A D V A N C E S IN SAFETY A N D RELIABILITY Proceedings of the ESREL'97 International Conference on Safety and Reliability 17 - 20 June, 1997, Lisbon Portugal
Volume 1
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ADVANCES IN S AFETY AND RELIABILITY Proceedings of the ESREL'97 International Conference on Safety and Reliability 17 - 20 June, 1997, Lisbon Portugal
Volume 1 Edited by C. Guedes Soares
Technical University of Lisbon Lisbon, Portugal
PERGAMON
U.K.
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First edition 1997
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T A B L E OF C O N T E N T S
Volume 1 AI: Risk Based Regulations The Regulatory Review of Safety-Related Information Regarding Underground Radioactive Waste Disposal in England and Wales T h o m p s o n , B. G. J. and Williams, C.R ................................................................................................ 3
Developments and Practice Towards Risk Based Regulations in Various Technologies Berg, H. P. and Kafka, P ..................................................................................................................... 15
Incorporating Risk Assessment and its Results in the Decision-Making Process Le Guen, J. M ...................................................................................................................................... 27
A2: Risk Perception Public Perceptions of Risks Associated with Major Industrial Hazard Sites Brazier, A., Irwin, A., Kelly, C., Prince, L., Simmons, P., Walker, G. P. and Wynne, B .................. 37
Societal Risk and the Concept of Risk Aversion Vrijling, J. K. and Van Gelder, P. H. A. J. M .................................................................................... 45
From Risk Analysis to Risk Perception." Developing a Risk Communication Strategy for a DamBreak Flood Risk Lima, M. L. de, Almeida, A. B. and Silva, D ..................................................................................... 53
A3: Integrating Management Models Dynamic Modelling of Safety Management Hale, A. R., Bellamy, L. J., G u l d e n m u n d , F., Heming, B. H. J. and Kirwan, B ............................... 63
Understanding Safety Culture in Organ&ations- The Concept of Total Safety Management and its Practical use in Audit Instruments Grote, G., Kiinzler, C. and Klampfer, B ............................................................................................. 71
Case Studies with Tomhid Safety Analysis Methodology Heikkil~i, J ............................................................................................................................................ 79
A4: Safety Culture and Management Attitudes In-Depth Analysis of Organisationat Factors. The Need for Field Inquiries Llory, M ............................................................................................................................................... 89
Safety Management and Accident Prevention: the State of the Art in 14 Small and Medium-Sized Industrial Plants Seppala, A .............................................................................................................................................. 97
vi
Contents
Safety Practices and Risks Attitudes in French Small Companies Favaro, M. and Davillerd, C ............................................................................................................. 105
A5: Human Factors The Integration of Human Factors in Dependability." A Vital Aspect for Risk Management Fadier, E ............................................................................................................................................ 117
Human Errors in Maintenance Actions- An Experience Based Study Pyy, P., Laakso, K. and Reiman, L .................................................................................................. 129
Human Error and Technological Accident Prevention Ferro Fernandez, R ............................................................................................................................ 137
A6: Human Reliability State of the Art in the Development of a Simulator Aided Approach to Human Reliability Assessment Bareith, A., Hol16, E., Karsa, Z., Borb61y, S. and Spurgin, A. J ...................................................... 147
An Approach to the Human Reliability Assessment in the Context of the Probabilistic Safety Analysis of Complex Plants Kosmowski, K. T ............................................................................................................................... 155
HRA Study of Cognitive Reliability in a NPP Training Simulator Gao, J., Hang, X.-R. and Shen, Z.-P ................................................................................................ 167
A7: Operational Errors and Support Systems Rating Systems and Checklists as Tools in Development and Implementation of Environmental and Safety Management Systems Christiansen, H. C. and Hansen, E .................................................................................................... 175
Safety Program to Loss Prevention Control das Neves, J. A. and Pereira, C. M ................................................................................................... 181
Approach for Assessing Hazards Related to Hidden Deficiencies in Technical Systems Tomter, A ........................................................................................................................................... 189
A8: Expert Judgement in Safety Assessments Keejam." A Knowledge Engineering Methodology for Expert Judgment Acquisition and Modeling in Probabilistic Safety Assessment Cojazzi, G., Guida, G., Pinola, L., Sardella, R. and Baroni, P ........................................................ 199
A Practical Case of Assessing Subjective Probabilities- A Discussion of Concepts and Evaluation of Methods Andersen, L. B., Nilsen, T., Aven, T., Guerneri, A. and Maglione, R ............................................. 209
Expert Judgement in Safety Assessments Brown, D. A. and Scott, I. M. B ....................................................................................................... 217
Contents
vii
A9: Risk Management Decision Support Systems Risk Analysis and Decision Making." An Integrated Approach to Designing for Safety Tan, J. K. G .......................................................................................................................................
227
The Macro Project." Cost/Risk Evaluation of Engineering & Management Decisions Woodhouse, J .....................................................................................................................................
237
Development of a Methodology to Examine the Cost Effectiveness of Health and Safety Management Practices Priestley, K. N. and Livingston, A. D ............................................................................................... 247
A I0: Risk Management Decision Support Systems ADAM." An Accident Diagnostics, Analysis and Management System Esmaili, H., Orandi, S., Vijaykumar, R., Khatib-Rahbar, M., Zuchuat, O. and Schmocker, U ..... 257
RISMAN, a Method for Risk Management of Large Infrastructure Projects de Rijke, W. G., van der Does de Bye, M. R., Buvelot, R. and Vrijling, J. K ................................ 265
Computer Supported Event Analysis in Industry with High Hazard Potential Baggen, R., Wilpert, B., Fahlbruch, B. and Miller, R ...................................................................... 273
All: Risk Management Decision Support Systems An Information System Supporting Design for Reliability and Maintenance Rit, J.-F. and B6raud, M.-T ..............................................................................................................
281
Reliability Support System for Metallic Components Susceptible to Corrosion Related Cracking Lopes, E. Dias, Vianna, C., Carvalho, T., Schmatjko, K. J., Esmeraldo, D., Vancoille, M., van Acker, W., Boulliard, G., Phlippo, K., Jovanovic, A., Poloni, M., Bogaerts, W. and Tulp, J. 289
A Knowledge-Based System for Failure Identification Based on the HMG Method Jalashgar, A ........................................................................................................................................
297
A12: Software Reliability Software and Human Reliability Evaluation." An Experimental Attempt for a Common Approach Pasquini, A., Rizzo, A. and Veneziano, V ......................................................................................... 307
An Exponential Approximation to the Exponential- Multinomial Function Sfiiz de Bustamante, B .......................................................................................................................
315
Analysis and Recommendations for a Reliable Programming of Software-Based Safety Systems Nfifiez McLeod, J., Nfifiez McLeod, J. and Rivera, S. S .................................................................. 323
A13: Safety Critical Systems Overall Reliability Evaluation of the IEEE Benchmark Test System Using the NH-2 Program Pinheiro, J. M. S., Dornellas, C. R. R., Schilling, M. T., Melo, A. C. G. and Mello, J. C. O ........ 333
Hardware and Software Fault Tolerance." Definition and Evaluation of Adaptive Architectures in a Distributed Computing Environment Di Giandomenico, F., Bondavalli, A., Xu, J. and Chiaradonna, S .................................................. 341
viii
Contents
A Programmable Electronic System for Safety Related Control Applications Halang, W. A. and Adamski, M .......................................................................................................
349
Systemic Failure Modes." A Model for Perrow's Normal Accidents in Complex, Safety Critical Systems Collins, R. J. and T h o m p s o n , R.
357
The Essential Logic Model: A Method for Documenting Design Rationale in Safety Critical Systems Collins, R. J .......................................................................................................................................
365
A14: Software Reliability 3 P - The Product, the Process, the Processing in Software Reliability Leclercq, P. R ................................................................................ •.................................................... 375
Software Reliability Method Comparative Analysis From the Experience to the Theory Arbaretier, E ...................................................................... "................................................................
383
Subjective Safety Analysis for Software Development W a n g , J., Saeed, A. and de Lemos, R ...............................................................................................
389
A15: Software Reliability Software Reliability Prediction Recalibration Based on the TTT-Plot Z h a o , M. and Helander, M ................................................................................................................
399
Safety Monitor Synthesis Based on Hazard Scenarios G6rski, J. and Nowicki, B .................................................................................................................
407
Development of a System for a Rule-Driven Analysis of Safety Critical Software Miedl, H .............................................................................................................................................
417
BI: PSA Applications Individual Plant Examinations: What Perspectives Can Be Drawn? D r o u i n , M. T., Camp, A. L., Lehner, J., Pratt, T. and Forester, J .................................................. 425
PSA for CANDU-6 Pressurized Heavy Water Reactors." Wolsong Units 2, 3 and 4 of Korea Kim, M.-K. and Park, B.-C ...............................................................................................................
435
Level 2 PSA to Evaluate the Performance of the Doel l&2 NPP Containment Under Severe Accident Conditions D ' E e r , A., Boesmans, B., Auglaire, M., Wilmart, P. and Moeyaert, P .......................... .................. 441
R A O L - Simplified Approach to Risk Monitoring in Nuclear Power Plants Simi6, Z., O'Brien, J., Follen, S. and Mikuli6i6, V ............................................................................
449
B2: PSA Applications Relative Risk Measure Suitable for Comparison of Design Alternatives of Interim Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage Facility Ferjen6ik, M ..................................... ..................................................................................................
459
Contents
ix
Evaluation of Advanced Containment Features Proposed to Korean Standard Nuclear Power Plant Jin, Y., Park, S. Y., Kim, S. D. and Kim, D. H ............................................................................... 467
The Benefits of Symptom Based Procedures in a PSA (and vice-versa) Verweij, A. J. P. and de Wit, H. W ................................................................................................... 475
B3: Living QRA
On-Line Maintenance Scheduling and Risk Management- The EOOS Monitor ® Approach Simi6, Z., Follen, S. and Mikuli6i6, V ............................................................................................... 483
Supporting Risk Monitoring with off-line PSA Studies Vivalda, C., Carpignano, A. and Nordvik, J. P ................................................................................ 489
"Living" Safety Cases- A Team Approach Rawlinson, G. A ................................................................................................................................
497
B4: Waste Isolation Pilot Plant
Condensed Summary of the Systems Prioritization Method as a Decision-Aiding Approach for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Boak, D. M., Prindle, N. H., Bills, R. A., Hora, S., Lincoln, R., Mendenhall, F. and Weiner, R.. 507
Conceptual "Computational Structure of 1996 Performance Assessment for the Waste Isolation Plant Anderson, D. R., Helton, J. C., Jow, H.-N., Marietta, M. G., Chu, M. S. Y., Shephard, L. E. and Basabilvazo, G ................................................................................................................................... 515
Uncertainty and Sensitivity Analysis in 1996 Performance Assessment for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Helton, J. C., Anderson, D. R., Jow, H.-N., Marietta, M. G. and Basabilvazo, G ......................... 525
B5: Management of Safety Assessments
Management of Safety Assessments- Lessons Learned from Experience within National Projects Wilmot, R. D. and Galson, D. A ...................................................................................................... 535
Management of Performance Assessments in the Swedish Waste Disposal Programme." SKI's Views and Experiences Dverstorp, B., Kautsky, F., Norrby, S., Toverud, 6. and Wingefors, S .......................................... 541
Organisational and Management Issues in the Regulatory Assessment of Underground Radioactive Waste Disposal Thompson, B. G. J. and Sumerling, T. J ........................................................................................... 549
B6: Safety of Nuclear Waste Disposal
Safety Assessment of Complex Engineered and Natural Systems." Radioactive Waste Disposal McNeish, J. A., Balady, M. A., Vallikat, V. and Atkins, J .............................................................. 561
Assessing Performance of Imprecisely Characterized Systems." A Mathematical Perspective Tierney, M. S. and Rechard, R. P ..................................................................................................... 569
x
Contents
Assessing and Presenting Risks from Deep Disposal of High-Level Radioactive Waste McKinley, I. G., McCombie, C. and Zuidema, P ............................................................................. 577
B7: Safety of Nuclear Work Disposal
Parallel Computing in Probabilistic Safety Assessments of High-Level Nuclear Waste Pereira, A., Andersson, M. and Mendes, B ....................................................................................... 585
Exploring the Potential for Criticality in Geologic Repositories for Nuclear Waste Rechard, R. P ..................................................................................................................................... 593
B8: Industrial Safety
Derivation of Fatality Criteria for Humans Exposed to Thermal Radiation Rew, P. J. and McKay, I. P ............................................................................................................... 603
An Inherent Safety Opportunity Audit/Technology Options Analysis Ashford, N. A. and Zwetsloot, G ...................................................................................................... 613
Live Work Safety Audits Mendes, N .......................................................................................................................................... 619
B9: Industrial Safety
Technical Certification of Dangerous Equipment: A Study of the Effectiveness of Three Legally Compulsory Regimes in the Netherlands Hale, A. R., Pietersen, C. M., Heming, B. H. J., van den Brock, B., Mol, W. E. and Ribbert, C.. 631
Environmental Risk Assessment of Chemical Plants." A Process Systems Methodology Stefanis, S. K., Livingston, A. G. and Pistikopoulos, E. N .............................................................. 639
Process Safety Management." Performance Support and Training Systems Fiorentini, C., De Vecchi, F., Lander, E. P. and Orta, C. V ............................................................ 649
An Investigation of the Consequenciesfrom Possible Industrial Accidents in Northern Greece Ziomas, I. C., Poupkou, A. and Mouzakis, G .................................................................................. 657
B10: Industrial Safety
Using Modern Database Concepts to Facilitate Exchange of Information on Major Accidents in the European Union Kirchsteiger, C ................................................................................................................................... 667
Plant Safety Improvement by Logical-Physical Simulation Piccinini, N., Fiorentini, C., Scataglini, L. and de Vecchi, F ........................................................... 675
Planning of Component Inspection." Developments in the Netherlands Heerings, J. H. and Boogaard, J ........................................................................................................ 683
B11: Modelling Physical Phenomena
Uncertainty Quantification in Probabilistic Safety Analys& of the BLEVE Phenomenon Papazoglou, I. A. and Aneziris, O. N ................................................................................................ 693
Contents
xi
Extended Modelling and Experimental Research into Gas Explosions Mercx, W. P. M .................................................................................................................................
701
Modelling of a Low Discharge Ammonia Release Dusserre, G. and Bara, A ..................................................................................................................
709
B12: Pipeline Safety Risk Assessment of Pipelines Aneziris, O. N. and Papazoglou, I. A ................................................................................................
717
Quantified Risk Analysis in Transport of Dangerous Substances: A Comparison Between Pipelines and Roads Leonelli, P., Bonvicini, S. and Spadoni, G ........................................................................................
725
Artificial Neural Networks for Leak Detection in Pipelines Belsito, S. and Banerjee, S .................................................................................................................
733
Volume 2 CI: Offshore Safety On the Sensitivity of Offshore QRA Studies Vinnem, J. E .......................................................................................................................................
745
Details of the Offshore QRA Sensitivity Studies Vinnem, J. E .......................................................................................................................................
755
Designing Maintenance Programs for Not Normally Manned Offshore Installations A a m o d t , K. and Reinertsen, R ..........................................................................................................
763
Safety Analyses as a Too!for Safe and Cost-Efficient Design against Gas Explosions Svendsen, T ........................................................................................................................................
771
Probabilistic Modelling of Offshore Pool Fires Guedes Soares, C., Teixeira, A. P. and Neves, L .............................................................................. 781
C2: Offshore Safety Experience with Fast Track Risk Assessment Used to Compare Alternative Platforms Brandtz~eg, A. and Bea, R. G ............................................................................................................
791
Demanning or not Demanning? A Case Study Chamoux, P., Leroy, A. and Petit, A ................................................................................................
799
Methods and Models for Assessing Regularity in Gas Supply from the Norwegian Gas Network to the Markets Andersen, T., Horgen, H. and Pedersen, B ....................................................................................... 807
C3: Offshore Safety (ESRA TC) Overview of the Need for Modelling Development in Offshore QRA Studies Vinnem, J. E., Pappas, J. and Cox, R. A ..........................................................................................
819
xii
Contents
Modelling of Material Damage and Production Loss Due to Accidents on Offshore Installations Brennan, G., Vinnem, J. E., Tveit, O., Skramstad, E., Nesje, J. D., Lund, J., Kragh, E., Pappas, J., Svendsen, T., Trbojevic, V., Bjorna, J. K., Cox, T., Kinsella, K. and Hide, A ............. 829
Probabilistic Escalation Modelling Korneliussen, G., Eknes, M. L., Haugen, K. and Selmer-Olsen, S ................................................... 837
C4: Maritime Safety An Approach to Safety Assessment for Ship Structures Emi, H., Matoba, M., Yamamoto, N., Arima, T. and Omata, S ..................................................... 849
The Impact of Human Element in Marine Risk Management Gaarder, S., Rognstad, K. and Olofsson, M .....................................................................................
857
Structured Simulator Training to Improve Maritime Safety Cross, S. J ..........................................................................................................................................
867
C5: Maritime Safety R&k of Environmental Impact from a Coal Harbour Hansen, N. J ......................................................................................................................................
877
Ship-Platform Collision Risk Analysis Haugen, S ...........................................................................................................................................
885
Traffic Situation Assessment and Shore Based Collision Risk Recognition Baldauf, M .........................................................................................................................................
893
SATEST, a Method for Measuring Situation Awareness in Vessel Traffic Service Operators Wiersma, E., Heijer, T. and Hooijer, J ..............................................................................................
901
C6: Aviation Safety Aviation Systematic Safety- Worldwide Accident Review Sayce, A. G. and Doherty, S. M .......................................................................................................
909
A Framework for Setting Risk Criteria in Aviation Nicholls, D. B ....................................................................................................................................
915
An Alternative Approach to Setting Reliability and Maintainability Requirements for Combat Aircraft Appleton, D. P ...................................................................................................................................
923
C7: Aviation Safety Conditional Reliability Assessment of Aircraft Structures Pieracci, A. and Rackwitz, R .............................................................................................................
933
Decision Support for Aviation Safety Diagnostics." A Bayesian Approach Luxhoj, J. T ........................................................................................................................................
943
Aviation Systematic Safety- Occurrence Grading Scheme Sayce, A. G. and Doherty, S. M .......................................................................................................
951
Contents
xiii
C8: Railway Safety System Reliability Model for Analysing Performance of a New Railway Formaniak, A. J., Muir, I. G. S., Nanu, L. and Pickett, A. D. F .................................................... 961
Safety Communications and Management of Railway Spaces Open to the Public French, L. H ......................................................................................................................................
971
Application of a Quantified Risk Control Process Tong, D., Kwong, P. and Ho, C. W .................................................................................................
977
C9: Railway Safety Monitoring of the Railway Vehicles Availability Hudoklin, A. and Stadler, A ..............................................................................................................
987
Reliability Centered Maintenance of Signalling on French Railways (SNCF) Dermenghem, J.-P ..............................................................................................................................
995
Quantitative Risk Analysis of Industrial and Transportation Activities in the Ravenna Area: A Second Report Spadoni, G., Leonelli, P. and Egidi, D .............................................................................................
1003
C10: Automobile Reliability IAM (Intelligent Actuation and Measurement) Model and its Maintenance Relevancy for Robotic Car Assembly Zeng, S. W ........................................................................................................................................
1013
Towards an Architecture for Safety Re&ted Fault Tolerant Systems in Vehicles Dilger, E., Johansson, L. A., Kopetz, H., Krug, M., Lid6n, P., McCall, G., Mortara, P., Mfiller, B., Panizza, U., Poledna, S., Schedl, A. V., S6derberg, J., Str6mberg, M. and Thurner, T .........................................................................................................................................
1021
Using Semi-Parametric Bayesian Techniques in Reliability Validation Tasks Raoult, J. P., Gouget, N. and E1 Khair, A ......................................................................................
1031
Cll" Ship Equipment Reliability Shar&g Ships' Reliability, Availability, Ma&tainability (RAM) Information to Improve Cost Effectiveness and Safety Inozu, B., Schaedel, P. G., Roy, P. and Molinari, V ....................................................................... 1039
Economic and Reliability Aspects of Simple and Redundant Configurations for Ship Electric Propulsion Systems Pierrat, L., Fracchia, M. and Manzini, R ........................................................................................
1047
Life Assessment of CPPE's Power Plants Critical Components Goul~o, A. and Enes, J .....................................................................................................................
1057
C12: Reliability of Electronic Systems New Methods of Field Reliability Analysis & a Harsh Environment Hernandez, R ....................................................................................................................................
1067
xiv
Contents
Reliability of Electronic Components- Failure Rates Prediction Methods Bot, Y., Herrer, Y., Korenfeld, H. and Gabay, Y ........................................................................... 1075
EriView 2000- A Tool for the Analysis of Field Statistics Oscarsson, P. and Hallberg, 6 ..........................................................................................................
1083
C13: Reliability of Power Engineering Systems Power System Reliability Assessments and Applications- A Review Allan, R. N .......................................................................................................................................
1093
Reliability Analysis of Distribution Systems Considering Sub-Unavailabilities Rom{m Ubeda, J. and Rivier Abbad, J ............................................................................................
1105
Liability for Electrical Accidents." Safety and Risk Stillman, R. H ...................................................................................................................................
1115
C14: Reliability of Power Engineering Systems The New VDEW Statistics of Incidents- A Source for Component Reliability Indices of Electric Power Systems Htigel, R., Weber, Th., Lebeau, H., B6se, C. and Wellssow, W. H ................................................ 1127
Different Ways to Process Failure Statistics for Use in Reliability Analysis of Electric Power Systems Lovers, G. G. and Opskar, K. A .......................................................................................................
1135
Deterministic and Probabilistic Approaches to the Dependability of Instrumentation and Control Systems." Two Complementary Assessments in Compliance with IEC 1069 Allain-Morin, G. and Hausberger, R ...............................................................................................
1143
C15: Tools and QRA Apph'cations A Software Method for the Preliminary Definition of Maintenance on Complex Systems Components Righini, R., Bottazzi, A., Fichera, C., Kladias, N. and Perasso, L ................................................. 1155
STOPHAZ." A Support Tool for Operability and Hazard Studies Senni, S., Colombo, L. and Preston, M. L .......................................................................................
1163
Computer Simulation and Risk Analysis around Unstable Cliffs. Application to a French Case E1-Shayeb, Y., Verdel, T. and Didier, C ...........................................................................................
1171
D l: Structural Reliability and Maintenance of Bridges Optim&ation of Bridge Management Dec&ions Based on Rel&bility and Life-Cycle Cost Frangopol, D. M. and Estes, A. C ...................................................................................................
1183
Reliability Methods as a Complement to the Practice of Bridge Management Mancino, E. and Pardi, L .................................................................................................................
1195
Influence of the Fatigue Degradation and the Rheological Changes in Material on the Reliability of Bridges Sieniawska, R., Sniady, P. and Zukowski, S .................................................................................... 1203
Contents
xv
D2: Optimisation of Structural Systems
Optimal Allocation of Resources for Life-Cycle Management of Structures and Highway Networks Augusti, G., Ciampoli, M. and Frangopol, D. M ............................................................................ 1213
Development of a Maintenance Optimization Procedure of Structural Components in Nuclear Power Plants Bryla, Ph., Ardorino, F., Aufort, P., Jacquot, J. P., Magne, L., Monnier, B., Pitner, P., V+rit6, B. and Villain, B .................................................................................................................................... 1221
Optimization of Thin-Walled Girders in Probabilistic Formulation Gibczyfiska, T. and Bereza, P ...........................................................................................................
1229
D3: Stochastic Models of Loads
Stochastic Modelling of Traffic Loads for Multilane Effect Evaluation Croce, P., Salvatore, W. and Sanpaolesi, L ......................................................................................
1237
The Maximum of Stationary Non-Differentiable Gaussian Processes Breitung, K., Casciati, F. and Faravelli, L .......................................................................................
1245
Robust Reliability of Mechanical Systems Ben-Haim, Y .....................................................................................................................................
1253
D4: Simulation in Structural Reliability
Multinormal Probability by Sequentional Conditioned Importance Sampling Ambartzumian, R., Der Kiureghian, A., Ohanian, V. and Sukiasian, H ........................................ 1261
Adaptive Use of Response Surfaces in the Reliability Computations of Mechanical Components Devictor, N., Marques, M. and Lemaire, M .................................................................................... 1269
From Partial Factors Method to Simulation-Based Reliability Assessment Concepts in Structural Design de Almeida, A., Marek, P. and Guitar, M ....................................................................................... 1279
Monte Carlo Simulation Challenges in Structural Mechanics." An Approach with PROMENVIR Marchante, E. M ...............................................................................................................................
1287
D5: Time Variant Reliability
A Concept for Deriving Partial Safety Factors for Time-Variant Reliability Rackwitz, R .......................................................................................................................................
1295
Time Variant Reliability of a Reinforced Concrete Column Holick2~, M. and Vrouwenvelder, T ..................................................................................................
1307
Probabilistic Estimation of Structure Life from the Po&t of View of Safety Borg6n, J., Klimaszewski, S., Smoliflski, H. and Tomaszek, H ....................................................... 1315
xvi
Contents
D6: Structural Reliability of Dynamic Systems
Moment and Spectral Methods for Stochastic Parameter Estimation of Multi-Degree of Freedom Systems Battaini, M. and Roberts, J. B ......................................................................................................... 1323
Interval Prediction of Eigenvalues, Eigenvectors and Frequency Response Functions Teicher.t, W. H. and Sz6kely, G. S .................................................................................................... 1331
Dynamic Reliability Evaluation of Hysteretic MDF Structures Considering Parameter Uncertainties Zhao, Y. G. and Ono, T ................................................................................................................... 1341
D7: Structural Control
Model-Based Diagnosis of Structural Systems Natke, H. G ....................................................................................................................................... 1351
On Controlled L&ear Quadratic Gauss&n Systems with Contaminated Observations Romera, R. and Villagarcia, T ......................................................................................................... 1361
System Reliability Approach to Safety Analysis of Controlled Structures Battaini, M., Casciati, F. and Faravelli, L ....................................................................................... 1369
D8: Fire Safety
Risk Assessment of Building Fires Magnusson, S. E., Frantzich, H. and Kundin, J .............................................................................. 1379
Assessment of the Impact of Reliability of Fire Protection Systems on Life Safety in Buildings Yung, D. and Hadjisophocleous, G. V ............................................................................................. 1391
Fire Risk Analysis and Protective Measures for the Historic Site of Evora Serrano, M. B. and Ferreira, I. M .................................................................................................... 1399
D9: Offshore Safety (ESRA TC)
Fire Reliability of Skeletal and Plated Structures in Offshore Platforms Shetty, N. K. and Guedes Soares, C ................................................................................................ 1407
Reliability Based Factors for Fixed Steel Offshore Structural Design Efthymiou, M., van de Graaf, J. W., Tromans, P. S. and Hines, I. M ........................................... 1415
Improved Processes for Strength Assessment in the Requalification of Offshore Structures Di Cocco, N. R., Copello, S. and Piva, R ........................................................................................ 1423
Offshore Pipelines." Design Scenarios and Code Calibration by Reliability Methods Leira, B. J ............................................................. ............................................................................. 1435
D10: Offshore Safety (ESRA TC)
Overview of Probabilistic Models of the Wave Environment for Reliability Assessment of Offshore Structures Bitner-Gregersen, E. M. and Guedes Soares, C ............................................................................... 1445
Contents
xvii
Reliability Analysis of the Primary Strength of an Oil Tanker- Combination of Vertical and Horizontal Wave-Induced Load Effects Casella, G. and Rizzuto, E ...............................................................................................................
1457
Fatigue Reliability of Ship Hulls with Random Limit State Guedes Soares, C. and G a r b a t o v , Y ................................................................................................ 1467
D11: Fatigue Reliability
An Engineering Methodology for Structural Integrity Assessments Using Probabilistic Fracture Mechanics Ruggieri, C. and D o d d s Jr., R. H .................................................................................................... 1477
Fatigue Crack Monitoring in Parallel Time Scales K o r d o n s k y , Kh. and Gertsbakh, I .................................................................................................... 1485
Models for Reliability and Management of NDE Data Simola, K. and Pulkkinen, U ............................................................................................................ 1491
D12: Structural Reliability
Reliability Analysis of the Stability of Slender Structures with Geometrical Imperfections Thieffry, P., Mitteau, J. C. and Lemaire, M .................................................................................... 1501
Reliability Analysis of a Stochastically Non-Linear Structural System Rozmarynowski, B ............................................................................................................................
1509
STRAP." A Computer Tool for Structural Reliability Analysis Ciccotelli, M. and Meghella, M ........................................................................................................ 1519
Probabilistic Approach of the Tunnel Face Stability Using the Monte Carlo Procedure G a m b a , L. and C h a m b o n , P ........................................................................................................... 1527
D13: Seismic Risk and Concrete Structures
A New Statistical Model for Vrancea Earthquakes Using Prior Information from Earthquakes Before 1900 van Gelder, P. H. A. J. M. and Lungu, D ....................................................................................... 1535
The Probabilistic Evaluation of the Risk Ground Movement Rezig, S., Favre, J. L. and Leroi, E .................................................................................................. 1543
Probabilistic Modeling of Concrete Structures in Bending for Cracking Analysis Bljuger, E ..........................................................................................................................................
1551
An Application of the Material Combination Factor in the Design of RC Structures Krakovski, M. B ...............................................................................................................................
1559
D14: Variability of Material Properties
Statistical Properties of the European Production of Structural Steels Cecconi, A., Croce, P. and Salvatore, W .......................................................................................... 1567
Control of Concretes Quality Lechani, M., Ait M o h a n d , H. and Madiou, H ................................................................................ 1575
xviii
Contents
Data and Consideration on the Var&bility of Geotechnical Properties of Soils Cherubini, C ...................................................................................................................................... 1583
D15: Structural Reliability Design Combining Information in the Field of Structural Engineering Scheiwiller, A .................................................................................................................................... 1595
Probabilistic Safety Design by a Generalized Two Parameter Approach Bertrand, G. and H a a k , R ................................................................................................................
1601
Failure Estimation of Trusses by Fuzzy Sets Jendo, S. and Niczyj, J ...................................................................................................................... 1609
Volume 3 El: Uncertainty Modelling (ESRA TC) (no entries)
E2: Uncertainty Modelling MayDay. A Software Tool to Perform Uncertainty and Sensitivity Analysis. Capabilities and Applications Bolado, R., M o y a , J. A. and Alonso, A ........................................................................................... 1621
Propagation of Uncertainty in Coherent Structures F a n k h a u s e r , H. R. and R e j d e m a r k , K ............................................................................................. 1629
Intuition Theory and Risk Analysis Applications Islamov, R. T .................................................................................................................................... 1637
E3: Uncertainty Analysis On the Bayesian Approach to Risk Analysis Aven, T ............................................................................................................................................. 1647
Analysis of Uncertainty of Mechanical Components Dependability Data N o w a k o w s k i , T ................................................................................................................................. 1653
An Approximate Statistical Predictor for the Melcor Code Mira, J. and Pefia, D ........................................................................................................................ 1661
E4: Modelling Maintenance Costs A Review of the Marginal Cost Approach for Order-Replacement Models for a Spare Unit Csenki, A ........................................................................................................................................... 1671
The Cost Function for Periodically Tested Standby Units With Age-Replacement Maintenance Vaurio, J. K ...................................................................................................................................... 1681
The Zero Option Maintenance ,Strategy for Minimum Risk of Failure S m a l k o , Z., Ja2wihski, J. and Zurek, J ............................................................................................. 1691
Contents
xix
E5: Maintenance Optimisation
On the Modelling of Condition Based Maintenance Scarf, P. A ......................................................................................................................................... 1701
On the Use of Equipment Criticality in Ma&tenance Optimization and Spare Parts Inventory Control Dekker, R. and Plasmeijer, R ........................................................................................................... 1709
Availability and Spares Requirements Under the Renewal Theory for Single Repairable Units Martinez Garcia, J
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1719
A Survey on the Interval Availability Distribution of Failure Prone Systems Smith, M. A. J., Aven, T., Dekker, R. and van der Duyn Schouten, F. A ..................................... 1727
E6: Maintenance Optimisation
Probability-Based Optimization of Maintenance of the River Maas Weir at Lith van Manen, S. E., Janssen, M. P. and van den Bunt, B .................................................................. 1741
Numerical Absolute & Constrained Optimization of Maintenance Based on Risk and Cost Criteria Using Genetic Algorithms Mufioz, A., Martorell, S. and Serradell, V ....................................................................................... 1749
Modelling of Test-and Inspection Procedures." a Case Study." a Branch of an Auxiliary Feed Water System (AFWS) Tombuyses, B. and Absil, P .............................................................................................................. 1757
E7: Preventive Maintenance
Reliability Evaluation of Systems Subject to Partial Renewals for Preventive Maintenance Ch~telet, E., B6renguer, C. and Grall, A .......................................................................................... 1767
The Effect of Preventive Maintenance on Component Reliability Dorrepaal, J. W., Hokstad, P., Cooke, R. M. and Paulsen, J. L .................................................... 1775
Recent Results in Age Based Preventive Maintenance Planning Nachlas, J. A., Murdock, W. P., Degbotse, A. and Rao, N. R ....................................................... 1783
E8: Risk Based Maintenance
Maintenance Evaluation Using Risk Based Criteria Torres Valle, A .................................................................................................................................. 1793
Risk Ranking- The Opportunity for Cost Reduction Parkinson, W. J., Schloss, J. C., Hewitt, J. R., Hamzehee, H. G., Karpyak, S. D. and Tirsun, D. M ..................................................................................................................................... 1801
Risk Level Indicators for Surveillance of Changes in Risk Level Oien, K., Sklet, S. and Nielsen, L .................................................................................................... 1809
E9: Reliability Data Banks (ESReDA)
The European Industry Reliability Data Bank." EIReDA Procaccia, H., Aufort, P. and Arsenis, S .......................................................................................... 1819
xx
Contents
The ESReDA Guidebook on the Effective Use of Safety and Reliability Data with Particular Reference to "Intelligent" Selections from Raw Reliability Data Arsenis, S. P ...................................................................................................................................... 1827
Data Bank Quality Pettersson, L ............................ ........................................................................................................... 1835
Development and Use of a Directory of Accident Databases involving Chemicals Pineau, J. P ....................................................................................................................................... 1841
El0: Data Analysis
Inference from Accelerated Life Tests with Generalised Life Distribution Function and with Data Driven Selection of an Ageing Model. Maciejewski, H .................................................................................................................................. 1849
Reliability of Mechanical Components--Accelerated Testing and Advanced Statistical Methods Aug6, J.-C, Lallement, J. and L y o n n e t , P ...................... ;.................................................................. 1859
Evaluating the Effectiveness of Different Burn-in Strategies Using Field Failure Analysis N y b o r g , M ........................................................................................................................................ 1869
Ell: Data Analysis
Resampling and Bootstrap Methods in Analysis of Reliability Data Belyaev, Y. K .................................................................................................................................... 1877
Resampling and Simulation on Small-Size Samples Chevalier, M., Perez, D., Biasse, J.-M. and M i t t e r r a n d , J.-M ......................................................... 1883
Derivation of Frequency and Recovery Probabilities for Loss of Off-Site Power Accident M o r o z o v , V. B. a n d T o k m a c h e v , G. V ............................................................................................ 1889
El2: Bayesian Methods
Assessing the Failure-Rate-Prior-PDF after Component Modifications Aimed to ReliabilityGrowth Clarotti, C. A., L a n n o y , A. and Procaccia, H .................................................................................. 1897
Bayesian Prediction of Risks Based on Few and Dependent Data Bigfin, E. S ........................................................................................................................................ 1903 Costs Associated with Life Testing, Truncated After the Occurrence of a Predetermined Number r of Failures D e Souza Jr., D. I ............................................................................................................................. 1913
El3: Mathematical Methods in Reliability
Reliability Evaluation of Large Weibull Systems with Different Components K o t o w r o c k i , K .................................................................................................................................. 1923
Approximation of the Reliability of Large Scale Systems with Random Number of Components S m o l a r e k , L ....................................................................................................................................... 1931
Contents
xxi
Explicit Shape of the Status and Reliability Functions of Any System M a r t i n e z Garcia, J ............................................................................................................................ 1937
Optimal Replacement Times for Systems of Multiple and Single Use K o p n o v , V. A ................................................................................................................................... 1947
Statistical Method Based on the Weibull Distribution to Estimate the Life-Length of Banknotes Le6n, F .............................................................................................................................................. 1957
El4: Reliability and Stochastic Processes Control
A Simple Definition of Risk and Its Control Charts Girmes, D. H .................................................................................................................................... 1967
A Note on Safety, Reliability and Control of Systems von Collani, E ................................................................................................................................... 1977
Applications of Some Reliability Models Considering Covariates K u m a r , D. and Westberg, U ............................................................................................................ 1985
El5: Education and Training
Centre for Dependability and Maintenance at LuleCt University of Technology- A Way to Improve Research and Education. Klefsj6, B. and K u m a r , U ................................................................................................................ 1995
Stochastic Process Control and Quality Management R a m a l h o t o M. F. and G u e d e s Soares, C ......................................................................................... 2003
An Interesting Real Problem to Teach Simulation Techniques to Engineering Students Villagarcia, T. and R o m e r a , R ......................................................................................................... 2011
FI: Systems Dependability
Using the Constraint Programming System Toupie for Qualitative Analysis of Industrial Systems Failures Lajeunesse, S. and R a u z y , A ............................................................................................................ 2021
Modeling the Operating Environment Effects on Phsyically-Connected Redundant Components Marseguerra, M., P a d o v a n i , E. and Zio, E ...................................................................................... 2029
F2: Fault Tree Analysis
Better Fault Tree Analys& Via Sequential Modularization Schneeweiss, W. G ............................................................................................................................ 2039
BDD Based Fault-Tree Processing." A Comparison of Variable Ordering Heuristics Bouissou, M., Bruy~re, F. and R a u z y , A ......................................................................................... 2045
RAMS Computation Algorithms using the Set of Good Paths of the System Lardeux, E ......................................................................................................................................... 2053
xxii
Contents
F3: Boolean Modelling
Handling Boolean Models with Loops Dutuit, Y. and Rauzy, A .................................................................................................................. 2063
An Easy-to-Implement Efficient Algorithm for Solving the Terminal Pair Reliability Problem Schneeweiss, W. and Wirsching, J .................................................................................................... 2071
Pseudo-Boolean Approach to Solving Reliability Problems Rai, S. and Trahan, J. L ................................................................................................................... 2079
F4: Dynamic Reliability
Method to Divide Dynamic Systems into Independent Sub-Systems for Reliability Computation Duhesme, E. and Laleuf, J.-C ................................................... i ....................................................... 2089
On the Application of the ISA Methodology to the Study of Accident Sequence Precursors Mel6ndez Asensio, E., P6rez Mulas, A. and Izquierdo R o c h a , J. M ............................................... 2097
Role of Time Delays in Event Trees Dessars, N. and Devooght, J ............................................................................................................ 2105
F5: Monte Carlo Methods in Reliability
Parameter Estimates for Monte Carlo Simulation of Contaminant Transport in Groundwater Marseguerra, M. and Zio, E ............................................................................................................. 2115
Variance Reduction for Simultaneous Monte Carlo Estimation of Many Markovian Unreliability Functionals Delcoux, J. L .....................................................................................................................................
2123
Variance Reduction Techniques in Monte Carlo Simulation Applied to Dynamic Reliability Labeau, P. E .....................................................................................................................................
2129
Using D&crete Event Simulation in Rel&bility Analysbs Eisinger, S .........................................................................................................................................
2139
F6: Semi-Markov Analysis
ph-Distribution Method for Reliability Evaluation of Semi-Markov Systems Bousfiha, A. and Limnios, N ............................................................................................................ 2149
Application of Transport Equations to Model Reliability Problems of Dynamic Systems Becker, G., Camarinopoulos, L. and Micheler, M ........................................................................... 2155
Availability Analysis of a 1-out-of-2:G Non-Markovian System Operating under Fluctuating Environment Agarwal, M. and Chaudhuri, M ....................................................................................................... 2163
F7: Modelling Dependent Failures
Modeling Stochastically Dependent Failures Marseguerra, M. and Zio, E ............................................................................................................. 2173
Contents
xxiii
Searching for Systemic Failure Modes Collins, R. J. and T h o m p s o n , R ....................................................................................................... 2181
VVER Specific Common Cause Failure Data Tokmachev, G. V ..............................................................................................................................
2189
F8: Reliability of Degrading Systems
Reliability Analysis of Degraded System Configurations Vahl, A ..............................................................................................................................................
2197
Simulator for Estimating Reliability of a System Subject to Imperfect Repair Lie, C. H., Hong, J. S., Kim, T. W., Baek, S. Y. and Lim, T. J ..................................................... 2205
Reliability Analysis of Non-Repaired Multistate Systems Korczak, E ........................................................................................................................................
2213
F9: Reliability in Networks
An Overview of Methodologies for Reliability Analysis of Multiexchange Networks Craveirinha, J. and Gomes, T ........................................................................................................... 2223
A Simulation Approach to the Estimation of Cutoff Connection Rate in the A TM Switching System Jeong, M. K., Koh, J. S. and Choi, S. H ......................................................................................... 2233
An Improved Method for Network Reliability Analysis Shen, Y.-L. and Tao, C.-X ............................................................................................................... 2239
Quantifying the Fault Tolerance of Multiple-Bus Based Systems Schneeweiss, W. G. and Kfifner, H .................................................................................................. 2247
F10: Petri-Net Analysis
Analysis of a Sequential Non Coherent and Looped System with Two Approaches." Petri Nets and Neural Networks Pasquet, S., Chf~telet, E., Thomas, P. and Dutuit, Y ....................................................................... 2257
Application of Petri-Nets-Based Method for Reliability Analysis of NPP Safety System Petkov, G. I .......................................................................................................................................
2265
Time-Dependent Availability Analysis for Ship Electric Redundant Propulsion Systems Using Petri Nets Pierrat, L. and Fracchia, M .............................................................................................................. 2275
Fll: Dependability of Robot Systems
Failure Detection, Isolation and Recovery System Concept for the European Robotic Arm Bos, J. F. T. and Oort, M. J. A ........................................................................................................ 2285
Developing the Safety Case for Large Mobile Robots Seward, D., Quayle, S., Somerville, I. and Morrey, R ..................................................................... 2293
Failure Diagnosis and Analysis for an Autonomous Underwater Vehicle Christensen, P., Lauridsen, K. and Madsen, H. O ........................................................................... 2301
xxiv
Contents
FI2: Reliability in Design Sensitivity of Passive System Behaviour Ricotti, M. E. and Zio, E .................................................................................................................
2311
The Utility of Passive Systems for Safety and Reliability Spray, S. D. and Cooper, J. A ..........................................................................................................
2321
Improving Systems' Dependability Agarwal, J., Blockley, D. I. and Woodman, N. J ............................................................................ 2329
F13: Reliability in Design Modelling Reliability Growth Through Innovation Ansell, J. I. and Phillips, M. J ..........................................................................................................
2341
A New Analysis Method for Reliability Design." Computational Graphic Modeling Karasawa, S., Nojo, S. and Watanabe, H ........................................................................................ 2353
Reliability Apportionment for Systems with Nonexponential Time to Failure Jaeger, M., Porat, Z. and Tzidony, D .............................................................................................. 2361
Probabilistic Reliability in Machine Tool Design Jia, Y., Cheng, X. and Jia, Z ............................................................................................................
2367
F14: Case Studies of Systems Reliability A Case Study on Reliability Analysis of a Multiexchange Telecommunication Network Gomes, T., Craveirinha, J., Baeta, I., Santos, R. and Pereira, J ...................................................... 2377
Reliability Analysis of Service Water Pumps by Poisson Point Processes with a Generalized Model for the Rate of Occurrence of Failures Saldanha, P. L. C., de Simone, E. A. and Frutuoso e Melo, P. F .................................................. 2385
Safety Analysis in Operation and Design of Open Pit Machines Mlynczak, M .....................................................................................................................................
2393
F15: Fuzzy Set Modelling Applications of Fuzzy Inference Methods to Failure Modes Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) Kara-Zaitri, C. and Fleming, P. V .................................................................................................... 2403
Fault Tree Analysis with Fuzzy Failure Rates Comotti, D., Di Giulio, A., Ghisleni, T., Sinisi, M. and Uguccioni, G ........................................... 2415
The Limited Applicability of Fuzzy Set Theory to Fault Tree Analysis--Negative Probabilities and other Anomalies Bischoff, K. and Bretschneider, M ................................................................................................... 2423
PREFACE
These volumes comprise the papers presented at the ESREL'97 Conference. The purpose of the ESREL Conferences is to provide a forum for the presentation of technical and scientific papers covering both methods and applications of safety and reliability to a wide range of industrial sectors and technical disciplines enhancing cross-fertilisation between them. A broad view is taken of safety and reliability which includes essentially probabilistically based methods, or more generally, methods that deal with the quantification of the uncertainty in the knowledge of the real world and with decision making under this uncertainty. The areas covered range from design and product liability, to availability, reliability and maintainability, to assessment and management of risks to technical systems, health and the environment and to mathematical methods of reliability and statistical analysis of data. The annual ESREL Conferences stem from an European initiative merging several National Conferences into a Pan-European Safety and Reliability event under the auspices of ESRA, the European Safety and Reliability Association. ESRA started up in the late 1980's by the European Commission and in 1992 it was established in Brussels as a non-profit making International Association, aiming at the advancement and application of Safety and Reliability technology in all areas of activity. ESRA strives to establish co-operation and mutual exchange of information between national and international professional societies, standard setting organisations, industry and research groups, aiming at the advancement of the methods and applications of Safety and Reliability. The ESREL Conferences started from National Conferences in France and the United Kingdom, Xla7 in Brest in 1990 and REL'91 in London. From 1992 onwards, they acquired a more European dimension and they have been held successively in Copenhagen, Munich, La Baule, Bournemouth and Crete from 1992 to 1996, the latter in co-operation with IAPSAM. The 1997 Conference is organised by Instituto Superior T6cnico of the Technical University of Lisbon. The technical programme has been the responsibility of an International Committee of about 50 specialists from different countries, industries and technical disciplines that have reviewed the abstracts and then the full papers, prior to their final acceptance. The starting point has been 510 abstracts from which 310 have been accepted, from which 270 papers have been included in these proceedings for presentation at the Conference. It is important to stress that the present conference has, in fact, gone beyond the European dimension insofar as it includes papers with authors from 35 countries, 15 of which are non-European. The organisation of the books follows closely the sessions of the Conference, which in turn is based on six parallel sessions. Each of the three volumes of the proceedings contains the papers from two parallel sessions. XXV
xxvi
Preface
The first session deals with Risk Management, including aspects of risk perception, safety culture, human factors and decision support systems. In addition it includes topics of software reliability and of safety critical systems. The second session concentrates on applications of quantified risk assessment to the nuclear industry and to industrial safety. The second volume includes a session dealing mainly with transportation safety, including aviation, railway, automobile and maritime as well as aspects of offshore safety. It also covers aspects of reliability of electronic and power engineering systems. The other session deals mainly with aspects of structural reliability, which cover assessment methods, the modelling of loads and material properties, as well as applications to different types of structures such as bridges, buildings, concrete structures, highway systems, offshore and ship structures. The last volume includes sessions on reliability based maintenance and on systems dependability. The first of the two sessions has papers on uncertainty modelling, on maintenance and on statistical analysis of data. The other includes topics such as fault-tree analysis, dynamic reliability, boolean and semi-markov analysis and reliability in design. It is hoped that such a wide programme will ensure that the conference fulfils its aim of being a forum for engineers, scientists, managers and regulators linked to different industries and technical disciplines to meet and exchange their knowledge and experience in the field of safety and reliability engineering. In concluding, I would like to thank the authors and all those who have contributed to the organisation of the conference. In particular the members of the advisory board, the technical programme committee, the session organisers and chairpersons, the local organising committee and the conference secretariat. All have contributed to the final outcome of the conference and to the contents and organisation of these books. Carlos Guedes Soares ESREL '97 Conference Chairman
The 1997 Annual ESRA Conference
Organised by Instituto Superior T6cnico
in Collaboration with ESRA- European Safety and Reliability Association ESReDA Danish Risk Assessment Society Institute of Quality Assurance Institut de Suret6 de Fonctionnement Norwegian Association for Risk and Reliability Analysis Ordem dos Engenheiros SRE- Scandinavian Chapter The Safety and Reliability Society VDI-GSP - Verein Deutscher Ingenieure 3 ASI Associazone degli Analisti di Affidabilit/l e Sicurezza
Sponsored by Commission of the European Communities Fundag~o Calousten Gulbenkian Junta Nacional de Investigag~o Cientifica e Tecnol6gica xxvii
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ESREL'97 Conference Chairman c. Guedes Soares, PT
Advisory Board D. Harvey, UK l.Watson, UKP. Kafka, DEM. Cottam, UK K. Petersen, DKP.R. Leclercq, FI. Papazoglou, G
Technical Programme Committee J. Anselmo, B T. Aven, N I.C. Bacivarov, RO J.F. Barbet, F A. Bareith, HG P. Barrett, UK G. Becker, DE J. Biemat, PL A. Birolini, CH D.I. Blockley, UK M. Brown, UK L. Camarinopoulos, GR C.A. Clarotti, I R. Cooke, NL M. Cottam, UK J. Craveirinha, PT C. Dennis, UK
J. Devooght, B M.S. Elzas, NL E. Fadier, F L. Faravelli, I T.A.W. Geyer, UK T. Gulbrandsen, N A.R. Hale, NL L. Harms-Ringdahl, SE M. Holick~, CZR J. Holmberg, FN A. Hudoklin, SL R. Islamov, R P. Kafka, DE B. Klefs6, SE K. Kolov~Tocki,PL H. Kortner, N P.R. Leclercq, F
V. Leg~it,CZ M. Lemaire, F B. Littlewood, UK D. Lungu, RO S. Lydersen, N M. Marseguerra, I B.R. Martin, UK S. Martorell, E I.G. McKinley, CH J. Moltoft, DK R. Nevell, UK M. Newby, UK I. Papazoglou, GR A. Pasquini, I P.PY2¢,FN K.E. Petersen, DK C. Pietersen, NL
H. Procaccia, F R. Rackwitz, DE J-F. Raffoux, F M.F. Ramalhoto, PT M. Raasand, N V. Rouhiainen, FN A.S. Bustamante, E G.I. Schu~ller, A W. Schneeweiss, DE A. Seppala, FN J-P. Signoret, F P. Sniady, PL A. Sols, E B.G.J.Thompson, UK J.K. Vaurio, FN J.E. Vinnem, N E. Wolfgang, DE
Session Organisers T. Aven E. Fadier A.R. Hale L. Harms-Ringdahl J. Holmberg
P. Kafka J. Moltoft M. Newby I. Papazoglou A. Pasquini
K.E. Petersen R. Rackwitz V. Rouhiainen W. Schneeweiss
J.P. Signoret B.G.J. Thompson J.K. Vaurio I. Watson
Local Organising Committee A. Augusto Femandes P. Mendes
J.F. Craveirinha R. Teixeira Duarte
A.P. Teixeira V. Gonqalves Brito
Col~erence Secretariat M. F,'itima Pina, Cristina Ribeiro, Sandra Robalo xxix
M. Bouza Serrano M.F. Ramalhoto
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AI" Risk Based Regulations
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THE REGULATORY REVIEW OF SAFETY-RELATED INFORMATION REGARDING UNDERGROUND RADIOACTIVE WASTE DISPOSAL IN ENGLAND AND WALES B G J Thompson, and C R Williams The Environment Agency of England & Wales
ABSTRACT This paper builds upon earlier related contributions to the ESREL/PSAM Conference series and elsewhere, to outline the nature of a safety case based upon probabilistic risk analysis and the options for its assessment by a regulatory authority. Much has been published since the late 1970's, concerning the methods and tools used to perform technical analyses of radiological performance for any single party in a democratic society. However, little attention seems to have been given in the literature to the way in which such analyses, undertaken independently by a regulator, are best used to probe the safety case and its underlying arguments in a coherent and traceable manner. Recent experience from the review of preliminary safety-related information for a proposed deep repository in England indicates that further consideration should be given to the regulatory methodology, to possible difficulties due to oversimplified analyses, and to careful preparation for Public Hearings.
m~vwoans Regulation, risk, assessment, radioactive waste disposal, probabilistic risk assessment, public decision making, decision analysis, Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Pollution, HMIP.
INTRODUCTION
Papers published in the earlier ESREL/PSAM international conferences, for example Thompson (1994), Steam (1994), Sumerling and Read (1994), Thompson, Smith and Porter (1996), Ashworth and Porter (1996) and others, provide an ongoing account of the development and application of the post-closure risk assessment capability of the Environment Agency1, in connection with its duties to regulate the underground disposal of solid low and intermediate level radioactive wastes. The present paper builds upon the arguments advanced in these related contributions, and elsewhere, to outline the nature of a safety case based upon probabilistic risk analysis, and the options for its assessment by a regulatory authority. Although this experience has been related specifically to nuclear waste disposal, the general principles and methods outlined, together with issues of concern, should be of interest to those constructing safety-related arguments in other application areas. This paper is intended to underpin a complete session on risk-based regulation at ESREL '97, therefore.
1 Originally carried out by Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Pollution (HMIP) which, on 1 April 1996, became part of the Environment Agency of England and Wales.
4
B.G.J. Thompson and C.R. Williams
THE REGULATORY CONTEXT In the United Kingdom, no person may dispose of radioactive waste except in accordance with an authorisation under the Radioactive Substances Act 1993 (RSA93), except where the waste is excluded by the Act or by an Exemption Order. The developer of a deep repository, referred to below as "the proponent", will be required to apply to the relevant Agency - namely the Environment Agency for a site in England and Wales, or the Scottish Environment Protection Agency for a site in Scotland - for authorisation of disposals on or from the repository site. Authorisation under RSA93 would include both the emplacement of the primary solid waste, without intent to retrieve it at a later time, and the discharges of any secondary liquid or gaseous radioactive arisings. There is no statutory requirement for the proponent to make an application for an authorisation under RSA93 at any particular time, although he must have such an authorisation actually to dispose of radioactive waste. The proponent may choose to make an application to the Agency early in his programme, or much nearer the time that waste is to emplaced. The proponent is solely responsible for preparing and presenting the Agency with a satisfactory safety case, as part of an application for authorisation. The Agency is responsible for examining the quality of the scientific basis of this case, the way in which it has been applied, the quality and traceability of the data used, the way in which uncertainties have been treated, and, eventually the conclusions offered by the proponent in regard to the safety of the proposed disposal arrangements. A proposed repository would require planning permission under the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, in addition to authorisation under RSA93. Planning applications are made to the local planning authority- but in the case of a proposed repository, the application would be called in by the relevant Environment Secretary of State and a public inquiry will be held. The Agency is likely to be asked to provide the inquiry with a technical view on the proponent's proposals which is both informed and independent. HM Nuclear Installations Inspectorate (HMNII) of the Health and Safety Executive is responsible for the safety of operations on nuclear licensed sites as defined in the Nuclear Installations Act 1965. While the present paper is not concerned with those operational nuclear safety aspects, it may be noted that any future repository would be a nuclear licensed site, and that the Agency would consult and cooperate with HMNII to ensure that the requirements of each regulatory organisation would be met by the proponent.
THE PROCESS OF REGULATORY ASSESSMENT The nature of the safety case
A safety case may conveniently be considered as comprised of four related aspects: (a) A knowledge base of repository design, waste characteristics and quantities proposed for disposal, the information from the geological and other parts of the site-specific investigations, all set against the wider scientific and technical source literature. This may be sub-divided into: (at) (a2)
general information, possibly reviewed and agreed beforehand, including released computer software, development and test details and quality regime, and site-specific information and repository-specific information that comes only from the proponent and must be reviewed with a separate time-table.
(b) The description of the trace of all decisions, assumptions etc .... made during the development of the safety argument. This may be visualised as an decision or logic 'tree' or perhaps a 'graph'. It should make clear the use of evidence and judgements in a clear, explicit manner that allows the results from the safety calculations to be traced back to source in a justifiable manner. Each assumption may be a potential cause of bias on the results of orthodox calculations, and a means of evaluating these biases is necessary. See Thompson, Gralewski and Grindrod (1995).
Advances in Safety and Reliability: ESREL '97
5
(c) The quantitative analyses themselves, commonly termed the 'performance assessment', with their resulting estimates under uncertainty of radiological doses and risks during the long-term post-closure period. Other regulatory decision variables may be considered also, Environment Agency et al (1997). The Royal Society believes that these are usually less satisfactory than dealing directly with radiological risk, however. See Royal Society (1994). (d) Depending on the stage of the regulatory process, and the overall level of understanding gained to support the case, it may also be necessary to supply further arguments. These arguments would seek to justify that the proposed further information gathering from site investigation, further design work and/or the results of research and development generally, will reduce ignorance, and will clarify the current uncertainties. This is the problem of 'How much information, and of what kind, is sufficient to provide confidence in the analysis?' This is also called the 'information closure' problem. See, for instance, Bonano and Thompson (1993). Recapitulating on the previous ESREL '96/PSAM III conference papers, as summarised by Thompson, Smith and Porter (1996), the experience in the UK suggests that there are three main stages of work leading to possible authorisation for disposal of solid low and intermediate level radioactive wastes: Stage I: Developing a system model-based method of assessment employing Monte Carlo simulation to account for uncertainties. However, industry had never submitted its own safety cases to HMIP who necessarily had, therefore, to construct different surrogate 'cases' for hypothetical facilities to indicate what might be expected, at that stage of the subject, in a safety argument. Stage 2: A proponent is likely, at an intermediate state of site investigation and of the associated research programme, to submit a planning application to construct a deep repository. The long-term safety arguments will be made on the basis of a so-called detailed Environmental and Radiological Analysis (DERA). A large-scale Public Inquiry will be held at a venue local to the proposed site. By definition, the safety case will be based on interim information. Regulators will need, therefore, to be satisfied on all four aspects outlined earlier before offering a provisional view concerning possible future authorisation. Stage 3: In due course a Final Environmental and Radiological Analysis (FERA) will be submitted for authorisation to dispose of wastes under the Radioactive Substances Act (1993). In contrast to the DERA to be submitted in Stage 2, the FERA should not require further examination of fundamental scientific or engineering issues, and should provide a robust safety argument. Further work to confirm the safety case - within the same conceptual flame as that provided in the FERA - is likely to be required as the repository is operated over a period of perhaps 50 years, and will involve regular re-assessments as a basis for permitting continued emplacement of waste and other aspects of repository operation (e.g. backfilling vaults) to proceed.
Options for regulatory assessment Broadly, during Stages 2 and 3, a regulator could adopt one of four levels of assessment capability: (i) Purely responsive; awaiting, according to a general programme, the arrival of each submission from the proponent, and only then taking action to seek independent review from in-house or external expertise. (ii) Maintaining a continuing awareness of the subject through a Panel of Experts who can prepare themselves for a more thorough review on the basis of a general research programme. This is termed the Scientific and Technical Review (STR) capability and includes review of both repository engineering and site characterisation.
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B.G.J. Thompson and C.R. Williams (iii) In addition to the STR, introducing some ability to check the quantitative aspects of the submission by developing and maintaining expertise, independent of the proponent, in computational modelling etc .... At least being able to re-run sottware to verify the calculations performed within the proponent's own general assumptions reviewed under approach (ii). (iv) In addition to the capability of level (iii) developing and applying a completely Independent Performance Assessment (IPA) capability including methods for decision tracking and bias evaluation. This latter approach was adopted by HMIP, Thompson (1994).
Option (iv) preserves regulatory options for any specific application in the future. However, it has never been intended that UK regulators should produce a full safety case. That safety case is entirely the responsibility of the proponent, but it is difficult for the regulators to judge such a case without knowledge of what is involved based on "hands-on" experience of carrying out essential aspects of a safety analysis. RECENT ASSESSMENT-RELATED EXPERIENCE The second stage of the process is under way after a period of site investigation by the proponent. It was expected originally that the proponent would submit a planning application for repository construction in Autumn 1992, leading to a Public Inquiry in 1993/94. In response to this HMIP, following a comprehensive contract tendering process during 1991, commissioned two lead contractors to undertake assessments of safety documentation, and to provide support during the Inquiry hearings. These two principal contracts were:
The Scientific and Technical Review (STR) and the; Independent Performance Assessment (IPA) project; and these were assisted by two further contracts; Assessment Information Management System (AIMS), to provide a bibliographic database and regulatory correspondence logging procedure; and the Quality. Assurance (Q) contract, to review and extend the existing QA/SQA system and its documentation and to review the proponent's approach as required. Although no formal application to dispose of wastes would have been expected at the time of the Inquiry hearings, HMIP would have been required to give a provisional view as to the likelihood of such an authorisation being granted in due course once the full site study had been completed and a FERA safety case submitted during the third stage outlined above. Under the Scientific and Technical Review, detailed reviews of preliminary safety-related documentation were conducted by a panel of recognised experts, covering about twenty different disciplines. This helped HMIP to understand better how to conduct such reviews and to document them. It has also, we believe, been of help to any proponent to learn from this first experience of being exposed to such a critique, especially with regard to issues such as the traceability of results and conclusions back, through a chain of assumptions and decisions, to source literature and data. The Independent Performance Assessment project produced two partial post-closure, probabilistic systems analyses (PSA) based upon early site data and other information. During a first phase of work (February 1992 to April 1993) a simple PSA was completed for steady-state conditions, based on current climate. This central activity was augmented by a number of ancillary studies aimed at developing understanding of the site-specific effects of certain key processes. This was followed by a second phase of work (May 1993 to September 1994) that focused on the hydrogeological performance of the site and the release and transport of radionuclides in groundwater. Twodimensional and fully three-dimensional groundwater models were constructed using the NAMMU finite element software although the available data were still too limited for reliable calibration of these models. A number of scoping calculations were carried out for both present day and for a wide range of possible future site conditions (based on likely changes in climate, interpreted from records of the Quaternary period). These calculations explored the implications of the uncertainty at that time in our knowledge of the spatial configuration of major faults and the stratigraphy of the site and of the associated hydrogeological properties and boundary conditions, together with the uncertainty over their changes with time.
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Even under present-day climatic conditions, assumed to be preserved over the long-term post closure period, some three-dimensional calculations indicated, as shown for instance in Fig. 1, that a plume of contaminant could deviate from the two-dimensional vertical section assumed in earlier estimates. PRESENT DAY COASTLINE
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Figure 1. Estimated movement of contaminant assuming constant present-day climate. A "state-of-the-art" PSA was then carried out using the TIME4 and VANDAL Monte Carlo simulation software, Thompson and Sagar (1993), incorporating a fully three-dimensional groundwater flow and radionuclide transport model, that evolved over time under the influence of climate-driven changing surface boundary conditions (for instance, topographical changes, sea level, recharge etc). Statistical convergence of the sample mean dose (H) was well indicated after 940 realisations, using Simple Random Sampling, as the results over a period of 500,000 years show in Figure 2 which also compares the risks from the 95 %ile dose (Ho 95), and from the realisation yielding the highest peak dose ( ~ .
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B.G.J. Thompson and C.R. Williams
Figure 3 comparesthe results from the simple Phase 1 simulation, with the estimates obtained during Phase 2, of "mean risk" (yH) for different surface locations of a hypothetically exposed group drinking water from a sampling well. ~H
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Advances in Safety and Reliability: ESREL '97 RELATIVE ANNUAL INDIVIDUAL 'RISK'
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Figure 4. Effect of modelling assumptions on risk estimates. For example, the Dry Run 3 trial assessment, see for instance Thompson and Sagar (1993), showed that the then conventional tendency to omit quantitative consideration of the implications of sequences of long-term future climatic changes could lead to a serious underestimate in risk. Such effects may not be significant for other sites, but should evidently be considered fully in any viable safety case. In the present study, Figure 3 shows that an orthodox two-dimensional steady-state analysis gave no indication of high estimated risks to a group situated above the repository (compare curves A and B) nor of the strong spatial variation of exposure to a drinking water recipient (compare curves B, C and D).
The interpretation of existing regulations "Risk" is capable of many interpretations currently and, for instance, may be related to the probability distribution of health detriment in a manner analogous to that used for industrial safety, where curves of frequency versus consequence are often employed to guide decision making. The entire distribution can be compared to particular expressions of aversion to larger consequences using, for convenience, the complementary cumulative probability distribution (CCDF) of conditional risk (yH), as illustrated in Figure 5. Using logarithmic scales, a number of envelopes are shown that might represent different attitudes to risk. Curve A expresses a stakeholder opinion that the 104 p.a. target should always be met, whilst curve B only requires 10-4 p.a. never be exceeded. Curves C1, C2 and C3 retain a conviction that values below the target are of no concern, but these sloping lines represent an increasing degree of aversion to incurring larger risks above that target. Such curves can be derived from or related to personal loss functions. As long as the estimated CCDF lies to the left of the envelope of concern, the particular stakeholders should feel able to accept the safety argument provided that all other conditions, assumptions, judgements etc ... underlying the overall case are also acceptable in their view. The most commonly used interpretation of risk seems to be that based upon arithmetic sample mean dose (H) multiplied by the ICRP risk to dose conversion factor (Y), see Thorne (1988). This interpretation implies equal aversion (or lack of it) to doses on either side of the mean. But this might not be what is desired. It might therefore be appropriate to apply an asymmetric "loss function". One way of doing this would be to estimate risk based on a percentile of doses, Smith (1993). If, for instance, the 95 %ile is considered (Ho.9s) then usually, but not always, higher risks are estimated as in the example shown in Figure 2. Basing the risk upon the simulation run that gives the highest maximum dose (Hm~ yields much larger values, as the figure illustrates. Such a result had been pointed out in 1986, see Thompson and Sagar (1993), to caution against relying upon "worst case" bases for decisions.
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B.G.J. Thompson and C.R. Williams A, B, C, D, 'ENVELOPES' PROBABILITY OF EXCEEDING
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Figure 5. Illustrative results compared with different possible 'risk' envelopes.
When the full consequence distribution is considered, such as required by current US regulations, see for example Anderson et al (1997), then, from Figure 5, it is apparent that, at 360,000 years, the safety case might 'fail' against envelopes A or D, but would 'pass' with respect to B or C. Use of regulatory analyses to review a safety case
Much has been published since the late 1970s concerning the methods and tools used to perform technical analyses ofradiological performance as may be carried out by any single party in the process of decision making in a democratic society. Key concerns, that appear to have received little attention in the literature, are related to the way in which such analyses, undertaken independently by a regulator (or an interest group), are best used to probe the safety case and its underlying arguments in a coherent and traceable manner. Figure 6 illustrates the overall process of assessment by a regulator (activities below the diagonal) of a safety case put forward by a proponent (activities above the diagonal). The first three aspects (a, b, c) of the case are represented, with parallel development by a regulator of s e l e c t e d parts of a similar, but independently conducted, technical analysis. As explained more fully in Sumerling and Read (1994), for instance, it is the sole responsibility of the proponent to produce a full safety case, and a comprehensive set of quantitative results would not be produced by the regulator. Hence, the decision logic would be detailed only for those regulatory activities carried out. Either player would be likely to follow an iterative procedure of technical analysis similar to that shown in Thompson (1994) for instance, which leads to an orthodox PSA result. Dose percentiles versus time might be compared as shown for (say) a particular sub-set ofradionuclides, and a key exposure pathway. Such results, obtained independently, may disagree significantly because conventional analyses are based upon conceptual and computational models that necessarily have systematic biases due to lack of knowledge of system structure and of process representations. Bias is also likely due to numerical approximations and the unavailability of quality assured software that incorporates the latest understanding. The hypothesis is that if such "bias evaluation", as described above for the second phase of the present project, was applied in a c o n s i s t e n t m a n n e r to both sets of orthodox PSA results, it could bring these closer together, as sketched in Figure 6. A corresponding traceable record of the further decisions that are involved would also be examined, Thompson, Gralewski and Grindrod (1995). The process of regulatory review of the three aspects would then lead to the technical information upon which decisions would, in part, be made. If the overall programme of site investigation and other studies is still incomplete, as in Stage 2 described earlier, the DERA case may contain also a strategy (d) to reduce ignorance and to clarify key uncertainties thereby ensuring adequate overall confidence in the final (FERA) arguments. Such a strategy would be expected to reduce the amount of bias to be evaluated in this later safety case.
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ACT IVIT Y BY PROPONE NT \
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Possible advantages for both parties (i.e. developer and regulator)could occur if a number of issues were resolved before the formal submission of DERA (that is information (a) and safety case (b, c and d)). Hence, agreement might be sought on: a given format of recording and articulating the decision logic, and how to access this through related computer -based facilities; a given format of site geological and related information as, for instance, in the use of common three-dimensional data structures, and in related documents; overall safety case document structure and content; QA arrangements for software development and use, and for gathering and interpreting site data; a compatible treatment of bias to enable the parties involved to at least attempt reconciliation of lines of argument and results; formal agreements about incontrovertible common aspects such as: thermo-chemical data; climate analogue sites and data; the waste inventory and its stable element chemistry, with uncertainties made explicit;
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B.G.J. Thompson and C.R. Williams terminology, units and symbols; assumptions about the characteristics of future possible exposed groups; interpretation of'risk'; 'best practical means'...., in conjunction with policy groups; protocols for elicitation of subjective judgements and for peer reviews and, finally what might reasonably be expected in terms of 'validation'.
CONCLUDING REMARKS Interaction between regulators and proponents is necessary in advance Of any formal safety submission as well as in direct response to the latter as part of any authorisation process. If the preparation is done carefully there should be "no surprises" in the case presented. At most it should be a refinement of information already delivered, of arguments and decision logic already rehearsed. Software tools and techniques, whose development has been undertaken to well-established software engineering practice and quality assurance, should already have been published. Similarly, all methods underpinning the quantitative arguments and results, revealed in their definitive form in the case itself, should have been reviewed in the scientific and technical literature, Royal Society (1994). The examination of the safety case itself can be regarded as the review of the four aspects identified in this paper, and this examination may be done using nominally four different levels of regulatory and technical capability ranging through a classical peer review to a capability to carry out also any selected part of such a safety analysis in quantitative terms using independently developed tools and methods of analysis. It is suggested here that maintaining this capability keeps open the widest range of opportunities at each of the stages in the assessment process, thereby indicating it to be of most potential benefit to a regulatory body. The entire process is complex, and for its success will depend upon good management based upon relevant "hands on" experience. Management and organisational issues are discussed in the companion paper at this conference by Thompson and Sumerling (1997). Uncertainty is inescapable, and must be openly and thoroughly examined in any credible case. Contrary to much wish~l thinking in this subject it is by no means guaranteed that acquiring and using more site-specific and other data in an analysis will reduce uncertainty. It will, however, enable a better understanding of the domain of uncertainty, and hence reduce ignorance. However it remains, at present, an open question as to the amount of information required to provide regulatory confidence in a safety submission. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The authors thank the Environment Agency for permission to publish this paper. The results of this work may be used in the formulation of policy but at this stage do not constitute UK Government policy. The authors are especially appreciative of the constructive comments from Mr R.E. Smith of the Environment Agency during preparation of this paper. REFERENCES
Anderson, D.R., Helton, J.C., Jow, M-N, Marietta, M.G., Chu, M.S.Y. and Basabilvago, G. (1997). Conceptual Computational Structure of the 1996 Performance Assessment for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (ibid). Ashworth, A.B. and Porter, I.T. (1996). Application of PSA in the Regulation of the Drigg Low-level Waste Disposal Site. Proc. Third International Conference on Probabilistic Safety Assessment and Management, PSAM III, Crete, (June 1996). Bonano, E.J. and Thompson, B.G.J. (1993), (eds). Probabilistic Risk Assessment on Radioactive Waste, Special Issue of Reliability Engineering and System Safety, vol. 42, nos. 2, 3 (1993).
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Environment Agency, Scottish Environment Pollution Agency, Department of the Environment for Northern Ireland (1997). Radioactive Substances Act 1993: Disposal Facilities on Land for Low and Intermediate Level Radioactive Wastes: Guidance on Requirements for Authorisation. (January 1997). Grindrod, P. (1996). Traceability of Argument and the Treatment of Conceptual and Parametric Uncertainties within a Safety Case, and how the Regulator may examine this by Independent Analysis. PSAM III, Crete, (June 1996). HM Government (1993). Radioactive Substances Act 1993, HMSO, ISBN 0-10-541293-7. ICRP (1985). Radiation Protection Principles for the Disposal of Solid Radioactive Wastes, Annals of the Intl. Commission for Rad. Prot. 15(4), ICRP Publication 46, (1985). Royal Society (1994). Disposal of Radioactive Wastes in Deep Repositories. The Royal Society (London) ISBN 0 85403 493 5, (Nov 1994). Smith, A.F.M. (1993). An Overview of Probabilistic and Statistical Issues in Quantitative Risk Analysis for Radioactive Waste Disposal, Parts 1 and 2, UK Govt., Dept. of Environment Reports, DoE/RR/90. 073 -93 .074 (Jan 1993). Stearn, S.(1994). Risk Analysis in Regulation and Risk Communication. PSAMII, San Diego, Calif. (March 1994). Sumerling, T.J. and Read, D.(1994). Aspects of Review of a Proponent's Post-Closure Safety Assessment on behalf of a Regulator. PSAMII, San Diego, Calif (March 1994). Thompson, B.G.J.(1994). The HMIP Research and Development Programme for Post-Closure Risk Assessment. Proc. Second Intl. Conf. on Prob. Safety Assessment and Management, PSAMII, San Diego, Calif., USA (March 1994). Thompson, B.G.J., Gralewski, Z.A. and Grindrod, P. (1995). On the Estimation of Bias in Post-Closure Performance Assessment of Underground Radioactive Waste Disposal, Proc. 4th. Intl. High Level Rad. Waste Man. Conf., Las Vegas, Nev., USA. (April 1995). Thompson, B.G.J. and Sagar, B. (1993). The development and application of integrated procedures for postclosure assessment, based upon Monte Carlo simulation: the probabilistic systems assessment (PSA) approach. Rel. Eng. and Syst. Safety, vo142, pp 125-160 (1993). Thompson, B.J.G., Smith, R.E. and Porter, I.T. (1996). Some Issues affecting the Regulatory Assessment of Long-Term Post-Closure Risks from Underground Disposal of Radioactive Wastes. Proc. Third International Conference on Probabilistic Safety Assessment and Management, PSAM III, Crete, (June 1996). Thompson, B.G.J. and Sumerling, T.J. (1997). Organisational and Management Issues in the Regulatory Assessment of Underground Radioactive Waste Disposal (ibid). Thorne, M.C. (1998). Assessment of the Radiological Risks of Underground Disposal of Solid Radioactive Wastes, IrK Govt, Dept Of Environment Report No. DoE/RW/89.030 (Dec 1988).
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DEVELOPMENTS AND PRACTICE TOWARDS RISK BASED REGULATIONS IN VARIOUS TECHNOLOGIES H.P. Berg ~and P. Kafka 2 Bundesamt ~ r Strahlenschutz (BfS) P. O. Box 10 01 49, D-38201 Salzgitter, FRG. 2 Gesellschaft for Anlagen- und Reaktorsicherheit (GRS) mbH Forschungsgel~inde, D-85748 Garching, FRG.
ABSTRACT Over a long period of time, systems design and structure functions have been developed and estimated by the so-called trial-and-error method. With the increasing importance of complex and large-scale technologies functional and safety problems initiated by random effects within the man-machine-milieu interaction have challenged new procedures. Safety engineering and the relevant regulations turned from a retrospective to a prospective procedure. For this prospective procedure the so-called deterministic approach based on deterministic criteria and conservative calculations was established first. Today exists an increasing utilization of the so-called probabilistic approach to take into account risk aspects to a larger extent. The paper illuminates some basics in safety engineering, discusses some pros and cons regarding the deterministic and probabilistic approach and shows recent developments and practices towards risk based regulations in various technologies. Specific examples will be given from Civil Engineering, Space and Aviation Industry, the practice for Marine Structures and in the Process Industry. In the case of Nuclear Technology will be shown in particular current trends to support operational and maintenance decisions during plant operation not only by performance based but also by risk based considerations. The unresolved issue for many legal environments in various countries namely the uncertainties of probabilistic results and the vagueness of the state of knowledge, will be explained. Finally, some recommendations for supporting actions towards risk based regulations will be given. KEYWORDS: Safety Engineering, Risk Based Regulations, Risk Informed Regulations, Probabilistic Safety Assessment, Probabilistic Approach.
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE More than 2,400 years ago Pericles stated that: "the worst thing is to rush into actions before the consequences have been properly debated", and "the Athenians are capable at the same time of taking Risk and Estimating them before-hand". Realizing that already the ancient Athenians knew this codex, it is really surprising that today Safety Engineers have to learn again how all the various players in the real world have to be convinced that a modem society should move towards principles known to the Athenians. 15
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H.P. Berg and P. Kafka
As traditionally teached at the universities, an engineer has to design a component, system or structure in such a way that the product must function and be safe. A building, e.g., must possess a structure which provides strength and stiffness so that the entire system can perform the duties for which it was specified. Over a long period of time, systems design and structure functions have been developed by the so-called trial-and-error method. That means, based on the lessons learned from undesired events, e. g. the safety factors and the codes of engineering practice were improved step by step, expecting that new design would continue to meet the function and be more safe. With the increasing importance of complex and large-scale technologies functional and safety problems initiated by random effects within the man-machine-milieu interaction have challenged new procedures, e.g. to estimate analytically the prospective behavior of the component, system or structure. Safety engineering turned from a retrospective to a prospective procedure (see also: Blockley (1992), Fragola (1996), Kafka (1996 B, 1996 C)).
SYSTEM DESIGN VERSUS SYSTEM ASSESSMENT In principle, there is fundamental distinction between a task to design and construct a new system or to assess an existing one. In the first case, the state of knowledge regarding the layout and the foreseen function of the system is restricted. However, rules, design codes and recommendations for a proper and safe design are normally available and can be used in a mix for the creation of the various specifications and the calculation of the design parameters. The designer concentrates on the realization of the "function" of the system and the computation of the relevant point values for it. The required reliability is mainly ensured by conservative safety factors. In the second case, the state of knowledge regarding the system layout is more satisfying and most of the parameters are measurables of the system and operational experience is available. To assess "function" and "malfunctions" of components and the resulting consequences for the system are the duties. Other methods and tools are needed, e. g., event trees, fault trees and uncertainty simulations. An assessment of the safety level therefore requires an integrative respective "umbrella" procedure. Such a procedure allows to evaluate all consequences, effects and safety contributions of the system characteristics realized as a manifestation of the utilization of various rules, standards and requirements. If only the compliance with all these rules and recommendations and the correctness of the calculated design parameters are checked point by point separately, no integrative answer regarding the entire safety level can be given. The picture is complete only if the puzzle pieces are integrated together. In simple words: the design of a safe new system is a forward chaining task and to assess the safety level of an operating system is a backward chaining task, each performed normally with specifically adopted methods and tools. A design procedure graphically follows an event tree structure dealing with the task of establishing all the end states (design parameters) originating from the expected system function. Vice versa, an assessment procedure graphically follows a fault tree structure dealing with the task to identify all the possible root states (causes) for the malfunction of the system. This distinction is one of the reason why an applicant (the designer) and an assessor (the regulator) are often involved in long discussions regarding the most appropriate methods and tools needed for the common aim, the realization of a safe system.
DETERMINISTIC VERSUS PROBABILISTIC APPROACH
A deterministic criterion can be characterized as a pre-defined design rule whose fulfillment provides sufficient confidence that the design intent is met. These rules are based and established on the experience and expertise of a rule-making body, normally composed by members coming from different groups of interest e. g. designers, operators, and regulators. Such rules can be qualitative, quantitative or a mix of both (see Kafka (1995), Thadani (1996)).
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The essence of such a type of approach is that a deterministic analysis or calculation has to be performed and one has to show compliance with rules in a "checklist format" based on y e s and n o answers. The deterministic analysis can be characterized as a point value calculation via a functional representation of the system behavior including so-called conservative assumptions. Thus, the deterministic analysis is a single snapshot into the space of all the possibilities which can be formed by the real world behavior. One has to be aware that this simplification implicitly means that all the other possibilities - not considered by this snapshot - are excluded (some say as misuse: other cases are not possible). The strength of the deterministic approach is that the associated analysis and decision making process is relatively clear and simple. The systems analysis and the associated calculations are straightforward and the decision making answer is "Go" or "No-Go". The weakness of this approach is the extensive use of expert judgment without any explicit consideration of various types of uncertainties and the lack of any information about which criteria or analysis results are more or less important with respect to the safety level. A ranking procedure regarding issues or outcomes is not possible. Additionally, the world can not be modeled realistically using conservative assumptions. The real world normally follows the most probable circumstances and boundary conditions. In other words, an accident scenario simulated with conservative parameters represents a very rare single case within the space of all the possibilities. Finally, the deterministic approach may give the false impression that the results are "certain" and the scenarios are "true". A probabilistic approach can be characterized by an extensive use of probabilities. This implies also the extensive searching process for failure "possibilities" in systems" analysis and the performance of quantitative calculations because of the existence of random processes in the real world. In other words, the approach searches for the spectrum of possibilities quantified with probabilities. Thus, the analyst has a more comprehensive rather then a snapshot (by the way of a deterministic approach) view to the real world. Evidently probabilistic criteria are normally expressed in terms of failure or success probabilities per demand. The strengths are the integrative and quantitative approach which allows rankings of issues and results, explicit consideration and treatment of all types of uncertainties, and application of an optimization process Apostolakis (1990). A (fictitious) weakness of the probabilistic approach is the more complex and time consuming analysis and decision making process because more information and insights have to be collected, processed and considered for decisions. A still unresolved issue for many legal environments in various countries is the fact that the probabilistic approach explicitly shows the uncertainties and the vagueness of the state of knowledge and the result has to be characterized as a prognostic estimation of what in future can happen or not. In particular, the problem of incompleteness and sensitivity of the results is addressed. However, although also the probabilistic approach is only a model of the real world it represents the real world in a much more realistic way.
THE ELEMENTS OF RISK
The extent and nature of most safety engineering problems are such that a suit of technologies operating as an integrated safety feature would be required to prevent and mitigate existing potential hazards. Thus, the design, evaluation and assessment of the safety technologies is a complex decision process that is affected by a wide range of factors. Selecting technologies to work as an integrated safety feature is an optimization process. For each technology the objective is to maximize the positive impact and to minimize the negative ones. There exists a wide-spread consensus that optimization processes need a complete model focusing on all quantifiable issues of interest. A risk model as the foundation for formal safety optimizations and decisions is widely
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accepted as the preferred vehicle for an explicit and systematic consideration of all the issues affecting decision making in safety engineering (see also: Ale (1996), Aven (1996), Bonano (1996), E.C. (1993), Hessel (1996), Hirschberg (1996), Schmidt (1996), Watson (1993)). Ongoing findings and recommendations, e .g., by the Center for Risk Analysis at the Harvard School of Public Health, prepared for the U.S. Congress, CRA (1995), and the National Research Council (NRC) of the U. S. National Academy of Science, Bonano (1996), have both strongly advocated the use of risk assessment in environmental management and other decision making processes. It can be assumed that there also exists a consensus that safety engineering of complex installations is very much interrelated with environmental aspects. Important elements of "risk" in the context of the usefulness for safety engineering are the identified spectrum of undesired events, the estimated frequencies and consequences of these events, and the identified and quantified spectrum of the various types of uncertainties.
AIMS, GOALS AND TARGETS Safety Engineering is in principle a management process to establish aims, goals and targets, to transfer these requirements into the design and construction of the real system, and to assess the realized system with respect to the compliance with the established aims, goals and targets. It is usually said that system "aims" are the general aspects mainly focusing on the envisaged function and duties of the system. Goals are mostly used in the context of "Safety Goals", i.e. qualitative or quantitative requirements with respect to safety for the entire system. U.S. NRC (1986). "Targets" are mainly used in connection with system functions expressed in reliability and/or availability characteristics. Petersen (1992). ,
Level 4 Environment Level 3
Plant
TOPGoal J
Risk -Based
i¢ ~ ¢
~o~,~,~~,,,~,~~,,
n~.
C. . . . . . . . . . :.I..... ~.~ /. ~,~j~1~ ~ V ~,
Specific
Level 2 System
Level 1 Component (deterministic and/or probabilistic)
Fig. 1: Breakdown of Targets based on a Top Goal. Kafka (1995). All these expressions can, in principle be mapped into the various levels of the system (top level, subsystem level, component level or piece part level). To establish, e. g., targets on different system levels, a top-down procedure should be used (see Fig.l). Starting with a safety goal on the top of this pyramid one can break down targets at the various system levels. In Reliability Engineering appropriate tools exist to execute this breakdown in a structured manner. The safety goal set at the top of the system is correlated to the question "how safe is safe enough".
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Nowadays there exists a preference to establish this goal quantitatively, i.e., expressed by specific risk components (for example expressed as a frequency of occurrence of a given event scenario per plant-year). A pragmatic approach to establish such a safety goal is used in various technologies (Aviation, Haak (1995), Shooman (1990), JAA (1989), Space, Preyssl (1995), Klein (1996), Nuclear, Thadani (1996), OffShore, DNV (1992). Knowing and considering the "realized standard" for the existing installations the goal for "new" installations should e.g. two orders of magnitude (factor 100) "safer" (of lower in risk) than the existing installations. In other words, the frequency of a predefined catastrophic failure has to be less than 10x per installation-year. With the help of such a pragmatic approach one can perform the breakdown. Besides such a breakdown procedure there exists in most technologies a set of well established rules and regulations (based on best engineering practice) to achieve in a pragmatic way "safe" systems. Examples are the so-called single failure criterion, the spatial separation or the defense in depth concept. These rules should also be considered in safety engineering to gain a high safety standard. It should be mentioned that the issue "how safe is safe enough" would have a very strong relation and dimension to the risk awareness, acceptance and tolerability by the public. In the context of this paper comments and discussions on that topic are not foreseen. WHAT IS GOING ON IN VARIOUS TECHNOLOGIES NOWADAYS Safety Engineering regarding large technological systems, which essentially are assembled of active components (pumps, valves), passive structures (pipes, vessels), and the operational staff managing operation and maintenance requires a risk based analysis process. This process involves four main issues: (1) component reliability, (2)structural reliability (3) man-machine reliability, and (4) an integrative system reliability model. These issues and the necessary methods are more or less available and used in all technologies. Many more differences are in the various regulatory environments regarding the requirements of which type of studies and assessments are appropriate and needed. It varies from the opinion that a risk based (probabilistic) approach is not adequate, (e.g. Germany, chemical industry) toward to a totally risk based regulatory environment (e.g. Holland, process industry, Ale (1996)). By way of other examples, the aviation industry (e.g. Airbus industry, Haak (1995)) has used a probabilistic design concept for a few years, including a safety goal for catastrophic accidents and reliability targets for systems and components. The space industry moves more and more to a risk based approach for the main project decisions and to reliability targets for systems and components. Large manufacturing industries (e.g. Toyota, Ford Motor Company) moves toward Reliability and Maintainability (R & M) targets for all equipments and production lines, Reichart (1994), SAE (1995). In the civil and marine structure industries there exist probabilistic design codes for the design of structures including a set of probabilistic goals and pre-formulated calculation procedures. DNV (1992). In the nuclear industry one can observe worldwide in the last years a movement toward risk based approach and regulations which is strongly encouraged from the industry. Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) has become the tool of choice for selecting the best of several alternatives. Closely related to risk based regulation is the development of performance based rules. Such rules focus on the final result to be achieved. They do not specify the process, but instead establish the goals to be reached and the procedures how the achievement of those goals is to be judged. The inspection and enforcement activities are based on whether or not the goals have been met. Risk based regulation has the potential of both improving nuclear power plant safety and reducing plant operating costs. This modern form of regulation could be applied to present operating installations and to advanced designs. In fact, it would help to quantify the safety improvements of advanced designs. The application of PSA technology to the regulatory process can reduce public risks in several ways: by finding design weaknesses, by improving plant operations, and in developing severe accident management programs. For example, a traditional product of a Level 1 PSA is some estimate of the likelihood of a
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nuclear power plant having a core damage or core melt event. The overall core melt frequency is estimated by summing up many thousands of accident sequences, each providing some increment of core melt frequency. If a Level 2 PSA is performed, then there will also be estimates of the containment failure frequency and the releases of radioactive material to the environment associated with each containment failure mode. A large sum, e.g., a high core melt frequency or high containment failure frequency, can be an indication of a poor design. Further, by examining the different contributors to the aggregate value, particular areas of design weakness can be pin-pointed. Therefore, PSA results can be used to evaluate the design of nuclear power plants. Numerous plant-specific design improvements have already been implemented in various nuclear plants based on PSA insights, thereby lowering nuclear risks. Garrick (1995). More recently, PSA techniques have been applied in evaluating the operation of nuclear power plants focusing the interest on how plant risks vary with time. Kafka (1996 A). There are several mechanisms that can cause plant risks to change over time. The performance of individual components and whole systems may degrade due to aging or improve due to design modification or enhanced maintenance. Plant configurations also change from time-to-time as certain components are removed from (or restored to) service for tests and/or maintenance, while others may be removed through failure. Configurations also change when going from one plant operating mode to another, such as transition from power operation to shutdown. Since the risk significance of a component or system is also a function of the plant's configuration, changing configurations yield different risk levels. Just as earlier applications of integral PSA results were utilized to reduce the risks due to design weaknesses, present specific PSA applications are increasingly dedicated to minimizing operational weaknesses, e.g., avoiding high risk plant configurations. Quantitative safety criteria and objectives - correlated with the risk of each single individual in the vicinity of the plant and/or the societal risk of the population as a whole - are used in the decision-making process, for example, in the United Kingdom, Cassidy (1996), and in the Netherlands, Ale (1996). In both countries, this safety concept is not restricted to nuclear installations but it has been adopted as a more global safety policy regarding all potential hazardous industries and activities. Another significant milestone in the development of risk based regulation in the United States was the development of quantitative safety goals and there endorsement in a Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Policy Statement in 1986; U.S. NRC (1986). This addresses the question of "how safe is safe enough?". In the years following the safety goal policy statement, the relationship between specific regulatory requirements and the risk reduction or lack of it have been investigated in a number of intemal NRC studies. In 1994 the Commission approved a Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) implementation plan. The plan addresses the use of PRA in all major NRC functions, reactor regulation, research, evaluation of operational date, utilization of nuclear materials, and waste disposal. Its major elements include developing decision criteria for regulatory applications of PRA, developing pilot projects to test PRA application in specific circumstances, looking at the contribution of risk based thinking to the inspection process, and examining operator licensing issues from risk perspective. Following the PRA implementation plan was the publication of the Commission's PRA Policy Statement in 1995; U.S. NRC (1995). The PRA policy statement formalizes the Commission's commitment to risk informed regulation. It states, in part, "The use of PRA technology should be increased in all regulatory matters to the extent supported by the state of the art in PRA methods and data, and in a manner that complements the NRC's deterministic approach and supports the NRC's traditional defense in depth philosophy". Nowadays there exists a minor distinction between "risk based" and "risk informed" regulation and the Commission has begun to substitutes the.clearer term risk informed for risk based in its lexicon. Murphy (1995), Garrick (1995). The main elements of the implementation plan are threefold. The first part defines the regulatory areas where PRA can play a role in the decision making process. The second part underlines that the current deterministic engineering approach is maintained unless a solid basis for change is established. The third part of the framework are probabilistic considerations. Key elements are the use of established methods, success
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criteria, human and equipment reliability data and sensitivity and uncertainty analysis. The final part is the integration of deterministic and probabilistic considerations. The success of risk informed regulations ultimately depends on having sufficient reliability data to allow quantification of regulatory alternatives in terms of relative risk contribution. The NRC is considering in this context a new rule which is submitted for public comments, which would require power reactor licensees to collect and report to the NRC certain equipment reliability data. Also the so-called "Maintenance Rule" represents a step towards risk informed regulations. U. S. NRC (1996). In the Federal Republic of Germany, the nuclear licensing procedure is essentially based on deterministic safety analysis. In the context of periodic safety reviews which are recommended for all nuclear power plants in operation, also probabilistic considerations can be taken into account; this is a first smoothly step towards the international activities, but PSA, at present, only supports but does not determine regulatory decision making. Berg (1996A). As desirable as it might be to write regulations in terms of the ultimate measure of probabilities, it is not even nearly possible to define the probability of a possible accident sequence with enough precision and enough replicability to use such probabilities as terms in the regulations bottom line. Therefore the uncertainties have to be considered additionally. The fact that the PSA does not model all relevant issues (problem of incompleteness) and that the results are not sufficiently robust (problem of sensitiveness) is the main reason why PSA could not be the sole tool or basis for creating a new regulatory regime in the near future. Therefore, the determination of probabilistic safety goals is not supported in Germany from the legal point of view, neither as probabilistic limits nor as orientation values. In contrast, for the design of advanced reactor types like the European Pressurized Water Reactor (EPR) the common recommendations of the German and French advising bodies for the regulators have made an interesting statement: "For determining the adequate combination of redundancy and diversity in safety systems, the designer may use probabilistic targets as orientation values; in that case, orientation values of 10 -6 per year for the core damage probability due to internal events for power states and for shutdown states, respectively, could be used, having in mind the necessity to consider associated uncertainties. For those internal and external hazards the probabilities of which cannot be realistically determined, provisions have to be implemented by the designer to obtain a consistent design; this is the case for earthquakes, for which the designer has to state, in which way he intends to prove the existence of sufficient design margins". RSK (1994). In some other countries utilizing nuclear energy, e. g. Finland, Canada, Sweden, Switzerland, there is an increasing trend toward establishment and use of risk based regulations intermeshed with quantitative probabilistic safety goals. The current status and practice is shown, e. g., in Berg (1996A), SKi (1996). When properly applied, the results of a PSA can be used to identify and prioritize the importance of hardware, human actions (operation and maintenance staff activities) and plant procedures to plant risk. The information contained in a PSA is also important in the development of a sound risk management program that could be used for decision-making purposes. An integral part of a comprehensive risk management program at a nuclear power plant would be a living PSA that could be used as the basis for day-to-day operational and maintenance activities and for the short and long-term assessment and prioritization of safety-related needs. Regarding risk management, the idea of such a living PSA has been supported in the framework of the German Nuclear Regulatory Research Program.
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PROS AND CONS OF RISK BASED A P P R O A C H AND REGULATIONS Although some countries and various technologies are strongly discussing a proposed transition process from deterministic to a risk based approach the pros and cons including challenges of such a transition process should be taken into account. Summarizing the pros of the risk based approach considering its essential potential and the long term ideas and goals one can conclude: • it is supported explicitly (quantitatively) by our historical experience, • it is based on the understanding of the system and component behavior formulated in deterministic codes and calculations, • it the real world with all the determined, random and uncertain elements and parameters based on our state of knowledge, • it is quantitative and therefore appropriate for sensitivity, importance and optimization studies, • it integrates design, manufacturing and operational aspects for safety balancing over the life cycle of the system, • it integrates all the safety issues and allows therefore rankings and optimizations. Specific benefits of risk based regulations are: • • • • •
to to to to to
have a cost-effective approach to regulation, assure that resources are focused on essential safety issues, have a methodology that can be used to both enhance safety and manage operability, be able to communicate results and decisions on a clearly defined basis, attain an open, fair, and predictable regulatory framework.
On the other hand, there are disadvantages and difficulties which are posed by such a risk based approach: • to place very heavy reliance upon the exercise of regulatory personnel in judging whether standards have been complied with, whether risks have been properly identified and quantified, and whether enough preventive or mitigative measures have been taken to satisfy the proper balancing of costs and risks, • to ensure that the regulator's forces are extremely well-informed scientifically and technologically in order to produce consistent application of standards, • to be relatively time-consuming in ensuring a sound data-base for decisions about risk and methods of control in assessing safety, • to impart a high degree of uncertainty into computations of whether risks have been reduced in a sufficient manner which might be a fertile ground for endless debate between utility and regulator. Challenges which are associated with developing and implementing risk based approaches to regulation are: • to obtain an acceptable methodology for risk assessments that is commensurate with the decisions to be made, • to perform the needed, relevant risk assessments, • to focus regulatory questions so that risk assessments can be useful, • to have a regulatory structure that encourages risk based methods, • to perform the necessary regulatory research that assures a robust, stable approach to risk based regulation, • to effectively communicate the process, risks, and decisions to the public.
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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS A large number of contributions are available regarding the presented topic and only a few of them are referred in this paper. In this resume we will attempt to Summarize important insights and remarks from the widespread developments and applications of risk based approaches in safety engineering. • The suggestive idea for an ecologically and economically beneficial system (i. e. the higher the danger potential of a component, the more reliable the component itself and its safety features must be) can today be found in all safety engineering approaches within the various technological sectors. Nevertheless, the required and/or demonstrated safety level of systems is often evaluated by general engineering judgments, rules and requirements only. • The use of an entire model to build up all the physical and logical interrelations of the important elements and the adoptions of quantitative methods to evaluate this model is neither well established nor balanced in the various technologies. While nuclear technology, space, aviation, off-shore industry and civil engineering is at the front end, chemical engineering is at the back end. Also the status, effort and the application related to the risk based approach is very inhomogeneous in the various countries (e. g. Holland, Ale (1996), Norway, Aven (1996), Switzerland, BUWAL (1991), U. K., SKi (1996), U.S.A., SKi (1996), U. S. Congress (1994), is in the front end, and Germany is at the back end). • The principal value of risk based approach is that it represents the most complete compilation of the state-of-the-art knowledge analysis and data available for a given problem to develop an integrative perspective necessary to assess the variety of relationships between initiating events, human and equipment performance, mitigation features, accident phenomena and, if necessary, health effects and consequences. The risk based approach can also usefully be applied for balancing and evaluating the system design, the manufacturing aspects and the operation including operator actions and maintenance activities. Kafka (1996). • The deterministic approach for designing and assessing the system regarding safety performance generates in this context only limited insights which are needed as basic information but are solely not sufficient for decision making in safety engineering. Rankings and optimizations are requested. All the answers generated by the deterministic approach are uncorrelated with respect to the entire system characteristics. • The significant benefit of the risk based approach i. e. the identification and analysis of the possible event scenarios, generates much more insights than achievable by the deterministic analysis process. • The utilization of risk based approach requires of course more manpower and computation effort than a safety assessment with simplified assumption and based on checklist-formatted rules. But the larger effort must be balanced against the larger benefit in terms of a higher confidence in less risky systems. • The process of the risk based approach shows "uncertainties" and "vague" insights. This "new" situation for lawyers and regulators challenges further development of some basic laws and acts in safety engineering. The deterministic approach holds hidden these uncertainties and vague insights. It pretends an accuracy which is not given in the real world. Based on these summarized statements we want to give the following recommendations: • A risk based approach requires both, risk based procedures - to do safety engineering, and risk based regulations - to control what we have done in safety engineering. Both tools should undergo further developments to improve the state of knowledge for reduction of uncertainties in decision making. • As typical for all engineering fields, although some lessons learned from applications and historical events are beneficially adopted in the risk based approach (e. g. human factor, common cause failures), other issues (e.g. computer/software reliability) must undergo further developments and research work. • Finally, it should be stressed that in high level information processing systems, such as the risk based approach, should be a continuous activity established to collect and model the increasing state of knowledge and to quantify, as best as possible, also the so-called unquantifyable issues (e. g. the
H.R Berg and R Kafka
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safety culture, managerial aspects) per se. The risk based approach is a living process; there will never be an end to the story.
REFERENCES
Ale, B.J.M., Laheij, G.M.H., Uijt de Haag, P.A.M. "Zoning Instruments for Major Accident Prevention" Proceedings, ESREL" 96 - PSAM III, Crete, 1996, Springer Verlag, pp 2191 - 2196 Center for Risk Analysis, CRA, Harvard "Reform of Risk Regulation: Achieving more Protection at less Cost" Harvard School of Public Health, Boston, USA, March 1995 Apostolakis, G. "The Concept of Probability in Safety Assessment of Technological Systems" Science 50 (1990), pp 1359- 1366 Aven, T., Nja, O., Rettedal, W. "On Risk Acceptance and Risk Interpretation" Proceedings, ESREL'96 PSAM III, Crete, 1996, Springer Verlag, pp 2191 - 2196 H. P. Berg "Approach for Risk Based Regulation and Risk Management of Nuclear Power Plants", Proceedings of SRA Europe Meeting 1996, University of Surry, Guilford, June 1996 (A) Berg, H.P., G6rtz, R., Schaefer, T., Schott, H. "Quantitative probabilistische Sicherheitskriterien ffir Genehmigung und Betrieb kerntechnischer Anlagen: Status und Entwicklung im internationalen Vergleich" BfS-KT-15/96, 1996 (B) Blockley, D, Edt. "Engineering Safety" McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1992 Bonano, E., Peil, K. "Risk Assessment: a Defensible Foundation for Environmental Management Decision Making" Proceedings, ESREL'96- PSAM III, Crete, 1996, Springer Verlag, pp 2117-2121 BUWAL "Handbuch I zur St6rfallverordnung STFV" Bundesamt (Buwal), Schweiz, Juni 1991 Cassidy, K. "UK Risk Criteria for Siting of Hazardous Installations and Development in their Vicinity" Proceedings, ESREL' 96 - PSAM III, Crete, 1996, Springer Verlag, pp 1892 - 1898 DNV "Structural Reliability Analysis of Marine Structures" Classification AS, N-1322 Horvik, June 1992 Fragola, J. "Design Decisions and Risk: Engineering Applications" Proceedings, ESREL'96 - PSAM III, Crete, 1996, Springer Verlag, pp 1811 - 1816 Fragola, J., Shoomann, L. "Experience Bounds on Nuclear Plant Probabilistic Safety Assessment" 92RM-165: Garrick, J., Wakefield, D. "A Progress Report on the Status of Selected Applications of Probabilistic Risk Assessment in the U.S. Nuclear Power Industry" Proceedings, KAERI, PSA'95 November 1995, Seoul, pp 923 - 926 Haak, D. Airbus GmbH, Hamburg, informal communication, 1995 Hessel, P.P. "Toward Risk based Regulation" Proceedings, ESREL'96 - PSAM III, Crete, 1996, Springer Verlag, pp 339-342 Hirschberg, S., Spiekerman, G. "Comparative Evaluation of Severe Accident Risk Associated with Electricity Generation Systems" Proceedings, ESREL'96- PSAM III, Crete, 1996, Springer Verlag, pp 3945
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HSK SKi "Proceedings of Executive Meeting on Risk-Based Regulations and Inspections" Vol I, II, SKi 96-69, 1996 -
International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA "INSAG- 5, The Safety of Nuclear Power" IAEA Safety Series No. 75-INSAG-5, 1994 Joint Aviation Authority, JAA "Basic Objective Requirements for all Systems on Large Transport Category Airplanes" JAR 25.1309, 1989 Joksimovich, B. "Man versus Machine in Nuclear Safety Regulation" Proceedings, Seoul, Korea 1995, pp 788 - 794
KAERI, PSA'95,
Kafka, P. "Sicherheit grol3technischer Anlagen" TO, VDI Verlag Dtisseldorf, 9/95 September 1995, pp 354 - 357 Kafka P., Gromann A. "Where we are in Living PSA and Risk Monitoring" Proceedings, ESREL'96 PSAM III, Crete, 1996 (A), Springer Verlag, pp 1884 - 1891 Kafka, P. "Probabilistic Safety Assessment: Quantitative Process to Balance Design, Manufacturing and Operation for Safety of Plant Structures and Systems" Nuclear Engineering and Design 165 (1996) pp 33-350, 1996 (B) Kafka P. "Safety Engineering - Why Should we Move Towards Risk-Based Evaluations?" Proceedings, SKi 96-69, Vol 2, 1996 (C) Klein, M., Schueller, G.I., Esnault, P. "Guidelines for Factors of Safety for Aerospace Structures" Proceedings, ESREL'96 - PSAM III, Crete, 1996, Springer Verlag, pp 1696 - 1701 Murphy, J. "Risk Based Regulation: Practical Experience in Using Risk-Related Insights to Solve Regulatory Issues" Proceedings, KAERI, PSA'95 November 1995, Seoul, pp 945 -948 Petersen, K. , Sieger, K., Kongso, H. "Setting Reliability Targets for the Great Belt Link Tunnel Equipment" Paper, ESReDA Seminar, Amsterdam, Holland, April, 1992 Preyssl, Ch. "Safety Risk Assessment and Management - the ESA Approach" Reliability Engineering and System Safety, 49 (1995) pp 303 - 309 Reichart, G., Dilger, E., Winner, H. "Iterative Safety Design Process - Ein Ansatz zur Sicherheitsanalyse und -bewertung ktinftiger Fahrzeugsysteme" VDI Bericht 1152, Dtisseldorf 1994 RSK "Gemeinsame Empfehlung von RSK und GPR f~r Sicherheitsanforderungen an zukiinftige Kernkraftwerke mit Druckwasserreaktor", admitted in 1994 SAE "Reliability and Maintainability Guideline for Manufacturing Machinery and Equipment" Society of Automotive Engineers, Inc., SAE, Warrendale, PA, USA, 1995 Schmidt, S. "Decision Analysis, Risk Research & Assessment: An Integrated Approach for Risk Management" Proceedings, ESREL'96 - PSAM III, Crete, 1996, Springer Verlag, pp 1817 - 1822 Shooman, M. "Probabilistic Reliability: An Engineering Approach" 2nd Edition, Kreiger, Melbourne, FL, 1990 Thadani, A., Murphy, J. "Risk-Informed Regulation - Issues and Prospects for its Use in Reactor Regulation in den USA" Proceedings, ESREL'96 - PSAM III, Crete, 1996, Springer Verlag, pp 2172 2177
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The Engineering Council (E. C.) "Guidelines on Risk Issues" The Engineering Council, U. K., 1993, ISBN 0-9516611-7-5 U.S. Congress "Risk Assessment Improvement Act of 1994" Identifier: H. R. 4306, USA, 1994 U.S. NRC "Safety Goals for Nuclear Power Plant Operation" U.S. NRC, Washington DC, NUREG-0880, 1986 U. S. NRC "Probabilistic Risk Assessment Implementation Plan", U.S. NRC, Washington DC, 1994 U.S. NRC "PRA Policy Statement", U. S. NRC, Washington DC, 1995 U. S. NRC "Maintenance Rule", 10 CFR 50.65, U. S. NRC, Washington DC, 10 July 1996 Watson, I. "Developments in Risk Management" Paper, ESREL'93, Munich, VDI Verlag DOsseldorf, 1993, pp 511-521
INCORPORATI NG RISK ASSESSMENT AND ITS RESULTS IN THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS J M Le Guen Health and Safety Executive, Rose Court, 2 Southwark Bridge, London SE 1 7HS, UK
ABSTRACT The degree to which risks should be controlled is essentially a question of values. Individuals tolerate different levels of risk depending on the benefits they think they will gain from taking the risks. Equally, society's tolerance of different risks varies dramatically for a whole variety of reasons, some relatively straightforward and amenable to scientific evaluation and others complex expressions of deep-seated, psychological attitudes. This paper sets out criteria which HSE has developed against that background for defining tolerable levels of risks and integrating that in the decision-making process. The criteria accept that risk assessment, more often than not, cannot produce scientific estimates of actual risks but can instead only produce conditional estimates of risks under specified sets of assumptions; that there is generally a need to achieve a balance between risks and costs but equally that there are some risks that cannot be tolerated under any circumstances. The criteria have gained considerable acceptance within industry. It has helped HSE to meet its objective of being an open and transparent organisation by showing how decisions about risks are arrived at, and by letting duty holders understand what is expected of them and what they should expect from the regulator. KEYWORDS Unacceptable risk, tolerable risk, negligible risk, criteria for standard setting. INTRODUCTION As we approach the Millennium, contrasting public attitudes to a technological society at the beginning and at the turn of the twentieth century, is most revealing. In 1900, 'la belle ~poque', there was considerable optimism that science and technology would solve everything, transform people lives and make the world a safer, healthier and more prosperous one to live in. A lot of this has happened. During the last hundred years the standard of living has risen dramatically; we now live longer and are generally healthier. Yet people have never been more pre-occupied with risks to health, safety and the environment. Even more disturbingly, there is today a general malaise about science and technology. There are several reasons for this phenomenon. I will mention only a few. Firstly, the majority of people in industrialised countries these days no longer have to struggle for their daily bread. In industrialised countries obesity is now a bigger problem than malnutrition. As a result the acceptance of industrialisation to gain increased standards of living is no longer as readily given as when the fight against hunger and poverty overshadowed everything. This is giving rise to a growing propensity to scrutinise benefits brought about by industrialisation against its undesirable side effects such as the risk of being maimed or killed or environmental pollution. 27
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Secondly, there is a perception that the exploitation of modern technology is increasingly giving rise to risks: which could lead to catastrophic consequences - perceptions fuelled by greater awareness of issues such as nuclear fall-out following Chernobyl, depletion of the ozone layer, global warming and acid rain; where the consequences may be irreversible, eg. the release of genetically modified organisms; which lead to inequalities because they affect some people more than others such as those arising from the siting of a chemical plant, power station or a waste disposal facility; which could pose a threat to future generations such as radioactive waste depositories. Thirdly, whereas nearly everyone can readily assess the threat of a tiger over one's shoulder, this is not the case for risks posed by many of the newer hazards arising from industrialisation, eg pollutants in foodstuff. People must rely instead on the opinion of experts. However, the trust placed in expert opinion as a source of reassurance is being continually eroded particularly for those issues where the mass media have exposed controversies surrounding such opinions. There is a school of thought emerging that society's concerns about risks have now reached such a point that the redistribution of risks in society is becoming as important politically as the re-distribution of wealth (though the political system may be still lagging behind and may still be predominantly concerned with the latter). Whether this is true or not is still a matter for debate, but what cannot be denied is that: -
many managers today have less freedom in management matters which only yesterday they would have regarded as a private matter for themselves to decide; eg plans for modifying their plant within their own boundaries, what raw materials and processes they should use, or how the waste generated (or the plant itself at the end of its useful life) should be disposed of; more and more restrictions are being placed at international or European level on goods and services that are allowed on the market because of the risks (real or perceived) that they entail; ignoring or riding rough-shod over society's concerns may cause markets to collapse, give rise to calls for bureaucratic checks and entail legal proceedings and loss of reputation. it is more important than ever before that the management of health and safety risks be integrated in the overall management process itself, now that it is increasingly the norm to look at the health and safety record of a firm to get an indication of the quality of its management overall.
Some parts of industry may have been slow to recognise the above. They have often concentrated on taking decisions based on the results of risk assessments and failed to be sensitive to ethical, social and cultural considerations or played down the assumptions and uncertainties in the risk assessment thereby giving the impression that their results are based on sound science. Doubts have been expressed by some as to whether an approach based on risk assessment may be appropriate for the regulation of risks. This was witnessed by the controversy surrounding the proposals for the disposal of the Brent Spar oil platform in the UK, the collapse of the market for bottled Perrier water following their admission that their product had accidentally been contaminated by traces of benzene, the controversy surrounding Bovine Spongiform Encepalopathy (BSE). This paper describes the criteria known as the Tolerability of Risk (TOR) which HSE has developed to inform decisions about the degree to which risks should be regulated and/or controlled. It avoids the above pitfalls by taking into account the scientific knowledge about the risks concerned, the technology available for controlling them as well as public attitudes towards the risks and the benefits they engender. The criteria has gained considerable acceptance within industry.
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RISK ASSESSMENT
The process of assessing risks is now an essential component of an effective strategy for countering the general hankering after a zero risk society, incorporating the management of health of safety in the decision-making process and rationalising the amount of resources that should be allocated for preventing or reducing risks. More importantly it is being increasingly recognised that used judiciously, it can be a powerful tool for re-assuring the public that science is being used for pursuing technologies whose benefits outweigh the risks and integrating public values in the decision making and political process. Assessing risks is simple in principle. It involves identifying hazards or examining what in a particular situation could cause harm or damage, and then assessing the likelihood that harm will actually be experienced by a specified population and what the consequences would be (ie the risks). As such, a risk assessment is essentially a tool for extrapolating from available data, a value or judgement which people will accept as an estimate of the risk attached to a particular activity or event. Though a sharp distinction is often made between risk assessment and risk management - the distinction is artificial. It stems from original beliefs - now known to be misguided - that assessing risks could be, by and large, a totally scientific and objective process unlike risk management which inevitably has to be more subjective because it has to take into account a host of other factors such as economic analysis, perception of risks, availability of alternative technologies, concerns about equity etc. In practice, an assessment of risks is also a very subjective process since it often cannot be undertaken without making a number of assumptions. Moreover, since a risk assessment takes account of measures already in place it invariably contains some elements of risk management. In short though the basic principles of assessing risks may be simple, applying them is not as simple. Indeed risk assessment nowadays more often than not is a composite of established disciplines, including toxicology, engineering, statistics, economics, demography and psychology. Knowledge of these disciplines is required to solve many of the practical problems - described below - that are encountered during the assessment process. Uncertainty
Uncertainties are inherent in the process of assessing risks. They all stem from imperfect knowledge and can be considered to be of two types. Known uncertainties or 'what you know you don't know'. For example a risk estimate may be based on models which are known not to describe certain aspects of a problem or utilises data which are known to be of limited applicability or accuracy. Unknown uncertainties on the other hand arise from sources which are either unknown to those making the risk estimate, or whose significance is not appreciated - 'what you don't know you don't know'. For example it may not be appreciated that a particular model is incomplete in its description of possible effects. In the last few years, development of better methods for tackling problems posed by uncertainty has become increasingly important. Several techniques are available for tackling both known and unknown types of uncertainties. For instance, sensitivity testing is often used to check the importance of assumptions to the final result. Small changes are made, within limits, in the data used and assumptions made, and their effects on the result of the assessment are then examined. Large changes are an indication that the assumptions need to be re-examined. A review of available methods for tackling uncertainty is beyond the scope of this paper. Its influence and ramifications for informing policy decisions have been examined by Ravetz et al. Risk Perception
People's attitude to risks is greatly influenced by they way they perceive them. Indeed the factors that tend to reflect society's concerns about the risks bear a marked similarity with those mentioned earlier as influencing people's attitude to science and technology. How the risk interacts with psychological, social, cultural, and institutional processes is important. Factors of particular importance include how well the
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process (giving rise to the hazard) is understood, how equitably the danger is distributed, how well individuals can control their exposure, whether risk is assumed voluntarily and the number of people likely to be killed in any one incident and the trust that the public have in the regulator with responsibility for ensuring that those who create risks introduce appropriate measures to control the risks. THE REGULATION OF RISKS
Risk Criteria If they are to be successful, criteria for the regulation of risk must reflect society's values at large. As such they must take into account how people perceive risks and recognise that certain hazards give rise to societal concerns because people have an intrinsic dread of them or because they interact with the social aspirations, ethical beliefs and cultural ethos of society. Typical examples of such hazards include those associated with a nuclear power station, chemicals affecting the ozone layer or giving rise to global warming and biotechnology. Three broad 'pure' criteria have emerged for judging the tolerability of risk: equity-based, which starts with the premise that all individuals have absolute fights to certain levels of protection. This usually leads to standards held to be usually acceptable in normal life, or which refer to some other premise held to establish an expectation of protection. In practice, this often results in fixing a limit to represent the maximum level of risk to which any individual should be exposed. If the risk estimate derived from the risk assessment is above the limit, the risk is held to be intolerable whatever the benefits; c o s t / b e n e f i t b a s e d where some direct comparison is made between a value placed on the benefits of reducing risk of injury or detriment, and the costs of preventing and reducing the risks. This form of criterion may relate the comparison not to the overall benefits and costs, which may be very difficult to establish, but to the benefits and costs of an increment of risk reduction. In other words, cost/benefit based criteria compare the benefits in monetary terms obtained by the adoption of a particular risk prevention measure with the cost of introducing it. ' t e c h n o l o g y b a s e d ' . This essentially reflects the idea that a satisfactory level of risk prevention is attained when relevant best or good practice, or "state of the art" technology is employed.
The TolerabUity of Risk
The above criteria are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, all three are present in the framework that HSE has developed for deciding what risks are so great as to be unacceptable; so small that no further precautions are necessary; or, if they fall between these two states, whether the risks should be incurred, taking account of the benefits or the need to avoid some greater risk. The criteria known as TOR (short for tolerability of risk) are illustrated in the geometry at Figure 1. The horizontal line at the top represents an upper limit above which a particular risk for practical purposes is regarded as intolerable whatever the benefit. Any activity or practice giving l'{se to a risk greater than this threshold would be ruled out unless it can be modified to reduce the degree of risk below this level. The line at the bottom, on the other hand, represents a threshold below which risks are considered broadly acceptable because they compare with small risks which do not worry people or cause them to alter their behaviour in any way. When incurred they only result in a very small addition to the background level of risks to which everyone is exposed during their lifetime (typically 1 in a 100). Between the two lines is the region where people will tolerate risks in order to secure benefits. However, this tolerance of risks is buttressed by an expectation that people will be told the nature and level of the risks, and the confidence that the risks are being controlled as low as is reasonably practicable.
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This region, known as the 'tolerability region', accommodates people's and society's willingness to live with a particular risk so as to secure social and economic benefits. Benefits for which people and society tolerate risks typically include local employment, lower cost of production, personal convenience and the maintenance of general social infrastructure for example through the availability of electricity, food or water supplies. However, while people may tolerate risks for which they can see some benefits that outweigh them and as such will indeed engage voluntarily in activities which often involve high risks, in general they want the risks to be as low as possible. Moreover, they are far less tolerant of risks imposed on them and over which they have little control. The concept of tolerability implies that existing control measures should be periodically reviewed to ensure that they are both properly applied and that they take account of changes over time, as for example, the availability of new options for reducing or eliminating risks due to technical progress.
To lerab ility limits The dividing line between the unacceptable and tolerable regions must reflect society's values at large and will depend on the nature of the hazards and the detriment they could give rise to. However, HSE has proposed that for hazardous events to which workers are exposed, a risk of death of 1 in 1,000 per year should be the dividing line between what is tolerable for the majority of workers for most of their working lives, and what is unacceptable for any but fairly exceptional groups. For members of the public who have a risk imposed on them "in the wider interest" HSE would set this limit at an order of magnitude lower - at 1 in 10,000 per annum. At the other end of the spectrum, HSE believes that an individual risk of death of 1 in 1,000,000 per annum for the public (including workers) corresponds to a very low level of risk and should be considered as broadly acceptable. In addition to those levels of individual risks, the HSE has suggested that the chance of an accident causing societal concerns due to multiple fatalities in a single event should be less than 1 in 1,000 per year and, if possible, less than 1 in 5,000 for accidents where there is some choice whether to accept the risk of it happening - for example by allowing the erection of a hazardous installation in a built-up area. The choice of the above figures is essentially a policy decision and they are not intended to be straight-jackets applied rigidly in all circumstances. The upper boundary was determined by analogy with high risk industries generally regarded as well regulated while the lower boundary took account of people's voluntary acceptance of risks in particular situations and risks that they usually regard as negligible in their walk of life. On the other hand the boundary for the level of risk for events causing multiple fatalities is roughly based on an examination of the levels of risk that people were prepared to tolerate for hazards causing a major accident affecting the surrounding population eg the survey carried out by HSE on the potential risks of the industrial installations at Canvey Island on the Thames or the predicted annual chance of an aircraft crash in the UK killing 500 or more people. Though the above tolerability limits are defined in terms of fatalities, it is possible to apply the framework for judging the tolerability of other forms of detriments (eg non-fatal injuries) by converting them into "fatality equivalents".
Typical persons Some of the tolerability limits mentioned above relate to individual risks. But this is not as straightforward as it seems. What is a typical individual? Individuals are affected by risk differently depending amongst other things on their physical make up, abilities, age etc.
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When setting standards, tolerability limits, or control limits that apply to a particular activity whatever the circumstances, this problem is addressed by constructing a hypothetical type of individual or typical person who is in some fixed relation to the hazard, eg the person most exposed to it, or a person living at some fixed point or with some assumed pattern of life. Other individuals can then see how their circumstances relate to this typical person and reckon whether they or their family incur a greater or smaller risk. As such, typical persons may be regarded as persons (including groups) assumed to have homogeneous characteristics who are deliberately posited for the purpose of risk assessment. They may for example be persons hypothetically constantly present at the perimeter fence of a nuclear power station, or a group of workers presumed to be exposed to a given risk for exactly forty hours per week etc. It is therefore very important to understand that the determination as to where the risks from a particular activity lie in the TOR geometry (ie whether they lie in the unacceptable/tolerable/negligible region), is performed by calculating the risk to a typical individual exposed to the hazard under consideration for a specified period of time (usually a full working day) integrated over a full year. The calculations do not relate to the risk arising from the actual exposure of a real person to the hazard in question. Similarly, once it has been established where the activity lies in the TOR geometry, decisions on the measures that need to be taken across the board to control the risks relate to those needed to ensure the health and safety of the typical individual and not to those of an actual person undertaking the activity (though it may be necessary to adjust these measures to take account of any particular characteristic - eg a disability - peculiar to the real person). In short, the risks derived to the typical individual act as a pointer as to where the activity lies on the TOR geometry, which in turns dictates the type and degree of the measures that need to be introduced across the board to eliminate or to control the risks adequately. This approach of establishing for any circumstances the control measures that need to be introduced for protecting actual persons from risks, by looking at those needed to protect a typical individual, has an important consequence. Once these measures have been identified, they represent the measures that must then be introduced, even for short exposures, for protecting actual persons from the risks. For example if the risk in operating an unguarded power press, is found to be intolerable and a guard is necessary to make the risk tolerable, then the guard will need to be in place, however short the period it is being used. Nor is it admissible to arguethat there is no need to introduce risk control measures for a high risk activity because in practice the risk is shared between many employees to ensure that the risk to any one individual is low. REDUCING RISK AS L O W AS IS REASONABLY PRACTICABLE In practice most risks will fall into the 'tolerability region' which will require those having a duty to control the risk to decide whether the risks have been reduced as low as is reasonably practicable (ALARP). The first step is to look at whether relevant good practice has been adopted. Where relevant good practice is not established, duty-holders will be expected to apply risk-reducing measures balanced against their associated costs through a cost benefit assessment. In general the higher the risks the more the balance should tilt in favour of adopting the measures unless their costs are clearly excessive compared with the benefit of the risk reduction.
Placing a Monetary Valuation on Benefits Cost benefit assessments can often be done on the basis of common sense judgement and without the explicit valuation of the benefits. However, there are also many situations where the benefits of reducing risk can be valued explicitly. This requires agreement on protocols since the health and safety of people and protection of the environment are not things that are bought or sold. It is therefore difficult to find market transactions to gauge their value directly.
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Nevertheless, many techniques have been developed for putting a monetary value on risk reductions to human life and health. For example, by comparing property values, it is possible to estimate how much people actually pay for cleaner air or more attractive scenery. Or again by looking at how much more people are prepared to pay for a car fitted with an airbag it is possible to gauge what people are prepared to pay for achieving a marginal reduction in the risk of death. Similarly, by examining how much extra is paid for undertaking particularly dangerous jobs one can estimate what monetary compensation people require for a marginal increase in the risk of death. HSE in undertaking cost benefit analyses currently attributes a value of £8 for a reduction in risk of death of 1 in 100,000 per year - unless the risk is particularly dreaded or is near the margin of tolerability and subject to large uncertainties when higher values are used. CONCLUSIONS Individuals tolerate different levels of risk depending on the benefits they think they will gain from taking the risks. Equally, society's tolerance of different risks varies dramatically for a whole variety of reasons, which have at their roots deep-seated, psychological attitudes and beliefs. A philosophical framework which makes use of the results of a risk assessment can provide a structure for informing decisions on the risks that society and individuals are prepared to accept and for communicating how these decisions were reached. However, for the tool to work, all those who rely on it have to understand its nature and its limitations - in particular that it relates to typical rather than actual persons; that the process is assumption and value-laden and subject to uncertainties. In short, acceptance of decisions on risks has to take account of values established by informed debate and people's willingness to tolerate risks in return for benefits. HSE has developed and published such a framework, known as TOR, for establishing how far it is reasonable to regulate and control risks having regard to established good practice; the impact of technological change; the uncertainties attached to risk estimates and not least how people perceive risks and which one there are prepared to tolerate. Since its publication, HSE has found it extremely useful for justifying its regulatory decisions, targeting the allocation of resources and reaching judgements on what is reasonably practicable when enforcing the law. It has also helped to make decisions informed by the results of a risk assessment more acceptable. More and more firms are becoming aware that the public mood has changed and that they have to be open and transparent about the risks they create and the measures they have in place for preventing or controlling those risks. TOR provides an established framework for putting such information in the public domain. Though it may not bring back the optimism of the 1900s, many have found it a most useful tool in their attempts to dispel the malaise surrounding their industry.
REFERENCES Funtowicz Silvio O. and Ravetz Jerome R. (1990). Uncertainty and quality in Science for Policy, Kluwer Academic Publishers ISBN 0 7923 0799 2. Health and Safety Executive (1992). The Tolerability of Rbskfrom Nuclear Power Stations, page 32, paras 181183, HMSO, London, ISBN 0 11 886368 1.
A2" Risk Perception
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PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH M A J O R INDUSTRIAL HAZARD SITES A. Brazier ', A. Irwin2, C. Kelly3, L. Prince 4, P. Simmons 5, G. P. Walker6, B. Wynne 5 'Major Hazards Assessment Unit, Health and Safety Executive, Bootie, Merseyside, UK 2Department of Human Sciences, Brunel University, Uxbridge, Middlesex,, UK 3Ergonomics and Work Psychology, Health and Safety Laboratory, Sheffield, UK "INLOGOV, Birmingham University, Birmingham, UK 'Centre for the Study of Environmental Change, Lancaster University, Lancaster, UK 6Division of Geography, Staffordshire University, Stoke on Trent, UK
ABSTRACT This paper reports on research commissioned by the Health and Safety Executive in the context of the forthcoming Seveso II Directive, to help understand how members of the public perceive the risks from major hazard installations. The research is based on comparative case studies of seven hazardous installations and uses complementary data collection and analytical methods, including contextual research, focus group discussions, siting scenarios and Q-sort exercises. The purpose, rationale, methodology and emerging results of this major 3 year research project are discussed.
KEYWORDS Risk, perception, tolerability, siting, policy, UK.
INTRODUCTION In the UK statutory controls over major hazards are designed to identify sites with a major hazard potential, to prevent and reduce the severity of accidents through requirements for safe operation, and to mitigate the consequences of accidents which do occur, through emergency planning, information to the public and land-use planning. In accordance with the role envisaged under the Seveso II Directive (Commission of the European Communities 1994, Walker 1995) the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) provides expert technical advice on risks that would be posed by new hazardous installations and risks from existing installations to proposed development in their vicinity. Planning advice is also given on the risks from notified pipelines and licensed explosives sites. The Seveso II Directive will require information on safety 37
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measures and emergency planning to be made available to persons liable to be affected by a major accident originating from a major industrial hazard site. To prepare for the implementation of the Directive, HSE has commissioned an interdisciplinary research project to help understand:the level of public comprehension of hazard and risks from major hazard sites, for example, awareness of the nature and extent of these risks, and the sources of this information. public perception of these risks, that is, of the perceived likelihood of a major accident, compared with other perceived risks, and how this perception compares with assessed risk levels. the level of risk the public is willing to tolerate from major hazards, and the factors which influence attitudes, such as economic benefit, the public image of a company good neighbour policies, etc.
PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF THE RESEARCH The primary purpose of the research is to assist HSE and other Government Departments: • • • • •
to to to to to
develop policies on the tolerability of risk develop criteria for the siting of major hazards and the use of land within their vicinity explain risk issues to local planning and hazardous substances authorities and to the public evaluate the effectiveness and impact of legislation provide a baseline of knowledge from which to measure future change.
THE RESEARCH IN CONTEXT The research forms part of a wider HSE behavioural and social sciences research programme and coincides with both the revision of the HSE publication on the Tolerability of Risks from Nuclear Power Stations (HSE 1992) which is being redrafted to encompass other industries and the revision of the 1989 HSE discussion document (HSE 1989) which suggested quantified risk criteria for land use planning within the vicinity of major industrial hazards and outlined the rationale underpinning these criteria. In light of the many comments received on the discussion document and a further six years experience of their use HSE is revising the document to include more definitive approaches and criteria for control to include recommendations on:• • • • • •
the siting of new hazardous installations the tolerable risks from existing installations the further development of land in the vicinity of such installations the tolerable risks to existing development in the vicinity of such installations the location of pipelines containing hazardous substances the control of developments (both new and existing) in the vicinity of such pipelines, and touches on • the local control of dangerous substances transportation risks (to dovetail with the recommendations made in the 1991 HSE Report on the transportation of dangerous substances in major hazard quantities)
EXISTING RESEARCH BASE
Although major hazards have been recognised as a particular category of technological risk for over 20 years, there have been comparatively few studies of how the public perceive these risks. Much risk perception research has been concerned with how the public perceive multiple forms of risk in the abstract,
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rarely including major hazard risks amongst the list of risks to be considered. Where work has been focused on particular forms of environmental risk, nuclear power and radioactive waste have figured most prominently (e.g. Van der Pligt 1992, Macgill 1987, Wynne et al 1993) with hazardous waste landfill and incineration also receiving significant attention in the US. One limitation of this latter body of work, in relation to the present research project, is that it deals with populations affected by persistent and often undetectable toxic risks of a kind that have a particular cultural resonance because of their associations with notions of 'contamination' that arouses particular public anxieties (Erikson, 1990, Beck, 1992). Although some large chemical installations may be perceived as presenting a similar risk to local populations, in the case of many major accident hazards the risk of this sort of toxic exposure (and its powerful cultural associations) is absent. In the UK there has been a relatively small number of pieces of work concerned with major hazards. Social and Community Planning Research (Prescott-Clarke 1980, 1982) undertook a study of public perceptions of a range of risks incorporating analysis of perceptions of' major hazards, through a small-scale, qualitative feasibility study on Teesside and a larger nationally representative quantitative survey. The latter (Prescott-Clarke 1982) revealed a number of interesting patterns of perception but without analysing them in any real depth. For example, it was found that the nearer someone lived to a major industrial site the less likely they were to consider that such sites collectively posed a risk to the public, but the underlying reasoning behind this spatial trend is not explored. The discussion of the results of the focus group work on Teesside (Prescott-Clarke 1980) is in some ways more revealing, with selected quotes beginning to open up to dimensions of trust in regulators, economic dependency and industry-community relations. Smith and Irwin (1984) undertook a survey of public perceptions of risk in the vicinity of major hazard industry in Halton in Cheshire, concluding that in neither of the two survey areas, 'did the risks associated with factory accidents emerge as a major concern'. However, they questioned the value of attitudinal survey evidence, stressing the dangers of over-generalisation and the need to recognise the diversity and contextual nature of risk attitudes. A number of studies have also considered public perceptions and responses in the context of information given out to the public under the CIMAH Regulations. These include research contributing to comparative European studies led by Brian Wynne (1987, 1990) and work undertaken by Jupp and Irwin (1989)around the Carrington complex in Manchester. Irwin (1995) discusses the results of questionnaire and semi-structured interview work around plants in Eccles and Clayton/Beswick which found a generally high level of concern about factory accidents and pollution sitting alongside other concerns such as unemployment, crime and violence. The trust placed in various possible disseminators of information about hazards is explored, revealing a low level of trust in industry but also an overall pattern of scepticism and wariness about information sources. It is stressed that both the hazards and their perception are very much embedded in the nature of the locality and the lives of local people, so that they are 'an intrinsic part of everyday social reality and the very identity of these areas' (ibid.). Looking beyond the UK, a number of studies in the Netherlands have examined public perceptions of major accident hazards. Vlek and Stallen (1981) and Stallen and Tomas (1988) report on the results of research undertaken around the port of Rotterdam, using a number of different approaches to studying public risk perceptions. The initial study involved 700 people responding to a psychometric questionnaire, asking about their personal judgements of various risky activities. Three pairs of cognitive dimensions underlying sets of individual judgements were identified - riskiness, beneficiality and acceptability- but Vlek and Stallen emphasise the limitations of the study (despite its scale), such as the problem of group average ratings hiding substantial differences in understanding and interpretation, and raise doubts over the meaning of comparisons made between major hazards and other very different types of risk. A later follow on study in the Rotterdam area sought to extend this work by focusing on 'feelings on insecurity' when faced with the threat of a major accident, and the importance of 'personal control' in the response made to insecurity. Four types of response to the threat of major hazards are identified - secure, accepting, vigilant and defensive with their occurrence amongst the 600 interviewees analysed by spatial proximity to major hazard sites and gender. Little variation across space is found, although women are found to be more anxious about the risks because they value matters of personal health and well-being more highly than men. In particular, Stallen
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and Tomas argue, that it is important to look at the context of statements made about risk, as the intensity of feeling about a threat is only one aspect of a more involved qualitative structure of the affect. In a study undertaken in the vicinity of the DSM chemicals complex in south Holland and further afield as a control group, Wiegmann, Gutteling and Boer (1991) set out to explain the apparently greater level of acceptance of risk found in the vicinity of the hazard in Stallen and Tomas's study (a phenomenon also observed in survey research in the Halton study referred to above). Economic dependence upon the industry was found to play a part in this phenomenon but only appeared to account for a small proportion of the variation. They conclude that social learning theory, a cognitive theory which assumes that through a process of experiential verification the residents near the chemical complex are less affected by the 'biased' accounts of industry risks offered in the media, offers the best explanation of this effect. When contrasted to the results of the research around nuclear power, radioactive and toxic waste sites, these studies pose interesting questions about the rather different patterns of local perception of major accident risks. Whilst there are clearly differences between the political culture of the UK and other countries, it may also be that the cultural valency, and therefore individual perceptions, of these different types of hazards plays a significant part in accounting for these different patterns of response. One limitation of most of these existing studies has been the use of a single research method or a focus on a single major hazard site (albeit with other control sites in the case of the Dutch studies). This is where we anticipate that the approach to be adopted in the present study, involving both multiple sites and a combination of psychological and socio-cultural research methods, will provide some further insight into the issues that have been raised.
APPROACH TO THE RESEARCH The approach adopted by the research team to the study of how people experience the risks associated with major hazard sites, sees the various dimensions of awareness, comprehension, perception and toleration as closely intertwined (to the extent that it may be very difficult to separate them). Our approach also sees this experience as being formed in a specific local context. It follows that central to developing an understanding of risk perception will be an exploration of the interaction of risk perceptions with attitudes towards other aspects of industry, the local area, local regulatory bodies and the broader social and economic context within which the local community is situated. This perspective in turn influences the research methods chosen and the overall research design. The comparative research design is also intended to enable us to investigate a number of more specific issues raised by recent risk perceptions research both in Britain, Europe and the USA. In particular, within the overall aims specified earlier, the research will seek to: • • • •
draw out the extent of diversity, consistency and stability of perceptions amongst different publics, rather than seeking only some homogenised view of a putative local 'community'. explore the differing roles of national and local level influences on perceptions of risk from industrial sites. examine the role of dimensions of credibility and trust in industry and regulators in risk perceptions. examine the influence of implicit senses of empowerment or powerlessness held by members of the public on their interest in and willingness to take up information about hazards and emergency arrangements.
RESEARCH DESIGN Case study site selection
Seven case study major hazard sites are being examined. These have been selected by the research team in consultation with the HSE, in order to provide variety in the following characteristics:
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the nature of the hazard at the site (toxic, explosive/flammable) the designation of the site as a top-tier 'Seveso Directive' installation, referred to in the UK as a CIMAH ( Control of Industrial Major Accident Hazards Regulations 1984) site , or as a lower inventory installation referred to in the UK as a NIHHS (Notification of Installations Handling Hazardous Substances Regulations 1982) site. CIMAH sites will have disseminated information to local publics whilst there is no such requirement for NIHHS sites the physical size of the installation (ranging from a major complex to a warehouse) the length of time the installation has existed the history of accidents or publicised incidents at the plant the socio-economic characteristics of the surrounding population (derived from census data)
We were also constrained by the need to have a reasonably substantial population living near to the hazardous site. For this purpose we used census data to estimate how many people lived within the 'consultation distance' (CD) specified around each installation by the HSE. We have so far completed field work in three of the case study areas and details of these are shown in Table 1. Further case study sites are to include a major chemical/petrochemical complex, a warehouse holding ammonium nitrate and a stretch of'major hazard' pipeline. TABLE 1 CASE STUDY SITES
Company
Site
Hazard No. of Type Employees
!Albright Langley, CIMAH and Wilson Sandwell,West Toxic Midlands
Size
Year Established
Extent of CD
Population in CD
600
55 acres
1851
750-1000m 7,980
Allied Colloids
Low Moor, CIMAH Bradford, West Toxic Yorkshire.
2000
42 acres
1953
1300m
1,890
Rohm and Haas
Jarrow, South Tyneside
220
14 acres
1955
400m
1,950
NIHHS Toxic
Contextual research
The initial stage in the work in each case study area is to carry out contextual research. We see this as an important element in the research design. It involves, first of all, a search of information sources held in local studies libraries and archives. These include local press reports, local histories, industrial and company histories, local development plans and ordnance survey maps of the area. This research is supplemented by interviews with key local actors including site management at the company, the HSE Inspector responsible for the site, emergency planners, land use planners, the chair of the local liaison committee, together with other people from the local community such as head teachers of schools near to the site or, in cases, local councillors. Focus groups
The main method for finding out about how people perceive, understand and feel about risk is through focused group discussions. The advantage of focus groups as a method for this kind of research is that they provide a context in which people interact with one another. This creates an opportunity to observe the way
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in which people's views are formulated, expressed and challenged. It establishes a far more dynamic and in certain ways more revealing research situation than a one-to-one interview or a survey. Focus groups have not been widely used in risk perception research (Wynne et al 1993) but are extensively used in social research more generally. The approach that we have developed involves recruiting 6 groups of 6-8 local people in each area (without informing them of the principal themes of the research). Each group meets twice. Each meeting lasts ninety minutes and the two meetings take place about three weeks apart. In the first meeting a discussion guide is used and participants are led through a list of topics, beginning with their views about the area and gradually focusing in on the major hazard site. At the end of the meeting the Q-sort exercises (see below) are demonstrated to participants and they complete these in the period between the two meetings. The second meeting begins with a discussion of three stimulus sheets containing quotations which express different points of view about (a) the provision of public information about industrial hazards, (b) the regulation of industry and (c) who should be responsible for setting safety standards. In the second half of the meeting we employ two sets of materials which use planning and facility siting scenarios to stimulate discussion of a variety of risk issues, including questions of risk assessment criteria and societal risk. The first of these scenarios involves deciding about the location of new housing in the vicinity of an existing hazardous installation in an already built up area. The second relates to a choice between two possible locations for a hazardous plant extension.
Q-method Q-method is a pattern analytic technique developed for the study of subjectivity. It has been used in a range of disciplines, most notably political science, but has been employed to only a limited degree in previous studies of risk perceptions. In this project we have produced two Q-sort exercises which all the people involved in the focus groups undertake. One is concerned with people's sense of place. The second is concerned with their view of the local major hazard site. Using Q-method first involved the collection of statements about major hazard sites from a range of different sources. A sample representing the range of statements was then created and from this we produced a set of cards, each containing a single statement related to the local major hazard site. They were asked to sort the cards into a predetermined pattern according to the strength of their agreement or disagreement and to record the resulting configuration on a form provided. The resulting arrangement of cards for all participants is then subjected to factor analysis to reveal any underlying patterns or factors. These factors represent distinct points of view which to a greater or lesser extent are held in common by some of the participants. Interpretation of these factors is subsequently validated by returning to interview a few individuals whose Q-sorts exemplify a particular factor or point of view. Some contrasting examples of the statements that people are asked to sort on major hazards are as follows: ' An industrial accident that would harm local residents is extremely unlikely.' 'The safety of local people is a top priority for Allied Colloids.' ' No-one forces people to live here - if they think its too dangerous they can always move out.' ' The chemical industry is just a threat to everyone's health and safety.'
PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS AND RESULTS As the research project is yet to be fully completed, discussion of results must be preliminary and tentative. However certain themes have emerged from the focus group sessions and analysis of the Q-sort data is initially revealing some common patterns of response.
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43
Focus group." comparative themes and issues Initial thematic analysis of the focus group data has identified a number of issues and themes relevant to our understanding of people's perceptions and toleration of risks associated with these sites. These issues appear in various ways across all three case studies. They are: • • • • • • •
the influence of what we have called 'local memory' on perceptions of a site, this collective memory sometimes extending back a long time and passing from generation to generation the importance of experience of incidents in shaping local discussion and perceptions and relationships between the company and the local community the way in which inferences about risk are drawn from sensory 'evidence' such as smells, visible plumes, the general appearance of the site and the quality of local nature the way in which people reason about risk, in relation to probability and consequence arguments, trade-offs between risk and other concerns and the scope for individual choice in risk-taking the stigmatisation that can result from the presence of a hazardous site and the implications this has for local identity the variety of images that people hold of the company and the range of ways in which initiatives by the company, such as open days, community newsletters, and liaison groups are responded to the strength of views on regulation and regulators and the expectations of and trust in regulatory practice that are expressed
Q-sort data Our initial analysis of the Q-sort data has found that in each area two clearly differentiated, orthogonal factors, or points of view, emerged. In each case the strongest of these was a point of view which was in general distrustful of the company and had little confidence in the regulators or in the emergency services. This point of view was also characterised by concern about the risks associated with the site. The second factor represented a contrary point of view which, in general was more trusting in the competence of the company, the regulatory authorities and the emergency services and which consequently tended to be more tolerant of the risks. Significantly, very few of the participants in these case studies appeared to hold such a robust view. A comparative analysis of the factors identified for all three sites found them to correspond very closely, confirming that we were finding very similar patterns of response at all three sites. The most significant differences between the factors can be accounted for by specific differences in the local contexts. CONCLUSION The experience of bodies dealing with risk concerns has repeatedly shown the importance of developing a better understanding of public risk perceptions. However, despite much research over the past twenty years that understanding remains somewhat elusive. There is a need for research which deals with the perception of particular forms of risk in the settings and contexts in which these are experienced and which more explicitly recognises that living with risk is very much part of everyday life for many people. In the case of major accident hazards we have argued that such research must involve a locally focused and contextualised approach, which allows people, as much as possible, to discuss and express points of view in ways which they define and determine. Such an approach is also needed if we are to develop a deeper understanding of why particular perceptions of risk are held and the stability and certainty of particular points of view. The use of focus groups allied with q-method we have described in this paper, provides an innovative and effective approach to meeting these objectives and to the formulation of a range of recommendations for the development of major hazard policy and regulation in the UK.
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REFERENCES Beck U (1992) Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity, Sage, London, UK. Commission of the European Communities (1994) Proposal for a COUNCIL DIRECTIVE on the control of major accident hazards involving dangerous substances (COMAH). COM(94) 4 final: Brussels 26.01.94 Erikson, K. (1990) Toxic Reckoning: Business Faces a New Kind of Fear, Harvard Business Review, Vol. 90:1, pp. 118-126. Health and Safety Executive (1989) Risk Criteria for Land use planning in the vicinity of Major Industrial Hazards, HMSO, London, UK. Health and Safety Executive (1992) The Tolerability of Risk from Nuclear Power Stations, HMSO, London Irwin, A. (1995) Citizen Science. A study of people, expertise and sustainable development, Routledge, London, UK. Jupp, A. and Irwin, A. (1989) Emergency Response and the Provision of Public Information under CIMAH, Disaster Management, 1:4. Macgill, S.M. (1987) The Politics of Anxiety, Pion, London, UK. Prescott-Clarke, P. (1980) Public Attitudes Towards the Acceptability of Risks, Social and Community Planning Research, London, UK. Prescott-Clarke, P. (1982) Public Attitudes Towards Industrial Work Related and Other Risks, Social and Community Planning Research, London, UK. Smith, D. and Irwin, A. (1984) 'Public Attitudes to Technological Risk: the Contribution of Survey Data to Public Policy Making', Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 9. Stallen, P.J.M. and Tomas, A. (1988) Public Concern about Industrial Hazards, Risk Analysis, 8:2, pp. 237-245. Van der Pligt, J. (1992) Nuclear Energy and the Public, Blackwell, Oxford, UK. Vlek, C. and Stallen, P.J. (1981) Judging Risks in the Small and the Large, Organizational Behaviour and Human Performance, 28, pp. 235-271. Walker, G. P. (1995) Land use planning, industrial hazards and the 'COMAH' Directive, Land Use Policy, vol. 12, no. 3, pp. 187-191. Wiegman O, Gutteling JM and Boer H (1991) Verification of Information through Direct Experiences with an Industrial Hazard, 12:3, pp. 325-339. Wynne B (1987) Implementation of Article 8 of the EC Seveso Directive: A Study of Public Information, Report to the European Commission, DG XI. Wynne B (1990) Empirical Evaluation of Public Information on Major Industrial Accident Hazards, Report to EC Joint Research Centre, ISPRA Wynne B et al (1993) Public Perceptions and the Nuclear Industry in West Cumbria, Centre for the Study of Environmental Change, University of Lancaster, Lancaster, UK.
SOCIETAL RISK AND THE CONCEPT OF RISK AVERSION J.K.Vrijling and P.H.A.J.M. van Gelder Department of Civil Engineering, Delft University of Technology Stevinweg 1, 2600 GA Delft, The Netherlands
ABSTRACT It seems generally accepted that the FN-curve is a fairly accurate description of the societal risk. However in the communication with the public and representative decisionmakers a schematisation of the FN-curve to one or two numbers may bring certain advantages. Various measures like Potential loss of Life, the area under the FN-curve, the Risk Integral etc. are proposed in the literature. Although the formulae look distinctly different at first sight a more thorough inspection reveals, that all schematisations contain as building blocks the two familiar statistical moments of the FN-curve, the expected value of the number of deaths E(N) and the standard deviation ~(N). In the paper the linear combination E(N) + k.cy(N) is proposed as a simple risk averse measure of the societal risk.
KEYWORDS
Risk analysis, acceptable risk, societal risk, individual risk, risk aversion, decision making.
INTRODUCTION
There is general agreement in the literature and in regulatory circles that risk should at least be judged from two points of view (VROM (1988,1992), HSE (1989)). The first point of view is that of the individual, who decides to undertake an activity weighing the risks against the direct and indirect personal benefits. This first point of view leads to the personally acceptable level of risk or the acceptable individual risk, defined in as "the frequency at which an individual may be expected to sustain a given level of harm from the realisation of specified hazards". The specified level of harm is narrowed down to the loss of life in many practical cases. The second point of view is that of the society, considering the question whether an activity is acceptable in terms of the risk involved for the total population. Commonly the notion of risk in a societal context is reduced to the total number of casualties (VROM (1988,1992), HSE (1989)) using a definition as by IoCE (1985): "the relation between frequency and the number of people suffering from a specified level of harm in a given population from the realisation of specified hazards". If the specified level of harm is narrowed down to the loss of life, the societal risk may be modelled by the frequency of exceedance curve of the number of deaths, also called the FN-curve due to a specific hazard. 45
46
J.K. Vrijling and RH.A.J.M. van Gelder
The FN-curve can be seen as an exceedance curve with a related probability density function (p.d.f.) of the number of deaths. The p.d.f, of the number of deaths Ndij given an accident for activity i at place j can have many forms. A few types are presented here to stimulate further thinking. The first conditional p.d.f, is the Dirac, that limits the outcomes to exactly N fatalities. Other possibilities that allow a larger variation in the outcome, are the exponential and the log-normal p.d.f. The probability of exceedance curves of the number of fatalities, that can be derived from these two forms reflect to some extent the FN-curves found in practical quantitative risk assessment (QRA) studies. A fourth is the inverse quadratic Pareto distribution that coincides precisely with the norm put forward by the Ministry of VROM (1988). The Pareto p.d.f, has no finite standard deviation unless the right tail is truncated (Fig. 1). Exactly the same models could be applied for the material damage that results from a disaster, if the horizontal axis is measured in monetary units. It should be noted that the proposed conditional p.d.f.'s have to be multiplied with the probability p of an accident and that the outcome zero fatalities with probability (lp) should be added to find the complete p.d.f, of the number of deaths (Fig.l). The classical measures of expected value and standard deviation will appear to be very useful numbers to classify the risk. probability density function ECN wu ) I-p.
VAR(I~
:
probability of exceedance
2. p
m~j) -- 2 .
,.
LN (N ~AX )
m
2P
r
•
I
N
HA)(
X
•
~ M,I~C
Inverse quadratic Pareto
Figure 1" A theoretical p.d.f, and probability of exceedance curve for the number of deaths. A controversy is found on the way to judge and limit the societal risk. Many apparently different judgemental numbers and normative decision rules can be discemed as will be shown below.Also the question of these numbers and rules include risk aversion is the subject of debate. Some analysis makes however clear that the rules and numbers proposed in the literature fall in two categories: risk neutral or risk averse. The direction of the development seems to be towards risk averse measures, although this trend is somewhat obscured by mathematical complexity.
D I F F E R E N T MEASURES AND LIMITATIONS OF SOCIETAL RISK It seems generally accepted that the FN-curve is a fairly accurate description of the societal risk. However in the communication with the public and representative decision makers a schematisation of the FN-curve to one or two numbers may bring certain advantages. As to the limitation of the societal risk to acceptable levels many different rules are proposed by scientists and regulatory bodies. Disagreement is especially found on the question if societal risk should be judged with a risk averse or a risk neutral attitude. One of the oldest simple measures of societal risk is the Potential Loss of Life (PLL), which is defined as the expected value of the number of deaths per year:
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47
E (N) = ~ x. f Ndij (x). dx (1) where
: fNdij --
the p.d.f, of the number of deaths resulting from activity i in place j in one year
Ale (1996) has proposed the area under the FN-curve as a simple measure of societal risk. Although this is not immediately clear, it can be mathematically proven that the area under the FN-curve equals the expected value of the number of deaths (appendix 1).
E(N) =
I(1-
FNdij(x))dx (2)
An absolute limit to the expected value of the number of deaths is not mentioned in the literature. The use of the expected value seems very valuable in the comparison of various alternatives. VROM(1988) limits the societal risk at plant level by a line that is inversely proportional to the square of the number of deaths. This absolute requirement that formed the basis for the regulation and the siting of hazardous installations or new developments in the Netherlands during the last decade reads:
10 4 X
2
(3) for x > 10 deaths, where : FNdij = the c.d.f, of the number of deaths resulting from activity i in place j in one year (the subscript dij will be obmitted further on). The HSE (1989) remarks that the judgement of the societal risk at plant level by the VROM-rule is overly risk averse. HSE proposes to change the value of the exponent in the expression from 2 into 1 in order to form a more even judgement. In recent papers Cassidy (1996) of HSE defined the risk integral RI as an appropriate measure of societal risk that should be further explored: R I = I x. a - G ~x)). ax
(4) A limiting value is however not yet attached to this new concept. Vrijling (1995) notes that the societal risk should be judged on a national level by limiting the total number of casualties in a given year in the following way:
E(Na~) + k cy(Nm) < [3~ I00
(5) where : k - risk aversion index. The formula (5) accounts for risk aversion, which will certainly influence acceptance by a community or a society. Relatively frequent small accidents are more easily accepted than one single rare accident with large consequences, although the expected number of casualties is equal for both cases. The standard deviation of
48
J.K. Vrijling and RH.A.J.M. van Gelder
the number of casualties will reflect this difference. The risk aversion is represented mathematically by increasing the expectation of the total number of deaths, E(Nd~), by the desired multiple k of the standard deviation before the situation is tested against the norm. Rule (5) can be transformed into a similar expression valid at plant level by taking into account the number of independent installations NA. It can also be transformed mathematically into a VROM-type of rule applicable at plant level as shown in the same paper:
1- FNd,(X) <-- C--~2 for all x >_ 10
x
: I ~' 10012 where C,
[.k ~--AAJ (6)
For values of 13~= 0.03, k = 3 and NA = 1000 the rule equates exactly to the VROM-rule, which appears to be a specific case in a more general framework. Bohnenblust (1996) judges the number of casualties after correction with a factor q~(x) in an economic framework. Weighing the societal risk SR in the light of the cost of measures to improve safety an optimal decision is reached. Changing the summation into an integral the expression proposed by Bohnenblust reads:
Sl~ :
I x. , (x). G (x). & (7)
Although not explicitly stated by Wehr and Bohnenblust (1995), it can be deduced from a graph in the paper that (p( x ) - ~/(x/10). So the SR measure could be expressed as:
SR = I ~ l O. x 's. f u (x). dx
(8) THE RISK ATTITUDE OF THE VARIOUS RULES
First it should be stated that in this paper a decision based on the expected value only is called risk neutral. Risk neutrality can be modelled with a linear utility function. In case of a risk averse attitude a smaller standard deviation is preferred above a larger in case of equal expected values. In the literature this is frequently modelled by quadratic utility functions. To show the principle the expected utility is evaluated below for a linear and a quadratic utility function: In case of risk aversion the standard deviation starts to play a role. However the strict fipplication of quadratic utility curves has as a disadvantage that the units become [death 2/year], which is difficult to communicate to the public and most probably also to decision makers.
~ ax. f N (x). dx = a. E (N)
~ a x2. f u (x).dx = a.(E (N ) 2 + ~ (N ) 2) (9)
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49
Using the concept of risk attitude the PLL and the area under the FN-curve, that are both equal to E(N), can be classified as risk neutral measures of the societal risk. The rule proposed by Vrijling(1996), containing E(N) + k.(~(N), is clearly risk averse. Consequently the VROM-rule which is proven to be a special case of this rule can be similarly classified as risk averse. If the exponent of the VROM-mle is changed into 1 as is proposed by HSE only the expected value of the number of casualties is limited, which according to the definition given above should be called risk neutral. The measure proposed by Bohnenblust (1995,1996) has an intermediate position with an exponent of 1.5. It is very interesting to note that is can be mathematically proven (appendix 2) that the risk integral proposed by Cassidy (1996) of HSE equals:
1
2
RI = ~x.(1-Fu (x)).dx = -j(E2(N ) +c ( N ) ) (10) Apparently the need for a simple risk averse measure to schematise the FN-curve is also felt in the United Kingdom. A disadvantage of the risk integral RI might be that the units are [death 2 /year] and some difficulty will be met in formulating an easy to understand limiting value.
CASE STUDY The half of Holland that lies below the sea level is divided in NAi= 40 more or less independent polders surrounded by dike-rings. If it is assumed that at some future date each polder will house Npij= 1,000,000 inhabitants, an estimate of the number of casualties in case of flooding can be made. In 1953 approximately 1% of the inhabitants drowned, giving a value of pdjn=0.01. Little is known of the influence of modem technological development on this number, but the failure of energy and communication networks during the minor floods in Limburg point to a limited beneficial influence. The expected value and the standard deviation of the number of deaths in 40 independent polders per year are equal to:
E(Ndi )
=
40pj 10-210 6
cy 2(Ndi) = 40pj (1 - p j )(10-210 -6 )2 (11) If these expressions are substituted in the norm Eqn. 5 the solution for 13i=l becomes pnj= 3.10 -7 per year. In case the aversion of the inhabitants against flooding is more extreme and [3 i= 0.1 the acceptable probability of failure of the dike ring is pf~j= 3.10 .9 per year.
50
J.K. Vrijling and RH.A.J.M. van Gelder 10 0 ,
,
,
,
,
,
,
, , ,
,
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,
,
, ,
,,
,
,
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,
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,
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,,,
,
,
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,,
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=ol
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.
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iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii i iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii iiiiiiiiiiiilliii
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102 Number
103 of fatalities
104
N
Figure 2." FN-curve for flooding of the Brielse polder For the Brielse dike ring near Rotterdam a FN-curve (Fig.2) has been drawn estimating the probability of failure of the existing dikes at 10-4 per year. The FN-curve shows that there are five equally likely scenario's with death counts varying from 15 to appr. 5000 people. As these scenario's are assumed to be independent, the combinations, that claim even more casualties, are less likely by an order of magnitude. Developing the local criterion for a dike ring using the values mentioned above, the constant becomes C i - 27.8 - 0.278 for 13 - 1-0.1. Thus the present situation based on the philosophy developed by the Deltacommittee (1960) seems insufficiently safe in the light of modem developments. Following the normative framework developed here the acceptable probability of failure of the dike equals 6.3.10 .7 to 6.3.10 .9 depending on the value of 13 •
CONCLUSIONS Although the FN-curve, the exceedance curve of the number of deaths, is generally accepted as a clear representation of the societal risk regarding the loss of human life, a search for one simple number to express the societal risk can be observed. Several schematisations of the FN-curve are proposed. Some of these schematisations are completed with a limiting value to provide a decision rule. Although the formulae look distinctly different at first sight a more thorough inspection reveals a common approach that promises a relatively rapid convergence of opinions. It appears that all schematisations contain as building blocks the two familiar statistical moments of the FNcurve, the expected value of the number of deaths E(N) and the standard deviation c~(N). The Potential Loss of Life (PLL) measure and the area under the FN-curve, as a simple measure of the societal risk, are both equal to E(N). However no absolute use of this measure is mentioned and consequently no limiting value is reported in the literature. Using the concept of risk aversion it was proven that the most recently proposed ways to judge societal risk are all risk averse. The well known VROM-rule, that limits the FN-curve by 103/N 2 appears to be a special case of a more general rule proposed by Vrijling (1995), that limits the societal risk at the Dutch national level by: E(N) + k.c~(N) < 13.100.
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51
The criticism of the VROM-rule, that the exponent of 2 is overly risk averse and that a value of 1 should be preferred, leads to a limitation of E(N) only. Limiting the FN-curve by C/N places an upperbound to E(N) and must be classified as a risk neutral approach. The risk integral RI, recently proposed by HSE as an alternative measure needing further investigation, is shown to be equal to 0.5 {E(N) 2 +(y(N)2}. Thus the risk integral should be classified as a risk averse measure of societal risk. The units [death2 /year] in which RI is expressed may hamper the understanding of this measure by the public. A linear expression like E(N) + k.o(N) with units [death/year] is preferred. In addition the relatively simple relation between this measure and a VROM-type of rule provides the possibility of unification. Attention should be paid to the fact that some rules (e.g. Vrijling(1995)) limit the societal risk at a national level, while most others (VROM,HSE) address the risk at plant level. Because "many small unrestrained developments could add up to a noticeable worsening of the overall situation" (HSE(1989)), the societal risk should be limited in a concerted way on both national and local level. In the approach of Vrijling (1995) the societal risk is limited at national level and consequently taking the number of hazardous installations into account a VROM-type of rule is derived for plant level.
LITERATURE Ale,B.,(1996), Zoning instruments for major accident prevention, Proc. ESREL/PSIAM, Crete, p. 1911. Bohnenblust,H.,(1996), Integrating technical analysis and public values in risk based decision making, Proc. ESREL/PSIAM, Crete, p. 1911. Cassidy,K.,(1996), Risk criteria for the siting of hazardous installations and the development in their vicinity, Proc. ESREL/PSIAM, Crete, p. 1892.
Deltacommittee (1960), Deltareport, Den Haag, The Netherlands. HSE,(1989), Risk criteria for land-use planning in the vicinity of major industrial hazards, HM Stationery Office. Institute of chemical engineering,(1985), Nomenclature for hazard and risk assessment in the process industries, ISBN 85 295184 1. VROM, (1988), Dutch National Environmental Plan, The Hague. VROM,(1992), Relating to risks (in Dutch), The Hague. Vrijling, J.K. et alt.,(1995), A Framework for risk evaluation, Journ. of Hazardous materials, 43, p.245-261. Wehr,H., Femaud,C., Bohnenblust,H.,(1995), Risk analysis and safety concept for new long railway tunnels in Austria, Proc. Safety in road and rail tunnels, Granada, p.3.
APPENDIX 1 (PROOF OF EQN 2)
0
Ox
O0
0
52
J.K. Vrijling and R H . A . J . M . van G e l d e r
APPENDIX 2 (PROOF OF EQN 10) cy 2 ( N ) = v a r N = E N 2 - E 2 N ,
So
E2N +~2N
= EN 2,
oo
x
oox
0
0
00
So 0
o
u
o
0 u
FROM RISK ANALYSIS TO RISK PERCEPTION: DEVELOPING A RISK C O M M U N I C A T I O N STRATEGY FOR A D A M - B R E A K FLOOD RISK M.L. Lima ~, A. Bet~mio de Almeida 2 and D. Silva 3 ~Dept of Organisational and Social Psychology, I.S.C.T.E., Av. For~:as Armadas, 1600 Lisboa; Portugal 2Dept of Hydraulics and Water Resources, I.S.T.,Technical University of Lisbon, Av. Rovisco Pais, 1600 Lisboa; Portugal 3 GES - Social Ecology Group, L.N.E.C., Av. do Brasil, 101, 1799 Lisboa Codex, Portugal
ABSTRACT
This paper describes the process of development of a risk communication strategy to implement the first structured flood warning system in Portugal in case of dam failure. This research project was funded through the NATO Science for Stability Program (NATO PO-FLOOD RISK Project). The pilot warning system was located along two sequential dams in Arade River (Algarve), which will enhance the safety of the population living in downstream valleys. The five phases of the process can be briefly described as: (a) Risk analysis and definition of inundation maps for different dam failure scenarios; (b) Descriptive analysis of human occupation of the risk area; (c) Exploratory analysis of expert and lay discourses about dam safety and risk; (d) Survey study on the public perception of dam related risk, and preventive behaviour against floods in general; (e) Definition of a communication strategy to establish a flood warning system.
KEYWORDS
risk perception, risk communication, inundation maps, population at risk, dam break, warning system
INTRODUCTION
The concept of environmental education has been used to refer to the strategies which aim at making people aware of environmental problems and at changing behaviour to alleviate them. However, within this general concept, only a specific type of environmental problems are usually considered: those that encourage environmentally responsible behaviour (such as conserving water and energy, recycling etc.). Preventive action to minimise the consequences of a natural or technological disaster is not often seen as a problem within this conceptual area. Instead, it has frequently been conceived as a technical problem in which structural and technology solutions are evaluated in terms of engineering criteria (Sime, 1995), and the population at risk is conceived as a mere target of a final design to a warning system. The different approach to both problems has important consequences in the way communication strategies are defined. While, in the first case, it is widely recognised that effective communication must take into account the needs, 53
54
M.L. Lima et al.
expectations, values and prior behaviour of the public, in the second case, communication is conceived only in from the experts" point of view. This technical approach systematically promotes low levels of information about the risk in the public in contrast to custodians of that information and, in case of disaster (for example a flood), the public in the impacted area is often not warned beforehand, although the flood has been detected or forecasted in advance (Handmer, 1988). In our research, and contrary to the above view of risk communication, we support an altemative approach which, as Sime (1996) puts it, considers the perspective of the public as a starting point in a warning system evaluation. Under this perspective, an effective warning system cannot be defined only in terms of the phenomena and the forecast, but also in terms of the involvement, characteristics and perceptions of those who are at danger (AEMI, 1995, Handmer, 1996; Syme, 1996, Sime, 1996). In this paper, we present the process of development of a risk communication strategy to implement the first structured flood warning system in case of dam failure in Portugal. This process was developed within a multidisciplinary integrated research project funded through the NATO Science for Stability Program, which aims at improving the safety of the population in downstream valleys. This project, entitled Dam-Break Flood Risk Management in Portugal (NATO PO-FLOOD RISK Project), integrates the results of contributions from hydraulic analysis, safety analysis, land-use management, social sciences and computer sciences (Almeida et al., 1996), and is supported also by the Portuguese water and dam safety authority (INAG), the main Portuguese power company (EDP) and the Portuguese Civil Protection Agency (SNPC). Until now, the construction of a risk communication strategy to implement the warning system involved five stages. The aim of the communication was to establish a pilot warning system for a set of two sequential dams in Arade River (Algarve), which will enhance the safety of the population living in downstream valleys. We will briefly describe the rationale and the accomplishments of each stage.
Stage 1- M a p p i n g the floodable area in case of a dam b r e a k event - Inundation maps
In this stage, several dam-break inundation studies were performed to determine the impact of a flood produced by a dam failure on the downstream area. Inundation maps were obtained for different dam failure scenarios, by numerical simulation based on computational models. According to Almeida & Viseu (1996), these types of floods are very different from ordinary natural floods for several reasons including: (1) a very high peak discharge and water depth valves; (2) eventual occurrence of movable bores and modular jumps; (3) fast and violent flooding of the banks; (4) flooding of previously dry land with abnormal dissipative effects; (5) transport of sediments and debris; (6) very difficult calibration of the models for each case. The production of inundation maps for our particular case was an important outcome of the project and a necessary step for risk assessment. From the different maps available, we decided to base our communication strategy in the worst case scenario: break of both Funcho and Arade Dams, and all inundated area was considered at risk, independently of the depth of the water.
Stage 2: D e s c r i b i n g the inundation area - D e m o g r a p h i c and land use characterisation in a GIS
In this stage, our goal was to produce information about the character&tics of the occupation of inundation areas in case of dam break, for that specific valley. To gather the information about the, the inundation map was compared with the census maps. Using this methodology, we could estimate the total population at risk (PAR) (and described its social and demographic characteristics) and the built environment in specific areas. In urban areas it was easy to have a very good overlap of the two maps. In rural areas, due to the dispersion of buildings, it was difficult to reproduce the flood maps in census maps. Downstream risk assessment must take into consideration several factors, including: (1) Warning time (WT), according to the literature (DeKay & McClelland, 1993; Brown & Graham, 1988) this variable is critical to predict loss of life in case of a dam break. The model differentiates between three cases in increasing vulnerability: WT
90 minutes. We defined warning time as the time it takes the initial flood wave to reach the population at risk. (2) Community size (CS): urban areas, although more populated, are considered as less
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vulnerable because the buildings are less dispersed and the levels of organised safety is higher (Brown & Graham, 1988).This variable was set to two levels: whether the area was a city or a set of disperse villages. According to the above defined criteria, 5 risk areas were defined and described (Lima & Silva, 1996). Table 1 shows some of its characteristics.
TABLE 1 Description of the population and buildings at risk by .inundation area I
Inundation area Area Area Area Area Area
1 2 3 4 5
WT < 15m 15-25m 25 m 25-60 m 60 m
CS Rural Rural Urban Rural Urban
Population at risk PAR 674 549 3694 3212 905
O/Y rate 113% 109% 40% 19% 114%
Illiteracy 28% 34% 16% 15% 15%
Buildings at risk CSS 43% 41% 58% 50% 21%
Low 100% 100% 89% 89% 79%
This analysis show that in that valley, and according to the 1991 census data, we have about 9.000 residents at risk. Area 3 and 4 are the more populated ones. It is also there that we can find the higher percentage of young people (individuals below 19 years old). The other risk areas (1,2, and 5) show a reversed pattern: they are less populated, and they have more elderly (20-25%). The population has a very low level of literacy. The percentage of illiterate individuals vary from 15 to 34%. Only 10 to 20% have more than the fourth grade at school. Educational level of the population is especially low in areas 1 and 2. Areas 3 and 4 have more buildings and dwellings than the other risk areas. Almost all buildings are used as residences, specially in rural areas (1,2 and 4). Areas 4 and 5 are tourist zones, and we find in those areas higher percentage of occasional residences. The buildings in Areas 3 and 4 are younger and higher than those in the other areas, and they are more often constructed using concrete support structures. Buildings in risk area 5 are especially old and were built with weaker materials. Simultaneously, a land-use analysis was performed on the same areas, to identify key structures (schools, hospitals, etc.) and to determine the plans for the future years for that region (Farrajota & Campos, 1996). All those data were introduced into a database specially produced to this project, which also includes the characterisation of the dams (Femandes & Andrade, 1996).
Stage 3: Identifying local actors and discourses about dam safety and risk- Qualitative study The success of a risk communication strategy depends largely upon local involvement. Demographics cannot give us a clear picture of the different partners in the process and, as the valley under study spreads over different communities, some field work had to be done in order to identify the local authorities and opinion-
makers, as well as the lay discourses about dam safety. Some direct interviews were conducted with local experts (mayors, urban planners, civil protection agents, dam owners) and 30 residents in different risk areas. The first set of interviews allowed us the identification of the important structures to be contacted to implement the warning system, and their views about the problem.
WT: Warning time; CS: Community size; PAR: Population at risk; O/Y rate: old/young population rate. It corresponds to the ratio between the number of residents over 64 years old and the number of residents below 19 years old. Illiteracy: % of residents who have not received any formal education and cannot read or write. CSS: % of buildings with concrete support structure; Low: % of buildings with 1 or two floors.
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The second set of interviews gave us access to the lay discourses about the dams (Lima & Silva, 1996). A content analysis was performed on these interviews and results show that the dams are perceived in a rather positive way: the benefits are very clear, especially to those more vulnerable in case of dam failure. This can be a result of the specific type of dams we studied (built for water storage to be used to field irrigation), where, and contrary to dams producing electric power, there was a resultant improvement in the farming patterns of that area. The second important result was that no one ever complained about the non-existence of warning systems. Although there was a clear assertion of the inconveniences of unexpected spillouts no one proposed a more active strategy towards dam risk. This result was also found by other authors (Bishop and Syme, 1992; Syme, 1994), and the general pattern found resembles a passive resignation, blindly trusting others to take care of their lives. Important differences in discourse were found according to risk vulnerability. Specifically, three types of lay discourse about the dams were identified: • "The darns did not bring any benefits, except maybe for flood regulation" - discourse of the younger, and from those living far away from the dams, in risk area 5 (Portim~,o).
•
"The dams were very good for me, for this area and for farmers. They improved farming and helped in flood regulation. Dams can break, although it is an improbable event. I trust the dam because I know people working there, and I know that the engineers are very competent". This type of discourse was found in Silves (risk area 3), especially in retail store owners.
• "There are different types of dams, according to their material, their age, their structure, and they are variably safe. Even though I trust the older dam and there is no possibility that it breaks, although I sometimes have nightmares about it. This old dam was very good for me, as a farmer, and it improved farming and the whole quality of life in this area ". This kind of speech is typical of those farmers living very near the dams. They present a very concrete and specific way of speaking about the dams: although they are older and mainly illiterate, they speak in a much more complex and technical way about dams (thickness of wall, type of structure, etc). One other important characteristic of the discourse of this group is a need for denial of risk, often associated with reported fear. The different discourses highlighted some interesting issues. Higher levels of risk exposure is associated with risk denial. This result, which was also found for some other technological risks (van der Pligt, 1992), can be understood as an emotion-focused way of coping (Lazarus and Folkman, 1985) with an unavoidable stressor that enormous structure full of water quite near their house). The different pattern of confidence expressed by those rural and illiterate residents near the dams (a confidence in the dam itself) and by those more educated living in the nearby town (personal trust on the experts) was also a surprising and interesting result. We can associate this finding to Giddens (1990) concept of confidence in expert systems as a symptom of modem societies. Under this perspective, for those living far from the dams these are more abstract systems and confidence is produced through their access points (in our case the dam engineers or the those who work on the dam). Accordingly, they rate all dams as safe. On the contrary, for the rural population living near the dam, this structure has a very specific image and specific functions in their daily life. They don't need to trust the engineers, because the community has been living with the dam for many years and simply trusts a very familiar and useful structure.
Stage 4: Describing risk perception of dam break risks - Survey study The qualitative study we undertook produced a vivid picture of the reality we faced. But, in order to produce a communication strategy to implement the warning system, some more precise information was needed about the way people perceived those risks. In this stage, a quantitative analysis of the beliefs about dam safety was produced. A survey studY was performed, which intended to examine the following issues: (1) How does the population at risk in Case of a dam failure disaster think about that risk? (2) How are the dams perceived by those residents? 302 residents were randomly selected among the risk areas defined above (in this case, we joined the first and second areas because they have very similar demographic structures). The main differences in the
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demographic profile (Table 2) contrasts the rural samples (where respondents are older and more illiterate) with the urban settings. The subjects in our sample have a great amount of flood experience and they live in one or two store houses. This pattern is similar to the one described for the population, based on the statistics data for the region in 1991 (Step 2). Data was collected by direct interviews, using a structured questionnaire. The interview took place at the residence of the interviewed, and took an average of 32 minutes to complete.
TABLE 2 Description of the sample in the survey study
Risk area Warning time Community size Main community Number of Subjects Mean age Education (<4y) Building: apartment Flood experience >3
Sample1
Sample2
Sample3
Sample4
1& 2 <25m rural Barragem 48 54.7 70% 2% 86%
3 25m urban Silves 105 48.7 44% 28% 64%
4 <60m rural Mexilhoeira 85 53.7 71% 16% 63%
5 60m urban Portimfio 66 47.4 51% 16% 65%
First of all, we tried to understand the perceived probability of a series of hazards. For each hazard, respondents rated their probability of occurrence in a five point scale (l=it is not possible to happen, 5=it is very likely to occur). Results show (Figure 1) that bush fire are considered the most probable one (M=4.27, sd=.82), and dam failure is considered the least probable one (M=2.31, sd=.98), very close to big constructions failure (M=2.43, sd=.90). Floods are viewed as probable (M=3.66, sd=l.01), followed by earthquakes (M=3.23, sd=.88) and house fires (M=3.01, sd=.92). As Bishop and Syme (1992) found in Australia, dam failure risk is not salient in our sample. However, there are some differences in the subjective estimates of probability for dam failure risk in the four sub-samples: the areas closer to the dam underestimate it, as compared to the ones far away from the dam. This is particularly true for the two rural samples.
I
bush fire I flood earthquakes ~
l
_
house fire ~ =
big constructions
~
dam failure
~ 1
2
3
4
FIGURE 1" Subjective probabilities of different hazards
5
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Risk is not usually formulated by lay people in these quantitative terms and the risk perception literature identifies a series of qualitative dimensions in which the public evaluate the risks they take. These dimensions were used to rate flood and dam failure risk. Results (Figure 2) show that flood risk is described in moderate terms. It is seen as medially old, known by those exposed and by authorities. It is not considered as catastrophic, dread, or as affecting self (it is seen as a risk affecting more other people), and it is not also seen as very easily controllable by authorities or by self. Dam failure is seen in a less soft way. It is perceived as rather dreadful, new and catastrophic risk and not at all preventable by self. It is seen as not very well known either by the authorities or by the population at risk and they do not perceive the authorities as competent to control that risk. Again, it is mainly a risk that is perceived not to affect directly self and to be someone else's problem. When we compare those two risks (using the appropriate statistical tests to test the differences between observed means), we can see that dam break risk is perceived as more dread (t=-11.27, df=295,p<.0001), affecting more (t=--9.31, df=286,p<.0001) and more catastrophic (t=-19.26, df=273,p<.0001) than flood risk. Flood risk is perceived as more known by those affected (t=6.70, df=243,p<.0001) and by the authorities (t=-4.99, df=229,p<.0001), and more controllable and preventable by self (t=-10.14, df=273,p<.0001). No significant differences were found for control by the authorities, old risk or affecting more others than self.
Dread, Known, ,Z~ects me, Known byaulh, Controlable byaulh, Catastrophic, Old,
r
Prevar~able byself, Oe~rs
2
not at all -
3
- flood risk
g
very r m ~
------ dam break risk
FIGURE 2: Perceived floods and dam failure risks To simplify these descriptions and structure risk perception for both those risks, two factor analysis were performed to these risk descriptions. Our results showed that, although with a very similar underlying structure, dam break and flood risks are seen in very different ways. People think of them in terms of possibility of control (can this risk be controlled, either by myself or the authorities?), dread (does this risk produces fear?) and knowledge (is this risk well known?). They consider dam failure risk much more frightful, more unknown and less controllable than flood risk. In both cases, perception of risk controllability is more common in urban samples than in rural ones. Samples near the dam perceive dam break risks as more dreadful and flood risks as less dreadful than people living near the coast. Risk perception is not isolated from other cognitions (e.g., Vlek and Stallen, 1981). In this study we analysed also the perceived benefits of these two especific dams, the evaluations of dam safety and the beliefs that support safety evaluations. Similarly to the results of the qualitative study, farming benefits are particularly salient (especially for residents living closer to the dam), and the overall quality of life also was rated as having improved. Corresponding to that pattern of results, the beneficiaries of the dam are described as farmers and residents near the dam (Barragem and Silves). The region as a whole (Algarve) was also
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perceived as a beneficiary, but self was not seen that way except for those living in the rural area near the dam. According to our results, dams are perceived as very beneficial to the region, but they are also perceived as safe structures. The reasons for trusting the safety of the dams were also analysed. Age of the dam seems to be an important criteria for safety evaluations, together with trust in technicians. Although the level of explanation of the regression equation is not high (20%), the principal predictors of safety evaluations for dam are two items relating to trust in technicians, one stating the confidence on the dam age. Those results show an interesting pattern of cognition about dam safety: Trust in technicians seems to be an important factor to explain perceptions of safety but the age of the dam is another one. For the residents, an old dam, because it has had no problems during a long time, is trustworthy. The younger dam, although with a concrete structure, arises some suspicion, because it has not yet been proven to be safe.
Stage 5: Implementing a risk communication strategy for a warning system The studies performed in the stages described above have given us a lot of information to define the risk communication process to implement the warning system in case of a dam induced flood. Specifically, it has shown that: 1. As dam failure risk is perceived as a much more dramatic, uncontrollable and unfamiliar risk than flood risk, it is more difficult to accept. The flood warning system to be created should then be developed for floods in general: dam failure being a particular and extreme case of those. This strategy would have several other important consequences: it would prevent damages in case of natural floods or dam spillouts, and the population could have more opportunities to learn preventive behaviour. 2. Risk communication should not be conceived as a one-way strategy. In order to promote effective responses to warning systems, the decision process of the individuals must be understood and the residents should be informed about the seriousness of the risks they face and their possibility of response in adequate time (Janis & Mann, 1977). To fulfil these goals in our case study, where the population is living at risk for more than 40 years, direct communication is particularly desirable. Furthermore, a local committee of residents in risk areas could help to improve the dialogue between the experts and the public and prevent excessive responses (Syme, 1994). 3. Rural/urban distinctions are also important both in our results and the literature of warning response (Handmer &Ord, 1986). However, as the differences relate mainly to the age and degree of literacy of the subjects, they affect only the communication channel and not the content of the message. Local involvement is a key factor for the success of the warning system. A GIS for dam safety management is presently under development within this project (Gamboa & Santos, 1996). This user-friendly system includes the topography, river network, roads and inundation maps of the valley and it is a powerful instrument to promote the dialogue with the local authorities and residents. Several meetings with the local experts are already planned and our knowledge of the technical characteristics of the dams, the valley and its population make us an important partner in safety issues for this area.
CONCLUSION A multidisciplinary project is often a challenge for all the researchers involved. This paper showed how we tried to put together the results from the different disciplines involved in a research project which aimed at improving the safety of a downstream valley below two dams in Rio Arade (Algarve). Although, at first, each of the contributions seemed quite autonomous, the main goal of producing an effective communication strategy with the local authorities and population seemed quite effective to connect the research team. The
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philosophy of our methodology stresses a two-way approach to risk communication, and thus we tried to involve the public and their representatives in the different stages of our research. During this year several meetings will take place, and the final success of the waming team depends mainly on our skills to involve them in their safety.
REFERENCES AEMI (1995). Flood Warning." An Australian Guide. Mount Macedon, Ausffalian Emergency management Institute. Almeida, A.B., & Viseu, T. (1996). Dams and valley safety: a present and future challenge. Paper presented at the Workshop NATO Dams and Safety Management at Downstream Valleys. Lisbon, Portugal, November. (forthcoming publication). Almeida; A.B., Ramos, C.M., Franco, A.B., Lima, M.L., & Santos, M.A. (1996). Dam-break floodrisk and safety management at downstream valleys: A Portuguese integrated research project. Paper to be presented to the X/X Congress of the International Commission on Large Dams (ICOLD). Florence, Italy, 1997 (Q.75). Bishop, B.J., & Syme, G.J. (1992). Community perceptions of dam safety issues. CSIRO Division of Water Resources Consultancy, Report 92/32. Brown, Curtis A. & Graham, Wayne J. (1988) Assessing the threat to life from dam failure. Water Resources Bulletin, vol 2(6): 1303-1309. DeKay, M.L., & McClelland, G.H. (1993). Predicting loss of life in cases of dam failure and flash flood. Risk Analysis, 13, 193-205. Femandes, J.P, & Andrade, M.J. (1996). A database for dam safety management.. Paper presented at the Workshop NATO Dams and Safety Management at Downstream Valleys. Lisbon, Portugal, November. (forthcoming publication). Gamboa, M, & Santos, M.A.(1996). A GIS for dam safety management. Paper presented at the Workshop NATO Dams and Safety Management at Downstream Valleys. Lisbon, Portugal, November. (forthcoming publication). Giddens, A. (1990). The consequences of modernity. Oxford: Basil Balckwell. Handmer, J. (1988). The performance of the Sydney flood warning system, August 1986. Disasters, 12, 37-49. Handmer, J. (1996). Bellow the spillway: ensuring effective warnings in a crisis. Paper presented at the Workshop NATO Dams and Safety Management at Downstream Valleys. Lisbon, Portugal, November. (forthcoming publication). Handmer, J.W. & Ord, K.R. 1986. Flood warning and response. In D.I. Smith and J.W. Handmer (Eds.) Flood Warning in Australia (pp. 235-251). Canberra: CRES. Janis, I.L. & Mann, L. 1977. Decision making." a psychological analysis of conflict, choice and commitment. New York: Free Press Lazarus, R.S., & Folkman, S. (1984). Stress Appraisal and Coping. New York: Springer. Lima, M.L., & Silva, D. (1996). Caracteriza¢6o socio-demogr6fica e do edificado das zonas em risco de inunda¢6o por ruptura das barragens do Funcho e de Silves. Lisboa: L.N.E.C. (in press) Lima, M.L., & Silva, D. 1996a. Understanding lay perceptions of dam-related risks. Paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the Society for Risk Analysis(Europe). Guilford, June Quarentelli, E.L. (1978) Disasters: theory and research. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications Sime, J.D. (1995). Crowd psychology and engineering. Safety Science, 21(1), 1-14. Sime, J.D.(1996). Informative flood warnings: occupant response to risk, threat and loss of place. In J. Handmer (Ed.) Current issues in total flood warning system design - An international Workshop. Middlessex University, September 1995 (forthcoming publication). Slovic, P. 1987. Perception of risk. Science, 236: 280-285. Syme, G.J. (1996). Risk versus Standards based approaches to dam safety: The consequences for community involvement in decision making and safety management in the Australian context. Paper presented at the Workshop NATO Dams and Safety Management at Downstream Valleys. Lisbon, Portugal, November. (forthcoming publication). Syme, G.J. (1994). Dam break: Creating a vigilant community. Paper presented to International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction, Sydney. van der Pligt, J. (1992). Nuclear Energy and the Public. Oxford: Blackwell. Vlek, C., & Stallen, J.P. 1981. Judging risks and benefits in the small and in the large. Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 28:235-271.
A3" Integrating Management Models
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DYNAMIC MODELLING OF SAFETY MANAGEMENT A.R. Hale l, L.J. Bellamy 2, F. Guldenmund l, B.H.J. Heming 1 and B. Kirwan 3, Safety Science Group, Delft University of Technology, 2628 EB Delft, NL 2 SAVE Engineering Advice Bureau, 7301 GL Apeldoorn, NL 3 Ergonomics Group, University of Birmingham, Edgbaston, Birmingham B 15 2TT, UK
ABSTRACT The modelling and quantification of failure risk and of safety management began as two distinct activities. Since the 1980s they have been growing together. This paper describes the latest in a series of studies to integrate technical and management modelling so that predictions and assessments of total system risk and its control can be made. The approach emphasises the dynamics of management control of risk. It combines the PRIMA audit system with the Delft framework of safety management systems, using SADT-modelling for a systematic approach to critical management factors. The process of integration raises fundamental questions about how to articulate the two parts, which are based on different paradigms.
KEYWORDS Integrated risk modelling, safety management, audit, management dynamics
INTRODUCTION: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE The assessment of failure probability and of safety management competence started life as totally independent activities. Probabilistic risk analysis is deterministic, based on progressive logical disaggregation of small numbers of tightly defined top events linked by event trees (each step subject to the test that it is a necessary and complete breakdown of the one above). It is by essence quantitative and is driven by the availability of failure data and by sensitivity analyses directed towards the most important combinations of failure determinants. Fault trees are constructed which are broken down to the level of component or system failure where failure rate data is available from data banks, or can be assessed with sufficient reliability by experts. Such data is genetic by nature, collected across many organisations, and so taking no account of differences in management control competence. The fault trees used seldom, if ever, contain items related to organisational tasks or characteristics. Indeed the practice in chemical industry studies, which are largely directed at assessing off-site risks in relation to major hazards regulations, is that the factors leading to initiating events, such as loss of containment (LOC), are hardly modelled at all; such risk assessments consisting mainly of event trees which model effects on the consequences of the LOC. Safety management assessment traditionally started as a holistic assessment, largely qualitative in its aims, and focused on improvement. Quantification in audits such as ISRS (DNV 1995) has been used only as an aid to prioritisation and has been based on unstructured expert judgement. The checklists used in such audits are lists of management activities not linked in any clear way to failure scenarios, or even to the direct control of the primary process and the technology of the organisation. Management systems at the level of these checklists are therefore 63
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assumed to be generic for all types of technology (Hale &Hovden 1996). Many audit systems, particularly since the publication of the ISO 9000 series of standards, are based on models with implicit or explicit feedback and learning loops designed to improve performance. The first attempts to bridge the gap between technical risk and safety management and to develop a more integrated modelling were made in the 1980s. MANAGER (Technica 1988) developed two management factors which were used to modify PRA probabilities. This work was followed by the development of PRIMA (Wright et al 1993), whilst an independent development gave rise to WPAM (Davoudian et al. 1994a, 1994b) based on task analysis and organisational factor assessment. PRIMA was developed using the analysis of LOC incidents as a basis for assessing priorities for management modelling. It links to the technical risk model at the level of the initiating events, which it splits into three; LOC through failures of pipes, vessels and hoses. The management model is divided into the phases of the plant life cycle, design (and domino effects from plant layout, etc.), manufacture, construction, operations and maintenance. Within those phases it classifies activities relevant to preventing LOCs as hazard reviews (HAZ), routine inspection and testing (ROUT), human factors review of tasks, interfaces, procedures, etc. (HF) and checking and supervision for successful completion of work (CHECK). The analysis of the LOC incidents showed that eight of the cells of the matrix formed by these two dimensions account for the vast majority of failures. These eight areas of management were therefore used as the focus for an audit which produced an assessment of each area. These assessments could then be combined, using the proportions found in the incident study as weighting factors, to produce three management factors for the three types of technical failure (see Hurst et al 1996 for details). The audit was constructed as a check of the control and monitoring loops postulated as responsible for ensuring that the eight key activities are developed, formalised, implemented, reviewed and improved. PRIMA adopted some of the structure of existing management models, notably the planning, feedback and monitoring loops and offered a formalised way of linking them to the technical failures, but it suffered from a number of limitations: the link to the technical failures is at a global level, providing little guidance about what management factors affect the failures in which way; the way in which the audit questions relating to the presence and working of the control and monitoring loops should be combined to produce a rating of the audit area is not clearly articulated; the model and audit are still essentially static in their approach, recognising that leaming loops must exist to keep risk managed effectively over time, but giving no clear indication of how the level of risk could vary given specified characteristics and developments in the management and technical systems. These limitations formed the starting point for a project (I-Risk) sponsored by the European Commission.
I M P R O V I N G THE M A N A G E M E N T MODEL: ADDING THE DELFT F R A M E W O R K
The PRIMA audit and modelling system is being supplemented in the project by the approaches developed, until now independently, in Delft (see Hale 1995, Hale et al 1997 for details). This work started as a framework for safety management devised for qualitative modelling of the control of risks in the primary process of an organisation. Like PRIMA, it recognises the importance of the life cycle phases from design through to operations and maintenance (and decommissioning). It postulates in each phase three functional levels of control of risk; an execution function (E) which directly interfaces with the primary process in which the risks arise or are created, which operates the measures and controls which keep the risks from manifesting themselves and which corrects deviations which would otherwise lead to harm. The primary process per life cycle phase has a different relationship to plant safety; in the design phase it is the design process leading, as product, to a plant which has low intrinsic danger, built-in risk controls and which is low maintenance (since maintenance is related to some 4050% of all major accidents in the process industry [Moll et al 1994]) and maintenance-friendly; in the operations phase it is the direct operation of the plant without loss of containment; in the maintenance phase it is carrying out of maintenance in such a way that the maintenance staff is not injured and that the plant is retumed to service in a better state for safe operation and without added failure probabilities introduced by the maintenance process. a planning and policy function (P) which devises and improves the methods, techniques, criteria and allocates resources for safe operation (E). This is modelled as a problem-solving cycle with nine clearly defined steps directed at risk recognition and evaluation, development of control solutions, implementation and monitoring.
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a system structure and culture function (S) which sets up, implements, reviews and modifies and improves the P function within the overall company structure and management philosophy, making decisions about where and by whom the problem solving steps in P will be carried out, what priorities will be and how the safety management system (SMS) will be kept motivated and functioning in line with best practice and the pressures from the market, regulators and others. These three functions are implemented within any given company in different ways; the tasks being given to different layers in the company hierarchy, or sometimes contracted out to consultants, or may even be done by regulatory bodies (e.g. inspections of small companies, review and certification of SMS for certification. This functional, as opposed to structural, modelling is an essential feature of the framework, since it offers the possibility of generic modelling of an SMS which will be applicable to any company no matter how it is structurally organised. Mapping onto the structure of a given company takes place by asking how, and how effectively, the functions are carried out in the given organisation. The Delft framework maps well onto the control and monitoring loops and the life cycle phases of the PRIMA audit. It also provides a formalism for identifying more systematically where the four types of activity (HAZ, ROUT, CHECK, HF) in the PRIMA model take place and how they relate to each other. The links within and between the functional levels are made more explicit than in the PRIMA model and are broken down into more specific steps, which can be linked better to audit questions for assessment purposes. The improved model will therefore consist not of eight more or less independent loops, each affecting risk levels separately, but of one dynamically interrelated management system, showing how all aspects are connected. We return below to the issues which this step raises for quantification and for the assumptions of independence of events represented in fault trees.
GENERIC NOTATION FOR MODELLING MANAGEMENT:SADT A second area in which the modelling is being developed is that of the formal notation for representing the various steps in the functional levels. Both PRIMA and the original Delft framework identified management activities in the SMS, but did not formalise the representation of them any further, beyond the indication that they were decisions and actions which were connected to each other by arrows, implying information flows. The current modelling is exploring the potential of the Structured Analysis and Design Technique (SADT) (Marca & McGowan 1988) for making this process more systematic (see Hale et al 1996 for details). This notation represents activities genetically as transformations in which defined inputs (I) combine or are altered to produce outputs (O). The transformations are carried out by mechanisms or resources (R), which themselves do not get used up (at least in the short term) or incorporated into the outputs directly. Transformations are under the control of criteria and constraints (C), which represent performance indicators by which the success of the transformation can be judged. An example of a transformation relevant to the safety management system might be the operation of a safety information system, in which the following at least are relevant (a full analysis would be too lengthy for this paper). The inputs are data on possible scenarios, risk exposure, actual deviations, incidents, near misses and breakdowns, actual harm, the range of potential prevention measures possible, between which the system must choose, and the actual measures chosen and implemented with their expected effects, practice, problems and new developments elsewhere. The transformation is the comparison of actual performance with expected performance of prevention measures (e.g. to detect unexpected scenarios, deviations happening despite the presence of control measures, etc.), which produces as outputs reports (to the company, regulators, insurers, etc.), recommendations to change practice (E-level), plans and procedures (P-level), and the signals to trigger major redesign of the SMS at the S-level.. The resources are the skills and knowledge of those who record, process and analyse the information, those who use it, the hardware and software to record, store, analyse, dis.tribute, discuss and use it, the time to devote to the work and the money to finance it (e.g. purchase of external information). The controls governing the transformation are the needs of the users, the requirements of external bodies for reporting, the criteria set by the SMS which have to be met, etc. The four factors are represented as arrows leading into, and out of a box in which the activity takes place. They are placed in a clockwise order (I,C,O,R) around the faces of the box. The notation was developed for the process of knowledge engineering, the formalisation of decision making processes in order to program them into software.
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Since the purposes of generic modelling of the SMS resemble in many ways the objectives of building decision support software, the potential for this technique seems clear. It has also been used in modelling primary processes and the risk controls on them (Rasmussen & Whetton 1993), which is an attractive long term characteristic, since compatibility between technical and management models is a long term aim of research. Trials in the current project have been undertaken with the modelling tool to represent the relationships between maintenance management and safety studied in earlier projects (Heming et al 1996) and to make explicit the PRIMA audit model. The SADT notation works with a hierarchical representation of any given activity. Any formulation of a task can be "unpacked" into its constituent steps, in much the same way that hierarchical task analysis is used for human reliability assessment (Kirwan & Ainsworth 1992) (c.f. the use of task analysis in WPAM [Davoudian et al 1994]). The use of the safety information system sketched above can be unpacked into its sub-tasks of recording data, analysing it, updating risk inventories and scenarios, evaluating of the effectiveness of prevention measures, recommending changes and reviewing and updating the operation of the information system. In the same way each functional level of the model (S,P,E) can be split up into its component steps. The notation and its software (Logic Works, undated) require that, as the broadly formulated tasks are unpacked, all of the I,O,C and R at the higher aggregation should be linked to each of the unpacked steps to show how they are driven and regulated. This means that the successive unpacking must also contain the explicit steps in which global performance criteria and resources are translated and allocated, respectively, in order to control and resource the successively more detailed sub-tasks of the activity. This formalism is a good discipline for both understanding and representing existing management processes, and for identifying weaknesses in them, for example steps which are under-resourced, or which have no defined criteria controlling them. In terms of the improvement to the PRIMA audit, the notation offers ways of classifying, grouping and where necessary supplementing or thinning out and evaluating the audit questions asked to verify the existence and functioning of the control and monitoring loops (now transformed into the three functional levels of the new framework). Trials with the notation have shown that there are conceptually only a limited number of generic types of controls and resources which are almost always relevant for any activity in the SMS. This is attractive in terms of the principle of parsimony as well as being valuable in terms of simplifying the process of assessing influences on any one SADT box. Only 10 factors have been identified so far as necessary. RESOURCES: competence (knowledge and skills present in the heads of people) commitment (perhaps the least tightly defined resource, but coveting the motivation to apply time and competence and to carry out the activity necessary for achieving the end result, rather than skipping it) hardware (measuring instruments, control devices, barriers, etc) soft tools (methods, software, measuring protocols etc) time (both of people and hardware). money (to pay for the development and presence of the above). The last two are strictly speaking, according to the rules of SADT, not resources, as they are used up, but it is more convenient to model them as such, since they are usually not directly combined with other SMS or primary process inputs to create the outputs. CONTROLS: output criteria (goals for safety and other objectives, e.g. production, and possible conflicts between them) rules (agreed and often written rules imposed by the working group or company as means of achieving the output criteria; either procedural or highly specific [see Hale & Swuste 1993 for a discussion about hierarchies of rules, related to the notion of unpacking criteria for use at different SADT levels]) risk perception (criteria for performance internal to the persons carrying out the activity) supervision (criteria and rules internal to a person directly supervising and directing the activity) It becomes clear in using these genetic categories, however, that they are not independent influences. There is almost always some dependency between controls and resources, since they are physically linked; e.g. a piece of hardware used as resource (say a relief valve) comes with a limited range of set-points, which are built-in criteria for its functioning; a person carrying out a task as resource of competence comes with a certain commitment and risk perception, which are only partially modifiable, and may vary together (e.g. Reason et al 1989 showed that
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persons who rated their competence as high were more likely to violate rules on the grounds that this was not a risk for them). It is also clear that different combinations of the influences may be alternatives for good control of an activity. Competence, rules and supervision form such a trio (with a minor link to commitment). We have encountered a number of activities which can be just as well controlled by either highly competent people with few imposed rules or supervision, or by people with little knowledge, but clear, detailed rules and close supervision, or even rules and no supervision, but a great commitment to stick to the rules. Considering the genetic influences and their interaction forces the modeller to come to terms with these interactions. When we reach the stage of quantification of management effects, the interactions may necessitate the use of influence modelling techniques using expert judgement (e.g. Phillips et al. 1983) The SADT notation provides a convenient way of modelling control and feedback loops. The influence of the controls (C) on any given box can be modelled as a sub-task, at the next level of unpacking, in which the "draft output", e.g. the hazard review of a design, the procedures for plant shutdown, or the completed permit-to-work before signing a job off, is subject to a quality check against the defined criteria (C). The result of this check box is the "approved output", but also a report to the higher (P) level indicating whether the output was satisfactory, or whether action must be taken to modify or reinforce the procedures which governed production of that hazard review. Each SADT box, therefore, has associated feedback loops attached to it, which take the outputs of the box and monitor them in order to learn whether changes need to be made in the Cs, Rs, or Is of the system in order to make it work more safely next time. We can envisage these as the means for preventing the SMS decaying and for adapting it constantly to new and changing circumstances. Some of the control and monitoring loops stay at the same level in the SMS; these are direct check activities which pick up deviations and correct them. Other loops circle up to a higher level (E to P, and P to S) and are responsible for the company redefining, or re-emphasising the safety controls (C) on an activity, or reconsidering, refreshing or renewing the resources (R) needed to carry it out. We can postulate that the absence or weakness of these loops allows the quality or preparedness of the Cs and Rs to decline over time, which will, in turn, mean that they are less effective in ensuring that the activity or transformation in the box is carried out to a high quality and hence that the genetic failure rate being processed by the box stays low. If we wish to use such a loop in quantitative modelling as an input to the failure probability monitoring, it will be necessary to make assumptions (or get expert judgements) about the frequency and quality with which these loops must operate in order to prevent corrosion (or indeed to produce improvement in the transformation). In this way more specific form is given to the checks made of the control and monitoring loops in the PRIMA audit. This example demonstrates a generic aspect of the SADT-modelling, namely that, if we follow the I --> O links we stay on one level of the SMS model. If, on the other hand, we pursue a C or R arrow out of a transformation box and enquire how that control or resource is decided upon, provided, and kept functional, we move up a level in the SMS, from E to P to S. This means we drive deeper into the management system and through into the safety culture of the organisation. It is in following these paths that we must expect to be able to capture the common mode failures represented by a less than adequate safety culture. The quality of these links between functional levels can give us an indication of whether the levels interact and drive each other successfully or simply flow over each other as lamina, in which case only pseudo-control will occur, characterised by such phenomena as well-kept safety manuals which bear no relationship to reality, high levels of violations of rules which are impracticable and false ideas at senior level that safety problems are under control because no reports of failures reach their level. The trials with the SADT-notation show that the first levels of unpacking of the SMS within, or across life cycle phases yields a highly generic model which seems to be applicable to any company and any technology. However, as the SADT-boxes are unpacked it becomes increasingly necessary to model in relation to a specified technology and the organisation of the SMS at a specific site. this means that the tool offers the potential for generating generic audit questions at a fairly high level of aggregation (based on the I,C,O and R of the significant management processes), which can be answered by any given company in terms of the organisational arrangements it has for meeting carrying out those activities. The same model can be developed further by any one company interested in modelling its own system in more detail, the differences between companies at this more detailed modelling level, but applied to the same technology, provide one clear definition of differences in safety culture.
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LINKING THE MANAGEMENT AND TECHNICAL MODELS More explicit modelling of the safety management system with SADT raises fundamental questions about the link between this sort of model and the technical risk model. Current fault trees, particularly those used in chemical risk studies, do not generally contain direct failure elements which link directly to management system failures. Conceptually the inclusion of this sort of element is not problematic. The MORT tree (Elsea & Conger 1983) has shown this at a generic level. More recently van der Mark (1996) has produced genetic fault trees for all LOC incident types and shown that 10 trees can cover all causal mechanisms. His genetic trees reach the level of management factors such as design and maintenance decisions after two three layers. The problem of the fault tree approach is that such factors start to appear in many different branches (e.g. design decisions related to all the various hardware risk controls). These design decisions represent potential common mode failures, if they are carried out by the same design team, with the same competence, risk perception and design philosophy.Common mode failure has always presented problems for quantification in PRAs, since the basic assumption of the method is that base events in a fault tree are independent of each other. From the side of the management model the process of unpacking of the SMS in each life cycle phase is also one of increasing specificity, whereby the different aspects of the risk control system are devised and kept operational. At several levels into that unpacking of SADT-boxes the direct links to the design, maintenance and operation of specific risk controls becomes evident. The fact that these are sub-tasks of larger SMS tasks indicates that the very purpose of the (rational) management system is to plan and run these actions so that they are "common mode successes". The degree of common mode is given by the final point in the unpacking at which two or more of the design decisions are still represented in one SADT-box. The closer that is to the specific failure mode of the technical components, the more there will be a common mode failure component. The presence and successful use of the control and monitoring loops within and between the functional levels will also indicate the degree to which the management system succeeds in linking separate failure modes into one common mode.
Figure : Fit of technical and management models The technical (fault tree) model and the management (SADT) model can therefore be thought of as triangles, with increasing specificity towards their bases. They have to be fitted together as shown in the figure. The representation on the left indicates highly detailed specific linking, which would be likely to be qualitatively very interesting, but exceptionally time-consuming to model, and a nightmare to quantify (compare the modelling of Wreathall 1989). The right-hand representation shows the linking achieved in MANAGER and PRIMA. The central figure shows the level at which the current project is aimed. In order to make that link, decisions have to be made about the point at which both significant and generic management failure (or success) components can best be modelled as common modes in the fault trees. Guidance on this can be obtained by more detailed analysis of the original LOC data used in PRIMA (Hurst et al 1991), to discover what are the dominant management factors in the different types of LOC incident classified by failure mechanism. One factor in deciding how far down in fault trees to go is the danger of incompleteness of the modelling as determinants are disaggregated (c.f. Fischhoff et al 1978). The matching process therefore brings into sharp focus the issue of common mode. To the extent that a
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management system succeeds in linking all failure determinants into one common management system, and in managing that successfully, fault tree modelling becomes redundant; the best predictor of technical failure would then be the measure of how good that unifying SMS is. It is only because any SMS fails to be all-embracing and to operate its structuring (S) and planning and procedures (P) functions perfectly, that detailed modelling of how good its constituent parts are and how those constituent parts link to top events is necessary. In particular, the data from the LOC analyses on which the PRIMA audit are based show that different life cycle phases and the management failures in them load very differently onto different failure mechanisms; see table 1. The table shows the percentage breakdown for 502 failures according to the type of failure causing LOC and the life cycle phase in which recovery would have been possible. (The total table sums to 84%, the rest of the incidents being from other causes or unclassifiable)
TABLE 1 L I F E C Y C L E A N A L Y S I S OF M A N A G E M E N T F A C T O R I N F L U E N C E S F O R LOG
Corrosion
Erosion
INCIDENT TYPES F O R P I P E W O R K F A I L U R E S ( % )
External Loading
Impact
Overpressure
Vibration
Temperature
Wrong Equipment
Operator error
Defective pipe
Design/ Layout
5.5
0.8
2.2
2.7
7.35
1.7
2.9
1.3
1.7
1.3
Construct./ Manufact
1.5
0
0.15
0.1
0.8
0.2
0
3.4
2.1
1.7
Operation
0.3
0
0.4
1.8
1.1
0.05
0.3
0.03
6.2
0.5
Maint.
5.6
0.5
0.6
1.05
3.3
0.6
1.0
2.05
18.0
4.0
Since the different life cycle phases are quite commonly subcontracted to different organisations with their own SMS, it is likely that the common mode across phases is comparatively less than within them. Further modelling will be needed to establish to what degree each life cycle phase SMS must be detailed and how much further it will be necessary to go than the four types of control and monitoring loop already modelled in PRIMA.(HAZ, HF, ROUT, and CHECK - see above). The project is not yet at the stage of detailed quantification using the SADT notation, so it is not yet clear how its use may modify current risk parameters for given sites.
CONCLUSIONS SADT-modelling offers a rigorous notation for modelling management systems. The current project has shown that it can clarify the relations between management factors and technical failures and can be more systematic in modelling them than earlier methods. The confrontation of technical and management models places a strong emphasis on how common mode failure (or success) should be seen and quantified in risk modelling. Because it is hierarchical in structure it also offers a way of reconciling the needs of regulators to model management systems at genetic and aggregated levels with the interest of companies in modelling qualitatively in much detail their own site- or company-specific management systems in order to improve them. Field trials later in the project must indicate the degree to which it can be applied in practice as a modelling tool.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This paper is based largely on work sponsored by the European Commission under the Environment programme, in the project I-Risk.
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REFERENCES
Davoudian K., Wu J-S. t~¢ Apostolakis G. (1994). Incorporating organisational factors into risk assessment through the analysis of work processes. Reliability Engineering and System Safety 45:1-2, 85-105. Davoudian K., Wu J-S. & Apostolakis G. (1994). The work process analysis model (WPAM). Reliability Engineering and System Safety 45:1-2, 107-125. DNV (Det Norske Veritas). (1995). International Safety Rating System. Intemational Loss Control Institute. Georgia. Elsea K.J. & Conger D.S. (1983). Management Oversight and Risk Tree. Risk Report, 6:2. Intemational Risk Management Institute. Fischhoff B., Slovic P. & Lichtenstein S. (1978). Fault trees: sensitivity of estimated failure probabilities to problem presentation. J. of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance 4:2, 330-344 Hale A.R., Heming B. Carthey J., & Kirwan B. (1996). Modelling of safety management systems. Safety Science in press. Hale A.R. (1995). Modelling integrated working conditions management systems. Paper to Workshop on Improving the Working Environment." from medical-technical problem solving to a process of participative management. Swedish Institute for Work Research. Stockholm. Hale A.R. &Hovden J. (1996). Management and culture: the third age of safety. Paper to the conference on Safety Policy & Management, Worksafe. Australia. Sydney Hale A.R., Kirwan B., Guldenmund F. & Heming B. (1996). Capturing the fiver: multi-level modelling of safety management. 2nd International Workshop of International Power Operators (INPO). Technical University of Berlin, Germany. Hale A.R. & Swuste S. (1993). Safety rules: procedural freedom or action constraint? llth NeTWork Workshop. The use of rules to achieve safety. Bad Homburg. Heming B., Hale A.R., Smit K., van Leeuwen N.D. & Rodenburg F. (1996). Evaluating the control of safety in maintenance management in Dutch major hazard plants: a research model, in Cacciabue P.C. & Papazoglou I.A. (eds). Probabilistic Safety Assessment & Management. Springer, London. 732-737. Hurst N.W., Bellamy L.J., Geyer T.A.W. & Astley J.A. (1991). A classification scheme for pipework failures to include human and socio-technical errors and their contribution to pipework failure frequencies. Journal of Hazardous Materials. 26, 159-186. Hurst N.W., Young S., Donald I., Gobson H & Muyselaar A. (1996). Measures of safety management performance and attitudes to safety at major hazard sites. J. of Loss Prevention in the Process Industry. 9:2, 161172. Kirwan B. & Ainsworth L.K. (eds). (1992). A guide to task analysis. Taylor & Francis. London. Logic Works. Logic Works BPwin~. Princeton, New Jersey. Marca, D.A. & MacGowan, C.L. (1988). SADT; Structured Analysis and Design Technique. New York: Mc Graw-Hill. van der Mark R. (1996). Generic fault trees and the modelling of management and organisation. Graduation report. Faculty of Mathematics. Technical University of Delft. Moll, O., Hale A.R. & Smit K. (1994). Preventie van onderhoudsgerelateerde ongevallen (Prevention of maintenance-related accidents). Tijdschrifi voor Toegepaste Arbowetenschap, 6, 79 - 86. Phillips, L.D., Humphreys, P., and Embrey, D.E. (1983). A socio-technical approach to assessing human reliability. London School of Economics, Decision Analysis Unit, Technical Report 83-4. Rasmussen B, & Whetton C. (1994). Hazard identification based on plant functional modelling. European Safety & Reliability Conference. 986-995. Reason J.T., Manstead A.S.R., Stradling S.G., Baxter J.S. and Campbell K.A. (1989). Errors and violations on the roads: a real distinction? CEC Workshop. Errors in the operation of transport systems. Cambridge. Technica (1988). The Manager Technique. Management Safety Systems Assessment Guidelines in the Evaluation of Risk. London Wreathall J. (1989). A hierarchy of risk control measures with some considerations of "unorganisational" accidents. Paper to the Second World Bank Workshop on Risk Management and Safety Control. Karlstad, Sweden. Wright M.S., Bellamy L.J., Brabazon P.G. & Hurst N.W. (1993). The evaluation and management ofpipework and vessel safety. C454/014/93. Institution of Mechanical Engineers.
UNDERSTANDING SAFETY CULTURE IN ORGANIZATIONSTHE CONCEPT OF TOTAL SAFETY MANAGEMENT AND ITS PRACTICAL USE IN AUDIT INSTRUMENTS G. Grote, C. Kfinzler and B. Klampfer Work and Organizational Psychology Unit Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH), 8092 Ztirich, Switzerland
ABSTRACT
Recent attempts to capture system safety have focused on the term safety culture indicating a shift in emphasis from individual and directly accident-related factors to organizational and "latent" safety factors. Based on the sociotechnical systems approach, an extension of existing models of safety culture is suggested, termed Total Safety Management. According to the understanding of culture as deeply rooted assumptions about the interplay of people, technology, and organization, shared by the members of an organization, a method attempting to capture these assumptions and to evaluate them in relation to the furthering or hindering of system safety along with first results of its application in safety audits is presented. While past investigations into the usefulness of the Total Safety Management model for evaluating safety culture have been focused on industrial systems, especially chemical production, a current project aimed at safety in civil aviation will be outlined briefly in a final section.
KEYWORDS Safety culture, Total Safety Management, sociotechnical systems design, chemical production, aviation, audit instruments, risk management
INTRODUCTION
In research as well as in industrial practice, efforts aimed at increasing the safety of high-risk production systems more and more focus not only on technical and individual-centred measures, but on an integral safety management improving the interplay of technology, organization and human resources. Faulty management decisions, termed "latent errors" (Reason, 1990), endangering an optimal functioning of the sociotechnical system and thereyby increasing the likelihood of errors, have become the core of safetyrelated system diagnosis, especially in those systems, where a high safety margin has been reached already. In an attempt to not only identify such management errors, but yet again move back in the causal chain of accidents and incidents in trying to forecast such errors, the value systems of organizations are evaluated on the basis of notions of a "safety culture" (e.g. INSAG, 1991). 71
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In this paper, a concept of safety culture is outlined, which is based on the sociotechnical systems approach. The main focus of the concept is process safety, including individual safety as well as environmental concerns in as much as they affect and are affected by process safety concems. Subsequently, a method for evaluating safety culture according to this concept is presented. The rationale for the method as well as results of its application in safety management audits in petrochemical plants are described. The usefulness of the chosen approach is discussed and some current work extending it to civil aviation is outlined.
A SOCIOTECHNICAL MODEL OF SAFETY CULTURE: TOTAL SAFETY MANAGEMENT The Intemational Nuclear Safety Advisory Group (INSAG), among others, coined the term safety culture as "that assembly of characteristics and attitudes in organizations and individuals which establishes that, as an overriding priority, nuclear safety issues receive the attention warranted by their significance" (INSAG, 1991, p. 1). The group also provided a framework for the 'measurement' of safety culture by distinguishing characteristics of safety culture on the strategic, management, and individual level of an organization (IAEA, 1994). Similar characteristics to those in the INSAG-model have been identified by empirical comparisons between 'safe' and 'unsafe' organizations (e.g. Cohen, 1977; Hoheisel, 1995; Zohar, 1980) and through analysis of active and latent failures having led to major accidents (Reason, 1991). Frequently mentioned characteristics are management commitment to safety, safety training and motivation, safety committees and safety rules, record keeping on accidents, sufficient inspection and communication, adequate operation and maintenance procedures, well-designed and functioning technical equipment and good house keeping. A major problem with those models of safety culture is their lack of integration into general models of organization and of organizational culture, understood as the deeply rooted assumptions about human, societal and ecological categories shared by the members of an organization and their expression in values, behavior pattems, and artifacts found in the organization (e.g. Schein, 1985). Also, the connection between safety-related characteristics of a system and more general characteristics, like job and organizational design and the use of technology, is missing. Thereby, the impression is furthered that safety can be looked upon and be promoted as something detached from the make-up of the sociotechnical system as a whole. Under the heading of Total Quality Management, a more integral approach has been developed with respect to quality. Similarly, the establishment of a safety culture could bedescribed as "Total Safety Management". It has been argued by the present authors that the sociotechnical systems approach can provide the basis for such a Total Safety Management (of. Grote & Ktinzler, 1996a,b). The sociotechnical systems approach conceives of work systems as having a technical and a social subsystem which together determine how well the primary task of a work system can be accomplished. Only if the two subsystems are jointly optimized, can maximum effectiveness be achieved. The predominant design objective is the provision of a high degree of self-regulation in the sub-units of the work system down to its individual members in order to allow for direct and flexible reaction to or proactive prevention of variances in the production process (cf. e.g. Grote, 1997; Susman, 1976; Ulich, 1994). On at least two levels the sociotechnical systems approach can be linked to safety, i.e. the definition of the primary task of a work system and the degree of self-regulation of sub-units in the system. Starting from the assumption that work systems are created and designed with respect to the optimal accomplishment of their primary task, this task should be defined not only in terms of the quantity and quality of products or services, but should contain the safety of their production as well. Only when safety is understood as a central task inseparably linked to production, can one assume that safety measures will penetrate every part of the work system. Secondly - and contrary to most industrial practice - it is argued that a high degree of self-regulation of work teams is beneficial to safety. This assumption has two roots, one is that especially in complex systems immediate reactions to variances and disturbances in the production process as well as anticipatory
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actions for their prevention necessitate the delegation of control to the lowest, i.e. shop floor, level (e.g. Perrow, 1984). The second root is the motivation model embedded in the soci0technical approach, i.e. task orientation (Emery, 1959; Ulich, 1994). Tasks that among other things allow for a high degree of autonomy, task completeness and task feedback, will further an indiviual's intrinsic motivation. If, as derived from the definition of the primary task, his or her task includes safety, then motivation should also be directed towards that aspect of the task. Some empirical evidence for this assumption has been provided in studies on the effects of working in semi-autonomous work teams where it could be shown that accidents and unsafe acts decreased (Trist et al., 1963; Trist, Susman & Brown, 1977). However, as Perrow (1984) among others has pointed out, tight coupling of technical systems limits the possibilities for decentralized regulation of a system. If strong interdependencies exist between parts of the system so that changes in one subsystem will have wide-ranging and locally not foreseeable effects in other subsystems, regulation should be centralized. Observations in so-called "high reliability" organizations like aircraft carriers indicate one possible solution to the dilemma of concurrent requirements for centralized and decentralized regulation of the system. LaPorte and Consolini (1991) described how these organizations can switch between forms of regulation with different degrees of decentralization depending on the requirements of the situation. Under 'normal' conditions, high levels of formalized, hierarchical control were found while in states of increased alertness due to emerging threats a more team-like cooperation with local control was established. The importance of cultural factors in being able to perform these switches in control patterns was emphasized by Weick (1987). On the basis of these links between sociotechnical systems design, organizational culture and safety, it has been suggested that the aforementioned models of safety culture should be extended in a number of ways (Grote & Ktinzler, 1996a, b; see Figure 1): Firstly, characteristics of the work system not directly related to safety should be included, especially characteristics of job and organizational design influencing the degree of self-regulation on the shop floor. Secondly, a model of safety culture should be incorporated into a more general model of organizational culture (e.g. Schein, 1985, 1992), emphasizing complex interactions between an organization's material and immaterial reality. Thirdly, along with the suggested extensions of existing models of safety culture regarding material indicators of culture, the norms and beliefs linked to these indicators should be included. This concerns assumptions related to the chosen form of work organization, e.g. regarding the nature of human activity and the necessity of control, as well as management philosophies on automation and human reliability as they are expressed in the actual division of functions between human operators and machines.
Joint optimization of technology and work organization aiming at the regulation of disturbances at their source Material characteristics of the organization
{ Integration of safety in organizational structures and processes
$1" Immaterial characteristics of the organization
Values and beliefs that further integration of safety in all work processes
{ Norms related to socio-technical design principles like automation philosophy and beliefs concerning trust/control
Figure 1: Sociotechnical model of safety culture as Total Safety Management (adapted from Grote & Kianzler, 1996b)
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Investigations aimed at comparing work organization, safety measures and employees' perceptions of safety in four chemical plants and a transportation company indicated the usefulness of the Total Safety Management model for understanding differences in safety culture especially between the transportation company and the chemical plants (cf. Grote & Ktinzler, 1996a,b). Based on these investigations a method was developed to capture safety culture as part of safety audits as they are carried out, for instance, by insurance companies or other external agencies. The development and test of this method will be presented in the following sections.
D E V E L O P M E N T OF A M E T H O D FOR EVALUATING SAFETY CULTURE While the original investigations were carried out over the course of two years, comprising job observations and interviews with operators, interviews with safety experts and production managers as well as a survey of safety-related assessments of production personnel, a diagnostic method usable during safety management audits has to be applied in the course of a few days with a few resources as possible. At the same time, as much information from as many people as possible is needed to gain a picture detailed enough to allow inferences about an organization's culture that by definition is difficult to capture as it is ingrained in deeply rooted, usually unconscious norms and assumptions (cf. e.g. Schein, 1985, 1992; Schneider & Shrivastava, 1988). These conflicting requirements were met by developing a questionnaire that complements information gained from top and middle management interviews and plant tours which audits are normally comprised of. By means of the questionnaire views of organizational members in different departments and on different hierarchical levels can be obtained on factual characteristics of safety in their company as well as on more value-oriented statements closer to 'cultural assumptions'. By analyzing the responses in terms of the nature of shared views as well as differences between different organizational groups, a more varied picture can be developed regarding the way an organization handles safety, building on and extending the 'baseline' information obtained from the expert interviews. The questionnaire, which was developed for audits in petrochemical production sites, contains three parts: (I) questions on the company's safety measures, e.g. safety training, management involvement in safety issues, maintenance procedures and technical design (cf. e.g. Hoheisel, 1995, Reason, 1993, Zohar, 1980, for similar questions), (II) pairs of statements describing different 'philosophies' regarding safety measures, work organization, and use of technology, e.g. "Employees are motivated for safety by information and interesting tasks vs. Employees are bound to safety by strict control", (III) questions related to personal needs for good job performance, e.g. more vs. less procedures. In all three sets of questions, directly safety-related concerns as well as more general aspects of job and organizational design were included. While the first and third part of the questionnaire mainly deal with 'material' characteristics of the organization, the second part aims to touch on more normative, 'immaterial' characteristics. For each pair of statements in the second part, a 'positive' side was defined based on assumptions contained in the Total Safety Management model. Questionnaire responses are analyzed in four steps. Firstly, the overall pattem of responses is looked at in order to gain a first impression of the 'average safety perception' in a plant. Secondly, relevant groups of employees within the plant are identified, e.g. based on different hierarchical levels, different departments, and different production units, and their response patterns are compared. In a third step, the questionnaire responses are related to the information obtained from expert interviews during the audit. These analyses allow preliminary judgements on the general quality of safety measures, on the degree to which shared views on safety and the work situation exist that resemble a shared culture, and on the quality of that culture in terms of the degree to which norms crucial for a 'safety culture' exist. As a fourth step, requiring onsite analysis of the questionnaire responses, these judgements need to be put to a test, though, by discussing them - as openly as possible - in a feedback meeting with representative members of the organization audited. This
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also points to a general limitation of the chosen approach, as it requires an open and not, or at least not predominantly, inspection-oriented relationship between the audit team and the audited company. The insurance company, for which the questionnaire was developed, therefore uses the questionnaire only for those clients with whom they maintain a good and long-term relationship. Following, the results from two audits which were carried out by members of the insurer's risk management team together with one of the authors, will be discussed in order to illustrate the application of the suggested method.
RESULTS FROM SAFETY MANAGEMENT AUDITS The questionnaire has been tested in four audits. Selected results from two of these audits will be presented in order to discuss the usefulness of the chosen approach for the evaluation of safety culture. Both audits were carried out in petrochemical plants belonging to large US petrochemical companies. Plant A has has about 800 employees, a total of 41 employees were included in the survey, 31 in operation and ten in maintenance. Eighteen respondents occupied lower and middle management functions, the others were operators without management functions. Plant B has about 500 employees, a total of 69 employees participated in the survey, 54 in operations, distributed among three production units, and 15 in maintenance. Twenty-five of the respondents occupied lower and middle management functions. The overall evaluation of safety measures by the respondents was more positive in plant A than in plant B. Also the more detailed assessments of safety measures in Part I of the questionnaire were generally more positive in plant A. Based on an exploratory factor analysis, the items in Part I were combined into three scales, 'formal safety' (e.g. There are sufficient written procedures, checklists etc. to ensure process safety.), 'personal safety' (e.g. There exist numerous training courses for the advancement of safe behavior.), and 'enacted safety' (e.g. In case of conflicts with production requirements safety comes first.). Interestingly, only for the scales 'personal safety' and 'enacted safety', the differences were large enough to reach statistical significance. Differences in the perception of 'formal safety' were non-significant (see Table 1). The more positive assessments by respondents in plant A coincided with a more positive evaluation of safety management by the auditers based on expert interviews. Interestingly, particularly negative assessments by the auditers conercerning certain aspects like safety training and learning from near misses were found in the questionnaire responses of plant personnel as well. TABLE 1 EVALUATION OF SAFETYMEASURESIN TWO PETROCHEMICALPLANTS Scale a Formal safety Personal safety Enacted safety
Plant A 3.58 3.83 3.45
Plant B 3.40 3.18 3.05
t-Test n.s. p < .001 p < .01
a The scores are averaged responses on 5-point Likert scales for all items contained in the respective scale. In both plants evaluations by superiors were generally more positive than by operators, a result pointing to potential hierarchical subcultures, which has to be interpreted cautiously, however, as it might be the expression of an attributional bias, not basic cultural norms. Superiors being more responsible for safety measures might perceive them more positively in support of a more positive self-image, which is a finding similar to the "self-serving bias" frequently reported in attribution research (e.g. Zuckerman, 1979).
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Especially in plant B, a number of interesting differences in responses by employees from different production units were found, questioning the existence of a strong shared culture. While responses in two units with overall evaluations of safety measures reaching mean values of below 4 on a 7-point scale were astonishingly negative - especially when considering that the employees were well aware of the questionnaire being part of an insurance audit - the responses in the third unit were quite positive with a mean value of 5.5. In particular, safety training, the enactment of the 'Safety First'-principle, and sufficient discussion of safety issues were aspects perceived much more negatively in the first two units than in the third. Looking at the norm-related statements of Part II of the questionnaire, yet again, respondents in the first two production units gave - based on the assumptions of the Total Safety Management model - more negative responses than in the third unit. They for instance saw employees more bound to safety by strict control instead of motivated for safety by information and interesting tasks and indicated less frequently that learning from near misses occurs in the plant. Interestingly, respondents in the first two production units stated more often - with a similar mean value as in plant A - that personnel can make their own decisions during process upsets instead of having to follow clearly documented procedures. This result points to a controversial issue in safety management as discussed above, i.e. the degree of decision latitude provided to operators. One interpretation for the positive evaluation of plant A's safety management by employees and auditers alike is the fact that plant A management follows a highly participative strategy furthering employee involvement at all levels and regarding all issues of safety as well as general management. This interpretation is based on empirical evidence pointing to generally positive effects of employee participation (cf. e.g. Ulich & Grote, in press), but also on the assumption that participation is a form of 'higher order autonomy' that allows for a compromise in the conflict between centralization and decentralization also discussed above (Grote, 1997). The effect of participatory decision making, e.g. concerning the development of standard operating procedures and the degree of flexibility permitted in running production processes by automated vs. manual control, will have to studied further, before firm conclusions can be drawn, however.
DISCUSSION AND F U R T H E R R E S E A R C H PLANS
As the reported results show, the questionnaire proved useful for obtaining data on safety-related perceptions which complement and expand information gained from expert interviews during safety audits. One generally encouraging result was the lack of a social desirability bias as indicated by the occurrence of rather negative responses in some samples. Also, differences in the perceptions of groups of employees within a plant are a very valuable source for more differentiated interpretations of a plant's safety culture. However, great caution is required not to stretch interpretations too far: What can be achieved - especially by means of a very open discussion of the results - is helping the auditers in adding a 'deeper' layer to their assessments. Also, the organization can be supported in obtaining an increased consciousness of existing norms and values and their interaction with the organization's material reality, thereby identifying furthering and hindering conditions for an integral approach to system safety. A general shortcoming of the research basis for safety indicators used in audit instruments - also inherent in the approach described - is the reliance on post hoc analyses of causal factors in accidents. In order to identify measures required for proactive safety management, more analyses of incidents and non-routine occurrences are necessary. Such analyses allow to identify factors directly furthering safety as event sequences are studied that involve coping with unsafe or critical conditions. In a follow-up project, an airline's data base of incidents and non-routine occurrences will be used to study the interplay of organizational and social environment, technical environment (with a special focus on flight deck automation), and human strenghts and limitations in performing flight operations. Accidents and incidents in aviation- like in other complex working systems - rarely have a single cause, but instead are the
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result of a series of contributory factors concerning human, technical, organizational and environmental matters. Correspondingly, a systems approach like the Total Safety Management model described above that deals with 'root causes' of safe as well as unsafe conditions must be chosen for risk management and risk assessment. There are many accident and incident reports which provide excellent information on what in detail went wrong, without reflecting underlying causes. An example of such a 'just referring to symptoms' is the often cited crew-caused factor "pilot deviation from basic operational procedure". A Special Safety Report of the FSF (1994) discusses the problem of flight deck procedure design and asks the question why pilots deviate from SOPs: "A complex human-machine system is more than merely one or more human operators and a collection of hardware components. In order to operate a complex system successfully, the human-machine system must be supported by an organizational infrastructure of operating concepts, rules, guidelines, and documents. The coherence of such operating concepts, in terms of consistency and logic, is vitally important for the efficiency and safety of any complex system." (FSF, 1994) The objective of the follow-up project is to develop methodologies that lead causal analysis of incidents beyond the simple surface description of symptoms, thereby attempting to improve knowledge on indicators and measures for proactive safety management. A systematic analysis of incident data for at least two types of aircraft with highly automated flight decks will be carried out, conerning technical, operational and environmental factors. In addition, an instrument will be developed to gain information on the 'human side' of the events (especially which factors like training, SOPs or design components were supportive and which acted in the opposite direction) as well as on organizational circumstances. Analyzing incidents in this way offers the advantage that not only failures can be identified but also strategies for handling these failures and dealing successfully with a critical situation. This allows to study "good coping practices", which can help to improve risk assessment and risk mangement in the sense of a Total Safety Management.
REFERENCES Cohen, A. (1977). Factors in successful occupational safety programs. Joumal of Safety Research, 9, 168178. Emery, F.E. (1959). Characteristics of socio-technical systems. London: Tavistock Document No. 527. FSF: Flight Savety Digest (August 1994): "Flight Deck Procedure disigns ca Reduce Confusion, Enhance Safety (Special Safety Report) Grote, G. (1997). Autonomie und Kontrolle - Zur Gestaltung automatisierter und risikoreicher Systeme. Ztirich: vdf Hochschulverlag. Grote, G. & Ktinzler, C. (1996a). Sicherheitskultur, Arbeitsorganisation und Technikeinsatz. Ztirich: vdf Hochschulverlag. Grote, G. & Ktinzler, C. (1996b). Safety culture and its reflections in job and organizational design: Total Safety Management. In A.V. Gheorghe (Ed.), Integrated regional health and environmental risk assessment and safety management. Intemational Joumal of Environment and Pollution, 6, 618-631. Hoheisel, D. (1995). Massnahmen zur verbesserung der Arbeitssicherheit im Betriebsvergleich. In C. Graf Hoyos & G. Wenninger (Eds.), Arbeitssicherheit und Gesundheitsschutz in Organisationen (pp. 6378). G6ttingen: Verlag ftir Angewandte Psychologie. IAEA (1994). ASCOT Guidelines. Wien: Intemational Atomic Energy Agency. INSAG (1991). Safety culture. Safety Series No. 75-INSAG-4. Wien: Intemational Atomic Energy Agency. LaPorte, T.R. & Consolini, P.M. (1991). Working in practice but not in theory: Theoretical challanges of "high-reliability organizations". Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 1, 19-47.
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Perrow, C. (1984). Normal accidems. Living with high-risk technologies. New York: Basic Books. Reason, J. (1990). Human error. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Reason, J. (1991). Too little and too late: A commentary on accident and incident reporting systems. In T.W. van der Schaaf, D.A. Lucas & A.R. Hale (Eds.), Near miss reporting as a safety tool (p. 9-26). Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann. Reason, J. (1993). Managing the management risk: New approaches to organisational safety. In B. Wilpert & T. Qvale (Eds.), Reliability and safety in hazardous work systems (p. 7-22). Hove: Lawrence Erlbaum. Schein, E.H. (1985). Organizational culture and leadership. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. Schein, E.H. (1992). Organizational culture and leadership (2nd Ed). San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. Schneider, S.C. & Shrivastava, P. (1988). Basic assumptions themes in organizations. Human Relations, 41,493-515. Susman, G.I. (1976). Autonomy at work. A sociotechnical analysis of participative management. New York: Praeger. Trist, E.L., Higgin, G.W., Murray, H. & Pollock, A.B. (1963). Organizational choice: The loss, redicovery and transformation of work tradition. London: Tavistock. Trist, E.L., Susman, G. & Brown, G.R. (1977). An experiment in autonomous working in an american underground coal mine. Human Relations, 30, 201-236. Ulich, E. (1994). Arbeitspsychologie (3rd Ed). Ztirich: Verlag der Fachvereine; Stuttgart: Poeschel. Ulich, E. & Grote, G. (in press). Work organization. ILO Encyclopaedia of Occupational Health and Safety, 4th Ed. Weick, K.E. (1987). Organizational culture as a source of high reliability. California Management Review, 29, 112-127. Zohar, D. (1980). Safety climate in industrial organizations: Theoretical and applied implications. Journal of Applied Psychology, 65, 96-102. Zuckerman, M. (1979). Attribution of success and failure revisited, or: The motivational bias is alive and well in attribution theory. Journal of Personality, 47, 245-287.
CASE STUDIES WITH TOMHID SAFETY ANALYSIS M E T H O D O L O G Y Jouko Heikkil~ VTT Manufacturing technology, P.O.Box 1701, FIN-33101 Tampere, Finland e-mail: j ouko. heikkila@vtt, fi
ABSTRACT
TOMHID is a new safety analysis methodology developed in an international project. It is intended to be used in an overall study of a process plant. The goal is to identify those parts which primarily require further investigation and improvement. The methodology integrates the identification of significant hazardous situations and the investigation of defects in the management of safety. A special description of a plant is created to guide the study. The description summarises the chemicals, functions, operations, organisation and equipment of the plant. The investigation of managerial tasks is based on accident scenarios which are developed according to the identified hazardous situations. The methodology was tested with three case studies.. The cases included full scale TOMHID analyses in a power plant, in a dairy and a related warehouse, and in a steel pipe factory. Possible problems in performing TOMHID analysis were especially investigated in the case studies. Defects were found especially in guidelines for specifying defects in management systems. On the other hand, many especially positive features were noted. For example, the special plant description was considered as a good means for organising information for hazard identification. Furthermore, the method developed for the analysis of potential human errors produced good results. An overall evaluation of the TOMHID methodology is, that the structure and approach of the methodology appeared to be practical, and most of the methodology worked well and was easy to use. KEYWORDS hazard identification, safety management, process, plant, TOMHID, case study INTRODUCTION
Many different safety analysis methods have been developed in resent decades and some of them have proved to be very practical and useful for improving safety. Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA), MOND and DOW indices, Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP), Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) and Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) are already widely used in industry. Management systems are analysed with Management Oversight and Risk Tree (MORT) and many auditing methods like Five Stars. Human factors are analysed for instance with Task Analysis and with Technique for Human Error Rate Prediction (THERP). All these methods are performing reasonable well when they are used independently and in a task which they are planned for. However, when carrying out a plant level safety analysis following problems may arise: • Normally, some purely technical descriptions, like a layout drawing, process flow diagrams or technical drawings are used for guiding PHA, HAZOP, FMEA and FTA analyses. Human activities are not presented in these descriptions, and therefore human contribution to accidents can easily be forgotten. 79
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• HAZOP, FMEA and FTA are aimed and used for quite detailed examination of possible accidents in a system. It means that only selected parts of complex systems, like a chemical plant, can be analysed with these methods, since a lot of work is required. The same problem applies to methods for human factor analysis. Moreover, with HAZOP and FMEA the analysis is started from deviations or failures which is not very effective way of identifying hazards, although the results of an systematic analysis can be very comprehensive. • Experiences on application of MORT for the investigation of management system have indicated, that with this method it is not easy to gain results which are concrete enough to tell how the safety management can be improved. • Methods dot not systematically utilise or integrate the results of analyses carried out with some other method which means that the combination of the results of a plant level safety analysis may remain incomplete even if the separate analyses have been carried out appropriately. Development of a new methodology was inspired by the identification of the problems listed above. TOMHID methodology is planned for a plant level analysis of hazards in a chemical plant. As a basis of the methodology the existing methods are used as much as possible. Moreover, the methodology is developed to meet the needs that have been derived from the identified problems listed above. The needs can be stated as follows: • A method for creating a such plant description which will support a comprehensive plant level hazard analysis. The description should comprise sufficient information on the chemical, functional, operational, organisational, constraint and equipment information of a plant. • A systematic hazard identification method which utilises the comprehensive plant description mentioned above. • A management system analysis method which will provide concrete results. • Methods for integrating the investigation of technical, human and managerial factors in a plant level analysis. The methodology was tested with two case studies within TOMHID development project. However, three new case studies were arranged, because the first two studies were not full-size TOMHID analyses. The purpose of the case studies was to test the functionality of the methodology: how the methodology meets the needs listed above and what problems arise when carrying out a TOMHID analysis in practice. T O M H I D M E T H O D O L O G Y AND ANALYSIS CASES
TOMHID methodology is developed for analysis of whole plant. The leading idea of the methodology is to investigate both a technical system and a system for running the plant within the same analysis case. Major hazards in technical system and major weaknesses in management activities are identified. Target is to define which parts and activities of the plant should be further studied and improved. The sequence linking management activities and accident events is as follows (see also Figure 1): the management activities are used to maintain and develop working conditions, so that worker can avoid errors, which would affect to accident events. The methodology has been described in details by Rasmussen and Whetton (1993), Wells et al (1993) and Heikkila et al (1995). The TOMHID development project and the methodology have been introduced by Suokas (1995).
Test Cases
The functionality of TOMHID methodology was investigated and improved in three full-size TOMHID analyses in different industrial plants. Analyses were carried out by two research scientist at the time. One of them leaded the analysis and the other observed. After each analysis stage, the observations were discussed and solutions for identified problems were looked for. Representatives of plants were encouraged to point out weaknesses of the methodology and to suggest improvements. A questionnaire for evaluating each analysis session was given to the participants of the session.
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Figure l Link between management activities and accident events The methodology was tested in three plants including a power plant, a dairy, and a steel pipe factory. The power plant burns coal and produces electric power into the national networks. There are about 16 employees in a shift when full production power is used. Additionally there are some maintenance personnel, design personnel, administrative personnel, upper management, experts, guards etc. About 50 persons at most are working on plant site at the time in a normal situation. The dairy produces and packs milk products. The related warehouse also stores products of other diaries. The dairy and warehouse has about 260 employees working mainly in two shifts. The steel pipe factory manufactures steel pipes starting from a steel strip. It has about 160 employees working mainly in two shifts.
Starting of Analysis Each study was started with a meeting in which the scope and boundaries of the analysis case was defined and the case was organised. In the meeting, 2-3 TOMHID experts and about five company representatives were present. The company representatives typically included the director of plant, plant or company safety manager, production manager(s) and the manager of technical services. In the beginning of the meeting TOMHID methodology was introduced to the representatives of the company. The company representatives briefly introduced the plant and its operation. The boundaries of the analysis were defined concerning equipment, operations and organisation. The criteria for hazard identification was defined concerning the severity and type of accident consequences. Different types of accident consequences included: injuries and fatalities, loss of production, damage of property, and environmental damage. In one case the criteria was as follows: • one or more fatalities or permanent incapacity for work • costs of more than 175 000 ECUs from damaged property and loss of production together • accident affecting outside of the plant site in a such way that the public pays attention to it. The criteria was quite similar in the other cases. As the practical matters, the contact persons ware named and the dates of next meetings were agreed. The construction of plant description was started by outlining plant operations with the simplified process flow
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diagram. As the end of the meeting, TOMHID experts visited on plant site and got material describing the plant. After this first meeting, the analyses continued as it is presented in figure 2. Construction of i Functional Model of I'--'1 : " Plant II ......w':: .... : : Hazard I:: .... Identification l:: ::~¢ :v
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Construction of Plant Description The first stage is to prepare a plant description which is used for guiding the subsequent hazard identification session. The description summarise the chemical, functional, operational, organisational and equipment information of a plant. The plant description was constructed together with the TOMHID experts and the representatives of the plant. Production manager and manager of technical services typically participated in description construction. The plant description is hierarchical. On the top level, the main operations and their connections are presented. For exanple, in the top level description, the diary operations were divided as follows: milk production, storage functions, heating system, cooling systems, electrical systems, safety systems, information systems, management, maintenance, operational states, and other operations. Each upper level operation is divided and presented as a combination of operations until the appropriate amount of details has been achieved. For example, the mid-level description of milk production operation include the following operations: material reception and intermediate storage, milk production line, packing system. The most detailed level of description also include different inputs, outputs, constraints and resources to the operation. In these cases plant descriptions included at most three hierarchical levels. An example of the description of an operation on the most detailed level is presented in figure 3.
Hazard Identification In a hazard identification session, potential hazardous situations are identified and documented. The documentation of a potential hazardous situation includes couple of main events of a potential significant accident. The identification is carried out by the plant personnel together with a TOMHID expert. The plant personnel included safety manager/engineer, and managers of production and maintenance, supervisors from
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production and maintenance, workers from production and maintenance. In these case studies, there were two sessions lasting about three hours.
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Figure 3 Description of heating system as a part of plant description The safety expert led the sessions and directed the discussion. In the beginning of the session, the criteria for selecting hazardous situations were introduced. The criteria was different in each case. Each item in the description was separately discussed. Items include each input, each operation, each output, each safety system etc. The discussion on each item was typically started with asking about the possible accidents (fire, explosion etc.) of the item (natural gas input, steam boiler, gas alarm, etc.). After that, keywords were used.
Reporting and Hazard Evaluation In these cases, 32, 70 and 66 potential hazardous situations were reported. This does not directly measure the hazardousness of the plant, since the criteria was different in each case. A hazardous situation was described in a report, for example, as follows: "Handling of heavy slippery and heavy loads: Loads handled in warehouse are heavy and can be slippery because of ice or leakage of contents. It is possible that the worker falls or the load falls on worker causing injury or even death." Identified hazardous situations were evaluated by the plant representatives. The plant representatives included director of the plant, production manager(s) and manager of maintenance. Hazardous situations were organised in 6-7 groups according to the nature of hazard (e.g. fire, collision, etc.) or the scope of hazardous situation (e.g. maintenance, handling of loads, etc.). For example, in one of the cases, the groups were: 1) Material handling and transportation, 2) Input materials and energy, 3) Maintenance, monitoring and operational activities, 4) Control systems 5) Smoke and other harmful discharges 6) Storage ja use of hazardous chemicals. Hazards in one group was evaluated at the time. Normally, 1-3 hazardous situations in each group were evaluated to require immediate improvements. In one case, for example, the following hazards were selected: handling of heavy loads in material reception, cable fire, worker falling while working in strorage hall, fire in control room, fire in storage hall, and possible defects in LPG system.
Construction of Accident Scenarios Construction of accident scenarios was started by selecting two or three of potential hazardous situations. The potential hazardous situations are used as a starting point of the construction of accident scenarios which will
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support examination of working conditions. The potential hazardous situations were selected on the basis of the criteria comprising the severity of the potential accident and how well the plant and different hazard categories are covered. The target was that the selected hazardous situations would cover sufficiently all the different plant functions, activities, equipment, and regions as well as the different types of hazards. Severity of the potential consequences is important for directing the investigation to the safety critical areas and it may be important for motivating the interviewees. Usually interviewees are more interested in likely and personally affecting accidents than unlikely and generally severe accidents - if these are the alternatives. A sufficient coverage is more important than the selection of the most severe potential accidents. The selected potential hazardous situations were developed to descriptions accident scenarios. An accident scenario includes the description of those events which may comprise a specific accident. Events are typically failures of equipment, human errors and deviations in a process functions and conditions. Failure to control (prevent, detect, mitigate, etc.) an accident development is one special type of such events. 'Failure to control' usually has direct link to human tasks. Scenario should be quite simple, so that it is easy to understand. The scenarios in the cases handled following topics: 'Accidental start of pump while maintenance', 'Leakage of fuel pump', 'Smouldering coal in storage', 'Collision in production line', 'Collision of forklift truck and cyclist', 'Fire of cables', 'Handling of heavy and slippery loads'. The scenario events, for example in 'Leakage of fuel pump' were: 'Blockage of filter in input line', 'Pump trembles', 'Joint brakes', 'Leakage of fuel', 'Ignition and fire'.
Working Condition Examination Working conditions in plant are examined by interviewing workers. The aim is to collect a list of examples of deficiencies in working conditions. This list is the starting point to the subsequent working condition management examination. Accident scenarios are used for inducing and directing the discussion in worker interviews. Interviewees were the workers, who has opportunity to affect to the course of described accident. In each case, 6-7 workers were interview. In the firs1 case, interviews were individual, but in the other two cases, workers were interviewed in groups of 3-4 workers. One interview lasted 2-3 hours The working conditions are examined by discussing each event of the scenario separately. The examination was started with the identification of errors, failures or other problems possibly causing the event. After identification of such error, conditions contributing to the error were identified. The identification of error producing conditions was supported with the check list of the objects related to working. The check list comprises: 'Equipment', 'Environment', 'Materials', 'Procedures', 'Individual' and 'Other factors'. The number of the identified conditions were 80-160 in each case. For example, the following 'error producing' conditions were noted: • incoming packages can vary a lot, which make their handling difficult • the space for material reception is crowded • pallets may be in bad conditions • a barrel may fall from load when the doors of trailer are opened • the tool for checking the correct tightness of joint is not available • reparation of joint may fail because of dirt • it is difficult to locate the actual source of smoke in the case of cable fire • it is difficult to find a telephone in the basement; that might be needed in emegency situation. It should be noted that, in this stage, the worker had the main responsibility for evaluating the conditions as 'error producing'.
Working Condition Management Examination The state of working condition management was examined by interviewing appropriate plant personnel affecting working conditions. These included designers, engineers, supervisors, managers, safety and fire protection engineers and managers, and training personnel. In each case, 10-14 persons were interviewed. Interviews were based on the list of 'error producing conditions' collected in worker interviews. Intention of
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the discussion was to find out whether the identified 'error producing condition' exists only randomly (by mistake), or if they are caused by deficiencies in system. The discussion was started by selecting an 'error producing condition', that the interviewee somehow is responsible for. The responsibility could be identification, decision making, or planning, designing or implementation of improvements. The diagram presented in figure 4 was used to support the discussion.
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Figure 4: Sequence describing management of working conditions After the introduction of an 'error producing condition', it was discussed, what might prevent the correction of that or similar conditions. Thus the deficiencies in conditions to manage working conditions were identified.
Reporting on Working Condition Management Identified problems affecting to management of working conditions were reported as a list of statements concerning the poor conditions to manage working conditions. Typically, these include lack of time, lack of money, lack of competence, lack of means, and lack of or too much information for certain tasks. The statement included a brief description of problem, some actual statement presented in interviews and comments by the analysts. An example of a reported 'poor condition' is as follows: "People do not prepare for meetings. ' There is not useless meetings, but I have not time to prepare for every meeting' 'People do not bother to prepare for meetings. Comment: If the participant is not prepared for the meeting, it may be impossible to participate in the handling of the matter or the handling is ineffective. The result may also be inadequate or even wrong decision, if the person who has not prepared, has power and wilfingness to make decision." The number of statements in each case was 104, 101 and 44. The statements were organised in groups. In one of the cases the groups were: Meetings, Available time, Quality system, Decision Making, Teams and shifts, Information systems, Activity of personnel, Safety, Emergency situations, Procedures, Training, Development activities, Co-operation and interaction, Practices, Management, authority and responsibilities. In other cases, partially same groups were used. Other used groups were as follows: Arrangements of production, Practices of
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foremen, Projects, Documentation, Maintenance activities. The specific groups in each case depended on the material achieved from the interviews. The relative number of statements in each group was presented. In order to further process the reporter problems, it was suggested, that appropriate groups of employees evaluate the identified problems, and try to develop solutions. RESULTS The test cases introduced both the well working and unsatisfactory features of the methodology: • Definition of specific criteria for selection of hazards during hazard identification was included in the methodology in the beginning of this project. It diminished the discussion on whether the hazard should be reported or not. • The plant description was evaluated as a good means to organise plant information for hazard identification. Identification of hazards related to 'Inputs', 'Operations' and 'Outputs' proceeded well and was productive. However, the way by which the other parts of the description was handle did not work so well and it could not be improved. • The reporting and the procedure for evaluating the identified hazards was improved during the project. Selection of significant hazards from a group of the reasonable number of identified hazards, appeared to perform well, even if it is not very formalprocedure. • Identification of 'error producing conditions' by using accident scenario proved to be a functional solution. The number and range of the identified conditions was more than satisfactory for the purposes of TOMHID analysis. The plant personnel was also very interested in the list of identified conditions. Unfortunately, its use as a part of final results of the analysis is limited, since it is based on very few interviews. • Identification and, especially, reporting of problems in working condition management would require more guidance and support in the methodology. The plant representatives were much less certain how to proceed with this report that with the report of identified hazards. The plant representatives unfamiliarity to formally treat organisational problems may partly explain this difference. The test cases proved that the concept of the TOMHID methodology is functional. TOMHID analyses produced results that the plant representatives regarded as important and useful. It was especially noted that analysis support long term safety management of a plant. It required 1,5-2,5 man months to lead and report a TOMHID analysis. Approximately as much resources was required from plant personnel. This was estimated to be possibly too much in a commercial use, even if the plant representatives regarded the result of the analyses very satisfactory. When compared to the possible costs of any of the identified possible accidents, the costs of the analysis are low. REFERENCES Heikkil~., J., Rasmussen, B., Rouhiainen, V. & Suokas, J. (1995). M I M I X - Method for investigating management impact on causes and consequences of specific hazards, VTT Research Notes 1689, Technical Research Centre of Finland, Espoo, Finland Rasmussen, B. & Whetton, C. (1993). Hazard identification based on plant functional modelling, Riso-R712(EN), Riso National Laboratory, Roskilde, Denmark Suokas, J. (ed.) (1995). An overall knowledge-based methodology for hazard identification, Results from the TOMHID-project. VTT Research Notes 1658, Technical Research Centre of Finland, Espoo, Finland Wells, G., Wardman, M., & Whetton, C. (1993). Preliminary safety analysis. Journal of Loss Prevention in Process Industry, 6:1, 47-60.
A4" Safety Culture and Management Attitudes
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IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS OF ORGANIZATIONAL FACTORS. THE NEED FOR FIELD INQUIRIES
M. Llory Institut du Travail Humain, 17 rue des Espessas, 30660 Gallargues-le-Montueux, France
ABSTRACT Analysis and interpretation of industrial and occupational accidents are shifting from the human error paradigm to the organisational accident paradigm. We present in this paper ten proposals which could form the basis of this new paradigm. Work organisation, communication failures organisational factors, perceptions of operators on their own work, are fundamental aspects of this method of thinking safety. We illustrate the proposals with two different accident cases: the space shuttle Challenger accident and the accident that occurred to a crane-driver.
KEYWORDS
Accidents; Accident investigation; Organisational factors; Paradigm; Precursor; Safety management; Work analysis.
INTRODUCTION Accidents and incidents: what questions should we ask ? What models should we take ?
Each serious industrial or occupational accident incurs the same serious and complex questions for experts and managers. Was the accident predictable? Was it avoidable? What were the root causes behind it? How far back do we need to go into the history of the human organisational structures which are implicated? Was the analysis complete and thorough? Can we put an accident down to the mere chain-effect of some important events and tangible, established facts? Can we build a general accident model and statistically pinpoint relations of cause and effect? What information can be drawn from accidents? (Llory, 1996). We must admit as well that, far from functioning regularly and smoothly, sociotechnical systems are riddled every day with little incidents or minor dysfunctionings and that latent causes of failure, hidden technical or organisational inadequacies tend to create potential weaknesses in these systems. As from here, accident prevention largely depends on the capacity of the organisation concemed to identify, acknowledge, master or reduce the incidents and loopholes in question. 89
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These determining safety objectives are closely dependent on the conception that the people who are directly involved have of accidents and their causes, of incidents and their relation to accidents: that is, their conception of how events typically arise, how latent they are and their typical potential to develop and degenerate into accidents. From the human error paradigm to the a organisational accident ~.
The paradigm of human error, as we have named it, has been built, expanded and stabilised over these last decades. By 'paradigm' we mean a group of concepts, theories and their underlying models (human and organisational models), analytical and investigatory methods, procedures for interpreting and gathering information, etc. (Vinck, 1995). Amongst other advantages, this paradigm has enabled us to progress from 'accusatory dynamics' in companies to 'functional (analysis) dynamics' (Dodier, 1995). For all that, people have never stopped criticising the paradigm of human error, sometimes vigorously. We will simply recall C. Perrow's critical analysis (1982) concerning the interpretation of the Three Mile Island accident in the corresponding report by the Presidential Commission which, in particular, qualifies the diagnosis of human operator error as a retrospective judgment. We are thus quietly introducing a fundamental question concerning analysis methods that was pointed out clearly by D. Vaughan (1996). As with any historical procedure, an interpretation - and accident or incident analysis can be considered such a procedure - has to take account of the context (organisational, psychological, or knowledge-related) before and at the time of the events, of the state of mind of the people involved, and of their understanding of the situation workwise before the accident. We must not make the mistake - sometimes in rather an insidious way - of introducing presumptions which stem from our (retrospective) knowledge of the accident or incident. With human error identification, analysts seem to come up against an insurmountable difficulty and to be hardly able to get any further than acknowledging the error and its consequences. If we go back to G. Bachelard's concept (1993), we can say that, from the epistemological point of view, human error is an obstacle when analysing incidents and accidents (M. Llory and A. Llory, 1997). Another conception of accidents, organisational this time, has been outlined and put forward in opposition to the human error paradigm.This organisational concept has been developed by authors like C.Perrow (1984), Diane Vaughan (1996) regarding the Space Shuttle Challenger accident, L. Clarke (1992) concerning the wreckage of the Exxon Valdez, J. Reason, author of 'The Age of the Organisational Accident' (1990). Here we quote L. Clarke and J.F. Short (1993): 'In the preceding remarks one can see humans erring, but because of social structure and culture rather than individual failures. The intellectual problem is that as a theory of sociotechnical breakdown, human error presumes more than it explains, obscuring the complexities of interaction between humans, machines, and organisation. We learn more about how risks are produced by theorising organisational factors such as production pressures, managerial expectations, and regulatory effectiveness than by focusing on human error.' (p. 387). The aim of this article is to emphasise the need for field enquiries ('clinical' as opposed to statistical), in order to analyse organisational factors which could lead to accidents or accidental situations, and to extend the organisational conception of accidents by introducing work organisation aspects. Two cases have been chosen to support this reasoning throughout the paper: - the accident to the Space Shuttle Challenger, which is probably the best-analysed accident we have in terms of the human and social factors contributing to this industrial accident. - an occupational accident we analysed ourselves directly: the fall of a motor-driven crane, which led to the serious injury of the driver.
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Advances in Safety and Reliability: ESREL '97 T W O VERY D I F F E R E N T CASES OF ACCIDENTS
We will not give details about the analysis of the Challenger accident: there is a very rich and critical bibliography already available (Llory, 1996). However, we will be referring to Vaughan's recent work (1996), amongst others, throughout this paper. Here is a brief reminder of the circumstances surrounding the second accident. Agents from a neighbouring department ask a crane-driver to carry out a lifting manoeuvre involving a heavy load. The agents who make the request tell the crane-driver that two of the sole-plates on which the crane stands are on unstable ground (a trench has been dug for the passage of a large electrical cable, then filled in). The crane-driver reduces the supporting surface underneath the crane to avoid a possible accident, but by so doing he unbalances it and creates a risk of another kind. The electronic safety-device which covers the load, crane-jib and supporting surface available is defective. The crane is thrown off balance and the driver, trapped in his cabin and partly crushed by the load, is badly injured.
PROPOSALS F O R ACCIDENT P S Y C H O L O G I C A L FACTORS
TEN
ANALYSIS
BASED
ON
ORGANISATIONAL
AND
The following basic proposals, ten in number, form an essential part of the grounds for a psychoorganisational conception of accidents which completes and extends the organisational concept in two ways: - composing elements and conditions of work organisation are taken into consideration ;
- safety questions are accounted for by the actual people concerned, notably decision-makers and managers. This conception also underlines the historical dimension of each accident.
Proposal number 1: Precursors and weak signals, before accidents Accidents are preceded by accident precursors, but these are not recognised as signals of potential disasters. 'Bad news' does not reach the upper levels of organisations, where top managers and decision-makers could stop the development of accident sequences (Llory, 1996). In the case of Challenger, 'weak signals' concerning the dysfunctioning of booster seal-rings were not taken into account. And the people in charge of the department for which the crane-driver was doing the job were either not alarmed by different ' signals', or were unable to identify them. These were: - the existence of very conflictual relationship from the crane-driver and his colleagues on one hand and the foreman on the other hand ; - a renewed outbreak of work accidents concerning the team ; - an increasing work-load for the said team, who were given tasks in assembly, dismantling, maintenance, and putting away material, these being 'peripheral' as such to the main aims and activities of the department which were related to testing.
Proposal number 2: Communication failures: a major source of accidents Formal structures in organisations have a tendency to rigidify what goes on within: the circulation of information, of signals related to potential hazards, is filtered, distorted or blocked. Over the last years, there has been a widely-accepted tendency to interpret accidents and organizational dysfunctioning differently in terms of communication failure ( Rogers Commission, 1986), or 'distorted communication' (Tombs, 1990), or 'pathology of communication' (Dejours, 1992).
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Studies on communication processes within organisations would relate to how densely and how smoothly information circulates, the authenticity of what people involved say, the possibilities field-personnel have of expressing their fears and doubts, and acceptability or tolerance levels of 'bad news' by managers and experts. These fundamental components and characteristics are implicated in organisational diagnosis and in forecasting the way organisations will evolve. Informal aspects of communication are very important and require our close attention. Communication breakdowns were analyzed during the hearings of the Presidential Commission on the space shuttle Challenger accident (Rogers Commission, 1986). "Bad news" related to the degraded social climate (see the following proposal) of the team in which the crane-driver was working dit not reach the top managers.
Proposal number 3: Defensive attitudes of managers and organisational pressures Denial of information (its refusal in the psychological sense) is not a very rare symptom with managers who are far from the field. In this way, 'bad news' from field operators or personnel can be played down or refuted. Our attention subsequently switches to the executives and managers rather than the operators who usually make the errors. However, executives and managers often shelter behind complex attitudes, systematically underestimating the difficulties facing the field personnel. They camp firmly on extremely normative positions, while discussions with them reveal their profound ignorance of human factors and of work-related organisational factors. They tend to approach accidents from the behavioural aspect and inrelation to the individual. These defensive attitudes can build up pressures within organisations: pressure to be productive and pressure to conform to procedures and prescriptions. The chapter VIII of the report on the Challenger accident was untitled: "Pressures on the system" (Rogers Commission, 1986). Some years before the crane-driver accident, production pressures led to unfavourable decisions concerning work organisation: the team in which the crane-driver was working was reduced; the consecutive overload of handling and storage tasks led to the postponing of important jobs, and to growing social tensions within the team.
Proposal number 4: From individual behaviour to work organisation A lot of recurrent and persistent problems in organisations are related to work organisation, and not to individual behaviour. 'We only find what we are searching for': we have to incorporate a careful examination of how work is really organised into our analysis of organisations and sociotechnical systems (Llory, 1997). Diagnosing safety questions in relation to organisational factors presupposes that we analyse co-operation and communication in judgments and decisions made in the work context (work-related difficulties or risks), particularly at the interface between executives, managers and field personnel. Analysis centres on everyday work, evaluating work-teams' and management-teams' adaptability and reactivity to unforeseen situations, and on how far these situations are collectively anticipated and elaborated (M. Llory and A. Llory, 1996a). This type of enquiry must be carried out in conformance with clearcut aims and protocol and within a strict deontological framework.
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According to how profound or intense it is, operators' personal motivation is a fundamental indication when diagnosing and forecasting. In the case of Challenger, managers and engineers at NASA and Morton Thiokol (the subcontractors who designed and manufactured the boosters) were too busy elsewhere to attend to conditions prevailing in their own work organisation: the second teleconference was arranged overhastily; Morton Thiokol engineers had insufficient time to prepare arguments and visual aids; communication problems were underestimated for a teleconference involving three different sites; discussions and the circulation of information of vital importance for the launch continued well into the night, so the participants' degree of resistance was overestimated (Mitler, 1988), etc... After the crane-driver's accident, the managers' first analyzes do not show the determining influence of work organisation behind the event: i.e. an excessive amount of work, which meant the driver did several parallel jobs; an accumulation of problems related to storing heavy material; not enough attention paid to maintenance on control- and safety-devices; a tendency to carry out jobs singlehanded and not in twos to avoid unnecessary employment - (the people who requested the lifting operation were not trained to drive such machines or to understand the problems associated with them); neglect by the management to arbitrate in conflicts.
Proposal number 5: The importance of historical aspects We need to include historical aspects in our analysis of organisational factors in risk-prone systems and accidents. Accidents are 'rooted in history' (Rogers Commission, 1986). To explain the Challenger accident, the Rogers Presidential Commission showed it was necessary to go back thirteen years in time and not just fifteen hours from the accident, that is to say to the beginning of the second teleconference during which Morton Thiokol managers reversed their position. In the second case analysed, production pressure, aimed at making the company's technical installations financially viable, had lead to a chain-effect of decisions and choices being made several years before, which had had an unfavourable effect on the company's work organisation and created favourable ground for highly accident-prone work situations to arise: a reduced number of workers in the crane-driver's team; the removal of an intermediate engineering post which had ensured arbitration duties whenever conflicts arose within the team; an emphasis on 'profitable' jobs and a tendency to build up 'auxiliary' or 'peripheral' tasks like storage and maintenance ; no works foreman or pilot to provide support or guidance for the crane-driver in his work.
Proposal number 6: Examples of organisationalfactors The main organisational factors which seem to be present in a lot of accidents are the following: the producing of a local culture (or mentality) which is resistant to new ideas: see the concept of paradigm (Vaughan, 1996); - a culture of production and profitability which generates pressure on the field personnel; the pernicious effects of this pressure are not properly assessed by middle- and top-managers; - ' structural secrecy' (Vaughan, 1996) ; a system of heavy, rigid, impersonal and omnipresent procedures; this system induces a general attitude of conformity (Vaughan, 1996) ; some technical failures and human conflicts are not solved or settled by arbitration; the effects of these problems tend to last or to get worse. -
-
-
In the case of the Challenger accident, two additional factors relating to D. Vaughan's analysis seem to be determining:
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- the apparent lack of any analysis or thought about the working methods and work organisation conditions which prevailed with the managers and engineers in charge of examining the files and preparing the launch decision. (See Proposal number 4). - the occulting of any worries or basic rules related to safety,(notably that of the principle of precaution), which is illustrated by an absence of safety experts at the decisive teleconference. This point was emphasised by the Rogers Commission (1986), who entitled Chapter VII of their report: The Silent Safety Program. The safety back-up often provided by safety experts was therefore non-existent.
Proposal number 7: From audits to field enquiries These factors and their corresponding effects are not easy to detect byaudits. Audits are traditionally carried out to assess organisational conformity to safety standards. We prefer field enquiries to analyse the flexibility and reactivity of organisations, and to detect potential problems and incident precursors that cannot be determined beforehand. It is particularly important to evaluate the fluidity of bottom-up communication, as mentioned above (Proposal number 2). Enquiries demand much active and difficult attention from participants; they can be likened to the comprehensive approach (Dejours and Abdoucheli, 1990), already recommended by Taylor (1981) for safety analysis. They presuppose a fundamental reversal from the epistemological angle, and lead us to give predominance to those who actually carry out the work and not to the experts who dictate or prescribe the phases and organisational changes in the work (M. Llory and A. Llory, 1997). T. Dwyer (1992) argues on similar lines, stressing the need for a change of paradigm. The enquiry following the crane-driver's accident was carried out in such conditions. It not only showed up unfavourable safety-related factors, the weak points of the organisational system (see Proposals number 4 and 5), but also the dynamics of human and collective processes involved. Above all, the enquiry showed how a certain number of managerial choices, such as: productivity pressure, work organisation methods using teams set up for the occasion, closer relations between operators and the customers (who actually had access to technical installations and hence exerted additional pressure on the personnel) tended to affect the conditions of work organisation and to destabilise this work organisation.
Proposal number 8: Requirements for field enquiries These field enquiries need a specific professional code of ethics and a well-adapted methodological framework. We prefer collective interviews to individual ones, and the status of working groups for these teams. Post-accident enquiries need special care, as working teams are stressed and destabilised by the event. Results of enquiries should be handed over for validation to the people involved in the events who participated in those enquiries. Above all, enquiries enable us in this way to understand accidents, their causes, the dynamics behind their development through the protagonists themselves, and also to reconstitute and restore - in a symbolical way too - socioprofessional relations which have been upset or strained by the accidents.
Proposal number 9: Inconsistencies in work descriptions In-depth studies (of the 'clinical' type) are needed on real working practices and on what operators and managers actually perceive of normal situations. Investigations are needed after accidents, like those of the Challenger (Rogers Commission, 1986) and of the Dryden accidents (Reason, 1995). These investigations would allow us to detect inconsistencies in work descriptions by different categories of personnel (for the concept of description: see M. Llory and A. Llory, 1996b). They would be available to the experts for scientific discussion, and would allow testing of descriptive and explanatory models.
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Proposal number 10: Panels for studying potential precursors Incident precursors are usually noticed and pointed out by field personnel: before most accidents, people who are aware of potential and emergency hazards try to forewarn decision-makers, but they do not succeed. They should be able, as a last resort, to seek the help of an independent control panel or commission. It is urgent for us to set up panels like this within organisations. These advisory commissions should be entirely independent of the organisational powers concerned and have efficient means of action at their disposal.
DISCUSSION - CONCLUSION A radical change seems to be taking place in accident conception. The human error paradigm still dominant today presupposes that we should have a prior and virtually thorough knowledge of potential incidents and defects in the sociotechnical system and in procedures if we are to offset them. In this case, accidents happen because operators and certain managers do not conform to the prescribed rules (as with the Challenger accident, where the common interpretation of the Rogers Commission report put ultimate blame on the middle-managers, as Vaughan (1996) reminds us). This interpretation of accidents justifies the conformity audit as a fundamental type of safety method. But, as D. Vaughan convincingly points out, the Challenger accident is in fact a tragic case of conformity. The managers respected the rules scrupulously. It is also a tragic case of silence (Llory, 1996). With this new accident concept, we must go right down to the roots of how organisations function and how work is organised, to informal communication, co-operation and elaboration, which implies, as we have seen, specific enquiry methods. Comprehensive enquiry methods like this can prove efficient in accident prevention.
REFERENCES
Bachelard, G. (1993), Laformation de l'esprit scientifique, Librairie Philosophique J.Vrin, Paris, France. Clarke, L. (1992), The wreck of the Exxon Valdez, In: Controversy. Politics of technical decisions, Sage Publications, Newbury Park, California, U.S.A., 80-96. Clarke, L. and Short, J.F. (1993). Social organization and risk: some current controversies. Annu. Rev. Sociol. 19, 375-399. Dejours, C. (1992), Pathologie de la communication. Situation de travail et espace public: le cas du nucl6aire, Raisons pratiques, Ed. de I'EHESS, Paris, France, 3, 177-201. Dejours, C. and Abdoucheli, E. (1990). Itin6raire th6orique en psychopathologie du travail. Revue Prdvenir. 2: 19, 3-19. Dodier, N. (1995), Les hommes et les machines, M6taili6, Paris, France. Dwyer, T. (1992). Industrial safety engineering. Challenges of the future, Accident Analysis and Prevention, 23: 3, 265-273. Llory, M. (1996), Accidents industriels. le co~t du silence, L'Harmattan, Paris, France. Llory, M. (1997). Human - and work - centred safety: keys to a new conception of management. Ergonomics, to be published. Llory, M. and Llory, A. (1996a). L'intervention en entreprise ; de l'analyse du comportement/~ celle du travail, Proc.XXXI st Conf. S.E.L.F. (Soci6t6 des Ergonomes de Langue Frangaise), Bruxels, Belgium, 2, 100-108. Llory, M. and Llory, A. (1996b). Description gestionnaire et description subjective: des discordances. Revue Internationale de Psychosociologie, 3: 5, 33-52. Llory, M. and Llory, A. (1997). Psychodynamique du travail et pr6vention des accidents du travail: vers un renouvellement des analyses et des pratiques de s6curit6, Colloque International de Psychodynamique et de
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Psychopathologie du Travail, Paris, France, 30-31 january 1997. Mitler, M.M. and al. (1988). Catastrophes, sleep and public policy: consensus report, Sleep, 11" 1,100-109. Perrow, C. (1982). The President's Commission and the normal accident. In: Accident at Three Mile Island. The human dimensions, Sills, D.L., Wolf, C.P., Shelanski, V.P., Ed., Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, U.S.A., 16, 173-184. Perrow, C. (1984), Normal accidents. Living with high-risk technologies, Basic Books, New York, U.S.A. Reason, J. (1990). The age of the organizational accident. Nuclear Engineering International, july, 18-19. Reason, J. (1995). A system approach to organizational error. Ergonomics, 38: 8, 1708-1721. Rogers Commission (1986), Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, Washington, D.C., U.S.A. Taylor, D.H. (1981). The hermeneutics of accidents and safety. Ergonomics, 24: 6, 487-495. Tombs, S. (1990). A case study in distorted communication. Institution of Chemical Engineers Symposium Series, 122, 99-111. Vaughan, D. (1996), The Challenger launch decision, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, U.S.A. Vinck, D. (1995), Sociologie des sciences, Armand Colin, Paris, France.
SAFETY M A N A G E M E N T AND ACCIDENT PREVENTION: THE STATE OF THE ART IN 14 SMALL AND MEDIUM-SIZED INDUSTRIAL PLANTS A. Seppala Finnish Institute of Occupational Health, Department of Occupational Safety Laajaniityntie 1, FIN - 01620 Vantaa, Finland
ABSTRACT
Swedish-speaking workers have accidents at work about one third less frequently than Finnish-speaking workers. A study was designed to survey the safety culture in 14 small and medium-sized companies; six Finnish-speaking, six Swedish-speaking, and two bilingual companies. By means of a questionnaire, data were collected about the following issues: perception and assessment of safety hazards at work; safety attitudes; safe behavior and risk-taking; safety in work planning and in work methods; general safety actions and management issues within the plant. In all, 333 people (managers, supervisors, clerical workers, blue-collar workers) filled out the questionnaire consisting of 104 items. The results indicated that the Swedish-speaking companies were significantly better when the safety hazards of the work environment and machinery were evaluated. The senior management's attitudes towards safety were evaluated as being better in the Swedish-speaking companies. Supervisors paid more attention to the overall safety of the work environment in the Swedish-speaking companies than in the Finnish-speaking companies.
KEYWORDS
Accidents, safety hazards, safety management, safety culture
INTRODUCTION
Finland has about 5 million inhabitants and two official languages, Finnish and Swedish. The Swedishspeaking inhabitants form a minority of about 300 000 people. Most of the Swedish speakers live on the southern or western coast of Finland. Some of Finland's population is Swedish-speaking owing to the shared history and long-standing cultural and political contacts between Finland and Sweden. The cultural and social border between these two groups has traditionally been distinct. This cultural difference is reflected in a number of ways. The worker population of these two groups seem to differ as to the outcomes of their behavior. According to a variety of national statistics, Swedish-speaking companies have a lower frequency of occupational accidents than Finnish-speaking companies. Salminen et al (1996 a) observed that Swedish-speaking workers have about 20-40 % fewer occupational accidents than do Finnish97
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speaking workers in Finland, adjustments are made for the branch of industry in question. These statistical findings led us to seek possible explanations in the safety culture and the safety management practices in the enterprises. Safety culture is defined here as a composite of values and attitudes in safety that are reflected in the ways and modes of daily safety practices and behavios at work. The safety culture indicates implicitly how to behave, how to organize things, how to reward behavior, and how to punish behavior. The culture arises from perceptions of behavioral outcomes. It is based on a longterm history of joint experience. Values and attitudes concerning safety are individual, but also depend on organizational values within a specific company. Individual values may differ from the organizational values; yet a strong organizational culture may have a primaryeffect on behavior. Different companies certainly have different safety cultures. It is important to identity the safety factors that are linked with accident occurrence. A previous study by Seppala (1992) reported that the accident rates of industrial enterprises were associated with their safety culture, especially with the managerial practices reflecting organizational responsibility for safety. Accident frequences have been found to differ considerably between Finnish-speaking and Swedish-speaking companies. This study was conducted in order to investigate the possible differences in safety cultures between Finnish-speaking and Swedishspeaking companies. The aim of this study, a pilot.project, is to help us focus more attention on the relevant characteristics of safety culture and of safety management practices in small and medium-sized companies.
M
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A study was planned to survey the safety culture, i.e. the forms and expressions of safe behavior, and the implementation, effectiveness and problems of safety management in 14 small and medium-sized companies. The enterprises represented the following spheres of activity: eight metal plants; four woodworking plants; and two dairies. The number of personnel in the separate plants ranged from 24 to about 60. Six companies were predominantly Finnish-speaking and six were Swedish-speaking. Two companies had about the same number of Finnish-speaking and Swedish-speaking personnel. Data were collected by means of a questionnaire. The questionnaire on safety culture focused on the following issues: background data - perception and assessment of safety hazards at work - work environment, machines and devices, work methods safety attitudes, safe behavior and risk-taking - safety in work planning and in work methods general safety actions and management issues within the plant. -
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In all, 333 persons (managers, supervisors, clerical workers, blue-collar workers) filled out the questionnaire, consisting of 104 items. Accident occurrences were inquired by a questionnaire, as well as by a follow-up of the statistics from the previous 5 years. This paper presents the preliminary data obtained from the project. The differences are reviewed on the basis of t-tests of the means between companies according to the language predominantly spoken in the companies (mostly between the Finnish-speaking and Swedish-speaking companies).
Research groups
The personnel was given freedom to choose between a Finnish-language or a Swedish-language
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questionnaire form. We received 185 Finnish-language questionnaires and 145 Swedish-language questionnaires. There were no statistical differences between these groups as to the main occupational category, age, gender, length of employment, or function as a safety person. This paper describes the results only between the companies of different language groups. We received 148 completed questionnaires from the Finnish-speaking companies, 134 from the Swedish-speaking companies, and 48 from the bilingual companies. Table 1 shows the distribution of respondents in the companies, by occupation.
TABLE 1 DISTRIBUTIONOF THE RESPONDENTSIN THE FINNISH-SPEAKING, SWEDISH-SPEAKINGAND BILINGUAL COMPANIES, BY OCCUPATIONALCATEGORY Occupational category
Finnish-speaking companies (n=145) %
Swedish-speaking companies (n=132) %
Bilingual companies (n=47) %
5 10 78
6 17 74
15 17 60
100
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100
management supervision clerical work worker
There were proportionally fewer workers in the bilingual companies. Otherwise there were no statistical differences as to the age or gender of the personnel, length of employment, or function as a safety person among the three groups of companies.
RESULTS
Accident frequences of the companies During 1990-1995, 244 occupational accidents had occured in the companies studied (Salminen et al, 1996 b). The frequency of accidents by the companies' main language is shown in Table 2. The bilingual companies had a significantly higher accident frequency than did the predominantly Swedish-speaking or Finnish-speaking companies. The accident frequency in the Swedish-speaking companies was 16% lower than in the Finnish ones; the difference was not, however, statistically significant.
TABLE 2 ACCIDENT FREQUENCY(ACCIDENTS PER 1000 PERSON-YEARS)AT THE WORKSITE, BY THE COMPANIES' MAINLANGUAGE Main language of the company Finnish Swedish Bilingual
Companies (n) 6 6 2
Accidents
Person-years
103 66 75
1293 986 444
Accident frequency 79.66 66.94 168.92
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Perception and assessment of safety hazards at work Table 3 shows the mean of the 18 hazardous items according to the companies' main language.
TABLE
3
THE MEAN AND THE T-VALUES OF THE EVALUATIONSOF SAFETY HAZARDS (18 ITEMS) BY THE COMPANIES' MAIN LANGUAGE (RESPONSE SCALE: 1=POOR, DANGER EXISTS; 2=SOME DEFICIENCIESEXIST; 3=GOOD, NO DANGER)
Main language People Mean of the SD t of the company (n) hazard items Finnish 148 2.20 0.36 1) -3.400 Swedish 138 2.35 0.38 2) -0.320 Bilingual 47 2.37 0.37 3) -2.817 1) difference between Finnish-speaking and Swedish-speaking companies 2) difference between Swedish-speaking and bilingual companies 3) difference between Finnish-speaking and bilingual companies
p< .001 n.s. .01
The personnel in the Swedish-speaking companies reported fewer hazards than did the personnel in the Finnish-speaking companies. The evaluation of the hazards in the Swedish-speaking companies was significantly better in the following items: - orderliness of the work environment - traffic arrangements passages, hallways - work space lighting of the work sites - safety devices on the machinery physical strain. -
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It appears that management in the Swedish-speaking companies pays more attention towards maintaining and improving the general work environment, as well as towards ensuring safety preconditions at the worksites.
Safety attitudes, safe behavior and risk-taking The mean of the 14 safety attitude items (response scale: l=highly disagree; 5= highly agree) was 3.56 for the Swedish-speaking companies and 3.49 for the Finnish-speaking companies. The attitudes towards safety were thus slightly better in the Swedish-speaking companies; the difference, however, was not statistically significant. Personnel in both of the company groups indicated high interest in safety. Other workers were also seen as appreciating safety. The attitudes in the bilingual companies (mean 3.77) were significantly better than in the Finnish-speaking or Swedish-speaking companies. About 69-73% of the personnel in each group of the companies reported that they took more risks when they were very busy at work. The attitudes in the Swedish-speaking companies were significantly better than those in the Finnishspeaking companies as to the following single items: - the senior management considers safety to be important - supervisors ensure the safety at the workplace - I can influence the safety of my job.
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The attitudes in the Finnish-speaking companies, on the other hand, were significantly better in the following items: - I take safety into consideration in my work habits - supervisors intervene when they observe unsafe work habits - safety personnel have an impact on safety at my workplace. The results suggest the Swedish-speaking companies place more emphasis on preconditions of safety in the work and in the work environment; also, supervisors are perceived as looking after preventive safety work and the individual employee is seen as having an active impact on safety. The Finnish-speaking companies, in turn, seemed to emphasize work habits. Supervisors are seen as intervening when unsafe work habits are observed rather than as ensuring job safety or the safety of the work environment. Finnish-speaking companies also seem to emphasize the role of the safety staff.
Safety in work planning and in work methods The evaluations as to the safety of daily work and work methods were slightly better in the Swedishspeaking companies than in the Finnish-speaking ones. The mean of the 30 items for the Swedish companies was 2.06 and for the Finnish companies 1.99 (response scale: l=poor; 3= good); the difference, however, was not statistically significant. The evaluations were best for the bilingual companies (mean 2.14). There were only a few significant differences in the single items between the Swedish-speaking and Finnish-speaking companies. The personnel in the Swedish companies rated the following items better than did the personnel in the Finnish companies: - financial resources for safety condition of the machines and devices - safety devices on the machines availability of first-aid equipment. -
-
The results again seem to indicate that the Swedish-speaking companies took better preventive actions to ensure safety in the work environment and of machinery.
General safety actions and management issues within the plant The personnel in the Swedish-speaking companies also evaluated the level of various safety activities and practices as slightly better than did the personnel in the Finnish-speaking companies. The mean for the 22 items concerning safety actions and safety management in the Swedish-speaking companies was 2.99; in the Finnish-speaking companies it was 2.91 (the response scale: 1= very poor; 5= very good); the difference was not statistically significant. The evaluations were again best in the bilingual companies, the mean of the scale being 3.21. The evaluations of the safety level were, in general, quite poor. At best, only one third to about a half of the personnel in each group of main company language evaluated the safety level as good. If we examine the evaluations of the blue-collar workers only, the ratings were even slightly worse; the mean of the evaluations of the safety level was 2.73 for the workers in the Finnish-speaking companies, being 2.84 for the workers in the Swedish-speaking companies and 2.90 in the bilingual companies.
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The worst evaluations given for safety activities are shown in Table 4. It seems that all of the small and medium-sized companies in the study had paid less attention in the implementation and improvement of general safety practices.
TABLE 4 THE WORST EVALUATIONS OF THE SAFETY PRACTICES IN THE FINNISH-SPEAKING AND SWEDISH-SPEAKING COMPANIES
Item of safety activity
safety education safety control definition of safety responsibilities discussion of accidents that had occurred safety information
Finnish-speaking companies poor or very poor (% of all responses) 57 44
Swedish-speaking companies poor or very poor ( % of all responses) 57 46
42
46
42 40
45 47
DISCUSSION The results indicated that the Swedish-speaking companies had slightly lower accident occurrences (a 16% lower accident frequency) than the Finnish-speaking companies in Finland. The evaluations of the safety hazards, attitudes, work and work methods, and the safety level of the companies all suggest that better preventive measures are taken in the Swedish-speaking companies. The management of the Swedishspeaking companies seems to pay more attention to maintaining and improving the general work environment and safety of the machinery, as well as to ensuring safe preconditions at the immediate worksite. The supervisors and foremen are perceived as taking care of preventive safety work as well. Preventive safety work by supervisors is supported by better senior management attitudes. The personnel have more direct impact on safety. The responses of personnel in the Finnish-speaking companies indicated good personal attitudes towards safety. They also seemed to emphasize individual work habits. Supervisors are seen as intervening when unsafe work habits are observed rather than interfering with the work or work environment itself. The Finnish-speaking companies also emphasize the role of safety personnel. Owing to the small number of companies in the pilot study, the results should be considered only preliminary. Futher research is needed on the differences that were found. The results of this study indicated some issues that could be focused on. No specific scientific conlusions can yet be drawn on real differences in safety culture and management practices of the Finnish-speaking and Swedish-speaking companies. The safety evaluation of the personnel in the bilingual companies was especially problematic. The personnel in the bilingual companies evaluated the safety culture and safety practices on the whole as better than did the personnel in either the Finnish-speaking or Swedish-speaking companies. There were only two bilingual companies in the study. It is difficult to say how well they represent bilingual companies in general. For example, two bilingual companies that had better accident rates refused to participate in the study. The personnel of the bilingual companies had more clerical workers and management staff. These personnel groups usually have more positive attitudes towards safety activities than do blue-collar workers
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(Seppala, 1992). There may also be some problems in the study method that was used, or in the approach adopted by the personnel when making their evaluations. The larger project, of which this study was a part, applied an on-site observation method to evaluate some safety factors, e.g. orderliness of the work environment, machine safety, work methods, ergonomics, hallways, and first-aid equipment. The results indicated that the bilingual companies had the best over-all level of safety in these aspects. Safety practices, attitudes towards safety and occupational hazards need to be studied more specifically in a variety of bilingual companies to be able to draw any further conclusions. The safety of the daily work and the safety practices followed were, at best, evaluated as being only mediocre. A good starting point for improvement would be to provide safety training for the specific needs identified in small and medium-sized companies, giving the personnel the opportunity to participate in the training. Another major step would be to assist small and medium-sized companies in defining and implementing a company safety policy. For instance, safety responsibilities, the provision of on-the-site job instruction, improved information processing, hazard identification and safety inspections, safety control, and measures for implementing safety measures all need to be defined and specified in the company safety policy. The practices adopted in and the recommendations derived from large companies and corporations usually cannot be applied as such in small and medium-sized companies.
References Salminen S., Johansson, A., Hiltunen, E. & Str6mnes, F.J. 1996 a. Accident frequencies among the Finnishspeaking and Swedish-speaking workers (in Finnish). TyOja Ihminen, 10:2, 125-136. Salminen, S., Johansson, A., Seppala, A. 1996 b. Differences of safety culture and production arrangements in Finnish-speaking and Swedish-speaking companies (in Finnish). Finnish Institute of Occupational Health, Helsinki, Finland. Seppala, A. 1992. Evaluation of safety measures, their improvement and associations with occupational accidents (in Finnish). Ty6ja lhminen, suppl. 1/92.
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SAFETY PRACTICES AND RISKS ATTITUDES IN F R E N C H SMALL COMPANIES M. Favaro and C. Davillerd National Research and Safety Institute (INRS), Avenue de Bourgogne, B.P. 27 - 54501 Vandceuvre Cedex, FRANCE
ABSTRACT A survey of French SMEs safety practices and risks attitudes has been carried out. 98 randomly sampled firms were investigated in various business sectors, ranging in personnel from 20 to 200. The objective was to explore the relations between safety practices, occupational accidents, risks attitudes and other managerial and economic characteristics of firms. The results show a strong differentiation among the level of safety practices observed in the surveyed firms. Further analyses show that those firms that give good decisional autonomy to Health and Safety personnel (if any) suffered the least number of accidents. Firms economically less profitable than their respective sector average tend to suffer the greater number of accidents. Firms that delivered categorical and/or negative Health and Safety opinions suffered the more serious accidents and are the less safety "active". Firms which gave more balanced and/or positive judgments suffered less serious or minor accidents and are more "active". KEYWORDS
Clustering Analysis, Health And Safety Practices, Multiple Correspondence Analysis, Occupational Accidents, Principal Components Analysis, Safety Management, Small Firms, Risks Attitudes. INTRODUCTION Health and Safety (H&S) in French Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) is a matter of some concern, as companies whose staffs are under 300 make up + 99,5 % of existing companies and employ _+ 75 % of the whole workforce. As well as their numerical size, empirical evidence shows that H&S is often poorly handled, and that it remains difficult to make any significant progress in its management (CNAM, 1994 ; Eakin, 1988 ; Favaro et al, 1997a). Large managerial differences are also empirically observable between small and larger companies (Favaro, 1992). It was therefore decided to carry out a survey using personally administered questionnaires. The objective was to deepen the existing knowledge of the characteristics and determining factors of H&S practices, attitudes, and occupational accidents occuning in small firms. After a short methodological presentation, this paper gives a presentation of the main results achieved, with an emphasis on the statistical relations between H&S data and a set of structural, economic and managerial characteristics of the firms. M E T H O D O L O G I C A L FRAMEWORK Together with H&S data, a broad range of information was collected in order to obtain a description of each firm participating in the survey. Information came either from questionnaires (i.e information given by respondents), or from other sources including descriptive data on firms from the French INSEE 1, statistical 1 Institut National de la Statistique et des Ewdes Economiques (National institute for statistics and economic studies). 105
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data on occupational accidents from the Prevention Services of Regional Health Insurance Funds (French CRAM) and economic and financial data from a specialized private data base. The type of data collected was prescribed by the overall design of the research, stressing the following five themes :
Description of H&S characteristics of firms : 1- health and safety practices and attitudes : risks/accidents analysis methods, H&S training, available H&S information, opinion on protective devices, on H&S regulations, etc.) ; 2- miscellaneous health and safety characteristics (dangerous equipment, health problems, H&S representatives, statistical data on accidents, etc.).
Themes for contextual description of firms : 3- position of the firm (economic activity, organizational and technological data, etc.) ; 4- running of the firm (firm targets, quality certifications, marketing, position of markets, appraisal of personnel, etc.) ; 5- profiles of respondents : age, training, function, lenghts of service, former activities, timetables (market prospecting activities, negociations with suppliers, supervision of working progress, financial control, etc.). In all, more than 250 variables, including 195 from questionnaire administration were collected from 98 firms, using a probability sampling method with constraints of size (20-200 personnel bracket), activity sectors (elimination of sectors little exposed to occupational accidents) and geographical localisation (the 11 French administrative areas whose prevention services participated). Special care was taken to suit the context of small firms : direct contact, initial survey with open-ended questions, questionnaire tests, procedure acceptable by respondents in terms of duration and relevance of questions. SPAD.N statistical analysis software was used to process the data 2. Most of the variables being qualitatives, Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA) was the main technique employed, together with Clustering Analysis (CA) (Benz6cri, 1992 ; Cox et Cox, 1994 ; Tenenhaus et Young, 1985). Quantitative information, e.g. on occupational accidents or economic outcomes, were also subjected to more classical Principal Components Analysis (PCA). E X P L O R A T I O N OF H E A L T H AND SAFETY PRACTICES Two analyses are presented below, both focused on answers given about the H&S practices declared. The first analysis refers to the whole sample (n=98). The second one focuses on the sub-sample (n=32) of respondents who declared that they employ specialized H&S personnel.
H&S practices : whole sample analysis The exploration of H&S practices consisted of the statistical analysis of the answers delivered for the following 15 qualitative variables: 1- H&S training (2 categories- 'yes/no'), 2- safety checks on equipment (3 categories - 'yes/no/does not apply'), 3- maintenance procedures (2 categories), 4- general H&S initiatives (8 categories - recoded open questions/see QAL HS INIT./), 5- accidents/risks analysis methods (2 'yes/no' categories), 6- H&S estimates (2 'yes/no' categories), 7---> 12- available H&S information (6 variables x 2 'yes/no' categories/see INFO on Fig.l/), 13- personnel committed to H&S (2 'yes/no' categories, recoded from 4 specific variables/see below "subsample analysis"/), 14--->15- self initiated contacts with H&S authorities (work inspectorate & occupational medicine) (2 x 2 'yes/no' categories).
2 SPAD.N (Syst~me Portable d'Analyse de Donn6es Num6riques) is developped by the CISIA (Centre International de Statistique et d'Informatique Appliqu6es), St-Mand6, France.
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Figure 1 gives the graphical configuration of Managers'answers on the first 2 MCA axes 3.
(~AL HS INIT. " • HEALTH & SAFETY
GAL HS INIT.
• HEALTH •
• INFO "YES SAFETY SHEETS • YES SEEK ADVICI FROM WORK INSPECT.
INFO : YES FREE ACCESS TO LITERATURE
• YES PROCEDURES IF PROBLEMS 0.3 • YES SEEK ADVICE FF )M OCCUP. MED. • INFO : NO HS MEETINGS
• YES HS TRAINING
ACTIVE TREND
FACTOR1
• YES HS PERS.
• YES ACCID! NT/RISK ANAL. METHODS
• INFO : YES HS MEETINGS • YES SAFETY CHECKS ON EQUIP.
PASSIVE
==,,,.._
• NO HS PERS.~ TREND • NO HS TRAINING • INFO : NO POSTERS • INFO : NO SAFETY SHEETS DON'T SEEK ADVICE • FROM OCCUP. MED. o.3
-0.3
-0.3
GAL HS INIT. • GAL HS INIT.
: NTR •
:
ST'h,-N'Dh,-l~'D I--S'A-TI0N =INFO • YES WELCOME BOOKLET
• INFO
• YES HS GUIDE
93~ r e s p o n d e n t s eigenvalues : F1 = 0 , 2 8 7 5 F2=0,1079
•
cumulative variance=27% PHI2=1,46
YES HS ESTIMATES
• GAL HS INIT.
• IRRELEVANT GAL HS INIT.
• DON'T KNOW •
Figure 1 • Factorial chart of Health and Safety Practices (whole sample) This chart strongly suggests that axis 1 discriminates two profiles of respondents, respectively called 'active' (left side) vs 'passive' (right side) 4. Notice that here axis 2 remains difficult to qualify. To highlight what are the main statistical determinants of the H&S results delivered by the basic factorial analyses, we used the technique of illustrative (or supplementary) variables. It consists in projections of selected variables (which are here contextual ones/see above/) upon factorial charts, previously made with the active (or principal) variables (the more descriptive of H&S ones that participated in the determination of the
3 For all factorial charts, only categories with valid contributions on axes are represented. The criteria for determining 'valid contributions' is presented by Cibois (1984). 4 A clustering analysis (CA) worked out with the same data gave further confirmation about the adequacy of the partition. This CA allowed us to add a new 'H&S practices' variable, composed of two modalities 'active' & 'passive'.
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factorial axes). Depending the objectives to be reached, such information may be either the 'individuals' (raw profiles) or the 'data' (column profiles) (see Benzdcri, 1992 • Morineau, 1994 • Favaro, 1997b). Figure 2 shows the mean positions of a range of categories, projected as illustrative variables on the factorial chart of H&S practices. The set of variables selected here are the followings : sector activities, existence of an H&S agreement with the regional prevention services, existence of an H&S committee, training/education, juridical status (eg. family business), number of hierarchical levels (< 3 ; _>4). • RUBBER, PAPER, CARDBOARD INDUSTRY
(n= 1)
• THERE WAS A H&S COMMITTEE (n = 7)
WOOD, PLASTIC INDUSTRIES (n= 9) • • HS AGREEMENT WITH REGIONAL PREVENTIVE SERVICES (n = 14)
• 'INTERMEDIATE GOODS' INDUSTRY (n = 13)
0.2
" 3 HIERARCHICAL LEVELS (n = 50)
ACTIVE TREND
NO HS AGR. WITH REG. PREV. SERVICES (n = 79) HIGHLY QUALIFIED EXEC. (n = 32) • 4 HIERARCHICAL LEVELS (n = 43) THERE IS A H&S COMMITTEE (n = 43)
0.3
• -0.3
• NEVER BEEN H&S COMMITTEE (n = 41 ) • TRADES (n = 23) -0.2
BUILDING IND. (N = 1) •
Figure 2" Projection of illustrative variables on the H&S Practices factorial chart By plotting the points referring to the selected data, this chart (Figure 2) brings into light new information about a range of determinants of safety involment in SMEs. Thus in this example, the H&S activity ('active trend') is associated with a high number of hierarchical levels ('_>4 levels' : V-test=-2,3 & V-test=2,3 for '<3 levels'), the presence of an H&S safety committee (V-test=-2,7 for 'presence' & V-tes~=2,7 for 'absence') and with highly educated executives (V-test=-3,4 for 'higher education level') 5. Further analyses also indicate that the sector-activities do not contribute much to explain the observed differencies between levels of H&S 5 The V-test ("test-value") is a statistical criteria available with SPAD.N. It is conceptually closely linked to the p-value and used here to ensure a valid interpretation of the data. As a rule, we consider as statistically significant a V-test ___2.For more information, see Morineau (1992, 1994).
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practices. The only exception are the firms that belong to the chemical industry, which tend to be the more "active" ones. H&S practices • sub-sample analysis
Most of the variables remain similar to the former analysis (made on the whole survey sample). The only exception is that seven new qualitative variables have been substituted for the former variable "personnel committed to H&S", in order to describe more in detail the characteristics of the H&S personnel. The first four variables refer to H&S decision autonomy in the firm : "to supervise jobs ?", "to decide of purchase or jobs ?", "to call meetings ?", "to intervene in the workplace ?". The last three variables describe the professional profile of H&S personnel : function (technical/administrative/other), training (technical/other than technical/without training), hierarchical position (shop flooffsupervisodmanagement). Figure 3 gives the MCA graphical configuration of the categories of answers for the sub-sample of respondents that have declared an H&S personnel.
STRONG DECISION AUTONOMY 32 respondents eigenvalues
HS PERS : YES TO SUPERVISION • OF JOBS
F2=0,1772
HS PERS : YES TO DECISIONS ON PURCHASE OR JOBS • HS PERS
cumulative
: TECHNICAL OFFICES •
: YES TO BRING MEETINGS ABOUT • HS PERS : YES TO INTERVENE • IN THE WORKPLACE
• NO SAFETY CHECKS ON EQUIP. • INFO • NO HS MEETINGS
0.2
DO NOT SEEK ADVICE • FROM OCCUP. MED.
• INFO " YES WELCOME BOOKLET
FACTOR 1
• INFO : NO WELCOME BOOKLET NO PROCEDURES IF PROBLEMS •
• YES HS TRAINING
• YES PROCEDURES IF PROBLEMS
o3
- 0.3
"-
PASSIVE TREND
• NO HS TRAINING • INFO : NO SAFETY SHEETS
• INFO • YES SAFETY SHEET~ -0.2
YES SEEK ADVICE FROM OCCUP. MED. •
variance=27,59%
PHI2=1,65
HS PERS
ACTIVE TREND
:
F1 = 0 , 2 7 8 0
GAL HS INIT.
: NTR •
INFO : NO POSTERS • • INFO • YES HS MEETINGS GAL HS INIT.
• YES PROCEDURES IF PROBLEMS HS PERS
• STANDARDISATION •
• MISCEL. TRAINING •
INFO " YES FREE ACCESS TO LITERATURE
HS PERS : NO POWER OF DECISION OVER PURCHASE OR JOBS •
•
• HS PERS
: NO SUPERVISORY AUTHORITY ON JOBS
HS PERS : CANNOT INTERVENE • IN THE WORKPLACE •
HS PERS
YES HS ESTIMATES
• YES ACCIDENT/RISK ANAL. METHODS • G A L H$ INIT.
•
HS PERS
: ADMINIST. OFFICES •
: CANNOT CALL HS MEETINGS
• IRRELEVANT
! WEAK DECISION AUTONOMY
]
Figure 3 • Factorial chart of Health and Safety practices (sub-sample)
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Examining the chart shows that this sub-sample is composed of two different H&S personnel patterns. The upper-left side ('active' firms) of the graph put together answers that refer to a high decision autonomy. On the other hand, answers typical of a weak decision autonomy are plotted on the bottom-right side ('passive' firms). This outcome gives support for arguing that the presence of personnel involved in H&S, although contributive the "active trend", does not imply in all cases a real emphasis on safety activities. Closer examination of this sub-sample (Figure 3) put forward a statistical relationship between the tendency to be 'active' vs 'passive' when there is a H&S personnel : 'active' firms leave much mole deqision autonomy to their H&S personnel than 'passive' ones do. E X P L O R A T I O N OF O C C U P A T I O N A L ACCIDENT DATA PCA were computed with a range of Occupational Accidents (OA) that occurred in the ill'm-sample during the last three years 6. Table 1 gives the basic statistics for each variable subjected to a PCA. Variables 1 and 3 are related to the frequency of OA whereas variables 2 and 4 are severity indicators. TABLE 1 BASIC STATISTICS FOR OCCUPATIONAL ACCIDENTS Variables (3 ~,ears • recoded) 1- No of accidents with LWD 2- No of LWD ~ ~or._t~,Iiil:~a ~,l,.,jil mto~_ ill IL**vjI
4- No of LWD per accident
Sample size 87 87 84 89
Mean 10,31 196,83 7,45 21,93
Standard deviation 8,15 190,76 7,68 18,11
min.
max.
0,74 47,17 7,29 857,84 0 35,90 0,9 100,43 (LWD=Lost Work Days)
Table 2 gives the variable/factor correlations achieved with the PCA. TABLE 2 VARIABLE/FACTOR CORRELATIONS (OA PCA) Factors 1 2 3 Variables (3 years • recoded) 1- No of accidents with LWD iiiiiiiiiiiii;0..iiiSi..5.iiiiiiii::iiiiiiii -0,34 0,32 0,22 2- No of LWD i iiiiii.~i.Si~.iii!i.....iii] 0,34 3- No accidents without LWD ,ii~iiiiiii~i~0ii~i~iiiiiii.l.iii. -0,37 -0,56 4- No of LWD per accident 0,29 :~i~:~!ii:~i~i:~i~i~i~i:~:i~iiiii -0,19
4 0,23 -0,25 -0,03 0,17 (LWD=Lost Work Days)
Examination of the 2 first axes variable/factor correlations (Table 2) indicates a positive and rather strong correlation between the first factor and variables 1 to 3. This first axis has been qualified as a frequency one. Factor 2 is very strongly correlated with variable 4 (severity indicator), and moderately but negatively correlated with variables 1 and 3 (frequency indicators). Therefore, this second axis as been interpretated as an indicator of severity. This PCA analysis was mainly used to look for some determinants of OA in the film sample. One result to be noticed here is the following • the projection of economic variables upon the PCA chart shows that firms economically les~ profitable than their respective ~ector average statistically tend to suffer the greater number of accidents.
6 Raw data were delivered by the 11 (out of 16) regional prevention services that participated in the survey.
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ATTITUDES
Here we will focus on risks attitudes considered through the responses delivered by managers for a set of 20 statements that convey some of the most typical attitudes - favourable or not - observed in the field of H&S. The answers given by the respondents could be either "rather in agreement" or "rather in disagreement" (2 categories). The statements put forward refer to 4 main topics and are the followings : 1- persqnal protective equipment : 1.1- may impede the work procedures, 1.2- is a complement to the implementation of more technical solutions, 1.3- is interesting because of its cheapness, 1.4- is above all a regulatory requirement to which one is subjected, 2- technical protective devices : 2.12.22.32.4-
allow risk control, are mostly a mean to be in accordance with H&S regulations, generate loss of time, are very effective,
3' to comply with H&S regulations : 3.1- a necessity to ensure employees'safety, 3.2- mostly a constraint, 3.3- more and more difficult to honour, 3.4- essential to give a good image of the finn, 3.5- a necessity to protect the environment, 3.6- a cost whose benefit is difficult to see, 4- tO reach gQ0d safety records : 4.14.24.34.44.54.6-
to reduce the unpredictable at a minimum, to take on qualified personnel, to give priority to the work organization, to encourage personnel to take personal responsability for safety, to act upon major hazards or pollutions, to define the rules and make them applied.
Figure 4 summarizes the MCA graphical configuration of the answers given by respondents. Synthesized statements are given, along with the percentages of answers and the reference number (in brackets) for each category. The first axis (see Figure 4) suggests that firms deliver either balanced and/or positive judgments (on the left side) or categorical and/or negative H&S opinions (on the fight side). If we consider more in detail each sector (I to IV) of the chart, the main opinion tendencies about H&S tend to be the following : - Sector I brings together managers favourable to H&S regulation but remaining qualified in their opinions, - Sector II illustrates a general attitude of opposition to technical prevention, - Sector III conveys an attitude of general opposition to H&S rules and regulations, - Sector IV always refers to favourable and/or qualified attitudes about protective devices (whether they are technical or personal ones). Notice that all the statements do not appear on the chart. Only 11 out of 20 statistically contribute to shape patterns of attitudes towards risks. Two among them (No 1.2 and 3.4) are indicated two times, which means that they are associated with "agreement" and "disagreement" answers. Therefore those items strongly contribute to illustrate the opposition observed with this MCA in the field of risks attitudes. Further projections (as illustrative variables/see above/) of the Occupational Accidents outcomes and of Safety Practices (see Figure 1) on this "Risks Attitude mapping" (Figure 4) show that firms delivering categorical and/or negative H&S opinions (sectors II and III) suffered the more serious accidents and are the less safety "active". Conversely firms which gave more balanced and/or positive judgments (sectors I and IV) suffered less serious or minor ac~:idents and are more "active".
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M. Favaro and C. Davillerd
Q
Q
ev "H&S REGULATIONS ARE NOT MOSTLY A CONSTRAINT" 45%
(3.2)
L.)
"TECHNICAL SAFETY NOT VERY EFFECTIVE" Z1%
(z.4)
"ACCORDANCE WITH THEM IS GOOD FOR FIRM'S IMAGE" 50% (3.4) "BUT MORE AND MORE DIFFICULT TO HONOUR" 35% (3.3)
"MOSTLY A MEAN TO BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH H&S REGULATIONS" 38% (z.z)
"GENERATES LOSS OF TIME" 23% (2.3) FACTOR 1
-...,,,
v
"TECHNICAL AND PERSONAL PROTECTION ARE COMPLEMENTARY 61% (1.2__) "PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT IS NOT ONLY A REGULATORY REQUIREMENT" 54% (1.4) "BUT IT IS AN IMPEDIMENT TO WORK" 31% (1.1) 80 respondents eigenvalues : F1=0,1385 F2=0,1t67 cumulative variance=l 5,46% PHI2=1,65
"TO HONOUR H&S REGULATIONS IS NOT NECESSARY FOR FIRM IMAGE" 49% (3.4) "NOT NECESSARYTO DEFINE RULES AND MAKE THEM APPLIED" 13% (4.6) "USELESS TO TRY TO REDUCETHE UNPREDICTABLE" 18% (4.1) "TECHNICAL AND PERSONAL PROTECTION ARE NOT COMPLEMENTARY" 29%
(i .z)
O
Figure 4 • Summarized factorial chart of Risks Attitudes CONCLUSION This paper gives some of the more salient information produced by the analysis of the information collected during the survey that we devoted to H&S in SMEs 7. A practical conclusion of the results presented in this paper is that since safety practices and attitudes in small firms appear to be more strongly dependent on characteristics like hierarchical levels, existence of an H&S committee, economic achievement, etc. than on more technical ones (given by sector-activity), we suggest that guidance to encourage the safety "passive" ill'ms to move towards better Health and Safety involvement should include promotion of more managerial and economic expertise, rather than to focus exclusively upon the technical side of H&S. With the use of the existing data file of this H&S survey in SMEs, new developments are cun'ently underway. The objective of such a further study will be to compute an experimental scoring application (making use of discrimination methods with further extension of the data file for consolidation of the results achieved)that can be applied to statistically predict H&S practices and also, if proven to be feasible and realistic, Occupational 7 Much other valuable information is not presented here, in particular answers to more open questions. For complete results, see Favaro et al (1997a).
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Accident outcomes. We assume that such a conception of an H&S scoring procedure will contribute to the advancement of decisional research and further applications in the field of Safety Management in the context of SMEs. REFERENCES
Benzdcri, J.P. (1992). Correspondence Analysis Handbook, Marcel Dekker, New-York, U.S.A. Cibois, P. (1984). L'Analyse des Donndes en Sociologie, PUF, Paris, France. CNAM (Caisse Nationale d'Assurance Maladie) (1994). Rapport d'activit6, CNAM, Paris, France. Cox, F.T.and Cox, M.A.A. (1994). Multidimensional Scaling, Chapman et Hall, London, U.K. Eakin, J.M.(1988). Occupational Health and Safety in Small Businesses, University of Calgary, Department of Community Health Sciences, Canada. Favaro, M. (1992). Safety management through the development and the implementation of safety indicators.Safety and Reliability'92, Elsevier, London, 237-248 (Proceedings of the European Safety and Reliability Conference'92). Favaro, M. (1996). La pr6vention dans les PME, I-"Situation", INRS, Notes Scientifiques et Techniques n°134. Favaro, M., Davillerd, C. and Francois, M.(to be issued 1997a). La pr6vention dans les PME, II-"Enqu~te" INRS, Notes Scientifiques et Techniques. Favaro, M. (to be issued 1997b). La pl'6vention dans les PME, III-"Methodologie", INRS, Notes Scientifiques et Techniques. Morineau, A. (1992). L'analyse de donn6es et les tests de coh6rence dans les donn6es d'enqu~te, in ASU • L___aa qualit6 de l'inf0rmation dans lea enqu~tes, Dunod, Paris, 427-440. s
Morineau, A. (1994). Le "Th6mascope" ou analyse structurelle des donn6es d'enquOte, in Gl'ang6, D. and Lebart, L. • Traitements statistiques des enqu~tes, Dunod, Paris, 135-159. Tenenhaus, M. and Young, W. (1985). An analysis and synthesis of multiple correspondence analysis, optimal scaling, dual scaling, homogeneity analysis and other methods for quantifying categorical multivaxiate data. Psychometrika 50 • 1, 91-119.
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THE I N T E G R A T I O N OF H U M A N F A C T O R S IN D E P E N D A B I L I T Y : A VITAL A S P E C T FOR RISK M A N A G E M E N T Invited Lecture International Conference on Safety and Reliability June 17 - 20, 1997 - Lisbon, Portugal
ELIE FADIER Institut National de Recherche et de S6curit6 Service E r g o n o m i e et Psych01ogie Industrieile F-54501 V a n d o e u v r e Cedex
ABSTRACT In addition to defining the concept of what the activities of human operator's include and their evolution as a function of time, this paper will outline a certain number of elements that will help us to better understand how the human operator functions, some of their characteristics, the operational "model" that they use, contributions and weaknesses so that we can integrate these factors during the conception of a given working situation. Following this, we will discuss the impact of automation on human activity, and then finish by looking at some of the steps currently being taken to integrate human factors in industrial situations. KEYWORDS : Automation, Dependability, Human activities, Human factors, Human reliability methods, MAFERGO
INTRODUCTION
Despite the increasing automation of industrial production and/or exploitation systems - one of the consequences of which is a reduction in the number of human operators - the role and place of human activity remain very important. These are reflected either by the performance of tasks that the technical systems cannot perform, or by the monitoring, control, regulation mad recovery from random events that come from the technical system. The mastery of the dependability (RAMS) of a system depends not only on a knowledge of how the system functions in a normal state, but also of how it is organised and configured, and of the identification, analysis and treatment of abnormal events. Control over human factors also requires knowledge of how human operator's reacts, the identification of their requirements and characteristics, as well an analysis and tratment of weaknesses and errors. The objective of this paper is to outline a certain number of elements that will help us to better understand how the human operator functions, some of their characteristics, the operational "model" that they use, contributions and weaknesses so that we can integrate these factors during the conception of a given working situation. Following this, we will discuss the impact of automation on human activity, and then finish by looking at some of the steps currently being taken to integrate human factors in industrial situations. E V O L U T I O N OF THE C O N C E P T OF THE O P E R A T O R
The concept of what the activities of a human operator include has evolved in the same manner, and at the stone time, as the technological evolution df industrial production and/or exploitation systems. At the beginning of the industrial aera, production systems relied very heavily, and almost without exception, on the physical activity of their human operators who executed repetitive tasks without considering the meaning of their actions. As technology - and its reliability - advanced, automation began, little by little, to take over the tasks of the transformation and production of different products. This in turn caused humans to assume roles with a more dominant cognitive (mental) component - roles that require more reflection and that are more motivating. However, even though this observation is generally true, there are nevertheless still some situations where physical activity still dominates daily work. It is useful to define three different, but complementary, "models" of a human operator: 117
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The operator as an executor
Here, the operator is assumed to execute a pre-defined task "as faithfully as possible", which in turn supposes that the defined task can be performed and executed exactly as defined. The operator's activity is defined by the means that are to be used, and includes a relatively detailed mode of operation. An inheritance of Taylorism, this idea of the operator as executor obviously implies that the average operator is simply considered as a simple component of a system, to whom the order to execute a particular task is given. Any failure on the part of the operator is immediately seen as having an effect on the performance of the system. It is this "model" that formed the basis of a qualitative approach to human reliability (Swain 1964, 1974). The operator as an intelligent actor
In this representation, the activity of the operator has a predominantly mental component. The task, necessarily more complex, is defined as an obligation to obtain certain results, often with a particular goal to be attained. Even if the means used to complete the task are occasionally defined, more emphasis is placed on the objective to be satisfied. For this reason, the operator interacts with other elements of the system to accomplish his task. In this context, there is often a difference between the defined task and the activity carried out. This difference can be explained by the contribution that the operator makes to adapt the task to different working situations (random, or unforeseen events in the technical system, external solicitations from the immediate environment or organisation). Here the operator is not a simple executor, but rather an intelligent actor (participant) who must carry out cognitive tasks (reasoning, representation, memorisation, diagnosis, information processing, etc.). The approach best adapted to the understanding and analysis of this role is the qualitative and explicative approach of human reliability - an approach that has been strongly developed by psychologists and ergonomists since the 1960s (Faverge 1966, Bainbridge 1982, Leplat 1985, Reason 1990, Hoc 1996). The operator as a collective agent
This concept of the operator appears in instances when the work station disappears. The operator, who is never isolated, is integrated into a team with a given mission to carry out. The tasks are shared out between the team members, and performed with only a certain degree of autonomy since they are carried out in co-operation with several partners. In this context, the personality of the individual plays a deternaining role in the success of the mission. Co-operation, communication, as well as the organisation of the work to be performed become pertinent indicators of activity and of the success of the mission. Furthermore, if an emphasis is placed on the influence of the task organisation on the psyche of the individual, Human-Hulnan relations and the effects of task sharing between operators are no longer elements that can be neglected in this approach. This is the psychological approach of the human in the work place (de Terssac et al. 1990). Finally, it also appears to be important to point out that the role and influence of the "decision maker", and of management and the supervisory staff must also be taken into consideration since the fact that they have an impact on the role, place, and performance of human beings is undeniable. SOME S P E C I F I C S OF HUMAN F U N C T I O N I N G (Fadier & Mazeau 1994) D e f i n e d tasks a n d real activities
The organisation of a job (defined by its designers, management, environment, etc.) defines the constraints and formal rules that must be respected in order to carry out a given operation (tools to be used and conditions for their use, tools that are forbidden, obligatory protective equipment, operatory modes, order of operations, temporal constraints for execution, documents to be filled out, etc.). The reliability of an operation depends on the correct execution of the defined task and the respect of rigorously defined indications. This hypothesis does not hold together for three reasons: It is occasionally difficult to define the conditions of a task with precision beforehand. The degree of precision required will vary from operator to operator, and as a function of the tasks to be completed. Implied tasks are inevitable, and constrain the operators to (Kern et al. 1989): complete the existing procedures to include the implicit parts, redefine "others" in order to adapt them to the realities of a given situation, - define non-existent "procedures". -
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The human operator cannot scrupulously execute a given task without understanding exactly what is asked of him. In certain cases he will interpret the instructions, thereby introducing the possibility of errors, especially when specific aspects of the behaviour of the operator have not been taken into account: e.g. becoming tired, reasoning on the basis of a mental representation of reality, etc. Maintenance tasks (and not only corrective maintenance) are characterised by a high degree of interaction between diagnostic activities and activities related to task execution: given what is seen by the operator, are we still within the context of the previously defined procedure? If not, is the difference significant? Should the supervisory staff be called?... These questions are not always consciously asked (if they were, the difficulties would be resolved more often than not), but do stimulate the taking of certain actions. Work-related situations, in both maintenance and production, are characterised by: -the presence of technical malfunctions. These are particularly damaging when they strike diagnostic systems because they can render a solution impossible, - process instability. Machines suffering from a total malfunction are often easier to manage than machines that breakdown only intermittently and/or partially, conditions of execution that are occasionally difficult (hot environments, uncomfortable posture that do not help reflection, night-time interventions .... ), - situations with co-activity (with those operators in charge of production who take over or who are waiting, cooperation between electricians and mechanics .... ), - situations where maintenance and production co-operate. -
hnportance of the mental representation The analysis of human errors (Leplat 1985, Rasmussen 1986, de Keyser 1989, Reason 1990), in both maintenance and production/exploitation, reveals that the behaviour of a given operator obeys some sort of logical in each of the cases observed. This logic turns out to be ill-adapted to the situation after the fact since it only takes one, or a few of the elements of a situation into account (context, operational mode, execution time, state of resources .... ). Current understanding of human function in the work place, and particularly of the ways in which we treat information has demonstrated the importance of a mental representation (of the installation, of the task objectives, of the role of each person .... ) of the system that the operators construct to help them decide on a course of action. Available information might have little significance if it contradicts the mental representation of the state of the system or of the system that the operator has constructed. This operational specificity that push the operator to retain only that information from a given situation that confirms the preestablished hypotheses and to not retain any infonrmtion that contradicts these hypotheses is referred to as "confirmation bias". In each of the situations with which the operator is confronted, it is therefore important to ensure (through an analysis of the task) that he does not run the risk of "reasoning correctly for the wrong reasons" - reasons that he will not question again. The predominance of the recent past, of the more critical incidents, and ambiguous information are traps which should be avoided (Mazeau 1993).
Role of the collective work (group) The collective (or group-oriented) nature of work in general (Leplat 1988, Six et al. 1993) is accentuated by technological evolutions. Here, it is indispensable to mark the difference between a group of operators - an operational "collective" - (a group of individuals pursuing a common goal), and a work group - or working collective - (a group of people having a common characteristic). Production operators, lnaintenance operators, and system methods engineers constitute working collectives. The engineer in charge of a service, the system operator, system methods engineers, the maintenance operator and the technician working for an external firm who all meet in the control room in order to understand the cause of a malfunction and to decide what to do together constitute a "collective operator". The way these informal groups function is much better understood today (than it was previously). Certain conditions are necessary if this collective is to be efficient: the perception of a common goal and a shared interest in obtaining it, and thus the technical and organisational means needed to construct the "Common Operative Reference" (de Terssac 1990) needed to stimulate efficient communication (Mazeau 1993). An analysis of the co-operation between the operators of a given team often reveals difficulties of communication (de Keyser 1985) which are sometimes due to managerial structure (hierarchical and salaried differences .... ), to task organisation (difficulties for one operator to accept the competition from another in the same job in situations where different tasks are performed simultaneously, cost of any stoppages to the firm or to maintenance...). However, the most frequent source of difficulties seems to be associated with logical and representational differences stemming from divergences in the "implicit functional analysis" of the installation
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(principal functions, priorities .... ). These can generate difficulties of communication that lead to contentious situations. Current computer-based tools (C.A.M.M. Computer Aided Maintenwme Management) can help to resolve these problems by facilitating the diffusion of information, provided that they respect the language, logical and priorities of each group.
Overlapping of physical, mental and psychological plans The growing importance of aspects related to the treatment of information should not cause one to forget the other characteristics of the way humans function in the work place: operational efforts, postures that can be difficult to hold, fatigue due to physical labour, changes noted during night shifts, etc. These can all influence the ability of human beings to face up to those situations with which they are confronted. Previously taught habits, and those learned from experience can modify one's perception of a situation and trigger a response that is poorly adapted to any modifications that may have been made to the system. Finally, psychological aspects including stress, fear, and boredom should not be forgotten since they also influence the behaviour of humans in the work place.
The specificity of activity in automated systems The ever-increasing role assumed by automated and computerised system in certain operations in manufacturing processes has thus caused major changes in the nature of the work performed by human operators, as well as in the nature of related risks. a - Changes in the nature of risks Technological changes contribute to improvements in the direct safety of human operators to the extent that they are farther removed (and protected) from the exact site where the transformation of the product takes place. However, even if the system operator is relatively safe, an improper action in the control room can have serious consequences on the rest of the site. The safety of operators present at the site often depends directly on those actions undertaken by the operator in the control room. It is therefore necessary to design information/control systems that can help to avoid such actions, their causes and/or their consequences. It is therefore possible to say that the safety of a complex, computerised installation (and the quantity and quality of what is produced) is highly dependent on an optimal co-operation between different teams, and between humans and the computerised command and control system. b - Changes in the nature of work performed These changes can be of two types (Neboit 1991) : first, the person controlling the system is informed and acts oll the process in an indirect manner (via screen/keyboard/synoptic/control interfaces), and second, the controller generally intervenes only when the operation of the system is in a deteriorated state. Use of interfaces the operator intervenes in the process via interfaces that present complex, symbolic information. This has been made necessary due to the fact that the processes themselves have become extremely complex, and because tasks at different levels of regulation and control have been integrated into a generalised monitoring function. Because the intervention occurs in this manner, the operators' task requires mental (or cognitive) activities including the gathering/treatment of information, memorisation, representation, anticipation, and diagnosis. The nature of these activities and reasoning strategies should thus be taken into account when designing such interfaces in order to help the person who controls the process. Interventions in deteriorated situations: the operator norlnally intervenes less often during the normal operating regime, or at least where normal operating procedure is observed and can followed with a computer. In this event, the role of the operator is essentially reduced to a monitoring task. On the other hand, he intervenes more often during phases where normal operation is not observed in order to find the malfunction, diagnose its cause(s), anticipate the evolution of the process, and, when necessary, switch over to manual operation. This places the operator in a position where he must recover from incidents (Faverge 1980) with a temporal constraint - this being a potential source of information overload, stress and risk. C E R T A I N A S P E C T S OF A U T O M A T E D SYSTEMS
The massive introduction of new technologies has modified the nature of production and exploitation systems in
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a significant manner. The principal characteristics of these systems can be SUlnlnarised as follows:
Increasing complexity: This complexity stems from a significant addition of technical materials for production, control, detection, monitoring, and diagnosis. Mixed technologies The excessive cost of adding new technologies often pushes those people making the (financial) decisions to make changes step by step. For this reason materials from different generations of more or less compatible technologies, of different forms and natures, are found side by side. Add to this coexistence of technologies a competitive industrial pressure that forces finns to widen their product range, and one can see that this will have severe consequences on the operators' activities. A collective dimension to work It has been noted that the evolution of work is first of all characterised by the disappearance of the work station, and by the increasing "discretionality" of the (operator's) tasks. These tasks are often defined in terms of their goals and principals of execution that are more or less explicit. In this event, it is better to talk about a specific mission to be accomplished by a team than about tasks to be carried out (de Terssac 1992). A more or less explicit definition of the execution conditions gives the operator a greater or lesser degree of autonomy, and emphasises the importance of exchanges, communication and the co-ordination of tasks between different individuals who have the same overall objective to attain. An increasing role of human-machine interfaces Human operators are generally removed from the site of production/exploitation in automated systems. For this reason, they generally intervene in the process by means of different types of control interfaces (screens and/or synoptics), and are called upon to manage transformed, abstract visual or audio information in different forms (analogue, symbolic, graphic), which might, or might not be coded. An increasing role for information In order to better manage the complexity of a system, its designer provides abundant amounts of documentation on the procedures. This implies different forms of communication (written vs. oral, explicit vs. implicit). The comprehension and execution of instructions and procedures currently pose significant safety problems. More and more, emphasis is being placed in the design and maintenance of procedures (ISdF 1991, 1994). The following Table summarises the impact of this massive introduction of technology, on the system in general, on safety, and the activities of the operator, and mentions certain new requirements in the area of risk management. SOME PERSPECTIVES
What are the possible automated systems?
approaches that will allow one to better consider human factors in complex
Given that humans are a specific element in a socio-technical system, whoever - or whatever - interacts with them interacts not only with their physiological and psychological components, but also with their psychic and affective components. For this reason the only practical approach is the adaptation of the system to human characteristics and requirements. This adaptation is realised using the ergonomics of working situations, and could touch upon the following aspects:
Action on the physical environment (noise, lighting, vibrations, ventilation, etc.) through classical ergonomic knowledge whereby one attempts to adapt the physical environment to the physiological characteristics of human beings while taking into consideration their activities (Cazamian 1989). Action on Human-Machine Interfaces, from simple interfaces (command dials, colours and buttons) up to the edition of operating procedures and modes. Any form of aid to these operators can be considered as an interface in this context. This adaptation must take the physiological and cognitive characteristics of humans into consideration along with their activities.
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E. Fadier TABLE 1 IMPACT OF AUTOMATION ON PRODUCTION SYSTEMS
I M P A C T ON THE SYSTEM
INCREASING COMPLEXITY
MIXED TECHNOLOGIES
COLLECTIVE NATURE OF WORK
IMPACT ON ACTIVITIES
• increase of activity with predominant mental component • removal of (monitoring and/or humans from site of supervision, transformation of diagnosis, the product memorisation, representation, anticipation) • intervention in • instability of deteriorated production systems • variety of products situations • Compensation by • co-existence of humans, recovery several generations activities of material • transfer of human knowledge to tools
• disappearance of the idea of the fixed work station
co-activity and cooperation •
• permanence of activity
I M P A C T ON SAFETY • disappearance of classical risks associated with production activities
• transformed/ abstract information: • visual/audio ,analogue/ symbolic/graphic • coded • screens/synoptics
INCREASING ROLE OF INFORMATION
• abundance of documentation and procedures
• analysis of malfunctions and failures
• increase of physical work load in some cases
• proof of critical working situations
• rigidity of automated sequences • shift change-over • breakdown of structural control
• different forms of communication (written - oral, implicit - explicit)
• task/activity definitions • analysis of tasks/work • consideration of organisation aspects of work • training (common operative referential)
• same interface for several users
• solicitation of different mental functions, and importance of reasoning-type activities
• adequate representation of necessary information
• sollicitation of different mental functions and importance of reasoning-type activities
• development of a functional schedule of conditions
• appearance of new working situations that present a risk
• increasing use of control interfaces
• increased work load
• definition of needs
• integration of humans in the production cycle
• sharing and definition of tasks between humans, teams, and humanmachine • structural controls INCREASING ROLE OF HUMANMACHINE INTERFACES
NEW R E Q U I R E M E N T S IN RISK MANAGEMENT
• new forms aids in work place to compensate for lack of skills - specific training
• mental representation of technical systems • vigilance • understanding of instructions and procedures • shift change-over
• ergonomics of procedures, instructions and reasoning aides
Actions on task definition - a task upstream from the sharing out of jobs b e t w e e n h u m a n s and m a c h i n e s .
U p to what point should one automate? W h a t is the role of the human in the system? S y s t e m design is generally d o n e using functional analysis techniques. This is essentially a formal f r a m e w o r k for co-operation, or s y s t e m of
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rules, between the different parties contributing to the design. In fact, when a functional analysis is performed attention is usually focused on technical functions, with the operator only being taken into account summarily (ergonomics of the wrist, colour of the interface). He is generally given those functions that the technical system cannot perform (Garrigou 1992). In so far as this lastpoint is concerned, several studies (Fadier et al. 1991, Ligeron et al. 1991, Chevenier et al. 1991, Gauthier et al. 1994) have shown that the functional analysis methods that are currently the most widely used cannot account for the activities of future users (production activities, maintenance activities .... ), nor for areas of potential use (in particular conditions of operation in deteriorated states), whereas ergonomics has underlined, by means of the analysis of real activities, the fact the work is composed of adaptations and adjustments and optimal operating conditions that are very rarely seen. This difference (and sometimes contradiction) between the (theoretically) expected operation and real operation (including the management of random events) is considered as one of the most important sources of "risk taking" since the operator/user needs to rectify a situation that was not foreseen during the design phase.
Action. on task organisation. This must take not only the collective dimension of the tasks into consideration, but also the adaptation of the activities for new types of work and the new characteristics of automated systems. Communication, co-operation and co-ordination are three very important factors that all managers should integrate before proposing changes in the organisation of tasks in the work place. Action on the trabThTg of the personnel. This should complement the above actions. Continuing education, learning of new techniques, and training in the management of the more common random events are 'all possibilities that could help the operators become more capable in specific operational conditions. What methods should one use? In the work presented by the Institut de Sfiret6 de Fonctionnement "State of the Art in the Area of Human Reliability" (Fadier et al. 1994), the majority of the methods used for human reliability and ergonomics are described, and the reader is referred to this text for more details. Nevertheless, it should be remembered that several different methods are used depending on, sector of activity and the specifics of the activities carried out (see table 2). Furthermore, for approximately tens years now, "benchmark exercise" studies have been carried to help potential users in their choice of methods (Gerdes 1993, Humphreys et al. 1988, Kirwan 1988, 1992, Kirwan et al. 1995, Mesiter 1986, Watters 1988). The results of these studies are rather convinchag. However, in order to satisfy the requirements of SMI/SMEs, and to improve the operational reliability of automated systems, the INRS has developed a method entitled "Mdthode pour l'Analyse de la Fiabilit6 et ERGonomie Opdrationnelle" (MAFERGO Method for the Analysis of Operational Reliability and Ergonomics). This method [Fadier et al. 1991, Fadier et al. 1996] integrates both reliability and ergonomic approaches, and has been proposed as a method to respond to the requests of external finns. It includes four steps which are very briefly outlined below: A s t r u c t u r a l - f u n c t i o n a l a n a l y s i s aimed at understanding the nonnal operation of an existing system through the use of descriptive methods (block diagrams, flow charts), the description of foreseen tasks, and a preliminary analysis of real activities. An operational analysis aimed at describing the modes of exploitation and operation of a system, as well as the availability of the technical components, by comparing them with the analysis of the spatial-temporal planning of the tasks (requirements, constraints). The identification of m a l f u n c t i o n s is done using an event tree and AMDE, as well as an analysis of the consequences of the malfunctions on the operators' activities. An analysis of the cause of the m a l f u n c t i o n s using a fault tree (ADD) offer the possibility of defining the degree of fragility of the system, and the scenarios of the events that impose constraints on the operators. Finally, proposals of i m p r o v e m e n t s are focused on the improvement of reliability and availability, as well as on the improvement of the human-task pairing. -
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E. Fadier TABLE 2 CATEGORYOFMETHODSUSEDIN HUMANREIAABILITY
Category of Methods
Characteristics of the Type of Methods
Examples
Methods' of evaluation of human reliability
These describe and quantify human peffonrmnces in THERP (Swain et al. 1983) a given task in order to evaluate and predict human - TESEO (Bello et al. 1980) reliability for this type of task - APJ (Seaver et al. 1982) Methods of qualitative These describe and model human variability in the Reason Approach analysis of the human execution of a task, or, more generally, help to (Reason J. 1979) understand the psychological process that intervenes - Rasmussen Model components of in the appearance of an error reliability (Rasmussen et al. 1987) - OAET (Brown et al. 1982) These integrate the description, quantification and Methods for the SHERPA (Embrey D.E. management of human psychological analysis of errors in the wider context 1986) of a global approach - the objective of which is the - HCR (Hannaman et al. reliability prevention of the causes of errors and the design of 1984) systems better adapted to human capabilities and - HEART (Williams J.C. requirements 1985) Methods using These rely on an a posteriori evaluation of human - A Simulator-Based Model reliability in reference tasks in order to infer human feedback and data (Beare et al. 1984) reliability in a similar task. Qualitative data offer the bases EPFH (EDF 1986) possibility of predicting the variability of the - MAFERGO (Fadier et al. behaviour for a given task, which in turn allows one 1991) to direct research and design approaches -
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CONCLUSION Let us recall that work is composed of a permanent cycle of adaptations and adjustments, and that in order to manage this adaptation the operator needs a degree of autonomy. The difficulty for designers lies in the need to maintain the level of the performance of systems while allowing the operator sufficient room to manoeuvre in order to be able to complete his mission. The human factor should not simply be reduced to human errors. It is true that human reliability is not infallible (Faverge 1970, Mazeau 1993), and that any human intervention will have both positive and negative aspects. Fixating only on the negative aspects would necessarily lead to the neglecting of a significant portion of reality, and would cause us to opt for biased choices. How do we avoid human errors without inhibiting the adaptive function of human activities? question that specialists are currently looking to answer.
This is the
In fact, e r r o r should be seen and analysed not only from the point of view of its consequences on the system, nor as a deviation from a proscribed procedure, but also as the symptom of a poor operator-task pairing. A reliable system is one that can be recovered, and is thus capable of managing any m a l f u n c t i o n s , which in tuna implies that the latter be well understood.
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BELLO, G.C. & COLOMBANI, V. (1980). The human factors in risk analyses of process plants. The control room operator model, "TESEO". Reliability engineering, 1, 3-14. BROWN, R.G., VONHERRMAN, J.L. & QUILLIAN, J.F. (1982). Operator action event trees for the Zion 1 pressurized water reactor. NUREG/CR-2888. CAZAMIAN, P. (1989). Traitg d'ergonomie. Octares Editions. CHEVENIER, C., MERCIER, C. & RAGAZZO, D. (1991). Bilan d'une adaptation de SADT dans un contexte contrale-commande de production. JoumEes Intemationales de GEnie Logiciel de Toulouse. DE KEYSER. V. (1985). Les communications dans les systEmes automatisds: champs cognitifs et supports d'information chez les opdrateurs. In: Noizet, Bouilanger, Bresson et al. (Eds.): La communication. Presses Universitaires de France, Paris. DE KEYSER, V. (1989). L'erreur humaine. La Recherche, 216, 1444-1455. DE TERSSAC, G. (1992). Autonomie darts le travail. Octares Editions. DE TERSSAC, G. & CHABAUD, C. (1990). REferentiel opdratif commun et fiabilit6. In: J. Leplat & G. de Terssac (Eds.): Lesfacteurs humains de lafiabilitd dans le syst~me complexe, chapitre 4, 112-139. Octares Editions. EDF (1986). Evaluation probabiliste de la fiabilitd humaine et essais sur simulateur. Mosneron-Dupin, Grosdeva, Saloiu & Berger. In: Colloque INRS "Lesfacteurs humains de Iafiabilitd", avril 1991. EMBREY, D.E. (1986). A systematic approach for assessing and reducing human error in process plants. Human Reliability Associates Ltd, Delton. FADIER, E. & al. (1994). Etat de l'art clans le domaine de la fiabiIitg humaine. Octares Editions. FADIER, E. (1990). Fiabilitd humaine: mdthode d'analyse et domaine d'application. In: J. Leplat & G. de Terssac (Eds.): Lesfacteurs humains de lafiabilit~ darts le syst~me compIexe, chapitre 2. Octares Editions. FADIER, E. & MAZEAU, M. (1994). T'~ches de maintenance et rSle de l'homme. Journdes AFIM/ISdF "Apport de la maintenabilit~, de la maintenance et des facteurs humains gz la s~retd de fonctionnement", Paris, 2223 novembre 1994. FADIER, E. & NEBOIT, M. (1996). Proposition d'une mdthode d'analyse de la fiabilit6 opErationnelle intEgrant l'analyse ergonomique. Communication faite au 10e Colloque de fiabilit~ et maintenabilitd, Saint-Malo (France), ler-3 octobre 1996. Editions SEE. FADIER, E., POYET, C. & NEBOIT, M. (1991). Advantages of an integrated approach of reliability and ergonomical analysis: application to an hybrid system of sequential production. In: Y. Queinnec & F. Daniellou (Eds.): Designing for Eve13,one. Taylor & Francis. FAVERGE, J.M. (1980). 203-206.
Le travail en treat qu'activit6 de rEcupEration. Bulletin de Psychologie, 33:344,
FAVERGE, J.M. (1966). L'ergonomie des' processus industriels. l'Universit6 Libre de Bruxelles.
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17-18 novembre 1994. GERDES, V. (1993). HRA Techniques. A Selection Matrix. In: Proceedings SRE Symposium "Reliability a competitive edge", october 4-6, 1993. HANNAMAN, G.W., SPURGIN A.J. & LUKIC, Y.D. (1984). PRA analysis Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto. HOC, J.M. (1996). SupeJwision et contr6le de processus. Presses Universitaires de Grenoble.
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Human cognitive reliability model.
La cognition en situation dynamique.
HUMPHREYS, P., EMBREY, D.E., KIRWAN, B. & REA, K. (1988). Human reliability assessors guide. Safety and Reliability Directorate. United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority, Wigshaw Lane. ISdF (1991). Conception et maintenance des procgdures. Proiet 11/92. ISdF (1994). Aide h la conception, gz la validation et ?~la maintenance des plvcddures. Projet 7/94. KERN, H. & SCHUMANN, M. (1989). Latin de la division du n'avail? La rationalisation dans la plvduction industrielle. Editions Masson/Sciences de l'Homme, Paris, 417 p. KIRWAN, B. (1988). A comparative evaluation of five human factors assessment techniques. In : B.A. Sayers (Ed.): Human factors and decision making: t heir influence on safety and reliability. Elseviers Applied Science, 87-109. KIRWAN, B. (1992). Human error identification in human reliability assessment. Part 1: approaches. Applied Ergonomics, 23:5,299-318. KIRWAN, B. (1992). Human error identification in human reliability assessment. comparaison of techniques. Applied Ergonomics, 23:6, 371-381.
Overwiew of
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MEISTER, D. (1986). Human Factors Testing and Evaluation. Elsevier, 424 p. NEBOIT, M. (1991). Ergonomie et fiabilit6 humaine dans la conduite des syst6mes complexes. Revue Ggngrale d'Electricit~, 5, 36-40. RASMUSSEN, J. DUCAN, K. & LEPLAT, J. (1980). New technology and human error. John Wiley & Sons, Chistester. RASMUSSEN, J. (1986). Information processing and human-machhTe interaction: cm. approach, to cognitive engineering. A.P. Sage (Ed.), North-Holland series in system science and engineering 12. REASON, J. (1979). Actions not as planned: the price of automatization. In: G. Underwood & R. Stevens (Eds.): Aspects' of consciousness. Volume 1: Psychological issues. Academic Press, Londres.
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REASON, J. (1990). Human error. Department of Psychology, University of Manchester. SEAVER, D.A., STILLWELL, W.G. & SCHWARTZ, J.P. (1982). Expert estimation of human error plvbabilities in nuclear power plant operatiom': a review of probability assessment and scalh~g. NUREG/CR-2255. Decision Science Consortium Inc., Falls Church. SIX, F. & VAXEVANOGLOU, X. (1989). Les aspects collectifs de travail. Octares Editions. SWAIN, A.D. (1964). THERP. Sandia Laboratories, Albuquerque. Report SC.R 64 1338. SWAIN, A.D. (1974). Human factors' associated with prescribed action links. Albuquerque. Report SC.R 74 0051, 35 p.
Sandia Laboratories,
SWAIN, A.D. & GUTTMANN, H.E. (1983). Handbook of human reliability analysis with emphasis on nuclear plant applications. NUREG/CR- 1278, US Nuclear Regulation. WATFERS, T. (1988). Human factors reliability benchmark exercise. In: B.A. Sayers (Ed.): Human factors and decision, making." their influence on safety and reliability. Elsevier Applied Science, 110-125.
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HUMAN ERRORS IN MAINTENANCE ACTIONS AN EXPERIENCE BASED STUDY Pekka Pyy, Kari Laakso l, Lasse Reiman 2 1VTT Automation, PL 1301, 02044 VTT, FINLAND [email protected], [email protected] 2STUK, PL 14, 00881 Helsinki, FINLAND [email protected]
ABSTRACT
In this paper, a study of human errors related to nuclear power plant (NPP) maintenance is presented. About 4400 maintenance history fault information records and licensee event reports of an NPP from the years 199294 were analyzed. A considerable time was used to verify the results with the maintenance personnel of the NPP. The paper discusses the scope and objectives of the study, method used and results obtained. The results are presented separately for single human errors, common cause failures (CCFs) and single human errors leading to multiple effects due to shared equipment. Finally, the validity of results is discussed and conclusions made with some recommendations.
KEYWORDS
Maintenance, human errors, human factors, human reliability, nuclear power plants, statistics, common cause failures, fault history.
INTRODUCTION In the research concerning human behaviour and human error possibilities, main attention has been traditionally focused upon the control room crew performance in disturbance and accident conditions. The control room operators have an essential role in disturbance management. On the other hand, also maintenance errors may have an impact on the severity of a disturbance by disabling safety related equipment. The chances of operators to manage the situation are worsened if latent equipment failures due to imperfect test and maintenance activities exist. Especially common cause failures, affecting several trains of a safety related system, may have a significant contribution to the reactor core damage risk. Therefore, the dependence of errors between tasks performed in redundant trains is an issue of extreme importance. The topic is highlighted in many earlier studies, e.g. in (Reiman 1994). The objectives of the study were to identify human errors related to maintenance, give examples of the origin and appearance of human induced common cause failure mechanisms, generate numerical indicators explaining maintenance related errors and their influence and to try to find out improvents. Human reliability 129
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explaining maintenance related errors and their influence and to try to find out improvents. Human reliability data estimation based on the material and detailed root cause analyses were, so far, excluded from the study scope due to the extensive effort required for the data screening. In future, however, human reliability data analysis is an important topic to be studied.
USED METHOD
It is useful to study which kinds of human maintenance related errors can pass on to otherwise operable components and cause latent unavailability. The kernel of the thinking behind the study is that equipment may be declared operable, although it actually is not capable of fulfilling all its functions. This latent unavailability may due to many phenomena, e.g., human actions such as forgetting a restoration and imperfectness of testing. The principle of latent unavailability born via maintenance related actions and not revealed thereafter is shown in Figure 1. Timeline Component operable
QC
inoperable
Component inoperable
Maintenance
Oe.~gn Work planning / / ~
Component
~Humanl~lP-rrorXtakesplaceana,[ maintenanceI r I leavesthecon~nentI ~ a~. x I
Unavailability due to maintenance
inoperable
operable
Operating
organisation
Work permit - -
Component declared
Component organisation
I to a degraded state I
,
wOrkcontrol roomPermi returned t to///
V' Most errors found
Residual unavailability due to errors
,
I
.~ ,Administrative,
;
I
2,3 ....
I
~,_ , veriodic tests
I ' ', .... I
e~'res Som idual errors f(xJnd
y Som residual errors found
Residual unavailability decreases
Residual unavailability decreases
.=,
,
I
I Resi
errors found,
disturbance conditions
Figure 1. Model of the birth of an error in a maintenance action and its consequences (component degradation) passing several barriers. The unavailability decreases in each barrier due to possibilities to detect the fault. The database used in the study were the fault and repair history records, completed with other utility reporting, of one NPP located in the Nordic countries. The failure reports covered 4407 failure and repair records in maintenance history from the calendar years 1992-1994. Human errors related to maintenance, such as omissions or wrong settings, may result in single or dependent component failures. The number of single failures is high when compared to the CCFs, called here as HCCFs (Human CCFs). An HCCF may be born by repeated wrong actions or due to correct actions bringing e.g. an unfit set point or spare part to the target system. In special cases, also single human errors may cause multiple consequences due to latent technical interactions between components and systems. They may be called human shared equipment failures, HSEFs. A failure is considered to be an HCCF or HSEF via its consequences, i.e. redundant components are faulted in parallel. Similarly, human induced non-critical faults (HCCNs) have been studied due to their precursor importance and due to similar error mechanisms as in HCCFs. Thus, the scope of the CCF definition used here is to some extent different than used in Probabilistic Safety Assessments (PSAs). In the cases, where the human originated dependence between faults remained unclear even after interviews, single errors were assumed. For the exact definitions of the terms, see (Laakso et al 1997). The first part of the study was the screening of the 4407 fault records, their feedback information and 16 utility reports to find out human error candidates cases. The details facilitating the identification were the coding of the fault causes and the text description based on the findings in repair. The screening phase was carried out by
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two analysts in a sequential order resulting in about 500 candidate records that were discussed with the maintenance foremen of the utility. That first review resulted in 334 candidate cases, of which amount 6 came from other sources than from the fault history data (See Figure 2). Further investigation with the utility personnel revealed that, from these 334 cases, 126 fault history records could be further grouped into 37 different dependence cases (HCCFs, HCCNs and HSEFs). This reduction was due to the fact that multiple fault records in the database often originated in repeated erroneous actions. Thus, the number of single human errors found in the fault history was 206. Furthermore, 11 dependence cases preliminary classified as HCCFs and 2 single errors were found to caused by other reasons, e.g. by ageing, rather than human errors. The flow of the screening is manifested in Figure 1.
Number of cases Utility fault history records -4400
Utility reports e.g. rootcausestudies 16
Search and screening of human errors based on failure reporting and additional utility reports -500
the
*
~166 Otherthan Iverification of the search results with the maintenanc 4 _ _ - II~ human errors foremen screened out I /
/
334 cases
*
Human error classification into single failures, candidate common cause failures etc. 126 -HCC F/H-NNC -chffdiclafe-f-a ~1i ~ec-o?ds~. . . .
~/E I
2 ageing caused records q
i JStatisticsof206 ------I~ single errors 14 cases
' 3 - 7 - ca-ses
HCCFs and
Refined root cause analysis
23 cases ~W J
Other, e.g. 12 I human shared | equipment |
/dependences
etci
Figure 2. Flow chart of screening of the human errors related to maintenance activities. The 334 maintenance records, including 6 cases from other utility reports, were classified according to the following explaining factors: direct cause of the error, type of equipment involved, time of error origin, time of error detection and type of action that revealed the error. Also underlying causes of human errors, such as work planning and co-operation deficiencies, were studied in the cases of dependent errors. The analysis results of the data will be discussed more in the following chapters.
RESULTS As may be deducted from Figure 2, about 7,5 % of all failure records could, finally, be identified as human errors related to maintenance. Human errors could be found in all four cause categories used by the plant personnel. This may be easily understood against the background that the used cause categories, e.g. 'operating and maintenance personnel' and 'failure in installation or earlier' are not mutually exclusive. Similarly, if sub-categories were used, e.g. 'foreign labour' and 'installation error' are not mutually exclusive. The frequent use of other categories than 'miscellaneous', given that the fault was caused by human actions,
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however, speaks about a realistic classification of human errors and increases the reliability of the used database. In the following, the results will be discussed separately with regard to single human errors and dependent ones (HCCFs, HCCNs and HSEFs).
Single human failures Together 206 single human errors were identified, as shown in Figure 2. According to the results presented in TABLE 1, control & instrumentation (84 cases) and electrical equipment (40 cases) are most frequently affected with the share of about 60 %. An interesting observation can be made with regard-to process valves, dampers and hatches - their maintenance errors and wrong alignments are modelled often in PSAs but, here, their share is rather low (17 %). This supports the idea that more safety emphasis should be put to complex systems including instrumentation, control, protection and electrical power supply. In order to study the occurred error types, a praxis oriented application of (Swain & Guttmann 1983) taxonomy, relating the error phenotypes omission and commission to the consequences, was used with the extension to wrong setting errors. Commission errors dominate the results with the share of 67 %, and especially the category 'other (error of) commission than wrong direction' is frequent (54 %). That category consists of several types of wrong actions such as carelessness, confusion in object, use of too much or little force causing bad connections, untight bolts, broken pieces etc. The finding is interesting since human reliability analysis (HRA) studies often concentrate upon omission errors, and, in some cases, wrong settings. However, in praxis, many commission errors result in similar consequences as omissions. The equipment type has a significant effect on the distribution of the error types. Based on TABLE 1, the share of commission errors in instrumentation and control (I&C) equipment is exceptionally high. In contrast to that, many omissions take place in actions on instrument line block valves (67 % of total all error modes). With regard to the valves, the result could be expected - error types such as wrong direction and wrong settings are not very likely to take place in process equipment. The amount of wrong settings in I&C and electrical equipment was only app. 12-13 % of the total, which can be regarded as rather expected, too. It is worth noticing that although many errors take place in I&C it is not always the respective maintenance team that has committed an error. Due to the fact that many of the errors are of type commission, also other e.g. mechanical maintenance team can cause instrument faults by crushing objects, by wrongly installing instrumentation lines etc. Although a detailed study of underlying causes of single human errors was not possible, many commission errors had their background in work planning and system design & layout.
TABLE 1. SINGLE HUMAN ERROR CAUSE DISTRIBUTION AMONG COMPONENT CATEGORIES.
Omission error Wrong settings Commission, wrong direction Commission, other TOTAL
I&C Mechanical Electrical components components components 13 7 14
Valves 7
Instr. line TOTAL valves 8 49
11
0
5
2
0
18
1!
3
7
6
0
27
49
26
14
19
4
112
84
36
40
34
12
206
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Most preventive maintenance, modifications and testing activities take place during the annual refuelling outage. Therefore, it is not surprising that 127 (app. 62 %) single human error cases also stem from that period. It is more interesting to study the detection time of the errors. There, the situation is somewhat reversed: only about 32 % of all single human errors are detected during an outage. Approximately 60 % of single errors were detected during the power operation and 7 % during the plant start-up. Preventive actions revealed only app. 20 % of single human errors. About 94 % of those errors born during the power operating mode of the plant were also detected in that same mode. The errors born during an outage were studied further in order to assess the proportion remaining latent until the plant start-up. The result is shown in Figure 3. Approximately 5 1 % of induced errors are also discovered during the same outage. However, residual 49 % remain latent until the plant start-up or even until the power operation. This result can partly be explained by the fact that many of the faults caused are rather negligible from the safety and economy point of view. However, faults exist in safety systems, too. No thorough analyses have been performed to verify, if human errors in safety systems have a different detection distribution than other errors. Although somewhat better detection before plant start-up can be judged based on the data, no major conclusions can be made. Preventive actions, e.g. testing and preventive maintenance are not specifically effective, only 17 % of errors were detected by them. The low ratio may be explained by the fact that many of these single human errors are not critical from safety point of view. Thus, they are noticed during plant walk-troughs in various purposes, by alarms or occasionally while working nearby.
Power Start-up operation, prev. 10 % action 7%
Power operation, other 32 %
Outage /prev. Start-up Outage ! other action 1 % Shut-down oper./prev. Outage, other 34%
uuP,ge, prev. action 17%
other 79 %
Figure 3. Plant operating mode at the time of detection of 127 single human errors stemming from outages (left) and 78 stemming from the operating period (right). The amount of omission, wrong direction/sequence and wrong setting errors remained quite stable through 1992-1994, and according to the Chi-square test the calendar year was not a statistically significant explanatory factor. The yearly distributions obtained for omission and commission errors are somewhat higher than what was presented in (Reiman 1994). Reiman discovered app. 9,6 omissions and 3,8 wrong direction commissions per year through 1981-1991, whereas the findings of this study are 16,3 and 9, correspondingly. The difference is mostly due to the more extensive scope of this study, since the search for human errors covered all the maintenance records and not only those pre-classified as human errors. In the search for human maintenance errors, thus, all the fault cause categories should be investigated in order to avoid underestimation. Wrong settings were not studied in the form of their yearly distribution in (Reiman 1994).
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Dependent human failures Dependent equipment faults, originally classified as human induced, were found in 126 maintenance records and 4 other plant reports. After a profound and effort intensive analysis, this amount could be reduced to 44 records referring to 14 HCCF and HCCN cases and 15 records referring to 12 HSEFs. In several cases, there were more fault records in the maintenance history than actual human errors since some errors had effect on several components. It is worth mentioning, that in the course of this study, many dependent mechanisms, first regarded as wrong settings, could be screened out. This was due to the fact that they, actually, were caused by e.g. ageing. In the plant fault records, they were originally classified as human errors. Should their analysis be carried out on a superficial level, the wrong settings would have dominated the results of HCCF and HCCN study (see earlier text for acronym clarifications). The results obtained for HCCFs and HCCNs are, surprisingly, rather similar as to the single human errors. Again, instrumentation (10 cases) and electrical equipment (4 cases) dominate as target equipment groups - no other equipment were identified. The corresponding ratio in critical faults (HCCFs) is 5 and 3 cases. The dominant error type category is, again, commission (6 cases, 5 HCCFs) with 42 % contribution. Also dependent wrong settings (4 cases, 29 %) are an usual category, but all appear to be non-critical instrumentation related HCCNs. The contribution of wrong settings is, anyway, more significant than in the case of single errors. Omission was the error type in 2 cases (1 HCCF, 1 HCCN, both related to instrumentation) and wrong direction in other 2 instrument related HCCFs. Two HCCFs error mechanisms were born during the power operation. One of them was detected in a periodic test and another otherwise, as a part of routine activities, during the power operation. Figure 4 presents the detection modes of the 12 dependent human errors born during the outage time. About 62% of all, and from the HCCFs about 68 %, remained undetected at least until the start-up. The distribution of detection time of HCCFs and HCCNs in safety related system follows roughly the same distribution. From these dependent faults, 8 out of 12, and from HCCFs 5 out of 6, were in safety systems or in their support systems. Thus, the fact that some errors are negligible by their consequences, as many single human errors, does not explain the results. Three faults were discovered from two plant units. One has to, however, bear in mind that the database begins to be rather small, when HCCFs and HCCNs are studied. This does not overrule the fact that a large proportion of the dependencies has remained undetected and even one of them has been discovered through a plant level disturbance. r ' ~ ' ~Nsgi J ~ ~ ven " ~ ' ~ 'that ~ - ' ~they e ~ i i ~we : ~ i ~ ~ ~f!~~~ ~D~t~cti~o~p e riod of HCCFs an d~~~CC born during an outage
:
"~
"
~~;.~,.'.;I
III
"~!~
~i'~" i! '~: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Figure 4. Distribution of the detection modes of human induced dependences given that they were introduced during an outage (12 cases, in one case the origin was outage at one unit and power operation at another).
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The thorough analysis of the dependent human errors allowed to make further inference about their birth and discovery occasions. Modifications are an important source of dependencies with the share of almost 50% (7 cases). The distribution of detection occasions is quite flat, although periodic testing and alarms produce almost 50 % of total.
Figure 5. The detailed detection (left) and origin activity (right) types of dependent human errors (14 cases). The result is interesting from the safety point of view, because it is difficult to know which kind of hazards are due to new equipment requiring new skills and practices. However, nuclear utilities normally carry out extensive start-up testing programs for their new equipment. In future, even more profound planning, coordination and testing of the backfittings and modifications could, however, result in even better equipment performance.
Human induced shared equipment failures Apart from HCCFs and HCCNs, together 12 HSEFs (see earlier text for acronym clarifications) were identified in the course of the study. Of this amount, 3 were omissions and 7 other commissions than wrong direction errors. All the omissions were cases, where one single error, e.g. delayed or forgotten restoration or missed point in instructions, led to multiple consequences in equipment. HSEFs can be seen important from the safety point of view, since the probability of one error is normally higher than of repeated ones. Seven HSEFs were born during an outage and 5 during the power operation. Eight HSEFs had been detected during the power operating mode. Three out of those 7 HSEFs born during an outage have remained latent until the power operation, which is somewhat less than for HCCFs and HCCNs. All those HSEFs born during the power operation were also detected in that operating mode. All this is rather analogical to single human errors. As another analogy, preventive actions have been rather insignificant detection means with only 17 % share.
DISCUSSION The most significant uncertainties in the results of this work are related to the data and its uses, i.e., identifying human errors based on the fault records and classifying them based on the raw data. The cause categories used in the plant maintenance records did neither directly address the failures in redundant components nor explicitly allow human error classifications. This may have led to not noticing some error mechanisms. Besides, at the outset of the study, the target was set to identify dependent human errors causing faults in redundant components or trains. This led to the result where otherwise correlated dependence mechanisms where left outside an accurate consideration and may appear as single errors.
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The authors wish to express that there are also other data sources that may be used to complete the results, e.g., quarterly reports, annual outage event reports, test and calibration protocols, control room log books, work orders and modification data. These were only utilised to a limited extent in the study. The reason for this was to limit the effort. For example, finding evidence from the calibration protocols requires extremely experienced researchers and a great deal of resources. The human error type classification used in the study was not very detailed. More detailed taxonomies, presented in e.g. (Reason 1990) would have required considerably more work and the results, still, might have been rather uncertain. Thus, the attempt to try to map e.g. cognitive error mechanisms involved was left outside the study as a very detailed statistical significance testing of results, too. The latter decision was supported by the fact that, in most cases, the influences of certain factors to data could be inferred, otherwise. In future, it may be interesting to compare the results with PSA and plant technical specifications to make further conclusions e.g. about the safety significance of the results.
CONCLUSIONS The study was capable of producing interesting results, since large amount of plant specific maintenance data was used as source material. Many of the results were expected, e.g. that outages are an important human error source due to high amount of maintenance and modification. Many of the maintenance related errors stemming from outages remain undetected until the power operation. In that respect, single and dependent human errors showed rather similar behaviour. One has to remember, anyway, that maintenance outages are vital in order to ensure the safe operation of an NPP. Maintenance related human errors may have a significant safety influence - however, more safety degradation would probably be caused if no maintenance would take place. Although a significant amount of human errors took place in safety related systems, not all of them were functionally critical. In addition, the most common error type was very wide 'other commission error', more or less, related often to carelessness, e.g. too much or little force was used. Instrumentation and electrical components seem to be prone to human errors, partly due to the vulnerability and partly due to the complexity of the equipment and their uses. More emphasis may be needed in HRA to study these components, in future. Plant modifications appeared as a very important source of dependent human errors. Thus, more extensive planning, co-ordination and testing of the modifications is suggested. This includes better interaction between different design branches / maintenance groups of a nuclear installation. The topic may be very plants specific and no generic conclusions should be drawn without revisiting plant own experience. The amount of work used in the study was extensive, especially going beyond the maintenance data base in the form of interviews and analysis was resource consuming. Still, in many cases it was difficult to extract exact information and additional analyses may be required to verify some results. Yet, plant maintenance records offer the best database for maintenance related human errors. Their wider utilisation is recommended, in future.
REFERENCES
Laakso, K., Pyy, P., Reiman, L. 1997. Human errors in maintenance action at nuclear power plants. Research Report, STUK-YTO Series. In press. Reason, J. 1990. Human error. Cambridge University Press. 302 pp. Reiman, L. 1994. Expert judgment in analysis of human and organizational behaviour ay nuclear power plants. STUK-A 118, Helsinki.226 pp. Swain & Guttmann. 1983. Handbook of human reliability analysis with emphasis on nuclear power plant applications.
HUMAN ERROR AND TECHNOLOGICAL
ACCIDENT PREVENTION
R. Ferro Fernandez National Center for Nuclear Safety, Ministry of Sciences, Technology and Environment, Cuba
ABSTRACT Human error prevention is essential in assuring the safety of hazardous industries, taking into account that it has been one of the most important contributors to several industrial accidents which have occurred in the world during the last decades. These accidents resulted in human victims, costly material damages because of production, installations and equipment losses or environmental effects in case of contaminating industries. Today it is widely recognized that industry safety and reliability depends not only on their systems and equipment reliability, but also on human reliability, either in normal or in emergency conditions. This paper presents a general background on the importance of human error prevention, some ways to reduce the probability of their occurrence and the need to achieve a high safety culture at all levels of industry and also describes the efforts made in our country in this field by the National Group of Probabilistic Safety Assessment.
KEYWORDS
Human Factors, Human Error, Human Reliability, Technological Accident, Accident Prevention, Safety.
INTRODUCTION Human error prevention is essential in assuring safety in the industries with potential risks. Man has been one of the major contributors to several of the biggest technological accidents that