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Advancing Knowledge and the Knowledge Economy edited by Brian Kahin and Dominique Foray The revolution in information technology transforms not only information and its uses but knowledge and the ways we generate and manage it. Knowledge is now seen as input, output, and capital, even if imperfectly accounted for or understood. Many businesses and public agencies are convinced that knowledge can be managed in sophisticated, rational ways and that networking and information technology are essential tools for doing so. In this collection, experts from North America and Europe look at the transformation of knowledge in the global economy in light of the rapid changes in information technology, the resulting explosion of data, the recognition of intangibles as sources of value and liability, and the increasingly blurred distinction between private and public knowledge. The appeal of the Internet as boundary-spanning knowledge infrastructure, bridging all sectors of the economy, is shadowed by another infrastructure of rights-based contracts, practices, and institutions. The contributors address the ways in which the processes for creating and organizing knowledge interact with information technology, business strategy, and changing social and economic conditions. They discuss the balkanization that results from the complexity of the knowledge economy, the variety of knowledge resources, the great diversity of institutional and market contexts, and competing models of control and cooperation — and of proprietary and nonproprietary knowledge. Brian Kahin is Visiting Professor at the University of Michigan. He is a coeditor of Transforming Enterprise (MIT Press, 2004) and many other books. Dominique Foray holds the Chair in Economics and Management of Innovation and is Director of the College of Management of Technology at École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne. He is the author of The Economics of Knowledge (MIT Press, 2004).
Transforming Enterprise The Economic and Social Implications of Information Technology
edited by William H. Dutton, Brian Kahin, Ramon O’Callaghan, and Andrew W. Wyckoff Innovators across all sectors of society are using information and communication technology to reshape economic and social activity. Even after the boom — and despite the bust — the process of structural change continues across organizational boundaries. Transforming Enterprise considers the implications of this change from a balanced, post-bust perspective.
The MIT Press Massachusetts Institute of Technology Cambridge, Massachusetts 02142 http://mitpress.mit.edu
0-262-61214-3
978-0-262-61214-2
Kahin and Foray, editors
O F R E L AT E D I N T E R E S T
Advancing Knowledge and the Knowledge Economy
B U S I N E S S / C O M P U T I N G / T E L E C O M M U N I C AT I O N S
Advancing Knowledge and the Knowledge Economy EDITED BY
Brian Kahin and Dominique Foray
Advancing Knowledge and the Knowledge Economy
Advancing Knowledge and the Knowledge Economy
edited by Brian Kahin and Dominique Foray
The MIT Press Cambridge, Massachusetts London, England
( 2006 Massachusetts Institute of Technology All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form by any electronic or mechanical means (including photocopying, recording, or information storage and retrieval) without permission in writing from the publisher. MIT Press books may be purchased at special quantity discounts for business or sales promotional use. For information, please email
[email protected] or write to Special Sales Department, The MIT Press, 55 Hayward Street, Cambridge, MA 02142. This book was set in Sabon on 3B2 by Asco Typesetters, Hong Kong, and was printed and bound in the United States of America. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Advancing knowledge and the knowledge economy / edited by Brian Kahin and Dominique Foray. p. cm. Conference papers. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN-13: 978-0-262-11300-7 (alk. paper)—ISBN 978-0-262-61214-2 (pbk. : alk. paper) ISBN-10: 0-262-11300-7 (alk. paper)—ISBN 0-262-61214-3 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. Knowledge management—Congresses. 2. Information technology—Economic aspects— Congresses. I. Kahin, Brian. II. Foray, Dominique. HD30.2.A345 2006 658.40 038—dc22 2005058229 10
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Contents
Preface
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Prospects for Knowledge Policy Brian Kahin
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Optimizing the Use of Knowledge Dominique Foray
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OECD Work on Knowledge and the Knowledge Economy Berglind A´sgeirsdo´ttir
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Measuring Knowledge
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Measuring Knowledge and Its Economic Effects: The Role of Official Statistics 27 Fred Gault
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Assessing Innovation Capacity: Fitting Strategy, Indicators, and Policy to the Right Framework 43 Reinhilde Veugelers
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Knowledge Communities
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Interactive Learning, Social Capital, and Economic Performance Bengt-A˚ke Lundvall
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Social Capital, Networks, and Communities of Knowledge Tom Schuller
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Knowing Communities in Organizations Patrick Cohendet
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III The Changing Role of Institutions 9
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Epistemic Infrastructure in the Rise of the Knowledge Economy Margaret Hedstrom and John Leslie King
10 Universities and the Knowledge Economy Robin Cowan
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11 The Impact of ICT on Tertiary Education: Advances and Promises Kurt Larsen and Ste´phan Vincent-Lancrin
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12 The Bayh–Dole Act of 1980 and University–Industry Technology Transfer: A Policy Model for Other Governments? 169 David C. Mowery and Bhaven Sampat IV Knowledge and Place
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13 The Changing Dynamics of the Global Market for the Highly Skilled Andrew Wyckoff and Martin Schaaper 14 Knowledge in Space: What Hope for the Poor Parts of the Globe? Jan Fagerberg V
New Models of Innovation
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15 Democratizing Innovation: The Evolving Phenomenon of User Innovation 237 Eric von Hippel 16 Innovation, Experimentation, and Technological Change Stefan Thomke 17 Knowledge, Platforms, and the Division of Labor W. Edward Steinmueller
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18 Between ‘‘Knowledge’’ and ‘‘The Economy’’: Notes on the Scientific Study of Designs 299 Carliss Y. Baldwin and Kim B. Clark VI Models of Control and Cooperation
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19 Patent Quantity and Quality: Trends and Policy Implications Dietmar Harhoff
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20 Blurred Boundaries: Tensions Between Open Scientific Resources and Commercial Exploitation of Knowledge in Biomedical Research 351 Iain M. Cockburn 21 The Economics of Technology Sharing: Open Source and Beyond Josh Lerner and Jean Tirole
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22 ‘‘Open and Collaborative’’ Biomedical Research: Theory and Evidence Arti K. Rai 23 Critical Tensions in the Evolution of Open Source Software Brian Fitzgerald VII Emerging Infrastructure
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24 Toward a Cyberinfrastructure for Enhanced Scientific Collaboration: Providing Its ‘‘Soft’’ Foundations May Be the Hardest Part 431 Paul A. David 25 Cyberinfrastruture-in-the-Making: Can We Get There from Here? C. Suzanne Iacono and Peter A. Freeman Contributors and Affiliations Index 481
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Preface
At an elemental level, it is easy to see that information technology transforms information and the way we use it. The impact on knowledge is less apparent, in part because knowledge is a more complex and elusive matter than information. Nonetheless, we now see many businesses and public agencies taken with the idea that knowledge can be managed in rational ways and that networking and information technology are essential tools for doing so. We see knowledge assets embraced as a form of capital that is imperfectly understood and accounted for—even though it differentiates position and potential in an intensely competitive world, for nations as well as firms and institutions. Advancing Knowledge and the Knowledge Economy is the third of a series of projects that examine the economic and social implications of information technology. Beginning with Understanding the Digital Economy in 1999, followed by Transforming Enterprise in 2003, we have sought to showcase disinterested analysis in a way that helps a broader audience understand how information technology is changing the way we live and work. From a broad assessment at the peak of the Internet boom, we have moved toward a deeper, longer-term understanding of transformative processes. In this project, we look specifically at the transformation of knowledge as a resource underlying all fields of endeavor. To this end, we have sought collaborators in Europe. Not only is there a rich body of work on the economics of knowledge in Europe, but the European Commission has paid close attention to the social and economic underpinnings of research and innovation. We were pleased not only to work with Information Society Directorate General again but also, for the first time, with the Directorate General for Research. Special thanks are due to Andrew Sors and Nikolaos Kastrinos of the Strategy and Policy Unit of the Directorate for Social Sciences and the Humanities for their participation and support in bringing European researchers to the conference. We also thank Jesus Villasante of the Information Society Technologies Program for his continuing involvement in this effort.
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The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, more commonly known as OECD, played a major role in this project. Advancing Knowledge and the Knowledge Economy was inspired by a panel on the transformation of knowledge at the Transforming Enterprise conference. My coeditor Dominique Foray was then at the OECD Centre for Educational Research and Innovation, where he pursued this project on behalf of OECD, and he continued to contribute his time and vision from his new position at the E´cole Polytechnique Fe´de´rale de Lausanne. Kurt Larsen and Andrew Wyckoff at OECD also played important roles in guiding the project, and we are grateful to Deputy Secretary General Berglind Asgeirsdottir for her conference keynote and introductory essay. Principal funding for the Advancing Knowledge project was provided by the Digital Society and Technology Program and the Digital Government Program of the National Science Foundation.1 We would like to thank Bill Wulf, president of the National Academy of Engineering, for sponsoring the use of the National Academies auditorium and for opening the conference. We would also like to thank Comptroller General of United States David Walker for his inspiring keynote address, which is not included here but can be found online at: http://www.gao.gov/cghome/ ke01112005/. Finally, we would like to thank the many who contributed in other ways to making this project a success, including our panel moderators and the staff at the University of Michigan, the National Science Foundation, OECD, the National Academies, and the National Coordination Office for Networking and Information Technology Research and Development, Quantum Publishing Services, and The MIT Press. Brian Kahin University of Michigan Note 1. This material is based upon work supported by the National Science Foundation under Grant No. 0444492. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation.
1 Prospects for Knowledge Policy Brian Kahin
The maxim that the business of everybody is the business of nobody applies with special poignancy to knowledge. There are no ministries of knowledge. Knowledge lacks the cachet of technology and innovation. It lacks the specificity and urgency of information. Knowledge is diverse, complex, and context dependent—and rarely a topic of public discourse. The transformative effects of information technology and the global economic environment are changing the nature and uses of knowledge—and challenging the policy domains in which it plays a critical role. The generation and management of new knowledge is linked to innovation, wealth creation, and economic growth. Europe has conspicuously embraced the goal of becoming the world’s most competitive knowledge-based economy. However, linking knowledge to economic growth is difficult. The value of knowledge can lie in its ‘‘infinite expansibility’’—or in its novelty and enforced scarcity. The multifaceted and multivalent nature of knowledge makes it opaque—for academics and policymakers alike. There is too much to know about knowledge to be able to make intelligent decisions about it. Rapidly changing technological and economic conditions make the problem worse. Knowledge is more important, more multifaceted, more multivalent than ever. In relative terms, we know less and less about more and more. Yet specific changes show the growing significance and need for informed policy perspectives on knowledge. One can point to
The rise of information technology and the Internet as knowledge infrastructure,
The Internet-enabled explosion of codified knowledge,
Emergence of innovation policy as an essential tool for economic growth,
The growing scope and significance of intellectual property,
Recognition of intangibles as sources of value and liability,
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Disaggregation of the firm and the emergence of markets for knowledge and technology,
Emergence of knowledge management as a practical discipline, and
Increasing movement, sharing, and use of knowledge across boundaries.
While these developments challenge us to come to grips with the fabric of ‘‘knowledge policy,’’ they also show that our understanding of knowledge is changing in ways that are exceedingly difficult to keep in focus. Knowledge policies remain balkanized and isolated under different institutions and areas of expertise. Unlike the information revolution, the knowledge transformation has no analog-todigital shift and no discrete units like bits and bytes. Unlike other products of the information revolution, the transformation of knowledge cannot be readily priced and measured. The unspeakable complexity of the knowledge economy is reflected in the struggle over how to understand, represent, and account for intangible sources of value.1 But this specific and technical debate is only the most visible and persistent manifestation of the problem of generating usable knowledge about knowledge—a challenge whose infinite recursiveness seems to consign it to philosophy rather than social science. We do understand pieces of the transformation from personal experience. Our knowledge about people, firms, and institutions has come to be constructed and framed by websites. We know the extraordinary power of search engines for extracting approximations of contextual knowledge. The success of open source software development offers graphic evidence of the economic power of knowledge networks operating outside (but adjacent to) priced markets and incentives. Knowledge policy, such as it may be, remains widely dispersed in areas as diverse as intelligence and security, K–12 education, healthcare, patents, agency rulemaking, research funding, and the dissemination of agency information. It is hard to imagine a relationship between the established knowledge and basic skills taught in elementary school and the quest for new knowledge in science and technology. Yet K–12 education creates human capital that will serve the knowledge needs of the future. The balkanization of knowledge policy was less at issue in the past because knowledge moved more slowly. Patterns of dissemination were institutionalized and stable. Without digital technology, knowledge did not readily transcend geographic location or institutional boundaries. National boundaries were less permeable, private knowledge was confined within vertically integrated firms, and intellectual property controls were more limited. Higher education was successful as a bridge between fundamental knowledge and new knowledge, but students rarely
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came in contact with proprietary knowledge. In universities and the public sector, knowledge was presumptively public unless it was classified. (This presumption was especially strong in the United States, which rejects the notion of government copyright and, since 1974, has had a strong, broadly applicable Freedom of Information Act.) The appeal of cyberinfrastructure lies in enabling users to overcome barriers of space, discipline, and institutional practice—and to liberate knowledge from original context. While it arises from the needs of scientific research, its greatest potential is as boundary-spanning general-purpose knowledge infrastructure available to school, work, and home. Like the Internet and the Web, it should bridge all sectors of the economy, public and private, facilitating the flow of knowledge within and across them. The debates over privatization and commercialization of the Internet 15 years ago were resolved by defaulting to openness and interconnection among heterogeneous networks and users. Today, there is concern that security must be addressed in future generations of information infrastructure. How does this concern translate beyond technical requirements and to higher-level knowledge infrastructure? Behind the enabling vision of cyberinfrastructure lies an expanding shadow infrastructure of rights-based contracts, practices, and institutions. Controls on intellectual property encourage disclosure and sharing of specific knowledge, at least within limited contexts such as business relationships or joint research projects. Yet in the aggregate these controls seem to become too trivial and commonplace, too hard to identify, and too easy to trip over. What was once a relatively clear-cut distinction between open/public and controlled/private knowledge has been blurred. Boundary-spanning economic activity flourishes: joint ventures, alliances, standards consortia, open source development. . . . Ownership of knowledge is crafted to varying degrees of centralization and different configurations of openness and control. Just as a variety of financial instruments have proliferated, the benefits and risks of knowledge can be allocated and modulated ad infinitum by creative contracting. The excessive variety of open source licenses is evidence.2 At the same time, markers of intangible value are increasingly articulated and costly to interpret. Patents have more claims, embrace a much greater range of subject matter, and are written with a wider variety of strategic interests in mind. Unlike real property, a patent is not prima facie a right to exploit, it is a right to exclude, and its value depends greatly on the scope and strength of its exclusionary power. It may be very costly to determine who owns what knowledge with confidence, taking into account interpretation, other patents, ambient interests, and the likelihood of finding prior art that invalidates the patent. What are the values of
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complementary knowledge assets? What are the owner’s interests in asserting or sharing the property? Must these questions be addressed now or can/should they be deferred until later, when more may be known about technological potential, market demand, or competitive conditions? How should business relationships, industry norms, and the high cost of legal analysis and litigation be factored in? Like intellectual property, real property may be unique, but there are time-tested ways of determining its value with reasonable accuracy at a low cost. The problem is compounded by the fragmentation of the ‘‘owner.’’ As the Enron debacle shows, institutional and firm boundaries can be obscured or confused by the proliferation of partially controlled entities and privately contracted ownership interests. The fragmentation and blurring of ownership interests in elemental knowledge is disconcerting because it promotes the fragmentation of knowledge and its uses. A profusion of property interests cannot be managed with due attention, understanding, and deliberation on a cost-effective basis, especially when the interests are of low or indeterminate value. We see a number of market-based responses to this problem, such as: Patent pools—Rights to technologies needed to perform well-defined functions are assembled with a specific royalty and allocation of the revenue stream to patent holders.
Cross-licensing—Rights to use portfolios are traded, often with side payments that compensate for aggregate differences in value.
Nonassertion agreements—Mutual promises are made not to sue for patent infringement.
‘‘Mutually assured destruction’’—There is an implicit understanding not to sue because infringement is commonplace and likely to be mutual.
Patent pools are both knowledge-intensive and rights-intensive, but the fact that both enabling knowledge and knowledge about rights to control are involved compounds the problem. It took longer to negotiate the MPEG 4 patent pool than it did to develop the standard in the first place. Patent pools also raise antitrust problems when a choice is made among substitutable technologies. While patent pools may be quasi-public because of the competition policy implications, the other mechanisms operate privately with little accountability. Furthermore, they seem to undermine the exclusivity and disclosure that the patent system is supposed to provide. Opacity does not merely inspire efforts and mechanisms to reduce the costs and risks of navigating highly distributed, poorly defined rights. It leads to asymmetries of knowledge that can be exploited to perpetuate market advantage or dominance. Those who lack sophistication in knowledge management, who lack resources to as-
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sert or defend themselves, or who have sunk investments based on incomplete information are the most at risk. The nascent ‘‘patent troll’’ is a knowledge arbitrageur who is able to take advantage of opacity, asymmetries, surprise, and the vulnerability of sunk investments. Judicious avoidance of knowledge is not necessarily a bad thing. Human attention and absorptive capacity are scarce. Opportunity costs may be high. We may do better to leave the details to trained professionals who have the epistemological and experiential frameworks needed to process knowledge. Users of knowledge and technology do not want to be overwhelmed by choices and the demands of decision-making that is peripheral to their core business. They want to trust their suppliers, and they want enduring relationships with both suppliers and customers. They want to reserve their attention for when and where their attention and action can have the most impact. In the words of Alfred North Whitehead: It is a profoundly erroneous truism, repeated by all copybooks and by eminent people when they are making speeches, that we should cultivate the habit of thinking of what we are doing. The precise opposite is the case. Civilisation advances by extending the number of important operations which we can perform without thinking about them.3
The same holds true for firms and institutions—all the more so when competition demands conservation and strategic allocation of business focus. Tools for performing without thinking are increasingly diverse and sophisticated. Just as writing obviates time spent memorizing, software drastically reduces the time spent on repetitive tasks of informing and learning. Firms buy off-the-shelf software because they do not want to expend the time and attention to develop their own word processors and spreadsheets. Policymakers know well the necessity of making decisions based on incomplete knowledge abstracted under severe practical constraints from staff and outside experts. They know, as do writers and editors, that impact is not based on volume of expression but on the ability to connect with an audience that may have little patience and many competing demands. Yet we have also become skeptical and distrustful of politicians, lawyers, the media, and other knowledge intermediaries. Businesses have become increasingly wary of being locked in to particular consultants, technologies, and sole-source solutions. But where to draw the line is continuous in any competitive or public operation, especially where fast-moving technology is constantly reframing and re-presenting the problem. Do we buy-in or preserve options? Buy or build? In what time frame? Do we invest in internal capacity and ownership—or somebody else’s tools and skills? Intellectual property or freedom of action? Not only tomorrow but 5, 15, and 30 years from now?
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As global markets and the quest for sustainable advantage grow, these become questions of national and regional strategy—and therefore of public policy. Today, concern about software dependency and local capacity to develop and customize software is a factor in policy debate over government use of open source software, a long-term policy problem outside the conventional ‘‘total cost of ownership’’ calculus. At the same time, there is growing recognition of the economic complementarity of commonalities and property rights, especially in the ICT sector, where standards are an essential platform for innovation and market growth. The report of the National Innovation Initiative embraces a broad practical vision of intellectual property as both open and proprietary. A section entitled ‘‘Proprietary and Public Domain Intellectual Property’’ speaks of ‘‘intellectual property’’ as a knowledge asset that can be private or public, observing [T]he evolution of the innovation enterprise—the trend toward user co-creation, the need for interoperability in complex IT networks and revolutionary advances in understanding about human biological networks—is putting pressure on traditional IP models and strategies.
More explicitly: From an intellectual property perspective, open and proprietary IP models should not be seen as mutually exclusive; rather the IP framework must enable both approaches. Because collaborative innovation is relatively new, however, the structure and processes to accommodate ownership, openness and access are evolving. New creative models are emerging across sectors. A mature, balanced understanding of the purpose and practice of standards, including the important role of open standards and global harmonization, is essential to further interoperability, spur technological innovation and expand market applications.4
Instead of a bright-line dichotomy between exclusive and a pure public domain, we now have a growing variety of models and strategies, often shared by multiple entities, for mixing openness and control. This mix not only involves degrees of control, but it reflects the importance of complementarity—the need to examine the context that grounds new knowledge in shared understanding and common language. This is nothing new. Basic science has long provided a nonproprietary platform from which proprietary technology can be derived. However, the Internet and the Web have greatly expanded recognition of the importance of freely usable platforms into the realm of applied technology and services. Complementarity is an essential characteristic of systems technologies. Its nonproprietary/proprietary variant has become pervasive and important—in the ICT sector, in market-oriented innovation, and in free Web-based services such as Google. At the same time, institutional and economic forces have pushed the legal boundary between proprietary and nonproprietary in the opposite direction. Standards of
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utility and inventiveness have been lowered, making patents easier to get. At the same time, patents have become easier to assert—and, at least in the United States, available in all fields of human activity. ICT-based systems of enablement and legally based systems of control do not pull against each other directly. Indeed, technology can be used to control, and law can be used to enable. Both are fed by the explosive growth of information and knowledge. In fact, these seemingly antithetical developments extend orthogonally, defining an exponentially expanded strategic space that offers vast new opportunities for combination, interaction, and complementarity. While not necessarily antagonistic, these two dimensions of knowledge management remain rooted in two fundamentally different perspectives on the value of knowledge. One says that value lies in scarcity, the other that value lies in ubiquity. Scarcity-based value can be linked to priced markets; ubiquity-based value does not show on the books but helps create and maintain markets. Businesses in the digital economy must be able to work with both with sustained focus in the design of competitive offerings. Policymaking by contrast is concerned with environments and how different enterprises and institutions may compete and evolve within future environments. The vision of cyberinfrastructure promises coherence and integration, but we know now that digitization brought far more differentiation than convergence, and that complex environments do not extrapolate well. Knowledge itself is increasingly protean, proprietary to infinitely varying degrees—promising access but demanding protection and inviting arbitrage. And policymakers, inured to acting on incomplete information, are already overwhelmed by the demands on their attention. Politicians recognize the ascendance of knowledge, but what can they do about it? The exploding scope, volume, and significance of knowledge in the global economy now exceeds the more slowly developing analytic frameworks and statistical bases on which informed public policy can be made. Inherited models of the physical world —assembly lines, pipelines, hierarchies, ledgers, warehouses—die hard and slowly. We know from software that knowledge can quietly encode and extend itself into infrastructure. We know from living that knowledge extends backward into its roots in the human psyche. We know that it spans the world outside and the world within. We may be slipping into the riddles and paradox. Perhaps we are revisiting an earlier era when men and women tried to make sense of a world in which they had been thrust—a world with plenty of signs but without coherent explanation, except whatever stories they could conjure up to string the fragments together. Today we test our stories against each other. We hope that these stories are compelling enough to carry beyond this book. We hope they speak to a world where
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value is increasingly accorded to the creation, management, and distribution of what remains unknown. Notes 1. For example, Margaret M. Blair and Steven M. H. Wallman, Unseen Wealth: Report of the Brookings Task Force on Intangibles (Brookings Institution Press, 2001). 2. http://www.opensource.org/licenses/. 3. An Introduction to Mathematics (London: Williams and Norgate, 1911). 4. National Innovation Initiative, Innovate America, Council on Competitiveness, December 2004, pp. 15, 44.
2 Optimizing the Use of Knowledge Dominique Foray
Knowledge has always been at the heart of economic growth.1 From the 19th century (at least), the ability to invent and innovate, that is, to create new knowledge and new ideas that are then embodied in products, processes, and organizations, has served greatly to fuel development. And there have always been organizations and institutions capable of creating and disseminating information and knowledge in an efficient way. The knowledge economy, however, is a recent term that signifies a change from the economy of earlier periods. The knowledge economy is an economy in which much greater strategic importance is given to the allocation of resources in
R&D and other formal modes of knowledge creation,
The formation of human capital through education and training,
The management of information, knowledge, and expertise through investments in codification and the building of social networks, and
The organization of markets of rights in knowledge.
This is also an economy in which a general-purpose technology (information technology) provides a powerful infrastructure that increases productivity and offers new opportunities to any knowledge-driven activity. The knowledge economy is, therefore, a useful framework for speaking of changes related to the production and distribution of knowledge in modern societies. These changes are numerous. However, there a few broad themes that merit comment. Efficient and Effective Deployment of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) as Knowledge Instruments ICTs are technologies geared to the production, processing, and dissemination of knowledge and information, and their effective deployment is central to the chal-
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lenge of advancing the knowledge economy. One part of this book is dedicated to showing how ICTs are revolutionizing scientific and engineering research,2 education, and training as well as any activities involving collective actions, based on sharing rich messages and resources among many people. The unifying framework here is the concept of a general-purpose technology, stressing the potential of ICTs for broad applicability and therefore wide economic impact and also showing the crucial complementarities between the invention of ICTs and the development of applications in the general dynamics of the technology.3 The production of knowledge on the user side—that is, the development of new applications—is crucial to ensure the effective diffusion of the technology. This process is called ‘‘coinvention of applications’’ to show the creative aspect of it. The complementarities between the invention of ICTs and the coinvention of applications inject a dynamic feedback loop in which advances in ICTs lead to unpredictable inventions in applications, which in turn raise the return to improvement in ICTs. The positive externalities generated by such complementarities are extremely powerful in shaping a rapid and effective development path:3 One externality deals with the falling of coinvestment costs: Early users’ experience lowers later users’ costs of coinvention.
A second externality flows through the supply of improved technology, which depends of the number of total adopters and their likely adoption dates. The more extensive and earlier the adoption, the higher the incentive for suppliers to invest, race, and compete for the business created by the application.
This externality structure creates two lags: between invention and first coinvention and between early coinvention and the generalization of coinvented ideas. This is why the productivity impact comes late and is spread over time. It is often ‘‘too early to be disappointed’’4 when we look at the poor productivity impact of new ICT inventions. The coinvention of the related applications takes time! This is why the first episode of the ‘‘new economy’’ was characterized by productivity growth limited to the producer sector (the computer industry) prior to its impact on the many user sectors.5 The externality structure described above is particularly strong and powerful in activities like scientific and engineering research, where some specific circumstances create a very favorable environment for the coinvention of applications. In such circumstances (not limited to scientific research), the externalities between inventors of ICTs and coinventors of applications are considerable.
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Emergence, Transformation, and Path-Dependent Evolution of Institutions Devoted to the Creation and Transmission of Knowledge This is in a sense the essence of the economics of knowledge as a discipline: to explore socioeconomic institutions that can be relied upon to produce knowledge in an efficient manner. The unifying framework here is the character of knowledge as a semipublic good, with difficult-to-enforce property rights. Its diffusion is in principle good for social well-being but bad for private returns: No one wants to invest in the creation of new knowledge if the rents generated are not at least partly appropriable. Institutions that govern the creation and diffusion of knowledge are shaped by this trade-off: On the one hand they need to meet the objective of providing the ideal motivation to the private producer of knowledge while on the other they have to fulfill the social objective of ensuring efficient use of knowledge once it has been produced. This book discusses various institutional issues rather deeply: The necessary transformation of an old institution—the patent system—is the focus of several chapters. There are some doubts that in the age of the knowledge economy, the new equilibrium, involving intensive patenting activities, a large amount of cross-licensing, and aggressive patent enforcement strategies, is ‘‘better’’ than the preceding one that was characterized by a moderate level of patenting activities, with firms allowing diffusion of their own knowledge in return for lowcost absorption of others’ knowledge. The latter seems to be a system with lower transaction costs, while the former does not seem distinctly superior in terms of knowledge creation.
Some contributions deal with the increasing importance of resource allocation mechanisms that replicate some of the structures of open science, supporting a more original approach to rewarding inventors and managing spillovers than that suggested by the use of intellectual property rights to exclude potential users. It is interesting to see that this particular class of social organizations, in which high rates of innovation are correlated with rich voluntary spillovers, is of broader applicability than is suggested by the predominant and sometimes only reference, open source software.
New trust-building mechanisms are critical to the effective development of virtual relations in the knowledge economy. These involve a very broad range of issues, such as the construction of ‘‘emotional trust’’ in situations where it is unlikely to emerge spontaneously or the construction of cognitive trust, such as the certification of knowledge circulating on the Internet, teachers’ competences, and curriculum
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supplied by long-distance organizations. The concept of social capital6 is considered in our book as a useful way to capture the importance of this type of knowledge that is more a relational asset than a personal attribute possessed by individuals. It can be seen as a form of glue that holds the constituent members of society together and permits them to function more productively in the economic sphere as well as in other interpersonal transactions where trust is beneficial. Addressed also in this book is the issue of the new division of labor between the old and the new institutions designed to collect, organize, preserve, and provide access to knowledge-bearing objects. The old LAM (libraries, archives, and museums) and the new Internet are strongly complementary and must be deployed in a coherent way to ensure the effective development of the epistemic infrastructure. The advent of the Web has reignited naı¨ve notions of a single universal collection of all knowledge while also amplifying preexisting sources for information access in ways heretofore impossible. The LAM and the Web in fact prove complementary in four key areas: access, information quality insurance, social memory, and information property.
Universities—a key institution for the knowledge economy—are under pressure to redefine their places and roles in this new division of labor. History shows that this is not the first time Western universities have been pressed to reinvent themselves. After the Bolonia model (universities as a place for education) came the Humboldt model (a place linking education and research) and then the MIT model (a place linking education, research, and innovation). What is the next step? The academic capitalism model strongly emphasizes the commercialization of some of the basic functions of universities. The post Bayh–Dole university involves the mission of commercializing research through an increasing patenting and licensing activity. In the chapter devoted to this topic, the author pleads for a sort of retro-evolution to push universities back to produce the kind of public goods they traditionally generated and that serve to help the innovation system, but only in an undirected way: The question ‘‘What is the market value of this knowledge’’ should be replaced in many circumstances by ‘‘Is it true? Let’s stop and think.’’
The Coevolution of Technologies and Institutions ICTs and institutions are mutually interdependent processes. This is strongly emphasized in a couple of chapters: Creating the right and proper institutional design to fully realize the potential of ICTs has proved to be at least as difficult as advancing the technology itself. Systemic discrepancies between the development of ICTs and the development of institutional equipment are a strong source of turbulence. Pro-
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viding the soft (institutional) foundations of cyberinfrastructure may be the hardest part.7 Knowledge Division and Dispersion The division of labor and increasing specialization in knowledge production cause the knowledge base to fragment and disperse. Division (due to the natural development of science and technology), dispersion (associated with ‘‘democratization’’ of innovation), and the increasing ability of firms and agents to realize ‘‘experiments’’ make broad integrated understanding difficult. This is a source of inefficiency and ignorance at the micro level that can have disastrous consequences at the level of global policy making. The structures of the knowledge constantly need to be rebuilt, which requires knowing how to organize fragmented knowledge. This is why the creation of integrative knowledge and coordinating mechanisms is important—that is, norms, standards, infratechnologies, and architectures, which lead in turn to new coordination mechanisms (such as modularity) that are economically efficient and effective. Communities are coordinating and integrating mechanisms, for creating and developing common languages and codes and increasing the number of interpersonal transactions within fields of knowledge or practice. Community-developed codes, such as language, and techniques help integrate dispersed and divided knowledge. However, they have an ambivalent role. Codes also raise entry costs and keep outsiders at bay. There is thus a need for meta-standards to ensure that highly integrated communities will not isolate themselves and their knowledge from the rest of the world. Proximity—geographic agglomeration and clustering—is also an important factor for integrating knowledge. The need for knowledge integration becomes an important factor in locational problems and may counterbalance the mitigation of geographical constraints due to the fact that the costs of moving knowledge is dramatically decreasing (at least relative to the cost of moving people). The Importance of Public Knowledge In a period of wild passion for private property in the realm of knowledge creation, it is important to reassert the importance of public knowledge. In any process of knowledge creation, integration, and exploitation, the existence of a freely accessible stock of knowledge—a knowledge commons—is crucial. By public knowledge, I do not necessarily mean public-sector, but rather the sharing and pooling of knowledge/information as a result of freely revealing it, involuntary spillovers,
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academic norms, etc. Deeper appreciation of the role of public knowledge as an efficiency driver is needed to balance a preoccupation in knowledge management literature with how private actors can capture information and how businesses can control strategic knowledge assets. Open, Distributed Systems Mixing a number of these ingredients together—ICTs, freely revealing behavior, integration, trust—points to an emerging paradigm of open, distributed systems of innovation and learning. The various organizational forms and functions of open, distributed systems are in fact assuming wider relevance and prominence in the knowledge economy. Historically speaking, scientific communities have been pioneers in the development of such open, distributed systems, but in the knowledge economy this particular decentralized mode of knowledge creation and distribution expands far beyond scientific activities toward software programmers, product and service development activities, and the many professional and expert communities that engage in knowledge sharing, information pooling, and learning by interacting. Toward Evidence-Based Knowledge Policy As the several chapters dedicated to the measurement of (activities related to) knowledge show, major progress in the economics of knowledge has been achieved on the empirical side. During the past several decades a number of efforts have overcome the nonobservability problem to make knowledge a more measurable phenomenon. As a result, knowledge is a bit less slippery for economists who want to study it, and policy makers have access to accumulating evidence on many aspects of the knowledge economy. Policy development should no longer rest only on a casual understanding and vague perception of problems and issues. However, increasing the efficiency of institutions for generating and using knowledge requires a clearer picture of the ways knowledge, information, and know-how are generated and used. In the chapters focusing on measurement issues, the authors demonstrate the kind of ‘‘evidence-based policy research’’ that is useful for knowledge policy making. However, the economic foundations of knowledge policy are still in their infancy, and we are still stuck with a collection of sectoral policies dealing with R&D, education and training, intellectual property rights, etc. Given the characteristics of knowledge as an economic good, it is possible to identify resource allocation mechanisms, socioeconomic institutions, that can in princi-
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ple produce and allocate knowledge in an efficient manner. However, institutional dynamics of institutions exhibit inherent market failures. Better understanding of these institutions and the processes governing their evolution is, therefore, needed to inform policy design. Knowledge policies are needed as tools to improve the working of institutions but also to inform larger social choices about what kind of institutions and mechanisms will lead to outcomes that are ‘‘optimal’’ at national, regional, and global levels. Notes 1. I am grateful to Brian Kahin for scholarly advice and invaluable editorial help. 2. In the opening speech of the Advancing Knowledge and the Knowledge Economy Conference, Bill Wulf talked of computing as the ‘‘fourth modality of scientific research’’ (after observation, theory, and experiment). 3. T. Bresnahan, The Mechanisms of IT’s Contribution to Economic Growth (Paris: St Gobain Centre for Economic Research, 2000). 4. M. Abramovitz and P. A. David, ‘‘Two Centuries of American Economic Growth: From Exploitation of Resources Abundance to Knowledge-Driven Development.’’ Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research, Discussion Paper No. 01-05, 2001. 5. In 1999, experts wrote ‘‘to date, computer technology has proved unbelievably effective at reproducing itself; beyond that, its apparent influence on productivity has so far been somewhere between imperceptible and adverse’’ (‘‘The New Economy,’’ The Economist, July 24, 1999), while in 2004 they wrote ‘‘The core of the US success story, and the source of its difference from Europe, appears to have been in ICT-using industries’’ (R. Gordon, ‘‘Why Was Europe Left at the Station When America’s Productivity Locomotive Departed?’’ CEPR, London, Discussion Paper No. 4416, 2004). The two statements are true. There is simply a lag between these two channels through which ICT has impacted productivity. 6. However, the use of the metaphor of ‘‘capital’’ and the term social capital may not be appropriate here (see Arrow, ‘‘Observation on Social Capital,’’ in Social Capital: A Multifaceted Perspective, ed. Dasgupta and Serageldin [Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1999). 7. To borrow from the title of the chapter by Paul A. David in this volume.
3 OECD Work on Knowledge and the Knowledge Economy Berglind A´sgeirsdo´ttir
While knowledge always has been at the heart of economic development, there is substantial evidence that the capacity to produce and use knowledge has much more explanatory value in determining levels of economic welfare and growth than in the past. The OECD has now for two decades worked on knowledge and the knowledge economy. The TEP (Technology Economy Programme) in the late 1980s was one of our first attempts to clarify the relations between technology developments and economic performance. Since then there have been many other projects involving many other people. A few of the more recent OECD studies with an analytical focus on knowledge and the knowledge economy are 1. The Growth Project, aiming at identifying the factors determining growth in OECD countries, 2. The economic impacts of ICT investments, 3. Intellectual assets and innovation, 4. Knowledge management—analyzing the production, dissemination, and application of knowledge in different sectors, 5. Human and social capital investments and returns, and last but not least 6. Statistical and other indicator development to measure the knowledge economy, such as the Science, Technology, and Industry Scoreboard, knowledge management practices in the private sector, intangible investments in enterprises, etc. Space does not allow me to summarize all this work. I will therefore concentrate on four key messages on the important issues that need to be taken into account when countries and their institutions want to promote their knowledge economy.
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Figure 1 Important factors shaping the knowledge economy.
My first message is as follows: Good ‘‘economic fundamentals’’ are important for stimulating the knowledge economy. By good ‘‘economic fundamentals’’ I understand Stable macroeconomic policies that allow long-term planning, including wellfunctioning product and capital markets,
Well-functioning labor, product, and capital markets;
Efficient training policies that help ensure that the lesser educated are equipped with the right skills, thus avoiding ‘‘knowledge divide,’’
Competition policies, which drive down the costs of technologies,
Liberalization of telecommunication policies, and
Openness to trade and foreign direct investments to let in ‘‘new ideas.’’
I have chosen to illustrate the important factors shaping the knowledge economy as a ‘‘Greek temple’’ with four pillars (Figure 1). The ‘‘economic fundamentals’’ are the base on which the four pillars stand. The four pillars also illustrate that for the knowledge economy to develop and grow, it is not enough to focus on a single policy or institutional arrangement. A whole range of policies and coordinated actions to create the right conditions is necessary. The ‘‘policy mix’’ must be based on a comprehensive strategy suited to each country or circumstance and will include the four pillars ‘‘innovation,’’ ‘‘new technologies,’’ ‘‘human capital,’’ and ‘‘enterprise dynamics.’’ At the top of the Greek temple, I have put ‘‘globalization,’’ which is a driver that influences all four pillars and all four key factors, which are becoming increasingly
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Figure 2 First pillar, innovation: R&D growth by industry structure (percentage point in business R&D industry as a share of GDP).
mobile and global under the globalization process: ‘‘research and development,’’ ‘‘Internet,’’ ‘‘highly skilled,’’ and ‘‘multinational companies.’’ My second message is therefore as follows: The development of the knowledge economy is dependent on four main ‘‘pillars’’: innovation, new technologies, human capital, and enterprise dynamics. I will briefly go through the main developments in the four pillars that have occurred during the past decade in OECD countries. The first pillar is innovation. R&D expenditure, patents, etc. all grew in the second half of the 1990s in most OECD countries. Innovation has now become more widespread, with increasing activities especially in services, ICTs, and pharmaceuticals, as can be seen in Figure 2. The importance of innovation as a key competitive factor has forced a faster cycle time and meant that firms had to experiment with new ways to acquire innovations either through links to universities, alliances with each other, or mergers and acquisitions. There is little doubt that ICTs are the technologies of our era. The comparisons with bio- or nanotechnologies are weak. The United States and small E.U. countries have had a relatively large impact of ICT investment in terms of its contribution to
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Figure 3 Second pillar, information technology: ICT capital to GDP growth (in percentage points).
Figure 4 Third pillar, human capital: Population that has attained at least upper secondary education.
GDP growth; the effect has been much smaller in France, Germany, and Italy (Figure 3). One of the key issues is to what extent the rapid technological progress in ICT goods and services contributes to productivity growth. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York has recently published a study saying that there is now a consensus that a large portion of the productivity growth in the United States can be traced to the sectors of the economy that produce information technology or use ICT equipment and software most intensively. The third pillar is human capital—the knowledge, skills, and competences instilled in workers (Figure 4). Human capital is very important for developing
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Figure 5 R&D share of foreign affiliates/total business and R&D.
a knowledge economy in several respects. First, we know that there is a wellestablished relationship between human capital and labor productivity, and human capital is therefore a significant determinant of growth. Second, the two previously mentioned pillars of the knowledge economy—innovation and new technologies— are not effective without a stock of trained and qualified workers to realize their benefits. OECD countries have increased the percentage of the population that have attained at least a secondary education in order to meet the increased demand for ‘‘knowledge-intensive’’ employment. The fourth pillar is enterprise dynamics. Newly created firms have spurred innovation in many areas. They have been responsible for an increasing share of the growth in the private R&D and patent activity in the United States and a number of other OECD countries (Figure 5). The dynamics in firm turnover (exit and entry) reflect the ability of countries to expand the boundaries of economic activity, shift resources, and adjust the structure of production to meet consumers’ changing needs. My third message is as follows: Globalization is a pervasive factor that affects all four pillars of the knowledge economy. Globalization is not new, but it has been strengthened by the international mobility of highly skilled workers, ICTs, faster and cheaper transportation, trade liberalization, global capital markets, etc. The R&D share of foreign affiliates compared to the total business R&D is substantial in some countries, for example, Canada,
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Ireland, Spain, and Sweden, and less important in France, Japan, and the United States, and in all countries exempt Ireland it increased during the period 1995–2001. My fourth message is as follows: New organizational innovations and knowledge management practices have to be developed to deepen the benefits of the knowledge economy. The ‘‘softer’’ social and organizational changes are in many cases very important for the development of the knowledge economy. Investments in ICTs or R&D without the management and organizational structures in enterprises that enable productive use of knowledge workers are less productive. These include teamwork, flatter management structures, and stronger employee involvement, and they often entail a greater degree of responsibility of individual workers regarding the content of their work. The adoption of work practices and the presence of labor–management institutions tend to facilitate take-up of new technology. Organizations are increasingly paying attention to their systems of knowledge management to ensure that they are capturing, sharing, and using productive knowledge within their organization to enhance their learning performance. Joint work by Statistics Canada and OECD on knowledge management indicates that knowledge management practices in companies seem to have a far from negligible effect on innovation and other aspects of corporate performance. A survey on knowledge management practices in French companies has shown that whatever the company’s size, industry, or R&D effort, firms innovate more extensively and file more patents if they set up knowledge management policies. Social capital in the form of networking and trust can help realize innovative environments such as Silicon Valley. Trust-based relations facilitate cooperation and are essential for good economic performance and innovation. Trust reduces transaction costs and improves the flow of information and thus has direct economic effects as well as indirect and wider outcomes. It aids innovation by improving communication flows and the diffusion of knowledge, within and between organizations. The knowledge economy cannot simply be characterized by higher ‘‘knowledge intensity,’’ as for example more highly skilled people in the labor force. Increasingly, countries will have to think about how education promotes effective participation in communities of knowledge, and this will include social and moral competences as well as technical ones. Conclusion This synopsis of what the OECD knows about knowledge and the knowledge economy makes us aware that there is much more that we need to know. There is a huge
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agenda for researchers, policy-makers, and others to develop better understandings and policies for the knowledge economy. Acknowledgments It was a great pleasure to be involved in this project on Advancing Knowledge and the Knowledge Economy and to know that it is the result of a partnership of OECD, the National Science Foundation, the European Commission, the U.S. Interagency Working Group on IT Research and Development, and the University of Michigan. I especially want to thank the National Academies for hosting the event—it was a marvelous place to have a debate about the role and nature of knowledge in our economies and societies.
I Measuring Knowledge
4 Measuring Knowledge and Its Economic Effects: The Role of Official Statistics Fred Gault
Introduction This chapter is about measuring knowledge and its economic effects, and the role played in this by official statistics. Knowledge is pervasive, and more and more consumption involves products of the mind, which have economic and social consequences. The chapter focuses on the generation, transmission, and use of knowledge, the indicators used to describe these activities, and the economic effects that they produce. With the information and communication technology (ICT) infrastructure in place, electronic products can be traded globally and material goods can be purchased electronically from anywhere. These products embody knowledge, some more than others, and their production and trade can be monitored, using the existing statistical infrastructure, with some additional assumptions. These statistics can contribute to discussions of the knowledge-based economy (KBE). The chapter distinguishes between the KBE and ‘‘knowledge’’ and goes on to discuss measures of knowledge activities, linkages, and outcomes before placing them in an economic and social context. Some time is spent on the activity of learning since without learning through education, training, and doing, knowledge cannot flow, and without flow it cannot have an economic effect. The chapter ends with a discussion of the knowledge system, which consists of institutional actors engaged in the generation, transmission, and use of knowledge, and identifies gaps in the statistics that describe the system and the implication for evidence-based policy. The KBE and Knowledge Before looking at the measurement of knowledge and its economic effects, the economic analysis of the KBE is examined briefly and compared with other special frameworks.
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To describe the KBE, some industries can be identified as knowledge intensive, and once that is done, all of the statistics available in the System of National Accounts (SNA) can be made available as a special aggregation. Special aggregations have been done for some years for the energy and tourism sectors, and their definitions are found in annexes to the International Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities, revision 3 (ISIC.rev.3) (UN 1990). More recently, a definition of the Information and Communication Technology (ICT) sector has been added to ISIC.rev.3.1 (UN 2002), and these aggregations of four-digit ISIC classes allow analysts to track the behavior of these sectors and to compare a sector with other sectors, or four-digit classes. As a concrete example, Statistics Canada publishes monthly GDP figures for the ICT sector (Statistics Canada 2004) using this aggregation. The classification of industries as knowledge intensive, or as high, medium, and low tech, based on R&D intensity (Hatzichronoglou 1997) is not without its problems since agreement has to be reached on the assumptions needed to do this. Once industries are classified, firms in knowledge-intensive industries may produce products that are not knowledge intensive, with the converse being true for firms in non– knowledge intensive industries. If the concept of the KBE is to be taken further, there must be a classification of knowledge-based products (goods or services). If there is such a classification, trade figures can be produced and studies done of the economic and social impacts of the acquisition and diffusion of knowledge-based products. This has been done for the ICT products by the Working Party on Indicators for the Information Society (WPIIS) (OECD 2002c), and Hatzichronoglou (1997) has done it for high, medium, and low technology. However, there is no equivalent to these internationally agreed definitions for knowledge-based industries or products nor agreement on the economic and social surveys required to collect information on their production and use. Measuring knowledge itself is more challenging, if not impossible (Foray and Gault 2003, p. 18). There is no unit of knowledge that corresponds to a currency unit in the SNA, and there is nothing comparable to the concepts of current and constant currency units that supports comparisons of the economic system over time. There is also nothing comparable to purchasing power parities (PPP) that supports comparisons across space or price indices for comparison over time. Knowledge is different from conventional economic products. It can be sold or given away, but it is still retained by its original owner, unlike a tangible good (a brick) or an intangible good (music, text, or video on a medium). Knowledge can, in some cases, be disseminated instantaneously (an encryption key), unlike goods,
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which have to be transported, or services, which have to be rendered (haircuts, computer system designs, or sessions of financial advice). In other cases, the dissemination is far from instantaneous. It takes months to become proficient in a foreign language or to able to solve a differential equation. It may take an eternity to achieve knowledge of the presence of a supreme being. Knowledge is a complex subject and growing in complexity (Hodgson 2000), as is the measurement of knowledge, assuming that measurement is possible. This chapter addresses knowledge that can result in economic or social outcomes and then focuses on economic effects (Stehr 1996). Three kinds of knowledge activity are considered: generation, transmission, and use (Foray and David 1995). In each of these activities, knowledge can be codified and stored in documents, or embodied in a product, or tacit and present in a person, a team, an organization, a region, or a country. Moving knowledge requires the capacity to transmit it, to publish, to demonstrate, to mentor, or to teach. It also requires the capacity to absorb, or to learn, through education and training, and by doing. Knowledge activities are more encompassing than just those associated with natural sciences and engineering; they include social science and humanities activities. This gives rise to a different set of policy issues that go beyond promoting the creation of new knowledge through curiosity driven research. For example, the involvement of living things in research introduces ethical issues, and some activities, such as human cloning or stem cell research, raise moral issues. National security can also circumscribe the creation, transmission, and use of knowledge about, for example, encryption, the artificial creation of viruses, or applications of nano-devices. Conveying a capacity for action is broader than research activities and their associated social and economic boundaries. Using a taxonomy developed by Lundvall and Johnson (1994), knowledge is conveyed in schools, where students learn to ‘‘know what’’ (the density of lead), in universities, where they learn to ‘‘know why’’ (the laws of quantum physics), and in the workplace, where they learn to ‘‘know how’’ (on-the-job training), and as they become part of networks, they learn to ‘‘know who’’ (Lundvall 2000). Since this chapter is about measurement of knowledge and its economic effects, examples of knowledge activities, linkages, and outcomes and their related indicators are first presented. These lead to a discussion of how the indicators could be used in an integrated manner to describe the generation, transmission, and use of knowledge, and of where there are gaps in such an approach. It follows the observation of Foray (2004, p. 18) that ‘‘The aim of the economics of knowledge is thus to analyze and discuss institutions, technologies, and social regulations that can facilitate the efficient production and use of knowledge.’’
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Knowledge Activities The description of activities starts with formal knowledge generation as a result of research and development (R&D), continues with invention, innovation, adoption, and diffusion of practices and technologies, and then moves to the human resources related to all of these activities. Once people are brought into the analysis, the measurement problems and the policy issues multiply, and that leads to the section on knowledge linkages that follows. The order of presentation is not meant to suggest a linear model view of knowledge activities. Each activity can, and does, occur independently, as well as in conjunction with other knowledge activities. In innovation, this is described by the ‘‘chain-link’’ model of Kline and Rosenberg (1986). Research and Development This is the creation of new knowledge, which may appear as a seminar, a publication, or a patent or as knowledgeable graduate students and researchers. The indicators for R&D are well established (OECD 2002a) and include expenditure on the funding and performance of R&D and the human resources allocated to the doing of R&D (OECD 2004a). With the increasing global nature of R&D, attention is turning to the international payments and receipts for R&D services (OECD 1990) and the role of networks, alliances, and partnerships in the doing of R&D (Hagadoorn 2001). Invention Inventions can be an outcome of R&D, a formal process of knowledge generation, they can result from learning by doing in a production or delivery environment, and they can be influenced by suppliers and clients. Inventions may be protected by intellectual property instruments, such as a patent, a trademark, or a copyright, or by trade secrecy. Patent indicators are produced by the OECD (2004a). Guidelines for developing and using patent indicators are also provided by the OECD (1994). Innovation For the past 20 years technological innovation has been regarded as the bringing of new or significantly improved products (goods or services) to market or the introduction of new or significantly improved processes for the production or delivery of products. This can be regarded as the use of knowledge, both internal and external to the firm, to create value. Guidelines on how to measure the activity of innovation were codified in 1992 as the Oslo Manual (OECD 1992) and revised in 1997 (OECD/Eurostat 1997). The indicators, resulting from three rounds of the European Community Innovation Survey (CIS), are published by the European Union (Com-
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mission of the European Communities 2004a) and by individual governments, as are indicators derived from surveys in non–E.U. countries (Gault 2003). They include the propensity to innovate as well as a number of indicators related to sources of information, outcomes, use of intellectual property, and barriers to innovation. What has become clear during the last decade of formal measurement of innovation in many countries is the importance of organizational structures and management practices as well as the development of new and existing markets to the innovation process. This would have been no surprise to Schumpeter (1947), but it has taken some time for the empirical world to move from technological innovation rooted in natural science and engineering to a broader concept that includes knowledge drawn from the social sciences and humanities. The most recent revision of the OECD/Eurostat Oslo Manual incorporates these changes and was released in 2005. This will lead to new indicators of innovation that will show how knowledge from different sources combines to add value to the firm and to have impact on businesses and people. Use of Technologies and Practices Innovation is classified according to its novelty. It can be a world first, a market first, or a firm first. This means that firms that adopt new technologies and practices can lay some claim to a firm-first innovation. Indicators of the adoption and diffusion of technologies and practices are guides to how the economy and society are changing and to the impacts resulting from such change. There are many indicators of the activity of adopting technologies and practices and of related activities, much as is the case for the activity of innovation. The OECD publishes indicators of the use of biotechnologies, information and communications technologies, and nano technologies (OECD 2002b, 2003) and of knowledge management practices (Foray and Gault 2003). These indicators illustrate the use of knowledge by the firm to adopt new processes in order to do better what it does. Human Resource Development A key to all of these activities is the human element. It is the person or, more likely, the team (Prusak 2001), that changes behavior and creates additional value. The question is how the knowledge held by the people involved is measured. One way is to identify the percentage of the labor force with particular educational attainments on the assumption that the higher the attainment, the more likely the people are to be sources of knowledge and to be able to capture knowledge for value creation. This approach is used in the European Innovation Scoreboard (EIS) (Commission of the European Communities 2004b), which records the percentage of the
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labor force in the Eurostat Labour Force Survey in the age range 25–64 with tertiary education. An attempt at codifying measures of the characteristics of people in science and technology led to the Canberra Manual (OECD/Eurostat 1995), which focused on level of education and on occupation. This has proved difficult to apply since, outside of a population census, there are few surveys that collect data from a large enough sample to support analysis of the characteristics of people by industry, level of education, and occupation. An alternative approach, used in the EIS, is to record the percentage of science and technology graduates in the population with an age range of 20 to 29. While the characteristics of the highly qualified personnel in the population and the labor force are important indicators of the stock, the policy preoccupation has been shifting to mobility. Mobility of people is a flow of embodied knowledge and of absorptive capacity. This is addressed in the next section, on linkages. The attraction and retention of the highly qualified are becoming more important as retirements increase because of the age distribution of the labor force, and there is concern that the production of newly qualified graduates by the higher education sector is not able to deal with the demand and that immigration cannot fill the gap as it has in the past in some countries. The market for the highly qualified has moved from overlapping local markets to a global market, and this is especially true for academics. The question is how to capture this in official statistics, and that is discussed in the next section. Knowledge Linkages Many of the knowledge activities in the previous section are covered by official statistics, although there are still gaps. The same cannot be said for knowledge linkages, which tie together knowledge activities. These ties can be bilateral one- or twoway flows, or they can be multilateral and multidirectional. Understanding them and providing robust indicators of them is another challenge that must be met if there is to be a beginning of an understanding of how this dynamic system works. This section is divided into two subsections, one on sources of knowledge and one on networks of knowledge. Sources of Knowledge The R&D department in a firm, a government laboratory, or a university department can use and generate knowledge, but for it to enable the creation of value, the knowledge must be transferred to the market, directly or indirectly. There are several ways of doing this.
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Intellectual property can be transferred within the firm that has generated it or licensed to an affiliated or unaffiliated firm or to a new ‘‘spinoff’’ firm established to develop the knowledge in the marketplace. In all of these cases, the knowledge flow can be one- or two-way. If it is two way, the market experience can be fed back to the knowledge creators, and the knowledge can develop in response. The role of the client as a source of ideas has been developed by von Hippel (1988, 1998), but they are not the only source. Suppliers of materials, equipment, and people may be sources of ideas for knowledge activities in an organization, and ideas for doing new things do not just come from the R&D department. They may come from the production unit, if management is aware enough to harvest them, or from the providers of finance, who wish to grow their investment. In the development of official statistics on innovation and the use of technologies and practices, questions are added to surveys to identify the sources of ideas for the activity, and the answers illuminate policy discussions about the purpose of government laboratories or the role of research in universities. Little happens without money, and large firms are able to fund new activities from retained earnings or through debt. A small firm in the service sector will have limited revenue and no assets beyond the minds of its people. For it to bring new products to market or to introduce a new process for production or delivery, it needs help, and that is a role for the angel investor or the venture capitalist. Financial organizations, especially if they have been working in the industry, bring to the firm knowledge about pitfalls and opportunities, and the transfer of that knowledge to the firm is key to its success. Knowledge can be licensed, acquired by listening to clients, suppliers, and the product producers, but it is people who do the licensing and the listening and without them, nothing happens. The key issue of absorptive capacity is dealt with later, but the question here is where do the highly skilled and highly qualified people come from? People, who embody knowledge, come from postsecondary institutions, other organizations in the same business, and other organizations that do business with the organization. These sources may cross national boundaries, and they raise the question of mobility of the highly qualified and the ease with which immigrants can be assimilated into the economy and society (OECD 2004b). There is a joint initiative of the OECD and the UNESCO Institute of Statistics (UIS), supported by the National Science Foundation, to look at the career paths of doctorate holders. This involves the development of surveys of earned doctorates not dissimilar to the NSF survey of that name, and the objective is to initiate pilot
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surveys in a number of OECD countries. This will result in indicators of the work intentions of new doctorate holders, including plans to work outside the country where the doctorate was awarded. This raises the problem of how to share such information among the statistical agencies involved in the collection of the data so that the holders of doctorates who cross borders can be included in surveys that track these highly qualified people throughout their careers. The indicators from a network of surveys of earned doctorates will provide measures of knowledge flow across economic sectors and national boundaries, and they will support discussion of education and of immigration policies. There are also indirect links of knowledge to the market. An example is the generation of knowledge to support regulation of drugs, foods, and health care products, quality of education, and health and social services. Such knowledge tends to be generated and applied in governments and in other public institutions. Networks of Knowledge The indicators in the first part of this section address individual sources of knowledge transfer. In this part, indicators of knowledge networks are discussed. With the development of bibliographic databases, a whole field of bibliometrics has developed that includes measures of knowledge flow. An example is copublication analysis, which captures the implicit link in academic papers, or patents, written by authors from different institutions. The extreme example is the experimental high-energy particle physics paper with more than a hundred authors and from many institutions all over the world, but collaboration is not just limited to highenergy particle physicists. In a global village, collaboration is increasing, and so is the knowledge flow associated with it. A paper by Godin et al. (1998) mapped copublication in Canada and produced indicators showing the links between government, higher education, and the private sector, and it demonstrated the significant role of the universities in Canadian knowledge flow. While the paper was published by the statistical office as part of a program of indicator development, the indicators never became ‘‘official statistics.’’ Because the database from which they were derived was commercially available, any institution could produce such indicators, and in Canada, they have evolved outside the statistical office. Another indicator of knowledge flow is a contract. One institution agrees to pay money to another institution for the delivery of a product, which may be new knowledge. Contracts for R&D can be tracked in R&D surveys, and they provide evidence of knowledge flow in the R&D community. With globalization, the flow of money across borders for R&D is becoming an area of interest. Who is buying and who is selling knowledge becomes important when much domestic knowledge is rooted in an institutional infrastructure that is supported by public funds.
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A contract is, by its nature, restrictive, while joint ventures are less so. They will have a common goal to which the partners subscribe, but once established, there is scope for adjusting the projects within the undertaking. An example is an industry– university collaboration around the needs of an industry, with practical and well funded projects being available to academics and their graduate students. As the knowledge is developed collaboratively, the intellectual property can be managed differently from that of academics wishing to commercialize the results of their research through the university technology transfer office. Both of the examples just offered give rise to indicators of knowledge flow that is at least two way and that can be many way. Knowledge Outcomes Indicators of activities support public policy debate on the funding for the activity, its industry, and its location. Indicators of linkages show how different parts of the economy connect, and that adds a dimension to the policy debates on the activities. However, as corporate and public accountability become more widespread, interest groups want to know what happened as a result of resources committed to knowledge activities. This raises the question of what indicators are needed to help answer these questions. An outcome of the activity of knowledge creation can be more knowledge, which feeds back into knowledge creation. This can be measured by academic publication, and its relevance by academic citation. The activity can give rise to commercially valuable intellectual property protected by patents, trademarks, or copyrights, or it can result in new products or processes, new forms of organization, greater market share, or the opening of entirely new markets. Indicators of outcomes can be directly linked to a project, such as the number of papers, patents, graduate students, academic promotions, and Nobel prizes resulting from an NSF funded university research project, or they can be lagged or indirectly linked. The link between photonics in 2005 and Einstein’s paper on the photoelectric effect in 1905 is an example of the latter. Somewhere in between are indicators of employment levels and skill levels in firms resulting from the introduction of new processes and products that result from the flow of knowledge from sources inside and outside the firm. The need to be able to say what the government, the business, or the academic institution got in return for committing scarce resources to an activity will continue to drive the development of indicators based on outcomes. Demand for official statistics produced at arms length from the policy process and interest groups will also grow.
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Related Characteristics of Institutions and Regions While indicators of knowledge activities, linkages, and outcomes reflect the state of the system at a given time, additional indicators are needed to provide context. Some of these are the size of the institution, the industry it is in, the quality of its labor force, the characteristics of its location, and the legal conditions that govern its operation. There are also the framework conditions that govern the economy and society. Size matters in two ways. The propensity to engage in R&D, to patent, and to adopt and adapt new technologies and practices increases with the size of the firm. However, this variation with size is not continuous for all activities (Earl and Gault 2003). Work on knowledge management practices suggests that some are appropriate for small firms and others are more important for large firms. The propensity to use such practices rises with size to an upper bound, and then they are overtaken by other practices that can be supported by the infrastructure of a larger organization. These findings have implications for policy interventions to promote innovation and knowledge flow. Industry matters since not all industries engage in knowledge activities to the same degree. For example, some make extensive use of patents, some do not. Others prefer trade secrecy. The quality of the human resources in the firm is related to the propensity to engage in knowledge activities. Geography is an issue even in a global economy since firms relate to their competitors, to local institutions of education, and to affiliate firms, which may be geographically close if the firm is a spinoff. While there is a considerable literature on clusters and other geographical characteristics (OECD 2001; Florida 2002), stimulated by the work of Porter (1990), statistical organizations and academics are still working on indictors that could provide reproducible evidence of the existence and performance of a cluster. While Florida has a number of indicators that can be derived from census of population data and that can distinguish regions more likely to attract the highly qualified labor force needed for knowledge activities in firms, there are also indicators of educational attainment and of the quality of the educational institutions. The OECD conducts the Program for International Student Assessment (PISA), and the resulting indicators are able to differentiate OECD countries and regions within them according to the performance of 15-year-old students in mathematics, reading, sciences, and problem solving. In addition to the performance in the four areas, PISA provides information on family characteristics (OECD 2004c). Throughout this chapter the assumption has been made that knowledge indicators are being developed within a functioning market economy with well established
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institutions that deal with legal issues, education, finance, government programs, and trade and link to the international institutions. In many countries of the world this is not the case, and the first step in dealing with knowledge and its economic effects requires the strengthening of institutions and their links with international organizations (Dahlman and Aubert 2001). There is also the need to bridge the ‘‘knowledge divide’’ that separates the industrialized from the nonindustrialized (Chataway et al. 2003). Learning and Doing Learning is essential to any of the activities of knowledge generation, transmission, and use, and it is not just the learning of an individual, but of the team, the institution, the region, and the nation. Official statistics of education provide indicators of learning achievement, and they have been well developed over the years, but they deal with the individual, not the group. However, it is the group that is instrumental in transmitting the economic effects of knowledge (Dierkes 2001). The R&D establishment of a firm can be used as proxy for the ability of the firm to absorb knowledge from outside and from inside, if the R&D team is connected to the production and the sales departments in a way that supports the flow of useful knowledge. However, not all firms engage in the activity of formal R&D, devoting at least one person-year to it. In Canada, less than 4% of manufacturing firms do R&D, but around one in 10 produces world-first innovations. Where does absorptive capacity come from for the innovating firms that do not do R&D? This raises the need for indicators of the characteristics of the labor force, as a well educated labor force, with good management and communication skills that can capture ideas, technologies, and practices from a variety of sources and integrate them into the value chain. Some proxy indicators are the percentage of the labor force with tertiary education and measures of the use of practices by the firm to attract, train, and retain workers of high quality. Firms and other organizations can engage in alliances, networks, and partnerships to enhance their opportunity to learn and to capture and absorb knowledge. Indicators of networks have been developed over the years (Hagadoorn 2001; de la Mothe and Link 2002) but have not yet become part of official statistics. The System In order to measure knowledge and to determine its economic effects, there have to be indicators that describe knowledge activities, linkages, and outcomes. The
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indicators discussed in this chapter have been a mixture of those based on official statistics and those developed by academic institutes, and in their present state they are insufficient to provide a clear understanding of ‘‘knowledge and its economic effects.’’ The question is whether it is possible to develop such a set of indicators, and then, whether it is feasible. If the System of National Accounts is taken as a model, it is difficult to establish a correlation between investment in fixed capital in a firm and economic outcomes, such as changes in quality of life, in the skill requirements of the labor force, or in employment levels. There are many studies on the correlation between investment in ICTs or R&D and economic growth, but they rely on a wealth of economic data made possible by many years of developing and using the standards of the System of National Accounts or of R&D measurement. In the wider context of knowledge measurement, the history is not yet there. There are organizations that work with member countries to set standards for definitions and the interpretation of data collected using the definitions. The SNA manual brings together the work of the Commission for the European Communities, the International Monetary Fund, the OECD, the United Nations, and the World Bank (1993). This community is now discussing whether to treat research and development as a capital investment rather than as an operating expense, a decision that could have considerable impact on official statistics and on how R&D is treated and analyzed in national accounts. This leads to a discussion of the economic effects of knowledge stocks, as well as flows. The OECD brings together 30 member countries to set the standards used to measure and interpret technological and related organizational change. The standards for R&D were established in the 1960s (OECD 1963), and those for innovation were first codified in the 1992 Oslo Manual (OECD 1992). In 2005, the OECD released a revision of the current Oslo Manual (OECD/Eurostat 1997) that will incorporate nontechnological innovation such as the development of markets or the finding of new markets or changes in organization or in the use of management practices. It will also incorporate a chapter on linkages to stress the importance of tying together sources of knowledge from outside the firm, the activity of innovation, and the outcomes of the activity. This is a significant step in making the point that indicators of activities, presented and used in isolation, are not the most effective way of describing the system that surrounds the activity. The need to describe the (knowledge) system has implications for how the statistical work is done and for policy development that uses the indicators. Greater collaboration in the development of indicators is needed, bringing together official statistics on education, training, lifelong learning, and related topics with those on technological and related organizational change.
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Understanding the system is one thing; influencing it is another. Official statistics on the financial system combined with government statements on the need to control inflation reduce expectations of inflation, and this has implications for wage settlements and the domestic or international mobility of the highly qualified. If the objective is to promote innovation or entrepreneurship, official statistics play a different role. They describe the present state of the system and allow it to be compared with, or benchmarked against, other systems. The official statistics then support the monitoring of progress toward the targets of government and can be used to identify best practices in other countries that could be implemented domestically. An example of this approach is the EU Innovation Scoreboard. Conclusions Measuring ‘‘knowledge’’ is a complex, if not impossible, undertaking, and relating knowledge to economic effects is more complex. If understanding of the knowledge system is to be advanced in a cost effective way, the policy community must involve itself in the development of new indicators and standards related to their development. This will ensure that the new indicators are used. The shift from producing indicators of activity toward indicators of linkages, or flows, and on to indicators of outcomes should continue if there is to be any hope of understanding the knowledge system, its actors, activities, and linkages, and its outcomes. This will make survey questionnaires longer and more complicated than they would be if only the activity were measured, but that increase in burden should be justified by more effective evidence-based policy. The breadth and complexity of the knowledge system must be acknowledged. The knowledge system does not involve just the firm and its activities, but schools, colleges, and universities, municipal, state, and federal governments, and organizations providing cultural and other leisure activities. The firm that is producing the value added is connected locally, since that is where its people live, but also globally to other firms involved with the same kind of knowledge. While statistics and policies relating to all of these areas could be brought together more easily under a central government, such integration presents a real challenge to federal governments. It does, however, underline the need for collaborative development of both policy and measurement across jurisdictions and disciplines. Acknowledgments The author is grateful for comments from colleagues from Statistics Canada and from the international community involved in measuring knowledge, the information society, and technological and organizational change.
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References Chataway, Joanne, Paul Quintas, David Wield, and Fred Gault (2003). ‘‘From Digital Divide to Knowledge Divide—A Primer.’’ In Monitoring the Digital Divide and Beyond, George Sciadas, editor. Montreal: Orbicom. Commission for the European Communities, the International Monetary Fund, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, the United Nations, and the World Bank (1993). System of National Accounts 1993. Brussels/Luxembourg, New York, Paris, Washington, DC. Commission of the European Communities (2004a). ‘‘Innovation in Europe: Results for the EU, Iceland and Norway.’’ Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. ——— (2004b). ‘‘European Innovation Scoreboard 2004: Comparative Analysis of Innovation Performance.’’ Commission Staff Working Paper SEC (2004) 1475. Brussels: Author. Dahlman, Carl J., and Jean-Eric Aubert (2001). ‘‘China and the Knowledge Economy: Seizing the 21st Century.’’ WBI Development Series, Washington DC: World Bank. de la Mothe, J., and A. N. Link, editors (2002). Networks, Alliances, and Partnerships. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Dierkes, Meinolf (2001). ‘‘Practice and Knowledge Management.’’ In Knowledge Management in the Innovation Process, pp. 9–42, John de la Mothe and Dominique Foray, editors. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Earl, Louise, and Fred Gault (2003). ‘‘Knowledge Management: Size Matters.’’ In Measuring Knowledge Management in the Business Sector: First Steps, Dominique Foray and Fred Gault, editors, pp. 169–188. Paris: OECD. Florida, Richard (2002). The Rise of the Creative Class, and How It’s Transforming Work, Leisure, Community and Everyday Life. Philadelphia: Basic Books. Foray, Dominique (2004). The Economics of Knowledge. Cambridge MA: MIT Press. ———, and Paul David (1995). ‘‘Accessing and Expanding the Science and Technology Knowledge Base.’’ STI Science, Technology, and Industry Review 16: 13–68. ———, and Fred Gault (2003). Measuring Knowledge Management in the Business Sector: First Steps. Paris: OECD. Gault, Fred, editor (2003). Understanding Innovation in Canadian Industry. Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press. Godin, B., Y. Gingras, and L. Davignon (1998). ‘‘Knowledge Flows in Canada as Measured by Bibliometrics.’’ Catalogue No. 88F0006XIE19980010, Ottawa: Statistics Canada. Hagadoorn, J. (2001). ‘‘Inter-Firm Partnerships—An Overview of Major Trends and Patterns Since 1960.’’ in Strategic Partnerships: Proceedings from an NSF Workshop, J. E. Jankowski, A. N. Link and N. S. Vonortas, editors, pp. 63–92. Washington DC: National Science Foundation. Hatzichronoglou, T. (1997). ‘‘Revision of the High-Technology Sector and Product Classification.’’ OECD STI Working Paper 1997/2, Paris: OECD.
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Hodgson, G. M. (2000). ‘‘Socio-Economic Consequences of the Advance of Complexity and Knowledge.’’ In The Creative Society of the 21st Century, pp. 89–112. Paris: OECD. Kline, S. J., and N. Rosenberg (1986). ‘‘An Overview of Innovation.’’ In The Positive Sum Strategy: Harnessing Technology for Economic Growth, R. Landau and N. Rosenberg, editors, p. 289. Washington, DC: National Academy Press. Lundvall, B. (2000). ‘‘The Learning Economy: Some Implications for the Knowledge Base of Health and Education Systems.’’ In Knowledge Management in the Learning Society, pp. 125–141. Paris: OECD. ———, and B. Johnson (1994). ‘‘This Learning Economy.’’ Journal of Industry Studies 1, No. 2 (December): 23–42. OECD (1963). Proposed Standard Practice for Surveys of Research and Development: The Measurement of Scientific and Technical Activities. Directorate for Scientific Affairs, DAS/ PD/62.47, Paris: OECD. ——— (1990). Proposed Standard Method for Compiling and Interpreting Technology Balance of Payments Data: TBP Manual 1990. Measurement of Scientific and Technological Activities Series, Paris: OECD. ——— (1992). Proposed Guidelines for Collecting and Interpreting Technological Innovation Data: Oslo Manual. OECD/GD(92)26, Paris: OECD. ——— (1994). Using Patent Data as Science and Technology Indicators—Patent Manual 1994. The Measurement of Scientific and Technological Activities Series, Paris: OECD/ GD(94)/114, 1994, Paris: OECD. ——— (1995). The Measurement of Human Resources Devoted to Science and Technology—Canberra Manual. Paris and Luxembourg: OECD and Eurostat. ——— (2001). Innovative Clusters: Drivers of National Innovation Systems. Paris: OECD. ——— (2002a). Frascati Manual: Proposed Standard Practice for Surveys on Research and Experimental Development. Paris: OECD. ——— (2002b). OECD Science, Technology and Industry Outlook. Paris: OECD. ——— (2002c). Measuring the Information Economy. Paris: OECD. ———(2003). OECD Science, Technology and Industry Scoreboard. Paris: OECD. ——— (2004a). Main Science and Technology Indicators, Vol. 2004. Paris: OECD. ——— (2004b). ‘‘Meeting of the OECD Committee for Scientific and Technological Policy at Ministerial Level: Science, Technology and Innovation for the 21st Century.’’ OECD news release January 29–30, 2004, Final Communique´, Paris: OECD. ——— (2004c). Learning from Tomorrow’s World: First Results from PISA 2003, Paris: OECD. OECD/Eurostat (1995). The Measurement of Human Resources Devoted to Science and Technology—Canberra Manual. Measurement of Scientific and Technological Activities Series. Paris and Luxembourg: OECD and Eurostat. ——— (1997). Proposed Guidelines for Collecting and Interpreting Technological Innovation Data: Oslo Manual. Paris and Luxembourg: OECD and Eurostat. Porter, M. (1990). The Competitive Advantage of Nations. New York: Free Press.
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Prusak, Larry (2001). ‘‘Practice and Knowledge Management.’’ In Knowledge Management in the Innovation Process, John de la Mothe and Dominique Foray, editors, pp. 153–157. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Schumpeter, J. (1947). Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, 2nd ed. New York: Harper and Row. Statistics Canada (2004). The Daily (December 23), Catalogue No. 11-001E, Ottawa: Author. Stehr, Nico (1996). ‘‘Knowledge as a Capacity 88F0017MIE1996002, Ottawa: Statistics Canada.
for
Action.’’
Catalogue
No.
UN (1990). International Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities, Revision 3, Series M, No. 4/Rev. 3. New York: Author. ——— (2002). International Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities, Revision 3.1, Series M, No. 4/Rev. 3.1. New York: Author. von Hippel, E. (1988). The Sources of Innovation. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press. ——— (1998). ‘‘Economics of Product Development by Users: The Impact of ‘Sticky’ Information.’’ Management Science 44: 5.
5 Assessing Innovation Capacity: Fitting Strategy, Indicators, and Policy to the Right Framework Reinhilde Veugelers
Introduction Europe’s growth performance has been the subject of increasing scrutiny during recent years, most notably in the context of the Lisbon process to make the European Union the most knowledge-based economy in the world and its efforts to encourage governments to introduce employment- and productivity-enhancing reforms. This reform agenda is all the more pressing given that the European Union’s underlying growth rate has been trending downward since the second half of the 1990s. The much debated analysis of the contribution to overall productivity growth from ICT production and use, described below, indicates the European Union’s difficulty in reorienting its economy toward the newer, higher productivity growth sectors such as ICT. At the same time, it raises the broader issue, discussed later, of whether the European Union is insufficiently capable of creating and exploiting new technologies in general. Tackling the deficient E.U. innovative capacity requires a broad systemic policy framework that goes well beyond targeting R&D budgets but unfortunately includes many factors difficult to document with statistical indicators. We evaluate the actual policy strategy developed to tackle the European Union’s growth challenge, namely the Lisbon strategy. More particularly we examine the choice of policy priorities and structural reforms for tackling the deficiencies in the innovative capacity. In addition, we analyze the set of indicators chosen to evaluate progress. We then draw the policy conclusions. Are the right indicators chosen for informing improvement in innovative capacity? What are the interactions and complementarities between the various reforms and indicators? We also consider the need to monitor and evaluate the indicators—and whether this should be done at aggregate or sectoral levels, at the E.U., national, or regional level.
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Assessing the Problem: The European Union’s Relative Productivity Performance Enhancing productivity growth is fundamental to realizing the Lisbon ambition. We first focus on the nature and source of the deterioration in the European Union’s productivity growth performance relative to that in the United States since the mid1990s, which will serve the subsequent discussion of the policy approach to be adopted in order to remedy this situation. Where Are the European Union’s Productivity Growth Problems Coming From? The Importance of Knowledge Production and Diffusion One of the most popular explanations for the diverging productivity fortunes of the European Union and the United States has been the relative exposure of both areas to ICT. A primary source of U.S. productivity acceleration in the 1990s has been the increasing share of ICT production in the United States, combined with extraordinary gains in productivity. However, given the general purpose technology characteristics of ICT, one should also see productivity gains from using that technology, further sustaining the ICT effect on aggregate productivity (e.g., Jovanovic and Rousseau forthcoming; Bresnahan and Trajtenberg 1996). In fact, using a growth accounting framework, both the ICT producing manufacturing and intensive ICTusing private services categories are causing the 1996–2000 divergences in European Union–United States productivity growth rates. It is precisely in these two areas of the economy where the European Union fares most poorly relative to the United States, either in terms of the size of the respective industries (i.e., small shares of overall E.U. output) and/or in having relatively low productivity growth rates (European Commission 2004b, Annual Review).1 An important question to examine is the extent to which the example of ICT is an isolated case or is likely to be replicated in other high-growth, high-tech industries. If this is a credible risk, then the key question is whether the European Union has specific problems in relation to its innovation infrastructure and whether the United States has a better innovation capacity in general than the European Union. In overall terms, when one assesses the evidence in relation to the manufacturing sector, it is fair to conclude that the overall R&D infrastructure of the United States seems to dominate that of the European Union. Not only does the United States display a higher R&D intensity overall, it also has a larger weight of its production concentrated in high-tech sectors, and it realizes a better growth performance in high-tech sectors. Hence, differences in innovative capacity are a prime candidate to explain the European Union–United States differences in productivity growth performances, particularly in high-tech manufacturing industries (see Table 1).
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Table 1 Comparison of European Union–United States differences in R&D spending and productivity growth in high-tech manufacturing sectors
High-tech manufacturing ICT Non–ICT
E.U.–U.S. gap in R&D spending
E.U.–U.S. gap in VA (specialization)
E.U.–U.S. gap in productivity growth
1991– 1995
1996– 1999
1991– 1995
1996– 2000
1991– 1995
1996– 2000
0.686 0.552 0.783
0.621 0.411 0.813
0.825 0.45 0.98
0.826 0.42 1.01
0.48 0.23 1.15
0.41 0.27 2.81
Note: U.S. ¼ 1. Source: European Commission 2004b, Annual Review.
While Table 1 illustrates the United States’ higher specialization, larger R&D intensity, and higher productivity growth in ICT sectors compared to the European Union, for non–ICT high-tech sectors, the picture is less devastating for the European Union, particularly in the second part of the 1990s. There is no difference in specialization in these industries, nor a productivity disadvantage. The gap in total expenditures on R&D is also smaller than in total. Unfortunately, these sectors, often being only medium- to high-tech, have far less scope for productivity growth than the ICT industries. The main conclusion is that while there are examples of good performance, in particular sectors and particular member states, overall the E.U. innovation environment remains weak in a number of key ‘‘input’’ indicators. But in addition to investments in R&D, there are also other characteristics of the E.U. innovation system that need to be looked at to explain its problems, to focus on the high-productivity growth areas, and to gain a higher rate of return from its knowledge investments. What Determines a Nation’s Innovation Capacity? What are these factors that determine an economy’s ‘‘national innovation capacity,’’ defined as the ability of a nation not only to produce new ideas but also to commercialize a flow of innovative technologies over the longer term? Using the insights from macro- and microeconomics and national innovation systems models (e.g., Aghion and Howitt 1992; Romer 1990; Lundvall 1992; Freeman 1987; Nelson 1993) applied economic theorists (e.g., Furman et al. 2002) have synthesized what determines an economy’s national innovation capacity. From this perspective a range of factors are deemed to be important for effective innovation effort. A
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sufficiently developed ‘‘supply’’ side of R&D (as reflected in the amount of R&D carried out or the number of skilled researchers) is a necessary but insufficient condition for successful innovation. Broader framework conditions are important as well, including a sufficient ‘‘demand’’ for innovation to reward successful innovators. This requires sophisticated lead users willing to pay for innovations, effective intellectual property rights (IPR) schemes, a favorable macroeconomic environment, and effective competition in output markets, and especially market entry and exit processes. But perhaps the most critical element in the framework is the interconnectedness of the agents in the system, linking the common innovation infrastructure to specific technology clusters. This requires good industry–science links and well-functioning capital and labor markets. In the national innovation capacity perspective, country differences with respect to innovation and growth might reflect not just different endowments in terms of labor, capital, and the stock of knowledge but also the varying degrees of the ‘‘knowledge distribution power’’ or the efficiency of the innovation system. Overall, this perspective warns against looking at statistical indicators individually to assess the performance of a national innovation capacity. Rather, a systemic approach should be taken to understand the relationships between science, technology, and innovation and socioeconomic development. The problem with this approach, however, is to approximate empirically the institutional framework and the ‘‘knowledge distribution power’’ of nations. What is available at present are only pieces of statistical evidence showing the importance of interactions, such as the availability of venture-backed financing, cooperation in R&D among firms and between science and industry, (international) copatenting, the number of researchers employed by business, etc. (see, for example, Furman et al. 2002, Economic Policy Committee 2004). These framework features, although more difficult to document with statistical indicators, need however to be taken into account when we want to understand the relative overall effectiveness of a country’s innovative systems, if not quantitatively, then at least qualitatively. The Economic Policy Committee (2004), from combining fieldwork evidence and an analysis of statistical indicators, concludes that ‘‘market pull conditions’’ and knowledge networks are the key areas of E.U. weakness. The European Union generates a great deal of knowledge in its universities and research institutes and produces large numbers of skilled personnel. But often it does not exploit this knowledge and expertise for social and economic needs (the ‘‘European paradox’’). This compares to the United States, which has a better connectedness of science and industry with an openly competitive system of private and public universities and government subsidies to universities through peerreviewed research grants, which result in a higher quality of the research base. Other
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important framework conditions present in the United States are the advantage of a large, unified market unencumbered by differences in language, customs, and standards, a clearer and stronger U.S. intellectual property rights system, more flexible financial markets, making available venture capital finance to innovating firms, and more flexible labor markets, affecting both internal migration and the international immigration of highly skilled people (Gordon 2004b). The Policy Reaction: The Need for a ‘‘Systemic Approach’’ The overarching policy implication from all this is a need for a ‘‘systemic’’ policy approach to improve the European Union’s innovative potential. At the European Council of March 2000 in Lisbon, the European Union launched a comprehensive set of integrated structural reforms geared toward the general objective of becoming ‘‘the most dynamic and competitive knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion’’ as well as ‘‘an increasing respect for the environment.’’ With the adoption of the strategy of Lisbon, as it became known, the European leaders acknowledged the need for profound reforms in the European Union. The scope of the Lisbon strategy has been wide from the outset, not only in terms of objectives but also in terms of the policy tools to be used. Table 2 classifies the Table 2 Lisbon reforms Investments in the knowledge-based economy Invest in R&D and innovation Invest in education and training Encourage production and use of ICT Product and capital market reforms Improve the business environment Improve the functioning of the internal markets for goods and services Promote E.U. financial integration
Labor market reforms Improve incentives to participate and remain in the labor market Improve matching between human resources and vacancies Increase labor market flexibility
Social policy reforms Modernize social protection systems Improve working conditions and skill levels
Environmental policy reforms Improve understanding of environmental problems Increase use of cost–benefit analysis Increase use of market based instruments
Source: Adapted from Economic Commission 2005.
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Lisbon reforms into five categories: investments in the knowledge-based economy, product and capital market reforms, labor market reforms, social policy reforms, and environmental policy reforms. As the previous sections have documented, tackling the deficiencies in the innovative capacity requires a systemic policy perspective. The Lisbon strategy embodies the idea that to yield maximum synergies from structural reforms, they are best implemented in a comprehensive and coordinated way. Therefore, beyond stimulating the research inputs from the public and private sectors, it is important that other structural reforms are part of the Lisbon agenda as well, to improve the European Union’s innovative capacity. Investment and innovation benefit from a more competitive and entrepreneurial environment, fostered by structural reforms on product, capital, and labor markets that improve the transfer of resources from low-productivity to higher productivity use. With well-functioning product markets, firms will have incentives to innovate and new firms embodying new ideas can flow into the market. Furthermore, new business opportunities can be taken advantage of only if appropriately educated and skilled workers can be hired under the right conditions. This requires flexible labor markets to provide innovators access to researchers and skilled human capital. Similarly, well-functioning risk capital markets ensure innovators access to financial capital to finance their risky projects. High-tech start-ups, often an important source of breakthrough innovations, in particular need open product markets with low entry barriers and access to capital, especially early stage financing of high-risk ventures. Implementing the Policy Strategy: Need for Indicators The wide scope of the Lisbon strategy made it necessary to focus and identify a restricted, well-defined set of targets and policy measures necessary to achieve the objectives and at the same time a corresponding restricted set of indicators to monitor progress on the targets. Defining the Targets and Policy Measures With respect to research and innovation, a key element of the Lisbon strategy has been to speed up the transition toward a knowledge-driven economy under the umbrella of a European Knowledge Area (EKA). Action has been shaped around a range of initiatives ranging from e-Europe and the creation of a European Research Area to promoting innovation and establishing common objectives at the E.U. level for national education policies. For innovation and research, the following list summarizes the targets and policy measures with respect to the EKA:
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Research Network national and joint research programs on a voluntary basis around freely chosen objectives.
Improve the environment for private research investment, R&D partnerships, and high-technology start-ups.
Develop an open method of coordination for national research policies.
Roll out a world-class research communications infrastructure.
Remove obstacles to the mobility of researchers; attract and retain high-quality research talent in Europe.
Introduce a cost-effective community patent.
Harness new and frontier technologies, notably biotechnology and environmental technologies (Stockholm).
Fully implement the e-Europe Action Plan by 2005.
Information Society
Ensure that all teachers have training in digital skills by 2003.
Ensure access to a widespread, world-class communications infrastructure and ensure significant reduction in the cost of using the Internet (local loop unbundling).
Create conditions for e-commerce to flourish.
Prevent info exclusion.
Stimulate e-government.
Support takeup of 3G mobile communications and introduction of Internet Protocol version 6.
Education
Achieve a substantial increase in per capita spending on human resources.
Promote lifelong learning.
Adapt skills base better to needs of knowledge society.
Better recognize qualifications.
Promote learning of E.U. languages and introduce a European dimension to education.
Promote school twinning via the Internet.
This has been translated into specific and measurable targets for the European Knowledge Area:
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Increase R&D spending with the aim of approaching 3% of GDP by 2010.
The proportion financed by business should rise to two-thirds of that total by 2010.
100% of schools should be connected to the Internet by 2002.
100% of teachers should have training in digital skills by 2003.
Internet penetration in households should reach 30% by 2002.
Basic governmental services should be 100% online by 2002.
Indicators Structural Indicators To monitor the progress on the main targets of the Lisbon strategy, the European Commission and Council agreed on a list of 14 main structural indicators. Member states’ performance on these indicators is continuously being assessed. For the European Knowledge Area, R&D expenditures as a percentage of GDP, with a target of 3%, is the main structural indicator.2 But beyond this main indicator, there are other (secondary) structural indicators of the EKA, which are continuously being monitored:
Spending on human resources (public expenditure on education),
GERD (gross domestic expenditure on R&D) by source of funds (private–public),
Level of Internet access—households/enterprises,
Science and technology graduates—total/females/males,
Patents—EPO/USPTO,
Venture capital investments—early stage/expansion and replacement, and
ICT expenditure—IT/telecommunications expenditure.
Innovation Indicators Beyond the structural indicators that cover all Lisbon areas, the Lisbon European Council also requested, for the area of innovation and R&D, the development of the European Innovation Scoreboard (EIS) by DG Enterprise.3 The 2003 EIS contains 19 main indicators, selected to summarize the main drivers and outputs of innovation. These indicators are divided into four groups: human resources for innovation (five indicators); the creation of new knowledge (four indicators); the transmission and application of knowledge (three indicators); and innovation finance, output, and markets (seven indicators). The EIS mainly uses Eurostat data, covering 32 countries. Six of the 19 indicators are drawn from the E.U. Structural Indicators.
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1. Human resources 1.1 Science and engineering graduates (percentage of 20–29 years age class) 1.2 Population with tertiary education (percentage of 25–64 years age class) 1.3 Participation in life-long learning (percentage of 25–64 years age class) 1.4 Employment in medium-high and high-tech manufacturing (percentage of total workforce) 1.5 Employment in high-tech services (percentage of total workforce) 2. Knowledge creation 2.1 Public R&D expenditures (GERD–BERD) (percentage of GDP) 2.2 Business expenditures on R&D (BERD) (percentage of GDP) 2.3.1 EPO high-tech patent applications (per million population) 2.3.2 USPTO high-tech patent applications (per million population) 2.4.1 EPO patent applications (per million population) 2.4.2 USPTO patents granted (per million population) 3. Transmission and application of knowledge 3.1 SMEs innovating in-house (percentage of manufacturing SMEs and percentage of service SMEs) 3.2 SMEs involved in innovation cooperation (percentage of manufacturing and service SMEs) 3.3 Innovation expenditures (percentage of all turnover in manufacturing and services) 4. Innovation finance, output, and markets 4.1 Share of high-tech venture capital investment 4.2 Share of early stage venture capital in GDP 4.3.1 SME sales of ‘‘new to market’’ products (percentage of all turnover in manufacturing and service SMEs) 4.3.2 SME sales of ‘‘new to the firm but not new to the market’’ products (percentage of all turnover in manufacturing and service SMEs) 4.4 Internet access/use 4.5 ICT expenditures (percentage of GDP) 4.6 Share of manufacturing value-added in high-tech sectors 4.7 Volatility rates of SMEs (percentage of manufacturing and service SMEs)
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Research Indicators In support of the European Research Area (ERA) initiative, DG Research was entrusted with a mission to produce a set of indicators and a methodology for benchmarking research policies in the member states. A set of 20 indicators was proposed to help monitor and report on progress toward the ERA. Most of the indicators are already used in other commission publications. Eight indicators are also used in the European Innovation Scoreboard (DG Research 2003). Evaluating Performance on the Selected Indicators In 2004 at midterm, the Lisbon strategy was evaluated by a group of reviewers chaired by Mr. Kok, known as the ‘‘Kok group.’’ The objectives initially set out were far from being achieved. During the last four years, the overall growth performance of the European economy has been disappointing. In fact, after having peaked in the mid-1990s at around 97% of U.S. levels, E.U. labor productivity per hour is projected to deteriorate to around 88% in 2005, which is close to its relative level in the early 1980s. This post-1995 deterioration in relative productivity levels reflects a sharp decline in E.U. productivity growth rates relative to those of the United States during the period in question (European Commission 2005). One of the most disappointing aspects of the Lisbon strategy to date is the performance on R&D. On the R&D target, only two countries (Finland and Sweden) currently have R&D spending exceeding 3% of GDP; in these same two countries business is achieving the goal of spending the equivalent of 2% of GDP on R&D. The rest are behind on both scores. Progress in providing every teacher with digital training is very disappointing. On a positive note, member states have progressed in the spread of ICT and Internet use in schools, universities, administration, and trade. Household Internet penetration, for example, has risen rapidly, with 12 member states meeting the targets. The little progress that has been made on R&D is all the more remarkable taking into account that the Lisbon European Council rightly recognized that Europe’s future economic development would depend crucially on its ability to create and grow high-value, innovative, and research-based sectors. However, the knowledge society is a larger concept than just an increased commitment to R&D expenditures. Further zooming in on innovation and R&D, Table 3 provides a look at a selected combination of indicators from the innovation indicators discussed previously for the EU15 relative to the United States and Japan. As Table 3 indicates, Europe continues to lag behind the United States and Japan on several indicators. Although science and technology graduates show no gap, both Japan and the United States have significantly more working population with
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Table 3 Selection of main EIS indicators—A triad comparison EU15 1. Science and engineering graduates 2. Working population with tertiary education 3. Total R&D expenditures (GERD as percentage of GDP) 4. Public R&D expenditures (GERD–BERD) (percentage of GDP) 5. Business expenditures on R&D (percentage of GDP) 6. Early stage venture capital in GDP 7. EPO patent applications (per million population) 8. USPTO patent applications (per million population) 9. EPO high-tech patent applications (per million population) 10. Share of high-tech sectors in manufacturing value added 11. ICT expenditures (percentage of GDP)
U.S.
Japan
11.3 21.5 1.99
10.2 37.2 2.80
33.8 3.01
0.69
0.76
0.81
1.30
2.04
2.28
0.037 161.1
0.218 169.8
174.7
80.1
322.5
265.2
31.6
57.0
44.9
14.1
23.0
18.7
7.0
8.2
9.0
Source: European Commission (2004a).
tertiary education. Both government and, in particular, business expenditures on R&D are considerably lower within Europe. Moreover, growth rate differentials reveal a similar trend, suggesting a further widening of this gap in the near future. Also, with respect to invested venture capital, within Europe the amounts of resources available (divided by GDP) are clearly lower. This difference in the level of science and technology ‘‘inputs’’ between the European Union and the United States is accompanied by lower levels of technological output. Both the United States and Japan outperform Europe in terms of technological performance as measured by the number of patents per million inhabitants, with this ‘‘gap’’ being even more pronounced for high-tech patents. Similarly, in terms of the share of added value within manufacturing industries, the difference from the United States is especially striking. Broadly speaking, a picture emerges from the indicators in which the European Union continues to lag behind on the level of technological performance and related—technology intensive—economic activity. All of this confirms the analysis of the persistent deficiency of the European Union’s innovative and growth capacity
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underlying the rationale for the Lisbon strategy, as discussed previously. Hence, the conclusion seems inescapable that Lisbon as yet has failed to deliver with respect to improving the European Union’s innovative capacity. Conclusions for the E.U. Policy Process At midterm it is clear that the Lisbon strategy has not delivered what was expected, particularly with respect to the knowledge economy, calling for an evaluation of the policy strategy. Does the European Union Have a Systemic Policy Approach? A ‘‘systemic’’ approach builds on complementarities among reforms: In order to reach maximum effectiveness, measures in one reform domain need to be accompanied by flanking measures in another domain. Measures that increase the level of competition in product markets, for example, often lead to economic restructuring, implying job losses in some sectors and employment creation in others. Wellfunctioning labor markets would tend to facilitate such a transition. Hence, in view of the complementarities, Lisbon should be broad, i.e., should cover multiple policy areas. The problem is, however, that the Lisbon strategy is not sufficiently connected to be understood as a truly ‘‘systemic’’ endeavor. Lisbon is a collection of policy initiatives rather than a truly integrated view. This is why the Kok group successfully called for more focus.4 For Europe to increase its living standards, it needs to focus on employment and productivity growth. But in line with the systemic approach, this needs to be done through a wide range of reform policies as well as a wider macroeconomic framework as supportive as possible of growth. No single action will deliver higher growth. Rather, a series of interconnected initiatives and structural changes are needed. In line with a ‘‘systemic perspective,’’ the renewed Lisbon strategy, although it clearly carries as a priority progress on the knowledge society, calls for action in other areas of policy as well, such as the completion of the internal market and improving the business climate. Evaluating the Choice of Indicators for Improving the Innovative Capacity Are the Sets of Indicators Chosen to Evaluate Progress the Right Indicators for Informing Improvement Toward the Lisbon Objectives? The set of indicators—both the structural indicators and those specific for research and innovation—although being restricted by data availability, clearly look like be-
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ing inspired by the specific weaknesses of the E.U. innovative capacity and the ‘‘systems’’ approach toward improving this capacity. Although R&D spending is a central structural indicator, it fits into a set of other structural indicators, allowing integration with labor, capital, and product market reforms. The targets in other areas are also important to improving the innovative capacity. For instance, assessing the ease of entry of new firms and their survival is important to have new ideas coming to market. For this, targets like the Risk Capital Action Plan, lowering the cost of doing business, further opening up markets, are important to assess as well. But also targets like lifelong learning and the reduction of barriers to labor mobility between member states will improve the human capital resources necessary for implementing innovation strategies. Even sustainable development targets, when directed towards green technology development, could be developed into an E.U. innovative strength. Are We Measuring the Right Indicators for Informing Improvements in Innovative Capacity? A key message from a systemic approach is that the effectiveness of innovation systems depends on the balanced combination of creative capacity, diffusion capacity, and absorption capacity. These dimensions are all somehow reflected in the selected indicators. The targets selected for the European Knowledge Area, beyond R&D expenditures, reflect the importance of a highly educated labor force as central in the European Union’s creative, distributive, and absorptive capacity. It also reflects the specific importance of ICT in the European Union’s growth agenda as a general purpose technology and recognizes the importance of financing for innovation. The area of indicators that is least represented is scientific performance and industry–science links. Especially the lack of industry–science link indicators is disturbing since this is one of the particular deficiencies of the E.U. innovative capacity (cf. European Paradox). What we are missing in the set of main indicators are those on industry–science links such as, for instance, cooperation between firms and research institutes, copatenting and copublishing, researcher mobility between industry and science, private research funding of basic research, patenting by universities and public research institutes, and spinoffs. This is partly due to a lack of systematic data on this, but clearly more could be done here (Gault, this volume). Are We Measuring the Indicators at the Right Level of Aggregation? Underlying any aggregate innovation indicator is the structural makeup of the economy, which differs greatly between E.U. countries. Such structural differences can have an important role in explaining some of the differences in innovation performance. The main reason is that there is a great deal of diversity among industrial
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sectors in terms of innovation process, innovation inputs, and outputs. First, technological opportunities differ across sectors, with ICT as a prime example of the high-growth sector, with huge opportunities for technological advance. Other major differences across sectors are the sizes of the innovating units and the objectives of innovation, with product versus process innovations. There is also a great deal of diversity among the sources of innovation: in-house R&D laboratories, suppliers, users, public research institutes. This implies that there will be major differences across sectors in many of the indicators used in the EIS, for example those based on R&D, patenting, SMEs, and innovation expenditures. Since the systemic approach operates at the specific technology or sectoral level, this implies that indicators should be traced at technology/sectoral level. The single most important constraint is the lack of data at the sector level for some key variables. Nevertheless, the main conclusion from an exploratory analysis of the EIS indicators at sectoral level is that there is a great deal to be gained by analyzing innovation performance across sectors. Another area of overaggregation is the geographical dimension. Regional-level data are of value for two reasons. Innovation policies are often developed and implemented at the regional level, in addition to national- and E.U.-level policies. Regional indicators can help inform these policies. Beyond the selection of indicators and the level at which they should be evaluated, there is also the issue of the systemic approach to evaluating the indicators. Since multiple dimensions need to be measured for innovation capacity, multiple indicators need to be developed and assessed simultaneously. The recognition of the need to measure multiple dimensions has led to an emerging call for composite indicators. Also, the European Union had advocated the use of composite indicators. The EIS 2003, for instance, contains two such composite indicators as well as the 3% Action Plan. However, the current use and implementation of composite indicators reflects that the main motivation is the need to summarize different indicators, rather than reflecting the need for a systemic evaluation of indicators. This is clear since the weighing of indicators is mostly statistical rather than guided by a conceptual model. Implications for STI Policies We conclude by drawing some implications for a systemic policy process. Enhancing Horizontal Policy Coordination Increasing the efficiency of STI policies implies improving the policy arena in terms of coordination among various policy makers. STI policies should not be designed in isolation from each other (research policies, innovation and education policies)
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in close interaction with other policy areas (financial markets, labor markets, product markets, macroeconomic stability, environmental policies). Close cooperation among decision-making instances or even integration should be explored to guide prioritization processes and to better exploit synergies. Enhancing Vertical Policy Coordination The natural tendency for R&D resources to concentrate geographically should be reflected in a decentralized policy design, but this should be accompanied by coordination of policies among regional, national, and international policy makers. The Lisbon strategy and the ERA should not be thought of as a harmonization process: Innovative and productive structures differ across countries and regions. A decentralized policy approach implies more possibilities of adaptation to local specific needs in order to better align the various complementary local actors. Flexibility of policy measures is needed at the various administrative levels, especially between national and regional levels. Nevertheless, coordination among the various policy levels is important. The progressive opening of national programs, cross-fertilization measures, and international mobilization of human resources need to be promoted. The idea is to facilitate cooperation and to boost diffusion and uptake of knowledge by increasing the efficiency of the resources used. Improving the Management of the Policy Framework Well-developed skills and competencies are needed within the policy world itself. Inventiveness and creativity in policy building will be enhanced if policy makers can access experiences of other countries, provided these are presented in their context and evaluated properly. Benchmarking exercises involving policy makers should be conceived as ‘‘learning-by-interacting’’ exercises rather than ‘‘diffusion of best practices.’’ In addition, STI policies need to be supported by monitoring and evaluation (scientific, external) practices, which then feed back into the policy process. Finally, involving stakeholders in policy making is necessary. This emphasizes the importance of an appropriate governance system for policy. Acknowledgments The author acknowledges support from the European Commission Key Action ‘‘Improving the Socio-Economic Knowledge Base’’ through contract No. HPSE-CT2002-00146, the Belgian Federal Government DWTC (IUAP P5/11/33), KULeuven (OT/04/07A), and the Flemish Government (Steunpunt O&Ostatistieken). The chapter reflects only the views of the author and does not commit the European Commission.
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Notes 1. Regarding manufacturing, two sectors dominate the overall productivity patterns, namely semiconductors and office machinery. These are the two industries where the United States is clearly ahead, with semiconductors contributing five times more to U.S. productivity growth compared to the equivalent gains for the European Union and with office machinery contributing more than twice as much. Of the service industries that individually contributed significantly to overall productivity growth, the United States is dominant in the financial services area and wholesale and retail trade. 2. For a full list of performances on all structural indicators, see European Commission (2005). 3. In addition, in the framework of enterprise and industrial policy, there is the complementary Enterprise Policy Scoreboard. Several indicators in both scoreboards are identical. 4. At the same time, the midterm reviewers have called for an improvement in the governance of the Lisbon process. A major deficiency of the Lisbon strategy is the governance of the policy process, with a lack of peer pressure at the level of the member states and poor communication about the benefits to all actors involved. An ambitious and broad reform agenda needs a clear narrative in order to be able to communicate effectively about the need for it.
References Aghion, P., and P. Howitt (1992). ‘‘A Model of Growth Through Creative Destruction.’’ Econometrica 60: 323–351. Bresnahan, R., and M. Trajtenberg (1996). ‘‘General Purpose Technologies: Engines of Growth?’’ Journal of Econometrics 65: 83–108. David, P., and D. Foray (1995). ‘‘Accessing and Expanding the Science and Technology Knowledge Base.’’ STI Review 16. DG Research (2003). ‘‘Investing in Research: An Action Plan for Europe.’’ Economic Policy Committee (2004). ‘‘Mid-Term Review of the Lisbon Strategy: Progress Report by the Economic Policy Committee,’’ Annex B. European Commission (2003a). ‘‘3th Science & Technology Indicator Report.’’ DG Research. ——— (2003b). ‘‘European Innovation Scoreboard.’’ Technical Paper No. 1-4. ——— (2004a). ‘‘2003 Innovation Scoreboard.’’ Commission Staff Working Paper. ——— (2004b). ‘‘The EU Economy: 2004 Review.’’ European Economy. ——— (2005). ‘‘The Economic Costs of Non–Lisbon.’’ Occasional Papers No. 16, European Economy. Freeman, C. (1987). Technology and Economic Performance: Lessons from Japan. London: Pinter. Furman, J., M. Porter, and S. Stern (2002). ‘‘The Determinants of National Innovation Capacity.’’ Research Policy: 899–934.
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Gordon, R. (2004a). ‘‘Five Puzzles in the Behaviour of Productivity, Investment and Innovation.’’ CEPR Discussion Paper No. 4414. ——— (2004b). ‘‘Two Centuries of Economic Growth: Europe Chasing the American Frontier?’’ CEPR Discussion Paper No. 4415. ——— (2004c). ‘‘Why Was Europe Left at the Station When America’s Productivity Locomotive Departed?’’ CEPR Discussion Paper No. 4416. Jones, C. I. (2002). ‘‘Sources of US Economic Growth in a World of Ideas.’’ American Economic Review 92: 220–239. Jovanovic, B., and P. Rousseau (forthcoming). ‘‘General Purpose Technologies.’’ In Handbook of Economic Growth, P. Aghion, editor. Lundvall, B.-A., editor (1992). National Systems of Innovation: Towards a Theory of Innovation and Interactive Learning. London: Pinter. Nelson, R., editor (1993). National Innovation Systems: A Comparative Analysis. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Romer, P. (1990). ‘‘Endogenous Technological Change.’’ Journal of Political Economy 98: S71–S102.
II Knowledge Communities
6 Interactive Learning, Social Capital, and Economic Performance Bengt-A˚ke Lundvall
Introduction In general, with the exception of new growth theory and the literature on national systems of innovation, there is a tendency for scholars working on innovation and knowledge not to confront the macroeconomic issues. Seen from the other side, it has been quite acceptable among macroeconomists to assume that what happens at the macroeconomic level can be well understood without bothering too much about technology and institutions related to innovation and learning. One temporary exception, when macroeconomists actually did get involved in the debate, was the ‘‘new economy’’ episode, when even mainstream OECD economists—stimulated by Alan Greenspan’s speeches on the new economy—for a short period referred to technology, and especially information technology, as a factor that might affect the workings of the aggregate economy. It was a pity that the basic hypotheses behind this concept were too crude. Their assumptions that it would be rather simple for firms and for the economy as a whole to absorb the new technology and to transform it into economic growth reflected some lack of understanding of institutions and innovation processes (Lundvall 2003). This episode, and what appeared as the burst of the IT bubble, might actually have reaffirmed to macroeconomists that it is best to stay away from difficult themes having to do with knowledge and innovation. This essay presents some preliminary arguments for why this might not be a good idea. Specifically, it will be argued that the kind of interactive learning that interconnects users and producers in processes aiming at new products may have a major impact on economic performance of the economy. To understand the prerequisites for such learning to take place should therefore be of major concern not only for management but also for policy-makers at the national level.1 In this chapter we link ‘‘learning by interacting’’ to macroeconomic dynamics. The argument is that this form for learning is fundamental since it transforms the
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outcomes of learning by doing and learning by using from being local to becoming nonlocal. Embodying knowledge in new services and products may be seen as an alternative to codification as a mechanism of generalizing local knowledge. The argument is predominantly conceptual and will be built up through references to contributions from a handful of outstanding economists. The chapter is a follow-up of ideas first developed in the booklet Product Innovation and User– Producer Interaction (Lundvall 1985). Learning as the Major Source of Economic Growth—Pasinetti on Growth and Structural Change Pasinetti (1981) is one of the major postwar contributors to economic theory. Pasinetti builds a theoretical model with vertically integrated sectors each ending up with final commodities for private consumption. The dynamics driving structural change come from producer learning, resulting in productivity growth in these sectors, while the uneven growth in demand reflects consumer learning in connection with consumers’ adoption of new and old consumption goods. It is characteristic for Pasinetti’s argument that product innovation—in the form of new consumption goods—is seen as a prerequisite for avoiding stagnation and thus for sustainable growth. This is in contrast to most production theory that simply ignores product innovation. And it is also characteristic that the diffusion of new consumption goods is seen as requiring consumer learning. Consumers’ preferences are shaped in such learning processes and not given once and for all. These assumptions bring us closer to the realities of the modern economy than standard production and consumption theory. Empirical studies show that new products, together with change in process technology and in work organization, are key elements in economic growth (Christensen and Lundvall 2004). But the major aim of Pasinetti’s model is to build a theory explaining the logic of value creation in a dynamic context without specifying the institutional context, and the author, while recognizing the critical importance of the phenomena, abstains from explaining how and why learning takes place in respectively consumption and production. To get closer to understanding how learning takes place, it is actually necessary to open the black boxes of the vertically organized production chains and to be explicit regarding institutional framework and its impact on interactive learning. We will argue, first, that the organization of these chains in terms of markets, hierarchies, and networks is of crucial importance for the rate of productivity growth within each chain and, second, that the framework conditions at the level of the national system have a major impact on the organization and thereby on the actual rate of growth of the whole economy.
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The Division of Labor and the Static Scale Effects What follows is very much in the spirit of Adam Smith (1776 [1904]). It may be seen as an attempt to bring his analytical framework up to date by taking into account the speedup of change and the increasing importance of knowledge creation and learning (David and Foray 2002, p. 4). The starting point is his fundamental hypothesis, that economic development may be defined as a process where the degree of specialization and the division of labor becomes more developed and complex. For our purpose it is fundamental to distinguish between two different dimensions of specialization, one where the specialization takes place within an organization and one where activities become separated from each other by organizational borders. Specialization within the firm we call internal specialization and that between organizations we call external specialization. The more developed internal specialization makes it possible to reap static economies of scale within the organization. These economies emanate from reducing the frequency of shifts in job tasks for each worker or team as well as from workers and teams learning to pursue their tasks more skillfully through longer cycles of repetition. We call this the internal static effect.2 A similar static effect emanates from increasing the vertical division of labor among organizations. A single firm specializing in producer goods—components, equipment, and systems—may—instead of serving a user within the same organization—serve many external clients and thereby obtain scale economies in production. Organizations become more efficient by reaping scale effects, and by focusing their use of specialized resources on tasks that are well suited for these resources, they also learn to pursue the tasks involved more proficiently. We call this the external static effect.3 Adam Smith also took into account dynamic effects affecting the rate of innovation, but these will be left aside now and returned to later. Entering Transaction Costs—Williamson (1975) Oliver Williamson’s seminal book from 1975 has had a major impact on the understanding of industrial organization and especially on the analysis of vertical integration and disintegration. The argument is that scale economies (‘‘technology’’ in Williamson’s terminology, internal and external static effects in ours) are of secondary importance compared to transaction costs when it comes to explaining vertical integration. Williamson’s arguments are well known. Uncertainty coupled with opportunism —agents pursuing their aims with guile—will, in contexts of ‘‘small numbers,’’
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lead to high transaction costs and thereby give incentives for firms to integrate vertically, i.e., substituting a hierarchy for the market. Today his analytical model has become more complex, emphasizing asset specificity, taking hostages, and holdup situations. But the main line of argument remains unchanged. Starting from Williamson’s analysis it is a paradox that product innovation (innovations addressing the market) is a frequent phenomenon—at least as frequent as process innovation (Lundvall 1985). It can also be argued that ‘‘perfect’’ competition—with anonymous relationships between seller and buyer and with price/quantity as the only information accessible for agents—forms a very poor climate for product innovations. One way to solve the paradox is to introduce the idea of ‘‘organized markets’’ and different mechanisms that might limit opportunism in such markets. Seen in this light you need to take into account not only transaction costs but also benefits emanating from interactive learning between users and producers across these organized markets (Lundvall 1992). The Organization of Industry—Richardson’s Contribution When it comes to explaining vertical integration, most scholars associate with transaction cost theory and the contributions by Williamson. But, actually, G. B. Richardson had presented a different approach to vertical integration already in 1972 in his article ‘‘The Organisation of Industry’’ (Richardson 1972). Richardson argued simply that what firms would choose to do inside the organization would be ‘‘similar’’ activities—in a resource-based context it meant that they should draw upon similar capabilities. Ahead of his time, he went further and explained network formation as a governance form in between market and hierarchy, arguing that activities that were ‘‘complementary’’ but not ‘‘similar’’ would tend to be traded in the network form.4 In a more recent paper he revisits his analysis from 1972 (Richardson 2002). Here he argues that an economy with vertically integrated firms would be quite vulnerable to shifts in demand. If demand is reduced for an end product, a proportional reduction would be imposed at all the earlier stages of the production chain. If you assume limited interorganizational mobility of resources, this would in an economy with demand shifts contribute to low rates of capacity utilization.5 Richardson argues that for the economy as a whole this rigidity can be overcome by vertical disintegration. In the case of parallel vertically integrated production chains a fall in final demand for specific end products would affect the productivity of the vertically organized production chains significantly downward. In the vertically disintegrated production system the specialized producer can address other users and even reorient capabilities to other purposes more easily. We call this the external flexibility effect.6
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Learning by Doing and Learning by Using There is growing consensus that one new tendency in the economy is a speedup of change and a simultaneous reduction in the life expectancy of knowledge (Foray and Lundvall 1996). One way to characterize the combination of the growing importance of knowledge in the economy and the more rapid depreciation of knowledge capital is to refer to a ‘‘learning economy’’ (Lundvall and Johnson 1994; Lundvall 1996). The most fundamental characteristic of this new stage is a rapid rate of change driven by technology, not least information technology, globalization, and market deregulation, forcing a big proportion of firms and of the workforce to engage in building new competencies in order to survive or avoid exclusion. This change in context makes the following considerations especially urgent. The concept ‘‘learning by doing’’ was made known by Kenneth Arrow (1962). He used empirical observations of learning curves and productivity growth patterns from the production of airplane bodies as inspiration for the idea. Later Rosenberg (1982) developed the idea of ‘‘learning by using’’ to explain the rapid reduction in the cost of using complex systems as users become more familiar with them. His empirical reference was to airway companies and their use of new generations of airplanes. As a follow-up Von Hippel and Tyre (1995) gave interesting illustrations of how the introduction of new process technology normally involves a phase of solving unforeseen problems—a phase during which both operators and technology developers learn by doing/using. These kinds of learning take place to different degrees in all parts of the economy. The more innovations in terms of new products and systems, the more learning will be imposed upon developers, producers, and users. But you might argue that their impact in relation to the whole economy is limited since the learning is ‘‘local’’ and ‘‘specific’’ to one specific user or producer, or perhaps it even remains embodied in individuals (this is argued in Foray 2000).7 This brings us to the core argument that ‘‘learning by interacting’’ is fundamental for the generalization of local learning. (With the side conclusion that ‘‘generalization of local knowledge’’ does not always take the form of codification!) Learning by Interacting One major argument against Williamson’s assumption that calculating transaction costs would be sufficient to analyze and explain vertical integration is that the separation of users from producers into two different organizations actually might enhance interactive learning.8 The idea is simple. If a producer integrates with a user, or the other way around, the integrated couple tends to become less attractive as partners for interaction, information exchange, and learning seen from the viewpoint
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of the remaining independent users or producers. The independent units have very good reasons to be wary about the self-interest of the integrated units and be reluctant to share information about what they have learned from doing and using. We do not need to introduce ‘‘opportunism’’—it is simply a question of clear and legitimate self-interest. The reduction in transaction costs for the integrated couple might be substantial, but the long term loss from being locked into learning with only one user (producer) may be much bigger, especially if we are in a sector with turbulent technology and rapid change in user needs. In the learning economy it is important to be able to draw upon a diversity of experiences among users (producers). And, what is more important for the argument in this chapter, from the viewpoint of the whole economy the learning by interacting has the effect of transforming local learning into general knowledge embodied in, for instance, new machinery, new components, new software systems, or even new business solutions. This argument is parallel to Richardson’s argument on ‘‘flexibility,’’ but here his argument is taken one step further; vertical disintegration is seen as fundamental for stimulating learning-based growth in the economy as a whole. We might call this the external learning effect. Adam Smith and Two Modes of Innovation—DUI and STI Adam Smith’s arguments for the development of the division of labor went farther than static internal and external economies of scale. He links the development of the division of labor to innovation in two different ways, and he actually indicates two different modes of innovation. One is experience based and corresponds to DUI learning, referring to learning by doing, using, and interacting. The other mode is science based and corresponds to STI learning, referring to science, technology, and innovation (see Jensen et al. 2004). In the beginning of Volume I of Wealth of Nations he gives the example of innovation based upon learning by doing: The boy who develops an easier way to handle a process in order to get more time to play with his friends (see Box 1). But immediately after that he refers to ‘‘men of speculation’’—the scientists—who are ‘‘often capable of combining together the powers of the most distant and dissimilar objects.’’ Both of these examples are relevant for our reasoning about vertical disintegration, diversity, and interactive learning. For instance, the producer of process equipment may be involved in an interaction with users where he draws upon the experiences of operators in user firms when developing new models and systems. But he might also be involved in an interaction with knowledge institutions, as suppliers, in order to be updated on technological opportunities or even to buy R&D results.
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Box 1 Adam Smith (1776: p. 8) on the DUI mode of learning A great part of the machines made use of in those manufactures in which labour is most subdivided, were originally the inventions of common workmen, who, being each of them employed in some very simple operation, naturally turned their thoughts towards finding out easier and readier methods of performing it. Whoever has been much accustomed to visit such manufactures, must frequently have been shown very pretty machines, which were the inventions of such workmen, in order to facilitate and quicken their own particular part of the work. In the first fire-engines, a boy was constantly employed to open and shut alternately the communication between the boiler and the cylinder, according as the piston either ascended or descended. One of those boys, who loved to play with his companions, observed that, by tying a string from the handle of the valve which opened this communication, to another part of the machine, the valve would open and shut without his assistance, and leave him at liberty to divert himself with his play-fellows. One of the greatest improvements that has been made upon this machine, since it was first invented, was in this manner the discovery of a boy who wanted to save his own labour. All the improvements in machinery, however, have by no means been the inventions of those who had occasion to use the machines. Many improvements have been made by the ingenuity of the makers of the machines, when to make them became the business of a peculiar trade; and some by that of those who are called philosophers or men of speculation, whose trade it is not to do any thing, but to observe every thing; and who, upon that account, are often capable of combining together the powers of the most distant and dissimilar objects. In the progress of society, philosophy or speculation becomes, like every other employment, the principal or sole trade and occupation of a particular class of citizens. Like every other employment too, it is subdivided into a great number of different branches, each of which affords occupation to a peculiar tribe or class of philosophers; and this subdivision of employment in philosophy, as well as in every other business, improves dexterity, and saves time. Each individual becomes more expert in his own peculiar branch, more work is done upon the whole, and the quantity of science is considerably increased by it.
In both cases the separation line (some kind of market) between the producer and user may benefit interactive learning at the level of the involved parties as well as knowledge diffusion at the level of the economy as a whole. In the case of STI learning a certain amount of in-house R&D may be needed to absorb knowledge from the outside sources. But the diversity argument remains relevant also here. The research laboratory or the software firm that addresses many users with different needs and experiences will learn more by doing so than the in-house lab or software department getting feedback only from in-house users. But even if similar mechanisms are at work, it might still be useful to make a distinction between the two modes because the prerequisites for interactive learning to
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take place are different. In the DUI mode the generalization of local learning will typically be embodied in new machinery and components, while in the STI mode innovations may reach the user in the form of disembodied codified knowledge. The first type of interaction may be based on social interaction and trust in a broad sense, while the second may be more demanding in terms of overlapping scientific competences, and it might therefore thrive only on the basis of a common professional background. For instance, firms that are users of knowledge produced by academia may need to have, in house, employees with an academic background. Douglass North on Institutions, Organizations, and Market Competition In a brief essay developed on the basis of his Adam Smith lecture in 1994, North introduces a discussion parallel to the one entered here (North 1996). His essay contrasts the gains from increasing division of labor with the costs to make the system work. He identifies a ‘‘transaction sector’’ and refers to data showing that already by 1970 as much as 45% of the GNP in the United States could be defined as ‘‘transaction costs.’’9 North does not make a clear distinction between internal and external transaction costs, and he tends to see all government expenditure as part of transaction costs. Controlling shirking within the organization is referred to in parallel with costs of stipulating and enforcing contracts. In the beginning of his essay he refers to ‘‘human learning, the most important source of long run economic change,’’ but in the rest of the paper institutions are discussed not in terms of how they affect learning but instead in regard to their impact upon transaction costs. But his observations that it is more or less difficult to establish ‘‘efficient markets’’ in different national economies and that the concept ‘‘social capital’’ may be seen as opening up a new way of tackling this issue are useful for the purpose of this chapter. But in this chapter the adjective ‘‘efficient’’ has a different meaning. North says that ‘‘the key to efficient markets are institutions that result in low costs of transacting.’’ Here we add that (in the learning economy) dynamic efficiency needs to be taken into account and dynamic efficiency has to do with how far institutions support learning within and between organizations.10 There might be overlap between institutional forms that bring down transaction costs and forms that stimulate learning—the presence of trust and the absence of opportunism are obvious examples. But they are certainly not identical. For instance, a restrictive intellectual property right regime may reduce transaction costs while at the same time reducing benefits from learning by interacting. But the most obvious case where the two deviate is when producers and professional users are engaged in a process of interactive learning in connection with prod-
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uct innovation. Here you might reduce transaction costs by vertical integration, but by doing so you would reduce the contribution from interactive learning to technical progress both on the user and the producer side. Conclusions User–producer interaction in connection with product innovation is certainly of interest for management scholars. Getting the interaction to work well is a key to successful innovation. In this chapter it has been argued that creating institutional frameworks at the national (and international) level that promote this kind of interaction in ‘‘organized markets’’ is of major interest also for enhancing macroeconomic dynamic performance. North makes the point that the vertical division of labor will be affected by ‘‘social capital.’’ It is a somewhat amorphous concept but it certainly points in the right direction. Here it has been implicitly defined as ‘‘the willingness and capability of citizens to make commitments to each other, collaborate with each other, and trust each other in processes of exchange and interactive learning.’’ A crucial issue is who is regarded as the ‘‘significant others’’—is it the members of the family, tribe, or nation or does it include everybody on the globe? Defined in this way, it is true that a society rich in terms of ‘‘social capital’’ will operate with a more developed vertical division of labor—including more organizational borders cutting through the production chains. Such a society would be more successful in terms of net wealth creation because its interactive learning would be based on more diversity and local learning would be more widely generalized and diffused more widely in the economy. It would also be more flexible in its response to shifting demand—capacity utilization would be higher, ceteris paribus (cf. Richardson argument above). As pointed out by North, in a society poor in terms of ‘‘social capital’’ with a high GNP per capita and a highly developed division of labor much of the wealth would be absorbed by social costs—costs to control workers inside organizations and costs to control market transactions and access to intellectual property outside/between organizations. This raises the next question—what determines the willingness and capability of citizens to make commitments to, collaborate with, and trust others in processes of exchange and interactive learning? Here we propose that economists need help from other disciplines with more insight into what humanity and human societies are about. George Herbert Mead (1934) and the social interactionists have important things to say that could help us analyze these issues.
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A predictive and transparent legal system may be helpful both in its own right and as bolstering trust when corruption in the private and public sectors is not supportive to social capital. Social inequality and unequal opportunities undermine social capital, especially when seen as an injustice by the have-nots. Therefore, following North, and seeing all public expenditure including social welfare and regional policies as ‘‘transaction costs,’’ may be a mistake. It might alternatively be seen as investment in social capital. Taking it for granted that all citizens are free riders, always ready to tell a lie and engage in ‘‘holdup’’ whenever they see an advantage in doing so, might be a serious mistake, making our economy much less efficient than it could be. If this pessimistic view were correct, the learning economy would soon dwindle. Nothing is more demanding in terms of trust than interactive learning. And, as Arrow (1971) says, ‘‘you cannot buy trust—and if you could buy it . . . it would have no value whatsoever.’’ This is why the learning economy must anchor its efficiency outside the economy, i.e., in society and good citizenship—greed is not enough to make the system work. And perhaps there are good reasons to be grateful for that. Notes 1. The argument in this chapter relates to the contribution to this volume by Eric von Hippel, who demonstrates that, in certain areas, users—including consumers—become increasingly active in developing new products for their own use and that this phenomenon may have a positive impact on economic welfare. Superficially, there is a contradiction with the view in this chapter that ‘‘process innovation’’ is less useful at the systems level since it remains local. If we introduce feedback mechanisms from users to producers, entrepreneurial initiative among users, and ‘‘communities of sharing’’ in the von Hippel framework, the two perspectives may be seen as complementary since user experimentation contributes to diversity in learning. Without specifying such mechanisms it might, actually, be difficult to discuss the welfare impact of user innovation. 2. It is observed in the so-called Horndahl effect, where plant productivity grows year by year with little change in organization, equipment, and products (Lundberg 1961). 3. This perspective is presented in Stigler (1951) to explain the vertical division of labor. 4. A recent interesting contribution applying the resource-based view of the firm to vertical integration and confronting it with Williamson’s transaction cost approach is from Jacobides and Winter (2004). 5. In order to reap the static internal benefits, the division of labor within the organization needs to be characterized by a certain constancy. If workers were floating freely in and out of the organization, their learning would be limited. A different argument in the Williamson spirit would be that we must take into account that ‘‘transaction costs’’ are higher in the labor market than in most other markets since what is bought is ‘‘labor power’’ rather than concrete ‘‘labor.’’
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6. Vertically organized firms might try to overcome the problem by introducing management techniques that promote functional flexibility. One aim of functionally flexible organizational forms would typically be to reduce the negative effects on internal flexibility of a highly developed division of internal specialization. Learning organizations may be seen as a solution to rigidities that alternatively would require vertical disintegration. 7. There are different managerial ways to try to compensate for the limited learning capability of hierarchies. The establishment of a ‘‘learning organization’’ where horizontal communication and interdivisional groups are combined with external networking may be seen as such an attempt. But learning organizations are as important for innovative capability in firms that have focused their attention on a few steps in the production chain and that operate in technologically dynamic sectors (Christensen and Lundvall 2004). 8. The idea of benefits from interactive learning was originally inspired by a case where a Swedish dairy technology producer (Alfa Laval) kept an affiliate in Denmark in spite of its having losses year after year. Asked why they did not close it down, the management of Alfa Laval responded that they were willing to pay a price for being close to and learning from the most advanced dairy technology users in the world. 9. Anne P. Carter (1994) has introduced an alternative perspective where several of the posts that North count as ‘‘transaction costs’’ are defined as ‘‘costs of change’’—that is, as resources that have been used either to incite change or to cope with the consequences of change. Actually, this might be a more relevant perspective in the rapidly changing learning economy. 10. At the DRUID conference on Bornholm in 1998, Oliver Williamson was asked if he would define interactive learning as just another form of transaction. He responded modestly that his analytical model has its limitations, especially when it comes to capturing dynamic processes such as learning and innovation.
References Arrow, K. J. (1962). ‘‘The Economic Implications of Learning by Doing.’’ Review of Economic Studies 29, no. 80. ——— (1971). ‘‘Political and Economic Evaluation of Social Effects and Externalities.’’ In Frontiers of Quantitative Economics, M. Intrilligator, ed. Amsterdam: North Holland. Carter, A. P. (1994). ‘‘Production Workers, Metainvestment and the Pace of Change.’’ Paper prepared for the meetings of the International J. A. Schumpeter Society, Munster, August 1994. Christensen, J. L., and B.-A˚. Lundvall, eds. (2004). Product Innovation, Interactive Learning and Economic Performance. Amsterdam: Elsevier. David, P. A., and D. Foray (2002). ‘‘Economic Fundamentals of the Knowledge Society.’’ SIEPR Discussion Paper No. 01-14, Stanford University. Foray, D. (2000). The Economics of Knowledge. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. ———, and B.-A˚. Lundvall (1996). ‘‘From the Economics of Knowledge to the Learning Economy.’’ In Employment and Growth in the Knowledge-Based Economy, D. Foray and B.-A˚. Lundvall, eds. Paris: OECD.
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Jacobides, M. G., and S. G. Winter (2004). ‘‘The Co-Evolution of Capabilities and Transaction Costs.’’ The Leverthulme Trust Digital Transformations Programme Working Paper (August). Jensen, M. B., B. Johnson, E. Lorenz, and B.-A˚. Lundvall (2004). ‘‘Absorptive Capacity, Forms of Knowledge and Economic Development.’’ Paper presented at the Second Globelics Conference in Beijing, October 16–20. Lundberg, E. (1961). Produktivitet och Raentabilite. Stockholm: Norstedt and Soener. Lundvall, B.-A˚. (1985). Product Innovation and User-Producer Interaction. Aalborg: Aalborg University Press. ——— (1992). ‘‘Explaining Inter-Firm Cooperation and Innovation: Limits of the Transaction Cost Approach.’’ In The Embedded Firm: On the Socioeconomics of Industrial Networks, G. Grabher, ed. London: Routledge. ——— (1996). ‘‘The Social Dimension of The Learning Economy.’’ Aalborg University, DRUID Working Paper 1996-1. ——— (2003). ‘‘Why the New Economy Is a Learning Economy.’’ Economia e Politica Industriale: Rassegna trimestrale diretta da Sergio Vacca` 117: 173–185. ———, and B. Johnson (1994). ‘‘The Learning Economy.’’ Journal of Industry Studies 1, no. 2 (December 1994): 23–42. Mead, G. H. (1934). Mind, Self, and Society. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. North, D. (1996). ‘‘Organisations, Institutions and Market Competition.’’ Working Paper, Washington University, St. Louis, MO. Pasinetti, L. (1981). Structural Change and Economic Growth. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Richardson, G. B. (1972). ‘‘The Organisation of Industry.’’ Economic Journal 82: 883–896. ——— (2002). ‘‘The Organisation of Industry Revisited.’’ DRUID Working Paper No. 02-15. Rosenberg, N. (1982). Inside the Black Box: Technology and Economics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Smith, Adam (1776). An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, 5th ed. 1904, Edwin Cannan, ed. London: Methuen and Co. Stigler, G. J. (1951). ‘‘The Division of Labor Is Limited by the Extent of the Market.’’ Journal of Political Economy 59: 185–193. von Hippel, E., and M. Tyre (1995). ‘‘How Learning by Doing Is Done: Problem Identification and Novel Process Equipment.’’ Research Policy 24, no. 5. Williamson, O. E. (1975). Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications. New York: Macmillan.
7 Social Capital, Networks, and Communities of Knowledge Tom Schuller
Introduction This chapter considers the role of networks in knowledge economies. Unlike most of the chapters in this volume, it does not focus heavily on new technologies in advancing knowledge but concentrates on the nature of relationships within knowledge communities and deals with the topic primarily from a conceptual viewpoint. I use terminology developed within a social capital perspective but accept that similar insights could be gained using different labels. A major advantage of using social capital is the emphasis it encourages on values and norms as a defining characteristic of effective networks and communities (Schuller et al. 2000). These express themselves behaviorally as well as attitudinally and as such are open to fruitful empirical investigation. The ways in which social capital complements the more traditional concept of human capital to improve economic prosperity and enhance social well-being have been explored in OECD’s 2001 publication, The Well-Being of Nations (WN). The key thrust of the argument in WN is that conventional usage of human capital alone is inadequate as a tool to understanding the development and functioning of knowledge and skills. This is the case even when this is interpreted in terms of economic objectives only but still more so when wider objectives are factored in. I take up some of the issues raised in WN and suggest ways of getting some purchase on the varied roles of networks in the generation, dissemination, and validation of knowledge. The underlying premise is that we need to elaborate ways of differentiating networks and communities and to incorporate into our analyses a sense of how such networks change over time. In addition to the broadening of scope that the application of social capital entails, there is a significant shift in many OECD member countries to a concern with outcomes rather than inputs and with the mechanisms that translate inputs into outcomes. In relation to education, this means that instead of focusing predominantly
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on the numbers or proportions of the population who participate in human capital formation (education or training) or the amounts invested in those activities, there is growing interest in what happens as a result of the investment: public as well as private returns, and in domains such as health and social inclusion as well as for employment and productivity.1 As for knowledge advancement, the OECD’s Science, Technology and Industry Scoreboard (2003, p. 16) defines investment in knowledge in terms of expenditure on R&D, expenditure for higher education (public and private), and investment in software. The limited range of inputs is related to productivity and GDP, but there is clearly a need to explore both a wider range of intermediate and final outcomes resulting from such investment and the mechanisms that turn the investment into results, in whatever degree of efficiency. This is not so much a criticism of the scoreboard as a confirmation that we have major gaps in our conceptual apparatus for understanding the process of knowledge creation, as well as in the data needed. WN defined social capital as ‘‘networks together with shared norms, values and understandings that facilitate cooperation within or among groups’’ (OECD 2001, p. 41). I follow this definition, although I shall have some observations to make on the extent to which such sharing takes place or is expected to take place. Trust is not explicitly included in this top-level definition but figures prominently in the discussion, as both a source and an outcome of social capital. In the latter part of the chapter I deal briefly with the role of trust in promoting the validation and critique of knowledge creation. Interactions Between Bonding and Bridging Social Capital The literature commonly identifies three basic forms of social capital, following Woolcock (1998): Bonding SC which refers to relationships within or between relatively homogeneous groups. In the context of knowledge advancement, this may refer particularly to intradisciplinary or intraprofessional affiliations.
Bridging SC referring to relationships within or between relatively heterogeneous groups. In this context, it refers particularly to interdisciplinary or interprofessional connections.
Linking SC referring to relationships between people or groups at different hierarchical levels.
The conventional distinction between bridging and linking is that the former refers to horizontal connections and the latter to vertical ones within power structures. For
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the purposes of this chapter the distinction is not strongly relevant, so I shall not deal with linking SC as a separate component. Although these forms are now very familiar in the literature, it is striking how little consideration is given to how one might analyze or even conceptualize the interaction between them, to how far they complement or conflict with each other in different contexts, and especially to how these interactions may play out over time. A first general proposition of this paper is that the relevance of SC, and network thinking, to the knowledge economy will be greatly enhanced if we can further develop our understanding of these interactions. Pointing to high levels of social capital or strong networks tout court will bring only limited insights. The effect of social capital can be better understood if there is a clearer focus on the different forms it takes and on how these forms reinforce or impede each other.2 One can have bonding SC without bridging, but not vice versa. Almost any form of social life involves bonding, whether the basis for the bonds is predominantly normative or functional. Bonding may be tight or loose, but tightness or looseness does not itself tell us that much about the effects. Bonding has its limitations, for those who are within the group as well as those excluded. This is demonstrated in Granovetter’s seminal work on weak ties (1973), which shows that employment prospects are helped more by knowing people with whom one has loose links than by those one associates with closely. In relation to knowledge generation and innovation, excessive bonding encourages groupthink, discourages new perspectives, and narrows the potential range of skills and expertise available to the group. However, defining at what point bonding becomes dysfunctional is difficult. Bonding entails exclusion, as its mirror image. A social group that is infinitely porous and has no conception of who does and does not belong to it cannot have much reality. ‘‘Exclusion’’ in this sense is socially neutral. It may be gentle and weak, so that it is easy for outsiders to join, but there must be some notion of differentiation between those inside and outside the group. By contrast, of course, the exclusion may be harsh rather than gentle, so that aspiring entrants are rudely rejected (for example, at a macro level the forcible exclusion of unskilled economic migrants from a country or region, or at a micro level racist blackballing from a social club), and it may be strong though unarticulated (or perhaps because unarticulated; cf. the existence of shadowy but powerful old boy networks where the rules of membership are never explicit, making it doubly difficult for outsiders to break in). Even where the bonding is strong, this does not mean it is exclusionary in any pejorative sense. Thus, a research group may exercise very strong disciplinary bonding that is highly exclusionary, because it is difficult for most people to acquire the necessary disciplinary expertise to become part of it, but socially and economically functional
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because it enables the group to advance its knowledge base rapidly and efficiently and to put this to wider use. The distinction between bonding and bridging is almost entirely context dependent. Very few groups are entirely homogeneous. For our purposes it may be convenient to think of academics—one category of knowledge producers—as at one level a single social group with its own norms and values (see Tony Becher’s catchily titled anthropological work Academic Tribes and Territories [1989]), but very obviously any investigation of how they generate and disseminate knowledge will quickly break the group down, most likely into different disciplines and then into subdisciplines and yet further into the proliferating branches of each evolving field of knowledge. Each of these branches sustains some form of communality of understanding with its fellow branches, but the links spanning the community as a whole grow weaker the closer one looks. The same process necessarily applies to other groups—in other words, the more fine-grained the examination the greater the apparent heterogeneity. Academics may share some universal common values, such as a commitment to seeking after truth or a belief that universities should be adequately funded, that unite them at certain times. But these do not have much power to tie them together in very effective or meaningful ways (remember Clark Kerr’s acid definition of a university as a crowd of disaffected academics united only by common grievances over car parking). The role of ICT in shifting the characteristic profile of academic communities away from its physical institutional base to more virtual forms is well known. The value of bridging, i.e., of making connections with people or groups that are dissimilar in their approach to knowledge generation, is that it can extend the range of ideas, expertise, and contacts to which one has access and the range of opportunities for applying knowledge, commercially or not. It is therefore likely to be particularly important for those concerned with extending the frontiers of knowledge, at least for parts of the process (see discussion of trajectories below). This thesis is well suited for empirical application (see Burt 1982 on bridging within organizations). But my point here is that we can understand it only if we look at both sides of the coin. So I offer a second general proposition, that a successful and dynamic interaction between bonding and bridging forms of SC is likely to be a key component of sustained knowledge generation. The relationship between bonding and bridging forms of SC may be complementary or conflicting, in most cases lying somewhere along the continuum between the two. In some contexts, bonding is achieved only by enforcing total commitment to the group in question, forbidding cross-membership of contiguous or related groups, minimizing external contacts, and rigorously filtering new memberships. Cult religious groups are an extreme case but are hardly an appropriate one for study in
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the context of knowledge advancement. More relevant are lesser degrees of extremity, where adherence to a particular paradigm of knowledge accumulation is nevertheless regarded as radically incompatible with sympathy for any other approach. Closer to home is the question of the place of randomized control trials in social research, following the norm of medical research: At one extreme is the group that sees RCTs as generating the only form of truly robust evidence, to the exclusion of all others, while at the other end are those who see any use of such an approach as wholly inappropriate to social or educational purposes and not even to be discussed as an option (Oakley et al. 2003). Even where paradigm wars as such have not broken out, there will often be ongoing fluctuating tensions in the extent to which groups see benefit in accepting the norms or values of others’ approaches to knowledge generation. It is hard also to define what might constitute ideally complementary forms of bonding and bridging.3 But arguments over interdisciplinarity are a useful example of how such forms need to be analyzed. Lip service for a long time has been paid to the idea of interdisciplinarity (cf. OECD 1972) as a classic form of bridging, but it generates inherent tensions. It must entail, up to a point, the reduction of disciplinary boundaries in order to increase communication and cross-fertilization, but just how far should this process go? It is sometimes implied that the aim should broadly be for dissolution of the distinctions between disciplines and that the farther this process goes, the better. An alternative view, to which I myself subscribe, is that effective interdisciplinarity depends on most (not all) participants continuing to have access to a secure disciplinary base, from which they can make effective connections, returning iteratively to their discipline to move it forward and change its shape as a result of the interaction. The same applies, mutatis mutandis, to professions and related knowledge practitioners. The function of a bridge is to link two discrete terrains, not to obliterate the differences between them. Moreover, there may be inherent limits to the range of disciplines that can be coherently involved in any single exchange. But as the process of interdisciplinary collaboration develops, one can expect participants to reach out to more partners, without fearing that they are abandoning their own original reference group. It is easy to picture a simple matrix as a way of considering the set of relationships between networks, or other social units, in these terms (Figure 1). A group of, say, researchers or other knowledge builders that has high levels of both bonding and bridging would presumably be secure in its own identity and internally cohesive but manage this without closing itself off to new ideas and expertise. This looks like the ideal combination for advancing knowledge; however, the equilibrium is not necessarily one that can be easily sustained, because the energies successfully
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Figure 1
generated produce their own destabilizing effects. The diametric opposite—low on both counts—is likely to be unstable from the start, but in a nonproductive sense. It is low on trust and xenophobic—at least in the intellectual if not the social sense. It is therefore unlikely to generate much from its own resources nor to derive benefit from external contacts. High bonding and low bridging has the strengths and weaknesses alluded to above. It is a profile that may be functional and comfortable for a (long) time but at a lower energy level because it lacks infusion of foreign ideas. This implies a risky degree of closure—risky because in a context of rapid knowledge obsolescence the community will find itself isolated and left behind. The fourth category, with high bridging but low bonding, looks like a group that is ready to redistribute itself through lack of central cohesiveness or whose members do not have this group as their primary reference point but use it only instrumentally. It could be a disciplinary association or research group whose subject area is running out of steam or, on the other hand, that is so dynamic it is unlikely to sustain a common identity for much longer. These are all ideal types, ripe for empirical illustration. It would be interesting to compare, for example, different disciplines within an academic institution or different epistemic communities linked by similar research concerns to see how the dynamics evolve. The sense of dynamic takes me to a third proposition, which concerns the significance of typical or atypical trajectories over time. Forms of social capital, and the relative importance of bonding and bridging for any given social or knowledgegenerating unit, will change over time, so that there is rarely a stable equilibrium (and where this exists, it will be time limited). Early in a network’s formation, bonding will be particularly important to establish trust and ensure that there is an adequate sharing of norms and values, with the benefits this brings in terms of sharing of ideas, data, and so on. None of this needs to be explicit, but it will be hard for collective knowledge generation to occur if a basic level of bonding SC is not built up.
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Figure 2
The interesting empirical question is at what point(s) in the trajectory of the network does bonding SC begin to need to be complemented by bridging SC and then whether the growth of bridging SC leads to a transformation in the identity of the network. Schematically, one can envisage various forms of trajectory on this kind of measure (see Figure 2). A simple linear one (A) denotes the continued steady growth of a knowledge-generating group (not necessarily growth in numerical terms; it could be in output or in influence or reputation) that maintains internal strength without recourse to bridging. Alternatively, without such recourse the group may lose impetus, lacking external stimulus, and wither away (B). A third trajectory (C) shows initial growth in bonding followed by some fallback but then a reinvigoration when links are made with external groups, bringing in new research ideas or fresh approaches to the implementation of research results. Many other more complex trajectories are obviously possible. So the temporal dimension is crucial, but we need to add in one further aspect. Thus far I have spoken largely in disciplinary terms, with research groups as the model of knowledge generators. Under this line of thinking the bridging is between disciplines and researchers. But innovative knowledge advancement depends in part on the interaction between knowledge generators and knowledge users. This is the case increasingly in many sectors, e.g., software development (Foray 2004; von
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Hippel this volume). So effective advancement will depend at some point on bridges being built with the users of knowledge and its outputs. When the product is a marketable good, the users are the consumers or the intermediate producers. For some services this is also the case; i.e., the consumers purchase the service, and the market is the mechanism through which their preferences are transmitted. But public services in particular are a huge area where markets do not operate, or operate only partially, and the primary user is the professional service provider, such as a teacher or health worker. If there is no communication or trust between the knowledge generators and those responsible for applying the knowledge, it is unlikely to succeed (see OECD 2003). The implications of this fairly banal observation are considerable. The ‘‘coproduction’’ of knowledge in these cases does not mean the elimination of differences in role and competence, just as interdisciplinarity does not mean the elimination of disciplines. But it does mean a level of mutual understanding and respect. Here I need to return for a moment to the WN definition of social capital as the sharing of norms, values, and understandings. This could be taken to imply wholesale identity in respect of each of these three terms. In other words, for social capital to exist in significant measure, whether in bonding or bridging form, the members of the network need to be wholly congruent in their norms, values, and understandings. This would be to misconstrue the nature of such networks. It is unrealistic to expect or aspire to such congruence. It is not unrealistic to expect a considerable degree of overlap. But the important thing, arguably, is that there is a recognition and acknowledgment of each other’s norms and values—even if these are not completely shared in the sense that each party subscribes to them equally. This is especially true in respect of bridging social capital. In fact, it may be worth considering a revision of the conceptual structure so that bonding SC is defined in terms of sharing norms and values with other network members, whereas bridging SC is defined in terms of acknowledging the validity of others’ norms and values without necessarily having to share them.4 For example, researchers in health or education may have as their primary goal the advancement of particular forms of knowledge, of pushing forward the boundaries of their field in intellectually exciting ways. These are not the values that principally characterize practitioners’ work, which is why researchers as a bonded group will find it difficult to include practitioners who cannot see relevance in the researchers’ enthusiasm (and are unlikely to comprehend the conversation if it is cutting edge). But if practitioners can recognize these values as crucial components in the work of researchers while on the other side the researchers acknowledge the practitioners’ valuing of accessible and applicable results, there should in principle be better communication, less frustration, and higher levels of mutually satisfactory
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Figure 3
output. At least the odds of success will be higher (though there is no guarantee that the obstacles of communication and of different timeframes will be overcome). Successful partnerships are built on this kind of recognition of mutual advantage and not on an unrealistic assumption of total identity of interest. It is this line of argument, incidentally, that best defends social capital against the charge that it smuggles in some quasi-coercive form of communitarianism, which imposes a single world-view on all its members. To sum up this very schematic discussion: 1. Social capital, with its notions of bonding and bridging, offers a useful if not entirely new way into thinking about the role of networks in knowledge generation. 2. Bonding and bridging have to be seen in relation to each other and the pattern of their interaction traced over time. 3. Empirical work can trace out these different trajectories as they appear in different knowledge fields and social contexts. 4. There are significant measurement issues to be resolved in analyzing the extent of both bonding and bridging. I turn now to a different application of social capital, to the theme of knowledge economies. Mapping SC in Knowledge Economies A knowledge-based economy is characterized by
The growing importance of economic transactions dealing with knowledge itself,
Rapid qualitative changes in goods and services, and
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The incorporation of the creation and implementation of knowledge into the mission of the personnel involved.
Figure 3 derives from a number of simple propositions:
Knowledge is not just a matter of accumulating facts, or even information.
The distribution of knowledge and of the competences required to generate it will impact on the efficiency with which knowledge can be generated.
These competences are not the property of individuals alone but of collectives/ groups.
Axis A refers to the volume of knowledge accumulated. As we grow more ‘‘knowledge-rich,’’ we shift upward on this axis. There is no need to go here into the question of how this is to be measured, but traditional nested hierarchies such as facts/information/knowledge/wisdom are relevant concepts. The accumulation is not of course a simple linear process. In any case, it is clear that the mere accumulation, even of wisdom (or whatever is conceived of as at the top of the hierarchy), is not enough to guarantee progress and satisfaction. Trust accelerates the accumulation of knowledge, but crucial questions remain of who owns the knowledge, who has access to it, and who is able to take advantage of such access. Therefore, axis B refers to the extent to which the knowledge mapped on axis A is accessible, formally or actually. As the distribution of knowledge grows broader, we shift outward on this axis. The nature of accessibility reflects the complexity of knowledge. It might refer to formal accessibility (for example, in respect of patents and IPR or of the spread of ICT-driven access) or to the skills required to take advantage of opportunities (cf. Sen 1999 on capabilities). Immediately the traditional efficiency/equity issue presents itself: To what extent is there a trade-off between speed of knowledge accumulation on the one hand and on the other a desire to see maximum participation in this process and the private or public benefits it generates? The trade-off may not exist at all, and equity may complement, not conflict with, efficiency, but this is not my concern here. Instead I am simply suggesting that efficiency considerations on their own may require at least a basic distribution, such that the process of knowledge advancement is partially conditioned by the relationship between the vanguard and others. Trust, locally or at higher levels, represents a collective investment that enhances accessibility and broad distribution. This is therefore an issue for public policy. Axis C refers to the cultural and organizational processes that govern the validation of the knowledge. Shifting outward on this axis implies that these processes are growing stronger, enabling us (the participants in whatever the social unit is) to have greater confidence in the quality of the knowledge.5 This occurs through
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professional, public, and private critique and exchange. As increasing amounts of information—from cutting-edge research findings to lay advice—wash across the world, conventional mechanisms for sifting and testing it are stretched beyond their limits. Advancing knowledge generates major challenges for our validating standards and mechanisms. Trust is an essential component in remedying the weaknesses of formal knowledge-validating systems. Traditional means of developing, establishing, and implementing professional knowledge are put under strain by a number of factors: the sheer growth in the volume of output, already mentioned; the speed of circulation of information, powered primarily by new technologies, which defies the capacity of conventional modes of scientific examination such as peer review to keep up with output and to sift out the good from the dross; the erosion of established forms of professional authority, for example, the status of academics, which means less certainty even when established professionals do offer judgment; and the shift toward Mode 2 knowledge, which is less bounded by disciplinary divisions (Gibbons et al. 1994). In some measure those involved in the generation and the use of knowledge will rely more on trusted contacts than on external sources to enable them to discriminate between reliable/less reliable and valuable/less valuable knowledge. This will especially be the case in fast-moving fields where recourse to traditional methods of knowledge validation will simply take too long to satisfy the needs of the individual researcher, the research community, or the user. This in turn raises interesting issues about how far informal trust relationships can be expected to assume the burden of knowledge validation and what the implications are for public accountability, especially, though not only, where there is no market mechanism as one test of quality. Historically, informal relationships of this kind have been used to sustain existing structures of power and to exclude nonconforming knowledge challenges, as well as for more positive functions. In one sense, the more such informal relationships are utilized, the more opaque becomes the process of accumulating and developing innovation. Like social capital generally, trust relationships can be put to uses that are biased or regressive in social terms. But overall there is good reason to suppose that higher trust levels will sustain the overall quality of information. Social capital, with its emphasis on trust, thus reenters the discussion via axis C, but linking to the model as a whole. Faced with proliferating rivers of knowledge— potentially valuable but also potentially overwhelming even where valid and potentially misleading—we need processes for rendering them accessible and manageable so that they do not become floods of muddy and polluted water. Gaining access to valuable new knowledge is only one side of the picture. It is equally important to be able to distinguish and discard irrelevant, dubious, or downright false information.
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To do this, we need to be able to rely on others when our own levels of understanding are insufficient. Sometimes this can be done contractually, for example, by paying people to gather and sift information, whether as part of a research team or in a service capacity. It may also be done by relying on formal or informal networks of colleagues or friends whom we trust, personally and/or professionally. In other words, for the purposes of knowledge validation there is arguably a shift from trust in recognized external sources of authority to more personalized forms of trust that depend on one’s judgment of the individual or body concerned—their technical expertise, of course, but also their trustworthiness and their commitment to similar values. How are such contacts formed and used? The interaction between bonding and bridging SC is paralleled by one between different forms of trust: on the one hand wholesale reliance on a known person or body as authority source (akin to bonding) and on the other recourse to a less familiar but potentially enriching partner. It is worth noting the role that trust has in validating skills as well as knowledge, especially in areas where traditional certification procedures are inadequate. Trust reduces transaction costs and improves the flow of information and thus has direct economic effects as well as indirect and wider outcomes. It aids innovation by improving communication flows and the diffusion of knowledge, within and between organizations (Maskell 2000; PIU 2002). But it is also a key part of building knowledge-generating capacity. Recruiting people into leading-edge knowledge occupations often means using contact networks where trust complements or even replaces more formal procedures. These processes of accumulation, access, and validation will play out in different ways in different contexts. The health sector provides a brief illustration. It involves massive amounts of research (on products and services) and presents particular challenges in respect to how the knowledge generated is utilized. Much health service research involves mixes of Mode 1 and Mode 2 knowledge generation (Ferlie and Wood 2003). It combines traditionally determined, discipline-bound inquiry based on academic standards of expertise with work that is more socially distributed, boundary-crossing, and iterative between different stakeholders. The language of Mode 2 may be less academically esoteric, but communication is more complex because of the range of interested parties. Second, there is a shift toward new relationships between knowledge producers and users. This requires new bridges to be built, bringing together into a direct partnership groups that previously had an arms-length relationship. One aspect of this has been labeled ‘‘cocreation,’’ where the experience of health service users is tapped and developed to change and improve delivery (Cottam and Leadbeater 2004). To
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some extent the producer–user divide is blurred, because the users not only supply inputs from their experience but also become more able to supply their own care, notably in respect to conditions such as diabetes or arthritis. Third, the effectiveness of service delivery—the application of knowledge— depends in part on the quality of communication between provider and consumer. Education can strongly influence the pattern of communication, enabling consumers to articulate their needs, which in turn enables the provider to identify the appropriate type of service (Hammond 2003; Schuller et al. 2004). The growth of internetbased self-doctoring has a different set of implications for consumer education and for professional–patient interaction. All of these relationships involve different forms of trust and mutual confidence, which shape the speed and quality of knowledge advancement. Conclusion This chapter has presented nothing in the way of empirical substance. While it may be obvious that functioning networks and trust levels generally enhance the creation and dissemination of knowledge, the ways in which this works at the frontiers of knowledge still remain to be understood. All I have aimed to do is open up some lines of thinking and analysis, applying a social capital perspective to knowledge advancement. I conclude with three rather diverse policy questions that relate to the field of education: 1. What factors, social as well as technological, have general significance in shaping the ways networks function? To take just one example: how will the change in relative educational achievement by men and women, and the consequent shift in the gender profile of knowledge occupations, affect these functions? 2. The knowledge economy cannot be characterized simply as one that employs high proportions of educated people, as measured by standard levels of individual qualification. Increasingly countries will have to think about how education promotes effective participation in communities of knowledge, and this will include social and moral competences as well as technical ones. Assessing these, and their outcomes, is a major challenge. 3. How far does the physical architecture of our educational institutions reflect and complement the demands of a knowledge-based economy? Equipping schools, colleges, and research institutions with up-to-date technologies for the accumulation of knowledge is one thing, but constructing facilities that enhance effective access and validation demands other kinds of creative approaches.
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Notes 1. CERI’s activity on Measuring the Social Outcomes of Learning (http://www.oecd.org/edu/ socialoutcomes) addresses these issues directly. 2. The same general point is arguably true of human capital, but social capital is more strongly identified with relationships than with attributes, so the interactions are correspondingly more central. 3. Steinmuller’s (2003, p. 63) discussion of relationships between communities of practice addresses this issue and introduces a number of concepts—boundary objects, translation processes—that could well form the basis for a systematic analysis of the nature of internetwork interactions. As he says, however, this is as yet a very young field of study. 4. A similar distinction, far more elaborated, is made in respect of innovation by Duguid (2003), between communities of practice and networks of practice: CoP members not only have a practice in common but coordinate that practice with each other; NoP members share some form of practice but do not systematically coordinate it. 5. We are, I acknowledge, caught in a basic epistemological circularity: given that the issue is one of knowledge validation, who is to determine whether the processes are actually growing stronger, and by what criteria? However, I do not think this detracts from the applicability of the model.
References Becher, T. (1989). Academic Tribes and Territories. Buckingham: Open University Press/ SRHE. Burt, R. (1982). Towards a Structural Theory of Action. New York: Academic Press. Cottam, Hilary, and Charles Leadbeater (2004). Health: Co-Creating Services. Red Paper 01. London: Design Council. Duguid, Paul (2003). ‘‘Incentivizing Practice.’’ Institute for Prospective Technological Studies (IPTS) Workshop on ICTs and Social Capital in the Knowledge Society, Seville, November. Ferlie, E., and M. Wood (2003). ‘‘Novel Mode of Knowledge Production? Producers and Consumers in Health Services Research.’’ Journal of Health Services Research and Policy 8, Suppl 2: 58–61. Foray, Dominique (2004). The Economics of Knowledge. Boston: MIT Press. Gibbons, M., C. Limoges, H. Nowotny, S. Schwartzman, P. Scott, and M. Trow (1994). The New Production of Knowledge: Science and Research in Contemporary Societies. London: Sage. Granovetter, M. (1973). ‘‘The Strength of Weak Ties.’’ American Sociological Review 78(6): 1360–1380. Hammond, C. (2003). ‘‘How Education Makes Us Healthy.’’ London Review of Education 1(1): 61–78. Maskell, Peter (2000). ‘‘Social Capital, Innovation and Competitiveness.’’ In Social Capital: Critical Perspectives, S. Baron, J. Field, and T. Schuller, eds. Oxford: OUP.
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Oakley, A., V. Strange, T. Toroyan, M. Wiggins, I. Roberts, and J. Stephenson (2003). ‘‘Using Random Allocation to Evaluate Social Intervention: Three Recent U.K. Examples.’’ Annals AAPSS 589 (September): 170–189. OECD (1972). Interdisciplinarity. OECD, Paris. OECD (2001). The Well-Being of Nations. OECD, Paris. OECD (2003). The Science, Technology and Industry Scoreboard. OECD, Paris. PIU (Performance and Innovation Unit) (2002). ‘‘Social Capital: A Discussion Paper.’’ Cabinet Office, UK Government, London. Schuller, Tom, Steve Baron, and John Field (2000). ‘‘Social Capital: A Review and Critique.’’ In Social Capital: Critical Perspectives, S. Baron, J. Field, and T. Schuller, eds., pp. 1–42. Oxford: OUP. Schuller, T., J. Preston, C. Hammond, A. Brassett-Grundy, and J. Bynner (2004). The Benefits of Learning: The Impact of Education on Health, Family Life and Social Capital. London: Routledge Falmer. Sen, A. (1999). Development as Freedom. Oxford: OUP. Steinmuller, Edward W. (2003). ‘‘Communities of Practice and Their Effects on Performance and Functioning of Organizations.’’ Institute for Prospective Technological Studies (IPTS) Workshop on ICTs and Social Capital in the Knowledge Society, Seville, November. Woolcock, M. (1998). ‘‘Social Capital and Economic Development: Towards a Theoretical Synthesis and Policy Framework.’’ Theory and Society 27: 151–208.
8 Knowing Communities in Organizations Patrick Cohendet
Introduction A knowing community can be defined as a gathering of individuals who accept to exchange voluntarily and on a regular basis about a common interest or objective in a given field of knowledge.1 Through this regular exchange, common cognitive platforms and common social norms are built. These ensure the cohesion of the community and guide the behavior of newcomers. The critical role of knowing communities in the building of useful knowledge for society has been popularized recently by successful examples such as the Linux open source community or the role of the community of ‘‘reps’’ at Xerox.2 These examples underline the role of communities as modes of economic coordination that ‘‘economize’’ on hierarchy to produce useful knowledge. As the knowledge-based economy expands, it is said that knowing communities play an increasing role, because they can take charge of significant parts of the ‘‘sunk costs’’ associated with the process of generation or accumulation of specialized parcels of knowledge.3 These costs correspond, for instance, to the progressive construction of languages and models of action and interpretation that are required for the implementation of new knowledge and that cannot be covered through the classical signals of hierarchies (or markets). This setting is likely to compensate for some organizational limitations (learning failures) that firms face when confronted with the need to continuously innovate and produce new knowledge. Knowing communities might be found in traditional work divisions and departments, but they also cut across functional divisions, spill over into after-work or project-based teams, and straddle networks of cross-corporate and professional ties. ‘‘For example, within firms, classical communities include functional groups of employees who share a particular specialization corresponding to the classical division of labor (e.g., marketing or accounting). They also include teams of employees with heterogeneous skills and qualifications, often coordinated by team leaders and
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put together to achieve a particular goal in a given period of time’’ (Amin and Cohendet 2004). Knowing communities can be of a different nature in the way they deal with knowledge: Some of them may focus on the accumulation and exploitation on a given field of knowledge (communities of practice), some of them on the exploration of a new field of knowledge (epistemic communities). The role of knowing communities seems to be particularly important for organizations, in particular for firms. As Brown and Duguid (1991) suggest, the firm can be viewed as a collective of communities, not simply of individuals, in which enacting experiments are legitimate, separate community perspectives can be amplified by interchanges among communities. Out of this friction of competing ideas can come the sort of improvisational sparks necessary for igniting organizational innovation. Thus large organizations, reflectively structured, are perhaps well positioned to be highly innovative and to deal with discontinuities. If their internal communities have a reasonable degree of autonomy and independence from the dominant worldview, large organizations might actually accelerate innovation.
Brown and Duguid’s statement opens the field for a renewed vision of the economic approach of the firm, at least in three directions: First, behind the scene of the ‘‘visible’’ infrastructure of knowledge defined by the hierarchy, firms can be considered as a set of knowing communities that are repositories of useful knowledge, which is embedded in their daily practices and habits. As Wenger (1998) noted, a community drawing on interaction and participation to act, interpret, and innovate acts ‘‘as a locally negotiated regime of competence.’’ Therefore, communities are suppliers of sense and collective beliefs for agents and play a central role of coordination in the firm.
Second, an important part of the innovative potential of firms may reside in the interaction between different knowing communities of the organization. The quality of this innovative potential depends on the nature of the interaction between communities. Thus, a critical role of the hierarchy of the firm is to contribute to organize efficient platforms of knowledge within firms in order to facilitate the interaction between knowing communities. Also, firms should design internally the mechanisms that ensure a satisfactory circulation of the knowledge held by knowing communities to the formal structures of the firm.
Third, large firms may find in the functioning and activation of their communities considerable potential of innovation that could contribute to counterbalance the traditional bureaucratic handicap of large firms toward innovation.
This contribution aims at assessing and explaining the role of knowing communities in organizations along the three perspectives opened by Brown and Duguid. In the first part, we discuss the nature of knowing communities, their characteristics, and
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the reasons for the growing interest in this mode of generation of knowledge in society. In the second part, we focus on the interaction between heterogeneous communities as a strategic locus of generation of innovation in a given organization. This issue also raises the problem of the delicate matching between the ‘‘visible’’ hierarchical structure of the firm and the ‘‘invisible’’ process of active knowledge formation that occurs within the myriad of communities in a given firm. The last part is devoted to a discussion of the role of communities as a critical potential for large firms to increase their degree of innovativeness. Knowing Communities: Characteristics, Properties, and Limits In this contribution, we will consider the notion of knowing communities as a general one, without specific distinction. However, it is important to recall that the literature has identified different types of knowing communities,4 among which the two main types are the following: 1. Communities of practice The concept was emphasized by Lave and Wenger (1991), who identified the existence of groups of persons engaged in the same practice, communicating regularly with one another about their activities. Members of a community of practice essentially seek to develop their competencies in the practice considered. Communities of practice can then be seen as a means to enhance individual competencies, and this goal is reached through the construction, the exchange, and the sharing of a common repertoire of resources (Wenger 1998). Self-organization is an essential characteristic of communities of practice. 2. Epistemic communities are small groups of ‘‘knowledge-creating agents who are engaged on a mutually recognized subset of questions, and who (at the very least) accept some commonly understood procedural authority as essential to the success of their collective activities’’ (Cowan et al. 2000, p. 234). Because of agents’ heterogeneity, for the sake of knowledge creation the first task of epistemic communities is to create a codebook. And because agents lack deeply shared values, knowledge creation mode is much like a form of externalization (conversion of tacit into explicit knowledge, in the sense of Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995). As informal groups, knowing communities exhibit specific characteristics that distinguish them from the traditional organized entities usually analyzed in economics or business science: Communities have no clear boundaries, and there is no visible or explicit hierarchy at the top of them that can control the quality of work or the respect of any standard procedure.
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It has been repeatedly argued that what holds the community together is the passion and commitment of each of its members to a common goal, objective, or practice in a given domain of knowledge. Thus, the notion of contract is meaningless within the members of the community, and in particular there is a priori no motive to think of any financial or contractual incentive devices to align the behavior of the members of the community.
The interactions between members of the community are governed by a type of trust grounded in respect for the common social norms of the community. Trust within the community can be measured when one can observe that the behaviors of the participants, after being exposed to an unexpected event, are not guided by any form of contractual scheme but by the respect of the social norm of the group.
Recent literature has emphasized that some of the specific motives that guide the behaviors of members of the community could have an economic interpretation. Frequency of interactions within the community considerably reduces opportunistic behaviors. With repeated interactions, holdups and moral hazard problems will be attenuated through the creation of norms of cooperation and routines5 as well as the intensification of reputation mechanisms. Therefore, a large part of agency problems will be resolved spontaneously in the knowledge-based economy.
The validation of the knowledge takes place in first analysis within a given community. In the same way, the interpretation of the knowledge provided by the outside (in particular by the hierarchy) is examined, criticized, and reprocessed (to lead sometimes to creative adaptations) within communities.
All the above features that characterize learning communities contribute to making clear the differences between communities and the other forms of coordination units that can be found within the firm: Knowing communities differ from functional groups. Contrary to communities, these units are under the responsibility of a hierarchy at the top of them, with clear boundaries separating those belonging to the unit and those apart. Of course, such functional units can contribute to the process of accumulation of knowledge. However, when compared to communities (where cognitive links are continuously activated and enhanced ‘‘naturally’’ between members), these units require considerable efforts to be made in order to activate the conservation of routines, the power of replication of the routines, and the continuous improvement of the routines between members. Moreover, while communities are loci of active and deliberate learning processes between members in order to create, exchange, and accumulate knowledge, functional units are mainly characterized by passive modes of learning, such as, for instance, ‘‘learning by doing,’’ which has been heavily described in the literature.
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Knowing communities differ from project teams, or task forces. These teams of employees with heterogeneous skills and qualifications are often coordinated by team leaders and put together to achieve a particular goal in a given period of time. Communities may share some common traits with teams: For instance, the group’s interests generally coincide with the interests of the members. However, there is no visible hierarchy in communities, nor any constraint of time in the process of knowledge generation and accumulation.
Knowing communities differ from coalitions in the sense that the strategic calculation of agents does not generally determine their adherence to a given community. Moreover, a coalition has by definition a clear boundary, contrary to communities.
Knowing communities differ from cliques in network theories. If cliques share with communities the characteristic of having no clear boundaries, they differ in the sense that the relationships between agents within a clique do not express a generally cognitive dimension. They do not address a clear objective of creation and accumulation of knowledge.
Knowing communities are thus repositories of useful knowledge, which is embedded in their daily practices and habits. The local daily interactions constitute an infrastructure that supports an organizationally instituted learning process that drives the generation and accumulation of knowledge by the community. Most of the time, the accumulation of knowledge by a given community is shaped by a dominant mode of learning (such as ‘‘by circulation of best practices’’) adopted by the community and can circulate through the existence of a local language understandable by the members only. As Wenger (1998) noted, a community drawing on interaction and participation to act, interpret, and innovate acts ‘‘as a locally negotiated regime of competence.’’ The communal setting provides the context in which the collective beliefs and the representations structuring the individual choice are built. Communities allow the strengthening of individual commitments in an uncertain universe. Individuals remain attentive to the specific contexts and can therefore update the shapes of their cooperative engagements. However, as an organizational mechanism, communities have limits. In particular, since a given community focuses on a given domain of knowledge, the issue of the lack of diversity resulting from the interplay of communities is raised. Diversity in organization can be obtained by the interaction between different communities, but nothing guarantees a priori the systematic concordance of interests and objectives of the different communities on the spot. Constituent communities of the organization are not necessarily all homogeneous or convergent toward a common objective. Risks of intercommunal conflicts, autism, or parochial partitioning are latent. The issue is the extent to which the knowledge held by one community can
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be transmitted to the rest of the organization: to the ‘‘visible’’ hierarchical structure and to the myriad of other communities in the firm. The coherence of the firm and the existence of common referential systems become therefore crucial questions. The coexistence of hierarchies and communities within the firm poses the problem of the spontaneous or deliberate emergence of referential systems structuring individual and collective beliefs constructed in the process of decision. Such critical issues call for an in-depth discussion of the nature of the interaction between communities. This discussion is proposed in the following part. The Nature of Interaction Between Knowing Communities in the Firm, and the Role of the Hierarchy How, within a given organization, do communities interact? Intuitively, we can assume that as for individuals, too distant communities within a firm will not lead to innovative solutions. But if the cognitive distance between communities is too small, the innovative potential of the firm will fade away.6 However, the interactions between communities reveal specific properties. More than interaction between individuals in an organization, the interaction between communities can be conceived as a game of language and translation, depending on the one side on the habits and social norms of the respective communities and on the other side on the number and behavior of ‘‘browsers’’ (individuals who navigate between different communities). Last but not least, this game is arbitrated by the hierarchy. The hierarchy cannot in principle influence the internal functioning of a given community, but it can influence the nature of interactions between communities.7 Hierarchy can facilitate the building of a common platform of knowledge between communities and find ways to let the knowledge accumulated by communities flow and bring value to the firm. This raises the issue of the delicate matching between the ‘‘visible’’ hierarchical structure of the firm and the ‘‘invisible’’ process of active knowledge formation that occurs within the myriad of communities in a given firm. A too strict control of hierarchy forcing members to follow the rules decreed by the ‘‘visible structures’’ would prevent the firm from benefiting and deriving value from the knowledge accumulated by the ‘‘invisible communities.’’ Such decisions certainly would not have eliminated the functioning of the community (people would continue to talk and exchange about their practices), but the flow to the rest of the organization of useful knowledge accumulated at the level of the respective communities would presumably have been hampered. On the other hand, leaving to the communities all the process of knowledge creation and formation will expose the firm to risks of incoherence, inconsistency, and anarchy. To a large extent, hierarchy is in charge of the fine tuning of the cognitive distance between communities.
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The above developments claim for a precise examination of the nature of the interactions between communities. To do so, considering that the unit of analysis is the community, let us focus on how to describe the nature of interactions between communities. In other words, what is the meaning of a ‘‘strong’’ or a ‘‘weak’’ interaction between communities? We propose to explore this issue through two main hypotheses: Our first hypothesis is that the structure of interactions between communities can be defined by two main factors: the repetitiveness of interactions between communities and the quality of communication between communities, which could be assimilated to the cognitive distance between communities. Indeed, the two phenomena have common features, but distinguishing them is important to clarify the different contexts of interactions between communities. The repetitiveness of interactions between communities expresses the ‘‘quantitative’’ dimension of the relationships between communities.8 Some communities may meet frequently (e.g., workers and managers using the same canteen), and this can generate some benefits for the firm (e.g., formation of a certain common knowledge, circulation of news that ‘‘something isn’t going well’’), even though the intensity of communication between them is low (e.g., minimal common language or grammar to improve the circulation of knowledge between the communities). A high degree of repetition of interactions between knowing communities contributes to stimulate the processes of learning, create favorable conditions for the resolution of conflicts, and encourage the realization of economies of scale. Organizational devices, such as group projects or frequent meetings encouraging the socialization of experiences, are regularly introduced by the management to compensate for the lack of spontaneous interaction between heterogeneous communities. This enables us to better understand the importance given to the construction of privileged learning platforms by firms (‘‘ba,’’ in the sense of Nonaka and Konno 1998). Frequent quantitative interactions between communities contribute to lower the cognitive distance between communities but do not guarantee in the long term the existence of a common grammar and codes between heterogeneous units.
The quality of communication between communities expresses the ‘‘qualitative’’ dimension of the relationships between communities. Some communities can be joined together through a rich texture of communication, even if the quantitative ‘‘degree of repetition’’ of interaction is low. Mintzberg (1979), for example, quotes the well-known example of operations in hospitals, where the members of the different communities involved (surgeons, anesthetists, nurses) meet infrequently, but when they do so, they know exactly what to do and how to work together (thanks to the possibility of communication provided during their respective training).
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Table 1 Different types of organizational contexts of interactions between communities within the firm Low repetitiveness of interactions between communities
High repetitiveness of interactions between communities
Low quality of communication between communities
Weak interactions (weak ties, strong cognitive distance)
Moderate interactions I (strong ties, strong cognitive distance)
High quality of communication between communities
Moderate interactions II (weak ties, weak cognitive distance)
Strong interactions (strong ties, weak cognitive distance)
Circulation of knowledge in an innovating firm is based essentially on the sharing of codes and languages allowing various communities to interact. Thus, it is a question of relational or cognitive proximity (Nooteboom 2000a) between distributed units, requiring attention to syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic communication, shared tacit knowledge, flow and interpretation of information, and trust or other conventions of collaboration. As a result, the specific combinations of the two dimensions (repetitiveness of interactions and quality of communication) lead to four different organizational contexts corresponding to different structures of interactions between communities (see Table 1). From the above, it follows that the coherence of the firm requires that hierarchical structures (including the style of management, the system of decision-making, etc.) should vary with the organizational contexts of interactions between communities. In order to extract the potential benefits from intercommunity interactions, the role, the nature, and the design of hierarchies should strongly differ according to the different organizational contexts. In a knowledge-based context, where an increasing part of useful knowledge is held by communities, the delicate matching between the functioning of autonomous communities and the hierarchical system heavily depends on the context of interactions between communities. We thus consider that the degree of repetition of interactions combined with the likeness of representations due to rich communication modes between communities are the essential elements to understand not only the convergence of actor anticipations, and adaptation to common norms, but also the coherence of the firm as a whole. Obviously, there is no ‘‘ideal’’ organizational configuration for knowledge creation (a one best way). Each configuration might be fitting to a specific environment.
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But we argue that as the knowledge-based economy develops, decentralized configurations as proposed above (cases 3 and 4 in Table 1) will be increasingly salient. Cowen and Parker (1997, p. 28) explain with respect to internal organization that ‘‘market changes are moving manufacturing farther and farther away from steadystate, low variety, long-batch production runs, relevant to Taylorist methods, to high variety and small runs . . . Organizations are adopting new forms of decentralization to cope with the instability, uncertainty, and pace of change of the marketplace . . . In cluster or network working, employees of undifferentiated rank may operate temporarily on a certain task or tasks in teams. The clusters are largely autonomous and engage in decentralized decision-making and planning . . . They are conducive to individual initiative (intrapreneurship) and faster decision-taking. They facilitate organizational flexibility.’’ The implications of the above hypotheses lead to the following typology (Table 1) of interactions between communities. 1. The first category (low repetitiveness of interactions between communities, low quality of communication between communities), corresponds to a situation where communities do not interact in the organization and have no means to do so. Thus, the coherence of the firm and the innovative impulse of the organization have to come from an external entity. In such cases, the essence of coordination relies on intensive managerial coordination that establishes ex-ante top-down rules and procedures to be followed by the entire organization and centralizes the global vision of the product creation process in what can be called the traditional sequential process mode of management (as in a typically Taylorist organization). The strong division of work relies on specialized units that do not interact on a frequent basis and do not develop rich modes of communication. Classic incentive and coordination mechanisms such as Taylorist time and motion management principles drive decisionmaking. Management by design clearly dominates management by communities (Amin and Cohendet 2004), although local mechanisms of learning in communities (e.g., at shop floor level) can transmit learning-by-doing effects at the global level of the organization. In this particular environment, the cognitive distance between communities does not change through time. Communities remain distant, and there is no force in the organization that favors a reduction of the cognitive distance between communities. 2. The second category (high repetitiveness of interactions, low quality of communication between communities) corresponds to the overlapping problem-solving mode (as in matrix types of organizations) that aims at bridging and cross-fertilizing through repeated informational exchanges between specialized groups in the organization. When some groups gathering members of different communities are formed,
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these groups (such as team projects) are temporary, and each individual keeps the jargon and codes of his community of origin. The absence of a rich architecture of communication between the groups leads to an expensive search for a cognitive consensus between communities and calls for active managerial involvement, mostly expost, to solve disputes and conflicts between communities, but also designated to implement common knowledge and to coordinate beliefs while producing sense. The low intensity of communication between communities, especially noticeable in emergent relations built around many communities, can lead to an expensive search for cognitive alignment between communities. Coordination by leadership (necessarily conscious and intentional) appears to be the ideal solution in instances where the costs of communication or compatibility are onerous or where the resolution of coordination problems is urgent. Therefore, a script of leadership emerges, charged with coordinating intricate actions or beliefs while producing sense. Foss (1999) has shown that, in some circumstances, leadership can offer less expensive solutions than complex mental processes or formation of conventions. This type of situation also requires a specific coupling between management by design and management by communities. Part of the solution might reside in the hands of ‘‘middle management’’ that plays, for authors such as Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995), a decisive role in the innovative quality of the business. The middle managers can be seen as mediators who know the norms and habits of the communities sufficiently well to translate messages of the hierarchy into a jargon intelligible to different communities, and in turn, to translate the messages coming from communities for the hierarchy. In such contexts, the high frequency of interactions between communities may reduce the cognitive distance between them. However, the reduction of the cognitive distance is an uncertain long-term result that may depend on other characteristics of the relationship between communities such as the duration of the interactions (Bogenrieder and Nooteboom 2004). For instance, in short-term projects it is unlikely that the interactions between agents during the project have significant impacts on the cognitive distance between communities. 3. The third category (low repetitiveness of interactions and high intensity of communication between communities) corresponds to the existence of cognitive structures of interaction between communities. The modular organization, based on cognitive platforms that allow rather independent heterogeneous communities to interact efficiently, is the emblematic example of this situation. In such contexts, learning at the component level is insulated from disruptions by unexpected changes in product architecture during development projects. The role of hierarchy is to define ex ante the nature of the platform, and ex post to redefine the platform if radical innovations are unavoidable. The existence of
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such an infrastructure of knowledge (common grammar, common codes, common languages) may be due to very different historical factors (a type of education that has anticipated the cognitive forms of relationships between heterogeneous communities, shared experience that has lasted long enough to permit a common grammar to be built, a decision taken by the hierarchy to build a modular platform of knowledge, etc.). But whatever the reason, the common infrastructure of knowledge has taken time and sunk costs to be built. It not only defines what the communities have in common, but it also implicitly defines what they do not have in common. Standardized interfaces between each community and the common platform of knowledge allow each community to work independently of others. This implies specific advantages, in particular the fact that provided that the platform holds, the need for coordination by hierarchy is significantly reduced. The functioning of the modular system implies that the cognitive distance between heterogeneous communities is maintained constant. The innovativeness of the global system results from the freedom offered to each community to explore in-depth the variety of options in its specialized field of knowledge, provided that the standard interfaces are respected. In this case, management by communities temporarily dominates management by design. However, if the constraint of the interfaces cannot be respected, then the efficacy of the common platform becomes severely questioned. This could happen, for example, when emergent innovations in one community imply the reformulation of the whole cognitive platform. In such a context, sense-making interventions by the hierarchy may be needed to decide if the novelty produced requires reformulating the common platform. If so, a new cognitive process of definition of a common grammar, codes, and language has to be initiated. In summary, the role of the hierarchy is to intervene at critical moments when the need to reformulate a common platform of knowledge between communities is perceived as essential. Category 3 is thus a case where management by design and management by communities sequentially alternate as dominant modes of coordination. 4. In this fourth category (high repetitiveness of interactions and high intensity of communication between communities), we can envisage governance by community alone, with hierarchy needed only to ‘‘authorize’’ or ‘‘enact’’ the organizational forms produced by the interactive autonomous communities. The organization can extensively operate in a self-organized manner as one is located in either a consolidated or an emergent context. It is probable that in such a situation, the unceasing efflorescence of communities allows the organization to innovate constantly. This mode could be called management by enactment, echoing the work done by Ciborra (1996), who described the knowledge platform at Olivetti in such terms.
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The organization can largely operate in a self-organized manner (including the determination of its core interests, which can occur without excessive market or hierarchical intervention) in either a consolidated or an emergent context. It is probable that in such a situation, the unceasing bubbling of communities allows the organization to innovate constantly since it does not disrupt corporate integrity (this dimension can be related to the creative spiral as conceived by Nonaka and Takeuchi [1995]). In such a context, where management by communities clearly dominates management by design, the main role of the hierarchy is to enact the innovative outcomes produced by the constant interactions of communities. Knowing Communities and the Innovative Potential of Large Firms Having analyzed the nature of the interactions between communities, we can now turn to the issue of the innovativeness of large firms. As suggested by Brown and Duguid, large firms might be highly innovative if they succeed in leveraging the innovative potential of the myriad of their small knowing communities. ‘‘One of the central benefits of these small, self-constituting communities is that they evade the ossifying tendencies of large organizations. Canonical accounts of work are not only hard to apply and hard to learn. They are also hard to change. Yet, the actual behaviors of communities of practice are constantly changing, both as newcomers replace old timers and as the demands of practice force the community to revise its relationship to its environment. Communities of practice like the reps’ continue to develop a rich, fluid, non canonical world view to bridge the gap between their organization’s static canonical view and the challenge of changing practice. This process is highly innovative’’ (Brown and Duguid 1991, p. 50). The literature on innovation (see, for instance, Symeonidis 1996) generally mentions some specific advantages of large firms as compared to small firms in their ability to innovate. These advantages include economies of scale and scope, ability to benefit from externalities between different projects, a larger market power, a larger financial potential, the possibility to concentrate R&D, etc. On the contrary, the small firms benefit from a larger flexibility and a larger potential to exploit decentralized initiatives from the agents belonging to the organization. In particular, SME offer a priori the advantages of avoiding bureaucratic costs associated with the management of large organizations. The rise of coordination costs as the size of the firm grows seems to be unavoidable and appears as the principal factor that hampers large firms from innovating. This increase of bureaucratic burden contributes to muffle the decentralized initiatives to innovate within large companies. What Brown and Duguid suggest is thus a strong potential counterargument to the intense debate found in the literature. Large firms, provided that they can exploit
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the innovative potential of the communities that compose the firm, could escape from the burden of increased bureaucracy: They can ‘‘economize on bureaucracy.’’ Knowing communities can bring forward innovative potential to a given organization for the following reasons: Knowing communities do not bear the risk of being ‘‘ossified’’ by the codified rule of a large corporation. The continuous circulation of best practice among the members of the community is a guarantee that within a knowing community the rules in place are continuously questioned.
Knowing communities are continuously enriched by the entrance of new members that bring new ideas and new human capital.
The functioning of knowing communities is not constrained by the boundaries of the organization. Knowing communities are open to the world, and members of a given community continuously exchange knowledge with individuals who do not belong to the organization (and sometimes even work for competing firms). They are global in scope, connecting practitioners worldwide. Members of a given community who belong to the same organization are thus permanently exposed to new ideas and knowledge coming from the outside world. Thus, it often happens that ‘‘communities know more than the organization does.’’ However, this feature has a negative counterpart, the risk that some of the strategic knowledge of a given organization is diffused to the outside world through the current functioning of a given community. Such leakages may be extremely difficult to control.9
The example of the reps at Xerox illustrates the innovative potential of a knowing community in an organization. The dynamic process of innovation activated by this community could be analyzed as a process of dynamic ‘‘cognitive contagion’’ between communities. The process starts at the interaction between the reps and the users.10 Then the reps alerted other communities within the organization (engineers, designers, etc.) to convince them of the need to develop creative ideas at Xerox in small photocopier lines of products. By a progressive contagion of communities within the organization, a kind of ‘‘percolation’’ threshold is achieved, from which the organization as a whole contributes to the development of the innovation. The dynamics of communication between communities can be approached through the principle of ‘‘translation/enrolment,’’ elaborated in particular by Callon and Latour (1991). According to these authors, the innovative diffusion of ideas (for example, from the lab to the market) can be interpreted as a process of progressive contagion of communities, where each community makes efforts to ‘‘command the attention’’ of other communities to convince them of the relevant interest of the knowledge it has elaborated. Of course, this dynamic perspective of communication between communities depends on the nature of the static organizational contexts of
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interaction, which were discussed in detail previously. It is thus probable that Category 4 (‘‘Strong interactions, with strong ties and weak cognitive distance’’) is the context in which the innovative process has the greatest chance of being achieved. The group of agents who succeed in expressing and formalizing an innovative idea is confronted by one main difficulty: not the risk of being copied (at no cost), but rather the risk of being misunderstood by others (including agents belonging to the same institution), which then leads to their procedures and experience not being reproduced by others. Communities with creative ideas will thus undertake considerable efforts to alert other communities in order to convince them of the usefulness and potentials of their discovery, by forcing engagement, adherence, a common language, common beliefs, and alignment of interests in general (Callon 1999). The procedural construction of a cognitive weft between communities makes it possible to code the experiences and the history of the organization and therefore to give the sense, ex post facto, of the construction and stabilization of a common vision or culture, ensuring the global consistency of the distributed venture. Conclusion This contribution attempted to recognize and understand the increasing role of knowing communities in organizations. Companies are beginning to recognize that knowing communities can be supported, nurtured, and leveraged to benefit the members of the community and the organization as a whole. The critical role of communities as building blocks for the formation of knowledge and competences in organizations has been highlighted. However, the growing role of knowing communities raises many questions for corporate management. In particular, a key question is how can firms benefit from the useful knowledge held by its different distributed communities without compromising the organizational hierarchical structure geared toward the firm’s efficiency. Facing this dilemma, it is probable that as long as communities emit ‘‘weak signals’’ in the organization, hierarchy will not intervene. However, as a knowing community becomes increasingly influential, the firm will certainly try to exercise more control over the community and limit its growing influence by trying to convert this influential community into an organizational unit. This tendency is illustrated by Gongla and Rizzuto (2001, p. 273) in the ways they describe successful knowing communities at IBM Global Services experience: At this stage, the community innovates and generates, creating significant new business objects—new solutions, new offerings, new methods, new processes, and new groups. The community identifies, influences, and even creates trends in its area of expertise. The community’s innovation affects not just its members and the immediate domain within which it
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operates but other parts of the organization and external agencies as well. We hypothesize, however, that few communities will ever reach or sustain themselves as a community at the adaptive stage. The work being done by the community becomes too important to the organization for it to allow the community to continue as a self-governing body. There is a distinct likelihood that the organization will want more control and essentially convert the community into an organizational unit.
Notes 1. This chapter is issued from a series of works in process carried out at BETA Strasbourg, with M. Diani, O. Dupouet, E. Schenk, and F. Cre´plet. It also benefited from a discussion at the conference in honor of Bart Nooteboom, Nov. 25 and 26, 2004, University Erasmus of Rotterdam. 2. One of the most widely cited studies of knowing communities was carried out by Orr (1990) concerning activities of a team of photocopier reps at Xerox. According to Orr, the job of a rep is best described as a continuous improvisation taking place in a network of relationships between clients, machines, and other reps. Reps work autonomously. They intervene at Xerox clients’ places where they have to repair a machine, by themselves most of the time. Together, they form a community of practice, which allows mutual help and the collective problem solving of unusual breakdowns. When they talk about machines, technicians actually build up a common identity while exchanging what each of them gained from various experiences. They create a stock of operational competencies in sharp contrast with handbooks and user guides that are promoted by the hierarchy. This ever-actualized repertoire is transmitted through oral culture. It allows reps to cope with managerial evolutions that downplay their role by increasingly relying on work methods disconnected from the reality of workers and machines. The highly technical work of reps appears as a resource socially distributed, stored, and diffused above all by informal conversations. Moreover, through their ability to maintain constant interactions with other communities (engineers, designers, etc.) in the organization, reps are at the origin of many creative ideas at Xerox. 3. See, for instance, Cowan and Foray (1997). 4. In organizations, the knowing communities have been called by different names at various times, such as ‘‘learning communities’’ (Hewlett Packard), ‘‘family groups’’ (Xerox), ‘‘knowledge networks’’ (IBM Global Services), etc. In the academic literature as well, many types of knowing communities have been recently analyzed. Besides the main categories (communities of practice and epistemic communities detailed in the text), one can quote, for instance: Communities of creation were studied by Sawnhey and Prandelli (2000). These authors demonstrate that traditional organizational models associated to R&D departments do not allow firms to benefit from the full creativity and diversity that their partners could bring in. They help in setting interorganizational cooperation agreements on innovations. Strategic communities have been identified by Storck (2000), who draws this concept from empirical studies carried out at Xerox. These communities might belong to the company or to operational units. They are formed by groups of collaborators specialized in a specific information technology. The variety of experiences and knowledge gained from belonging to
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these two dimensions provide them with sources of learning and organizational performance enhancement. Lynn et al. (1996) refer to the concept of communities of innovation to account for modalities used by organizations to bring a technology to the market. These are a set of interdependent and integrated organizations involved in this process. Members are identified by examining sources and flux of assets and information circulating during the process of commercialization. Communities of creation, given their properties, are quite similar to epistemic communities as they are described in this paper. The two other types of communities are, on the contrary, different in nature from both epistemic communities and communities of practice (Storck, 2000, draws the differences existing between strategic communities and communities of practice). 5. The ‘‘truce’’ hypothesis in Nelson and Winter’s routine analysis (1982). 6. As discussed in Nooteboom, in order to achieve a specific joint goal, the categories of thought of the people involved must be coordinated to some extent. Different people have a greater or lesser ‘‘cognitive distance’’ between them (Nooteboom 1999). A large cognitive distance has the merit of novelty but the problem of incomprehensibility. In view of this, organizations need to reduce cognitive distance, i.e., achieve a sufficient alignment of mental categories to understand each other, utilize complementary capabilities, and achieve a common goal. ‘‘Cognitive distance yields both a problem and an opportunity. The opportunity is that we learn from others only when they see and know things differently. In the absence of claims of objective knowledge, interaction with others is the only path we have to correct our errors. The problem is that people may not understand each other and have to invest in understanding’’ (Bogenrieder and Nooteboom 2004). 7. Learning communities tend to maintain a cognitive distance vis-a`-vis the exterior, in particular vis-a`-vis the hierarchy of the organization. This can be interpreted as a ‘‘creative insubordination,’’ which is in particular expressed in the classical example of the ‘‘rep’’ from Xerox, rather than reinterpret in their own jargon, rules, and norms of the community the codified orders that are coming from the hierarchy. This natural tendency could be interpreted in terms of cognitive dissonance. Cognitive dissonance is a psychological phenomenon that refers to the discomfort felt at a discrepancy between what you already know or believe and new information or interpretation. It therefore occurs when there is a need to accommodate new ideas, and it may be necessary for it to develop so that we become ‘‘open’’ to them. Neighbour (1992) makes the generation of appropriate dissonance into a major feature of tutorial (and other) teaching: He shows how to drive this kind of intellectual wedge between learners’ current beliefs and ‘‘reality.’’ Cognitive dissonance has two major effects on learning: If someone is called upon to learn something that contradicts what they already think they know—particularly if they are committed to that prior knowledge—they are likely to resist the new learning. Accommodation is more difficult than assimilation, in Piaget’s terms. If learning something has been difficult, uncomfortable, or even humiliating enough, people are not likely to admit that the content of what has been learned is not valuable. To do so would be to admit that one has been ‘‘had,’’ or ‘‘conned.’’ It is not, however, the qualities of the course that are significant so much as the amount of effort that participants have to put into it, so the same qualification may well be valued more by the student who had to struggle for it than the student who sailed through.
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8. We have simplified the analysis of the quantitative dimension of the interaction between communities by focusing only on one characteristic (the frequency of interaction). Bogenrieder and Nooteboom (2004) suggested a richer definition based on four characteristics (one of them being the frequency of interaction): ‘‘In our view, the ‘strength of ties’ has four aspects. One aspect is intensity, which refers to the effort and commitment of resources involved and to the scope of activities taken up in the tie (share of total activities). The resources that are committed are not necessarily only resources of money, time, or effort, and may also include psychological resources (commitment, loyalty, fairness, and empathy). A second aspect is frequency of interaction, a third is openness of communication, and a fourth is duration of ties. Strong ties yield shared experience, which reduces cognitive distance. Durable ties enable the development of empathy and identification . . . as a basis for trust.’’ 9. Because virtual devices will expand, this issue is going to be a critical one for organizations. A solution to avoid excessive diffusion of strategic knowledge to the outside world from a given knowing community in the organization is to propose to the organizational members to sign a ‘‘charter’’ of responsive behavior toward the organization. 10. In the perspective of Eric von Hippel’s works.
References Amin, A., and P. Cohendet (2004). Architectures of Knowledge: Firms, Capabilities, and Communities. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Bogenrieder, I., and B. Nooteboom (2004). ‘‘Learning Groups: What Types Are There? A Theoretical Analysis and an Empirical Study in a Consultant Firm.’’ Organization Studies 25: 287–313. Bourdieu, P. (1977). Outline of a Theory of Practice. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Brown, J. S., and P. Duguid (1991). ‘‘Organizational Learning and Communities of Practice: Toward a Unified View of Working, Learning and Innovation.’’ Organization Science 2: 40– 57. ———, and P. Duguid (1998). ‘‘Organizing Knowledge.’’ California Management Review 40: 90–111. Callon, M. (1999). ‘‘Le re´seau comme forme e´mergente et comme modalite´ de coordination.’’ In Re´seau et Coordination, M. Callon et al., eds. Paris: Economica. ———, and B. Latour (1991). La science telle qu’elle se fait: Anthologie de la sociologie des sciences de langue anglaise. Paris: La De´couverte. Ciborra, C. U. (1996). ‘‘The Platform Organization: Recombining Strategies, Structures, and Surprises.’’ Organization Science 7: 103–118. Cohendet, P., F. Creplet, M. Diani, O. Dupouet, and E. Schenk (2004). ‘‘The Delicate Matching between Hierarchies and Communities.’’ Journal of Management and Governance 8: 27– 48. Cowan, R., and D. Foray (1997). ‘‘The Economics of Knowledge Codification and Diffusion.’’ Industrial and Corporate Change 6(3): 595–622.
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———, P. A. David, and D. Foray (2000). ‘‘The Explicit Economics of Knowledge Codification and Tacitness.’’ Industrial and Corporate Change 9: 211–253. Cowen, T., and D. Parker (1997). Markets in the Firm: A Market-Process Approach to Management. London: Institute of Economic Affairs. Foss, N. (1999). ‘‘Understanding Leadership: a Coordination Theory.’’ Working DRUID. Gongla, P., and C. R. Rizzuto (2001). ‘‘Evolving Communities of Practice: IBM Global Service Experience.’’ IBM Systems Journal 40(4): 842–862. Grandori, A. (1997). ‘‘Governance Structures, Coordination Mechanisms and Cognitive Models.’’ The Journal of Management and Governance 1: 29–47. Granovetter, M. (1985). ‘‘Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness.’’ American Journal of Sociology 91: 481–510. Langlois, R., and N. Foss (1996). ‘‘Capabilities and Governance: The Rebirth of Production in the Theory of Economic Organization.’’ Kyklos 52: 201–218. Lave, J., and E. Wenger (1991). Situated Learning: Legitimate Peripheral Participation. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Leonard-Barton, D. (1995). Wellsprings of Knowledge: Building and Sustaining the Source of Innovation. Boston: Harvard Business School Press. Lynn, L., N. Mohan Reddy, and J. D. Aram (1996). ‘‘Linking Technology and Institutions: The Innovation Community Framework.’’ Research Policy 25: 91–106. Mintzberg, H. (1979). The Structuring of Organizations. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. Neighbour, R. (1992). The Inner Apprentice. Plymouth, UK: Petroc Press. Nelson, R. R., and S. Winter (1982). An evolutionary Theory of Economic Change. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Nonaka, I., and N. Konno (1998). ‘‘The Concept of ‘Ba’: Building a Foundation for Knowledge Creation.’’ California Management Review 40: 40–54. ———, and H. Takeuchi (1995). The Knowledge-Creating Company: How the Japanese Companies Create the Dynamic of Innovation. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Nooteboom, Bart (1999). Inter-Firm Alliances: Analysis and Design. London: Routledge. ——— (2000a). ‘‘Learning by Interaction: Absorptive Capacity, Cognitive Distance and Governance.’’ Journal of Management and Governance 4: 69–92. ——— (2000b). Learning and Innovation in Organizations and Economies. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Orr, J. (1990). Talking about Machines: An Ethnography of a Modern Job. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University. Polanyi, M. (1967). The Tacit Dimension. New York: Doubleday. Sawnhey, M., and E. Prandelli (2000). ‘‘Communities of Creation: Managing Distributed Innovation in Turbulent Markets.’’ California Management Review 4: 24–54. Scholer, D. (1996). New Community Networks: Wired for Change. Reading, MA: AddisonWesley.
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Storck, J. (2000). ‘‘Knowledge Diffusion through ‘Strategic Communities.’ ’’ Sloan Management Review 41(2): 63–74. Symeonidis G. (1996). ‘‘Innovation, Firm Size and Market Structure: Schumpeterian Hypotheses and Some New Themes.’’ OECD Economic Studies 27: 11. von Hippel, E. (1988). The Sources of Innovation. New York: Oxford University Press. Wenger, E. (1998). ‘‘Communities of Practice: Learning as a Social System.’’ Systems Thinker 9: 2–3. ———, R. McDermott, and W. M. Snyder (2002). Cultivating Communities of Practice. Boston: Harvard Business School Press.
III The Changing Role of Institutions
9 Epistemic Infrastructure in the Rise of the Knowledge Economy Margaret Hedstrom and John Leslie King
Introduction The epistemic infrastructure of the knowledge economy1 arose from libraries, archives, museums, galleries, zoos, aquaria, and other systematic collections that enable individuals and societies to know what they know and to do what they do.2 The assembling, safe keeping, organizing, representing, and displaying of archival documents, plants and animals, common and rare objects, works of art, and so on is the heart of knowledge generation, learning, sense making, and commerce. This is an ancient art: As long ago as 5,000 years, collections of clay tablets, papyri, and inscriptions on stone kept track of laws and decrees, administrative and financial transactions, and ownership and control over property and reminded citizens and subjects of their duties and obligations.3 These collections were stored and maintained in centers such as the great library of Alexandria, as well as in similar libraries at Ephesus, Pergamum, Athens, and Ur. Ancient libraries can be found as well in sites from Macedonia to the Persian Gulf and from China and India to southeastern Asia. Even though elements of epistemic infrastructure have been with us for five millennia, there is no inherent reason for any particular collection or collecting institution to persist. In fact, we have to contend with the fact that the Alexandrian library was destroyed and that no library of Greek or Roman antiquity survived intact due to a combination of natural disasters, intentional destruction, and a decline in the relevance of their collections for new political regimes, ideologies, and epistemic cultures. The decline and rebuilding of collections and amassing of new ones both signals and serves as a trigger for significant transformations in the creation, dissemination, and exploitation of knowledge. The Dark Ages of Europe followed closely upon the purposeful destruction and dissipation of the ancient libraries of Greek and Roman antiquity in the 4th century. Had the learning captured in those collections not been preserved by Islamic scholars
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of the Middle East and North Africa, it might have been lost forever. That learning was restored to the West beginning with the Islamic conquest of Iberia in the 8th century. The Christian retaking of Iberia in the late 11th century captured some of what had been preserved in these precious Islamic libraries, and portions of the collections were subsequently translated into Latin and disseminated. Christian Europe, awakening from centuries of intellectual impoverishment, began to evolve institutional mechanisms of knowledge creation and sharing that contributed directly to the Renaissance, the Scientific Revolution, and the Enlightenment. We attribute the persistence of collections in part to the adaptability of collecting practices and collecting institutions. As collections grew in size and scope, their custodians developed methods for organizing and managing larger collections and new types of material. In time, ancient collections and their new counterparts were transformed from cloistered secrets or private treasures to public goods that played vital service for science, education, and entertainment. This brief essay cannot cover completely the story of epistemic infrastructure. Rather, it pulls into the foreground attributes whereby epistemic infrastructure forms an essential foundation for the knowledge economy, and suggests how and why epistemic infrastructure is as critical today as it has been in the past. The Rise and Role of Epistemic Infrastructure Modern epistemic infrastructure has been built on a vast array of collections, as well as the systems of practice that have shaped their contents, organization, accessibility, and use. To illustrate the rise and role of epistemic infrastructure, we focus on collections of objects and texts in two classes of institutions, museums and archives/ libraries. The modern versions of these institutions arose from a revolution in thinking in early 17th century Europe that replaced the traditions of scholasticism with principles of rationality and empirical investigation. Slowly, the haphazard gathering of oddities evolved into a deliberate practice of collecting similar and dissimilar things and imposing upon them a systematic order that reflected a new way of thinking that became the foundation of the modern world.4 We begin with the Ashmolean Museum of Oxford University, which is among the oldest surviving museums in the world.5 The Ashmolean was never conceived of as a museum in the modern sense. It arose from rather informal collecting habits by two gardeners, a father and son team both named John Tradescant between 1610 and 1662. Tradescant Sr. began collecting plants, but expanded his collection to include shells, stuffed animals, works of art, and artifacts from afar.6 He eventually established a residence in South Lambeth, across the Thames from London at Westminster, and put his collection on display under the name The Ark. Tradescant Jr.
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became the keeper of the collection and expanded it after his father’s death. In 1650 he met Elias Ashmole, a successful lawyer who had studied at Oxford and who recognized the importance of the collection. Ashmole and a colleague, Thomas Wharton, produced a catalog of the collection titled Musaeum Tradescantianum in 1656. Following Tradescant Jr.’s death in 1662, Ashmole took control of the collection and donated it to Oxford University in 1683. This was not a unique occurrence. From the middle of the 16th century onward, many such collections were created.7 By the 18th century, Paris alone had at least 723 of these Cabinets of Curiosities, or Wunderkammern as they were commonly known.8 Such collections eventually found their way into institutionalized arrangements in universities and scholarly societies and as self-standing museums that afforded greater stability and allowed for scholarly interrogation. This paralleled the rise of the distributed ‘‘invisible college’’ of scholars, collaborating through meetings and correspondence under the auspices of organizations such as the Royal Society of Great Britain.9 The Royal Society set out in 1669 to construct a universal taxonomy of natural objects, and although the effort failed, it established a goal of systematic collecting in the natural sciences that continues to this day. Wunderkammern, and their later instantiation as museums, played a critical role in the rise of modern science and scholarship. Collecting became a form of inquiry: a means of creating a didactic resource that initially made sense only to the collector but with organization and codification was transformed into a resource that could be shared among collectors and with inquisitive people to create a common knowledge.10 This institutionalized clarification and correction of earlier evidence constituted a vital step in the rise of modern scholarly and scientific inquiry. When the skeleton of the dinosaur Iguanadon, discovered in 1822 in southern England, went on public display, visitors asked where such a thing came from. The public debate over the fossil record and the implicit arguments by visual metaphors that specimen collections presented paved the way for both easy acceptance of and widespread alarm at the publication of Darwin’s Origin of Species in 1859. Science came into the political sphere and remains there still. Wunderkammern also aided the rise of systematic method in the sciences by facilitating careful, repeated observation. Large collections permitted careful comparison of morphology among the specimens and sparked early efforts at taxonomy and classification that became the foundation of the life sciences. Documentation, in the form of written and printed catalogs and paintings of Wunderkammern, allowed representations of the collections to circulate.11 This made it possible to export knowledge from centers to the periphery and to import knowledge into the centers from far-flung places in an emerging global network of trade and commerce. Scholars on the periphery could compare local collections with
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representations of other collections, raising questions that led to further discussion and examination via the invisible college.12 At the same time, new specimens and objects were imported from China, India, Africa, and the Americas into European commercial centers such as Venice, Seville, Lisbon, and Amsterdam, enabling what Burke calls ‘‘discovery in a global context.’’13 This emerging epistemic infrastructure laid the groundwork for Carl von Linne´ (Linnaeus) to construct his Systema Naturae in 1738, upon which all subsequent biological taxonomy was built. Wunderkammern sparked scholarly and scientific collaboration that formed the foundation of the scientific and industrial revolutions. In a short time, major institutionalized collections were formed. The nucleus of the French National Museum of Natural History was formed in 1749, and that of the British Museum in 1753. Their success led to a golden age of museum expansion and stabilization in the 19th century. Philadelphia’s Academy of Natural Sciences opened in 1812. The Peale Museum opened in Baltimore in 1814. The National Museum of Denmark was established in 1816. The ethnographic museum of the Academy of Sciences in Petrograd opened in 1836. The Smithsonian Institution got going in 1846. The British Great Exhibition of 1851 had a major influence on the relationship between display of collections and emerging industrial enterprise. Harvard University established museums for botany, zoology, and anthropology between 1858 and 1866. Museums became both forces for development and common fixtures in developed countries. Modern libraries and archives also emerged during the Scientific Revolution and the Enlightenment. The invention of printing with movable type around 1450, based upon earlier woodblock printing and papermaking technologies from China and the Islamic world, interjected a powerful new technology into the epistemic infrastructure.14 Historians of writing and literacy find many connections between the introduction of printing, the Scientific Revolution, and the spread of Enlightenment thought. For one, the technology of printing made it possible to reproduce manuscripts as books and greatly reduced the labor required to create multiple copies. The vast majority of early printed books were published editions of classical and religious texts that had been preserved in Islamic societies or salvaged thorough repeated copying and translation in the monasteries of Catholic Western Europe.15 Yet by the 16th century, printers were publishing a wide variety of new compilations of facts, drawings, and other data. These compendia of laws, astronomical charts, botanical drawings, maps, and the like created the initial constructs for analyzing abstract representations of the world, much like the early collectors of museum objects created a common language for analyzing objects of nature.16 Multiple copies of stable printed works created an opportunity for scholars, intellectuals, and the clergy to compare different texts and to discover similarities and
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anomalies among different representations of similar things and among different interpretations of similar phenomena. The circulation of printed works fundamentally altered the transfer of knowledge between religious and secular cultures, from expert to novice, from academy to academy, from scientist to artisan, and across generations. The power to reproduce texts and circulate them on a larger scale than ever before possible allowed scientists, philosophers, and theologians to mobilize and convince others to see the world the same way they did.17 The circulation of published works also created new discourse about secular society, religion, science, philosophy, and geography that eventually resulted in distinctions between science and magic, evidence and faith, and near and distant, which characterize the Scientific Revolution and Enlightenment thought. Printing texts in vernacular languages, with accompanying dictionaries, grammars, and spelling books, helped to consolidate local dialects into national languages, giving European languages their modern forms by the 17th century. This process hastened the differentiation of people from people and state from state on the basis of a shared lingu