CONTENTS LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS
vii
INTRODUCTION David Lewin and Bruce E. Kaufman
ix
EUROPEAN RESPONSE TO HIGH RATES O...
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CONTENTS LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS
vii
INTRODUCTION David Lewin and Bruce E. Kaufman
ix
EUROPEAN RESPONSE TO HIGH RATES OF UNEMPLOYMENT: MONETARY POLICY OR DEREGULATION OF PART-TIME WORK? Stephen M. Hills and Teresa Schoellner
1
THE EFFECTS OF USING ALTERNATIVE TYPES OF STAFFING ARRANGEMENTS Cynthia L. Gramm and John F. Schnell
27
ADOPTION AND USE OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCEDURES IN THE NONUNION WORKPLACE Alexander J. S. Colvin
69
THE ORGANISATIONAL OMBUDS: IMPLICATIONS FOR VOICE, CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND FAIRNESS AT WORK Sue Fernie and David Metcalf
97
BUILDING AND SUSTAINING LABOR-MANAGEMENT PARTNERSHIPS: RECENT EXPERIENCES IN THE U.S. Susan C. Eaton, Saul A. Rubinstein and Robert B. McKersie
137
UNION AND EMPLOYER TACTICS IN ONTARIO ORGANISING CAMPAIGNS Felice F. Martinello and Charlotte Yates
157
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LABOR’S “LAST STAND” IN NATIONAL POLITICS? THE CAMPAIGN FOR STRIKER REPLACEMENT LEGISLATION, 1990–1994 John Logan
191
THE TRANSFER OF IDEAS IN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS: DUNLOP AND OXFORD IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF AUSTRALIAN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS THOUGHT, 1960–1985 Diana Kelly
245
LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS Alexander J. S. Colvin
Department of Labor Studies and Industrial Relations, Pennsylvania State University, USA
Susan C. Eaton (Deceased)
Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, USA
Sue Fernie
London School of Economics and Political Science, UK
Cynthia L. Gramm
College of Administrative Science, University of Alabama – Huntsville, USA
Stephen M. Hills
Fisher College of Business, Ohio State University, USA
Bruce E. Kaufman
Department of Economics and Beebe Institute, Georgia State University, USA
Diana Kelly
University of Wollongang, Australia
David Lewin
UCLA Anderson School of Management, University of California at Los Angeles, USA
John Logan
London School of Economics and Political Science, UK
Felice Martinello
Department of Economics, Brock University, Canada
Robert B. McKersie
Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, USA
David Metcalf
London School of Economics and Political Science, UK
Saul A. Rubinstein
School of Management and Labor Relations, Rutgers University, USA vii
viii
John F. Schnell
College of Administrative Science, University of Alabama – Huntsville, USA
Teresa Schoellner
PhD, Department of Economics
Charlotte Yates
Labour Studies and Department of Political Science, McMaster University, Canada
INTRODUCTION Volume 13 of Advances in Industrial and Labor Relations (AILR) contains eight papers that deal with a variety of industrial relations topics. The first chapter, by Stephen Hills and Teresa Schoellner, analyzes the influence of the creation in 1999 of the European Monetary Union (EMU) on the deregulation of part-time work in each of the 13 EMU member nations. The second chapter, by Cynthia Gramm and John Schnell, provides a systematic review and analysis of the effects of flexible staffing arrangements (e.g. temporary employment) on individuals working under such arrangements, regular employees in the same organizations, organizational performance, and macroeconomic outcomes. The third chapter, by Alexander Colvin, analyzes the adoption, structure, and function of peer review and arbitration type dispute resolution procedures, respectively, for nonunion employees in two different business units of the TRW company. The fourth chapter, by Sue Fernie and David Metcalf, nicely complements the Colvin paper by examining the uses and implications for employee voice, conflict resolution, and fairness at work of ombuds arrangements in four British enterprises. The fifth chapter, by Susan Eaton, Saul Rubinstein, and Robert McKersie, analyzes recent U.S. experience with 50 labor-management partnerships by identifying key factors that influence the formation and sustainability of such partnerships, including the development of network ties across traditional boundaries, and by providing theoretical and empirical perspectives on this experience as a whole. The sixth chapter, by Felice Martinello and Charlotte Yates, applies cluster analysis to a sample of Ontario, Canada union organizing campaigns, finds several distinctive (though interdependent) union and employer campaign strategies, and estimates the effects of these strategies on campaign outcomes. The seventh chapter, by John Logan, provides the first detailed scholarly analysis of the U.S. AFL-CIO’s 1990–1994 campaign to achieve legislation proscribing the use of permanent striker replacements, and also analyzes this campaign’s significance for several other on-going labor problems. The eighth chapter, by Diana Kelly, analyzes the influences of U.S. scholar John Dunlop and of the British Oxford School, respectively, on the development during 1960–1985 of Australian industrial relations thought, and shows how and why Dunlop had substantially greater influence than the Oxford School in this regard. On a note of recognition, the papers in this volume by Colvin, Martinello and Yates, and Logan were winners of the 2003 AILR/Industrial Relations Research ix
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Association (IRRA) “best papers” competition. On an extremely somber note, Susan Eaton, co-author with Saul Rubinstein and Robert McKersie of a paper in this volume, died of an incurable illness in late 2003 at a very young age. It may come as some solace to Susan’s family and friends that the editors of AILR were able to tell Susan that her paper had been accepted for publication. It is not by happenstance that the research settings for the papers contained in Volume 13 of AILR include North America, Europe and the Pacific Rim. AILR has long encouraged manuscript submissions from researchers worldwide, and seeks to publish articles that expand theoretical and empirical industrial relations knowledge beyond that obtained from U.S. settings and data sources. Taken as a set, the eight papers contained herein clearly reflect achievement of this objective. David Lewin Bruce E. Kaufman Editors
EUROPEAN RESPONSE TO HIGH RATES OF UNEMPLOYMENT: MONETARY POLICY OR DEREGULATION OF PART-TIME WORK? Stephen M. Hills and Teresa Schoellner INTRODUCTION Decreased regulation of part-time work is one way a country responds to high rates of unemployment. Proponents of deregulation argue that a more flexible labor market is required to allow labor markets to clear. A more traditional response to high unemployment is change in monetary policy, where interest rates are lowered to stimulate the economy and increase rates of employment. Both policies have been tried in Europe, a good place to study the effects of the two policy responses, both because European unemployment has been high and because the trade off between monetary policy and the deregulation of part time work has varied from country to country. The establishment of the European monetary union (EMU) in 1999 created a natural experiment in which any one country’s ability to adjust its monetary policy was curtailed, creating pressure for deregulatory policies to come into play (Aaronovitch & Grahl, 1997; Pisani-Ferry, 1998). The establishment of the EMU lowered the relative cost of easing restrictions on part-time work and may have caused changes in labor regulation in certain
Advances in Industrial and Labor Relations Advances in Industrial and Labor Relations, Volume 13, 1–26 Copyright © 2004 by Elsevier Ltd. All rights of reproduction in any form reserved ISSN: 0742-6186/doi:10.1016/S0742-6186(04)13001-1
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European countries. In fact, changes in the monetary policy of each of the eleven signatory countries to the EMU became, in terms of international political relationships, far more costly on January 1, 1999, when the Maastricht treaty was implemented.1 On that date, all eleven countries aligned their interest rates and agreed to exchange rate fluctuations within a narrow band, placing monetary policy under the authority of a single central bank. Nevertheless, each maintained autonomy over its separate regulatory environment. We, therefore, expected the regulatory environment to change as some countries turned to their next best options for dealing with unemployment. What had formerly been the politically less costly option – an independent monetary policy – was no longer viable. In this chapter we describe the European march toward monetary union in terms of interest rates, inflation rates, and unemployment. Secondly, we estimate a fixed effects model of change in each country’s unemployment, hypothesizing that the EMU would result in differential rates of unemployment that reflect the variety of institutional regulations across Europe. In other words, a common monetary policy would make the unemployment costs of different labor regulations more obvious, country by country, producing rates of unemployment that were higher in some and lower in others. A common monetary policy might increase pressure on countries with tighter regulations over part time work to ease them, but countries might also seek a common standard of regulation and encourage adjustment through migration from countries with high unemployment to countries with low unemployment. Since the latter would mean giving up even more economic control to the EU, we expected pressures to increase to ease regulations on part time work. Before examining the record on deregulation, however, we looked at the trade off between unemployment and inflation, using rates of inflation as a way of inferring which countries had, in the past, relied more heavily on monetary policy to control unemployment. Those with historically high rates of inflation might be most likely to try and retain control over unemployment by easing restrictions on part time work. The fixed effects model is modified to reflect changes in both unemployment and inflation as countries sought to align their monetary policies under the dictates of the Maastricht treaty. We use the fixed effects model to predict what countries experienced unexpectedly high unemployment rates after full implementation of the EMU. We also use it to identify countries where the trade off between unemployment and inflation was particularly difficult in the years immediately preceding monetary union. Finally, we turned to the regulatory record. We asked whether policy makers in the countries most affected by the EMU had already begun to ease restrictions on part-time work, even before 1999.2 We speculated on the type of policy changes that might continue to occur, given the country’s cultural and political environment. We asked whether deregulation of part time work prior to 1999 had
European Response to High Rates of Unemployment
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helped some countries adjust to a loss of control over monetary policy subsequent to the establishment of the EMU.
PART-TIME WORK AND THE EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONAL LANDSCAPE Rates of part-time work have varied widely from country to country in Europe, even before Maastricht. Rates can be obtained from the statistical offices of the separate countries, but definitions are often not consistent. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), however, uses a consistent definition for part-time work: less than 30 hours of work per week. Using OECD data, we found part-time work varying from 5% of employment in Spain to 27% in the Netherlands in 1988. (Comparable data for the U.S. showed a rate of 13%.) For women the range was even greater, from 12% in Spain to 51% in the Netherlands (see Table 1). Not only do rates of part-time employment vary widely at one point in time; they are changing significantly over time. In Denmark, rates of part-time work fell in the past ten years, particularly for women. A decline also occurred in Sweden. But both Italy and Luxembourg have seen dramatic increases in part-time work over the same time period. In Luxembourg, part-time rates for women went from Table 1. Rates of Part-time Employment, Potential EMU Countries (Total Labor Force, Women Only, 1988 and 1998). Country
Austria Belgium Denmark Finland France Germany Ireland Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Portugal Spain Sweden U.K.
Both Sexes, % Labor Force
Women, % Labor Force
1988
1998
1988
1998
NA 13.2 19 7.4 12.3 11.4 9.3 8.3 7.1 26.9 6.7 5 16 20.5
11.5 16.3 17 9.6 14.8 16.6 18 11.2 12.8 30 9.9 7.7 13.5 23
NA 27.7 31.4 10.5 21.8 26.4 19.4 17.3 18.3 51.2 12.3 12.1 27.6 40.8
22.8 32.2 25.4 13 25 32.4 31.2 22.4 29.6 54.8 15.8 16.6 22 41.2
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STEPHEN M. HILLS AND TERESA SCHOELLNER
18% in 1988 to 30% just a decade later. Rates of part-time work are a complex result of legislative regulation, collective bargaining provisions, cultural norms, and economic conditions, all of which can change over time. In the late 1990s, member states of the OECD were tracking changes in the cultural and regulatory environment of part-time work through the framework of the OECD Jobs Strategy. The OECD’s Economic and Development Review Committee recommended in 1995–1996 a number of specific changes for each of the member countries. Reports in 1997 and 1999 documented the changes that occurred. The 1999 report demonstrated that the reason for falling rates of parttime employment in Denmark and Sweden was, in part, deteriorating economic conditions from 1993 to 1997. In Sweden, both full time and part-time employment opportunities fell for women during this time period. In Denmark, however, full time opportunities increased for women at the same time that part-time work decreased (OECD, 1999, Table 4.4, p. 86). Some of the increases in part-time employment can also be traced to changing economic conditions. In Luxembourg, decreasing full-time opportunities for women accompanied an increase in part-time work. The same was true, though to a lesser extent, for France and Germany. Ireland’s dramatic increase in part-time work for women was accompanied by an equally dramatic 7% increase in total employment from 1993 to 1997 (OECD, 1999, Table 4.4, p. 86). To some degree, increasing part-time work may be a result of the long standing decline in work hours throughout European countries. This contrasts with rising hours worked in the U.S. during the 1990s. The European decline in work hours is largely a result of voluntary agreement between employers and employees (or their union representatives), but government health and safety regulations also reinforced the trend (OECD, 1999, p. 122). Changes in the rate of part time work clearly are influenced by a variety of factors. Our task is to determine if unexpected changes in the level of unemployment put pressure on European governments to ease regulations on part time work. Is there evidence that regulatory reform was used as a substitute for monetary policy in the countries associated with monetary union? To answer this question, we first examine Europe’s peculiar kind of unemployment.
EUROPEAN UNEMPLOYMENT: STRUCTURAL OR A RESULT OF THE DRIVE TO MONETARY UNION? The rise in European unemployment for the last twenty years has begged explanation. The U.S. fall in unemployment over the same period of time – in the year 2001 near or below what had been thought the “natural rate” – caused soul
European Response to High Rates of Unemployment
5
searching about the flexibility of European labor institutions. Real wage rigidity, minimum wages, unemployment insurance systems, governmental regulations on discharge, and other collectively bargained regulations have been candidates for blame. (Scarpetta, 1996; Vinals & Jimeno, 1998). The rise in unemployment made monetary union more difficult since individual countries had to relinquish control over monetary policy, one of the main policy instruments for dealing with unemployment. If high rates of unemployment were structural, however, relinquishing monetary policy would perhaps not be so hard, since monetary
Fig. 1. Unemployment Rates.
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STEPHEN M. HILLS AND TERESA SCHOELLNER
policy is not the best tool for encouraging structural change anyway. Changes in bargaining rules or legislative regulations might be more appropriate. All European countries have experienced rising rates of unemployment over the last twenty years. In Fig. 1 are displayed the unemployment rates for the eleven EMU countries plus Great Britain, Denmark and Sweden, all of which ultimately opted out of the union but could have joined if they wished. The general rise since 1970 can be seen plus a growing dispersion in rates for all but Spain. Most countries had an upward trend in unemployment, but Spain did not. Spanish unemployment rates rose to 21% in 1985, fell to 16% in 1990, peaked at 24% in 1994 and then fell dramatically thereafter, registering 14% in 2000. Irish rates peaked at 18% in 1987, fluctuated around that rate until 1993, and fell to 3.6% in 2000. Only the Netherlands had a rate lower than the Irish in the year 2000, registering just 2.5%. Finnish rates of unemployment peaked at 17% in 1994 and fell to 9.2% in 2000. While Finland, Ireland, and Spain showed considerable convergence around the new European norm for unemployment, other countries did not show a similar movement toward convergence.
EUROPEAN MONETARY POLICY The Maastricht Treaty of 1992 established the framework for monetary union. The treaty was signed by the then Heads of State of the European Community and established the criteria for member states to enter into monetary union. The criteria placed limits on the amount of government deficit and total debt that a country could incur and asked member states to achieve inflation rates and longterm interest rates close to the average for the three countries with the lowest inflation. In 1994, Austria, Finland and Sweden voted to enter the European Community and were thereby considered eligible for the EMU. Sweden would ultimately opt out of the EMU, as would the UK and Denmark, leaving eleven countries who agreed to the EMU as of January 1, 1999. Greece, which had been a member of the European Community since 1981 was not accepted for the EMU in 1999 but it did enter the European Monetary System, aligning its exchange rates with other European countries that agreed to the EMU. Given the coordination in monetary and fiscal policy necessary to meet Maastricht requirements, we would expect convergence in European interest rates. Figure 2 shows the full range of short term interest rates that have reflected independent monetary policy in European countries for the last thirty years. One can see the effects of Maastricht on interest rates in the 1990s. Sharp convergence has taken place. With the exception of the UK whose interest rates were at 6.6%
European Response to High Rates of Unemployment
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Fig. 2. Interest Rates (Includes Only Short-term Interest Rate Data from Datastream).
in 2000, interest rates in other European countries have been just above 4%: 4.6% in Denmark, 4.2% in Sweden, and the forced convergence of the eleven EMU countries at 4.25%. Historically high unemployment rates in Europe may, indeed, be the result of labor market “inflexibility.” Alan Krueger addressed the impact of European integration on the “labor compact,” namely the “implicit bargain among labor, capital and government encompassing pay, work effort, social protection, and labor – such market rules as union organization, safety standards, and termination laws” (Krueger, 2000, p. 1). But he concluded that the threat to separate labor
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compacts in individual European countries has likely been exaggerated. Imperfect mobility of labor, capital and services will prevent the convergence of labor compacts according to Krueger, but countries will have to bear costs for their unique regulatory environments. An integrated monetary policy will make the costs of different regulatory environments more transparent. One can see this by examining the trade off between unemployment and inflation in the countries meeting the stringent monetary and fiscal requirements of Maastricht. In Fig. 3 we have plotted inflation rates against unemployment rates for fourteen European countries – for the eleven who eventually founded the EMU and the three others who considered it but opted out, at least in 1999. For many of the countries, in the late 1980s and through the 1990s, higher rates of unemployment were accepted in exchange for the lower rates of inflation that would ultimately be the criteria for monetary union. The trade off appears to have been
Fig. 3. Inflation vs. Unemployment Rate.
European Response to High Rates of Unemployment
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Fig. 3. (Continued )
made in the early 1980’s for most countries. Starting at that point, a steady increase in unemployment was matched by an equally steady fall in inflation for the next fifteen years. Finland, Sweden and Portugal lagged in their decisions. Nevertheless, for almost all 14, conscious policy choice appears to have been an important factor in rising unemployment rates. The different institutional arrangements (including regulations regarding part-time work) undoubtedly influenced how high unemployment would rise, but one should not discount the effect that a planned monetary union has had, even well before 1999.
MEASURING THE EFFECT OF THE EMU THROUGH UNEXPECTEDLY HIGH UNEMPLOYMENT We predicted that the EMU’s effects might be seen, in part, through unusually high unemployment in some countries. But in which countries? The EMU’s effects should be most visible in those countries where an independent monetary policy had previously reduced unemployment to a rate lower than its institutions would permit under a common, multi-country monetary policy. We sought to show this effect by constructing a model to compare predicted and actual rates of unemployment at the time of monetary union. For these estimations we used a fixed effects model in which real interest rates, and each country’s lagged unemployment rate were predictors for the country’s annual rate of unemployment. A pooled cross-sectional, time series design was used for the data that began in 1970 and continued through 1999. Data were obtained from Data Stream, a British based on-line source for economic and financial data over time. The single source helped to insure consistent definitions for the variables over time. The results of our estimations are shown in Table 2. The fit for the model was good – with an overall R squared of 0.95%; much of the fit was attributable to
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STEPHEN M. HILLS AND TERESA SCHOELLNER
Table 2. Fixed Effects Model, 1998 (Pooled Annual Data, 1970–1998). Country
Country Specific Intercept
Group Intercept
Beta 1 × Inflation
Beta 3 × Lagged Unemployment
Predicted Value
Actual Value
Residual
Austria Belgium Denmark Finland France Germany Ireland Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Portugal Spain Sweden U.K.
−0.136 0.346 1.043 0.166 0.457 0.155 −1.205 0.214 −0.467 −0.152 0.176 2.516 −0.260 Base
0.255 0.255 0.255 0.255 0.255 0.255 0.255 0.255 0.255 0.255 0.255 0.255 0.255
0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.000
6.456 8.557 7.020 11.503 11.312 8.857 9.421 10.758 3.037 5.038 6.156 18.933 7.302
6.577 9.161 8.321 11.927 12.026 9.270 8.476 11.230 2.828 5.145 6.592 21.707 7.297
7.20 9.51 6.38 11.37 11.81 10.88 7.60 11.94
−0.623 −0.349 1.941 0.557 0.216 −1.610 0.876 −0.710
4.15 5.04 18.82 6.52
0.995 1.552 2.887 0.777
the lagged unemployment figure. All countries that initially tried to meet EMU requirements, including those that ultimately opted out of monetary union, were included in the estimates. The UK, with its independent monetary policy, was used as the base.3 Table 3. Residuals from Fixed Effects Model. Residual
Germany Italy Austria Luxembourg Belgium France Ireland Finland Sweden Denmark Netherlands Spain Portugal
1999
1998
−0.116 0.313 0.426 0.577 0.594 0.736 0.814 1.078 1.125 1.183 1.281 1.712 2.096
−1.15111 −0.1962 −0.16463 0.537426 0.024033 0.579613 1.265345 1.082641 1.567412 1.530381 1.545402 0.570743 3.01023
European Response to High Rates of Unemployment
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Residuals are shown in Table 3 (residuals are calculated as predicted values minus actual values, thus a negative means unexpectedly high actual unemployment). When predicted values from the fixed effects model were compared with actual values for 1998 or 1999, Germany, Italy and Austria showed noticeably higher rates of unemployment than we would have expected. In Fig. 4 are shown the eleven EMU countries by level of unemployment in 1998. The fixed effects model shows that three countries with already high rates of unemployment in 1998 (Germany, Italy and Austria) were disproportionately affected by EMU in 1999. Residuals ranged from −0.6 to −1.6. Not all the high unemployment countries were affected, however. Spain, which had the highest rate of unemployment in 1998, did not have unexpectedly high unemployment that might be attributed to EMU – in fact, our estimates show a rate of unemployment considerably lower than expected.
Fig. 4. Unemployment in 11 EMU Countries, (a) 1998 and (b) 1999.
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Table 4. Fixed Effects Model with Cross Term for Unemployment 1992–1999 (Pooled Annual Data, 1970–1999). Variable
df
B-Value
Std. Error
t-Ratio
Approx. Prob.
Intercept LAGURATE INFL RGDP Austria Belgium Finland France Germany Ireland Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Portugal Spain Sweden U.K. Austria D Belgium D Finland D France D Germany D Ireland D Italy D Luxembourg D Netherlands D Portugal D Spain D Sweden D U.K. D
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0.886 0.913 0.128 – −0.250 0.494 −0.011 0.673 0.0508 −0.890 0.0212 −0.686 −0.172 0.587 5.16 −0.452 0.113 0.253 0.329 0.186 0.188 0.478 −1.66 0.587 0.228 −0.451 0.379 1.48 0.397 −0.810
0.254 0.022 0.055 – 0.316 0.331 0.306 0.342 0.3104 0.727 0.2991 0.339 0.301 0.397 1.34 0.324 0.299 0.449 0.447 0.491 0.455 0.455 0.45 0.452 0.431 0.444 0.465 0.67 0.457 0.445
3.487 41.686 2.341 −3.155 −0.791 1.494 −0.037 1.969 0.164 −1.224 0.071 −2.024 −0.571 1.477 3.867 −1.395 0.377 0.564 0.735 0.378 0.413 1.050 −3.695 1.298 0.529 −1.017 0.815 2.191 0.868 −1.821
0.001 0.000 0.020 0.002 0.430 0.136 0.970 0.050 0.870 0.222 0.944 0.044 0.568 0.141 0.000 0.164 0.706 0.573 0.463 0.706 0.680 0.295 0.000 0.195 0.597 0.310 0.416 0.029 0.386 0.070
SSE MSE SBC Reg. Rsq. Durbin-Watson
353.3129 1.021135 1221.529 0.9539 0.8465
DFE Root MSE AIC Total Rsq.
346 1.010512 1103.641 0.9539
Note: F-test on including the crossterm dummies. F-test: Numerator df: 11, denominator df: 346; F-statistic: 2.5119, Prob > F: 0.0047.
European Response to High Rates of Unemployment
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MEASURING THE EFFECT OF THE EMU THROUGH CHANGES IN UNEMPLOYMENT, 1992–1999 A problem exists in measuring the effects of the EMU only in 1998 and 1999. Well prior to 1999, when the Maastricht treaty was implemented, countries were aligning their monetary and fiscal policies. The common monetary policy was a process, rather than a single event. To provide a more complete picture of the effects of the EMU, we re-estimated the fixed effects model, including a cross term to measure the increases in unemployment that occurred while a common monetary policy was being instituted between 1992 and 1999. The results (Table 4) show that in all countries except Ireland, the Netherlands, or the UK, unemployment was increasing. In Spain, Germany, and Italy unemployment increased the most. The dummy variables for all countries were jointly significant, though not close to significant separately.
MEASURING THE EFFECT OF THE EMU THROUGH RATES OF INFLATION A second way of gauging the effect of the EMU on individual countries is to examine past monetary policies that were used to lower the rate of unemployment. Assuming: (1) that inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon;
Fig. 5. Inflation Rates, Potential EMU Countries, 1970–1999.
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STEPHEN M. HILLS AND TERESA SCHOELLNER
and (2) that monetary authorities rationally respond to political pressure to reduce unemployment, we need only look for countries that had “relatively” high rates of inflation prior to Maastricht. These same countries should be the ones with the lowest tolerance for high levels of unemployment and would also have the most trouble adapting to the low inflation policies of the European Central Bank. In Fig. 5, inflation rates are displayed over time for the eleven countries of the EMU. Based on our rather straightforward criteria, Portugal, Spain, and Italy should have the most difficult time adjusting to the EMU, followed by Finland, Sweden and Belgium.
MEASURING THE EFFECT OF THE EMU THROUGH CHANGES IN RATES OF INFLATION FROM 1992–1999 To measure how the Maastricht process changed rates of inflation from 1992–1999, we re-estimated the fixed effects model, including a cross term to measure the rates of inflation that occurred while a common monetary policy was being instituted. Results are shown in Table 5. Finland, Spain, and Belgium had the highest rates of inflation after 1992. Cross terms were jointly significant, but not individually significant so results must be interpreted somewhat cautiously. To summarize our results: In Germany, Italy, and Austria unemployment was unexpectedly high during the implementation period for the Maastricht treaty (1992–1998). But in virtually all 11 countries (with the exception of the Netherlands) unemployment increased, compared to years prior to 1992. In Belgium, Finland and Spain, rates of inflation were highest during the seven years of adjustment to Maastricht’s requirements. Of those three, we suspected that Spain would have the most difficulty adjusting to Maastricht due to its historical willingness to accept inflation in its monetary policy. Finally, only Germany experienced a rate of unemployment that was higher than predicted after the implementation of Maastricht was complete in 1999. To reiterate: our strategy here was to estimate the effects of EMU on unemployment and on monetary policy (including inflation). In countries where effects of EMU were strong, we hypothesized that political pressure may have led countries to reduce labor market regulation, given that an independent monetary policy was no longer an option. We turn now to the regulatory record. Our focus will be on Austria, Germany, Italy, and Spain, all countries that experienced unexpectedly high unemployment, either in the run-up to the EMU or after the EMU was fully implemented. We will also pay special attention to the Netherlands, the exception to rising unemployment in years prior to the EMU. We expect to find a complex, though interesting,
European Response to High Rates of Unemployment
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Table 5. Fixed Effects Model with Cross Term for Inflation 1992–1999 (Pooled Annual Data, 1970–1999). Variable
df
B-Value
Std. Error
t-Ratio
Approx. Prob.
Intercept LAGURATE INFL RGDP Austria Belgium Finland France Germany Ireland Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Portugal Spain Sweden U.K. Austria I Belgium I Finland I France I Germany I Ireland I Italy I Luxembourg I Netherlands I Portugal I Spain I Sweden I U.K. I
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1.03 0.895 0.195 – −0.327 0.445 −0.213 0.624 0.0225 −1.763 0.00142 −0.800 −0.236 0.501 5.24 −0.626 0.0958 16.9 30.5 77.0 31.5 25.1 −0.112 20.2 11.8 −14.8 17.0 56.7 48.1 −31.1
0.24 0.020 0.051 – 0.296 0.310 0.290 0.316 0.2907 0.648 0.28560 0.318 0.291 0.361 1.11 0.294 0.2870 19.2 23.0 35.1 27.5 18.5 0.037 11.5 18.8 18.9 10.8 14.3 17.7 15.9
4.284 45.508 3.859 −3.98 −1.105 1.435 −0.735 1.977 0.077 −2.721 0.005 −2.514 −0.808 1.388 4.722 −2.129 0.334 0.879 1.326 2.19 1.147 1.359 −3.012 1.755 0.628 −0.78 1.582 3.961 2.718 −1.954
0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.2701 0.1522 0.4629 0.0489 0.9383 0.0068 0.996 0.0124 0.4195 0.1661 0.0001 0.034 0.7386 0.38 0.1856 0.0292 0.2523 0.175 0.0028 0.0802 0.5306 0.4362 0.1145 0.0001 0.0069 0.0515
SSE MSE SBC Reg. Rsq. Durbin-Watson
334.0426 0.965441 1200.441 0.9564 0.8662
DFE Root MSE AIC Total Rsq.
346 0.982569 1082.553 0.9564
Note: F-test on including the crossterm dummies. F-test: Numerator df: 11, denominator df: 346; F-statistic: 3.5730, Prob > F: 0.0001.
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picture of interaction among political forces, a country’s culture, and its regulatory stance.
POLICY PRESSURES IN COUNTRIES NEGATIVELY AFFECTED BY EMU In the run up period prior to monetary union, European countries considered decreased regulation of the labor market as an alternative to monetary policy. To demonstrate this, we turn to a set of “European Employment Strategy Papers” required by the Employment Title of the Treaty of Amsterdam. The treaty was signed by members of the European Union in 1997. Since then, each country of the EU has drawn up a National Employment Action Plan that is available publicly on the “Europa” web site. Action plans are created annually. In the action plans, proposals for legislative changes are described, and changes that have already been made in the regulatory environment are noted. We have studied the plans for each of the countries identified in our statistical analysis as significantly affected by the Maastricht agreement, paying special attention to plans that would change the regulation of part time work. Countries of interest were Germany, Austria, Italy and Spain. Germany’s 1999 National Employment Action Plan began its section on labor market adaptability by pointing out an important fact: 90% of workers required to pay social security contributions are covered by collective bargaining contracts. Therefore, flexibility depends greatly on the stance taken by German unions, which have traditionally been very inflexible. The job crisis, aggravated by German unification in 1990 caused the Confederation of German Trade Unions (the DGB) to change its policy, however. Gradually, the DGB accepted more flexible ways of calculating work hours, including provisions for part-time work and sabbaticals, particularly for older workers who make the transition to retirement. The DGB also wanted to extend collective bargaining protection to “non-standard jobs,” most importantly to temporary workers (Sarfati, 1998, p. 21). By the end of 1998, about 40% of workers covered by collective contracts had negotiated agreements that contained provisions for part-time employment for older workers (German Employment Action Plan, 1999, p. 57). The Law on Development of Part-time Work of Older Workers came into effect on January 1, 2000 and further strengthened the legal parity of part-time and full-time workers. Future collective agreements were expected to gradually extend the scope of part-time work (German Employment Action Plan, 2000, p. 9). Despite gradual change, the unexpectedly high unemployment in Germany was undoubtedly a reflection of its fairly inflexible
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institutions. In the years following implementation of the EMU, we should expect increasing pressure for German institutions to be made more flexible as a way of compensating for the country’s loss of an independent monetary policy that could attack unemployment more directly. Rates of part-time work are neither high nor low in Austria. Yet it is one of the countries identified by our statistical analysis as experiencing disproportionately high unemployment in 1999, as countries rushed to meet the requirements for monetary union. The Austrian government in 1998 was focussed on promoting job creation and on alleviating the financial strains of its social insurance funds. A package of legislative measures took effect on January 1, 1998 (Sarfati, 1998, p. 13). As in France, the debate between Austrian employers’ associations and trade union confederations centered mostly on reducing weekly hours. For its part, the Austrian government offered to help compensate for loss of pay and to promote training and educational leaves (Sarfati, 1998, p. 13). The Austrians did not, as of 1998, seem inclined to use regulatory reform as an offset to the loss of an independent monetary policy. Despite the unexpectedly high unemployment, Austrian policy response was ambivalent. Historically, Italy has suffered consistently high unemployment, particularly in the south. At 11.2% in 1998, Italy’s rate of part-time employment was relatively low, with only three EMU countries registering a lower rate. Italy has had wide gender gaps in both employment and unemployment rates; its overall employment rate is only 51%. In the 1990s, the Italian government was concerned with persisting inflation, accompanied by recession, public deficits, and high unemployment. Italy’s 1999 National Employment Action Plan took a holistic approach to these interrelated problems, arguing for a high level pact involving all the “social partners,” namely employers’ associations, trade unions, and the Italian government. In 1992, a pact was reached that abolished the Italian automatic pay indexing system known as the “scala mobile,” thereby allowing the introduction of effective incomes policies. The second such pact, agreed to in 1997, was in part aimed at increasing labor market flexibility. The agreement legalized private temporary employment agencies and promoted part-time work by reducing employers’ social security taxes. Other provisions funded community work in areas of high unemployment, discouraged black market transactions, and subsidized vocational training (Sarfati, 1998, p. 17). The 1999 action plan set a goal to raise part-time employment to the European average of 17% by the year 2003 (Italian National Employment Action Plan, 1999, p. 41). Part time work was not to be targeted at women, the long term unemployed, or young people. Rather, part-time work was intended to carry with it benefits and regulatory protections equal to full time work. In short, the low level of part-time work in Italy have been part cultural and part structural. The structural initiatives
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of 1997 were intended to raise part time employment by about 50%, by no means a small change. It is unclear how much more change could have occurred without important shifts in cultural values. In Spain, where unemployment in the 1990s was the highest in the EU, economic growth has from 1996 to 1999 exceeded significantly the average growth of other member countries (European Commission, 2000, p. 28). Yet Spain had the lowest employment rate of any country in the EU, and gender differences were large. The employment rate for women in 1999 was only 35%, compared with a 51% rate for women in all EU countries. Spanish women had an unemployment rate twice the rate for women in the EU and double the rate for Spanish men. About one fourth of Spanish women were unemployed in 1999 (European Commission, 2000, p. 29). Given the high rates of unemployment in Spain, rates of part time work were surprisingly low. At 7.7%, the rate was the lowest of any EMU country. Only two countries had rates of part time employment for women that were lower than for Spanish women – Finland and Portugal (see Table 1). The National Employment Action Plans for Spain in 1999 and 2000 revealed a strong emphasis on the positive effects of economic growth on reducing unemployment. Several references were made to positive rates of employment growth in Spain and their link to the overall rise in GDP. The action plan emphasized the beneficial effects of the reduction in budgetary deficits and wage restraint in collective bargaining. But little emphasis was placed on labor market flexibility or on encouraging a higher rate of part-time work. The only reference to part-time work was in the 1999 action plan where reference was made to legislation passed in November, 1998 encouraging “stable part-time employment.” Labor market reform in Spain dates back to 1984 when a Spanish Workers’ Statute was amended. Regulations on fixed term contracts were lifted, dismissals were made easier, and labor mobility was encouraged (Sarfati, 1998, p. 16). Labor market reform, as defined in 1997, meant creating better protection for part-time workers and limiting the use of temporary contracts. These two provisions grew out of a year-long negotiation between the Spanish employer’s association and Spain’s two main trade union confederations (Sarfati, 1998, p. 39). In 1997, the Spanish government again relaxed regulations on dismissals and on severance pay, but with the aim of encouraging open ended (as opposed to fixed, temporary term) contracts. In sum, Spain’s public policy was aimed mainly at macro-economic stimulation of the growth in GDP. To be sure, legislation restricting the use of temporary employment contracts was modified but little direct policy emphasis was placed on encouraging part-time work. Our empirical results for Spain were mixed. On the one hand, Spain showed unexpectedly high unemployment between 1992 and 1999. But in 1999 alone, we
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showed an unexpectedly low rate of unemployment. In the late 1990s, Spain was growing its way out of unemployment, with the help of the free trade associated with the European Union. On the other hand, Spain’s independent monetary policy and its associated higher inflation (relative to its neighbors) had to yield to an EU common monetary policy that would raise Spain’s unemployment. The two opposing effects may have been reflected in our mixed results. Our results for inflation identified three countries which had particularly high rates of inflation in the years during which the EMU was established – Belgium, Finland, and Spain. In each country, a special set of circumstances helps explain these results. In Belgium, debate over work hours, part-time employment and part-time early retirement was part of a failed tripartite negotiation initiated by the government in 1996. Labor unions would not accept the government’s proposed wage restraint unless job creation was part of the employment side of the agreement. Employers wanted wage restraint and labor flexibility without guarantees for job creation. After negotiations broke down, the government unilaterally imposed an incomes policy and passed legislation aimed at meeting EMU fiscal requirements (Sarfati, 1998, p. 15). The need for an incomes policy probably means that monetary policy prior to 1996 had an inflationary bias. In Finland, a “Rainbow Coalition” elected in 1995 promised to halve unemployment by 1999. Unemployment, which had peaked in 1994 at 16.6%, fell steadily to 9.2% in 2000. The new government followed a coalition government that had not taken much responsibility for employment promotion in the recessionary years of the first part of the decade. The Finnish push to lower unemployment probably increased rates of inflation from 1992 to 1999. The third country where inflation was evident just prior to the EMU was Spain, whose emphasis on (inflationary) economic growth we have already discussed.
COUNTRIES WITH RATES OF UNEMPLOYMENT UNAFFECTED BY THE EMU Perhaps the best example of a country whose unemployment was not affected by the EMU was the Netherlands. From 1992 to 1999, our data showed that the Dutch were the only ones who did not show an increase in unemployment associated with the run-up to the EMU. In the Netherlands, low rates of unemployment have historically been coupled with extraordinarily high rates of part-time employment. Since the recessionary periods of the 1970s and early 1980s, the Dutch government promoted part-time employment and urged labor and management to improve the quality of part-time jobs. Access to social security coverage was the same, whether part-time or full-time. Dutch legislation also simplified procedures for temporary
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help agencies. The result was the highest incidence of part-time work among industrialized countries (Sarfati, 1998, p. 12). With such high rates of part-time work, one might ask whether those holding part-time jobs did so voluntarily or involuntarily. The European Union fields its own Labour Force Survey (LFS), which helps to answer this question. In the EU’s LFS, workers are asked if they are employed in part-time jobs voluntarily or involuntarily. Among men, where somewhat less than 10% held part-time jobs in 1998, less than 2% of all part time employed men responded that they held their part-time jobs involuntarily. The figures were even more dramatic for women. Among women, where about 55% held part-time jobs in 1998, less than 2% of part time employed women responded that they held their part-time jobs involuntarily. Clearly, part-time jobs were overwhelmingly viewed as good jobs in the Netherlands (European Commission, 1999, Tables 35 & 36, p. 39 and Table 1).
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS Perhaps the key question underlying the study of industrial relations is how control over employment relationships is, or should be, shared. In the case of the EMU, we see several forces at work, each vying for its own control. Eleven European nation states have opted to cede control over monetary policy to a central bank. Two others (Sweden and Denmark) have aligned their interest rates with the eleven, even though they have not entered the union. We estimated the effects of giving up control over monetary policy, with the expectation that some countries would experience an increase in unemployment. We hypothesized that countries with abnormally high unemployment would, in turn, show pressure to substitute regulatory control for monetary control, and we found a wide variety of possibilities, even when looking only at regulations concerning part-time work. In some cases, governments were quite aggressive in changing legislation that affected the amount of part-time work. In other cases, governments worked indirectly through negotiations with social partners to change the nature and amount of part-time work. In some countries, negotiations and changes in legislation were long standing. Others began in the late 1990s. Our statistical analysis showed that pressures for more labor market flexibility would be expected in Austria, Germany, Italy and Spain. Italy had begun to change its stance toward part-time work, but it still had one of the lowest rates of participation in Europe Furthermore, change in the provisions for part time work in Italy had to be bargained through the national labor federations. In 1997, changes were bargained, but before that, concern was largely over the inflationary effects
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of the “scala mobile.” Spain successfully countered increased pressure from unemployment with economic growth, but if growth were to slacken, a change in policy toward part time work could be expected. In Germany, the DGB agreed to changes in regulation of part-time work, but the changes were directed at special groups – those readying for retirement in particular. Pressure could, perhaps, be expected for broader changes affecting all part-time employment. In Austria we should expect discussion to turn from weekly work hours to the use of part-time and temporary labor as the unemployment costs of Austria’s regulatory environment become more clear. From the limited information available, it appeared that Austrian discussion on these issues in the late 1990s was just beginning. The country most aggressive in its encouragement of part-time work was the Netherlands. The EU’s Labour Force Survey helped us establish that part-time work in the Dutch context was not seen as “involuntary.” But the Dutch also enjoyed one of the lowest unemployment rates in Europe in 1999. In this context, Dutch workers appeared to be using part-time work to accommodate a variety of patterns of work and non-work activity. The Dutch government sought to insure that part-time work did not carry with it lower benefits than full time work, at least where government-provided social insurance is concerned. The flexibility of part-time work arrangements probably helped insulate the Dutch economy from the negative effects on unemployment that the introduction of the EMU produced. What does the policy record show since 1999 in regard to monetary policy and deregulation of part time work? Arguments for flexibility in labor market institutions were more compelling when European labor markets were loose in comparison with the tight labor markets in the United States in the late 1990s. The distribution of unemployment from country to country in Europe was more controversial when policy makers believed that the overall rate of unemployment could be lower if only there were more flexibility. Subsequent to September 11, 2001, rates of unemployment worldwide increased significantly, thereby changing the policy debate considerably. Overall monetary policy in the EU and the U.S. became the focus of attention as central banks sought to engineer an economic recovery. The deregulation of part time work fell rapidly down the list of policy concerns. As evidence, one only needs to examine the most recent National Action Plans listed on the Employment and Social Affairs section of Europa’s web site: (http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment social/news/2001/ jun/napsincl2001 en.html). New policy themes are the following: policies to combat social exclusion, and policies to impact significantly the level of poverty within the EU. The variety of policy approaches to labor market regulation have been great in Europe. Nevertheless, with the establishment of the EMU, pressure in the late 1990s increased throughout Europe to make labor markets more “flexible.” (Our
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proxy for flexibility is a policy change that eases restrictions on part time work.) In each of the countries most affected by the EMU, we found evidence that restrictions on part time work were being lifted. Was this good policy? In the Netherlands, with low unemployment and strong economic growth, it appeared to be. Only small numbers of Dutch citizens responded that their part time employment was involuntary. In Germany, Italy, and Spain, where the unemployment effects of the EMU were large, relaxation of the rules on part time work occurred slowly – through bargained agreements. Rates of part time work in these countries wee much lower than in the Netherlands. The slow, negotiated change may mean that unemployment continues to be problematic in these countries, but the negotiating partners who change the rules governing part time work may also insure that part time jobs are ultimately considered good jobs and therefore the policy that encourages them, good policy.
NOTES 1. The eleven countries are Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. Denmark, Sweden and the U.K. opted not to enter the EMU. 2. Part-time work, because of the availability of data, is used as a proxy for other types of institutional reform – the removal of restrictions on the use of temporary work, for example. 3. Alternative specifications, including models scaled to real GDP, and models using the Parks method for analyzing autoregressive time series in a panel excluding the fixed effects were also considered. To test for sensitivity, the model was re-estimated with Denmark as the base. The pattern of results was the same as when the U.K. was used as the base.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The authors thank Dustin Burt, Ryan Leszczynski, and Frederic Petipre for their help with this project and OSU’s Center for International Business, Education, and Research (CIBER) for partial funding of the project. The OSU CIBER is supported by a grant from the U.S. Department of Education. Views expressed in this research do not necessarily reflect the views of the U.S. Department of Education.
REFERENCES Aaronovitch, S., & Grahl, J. (1997). Building on Maastricht. In: P. Gowan & P. Anderson (Eds), The Question of Europe (pp. 178–202). London, NY: Verso. European Commission (1999). Employment in Europe 1999. Brussels: European Commission.
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European Commission (2000). Guidelines for member states’ employment policies for the year 2000. Brussels: Employment and Social Affairs, European Commission. Krueger, A. B. (2000). From Bismarck to Maastricht: The march to European Union and the labor compact. NBER Working Paper 7456. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research (January). Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (1999). Implementing the OECD jobs strategy: Assessing performance and policy. Paris: OECD. Pisani-Ferry, J. (1998). Monetary Union with variable geometry. In: J. Frieden, D. Gros & E. Jones (Eds), The New Political Economy of the European Monetary Union (pp. 125–161). Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. Sarfati, H. (1998). Labour market flexibility vs. jobs: The challenge for social dialogue in Europe. Paper presented at the International Industrial Relations Association Meetings, Bologna, Italy (September 22–26). Scarpetta, S. (1996). Assessing the role of labour market policies and institutional setting on unemployment: A cross-country study. OECD Economic Studies, 26, 43–98. Vinals, J., & Jimeno, J. F. (1998). Monetary Union and European unemployment. In: J. Frieden, D. Gros & E. Jones (Eds), The New Political Economy of the European Monetary Union (pp. 13–52). Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
APPENDIX: HISTORY OF THE EUROPEAN MONETARY UNION http://cec.caixacatalunya.es/euro/int2eng.html Web site of Caixa Catalunya, a financial institution with a network of 800 branches in Spain. Managing assets of more than 2.5 billion pesetas, it is the third largest savings bank in Spain. 1957 The Treaty of the European Economic Community promoted the coordination of national economic and monetary policies. The member states of the European Community committed themselves to taking exchange rates into consideration as a matter of common interest. 1959 Creation of the convertibility of all the currencies in various European states. 1970 The Werner Plan was proposed to promote the step-by-step approach to economic and monetary union, with a single currency by 1980. However, the major instability of currency in the early seventies, added to divergent economic policies as a result of the first petrol crisis, prevented this materializing.
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1972 In consequence of the evolution of the Bretton-Woods system, the Council of Ministers of the European Community decided to limit fluctuation between the six currencies of the European Community to a margin of ±2.25%. The U.K., Ireland and Denmark agreed to become part of the “monetary snake,” in anticipation of their joining the European Community in 1973. The pound sterling, the Irish pound, the French franc and the Italian lira withdrew at a very early date. 1979 The European Monetary System (EMS) was founded on Franco-German initiative. Its main features were exchange rate, intervention and credit mechanisms. With the exception of the U.K., the eight member states joined the exchange rate mechanism of the European Monetary System, with set but flexible exchange rates. 1987 The European Single Act for the creation of a Single European Market came into effect on 1 July. The objective of monetary union was laid down for the first time in the Treaty of the European Community. 1989 At the meeting in June, in Madrid, the Council of Europe passed the Delors report outlining a three-stage plan for the founding of the European Economic and Monetary Union. The peseta joined the exchange rate mechanism with fluctuation extended to ±6%. 1990 On 1 July, the Economic and Monetary Union embarked on its first phase. In October, the U.K. joined the exchange rate mechanism with extended fluctuation. 1991 In December, the Heads of State and Government of the European Community decided, in Maastricht, to create the Economic and Monetary Union no later than 1999. 1992 In April, the Portuguese escudo joined the exchange rate mechanism with a broad margin of fluctuation, of 6%. In September, the pound sterling and Italian lira withdrew from the exchange rate mechanism.
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1993 As a result of the monetary crisis in the EMS, in August the ministers of finance and the presidents of European Union central banks decided to extend the fluctuation of this system to 15% (exception: the German mark -DEM- and the Dutch guilder -NLG-, which continued at 2.25%). 1994 1 January saw the start of the second phase of the European Monetary Union. The European Monetary Institute (EMI) was set up as a forerunner of the European Central Bank (ECB). 1995 Austria joined the exchange rate mechanism at the start of the year. As a result of the weakness of the American dollar, in February and March many European currencies came under pressure from the German block. March saw the devaluation of the peseta and the escudo in the European Monetary System. European Council confirms in Madrid the date of the beginning of EMU’s 3rd phase: 1.1.99 and it changes the name of unique currency, which goes to euro. Also, they set up three stages A, B and C for European Monetary Union: (a) Preparation of EMU, from 1.5.98 to 31.12.98 (b) Beginning of EMU, from 1.1.99 to 31.12.01 (c) Currency duality, from 1.1.02 to 30.6.02 at most. 1996 European Council in Dublin approves the new structure of change process, SME2 or MTC2 and decides the new juridical environment of euro. They present the first design of euro bills. 1997 European Council in Amsterdam approves MTC2, the process of change rates which has to substitute the actual. They present the first euro coins design. The CE autumn rapport about convergence is positive for every country, except for Greece. European Council in Luxembourg in December approves the creation of an informal organ to coordinate economic politics of the 11 countries in the euro area, called Euro-11. Spanish government presents in December the “National Plan for Transition to Euro.” Sweden, Denmark and U.K. announce that they will not accede to euro in the first phase.
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1998 Greece enters to EMS in March. Special European Council in Brussels at the beginning of May decides the 11 countries which will accede to euro in the first phase, also the ECB managers and the process of determination of euro conversion rates. On the first of July the ECBS initiates its activity and its main organ, the ECB, with central office in Frankfurt. In December Spanish Parliament approves Euro Introduction Law. 1999 (January 1) Introduction of the Euro and monetary union
THE EFFECTS OF USING ALTERNATIVE TYPES OF STAFFING ARRANGEMENTS Cynthia L. Gramm and John F. Schnell INTRODUCTION Traditionally, hiring indefinite duration contract employees has been the dominant method used by U.S. organizations to staff their labor needs. Indefinite duration contract employees, hereafter referred to as “regular” employees, have three defining characteristics: (1) they are hired directly as employees of the organization whose work they perform; (2) the duration of the employment relationship is unspecified, with a mutual expectation that it will continue as long as it is mutually satisfactory; and (3) the employment relationship provides ongoing – as opposed to intermittent – work. When their demand for labor increases, organizations staffed exclusively by regular employees can respond by having their employees work overtime or by hiring additional regular employees. Conversely, when their demand for labor decreases, such organizations can either maintain “inventories” of excess regular employees or reduce labor inputs by laying-off or reducing the work hours of regular employees. “Flexible staffing arrangements” (FSAs), defined by the absence of one or more of the defining characteristics of “regular” employment, contribute to an organization’s flexibility to adjust labor inputs on an as-needed basis (Abraham, 1988). FSAs, together with regular employment, comprise a set of options available to an organization for staffing its work.1 Table 1 defines several common forms of FSAs.
Advances in Industrial and Labor Relations Advances in Industrial and Labor Relations, Volume 13, 27–68 Copyright © 2004 by Elsevier Ltd. All rights of reproduction in any form reserved ISSN: 0742-6186/doi:10.1016/S0742-6186(04)13002-3
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Table 1. Definitions of Different Types of Flexible Staffing Arrangements. Type of Staffing Arrangement
Definition
Direct-hire temporaries or short-term hires
Individuals employed directly by an organization under a fixed term contract, for the duration of a project, or to fill positions that are explicitly identified as temporary. Individuals in a pool of workers who are called in to work for an organization on an as-needed basis. Individuals employed by a temporary help agency who perform work for client organizations of the agency. Individuals provided by a labor market intermediary firm (i.e. contractor firm or consulting agency) who perform work for client organizations of the intermediary firm. (Such individuals may or may not be regular employees of the intermediary firm.) Depending on the terms of the contract between the client organization and the intermediary firm, the work may be performed either on the premises of the client organization or on the intermediary’s premises. The client organization’s procurement of a contract with the intermediary firm to provide this form of staffing is referred to as subcontracting or contracting out. Work force employed by an employee leasing organization, which “leases” the work force to a client organization. Self-employed individuals who provide labor or services to client organizations. Includes self-employed consultants.
On-call workers Agency temporariesa Contract firm workers/contractors/job shoppers/agency consultantsa
Leased work forcesa Independent contractors a Individuals
working in these types of FSA may be regular employees of the temporary or leasing agency, the contractor firm, or the consulting agency. These types of staffing arrangements are sometimes referred to as “intermediated” and the contractor firms, temporary help agencies, consulting agencies, and employee leasing firms that employ such workers are referred to as “labor market intermediary firms.”
Many other labels – “contingent” (Freedman, 1985), “market-mediated” (Abraham, 1990), “nonstandard” (Kalleberg et al., 1997), “nontraditional” (Ferber & Waldfogel, 1998), “atypical” (Delsen, 1995), and “alternative” (Polivka, 1996; U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1995) – have been coined to describe FSAs. Of these, “contingent work” is probably the most widely used. Freedman (1985, p. 35) originally characterized contingent work as an array of staffing options available to the employer that provided for “conditional and transitory employment arrangements as initiated by a need for labor,” which is consistent with our conceptualization of flexible staffing arrangements. We prefer the label “flexible staffing arrangements,” rather than the label “contingent work” for these staffing options because “contingent work” subsequently has come to have so many diverse meanings that its use is confusing. Many define contingent work to include all or
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Table 2. Definitions of Contingent Workers. BLS definition 1
BLS definition 2
BLS definition 3 Kalleberg, et al., definition
a U.S.
Wage and salary workers who expect their jobs will last for an additional year or less and who had worked at their jobs for 1 year or less. Excludes self-employed and independent contractors.a Workers including the self-employed and independent contractors who expect that their jobs will last for an additional year or less and who had worked at their jobs or were self-employed for 1 year or less.a Workers including the self-employed and independent contractors who do not expect their jobs to last.a All on-call/day laborers as well as workers who: “(1) report their job as temporary; (2) report they cannot work for the employer as long as they wish; (3) are not sure about criteria “1” or “2”; or (4) expect their job to last for only one year or less.”b
Bureau of Labor Statistics (1995). et al. (1997).
b Kalleberg
virtually all work arrangements except work as full-time regular employees. Others characterize contingent work as jobs with a variety of negative attributes, including low prospects for long-term employment, unpredictable hours, and lack of access to benefits. Such broad definitions result in groupings that are too heterogeneous to be theoretically or empirically useful. Even the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics’ (BLS) (1995) recent efforts to define contingent work in terms of a single trait – insecure employment – have resulted in multiple definitions that some critics assert are too narrow (Kalleberg et al., 1997). Table 2 summarizes the BLS definitions as well as an alternative definition offered by Kalleberg et al. (1997).2 Following the BLS, in the next section of this paper we will use the term “contingent” to describe a job trait – insecure employment – that may be correlated with working in many types of FSAs. The perception that U.S. organizations increasingly are staffing their work using arrangements other than regular employment has focused scholarly and media attention on FSA usage. Available evidence confirms that U.S. employment in at least one type of FSA, agency temporaries, has grown rapidly and comprises an increasing share of total employment (Golden, 1996; Laird & Williams, 1996; Segal & Sullivan, 1995, 1997a).3 Specifically, from 1972–1995, temporary help supply (THS) industry employment grew at an annual rate of over 11%, compared to a 2% annual growth rate for aggregate nonfarm employment (Segal & Sullivan, 1997a). In the short-run, THS employment growth appears to be influenced by both supply-side factors, such as the entry of married women into the labor force, and demand side factors, such as economic expansion and foreign competition (Golden & Appelbaum, 1992; Golden, 1996; Laird & Williams, 1996). Laird & Williams
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(1996), however, fail to find evidence of any long-run equilibrium relationships between THS employment and such supply- and demand-side factors. Rather, changes in the legal environment may have fueled long-term growth. Careful analyses by Autor (2000a) suggest that THS employment increases significantly in response to a state’s adoption of the implied contract exception to the employmentat-will doctrine, with such changes accounting for as much as 20% of the growth in THS employment from 1973 to 1995.4 Lee (1996) argues that other changes in employment law may have fueled growth in FSA usage, but these hypotheses are yet to be tested. Autor (2000a) also provides evidence of more rapid growth in THS employment in states where union density declined more slowly, although the direction of causality in this relationship is unclear. The unavailability of longitudinal data on employment in other types of FSAs makes it impossible to verify whether they exhibit similar growth trends. Nevertheless, the limited evidence available from surveys of employers is suggestive of growth and expected growth in the use of other types of FSAs (Abraham, 1990; Abraham & Taylor, 1996; Houseman, 2001b; Lautsch, 1998). The growth in the use of FSAs has been controversial. Much of the controversy stems from two contrasting views of the effects of using FSAs, a positive view, which emphasizes the perceived beneficial effects of using FSAs for both organizations and individuals, and a negative view, which emphasizes the perceived adverse effects of using FSAs. Adherents to the positive view argue that using FSAs can contribute to organizational efficiency by facilitating a firm’s ability to adjust its work force in response to fluctuating market conditions and by more efficiently providing screening, selection, and training capabilities that enhance worker-job matches (e.g. Lentz, 1996). They also emphasize that FSAs provide training and work opportunities for individuals whose inexperience, lack of training, need for a flexible schedule, or need for short-term or supplemental income may make regular employment an undesirable or unattainable alternative (e.g. Lentz, 1996). If true, the alleged positive microeconomic effects of growth in the use of FSAs imply positive macroeconomic effects, such as productivity growth. Adherents to the positive view tend to advocate legal changes that accommodate the use of FSAs (e.g. Lentz, 1996). Adherents of the negative view assert that FSAs provide less favorable terms and conditions of employment than regular employment, including lower pay, fewer employee benefits, less desirable working conditions, fewer training and advancement opportunities, and less secure employment. The alleged substandard nature of FSA jobs is thought to be attributable, at least in part, to fact that individuals working in many FSAs either are not covered by, or often will fail to meet, eligibility requirements for protections and benefits provided by U.S.
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labor and employment laws. If these perceptions are true, at the macroeconomic level, a growing share of the labor force working in FSAs implies a growing share of the labor force working in insecure jobs with “substandard” compensation and working conditions and limited advancement opportunities. Moreover, to the extent that organizations use FSAs to support efficiency wage policies and long-term employment commitments for regular employees, a growing share of the labor force working in FSAs may imply a growing gap between the quality of work and the standard of living experienced by regular employees and FSA incumbents. Adherents to the negative view tend to advocate the adoption of public policies designed to restrict the use of FSAs, to prevent organizations from offering individuals working in FSAs less favorable compensation packages than their regular employees, and/or to extend legal protections granted to regular employees to workers in FSAs (e.g. Carnevale et al., 1998). Both views of flexible staffing arrangements pose a number of empirical questions about the effects of using FSAs. A review of research on such effects can inform policy discussions as well as pinpointing future research needs. Our review will focus on U.S. empirical research published since 1990. The next section will review the relatively extensive body of research on the effects of using FSAs on individuals working in such arrangements. The third section provides a review of the much sparser body of research examining the effects of using FSAs on regular employees in the same organization, on organizational performance, and on macroeconomic performance.
THE EFFECTS OF WORKING IN FSAS ON INCUMBENT WORKERS The dominant prediction associated with the negative view of flexible staffing arrangements is that they provide less desirable terms and conditions in employment than regular employment. This proposition has motivated a sizable body of quantitative empirical research investigating the effects of working in an FSA on incumbents. Most such studies seek to compare employment outcomes for workers in one or more types of FSA to outcomes for some reference group. However, because the categorization of staffing arrangements varies across studies, the reference group does not always correspond directly to our definition of regular employees. Table 3 identifies the data source, categories of FSAs, and reference group used in each of the studies that we discuss below. Pay. The most extensive body of research investigating the effects of working in FSAs on incumbents focuses on the effects of such work on pay and other measures of earnings. Data from recent U.S. household surveys – the Contingent
32
Table 3. Categorization of Staffing Arrangements in Studies of the Effects of Working in FSAs on Incumbents. Data Source
FSA Categories
Reference Category
Allen & Sienko (1998)
Sample of 197 employees of a U.S. telecommunications company who were given the Hackman & Oldham (1998) Job Diagnostic Survey. 1994 U.S. B. L. S. Occupational Compensation Survey of Temporary Help Supply Services – sample of 1033 THS establishments. Telephone interviews of a stratified random sample of temporary help supply establishments in six metropolitan areas. 1990 Biennial Survey of Illinois Registered Nurses 1997 CAEAS
Short-term hires
Regular employees
Agency temporaries
None
Agency temporaries
None
Agency temporaries
Direct hire employeesa
Agency temporaries, independent contractors, contract firm employees, on-call/day-laborers Short-term hires
Standard employeesa
Autor (2000)
Autor, Levy, & Murname (1999)
Bellemore (1998) Belman & Golden (2000)
Chattopadhyay & George (2001) Cohany (1998)
Christensen (1998)
DiNatale (2001)
Ellingson, Gruys, & Sackett (1998)
Surveys of workers in two computer hardware manufacturing organizations. 1997 CAEAS
Survey and interviews of representatives of 21 firms that are members of Boston College’s Work-Family Roundtable. 1999 CAEAS
Survey of 174 agency temporaries employed by a single temporary help supply firm.
Regular employees
Agency temporaries, independent contractors, on-call workers, contract firm employees Agency temporaries, short-term hires, independent contractors/consultants
Workers not in any of the FSA categoriesa
Agency temporaries, independent contractors, on-call workers, contract firm employees Agency temporaries
Workers not in any of the FSA categoriesa
Regular employees
None
CYNTHIA L. GRAMM AND JOHN F. SCHNELL
Author(s)
Data from the Displaced Worker Supplements to the February 1994 & 1996 Current Population Surveys matched to CAEAS in the subsequent years (1995 & 1997).
Feldman, Doerpinghaus & Turnley (1995)
Survey of 186 agency temporaries employed by 7 temporary help supply firms. 1995 CAEAS
Hipple & Stewart (1996)
Houseman (2001b)
Houseman & Polivka (1998)
James (1998) Jarmon, Paulson, & Rebne (1998)
Kalleberg et al. (1997)
Upjohn Institute’s survey of a national stratified random sample of private sector establishments. 1995 CAEAS
Employees & nonemployee contractors in a single firm. Survey of managers in a convenience sample of six client organizations. Responding managers had responsibility of supervising one or more contract company employees. 1995 CAEAS
Kalleberg, Reskin & Hudson (2000)
1995 CAEAS
Kalleberg & Reynolds (2000)
Second National Organizations Survey (NOS-II)
Three categories: (1) independent contractors, consultants, & other free-lance workers; (2) other self-employed workers; and (3) agency temporaries, workers in “temporary jobs,” on-call, & contract workers. Agency temporaries
Regular employees
None
Agency temporaries, independent contractors, on-call workers, contract firm employees Agency temporaries, short-term hires, on-call workers, contract company employees Agency temporaries, on-call workers, contract company employees, short-term hires, & independent contractorsb Non-employee contractors
Workers not in any of the FSA categoriesa
Regular employees
Contract company employees
Regular employees
Agency temporaries, on-call workers, day laborers, and independent contractorsb Agency temporaries, contract workers, on-call/day labor workers, and independent contractorsb Agency temporaries (on-site and off-site), on-call workers, contract company employees (on-site and off-site)
Full-time regular employees
Full-time regular employees
Full-time regular employees
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Farber (1999)
Full-time regular employees
Full-time regular employees
33
34
Table 3. (Continued ) Author(s)
Data Source
FSA Categories
Reference Category
Lapidus (1993)
May 1985 Current Population Survey
Temporary help agency employees
Lautsch (1998)
Agency temporaries (worker survey); direct hire temporaries and temporaries employed through intermediaries – agency temporaries or contract company workers (establishment survey) Short-term hires Short-term hires Temporary help agency employees
Polivka, Cohany & Hipple (2000)
Survey of workers at Polaroids’ Digital Products Division & a 1997 establishment survey conducted by the University of Massachusetts Center for Survey Research. 1992 survey of U.S. establishments 1992 survey of U.S. establishments Survey of employees of 20 THS firms in a southeastern city Survey of supervisors and of engineers and engineering technicians who were either employees or contractors working for a large aerospace firm. 1995 & 1997 CAEAS
Non-temporary help agency employees Regular employees
Schur (2003)
(1) 1995, 1997, 1999, & 2001 CAEAS
Lautsch (2000) Lautsch (2003) McClurg (1999)
Rebitzer (1998) Segal & Sullivan (1995)
(2) Survey of Income and Program Participation (3) A nationally representative household survey of people with and without disabilities Telephone survey of workers at petrochemical facilities Current Population Survey
Independent contractors.
Employees.
Agency temporaries, on-call workers, short-term hires, contract company workers, and independent contractorsb (1) Agency temporaries, on-call workers & day laborers, short-term hires, contract company workers, and independent contractors (2) Agency temporaries
Full-time regular employees
Varies depending on the data set used.
(3) Temporary workers
Contract company employees
Direct hire employees
Employment in the Personnel Supply Industry (SIC 736)
Non-SIC 736 employment
CYNTHIA L. GRAMM AND JOHN F. SCHNELL
Pearce (1993)
None None No reference category
Segal & Sullivan (1997b)
Segal & Sullivan (1998)
Wiens-Tuers (1998)
a
1983–1993 outgoing rotations of the Current Population Survey. 1984–94 time series data on sample of individuals taken from the administrative files of the Unemployment Insurance system in state of Washington. 1984–94 time series data on sample of individuals taken from the administrative files of the Unemployment Insurance system in state of Washington 1995 CAEAS
Employment in the Personnel Supply Industry (SIC 736) Temporary services industry employmentd
Non-SIC 736 employment
Temporary services industry employmentd
Employment outside of temporary services industry.
Agency temporaries, contract company workers, day laborers, leased employees, on-call employees, independent contractors
“Standard” employeesc
Employment outside of temporary services industry and unemployment
The author does not indicate whether this category includes short-term hires as well as regular employees. The authors do not distinguish between those FSAs who work part-time and those who work full-time. c Includes all those who do not fall into any of the categories of FSAs listed in the second column and who are not self-employed. Thus, this category presumably includes short-term hires as well as regular employees. d Employed by firms in the Temporary Services industry, which includes leased workers as well as agency temporaries. b
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Segal & Sullivan (1997a)
35
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CYNTHIA L. GRAMM AND JOHN F. SCHNELL
and Alternative Employment Arrangements Supplements (CAEAS) to the Current Population Survey (CPS) – lend themselves to addressing this empirical question.5 Descriptive evidence from the 1995, 1997, and 1999 CAEAS indicates that in comparison to workers with traditional arrangements, median weekly earnings are lower for on-call workers and agency temporaries but higher for independent contractors and contract company workers (Cohaney, 1998; DiNatale, 2001; Hipple & Stewart, 1996). Several studies use the CAEAS data to estimate multiple regression models of the effect of FSA work on wages or other measures of earnings. Polivka et al. (2000) provide evidence that full-time regular employees have higher real hourly earnings than both agency temporaries and short-term hires, but lower real hourly earnings than independent contractors and, in 1997, than contract company workers.6 Kalleberg et al. (1997) estimate separate wage models for men and women. In their base model for both men and women, agency temporaries, on-call workers, independent contractors, and contract company workers all earn significantly lower wage rates than full-time regular workers (Kalleberg et al., 1997).7 When additional controls are added, the pattern of results changes.8 Specifically, whereas wages are significantly lower for female on-call workers than for female fulltime regular employees, there are no apparent wage differentials between female agency temporaries and female full-time regular employees (Kalleberg et al., 1997). Conversely, male full-time regular employees’ wages are higher than the wages of male agency temporaries but are no different than the wages of male on-call workers (Kalleberg et al., 1997). For both women and men, wage rates are significantly higher for independent contractors and for contract company employees than for full-time regular employees (Kalleberg et al., 1997). These studies do not isolate the effects of part-time work from the effects of working in FSAs. As Lee and Johnson (1991) have pointed out, work schedule (i.e. full- or part-time) and type of staffing arrangement are conceptually distinct features of work. Moreover, there is evidence that part-time workers tend to have lower rates of pay (as well as less access to employer-provided benefits than fulltime workers (e.g. Ferber & Waldfogel, 1998, 2000).9 As a result, the failure to clearly isolate the effect of work schedule from the effect of the type of staffing arrangement in empirical analyses may result in statistical bias when estimating the effect of working in an FSA on wages (or benefits). For example, in wage models in which the reference category is full-time regular employees and in which the model does not control for whether FSA employment is full-time or part-time, the coefficients associated with most measures of FSA employment will be biased, thereby overstating or understating the effect of FSA employment.10 Belman and Golden (2000) explore whether the estimated effects of FSA-work on wages are robust to the inclusion of controls for work schedule. They use the
The Effects of Using Alternative Types of Staffing Arrangements
37
1997 CAEAS data to estimate three alternative models of ln(hourly earnings). Their base model (Model 1) augments a standard human capital equation by including indicator variables of four types of FSAs as right-hand-side variables: agency temporary, independent contractor, contract company employees, and on-call/daylabor. Their Model 2 adds a dummy variable for part-time status. Finally, their third model adds controls for major industry and occupational classifications. In general, their findings indicate that hourly earnings are lower for agency temporaries and higher for independent contractors and contract company employees than for the “standard workers;” the hourly earnings differential between on-call/day-labor workers and “standard workers” is not statistically significant.11 A comparison of coefficients on the FSA variables in Belman and Golden’s (2000) Models 1 and 2 provides evidence that failing to isolate work schedule effects from FSA effects can bias the estimation of FSA effects: Controlling for part-time status increases the magnitude of the hourly earnings advantage of independent contractors. In contrast, controlling for work schedule has minimal effect on the estimates of hourly earnings gap between “standard workers” and either agency temporaries, contact company employees, or on-call/day-labor workers. Controlling for the type of staffing arrangement, the part-time work schedule effect is negative, significant and sizable. When industry and occupational controls are added, the hourly earnings differential between contract company employees and “standard workers” is no longer significant and the part-time effect is reduced but still considerable. Belman and Golden’s (2000) results confirm the need to isolate work schedule from FSA effects. Their model assumes, however, that the work schedule effect is constant for each type of staffing arrangement. Estimation of an alternative model that allows the work schedule effect to vary by type of staffing arrangement would be a useful extension of their work. Using data from the 1985 CPS, Lapidus (1993) estimates a wage equation using samples of nonunionized males and females who are not employed by THS firms and then uses its results to obtain a predicted mean wage for samples of males and females employed by temporary help agencies.12 While she finds no difference between the predicted mean wage and the actual mean wage for female temporaries, for male temporaries, the predicted mean wage is $2.21 less than their actual wage. Segal and Sullivan (1995) use the CPS outgoing rotation data for 1983–93 to estimate the wage effects of employment in the Personnel Supply Services (PSS) industry (SIC 736).13 Other things equal, they estimate that, whereas pinkcollar and blue-collar PSS workers earn 10.2% and 34.3% less, respectively, than comparable workers outside that sector, hourly white-collar PSS workers earn 2.4% more than their counterparts in other industries (Segal & Sullivan, 1995).14 In a subsequent paper, Segal and Sullivan (1997a) demonstrate that the percentage wage gap favoring regular employees declines from 21.8 to 7.7% after controlling
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CYNTHIA L. GRAMM AND JOHN F. SCHNELL
for worker and job characteristics.15 Their estimates suggest a lower wage gap for white-collar than for either blue-collar or pink-collar workers (Segal & Sullivan, 1997a). Because cross-sectional estimates of wage differentials among different types of staffing arrangements may reflect differences in unobserved productivity-related characteristics among individuals employed in different staffing arrangements, investigating how an individual’s wage varies with changes in the staffing arrangement in which she is employed may provide a clearer picture of the effect that working in an FSA has on wages. Three recent papers by Segal and Sullivan (1995, 1997a, 1998) explore whether wage differences apparent in cross-sectional studies are robust when time series data on individuals are used to estimate the wage effects of temporary work. In the first paper, Segal and Sullivan (1995) follow up their cross-sectional estimates of wage differentials between PSS and non-PSS workers, which are described above, by estimating the impact of changing the type of staffing arrangement in which a worker is employed on a worker’s one-year wage growth. Compared to the base case, in which the worker had non-PSS employment in both time periods, for pink-collar workers moving from non-PSS to PSS employment is associated with 4.7% less wage growth, whereas moving from PSS to nonPSS employment status is associated with 9.6% higher wage growth. The wage growth model results for pink-collar workers are of a magnitude consistent with the 10.2% gap estimated in the cross-sectional wage-level models summarized above. For blue-collar workers, changing from non-PSS to PSS employment is associated with 12.2% less wage growth and changing from PSS to non-PSS employment is associated with 14.2% more wage growth than the base case (Segal & Sullivan, 1995). Both of these estimates are of considerably lower magnitude than the 34.3% estimated effect of PSS employment in Segal and Sullivan’s (1995) cross-sectional wage-level models, which suggests that some of the estimated differential in the cross-sectional wage-level models may be attributable to differences between PSS and non-PSS employees in unobserved productivity-related traits. For white-collar workers, changing from non-PSS to PSS employment is associated with 5.75% less wage growth relative to the base case, but wage growth is not significantly different between the base case and changing from PSS to non-PSS employment (Segal & Sullivan, 1995). For all three groups of workers, the wage growth of workers who are PSS employees at both points in time did not differ significantly from the wage growth of individuals who are non-PSS employees at both points in time (Segal & Sullivan, 1995). In their second paper, Segal and Sullivan (1997a) estimate models with workerspecific fixed effects that may influence earnings. These fixed effects control for unobservable characteristics, such as intelligence, education quality, or work ethic,
The Effects of Using Alternative Types of Staffing Arrangements
39
that are constant over time, that are likely to influence wage rates, and that may vary systematically between PSS and non-PSS workers. The wage gap between non-PSS and PSS workers in the fixed effect model is 3.1%, which is substantially lower than the 7.7% gap that they observe in models without individual fixed effects (Segal and Sullivan, 1997a).16 Observing that the disadvantage of estimating models with fixed effects is that unobserved heterogeneity may bias the estimated effects toward zero, Segal and Sullivan (1997a) also estimate specifications correcting for such bias. These estimates suggest that wage rates for PSS workers are about 5% lower than those for non-PSS workers (Segal & Sullivan, 1997a). In a third study using Washington State Unemployment Insurance data in which the career histories of a sample of individual workers are tracked for 11 years (1984–1994), Segal and Sullivan (1998) are able to estimate the wage differential associated with THS employment controlling for worker-specific fixed effects, which capture the effects of individual characteristics that are constant over time, and worker-specific time trends, which capture the effects of worker characteristics that vary over time at a near constant rate (e.g. age, experience). With such controls, they estimate a 10% differential between temporary wages and “reasonable indicators” of the non-temporary wage opportunities that the THS workers might have had (Segal & Sullivan, 1998, p. 13). Observed wage differences across staffing arrangements in the above studies, which at best control only for broad occupational categories, may be attributable to wage differences among occupations. Studies of wage differences across staffing arrangements within a single occupation facilitate distinguishing the effect of staffing arrangements on wages from occupational effects. In one such study using data from the 1990 Biennial Survey of Illinois Registered Nurses, wages are significantly higher for nurses employed through temporary agencies than for those who are direct-hire employees (Bellemore, 1998). Interestingly, the return to tenure is greater for agency temporary nurses whereas the return to experience is greater for direct-hire employee nurses (Bellemore, 1998). Lautsch (1998) estimates wage differentials using data on a single firm’s work force, which includes agency temporaries and regular employees working in the same occupations and receiving identical training and supervision. Controlling for human capital characteristics, race, gender, and job characteristics, she finds that the wage rates of agency temporaries are not significantly different from those of regular employees. Studies of employing organizations regarding how their compensation practices vary across staffing arrangements among workers in comparable positions provide an alternative source of information to data in which the individual worker is the unit of analysis. Houseman (2001b) notes that the majority of respondents to an employer survey report that their on-call workers and short-term hires receive
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CYNTHIA L. GRAMM AND JOHN F. SCHNELL
hourly pay rates that are about the same as the hourly pay rates of their full-time regular employees in similar positions. In contrast, the majority of employers state that their hourly billed rate for agency temporaries was higher than the hourly pay rate for full-time regular employees in similar positions (Houseman, 2001b). Evidence from case studies suggests that job-level wage differentials between FSAs and regular employees in an organization vary substantially with the organizational context in which the FSAs are used (Erickcek et al., 2002; Lautsch, 2002). Lautsch’s (2002) analyses of four cases suggests that the within-firm wage gap between FSAs and regular employees in similar job classifications is lowest when FSAs are used to facilitate numerical flexibility and when the technology prevents managers from shifting the skill mix of tasks between regular employees and FSAs and that the within-firm wage gap between the two types of workers is highest when FSAs are used to lower costs, regardless of technology. Benefits. For a variety of reasons, employers may not want to offer all of its workforce an identical benefits package.17 Under the U.S. Federal Tax Code’s nondiscrimination (ND) rules, however, benefits qualify for favorable tax treatment (tax-exemption or tax deferral, depending on the type of benefit) only if the firm can demonstrate that the benefit plan does not discriminate in favor of highly compensated employees. The nondiscrimination rules permit firms to exclude workers who are not their employees (e.g. agency temporaries, contract company workers, and independent contractors) as well as seasonal employees, which would include some direct-hire-temporaries and on-call workers, from nondiscrimination calculations, thereby creating an incentive for firms to use staffing arrangements that are excluded from nondiscrimination calculations for workers who are likely to have atypical tastes for benefits relative to their co-workers or who are likely to be outliers in the firm’s pay distribution (Carrington et al., 2002). Additionally, laws that mandate employer-provided benefits (e.g. workers’ compensation laws, the Family and Medical Leave Act) only require organizations to provide such benefits to their employees, which excludes independent contractors from coverage.18 Thus, even in cases where comparable workers in different staffing arrangements receive similar pay rates, there is concern that FSA workers are likely to lack the employer-provided benefits that are commonly part of the regular employee’s compensation package. Segal and Sullivan (1997a) report that PSS workers are less likely than nonPSS workers to have health insurance that is paid for (wholly or in part) by their employer, controlling for worker and job characteristics. Multiple regression analyses of the 1995 CAEAS data suggest that on-call workers are 2.2 times less likely and agency temporaries are 7.1 times less likely to have health insurance from any source than “standard employees” (Wiens-Tuers, 1998). The adverse
The Effects of Using Alternative Types of Staffing Arrangements
41
effect that working in these two types of FSAs has on access to health insurance increases if the worker is black or Hispanic (Wiens-Tuers, 1998). Several studies provide evidence that the odds of having employer-provided health insurance and the odds of having an employer-provided pension plan are lower for each type of FSA studied (i.e. agency temporaries, on-call work, wage and salaried independent contractors, and contract company employment) than they are for full-time regular workers (Kalleberg et al., 1997, 2000; Polivka et al., 2000). Moreover, agency temporaries, on-call workers, short-term hires, and contract company employees are all less likely than full-time regular employees to have health insurance from any source (Polivka et al., 2000). Establishmentlevel evidence indicates that although the vast majority of U.S. establishments provide full-time regular employees with paid vacations and holidays, paid sick leave, pension benefits, and health insurance benefits, only a small percent of establishments provide those benefits for their on-call workers or short-term hires (Houseman, 2001b). Although establishments are less likely to provide health insurance and pensions to short-term hires than to regular employees, the likelihood of providing these benefits for short-term hires is higher when the organization provides the benefits to its regular employees and when the organization has consistent performance objectives for workers in both groups (Lautsch, 2003). Because many FSAs may work part-time and part-time workers are less likely than full-time workers to have benefits, the estimated differences in access to benefits between FSAs and full-time regular employees may be attributable to the part-time status of many FSA workers rather than to the type of staffing arrangement. Belman and Golden (2000) distinguish FSA-effects on benefits from the effects of work schedule. They use the 1997 CAEAS data to investigate the effect of working in four types of FSAs – agency temporary, independent contractor, contract company employees, and on-call/day-labor – on having employer-provided pension coverage, on having health insurance through the employer, and on having health insurance from any source. They estimate three alternative models for each dependent variable, which parallel their three alternative ln(hourly earnings) models described in the previous subsection. The coefficients associated with each of their FSA measures are consistently negative and significant, suggesting that FSA workers are less likely than “standard” workers to have employer-provided pensions, employer-provided health insurance, or health insurance from any source. Their findings also indicate that part-timers are significantly less likely than full-time workers to have any of these benefits. Moreover, controlling for work schedule reduces the magnitude of the adverse effects of working as independent contractors or as on-call/day-laborers on access to benefits. Adding industry and occupational controls produces minimal change in these estimated effects.
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CYNTHIA L. GRAMM AND JOHN F. SCHNELL
Bellemore (1998) finds that agency-temporary nurses have fewer benefits but higher wages than regular-employee nurses and, moreover, that nurses who value wages highly relative to benefits, especially pensions, are more likely to work for temporary agencies. This suggests that the wage share of total compensation may differ by type of staffing arrangement and that workers may sort themselves among different staffing arrangements based upon their degree of preference for cash compensation relative to benefits. Investigating whether these relationships can be replicated for other occupational groups, especially occupations that are less female-dominated, would be worthwhile. Among establishments employing both regular employees and short-term hires, Lautsch (2000) finds that the likelihood that the establishment provides healthcare benefits to short-term hires is positively related to the existence of a human resources management (HRM) department, to the importance of job ladders and to the age of the establishment, and is inversely related to the importance of seniority rules and the log of the number of regular employees in the establishment. The likelihood that the establishment provides pensions for short-term hires is positively related to the provision of pensions for the establishment’s regular employees, the presence of an HRM department, an efficiency wage policy, whether the establishment is part of a larger organization, establishment age, the importance of job ladders, and the ratio of short-term hires to regular employees; and is inversely related to the importance of seniority rules, the log of the number of regular employees, and the importance of “considering worker needs” (Lautsch, 2000). Evidence from organizational case studies suggests that union contracts and legal mandates may also influence whether organizations provide benefits for their FSA workers (Erickcek et al., 2002). While most studies of the effects of working in FSAs on access to benefits have focused on pension and health insurance benefits, there is also some evidence suggesting that organizations are more likely to provide other types of benefits for regular employees than for FSA workers. In a sample of 21 “family-sensitive” U.S. firms, the incidence of availability of six family-friendly benefits (i.e. flextime, seminars on work family issues, child care location and referral, parent support groups, child care information assistance, elder care/adult dependent care information assistance) is approximately twice as high for regular employees as for short-term hires who, in turn, are more likely to receive these benefits than either agency temporaries and contractors/consultants performing work for these firms (Christensen, 1998). In a second study, Lautsch (2003) finds that establishments are less likely to provide child care for short-term hires than for regular employees. There is some evidence suggesting that the decision to provide benefits for FSA workers varies with a variety of organizational attributes. Lautsch (2000) finds that the likelihood that an establishment will provide day care benefits for
The Effects of Using Alternative Types of Staffing Arrangements
43
short-term hires is higher in establishments that provide day care benefits to the company’s regular employees and in establishments that are part of larger organizations. Providing these benefits also is positively related to the number of high performance work practices used by the establishment (i.e. job rotation, total quality management, quality circles, teams), to the extent to which absenteeism is a serious problem for the company, and to the age of the establishment; and is negatively related to the log of the number of regular employees in the establishment (Lautsch, 2000). Standard of living. Differences across types of staffing arrangements in the terms and conditions of employment are likely to be associated with differences in the standard of living. Wiens-Tuers (1998) finds that both temporaries and on-call workers are less likely than regular employees to live in a home owned by a member of the individual’s household, suggesting that household economic well-being is higher for the latter group. Independent contractors were even more likely than regular employees to live in a home owned by the household (Wiens-Tuers, 1998). In a second study, Lautsch (2003) finds that the likelihood that short-term hires have child care benefits is higher when regular employees have day care benefits, when flexibility considerations motivate the use of short-term hires, and when the organization has consistent performance objectives for both groups. Among female workers, compared to full-time regular employees, the odds of receiving a poverty level wage are higher in two types of FSAs – on-call work and agency temporary work, and lower for independent contractors (Kalleberg et al., 1997). For both men and women, the odds of being paid a wage in the highest quintile of the wage distribution is significantly greater for independent contractors and for contract company employees than for those full-time regular employees (Kalleberg et al., 1997). Kalleberg et al. (2000) find that individuals with full-time regular employment who are not contingent workers are less likely to earn a low wage (defined as a wage rate in the lowest quintile of the 1995 CAEAS sample) than on-call workers, agency temporaries, or independent contractors; among females, the odds of earning a low wage is also higher for full-time, noncontingent regular employees than for contract company employees.19 Employment security. Much of the controversy surrounding the use of FSAs stems from the assumption that work in flexible staffing arrangements is more likely to be insecure or “contingent” than work as a regular employee. Testing this assumption requires individual-level data on both the type of staffing arrangement in which individuals are employed and whether their employment is contingent, with contingent defined such that its definition is not tautological with the definitions of the types of staffing arrangements. Table 4 reports CAEAS estimates for 1995 of contingent workers as a percent of employment by type of staffing arrangement, using the three alternative BLS definitions of contingent workers
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CYNTHIA L. GRAMM AND JOHN F. SCHNELL
Table 4. Contingent Workers as a Percent of Employment by Type of Staffing Arrangement. Definition of Contingent Worker
BLS Definition 1 BLS Definition 2 BLS Definition 3
Contingent Workers as % of Total Workers Employed by Type of Staffing Arrangement All Staffing Arrangements
Agency Temporaries
On-Call Workers
Contract Firm Employees
Independent Contractors
Nonalternative Employment Arrangements
2.2 2.8 4.9
39.4 48.0 66.5
17.6 18.0 35.2
7.7 11.7 19.8
Not applicable 3.8 3.8
1.6 1.8 3.6
Note: Percent of total employed estimates are taken from Polivka (1996) using the BLS’ 1995 CAEAS data.
summarized in Table 2. While none of these definitions may be ideal, one can draw some tentative conclusions when the pattern of results is consistent across different definitions of contingent work. In general, the descriptive statistics reported in Table 4 challenge the assumption that the work provided by FSAs is necessarily contingent. Interestingly, contingent workers comprise a minority of the workers employed as on-call workers, as independent contractors, and as contract company employees and comprise a majority of agency temporaries only when the broadest definition of contingency is used. Moreover, contingent work is much more common in some types of FSAs – agency temporary work and on-call work – than in others. Consistent with the proposition that FSAs provide less employment security than regular employment, workers in “nonalternative staffing arrangements” are, for the most part, less likely to be contingent than agency temporaries, on-call workers, workers provided by contract firms, or independent contractors. Because the “nonalternative staffing arrangements” category includes short-term hires as well as regular employees, the estimate of the share of workers in this category who are contingent is likely to overstate the percent of regular employees who are contingent.20 Subsequent research using the CAEAS data explores whether the relationships apparent in these descriptive statistics are robust to regression analyses controlling for other factors likely to influence whether an individual has a contingent job. Specifically, in a model using the third and most inclusive BLS contingent work measure as a dependent variable and controlling for human capital, personal characteristics, industry, and occupation, Wiens-Tuers (1998) finds that relative to “standard” employees, on-call employees are 8 times more likely to be contingent, temporaries are 50 times more likely to be contingent, and day laborers are 155 times more likely to be contingent. Moreover, being black or Hispanic increases the odds of a temporary being in contingent work (Wiens-Tuers, 1998).
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Houseman and Polivka (1998) use multivariate analyses of the CAEAS data to investigate differences across types of staffing arrangements in employment stability. Their key findings are that: (1) on-call workers, direct hire temporaries, and contract workers are more likely than full-time regular employees to switch jobs, to become unemployed, and to leave the labor force within a year; (2) agency temporaries are more likely than full-time regular employees to switch jobs and to become unemployed within a year; and (3) there are no significant differences between independent contractors and full-time regular employees in the likelihood of switching employers, becoming unemployed, and leaving the labor force within a year (Houseman & Polivka, 1998). Taken together, these findings suggest work in three types of flexible staffing arrangements – agency temporaries, on-call work, and contract company employees – provide less employment stability than full-time regular employment; conversely, there appears to be little difference between full-time regular employees and independent contractors in the degree of employment instability. Although Houseman and Polivka (1998) control for a variety of demographic traits in their analyses, they caution that other unobserved personal characteristics may account for the observed differences between full-time regular employees and on-call workers, direct hire temporaries, and contract workers. Moreover, their findings do not isolate the effect of FSA vs. regular employment from the effect of full-time vs. part-time work. Training. A related concern is that work in FSAs provides few opportunities for human capital development, thereby limiting opportunities for workers in FSAs to obtain future employment as regular employees. Most research investigating the training consequences of FSA work focuses on agency temporaries. Recent surveys suggest that a majority of THS establishments provide training to their employees (Autor, 2000b; Autor et al., 1999). The incidence of providing training, however, appears to vary by occupation, with workers in clerical occupations being the most likely to receive training (Autor et al., 1999). The goal of training for industrial and blue collar THS workers is more likely to be to help them qualify for an assignment, whereas for other occupations (i.e. managerial and professional, clerical, and technical workers) the goal of training is more likely to be the advancement of existing skills (Autor et al., 1999). Training provided by THS firms is necessarily general (Autor, 2000b) and typically is provided prior to the employee’s placement (Krueger, 1993). These stylized facts run counter to the common perception of THS firms as providers of jobs with limited training opportunities, as well as to the human capital model, which predicts that workers pay for general training. To explain this, Autor (2000b) proposes a model in which THS firms provide free, up-front general skills training to induce self-selection of high-ability employees, where ability is defined
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as the motivation and ability to learn job skills. Autor’s (2000b) model assumes that training is more productive and valuable to high ability workers, that workers have some prior (albeit incomplete) private information about their ability, and that providing skills training enables a THS firm to acquire information about worker ability that in the short-run is unavailable to other firms. The model predicts that workers who perceive their ability as high will seek work with THS firms offering a package of initially lower wages and up-front general training in expectation of future wage gains in permanent employment, while workers who perceive their ability as low will avoid such firms because of the lower initial wages and their limited expected gains from training (Autor, 2000b). The THS firms offering the low initial wage/up-front training package profit from their training investment via the short-run informational advantage about worker ability that they derive from providing training (Autor, 2000b). Autor’s model predicts that training THS establishments will pay their employees lower wages and charge their clients higher mark-ups than non-training THS establishments. As hypothesized, Autor (2000b) finds lower wages at THS establishments providing training than at those which do not, other things equal. Using a smaller sample, Autor et al. (1999) observe higher mark-ups at training than nontraining THS establishments but comparable wages at both types of establishments despite higher quality workers at THS establishments providing training. This result, although weaker, is still consistent with the notion that it is the training THS firm, rather than the worker, which profits from the higher labor market value of its workers during their stint as temporaries. Second, consistent with the prediction that training will be rationed by ability, hiring selectivity is significantly higher at THS establishments providing computer training, and workers with better employment credentials are more likely to have access to training in THS firms (Autor et al., 1999). Third, although direct evidence of the hypothesis that individuals who have worked at training THS establishments will have steeper wage profiles than those who have worked at non-training THS establishments is unavailable, estimates that permanent job placement rates are 60–80% higher for temporaries at training establishments than for their counterparts at non-training establishments provide indirect support for this hypothesis (Autor, 2000b; Autor et al., 1999). Finally, market competition produces higher THS wages, especially at training THS establishments (Autor, 2000b). Evidence exploring whether workers in other types of FSAs have less access to employer-provided training than regular employees is limited. In one case study of a single firm, although comparable amounts of training were provided to regular employees and workers in FSAs, regular employees both expressed higher training needs and reported their jobs as more skill-enhancing than workers in
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FSAs (Lautsch, 1998). Additional case study evidence suggests that FSA workers are likely to receive the same training as regular employees in the same job category and firm when technology prevents managers from shifting the skill mix of tasks between regular employees and FSAs (Lautsch, 2002). When technology enables managers to shift the skill mix of tasks among the two types of workers, however, the training deficit of the FSA workers relative to their regular employee counterparts is higher when FSAs are used to generate cost savings than when they are use to achieve numerical flexibility (Lautsch, 2002). Further research is warranted on how organizations allocate training opportunities among individuals working in different types of staffing arrangements and with different ability levels, on what factors influence those allocation decisions, and on the implications of such allocation decisions for workers’ career paths and wage profiles. Three types of data would be particularly helpful in addressing such questions: (1) case studies of a single organization in which the individual workers, whose staffing arrangements, access to training, and career outcomes may vary, are the unit of analysis; (2) samples of organizations in which one observes each organization’s policies and practices with respect to training workers in different types of staffing arrangements; and (3) longitudinal data on individuals. Other unanswered questions include: Are the training practices of non-THS employers and the outcomes of those practices comparable to those of THS employers? Given the widespread provision of basic general skills training by THS establishments, do THS employers provide employment and training opportunities to workers who otherwise would have limited access to such opportunities? How do the wage profiles and career paths of FSA workers with experience at training firms compare to those of FSA workers with experience at non-training firms? How does the practice of using FSAs to screen workers for positions as regular employees influence training opportunities and career paths for such workers? Advancement opportunities. Given available evidence that many FSA jobs provide employment conditions that appear to be inferior to those in regular employment, it becomes important to assess whether jobs in such FSAs are “deadends” or bridges to jobs with better terms and conditions of employment. Evidence from surveys of firms and from case studies suggests that some firms use FSAs to screen workers for regular employment (Abraham, 1988; Abraham, 1990; Erickcek et al., 2002; Houseman, 2001b). Case studies suggest, moreover, that absent such screening arrangements some employers would be unwilling to consider workers perceived as risky hires (e.g. those with criminal records or poor work histories) for regular employment (Erickcek et al., 2002). Thus, FSA work may provide some of the least marketable members of the labor force with opportunities they would not otherwise have to be considered for regular employment.
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Few studies examine the role of FSA work as transitional employment. Using matched CPS data (DWS and CAEAS), Farber (1999) estimates the extent to which “alternative employment arrangements” are responses to job loss. He finds that workers who lose their jobs are more likely subsequently to be employed in temporary or part-time work (involuntarily) than are non-losers and that such jobs are part of a transitional process back to full-time regular employment. Based on analyses of multiple data bases, Schur (2003) concludes that FSAs offer employment opportunities for disabled workers whose health might prevent them from holding regular jobs and, for some disabled workers, may facilitate transitions to regular employment. Segal and Sullivan’s (1995) analyses of U.S. CPS data suggest that less than one-third of temporary workers were still temporaries a year later and more than half were in permanent positions. Observing that whether employment as an agency temporary is dead-end employment or a bridge to a job in a more desirable form of staffing arrangement depends upon whether employment spells as agency temporaries are long or short, Segal and Sullivan (1997b) use Washington State Unemployment Insurance (UI) data in which career histories on a sample of individual workers are tracked for 11 years (1984–1994). Their analyses suggest that for most individuals, spells of work as an agency temporary tend to be brief – the average duration is only about two quarters with 75% of temporary employment being accounted for by spells of a year or less, and, for a majority (58%), such spells end with a transition to permanent work (Segal & Sullivan, 1997b). Nevertheless, for a sizable minority, spells of temporary work do not end with a transition to permanent work. Because the Washington UI data do not have any demographic or occupational information, the authors are not able to examine whether such traits influence the duration of temporary employment spells or the likelihood that a spell of work as an agency temporary will lead to regular employment. This would be a fruitful topic for future investigation. The limited evidence available to date suggests that FSA work provides bridges to regular employment or transitional employment between spells of regular employment for many workers. Nevertheless, a sizable minority of FSA workers appears to be “stuck” in FSA jobs. This raises an empirical question that warrants further investigation: what factors facilitate a successful and speedy transition to regular employment? Although common sense suggests that individual traits are likely to influence such transitions, there is some evidence that organizational factors also play a role. Using a sample of establishments, Lautsch (1998) finds that the percent of temporaries later hired as regular employees by the establishment is positively related to the importance to management of flexibility relative to cost considerations and inversely related to the competitiveness of the environment and to the presence of a union. Analyses of four case studies suggest that the withinfirm mobility from FSA jobs to regular employment is highest when FSAs are
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used to facilitate numerical flexibility and when the technology prevents managers from shifting the skill mix of tasks between regular employees and FSAs and is lowest when FSAs are used to achieve cost savings (Lautsch, 2002). Union representation. U.S. labor law is geared to providing union representation and collective bargaining rights to individuals who are employees. Not surprisingly, descriptive data suggest that full-time, regular employees are more likely to have union representation than employees in most flexible staffing arrangements (Kalleberg et al., 1997, p. 49). On-call workers are an exception to this generalization; they are slightly more likely than full-time regular employees to be union members or covered by a collective bargaining agreement (Kalleberg et al., 1997, p. 49). Noting a variety of potential benefits to unions from organizing individuals in FSAs, Stone and Gallagher (1997) hypothesize that both on-call workers and agency temporaries would probably be more receptive to organizing efforts than independent contractors, with on-call workers being the easiest of the three types of workers to organize. They note further that both on-call workers and agency temporaries might be good candidates for associate union membership whereas independent contractors might be receptive to occupational unionism (Stone & Gallagher, 1997). Their conceptual analysis suggests a need for careful empirical analyses of the impact that the type of staffing arrangement in which an individual works has on his or her attitude toward unions and desire for union representation. Other job attributes. The type of staffing arrangement in which an individual works also may have implications for the worker’s physical well-being. U.S. rules for assigning legal liability for the costs of job-related accidents deter client organizations from providing employees of contract firms working at the client site with safety-related training and supervision (Rebitzer, 1998). Arguing that FSAs typically are less experienced and skilled; less familiar with equipment, people, and norms at a work site; and receive less safety-related training than regular employees, Rousseau and Libuser (1997) hypothesize that FSAs are at greater risk of on-the-job accidents, injuries, and deaths than regular employees. Rousseau and Libuser’s (1997) review of the largely descriptive evidence from two high-risk industries – coal mining and petrochemicals – provides preliminary support for this hypothesis. Rebitzer’s (1998) analysis of the determinants of accidents among contract and direct-hire employees working in maintenance jobs in the petrochemical industry provide even stronger support: other things equal, the incidence of accidents was significantly and substantially higher among contractor employees than among direct-hire employees. Rebitzer’s (1998) results also suggest that closer safety supervision of contract employees by the client organization – proxied by a requirement that contract employees report onthe-job accidents, injuries, and safety problems to the client organization as
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well as to the contracting organization – significantly reduces the incidence of contract employee accidents. Consistent with the view that safety training by contractors may be less than adequate, Rebitzer (1998) finds no evidence of a relationship between contractor-provided safety training and the incidence of contract employee accidents at client organization sites. Alternatively, individuals who take jobs as contract employees may be inherently more difficult to train than those who take jobs as direct-hires (Rebitzer, 1998). Chattopadhyay and George (2001) report evidence that short-term hires perceive their jobs as having a lower level of prestige than regular employees. Additionally, both the degree and nature of control exerted over workers may vary by type of staffing arrangement. Gottfried (1991) describes the control mechanisms developed by four temporary help firms and hypothesizes that agency temporaries will be subjected to different methods of control than regular employees. Although Gottfried (1991) lacks the control group of regular employees needed to test his hypothesis, James’ (1998) finding that workers who are employees are subject to less managerial control than non-employee contractors provides support for the general proposition that control mechanisms differ for the two types of workers. Attitudes. The assumption that the work-related attitudes and behavior of workers in FSAs will differ from those of regular employees permeates the literature on FSAs. On one hand, FSAs may attract workers from different populations and with correspondingly different attitudinal and behavioral tendencies than regular employment. On the other hand, the nature of work in FSAs may provide different psychological experiences for workers than regular employment, resulting in attitudinal and behavioral differences between workers in FSAs and regular employees. Lee and Johnson (1991) find that temporary employees had significantly higher organizational commitment and job satisfaction than regular employees in the same organization. Tests of individual hypotheses in Lee and Johnson’s model generally yield stronger results for temporary than for permanent employees. Allen and Sienko (1998) report that regular employees evince higher satisfaction with job security than short-term hires in similar jobs in the same organization, but observe no differences in the mean levels of pay satisfaction reported by the two types of employees. The attitudes of FSA workers, like those of regular employees, vary with other attributes of the individual and the job. In support of their general hypothesis that organizational commitment and job satisfaction are influenced by both the individual’s work schedule (full- or part-time) and whether it is the individual’s preferred work schedule, Lee and Johnson (1991) find that full-time temporary employees have higher organizational commitment than part-time temporary employees when both work a preferred schedule, but have lower organizational
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commitment and lower job satisfaction than part-time temporary employees when both work an unpreferred schedule. Using data from a survey of agency temporaries, Feldman et al. (1995) find that such temps report higher satisfaction with several aspects of their work when they are temps by choice, are placed in positions consistent with prior experience and education, and are not trying to convert to more permanent employment. Similarly, Ellingson et al. (1998) find that pay satisfaction and satisfaction with temporary work are higher among voluntary than among involuntary agency temporaries. Taken together, these findings suggest that the work-related attitudes of individual’s working in FSAs may be strongly influenced by whether an individual is working in his preferred type of staffing arrangement and whether other characteristics of the job (e.g. work schedule) are compatible with the individual’s human capital investments and preferences. Organizations that staff the same jobs with a mixture of similarly-qualified FSAs and regular employees provide ideal settings for exploring the effect that working in an FSA has on worker attitudes or behavior. Findings from two studies of this type fail to support the conventional wisdom that regular employees will exhibit greater organizational commitment and more extra-role behaviors than workers in FSAs (Lautsch, 1998; Pearce, 1993). Gallagher and Parks (2001) observe that the various foci (i.e. employment, occupational, job, and organizational commitment) of work commitment may have less relevance or different meanings for FSA workers than for regular employees (Gallagher & Parks, 2001). Although the concept of employment commitment is likely to be relevant for workers in FSAs, as well as for regular employees, one might expect the level of employment commitment to be lower for most FSAs than for regular employees, especially among FSA workers who prefer FSA jobs over regular employment. Depending on the type of FSA, the concepts of occupational commitment, job commitment, and organizational commitment may be either inapplicable or have different meanings for FSA workers (Gallagher & Parks, 2001). For example, for workers employed by labor market intermediaries, it might be appropriate to adapt the concept of dual (organizational) commitment (to the employing organization and the client organization) that has successfully been applied to unionized workers. Thus, it may be necessary to rethink or modify these concepts of commitment when applying them to FSA workers. Consistent with this view, McClurg (1999) finds that the Steers (1977) model of organizational commitment, which has been widely used in non-THS settings, performed poorly when tested using a sample of employees of THS firms. Similarly, the concept of job satisfaction and its various components may be irrelevant or have different meanings for various types of FSA workers than for regular employee. For example, application of the concept of job satisfaction to employees of labor market intermediaries requires careful consideration of how
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to define the job. Specifically, is the “job” defined by the worker’s “job” as an employee of the labor market intermediary or by the tasks and attributes of the work the worker performs for a particular client organization? Which definition of job is used is likely to have an impact on both measurement and results. Worker performance. In one study comparing the work performance of similarly situated FSAs and regular employees, managers of high-tech organizations who supervised both contractors and regular employees in professional jobs perceived overall contractor performance to be at least as good as that of regular employees (Jarmon et al., 1998). While this suggests that using FSAs is unlikely to have either positive or negative effects on organizational performance, it would be useful to test whether this result applies to other professions, to workers in nonprofessional occupations, and to workers in other types of FSAs. Moreover, there is some evidence that the performance of FSA workers is likely to depend upon job characteristics and workers’ satisfaction with their job. Specifically, Ellingson et al. (1998) estimated a model of agency temporary performance, as rated by a representative of the client firm in which the temporary completed the job assignment. Their findings suggest that an agency temporary worker’s performance is positively and significantly related to assignment length, to the temporary’s overall assignment satisfaction, and to the temporary’s satisfaction with temporary work.21 Drawing on interviews with a small sample of agency temporaries, Rogers (1995) provides anecdotal evidence that agency temporaries experience alienation from their work, from co-workers in both the temporary agency and the client organization, and from themselves. The absence of a control group of nontemporaries, however, suggests caution in attributing the alienation to temporary work. Using a sample of temporary and regular employees working in the same jobs for a single organization, Lautsch (1998) finds no differences between temporaries and regular employees in work-family conflict.
OTHER EFFECTS OF USING FSAs The effects of using FSAs are unlikely to be limited to incumbents. FSA usage may also influence the attitudes, terms, and conditions of employment of regular employees working in the same organization. If FSA workers differ systematically from regular employees in their attitudes and behavior; if organizations systematically treat FSA workers differently than regular employees; or if the cost of utilizing of FSA workers differs from the cost of utilizing regular employees, controlling for productivity; then the use of FSAs may have an impact on organizational performance. Similarly, if FSAs systematically experience
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different terms and conditions of employment than regular workers or if FSAs influence organizational performance, then the share of the labor force working in FSAs is likely to have an impact on macroeconomic outcomes. While there are a very limited number of studies of the effects of FSA usage on regular employee co-workers, on organizational performance, and on macroeconomic outcomes, including them in our review can assist in pinpointing future research needs. Effects on regular employee co-workers. Surveys of organizations indicate that some firms use FSAs in order to buffer regular employees against demand fluctuations, which suggests that using FSAs may enhance a firm’s ability to make long-term commitments to regular employees (Abraham, 1988; Abraham, 1990; Houseman, 2001b; Kahn et al., 2001). Gramm and Schnell (2001) find that the extent to which an organization relies on temporary lay-offs for regular core employees is inversely related to the use of in-house flexible employment relationships in core jobs. Wiens-Tuers (2001) finds that an establishment is more likely to have a commitment to its core regular employees if it uses short-term hires; in contrast, the use of “indirect and intermediate employment relationships,” which include agency temporaries and contract employees, is not significantly related to the likelihood of a commitment to core regular employees.22 Thus, while both of these studies support the view that FSAs are used to buffer regular core employees against demand fluctuations, the latter study suggests that short-term hires are more likely to be used for this purpose. The use of FSAs may also influence advancement opportunities for regular employees. Barnett and Miner (1992) find that depending upon the characteristics of the internal labor market in which they are used, hiring temporaries can either prolong or reduce the length of time that regular employees wait for promotion. Specifically, they find that hiring temporary workers into jobs that would otherwise provide promotion opportunities for regular employees delays promotions for regular employees, whereas hiring temporary workers into entry-level jobs in internal labor markets with few such entry portals hastens promotions for regular employees. Working along side of FSAs may also influence the attitudes of regular employees. Pearce (1993) finds that regular employees in work units with contractor co-workers reported lower trust in their organization than regular employees performing similar work in employee-only work units. Davis-Blake et al. (2003) find that using temporary workers increased intentions to quit among regular employees in the same job and decreased their perceptions of the quality of their relations with managers, their loyalty, and their desire to unionize. The magnitudes of the temporary worker usage effects on loyalty and relations with manager were lower for high wage regular employees; however, having a high wage did not moderate the effects of temporary usage on regular employees’
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quit intentions or desire for union representation (Davis-Blake et al., 2003). Additionally, the effects of temporary usage on exit intentions and desire to unionize were moderated by the degree of training and supervisory responsibilities of the regular employee (Davis-Blake et al., 2003). The use of contract company employees to perform work associated with the jobs of regular employees also had a negative effect on regular employees’ perceptions of the quality of their relations with managers, although this effect was not moderated by the wage level of regular employees and its magnitude was smaller than the magnitude of the effect of using temporary workers (Davis-Blake et al., 2003). Using contract company employees did not significantly affect regular employees’ exit intentions, loyalty, or desire to unionize (Davis-Blake et al., 2003). Contrary to their hypothesis, Chattopadhyay and George (2001) find that among regular employees, greater work status dissimilarity (i.e. dissimilarity to co-workers in terms of the type of staffing arrangement) is associated with a more positive attraction to co-workers. In work groups comprised of both short-term hires and regular employees but dominated by short-term hires, work status dissimilarity had a negative effect on the organization-based self-esteem, trust in and attraction to peers, and altruism toward peers of regular employees (Chattopadhyay & George, 2001). The use of FSAs appears to influence the job content of their regular employee co-workers. Pearce (1993) finds that when some jobs in a work unit are staffed by contractors, tasks requiring interdependence among co-workers are shifted from the contractors to regular employees. Supervisors reported during interviews that they tried whenever possible to assign simpler and more easily monitored tasks to contractors (Pearce, 1993). In a study applying the Hackman and Oldham (1980) job characteristics model to a sample of regular employees and short-term hires employed in the same types of professional and technical jobs within a single organizations, Allen and Sienko (1998) find differences between the two groups of workers in two of the five core job characteristics identified by the model. Specifically, compared to regular employees, shortterm hires reported higher levels of task identity and higher levels of feedback from job (Allen & Sienko, 1998).23 These results suggest that even when regular employees and FSAs work side-by-side in the same jobs, there may be subtle differences in the tasks they perform and, in particular, that organizations may try to allocate tasks such that the work of FSAs is either more easily monitored or self-monitoring than than the work of regular employees who are ostensibly performing the same jobs. Such subtle differences may account, at least in part, for an organization’s decision to treat FSAs differently than regular employees and for attitudinal and behavioral differences between FSAs and regular employees.
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The effects of FSAs on the terms and conditions of employment, attitudes, and behavior of regular employee co-workers is unlikely to be uniform across organizations. Evidence from organizational case studies of the use of agency temporaries and contract company employees in low-skilled jobs by auto suppliers, hospitals, and public schools conducted by Erickcek et al. (2002) suggest that the effects of FSA work on regular employees’ wages, benefits, and working conditions vary considerably with the organizational context. They find stronger adverse effects when the FSAs are long-term substitutes for, and receive lower compensation than, regular employees (Erickcek et al., 2002). Organizational performance. Conceptual and theoretical work by organizational scholars suggests that the use of FSAs and the context in which they are used can significantly affect organizational performance (e.g. Matusik & Hill, 1998; Pfeffer & Baron, 1988). A small number of recent studies have begun to explore these effects empirically. In one recent study, Kahn (2000) couples findings based on in-depth interviews with a small sample of HR executives regarding how growth in the use of temporary workers influences profitability and/or productivity, with an industry-level analysis of a broader category of “nonstandard workers.” Both of Kahn’s (2000) analyses indicate that organizations made increasing use of flexible staffing arrangements in the mid- to late-1990s in order to adapt to variability in financial performance. Additionally, Kahn (2000) reports that increases in nonstandard worker usage are positively correlated with productivity but not significantly correlated with profitability. Using data on a small sample of firms (n = 35), Kahn et al. (2001) estimate simple correlations between temporary usage and several measures of organizational performance. The share of temporaries in the firm’s workforces is positively correlated with the change in the share price of the firm’s stock over the five year period and the change in primary earnings per share (Kahn et al., 2001). A measure of strategic changes in the use of temporaries is positively correlated with various profitability measures. Their findings, although exploratory in nature, provide some support for the notion that organizations can use FSAs as part of a staffing strategy designed to enhance organizational financial performance (Kahn et al., 2001). Research by Bendapudi and Ash (1999), moreover, suggests that the effect of using FSAs on organizational performance depends on degree of fit between the choice of staffing arrangements and a firm’s competitive strategy. A recent article by Lepak et al. (2003) explores the effects of four “employment modes” – knowledge-based employment, job-based employment, contract work, and alliances/partnerships – on two measures of firm performance, return on equity (ROE) and market-to-book (RTB). Although they do not define these four employment modes in terms of flexible staffing arrangements, we infer from their
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definitions that knowledge-based employees would consist of regular employees with (implicit or explicit) contracts providing long-term employment with considerable training and development opportunities; that job-based employees would consist of regular employees whose contracts provide less security, training, and development as well as short-term hires and on-call workers; that contract workers would include independent contractors, agency temporaries and consultants; and that alliances/partnerships would include contract firm employees and leased workers. Both of their measures of firm performance increase with the degree of reliance on knowledge-based employment and the degree of reliance on contract work, but are not significantly influenced by the degree of reliance on the other two employment modes (Lepak et al., 2003). Additionally, their findings indicate that how employment modes are combined influences firm performance. Specifically, firms using a mix of knowledge-based employment and contract work perform better than firms relying on only one or neither of these employment modes (Lepak et al., 2003). Moreover, the relationship between reliance on a job-based employment mode and firm performance was positive when the firm also relied heavily on contract work but negative when firms relied less heavily on contract work (Lepak et al., 2003). Keeping in mind the caveat that the links between “employment modes” and categories of staffing arrangements are imprecise, these findings suggest that using a mix of regular employees combination with non-employee forms of FSAs may be desirable. Finally, Lepak et al. (2003) provide some evidence of interaction effects between employment modes and technological intensity. FSA usage can also influence organizational performance if it raises or lowers the cost of doing business relative to the use of regular employees. In contrast to the many individual-level studies comparing the wages and benefits of FSA workers with those of regular employees, there are few organizational-level studies comparing labor costs for FSAs and regular employees. In one such study, Park and Butler (2001) find that one component of labor costs – workers’ compensation costs – are three times greater for leased workers than they are for regular fulltime workers. This result is consistent with evidence of higher injury rates for contract firm employees than for regular workers (Rebitzer, 1998; Rousseau & Libuser, 1997). Park and Butler (2001) attribute their finding mainly to higher claim frequency rates for leased workers. Because the leasing agency is unable to monitor the safety behavior of its employees, and because these workers typically enjoy benefits packages that are inferior to that of regular employees, Park and Butler (2001) argue that leased workers are prone to “claims-reporting moral hazard.” Alternatively, the differential workers’ compensation costs between these two groups may reflect differences in safety-related training provided for or human capital (i.e. trainability) differences between leased workers and regular employees.
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Macroeconomic outcomes. If employment in some forms of FSAs provides less employment stability than regular employment, then growth in the share of the labor force working in those FSAs is likely to decrease aggregate job stability. Simulations suggest that the rapid growth in U.S. agency temporary employment over the 1986–1987 to 1995–1996 period resulted in a modest decline in aggregate job stability (Houseman & Polivka, 1998). Kahn (1998) finds evidence that the magnitude of decreases in an occupation’s interindustry wage differential increases with the share of employment in an occupation that is self-employed or contracted out. Her analyses suggest, however, that only a small portion of the fall in interindustry wage differentials occurring during the late 1980s and the 1990s are attributable to this relationship. Growth in the share of employment in FSAs also may have implications for the interpretation of macroeconomic indicators. For example, Segal and Sullivan (1995) estimate that half of the measured job loss in manufacturing employment in the early nineties may be attributable to the increased share of leased and temporary workers working in industrial jobs. They also note that the accuracy of estimates of wage inflation and productivity in manufacturing may be affected by the growing share of temporary and leased workers who are working in manufacturing jobs, but are counted as PSS employment in government statistics (Segal & Sullivan, 1995). Similarly, Katz and Krueger (1999) hypothesize that improvements in labor market competition and the efficiency in job matching resulting from the rapid growth of private sector labor market intermediaries, especially temporary help agencies, may help explain the unusual combination of low inflation and low unemployment in the 1990s. Their empirical analyses suggest that states with a greater share of agency temporary employment at the start of the decade experienced lower wage growth in the 1990s (Katz & Krueger, 1999). They further estimate that the temporary help industry may account for a decline of 0.39 percentage points over the past decade in the level of unemployment consistent with stable inflation (the NAIRU) (Katz & Krueger, 1999). Although these findings are, in the authors’ words, “preliminary (and quite speculative),” they suggest that growth in the temporary help sector may explain as much of the decline in unemployment as changes in the demographic composition of the labor market (Katz & Krueger, 1999).
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION FOR FUTURE RESEARCH During the last decade and a half, there has been an explosion of U.S. empirical research investigating the effects of using FSAs. Our review has focused on
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studies investigating the effects of using FSAs on individuals working in such arrangements, on regular employees in the same organization, on organizational performance, and on macroeconomic outcomes. Of these, the body of literature investigating the effects of FSA work on incumbents, especially on their pay, is the most extensive and well-developed, although there is still ample need for further research on such effects. The bodies of literature investigating the effects of using FSA workers on regular employees working in the same organization, on organizational performance, and on macroeconomic outcomes remain quite sparse and offer numerous avenues for future research. Effects of Working in FSAs on Incumbent Workers. Much of the research on this broad topic investigates the compensation effects of working in various types of FSAs, especially agency temporary work. One result is relatively robust across studies using cross-sectional as well as longitudinal data on individuals and after controlling for the effect of work schedule: agency temporaries on average earn lower hourly wage rates than regular employees. The relatively rare exceptions occur in studies of regular employees and agency temporaries working in similar or identical jobs in a single organization, studies of a single profession, or analyses in which the sample is limited to female workers, suggesting a clear need for occupation-specific, organization-specific and gender-specific investigations of this gap. The bodies of research on wage differentials between regular employees and workers in other types of FSAs and on the nonwage effects of FSA work are sparser. Nevertheless, several stylized facts emerge from this literature: Independent contractors and contract company employees, on average, earn as much or more than regular employees. Workers in most types of FSAs are less likely to have employer-provided health insurance and pensions than regular employees; however, independent contractors and contract company workers, as well as professionals in working in other types of FSAs, frequently appear to receive hourly earnings premiums to compensate for the lack of benefits. Although regular employees on average have greater job stability than FSA workers, the majority of FSA workers do not work in contingent jobs. For some workers, FSA jobs offer training opportunities that they might otherwise not receive. For many workers, FSA jobs offer bridges to regular employment or to other types of FSA jobs with more favorable terms and conditions of employment. We offer, however, the following caveats to these generalizations. First, most of the existing studies use individual-level, cross-sectional data that control imperfectly for occupation, individual productivity-related characteristics, and work schedules
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and do not control at all for job-specific and organization-specific factors. There is some evidence that outcomes of FSA work for incumbents may be influenced by these factors, indicating a need to better control for them in future research. Second, most cross-sectional studies assume that workers are randomly assigned to some type of staffing arrangement, implying that estimated differences in outcomes are attributable to the type of staffing arrangement. Available evidence calls into question the validity of this assumption (e.g. Farber, 1999; Polivka et al., 2000), suggesting a need to confirm whether these stylized facts are robust after controlling for sample selectivity. In general, the body of literature investigating the wage gap between agency temporaries and regular employees provides an excellent template for future research on the wage gap between regular employees and other types of FSA workers and on the nonwage effects of FSA-work on incumbents. Further research is needed to establish the robustness of these stylized facts. In particular, additional studies using longitudinal data on individuals, studies isolating the FSA effect from the work schedule effect, organizational level studies examining differences between FSA workers and regular employee co-workers in the same job, and studies examining whether the effects of FSA work differ by gender and other demographic characteristics are needed. Finally, it is useful to consider whether the extant evidence provides an answer to a key empirical question raised by the controversy over growing employment in flexible staffing arrangements: Do FSA jobs provide substandard terms and conditions of employment as adherents of the negative view of FSAs assert? The answer appears to be, not necessarily. Rather, the extant evidence suggests considerable diversity in the quality of FSA jobs. We interpret the available evidence as suggesting that FSA employment can be characterized as having “three faces” reflecting three distinct clusters of job attributes, which we will refer to as: (1) secondary FSA jobs; (2) primary FSA jobs; and (3) transitional FSA jobs.24 Secondary FSA jobs correspond to the negative view’s conceptualization of FSA jobs. Compared to regular employment, these jobs provide low pay, few or no benefits, minimal employment security, little or no opportunities for training or advancement, and other less desirable working conditions. Perhaps one of the most pressing future research needs is to more fully explore what factors influence who ends up in secondary FSA jobs and what steps or interventions might assist such workers in successfully bridging to more favorable types of employment. In terms of their overall quality, primary FSA jobs are comparable to regular employment and are superior to secondary FSA jobs. Some primary FSA jobs provide earnings, benefits, and other working conditions that are similar to those provided by regular employment in the same occupation. For other primary FSA jobs, some elements of the terms and conditions of employment may be inferior
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to those typically provided by regular employment in the same occupation, but such differences are balanced by compensating wage differentials or other job attributes for which the incumbent has a preference. In other words, the value of the total package of employment terms of the primary FSA job is comparable to that of regular employment in the same occupation. Another factor distinguishing primary FSA jobs from secondary FSA jobs is that primary FSA jobs provide either relatively continuous employment (like regular employment) or the opportunity to work with the degree of frequency desired by the incumbent. Thus, some workers may prefer primary FSA jobs over regular employment because they offer relatively high quality employment that accommodates atypical preferences for job attributes, such as intermittent work or a compensation package heavily weighted toward cash. Transitional FSA jobs have some attributes in common with secondary FSA jobs. In particular, they tend to provide lower pay and benefits than regular employment. However, unlike secondary FSA jobs, transitional FSA jobs have attributes that facilitate the incumbent’s transition either into a higher quality type of job (i.e. regular employment or a primary FSA job) or into retirement. Examples include FSA jobs designed to screen and/or train incumbents for regular employment; agency temporary jobs that provide a significant amount of general training and, thus, permit the incumbent to acquire the human capital required to attain a better job; or jobs whose combined attributes address the needs of workers who want to retire from regular employment but not to fully cease working in their occupation or profession. Further research is needed to assess whether actual FSA jobs, based upon their attributes, can be categorized in accordance with the three faces of FSA work that we propose. Conducting such research will require individual-level data with fairly detailed information on job attributes as well as the type of staffing arrangement in which an individual works. If the categorization of FSA jobs as primary, secondary or transitional proves to be empirically meaningful, further research will be needed to estimate the share of the labor force in primary FSA jobs, secondary FSA jobs, and transitional FSA jobs, respectively; and to explore what sorts workers among these three faces of FSA jobs and regular employment. Based on the extant literature, we believe that there may be associations between the type of FSA (i.e, agency temporary, independent contractor, short-term hire, oncall worker, contract company worker) and whether the job can be characterized as a primary, a transitional, or a secondary FSA job. Nevertheless, the universe of jobs in any given type of flexible staffing arrangement is likely to include some primary FSA jobs, some transitional FSA jobs, and some secondary FSA jobs. For example, although contract company workers, agency consultants, and independent contractors are more likely than workers in other types of FSAs to
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have primary FSA jobs, some contract company workers, agency consultants, and independent contracts will have jobs that are either secondary FSA jobs or transitional FSA jobs. Thus, it will be necessary to investigate what individual traits (e.g. demographic, productivity-related traits, occupation, personal preferences), and organizational traits (e.g. business strategy, reason for using FSAs, job design) influence whether an individual works in regular employment, a primary FSA job, a transitional FSA job, or a secondary FSA job. Other effects of using FSAs. Existing research provides some preliminary evidence that the use of FSA workers may influence the attitudes, performance, job security, advancement opportunities, and work tasks of regular employees working in the same organization. Additional research is needed both to expand our understanding of these relationships and to examine the effects of FSA usage on other terms and conditions of employment for regular employee co-workers. For example, Kandel and Pearson (2001) have hypothesized that several additional terms and conditions of employment of regular employees (e.g. use of incentive pay, screening practices, training investments) may be influenced by the share of the employer’s work force who are FSA workers. Other scholars have suggested that some firms use FSA workers to support efficiency wages for their regular workers, which suggests there will be within-firm compensation differentials favoring regular employees over their FSA co-workers. It is important to note that how FSAs affect regular employees in an organization is likely to depend on the organization’s motive for using FSAs, the types of FSAs used, and the manner in which they are used (e.g. whether the FSAs are used to supplement regular employees in a job or to substitute completely for employing regular employees to perform work). Both organizational scholars and adherents to the positive and negative views of FSAs have articulated propositions regarding consequences for organizational performance of using FSAs. The body of empirical research addressing the link between the firm’s choice of staffing arrangements and firm performance is small and most studies are exploratory in nature. Nevertheless, available evidence is consistent with the view that the mix of staffing arrangements used has implications for firm performance. Because the effects of staffing arrangement choices on firm performance may be contingent on the context in which they are used (e.g. business strategy, job design, technology, motivations for using FSAs), a more systematic exploration of the inter-relationships between FSA usage, other contextual factors, and firm performance is needed. Moreover, most of the existing literature focuses on macro-organizational performance measures (e.g. profitability). Staffing arrangement choices, however, are likely to have their most direct impact on measures of human resource performance in the firm, which in turn, are likely to influence indicators of macro-organizational performance. Thus,
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there is a need to more fully explore the effects of staffing arrangement choices on different indicators of human resource performance. For example, under what circumstances, if any, does the use of FSAs result in lower labor costs than the use of regular employees? Does using FSAs decrease the likelihood of employmentrelated litigation? Does using FSAs to screen workers for regular employment result in better worker-job matches than alternative screening methods? There have been only a handful of studies investigating the macroeconomic effects of the presence of FSA workers in the labor force. Available evidence suggests that changes in the share of the labor force working in FSAs has implications for the accuracy and interpretation of estimates of indicators of macroeconomic performance. These implications warrant further investigation. Additionally, there is a need for research investigating the impacts that the shares of the labor force working in various types of FSAs have on both aggregate earnings distributions and the proportion of the population lacking medical insurance coverage. The lack of time series data on the share of the labor force in most types of FSAs (agency temporaries are the exception) has been the primary barrier to such research. Thus, there is a need for better time series data on the share of the labor force working in FSAs to further explore the relationship between the share of workers in various FSAs and aggregate economic outcomes. A final comment on the positive and negative views of FSAs. In light of the evidence available to date, what can be said about the validity of the positive and negative views of flexible staffing arrangements? The short answer is that neither polar view can be wholly embraced or dismissed. On one hand, consistent with the negative view, there is considerable evidence that some FSA jobs provide less favorable terms and conditions of employment than regular employment. On the other hand, it is clear that not all FSA jobs are substandard. In addition, consistent with assertions by adherents to the positive view, FSA jobs appear to provide bridges to regular employment for some workers who might otherwise not be considered for such employment. Finally, evidence regarding the organizational and macroeconomic effects of FSA usage, in our view, remains too sparse and too exploratory in nature to confirm or refute assertions regarding those effects associated with either view.
NOTES 1. Both regular employment and FSA work may offer either full- or part-time work schedules. Thus, the type of staffing arrangement and the type of work schedule are distinct constructs. See Lee and Johnson (1991).
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2. These definitions are not without controversy. First, the BLS definitions rely on worker perceptions of the security of their jobs, which may not be consistent with the intentions of the organization at which they work. For example, anecdotal evidence suggests that employers in states recognizing the contract exception to the employment-at-will doctrine sometimes deliberately avoid labeling jobs as temporary or permanent in order to prevent breach-of-contract lawsuits when they terminate employees. Second, Kalleberg et al. (1997, pp. 36–37) argue that even the most inclusive of the BLS definitions is too narrow, asserting that the length of time an individual has worked in an arrangement is minimally relevant to future job security and that the criterion of an expected duration of a year or less is too restrictive, even for independent contractors and the self-employed. Although the BLS criteria may result in under-estimation of the share of employed who hold insecure jobs, the Kalleberg et al. (1997) assumptions – that all workers who are uncertain if their job is temporary, who are uncertain if they can work for their employer as long as they want, and who are on-call/day laborers hold insecure jobs – may result in overstating the share of employed holding insecure jobs. 3. The temporary help industry prefers the labels of temporary help “firm” or “service” to the label of temporary help “agency.” 4. The adoption of the implied contract exception creates an incentive to substitute agency temporaries for regular employees because state courts have not extended that exception’s protections against at-will dismissals to agency temporaries. Two other exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine – the public policy exception and the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing exception – create a cause of action for agency temporaries as well as for regular employees (Autor, 2000a). Not surprisingly, a state’s adoption of either of these latter two exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine does not have a significant impact on THS employment growth after controlling for other covariates (Autor, 2000a). 5. The CAEAS has been conducted every other year beginning in 1995. Most empirical research to date has used the 1995 or 1997 sample. 6. Their base model controls for age, age-squared, gender, race, education, marital status, tenure, tenure-squared, region, city type (center city, suburban, rural), industry, and occupation. 7. Controls are included for four race/ethnicity categories, six education levels, four Census regions, three urban/city categories, age and age squared, two marital status categories, being a leased worker, and whether born in the U.S. 8. Unless otherwise noted, the more complete models estimated in Kalleberg et al. (1997) control for 14 industries, 12 occupations, receipt of either employer-sponsored health insurance or a pension, and union membership or coverage by a union contract, as well as personal characteristics and location. 9. A full review of the theoretical and empirical effects of work schedule on the terms and conditions of employment is beyond the scope of this paper. See Barling and Gallagher (1996) for a review of research on part-time employment. 10. The direction of the bias (i.e. whether the estimated effect overstates or understates the true effect) may vary depending on the dependent variable and the type of FSA employment. For example, assuming that part-time work has a negative impact on hourly earnings, if hourly earnings rates are higher for independent contractors than for regular employees, in hourly earnings models in which the reference category is full-time regular employees and in which the independent contractor variable includes both full- and part-timers, the coefficient on the independent contractor variable will be biased toward zero, thereby
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understating the effect of working in that FSA. Conversely, if hourly earnings rates are lower for agency temporaries than for regular employees, in hourly earnings models in which the reference category is full-time regular employees and in which the agency temporary variable includes both full- and part-timers, the coefficient on the agency temporary variable will be biased away from zero, thereby overstating the effect of working in the FSA. 11. They do not distinguish short-term hires from regular employees. 12. Her models control for age, marital status, education, and number of children. 13. Segal and Sullivan (1995) note that the PSS industry includes employment agencies and other help supply services as well as temporary help supply (THS) firms and that employment in the PSS industry is not all temporary: it includes regular employees who recruit and place the temporary employees as well as the temporary employees. Thus, not all workers classified as employed in the PSS industry fit the standard conceptualization of an agency temporary. They provide evidence, however, that THS employment accounts for the bulk of PSS employment and that only only a small share of PSS firm employees are regular employees. 14. They control for age, age-squared, race, sex, and educational attainment, and allow for year-specific wage inflation rates. 15. Their controls include age, race, sex, education, census division, metropolitan area, union status, part-time status, and one-digit occupation. 16. The latter models control for several observable productivity-related characteristics. 17. See Houseman (2001a) for a detailed discussion of the incentives for employers to use FSAs to save on employee benefit costs. 18. Although not eligible for such benefits from the client organization whose work they perform, leased workers, contract company workers, agency temporaries, and agency consultants may be eligible for such benefits from the intermediary firm that employs them. 19. Kalleberg et al. (2000) control for employment insecurity, unionization, occupational complexity, race, marital status, children, education, age, age-squared, city type (suburban, urban, rural), region, occupation, and industry. 20. The failure to identify short-term hires as a distinct category of alternative staffing arrangement is one of the drawbacks of the CAEAS categorization of staffing arrangements. Estimates from organizational surveys provide evidence that the incidence of using shortterm hires is fairly high – 20–44% (Houseman, 2001b; Lautsch, 1998). 21. Their models control for age, gender, education, work experience, clerical experience, temporary work experience, and measures of the extent to which the individual was voluntarily working as a temp. 22. Wiens-Tuers (2001) defines an organization as having such a commitment if it has an implicit or explicit agreement or in actual practice goes to substantial or great lengths to avoid lay-offs. 23. Task identity is the degree to which a job involves completion of a task from beginning to end with a visible outcome; feedback from job is the degree to which doing the job provides the worker with clear feedback on the effectiveness of his performance. 24. Our labels for the former two clusters borrow terminology from the literature on dual labor markets because their attributes resemble those of jobs in the secondary and primary labor markets, respectively. Categorizing FSA job quality based on clusters of job attributes is consistent with Osterman’s (1987) prediction that work practices and worker outcomes tend to cluster together.
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Matusik, S. R., & Hill, C. W. L. (1998). The utilization of contingent work, knowledge creation, and competitive advantage. Academy of Management Review, 23(October), 680–997. McClurg, L. N. (1999). Organizational commitment in the temporary-help service industry. Journal of Applied Management Studies, 8(June), 5–26. Osterman, P. (1987). Choice of employment systems in internal labor markets. Industrial Relations, 26(1), 46–67. Park, Y.-S., & Butler, R. J. (2001). The safety costs of contingent work: Evidence from Minnesota. Journal of Labor Research, 22(Fall), 831–849. Pearce, J. L. (1993). Toward an organizational behavior of contract laborers: Their psychological involvement and effects on employee coworkers. Academy of Management Journal, 36, 1082– 1096. Pfeffer, J., & Baron, J. N. (1988). Taking the workers back out: Recent trends in the structuring of employment. Research in Organizational Behavior, 10, 257–303. Polivka, A. E. (1996). Contingent and alternative work arrangements, defined. Monthly Labor Review (October), 3–9. Polivka, A. E., Cohany, S. R., & Hipple, S. (2000). Definitions, composition, and economic consequences of the nonstandard work force. In: F. Carr´e, M. A. Ferber, L. Golden & S. A. Herzenberg (Eds), Nonstandard Work: The Nature and Challenges of Changing Employment Arrangements. Champaign, IL: Industrial Relations Research Association. Rebitzer, J. B. (1998). Job safety and contract workers in the petrochemical industry. In: K. Barker & K. Christensen (Eds), Contingent Work: American Employment Relations in Transition. Ithaca, NY: ILR Press. Rogers, J. K. (1995). Just a temp: Experience and structure of alienation in temporary clerical employment. Work and Occupations, 22(May), 137–166. Rousseau, D. M., & Libuser, C. (1997). Contingent workers in high risk environments. California Management Review, 39(Winter), 103–123. Schur, L. A. (2003). Barriers or opportunities? The causes of contingent and part-time work among people with disabilities. Industrial Relations, 42(October), 589–622. Segal, L. M., & Sullivan, D. G. (1995). The temporary labor force. Economic Perspectives: A Review from the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, 19(2), 2–19. Segal, L. M., & Sullivan, D. G. (1997a). The growth of temporary services work. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 11(Spring), 117–136. Segal, L. M., & Sullivan, D. G. (1997b). Temporary services employment durations: Evidence from state UI Data. Working Paper No. WP-97–23 (December). Chicago: Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. Segal, L. M., & Sullivan, D. G. (1998). Wage differentials for temporary services work: Evidence from administrative data. Working Paper WP-98–2. Chicago: Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. Steers, R. M. (1977). Antecedents and outcomes of organizational commitment. Administrative Science Quarterly, 22, 46–56. Stone, T. H., & Gallagher, D. G. (1997). Contingent workers and labour representation: Worker disposition and union prospects. Paper presented at the 3rd International Conference on Emerging Union Structures: Reshaping Labour Market Institutions, Canberra, Australia (December 1). U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (1995). Contingent and alternative employment arrangements. Report No. 900. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Labor. Wiens-Tuers, B. A. (1998). The relationship of race and outcomes of non-standard labor. Journal of Economic Issues, 32(June), 575–585. Wiens-Tuers, B. A. (2001). Employee attachment and temporary workers. Journal of Economic Issues, 35(March), 45–60.
ADOPTION AND USE OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCEDURES IN THE NONUNION WORKPLACE Alexander J. S. Colvin INTRODUCTION This paper investigates the adoption, structure, and function of dispute resolution procedures in the nonunion workplace. Whereas grievance procedures in unionized workplaces have been an important area of study in the field of industrial relations, research on dispute resolution procedures in nonunion workplaces has lagged behind. As a result, our knowledge of the development of nonunion procedures remains relatively limited. Similarly, with a few noteworthy exceptions (e.g. Lewin, 1987, 1990), our knowledge of workplace grievance activity is almost entirely based on research conducted in unionized settings. Given the major differences in the institutional contexts of union and nonunion workplaces in the United States, existing ideas about workplace dispute resolution developed in the unionized setting will likely require significant modification in order to understand dispute resolution procedures and activity in the nonunion workplace. Issues relating to dispute resolution in the nonunion workplace are of increasing importance to public policy given the combination of continued stagnation in levels of union representation and mounting concerns over rising levels of employment litigation in the courts. Knowing what nonunion dispute resolution procedures look like and how they function will help answer the question of what role these procedures may play in the future governance of the workplace.
Advances in Industrial and Labor Relations Advances in Industrial and Labor Relations, Volume 13, 69–95 Copyright © 2004 by Elsevier Ltd. All rights of reproduction in any form reserved ISSN: 0742-6186/doi:10.1016/S0742-6186(04)13003-5
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In the contemporary unionized workplace, issues of the adoption and structure of grievance procedures spark relatively little controversy. Development and diffusion of union grievance procedures dates to the period of the 1940s War Labor Board and the post-War consolidation of stable collective bargaining. The structure of union grievance procedures has exhibited remarkable stability since that period, with virtually all current unionized workplaces having multi-stage grievance procedures culminating in arbitration (Eaton & Keefe, 1999). By contrast, nonunion dispute resolution procedures vary widely in both their adoption and structure. As many as half of all nonunion workplaces continue to lack any formal procedures for the resolution of employee complaints (Feuille & Chachere, 1995). Among workplaces that do feature formal dispute resolution procedures, these procedures vary in basic features such as, who is the final decision-maker under the procedure, whether employees are permitted representation, what complaints can be brought under the procedure, and what criteria are used to decide disputes (Feuille & Chachere, 1995; Feuille & Delaney, 1992). An initial issue that needs to be addressed with regard to nonunion procedures is what factors shape the diversity in the structures that are used to resolve disputes in the nonunion workplace. As with other areas of industrial relations and human resource practices, environmental pressures and human resource strategies provide two broad categories of factors that may influence the development of nonunion dispute resolution procedures (Barringer & Milkovich, 1998). Among environmental pressures, concerns about workplace disputes giving rise to litigation and the desire to avoid unionization by providing workers with a mechanism for resolving complaints have both been suggested as possible motivations for nonunion organizations to introduce procedures (Feuille & Delaney, 1992). Some have argued, however, that union substitution no longer plays a major role in the introduction of nonunion procedures due to declining unionization levels and reduced fear of organizing activity (Feuille & Delaney, 1992). Others have suggested that the extent of actual litigation pressures on organizations are also often exaggerated, though fear of litigation may provide an important rhetorical device in convincing managers to adopt procedures as an appropriate organizational “best practice” (Edelman, 1990; Edelman et al., 1992, 1999). An alternative category of explanations suggest that nonunion procedures are adopted as part of human resource strategies that emphasize fostering positive relations between employees and management. Arguments from the perspective of organizational justice theory suggest that by providing greater procedural and distributive justice in decision-making, nonunion procedures may reduce turnover and foster greater employee commitment and effort (Olson-Buchanan, 1996). In addition to the question of what is the respective importance of environmental pressures and human resource strategies in the adoption of procedures, an
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additional question to be addressed is whether there is any interaction between these factors in how procedures are developed. A second set of issues relating to nonunion dispute resolution procedures concern how they are used by employees and what is their function in the workplace. The traditional image of nonunion procedures was that they were little used by employees due to their deficiencies in the area of due process and were largely ineffective as workplace institutions (Slichter et al., 1960). More recent research has found examples of nonunion procedures with more regular employee usage, though at levels well below that of typical union grievance procedures (Lewin, 1987, 1990). In addition to differences in usage levels, the way in which nonunion procedures function may differ significantly from union grievance procedures. In particular, the absence of the institutionalized presence of the union in representing employees means that in a nonunion procedure employees are much more dependent on the goodwill of management in resolving complaints. The question of how nonunion procedures function in practice is closely linked to the issue of what impact these procedures have on the operation of the workplace. For unionized workplaces, persistent high grievance rates have been seen as a major part of embedded high conflict patterns of industrial relations, interfering with the operations of the workplace and reducing productivity (Kochan et al., 1994). By contrast, for nonunion procedures the initial question is not excessive conflict, but rather whether the procedures have enough of an impact on the management of the workplace to make any real difference for employees. In this paper, I investigate these questions of the formation and function of nonunion dispute resolution procedures through a case study of the procedures adopted at the multi-divisional manufacturing firm TRW. TRW provides a useful case for investigating the possible direction of development of nonunion procedures due to its relatively extensive set of procedures for its nonunion employees. Concerning the adoption of procedures, the results of the case study will provide support for the importance of both environmental pressures and human resource strategies. Furthermore, it will suggest that these are not simply alternative explanations for the adoption of procedures, but rather operate as complimentary factors that interact in shaping the structure of nonunion procedures. On the issue of the usage and function of nonunion procedures, the results of the case study suggest that employees do use at least this type of more developed nonunion procedures, but that concerns remain as to due process limitations in the operation of the procedures. At the same time, the procedures do appear to have had some significant impacts on the operation of the workplace. Most notably, procedures in some instances led to increased negotiated resolution of workplace disputes and modification of existing practices or procedures, despite features in the design of the procedures directed at limiting this type of outcome. Lastly, the case study
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results reveal a major division between white-collar and blue-collar employee groups in both the development and operation of procedures. The contrasts found between these two groups indicate the need to be careful about making generalizations about the nonunion workforce, which can be characterized by high degrees of diversity in employment conditions and outcomes.
METHODOLOGY As noted above, this paper investigates the adoption and use of nonunion dispute resolution procedures through a case study of procedures at the multidivisional American manufacturing company, TRW. In the context of dispute resolution, TRW provides a useful case for understanding the development of nonunion procedures due to the relatively extensive and elaborate nature of the procedures that the company has adopted. Rather than being a typical case, it was selected as a “best practice” case in order to investigate the impact of nonunion procedures in an organizational setting where particularly strong efforts have been made to ensure the widespread adoption and use of the procedures. This is not to suggest or advocate that organizations should necessarily adopt the practices that are described here, but rather that we can better evaluate the possibilities and limitations of nonunion procedures from a “best practice” case than from a case with less extensive procedures. By analogy, past research was able to learn much about the impact of employee involvement in the workplace from studying GM’s innovative Saturn division (e.g. Rubinstein & Kochan, 2001) and about employee ownership from the unusually active worker ownership structure used at the Rath packing company (Hammer & Stern, 1986) not because these were typical cases, but rather because they were “best practice” cases that provided strong examples of the phenomena being investigated. The primary data sources for the case study presented in this paper are interviews conducted by the author at the company in 1997–1998 and examination of documents relating to the procedures. Individual interviews were one to one-anda-half hours and followed a semi-structured format. Primary interview subjects included human resource managers at the corporate, divisional, and plant level, and in-house employment and labor law counsel. Secondary information sources included descriptions of the company’s procedures and experience with their usage that have been presented by TRW managers at conferences (e.g. Boxer, 2000) and a profile of dispute resolution procedures at TRW was included in a 1997 General Accounting Office (GAO) report as one of five private sector companies providing leading examples of the adoption of nonunion dispute resolution procedures (GAO, 1997).
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The primary focus in the research was on the management side. The reason for this focus was that management decision-making was central to the research questions being investigated; in particular decisions of management determined the adoption of the procedures, the structure of the procedures, and how they were operated. Although additional perspectives on the issues examined were obtained from union and plaintiff attorney sources, the primary focus on the management side is a limitation of the research emphasis that should be recognized. A more general research caution is inherent in the use of a “best practice” case methodology. As is the case for this study, in following a “best practice” case methodology the researcher selects a research site to represent a strong example of a particular phenomenon. The danger then becomes that the researcher will excessively identify with the interests of the group or organization being studied and this will in turn influence the research findings. This is not to suggest that what the researcher views as “best practice” cases should not be studied, but rather that the researcher needs to be aware of and recognize potential biases. In the present case, as a researcher I approached this case study with the recognition that I was examining what I viewed as likely a best case scenario for nonunion procedures. With that recognition in mind, the case study was written with an effort to identify both the potential weaknesses and the strengths of the company’s procedures and with this initial caution to readers that they are reading about a case that was deliberately selected as a potential “best practice” case for the phenomenon in question.
CASE BACKGROUND The diversified manufacturing company TRW has occupied a prominent role in American industrial relations history and research. During the earlier part of the 20th century, under its former name of Thompson Products, the firm was one of the leading exemplars of the “welfare capitalist” movement among American companies. Despite organizing efforts by the United Auto Workers during the 1930s and 1940s, only a few of the company’s plants became unionized during the period of expansion of unionization following passage of the Wagner Act. In his landmark study of the survival and continuation of welfare capitalism during the post-war period, Modern Manors, Sanford Jacoby (1997) uses Thompson Products, along with Eastman Kodak and Sears, as a critical case study of a company that continued to follow this management philosophy during an era when it was thought to have disappeared from the landscape of American business. Thompson Products’ ability to maintain its predominantly nonunion status during the post-war period was not due solely to the benefits offered to employees
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by welfare capitalism. Jacoby (1997) notes that, unlike Eastman Kodak and Sears, Thompson Products was subject to intensive union organizing, to which the company often responded with more heavy-handed tactics. Although unions succeeded in organizing some TRW plants during the post-war period, by the 1990s, only three or four of the company’s American plants were unionized. The current TRW is a diversified manufacturing company, headquartered in Cleveland, Ohio. Organizationally, it is divided into two business groups. One is the Automotive group, which accounts for 60% of total sales. Auto parts were the traditional center of the company’s business, though it has remained dynamic in this area in recent years through expansion into new product areas such as air bags. The other major group in the firm is TRW’s Space, Defense and Information Technology business group, which contains two units: space and defense; and systems integration. In sharp contrast to the more traditional manufacturing setting of the Automotive group, the Space, Defense and Information Technology (SDIT) group produces highly sophisticated products with a predominantly professional workforce. Among the space and defense unit’s primary products are commercial and military satellites. In addition, it is the primary contractor for such major defense contracts as the airborne laser being produced for the U.S. Air Force. The other major unit within this group is systems integration, which provides management and information system services for complex operations, such as major government research projects. An important factor in understanding developments at TRW is the values and human resource orientation of the company’s management. During the 1930s and 1940s Thompson Products’ retention of welfare capitalist policies was heavily influenced by the employee relations values of the company’s president, Frederick C. Crawford (Jacoby, 1997). This orientation continued during the 1960s, when the company began experimenting with new behavioral science concepts in the management of its workforce, such as innovative compensation and selection systems. In addition, in 1977 the company opened a new nonunion teamconcept plant in which employees were assigned to teams rather than specific jobs and compensation was all-salaried based on a pay-for-knowledge system (Kochan et al., 1994). These human resource policies were developed in the context of the company’s continuing commitment to avoiding unionization. In particular, the innovative practices were concentrated in the company’s newer nonunion facilities and not extended to its few unionized facilities. More recently, the company’s current human resource management orientation is reflected in strong public advocacy by its management of such policies as gain-sharing, pay-for-productivity and employee involvement (Daily Labor Report, 1994 DLR 13 d11). It is also noteworthy that the executive vice-president of human resources at TRW is a member of the firm’s executive committee, indicating the
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relatively strong role of human resource management considerations in the firm’s decision-making. Dispute resolution procedures formed part of the high commitment human resource policies introduced at TRW facilities in the 1960s and 1970s. These procedures initially consisted of provisions for written complaints to be filed with and reviewed by management. These procedures primarily provided a more formal and systematic structure for management review of employee concerns, rather than a more independent process of dispute resolution. In addition, committees composed of employees were established in plants to bring complaints of general concern to management. Although providing a mechanism for raising employee grievances, a weakness of these procedures was that they did not provide a structure for the resolution of disputes beyond the normal management decisionmaking process. However, during the 1990s a series of factors led to the development of more complex dispute resolution procedures that afforded greater independence from the management chain-of-command in the adjudication of employee grievances. Rather than a single process, development of nonunion procedures at TRW in the 1990s actually involved two distinct processes that led to the introduction of two different types of procedures, peer review procedures and nonunion arbitration procedures. Under peer review procedures, employees who are peers of the employee filing the complaint sit on a panel that decides the grievance. By contrast under the nonunion arbitration procedures a neutral arbitrator hears and decides claims by employees against the company concerning violation of employee legal rights. Although there were common elements in the development of these procedures, the development and introduction of each procedure involved a distinct decision-making process in response to separate pressures and motivations. Furthermore, once adopted the peer review and nonunion arbitration procedures retained distinctions in their operation, usage, and functions. For this reason, in the subsequent sections the development and use of the two types of procedure will be examined separately, beginning with the peer review procedures, then turning to the nonunion arbitration procedures. In this respect, the procedures serve as an embedded unit of analysis within the organizational case that permits comparing and contrasting two different processes of procedure development within the same firm.
PEER REVIEW PROCEDURES In the early 1990s, TRW’s Vehicle Safety Systems division introduced peer review for the first time into dispute resolution procedures in the company. Vehicle Safety
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Systems (VSSI) is a division of the automotive business group. Its primary products are air bags and seat belts. This is a relatively new product area for the company, with the initial part of the division entering the company through a 1984 acquisition. With the expansion of the use of air bags in automobiles, the division grew rapidly from a $2 million business in 1984 to an over $2 billion business by the late 1990s. All of VSSI’s American plants are nonunion and are generally recently constructed facilities, with relatively young workforces. The total workforce of the division is 16,000 employees, half of whom are located in the United States, with the remainder spread across plants in other countries, including Mexico, Canada, and Germany. Introduction of a peer review procedure was first proposed at VSSI during the early 1990s based on a series of interrelated reasons why the practice would be advantageous to the division. The first rationale was that peer review would serve as a “counter-defensive” move to avoid VSSI’s plants becoming a target for unionization. Although VSSI had managed to avoid unionization of its American plants, with the continued strength of the UAW in the industry its plants remained a potentially attractive target for organizing. The perception of managers in the division was that their employees were aware of what employment conditions were like in the unionized plants in the auto industry. As a consequence, management actively monitored what was going on in the unionized sector of the industry to ensure that the wages and conditions of employment in VSSI’s nonunion plants were roughly comparable. Peer review was offered as a component of that strategy of union substitution, which would provide a better substitute for union grievance procedures than the division’s existing complaint procedures. A closely related rationale offered for the introduction of peer review was that it would respond to the expectations of the division’s workforce. As noted earlier, employees in the division are relatively young, averaging 25–35 years of age in most plants. Management perceived these employees as expecting a high involvement, team-oriented culture in the workplace, what one manager described as the “video generation who want a say in the business.” Peer review was proposed as a way to respond to these perceived employee expectations that would complement related human resource practices such as performance- and group-based compensation and selfdirected work teams. The complimentarity with VSSI’s overall high commitment human resource strategy was the third rationale offered for the introduction of peer review. Peer review was advocated as being in keeping with the “spirit of a modern company” that TRW was seeking to achieve in its human resource strategy. Peer review was offered as a new “best practice” in the area of dispute resolution procedures, which would be appropriate for TRW to adopt. It is worth noting that although peer review procedures were adopted in other companies, most prominently at General Electric, in the 1970s, they were not part of
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the initial set of human practices adopted when VSSI’s first facilities were opened in the mid-1980s. Instead, peer review first came under consideration as a new type of best practice in the 1990s. This reflects the significant lag times often involved in the diffusion and adoption of new practices, a factor important to consider in examining the causes of change in employment relations. In addition, it reflects the importance of changes in the set of options for behavior under consideration by management. Taking a strategic choice view of employment relations (Kochan et al., 1994) suggests that to understand change it is necessary to consider the specific alternatives under consideration at the relevant point in time. The environmental factors that ultimately led to the introduction of peer review were already present in the 1980s. However it was only in the 1990s that VSSI management brought into consideration the option of introducing peer review as a new best practice that would help avoid the environmental threat of union organizing, respond to the expectations of its workforce, and complement its other human resource practices. Although peer review was presented as a policy that complimented VSSI’s human resource strategy, its initial proposal met resistance from both senior and lower-level line managers. In particular, line managers were concerned about the prospect of having to justify their actions to employees on the peer review panels. A key factor in convincing management to adopt peer review was the assurance offered to line managers that human resource managers would be there to provide support to line managers when they went into peer review. However concerns remained and were exacerbated when the first peer review hearing resulted in the overturning of a line manager’s decision. Although this decision exacerbated line management concerns about peer review, it ultimately proved fortuitous in helping establish early on to employees that management would respect the decisions of the panels, even if unfavorable. The peer review procedure was introduced at VSSI in 1992 as an additional procedure to which employee disputes could be taken to on top of existing open door policies at plants. Usage of peer review was restricted, however, to employee complaints about final warning or termination decisions, excluding terminations due to elimination of the employee’s job or work reduction. Peer review panels consist of five members, two managers and three peer employees. A new panel is formed for each appeal. The definition of peer is grievant specific, so if the employee is a production worker, the peer employee panelists will be selected from all eligible production workers in the plant. In order to serve on a peer review panel, an employee must have been employed for at least one year, not be under corrective counseling, and not have received disciplinary action or corrective counseling in the past year. Additional exclusions from panel membership include: family members of the grievant; anyone in the chain of command of the grievant;
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members of human resources; and “persons who have a vested interest and/or conflict of interest in the outcome of the meeting.” The members of the panel are chosen at random from the pool of eligible peer employees and managers by the grievant. The employee first picks four names from the pool of eligible managers, chooses two of the managers to serve as panel members, then selects one as an alternate, and discards one name. Then the employee picks five names from the pool of eligible peer employees, chooses three employees to serve as panel members, selects one as an alternate, and discards one name. Service on the peer review panels is voluntary and panelists may not serve on two consecutive peer review panels. If a grievant requests, one of the panelists may be chosen from a pool specifically composed of members of a protected minority class of which the grievant is a member. As a general rule, there must be at least 15 members in each pool from which panelists are chosen. If there are not enough members in any group at a facility, employees from other locations may be included in the pool to ensure sufficient numbers. This is a particular concern where there are insufficient numbers of employees in a protected minority class to ensure representation on the panel of peers of the same racial or ethnic group as a minority complainant. For each panel, a human resources representative serves as a “facilitator” (Schwartz, 1994). The role of the facilitator is to handle the administration of the procedure, organize meetings, maintain files, and provide assistance to the panel. In addition to organizational and record keeping duties, the facilitator has a more substantive role in the procedure in meeting with the grievant and supervisor to explain the procedure, determining any conflict of interest questions in the panel selection, and gathering any data or information requested by the panel. The importance of the role of the facilitator is enhanced by the instruction in the procedure that they “may be called upon to provide policy interpretation and general factual information concerning precedents, but he/she is not expected to give detailed information regarding other specific corrective actions, appeals, or precedents.” Given this significant role of the facilitator in the peer review procedure, only senior human resources representatives are allowed to perform this function. In addition, any human resource representative involved in the decision under appeal is not allowed to act as the facilitator. Peer review proceedings are commenced by the employee filing a peer review request form stating whether it is a final warning or a termination case, the nature of the employee’s concern, and the company policy in question. Requests for peer review must be filed within three working days of the final warning or termination decision being appealed. Following the filing of the request form with human resources, a panel will be convened in a time not to exceed 45 days from the request.
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Prior to the hearing, peer review panelists are given a day of training consisting of instruction on the procedure and on the conduct of hearings. A major focus in the training is to emphasize the confidentiality of the procedure. Management had strong initial concerns that employees would be reluctant to use peer review if they thought that confidential information about them would be spread around the plant by the panelists. In practice, this has not been a problem with the panels. During the training period, the panels are also asked to select their own panel leader. The panel leader is responsible for chairing the hearing and making procedural decisions on issues such as the calling of witnesses. The facilitators generally recommend that a peer employee lead the panel and this is the usual practice. At the commencement of the peer review hearing, the human resources facilitator introduces the subject of the complaint. The employee is then given the opportunity to present his/her case, including presenting any documents or witnesses that support his/her case. The employee’s presentation may be oral, written, or both, however no internal or external employee representative is permitted to participate in the hearing. Following the employee’s presentation, the supervisor who made the decision being challenged is given an opportunity to justify his/her actions, including any documents or materials supporting his/her position. The supervisor must present his/her case on his/her own, also without assistance of a representative. The panel can cross-examine witnesses presented by the employee or the supervisor, as well as call any additional witnesses they want to hear from. The panel is entitled to examine company files and records, as well as to “seek advice from experts within the Company regarding policy interpretation, etc.” Following the presentations of the employee and supervisor and when all information the panelists wish to review has been heard, the employee and supervisor are excused from the hearing room and the panel deliberates. During training, the panelists are instructed that they are limited to reviewing the application of company policies and cannot change policy. However, the procedures also note that policies are only guidelines and cannot cover every situation. Thus, panelists are also instructed that “a common sense approach must be used by the panel members in determining the final outcome.” Then, after discussion of the information presented at the hearing, the panel makes its decision by secret ballot. The panel leader conducts the secret ballot, with all panelists voting. Ballots are opened one by one until a majority of votes are cast to accept or reject the employee’s appeal. Remaining ballots are not opened and all ballots are destroyed after the counting of the votes. The unusual procedure of not opening the remaining ballots once a result is reached protects panelist independence by reducing the possibility of determining which way any individual panel member voted – e.g. if four of the five panel members admitted to voting for or against an appeal it would be possible to identify the dissenting panel member on a 4–1
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majority vote. However, in some cases it prevents the employee from knowing what the final vote count was on the panel – e.g. if the first three votes opened were to deny the appeal, the employee will not be able to find out if the final vote count would have been 3–2, 4–1, or 5–0. If an appeal of a final warning is accepted by the panel, the warning is removed. If an appeal of a termination is accepted by the panel, the termination is reversed and the employee reinstated with retroactive pay and benefits. Although the first decision from a VSSI peer review panel accepted the employee’s appeal, the majority of subsequent decisions were in favor of upholding the supervisor’s decision. From 1992 to 1997, only 10 of 160 employees who took cases to peer review were successful. The cases where employees were successful in appealing to peer review panels often involved failures of management to follow the exact procedural details of their own rules, such as the form and timing of warnings, rather than the content of the complainant’s conduct. The division intentionally limited the panels to considering whether or not company policies were correctly applied, though the human resource managers expressed some surprise at the degree to which employees on the panels have held management to the letter of the rules in the conduct of discipline and terminations. This may reflect a reality that if peer employees are placed in a structure where the only basis on which they can overturn management decisions is for lack of compliance with company rules, they then turn to less flexible interpretations of management behavior under the rules in order to obtain the leverage necessary to accept appeals. Although employees have not had a high success rate at hearings, peer review may have a broader impact on the behavior of line and human resources managers. Given the possibility of having to justify their decisions to a peer review panel, managers reported having to be more careful in making termination or final warning decisions. Peer review is thus seen as having an indirect effect on the behavior of managers in making them more accountable and keeping them on their toes.
NONUNION ARBITRATION PROCEDURES Although both represent alternatives to traditional management review in dispute resolution, the development of nonunion arbitration and peer review at TRW involved responses to different environmental pressures involving very different groups of employees. In contrast to the union substitution and human resource strategy motivations that led to the introduction of peer review in VSSI, the development of TRW’s nonunion arbitration procedure was a response to changing patterns of employment litigation against the firm. In addition, whereas peer review was first introduced in the auto parts section of the company, nonunion arbitration
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was developed primarily in response to events in TRW’s Space, Defense, and Information Technology (SDIT) group. In contrast to the traditional manufacturing plants of the automotive business group, the SDIT group operates extremely high technology facilities employing highly skilled workers. Among the best known of the products of the group’s space and defense unit was the NASA probe Pioneer 10, the first probe to reach Jupiter and the first human made spacecraft to escape the gravity of the solar system. On a less ethereal front, the group is building the first tactical lasers for the Army and the Air Force, and is a leader in the area of battlefield information systems. This type of product leads to a strikingly different production facility setting from traditional manufacturing. For instance, at the group’s main “Space Park” location in Redondo Beach, California, one of the production labs is a single production facility in which around 150 engineers and scientists work on producing a single satellite at a time. In some respects, these facilities resemble a high technology version of a shipyard, with each product being worth millions of dollars and production occurring in an almost craft-like fashion. Overall, 60% of the group’s workforce is classified as exempt professional and managerial employees. Until the early 1990s TRW had experienced very little employment litigation. In part, this was likely due to the limited nature of exceptions to employment-atwill. However, a major additional factor was that the company gave employees effective lifetime employment, a practice reflective of the historical welfare capitalist philosophy of the firm. This effective lifetime employment policy was ruptured in the early 1990s when the SDIT group engaged in large-scale layoffs in response to the contraction of the aerospace industry following the end of the Cold War. Although the contraction of the industry may have created the economic necessity for the layoffs, it also made their impact particularly hard for the affected employees. With the whole aerospace industry in contraction, many of the laidoff employees were unable to quickly find alternative employment. Given the inevitable questions of fairness surrounding the dismissal of large numbers of employees, particularly those who believed the company had promised them lifetime employment, a major surge in employment litigation followed the layoffs. The ability of employees to engage in litigation was enhanced by the expansion of substantive employment rights during the 1980s and early 1990s, particularly in California, which increased the willingness of plaintiff attorneys to take on employment cases. As one manager graphically described the situation, they were “laying off employees when employment lawyers were starting to advertise their services on billboards at the side of highways.” At the same time as these developments were increasing the pressures from employment litigation upon the company, changes in the law of arbitration provided new opportunities to use alternative dispute resolution procedures to
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avoid litigation. In the United States Supreme Court’s landmark 1991 decision in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane, 500 U.S. 20 (1991), the court had held for the first time that rights contained in employment statutes, in that specific case the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, could be subject to mandatory arbitration under an arbitration agreement. Although the following decade would be filled with decisions attempting to sort out the many implications of Gilmer, what the decision did for the first time was open the door to the possibility that companies could adopt nonunion arbitration procedures that would serve as an alternative to litigation through the courts for claims against them by their employees (Stone, 1996, 1999). One advantage of nonunion arbitration procedures was that the employer could design the type of procedure it desired to fit its organizational objectives. Perhaps most importantly though, arbitration provided a mechanism to avoid being subject to the uncertainties and potentially large damages of the jury system. Although a competent arbitrator might be quite willing to find against the company where the employee had a valid claim, the general perception among management was that arbitrators would not be likely to award the type of extremely high damage amounts designed to punish companies that juries occasionally awarded. Damages would also be further reduced by the potential for arbitration to occur much more quickly than litigation, thereby preventing damages from accruing to the same amounts as could happen during slower moving court proceedings. Recognizing the potential impact of these developments, the group’s labor and employment counsel wrote a memo to TRW’s senior management suggesting that the recent Gilmer decision had opened the door to using a nonunion arbitration procedure to avoid litigation and resolve these disputes at much lower cost. Following the memo, a management team was put together at the corporate level to investigate the development of an alternative dispute resolution procedure to handle employment disputes that might lead to litigation. The team included representatives from legal, human resources, and communications departments and was led by a vice-president of human resources. The team spent six months, occupying its members virtually full-time, investigating the question of what dispute resolution policy to adopt. During its investigations, a major dividing point emerged within the team over the question of how to make sure any agreement establishing a nonunion arbitration procedure was enforceable against employees. Legal department members of the team were concerned that an arbitration agreement had to be clearly enforceable to make sure of protecting the company against potential employment litigation. To do so, they proposed that employees be required to sign arbitration agreements, either at initial hiring or as a condition of receiving salary increases or stock options. Although the courts would likely enforce arbitration agreements without any such additional consideration for the agreement beyond continued employment, legal
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counsel recommended this more conservative approach, which had been followed by another aerospace company that had just introduced a nonunion arbitration procedure. The human resources members of the team were strongly opposed to this proposal. They argued that it would lead to the dispute resolution procedure being viewed as an anti-employee move, which would conflict with TRW’s overall human resource strategy of enhancing employee commitment and involvement. In particular, they objected that whereas other companies might require employees to sign arbitration agreements to get bonuses and stock options, this was inconsistent with the philosophy of employment relations at TRW. The decision on how to handle the problem of ensuring any procedure was binding and enforceable became the crucial stumbling block in TRW’s development of its nonunion arbitration procedure. After nine months of debate, the issue eventually had to be resolved by the company’s General Counsel and its Executive Vice-President of Human Resources, who sided with the view that the nature of the arbitration procedure had to be made consistent with TRW’s overall human resource philosophy. The final design decision reached was that the nonunion arbitration procedure would be mandatory and binding on the company, but that it would be mandatory but non-binding for the employee. The employee would be required to take any legal dispute arising from employment through the arbitration procedure, however if the employee did not accept the arbitrator’s decision they would be free to proceed to litigation. The decision to make the arbitration decisions non-binding for employees makes TRW’s procedure virtually unique among nonunion arbitration procedures. Indeed, it is worth remembering that the key reason Gilmer led to the expansion of nonunion arbitration was that it allowed for the implementation of procedures that would produce binding arbitration awards, eliminating the possibility of taking statutory employment claims to litigation. Despite having been inspired to consider introducing a nonunion arbitration procedure as a result of Gilmer offering the possibility of using it to avoid rising litigation, this decision meant that TRW would be relinquishing one of the primary advantages of arbitration to employers. With the issue of the nonbinding status of the procedure finally resolved, a company policy directive was issued for the implementation of the new dispute resolution procedures (TRW Human Resources Memorandum No. 10, January 1, 1995). Although the policy directive required the establishment of new procedures and set out basic features that had to be included in each procedure, the format of the actual procedures was left up to the individual divisions of the company. The use of a company directive allowing a degree of discretion to individual divisions reflects both the decentralized business group and divisional organization of TRW, as well as the diversity between different parts of the company. Under the directive, each division was required to establish a dispute resolution procedure covering:
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involuntary terminations that could form the basis for a claim in the courts; claims of discrimination or harassment based on protected status; and claims of constructive discharge. Individual divisions could provide that other types of disputes were covered by the procedure, but a number of types of disputes had to be excluded from coverage. The excluded categories included: benefit or pension claims; workers’ compensation; unemployment compensation; claims by the company for injunctive relief; and “the establishment or modification of TRW’s policies or procedures.” Certain due process features had to be included in the procedures. Employees would have the right to representation by counsel. A basic entitlement to discovery of relevant documents and deposition of one individual for each side could be expanded on order from the arbitrator. Remedies equivalent to those available in court could be ordered by the arbitrator. The arbitrator would be required to provide a written decision stating a summary of the claims, the remedies ordered, and the reasons for the award. As had been decided, the decision of the arbitrator would be binding on the company, but not binding on the employee. However, the company reserved the right to introduce the arbitrator’s decision as evidence in any subsequent litigation. Initially, the directive provided that the costs would be split, but that the employee’s contribution would be capped at two days base pay. If the employee were successful, the company would pay the entire costs. This provision was later changed so that employees would only pay a $100 filing fee based on subsequent court decisions rejecting the imposition of the costs of employer mandated nonunion arbitration procedures on employees. As noted above, an interesting feature of the company directive is that it left the format of the procedure up to the division. Prior to the company directive on alternative dispute resolution procedures, the individual divisions of TRW had a variety of internal complaint procedures. These ranged from simple open door policies to the complex peer review procedure in the VSSI division described above. The company directive led to both the introduction of new arbitration procedures and a coincident enhancement of many of the internal complaint procedures. These collateral changes in internal complaint procedures reflect an interesting process in which the focusing of organizational effort on improving existing dispute resolution procedures led to changes beyond those that inspired the initial initiative. This suggests that organizational change is not a continuous process of adaptation to environmental pressures and internal imperatives, but rather that there is a discrete process in which the forces that overcome organizational inertia in a particular area can lead to a series of attendant changes. One of the divisions that introduced more general changes to its dispute resolution procedures in conjunction with the introduction of nonunion arbitration was TRW’s Systems Integration Group (SIG). Prior to the introduction of
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arbitration, SIG had a simple grievance procedure in which employees could lodge written complaints with senior management, who would either accept or reject the complaint. Accompanying the introduction of arbitration, SIG established a new three-stage dispute resolution procedure. The first stage, “management review” consisted of the internal complaint procedure. The employee would begin the first stage by presenting a written statement of the dispute to the immediate supervisor. If unresolved, the next part of stage one would be for the complaint to be reviewed by a higher-level manager who had not been involved in the decision that was the subject of the complaint. During these two parts of stage one the facility’s human resources manager would provide internal mediation to try to resolve the dispute. If unresolved, the employee could take the dispute to stage two, “appeals committee/mediation,” which provided two mutually exclusive options. In the first option, the complaint could be reviewed by an appeals committee, consisting of a five member panel of fellow employees with the senior human resources director serving as a non-voting chair. The appeals committee was a peer review type of panel, though unlike the randomly selected VSSI panels, in SIG employees could nominate their fellow employees to serve on the pool from which the committee is drawn. The employee selected three members from the pool and management selected the remaining two. The other option in stage two was to have the complaint brought to an external mediator who would attempt to facilitate a negotiated resolution of the complaint. As will be discussed later, after a period of experience with the procedure, stage two was modified to eliminate the appeals committee option due to lack of employee usage. If the complaint was unresolved at stage two, the employee could proceed to stage three “alternative dispute resolution.” Where the employee selected the appeals committee option in stage two, they were required to participate in external mediation as an initial part of stage three. If the complaint was unresolved in mediation, the final part of stage three was arbitration. The arbitrators are chosen from American Arbitration Association lists of employment arbitrators. For disputes involving allegations of sexual or racial harassment or termination, the employee had the option to bypass stage one and/or stage two. Disputes involving discipline for violation of sexual or racial harassment policies or legal and ethical conduct policies had to be taken directly to stage three mediation and arbitration. The inclusion of the appeals committee and mediation options in the SIG procedure is particularly noteworthy. The combination of appeals committees and mediation provide an additional dispute resolution structure within the division that goes beyond the basic nonunion arbitration procedure required under the company directive to help shield against litigation. As will be described in more detail below, these additional new institutional structures may have particular importance for the process of resolving disputes within the firm.
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The other divisions of TRW adopted a range of combinations of elements in their procedures. In contrast to the multi-stage procedure at SIG, with its appeals committee and mediation options, the procedure introduced for staff at TRW corporate headquarters simply provided for arbitration of legal claims. Within the Automotive group, the Valve Division introduced both peer review and arbitration procedures in response to the corporate directive. Whereas at VSSI, the division adopted a similar approach to SIG and introduced mediation and arbitration as additional stages to its dispute resolution procedure, supplementing its existing peer review panel procedure. Although the automotive business group has a larger workforce, employees within the SDIT group made greater use of the new mediation and arbitration procedures. During the first three years after the introduction of the new procedures, from 1995 to 1997, out of a total of seventy-two mediation and arbitration cases at TRW, fifty-five were in the Space, Defense, and Information Group. The vast majority of these claims were either resolved or abandoned during or after the mediation stage, with only three of the seventy-two claims during this initial three-year period going to arbitration. A range of different types of cases were brought to mediation and arbitration during this period, including: 27 layoffs involving employees in protected groups; 20 wrongful discharge claims of all types; seven disputed applications of company policies or discipline short of termination; five Americans with Disabilities Act claims; five claims of sexual harassment or discharges for sexual harassment; four promotion denials or demotions; two Equal Pay Act claims; and two failures to rehire following layoffs. With the majority of claims being resolved or abandoned at mediation, this stage assumed particular importance in the impact of the new procedure. The experience with mediation was very positive for management, with most cases being resolved quickly and at low cost in mediation. Time to resolve cases in mediation averaged only 3–4 months from the filing of the initial claim. The average cost to management of resolving cases in mediation has been remarkably low, at around $2000 per case. However, this figure is based on the direct monetary costs of settlements to the company, which does not include indirect costs to the company and often understated the value of the remedy to the employee. A number of the settlements in mediation involved non-monetary remedies. Reinstatement of terminated employees, adjustment of the application of policies, and finding new jobs for employees within the company were common non-monetary elements in settlements that provided substantial benefits to complainants without direct monetary costs to the company. Employees used attorneys in mediation in only around half of the cases. This may reflect an employee perception that they did not need representation at this stage in the procedure or that it was to their advantage to resolve their complaint quickly
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and cheaply without incurring the additional expense of an attorney. However it is also possible that employees may have felt that bringing an attorney into the proceedings would be viewed as overly confrontational and negatively affect their future career in the company. Whatever the motivation of the employees, it is of concern that employees may have been settling potential legal claims in mediation without the benefit of consultation with legal counsel. An interesting additional development in the area of representation is that a number of complainants brought representatives other than counsel with them to mediation. In some cases, spouses accompanied the complainant to mediation. In one instance, the complainant’s priest attended mediation to assist the employee. Although it is difficult to judge the effect of these non-attorneys on the mediation process, they introduce a new and potentially significant element into the dynamics of the dispute resolution procedure. In many cases these nonattorney representatives were very forceful in pressing the complainant’s position at mediation, more so than the complainants themselves. In addition to the direct resolution of cases, the introduction of mediation and arbitration had important effects on the management of employment relations at TRW. For the in-house labor and employment counsels it led to a shift towards sending more of their time on proactive work and less reacting to developments in litigation. One attorney described having shifted from spending 60% of working time before the introduction of the procedures on litigation of cases, to spending 80% of working time after their introduction on counseling managers and helping human resources deal with employee complaints. A major part of shifting to a more proactive focus was the ability to respond to disputes more quickly. The past experience of the company had been that cases would take a couple of years to come to trial, by which point the manager involved might have left the firm. The company might also have initially accepted the manager’s account of events, but then subsequently it was demonstrated at trial that the manager was engaged in illegal conduct and the manager’s behavior had continued on unchecked for the interim period causing further harm and mounting damages. With less than a year being taken to bring cases to mediation and arbitration, the company was able to take remedial action more quickly and managers were more likely to be promptly held responsible for the consequences of their actions.
ANALYSIS The development of peer review and nonunion arbitration procedures at TRW were the product of a combination of external pressures and internal management decisions that led the company to establish these new structures governing
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employment relations within the firm. Institutional environmental pressures and management strategies are often seen as alternative explanations for the development of organizational structures and practices. Yet in this instance, the factors of environmental pressures and management strategies worked together in determining the direction of development of procedures. In a period of declining unionization, deregulation, and globalization, institutional forces are often viewed as being of diminished significance in determining the content of employment relations, particularly in the United States. However it is striking that in the case examined here, which involved a company that is in many respects an exemplar of a “High Performance” or “High Commitment” approach to managing the workforce, institutional pressures played an important role in shaping organizational practices. Furthermore, this was not only the case in the “old” industrial context of automobile parts manufacturing where unions still have a substantial pressure, but also in the “new” context of the high tech aerospace sector where litigation pressures create a similar disciplining pressure on management to that of unions in the older context. Yet it would also be incorrect to solely emphasize the institutional pressures involved and downplay the significance of management strategies. Neither union organizing nor litigation threats necessitate one specific response from management; in either case there was a range of responses the company could take. In each instance, the particular response to the environmental pressure that management chose was a product of the company’s overall human resource strategy. In the context of the potential for union organizing activity, the choice of practices such as the adoption of peer review procedures provides a union substitution approach that fits with a high commitment strategy, as opposed to the alternative of simply relying on suppression of organizing drives. Similarly, in adopting an alternative dispute resolution procedure to respond to litigation pressures, the company could have taken an approach of simply requiring employees to arbitrate claims and designed a procedure that lacked significant due process protections. In this case, the decisions to introduce more elaborate procedures with a major mediation component and, especially, to make the arbitration procedure non-binding for the employee were a product of the desire to balance protection of the company from litigation with a human resource strategy that emphasized fostering high commitment and trust levels with its workforce. Whereas there is a strong common thread in the interaction of environmental pressures and management strategies in the development of the peer review and nonunion arbitration procedures, the most striking contrast in this study involves the dynamics of procedures for white-collar and blue-collar employees. Even though the study examined employees within the same company with a common orientation to human resource strategy, the patterns of development and usage of dispute resolution procedures were distinct and different. For the blue-
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collar employee workforce in the automotive group, the dominant environmental pressure was the threat of union organizing, with litigation by employees playing no significant role. By contrast, for the white-collar employee workforce in the SDIT group, employment litigation was the dominant environmental pressure, with union organizing threats being non-existent and irrelevant. The contrasts in types of environmental pressure produced different directions of development of dispute resolution procedures to respond to the specific nature of the threat involved. To respond to the increase in litigation activity among the white-collar workforce in SDIT, adoption of the nonunion arbitration procedures provided a mechanism to transfer these claims into an alternative dispute resolution structure that could produce faster and cheaper resolution of claims, while substantially reducing the threat of the uncertainties inherent in the jury-driven litigation system. In contrast, in responding to the threat of potential union organizing and related employee expectations for fair treatment among the blue-collar employee workforce of the automotive group, peer review procedures provided a mechanism for employee involvement in the area of dispute resolution that could offer a better alternative to union grievance procedures than simple management decisionmaking in responding to complaints. The contrast between white-collar and blue-collar employee groups in the development and structure of dispute resolution procedures was also reflected in how the procedures were used. Although peer review procedures were available to both blue-collar and white-collar employees in the automotive divisions where it was adopted, in practice it was used almost exclusively by blue-collar employees. Even more strikingly, when peer review was offered as an option that could be used instead of mediation in the procedure adopted for the SIG division’s whitecollar workforce, the peer review option was used so infrequently that the option was later dropped from the procedure. The explanation offered within the division for this lack of usage of the option was that the white-collar employees perceived that mediation would provide them with a more independent dispute resolution processes than peer review. One of the particular concerns with peer review for many white-collar employees is that their effective peer group includes employees who are in management or on career tracks leading into management. If the peers on the panel bring a managerial perspective to the dispute resolution process, much of the distinctiveness of peer review compared to a grievance procedure in which a board composed entirely of managers hears the complaint is lost. This difference has broader implications when we consider the differing nature of employment relations for white-collar and blue-collar employees. Traditionally industrial relations theory and research has emphasized a sharp divide between labor and management as two separate actors in the industrial relations system. In the nonunion context studied here this analysis held up well in looking at the
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blue-collar employee workforce, but broke down in looking at the white-collar employee workforce where the employees did not necessarily identify with their fellow employees as a group with common interests in opposition to managers within the company. For these white-collar employees, external mechanisms of the courts and independent neutrals in dispute resolution provided the supporting institutional structure for them to further their interests, rather than a structure internal to the workforce of the company such as organization either in the stronger institutional form of a union or in the weaker institutional form of worker participation in peer review procedures. Two major criticisms that have been leveled at nonunion dispute resolution procedures are that they are lacking in due process protections and that usage of them by employees tends to be at very low levels. If the TRW procedures represent a “best case” example among current nonunion procedures, what does it tell us about these criticisms? In the area of due process protections, the most negative picture of nonunion procedures is not supported by this study. In both the peer review and nonunion arbitration procedures, substantial protections are included to enhance the neutrality of the decision-makers, ranging from the jurylike selection procedures for peer review panelists to the use of arbitrators and mediators provided by reputable neutral service providers. Balanced against the features aimed at ensuring neutrality of decision-making is the reality that these are procedures structured by management that limit how far decisions can go in affecting organizational rules and procedures. Types of complaints are limited under both types of procedures, with nonunion arbitration and mediation restricted to potential legal claims and peer review to disciplinary and dismissal decisions that are alleged to violate company policies and procedures. An area of concern particular to the peer review procedures is limitations on the ability of parties to bring representatives to the panel hearings. Although this restriction applies equally to the supervisor who made the decision being challenged, the absence of employee representatives is a significant weakness from a due process perspective. In general, the overall picture of the procedures is one of a reasonable degree of due process protections, but at the same time with some substantial limitations on the procedures designed to protect the company. When we turn to the usage of the procedures, the more dire pictures of nonunion procedures again appear unwarranted. Employees used both the peer review and nonunion arbitration procedures to a substantial degree, albeit at a rate well below usage of many union grievance procedures. Although employee win rates were not high under the peer review procedures, employees continued to use them frequently and in a number of cases where management decisions were overturned were able to continue successful careers with the company. Indeed compared to the unionized context, the relatively low win rates in the peer review procedures
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may be somewhat misleading given that there is no effective check on the ability of an employee to file a complaint. Whereas unions typically undertake an evaluation of the strength of a grievance in deciding whether or not it is worth taking the complaint to arbitration, under peer review the employee alone decides whether or not to proceed. Given peer review is a relatively quick and low cost procedure for the employee it is unsurprising that employees would be willing to take a chance on bringing relatively weak complaints to peer review whereas a union might not consider it worth investing the costs of arbitration on a similar weak grievance. It is important to recognize that the most significant effects of these types of dispute resolution procedure may lie in their impact on the general conduct of employee relations by management, rather than on the resolution of specific cases. In this regard, it is noteworthy that some of the strongest concerns about the introduction of peer review came from line management concerned about having their decisions challenged and reviewed by the panels. Indeed, managers noted that one of the main impacts of the adoption of the peer review procedure was to increase the time and care taken in reaching and executing decisions to discipline and dismiss employees. Viewed from this perspective, the procedures served as a tool for human resources within the organization that helped ensure line managers were actually following the policies adopted by the company directed at ensuring fair treatment of employees in the workplace. The nonunion arbitration procedures had a similar impact on helping promote fairer treatment of employees by managers, particularly due to the more rapid resolution of complaints. Given that a manager was likely to have his or her decisions reviewed in a much shorter time frame than had previously been the case, the probability that improper actions would come to light and be remedied was increased. On a broader level, an interesting development was that in some instances employee complaints under the procedures led to modification and improvement of organizational practices and procedures. For example, following a complaint that indicated a weakness in an employee relocation policy, the policy was changed to fix the problem, improving the assistance provided to employees. This occurred even though the procedures themselves specified that decisions could not modify company policies and suggests the utility of the procedures as organizational learning systems for nonunion organizations through which complaints reveal problems and weaknesses in policies and practices that might not otherwise be identified.
CONCLUSION This case study set out to investigate the adoption, structure, and function of dispute resolution procedures in the nonunion workplace. The case examined here does not
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represent the situation in the typical nonunion workplace, rather it was selected as a “best practice” case study to investigate a stronger example of the development of this type of procedure and to see the possible direction of developments in this area. One of the motivations for this investigation was to consider the degree to which nonunion dispute resolution procedures have the potential to provide some element of fairness and voice in the context of a workforce where union representation has declining reach. The answer from this study is that nonunion procedures can serve a partial function in enhancing fair treatment and employee voice in the workplace, but the degree to which they will serve this function is conditional on both the continued existence of external institutional pressures that provide an incentive to companies to adopt procedures and the strategic orientation of nonunion companies in managing their workforces. The absence of either factor will reduce the probability of the development of effective dispute resolution procedures in the nonunion workplace. It is significant that even in this setting of a “best practice” case where the human resource management orientation of the firm was likely to be especially focused on ensuring fair treatment in the workplace, environmental pressures from litigation and unions provided the initial impetus for the introduction of the nonunion procedures. If environmental pressures are a key factor in the adoption of nonunion procedures in the “best practice” case setting where we would expect human resource management strategies to play a stronger role, then we should anticipate that environmental pressures will be even more critical for ensuring fair treatment in the more typical “non-best practice” nonunion workplace. A second lesson from the study is that promoting effective nonunion procedures requires different factors for different parts of the labor force. Whereas an institutional solution of promoting the continued vitality of union representation and collective bargaining is clearly of importance for the blue-collar labor force, other solutions, in particular a robust litigation system combined with alternative dispute resolution mechanisms that enhance rather than undermine rights, are necessary to deal with the problems of white-collar segments of the labor force. For industrial relations research and theory this suggests that while the traditional ideas of ensuring strong institutions in the governance of employment relations remain relevant, they need to be adapted and applied to different types of solutions if they are to be effective across the whole labor force rather than one segment of it. A similar challenge is posed from an industrial relations perspective in the findings from this study that while these nonunion procedures clearly have their weaknesses and limitations, they also are serving an important role for nonunion employees within the organization in giving them a structure that can be used to challenge unfair decisions and helping to shape how managers deal with employees in the workplace. Although not a strongly institutionalized structure for governance of
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employment relations of the form seen in American unionized workplaces with their collective agreements and grievance arbitration procedures, neither does this appear as a situation of unchecked managerial discretion. Rather the combination of external pressures and the company’s development of an internal institutional structure through these dispute resolution procedures creates a situation that can be described as a semi-institutionalized structure for governance of employment relations. If this type of semi-institutionalized structure is viable and effectively excludes external actors such as national unions from the workplace, then it poses a major challenge to the conventional industrial relations system based on strongly organized workplace representation through collective bargaining. Questions that will need to be answered in relation to the development of this type of semi-institutionalized governance structure include: how sustainable are these procedures; how widely will they diffuse across different organizations; and what is the role of employee representation in relation to these procedures? For the union movement, this last question will be particularly critical if they are not to abandon prospects for providing representation across a growing segment of the labor force.
AFTERNOTE Subsequent to the period covered by this study, in 2002 TRW was acquired by the major aerospace company Northrop-Grumman. While the former TRW Space, Defense, and Information Technology (SDIT) group became part of NorthropGrumman, the TRW automotive parts group became an independent firm under the name TRW Automotive. The implications of the acquisition and division of the company for the future of the dispute resolution issues described in this study are yet to be determined, though the shift in corporate ownership may not mean a drastic shift in approach to employee relations. Northrop-Grumman is itself known for its longstanding nonunion grievance procedure that has used arbitration as its final step since the 1940s, so it is by no means clear that the acquisition will result in a major shift in the character of the procedures in the former SDIT group. However, the potential impact of this corporate acquisition is a reminder of the importance of both management strategies and firm history in determining the path of evolution of employment relations within organizations.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The author would like to thank Harry Katz, Rose Batt, Katherine Stone, David Lipsky, David Lewin, and anonymous referees for helpful comments. My particular
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thanks are owed to the employees of TRW who gave generously of their valuable time for the interviews for this research project.
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Stone, K. V. W. (1996). Mandatory arbitration of individual employment rights: The yellow dog contract of the 1990’s. Denver University Law Review, 73, 1017–1050. Stone, K. V. W. (1999). Employment arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act. Chapter 2. In: A. E. Eaton & J. H. Keefe (Eds), Employment Dispute Resolution and Worker Rights in the Changing Workplace. Champaign, IL: Industrial Relations Research Association.
THE ORGANISATIONAL OMBUDS: IMPLICATIONS FOR VOICE, CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND FAIRNESS AT WORK Sue Fernie and David Metcalf 1. INTRODUCTION In his review of theoretical and empirical research on grievance procedures, Lewin (1999) states that the “grievance procedure is widely regarded by scholars and practitioners as the centerpiece of union-management relations.” It is somewhat strange, then, that a trawl through British industrial relations publications for the 1980s and 1990s reveals very few dealing with the process for resolving employment disputes in unionised workplaces (usually articles about industrial tribunals, now called employment tribunals). Given this paucity of studies in unionised workplaces, it is less surprising that almost no research has been published recently on how employees and management in non-union firms go about dealing with individual conflict in the workplace today. Whilst industrial relations scholars may have used the excuse of the drastically reduced incidence of collective responses to drop the study of conflict altogether from their recent repertoires, other disciplines still recognise that conflict is an allpervasive element of workplace life. One common conclusion is that conflict can be constructive if managed properly but destructive if not. The positive benefits of conflict include the airing of problems that the employer needs to address and the
Advances in Industrial and Labor Relations Advances in Industrial and Labor Relations, Volume 13, 97–135 Copyright © 2004 by Elsevier Ltd. All rights of reproduction in any form reserved ISSN: 0742-6186/doi:10.1016/S0742-6186(04)13004-7
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resulting beneficial changes in such areas as policies, procedures and productivity. The negative consequences can include reduced productivity, emotional distress and the escalation of minor differences into major hostilities. This paper deals with an innovative form of alternative conflict resolution – the organisational ombuds, who is “a confidential and informal information resource, communication channel, complaint handler, mediator and dispute resolver who may look into problems informally and work for systems change” (Rowe, 1997). Two threads are woven together: first, is this informal type of problem solving a means to an end – is it just the first step individuals may go through before they embark upon a more formal grievance against their employer – or can the ombuds act as a conduit through which reactive voice can be turned into proactive voice with beneficial opportunities for the organisation? This thread embraces themes one and two in the next section, namely reactive vs. proactive voice and the difference/similarity between the ombud and a grievance procedure. And second, what are the outcomes for workers and organisations? For example, do individuals in (primarily) non-union workplaces who can avail themselves of this alternative form of conflict resolution experience the same sort of outcomes in terms of procedural fairness as those in organisations which use a more formal, mainly reactive form of dealing with grievances? This thread is examined further in theme three below, which discusses different forms of workplace justice. We focus on four case study organisations in the following industries: retail sales (termed “Shop” in what follows); manufacturing and servicing equipment vital to offices and other organisations (“Liftco”); financial services with emphasis on credit card transactions (“Finser”); and an international financial institution with its headquarters in London (“IFI”). These are the only four organisations in the U.K. which have an ombud function, so we essentially had no choice over our case study organisations. Our method of investigation included interviews with the respective ombuds, surveys of users and non-users, and use of documentary evidence. We were not able to conduct “twin” studies of otherwise similar organisations with and without an ombud, nor were we able to undertake a before/after analysis. There is considerable concern in the U.K. that the number of cases going to the labour courts (Employment Tribunals, ET) has doubled over the last decade to some 130,000. These cases cover, inter alia, unfair dismissal and sex and race discrimination. The Employment Act 2002 contained measures to reduce this case load. Employers must now have a written grievance and disciplinary procedure. And an employee must normally exhaust the procedure prior to taking a case to the ET. These provisions have caused many organisations to rethink their voice and dispute resolution procedures, so this study of the workings of the organisational ombud in the four U.K. institutions with such an arrangement is timely because other firms and public sector bodies are contemplating adopting such a system.
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The ombud is able to deal informally with the sort of cases which may otherwise go to a formal ET, for example, dismissal and discipline, but can also handle more interpersonal issues such as the behaviour of line managers and peers, poorly functioning teams and staff development. In the past, some of these matters may have been dealt with by trade unions, but the near halving of union membership in the last two decades has opened the door to alternative voice and dispute resolution mechanisms. In the second section we outline some of the themes concerning the nature of justice and employee voice in organisations. The third section examines in some detail the role of the organisational ombuds and details how this function interrelates with both unions and other aspects of human resource management in organisations. The fourth section describes our case study organisations and in the fifth section we detail the methods of investigation used to study the institution, process and outcomes of the ombuds’ function. The sixth section reports and discusses our evidence on matters like proactive vs. reactive conflict resolution and voice, procedural justice, organisational outcomes and comparisons with formal procedures such as Employment Tribunals. Conclusions, including some implications for the future of unions, are set out in the final section.
2. THEMES Three themes emanating from the literature on employment dispute resolution are used to organise this discussion of voice and conflict resolution. First, the merits of reactive and proactive voice are discussed, and it is suggested that the role of the ombuds is to act as a conduit from the former to the latter. Next we analyse whether the ombuds should be viewed as the first step on the way to a formal grievance and appeal system or as something qualitatively different. Finally, ideas of workplace justice – distributive, procedural and interactional – and the possible mediating effect of the ombuds are presented. 2.1. Reactive vs. Proactive Voice The issue of conflict resolution at work is inextricably bound up with issues of worker voice. Both grievance procedures and many of new forms of work organisation, for example self-managed teams, can be seen as forms of employee voice, and “exit-voice theory” has been used to explain lower turnover in organisations with some form of worker voice. But there is great variety in the types of voice on offer. The grievance procedure is mainly a reactive form of voice, i.e. a complaint is made by an individual that his or her contractual rights have been
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violated and the instigation of the grievance is a reaction to a manager’s action. Another type of voice is having the opportunity to influence decisions before action is taken e.g. deciding the method of production with proper employee involvement, and this is termed proactive voice. However, the majority of workplaces do not have this mechanism (Cully et al., 1999, Table 5.5) The Information and Consultation Directive from the European Union, which comes into force in 2007, directs organisations with 50+ employees to establish mechanisms to consult and inform their employees and can be viewed as an opportunity to enhance proactive employee voice (Gospel & Willman, 2003), but for now, most managements unilaterally decide both pay and terms of work in addition to those matters of work organisation not covered by contract. Both types of worker voice are useful. Without the opportunity to react, people do not have recourse to a fair hearing for unjust treatment. Without the opportunity to be proactive, workers have less influence at the workplace nor can management take advantage of their knowledge. Unions are normally a source of reactive voice while high commitment work practices (HCWP) ensure proactive voice. It is worth noting that, in both U.S. and U.K., workplaces with both unions and HCWP have higher labour productivity than counterpart workplaces with just one or with no voice mechanism (see Metcalf, 2003). The ways in which conflict is handled at work will vary according to, among other things, the type of workplace governance (Lewin & Peterson, 1988). The Oxford School pluralists such as Clegg and Kahn Freund, who believed conflict to be an inevitable aspect of working life, saw trade unions as having the collective right to jointly regulate terms and conditions with employers, or even better with employers organisations. This pluralist voice mechanism takes the forms of both collective representation and negotiated grievance procedures. The decline in union power and greater emphasis on individual rights at work during the 1980s, e.g. the right not to belong to trade union, led to a new focus on individual rights. Consequently, the number of applications to Employment Tribunals trebled in the 1990s, just when strike activity hit a post-war low around the millennium. With the advent of high commitment work practices, it is hoped that the management-employee relationship will become less adversarial. The existence of conflict is negated, and “them and us” becomes “us (i.e. workers and management within the firm) vs. them (i.e. the competition).” Commitment wins over control, co-operation prevails over adversarialism (Walton, 1985). Worker participation in decision-making, often in areas traditionally reserved for management such as how to allocate work, team working, flexibility and empowerment are seen as routes to success. To the extent that union-management relations become more co-operative, some trade union reps are backing away from their traditional roles as “prosecutor” or “defence” in resolving grievances. In this context, what happens to workers’
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rights? Do they still receive due process (procedural justice)? As we shall see, one possible solution to ensure such justice is the existence of the organisational ombuds.
2.2. Is the Organisational Ombuds the First Step of a Grievance Procedure, or a Qualitatively Different Thing? “Informal discussion of grievances may be said to have an integrative (problem solving) quality that bespeaks preventive conflict resolution, rather than problemoriented formal grievance filing that bespeak reactive conflict resolution” (Lewin, 1999). Most theories of the grievance procedure at work are predicated on the fact that there has been a deterioration in the aggrieved employee’s relationship with his/her employer, and as a result they concentrate on reactive forms of workplace conflict resolution to the exclusion of any other. We would suggest, on the other hand, that an informal system – yet one which has the power to effect change, like the organisational ombuds – is a qualitatively different thing. It is not just another step in a multi-step grievance procedure which will ultimately end up in a quasi-judicial situation, but a method by which problems can be aired and dealt with in a timely fashion and both behavioural and organisational change can be accomplished. Proponents of a particular form of individual conflict resolution – mediation – use the discourse of interests and needs, and turn attention away from a person as a carrier of rights. But individuals have interpersonal-based problems as well as rights-based problems. For example, an employee who suffers sexual harassment should not be expected to compromise with the harasser to reach an agreement in a mediation. If she chooses not to file a formal complaint, she should know that something will still be done. The ombuds can investigate, can go straight to the CEO, and can publicise the wrongdoing. Therefore the ombuds may not satisfy those who only want fully fledged adversarial litigation, but it addresses more of the critics of ADR’s concerns – especially the lack of involvement of the third party – than does mediation. Where a formal grievance is too much, and mediation is too little, the ombuds may be the optimal solution. S/he is not adversarial like litigation, but s/he can take sides, as opposed to a mediator, who cannot. This does not always mean sides as in favour of one party over the other, but it does always mean “sides” as in favour of honesty, integrity and principles. The idea of third party mediation in general, and the ombuds in particular, in individual grievances is a newish one in U.K. employment relations. Two important factors that will dictate its success are managerial behaviour and trust. In a unionised workplace, a grievance usually means that a union is seeking to
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challenge management authority, and management will seek to maintain the status quo. The acceptance of a third party requires the employer and employee to come to some compromise in nearly every case. As such, many managements may fear the existence of a third party as a challenge to their prerogative. Mediation is therefore seen as having a better outcome if it is mutually agreed, but the desire to always press for a win may be indicative of the adversarial nature of employment relations in the U.K. The adoption and success of the ombuds role requires greater co-operation in dealing with conflict. It is therefore likely that the success of an ombuds programme – defined in this case as being the ability to nip problems in the bud informally – will depend on the attitude of senior management to the function and the degree of harmony in employment relations at the workplace. When an organisation establishes an ombud programme, the aim is for disputes/problems to be settled informally through the good offices of the ombud rather than simply being the first step in a formal grievance procedure. Most problems at work are settled in informal discussions between workers and supervisors. In Routes to Resolution the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) estimates that 900,000 disputes annually could lead to an employment tribunal, but most get solved beforehand. Most tribunal cases are resolved prior to a hearing. Nevertheless, in order to reduce the numbers of cases going forward to tribunal, Routes to Resolution proposed that ALL employers must have written grievance and disciplinary procedures, to a minimum standard. An employee MUST exhaust the procedures before applying to a tribunal (except if s/he is bullied or intimidated at work). The Employment Act 2002 therefore provides a good opportunity for companies without such procedures to think about dispute resolution in the workplace, but it is unlikely that simply producing a list of formal steps is will alter the way in which conflict is dealt with, especially for the 20% of employees who currently work in places with no procedures.
2.3. Workplace Justice – Distributive, Procedural and Interactional Three strands of workplace justice have been identified in the OB literature: distributive, procedural and interactional. Distributive justice is concerned with the fairness of the outcomes of a decision, e.g. selection, pay rises, promotions. Procedural justice is concerned with the extent to which perceptions about the fairness of outcomes are based on processes and procedures used to obtain them (Folger & Greenberg, 1985). Interactional justice is concerned with workers’ sensitivity to the quality of interpersonal treatment they receive during the enactment of organizational procedures (Bies & Moag, 1986), e.g. is the supervisor considerate? Did s/he consider the employee’s rights and deal truthfully with the case? Did s/he explain the decision made? Moorman (1991) found that employees’
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impressions of the fairness of their interactions with supervisors communicated more to them about trust and equity than did fair procedures. Normally an organisational ombud deals with procedural and interactional justice – process and procedure in the workplace. The ombud does not have a direct say in, for example, pay and promotion outcomes – distributive justice – but may help ensure colleagues are content with the process by which such outcomes are reached. We might expect the ombuds to influence both procedural and interactional justice at the workplace, and that outcome variables such as job satisfaction, satisfaction with management and certain citizenship behaviours will be influenced by the mediating impact of the ombuds. Such evidence is presented in the sixth section. Thus the ombud plays a similar role to a union. For example, the union’s role in providing procedural justice via its representation in the grievance system is held to be more significant than other benefits provided by the union (Gordon & Fryxell, 1993). Further, such procedural justice contributes importantly to members’ satisfaction with both their union and their management. But, in addition, the ombud can act as a conduit between reactive and proactive forms of employee voice which, in principle, can enhance outcomes for both employees and management. Further, the majority of workplaces do not recognise a union and therefore the establishment of an ombud programme in such organisations is likely to enhance justice at work.
3. ROLE OF ORGANISATIONAL OMBUDS 3.1. Role and Principles An organisational ombuds is concerned with both conflict resolution and provision of employees’ voice. S/he “fosters values and behaviour such as fairness, equity, justice, equality of opportunity and respect” (Rowe, 1997). The Ombudsman Association (1995) describes the role as follows: “The mission of the organisational ombuds is to provide a confidential, neutral and informal process which facilitates fair and equitable resolutions to concerns that arise in the organisation. In performing this mission, the ombuds serves as an information and communication resource, upward feedback channel, advisor, dispute resolution expert and change agent.” The Ombudsman Association (TOA) is the professional body for corporate and organisational ombuds. It sets out a range of standards of practice and provides training and professional certification. The four key principles are: confidentiality, neutrality, informality and privilege. First, the practice is based on confidentiality. An ombuds does not use the names of individuals without express permission. During the problem-solving process an ombuds may make known information as long as the identity of the individual
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contacting the office is not compromised. Second, an organisational ombuds is neutral and is independent of ordinary line and staff structures. He or she serves no additional role within the organisation which would compromise this neutrality. Third, the ombuds is an informal, off-the-record resource. Formal investigations – for the purpose of adjudication – should be done by others. Thus the ombuds does not normally act as an agent for the organisation. Further individual workers are not required to meet with the ombuds – all interactions with the ombuds are voluntary. Fourth, there is a privilege with respect to communications with the ombuds and s/he resists testifying in any formal process inside or outside the organisation. (Privilege is a legal term which describes a relationship which the law protects from forced disclosure. Traditional privileges are client/lawyer, doctor/patient, priest/penitent, husband/wife.)
3.2. Appointment, Cases and Functions In some organisations, the ombuds is appointed from within the institution, and sometimes this is the last job they will hold in that organisation prior to retirement. In other organisations the ombuds is appointed from outside. In yet other organisations, the ombuds remains an outsider, employed on a consultancy basis. Such an arrangement possibly enhances the neutrality and confidentiality principles noted above. An organisational ombuds deals with a great variety of cases. For example, at IFI cases include: job content, working conditions, e.g. downgrading, responsibility; relationship with other staff, including line manager, e.g. bullying, discourteous behaviour; performance evaluation, promotion, salary and bonus, both process and outcome; career development and training; benefits and allowances administration, e.g. rights to specified benefits; harassment and incidents of perceived discrimination. It is also worth pointing out what an organisational ombuds does not deal with (see also Rowe, 1997). S/he is not a safety, ethics, audit or equal opportunities officer. These are all very specific functions whereas ombuds’ cases are often both undefined and complex. Similarly the ombuds is not a counsellor like those running an employee assistance programme nor is s/he a compliance officer, making sure, for example, that the organisation enforces relevant procurement or health and safety rules. Unlike a union steward, the ombuds does not primarily focus on complaints arising under contract. It is apparent that the two key functions of the organisational ombudsman concern dispute resolution and voice (see, for example, American Bar Association, 2000). The manner in which the ombuds differs from and/or fits with more
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Table 1. Disputes and Their Resolution. Degree of Formality
Individual Both Union and Non-Union
Collective Largely Union
Very formal
Collective bargaining procedures (union workplaces only) e.g. re-dismissal
Official industrial action Arbitration • Conventional • FOA
Formal
Law suits e.g. safety Employment tribunal e.g. discrimination Grievance and appeals committee Mediation Conciliation e.g. via ACAS in discrimination cases
Mediation Conciliation
Informal
Ombudsman
Unofficial industrial action
Very informal
Line manager, open door policy
Note: ACAS is state-funded Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service; FOA is final offer arbitration. Source: Adapted from Kaminski (1999).
traditional dispute resolution and voice mechanisms is set out in Tables 1 and 2. Consider first conflict and its resolution (Table 1). An ombuds deals with individuals in an informal manner. There are many other dispute resolution procedures for individual disputes. Formal mechanisms – using established due process procedures – include those established by collective bargaining if there is union recognition, lawsuits, employment tribunals, grievance and appeals committees, mediation and conciliation, perhaps via the state-sponsored Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service (ACAS). The ombuds is an Table 2. Voice Mechanisms.
Source: Adapted from Kaminski (1999), Table 1.
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informal mechanism as is, for example, a line manager with an open door policy. The ombuds normally does not get involved with collective disputes. Voice in organisations can be proactive or reactive and can affect both individual and collective relations. The ombuds provides an informal, reactive voice for individuals yet contributes to the proactive resolution of conflict within the organisation. Table 2 puts the ombuds role in context by setting out alternative voice mechanisms which provide both collective and other types of communication. 3.3. Interests, Rights and Power Ury et al. (1988) note that there are three forms of “dispute” which need reconciling. First, interests which involve “needs, desires, concerns, fears.” Dispute resolution here is problem-solving, for example over a poorly carried-out performance appraisal. Second rights, which turn on informal or formal standards – does the employee have the right to a promotion after a specified tenure or a right to a particular benefit? Third, power raises concerns such as the relationship between a line manager and a subordinate. Whilst these notions of interests, rights and power are normally applied to collective disputes, they can, as shown here, also be applied to individual matters. Consider for example a case of alleged gender discrimination in promotion. This would depend, in part or whole, on the perceived power of the line manager and other colleagues who decide on such promotions. Without ombud-ADR it would be resolved via any extant formal grievance and appeal procedures in the organisation, an employment tribunal or litigation – an appeal to rights. But the ombuds focusses on interests. S/he gets the permission of the individual to pursue the case (but only once approached, since an ombuds is not an advocate), talks to the line manager, HR department, peers, etc., perhaps concluding that the colleague was not quite ready for promotion now is likely to find favour shortly. This is precisely the “back and forth communication intended to reach agreement” described by Ury et al. (p. 6). Such back and forth communication is surely cheaper than litigation; both parties are likely to be satisfied with procedures and (probably) outcomes; the parties can continue to work together and the solution is likely to be durable. 3.4. Fit with Unions, Legal Framework, HR Most organisations who have adopted the ombuds function do not also recognise a trade union, but some do (see the fourth section). In such organisations there is normally a division of labour such that the ombuds does not trespass on union territory. At Liftco, for example, the ombuds does not take cases involving pay and conditions covered by collective agreements.
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Many areas of the individual’s employment relationship with the company are defined by law. These include minimum standards for pay, working time, certain benefits such as maternity arrangements, non-discrimination and terminations. An ombuds may on occasion mediate concerning these legal rights but typically the function is much more subtle and complex. Rather than adjudicating on maternity benefits, the ombud can examine the manner in which the organisation’s familyfriendly policy is being implemented by line managers. Similarly, the ombud does not decide minimum safety standards, but it may influence compensation amounts paid to employees for accidents sustained at work. Interactions between the ombuds and HR department are complex. While the ombuds may sometimes be a thorn in Personnel’s side, equally cajoling line managers to take personnel issues seriously is helpful. Perhaps more important is the proactive (internal consultant/change agent) role played by the organisational ombudsman. By commenting on and acting on, for example, the performance appraisal or promotion process, bullying at the workplace or discriminatory procedures, s/he is likely to encourage a more strategic approach to personnel issues within the organisation.
4. THE SAMPLE OF CASE STUDY ORGANISATIONS 4.1. The Organisational Characteristics The characteristics of the organisations and the employees are set out in Table 3. The financial services company (Finser) is a private plc, foreign-owned, which has been in operation since 1850. Shop is worker-owned, British and has operated in the heart of London since the 1880s and subsequently at many other locations. Liftco is a plc with an American parent company that has been operating for 140 years. IFI is London-based, mostly foreign-owned and has only been operating since 1991. Liftco recognises a trade union in the U.K. and both it and Finser have works councils in other European countries. Finser has 8,000 employees in the U.K. and a total of 18,000 in its Europe and Middle East Area. Around two-thirds of employees are female and one-third are managers. Shop has 56,000 employees in the U.K. and none abroad, 60% of whom are female and 16% are managers. Liftco has 60,000 employees worldwide, of whom 2,500 are in Britain. Female employees and managers account for around one-fifth of the total. IFI has some 800 employees at its London base and a further 250 in its countries of operation. Three-fifths of its staff are professional and twofifths are support; just over half are women. Human resource management practices vary enormously among the four organisations. Finser has top-down communication methods, extensive
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Table 3. Characteristics of the Organisation and Employees. Characteristic Organisation Private/public Sector Foreign/U.K. owned Age of organisation (in 2003) How long at this location Mission
Employees No. of employees % Female % Management
Shop
Liftco
IFI
Private, plc Financial services Foreign 1850 (153 years)
Private Retail U.K. 1929 (Trust), 1880s Oxford Street 122 years “The partnership’s ultimate purpose is the happiness of all its members, through their worthwhile and satisfying employment in a successful business.” No
Private, plc General engineering American parent 140 years
Public IFI Mostly foreign 1991
137 years Sale, installation, service and repair of lifts, escalators and travalators
12 years “Seeks to foster the transition to an open market-oriented economy and to promote private and entrepreneurial initiative in all 26 countries of operation” No
1976 (27 years) “To be world’s most respected brand”
UK: No EU: Yes in Some countries U.K. 8,000 EMEA 18,000 U.K. 60% EMEA 67% 33% Other 67% “associates”
U.K. 56,000 60% 16%
AEEU in UK, Works Councils in Europe U.K. 2,500 Worldwide 60,000 U.K. 20% Worldwide 15% U.K. 20% professional, 20% support and admin Worldwide 15% both
U.K. approx 800 Resident offices approx 250 54% 60% Professional 40% Support
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Union
Finser
Intense, e.g. Committees for comm. Top Mgt. all workforce Store level weekly mts. Partnership/store level newsletters Readers’ letters, trading results in Gazette
Top down culture Cascade communication Team briefing Toolbox talks Employee surveys DIALOG (part of Ombuds program)
Employee surveys eQuality group Staff council minutes HR website & “state of nation” talks
TQM or similar
None
Informal
ACE (Achieving Competitive Excellence) Focus groups
None
Teamworking
No – tried but didn’t work Ad hoc teams for specific projects
Yes, in dept. stores
Yes – Team building “Coverdale” and “Working transitions”
Ad hoc team building and coaching
Performance pay
Yes, e.g. • Sales % of revenue • Team bonuses (no team?) • Performance appraisal (via grid)
Yes • Merit pay, up to 40% of basic • Organisation-wide bonus, % of basic
Annual performance appraisal 360 degree Co-wide PRP axed 2000 Sales/Field incentives Management bonus Executive PRP% of salary × profitability and other key achievements
Professional staff: Annual PA Bonus Merit pay rises Promotion Support staff: Annual PA Merit pay rises Limited 360 degree
Other dispute resolution methods
No, but 2001 “facilitated discussion”
Committees for communication
Registered grievances Appeals against disciplinary ET
Formal grievance and appeal machinery
Other
ee surveys, value surveys, mgt. graded acc. to ee responses
See communication above
ee surveys Gender, bullying, ff etc.
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Top down, strong ethic Employee surveys Value surveys Mgt. graded according to employee responses
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HRM practices Communication methods
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teamworking which is in the process of being reconsidered, and performancerelated pay (PRP) via team bonuses and the performance appraisal. The ombuds is the main form of conflict resolution and recently extended to “facilitated resolution” – a voluntary process where two parties in conflict discuss informally their concerns, aided by a neutral facilitator. As a result, the parties aim to develop a better understanding of their perspectives and come to a mutually satisfactory resolution. Extensive use is made of employee surveys and individual managers are graded according to employee responses. Shop operates a form of collective industrial relations, similar to works councils, called “committees for communication.” Top management meets all the workforce in a particular shop periodically. In addition, there are weekly store-level meetings, regular newsletters and a lively letters page in the house magazine (which is, however, edited by management). Stores are traditionally organised in a hierarchical fashion, and there is no formal total quality management (TQM) process. Performance-related pay (PRP) is powerful, with merit pay comprising up to 40% of basic pay and an annual organisation-wide bonus determined as a percentage of basic pay. The committees for communication provide a way for staff to express their views, make suggestions for improving the business and influence how it operates. Any member of staff can stand for election, and heads of branches are invited. They meet at least four times per year. Liftco has a variety of communication channels including cascading, teambriefings, toolbox talks, employee surveys and the Dialog programme where the ombuds answers employees’ written queries. TQM is achieved through focus groups “achieving competitive excellence.” There is extensive teamworking. Company-wide performance pay was ended in 2000 so that greater attention is now given to individual performance, including 360 degree appraisals and elements of PRP for sales, field and management employees. The company has a formal grievance and appeals system and a trade union is recognised in the U.K. Until recently HR practices at IFI were mainly concerned with recruitment and separations. There were some ad hoc surveys, e.g. concerning gender or work/life balance. Similarly, team building was via sporadic ad hoc coaching. PRP for professional employees comes through promotion and the bonus (averaging around 20% of basic pay). Support staff receive merit pay awards. IFI has formal grievance and appeal machinery.
4.2. Characteristics and Methods of Operation of the Ombuds The characteristics of the ombuds are set out in Table 4, much of which is self-explanatory. The reasons for adopting the ombuds function is a mixture of
Characteristic Adoption, etc. Why
Finser
Shop
Liftco
IFI
ee surveys incidents (money laundering) US federal sentencing guidelines
Rules 83–95 of Constitution discuss Partners’ counsellor and Registrars (1 per 15 at grocery division) Personnel Director “not too soft” P. C. “not too hard”
People values – voice, confidence, failure of other channels or inappropriate Legal/financial compliance – (Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, Federal Sentencing Guidelines)
No union IFI above the law Staff council only collective issues Grievance and appeal too formal
U.K. 1996
1929
1986
1998
No. of ombuds
2 (1 U.K.)
2 at HQ (P. C.) 40 Registrars
1 per division plus 1 Corporate Ombuds + Otis = 50 DIALOG administrators worldwide
2 (approx 1 FTE 1 day/week)
How long in post
7 years
4 years (HQ)
5 years
5 years
How filled
Internal advert Intensive interviews Representative ee panel Psychometric tests References
By Chairman from within
By invitation
By invitation, agreed by President, Staff Council, VP Personnel
Where can go afterwards
Can go anywhere, it is not pre-retirement job, could even go to HR or work for CEO
Can go anywhere, not necessarily pre-retirement. Previous Omb. → Director of Personnel
Out!
Independent of IFI so no link once appointment finishes
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When
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Table 4. (Continued ) Characteristic
Shop
Liftco
IFI
Linked to specific grade in the organisation
By Chairman
Linked to specific grade
Agreed daily rate
Brighton – physical office plus visit other sites in EMEA area
HQ London Registrars offices
70 countries, 30 languages 2 × offices
Meeting room inside IFI or off-site
How much face-to-face
U.K. cases 50% (phone 50%) Other EMEA (Switzerland) more phone intensive
HQ 90% Registrars almost all
90% Telephone contact 10% F/f country visits
Almost all
Phones, translation, home calls, fax e-mails
Yes, all Completely separate from AMEX systems
Can phone, but normally require face-to-face
Toll free telephone, e-mail, fax, business telephone lines, secretary, intranet Language line, written translation service
Could be all but mostly initiated by e-mail then face-to-face
Documentation
shredded once case completed
HQ – retained in case ET follows
Employee name/address shredded on case closure. Rest of file kept 3–5 months max.
Kept 1 year
Can cases be anonymous
Yes
No (HQ) Occasionally at