After the Fall: German Policy in Occupied France, 1940-1944

AFTER THE FALL

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AFTER THE FALL GERMAN POLICY IN OCCUPIED FRANCE, 1940–1944

THOMAS J. LAUB

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Great Clarendon Street, Oxford ox2 6dp Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide in Oxford New York Auckland Cape Town Dar es Salaam Hong Kong Karachi Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Nairobi New Delhi Shanghai Taipei Toronto With offices in Argentina Austria Brazil Chile Czech Republic France Greece Guatemala Hungary Italy Japan Poland Portugal Singapore South Korea Switzerland Thailand Turkey Ukraine Vietnam Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries Published in the United States by Oxford University Press Inc., New York © Thomas J. Laub 2010 The moral rights of the author have been asserted Database right Oxford University Press (maker) First published 2010 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above You must not circulate this book in any other binding or cover and you must impose the same condition on any acquirer British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Data available Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Data available Typeset by Laserwords Private Limited, Chennai, India Printed in Great Britain on acid-free paper by MPG Books Group, Bodmin and King’s Lynn ISBN 978–0–19–953932–1 1 3 5 7 9 10 8 6 4 2

Contents Abbreviations and foreign words List of figures and tables Acknowledgments Map of Occupied France, 15 March 1941 Introduction

vi xiii xv xviii 1

1. The Shocking Defeat

23

2. Rivals and Scavengers

49

3. Setting the Precedent

71

4. First Measures

89

5. Resistance and Reprisals

112

6. The End of Ambiguity

134

7. Transitions

168

8. Defamation, Discrimination, and Despoliation

194

9. Racial Deportations

220

10. Labor Deportations and Resistance

247

11. Invasion and Retreat

273

Bibliography Index

297 315

Abbreviations and foreign words Bibliographic abbreviations ADAP

Akten zur deutschen ausw¨artigen Politik 1918–1945

BAK

Bundesarchiv, Abteilung Koblenz

BALW

Bundesarchiv, Abteilung Reich und DDR, Lichterfelde-West, Berlin

BAMA

Bundesarchiv, Abteilung Milit¨ararchiv, Freiburg im Breisgau

CCDR

Commission Consultative des dommages et des R´eparations

DGFP

Documents on German Foreign Policy

IMT

Trial of major war criminals before the International Military Tribunal

MGFA

Milit¨argeschichtliches Forschungsamt

nfn

No frame number

RG

Record Group

USNA

United States National Archive and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland

Textual abbreviations BdS

Beauftragter des Chefs der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD. Representative of the Security Police and SD in France. After the summer of 1942, the title shifted to Befehlshaber or ‘Commander’ of the Security Police and SD

abbreviations and foreign words

BEF

British Expeditionary Force, a portion of the British army sent to France in 1939

CGQJ

Commissariat-g´en´eral aux questions juives, the General Commissariat for Jewish Affairs

FK

Feldkommandant. Field Commander (of an occupied area)

Gestapo

Geheime Staatspolizei, the secret state police

GFP

Geheime Feldpolizei, the secret military police

HSSuPF

H¨oherer SS- und Polizeif¨uhrer. A senior SS police commander

KK

Kreiskommandant. District Field Commander (of an occupied area)

KSSVO

Kriegssonderstrafrechtsverordnung. A decree concerning special military crimes during war

KStVO

Kriegsstrafverfahrensordnung. A decree concerning military jurisdiction during war and special operations

Kripo

Kriminalpolizei, criminal police

MBB

Milit¨arbefehlshaber in Belgien und nordwest Frankreich. The Military Commander of Belgium and the French Nord and Pas-de-Calais departments

MBF

Milit¨arbefehlshaber in Frankreich. The Military Commander in France

MOI

Main-d’oeuvre immigr´ee. A section of the French Communist party made up of immigrant workers

MVW

Milit¨arverwaltungsstab. Military administration staff directly subordinate to the MBF that included government and economic subsections

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MVW Abt Wi

Milit¨arverwaltung Abteilung Wirtschaft, an economic subsection of the military administration

MVW Abt Verw

Milit¨arverwaltung Abteilung Verwaltung, a government subsection of the military administration

NSDAP

Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei: the Nazi party

Ob West

Oberbefehlshaber West. Supreme (army) command in the West

OFK

Oberfeldkommandant. Senior field commander (of an occupied area)

OKH

Oberkommando des Heeres: Army High Command

OKW

Oberkommando der Wehrmacht: Armed Forces High Command

OKW Wi. Ru. Amt

Wirtschafts- und R¨ustungsamt: Armed Forces High Command, Economic and Armaments Office

Orpo

Ordnungspolizei: order police

PCF

Parti Communist Franc¸ais: the French Communist Party

POW

Prisoner of war

RSHA

Reichssicherheitshauptamt, the Reich Security Main Office

SA

Sturmabteilungen or storm detachments. A Nazi organization established in 1920 to help Hitler control the streets

SCAP

Service de contrˆole des administrateurs provisoires: a temporary administration agency

SD

Sicherheitsdienst, the SS security service

viii

abbreviations and foreign words

Sipo

Sicherheitspolizei, the security police

SS

Schutzstaffeln. Protection squads: an independent organization within the Nazi party that was under the control of Heinrich Himmler. Also known as the Black Corps

STO

Service du Travail Obligatoire: program supplying French labor to Germany

UGIF

Union G´en´eral des Isra´elites de France: The General Union of the Israelites of France

USSR

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Unabbreviated foreign words Abwehr

Military intelligence organization attached to OKW until 1944

Allgemeine SS

The general SS, a branch of the SS that includes elements of the German police and operated concentration camps

Aryan

A term that refers to descendants of the people who first spoke the parent language of the IndoEuropean family. In Nazi Germany, the noun ‘Aryan’ refers to a mythical master race that hailed from ancient Iran and allegedly stood behind all great European accomplishments. The verb ‘to Aryanize’ (Arisierung) means to make something Aryan by eliminating the influence of allegedly inferior races. Also used as an adjective when speaking of or pertaining to the so-called Aryan race (e.g. Aryan art or art produced by pure Aryans).

Attentisme

Wait and see

Bezirkchef

Regional commander (of an occupied area)

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Deutsch-Franz¨osische Gesellschaft

The Franco-German friendship association

Dienststelle Ribbentrop

The ‘foreign office’ of the Nazi party that was run by Joachim Ribbentrop and rivaled the official Foreign Office

Einsatzgruppen

Special action squads, small groups of SS soldiers who executed racial opponents of the Third Reich behind the front lines

Einsatzstab Rosenberg

Special action staff Rosenberg

Exekutivbefugnisse

Executive authority. The legal power to make arrests and ‘carry out the law’

Fall Gelb

Case Yellow, the German plan for the invasion of France and the Low Countries.

Freisch¨arlerei

Hostile acts committed by civilians or illegal combatants

F¨uhrerbefehl

Hitler order, an order from Hitler that could not be questioned

Gauleiter

District leader (of the Nazi party)

Geiselverfahren

The hostage process

Gerichtsheer

Judge Advocate General

Gleichschaltung

Coordination. The nazification of professional and social groups after Hitler seized power

Kommandostab

Command staff. Section of the German military government in France that controlled regular troops assigned to the MBF

Kulturg¨uter

cultural artifacts

Kriegsverrath

War treason

x

abbreviations and foreign words

Landessch¨utzen

Reserve battalions assigned to the MBF for routine security duties

lebensunwertes Leben

Life unworthy of living. A program to kill racially unfit, handicapped Germans, and other ‘useless eaters’

Luftwaffe

German air force

Milit¨argesetzbuch

Military penal code

Milit¨arverwaltung Abteilung Verwaltung

Government subsection of the military administration

Milit¨arverwaltung Abteilung Wirtschaft

Economic subsection of the military administration

Nacht und Nebel Erlass

The Night and Fog Decree

Ortskommandant

Commander of a municipal district in an occupied area

Reichsf¨uhrer

Reich leader. Refers to Heinrich Himmler

Reichsleiter

Reich leader. A title granted to Alfred Rosenberg in 1937

Reichsmarschall

Reich marshal. Refers to Hermann G¨oring

Reichstag

The German parliament

Schwerpunkt

Spearhead or main effort of an attack

Sections sp´eciales

Special courts established by the Vichy government on 23 August 1941 to prosecute enemies of the state. Also referred to as Cour Sp´eciale

Verf¨ugungstruppe

Armed SS troops that Hitler could use during an internal emergency

Waffen SS

Armed SS. A branch of the SS equipped and organized along military lines

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Wehrkreis

Military district

Wehrmacht

German armed forces

Wehrwirtschaftsstab und R¨ustungsstab

War economy and armament staff

Zehn Gebote

Ten commandments. The SS–Abwehr agreement outlining the responsibilities of each organization

Zentralauftragsstelle

Central purchasing office under the joint control of OKW and the Reich Economic Ministry

Zersetzung der Wehrkraft

A crime defined as undermining of German defense power

xii

List of Figures and Tables Figures Local, district, and regional branches of the Military Commander in France c.15 March 1941 xviii 1.1 German plans to invade France in 1914, 1939, and 1940

27

1.2 The Norwegian Campaign, 1940

29

1.3 The Western Campaign, 1940

31

1.4 Adolf Hitler being greeted in the Compi`egne forest

35

1.5 The German chain of command

42

1.6 The German Military Government in France

46

2.1 Göring, Ribbentrop, Rosenberg, Goebbels, and other leading Nazis listen as Hitler declares war on the United States, 11 December 1941

51

4.1 Crimes prosecuted by the MBF, 1940–1942

107

4.2 Serious crimes prosecuted by the MBF, 1940–1942

108

4.3 Daily life in Occupied France

110

5.1 General Otto von St¨ulpnagel consults Field Marshal Walter von Brauchitsch in Paris, 21 May 1941

126

5.2 Helmut Knochen

131

6.1 The German chain of command in Nantes, 1941

152

6.2 Werner Best

153

6.3 Admiral Darlan, Marshal P´etain, and Reichsmarschall G¨oring in St. Florentin

156

7.1 The Nazis spring a trap, 1944

176

7.2 Prime Minister Laval and HSSuPF Oberg, 1 May 1943

185

8.1 Local, district, and regional authorities in occupied France, 1944

198

8.2 Aryanization in Marseilles. A ‘Jewish’ business under new management 213 9.1 Reinhard Heydrich

229

9.2 Pithiviers internment camp c.1941

233

after the fall 9.3 Racial deportations, 1943–1944

239

10.1 French volunteers leaving for Germany, 1940–1942

252

10.2 Gauleiter Fritz Sauckel

253

10.3 French workers departing for Germany, June–December 1942

255

10.4 French workers departing for Germany, 1943

260

10.5 Labor deportations, 1944

262

10.6 A German atrocity

270

11.1 Forty-four French hostages shot in Premilhat, near Montlucon, on 14 August 1944

278

The views or opinions expressed in this book, and the context in which the images are used, do not necessarily reflect the views or policy of, nor imply approval or endorsement by, the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum.

Table 7.1 Arrests for serious resistance activity, October 1941–May 1942

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Acknowledgments I could not have written this book on my own and would like thank all the people who helped me navigate the research and writing process. A long and distinguished list of family members, academic mentors, colleagues, and friends provided considerable help during the course of this project. I owe all of you a debt of gratitude and would like to express my sincere thanks. Grounded in business and finance, the Laub family always appreciated the value of education but viewed my foray into graduate school with a degree of skepticism. What can you do with a degree in history? Wouldn’t a business or a law degree be more rewarding? My father, George W. Laub, set aside his initial doubts and supported my graduate education through thick and thin. Persuaded in no small part by my father’s vocal support, my mother Sandra, sister Lorinda, and brother George funded my insatiable appetite for books, encouraged me to finish this manuscript, and helped me overcome professional challenges. This book could not have been written without the emotional and financial support from the entire Laub family. I must also thank the extended Bowles family for providing moral support during the final stages of the revision process. Dean and Nancy Jo Cline welcomed me into their home. David and Shirly Bowles listened to a frustrated academic with sympathy and patience. All four exemplified southern hospitality and overlooked my Yankee heritage. Last but certainly not least, Laura Bowles helped me overcome numerous bureaucratic obstacles, edited portions of this manuscript, and helped me recover from the writing process. Both families have my heartfelt thanks. Educators in Europe and the United States contributed to this work in many different ways. Led by Alan Draper, the faculty of the history and government departments at St. Lawrence University introduced me to the rigors of academic life. Richard Breitman, W. Scott Haine, and Mark Masurovsky revealed the nuances of French and German historiography at the American University. Damon Chetson, Will Hay, Erin Mahan, Christof Morrissey, and Steve Norris brightened my days at the University of Viginia. Stephen Schuker helped a green graduate student develop

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and execute an ambitious research agenda. His sage advice, rigorous standards, and constant encouragement shaped this work from start to finish. A graduate student could not hope for a better friend and mentor. Archivists at the US National Archives in College Park, Maryland, the the Bundesarchiv Lichterfelde-West in Berlin, Milit¨ararchiv in Freiburg im Breisugrau, and the Bundesarchiv in Koblenz all pointed me toward the appropriate finding aids, passed along invaluable suggestions, and helped me unearth the documentation that supports this manuscript. I cannot understate my debt to archivists and staff at all four instituions. Lenard Berlanstein, Dale Copeland, Alan Megill, and Philip Zelikow asked penetrating questions during the writing process and offered invaluable advice after my dissertation defense at the University of Virginia. My extended academic family played a profound role in my education and deserve a share of whatever accolades this work receives. Any blunders, mistakes, and omissions that remain are my responsibility alone. David Frey and Ben Shepherd counseled me during the research process. Peter Lieb, Jeff Rutherford, Alex J. Kay, and Dave Stahel commented on papers and can only be described as wonderful colleagues and good friends. Christopher Wheeler, Matthew Cotton, and the staff at Oxford University Press guided me through the publishing process with constant aplomb. In conjunction with five anonymous reviewers, they identified many blunders and improved this text. All have my thanks. Colleagues and friends at Sweet Briar College and Longwood University helped me survive the early stages of my academic career. Phil Blaker and Bill Harbour guided me through the minefield of adjunct life. Lynn Lauffenberg, Gerry Berg, and Kate Chavigny encouraged me to continue with the revision process and served first-class dinners with generous helpings of merriment and sympathy. Maud Pintner, Lea Pyne, and Rachel Moretta delighted me with discussions that ranged from the profound to the absurd and helped me keep my own worries in perspective. Jim Schaefer, Carol Fleming, Mike Galgano, and the staff at James Madison University continue to support my research endeavors with advice and patience. I owe all a debt of gratitude. Thanks must also be extended to friends who provided respite from the trials and tribulations of academic life. Jean Boyle, Gary Downey, Kim Martone, Joseph Molisani, Brad Rauch, David Rickards, and Jeffrey Wrenn all listened to my complaints on more occasions than I or they care to xvi

acknowledgments

remember. Christie and Joseph Martin provided genuine camaraderie while I worked in the National Archives and remain fast friends. James Bumbalo, Jack Hurley, George Liederhaus, Tom Pidgeon, Walter Rand, and Michael Sladden helped me appreciate the value of hard work, taught me how to tell a good story, and provided refuge in the woods of northern Ontario. The study of Nazi Germany can be a dark and depressing endeavor. Without aid and moral support from these and many other friends, I could not have completed this manuscript. I dedicate this book to my friend Christopher M. Morrison. Despite the attractions of a rich home life and obligations associated with a grueling work schedule, Chris always found time to brighten my day with a quick phone call. With uncanny timing, he offered useful advice, heartfelt encouragement, and the proverbial kick in the backside when necessary. His integrity, honesty, and friendship inspire me every day. Chris passed away while I was drafting chapter six. Although writing a book is indeed challenging, it does not compare to eulogizing a dear friend. Survived by his wife Kim, his parents Joe and Maureen, and many friends, Chris will always be missed. Thomas J. Laub January 2009 [email protected]

xvii

Local, district, and regional branches of the Military Commander in France c.15 March 1941.

Introduction

Motivated by evidence of barbarism that trickled out of Europe during World War Two, Allied leaders vowed to prosecute war criminals at the Moscow Conference in October 1943. Toward this end, judges from France, Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union convened an international military tribunal in Nuremberg on 14 November 1945. Prosecutors charged leading Nazis with committing crimes against peace, conspiracy against peace, specific violations of the Hague and Geneva Conventions (i.e. ‘war crimes’), and crimes against humanity. National courts judged citizens accused of treason and German nationals who committed crimes within their jurisdictions. In France, proceedings began immediately after the Liberation. Local resistance cells convened ad hoc courts and judged people who were accused of collaborating with German forces. After the provisional French government purged the judicial system, traditional courts handled charges like ‘(e)ntertaining, in time of war, relations with a foreign power or its agents in order to support this power against France.’¹ By the time major trials ended in 1949, French prosecutors had executed approximately 7,000 people and sent another 26,289 to prison, but a 1950 amnesty bill pardoned many offenders. As they rendered verdicts and passed down sentences, French jurists defined unacceptable forms of collaboration and punished those found guilty of treason. Official proceedings failed to ¹ Peter Novick, The Resistance versus Vichy. The Purge of Collaborators in Liberated France (New ´ York: Columbia University Press, 1968); Philippe Bourdrel, L’Epuration sauvage, 1944–1945 (Paris: Perrin, 1988).

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live up to those that followed Napoleon III’s 1851 coup d’´etat or the 1871 Paris Commune. Although harsh during the months that immediately followed the Liberation, French courts eventually accepted a rather narrow definition of collaboration that, in many ways, let bygones be bygones.² The relatively moderate nature of purges may be connected to widespread acceptance of arguments advanced by defendants during postwar trials. In response to charges that he betrayed the Third Republic, Marshal Henri P´etain, the leader of the French state between 17 June 1940 and August 1944, testified that I used my power as a shield to protect the French people . . . Every day, a dagger at my throat, I struggled against the enemy’s demands. History will tell all that I spared you, though my adversaries think only of reproaching me for the inevitable . . . While General de Gaulle carried on the struggle outside our frontiers, I prepared the way for liberation by preserving France, suffering but alive.

In his own mind, P´etain assumed a thankless position as leader of a defeated nation. From his capital in the eponymous town of Vichy, he exchanged limited French cooperation for limited German demands. From this perspective, de Gaulle served as a sword that struck against Nazi tyranny from London while P´etain shielded the French nation from the same threat in Vichy. Both men employed different tactics to achieve the same basic goal: the preservation of France. The Marshal attributed ‘excessive’ collaboration to unscrupulous politicians like Pierre Laval, fascists such as Jacques Doriot, and adventurers like Joseph Darnand.³ The High Court sentenced the Marshal to death on 14 August 1945, but judges suggested the death sentence be suspended, ostensibly because of the perpetrator’s advanced age. General Charles de Gaulle, then the provisional leader of France, commuted P´etain’s death sentence to life in prison.⁴ From these meager beginnings, the sword and shield theory took root in French society and shaped legal, popular, and academic conceptions of the Vichy regime. Shortly after the Liberation, three sympathetic authors confirmed the sword and shield interpretation of the Vichy era. Louis Rougier’s Les Accords P´etain–Churchill appeared in 1945 and Henri du Moulin de Labarth`ete’s Le ² Jean-Pierre Rioux, The Fourth Republic, 1944–1958, translated by Godfrey Rogers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 29–42. ³ Proc`es du Mar´echal P´etain (Paris: Editions Louis Pariente, 1945), pp. 15–16; Jean-Marc Varaut, Le Proc`es P´etain, 1945–1995 (Paris: Perrin, 1995). ⁴ Varaut, Le Proc`es P´etain, p. 381ff.

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introduction

Temps des illusions followed a year later. Louis-Dominique Girard published Montoire, Verdun diplomatique in 1948. All three highlighted the diplomatic successes of the Vichy regime and implied that France might have fared much worse without P´etain. Most on the political right blamed Pierre Laval for the ‘excesses’ of Vichy, and few authors disputed the consensus.⁵ During the ten years that followed World War Two, P´etain’s sword and shield argument influenced historical analysis of the Vichy era. Postwar politics eventually divided veterans of the resistance into two camps. Allies of de Gaulle initially supported the trial of P´etain because the latter ‘had symbolized capitulation and, even if he did not wish it, collaboration with the enemy.’⁶ Eventually General de Gaulle shifted his position and attributed P´etain’s collaboration to weakness brought on by old age. Gilbert Renault, a confidant of the general who was known as Colonel R´emy during the war, reported that de Gaulle described himself and P´etain as two strings on the same bow. Taking their lead from the general, prominent Gaullists made amends with some former collaborators. Robert Aron’s scholarly Histoire de Vichy, 1940–1944 exonerated many bureaucrats who had worked for the Vichy regime and confirmed P´etain’s ‘sword and shield’ theory. Slowly but surely, moderate and conservative Frenchmen embraced the notion that forty million r´esistants had opposed Germany.⁷ Left-wing opponents of the Vichy regime halfheartedly opposed the sword and shield theory. L’Humanit´e, the official newspaper of the French Communist Party (Parti Communist Franc¸ais or PCF), supported the execution of Marshal P´etain. Long-time members of the resistance (as opposed to r´esistants who joined during the last months of the war) condemned lenient sentences that courts handed down to functionaries of the Vichy regime.⁸ ⁵ Henry Rousso, The Vichy Syndrome: History and Memory in France since 1944, translated by Arthur Goldhammer (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991), pp. 241–251; Louis Rougier, Les Accords P´etain–Churchill: Historie d’une mission secr`ete (Montreal: Beauchemin, 1945); Henri du Moulin de Labarth`ete, Le Temps des illusions: Souvenirs, juillet 1940–avril 1942 (Geneva: ´ Editions du Cheval ail´e, 1946); Louis-Dominique Girard, Montoire, Verdun diplomatique: Le Secret du Mar´echal (Paris: A. Bonne, 1948); Ren´e de Chambrun, France during the German Occupation, 1940–1944, translated by Philip W. Whitcomb (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1957); ´ Paul Badouin, Neuf mois au gouvernement (Paris: Editions de la table ronde, 1948); Yves Bouthillier, Le Drame de Vichy (Paris: Plon, 1950). ⁶ Rousso, The Vichy Syndrome, p. 35. ⁷ Rousso, The Vichy Syndrome, pp. 32–43; Robert Aron, The Vichy Regime 1940–1944 (Paris: ´ Fayard, 1954); Pierre Laborie, L’Opinion franc¸aise sous Vichy (Paris: Editions du seuil, 1990). ⁸ Varraut, Le Proc`es P´etain, p. 387; Fred Kupferman, Les Premiers beaux jours, 1944–1946 (Paris: Calmann-Levy, 1985); Jean Cassou, La M´emoire courte (Paris: Minuit, 1953), pp. 33–4; Charles

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Yet the dismay of the political left may have been disingenuous. Communists avoided a thorough discussion of the past because such an endeavor might talk about the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact, widespread public apathy during the first years of the Occupation, and other disconcerting facts. With skeletons in almost every closet, neither right- nor left-wing parties pushed for a thorough examination of the Vichy era. They both accepted the sword and shield theory as the least-worst explanation of the Occupation.⁹ Robert Paxton’s Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order, 1940–1944 forced many to revise their understanding of the Vichy era. Using German sources, Paxton argued that the shield theory hardly bears close examination. The armistice and the unoccupied zone seemed at first a cheap way out, but they could have bought some material ease for the French population only if the war had soon ended. As the war dragged on, German authorities asked no less of France than that of the totally occupied countries. In the long run, Hitler’s victims suffered in proportion to his need for their goods or his ethnic feelings about them, not in proportion to their eagerness to please. Vichy managed to win only paltry concessions: a few months of the rel`eve instead of a labor draft, exemption from the yellow star for Jews in the unoccupied zone, slightly lower occupation costs between May 1941 and November 1942, more weapons in exchange for keeping the Allies out of the empire. Judged by its fruits, Vichy negotiation was barren.¹⁰

Paxton examined the actions of the Vichy regime and found that P´etain and his lieutenants pushed their own agenda. In 1940 P´etain asked Germany for an armistice to prevent a left-wing revolution. After hostilities ceased in June 1940, Laval and Darlan tried to exchange economic and military collaboration in return for an easing of restrictions outlined in the Armistice Agreement. Although fettered by the 1940 defeat and the occupation of two-thirds of France, P´etain’s lieutenants used whatever autonomy they could muster to construct a new version of La Patrie. Instead of describing Vichy’s program as something imposed by Hitler, Paxton characterized Rist, Une Saison gˆat´ee. Journal de la guerre et de l’occupation (Paris: Fayard, 1983), p. 40; Pierre Guillain de B´enouville Le Sacrifice du matin (Paris: Lafont, 1946); Yves Farge, Rebelles, soldats et citoyens (Paris: Grasset, 1946). ⁹ St´ephan Courtois, Le PCF dans la guerre (Paris: Ramsay, 1980); Jacques Fauvet, Histoire du parti communist franc¸ais (Paris: Fayard, 1965), vol. II. ¹⁰ Robert O. Paxton, Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order, 1940–1944 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), p. 372.

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P´etain’s National Revolution as ‘another round in the virtual civil war of the 1930s.’ Rather than being victims of Nazi aggression or fascist stooges, the Vichy regime tried to rebuild France along lines developed by the political right during the interwar era.¹¹ When they were first published in 1972, Paxton’s conclusions revived a nasty debate about France during World War II. Admiral Paul Auphan, a staunch supporter of Marshal P´etain, argued that Paxton’s book was ‘laced with gaps and errors’ and discussed ‘a matter better kept between Frenchmen.’ But the controversy did not last and, by the time Paxton and Michael Marrus published Vichy France and the Jews in 1981, most scholars of the Vichy era accepted his central arguments.¹² Paxton’s work forced historians to abandon P´etain’s sword and shield theory, refine their definition of collaboration, and extend the search for collaborators into groups previously exonerated by French courts. In retrospect, Paxton’s conclusions should have come as no surprise. Eberhard J¨ackel published a study of Franco-German diplomatic relations during the Second World War in 1966—six years before Paxton’s Vichy France. His book, Frankreich in Hitler’s Europa, also relied on German sources and argued that Germany assumed a rather passive stance toward Vichy France. In late 1940 and early 1941, P´etain’s lieutenants, Pierre Laval and Admiral Franc¸ois Darlan, offered to collaborate actively with Germany in return for the release of French prisoners of war, a reduction in occupation costs that were paid to Germany, permission to increase French armed forces, a relaxation of various border restrictions, and other political concessions that would rally support for the Marshal’s National Revolution.¹³ At the time, Hitler did not believe that he needed French help in order to win the war and did not want to offer substantial concessions to P´etain, Laval, or Darlan. Like Paxton, J¨ackel highlighted French initiatives, demonstrated that Vichy officials did much more than ¹¹ Paxton, Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order, pp. 374, 381–3. ¹² John F. Sweets, ‘Chaque livre un ´ev´enement: Robert Paxton and the French, from briseur de glace to iconoclaste tranquille,’ in S. Fishman, L. Lee Downs, I. Sinanoglou et al. (eds.), France at War: Vichy and the Historians, translated by David Lake (New York: Berg, 2000), pp. 21–34, 303–307; Michael R. Marrus and Robert O. Paxton, Vichy France and the Jews (New York: Basic Books, 1981). ¹³ Eberhad J¨ackel, France dans L’Europe de Hitler, translated by Alfred Grosser (Paris: Fayard, 1968), pp. 154–179, 226–258, 312–326. First published as Frankreich in Hitlers Europa: Die deutsche Frankreichpolitik im zweiten Weltkrieg (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1966).

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just respond to German demands, and discounted the sword and shield theory. In the same year that J¨ackel published Frankreich in Hitlers Europa, Paxton published his own doctoral dissertation entitled Parades and Politics at Vichy: The French Officer Corps under Marshal P´etain. While Vichy France analyzed P´etain’s general political program, Parades and Politics focused on the French army as an institution. Soldiers and sailors played an important political role throughout the Vichy era. General Maxime Weygand, the French Commander in Chief in June 1940, refused to continue fighting Nazi Germany from North Africa and demanded an armistice. Between July 1940 and November 1942, the French army supported P´etain’s program of domestic reform and, as an institution, made little effort to resist Nazi Germany. While few professional officers volunteered to serve in the German armed forces after the invasion of the Soviet Union, even fewer joined Charles de Gaulle in London before November 1942.¹⁴ Although Paxton’s dissertation discussed one of the most significant institutions in French society, few Europeans recognized the importance of Parades and Politics. The distinguished French historian Jean-Pierre Az´ema claimed that specialists were familiar with Paxton’s first book, but their awareness was not reflected in contemporary scholarly journals. The Revue franc¸aise de science politique published an eight-line commentary that focused on Paxton’s sources, while the prestigious Revue d’histoire de la deuxi`eme guerre mondiale merely listed Paxton’s first book under works received in April 1967.¹⁵ Both J¨ackel’s Frankreich in Hitlers Europa and Paxton’s Parades and Politics reached conclusions that flatly contradicted the established sword and shield theory articulated by Aron and others, but they passed without comment in France. Paxton’s Vichy France essentially destroyed the sword and shield theory and, in light of its detailed research, has discouraged others from writing another history of the Vichy era ‘from the top down.’ Academics have continued to focus on issues of collaboration and resistance, but most have ¹⁴ Robert O. Paxton, Parades and Politics at Vichy: The French Officer Corps under Marshal P´etain (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1966), pp. 62–4, 142, 93–4, 407. ¹⁵ Sweets, ‘Chaque livre un e´v´enement: Robert Paxton and the French, from briseur de glace to iconoclaste tranquille,’ in France at War, p. 21.

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studied the question ‘from the bottom up.’ Some analyzed specific regions of France during the war and largely confirmed Paxton’s findings—albeit with variations. John Sweets scrutinized the town of Clermont-Ferrand and concluded few people actively supported Marshal P´etain’s regime. By the same token, few residents of Clermont-Ferrand took actions that directly threatened Vichy politicians or their German sponsors.¹⁶ Studies of women, children, the theater, religious groups, and big business have supported similar conclusions.¹⁷ Specialists of the Vichy era studied France from the bottom up and social history dominated the field. After the Liberation, prosecutors used a model of collaboration and resistance to adjudicate treason cases. Defendants either collaborated with Germany and were guilty of treason or supported the resistance and thus were innocent. Scholars employed a similar dichotomy to explain the actions of French social groups and institutions during World War II. What did a group or institution do, and did its actions advance Hitler’s cause? If the last question can be answered in the affirmative, then the subject was probably guilty of collaboration. Authors who employ the collaboration–resistance dichotomy can, because of the nature of the questions they are asking, concentrate on the activities of French men and women with little regard for other considerations. ¹⁶ John F. Sweets, Choices in Vichy France. The French under Nazi Occupation (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994). Other regional studies include Alya Aglan, La R´esistance sacrifi´ee: Le Mouvement Lib´eration-Nord (Paris: Flammarion, 1994); Laurent Douzou, La D´esob´eissance: Histoire d’un mouvement et d’un journal clandestin: Lib´eration-Sud (1940–1944) (Paris: Odile Jacob, 1995); H. R. Kedward, In Search of the Maquis: Rural Resistance in Southern France, 1942–1944 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993); Lynn Taylor, Between Resistance and Collaboration. Popular Protest in Northern France, 1940–1945 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000); Robert Zaretsky, Nîmes at War: Religion, Politics and Public Opinion in the Department of the Gard, 1938–1944 (Pennsylvania, PA: Penn State Press, 1995). ¹⁷ Sarah Fishman, We will wait! The Wives of French Prisoners of War 1940–1945 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1991); C´elia Bertin, Femmes sous l’occupation (Paris: Stock, 1993); Hanna Diamond, Women and the Second World War in France 1939–1948: Choices and Constraints (New York: Longman, 1999); Francine Muel-Dreyfus, Vichy and the Eternal Feminine: A Contribution to a Political Sociology of Gender, translated by Kathleen A. Johnson (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2001); W. D. Halls, The Youth of Vichy France (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981); Pierre Giolitto, Histoire de la jeunnesse sous Vichy (Paris: Perrin, 1991); Serge Added, Le Th´eaˆ tre dans les ann´ees Vichy (Paris: Ramsay, 1992); Jean-Pierre Bertin-Maghit, Le Cin´ema sous l’occupation: Le Monde du cin´ema franc¸ais de 1940–1946 (Paris: Olivier Orban, 1989); Jacques Duquesne, Les Catholiques franc¸ais sous l’occupation (Paris: Grasset, 1966); W. D. Halls, Politics, Society and Christianity in Vichy France (Oxford and Providence, NH: Berg, 1995); Richard Vinen, The Politics of French Business 1936–1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

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Rejecting this binary model, Philippe Burrin has developed the notion of accommodation to explain how people adapted to changing circumstances between 1940 and 1944. I have made use of the notion of accommodation so as to direct attention beyond the commonly accepted idea of collaboration that is seen in an essentially politico-ideological perspective. That perspective may be indispensable for giving an account of the action of the Vichy leaders and the attitude of those of their compatriots—the collaborationists—who adopted a position favoring entente with the conqueror; but it is unsuitable for a satisfactory understanding of the far more numerous choices of adaptation made by French society as a whole.¹⁸

Burrin’s concept of accommodation uses broad, contextual analysis to evaluate decisions made by various social groups including the Catholic Church, captains of industry, intellectuals, and regular French men and women who struggled to survive during the Occupation. Did French men and women who served a German client`ele, manufactured products for the German war effort, or simply learned to speak German sympathize with the ideological goals of the Nazi regime, support resistance efforts, or just try to make some easy money? Without passing judgement, Burrin suggests that many people balanced personal ideals against the necessities of life and accommodated some German demands without necessarily endorsing Nazi goals.¹⁹ Burrin’s method can also shed light on political affairs. Did the Vichy regime cooperate with various German authorities of its own accord or under duress? Using the collaboration–resistance model, J¨ackel and Paxton conclude that Darlan and Laval both pursued a policy of collaboration with initiative and enthusiam while they served as Prime Minister and use examples of reticence and resistance to define the limits of official collaboration. Leaders of the Vichy regime served up foreign Jews but made halfhearted attempts to protect assimilated French Jews. The collaboration–resistance model can identify Nazi sympathizers, but it struggles ¹⁸ Philippe Burrin, France under the Germans: Collaboration and Compromise, translated by Janet Lloyd (New York: New Press, 1996), p. viii. ¹⁹ Burrin, France under the Germans: Collaboration and Compromise, pp. 177–190, 250–261, 291–305. First published as La France a` l’heure allemande, 1940–1944 (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1993); Richard Cobb, French and Germans, Germans and French. A Personal Interpretation of France under Two Occupations, 1914–1918/1940–1944 (Hanover, NH and London: University Press of New England, 1983).

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to explain ambiguous and/or contradictory actions because it neglects context. Throughout the Occupation, French leaders and state officials spoke with diplomatic, military, and political leaders of the Third Reich on a regular basis, but these talks cannot be characterized as negotiations. Hitler did not allow subordinates to offer substantial concessions in return for French cooperation. Playing upon French fears of Polonization, the Führer insisted upon total compliance and threatened unspecified but undoubtedly dire consequences in the event of open defiance. Neither P´etain, Laval, nor Darlan dared to call Hitler’s bluff. Formal negotiations may have been barren, but circumstantial evidence of accommodation can be found in the actions of French and German authorities. Reprisals carried out by the military government undoubtedly claimed thousands of French lives, but they fell short of genocidal policies applied throughout Eastern Europe despite contrary orders from Berlin. For its part, the Vichy regime helped German authorities impress French workers, deport foreign Jews, and exploit French industrial resources far beyond requirements of the 1940 Armistice Agreement. Limited French cooperation and Germany’s relative moderation may be signs of accommodation. Any search for Franco-German accommodation must begin with a thorough understanding of German policy. What did Germany want? This basic question raises additional lines of enquiry. Did the German Foreign Office, Wehrmacht, SS, and branches of the Nazi party share a common policy agenda? What means did they employ to secure French assistance? Furthermore, did various German institutions achieve individual and/or collective goals? Finally, can German success be attributed to French collaboration and German failure be attributed to French resistance, or may another mechanism like accommodation explain the outcome of a particular policy? Answers to these questions may explain the actions of the French state and improve our understanding of the Vichy era. Burrin’s notion of accommodation requires a nuanced understanding of German demands in order to explain French responses and the history of the Occupation. When applied to German institutions, Burrin’s concept of accommodation may illuminate the inner workings of the German army and Nazi regime. The German army remains a controversial topic of historical

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inquiry. Approximately twenty million Germans served in the armed forces during World War Two, and thirteen million soldiers fought on the eastern front. Conscripts who filled the ranks represented almost every social group except the very old, the very young, and, to a lesser extent, women. Unlike most Nazi institutions, the army included most political, social, and economic groups within German society.²⁰ If the armed forces could be associated with the criminal policies of the Nazi regime, then a large number of Germans could be characterized as Hitler’s accomplices and would bear some degree of responsibility for crimes committed during World War Two. Did the German army embrace Nazi ideology and collaborate with Adolf Hitler? Judicial proceedings shaped initial conceptions of Nazi Germany and the German army. The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg did not designate German Army High Command (Oberkommando des Heeres or OKH) or the Armed Forces High Command (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht or OKW) as criminal institutions, but it did sentence General Alfred Jodl and Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel to death in 1946.²¹ Publication of Liddell Hart’s German Generals Talk inaugurated a wave of memoirs that blamed Hitler for the mistakes of Germany and credited battlefield successes to Guderian, Rommel, Manstein, and other former generals. Allied judges and German veterans usually described the army as a group of regular soldiers who served a criminal regime and indicted the SS for most war crimes committed during the Nazi era.²² Initial studies of the Wehrmacht accused senior leaders of undermining the Weimar Republic, not stopping Hitler’s rise to power, and not overthrowing what they knew to be a criminal regime after 1938. Indictments

²⁰ Michael Geyer, ‘Foreword,’ in Hamburg Institute for Social Research (ed.), The German Army and Genocide: Crimes Against War Prisoners, Jews, and Other Civilians, 1939–1944, translated by Scott Abbott (New York: New Press, 1999), pp. 7–9. ²¹ Manfred Messerschmidt, ‘Vorw¨artsverteidigung: Die ‘‘Denkschrift der Gener¨ale’’ für den Nürnberger Gerichtshof,’ in Vernichtungskrieg: Verbrechen der Wehrmacht, 1941–1944, eds. Hannes Heer and Klaus Naumann (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 1995), pp. 531–550; Rolf-Dieter Müller and Gerd Uebersch¨ar, Hitler’s War in the East: A Critical Assessment, translated by Bruce D. Little (New York: Berghahn, 2002). ²² B. H. Liddell Hart, The German Generals Talk (New York: W. Morrow, 1948); Heinz Guderian, Panzer Leader, translated by Constantine Fitzgibbon (New York: Dutton, 1952); Erich von Manstein, Lost Victories, translated by Anthony G. Powell (Novato, CA: Presidio, 1982).

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typically charged defeated generals with a failure to act. As the fortunes of war turned against Germany in 1942, Hitler transferred control of captured territory from the army to the SS. Thus the SS could be blamed for the brutal exploitation of civilians in Poland and the Soviet Union, most of the callous anti-partisan operations throughout Europe, and the Final Solution. War crimes that could not be blamed on the SS were attributed to superior orders. Soldiers who shot Russian prisoners claimed that they were just obeying a Führerbefehl, and they added that an order from Hitler could not be questioned, much less disobeyed. Early accounts of the German army drew clear distinctions between the ‘good’ Wehrmacht and ‘bad’ SS. Although damaging, accusations leveled against the army did not include direct support of Nazi racial ideology.²³ While interpretations of the Vichy era changed dramatically after the publication of Paxton’s Vichy France, scholarly analysis of the German army evolved slowly. The image of the ‘good’ Wehrmacht and ‘bad’ SS faded after Klaus-Jürgen Müller wrote Das Heer und Hitler in 1969. Unlike preceding historians, Müller noted that the Nazi Party and the German army shared many common goals. Both wanted to destroy the Weimar Republic, escape restrictions imposed by the Treaty of Versailles, and expand the Third Reich to, at very least, the borders of the old Kaiserreich. Although Hitler and leaders of the Wehrmacht often disagreed about the methods and tactics, they managed to work together on many occasions. In June 1934, army officers supplied the SS with weapons, helped neutralize the SA (Sturmabteilungen or storm detachments), and overlooked the death of Generals von Bredow and von Schleicher during the Night of the Long Knives. In return, Hitler assured senior officers that the Wehrmacht would be the sole bearer of arms in Nazi Germany. Officers helped the Führer eliminate dangerous political rivals and shored up their position in Hitler’s government. According to Müller’s analysis, the officer corps initially misjudged Hitler and was later seduced by foreign policy successes in the Rhineland and Austria. After the 1938 Blomberg-Fritsch affair, leading officers such as ²³ Gordon Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army, 1640–1945 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1955), pp. 496–503; John W. Wheeler-Bennett, The Nemesis of Power: The German Army in Politics, 1918–1945 (London: Macmillan, 1953), pp. 694–700.

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General Ludwig Beck grasped the extent of Hitler’s ambitions and began to doubt his acumen. But five years of Gleichschaltung (coordination or Nazification) and a string of foreign policy successes allayed doubts and prevented dissent from blossoming into opposition. The few officers who understood the radical nature of the Nazi regime could not convince their colleagues to depose the Führer.²⁴ Manfred Messerschmidt’s Die Wehrmacht im NS-Staat appeared in the same year as Das Heer und Hitler and reached similar conclusions. Messerschmidt explained how National-Socialist ideas penetrated the army during the 1930s and permeated both the officer corps and enlisted ranks by the end of the war. A wave of new recruits, many of whom were imbued with Nazi ideology that they learned as members of the Hitler Youth, diluted the influence of the traditionally conservative officer corps during the 1930s. Senior officers supported Nazi propaganda to fortify morale and prevent another outbreak of the disorder that appeared in 1918. According to Messerschmidt, commanding officers did not oppose and in some cases abetted the development of orders that violated the laws of war. He implicated junior and senior officers in the execution of Russian prisoners, the extermination of Jews, and some of the most unsavory policies of the Third Reich. Like Klaus-Jürgen Müller, Messerschmidt characterized the Wehrmacht as Hitler’s junior partner.²⁵ Christian Streit’s Keine Kameraden: Die Wehrmacht und die sowjetischen Kriegsgefangenen 1941–1945 carried Müller and Messerschmidt’s revision a step further. While continuing to study the Wehrmacht ‘from the top down,’ Streit accused senior army officers of embarking on a war of extermination in the Soviet Union. The men in charge of OKW and OKH helped Hitler formulate and implement the Kommissarbefehl or Commissar Order that directed German troops to execute Red Army political commissars and thus violated international agreements and German military regulations. Senior German officers struck a Faustian bargain with the Führer and did not oppose racial directives to demonstrate the political reliability of the army. Furthermore, many officers believed the ²⁴ Klaus-Jürgen Müller, Das Heer und Hitler: Armee und nationalsozialistisches Regime, 1933–1940 (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1969). ²⁵ Manfred Messerschmidt, Die Wehrmacht im NS-Staat: Zeit der Indoktrination (Hamburg: R. v. Decker’s Verlag, 1969), pp. 396–422, 480–491.

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war against the Soviet Union would be short-lived and thus not very incriminating. Staff officers who condemned the war of extermination did so to preserve traditional military discipline and not because they truly believed in the laws of war codified in the Hague Convention. By fully implicating the German officer corps in Hitler’s war of extermination, Streit characterized the army as an equal and willing partner of the National-Socialist regime.²⁶ Omer Bartov’s studies of the German army complemented Streit’s work by examining the German army ‘from the bottom up.’ His first book, The Eastern Front, 1941–45: German Troops and the Barbarisation of Warfare, scrutinized three army divisions and concluded: Under the circumstances described in this book it [the barbarization of warfare] can be said to have been almost inevitable. For the men who were educated in Hitler’s Germany, indoctrinated in the Wehrmacht of the Third Reich and sent into a war of unimaginable ferocity, barbarism was normality, humanism long forgotten.²⁷

Like Streit, Bartov linked regular soldiers to crimes that preceding historians and the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg had attributed to the SS. Bartov’s second book, Hitler’s Army: Soldiers, Nazis and War in the Third Reich, provided a theoretical explanation of the ‘barbarization’ process. As casualties decimated front-line units and supplies became scarce, most soldiers turned to Nazi ideology for spiritual support. Unlike Streit, who argued that the German officer corps supported the goals of National Socialism before the invasion of the Soviet Union, Bartov believed that brutal conditions on the eastern front and military setbacks during the winter of 1941–1942 transformed the Wehrmacht into Hitler’s army.²⁸ ²⁶ Christian Streit, Keine Kameraden: Die Wehrmacht und die sowjetischen Kriegsgefangenen, 1941–1945 (Bonn: J. W. H. Dietz, 1991), pp. 13–16, 50–61, 76–82; Jürgen F¨orster, ‘Operation Barbarossa as a War of Conquest and Annihilation,’ in Milit¨argeschichtliches Forschungsamt (hereafter abbreviated as MGFA), eds., Germany and the Second World War, vol. IV, The Attack on the Soviet Union, translated by Dean S. McMurry, Ewald Osers, and Louise Willmont (Oxford: Oxford University Press Press, 1998), pp. 491–513; Theo Schulte, The German Army and Nazi Policies in Occupied Russia (Oxford: Berg, 1989), pp. 215–224; Michael Burleigh, The Third Reich: A New History (New York: Hill and Wang, 2000), pp. 513–529. ²⁷ Omer Bartov, The Eastern Front, 1941–45: German Troops and the Barbarisation of Warfare (London: Macmillan Press, 1985), p. 6. ²⁸ Omer Bartov, Hitler’s Army: Soldiers, Nazis, and War in the Third Reich (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992).

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With few notable exceptions,²⁹ scholars have gradually abandoned the ‘good Wehrmacht, bad SS’ interpretation. Current orthodoxy combines the top-down analysis of Müller, Messerschmidt, and Streit with the bottomup approach of Bartov and Hannes Heer to characterize the Wehrmacht as an institution mired in the most unsavory crimes of the Third Reich.³⁰ Yet questions of scope and timing remain open to disagreement. When did the Wehrmacht abandon its traditional code of conduct, turn toward the principles of National Socialism, and implement Hitler’s racial agenda? Christian Streit and Hannes Heer situate the army’s turn toward National Socialism before the invasion of the Soviet Union. Bartov argues that conditions on the eastern front drove soldiers to embrace the radical tenets of National Socialism and embark on a war of extermination during the winter of 1941–1942.³¹ The Polish campaign provides ambiguous evidence with regard to the ideological proclivities of the German army at the start of World War Two. During the 1939 campaign, some regular soldiers tormented Jews and shot enemy civilians. Their actions displayed and personal accounts confirmed an affinity for Nazi methods that would later define military operations in the Soviet Union.³² On the other hand, a group of senior officers condemned SS and army troopers who violated the rules of war in 1939. General August von Mackensen protested so vociferously that superiors recalled an SS Einsatzgruppe (SS special action squad) operating in his jurisdiction. General Ulex, the military commander of Krakow, claimed that Einsatzgruppen had ‘dishonored the entire German people.’ Their protests forced Hitler to retroactively pardon all who were accused ²⁹ No reputable historian denies widespread atrocities occured in the Soviet Union during World War Two, but some suggest they may have been partially justified. See Andreas Hillgruber, Zweierlei Untergang: die Zerschlagung des Deutschen Reiches und das Ende des europ¨aischen Judentums (Berlin: Siedler, 1986); Ernst Nolte, Der europ¨aische Bürgerkrieg, 1917–1945: Nationalsozialismus und Bolschewismus (Berlin: Propyl¨an Verlag, 1987); Richard J. Evans, In Hitler’s Shadow: West German Historians and the Attempt to Escape from the Nazi Past (New York: Pantheon, 1989); and Forever in the Shadow of Hitler? Original Documents of the Historikerstreit, the Controversy Concerning the Singularity of the Holocaust, edited and translated and edited by James Knowlton and Truett Cates (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1993). ³⁰ For a range of opinions, see Heer and Naumann (eds.), Vernichtungskrieg: Verbrechen der Wehrmacht. ³¹ Hannes Heer, ‘Die Logik des Vernichtungskrieges: Wehrmacht und Partisanenkampf,’ in Vernichtungskrieg: Verbrechen der Wehrmacht, pp. 104–138. ³² Alexander B. Rossino, Hitler Strikes Poland: Blitzkrieg, Ideology, and Atrocity (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2003).

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of mistreating civilians and suggested that ‘the army was not a reliable supporter of the kind of ideological and racial warfare that Hitler had ordered in Poland.’³³ At first glance, the ‘good army, bad SS’ model seems to describe the German army in occupied France. Before the 1940 Western campaign, OKW ordered German soldiers to obey international agreements and respect the rights of non-combatants in no uncertain terms.³⁴ While hostilities raged, German soldiers usually treated Caucasian opponents in accordance with the rules of war. After France and Germany signed an armistice on 22 June 1940, Hitler placed a military commander (Milit¨arbefehlshaber in Frankreich or MBF) in charge of occupied France. The MBF ordered subordinates to obey the Hague Convention and insisted that ‘[t]he best propagandist for the German cause is the disciplined, correct appearance of the German soldier.’³⁵ As an institution, the military government displayed little enthusiasm for Hitler’s racial agenda. The MBF from October 1940 to February 1942, General Otto von Stülpnagel, resigned his commission to protest draconian reprisals ordered by Berlin. His cousin and successor, Carl-Heinrich von Stülpnagel, played a significant role in the 20 July 1944 plot to overthrow the Nazi regime. With substantial help from the French police, SS personnel oversaw the deportation of 75,000 French and foreign Jews who ultimately perished in Auschwitz. When viewed from this perspective, the MBF functioned as Hitler’s reluctant executioner. ³³ Helmut Krausnick, ‘Hitler und die Morde in Polen: Ein Beitrag zum Konflikt zwischen Heer und SS um die Verwaltung der besetzten Gebiete,’ Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 11 (1963), 196–209; Richard Breitman, The Architect of Genocide: Himmler and the Final Solution (Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 1991), pp. 69–72, 105–108; Raffael Scheck, Hitler’s African Victims. The German Army Massacres of Black French Soldiers in 1940 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 156. ³⁴ U.S. National Archives, Washington D.C., Record Group 242 (Captured German Records), Microfilm Series T-77 (Records of the German Armed Forces High Command (OKW)), Roll 1430, frames 291–297. Hereafter referred to as USNA, followed by record group number, microfilm series or entry number (if applicable), folder number (if applicable) or microfilm reel, and page or frame number. For example, USNA, RG 242/T-77/1430/291–297. When page or frame numbers are not available, author, date, title, original reference number, or identifying characteristic will be placed in parenthesis after the abbreviation nfn (no frame number). ³⁵ Peter Lieb, Konventioneller Krieg oder NS-Weltanschauungskrieg? Kriegsführung und Partisanenbek¨ampfung in Frankreich 1943–44 (München: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 2007), pp. 15–20; Scheck, Hitler’s African Victims, pp. 3, 64–5; USNA, RG 242/T-501 (Records of German Field Commands: Rear Areas, Occupied Territories, and Others)/143/465.

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Despite the relatively benign description of the military administration presented above, French prosecutors accused Otto von Stülpnagel of committing war crimes and had a strong case. Shortly after arriving in Paris, the military government issued a series of anti-Semitic decrees that cleared the way for more severe measures subsequently implemented by the SS. According to its own statistics, the German military administration shot at least 471 French hostages between August 1941 and June 1942.³⁶ As they answered resistance activity with deadly reprisals, General Otto von Stülpnagel and his successor Carl-Heinrich von Stülpnagel embarked on a policy that appeared to violate article 50 of the Hague Convention.³⁷ In addition, the military administration helped the Plenipotentiary for the Mobilization of Labor, Fritz Sauckel, impress hundreds of thousands of French workers into the German war economy. As an institution, the German military administration in France discriminated against, despoiled, and deported Jews, shot civilians, and established a system of forced labor. Some argue that policies established by the MBF in 1940 ineluctably led to the 1944 massacre of civilians in Oradour-sur-Glane.³⁸ Evidence presented herein suggests that neither the ‘good Wehrmacht, bad SS’ nor the ‘Wehrmacht as Hitler’s willing partner’ interpretation of the German army can explain the behavior of the German military administration in France. Efforts to place the entire German army into a single moral category may be inappropriate. Burrin’s notion of accommodation, although intended to describe French society, may also apply to the German military administration in France. The MBF and his subordinates had to accommodate demands coming from political and military superiors in Berlin, rival institutions such as the SS, French leaders in Vichy, and ³⁶ The number 471 comes from Bundesarchiv-Milit¨archiv, Freiburg, Bestandssignatur RW 35 (Milit¨arbefehlshaber in Frankreich und nachgeordnete Dienststellen), Archivsignatur 542, p.121. Hereafter abbreviated as BAMA, followed by Bestandssignatur, Archivsignatur, and page number. For example, BAMA, RW 35/542/121. When page numbers are not available, author, date, original reference number, and like information will be placed in parenthesis after the abbreviation nfn (no frame number). ³⁷ Leon Friedman (ed.), The Laws of War: A Documentary History, vol. I (New York: Random House, 1972), p. 322. ³⁸ Ahlrich Meyer, L’Occupation allemande en France 1940–1944, translated by Pascale Hervieux, ´ Florence Lecanu, and Nicole Taubes (Toulouse: Editions Privat, 2002), pp. 9–13; Regina M. Delacor, Attentate und Repressionen. Ausgew¨ahlte Dokumente zur zyklischen Eskalation des NS-Terrors im besetzten Frankreich 1941/42 (Stuttgart: Jan Thorbecke Verlag, 2000).

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French bureaucrats throughout the Hexagon (France, so called because of its six distinct borders). All of these considerations tempered the policy and actions of the German military administration in France during World War Two. At the start of the Occupation, only the army had the personnel, resources, and mandate to supervise France. With only vague instructions from superiors in Berlin, General Otto von Stülpnagel and the military administration made economic collaboration their top priority. They used French resources to repair military vehicles, manufacture transport aircraft, refit submarines, supply food, and manufacture goods for the German consumer market. In 1940, the MBF insisted that soldiers obey the rules of war and made no concerted attempt to enforce the infamous Nuremberg racial laws inside the Hexagon. To guard against sabotage, the military administration followed traditional military doctrine and established a reprisal policy that was designed to teach French men and women that resistance did not pay. Left to its own devices, the military administration established a standard of conduct that was undoubtedly severe but largely unadulterated by Nazi ideology. The MBF relied on assistance from Marshal P´etain and French bureaucrats. Under the terms of the 1940 Armistice Agreement, the military administration supervised the Vichy government and indirectly controlled France. Without technical support from French institutions, German officials would have had to collect taxes, enforce laws, regulate the economy, and guard against an Allied invasion by themselves. With few resources at his disposal, the MBF simply could not afford to drive Marshal P´etain into open resistance. He urged superiors to relax onerous provisions of the Armistice Agreement, opposed measures that disrupted economic cooperation, and tried to accommodate some French needs in order to secure French assistance.³⁹ The military administration also had to consider rival Nazi party institutions such as the SS. Eager to garner a share of the spoils of victory, leading Nazis established offices in Paris and began to pursue their respective agendas. The ideological chief of the Nazi party, Alfred Rosenberg, confiscated property that Jews had allegedly stolen from Germany. As acts of resistance ³⁹ J¨ackel, France dans l’Europe de Hitler, pp. 125–140.

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multiplied during the fall of 1941, SS officers urged the MBF to restore order by liquidating racial enemies and solving the so-called ‘Jewish question.’ If he refused to implement the Nazi racial policy, the MBF had to consider the possibility that Hitler would view his opposition as a sign of disloyalty and place a steadfast Nazi in charge of France. The latter would dilute the authority of the military administration, impede the Wehrmacht’s ability to exploit French resources, and demonstrate the political unreliability of the army. The MBF had to consider the wishes of other Nazi institutions when formulating policy. Although initially dominant, the German military government gradually lost control of German policy because it could not reconcile a traditional definition of military security with Nazi racial ideas. Hitler considered World War Two to be a struggle between Aryans and Jews; he concluded that liquidating racial opponents would eliminate resistance activity, ensure order, and lead to victory. On the other hand, generals who served as MBF and influential figures within the military administration viewed World War Two as a struggle between traditional nation-states. In order to secure victory, they tried to maintain order, cultivate French support for the German cause, and place French resources at the disposal of the German war economy. While many senior officers who were attached to the military administration viewed Hitler’s racial agenda as a secondary mission or an outright distraction, dedicated Nazis believed it to be the fundamental point of the entire war. By characterizing the military administration as being soft on Jews, Nazi paladins won Hitler’s favor, secured influential roles in French affairs, and expanded their respective bureaucratic empires. Efforts to dethrone the military administration began shortly after France and Germany signed the 1940 Armistice Agreement. Alfred Rosenberg and subordinates on his ‘special action staff,’ the Einsatzstab Rosenberg, confiscated valuable art collections from affluent French Jews. With support from Hermann G¨oring and the German embassy in Paris, Rosenberg’s minions underlined the ideological nature of the war, argued that Jews used valuable works of art to finance resistance activity, and concluded that the military administration had an obligation to seize artwork owned by Jews.⁴⁰ ⁴⁰ BAMA, RW 35/698/164–173.

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Using similar logic, SS officers championed aggressive anti-Semitic policies and organized the bombing of seven Parisian synagogues on the night of 2–3 October 1941. The MBF opposed confiscations because they soured Franco-German relations and did not appear to be essential to the war effort. The synagogue bombings embarrassed the MBF, who responded by banning the Black Corps from his headquarters in the Hotel Majestic. Hitler disregarded the consequences of confiscations and bombings, interpreted military complaints as signs of ideological impurity, and granted first the Einsatzstab Rosenberg and later the SS autonomy within occupied France. Assassinations carried out in the fall of 1941 once again brought the question of security to the fore and highlighted disagreements between the political leadership of the Third Reich, branches of the Nazi party, and the military administration. In accordance with contingency plans drawn up in 1940, Otto von Stülpnagel seized hostages and ordered a series of reprisals that increased as resistance activity continued. After the assassination of a German soldier, the MBF would order an investigation and then execute a number of hostages who were somehow connected to the perpetrators and had already been convicted of lesser crimes such as assault, sabotage, or even curfew violations. Of dubious legality with regard to the rules of war, collective reprisals essentially punished one person or several people for the crimes of another and were a part of American, British, French, and especially German military doctrine. Hitler rejected the MBF’s anti-partisan policy as ‘much too mild’ and ordered a very different response. The Führer believed that Jews stood behind all resistance activity and could not see the need for a protracted investigation to identify the actual perpetrators. Since he believed Aryan life to be inherently more valuable than that of another race, all reprisals had to be disproportionate. Finally, Hitler viewed reprisals as an opportunity to murder inferior races and resolve the so-called Jewish Question or Judenfrage. Regardless of the circumstances, the Führer believed immediate, disproportionate, and deadly reprisals against Jews and their alleged associates to be an appropriate response for every act of resistance. General Otto von Stülpnagel, the MBF from October 1940 to February 1942, could not reconcile the demands of the Nazi regime with the dictates of his own conscience and resigned his commission. Realizing that formal protests would accomplish nothing, his cousin and successor,

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Carl-Heinrich von Stülpnagel, carried out Hitler’s orders with perfunctory enthusiasm and plotted to overthrow the Nazi regime. Although they chose to employ very different tactics, both Stülpnagels opposed Hitler’s racial agenda and their actions had far-reaching consequences. Hitler diminished the authority of the MBF by transferring control of all German security troops to Himmler’s SS in the summer of 1942. Embittered by consecutive defeats at the hands of the Einsatzstab Rosenberg and the SS, the military administration made little effort to accommodate the SS agenda and played a secondary role in the Final Solution within France. In an August 1944 message sent to a subordinate, Heinrich Himmler blamed an ‘extremely difficult’ MBF for the continued survival of a large Jewish population in the Hexagon.⁴¹ The Einsatzstab Rosenberg and the SS ignored the MBF’s sensibilities, created independant satrapies, and alienated the residents of the Hotel Majestic. By deprecating the ideological fervor of the MBF and his military administration, both organizations secured influential positions within occupied France, but their respective victories came at a price. Once ensconced in power, the SS lacked the personnel to investigate sabotage, arrest spies, and deport racial enemies. Given past disagreements with the MBF, the Black Corps could not count on much help from the military administration. The Senior SS and Police Leader (H¨oherer SS- und Polizeiführer or HSSuPF) assigned to France, Carl Oberg, had to rely on French policemen to identify, arrest, and deport Jews. French enthusiasm for cooperation faded as German prospects for victory declined and anticipated concessions failed to materialize. When they worked together, French and German institutions could achieve formidable results. Hitler’s labor czar, Fritz Sauckel, cooperated with both the Vichy regime and the military administration as he recruited, coerced, and impressed approximately 850,000 French workers into German factories—over ten times the number of Jews sent from France to SS death camps.⁴² Accommodation can explain the divergent results of labor and racial programs that various German agencies advanced during the Occupation. ⁴¹ USNA, RG 242/T-175 (Reichsführer SS and Chef der Deutschen Polizei)/155/268 5772–2685773. ⁴² Commission Consultative des Dommages et des R´eparations, Dommages subis par la France et l’union franc¸aise du fait de la guerre et de l’occupation ennemie, 1939–1945, vol. IX (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1950), pp. 63–8, 85, 101, 126, 139, 144, 157.

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Army–SS strife reached its zenith on the night of 20/21 July 1944. After dissident army officers tried to assassinate the Führer, General CarlHeinrich von Stülpnagel arrested and prepared to execute SS personnel who had committed war crimes. As the coup collapsed in Berlin, the MBF and HSSuPF reversed course, began to work together, and covered up the scope of the plot in Paris. Eager to disguise his own shortcomings, Oberg launched a very delicate enquiry in conjunction with army officers and asked questions that evoked answers which fitted an improbable cover story. Although dozens of military administration officers had participated in the coup, only three perished as a result of Oberg’s cursory investigation. Diplomats, soldiers, and Nazis often worked at cross-purposes as they vied for control of occupied France, but they could achieve astonishing results through accommodation. Notions of collaboration and resistance, terms like good and bad, and flamboyant titles like Hitler’s Willing Executioners all struggle to explain the actions of French and German authorities in occupied France.⁴³ Influential historians who study French society during the Occupation have already recognized the shortcommings of such terms and adopted or adapted Burrin’s notion of accommodation to suit their respective purposes.⁴⁴ Although designed to explain popular French reactions to the experience of occupation, Burrin’s notion of accommodation can account for the contradictory actions of the German military administration in Paris, clarify the inner workings of the Nazi regime, and shed light on Franco-German relations. Breaking with scholarly trends that favor social history from the bottom up, this manuscript applies Burrin’s notion of accommodation to the study of Occupied France from the top down. Focused primarily on the military government, After the Fall studies the issues that preoccupied the men in charge of the German military administration and the Vichy regime between 1940 and 1944. Eschewing propaganda, prostitution, and other topics that have been analyzed in the recent past,⁴⁵ it examines the ⁴³ Daniel Goldhagen, Hitler’s Willing Executioners. Ordinary Germans and The Holocaust (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1996). ⁴⁴ Robert Gildea, Marianne in Chains: In Search of the German Occupation 1940–1945 (New York: Macmillan, 2002), pp. 1–13; Julian Jackson, France. The Dark Years 1940–1944 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 239–245; Richard Vinen, The Unfree French: Life under the Occupation (New Haven, CT and London: Yale University Press, 2006). ⁴⁵ Denis Peschanski, Vichy 1940–1944: Contrˆole et exclusion (Brussels: Editions Complexe, 1997); Laurent Gervereau and Denis Peschanski, La Propagande sous Vichy 1940–1944 (Nanterre:

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economic, labor, military, political, racial, and security issues that consumed the German military administration and leading figures of the Vichy regime during World War Two. Biblioth`eque de documentation internationale contemporaine, 1990); Insa Meinen, Wehrmacht et ´ prostitution sous l’Occupation, translated by Beate Husser (Paris: Editions Payot and Rivages, 2006).

22

1 The shocking defeat

Europeans dared not cheer the start of hostilities in September 1939. Memories of the Great War remained fresh in the public mind and most believed a future conflict, regardless of the outcome, would be long and brutal. Advances in technology threatened to extend the horrors of modern war into the very homes of average Europeans. On the first day of hostilities, residents of London, Berlin, and Paris huddled in air-raid shelters and prepared to endure World War Two.¹ Trepidation pervaded military circles as well. Before the war, French generals had promised to attack Germany by the fifteenth day of mobilization. While elite units of the German army raced toward Warsaw, first-class French divisions launched a halfhearted assault along the Franco-German border. Secondclass German divisions stemmed the Gallic tide with little loss of life on either side. Fearing that a hasty offensive could only produce casualties that La Patrie could ill afford, General Maurice Gamelin, the French commander-in-chief, preferred to wait for the arrival of British troops and modern equipment before launching a major offensive.² Geography and the defensive outlook of Allied leaders limited western assistance to Poland. Obsolescent Polish airplanes and outmoded cavalry ¹ Alistair Horne, To Lose a Battle: France 1940 (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1969), p. 94; R. A. C. Parker, Struggle for Survival: The History of the Second World War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 19–20. ² Guy Chapman, Why France Fell: The Defeat of the French Army in 1940 (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1968), pp. 59–61; Hans Umbreit, ‘The battle for hegemony in western Europe,’ in Germany and the Second World War, vol. II, Germany’s Initial Conquests in Europe, pp. 265–271.

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divisions could not stop German forces that were equipped with modern weapons. In a replay of Guernica in April 1937, German planes bombarded Warsaw for ten days and the capital surrendered on 27 September 1939. Rather than holding out until the spring of 1940 as General Gamelin expected, Poland succumbed to the German onslaught in four short weeks. The sudden defeat of Poland reinforced an image of German strength and suggested the Allies had good reason to fear the Wehrmacht.³ Despite their victory over Poland, German generals remained pessimistic. After-action studies noted serious deficiencies in the training, equipment, discipline, and personnel of German formations. But Hitler saw things differently. Citing advantageous political and military conditions, the Führer ordered Army High Command (OKH) to prepare an immediate offensive against Holland, Belgium, and northern France. The 9 October 1939 directive aimed to capture bases in the Low Countries for subsequent operations against Great Britain and protect vital German industries in the Ruhr.⁴ OKH quickly churned out an appropriate plan, dubbed Case Yellow or Fall Gelb, but it did not inspire confidence among field commanders. In a 24 September 1939 memorandum, the deputy chief of the Army General Staff in charge of operations, Major-General Carl-Heinrich von Stülpnagel, argued that Germany lacked the weapons and ammunition necessary to breach fortifications in France or Belgium. The chief of the war economy staff added that the economy could not sustain the army in a prolonged war.⁵ After two days of discussions with senior field commanders, Generals Walter von Brauchitsch and Wilhelm Keitel, the heads of OKH and Armed Forces High Command (OKW) respectively, met with Hitler on 5 November 1939. The 58-year-old Brauchitsch argued that the 1939 German army was in many ways inferior to the Imperial Army of 1914 and ³ Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, L’Abîme, 1939–1945 (Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1982), pp. 23–26; Anna M. Cienciala, Poland and the Western Powers, 1938–1939 (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1968), pp. 224–37, 244–5, 258–9; Simon Newman, March 1939: The British Guarantee to Poland: A Study in the Continuity of British Foreign Policy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976); Jon Kimche, The Unfought Battle (New York: Stein & Day, 1968), p. 146. ⁴ Williamson Murray, ‘The German response to victory in Poland: A case study in professionalism,’ Armed Forces and Society, 2 (winter 1981), pp. 285–98; Documents on German Foreign Policy (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1954), ser. D., vol. VIII, pp. 248–250 (hereafter abbreviated as DGFP). ⁵ Umbreit, ‘The battle for hegemony in western Europe,’ pp. 238–40, 232–6.

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could not withstand the rigors of an attack in the West without further training and new equipment. Eager to attack, Hitler responded with a tantrum. The Führer could not understand why his chief military advisor worried about ‘a little indiscipline,’ accused his generals of defeatism, and stormed out of the meeting. Brauchitsch and Keitel lost on two fronts; they failed to delay the invasion of France as their subordinates had demanded, and damaged their relationship with the Führer.⁶ Although they shared some common goals, Hitler and many German generals did not enjoy a cordial relationship. The Führer believed that many of his foreign policy victories had been attained despite military resistance. Minister of War Werner von Blomberg had opposed the introduction of conscription and the occupation of the Rhineland. Formal and widespread disapproval of Hitler’s plans for Czechoslovakia surfaced at a 5 November 1937 conference with the Foreign Minister and the three service chiefs. After the January 1938 Blomberg–Fritsch affair, Hitler replaced skeptical generals with officers who would carry out orders without question. The Führer removed senior generals who had questioned his plans for expansion before the war, but discontent simmered just below the surface of the German officer corps. From Hitler’s perspective, opposition to his plan for the immediate invasion of France appeared to be another skirmish in his war against conservative generals.⁷ Opposition to the original version of Fall Gelb emerged in two forms during what General Erich von Manstein called the ‘winter of discontent.’ Educated in the tradition of the Imperial General Staff, officers like Stülpnagel lacked faith in Hitler’s political judgment and saw no military way to defeat Allied armies. Many failed to realize the potential of tanks and offensive tactics championed by General Hans von Seeckt during the Weimar era.⁸ The original version of Fall Gelb would not defeat France and postponed a decisive land battle until the summer of 1941 or perhaps 1942. Not by accident, the latter date coincided with Stülpnagel’s re-armament estimates. Staff officers like Stülpnagel believed that Germany ⁶ Walter Gorlitz (ed.), The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Keitel, translated by David Irving (New York: Stein and Day, 1966), pp. 101–102. ⁷ Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army, pp. 486–495. ⁸ Manstein, Lost Victories, pp. 127–147; James S. Corum, The Roots of Blitzkrieg: Hans von Seeckt and German Military Reform (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1992), pp. 199–202.

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was not prepared for a long war and tried to delay major offensive operations.⁹ Younger officers like Manstein also questioned the merits of the original version of Fall Gelb and searched for a military strategy to overcome French defenses. Manstein proposed to shift the point of attack (Schwerpunkt) from Army Group B opposite Holland and Belgium to Army Group A in the center of German lines opposite the Ardennes forest. General Gerd von Rundstedt would lead Army Group A across the Meuse near Sedan, threaten the rear of the Maginot line, endanger Paris, strike toward the English Channel, and cut off Allied forces in Belgium. Manstein’s new strategy had never been tried before, satisfied Hitler’s penchant for bold operations, and offered a chance to win a decisive victory. With Hitler’s support, Manstein’s ideas eventually won over some senior generals who had previously favored delay, discouraged anti-Nazi conspiracies, and provided the basis for German operations in May 1940.¹⁰ While German generals developed a bold new plan of attack, Allied leaders prepared to wage a long war of attrition. Citing a shortage of modern equipment, French and British generals did not intend to invade Germany proper in 1939 or 1940. Instead, they prepared to cut Germany off from strategic raw materials by attacking the Soviet Union in the far north and far south. After the Red Army invaded Finland on 30 November 1939, French politicians wanted to land Allied troops in the Finnish town of Petsamo, cut off Germany from vital nickel mines, and cripple German armor production.¹¹ Another proposal called for French forces in Syria to advance toward Baku and destroy oil wells in southern Russia. In theory, ⁹ Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, vol. XXVI (Nuremberg, 1947–1949), pp. 327–36 (hereafter cited as IMT ); IMT , vol. XXXIV, pp. 266–9; Manstein, Lost Victories, pp. 94–101; Gerhard Weinberg, A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 108–111; Liddell Hart, The German Generals Talk, pp. 107–111. ¹⁰ Weinberg, A World at Arms, pp. 111–112; Manstein, Lost Victories, pp. 119, 120–126; F. W. von Mellenthin, Panzer Battles, translated by H. Betzler (New York: Ballantine Books, 1956), pp. 14–15; Liddell Hart, The German Generals Talk, pp. 112–117; Joachim Fest, Plotting Hitler’s Death. The Story of the German Resistance, translated by Bruce Little (New York: Metropolitan Books, 1996), pp. 139–144. ¹¹ Martti H¨aiki¨o, ‘The race for northern Europe, September 1939–June 1940,’ in Scandinavia during the Second World War, ed. Henrik S. Nissen, translated by Thomas Munch-Petersen (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1983), pp. 66–97.

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Figure 1.1. German plans to invade France in 1914, 1939, and 1940.

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Stalin would be forced to break the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact and stop delivering oil to Germany. Ensuing shortages would fuel civil unrest in the Reich, hamstring the German economy, and encourage a reprise of the November 1918 Revolution. Some Allied leaders believed Nazis and Bolsheviks to be two sides of the same coin and pressed for attacks against what they believed to be the weaker enemy, but cooler heads eventually prevailed. The Supreme Allied War Council declared the Petsamo campaign impracticable on 5 February 1940 and the 10 May invasion of France precluded operations in southern Russia.¹² Allied leaders had little time to formulate a practical strategy during the so-called Phony War or the period between Poland’s surrender and the invasion of France. Germany invaded Denmark and Norway on 9 April 1940. Using troops originally earmarked for operations in Finland, France and Britain landed 12,000 soldiers on either side of Trondheim in the Norwegian villages of Aandelsnes and Namsos. Without air support or heavy weapons, they faced a comparable number of German troops equipped with tanks and supported by the Luftwaffe. German forces compelled the Allies to withdraw from southern Norway by 3 May, but operations in the north fared slightly better. The Royal Navy sank ten German destroyers while land forces pushed Axis soldiers out of Narvik, but the Allies themselves retreated on 7 June and redeployed the remaining forces in France. Allied plans for an offensive came to naught during the Phony War.¹³ Aside from Hitler, most Europeans began the war with a similar outlook. Politicians dreaded the cost of war, citizens feared widespread destruction, and military leaders believed their troops to be unprepared and ill-equipped. But Axis and Allied leaders embarked on different paths after the outbreak of hostilities. Under pressure from Hitler, German generals trained reservists in the art of mobile warfare, rushed new equipment to the front, launched a series of offensives, and developed an innovative plan for the invasion of France. In contrast, the Allies spent most of the Phony War reacting to German maneuvers and failed to address serious shortcomings in training, equipment, or operational planning. Allied performance in the battle of ´ ¹² Jean-Pierre Az´ema, 1940: L’Ann´ee terrible (Paris: Edition du Seuil, 1990), pp. 55–7. Franc¸ois B´edarida (ed.), La Strat´egie secr`ete de la drˆole de guerre (Paris: Editions du CNRS, 1979), pp. 235–243, 270–276. ¹³ Weinberg, A World at Arms, pp. 114–119.

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Figure 1.2. The Norwegian Campaign, 1940. Map courtesy of the United States Military Academy at West Point.

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France suggested that Allied leaders learned little from defeats in Poland, Denmark, or Norway.¹⁴ The invasion of France, Luxembourg, Belgium, and Holland on 10 May 1940 marked the beginning of the Western campaign. After learning that German troops had crossed into the Low Countries, General Gamelin, commander of Allied forces in France, immediately set the Dyle plan into operation. Based on the assumption that the German Schwerpunkt would strike near Li`ege and then turn southwest toward Paris, the Dyle plan called for mobile elements of the French army and British Expeditionary Force (BEF) to rush north, link up with the Belgian army near Antwerp, and defend a line running along the Dyle river, past Louvain, and ending in Belgian fortresses near Namur. Gamelin hoped the Dyle plan would keep Belgium in the war against Germany, shelter essential heavy industries in northeast France, protect the Channel ports, and provide forward bases for the Royal Air Force. The French commander ordered 30 divisions (including two of the three armored, five of the seven motorized, all three of the light mechanized French divisions, and the BEF) to advance and support Belgian troops.¹⁵ Although the Dyle plan might have countered the original version of Fall Gelb, it proved to be a fatal blunder in the spring of 1940. Allied forces advanced slowly over roads clogged by frightened refugees and faced German troops from ill-prepared positions. Poor liaison between British, French, and Belgian forces further undermined defensive efforts.¹⁶ The German army also enjoyed several psychological advantages. It assumed the offensive and launched commando operations whose success undermined Allied morale. German paratroopers’ capture of the Belgian fortress Eben Emael and seizure of vital bridges across the Maas river led many to suspect that a fifth column had aided the Nazi soldiers. English and French newspapers began to speculate about secret weapons and nuns in hobnailed shoes.¹⁷ The German juggernaut rolled slowly but surely through the Low Countries despite facing the best divisions that the Allies had to offer. ¹⁴ Umbreit, ‘The battle for hegemony in western Europe,’ p. 281; Az´ema, 1940: L’Ann´ee terrible, pp. 66–9. ¹⁵ Horne, To Lose a Battle, pp. 124–132; Chapman, Why France Fell, pp. 74–8; Umbreit, ‘The battle for hegemony in western Europe,’ pp. 265–271. ¹⁶ Jeffery A. Gunsberg, Divided and Conquered: The French High Command and the Defeat of the West, 1940 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1979), pp. 140–141, 215–216, 267. ¹⁷ Louis De Jong, The German Fifth Column in the Second World War, translated by C. M. Geyl (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1956), pp. 80–81, 205–206.

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Figure 1.3. The Western Campaign, 1940. Map courtesy of the United States Military Academy at West Point.

The revised version of Fall Gelb called for two major attacks in the spring of 1940. Army Group B carried out the first assault and advanced through the Low Countries toward Rotterdam and Antwerp. While the success of this drive compromised Allied positions, a second attack launched through the Ardennes forest by Army Group A delivered the coup de grˆace. French and Belgian cavalry divisions in the Ardennes fell back sooner than expected and compounded their dismal performance by not providing senior commanders with an accurate picture of the strong German formations approaching the Meuse river.¹⁸ Two German panzer corps exited the dense Ardennes forest and attacked across the Meuse at Sedan and Dinant on 13 May. Three of the initial six assaults launched by ¹⁸ Robert Allen Doughty, The Breaking Point: Sedan and the Fall of France, 1940 (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1990), pp. 46–53; Chapman, Why France Fell, pp. 112–113, 116–117.

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one corps failed to reach the western bank of the river, but German generals adapted to changing conditions and built on success. They attacked from successful bridgeheads, dislodged remaining French defenders on 14 May, and crossed the last major geographic barrier between them and the English Channel.¹⁹ While Army Group B distracted elite French and British forces in the Low Countries, Army Group A broke through a thinly defended section of French lines. With their best divisions engaged in Belgium and few units in reserve, the Allies could not plug the hole.²⁰ When the Western campaign began on 10 May, German and Allied forces faced each other on essentially equal ground. German airpower offset Allied advantages in both tank and infantry divisions.²¹ General Gamelin estimated that the French lost 17 infantry, 6 motorized, 3 armored, 1 heavy armored, and 2 cavalry divisions by the time German forces captured Dunkirk, but Germany did not suffer comparable losses and began the second phase of the Western campaign with a significant advantage.²² Although outnumbered and outclassed, French soldiers put up stiff resistance during the second phase of the Western campaign that began on 5 June. Infantry divisions arranged in a checkerboard pattern held their ground against German armored forces, but losses incurred in May limited the depth of French defenses. Once German tanks broke out of their initial bridgeheads along the Somme river, the French army could not stop the German drive south.²³ The commander in chief of the French Army since 20 May, General Maxime Weygand, announced that he would defend the French capital on 4 June, but official reassurances deceived few. Clouds of smoke billowed from government offices as bureaucrats burned secret records. The French government retreated to Tours on 10 June and a wave of civilians followed their example the next day. Parisians joined Belgians and their fellow countrymen from northern d´epartements on roads heading south. With only 10,000 troops and 30 tanks to defend the capital, General Weygand announced the obvious on 13 June. Speaking through the American ¹⁹ Chapman, Why France Fell, pp. 109–123; Doughty, The Breaking Point, p. 164. ²⁰ Chapman, Why France Fell, pp. 170–174; Doughty, The Breaking Point, pp. 266–293. ²¹ Umbreit, ‘The battle for hegemony in western Europe,’ pp. 278–9; R. H. S. Stolfi, ‘Equipment for victory in France, 1940,’ History 55 (February 1970) 20, pp. 1–20; Ernest R. May, Strange Victory: Hitler’s Conquest of France (New York: Hill and Wang, 2000), pp. 476–480. ²² Horne, To Lose a Battle, pp. 555–6; Umbreit, ‘The battle for hegemony in western Europe,’ p.295. ²³ Mellenthin, Panzer Battles, pp. 24–6; Chapman, Why France Fell, pp. 235–6.

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Charg´e d’Affairs in Berne, the French government declared Paris an open city. German troops entered the City of Light early on the morning of 14 June and Paris fell with nary a shot fired.²⁴ Three days later, the French government requested an armistice. The Franco-German armistice completed a process of rapid diplomatic change that began in the spring of 1939. Depending upon who was in power, throughout the 1920s and 1930s French foreign policy varied between Aristide Briand’s strategy of Franco-German reconciliation and Raymond Poincar´e’s calls for a strict enforcement of the treaty of Versailles. This rough political balance collapsed after Hitler violated the Munich Agreement and occupied Bohemia and Moravia on 15 March 1939. Moderate right- and left-wing parties in France and Britain responded by supporting accelerated rearmament programs. The 1939 Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact transformed the French political landscape a second time. Traditionally a proponent of a ‘united front’ against fascism, the Parti Communist Franc¸ais (PCF) reversed course on the eve of World War Two, extolled the virtues of ‘progressive’ Germany, and condemned corrupt Allied plutocracies. Although individual communists disobeyed Stalin’s orders and supported the French war effort in 1939, the PCF opposed France’s entry into World War Two.²⁵ Spectacular policy shifts in March and August 1939 acclimatized some Frenchmen to dramatic change. A policy of war against Nazi Germany enjoyed support from all but the most extreme parties in the fall of 1939. Conservatives like General Weygand, the commander of French forces in the Levant during the Phony War, urged the government to bomb Soviet oil fields in Baku. L´eon Blum, the former leader of the Popular Front, beseeched the Daladier government to help Finland against the Soviet Union.²⁶ Even if France lacked the strength to attack the Reich directly, many thought she could undermine the German war effort by attacking the Soviet Union in the ²⁴ DGFP, ser. D, vol. IX, pp. 560–1; Az´ema, 1940: L’Ann´ee terrible, pp. 100–108; David Pryce-Jones, Paris in the Third Reich. A History of the German Occupation, 1940–1944 (London: William Collins and Sons, 1981), pp. 3–6. ²⁵ Angelo Tasca, Les Communistes franc¸ais pendant la drˆole de guerre (Paris: Les Iles d’Or, 1951); Ronald Tiersky, French Communism, 1920–1972 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974); St´ephane Courtois, Le PCF dans la guerre (Paris: Ramsay, 1980). ²⁶ Franc¸ois B´edarida, ‘Huit mois d’attente et d’illusion: la drˆole de guerre,’ in La France des ´ ann´ees noires, ed. Jean-Pierre Az´ema and Franc¸ois B´edarida (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1993), vol. I, pp. 37–67.

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north or south.²⁷ Both proposals assumed that the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany were allied in a war against Britain and France. In retaliation for not pursuing an aggressive military strategy and aiding Finland, Blum’s Socialist Party declined to support the Daladier government in a vote of confidence on 20 March 1940. The following day, Edouard Daladier tendered his resignation and Paul Reynaud became the French Prime Minister.²⁸ The Reynaud government fared little better as the scope of France’s defeat became apparent. While French and British troops retreated toward Dunkirk, Reynaud invited Marshal Henri P´etain to join his government and fortify ministerial resolve. By 12 June, the French Commander in Chief said that it was ‘impossible to continue a coordinated defense of French territory.’²⁹ Weygand’s appraisal left the government, for the moment in Tours, with two choices: reach an agreement with Germany or abandon metropolitan France and continue to fight from North Africa. Following the strategy that brought him to power in March, Reynaud favored an aggressive policy of continued resistance.³⁰ Political considerations drove others to favor an armistice with Germany. On 13 June General Weygand told the cabinet that ‘serious disturbances have broken out in Paris and that (PCF leader Maurice) Thorez has installed ´ ee.’ The report proved to be false, but it conjured himself in the Elys´ memories of the 1870 Paris Commune and terrified conservatives. With support from General Weygand, P´etain urged the government to accept responsibility for defeat on behalf of the entire nation, called for negotiations with Nazi Germany, and betrayed Prime Minister Reynaud.³¹ Unable to settle on a common policy, the cabinet retreated from Tours to Bordeaux on 14 June. Once ensconced in Bordeaux, the French cabinet split into factions. P´etain, Weygand, Baudouin, Chautemps, and Ybarnegaray pressed for an ²⁷ Bernd Stegemann, ‘Politics and warfare in the first phase of the German offensive,’ in Germany and the Second World War, vol. II, Germany’s Initial Conquests in Europe, pp. 13–15; B´edarida (ed.), La Strat´egie secr`ete de la drˆole de guerre, pp. 235–243, 289–293, 296–301. ²⁸ Az´ema, 1940: L’Ann´ee terrible, pp. 56–9; B´edarida (ed.), La Strat´egie secr`ete de la drˆole de guerre, pp. 282–6. ²⁹ Az´ema, 1940: L’Ann´ee terrible, pp. 140–141. Paul Reynaud, In the Thick of the Fight, 1930–1945, translated by James D. Lambert (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1955), pp. 379–380. ³⁰ Reynaud, In the Thick of The Fight, pp. 484–491. ³¹ Horne, To Lose a Battle, pp. 568–9; Proc`es du Mar´echal P´etain, pp. 20–23; Philippe Simonnot, Le Secret de l’armistice 1940 (Paris: Plon, 1990), pp. 22–36.

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Figure 1.4. Adolf Hitler being greeted in the Compi`egne forest. Photograph courtesy of the Library of Congress.

agreement with Germany while Mandel, Campinchi, Marin, and de Gaulle vowed to fight on. The divided cabinet never considered Churchill’s hasty proposal for a political union with Great Britain or fighting Germany from North Africa. Unable to build a consensus, Reynaud submitted his resignation to President Lebrun on 16 June. As a member of the Reynaud government and Marshal of France, P´etain appeared to be the obvious successor. Two hours after Reynaud tendered his resignation, President Lebrun asked the aged Marshal to form a government. Without missing a beat, P´etain handed a list of ministers to the President. Obviously the Victor of Verdun had planned ahead.³² The new government of sixteen ministers (including eleven holdovers from the Reynaud cabinet) wasted little time debating policy. On the same day that he assumed power, 17 June, P´etain asked Hitler for an armistice through the Spanish ambassador, Se˜nor de Lequ´erica. Three days later, a ³² Horne, To Lose a Battle, pp. 568–577; Henri Michel, Vichy ann´ee 40 (Paris: Robert Lafont, 1966), pp. 31–6; Charles de Gaulle, The Complete War Memoirs of Charles de Gaulle, translated by Jonathan Griffin and Richard Howard (New York: Carroll and Graff Publishers, 1998), pp. 64–80; Jean Lacouture, De Gaulle: The Rebel 1890–1944, translated by Patrick O’Brian (London: Collins Harvill, 1990), pp. 201–207.

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French delegation crossed into occupied France during a local ceasefire, arrived in Compi`egne, and boarded the same railroad car in which Marshal Foch and General Weygand had received a German armistice delegation a generation earlier. The leader of the French delegation, General CharlesL´eon Huntziger, relayed Germany’s terms back to the French government in Bordeaux on the evening of 21 June. The French delegation signed the Armistice Agreement on 22 June, but the twenty-four articles did not come into force until France reached a comparable agreement with Italy. Fighting ceased at 1:35 a.m., 25 June 1940.³³ Eight days later, the French government moved to the eponymous town of Vichy and the era began in earnest. The March 1939 occupation of Bohemia and Moravia discredited appeasement and created support for rearmament in France and Britain. The August 1939 Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact pushed obedient French communists into an alliance with reactionaries who refused to ‘die for Danzig,’ undermined the Union Sacr´ee, and destroyed another foreign policy shibboleth. Defeat on the field of battle seemed to vindicate opponents of the war and simply overwhelmed many French men and women. Disoriented by a long period of dramatic change and exhausted by defeat, many Frenchmen adopted a ‘wait and see’ or attentiste attitude. They accepted terms of the 1940 Armistice Agreement by default. The Armistice Agreement shaped Franco-German relations for the next four years. General articles required French troops to lay down their arms, defined the zone of occupation, and obliged French officials to obey German orders in the occupied zone. Specific clauses ordered the French high command to surrender fortifications (article 7), compelled the French merchant marine to return to port (article 11), and grounded French aircraft (article 12). Drafts called for the demobilization of all French soldiers, but revisions allowed the French government to keep 100,000 men under arms, albeit without heavy weapons, modern airplanes, or tanks. By winning the right to maintain a small army, Marshal P´etain preserved the regime’s ability to suppress a communist insurrection and thus accomplished an initial goal of the Vichy regime. In return, France agreed to help Germany maintain order. German authorities could reduce the number of troops stationed in the Hexagon because they could count ³³ DGFP, ser. D, vol. IX, pp. 590, 643–654, 662–671.

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on French support. Clauses pertaining to the French army benefited both governments.³⁴ Without a large surface navy of his own, Hitler could not destroy the French fleet by force. If fighting between Germany and France dragged on, Admiral Jean Franc¸ois Darlan, the long-time commander-in-chief of the French navy, could transfer his beloved fleet to French colonial or British bases and provide the Royal Navy with valuable reinforcements.³⁵ Article eight called for units of the French fleet to return to their peace-time ports for demobilization and disarmament. From a German perspective, the agreement neutralized the French navy at no cost to the Reich. In later paragraphs of article eight, the German government promised not to use the French fleet for the duration of the war.³⁶ Marshal P´etain and Admiral Darlan saw article eight as an important diplomatic victory. Although some ships had to return to France and be disarmed, other vessels remained in colonial waters and could either be used as a bargaining chip in negotiations with Germany or deployed to protect French colonies from foreign depredation. If the German occupation became too oppressive, Marshal P´etain could extract concessions from Hitler by threatening to send French vessels to British or American ports. During the Occupation, P´etain, Laval, and Darlan never brandished this stick and preferred to curry German favor with concessions. When German forces crossed the demarcation line in response to the Allied invasion of North Africa in November 1942, few French naval officers joined the Allied cause and chose instead to scuttle the fleet. Attitudes of naval officers and the Vichy government, not the language of article eight, neutralized the French fleet as a factor in World War II.³⁷ The Armistice Agreement also shaped Franco-German economic relations. The Vichy government agreed to allow the trans-shipment of goods across metropolitan France (article 15), prevent ‘economic assets’ from leaving the country (article 17), and bear the cost of maintaining German troops on French territory (article 18). Article 22 created a joint ³⁴ A copy of the Armistice Agreement appears in DGFP, ser. D, vol. IX, pp. 671–9. ³⁵ Paxton, Parades and Politics at Vichy, pp. 7–8, 121; George E. Melton, Darlan: Admiral and Statesman of France, 1881–1942 (Westport, CT: Prager, 1998), pp. 74–7, 82–6. ³⁶ Paul Auphin and Jacques Mordal, La Marine franc¸aise dans la seconde guerre mondiale (Paris: Empire-France, 1967), pp. 23–5, 38–40; Paxton, Vichy France, pp. 110–111; Joachim Fest Hitler, translated by Richard and Clara Winston (New York: Vintage, 1975), pp. 634–6. ³⁷ Duroselle, L’Abîme, pp. 390–391.

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Franco-German commission that would turn principles outlined in the Armistice Agreement into specific regulations. Although usually inconsequential, the Armistice Commission did enhance German economic power by establishing a favorable rate of exchange. Using an inflated reichsmark, some German companies bought French industrial concerns outright or purchased stock at a very reasonable price and exercised indirect control over French businesses. As the war dragged on, German industrialists and Nazi bureaucrats used articles 15, 17, and 18 to first influence, later regulate, and finally control strategic French industries. Working behind the facade of a liberal economy, Nazi leaders exploited ambiguities of the Armistice Agreement and integrated large chunks of the French economy into the German war effort.³⁸ Articles that discussed political relations worked in much the same way. Article 3 granted German authorities ‘all the rights of an occupying power’ in territory occupied by the German army. In an unsigned note attached to the agreement, Hitler agreed that ‘the requirements of the conduct of the war against England’ and ‘everything . . . that was militarily necessary’ would define Germany’s rights as an occupying power. Later sections declared ‘that it [Germany] did not intend to burden itself with civil administration and with caring for the population. In that respect the French authorities were to continue to carry on the administration.’³⁹ Terms of the Armistice Agreement and associated memoranda could be interpreted in several different ways. The phrase ‘rights of an occupying power’ connected the Armistice Agreement with the Hague Convention on the Rules of Land Warfare. The Convention, particularly articles 42 through 54, established what an army could and could not do in occupied territory. For example, rules of the Hague Convention allowed an occupying army to collect taxes necessary for the maintenance of the army of occupation and take appropriate measures to ensure the safety of occupying soldiers, but they did not allow conquerors to seize private property without compensation or tamper with the religious customs of local inhabitants.⁴⁰ Language of the ³⁸ J¨ackel, France dans l’Europe de Hitler, pp. 107–108, 110; Alan S. Milward, The New Order and the French Economy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970), pp. 42–58; Norman Rich, Hitler’s War Aims, vol. II (New York: W. W. Norton, 1974), pp. 205–207. ³⁹ DGFP, ser. D, vol. IX, pp. 676–7. ⁴⁰ USNA, RG 153 (Records of the Office of the Judge Advocate General, U. S. Army)/135 (JAG Law Library, 1944–49)/21/31–35.

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Armistice Agreement suggested that Germany intended to obey the Hague agreement.⁴¹ Although noble in design, the Hague Convention anticipated neither the scope of modern economic warfare nor the twentieth-century concept of total war. Terms of the Hague Convention established one set of rules for private property and non-combatants while a second set of regulations governed the treatment of soldiers and property of belligerent governments. During the First and particularly Second World Wars, political and military leaders alike understood that modern warfare blurred distinctions central to the Hague Convention. Axis and Allied powers both hoped to turn the rules of war to their own advantage.⁴² The Armistice Agreement proved to be a flexible document. Germany’s promise not to seize the French fleet, permission to retain a 100,000 man French army, and assurances that the Reich would not tamper with the internal administration of France induced Marshal P´etain to sign an accord with the Third Reich. But qualifications tempered many of the assurances that P´etain found so attractive. Hitler designed the treaty to appear benign while reserving the option to exploit France through an intrusive occupation if necessary. As the war turned against Germany, the Führer ordered subordinates to take advantage of ambiguities within the Armistice Agreement. Neither French nor German leaders intended the Armistice Agreement to serve as a lasting settlement. Marshal P´etain’s Foreign Minister, Paul Baudouin, initially asked for an armistice but expected to negotiate a peace treaty in short order.⁴³ Acting on orders from the Führer, German diplomats ignored French peace proposals. Hitler informed members of his entourage, many of whom were dismayed by the lenient terms of the Armistice Agreement, that a final agreement with France would be inspired by the Treaty of Versailles and include territorial annexations.⁴⁴ He promised to undo 400 years of ‘robbery’ and ‘oppression’ by restoring Flanders, Alsace, Lorraine, the Ardennes, and the Argonne regions to the Reich.⁴⁵ The Führer viewed France as an implacable enemy of Germany ⁴¹ USNA, RG 242/T-501/101/11–13. ⁴² BAMA, RW 35/246/5–13. ⁴³ DGFP, ser. D, vol. IX, pp. 590, 680–681; Michel, Vichy ann´ee 40, pp. 40–45. ⁴⁴ Walter Warlimont, Inside Hitler’s Headquarters, translated by R. H. Barry (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), pp. 102–103. ⁴⁵ Wolfgang Schumann and Ludwig Nestler (eds.), Die faschistische Okkupationspolitik in Frankreich, 1940–1944 (Berlin: VEB Deutscher Verlag der Wissenschaften, 1990), pp. 111–113;

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and wanted to eliminate France as a great power.⁴⁶ Although his plans for France were less extreme than those being prepared for Poland or later the Soviet Union, Hitler could not afford to reveal his intentions before a total German victory. Disclosure would only encourage resistance. The Vichy and Nazi regimes benefited from the Armistice Agreement. The Vichy regime avoided the total occupation and won several apparent concessions like the right to retain a small military organization. The shock of defeat, domestic political considerations, German concessions, and bleak prospects for an Allied victory made the Armistice Agreement seem palatable to many Frenchmen. For his part, Hitler nullified the French fleet as a military force and turned an active belligerent into a helpful neutral that later contributed to the German war effort. In return for vague promises of benevolent treatment, Hitler won a substantial diplomatic victory that complemented battlefield successes.⁴⁷ If ‘defeat struck France as lightning strikes a tree,’ then many Germans were startled by the thunder. Neither staff officers nor field commanders had much faith in the original version of Fall Gelb, and everyone except Hitler viewed the revised plan as a desperate gamble.⁴⁸ As a result, civil and military leaders did not plan an elaborate occupation. Hitler issued a two-page directive in November 1939 that placed the commander-in-chief of the army in charge of all occupied territories in the West. He instructed General von Brauchitsch to establish a military government, suppress talk of territorial annexations, obey the Hague conventions, and place captive economies at the disposal of the Reich. Political work-stoppages, passive resistance, sabotage, and guerrilla warfare were to be suppressed with the ‘utmost severity.’ Finally, the Führerbefehl denied civilian and Nazi party agencies access to conquered lands without explicit permission from senior military authorities.⁴⁹ IMT , vol. XXXVII, pp. 218–223; IMT vol. VI, pp. 427–430; Bundesarchiv, Abteilung Reich und DDR, Lichterfelde-West, Berlin; Bestandssignatur R 43 II (Reichskanzlei), Archivsignatur 675, pp. 18–20. Hereafter abbreviated as BALW (Bundesarchiv Lichterfeld-West), followed by Bestandssignatur, Archivsignatur, and page number. For example, BALW R 43 II/675/18–20. ⁴⁶ Rich, Hitler’s War Aims, vol. II, pp. 197–198. Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf, translated by Ralph Manheim (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1971), pp. 619–620, 653, 674. ⁴⁷ DGFP, ser. D, vol. IX, pp. 676–7; Umbreit, ‘The battle for hegemony in western Europe,’ pp. 313–316. ⁴⁸ Burrin, France Under the Germans, p. 5; May, Strange Victory, pp. 267–8. ⁴⁹ Lucien Steinberg and Jean-Marie Fit`ere, Les Allemands en France, 1940–1944 (Paris: Albin Michel, 1980), p. 21; IMT vol. XXX, pp. 211–220, 232–6; Hans Umbreit, ‘Towards continental

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OKW and OKH intended to establish a traditional military government and present a benign appearance. Generals in Berlin ordered field commanders to obey international agreements and care for needy residents. Civil authorities would be allowed to continue about their business once the fighting ceased. General Keitel instructed field commanders to respect private property, cited specific articles of the Hague agreement, and threatened to punish plundering with death. Initial military regulations called for a modest, three-tiered military government and appear to be unadulterated by Nazi ideology.⁵⁰ Initial plans unraveled as troops encountered ‘catastrophic success’ and captured far more land than their original military government could absorb. Six days after the start of the Western campaign, OKH placed General Alexander von Falkenhausen in charge of the Netherlands. On 21 May, Hitler replaced Falkenhausen’s military government in Holland with a civil government led by Reichskommissar Arthur Seyss-Inquart. Ten days later, OKH installed Falkenhausen’s military government in Belgium and the French d´epartements of Nord and Pas-de-Calais. Falkenhausen became the Military Commander in Belgium and northwest France (Milit¨arbefehlshaber in Belgien und nordwest Frankreich or MBB) and supervised local, district, and senior (regional) commanders.⁵¹ Brauchitsch eventually installed a similar government in occupied France. Designated the Military Commander in France (Milit¨arbefehlshaber in Frankreich or MBF) on 17 June, General Johannes Blaskowitz controlled a four-tiered military government that included regional commanders (Bezirkchefs) who typically governed several d´epartements, field commanders (Feldkommandanten) in charge of individual d´epartements, and town commanders (Ortskommandanten) who oversaw French authorities in significant urban areas. The MBB and MBF both had the authority of an army commander, answered directly to Brauchitsch, and served as the dominion,’ in Germany and the Second World War, vol. V, Organization and Mobilization of the German Sphere of Power, part 1, Wartime Administration, Economy, and Manpower Resources 1939–1941, pp. 11–21; USNA, RG 242/T-77/1430/296–297. ⁵⁰ USNA, RG 242/T-77/1430/291–295; USNA, RG 242/T-501/166/67–70; USNA, RG 338 (Records of the United States Army Commands, 1942)/Foreign Military Studies/P-033 (German Military Government, Volume I)/fiche 155/31; Steinberg and Fit`ere, Les Allemands en France, pp. 21–3. ⁵¹ USNA, RG 242/T-501/93/7–8, 19–22, 37–39; Umbreit, ‘Towards continental dominion,’ pp. 72–8.

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Figure 1.5. The German chain of command.

ultimate legal authority within their respective domains. By the end of 1940, the MBF controlled 4 regional commanders, the commandant of greater Paris (who was equivalent to a regional commander), 47 field commanders, and 144 town commanders.⁵² It was a far cry from the original system of two senior-, two field-, and six local commanders envisioned in 1939. Brauchitsch placed dubious men in charge of improvised military governments. Known as an opponent of the Nazi regime before the war, General Blaskowitz lost his command in eastern Poland after criticizing Himmler’s Einsatzgruppen in two reports that eventually reached Hitler. His denunciations united anti-SS army officers and probably contributed to irregular SS formations being excluded from the German order of battle ⁵² USNA, RG 242/T-501/93/73, 78–79; USNA, RG 242/T-77/1587/folder 7/nfn. (Ob d H, Gen St d H, Generalquartermeister, Nr. 15645/40 dated 13.7.40); USNA, RG 242/ T-501/143/621; BALW, R 43 II/675/76–86.

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in France.⁵³ To cover up the scandal, Hitler had to pardon everybody accused of shooting prisoners, illegally seizing property, and mistreating civilians in Poland. Given Hitler’s racial agenda and Blaskowitz’s recent behavior, Blaskowitz’s appointment as the Milit¨arbefehlshaber in Frankreich seems impolitic; it lasted just 13 days.⁵⁴ General Alfred Streccius succeeded Blaskowitz as MBF on 30 June 1940. Commissioned in 1894, Streccius served in China during the Weimar era and earned a reputation for a lack of ethical restraint stemming from ‘Eastern influences.’ As an admirer of Taoism, Streccius often quoted Lao-Tzu and preferred the status quo.⁵⁵ General Otto von Stülpnagel succeeded Streccius on 25 October 1940 and governed France for almost 16 months. Although he appeared to be the stereotypical Prussian officer with a monocle, narrow moustache, and humorless demeanor, Stülpnagel also took an interest in airplanes before World War One and loved to speed through the streets of Paris in a red convertible during the Occupation. During World War One, he served in a variety of staff positions on the western front and received three nominations for Germany’s highest military decoration, the Pour le M´erite. Once hostilities ceased, Stülpnagel angrily defended the army against charges of war crimes and, together with Kurt von Schleicher and Freiherr von Bussche, played an integral role in the Reichswehr until he fell from grace before the Nazi seizure of power. After the Anschluss, Stülpnagel returned to active duty and assumed command of German forces in Austria.⁵⁶ ⁵³ Christopher Clark, ‘Johannes Blaskowitz—Der christliche General,’ in Ronald Smelser and Enrico Syring, eds., Die Milit¨arelite des Dritten Reiches (Berlin: Ullstein Buchverlage, 1997), pp. 28–50; Richard Giziowski, The Enigma of General Blaskowitz (New York: Hippocrene, 1997), pp. 483–504; Breitman, The Architect of Genocide, pp. 105–115; de Chambrun, France during the German Occupation, vol. III, p. 1774. ⁵⁴ Helmut Krausnick, ‘Hitler und die Morde in Polen,’ Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 11 (1963), pp 196–209; BAMA, RW 35/209/87–88; Giziowski, The Enigma of General Blaskowitz, pp. 117, 130, 143–8, 222–9. ⁵⁵ Steinberg and Fit`ere, Les Allemands en France, p. 23; Rich, Hitler’s War Aims, vol II, p. 201; Bundesarchiv Koblenz, Bestandssignatur N 1023 (Nachlaß Best), Archivsignatur 1, p. 4. Hereafter abbreviated as BAK, followed by Bestandssignatur, Archivsignatur, and page number. For example, BAK, N 1023/1/4. ⁵⁶ BAMA, N 5 (Depot Stülpnagel)/26/11, 26–29; BAMA, RW 35/1/100–105; Martin Kitchen, A Military History of Germany (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1975), p. 267. Otto von Stülpnagel, Die Wahrheit über die deutschen Kriegsverbrechen (Berlin: Staatspolitischer Verlag, 1921); USNA, RG 242/T-501/165/442; Walter Bargatzky, Hotel Majestic: Ein Deutscher im besetzten Frankreich (Freiburg: Verlag Herder, 1987), pp. 52–3.

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The man in charge of occupied Belgium, General Alexander von Falkenhausen, enjoyed an even more suspicious reputation. After holding a variety of diplomatic and military posts during World War One, Falkenhausen served as chief of the infantry training school during the Weimar era. When his brother perished during the Night of the Long Knives in 1934, Falkenhausen left the German army, advised Chiang Kai Shek, and designed the strategy that obliged Mao to begin his Long March. Falkenhausen returned to Germany after the Nazi regime, acting under pressure from the Japanese government, ‘made it clear that the welfare of his family was in danger.’⁵⁷ The men in charge of Belgium and France all served with distinction in World War One, viewed the collapse of the Kaiserreich with dismay, and displayed enough talent to avoid retirement in 1919. They had little sympathy for the Weimar Republic and shared Hitler’s desire to redraw the map of Europe but disdained the ‘Bohemian corporal.’⁵⁸ Because of their traditional background, these soldiers were not well suited to rule France or Belgium in a manner that would please Hitler. All four appointments highlight Brauchitsch’s political ineptitude. The MBF divided his staff into two separate parts: a command staff (Kommandostab) and a military administration staff (Milit¨arverwaltungsstab or MVW). The command staff directed reserve battalions (Landesschützen) stationed in their respective domains and supervised the secret military police (Geheime Feldpolizei or GFP). Men serving in reserve battalions were past their prime as fighting soldiers, but they could carry out missions that did not involve heavy combat.⁵⁹ Secret military police units searched for enemy agents and investigated crimes committed by or against German soldiers. Regional, field, and local commanders copied the MBF and divided their respective staffs into command and military administration sections.⁶⁰ The military administration staff included two subsections. The government subsection (Milit¨arverwaltung Abteilung Verwaltung) oversaw the regular ⁵⁷ Richard Cavell Fattig, ‘Reprisal: The German Army and the execution of hostages during the Second World War’ (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California, San Diego, 1980), pp. 33–35; John A. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2005), p. 21. ⁵⁸ Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army, pp. 482–4. Klaus-Jurgen Müller, The Army, Politics and Society in Germany, 1933–1945: Studies in the Army’s Relation to Nazism (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1987). ⁵⁹ USNA, RG 242/T-501/143/434, 442, 470. ⁶⁰ BAMA, RW 35/245/14.

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operations of the Vichy government, ensured that French bureaucrats took German interests into account, supervised the local police, approved French legislation, assisted refugees, distributed propaganda, protected French artistic treasures, and supervised highway and railroad construction.⁶¹ The economic subsection of the military administration (Milit¨arverwaltung Abteilung Wirtschaft) usurped economic controls established by the French government after the start of World War Two. In conjunction with the Vichy government, the economic subsection of the MVW allocated raw materials, installed price regulations, issued export and import licenses, confiscated Jewish businesses, and generally exploited French economic resources to the benefit of the German war economy.⁶² MVW officers had little or no military experience, wore unique military uniforms, and held officer status based on their civil service rank. Some veterans of the MVW reported friction between regular military officers serving on the Kommandostab and newcomers seconded to the military administration. Regular officers who slowly worked their way up through the ranks resented interlopers granted the rank and pay of a captain, major, or colonel.⁶³ The number of men (excluding clerks, drivers, secretaries, and translators) assigned to the MVW reached 1,600 in the winter of 1941/42 but usually hovered around 1,200.⁶⁴ The average age of MVW officers increased during the war as younger officials were sent to the Eastern front. By 1943, 80 per cent of the officers serving with the MVW were over 37 years old.⁶⁵ Those who remained were typically too young to have served in World War One but too old for front-line duty in World War Two. G¨oring’s Office of the Four-Year Plan, the Ministry of the Interior, Himmler’s SS, and other government offices all seconded officials to serve with the military administration.⁶⁶ Some ministries probably used the opportunity to get rid of unwanted administrators. The case of Werner Best may not have been unusual. After losing a power struggle with Reinhard Heydrich, Best left the Reich Security Main Office (Reichssicherheitshauptamt ⁶¹ BAMA, RH 3 (OKH Generalquartermeister)/198/7–18. ⁶² USNA, RG 242/T-77/1587/nfn (Ob d H, Gen St d H, Gen Qu, Nr. 15530/40, dated 26.6.40). ⁶³ BAMA, RH 3/198/10–12; BAMA, RW 35/245/3–4; Umbreit, ‘Towards continental dominion,’ p. 74 (note 174), p. 136. ⁶⁴ BAMA, RH 3/198/52–53; USNA, RG 252/T-78/32/706119–706154. ⁶⁵ BAMA, RH 3/164. ⁶⁶ BAMA, RW 35/244/5–6.

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Figure 1.6. The German Military Government in France

or RSHA) and volunteered for military service after the Polish campaign. At 37 years of age, he was too old for front-line service, but his legal training and experience in RSHA qualified him to serve as the head of the government subsection of the military administration.⁶⁷ Active soldiers assigned to the military government came from a similar background. Falkenhausen and Streccius had been cashiered before the war and were recalled to active duty after the invasion of Poland. Political disagreements with the Nazi regime ensured that Hitler would never promote either Blaskowitz or Otto von Stülpnagel. The head of the economic subsection noted that personnel were carefully selected for important positions within the military administration, but another official remarked that ‘unfit administrators,’ particularly at the ⁶⁷ Ulrich Herbert, Best. Biographische Studien über Radikalismus, Weltanschauung und Vernunft 1903–1989 (Bonn: J. H. W. Dietz, 1996), pp. 230–237, 255–6.

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lower levels, often caused trouble.⁶⁸ Some people assigned to the military government had marginal prewar careers. The military administration identified refugees as a serious problem in need of immediate attention. Military kitchens and the relief train Bavaria served 42.6 million meals between 6 June and 20 August, and army hospitals treated 93,000 French patients. A few supply officers allowed refugees to use military transportation while others doled out scarce gasoline to French civilians.⁶⁹ German troops restored essential public services and conjured an illusion of benevolence by helping peasants bring in the harvest.⁷⁰ Under orders from Berlin, German soldiers helped French refugees return home, but other measures exacerbated the refugee problem. To keep plans for the invasion of England secret, field commanders expelled enemy citizens (Belgians, British citizens, etc.), people without citizenship (e.g. Czechs and Poles), and racial enemies (gypsies and Jews) from nine French d´epartements along the Atlantic coast.⁷¹ To make matters worse, Hitler placed Alsace and Lorraine in the hands of Robert Wagner and Joseph Bürckel on 2 August 1940. As they integrated both provinces back into the Reich, the two district leaders (Gauleiters) dumped approximately 105,000 Jews and French nationalists in unoccupied France by the end of 1940.⁷² Large numbers of French and British prisoners of war created another security problem. During the 1940 Western campaign, advancing German soldiers frequently disarmed white prisoners and ordered them to march toward the rear without escort. Although many obediently marched into captivity, others simply melted into the countryside. The military government spent considerable time rounding up French and particularly British prisoners of war because they constituted a potential asset during peace ⁶⁸ BAMA, RW 35/244/5; BAMA, RW 35/245/14; Bargatzky, Hotel Majestic, pp. 45–6. ⁶⁹ Jackson, France. The Dark Years, pp. 118–121; Vinen, The Unfree French, pp. 29–44; Pierre Miquel, L’Exode, 10 mai–20 juin 1940 (Paris: Plon, 2003); Az´ema, 1940: L’Ann´ee terrible, pp. 119–128; USNA, RG 242/T-501/143/362. ⁷⁰ Charles W. Sydnor, Soldiers of Destruction (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990), pp. 120–127; USNA, RG 242/T-77/1587/folder 7/nfn (Chef des MVW Bezirkes Swfr., ‘Anzug aus den Besprechungen beim Chef der MVW Frankreich am 31 July 1940,’ Tgb. Nr. Qu 173/40, dated 7.8.40). ⁷¹ BAMA, RW 35/353/nfn (MBF Kdostab Abt Ia/Org 2/Ic, Tgb. Nr. Ia 127/40, dated 11.7.40). ⁷² DGFP, ser. D, vol. X, pp. 498–9; DGFP, ser. D, vol. XI, pp. 448–9; 456, 570–571, 578–581, 885; Rich, Hitler’s War Aims, vol. II, pp. 231–9; Az´ema, 1940: L’Ann´ee terrible, pp. 285–8.

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negotiations. Once collected, prisoners had to be identified, sorted, and transported to the Reich for service on German farms and in factories.⁷³ Members of the military administration also prepared for the occupation of Great Britain. The MBF built 7 concentration camps to accommodate 10,000 prisoners of war that OKH expected to capture during the invasion. Officers assigned to the military administration prepared a rudimentary military government for the British Isles.⁷⁴ Army divisions trained for contingencies including the invasion of unoccupied France and later the Soviet Union.⁷⁵ Neither the MBF nor regular army units had time to remodel France in accordance with Nazi ideology. Refugees, Allied prisoners of war, and military contingency plans represented only three of the most immediate problems that faced the military government. The MBF had to establish a regular system of occupation, protect German forces scattered across France, and monitor every level of the French government. Translators, prisoner of war guards, and capable administrative personnel remained in short supply. Pragmatic concerns like the procurement of food and housing also took up valuable time. With twenty-three million French civilians in thirty-seven fully and twelve partially occupied departments, the MBF had his hands full. Keitel, Brauchitsch, and other leading generals in Berlin spent most of their time planning for the invasion of Great Britain, Yugoslavia, Greece, and the Soviet Union between the fall of 1940 and spring of 1941; they wasted little time worrying about administrative details in France. Hitler’s long-term plans remained opaque to even his closest associates in the summer of 1940. Passages of Mein Kampf and remarks delivered to his entourage later in the war suggest that Hitler had little love for the French. He certainly wanted to weaken France so that it could never threaten his thousand-year Reich, but how he would do so remained an open question. Hitler preferred to leave terms of a final Franco-German peace settlement uncertain until military operations defeated Great Britain and later the Soviet Union. With minimal guidance from Berlin, the MBF remained free to govern France as he saw fit. ⁷³ USNA, RG 242/T-501/143/350–353. ⁷⁴ BAMA, RW 35/243/7–59; USNA, RG 242/T-501/143/525. ⁷⁵ USNA, RG 242/T-501/143/339–340.

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2 Rivals and scavengers

After becoming the Chancellor of Germany, Hitler shared power with conservative and independent politicians. Within his first cabinet, the Führer could only rely on support from Hermann G¨oring (Minister without Portfolio) and Wilhelm Frick (Minister of the Interior). While the departure of Alfred Hugenberg (Minister of Agriculture and Economics) and Franz von Papen (Vice-Chancellor) limited conservative influence, Nazis did not gain unfettered command of the government until Joachim Ribbentrop replaced Konstantin Freiherr von Neurath as Foreign Minister and Hitler assumed personal control of the Wehrmacht in 1938.¹ Between 1933 and 1939, leading Nazis like Heinrich Himmler and Hermann G¨oring outmaneuvered political rivals, seized the levers of power, developed extensive bureaucratic empires, and occupied all available political Lebensraum or living space. By 1939, Nazi paladins could only expand their respective bailiwicks within Germany at the expense of other influential Nazis. Military victories gave ambitious Nazis another opportunity to expand their bureaucratic satrapies. To capture a share of the spoils, G¨oring, Himmler, and Ribbentrop had to play a part in the war effort and find a raison d’être in newly occupied territories. Conquests also offered people like Alfred Rosenberg another chance to secure an influential position. The leader of the Nazi Party while Hitler languished in prison, Rosenberg did not obtain a ministerial position after the Nazi seizure of power. Regarded as an expert on race and foreign policy, he had reason to expect that a ¹ Martin Broszat, The Hitler State: The Foundation and Development of the Internal Structure of the Third Reich, translated by John W. Hiden (New York: Longman, 1981), pp. 262–3, 270–280.

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position of influence would come his way as German armies conquered Lebensraum. With an industrialized economy, skilled workforce, and a wide range of assets, France was indeed a rich prize for an ambitious Nazi. Hitler’s October 1939 directive and the terms of the Armistice Agreement placed occupied France squarely in the hands of the army. As the sole organization with executive authority (Exekutivbefugnisse), only the MBF could make arrests and confiscate property. Immediately after the Armistice, the German army secured a dominant role in occupied France by citing military necessity and emphasizing the need for security. However, most soldiers lacked the legal, technical, and administrative expertise to supervise the entire French government. OKH overcame this limitation by placing civilian bureaucrats in uniform and integrating administrators into the military government. After serving together for several months, most regular officers and bureaucrats seconded to the Milit¨arverwaltungsstab (military administration staff or MVW) worked as a team and developed an esprit de corps, but some former civilians never overcame their parochial background. On occasion, bureaucrats continued to advance the interests of their former agencies and operated as a ‘fifth column’ inside the MVW.² By exploiting the loyalty of some former bureaucrats, civil ministries in Berlin gained a toehold inside the MBF’s headquarters in the Hotel Majestic. Conservative French leaders feared a reprise of the 1870 Paris Commune and signed the Armistice Agreement in part to prevent a communist insurrection. Sharing similar concerns, OKH stationed one Waffen SS division and four army divisions around Paris in the fall of 1940.³ Throughout the Occupation, the MBF worried about security and vigorously pursued cases of anti-German propaganda, espionage, and sabotage. Hitler shared many of their concerns but employed an expansive definition of security. In keeping with his radical views of race and anti-Semitism, the Führer ordered subordinates to first study and later attack racial opponents in order to prevent any potential resistance. Some officers educated in the tradition of the Imperial Army ignored directives that fell outside their traditional conception of security. Eager to expand their respective empires, Himmler, G¨oring, Ribbentrop, and Rosenberg stepped into the breach and carried ² BAMA, RW 35/245/3–4. ³ BALW, R 19 (Ordnungspolizei)/401/81–82; BAMA, RW 5 (Auslander Amt/Abwehr)/ 318/50.

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Figure 2.1. G¨oring, Ribbentrop, Rosenberg, Goebbels, and other leading Nazis listen as Hitler declares War on the United States, 11 December 1941. Photograph courtesy of the Bundesarchiv, Bild 183-1987-0703-507.

out racial ‘security’ missions that were beneath the Wehrmacht’s dignity. By underestimating the importance of Hitler’s radical ‘security’ directives, officers imbued with traditional military values allowed civilian rivals to establish a substantial presence in occupied France. In theory, the French government remained sovereign under terms of the 1940 Armistice Agreement. Germany could exercise ‘all the rights of the occupying power’ but ‘did not intend to burden itself with the civilian administration’ of France. G¨oring’s failure to crush Britain during the fall of 1940 ensured that hostilities would continue for some time, and Hitler refused to negotiate a peace agreement with France alone.⁴ Orders dated 3 August and 20 November 1940 placed the Foreign Office in charge of political discussions with the French government and left ⁴ DGFP, ser. D, vol. IX, pp. 672, 677; J¨ackel, France dans l’Europe de Hitler, pp. 77–80.

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military affairs in the hands of the army.⁵ Directives from Berlin gave Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop and his representative in Paris, Ambassador Abetz, permission to to manage diplomatic relations between France and Germany. Joachim von Ribbentrop joined the party in May 1932 and operated as Hitler’s personal diplomat after the Nazi seizure of power. He later served as the Ambassador to the Court of St. James but failed to negotiate a political agreement with Great Britain. In the aftermath of the Blomberg–Fritsch affair, Hitler placed Ribbentrop in charge of the Foreign Ministry to limit conservative influence.⁶ After negotiating the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact on 24 August 1939, the Foreign Minister assured Hitler that Britain would not support Poland. When the latter proved false, Ribbentrop’s reputation declined precipitously. Throughout the Phony War, the Foreign Minister bickered with Joseph Goebbels and smoothed feathers that had been ruffled by the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact.⁷ During the Norwegian campaign, Ribbentrop bungled talks with King Haakon VII and backed the unpopular Vidkun Quisling over other potential collaborators who were more acceptable to the Norwegian public. In the aftermath of the debacle, Hitler literally distanced himself from his Foreign Minister; Ribbentrop observed the Western campaign several miles away from his beloved Führer. The first nine months of the war did not treat the former spirits salesman well.⁸ On the same day that German troops occupied Paris, Ribbentrop selected Otto Abetz to represent the interests of the Foreign Office in France. Born in 1903, Abetz was too young to serve in World War One. During the Weimar era, he played a significant role in youth organizations that promoted better relations between France and Germany. Although commonly described as a Francophile, Abetz had a love–hate relationship with France. On the one hand, he raged against French pilots who killed civilians during World War One bombing raids over Karlsruhe ⁵ DGFP, ser. D, vol. X, pp. 407–8; DGFP, ser. D, vol. XI, pp. 638–9. ⁶ Michael Bloch, Ribbentrop (New York: Crown Publishers, 1992), pp. 23–6; John Weitz, Hitler’s Diplomat (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1992), pp. 140–146; Gerhard L. Weinberg, The Foreign Policy of Hitler’s Germany: Starting World War II, 1937–1939 (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1980), pp. 45–7. ⁷ Bloch, Ribbentrop, pp. 251–276; Gerhard Schreiber, ‘Political and military developments in the Mediterranean area, 1939–1940,’ in MGFA, ed., Germany and the Second World War, vol. III, The Mediterranean, South-east Europe, and North Africa, 1939–1941, pp. 9–25. ⁸ DGFP, ser. D, vol. IX, pp. 142–4, 159–164, 195–7, 263–8; Bloch, Ribbentrop, pp. 278–281.

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and fulminated against black soldiers sent to occupy the Rhineland. Yet Abetz also supported the policies of rapprochement favored by Briand and Stresemann during the Weimar era and appreciated European international culture as expressed by Stefan George and Rainer Maria Rilke. He may have resolved his contradictory attitude by blaming anti-German sentiments on Jews and Freemasons. After the Nazi seizure of power, Abetz set aside doubts about the Nazi regime and promoted amicable relations between the two nations. He allayed French fears by arranging cultural exchanges between French and German veterans’ associations and expanding contacts with diverse intellectuals like Bertand de Jouvenel, Jean Luchaire, and Jules Romains. Although not yet a member of the Nazi party, Otto Abetz proved to be a useful tool and advanced the Nazi agenda.⁹ Service as Hitler’s translator and modest success in fostering FrancoGerman reconciliation brought Abetz to the attention of senior Nazi leaders including Joachim von Ribbentrop. The latter asked Abetz to join the Dienststelle Ribbentrop, a Nazi party organization that rivaled the official Foreign Office, and eventually placed him with the Deutsch-Franz¨osische Gesellschaft, an organization that arranged cultural exchanges, promoted international understanding, and distributed propaganda. Expelled from France shortly before the invasion of Poland, Abetz received a promotion and supervised the distribution of propaganda in western Europe during the Phony War. Ribbentrop appointed Abetz to serve as Representative of the Foreign Ministry with the Military Commander in France on 15 June 1940, and he acted as Germany’s chief diplomat in France throughout the Occupation.¹⁰ Following instructions from Hitler and Ribbentrop, Abetz pursued a general strategy of collaboration along three specific avenues. First, he met with potential collaborators from across the political spectrum. On 15 July he sent the military government a list of ‘politicians and political movements that are accessible to us.’ Old contacts from the Deutsch-Franz¨osische Gesellschaft and new-found friends placed Abetz in ⁹ Otto Abetz, Das offene Problem: Ein Rückblich auf zwei Jahrzehnte deutscher Frankreichpolitik (K¨oln: Greven Verlag, 1951), pp. 15–34; Barbara Lambauer, Otto Abetz et le Franc¸ais ou l’envers de la collaboration (Paris: Fayard, 2001), pp. 22, 59–63. ¹⁰ Lambauer, Otto Abetz et le Franc¸ais, pp. 82–3, 92–5, 127; Abetz, Das offene Problem, pp. 41–3, 108, 132–5.

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touch with the Vichy regime and all major political parties of the Third Republic. Second, the Paris embassy assumed direct control over the newspaper L’Illustration and placed sympathizers in charge of La France au Travail, La Gerbe, and La Vie Nationale. The four papers each courted a different segment of the political spectrum and operated as points around which public opinion could coalesce in favor of the Reich. Abetz’s propaganda efforts continued along the lines of the old Deutsch-Franz¨osische Gesellschaft and tried to foster Franco-German reconciliation.¹¹ Attacks on racial opponents formed the third component of Abetz’s policy. On 5 July 1940, Hitler ordered the Einsatzstab Rosenberg, a small Nazi party organization with interests in foreign affairs, ideological education, and Aryan culture, to search through state libraries, archives, churches, and masonic lodges for evidence of anti-German conspiracies. On his own initiative, Abetz supported the Einsatzstab Rosenberg as part of his campaign to eliminate anti-German influences.¹² He expanded his mission beyond the written materials targeted in Hitler’s 5 July order and pursued tapestries, sculptures, paintings, and other objets d’art owned by Jews. At various times, Abetz described seizures as a bargaining chip that could be used during final peace negotiations, an attempt to impoverish French Jews, and an effort to protect cultural assets from the ravages of war. Seizures of Jewish property, particularly objets d’art, played a major part in Abetz’s campaign against anti-German elements within French society.¹³ After six weeks in France, Abetz discussed German policy with Hitler in early August 1940. In hopes of fostering French support for the Vichy regime and encouraging pro-German sentiments, Abetz asked the Führer to liberate French prisoners of war and rescind travel restrictions between occupied and unoccupied France. Angered by stories that French police had mistreated German prisoners during the Western campaign, Hitler refused both requests and ruled that ‘[t]he treatment of the demarcation line between the occupied and unoccupied parts of France must correspond to the requirements of Germany’s conduct of the war. The security of ¹¹ DGFP, ser. D, vol. X, pp. 215–217; Abetz, Das offene Problem, pp. 60–74, 89–97. ¹² BAMA, RW 35/698/1; USNA, RG 242/T-501/196/627; see also Chapter 3 this volume. ¹³ Abetz, Das offene Problem, p. 137; Bargatzky, Hotel Majestic, pp. 65–7.

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military operations takes first place.’ Hitler insisted that the French first prove themselves to be loyal allies before he would grant any concessions.¹⁴ Hitler’s refusal undermined Abetz’s attempts to expand Franco-German collaboration, but it did not apply to the military administration. If the Vichy government allowed Germany to influence the administration and economy of France and the French empire beyond limits set forth in the Armistice Agreement, then the MBF could relax the enforcement of existing travel and trade restrictions. The process also worked in reverse. After P´etain fired Pierre Laval on 13 December 1940, the military administration did not allow French civil servants to cross the demarcation line. Because soldiers manned checkpoints and physically regulated traffic, the military could exert influence without making a firm commitment. Although vested with comparable authority, the Foreign Office had less real power than the MBF because the latter implemented German policy.¹⁵ Abetz left his 3 August meeting with Hitler under the impression that the Führer mistrusted the French but had not yet decided on a specific course of action. He returned to Paris and carried out duties that included representing the Nazi government, advising military authorities on political questions, censoring the press and radio, and securing ‘public artistic properties . . . especially Jewish artistic properties in accordance with special directives issued on that subject.’¹⁶ The last mission alienated sympathetic Frenchmen because Germany appeared to be robbing France’s ‘artistic patrimony.’ Citing changed circumstances, the ambassador eventually abandoned efforts to seize objets d’art from racial enemies to protect his fundamental goal of Franco-German collaboration.¹⁷ When forced to make a choice, Abetz favored collaboration over robbery. Other diplomats supported Abetz’s policy of Franco-German collaboration. An official in Ribbentrop’s entourage drafted a protocol that guaranteed France her ‘rightful place in a reorganized Europe’ if the French government helped Germany defeat Great Britain. A member of the ¹⁴ J¨ackel, France dans l’Europe de Hitler, pp. 100–102; DGFP, ser. D, vol. X, pp. 251, 468–470; Abetz, Das offene Problem, pp. 141–4. ¹⁵ USNA, RG 242/T-77/1587/folder 20030/nfn (Der Chef der Milit¨arbefehlshaber in Frankreich, Kommandostab Ia, Paris 11.8.40, Betr. Zusammenarbeit im Dienste der Milit¨arverwaltung); Jackson, France. The Dark Years 1940–1944, pp. 174–5. ¹⁶ Abetz, Das offene Problem, pp. 141–4; DGFP, ser. D, vol. X, pp. 407–408. ¹⁷ Bargatzky, Hotel Majestic, p. 66; BAMA, RW 35/705/27–28; BAMA, RW 35/712/131– 133.

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Franco-German Armistice Commission outlined a series of concessions including a reduction in occupation costs that France paid the Reich.¹⁸ But Hitler did not discuss either proposal with Laval and Marshal P´etain in Montoire on 22 and 24 October 1940. Both French leaders repudiated France’s declaration of war on Germany, urged the Führer to avoid the mistakes of 1918, and pleaded for a generous settlement. Hitler observed that somebody would have to pay for the war and implied that Britain would bear the majority of the bill if France furnished substantial aid to Germany.¹⁹ Eager to score a diplomatic coup, Abetz pursued vague calls for full-blown collaboration that Hitler expressed in Montoire with reckless enthusiasm. Subsequent discussions between Abetz and the French government produced the Protocols of Paris that allowed Germany to purchase supplies for the Africa Korps and use French bases in Syria, Iraq, Bizerte, and Dakar. In return, France would receive the release of approximately 80,000 prisoners of war, a reduction in occupation costs charged to the French government, relaxed trade and travel rules, and permission to expand French military forces. Initialed on 27 and 28 May 1941, the Protocols offered concessions that Nazis in Berlin were not prepared to deliver. With Hitler’s approval, Ribbentrop condemned ‘these naïve French attempts at blackmail’ and consigned Abetz’s policy to oblivion.²⁰ The Protocols of Paris established the limits of Abetz’s influence. After the invasion of the Soviet Union, Hitler refused to discuss political concessions or a final peace settlement before France declared war on Great Britain and the United States. The Vichy regime wanted political and military concessions before formally declaring war on the Allies.²¹ Both parties tried to get the other side to deliver benefits before giving anything in return. Abetz could not convince either party to take the first step. Unable to negotiate a mutually acceptable settlement, Abetz expanded links with ultra-fascists like Jacques Doriot, Marcel D´eat, and Eug`ene ¹⁸ DGFP, ser. D, vol. XI, pp. 346–351; J¨ackel, France dans l’Europe de Hitler, pp. 163–7. ¹⁹ DGFP, ser. D, vol. XI, pp. 354–361, 385–392; J¨ackel, France dans l’Europe de Hitler, pp. 163–7, 169–176; Lambauer, Otto Abetz et les Franc¸ais, pp. 204–209. ²⁰ DGFP, ser. D, vol. XII, pp. 892–900; DGFP, ser. D, vol. XIII, pp. 142–3; Lambauer, Otto Abetz et les Franc¸ais, pp. 329–350; J¨ackel, France dans l’Europe de Hitler, pp. 242–251; Paxton, Vichy France, pp. 116–120. ²¹ DGFP, ser. D, vol. XIII, pp. 143–9, 930–934; ADAP, ser. E, vol. I, p. 173.

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Deloncle who would support the Nazi cause without asking for any substantial concessions in return but had minimal support among the French public.²² Acting with Hitler’s approval, Ribbentrop scotched the Protocols of Paris on 16 July 1941. Two months later, Hitler once again met with Abetz and characterized the French as ‘a decent people’ who could find a place in his new order if they contributed to the German war effort ‘without reservation.’ While speaking with his ambassador, the Führer claimed that his territorial ambitions were limited to Alsace, Lorraine, and a special security arrangement for Calais.²³ Limited annexations discussed with Abetz contradict passages of Mein Kampf that describe France as the ‘mortal enemy.’ In a conversation on 31 January 1942, Hitler echoed passages of his first book and assumed a hard line against France. ‘France remains hostile to us. She contains, in addition to her Nordic blood, a blood that will always be foreign to us.’ One month later, Hitler reconciled the ‘soft’ policy described to Abetz and the ‘hard’ line set forth in Mein Kampf : Abetz is too exclusively keen on collaboration, to my taste. Unfortunately, I can’t tell him precisely what my objects are, for he has a wife. The fact is, I know of a man who talks in his sleep, and I sometimes wonder whether Abetz doesn’t do the same. But he’s intelligent at organizing resistance in Paris against Vichy, and in this respect his wife is useful to him. Thus things take on a more innocent character.

The Führer mistrusted France and his ambassador for similar reasons. Abetz married a French woman and could not be trusted because he might talk in his sleep. Frenchmen carried non-Aryan blood and might sabotage Hitler’s war against Jews.²⁴ Neither could be trusted. While the war lasted, the Führer used Abetz to pacify France with seductive words. Hitler’s long-term intentions toward France would resemble ideas in the Stuckart Memoranda and Mein Kampf . Once victorious, Hitler probably planned to ²² Bertram M. Gordon, Collaborationism in France during the Second World War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1980), pp. 27–41, 61–2; Lambauer, Otto Abetz et les Franc¸ais, pp. 229–231. ²³ DGFP, ser. D, vol. XIII, pp. 518–520. ²⁴ Hitler, Mein Kampf , pp. 619, 624, 671, 674; H. R. Trevor-Roper (ed.), Hitler’s Table Talk, 1941–1944, translated by Norman Cameron and R. H. Stevens (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1953), pp. 264–5, 344–5.

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strip France of all territory lying north of a line that ran from Lake Geneva in Switzerland to the Somme estuary on the Atlantic coast.²⁵ Events surrounding the end of World War One inspired Hitler’s basic policy toward France. The 1940 Armistice Agreement mimicked Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points. Both ended hostilities and appeared benign but exercised little influence on subsequent events. Just as French troops seized control of Alsace and Lorraine before either France or Germany had ratified the Treaty of Versailles, Hitler ordered the same provinces reintegrated into the Reich shortly after signing the 1940 Armistice Agreement.²⁶ The Führer signed the 1940 Armistice in Marshal Foch’s railroad coach to humiliate France, and the ceremony indicated the heading that Hitler would follow after Germany won the war—a course that included territorial annexations and the destruction of France as a great power. Hitler pursued a schizophrenic policy toward France throughout the Occupation. During the October 1940 Montoire conference, he assured Laval that ‘Germany was not seeking a peace inspired by arrogance or vengeance’ and suggested that France could avoid ‘the suffering which she herself had inflicted on Germany in 1918.’ The Führer satiated French opinion by making vague promises and returning the remains of Napoleon’s son to Paris, but he refused to offer substantial concessions or limit his postwar plans.²⁷ After the war turned against Germany, Hitler would not negotiate from a position of weakness. Passages from Mein Kampf and conversations with trusted cronies suggest that Hitler had ominous longterm plans for France. The Führer used Abetz as a pawn when collaboration suited his interests but relied upon brute force to determine FrancoGerman relations. Ambassador Abetz distracted the Vichy regime with promises of benign treatment, but his words carried no weight. Without Hitler’s trust or the means to act independently, neither Ambassador Abetz nor Foreign Minister Ribbentrop could determine German policy in France.²⁸ ²⁵ Umbreit, ‘The battle for hegemony in western Europe,’ pp. 321–4; Lambauer, Otto Abetz et les Franc¸ais, pp. 175–7. ²⁶ Joseph Goebbels, The Goebbels Diaries, 1939–1941, translated by Fred Taylor (New York: G. P. Putnam and Sons, 1983), p. 123; BALW, R 43 II/675/18–20. ²⁷ DGFP, ser. D, vol. XI, pp. 356, 359; Abetz, Das offene Problem, pp. 174–6; DGFP, ser. D, vol. XI, p. 866 note 2, 891–8, 951–2. ²⁸ Trevor-Roper (ed.), Hitler’s Table Talk, p. 265; Gordon, Collaborationism in France during the Second World War, pp. 27–41, 61–2.

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As the ‘Second Man’ in the Third Reich, Reichsmarschall Hermann G¨oring expected to play a significant role in occupied France. A year after he joined the Nazi party, G¨oring participated in the November 1923 Beer Hall Putsch and served as National Commissar for the Prussian Ministry of the Interior, National Commissioner for Air Traffic, and Minister without Portfolio in Hitler’s first government. He eventually stepped down as Minister President of Prussia and relinquished control of the Gestapo in exchange for appointments as Minister of Economic Affairs and Leader of the Four-Year Plan. The latter placed large sections of the German economy under his control and secured his position near the top of the Nazi hierarchy.²⁹ In addition to his economic responsibilities, G¨oring advised Hitler on diplomatic questions in Italy and Eastern Europe. The Führer used Ribbentrop to execute routine diplomatic business but consulted his ‘most loyal paladin’ before annexing Austria and parts of Czechoslovakia.³⁰ G¨oring backed away from the Führer’s bellicose foreign policy in 1939 and maintained contact with the British government through the Swedish industrialist Birger Dahlerus in a halfhearted attempt to prevent war with Great Britain. Not to be thwarted, the Führer used the ever-pliant Joachim von Ribbentrop to ignite World War Two.³¹ After France requested an armistice, the Foreign Office asked ministers to submit a list of ‘wishes and suggestions’ within their respective areas of expertise that could be used during the negotiation of a final peace agreement. G¨oring curtly replied that he, not the Foreign Minister, would negotiate economic tenets of a general settlement.³² The dispute proved to be academic because Germany never signed a treaty with France, but it guaranteed the Reichsmarschall a degree of influence in the Hexagon. Terms of the Armistice Agreement created two avenues for influencing the French economy. Article 22 established an Armistice Commission to hammer out details of the accord. General Carl-Heinrich von Stülpnagel ²⁹ Richard Overy, G¨oring: ‘The Iron Man’ (Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984); Alfred Kube, ‘Hermann Goering: second man in the Third Reich,’ in Ronald Smelser and Rainer Zitelmann, eds., The Nazi Elite (New York: New York University Press, 1993), p. 65. ³⁰ Overy, Goering: The ‘Iron Man’, pp. 76–80; Kube, ‘Hermann Goering: second man in the Third Reich,’ p. 67; Broszat, The Hitler State, pp. 300–306. ³¹ Leonard Mosley, The Reich Marshal: A Biography of Hermann Goering (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1974), pp. 236–245. ³² DGFP, ser. D, vol. X, pp. 24, 93, 115, 170–173, 213–215.

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led the entire commission while Hans Hemmen, a veteran diplomat, took charge of the economic subsection. G¨oring won the right to approve Hemmen’s appointment and formulate his instructions in conjunction with the Foreign Office, but the victory proved hollow because the Armistice Commission accrued little real power. With advance knowledge of French bargaining positions, Hemmen ran his delegation with equanimity. Using diplomatic means, Hemmen transferred the economic prerogatives of the French state to OKW.³³ G¨oring could influence the French economy via Hemmen and the economic subsection of the Armistice Commission. A central purchasing office (Zentralauftragsstelle) under the joint control of OKW and the Economic Affairs Ministry carried out most of the detailed exploitation of the French economy. Headquartered in Paris, the office drew personnel from all three branches of the armed services, G¨oring’s economic empire, and Fritz Todt’s Armaments and Munitions Ministry.³⁴ It approved all large German government contracts placed with French concerns and distributed scarce raw materials. The Reichsmarschall placed Major-General Bührmann in charge of the office, but his influence proved to be short-lived as Bührmann died shortly after arriving in France. After a desultory exchange of letters, the Reichsmarschall allowed General Georg Thomas, an officer currently in charge of the OKW Economy and Armaments office (Wirtschafts- und Rüstungsamt or OKW Wi. Ru. Amt), to take over the central purchasing office.³⁵ The military administration economic section (Milit¨arverwaltung Abteilung Wirtschaft) ensured compliance with the Armistice Agreement and wielded considerable influence over economic planning and resource allocation in occupied France. Dr. Elmar Michel, a veteran of the Ministry of Economic Affairs, ran the MVW economic section and cooperated with the OKW’s central purchasing office because he and many of his subordinates held positions in both organizations. Their dual service allowed officers to don mufti and travel through unoccupied France as arms control inspectors, agents of the Economics Ministry, or representatives of the Four-Year Plan. In conjunction with OKW, the economic section of the MVW ³³ Milward, The New Order and the French Economy, pp. 48–9, 56; DGFP, ser. D, vol. X, pp. 213–215; J¨ackel, France dans l’Europe de Hitler, pp. 107–110. ³⁴ BALW, R 43 II/675/14–16; Milward, The New Order and the French Economy, pp. 65–9. ³⁵ BALW, R 43 II/609/9, 12, 47; Georg Thomas, Geschichte der deutschen Wehr- und Rüstungswirtschaft (Boppard am Rhein: Harald Boldt Verlag, 1966), pp. 221–6.

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first restored French industrial capacity and then used French factories to augment the German war effort. German agencies in command of the French economy were able to coordinate their activities because leading officials held multiple posts. Personal relations between influential bureaucrats and officers dictated relations between the MVW economic section, OKW, the Ministry of Economics, and the Office of the Four Year Plan.³⁶ Hitler granted the Reichsmarschall authority to settle all economic disputes between civil and military agencies during the spring of 1941, but G¨oring used that power sparingly.³⁷ As the economic tsar of the Third Reich, G¨oring could have played a leading part in removing Jewish influences from the French economy—a process Nazis called ‘Arisierung,’ or ‘Aryanization.’ Just as he let OKW and the military administration allocate raw materials and negotiate contracts, the Reichsmarschall allowed the Foreign Office and Einsatzstab Rosenberg to identify, confiscate, and redistribute firms owned or controlled by Jews.³⁸ He let others act in his stead and played an indirect role in the so-called Aryanization process, but he fought scrupulously for the right to enforce his will.³⁹ The Reichsmarschall played an active role in the confiscation of works of art owned by wealthy Jews—a task that Nazis regarded as a subsection of economic Aryanization. Before her death, G¨oring’s first wife Carin had taught her husband to appreciate Renaissance painters and the Dutch school. Throughout his tenure in power, he followed the art market and ordered staff members to search for bargains. Unlike Hitler, G¨oring spent time enjoying collections displayed in his four mansions and a hunting lodge outside Berlin. The conquest of western Europe created new opportunities for the Reichsmarschall to expand his holdings by creating a group of motivated sellers—wealthy Jews trapped in conquered territories. The Reichsmarschall instructed a subordinate on his staff to ‘forget about the racial background of the [art] dealers with whom you come in contact’ and did not hesitate to exploit the misfortunes of others. On occasion, G¨oring helped obliging Jewish art dealers escape ³⁶ BAK, N 1023/1/19; BALW, R 43 II/623a/3; Milward, The New Order and the French Economy, pp. 269–297. ³⁷ BAMA, RH 3/202/10–18. ³⁸ BAMA, RW 35/2/nfn (Abschrift, Der Reichsmarschall des Grossdeutschen Reiches, Beauftragter für den Vierjahresplan, Der zweite Staatsekret¨ar; VP 19 002/5; Berlin 4.12.40). ³⁹ BAMA, RW 35/712/83.

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Nazi territory. With breathtaking cynicism, he played upon Jewish fears, created a group of motivated sellers, and expanded his own personal art collection.⁴⁰ G¨oring worked with private art dealers in the Low Countries but turned to the Einsatzstab Rosenberg for help in obtaining works of art owned by French Jews. In conjunction with officials from the Paris embassy, the Einsatzstab Rosenberg located several large collections of artwork that were owned by French Jews such as the Rothschilds and discovered others that had been transferred to state institutions like the Louvre.⁴¹ The MBF vehemently opposed plans to transfer public or private property back to the Reich for ‘safe keeping’ and later forced G¨oring to absolve the military of all responsibility for any criminal charges stemming from confiscations. Hitler, who regarded Jewish property as ownerless, overruled military opposition to confiscations and allowed agents of the Einsatzstab Rosenberg to seize Jewish assets.⁴² On 3 November 1940, G¨oring issued a decree that placed the Einsatzstab Rosenberg in charge of discovering, cataloging, collecting, and packing art that would in turn be shipped back to the Reich by the Luftwaffe.⁴³ Preoccupied by the Battle of Britain and discredited by his inability to stop the British escape from Dunkirk, G¨oring allowed the Einsatzstab Rosenberg to fight military figures who opposed the confiscation of Jewish property but secured a share of the spoils for himself. The Reichsmarschall also dabbled in Franco-German diplomacy. He met Laval at Marshal Pilsudski’s funeral in 1935 and spoke with Prime Minister Daladier during the 1938 Munich conference. At a meeting on 1 December 1941 with Marshal P´etain in Saint Florentin, G¨oring repeated Hitler’s basic policy toward France and failed to persuade P´etain to move toward Berlin.⁴⁴ Hans Speidel, the MBF’s Chief of Staff between 1940 and 1942, reported that G¨oring stood up in the middle of an important ⁴⁰ Mosley, The Reich Marshal, pp. 263–5; Jonathan Petropoulos, Art as Politics in the Third Reich (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1996), pp. 187–195; Lynn H. Nicholas, The Rape of Europa. The Fate of Europe’s Treasures in the Third Reich and the Second World War (New York: Vintage Books, 1995), pp. 35, 107. ⁴¹ BAMA, RW 35/698/22–23, 143. ⁴² BAMA, RW 35/1/4–7; BAMA, RW 35/712/109–110; USNA, RG 242/T-77/1624/8–10; Robert Cecil, The Myth of the Master Race: Alfred Rosenberg and Nazi Ideology (London: B. T. Batsford, 1972), pp. 159–160; USNA, RG 242/T-501/196/649–651. ⁴³ USNA, RG 242/T-501/165/347–348. ⁴⁴ DGFP, ser. D, vol. XIII, pp. 914–927; BAMA, RW 35/542/73–76.

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meeting concerning food distribution and abruptly declared ‘now I will go to Maxim’s,’ Paris’s premier restaurant, and abruptly left the room. In 1943 he issued directives to combat the black market and improve air raid defenses but left day-to-day operations to military officials.⁴⁵ The Reichsmarschall could influence Franco-German relations, but he chose to do so only when protecting his own authority and often behaved erratically. Often driven by self-interest, G¨oring focused on personal matters and usually allowed others to act in his stead. He exercised a haphazard influence over French affairs and infuriated the military government on several occasions. General Otto von Stülpnagel’s letter of resignation highlighted the Reichsmarschall’s baneful influence.⁴⁶ Like Foreign Minister Ribbentrop and Ambassador Abetz, Hermann G¨oring possessed considerable powers and could not be ignored, but he did little more than disrupt military plans. While Hermann G¨oring’s star waned within the political constellation of the Third Reich, Heinrich Himmler improved his standing within the Nazi hierarchy. Born in 1900, Himmler joined the NSDAP in 1925 and worked for Gregor Strasser. A year later he moved to Munich and worked in the Nazi Party’s propaganda section. Himmler’s career as an independent leader began with his appointment to head the Schutzstaffeln, better known by the abbreviation SS, in 1929. Also known as the Black Corps, the SS protected Nazi leaders, battled political opponents, and became an elite organization loyal only to Hitler.⁴⁷ Himmler established an SS intelligence branch in 1932 and an office dealing with racial matters one year later. By 1939 the Reichsführer controlled police forces throughout the Reich, ran a network of concentration camps, collected intelligence inside Germany and abroad, and had a small armed section (the Waffen SS) that was equipped with heavy weapons. Only the Waffen SS could participate in regular military operations and garner laurels, but secret decrees issued in August 1938 and May 1939 limited the size of the Waffen SS relative to the regular army. ⁴⁵ Hans Speidel, Aus unserer Zeit. Erinnerungen (Berlin: Verlag Ullstein GmbH, 1977), p. 105; BAMA RW 35/826. ⁴⁶ USNA, RG 242/T-501/165/438; BAMA N 5/24/26–28. ⁴⁷ Robert Lewis Koehl, The Black Corps. The Structure and Power Struggles of the Nazi SS (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1983), pp. 21–30; Bernd Wegner, The Waffen SS. Organization, Ideology and Function, translated by Ronald Webster (Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell Ltd, 1990), pp. 61–4.

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In general, Himmler designed the SS to fight clandestine opponents and prevent a reprise of the 1918 Revolution.⁴⁸ The Second World War focused public attention squarely on military leaders but encouraged Hitler to embrace radical solutions that only the SS could or would carry out. Using military operations as a cover, SS special action squads (Einsatzgruppen) executed political and racial opponents in Poland, and SS doctors killed handicapped Germans through the life unworthy of living (lebensunwertes Leben) program.⁴⁹ The conquest of western Europe created another opportunity to battle racial enemies, but a need for absolute secrecy forced the Reichsführer to proceed with caution. In order to carry out his secret mission, Himmler had to create a palatable justification for the SS in western Europe. Himmler had few allies among the upper ranks of the army hierarchy in 1939. SS critics like Generals Blaskowitz, Leeb, Küchler, and Ulex outnumbered SS proponents such as General Reichenau. The majority of the officer corps mistrusted the SS and viewed the Waffen SS as a dangerous rival. Military opposition to the SS took concrete form in protests stemming from the execution of Jews during the campaign in Poland and Himmler’s 28 October 1939 speech that urged members of the SS to father children in or out of wedlock. Himmler delivered a conciliatory speech to senior military figures in March 1940, and General Keitel minimized military opposition by listening to the complaints from subordinates but not passing on grievances to Hitler or taking concrete measures against the Reichsführer. Himmler’s conciliatory tactics and Keitel’s spineless nature tamped down open dissent but did not eliminate military opposition to SS activities. General von Brauchitsch barred Allgemeine SS units from entering France, and Waffen SS divisions remained under military control during the 1940 Western campaign. Security Police (Sicherheitspolizei or Sipo), Secret State Police (Geheime Staatspolizei or Gestapo), Order Police (Ordnungspolizei or Orpo), and SS Security Service (Sicherheitsdienst or SD) officers could only watch from a distance as soldiers enjoyed the fruits ⁴⁸ Koehl, The Black Corps, pp. 141–5; Wegner, The Waffen SS, pp. 109–119; Edward B. Westermann, Hitler’s Police Battalions. Enforcing Racial War in the East (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2005), pp. 36–40, 55–7. ⁴⁹ Breitman, Architect of Genocide, pp. 67–72, 85–104; Peter Padfield, Himmler: Reichsführer-SS (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1990), pp. 260–262; Robert Proctor, Nazi Doctors (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988); Rossino, Hitler Strikes Poland.

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´ ees.⁵⁰ At the start of the Occupation, of victory along the Champs Elys´ Himmler played an inconsequential role in France. In the chaos surrounding the fall of Paris, Reich Security Main Office (Reichssicherheitshauptamt or RSHA) covertly installed twenty SS intelligence specialists (SD) in two buildings along the Avenue Foch. Later joined by Gestapo agents who evaded travel restrictions by masquerading as military policemen, the SS accomplished almost nothing because military officers would not allow the Black Corps to talk with RSHA via the military communications network during the summer of 1940. A third detachment of criminal police (Kriminalpolizei or Kripo) arrived to provide security for Hitler’s victory parade through the Arc de Triomphe. Although the parade was canceled, all three SS groups remained in Paris.⁵¹ SS Brigadeführer Dr. Max Thomas led the entire contingent while his executive officer, Sturmbannführer Helmut Knochen, negotiated with military authorities for permission to operate in France. In his first substantial report to superiors in Berlin, MBF General Streccius asked superiors to clarify the role of civilian agencies like the SS, but his request went unanswered. The confusion helped RSHA establish a foothold in Paris.⁵² SS policemen arrived in Paris without permission or a raison d’être, but they were led by two ambitious officers.⁵³ Knochen surmounted the most formidable impediment by securing official permission to operate in France. On 4 October 1940 Field Marshal von Brauchitsch authorized Sipo and SD agents to investigate anti-German activities carried out by Jews, immigrants, communists, and church groups in the occupied zone.⁵⁴ SS officers could wear their black SS uniforms and ‘register’ the possessions of groups hostile to the Third Reich. Thomas had to inform the MBF of SS strength and Himmler agreed to tell OKH about any orders that had political implications. Only subordinates of the MBF, specifically the Abwehr and GFP, had executive authority or the power to make arrests ⁵⁰ Breitman, Architect of Genocide, pp. 105–115; Müller, Das Heer und Hitler, pp. 458–466. ⁵¹ BAK, All. Proz. 21/Proc`es Oberg-Knochen/6–7; Steinberg and Fit`ere, Les Allemands en France, 1940–1944, pp. 39–45. ⁵² BALW, R 70 Frankreich (Polizeidienststellen in Frankreich)/33/3–18; Helmut Knochen, ‘Reich Service VI in Paris,’ in de Chambrun, France during the German Occupation 1940–1944, vol.III, pp. 1635–1644; USNA, RG 242/T-501/143/422–423; BAK, N 1023/1/20. ⁵³ BALW, R 70 Frankreich/33/4–5. ⁵⁴ Although they were two separate organizations inside the Third Reich, the Sicherheitspolizei (Sipo) and Sicherheitsdienst (SD) acted as a single organization in France until 1942. USNA, RG 242/T-501/196/655–656.

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and confiscate private property in occupied France, but the SS had some leeway. They received their orders directly from RSHA and could not be punished by military courts-martial. As a result, military authorities could not discipline SS officers who violated the Himmler–Brauchitsch agreement.⁵⁵ With official permission in hand, Thomas and Knochen opened a central office in Paris and branches in Bordeaux, Dijon, and Rouen. By 1944, branches employed approximately 140 German men and 50 German women per office. Organized like RSHA in Berlin, SS offices worked alongside branches of the military government by the end of 1940. Intelligence specialists continued their prewar efforts collecting information and assessing the influence of Jews. Racial experts oversaw and tried to control the Aryanization of the French economy. Another contingent searched for evidence of an anti-German conspiracy among Synagogue and Masonic records. Others helped the Einsatzstab Rosenberg concentrate Jewish possessions in the Louvre.⁵⁶ In conjunction with Ambassador Abetz, the SS dabbled in politics and championed Adrien Marquet and Eug`ene Deloncle in an attempt to enlist ardent French collaborators in Hitler’s cause. The SS also established a direct link with the French government through SS Hauptsturmführer Kurt Geissler in Vichy.⁵⁷ The SS maintained an innocuous profile while building a far-reaching organization. Although Nazi ideology regarded the French Communist Party (Parti Communist Franc¸ais or PCF) as a subversive organization that was under the control of ‘international Jewry,’ the SS spent little time persecuting French communists. In response to the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact, the Daladier government outlawed the PCF and forced the party underground. After the Armistice, PCF representatives asked SS officers to persuade the Vichy regime to rescind the ban, but SS delegates claimed that they could not interfere in internal French affairs and assumed a neutral stance. Before negotiations could continue, French police arrested the communist agents. When it suited their interests, the SS could eschew Nazi ideology and ⁵⁵ USNA, RG 242/T-501/196/655–656; BAMA, RW 35/209/211–213. ⁵⁶ USNA, RG 242/T-501/196/655–656, 647; BAK, All. Proz. 21/Proc`es Oberg-Knochen/12–13; BALW, R 70 Frankreich/31/59–60; BALW, R 70 Frankreich/33/4–5, 15–17; Lieb, Konventioneller Krieg oder NS-Weltanschauungskrieg, pp. 63–73. ⁵⁷ BAK, All. Proz. 21/Proc`es Oberg-Knochen/17–18, 13; BALW, R 70 Frankreich/33/ 17–18; Gordon, Collaborationism in France, pp. 57, 68, and Chapter 6 of that volume; Marrus and Paxton, Vichy France and the Jews, p. 18.

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adopt a laissez faire attitude. After Germany invaded the Soviet Union in 1941, the SS abandoned its neutral stance and, in conjunction with French police, attacked the PCF with gusto.⁵⁸ During the first year of the Occupation, the SS office in Paris established itself as an expert on Jewish affairs and limited itself to research activities. Before the 20 January 1942 Wannsee conference, such activities caused only minor irritation among military circles in Paris. After the invasion of the Soviet Union, Stalin’s Communist International (Comintern) ordered the PCF to attack Germany and sabotage Hitler’s war effort.⁵⁹ Nazi ideology assumed that Jews controlled the PCF and were implacable enemies of the Third Reich. With several years of experience studying Jewish groups, the Black Corps stood ready to lead the fight against resistance organizations. The radicalization of the German war effort favored the Black Corps in its struggle for power and influence, and unlike Ribbentrop and G¨oring, Himmler eventually seized a position of considerable influence inside occupied France. Alfred Rosenberg joined the Nazi party in 1919 and assumed control of the organization while Hitler served time in Landsberg prison, but he failed to secure an influential job after the Nazi seizure of power. Although he edited the Nazi party newspaper, he remained a step below G¨oring, Himmler, and Ribbentrop in terms of power and influence. Despite his relatively inconsequential status, Rosenberg played an important role in the occupation of France during World War Two. The organization that he led there, the Einsatzstab Reichsleiter Rosenberg, defied military authorities, secured a degree of autonomy, and set an important precedent. Rosenberg failed to capitalize on his initial success, but Himmler used Rosenberg’s precedent to build a bureaucratic empire that operated beyond military control. The son of a successful Baltic artisan turned businessman, Rosenberg studied in Riga and Moscow before returning home to Reval in 1918 with a diploma in architecture. That same year he moved to Munich but pursued his chosen profession with little enthusiasm. Instead, the 25-year-old turned his energies toward the formulation of an all-encompassing ideology. After ⁵⁸ Maurice Agulhon, The French Republic, 1879–1992, translated by Antonia Nevill (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), pp. 290–292; Tasca, Les Communistes franc¸ais pendant la drˆole de guerre, pp. 322–336. ⁵⁹ Jackson, France. The Dark Years 1940–1944, pp. 423–5.

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joining the party, he began to write full-time for the party newspaper, the V¨olkischer Beobachter, and became the editor two years later. Crude social Darwinism, anti-Semitism, and anti-communism served as the basis for much of his early work, summed up in his 1930 book The Myth of the Twentieth Century in which Rosenberg contended that pernicious Jewish influences stood behind the decline of ancient Greece, the Fall of the Roman Empire, and the destruction of the Romanov dynasty in Russia. Turning toward the future, he argued that Germany, perhaps in an alliance with Great Britain, should invade the Soviet Union, destroy the alleged Jewish menace that supposedly controlled the Soviet government, and seize living space for the so-called Aryan race. Publication of The Myth of the Twentieth Century in 1930 cemented Rosenberg’s position as the ideological leader of the Nazi party.⁶⁰ Rosenberg met Hitler in 1919 and joined the NSDAP toward the end of that year with party number 623. In the chaotic aftermath of the 1923 Beer Hall Putsch, Rosenberg took charge of the Nazi party while Hitler served time in prison but failed to control party factions. The Führer sharply criticized Rosenberg’s leadership and relations between the two remained strained thereafter. After his release in late 1924, Hitler rebuilt the Nazi party and reappointed Rosenberg managing editor of the V¨olkischer Beobachter but demoted him to ‘publisher’ after a 1937 quarrel with Goebbels. Fancying himself to be an intellectual, Rosenberg organized the Fighting League for German Culture and attended anti-Semitic congresses in 1927 and 1928. After the September 1930 elections, he served on the Reichstag foreign policy committee. Hitler later awarded Rosenberg the title of Reichsleiter, Leader of the Foreign Policy Office of the Nazi party, and ‘the Führer’s Commissioner for the supervision of all intellectual and ideological education and training in the NSDAP.’ As the ideological leader of the Nazi movement, Rosenberg occupied a tenuous position within a party that valued instinct and action over philosophy.⁶¹ Rivals such as Goebbels and Ribbentrop limited the positions available to Rosenberg. Joseph Goebbels became Minister of Propaganda after the ⁶⁰ Reinhard Bollmus, ‘Alfred Rosenberg: National Socialism’s ‘‘chief ideologue’’?’ in The Nazi Elite, ed. Ronald Smelser and Rainer Zitelmann, pp. 183–193; Cecil, The Myth of the Master Race, pp. 21–31. ⁶¹ Andreas Molau, Alfred Rosenberg: Der Ideologue des Nationalsozialismus (Koblenz: Verlag Siegfried Bublies, 1993), pp. 24–30.

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Nazi seizure of power and assumed control of the press. Hitler demoted Rosenberg from managing editor to editor in 1937 because the ideological leader of the Nazi party would not follow Goebbels’ editorial policy in the pages of the V¨olkischer Beobachter.⁶² Based on his service as the Nazi delegate to the Reichstag foreign policy committee, his writings on race and foreign policy, and his experience as head of the party’s foreign policy office, Rosenberg also coveted the Foreign Ministry after the Nazi seizure of power. Neurath served as Hitler’s Foreign Minister until 1938 to placate conservative interests, and then the post passed to the more pliant Ribbentrop in order to concentrate power in the hands of the Führer. Positions of influence in the Foreign and Propaganda Ministries remained just beyond the Reichsleiter’s grasp.⁶³ Rosenberg eventually carved out a satrapy in the field of education. Hitler signed a decree on 29 January 1940 that enabled the Reichsleiter to organize a ‘central point for National Socialist research, doctrine, and education.’ Although Hitler forbade construction until the end of the war, Rosenberg planned to establish ten branches of what can best be described as the Nazi party analog to military staff colleges. Schools, complete with libraries, would be established inside existing universities to train the next generation of party leaders.⁶⁴ The Führer later authorized the formation of the Einsatzstab Rosenberg, a small group under the direct control of Rosenberg, to advance behind victorious German armies and collect ‘educational’ materials from state archives, libraries, church offices, and Masonic lodges that pertained to Germany and anti-German conspiracies. The 5 July 1940 directive allowed the Einsatzstab Rosenberg to set up shop in occupied France and operate outside of military control. Although it seemed inconsequential, the order established an important precedent.⁶⁵ Himmler, Ribbentrop, G¨oring, and Rosenberg all had representatives in Paris shortly after German troops entered the City of Light, but their organizations faced a comparatively better-organized military government that did not appreciate civilian interference. All four paladins searched for a ⁶² Bollmus, ‘Alfred Rosenberg: National Socialism’s ‘‘chief ideologue’’?,’ p. 184. ⁶³ Petropolous, Art as Politics in the Third Reich, pp. 20, 34–5, 64–70; Willem de Vries, Sonderstab Musik: Music Confiscations by the Einsatzstab Reichsleiter Rosenberg under the Nazi Occupation of Western Europe, translated by UvA Vertalers and Lee K. Mitzman (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 1996), pp. 21–9. ⁶⁴ Cecil, The Myth of the Master Race, p. 158. ⁶⁵ BAMA, RW 35/698/1.

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way to secure a share of the spoils of victory, but first they needed an appropriate mission. Oddly enough, the brouhaha over confiscated Jewish art provided the pretext that they needed. Himmler, Ribbentrop, and G¨oring established a bureaucratic presence in France in order to help the Einsatzstab Rosenberg collect ‘educational’ materials. Working together, they carved out a position for their respective satrapies, broke the Wehrmacht’s monopoly of power, and undermined the rational exploitation of occupied France. Although largely irrelevant to a general history of occupied France, the Einsatzstab Rosenberg set a critical precedent.

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3 Setting the precedent

Throughout World War Two, Hitler periodically issued orders that undermined the war effort but advanced the ideological goals of National Socialism. For example, Ambassador Abetz and General von Stülpnagel advised Hitler to rescind travel and trade restrictions that divided occupied France, unoccupied France, and the two northern departments of Pas de Calais and Nord to facilitate industrial production and, by extension, France’s contribution to the German war effort. Citing security concerns, Hitler refused to lift the restrictions. While generals favored a policy of ruthless economic exploitation that would contribute to military victory, the Führer pushed an agenda driven by race and considered the fight against Jews to be a fundamental part of his strategy. Unwilling or unable to appreciate the Führer’s thinking, some German officers ignored orders that, in their opinion, did not contribute to the war effort. In France, directives calling for the confiscation of Jewish assets, particularly works of art, were often viewed as an unwelcome distraction.¹ OKW issued detailed orders that governed the sort of property soldiers could seize and described how confiscations should be carried out by troops. Signed by General Keitel, the first directive complied with German law and the Hague Convention. After the conquest of France, however, Hitler ordered branches of the German government and Nazi party to seize property in a fashion that violated Keitel’s original regulations. Two ethical ¹ DGFP, ser. D, vol. X, pp. 238–242, 468–470; Milward, The New Order and the French Economy, pp. 52–3; BAMA, RW 35/708/4.

after the fall

codes emerged during the ensuing debate over confiscations. Most army officers did not hesitate to exploit French resources, but they did so within the bounds of custom, German law, and international agreements. Personnel shortages also made the military commander in France (Milit¨arbefehlshaber in Frankreich or MBF) rather dependent on French support and sensitive to French objections. Adhering to an older tradition, Hitler, Rosenberg, Himmler, and G¨oring disregarded Gallic sensibilities and argued that the spoils of war belonged to the victor. Debate over German confiscation policy had significant political implications. By opposing Hitler’s wishes, generals in France proved themselves to be, in the eyes of the Führer, dangerous reactionaries. Since they were out of step with Hitler’s new order, conservative generals had to be pushed aside. To advance the ideological goals of the Nazi regime, Hitler placed the Einsatzstab Rosenberg beyond military control and ordered the Nazi party organization to confiscate Jewish property in occupied France. In a narrow sense, the ruling had little significance: it did not dramatically alter the course of the war or lead to moral outrages characteristic of the Nazi regime in the East, but it diluted the authority of the MBF and set an important precedent that the SS used to secure its own freedom of action. Once free from military oversight and armed with executive authority, the SS could resolve the so-called Jewish Question to Hitler’s satisfaction. German confiscation policy also affected Franco-German relations. During the summer of 1940, the Vichy regime tried to preempt German confiscations by launching an equivalent program in order to preserve the principle of French sovereignty. Once this tactic failed, French officials complained to the military administration, but to no avail. The MBF could not explain Rosenberg’s confiscation program to the Vichy regime because it was classified top secret and, as a political matter, fell outside his purview. Disregarding advice from the MBF, Hitler ignored French protests, allowed the pillage to continue, and demonstrated his utter contempt for France. Debate surrounding German confiscation policy also revealed differences in the way Germans in Paris and Nazis in Berlin regarded the Vichy regime. Ambassador Abetz eventually realized that expropriations strained FrancoGerman relations, joined forces with the MBF, and tried to rein in the Einsatzstab Rosenberg. Both the German embassy and the military administration appreciated the value of French cooperation and acted 72

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accordingly. Superiors in Berlin saw only booty and an opportunity to introduce the new Nazi order. Differences of opinion emerged on both horizontal (MBF, German embassy, SS, and Einsatzstab Rosenberg in Paris) and vertical (Paris–Berlin) axes of the German hierarchy. As the war progressed, divisions became more pronounced and culminated in the 20 July 1944 coup against the Nazi regime. Six months before the invasion of France, General Keitel issued basic orders delineating what sort of property could be confiscated and how troops should go about seizing goods. The directive cited the Hague Convention and allowed division, corps, and army commanders to expropriate state property. Junior officers could confiscate military equipment, but they could not strip personal possessions from prisoners of war in accordance with article six of the 1929 Geneva Convention. Private property could only be seized through German military courts unless military necessity dictated otherwise. In any event, German law and Keitel’s 9 November 1939 order required officers to consider the needs of the local population when taking items such as food and gasoline. Commanders could seize mementos ‘of slight value’ as trophies of war but were not free to pillage the countryside. In closing, Keitel threatened to punish plundering with prison or, in extreme cases, death.² At Hitler’s behest, Keitel revised his 1939 order on 5 July 1940. Changes allowed agents of the Einsatzstab Rosenberg to search through church documents, Masonic records, public libraries, and state archives for evidence of anti-German conspiracies. The revision also required the Einsatzstab Rosenberg to work with SS police forces before the latter had official permission to enter France. On the basis of Keitel’s 5 July directive, SS Brigadeführer Thomas established offices throughout occupied France and argued that SS officers had executive authority, but Army leaders in Berlin informed the MVW that the SS could only observe, advise, and coordinate. To complete their missions, the Einsatzstab Rosenberg and the SS had to use military police officers.³ Keitel’s directive specified the sort of property that could be seized, but it did not place a single agency in charge of the entire confiscation process. The 5 July 1940 directive allowed Rosenberg to search for evidence of an anti-German conspiracy among clerical and Masonic archives. Nazi ² USNA, RG 242/T-501/166/67–70.

³ USNA, RG 242/T-501/196/623–624.

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demonology placed Jews in the center of this alleged plot, but the 5 July order did not explicitly mention Jews, Jewish organizations, or synagogues. The text of Keitel’s order noted that inspiration for the confiscation project came from Rosenberg but corresponded to the will of the Führer, who may have wanted to proceed with caution while the Battle of Britain remained undecided. OKW sent copies of the confiscation order to senior military commanders throughout western Europe. Rather than distributing a copy of Keitel’s secret decree to subordinates, the MBF published his own version in the official gazette of the MBF. Junior officers in charge of local and regional branches of the military administration remained unaware of Keitel’s original decree. The MBF’s 15 July 1940 directive emphasized that confiscations could only be carried out with explicit authorization from the MBF or members of his staff. Those who violated the directive could be fined and/or imprisoned. To carry out this ordinance, the MBF created an art group inside the government subsection of the MVW under the command of Franz Graf Wolff Metternich, a scion of the famous Austrian diplomat and a distinguished art historian in his own right.⁴ During the last months of the war, a senior MVW official described the art group’s mission as having two parts: helping the French government store objets d’art (e.g. paintings and sculptures) and ensuring that collections remained away from military installations and combat operations. Metternich embodied these lofty ideals and ‘was eventually fired in 1942—reportedly on Hitler’s express orders—as a result of his intransigence.’ Metternich evinced little enthusiasm for pillage.⁵ Rival groups quickly joined the race for control of French art treasures. Joseph Goebbels, the dominant force in cultural politics before the war, appeared to hold an early lead. Before the war, the Minister of Propaganda had ordered two art historians to examine French archives and compile a list of ‘works of art and valuable objects which since 1500 have been transferred to foreign ownership, either without our consent or by questionable legal transactions.’ After reading the 300-page report, Dr. Otto Kümmel, the ⁴ Bargatzky, Hotel Majestic, p. 64. The ‘art group’ (Gruppe Kunstschutz) stood subordinate to Best’s government subsection (Abteilung Verwaltung), itself a division of Schmid’s military administration staff (Milit¨arverwaltungsstab), underneath the MBF. ⁵ BAMA, RW 35/712/71–73; Nicholas, Rape of Europa, p. 119; Petropolous, Art as Politics in the Third Reich, p. 129; USNA, RG 242/T-77/1598/folder 4/nfn (Verordnungsblatt für die franz¨osischen Gebiete, Nr. 3, 15 Juli 1940).

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director of the Berlin Museum, noted that ‘it is questionable, if the entire French patrimony will suffice to replace these losses.’⁶ On 13 July Dr. Kümmel asked the Foreign Office to help collect unspecified materials in occupied France. Allegedly acting on direct orders from Foreign Minister Ribbentrop, Otto Abetz placed Legation Secretary Baron von Künsberg, a veteran of similar operations in Poland and Norway, in charge of a ‘repatriation’ campaign. The German embassy in Paris eagerly participated in the confiscation of cultural assets from the start.⁷ Throughout June and July, Künsberg and agents of the German embassy in Paris quietly gathered artwork from the Wildenstein, Seligmann, Paul Rosenberg, and BernheimJeune galleries in a house next door to the ambassadorial residence on the rue de Lille.⁸ The military remained unaware of Künsberg’s activities during the first weeks of the Occupation. Once he discovered that Künsberg planned to move approximately 1,500 works of art from castles in the Loire valley to the Louvre on 11 August, Metternich immediately told the commanderin-chief of the German army about the illegal transfers, and Brauchitsch issued a general order forbidding such confiscations on the same day. All works of art that the French government had placed in protective custody before the Western campaign were to be cataloged and placed under strict guard. Brauchitsch’s order forbade all transfers of objets d’art and left the fate of previously seized works in the hands of the Führer. Officers attached to the MBF immediately told Abetz about Brauchitsch’s decision.⁹ The day after Brauchitsch issued his no-evacuation order, Kümmel, Künsberg, and the MVW art group attended a meeting chaired by Abetz. Diplomats suggested that artwork stored in French castles be transferred to the Louvre because some paintings had allegedly been improperly packed by the French government. A selection of valuable works could then be diverted to Germany, perhaps because of a shortage of space in the Louvre. This second tactic failed when experts from the Berlin Museum and MVW art group reported that artwork had been packed ‘flawlessly.’ Künsberg could not provide contradictory evidence or obtain written permission for ⁶ Nicholas, The Rape of Europa, pp. 121, 122. ⁷ BAMA, RW 35/698/4; Bargatzky, Hotel Majestic, p. 64; Petropolous, Art as Politics in the Third Reich, p. 129; Abetz, Das offene Problem, p. 137. ⁸ USNA, RG 242/T-501/196/642–643; Nicholas, Rape of Europa, p. 125. ⁹ USNA, RG 242/T-501/196/638; Bargatzky, Hotel Majestic, p. 66.

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a transfer that Metternich demanded.¹⁰ He needed another excuse to ship valuable pieces of art back to Germany. Not to be deterred, Abetz argued that French art holdings had to be audited so that items ‘stolen’ during periods of German weakness could be identified and returned to their rightful owners. He proposed that experts from the Paris embassy and MVW be allowed to select 20 to 25 works ‘of outstanding value’ and determine if they had been obtained unfairly. Brauchitsch rejected the ambassador’s third proposal and refused to subordinate the MVW art group to the Paris embassy. OKH and Abetz agreed to share information about artwork located by their respective offices, but the exchange only revealed that artwork confiscated by the German embassy in Paris had been poorly stored and, in some cases, damaged in transit. Furthermore, many items had not been marked with the names of their owners and thus violated Keitel’s 5 July 1940 directive.¹¹ Metternich was not alone in his fight against confiscations. Otto von Stülpnagel, the MBF from October 1940 to February 1942, set the tone when he promised to oppose confiscations that could not be justified by military necessity.¹² Werner Best, a senior SS officer before the war, resisted seizures because they antagonized the Vichy regime. Responsible for overseeing the French government between 1940 and 1942, Best relied on the goodwill of French bureaucrats in order to coordinate Vichy policy with German needs. Setting aside his latent hostility toward France, he opposed confiscations that upset the French without strengthening Germany.¹³ Major Greiner, the head of the Secret Military Police (GFP) in Paris, condemned expropriations on principled grounds. He argued that the ‘unlawful removal’ of artwork dishonored the German army, but he agreed to subordinate GFP officers to the Paris embassy as long as confiscation operations were approved by the MVW.¹⁴ The MBF, heads of the MVW, MVW government subsection, and leaders of the art and police divisions all objected to the confiscation of French and Jewish art. Army officers obstructed confiscations by withholding logistical support and authorized personnel. Only the GFP had executive authority in occupied France. Neither the Einsatzstab Rosenberg, the SS, nor the Paris ¹⁰ ¹¹ ¹² ¹³

BAMA, RW 35/698/14–15; Lambauer, Otto Abetz et les Franc¸aise, pp. 151–160. USNA, RG 242/T-501/196/640–642; BAMA, RW 35/698/16. Bargatzky, Hotel Majestic, p. 67; Herbert, Best, p. 262. BAMA, RW 35/698/12; Herbert, Best, pp. 260–262. ¹⁴ BAMA, RW 35/698/5–6.

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embassy could lawfully confiscate property. Some agencies circumvented legal restrictions by bluffing their way into museums or private residences and taking whatever they wanted, but this tactic often failed when French officials mounted a determined resistance. The Paris embassy and branches of the Nazi party also suffered from a shortage of competent people. Without assistance from the army, the Paris embassy could only pillage a limited number of buildings. From the start, military officials hamstrung opponents by cutting off their access to army vehicles, translators, and police officers.¹⁵ In the face of determined military opposition, Abetz abandoned his campaign to pillage French art collections at the end of August 1940. Since their arrival in Paris, diplomats had stood at the forefront of efforts to collect and transfer French art collections, but their meager success came at a price. Verbal complaints and notes sent by the Vichy government to both the Armistice Commission and MBF in December 1940 and January 1941 suggest that confiscations upset official relations between the two governments at a time when continued British resistance increased the value of French cooperation.¹⁶ News of the confiscations leaked to the American press and tarnished the image of Germany in neutral countries. During the fall of 1940, Abetz realized that his practice of seizing art collections had damaged relations with the Vichy government, alienated the MBF, and created a propaganda disaster. He had to change course to achieve his basic goal of Franco-German collaboration.¹⁷ The Einsatzstab Rosenberg quickly stepped into the void left by the Paris embassy’s retreat. Holding press credentials from the Ministry of Propaganda, Dr. Georg Ebert arrived in Paris in mid-June, discovered a rich trove of Masonic and Jewish records, and reported his findings to Alfred Rosenberg. With support from Martin Bormann, Rosenberg asked Hitler for permission to confiscate anti-German materials, and his request culminated in Keitel’s 5 July 1940 order. The directive placed confiscations squarely in the hands of Alfred Rosenberg and the SD, but the Einsatzstab did not have the resources to carry the mission. With approximately 60 agents in Paris, the SD could provide little assistance and had its own problems with the Wehrmacht. Rosenberg cooperated with the German ¹⁵ USNA, RG 242/T-501/362/105; BAMA, RW 35/705/91; BAMA, RW 35/698/141. ¹⁶ BAMA, RW 35/712/109–110, 132; Bargatzky, Hotel Majestic, p. 66. ¹⁷ USNA, RG 242/T-501/196/643; de Vries, Sonderstab Musik, pp. 86–9.

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embassy in Paris, but the MVW art group blocked diplomatic confiscations by the end of August. As Metternich struggled against Abetz and Künsberg, Rosenberg built a small but effective organization in Paris. Dr. Ebert initially ran Rosenberg’s operation in western Europe but was replaced by Gerhard Utikal in 1941. Baron Kurt von Behr took charge of the Paris office.¹⁸ By September 1940 the Einsatzstab Rosenberg stood ready to carry out the Führer’s orders. Initial conversations between the MVW and Einsatzstab Rosenberg proceeded without a hitch. Speaking for the MVW on 28 August, Werner Best emphasized that confiscations could not take place without the approval of the MVW because only the military government had executive authority. Agents of the Einsatzstab Rosenberg agreed to respect private property laws but stated their intention to ‘register’ Jewish valuables. They described the registration of art as a measure comparable to military decrees ordering Frenchmen to register arms that could be used in a future conflict. Both sides spoke past one another, but they struck an amicable tone. In a letter that began ‘Dear Party-comrade’ Rosenberg further explained his mission to Best on 5 September 1940. The Reichsleiter stated that Hitler’s order authorized him to search libraries, archives, and Masonic lodges for evidence of anti-German conspiracies, but he promised to deal ‘exclusively’ with ‘abandoned (herrenloser) Jewish property’ for the present. Furthermore, he agreed to provide the MVW with a list of all items shipped to Germany. Rosenberg argued that these items needed to be protected from ‘robbery, destruction, or damage’ and told Best that Hitler would decide the fate of confiscated goods. In a memorandum attached to Rosenberg’s letter, Best remarked that unauthorized confiscations, including the seizure of archives or libraries, would discredit the MVW and had to be prevented. He concluded that the commander of the army would have to issue new orders to avoid an incident.¹⁹ The incident that Best feared unfolded on 7 September. Without warning, Rosenberg’s agents broke into the Turgenev and Polish libraries that had been sealed by the MVW and, with assistance from Künsberg, began shipping both collections back to Germany. The Polish library in Paris held the largest collection of Polish-language works outside of ¹⁸ Hans Umbreit, Der Milit¨arbefehlshaber in Frankreich, 1940–1944 (Boppard am Rhein: Herald Boldt Verlag, 1968), pp. 184–194; de Vries, Sonderstab Musik, pp. 30–31, 85–90, 94. ¹⁹ BAMA, RW 35/689/7–8, 12; USNA, RG 242/T-501/196/635.

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Poland. Founded in 1875, the Turgenev library owned a comparable collection of Russian-language books. Even though he was a Slavophobe and devout Nazi, Best followed the policy of the military administration and immediately sent policemen to both libraries, but his subordinates found only empty rooms. The seizures violated the 28 August understanding because they involved non-Jewish property and were not carried out by representatives of the MVW. Unlike the Foreign Office, the Einsatzstab Rosenberg made no attempt to collaborate with the MVW and robbed both libraries before the military could react.²⁰ The pillage of the Polish and Turgenev libraries aggravated a subject first made sore by Abetz, embarrassed Best, and antagonized the MVW. The MVW responded without delay. Dr. Bahnke, an official in the justice division of the government subsection of the MVW, fired off a long letter to Brauchitsch on 13 September that summarized the administration’s struggle with the Paris embassy and Einsatzstab Rosenberg. Bahnke noted that only the MVW had the executive authority and asked the commander of the German army to clarify the situation. Best personally approved Bahnke’s letter, and at least six other senior members of the military government contributed to its drafting. Conflict between the MVW art group and Paris embassy played out between Metternich and Best on one side and Künsberg and Abetz on the other. Bahnke’s letter forced senior authorities in Berlin to deal with the problem and raised the stakes for all concerned.²¹ Bahnke’s letter came to Hitler’s attention via Field Marshal von Brauchitsch. After discussing the matter with the Führer, Keitel issued another order on 17 September. He informed the MVW that all private property that had been transferred to the French state after 1 September 1939 would be subject to confiscation. The regulation allowed Rosenberg to transfer property back to Germany and listed the Polish library, art collections in the Palais Rothschild, and other ‘abandoned’ (herrenloser) Jewish properties as examples of items subject to seizure. Anticipating a negative reaction from the Vichy government, Keitel directed subordinates to acknowledge neither the registration, seizure, nor transport of confiscated property. Brandishing Keitel’s directive, Dr. Wilhelm Grau, an official with the Paris ²⁰ Bargatzky, Hotel Majestic, p. 68; BAMA, RW 35/712/90; USNA, RG 242/T-501/362/64. ²¹ USNA, RG 242/T-501/196/637–643; BAMA, RW 35/698/13–19.

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branch of the Einsatzstab Rosenberg, ordered Best to help the Einsatzstab seize art collections stored at fifteen specific addresses. Targets included ´ the Librairie Lipschutz, Ecole Rabbinique, Grand Orient de France, various houses owned by the Rothschild family, and the Alliance Isra´elite Universelle.²² The MVW had to comply with an order that clearly violated articles 46 and 56 of the 1907 Hague Convention which protected private property and forbade the seizure of works of art respectively. Keitel’s 17 September directive broke the military’s monopoly of power in France. The 5 July order targeted the records of anti-German groups and written materials housed in Masonic lodges, libraries, archives. It did not mention Jews, synagogues, or Jewish organizations. The 17 September regulation used similar language but included the addresses of fifteen prominent French Jews and Jewish organizations. Although the 5 July order may have applied to Jewish property, the 17 September regulation explicitly approved the expropriation of cultural goods (Kulturgüter) that were owned by Jews. Adding insult to injury, the MVW had to support the Einsatzstab Rosenberg by supplying the latter with GFP officers. Keitel’s 17 September regulation authorized Rosenberg to pillage France with impunity.²³ The 17 September order also gave the SS an official mission in occupied France. It directed the Gestapo to assist the Einsatzstab Rosenberg and required the army to reach an understanding with the Black Corps. Himmler and Brauchitsch signed an agreement that outlined the mission and responsibility of SS personnel in France on 4 October. The accord denied SS agents executive authority that they needed to confiscate property, but it directed GFP to act as the executive organ of the SS. In addition, SS agents received permission to study Jews, Freemasons, and anti-German elements in France. The 4 October agreement gained significance as resistance increased in 1941.²⁴ MVW officers continued to squabble with the Einsatzstab Rosenberg. Werner Best argued that expropriations were beneath the dignity of the Reich and should be dealt with in final peace negotiations. He directed subordinates not to help other German agencies—namely the Paris embassy—seize objets d’art. The Einsatzstab Rosenberg abandoned allies in the Paris embassy, sided with Best, and gained exclusive control of ²² BAMA, RW 35/698/23; USNA, RG 242/T-501/196/647. ²³ BAMA, RW 35/698/23; BAMA, RW 35/712/87, 118–119. ²⁴ USNA, RG 242/T-501/196/655–656.

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the expropriation process.²⁵ Two junior officials attached to the MVW justice division analyzed German confiscation policy and concluded that they could do little to change the situation. They understood that Keitel’s 17 September order gave the Einsatzstab Rosenberg autonomy and realized that further clarification would only diminish the authority of the MVW. They advised colleagues to work with the Einsatzstab and exhort its members (1) not to embark on any confiscation drives without agreement from the MVW, (2) to stick to their core mission, and (3) to obey proper procedure. Without support from superiors in Berlin, MVW officers tried to collaborate with and eventually tame the Einsatzstab Rosenberg.²⁶ Comradely cooperation between the MVW and Einsatzstab Rosenberg disintegrated between September and October 1940. The MVW assigned few GFP officers to the Einsatzstab Rosenberg and limited the number of confiscations that could legally be carried out. The Commandant of Greater Paris, the fount of all supplies in the French capital, did not provide the Einsatzstab with enough trucks or gasoline. On occasion, OKH reminded subordinates that Rosenberg’s work was essential to the German war effort and ordered officers to cooperate. In response to military obstruction, the Einsatzstab Rosenberg wielded Keitel’s 17 September directive like a club and acted without regard for the legal, political, or diplomatic consequences of its actions. By 1942 the leader of the Paris branch of the Einsatzstab Rosenberg went so far as to order military commanders to report any valuable objets d’art in buildings used by the military government. MVW officials and Einsatzstab Rosenberg engaged in a nasty cold war that continued until Germany’s surrender.²⁷ Although many army officers opposed unilateral expropriations, there were some exceptions. Dr. Hermann Bunjes, a young art historian, initially worked for the MVW art group in the Louvre and searched for paintings that had been ‘stolen’ by Jews and thus were subject to confiscation. He passed this information on to Reichsmarschall G¨oring who, in turn, frequently added the objets d’art to his own personal collection. Superiors in the military administration regarded Bunjes as a ‘black sheep’ and shunned ²⁵ USNA, RG 242/T-501/196/650–651; BAMA, RW 35/698/39; Lambauer, Otto Abetz et les Franc¸ais, pp. 161–2. ²⁶ BAMA, RW 35/698/38–41. ²⁷ BAMA, RW 35/712/94; BAMA, RW 35/705/78–80; BAMA, RW 35/708/10–11, 17.

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him whenever possible. In 1942, Bunjes transferred to the Luftwaffe and worked exclusively for G¨oring until the war ended.²⁸ Leading MVW officials opposed confiscations, but a minority of subalterns like Bunjes operated as a sort of fifth column, undermined Metternich’s efforts, and provided rivals like G¨oring with invaluable information. Reichsmarschall G¨oring weighed in on the confiscation question and issued another set of regulations on 3 November. Since Keitel’s 17 September order dictated what property could be confiscated, the Reichsmarschall’s directive focused on the division of the spoils. Hitler received first choice, followed by G¨oring. Afterwards, Reichsleiter Rosenberg could select ‘educational materials’ for libraries, schools, and museums that would be built after the war. Remaining items would be sold on the open market and the proceeds disbursed to needy Frenchmen. Additional paragraphs specified that confiscated goods would be seized by the Einsatzstab Rosenberg with help from the GFP, cataloged by the Einsatzstab alone, and shipped to the Reich by the Luftwaffe. In a handwritten note at the bottom of his order, G¨oring indicated that his regulations had been discussed with Hitler and corresponded to the Führer’s wishes.²⁹ G¨oring’s intervention had broad implications. First, both Keitel’s 17 September and G¨oring’s 3 November decrees indicated that Hitler stood behind Rosenberg’s efforts. Those who continued to oppose seizures carried out by the Einsatzstab Rosenberg would be going against the will of the Führer and would receive no support from G¨oring, Keitel, or Brauchitsch. Second, the Reichsmarschall oversaw the shipment of art from France to Germany and secured a share of the spoils for himself and the Führer. Although their participation ensured that the confiscation program would continue despite military opposition, it also diluted the profits available to Rosenberg. Third, G¨oring’s order provided the French government with an incentive to participate in the operation by offering Vichy a share of the spoils. The Reichsmarschall’s decree further discouraged those who wanted to stop illegal confiscations. Dr. Hans Lammers, the head of the Reich Chancellery and a major power-broker in the German government, voiced his opinion on the confiscation debate in an 18 November 1940 letter to the MBF. Lammers ²⁸ Bargatzky, Hotel Majestic, pp. 70–71; BAMA, RW 35/705/123; Umbreit, Der Milit¨arbefehlshaber in Frankreich, p. 191. ²⁹ USNA, RG 242/T-77/1624/11; BAMA, RW 35/1/12–17.

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first noted that German troops had confiscated works of art in Austria so that assets could not be ‘misused’ by enemies of the regime. He described confiscations in France as analogous to preceding events in Austria and ignored the fact that the 1940 Armistice Agreement guaranteed French sovereignty. Lammers declared that the German government did not care who actually seized objets d’art, but he argued that German directives always took precedence over French laws. He concluded by denying that Hitler had authorized any expropriations and noted that the Führer merely determined the fate of works that others had seized.³⁰ A Nazi first and a lawyer second, Lammers disregarded legal arguments raised by field officers. His letter may have been a feeble attempt to obscure Hitler’s role in the affair, but it revealed that the MBF could not count on support from the state bureaucracy. Despite the forces arrayed against them, the MBF and subordinates in the MVW continued to gripe. They raised a series of legal objections to G¨oring when he visited Paris in November 1940. The Reichsmarschall declared himself to be the supreme legal authority in the Third Reich and summarily dismissed all objections.³¹ Continued opposition to the Einsatzstab Rosenberg did produce one concrete result. To silence military opposition, the Reichsmarschall issued a written order that released the military administration from tenets of the Hague Convention that protected private property.³² The decree quelled arguments voiced by military officers that were based on legal grounds, but the debate did not end. Instead, it shifted to address the question of how to respond to French protests. Frenchmen had reason to condemn German seizures. Reichsmarschall G¨oring hitched two wagons full of objets d’art to his personal train when he left Paris in February 1941. By September, the Einsatzstab Rosenberg had shipped fifty-two boxcars of objets d’art that were seized from mostly Jewish residences back to Germany. Expropriations worth an estimated one billion Reichsmarks soon exhausted the supply of artistic treasures, but the Einsatzstab did not relent. Instead, it began to confiscate furniture and household goods for distribution among Germans made homeless by Allied bombing raids. By 1943, the Einsatzstab Rosenberg sent 8,642 boxcars ³⁰ BAMA, RW 35/698/106. ³¹ Herbert, Best, p. 261. G¨oring declared ‘Der h¨ochste Jurist im Staate bin Ich.’ ³² BAMA, RW 35/712/121–124; BAMA, RW 35/705/87–88.

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to the Reich. Sales in Germany generated a tidy profit that was divided between the Ministry of Finance and the Einsatzstab Rosenberg.³³ The Vichy regime did not stand by while the Einsatzstab Rosenberg robbed France blind. Nine days after the MBF published his 15 July confiscation decree, the Vichy regime passed a comparable law that allowed French officials to take control of abandoned assets as part of a general policy to assert French sovereignty throughout the Hexagon.³⁴ On 10 September 1940 the government went a step further and allowed officials to confiscate the property of denaturalized Jews. Using the 24 July and 10 September 1940 regulations, the French government tried to preempt German confiscations and preserve the illusion of sovereignty. In many ways, this strategy played into Germany’s hands by providing the appearance of due process. German authorities in Bordeaux reported that friction between the two governments developed as a result of competing confiscation policies. Germany ultimately prevailed, but not before generating much ill-will.³⁵ Rapha¨el Alibert, the Minister of Justice between July 1940 and February 1941, condemned German confiscations during a 21 October 1940 conversation with the MBF. Alibert noted that France had lost the war, deserved to pay a penalty, and believed that Germany had a right to receive a share of any profits generated by the sale of expropriated property. The Minister did not oppose the confiscation of Jewish property in principle, but he insisted that all seizures should be carried out by French authorities in accordance with French law. A second protest arrived on 18 December in the form of a verbal note. The message continued to accept the fundamental legitimacy of expropriations but argued for a share of the spoils. The Vichy regime wanted to alleviate widespread shortages by selling seized Jewish property and using the proceeds to fund a winter relief program, ³³ BAMA, RW 35/698/174; BAMA, RW 35/712/130; BALW, NS 8/131/88; Herbert, Best, p. 262; Bargatzky, Hotel Majestic, p. 77; Commission Consultative des Dommages et des R´eparations, Dommages subis par la France et l’union franc¸aise du fait de la guerre et de l’occupation ennemie, 1939–1945 (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1950), vol. I pp. 367–372; vol. VII, monograph P.F. 5, Oeuvres d’Art; G¨otz Ally, Hitler’s Beneficiaries: Plunder, Racial War and the Nazi Welfare State, translated by Jefferson Chase (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2005). ³⁴ BAMA RW 35/698/61; Dominique R´emy, Les Lois de Vichy (Paris: Romillat, 1992), p. 79; ´ Joseph Billig, Le Commissariat g´en´eral aux questions Juives, 1941–1944, vol. III (Paris: Editions du centre, 1960), pp. 74–7. ³⁵ Marrus and Paxton, Vichy France and the Jews, pp. 3–8; Richard H. Weisberg, Vichy Law and the Holocaust in France (New York: New York University Press, 1996), pp. 250–252; BAMA, RW 35/698/61, 69; BAMA, RW 35/712/125–126.

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the Secours National. The French delegation that was responsible for the sale of confiscated property wanted to catalog art that Rosenberg had concentrated in the Louvre and Mus´ee du Jeu de Paume. In closing, the French communiqu´e asked Otto von Stülpnagel, the MBF since 25 October 1940, to grant French officials access to both museums and release any proceeds generated by the sale of expropriated art. When the German government failed to respond to Alibert’s 21 October comments or the 18 December 1940 verbal note, the French government delivered a third protest to the MBF on 27 January 1941. It covered much of the same ground and asked German authorities to establish a system for handling similar conflicts in the future.³⁶ The French government assumed that the German army stood behind the seizure of French art collections and directed their complaints to the MBF and, later, the German embassy in Paris. They remained unaware of interagency struggles and did not negotiate with the Einsatzstab Rosenberg directly. The MBF could not answer French protests because Keitel’s 17 September regulation remained secret. The military administration shouldered the blame for the activities of the Einsatzstab Rosenberg.³⁷ Werner Best met with members of the Einsatzstab Rosenberg, the SS, and subordinates in the justice and art divisions of the military administration to decide on a course of action. Almost one month after receiving the first French verbal note, the committee advised Otto von Stülpnagel to pass the question to Berlin.³⁸ The Einsatzstab Rosenberg viewed French complaints as evidence that the anti-German conspiracy was stronger than ever. In a 24 January 1941 analysis sent to Best, two senior Einsatzstab officials argued that Jews and Freemasons had stood behind the 1914 assassination of Franz Ferdinand, built the ‘ignominious’ World War One memorial at Compi`egne, and arranged a boycott of German goods after the Nazi seizure of power. The memorandum described Jews as implacable enemies of the German people who would fight the Reich with every available weapon. They were related by ‘blood and tactics’ to the Belgian partisans of World War One and Polish ‘bandits’ who supposedly instigated the current struggle. The Einsatzstab argued that Jews used objets d’art to finance attacks against ³⁶ BAMA, RW 35/698/61, 83–84, 96. ³⁷ Bargatzky, Hotel Majestic, pp. 68–70; BAMA, RW 35/698/140. ³⁸ BAMA, RW 35/698/92–95.

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German soldiers. Valuable paintings were weapons in the hands of Jews and thus subject to confiscation. Rosenberg’s minions urged the MBF to ignore French protests and to treat the Vichy regime with suspicion. They argued that Germany should not return Jewish property unless the Vichy regime rigorously enforced anti-Semitic legislation formulated by Alibert. The memorandum adopted a hard line that matched both Hitler’s racial anti-Semitism and Dr. Lammers’ 18 November 1940 letter.³⁹ Disdaining advice from the Einsatzstab Rosenberg, Stülpnagel followed Werner Best’s suggestion and asked Berlin for guidance. His request traveled up the chain of command and landed on the desk of the General Quartermaster of OKH. After considering the matter for several months, OKH issued a classic bureaucratic response and advised the MBF to tell the French government that the matter was being studied in Berlin. Field Marshal von Brauchitsch finally mentioned Stülpnagel’s case to Hitler in a letter on 18 September 1941. The commander of the German army observed that the French government assumed the army, specifically the MBF, stood behind confiscation operations. Orders from Keitel and G¨oring placed the operations squarely in the hands of the Einsatzstab Rosenberg, but both directives were secret and thus could not be discussed with the Vichy regime. The Field Marshal concluded that the MBF should be absolved of responsibility and the entire matter handled by the Foreign Office.⁴⁰ Transfixed by battles on the eastern front, neither Hitler nor Keitel replied to Brauchitsch’s missive. Leaders in Berlin ignored French objections and cared little if this tactic damaged the army’s prestige. Vichy officials took the matter very seriously. Alibert’s conversation and the two verbal notes indicate that some people in the Vichy government considered the issue important because it had turned public opinion against the regime. Admiral Darlan raised the matter with Stülpnagel on 11 August 1941 and described its resolution as a major goal of his government. When notes sent directly to the MBF failed to produce results, the Vichy government contacted General Vogl, the head of the Armistice Commission, and Hans Hemmen at the economic branch of the Armistice Commission, in 1942. Xavier Vallat, the head of the Commissariat-g´en´eral ³⁹ BAMA, RW 35/698/164–173, 106–107. For Hitler’s views, see BAMA, RW 35/708/3–4. ⁴⁰ BAMA, RW 35/698/94, 104–105; BAMA, RW 35/705/51.

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aux questions juives (CGQJ) also tried to resolve the problem by speaking with Werner Best.⁴¹ Taken as a group, the letters indicate the Vichy government’s view of the confiscations. French protests eventually reached the ears of Abetz. The ambassador asked the MBF for a summary of correspondence that pertained to the confiscation of Jewish art in February 1941 and pondered the matter for another eight months before proposing a solution. He met with his former nemesis in the MVW art group, Count Metternich, on 17 October 1941 and suggested that a commission of French and German officials be established to catalog items seized by German authorities. The value of items confiscated by Germany, less the amount given back to Vichy for the Secours National, would then be subtracted from any reparations included in a Franco-German peace treaty signed at the end of hostilities.⁴² Abetz’s plan sought to place confiscations on a legal footing and thus placate the French government without costing Germany any real money or returning confiscated objects. Officers in Paris supported the plan, but military superiors in Berlin claimed that it was a political matter and thus not the responsibility of military authorities. Senior officials in Berlin once again ignored the issue, and Abetz’s proposal fell by the wayside.⁴³ Hitler ended the confiscation debate by issuing an order to all branches of the party, army, and state bureaucracy on 1 March 1942. The Führer declared that attacks against Jews, Freemasons, and their allies were essential to the German war effort. He granted Reichsleiter Rosenberg the right to dispose of Jewish property, goods of uncertain ownership, and abandoned possessions. The Führer ordered OKW to cooperate with Rosenberg against Jews and other ideological opponents of the regime. Hitler signed the Führerbefehl and no longer bothered to conceal his role in the seizures.⁴⁴ His personal intervention, in conjunction with the advent of armed resistance movements in France and fighting on the Eastern Front, pressed confiscations into the background. Resistance, reprisals, and hostage executions overshadowed expropriations in the fall of 1941. Before the 1940 Western campaign, Hitler and Keitel expected to fight a long war and proceeded with a degree of caution. After defeating France, ⁴¹ ⁴² ⁴³ ⁴⁴

BAMA, RW 35/705/45–48, 104–109, 114–115, 21–27. BAMA, RW 35/698/176; BAMA, RW 35/705/55–68. BAMA, RW 35/705/122; BAMA, RW 35/712/132, 133. BAMA, RW 35/708/3–4.

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the military administration in Paris planned to obey the laws of war, cultivate French support, and foster economic collaboration, but Hitler had other ideas. At the Führer’s behest, Keitel revised directives governing the confiscation of property and unleashed a wave of pillage. With support from Brauchitsch, officers in Paris eventually stopped diplomatic expropriations, but the Einsatzstab Rosenberg took over the operation and embarked on a campaign of organized robbery that far surpassed depredations carried out by Napoleon. Confident of victory, Hitler eventually acknowledged his role as the architect of the entire operation. Generals Streccius and Stülpnagel had no intention of treating France with kid gloves, but they tried to follow articles of the Armistice Agreement and obey rules of war. When faced with orders that violated their own sensibilities and could not be justified by military necessity, the MBF complained to superiors in Berlin. Nazi sympathizers and sycophants dominated the highest echelons of OKW and OKH after the Blomberg–Fritsch affair, but pockets of dissent survived in the middle ranks of the army. Complaints raised by members of the military administration suggest that some officers in Paris did not embrace every point of the Nazi agenda.

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4 First measures

Disagreement over the confiscation of Jewish art anticipated debates about anti-partisan policy in France. Just as they sparred for control of Jewish property in the latter half of 1940, several German agencies fought for the right to regulate anti-partisan policy. At the start of the Occupation, resistance activity amounted to little more than occasional sabotage and helping British soldiers evade capture. Even though he faced only minor security threats, the MBF issued regulations that outlined German antipartisan policy on 12 September 1940. After resistance groups began to assassinate German soldiers in the fall of 1941, the MBF followed long-standing guidelines and answered resistance activity with gradually increasing reprisals that included the execution of hostages who were somehow related to the suspected perpetrators. Speaking through Field Marshal Keitel, Hitler condemned the response as ‘much too mild’ and ordered the MBF to execute at least fifty hostages immediately after every lethal attack. Military intransigence led Hitler to place the confiscation of Jewish property in Alfred Rosenberg’s hands: the Führer faced a similar problem with regard to ‘security’ and imposed a comparable solution. After the MBF balked at mass executions, the Führer placed the SS in charge of German anti-partisan policy, which meant that the issue of anti-partisan policy enhanced the power of Himmler’s Black Corps in France. Nazis in Berlin and the military administration in Paris proposed disparate anti-partisan policies. Speaking through Keitel, Hitler ordered the MBF to

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carry out immediate, deadly, and disproportionate reprisals that targeted Jews. Hitler’s policy used resistance to justify genocide and enmesh the army in the Final Solution. Although he too supported harsh security measures that included hostage executions in principle and practice, the MBF preferred to investigate attacks and focus German retribution on actual partisans or criminals who could be linked with suspected perpetrators. The military administration encouraged Franco-German collaboration, tried not to alienate neutral Frenchmen, and used gradually increasing reprisals to teach partisans that resistance did not pay. When compared to historical precedents, the practices of other European armies, and common interpretations of the rules of war, the MBF’s reprisal policy stands just beyond or at the very edge of ‘normal’ military behavior in a modern guerrilla war. Hitler’s anti-partisan policy amounted to little more than a thinly veiled attempt to exterminate an alleged race and, when placed in the context of the laws of war and historical precedents, stands far beyond the pale of traditional military conduct. In theory, the laws of war (jus in bello) govern the behavior of soldiers in an armed conflict. They consist of specific international agreements negotiated by sovereign states and an amorphous group of historical precedents established over an indeterminate period of time. In the modern era, belligerent and neutral governments alike recognized that wounded soldiers suffered needlessly during the Crimean War (1854–1856). To resolve the problem, diplomats from twelve European countries signed the Red Cross Convention, alternatively known as the first Geneva Convention, in 1864. The ten articles of the treaty bound signators to treat all medical personnel and civilians engaged in helping the wounded as neutral.¹ Efforts to render military customs into written treaties continued throughout the nineteenth century. In the 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration, representatives of sixteen states agreed That the only legitimate object which states should endeavor to accomplish during war is to weaken the military force of the enemy; That for this purpose, it is sufficient to disable the greatest possible number of men; That this object would be exceeded by the employment of arms which uselessly aggravate the sufferings of disabled men, or render their death inevitable; ¹ Friedman (ed.), The Laws of War, vol. I, pp. 151, 187–191; Geoffrey Best, Humanity in Warfare (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980), p. 151.

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Attempts to recast vague military traditions did not always succeed. Diplomats, lawyers, and soldiers from fifteen countries failed to reach an agreement during the 1874 Brussels conference, but the desire to codify the ‘laws and customs of war’ remained popular among the European public.³ In 1898, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs proposed another meeting to consider ‘a possible reduction of the excessive armaments which weigh upon all nations.’ At the conference, Colonel Gross von Schwarzhoff, a member of the German delegation and informal spokesman for all opponents of arms control agreements, replied that the German people were ‘not crushed beneath the weight of armament expenditures’ and, with the support of American and British officers, blocked further attempts to restrict military spending. Yet the meeting did not end in total failure. Participants signed treaties concerning belligerency, prisoners of war, and military authority over hostile territory. They also prohibited the use of expanding (‘dum-dum’) bullets and banned ‘the use of projectiles the object of which is the diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious gases.’ Twenty-six nations eventually ratified what eventually became known as the 1899 Hague Convention.⁴ With support from American President Theodore Roosevelt, Tsar Nicholas II convened another major international conference at The Hague in 1906. Forty-four states revised the 1899 accords and passed a total of fourteen conventions but broke little new ground. Section III of the Laws and Customs of War on Land provoked considerable debate.⁵ Some participants argued that local inhabitants had a right to resist an invading army, while others believed that such resistance ‘merely prolonged the war and confused otherwise clear distinctions between soldiers and civilians.’ ² Friedman (ed.), The Laws of War, vol. I, pp. 192–3. ³ Friedman (ed.), The Laws of War, vol. I, pp. 149–155. ⁴ James Brown Scott (ed.), The Hague Conventions and Declarations of 1899 and 1907 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1915), pp. xiv–xv; Friedman (ed.), The Laws of War, vol. I, pp. 153, 204–250; Calvin DeArmond Davis, The United States and the First Hague Peace Conference (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1962), pp. 121–4, 289–302; Alfred Vagts, A History of Militarism (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1981), pp. 399–403. ⁵ Scott (ed.), The Hague Conventions and Declarations of 1899 and 1907, pp. vi–vii; Calvin DeArmond Davis, The United States and the Second Hague Peace Conference: American Diplomacy and International Organization, 1899–1914 (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1975), pp. 200–207.

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Diplomats surmounted the disagreement by retaining ambiguous language used in the 1899 treaty and made few substantive changes to the sections dealing with occupied territory.⁶ In order to limit the carnage of war, the Hague Convention tried to distinguish civilians from soldiers, militiamen, and lawful combatants. Articles of the 1907 Hague Convention specified that soldiers had to (1) be ‘commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates,’ (2) wear ‘a fixed distinctive emblem recognizable at a distance,’ (3) openly bear arms, and (4) conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war. As a hostile army approached, civilians could defend their homes and still be considered legitimate belligerents as long as they carried their weapons openly, tried to wear some sort of uniform, and obeyed the rules of war. Once invading troops seized control of enemy territory, civilians lost their right to revolt and owed a degree of loyalty to the occupying army.⁷ Unlike soldiers and militiamen, the inhabitants of an occupied territory existed in a grey area of international law. According to section III of the 1907 Hague Convention (Military Authority over the Territory of the Hostile State), an occupying power could not force civilians to swear allegiance to the occupying power (article 45) nor compel them to furnish information about another state’s army (article 44). An occupying army had to respect the family honor, family rights, religious convictions, and the private property of local residents (article 46). Article 47 simply stated that ‘(p)illage is formally forbidden.’ But inhabitants of an occupied territory could not embark on a guerrilla campaign against their conquerors. According to the Hague Convention, those who did could be considered war criminals because they did not wear a uniform or bear their arms openly. If found guilty of ‘war treason,’ ‘war rebellion,’ or similar war crimes, civilians could be punished as war criminals.⁸ The remaining eleven articles of section III protected civilians who lived in occupied territory, but they contained ambiguous phrases. Article 43 ⁶ Adam Roberts, ‘Land warfare: from Hague to Nuremberg,’ in Michael Howard, George J. Andreopolos, and Mark R. Schulman (eds.), The Laws of War: Constraints on Warfare in the Western World (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994), pp. 121–3. ⁷ Friedman (ed.), The Laws of War, vol. I, pp. 308–323; Manual of Military Law (London: His Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1914), chapter XIV; BAK, All. Proz. 21/208/35–43; Lieb, Konventioneller Krieg oder NS-Weltanschauungskrieg, pp. 233–258. ⁸ USNA, RG 153 (Records of the Office of the Judge Advocate General—Army)/entry 135/91/folder L-512/28–126.

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recognized that ‘legitimate power’ passed into the hands of an occupying army when the latter assumed control of enemy territory. While granting an occupying army what amounted to sovereignty, the same article bound a military governor to ‘take all measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country.’ Article 48 allowed an occupying army to collect taxes, but only ‘as far as possible, in accordance with the rules of assessment and incidence in force.’ Article 49 permitted an occupying army to levy additional funds from an occupied territory, but only ‘for the needs of the army or of the administration of the territory in question.’ The phrases ‘as far as possible’ and ‘unless absolutely prevented’ crippled article 43 and injected ambiguity into successive provisions.⁹ At first glance, article 50 appeared to outlaw collective punishments: No general penalty, pecuniary or otherwise, shall be inflicted upon the population on account of the acts of individuals for which they cannot be regarded as jointly or severally responsible.

According to the letter or the law, article 50 outlawed punishments for which the population could not be regarded as jointly responsible. The legality of collective reprisals depended on the perspective of the person doing the ‘regarding.’ Comparable linguistic flaws in articles 48 and 49 implicitly sanctioned extraordinary taxes and fines levied for alleged crimes supposedly carried out by an entire community. During World War Two, Nazis used ambiguous phrases in the Hague Convention to justify collective punishments.¹⁰ Articles 4 through 20 of the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions established rough guidelines for the treatment of prisoners of war, but the experience of World War One proved them to be inadequate. To remedy these shortcomings, diplomats expanded the Hague rules in the 1929 Geneva Convention. Sections with titles like ‘Prisoners-of-War Camps, Food and Clothing of Prisoners of War, and Labor of Prisoners of War’ fleshed out standards alluded to in the 1907 Hague Convention. Specific articles of the 1929 agreement outlawed collective punishments and established arrest for a duration of thirty days as the most severe penalty ⁹ Friedman (ed.), The Laws of War, vol. I, p. 322. ¹⁰ BAMA, RW 35/312/15–19, 21–59.

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that could be applied to prisoners of war.¹¹ The 1929 Geneva Convention protected prisoners of war from collective reprisals, but it did not apply to civilians. Agreements negotiated between 1864 and 1929 codified the unwritten rules of war, but many provisions were riddled with vague terms. Contentious provisions employed equivocal language to overcome disagreements between large and small nations. Public opinion compelled governments to participate in the talks, and no government wanted to appear to be responsible for their failure, but diplomatic and military negotiators refused to accept precise wording that might limit their actions during an armed conflict. In order to secure widespread acceptance, international agreements had to be ambiguous. In an attempt to overcome the limited scope of the Hague Convention, diplomats inserted the Martens clause into the preamble of both the 1899 and 1907 Hague agreements: Until a more complete code of the laws of war has been issued, the High Contracting Parties deem it expedient to declare that, in cases not included in the Regulations adopted by them, the inhabitants and belligerents remain under the protection and the rule of the principles of the law of nations, as they result from the usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, and the dictates of the public conscience.¹²

Named in honor of the jurist who advised the Tsar during the 1899 and 1907 conferences, the Martens clause admonished participants to adhere to the unwritten traditions of warfare and let historical precedent shape military conduct. In so doing, it opened up a Pandora’s box of both ‘good’ and ‘bad’ historical precedents that belligerents could use to support almost any policy. European soldiers had developed an elaborate code of conduct during the early modern era. Detailed but largely unwritten rules governing the capitulation of fortresses supplemented the earlier code of chivalry. Townsmen who refused to surrender might be put to the sword, but citizens who capitulated before a breach in the defenses had been effected could expect to pay a fine and escape with their lives. Similar traditions facilitated the exchange of prisoners and protected field hospitals in the ¹¹ Friedman (ed.), The Laws of War, vol. I, pp. 488–522. ¹² Friedman (ed.), The Laws of War, vol. I, p. 309.

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early modern era. Although often honored in breach, custom encouraged belligerents to distinguish soldiers from civilians and usually exempted the latter from bloody retribution.¹³ The French Revolution introduced a new set of military customs. The Convention renounced wars of aggression in the constitution of 3 September 1791 and expected French armies to be welcomed as liberators when they invaded neighboring states.¹⁴ Initially French troops tried to persuade opposing soldiers to abandon corrupt monarchs and join the French cause. When their efforts proved fruitless, war of liberation became a ‘terrorist war’ against ‘slaves of despots’ who ‘deserved no pity.’ Fanatical French soldiers established an unsavory precedent as they massacred captured ´emigr´es.¹⁵ Soldiers recruited during the lev´ee en masse eventually honored many traditional standards of conduct, but circumstances often impeded this process. While deployed in France, French armies enjoyed relatively short lines of communication and requisitioned supplies without resorting to violence. As armies advanced beyond the Hexagon, successive French governments failed to supply troops with adequate food and money. Out of necessity, French troops often resorted to pillage. General Custine, the commander of the Army of Moselle, initially punished soldiers for despoiling the Palatinate, but he eventually bowed to military necessity and instituted a system of organized pillage to feed his army. As they swept across Europe, French armies often resorted to pillage and set another dangerous example.¹⁶ During the Spanish campaign, French armies established a third precedent that haunted resistance groups during World War Two. In March 1808, ¹³ B. H. Liddell Hart, Revolution in Warfare (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1947), pp. 38–95; Geoffrey Parker, ‘Early modern Europe’ in Howard et al., The Laws of War: Constraints on Warfare in the Western World, pp. 40–58. Stephen C. Neff, War and the Law of Nations: A General History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). ¹⁴ Sydney Seymour Biro, The German Policy of Revolutionary France: A Study in French Diplomacy during the War of the First Coalition, 1792–1797 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957), pp. 24–5, 94. ¹⁵ Jean-Paul Bertaud, The Army of the French Revolution: From Citizen-Soldiers to Instrument of Power, translated by R. R. Palmer (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988), pp. 153–6, 85–6; Alan Forest, ‘The nation in arms I: the French wars,’ in Charles Townsend (ed.), The Oxford History of Modern War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 59–66. ¹⁶ Best, Humanity in Warfare, pp. 80, 115–118; Bertaud, The Army of the French Revolution, pp. 144–5, 286–291; Gunther E. Rothenberg, The Art of Warfare in the Age of Napoleon (London: B. T. Batsford, 1977), pp. 85–7.

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approximately 100,000 French troops invaded Spain and defeated the regular Spanish army in short order, but their system of supply—organized pillage—fomented unrest. French troops suppressed a bloody uprising in Madrid, but they failed to stop the insurrection from spreading to the countryside. Spanish guerrillas attacked small bands of French soldiers and often killed prisoners but dispersed when they encountered large groups of regulars. French soldiers responded by burning villages and seizing hostages. When French troopers continued to disappear, Napoleon’s marshals embarked on a campaign of collective reprisals and hostage executions. Spanish guerrillas, British regulars, and French conscripts all committed atrocities that harkened back to the Religious Wars of the sixteenth century.¹⁷ In addition to introducing organized pillage as a common military practice, the French Revolution established bloody collective reprisals as an acceptable military strategy. Wars of national unification in the latter half of the nineteenth century confirmed Napoleonic practices. During the early stages of the FrancoPrussian War, professional soldiers obeyed terms of the 1864 Geneva Convention. After the fall of the Second Empire in October 1870, the Government of National Defense ordered patriots to adopt guerrilla tactics and ignited a brutal war. ‘Irregular’ French soldiers or franc-tireurs attacked German troops and sabotaged vital supply lines. Following Napoleon’s precedent, German soldiers responded by burning villages and seizing hostages. Many of the latter spent the duration of the war in Germany as prisoners, but a fraction perished before German firing squads. German and French leaders called for revision of existing international agreements after the Franco-Prussian War, but their appeals produced only the cryptic language of the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions. The experiences of the Franco-Prussian War only confirmed practices developed during the French Revolution.¹⁸ Although it claimed an unprecedented number of lives, World War One did not transform standards of acceptable military conduct. Citing military necessity, both sides breached international agreements during the course ¹⁷ Geoffrey Best, War and Society in Revolutionary Europe, 1770–1870, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1982), pp. 168–183; Jan Read, War in the Peninsula (London: Faber and Faber, 1977), pp. 169–181. ¹⁸ Michael Howard, The Franco-Prussian War: The German Invasion of France, 1870–1871 (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1962), pp. 250–256, 377–381; Franc¸ois Roth, La Guerre de 1870 (Paris: Fayard, 1990), pp. 372–410; BAMA, RW 35/231.

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of hostilities. Germany violated Belgian neutrality at the outset, and the British Admiralty infringed on the rights of neutral shipping shortly thereafter. The Kaiser’s troops used the slightest pretext to justify the burning of villages and executed approximately 6,500 civilians in Belgium and northern France.¹⁹ The 1899 Hague Convention banned ‘the use of projectiles the object of which is the diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious gases,’ but it did not stop French soldiers from employing noxious (as opposed to poisonous) gas grenades in 1914. Less than a year later, Germany complied with the letter of the law and released poison gas from cylinders. Allied forces shot gas-filled artillery shells at German trenches six months later, but they described their response as a reprisal justified by Germany’s previous transgression.²⁰ War-crimes trials championed by David Lloyd George and Georges Clemenceau proceeded in Leipzig after the Armistice, but they adjudicated few cases, acquitted most defendants, and underlined the defects of international agreements.²¹ During World War One, both sides preyed upon the ambiguous terms of the Hague Convention. Nazi leaders routinely ignored portions of the Martens clause that referred to ‘the laws of humanity,’ ‘the dictates of the public conscience,’ and ‘usages established among civilized peoples.’ Adolf Hitler consistently championed brutal methods that have ‘always been used in the history of the expansion of the power of great nations’ to eliminate racial opponents and restore ‘tranquility.’²² Driven by the concept of military necessity and a shortage of manpower, German commanders used exemplary violence to intimidate and exploit Russian civilians. Taking refuge in the fact that the Soviet Union had not acceded to the 1929 Geneva Convention, men like Field Marshal von Manstein followed orders from Berlin and carried out Hitler’s war of annihilation. With an almost savage glee, Nazi lawyers and ¹⁹ Helen McPhail, The Long Silence: Civilian Life under the German Occupation of Northern France, 1914–1918 (New York: I. B. Tauris & Co, 2001); John Horne and Alan Kramer, German Atrocities, 1914: A History of Denial (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2001), p. 74; Alan Kramer, Dynamic of Destruction. Culture and Mass Killing in the First World War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 6–68. ²⁰ Robert A. Doughty, Pyrrhic Victory: French Strategy and Operations in the Great War (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press, 2005), pp. 148–150. ²¹ Roberts, ‘Land warfare, from Hague to Nuremberg,’ pp. 123–6; James F. Willis, Prologue to Nuremberg: The Politics and Diplomacy of Punishing War Criminals of the First World War (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1982). ²² DGFP, ser. D, vol. XII, p. 542.

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ambitious generals used loopholes in the Hague laws to salve their own consciences and gain an advantage.²³ The first article of the 1907 Hague Convention bound signators to ‘issue instructions to their armed land forces which shall be in conformity with the regulations respecting the laws and customs of war on land.’ Instructions embodied in the manuals of military law of Britain, France, Germany, and the United States, explain how each country planned to honor treaty obligations and reveal a common interpretation of international law. In many ways, the 1929 British Manual of Military Law is representative. British regulations made a clear distinction between non-combatant civilians and belligerent soldiers, and they depended upon this distinction in order to function properly. The Hague definition of a lawful combatant, repeated verbatim in the British manual, protected volunteers and militias in addition to professional soldiers. Once an area fell under enemy occupation, civilians owed a degree of loyalty to an occupying army. Citizens who disobeyed the army of occupation could be found guilty of ‘war rebellion’ or ‘war treason’ and punished accordingly.²⁴ While they did not have to swear an oath of loyalty or provide information, residents could not revolt and expect to be treated as lawful combatants. The 1929 edition of the British Manual of Military Law expected the inhabitants of an occupied territory to behave in an absolutely peaceful manner, . . . to in no way take part in the hostilities, to refrain from every injury to the troops of the occupant, and from any act prejudicial to their operations, and to render obedience to the officials of the occupant. Any violation of this duty is punishable by the occupant. (Chapter XIV, article 384)

Subsequent paragraphs restated article 50 of the Hague rules. If inhabitants committed hostile acts, a belligerent was ‘justified in requiring the aid of the population to prevent their recurrence and, in serious and urgent cases, in resorting to reprisals’ (article 386). Later sections labeled as war crimes ²³ Wolfram Wette, The Wehrmacht: History, Myth, Reality, translated by Deborah Lucas Schneider (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), pp. 129–130; Manfred Messerschmidt, ‘Forward defence: the ‘‘Memorandum of the Generals’’ for the Nuremberg Court’ in Hannes Heer and Klaus Naumann (eds.), War of Extermination (New York: Berghahn Books, 2000), pp. 389–396. ²⁴ Friedman (ed.), The Laws of War, vol. I, pp. 308–323; Manual of Military Law, chapter XIV; BAK/All. Proz 21/208/35–43.

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(1) violations of recognized rules of warfare by members of the armed forces, (2) illegitimate hostilities in arms committed by individuals who are not members of the armed forces, (3) espionage and war treason, and (4) marauding (article 441). Once a population resisted the legitimate authority of an occupying army, it could be ruled guilty of committing a war crime (usually ‘war treason’ or ‘war rebellion’) and could be subject to reprisals. Articles 461 through 464 explicitly sanctioned the seizure of hostages in the event of ‘perfidy’ on behalf of the enemy. British regulations did not comment on the possible fate of imprisoned hostages but stated that ‘in modern times it is deemed preferable to resort to territorial guarantees instead of taking hostages.’²⁵ French military doctrine treated collective reprisals as a matter of course. Cavalry regulations of 1924 advised commanders to ‘methodically disarm the local population and take hostages’ after seizing hostile territory. Infantry regulations of 1940 adopted a similar tone and suggested that officers ‘take hostages if the population is hostile.’²⁶ During the 1923 occupation of the Ruhr, French officers put these ideas into practice and seized hostages as part of a larger campaign to crush German resistance.²⁷ French jurists agreed with their military compatriots and used the concept of war treason—a crime committed by non-combatants who secretly aided enemy forces—to justify collective reprisals. Like their British counterpart, French regulations agreed that non-combatants could be punished for disobeying orders from a military government.²⁸ Regulations published by the Judge Advocate General of the United States Army discussed the occupation of enemy territory in great detail. American military doctrine reflected previous experiences in the Civil and Spanish-American Wars and explicitly recognized the ambiguous nature of international agreements. Sections of Rules of Land Warfare that reviewed collective punishment and reprisals began with relevant quotes from the Hague agreements and then noted how prominent scholars interpreted the conventions. In essence, the Judge Advocate General provided field commanders with enough legal theory to justify either a ‘hard’ or ‘soft’ ²⁵ Manual of Military Law, pp. 292–3, 302–307; BAK, All. Proz. 21/208/35–43. ²⁶ BAMA, RW 35/542/24–25; BAK, All. Proz. 21/218/45. ²⁷ Stanislas Jeannesson, Poincar´e et la Ruhr, 1922–1924: Histoire d’une occupation (Strasbourg: Presses Universitaires de Strasbourg, 1997), pp. 168–171, 187 note 58, 194, 201–205. ²⁸ J. M. Spaight, War Rights on Land (London: Macmillan and Co., 1911), pp. 333–4; Robert Jacomet, Les Lois de la guerre continental (Paris: L. Fournier, 1913), chapter 3, article 93.

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occupation policy. Field regulations of the United States Army embraced an expansive definition of war treason, branded civilians who rebelled against a military government as war rebels, and recognized that the latter could be sentenced to death. Although they described both collective punishments and reprisals as a ‘last resort,’ American guidelines did not prohibit collective punishments. They employed a unique tone but expressed views that ran parallel to French and British regulations.²⁹ German military regulations defined the jurisdiction of military courts, procedures that judges had to follow, and penalties that tribunals could impose. Unlike French, American, or British rules, German military law could be applied both inside and outside of the Reich, and German courts did not distinguish German citizens from the inhabitants of an occupied territory. All civilians had to obey military regulations in areas under martial law. Anybody who disobeyed could be found guilty of war treason (Kriegsverrat) and executed by a military court.³⁰ The German government curbed the jurisdiction of military courts during the Weimar era, but Hitler restored their powers by signing a new law on 12 May 1933. A revised version of the military penal code, issued 29 September 1936, included procedural practices, rules of evidence, and an appeal process that were integral parts of the Imperial Army’s military justice system.³¹ The Führer issued two decrees on 17 August 1938 that swept away many of the liberal guarantees central to the Imperial code of military justice, but neither law came into force until war became imminent on 26 August 1939. The first of those regulations, the Decree concerning Military Jurisdiction during War and Special Operations (Kriegsstrafverfahrensordnung or KStVO), established a streamlined judicial procedure that distilled earlier regulations down to five basic principles: 1. a trial had to be held before three judges; 2. the accused had to be heard if present; ²⁹ Edward H. Young, ‘Law of belligerent Occupation,’ Text No. 11 (Ann Arbor, 1944), pp. 111–126. Appears in USNA, RG 153/135/91/folder L-512; Basic Field Manual FM 27–10, Rules of Land Warfare (Washington, DC: United States Printing Office, 1940), pp. 85–9. ³⁰ James Garner, International Law and the World War, vol. II (London: Longmans, Green, 1920), pp. 92–5; BAK, All. Proz. 21/40/nfn (Abschrift, Dr. Victor Knipp, ‘Deportation als Kriegsverbrechen’). ³¹ USNA, RG 153/135/6/116/2–3 (Office of Strategic Services, Research and Analysis Branch, R & A number 2500.18, ‘German Military Government Over Europe: Military and Police Tribunals in Occupied Europe,’ dated 22 December 1944).

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3. decisions had to be set down in writing and accompanied by a written opinion; 4. a conviction had to rest upon the agreement of a majority of judges; and 5. sentences had to be confirmed by a competent commander. Commanders could observe the traditional Military Penal Code described by the Milit¨argesetzbuch or follow new procedures outlined in the KStVO at their own discretion, and the rules applied to all civilian and military personnel of any nationality operating within an area that fell under martial law.³² In essence, the KStVO allowed military commanders to abbreviate the judicial process and thus undermined the rule of law.³³ While the KStVO truncated judicial procedures, the Decree concerning Special Military Crimes during War (Kriegssonderstrafrechtsverordnung or KSSVO) defined criminal activity and established sentencing guidelines. Articles two through five defined espionage, hostile acts committed by civilians (Freisch¨arlerei), violations of German military regulations, and the undermining of German military power (Zersetzung der Wehrkraft) respectively. All four could be punished with death. Subsequent regulations established a particularly abbreviated judicial procedure for the crime of guerrilla activity. Other articles established sentencing guidelines for crimes such as treason in wartime and pillage.³⁴ The KSSVO increased the number of capital crimes and the KStVO eliminated many of the safeguards inherent in traditional military law developed during the Kaiserreich. Instead of rewriting military law to match the Nazi concept of justice, Hitler attacked the foundations of the Rechtsstaat or rule of law and granted military judges autonomy in judicial affairs. Once inculcated with Nazi values, field commanders could administer justice in keeping with Hitler’s new order. The execution of 13,000–15,000 German soldiers during ³² USNA, RG 153/135/6/116/2–4; USNA, RG 338/Foreign Military Studies/MS # P-033/18–21; BAMA, RW 35/209/99. ³³ Michael Stolleis, The Law under the Swastika, translated by Thomas Dunlap (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1998) pp. 145–154; Franz W. Siedler, Die Milit¨argerichtsbarkeit der deutschen Wehrmacht, 1939–1945 (Berlin: Herbig, 1991); Fritz Wüllner, Die NS-Milit¨arjustiz und das Elend der Geschichtsschreibung (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1991); and Manfred Messerschmidt, ‘German military law in the Second World War,’ in Wilhelm Deist, ed., The German Military in the Age of Total War (Dover, NH: Berg, 1985), pp. 323–335. ³⁴ USNA, RG 153/135/6/116/5–7; BAMA, RW 35/209/20–21, 99; BAMA, RW 35/308/112–113, 155; BAK, All. Proz. 21/213/13–19.

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World War Two—as compared with 48 during World War One—suggests that many did.³⁵ Regulations issued by OKW in 1938 allowed military commanders to seize hostages if they faced a hostile population that threatened German troops. If they used the abbreviated procedures set forth in the KStVO to prove the crime of Freisch¨arlerei defined in the KSSVO, field commanders could carry out reprisals without worrying about red tape, due process, and other bureaucratic impediments. To clarify abstruse legal theory, OKW included a list of 24 practical examples: In an area occupied by German troops, soldiers marching through are repeatedly shot at by guerrillas from a convenient hiding place. For the security of the troops, the division commander arrests five respected citizens as hostages. The population is told that the hostages will be shot if soldiers are again fired upon. The division commander has the authority to order the execution of the hostages. Solution: Hostage seizures and hostage executions are not forbidden by international law. However, the existence of military necessity always forms the basis for hostage seizures. The unhindered march of the troops could only be secured by taking of hostages. With this kind of hostage case, only the senior troop commander whose safety the hostages guarantee can decide the fate of the hostages.

Legal regulations formulated by OKW allowed senior field commanders to do anything that was not explicitly forbidden by existing international agreements. Because such freedom carried an element of political risk, OKW forced junior officers to operate under more restrictive rules. In the realm of judicial affairs, German field commanders possessed tremendous autonomy.³⁶ American, British, French, and German military regulations allowed field commanders to seize hostages, but they endorsed the strategy with varying degrees of enthusiasm. Several features distinguish the German code from its allied counterparts. First, German regulations established detailed procedures for hostage seizures and downplayed non-lethal alternatives. Second, only German regulations outlined a process that could be used to execute hostages. Third, Hitler eliminated traditional liberal guarantees that ensured a fair judicial process. American, British, French, and German regulations understood the ambiguous nature of the Hague rules. They ³⁵ BAMA, RW 35/209/211, 259; BAMA, RW 35/551/18–23; Bartov, Hitler’s Army, pp. 95–96. ³⁶ BAMA, RW 35/209/19–21, 28–38.

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all accepted collective reprisals and hostage seizures in principle, but only German regulations translated this principle into practice. Hitler encouraged subordinates to put Nazi legal doctrines into practice. On the eve of the 1940 Western Campaign, the Führer directed military forces to obey provisions of the Hague Convention but he added that ‘(h)ostile acts by the population will be suppressed with the utmost severity.’ He employed an expansive definition of ‘hostile acts’ that included passive resistance and ‘stopping work as a political demonstration.’³⁷ In accordance with Hitler’s wishes, General Alfred Streccius, the MBF between 30 June and 25 October 1940, issued anti-sabotage regulations on 12 September. Entitled ‘Measures to Prevent Sabotage,’ Streccius’s regulation described four methods that could be used to suppress dangerous resistance activity.³⁸ First, local commanders could force local residents to guard railroad tracks, factories, bridges, telegraph cables, and military installations. People who failed to fulfill their responsibilities could face prison, hard labor, or even death. Second, local German authorities could impose curfews, enact sumptuary laws like the prohibition of alcohol, and close restaurants, theaters, and public markets. Third, the MBF allowed regional commanders to collect a ‘security deposit’ from a community that could be confiscated in the event of unsatisfactory behavior. To circumvent Hague rules that forbade extraordinary taxes and maintain the appearance of legality, the MBF ordered subordinates to call the collected funds ‘forced contributions’ (Zwangsauflagen). All of Streccius’s ‘Measures’ rested on the concept of collective responsibility but did not create a reign of arbitrary punishment and terror. With ‘the greatest reserve,’ the MBF allowed regional commanders to arrest hostages: Hostages are local residents who will pay with their lives if the public does not behave flawlessly. Therefore the responsibility for their fate lies in the hands of their fellow countrymen. The population must be publicly warned that hostages will be liable for the hostile acts of individuals.

Streccius recognized that seizing hostages carried grave risks and limited the autonomy of his subordinates. Only regional commanders (Bezirkchefs) could arrest hostages, and they could do so only after careful consideration of the circumstances, in response to ‘serious acts of violence’ (schweren ³⁷ DGFP, ser. D, vol. IX, p. 301.

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³⁸ BAMA, RW 35/45/1–4.

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Gewalttaten), and when other ‘suitable’ measures were unavailable. Furthermore, only the MBF could order the execution of hostages. The MBF understood that indiscriminate use of his hostage policy could damage Germany’s political standing. If anti-German groups attacked Wehrmacht personnel after a Bezirkchef had seized hostages, the MBF would have to execute hostages and endure the subsequent public outrage or pardon hostages and risk the appearance of weakness. The MBF admitted that some ‘criminals and fanatics’ might not be deterred by the seizure of hostages. He realized that such measures might encourage communists and anarchists to attack the German army if their efforts would then force the Germans to execute bourgeois politicians, rich industrialists, or other class enemies.³⁹ Otto von Stülpnagel replaced General Streccius as MBF on 25 October 1940, but the latter’s ‘Measures to Prevent Sabotage’ remained in force for several months after his departure. General von Stülpnagel issued new regulations on 26 March 1941, but they followed Streccius’s policy and embraced the principle of collective responsibility: Individuals and the population are to be treated as jointly responsible if they support hostile acts against German forces through passive resistance, inhibit investigations of earlier sabotage acts by general conduct, encourage misdeeds, or create an atmosphere for insubordinate and anti-German attitudes.⁴⁰

Although he employed a broad definition of activity that could trigger collective reprisals, General von Stülpnagel warned his subordinates to apply sanctions with care. 1) All measures must be realistic and designed to be carried out. Unrealistic threats or threats alone do not work well. 2) One must always consider the full set of circumstances when examining a situation, including motivation and the existence of malicious intent . . . 3) Measures perceived as unjust undermine respect for German authorities, hurt the loyal population, and must be revoked. ³⁹ Gary Gordon describes how the process unfolded on the eastern front in ‘Soviet partisan warfare, 1941–1944: the German perspective’ (Ph.D. diss., Iowa University, 1972), pp. 30–31: ‘Several German or other Axis soldiers would be captured, mutilated, and killed. Their bodies would then be left in a place where the Germans would surely find them, often next to villages sympathetic to the invaders or neutral in their political sympathies. When the bodies were found, German security troops would take revenge on all the villages in the area by killing everyone they saw, by confiscating all cattle and crops, and by devastating entire sections of land. The survivors fled to the forests where they would be met by partisans who would sympathize with them and offer help.’ ⁴⁰ USNA, T-501/166/71–82.

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With regard to seizing hostages, the MBF offered the following advice: Hostages should only be taken with great restraint (Zurückhaltung). At the moment of the arrest, it can never be foreseen whether the later execution of the hostages is undesirable and should remain undone for political reasons. However, respect for the military government will be shaken and the taking of hostages made pointless if executions are not carried out once new hostile acts have been committed. The efficacy of the taking of hostages for the prevention of hostile acts is questionable if an especially close bond does not exist between the perpetrator and the hostages. Fanatics and criminals have no regard for the lives of hostages. Thus hostages are to be arrested only if serious crimes have been committed and there are no other suitable means available.

Like his predecessor, General von Stülpnagel conceived of hostage seizures as a last resort. Leaders of the military administration supported Stülpnagel’s policy. The head of the justice division, Rudolf B¨alz, analyzed the legal basis of German security measures in a memo that circulated within the government subsection of the military administration. He believed that the Hague agreements did not prohibit the seizure or execution of hostages and added that other belligerents had adopted the practice in recent wars. Based on his analysis of law and historical precedent, B¨alz concluded that seizing hostages conformed with German laws and international agreements.⁴¹ B¨alz thought that the military administration had to follow several specific guidelines before carrying out hostage executions. First, the hostage policy had to be announced so that members of the public understood the consequences of anti-German activity. Second, ‘hostages could only be liable for acts that have been committed after their arrest and after the MBF had announced his hostage policy.’ Third, only French citizens could serve as hostages. Using the Nazi concept of Sippenhaft and contrary to western legal tradition, B¨alz argued that hostages had to be connected with or related to resistance groups that had carried out an attack in order to serve as an effective deterrent. The head of the justice division concluded that fines might be more effective because they contributed to the German war effort while deterring resistance. Others went a step further and suggested that the MBF proscribe hostage executions for political reasons. Although they believed that hostages could be executed in accordance with ⁴¹ BAMA, RW 35/308/12. Bargatzky, Hotel Majestic, pp. 47–9.

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existing international agreements, members of the military administration questioned the wisdom of such a policy.⁴² Despite developing a deadly anti-partisan policy, Generals Streccius and Otto von Stülpnagel exercised a degree of restraint while in charge of occupied France. Cases of assault that involved a German victim and French perpetrator did not always trigger collective reprisals or hostage seizures, but they could result in a death sentence. The MBF insisted that ‘[t]he best propagandist for the German cause is the disciplined, correct appearance of the German soldier’ and administered a stern brand of justice to both French and German perpetrators.⁴³ The vast majority of the French populace assumed a passive stance that favored the Reich. News of the October 1940 meetings between Hitler, Laval, and P´etain generated enthusiasm for the Vichy regime, but favorable sentiments evaporated after talks failed to produce an agreement. The advent of rationing, de facto annexation of Alsace and Lorraine, and expulsion of French nationalists and Jews from the Moselle, Bas-Rhin, and HautRhin d´epartements all dampened popular enthusiasm for Laval’s policy of collaboration. Public attitudes remained sour throughout the winter of 1940–1941, though sullen moods did not translate into deadly resistance activity. Resistance groups limited their efforts to sabotage and distributing anti-German leaflets.⁴⁴ During the first year of the Occupation, German policemen focused on mundane transgressions. Between October and December 1940, the number of so-called crimes reported to and investigated by the military administration per month jumped from 8,000 to 17,000. As more German policemen arrived in France, the MVW consolidated its hold on the occupied zone and pursued more alleged perpetrators. New German policies also played a part in the increase. A January 1941 report described traffic accidents as the leading cause of death among German soldiers, and military policemen began to enforce German traffic regulations. Together with blackout and price control violations, traffic infractions accounted ⁴² BAMA, RW 35/308/1–8, 12–19; Ulrich Herbert, ‘The German military command in Paris’, in Ulrich Herbert (ed.), National Socialist Extermination Policies: Contemporary German Perspectives and Controversies (New York: Berghahn Books, 2000), pp. 128–162. ⁴³ Serge Klarsfeld, La Shoah en France, volume II, Le calendrier de la pers´ecution des Juifs de France, juillet 1940–août 1942 (Paris: Fayard, 2001), p. 20; USNA, RG 242/T-501/143/465. ⁴⁴ USNA, RG 242/T-501/143/365–366, 425–427, 459, 491–492; USNA, RG 242/ T-501/184/1074.

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first measures 20,000 Serious crimes Administrative arrest Traffic infraction Blackout violation Curfew violation Venereal disease Traffic accident Slandering or disdaining the German army Larceny (minor robbery) Unauthorized possession of a firearm

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Figure 4.1. Crimes prosecuted by the MBF, 1940–1942.

for most of the increase in the crime rate during the early months of the Occupation.⁴⁵ The total number of offenses investigated by the MVW began to drop in January 1941 and continued to decline until the MBF lost control of police forces in May 1942. German policemen may have overlooked minor transgressions and allowed some to perpetrators to escape with a warning. For their part, Frenchmen may have learned to hide their contempt for le boche because flagrant defiance could lead to charges of slandering the German army.⁴⁶ Statistical data do not explain why the incidence of traffic infractions, price control violations, and other petty crimes decreased in 1941, but the drop suggests an increase in law and order, a decline in enforcement, and a degree of Franco-German accommodation. ⁴⁵ USNA, RG 242/T-501/143/625; BAMA, RW 35/244/49–53; USNA, RG 242/ T-501/184/1070–1075. ⁴⁶ USNA, RG 242/T-501/184/1049–1050.

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Murder, attempted murder, manslaughter, and attacking military personnel Lost property Drunkenness Illegal association Price control violation Fraud Sabotage Espionage Desertion, AWOL Suicide Assault Sexual offenses Plundering, looting Arson Robbery

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Figure 4.2. Serious crimes prosecuted by the MBF, 1940–1942.

The invasion of the Soviet Union coincided with a temporary increase in the incidence of unauthorized possession of a firearm and slandering the German army. Both peaked in the fall of 1941 and suggested a wave of discontent and/or a German crackdown. The military administration often punished such offenses with prison sentences and/or fines, but people caught with military weapons or communist propaganda could receive a death sentence. German police examined an average of 258 cases of unauthorized possession of a gun each month with a peak of 435 cases in October and November 1941. By the summer of 1942 this number dropped to 178. The incidence of slander also followed a bell curve that peaked at 343 cases between August and September 1941. On average, police investigated 200 slander cases each month with a low of 116 recorded in May 1942. The zenith of illegal firearms possession and slander cases may reflect a ripple of public dissent or an increased German sensitivity to both offenses in the fall of 1941. 108

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The MBF regarded sabotage, espionage, and assault as very serious crimes that could result in death sentences or trigger hostage executions. The invasion of the Soviet Union corresponded with several attacks against German soldiers, but data collected by the MVW does not reveal a widespread pattern of sabotage, espionage, or assault. The MVW investigated an average of 60 acts of sabotage each month. The incidence of sabotage peaked at 86 cases in November 1940 and fell to an all-time low of 34 incidents by May 1942. Espionage followed a similar pattern. Between October 1940 and May 1942, the military government investigated 458 cases of spying or just under 23 incidents per month. Espionage peaked during the first month of the reporting period at 45 and fell to 7 cases by May 1942. Attacks against German military personnel followed a slightly different pattern. They peaked in June and July 1941 with 20 incidents per month, averaged just under twelve attacks for the entire reporting period, and fell to an anemic six attacks by May 1942. Statistics collected by the MVW suggest that sabotage and espionage followed a downward trend during the first 16 months of the Occupation. Despite a temporary increase in the summer of 1941, assault followed a similar pattern. Assassinations that followed in the wake of Operation Barbarossa were largely symbolic. Although the incidence of serious crimes usually declined between October 1940 and May 1942, punishments meted out to French offenders did not. German military courts sentenced a total of 581 French citizens to death during the first 23 months of the Occupation. Of these, 434 executions (75 per cent) were actually carried out.⁴⁷ Legal authorities reduced the remaining 147 cases to prison terms or hard labor, and many of these involved women or children under 18. Eighty-one per cent of the executions carried out by the MBF occurred after the invasion of the Soviet Union. The number of Frenchmen sentenced to long terms in prison matched the increase in executions until January 1942, after which it declined precipitously. As German forces bogged down on the eastern front, military courts handed out fewer prison sentences and executed a larger number of Frenchmen convicted of crimes against the German army. ⁴⁷ Figures do not include some Frenchmen executed as hostages between September 1941 and January 1942. Prisoners convicted of non-political crimes and sentenced to prison could later be executed as hostages and counted as reprisals. Numbers cited above are not comprehensive, but they do suggest that executions, both criminal and hostage, increased after the invasion of the Soviet Union. BAMA, RW 35/542; BAMA, RW 35/543.

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Figure 4.3. Daily life in Occupied France. Photograph courtesy of the Library of Congress.

The invasion of the Soviet Union may not have signaled the start of (what Germany regarded as) a new ‘crime’ wave, but it did mark the beginning of harsh repression based on an increase in the number of executions. Taken as a whole, crime statistics and subjective security reports suggest that German police did not encounter dangerous resistance activity while they remained in charge of German security policy. The incidence of murder, espionage, and sabotage all followed a downward trend through the spring of 1942. German policemen had enough time to pursue traffic scofflaws and confiscate shortwave radios. Resistance activity did not force the MBF to adopt bloody reprisals. International agreements in force during World War Two provided scant protection for civilians in occupied territories, and European armies exploited this weakness throughout the modern era. British soldiers employed collective reprisals during the Boer War and French troops seized German hostages during the 1923 occupation of the Ruhr. During the FrancoPrussian War, German forces had employed tactics that were comparable 110

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to Streccius’s 1940 Measures. One historian has described the occupation of Belgium between 1914 and 1918 as ‘a sinister pre-run for the occupations of World War Two.’⁴⁸ While resistance activity remained limited to cutting telegraph cables and breaking curfew regulations, Otto von Stülpnagel resisted the trend toward brutality and did not resort to hostage executions. Fanning an ingrained fear of partisans, Hitler revised the military regulations, eliminated traditional safeguards, and used unsavory precedents to justify immediate and disproportionate reprisals against civilians.⁴⁹ Abetted by criminal orders from Berlin, many German officers succumbed to guerillaphobia, shot all who looked askance, and advanced the racial goals of the Nazi regime by focusing reprisals on Jews. ⁴⁸ Best, Humanity in Warfare, p. 227. ⁴⁹ Ben Shepherd, War in the Wild East: The German Army and Soviet Partisans (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), pp. 41–6, 52–7; Herbert, Best, pp. 69–82; Mark Mazower, Hitler’s Empire: How the Nazis Ruled Europe (New York: Penguin, 2008), pp. 349–353.

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5 Resistance and reprisals

The 1939 Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact cast the French Communist Party (PCF) and Nazi Germany into an uneasy alliance. In conjunction with British and French liberals, the PCF had supported a united front against fascism during the Spanish Civil War. Once Hitler and Stalin signed the Non-Aggression Pact, the PCF condemned the Daladier and Chamberlain governments as ‘capitalist plutocrats’ and leading French communists like Maurice Thorez refused to serve in the French army. In response, the Daladier government banned the PCF on 27 August 1939 and forced the party underground.¹ Otto Abetz, the German ambassador in Paris, met with representatives of the PCF central committee after France and Germany signed the 1940 Armistice Agreement, but French police arrested the communist delegates before negotiations could bear fruit and the German military administration (Milit¨arverwaltungsstab or MVW) refused to intervene on their behalf.² During the first year of the Occupation, branches of the German government remained neutral while the Vichy regime and the PCF fought for the hearts and minds of French workers. After German forces invaded the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941, the tacit ceasefire between the PCF and the MVW unraveled. Stalin ordered communists throughout Europe to disrupt the Nazi war effort and German authorities noticed a sharp increase in anti-German propaganda. Leaflets ¹ Duroselle, L’Abîme, pp. 32–4, 38–43; Journal officiel, number 11770, dated 27 September 1939. ² BAMA, RW 36 (Kommandanturen der Milit¨arverwaltung)/97/1–24; Lambauer, Otto Abetz et le Franc¸ais, pp. 143–4.

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that vilified Nazi Germany and celebrated the Soviet Union began to appear in markets throughout Paris. Taking an optimistic tone, some began to compare the current situation with that of 1812.³ The military administration suspected that the propaganda came from Britain, but the production of leaflets dropped from 12,000 to 400 sheets per week after French police seized covert printing presses in September 1941. Despite the increase in anti-German propaganda during the summer, the military commander in France (Milit¨arbefehlshaber in Frankreich or MBF) believed that French opinion showed faint sympathy for Great Britain, the Soviet Union, or Nazi Germany.⁴ Eight days after the invasion of the Soviet Union, Keitel allowed the MBF to punish sabotage and guerrilla activity with the death penalty if necessary, but he did not order a new terror campaign. His note of 30 June 1941 told the MBF to inform Berlin of incidents that might influence Franco-German relations so that Hitler, OKW, and the Foreign Office could review sensitive cases and, if necessary, adjust the response. Keitel’s relatively mild decree ‘corresponded to the will of the Führer’ and granted Stülpnagel a free hand with regard to French resistance activity.⁵ General von Stülpnagel continued to follow his own policy. Jonathan Schmid, the head of the entire military administration, encouraged the Vichy regime to redouble its efforts against the PCF and directed SS police and intelligence agencies to assist French efforts. The MBF supervised the arrest of suspected communists and anarchists, but the entire campaign was carried out by French gendarmes. Stülpnagel warned subordinates not to create martyrs and preferred to let the Vichy government act in his stead. For the moment, the military government operated in the background.⁶ The MBF abandoned his pretense of neutrality and outlawed the PCF on 14 August. Publicized through radio announcements, newspaper articles, and posters, his decree threatened to punish communist activity with death and the distribution of anti-German leaflets with fifteen years in a German prison. Although the Daladier government had outlawed the PCF in 1939 and subsequent French administrations had pursued communist militants ³ USNA, RG 242/T-501/166/776–791; St´ephane Courtois, Denis Peschanski, and Adam Rayski, Le Sang de l’´etranger: Les immigr´es de la MOI dans la R´esistance (Paris: Fayard, 1989), p. 119. ⁴ USNA, RG 242/T-501/143/970–974; USNA, RG 242/T-501/144/44–48; Laborie, L’Opinion franc¸aise sous Vichy, pp. 253–260. ⁵ USNA, RG 242/T-501/165/353. ⁶ BALW, R 70 Frankreich/16/21–24.

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throughout France, the MBF’s 14 August 1941 decree allowed German military courts to prosecute suspected communists. If caught by German police forces, alleged communists had to face a German court martial and could wind up in a German concentration camp. The PCF gained a ruthless enemy on 14 August.⁷ Germany’s announcement spurred the French government to redouble its efforts against communism. The Ministry of Justice began to design a new branch of the judiciary that would prosecute suspected communists and anarchists on 16 August. The so-called Sections sp´eciales could try defendants in absentia and decisions issued by the court could not be appealed.⁸ Convicted communists or anarchists could be executed under existing sabotage and treason statutes or through special powers vested in the new court. In addition, the military administration promised to review all cases of communist activity that were investigated by French police or prosecuted by French courts. If not satisfied with the results, the MVW threatened to retry cases before a German court to achieve the desired outcome. The military administration allowed the French courts to handle cases of illegal association and communist activity, but the threat of German intervention hovered over Vichy officials who did not pursue communists with sufficient enthusiasm.⁹ On the morning of 21 August 1941, a pair of young men entered the Barb`es-Rochechouart station of the Paris Metro and fired two shots at Alfons Moser, a German naval cadet. Both shots struck home, and the 30-year-old sailor died of his wounds a few hours later. That evening, an unknown assailant attacked a German soldier in the Bastille Metro station, but the corporal eventually recovered from his injuries.¹⁰ Although it was not the first murder case that involved a German victim and French perpetrator, the Moser affair immediately attracted the attention of senior German authorities in Paris. German military courts had handled previous murder cases with little fanfare because they fell under the rubric of property crimes or crimes of ⁷ USNA, RG 242/T-501/166/600–608, 629–630. ⁸ USNA, RG 242/T-501/166/610–611; Weisberg, Vichy Law and the Holocaust in France, pp. 375–380. Published on 25 August 1941 in the Journal officiel, the law that created the Sections sp´eciales was dated 14 August. ⁹ USNA, RG 242/T-501/166/615–618, 623–625. ¹⁰ USNA, RG 242/T-501/143/1038–1141; USNA, RG 242/T-77/1624/folder 12/nfn (GFP report dated 21.8.41); Henri Nogu`eres, Histoire de la R´esistance en France de 1940 a` 1945, vol. II (Paris: Robert Laffont, 1969), pp. 69–84; Louis Oury, Rue du Roi-Albert: les otages de Nantes, Chˆateaubriant et Bordeaux (Pantin: Le Temps des cerrises, 1997), pp. 66–7.

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passion.¹¹ However, Moser, having arrived in Paris on 4 August, had not been around long enough to make friends or enemies, and the assailants had not stolen his wallet or identity papers. Officials from SS Security Service (Sicherheitsdienst or SD), German navy, and the Commandant of greater Paris discussed the assassination in the office of State Secretary Schmid six hours after the attack. They concluded that communists had probably carried out the attack to stir up anti-German resistance. General-Admiral Saalw¨achter and Admiral Lietzmann, the head of Naval Group Command West and his Chief of Staff respectively, referred to precedents set by the army in the Soviet Union and demanded immediate reprisals in response to the apparent political attack, but General von Stülpnagel chose to deliver one final warning.¹² On 22 August, he declared that all French prisoners held in German jails and prisoners detained in French jails at the request of German authorities would be counted as hostages. The MBF threatened to execute hostages in the event of further resistance activity and explained that the gravity of the offense would determine the number of hostages executed. Newspapers and posters carried a description of the MBF’s threat that same evening while radio stations broadcast the news over the airwaves.¹³ One day after the Moser attack, the French government sent the German military administration a note that expressed regret for the assassination, blamed the attack on communists, and hoped that German authorities would not punish all Frenchmen for the actions of a few communist miscreants. As per a tentative agreement reached on 20 August, the Vichy government promised to create the Sections sp´eciales and use the new court to try six leading communists who were already interned by the French police.¹⁴ In another meeting held on the same day, Fernand de Brinon (Vichy’s ambassador in Paris) and State Secretary Jean Ingrand (the Delegate ¹¹ Jackson, France. The Dark Years 1940–1944, p. 275; Klarsfeld, La Shoah en France, vol. II, p. 20; and USNA, RG 242/T-501/143. The suspected intent of the alleged assailants determined the German response. BAMA, RW 35/308/110–111 and BAMA, RW 35/542/6–8. ¹² BAMA, RW 35/308/122; USNA, RG 242/T-77/1614/folder 12/nfn (‘Fernmündlich von Kapt. Lt. Lang,’ 22.8.41, Betr. Erschiessung Moser); USNA, RG 242/T-77/1614/folder 12/nfn (Der MBF, Kommandostab Abt VOVF, An den Herrn Chef des Generalstabes, Betr. Moser, Paris 1.9.41, Vortrag bei Komm. Adm. am 1.9 11 Uhr); BAMA, RW 35/542/16–17. ¹³ USNA, RG 242/T-77/165/371–374. ¹⁴ USNA, RG 242/T-77/1614/folder 12/nfn (D´el´egation G´en´erale du Gouvernement Franc¸ais dans les Territoires Occup´es, ‘Attentat contre un officier de Marine Allemand: Position du gouvernement Francais,’ 22 August).

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for the Minister of the Interior in the Occupied Territories) assured Major Walter Beumelburg (the MVW’s liaison with the French government in Paris) that all six communists would be found guilty and sentenced to death. Furthermore, Brinon and Ingrand promised to bring the guillotine out of retirement and execute all six prisoners in public to demonstrate Vichy’s resolve with a gruesome flourish.¹⁵ The German government answered the French message on 22 August. The reply expressed satisfaction with the French measures but insisted upon several changes. First, the Germans wanted the Sections sp´eciales to meet behind closed doors. Second, they asked for some influence over suspects brought before the court. In a rare show of decorum, the German reply requested that executions not be held in public, but it demanded that all sentences be carried out by 28 August, or one week after the murder of Cadet Moser. Finally, the German communiqu´e observed that the French actions did not release Vichy from her obligation to aggressively investigate, prosecute, and punish future attacks.¹⁶ Brinon and Ingrand summed up the French position during a 23 August meeting with Major Beumelburg. Brinon informed his German counterpart that the Vichy government had formally created the Sections sp´eciales as promised and would begin to prosecute the Moser case on 26 August. Ingrand had already met with prosecutors and made sure that they appreciated the political importance of the cases. He told Beumelburg that the Sections sp´eciales would follow Vichy’s ‘revolutionary legal reasoning’ and fulfill official responsibilities to Germany’s satisfaction.¹⁷ Adhering to Germany’s schedule, the Sections sp´eciales convened on 26 August and adjudicated eleven cases in three days. The court sentenced three accused communists to death, six to terms of forced labor, and two to short prison sentences and a fine. The Vichy government carried out the death sentences immediately. Beumelburg concluded that the Vichy ¹⁵ USNA, RG 242/T-77/1614/folder 12/nfn (Der MBF, Kdo Stab Abt VOVF, 22.8.41, Betr. Attentat gegen einen deutschen Marineoffizier, Bezug: Mündliche Besprechung am 22.8 zwischen Botschafter de Brinon, Staatsrat Ingrand, Handelsrat Wilhelm, Mj. Beumelburg, und Lt. ´ Dr. Roesch); Joseph Barth´elemy, Ministre de la Justice, Vichy 1941–1943: M´emoires (Paris: Editions Pygmalion/G´erard Watelet, 1989), p. 574ff. ¹⁶ USNA, RG 242/T-77/1614/folder 12/nfn (VOVF, 22.8.41, Betr. Attentat gegen den deutschen Wehrmachtsangeh¨origen Moser am 21.8.41, ‘Erkl¨arung des VOVF gegenüber dem Generalbevollm¨achtigten der franz. Regierung’). ¹⁷ USNA, RG 242/T-77/1614/folder 12/nfn (MBF, Kdo. Stab. Abt. VOVF, 23 August 1941, Betr. Attentat am 21.8 und Ausnahmegesetz vom 23.8).

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government wanted to preempt German intervention by carrying out its own reprisals.¹⁸ The French government initially expressed satisfaction with the outcome of the Moser affair. When he learned that Stülpnagel had not demanded massive fines or reprisals, Marshal P´etain told his Chief of Staff that he was ‘absolutely satisfied.’ On 25 August he added that ‘it could not have turned out better.’ The French public did not appear to support the attack or oppose Vichy’s response. Major Beumelburg thought that the MBF’s moderate reaction had enhanced Germany’s standing both among the general public and in official circles.¹⁹ The death of Cadet Moser had not provoked the military administration, stirred up widespread support for resistance groups, nor driven a wedge between the Vichy government and German military administration as the attackers had hoped.²⁰ The verdicts did not appease every German agency. The SD received only a summary of evidence that was collected by the French police. To fulfill its ‘study’ of the PCF, the SD demanded complete interrogation transcripts and a comprehensive list of evidence seized during the course of the French investigation. When more detailed information arrived a few days later, the head of the SD in France, Helmut Knochen, complained that the first contingent appearing before the court only contained a single Jew and no foreigners.²¹ Without much influence inside the military administration, complaints from even the most senior SS leaders typically fell upon deaf ears during the first months of the Occupation. The Commanding Admiral of the German navy in France, Admiral Saalw¨achter, also felt short-changed. Speaking through his liaison officer, Saalw¨achter noted that the French government had promised to execute six leading communists in the wake of Moser’s death. As of 30 August, Vichy had only carried out three death sentences. Saalw¨achter asked the military ¹⁸ USNA, RG 242/T-501/166/657; USNA, RG 242/T-77/1614/folder 12/nfn (MBF, Kdo. Stab Abt. VOVF, 23 August 1941, Aufzeichnung, Betr. Ausnahmegesetz vom 23.8 Meldverfahren). ¹⁹ USNA, RG 242/T-77/1614/folder 12/nfn (MBF Kdo. Stab Abt. VOVF, 23 August 1941, Betr. Attentat am 21.8 und Ausnahmegesetz vom 23.8); USNA, RG 242/T-77/1614/folder 12/nfn (MBF Kdo. Stab Abt. VOVF, 25 August 1941, Betr. Gespr¨ach mit Benoist M´echin am 25 August 1941). ²⁰ Albert Ouzoulias, Les Fils de la nuit (Paris: Grasset, 1975), pp. 104–110, 113–118. ²¹ USNA, RG 242/T-77/1614/folder 12/nfn (MBF Kdo. Stab Abt. VOVF, 27 August 1941, Betr. Sonderverfahren gegen Kommunisten (Fall Moser)).

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administration to hold the Vichy government to its word and pressed for three more executions.²² The Chief of the MBF command staff, Colonel Hans Speidel, passed along the navy’s complaint to ambassador de Brinon in a 3 September letter. He expressed his ‘deep disappointment’ that the French government had not honored verbal assurances to execute six communists and added that it was in the ‘interests of the French people and Vichy government to fully redeem such assurances in the shortest amount of time.’²³ Secretary Ingrand gave the Ministry of Interior’s preliminary response to Major Beumelburg. He told the liaison officer that Germany could wait until the French government fulfilled its promises or seize and execute communists on its own. An hour after their first meeting, Ingrand returned to Beumelburg’s office with a rather different message. He apologized for the delay, remarked that the original promise to execute six communists was an oral agreement, and observed that the Vichy government had to preserve the appearance of judicial independence.²⁴ Paris courts condemned another three communists to death on 20 September, and the sentences were executed immediately. The MBF informed the Kriegesmarine of the additional reprisals and laid the Moser affair to rest in late September.²⁵ While the military administration, Vichy government, and German navy argued over how to handle the Moser assassination, the resistance struck again. On 3 September, two young men shot Sergeant Ernst Hoffmann as he entered the Terminus Hotel near the Gare de l’Est in Paris. After a brief investigation, police somehow concluded that communists had carried out the attack.²⁶ In accordance with his 22 August announcement, General von Stülpnagel ordered three hostage executions or, in the language of the military administration, sabotage countermeasures. Acting upon advice from Lieutenant-General Schaumburg and SS Brigadeführer Dr. Thomas, ²² USNA, RG 242/T-77/1614/folder 12/nfn (30 August 1941, ‘Betr. Sühnemassnahmen für Mord an dem deutschen Wehrmachtangeh¨origen, Marinehilfsassistent Moser’). ²³ USNA, RG 242/T-77/1614/folder 12/nfn (Der MBF, Der Chef des Kommandostabes, und Chef des Verwaltungsstabes, 3 September 1941, letter to Ambassador de Brinon). ²⁴ USNA, RG 242/T-77/1614/folder 12/nfn (Der MBF Verwaltungsstab Abteilung Verwaltung, 11.9.1941, Betreff: Sühnemassnahmen anl¨asslich der Ermordnung eines Wehrmachtsangeh¨origen, Sachbearbeiter: KVR Dr. Grohmann). ²⁵ USNA, RG 242/T-77/1614/folder 12/nfn (MBF Verwaltungsstab Abteilung Verwaltung, 9.41, Aktenzeichen Vju 821.1598.41, Betreff Anschlag auf den Wehrmachtangeh¨origen Moser, Schreiben an den Kommand. Admiral Frankreich). ²⁶ BAMA, RW 35/542/42–43; Nogu`eres, Histoires de la R´esistance en France, vol. II, pp. 128–9.

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the Commandant of greater Paris and the head of the SS/SD in France respectively, the MBF selected three Jewish communists who had already been convicted of non-capital crimes by German military courts. The executions took place on 6 September—three days after the Hoffmann attack.²⁷ Although he followed contingency plans laid out in 1940, Stülpnagel’s anti-partisan strategy came under fire once again. This time, the trouble came from Berlin. General Eduard Wagner, the quartermaster of the army (OKH Generalquartiermeister), forwarded Hitler’s view of the Hoffmann affair to General von Stülpnagel on 7 September. The Führer complained that ‘a German soldier is worth more than three communists,’ believed the MBF’s response was ‘much too mild,’ and considered the three executions to only be ‘a preliminary measure.’ If the authorities did not capture the perpetrators in the immediate future, Hitler advised his field commander to execute another fifty communists, and he added that they had to be leading communists because Frenchmen, particularly French communists, were worth much less than a single Aryan. The Führer urged Stülpnagel to arrest another 300 hostages and execute 100 of them immediately after the next assassination. In closing, Hitler demanded a telegraphic report on the entire matter.²⁸ Strategic questions may have forestalled Hitler’s intervention during the Moser affair in the latter half of August.²⁹ As General von Stülpnagel responded to the Moser assassination, the Führer refereed a squabble between his leading generals on the eastern front. The argument came to a head during a 23 August 1941 meeting between General Guderian, the leading proponent of a direct attack on Moscow, and more cautious generals who favored an advance into the Ukraine.³⁰ During the relative calm of early September, Hitler had time to learn about and comment on the Hoffmann case. Pressing events in the Soviet Union again diverted Hitler’s attention in the latter half of September and allowed Stülpnagel to delay his reply to the 7 September Hitler/Wagner message. Although often distracted by events on the eastern front, Hitler could exercise a decisive ²⁷ USNA, RG 242/T-501/165/375; BAMA, RW 35/542/18–19, 120. ²⁸ BAMA, RW 35/543/18. ²⁹ Abetz, Das offene Problem, p. 197. ³⁰ David M. Glantz and Jonathan M. House, When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1995), pp. 74–8; Ian Kershaw, Hitler 1936–45: Nemesis (New York: Norton, 2000), pp. 411–419.

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influence over French affairs when a bit of news caught his interest and fitted his agenda. Complaints about the handling of the Hoffmann attack lost their salience as new problems overshadowed previous concerns. Before General von Stülpnagel replied to the 7 September Wagner note, resistance groups launched three more attacks. On 6 September, unidentified cyclists shot at but missed a German corporal. Four days later, partisans shot a German sailor in the leg. Finally, on 12 September, someone hit a German paymaster over the head with a blackjack. None of the assaults proved to be fatal, but General von Stülpnagel chose to respond to all three attacks by executing ten hostages. While Hitler’s 7 September comments did not change Germany’s response to the Hoffmann attack, they may have pushed the MBF toward a more strident response to subsequent assaults.³¹ The Commandant of greater Paris went even further than General von Stülpnagel. In a 19 September announcement, Lieutenant-General Schaumburg complained that Frenchmen had not helped the police catch perpetrators who had carried out the September attacks. To punish the population, Schaumburg imposed a curfew for the entire Seine region between 20 and 23 September. All restaurants, theaters, and bars had to close by eight o’clock, and the public had to be off the streets one hour later. Those who violated the curfew, the message warned, would be arrested by German police and could serve as hostages in the event of another assassination.³² Simple mistakes could lead to a prison sentence, and all prisoners could, in turn, serve as hostages. Even the most apolitical Frenchman could not afford to ignore German regulations. Although much less common, acts of resistance were not limited to Paris. On 18 September, partisans sabotaged the Courbon–Montigny –Veauxhaulles railroad line in northeastern France. Both the MBF and generals in Berlin regarded railroad sabotage as a very serious threat that directly undermined the German war effort. In this case, they responded by executing two hostages on 23 September. The MBF approved ‘an extremely slight number’ of hostage executions because a French railroad worker had spotted the sabotage before any real damage had occurred.³³ ³¹ BAMA, RW 35/542/43–45. ³³ BAMA, RW 35/542/46–47.

³² BAMA, RW 35/1/41–45.

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General von Stülpnagel used reprisals to teach Frenchmen that resistance did not pay. After the Moser attack, the French government executed six prominent French communists to head off a direct German intervention. General von Stülpnagel sent three Jewish communists before a German firing squad after the attack on Sergeant Hoffmann. A series of non-fatal attacks that were carried out between 6 and 12 September resulted in the execution of ten hostages. Fatal attacks generally evoked a stronger response than non-fatal assaults, and the rank of the victim may have also influenced the German response. After unknown individuals killed Captain Scheben—a transport officer who worked in northern Paris—on 15 September, the MBF ordered the execution of twelve hostages on 19 September.³⁴ Slowly but surely, the MBF increased the number of reprisal executions to drive his point home. The military administration used prisoners who had already been convicted by a German military court as hostages. Of the ten people who were shot after the Hoffmann attack, four had been convicted of illegally possessing a firearm and six had been found guilty of communist activity but had not received the death penalty. In the Scheben case, six of the victims had been convicted of sabotage or other serious crimes, three had been sentenced to short prison terms for comparatively minor crimes, and three had been placed under administrative arrest by the secret German military police (Geheime Feldpolizei or GFP). Two convicted communists paid for the 18 September railroad sabotage in northeastern France.³⁵ The military administration tried not to execute completely innocent people, but a large number of reprisal executions sometimes made that difficult. When the supply of ‘dangerous’ convicts ran short (as in the Scheben case), Frenchmen convicted of price control violations or speaking against the German army could get drawn into the hostage process. General von Stülpnagel suspected that communists stood behind most resistance activity in France, but he did not dismiss the possibility that French chauvinists and Anglophiles had carried out some attacks. He ordered French and German wardens to send him a list of prisoners along with biographical information and a summary of the evidence against each prisoner. With a detailed list of potential hostages that could be sorted by region, criminal history, or political association, the MBF could aim ³⁴ BAMA, RW 35/542/45–46.

³⁵ BAMA, RW 35/542/43–47.

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reprisals at people somehow connected to or associated with the suspected perpetrators.³⁶ Based on a careful study of reports from his regional and district commanders, the MBF concluded that resistance activity remained largely uncoordinated and the act of isolated, anti-German people who had somehow escaped the clutches of the French and German policemen.³⁷ Throughout the fall of 1941, General von Stülpnagel and the military administration followed Streccius’s ‘Measures to Prevent Sabotage’ and focused reprisals on anti-German groups. They favored a nuanced response that mixed prohibitions, fines, and hostage executions. The MBF answered serious anti-German activity with gradually increasing executions in an attempt to show Frenchmen that resistance did not pay. Stülpnagel tried to select victims in a way that would minimize anti-German sentiments and not upset allies in Vichy. His methods followed traditional German doctrine and did not stray far from comparable rules governing the actions of Allied armies during World War Two. Analysis of guidelines issued by the military administration and actual reprisals carried out by the MBF suggests that they both favored a ruthless but logical anti-partisan policy. Leaders in Berlin favored a different course. Shortly after the invasion of the Soviet Union, Keitel allowed General von Stülpnagel to execute people for sabotage, espionage, or atrocities against German soldiers if the reprisals would enhance the security of German troops. His memo neither encouraged nor discouraged reprisals; he left the MBF with a free hand. Hitler did not comment on specific reprisals until he learned about the 3 September attack on Sergeant Hoffmann. Speaking through General Wagner, the Führer criticized Stülpnagel for being ‘much too mild’ and advised him to execute at least fifty leading communists after each attack.³⁸ Unlike his Chief of Staff, Hitler demanded severe reprisals from the start. Keitel slavishly adjusted his own views to match Hitler’s approach. In a top-secret order written at the Führer’s behest, Keitel informed military leaders throughout Europe that [s]ince the start of the campaign against Soviet Russia, communist insurrections have broken out everywhere in areas occupied by Germany . . . [H]ere is a ³⁶ USNA, RG 242/T-501/166/89–98; Fattig, ‘Reprisal,’ pp. 78–9; Ernst Roskothen, GrossParis, Place de la Concorde: Ein Wehrmachtsrichter erinnert sich (Bad Dürrheim: Kuhn, 1977), pp. 119–120; USNA, RG 242/T-77/1625/folder 75479/nfn (Der MBF, 28.9.1941, Betr. Geiselnahme, Bezug. Erlass vom 26 M¨arz 1941). ³⁷ USNA, RG 242/T-501/143/973. ³⁸ USNA, RG 242/T-501/165/353; BAMA, RW 35/543/18.

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resistance and reprisals mass movement, uniformly directed by Moscow which must be charged with the responsibility even for separate incidents of seemingly minor importance in areas heretofore quiet . . . One must also expect nationalistic and other circles to exploit this opportunity in order to create difficulties for the German occupying power by joining the communist uprising . . . In every case of rebellion against the German occupying power, no matter what the individual circumstances may be, communist origins must be assumed to be present.³⁹

Unlike General von Stülpnagel, Hitler assumed that communists carried out or coordinated all attacks against Germany. Resistance had to be treated with the same methods in each area under German control because it emanated from the same source: Moscow. These fundamental assumptions precluded the need to tailor German tactics to particular local conditions. In the same 16 September 1941 directive quoted above, the Führer denounced Stülpnagel’s policy of ‘relatively mild punishments’ and outlined an appropriate response to resistance activity: In order to nip agitation in the bud the harshest measures must be employed immediately at the first occasion, so as to make the authority of the occupying power prevail and prevent any further spread [of resistance activity] . . . [H]uman life is often considered to be of no value in the countries concerned, and a deterrent effect can be attained only through unusual severity. In these cases in general the death penalty for 50 to 100 communists must be considered an appropriate atonement for the life of a single German soldier . . . The only real deterrent here is the death penalty. In particular, acts of sabotage, acts of espionage and attempts to enter foreign armed forces must be punished with death as a matter of principle.

Hitler and Keitel broke with traditional conceptions of law and justice by placing no value on human life and establishing punishments that were not proportional to the original crime. In doing so, the National Socialist regime entered legal territory that had not been explored for hundreds of years. To further complicate matters, Nazi legal theory demanded a swift and immediate response to each and every crime. A memo sent to all regimental commanders in France summed up the principle with the phrase ‘swift justice is good justice.’⁴⁰ All sentences had to be immediate and harsh ³⁹ DGFP, ser. D, vol. XIII, pp. 541–3; Fattig, ‘Reprisal,’ pp. 61–6; Philip W. Blood, Hitler’s Bandit Hunters: The SS and the Nazi Occupation of Europe (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2008), pp. 63–5. ⁴⁰ BAMA, RW 35/209/211, 259–260.

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because hesitation or mercy could be interpreted as signs of weakness by opponents.⁴¹ After receiving repeated instructions from judicial authorities in Berlin, the MBF eventually told subordinate military judges that ‘[t]he safety and respect of the occupation forces requires the swift, hard, and uniform administration of justice.’ Reprisals had to be carried within days of the original attack. The need for speed gave local policemen scant opportunity to collect evidence or arrest actual perpetrators.⁴² With only sketchy information collected immediately after an attack, the military administration could only arrest and execute the usual suspects: Jews and communists. Arbitrary reprisals often terrified the public but, particularly if they missed their intended target, usually failed to deter further resistance activity. Once again, regulations from Berlin undermined the general strategy of the MBF. Several nuances linked Hitler’s anti-partisan policy with the Final Solution. First, the Führer considered the resistance to be under the control of the international Jewish conspiracy. Both Judaism and communism could only be defeated by the strongest measures. Subsequent paragraphs of the 16 September directive explained that ‘[o]nly in this manner [employing harsh reprisals], which has always been used by great nations as they expand, can tranquility be restored.’ In other words, precedent allowed Germany to liquidate enemies, expand her borders, and secure living space or Lebensraum for the German people. Third, the number of executions (50–100) reflected Hitler’s concept of race. In his mind, a single Aryan was inherently more valuable than a Slav or other racial group.⁴³ Terminology and theory linked anti-partisan measures to the Final Solution.⁴⁴ ⁴¹ USNA, RG 242/T-77/1626/folder 01/nfn (Der MBF Kommandostab Abt. III, Tgb Nr. 164/41 geh., Paris 28 September 1941, Zu allen Gerichten im Bereich des MBF). ⁴² USNA, RG 242/T-77/1626/folder 01/nfn (Der MBF Kommandostab Abt. III, Tgb Nr. 164/41 geh., Paris 28 September 1941, Zu allen Gerichten im Bereich des MBF). Emphasis in the original. ⁴³ Rab Bennett, Under the Shadow of the Swastika: The Moral Dilemmas of Resistance and Collaboration in Hitler’s Europe (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999), pp. 99–103, argues that military governments and the SS carried out reprisals according to predetermined quotas: 10 Frenchmen, 100 Poles, or 500 Slavs would be executed for each German soldier killed. Bennett cites Fattig, ‘Reprisal,’ p. 159; Fattig makes no such claim. Orders from Keitel and Hitler give no indication that they wanted French resistance groups to be treated differently from their counterparts in Eastern Europe or the Soviet Union. ⁴⁴ For Hitler’s ideas on the relationship between anti-Semitism and Marxism, see Ian Kershaw, Hitler, 1889–1936: Hubris (New York: Norton, 1998), pp. 243–250; and Philippe Burrin, Hitler and the Jews: The Genesis of the Holocaust, translated by Patsy Southgate (London: Edward Arnold, 1994), pp. 24–39.

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Anti-partisan strategy played an important role in Hitler’s general strategy and worldview or Weltanschauung. He viewed partisan warfare as a mixed blessing that could be turned to Germany’s advantage. During a 16 July 1941 conference, the Führer informed Lammers, Rosenberg, G¨oring, and Bormann that [t]he Russians have now given an order for partisan warfare behind our front. This partisan war again has some advantages for us; it enables us to exterminate everyone who opposes us . . . [T]he best solution (to partisan activity) was to shoot anybody who looked askance.⁴⁵

The same concept appeared in Himmler’s appointment book. An entry dated 18 December 1941 stated: ‘Jewish Question/to be exterminated as partisans.’ Hitler’s anti-partisan policy was much more than a mere question of tactics; it literally connected military strategy to Nazi racial policy and enmeshed the army in the Final Solution.⁴⁶ As subsequent orders made clear, Hitler and Keitel tried to terrorize the French population into submission. Reich Propaganda Minister Dr. Goebbels made this intention explicit in a message sent to Stülpnagel on 19 September. Rather than keeping the hostage policy or hostage executions secret to avoid popular unrest, the Minister of Propaganda advised the MBF to explain the hostage policy to the French nation and publish a list of hostages. Goebbels suggested that, after each resistance attack, the military administration should simply execute hostages whose names appeared at the top of the published list. He thought that this would force all hostages and their allies to do everything in their power to squelch resistance activity.⁴⁷ Goebbels’ plan sacrificed the appearance of a benign occupation in exchange for a ruthless and invincible reputation. At the very least, the letter told the MBF that Goebbels would not support a moderate anti-partisan policy. Obviously, Goebbels preferred sticks over carrots and assumed an unusual policy stance in light of his position as Propaganda Minister. While outlining Hitler’s strategy against partisans, the 16 September decree clearly articulated several tenets of National Socialism. It intimidated all Frenchmen, blamed resistance activity on communists, and called for bloody reprisals. In most respects, Hitler’s anti-partisan policy had little ⁴⁵ DGFP, ser. D, vol XIII, pp. 150, 154. ⁴⁶ DGFP, ser. D, vol. XIII, pp. 149–156; Blood, Hitler’s Bandit Hunters, pp. 64–5. ⁴⁷ USNA, RG 242/T-501/97/407–408; BAMA, RH 3 (OKH Generalquartiermeister)/204/7.

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in common with military tradition, international law, or customs that correlated punishments with the gravity of the original crime. As such, it contradicted the strategy and tactics designed by the MBF and military administration between July 1940 and September 1941. In light of the 7 September Hitler/Wagner telegram, the MBF had reason to believe that he and his policies did not enjoy Hitler’s favor. Shortly after the Hitler/Keitel directive arrived on 16 September, General von Stülpnagel discussed his situation with Field Marshal von Brauchitsch. The commander of the German army did not think the 16 September order had to be taken literally. He believed that the number of hostage executions could be ‘adjusted’ to suit circumstances in France and advised Stülpnagel to treat the document as a policy guideline. Although he understood the ‘difficulties’ that the MBF faced, Brauchitsch thought that Stülpnagel had Spielraum—room to maneuver.⁴⁸

Figure 5.1. General Otto von Stülpnagel (right) consults Field Marshal Walter von Brauchitsch in Paris, 21 May 1941. Photograph courtesy of Bundesarchiv, Bild 183-H29377. ⁴⁸ BAMA, RW 35/46/66.

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Both Generals Warlimont (OKW Operations, planning staff) and Wagner (OKH General Quartermaster) heard of the MBF’s conversation with Field Marshal von Brauchitsch and tried to set General von Stülpnagel straight in separate messages. On 18 September 1941, Warlimont told the MBF that ‘[p]lots against the occupying army’ must be crushed ‘with all sharpness, regardless of the state in which they occurred.’ He explained that Hitler continued to blame Moscow for all resistance activity and believed that Vichy would not object if Germany liquidated undesirable people. According to Warlimont, the 16 September order could not be adjusted to suit local circumstances.⁴⁹ General Wagner spoke with Major Crome, the intelligence officer of the MBF’s command staff (Kommandostab) on 19 September. Without mincing words, Wagner told Crome that Brauchitsch misunderstood his superiors in Berlin. The major allowed the matter to drop and turned his attention toward other problems. Curfews imposed by the Commandant of greater Paris, Crome asserted, forced French workers to arrive late and leave early. As a result, military production suffered. The quartermaster refused to intervene but suggested that curfews be imposed over holidays or the weekends. Like Warlimont, Wagner did not help the military administration moderate reprisals that damaged the German war effort. General von Stülpnagel received no support from superiors in Berlin.⁵⁰ Wagner passed along Hitler’s first critique of the MBF’s ‘mild’ policy on 7 September 1941. Nine days later, Keitel sent orders that explicitly denounced gradual methods. A few days after that, Warlimont and Wagner told the military administration that Hitler meant business with the 16 September decree. Although the 7 September Wagner/Hitler telegram demanded an immediate response, the MBF held his tongue. A full month after he received Hitler’s original critique from Wagner, General von Stülpnagel finally answered Hitler’s charges one by one. Stülpnagel began by pointing out that the military administration had reported the Hoffmann attack to the supreme commander of German forces on the western front (Oberbefehlshaber West or Ob West) but, because of the Moser affair and other pressing matters, did not think the incident worthy of a special report to Berlin. In the future, he promised to report ⁴⁹ BAMA, RW 35/536/13. ⁵⁰ USNA, RG 242/T-501/196/1069; Fattig, ‘Reprisal,’ pp. 61–8.

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similar attacks to Berlin immediately. The MBF also reported that over 4,000 Frenchmen who came from every walk of life and shade of the political spectrum were being held in German prison camps and had been designated as hostages. He saw no need to arrest additional hostages and implied that Hitler did not really understand the situation in France.⁵¹ Without mincing words, Stülpnagel then argued that three hostage executions were indeed an appropriate response to the Hoffmann attack. He lauded French anti-terrorist efforts and insisted that bloody reprisals would undermine German allies throughout the Hexagon. The MBF wanted to gradually increase his response to resistance activity and specifically rejected a ‘schematic’ or predetermined solution to any particular attack. Mass executions, Stülpnagel explained, might encourage passive resistance among French workers and endanger German troops who depended on French supplies. More than his colleagues in Berlin, the MBF understood the scope and value of French collaboration. To further strengthen his case, Stülpnagel pointed out that Ambassador Abetz shared the MBF’s interpretation of events. Apparently Hitler did not discuss the question of reprisals during a 16 September 1941 meeting with the ambassador, but Abetz did oppose reprisals that were carried out toward the end of October because they turned the French public against Germany.⁵² The Paris embassy often criticized Stülpnagel and coveted the authority of the military administration. During the fall of 1941, the ambassador tried to control the selection of hostages, but he was rebuffed by military leaders in Berlin.⁵³ With regard to reprisals, Abetz set his ambition aside and tried to help the MBF moderate Hitler’s reprisal policy in order to advance his policy of Franco-German collaboration. The final paragraph of Stülpnagel’s 11 October letter to OKH described the current situation as ‘unbearable.’ The MBF believed that mass executions ran counter to the basic political guidelines issued before and after the Armistice Agreement. He requested a new statement of Germany’s objectives and asked for an immediate recall if compelled to obey the 7 and 16 September orders. The MBF demanded some room to maneuver and backed it up with an offer to resign. Stülpnagel’s d´emarche arrived during ⁵¹ BAMA, RW 35/543/23–25. ⁵² DGFP, ser. D, vol. XIII, pp. 518–520, 682–5; Lambauer, Otto Abetz et les Franc¸ais, p. 429. ⁵³ USNA, RG 242/T-501/165/354.

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the climax of one of the great encirclement battles of World War Two: Operation Typhoon. His vitriolic reply must have seemed insignificant when compared to news that German troops had surrounded over 660,000 Soviet soldiers near Vyazma.⁵⁴ Favorable news from the eastern front probably took the sting out of Stülpnagel’s protest, but the fundamental disagreement remained. Assassinations carried out by resistance groups in August and September 1941 reveal a difference of opinion within the German military hierarchy. As he responded to the Moser, Hoffman, and Scheben attacks, the MBF tried to focus reprisals on bona fide opponents and followed traditional German military doctrine, but his response did not satisfy Nazis in Berlin. Hitler rejected Stülpnagel’s reprisals because they did not reflect Nazi racial ideas. Although he initially allowed the MBF to act as he saw fit, Keitel lived up to his nickname Lakaitel (an amalgamation of his surname and the German word Lakai, meaning lackey), embraced Hitler’s point of view, abandoned his subordinate, and ordered the execution of 50–100 Frenchmen for each German killed by resistance groups. Senior generals in Berlin quickly followed suit, repeated Hitler’s formula, and denounced Stülpnagel’s methods. Critiques advanced by Keitel, Warlimont, and Wagner reveal Hitler’s influence over his military coterie. Pressure generated by French resistance activity divided political generals in Berlin from field commanders in Paris. While the MBF bickered with superiors in Berlin, the Paris branch of the SS/SD chose to act. In the fall of 1941, Eugene Deloncle, a veteran of the Cagoule and founder of the ultra-fascist Mouvement Social R´evolutionnaire, asked his SS/SD patrons to help him avenge assassination attempts against Pierre Laval and Marcel D´eat that were carried out on 27 August.⁵⁵ With Heydrich and Knochen’s approval, SS Major (Sturmbannführer) Sommer procured explosives from Berlin and, on the afternoon of 2 October, distributed twelve bombs to four of Deloncle’s followers. Later that night, the men drove around Paris and bombed seven synagogues. One of the explosives proved to be a dud, but the remaining eleven damaged six temples, shattered nearby windows, and wounded two soldiers who were guarding an adjacent German dormitory.⁵⁶ ⁵⁴ Glantz and House, When Titans Clashed, pp. 78–81. ⁵⁵ Gordon, Collaborationism in France during the Second World War, p. 68; Nogu`eres, Histoire de la R´esistance en France, vol. II, pp. 105–108. ⁵⁶ BAMA, RH 3/142/258–261.

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Since the early days of the Occupation, SS agents stationed in France had stood far from the nexus of power. Only the military administration and their subordinates in the GFP had executive authority or the ability to make arrests. Unable to do serious police work, the SS studied antiGerman groups, helped the Einsatzstab Rosenberg, and advised the Paris embassy. In keeping with their ‘academic’ mission, SS agents confiscated artwork and pillaged the archives of various Jewish institutions. They also purged the French economy of Jewish influences by determining the racial background of business owners.⁵⁷ Unaware of Major Sommer’s involvement in the synagogue bombings, the MBF asked the resident expert on Jewish affairs—the SS—for additional information about the attacks. The task of answering Stülpnagel’s questions fell to SS LieutenantColonel (Obersturmbannführer) Helmut Knochen. The SS deputy commander faced a very dangerous political situation because two German soldiers had been wounded in the bombings. To reduce his liability, Knochen limited his response to passing along rumors, newspaper accounts, and French police reports. He told the MBF that most Frenchmen attributed the attacks to Jews who were trying to elicit public sympathy. Pointing to the organized nature of the attacks, French gendarmes suspected that Deloncle stood behind the bombings. Knochen also observed that Germans may have carried out the attacks because anyone else on the streets between two and four in the morning would have been arrested for violating the curfew. Some press reports, he added, suggested that Englishmen may have carried out the attacks. Submitted on 4 October, Knochen’s report did not reveal SS involvement.⁵⁸ Knochen and Sommer nearly covered up the SS’s role in the synagogue bombings. On the night of the attacks, Sommer had been out drinking with a German naval officer and had a solid alibi, but the naval officer later informed the military administration that Sommer had met with men who were associated with Deloncle very early in the morning of 3 October, declared ‘that has gone very well,’ and mentioned something about explosive charges. After conducting additional inquiries, officials assigned to the Commandant of greater Paris traced the truck used in ⁵⁷ USNA, RG 242/T-501/196/655–656; BAMA, RW 35/2/1–46. ⁵⁸ BAMA, RH 3/142/263–264.

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Figure 5.2. Helmut Knochen. Photograph courtesy of the Bundesarchiv, Bild 101III-Alber-096–11.

the attacks back to the SS. When questioned by military police, Sommer accused the naval officer of being drunk and denied any part in the seven bombings, but only six attacks had been reported in the press because one of the charges had not detonated. Sommer’s mistake incriminated the SS, and his subsequent denial linked Knochen to the affair.⁵⁹ ⁵⁹ BAMA, RH 3/142/257–261; Bargatzky, Hotel Majestic, p. 104.

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Acting on orders from Heydrich, Sommer and Knochen fled to Berlin as the cover-up fell apart. With damaging evidence in hand, General von Stülpnagel reported the matter to the commander of the army (Oberbefehlshaber des Heeres) on 8 October. He demanded the recall of Sommer, accused Knochen of submitting a false report, and complained that both had placed the military administration in a difficult situation vis-`a-vis the French government. After the Moser assassination, Stülpnagel had promised to shoot hostages if more German soldiers were attacked. Although two German sentries were wounded in the synagogue bombings, the MBF could not carry out reprisals because the SS had organized the campaign. He could either admit German complicity and seem inept or do nothing and appear inconsistent. Either way, Stülpnagel’s prestige suffered. General Wagner passed Stülpnagel’s complaint to Heydrich and asked for the recall of Dr. Max Thomas, the head of the entire SS contingent, because a leader should be held accountable for the actions of his subordinates.⁶⁰ Although he had immense power, Heydrich had to reply with great care in light of the grave charges leveled against the SS. In his 6 November response to OKH, Himmler’s right-hand man argued that Jews had to be punished for the wave of sabotage and assassination. By encouraging Deloncle’s followers to attack synagogues, Heydrich tried to show that Germany had allies in the war against ‘international Judaism.’ The fact that Nazi Germany had allies, he explained, far outweighed any damage to the MBF’s prestige. Heydrich had attacked ‘the responsible arsonist in Europe, which must finally disappear,’ with the approval of ‘a higher office.’ He claimed that General von Stülpnagel did not really understand the ideological war that the Nazis were fighting and told Wagner that ‘I was fully conscious of the political implications of measures (against the Paris synagogues), since I have been authorized for many years to prepare the final solution to the Jewish question in Europe.’ Without admitting any malfeasance, Heydrich recalled Thomas and Sommer but left Knochen in Paris. With the Final Solution looming on the immediate horizon, Heydrich needed ruthless anti-Semites on the eastern front.⁶¹ OKH and the MBF both rejected Heydrich’s explanation. They accused the SS of violating agreements that outlined the responsibilities of the Black ⁶⁰ BAMA, RH 3/142/252–256, 271–272. ⁶¹ BAMA, RH 3/142/293–296. Burrin, Hitler and the Jews, pp. 124–5.

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Corps in France. Unless compelled by an emergency situation, the SS did not have the power to act without the approval of the MBF, and the bombing of synagogues did not qualify as an emergency. Furthermore, Himmler had promised to tell OKW about any new orders that might affect the political situation in France. But the MBF could not force the SS to keep its promises. When it allowed the Black Corps into France in 1940, the army conceded the right to prosecute wayward SS men in a military court martial. Without the power to prosecute SS offenders, neither the MBF nor OKH could hold the SS to its word.⁶² Concessions that had appeared insignificant in 1940 began to haunt the army in 1941. Disagreements over the confiscation of Jewish art had strained army–SS relations in 1940. After the October 1941 synagogue bombings, Stülpnagel ordered his subordinates not to speak with SS officers in public or private and banned the Black Corps from his headquarters in the Hotel Majestic. The twin legacies of art confiscations and the synagogue bombings ensured that army–SS relations would never be cordial in France. In light of Hitler’s Weltanschauung, his criticism of the MBF, and the 16 September directive, the Black Corps stood to gain a great deal by championing radical measures against the racial enemies of the Reich. The synagogue bombings distinguished the SS from the traditional Wehrmacht and placed the former in an ideal position to succeed the latter when Hitler launched the Final Solution to the Jewish Question. Without any political or economic responsibilities in France, the SS had nothing to lose.⁶³ ⁶² BAMA, RH 3/142/297–300; BAMA, RW 35/698/27–28; BAMA, RW 35/209/211–212. ⁶³ Bargatzky, Hotel Majestic, pp. 103–106; BAK, N 1023/8/11–12; BAK, All. Proz. 21/217/129.

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Like their German opponents, French resistance groups suffered from internal divisions. After the 1940 Armistice, French nationalists could, among other things, support a Vichy regime that collaborated with France’s traditional enemy, join a rather unknown General de Gaulle in London, take independent action against Germany, or do nothing and watch events unfold. Charles de Gaulle led a diverse group of expatriates in London but had little influence inside metropolitan France before 1942. Discredited by defeat, moderate political parties remained in disarray throughout the Vichy era and could not lead potential dissidents. French Communists rebuilt an organization that had been ravaged by arrests ordered by the Reynaud, Daladier, and P´etain governments. The French Communist Party (PCF) discussed policies of resistance and collaboration but generally followed an attentiste or wait-and-see strategy before the invasion of the Soviet Union. Regardless of their political orientation, anti-German individuals enjoyed little support from traditional political parties before June 1941.¹ The invasion of the Soviet Union forced the PCF to embrace a policy of resistance and raised a series of tactical questions. Should the PCF join forces with Charles de Gaulle in London? How should it attack Nazi Germany? The bulk of the communist party adopted a policy of resistance limited to sabotage, propaganda, and passive resistance. While dangerous and heroic, ´ ¹ Eric Roussel, Charles de Gaulle (Paris: Gallimard, 2002), pp. 232–4; Laborie, L’Opinion franc¸aise sous Vichy, pp. 266–274.

the end of ambiguity

none of these actions could defeat Nazi Germany on their own. Some factions within left-wing resistance groups chose to go one step further. Based on their first-hand experiences with Nazi methods, some immigrants from Poland, Czechoslovakia, Austria, and other eastern European nations joined a faction of the PCF known as the Main-d’œuvre immigr´ee (MOI) and pushed for more direct action. Veterans of the Spanish Civil War and a number of young left-wing zealots rejected the PCF’s temperate approach and chose to attack Germany directly. In Paris, MOI militants coalesced around Albert Ouzoulias and Pierre Georges (aka Fredo and later Colonel Fabien). Together, they formed what later became known as the bataillons de la jeunesse and embarked on a campaign of sabotage and assassination.² During August and September, the bataillons de la jeunesse confined their activities to the Paris region. Their efforts resulted in the Moser, Hoffmann, and Scheben assassinations. Around 15 October, Ouzoulias and Georges dispatched three incendiary groups (groupes de brûlots) to provincial centers. Maurice Le Berre and Jacques d’Andurain traveled to Rouen and, with help from a local resistance group, destroyed a section of the Rouen–Le Havre railroad line on 19 October. Gilbert Brustlein and Guisco Spartaco assassinated a German officer in Nantes on the very next day. Pierre Rebi`ere met French and Spanish resistance fighters in Bordeaux and killed a German official on 21 October.³ Although the railroad sabotage in Rouen did not pass unnoticed, assassinations in Nantes and Bordeaux provoked massive German reprisals and accelerated the spiral of violence that had begun in August with the Moser assassination. Assassinations carried out by the groupes de brûlots transformed three critical relationships in France during World War Two. First, they strained Franco-German relations. Subsequent German reprisals dispelled the neutral or, in some cases, positive image of the German occupiers and pushed some Frenchmen toward resistance. Cordial collaboration devolved into begrudging acquiescence. Second, assassinations and reprisals divided the military administration in Paris from superiors in Berlin. While Stülpnagel ² Taylor, Between Resistance and Collaboration, pp. 61–2; Albert Ouzoulias, Les Bataillons de la ´ jeunesse (Paris: Editions sociales, 1967); Courtois et al., Le Sang de l’´etranger, pp. 123–4; Oury, Rue du Roi-Albert, pp. 61–5. ³ Ouzoulias, Les Fils de la Nuit, pp. 177–185; Nogu`eres, Histoire de la R´esistance en France, vol. II, pp. 147–152.

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viewed resistance as a political and military phenomenon, Hitler believed it to be the result of a Judeo-Bolshevik conspiracy and focused his policy accordingly. Rather than carry out a policy that he thought to be unwise, Otto von Stülpnagel first protested through official channels and later resigned his command. Third, bitter argument over German reprisal policy strained relations between German agencies that operated in Paris. As they struggled to control reprisal policy, the army, Foreign Office, and SS fought with each other. Debate aggravated latent antagonisms and undermined any spirit of cooperation. Franco-German and German interagency cooperation determined the success or failure of policy initiatives during the final two years of the Occupation. Around 7:45 on the morning of Monday, 20 October 1941, Gilbert Brustlein and Guisco Spartaco walked across Nantes’s Place de la Cath´edrale toward a pair of German officers who were on their way to work. After selecting their prey, both men drew pistols and opened fire. Spartaco’s pistol jammed and his quarry escaped unscathed, but three of the shots fired by Brustlein struck the second German officer in the back. According to Brustlein’s account, the mortally wounded German ‘fell down howling like a slaughtered pig’ as the two guerrillas made their escape. Although he did not know it at the time, Brustlein had just killed Lieutenant-Colonel Karl Friedrich Hotz, the Feldkommandant of Nantes.⁴ News of the assassination traveled up the German chain of command. First Lieutenant Kalbhenn, the local intelligence officer in Nantes, told his superior in Angers, Captain Dr. Schrader, about the attack around eight in the morning, and Schrader immediately passed the news along to Major Crome, the intelligence officer for the MBF Kommandostab in Paris.⁵ Schrader and representatives from the GFP and SD then drove from Angers to Nantes so they could direct the German response. When the three officers arrived in Nantes, they spoke with two officials who were attached to the local military administration. The five officers sealed off the center of the city and arrested the French prefect, his cabinet chiefs, and other local notables for ‘anti-German activity.’⁶ ⁴ Gildea, Marianne in Chains, pp. 243–6; USNA, RG 242/T-77/1588/01/nfn (MVW Bezirk B, Abt Ic Nr 1002/41, Lagebericht der Abt Ic für die Zeit vom 16.9 bis 15.11.41); Oury, Rue du Roi-Albert, pp. 92–3. ⁵ USNA, RG 242/T-77/1624/49; USNA, RG 242/T-501/165/416–422. ⁶ USNA, RG 242/T-501/165/423–424.

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Although they had followed established procedures, events overtook the junior officers in Nantes. Hitler learned of the attack around 10:30 a.m. and discussed the matter with Field Marshal Keitel in Berlin. The latter called General von Stülpnagel and passed along the Führer’s view of the matter. According to Keitel, Hitler saw the attack as ‘momentous proof’ of English activity in occupied France and wanted to set an example. Speaking through Keitel, the Führer advised the MBF to execute 100–150 hostages, impose a curfew throughout southwest France, and offer a 1 million gold-franc reward (to be paid by the Vichy government, naturally) for information leading to the arrest of the perpetrators. Hitler believed that countermeasures would intimidate neutral Frenchmen and force anti-German guerrillas to suspend resistance activity. Without indigenous support, English agents would not be able to operate in France and resistance activity would eventually collapse. In Hitler’s opinion, mild countermeasures that had been suggested by the MBF would not paralyze opponents with fear and were thus ‘inexpedient.’⁷ Early in the afternoon, Stülpnagel discussed possible German reprisals with Eduard Wagner, the General Quartermaster of the Army. After learning that Field Marshal von Brauchitsch, the commander of OKH, had approved Hitler’s measures, Stülpnagel asked Wagner to delay the executions for at least three days so police could gather evidence and interrogate suspects. Preoccupied by his primary job of supplying the eastern front, Wagner viewed the assassinations as a ‘great big filthy mess’ (eine gr¨oßere Schweinerei) and was not eager to execute hostages, but he passed Stülpnagel’s suggestion along to Berlin, where it was discussed by both OKW and OKH.⁸ Unable to reach a consensus among themselves, the generals submitted Stülpnagel’s request for a delay to the Führer for a final decision. Although he had previously described the assassination as ‘momentous proof of English activity,’ Hitler blamed young communists, perhaps under the influence of Gaullists, for the attack during an afternoon conference. He told Stülpnagel to work with the French police, impose a 5 p.m. to 8 a.m. curfew, arrest suspects from every criminal circle around Nantes, and offer a reward. Furthermore, the Führer ruled that fifty hostages should be executed right away, and he ordered another fifty ⁷ BAMA, RW 35/542/48–49. ⁸ Elisabeth Wagner (ed.), Der Generalquartiermeister: Briefe und Tagebuchaufzeichnungen des Generalquartiermeisters des Heeres (München and Wien: Günter Olzog Verlag, 1963), pp. 208–211.

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hostages be executed on 23 October unless the men who killed Hotz were brought to justice.⁹ Hitler casually shifted blame from British agents to communist youths, demanded immediate reprisals without regard for the actual perpetrators, and used assassinations to justify the execution of Jews and communists. Major Crome, the MBF’s chief intelligence officer, ordered Captain Schrader, the head of military intelligence for the southwest region, to prepare a list of hostages. After consulting with the local military administration in Nantes, the SD in Rennes, and the Abwehr in Brest, Schrader worked throughout the night of 20/21 October to assemble a tally. He placed anti-German militants, ‘enemies of French civilization,’ and other convicts from the Nantes area at the top of his roster, but this approach yielded only sixty-eight names. Since he could not find 100 people who had been convicted by local German courts, Schrader searched for another source of hostages. He found his answer in the town of Chˆateaubriant (Loire-Inf´erieur), where the military government oversaw a French prison that was filled with communists who had been arrested by the Vichy government. Although many of the prisoners had played a role in the PCF before World War Two, others, like 17-year-old Guy Mˆoquet, had been imprisoned simply because his father had been a communist deputy. To fill his quota, Schrader selected another thirty-two prisoners who were somehow connected to the outlawed PCF.¹⁰ Under considerable pressure from superiors in Paris and Berlin, Captain Schrader selected 100 hostages in 10 hours. In theory, he should have prepared an index of potential hostages according to instructions issued by the MBF in September, but the captain had not taken the MBF’s September directive seriously and had to work all night to assemble the requisite list. Apparently Schrader had either not read or disregarded Keitel’s 16 September order about ‘Communist Insurrections in Occupied Areas’ that recommended that 50 or 100 hostages be executed for each German soldier killed by partisans. He later claimed that ‘nobody could be prepared for a list of 100.’¹¹ On the morning of 21 October, Schrader sent his inventory of 100 names to Kriegesverwaltungschef Dr. Medicus, ⁹ BAMA, RW 35/542/48–51; USNA, RG 242/T-77/1624/49–51. ¹⁰ IMT , vol. XXXVII, pp. 199–205; USNA, RG 242/T-501/165/395–400, 416–422; Gildea, Marianne in Chains, pp. 247–9; BAMA, RW 35/542/52. ¹¹ USNA, RG 242/T-501/166/91–98; USNA, RG 242/T-501/165/417–418.

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the head of the government subsection of the military administration (Verwaltungsstab Abteilung Verwaltung) in Bezirk B (Angers) for approval. Medicus or one of his subordinates removed the names of two decorated World War One veterans from the roster and then sent the changes back to Nantes.¹² As the military administration vetted Schrader’s hostage list, the groupes de brûlots launched another attack in Bordeaux. Early on the evening of 21 October, an unidentified cyclist approached a civilian official working for the military administration, Kriegsverwaltungsrat Dr. Hans-Gottfried Reimers, as he walked home along Wilson Boulevard near the Rue Judaique. The assailant fired five shots and killed his victim before escaping into the darkness.¹³ When he learned that Lieutenant Colonel Hotz had been killed in Nantes on 20 October, Hitler ordered the execution of 100–150 hostages. General von Stülpnagel announced the reprisals, fine, and curfew to the French public on 21 October. Helped by the fact that Captain Schrader did not have a list of victims ready, the MBF delayed the first Nantes executions until 22 October. By this time, the resistance had struck again in Bordeaux. Rather than executing 100–150 hostages for each attack, Stülpnagel convinced his superiors to execute a total of 200 hostages for both attacks and split hostage executions into two contingents per city. The first Nantes contingent of forty-eight stood before a German firing squad on 22 October—the first anniversary of the Montoire agreement.¹⁴ In addition to minimizing the total number of executions and delaying the measures ordered by Hitler, General von Stülpnagel condemned Hitler’s policy through official channels. He informed General Wagner that the attacks were carried out by small terror groups and English soldiers or spies who move from place to place; that the majority of Frenchmen do not support them. I clearly believe that shooting hostages only embitters the people and makes future rapprochement more difficult . . . I personally have warned against Polish methods in France. ¹² USNA, RG 242/T-501/165/398, 418–424; USNA, RG 242/T-77/1587/8/nfn (Nr. 598/41 g.Kdos, 22 October 1941, Betr. Geiselerschiessung in Nantes und Chateaubriant am 22.10.41); Gildea, Marianne in Chains, p. 249. ¹³ USNA, RG 242/T-77/1585/folder 6/10; BAMA, RW 35/542/60–62. ¹⁴ USNA, RG 242/T-77/1587/folder 9/nfn (Nr. 598/41 g.Kdos, 22 October 1941, Betr. Geiselerschiessung in Nantes und Chateaubriant am 22.10.41); IMT , vol. XXXVII, pp. 200, 205–211.

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Stülpnagel believed that a second round of executions would turn public opinion against Germany and added that ‘draconian countermeasures’ ran contrary to the long-term interests of the Reich. If the policy continued, the MBF claimed that Germany would have to arrest every male Frenchman between 16 and 60 years of age. In closing, Stülpnagel asked Wagner to present his opinions to Hitler and requested clear instructions with regard to reprisals.¹⁵ Nine hours after speaking with Stülpnagel, Wagner called back with news from the Führer. Hitler ordered the MBF to levy a fine and impose a curfew for each assassination. In addition, he directed the MBF to immediately execute 50 hostages in response to each attack. The first Nantes contingent perished on 22 October, and their compatriots from Bordeaux met their fate on 24 October. Unless either French or German authorities apprehended the perpetrators within 48 hours, Hitler threatened to execute a second contingent of 50 hostages for each attack.¹⁶ Stülpnagel secured time for an investigation, but his complaints irritated men like Wagner who preferred to ignore France in favor of pressing matters on the eastern front. While the MBF tried to limit the number of hostage executions, the Vichy regime tried to steer the German response toward common enemies. On the morning of the Nantes attack (20 October), Vichy’s Interior Minister, Pierre Pucheu, met with Major Beumelburg. Passing along a rumor started by the German Ministry of Propaganda, Pucheu suggested that English paratroopers or communists acting under British influence may have carried out the Nantes assassination.¹⁷ While the Interior Minister observed that stiff reprisals might damage Franco-German relations, his Chief of Staff, Fr´ed´eric de La Rozi`ere, joined the meeting. The latter added that Vichy had 5 or 600 subversives in an internment camp in Chˆateaubriant. Pucheu offered Beumelburg a list of prisoners incarcerated in Chˆateaubriant to reduce any potential friction between the military administration and Vichy that might emerge during the hostage selection process. Rather than oppose German reprisals altogether, the ¹⁵ USNA, RG 242/T-501/122/711–716. ¹⁶ Wagner, Der Generalquartiermeister, p. 211; USNA, RG 242/T-77/1624/50–52; BAMA, RW 35/542/63–69. ¹⁷ Elke Fr¨ohlich (ed.), Die Tagebücher von Joseph Goebbels (München: K. G. Sauer, 1996), vol. II, part 2, pp. 160, 168, entries dated 23 and 24 October 1941.

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Vichy government tried to satiate Germany’s thirst for revenge with ‘expendable’ Frenchmen.¹⁸ Later that morning, Pucheu visited Field Marshal von Brauchitsch at his headquarters in Fontainebleau, conveyed P´etain’s regrets, and promised complete French cooperation during the German investigation. In addition, Pucheu handed Brauchitsch a police report that suggested the Nantes assassination had been carried out by English agents.¹⁹ After the second assassination in Bordeaux, representatives of the Vichy regime did not even bother to ask for clemency on humanitarian grounds as they had done after the Moser, Hoffmann, and Scheben cases. Instead, they argued that Frenchmen had not been responsible for the assassinations, suggested that massive reprisals might turn public opinion against the Reich, and tried to deflect German reprisals. Lobbying efforts of the Vichy government were not limited to ministers. Admiral Darlan, the head of the French government between February 1941 and April 1942, drove to Paris and met with General von Stülpnagel on the afternoon of 21 October. The admiral ‘understood the need for sharp countermeasures’ but wanted to make sure that German reprisals did not undermine Franco-German collaboration. Adopting a pragmatic approach, Darlan feared that mass executions would turn public opinion against Germany and not stop Great Britain from carrying out similar attacks in the future. He also observed that England would reap a propaganda victory because of the German policy.²⁰ News of the Bordeaux attack reached Darlan shortly after his meeting with the MBF and forced the admiral to change tactics. He conceded the execution of the first 50 hostages for the Nantes attack and concentrated all of his efforts on saving the second contingent.²¹ After meeting with Stülpnagel during the day, Darlan addressed Frenchmen over the radio on the evening of 22 October. The admiral described the murders as ‘cowardly,’ and he suggested that they had been carried out by foreign agents who wanted to sabotage a Franco-German peace agreement and delay the return of French prisoners of war. The head ¹⁸ BAMA, RW 35/543/63–64; Gildea, Marianne in Chains, p. 243. ¹⁹ BAMA, RW 35/1/50–51. ²⁰ BAMA, RW 35/308/158–159; BAMA, RW 35/542/62–63; USNA, RG 242/T77/1624/55; Herv´e Coutau-B´egarie and Claude Huan, Darlan (Paris: Fayard, 1989), pp. 459–461. ²¹ BAMA, RW 35/1/51; USNA, RG 242/T-501/166/768; Melton, Darlan, pp. 129–131.

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of the French government admonished compatriots to obey the terms of the Armistice Agreement. He believed that every citizen was obliged to respect the 1940 Armistice Agreement and help the government catch the assassins. In no uncertain terms, Darlan condemned the attacks, but he did not comment on German reprisals.²² Although he rarely intervened in the regular business of the French government, Marshal P´etain also commented on the October assassinations. On 21 October in a message delivered by Ambassador Abetz, P´etain reminded Hitler of promises made during their meeting at Montoire and thanked the Führer for his ‘noble gesture.’ The obsequious note begged the Führer ‘to accept the assurances of my highest consideration’ but did mention recent assassinations.²³ In a handwritten letter delivered by Admiral Darlan, the head of the French state asked the military administration to limit reprisals.²⁴ Third, Marshal P´etain addressed the entire French nation over the radio on the evening of 22 October: Frenchmen, two shots have been fired at officers of the army of occupation: two are dead . . . This morning, fifty Frenchman have paid for these unspeakable crimes with their lives. Fifty more will be shot tomorrow if the guilty are not caught . . . Frenchmen, your duty is clear: the murders must stop. According to the Armistice, we set down our arms; we do not have the right to strike Germany in the back. The foreigner who ordered these crimes knows well that this is clearly murder.²⁵

When communicating with the MBF, the marshal used conciliatory language to construct pragmatic arguments against mass reprisals. Speaking with Hitler, P´etain adopted a subservient tone, laced his messages with flattery, and did not even dare to mention the hostage executions. Perhaps because he feared Hitler more than French public opinion, P´etain explicitly condemned assassinations when addressing compatriots over the radio. P´etain and Darlan began to lobby the German government immediately after the Nantes assassination on 20 October, but they failed to stop the execution of either the first Nantes or Bordeaux contingents on 22 and 24 October respectively. On 24 October, Vichy’s Minister of the Interior, ²² USNA, RG 242/T-501/166/768. ²³ DGFP, ser. D, vol. XIII, pp. 673–4. The ‘noble gesture’ that P´etain referred to alludes to the return of the body of Napoleon I’s son, the Duke of Reichstadt, in December 1940. ²⁴ BAMA, RW 35/308/158–159. ²⁵ Jean-Claude Barbas (ed.), Discours aux Franc¸ais, 17 juin 1940–10 août 1944 (Paris: Albin Michel, 1989), pp. 203–204.

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Pucheu, informed Ambassador Abetz that P´etain planned to send Hitler a message over the radio: I cannot let the blood of those who had no part in these murders be spilled. I should betray my people if I did not address a solemn protest to you at this hour. If you refuse to hear my voice and if you need further hostages and victims, then take me. I shall be at the demarcation line in Moulins today at 2:00 p.m., where I shall consider myself your prisoner while awaiting your decision.²⁶

In keeping with an archaic sense of chivalry, the aged marshal tried to exchange his own freedom in return for clemency for the second two hostage contingents. The marshal’s plan, which Abetz attributed to the chief of P´etain’s civil cabinet, Henri du Moulin de Labarth`ete, had some merits. The offer increased P´etain’s stature inside France and fortified the ‘P´etain as shield, de Gaulle as sword’ interpretation of the Vichy era. If Hitler accepted the deal, the military administration would have to shoot P´etain or stop executing hostages altogether in the event of continued assassinations. While the former course might turn the entire French nation against Germany, the latter policy could make Germany look weak. If Hitler and the military administration accepted P´etain as a hostage, the Reich would be placed in a difficult political situation.²⁷ P´etain’s plan also posed difficulties for the Vichy regime. On 9 July 1940, the French National Assembly abandoned the 1875 constitution. The next day, it placed both executive and legislative authority in P´etain’s hands and authorized him to write a new constitution. Until he drafted a new system of government, the marshal had almost unlimited power to rule France as ‘the Head of the French State.’ He could appoint or dismiss ministers, sign proposed legislation into law, and only had to consult the National Assembly if he wanted to declare war.²⁸ Although P´etain had designated Admiral Darlan as his successor, the marshal’s departure could only weaken the government and undermine his National Revolution. Admiral Darlan, Interior Minister Pucheu, and other members of the Vichy government understood the risks associated with the marshal’s idea. On the morning of 24 October, they told P´etain that his departure ²⁶ BAMA, RW 35/46/82. ²⁷ USNA, RG 242/T-77/1588/folder 01/1–4; DGFP, ser. D, vol. XIII, pp. 682–5; USNA, RG 242/T-120/685/259187–88; Nogu`eres, Histoire de la R´esistance en France, vol. 2, pp. 153–5. ²⁸ Paxton, Vichy France, pp. 24–33.

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would create a constitutional problem for the Vichy regime and have incalculable political consequences. Darlan and Pucheu appealed to the marshal’s sense of duty, scotched the plan, and saved Germany from having to reject the offer.²⁹ Even though they opposed P´etain’s scheme, Darlan and Pucheu tried to use it to extract concessions from the MBF. During an afternoon meeting with Benoist-M´echin and Stülpnagel, Pucheu told the MBF that P´etain might still offer himself as a hostage unless Germany declined to execute the second contingents of hostages for the Nantes and Bordeaux attacks. Vichy’s Interior Minister observed that P´etain’s initiative could confirm the impracticability of collaboration and transform FrancoGerman relations. Stülpnagel took their threats seriously and immediately telegraphed a summary of the 24 October meeting to Berlin.³⁰ As General von Stülpnagel had predicted, draconian reprisals damaged Germany’s reputation. Diplomats from several south and central American countries supported Vichy’s request for leniency. In a fit of pique, Ribbentrop ignored their complaints and refused to speak with those who questioned Hitler’s methods.³¹ The President of the United States, Franklin D. Roosevelt, condemned hostage executions in sweeping terms: The practice of executing scores of innocent hostages in reprisal for isolated attacks on Germans in countries temporarily under the Nazi heel revolts a world already inured to suffering and brutality. Civilized peoples long ago adopted the basic principle that no man should be punished for the deed of another. Unable to apprehend the persons involved in these attacks the Nazis characteristically slaughter fifty or a hundred innocent persons. Those who would ‘collaborate’ with Hitler or try to appease him cannot ignore this ghastly warning . . . These are the acts of desperate men who know in their hearts that they cannot win.³²

Prime Minister Churchill wholeheartedly endorsed the American president’s words and added that the hostage executions were ‘a foretaste of what Hitler would inflict upon the British and American peoples if only he could get the power.’³³ Hostage executions alienated neutral powers and provided Britain with a propaganda bonanza. ²⁹ BAMA, RW 35/542/67–69; DGFP, ser. D, vol. XIII, pp. 684–5; Aron, The Vichy Regime, pp. 458–9. ³⁰ USNA, RG 242/T-501/196/1096–1098. ³¹ USNA, RG 242/T-501/122/711–716; J¨ackel, France dans l’Europe de Hitler, p. 277. ³² ‘FDR on the Execution of Hostages by the Nazis’ in Department of State Bulletin, 25 October 1941. http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/1941/411025a.html Checked 12 March 2008. ³³ ‘Mr. Churchill on a ‘‘Foretaste’’ ’, The Times, 27 October 1941, p. 4.

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Charles de Gaulle could not take advantage of initial German reprisals. He remained in central Africa while the Moser affair unfolded and he had to unravel a nasty dispute with the British government after returning to London on 1 September 1941. While Stülpnagel responded to the Hoffmann and Scheben assassinations, de Gaulle outmaneuvered political rivals within the Free French movement and established the French National Committee (or CNF) on 24 September.³⁴ With his diplomatic and political affairs in order, the general stood ready to condemn reprisals that followed the Nantes and Bordeaux assassinations. During a 23 October radio broadcast, de Gaulle expressed neither surprise nor outrage at the first round of executions; he expected Germans to act ‘like Germans’ and never doubted their ‘ferocious’ nature. Despite an angry preamble, the general counseled a policy of prudence in the body of his address: In the present circumstances the directive I give for the occupied territory is not to kill Germans. This, for a single but very good reason, is because it is too easy for the enemy to retaliate by the massacre of temporarily disarmed combatants. On the other hand, as soon as it is possible to attack, you will receive appropriate orders. Until then, patience, preparation, resolution.³⁵

Although he had little if any influence over left-wing resistance groups that carried out the attacks in Nantes and Bordeaux, de Gaulle did not want to exchange the lives of 50 or 100 French civilians for the death of a single German officer and ordered his followers to stand down. As a professional soldier, de Gaulle discounted guerrilla warfare and believed that the liberation could not begin until regular soldiers landed in France.³⁶ The arrest of ‘a wanted terrorist’ in Nantes on 24 October and de Gaulle’s timely retreat convinced Hitler that he had won. Speaking to General Wagner over the telephone in the evening of 24 October, the Führer ordered OKH to spare hostages associated with de Gaulle’s movement. During the same conversation, Hitler assumed responsibility for the reprisals, informed the MBF and OKH that they were not liable for any political repercussions caused by German executions, and reserved the right to intervene ³⁴ Lacouture, De Gaulle: The Rebel, pp. 305–315; Roussel, Charles de Gaulle, pp. 243–9. ³⁵ Charles de Gaulle, Discours et messages, vol. I (Paris: Plon, 1970), pp. 122–3. ³⁶ Charles De Gaulle, The Complete War Memoirs of Charles de Gaulle, pp. 262–4; Lacouture, De Gaulle: The Rebel, pp. 369–378.

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in subsequent crises. Three days later, he postponed the execution of the second Nantes and Bordeaux contingents for two more days. In a rare show of what was for him benevolence, Hitler suspended the execution of both groups indefinitely on 28 October.³⁷ Diplomatic pressure, effective police work, and de Gaulle’s timely retreat may have encouraged the Führer to spare the second Nantes and Bordeaux contingents. Perhaps thinking that his reprisals had cowed some opponents, Hitler was willing to be relatively magnanimous. In several respects, French public opinion confirmed Hitler’s opinion. Nantes citizens believed Lieutenant-Colonel Hotz to be a decent man and 3,000 attended his funeral. The mayor of Nantes declared him to be ‘good,’ and Admiral Darlan believed Hotz to be ‘particularly considerate’ and ‘in no sense a Hitlerian.’ Most locals genuinely condemned the assassination, feared German reprisals, and shared little sympathy with the perpetrators. A Nantes restaurant owner later identified one of the assassins, and many concluded that her tip and public condemnation saved the second hostage contingent. Rallying behind Marshal P´etain, they interpreted events surrounding the Nantes assassination as a victory for collaboration, not a clarion call for resistance.³⁸ General von Stülpnagel and the military administration viewed executions as a propaganda disaster, but the Paris embassy saw reprisals in a very different light. In a carefully worded telegram sent to the Foreign Ministry on the night of 25 October, Abetz discounted French protests. The ambassador suggested that some members of the French cabinet were secretly pleased by the executions because ‘the major part of the hostages are communists, and with them disappear elements undesirable to the Government.’ Other French leaders welcomed the executions as a means to foster patriotic sentiments, overcome political divisions, and create ‘a morally united front against the Germans, which is desired by Vichy.’ A third group had ‘more confidence in the European and socialist objectives of the occupying power than in the program of their own government.’ The ambassador believed that most French officials did not object to the ³⁷ USNA, T-77/1588/folder 001/9–10; DGFP, ser D., vol. XIII, pp. 684–5; BAMA, RW 35/542/69; BAMA, RW 35/308/149–150; Hans Luther, Der franz¨osische Widerstand gegen die deutsche Besatzungsmacht und seine Bek¨ampfung (Tübingen: Institut für Bestazungsfragen, 1957), pp. 202–213. ³⁸ Oury, Rue du Roi-Albert, pp. 98, 99, 102; Gildea, Marianne in Chains, pp. 243–4, 250, 256–8.

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German reprisals, but he added that the basis of official French support varied dramatically.³⁹ Abetz also discounted P´etain’s offer to serve as a hostage. He described the marshal’s proposal as the result of cabinet intrigue engineered by the chief of the marshal’s civil cabinet, Moulin de Labarth`ete. According to Abetz, the latter tried to get rid of P´etain just as he successfully ousted Laval on 13 December 1940. If imprisoned as a hostage, P´etain could not dismiss General Weygand, the Commissioner of French colonial possessions in North Africa who allegedly favored the Allies.⁴⁰ Aside from Darlan and Pucheu, the German ambassador had little confidence in the people around Marshal P´etain. The Paris embassy casually dismissed P´etain’s offer to serve as a hostage and discounted concerns raised by the military administration. Furthermore, Abetz suggested that German reprisals had a salutary effect on French policemen. Although he had no official contact with police officials, the ambassador claimed that French policemen had not fully cooperated with German authorities during previous investigations. Like most of the public, Vichy policemen were alarmed by the executions and would now do ‘all that is humanly possible . . . to avoid further executions.’⁴¹ In the ambassador’s opinion, draconian reprisals improved Franco-German collaboration. In this respect, the ambassador’s observations matched Hitler’s expectations. Playing both sides of the field, the ambassador described public opinion as markedly different from official attitudes: [T]he attitude of the French population does not provide any prerequisite for these assassinations of members of the Wehrmacht; indeed, in recent weeks there has been a noticeable improvement among the masses in the attitude toward Germany . . . The French public is uniform in condemning the murders and the treacherous manner of their execution. If the remaining 100 hostages are executed, however, there exists the danger that the indignation of the people about the assassinations will be transformed into indignation at the reprisals which are disproportionately high according to local opinion.⁴²

The ambassador hedged his analysis by describing official reaction to German reprisals as surreptitiously positive, but characterized the public response as negative and potentially damaging. He supported executions ³⁹ DGFP, ser. D, vol. XIII, pp. 682–5. ⁴¹ DGFP, ser. D, vol XIII, p. 684.

⁴⁰ DGFP, ser. D, vol. XIII, pp. 730–732. ⁴² DGFP, ser. D, vol. XIII, p. 685.

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that had already been carried out but advised his superiors to spare the remaining hostages. In other words, the ambassador fecklessly straddled the fence. While sections of his 25 October report were ambiguous, Abetz did not miss a chance to attack the military administration. He told his superiors in Berlin that I have personally expressed the view to the military authorities that the reprisals ordered were entirely appropriate if the situation reports on France sent to the Führer’s Headquarters by almost all the German officers in Paris, in contrast to those of the Embassy for the past year and a half, were true, that is, if the overwhelming majority of the population were actually de Gaullist and anti-German.⁴³

The MBF had made no such claims. A situation report sent to Berlin for the months of August and September 1941 characterized the French position as ‘attentiste.’ According to the military administration, French public opinion followed the lead of the Vichy regime and adopted a wait-and-see stance toward Germany in the fall of 1941. The vast majority of Frenchmen condemned resistance assassinations and German reprisals. From the perspective of the military administration in the Hotel Majestic, only a small minority of Frenchmen favored de Gaulle or supported resistance activity.⁴⁴ The ambassador described the Vichy regime as a small group of sincere collaborators who were surrounded by a large number of anti-German conspirators. Abetz distorted the views of the military administration and condemned the MBF’s response to the Nantes and Bordeaux assassinations in an attempt to gain an advantage within the German hierarchy. He implied the military administration did not really understand French politics and suggested that the Paris embassy could better manage the selection of French hostages. However, even the ambassador’s tortured prose could not obscure the fact that both the Paris embassy and the military administration needed to limit bloody German reprisals. By 7 December, the Paris embassy had stopped attacking the MBF for the way that he had handled reprisals. In a telex on 7 December to the Foreign Office in Berlin, Abetz asked his superiors to support General von Stülpnagel’s request for a free hand so that the MBF could respond to resistance activity on a case-by-case basis. ⁴³ DGFP, ser. D, vol. XIII, pp. 682–3. ⁴⁴ USNA, RG 242/T-501/143/940–941, 1144–1146, 1172–1175.

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The ambassador finally recognized that a hard and fast policy of draconian reprisals could not benefit the German embassy in Paris or its French clients.⁴⁵ In addition to pressure from Vichy and Ambassador Abetz, the MBF also had to contend with Joseph Goebbels. The Propaganda Minister believed that the MBF did not understand Clausewitz’s description of war as an extension of politics and described General von Stülpnagel as politically naïve. He lobbied OKW to impose harsh reprisals and confessed a desire to control German policy in Belgium, Holland, and occupied France.⁴⁶ Goebbels interpreted the Moser assassination as a simple test of German authority. If the military administration imposed harsh reprisals at the first sign of resistance, he thought Germany’s opponents would quickly acquiesce.⁴⁷ (W)hat prevents us from arresting about three hundred leading communists, publishing a list of those prisoners, and explaining that, after each new assassination, fifteen communist leaders at the top of the list will be executed? The communists would protect themselves and prevent further stupid youthful pranks. But our military commanders in western Europe follow an exact scheme. Nothing gets through to them. They only appeal to force, and not very cleverly or with great intelligence.⁴⁸

As the MBF ordered an ever-increasing number of reprisal executions, Goebbels moderated his criticism. He thought the execution of twelve hostages had a ‘wholesome’ and ‘sobering’ effect on the French public and believed the general situation in France had actually improved by the end of September. Attributing the improved situation in Paris to his own intervention, Goebbels thought that Frenchmen would gradually turn against resistance groups.⁴⁹ Hitler appeared to endorse Goebbels’ policy during a meeting on 24 September 1941 with the Minister of Propaganda. ⁴⁵ USNA, RG 242/T-501/165/354; Schumann and Nestler (eds.), Die faschistische Okkupationspolitik in Frankreich, 1940–1944, p. 189. ⁴⁶ Kershaw, Hitler 1936–1945, p. 35; Elke Fr¨ohlich, ‘Joseph Goebbels: the propagandist,’ in Smelser and Zitelmann (eds.), The Nazi Elite, pp. 48–61; BAMA, RH 3/204/7; USNA, RG 242/T-501/97/381–382. ⁴⁷ Fr¨ohlich (ed.), Die Tagebücher von Joseph Goebbels, vol. II, part 1, pp. 291, 303, 326, 296. Diary entries dated 22 August, 24 August, 29 August, and 23 August 1941. ⁴⁸ Fr¨ohlich (ed.), Die Tagebücher von Joseph Goebbels, vol. II, part 1, pp. 326–7. Diary entry dated 29 August 1941. ⁴⁹ Fr¨ohlich (ed.), Die Tagebücher von Joseph Goebbels, vol. II, part 1, pp. 463, 468, 474. Entries dated 21, 22, and 23 September 1941.

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The Führer thought that even the ‘most doubtful cases’ of sabotage and assassination should be answered with ‘draconian punishments,’ but he did not mention specific numbers. Goebbels may have concluded that his suggestion of 10 to 15 reprisal executions matched Hitler’s concept of ‘draconian.’ The two also discussed the replacement of General von Falkenhausen, the military commander Belgium, with a civilian commissioner, but Hitler postponed a final decision. Three weeks later, the Minister of Propaganda told the MBF that he still opposed ‘mass shootings’ and simply wanted to institute ‘timely and psychologically appropriate punishments.’⁵⁰ With Hitler’s apparent support, Stülpnagel’s apparent obedience, and decreasing resistance activity, Goebbels had reason to feel optimistic. Assassinations in Nantes and Bordeaux dispelled any false confidence and, along with German reprisals, may have caught the Minister of Propaganda off guard. At first, Goebbels attributed the MBF’s harsh response to influence exerted by his ministry. Since the MBF had failed to nip resistance in the bud after the Moser and Hoffmann attacks in August and September, Goebbels thought that the MBF had no choice but to execute fifty hostages in October. In Paris, the Ministry of Propaganda spread rumors that the attacks had been carried out by English spies even though it had no evidence to support this claim.⁵¹ Three days after the Nantes attack, Stülpnagel told General Wagner that he had consulted with Goebbels and claimed that the latter also opposed ‘mass shootings.’⁵² Unfortunately for General von Stülpnagel, the Propaganda Minster’s support proved to be ephemeral. Before the Nantes assassination, Goebbels had argued that the execution of ten or fifteen hostages would be an appropriate response for each attack on a German soldier. Immediately after Nantes, Goebbels shifted his position to accommodate Hitler’s demand for draconian reprisals. In a diary entry dated 24 October, he argued that an act of mercy would make the Reich look soft and encourage resistance activity.⁵³ When Hitler first postponed and later suspended the execution of the second Nantes and ⁵⁰ Fr¨ohlich (ed.), Die Tagebücher von Joseph Goebbels, vol. II, part 1, p. 485; vol. II, part 2, p. 130. Entries dated 24 September and 17 October 1941. ⁵¹ Fr¨ohlich (ed.), Die Tagebücher von Joseph Goebbels, vol. II, part 2, pp. 144, 160, 168, entries dated 20, 23 and 24 October 1941. ⁵² USNA, RG 242/T-501/122/711–712. ⁵³ Fr¨ohlich (ed.), Die Tagebücher von Joseph Goebbels, vol. II, part 2, pp. 168, 175, entries dated 24 and 25 October 1941.

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Bordeaux contingents, Goebbels adroitly reversed course, hailed the move as ‘a skillful gambit,’ and lauded Hitler’s ‘humane gesture.’ With no sense of hypocrisy, he declared that ‘bloody methods are only appropriate when all other ways are barred.’⁵⁴ Rather than advance a consistent policy of his own design, Joseph Goebbels simply aped the Führer. Goebbels justified his strategy during a meeting on 1 November with Field Marshal von Brauchitsch. He accused both the MBF and General von Falkenhausen, the military commander in Belgium and northwest France (Milit¨arbefehlshaber in Belgien und nordwest Frankreich or MBB), of being soft. According to the Minister of Propaganda, they had failed to nip resistance activity in the bud and let things get out of hand. As a result of their restraint in August and September, Germany had no choice but to impose drastic penalties in October. As usual, Brauchitsch did not bother to defend his subordinates.⁵⁵ Buoyed by his success with the commander of the army, Goebbels used even stronger language with General von Falkenhausen two weeks later. He described initial reprisals carried out by the MBB and MBF as being ‘neither sharp nor clever.’ Goebbels believed that moderate reprisals instituted in France and Belgium failed to ‘connect threats with penalties’ and did not target people associated with the likely perpetrators. The politically astute Falkenhausen did not mention Hitler’s repeated calls for immediate reprisals. Yet criticism from an unidentified source obviously stung the Minister of Propaganda. Goebbels complained that some of his remarks ‘had been greatly exaggerated’ and that his enemies were ‘braying like bloodhounds.’⁵⁶ The conference between Goebbels and the MBB lasted over two hours and ‘followed a harmonious course,’ but the Minister of Propaganda clearly disagreed with General von Falkenhausen. In his diary, Goebbels complained about the ‘unpolitical nature’ of generals and thought that they simply concerned themselves with military tactics and had no political sense. The Minister of Propaganda dabbled in French affairs throughout October 1941 and could not be ignored in light of his close relationship with Hitler. After the crisis died down, Goebbels and Dr. Hans Lammers, ⁵⁴ Fr¨ohlich (ed.), Die Tagebücher von Joseph Goebbels, vol. II, part 2, pp. 180, 201, entries dated 26 and 29 October 1941. ⁵⁵ Fr¨ohlich (ed.), Die Tagebücher von Joseph Goebbels, vol. II, part 2, p. 217, entry dated 1 November 1941. ⁵⁶ USNA, RG 242/T-501/97/382–393.

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the head of the Reich Chancellery, began to push for the recall of Generals von Falkenhausen and von Stülpnagel. They urged Hitler to replace military governments with civil governments under the control of Nazi party loyalists.⁵⁷ In a figurative sense, the groupes de brûlots provided Goebbels with an opportunity to expand his influence and wounded both Falkenhausen and Stülpnagel. In addition to complaints from Abetz, Goebbels, and Hitler, Stülpnagel had to contend with internal dissent. The MBF’s headquarters included an administration staff (Verwaltungsstab) and command staff (Kommandostab) manned by regular army officers. The latter collected intelligence, maintained public order, and guarded against invasion. It played a subordinate role in everyday affairs but had almost unlimited power in an emergency. Consisting of civilian officials with temporary rank, limited authority, and a unique uniform, the military administration staff oversaw the French economy and supervised the French government. The head of the government subsection (Verwaltungsstab Abteilung Verwaltung), Werner Best, accused the command staff (Kommandostab) of unilaterally selecting hostages and implied that they had made poor choices. He tried to seize control of Militärbefehlshaber in Frankreich General Otto von Stülpnagel Ic des MBF Major Crome

Command Staff (Kommandostab) Colonel Hans Spiedel

Region B, Angers Lt. General Neubron-Neurode Command Staff Captain Schrader

Military Intelligence (Abwehr) Captain von Bonin

Military Administration (Verwaltungsstab) Jonathan Schmid

Military Administration Dr. Medicus

Government Subsection Werner Best

SD Major Wolf

Secret Field Police (GFP) Major Dernbach

District 518, Nantes Lt. Colonel Friedrich Hotz Command Staff Ic des FK 518, Lieutenant Kalbhenn

Military Administration Kriegesverwaltungsrat Schuster

Figure 6.1. The German chain of command in Nantes, 1941. ⁵⁷ USNA, RG 242/T-501/97/392; Fr¨ohlich (ed.), Die Tagebücher von Joseph Goebbels, vol. II, part 2, p. 285, entry dated 14 November 1941; DGFP, ser. D vol. XII, pp. 672–3.

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German reprisal policy and aggravated latent divisions within the MBF’s command.⁵⁸ According to orders issued by the MBF on 26 March and 28 September 1941, members of the command staff were supposed to consult counterparts on the military administration when they designed and implemented German reprisals.⁵⁹ As soon as they learned of the Nantes assassination, members of the regional (Bezirk) command staff drove to Nantes and, in conjunction with local command staff and military administration officials (Feldkommandant), began to select hostages. The regional office of the

Figure 6.2. Werner Best. Photograph courtesy of the Bundesarchiv, Bild 183-B22627. ⁵⁸ See Chapter 1 of this volume, pp. 41, 44–5; USNA, RG 242/T-501/165/406–415. ⁵⁹ USNA, RG 242/T-502/166/71–82, 91–98.

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military administration reviewed the hostage list on 22 October and discovered two mistakes. According to Best, Schrader and the command staff had included a police officer and a former mayor of Nantes on their hostage list. The regional military administration asked the command staff to remove both names and the latter promptly complied. Best claimed that mistakes could have been avoided if the regional and national branches of the military administration had been included in the hostage selection process. He may have been trying to expand his own authority and ingratiate himself with hardliners in Berlin, or he could have been driven by personal motives. Best considered the victim of the Nantes attack, Lieutenant-Colonel Hotz, to be a kind and reasonable gentleman; Hortz had served with his father during World War One.⁶⁰ Lieutenant General Neumann-Neurode, the regional commander (Bezirkchef ) responsible for Nantes, characterized Best’s charges as ‘baseless’ and described his report as ‘neither fair nor correct.’ He assumed responsibility for any mistakes that may have been made during the selection of hostages and vowed to make improvements in the process, but he denied accusations that he or his command staff had excluded the military administration. Two of the general’s subordinates swore that they had consulted with the regional military administration leader, Dr. Medicus, and his assistant, Dr. Kübler, over the telephone. In addition, the head of the local military administration, Kriegsverwaltungsrat Schuster, played an integral role throughout the reprisal process. Like their counterparts on the command staff, few senior military administration officials from the Paris office participated in formulating German reprisals, but regional and local officials certainly did. Best’s charges appear to be groundless.⁶¹ General von Stülpnagel reacted to Best’s complaint with surprise and outrage. In a letter to Jonathan Schmid, the head of the entire military administration and Best’s immediate superior, the MBF observed that Best had not complained about the system of selecting hostages during a September 1941 staff conference. Furthermore, he wondered if the head of the government subsection had avoided the selection process so that he would not have to make a tough decision in a short amount of time. By ⁶⁰ USNA, RG 242/T-501/165/395–400; BAK, N 1023/1/11–13. ⁶¹ USNA, RG 242/T-501/165/403–404, 393–394, 416–422.

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complaining that he had been excluded from the hostage process weeks after the fact, Best alienated regular military officers who had initially overlooked his SS background. Far from being the e´minence grise behind German reprisal policy, Werner Best stood on uncertain ground within the military administration.⁶² Given time, the MBF might have been able to resolve disagreements within his own office and shore up relations with Hitler, Goebbels, Keitel, and Wagner in Berlin, but communist resistance groups did not relent. Acting under the direction of Albert Ouzoulias, groupes de brûlots launched another series of attacks in Paris. On 21 November, partisans bombed a book store that sold National Socialist literature and had connections with the German embassy. One week later, guerrillas lobbed two grenades into the bar of the Hˆotel du Midi and killed three German soldiers.⁶³ In light of General von Stülpnagel’s general policy of gradually increasing reprisals, Hitler’s consistent demand for hostage executions, and Nantes and Bordeaux precedents, the bombings should have provoked an immediate, deadly reaction. Pressure from Berlin once again forced the MBF to temper his response. On 18 November, G¨oring arranged a meeting with P´etain at Saint Florentin. The two marshals planned to discuss pressing military and political issues, and both sides wanted the negotiations to proceed without a hitch. G¨oring needed French support to expedite the flow of supplies to the German Africa Corps, and P´etain wanted to win the release of French prisoners of war and ameliorate German economic demands. To ensure that negotiations did not get sidetracked, G¨oring asked the MBF to suspend hostage executions until 10 December.⁶⁴ Once talks began on 1 December, P´etain asked for economic, political, and military concessions that would substantiate benevolent intentions voiced by Hitler at Montoire. G¨oring immediately rejected P´etain’s proposals, condemned French impudence, repeated Hitler’s favorite list of French transgressions, and demanded immediate, unreserved collaboration. To make matters worse, the Reichsmarschall skipped a dinner hosted by the Paris embassy, organized his own party at the A´ero-Club, and scrupulously avoided French officials after ⁶² USNA, RG 242/T-501/165/428–431; Meyer, L’Occupation allemande en France, pp. 28–39. ⁶³ BAMA, RW 35/542/73–75; Ouzoulias, Les Fils de la nuit, pp. 245–7; Nogu`eres Histoire de la R´esistance en France, vol. II, pp. 226–9. ⁶⁴ J¨ackel, France dans l’Europe de Hitler, pp. 285–298; BAK, All. Proz. 21/217/229.

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Figure 6.3. Admiral Darlan, Marshal P´etain, and Reichsmarschall G¨oring in St. Florentin. Photograph courtesy of the Library of Congress.

business hours. Like the Protocols of Paris, the Saint Florentin talks collapsed because each side refused to grant concessions before first receiving concessions from the other.⁶⁵ While the Saint Florentin negotiations continued, the MBF levied fines, imposed curfews, and threatened dire reprisals. Limitations imposed by Berlin undermined General von Stülpnagel’s efforts to follow a consistent policy, but they gave policemen time to investigate attacks and identify suspects. Subsequent inquiries failed to identify perpetrators of the 28 November hotel bombing that killed three German soldiers, and Stülpnagel asked Berlin for permission to shoot 50 hostages, fine Parisian Jews, and deport an additional 1,000 Jews and criminals with ‘Jewish connections’ on 1 December—the same day that G¨oring met P´etain at Saint ⁶⁵ DGFP, ser. D, vol. XIII, pp. 930–934, 914–927; Jacques Benoist-M´echin, De la D´efaite au d´esastre, vol. I (Paris: Albin Michel, 1984), pp. 317–327.

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Florentin—but Berlin insisted upon restraint. Although none proved to be fatal, groupes de brûlots shot three more Germans on 2, 5, and 6 December and bombed a military canteen on 7 December. Incensed that a Luftwaffe major had been lightly wounded in the 5 December attack, G¨oring reversed course and immediately demanded bloody reprisals. With Franco-German negotiations at an impasse, the Reichsmarschall could indulge his desire for revenge without consequence. To placate G¨oring, OKW directed the MBF to execute 100 Jews (50 more than the MBF asked for), deport 1,000 Jews and 500 ‘young communists,’ and impose a one billion franc fine on 12 December.⁶⁶ Reprisals ordered by Berlin included a significant innovation: the deportation of 1,000 Jews and 500 young communists. On 7 December 1941, Hitler signed the ‘Night and Fog Decree’ (Nacht und Nebel Erlass) and added a new twist to Berlin’s anti-partisan policy. In a cover letter attached to the Hitler order, the OKW Chief of Staff explained that it is the long considered will of the Führer that, in the occupied zone, attacks against the Reich or occupying power should be met with other measures (anderen Maßnahmen). In the eyes of Hitler, punishing crimes with prison sentences, even lifelong prison sentences (lebenslange Zuchthausstrafen), is a sign of weakness. An effective and enduring deterrence can only be had through death sentences and equally far-reaching measures, measures that leave the relatives and public uncertain over the fate of the perpetrator. Deportation to Germany also serves this purpose. The attached guidelines for the prosecution of criminal offenses correspond to the view of the Führer. They have been examined and approved by him. Signed Keitel.⁶⁷

The Nacht und Nebel Erlass once again directed senior military commanders and military courts to punish espionage, sabotage, communist activity, and other serious crimes with death; in that respect it contained nothing new. However, it also allowed military commanders and their subordinate courts-martial to send prisoners to the Reich and decreed that the entire process, as well as the ultimate fate of the accused, would remain secret. Keitel’s covering letter explained that deportation was equivalent to a death sentence. Because prisoners would be handed over to the SD for ‘deportation,’ the directive also created a new task for the SD, and this, in ⁶⁶ BAK, All. Proz. 21/217/229–231; BAMA, RW 35/542/73–82. ⁶⁷ USNA, RG 242/T-501/97/409.

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turn, demanded an increased SS/SD presence in occupied France. Speaking for OKW, Admiral Canaris, the head of the Abwehr, described the decree as a ‘fundamental innovation’ in German policy.⁶⁸ Ostensibly designed to combat terrorism, the Nacht und Nebel Erlass advanced the racial goals of the Nazi regime. During an 18 December conversation with Himmler, ‘Hitler confirmed that in the east the partisan war, which had expanded sharply in the autumn, provided a useful framework for destroying the Jews. They were ‘‘to be exterminated as partisans’’.’⁶⁹ Although it did not explicitly mention Jews, the Nacht und Nebel Erlass followed the spirit of Hitler’s anti-terrorism policy (massive reprisals), established a conduit to death camps in eastern Europe, and provided the army with another way to contribute to the Final Solution as it fought partisans. Like his Führer, Himmler used racial deportations to reduce resistance and considered the fight against so-called JudeoBolshevism to be a vital part of the war effort. OKW’s 12 December 1941 directive to the MBF demonstrated proper use of the Nacht und Nebel Erlass by ordering the deportation of 1,500 Jews and communists.⁷⁰ The Nacht und Nebel Erlass served as bait to enlist Stülpnagel in genocide. Before December 1941, the MBF did little to advance Nazi racial objectives. Acting on its own accord, the Vichy regime passed the Statut des juifs and launched its own Aryanization program in a vain attempt to curry favor with Nazi Germany.⁷¹ The German embassy in Paris and SS/SD agents stood at the forefront of German efforts to persecute Jews, but their efforts were hampered by a lack of executive authority and a shortage of personnel. General von Stülpnagel opposed the confiscation of Jewish property because such measures dishonored the army, aggravated friends in Vichy, and distracted the military administration from pressing tasks like the exploitation of French industrial resources. Stülpnagel embraced the principle of collective reprisals but worried about the political consequences of massive hostage executions. Using the Nacht und Nebel Erlass, military commanders in France and other occupied territories could liquidate ⁶⁸ USNA, RG 242/T-501/97/407–416. ⁶⁹ Kershaw, Hitler, 1936–1945: Nemesis, pp. 492, 965 note 156. ⁷⁰ BAMA, RW 35/708/4; BALW, NS 19/2774/fiche 1/1; Christian Gerlach, ‘Die WannseeKonferenz, das Schicksal der deutschen Juden und Hitlers politische Grundsatzentscheidung, alle Juden Europas zu ermorden,’ Werkstattgeschichte, 18 (1997), pp. 7–44, especially 22; BAMA, RW 35/542/78–82. ⁷¹ Marrus and Paxton, Vichy France and the Jews, pp. 3–18.

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hostages in accordance with Keitel’s 16 September 1941 directive but avoid the negative political consequences that mass shootings had previously entailed. Jews, communists, and suspected partisans would simply disappear into the ‘night and fog.’ With the Nacht und Nebel Erlass, General von Stülpnagel and the military administration could carry out deadly reprisals while still keeping their hands clean. The Nacht und Nebel Erlass did not mark an immediate shift in the way the MBF responded to particular attacks. On the evening of 28 December 1941, an unknown assailant shot Lieutenant Dr. Winiger in Dijon. Further investigation by local French and German detectives unearthed ‘unmistakable signs of communist activity’ in the area. After consulting with the regional branch of the military administration, the MBF ordered the execution of ten hostages.⁷² Why did Stülpnagel forgo 21 October and 12 December precedents and act with such reserve? On 5 December 1941, the Red Army launched an offensive that pushed German forces back along the entire eastern front. To stem the Soviet advance and counter guerrilla activity behind front lines, OKH transferred 3 regular army divisions, 1 regional, 10 district, and 55 local sections of the military administration to the eastern front. German troop transfers consumed all available transport and precluded large-scale deportations.⁷³ News of the Dijon attack may not have reached Hitler in a timely fashion. Multiple sources told the Führer about Nantes and Bordeaux assassinations on the day of each incident. Before and during the 1 December Saint Florentin meeting, both Hitler and G¨oring had monitored French political affairs. They knew about the November bombings that had killed three German soldiers and suspended reprisals to support diplomatic initiatives. Hitler, G¨oring, Goebbels, and other leading Nazis focused on the eastern front in late December and may not have heard about the 28 December attack in Dijon. Their ignorance allowed the MBF to revert to his preferred strategy of limited reprisals. The Führer certainly worried about incomplete or misleading reports and had already chastised the MBF for not providing Berlin with timely information. Speaking through General Warlimont, Hitler ordered all field commanders to submit ⁷² USNA, RG 242/143/1238; BAMA, RW 35/542/83. The former spells the victim’s name Winiger, the latter Winkler. ⁷³ USNA, RG 242/T-501/143/1240–1241; USNA, RG 242/T-78/32/706154; USNA, RG 242/T-501/196/1141.

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accurate reports, avoid exaggeration, and confess mistakes on 26 December 1941.⁷⁴ Obliging the Führer, General von Stülpnagel sent a substantial report to OKW on 15 January 1942. He pointed out that German and French policemen had already solved 22 of the 68 attacks carried out by resistance groups between 21 August 1941 and 3 January 1942. Small, fanatical terrorist groups associated with the communist party, Stülpnagel observed, had carried out the attacks and often committed suicide as soon as they were arrested. He argued that the groupes de brûlots enjoyed no popular support. French workers, like their German counterparts, continued to serve the German war economy. Both the Vichy government and French police forces had cooperated ‘loyally and energetically’ with German authorities in each and every case. General von Stülpnagel thought that the Vichy government had behaved ‘flawlessly’ and found a few words of praise for the SD, which had cooperated with the Abwehr and GFP during recent investigations. To protect himself against accusations that the military administration was following a ‘soft’ anti-terrorist policy, Stülpnagel noted that French and German police forces had arrested approximately 25,500 Jews and communists throughout France.⁷⁵ The MBF discounted anti-terrorist measures that were ordered by Berlin. The groupes de brûlots welcomed German reprisals that alienated workers, provoked resistance, and forced Germany to send more security forces to the Hexagon. Second, General von Stülpnagel noted that mass deportations could not be carried out because of transportation shortages, and he questioned the wisdom of sending young communists to the east for ‘work duty’ (Arbeitsm¨assig) on security grounds.⁷⁶ Shifting to general terms, Stülpnagel argued that hostage executions did not correspond to the French conception of justice and would eventually turn the French population against Germany. He implied that leaders in Berlin understood neither French politics nor the French mentalit´e. General von Stülpnagel assured OKW that his military administration would continue to arrest and deport Jews as soon as transportation became ⁷⁴ USNA, RG 242/T-78/32/706178. ⁷⁵ USNA, RG 242/T-501/196/1138–1144. ⁷⁶ Stülpnagel’s use of the term ‘work duty’ (Arbeitsm¨assig) suggests that the MBF may have conveniently forgotten the lethal nature of the Nacht und Nebel Erlass, which Keitel explicitly described in his cover letter to Hitler’s order.

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available. He promised to execute a limited number of hostages and support further deportations if resistance activity continued. He also pledged to impose fines, curfews, and other prohibitions in response to non-lethal attacks. Yet the MBF advised Berlin that I only intend to carry out future executions when a member of the armed forces has been assassinated (and the attack results in a death), after a series of non-fatal assassination attempts, or after cases of sabotage which have especially dangerous effects. However, I consider it essential to wait for an appropriate period of time so that a criminal investigation can uncover the perpetrators that such well prepared crimes require under the especially difficult conditions of the occupied zone. I intend to only order a limited number of executions and will adjust the number to suit the circumstances. At least under the present circumstances, I can no longer arrange mass shootings and answer to history with a clear conscience because of my knowledge of the entire situation, the consequences that such hard measures would have on the entire population, and on our relationship to France.⁷⁷

Without mincing any words, General Otto von Stülpnagel rejected Hitler’s anti-partisan policy and drew a line in the sand. Subordinates on the command staff and military administration backed up General von Stülpnagel. In its report to Berlin, sent once every two months, the military administration claimed that the Frenchmen passionately opposed hostage executions. In conjunction with food and fuel shortages, German reprisals undermined support for collaboration and threatened to turn the local population against Nazi Germany. The military administration also minimized the threat posed by resistance activity and noted a decrease in the incidence of sabotage and assassination. As usual, the ‘political’ section of the report concluded that ‘[a]t the present time, internal security is not threatened.’⁷⁸ Colonel Hans Speidel, the head of the command staff, went one step further than his civilian colleagues in the military administration. He characterized German policy as punishment without reward and argued for concessions to complement German reprisals. Going into further detail, Speidel observed that some other dramatic step like the start of FrancoGerman peace negotiations might induce the Vichy regime and the French ⁷⁷ USNA, RG 242/T-501/196/1142–1143. Emphasis in the original. ⁷⁸ USNA, RG 242/T-501/143/1237–1239.

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public to wholeheartedly support the German war effort. On a local level, Colonel Speidel believed that specific rewards, in conjunction with reprisals, might enlist popular support for the campaign against resistance groups. The head of the command staff discounted resistance activity as the work of small terrorist groups organized by the PCF and advised superiors to punish only the people who attacked Germany. A member of the General Staff, Speidel ventured into the realm of politics and condemned draconian reprisals.⁷⁹ Keitel discussed the general situation in France with General von Stülpnagel on 23 January 1942. The field marshal realized that Stülpnagel had to carry out Hitler’s security agenda while working with the French government on economic issues. He believed that the MBF exchanged a mild reprisal policy for French economic collaboration and thought that this strategy caused problems with Hitler. Keitel echoed one of Hitler’s common complaints during a 30 January military conference by saying that generals simply did not understand politics or resistance. He suspected that Stülpnagel was a Francophile and either ignored or misunderstood the MBF’s fundamental problem with Hitler’s reprisal policy. With great ambitions but limited talents, Keitel may have resented Stülpnagel’s distinguished military record.⁸⁰ Field Marshal Keitel did not want to be responsible for German security because it created problems with the Führer, so he ordered General Warlimont to solve the problem by reorganizing the German chain of command. Warlimont designed and Keitel approved a plan that would make the MBF and MBB subordinate to a commander of all German forces in western Europe (Oberbefehlshaber West), a post eventually filled by Field Marshal von Rundstedt. OKW and OKH would no longer have to deal with Stülpnagel directly. Second, Keitel called for the installation of a Senior SS and Police Leader (H¨oherer SS- und Polizeiführer or HSSuPF) in France and transferred responsibility for security of German troops from the army to the SS. Even though the new design would decrease the MBF’s authority, Keitel referred to it as something that would enhance the power of the MBF because OKW would no longer have to deal with troublesome security issues and local commanders could concentrate on economic exploitation.⁸¹ ⁷⁹ USNA, RG 242/T-501/144/3–7; BAMA, N 5/24/11, 27–28. ⁸⁰ BAMA, RW 5/690/39–43; Luther, Der franz¨osische Widerstand, p. 211. ⁸¹ BAMA, RW 5/690/42–45.

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After consulting with Hitler and his staff, Keitel ordered General Wagner to reply to Stülpnagel’s d´emarche on 2 February 1942: Field Marshal Keitel does not reject the (MBF’s) proposal for exclusive and final control over reprisals for assassinations and bombing attacks, so long as the proposed reprisals agree in type and scope with the Führer’s basic attitude. Attacks and bombings reported since 15 January that have not been solved must be answered with sharp deterrents including the execution of a large number of imprisoned communists, Jews, or people who carried out previous attacks, and the arrest of at least 1,000 Jews or communist for later evacuation. Field Marshal Keitel expects a corresponding instruction for submission to the Führer.⁸²

As long as he obeyed the Führer’s policy of draconian reprisals and massive deportations, Hitler and Keitel were willing to grant the MBF a free hand. In light of comments made during the 30 January conference, Keitel probably knew that Wagner’s 2 February letter would trigger Stülpnagel’s resignation. Like Hitler, he welcomed the opportunity to dispose of a difficult subordinate and had already developed plans to reorganize the chain of command.⁸³ The MBF understood that the offer made by Hitler and Keitel through Wagner left him with no room to maneuver. Unable to reconcile Hitler’s reprisal policy with his own conscience, General Otto von Stülpnagel tendered his resignation to General Keitel and OKW. Stülpnagel’s official letter recapitulated his long, distinguished career and requested an immediate recall. Although he based his request on a medical excuse and included a note from his doctor, the MBF explained that health reasons camouflaged a basic disagreement between both Hitler and military leaders in Berlin on the one hand and himself on the other. The MBF resigned because he felt that he no longer enjoyed ‘the full trust of the Führer or my direct superiors in the administration . . . The full extent of the military administration’s achievements will only be realized later.’ At first glance, the MBF resigned because he felt that the Nazi regime did not value his professional judgment.⁸⁴ Yet the MBF did not resign just because of a simple policy disagreement with the Nazi regime. In his 15 January report, General von Stülpnagel rejected mass executions on both pragmatic and principled grounds. He ⁸² BAMA, RW 35/543/58. ⁸³ BAMA, RW 5/690/46–48. ⁸⁴ USNA, RG 242/T-501/165/441–443.

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foresaw his place in history and refused to carry out orders that disagreed with his conscience. In the final paragraphs of his official resignation to OKW, Stülpnagel complained that without this trust and freedom of action, the position of the MBF in the occupied area becomes more difficult, leads to weighty conflicts of conscience, and undermines my energy, self-confidence, and determination . . . I can withdraw to private life with clear conscience, confident in the knowledge that I served my people, country, and opponents with complete unselfishness and fulfilled my duties to the best of my ability.

As a leading figure in the army throughout the interwar period, Otto von Stülpnagel had personal relationships with most of the leaders of the Wehrmacht. To drive his own opinions home, he sent a second letter directly to Keitel, the head of OKW and Hitler’s immediate subordinate for military affairs. The MBF did not mince words and, unlike his ‘official letter,’ discussed details and named names. In the very first paragraph of his letter, Stülpnagel discounted his own ambitions and claimed that he had never lobbied for his command in France. In contrast, he criticized civilian branches of the Reich government for expanding into areas outside of their jurisdiction, not following the ‘will of the Führer,’ and obstructing the military administration. Despite challenges posed by agencies that did not feel obligated to obey the MBF, Stülpnagel believed that he had mastered the situation and exploited France far beyond the terms of the 1940 Armistice Agreement.⁸⁵ Although he abhorred the disruptive role played by civilian agencies, General von Stülpnagel reserved special criticism for Ambassador Abetz and Reichsmarschall G¨oring. The ambassador consistently supported a variety of small and ‘untrustworthy’ political parties and allowed the latter to criticize Marshal P´etain and Admiral Darlan in the press. In so doing, Abetz undermined the Vichy regime’s ‘attempts to work with the Germans on a soldier-to-soldier level.’ If only the ambassador would obey the will of the Führer, act responsibly, and stop encouraging groups that undermined the French government, Stülpnagel believed that political and economic relations with the Vichy regime would improve dramatically. Realizing that his military career had come to an end, the MBF did not shy away from disparaging Hitler’s designated successor, Reichsmarschall Hermann G¨oring. ⁸⁵ USNA, RG 242/T-501/165/433–440.

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the end of ambiguity I am placed in too many tragi-comic situations. For example, the Reichsmarschall recently would not allow me to impose a harsh sentence in an ongoing case because it might hinder his ongoing negotiations with Marshal P´etain. Two days later, after a plot against a Luftwaffe officer, he immediately demanded the sharpest possible punishment. In this and many other questions, I sit between two stools.⁸⁶

General von Stülpnagel also condemned draconian reprisals ordered by Berlin and, by extension, Hitler’s anti-partisan policy. Simply put, the MBF claimed that mass executions would not deter further resistance activity. They offended the ‘French sense of justice’ and alienated the Vichy regime. Instead, Stülpnagel proposed another form of atonement is necessary for attacks against Wehrmacht personnel, that is to say, through limited executions, above all through evacuation of most communists and Jews to the East, when we are able to reach it. Based on my knowledge of the French population, I believe this deterrence, and not mass executions, will work.⁸⁷

As he endorsed deportations over mass executions, Otto was alluding to Keitel’s failure to win the war in the east and delivered a stinging barb. He did not oppose executions or deportations in principle. His letter to Keitel rejected Hitler’s measures and supported reprisals that were tailored to local conditions and proportional to the original crime. Previous reports to Berlin, particularly those including remarks about having a clear conscience and having to answer to history, suggest that moral or ethical considerations influenced Stülpnagel’s decision to resign. He voiced similar concerns during his struggle against the Einsatzstab Rosenberg, but they did not prevent the MBF from encouraging the ‘evacuation’ of Jews and Communists. OKW accepted Stülpnagel’s resignation without comment and neither it nor Keitel replied to Otto von Stülpnagel’s letters. Attacks in Nantes and Bordeaux placed General von Stülpnagel and the military administration in the center of a political firestorm. They faced pressure from Hitler, political generals in Berlin, Nazi party paladins, the Paris embassy, and the Vichy government. Using assassinations as an pretext for genocide, Hitler ordered draconian reprisals and, after 7 December 1941, massive deportations in response to every resistance attack. Drawing upon his first-hand knowledge of the situation in France and 45 years ⁸⁶ USNA, RG 242/T-501/165/438.

⁸⁷ USNA, RG 242/T-501/165/437.

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of military experience, General von Stülpnagel decried Hitler’s ‘Polish methods’ and stood his ground, but this stance destroyed his relationship with Nazis in Berlin. Keitel, Jodl, and Wagner refused to support the MBF’s protests and simply followed orders. Rather than following suit, Stülpnagel condemned directives that neither made political sense nor sat well with his conscience. Debate between the MBF in Paris and Nazis in Berlin revealed fundamentally different assumptions about the source of resistance activity and exposed discord within the German chain of command. Unlike most of his peers, Otto von Stülpnagel did not believe that superior orders excused criminal activity and resigned his command. As the war expanded in scope, Hitler escalated the scale of violence. Before the invasion of France, Hitler ordered subordinates to obey the Hague Convention. One the eve of the invasion of the Soviet Union, the Führer directed troops on the eastern front to shoot Jews and communists out of hand. With Hitler’s approval, Keitel commanded subordinates throughout Europe to answer increasing resistance activity with immediate and disproportionate reprisals on 16 September. Going one step further, the Nacht und Nebel Erlass supplemented mass executions with mass deportations on 7 December. Reverses on the eastern front and America’s entry into the war lent impetus to Hitler’s war against Jews and created a need for new men who would carry out Hitler’s policies without question. The structure and authority of the previously obstinate military administration would have to accommodate changing tactics of the Nazi regime. The dawn of the Final Solution created a need for an enlarged SS/SD presence in France, and increased demands for foreign labor provided an opportunity for the Plenipotentiary for the Mobilization of Labor, Fritz Sauckel. The French government also had to adjust to new circumstances. The Vichy regime used the hostage process to dispose of unwanted prisoners and political opponents.⁸⁸ Despite his policy of collaboration, Admiral Darlan could not mitigate German economic demands, limit lethal reprisals, secure political concessions, or protect French colonies from foreign depredation. In desperate need of French resources and unwilling to countenance further obstruction, the German embassy in Paris and OKW pressed for Laval’s return. Emboldened by his German friends, Pierre Laval lobbied for a new, ⁸⁸ USNA, RG 242/T-77/1625/folder 75479/nfn (Der MBF, 19.9.41, An den Generalbevollm¨achtigten der franz¨osischen Regierung beim MBF, Betr. Geiselnahme); BAK, All. Proz. 21/217/213–215.

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powerful position in the Vichy government during a meeting with Marshal P´etain on 26 March. Darlan fought back, secured his position as head of the French armed forces, and remained P´etain’s designated successor but, in accordance with German wishes, resigned his political offices on 17 April.⁸⁹ On 26 April 1942, Laval resumed his duties as Prime Minister, installed Ren´e Bouquet as Secretary-General of the Police, and placed Louis Darquier de Pellepoix in charge of the Commissariat-g´en´eral aux questions juives. The second Laval government transformed a defeated French nation into a German satellite. The spiral of violence also transformed Germany’s relationship with the French public. Everyday problems stemming from rationing, inflation, and fuel shortages preoccupied most Frenchmen and, in the winter of 1941–1942, overshadowed broad political issues.⁹⁰ German reprisals, chronic shortages, and economic difficulties all suggested the bankruptcy of Hitler’s new order. Only those with thick, rose-colored glasses could anticipate an Allied victory one full year before Germany’s defeat at Stalingrad. On the other hand, the consequences of resistance were readily apparent. A majority of Frenchmen concluded that neither collaboration nor resistance made sense and embraced attentisme by default. Unenthusiastic collaboration gave way to sullen acquiescence during the second winter of the Occupation. ⁸⁹ Melton, Darlan, pp. 147–155.

⁹⁰ USNA, RG 242/T-501/143/1237–1239.

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7 Transitions

During the final months of 1941, political and military elites in Berlin compelled the MBF to follow a reprisal policy that liquidated Jews and terrorized opponents. After a protracted but futile struggle against ‘Polish methods,’ Otto von Stülpnagel retired with his wife in Berlin. In his stead, OKW appointed General Carl-Heinrich von Stülpnagel, Otto’s amiable cousin, to serve as the next Milit¨arbefehlshaber in Frankreich. The new MBF assumed command on 16 February 1942, revised German reprisal policy, and began to reshape the military administration. Like his predecessor, Carl-Heinrich rejected the methods and goals of the Nazi regime, but he expressed his opposition in a very different fashion. Rather than denouncing ideological directives, the new MBF simply followed orders while plotting against the Nazi regime. While Carl-Heinrich remained in charge, the military administration used ‘creative accounting’ methods to reduce the number of hostage executions but carried out Hitler’s basic policy without complaint. Despite the conciliatory tone of the new MBF and a continued decline in the incidence of sabotage, espionage, and murder, Hitler installed a Senior SS and Police Leader (H¨oherer SS- und Polizeiführer or HSSuPF) in France. On 1 June 1942, Carl Oberg took over German and French police forces in occupied France. The SS finally won autonomy and ‘executive authority’ or the right to make arrests and seize property. The new HSSuPF assumed control of the military administration’s police records and card-files, along with a large portion of its police officers and

transitions

administrative personnel.¹ Armed with formidable powers, the HSSuPF stood ready to carry out Hitler’s racial agenda without fear of objections raised by a legalistic military administration, but he also faced enduring problems. Personnel shortages forced Oberg to collaborate with French policemen just like his military predecessors. Dependent upon French support, he built upon foundations established by the military administration, accommodated some French concerns, and gradually expanded German efforts against Jews, communists, and saboteurs. The installation of an HSSuPF coincided with significant changes in the German war effort. As it became apparent that the war would continue for some time, OKW addressed serious labor shortages that limited German military production. During the first two years of the war, Germany used French prisoners of war as agricultural laborers and haphazardly sentenced enemies to terms of labor in German concentration camps. The Nacht und Nebel Erlass established a new ‘security’ measure—the deportation of Jews and communists to German concentration camps in Poland—that increased the pool of slave labor. During the last two years of the Occupation, the Nazi regime abandoned haphazard use of French labor in favor of the organized collection and forcible deportation of French workers and suspected partisans for service in German factories.² Otto von Stülpnagel’s departure cleared another impediment on the path to total war in France. With reduced authority and jurisdiction, the legalistic military administration could no longer hamstring labor and racial programs. Haphazard discrimination and expropriation gave way to systematic deportation and extermination. Born in 1886, Carl-Heinrich Rudolf Wilhelm von Stülpnagel grew up in Munich and attended the humanistische Lessing-Gymnasium in Frankfurt where he excelled in almost every subject except music. In addition to French, which he often spoke at home, young Carl-Heinrich knew Latin, Greek, English, some Italian, and some Russian. Despite undistinguished tours of service on the western front and in the Balkan region during World War One, Stülpnagel avoided demobilization. His cousin, Joachim ¹ Herbert, Best, pp. 314–316, 321–6; BALW, R 70 Frankreich/13/53ff. ² Milward, The New Order and the French Economy, pp. 110–126; Ulrich Herbert, Hitler’s Foreign Workers: Enforced Foreign Labor in Germany under the Third Reich, translated by William Templer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 95–100, 106–108, 192–8.

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von Stülpnagel, advised Generals von Seeckt and Schleicher during the 1920s and may have helped Carl-Heinrich survive personnel cutbacks mandated by the Versailles Treaty. After the war, Stülpnagel helped organize the Black Reichswehr in Silesia and the Ruhr before commanding small infantry units and holding a range of staff positions.³ As he slowly ascended the ranks, Carl-Heinrich met and impressed future leaders of the Wehrmacht, including Fedor von Bock, Walter von Brauchitsch, Ferdinand von Bredow, Ludwig Beck, Erwin Rommel, and Walther von Reichenau. Just before the Nazi seizure of power, he attained the rank of colonel and took charge of the general staff section that studied Germany’s western neighbors.⁴ According to his son Joachim, murders carried out during the R¨ohm purge turned Carl-Heinrich against the Nazi regime, but he continued to enjoy the privileges of a rising officer. Foreign policy goals that Hitler articulated in a staff conference on 5 November 1937 and that Colonel Hoßbach recorded in his famous memorandum troubled Stülpnagel, but promotions and foreign policy successes like the 1938 Munich Agreement muffled serious opposition inside OKW and OKH.⁵ When war finally broke out in September 1939, Major-General von Stülpnagel worked as the deputy chief of the Army General Staff for operations (Oberquartiermeister I) and served as Brauchitsch’s direct subordinate. After the end of the Polish campaign, he visited the major field commands on Germany’s western border and tried to stir up opposition against the Nazi regime while planning logistical support for the invasion of France. In the winter of 1939/1940, Stülpnagel completed his logistical plan and directed a series of crucial map exercises that tested Manstein’s variant of Fall Gelb.⁶ Frustrated by his inability to organize resistance to Hitler’s plans and drained by official ³ F. L. Carsten, The Reichswehr and Politics, 1918 to 1933 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966). Joachim ‘le rouge’ von Stülpnagel (because of his support for a ‘citizens army’) should not be confused with either Otto ‘der Schwarze’ von Stülpnagel (for his staunch conservatism) or Carl-Heinrich ‘der blonde’ von Stulpnagel (because of his reddish blonde hair). Bargatzky, Hotel Majestic, pp. 52–4; Geoffrey P. Megargee, Inside Hitler’s High Command (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 2000), pp. 14–15. ⁴ Heinrich Bücheler, Carl-Heinrich von Stülpnagel: Soldat—Philosoph—Verschw¨orer (Berlin: Verlag Ullstein, 1989), pp. 30–45, 70–87, 94–118. An abbreviated history of the entire Stülpnagel family can be found in BAMA, N 5/26/1–42. ⁵ Bücheler, Carl-Heinrich von Stülpnagel, pp. 128–135, 137–158; Müller, Das Heer und Hitler, pp. 210, 232. ⁶ Umbreit, ‘The battle for hegemony in western Europe,’ pp. 235–8.

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obligations, Carl-Heinrich succumbed to exhaustion and reported sick in early 1940. He recovered in time to lead an infantry corps during the second phase of the Western campaign and later took charge of the Franco-German Armistice Commission in Wiesbaden, but he did not remain at his post for long.⁷ In early 1941 he assumed command of the 17th Army and began to prepare for the invasion of the Soviet Union as part of Army Group South. He briefly opposed ‘security measures’ that included the ‘relocation’ of Jews and other potential subversives from the rear area of his command but abandoned his complaints after seeing Hitler’s Commissar Order and talking with State Secretary Josef Bühler, a leading official in Poland’s Generalgouvernment.⁸ By the time Germany invaded the Soviet Union, Stülpnagel’s misgivings had fallen by the wayside. His 17th Army earned praise from an SS execution squad (Sonderkommando) for its attitude towards Jews, but SS accolades could not deflect Hitler’s ire when Stülpnagel’s command lagged behind neighboring units. Unable or unwilling to endure censure from OKW, Carl-Heinrich once again reported sick and gave up his post on 4 October 1941.⁹ General Franz Halder, the Chief of the Army General Staff (OKH), diagnosed Stülpnagel’s sickness as a case of ‘timid leadership.’ Carl-Heinrich quickly recovered from his illness, returned to Berlin, and eventually secured a new post as Milit¨arbefehlshaber in Frankreich. In light of Stülpnagel’s pessimistic attitude in the fall of 1939 and his lackluster performance during the opening stages of Operation Barbarossa, one can only wonder why Hitler approved the appointment. Support from Halder, Wagner, and Warlimont must have been decisive. All three men had worked closely with Stülpnagel between 1938 and 1940, and the first two also shared Carl-Heinrich’s distaste for Hitler.¹⁰ Unlike his cousin Otto, who combined exceptional military skills with a grating disposition, Carl-Heinrich used his genial temperament and formidable intellect to compensate ⁷ Bücheler, Carl-Heinrich von Stülpnagel, pp. 168–194. ⁸ Bücheler, Carl-Heinrich von Stülpnagel, pp. 212–216. ⁹ Streit, Keine Kameraden, pp. 111, 114–115, 117–119; F¨orster, ‘Securing ‘‘living space’’ ,’ in Germany and the Second World War, vol. IV, pp. 1194–1204; Bücheler, Carl-Heinrich von Stülpnagel, pp. 220–227. ¹⁰ Bücheler, Carl-Heinrich von Stülpnagel, pp. 227–8; Klaus-Jürgen Müller, ‘Witzleben, Stülpnagel, and Spiedel,’ in Correlli Barnett (ed.), Hitler’s Generals (New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1989), pp. 43–74.

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for unexceptional military skills. Personal charm and a reputation for being a ‘timid leader’ suggested that Carl-Heinrich would not cause trouble and may have helped him secure his post.¹¹ In order to keep his position as Milit¨arbefehlshaber in Frankreich, CarlHeinrich would need all of his diplomatic skills and a measure of luck. Before he assumed command on 16 February 1942, Carl-Heinrich spoke to his cousin Otto, and he certainly understood the situation that he would have to master. Personnel reductions forced the MBF to rely on the cooperation of the Vichy government. On the other hand, Hitler did not withdraw his demand for staunch reprisals that upset the Vichy regime. However, the new MBF also had several factors working in his favor. First, the 1941–1942 Soviet winter offensive distracted Hitler. If OKW and the Führer did not hear about a particular attack, they could not order draconian reprisals. Second, Pierre Laval’s return as Prime Minister of the Vichy regime on 26 April 1942 heralded a compliant French government that would negotiate but not impede Nazi Germany. Finally, the incidence of sabotage, espionage, and murder continued to decrease in the first five months of 1942. When he became MBF, Carl-Heinrich von Stülpnagel faced a difficult but not hopeless situation. Resistance groups tested Carl-Heinrich a mere week after he became the MBF. In broad daylight, the L´eon Lioust group of the bataillons de la jeunesse threw a grenade at a group of German soldiers who were marching across la place de l’Arsenal in Le Havre on 23 February 1942. After consulting with naval authorities, the MBF proposed the immediate execution of five hostages because ‘up to now, French authorities and the population of Le Havre have worked together with Germany flawlessly.’ The German navy supported a muted response because draconian reprisals might alienate French workers who serviced German U-boats in Atlantic ports. Despite agreement between the MBF and navy, Hitler rejected the mild reprisals that had been proposed by Carl-Heinrich and ordered the execution of thirty hostages. The Führer dismissed fears that his sanctions would alienate French workers because they targeted separate, alien people: Jews. In Hitler’s opinion, regular French workers would not identify with or protest against the death of ‘foreigners.’¹² ¹¹ BAMA, N 5/24/1–42; Bargatzsky, Hotel Majestic, pp. 52–5, and Ernst Jünger, Strahlungen (Tübingen: Heliopolis, 1955), pp. 81–2, 89, 108–110, 119–120. ¹² BAMA, RW 35/542/90–91; Nogu`eres, Histoire de la R´esistance en France, vol. II, p. 354.

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Like his cousin and predecessor, Carl-Heinrich followed the letter but not the spirit of Hitler’s reprisal orders. Earlier in the month, the regional branch of the military administration had tried and executed five Frenchmen for various crimes against Germany. The MBF counted these five executions toward the Le Havre reprisals ordered by the Führer. For the remaining twenty-five executions that had to be carried out, the military administration selected eight people who had already received sentences of two to fifteen years for crimes such as illegal possession of a firearm, distributing anti-German propaganda, and aiding the enemy. Another Frenchmen held under administrative arrest by the German military administration also wound up on the hostage list. The French government turned over eleven people who had either been detained for or convicted of a crime by the Vichy regime. Another five hostages were removed from the list at the last minute for unspecified ‘technical’ reasons. Like his predecessor, Carl-Heinrich used creative accounting methods to reduce the number of hostage executions from the thirty ordered by Hitler to twenty who were actually shot on 26 February 1942.¹³ The MBF used a variety of stratagems to reduce the number of reprisal executions. After ‘terrorists’ shot and killed Private Hoffendank at his guard post in Paris on 1 March, Carl-Heinrich von Stülpnagel ordered the immediate execution of twenty Jews and communists. If the perpetrators were not caught by 15 March, he threatened to shoot another twenty people. Only twelve of the original twenty executions were actually carried out because the Commandant of greater Paris had a ‘credit’ of six people who had already been put to death for other ‘crimes.’ Shortly before the execution of the first contingent, the military administration disqualified two more hostages ‘on technical grounds.’ The MBF suspended the execution of the entire second contingent after French and German police apprehended three resistance fighters who had carried out, among others, the Hoffendank attack: Karl Sch¨onhaar, Raymond Tardif, and Georges Tondelier.¹⁴ When responding to deadly attacks, Carl-Heinrich von Stülpnagel always promised to execute two groups of hostages. By splitting reprisal executions into two separate contingents, he could condemn a large number of Frenchmen and appear to be a hardliner. When neither the Führer ¹³ BAMA, RW 35/542/90–91, 120. ¹⁴ BAMA, RW 35/542/91; Nogu`eres, Histoire de la R´esistance en France, vol. II, pp. 367–371; Ouzoulias, Les Fils de la nuit, pp. 246–255.

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nor OKW were paying attention, the MBF could declare the French to be properly chastened and pardon the second hostage contingent. Both Otto and Carl-Heinrich von Stülpnagel also disqualified a number of hostages ‘on technical grounds’ shortly before they were scheduled to face a firing squad. After the Nantes reprisals, Werner Best, German diplomats, and British propaganda all criticized the military administration for placing a disabled World War One veteran on the hostage list.¹⁵ German military courts did not hesitate to condemn any suspected criminals or their associates to death, but Hitler encouraged subordinates to commute the sentences of women and children to life in a German prison for propaganda reasons.¹⁶ After the Nantes reprisals, Otto von Stülpnagel issued new guidelines that disqualified women, children under the age of 18, and disabled or blind veterans from hostage lists.¹⁷ Carl-Heinrich also used ‘technical reasons’ to spare twenty-three lives in eight of the eighteen reprisal cases that he adjudicated as the chief legal military authority in France. While they used a variety of stratagems to reduce the number of hostage executions, both Otto and Carl-Heinrich authorized the deportation of substantial numbers of Jews and communists. Acting on orders from Berlin, Otto von Stülpnagel deported 1,500 Jews and communists in December 1941. His cousin sent another 3,600 Jews and communists ‘to the east’ in response to eight different incidents.¹⁸ In 1942, 43 transports carried 41,951 Jews and communists to death camps in eastern Europe. Deportations ordered by the MBF—5,100 in all—filled the first five trains to Auschwitz.¹⁹ Both Otto and Carl Heinrich von Stülpnagel played a part in the Final Solution. Most leading figures within the military administration understood the deadly consequences of deportation. In his letter of resignation, Otto von Stülpnagel questioned the wisdom of sending young Jews and communists to the east for ‘work duty’ (Arbeitsm¨assig) because he feared that prisoners might escape and create security problems. He could only maintain this ¹⁵ USNA, RG 242/T-501/165/400. ¹⁶ USNA, RG 242/T-77/1634/nfn (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, 14 n 16 WR (I/3)/351/41 g; Berlin den 8.5.41). Hitler’s restraint was limited to western Europe; see BALW, NS 19/2175/1–2. ¹⁷ BAMA, RW 35/308/30–34, 46. ¹⁸ BAMA, RW 35/542/73–82, 94–95, 100–104, 106–109, 111–114, 116–117. ¹⁹ Serge Klarsfeld, Vichy–Auschwitz: Le Rˆole de Vichy dans la solution finale de la question juive en France–1942 (Paris: Fayard, 1983), p. 41.

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interpretation by willfully ignoring the subtleties of the Nacht und Nebel Erlass and ominous rumors that circulated through the military administration in the fall of 1941. Nevertheless, Otto continued to favor deportations over mass shootings in his letter of resignation. Based on his experience as the commander of the 17th Army, Carl-Heinrich must have suspected and almost certainly knew what ‘deportation’ really meant. If he had any doubts, Reinhard Heydrich dispelled them during a visit to Paris on 6 May 1942. Both Otto and Carl-Heinrich von Stülpnagel muted their criticism of deportations as long as Himmler’s Black Corps did most of the dirty work.²⁰ While he was in charge of German reprisal policy, Carl-Heinrich occasionally consulted superiors in Berlin before announcing his response to a particular attack. Of the eighteen serious attacks that were carried out by resistance groups between February and May 1942, Carl-Heinrich spoke with superiors in OKH before announcing his response on six occasions. Consultation with political generals in Berlin reduced but did not eliminate Hitler’s interference. In three of the eighteen attacks, Hitler reduced the interval between the execution of the first and second contingents or raised the number of people to be executed and deported.²¹ Furthermore, CarlHeinrich did not oppose Hitler’s policy of massive reprisals and sweeping deportations in angry memoranda. The new MBF’s diplomatic approach reduced friction between Paris and Berlin. Methodical police work also began to produce arrests that, in turn, led to a number of highly publicized trials. The first major trial opened on 6 January 1942 in the Mus´ee de l’Homme before a German military tribunal. French lawyers described the process as ‘pleading for cadavers,’ but the court acquitted four defendants and sentenced another to six months in prison. The German judge in charge of the process, Captain Roskothen, sentenced the remaining ten defendants to death, but superiors later reduced three of the death sentences to deportation.²² Subsequent trials held in March and April followed a similar pattern: they lasted only a few days, convicted most but not all of the defendants, and male defendants found guilty of serious crimes were quickly executed. Almost all of the defendants had ²⁰ Bargatzky, Hotel Majestic, pp. 36, 96–109; USNA, RG 242/T–501/196/1138–1145; USNA, RG 242/T-501/165/433–440; Marrus and Paxton, Vichy France and the Jews, pp. 135, 219–220. ²¹ BAMA, RW 35/542/90–119. ²² Nogu`eres, Histoire de la R´esistance en France, vol. II, pp. 348–352. Dr. Ernst Roskothen served as an army lawyer in France and published a semi-fictional account of his experience in Gross-Paris, La Place de la Concorde (Bad Dürrheim: Kuhn, 1977).

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Figure 7.1. The Nazis spring a trap, 1944. Photograph courtesy of the Library of Congress.

some connection to the PCF, many were associated with the bataillons de la jeunesse, and some had committed multiple acts of resistance. The capture, trial, and execution of militant communists during the first half of 1942 retarded some of the most dynamic resistance groups.²³ German authorities used trials to demonstrate that foreigners and Jews stood behind most resistance activity, and the facts of all three cases supported their contention. The German interpretation failed to resonate with the bulk of the French public because the brief duration of all three trials obscured evidence that supported Germany’s interpretation of events.²⁴ Cameramen filmed the proceedings and newspapers carried detailed accounts of all three cases. The MBF’s propaganda division never released footage of the proceedings, and the verdicts only encouraged Jews, particularly those from Eastern Europe, to resist Nazi Germany because they ²³ Nogu`eres, Histoire de la R´esistance en France, vol. II, pp. 367–9, 415–417. ²⁴ Nogu`eres, Histoire de la R´esistance en France, vol. II, pp. 349–352, 367–370; Laborie, L’Opinion franc¸aise sous Vichy, pp. 253–256, 264–278.

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had nothing to lose.²⁵ In the short run, the military administration eliminated several important resistance leaders and validated Otto von Stülpnagel’s orthodox anti-partisan policy. From a longer-term perspective, German political leaders ultimately mishandled the proceedings. Abbreviated judicial proceedings appeared unconvincing and German reprisals seemed brutal and unjustified. Trials were a tactical victory but, at the same time, a strategic defeat. Statistical evidence collected by branches of the military administration continued to suggest a drop in serious resistance activity. While Carl-Heinrich remained in charge of security, the incidence of murder, espionage, sabotage, and illegal possession of a firearm continued to decline. Some of the dips may be linked to a decrease in the number of German policemen. As German forces became bogged down on the eastern front, the MBF had to dispatch elements of the military administration—including GFP officers—to the eastern front. German police forces stationed in France never surpassed 3,000 men and were dwarfed by 47,000 Frenchmen in the Gendarmerie alone. German policemen only accounted for a fraction of the law enforcement community in France.²⁶ French police officers worked well with their German counterparts and, according to the MBF, provided invaluable assistance.²⁷ The capture and execution of a few extraordinarily active militants probably also played an important part in reducing the overall incidence of serious resistance activity in 1942. Until labor deportations stirred up additional unrest, the ranks of major resistance groups would remain depleted. While Carl-Heinrich remained in charge of German police forces, resistance activity did not seriously impair the German army or the Nazi regime. Although he carried out orders without complaint and enjoyed some success, Stülpnagel lost control of German police forces on 1 June 1942. Hitler and Goebbels discussed the replacement of General von Falkenhausen, the ²⁵ Jacques Adler, The Jews of Paris and the Final Solution: Communal Response and Internal Conflicts, 1940–1944 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 165, 188–195; Courtois et al., Le Sang de l’´etranger, pp. 125–8, 143–170; Ren´ee Poznaski, ‘La R´esistance juive en France,’ Revue d’histoire de la Deuxi`eme Guerre Mondiale et des conflits contemporains, 137 (January 1985), 3–32. ²⁶ USNA, RG 242/T-120/3/396–397; BALW, R 70 Frankreich/13/7–14; USNA, RG 242/T-501/157/744–757; and USNA, RG 242/T-501/184/1045–1083. ²⁷ USNA, RG 242/T-501/144/65, 72–73, 185–189; Bernd Kasten, ‘Gute Franzosen.’ Die franz¨osische Polizei und die deutsche Besatzungsmacht im besetzten Frankreich 1940–1944 (Sigmaringen: Jan Thorbecke Verlag, 1993); Maurice Rajsfus, La Police de Vichy: les forces de l’ordre franc¸aises au service de la Gestapo, 1940/1944 (Paris: Le Cherche-Midi e´ diteur, 1995), pp. 217–261.

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after the fall Table 7.1 Arrests for serious resistance activity, October 1941–May 1942²⁸

Oct. 1941– Dec. 1941– Feb. 1942– Apr. 1942– Nov. 1941 Jan. 1942 Mar. 1942 May 1942 Murder or attempted murder Manslaughter Espionage Sabotage Unauthorized possession of a gun

14

7

4

7

0 30 124 870

1 28 119 604

4 19 114 579

0 15 68 357

MBB, at a 24 September 1941 meeting. After the Nantes and Bordeaux assassinations, Goebbels, Lammers, and other leading Nazis urged Hitler to replace military administrations in France and Belgium with civil governments controlled by reliable Nazis.²⁹ Military opposition to the confiscation of Jewish property and protests against Hitler’s reprisal policy suggested that neither the MBF nor the MBB could be trusted to carry out Germany’s racial agenda with the necessary ruthlessness. Apparently Hitler believed that the military administration had some value. Rather than installing a civil government modeled along the lines of the administrations in Poland or Denmark, the Führer left the military administration in place and transferred German reprisal policy to a Senior SS and Police leader (H¨oherer SSund Polizeiführer or HSSuPF) in France. A decree issued on 13 November 1937 had authorized Heinrich Himmler, the Reichsführer-SS und Chef der deutschen Polizei, to appoint an HSSuPF in each military district (Wehrkreis) of the Reich upon mobilization of the army. The HSSuPF coordinated the order police (Ordnungspolizei or Orpo) and security police (Sicherheitspolizei or Sipo) at a local level. By design, the decree did not specify the exact responsibilities of the new office and left the HSSuPF’s relationship with other branches of the Reich government and ²⁸ USNA, RG 242/T-501/143/1246 (October–November 1941), USNA, RG 242/T501/144/34–35 (December 1941–January 1942), 157–158 (February–March 1942), and 232–233 (April–May 1942). These numbers are limited to crimes that were prosecuted in German military courts. ²⁹ Fr¨ohlich (ed.), Die Tagebücher von Joseph Goebbels, vol. II, part 1, p. 485. Entry dated 24September 1941; DGFP, ser. D, vol. XIII, pp. 672–3.

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Wehrmacht subject to further instructions from Himmler. In practice, the authority of an HSSuPF varied from district to district; it usually depended on his relationship with Himmler and local circumstances. Once war broke out in 1939, Himmler appointed an HSSuPF to each military district within the Reich and later installed HSSuPFs in sections of Poland that were incorporated into the Reich and Hans Frank’s Generalgouvernement.³⁰ After the conquest of Western Europe, Hitler established civil governments in Norway and the Netherlands. Himmler quickly appointed an HSSuPF to both states. HSSuPFs arrived in conquered Soviet territory as German armies advanced further and further east. Areas in which Hitler had installed a military government did not receive HSSuPFs until early 1942, but their arrival did not necessarily indicate army–SS friction. Even though the military government in Serbia had far surpassed Keitel’s 16 September 1941 directive and was well on its way to annihilating all Serbian Jews, Himmler appointed an HSSuPF to the region on 22 January 1942.³¹ Otto von Stülpnagel’s resistance to draconian reprisals certainly encouraged Hitler and Himmler to insert an HSSuPF in France, but the advent of the Final Solution probably influenced their decision as well. Himmler’s authority derived from three basic titles: head of the SS (Reichsführer-SS), Chief of German Police (Chef der deutschen Polizei), and Reich Commissar for the Protection of German Blood (Reichskommissar für die Festigung deutschen Volkstums). The HSSuPF did not merely function as the top German cop in France; he served as Himmler’s personal representative and coordinated all SS activities within his jurisdiction. Racial and police missions of the HSSuPF complemented one another because they both targeted the same group: Jews. Furthermore, the HSSuPF’s arrival relieved the military administration of two onerous tasks: reprisals and racial cleansing or, in Nazi parlance, ‘Aryanization.’ Once empowered with executive authority, Himmler’s lieutenants could pursue SS racial goals and implement Hitler’s anti-partisan policy without regard ³⁰ Helmut Krausnick, Hans Buchheim, Martin Broszat and Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, Antatomy of the SS State, translated by Richard Barry, Marian Jackson, and Dorothy Long (New York: Walker and Company, 1968), pp. 213–214; Ruth Bettina Birn, Die H¨oheren SS- und Polizeifuhrer: Himmler’s Vetreter im Reich und in den besetzten Gebieten (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1986), pp 186–206. ³¹ Birn, Die H¨oheren SS und Polizeiführer, pp. 206–230, 238–249; Christopher Browning, ‘Wehrmacht reprisal policy and the murder of the male Jews in Serbia’ in Christopher Browning, Fateful Months: Essays on the Emergence of the Final Solution (New York: Homes & Meier, 1985), pp. 39–56; Walter Manoschek, ‘The extermination of the Jews in Serbia,’ in Ulrich Herbert (ed.), National Socialist Extermination Policies, pp. 163–185.

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for opposition from conservative military officers. As members of the old guard of the Nazi party who had Himmler’s complete trust, HSSuPFs were ideally suited to handle special projects like the Final Solution.³² Field Marshal Keitel welcomed the installation of an HSSuPF in France. After a contentious exchange with Otto von Stülpnagel on 23 January 1942, Keitel directed General Warlimont to consider ways of redistributing responsibilities for security and reprisals in France. OKW eventually decided to negotiate with Heydrich and the SS.³³ In mid-January, Admiral Canaris, the head of the Abwehr, met with Heydrich and Heinrich ‘Gestapo’ Müller, the head of the political police, to discuss counter-espionage responsibilities and other security issues. Canaris and Heydrich simply expanded the scope of their discussions to include the entire SS–Abwehr relationship. On 6 April, both organizations distributed a new set of principles, known as the ten commandments (Zehn Gebote), that established the jurisdiction of both agencies.³⁴ Under the 1942 Zehn Gebote, the SS expanded at the expense of the Abwehr and GFP. Military organizations limited their activities to protecting the armed forces and military installations from foreign agents. In contrast, the SS gained permission to collect intelligence on Germany’s opponents and pursue foreign agents throughout the territory controlled by the Reich. Heydrich also won the right to report on political and economic developments and could thus influence future German policy. Himmler’s right-hand man used his new authority to mount a concerted campaign against what he believed to be the usual agents of foreign espionage organizations: Jews and communists. Devout Nazis viewed counter-espionage operations as related to and integrally linked with Nazi racial goals.³⁵ Like Keitel, Canaris passed unsavory tasks to the SS. The SS expanded its brief to encompass all security measures—which included racial cleansing—in the Reich and occupied territories throughout Europe. The installation of a HSSuPF in France fitted within a general pattern of SS expansion and military retreat. ³² USNA, RG 242/T-501/172/482–484; Birn, Die H¨oheren SS- und Polizeiführer, pp. 18, 23, 106–112. ³³ Birn, Die H¨oheren SS und Polizeiführer, p. 250; BAMA, RW 5/690/39–43, 46–48; BAK, All. Proz. 21/Proc`es Oberg-Knochen/20; USNA, RG 242/T-175/140/2668340–2668345. ³⁴ BAMA, RW 5/690/21–23; USNA, RG 242/T-77/1513/635–639. ³⁵ USNA, RG 242/T-77/1513/555–569; BAMA, RW 5/690/58–67, 77–80.

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Himmler appointed Carl Albrecht Oberg to serve as the HSSuPF in France. Born in 1897, Oberg grew up in Hamburg where his father was as a physician. After receiving his Abitur in 1914, he joined the army, won the Iron Cross first and second class, and earned a battlefield commission before being demobilized in 1919. After spending three years in the free corps movement, Oberg settled down and married in 1923. For the remainder of the Weimar era, he worked as a paper salesman, private secretary, clerk, and tobacco store manager. He joined the Nazi party in 1931, entered the SS in 1932, and, after the Nazi seizure of power, went to work full-time for the personnel and organization division of the Reichsführer-SS Hauptamt in Berlin. Once the war broke out, he worked in Zwickau and later served as an SS Police Leader (SS- und Polizeiführer or SSuPF) in Radom (south of Warsaw) with the SS rank of Brigadeführer.³⁶ As an HSSuPF, Oberg had considerable authority. He received orders from and answered directly to Himmler—Oberg did not have to take orders from Heydrich or RSHA. In theory, the MBF could ‘direct’ the operations of the HSSuPF, but this authority amounted to little in practice. General von Stülpnagel could only issue binding orders during a military emergency, and his subordinates had even less influence. If a local or regional military commander wanted to make a request to his opposite number in the SS, his wishes had to travel up the military chain of command to the MBF, who would discuss the matter with the HSSuPF, and then a subsequent decision would return down the separate military and SS channels.³⁷ If the MBF disagreed with the HSSuPF, the dispute would be resolved by Keitel and Himmler in Berlin. Given Keitel’s pusillanimous nature and OKW’s record of not supporting field commanders, this safeguard offered little protection. Hitler issued orders that installed an HSSuPF in France on 9 March 1942, and the MBF clarified the Führer’s general guidelines in a series of regulations that were released just before Oberg formally assumed his post on 1 June. Carl-Heinrich von Stülpnagel insisted upon close Army–SS ³⁶ Birn, Die H¨oheren SS- und Polizeifuhrer, p. 341; USNA, RG 153/144 (War Crimes Branch)/Box 5/Folder 100–197/nfn (Oberg’s P.I.R. file); Ulrich Lappenküper, ‘Der ‘‘Schl¨achter von Paris’’: Carl-Albrecht Oberg als H¨oherer SS- und Polizeiführer in Frankreich 1942–1944,’ in Stefan Martens and Maurice Vaïsse (eds.), Frankreich und Deutschland im Krieg (November 1942–Herbst 1944): Okkupation, Kollaboration, R´esistance (Bonn: Bouvier Verlag, 2000), pp. 129–143. ³⁷ BALW, R 70 Frankreich/13/53–56.

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cooperation and would not allow ongoing police investigations to be interrupted. He told his subordinates, specifically the police and justice divisions of the military administration, to turn over all information relating to ongoing cases and demanded a seamless transition. Stülpnagel surpassed the terms of Hitler’s 9 March order that placed both French and German police forces under the HSSuPF’s control and transferred responsibility for the oversight of French political organizations, unions, and youth organizations to Oberg’s lieutenants. The SS also took charge of foreigners interned by the French or German governments and handled cases of sabotage and assassination throughout the occupied zone. According to Hitler’s 9 March order and the Zehn Gebote, the MBF could only investigate cases of espionage aimed at military installations and military personnel.³⁸ Furthermore, the HSSuPF’s subordinate, the Commander of the Security Police and SD in France (Befehlshaber der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD or BdS), relieved the MBF of his ‘reporting duty’ (Meldepflicht). The ability to describe and interpret the situation in France had helped the MBF fend off criticism from the Paris embassy after the Nantes and Bordeaux assassinations in the fall of 1941. Without authority to send official reports to superiors in Berlin, the MBF lost the ability to frame events in a manner that favored the military administration. If he could not explain his perspective to the political and military leadership of the Reich, the MBF could not effectively defend what little authority he and his military administration still possessed. To make matters worse, the duty of interpreting French affairs passed to Helmut Knochen, the long-time SS commander in France. Otto von Stülpnagel had requested Knochen’s recall after the BdS submitted a patently false report on synagogue bombings in October 1941. Not only did the military lose an important weapon in the war against rival German agencies, but the tool fell into the hands of a dedicated anti-Semite who did not share the MBF’s sense of restraint. After Oberg arrived in mid-1942, the MBF could only comment on economic affairs. Although Hitler’s 9 March 1942 order gave him control over all ‘sanctions’ and ‘countermeasures’ (Vorbeugungs- und Sühnemassnahmen), the HSSuPF did not freeze the military administration out of all security matters. Regional and local branches of the military administration retained the right to impose fines, prohibitions, and curfews. They continued to ³⁸ USNA, RG 242/T-501/172/441, 453–454.

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organize the local population into guard detachments that would protect lines of communication and patrol the border between unoccupied France and Franco’s Spain. Both Oberg and Stülpnagel expected the military administration and SS to work together with regard to mundane security matters, but the SS retained exclusive control of the French police and oversaw major investigations.³⁹ The HSSuPF realized that he did not have the resources to fulfill all of his missions on his own, and gradually ceded control of minor security concerns back to the military administration.⁴⁰ To further extend his authority and overcome personnel shortages, Oberg tried to issue orders directly to GFP and Abwehr units that were already assigned to the military administration. Admiral Canaris, the man ultimately in charge of the Abwehr and GFP, refused to place military personnel under SS jurisdiction. From his office in Berlin, Canaris effectively blocked Oberg’s incursion and avoided a precedent that could endanger the independence of the entire Wehrmacht. Keitel supported Canaris’s general strategy but did not dare to flagrantly oppose Himmler. He eventually negotiated an agreement with the SS that disbanded most GFP groups in France. The SS, in turn, immediately drafted the demobilized members of the GFP into the Black Corps. Younger agents were sent to the eastern front while older policemen returned to France for service in the Sicherheitspolizei under the command of Helmut Knochen. Few escaped the clutches of the SS.⁴¹ General Carl-Heinrich von Stülpnagel and SS-Brigadeführer Oberg worked well together and forged a series of agreements that established the respective tasks and responsibilities of the SS and military administration before the HSSuPF formally assumed his post. During this delicate process, neither referred a dispute to higher authorities in Berlin. After the October 1941 synagogue bombings, Otto von Stülpnagel banned all SS personnel from the Hotel Majestic. In contrast, Oberg frequently visited Carl-Heinrich and coordinated policy with the military administration whenever circumstances dictated. The two men had served in the same ³⁹ USNA, RG 242/T-501/172/482–484. ⁴⁰ UNSA, RG 242/T-77/1634/folder 12/nfn (MBF Verwaltungsstab–Abt. Verwaltung, 31Mai 1942, Az. V in 100/1/1400/42g.); BALW, R 70 Frankreich/12/1–4. ⁴¹ BALW, R 58/861/fiche 2/54–55; USNA, RG 338/Foreign Military Studies/Fiche 0027/FMS number C-029, ‘The secret field police’ by Wilhelm Kirchbaum; Klaus Gessner, Geheime Feldpolizei (Berlin: Milit¨arverlag der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 1986), pp. 65–9.

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regiment during World War One, and this common bond may have helped them maintain cordial relations during the Occupation.⁴² Hitler’s 9 March 1942 directive allowed Oberg to issue instructions to various branches of the French police forces, but the Führer did not define the precise relationship between the Vichy regime and the HSSuPF. In order to clarify matters, Oberg won the right to negotiate directly with Vichy. He did not have to work through the German embassy in Paris or a military liaison officer. With an open channel to the very highest echelons of the French government and almost unlimited power as the head of German security forces in France, Oberg could play a decisive role in Franco-German relations. The Vichy government heard about Oberg’s appointment in April 1942.⁴³ On 5 May, Reinhard Heydrich flew to Paris and introduced the new HSSuPF to French officials. On the same day that they arrived, Oberg and Heydrich spoke with Fernand de Brinon, Vichy’s representative in Paris, and Louis Darquier de Pellepoix, the new Commissioner-General for Jewish Affairs (Commissaire-g´en´eral aux questions juives or CGQJ) in SS offices on l’avenue Foch.⁴⁴ Leaders of the military administration met Oberg at a dinner held in the Ritz hotel that same night, and Ren´e Bousquet discussed police business with the two senior SS officers the next morning: 6 May 1942. The meeting with Bousquet, who Laval had appointed the Secretary-General of the Police (Secr´etariat-g´en´eral a` la Police) in the Ministry of the Interior, lasted over two hours and explored how French and German policemen would work together.⁴⁵ Hitler’s 9 March 1942 order installing an HSSuPF in France allowed Oberg to ‘supervise and issue instructions to French authorities and police forces. He is responsible for the employment of the French police in the occupied zone.’ In other words, the Führer granted Oberg control of French police forces in occupied France.⁴⁶ Since the Occupation ⁴² Wilhelm von Schramm, Conspiracy Among Generals, translated by R. T. Clark (New York: Scribner and Sons, 1956), pp. 125, 143, 169; BAK, All. Proz. 21/Proc`es Oberg-Knochen/33, 35. ⁴³ USNA, RG 242/T-77/1624/folder 3/45–48; USNA, RG 242/T-120/2398/E209343– E290347. ⁴⁴ Corinna Franz, Fernand de Brinon und die deutsch–franzoesischen Beziehungen, 1918–1945 (Bonn: Bouvier Verlag, 2000); Gilbert Joseph, Fernand de Brinon: L’Aristocrate de la collaboration (Paris: Albin Michel, 2002); Marrus and Paxton, Vichy France and the Jews, pp. 283–293. ⁴⁵ Pascale Froment, Ren´e Bousquet (Paris: Stock, 1994), pp. 200–204, 207–213. ⁴⁶ BALW, R 70 Frankreich/13/53–56.

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Figure 7.2. Prime Minister Laval (left) and HSSuPF Oberg (centre), 1 May 1943. Photograph courtesy of the Bundesarchiv, Bild 183-H25719.

had begun in 1940, the Vichy regime consistently tried to preserve the principle of French sovereignty by using French authorities to carry out German policies. Both Laval and Admiral Darlan tried to reinforce the precedent that French bureaucrats and the Vichy government ruled France. By doing so, they hoped to block German penetration of the French bureaucracy and prevent the gradual break-up of France. The arrival of Oberg and his mandate to supervise French police endangered Vichy’s control over its own police force and, by extension, French sovereignty. Secretary-General Bousquet certainly understood the basic policy of the Vichy government. During his meeting with Oberg and Heydrich on 6 May, Bousquet tried to persuade Himmler’s lieutenants to stop reprisal executions, preserve Vichy’s sovereignty, and get all German policemen to work with French counterparts through official channels. Like Laval, the Secretary-General of French Police wanted to keep ultra-collaborationists such as Marcel D´eat out of the official decision-making process and block

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unauthorized collaboration between local French and German officials. In return, he offered to share information and cooperate with German policemen.⁴⁷ Given the severe shortage of trained policemen, RSHA could not afford to send additional SS officers to France and closely supervise French police forces.⁴⁸ At a dinner held in the Hotel Majestic during his visit, Heydrich told the MBF and 50–60 MVW officials in attendance that he did not intend to use ‘eastern methods’ in France. He explained that hostage executions demonstrated Germany’s weakness and had to be curtailed. Instead, Heydrich planned to enlist the French police in Germany’s struggle against communists and terrorists who were attacking German forces.⁴⁹ Heydrich and Bousquet were prepared to make some accommodations. Heydrich’s assassination on 29 May disrupted Franco-German talks, and Oberg needed time to settle into his new position once he was formally installed on 1 June 1942.⁵⁰ Eager to resume negotiations, Bousquet sent a note to Oberg on 18 June. The HSSuPF conferred with superiors in Berlin, diplomats attached to the German embassy in Paris, and the MBF before replying on 23 July. Oberg congratulated Bousquet on the ‘commendable’ performance of the French police and outlined measures to further increase their effectiveness.⁵¹ The new HSSuPF offered to provide better weapons, permitted the opening of a school to train police officers, and allowed the French police autonomy as long as they followed German directives. In return, Oberg expected Bousquet to maintain law and order throughout France, share all intelligence, and collaborate closely with the SS. Bousquet’s 18 June letter offered to collaborate against ‘anarchism, communism, and terrorism,’ but Oberg’s 23 July reply tried to expand this definition to include ‘all enemies of the Reich.’⁵² Bousquet recognized that Oberg’s reply inflated the scope of FrancoGerman collaboration. On 29 July, the Secretary-General asked Oberg to ⁴⁷ Kasten, Gute Franzosen, pp. 70–71; Froment, Ren´e Bousquet, pp. 162–3, 174–188, 205. ⁴⁸ BALW, R 19 (Ordnungspolizei)/97/55. ⁴⁹ BAK, All. Proz. 21/217/455–457; Luther, Der franz¨osische Widerstand, p. 214. ⁵⁰ Froment, Ren´e Bousquet, pp. 205, 214–217; Kasten, Gute Franzosen, pp. 69–73. ⁵¹ Klarsfeld, Vichy–Auschwitz, 1942, pp. 209–213; Oberg’s congratulations probably referred to the Vel d’Hiv round-ups carried out by the French police in the middle of July. Bousquet and Laval may have authorized the raids to demonstrate French reliability. ⁵² USNA, RG 242/T-120/2398/E209364–E209367; Kasten, Gute Franzosen, p. 72.

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specify the duties and responsibilities of the French police. He once again offered to pursue anarchists, terrorists, and communists because all three groups jeopardized order and endangered Germany. Bousquet volunteered to hunt down Vichy’s opponents and did not mind collaborating with German forces against common enemies, but he did not want to give the HSSuPF a blank check to use the French police however he wished. In Bousquet’s opinion, Franco-German collaboration should be limited to civil matters revolving around the maintenance of order. He did not want to get the French involved in ‘purely military affairs’ that were the exclusive domain of the HSSuPF.⁵³ Oberg unveiled his final offer during a lunch meeting on 8 August 1942 in his private apartment on the boulevard Lannes. Before a small group of prefects and senior police officials, the HSSuPF promised to issue instructions through the French administration and preserve the illusion of French sovereignty. He also agreed to leave the French police out of the reprisal process and assured the assembled officials that ‘people arrested by them [the French police] would not be the object of reprisals ordered by German authorities.’ In return, the French would have to cooperate in the repression of the Reich’s enemies and specifically listed ‘communists, terrorists, and saboteurs.’⁵⁴ In the mind of every dedicated SS officer, these latter three groups certainly included racial opponents of the Nazi regime. The French delegation retired to offices on the rue de Monceau to review the HSSuPF’s offer. Unfamiliar with SS duplicity, Bousquet told colleagues that the accord was a binding declaration that limited German demands and French collaboration. He believed that the agreement allowed the French considerable autonomy and stopped French participation in German reprisals. After some discussion, the rest of the French delegation concurred. Oberg viewed the accord in a rather different light. He later described the Oberg–Bousquet accords as an unsigned ‘gentleman’s agreement’ that outlined Franco-German collaboration. Articles of the Oberg–Bousquet accord obliged French policemen to support and protect the German army but placed few limits on the demands that Germany could make in return. Exploiting Bousquet’s naïvet´e, Oberg expanded the scope of collaboration ⁵³ Klarsfeld, Vichy–Auschwitz: 1942, pp. 297–300; BAK, All. Proz. 21/209/407–411. ⁵⁴ BAK, All. Proz. 21/209/415–417.

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to include the deportation of Jews and pushed France further down the slippery slope of collaboration.⁵⁵ Behind closed doors, Oberg outlined comparatively moderate security policies to Secretary-General Bousquet and representatives of the Vichy regime. In public, however, the new HSSuPF described a different course. On 10 July, posters throughout Paris congratulated the majority of Frenchmen and women who continued to go about their daily business despite assassinations, sabotage, and other provocations carried out by English and Soviet agents. As a reward, Oberg guaranteed peace and quiet to the populace. Toward this end, he announced a new policy of repression that was aimed at the relatives of resistance fighters. If families did not turn in relatives who had attacked the German army within ten days of the original crime, the HSSuPF threatened to execute all siblings and cousins over 18 years of age. Female relatives would be deported to Germany for an undetermined sentence of forced labor, and children would be sent to reform schools.⁵⁶ While reprisals ordered by the MBF tried to target ideological fellow-travelers and ‘criminal associates,’ the HSSuPF embraced a policy of blatant terror by striking at the family members of resistance fighters. The German embassy in Paris did not oppose the method outlined in Oberg’s 10 July announcement, and distributed versions of his policy to the French press. It considered the people who stood behind sabotage and assassinations to be ruthless and undeserving of mercy. Initial assassinations carried out by resistance groups violated the laws of war and warranted German reprisals. A diplomat attached to the embassy argued that ‘destruction of an insidious adversary must be the only principle guiding German countermeasures.’ Both the embassy and the HSSuPF judged Allied protests that were based on ‘humanitarian phraseology’ to be the height of hypocrisy. They considered Germany to be just as brutal as their Allied opponents, but took solace in the honesty of the Reich’s candor.⁵⁷ Two well-known attacks forced the HSSuPF to reconcile public threats with private assurances made to Bousquet. On 5 August 1942, unknown ‘terrorists’ tossed hand grenades at a group of German airmen jogging around a Parisian athletic field. G¨oring and Hugo Sperrle, the local Luftwaffe commander, immediately demanded sharp reprisals. Under considerable ⁵⁵ Froment, Ren´e Bousquet, pp. 217–221; Kasten, Gute Franzosen, pp. 71–3; Paxton, Vichy France, pp. 131–5; BAK, All. Proz. 21/209/407. ⁵⁶ BAK, All. Proz. 21/217/465. ⁵⁷ USNA, RG 242/T-120/2398/E209360–E209363.

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political pressure from a rival paladin, Himmler directed Oberg to execute a total of ninety-three prisoners or three Frenchmen for each German killed and two Frenchmen for each German wounded. On 11 August, the SS shot eighty-eight prisoners who were suspected of being associated with a terrorist group to satisfy the Luftwaffe’s thirst for revenge.⁵⁸ Fifty-seven of the victims had been arrested by the French police and had not committed a crime against the German army.⁵⁹ The HSSuPF had waited a mere three days to violate terms of the Oberg–Bousquet accords. A group linked to the Francs Tireurs et Partisans/Mouvement Ouvrier International (FTP/MOI) carried out another attack on 19 September 1942. The Valmy cell—named after the 20 September 1792 battle that stemmed a counter-revolutionary invasion—exploded a bomb in the ‘Rex’ movie theater and claimed fifty-eight casualties. Although bloody, the attack did not cause an immediate sensation. German personnel in Paris had become accustomed to resistance activity and had adapted to the hostile atmosphere.⁶⁰ The HSSuPF ordered the immediate execution of 116 hostages (70 imprisoned in Bordeaux and 46 held in Romainville, just outside Paris), placed all theaters and cinemas off limits to Frenchmen, and imposed a strict curfew in the Seine, Seine-et-Oise, and Seine-et-Marne d´epartements. Why the HSSuPF chose hostages from the Romainville and Bordeaux prisons remains unclear. The decision represented a break with the MBF’s policy which called for the execution of hostages from the same region as the original attack. The Valmy group operated in metropolitan Paris, had about thirty-five members, and carried out thirty-one attacks between 29 July 1941 and 16 October 1942 before being broken up by French and German policemen. A large supply of communist prisoners in Bordeaux and Romainville may have influenced Oberg’s decision, or he may have thought the random nature of the executions (as opposed to always using ‘local’ hostages) would make his countermeasures even more terrible and therefore more effective.⁶¹ ⁵⁸ USNA, RG 242/T-120/1854/E040540–E040543; Luther, Der franz¨osische Widerstand, p.217. Numbers of dead and wounded come from Luther but do not match diplomatic reports that list 4 dead, 10 seriously injured, 19 lightly injured, 7 ambulatory cases, and 1 nervous breakdown. ⁵⁹ Froment, Ren´e Bousquet, p. 222. ⁶⁰ BAK, All. Proz. 21/217/301–303, 315; Luther, Der franz¨osische Widerstand, pp. 217–219. ⁶¹ IMT , vol. XXXVII, pp. 190–199; USNA, RG 242/T-175/129/2655204–2655206; BAK, All. Proz. 21/217/343–349, 537–541.

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Between 1 June 1942 and the liberation of France in the fall of 1944, the HSSuPF executed 254 hostages in response to 3 dramatic assassinations.⁶² In contrast, Otto and Carl-Heinrich von Stülpnagel ordered the execution of 471 hostages while they served as the MBF.⁶³ Statistics suggest that the HSSuPF followed a more moderate reprisal policy than his military counterparts, but these numbers are deceptive: several factors belie alleged SS moderation. First, the MBF controlled all hostage executions, recorded the entire hostage process, and publicized reprisals in order to ‘teach’ Frenchmen that resistance did not pay. Neither methodical nor exacting, the HSSuPF allowed local and regional subordinates to carry out reprisals on their own accord and preferred not to leave a paper trail. Oberg did not know about all reprisal actions carried out by subordinates and did not report every incident to superiors in Berlin. While the MBF used reprisals to impress the folly of resistance upon the French public, the SS used hostage executions to liquidate enemies. By design, the HSSuPF did not control, record, or publicize hostage executions.⁶⁴ Second, the HSSuPF had more reprisal options than either of his military counterparts. In addition to reprisal executions, the HSSuPF could arrest hostages under the Nacht und Nebel Erlass and count the subsequent deportations as equivalent to hostage executions. Keitel issued the Nacht und Nebel Erlass on 7 December 1941 while Otto von Stülpnagel remained in charge of the military administration, but the MBF could not take advantage of the alternative policy. Transportation shortages aggravated by the Soviet winter offensive and troop movements prevented the deportation of substantial numbers of Frenchmen that would be necessary to satisfy Hitler. Oberg’s arrival coincided with an improvement in the transportation situation. The HSSuPF could substitute deportations for hostage executions, but the former could be just as deadly as the latter and, when carried out in accordance with Hitler’s wishes, targeted the same people: Jews. During ⁶² For the third case, the assassination of Julius Ritter on 10 September 1943, see Luther, Der franz¨osische Widerstand, pp. 219–220 and Froment, Ren´e Bousquet, p. 415. For the total number of hostage executions carried out by the HSSuPF, see Luther, Der franz¨osische Widerstand, pp.269–274; Umbreit, Der Milit¨arbefehlshaber in Frankreich 1940–1944, pp. 140–146. ⁶³ BAMA, RW 35/542/120. ⁶⁴ Birn, Die H¨oheren SS- und Polizeiführur, pp. 91–3, 106–131; IMT , vol. VI, pp. 383–4. Nogu`eres, Histoire de la R´esistance en France, vols. 3 and 4 mention additional reprisal executions that are not described by Luther, HSSuPF records, or military archives.

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the Occupation, German authorities deported at least 6,639 people under the Nacht und Nebel Erlass.⁶⁵ Hitler also made the HSSuPF’s job a bit easier by releasing the socalled Commando Order. Issued in October 1942, the decree ordered subordinates to not take enemy commandos prisoner, even if they were caught wearing a uniform and bearing weapons openly. Officers who mistakenly took prisoners were to turn commandos over to the SD immediately, and the Führer threatened to prosecute officers who did not follow his directive with dereliction of duty to drive his point home.⁶⁶ Fearful of Allied reprisals against captured soldiers and downed pilots, the military hesitated to carry out the Commando Order and regularly issued ‘clarifications’ that distinguished combatants who could be treated as prisoners of war from guerrillas who were subject to the Commando Order. The Führer preferred an expansive definition of a commando, but enthusiasm for his interpretation decreased as one approached the front.⁶⁷ SD agents usually operated in rear areas, ran little risk of falling into enemy hands, and volunteered to take captured Allied commandos off the Wehrmacht’s hands.⁶⁸ The Commando Order allowed the SS to shoot partisans without a trial, reduced the need for damaging public executions, and did not create a paper trail. On 30 June 1942, Himmler installed an SS police court in France.⁶⁹ The new judiciary supplemented military courts-martial and could also be used to prosecute members of the French resistance. While in charge of German police forces, the military administration followed traditional rules of military justice. Trials of people who were accused of resistance activity in early 1942 followed rules set forth in the Milit¨argesetzbuch. SS courts, particularly if short of judicial personnel, may not have been so meticulous. The SS adopted a modified version of the military legal system and could certainly use abbreviated procedures set forth in the KStVO and KSSVO. Using a truncated legal code, SS courts were staffed with dedicated National-Socialists who could handle French criminals in a way ⁶⁵ Luther, Der franz¨osische Widerstand, p. 136; Umbreit, Der Militarbefehlshaber in Frankreich 1940–1944, p. 145. ⁶⁶ USNA, RG 242/T-77/1430/168–171, 176–182; Blood, Hitler’s Bandit Hunters, pp. 81–3. ⁶⁷ USNA, RG 242/T-77/1428/797, 869–870, 1010–1012. ⁶⁸ USNA, RG 242/T-77/1428/812–813. ⁶⁹ USNA, RG 242/T-580/95/nfn (Der RFSS, Hauptamt SS-Gericht, II/203/265, Tgb. 695/42, München den 8/7/42); Krausnick et al., Anatomy of the SS State, pp. 248–254.

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that was bound to satisfy both Himmler and Hitler; they also provided a fourth way to liquidate alleged terrorists away from the public eye.⁷⁰ Fifth, the Reichsführer-SS and his lieutenants did not have a zealous rival driving them toward extreme measures. While the MBF remained in charge of security and reprisals during the first half of the Occupation, SS critics in Paris and Nazis in Berlin condemned the MBF’s moderation. Who would dare accuse the head of the SS of being soft on enemies of the Reich? Certainly not Carl-Heinrich von Stülpnagel or Wilhelm Keitel. Like his military predecessors, Himmler depended upon support from the French police and could not afford to shoot thousands of Frenchmen after the death of a few German soldiers. Without a deadly political rival standing over his shoulder, Oberg enjoyed more leeway than his military predecessors.⁷¹ Hitler specifically ordered hostage executions in at least seven of the thirty major sabotage and assassination cases that were handled by the military administration. After the 5 August 1942 grenade attack, Himmler—not Hitler—ordered Oberg to shoot ninety-three hostages. With the trustworthy Reichsführer-SS in charge of sabotage countermeasures, Hitler may not have felt compelled to monitor resistance activity or German reprisals. The Führer allowed Himmler and the SS a degree of latitude that would never have been awarded to an army officer. Himmler functioned as a buffer between the HSSuPF and the Führer. Oberg further reduced the need for executions by not reporting every incident of sabotage to superiors in Berlin.⁷² If Hitler and Himmler did not know about a particular attack, they could not order draconian reprisals. After the liberation of France, the French government estimated that 29,660 Frenchmen had been shot as hostages during World War Two, but the French government used an expansive definition of ‘hostage’ (otage) and included people shot by the regular army and SS units as Germany retreated in the fall of 1944. Statistics compiled by the MBF and HSSuPF indicate that German police forces executed about 725 French hostages, but German data does not include thousands of prisoners deported under the Nacht und ⁷⁰ BALW, R 58/642/1–9; Wüllner, Die NS-Milit¨arjustiz und das Elend der Geschichtsschreibung, pp. 298–9. ⁷¹ USNA, RG 242/T-501/184/1045–1083, especially p. 1070. ⁷² BAMA, RW 35/542/40–120, particularly cases 5, 6, 7, 9, 13, 16, and 19; Birn, Die H¨oheren SS- und Polizeiführer, p. 256; J¨ackel, France dans l’Europe de Hitler, pp. 282–4.

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Nebel Erlass, executions carried out by junior SS commands, or Frenchmen shot by the regular army in the final weeks of the Occupation. French and German accounts struggle to distinguish dubious hostage executions from shooting of unlawful combatants who had violated the rules of war. Political considerations and problems associated with memory undermine statistical surveys carried out immediately after the war. A recent summary of available data suggests that a total of about 20,000 French men and women perished during the Occupation. If anti-partisan operations during the final months of the Occupation and summary executions carried out by the regular army as it retreated toward Germany claimed approximately 12–14,000 French lives, then approximately 6,000–8,000 French men and women perished through hostage executions, deportations, and equivalent measures ordered by the MBF and HSSuPF. Atrocities carried out by the field army during the liberation of France probably accounted for the bulk of French casualties, but this should not obscure or excuse the lethal nature of army and SS reprisal policies.⁷³ ⁷³ IMT , vol. XXXVII, p. 212; Lieb, Konventioneller Krieg oder NS Weltanschauungskrieg, pp.289–299, 412–415.

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8 Defamation, discrimination, and despoliation

Before 1942, the fortunes of war clearly favored the Axis powers on the continent of Europe. German victories in Poland (September 1939), Norway (April 1940), France (June 1940), Yugoslavia (April 1941), Greece (April 1941), and Crete (May 1941) overshadowed the ‘miracle at Dunkirk’ and Britain’s successful defense of the skies over London. Winston Churchill recognized Great Britain’s grim situation when he exclaimed that ‘[w]ars are not won by evacuations.’¹ The 22 June 1941 invasion of the Soviet Union inaugurated another round of Axis triumphs. German soldiers captured 324,000 Soviet troops around Minsk (9 July), 310,000 near Smolensk (5 August), 665,000 in Kiev (26 September), and 663,000 in Vyazma/Bryansk (10 October).² Allied troops fared somewhat better in North Africa. Italian forces occupied sections of northwestern Egypt in September 1940, but Mussolini’s success evaporated after British forces liberated Egypt, captured 130,000 prisoners, and seized portions of Italian Libya by February 1941. In conjunction with Italian troops, the newly arrived German Africa Corps invaded Egypt during the spring and summer of 1941, but Axis forces were themselves forced to retreat in January 1942.³ ¹ Churchill quoted in Horne, To Lose a Battle, p. 554. ² John Lucas, War on the Eastern Front: The German Soldier in Russia 1941–1945 (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1979), p. 176; R. H. S. Stolfi, Hitler’s Panzers East: World War Two Reinterpreted (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), pp. 192–3; Glantz and House, When Titans Clashed, pp. 49–87; John Erickson, The Road to Stalingrad (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1975), pp. 101–248. ³ Weinberg, A World At Arms, pp. 264–299; Parker, Struggle for Survival, pp. 106–114.

defamation, discrimination, and despoliation

Allied defensive stands in late 1941 marked the end of the beginning of World War Two—a stage punctuated by dramatic Axis victories and humiliating Allied retreats—and introduced a period during which both sides experienced mixed results. Hitler responded to new conditions with characteristic aggression. After learning about the 7 December 1941 Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the Führer rushed back to Berlin and declared war on the United States because a ‘great power does not allow itself to be declared war upon; it declares war on others.’⁴ Hitler could embark on a policy of total war without fear of political repercussions because all of the Great Powers had joined either the Axis or the Allied cause. In response to the December 1941 Soviet counter-offensive, Hitler fired dozens of generals, reorganized the German chain of command, and adopted new policies. During the height of the Soviet attack, both field commanders and Army High Command asked Hitler, the head of Armed Forces High Command (OKW) since 1938, for permission to retreat. Characterizing such requests as defeatist, the Führer replaced Gerd von Rundstedt, Fedor von Bock, and other pessimistic generals with reliable Nazis like Walther von Reichenau or opportunistic commanders such as Hans Günther von Kluge. Second, Hitler accepted Field Marshal von Brauchitsch’s resignation on 19 December 1941 and assumed direct control of Army High Command (OKH). The Führer replaced doubters with obedient soldiers and concentrated power in his own hands.⁵ In addition to personnel changes, Hitler instituted new policies to deal with changing circumstances. As German forces became bogged down on the eastern front, the Führer ordered a ruthless crackdown on all resistance activity. OKW’s 16 September 1941 directive ordered military commanders to answer sabotage and espionage with death. The 7 December 1941 Night and Fog decree (Nacht und Nebel Erlass) meted out ‘special treatment’ to real and imagined partisans, Jews, and communists. Toward the end of 1942, Hitler instructed the army to offer no quarter to commandos, even when unconventional soldiers qualified as lawful combatants according to the laws of war. By 1945, OKW considered renouncing the Hague and Geneva conventions so that Germany could fight without any sense of ⁴ Gerhard L. Weinberg, Germany, Hitler, and World War II (New York: Cambridge, 1995), pp. 194–204. Ribbentrop uttered the quote, but it certainly reflected Hitler’s point of view. ⁵ Megargee, Inside Hitler’s High Command, pp. 142–169, 160–161.

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restraint.⁶ As fortune turned against Germany, Hitler championed ever more ruthless measures. Nazi ideology links deadly anti-partisan measures to the so-called Final Solution of the Jewish Question (die Endl¨osung der Judenfrage). Long before the Nazi party gained control of the German state, Adolf Hitler believed that Jews exercised a disproportionate influence on European society. In the Führer’s mind, all of Germany’s problems could be traced back to malevolent Jews, and the ‘question’ was how to eliminate Jewish influence in Germany and Europe. Nazi lieutenants proposed a range of solutions including, but not limited to, despoliation, sterilization, resettlement within a greater German Reich, and enforced emigration.⁷ The outbreak of war in 1939, continued British resistance, and military setbacks in December 1941 eliminated compulsory emigration, resettlement in Madagascar, and deportation to Siberia as viable options. SS experiments proved sterilization to be slow and inefficient. Increasing resistance behind the eastern front seemed to underline the danger of the alleged Jewish conspiracy, so something had to be done. At some time in 1941, senior Nazi leaders settled upon the Final Solution (die Endl¨osung) or outright murder of all European Jews as the definitive ‘answer’ to the so-called Jewish Question and the problem of resistance.⁸ Changes instituted in the wake of the 1941 Soviet counter-offensive removed people and isolated institutions that had previously impeded Hitler’s racial policy: 1941 marked a major turning point in World War Two. The arrival of new leadership transformed the German military government in France. Following his own predilection and Keitel’s advice, Hitler installed the apparently compliant Carl-Heinrich von Stülpnagel as MBF on 16 February 1942. One month later, Colonel Hans Otfried von Linstow superseded Hans Speidel as the MBF’s Chief of Staff. Neither Linstow nor Carl-Heinrich von Stülpnagel could block Hitler’s anti-partisan policy or obstruct the Final Solution because SS-Brigadeführer Carl Oberg, a member of the Nazi party since 1931, assumed control of German security forces in France.⁹ Older generals inculcated with the values of the Imperial Army gave way to younger men who identified with the goals of the Nazi ⁶ USNA, RG 242/T-77/1430/168–172, 176–182; USNA, RG 242/T-77/1429/245–257. ⁷ Ian Kershaw, The Nazi Dictatorship: Problems and Perspectives of Interpretation, 3rd edn. (New York: Arnold, 1993), pp. 80–107. ⁸ Browning, Fateful Months, pp. 8–38. ⁹ BAMA, RW 5/690/39–45.

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regime. With Oberg in charge of security and the military administration handicapped by what appeared to be timid leadership, Hitler had reason to expect a vigorous campaign against communists, partisans, and Jews. Hitler also reorganized the military hierarchy in Western Europe to account for Allied progress and an increased emphasis on racial policy. In March 1942, Field Marshal von Rundstedt replaced Erwin von Witzleben as the head of Army Group D, a skeleton command in charge of active army units in western Europe. Over the next several months, OKW transformed Army Group D into the supreme command for German forces in the west (Oberbefehlshaber West or Ob West). The command oversaw the military government in Belgium (MBB), the MBF in the originally occupied portion of France, and the rump of Army Group D in the newly occupied portion of the Hexagon.¹⁰ After Hitler created Ob West, neither the MBF nor the MBB had direct access to Hitler, OKW, or OKH. The new structure insulated the highest echelons of the German armed forces from cantankerous subordinates who disagreed with Nazi methods and policy. In response to the Allied invasion of North Africa, Axis troops occupied southern France on 11 November 1942. Rather than expanding the MBF’s jurisdiction, Hitler designated the newly occupied zone as an ‘operational area,’ and placed it under the control of Army Group D and Ob West. OKW expected General von Stülpnagel’s staff to provide technical expertise but explicitly forbade the installation of a military government.¹¹ Hitler’s penchant for complicated command structures did not extend to the SS. The same 16 November 1942 order that placed the newly occupied zone under Army Group D allowed Oberg to expand his brief throughout France. The HSSuPF simply opened new offices in Limoges, Vichy, Lyon, Marseille, Montpellier, and Toulouse. Although suspicious of conservative generals and ‘the spirit of Zossen,’ the Führer tolerated centralized police networks under SS control. Personnel and structural changes introduced in December 1941 cleared the path for the Final Solution in France. The chain of command limited ¹⁰ Samuel W. Mitcham, Hitler’s Legions: The German Army Order of Battle in World War II (New York: Stein & Day, 1985), pp. 494–6; Umbreit, Der Milit¨arbefehlshaber in Frankreich 1940–1944, pp. 62–7, 97–106. ¹¹ J¨ackel, France dans l’Europe de Hitler, pp. 335–7, 343–361; USNA, RG 242/T-501/121/ 441–444.

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Figure 8.1. Local, district, and regional authorities in occupied France, 1944.

the influence of a military administration that had opposed the confiscation of Jewish property and condemned draconian reprisals. The creation of Ob West and the division of France into two main zones under the MBF and Army Group D had the same effect as Hitler seizing direct command of OKW in 1938 and OKH in late 1941. They isolated critical subordinates and reduced the authority of institutions that could impede Nazi racial policies. Structural, personnel, and policy changes that were carried out between December 1941 and November 1942 cleared the way for the Final Solution to the Jewish Question in Western Europe. First implemented in Germany, Hitler’s campaign against the alleged Jewish menace began with defamation and discrimination. Joseph Goebbels organized a boycott of Jewish businesses throughout the Third Reich on 198

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1 April 1933. Six days later, the regime barred Jews from select professions. Decrees issued in the wake of the 1938 annexation of Austria added despoliation and forcible emigration to the list of Jewish tribulations. A few days after the Anschluss, Adolf Eichmann arrived in Vienna and created a bureaucratic system to oblige Jewish emigration under the watchful eyes of the SD. Promulgated on 14 June, the third Nuremberg Law defined Jewish businesses and established a system of despoliation that amounted to state-sponsored robbery.¹² As the Nazi regime settled into power, German Jews faced gradually increasing pressure from Nazi militants and, later, state bureaucrats. After the 1940 Armistice, a similar process unfolded in the Hexagon. German institutions participated in the defamation–discrimination–despoliation process with varying degrees of enthusiasm. The German embassy in Paris dispersed virulent anti-Semitic propaganda in an attempt to dampen anti-German sentiments and foster Franco-German reconciliation. The military administration perceived Jews as a security threat and evicted them from provinces along the English Channel. Under direct orders from Berlin, the MBF also participated in the Aryanization (Arisierung) or de-Judaicization (Entjudung) of the French economy. The Einsatzstab Rosenberg considered the expropriation of Jewish art collections to be a subset of economic Aryanization and began to steal paintings from wealthy Jews in the fall of 1940. Following methods pioneered in eastern Europe, SS officers created a council (Judenrat) to exploit the entire Jewish community. In an attempt to satisfy latent anti-Semitic tendencies within French society, the Vichy regime launched its own campaign against Jews which followed a similar pattern of defamation, discrimination, and despoliation. Acting on its own accord, the French government encouraged anti-Semitic propaganda by rescinding the 1881 Marchandeau Law and passed the Statut des Juifs which defined ‘Jews’ and barred them from practicing select professions. In conjunction with the German military administration, the French government confiscated Jewish businesses and Aryanized the French economy. Admiral Franc¸ois Darlan established the General Commissariat for Jewish Affairs (Commissariat-g´en´eral aux questions juives or CGQJ) to coordinate French anti-Semitic initiatives. French politicians, bureaucrats, ¹² Leni Yahil, The Holocaust: The Fate of European Jewry, 1932–1945, translated by Ina Friedman and Haya Galai (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 60–67, 104–108.

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and policemen participated in every major aspect of Hitler’s campaign against European Jewry as it pertained to France. From the start of the Occupation, the Vichy regime, German military administration, Paris embassy, Einsatzstab Rosenberg, and SS all championed programs that were designed to address the so-called Jewish Question and advance their respective institutional interests. French leaders used anti-Semitic measures to satisfy indigenous anti-Semites, curry favor with German authorities, and keep strategic assets in French hands. The Einsatzstab Rosenberg welcomed economic Aryanization because it provided an opportunity to enhance their position within the Nazi hierarchy and play a significant role in French affairs. The German embassy in Paris viewed the Final Solution as a way to obscure German oppression and dampen resistance activity. It was no accident that German institutions typically championed anti-Semitic policies which advanced their own institutional goals. Divergent institutional goals fostered conflict among various German institutions. The MBF consistently favored anti-Semitic measures that supported the German war effort and enhanced the security of the German army. Although they had no problem evicting Jews from d´epartements along the English Channel in 1940, officers expressed little enthusiasm for initiatives that disrupted French industrial production and limited France’s contribution to the German war effort. During the first two years of the Occupation, SS officers favored aggressive anti-Semitic policies even when such measures alienated the Vichy regime and upset the French public. Once in charge of security and thus dependent upon assistance from the French police, SS officers began to pay some attention to French sensibilities. The Vichy regime welcomed the ‘evacuation’ of unpopular Jewish refugees but balked at the deportation of assimilated French Jews, which triggered public protests. The military administration, Paris embassy, SS, and Vichy regime accepted the fundamental legitimacy of the so-called Jewish Question and perceived Jews as a menace, but institutional prejudices tempered the policy of each group. How each proposed to address the Jewish Question in 1940, and the degree to which they embraced Hitler’s Final Solution in 1942, sheds considerable light on the ethos of each institution. Following a course charted by the Nazi party but inspired by indigenous anti-Semitism, xenophobia, and the legacy of the 1940 defeat, the 200

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Vichy regime defamed and discriminated against Jews of its own accord. Anti-Semitism and economic nationalism later encouraged the regime to participate in Germany’s despoliation program. Xenophobia drove early French denaturalization efforts and German diplomatic pressure accelerated this process in 1942. As German control over the French polity increased during the course of the Occupation, so did German influence over French anti-Semitic policy. Vichy’s anti-Semitic campaign began as an indigenous French movement, turned into a bargaining chip that Laval tried to exchange for broad political concessions, and eventually devolved into ignominious accommodation. The Vichy regime inaugurated its defamation campaign on 27 August 1940. The Third Republic passed the Marchandeau Law in 1881, which banned press attacks ‘toward a group of persons who belong by origin to a particular race or religion when it is intended to arouse hatred among citizens or residents,’ and elected a Jewish Prime Minister in 1936. At the same time, a large segment of French society celebrated determined anti-Semites such as Edouard Drumont, Charles Maurras, and Robert Brassillach. Profoundly reactionary attitudes continued to survive and thrive inside the liberal Republic. After they eviscerated the Third Republic, leaders of the Vichy regime repealed the Marchandeau Law and unleashed a wave of anti-Semitic propaganda in the press.¹³ Forthright discrimination antedated repeal of the Marchandeau Law. During the height of an economic boom that followed World War One, the French government reformed immigration laws to accommodate desperately needed eastern European workers. Changes encouraged an influx of immigrants in the latter half of the 1920s, but these same workers became a source of bitter contention with the onset of the Great Depression and mass unemployment. Eager to resolve unfinished business from the interwar era, the Vichy regime created a commission to review recent applications for French citizenship on 7 August 1940. The committee examined naturalization applications submitted since 1927 and denaturalized those judged unable to assimilate into French society. Orthodox Jews who had emigrated from eastern Europe often fell into the latter category. After the French government stripped Jews of their French citizenship, they ¹³ Mission d’´etude sur la spoliation des Juifs de France, La Pers´ecution des juifs de France, 1940–1944, et le r´etablissement de la l´egalit´e r´epublicaine (Paris: La Documentation franc¸aise, 2000), p. 87; Marrus and Paxton, Vichy France and the Jews, pp. 3–5, 34–44.

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became ‘stateless’ and could be sent to the east without offending Gallic amour propre. During the Occupation, approximately 15,000 people—a number that included at least 7,000 Jews—lost their French citizenship and ultimately perished in this fashion.¹⁴ Vichy’s enthusiasm for denaturalization had limits. As trains bound for Auschwitz reduced the number of stateless Jews in 1942, Helmut Knochen urged Prime Minister Laval to automatically denaturalize all Jews who had acquired French citizenship since 1927. Citing protests led by prominent French Catholics including Cardinal Gerlier, Laval claimed that he could not deliver Jews ‘like goods from a supermarket’ and pleaded for additional time.¹⁵ The head of the CGQJ, Darquier de Pellepoix, drafted a law that denaturalized all Jews who had obtained French citizenship since 1927, spouses who had acquired French citizenship by marrying naturalized French Jews, and the children of naturalized Jews on 31 December 1942. The Secretary-General of the Police, Ren´e Bousquet, proposed a similar law that denaturalized Jews who had gained French citizenship since 1932, and his proposal included an exemption for Jews related to prisoners of war. SS criticism obliged Bousquet to change the date of denaturalization from 1932 to 1927, but the revised legislation still exempted the relatives of Jewish prisoners of war. Darquier rejoined the debate by submitting a fourth version that exempted Aryans who were married to Jews but included children resulting from mixed marriages. Pierre Laval and Maurice Gabolde, the Guardian of the Seal, signed Bousquet’s second draft on 10 June 1943 and Darquier’s second version on 20 and 22 June respectively.¹⁶ The Allied conquest of Sicily and Mussolini’s arrest on 25 July 1943 may have encouraged Prime Minister Laval to reconsider his position with regard to collaboration in general and denaturalization in particular. Although both denaturalization bills had been signed by the Prime Minister and Guardian of the Seal, neither measure had been published in the Journal officiel and thus did not carry the force of law. A senior SS official ¹⁴ Marrus and Paxton, Vichy France and the Jews, pp. 3–5; Weisberg, Vichy Law and the Holocaust in France, pp. 356–369; Klarsfeld, La Shoah en France, vol. II, p. 16. ¹⁵ Klarsfeld, La Shoah en France, vol. II, pp. 651–2; Serge Klarsfeld, La Shoah en France, volume III, Le calendrier de la pers´ecution des Juifs de France, septembre 1942–août 1944 (Paris: Fayard, 2001), pp. 1033–5. Marrus and Paxton, Vichy France and the Jews, pp. 3–5; Weisberg, Vichy Law and the Holocaust in France, pp. 356–369; Klarsfeld, La Shoah en France, vol. II, p. 16. ¹⁶ Weisberg, Vichy Law and the Holocaust in France, pp. 355–365; Klarsfeld, La Shoah en France, vol. III, pp. 1302–3, 1474–6, 1522–3, 1545–6, 1611–1614.

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reported that Laval had reopened the denaturalization debate during a cabinet meeting on 7 August 1943. One week later, Laval asked for a delay because Marshal P´etain opposed regulations that denaturalized the wives and children of Jews. Knochen threatened to arrest Jews without French assistance, but Laval stood his ground.¹⁷ The arrest of Jewish children and labor deportations had turned segments of the French public against Laval’s government. With a brief limited to security, the SS could not offer economic or political concessions such as a reduction in occupation costs or the release of French prisoners of war that might make denaturalizations palatable and accommodate French concerns. Unwilling or unable to repudiate Franco-German collaboration, Laval and the Vichy government lapsed into attentisme. Vichy’s anti-Semitic campaign did not stop with discrimination and denaturalization. Before France and Germany signed the Armistice Agreement, Army High Command (OKH) allowed senior German officers to manage enterprises whose owners had fled before the German advance. The 20 May 1940 decree did not explicitly refer to Jews, appeared to be part of a larger plan to revive French industry, and could be used to confiscate businesses that were abandoned by Jewish or gentile owners. French observers interpreted the regulation as a blatant attempt to expropriate segments of the French economy, sap France’s long-term economic strength, and undermine Vichy’s sovereignty.¹⁸ To counter German despoliation and reduce Jewish influence within the French economy, Vichy’s Ministry of Finance and Industrial Production established a temporary administration agency (Service de contrˆole des administrateurs provisoires or SCAP) on 10 September 1940.¹⁹ SCAP appointed French trustees to oversee businesses owned by Jews in order to supersede the installation of German administrators who might not act in the interests ¹⁷ Weisberg, Vichy Law and the Holocaust in France, pp. 365–9; Vicki Caron, Uneasy Asylum, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999), pp. 338–341; Klarsfeld, La Shoah en France, vol. III, pp. 1610, 1616–1619; BALW, R 70 Frankreich/32/28; BALW, R 70 Frankreich/23/46–47. ¹⁸ Mission d’´etude sur la spoliation des Juifs de France, La Pers´ecution des juifs de France 1940–1944, pp. 43–5; Philippe Verheyde, Les mauvais comptes de Vichy: l’aryanisation des entreprises juives (Paris: Perrin, 1999), p. 24; Paxton, Vichy France, pp. 176–181; Marrus and Paxton, Vichy France and the Jews, p. 8; de Chambrun, France during the German Occupation, vol. I, pp. 30–34, 98–100, vol. II, pp. 626–636; Baudouin, Neuf mois au gouvernement, p. 341. ¹⁹ Mission d’´etude sur la spoliation des Juifs de France, La Pers´ecution des juifs de France 1940–1944, p. 88; Verheyde, Les mauvais comptes de Vichy, pp. 23–34; Jean-Marc Dreyfus, Pillages sur ordonnances: aryanisation et restitution des banques en France 1940–1953 (Paris: Fayard, 2003), pp.66–70.

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of France. French legislation sought to block the sale of French businesses to German concerns unless the transaction was approved by Vichy’s Ministry of Finance. In October 1940, the military administration granted legal power to French trustees who were nominated by SCAP. The Vichy regime worked with the German military administration by providing administrative and technical support to prevent the ‘Germanization’ of the French economy.²⁰ The Darlan government continued to support and extend despoliation measures established by the first Laval administration, which suggests that Vichy’s campaign was not the product of a single person or isolated cabal. French efforts to defame, despoil, and discriminate against Jews proceeded haphazardly during the first year of the Occupation. For example, the Vichy regime passed a law that banned foreign Jews from practicing medicine on 16 August 1940. Promulgated on 3 October, the Statut des Juifs defined ‘Jews’ and restricted them from practicing select professions including architecture, banking, law, and education. One day later, French bureaucrats won the right to imprison foreign Jews in French concentration camps. Long before agents of the Nazi regime brought official pressure to bear, the Vichy regime established its own anti-Semitic program which limited the influence of French and foreign Jews.²¹ On 29 March 1941, the Vichy regime created an agency to coordinate and extend all antiSemitic measures. Known as the General Commissariat for Jewish Affairs (Commissariat-g´en´eral aux questions juives or CGQJ), the new agency had three specific missions: (1) to prepare and propose all legislative measures relative to the political, economic, and legal status of Jews; (2) taking into account national needs, to fix the date for liquidating Jewish property in cases where liquidation had been prescribed by law; and (3) to designate trustees for confiscated Jewish property and control their activity. The mandate allowed the CGQJ to operate throughout France, although ²⁰ Philippe Verheyde, ‘The looting of Jewish property and Franco-German rivalry, 1940–1944,’ in Gerald D. Feldman and Wolfgang Seibel (eds.), Networks of Nazi Persecution: Bureaucracy, Business and the Organization of the Holocaust (New York: Berghahn Books, 2005), pp. 69–87; Jean-Paul Cointet, Histoire de Vichy (Paris: Plon, 1996), pp. 132–133. ²¹ Marrus and Paxton, Vichy France and the Jews, pp. 4, 98; Mission d’´etude sur la spoliation des Juifs de France, La Pers´ecution des juifs de France 1940–1944, pp. 89–91; Asher Cohen, Pers´ecutions et ´ sauvetages: juifs et franc¸ais sous l’occupation et sous Vichy (Paris: Editions du Cerf, 1993), pp. 113–124; Claire Andrieu, ‘Le mythe de la banque juive et les r´ealit´es de l’aryanisation,’ in Andr´e Kaspi, Annie Kriegel, and Annette Wiebiorka (eds.), Les Juifs de France dans la seconde guerre mondiale (Paris: Cerf, 1992), pp. 85–6.

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measures usually began in the occupied zone and spread slowly or were implemented with less enthusiasm in the unoccupied or, after November 1942, newly occupied portion of the Hexagon.²² Working through the CGQJ, the Vichy regime established a comprehensive system of legal discrimination and despoliation. Why did the French government create the CGQJ in early 1941? After the December 1940 fall of the Laval government, German officials refused to discuss important questions such as a reduction in occupation payments, the repatriation of French prisoners of war, or a return of the French government to Paris with their French counterparts. By creating the CGQJ, Darlan tried to demonstrate France’s commitment to a central tenet of Hitler’s new order and resuscitate Franco-German negotiations.²³ His efforts forestalled the installation of a comparable German agency, preserved the illusion of French sovereignty, and satisfied radical anti-Semites who had accused the Vichy regime of being ‘soft’ on Jews. Although German pressure undoubtedly influenced Darlan’s judgment, economic and political factors also informed the Admiral’s decision to create the CGQJ.²⁴ Admiral Darlan placed Xavier Vallat, a fervent nationalist and devout Catholic, in charge of the CGQJ. Born in 1891, Vallat lost both an arm and an eye during World War One. While serving as a deputy from Ard`eche in 1919–1924 and 1928–1940, he associated with the moderate F´ed´eration Republicaine and right-wing movements such as the Action Franc¸aise, George Valois’s Faisceau movement, and Colonel de la Rocque’s Croix de Feu. The latter groups certainly influenced Vallat’s opinion of Jews. Throughout his career, Vallat defined Jews by a combination of race, religion, and culture. He argued that France could indeed absorb a small number of Jews who had embraced French culture and tried to protect Jews who had served the French state with distinction. During the Occupation, Vallat continued to define a Jew in terms of race and culture and exempted some assimilated French Jews from various anti-Semitic measures. By appointing Vallat to ²² DGFP, ser. D, vol. XII, pp. 437–9; BALW, R 70 Frankreich/23/3–5; Dreyfus, Pillages sur ordonnances, p. 118. ²³ Lambauer, Otto Abetz et les Franc¸ais, pp. 279–296, 305, 311–318; DGFP, ser. D, vol. XI, pp. 1055–6, 1169; Fred Kupferman, Laval (Paris: Balland, 1987), pp. 257–8; BAMA, RW 35/2/7. ²⁴ Coutau-B´egarie and Huan, Darlan, pp. 387–395, 506–508; Marrus and Paxton, Vichy France and the Jews, pp. 82–7; Cohen, Pers´ecutions et sauvetages, pp. 127–136; DGFP, ser. D, vol. XII, pp. 227–8; Verheyde, Les mauvais comptes de Vichy, pp. 40–41.

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lead the CGQJ, Darlan signaled both his independence from Germany and his support for many anti-Semitic measures favored by the Reich.²⁵ Vallat’s independence created friction with the German embassy and SS. Otto Abetz, the German ambassador in Paris, considered Vallat to be dangerous because the latter had served as head of a French veterans group in 1940. The SS questioned Vallat’s heretical brand of anti-Semitism because it did not focus exclusively upon race. Werner Best formally requested Vallat’s dismissal on 2 March 1942, and Louis Darquier de Pellepoix assumed control of the CGQJ two months later.²⁶ The change in leadership coincided with the advent of the Final Solution in France and reflected the increasing power of the SS. Under Darquier’s command, the CGQJ became an SS appendage. Darquier passed confidential papers to SS officials, eliminated exemptions for assimilated French Jews, extended anti-Semitic measures into the unoccupied zone, and acquired his own police unit. As the CGQJ adopted SS policies, its prestige within French official and public circles dropped. While Vallat often dined with P´etain and could be described as a part of the conservative establishment, Darquier only met with Laval once or twice each month. Trumping Laval’s indifference, Marshal P´etain referred to Darquier as ‘Monsieur le tortionnaire.’ Darquier’s greatest strength—his willingness to obey SS directives—also made him an ineffective tool because he could not rally widespread support for Hitler’s Final Solution. Unable to ‘impose his will on the French government’ and eventually abandoned by his SS sponsors, Darquier resigned his post on 26 February 1944.²⁷ Charles Mercier du Paty de Clam, a scion of the commandant who had arrested Captain Dreyfus in 1894, succeeded Darquier. ‘[L]argely indifferent to the commissariat and its goals,’ du Paty went on indefinite leave in May and was eventually replaced by Joseph Atignac. As the probability of an Allied invasion increased, the CGQJ became lethargic and irrelevant. The SS turned to the Milice, a French paramilitary group under the command of Joseph Darnand, for support and assistance. On a national scale, coordinated anti-Semitic measures ground to a halt as Allied armies liberated France ²⁵ BALW, R 70 Frankreich/2/136–137; Marrus and Paxton, Vichy France and the Jews, pp. 87–95; BALW, R 70 Frankreich/32/9–13; BALW, R 70 Frankreich/31/55–64. ²⁶ Marrus and Paxton, Vichy France and the Jews, pp. 88–9, 118; BALW, R 70 Frankreich/32/14–20; Klarsfeld, Vichy–Auschwitz, 1942, pp. 50–51. ²⁷ Rajsfus, La Police de Vichy, pp. 191–202; Marrus and Paxton, Vichy France and the Jews, pp. 283–293; USNA, RG 242/T-501/144/203.

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during the summer of 1944. Only a few dedicated CGQJ officials carried out their mandate to the bitter end.²⁸ French enthusiasm for anti-Semitic measures can be linked to German prospects for victory and the power of the SS. As an observer, the SS could not control French anti-Semitic policy during the early stages of the Occupation. Admiral Darlan placed Vallat in charge of the organization. Vallat pursued a unique agenda, exempting some assimilated French Jews from Vichy’s anti-Semitic measures but pursuing foreign Jews with remarkable enthusiasm and developing an extensive program of defamation, discrimination, despoliation, and denaturalization. In response to military setbacks, Hitler ceded additional powers to the SS and added extermination to the aforementioned list of anti-Semitic measures. Unable to suffer Vallat’s independence, the SS engineered his dismissal, supported the rise of Darquier de Pellepoix, and began to transport Jews from France to Auschwitz. After the fall of Mussolini, Laval belatedly overcame the shock of defeat and recognized that further accommodation would not yield any substantial concessions, but the Prime Minister could not reverse course and expect to survive. During the final two years of the Occupation, Vichy ‘resistance’ amounted to little more than a refusal to extend official accommodation beyond limits established during the summer of 1942. The Vichy government developed a comprehensive campaign of defamation, discrimination, despoliation, and denaturalization of its own accord. Although they did not explicitly endorse the outright murder of all Jews, the CGQJ and French police forces played an integral role in the deportation process during the latter stages of the Occupation. The Germany embassy in Paris failed to play a major role in Germany’s campaign against Jews, though not because of a lack of effort. Basic instructions from the Foreign Ministry directed Ambassador Abetz to take charge of ‘all political questions in occupied and unoccupied France.’ Specific guidelines authorized the ambassador to represent German interests, supervise German propaganda, direct the ‘seizure and securing of . . . private and especially Jewish artistic properties,’ and advise the military administration, Secret Military Police (GFP), and the Gestapo.²⁹ In theory, ²⁸ Marrus and Paxton, Vichy France and the Jews, pp. 333–9, quote p. 336. ²⁹ DGFP, ser. D, vol. X, pp. 407–408.

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this sweeping mandate allowed the German embassy in Paris to play a leading role in the defamation–discrimination–despoliation process. During the summer of 1940, German diplomats focused most of their efforts on despoliation. Led by Baron von Künsberg, they fanned out across occupied France and stole valuable works of art from wealthy Jews. Protests from the military administration and later the Vichy regime eventually convinced Abetz to reconsider his confiscation policy. Künsberg and company got out of the confiscation business in September 1940, but the Einsatzstab Rosenberg stepped into the void. With Hitler’s support, the latter agency spearheaded Germany’s despoliation campaign.³⁰ Based on his role as a political advisor, Ambassador Abetz urged the MBF to embark on a campaign of discrimination under the guise of ‘security.’ He advised General von Stülpnagel to prohibit Jews from crossing the demarcation line, require Jews to register with local authorities, and appoint trustees for ‘abandoned’ Jewish enterprises. The head of the MVW’s government subsection, Werner Best, promised to study Abetz’s suggestions and passed them along to subordinate departments. On 29 August, Abetz told the military administration that his ‘suggestions’ were actually orders from Hitler, but the MVW proceeded in a dilatory fashion,³¹ and without the means to carry out their own campaign, diplomats had to ask others for assistance. The military administration did not have to obey orders from Ambassador Abetz. Conflict between Count von Metternich’s MVW art group and Baron von Künsberg indicated that the two organizations had rather different policies with regard to the treatment of Jews and Jewish property. Werner Best disregarded Abetz’s call for vigorous anti-Semitic measures, even after the ambassador claimed that his suggestions came directly from Hitler, and supported Count von Metternich’s efforts to stop Künsberg. Starting in the fall of 1940, the French government denounced the confiscation of Jewish art works in a series of verbal notes delivered to the German government and forced Abetz to reconsider his policy. The ³⁰ BAMA, RW 35/712/67–83. ³¹ DGFP ser. D, vol. X, p. 513; Klarsfeld, La Shoah en France, vol. II, p. 18; Henri Monneray (ed.), La Pers´ecution des juifs en France et dans les autres pays de l’ouest pr´esent´ee par la France a` Nuremberg ´ (Paris: Editions du centre, 1947), pp. 83–4; Lambauer, Otto Abetz et les Franc¸ais, pp. 299–301; Umbreit, Der Milit¨arbefehlshaber in Frankreich, pp. 261–2.

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ambassador eventually reversed course, joined the military administration, and opposed pell-mell confiscations in order to preserve cordial relations with Vichy.³² However, Abetz did not abandon his general campaign against the Jews; instead, he searched for a more amenable pawn. Acting on a proposal floated by Theodor Dannecker during a 28 February 1941 conference, the ambassador urged the Vichy government to create a central Jewish office (Judenamt). In a meeting on 5 March 1941 with Admiral Darlan, Abetz reported that: Darlan indicated his willingness to let the French Government set up such an office, but at the same time called attention to the fact that there was much vacillation in Marshal P´etain’s attitude toward the Jewish Question. The Marshal would not want native Jews and those French Jews who had distinguished themselves in military service for France to be treated the same way as Jews who have immigrated from other countries.

Since German diplomats could not force the MBF to take vigorous action against Jews, they chose to act in conjunction with the Vichy regime. Less than one month after he raised the issue of a Jewish office with Darlan, Abetz reported creation of the CGQJ to superiors in Berlin. He assigned Counselor of Legation Karl-Theodor Zeitschel to serve as his liaison to the CGQJ and allowed the French government to act as his proxy against the so-called Jewish conspiracy.³³ German diplomats could not discriminate against Jews on their own and failed to secure substantial help from the military administration, but the Vichy government proved more obliging. Throughout the Occupation, the German embassy used propaganda to defame Jews and divide Frenchmen. Beginning in October 1940, the embassy supported a series of exhibitions with titles like ‘European France,’ ‘The Jew and France,’ and ‘Bolshevism against Europe.’ Millions of Frenchmen viewed embassy-sponsored exhibitions that directed popular animosity away from occupiers and toward allegedly subversive groups such as communists, Freemasons, and Jews. The embassy also subsidized a broad range of newspapers aimed at a variety of different social groups. ³² Billig, Le Commissariat g´en´eral aux questions juives, vol. III, pp. 62–5; BAMA, RW 35/712/81. ³³ Schumann and Nestler (eds.), Die faschistische Okkupationspolitik in Frankreich, pp. 148–9; DGFP, ser. D, vol. XII, pp. 227–8, 437–9.

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Propaganda formulated by the German embassy convinced portions of the French public that Jews, Freemasons, and communists posed a threat, but it failed to generate substantial active support for the Nazi cause.³⁴ Several factors limited the influence of the Paris embassy. Without explicit permission from superiors in Berlin, which was never forthcoming, Abetz could not exchange German concessions for French cooperation. Diplomatic personnel did not control the MBF and could not force the French government to act in a particular way. Only when the Vichy regime wanted to curry favor with the Nazi government could Abetz shape events. French politicians eventually discovered that the Paris embassy had little influence over German policy, and as the Occupation dragged on, they began to speak directly to their German counterparts. Laval discussed economics with the MBF, labor policies with Fritz Sauckel, and racial issues with the SS. While they served as Prime Minister, both Darlan and Laval belatedly discovered that the German embassy in Paris was irrelevant. German diplomats could not offer meaningful concessions and accommodate any French needs. By playing upon Laval’s fear of Bolshevism and Anglo-Saxon hegemony, Hitler and Ribbentrop secured most of what they wanted from him.³⁵ In response to the Allied invasion of North Africa, Hitler recalled his ambassador and left Germany without representation in Paris for most of 1943. During Abetz’s absence, Consul-General Rudolf Schleier managed diplomatic affairs until November 1943. Abetz and Schleier allowed Zeitschel to handle Jewish affairs for most of the Occupation.³⁶ Zeitschel participated in a weekly meeting of all senior German officials involved in anti-Jewish affairs that was known as the Tuesday Group and eagerly anticipated the time when France could be cleared of Jews, but he usually backed SS proposals.³⁷ With an irregular diplomatic presence and limited authority, German diplomats could only encourage others ³⁴ Burrin, France under the Germans, pp. 292–8; Jackson, France. The Dark Years, pp. 198–204; BALW, R 70 Frankreich/23/18–21; Rita Thalmann, La mise au pas. Id´eologie et strat´egie s´ecuritaire dans la France occup´ee (Paris: Fayard, 1991), pp. 202–206; Ren´ee Poznanski, Jews in France during World War II, translated by Nathan Bracher (Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 2001), pp. 377–380. ³⁵ Paxton, Vichy France, pp. 309–326; J¨ackel, France dans l’Europe de Hitler, pp. 311–334; ADAP, ser. E, vol. IV, pp. 301–310; ADAP, ser. E, vol. VI, pp. 8–17. ³⁶ BAK, All. Proz. 21/216/145; de Chambrun (ed.), France During the German Occupation, vol. III, pp. 1611–1613. ³⁷ Marrus and Paxton, Vichy France and the Jews, pp. 78–82; BAK, All. Proz. 21/233/4–5.

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and played an inspirational but ultimately subordinate role in the Final Solution. During the first two years of the Occupation, the German military administration alone possessed ‘executive authority’ and had the power to implement Germany’s anti-Semitic agenda. The terms of the 1940 Armistice Agreement granted the military administration ‘all the rights of an occupying power’ and Hitler placed the MBF in charge of ‘security.’ To carry out his mission, General Otto von Stülpnagel could use military policemen or pass orders along to French police forces via the French government in accordance with the Agreement. The MBF had both the mandate and the means to persecute Jews throughout Occupied France. In keeping with general directives issued in 1939 and 1940, the military administration concentrated on security and economic exploitation, and both initiatives included anti-Semitic components.³⁸ Economic exploitation began amidst the 1940 Western campaign. As German soldiers approached the English Channel, General Brauchitsch issued regulations that allowed senior military commanders to appoint trustees to manage businesses whose owners had fled before the German advance. The 20 May 1940 decree could be used to confiscate Jewish or gentile businesses, could be interpreted as a plan to restore French industry, and did not appear to be fundamentally anti-Semitic. General Streccius reiterated Brauchitsch’s initial decree on 18 October and allowed military administrators to place an Aryan trustee in charge of abandoned ‘Jewish’ businesses. Neither Blaskowitz, Streccius, nor Otto von Stülpnagel—the first three MBFs—applied the 20 May or 18 October 1940 statutes with much enthusiasm.³⁹ The MBF’s lax attitude provoked a reprimand from the commander of the German army on 12 November 1940. Brauchitsch ordered Otto von Stülpnagel to focus the military administration on the seizure of Jewish businesses and told him to use the proceeds to support the war effort. Monthly reports sent to Berlin did not discuss Jews or Aryanization in detail before December 1940, but Brauchitsch’s reprimand produced immediate results. The MBF began to Aryanize the French economy by ³⁸ USNA, RG 242/T-77/1430/291–297; DGFP, ser D, vol. IX, pp. 300–301; DGFP, ser. D, vol. X, pp. 128–130, 407–408. ³⁹ Mission d’´etude sur la spoliation des Juifs de France, La Pers´ecution des juifs de France 1940–1944, pp. 43–5, 51–3. Billig, Le Commissariat g´en´eral aux questions juives, vol. III, p. 71.

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placing Aryan trustees in charge of Jewish businesses. Trustees could either operate enterprises on their own or sell them to certified Aryans. Jews ultimately had to sell their businesses or turn them over to French or German trustees.⁴⁰ Brauchitsch’s 12 November directive triggered a comprehensive despoliation campaign that targeted Jews. Without French assistance, the numerically weak military administration could not hope to identify, much less liquidate, every Jewish business. The head of the economic branch of the military administration, Elmar Michel, explained the MBF’s strategy: First, we must do what is necessary to eliminate Jews even after the Occupation. More important, we cannot from our side provide sufficient manpower to deal with the great number of Jewish enterprises. These two factors have led us to have the French authorities participate in the elimination of Jews. We thereby gain shared responsibility by the French and we have at our disposal the French administrative apparatus.⁴¹

Knochen argued that Aryanization would ‘give numerous Frenchmen the possibility of moving from low social status to the middle class’ and create French co-conspirators who had a financial interest in German victory. Under the control of Kurt Blanke, an Aryanization subsection of the MVW’s economic division drove the Vichy regime to enact a comprehensive despoliation campaign. If Vichy did not act against Jewish businesses with the necessary enthusiasm, Blanke’s subsection could appoint German trustees who might, in turn, sell French concerns to German industrialists at fire-sale prices. Eager to preserve economic assets, protect French sovereignty, and curry favor with the Nazi regime, both Admiral Darlan and Laval supported an indigenous Aryanization program that advanced Nazi racial goals. By playing upon French greed and fear, the military administration created French support for Germany’s despoliation program.⁴² ⁴⁰ BAMA, RW 35/255/48–49, 2–3; Mission d’´etude sur la spoliation des Juifs de France, La Pers´ecution des juifs de France 1940–1944, pp. 97–8. ⁴¹ Billig, Le Commissariat g´en´eral aux questions juives, vol. III, p. 75; Weisberg, Vichy Law and the Holocaust in France, pp. 251–2. ⁴² Adam Rayski, The Choice of the Jews under Vichy: Between Submission and Resistance, translated by Will Sayers (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2005), pp. 47–8; Billig, Le Commissariat g´en´eral aux questions juives, vol. I, pp. 13, 22; Wolfgang Seibel, ‘A market for mass crime? Inter-institutional competition and the initiation of the Holocaust in France, 1940–1942,’ in International Journal of Organization Theory and Behavior 5 (2002), 219–257.

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Figure 8.2. Aryanization in Marseilles. A ‘Jewish’ business under new management. Photograph courtesy of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum.

In a 3 December 1940 report, the MBF told superiors that the military administration had laid the legal foundation for economic Aryanization. Using French police data, the military administration counted 149,734 Jews, 7,737 Jewish businesses (Einzelunternehmen), and 3,456 Jewish enterprises (Gesellschaften) in the greater Paris region. While discussing efforts to Aryanize the French economy, the MBF expressed concerns about antiSemitic measures in general. He warned that Aryanization would take years to complete, disrupt industrial production, and reduce France’s contribution to the German war effort. According to the military administration, the French public was surprised by the number of Jewish businesses and welcomed the elimination of foreign Jews, but regarded discrimination

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against assimilated French Jews as an ‘injustice.’ Stülpnagel questioned the wisdom of the program but followed orders.⁴³ Between December 1940 and January 1941, the MVW appointed trustees to manage large Jewish companies and announced the ‘evacuation’ of assets from Jewish businesses to Germany. Exaggerating its success, the MVW reported that ‘the Aryanization of the French economy has made considerable progress.’ Laws passed by the Vichy government had created a ‘sufficient legal basis’ for Aryanization in the eyes of the French public. The MVW inflated its own accomplishments and attributed delays to a lack of enthusiasm for such measures among some French circles. In defense of Vichy, the military administration added that comparable actions had also taken a long time to implement inside the Reich.⁴⁴ Aryanization did not always proceed smoothly. During April and May 1941, German and French authorities raised their estimate of the number of Jewish businesses in the Paris area from 10,000 to approximately 15,000. They Aryanized about 900 businesses in metropolitan Paris and reported that most Jewish businesses in outlying districts of the occupied zone had already been placed in Aryan hands. After 26 April 1941, profits from the sale of Jewish enterprises flowed into blocked accounts that could not be tapped by former owners. Although some French Jews had voluntarily Aryanized their own businesses, German officials worried that such transactions would have to be scrutinized to avoid fraud.⁴⁵ As they delved into the task of Aryanization, German bureaucrats discovered just how difficult the operation would be. As spring turned to summer, the military administration began to worry that French authorities might not fulfill their promises. Because ‘Germany lacks the power to take such inclusive actions over the long run,’ the MVW had no choice but to rely on French assistance. It viewed Aryanization as a test of Vichy’s commitment but did not predict how Vichy would respond. ‘The practical implementation of the law will show how serious the French government is about de-Judaicization (Entjudung).’ After Germany invaded the Soviet Union during the summer of 1941, one regional (Bezirk), ten district (Feld), and fifty-five local (Ort) branches of the military government ⁴³ USNA, RG 242/T-501/143/493; Dreyfus, Pillages sur ordonnances, pp. 109–110. ⁴⁴ USNA, RG 242/T-501/143/560–562. ⁴⁵ USNA, RG 242/T-501/143/886–887; BALW, R 70 Frankreich/31/49–53, 55–56, 58–64; Verheyde, Les mauvais comptes de Vichy, pp. 369–373.

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were eliminated and the personnel sent to the east. Transfers decimated the military administration and intensified fears of a French relapse. The MBF told superiors in Berlin that ‘personal supervision has been replaced by hasty surveys.’ Despite the Vichy regime’s questionable dedication, the MBF reduced the Aryanization office.⁴⁶ Stülpnagel probably used troop transfers to minimize an unpopular program. In January 1941, he told Field Marshal von Brauchitsch that Aryanization should not proceed beyond the registration of Jewish property because there was no legal precedent for such a policy. Moving beyond registration, Stülpnagel explained, would undermine ‘respect for the leaders of the German state in the eyes of the public at home and in the judgment of the world.’ He claimed that he would have nothing to do with the confiscation process when he took command of the military administration, would not ‘reduce [his] personal responsibility by acting jointly’ with another German agency, and advised his boss to take a similar position. Stülpnagel’s advice undoubtedly referred both to the confiscation of Jewish art and the Aryanization of the French economy. Though Stülpnagel could not extricate himself or his staff from the Aryanization process without disobeying orders, he tried to limit the MVW’s involvement and encouraged the French government to act in his stead.⁴⁷ With considerable assistance from French bureaucrats, a small group of German officials identified 42,739 Jewish businesses during the Occupation. By August of 1944, they had Aryanized 18,227 of these concerns by selling them to certified Aryans, liquidating businesses, or by transforming them into ‘piecework’ operations that could not be controlled by the owner. After the liberation of Paris but before the end of World War Two, a veteran of the military administration estimated that German and French officials had Aryanized approximately 43 per cent of Jewish businesses and could have completed their task in another twelve to eighteen months.⁴⁸ The military administration played an important role in the Aryanization process by prodding the French government to act. With substantial French ⁴⁶ USNA, RG 242/T-501/143/1157, 990, 1245, 1253. ⁴⁷ USNA, RG 242/T-77/1624/folder 75455/nfn (Stülpnagel to Brauchitsch dated 31.1.41); Verheyde, Les mauvais comptes de Vichy, p. 292. ⁴⁸ BAMA, RW 35/2/22, 32–37. See other estimates of Aryanized businesses in Raul Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews, 3rd edn (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003), pp. 653–8; Paxton, Vichy France, p. 176; Billig, Le Commissariat g´en´eral aux questions juives, pp. 326–7; Verheyde, Les Mauvais comptes de Vichy, pp. 361–9.

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assistance, the military administration despoiled Jewish property and raised considerable sums of money that, in turn, supported the German war effort.⁴⁹ The military administration viewed Jews as a security threat from the start of the Occupation. While the field army prepared to invade England, the MBF evicted Jews and foreigners from nine d´epartements along the English Channel. Acting on behalf of the MBF, Speidel barred Jewish refugees from returning to the occupied zone on 20 September 1940. One week later, the military administration issued regulations that defined a ‘Jew,’ directed Jews register with French police, and ordered Jewish business owners to place a bilingual sign (‘Entreprise juive’ and ‘Judengesch¨aft’) on the door of their establishments. Frenchmen expressed surprise at the number of Jewish businesses, but the MBF noted that German soldiers continued to patronize Jewish shops. Two years later, policemen used registration data collected at the behest of the military administration to arrest and deport Jews. Subsequent regulations ordered French police to stamp ‘Juif’ or ‘Juive’ on the identity papers of all people who qualified as Jews. After initial regulations identified the scope of the alleged Jewish menace, the MBF focused on despoliation while life in occupied France gradually became routine.⁵⁰ Food shortages, unemployment, and German victories in North Africa and eastern Europe triggered anti-German demonstrations that increased security concerns during the spring of 1941. Accepting a basic Nazi assumption, military reports attributed unrest in Paris, Lyon, and Marseille ‘mostly to Jews.’⁵¹ To guarantee order, Werner Best urged the MBF to intern Jews throughout occupied France. Taking a somewhat softer line during a 4 April 1941 meeting with Vallat, the MBF asked the head of the CGQJ to enforce French anti-Semitic regulations. Vallat explained that the arrest or deportation of Jewish veterans and assimilated French Jews might stir up more unrest because France did not have a long history of ‘serious’ anti-Semitism, but he promised to fulfill his mandate and consider the arrest of German Jews.⁵² ⁴⁹ Ally, Hitler’s Beneficiaries, pp. 91, 119–123, 130. ⁵⁰ BAMA, RW 35/353/1–3; Klarsfeld, La Shoah en France, vol. II, pp. 26–28, 34; USNA, RG 242/T-501/143/493, 573; Poznanski, Jews in France During World War II, pp. 31–6. ⁵¹ Jackson, France. The Dark Years, pp. 274–7; Gildea, Marianne in Chains, pp. 161–9; USNA, RG 242/T-501/143/735. ⁵² Monneray (ed.), La Pers´ecution des juifs en france, pp. 137–8; BALW, R 70 Frankreich/ 32/9–13.

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On the basis of this ‘pressure,’ French police sent the so-called billet vert (green ticket) via mail to 6,500 Austrian, Czech, and Polish Jews living in Paris. The message ordered recipients to show up at a local police office with a friend or family member on 14 May. Those who did were promptly arrested while the companion returned home and packed a bag for the hapless victim. The scheme yielded 3,747 prisoners or 60 per cent of the people originally notified by the French police. At the end of May 1941, the MVW expressed satisfaction with Vallat and believed that he would ‘contribute decisively to a radical solution of the Jewish question in France.’⁵³ The invasion of the Soviet Union triggered a second round of antiGerman demonstrations. In response to a protest on 13 August, French and German police arrested two anti-German activists and proscribed the French Communist Party on 15 August. Four days later, German firing squads executed two militants thought to be responsible for the 13 August protest. The detention of 4,000 Jews at a 20 August demonstration, as well as the arrest of 3,477 Jews for possession of illegal firearms, leaflets, and other contraband in August and September 1941, seemed to confirm the belief that Jews were implacable enemies of the Reich.⁵⁴ Leaders of the military administration undoubtedly considered Jews to be a genuine security threat. Early regulations written by the military administration directed commanders to prepare lists of potential hostages that included communists, anarchists, Anglophiles, Gaullists, and nationalists. The MBF considered all to be potential security threats.⁵⁵ Assassinations carried out during the fall of 1941 led the MBF to revise his understanding of likely partisans. The regional commander (Bezirkchef ) of southwest France noted that resistance cells associated with the PCF had become more active and had begun to cooperate with the followers of Charles de Gaulle in September. Rumors linked Gaullists to October 1941 assassinations and seemed to confirm the existence of a centralized conspiracy against Nazi Germany.⁵⁶ ´ ⁵³ Andr´e Kaspi, Les Juifs pendant l’occupation (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1991), pp. 212–214; Klarsfeld, Vichy–Auschwitz, 1942, pp. 15–19; USNA, RG 242/T-501/143/855–857; Rajsfus, La Police de Vichy, pp. 69–71. ⁵⁴ USNA, RG 242/T-501/143/1051, 1096–1099; Meyer, L’Occupation allemande en France, pp. 70–74. ⁵⁵ USNA, RG 242/T-501/143/491; USNA, RG 242/T-501/166/91–98. ⁵⁶ USNA, RG 242/T-77/1587/folder 9/nfn (MVW Bezirk B, Kdo.St. Ia Br B Nr 3508/41, Angers 19.9.41, Betr. Lagebericht der Abt Ia für die Zeit vom 20.7.41 bis 19.9.41); USNA, RG 242/T-77/1588/folder 1/1–7.

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As the number of assassinations multiplied, military authorities had trouble differentiating attacks carried out by various resistance groups. Toward the end of 1941, they characterized most resistance activity as the work of a single Judeo-Bolshevik conspiracy and focused their reprisals on Jews and communists. Carl-Heinrich von Stülpnagel ordered subordinates to avoid words like hostage (otage) when describing people shot in reprisal for a particular resistance attack because they did not link the people being shot with the perpetrator of the original crime. Instead, he directed his lieutenants to characterize unknown perpetrators as ‘Jews’ and ‘communists.’⁵⁷ The linguistic shift indicates a new attitude that brought the military administration into accord with OKW regulations. The latter’s September 1941 directive ordered the MBF to assume that all anti-German activity had communist origins, and Nazi dogma described communists and anti-German nationalists as tools of the so-called international Jewish conspiracy. The MBF had embraced language that cleared the way for the outright murder of Jews living in France.⁵⁸ Census data and the marking of identity papers laid the legal and administrative foundations of the Final Solution. The MVW’s economics division launched a despoliation program that provoked a larger French analog. Otto and Carl-Heinrich von Stülpnagel ordered the deportation of 5,100 Jews to the east, and they almost certainly understood that deportation was equivalent to a death sentence. Finally, both Stülpnagels shot Jews in response to resistance activity. Deportations and hostage executions carried out by the MBF killed thousands of Jews; they may fall short of the tens of thousands murdered by the SS in Auschwitz, but they still contributed to the Final Solution in France. In a letter of 31 July 1944 to Gauleiter Martin Mutschmann, Heinrich Himmler blamed an ‘extremely difficult’ military commander for the continued survival of French Jews. Himmler’s expert opinion may attenuate charges of genocide, but it does not invalidate war crimes or mass murder indictments.⁵⁹ Every major German and several French agencies persecuted Jews during the Occupation. Perceiving Jews as a potential security threat, the military administration evicted Jews from a security zone along the Channel coast ⁵⁷ BAMA, RW 35/308/8–9; USNA, RG 242/T-501/144/1–6; USNA, RG 242/T-501/ 166/121–122. ⁵⁸ USNA, RG 252/T-501/196/1072–1074. ⁵⁹ USNA, RG 242/T-175/155/2685772–2685773.

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and played a major role in the Aryanization of the French economy. The Vichy regime defamed and discriminated against Jews on its own accord, despoiled Jews through the CGQJ, and ordered French police to arrest specific categories of Jews. Although French and German agencies persecuted Jews, they did not all act with an equal measure of enthusiasm. The MBF objected to Aryanization on legal grounds and did not believe that Jews stood behind all resistance activity. Laval objected to the arrest of assimilated French Jews because the round-ups undermined support for his government. The SS and German embassy in Paris both championed the entire defamation, discrimination, despoliation, and deportation process, but they lacked the manpower and a legal mandate to act on their own before the summer of 1942. During the first half of the Occupation, no single French or German agency controlled the entire anti-Semitic process.

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With an estimated 310,000 Jews, France possessed the largest Jewish population in western Europe and appeared to be an attractive target for Hitler’s Final Solution. During the course of the Occupation, French and German police deported approximately 75,000 Jews and exterminated 25 per cent of the Jewish population in France. In contrast, about 45 per cent (25,000 of 55,670) of registered Belgian Jews and 75 per cent (105,000 of 140,000) of Jews living in the Netherlands perished during World War Two. Eastern European Jews typically endured higher mortality rates that fluctuated between 69 per cent in Hungary and 81 per cent in Greece.¹ What factors contributed to the survival of Jews in general and French Jews in particular? Geography and dispersement may have helped some European Jews escape deportation. In the Low Countries, most Jews resided in large cities and could not flee to a neighboring neutral state like Sweden or melt into a sparsely inhabited rural area.² Although many French Jews lived in Paris, a substantial number fled before advancing German armies, scattered throughout the unoccupied zone, and found some refuge in the relative wilds of southern France. Jews in southeastern France could also rely on a degree of protection from the Italian army. Geography and ¹ Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews, pp. 650–2 (France), pp. 636–645 (Belgium), pp. 600–628 (the Netherlands), and pp. 738–755 (Greece), 1321; Wolfgang Benz (ed.), Dimension des V¨olkermords: Die Zahl der jüdischen Opfer des Nationalsozialismus (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1991). ² Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews, pp. 600–601, 636.

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dispersement may have helped some French Jews and endangered their Dutch counterparts, but neither factor can explain the high mortality rate in Yugoslavia.³ A general explanation for varying survival rates must lie elsewhere. Diplomatic considerations may have influenced the deportation process in nations that contributed to the Axis war effort. After signing an armistice with Germany, the Vichy regime functioned as a friendly neutral and reluctantly supported the German war effort. Perhaps France’s valuable economic assets allowed the Vichy regime to shield Jews from Himmler’s depredations. This strategy yielded favorable results in Italy, where 75 per cent of the Jewish population survived both Mussolini’s Fascist regime and the subsequent German occupation.⁴ Hungary also offered substantial assistance to the Third Reich, but at least 550,000 or 69 per cent of the approximately 795,000 people who were regarded as Jews inside of greater Hungary did not survive World War Two.⁵ An alliance with Hitler’s regime might delay large-scale deportations, but the Hungarian example suggests that collaboration offered very little protection in the long run. Diplomatic considerations may have influenced but did not determine varying survival rates. Recent scholarship suggests that governmental structures may explain higher survival rates in some European nations. As German armies marched across Europe, Hitler integrated regions such as Danzig–West Prussia and Lorraine directly into the Reich. Civilian administrators governed potential colonies in Poland and ‘friendly races’ in Denmark and Norway. Military governments controlled portions of France, Belgium, and Greece for the duration of World War Two.⁶ Wolfgang Seibel argues that ‘territorial administrative structures’ shaped the course of the Final Solution. He links the low survival rate in the Netherlands to the civilian administration and attributes higher survival rates in Belgium and France to military ³ Yahil, The Holocaust, pp. 349–352, 491–6; Manoschek, ‘The extermination of the Jews in Serbia,’ pp. 163–185. ⁴ Liliana Picciotto Fargion, ‘Italien’ in Benz (ed.) Dimension des V¨olkermords, pp. 199–228. ⁵ L¨aszl´o Varga, ‘Ungarn’ in Benz (ed.) Dimension des V¨olkermords, pp. 331–351. ⁶ Hans Umbreit, ‘German rule in the occupied territories 1942–1945,’ in MGFA (ed.), Germany and the Second World War, vol. V, Organization and Mobilization of the German Sphere of Power, part 2, Wartime administration, economy, and manpower resources, 1942–1944/5, translated by Derry Cook-Radmore, Ewald Osers, Barry Smerin, and Barbara Wilson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003), pp. 9–12.

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governments.⁷ Limited to western Europe, his study cannot account for low Jewish survival rates in Greece or high survival rates in Denmark, which were under the auspices of military and civilian administrations respectively. Structural analysis does not provide a comprehensive account of the varying survival rates. Local attitudes appear to be equally deceptive. Although a substantial portion of French society embraced anti-Semitism after the 1894 conviction of Captain Alfred Dreyfus and collaborated with Germany during the Occupation, three-quarters of the Jewish population outlived Marshal P´etain’s regime. A history of tolerance may have helped Italian Jews survive the Holocaust, but it did not save co-religionists in the Netherlands. Widespread partisan activity did not necessarily translate into high survival rates either. Recognizing the unique dangers that Jews faced, Danish resistance groups helped the small Jewish community escape to Sweden. Although they came to the same conclusion and actually derailed a deportation train, Belgian guerillas could not stop the murder of 45 per cent of the 55,000 registered Jews. French resistance groups assassinated German personnel and sabotaged the transportation network but did not identify Jews as an especially endangered group or impede the deportation process.⁸ Widespread resistance activity, anti-Semitism, diplomatic considerations, geography, and structural factors influenced the course of the Final Solution, but none explain varying rates of survival throughout Europe. In the conclusion of Vichy France and the Jews, Michael Marrus and Robert Paxton argue that ‘the degree to which Germans were able to apply their power’ governed varying rates of survival, but vague terminology undermines sound logic.⁹ Analysis of ‘German’ racial policy must reflect the polycratic nature of the Nazi government. Inter-agency competition often precluded effective cooperation between the Army, SS, Foreign Office, and other German agencies. Although it was responsible for the war against Judaism, the SS often lacked the means to carry out Hitler’s racial agenda on its own and frequently depended upon the support from indigenous collaborators and other German agencies. ⁷ Wolfgang Seibel, ‘The strength of perpetrators—the Holocaust in western Europe, 1940–1944,’ in Governance 15 (April 2002), 211–240. ⁸ Yahil, The Holocaust, pp. 496–7; Adler, The Jews of Paris and the Final Solution, pp. 195, 209–217. ⁹ Marrus and Paxton, Vichy France and the Jews, p. 357.

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An analysis of the Final Solution in France highlights the importance of both inter-agency cooperation and indigenous accommodation. At the start of the Occupation, Army leaders dominated Franco-German relations and advanced a policy of economic collaboration in order to place French resources at the disposal of the German war economy.¹⁰ Interpreting increased resistance activity as the product of a flawed security policy, Hitler transferred control of French and German police forces to the SS in the middle of 1942. Once vested with executive authority, the Black Corps pressed for the immediate deportation of all Jews and disregarded French sensibilities. Bitter at the loss of authority, the MBF limited army participation in the Final Solution because the latter undermined economic collaboration. French enthusiasm for racial deportations evaporated once cooperation yielded few diplomatic benefits and the prospects for a German victory declined. Hamstrung by a severe shortage of personnel, the SS depended upon ephemeral French support and could only deport a relatively small percentage of Jews to Auschwitz. Conversely, a high degree of inter-agency cooperation and substantial indigenous accommodation fostered low survival rates. With support from an obliging Dutch bureaucracy, Reichskommissar Dr. Seyss-Inquart deported three-quarters of the Jewish population in the Netherlands. SS leaders in Belgium overcame a generally hostile public with limited resources because most Belgian Jews lived in Brussels and Antwerp. In such an environment, limited German manpower proved to be especially efficient and thus deadly. The Plenipotentiary Commanding General in Serbia, Franz B¨ohme, concurred with his SS counterparts, identified Jews and communists as the fundamental source of resistance activity, established joint army–SS ‘pursuit groups,’ and exterminated the entire Jewish population by June of 1942. On the eastern front, a military fear of resistance activity or guerillaphobia complemented SS Judeophobia and encouraged inter-agency cooperation. Soldiers worked with their SS counterparts and shot ‘all who looked askance.’¹¹ Inter-agency cooperation and local accommodation determined varying rates of survival throughout Nazioccupied Europe.

¹⁰ Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews, pp. 635–6. ¹¹ Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews, p. 676; Manoschek, ‘The extermination of the Jews in Serbia’ pp. 164–170; Shepherd, War in the Wild East, pp. 45–8, 52–7, 86–94.

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In France, Vichy politicians, French policemen, German diplomats, SS fanatics, and leaders of the German military administration all contributed to the so-called Final Solution of the Jewish Question. Diplomats associated with the German embassy in Paris regularly highlighted the dangers of the alleged Jewish menace but could not solve the so-called Jewish Question without help. Wehrmacht leaders ordered the MBF to register Jews in occupied France, confiscate Jewish property, and answer resistance activity with reprisals that focused on Jews. The military administration demonstrated its political unreliability to leaders of the Nazi regime by objecting to the confiscation of Jewish property and arguing against draconian reprisals. In response, Hitler inserted an HSSuPF in France and placed the SS in charge of French and German police forces. The SS began the Occupation as a second-class Nazi party organization in search of a spot in France. When German soldiers marched into Paris on 14 June, relations between the SS and army remained tense. The activities of SS Einsatzgruppen in Poland and a speech on 28 October 1939 in which Himmler urged members of the SS to father children out of wedlock upset conservative officers throughout the military establishment. Elements of the Waffen SS participated in the Western campaign, but they were attached to regular army formations and subject to military control. General von Brauchitsch did not allow SS police or intelligence organizations to enter France during the 1940 campaign.¹² Without the approval of OKW or OKH, a group of about twenty SD intelligence experts surreptitiously established offices near the German embassy along the avenue Foch.¹³ Elements of the Kriminalpolizei and Gestapo eluded military police and joined their SD comrades in Paris during the following weeks. By the end of the summer, sixty SS agents worked in France. Brigadeführer Dr. Max Thomas led the entire SS contingent and had the title Representative of the Security Police and SD (Beauftragter des Chefs der Sicherheitspolizei und des Sicherheitsdienst or BdS).¹⁴ His executive officer and eventual successor, Sturmbannführer Helmut Knochen, negotiated an agreement which would permit the SS to operate lawfully in occupied France ¹² Breitman, The Architect of Genocide, pp. 105–115; Müller, Das Heer und Hitler, pp. 458–466. ¹³ Steinberg and Fit`ere, Les Allemands en France, 1940–1944, pp. 39–45. ¹⁴ Once vested with executive authority in 1942, the Beauftragter des Chefs der Sicherheitspolizei und SD became Befehlshaber der Sicherheitspolizei und SD. The abbreviation, BdS, remained the same.

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on 4 October 1940. Members of the Black Corps could wear their black uniform but could not arrest suspects or confiscate property on their own. SS officers monitored the activity of Jews, foreigners, Freemasons, communists, and clerics; located and secured valuable documents and records in state libraries, Masonic lodges, and religious institutions; and investigated anti-German conspiracies. In return, the SS had to inform the MBF of their strength and activity. Finally, Himmler promised to tell the army high command and General von Stülpnagel about any change in the SS’s mission.¹⁵ To carry out his duties, Thomas established a central bureau in Paris that, in terms of structure, mimicked Reich Security Main Office (Reichssicherheitshauptamt or RSHA) in Berlin. By 1942, the Paris headquarters had seven sections focused on personnel, finance and industry, liaison with the French government, anti-German groups, criminal police (Kriminalpolizei or Kripo), intelligence, and cultural affairs. SS branch offices stood beside regional commands of the military administration in Bordeaux, Rouen, and Dijon.¹⁶ Thomas’s second-in-command, Knochen, served as the SS liaison with the MBF. SS Sturmbannführer Herbert Hagen arrived with the very first group of SS operatives, opened the branch office in Bordeaux, and supervised the collection of foreign intelligence as head of section VI. After HSSuPF Oberg arrived in 1942, Hagen moved to Paris and served as Oberg’s Chief of Staff and representative (pers¨onal Referent). One of Hagen’s colleagues, SS Sturmbannführer Kurt Lischka, ran the Paris office and served as Knochen’s agent (st¨andiger Vertreter) when the BdS was unavailable. Both Lischka and Hagen had worked with Adolf Eichmann before the war and juggled several jobs within the SS apparatus. A convoluted SS hierarchy and blurred lines of jurisdiction between various German agencies often confused outsiders.¹⁷ Because they had limited powers, SS men spent much of their time collecting anecdotal information and sending eclectic reports to superiors in Berlin. An intelligence summary of 14 December 1940 focused on disgruntled workers, characterized the atmosphere of Paris as ‘revolutionary,’ ¹⁵ USNA, RG 242/T-501/196/655–656. ¹⁶ BAK, All. Proz. 21/Proc`es Oberg-Knochen/12–13, 39–43; BALW, R 70 Frankreich/ 1/6–21; BALW, R 70 Frankreich/4/5–42. ¹⁷ Joseph Billig, La Solution finale de la question juive. Essai sur ses principes dans le III Reich et en France sous l’occupation (Paris: Centre de Documentation Juive Contremporaine, 1977), pp. 169–178, 192, 88–90, 197–8; BAK, All. Proz. 21/Proc`es Oberg-Knochen/35; BALW, R 70 Frankreich/4/7.

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and conjured images of 1870. The MBF’s December 1940 report noted a deterioration in public morale but added that subversive groups were being carefully monitored and concluded that ‘the safety of the occupation is nowhere endangered.’ SS reports focused on Jews and communists, exaggerated racial threats, and highlighted the need for racial vigilance in the Hexagon. Unlike comprehensive accounts written by the military administration, SS briefs did not assess the overall popularity of resistance groups or place resistance activity within the larger context of French society.¹⁸ While Knochen sent dubious reports to Berlin, Theodor Dannecker prepared the ground for the Final Solution. Born in 1913, Dannecker joined the SS in June of 1932 and enrolled in the Nazi party six weeks later. After the Nazi seizure of power, he served in an SS Verfügungstruppe before transferring to Columbia-Haus in Berlin, where he gained a first-hand knowledge of the Nazi concentration camp system. Dannecker secured a position as a Jewish affairs expert in the SD Main Office (SD Hauptamt) in 1937 and worked closely with Eichmann, Hagen, Lischka and, to a lesser extent, Reinhard Heydrich. Eichmann relocated to Austria after the March 1938 Anschluss and trusted Dannecker enough to leave him in charge of the Berlin office during his absence. Toward the end of 1939, Himmler integrated the SD Hauptamt into RSHA. Along with Eichmann, Dannecker joined section IV D 4 (Gestapo Jewish affairs, later renamed IV B 4) under the command of Heinrich Müller. Before World War Two, Dannecker had won the trust of influential SS leaders who would later shape the Final Solution.¹⁹ Dannecker arrived in France on 5 September 1940 and took charge of subsection J (Jewish affairs), in section IV (anti-German groups) on the staff of the BdS. Although nominally a part of Thomas’s team, he usually received his orders from and reported directly to Eichmann in Berlin. Despite a modest rank that was equivalent to an army lieutenant, 27-year-old SS-Obersturmführer Dannecker played a pivotal role in the Final Solution.²⁰ ¹⁸ Schumann and Nestler (eds.), Die faschistische Okkupationspolitik in Frankreich, pp. 126–7; USNA, RG 242/T-501/143/557; Germaine Willard, Roger Bourderon, and Gilbert Badia (eds.), ´ La Gestapo contre le parti communiste: rapports sur l’activit´e du PCF (Paris: Editions Messidor, 1984). ¹⁹ Claudia Steur, Theodor Dannecker: ein Funktion¨ar der ‘Endl¨osung’ (Essen: Klartext Verlag, 1977), pp. 16–29, 40–42; Krausnick et al., Anatomy of the SS State, pp. 163–187. ²⁰ Steur, Theodor Dannecker, pp. 45–91. Dannecker was promoted to Hauptsturmführer or captain by April 1941.

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Once in France, Dannecker tried to implement the anti-Semitic routine pioneered by SS colleagues in Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Poland that began with identifying Jews, segregating them from the rest of the population, and confiscating their assets before concluding with deportation and extermination.²¹ In conjunction with the Vichy regime, the military administration discriminated against and despoiled Jews, but the MVW characterized additional discrimination as a French matter and declined to proceed further. Unfettered by legal concerns, Dannecker established a Jewish council (Judenrat) to carry out SS orders. The resulting organization, the Coordination Committee for the Jewish Relief Organizations of Paris (Comit´e de Coordination des Oeuvres de Bienfaisance Isra¨elites a` Paris) started operations on 30 January 1941.²² Dannecker’s first Judenrat proved ineffective. Several major Jewish organizations refused to cooperate, the MBF claimed that such matters lay beyond his jurisdiction, and the French government declined to assist the young SS officer. The military administration’s reluctance to tamper in internal French affairs dissipated as assassinations increased during the fall of 1941. Under pressure from the MBF and especially the SS, the French government forced Jews to join the General Union of the Israelites of France (Union G´en´eral des Isra´elites de France or UGIF) on 29 November 1941.²³ After a year of struggle, Dannecker had established a Judenrat that could support the deportation process. Dannecker also tried to consolidate French anti-Semitic initiatives to facilitate SS control. During a conference with German diplomats on 28 February 1941, he painted an ominous picture of 50,000 French and 150,000 foreign Jews living in metropolitan Paris and convinced Ambassador Abetz to support the creation of a French office that would coordinate French anti-Semitic programs. Abetz raised the issue with Darlan during a dinner at the German embassy, and the Admiral established the Commissariat-g´en´eral aux questions juives (CGQJ) on 29 March 1941. The CGQJ placed French bureaucrats at the disposal of SS officials, facilitated despoliation, and later expedited the Final Solution. Dannecker could issue orders to Jewish ²¹ Yahil, The Holocaust, pp. 104–106, 115–122, 146–150, 176–8; Steur, Theodor Dannecker, pp. 48–53. ²² Adler, The Jews of Paris and the Final Solution, pp. 57–8; Steur, Theodor Dannecker, p. 52; Marrus and Paxton, Vichy France and the Jews, pp. 80–83; Billig, Commissariat g´en´eral aux questions juives, vol. I, p. 27. ²³ Adler, The Jews of Paris and the Final Solution, pp. 57–80.

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groups through the UGIF and to the CGQJ via the French government. He compensated for the small number of SS personnel under his direct command by creating a network of French and Jewish proxies.²⁴ With his administrative apparatus taking shape, Dannecker began to experiment with deportations but, without the power to make arrests, could not act unilaterally. Dannecker, Ambassador Abetz, the MBF, and Werner Best all asked Xavier Vallat, the newly appointed head of the CGQJ, to demonstrate France’s commitment to racial ideals and arrest ‘politically unpleasant Jews’ during a series of meetings held on 3 and 4 April 1941. Six weeks later, French police sent out 6,500 billets verts and arrested 3,747 Polish, Czech, and Austrian Jews.²⁵ Playing on fears of increased communist activity, Dannecker persuaded the MBF to launch a second round-up on 20 August 1941. After meeting with junior army officials, 2,400 French policemen sealed the 11th arrondissement and detained both French and foreign Jews without informing superiors in Vichy until after the fact. By the end of the four-day operation, French police had seized 4,232 Jews in 16 different sections of the French capital.²⁶ In response to a series of attacks carried out between 2 and 6 December, 260 French and 200 German policemen seized 743 French Jews during a third round-up. Dannecker characterized the 1941 raids as ‘restrained,’ but added that they did indeed address the so-called Jewish Question.²⁷ French police sent prisoners seized by the 1941 round-ups to concentration camps in Pithiviers, Beaune-la-Rolande (Loiret), and Drancy that were run by French policemen under German supervision. Drancy served as a source of hostages and, later, the anteroom of Auschwitz. Round-ups carried out in 1941 filled all three camps well beyond their capacity. Appalled by conditions in Drancy, a German military commission ordered the release of approximately 900 sick and dying prisoners in October 1941. On ²⁴ Schumann and Nestler (eds.), Die faschistische Okkupationspolitik in Frankreich, pp. 148–9; Billig, La Solution finale de la question juive, p. 120; Rayski, The Choice of the Jews under Vichy, pp. 22–4. ²⁵ BALW, R 70 Frankreich/23/3–5; BALW, R 70 Frankreich/32/9–13; Kaspi, Les Juifs pendant l’occupation, pp. 212–214; Rajsfus, La Police de Vichy, pp. 67–71. Kasten, Gute Franzosen, p. 96, note 302, argues that the SS instigated the 14 May raids. ²⁶ Klarsfeld, La Shoah en France, vol. I, pp. 28–32; vol. 2, pp. 183–199; Kaspi, Les Juifs pendant l’occupation, pp. 214–215; Rajsfus, La Police de Vichy, pp. 71–3. ²⁷ Klarsfeld, Vichy–Auschwitz, 1942, pp. 32–3; Monneray (ed.), La Pers´ecution des juifs en France, pp. 117–121; Steur, Theodor Dannecker, pp. 55–8.

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Figure 9.1. Reinhard Heydrich. Photograph courtesy of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum.

2 January 1942, Best informed Knochen that problems on the eastern front created a transportation shortage and prevented the deportation of Jews until February or March 1942.²⁸ Overcrowding and transportation shortages precluded further arrests and deportations respectively. Dannecker discussed the situation with Eichmann at a conference in Berlin on 4 March 1942. Eichmann told his assistant that RSHA could only accept 5,000 French Jews in 1942. He advised Dannecker to strip all deportees of their French citizenship to forestall French protests. Heydrich secured transport for the deportation of 1,000 Jews and approved plans for 4,000 more ‘evacuations,’ but he told Dannecker that widespread deportations would have to wait until 1943. After conferring with Heydrich ²⁸ BAK, All. Proz. 21/212/99–100; Marrus and Paxton, Vichy France and the Jews, pp. 251–5; Adler, The Jews of Paris and the Final Solution, pp. 39–40; BALW, R 70 Frankreich/23/8.

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and Eichmann, Dannecker (recently promoted to the rank of captain) prepared to arrest a limited number of foreign Jews.²⁹ The SS enjoyed a bit of luck. During a chance conversation with a Luftwaffe major, Dannecker learned that the German officer in charge of French railroads, Lieutenant-General Otto Kohl, was ‘very interested in the Jewish Question.’ He arranged a meeting with the general and discussed the Jewish question for over an hour on 13 May. The SS captain discovered that Kohl was ‘an inveterate adversary of the Jews’ who ‘completely approved of the Final Solution.’ The general promised to supply Dannecker with all of the rolling stock that he needed. Although Heydrich could not secure transportation for large-scale deportations, Dannecker found a way around the bottleneck through Lieutenant-General Kohl. As a result of Dannecker’s ingenuity, RSHA raised the number of expected deportations from 5,000 Jews envisioned by Heydrich on 4 March to 100,000 during an 11 June 1942 meeting in Berlin. Eleven days later, Eichmann refined the transportation schedule to accommodate 40,000 deportations from occupied France, 40,000 from the Netherlands, and 10,000 from Belgium.³⁰ The first convoy to Auschwitz left Compi`egne on 27 March 1942. Like most deportation trains, it carried over one thousand Jews in sealed box cars to conserve guards. Four more convoys left Drancy, Pithiviers, and Beaune-la-Rolande in June, followed by eight in July, thirteen in both August and September, and four in November. Dannecker paid for the operation by charging the French government 700 reichsmarks per prisoner. June departures relieved prison overcrowding and literally cleared the way for more arrests. The installation of Oberg as HSSuPF further encouraged the Final Solution. Beginning on 1 June 1942, SS policemen could arrest people on their own, negotiate with the Vichy government, issue orders to French police in Occupied France, and circumvent the military administration.³¹ Dannecker needed more Jews to stock Kohl’s trains and fulfill Eichmann’s schedule. On 25 June 1942, he met with Jean Leguay, who oversaw police affairs in the occupied zone and worked for Ren´e Bousquet, the ²⁹ Klarsfeld, Vichy–Auschwitz, 1942, pp. 59–63, 196–9; Monneray (ed.), La Pers´ecution des juifs en France, pp. 124–5; BALW, R 70 Frankreich/23/14–17. ³⁰ BAK, All. Proz. 21/212/131–133; ADAP, ser. E, vol. III, pp. 43–4. ³¹ Klarsfeld, La Shoah en France, vol. I, p. 205; BAK, All. Proz. 21/212/131–133, 149; USNA, RG 242/T-501/172/441.

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Secretary-General of Police. Dannecker demanded that French police arrest of a total of 32,000 Jews: 22,000 Jews living in metropolitan Paris and 10,000 from unoccupied France. He insisted that 40 per cent of the Parisian Jews be either French or denaturalized French citizens but allowed Vichy to select the categories (age, gender, citizenship, etc.) of Jews to be arrested in unoccupied France. The SS captain characterized deportations as security measures and disregarded Leguay’s objections.³² Laval heard about Dannecker’s demands from Bousquet, and the French Prime Minister announced his opposition to Dannecker’s proposals during a cabinet meeting on 26 June that Marshal P´etain attended. With support from Laval and Bousquet, Leguay refused Dannecker’s order.³³ By directing French police to arrest French Jews, a mere SS captain brought the SS and Vichy government to an impasse. Dannecker’s order coincided with the negotiation of the Oberg–Bousquet accords. The latter defined the rights and responsibilities of both SS and French police forces throughout France. With few SS personnel at his disposal, Oberg needed French help. For their part, Laval and Bousquet wanted to secure a place in Hitler’s new order and elicit German concessions by cooperating with the Reich, but they did not want French police to become Nazi stooges. Demands made by Dannecker to Leguay seemed to confirm fears that the SS would simply take over the French police. As a junior official working in a specialized office, Dannecker may not have been able to appreciate the big picture, but by embroiling Oberg and Knochen in a diplomatic confrontation, he earned the enmity of his superiors.³⁴ Vichy officials balked at Dannecker’s high-handed methods and objected to the deportation of assimilated French Jews, but they did not oppose deportations in principle. In a February 1942 memo to Zeitschel, the German Consul-General in Vichy, Roland Krug von Nidda, reported that Vichy leaders would support the deportation of 1,000–5,000 Jews per month if the deportations were carried out discreetly. During the 26 June cabinet meeting, Laval refined Vichy’s position and protected French Jews by serving up foreign Jews. Following P´etain’s lead, the Prime Minister opposed Dannecker’s plan because it did not distinguish assimilated French ³² Klarsfeld, Vichy–Auschwitz, 1942, pp. 215–216. ³³ Klarsfeld, Vichy–Auschwitz, 1942, pp. 74–5, 221. ³⁴ Steur, Theodor Dannecker, pp. 85–91.

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from foreign or naturalized Jews. Oberg, Knochen, Lischka, and Hagen discussed Dannecker’s plan for 32,000 deportations with Bousquet on 2 July 1942. The Secretary-General of Police characterized the arrest of French Jews by French police as ‘troublesome’ (gênant) but offered 10,000 foreign Jews from the unoccupied zone and did not object to German police arresting French Jews in occupied territory.³⁵ Knochen replied on behalf of the SS. Hitler, the BdS explained, had always emphasized the necessity of a decisive solution to the Jewish Question. According to Knochen, the Führer would not understand why the French government objected to the arrest of French Jews. The BdS implied that French obstruction might have political repercussions. Bousquet countered with an offer to have French police arrest foreign Jews throughout France but continued to insist that French Jews not be detained. Oberg, Knochen, and Hagen repudiated Dannecker’s plan and accepted Bousquet’s compromise because the latter included vital assistance from the French police. As a reward for his tact, Dannecker received a transfer to Bulgaria.³⁶ Talks between Bousquet and the SS led to the so-called V`el d’Hiv round-up. In order to demonstrate France’s commitment to Hitler’s new order, French police began to arrest German, Austrian, Polish, Czech, Russian, and stateless Jews between the ages of 16 and 50 on 16 July 1942 throughout metropolitan Paris. Dannecker expected to catch approximately 22,000 victims and planned transportation schedules accordingly. Unable to fill their original quotas, French and German policemen began to disregard age and arrested entire families. After two days, French police had detained 12,884 foreign Jews, including 3,031 men, 5,802 women, and 4,051 children. They incarcerated Jewish prisoners in a local sports arena, the V´elodrome d’Hiver, before moving prisoners to concentration camps in Drancy, Pithiviers, and Beaune-la-Rolande.³⁷ While French police arrested Jews throughout Paris, Dannecker searched for new sources of victims during an eight-day tour of the unoccupied zone. He discovered that French officials had already interned a large number of non-French Jews in southern France. Upon his return to Paris, ³⁵ Jean-Paul Cointet, Pierre Laval (Paris: Fayard, 1993), pp. 398–400; Klarsfeld, Vichy–Auschwitz, 1942, pp. 196, 221, 227–232. ³⁶ Klarsfeld, La Shoah en France, vol. II, pp. 445–451, 593. ³⁷ BAK, All. Proz. 21/212/149–153, 139–141; Klarsfeld, Vichy–Auschwitz, 1942, pp. 238–240; Monneray (ed.), La Pers´ecution des juifs en France, pp. 148–151.

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Figure 9.2. Pithiviers internment camp c.1941. Photograph courtesy the Bundesarchiv, Bild 183-S69238.

the SS captain reported his findings to superiors and, in light of the paltry results of the V´el d’Hiv round-up, began to press for the deportation of foreign Jews in unoccupied France.³⁸ Dannecker asked Knochen to discuss the matter with Bousquet, and SS Lieutenant (Obersturmführer) Heinz R¨othke, Dannecker’s eventual successor, made the same request to Leguay during a conference on 27 July. Leguay may have anticipated R¨othke’s appeal, because he immediately agreed to turn over foreign Jews interned by the French government in southern France. The next morning, Leguay ordered four transports to Drancy that would begin on 7 August 1942.³⁹ Leguay’s transports moved 3,429 Jewish prisoners from various camps in southern France to Drancy between 7 and 14 August. After a short stay in Drancy, most continued to Auschwitz, and most perished shortly after they ³⁸ Monneray (ed.), La Pers´ecution des juifs en France, pp. 158–164. ³⁹ Klarsfeld, Vichy–Auschwitz, 1942, pp. 279, 292–4.

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arrived in the death camp. Transports exhausted the supply of incarcerated Jews in unoccupied France and necessitated more arrests. Planning ahead, Knochen asked Bousquet to arrest more foreign Jews and strip recently naturalized Jews of their French citizenship during a meeting on 29 July. The Secretary-General of Police promised to discuss the matter with Laval.⁴⁰ With the Prime Minister’s approval, French police prepared to arrest 15,000 foreign Jews in unoccupied France between 26 and 29 August 1942, but the ensuing round-ups yielded only 6,584 Jews who were eligible for deportation. Between 25 August and 15 September, nine trains carried 7,095 foreigners and Jews from camps in southern France to Drancy.⁴¹ French and German police captured 8,722 Jews during three roundups carried out in 1941, and the V`el d’Hiv raids yielded another 12,884 Jews eligible for deportation. By 15 September 1942, French and German authorities incarcerated a total of 21,606 Jews in occupied France. French officials supplied another 10,524 Jews from southern to occupied France by September and brought the number of Jews who were eligible for deportation to 32,130. Between 27 March and 15 September 1942, a total of 32 trains carried 32,085 prisoners from occupied France to Auschwitz. Although round-ups caught far fewer prisoners than expected, arrests managed to keep pace with scheduled deportations. Dannecker and R¨othke certainly understood the consequences of failure. A shortage of Jewish prisoners in Bordeaux forced R¨othke to cancel a deportation train on 15 July. The very next day, Eichmann called Paris, claimed that the stoppage undermined his credibility with German railroad officials and, more ominously, threatened to take the matter up with the head of the Gestapo.⁴² Neither Dannecker nor R¨othke canceled another train. Deportations to Auschwitz followed a precise schedule and had to be coordinated with arrests carried out by French police throughout the Hexagon. To keep pace, Oberg, Knochen, and Dannecker regularly pressed the Vichy regime to turn over more Jews. On 28 August, Eichmann decided to accelerate the pace of deportations from three to six transports per week. The man in charge of logistical ⁴⁰ Klarsfeld, Vichy–Auschwitz, 1942, pp. 146–7; Klarsfeld, La Shoah en France, vol. II, pp. 595–8, 602–3. ⁴¹ Monneray (ed.), La Pers´ecution des juifs en France, pp. 151–3; Klarsfeld, Vichy–Auschwitz, 1942, pp. 158–9, 337–8, 373–4, 377; Kaspi, Les Juifs pendant l’occupation, pp. 135–7. ⁴² BAK, All. Proz. 21/212/189–191; Klarsfeld, La Shoah en France, pp. 506–507.

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support for the Final Solution anticipated a transportation shortage in October and ordered subordinates to ‘evacuate’ as many Jews as possible before military exigencies consumed all available rolling stock. In keeping with his new schedule of daily transports during October, Eichmann asked Knochen, Lischka, and Hagen to collect guards for the trains and persuade the Vichy government to arrest more Jews. He allowed Dannecker’s successor, R¨othke, to concentrate on foreign Jews and promised to discuss the deportation of Italian, Portuguese, Spanish, and Swiss Jews who were in France with the Reich Foreign Ministry.⁴³ Initial transports had already evacuated most of the unwanted foreign Jews incarcerated in various French and German camps. As summer turned to fall, Eichmann and company began to search for new categories of Jews who could be arrested. SS Lieutenant R¨othke responded to Eichmann’s directive by urging Knochen, Lischka, and Hagen to adopt a more militant stance toward Vichy. In a series of reports and memoranda, he implored his superiors to press the French government for more arrests in occupied France. Starting around 16 September, he began to organize another round-up in the occupied zone that would be comparable in scope to the V´el d’Hiv operation. R¨othke wanted French police to arrest Jewish writers, doctors, professors, lawyers, and businessmen who lived in and around Paris. The SS lieutenant planned to arrest entire families and expected to seize approximately 23,000 prominent French Jews.⁴⁴ Although it had targeted foreign Jews and unpopular Jewish refugees, the V´el d’Hiv roundup had aroused some public dissent. Arrests planned for late September targeted assimilated French Jews and promised to elicit a stronger response from a wider segment of French society. While Eichmann and R¨othke planned more arrests and deportations, French leaders moved in the opposite direction. According to a German diplomat, the Vichy government supported discreet deportations. Arrests made by French policemen preserved the illusion of French sovereignty, satisfied German demands, and eliminated unwanted foreigners who allegedly took jobs from native Frenchmen.⁴⁵ Much to Vichy’s dismay, round-ups carried out in July and August had aroused protest from Catholics, foreign ⁴³ BAK, All. Proz. 21/212/227–229; Klarsfeld, Vichy–Auschwitz, 1942, pp. 392–3. ⁴⁴ Klarsfeld, Vichy–Auschwitz, 1942, pp. 400–402, 419–420, 427–9, 178, 443–5. ⁴⁵ Klarsfeld, La Shoah en France, vol. II, pp. 333–4; Caron, Uneasy Asylum, pp. 338–340.

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diplomats, the general public in neutral countries, and even some Axis allies. Furthermore, cooperation yielded no appreciable concessions from the Reich. During a meeting with Hagen on 25 August 1942, Bousquet argued that he had to proceed with caution because of protests from Cardinal Gerlier and the Archbishop of Toulouse.⁴⁶ Religious, popular, and international condemnation of the deportation of foreign Jews and especially Jewish children forced Vichy to reconsider cooperation with regard to deportations. Laval expressed a new-found reluctance at a dinner hosted by Ambassador de Brinon on 2 September. The Prime Minister told Oberg and Abetz that opposition from Cardinal Gerlier made further deportations difficult. He offered to deliver German, Austrian, Czech, Polish, and Hungarian Jews to the SS and insinuated that Belgian, Dutch, and some naturalized French Jews could be added to the list, but only after initial categories of deportees had been exhausted. Mindful of public opinion, Laval tried to proceed with caution. One week later, Leguay reiterated why French police could not make additional arrests and asked R¨othke to suspend deportations until the middle of October.⁴⁷ Opposition from the Catholic Church made Laval, Bousquet, and Leguay reluctant to proceed with further arrests and deportations. Eichmann and R¨othke pressed for a substantial increase in the deportation rate that would necessitate further arrests. The Vichy regime feared the political consequences of another major round-up. Oberg and Knochen stood in the middle with the power to set German policy in the Hexagon. SS Major-General (Brigadeführer) Oberg answered to Himmler and did not have to follow orders from RSHA or Eichmann. The HSSuPF discussed accelerated deportations with his boss, and the two agreed not to arrest French Jews. SS Colonel (Standartenführer) Knochen outranked SS Lieutenant-Colonel (Obersturmbannführer) Eichmann and could, with some risk, defy RSHA staff officers. To protect himself from recrimination, Knochen informed Eichmann that the arrest of French Jews would disrupt the general political situation and threaten Prime Minister Laval. ⁴⁶ Kaspi, Les Juifs pendant l’occupation, pp. 241–4; Cohen, Pers´ecutions et sauvetages, pp. 300–316; ADAP, ser. E, vol. III, pp. 419–420, 425; Klarsfeld, La Shoah en France, vol. II, pp. 863–4. ⁴⁷ Cointet, Pierre Laval, pp. 398–403, 425–7; Klarsfeld, Vichy–Auschwitz, 1942, pp. 407–409, 419–420.

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With Himmler’s approval and support from Oberg, Knochen quashed Eichmann’s plans for another large-scale round-up.⁴⁸ Knochen’s policy did not preclude further arrests or deportations. French police continued to seize foreign Jews and, under German pressure, increased the list of eligible nationalities. Raids launched on 14 September caught approximately 200 Dutch, Lithuanian, Estonian, Bulgarian, and Yugoslav Jews in metropolitan Paris. R¨othke reported the seizure of 1,594 Rumanian Jews on 24 September. Knochen arranged the arrest of Belgian Jews on 6 October, and the Foreign Ministry allowed the police to imprison Greek Jews one week later.⁴⁹ Arrests allowed Vichy to send 483 foreign Jews from unoccupied France to Drancy between 25 September and 22 October 1942. In turn, R¨othke scheduled seven trains from Drancy to Auschwitz during the latter half of September, and four more trains followed in November. Oberg and Knochen followed a policy that can be characterized as moderate only when juxtaposed against more ambitious plans proposed by Eichmann and R¨othke.⁵⁰ Frustrated by restrictions imposed from above, R¨othke’s staff launched their own personal round-up on the night of 22/23 September 1942. The wildcat operation captured only 76 Jews and underlined the central importance of cooperation.⁵¹ Without French assistance, the SS had reason to believe that future German round-ups would yield unsatisfactory results. The SS could not expect substantial assistance from the MBF because personnel transfers had already reduced the forces under Stülpnagel’s control. Furthermore, the legacy of 1940 art confiscations and October 1941 synagogue bombing made cordial cooperation with the MBF unlikely. Oberg and Knochen had to accommodate the Vichy government if they wanted to deport more than a handful of Jews. With Himmler’s approval, the first round of deportations wound down in November 1942. During the entire year, 43 trains carried 41,951 people to Germany. Only 805 deportees returned to France after the war. Aside from the December 1941 round-ups that were organized by the MBF under the guise of reprisals, SS officers played a major role in every sweep that targeted Jews. Dannecker and R¨othke planned the raids and ordered ⁴⁸ ⁴⁹ ⁵⁰ ⁵¹

Klarsfeld, Vichy–Auschwitz, 1942, pp. 181–2, 454. Klarsfeld, Vichy–Auschwitz, 1942, pp. 429–430, 177, 452, 472–3, 185–6. Klarsfeld, Vichy–Auschwitz, 1942, pp. 159, 191. Klarsfeld, Vichy–Auschwitz, 1942, p. 477.

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the UGIF to provide food for prisoners and shelter for children orphaned by the deportation process. Eichmann supplied transportation. Oberg and Knochen delivered French cooperation. The SS oversaw every stage of the deportation process and drove the entire operation forward. Convoys to Auschwitz ceased between 11 November 1942 and 8 February 1943. During the pause, Germany responded to the Allied invasion of North Africa by occupying southern France in November 1942. Himmler extended the HSSuPF’s brief to include the newly occupied zone, and additional anti-Semitic measures followed in the wake of Germany’s advance. Expansion into southern France spread SS resources over a wider area, and neither OKW nor RSHA could provide substantial reinforcements. With approximately 2,200 SS policemen at their disposal, SS leaders had to rely on French support that would only be forthcoming if the Black Corps accommodated some French concerns.⁵² SS officials viewed the ‘stateless’ Jews in newly occupied France as both a security threat and a pool of potential deportees who could fill trains bound for Auschwitz. The new year brought the SS both opportunities for more arrests and risks stemming from their dependence on French support. Despite increasing French lassitude and a dearth of reliable security forces, Heinrich Himmler outlined an ambitious plan for France. In his 18 December 1942 letter to Martin Bormann, the Reichsführer called for a ‘radical fight against communists and all of their helpers’ and the ‘evacuation’ of Jews.⁵³ After Himmler learned about four bombings in Marseille, the Reichsführer decided to make an example of France’s second largest city. On the night of 22/23 January, French and German police spread through the streets of Marseille and began to check identity cards. Under the direct supervision of Oberg and Bousquet, French and German police arrested 5,956 people, including about 800 Jews. The two-day round-up culminated in the physical destruction of the old-port quarter of Marseille, which some regarded as an insalubrious den of ‘criminals.’⁵⁴ ⁵² USNA, RG 242/T-77/788/5517241–5517243; Serge Klarsfeld, Vichy–Auschwitz: Le Rˆole de Vichy dans la solution finale de la question juive en France—1943–1944 (Paris: Fayard, 1985), pp. 12–13; Marrus and Paxton, Vichy France and the Jews, pp. 302–306; BALW, R 58/642/fiche 1/1–9. ⁵³ BALW, NS 19/1929/fiche 2/61–64. ⁵⁴ Jacques Delarue, Trafic et crimes sous l’occupation (Paris: Fayard, 1968), pp. 242–250; Donna Ryan, The Holocaust and the Jews of Marseille (Urbana and Chicago, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1996), pp. 176–193; Froment, Ren´e Bousquet, pp. 362–399.

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Figure 9.3. Racial deportations, 1943–1944.

Described as a security measure, the destruction of part of Marseille both advertised German power and supplied Auschwitz with Jews. Smaller round-ups in Rouen, Paris, and Lyon complemented the Marseille operation. In response to an assassination on 12 January 1943, German police demanded the arrest of both French and foreign Jews in Rouen. With French support, SS agents arrested 222 Jews who were immediately sent to Drancy. On the night of 11 February 1943, French police arrested 1,569 of the 7,313 registered foreign Jews who remained in Paris. The operation captured just over 20 per cent of the Jews who were eligible for deportation. Two nights later, an unknown assailant killed two Luftwaffe officers in the heart of Paris. Following German orders, French police dutifully seized 2,000 Jews in southern France. Under the direction of Klaus Barbie, SS agents in Lyon targeted the leadership of the UGIF on 9 February and caught 84 Jews without assistance from the French police. Trains immediately carried the unfortunate prisoners to Drancy.⁵⁵ French police continued to support German round-ups as long as they targeted foreign Jews or could be characterized as security measures, but they became less effective as the prospect of a German victory faded. Arrests in Rouen, Marseille, Paris, and Lyon captured enough prisoners to necessitate further deportations. On 21 January, Knochen informed RSHA that 1,200 Jews in Drancy qualified for deportation and requested ⁵⁵ Klarsfeld, La Shoah en France, vol. III, pp. 1311, 1359–1360, 1363–4, 1374–5; Kaspi, Les Juifs pendant l’occupation, p. 248.

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two trains. Five days later, regional and local SD commanders received orders to send all Jews in their custody to Drancy. SS Lieutenant R¨othke added a third train and scheduled deportations from Drancy to Auschwitz on 9, 11, and 13 February.⁵⁶ Speaking through a subordinate, Bousquet warned R¨othke that French police would not guard trains carrying French Jews to Auschwitz. Despite these threats, French gendarmes escorted the 13 February 1943 convoy and subsequent transports that carried some French Jews to the German border without incident. Beginning in February, trains left Drancy on a more or less regular basis. Seventeen trains carried 17,069 Jews to Auschwitz and Sobibor during 1943, but only 466 of the Jewish passengers returned to France after the war.⁵⁷ Modest round-ups failed to satisfy RSHA. During an 11 February 1943 visit to Paris, Eichmann pressed for a ‘maximalist evacuation program’ that would include French Jews. Knochen immediately discounted Eichmann’s scheme in a letter to Heinrich Müller (of the Gestapo), but R¨othke began to prepare for 8–10,000 deportations per week. In order to obtain the necessary victims, R¨othke understood that he would need to negotiate with the French and Italian governments. Throughout the spring and summer of 1943, German officials lobbied the Vichy regime to strip French citizenship from Jews naturalized since 1927, but the plan ultimately collapsed when Prime Minister Laval refused to promulgate the necessary legislation in August of 1943.⁵⁸ In order to facilitate the identification of potential victims, SS officials also tried to persuade the French government to pass legislation that forced Jews to wear the Star of David. Marshal P´etain blocked the appropriate French legislation and forced the MBF to impose the ‘Jewish Star’ by decree: this regulation only applied to occupied France.⁵⁹ The highest levels of the Vichy regime balked at new anti-Semitic measures that would feed the deportation process. R¨othke’s second source of Jews lived under the protection of the Italian government in southern France.⁶⁰ Following the Allied invasion of North Africa, Italian forces seized control of seven French d´epartements east of the ⁵⁶ BALW, R 70 Frankreich/23/25; Klarsfeld, Vichy–Auschwitz, 1943–1944, pp. 200, 216–217. ⁵⁷ Klarsfeld, Vichy–Auschwitz, 1943–1944, pp. 216–217, 220–221, 247–9, 255, 393. ⁵⁸ Klarsfeld, La Shoah en France, vol. III, pp. 1368, 1412–1414, 1610; see above pp. 202–203. ⁵⁹ Poznanski, Jews in France during World War II, pp. 237–250; Klarsfeld, La Shoah en France, vol II, pp. 353–4, 376, 379–381, vol. III, pp. 1368–1371. ⁶⁰ Susan Zuccotti, The Holocaust, the French, and the Jews (New York: Basic Books, 1993); and Daniel Capri, Between Mussolini and Hitler: The Jews and the Italian Authorities in France and Tunisia

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Rhˆone river and protected the 25,000 Jews within their jurisdiction.⁶¹ The Italian Consul General in Nice, Alberto Calisse, blocked French efforts to mark the identity papers of French or foreign Jews on 27 December 1942, and the Italian Foreign Office supported the consul’s stance two days later. Knochen detailed Italian obstruction in two reports sent to RSHA on 13 January and 2 February 1943. Schleier described similar problems to the Foreign Office in Berlin and concluded that the Final Solution could only be carried out in the Italian zone after Germany and Italy resolved their differing views on the so-called ‘Jewish Question.’⁶² Himmler raised the matter with Ribbentrop during a meeting on 29 January, and the Nazi Foreign Minister directed the German Ambassador in Rome, Hans Georg von Mackenson, to personally discuss the problem with Mussolini.⁶³ On 7 April, Knochen informed RSHA that Italian officials continued to block French and German anti-Semitic measures. The BdS informed his superiors that the Italian commandant in Valence (Drˆome) would not allow Vichy officials to deport twenty-nine foreign Jews. Citing several examples of obstruction, Knochen claimed Italian officials made the Final Solution ‘impossible’ in the Italian zone. Ribbentrop’s diplomatic intervention and lower-level contacts in Paris and southern France all failed to produce results. The Italian example encouraged French resistance and limited deportations throughout southern France. Knochen argued that Jews in the Cˆote d’Azur posed a ‘serious danger’ to the security of German forces and begged RSHA to do something.⁶⁴ Mussolini’s arrest on the morning of 25 July 1943 further discouraged Italian cooperation. Italian officers who controlled the southeastern corner of France had little incentive to cooperate with the SS while a new government under Marshal Pietro Badoglio negotiated a surrender with the Allies. Jews gathered in the Italian zone to escape persecution at the hands of French and German police.⁶⁵ Because of Italian obstruction, (Hanover, NH: Brandeis University Press, 1994); Jonathan Steinberg, All or Nothing: The Axis and the Holocaust, 1941–1943 (New York: Routledge, 1990), pp. 105–130, 157–164. ⁶¹ BALW, R 70 Frankreich/23/26–30; BALW, NS 19/3402/fiche 2/76–77. ⁶² Klarsfeld, Vichy–Auschwitz, 1943–1944, pp. 196–7, 202–203; Klarsfeld, La Shoah en France, vol. III, pp. 1312–13, 1337–1347; ADAP, ser. E, vol. V, pp. 98, 132–3. ⁶³ Klarsfeld, Vichy–Auschwitz, 1943–1944, pp. 225–7; BALW, NS 19/3402/fiche 2/76–77; ADAP, ser. E, vol V, 368–373. ⁶⁴ Klarsfeld, Vichy–Auschwitz, 1943–1944, p. 264. ⁶⁵ Denis Mack Smith, Mussolini: A Biography (New York: Vintage Books, 1983), pp. 294–9; Weinberg, A World at Arms, pp. 595–601; ADAP, ser. E, vol. 6, pp. 255–6.

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neither French nor German police forces could arrest Jews in provinces east of the Rhˆone river before Italian troops left. Failed diplomacy precluded the large scale round-ups imagined by Eichmann and R¨othke at the start of 1943. German pressure could not force Laval to change French denaturalization laws or elicit Italian support in southern France. A substantial report written by the Germany embassy in Paris and dated 27 July 1943 described the impotence of French authorities in that city. Supply shortages, Allied advances, and German setbacks helped many Frenchmen to recover from the shock of the 1940 defeat and begin to question an inevitable German victory. Although Laval continued to serve German interests, he could not impose his will upon the entire French bureaucracy. Junior French policemen began to prepare for an Allied invasion and a possible change in government. An intelligence brief dated July 1943 claimed that French policemen in Toulouse would arrest fanatical supporters of the Vichy regime in the event of an Allied invasion, and similar reports from Orleans, Lyon, and Marseille followed in subsequent months. Regulations formulated in 1943 and refined in 1944 allowed French bureaucrats to prepare for the end of the Vichy regime.⁶⁶ A determined but pragmatic anti-Semite, Knochen adapted this policy to suit new political circumstances. According to a report forwarded to Berlin by the BdS, French police continued to make an essential contribution in the fight against communism but would not expose themselves to advance German interests. The SS expected French police to remain neutral during the initial stages of an Allied landing; as soon as Axis or Allied forces gained an advantage, Knochen assumed French police would support the likely victor. Knochen advised superiors to limit the weapons available to French policemen and promised to monitor the situation with care.⁶⁷ The BdS continued to appreciate the value of Vichy’s cooperation, but he acknowledged the limited scope and declining value of French support. Specific round-ups carried out in 1943 followed the course predicted by the BdS; massive raids gave way to routine police work and smallscale arrests. French police checked the papers of 130,000 people every ⁶⁶ ADAP, ser. E, vol. VI, pp. 308–325; BALW, R 70 Frankreich/17/1–11. ⁶⁷ BALW, R 70 Frankreich/13/110–131.

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two weeks, and their efforts yielded enough prisoners to maintain the concentration camp population and fulfill regular deportations. Between 28 April and 6 May, German police combed trains in southwest France and arrested all who qualified as Jews.⁶⁸ Once Italian troops finally abandoned their zone of occupation in southeastern France, German troops and an SS commando under the command of Alois Brunner began to arrest French and foreign Jews around Nice. Aided by a small number of Jewish informants, Brunner’s small commando caught 1,819 Jews between 10 and 14 September. By the end of 1943, they had seized less than 10 per cent of the estimated 25,000 Jews in the area. The legacy of Italian resistance degraded subsequent German round-ups.⁶⁹ A shortage of reliable SS agents, uncooperative French authorities, and a sympathetic local population helped many Jews evade the Nice roundup and set the pattern for 1944. French police seized 48 per cent of the registered Jews in Bordeaux and Dijon during 10–11 January and 24 February 1944 raids. The SS commander in Poitiers launched a surprise round-up on 30 January and reported the arrest of 76 per cent of registered Jews in the region. German and joint Franco-German roundups in the occupied zone could be successful as late as February 1944, but sweeps carried out in southern France often yielded meager results.⁷⁰ German police found their French counterparts to be most accommodating in the occupied zone. Under strong German pressure, Vichy authorities had purged Jews, Freemasons, communists, and other ‘unreliable elements’ from the French police force during the first two years of the Occupation, and their efforts yielded a dividend of continued cooperation in its final months. The presence of German troops and/or a strong communist threat also encouraged effective accommodation in coastal and industrialized districts. French authorities proved less amenable as the threat of an Allied invasion increased and when German threats could not backed up by force. During the final year of the Occupation, French police cooperation ranged from cordial if unenthusiastic in the occupied zone to non-existent in the newly occupied zone.⁷¹ ⁶⁸ Poznanski, Jews in France during World War Two, pp. 327, 374–7. ⁶⁹ Rayski, The Choice of the Jews under Vichy, pp. 201–203; Cohen, Pers´ecutions et sauvetages, pp. 449–462. ⁷⁰ Poznanski, Jews in France during World War II, pp. 390–393; Kasten, Gute Franzosen, pp. 172–5. ⁷¹ USNA, RG 242/T-501/184/1061; USNA, RG 242/T-501/184/1061.

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On 14 April 1944, Knochen eschewed official French collaboration and ordered SS forces to arrest all people who qualified as Jews without regard for age or citizenship. Subalterns detained entire Jewish households including children, in-laws, and parents. The BdS sanctioned the arrest of Aryans married to Jews and Jews holding an American or British passport, but he ruled that the latter should be placed in labor camps. Knochen ordered his minions to lock up the houses or apartments and turn the keys over to Rosenberg’s Dienststelle Westen des Reichsministeriums für die besetzten Ostgebiete. In turn, Rosenberg shipped much of the booty to the Reich for distribution to Germans made homeless by the Allied bombing campaign. During the last months of 1943 and the first months of 1944, French police carried out indiscriminate round-ups with little enthusiasm. Knochen recognized the declining value of Vichy’s cooperation and abandoned efforts to accommodate Vichy concerns. To compensate for the loss of effective French assistance, the BdS gradually embraced the Milice, a French paramilitary organization founded in January 1943, and appealed to French greed by offering a bounty for information leading to capture of Jews.⁷² Knochen’s last-ditch policy failed to increase the number of deportations during the final months of the Occupation. The number fell far short of the 41,951 Jews sent to their death in 1942 and failed to keep pace with 1943 deportations. The BdS could not overcome French indifference by using SS forces, unleashing determined collaborators, or offering bounties to greedy opportunists. Eight days before the liberation of Paris, the last deportation train left Drancy with 51 unfortunate Jews. Between 20 January and 17 August 1944, SS functionaries sent 17 trains filled with 14,833 Jews to death camps in the east.⁷³ SS personnel championed an aggressive anti-Semitic policy throughout the Occupation. Bereft of power in 1940, members of the Black Corps consistently described Jews as a dire security threat. While senior SS officers demonstrated their enthusiasm for radical racial measures by bombing Parisian synagogues, Theodor Dannecker developed and tested his deportation apparatus. Building upon the MBF’s anti-partisan policy, the SS characterized deportations as security measures and began to carry ⁷² Vries, Sonderstab Musik, pp. 85–101; Ally, Hitler’s Beneficiaries, pp. 144–152, 280–293; ADAP, ser. E, vol. VI, p. 484; BAK, All. Proz. 21/212/263–275; Jacques Delperri´e de Bayac, Histoire de la Milice, 1918–1945 (Paris: Fayard, 1994). ⁷³ Klarsfeld, Vichy–Auschwitz, 1943–1944, p. 393.

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out the Final Solution but had to rely on French assistance because of personnel shortages. Acting on its own accord, the French government defamed, discriminated against, and despoiled Jews. The Darlan and Laval administrations extended anti-immigrant measures initiated by the Daladier government and furnished Germany with policemen to round up foreign Jews. Laval sanctioned the incarceration of French Jews when arrests could be characterized as reprisals, but he refused to expand the deportation process to include assimilated French Jews because it alienated segments of the French populace and did not yield diplomatic concessions. The Prime Minister did not object to deportations on principled grounds. Once enmeshed in petty discrimination, despoliation, and the deportation of foreign Jews, Laval and the Vichy government could not reverse course and expect to survive. In for a penny, in for a pound. During a monologue on 5 January 1942, Hitler explained the crux of his strategy to his entourage. ‘The French who have compromised themselves with us will find it to their own interest that we should remain in Paris as long as possible.’⁷⁴ Almost a year later, the Führer repeated the same point to General Jodl: The [French] police are hated more than anything else in the country and seek support from a stronger authority than their own government; that’s us. It will come to a point where the police will beg us not to leave the country.⁷⁵

The 24 December 1942 assassination of Admiral Darlan highlighted the perils of trying to reverse course; Laval cooperated with Germany until the end of the Occupation. Hitler may have exaggerated French enthusiasm for collaboration, but his statements encapsulate Vichy’s dilemma during the final months of the Occupation. A veteran of the military administration used different words to express a similar idea: They (the MBF and SS) managed to steer the French government’s own impulses and those of the French police in the same direction. That way they not only saved effort. They also spared French self-respect and thereby brought even nationalist circles closer to the German positions. That reduced the odium of the use of force, since it was French force, or left it at French doors.⁷⁶ ⁷⁴ Trevor-Roper (ed.), Hitler’s Table Talk, 1941–1944, p. 265. ⁷⁵ Felix Gilbert (ed.), Hitler Directs His War (New York: Octagon Books, 1982), p. 4. ⁷⁶ BALW, R 70 Frankreich/13/170.

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French support allowed the SS to deport approximately 75,000 Jews from France during World War Two. By the same token, SS reliance on French assistance limited SS deportation efforts. Approximately three-quarters of Jews living in France before the 1940 Armistice managed to survive World War Two.

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10 Labor deportations and resistance

Labor shortages plagued the German economy long before the onslaught of World War Two. Armaments spending and massive public works projects reduced the number of unemployed workers from approximately 6 million in 1933 to 1 million in 1936, and the latter included unemployed seasonal laborers, people unable to work because of raw material shortages, and Jews barred from practicing various professions. Toward the end of the decade, employers raised wages to attract workers, and skilled workers gradually improved their standard of living. Mobilization subtracted millions of soldiers from the workforce, aggravated labor shortages, and forced wages upward, but Hitler refused to curtail the manufacture of consumer goods, shift workers into the defense economy, and risk popular discontent stemming from the ensuing shortages. With some difficulty, the German economy managed to produce both guns and butter during brief military campaigns in 1939 and 1940.¹ The rapid defeat of France allowed Hitler to postpone difficult economic choices. Because it lasted only six weeks, the 1940 Western campaign did not consume a great deal of war material or produce a large number of casualties that could only be replaced by drafting additional workers into the armed forces. Late in the summer, Hitler scaled back military production and released a limited number of soldiers from military service. Army officials set French prisoners of war to work on German farms and factories ¹ Rolf-Dieter Müller, ‘The Mobilization of the German Economy for Hitler’s War Aims,’ in MGFA (ed.), Germany and the Second World War, vol. V/1, Organization and Mobilization of the German Sphere of Power, pp. 407–563.

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to alleviate labor shortages.² OKW established a purchasing office in Paris, negotiated contracts with French businesses, and acquired scarce raw materials from French suppliers. The military administration requisitioned raw materials and encouraged unemployed French civilians to seek work in the Reich. Private German companies subcontracted work to French manufacturers and used French resources to support the production of both military and civilian goods.³ By employing French prisoners, confiscating raw materials, and subcontracting with French businesses, German leaders resolved some of the pressing economic issues that faced the Reich in 1940 and early 1941. Unlike previous campaigns, Operation Barbarossa failed to produce a decisive victory and cost Germany dearly in terms of men and material. During the first 6 months of fighting on the eastern front, the army sustained approximately 750,000 casualties. By the first anniversary of Operation Barbarossa, almost 1,300,000 soldiers had been killed or wounded.⁴ To replace losses, OKW drafted additional German workers into the armed services and shifted some French prisoners of war from the agricultural sector into munitions factories to maintain military production.⁵ As the war dragged on, the Wehrmacht made contradictory demands on German society by asking it to produce more weapons and more soldiers. The more Germans pressed into military service, the fewer Germans available to produce armaments and ammunition. The Allies overcame this dilemma by curtailing civilian consumption and encouraging women to join the workforce. Hitler refused to accept the social consequences of either option and searched for another solution. To resolve economic problems that stemmed from an unexpectedly long and costly campaign in the Soviet Union, Hitler placed new men in charge of the German war economy. After the 8 February 1942 death ² Milward, The New Order and the French Economy, pp. 46–51, 67; Herbert, Hitler’s Foreign Workers, pp. 95–7; Hans Umbreit, ‘Exploitation of the occupied lands,’ in MGFA (ed.), Germany and the Second World War, vol. V/1, pp. 265–284; USNA, RG 242/T-501/143/461–462, 806. ³ Milward, The New Order and the French Economy, pp. 65–9; Thomas, Geschichte der deutschen Wehr- und Rüstungswirtschaft, pp. 274–6; BALW, R 43 II/675/14–16. ⁴ Bartov, Hitler’s Army, pp. 37–45. ⁵ Rolf-Dieter Müller, ‘The failure of the economic ‘‘blitzkrieg strategy’’ ,’ in MGFA (ed.), Germany and the Second World War, vol. IV, The Attack on the Soviet Union, pp. 1081, 1097; Bernhard R. Kroener, ‘The manpower resources of the Third Reich in the area of conflict between Wehrmacht, bureaucracy, and war economy, 1939–1942,’ in MGFA (ed.), Germany and the Second World War, vol. V/1, pp. 868–886, 1009–1028.

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of Fritz Todt, Hitler appointed Albert Speer to serve as the Minister of Armaments and Munitions. In his new post, the young architect allocated scarce raw materials, organized the production of war material, supervised the construction of fortifications along the Atlantic coast, and directed the construction industry through G¨oring’s Office of the FourYear Plan. A broad mandate allowed Speer to control French factories that produced military supplies for the Reich. By using his control over the supply and distribution of scarce raw materials, Speer could also influence segments of the French economy that remained beyond his direct purview.⁶ In keeping with his general strategy of divide and conquer, Hitler gave Speer control over the production of war material but appointed Fritz Sauckel to serve as the Plenipotentiary for the Mobilization of Labor. Born in 1894, Sauckel left high school at the age of fifteen and embarked on a career in the merchant marine. After a stint in a French prisoner of war camp during World War One, he found work as a lathe operator in Schweinfurt. Sauckel joined the Nazi party in 1923 and, because of his ability to win new recruits, became district leader (Gauleiter) of Thuringia in 1927. Denied permission to serve in the navy at the beginning of World War Two, he secured a position as Germany’s labor tsar on 21 March 1942. Hitler’s mandate allowed Sauckel to recruit and distribute [a]ll available labor, including hired foreigners and prisoners of war, as well as the mobilization of all unused labor still in the Greater German Reich, the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, the Government General in Poland, and other occupied territories.⁷

The Führer’s sweeping edict gave Sauckel control of French workers who were employed in Speer’s industrial network and created another Nazi paladin who could tamper with German policy in the Hexagon. The military administration recruited French labor during the first twenty months of the Occupation. Sauckel took over the military administration’s operation and, after negotiating an agreement with Pierre Laval, established the Rel`eve program which furloughed one French prisoner of war in ⁶ Jost Dülffer, ‘Albert Speer: cultural and economic management,’ in Smelser and Zitelmann (eds.), The Nazi Elite, pp. 212–223; Albert Speer, Inside the Third Reich (New York: Collier Books, 1970), pp. 191–8. ⁷ Peter W. Becker, ‘Fritz Sauckel Plenipotentiary for the Mobilisation of Labour,’ in Smelser and Zitelmann (eds.), The Nazi Elite, pp. 194–201; IMT , vol. V, pp. 440–1.

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exchange for every three skilled laborers that went to work in Germany. When his initial efforts failed to satisfy Germany’s escalating needs, the Plenipotentiary for the Mobilization of Labor persuaded Vichy to establish a system of forced labor. Known as the Service du Travail Obligatoire (STO), the coercive program supplied French workers to German factories in early 1943, but it alienated French workers. Recalcitrant laborers known as r´efractaires formed marauding bands that wandered through the French countryside in search of food and shelter, and some eventually joined resistance groups. Wags began to talk about the Arm´ee Sauckel, an ironic reference to the Arm´ee Secr`ete. Sauckel’s labor programs created thousands of potential resistance fighters during the final year of the Occupation. Heinrich Himmler adopted a preemptive strategy against r´efractaires and Jews. Although the incidence of resistance remained constant and labor deportations increased during the first three months of 1943, the Reichsführer SS used exemplary violence to solve racial, labor, and security problems in one fell swoop. Beginning in January 1943, thousands of French and German policemen and SS troops began to arrest all who looked askance at the officers, sent Jews to concentration camps, dispatched eligible French workers to factories in Germany, and intimidated neutral Frenchmen. The fight against Jews and alleged terrorists eventually subsumed the deportation of French labor. The military administration could only watch as Sauckel’s labor program and indiscriminate SS security measures alienated French society. Repression fostered resistance, which begot reprisals, which in turn inspired more resistance. German economic policy toward France amounted to little more than loosely organized pillage during the summer of 1940. In early August, the military administration curtailed requisitions in favor of indirect exploitation. Under military supervision, the French government established comit´es d’organisation that controlled the distribution of raw materials. Committees supplied French factories that were working for Germany with scarce commodities and allowed non-essential businesses to wither away because of raw material shortages. Using funds that the French government had paid to Germany in accordance with the Armistice Agreement, the German government bought whatever they needed from French suppliers.⁸ Although ⁸ Milward, The New Order and the French Economy, pp. 46–50, 67–8; USNA, RG 242/T501/166/61–66.

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not necessarily rational or well organized, the system exploited French resources with little oversight. Still confident of a quick victory, the military administration did not block legislation that forbade Frenchmen ‘from working in the production of war material in foreign countries.’ French regulations enacted in October 1940 barred Frenchmen from working for or otherwise supporting the British war effort, but they also hindered German plans to recruit French labor.⁹ The military administration simply ignored these restrictions and recruited French workers for employment in Germany. Once it realized that the invasion of the Soviet Union would not end in a quick victory, the military administration established recruiting offices in major French cities and promised prospective workers high wages and health insurance benefits. In return for permission to enlist French laborers, the military administration agreed not to hire workers already employed in agriculture, mining, or other strategic sectors of the French economy.¹⁰ Between October 1940 and June 1942, the MVW recruited approximately 153,000 French workers for service in Germany. At the same time, the MBF employed 45,000 people as domestic servants, cooks, mechanics, and office workers.¹¹ By the spring of 1942, 275,000 French laborers were building airfields and fortifications along the Atlantic coast. Another 400,000 worked in French armaments factories, and the fruits of their labor went directly to the Reich.¹² During the first two years of the Occupation, the economic branch of the military administration (Verwaltungsstab Wirtschaftsabteilung) enlisted a substantial number of French workers in the ⁹ Burrin, France under the Germans, p. 138; Jacques Evrard, La D´eportation des travailleurs franc¸ais dans le IIIe Reich (Paris: Fayard, 1972), p. 25. ¹⁰ BAMA, RW 35/1150/nfn (Der MBF, Verwaltungsstab–Wirtschaftsabteilung, Wi VII/741 a/41, Paris, 30.10.41, Richtlinien für den Einsatz von unter deutscher Leitung stehenden Gefolgschaften oder Gruppen von Arbeitskr¨aften aus Frankreich nach Deutschland); ‘Monographie D. P. 1: Exploitation de la main d’œuvre franc¸aise par l’Allemagne,’ in Commission Consultative des Dommages et des R´eparations, Dommages subis par la France et l’union franc¸aise du fait de la guerre et de l’occupation ennemie, 1939–1945, vol. IX (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1950), pp. 63–6. Hereafter abbreviated as ‘Monographie D.P.1,’ in CCDR, Dommages subis par la France. ¹¹ Monographie D.P.1, in CCDR, Dommages subis par la France, vol. IX, p. 68; Burrin, France Under the Germans, pp. 283–4. ¹² J¨ackel, France dans l’Europe de Hitler, p. 320. Figures in the paragraph and chart below can be found in Monographie D.P.1, in CCDR, Dommages subis par la France, vol. IX, p. 68; J. Quellien, ‘Les Travailleurs forc´es en Allemagne. Essai d’approche statistique,’ in Bernard Garnier and Jean Quellien (eds.), La Main d’oeuvre franc¸aise exploit´ee par le IIIe Reich (Caen: Centre de recherche d’histoire quantitative 2003), pp. 67–84.

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N

O ct

40 ov 4 D 0 ec 4 Ja 0 n4 Fe 1 b4 M 1 ar 4 Ap 1 r4 M 1 ay 4 Ju 1 n4 1 Ju l4 Au 1 g4 Se 1 p4 O 1 ct 4 N 1 ov 4 D 1 ec 4 Ja 1 n4 Fe 2 b4 M 2 ar 4 Ap 2 r4 M 2 ay 42

0

Figure 10.1. French volunteers leaving for Germany, 1940–1942.

German war effort, but it could not satiate Germany’s appetite for labor. After Fritz Todt’s death, the military administration’s recruiting program fell under Fritz Sauckel’s control. Sauckel discussed the labor situation with the Führer and Field Marshal Keitel shortly before becoming the Plenipotentiary of the Mobilization of Labor. Keitel observed that the French armaments industry was fulfilling contracts that were worth 3 billion reichsmarks but suspected that the French textile industry included many underemployed workers. Hitler and Sauckel agreed that France could afford to send 350,000 laborers to Germany and military authorities in Berlin promised to transport 10,000 workers per day from France to Germany. To secure French support for German labor drives, the MBF and German embassy in Paris asked Hitler to adjust the status of French prisoners and offer benefits to former prisoners of war who enlisted as volunteer laborers, but Hitler refused to grant concessions while prospects for victory remained bright.¹³ Laval may have learned about Sauckel’s plans through unofficial channels. By chance or design, the French Prime Minister sent a letter to Foreign Minister Ribbentrop on 12 May 1942 that promised to support Germany’s fight against Bolshevism. In detailed negotiations with Hans Hemmen, ¹³ ADAP, ser. E, vol. II, pp. 330–331, 198, 289–290.

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Figure 10.2. Gauleiter Fritz Sauckel. Photograph courtesy of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum.

the German representative on the economic branch of the Armistice Commission, Laval offered to send 36,000 workers to Germany over the next 5 months, but his proposal fell far short of German expectations. Hemmen characterized Laval as ‘receptive’ to German demands but implied that the Prime Minister needed something from Germany in return for French support.¹⁴ Sauckel discussed the recruitment of French workers with Laval three times between 15 May and 15 June 1942. Abetz and MVW officials participated in the first meeting, but they only talked about general economic issues. Laval agreed to encourage French women to join the workforce, support the consolidation of French businesses to free up additional workers, and help Germany recruit more volunteers for labor in the Reich. At a meeting on 6 June 1942, the Plenipotentiary for the Mobilization of Labor offered to release 50,000 French agricultural workers ¹⁴ ADAP, ser. E, vol. II, pp. 341–5, 415–16.

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being held as prisoners of war after France sent 150,000 skilled workers to work in Germany. Laval thanked Sauckel for the ‘generous’ offer and tried to transform talks into a general discussion of Franco-German relations. Sauckel parried Laval’s proposal by stating that he could only discuss technical matters and advised the French Prime Minister to raise political issues with the Foreign Minister.¹⁵ During their second talk, Sauckel and Laval outlined their respective bargaining positions but failed to agree on specific terms. Negotiations came to a head during a meeting on 15 June. Laval tried to link the delivery of French workers with the release of French prisoners of war. Sauckel countered with threats to requisition French labor and implied that Germany would stop delivering coal and lubricants to France if the Vichy government did not satisfy German demands. Stunned by Sauckel’s hard line, Laval described German proposals as contrary to the Armistice Agreement and threatened to resign. During a break in negotiations, Sauckel spoke with Hitler over the telephone and received permission to furlough (not release or liberate) 50,000 French prisoners of war if France sent 150,000 skilled workers to Germany. They agreed to exchange one French prisoner of war for every three skilled workers that arrived in Germany.¹⁶ Laval announced the so-called Rel`eve program on 22 June 1942 and told Frenchmen that they ‘had the key to the [POW] camps.’ Hoping to enlist at least 250,000 skilled workers for service in Germany, the Vichy government described the voluntary program as a patriotic duty.¹⁷ In return for accepting the one POW for three skilled workers ratio, Vichy shielded some French laborers from a few of the more coercive aspects of Sauckel’s first labor drive and preserved Vichy’s sovereign image. Laval hoped the Rel`eve would demonstrate French loyalty for Germany’s cause and win over the French public by securing the release of French POWs.¹⁸ From both the French and German perspectives, the Rel`eve turned out to be a failure. On 11 August 1942, Laval greeted the first train of returning POWs released under the exchange agreement, but the return ¹⁵ ADAP, ser. E, vol. II, pp. 393–4; ADAP, ser. E, vol. III, pp. 3–6. ¹⁶ ADAP, ser. E, vol. III, pp. 33–7; Edward L. Homze, Foreign Labor in Nazi Germany (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1967), pp. 180–182; IMT , vol. XV, pp. 49–50. ¹⁷ IMT , vol. XV, pp. 47–51; Kupferman, Laval, pp. 333–4; ‘Monographie D.P.1,’ in CCDR, Dommages subis par la France, vol. IX, pp. 68–75. ¹⁸ Homze, Foreign Labor in Nazi Germany, pp. 182–4; Paxton, Vichy France, pp. 367–8.

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September October

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Figure 10.3. French workers departing for Germany, June–December 1942.

of some POWs did not translate into increased support for Vichy or Laval. Resistance propaganda proclaimed that ‘the workers do not march’ and condemned the Prime Minister as a ‘slave merchant.’¹⁹ German authorities were not satisfied with the number of volunteers in June (12,000) or July (23,000). At that initial rate of enlistment, German demands for 250,000 workers would not be satisfied until the middle of 1943. To make matters worse, volunteers recruited by the military administration in late 1940 and early 1941 began to return home as their employment contracts expired. By July 1942, over 80,000 volunteers had returned to France and spread reports of dismal working conditions in the Reich. Two months after Laval announced the Rel`eve, Sauckel began to reconsider voluntary recruiting programs.²⁰ Viewed in its entirety, Sauckel’s first recruiting campaign, which ended in July 1942, turned out to be very successful. The Plenipotentiary for the Mobilization of Labor surpassed his quota of 1.6 million recruits by 39,794 workers. The vast majority of laborers had been recruited from eastern Europe and POW camps that held Soviet prisoners. Western Europe yielded far fewer recruits, but many of the latter were skilled laborers that German authorities considered more valuable. In France, the Rel`eve failed ¹⁹ Kupferman, Laval, pp. 336–7. ²⁰ Figures used in the paragraph above can be found in Monographie D.P.1, in CCDR, Dommages subis par la France, vol. IX, pp. 68, 85. Using German sources, Homze lists 5,500 French workers departing in June and 11,800 in July. German sources may include only skilled workers participating in the Rel`eve.

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to meet Sauckel’s expectations.²¹ German and French authorities realized that the system would have to be modified before the next labor campaign. After Sauckel announced the success of his first drive, Hitler discussed labor shortages with senior economic and military advisors. During an August 1942 conference, the Plenipotentiary for the Mobilization of Labor boasted that he could bring another million foreign workers to Germany. Hitler ordered him to dragoon labor throughout the Nazi empire, and he authorized the use of force when necessary. Immediately after Sauckel fulfilled his initial goals, Hitler ordered his labor tsar to inaugurate a second campaign.²² Acting in conjunction with Sauckel, the military administration and Paris embassy laid the foundations for a second campaign that would last until 1943. In letters sent on 26 and 29 August 1942, Elmar Michel, the head of the military administration’s economic staff, asked the Vichy regime to pass legislation that would establish a reliable supply of workers. Michel wanted a law that would freeze workers in their current jobs and make the hiring of new workers conditional upon the approval of French authorities. He advised Vichy to take a comprehensive census of available labor resources and count the number of unemployed and parttime workers. Furthermore, the head of the MVW’s economic staff asked Vichy to institute a compulsory labor law for all men between 18 and 55 years of age and suggested the establishment of mandatory job training to produce skilled workers that were in short supply.²³ The Paris embassy pursued similar goals through diplomatic channels.²⁴ In response to German demands, the French government issued three decrees in September 1942 that met almost all of Germany’s needs. Laws required Frenchmen between 18 and 50 years of age and unmarried women between 21 and 35 years old to work at least 30 hours per week. Vichy’s Ministry of Labor could force unemployed or part-time workers to take jobs in another part of France or Germany. Regulations supplemented previous economic controls that governed the distribution of raw materials and combed excess labor from existing factories. Working ²¹ Homze, Foreign Labor in Nazi Germany, pp. 135–9, 178–182. The figures used to construct Figure 10.3 appear in ‘Monographie D.P.1,’ in CCDR, Dommages subis par la France, vol. IX, pp. 68, 85. ²² Homze, Foreign Labor in Nazi Germany, pp. 139–141. ²³ Homze, Foreign Labor in Nazi Germany, pp. 182–3; IMT , vol. V, pp. 484–5. ²⁴ ADAP, ser. E, vol. III, pp. 386–391, 402–403, 455–6.

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through the French government, MVW officers used Vichy industrial and labor ordinances to manage the French economy. Although less stringent than regulations imposed by the military government in Belgium, French laws established what amounted to a system of forced labor. The September decrees produced immediate results but only applied to laborers in occupied France. The number of workers departing for Germany jumped from 15,279 in September to 51,341 in October and peaked at 79,980 in November 1942.²⁵ Although the number of workers departing for Germany began to increase, Sauckel remained suspicious of French efforts. In a meeting of German officials on 15 October, the Plenipotentiary for the Mobilization of Labor accused Laval of playing a clever waiting game and threatened to seize French workers with German police forces in areas that did not supply the requisite number of ‘volunteers.’ He did not believe that the French Prime Minister would resign if Germany began to unilaterally conscript French labor. Citing the limited forces under his command, Helmut Knochen advised Sauckel to proceed with caution. The BdS recognized that direct labor conscription could stir up trouble and inspire popular resistance. When responsible for law and order, Knochen favored moderation and accommodation.²⁶ The German embassy in Paris also took Laval’s threat to resign seriously. Abetz recognized that Vichy provided invaluable assistance and did not believe that German agencies could recruit or dragoon more French workers on their own. The MBF played a passive role in negotiations with Vichy. Military administration officials participated in meetings with French labor experts, and local branches of the military administration supported French efforts to ‘recruit’ labor, but neither Stülpnagel nor his chief lieutenants played a vocal part in discussions. Unlike his predecessor, Carl-Heinrich did not complain about dangerous policies advanced by Nazi fanatics like Fritz Sauckel.²⁷ The voluntary program created by the military administration sent 52,500 laborers to the Reich between 1 January 1942 and 1 June 1942. During the first Sauckel Action, another 53,000 went to Germany through the Rel`eve ²⁵ Homze, Foreign Labor in Nazi Germany, pp. 182–3; ‘Monographie D.P.1,’ in CCDR, Dommages subis par la France, vol. IX, pp. 77–80, 85; ADAP, ser. E, vol. IV, p. 36. ²⁶ ADAP, ser. E, vol. IV, pp. 101–103; ADAP, ser. E, vol. III, pp. 455–6. ²⁷ ADAP, ser. E, vol. IV, pp. 35–7.

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between the beginning of June and the end of August 1942; another 186,000 French laborers went to work in Germany between 1 September 1942 and 1 January 1943. Based on statistics collected by the French government immediately after the war, a total of 292,000 French laborers joined millions of French prisoners of war working in German farms and factories during 1942.²⁸ Prisoners of war furloughed under the Rel`eve could be re-interned whenever necessary. Coercive labor decrees issued by the Vichy regime on 4 September 1942 applied only to the occupied zone, but they were extended throughout the Hexagon in November. The French government cooperated with Sauckel and supplied the Reich with a substantial number of workers but received almost nothing in return. German defeats triggered additional austerity measures in 1943. Allied invasions of North Africa and the Italian peninsula forced German commanders to occupy southern France and disperse the remaining troops over a wider area. The surrender of German forces in Russia and North Africa subtracted more divisions from the German order of battle. Hitler authorized radical measures to raise additional manpower, and the German embassy in Paris passed along new labor demands to Prime Minister Laval in December 1942. The Reich expected France to supply Germany with another 250,000 French workers by 1 May 1943. The number included 37,000 skilled workers who would depart for Germany by 25 January. In order to fulfill German demands, Sauckel’s representative in Paris, Julius Ritter, suggested the mobilization of all 20–23-year-old men. Laval agreed to the measure in principle and promised to support the fight against Bolshevism as best he could, but in order to sell the program to the French nation, he asked Ritter for political concessions including the release of two French prisoners for every three workers sent to Germany.²⁹ Sauckel arrived in Paris on 10 January 1943 and negotiated with Laval in person. Hitler had already granted Sauckel the power to recruit both skilled and unskilled labor ‘with pressure and more severe measures’ if talks collapsed. For his part, Laval had to agree to German demands or risk severe measures comparable to those imposed in Belgium. After ‘difficult discussions’ that Laval tried to drag out by introducing political demands, Sauckel got his way. Laval agreed to send an additional 150,000 skilled ²⁸ ‘Monographie D.P.1,’ in CCDR, Dommages subis par la France, vol. IX, pp. 68, 85, 157. ²⁹ Kershaw, Hitler, 1936–1945: Nemesis, pp. 567–8; Speer, Inside the Third Reich, pp. 252–264; ADAP, ser. E, vol. IV, pp. 604–605; ADAP, ser. E, vol. V, p. 6.

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and 100,000 unskilled workers to Germany by the middle of March and Sauckel promised to furlough one French POW for every three skilled workers sent to the Reich.³⁰ To meet German demands, Laval ordered prefects to count and classify all men born between 1 January 1912 and 31 December 1921. A 16 February 1943 decree established a compulsory labor program known as the Service du Travail Obligatoire (Obligatory Labor Service or STO). The statute allowed French bureaucrats to place workers in jobs deemed essential to the needs of the French economy. Only those born between 1920 and 1922 were subject to service in Germany, and the government exempted farmers, miners, and policemen from the program. Service lasted two years and replaced traditional military conscription.³¹ After Laval agreed to Germany’s demands and the Council of Ministers issued the necessary legislation, supplying workers became a law enforcement question. Before November 1942, some workers had escaped September 1942 regulations by fleeing to southern France. After the Allied invasion of North Africa, German forces crossed the demarcation line and, in conjunction with their Italian allies, occupied the remainder of the Hexagon. The unoccupied zone became the newly occupied zone. Although Vichy retained nominal sovereignty over southern France, troops under the command of OB West and SS security forces held the reins of power. In conjunction with French bureaucrats, German officials applied labor ordinances throughout metropolitan France. From Germany’s perspective, the 1943 Sauckel Action started off well. During January meetings with Laval, Sauckel demanded that 250,000 French workers be turned over to Germany by 15 March. Two weeks after Sauckel’s deadline, a total of 250,259 French workers arrived in the Reich.³² Even though France had fulfilled its obligation, Hitler required another one million French workers and would not consider any incentives or rewards. When he met with Laval on 5 March, Sauckel thanked the French Prime Minister for meeting the goals of his 1943 labor drive and informed Vichy that, after a ‘short pause,’ Germany would need an additional 100,000 ³⁰ ‘Monographie D.P.1,’ in CCDR, Dommages subis par la France, vol. IX, pp. 89–92; IMT vol. V, pp. 486–7; Homze, Foreign Labor in Nazi Germany, p. 186; ADAP, ser. E, vol. V, pp. 67–70. ³¹ ‘Monographie D.P.1,’ in CCDR, Dommages subis par la France, vol. IX, pp. 92–5. ³² ADAP, ser. E, vol. V, pp. 67–70; ‘Monographie D.P.1,’ in CCDR, Dommages subis par la France, vol. IX, pp. 101, 126.

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r be em

D

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em

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be

O ct

m te

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Figure 10.4. French workers departing for Germany, 1943.

workers each month. Laval welcomed the proposed respite but neither endorsed nor rejected German plans. He emphasized the need to build popular support for the German labor program and suggested negotiations to discuss potential concessions.³³ Although both the MBF and Paris embassy supported concessions, neither a pause nor high-level negotiations followed the 5 March 1943 meeting. Hitler recalled Abetz in response to the invasion of North Africa and serious political negotiations could not proceed until Abetz returned to France almost a year later.³⁴ Sauckel’s lieutenants scaled back but did not suspend recruiting efforts. When Sauckel met with Laval on 9 April, he demanded 120,000 workers by the end of May and another 100,000 before July 1943. Sauckel told Laval that German troops were protecting Europe from the ‘Bolshevik menace’ and brushed aside all complaints. The Reich needed another 220,000 workers.³⁵ To meet Sauckel’s demands, Laval expanded the STO to cover the entire 1942 draft class and eliminated exemptions for agricultural workers and students. Renewal of the Oberg–Bousquet agreement on 16 April 1943 ensured cooperation between French and German police forces.³⁶ The Vichy government issued a decree on 12 June 1943 that punished r´efractaires ³³ ADAP, ser. E, vol. V, pp. 66–7, 348–352. Figure 10.4 is based on statitistics in ‘Monographie D.P.1,’ in CCDR, Dommages subis par la France, vol. IX, pp. 101, 126. ³⁴ Abetz, Das offene Problem, pp. 283–285, 292. ³⁵ ADAP, ser. E, vol. VI, pp. 557–564. ³⁶ BALW, R 70 Frankreich/1/25–26; Froment, Ren´e Bousquet, pp. 223–4.

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with heavy fines and ‘internment.’³⁷ French and German police cracked down on r´efractaires during the summer and sent more workers to the Reich in June and July, but the increase proved temporary. With support from much of the French public, thousands of youths fled to the countryside and the number of labor deportations plummeted as fall approached.³⁸ On 14 August 1943, Sauckel tried to circumvent resistance among the French bureaucracy by placing Nazi district leaders (Gauleiters) in charge of French departments. Labor officials from each German Gau would supervise the allocation of labor in the departments that they controlled. Gau officials extracted additional manpower, but they often used French workers to satisfy local needs and neglected the German war effort.³⁹ Sauckel claimed that the last third of his 1943 recruiting plan had been ‘wrecked’ by uncooperative French bureaucrats and businessmen. Neither French nor German rhetoric could overcome the fundamental unpopularity of the Service du Travail Obligatoire and increase the number of people being sent to Germany. As the prospects of German victory began to fade, few French workers wanted to endure Allied bombing attacks in a German factory. With the majority of German troops tied down on the eastern front, the Reich could not enforce compliance. As the fortunes of war turned against the Reich, the risks of service in Germany began to outweigh the dangers of life underground.⁴⁰ Sauckel compensated for the shortfall by transforming French POWs into ‘voluntary’ workers. At the end of 1942, Germany held over 1 million French soldiers in prison camps throughout the Reich. The majority worked on farms and—contrary to the Geneva Convention—in armaments factories. In exchange for a brief furlough in France, improved wages, and the same rights as voluntary French workers, POWs could renounce their status of prisoners and forsake the security of international agreements that protected the rights of POWs. In 1943, 197,000 French POWs accepted Sauckel’s deal and became ‘voluntary’ laborers. Despite a sharp decline in the numbers of volunteers and draftees, the 1943 ³⁷ ‘Monographie D.P.1,’ in CCDR, Dommages subis par la France, vol. IX, pp. 115–117. ³⁸ Homze, Foreign Labor in Nazi Germany, pp. 189–190; ADAP, ser. E, vol. VI, pp. 76–7. ³⁹ ‘Monographie D.P.1,’ in CCDR, Dommages subis par la France, vol. IX, p. 116; IMT , vol. XV, 77–80; IMT , vol. XXVII, p. 114. ⁴⁰ IMT , vol. V, pp. 492–3; ADAP, ser. E, vol. VII, pp. 264–7; BAMA, RH 36/146.

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after the fall 7,000 6,000 5,000 4,000 3,000 2,000 1,000 0 January

February

March

April

May

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August

Figure 10.5. Labor deportations, 1944.

Sauckel Action injected 638,000 French laborers into the German economy. His labor program proved to be, in the words of one historian, ‘highly successful.’⁴¹ Because of his success in transforming French POWs into ‘voluntary’ workers, Sauckel did not press the French government to fulfill the last third of the 1943 labor drive. Hitler approved of Sauckel’s restraint in October but planned to resume massive labor deportations in the opening months of 1944.⁴² At a conference on 4 January 1944, military and economic planners estimated that Germany would need to dragoon between 2.5 and 3 million foreign workers during the new year. Albert Speer thought that his office would require an additional 1.3 million foreign workers to meet his production schedule in occupied territories. The group, which included Hitler, Himmler, Speer, Sauckel, Keitel, Milch, and Lammers, expected France to supply 1 million workers in 1944. To meet their quota, Vichy and German authorities in France would have to send 91,000 Frenchmen to the Reich each and every month.⁴³ Sauckel told Himmler that his 1944 program ‘would depend on the number of German police put at his disposal. If he had to rely on the indigenous police his project could not be carried out.’ In response, ⁴¹ ‘Monographie D.P.1,’ in CCDR, Dommages subis par la France, vol. IX, pp. 105–110; Homze, Foreign Labor in Nazi Germany, pp. 193–4. ⁴² ADAP, ser. E, vol. VII, p. 74. ⁴³ IMT , vol. V, pp. 493–4; IMT , vol. III, pp. 478–480; IMT , vol. XI, pp. 130–1. The statistics in Figure 10.5 can be found in ‘Monographie D.P.1,’ in CCDR, Dommages subis par la France, vol. IX, pp. 144, 157.

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Himmler stated ‘that the executive agents put at his disposal are extremely few,’ but he promised to exhort his subordinates in France to work harder. The Reichsführer SS offered Sauckel cold comfort and focused his limited resources on the Final Solution.⁴⁴ In response, the Plenipotentiary for the Mobilization of Labor created his own paramilitary force to catch r´efractaires and dragoon ‘idle’ workers. Sauckel’s minions offered bounties to people who delivered French workers. For its part, Vichy issued decrees that closed superfluous businesses and expanded eligibility requirements for the STO. Laval acknowledged the unreliability of French police forces during negotiations with Germany, but he eventually acceded to Sauckel’s wishes and imposed the death penalty on those who impeded or avoided Germany’s labor program.⁴⁵ Despite French acquiescence, the 1944 Sauckel Action proved to be a dismal failure. French and German police dragooned a total of 31,610 workers during the final 7 months of the Occupation.⁴⁶ In light of the imminent Allied invasion and the absence of German concessions, the failure of French and German ‘recruiting’ efforts in 1944 should come as no surprise. Labor drives carried out by the military administration, French government, and Sauckel’s organization supplied the Reich with at least 850,000 French workers desperately needed by the German economy. By way of comparison, the SS could only deport 75,000 Jews from the Hexagon. Although a majority of Frenchmen disliked both labor and racial deportations, Sauckel dragooned ten times more workers than Himmler could Jews. How can we explain this disparity? Sauckel’s agents cooperated with German diplomats and military counterparts. The MBF and MVW officials understood that French labor contributed to the war effort and helped Sauckel whenever possible. The German embassy in Paris supported Sauckel through diplomatic channels. Second, the Plenipotentiary for the Mobilization of Labor negotiated with the French government and mixed ominous threats with token concessions. He accommodated some French concerns by returning a few POWs and excluding select groups like farmers and policemen from his programs. Labor deportations may have been as or ⁴⁴ IMT , vol. V, p. 503; IMT , vol. III, p. 480. ⁴⁵ BAK, All. Proz. 21/216/43–45; ADAP, ser. E, vol. VII, pp. 323–6; IMT , vol. V, p. 504. ⁴⁶ BAMA, RW 35/331/nfn (MBF, Nr A 2/5552/1087/44g., Paris 21.6.44, Betr. Einführung des nationalen Jugendienstes in Frankreich und Aufruf des Jahrgangs 1924); ‘Monographie D.P.1,’ in CCDR, Dommages subis par la France, vol. IX, pp. 139, 144, and 157.

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even more unpopular than racial deportations, but they succeeded because Sauckel tried to accommodate the concerns of other French and German institutions. With a brief limited to security, the SS could offer nothing in return for cooperation with racial deportations. The military administration and Sauckel pressed the Vichy regime to supply Germany with additional workers, and the pressure increased as the need became desperate. Coercive labor laws that were enacted at Germany’s behest discredited the Vichy regime, created r´efractaires, and eventually encouraged resistance. The last development did not catch senior Nazis by surprise. The acting head of RSHA’s Foreign Intelligence Service (Amt VI), Walter Schellenberg, reported that pro-Allied circles around Marshal P´etain negated pro-German influences surrounding Prime Minister Laval on 15 November 1942. Discouraged by the STO, most Frenchmen no longer cooperated with enthusiasm.⁴⁷ Acting in part on analysis from RSHA, Himmler discussed the situation with Hitler in December 1942. After meeting with the Führer, Himmler told Martin Bormann about a scheme that would counter French attentisme, supply Sauckel’s organization with additional labor, catch Jews, and destroy French resistance all at the same time. The Reichsführer planned to counter attentisme by purging unreliable elements from the French police and rewarding French policemen who carried out their duties to Germany’s satisfaction. Second, Himmler planned to deliver 5–600,000 Italian anti-fascists and 3–400,000 ‘Red Spaniards’ who sought refuge in France before World War Two to Sauckel. Arrests would reduce the pool of potential opponents and solve Vichy’s nagging refugee problem. Himmler also planned to incarcerate British and American citizens, Jews, and former leaders of the Third Republic who were part of the alleged anti-German conspiracy. Last but not least, Himmler anticipated a ‘radical fight against the communists’ that would include large-scale round-ups in cities and anti-partisan sweeps through rural areas.⁴⁸ The Reichsführer SS translated his plan into action by ordering HSSuPF to carry out a ‘radical crackdown’ in Marseille. After criticizing Oberg for not taking charge of the operation in person, Himmler told his HSSuPF ⁴⁷ USNA, RG 242, T-175/454/2970452–2970454. ⁴⁸ USNA, RG 242/T-175/129/2654856; USNA, RG 242/T-175/454/2970672–2970675.

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to meet with Kurt Daluege, the head of the Ordnungspolizei, in Marseille on 6 January. Unwilling to trust even his most senior lieutenants with an important operation, Himmler sent another directive that outlined specific goals of the Marseille operation on 8 January. His ‘guidelines’ anticipated the arrest of 100,000 people who would be deported to Germany. To reduce casualties, the Reichsführer SS supported the use of French policemen and ordered a ‘radical blasting of criminal quarters’ to eliminate the need for house-to-house inspections. He believed that the French would eventually thank Germany for cleaning out the ‘pigsty of Marseille, the pigsty of France,’ and underlined the importance of the Marseille operation by requesting daily progress reports from Oberg.⁴⁹ In an attempt to solicit French cooperation, Oberg met with Bousquet on 7 and 13 January 1943. Playing upon French fears that ‘Operation Tiger’ would mimic reprisals carried out in Prague, the HSSuPF threatened to employ only SS personnel in the Marseille operation. Desperate to preserve Vichy’s sovereign image shortly after the occupation of southern France, Bousquet agreed to order French police to arrest French Jews in an attempt to steer repression toward mutually undesirable groups. On 16 January, 9,100 French policemen from the Sûret´e Nationale, Gendarmerie, Gardes mobiles, and Groupes Mobiles de Reserve (GMR) prepared to ‘cleanse’ France’s second largest city.⁵⁰ With Himmler’s backing, the HSSuPF sent 2,000 SS troops armed with heavy weapons and tanks to ‘the criminal center of Europe that is full of strange races and hostile political elements’ during the third week in January.⁵¹ On the night of 22 January 1943, French and German policemen began to arrest Jews, anti-Fascist Italians, German deserters, French r´efractaires, wanted criminals, suspected prostitutes, and anyone without proper identification. The next morning, police evacuated everyone located in the Old Port quarter of the city. By Sunday morning, French and German policemen had checked 40,000 identity cards and detained 5,956 people, but they released 3,977 after further investigation. Prisoners went to Baumettes ⁴⁹ Meyer, L’Occupation allemande en France, pp. 155–7; BALW, NS 19/120/2; BALW, NS 19/3402/fiche 2/68; BALW, NS 19/2799/1–2; USNA, RG 242/T-175/65/2980607. ⁵⁰ BALW, NS 19/3402/fiche 2/76; Froment, Ren´e Bousquet, pp. 364–375; Rajsfus, La Police de Vichy, pp. 209–216. ⁵¹ USNA, RG 242/T-175/3/2503396; Paul Jankowski, Communism and Collaboration: Simon Sabiani and Politics in Marseille, 1919–1944 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989), pp. 71–120; Meinen, Wehrmacht et prostitution sous l’Occupation, pp. 75–7.

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prison camp for sorting. Jews were sent to Compi`egne while the remainder traveled to a French military camp in Fr´ejus (in the Var d´epartement). The total number of prisoners fell far short of the 100,000 expected by Himmler and did not fill the thirty trains that had been commandeered by Oberg. In a final display of raw power, German engineers began to systematically destroy the old quarter of Marseille on 1 February. By the time ‘Operation Tiger’ ended, they had reduced forty hectares of Marseille to rubble.⁵² The Marseille operation marked the advent of large-scale sweeps that detained all who looked askance. German intelligence sources identified three resistance groups, the largest of which had an estimated 600–1,000 members, operating in Corr`eze, Puy-de-Dˆome, and Rhˆone. In conjunction with the SD, French police launched a sweep through south-central France on 8 May 1943. Rudolf Schleier, the Minister of the Paris embassy, detected an ominous degree of cooperation among partisans and reported that one resistance group had warned other bands about the impending operation. During initial sweeps through rural areas, army, SS, and French police forces usually seized prisoners and did not resort to burning villages or shooting women and children.⁵³ The SS office in Limoges launched a major operation in Corr`eze near the village of Donzenac in November 1943. After a three-hour fight, the SS Police regiment Todt seized one machine gun, twenty-four automatic pistols, a few hand grenades, and some ammunition. They killed seventeen ‘terrorists’ and took four prisoners but could not prevent the escape of another fifteen or twenty partisans. Sweeps carried out in southern France tried to destroy resistance groups, round up Jews, and collect r´efractaires for Sauckel’s labor organization. During the last quarter of 1943, police actions seized approximately 15,000 prisoners, many of whom eventually wound up in Sauckel’s hands. Manpower shortages limited the utility of German operations and allowed resistance groups to flourish in remote portions of southern France that did not have a strong, enduring German presence. Some SS commanders wanted to eschew ⁵² Ryan, The Holocaust and the Jews of Marseille, pp. 181–7; Froment, Ren´e Bousquet, pp. 376–391, 397; BALW, NS 19/3402/fiche 2/76. ⁵³ Nestler and Schulz (eds.), Die faschistische Okkupationspolitik in Frankreich, 1940–1944, pp. 264–5; ADAP, ser. E, vol. VI, pp. 51; Lieb, Konventioneller Krieg oder NS-Weltanschauungskrieg, pp. 303–307.

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French cooperation, but Oberg and Knochen insisted on joint operations both to compensate for manpower shortages and spread political liability.⁵⁴ The incidence of murder increased from 254 cases in December 1943 to 339 in January 1944 and suggests an increase in resistance activity, but exemplary violence may have shaped resistance behavior. Eighty per cent of the murders claimed the lives of French collaborators. Neither large operations like Marseille nor smaller sweeps through Corr`eze eliminated resistance activity. By the end of the year, the German embassy claimed that five d´epartements in south-central France (Savoie, Haute Savoie, Is`ere, Corr`eze, and Creuse) teetered on the brink of open dissidence.⁵⁵ Established to command regular and reserve troops stationed on the western front, OB West (Oberbefehlshaber West or Supreme Command in the West) joined the fight against partisans in 1944. Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt commanded forces that guarded the coastal regions against an Allied invasion and regulated the newly occupied zone after November 1942. Unlike the MBF or HSSuPF, OB West possessed some first-class units equipped with modern weapons. Draft orders written by OB West in October 1942 resembled comparable regulations released by General Streccius during the first months of the Occupation, but they allowed junior (regimental and battalion) officers to seize hostages, contained few words of caution, and did not characterize hostage executions as a last resort.⁵⁶ Increasing resistance activity compelled OB West to join the fight against partisans and revise regulations in the final year of the Occupation. Using Hitler’s broad definition of resistance as a point of departure, OB West issued revised anti-partisan regulations on 3 February 1944. While Field Marshal von Rundstedt, the commander of German forces on the western front, was on vacation, his deputy, Luftwaffe Field Marshal Hugo Sperrle, issued his own ‘Order for Fighting Terrorists.’ The regulation directed all German soldiers to start shooting right after an incident and explained that ‘[i]t is regrettable if innocent civilians get caught up [in ⁵⁴ BAMA, RW 35/551/11; Kasten, Gute Franzosen, pp. 158–165, 170. ⁵⁵ ADAP, ser. E, vol. VII, pp. 435–7; Schumann and Nestler (eds.), Die faschistische Okkupationspolitik in Frankreich, 1940–1944, pp. 282–3. ⁵⁶ USNA, RG 242/T-77/788/5517241–5517243; Lieb, Konventioneller Krieg oder NS-Weltanschauungskrieg, pp. 259–261; Umbreit, Der Milit¨arbefehlshaber in Frankreich, 1940–1944, pp. 98–106; BAMA, RH 3 (Generalquartiermeister, Heeresfeldpostmeister)/204/49–50.

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the crossfire], but that is exclusively the fault of the terrorists.’ Once the shooting stopped, Sperrle directed soldiers to arrest everybody in the area and burn down nearby houses. After those initial countermeasures had been carried out, the Field Marshal ordered soldiers to contact the MBF and SD for further instructions. Sperrle threatened to prosecute ‘weak and irresolute’ commanders who did not carry out instructions and assured subordinates that nobody would be punished for over-zealousness.⁵⁷ Although he had no experience on the eastern front, Sperrle issued orders that fulfilled the spirit of Hitler’s anti-partisan policy. Carl-Heinrich von Stülpnagel distributed Sperrle’s ‘Order for Fighting Partisans’ to subordinates on 12 February 1944 and augmented the regulation with classic Nazi rhetoric. According to the MBF, ‘respect for the German armed forces must be preserved and insubordination fought from the start.’ His language echoed Hitler’s 16 September 1941 order to ‘nip resistance in the bud’ by using the ‘sharpest means.’⁵⁸ As he conspired to overthrow the Nazi regime, von Stülpnagel adorned his orders with Nazi terminology and played a double game. A top-secret order from Keitel confirmed Sperrle’s directive. Released on 4 March 1944 and entitled ‘Fighting Terrorism,’ the OKW regulation characterized resistance as an ‘increasing nuisance’ and identified guerilla activity and railroad sabotage as especially dangerous threats. Hitler’s chief military advisor ordered troops to ‘finish off’ (erledigen) partisans in the field. According to OKW, commanders did not need to convene a trial as described in the military penal code (Milit¨argesetzbuch) or employ truncated legal procedures outlined in the Decree concerning Military Jurisdiction during War and Special Operations (Kriegsstrafverfahrensordnung or KStVO). Keitel’s directive underlined the Third Reich’s disdain for the rule of law, allowed subordinates to liquidate opponents in the field, and completed a process that began in 1938.⁵⁹ The MBF did not wholeheartedly accept anti-partisan policies released by superiors in OKW and OB West. Colonel von Linstow, a member of Carl-Heinrich von Stülpnagel’s staff, tried to soften OB West’s reprisal ⁵⁷ Luther, Der franz¨osische Widerstand, p. 239; BAK, All. Proz. 21/213/77–81; Lieb, Konventioneller Krieg oder NS-Weltanschauungskrieg, pp. 261–6. ⁵⁸ BAK, All. Proz. 21/209/175; BALW, R 70 Frankreich/12/46–49; USNA, RG 242/T501/97/368–370. ⁵⁹ Lieb, Konventioneller Krieg oder NS-Weltanschauungskrieg, p. 268; BAMA, RW 35/551/19. See also Chapter 4, p. 100.

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policy. A regulation of 19 June 1944 ordered security forces attached to the military administration to consider the following questions when dealing with ‘terrorists’: 1. Do adversaries wear distinguishing marks (armbands, hats, or parts of a uniform)? 2. Do adversaries bear arms openly or carry concealed weapons (pistol in pocket or hidden under clothes)? 3. Is the group led by a recognized leader, or is it a collection of disparate elements? 4. Does the group obey the laws of war (take prisoners and spare Red Cross personnel)? Linstow raised questions that echoed terms of the Hague Convention. His memo encouraged commanders to consider the laws of war as they decided how to handle irregular combatants. It undermined directives from OKW and OB West that demanded a ‘shoot first and ask questions later’ policy and provided a degree of protection for those who opposed Hitler’s murderous approach.⁶⁰ Soldiers and policemen had a degree of flexibility as they battled partisans and impressed French workers in 1944. They could choose draconian methods championed by OKW and OB West or follow the moderate policy advanced by dissidents within the military administration. Stationed in a hotbed of resistance activity southwest of the Swiss border in Ain, the 157th Reserve Division launched a series of ‘cleansing operations’ while training recruits and preparing for the invasion of France. Carried out by French and German police forces between 5 and 13 February, Operation Korporal killed 40 alleged partisans (most likely civilians), turned up 460 Frenchmen eligible for labor in Germany, confiscated food stores, and burned down houses. Soldiers cooperated with SS officers who led the operation, and senior army commanders considered the project to be a success.⁶¹ Subsequent operations in neighboring areas followed a similar pattern. Launched on 26 March, ‘Operation Haute-Savoie’ lasted four days and involved the 157th Reserve Division, SS and French police units, German border police, and the French Milice. While small guerilla detachments ⁶⁰ BALW, R 70 Frankreich/12/51. ⁶¹ Lieb, Konventioneller Krieg oder NS-Weltanschauungskrieg, pp. 309–321; Meyer, L’Occupation allemande en France, pp. 159–160, 163–7.

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Figure 10.6. A German atrocity. Photograph courtesy of the Library of Congress.

retarded the Franco-German advance, approximately 450 partisans melted into the sparsely populated countryside. German forces sustained ten casualties and killed around twenty partisans while clearing the area. Local civilians escaped deadly German reprisals but were forced to leave the area. Following orders from OB West, soldiers turned prisoners over to the SS, and many were shot in the following weeks. Mounted in the departments of Ain and Jura between 7 and 18 April, Operation Frühling (Spring) killed 148 alleged partisans and captured 869 partisan sympathizers. Disgusted by the widespread brutality, the commander of the 157th Reserve Division considered the sweep to be a failure that pushed local inhabitants into the arms of resistance groups. In response, army authorities no longer subordinated military units to the SS during anti-partisan operations.⁶² ⁶² Lieb, Konventioneller Krieg oder NS-Weltanschauungskrieg, pp. 321–8; Meyer, L’Occupation allemande en France, pp. 163–5; Kedward, In Search of the Maquis, pp. 132–8.

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Operations carried out in the Dordogne followed the pattern established by the 157th Reserve Division in the Gli`eres plateau. In conjunction with French police and paramilitary forces, German soldiers and policemen under the command of General Walter Brehmer swept through Corr`eze and the Dordogne between 30 March and 4 April 1944. Regular and reserve army divisions destroyed 3 resistance camps, burned 62 houses, shot 55 ‘terrorists,’ and arrested 388 ‘suspected terrorists,’ r´efractaires, and otherwise suspicious characters. In April, troops assigned to OB West carried out 3 other major and 138 minor anti-partisan sweeps in which 569 ‘terrorists’ were shot, 4,463 arrested, and 528 sent to Sauckel’s labor service.⁶³ Although OB West mounted several large-scale sweeps in southern France, other portions of the Hexagon remained quiet. Stationed along the Atlantic coast in Normandy and Brittany, the Seventh Army attributed one death to resistance activity in February 1944. One month later, a German corps noted no instances of sabotage around Le Havre. The regional branch of the military government in northwest France recorded only eleven instances of assault and four German casualties in May 1944. Rundstedt let Sperrle’s order for bloody reprisals stand, but he refused to fuel the MBF’s anti-partisan and labor campaigns by releasing supplies of gasoline. Aside from calls for bloody reprisals, OB West paid little attention to r´efractaires and resistance groups.⁶⁴ Anti-partisan sweeps in southeastern and southwestern France reveal subtle but important distinctions in the behavior of army, SS, and French units. While locked in combat, troops subordinate to OB West employed ruthless tactics and did not distinguish irregular combatants from civilians. They burned down houses and turned over ‘all who looked askance’ to police colleagues. SS policemen and members of the French Milice displayed an even greater brutality that lasted long after the shooting stopped. SS forces and their French auxiliaries employed torture and shot prisoners who may or may not have been involved in anti-German activity. Yet although they were brutal and bloody, German tactics did ⁶³ USNA, RG 242/T-77/1430/798–836. Luther, Der franz¨osische Widerstand, pp. 235, 244. ⁶⁴ Lieb, Konventioneller Krieg oder NS-Weltanschauungskrieg, p. 265; BAK, All. Proz. 21/209/251–255; USNA, RG 338/Foreign Military Studies/C–032/3–39.

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not involve widespread use of ‘dead zones’—the complete devastation of an entire region—that were common in Russia.⁶⁵ Large-scale sweeps spread terror through the French countryside, destroyed any remaining support for Franco-German collaboration, and leavened expectations of liberation. From Germany’s perspective, they supplied Sauckel with slave labor and advanced the racial goals of the Nazi regime. Neither arson, deportation, nor summary executions persuaded resistance groups to abandon their fight. As the probability of liberation waxed, the efficacy of draconian reprisals and labor deportations waned. ⁶⁵ BALW, NS 19/2175; BALW, R 19/318/31–51; Shepherd, War in the Wild East, pp. 166–187.

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11 Invasion and retreat

The Allied invasion of Normandy on 6 June 1944 posed new dilemmas to Nazi leaders. During the 1940 Western campaign, Army High Command insisted that uniformed German paratroopers who were deployed behind enemy lines qualified as lawful combatants as defined by the Hague Convention. Hermann G¨oring threatened to shoot ten Allied pilots for every German paratrooper who was mistreated by Allied authorities. D-Day promised to reverse the roles played by Allied and Axis leaders regarding airborne troops. With vulnerable rear areas and few security troops on hand, German leaders worried about sabotage as the threat of invasion loomed large. In 1944, Allied leaders planned to disrupt German movements with a combination of airborne troops and indigenous resistance forces.¹ Now that the shoe was on the other foot, Hitler ordered subordinates to treat all commandos as unlawful combatants who could be summarily executed. Released in October 1942, Hitler’s Commando Order fitted within a larger pattern of gradually increasing and finally unrestrained violence. Both right- and left-wing radicals had shot hostages as they vied for power during the 1919 Revolution in Germany. While he led the nascent Nazi party, Hitler seized left-wing hostages to ensure safe passage back from a rally in Coburg. Influenced by a long history of guerillaphobia in the German army, the MBF released comprehensive anti-partisan regulations that included ¹ BAMA, RW 35/209/175; USNA, RG 242/T-77/1428/797; Weinberg, A World at Arms, pp. 679–683, 686–8.

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hostage seizures in September 1940.² Building upon a concept that had deep roots in German political and military culture, Hitler expanded the scale and scope of traditional hostage policies employed in the FrancoPrussian War and World War One. Keitel’s 16 September 1941 regulation described 50 or 100 hostage executions as appropriate, and the Nacht und Nebel Erlass exchanged hundreds of hostage executions for thousands of deportations. In response to the August 1942 Dieppe raid, the Führer ordered subordinates to treat commandos as unlawful combatants. Eager to ‘fight fire with fire,’ the Führer employed increasingly ruthless tactics against an expanding list of enemies that started with Jews and communists, incorporated commandos and r´efractaires, and, by the end of the war, included Allied ‘terror pilots.’ In 1945, Hitler considered abrogating the Hague Convention altogether in an attempt to gain an advantage.³ Hitler’s increasing propensity for violence, the prospects of impending defeat, and the threat of war crimes trials eventually convinced a minority of German officers to overthrow the Nazi regime. On the night of 20 July 1944, Carl-Heinrich von Stülpnagel and a number of his subordinates told colleagues that the SS had killed Hitler and launched a coup d’´etat in Berlin. In order to prevent unrest, the MBF ordered army security forces to arrest the SS. Stülpnagel successfully carried out his part of the plot to overthrow the Nazi regime, but news of Hitler’s survival eventually reached Paris. Although the coup failed, a scheme to cover up the scope of anti-Nazi conspiracy in France succeeded. By working together, CarlHeinrich von Stülpnagel, Otto Abetz, Helmut Knochen, and Carl Oberg concealed widespread participation in the plot and, except for Stülpnagel, managed to save their own skins. When they worked together, German agencies could achieve surprising results. British troops did not completely abandon continental Europe after the Dunkirk evacuation. Small groups of Allied commandos periodically attacked military installations situated along the French coast. One hundred British soldiers destroyed a radar station in Bruneval (Seine-Inf´erieure) on the night of 27/28 February 1942. One month later, a larger force blew ² Burleigh, The Third Reich, pp. 40, 55; Hitler, Mein Kampf , Chapter 9, Section 2, ‘The expedition to Coburg in October 1922;’ Isabel V. Hull, Absolute Destruction. Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial Germany (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005), pp. 324–333. ³ USNA, RG 242/T-77/1430/168–170, 176–182; Lieb, Konventioneller Krieg oder NSWeltanschauungskrieg, pp. 31–4; USNA, RG 242/T-77/1429/245–257.

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up the only French dry dock that could repair large German warships and limited the battleship Tirpitz to Norwegian waters. Designed in part to test the feasibility of a large-scale invasion, the 19 August 1942 Dieppe raid involved approximately 6,000 uniformed soldiers but proved to be a fiasco. Commando operations alarmed German commanders and provoked Hitler to release the so-called Commando Order on 18 October 1942. The directive ordered all German troops to refuse the surrender of commandos and hand over mistakenly captured commandos to the SD. Armed or unarmed, dressed in mufti or military uniform, whether encountered in combat, in flight, or while trying to surrender, all commandos were to be ‘annihilated’ (niederzumachen). Since they were inserted behind enemy lines, the 3 divisions of Allied paratroopers, 2,000 British commandos from the Special Air Service, and American Jedburgh teams deployed during the 1944 invasion could all be described as commandos and thus subject to Hitler’s Commando Order.⁴ OKW insisted that the Commando Order remain in force after the Allied invasion of France. On 26 June 1944, Keitel informed senior commanders in western Europe that ‘all troops inserted outside the Normandy combat zone must be destroyed as hostile terrorist troops’ or turned over to the SD for execution after interrogation. Toward the end of July, Hitler reiterated his basic anti-partisan strategy and directed German troops to execute all non-Germans suspected of ‘terrorism.’⁵ With unflagging support from OKW, Hitler championed the immediate execution of commandos and alleged terrorists; leaders of the Nazi regime did not flinch as the prospect of defeat loomed large. Five days after D-Day, Ob West directed subordinate commanders to treat all French civilians who resisted German authority as guerrillas. Wounded resistance fighters and French partisans who wore a uniform or other distinguishing mark (beret, armband, etc.) would be treated as terrorists and shot out of hand. American and British paratroopers dropped behind enemy lines might also qualify as guerrillas and be eligible for ‘special treatment’ if found beyond the ill-defined Normandy combat zone.⁶ Even General Johannes Blaskowitz, a vocal critic of German atrocities in Poland ⁴ Weinberg, A World at Arms, pp. 360, 367; Lieb, Konventioneller Krieg oder NS-Weltanschauungskrieg, pp. 31–7, 141–7; USNA, RG 242/T-77/1430/168–170. ⁵ USNA, RG 242/T-77/1428/794–795; BAK, All. Proz. 21/213/277. ⁶ BAMA, RW 35/551/24.

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and commander of Army Group G in southwest France, approved of Ob West’s ‘sharp’ countermeasures. He argued that terrorists and commandos could only operate with the help of local Frenchmen and therefore presumed the local French population to be complicit in sabotage and resistance. Accordingly, he endorsed Ob West’s reprisal policy and cited the indiscriminate bombing of German cities as further justification for German methods. The argument advanced by General Blaskowitz suggests that some non-Nazi officers succumbed to guerillaphobia and voluntarily carried out bloody reprisals in 1944.⁷ Subordinate to Ob West, the commander of the LXVI Reserve Corps condemned troops who disgraced the ‘good reputation of the cleanfighting German soldier’ and vowed to prosecute the mistreatment of enemy civilians and unauthorized reprisals. An intelligence officer on the MBF’s staff tried to support the LXVI Reserve Corps commander in a memo on 19 July 1944. He paid lip-service to Hitler’s anti-partisan policy by saying that ‘softness against an adversary who fights mostly from ambush and disregards the laws of war is misplaced,’ but added that ‘(n)o German soldier assaults helpless women and children!’ Some German officers believed that soldiers had a duty to protect civilians even if guerrilla operations made it difficult to distinguish friend from foe.⁸ Walter Bargatzky, a senior official in the military administration legal office, advised subordinates to treat prisoners according to regulations set forth in the Milit¨argesetzbuch. Opponents who carried their weapons openly and could be identified as enemies from a distance would be treated as prisoners of war according to the Hague Convention. Combatants who did not meet these criteria would be treated as guerrillas and turned over to the SD. Bargatzky advised military judges to consult the arresting officers before deciding how to treat suspected guerillas.⁹ His legal opinion violated the spirit of Hitler’s Commando Order, Keitel’s subsequent explanation, and Ob West directives. Immediately after the Allied invasion of France, the MBF also offered an amnesty to partisans who surrendered to German police forces. Ob West quashed the MBF’s program because it violated ⁷ BAK, All. Proz. 21/213/167–171. ⁸ BAMA, RW 35/551/54, 57; Lieb, Konventioneller Krieg oder NS-Weltanschauungskrieg, pp. 273–4, 283–5. ⁹ USNA, RG 242/T-77/1626/folder 75486/nfn (Der MBF, Verwaltungsstab Abteilung Justiz; Paris 14.10.43; Az Vju 257.43g.820; Betreff V¨olkerrechtliche Stellung der Angeh¨origen der frz. Geheimarmee; Sachbearbeiter: KVR Bargatzky).

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Hitler’s guidelines and ordered all subordinate commands, including the MBF, to shoot guerillas and commandos.¹⁰ In theory, Ob West embraced Nazi methods. In practice, soldiers attached to Ob West displayed a range of behaviors with regard to Hitler’s Commando Order. Troops assigned to Ob West shot British commandos near Bordeaux in December 1942 but incarcerated other paratroopers in army POW camps. Provisions of the Commando Order allowed paratroopers caught in a combat zone to be treated as lawful combatants and protected most commandos deployed in Normandy on D-Day, but Free French paratroopers who fought in British uniform could face a summary execution. As usual, Waffen-SS formations assigned to Ob West treated partisans, paratroopers, and commandos with characteristic brutality. In response to a military administration report of atrocities carried out by the 2nd SS Panzer Division ‘Das Reich’ near Toulouse, the commander of the LVIII Corps accused French authorities of exaggeration. He believed that the ‘terrorist nuisance’ could only be answered with the ‘sharpest measures’ and added that divisional commanders understood the relevant orders from Ob West. The commander of the LVIII corps believed that investigations were ‘absolutely unnecessary’ and quashed further proceedings.¹¹ Like many other smaller atrocities, the notorious massacre at Oradour-sur-Glane went unpunished by German authorities. In keeping with the 1943 Moscow Declaration, General Dwight D. Eisenhower ordered a small group of captains and lieutenants to fan out across France and collect evidence of German war crimes. Advancing behind combat troops during the fall of 1944, the team collected data with varying degrees of precision. After they arrived in a particular region, some officers asked local resistance leaders about atrocities committed by German troops and recounted findings in summary reports. More diligent counterparts avoided hearsay evidence, interviewed eyewitnesses, studied police records, and tried to distinguish legitimate war crimes ¹⁰ BALW, R 70 Frankreich/12/54. ¹¹ Lieb, Konventioneller Krieg oder NS-Weltanschauungskrieg, pp. 144–154; BAMA, RW 35/551/55–56; Max Hastings, Das Reich. The March of the 2nd SS Panzer Division Through France (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1981), Chapters 4–6, 8–10; Sarah Farmer, Martyred Village: Commemorating the 1944 Massacre at Oradour-sur-Glane (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999); Robin Mackness, Oradour: Massacre & Aftermath (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 1988).

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Figure 11.1. Forty-four French hostages shot in Premilhat, near Montlucon, on 14 August 1944. Photograph courtesy of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum.

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from ambiguous reprisals. The thirteen volumes of evidence suggests that Wehrmacht and SS units often shot nearby civilians and burned houses after taking enemy fire during the August 1944 retreat. German and French police often tortured suspects and executed prisoners as they fled toward Germany.¹² One investigator concluded that [t]he troops when in flight feared the maquis so much that they killed anyone they suspected of being in the resistance. When soldiers of the German Army were wounded or killed the others immediately took reprisal measures against the first person they found. In the cases involving the SS and Gestapo, whenever a person was arrested, he was usually beaten and tortured until he revealed the names of other persons engaged in resistance, and then killed. In this never ending process many persons were the victims of relentless beatings and death. The uncivilized actions of the Germans were not restricted to special troops, rather they were prevalent in all organizations, particularly after the landing of the Allies in France. The Gestapo specialized in torture, the SS in mass executions and torture, and the German line troops in reprisal actions.¹³

A second investigator, Captain Perry Miller, recognized that Germans used resistance activity to justify brutal reprisals. He believed that the German argument gained ‘increasing plausibility’ as resistance activity increased, and the officer in charge of the Allied investigation in Brittany concurred. After recounting a typical story of reprisals carried out in August 1944, he described the reaction of the local population. If they [partisans] had been merely shot and decently buried, there would have been, as even the local French admit, no complaint, as they realize that the Germans might have some legal grounds for treating them as ‘franc-tireurs’ in spite of the fact that they were covered by the declaration of General de Gaulle and wore the FFI brassard. But the state of these bodies proved without a shadow of a doubt that these men had been tortured and beaten with inhumane ferocity before being killed. No international law can justify such brutality and sadism.

Some Frenchmen recognized the dubious legality of armed resistance but contended that many German reprisals surpassed the limits of humanity.¹⁴ ¹² USNA, RG 153/145/100/folder 109-5/1–6; USNA, RG 153/135/boxes 67–70. ¹³ USNA, RG 153/135/70/folder 15/1–2. ¹⁴ USNA, RG 153/135/69/folder 13/10; Lieb, Konventioneller Krieg oder NS-Weltanschauungskrieg, pp. 253–8.

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Investigators also identified a pattern of behavior and degree of organization in German actions. [I]t is evident that most of the atrocities listed were organized or ordered by responsible German officers, and formed part of a plan and were not, merely, the brutal excesses of individuals or groups of individuals. The natural sadistic nature of the Germans facilitated the execution of such orders, and, in some cases, the men concerned probably gave free rein to their imagination in this respect.

Allied investigators concluded that some German forces carried out Hitler’s orders with considerable enthusiasm. Regular Wehrmacht troops comprised the bulk of German forces in France, and they probably carried out many reprisals or, in German parlance, ‘sabotage countermeasures.’ Although one Allied investigator detected some reluctance to carry out atrocities, it was probably the rapid Allied advance rather than any special regard for the rules of war that limited the scope of reprisals. Cautionary orders from the military administration in Paris did not influence the behavior of many German soldiers.¹⁵ Advancing Allied soldiers eventually obtained a copy of Hitler’s Commando Order, which General Eisenhower pointedly referred to in a ‘solemn warning’ that he transmitted to OKW. The Supreme Commander of Allied Expeditionary Forces promised to prosecute Wehrmacht and SS officers who shot Allied paratroopers. Designed to protect Allied soldiers, Eisenhower’s warning did not cover French resistance groups, innocent civilians, and other alleged ‘terrorists.’ Unlike their German counterparts, Allied leaders favored deliberate prosecution over immediate reprisals carried out in the field. Eisenhower’s reaction suggests that Hitler’s Commando Order posed a real danger to Allied personnel that had to be countered with threat of prosecution.¹⁶ After the war, the French government estimated that 29,660 French citizens had been shot during the Occupation.¹⁷ Anecdotal evidence collected by Allied investigators indicates that calls for moderation expressed by dissidents within the military administration had little influence. As they retreated toward Germany, soldiers followed a ‘shoot first, ask questions ¹⁵ USNA, RG 153/135/67/folder 5/130–131; USNA, RG 153/135/68/folder 8/3–4. ¹⁶ USNA, RG 242/T-77/1428/748–750. ¹⁷ IMT , vol. XXXVII, p. 212; Lieb, Konventioneller Krieg oder NS Weltanschauungskrieg, pp. 412–415.

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later’ policy that killed thousands of French civilians. Rooted in an institutional fear of guerillas and accelerated by criminal directives from OKW and Ob West, German soldiers shot everybody who impeded the retreat toward Germany. Responsible commanders in Ob West declined to investigate, much less prosecute, war-crimes accusations. By 1944, calls for moderation fell upon deaf ears. While they served as the MBF, both Otto and Carl-Heinrich von Stülpnagel became acquainted with the goals and methods of the Nazi regime. Otto von Stülpnagel worked within the chain of command to ameliorate unwise and unlawful policies. Unable to reconcile ideological directives from superiors in Berlin with the dictates of his conscience, he retired from military service. Carl-Heinrich learned from Otto’s mistakes and chose a different course. As MBF, he did not bicker with the SS, try to curb the destructive behavior of Nazi potentates like Fritz Sauckel, nor condemn Hitler’s Commando Order. Rejecting the entire Nazi system, he conspired against the regime. As a junior officer, Carl-Heinrich von Stülpnagel had forged bonds with future leaders of the anti-Nazi movement. He worked with General Ludwig Beck during the final years of the Weimar Republic and denounced Nazi policies in letters to the General in 1936 and 1937. During the Munich Crisis and Phony War, Stülpnagel discussed Hitler’s overthrow with, among others, Franz Halder, Erich Hoeppner, and Helmuth Groscurth.¹⁸ He curtailed his conspiratorial activity while serving as the head of the FrancoGerman Armistice Commission and during his term as the commander of the Seventeenth Army but resumed contact with anti-Nazis upon his return from the Russian front. Helmuth James Graf von Moltke, Graf Yorck von Wartenburg, Eugen Gerstenmaier, Alfred Delp, and Adam von Trott zu Solz tried to recruit the MBF while visiting Paris, and their efforts eventually paid off. In December 1943, Carl-Heinrich von Stülpnagel agreed to play an active role in Stauffenberg’s plot against Hitler.¹⁹ Carl-Heinrich conspired against the Nazi regime with other officers linked to the Stauffenberg family. Colonel Eberhard Finckh had studied ¹⁸ Bücheler, Carl-Heinrich von Stülpnagel, pp. 108–114, 135–7; BAMA, N 5/24/25; Peter Hoffmann, The History of the German Resistance, 1933–1945, translated by Richard Barry (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1977), pp. 128–144. ¹⁹ Bücheler, Carl-Heinrich von Stülpnagel, pp. 244–5, 275–287; Gerd van Roon, German Resistance to Hitler: Count von Moltke and the Kreisau Circle, translated by Peter Ludlow (London: Van Nostrand Reinhold Company, 1971), pp. 167–175, 211.

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with Claus von Stauffenberg before the war and served as Ob West’s Deputy Chief of Staff in 1944. Stauffenberg’s cousin, C¨aser von Hofacker, served on the MBF’s staff and played an active role in the anti-Nazi conspiracy.²⁰ Finckh, Hofacker, and Stülpnagel developed plans to arrest supporters of the Nazi regime in Paris, brought additional officers into the conspiracy, and coordinated their efforts with confederates in Berlin. When Stauffenberg launched his assassination attempt, the three main conspirators in Paris could rely on assistance from, among others, Colonel Hans Otfried von Linstow, Stülpnagel’s Chief of Staff; Elmar Michel, the head of the MVW; Lieutenant-Colonel Walter Bargatzky, an MVW legal advisor; Lieutenant-Colonel Friedrich Freiherr von Teuchert, an MVW official in the government subsection; Lieutenant-General Freiherr Hans von Boineburg-Lengsfeld, Commandant of Greater Paris; Major-General Brehmer, Deputy Governor of Paris; Colonel Karl von Unger, BoineburgLengsfeld’s Chief of Staff; and Lieutenant-Colonel Kurt von Kraewel, the commander of the garrison regiment in Paris. Stülpnagel, Finckh, and Hofacker developed a substantial network and made contact with dissidents in Ob West.²¹ On the night of 19 July 1944, Hofacker told some of his fellow conspirators that a coup was imminent. The next morning, Colonel Finckh heard similar news from confidants in Berlin. There had already been two false alarms during the previous fortnight, so many plotters remained apprehensive. On 20 July, Stülpnagel followed his normal routine and lunched in the Hotel Rapha´el with Ernst Jünger, but the conversation seemed constrained. At a neighboring table, Bargatzky discussed plans to prosecute SS officers while other patrons greeted one another with ‘Heil Hitler.’²² Sometime after 2:00 p.m., Finckh received a second telephone call from Berlin and learned that the ‘exercise’ was ‘finished.’ He immediately traveled to Ob West and told General Blumentritt that the Gestapo had assassinated Hitler and launched a putsch. Around three or four in ²⁰ Robert B. Kane, Disobedience and Conspiracy in the German Army, 1918–1945 (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, 2002), pp. 207–211; Gerd R. Uebersch¨ar, ‘C¨asar von Hofacker und der deutsche Widerstand gegen Hitler in Paris,’ in Martens and Vaïsse (eds.), Frankreich und Deutschland im Krieg, pp. 621–631. ²¹ Schramm, Conspiracy Among Generals, pp. 210–211; J¨ackel, France dans l’Europe de Hitler, pp. 473–4. ²² Hoffman, The History of the German Resistance, 1933–1945, pp. 470–471; Bücheler, CarlHeinrich von Stülpnagel, p. 302; Bargatzky, Hotel Majestic, p. 132.

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the afternoon, Stauffenberg told Hofacker that Hitler had perished in an explosion.²³ Hofacker immediately passed the news to Stülpnagel. Throughout the afternoon, Stülpnagel, Linstow, Michel, and Boineburg-Lengsfeld prepared to arrest the SS. In addition to his duties as military governor, Boineburg-Lengsfeld commanded 25,000 soldiers assigned to the 325th Security Division stationed in Paris. Earlier in the war, he had commanded the 23rd Panzer division and survived being run over by a Russian tank before being relieved of his command on charges that had sent others to prison. Stülpnagel told the resilient general that the Gestapo had made an attempt on Hitler’s life and had launched a coup in Berlin, gave him a map of SS barracks, and ordered him to arrest the SS after the 11:00 p.m. curfew. The MBF authorized Boineburg-Lengsfeld to use deadly force if members of the Black Corps resisted arrest. Around 6:00 p.m., Stülpnagel spoke with General Beck over the telephone. Beck told Stülpnagel that he did not yet have details about the explosion at Hitler’s headquarters and asked the MBF to enlist the commander of Ob West, Field Marshal Hans Kluge, in the plot.²⁴ Around 6:15, Stülpnagel received an invitation to dine with Kluge in La Roche-Guyon. Leaving Linstow to manage events in Paris, Stülpnagel took Hofacker to the critical meeting with his superior. As Stülpnagel and Hofacker drove to dinner, Kluge received contradictory news from Berlin. Radio reports and a telephone conversation with Major-General Stieff in Berlin indicated that Hitler was alive; Beck, Stauffenberg, Hoeppner, and General Fromm all claimed that Hitler was dead. Although sympathetic to the anti-Nazi resistance, Kluge hesitated. Shortly before Stülpnagel arrived at his headquarters, the Field Marshal guessed the truth and told staff officers that ‘it’s just a bungled assassination attempt.’²⁵ Stülpnagel and Hofacker reached La Roche-Guyon around 7:30 p.m. and met with Kluge, Günther Blumentritt, and Hans Speidel. All three officers from Ob West had had some contact with the anti-Nazi conspiracy, but none had foreknowledge of Stauffenberg’s plot. After listening to ²³ Schramm, Conspiracy Among Generals, pp. 23–7, 38; Liddell-Hart, German Generals Talk, pp. 261–3. ²⁴ Hoffmann, The History of the German Resistance, 1933–1945, p. 471; Mitcham, Hitler’s Legions, p. 222; Schramm, Conspiracy Among Generals, p. 40. ²⁵ Hoffmann, The History of the German Resistance, 1933–1945, pp. 472–3.

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Hofacker’s description of events in Berlin, Kluge concluded that his guests had inside information and suspected that the coup had indeed failed, but he still asked everybody to join him for dinner. After an awkward meal by candle light, Stülpnagel told Kluge about the impending arrest of SS personnel in an attempt to force the Field Marshal’s hand. Kluge refused to support the coup, told Stülpnagel to consider himself suspended from duty, and advised the MBF to hide out in Paris. Unlike ‘Clever Hans,’ Carl-Heinrich realized that he had already crossed the Rubicon and was compromised beyond the point of return. Without shaking hands with Kluge, Stülpnagel left La Roche-Guyon around 11:00 p.m. on the night of 20 July.²⁶ As Stülpnagel left Ob West, Boineburg-Lengsfeld and Major-General Brehmer assembled their troops in the Bois de Boulogne. Neither Brehmer, a member of the Nazi party ‘Blood Order,’ nor his subordinates expressed surprise when they learned about the purported SS coup. One soldier told Boineburg-Lengsfeld that he looked forward to locking up the SS. ‘At last we’re going to finish with the black bastards. Then we’ll soon have peace.’ As Brehmer arrested Oberg in person, the HSSuPF expressed surprise and added that ‘it was all a misunderstanding.’ Soldiers incarcerated Oberg and Knochen with a bottle of brandy in the Hotel Continental. By the time Stülpnagel arrived back in Paris shortly after midnight, army authorities had detained the other 1,200 members of the Black Corps in the Fort de l’Est and Fresne military prison.²⁷ While the coup unfolded on the streets of Paris, conspirators gathered in the Hotel Rapha´el, which served as the barracks for senior military administration personnel. Around 10:30 p.m., Linstow told Bargatzky, Teuchert, and others that, according to Stauffenberg, the coup was collapsing in Berlin. Boineburg-Lengsfeld reported the successful arrest of the SS around midnight, and the party retired to the hotel bar for refreshment. Upon his return, Stülpnagel dropped by the Rapha´el, spoke with his fellow conspirators, and passed along news of Kluge’s refusal to join the conspiracy. Other patrons had nary an inkling of the attempted coup in Berlin or the recent arrests in Paris, but they all listened to Hitler’s triumphant 1:00 a.m. broadcast that confirmed the failure of Stauffenberg’s ²⁶ Liddell-Hart, German Generals Talk, pp. 261–4; Hoffmann, The History of the German Resistance, 1933–1945, pp. 474–5; Schramm, Conspiracy Among Generals, pp. 44–65. ²⁷ Schramm, Conspiracy Among Generals, pp. 66–70.

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plot.²⁸ To make matters worse, G¨oring ordered Luftwaffe personnel to go on alert, and the chief of Naval Group West, Admiral Theodor Krancke, threatened to march 1,000 marines into Paris if the MBF did not release SS personnel. As news of the failed coup spread, pressure mounted on the military administration in general and General Carl-Heinrich von Stülpnagel in particular.²⁹ Sometime after 1:00 a.m. on the morning of 21 July, the conspirators began to cover their tracks. While Hofacker burned evidence in the Hotel Majestic, Stülpnagel retired to the Rapha´el’s Salon Bleu and ordered Boineburg-Lengsfeld to release the SS. The Commandant of greater Paris drove to the Hotel Continental and found Oberg and Knochen sitting with a bottle of brandy and a radio. After the obligatory Heil Hitler salute, Boineburg-Lengsfeld returned Oberg’s sidearm, invited both men to the Hotel Rapha´el, and initiated a reconciliation.³⁰ Oberg found Stülpnagel, Hofacker, and Linstow drinking wine with Abetz and greeted the MBF with a sneer. After listening to a plea for unity from Abetz, Oberg gradually calmed down, listened to the ambassador’s advice, and began to forge a common front with the conspirators. The HSSuPF could be found liable if the full extent of the Paris conspiracy leaked out, and Stülpnagel had an obvious interest in hushing things up to protect his staff. Under the guidance of Abetz, Oberg and Stülpnagel agreed that the arrests had been a big mistake carried out under false orders from Berlin. Junior officers, soldiers, and SS personnel would be told that the arrests had been an ‘exercise.’³¹ Back in La Roche-Guyon, Kluge began to worry about his own neck. Shortly after Stülpnagel left for Paris, Admiral Krancke told Kluge that the SS had been arrested in Paris and demanded an explanation. Kluge sent Blumentritt to Paris with orders to straighten out the mess, formally notified Berlin of Stülpnagel’s dismissal, and thereby doomed Carl-Heinrich. Blumentritt picked up Admiral Krancke and Knochen on his way to the Hotel Rapha´el, and the group arrived sometime after 2:00 a.m. They found a bizarre celebration in full swing. As the champagne flowed, army and SS personnel agreed to treat the entire affair as an ²⁸ Bargatzky, Hotel Majestic, pp. 133–5; Schramm, Conspiracy Among Generals, pp. 93–6. ²⁹ Hoffmann, The History of the German Resistance, 1933–1945, pp. 476–7. ³⁰ Fest, Plotting Hitler’s Death, pp. 284–7; Schramm, Conspiracy Among Generals, pp. 100–101. ³¹ Abetz, Das offene Probleme, p. 290; Hoffmann, The History of the German Resistance, 1933–1945, p. 478.

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‘exercise’ carried out under false orders from Berlin and let bygones by bygones.³² The preposterous tale proved to be too much for Admiral Krancke. The commander of German naval forces in the West ‘erupted in a tirade about ‘‘Stülpnagel, treason, and perfidy’’ ’ before storming out of the room. With Krancke out of the way, Blumentritt followed Abetz’s lead and began to talk about ‘mistakes’ and ‘false alarms.’ Under the influence of champagne, Oberg, Knochen, Abetz, and the military administration agreed to work in unison for the first and last time.³³ They conjured up an implausible explanation of the evening’s events and doggedly adhered to the ‘party line’ of an exercise ordered by Berlin. Oberg and sympathetic army officers controlled the inquiry and allowed the cover-up to succeed beyond reasonable expectations. The ensuing investigation revealed only a handful of conspirators in Paris. Acting on Kluge’s account of events in Paris, Keitel ordered Stülpnagel to report to Berlin on the morning of 21 July. After a brief round of goodbyes, Carl-Heinrich left Paris and traveled by car toward Germany. Along the way, he stopped by an old battlefield near Verdun and attempted suicide. After hearing a shot, Stülpnagel’s driver found the General lying in a canal with a single wound to the head. Unaware of the MBF’s role in the previous day’s events, the driver assumed that partisans had attacked Stülpnagel and drove his commanding officer to a hospital in Verdun. Oberg visited his former regimental comrade while he recovered, but the contents of their conversation remain unknown.³⁴ Stülpnagel made no attempt to escape punishment but did not turn in comrades. Blinded by his suicide attempt, Stülpnagel eventually returned to Berlin, faced a summary trial before the People’s Court, and was executed in Plotzensee prison on 30 August 1944. Back in Paris, Oberg conducted a lackadaisical investigation. The HSSuPF usually questioned suspects in the presence of a senior army officer (often Blumentritt) and never resorted to the third degree. Oberg’s lackluster attitude could not obscure the activities of Linstow, Hofacker, ³² Liddell-Hart, German Generals Talk, p. 264; Schramm, Conspiracy Among Generals, pp. 101–105; Hoffmann, The History of the German Resistance, 1933–1945, p. 478. ³³ Fest, Plotting Hitler’s Death, p. 285; Schramm, Conspiracy Among Generals, pp. 109–111; Abetz, Das offene Probleme, p. 136. ³⁴ Schramm, Conspiracy Among Generals, pp. 120–121, 126–7, 169–170; BAMA, N 5/24/26.

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or Finckh. All three died in prison. Boineburg-Lengsfeld and General Brehmer received reprimands and transfers for their part in the coup, but Michel, Bargatzky, Teuchert, and several other conspirators continued as if nothing had happened. The commander of the regiment that actually arrested the SS, Lieutenant-Colonel Kraewel, remained at his post and hindered the demolition of Paris during the final days of the Occupation. Oberg followed Abetz’s ‘formula,’ wrapped up his investigation quickly, and may have intervened in favor of Stülpnagel’s family who, unlike most of the Stauffenberg clan, survived the war.³⁵ Why did Oberg help Abetz and Stülpnagel cover up the 20 July coup in Paris? First, the HSSuPF and Carl-Heinrich von Stülpnagel had served together during World War One. Second, the HSSuPF had developed an effective working relationship with the MBF and shared a common view of France with the military administration. While in charge of security, Oberg expressed little enthusiasm for draconian reprisals. Like the MBF, the HSSuPF favored labor deportations that contributed to the German war effort. For his part, Stülpnagel did not tamper with SS affairs. Oberg followed a pragmatic course, carried out orders to the best of his modest abilities, and rarely seized the initiative.³⁶ With Allied armies approaching Paris and the war all but lost, blind loyalty to a dying regime made little sense to the pragmatic Oberg. Allied soldiers, not the 20 July conspirators, liberated Paris and ended the Occupation by force of arms. Paris teetered on the brink of revolution and approximately 100,000 Frenchmen participated in demonstrations on Bastille Day: 14 July 1944. Hitler replaced Carl-Heinrich von Stülpnagel with General Dietrich von Choltitz, a veteran of the attack on Rotterdam and the siege of Sevastopol. After meeting with Hitler and receiving orders to not surrender without explicit permission, Choltitz assumed command of German forces in Paris on 9 August 1944.³⁷ French railway workers walked off the job the day after Choltitz arrived, and Ob West ordered ³⁵ Schramm, Conspiracy Among Generals, pp. 172–5; Hoffmann, The History of the German Resistance, 1933–1945, pp. 517–518, 529; Liddell-Hart, German Generals Talk, pp. 266–7; BAMA, N 5/24/11–13. ³⁶ Birn, Die H¨oheren SS- und Polizeiführer, pp. 255–9, 341; Lappenküper, ‘Der ‘‘Schl¨achter von Paris’’.’ ³⁷ USNA, RG 242/T-175/65/2580562–2580563; Larry Collins and Dominique Lapierre, Is Paris Burning? (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1965), pp. 33–6, 46–8.

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the MBF to disarm French policemen on 12 August. Unfettered by orders to fight to the last man, SS policemen began to flee on 10 August. The last MBF would have to hold Paris without help from Ob West, French collaborators, or the Black Corps.³⁸ Communist partisans called for a general strike and mobilized their forces on 18 August, and non-Communist leaders quickly followed suit. General von Choltitz threatened to answer resistance with ‘the sharpest means,’ but his threats proved hollow. Skirmishes broke out across Paris and, despite local ceasefire agreements, continued until 24 August. General Eisenhower would have preferred to bypass the French capital, but General de Gaulle forced his hand. Elements of General Leclerc’s Free French forces entered Paris on 24 August and accepted the surrender of General von Choltitz the following day.³⁹ Given the forces at his disposal, Choltitz had no other realistic choice. Despite contrary orders from Hitler, Paris escaped total destruction. Approximately 60 per cent of the military administration survived the retreat to Germany by joining regular military units. Survivors eventually gathered in Potsdam during the winter of 1944–1945 and, in an attempt to avoid combat, began to write a history of occupied France. Veterans of the military administration did not escape the malevolent attention of Heinrich Himmler. The Reichsführer SS asked Keitel to reassign MVW officials to combat units immediately after they finished writing their reports. Oddly enough, the process lasted until 7 May 1945—the day Jodl agreed to an unconditional surrender.⁴⁰ Final reports written by the military administration contain a wealth of information pertaining to the occupation of France during World War Two.⁴¹ Although rich in detail, many were written by people who feared prosecution for war crimes after the end of hostilities. Veterans of the military administration excused their own actions by crediting war crimes to the SS, the German embassy in Paris, Sauckel’s labor organization, senior military leaders in Berlin, and orders from Hitler. ³⁸ Jackson, France. The Dark Years 1940–1944, p. 561; BALW, R 70 Frankreich/33/7; BAK All. Proz. 21/209/39–41. ³⁹ BAMA, RH 19 IV/141/fiche 2/94; Jackson, France. The Dark Years, 1940–1944, pp. 561–9. ⁴⁰ BAMA, RH 3/206/30, 57–59, 66, 95, 99; J¨ackel, France dans l’Europe de Hitler, pp. 508, 520. ⁴¹ BAMA, RW 35/244–247.

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Although interspersed with references to the Hague Convention and leading scholars of international law, arguments amounted to little more than ‘somebody else did it’ or ‘you did it too.’ Every parent can appreciate the value of such rhetoric. Often portrayed as an absolute dictator in scholarly discourse and popular imagination, Hitler recognized the limits of his power. An anti-Semite to the core, Hitler understood that German society did not share all of his opinions regarding Jews and proceeded with caution. As Nazi electoral prospects improved in the 1930s, the Führer toned down antiSemitic rhetoric in favor of the need for living space and the iniquity of parliamentary politics.⁴² After assuming control of the German state in 1933, Hitler implemented his anti-Semitic agenda in stages that began with defamation and discrimination before proceeding to despoliation and concluding with extermination during the war. After defeating the French on the field of battle, Hitler followed the same pattern and pursued French Jews in stages but proceeded without any regard for French sensibilities. Ignoring legal arguments raised by military administration officials, the Führer approved the confiscation of Jewish property and antagonized the Vichy government in short order. The advent of deadly resistance activity allowed Hitler to up the ante in 1941. Speaking through Keitel, Hitler outlined a reprisal policy of 50 to 100 executions for each and every German casualty. The Führer’s brutal strategy liquidated racial opponents, intimidated neutral Frenchmen, and shocked the French public. Confident of victory, Hitler refused to accommodate French concerns and pushed his anti-Semitic agenda forward. The Vichy regime went to extraordinary lengths to accommodate German needs. After the Moser assassination, French courts executed six communists to satisfy Germany’s thirst for vengeance. Darlan allowed French firms to work for the German war machine even when such contracts made France vulnerable to Allied bombing raids. Neither Darlan or Laval displayed a preference for anti-Semitism during the interwar era, but both supported the defamation, discrimination, and despoliation of French Jews and the deportation of foreign Jews of their own accord. Until the very last weeks of the Occupation, many French police cooperated with their German counterparts in an effort to seize Jews, round up r´efractaires, ⁴² Kershaw, Hitler, 1889–1936: Hubris, pp. 288, 330.

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and maintain order. The French government accommodated Nazi goals and persecuted Jews in an attempt to vanquish common enemies and secure a place in Hitler’s new order. During his tenure as MBF, Otto von Stülpnagel indulged some French concerns in order to expand economic collaboration. For example, he opposed travel restrictions that divided occupied and unoccupied France because they impeded commerce. In a 1940 letter, the MBF asked General Jodl to send vital raw materials to France because ‘one must give a cow fodder in order to get milk.’⁴³ During the hostage debate, Otto von Stülpnagel condemned ‘Polish Methods’ that made ‘future rapprochement more difficult.’⁴⁴ Carl-Heinrich von Stülpnagel followed the policies of his cousin and minimized the number of hostage executions while he remained in charge of German security policy. Both MBFs placed economic cooperation above racial considerations and tried to accommodate French sensibilities while they supported the military war effort. Oberg certainly understood Nazi racial goals based on his SS background, first-hand experience in Poland, and talks with Heydrich during the latter’s May 1942 visit to Paris. Personnel shortages drove Oberg to negotiate with French counterparts and accommodate some French concerns in order to secure indigenous support. To mitigate the number of unpopular reprisals, he did not report every incident to higher authorities in Berlin. In exchange for accelerated labor deportations in the first half of 1943, the HSSuPF quashed plans for accelerated deportations that were championed by Eichmann, Dannecker, and R¨othke. Neither Oberg nor Knochen threatened dire repercussions after Laval failed to publish denaturalization legislation that would facilitate the deportation of more Jews. Under Oberg’s command, SS police forces focused on r´efractaires and resistance groups that endangered order. Oberg’s support for the cover-up of the 20 July coup can be characterized as another act in a series of modest accommodations. Pragmatic considerations may have informed Oberg’s decision to accommodate the Vichy regime. The HSSuPF could not fulfill his entire mission with the 3,000 German policemen at his disposal. Unilateral German roundups alienated the French populace and drove people toward resistance ⁴³ BAMA, RW 35/244/32–35; J¨ackel, France dans l’Europe de Hitler, p. 139. ⁴⁴ USNA, RG 242/T-501/122/711–712.

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groups. Assassinations had discredited Otto von Stülpnagel in late 1941. Burgeoning resistance activity and widespread participation in the coup against Hitler threatened to do the same to the HSSuPF in 1944. Once in charge of ‘security,’ Oberg had an interest in securing French cooperation through accommodation. Oberg’s predecessor, SS Brigadeführer Thomas, had helped the Einsatzstab Rosenberg confiscate Jewish property, bombed synagogues, antagonized the military administration, and upset the leaders of the Vichy regime. Relative to Thomas, Oberg acted with some discretion and accomplished some of Himmler’s goals while accommodating some concerns of his French and German colleagues. The logic of accommodation also shaped racial and labor deportations. Fritz Sauckel furloughed one French POW for every three workers sent to Germany through the Rel`eve program. Subsequent drives exempted policemen, agricultural laborers, and other key Vichy supporters in return for French assistance. Labor campaigns mounted in the final months of the Occupation failed in part because they included few exemptions and incurred widespread hostility. Racial deportations followed a similar course. Initial round-ups exempted assimilated French Jews, focused on unpopular refugees, and were backed by the Vichy regime and French policemen. Once the supply of foreign Jews ran short, SS officials pressed for the deportation of recently naturalized and later assimilated French Jews, but they could offer nothing in return for French cooperation. With a brief limited to security, the SS could not offer political or economic concessions that Laval craved. Finally, the military administration helped Sauckel collect French workers but played a junior role in racial deportations after 1 June 1942. As long as they could accommodate the concerns of other German agencies and the Vichy regime, both Sauckel and Oberg enjoyed a degree of success, but with more to offer, Sauckel enjoyed the greater success. The balance of Franco-German accommodation inevitably favored the Reich. At the beginning of the Occupation, French leaders expected to pay a price for France’s defeat and accepted German measures with a degree of resignation. The annexation of Alsace and Lorraine surprised few observers. French policemen turned over common enemies and undesirable refugees to Himmler’s SS. Laval passed legislation that sent hundreds of thousands of French workers to Germany in exchange for a few prisoners of war and short-lived exemptions for select Vichy supporters. Eager to 291

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preserve French sovereignty, the Vichy regime surpassed terms of the 1940 Armistice Agreement in an attempt to curry German favor, demonstrate French loyalty, and secure a place in Hitler’s new order. In return, the Führer gave France the ashes of Napoleon Bonaparte’s son and four long years of cold, hunger, and oppression. The Vichy regime and, by extension, the French public, may not have had any other realistic choice. Foreign communists associated with the Main-d’œuvre immigr´ee answered Stalin’s call for resistance and carried out a series of dramatic assassinations in 1941, but most French communists stuck to propaganda and sabotage. Deadly German reprisals forced Charles de Gaulle to back down in 1941 and underscored the folly of armed resistance while German soldiers stood at the gates of Moscow. With few weapons at their disposal, resistance forces could not attack Germany directly and focused their ire on French collaborators in 1943 and 1944. Resistance groups and the French public had to accommodate overwhelming German firepower. Hitler’s strategy succeeded in so far as it ran parallel to traditional goals, long-standing prejudices, and popular stereotypes. Eager to avenge the Versailles Agreement, many German officers overlooked unpalatable facets of the Nazi regime, supported rearmament in the 1930s, and acquiesced in aggressive foreign policy initiatives that culminated in World War Two. Playing upon an institutional fear of partisans who operated behind German lines, Hitler secured military support for an expanded definition of reprisals that included racial opponents of the Nazi regime. Although the scale and scope of cooperation between the Nazi party and German army remains a controversial topic of historical inquiry, both Hitler and the army shared some common goals. Despite the occasional pinch, Hitler’s Nazi glove usually fit the Wehrmacht’s iron fist quite well. Officers may have complained about and bristled under Hitler’s leadership on occasion, but they endured five long years of war before mounting a serious attempt to overthrow the Nazi regime. By satisfying the army’s desire for revenge and manipulating a widespread fear of partisans, Hitler maintained control over most of the Wehrmacht until the bitter end. The French and Nazi governments, as well as the German military administration, all accepted the fundamental legitimacy of the so-called Jewish Question but could not agree upon a common answer to the alleged problem. In a plebeian attempt to satisfy latent French anti-Semitism and 292

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curry favor with the Nazi regime, the Vichy government inaugurated a campaign against Jews in the press, stripped Jewish immigrants of their French citizenship, and allowed prefects to imprison foreign Jews. Prime Minister Laval created a temporary administration agency (SCAP) to take over ‘Jewish’ businesses and ‘Aryanize’ the French economy. Admiral Darlan created the General Commissariat for Jewish Affairs (CGQJ) to coordinate French anti-Semitic initiatives. Aggravating traditional antiSemitic prejudices that survived throughout Europe, Hitler enlisted French support in comprehensive defamation, discrimination, and despoliation campaigns. Perceiving Jews as a security threat, the military administration deported Jews from coastal provinces and ordered Jews to register with local police. Playing upon widespread guerillaphobia within the German army, Hitler also tried to enlist the MBF in the Final Solution via hostage executions. Characterizing Otto von Stülpnagel’s response to resistance as much too mild, the Führer directed the MBF to execute 50 to 100 hostages after every resistance attack. Upping the ante in December 1941, Hitler allowed military commanders to exchange hundreds of hostage executions for thousands of deportations by way of the Nacht und Nebel Erlass, and ancillary documents reveal deportation as equivalent to death. In any case, both hostages and deportees would be drawn from anti-German groups that were, in Hitler’s mind, invariably led by Jews and Jewish stooges.⁴⁵ By demanding immediate reprisals, Hitler guaranteed that investigators would not have time to catch bona fide perpetrators and ensured that reprisals would fall squarely on the usual suspects: Jews. Otto von Stülpnagel protested against Hitler’s reprisal policy, resigned his command, and proved that neither he nor the military administration could be relied upon to wage Hitler’s deadly war against the so-called international Jewish conspiracy under the guise of reprisals. Opposition to the Einsatzstab Rosenberg and a lack of enthusiasm for deadly reprisals discredited the MBF in the Führer’s eyes. In response, Hitler placed French and German police forces in the hands of a man who accepted his broad definition of security. Oberg’s appointment signaled another major defeat for the military administration and provides further ⁴⁵ Gerhard Weinberg (ed.), Hitler’s Second Book, translated by Krista Smith (New York: Enigma Books, 2003), pp. 229–234.

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evidence that neither Stülpnagel served as Hitler’s willing executioner. As HSSuPF, Oberg had the authority to address the so-called Jewish Question to Hitler’s satisfaction, but he lacked the resources to carry out the Führer’s will on his own. Dependent upon French police and German military assistance, Oberg concentrated on common enemies in an attempt to carry out part of his mission. Although willing, he was not able to fulfill the racial goals of the Nazi regime. During their tenure as Milit¨arbefehlshaber in Frankreich, Otto and CarlHeinrich von Stülpnagel gained first-hand knowledge of the methods and goals of the Nazi regime. Otto von Stülpnagel worked within the chain of command and condemned Nazi policies in a series of letters, memoranda, and official reports. After resigning his command and retiring to Berlin, he survived the war only to be arrested by Allied authorities. Carl-Heinrich von Stülpnagel also rejected the Nazi regime but followed a different course. Rather than condemning specific policies, Carl-Heinrich turned against the entire Nazi regime. Conspirators in Paris arrested the SS in an attempt to change the political balance of power within the Reich and eliminate a baneful influence within German society. Despite pursuing very different courses, both Stülpnagels ultimately paid a high price for their conduct. Carl-Heinrich met his fate before a Nazi court in Berlin, and Otto committed suicide while awaiting trial for war crimes in a French prison. Tainted by their association with the Nazi regime and anti-Nazi resistance, neither man could escape the hangman’s noose. On the whole, members of the military administration may have behaved in a more humane fashion than some of their civilian and SS counterparts. But the military administration can be characterized as humane or ‘proper’ only when juxtaposed with the SS. The military administration ruthlessly exploited French industrial resources to support the German war effort. Senior officers used ambiguous language in the Hague and Geneva Conventions to justify harsh reprisals that stopped short of genocide but still resulted in mass murder. Carl-Heinrich von Stülpnagel and his confederates may have detested Hitler, but they made no overt preparations to end the Occupation or rescind criminal regulations from OKW.⁴⁶ Guerrilla tactics employed by resistance groups may not have been completely ‘legal,’ but they cannot excuse the transgressions of the MBF or his military ⁴⁶ J¨ackel, France dans l’Europe de Hitler, p. 475.

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administration. American and British officials followed a very different course as they governed western Germany after the war. American, British, and French jurists operated under the same ambiguous rules of war set forth in the Hague Convention, but they made veterans of the German occupation stand trial after hostilities ceased. Carl Oberg, Helmut Knochen, Otto Abetz, Werner Best, and Elmar Michel all managed to survive the Allied occupation.

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314

Index Abetz, Otto 52–8, 63, 66, 71, 72, 75–8, 79, 87, 112, 128, 142, 143, 146–9, 152, 164, 206, 207, 208–10, 227, 228, 236, 253, 257, 260, 274, 285–7, 295 Abwehr 65, 138, 158, 160, 180 Action Franc¸aise 205 A´ero-Club 155 Africa corps 56 Ain (Swiss border) 269, 270 Alibert, Rapha¨el 84, 86 Alliance Isra´elite Universelle 80 Allied forces 25, 26, 28, 30–2, 122, 191, 195, 196, 197, 242, 274, 275 and bombing raids 83, 244, 261, 289 conquest of Sicily 202 in North Africa 194; see also North Africa and prospects for victory 40, 167 and World War One 97 see also Allies, the; British forces; D-Day; France; Normandy; United States Allies, the 1, 4, 17, 23, 24, 26, 28, 30, 39, 56, 147, 188, 241, 248, 273–81, 287–8 Alsace 39, 47, 57, 58 German annexation of 106, 291 American Civil War 99 Andurain, Jacques d’ 135 Anglophiles 217 Anglo-Saxon hegemony 210 Anschluss, see Austria anti-German activity by French resistance groups 65, 122, 134–5, 148, 173, 216, 217, 218, 293 anti-Semitism 16, 19, 50, 68, 111, 196, 199–200, 209–10; see also Final Solution to the Jewish Question; France; Hitler; Jews; SS; Vichy regime Arc de Triomphe 65 Ardennes 26, 31, 39 Argonne 39 Arm´ee Secr`ete (Arm´ee Sauckel) 250 Armed Forces High Command (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht or OKW) 12, 15, 24, 41, 60, 71, 74, 87,

88, 102, 113, 133, 137, 149, 157, 158, 160, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 174, 180, 195, 197, 198, 218, 224, 238, 268–9, 275, 280, 281, 294 Aryan race and culture 54, 68, 119, 124, 212, 215, 244 Aryanization process 61, 66, 180, 211–16, 219; see also French economy Atignac, Joseph 206 attentisme, see France; Vichy regime Auphan, Admiral Paul 5 Auschwitz concentration camp, see concentration camps Austria 11, 59, 83, 135, 226, 227 German annexation of (Anschluss) 43, 199, 226 see also Jews Axis powers 28, 39, 194, 195, 197, 221, 236, 242, 273 retreat of the (1942) 194 Badoglio, Marshal Pietro 241 Bahnke, Dr. 79 Baku 26, 33 B¨alz, Rudolf 105 Barbie, Klaus 239 Bargatzky, Walter 276, 282, 284, 287 Bartov, Omer 13–14 Battle of Britain 62, 74 Baudouin, Paul 34, 39 Baumettes prison camp 265–6 Bavaria (relief train) 47 Beck, General Ludwig 12, 170, 281, 283 Beer Hall Putsch (1923) 59, 68 Behr, Baron Kurt von 78 Belgium 30, 41, 44, 111, 149, 150, 151, 178, 221, 223, 230, 257, 258 German invasion of (1940) 24, 26, 30–2 and World War One 85, 97, 111 see also Jews Benoist-M´echin, Jacques 144 Berlin 21, 23, 41, 48, 50, 56, 61, 65, 66, 72, 73, 79, 81, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 97, 111,

index Berlin (cont.) 113, 119, 120, 122, 124, 127–8, 129, 132, 135, 137, 138, 144, 148, 154, 155, 156, 157, 160, 161, 163, 165, 166, 168, 174, 175, 181, 183, 186, 190, 192, 195, 199, 209, 210, 211, 215, 225, 226, 229, 230, 242, 252, 274, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 290, 294 Berlin Museum 75 Bernheim-Jeune art gallery 75 Best, Werner 45–6, 76, 78–80, 85, 86, 87, 152–5, 174, 206, 208, 216, 228, 229, 295 Beumelburg, Walter 116, 117, 118, 140 billet vert (green ticket) 217, 228 Bizerte 56 Black Corps, 19, 20, 65, 67, 80, 89, 132–3, 175, 183, 223, 225, 238, 244, 283, 284, 288; see also SS Black Reichswehr in Silesia and the Ruhr 170 Blanke, Kurt 212 Blaskowitz, General Johannes 41, 42, 43, 46, 64, 211, 275–6 Blomberg, Werner von 25 Blomberg-Fritsch affair (1938) 11, 25, 52, 88 Blum, L´eon 33, 34 Blumentritt, General G¨unther 282–3, 285–6 Bock, Fedor von 170, 195 Boer War 110 Bohemia 250 German occupation of (1939) 33, 36 B¨ohme, Franz 225 Boineburg-Lengsfeld, Lieutenant-General Freiherr Hans von 282–5, 287 Bois de Boulogne 284 Bolshevism 28, 210 fight against 252, 258, 260 ‘Bolshevism against Europe’ exhibition 209 Bordeaux 34, 36, 66, 84, 135, 225, 234, 243, 277 assassination 135, 141, 144, 145, 148, 150, 159, 165, 178, 182 executions 139, 140, 142, 144, 146, 155 Bormann, Martin 77, 125, 238, 264 Bousquet, Ren´e 167, 184, 185–8, 202, 230–1, 232, 233, 234, 236, 238, 240, 265

Brassillach, Robert 201 Brauchitsch, General Walter von 24–5, 40, 41–2, 44, 48, 64, 65, 66, 75, 76, 79, 80, 82, 86, 88, 126–7, 137, 141, 151, 170, 195, 215, 224 despoliation campaign against Jews 211–12 Bredow, General Ferdinand von 11, 170 Brehmer, Major-General Walter 271, 282, 284, 287 Briand, Aristide 33, 53 Brinon, Fernand de 115–16, 118, 184, 236 British Expeditionary Force (BEF) 30 British forces 32, 34, 89, 110, 274, 275 British government 59, 145 British liberals 112 British Manual of Military Law (1929) 98 British propaganda 174 British resistance 77, 196 British war effort 251 Brittany 271, 279 Brunner, Alois 243 Brussels conference (1874) 91 Brustlein, Gilbert 135, 136 B¨uhler, Josef 171 B¨uhrmann, Major-General Robert 60 Bulgaria 232; see also Jews Bunjes, Dr. Hermann 81–2 B¨urckel, Joseph 47 Burrin, Philippe 8 concept of accommodation 8, 9, 16, 21 Bussche, Freiherr von 43 Calais 57 Calisse, Alberto 241 Campinchi, C´esar 35 Canaris, Admiral Wilhelm 158, 180, 183 Case Yellow (Fall Gelb) 24–6, 30, 31, 40, 170 Catholic Church 8, 236 central and south American countries 144 Chamberlain government (UK) 112 ´ ees 65 Champs Elys´ Chautemps, Camille 34 Chiang Kai Shek 44 China 43 Choltitz, General Dietrich von 287–8 Churchill, Sir Winston 35, 144, 194 City of Light, see Paris Clausewitz, Carl von 149

316

index Clemenceau, Georges 97 Clermont-Ferrand (town) 7 Comit´e de Coordination des Oeuvres de Bienfaisance Isra¨elites a` Paris 227 Commander of the Security Police and SD in France (Befehlshaber der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD or BdS) 182, 224, 225, 226, 232, 241, 242, 244, 256 Commissariat G´en´eral aux Questions Juives (CGQJ) 86–7, 167, 184, 199, 202, 204–7, 209, 216, 219, 227–8, 293 Communist International (Comintern) 67 communists 223, 264, 274 deportation of 157–8 execution of 149, 166 see also French Communist Party; French communists Compi`egne 266 concentration camps 48, 63, 114, 169, 226, 243, 250 Auschwitz 15, 174, 202, 207, 218, 223, 228, 230, 233, 234, 237, 238, 239, 240 Beaune-la-Rolande (Loiret) 228, 230, 232 Chˆateaubriant 140 Drancy 228, 230, 232, 233, 234, 237, 239, 240 in France 204, 228, 230 Pithiviers 228, 230, 232 in Poland 169 Sobibor 240 see also death camps; prisoner of war (POW) camps Corr`eze 267, 271 Court of St. James 52 Crete, German invasion of (1941) 194 Creuse 267 Crimean War (1854–56) 90 crimes against humanity 1; see also war crimes criminal police (Kriminalpolizei or Kripo) 65, 224, 225 Crome, Major Hans 127, 136, 138 Custine, General Adam Philippe 95 Czechoslovakia 25, 59, 135, 227; see also Jews

D-Day 273, 275, 277 Dahlerus, Birger 59 Dakar 56 Daladier, Edouard 34, 62, 66 Daladier government 33, 34, 112, 113, 134, 245 Daluege, Kurt 265 Dannecker, Theodor 209, 226–35, 237, 244, 290 Danzig-West Prussia 221 Darlan, Admiral Jean Franc¸ois 4, 5, 8, 9, 37, 86, 141–4, 146, 164, 166–8, 185, 199, 205–6, 207, 209, 210, 212, 227, 289 assassination of (1942) 245 Darlan government 204, 245 Darnand, Joseph 2, 206 Darquier de Pellepoix, Louis 167, 184, 202, 206, 207 Darwinism, social 68 D´eat, Marcel 56, 129, 186 death camps 20, 158, 174, 234, 244 Decree concerning Military Jurisdiction during War and Special Operations (Kriegsstrafverfahrensordnung or KStVO) 100–2, 192, 268 Decree concerning Special Military Crimes during War (Kriegssonderstrafrechtsverordnung or KSSVO) 101–2, 192 Deloncle, Eug`ene 56–7, 66, 129, 130, 132 Delp, Alfred 281 Denmark 30, 178, 221, 222 German invasion of (1940) 28 deportations 157–61, 163, 165, 166, 169, 174–5, 190–1, 193, 207, 218, 274 labor 177, 180, 203, 247–72, 287, 290, 291 racial 220–46, 263, 291 Deutsch-Franz¨osische Gesellschaft 53, 54 Dienststelle Ribbentrop 53 Dieppe Raid (August 1942) 274, 275 Dijon 66, 225, 243 attack 159 Dordogne 271 Doriot, Jacques 2, 56 Dreyfus, Captain Alfred 206, 222 Drumont, Edouard 201

317

index Dunkirk 34, 194 British escape from 62, 274 German capture of (1940) 32 Dyle plan 30 Eastern Front, fighting on the 86, 87, 109, 119, 129, 159, 165, 166, 177, 190, 195, 196, 229, 248 Eben Emael (Belgian fortress) 30 Ebert, Dr. Georg 77–8 ´ Ecole Rabbinique 80 Egypt 194 Eichmann, Adolf 199, 225, 226, 229–30, 234–5, 236, 237, 238, 240, 242, 290 Einsatzstab Rosenberg 18, 19, 20, 54, 61, 62, 66, 67, 69, 70, 72, 73, 76–88, 130, 165, 199, 200, 208, 291, 293 and anti-German conspiracies 70, 73, 78, 80, 85, 130, 218, 225, 264 Eisenhower, General Dwight D. 277, 280, 288 England 38 German planned invasion of 47, 216 English Channel 26, 32, 199, 200, 211, 216, 219 Europe 1, 11, 44, 95, 122, 132, 166, 180, 194, 196, 197 conquest of Western 61, 64, 179 Eastern 9, 59, 135, 158, 216 ‘European France’ exhibition 209 executions 279 hostage 173, 174, 186, 189, 190, 192–3, 217, 270, 274, 290 mass 141, 163, 165, 166, 169 see also French resistance; Hitler, Adolf; Jews Falkenhausen, General Alexander von 41, 44, 46, 150, 151, 152, 178 fascism 33, 112; see also Mussolini, Benito F´ed´eration Republicaine 205 Ferdinand, Franz, assassination of (1914) 85 Fighting League for German Culture 68 Final Solution to the Jewish Question 11, 18, 72, 124–5, 132–3, 158, 166, 174, 179–80, 196, 198, 200, 217, 221, 222, 226, 228, 230, 235

in France 20, 90, 197–8, 200, 206, 211, 217, 218, 220, 223, 224, 226, 227, 230, 235, 245, 263, 293, 294 in the Italian zone 241 Finckh, Colonel Eberhard 281–2, 287 Finland 26, 34 Soviet invasion of (1939) 26, 33 Flanders 39 Foch, Marshal Ferdinand 36, 58 Fort de l’Est and Fresne military prison 284 France 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 15, 16, 17, 18, 20, 24, 25, 28, 33–4, 37, 39, 40, 43, 44, 48, 50, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 64, 83, 84, 95, 98, 128, 133, 134, 135, 143, 148, 149, 151, 160, 167, 169, 178, 197, 237 agreement with Italy (1940) 36 Allied invasion of 206, 242, 243, 263, 267, 273–95 anti-Semitism in 199–201, 205, 206, 217, 222, 227 and the attentiste (‘wait and see’) attitude 36, 134, 148, 167, 203, 264 civilian crimes in 106–11 declaration of war against Great Britain and the United States 56 German anti-partisan policy in 89, 106, 119, 122, 124–5, 157, 161, 165, 177, 180, 193, 196, 244, 270, 271, 273–4 German confiscation policy in 71–88 German invasion of (1940) 24, 25, 28, 30, 31–3, 166, 170, 194, 247 German occupation of southern (1942) 238 the HSSuPF in 178–93, 197, 224, 236, 238 and immigration 201 Liberation of (1944) 1, 2, 7, 190, 192, 193, 206, 272, 273–95 politics in 3, 5, 33 rearmament of 33, 36 SS court in 191–2 Second Empire (1870) 96 ‘sword and shield’ theory in 2–4 Third Republic 2, 54, 201, 264 unoccupied 47, 48, 54, 60, 71, 183, 205, 206, 207, 220, 231, 232, 233, 234, 259, 290

318

index and World War One 97 see also Final Solution to the Jewish Question; Vichy regime; occupation, French Franco, General Francisco 183 Franco-German accommodation 9, 107, 291 Franco-German Armistice Agreement (1940) 4, 6, 9, 17, 18, 33, 35–40, 48, 50, 51, 55, 56, 58, 59, 60, 66, 88, 112, 128, 134, 142, 164, 199, 203, 211, 221, 246, 250, 254, 292 Franco-German Armistice Commission 38, 56, 59–60, 77, 86, 171, 253, 281 Franco-German collaboration 1, 2, 3, 5, 8, 9, 53–4, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 66, 77, 89, 106, 128, 136, 141, 146, 147, 161, 187, 188, 199, 202, 203, 207, 222, 223, 243, 272 economic 17, 37–8, 88, 162, 223, 290 and resistance 6, 7, 8, 21, 134, 167; see also French resistance see also Franco-German relations Franco-German peace settlement 87, 141, 161 Franco-German relations 5, 19, 21, 36–7, 38, 52, 53, 58, 62, 63, 72, 113, 135, 140, 144, 184, 223, 254; see also Franco-German collaboration Franco-Prussian War 96, 110, 274 Francs Tireurs et Partisans/ Mouvement Ouvrier International (FTP/ MOI) 189 Frank, Hans 179 Freemasons 53, 85, 87, 209, 210, 243 French anarchists 104, 113–14, 187, 217 French army 6, 30, 32, 34, 36, 37, 39, 58, 95, 112, 167 Spanish campaign (1808) 95–6 French business and industry 38, 50, 61, 158, 203–4, 211, 248–53, 294 French Communist Party (Parti Communist Franc¸ais or PCF) 3, 33, 34, 66–7, 112, 113–14, 117, 134–5, 138, 162, 175, 217, 218 bataillons de la jeunesse 135, 172, 175–6 groupes de brˆulots 135, 139, 152, 155, 157, 160 Main-d’oeuvre immigr´ee (MOI) 135, 292 and policy of resistance 134, 140, 155 see also French communists

French communists 4, 36, 65, 66, 104, 112, 113, 115, 125, 134, 149, 169, 176, 186, 195, 209, 210, 217, 225, 226, 243, 288, 292 deportation of 160, 157–8, 165, 169, 174 execution of 138, 146, 149, 159, 163, 173, 176, 189, 289 persecution of 113–19, 121, 123, 124, 134, 149, 180, 187, 218, 238, 242 French economy 38, 45, 50, 55, 59–61, 130, 152, 203, 221, 249, 251, 259 Aryanization (arisierung) of 66, 130, 199–200, 203, 211–16, 219, 293 French government, see Vichy regime French law 83, 84 French liberals 112 French Ministries: of Finance 204 of the Interior 184 of Justice 114 French National Assembly 143 1875 Constitution 143 French nationalists 134, 217 French navy 37, 39, 40 French police 15, 20, 54, 67, 112, 113, 114, 117, 122, 130, 137, 147, 160, 168–9, 173, 177–9, 182, 184–8, 192, 200, 207, 211, 216, 217, 219, 220, 223, 224, 227, 230–1, 232, 234, 235, 236, 237, 239, 240, 241, 242, 244, 245, 250, 260–1, 263, 264, 265, 266, 269, 271, 279, 288, 289, 291, 293, 294 French resistance 3, 6, 8, 9, 17–18, 19, 34, 67, 77, 80, 87, 89, 90, 95, 105, 106, 110, 112–33, 134–5, 145, 148, 149, 155, 156–7, 160, 161, 166, 167, 172, 176, 177, 188–92, 200, 216, 217–19, 222, 223, 226, 238–9, 241, 247–72, 275, 276, 279, 280, 288, 290–1, 292 and German reprisal policy 135–7, 168, 172, 175, 177, 180, 187, 188, 190, 192, 193, 217–18, 238–9, 276, 279 and suspected British activity 137, 138, 141, 150, 188 propaganda for leaflets and newspapers distributed by resistance groups 50, 112, 173, 255 trials of members of the 175–7, 191 French Revolution 95, 96

319

index French workers 9, 127, 128, 160, 169, 172, 253, 287; see also deportations, ‘labor’ Fr´ejus (Var d´epartment) 266 Frick, Wilhelm 49 Fromm, General Friedrich 283 F¨uhrerbefehl 11, 40, 87 Gabolde, Maurice 202 Gamelin, General Maurice 23, 24, 30, 32 Gaulle, General Charles de 2, 3, 6, 35, 134, 146, 217, 279, 288 and the Free French movement 145 and the French National Committee (CNF) 145 and the French people 148 and German reprisals 145, 292 and the ‘sword and shield’ theory 2, 3, 143 Gaullists 137, 148, 217 Geissler, Kurt (SS Hauptsturmf¨uhrer) 66 Geneva Convention 1, 73, 195, 261, 294 first (1864) 90 second (1929) 93–4, 96, 97 genocide 9, 158, 165, 218 George, Stefan 53 Georges, Pierre (aka Fredo and later Colonel Fabien) 135 Gerlier, Cardinal Pierre-Marie 202, 236 German Africa Corps 155, 194 German army 9–14, 15, 16, 20, 24, 30, 38, 44, 50, 76, 79, 85, 86, 104, 107, 108, 122, 126, 136, 177, 187, 192, 193, 200, 211, 220, 221, 222, 224, 273, 279, 292 civilian attacks against the 104, 107, 108, 109, 114, 127; see also French resistance see also German forces; Luftwaffe; Wehrmacht German Army Groups 26, 31–2, 171, 197, 198, 276 German Army High Command (Oberkommando des Heeres or OKH) 10, 12, 24, 41, 48, 50, 65, 76, 81, 86, 88, 119, 128, 132, 137, 145, 159, 162, 170, 171, 175, 195, 197, 198, 203, 224, 273 German consumer market 17, 247–8 German farms and factories 247–8, 250, 258, 261

German forces 1, 6, 23, 32, 43, 48, 83, 102, 109, 110, 112, 122, 128, 129, 159, 162, 195, 197, 241, 243, 258, 259, 261, 268, 269, 271, 275, 277, 280, 287 German Foreign Ministry 52, 69, 207, 235, 237 German Foreign Office 9, 51, 52, 53, 55, 59, 60, 61, 75, 79, 86, 113, 136, 148, 222, 241 German Imperial Army 24–5, 50, 100, 196 German law 71, 72, 73 German military administration 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21–2, 55, 72, 108, 115, 117–18, 121, 122, 125, 126, 127, 140, 142, 147, 148, 149, 161, 173, 183, 199, 200, 204, 211, 216, 217, 224, 248, 250, 251, 252, 264, 276, 288, 289, 291, 293, 294 German Ministries: of Armaments and Munitions 60 of Economics 60–1 of Finance 84 of the Interior 45 of Propaganda 69, 77, 140, 150 see also German Foreign Ministry German navy 172 German police 106–7, 108, 110, 120, 122, 160, 168, 173, 177–8, 182, 184, 191, 193, 217, 220, 223, 224, 228, 232, 234, 241, 242, 243, 250, 257, 260–1, 262, 263, 265, 269, 271, 279, 290, 293 German U-boats 172 German war economy 16, 18, 24, 28, 38, 45, 160, 223, 247–9, 262, 263 German war effort 8, 33, 38, 40, 49, 57, 61, 67, 71, 81, 87, 105, 112, 120, 127, 162, 169, 200, 211, 213, 216, 221, 252, 263, 286, 294 Germany 3, 4, 5, 7, 9, 23, 26, 28, 30, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 44, 49, 50, 55, 56, 58, 59, 63, 67, 68, 69, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 81, 84, 86, 87, 96, 98, 110, 116, 117, 118, 122, 123, 125, 128, 134, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 151, 160, 162, 167, 170, 173, 180, 187, 193, 195–6, 206, 211, 214, 221, 237, 248, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 256, 257, 258, 261, 264, 265, 269, 279, 280, 286, 288, 292, 295

320

index defeat at Stalingrad 167 Nazi 6, 10, 11, 33–4, 112, 113, 132, 134, 135, 158, 161, 172, 176, 217 1918–19 Revolution 28, 64, 273 and World War One 96–7 see also Jews Gerstenmaier, Eugen 281 Gestapo (Geheime Staatspolizei) 59, 64, 65, 80, 207, 224, 234, 279, 282–3 Goebbels, Joseph 52, 68–9, 74, 125, 149–52, 155, 159, 178, 198 G¨oring, Carin 61 G¨oring, Hermann 18, 45, 49, 50, 51, 59–63, 67, 69, 70, 72, 81–3, 86, 125, 155–7, 159, 164–5, 189, 249, 273, 285 interest in art 61–2 Grand Orient de France 80 Grau, Wilhelm 79–80 Great Britain 1, 24, 28, 33, 34, 35, 51, 52, 55, 56, 59, 68, 98, 113, 141, 144, 194 German planned invasion of 48 rearmament of 33, 36 Special Air Service 275 see also England; London Greece 220, 221, 222 ancient 68 German invasion of (1941) 48, 194 see also Jews Greiner, Major 76 Groscurth, Helmuth 281 Guderian, General Heinz 10, 119 Guernica 24 gypsies 47 Hagen, Herbert 225, 226, 232, 235, 236 Hague Convention 1, 13, 15, 16, 38–9, 40, 41, 71, 73, 80, 83, 98, 99, 102, 103, 105, 166, 195, 269, 273, 274, 276, 289, 294, 295 (1899) 91–2, 93, 94, 96, 97 (1907) 92–5, 96, 98 Martens clause 94, 97 Halder, General Franz 171, 281 Haute Savoie 267 Heer, Hannes 14 Hemmen, Hans 60, 86, 252–3 Hexagon 17, 20, 36, 59, 84, 95, 128, 160, 197, 199, 205, 226, 234, 236, 249, 258, 259, 263, 271; see also Occupation, French

Heydrich, Reinhard 45, 129, 132, 175, 180, 181, 184, 185, 186, 226, 229–30, 290 assassination of 186 Himmler, Heinrich 20, 42, 45, 49, 50, 63–7, 69, 70, 72, 80, 89, 125, 132, 133, 158, 175, 178–82, 183, 186, 189, 191, 192, 218, 221, 224, 225, 226, 236, 237, 238, 241, 250, 262–3, 264–6, 288, 291 Hitler, Adolf (F¨uhrer) 4, 5, 7, 9, 10, 11–13, 14–15, 16, 18, 19, 20, 24, 25, 26, 28, 33, 35, 37, 38, 40, 41, 42–3, 44, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 52, 53, 54–5, 56, 57, 59, 61, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 86, 88, 89, 97, 100, 106, 112, 113, 119, 126, 127, 129, 136, 140, 142, 143, 144, 145, 147, 149, 152, 155, 159, 162, 163, 164, 167, 170, 178, 179, 181, 185, 192, 195, 198, 205, 210, 211, 221, 231, 247, 252, 254, 256, 258, 259, 260, 262, 264, 267, 268, 273–4, 280, 284, 287, 288, 289, 294 anti-partisan policy 124–6, 157, 161, 162, 163, 165, 172, 180, 196, 197, 268, 275, 276 anti-Semitism 50, 57, 71, 86, 90, 124, 158, 166, 172, 196, 197, 289–90 assumes direct control of OKH 195 Commando Order (1942) 191, 273, 275, 276–7, 280, 281 Commissar Order 12, 171 and communist insurgence 123, 124, 137, 138, 166, 197 declares war on the United States 195 expansive definition of security 50–1, 89–90, 162 and the Final Solution to the Jewish Question 133, 199, 206, 207, 220, 232, 293 and France 48, 57–8, 62, 72, 128, 245 and the French 55, 57 and the German policy of confiscation 71–2, 73, 74, 75, 77, 78, 79, 82, 83, 87, 88, 89, 208 and the German war economy 247–9 and the Hoffmann case 119, 120, 122 and hostage executions 145–6, 149–51, 155, 172–3, 175, 192, 293 and the Hotz case 137, 139 Mein Kampf 48, 57, 58 and military law 100–3, 111

321

index Hitler, Adolf (F¨uhrer) (cont.) and the Night and Fog Decree (Nacht und Nebel Erlass) 157–8, 190, 293 9 March 1942 directive 182–3, 184 plots against 25–6 ‘Polish methods’ 166, 290 racial agenda 14, 15, 18, 20, 43, 50–1, 124, 158, 169, 196, 222, 289–90 reprisal policy 158, 162–3, 172, 173, 175, 178, 192, 195, 289, 292, 293 Stauffenberg’s plot against (20 July coup) 281–7, 290, 291 Stuckart Memoranda 57 worldview (Weltanschauung) 125, 133 Hitler Youth 12 Hoeppner, Erich 281, 283 Hofacker, C¨aser von 282–7 Hoffendank, assassination of Private 173 Hoffmann, assassination of Sergeant Ernst 118–21, 122, 127–8, 129, 135, 141, 145, 150 Holland 41, 149 German invasion of (1940) 24, 26, 30 Holocaust 222 Hoßbach, Colonel Friedrich 170 Hotel Continental 284, 285 Hotel Majestic 19, 20, 50, 133, 148, 184, 186, 285 Hotel Rapha´el 282, 284, 285 Hotz, assassination of Lieutenant-Colonel Karl Friedrich 136, 138, 139, 141, 146, 154 Hugenberg, Alfred 49 Hungary 220, 221; see also Jews Huntziger, General Charles-L´eon 36 Ingrand, Jean 115–16, 118 International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg (1945) 1, 10, 13 Iraq 56 Is`ere 267 Italian anti-fascists 264, 265 Italian army 220, 240, 242, 243 Italian Foreign Office 241 Italian government 240 Italian occupation of southeastern France 240–2, 243 Italian resistance 243 Italy 59, 221 German occupation of 221

invasion of Egypt (1940) 194 and the ‘Jewish Question’ 241–3 see also Jews J¨ackel, Eberhard 5–6, 8 Japanese government 44 ‘The Jew and France’ exhibition 209 Jewish art, business, and property, confiscation of 18, 19, 54, 55, 61–2, 66, 70, 71–2, 76, 78, 80, 83, 84, 86, 87, 89, 130, 133, 158, 178, 198, 199, 204, 207–8, 211–16, 224, 227, 237, 289, 291 ‘Jewish conspiracy’ 196, 209 ‘international’ 124, 132, 218, 293 see also Judeo-Bolshevik conspiracy Jewish organizations 74, 80 Jewish property, ‘abandoned’ (‘herrenloser’) 78–80 Jews 4, 14, 17, 18, 53, 54, 57, 65, 74, 80, 81, 85–6, 87, 111, 169, 176, 179, 195, 196, 209, 210, 218, 247, 250, 264, 274 arrest of 160, 163, 216, 217, 231, 232, 239, 265, 266 and Aryans 18, 19 Austrian 217, 228, 232, 236 Belgian 220, 222, 223, 230, 236, 237 Bulgarian 237 Czech 217, 228, 232, 236 defamation of 198, 201, 204, 207, 208, 209, 219, 289, 293 denaturalization of 201–3, 207, 229, 234, 240, 242, 293 deportation of 15, 16, 156, 157–8, 160, 163, 165, 169, 171, 174, 188, 196, 200, 202, 216, 218, 219, 220–46, 289, 290, 293 despoliation of 16, 199, 201, 203, 204, 207, 208, 216, 218, 219, 227, 289, 293 discrimination of 16, 198, 201, 203, 204, 207, 208, 213, 219, 289, 293 Dutch 220, 221, 223, 230, 236, 237 Eastern European 176–8, 220 Estonian 237 execution of 64, 119, 121, 124, 138, 156, 157, 159, 163, 166, 172, 173, 190, 218, 244 expulsion (forced emigration) of 47, 106, 196, 199, 200, 216, 218

322

index extermination of 12, 158, 168, 179, 220, 227, 289 foreign 8, 9, 15, 204, 207, 213, 227, 228, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 239, 241, 243, 245 French 8, 15, 20, 54, 66, 67, 80, 106, 117, 130, 132, 201–3, 204, 205, 206, 207, 209, 214, 216, 218, 220–46, 265, 289, 291, 293 German 232, 236 Greek 220, 237 Hungarian 220, 221, 236 Italian 221, 222, 235 Lithuanian 237 Polish 217, 228, 232, 236 Portuguese 235 Rumanian 237 Russian 232 Serbian 179, 223 Spanish 235 and the Star of David 240 ‘stateless’ 202, 232, 238 sterilization of 196 Swiss 235 Yugoslav 221, 237 see also anti-Semitism; Final solution to the Jewish Question Jodl, General Alfred 10, 166, 245, 288, 290 Jouvenel, Bertrand de 53 Judeo-Bolshevik conspiracy 136, 158, 218 J¨unger, Ernst 282 Jura 270 Kaiserreich 11, 44, 101 Kalbhenn, First Lieutenant 136 Keitel, Field Marshal Wilhelm 10, 24, 25, 41, 48, 64, 71, 73–4, 76, 77, 79–82, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 113, 122, 123, 125, 126, 127, 129, 137, 138, 155, 157, 159, 162–3, 164, 165, 166, 179, 180, 181, 183, 190, 192, 196, 218, 252, 262, 268, 274, 275, 276, 286, 288, 289 King Haakon VII 52 Kluge, Hans G¨unther von 195, 283–6 Knochen, Helmut 65, 66, 117, 129, 130, 132, 182, 183, 202, 203, 212, 224, 225, 226, 229, 231, 232, 233, 234–42, 244, 257, 267, 274, 284–6, 290, 295

Kohl, Lieutenant-General Otto 230 Kraewel, Lieutenant-Colonel Kurt von 282, 287 Krakow 14 Krancke, Admiral Theodor 285–6 K¨ubler, Dr. 154 K¨uchler, General Georg von 64 K¨ummel, Dr. Otto 74–5 K¨unsberg, Baron Eberhard von 75, 78–9, 208 L’Illustration 54 La France au Travail 54 La Gerbe 54 La Patrie 4, 23 La Roche-Guyon 283, 284, 285 La Rozi`ere, Fr´ed´eric de 140 La Vie Nationale 54 labor, forced 16, 257; see also deportations, ‘labor’ labor camps 244; see also deportations, ‘labor’ Lammers, Dr. Hans 82–3, 86, 125, 151–2, 178, 262 Lao-Tzu 43 Laval, Pierre 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 37, 55, 56, 58, 62, 106, 129, 147, 166–7, 172, 184–6, 201, 203–4, 205, 206, 207, 210, 212, 219, 231, 234, 236, 240, 242, 249, 252–5, 257, 258–61, 263, 264, 289, 290, 291, 293 Laval governments: first 204 second 167, 172, 245 Le Berre, Maurice 135 Le Havre 271 attack (1942) 172–3 Lebrun, President 35 Leclerc, General 288 Free French forces 277, 288 Leeb, General Wilhelm 64 Leguay, Jean 230–1, 233, 236 Leipzig 97 Lequ´erica, Se˜nor de 35 Librairie Lipschutz 80 Libya 194 Lietzmann, Admiral Joachim 115 Limoges 197, 266 Linstow, Colonel Hans Otfried von 196, 268–9, 282–6

323

index Lioust, L´eon 172 Lischka, Kurt 225, 226, 232, 235 Lloyd George, David 97 London 2, 6, 23, 134, 145, 194 Long March, Mao’s 44 Lorraine 39, 47, 57, 58 German annexation of 106, 221, 291 Louvre, the 62, 66, 75, 81, 85 Low Countries 24, 62, 220 German invasion of the (1940) 30–2 Luchaire, Jean 53 Luftwaffe 28, 62, 82, 157, 165, 189, 230, 239, 285 Luxembourg, German invasion of (1940) 30 Lyon 197, 216, 239, 242 Mackensen, General August von 14 Mackenson, Hans Georg von 241 Mandel, Georges 35 Manstein, Field Marshal Erich von 10, 25, 26, 97, 170 Mao Zedong 44 Marin, Louis 35 Marquet, Adrien 66 Marrus, Michael 5, 222; see also Paxton, Robert Marseille 197, 216, 242, 264–7 German round-up in 238–9 see also Operation Tiger Masonic lodges, archives and libraries 66, 73, 77, 78, 80, 225 Maurras, Charles 201 Maxim’s (Paris restaurant) 63 Medicus, Dr. Franz Albrecht 138–40, 154 Messerschmidt, Manfred 12, 14 Metternich, Franz Graf Wolff 74–6, 78–9, 82, 87, 208 Meuse river 26, 31 Michel, Elmar 60, 212, 256, 282–3, 287, 295 Milch, Erhard 262 Milice (French paramilitary group) 206, 244, 269, 271 Milit¨arbefehlshaber in Belgien und nordwest Frankfreich (MBB) 41, 151, 162, 178, 197 Milit¨arbefehlshaber in Frankreich (MBF) 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 41–3, 44, 48, 50, 55, 62, 65, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76,

77, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 103–5, 106–7, 108, 110, 113, 115, 117, 119–28, 130, 132, 133, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 144, 145, 148, 149, 150, 151, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 177, 178, 181, 182, 186, 188, 189, 190, 192, 193, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 237, 240, 244, 245, 251, 252, 257, 260, 263, 267, 268, 269, 271, 273, 274, 276–7, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 290, 293, 294 command staff (Kommandostab) 44, 45, 118, 127, 136, 152, 153 military administration staff (Milit¨arverwaltungstab or MVW) 44–7, 50, 60–1, 73, 74–6, 78–83, 87, 106–7, 109, 112, 114, 152, 186, 208, 212, 214, 215, 217, 218, 227, 251, 256, 257, 263, 282, 288 Milit¨argesetzbuch (military penal code) 191, 268, 276 military doctrine: American 99–100, 102 British 98, 100, 102 French 99, 100, 102 German 100–3, 122, 129; see also Decree concerning Military Jurisdiction . . . ; Decree concerning Special Military Crimes . . . Miller, Captain Perry 279 Moltke, Helmuth James Graf von 281 Montoire agreement 139 Montoire conference (1940) 56, 58, 142, 155 Montpellier 197 Mˆoquet, Guy 138 Moravia 249 German occupation of (1939) 33, 36 Moscow 119, 123, 127, 292 Moscow Conference (1943) 1 Moscow Declaration (1943) 277 Moser, assassination of Alfons (‘Moser affair’) 114–18, 119, 121, 127, 129, 132, 135, 141, 145, 149, 150, 289 Moulin de Labarth`ete, Henri du 143, 147

324

index Mouvement Social R´evolutionnaire 129 M¨uller, Heinrich (‘Gestapo’) 180, 226, 240 M¨uller, Klaus-J¨urgen 11, 12, 14 Munich Agreement (1938) 33, 170 Munich conference (1938) 62 Munich Crisis 281 Mus´ee de l’Homme 175 Mus´ee du Jeu de Paume 85 Mussolini, Benito 194, 202, 207, 221, 241 arrest of (1943) 241 Mutschmann, Martin 218 Nantes 136, 137, 139, 146, 153 administration 136, 138, 139, 154 assassination 141, 142, 144, 145, 146, 148, 150, 153, 154, 159, 165, 178, 182 executions 139, 140, 142, 144, 146, 155, 174 Napoleon I 96 Napoleon III 2, 88 son 58, 292 National Socialism 12, 13, 14, 71, 125, 155 Nazi ideology 10, 12, 13, 17, 41, 48, 66, 67, 88, 196 racial 11, 18, 111, 125, 129, 158, 178, 198, 200, 211, 212, 222, 272, 294 Nazi party (NSDAP) 9, 11, 17, 19, 40, 53, 54, 59, 63, 67, 68, 69, 71, 77, 152, 165, 180, 181, 196, 200, 224, 226, 249, 273, 292 ‘Blood Order’ 284 Nazi propaganda 12, 53, 54, 63 Nazi regime 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 19, 21, 40, 42, 44, 46, 53, 72, 111, 123, 163, 166, 168, 169, 170, 178, 187, 196–7, 199, 204, 212, 224, 275, 281, 292, 294 overthrow plot (1944) 15, 20, 21, 73, 168, 268, 274, 281–7; see also Hitler, Adolf Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact (1939) 4, 28, 33, 36, 52, 66, 112 Nazification (Gleichschaltung) 12 Nazis 1, 18, 21, 28, 49, 56, 61, 72, 88, 89, 93, 98, 129, 166, 191, 192 and the Hague Convention 269, 273, 274, 276, 289, 294 Netherlands 41, 179, 220, 222, 223, 230

Neumann-Neurode, Lieutenant General Karl Ulrich 154 Neurath, Konstantin Freiherr von 49, 69 Nice 243 Nidda, Roland Krug von 231 Night and Fog Decree (Nacht und Nebel Erlass) 157–9, 166, 169, 174–5, 190–1, 195, 274, 293 Night of the Long Knives (1934) 11, 44 Nord (French department) 71 Normandy 271, 275, 277 Allied invasion of (1944) 273 North Africa 6, 34, 35, 147, 194, 216, 258 Allied invasion of (1942) 37, 197, 210, 238, 240, 258, 259, 260 Norway 30, 52, 75, 179, 221 German invasion of (1940) 28, 194 Nuremberg racial laws 17, 199 Oberg, Carl Albrecht 20, 21, 168–9, 181–90, 192, 196, 197, 225, 230, 231, 232, 234, 236, 237, 238, 264, 265, 266, 267, 274, 284–7, 290–1, 293–4, 295 Oberg-Bousquet accords 187–9, 231, 260 Occupation, French 4–5, 8, 9, 15, 17, 20, 21, 37, 39, 41, 43, 50, 51, 53, 54, 56, 58, 59, 60, 65, 66, 67, 70, 71, 72, 73, 75, 76, 87, 89, 106–7, 109, 112, 117, 130, 137, 149, 167, 168, 169, 184, 185, 191, 192, 193, 197, 200, 201, 202, 203, 205, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 215, 216, 219, 221, 222, 223, 224, 230, 234, 235, 243, 244, 245, 249, 250, 251, 256, 257, 258, 263, 267, 280, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 294 number of casualties during 192–3 Office of the Four-Year Plan 45, 59, 60, 249 Operation Barbarossa 109, 171, 248 Operation Fr¨uhling 270 Operation Haute-Savoie 269 Operation Korporal 269 Operation Tiger 265–6 Operation Typhoon 129 Oradour-sur-Glane massacre (1944) 16, 277 Order Police (Ordnungspolizei or Orpo) 64, 178 Orleans 242 Ouzoulias, Albert 135, 155

325

index Palais Rothschild 79 Papen, Franz von 49 Paris 16, 17, 18, 21, 23, 26, 33, 34, 42, 43, 52, 55, 60, 72, 73, 83, 87, 88, 89, 113, 138, 149, 175, 188, 189, 213, 214, 216, 220, 225, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 237, 239, 248, 274, 280, 281, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 290 bombing of synagogues (1941) 19, 129–33, 182, 183, 237, 244, 291 book store attack (1941) 155, 159 German embassy in (‘Paris embassy’) 18, 54, 62, 66, 67, 72, 73, 75, 76–80, 85, 128, 129, 130, 146, 147, 148, 149, 155, 158, 165, 166, 182, 184, 186, 188, 199, 200, 206, 207–8, 209, 210, 219, 224, 242, 252, 256, 257, 258, 260, 263, 266, 267, 288 German occupation of 52, 65, 69, 224; see also France Hˆotel du Midi bombing (1941) 155, 156, 159 liberation of 215, 244, 287–8 Polish library 78–9 Paris Commune (1870–1) 2, 34, 50, 226 Pas de Calais 71 Paty de Clam, Charles Mercier du 206 Paul Rosenberg art gallery 75 Paxton, Robert 4–7, 8, 11, 222 Pearl Harbor, Japanese attack of (1941) 195 P´etain, Marshal Henri 2–7, 9, 17, 34, 35, 36, 37, 39, 55, 56, 62, 106, 117, 134, 141, 142, 143–4, 146, 147, 155–6, 164, 165, 167, 203, 206, 222, 231, 240, 264 and the Jewish Question 209 and the ‘sword and shield’ theory 2–6, 143 trial of (1945) 2–3 Petsamo campaign 26, 28 Phony War 28, 33, 52, 53, 281 Pilsudski, Marshal J´osef 62 Plenipotentiary for the Mobilization of Labor,see Sauckel, Fritz Poincar´e, Raymond 33 Poitiers 243 Poland 11, 15, 28, 30, 40, 42–3, 52, 64, 75, 85, 135, 171, 178, 179, 221, 224, 227, 249, 290

German invasion of (1939) 14, 23–4, 46, 53, 64, 170, 194, 276 see also Jews Polonization 9 Popular Front 33 Potsdam 288 press: American 77 English 30 French 30, 188 prisoner of war (POW) camps 254, 255, 261, 277 prisoners of war 47–8, 73, 91, 93–4, 249 Allied 48 British 47 French 5, 47, 54, 56, 141, 155, 169, 202, 203, 205, 247, 248, 249, 252, 254, 258, 259, 261–2, 263, 291 Soviet 255 Protocols of Paris 56, 57, 156 Prussia 59 Pucheu, Pierre 140, 141, 143–4, 147 Quisling, Vidkun 52 Rebi`ere, Pierre 135 Red Army 12, 26, 161 invasion of Finland (1939) 26 Red Cross Convention, see Geneva Convention ‘Red Spaniards’ 264 r´efractaires 250, 260–1, 263, 264, 265, 266, 271, 274, 289, 290 refugees, problem of 47, 48 Reich Chancellery 82, 152 Reich Security Main Office (Reichssicherheitshauptamt or RSHA) 45–6, 65, 66, 181, 186, 225, 226, 229, 230, 236, 238, 239, 240, 241, 264 Reichenau, General Walter von 64, 170, 195 Reichswehr 43 Reimers, Hans-Gottfried 139 Rel`eve program 249–50, 254–6, 257–8, 291 Religious Wars (16th century) 96 Renault, Gilbert (Colonel R´emy) 3 Reynaud, Paul 34, 35

326

index Reynaud government 34, 134 Rhineland 11 occupation of 25, 53 Ribbentrop, Joachim von 49, 50, 52, 53, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 63, 67, 68, 69, 70, 75, 144, 210, 241, 252 Rilke, Rainer Maria 53 Ritter, Julius 258 Ritz Hotel (Paris) 184 Rocque, Colonel Franc¸ois de la: Croix de Feu 205 R¨ohm purge 170 Romains, Jules 53 Roman Empire, Fall of the 68 Romanov dynasty 68 Rommel, Erwin 10, 170 Roosevelt, Franklin D.: condemnation of hostage executions 144 Roosevelt, Theodore 91 Rosenberg, Alfred 17, 18, 49, 50, 67–9, 72, 74, 77–8, 81, 82, 85, 86, 87, 89, 125, 244; see also Einsatzstab Rosenberg Roskothen, Captain Ernst 175 R¨othke, Heinz 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 240, 242, 290 Rothschild family 62, 80 Rotterdam attack 287 Rouen 66, 135, 225, 239 Royal Air Force 30 Royal Navy 28, 37 Ruhr, French occupation of the (1923) 99, 110 Rules of Land Warfare 99 Rundstedt, Gerd von 26, 162, 195, 197, 267, 271 Russia 26, 28, 97, 272; see also Jews SA (Sturmabteilung) 11 Saalw¨achter, General-Admiral Alfred 115, 117 Saint Florentin meetings 155–6, 159 St. Petersburg Declaration (1868) 90–1 Sauckel, Fritz 16, 20, 166, 210, 249–50, 252–64, 266, 271, 272, 281 labor program 249–50, 288, 291 Savoie 267 Schaumburg, Lieutenant-General Ernst 118, 120

Scheben, assassination of Captain 121, 129, 135, 141, 145 Schellenberg, Walter 264 Schleicher, General Kurt von 11, 43, 170 Schleier, Consul-General Rudolf 210, 241, 266 Schmid, Jonathan 113, 115, 154 Sch¨onhaar, Karl 173 Schrader, Captain Dr. 136, 138, 139, 154 Schuster (Kriegsverwaltungsrat) 154 Schwarzhoff, Colonel Gross von 91 Secours National 85, 87 Secret Military Police (Geheime Feldpolizei or GFP) 44, 65, 76, 80, 81, 82, 121, 130, 136, 160, 177, 180, 183, 207 Secret State Police, see Gestapo Sections sp´eciales 114, 115, 116 Security Police (Sicherheitspolizei or Sipo) 64, 110, 178 Seeckt, General Hans von 25, 170 Seibel, Wolfgang 221 Seligmann art gallery 75 Senior SS and Police Leader (H¨oherer SSund Polizeif¨uhrer or HSSuPF) 20, 21, 162, 168–9, 178–80, 264–5, 267, 284, 285, 286, 287, 290, 294 Serbia 179; see also Jews Service de contrˆole des administrateurs provisoires or SCAP) 203–4, 293 Service du Travail Obligatoire (Obligatory Labor Service or STO) 250, 259, 260, 261, 263, 264 Sevastopol, siege of 287 Seyss-Inquart, Arthur 41, 223 Sommer, SS Major 129–32 Soviet Union 1, 11, 12, 14, 26, 33–4, 40, 68 , 97, 113, 115, 179 counter-offensive (1941) 195, 196 German invasion of the (1941–42) 6, 13, 14, 48, 56, 67, 108–10, 112–13, 119, 122, 134, 166, 171, 194, 195, 214, 217, 248, 251 Spain 183 French invasion of (1808) 95–6 see also Jews Spanish-American War 99 Spanish Civil War 112, 135

327

index Spartaco, Guisco 135, 136 Speer, Albert 249, 262 Speidel, Colonel Hans 62, 118, 161–2, 196, 216, 283 Sperrle, Hugo 189, 267–8, 271 SS (Schutzstaffeln) 9, 10–11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17–18, 19, 20, 21, 42, 45, 63–7, 72, 73, 76, 80, 85, 89, 113, 119, 130, 131, 132, 133, 136, 155, 158, 162, 166, 168, 171, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 186, 187, 189, 190, 192, 193, 196, 203, 207, 210, 225, 242, 250, 266, 269–71, 274, 279, 280–5, 287, 288, 290, 291, 294 and anti-German conspiracies 70, 73, 78, 80, 85, 130, 218, 225, 264 anti-Semitic activity 200, 202, 206, 218, 219, 222, 223, 226–8, 230, 236, 237, 238, 239, 244, 245, 246, 250, 263, 264 Einsatzgruppen 14, 42, 64, 224 Judenrat 199, 227 and the life unworthy of living (lebensunwertes Leben) program 64 see also Black Corps SS-Abwehr’s ten commandments (zehn Gebote) 180, 182 SS Security Service (Sicherheitsdienst or SD) 64, 65, 77, 115, 117, 119, 129, 136, 138, 157, 158, 160, 166, 183, 191, 199, 224, 226, 266, 268, 275, 276 Stalin, Joseph 28, 33, 67, 112, 292 Stauffenberg, Claus von 282–4 Stauffenberg family 281, 287 Stauffenberg’s plot against Hitler (20 July coup), see Hitler, Adolf Stieff, Major-General Helmuth 283 Strasser, Gregor 63 Streccius, General Alfred 43, 46, 65, 88, 103, 106, 211, 267 ‘Measures to Prevent Sabotage’ 103–4, 111, 122 Streit, Christian 12, 13, 14 Stresemann, Gustav 53 St¨ulpnagel, Carl-Heinrich von (MBF) 15, 16, 20, 21, 24, 25, 59, 168–78, 181, 182, 183–4, 190, 192, 196, 197, 257, 268, 281, 286, 290, 294 and deportations 174–5, 218 execution of (August 1944) 286

plot against the Nazi regime 15, 168, 170, 268, 274, 281–7, 294 see also Milit¨arbefehlshaber in Frankreich (MBF) St¨ulpnagel, Joachim 169–70 St¨ulpnagel, Joachim (C.-H. St¨ulpnagel’s son) 170 St¨ulpnagel, General Otto von (MBF) 15, 16, 17, 19, 43, 46, 63, 71, 76, 85, 86, 88, 104–6, 111, 113, 115, 117–23, 125, 126–9, 130, 132, 133, 135–6, 137, 139–40, 141, 144, 145, 146, 148–50, 150, 152, 154, 155, 156, 158, 159, 160–1, 162, 163, 168, 169, 171, 172, 174, 177, 179, 180, 183, 190, 208, 211, 213, 215, 218, 225, 237, 257, 281, 290–1, 294 resignation of 163–6, 175, 293 see also Milit¨arbefehlshaber in Frankreich (MBF) Supreme Allied War Council 28 Supreme command for German forces in the West (Oberbefehlshaber West or Ob West) 197, 198, 259, 267, 268–71, 275–7, 281–4, 287–8 Sweden 220, 222 Sweets, John 7 ‘sword and shield’ theory 2–6, 143 synagogues 19, 66, 74, 80; see also Paris Syria 26, 56 Taoism 43 Tardif, Raymond 173 Teuchert, Lieutenant-Colonel Friedrich Freiherr von 282, 284, 287 Third Reich 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 19, 28, 33, 37, 39, 40, 47, 48, 54, 56, 58, 59, 62, 63, 65, 67, 80, 82, 83, 84, 85, 100, 106, 133, 140, 141, 143, 150, 157, 164, 179, 180, 182, 187, 188, 192, 196, 198, 206, 214, 217, 221, 231, 236, 244, 248, 249, 251, 253, 255, 257, 258, 259, 261, 268, 291 Thomas, General Georg 60 Thomas, Dr. Max (SS Brigadef¨uhrer) 65, 66, 73, 118, 132, 224–5, 226, 291 Thorez, Maurice 34, 112 Thuringia 249 Todt, Fritz 60, 249, 252

328

index Todt (SS Police regiment) 266 Tondelier, Georges 173 Toulouse 197, 242, 277 Toulouse, Archbishop of 236 Tours 32, 34 treason 1, 7 Treaty of Versailles 11, 33, 39, 58, 170, 292 Trott zu Solz, Adam von 281 Tsar Nicholas II 91, 94 Turgenev library 78–9 Ukraine 119 Ulex, General Wilhelm 14, 64 Unger, Colonel Karl von 282 Union G´en´eral des Isra´elites de France (UGIF) 227, 228, 238, 239 Union Sacr´ee 36 United States 1, 56, 98 Army 99–100, 275 Utikal, Gerhard 78 Valence (Drˆome) 241 Vallat, Xavier 86, 205–6, 207, 216, 217, 228 Valois, Georges: Faisceau movement 205 V`el d’Hiv round-up 232, 233, 234, 235 Verdun 35, 286 Vichy regime 2–5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 16, 17, 20, 21–2, 36, 37, 40, 45, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 66, 72, 76, 77, 79, 82, 84, 86, 87, 106, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116–18, 121, 122, 127, 134, 137, 138, 140, 141, 143–4, 146, 148, 149, 152, 158, 160, 161, 164, 165, 166, 172, 173, 184, 185, 188, 199–200, 201, 208, 209, 210, 221, 228, 230, 250, 254–5, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 262, 263, 264, 289–90, 291 and anti-Semitism 199–207, 209, 219, 227, 245, 290, 291, 292, 293 Aryanization program 158, 214–16 and attentisme 203 and compulsory labor laws (1942) 256–7 denaturalization of Jews program 201–3, 207, 240, 242, 290, 293 deportation of Jews 231, 234–7, 240, 241 despoliation campaign against Jews 84–5, 212, 219, 227, 245, 293

end of the 242 and the Jewish Question 224, 292–3 and the 1881 Marchandeau Law 199, 201 Statut des Juifs 158, 199, 204 Vienna 199 Vogl, General Oskar 86 V¨olkischer Beobachter 68, 69 Waffen SS 50, 63, 64, 224, 277 Wagner, General Eduard 119–20, 122, 126, 127, 129, 132, 137, 139, 140, 145, 150, 155, 163, 166, 171 Wagner, Robert 47 Wannsee conference (1942) 67 war, laws (rules) of 12, 14, 15, 17, 19, 88, 90, 92, 94, 99, 188, 193, 195, 269 war crimes 1, 10, 11, 16, 21, 43, 92, 98, 219 German 277–80, 288, 294 trials 1–2, 97, 274, 294, 295 see also genocide war treason (‘war rebellion’) 92, 99, 100, 101 warfare 13, 39 Warlimont, General Walter 127, 129, 159, 162, 171, 180 Warsaw 23, 24, 181 Wartenburg, Graf Yorck von 281 Wehrmacht 9–14, 16, 18, 24, 49, 50, 70, 77, 104, 133, 147, 164 , 165, 170, 179, 183, 191, 224, 248, 279, 280, 292 Weimar Republic 10, 11, 25, 43, 44, 52, 53, 100, 181, 281 Western campaign (1940) 15, 30, 32, 41, 47, 52, 54, 64, 75, 87, 103, 171, 211, 224, 247, 273 Weygand, General Maxime 6, 32, 33, 34, 36, 147 Wildenstein art gallery 75 Wilson, Woodrow: Fourteen Points 58 Winiger, (Winkler) assassination of Dr. 159 Witzleben, Erwin von 197 World War One 23, 39, 43, 44, 45, 52, 53, 58, 85, 93, 96–7, 102, 139, 154, 169, 174, 184, 201, 205, 249, 274, 287 World War Two 1, 3, 5, 7, 10, 14, 17, 18, 21, 23, 33, 37, 39, 45, 59, 64, 67, 71, 93, 95, 102, 110, 111, 122, 129, 135,

329

index World War Two (cont.) 138, 166, 192, 195, 196, 215, 220, 221, 226, 246, 247, 249, 264, 288, 292

Ybarnegaray, Jean 34 Yugoslavia 221 German invasion of (1941) 48, 194 see also Jews

xenophobia 200–1

Zeitschel, Karl-Theodor 209, 210, 231

330