a banana field is usually limited to between five and 20 years before it is replanted, although small producers frequently allow their plants to continue fruiting for up to 60 years. Banana plantations are vulnerable to disease and to severe weather (particularly tropical storms), but the banana plant is fast-growing, and a replanted field can be ready to produce again within a year, though at a high cost. The varieties of dessert banana on which international trade is predominantly based, and which are most usually eaten raw owing to their high sugar content (17%–19%), comprise only a few of the many varieties which are grown. Many types of sweet banana, unsuitable for export, are consumed locally. Apart from the trade in fresh, sweet bananas, the fruit has few commercial uses, although there is a small industry in dried bananas and banana flour.
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Production of Bananas (’000 metric tons, excluding plantains)
* Unofficial figure. † FAO estimate. Source: FAO.
The numerous high-starch varieties with a lower sugar content, which are not eaten in their raw state, are used in cooking, mostly in the producing areas. Such varieties are picked when their flesh is unripe, although they are occasionally of a type which would become sweet if left to ripen. Cooking bananas, sometimes called ‘plantains’ (though this term is also applied to types of dessert banana in some countries), form the staple diet of millions of Africans. Bananas can also be used for making beer, and in Africa special varieties are cultivated for that purpose. Advances in production methods, packaging, storage and transport (containerization) have made bananas available world-wide. Although international trade is principally in the sweet dessert fruit, this type comprises less than one-fifth of total annual world banana production. The banana was introduced into Latin America and the Caribbean by the Spanish and the Portuguese during the 16th century. The expansion of the banana industry in the small Latin American (so-called ‘green’ or ‘banana’) republics between 1880 and 1910 had a decisive effect in establishing this region as the centre of the world banana trade. Favourable soil and climatic conditions, combined with the ease of access around the Caribbean and to a major market in the USA, were major factors in the initial commercial success of the Latin American banana industry. Although advances in storage and transportation made the US market more accessible to producers in other areas, they also made available an equally important market in Europe (see below). Owing to considerably lower production costs than in other producing areas, bananas from Central and South America command the major portion of the world export market. It is there that the large multinational companies
48 AGRICULTURAL AND MINERAL COMMODITIES YEAR BOOK
(notably United Brands, Standard Fruit and Del Monte) which dominate the world banana market are established. Bananas are grown in most Latin American countries. Brazil has traditionally been the region’s leading producer of bananas, although they contribute only a small proportion of the country’s total export earnings. The banana industry is of far greater economic importance in Ecuador, where production in 2000 surpassed that in Brazil and where bananas are the leading cash crop (as they are in Honduras), and in Colombia and Costa Rica, where they vie with coffee as the principal source of export revenue. Ecuador, the world’s second largest producer of bananas (after India), is the leading exporter, with shipments of 4.0m. metric tons (valued at US $954m.) in 1999. In that year bananas accounted for 21.4% of Ecuador’s export earnings. Banana shipments contribute significantly to the export receipts of Honduras (providing 8.6% of the total in 2000) and Costa Rica (9% in 2000). In October 1998, however, about 70% of the Honduran crop was destroyed by ‘Hurricane Mitch’, necessitating extensive replanting during 1999. In that year bananas contributed only 3.3% of Honduran export revenue. Among other Latin American countries where bananas are a major export are Panama (21.1% in 1999, excluding trade of the Colón Free Zone) and Belize (16.4% in 1999). Bananas are also a useful source of foreign exchange in Colombia (where they provided 4.8% of total export earnings in 1999), Guatemala (5.9% in 1999) and Nicaragua (3.0% in 1999). The territories most dependent on bananas for export receipts are Caribbean islands, including Dominica (where bananas represented 23.9% of total exports, by value, in 2000), Guadeloupe (22.2% in 1997), Martinique (36.6% in 1997), Saint Lucia (62.5% of domestic exports in 1999) and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (41.3% of total exports (including re-exports) in 1999). These islands’ size dictates that, while the crop is of utmost economic importance, they cannot be styled major producers in global terms (the largest producer in 2001 was Martinique, with an estimated 310,000 metric tons). As noted above, bananas are an important subsistence crop in many African countries. In 2001, Africa accounted for an estimated 11.2% of total world production, and, across the continent, Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, South Africa and Tanzania all produce bananas on a large scale. Only Cameroon and Côte d’Ivoire are notable exporters, however. In 2000 Côte d’Ivoire’s exports of bananas totalled 243,032 metric tons, compared with 241,580 in 1999, and 206,060 in 1998. Bananas accounted for 2.1% of the country’s export earnings in 1996, the last year for which figures are available. Cameroon exported an estimated 138,100 tons of bananas in 2000, after two years in which exports were estimated by the FAO to have declined to zero as a consequence of drought. The countries of the European Union constitute the most important market for the bananas of both Cameroon and Côte d’Ivoire. Both countries have benefited from the protective import policy of the EU (see below). Exports of bananas from Côte d’Ivoire are estimated to have increased threefold since the late 1980s, those of Cameroon twofold. In both countries production for export is undertaken on large plantations (operated by Dole and Chiquita in Côte d’Ivoire, and by Del Monte and Dole in Cameroon). Yields in Cameroon and Côte d’Ivoire are reportedly comparable with those achieved in Latin America, although quality remains inconsistent. The cost of producing bananas for export in Africa tends to be high, owing, in part, to poor communications infrastructure.
COMMODITY SURVEYS 49
In the Far East, the pattern of banana production is similar to that prevailing in Africa, in so far as it is dominated by subsistence crops. India, for example, is by far the world’s largest producer of bananas, but its exports are of little significance. The same is true of other major Far Eastern producers, such as the People’s Republic of China, Indonesia, Thailand and Viet Nam. The notable exception is the Philippines, where output of bananas totalled 4.9m. metric tons in 2000, and exports in the same year amounted to 1.6m. tons, compared with 1.3m. tons in 1999 (when bananas accounted for 0.7% of the country’s export earnings), and 1.1m. tons in 1998. The increase in shipments from the Philippines in 2000 was attributed to a rise in production, strong demand from East Asia, which constitutes the main market for Philippine bananas, and the weakness of the Philippine peso relative to the US dollar and the Japanese yen. In terms of value (f.o.b.), Japan was by far the most important destination for Philippine banana exports in 2001, followed by the People’s Republic of China, the Republic of Korea and Taiwan. Minor producers in the Asia-Pacific region include Australia, Bangladesh, Cambodia, Malaysia, Papua New Guinea and Pakistan. Production in Europe is confined to the continent’s southernmost fringes and possessions. The largest producer is Spain (Canary Islands—415,200 metric tons in 2001), while the crop is also grown in Portugal (Madeira and the Azores) and in Greece (Crete). Many of the countries of the Middle East produce small quantities of bananas, the most significant being Lebanon (110,000 tons in 2001, according to FAO estimates). There is no international agreement governing trade in bananas, but there are various associations—such as the Union of Banana-Exporting Countries (UPEB), comprising Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama and Venezuela; the Caribbean Banana Exporters’ Association, comprising Jamaica, Belize, the Windward Islands and Suriname; and WIBDECO, the Windward Islands Banana Development Co— which have been formed by producer countries to protect their commercial interests. Prices vary greatly, depending on relative wages and yields in the producing countries, freight charges, and various trade agreements negotiated under the Lomé Convention between the European Community (EC, now the European Union—EU) and 71 African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries. The Lomé arrangements include a banana protocol, which ensures producers an export market, a fixed quota and certain customs duty concessions. In this connection, the prospect of a withdrawal of internal barriers to intra-EC trade, as a result of the completion of a single market with effect from January 1993, was the cause of considerable anxiety to most major banana exporters (see below). The EU is the world’s largest market for bananas, accounting, in 2000, for an estimated 3. 3m. tons, representing about 27% of world banana imports. Under the market arrangements prior to the end of 1992, just over one-half of banana imports were subject to quota controls under the Lomé Convention. Approximately 20% of market supplies were imported, duty free, from former British, French and Italian colonies. The Windward Islands of Saint Lucia, Dominica and Grenada together accounted for some 90% of banana exports to the EC under the Lomé Convention’s banana protocol, Jamaica and Belize also being parties to the Convention. Around 70% of bananas from the Windward Islands were exported to the United Kingdom. France maintained similar arrangements with its traditional suppliers (overseas territories such as Guadeloupe and Martinique), as did Italy (Somalia). Another 25% of EC demand was satisified internally. The remainder of quota
50 AGRICULTURAL AND MINERAL COMMODITIES YEAR BOOK
imports (representing 10% of overall market demand) were imported, duty free, into Germany, mainly from Latin American countries. Banana consumption in Germany, at 18 kg per head annually, has been approximately twice that of other EU countries. Banana imports into the residual free market originated mainly from the same countries, but attracted a 20% import tariff. This complex market structure, which strongly favoured the Caribbean islands, was maintained by barriers to internal trade. These prevented the re-export of imports into Germany from, for instance, Honduras or Ecuador, to the United Kingdom and France. Without these restrictions, Central and Latin American exporters, enjoying the cost advantages of modern technology and large-scale production, and subject to a 20% import tariff on their EC exports, would have substantially expanded their market share, and possibly displaced Caribbean producers altogether in the longer term. The intention of the Commission of the European Communities that the tariff-free quota system would cease after 1992 held serious implications for Caribbean producers, who, with the ACP secretariat, sought to persuade the EC to devise a new preference system to protect their existing market shares, possibly taking the form of quota allocations, which would accord with the obligations of the EC countries in relation to trade with the ACP under the terms of the Lomé Convention. These guarantee that ‘no ACP state shall be placed, as regards access to its traditional markets…in a less favourable position than in the past or present’. In December 1992 it was announced by the EC Commission that ACP banana producers were to retain their preferential status under the EC’s single-market arrangements that were to enter into force in July 1993. These would guarantee 30% of the European banana market to ACP producers, by way of an annual duty-free quota of approximately 750,000 tons. Imports of Latin American bananas were to be limited to 2m. tons per year at a tariff of 20%, with any additional shipments to be subject to a tariff rate of 170%, equivalent to 850 European Currency Units (ECU) per ton. It was asserted that, as the proposals linked tariffs with quotas, the EC was not in contravention of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) regulations on the restriction of market access. These arrangements were opposed by Germany, Denmark, Belgium and Luxembourg, as well as by the Latin American banana producers, who forecast that their shipments to the EC, totalling approximately 2.6m. tons annually, could decline by as much as 20%. In early 1993 the German Government unsuccessfully sought a declaration from the Court of Justice of the European Communities that the EC Commission was in violation of GATT free-trade regulations. In June the Governments of Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico and Panama obtained agreement by GATT to examine the validity of the EC proposals. In the mean time, the new arrangements covering EC banana imports duly took effect on 1 July. In February 1994 a GATT panel ruled in favour of the five Latin American producers, declaring that the EU policy on bananas unfairly favoured the ACP banana exporters and was in contravention of free-trade principles. The Latin American producers accordingly demanded that the EU increase its annual quota to 3.2m. tons and reduce the tariff level on excess shipments. The EU responded to the ruling by offering to increase the Latin American banana quota to 2.1m. tons in 1994 (with effect from 1 October) and to 2.2m. tons in 1995, and to reduce the tariff rate by one-quarter. This compromise was accepted by
COMMODITY SURVEYS 51
Colombia, Costa Rica, Nicaragua and Venezuela, but rejected by Ecuador and the other Latin American producers. The Latin American exporters assenting to the plan were each to receive specific quotas, based on their past share of the market, within the overall 2.1m. ton quota. In October 1994 the Court of Justice of the European Communities rejected a petition by Germany seeking a quota of 2.5m. tons in that year, with subsequent annual increases of 5%. With the accession to the EU in January 1995 of Austria, Finland and Sweden, it was anticipated that the quota for duty-free bananas would be increased by up to 350,000 tons annually to accommodate the community’s enlarged membership. (This proposed level of increase, however, was viewed by Germany as inadequate.) In the same month, the US Government indicated that it was contemplating the imposition of retaliatory trade measures against both the members of the EU and those Latin American banana exporters which had agreed to the 1994 quota compromise arrangements. (Although the USA is only a marginal producer of bananas, US business interests hold substantial investments in the multinational companies operating in Central and South America.) In February 1995 the EU came under further pressure from a number of African banana-producing countries, led by Cameroon and Côte d’Ivoire, which sought further improvements in their access to EU markets under ACP arrangements. The USA, meanwhile, with the support of Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands and Finland, declared in July that renewed efforts should be made to formulate a new banana import regime that would reconcile the interests of the Latin American and ACP producers. France and the United Kingdom, however, reiterated their intention to maintain their perceived obligations towards their former Caribbean colonies, whose economies would be severely affected by the operation of a free market in bananas. In September 1995 the USA formally instituted a complaint against the EU with the World Trade Organization (WTO), the successor organization to the GATT. Further representations to the WTO by the US Government, supported by the Governments of Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras and Mexico, followed in February 1996. In the following month the EU, which had raised its annual duty-free banana quota to 2.35m. tons (see above), proposed a compromise reallocation of quotas, under which the Latin American producers would obtain 70.5% of the new quota (as against their existing proportion of 66. 5%), while the ACP growers would receive 26% (down from 30%). An additional allowance of 90,000 tons annually was also to be extended to certain categories of bananas from Belize, Cameroon and Côte d’Ivoire. In May, however, the USA, together with Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras and Mexico, made a concerted approach to the WTO to disallow the EU banana import regime in its entirety. Efforts by the contending groups of producers to achieve a compromise followed in July, when it was announced that ministerial meetings between the ACP and Latin American producing countries were to take place in October. In late July the EU announced that its annual quota for Latin American bananas was to be raised to 2.2m. tons to reflect increased demand from the enlarged EU membership. An interim report issued by the WTO in March 1997 upheld the complaint instituted in 1996 by the USA and four Latin American producers, and declared the EU to be in violation of its international trade treaty obligations. Representations by the EU against the ruling were rejected by the WTO appeals committee in September 1997, and the EU was
52 AGRICULTURAL AND MINERAL COMMODITIES YEAR BOOK
informed that it must formulate a new system for banana imports by early 1998. This ruling was accepted in principle by the EU, which in January 1998 proposed new arrangements under which it would apply a system of quotas and tariffs to both groups of producers, while retaining an import-licensing system. A quota increase to 2.5m. tons annually was to be offered to the Latin American exporters. It was also proposed to offer aid totalling ECU 450m. to the Caribbean producers to assist their banana industries towards the ability to compete efficiently in a proposed ‘free’ market in bananas by 2008. In June 1998 the US Government expressed dissatisfaction with the terms of the EU plan. The EU, however, refused to agree to further consultations with the WTO appeals committee. The US position was reinforced in September when the ‘Group of Seven’ major industrial countries sought, without success, to persuade the EU to accept the terms of the WTO ruling. However, the EU offered a new compromise plan, whereby the Latin American banana producers would, with effect from early 1999, receive an annual quota of 2.53m. tons, at an import duty rate of US $90 per ton, with the ACP growers retaining free access for annual shipments of 857,000 tons, which the EU stated to be in compliance with the WTO decision. This was rejected in October 1998 by the USA and the Latin American petitioners (who had been joined in February by Panama), and it was announced that the US Government was to seek authorization by the WTO for a programme of trade retaliation against the EU. Following further unsuccessful negotiations, and a challenge by the EU to the legality of the proposed sanctions, the US Government published in early December a list of 16 EU exports, including cashmere clothing, biscuits, candles and electric coffeemakers, on which it intended to impose tariffs of 100% with effect from early 1999. These measures, which were directed principally against the United Kingdom, France and Germany, and from which Denmark and the Netherlands (which had advocated acceptance of the WTO ruling) were exempted, provoked considerable anxiety internationally, on the grounds that they could lead to a wider disruption of world trade. Negotiations between representatives of the USA and the EU were resumed in January 1999, while the implementation of the proposed tariffs was suspended pending consideration by the WTO of their validity in international law. The WTO also agreed to re-examine the terms of the compromise plan put forward by the EU in the previous September. Following sustained but unsuccessful attempts by the USA and the EU to reach a negotiated settlement, the US Government, supported by the five Latin American petitioners, announced in early March 1999 that it was to invoke the punitive tariffs. Concurrently, a number of countries in the Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM) grouping announced that they were considering the abrogation of a narcoticscontrol agreement with the USA, which permitted US enforcement agencies to pursue suspected drugs-traffickers into their territorial waters and air space. In April 1999 the WTO ruled that the revised EU banana import proposals represented an attempt to avoid compliance with the original WTO ruling, and formally authorized the USA to impose trade sanctions against EU goods, valued at US $191.4m. annually (compared with damages of $520m. originally claimed), to compensate for losses incurred by US companies as a consequence of the EU banana regime. (This authorization was only the second in the 51-year history of the WTO and its predecessor, GATT.) The EU announced its acceptance of the decision, although indicating that the formulation of
COMMODITY SURVEYS 53
reforms could span the period to January 2000. The USA, meanwhile, accepted the need for this period of consultation and further extended the suspension of its import tariff proposals. However, in March 2000, following a complaint by the EU, a WTO panel ruled that the sanctions against EU goods imposed by the USA were a violation of international trade rules. In mid-2000 the European Commission proposed the possible introduction of a tariff quota system involving the distribution of licences on a ‘first come, first served’ basis. However, it also suggested that, if a consensus were not reached, a tariff-only solution, whereby no restrictions would be imposed on quantities but which would give ACP countries preferable rates, would be the only viable solution; the latter option was rejected by a number of EU governments as potentially damaging to EU banana-growers. Moreover, the granting of licences on a ‘first come, first served’ basis was subsequently rejected by representatives of Latin American banana-producing states, while the USA stated that the proposed regime did not adequately address its concerns. In July a WTO panel ruled that the sanctions against EU goods had been imposed prematurely by the USA, some six weeks before it had received the authorization of the WTO to apply them. The European Commission indicated at this time that it would take no further action itself, but that companies affected by sanctions before the WTO authorization were free to pursue claims for compensation in the US courts. The USA, meanwhile, was reported to be planning to ‘rotate’ the sanctions onto a new list of goods, the US Congress having ordered a so-called ‘carousel’ sanctions regime under which the list would change every six months. In addition, in May, the WTO had authorized Ecuador, the world’s largest banana exporter, to impose sanctions of up to US $201.6m. in the form of tariffs applied on EU service providers, industrial designs and copyrights. In October 2000 the European Commission formally approved the introduction of a tariff quota system for bananas on a ‘first come, first served’ basis. Such a system would retain the use of three quotas until 2006, the Commission favouring the introduction of a tariff-only regime thereafter. The third quota would permit annual imports of 850,000 tons and would be available to all exporters. However, ACP exporters would be granted a tariff preference of US $264 per ton, rather than $275 per ton, as had previously been proposed. The proposed new tariff quota system was immediately rejected by Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama, which threatened renewed action with the WTO. The USA also questioned whether the new regime was ‘WTO-compatible’. Shortly after the announcement of the details of the proposed new regime. EU governments declared that it provided ‘a basis for settling the banana dispute’. In March 2001 the EU announced that it would delay the introduction of the new tariff quota system for bananas in order to consider an alternative proposal, by the US fruit trading company, Chiquita Brands International, which would effectively grant quotas based on historical market share. Chiquita Brands International had, in January, initiated legal action against the European Commission in respect of losses allegedly incurred as a result of EU restrictions on banana imports. The USA had also threatened to implement new trade sanctions if the EU proceeded with the introduction of the new regime. In April the dispute over bananas appeared finally to have been resolved after the EU agreed temporarily to reallocate to Chiquita Brands International a larger share of the European banana market
54 AGRICULTURAL AND MINERAL COMMODITIES YEAR BOOK
from 1 July 2001, the date set as a target for the introduction of the new tariff quota system. In return, the USA was reported to have agreed to suspend, from that date, the sanctions it had imposed on EU goods; and to support a waiver in the WTO that would allow a specific quota for bananas from traditional ACP exporters. Under the settlement negotiated, the EU agreed to transfer 100,000 tons of bananas from the quota reserved mainly for ACP producers to that set for Latin American producers. From 1 July most import licences to the EU would be allocated on the basis of traditional shipment levels. Some 17% of licences would be reserved for new exporters or for companies which had significantly increased their imports since a 1994–96 reference period. Under the terms of the Cotonou Agreement, the successor convention to the fourth Lomé Convention that covers the period 2000–20, the system of trade preferences hitherto pertaining was to be gradually replaced by new economic partnerships based on the progressive and reciprocal removal of trade barriers. In a protocol to the Cotonou Agreement (the Second Banana Protocol), the ‘overwhelming importance to the ACP banana suppliers of their exports to the Community (EU) market’ was acknowledged, and the EU agreed to seek to ensure the continued viability of their banana export industries, and the continued access of their bananas to the EU market. Bananas were included by the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) on a list of 18 commodities in its proposed integrated programme for the regulation of international trade in primary products, based on commodity agreements backed by a common fund for financial support. The UN’s FAO and UNCTAD are seeking, through an inter-governmental group, to formulate such an international agreement on bananas, involving producers and consumers, which would ensure a proper balance of supply and demand, regulating trade in order to provide regular supplies for consumers at a price remunerative to producers. The main impediments to a trade pact are disagreements on the means by which the market would be stabilized, in particular on the definition and use of export quotas, which producers consider to be restrictive, and on the lowering of trade barriers to allow reciprocal trade, which is opposed by countries with high production costs. The average import price at US ports of first-class bananas from Central America and Ecuador declined from 25.46 US cents per lb in 1991 to 19.91 cents per lb in 1994. The annual average rose to 20.02 cents per lb in 1995,21.41 cents in 1996 and 22.25 cents in 1997, but eased to 21.61 cents in 1998. It fell to 19.39 cents per lb in 1999. On a monthly basis, the average price advanced from only 18.14 cents per lb in October 1998 to 24.62 cents in November (following the damage caused by ‘Hurricane Mitch’), but fell to 19.66 cents in December. The monthly average increased to 23.33 cents per lb in February 1999, but was reduced to only 17.02 cents in October. Banana prices rose sharply in early 2000, and the average for February was 24.63 cents per lb. According to the World Bank, the annual average price of bananas at US ports for 2000 was $424.0. Prices increased steadily throughout 2000 and into 2001—the average price for the latter year was $583.3, although the average for July-September of that year exceeded $650. Prices declined sharply thereafter, before recovering in 2002, the average price for the first seven months of that year being $553.0.
COMMODITY SURVEYS 55
Export Price Index for Bananas (base: 1980=100)
Barley
This annual cereal, of the genus Hordeum, is a member of the gramineae family. Varieties are distinguished by the arrangement of kernels on the plant. The two principal commercial forms are six-rowed barley (H. vulgare) and two-rowed barley (H. distichum). An irregular variety is also cultivated in Ethiopia. World-wide, barley is the fourth most-cultivated grain crop after wheat, rice and maize. In most of Europe, the USA and Canada, barley is generally sown in the spring. In the Mediterranean region, and in the southern USA, however, it is sown in the autumn. Barley is also grown as an annual winter crop in many areas. Barley is cultivated primarily for use as animal feed. As its protein content is superior to that of maize or sorghum, barley’s inclusion in feed compounds lessens the need for protein supplements. High-quality grain is used for malting (the controlled germination of cereals, and the arrest of this natural process through exposure to heat). Most of the malt produced from barley is used in the brewing industry. Germination capability is the key determinant of the grain’s suitability for malting, and modern brewing industries usually require this to be not less than 98%. Barley is a relatively minor source of flour for human consumption. (Barley flour is a by-product of pearling, the removal of the grain’s outer husk and part of its kernel.) However, its use for human consumption may be increased by research in progress in 2002, which seeks to identify ways in which the beneficial qualities of barley, such as its high fibre and antioxidant content, low fat content and lack of cholesterol, might be exploited to promote human health. Barley has been cultivated since ancient times and has been adapted to a wider range of climates than any other cereal, extending from subarctic to subtropical conditions. It does not, however, thrive where there is extreme heat and humidity. World barley production declined during the 1990s at an average annual rate of 3.6%, having increased sharply, by an average rate of 2.9% per year, in the 1970s, and steadily, by an average annual rate of 0.5%, during the 1980s. Average world production in 1990–99 was about 156m. metric tons per year, compared with about 147m. tons in 1970–79 and some 165m. tons in 1980–89. During the 1990s, with the exceptions of South America and Oceania, the decline in barley production was world-wide, but was especially marked in the countries of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, owing to adverse weather conditions, combined with political upheaval and its economic consequences. Like that of other cereals, notably wheat, the production of barley may vary considerably from year to year. Part of the variation is attributed to weather conditions. Drought, for example, occasionally decimates North African output.
COMMODITY SURVEYS 57
Production of Barley (’000 metric tons)
* Estimated production. † Unofficial figure. Source: FAO.
National producer-support policies are also a major influence. In the 1990s and early 2000s several major barley-producing countries, including leading exporters, pursued policies of market deregulation, prompting growers to substitute competing coarse grains, oilseeds or other protein crops for barley in years when their economic prospects appear more favourable. The most significant example of such deregulation has been the European Union’s (EU) ongoing adjustment of support arrangements for cereals, which is forecast, in the near term, to permit an expansion in member states’ production by increasing the price competitiveness of EU cereal crops on world markets. According to the FAO, world barley production totalled 141m. tons in 2001, compared with 135m. tons in 2000 and 128m. tons in 1999. These totals are similar to those corresponding to years in the early 1970s. In recent years the EU has dominated world barley production. In 2001 production of barley in the EU totalled 48.4m. metric tons (equivalent to 34.2% of total world output), compared with 51.5m. tons in 2000 (38.1%) in 2000 and 48.6m. tons (37.9%) in 1999. Among the EU member states, the principal producer is Germany, which harvested 13.6m. tons of barley in 2001, compared with 12.2m. tons in 2000 and 13.3m. tons in 1999. The domestic brewing industry is the primary destination for German production. France, generally the largest European producer until the mid-1970s when it was surpassed by Germany, is now generally the second largest producer in the EU, although in a number of years in the 1990s and in 2000 its production was exceeded by that of Spain (see below). French production was 9.8m. tons in 2001, compared with 9.7m. tons in 2000 and 9.4m. tons in 1999. Spanish barley harvests fluctuate more widely than that in most other major
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European countries (for example, the country produced in 1996 more than double its 1995 output), owing, in part, to the warmer climate and the vulnerability to drought. Spain’s 2001 production totalled 6.2m. tons, compared with 11.3m. tons in 2000 and 7.4m. tons in 1999. Barley production in the United Kingdom has declined since its peak of the early 1980s—until that point its harvests sometimes exceeded those of France. British production of barley in 2001 was 6.7m. tons (greater than that of Spain, in fact), compared with 6.5m. tons in 2000 and 6.6m. tons in 1999. The crop is grown in all 15 EU member states, the other most significant producer being Denmark (an estimated 4.1m. tons in 2001, broadly in line with previous years’ totals). The countries of the former Soviet Union ranked second in world barley production in 2001, with output amounting to 36.4m. tons, or 25.8% of the world total, a considerable increase from the 2000 figure of 26.4m. tons (19.8%, itself a marked increase on the 1999 figure). Within this group, production was dominated by Russia, which harvested 19.5m. tons in 2001, compared with 14.1m. tons in 2000 and 10.6m. tons in 1999. Ukraine also showed a marked increase in production in 2001, to 10.2m. tons, compared with 6.9m. tons in 2000 and 6.4m. tons in 1999…The other principal regional producers were Kazakhstan, Belarus and Lithuania. North America was the world’s third largest regional producer of barley in 2001, contributing 16.8m. tons, or 11.9%, to total world production. In the late 1990s, and early 2000s, Canadian production has tended to be about double that of the USA, where the climate is warmer and, hence, better suited to other cereals, most notably maize. In 2001 Canada produced 11.4m. tons of barley, compared with 13.5m. tons in 2000 and 13.2m. tons in 1999. US output was 5.4m. tons in 2001, 6.9m. tons in 2000 and 6.1m. tons in 1999. Other significant producing areas are the Middle East, where Turkey contributed an estimated 6.6m. metric tons of the region’s total output of 9.3m. tons in 2001; and Oceania, where Australia contributed nearly.all the 7.8m. tons produced in 2001. China is the principal producer in the Far East, with output amounting to 3.4m. tons in 2000. As noted above, North African production may fluctuate considerably from year to year in response to the level of rainfall. In 2000, for instance, Morocco, the largest producer in the region, produced only 466,000 metric tons, compared with 1.5m. tons in 1999 and 1.1m. tons in 2001. A similar pattern was observed in the other significant growers in the region, Algeria and Tunisia. Ethiopia is by far the largest producer in sub-Saharan Africa, with 2001 output estimated to equal the 2000 level of 1.1m. tons. Barley is far less important than wheat or maize in international trade. In 1990–99 the amount exported ranged between 18m. metric tons (1993) and 24m. tons (1992), averaging 21.2m. tons per year. In comparison, the amount of barley exported in 1970–79 averaged 12.7m. tons annually, and that exported in 1980–89 20.7m. tons. Exports of barley flour and grits and of pearled barley may vary enormously from year to year; they are of negligible significance in international trade. Exports of barley malt, however, are of considerable and steadily increasing importance. In 1990–99 exports of barley malt increased by an annual average of 3.3%, compared with average annual growth of 9.0% in 1970–79 and 3.0% in 1980–89.
COMMODITY SURVEYS 59
In 2001 world barley exports amounted to almost 24m. metric tons. The main exporters in that year were the EU, which accounted for 63% of the total, Australia (12.5%), Canada (7.5%) and the USA (4.6%). Intermittently, Russia, Ukraine and Turkey are also major exporters. Saudi Arabia is consistently and by far the largest individual importer of barley, accounting, on average, for about 21 % of the total market in each year in 1990–99. In 2000 Saudi Arabian imports represented about 22% of the total world-wide. Chinese imports increased steadily during the 1990s and in 2000 amounted to 2.1m. tons, or about 10% of the total quantity of barley imported in that year. Japanese imports averaged 1.6m. tons during the 1990s, and in 2000 totalled 1.7m. tons, 8.0% of the world total. North African imports (Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia exclusively) may be subject to considerable fluctuation from year to year, but in some years are very substantial. In 2000 they totalled 1. 8m. tons, 8.5% of the total imported world-wide. Despite its status as the leading producer and exporter of barley, the EU is also a major importer. In 2000 EU imports amounted to 4. 2m. tons, almost 20% of the total. Exports of barley malt totalled 5.2m. metric tons in 2000. In that year the EU was the leading exporter, accounting for almost 62% of the total, followed by Canada and Australia, which each accounted for a little less than 10% of the total. Canada has consistently exported more barley malt than Australia since 1995. Japan was the leading individual market for barley malt in 2000, importing 15.7% of the total. Thailand and the Republic of Korea are also important markets for barley malt, although far smaller than their Japanese counterpart. The Chinese market is far smaller still, although it grew significantly during the 1990s. In regional terms, and overall, South America was the leading importer of barley malt in 2000, with purchases amounting to almost 1m. tons, about 20% of the total. Brazil is by far the biggest market for barley malt in South America, accounting for almost 64% of the region’s imports in 2000. The EU was the second largest market for barley malt in 2000, accounting for about 16% of total imports. Trade in feed barley has been propelled in recent decades by rising meat consumption in Asia, the Middle East, North Africa and South America. Imports of barley—and, indeed, all feed grains—by countries in those regions have risen in line with the development of meat production there. This trend is forecast to continue as the diets of those countries become increasingly protein-based. Barley is the principal grain fed to livestock in Saudi Arabia and, traditionally, in North Africa too. However, its use does vary, depending on the relationship between its price and those of competing feed grains, such as maize and sorghum. The use of barley as a feed grain has declined somewhat in North Africa in recent years, owing to poor crops. Indeed, in the mid-1990s maize overtook barley as the main feed grain imported into North Africa, although this was partly the result of increased poultry production. Nevertheless, the countries of the Middle East and North Africa are expected to continue to constitute the world’s most important feed barley market in the medium term. Exploiting its geographical advantage, the EU has been the dominant supplier of feed barley to North Africa and Saudi Arabia, and, for that matter, to the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Australia has also had some success in marketing feed barley in the Middle East. Exports of barley by Canada have tended to be to markets where it, too, has a natural geographical advantage. Canada has lost considerable market share in Asia as a result
60 AGRICULTURAL AND MINERAL COMMODITIES YEAR BOOK
of competition from Australia and, to a lesser extent, the USA and the EU. While most of the barley it produces is of malting quality, US exports are primarily of feed barley. The other factor that has driven trade in barley in recent years has been increased demand by brewing industries for high quality grain for malting. For instance, about one-third of Australian barley produced is now marketed as malting barley. Chinese demand has been a considerable fillip to Australia’s export trade, and in some years China’s imports of barley from Australia have consisted entirely of malting quality grain. The prospects for Australia’s export trade appear favourable if, as expected, the growth in the Chinese brewing industry is repeated in other developing countries. Overall, as with feed barley, the supply of malting barley to the world market is dominated by the EU. Owing to its dominance in both the production of and trade in barley, the EU has been able to exert the strongest influence on the international price of the grain. The EU’s long-term policy of effectively using exports to manage the supply and demand of barley (and other grains) within its own borders provoked strong criticism, especially in the USA. The policy of subsidizing exports in order to reduce internal surpluses was most controversial, especially as in some years the level of subsidy could be higher than the price of the grain itself. Since 1993, however, as a result of budgetary constraint and international pressure, the EU has implemented a major reform of its Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), causing the internal price of barley (and other grains) to fall sharply, in line with the rest of the world, thus reducing the need for subsidization in order to compete on world markets. Reform of the CAP has aimed to expand internal use by reducing prices, in order to lessen imports of substitute feed grains. The effect of further reform of EU agricultural policy, undertaken under the ‘Agenda 2000’ programme, is expected to be the elimination of the need for export subsidies, enabling the EU to comply with World Trade Organization constraints on the subsidization of exports. EU agricultural policy reform has been assisted by the unforeseen substantial decline in the value of the euro against the US dollar, which, in combination with stronger world prices, has reduced the need for subsidies in order to make EU grains competitive. In early 2002 the EU was reportedly importing large quantities of competitively priced barley from the Black Sea region, as well as other feed grains, owing to a combination of high domestic prices after a substantially reduced crop, strong demand and zero import duties. The wide range of barley varieties and grades, the subsidies granted in certain markets and the effects of pooling combine to make general international price information on barley difficult to express accurately. Malting barley generally attracts a premium over feed barley, although again, the amount of this premium varies according to the market and the variety. Prices generally rose in late 2001 and early 2002 as adverse climatic conditions in many growing areas affected production. As a specimen, the average price of Pacific Northwest feed barley (f.o.b. at US ports) in January 2001 was US $125 per metric ton. This price decreased steadily during the year, falling to $95 in August, before increasing thereafter owing to increased import demand from East Asia, ending the year at $115. The price declined slightly from the second quarter of 2002, before increasing rapidly in August, as news of poor weather and flooding in Europe heightened demand.
COMMODITY SURVEYS 61
Export Price Index for Barley (base: 1980=100)
Cassava
Cassava (Manihot esculenta) is a perennial woody shrub, also known as Manioc, Tapioca or Yuca, up to 5 m in height, which is cultivated mainly for its enlarged, starch-rich roots, although the young shoots and leaves of the plant are also edible. The plant can be harvested at any time from seven months to three years after planting. A native of Central and South America, cassava is now one of the most important food plants in all parts of the tropics (except at the highest altitudes), having a wide range of adaptation for rainfall (500–8,000 mm per year). Cassava is also well adapted to low-fertility soils, and grows where other crops will not. It is produced mainly on marginal agricultural land, with virtually no input of fertilizers, fungicides or insecticides. It is little grown outside tropical regions. The varieties of the plant fall into two broad groups, bitter and sweet cassava, formerly classed as two separate species, M. utilissima and M. dulcis or aipi. The roots of the sweet variety are usually boiled and then eaten. The roots of the bitter variety are either soaked, pounded and fermented to make a paste (such as ‘fufu’ in West Africa), or dried, as in the case of ‘gaplek’ in Indonesia, or given an additional roasting to produce ‘gari’. They can also be made into flour and starch, or dried and pelletized as animal feed. In Indonesia a highfructose syrup is being produced from cassava starch in order to reduce sugar imports. The cassava plant contains two toxic substances, linamarin and lotaustralin, in its edible roots and leaves, which release the poison cyanide, or hydrocyanic acid, when plant tissues are damaged. Sweet varieties of cassava produce as little as 20 mg of acid per kg of fresh roots, whereas bitter varieties may produce more than 1,000 mg per kg. Although traditional methods of food preparation are effective in reducing cyanogenic content to harmless levels, if roots of bitter varieties are under-processed and the diet lacks protein and iodine (as occurs during famines and wars), cyanide poisoning can cause fatalities. Despite the disadvantages of the two toxins, some farmers prefer to cultivate the bitter varieties, possibly because the cyanide helps to protect the plant from potential pests, and possibly because the texture of certain food products made from bitter varieties is preferred to that of sweet cassavas. Cassava is the most productive source of carbohydrates and produces more calories per unit of land than any single cereal crop. Cassava is a staple source of carbohydrates and forms an essential part of the diet throughout tropical areas. Although the nutrient content of the roots consists almost entirely of starch, the leaves are high in vitamins, minerals and protein, and are a popular foodstuff in certain areas, particularly Africa, where they are known as ‘saka saka’. A plot of cassava may be left unattended in the ground for two years
COMMODITY SURVEYS 63
Production of Cassava (’000 metric tons)
* FAO estimate (s). Source: FAO.
after maturity without deterioration of the roots and the plant is resistant to prolonged drought, so the crop is valued as a famine reserve. The roots are highly perishable after harvest and, if not consumed immediately, must be processed (flour, starch, pellets, etc.). While the area under cassava has expanded considerably in recent years, there is increasing concern that the rapid expansion of cassava root planting may threaten the fertility of the soil and subsequently other crops. Under cropping systems where no fertilizer is used, cassava is the last crop in the succession because of its particular adaptability to infertile soils and its high nutrient use-efficiency in yield terms (although there is now evidence to suggest that cassava yields increase with the use of fertilizer). With the exception of potassium, cassava produces more dry matter with fewer nutrients than most other food crops. Soil fertility is not threatened by cassava itself, but rather by the cultivation systems which employ it without fertilizer use. In recent years there has been interest in the utilization of cassava as an industrial raw material as well as a food crop. Cassava has the potential to become a basic energy source for ethyl alcohol (ethanol), a substitute for petroleum. ‘Alcogas’ (a blend of cassava alcohol and petrol) can be mixed with petrol to provide motor fuel, while the high-protein residue from its production can be used for animal feed. The possibility of utilizing cassava leaves and stems (which represent about 50% of the plant and are normally discarded as cattle-feed concentrates) has also been receiving scientific attention. As a staple source of carbohydrates in the tropics, cassava is an essential part of the diet of about 300m. people. It is cultivated on almost 9m. ha in Africa and provides more than onehalf of the caloric requirements of about 200m. people in the continent. The area in Africa
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planted to cassava amounts to considerably more than one-half of the world total, and Africa’s output accounts for more than 50% of world production. Most of the African crop is produced by subsistence farmers and traded domestically; only a small amount enters world trade. Since the early 1970s African cassava production has been seriously undermined by mealybug infestation. Indigenous to South America, the mealybug (Phenacoccus manihoti) encountered few natural enemies in Africa, and by 1990 had infected all African cassavagrowing areas, with the exceptions of Uganda and Madagascar. In 1981 the parasitic wasp Epidinocarsis lopezi was introduced into Nigeria from Paraguay to attack the mealybug, and by 1990 E. lopezi was successfully established in 25 African countries. The green spider mite (Mononychellus tanajoa), another threat to cassava cultivation, is also being successfully combated by the introduction of a natural enemy, the phytoseiid mite (Typhlodromalus aripo), which by 1997 had established a presence over 400,000 sq km in west Africa, and in 1999 was reported to have reduced the presence of the green spider mite by up to 70% in some regions. In that year the only countries remaining to be included in the programme were Angola and Liberia. Funding was being sought to extend the range of these operations into other cassava-producing regions of Africa. Another threat is African cassava leaf mosaic disease, which, like the green spider mite, deprives the plant of chlorophyll and results in low yields. A new variety of cassava, reported to be resistant to this disease, was introduced in Uganda in 1997, with the aim of restoring production in the 60,000 ha lost annually to this blight. In addition, the development of high-yielding varieties (HYV) under the aegis of the International Institute of Tropical Agriculture was being successfully conducted in Nigeria during the late 1990s. The cultivation of a new HYV, also possessing resistance to pest damage, was reported to be proceeding successfully in Ghana in 1998. Thailand is the world’s leading exporter of processed cassava products, accounting, for instance, for more than 90% of world trade in cassava starch in 2000, and for more than 40% of trade in cassava tapioca. The main importers of these products, mostly in the form of pellets, are the Netherlands, France, Belgium and Germany, where cassava is sold as starch or used in the preparation of animal feed, providing a cheap substitute for cereals. It is a cheap energy source and, when combined with a protein source, makes a suitable substitute for cereals such as barley and maize. As, owing to its Common Agricultural Policy, cereal prices have risen within the European Community (EC, now the European Union—EU), the search for cheaper alternatives and the fact that cassava is not subject to the variable levy has led to an increase in imports of feed-grade cassava (mostly tapioca pellets from Thailand). Following protests from cereal producers (notably in France), the EC decided in 1979 to eliminate subsidies on compound animal feed, with the aim of reducing the use of cassava-based products. Thailand subsequently agreed to adopt voluntary export quotas for its tapioca products to EC countries. However, during the mid-1990s Thailand’s cassava exports to the EU declined, largely as a result of adverse weather conditions and lower yields. Since 1994 the government of Thailand has been offering cassava growers incentives to plant alternative crops. In 2001, according to preliminary estimates by the FAO, international trade in cassava products (dry weight) increased by 6%, compared with the previous year, to 7.3m. metric tons. Although demand from the EU was reported to have fallen as a consequence of a reduction in pig herds in the Netherlands and
COMMODITY SURVEYS 65
Spain, the decline was made good by increased demand from the Far East, in particular from the People’s Republic of China. Thai exports of cassava products were forecast to rise to 7. 0m. tons (dry weight of chips or pellets) in 2001, an increase of 7.7% compared with their estimated total in 2000. In late 2001 the FAO assessed the prospects for international trade in cassava in 2002 as dependent on the interplay between possible stronger prices for cereals within the EU, which would tend to increase demand for cassava, and possible continued reductions in EU member states’ pig herds, which would have the opposite effect. Demand from China, another major determinant of trade prospects, remained difficult to predict. Within South-East Asia demand increased during the 1990s for dried starch derived from cassava for use in the production of textiles and paper, and by manufacturers of processed foods. Viet Nam, with a total area under cassava of 283,000 ha, has obtained private Taiwanese and Japanese investment in the construction of a substantial facility for cassavaprocessing at Dong Nai. In regional terms, Latin America is the third largest producer of cassava, accounting for 18.2% of estimated world output in 2001. Brazil is by far the major producer, with estimated output of 24.1m. metric tons in 2001, compared with 23.3m. tons in 2000, and 20.9m. tons in 1999. Brazilian production has expanded in recent years in response to stronger prices, as has that of Colombia. In 2001 Colombian output was estimated at almost 2m. tons, compared with 1.8m. tons in 2000 and 1999, and 1.6m. tons in 1998. Paraguay is the second largest regional producer of cassava after Brazil, with estimated output of 3.9m. tons in 2001, compared with 2.7m. tons in 2000, and 3.7m. tons in 1999. None of the Latin American producers of cassava are significant exporters of the commodity. During 1993 the average monthly import price of hard cassava pellets at the port of Rotterdam, in the Netherlands, declined from US $160 per metric ton in January to $120 per ton in November. The annual average was $137 per ton, compared with $183 in 1992. Prices continued downward in later years, and fell very sharply in 1997. In 1999 the average import price of hard cassava pellets at Rotterdam was $102 per ton. A further sharp decline was experienced in 2000, in which year the average price was $84 per ton, and in the first eight months of 2001 the average price fell to $81 per ton. A steady recovery began thereafter, and by August 2002 the pellet price at Rotterdam had increased to $97 per ton. In January-August 1999 the average international price of cassava starches and flours was $176 per ton (the lowest price since 1988), compared with an average price of $305 per ton in the corresponding period of 1998. This price declined further throughout 2000, to an annual average of $158 per ton, although a recovery in January-March 2001 restored prices to the previous year’s average in that period. Export Price Index for Cassava (base: 1980=100)
* The monthly index remained constant at 36 throughout 1999–2001
66
Chromium
Chromium, historically used as an alloying element, is a hard, lustrous metal, the name of which derives from the Greek kroma (colour). It is only obtained from Chromite (the name applied both to the metal-bearing mineral and to the ore containing that mineral—the terms chromite ore, chromium ore and chrome ore are used interchangeably). Chromite is used by the metallurgical, chemical and refractory industries. About 85% of total demand for chromite is from the metallurgical industry, 8% from the chemical industry and 7% from the refractory and foundry industries. For the metallurgical industry, most chromite ore is smelted in an electric arc furnace to produce ferrochromium. Within the metallurgical industry the major use of chromium is as an essential alloying element in stainless steel, which is valued for its toughness and resistance to most forms of corrosion. Chromium chemicals are used for wood preservation, dyeing, and tanning. Chrome plating is a popular way of enhancing the appearance of motor vehicles, kitchen appliances, etc. World reserves of chromite ore were estimated by the US Geological Survey (USGS) to total about 3,600m. metric tons in 2001. More than 80% of known reserves are in South Africa, with a further 4% located in Zimbabwe and about 9% in Kazakhstan. South Africa produced almost 44% of estimated world chromite ore supplies in 2001, and is also the world’s dominant ferrochromium producer, accounting for about 43% of estimated world ferrochromium requirements in 2000. In that year Zimbabwe accounted for about 5%. South African charge-grade, high-carbon ferrochromium (which has a chromium content of 52%–55%) has been replacing the more expensive high- and low-carbon ferrochromium (which have a chromium content of 60%–70%) since the development, during the years 1965–75, of the Argon Oxygen Decarbonizing Process, which permits the widespread use of less costly charge-grade, high-carbon ferrochromium. South Africa’s ferrochromium sector has also benefited from its access to inexpensive supplies of electrical power, and to low labour costs. Strong demand for ferrochromium in the late 1980s, together with conditions of undersupply, generated an expansion of capacity both in South Africa and Zimbabwe. However, the potentially damaging effects of international boycotts and trade bans, and of civil disturbances, on South Africa’s ferrochrome industry led, in the 1980s, to the development of new production capacity, generally close to ore deposits, in Brazil, Finland, Greece, India, Sweden and Turkey. After 1993, and the implementation of political change, South Africa acted to consolidate its pre-eminence in international ferrochromium markets. In 1996 plans were outlined for the construction of a charge chrome smelter, with an annual
68 AGRICULTURAL AND MINERAL COMMODITIES YEAR BOOK
Production of Chromium Ore (’000 metric tons, gross weight)
* Estimated production. Source: US Geological Survey.
capacity of 100,000 tons, principally for export to Japan and China, at the Dilokong mine in northern South Africa, which has an estimated output capacity of 480,000 metric tons per year. In 1997 it was forecast that South African ferrochromium could account for 60% of world supplies by 2005. As noted above, Kazakhstan is the location of very substantial deposits of chromite ore. The country is the leading producer of the commodity among the republics of the former Soviet Union, with output in 2001 estimated by the USGS to have totalled 2.3m. metric tons, compared with 2.6m. tons in 2000. Production of ferrochromium in 2000 was estimated to have amounted to 640,000 tons, equivalent to 12.5% of world output in that year, compared with abut 598,000 tons in 1999. Production of chromite ore in Kazakhstan is from the Donskoy complex in the Aqtobe (Aktyubinsk) region. In 1998 more than 50% of the ore mined was exported, while the remainder was processed into ferroalloys, also destined for export. Russia is the only other notable producer of chromite ore among the former Soviet republics, with estimated output of 100,000 tons in 2000. Russia’s production of ferrochromium in that year was estimated to have amounted to 274,000 tons in 2000, compared with 249,000 tons in 1999 and 203,000 tons in 1998. Russian production of ferrochromium has declined substantially since 1992, when it totalled 400,000 tons. In 1999 the Saranov complex was reportedly the exclusive source of Russian chromite ore. In the Far East, India is the leading producer of chromite ore, with estimated output of 1. 5m. tons in 2001, as in 2000. India’s reserves of chromite were assessed at 26m. tons in 2001, less than 1% of total reserves world-wide. Output of ferrochromium (including ferrochrome and charge chrome) in 2000 was estimated to have amounted to 352,000 tons, more than double the country’s output in 1990.
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The People’s Republic of China and Japan were reportedly the main destinations for Indian exports of chromite ore in 2000. Viet Nam’s reserves have been officially assessed at some 20m. metric tons of chromium oxide. Production of chromite ore on a large scale commenced in the second half of the 1990s, and totalled an estimated 55,000 tons in 2000, compared with about 48,000 tons in 1999. China (itself formerly a producer of some chromium ore, although production was reported to have ceased in the late 1990s) is the principal destination for exports, which are mainly in the form of chromite concentrate. The Philippines was formerly a major producer of chromite ore, with annual output that usually exceeded 500,000 tons until the end of the 1970s. Production has since fallen away very substantially, and totalled only an estimated 15,000 tons in 2000. Australian output of chromite ore was estimated to have totalled 130,000 metric tons in 2000, as in the two previous years. In Latin America Brazil is the most important producer of chromite. In 2000 output was estimated at 400,000 metric tons, compared with 420,000 tons in 1999, and about 300,000 tons in 1998. The state of Bahia is the location of mining and beneficiation operations. Brazilian output of ferrochromium (both high- and low-carbon) amounted to an estimated 91,000 tons in 2000. In the Caribbean Cuban production of chromite amounts, on average, to 40,000 tons annually. Turkey is the most significant producer of chromite ore in the Middle East, with estimated output of 500,000 metric tons in 2001, a considerable decline compared with 2000, when production totalled 1m. tons. Turkish production of ferrochromium totalled an estimated 110,000 tons in 2000. Neighbouring Iran is also a major producer of chromite, with production in excess of 300,000 tons in each of the years 1998–2000. Output of ferrochromium, currently about 14,000 tons annually, is to be boosted, it was announced in 2000, through the construction of two new ferrochrome complexes, each with annual capacity of 25,000 tons, and scheduled, initially, for completion in 2002. Finland is the pre-eminent European producer of chromite ore, with estimated output of 640,000 metric tons in 2000. Finnish production of ferrochromium reportedly totalled an estimated 260,600 tons in the same year. Although its production has declined very substantially since the early 1990s, Albania remains a significant producer, with output estimated at 70,000 tons in 2000, about the same level as in 1999, compared with more than 100,000 tons annually in each year during 1993–98. Albania aims to restore its chromite mining industry through the improvement, with the assistance of Turkish investment, of existing facilities at Kalimash, near Tirana, and through the construction of new mines in the north east of the country. Albanian output of ferrochromium was estimated at about 10,000 tons in 2000, compared with some 28,000 tons in 1999. Elsewhere in Europe chromite is mined on a small scale in Greece and Cyprus. World ferrochromium supplies have exceeded demand in each year since 1990. They were boosted in particular by investment in new ferrochromium projects that increased world capacity by about 15% in 1991–92. South Africa was prominent in this investment programme. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, significant quantities of chromium raw materials entered the world market, and the subsequent integration of former Eastern bloc ferrochromium production exacerbated the surplus in supply, leading to rationalization measures within the industry; in South Africa, the chromite ore and
70 AGRICULTURAL AND MINERAL COMMODITIES YEAR BOOK
Export Price Index for Chromium (base: 1980=100)
* The monthly index remained constant at 222 throughout 1999–2001.
ferrochromium sectors reduced their capacity by between 40%–50%. Market conditions began to improve, however, in 1994, as chromium supplies from Russia and Kazakhstan were reduced, while demand from Western stainless steel producers improved. This higher level of world demand was not sustained in 1996, with consequent reductions in ferrochromium prices. In 1997 and 1998 South Africa reinforced its pre-eminence in world chromite and ferrochromium markets. Prices of ferrochromium in early 1999 were between 32 and 37 US cents per lb: their lowest level since 1993. Oversupply of stainless steel in world markets generated supply surpluses of ferrochromium during most of 1999, although late in the year an improvement in price levels indicated a return to a balance of supply and demand; this recovery was sustained in 2000, the average price for that year being 41 cents per lb.
Coal
Coal is a mineral of organic origin, formed from the remains of vegetation over millions of years. There are several grades: anthracite, the hardest coal with the highest proportion of carbon, which burns smoke-free; bituminous and subbituminous coal, used for industrial power: some is made into coke when the volatile matter is driven off by heating; and lignite or brown coal, the lowest grade and nearest to the peat stage. Anthracite and bituminous coal are classed as ‘hard’ coal. Coal gas is made from brown coal, but is not widely used for energy except in the republics of the former Soviet Union. Geographically, coal is one of the most evenly distributed of the fossil fuels. Of estimated world proven reserves of 984,453m. metric tons at the end of 2001 (comprising 519,062m. tons of anthracite and bituminous coal and 465,391m. tons of sub-bituminous coal and lignite), about 30% were located in the Far East and Australasia, 26% in North America, 23% in the republics of the former Soviet Union and 13% in Europe. During the period 1976–2000, according to the World Coal Institute, annual world production of hard coal (excluding sub-bituminous coal and lignite) increased from 2,469m. tons to 3,639m. tons: a rise of more than 47%. High levels of output and demand were maintained during the 1990s, owing to the increasing use of coal world-wide as the primary fuel for electricity generation. In 1999 coal accounted for about 38% of this demand, which is expanding at an annual rate of about 3%. Environmentalists, however, have increasingly criticized the large-scale use of fossil fuels as a prime causative factor in ‘acid rain’ pollution and the warming of the global atmosphere by accretions of carbon gases. As the greater part of coal output is consumed within the producing country, only a relatively small proportion of coal production enters world trade. In 2000 an estimated 381m. tons of steam coal (for power generation) was traded internationally, together with about 192m. tons of coking coal (for use in metallurgical industries). About 90% of total world consumption of coal is both mined and used in the same producing countries, mainly the USA and China. In 2001 China was estimated to account for about one-quarter of both world coal production and world consumption. In 2001 coal was estimated to account for 40.6% of primary energy consumption in the Asia-Pacific region, compared with 39.7% in 2000. Among the countries with the highest levels of utilization of coal for electricity generation in 2000 were Australia (84%), the People’s Republic of China (an estimated 80%) and India (66%). The Asia-Pacific region was also the principal world consumer of coal, accounting for an estimated 52% of global demand in 2000.
72 AGRICULTURAL AND MINERAL COMMODITIES YEAR BOOK
Production of Hard Coal (million metric tons, excluding brown coal and lignite)
* Estimated production. † Data include sub-bituminous coal. ‡ Data refer to fiscal year 1998/99. Source: The Mining Journal Ltd.
With identified reserves of 114,500m. metric tons (including sub-bituminous coal and lignite) at the end of 2001, China is the world’s largest producer of hard coal. About 75% of these deposits are located in the north and north-west regions. Only about 7% of the country’s proven reserves of anthracite and bituminous coal can be surface-mined, however, and less than 50% of its mines are fully mechanized. Moreover, many of these employ outdated technology. In 1992 the Government began to implement a comprehensive restructuring of the coal industry, in which uneconomic mines were closed, the industry’s labour force was reduced from 3m. to 2.5m. by 1995, and controls on the selling prices of coal were abolished. The reorganization continued in the later 1990s, with many small and unprofitable coal-mines, including some operated by township enterprises, being forced to close. As a result, China’s annual production of coal (including brown coal) was reduced from 1,397m. tons in 1996 to 1,029m. tons in 1999. During the latter year about 31,000 small mines (some of them operating illegally) were closed, leaving fewer than 38,000 functioning at the end of 1999. The programme continued in 2000, with a further 18,900 coal-mines scheduled for closure. In May it was reported that the Chinese Government aimed to limit coal production to 870m. tons in 2000, with output restrictions imposed on large state-owned collieries as well as on small mines. In the event, production reportedly totalled 1,171m. tons. Meanwhile, China’s exports of coal (traditionally a very small proportion of the country’s output) were being promoted, reaching 55.1m. tons (48.2m. tons of steam coal and 6.9m. tons of coking coal) by the end of 2000. Australia is also an important coal producer, overtaking the USA in 1986 as the world’s leading coal exporter, and accounting in 2000 for about 25% of world trade in steam coal
COMMODITY SURVEYS 73
and more than 50% of world trade in coking coal. Although Australia possesses less than 10% of the world’s coal reserves, it has become a major exporter because of comparatively low domestic demand for coal (which supplies about 43% of domestic primary energy), and the mineral’s location in unpopulated areas, inexpensive to mine. More than one-half of Australia’s coal output is exported, about 40% of this to Japan, mainly for use in its steel industry. Coal is Australia’s principal export commodity, and coal exports were valued at $A 10,840m. (9.1 % of the country’s total export earnings) in the year to June 2001. In recent years Australian coal-exporting companies have been forced to accept lower prices in their negotiations with Japanese power utilities (for sales of steam coal) and steel-producers (for coking coal). For the year to March 2000 contract prices for steam coal were reduced by 13%, and those for coking coal by 18%. For the Japanese fiscal year (April-March) 2000/ 01 contract prices for steam coal were reduced by a further 4%, to US $28.75 per metric ton (f.o.b.); and contract prices for coking coal by a further 5%, to US $39.75 per ton (f.o.b.). For the Japanese fiscal year 2001/02, however, this downward trend was checked, with contract prices for steam coal rising by 20%, and those for high-quality coking coal by 7.5%. To increase the Australian industry’s competitiveness, mining companies have restructured their activities, reducing employment at Australian mines by almost 30% in the 24 months to June 1999, and raising productivity by about 40%. Profitability has been boosted by a decline in the value of the Australian dollar, and Australian coal exports have been forecast to increase by as much as 20% in 2000–05. Australia is involved with Japan in a joint project to establish two coal liquefaction plants. A promising future was foreseen for this process, with petroleum prices rising (as they were when the project was envisaged) and conventional reserves rapidly being depleted. India has the fourth largest coal reserves in the world, after the USA, China and Russia, but nevertheless requires some imports of coal to satisfy domestic requirements. Coal, of which India is, after China and the USA, the third largest consumer, is its prime source of commercial energy. In the mid-1990s there were 530 operating mines, of which 355 were underground. With the assistance of foreign technology and a programme of modernization, India significantly increased its coal production during the 1990s. Demand was forecast to rise from 311m. tons in 1997 to 396m. tons by 2001, of which power generation requirements were expected to account for more than 55%. Although significant coal reserves are known to exist in Pakistan, output of hard coal totalled only 3.5m. tons in 2000. In the late 1990s feasibility studies were under way to ascertain prospects for future expansion. In recent years Indonesia has emerged as a significant regional producer and exporter of coal, of which its total reserves were estimated at 5,370m. tons in 2001. These reserves are in part formed by a variety with an exceptionally low content of sulphur and ash, the causative factors in air pollution resulting from coal combustion. Output of this coal, which has attracted interest in the USA, Japan, Spain and the Scandinavian countries, totalled 2m. tons in 1991 and was forecast to rise to 8m. tons annually by the late 1990s. Total Indonesian coal production was forecast to reach a level of 120m. tons annually by 2002, as East Asian consumers reduced their reliance on exporters outside the region. In 2000 Indonesia was the world’s fourth largest exporter of steam coal (after Australia, South Africa and China), exporting more than 48m. tons in that year.
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The world’s leading coal importer is Japan, which is seeking to reduce its dependence on petroleum for energy. In 2001, however, coal accounted for only 20% of Japan’s total primary energy supply. The exploitation of Japan’s proven coal reserves, estimated to total only 773m. tons in December 2001, has proved too expensive for domestic supplies to be able to compete with much cheaper imported coal. The country’s coal industry has been in decline since the mid-1980s, with uneconomic mines closing, despite government provisions of subsidies and ‘guide-lines’ seeking to persuade the steel industry to purchase domestic coal at prices far above those on the international market. Viet Nam, with exploitable reserves of 165m. short tons of high-quality anthracite, emerged in the late 1990s as a leading world supplier of this coal, principally to the Japanese steel industry, which normally purchases between 40% and 45% of export supplies, which totalled 3.6m. metric tons in 1997 but declined to about 3m. tons in 1998, in response to decreased East Asian demand. In August 1999 the government-controlled coal-producing company, Vinacoal, was reported to have imposed severe restrictions on output, pending a fall in accrued coal stocks estimated at about 4m. tons. In regional terms, the proven reserves of coal of North America, at an estimated 257, 783m. metric tons at 31 December 2001, rank second to those of the Asia-Pacific region. The aforementioned total comprised 120,222m. tons of anthracite and bituminous coal, and 137,561m. tons of sub-bituminous coal and lignite. By far the greater part of these reserves (almost 97%) lay within the USA, while those of Canada and Mexico were estimated, respectively, at only 6,578m. tons and 1,211m. tons. In 2000 US production of hard coal (including sub-bituminous coal) totalled an estimated 899.1m. tons, equivalent to about one-quarter of output world-wide, compared with 916m. tons in 1999. US production of brown coal was also estimated to have declined in 2000, and the USA thus recorded, for the first time in 40 years, a decline in overall production of coal for a second successive year. In 2000 US exports of steam coal totalled 24.6m. tons, while those of coking coal amounted to 28.4m tons. In 2001 coal provided about 25% of the USA’s total primary energy needs, and accounted in 2000 for about 56% of the country’s electricity generation. Production of hard coal by Canada in 2000 was estimated at 33.8m. tons, while that of Mexico amounted to an estimated 2.6m. tons. Canadian exports of steam coal totalled 4.6m. tons in 2000, while those of coking coal amounted to 27.2m. tons and were thus almost on a par with those of the USA. In 2001 coal supplied about 10% of Canada’s total primary energy requirements. At 31 December 2001 the proven reserves of coal of the former Soviet republics were estimated at 229,975m. metric tons, comprising 97,362m. tons of anthracite and bituminous coal, and 132,613m. tons of sub-bituminous coal and lignite. Coal was estimated to have supplied 19% of the total primary energy needs of the former Soviet republics in 2001. Of the total proven reserves, 157,010m. tons, or about 68%, were estimated to lie within Russia, comprising 49,088m. tons of anthracite and bituminous coal, and 107,922m. tons of sub-bituminous coal and lignite. Russian production of hard coal was estimated at 169.2m. tons in 2000, compared with 152.4m. tons in 1999. In 2000 exports of steam coal by Russia amounted to 27m. tons, while those of coking coal totalled 7.3m. tons. In 2001 Russia was estimated to have met some 18% of its total primary energy requirements from coal. After Russia, among the former Soviet republics, Ukraine possesses the largest proven reserves of coal, estimated at 34,153m. tons at 31 December 2001. Ukraine’s reserves comprised 16,
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274m. tons of anthracite and bituminous coal, and 17,879m. tons of sub-bituminous coal and lignite. In 2000 Ukraine produced an estimated 80.8m. tons of hard coal, compared with 81.2m. tons in 1999. In 2001 the country was estimated to have met almost 30 % of its total primary energy requirements from coal. At an estimated 34,000m. tons at the end of 2001, the proven reserves of coal of Kazakhstan, comprising 31,000m. tons of anthracite and bituminous coal, and 3,000m. tons of sub-bituminous coal and lignite, were almost equal to those of Ukraine. Output of hard coal by Kazakhstan in 2000 amounted to an estimated 71.1m. tons, compared with 56.6m. tons in 1999, while in 2001 the country met an estimated 57% of its primary energy requirements from coal, the highest rate of dependence of any of the former Soviet republics. At the end of 2001 the proven reserves of coal of Europe (including Turkey) were estimated at 125,395m. metric tons, comprising 47,512m. tons of anthracite and bituminous coal, and 77,883m. tons of sub-bituminous coal and lignite. In Western Europe, Germany’s proven reserves of coal were estimated at 66,000m. tons, comprising 23,000m. tons of anthracite and bituminous coal, and 43,000m. tons of sub-bituminous coal and lignite. German production of hard coal in 2000 was estimated at 37.4m. tons, compared with 43. 8m. tons in 1999. In 2000, with estimated production of some 180m. tons, Germany was the world’s leading producer of brown coal (used primarily for electricity generation), and in that year Germany relied on coal to generate 51% of its electricity, compared with an average rate of utilization for that purpose of 25% among the EU member states in 1999. In 2001 Germany was estimated to have met about 25% of its total primary energy needs from coal. Elsewhere in Western Europe, proven reserves of coal constitute a relatively small resource. Those of Greece were estimated to total 2,874m. tons at 31 December 2001, while those of the United Kingdom were estimated at 1,500m. tons. The proven reserves of Spain and France, meanwhile, were estimated, respectively, at 660m. tons and 36m. tons. In 2000 imports of steam coal by the EU member states were estimated at 122m. tons, while the corresponding figure for coking coal was 45m. tons. The United Kingdom’s imports of steam coal were estimated to have totalled 15m. tons in 2000, complemented by imports of 8.5m. tons of coking coal. Among the EU member states, in addition to Germany, Greece (69%), Denmark (52%) and the Netherlands (42%) all relied to a high degree on coal for electricity generation in 2000. In 2001 Greece was estimated to have met more than 30% of its total primary energy requirements from coal. In Central Europe, Poland’s proven reserves of coal were estimated at 22,160m. metric tons at the end of 2001, comprising 20,300 tons of anthracite and bituminous coal, and 1, 860m. tons of sub-bituminous coal and lignite. The country’s production of hard coal was estimated 102.2m. tons in 2000, compared with 110.2m. tons in 1999. Poland’s exports of steam coal totalled 18m. tons in 2000, while foreign sales of coking coal in the same year amounted to 5.8m. tons. In 1999 exports of coal, coke and briquettes contributed 3.6% of Poland’s total export earnings. The proven reserves of coal of the Czech Republic were estimated at 5,678m. tons at 31 December 2001, comprising 2,114m. tons of anthracite and bituminous coal, and 3,564m. tons of sub-bituminous coal and lignite. Production of hard coal was estimated to have amounted to 14.9m. tons in 2000, compared with 14.3m. tons in 1999, and 16.1m. tons in 1998. In 2000 the Czech Republic depended on coal for the generation of 71% of its electricity, and, in 2001, was estimated to have met about 51% of
76 AGRICULTURAL AND MINERAL COMMODITIES YEAR BOOK
its total primary energy requirements from coal. Bulgaria’s proven reserves of coal were estimated at 2,711m. tons at the end of 2001, comprising 13m. tons of anthracite and bituminous coal, and 2,698m. tons of sub-bituminous coal and lignite. Estimated output of hard coal in 2000 was no greater than 100,000 tons. Bulgaria was nevertheless estimated to have derived about one-third of its primary energy from coal in 2001. Elsewhere in Europe, the proven reserves of coal of Romania and Hungary were estimated, respectively, at 1, 457m. tons and 1,097m. tons at the end of 2001. Hungary’s reserves consisted exclusively of sub-bituminous coal and lignite, while those of Romania included just 1m. ton of anthracite and bituminous coal. Romania was estimated to have produced 1.3m. tons of hard coal in 2000, and to have derived about one-fifth of its primary energy from coal in 2001. Hungary, meanwhile, met an estimated 13 % of its primary energy requirements from coal in 2001. At the end of 2001 Turkey was estimated to possess proven reserves of coal totalling 3, 698m. metric tons, of which 278m. tons were anthracite or bituminous coal. In 2000 Turkish production of hard coal was estimated at 2.3m. tons. In 2001 Turkey was estimated to have met about 30% of its primary energy requirements from coal. At 31 December 2001 the proven reserves of coal of South and Central America were estimated at 21,752m. metric tons, comprising 7,738m. tons of anthracite and bituminous coal, and 14,014m. tons of sub-bituminous coal and lignite. Brazil’s proven reserves of coal, estimated at 11,929m. tons, and consisting exclusively of sub-bituminous coal and lignite, were the largest in the region. In 2000 Brazilian output of hard coal was estimated at 5.6m. tons, approximately the same as in the two preceding years. In 2001 Brazil was estimated to have met about 8% of its primary energy requirements from coal. Colombia’s proven reserves of coal were estimated at 6,648m. tons at the end of 2001, of which 6,267m. tons consisted of anthracite or bituminous coal. The country’s output of hard coal was estimated at 37.1m. tons in 2000, compared with 32.7m. tons in 1999. In 2000 exports of Colombian coal, which is used for pulverized coal injection, comprised 34m. tons of steam coal and 500, 000 tons of coking coal, and contributed 6.1% of the country’s total export earnings. In 2001 Colombia was estimated to have met about 10% of its primary energy needs from coal. Venezuela’s proven reserves of coal, comprising exclusively anthracite and bituminous coal, were estimated at 479m. tons at 31 December 2001. The country’s output of hard coal in 2000 was estimated at 8.9m. tons. Elsewhere in South America, Chile is a significant consumer of coal, meeting an estimated 16% of its primary energy requirements from coal in 2001. The proven reserves of coal of Africa were estimated to total 55,367m. metric tons at the end of 2001, and included 55,171m. tons of anthracite and bituminous coal, some 90% of which (49,520m. tons) were located in South Africa. Production of hard coal by South Africa was estimated to have totalled 225.3m. tons in 2000, the country thus ranking as the fourth largest producer in the world in that year. South African exports of steam coal amounted to 67.5m. tons in 2000, while those of coking coal totalled 2.5m. tons. South Africa was thus the world’s second largest exporter of steam coal in 2000, after Australia. In 1999 exports of coal, lignite and peat accounted for 6% of South Africa’s total export earnings. Some 90% of South Africa’s electricity was generated using coal in 2000, the highest rate of dependence in the world, while in 2001 the country was estimated to have met 75% of its
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Export Price Index for Coal (base: 1980=100)
primary energy needs from coal. The proven reserves of coal of Zimbabwe were estimated at 502m. tons of anthracite and bituminous coal at the end of 2001. Zimbabwe’s output of hard coal totalled an estimated 4.2m. tons in 2000. The proven reserves of coal of the Middle East (excluding Turkey) were estimated at 1, 710m. metric tons at the end of 2001, and consisted exclusively of anthracite and bituminous coal. Iran is the only significant regional producer of hard coal, with estimated output of 1. 2m. tons in 2000. The index of export prices for coal averaged 75 in February 2001. Australia’s exports of coal (including briquettes) had an average value of US $37.35 per metric ton in 1994, rising to $40.08 per ton in 1995. The average price per ton was $43.14 in 1996, but declined to $41.42 in 1997 and to $37.04 in 1998. During the first three months of 1999 Australia’s coal exports earned an average of only $34.68 per ton, and prices subsequently fell further. Most Australian coal shipments are delivered to overseas buyers under long-term contracts at negotiated prices, but in 1999 international coal prices on the ‘spot’ market (for prompt delivery) were at their lowest levels for more than 20 years. In September hard coking coal was being traded in Asia at about US $32 per ton. International ‘spot’ prices remained depressed throughout most of 2000, but, from the beginning of the final quarter of that year, began to rise dramatically in response to increased demand for US thermal coal from US electricity generators. By mid-2001 ‘spot’ prices of US coal were reported to have doubled—in some cases trebled—since late 2000. By mid-2001, as a result of the weakness of the Australian dollar, coal prices expressed in terms of the Australian dollar were almost 80% higher than at the beginning of 2000.
Cobalt
Cobalt is a hard, brittle metal, with a number of industrial uses. Prior to the 20th century it was chiefly used in salt form as a blue pigment for glass and ceramics. Cobalt is usually mined as a by-product of another metal, principally copper, although nickel-copper-cobalt ores are common and, in South Africa, some platinum ores yield cobalt. It is rarely mined as the primary product of an ore, and is found in very weak concentration, generally 0.1%–0. 5%. The ore must be crushed and ground after mining and subjected to a flotation process to obtain the concentrate. In the mid-1990s it was forecast that a new method of extraction, known as pressure acid leaching, would substantially increase the rate of recovery of cobalt as a by-product when laterite nickel ore is treated. In the early 2000s, however, this process was still not widely applied. About 35% of all cobalt produced is used in metallic form as superalloys (in gas turbine aircraft engines, for example), hardfacing and stellite. Approximately 34% is applied to chemical uses in such industries as glass manufacture, paints and inks, rechargeable batteries and, increasingly, as catalysts in the processing of oil and petroleum feed stocks and synthetic materials. A further 10% is used in the manufacture of ceramics, 11% in magnetic alloys and 10% in the fabrication of hard metals. The USA is the world’s principal consumer of cobalt. The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) possesses almost one-half of the world’s identified cobalt reserves. These reserves also have the highest grade of the metal, with up to six metric tons of cobalt produced with every 100 tons of copper. The mining, marketing and export of cobalt from the DRC is conducted by a state monopoly, La Générale des Carrières et des Mines (GÉCAMINES). From 1990, however, the country’s cobalt output was seriously disrupted by economic dislocation, caused by internal unrest, and by thefts of cobalt, which in some years were estimated to have resulted in the loss of 5%–25% of total output. Projects by GÉCAMINES to exploit new deposits and rehabilitate existing mines in partnership with Canadian, South African and other interests were initiated in the late 1990s, but continued political instability has meant that they have not all proceeded smoothly. An eventual restoration of internal order within the DRC could enable the country to re-establish cobalt output at the levels of the early 1980s, when annual exports were in the range of 14,000–16,000 tons. In 2000 the DRC was the world’s leading miner of cobalt, with production of 7,000 metric tons. Output was estimated to have been maintained at that level in 2001, when it was matched only by that of Zambia. (In 1992 the DRC (as Zaire) was overtaken by Zambia as the world’s leading cobalt producer, although
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Production of Cobalt Ore (cobalt content, metric tons)
* Estimated production. Source: US Geological Survey.
cobalt output in Canada advanced strongly during the 1990s and in 1993 exceeded that of Zambia.) In 1998 the DRC and Zambia jointly accounted for about 30% of world cobalt exports. Since the early 1980s Zambia has promoted the expansion of its cobalt production in an attempt to offset declines in the country’s copper output. In 2001 Zambia was, jointly with the DRC, the world’s leading producer of the commodity, with estimated output of 7,000 metric tons, compared with 4,600 tons in 2000, in which year the country’s Government completed the privatization of Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines Ltd (ZCCM), one of its principal producers of cobalt. In recent years Morocco, which reportedly produced 1,305 tons of cobalt in 2000, has tended to export concentrates to the People’s Republic of China. The construction of a second pre-treatment plant at Cobalt Métallurgie Bou Azzer’s (CMBA) refinery at Guemassa, near Marrakesh, in 1999 was expected to lead to a reduction in these exports as domestic output of refined cobalt increased. In the late 1990s two mining companies in South Africa were producing cobalt metal as a by-product of platinum production. South African production totalled an estimated 585 tons in 2000, compared with 450 tons in 1999. In 1992 the Ugandan government initiated a project to extract cobalt from stockpiles of cobaltiferous concentrate at the Kilembe copper mine, in south-western Uganda. An extraction plant is now operated at Kilembe by Kasese Cobalt Co Ltd (KCCL), a joint venture between state-owned Kilembe Mines Ltd and Canada’s Banff Resources Ltd. In 2000 Ugandan exports of cobalt totalled 395 tons, according to data cited by the US Geological Survey, earning some US $13m. More than 90% of the cobalt retrieved at Kilembe is exported. In 2000 production of cobalt by Botswana was reported to have totalled 319 tons, compared with 331 tons in 1999. In recent years Botswana has exported
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cobalt to Norway and Zimbabwe for refining. Zimbabwe itself produced an estimated 126 tons of cobalt in 2000. Following the identification of nickel-cobalt deposits in northwestern Tanzania in the early 1990s, the exploitation of cobalt reserves, estimated at about 20,000 tons, was expected to begin in the early 2000s. Reserves of cobalt identified in Côte d’Ivoire and Madagascar remained unexploited in 2000. With estimated output of 6,500 metric tons in 2001, compared with 5,600 tons in 2000, Australia was the world’s third largest producer of cobalt. Cobalt is mined as a co-product of nickel in Australia and output is rising as new mines in Western Australia approach their capacities. With estimated output of 1,100 tons in 2001, the French territory of New Caledonia (one of the earliest sites of cobalt exploitation) ranked as the world’s seventh largest producer of cobalt. Output is expected to be boosted, from about 2005, by Inco Ltd of Canada’s Goro Lateritic nickel-cobalt operation whose annual cobalt production may be as high as 5,000 tons. In 2000 the People’s Republic of China was estimated to have produced 200 tons of cobalt from deposits in Gansu and Jinchang. Although it has produced none in recent years, the Philippines possesses substantial reserves of cobalt. A project to construct a nickel smelter, in which Japan’s Sumitomo Metal Mining Co is a joint partner, and the proposed revival of the Nonoc nickel complex—shut down in 1986—with the aid of South African investment will, if successful, allow commercial production to resume before 2005. Both projects envisage the use of pressure acid leaching. As observed above, Canada emerged in the 1990s as a leading producer of cobalt and remained, in 2001, the world’s fourth largest source of the metal with estimated annual output of 5,000 metric tons. There has been an intensification of Canadian cobalt exploration in recent years in response to increased demand. Russia is the leading producer of cobalt among the former Soviet republics, and in 2001, with estimated output of 4,000 metric tons, ranked as the fifth largest producer in the world. Kazakhstan is the only other significant ex-Soviet producer, with estimated output of 300 tons in 2000. Cuba is by far the leading Latin American producer of cobalt, and in 2001, with estimated output of 2,600 metric tons, ranked as the sixth largest producer in the world. Elsewhere in Latin America, Brazil was estimated to have produced 900 tons of cobalt in 2000, compared with 700 tons in 1999, and 400 tons annually in 1996–98. Cobalt extraction in other regions of the world is negligible. Traditional cobalt-mining may eventually be challenged by the wide-scale retrieval of manganese nodules from the world’s seabeds. It is estimated that the cobalt content of each nodule is about 0.25%, although nodules recovered from the Pacific Ocean in 1983 had a cobalt content of 2.5%. Ferromanganese crusts, containing extractable cobalt, have been identified at relatively shallow depths within the USA’s exclusive economic zones, which extend 370 km (200 nautical miles) into US coastal waters. Research into the potential exploitation of cobalt-bearing nodules continued throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, some of the most valuable were considered to be those in the Pacific Ocean around the Cook Islands, where estimates of the cobalt resource were placed as high as 32m. metric tons. Nodules off Namibia were thought to have a lesser, though still significant, cobalt content. However, the full exploitation of seabed resources such as these is thought to lie decades, rather than years, in the future.
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The Cobalt Development Institute (CDI), founded in 1982, comprises 60 members from 18 countries, consisting of consumers, processors, merchants and the seven leading producers, including the DRC and Zambia. On the free market, the price of high-grade cobalt (minimum purity 99.8%) stood at more than US $14 per lb in early June 1993, but declined to $11.175 in November. Following reports of unrest in Zaire, the price of cobalt rose sharply in January 1994, reaching $22.75 per lb. After further fluctuations, the cobalt price increased to $28.125 per lb in October, but fell to $25.50 in December. Another strong advance in cobalt prices occurred in early 1995, with the quotation for high-grade metal reaching US $30.40 per lb in February. The price was reduced to $27.05 per lb in April, recovered to $29.30 in May, but declined to $27.05 again in July. It advanced to $32.875 per lb in January 1996, but fell to $20.625 in August. In September the cobalt price reached $23.40 per lb. In March 1997 the free-market price of high-grade cobalt declined to US $19 per lb, but in May, in response to the internal conflict in Zaire (now the DRC), it rose to $25.325. In June, following the establishment of the DRC, the price of cobalt eased to $22.50 per lb, although by December it had risen to $25.75. Cobalt prices subsequently declined, but the quotation for high-grade metal generally remained above $24 per lb until mid-1998. From June the price moved steadily downward, owing to increased availability and falls in demand, and in December it stood at only $12.10 per lb. Market sentiment was also affected by the continuation of regular sales of cobalt by the US government’s Defense Logistics Agency (DLA). According to the CDI, deliveries of refined cobalt from the DLA’s strategic stockpile in 1998 totalled 2,310 tons, accounting for 6.9% of the world’s available supplies (compared with 5.8% in 1997). The cobalt market slumped even further in January 1999, when, prior to another offering from the DLA, the price for high-grade metal declined to only US $8.40 per lb: its lowest level since the contract was introduced in June 1993. Following the announcement of proposed reductionsin Russia’s cobalt production, however, the metal’s price rapidly recovered, reaching $19.25 per lb in February 1999. Thecobalt price eased to $14.80 per lb in May, but advanced to $22.10 in June, following forecasts of declines in African production. The revival of the cobalt market was partly influenced by the conclusion, in January, of a three-year agreement granting a London-based trading company, MRG Cobalt Sales, exclusive rights to market GÉCAMINES’ output of cobalt world-wide. MRG had made a similar arrangement with ZCCM in October 1998, so the new agreement gave it control of about 30% of world cobalt supplies. In the second half of 1999, however, the free-market price of cobalt moved steadily downward, and in November the quotation for high-grade metal was $14.20 per lb. The price recovered to $15.05 per lb in December. Meanwhile, in August, an Australian mining company began marketing cobalt on the internet. Another internet site for selling cobalt was established later in the year by a London-based brokerage company. The price of high-grade cobalt rose to US $15.25 per lb in January 2000, but eased to $14.05 in February. It advanced to $16.975 per lb in early May, but slumped to $13.30 in July. The average annual ‘spot’ price for cobalt in 2000 was $15.16 per lb. Market oversupply and deteriorating economic conditions, most notably in aircraft manufacture, a major market
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for cobalt, contributed to further price falls in 2001. The average price per lb in December of that year, according to Metal Bulletin, was as low as $7.01. Prices declined further in 2002, barring a brief rally in May—the Metal Bulletin price fell below $7 in July.
Cocoa
The Cocoa tree (Theobroma cacao), up to 14 m tall, originated in the tropical forests of Central and South America. The first known cocoa plantations were in southern Mexico around AD 600. Cocoa first came to Europe in the 16th century. The Spanish and Portuguese introduced cocoa into Africa—on the islands of Fernando Póo (now Bioko), in Equatorial Guinea, and São Tomé and Principe—at the beginning of the 19th century. At the end of the century the tree was established on the African mainland, first in Ghana and then in other west African countries. Cocoa is now widely grown in the tropics, usually at altitudes less than 300 m above sealevel, where it needs a fairly high rainfall and good soil. The cocoa tree has a much shallower tap root than, for example, the coffee bush, making cocoa more vulnerable to dry weather. Cocoa trees can take up to four years from planting before producing sufficient fruit for harvesting. They may live to 80 years or more, although the fully productive period is usually about 20 years. The tree is highly vulnerable to pests and diseases, and it is also very sensitive to climatic changes. Its fruit is a large pod, about 15–25 cm in length, which at maturity is yellow in some varieties and red in others. The ripe pods are cut from the tree, where they grow directly out of the trunk and branches. When opened, cocoa pods disclose a mass of seeds (beans) surrounded by white mucilage. After harvesting, the beans and mucilage are scooped out and fermented. Fermentation lasts several days, allowing the flavour to develop. The mature fermented beans, dull red in colour, are then dried, ready to be bagged as raw cocoa, which may be further, processed or exported. Cultivated cocoa trees may be broadly divided into three groups. All West African cocoas belong to the Amazonian Forastero group, which now accounts for more than 80% of world cocoa production. It includes the Amelonado variety, suitable for chocolate manufacturing, grown in Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire and Nigeria. Criollo cocoa is not widely grown and is used only for luxury confectionery. The third group is Trinitario, which comprises about 15% of world output and is cultivated mainly in Central America and the northern regions of South America. Cocoa processing takes place mainly in importing countries, although processing capacity was established in West Africa during the 1960s and processed products now account for a significant part of the value of its cocoa exports. The processes include shelling, roasting and grinding the beans. Almost half of each bean after shelling consists of a fat called cocoa butter. In the manufacture of cocoa powder for use as a beverage, this fat is largely
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Production of Cocoa Beans (’000 metric tons)
* Unofficial figure. † FAO estimate. Source: FAO.
removed. Cocoa is a mildly stimulating drink, because of its caffeine content, and, unlike coffee and tea, is highly nutritional. The most important use of cocoa is in the manufacture of chocolate, of which it is the main ingredient. About 90% of all cocoa produced is used in chocolate-making, for which extra cocoa butter is added, as well as other substances such as sugar—and milk in the case of milk chocolate. Proposals that were initially announced in December 1993 (and subsequently amended in November 1997) by the consumer countries of the European Union (EU), permitting chocolate manufacturers in member states to add as much as 5% vegetable fats to cocoa solids and cocoa fats in the manufacture of chocolate products, have been perceived by producers as potentially damaging to the world cocoa trade. In 1998 it was estimated that the implementation of this plan could reduce world demand for cocoa beans by between 130,000–200,000 metric tons annually. In July 1999, despite protests from Belgium, which, with France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Spain, prohibits the manufacture or import of chocolate containing non-cocoa-butter vegetable fats, the European Commission cleared the way to the abolition of this restriction throughout the EU countries. The implementation of the new regulations took effect in May 2000. After coffee and sugar, cocoa is the most important agricultural export commodity in international trade. Recorded world exports (excluding re-exports) of cocoa beans totalled 2,499,608 metric tons in 2000, of which African countries accounted for 1,718,711 tons. The world’s leading exporters of cocoa beans in 2000 were Côte d’Ivoire (1,113,476 tons),
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Ghana (an estimated 360,250 tons), Indonesia (333,619 tons), Nigeria (an estimated 139, 000 tons), Cameroon (an estimated 75,887 tons) and Ecuador (49,047 tons). The principal importers of cocoa are developed countries with market economies, which account for about 80% of cocoa imports from developing countries. Recorded world imports of cocoa beans in 2000 were 2,401,841 tons. The principal importing countries in that year were the Netherlands (with 494,735 tons, representing 20.6% of the total), the USA (471,181 tons) and Germany (251,297 tons). Côte d’Ivoire is the world’s principal cocoa grower, accounting for more than 38% of output in 2001 and 44.1% of international cocoa exports in 2000. Government measures, implemented in August 1999 to liberalize the country’s cocoa sector, included the abolition of the state cocoa board, with the consequent removal of guaranteed prices. However, in November, the impact on Ivorian cocoa-growers of sharply lower world cocoa prices (see below) prompted the government to reintroduce a minimum price mechanism and buffer stock arrangements. These measures, combined with other forces, brought about a strong recovery in prices—in 2002 prices paid to farmers were reported to have reached record high levels. Since the mid-1960s, when it accounted for more than one-third of world production, Ghana’s share of the world market has fallen to about 14%, owing to the neglect of the industry and to the official policy of maintaining prices payable to producers at uneconomic levels. The decline has been exacerbated by the smuggling of cocoa to neighbouring countries, where higher prices are obtainable. The spread of plant diseases, particularly black pod and swollen shoot, have also inhibited recovery. In 1992 cocoa was overtaken by gold as Ghana’s main export commodity. In recent years, however, Ghana has sought to revive cocoa production through programmes of replanting and the introduction of disease-resistant varieties, together with insect spraying, and improved facilities for transport and storage. From July 1993 the Ghana Cocoa Board (COCOBOD) was deprived of its monopoly, and trading companies were licensed to purchase cocoa direct from farmers. Although COCOBOD has retained exclusive control over Ghanaian cocoa exports, proposals were under consideration in mid-2000 for assigning it a purely advisory and regulatory role. In July 2000 Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire announced plans to co-ordinate their cocoa sales as part of a joint strategy to generate a recovery in world prices. Among the smaller African producers, cocoa exports are a significant component of the economies of Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, São Tomé and Príncipe and Togo. Although cocoa remains Nigeria’s main export crop, its significance to the economy has been eclipsed by petroleum. In the Far East and Australasia Indonesia is the leading producer of cocoa. Production has risen very rapidly since the 1970s, when the crop first began to be planted extensively, to the point that in 2001, with output of cocoa beans totalling an estimated 340,000 metric tons, Indonesia was the third largest producer in the world. In 2000 Indonesia was the third largest exporter of cocoa beans in the world, shipping 333,619 tons. These exports, which make a relatively small contribution to the total value of Indonesia’s foreign trade, are mainly to Asian markets. The production of cocoa in Malaysia commenced on a large scale in the 1950s. Cultivation expanded rapidly in the 1980s and cocoa became the country’s fourth largest agricultural sector. In the early 1990s Malaysia was the fourth largest producer of cocoa world-wide, but production declined substantially during the decade, owing to the prevalence of low prices on international markets, and in 2001, with output of an estimated
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100,000 tons, Malaysia ranked as the world’s eighth largest producer. In 2001 the country exported only 16,248 tons of cocoa beans, mainly to Asian markets, and was a substantial net importer of the commodity. Papua New Guinea’s production of cocoa beans amounted to an estimated 42,500 tons in 2001, while in 2000 exports totalled 38,000 tons. In 1999 exports of cocoa contributed 1.6% of Papua New Guinea’s total export earnings. Latin America is the third most important producing area for cocoa beans, providing an estimated 15.4% of the total world crop in 2001. In that year Brazil was the world’s fifth largest producer of cocoa beans. In 2000 its exports of cocoa beans totalled 1,900 metric tons, equivalent to just 0.1 % of total world exports of 2,523,323 tons in that year. Brazil’s earnings from cocoa exports, which totalled about US $2m. in 2000, are relatively insignificant to the country’s economy, compared with those from coffee. In 1999 Ecuador obtained 2.3% of its export revenue from cocoa, compared with only 1.0% in 1998 and 2. 4% in 1997. The total volume of exports declined from 71,100 tons in 1996 to 12,135 metric tons in 1998, owing to the devastation caused to the cocoa crop as a result of El Niño (an aberrant current which periodically causes the warming of the Pacific coast of South America, disrupting usual weather patterns) in 1997–98. Cocoa exports increased to 63,600 tons in 1999, but declined again, to 49,047 tons, in 2000. In 1999 the Dominican Republic derived only an estimated 0.6% of its export earnings from cocoa and cocoa products (including exports from free-trade zones), compared with 2.3% in 1998. The country’s cocoa crop was severely damaged by ‘Hurricane Georges’ in September 1998. World prices for cocoa are highly sensitive to changes in supply and demand, making its market position volatile. Negotiations to secure international agreement on stabilizing the cocoa industry began in 1956. Full-scale cocoa conferences, under United Nations auspices, were held in 1963, 1966 and 1967, but all proved abortive. A major difficulty was the failure to agree on a fixed minimum price. In 1972 the fourth UN Cocoa Conference took place in Geneva and resulted in the first International Cocoa Agreement (ICCA), adopted by 52 countries, although the USA, the world’s principal cocoa importer at that time, did not participate. The ICCA took formal effect in October 1973. It operated for three quota years and provided for an export quota system for producing countries, a fixed price range for cocoa beans and a buffer stock to support the agreed prices. In accordance with the ICCA, the International Cocoa Organization (ICCO), based in London, was established in 1973. In December 2000 its members comprised 19 exporting countries, accounting for more than 80% of world production and exports, excluding re-exports, of cocoa beans, and 23 importing countries, accounting for almost 70% of world imports of cocoa beans. The USA, a leading importer of cocoa, is not a member. Nor is Indonesia, whose production and exports of cocoa has expanded rapidly in recent years. The governing body of the ICCO is the International Cocoa Council (ICC), established to supervise implementation of the ICCA. A second ICCA operated during 1979–81. It was followed by an extended agreement, which was in force in 1981–87. A fourth ICCA took effect in 1987. During the period of these ICCA, the effective operation of cocoa price stabilization mechanisms was frequently impeded by a number of factors, principally by crop and stock surpluses, which continued to overshadow the cocoa market in the early 1990s. In addition, the achievement of ICCA objectives was affected by the divergent views of producers and consumers, led by Côte
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d’Ivoire, on one side, and by the USA, on the other, as to appropriate minimum price levels. Disagreements also developed over the allocation of members’ export quotas and the conduct of price support measures by means of the buffer stock (which ceased to operate during 1983–88), and subsequently over the disposal of unspent buffer stock funds. The effectiveness of financial operations under the fourth ICCA was severely curtailed by the accumulation of arrears of individual members’ levy payments, notably by Côte d’Ivoire and Brazil. The fourth ICCA was extended for a two-year period from October 1990, although the suspension of the economic clauses relating to price support operations rendered the agreement ineffective in terms of exerting any influence over cocoa market prices. Preliminary discussions on a fifth ICCA, again held under UN auspices, ended without agreement in May 1992, when consumer members, while agreeing to extend the fourth ICCA for a further year (until October 1993), refused to accept producers’ proposals for the creation of an export quota system as a means of stabilizing prices, on the grounds that such arrangements would not impose sufficient limits on total production to restore equilibrium between demand and supply. Additionally, no agreement was reached on the disposition of cocoa buffer stocks, then totalling 240,000 tons. In March 1993 ICCO delegates abandoned efforts to formulate arrangements whereby prices would be stabilized by means of a stockwithholding scheme. At a further negotiating conference in July, however, terms were finally agreed for a new ICCA, to take effect from October, subject to its ratification by at least five exporting countries (accounting for at least 80% of total world exports) and by importing countries (representing at least 60% of total imports). Unlike previous commodity agreements sponsored by the UN, the fifth ICCA aimed to achieve stable prices by regulating supplies and promoting consumption, rather than through the operation of buffer stocks and export quotas. The fifth ICCA, operating until September 1998, entered into effect in February 1994. Under the new agreement, buffer stocks totalling 233,000 tons that had accrued from the previous ICCA were to be released on the market at the rate of 51,000 tons annually over a maximum period of four-and-a-half years, beginning in the 1993/94 crop season. At a meeting of the ICCO, held in October 1994, it was agreed that, following the completion of the stocks reduction programme, the extent of stocks held should be limited to the equivalent of three months’ consumption. ICCO members also assented to a voluntary reduction in output of 75,000 tons annually, beginning in 1993/94 and terminating in 1998/ 99. Further measures to achieve a closer balance of production and consumption, under which the level of cocoa stocks would be maintained at 34% of world grindings during the 1996/97 crop year, were introduced by the ICCO in September 1996. The ICCA was subsequently extended until September 2001. In April 2000 the ICCO agreed to implement measures to remedy low levels of world prices (see below), which were to centre on the elimination of sub-grade cocoa in world trade: these cocoas were viewed by the ICCO as partly responsible for the downward trend in prices. In mid-July Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria and Cameroon disclosed that they had agreed to destroy a minimum of 250,000 tons of cocoa at the beginning of the 2000/01 crop season, with a view to assisting prices to recover and to ‘improving the quality of cocoa’ entering world markets. A sixth ICCA was negotiated, under the auspices of the UN, in February 2001. Like its predecessor, the sixth ICCA will aim to achieve stable prices through the regulation of
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supplies and the promotion of consumption. The Agreement took effect, provisionally, on 1 January 2002, and will take effect definitively, subject to its ratification by at least five exporting countries (accounting for at least 80% of total world exports) and by importing countries (representing at least 60% of total world imports), on 1 October 2003. As the table below indicates, international prices for cocoa have generally been very low in recent years. In 1992 the average of the ICCO’s daily prices (based on selected quotations from the London and New York markets) was US $1,099.5 per metric ton (49.9 US cents per lb), its lowest level since 1972. The annual average price per ton subsequently rose steadily, reaching $1,456 in 1996 and $1,619 in 1997. The average rose in 1998 to $1,676 per ton, its highest level since 1987, but slumped in 1999 to $l,140(a fall of 32.0%). In 1996 the monthly average ranged from $1,339 per ton (in March) to $1,538 (June). In 1997 it varied from $1,373 per ton (February) to $1,770 (September). The average increased in May 1998 to $1,794 per ton (its highest monthly level since February 1988), but fell in December to $1,515. In 1999 the highest monthly average was $1,455 per ton in January, and the lowest was $919 in December. The comparable figure for February 2000 was only $859 per ton: the lowest monthly average since March 1973. On the London Commodity Exchange (LCE) the price of cocoa for short-term delivery increased from £637 (US $983) per ton in May 1993 to £1,003.5 in November, but it later retreated. In July 1994, following forecasts that the global production deficit would rise, the price reached £1,093.5 ($1,694) per ton. In late February 1995 the London cocoa quotation for March delivery stood at £1,056.5 per ton, but in March the price was reduced to £938 (US $1,498). The downward trend continued, and in late July the LCE cocoa price was £827.5 ($1,321) per ton. Prices under short-term contracts remained below £1,000 per ton until the end of December, when the ‘spot’ quotation (for immediate delivery) stood at £847.5 ($1,319) per ton. During the first quarter of 1996 London cocoa prices continued to be depressed, but in April the short-term quotation rose to more than £1,000 per ton. In May the LCE ‘spot’ price reached £1,104.5 (US $1,672) per ton. Cocoa prices had increased in spite of the ICCO’s forecast that supply would exceed demand in 1995/96, following four consecutive years of deficits. In July 1996, however, the ‘spot’ quotation in London declined from £ 1,049 ($1, 630) per ton to £924 ($1,438). In December the ‘spot’ price was reduced to £848.5 ($1, 419) per ton. In January and February 1997 short-term quotations for cocoa were at similarly low levels, but in March the ‘spot’ price on the London market rose from £894.5 (US $1,449) per ton to £1,012.5 ($1,621) in less than two weeks. On 1 July the London ‘spot’ price stood at £1,143 ($1,895) per ton: its highest level, in terms of sterling, for more than nine years. Three weeks later, however, the price declined to £963 ($1,615) per ton. By late August international cocoa prices had recovered strongly, in response to fears that crops would suffer storm damage, and in early September the LCE ‘spot’ quotation reached £1, 133.5 ($1,798) per ton, while prices for longer-term contracts were at their highest for almost a decade. Thereafter, the trend in cocoa prices was generally downward. In the first half of December, however, the London price advanced from £987 ($1,663) per ton to £1, 117 ($1,824).
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In February 1998 the LCE price of cocoa for short-term delivery was reduced to less than £1,000 per ton. Following political unrest in Indonesia and forecasts of an increased global supply deficit, the cocoa market rallied in the first half of May, with the London ‘spot’ price rising from £1,072.5 (US $1,787) per ton to £1,140 ($1,857). Meanwhile, cocoa under long-term contracts was being traded at more than £1,200 per ton. However, in late June the London price of cocoa for July delivery declined to £1,002.5 per ton. During July the ‘spot’ price reached £1,070 ($1,752) per ton, before easing to £1,026.5 ($1,684). London cocoa prices remained above £1,000 per ton until late September, when the ‘spot’ quotation fell to £970 ($1,651). Later in the year there was a steady downward trend, and in late December the price of cocoa was about £860 ($1,440) per ton. During the early weeks of 1999 the London cocoa market remained relatively stable, but in March the ‘spot’ price declined to £803 (US $1,307) per ton. The slump later intensified, following forecasts of plentiful crops and a weakening in consumption trends, and by late May the London price of cocoa had fallen to only £602.5 ($962) per ton. Prices subsequently rallied, and in June, with the EU failing to resolve an impasse over common rules on chocolate products (see above), the quotation for July delivery reached £819 per ton. In July, after the EU agreed to allow chocolate manufacturers to include vegetable fats, the ‘spot’ price of cocoa eased to £694 ($1,089) per ton, although it later recovered to £754 ($1,194). A further decline in cocoa prices ensued, and in September the ‘spot’ quotation fell to £601.5 ($975) per ton. After a slight recovery, the downward trend continued. In November the London cocoa price for short-term delivery was reduced to £527.5 per ton. In December the ‘spot’ quotation reached £570.5 ($926) per ton, but later in the month the price retreated to £530.5 ($854): its lowest level, in terms of sterling, since 1992. Despite the coup in Côte d’Ivoire in December 1999, the cocoa market weakened further during the opening weeks of 2000, and in late February the London price for short-term delivery stood at only £509 per ton. Meanwhile, the equivalent New York price of cocoa fell in February to only US $734 per ton: its lowest level for more than 25 years. In March the London ‘spot’ quotation advanced to £598.5 ($940) per ton, before easing to £549 ($874). Comparable prices in May ranged from £575.5 ($880) to £606.5 ($911) per ton, and those in July were between £582 ($881) and £599 ($907). In August the LCE price of cocoa for short-term delivery fell to £564 per ton. In September, however, the London ‘spot’ quotation rallied, ranging between £586 ($855) and £593 ($860) in that month. In December a further downward movement occurred, the ‘spot’ quotation in that month ranging between £556 ($803) and £534 ($774). Early in the same month the New York second position ‘futures’ price declined to $707 per ton, its lowest level for 27 years. In January 2001 the London price of cocoa for short-term delivery rose to £833 per ton, this upward movement being attributed to a steeper decline in deliveries from Côte d’Ivoire than had earlier been forecast. This recovery was sustained in February, when speculative buying and estimates of potential shortages in supply boosted the short-term price to £945. In March, however, as a result of improved forecasts of production by Côte d’Ivoire, the London ‘spot’ quotation declined, ranging between £799 (US $1,153) and £917 ($1,346) per ton. Comparable prices in May ranged from £745 ($1,068) to £799 ($1,136). In early May fund and speculative buying, together with renewed pessimism about the level of production in Côte d’Ivoire, boosted the price of the London July ‘futures’ contract to a
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Export Price Index for Cocoa (base: 1980=100)
three-week high of £815 per ton at one point. In June, however, the London price of cocoa for short-term delivery declined steadily, falling to £676 per ton late in the month. During the first two weeks of July the London ‘spot’ market quotation ranged between £728 ($1, 024) per ton and £674 ($947) per ton. In August reports of a poor conclusion to the main crop in Côte d’Ivoire caused the price of the second ‘futures’ position on the London market to rise above £750 per ton, but this recovery was cancelled out in September by substantial selling of new crop West African cocoa. Late in the month forecasts of reduced production by Côte d’Ivoire in 2001/02 caused the London December ‘futures’ contract to rise as high as £758 per ton at one point, the rally attributed to short-covering by commodity funds. In early October the price of the London second position ‘futures’ contract rose to £838 per ton, the highest price since midMay. This strengthening of the second position contract was, once again, attributed to fund buying. London ‘futures’ prices increased rapidly from mid-November, in response to renewed pessimism with regard to production by Côte d’Ivoire, and forecasts of a deficit in the season’s cocoa crop of some 200,000 tons. In the third week of November London ‘futures’ prices reached their highest levels for three years. The closing price of the London March contract on 16 November was £952 per ton, representing an increase of some £200 per ton over the preceding 14 days. The upward trend in prices continued during 2002, amid further reports of poor weather in West Africa and political unrest in the principal cocoa-growing areas of Côte d’Ivoire. The maintenance by one trading company of an unusually ‘long’ position in cocoa, thereby causing scarcity elsewhere in the market, exacerbated this trend throughout the first half of 2002. In March the price of the London second position contract reached £1,261 per ton, the highest price for a second position contract since September 1987. By the end of July 2002 the London ‘futures’ price had risen to £1,317. The Cocoa Producers’ Alliance (COPAL), with headquarters in Lagos, Nigeria, whose 12 members include all the major producers except Indonesia, was formed in 1962 with the aim of preventing excessive price fluctuations by regulating the supply of cocoa. Members of COPAL account for about 80% of world cocoa production, with its seven African members providing about 67%. COPAL has acted in concert with successive ICCA. The principal centres for cocoa-trading in the industrialized countries are the London Cocoa Terminal Market, in the United Kingdom, and the New York Coffee, Sugar and Cocoa Exchange, in the USA.
Coconut
The coconut palm (Cocos nucifera) is a tropical tree, up to 25 m tall, with a slender trunk surmounted by a feathery crown of leaves. The geographical origins of the tree are thought to be in the Asia-Pacific region. Its presence in most coastal areas and on many islands in the tropics is largely due to man, who introduced it to West Africa and the Americas. The tree’s fruits first appear after about six years, though the palm may not reach full bearing until it is about 20 years old. It may continue fruiting for a further 60 years. (Hybrid varieties have advanced the time of initial fruiting from the sixth to the fourth year, and the onset of full bearing from the 20th to the 10th year.) The fruits, green at first but turning yellow as they ripen, are often left to fall naturally, but, as many are then over-ripe, harvesting by hand is widely practised. Coconut, the most important of all cultivated palms, is frequently a smallholder crop, found mainly in small plots around houses and in gardens, although in the Philippines the average coconut farm covers 4–7 ha in area. The plant’s fruit, fronds and wood provide many thousands of families with a cash income as well as basic necessities such as food, drink, fuel and shelter. The palms grow with little or no attention where conditions are favourable. More than 80 varieties are known, divided broadly into tall palms, produced by crosspollination, and dwarf palms, which are self-pollinating. The sap of the coconut palm itself can be evaporated to produce sugar or fermented to make an alcoholic drink called ‘toddy’. This may be distilled to produce a spirit called ‘arrack’. Coconut oil is a rich source of medium-chain triglycerides (MCT), whose applications in medical nutrition include infant milk formulas and foods for persons unable to digest and assimilate fats. Its other food applications include use as a flavouring and also as an ingredient to prolong the shelf life of certain food products. All parts of the fruit have their uses. Beneath the outer skin is a thick layer of fibrous husk. The fibres can be combed out to produce coir (from the Malay word kayar, which means ‘cord’), a material used for making ropes, coconut matting, brushes, mattresses and upholstery (see below). Inside the husk is the nut—what people in temperate areas think of as a ‘coconut’ since the whole fruit is not usually imported. The nut has a hard shell, inside which is a thin white fleshy layer of edible ‘meat’. The nut’s hollow interior is partially filled with a liquid called ‘coconut water’ which is gradually absorbed as the fruit ripens. This ‘water’ is a refreshing and nutritious drink when taken from a young nut (7–8 months), while that from more mature nuts can be prepared as a soft drink and is also used in the production of yeast, alcohol, wine and vinegar. The so-called ‘coconut milk’ is the white,
92 AGRICULTURAL AND MINERAL COMMODITIES YEAR BOOK
Production of Coconuts (’000 metric tons)
* FAO estimate (s). † Unofficial figure (s). Source: FAO. Production of Copra (’000 metric tons)
* Unofficial figure (s). † FAO estimate (s). Source: FAO.
creamy extract obtained after pressing freshly grated coconut ‘meat’. Coconut flour, a byproduct of ‘coconut milk’, is a useful nutritional source of dietary fibre. The shells are mainly utilized as fuel, but small quantities are used to make containers, ornaments, ladles and buttons, and pulverized shells can be used as filler in plastics moulding, plywood and mosquito coil repellents. Raw coconut shell is a more efficient fuel after it has been carbonized into charcoal and, on further processing, can be converted into the still more efficient activated carbon, which finds a market in highly industrialized countries concerned with pollution control.
COMMODITY SURVEYS 93
After harvesting, the fruits are split open, the husk removed and the nuts usually broken open. The ‘meat’ is sometimes eaten directly or used to prepare desiccated coconut, widely used in the bakery and confectionery trades. However, by far the most important economic product of the plant is obtained by drying the ‘meat’ into copra, either in the sun or in a kiln (which may be heated by burning the coconut shells). The dried copra is the source of coconut oil, used mainly in the manufacture of soap, detergent and cosmetics, and also as a cooking oil and in margarine production. As technology advances, more uses for coconut oil are being developed. Recent experiments have shown that it can be converted into diesel fuel, and a programme of conversion might alleviate the financial burden on countries which are heavily dependent on petroleum imports. The residue left after the extraction of oil from copra is a valuable oilcake for feeding livestock, particularly dairy cattle. Good copra has an oil content of about 64%. Most extraction is done in the coconutgrowing countries, although there is a substantial trade in copra to countries that extract the oil themselves. Although the largest producer of copra, the Philippines was overtaken as the largest exporter in 1992 by Papua New Guinea, whose copra sales represented 28.1% of the world export trade in 1999 and 23.5% in 2000. The eclipse of the Philippines as a copra exporter, however, has been attributable to increased levels of crushings of its copra into crude coconut oil for export. Japan was formerly the main importer of copra, but it has been overtaken by Germany, which has accounted, on average, for about one-quarter of all imports in recent years. Germany’s partners within the European Union (EU) also constitute a major market for copra, coconut oil, desiccated coconut and copra meal. Coconut oil has encountered competition from the development of more productive annual oilseed crops, such as soybeans and rapeseed in the northern hemisphere, and from oil palm in the tropics. Up to 7 metric tons of oil per ha can be produced from oil palm, compared with a maximum of 3.25 tons from coconuts. The necessity for the production of copra prior to the extraction of oil has further eroded the competitiveness of coconuts in the world market for vegetable oils. In 2000 the Philippines accounted for 48% of world exports of coconut oil. The USA is the main importer, absorbing, on average, almost 30% of total world imports in recent years. In 2001, according to provisional figures from the FAO, world production of coconut oil was 3,594,686 tons, including 3,183,103 tons from Far East Asia and 106,744 tons from Oceania. The major producing countries in that year were the Philippines (1,489,440 tons) and Indonesia (930,000 tons). The Philippines is the world’s largest exporter of all coconut products, and about onethird of its population is directly or indirectly dependent on the coconut sector for a livelihood. In 1979 the Philippine Government agreed to the operation of a monopoly of the coconut industry by a group of private producers who controlled 80% of th