Adapting Historical Knowledge Production to the Classroom
Adapting Historical Knowledge Production to the Classroom
Edited by
P.V. Kokkotas, K.S Malamitsa and A.A. Rizaki National and Kapodistrian University of Athens, Greece
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Preface.................................................................................................................... vii Section A: Theoretical Framework 1. Teaching the Philosophical and Worldview Components of Science: Some Considerations ......................................................................................... 3 Michael R. Matthews 2. Is the History of Science the Wasteland of False Theories?............................ 17 Stathis Psillos 3. The History of Science and the Future of Science Education: A Typology of Approaches to History of Science in Science Instruction ........................... 37 William F. McComas 4. Textbooks of the Physical Sciences and the History of Science: ǹ Problematic Coexistence ................................................................................. 55 Kostas Gavroglu 5. Does History of Science Contribute to the Construction of Knowledge in the Constructivist Environments of Learning? ............................................ 61 Panagiotis Kokkotas and Aikaterini Rizaki 6. On the Concept of Energy: History of Science for Teaching .......................... 85 Ricardo Lopes Coelho 7. Troublesome Droplets: Improving Students’ Experiences with the Millikan Oil Drop Experiment ...................................................................... 103 Peter Heering and Stephen Klassen 8. The Antikythera Mechanism: A Mechanical Cosmos and an Eternal Prototype for Modelling and Paradigm Study ............................................... 113 Xenophon Moussas 9. History of Science and Argumentation in Science Education: Joining Forces?.............................................................................................. 129 Gábor Á. Zemplén 10. Integration of Science Education and History of Science: The Catalan Experience ..................................................................................................... 141 Antoni Roca-Rosell v
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Section B: Praxis 11. Teaching Modern Physics, using Selected Nobel Lectures ........................... 153 Arthur Stinner 12. Classroom Explorations with Pendulums, Mirrors, and Galileo’s Drama ............................................................................................ 159 Elizabeth Cavicchi 13. Developing Greek Primary School Students’ Graph/Chart Interpretation and Reading Comprehension as Critical Thinking Skills: Assessing a Science Teaching Approach which Integrates Elements of History of Science ......................................................................................... 181 Katerina Malamitsa, Michael Kasoutas and Panagiotis Kokkotas 14. Use of the History of Science in the Design of Research-informed NOS Materials for Teacher Education ................................................................... 195 Agustín Adúriz-Bravo 15. Which HPS do/should Textbooks Refer to? The Historical Debate on the Nature of Electrical Fluids....................................................................... 205 Cibelle Celestino Silva 16. A wiki-course for Teacher Training in Science Education: Using History of Science to Teach Electromagnetism.......................................................... 213 Vassilis Koulountzos and Fanny Seroglou 17. Could Scientific Controversies be used as a Tool for Teaching Science in the Compulsory Education?: The Results of a Pilot Research Based on the Galileo – Del Monte Controversy about the Motion of the Pendulum....................................................................................................... 229 Constantina Stefanidou and Ioannis Vlachos 18. Resolving Dilemmas in Acquiring Knowledge of Newton’s First Law: Is the History of Science Helpful? ....................................................... 249 Gyoungho Lee and Arie Leegwater
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PREFACE
Over the last decades an intensive interest has been developed related to the incorporation of History and Philosophy of Science in science education curricula. This fact is in direct relation to the organization of national and international scientific conferences, workshops, meetings, summer schools for PhD students etc., the publishing of proceedings, the publishing of the scientific journal ‘Science & Education’ and the creation of the International History, Philosophy Science Teaching Group. This group organizes every two years an International History, Philosophy Science Education Conference in different places of the Planet and the year in between an international workshop of experts is held at a different place in the World. In this context the 7th International History, Philosophy Science Teaching Workshop of Experts, which was entitled “Adapting Historical Science Knowledge Production to the Classroom”, was hosted in Athens 7–11 July 2008. The organization of this workshop gave the opportunity to the experts in History and Philosophy of Science as well as to science educators worldwide to sit together for fruitful discussions and speculations. The result of this exchange of views was a collection of high quality papers dealing with issues of both theoretical and practical interest, which focus and contribute to the discussion and the promotion of the strategic incorporation of History and Philosophy of Science in science teaching. The aims of the workshop were: – the communication and the exchange of views about the introduction and the utilization of History and Philosophy of Science in science teaching, – the osmosis of the views of the experts present at the discussion followed each presentation and – the contribution to the reflections for the improvement of science teaching. Product of the Athens workshop of Experts is the publication of the present book which includes the papers presented and discussed there. Additionally, a number of other papers, relevant to the theme of the conference, are included as they are of interest to the theme of this book since they deal with the use of the History of Science in science teaching. In this sense, the book is more extensive and wide ranging than if it was just a collection of contributions of the workshop. The aims of this book are: (1) to contribute to the improvement of the quality of science education at all levels of education with the utilization of elements from History of Science incorporated in science teaching and (2) to contribute to the debate about science education at the international level in order to find new ways for further inquiry on the issues that the book is dealing with. The book is divided in two parts: The first expounds its philosophical and epistemological framework and the second combines theory and praxis, the theoretical insights with their practical applications. The themes presented in it may attract the interest of the members of the international scientific community specialized either in History and Philosophy of Science or in science education (science teachers and advisors, researchers in science teaching etc) especially those specialists interested vii
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in the use of History and Philosophy of Science in science teaching and its potential to improve the quality of science education at all levels, for the benefit of all students boys and girls worldwide. More specifically, the reader of the book will find some contributions that deal with and develop issues of great interest since all of the issues addressed remain open for further analysis and inquiry or lead to dilemmas. In the chapter Teaching the Philosophical and Worldview components of Science Some considerations, Michael Mathews discusses an important aspect of the contribution of science to culture, namely its role in the development of worldviews in society. A case study of the adjustments to a central Roman Catholic doctrine occasioned by the metaphysics of Atomism which was embraced at the Scientific Revolution is presented. In the chapter Is the History of Science the Wasteland of False Theories?, Stathis Psillos uses the caloric theory of heat, as an example showing the non existence of a completely falsifiable or verifiable theory. On the contrary, he states that, using the example of the Laplace’s caloric theory of heat, past science, although not completely corroborated, is viewed historically a living part of contemporary science. In the chapter The History of Science and the Future of Science Education - A Typology of Approaches to History of Science in Science Instruction, William McComas examines the role to be played in the incorporation of History of Science approaches to the teaching of Nature of Science by discussing the rationales, reviewing prior strategies, considering examples with the ultimate goal of proposing a taxonomy (typology) of History of Science instructional approaches to inform practice, guide future research and provide shared definitions. In the chapter Does History of Science contribute to the construction of knowledge in the constructivist learning environments?, Panagiotis Kokkotas and Aikaterini Rizaki describe the attempts made for the introduction of History of Science in science teaching over the last century and research how from traditional theories of learning we arrived in the modern ones, which are very well rooted in epistemology. Modern theories of learning support the view that knowledge is constructed in individual learning or appropriated in interactive learning environments. So, it is neither transmittable nor discoverable. In constructivist learning environments the use of History of Science is based in two epistemological presuppositions a) the similarity between the conceptions of students’ and of scientists’ or philosophers’ of the past, and b) the parallelism between the development of students’ understanding and the evolution of scientific concepts in History of Science. Furthermore, there are contributions that deal with issues regarding the writing of contemporary science textbooks in which the position and the incorporation of elements of History of Science in science teaching are addressed, and the extent to which this incorporation contributes to the improvement of the quality of science teaching. In the chapter Textbooks of the physical sciences and the history of science ǹ problematic coexistence, Kostas Gavroglu tries to answer two questions. The first is whether historically informed textbooks play any role in making students understand what History of Science is. The second question is whether pedagogic viii
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expediency is always in tandem with the scholarship of History of Science. Finally, the author wonders “might it be the case that what one wants to achieve in pedagogic terms may be in conflict with what one wants to convey in historical terms?” and he concludes that what, perhaps, we need to attempt is to encourage the writing of historically informed textbooks. In the chapter Which HPS do/should textbooks refer to? - The historical debate on the nature of electrical fluids, Cibelle Celestino Silva asserts the importance of Nature of Science in science teaching and presents Brazilian National Standards which emphasize the social and cultural contextualization as necessary and point some abilities to be developed in physics teaching, recognizing among others: physics as a human endeavor, teaching aspects of its history and its relationship with cultural, social, political and economic contexts, its role in the production system etc. There are some other contributions that deal with science teaching approaches using History of Science, as they have been applied at the tertiary level of education, creating a fruitful field of discussions. In these contributions, based on the experience of the application, the results of the teaching procedures have been described. In the chapter Teaching Modern Physics, using selected Nobel lectures, Arthur Stinner describes the course and a rationale for prospective physics teachers at the University of Manitoba, using a selected number of appropriate Nobel lectures. He decided to give them some enthusiasm and self confidence for the teaching of the ideas and the concepts of modern physics. Based on his prior experience, he was convinced that the conventional approach revisiting the main ideas of modern physics using a textbook would only lead to boredom. His contribution also contains a shortened version of a handout produced by one of his students (in consultation with the instructor) based on the work of J. J. Thomson, as reported in his Nobel lecture. In the chapter Classroom Explorations with Pendulums, Mirrors, and Galileo’s Drama, Elizabeth Cavicchi presents classrooms explorations with Pendulums, Mirrors, and Galileo’s Drama. In this context, while exploring materials, students researched Galileo, his trial, and its aftermath. Questions and experiments evolved continually, differing perspectives on science and authority were exchanged respectfully and students developed as critical explorers of the world. In the chapter Use of the History of Science in the design of research-informed NOS materials for teacher education, Agustin Aduriz Brabo recognizing the NOS as a major component in science teacher education, argues that several programs and materials have been issued, based on NOS research and aim at changing prospective and in-service teachers’ ideas on what science is and how it works. In this study, he describes one possible rationale for an integration, which uses the History of Science as a set (in the theatrical sense) to learn key ideas from 20th century philosophy of science. He also provided a brief overview of the process of derivation of historybased NOS materials using the idea of ‘setting’. In the chapter A wiki-course for teacher training in science education: Using History of Science to teach electromagnetism, Vassilis Koulountzos and Fanny Seroglou present the design and development of the instructional e-material that ix
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has been inspired by History of Science for science teachers e-training. The teachers have been introduced to a variety of activities such as: experiments, role-playing, discussions, and debates. Wiki offers a dynamic environment for in-service teachers to interact with each other, providing a Wiki-course as a promising flexible and expanding character to teacher education. In the chapter Developing Greek Primary School Students’ Graph/Chart Interpretation and Reading Comprehension as Critical Thinking Skills - Assessing a Science Teaching Approach which Integrates Elements of History of Science, Katerina Malamitsa, Michael Kasoutas and Panagiotis Kokkotas discuss the development of sixth grade students’ graph/chart interpretation and reading comprehension skills as critical thinking skills, relatively to the contribution of the integration of aspects of History of Science into instruction. Towards this direction a project on electromagnetism was designed and implemented aiming to engage primary school students in a critical examination of knowledge by generating argumentation and discussion in their classrooms. The results were supportive to the integration of History of Science in science instruction. In the chapter Could scientific controversies be used as a tool for teaching science in the Compulsory Education? - The results of a pilot research, Constantina Stefanidou and Ioannis Vlachos present the results of a pilot research which aimed to introduce aspects of the Nature of Science in physics teaching, based on a historical context. Taking into account that the study of the simple pendulum is included in physics curriculum, they were inspired by the scientific and philosophical controversy between Galileo and Del Monte about the pendulum motion. The intervention was addressed to thirteen high school students and was assessed. The results indicated that scientific controversies may be useful for teaching Nature of Science. The following three contributions refer to Spain, Greece and Slovacia respectively and have their own distinguished contribution to this book. In the chapter Integration of Science Education and History of Science: The Catalan experience, Antoni Roca-Rosell signalizing that the role of History of Science in education ought to provide an alternative view of science and technology placing them in a human context, presents the efforts for the achievement this objective in Barcelona. There are a number of groups working on this objective with two main orientations: first, dissemination of historical content in science education, highlighting the educational value of case studies and second, special courses on history of science and technology at the university level. In the chapter the Antikythera Mechanism - A Mechanical Cosmos and an eternal prototype for Modelling and Paradigm Study, Xenophon Moussas argues that the Mechanism of Antikythera is the oldest, the only and in fact the very best known example of a complex astronomical device, a dedicated analogue astronomical computer, possibly a planetarium, a device made with gears. We know that this type of devices have been used as educational devices in schools. As we read in Cicero and other ancient texts, great scientists and philosophers developed and used such devices either for education, entertainment, or to impress one’s visitors and guests, including state persons during their state visits. The Mechanism is ideal for x
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investigating interdisciplinarity in the sciences, as it covers many fields of traditional disciplines, without taking into account traditional boundaries between academic subjects, so that it helps a pupil and a student, or an adult learner, to think in a way that crosses the borders of established fields and have a holistic view. In the chapter On the Concept of Energy: History of Science for Teaching, Ricardo Lopes Coelho acknowledges that some physicists have pointed out that we do not really know what energy is. He regards as a main aim of the present paper: “How to understand energy thanks to its history”. For this purpose, he proposes that historical topics which constitute the basis of modern approaches in textbooks will be considered and how to interpret Joule’s experiment. The history of science teaches us that energy was discovered in the 1840s. Mayer, Joule, Colding and Helmholtz are generally considered the discoverers. They did not speak of conservation or transformation of energy but rather of force (Mayer, Colding or Helmholtz) or conversion of mechanical power into heat and vice-versa. Studies like the following deal exclusively with either the educational transformation of the science concepts and the construction of educational material or the use of teaching strategies which incorporate History of Science in science teaching. In the chapter On the Concept of Energy: History of Science for Teaching, Ricardo Lopes Coelho acknowledges that some physicists have pointed out that we do not really know what energy is. He regards as a main aim of the present paper: “How to understand energy thanks to its history”. For this purpose, he proposes that historical topics which constitute the basis of modern approaches in textbooks will be considered and how to interpret Joule’s experiment. In the chapter Troublesome droplets - Improving students’ experiences with the Millikan oil drop experiment, Peter Heering and Stephen Klassen argue that the Millikan’s oil drop experiment is among the classic experiments from modern physics and one of the ‘most beautiful’ experiments of all time. They acknowledge that the educational existing concerns for the Millikan’s experiment contrast with the laboratory experience of students and instructors in performing the experiment. So, they started a research project on the Millikan experiment in order to improve its educational potential. In this chapter, they describe the project and the measures that they intend to take to improve the experience of students. In the chapter History of science and argumentation in science education: Joining forces?, Gábor Zemplén presents an important aspect of any educational approach that aims to incorporate History of Science to develop either knowledge and skills on the Nature of Science, citizenship ideas (including ‘socio-scientific issues’ and ‘public understanding of science’), or reflective, critical thinking. Argumentation appears to be a crucial aspect of science, and, as such, also for approaches incorporating history of science in curricula. In spite of this, at the moment mostly desiderata are set in course and curriculum objectives, without providing the necessary time for both history of science and argumentation in science classes, as a recent study concludes. Furthermore, the author outlines a number of limitations and some of the possibilities that research in argumentation in science education suggests in the hope of showing the benefit of these considerations for the incorporation of History of Science in science classrooms. xi
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In the chapter Resolving Dilemmas in Acquiring Knowledge of Newton’s First Lawn - Is the History of Science Helpful?, Gyoungho Lee and Arie Leegwater explore a dilemmas episode of a physics teacher who is confronted by student disbelief in Newton’s First Law of Motion; there is the tension between students’ common-sense knowledge and the formal knowledge of science. Furthermore, they present the historical case of natural motion and its potential for resolving the dilemmas of teaching Newton’s First Law. The Editors Panagiotis Kokkotas, Katerina Malamitsa and Aikaterini Rizaki National and Kapodistrian University of Athens, Greece
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SECTION A: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
MICHAEL R. MATTHEWS
1. TEACHING THE PHILOSOPHICAL AND WORLDVIEW COMPONENTS OF SCIENCE Some Considerations1
1. INTRODUCTION
A common feature of contemporary science education curricula is the expectation that as well as learning science content and method, students will learn something about science - its nature, its history, how it differs from non-scientific endeavours, and its interactions with society and culture. Thus as well as disciplinary or technical goals, contemporary science curricula rightly seek to contribute wider educational goals. These have often been called ‘humanistic’, ‘cultural’ or ‘liberal’ goals. The American Association for the Advancement of Science expressed its commitment to cultural or humanistic outcomes of science education in its Project 2061 (AAAS, 1989) publication, and the following year in The Liberal Art of Science: The teaching of science must explore the interplay between science and the intellectual and cultural traditions in which it is firmly embedded. Science has a history that can demonstrate the relationship between science and the wider world of ideas and can illuminate contemporary issues (AAAS, 1990, p. xiv). The unique contribution of the science programme to this more general problemsolving educational goal is the cultivation and refinement of specifically scientific habits of mind. These are meant to ‘spill over’ from the laboratory bench to the home, workplace, community and nation. For the AAAS, the wider ‘planetary’ problems are not just scientific and technical, they are also social, cultural, and ideological; and the conviction is that these problems can be, and perhaps only can be, solved by application of a ‘scientific habit of mind’. The expectations of the AAAS have found their way through to the US National Science Education Standards where there is a separate content strand on ‘History and Nature of Science Standards’ (NRC, 1996) this strand is to be covered in science programmes from kindergarten to year 12. Of this strand, the document says that: Students should develop an understanding of what science is, what science is not, what science can and cannot do, and how science contributes to culture (NRC, 1996, p. 2). P.V. Kokkotas et al., (eds.), Adapting Historical Science Knowledge Production to the Classroom, 3–16. © 2011 Sense Publishers. All rights reserved.
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And, The standards for the history and nature of science recommend the use of history in school science programs to clarify different aspects of scientific inquiry, the human aspects of science, and the role that science has played in the development of various cultures. (NRC, 1996, p. 107). The liberal or cultural curricular views advanced by the AAAS and evidenced in Norway’s Education Framework have a long history. The hope for a positive ‘spillover’ effect from the learning of science to the improvement of society and culture is a 21st century restatement of the central plank of the European Enlightenment of the 18th century: The Enlightenment thinkers believed that the spread of science would ameliorate many of the enormous physical, social and ideological problems that then beset Europe - terrible religious wars, widespread and gross superstitions, witch crazes, plagues, absolutist and authoritarian monarchical regimes, a domineering and intrusive Roman Catholic Church, and equally domineering Protestant Churches where they had the opportunity, the Inquisition, and so on. In these circumstances it was not surprising that many thought that the method of the New Science that was so manifestly fruitful in the achievements of Newton should be applied more broadly and that it would have flow-on effects for the betterment of culture and society. These curricular statements and Framework pronouncements provide an ‘open cheque’ for the inclusion of history and philosophy of science in science teacher education programmes, and for their utilisation in classrooms. Unfortunately this open cheque is too often not cashed. This paper will discuss an important aspect of the contribution of science to culture, namely its role in the development of worldviews in society; and then how this interaction of science and worldviews can be taught in school programmes. 2. SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY
Science raises philosophical questions and requires philosophical commitments: science and philosophy go hand-in-hand2. It is no accident that many of the major physicists of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries wrote books on philosophy and the engaging overlaps between science and philosophy - for instance Boltzmann, von Helmholtz, Mach, Duhem, Eddington, Jeans, Planck, Bohr, Heisenberg, Born, and Bohm3. Many less well known physicists also wrote such books; among the better ones being: Bridgman, Campbell, Margenau, Bunge, Chandrasekhar, Holton, Rabi, Shimony, Rohrlich, Cushing and Weinberg4. A good many chemists and biologists have made contributions to this genre –for instance Haldane (1928), Polanyi (1958), Bernal (1939), Hull (1988), Mayr (1982), Gould (1999), Birch (1990), Monod (1971), and Wilson (1998). One very recent contribution to the genre is by Francis Collins, the geneticist and leader of the Human Genome Project (Collins, 2007)5. 4
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The Oxford philosopher, R. G. Collingwood in his landmark study The Idea of Nature wrote on the history of mutual interdependence of science and philosophy and commented that: The detailed study of natural fact is commonly called natural science, or for short simply science; the reflection on principles, whether those of natural science or of any other department of thought or action, is commonly called philosophy. …but the two things are so closely related that natural science cannot go on for long without philosophy beginning; and that philosophy reacts on the science out of which it has grown by giving it in future a new firmness and consistency arising out of the scientist’s new consciousness of the principles on which he has been working (Collingwood, 1945, p. 2). He goes on to write that: For this reason it cannot be well that natural science should be assigned exclusively to one class of persons called scientists and philosophy to another class called philosophers. A man who has never reflected on the principles of his work has not achieved a grown-up man’s attitude towards it; a scientist who has never philosophized about his science can never be more than a second-hand, imitative, journeyman scientist (Collingwood, 1945, p. 2). What Collingwood says about the requirement of ‘reflecting upon principles’ being necessary for the practice of good science, can equally be said for the practice of good science teaching. Liberal education promotes just such deeper reflection and questioning of the basic laws or assumptions of any discipline being taught, including science. 3. SCIENCE AND METAPHYSICS
Science not only raises and is intertwined with the foregoing types of ‘routine’ philosophical questions, but these philosophical reflections lead inexorably to metaphysical ones, and finally to questions about worldviews. The phenomena and questions science investigates; the kinds of answers it entertains; the types of entities it recognises as having causal influence; the boundaries, if any, it sets to the domain of scientific investigation; and so on, all begin to touch upon or push against larger metaphysical commitments of an epistemological, ontological, and sometimes ethical kind. Consider the Law of Inertia, the foundation stone of classical physics which is taught to every science student in school. It is usually stated as: ‘bodies either remain at rest or continue travelling in a straight line at a constant velocity unless acted upon by a force’. In better schools it might be ‘demonstrated’ by means of sliding a puck on an air table. In a purely technical science education the law is learnt by heart, and problems worked out using its associated formulae of F = ma. Technical purposes might be satisfied with correct memorisation and 5
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mastery of the quantitative skills - ‘a force of X newtons acts on a mass of Y kilograms, what acceleration is produced?’- but the goals of liberal education cannot be so easily satisfied. Just a little philosophical reflection and historical investigation on this routine topic of inertia opens up whole new scientific and educational vistas. Apart from interesting and important history, basic matters of philosophy arise in any good classroom treatment of the law of inertia: – epistemology - we never see force-free behaviour in nature, nor can it be experimentally induced, so what is the source and justification of our knowledge of bodies acting without impressed forces? If force is measured by acceleration, and if acceleration is a function of measures of time, then the magnitude of a supposedly independent force depends upon our metric of time. – ontology - we do not see or experience force apart from its manifestation, so does it have existence? What is mass? What is a measure of mass as distinct from weight? – cosmology - does such an inertial object go on forever in an infinite void? What happens at the limits of ‘infinite’ space? Were bodies created with movement? These are the sorts of considerations that prompted Poincaré to say: ‘When we say force is the cause of motion, we are talking metaphysics’ (Poincaré, 1905/1952, p. 98). And as every physics class talks of force being the cause of motion, then there is metaphysics lurking in every classroom, just waiting to be exposed. But as well as movement upwards from the study of nature (science) to associated metaphysics, there is of course movement downwards. The study of nature presupposes certain metaphysical and procedural or methodological commitments: first the existence of an external world that is independent of the observer; second the universality of causation in that world, if something happens there is a cause that made it happen; and third the constancy of causation, if an event E has cause C today, then it will have the same cause tomorrow and the same cause in other places. To these three presuppositions might be added epistemological commitments such as: our mind or reason is such that we can come to know the external world. Some might add an additional epistemic presupposition of science: namely that appraisal of alternative beliefs needs to be rational; science is an activity in which evidence is of central relevance in deciding upon truth or falsity, it is thus different from politics or business. These presuppositions, postulates or principles might be labelled Realism, Determinism, Lawfulness, Reason and Rationality. They are not self-evident; not all people and cultures have believed them, some have argued that it was the Christian worldview where God was removed from nature that, contra animism, allowed science to flourish; and some of these principles are disputed by contemporary philosophers of science. The principles are not directly proved by science rather they are the default metaphysical positions for the conduct of Western science. Duhem and Poincaré, at the beginning of the twentieth century, called these principles ‘conventions’. Poincaré wrote that: ‘while these laws are imposed on 6
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our science, which otherwise could not exist, they are not imposed on Nature’ (Poincaré, 1905/1952, p. xxiii). And reassuringly for a Realist he added: ‘Are they then arbitrary? No; for if they were, they would not be fertile’ (ibid.). One philosophical question here is how does ‘fertility’ bear upon the truth of the principles of the fertile research programme; another is how does such truth, if truth it be, give grounds for believing in the invisible entities postulated by the principles? Clearly one important task for educators who are exhorted to teach something about science, its impact on culture, and how it is distinguished from other ways of knowing is to reflect on whether philosophy and metaphysics is separate from or a part of science. Either way it is going to need to be taught. If metaphysics and philosophical commitments are an integral part of science, then they clearly need to be fleshed out, articulated and examined; if they are something separate from science, then it will need to be shown just how they are separate. 4. SCIENCE AND WORLDVIEWS
This amalgam of ontological, metaphysics, epistemological and ethical commitments, especially when extended to include religious or irreligious positions can loosely be called a ‘worldview’. A worldview encompasses ideas of nature - its constitution, origins and purposes if any; ideas of our place in nature and in the general ‘scheme of things’; ideas of what entities exist in the world - matter?, spirits? minds? Angels?; ideas about the powers and actions of such existing entities?; ideas of God and how God may or may not interact with the world including answering prayers, performing miracles, making Revelations, and anointing prophets or messengers; ideas of the Sacred; ideas of how knowledge is acquired and tested; ideas of the goodness or badness of human nature; and so on. In the seventeenth century, the new science (natural philosophy) of Galileo, Descartes, Huygens, Boyle and Newton caused a massive change not just in science, but in European philosophy that had enduring repercussions for religion, ethics, politics and culture. All the major natural philosophers of the time rejected Aristotelianism in their scientific practice and in their enunciated philosophy. Overwhelmingly the new philosophy to which they turned was corpuscularian, mechanical and realist - it has rightly been called the ‘Mechanical World View’6. In this new world view, there was simply no place for the entities that Aristotelianism utilised to explain events in the world: hylomorphism, immaterial substances, natures, substantial forms, and final causes were all banished from the philosophical firmament. Galileo reached back to pre-Socratic atomistic sources, and to more recent medieval nominalist sources, for his account of matter. As a student he had read Democritus, Lucretius, and possibly other early atomists such as Leucippus the teacher of Democritus. For them colour and taste were opinions, mere names; what existed in the world was atoms and the void, and atoms had neither colour nor taste. They held a material monist position - all matter was an aggregate of invisible and indivisible ‘atoms’ each of which was made of the same material, and differing 7
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among themselves only in size and shape. It was the particular aggregate of atoms that gave bodies their tangible properties; a body’s properties were not produced or caused by its Form. When new substances are created from different materials, their immutable atoms are just rearranged in different ways; there is no change of Form, because there was no Form to change. This atomistic ontology was so comprehensively rejected by Aristotle in this Physics and his Metaphysics that it disappeared from the philosophical firmament for over a thousand years until it was revived by some thinkers on the margins of medieval philosophy such as William of Ockham and Nicholas of Autrecourt. Galileo makes explicit his atomism, or corpuscularianism, when he says: Those materials which produce heat in us and make us feel warmth, which are known by the general name of ‘fire’, would then be a multitude of minute particles having certain shapes and moving with certain velocities. Meeting with our bodies, they penetrate by means of their extreme subtlety, and their touch as felt by us when they pass through our substance is the sensation we call ‘heat’. …I do not believe that in addition to shape, number, motion, penetration, and touch there is any other quality in fire corresponding to ‘heat’. (ibid) Galileo’s ontology was simply inconsistent with Scholastic metaphysics and thus with the medieval world view built upon it. Galileo’s distinction between primary and secondary qualities was the beginning of the unravelling of this ‘Medieval Synthesis’ and its replacement by the ‘Mechanical World View’ and ultimately the ‘Scientific World View’. Newton, the greatest of all seventeenth-century scientists, was also a champion of the New Philosophy7. Beginning in his student days, Newton embraced Galileo’s mathematical methods, his Copernicanism, his experimentalism, his rejection of Aristotle’s physics, his rejection of Scholastic philosophy, and his embryonic atomism8. In the Preface of the Principia Newton identifies himself with the ‘moderns, rejecting substantial forms and occult qualities’ and endeavours ‘to subject the phenomena of nature to the laws of mathematics’ (Newton, 1729/1934, p. xvii). Much can be said about Atomism and its role in the Scientific Revolution, but for current purposes it is suffice to repeat Dilworth’s judgement that: The metaphysics underlying the Scientific Revolution was that of early Greek atomism. …It is with atomism that one obtains the notion of a physical reality underlying the phenomena, a reality in which uniform causal relations obtain. …What made the Scientific Revolution truly distinct, and Galileo …its father, was that for the first time this empirical methodology [of Archimedes] was given an ontological underpinning (Dilworth, 2006, p. 201). Whenever atomism was entertained in the medieval and renaissance period it provoked intense theological and religious attention, if not outrage; atomism was a 8
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red-flag to proponents of the established, church-endorsed, philosophical orthodoxy. Peter Gassendi adopted Epicurean atomism in the early seventeenth century, but bent it to the dictates of the Catholic Church in which he was a priest. Thus he said, contra Epicurus that the atoms are not eternal in time, they are not infinite in number, and their initial motion was not sui generis, but rather they were moved by God. The Islamic tradition also decried the new scientific worldview, and its Enlightenment champions. A representative Islamic reaction to the Scientific Revolution can be seen when one contemporary scholar writes that the new science of Galileo and Newton had tragic consequences for the West because it marked: The first occasion in human history when a human collectivity completely replaced the religious understanding of the order of nature for one that was not only nonreligious but that also challenged some of the most basic tenets of the religious perspective (Nasr, 1996, p. 130). Nasr repeats Western religious and romantic laments about the new science when he writes: Henceforth as long as only the quantitative face of nature was considered as real, and the new science was seen as the only science of nature, the religious meaning of the order of nature was irrelevant, at best an emotional and poetic response to ‘matter in motion’ (Nasr, 1996, p. 143). 5. THE ATOMISTIC HERESY
Just as science is associated with one or more worldviews, so too is religion; and both history and contemporary times bear witness to the fact that the worldviews of science and of religion do not always sit easily with each other. Worldview conflicts occasioned by disputes about Creation, Creationism, Teleology, Miracles, the existence of individual souls or spirits, and so on, have been comprehensively written upon, with just the past few years seeing bestsellers devoted to these conflicts (Dennett, 1995; Dawkins, 2006; Hitchens, 2007). A less written upon, but very illustrative, example of debate about compatibility of scientific and religious worldviews concerns atomism, the central ontological plank of the Scientific Revolution. Among the numerous Christian positions that atomism seemingly threatened, the most basic and important one was the revered Roman Catholic, Orthodox and Eastern Uniate teaching on Christ’s presence in the Eucharist; the doctrine of Transubstantiation. The Eucharist was the sacramental heart of the Catholic Mass, and the Mass was the devotional heart of the Church. Belief in the Real Presence of Christ, brought into being by the priest’s consecration of the communion host, underwrote devotional practice and doctrinal authority. Denial of the Real Presence was a capital offence. It was a litmus test in the Inquisition, where failure the belief meant a horrible death at the stake. 9
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Scholastic philosophy, with its Aristotelian categories of substance, accidents and qualities could bring a modicum of intelligibility to this central mystery of faith -at consecration the substance of bread changed to the substance of Christ’s body, but the accidents remained that of bread. So Christ became truly present, even though there was no sensible change apparent. Thomas Aquinas formulated the orthodox doctrine as: All the substance of the bread is transmuted into the body of Christ… therefore, this is not a formal conversion but a substantial one. Nor does it belong to the species of natural mutations; but, with its own definition, it is called transubstantiation (Summa Theologica III, q.75, a.4, in Redondi, 1988, p. 212). This Thomist formulation, along with the Aristotelian philosophical apparatus required for its interpretation, was affirmed as defining Catholic orthodoxy at the Council of Trent in 1551. Although Galileo was, in 1615, warned not to hold or teach the Copernican doctrine of a moving earth, it was only after The Assayer and its endorsement of atomism, was published in 1623 that he faced serious theological charges. The charge of Atomism against Galileo with its direct implications of heresy, was publicly made by Father Grassi, a prominent Jesuit professor of mathematics and astronomy at the Collegio Romano. In a book published in Paris in 1626 he wrote: I must now reply to the digression on heat in which Galileo openly declares himself a follower of the school of Democritus and Epicurus. … … I cannot avoid giving vent to certain scruples that preoccupy me. They come from what we have regarded as incontestable on the basis of the precepts of the Fathers, the Councils, and the entire Church. They are the qualities by virtue of which, although the substance of the bread and wine disappear, thanks to omnipotent words, nonetheless their sensible species persist; that is, their color, taste, warmth, or coldness. Only by the divine will are these species maintained, and in miraculous fashion, as they tell me. … Instead, Galileo expressly declares that heat, color, taste, and everything else of this kind are outside [inside?] of him who feels them, and therefore in the bread and wine, just simple names. Hence, when the substance of the bread and wine disappears, only the names of the qualities will remain. In the host, it is commonly affirmed, the sensible species (heat, taste, and so on) persist. Galileo, on the contrary, says that heat and taste, outside of him who perceives them, and hence also in the host, are simple names; that is, they are nothing. One must therefore infer, from what Galileo says, that heat 10
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and taste do not subsist in the host. The soul experiences horror at the very thought (Redondi, 1987, p. 336). Underlining the gravity of this charge against Galileo, Father Grassi adds that Transubstantiation ‘constitutes the essential point of faith or contains all other essential points’ (Redondi, 1987, p. 336). Descartes’ matter theory was likewise condemned in 1671 because its categories did not allow an intelligent rendering of the doctrine of Transubstantiation. John Hedley Brooke, an historian sympathetic to claims about the positive contribution of religion to science, recognized the problem that atomism posed ‘especially for the Roman Catholic Church, which took a distinctive view of the presence of Christ at the celebration of the Eucharist’ (Brooke, 1991, p. 141). He writes: With an Aristotelian theory of matter and form, it was possible to understand how the bread and wine could retain their sensible properties while their substance was miraculously turned into the body and blood of Christ. ….But if, as the mechanical philosophers argued, the sensible properties were dependent on an ulterior configuration of particles, then any alteration to that internal structure would have discernible effects. The bread and wine would no longer appear as bread and wine if a real change had occurred (Brooke, 1991, p. 142). On the face of it the whole influential tradition of Roman Catholic Thomistic and Scholastic teaching, which had enormous cultural and personal impact in Catholic Europe, Latin America, the Philippines, and elsewhere, was in flat contradiction to the worldview of science. Adjustments had to be made on one side or the other. This is a rich, fertile and engaging example of the impact of science on culture, and of culture’s responses and reactions to such impact. 6. OPTIONS FOR RECONCILING WORLDVIEWS
Examination of the Atomism heresy might seem arcane, but there are benefits to be derived; some issues, relationships and tensions are more obvious when viewed in the calmer light of history than in the often partisan glare of the present. The Atomism versus specifically Roman Catholic and Orthodox religious debate of the seventeenth century brings into focus a number of enduring philosophical, religious and cultural issues, among which are at least the following: 1. Does the Christian religion, make metaphysical claims? And are such claims best expressed in any particular philosophical system? 2. Is there a need for religious claims to be made intelligible or reasonable? 3. How adequate is Scholastic Thomism for the interpretation of Christian doctrine? 4. Should philosophical systems be judged by their theological adequacy or compatibility? 5. Does the Church have the authority to proscribe philosophical systems? 11
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These issues were argued within the Christian churches; they were debated in the Enlightenment; and are still debated9. For example, the author of one work titled Christian Metaphysics straightforwardly argues that: The thesis which I submit to the critical examination of the reader is that there is one Christian philosophy and one only. I maintain, in other words, that Christianity calls for a metaphysical structure which is not any structure, that Christianity is an original metaphysic. ...[it is] a body of very precise and very well-defined theses which are properly metaphysical … (Tresmontant, 1965, pp. 19–20). Such a position might be labelled ‘privileged’ in as much as the metaphysics comes from outside of science, not from within. This was the situation mentioned above when Gassendi modified the atomism of Epicurus to have it accord with Christian belief. Privilege for such metaphysical positions is usually is derived from Revelation, Theology, Philosophy, Intuition or perhaps Politics. Such privileged metaphysical views can be found enunciated by advocates of Judaic, Islamic, Hindu, Buddhist and a host of lesser religions; as well as of indigenous belief systems. These traditions would formulate the above five issues in their own terms. And if ‘Marxism-Leninism’ is substituted for ‘Thomism’, and ‘The Central Committee’ is substituted for ‘Church’ then the above list of issues is applicable to the situation that pertained in the Soviet Union and its satellites; with the Lysenko case being the most public and scandalous reminder of how enduring are the issues10. Where there is such incompatibility between scientific and religious metaphysics and worldviews - as in the case of Atomism developed above - the options usually taken to reconcile the differences are to claim that: 1. Science really has no metaphysics; that it makes no metaphysical claims. This is the option made famous by the Catholic positivist Pierre Duhem. 2. The metaphysics of science is false; at least any such purported metaphysics that is inconsistent with religious beliefs. This is the option advocated by the Scholastic tradition discussed above; by Tresmontant and Nasr who are quoted above; and by philosophical theologians such as Plantinga (2000), Mascall (1956), and numerous others. 3. There can be parallel, equally valid, metaphysics. This is an old option given recent prominence by Stephen Gould in his NOMA formulation (Gould, 1999). All these options have their problems, but this is not the place to elaborate them; they are fully elaborated by contributors to the Science & Education special issue devoted to ‘Science, Worldviews and Education’ (Vol. 18, Nos. 6–7, 2009). As far as education is concerned, the important thing is to have students first recognise what are the options, and second carefully examine them and their implications and ideally take up a personal, if provisional, position on the matter. 12
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7. CONCLUSION
Science has contributed immensely to our philosophical and cultural tradition, this is part of the ‘flesh’ of science; too often, unfortunately, science teaching presents just the ‘bare bones’ of science –this is one reason why, notoriously, advanced ‘technical’ science is so often associated with religious and ideological fundamentalism and bigotry. The cultural flesh needs to be part of any serious science programme, and indeed this is now required in many contemporary curriculum statements. These requirements present an open cheque for historical and philosophical studies in science education; but for the cheque to be cashed teachers need the relevant knowledge, interest and enthusiasm for such studies. Unfortunately they are poorly covered in teacher education programmes. In a good liberal education students will learn about the philosophical dimensions of science, beginning with the routine matters listed early in this paper - matters of conceptual analysis, epistemology, ethics and so on. They will also learn about the metaphysical, especially ontological, dimensions of science, some of which have been discussed above. They should also be introduced to, and hopefully make decisions about the constitution and applicability of the scientific outlook, habit of mind or the scientific temper - is a scientific outlook required for the solution of social and ideological problems? And finally students should engage with the questions of science and worldviews, and study options for reconciling seeming conflicts in this area. All of this makes science classes more intellectually engaging, it promotes ‘minds-on’ science learning, and it might help inoculate students against snake-oil merchants who peddle various ‘metaphysical’ schemes and wonders –if students have all ready engaged with serious metaphysical questions and debates, and have been exposed to genuine wonders about the world and science’s coming to know something about it– they might be less likely to fall for whatever passing fantasies are doing the internet and television rounds. In these three areas –philosophy, metaphysics and worldviews– teachers will need to guide and inform students, provide them with materials, and structure discussion and debate. These educational goals should not just be the responsibility of the science teacher; they should be realised by informed and competent curricula coordination across the subjects of science, philosophy and history. But it does not mean that students should learn the correct options, or that teachers should give them correct answers. Immanuel Kant famously said that the motto of the Enlightenment was ‘Have courage to use your own reason!’ (Kant, 1784/2003, p. 54). A century earlier, John Locke expressed this motif as a principle for liberal education in his 1689 Enlightenment classic, Essay Concerning Human Understanding, where he said: The floating of other men’s opinions in our brains makes us not one jot more knowing, though they happen to be true. What in them was science is in us but opiniatertry, whilst we give up our assent only to reverend names, and do not, as they did, employ our own reason to understand those truths which gave them reputation. 13
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And then proceeded memorably to say: Such borrowed wealth, like fairy money, though it be gold in the hand from which he received it, will be but leaves and dust when it comes to use (Locke, 1689/1924, p. 40). The same advice is applicable today. NOTES 1
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This paper is based on a longer version that is to appear in Science & Education, vol.18, nos. 5–6, 2009. The special issue is devoted to ‘Science, Worldviews and Education’. Some useful studies on the philosophical dimension of science are Smart (1968), Wartofsky (1968), Buchdahl (1969), Amsterdamski (1975), Trusted (1991), and Dilworth (2006). See for instance: Boltzmann, Theoretical Physics and Philosophical Problems (1905/1974), Helmholtz’s Science & Culture (1995), Mach’s The Science of Mechanics (1893/1960), Duhem’s The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory (1906/1954), Planck’s Where is Science Going? (1932), Eddington’s The Philosophy of Physical Science (1939), Jean’s Physics and Philosophy (1943/1981), Bohr Atomic Physics and Human Knowledge (1958), Heisenberg Physics and Philosophy (1962), Schrödinger My View of the World (1964), Born My Life & My Views (1968), and Bohm Wholeness and the Implicate Order (1980). See for instance: Bridgman Reflections of a Physicist (1950), Margenau The Nature of Physical Reality (1950), Rabi Science the Centre of Culture (Rabi, 1967), Bunge Philosophy of Science (Bunge, 1998), Chandrasekhar Truth and Beauty (Chandrasekhar, 1987), Campbell What Is Science? (Campbell, 1921/1952), Holton Thematic Origins of Scientific Thought (Holton, 1973), Cushing Philosophical Concepts in Physics (Cushing, 1998), Rohrlich From Paradox to Reality (Rohrlich, 1987), Shimony Search for a Naturalistic World View (Shimony, 1993) and Weinberg Facing Up: Science and Its Cultural Adversaries (Weinberg, 2001). Beyond the substantial and careful writers listed above it needs to be acknowledged that there is a veritable legion of insubstantial and careless writers whose books are nevertheless best sellers. These authors simply muddy the waters, and bring discredit to the programme of understanding the overlap of science and philosophy. For historical and philosophical elaboration of the mechanical world view see Dijksterhuis (1961/ 1986), Harré (1964), and Westfall (1971). Numerous works are available on Newton’s philosophy and metaphysics, among them are McMullin (1978), Stein (2002), McGuire (1995) and Hughes (1990). Although an atomist, Newton distanced himself from Descartes’ interpretation of the theory. For Newton’s early scientific and philosophical formation see Herivel (1965). For representative literature on this topic of ‘Christian Philosophy’ see Trethowan (1954) and Tresmontant (1965). For discussion of the suitability of Thomism as a vehicle for the interpretation of Christian doctrine, see McInerny (1966) and Weisheipl (1968). See Graham (1973), Joravsky (1970), Lecourt (1977), and Soyfer (1994).
REFERENCES American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS). (1989). Project 2061: Science for all Americans. Washington, DC: AAAS. (Also published by Oxford University Press, 1990) American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS). (1990). The liberal art of science: agenda for action. Washington, DC: AAAS. Amsterdamski, S. (1975). Between experience and metaphysics. Dordrecht: Reidel. Bernal, J. D. (1939). The social function of science. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 14
WORLDVIEW COMPONENTS OF SCIENCE Birch, L. C. (1990). On purpose. Sydney: University of New South Wales Press. Bohm, D. (1980). Wholeness and the implicate order. London: Ark Paperbacks. Bohr, N. (1958). Atomic physics and human knowledge. New York: Wiley. Boltzmann, L. (1905/1974). Theoretical physics and philosophical problems. Dordrecht: Reidel. Born, M. (1968). My life & my views. New York: Scribners. Bridgman, P. W. (1950). Reflections of a Physicist. New York: Philosophical Library. Brooke, J. H. (1991). Science and religion: Some historical perspectives. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Buchdahl, G. (1969). Metaphysics and the philosophy of science. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Bunge, M. (1998). Philosophy of science (2 Vols.). New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers. Campbell, N. R. (1921/1952). What is science? New York: Dover. Chandrasekhar, S. (1987). Truth and beauty: Aesthetics and motivations in science. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Collingwood, R. G. (1945). The idea of nature. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Collins, F. S. (2007). The language of God: A scientist presents evidence for belief. New York: Free Press. Cushing, J. T. (1998). Philosophical concepts in physics: The historical relation between philosophy and scientific theories. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Dawkins, R. (2006). The God delusion. London: Bantam Press. De Wulf, M. (1903/1956). An introduction to scholastic philosophy: Medieval and modern (P. Coffey, Trans.). New York: Dover Publications. Dennett, D. C. (1995). Darwin’s dangerous idea: Evolution and the meanings of life. London: Allen Lane, Penguin Press. Dijksterhuis, E. J. (1961/1986). The mechanization of the world picture. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Dilworth, C. (2006). The metaphysics of science. An account of modern science in terms of principles, laws and theories (2nd ed.). Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Duhem, P. (1906/1954). The aim and structure of physical theory (P. P. Wiener, Trans.). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Eddington, A. (1939). The philosophy of physical science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Gould, S. J. (1999). Rock of ages: Science and religion in the fullness of life. New York: Ballantine Books. Graham, L. R. (1973). Science and philosophy in the Soviet Union. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. Haldane, J. S. (1928). The sciences and philosophy. London: Hodder & Stoughton. Harré, R. (1964). Matter and method. London: Macmillan & Co. Heisenberg, W. (1962). Physics and philosophy. New York: Harper & Row. Helmholtz, H. von. (1995). Science and culture: Popular and philosophical essays (C. David, Ed.). Chicago: Chicago University Press. Herivel, J. (1965). The background to Newton’s ‘Principia’. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Hitchens, C. (2007). God is not great: How religion poisons everything. New York: Hachette Book Group. Holton, G. (1973). Thematic origins of scientific thought. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Hughes, R. I. G. (1990). Philosophical Perspectives on Newtonian Science. In P. Bricker & R. I. G. Hughes (Eds.), Philosophical perspectives on Newtonian science (pp. 1–16). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Hull, D. L. (1988). Science as a process: An evolutionary account of the social and conceptual development of sciences. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Jeans, J. (1943/1981). Physics and philosophy. New York: Dover Publications. Joravsky, D. (1970). The Lysenko affair. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Kant, I. (1784/2003). What is Enlightenment? In P. Hyland (Ed.), The enlightenment: A sourcebook and reader. London: Routledge. Lecourt, D. (1977). Proletarian science? The case of Lysenko. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Locke, J. (1689/1924). An essay concerning human understanding (A. S. Pringle-Pattison, Ed.). Oxford: Clarendon Press. Mach, E. (1883/1960). The science of mechanics. LaSalle, IL: Open Court Publishing Company.
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MATTHEWS Margenau, H. (1950). The nature of physical reality: A philosophy of modern physics. New York: McGraw-Hill. Martin, R. N. D. (1991). Pierre Duhem: Philosophy and history in the work of a believing Physicist. La Salle, IL: Open Court. Mascall, E. L. (1956). Christian theology and natural science: Some questions in their relations. London: Longmans, Green & Co. Mayr, E. (1982). The growth of biological thought. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. McGuire, J. E. (1995). Tradition and innovation: Newton’s metaphysics of nature. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. McInerny, R. M. (1966). Thomism in an age of renewal. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press. McMullin, E. (1978). Newton on matter and activity. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press. Monod, J. (1971). Chance and necessity: An essay on the natural philosophy of modern biology. New York: Knopf. Nasr, S. H. (1996). Religion and the order of nature. Oxford: Oxford University Press. National Research Council (NRC). (1996). National science education standards. Washington, DC: National Academy Press. Newton, I. (1729/1934). Mathematical principles of mathematical philosophy (A. Motte, Trans., F. Cajori, Rev.). Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Planck, M. (1932). Where is science going? New York: W.W. Norton. Plantinga, A. (2000). Warranted Christian belief. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Poincaré, H. (1905/1952). Science and hypothesis. New York: Dover Publications. Polanyi, M. (1958). Personal knowledge. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Rabi, I. I. (1967). Science the centre of culture. New York: World Publishing Company. Redondi, P. (1988). Galileo heretic. London: Allen Lane. Rohrlich, F. (1987). From paradox to reality: Our basic concepts of the physical world. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Schrödinger, E. (1964). My view of the world. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Shimony, A. (1993). Search for a naturalistic world view. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Smart, J. J. C. (1968). Between science and philosophy: An introduction to the philosophy of science. New York: Random House. Soyfer, V. N. (1994). Lysenko and the tragedy of Soviet science (L. Gruliow & R. Gruliow, Trans.). New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press. Stein, H. (2002). Newton’s metaphysics. In I. B. Cohen & G. E. Smith (Eds.), The Cambridge companion to Newton (pp. 256–302). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Tresmontant, C. (1965). Christian metaphysics. New York: Sheed and Ward. Trethowan, I. (1954). An essay in Christian Philosophy. London: Longmans, Green & Co. Trusted, J. (1991). Physics and metaphysics: Theories of space and time. London: Routledge. Wartofsky, M. W. (1968). Conceptual foundations of scientific thought: An introduction to the philosophy of science. New York: Macmillan. Weinberg, S. (2001). Facing up: Science and its cultural adversaries. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Weisheipl, J. A. (1968). The revival of Thomism as a Christian philosophy. In R. M. McInerny (Ed.), New themes in Christian philosophy (pp. 164–185). South Bend, IN: University of Notre Dame Press. Westfall, R. S. (1971). The construction of modern science: Mechanisms and mechanics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Wilson, E. O. (1998). Consilience: The unity of knowledge. London: Little, Brown & Co.
Michael R. Matthews School of Education, University of New South Wales, Australia e-mail:
[email protected]
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STATHIS PSILLOS
2. IS THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE THE WASTELAND OF FALSE THEORIES?
1. INTRODUCTION
These instructions are intended to provide guidance to authors of Imagine you live in 1823 and you are about to design an advanced course on the theory of heat. About fifty years ago, Lavoisier and Laplace had posited caloric as a material substance —an indestructible fluid of fine particles— which was taken to be the cause of heat and in particular, the cause of the rise of temperature of a body, by being absorbed by the body. No doubt, you rely on the best available theory, which is the caloric theory. In particular, meticulous and knowledgeable as you are, you rely on the best of the best: Laplace’s advanced account of the caloric theory of heat, with all its sophistication, detail and predictive might. You really believe that the best science teaching should be based on the best theories that are available. But you also believe that the best theory that is available is not really the best unless it has a claim to truth (or truthlikeness, or partial truth and the like). For what is the point of teaching a theory about the deep structure of the world unless it does say something or other about this deep structure? The course goes really well. Your notes are impressive. They are soon turned into a textbook with lots of explanatory detail and fancy calculations. Alas! The world does not co-operate. There are no calorific particles among the things there are in it. Heat is destroyed when work is produced. The advanced theory is challenged by alternative theories, anomalies and failed predictions. There is agony, but in your lifetime, the caloric theory gets superseded and is left discredited in the wasteland of false theories. Decades come by. You are not around anymore. Your grandchildren go to school and then to the university; they follow some new-fangled courses on the history of science. And there it is. The once powerful caloric theory of heat is now only a chapter in the history of science textbook. Why is this not the fate of all (or most) of the theories we come up with? Why aren’t current theories, despite their explanatory and predictive successes, just chapters in the hitherto unwritten history of science books? Why is science education not just future history of science education plus some problem-solvers? This might well be a fate we have to live with. Or, we might be able to say something different, viz., that science is a mixture of continuity and change and that there is reason to believe that parts of current scientific theories, like parts of past scientific theories, will survive radical theory-change and form (and keep on forming) a stable network of theoretical principles and explanatory hypotheses that P.V. Kokkotas et al., (eds.), Adapting Historical Science Knowledge Production to the Classroom, 17–36. © 2011 Sense Publishers. All rights reserved.
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constitute the backbone of our evolving, but by and large true, scientific image of the world. The aim of this paper is to motivate this alternative, especially in connection with issues related to science education. It is an appeal to render science education sensitive to the philosophical issues that can be drawn from a close look at the history of science. Section 2 is a brief outline of the caloric theory of heat. Section 3 is a little note on a methodological principle by means of which theories are judged — use-novelty. Section 4 offers a rather detailed exploration of Laplace’s advanced caloric theory of heat and explains its shortcoming in light of the foregoing methodological principle. Section 5 shows that this kind of criticism of Laplace’s theory has had an actual historical actor —the self-taught physicist John Herapath— and is not, therefore, available only by hindsight. Section 6 raises the question: where is the caloric theory now?; to which it offers the simple but painful answer: in the history books. It then paves the way for the discussion of the Pessimistic Meta-Induction, whose proper analysis and significance are given in Section 7. Section 8 draws on the material presented above to raise another important question: what is wrong with science education? To which it offers the answer that science education seems blind to the fact of theory-change in science and this obscures the importance of change as well as of continuity. History and philosophy of science can certainly help science education to avoid this blindness. 2. THE CALORIC THEORY OF HEAT
In the last quarter of the eighteenth century, French scientists, most notably Pierre Simon Laplace and Antoine Lavoisier posited caloric as a material substance — an indestructible fluid of fine particles— which was taken to be the cause of heat (Lavoisier, 1789, p. 1–2). Despite the theory’s success in giving qualitative explanations of several heat phenomena1, the caloric theory faced important experimental anomalies, most notably that caloric seemed to have no weight, and the generation of heat by friction, which contradicted the fundamental assumption of the caloric model, viz., that caloric is an indestructible fluid and that heat per se is a conservative quantity (cf. Davy, 1799, p. 9–23; Thompson (Count Rumford), 1798). Moreover, the caloric theory was not the one and only theory of heat available. According to the proponents of the rival dynamical theory —most notably Humphry Davy and Count Rumford— the cause of heat was not a material fluid but rather, the very motion of the molecules that constitute a substance. In this sense, heat was nothing over and above the motion of the constituents of a body. In fact the dynamical conception of heat was able to explain both major foregoing anomalies that the caloric theory faced (cf. Thompson (Count Rumford), 1799). The caloric theory could cope with these anomalies —for instance, by positing that the calorific particles were superfine and weightless. But as Joseph Black — a Scott advocate of the caloric theory— pointed out, all these attempts were rather ad hoc: their only justification was that they could save the caloric theory from 18
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refutation. In fact, Black (1803, p. 46) gave one of the first elegant accounts of ad hocness in his following remark: Many have been the speculations and views of ingenious men about this union of bodies with heat. But, as they are all hypothetical, and as the hypothesis is of the most complicated nature, being in fact a hypothetical application of another hypothesis, I cannot hope for much useful information by attending to it. A nice adaptation of conditions will make almost any hypothesis agree with the phenomena. This will please the imagination, but does not advance our knowledge (emphasis added). In his lectures, Black presented both then available theories of heat and, although he stressed that “the supposition” that heat is a material fluid appeared the “most probable”, he (1803, p. 44) added that: neither of these suppositions [i.e. the material and the dynamical] has been fully and accurately considered by their authors, or applied to explain the whole facts and phenomena related to heat. They have not, therefore, supplied us with a proper theory or explication of the nature of heat. Interestingly enough, Lavoisier and Laplace had an attitude similar to Black’s. After presenting both current theories of heat, they suggested that the theory of experimental calorimetry was independent of both theoretical considerations concerning the nature of heat. They noted: We will not decide at all between the two foregoing hypotheses [i.e. material vs. dynamical theory of heat]. Several phenomena seem favourable to the second, [i.e. the mechanical theory] such as the heat produced by the friction of two solid bodies, for example; but there are others which are explained more simply by the other [i.e. material theory of heat] —perhaps they both hold at the same time. So, (...) one must admit their common principles: that is to say, in either of those, the quantity of free heat remains always the same in simple mixtures of bodies. (...) The conservation of the free heat, in simple mixtures of bodies, is, then, independent of those hypotheses about the nature of heat; this is generally admitted by the physicists, and we shall adopt it in the following researches” (1780, p. 152–153). 3. A NOTE ON AD HOCNESS
Recall what Black said above: “A nice adaptation of conditions will make almost any hypothesis agree with the phenomena. This will please the imagination, but does not advance our knowledge”. This, for all practical purposes, can be taken to be what makes a theory (or a modification of a theory) ad hoc vis-à-vis a set of phenomena that theory is meant to explain. The charge of ad hocness is an epistemic charge. It is meant to illustrate a cognitive shortcoming of a theory —what Black captures by saying that an ad hoc theory “does not advance our knowledge”. An ad hoc theory is not a well-supported theory despite the fact that it may entail the laws that it is meant to explain. 19
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Clearly, there are two ways in which a known fact E can be accommodated in a scientific theory T. (1) Information about E is used in the construction of a theory T and T predicts E. (2) A phenomenon E is known the time that a theory T is proposed, T predicts E, but no information about E is used in the construction of T. Although the Lakatosian school has produced a fine-grained distinction between levels of ad hocness, (cf. Lakatos, 1970, p. 175; Zahar, 1973, p. 101), I shall concentrate on the most general case, namely: Conditions of ad hocness: A theory T is ad hoc with respect to phenomenon E if and only if either of the following two conditions is satisfied: (a) A body of background knowledge B entails the existence of E. Information about E is used in the construction of a theory T and T accommodates E. (b) A body of background knowledge B entails the existence of E. A certain already available theory T does not predict/explain E. T is modified into theory Tƍ so that Tƍ predicts E, but the only reason for this modification is the prediction/ explanation of E. In particular Tƍ has no other excess theoretical and empirical content over T. The key point here is that though theories do get support by explaining already known and established empirical laws, this support is a function of the way the theory is constructed and of the way it is related to the known laws. Simply put, if a known phenomenon E is accommodated within T in the way suggested by (1) above, E does not support T, whilst if it is accommodated in the way suggested by (2) above, E does support T. Following Earman (1992, chapter 4, section 8) we can speak of “use novelty”, where, simply put, a prediction P of a known fact E is use novel relative to a theory T, if no information about E was used in the construction of the theory which predicted it. So use-novelty is sharply distinguished from, and contrasted to, ad hoc accommodation. 4. ENTER LAPLACE
From the early 1780s until his death in 1827, Laplace was the dominant figure in theoretical physics in France. His programme, inspired and guided by Newton’s work, was the provision of a theoretical account of all natural phenomena in terms of attractive and repulsive (central) forces exerted between the particles (cf. Fox, 1974). In early 1820s Laplace was embroiled in a research project, aiming to give a theoretical basis and a quantitative explanation of the empirical laws of gases within the caloric theory of heat. This was a fine test for the caloric theory. Until then, the caloric theory had not been fully articulated mathematically and had not offered quantitative derivations and explanations of the empirical laws of heat. Not only did Laplace’s attempts aimed to show that Newtonianism could conquer one more territory —the thermal phenomena— but also to establish that the caloric theory of heat could offer adequate theoretical explanations of heat phenomena. Laplace first presented his mathematical theory before the French Academy of Sciences in September 1821 and came back to it in December 1822. He then 20
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published his researches in two articles in the Connaissance des Temps and reproduced them (with minor revisions) in the 12th book of his Traite de Mécanique Céleste in the early 1820s. The central assumption of Laplace’s account was that the so-called ‘repulsive power’ of heat —the power of heat in virtue of which a gas expands when heated— is due to repulsive forces among the particles of caloric. In particular, each molecule of ordinary matter attracts particles of caloric that form a caloric atmosphere around it. Yet, these caloric atmospheres repel one another. These repulsive forces tend to detach some quantity of caloric from each molecule and to create radiant caloric, which generates the repulsive power of heat (cf. 1823, p. 111–112)2. Contrary to these repulsive forces act the attractive forces between the molecules of matter, which are inversely proportional to the distance between two molecules. However, as we are about to see, Laplace took it that these attractive forces are insensible in gases and vapours. Using these central assumptions Laplace suggested that the force law between two molecules of a gas is H c2 ij(r) where c is the quantity of caloric retained by each molecule, H is a gas-specific constant depending on the repulsive force of heat and ij(r) is the attractive force exerted between the two molecules, where ij(r) v 1/r (1821, p. 278). He then calculated the repulsive force exerted on an envelope of a gas and equated it with the pressure P exerted by this envelope on surrounding layers of the gas. He found that P=2ʌHKȡ2c2
(1)
where 2ʌHK is a constant and ȡ is the density of the gas (op.cit., p. 280). Laplace had thereby managed to correlate the quantity of caloric contained in a gas with the macroscopic parameter of pressure and hence to provide a potential mechanism that connects variations in the macroscopic quantity of pressure with variations in the microscopic structure of heat and matter. The next problem was to specify a connection between the quantity of caloric contained in a gas with the macroscopic parameter of temperature (op.cit., p. 281). Laplace suggested that the quantity of caloric rays received at a surface, at a given instance, is solely a function of the temperature of the gas, and independent of the nature of surrounding bodies. Call this function Ȇ(T). The quantity of radiant caloric detached from a molecule m —due to the repulsive forces between the caloric c of the molecule m and the caloric atmospheres of neighbouring molecules— is ȡc2, that is, it is proportional to the quantity ȡc of the caloric of surrounding molecules and the quantity c of the caloric retained by molecule m. Since at any given moment, there is thermal equilibrium in the gas, it follows that qȆ(T) = ȡc2
(2) 21
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where q is a proportionality constant depending on the molecules of the gas. Incidentally, in arriving at this equation, Laplace neglected the quantity of free caloric emanated by surrounding bodies, since as he noted, its extreme velocity renders it insensible (1821, p. 281). Be that as it may, by means of (2) Laplace had managed to connect the macroscopic parameter of temperature with the microscopic structure of caloric. Given that temperature and pressure determine the macroscopic behaviour of gases, Laplace could now show how the observable behaviour of gases is caused by the micro-structure of caloric. Using (1) and (2), Laplace was ready to derive — within the framework of the caloric theory of heat— the laws of gases’ and in particular the Boyle-Marriotte’s law, Gay-Lussac’s law and the equation of the state. So far, so good. But there is a catch, which is relevant to the philosophical conclusions we might draw from this case. The catch is that there are certain respects in which Laplace’s derivation was ad hoc. Let us see why. Laplace’s derivation of the laws of gases rested on two explicit assumptions: First, the attractive force between two molecules of a gas located at insensible distances from each other is very small; in fact, negligible. Second, the only operative force is the repulsive force between the caloric atmospheres of the molecules of the gas (cf. 1821, p. 285). The first assumption enabled Laplace to get rid of the factor ij(r) and hence to derive equation (1) with no problem. This assumption is relatively uncontroversial. The second assumption however is by no means innocent. According to Laplace’s theory, the action between two molecules of a gas is actually the product of the following four forces: 1. The mutual repulsion of the quantities of caloric contained in caloric atmospheres around each and every molecule. 2. The attraction between the caloric atmosphere of the second molecule and the first molecule. 3. The attraction between the caloric atmosphere of the first molecule and the second molecule. 4. The mutual attraction between the two molecules. Yet, the derivation (and explanation) of the laws of gases rested only on the first force. Even though neglecting the attractive force between molecules may have been reasonable, excluding the other two forces (two and three above) was not obvious. Laplace (1821, p. 185) admitted this when he said: Yet, I do not dare assure that the second and third forces are insensible, especially concerning vapours, when a light compression reduces them to the liquid state. To make his model more realistic, Laplace went on to take into account the attractive forces exerted between the caloric atmosphere of a molecule m and the surrounding molecules of the gas, or vapour. However, here is the point where the ad hocness of Laplace’s attempts becomes rather transparent. Imagine, Laplace said, a cylindrical vase with indefinite height, containing a gas (1821, p. 285–286). Suppose also that the gas is pressed by a weight W put on the superior surface of the cylinder. Take, then, an infinitely thin horizontal plane A, at 22
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a distance from the superior surface of the cylinder, and suppose that the molecules of the gas are situated above this plane, at fixed positions. Let m be such a molecule, r its distance from the horizontal plane A, f its distance from another molecule m’ situated underneath the plane A at distance R from it, and s the distance between the points at which the perpendiculars from the two molecules cross plane A (cf. Figure 1).
Weight
m r
a f s
A R m'
Figure 1. Laplace’s model of caloric.
It is then evident that f = ¥(R+r)2 + s2. Generally, Laplace said, the repulsive action between the quantities of caloric retained by the two molecules m and mƍ is Hij(f), while the attractive action between the caloric atmosphere of m and molecule mƍ is Nij(f). The y-component of the total action between the two molecules will then be (Hc2 – Nc) ij(f) [(R+r)/f] where (R+r)/f is cos(a). Laplace was then able to calculate the repulsive action of the whole gas situated under the plane A on the molecule m and, moreover, the whole action of the gas above plane A on the superior surface of the cylinder. 23
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This action is counterbalanced by the pressure P of the weight placed on top of the superior surface. Hence, he derived P=2ʌȡ2(Hc2 – Nc)K
(1ƍ)
which is similar to (1) above, except that it also takes into account the attractive forces between the caloric atmosphere of a molecule m and the surrounding molecules. Laplace then invented an analogous equation for temperature. Take, he said, the action between two molecules m and mƍ at a distance r. If all forces are taken into account, this action will be Hcij(r)–Nij(r). Suppose that the calorific radiation of molecule m is proportional to the number of surrounding molecules, their forces — except the negligible ij(r)— and the quantities of caloric contained in each molecule. Then, this radiation will be proportional to ȡHc2 – ȡNc
(A)
In a state of thermal equilibrium quantity (A) will be equal to the quantity of caloric received at a surface; that is, ȡ(Hc2 – Nc) = qȆ(T)
(2ƍ)
This is similar to (2), except that it also takes into account the attractive forces exerted between the caloric atmospheres of molecules and the surrounding molecules. Then, by means of (1ƍ) and (2ƍ), Laplace was able to derive the laws of gases in the more realistic case where the attractive forces exerted between the caloric atmospheres of molecules and the surrounding molecules are taken into account. The similarity between equations (1ƍ) and (1) and (2ƍ) and (2) seems to suggest that the attractive forces between the caloric atmospheres of molecules and the surrounding molecules could be safely neglected as very weak compared to the repulsive forces between caloric atmospheres. However, two points are worth making: 1. In the derivation of (1ƍ), Laplace used the assumption that the attractive forces between the caloric atmospheres of molecules and the surrounding molecules are very weak. As we have seen, he took it that the total force that the molecule m is subjected to when the attractive force between the caloric of m and the molecule mƍ is taken into account is repulsive. This means that the attractive forces between the caloric of a molecule and the surrounding molecules are very weak, and in fact negligible compared to the repulsive forces between caloric atmospheres —hence, practically they do nothing to modify or weaken these repulsive forces. 2. In arriving at equation (1ƍ) Laplace neglected —without any reason— the effect on the pressure P of the molecules under plane A. As we shall are about to see, Laplace admitted this in his 1822 article. In fact, the only reason for formulating 24
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the equation of pressure as he did seems to be that (1’) could yield, together with equation (2’), the laws of gases only if it had this particular form. Laplace’s attempt to derive the laws of gases from the more realistic set of assumptions that both the attractive forces between the caloric of a molecule and the surrounding molecules are operative were ad hoc, and with no independent justification: the very fact that the attractive forces between the caloric of a molecule and the surrounding molecules must be negligible in order for the derivation to go through was used in showing that these forces were weak and negligible; and the very fact that the law of pressure must have a specific mathematical form if the laws of gases were to be derived, was used in the construction of this law. As noted already, Laplace returned to his theory a year later (cf. 1822). There, he explained again how equations (1) and (2) are constructed and, therefore, how the laws of gases can be derived within the caloric theory. But he made it clear that the derivation works only on the assumption that the repulsive forces due to the caloric atmospheres are the only forces that operate (1822, p. 291). More interestingly, he remarked that in his own derivation of the laws of gases when the attractive forces between the caloric of a molecule and the surrounding molecules are taken into account, he neglected the action of the molecules under the plane A and hence his equation (1ƍ) of the pressure P of the gas was not correct (1822, p. 296). He stressed that if the correct law of pressure is formulated, i.e. the one that, unlike (1’), takes also into account the pressure of the molecules under the plane A, then the three laws of gases cannot be derived (ibid.). How were, if at all, the laws of gases to be derived within the caloric theory? Laplace admitted that the only way to carry out the derivation was to admit beforehand that “the attraction of each molecule of a gas on other molecules and their caloric is insensible” (ibid.). Therefore, Laplace’s conclusion was, in effect, that unless the theory is modified in an ad hoc way, so that some forces are rendered negligible beforehand, the laws of gases could not be proved and explained within the caloric theory. 5. HERAPATH’S CRITICISM
The foregoing observation that Laplace’s constructions were ad hoc is not one merely drawn by hindsight. John Herapath (1790–1868)3, a then unknown physicist and self-taught schoolmaster from Bristol, in a paper that appeared in Philosophical Magazine in 1823, examined in detail Laplace’s constructions, argued against their fundamental assumptions, and criticised them, explicitly, for being ad hoc. In this paper, Herapath gave one of the first clear-cut formulations of what it is for a theory to be ad hoc with respect to a set of laws, as it is clear from his following statement: (...) the equations [Laplace] has produced are more the offspring of a previous knowledge of what they should be from the phenomena, than of that sound reason which his other works usual manifest (1823, p. 65). Herapath noted that Laplace’s equation (2) which connects the quantity of caloric emanated from each molecule with the macroscopic quantity of temperature, is not correct. Laplace, as we have seen, took it that the calorific radiation of a molecule 25
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is ȡc2 Yet, Herapath observed, in calculating the calorific radiation of a molecule one must also take into account the intensity of the repulsion of the surrounding caloric. Therefore, the calorific radiation of a molecule must be ȡc2vȥ(r), where ȥ(r) is a function of the intensity of repulsion of a particle of caloric, depending on the distance between the molecules4. In particular, the intensity of calorific radiation in a spherical envelope of radius r surrounding the radiating molecule will be ȥ3¥(Į/ȡ), where Į is a constant. Then, instead of Laplace’s equation (2), Herapath suggested that the correct equation should have been qȆ(t)=ȡc2 ȥ3¥(Į/ȡ)
(2”)
It is obvious that (1) and (2”) cannot yield the laws of gases, and hence the latter cannot be derived —nor be explained— within the caloric theory of heat, unless some important assumptions are dropped, in an unjustified way. Herapath stressed that Laplace was not justified in neglecting the intensity of calorific radiation ȥ3¥(Į/ȡ). In Laplace’s theory the calorific radiation is due to the repulsive forces between the caloric atmospheres of neighbouring molecules. Then, it is obvious that these forces must depend on the distance r between these caloric atmospheres— in fact, on the distance r between molecules. Laplace, Herapath added, did consider the function ȥ(r) (cf. Laplace, 1821, p. 287; Herapath, 1823, p. 64). But he subsumed it under the constant q in the equations (2) and (2’) (Herapath ibid.). However, this contradicted Laplace statement that the constant q is a factor dependent only on the nature of the molecules of the gas (1821, p. 281). Herapath concluded that Laplace’s principal and fundamental equations are erroneously deduced form his principles; and consequently that his subsequent conclusions [i.e. the laws of gases] are not consequences of what he first assumed (1823, p. 65)5. Herapath suggested that Laplace’s theory was ad hoc with respect to the known laws of gases. In effect, Laplace knew what he wanted to derive —that is, the known laws of gases— and he ‘cooked up’ the principles of the caloric theory so that these laws would follow suit. The known laws of gases were not use-novel visà-vis Laplace’s theory; they were accommodated within it in an ad hoc way. Herapath put this complaint in the following lengthy, but nice, quotation: Had the principles he [i.e. Laplace] sets out with been given him, namely, that there is such a thing as caloric, which, while strongly repulsive of its own, attracts and is attracted by other matter; which by some means radiates in extremely minute portions with great velocity; which attaching itself in considerable quantities to particles of mater overcomes their mutual attraction, and occasions them to stand at the greatest distance the envelope admits from each other; —had, I say, these things been given him [i.e. Laplace] without any knowledge of what the phenomena require, I would enture to appeal to himself, whether, with his mind so unacquainted, unbiased, and unprejudiced 26
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with the facts in question, his results would not have been very different from what they are (1823, p. 65). Herapath challenged Laplace that had he not known in advance the laws he wanted to derive, the principles of caloric theory would not have been able to yield them. Laplace, in effect, used these laws in the construction of his theory, in the sense that he modified its principles in such a way that they, eventually, yield the laws of gases. As noted earlier, Laplace was aware (in his second paper on the subject) that the attractive forces between the caloric of a molecule and the surrounding molecules had to be rendered negligible if the derivation were to go through. Herapath’s further point was that even if this were granted, the laws of gases could not be derived within the caloric theory, unless of course the latter was ‘forced’ to do so. 6. WHERE IS THE CALORIC THEORY NOW?
The fact is that the caloric theory of heat has long been abandoned. Its replacement with what came to be known as thermodynamics —pioneered by Rudolf Clausius and William Thomson (Lord Kelvin) and foreshadowed by Sadi Carnot— was an intricate and prolonged development. The key episode in this development was the admission that, contrary to what was implied by the caloric theory; heat was not a conservative quantity. After Clausius’s work in thermodynamics, it was established that heat is not a state-function of the macroscopic properties (volume, temperature and pressure) of a gas. On the contrary, when work is produced in a thermal cycle, the quantity of heat involved in this cycle does not uniquely depend on the initial and final states in which the substance undergoing the changes is found. As a result, heat is not conserved in all thermal processes. If heat is not a conservative quantity, its representation cannot be based on an indestructible fluid, as caloric was supposed to be. I have related this story elsewhere (cf. my 1994 and 1999, chapter 6). The point here is not to repeat it, but to answer the question in the section-heading in a straightforward manner: the caloric theory is currently in the history of science books and not in the science textbooks. The caloric theory is not part of the present corpus of established scientific theories; not an element in our evolving scientific image of the world. The world has simply no room for the caloric, despite the fact that a theory about it was the dominant theory for quite some time in the nineteenth century and despite the fact that it enjoyed explanatory and predictive success. Is this case atypical? Is it an one-off case in the history of science? If it were, there would be no cause for concern. If the advanced caloric theory of heat was a historical oddity, its consignment to the history of science books would present no problem to either philosophy of science or to science education. But it is far from a typical. In fact, a well-known argument in the philosophy of science, known as the Pessimistic Meta-Induction on the history of science, suggests that current theories too are likely to be abandoned later on and be replaced by others, which are radically discontinuous with the extant theories. If this is so, there is a special problem for science education —apart form any other philosophical problem they might arise. This is that current science will turn out to be chapters in future history 27
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of science books and hence that the teaching of current scientific theories is not the teaching of a relatively stable and, by and large true, image of the world and of its deep structure, but rather the teaching of born-to-be-abolished failed explanations and hypotheses. Before we examine in this problem for science education, let us take a closer look at the Pessimistic Meta-Induction (PMI). 7. THE PESSIMISTIC META-INDUCTION
Larry Laudan has argued that the history of science is full of theories which were once empirically successful and yet turned out to be false. Laudan’s argument can be summarised as follows (cf. 1981, p. 32–33): The history of science is full of theories which had been empirically successful for long periods of time and yet were shown to be false about the deep-structure claims they had made about the world. It is similarly full of theoretical terms featuring in successful theories which do not refer. Therefore, by a simple (meta-) induction on scientific theories, our current successful theories are likely to be false (or, at any rate, more likely to be false than true). Laudan has substantiated his argument by means of what he has called “the historical gambit”: the following list —which, Laudan says, “could be extended ad nauseam”— gives theories which were once empirically successful and fruitful, yet just false. Laudan’s list of successful-yet-false theories: – the crystalline spheres of ancient and medieval astronomy – the humoral theory of medicine – the effluvial theory of static electricity – catastrophist geology, with its commitment to a universal (Noachian) deluge – the phlogiston theory of chemistry – the caloric theory of heat – the vibratory theory of heat – the vital force theory of physiology – the theory of circular inertia – theories of spontaneous generation – the contact-action gravitational ether of Fatio and LeSage – the optical ether – the electromagnetic ether What is the target of Laudan’s argument? It is the realist explanation of the success of scientific theories in terms of the (approximate) truth of these theories. In particular, the target of PMI is the epistemic optimism associated with scientific realism, viz., the view that science has succeeded in tracking truth. One key view associated with scientific realism is the claim that mature and predictively successful scientific theories are well confirmed and approximately true of the world; hence, the entities posited by them, or entities very similar to those posited, inhabit the world (see my 1999 and my 2009 for a defence). Part of the defence of this epistemic optimism realist has come to be known as the ‘no-miracles’ argument6. 28
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Briefly put, this is an argument that mobilises the successes of scientific theories (especially their successful novel predictions) in order to suggest that the best explanation of these theory-driven successes is that the theories that fuelled them were approximately true —at least in those respects that were implicated in the generation of the successes. But if Laudan is right, then the realist’s explanation of the success of science flies in the face of the history of science: the history of science cannot possibly warrant the realist belief that current successful theories are approximately true. There has been some discussion of the exact structure of PMI. I have argued in detail elsewhere that it is a kind of reductio. The target is the realist thesis that: (A) Current successful theories are approximately true Laudan does not directly deny that current successful theories may happen to be truthlike. His argument aims to discredit the claim that there is an explanatory connection between empirical success and truthlikeness which warrants the realist’s assertion (A). In order to achieve this, the argument compares a number of past theories to current ones and claims: (B) If current successful theories are truthlike, then past theories cannot be Past theories are deemed not to be truthlike because the entities they posited are no longer believed to exist and/or because the laws and mechanisms they postulated are not part of our current theoretical description of the world. Then, comes the ‘historical gambit’: (C) These characteristically false theories were, nonetheless, empirically successful So, empirical success is not connected with truthlikeness and truthlikeness cannot explain success: the realist’s potential warrant for (A) is defeated. No-one can deny that Laudan’s argument has some force. It shows that, on inductive grounds, the whole truth and nothing but the truth is unlikely to be had in science. That is, all scientific theories are likely to turn out to be, strictly speaking, false. This is something that realists —as well as everybody else— have to concede. However, a false theory can still be approximately true or truthlike. These are notions that have resisted a formal explication, but we can say, intuitively, that a theory is truthlike if it describes a world which is similar to the actual world in its most central or relevant features. So, the realist needs to show that past successful theories, although strictly speaking false, have been truthlike. An obvious strategy that realists can follow is to try to reduce the size of Laudan’s list. If indeed only very few past theories make it to Laudan’s list of falsebut-successful theories, the historical gambit loses much of its putative force. One way to reduce the size of the list is to impose stringent criteria as to what theories should count as mature and genuinely successful. It has been argued (see my 1999, chapter 5) that the notion of empirical success should be more rigorous than simply getting the facts right, or telling a story that fits the facts. For any theory can be made to fit the facts —and hence to be successful— by simply ‘writing’ the right kind of empirical consequences into it. The notion of empirical success that realists 29
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should be happy with should such that it includes the generation of novel predictions which are in principle testable. Consequently, it is not at all clear that all theories in Laudan’s list were genuinely successful. The case of the advanced caloric theory of heat we have already discussed in some detail is a case in point. Despite its great sophistication, Laplace’s mature theory enjoyed empirical success only by being, ultimately, tailored to fit the empirical laws. Not only were there no novel predictions issued by the theory, but even the already known facts that it managed to accommodate, it accommodated them in an ad hoc way. The best strategy for blocking PMI is try to meet it head-on, by attacking its crucial premise (B). Without this premise the pessimistic conclusion does not follow, irrespective of the size of Laudan’s list. But how can premise (B) be defeated? In my (1999), I proposed the divide et impera strategy. The key idea is this. To defeat (B), it is enough to show that the genuine successes of past theories did not depend on what we now believe to be fundamentally flawed theoretical claims. Positively put, it is enough to show that the theoretical laws and mechanisms which generated the successes of past theories have been retained in our current scientific image. Accordingly, when a theory is abandoned, its theoretical constituents, i.e., the theoretical mechanisms and laws it posited, should not be (and were not) rejected en bloc. Some of these theoretical constituents are inconsistent with what we now accept, and therefore they have to be rejected. But not all are. Some of them, instead of having been abandoned, have been retained as essential constituents of subsequent theories. The divide et impera move suggests that if it turns out that the theoretical constituents that were responsible for the empirical success of otherwise abandoned theories are those that have been retained in our current scientific image, a substantive version of scientific realism can still be defended. So for the divide et impera move to work, we need to (i) identify the theoretical constituents of past genuine successful theories that essentially contributed to their successes; and (ii) show that these constituents, far from being characteristically false, have been retained in subsequent theories of the same domain. The success of the divide et impera strategy is in the details. One should look at specific past theories that meet the stringent standards of empirical success and show in detail how those parts of them that fuelled their empirical successes were retained in subsequent theories. In my (1999, chapter 6) I engaged in two detailed case-studies concerning the several stages of the caloric theory of heat and of the theories of the luminiferous ether7. A claim that has emerged with some force is that theory-change is not as radical and discontinuous as the opponents of scientific realism have suggested. It has been shown that there are ways to identify the theoretical constituents of abandoned scientific theories which essentially contributed to their successes, to separate them from others that were ‘idle’ —or as Kitcher (1993) has put it, merely ‘presuppositional posits’— and to demonstrate that the components that made essential contributions to the theory’s empirical success were those retained in subsequent theories of the 30
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same domain. Given this, the fact that our current best theories may be replaced by others does not, necessarily, undermine scientific realism. All it shows is that a) we cannot get at the truth all at once; and b) our judgements from empirical support to truthlikeness should be more refined and cautious in that they should only commit us to the theoretical constituents that do enjoy evidential support and contribute to the empirical successes of the theory. Realists ground our epistemic optimism on the fact that newer theories incorporate many theoretical constituents of their superseded predecessors, especially those constituents that have led to empirical successes. The substantive continuity in theory-change suggests that a rather stable network of theoretical principles and explanatory hypotheses has emerged, which has survived revolutionary changes, and has become part and parcel of our evolving scientific image of the world. Both Hasok Chang (2003, p. 910–912) and Kyle Stanford (2006) have challenged the move from substantive continuity in theory-change to approximate truth. It is argued that there is no entitlement to move from whatever preservation in theoretical constituents there is in theory-change to these constituents’ being truthlike. But that’s not quite right. What is right to say is that the mere demonstration of continuity in theory-change does not warrant the realist claim that science is ‘on the right track’. Claiming convergence does not, on its own, establish that current theories are true, or likely to be true. Convergence there may be and yet the start might have been false. But the convergence in our scientific image of the world puts before us a candidate for explanation. The generation of an evolving-but-convergent network of theoretical assertions is best explained by the assumption that this network consists of truthlike assertions. So there is, after all, entitlement to move from convergence to truthlikeness, insofar as truthlikeness is the best explanation of this convergence. Stanford has also claimed that the divide et impera move cannot offer independent support to realism since it is tailor-made to suit realism. According to him, it is the fact that the very same present theory is used both to identify which parts of past theories were empirically successful and which parts were (approximately) true that accounts for the realists’ wrong impression that these parts coincide. He (2006, p. 166) says: With this strategy of analysis, an impressive retrospective convergence between our judgements of the sources of a past theory’s success and the things it ‘got right’ about the world is virtually guaranteed: it is the very fact that some features of a past theory survive in our present account of nature that leads the realist both to regard them as true and to believe that they were the sources of the rejected theory’s success or effectiveness. So the apparent convergence of truth and the sources of success in past theories are easily explained by the simple fact that both kinds of retrospective judgements have a common source in our present beliefs about nature. This objection is misguided. The problem, as I see it, is this. There are the theories scientists currently endorse and there are the theories that were endorsed in the past. Some (but not all) of them were empirically successful (perhaps for long 31
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periods of time). They were empirically successful irrespective of the fact that, subsequently, they came to be replaced by others. This replacement was a contingent matter that had to do with the fact that the world did not fully co-operate with the then extant theories: some of their predictions failed; or the theories became overly ad hoc or complicated in their attempt to accommodate anomalies, or what have you. The replacement of theories by others does not cancel out the fact that the replaced theories were empirically successful. Even if scientists had somehow failed to come up with new theories, the old theories would not have ceased to be successful. So success is one thing, replacement is another. Hence, it is one thing to inquire into what features of some past theories accounted for their success and quite another to ask whether these features were such that they were retained in subsequent theories of the same domain. These are two independent issues and they can be dealt with (both conceptually and historically) independently. One should start with some past theories and —bracketing the question of their replacement— try to identify, on independent grounds, the sources of their empirical success; that is, to identify those theoretical constituents of the theories that fuelled their successes. When a past theory has been, as it were, anatomised, we can then ask the independent question of whether there is any sense in which the sources of success of a past theory that the anatomy has identified are present in our current theories. It’s not, then, the case that the current theory is the common source for the identification of the successful parts of a past theory and of its (approximately) true parts. Current theories constitute the vantage point from which we examine old ones —could there be any other?— but the identification of the sources of success of past theories need not be performed from this vantage point. 8. WHAT IS WRONG WITH SCIENCE EDUCATION?
These instructions are intended to provide guidance to authors of Bluntly put, it is that it is oblivious to the complex philosophical lessons that can be drawn from the history of science. Unless we resolve for the view that current science teaching is future history-of-science teaching, science education should be sensitive to the fact that science as we know it is a mixed bag of continuity and change. Science education seems blind to the fact of theory-change in science and this obscures the importance of change as well as of continuity. The responses to PMI outlined above suggest that the current scientific image of the world (which is what science teaching is about) is a hard-won image which has emerged out of a clash between truth and falsity; continuity and break. The continuity depicted in the current scientific image of the world is indeed hard-won, amidst false starts, failed hypotheses, idle and ad hoc explanations. This continuity represents whatever elements of past theories have a right to be called truthlike by having essentially contributed to the successes of otherwise abandoned theories and by having been retained in subsequent theories. This continuity signifies (at least on the realist reading suggested above) that what nowadays is taught in science courses is not destined to be part of the history of science books in two or three centuries from now. 32
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What are science students being taught now? It’s not enough to say they are being taught our best current guess about the deep-structure of the world. Laplace did not think of his theory as his best guess! He, like us today, thought of his theory as unveiling the deep and unobservable structure of the world. Guesses come and go. Theories are based on evidence and are meant to describe the world as it, more or less, is. An alternative would be to think of what is now taught as a set of practical recipes or problem-solvers; a rack filled with tools, as Pierre Duhem once put it. But this instrumentalist approach to science faces a number of problems, most of which are well-known. For one, it does not tally with the very idea that science has pushed back the frontiers of ignorance and error; for another, it does not even start to account for the fact that theories yield successful novel predictions and are used as premises in explanations of singular events. The question remains: what is taught now? Is it practical recipes + future chapters of the history of science books? Or is it chapters of an evolving-but-changing scientific image of the world? This kind of question (or dilemma) was first raised in a serious way in the dawn of the twentieth century, just before the two major revolutions that shook up physics. It took the form of the ‘bankruptcy of science’ debate in France. In his address to the 1900 International Congress of Physics, Henri Poincaré (1902, p. 173) put the point thus: The man of the world is struck to see how ephemeral scientific theories are. After some years of prosperity, he sees them successively abandoned; he sees ruins accumulated on ruins; he predicts that the theories in vogue today will in a short time succumb in their turn, and he concludes that they are absolutely in vain. This is what he calls the bankruptcy of science. But he went on to correct the view of ‘the man of the world’. Poincaré says: “His scepticism is superficial; he does not understand none of the aim and the role of scientific theories; without this he would understand that ruins can still be good for something”. What then are ruins good for, apart from reminding us the glorious past and days of bygone splendour? There are two options, really. One: If theories are merely instruments for the co-ordination of empirical laws and the prediction phenomena, it is no problem that their theoretical parts might well be mere speculations which subsequently get abandoned and are destined to be chapter in hitherto unwritten history-of-science books. As Poincaré put it, after all, “Fresnel’s theory enables us to [predict optical phenomena] as well as it did before Maxwell’s time”. Two: There is continuity in theory-change and this is not merely empirical continuity; substantive theoretical claims that featured in past theories and played a key role in their successes (especially in novel predictions) have been incorporated (perhaps somewhat re-interpreted) in subsequent theories and continue to play an important role in making them empirically successful. This is the option that Poincaré himself favoured8. The key point is that option number two is not only living, but actually the one that renders science teaching intelligible and compelling. 33
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How exactly science education should accommodate the philosophical lessons drawn from the history of science is itself a complex matter that I cannot discuss here. I will only suggest that part of the very idea of science education should be the cultivation and development of what might be called scientific conscience. This is not more theoretical or practical knowledge, but rather a set of methodological skills that constitute the scientific spirit: critical appraisal of one’s own theory; sensitivity to the strengths and limitations of scientific inquiry; openness to criticism and correction; responsiveness to epistemic values and theoretical virtues; sensitivity to the historical complexity and the philosophical implications of the scientific enterprise. Here is a case where scientific conscience becomes transparent. When we think about scientific theories and what they assume about the world we need to balance two kinds of evidence. The first is whatever evidence there is in favour (or against) a specific scientific theory. This evidence has to do with the degree on confirmation of the theory at hand. It is, let us say, first-order evidence, say about electrons and their having negative charge or about the double helix structure of the DNA and the like. First-order evidence is typically what scientists take into account when they form an attitude towards a theory. It can be broadly understood to include some of the theoretical virtues of the theory at hand (parsimony and the like) —of the kind that typically go into plausibility judgements about theories. The second kind of evidence (let’s call it second-order evidence) comes from the past record of scientific theories and/or from meta-theoretical (philosophical) considerations that have to do with the reliability of scientific methodology. It concerns not particular scientific theories but science as a whole. (Some) past theories, for instance, were supported by (first-order) evidence, but were subsequently abandoned; or some scientific methods work reliably in certain domains but fail when they are extended to others. This second-order evidence feeds claims such as those that motivate the Pessimistic Induction. Actually, this second-order evidence is multi-faceted —it is negative (showing limitations and shortcomings) as well as positive (showing how learning from experience can be improved). This is a philosophical problem. But science education won’t educate good scientists unless it makes them aware that in judging scientific theories, they should try to balance these two kinds of evidence. And this means that science education won’t train good scientists unless it trains them in history and philosophy of science. NOTES 1 2
3 4
5
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For a detailed account of the causal role that the caloric was called to play, see Fox (1971). According to Chang (2004, 72) this Laplacian assumption modified considerably Lavoisier’s original picture of the caloric. For a brief account of Herapath’s contribution to the kinetic theory of gases, see Mendoza (1961). Herapath uses ij(r) for this function, but this notation has been also used for the attractive force between two molecules of the gas. Herapath did also object to Laplace’s equation (1), which connected the pressure of a gas with the quantity of caloric upheld by its molecules. His chief point was that (1) unjustifiably neglects the attractive forces in virtue of which each molecule attracts its own caloric (1823, p. 62).
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7
8
It is based on Putnam’s claim that realism ‘is the only philosophy of science that does not make the success of science a miracle’. Chang (2003) has challenged some of the details of my case-study of the caloric theory. The discussion of Laplace’s advanced theory presented above is meant, among other things, to meet some of Chang’s criticisms concerning the actual historical development of the caloric theory. Though Poincaré took it that that there is an inherent limitation in what of the world can be known: its structure as opposed to how things are in themselves. This limitation was the child of Poincaré’s adherence to some form of empiricism and some form of neo-Kantianism. It has been known as structural realism and need not concern us here (see my 2009).
REFERENCES Black, J. (1803). Lectures on the elements of chemistry (J. Robison, Ed.). Edinburgh — all page references are from Roller (1950). Chang, H. (2003). Preservative realism and its discontents: Revisiting caloric. Philosophy of Science, 70, 902–912. Chang, H. (2004). Inventing temperature. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Davy, H. (1799). An essay on heat, light, and the communication of light. In The collected works of H. Davy (Vol. 2, pp. 1–86). London: Smith, Elder, and Co. Cornhill (1839). Earman, J. (1992). Bayes or bust? A critical examination of bayesian confirmation theory. Cambridge MA: The MIT Press. Fox, R. (1971). The caloric theory of gases. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Fox, R. (1974). The rise and fall of Laplacian physics. In R. McCormmach (Ed.), Historical studies in physical sciences. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Herapath, J. (1823). Observations on M. Laplace’s communication to the Royal Academy of Science, “Sur l’Attraction des Sphères et sur la Répulsion des Fluides Élastiques”. Philosophical Magazine, 62, 61–66. Kitcher, P. (1993). The advancement of science. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Lakatos, I. (1970). Falsification and the methodology of scientific research programmes. In I. Lakatos & A. Musgrave (Eds.), Criticism and the growth of knowledge. Cambridge University Press. Laplace, P. S., & Lavoisier, A. (1780). Mémoire sur la Chaleur. Ouevres Complètes de Laplace (Vol. 10). Paris: Gauthier-Villars. Laplace, P. S. (1821). Sur l’Attraction des Sphères et sur la Répulsion des Fluides Élastiques. In Connaissance des Temps pour l’année 1824 —reprinted in Ouevres Complètes de Laplace (Vol. 13, pp. 273–290). Paris: Gauthier-Villars. Laplace, P. S. (1822). Développement de la Théorie des Fluides Élastiques et Application de Cette Théorie a la Vitesse du Son. In Connaissance des Temps pour l’année 1825 —reprinted in Ouevres Complètes de Laplace (Vol. 13, pp. 291–301). Paris: Gauthier-Villars. Laplace, P. S. (1823). Sur l’Attraction des Sphères et sur la Répulsion des Fluides Élastiques. In Traite de Mécanique Céleste (Livre XII, Chapitre II) —reprinted in Ouevres Complètes de Laplace (Vol. 5). Paris: Gauthier-Villars. Laudan, L. (1981). A confutation of convergent realism. Philosophy of Science, 48, 19–49. Lavoisier, A. (1789). Traite Elémentaire de Chimie. Paris —English trans. as Elements of chemistry, by R. Kerr (1790), reprinted by Dover (1965). Mendoza, E. (1961). A sketch for a history of the kinetic theory of gases. Physics Today, 14, 36–39. Poincaré, H. (1902). La science et L’Hypothèse. (1968 reprint). Paris: Flammarion. Psillos, S. (1999). Scientific realism: How science tracks truth. London: Routledge. Psillos, S. (2009). Knowing the structure of nature. London: Palgrave. Roller D. (1950). The early development of the concepts of temperature and heat: The rise and the decline of the caloric theory. In J. B. Conant (Ed.), Harvard case histories in experimental science. Harvard University Press.
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PSILLOS Stanford, P. K. (2006). Exceeding our grasp: Science, history, and the problem of unconceived alternatives. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Thompson, B. (Count Rumford) (1798). An inquiry concerning the source of the heat which is excited by friction. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, 88, 80–102. Thompson B. (Count Rumford) (1799). An inquiry concerning the weight ascribed to heat. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, 89, 179–194. Zahar, E. (1973). Why did Einstein’s programme supersede Lorentz’s. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 24, 95–123, 223–262.
Stathis Psillos Department of Philosophy and History of Science, University of Athens Panepistimioupolis (University Campus), Athens 15771, Greece e-mail:
[email protected]
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WILLIAM F. MCCOMAS
3. THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE AND THE FUTURE OF SCIENCE EDUCATION A Typology of Approaches to History of Science in Science Instruction
1. INTRODUCTION
In the continuing campaign to enhance science instruction one battle we are winning relates to the inclusion of elements of the nature of science (NOS) in official recommendations designed to guide the development of the science curriculum. Increasingly, standards documents in the U.S. states (which effectively control what is taught within their borders), the U.S. national science education standards (NRC, 1996) (which does not have the force of law but is regularly consulted in planning science instruction by the individual states) and many other nations now include explicit requirements to include the nature of science in plans for science learning. We seem to have responded positively to the 1970 call from Carey and Stauss who stated that, “if the teacher’s understanding and philosophy of science are not congruent with the current interpretations of the nature of science, ... then the instructional outcomes will not be representative of science” (p. 363). There is little doubt that NOS should have a central place in the science curriculum and it is time that teachers blend both NOS and more traditional content to ensure that students come to understand what science is and how it functions. The term “nature of science” is a label for the description of elements that define how science operates at a level appropriate for science instruction. This description draws upon insights from the history, sociology and philosophy of science combined with research from the cognitive sciences such as psychology into a rich description of what science is, how it works, how scientists operate as a social group and how society itself both directs and reacts to scientific endeavors (McComas, Clough, & Almazroa, 1998, p. 4). The picture of science provided under the NOS label is designed for K-16 learners rather than as instructional objectives for those who will become historians or philosophers of science. P.V. Kokkotas et al., (eds.), Adapting Historical Science Knowledge Production to the Classroom, 37–53. © 2011 Sense Publishers. All rights reserved.
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Another front in the NOS campaign that seems to have been secured is that of defining the range of NOS-related concepts necessary and sufficient to inform K-12 science instruction. Fortunately, consensus has begun to emerge regarding the definition of the individual NOS aspects. Osborn, Collins, Ratcliffe, Millar and Duschl (2003), McComas (1998, 2008), Lederman (2002), for instance, have offered quite parallel sets of NOS content recommendations including elements such as the distinctions between law and theory, the role of creativity in science, the role of history, cultural and social elements, and the necessity of empirical evidence in scientific research. Even as we consider the agreement on the place and character of NOS in science instruction, we face what might be final NOS battle. This last challenge is how to include the nature of science in science instruction. Of course there have been many suggestions for way to meet the instructional demand, but nothing as yet has caught on in any systematic fashion. This chapter will focus on the issue of instruction by examining role that might be played by the use of the history of science in various forms in helping students understand the scientific enterprise. We will consider a proposed taxonomy based on a review of the ways in which the history of science has been used in the past while considering what role these strategies might play in the future of science teaching. The premise of this chapter is that history of science can be both a vehicle to convey important lessons about how science functions and a destination in its own right. HOS lessons can humanize the sciences with their inclusion of the personalities that have shaped the direction and products of the scientific enterprise. In this fashion, HOS can meet the challenge from the National Science Education Standards to show “science as a human endeavor” (NRC, 1996). At the same time, carefully selected HOS content can also be used in another way to tell the tale of how science works, what its rules and traditions are, and how knowledge is established in the sciences. 2. RATIONALES FOR THE USE OF THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE (HOS) IN SCIENCE INSTRUCTION INTRODUCTION
Advocacy for the inclusion of history of science in the science classroom is not new. More than a century and a half ago, the Duke of Argyll in his Presidential Address to the British Association for the Advancement of Science (1855) stated that, “What we want in the teaching of the young is not so much the mere results as the methods and, above all, the history of science.” (quoted in Matthews, 1992, p. 11). In the United States a hundred years later, the Educational Policies Commission Report on Education for All American Youth again raised the promise of the use of HOS (1944) stated … These scientists are thought of as living men [sic], facing difficult problems to which they do not know the answers, and confronting many obstacles rooted in ignorance and prejudice. In imagination, the students watch the scientists at work, and look particularly for the methods which they use in attacking their problems… 38
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In 1947 the authors of the American Association for the Advancement of Science President’s Scientific Research Board suggested that “Much more use should be made of the history of science with its adventure and dramatic action, which appeal strongly to young people’s interests and arouse their imagination” (Steelman, 1947, p. 86). Even today, the current National Science Education Standards (NRC, 1996) include an explicit section on the history and nature of science primarily to illustrate the role played by humans, the nature of scientific knowledge and historical perspectives of science. The Standards make the specific proposal that HOS may be useful in this regard with the recommendation that Through the use of short stories, films, video, and other examples, elementary teachers can introduce interesting historical examples of men and women (including minorities and people with disabilities) who have made contributions to science. These stories can highlight how these scientists worked –that is, the questions, procedures, and contributions of diverse individuals to science and technology (p. 141). The introduction of historical examples will help students see the scientific enterprise as more philosophical, social and human (p. 170). Use of the history of science will show that “many individuals have contributed to the traditions of science…” that “science has been practiced by different individuals in different cultures…” and reveal “how difficult it was for scientific innovators to breakthrough the accepted ideas of their time to reach the conclusions that we currently take for granted” (p. 171). Recommendations for the use of history of science in science instruction continued and included, but are not limited to, those by Eichman (1996), Sherratt (1982, 1983), Matthews (1994), and most recently Hodson (2008). However, in spite of these recommendations, there is very little inclusion of the history of science either in textbooks or in classroom discourse. Unfortunately, for most students science is presented in its “final form”. This label was coined by Duschl (1990) to describe the common phenomenon by which we share the current understanding of science with learners but rarely discuss the development of that understanding. This tradition may seem efficient but it depersonalizes the scientific enterprise, results in textbooks that are much less interesting than they might be otherwise and removes a fertile source of material that could be used to help students see the rules of the game of science in context (Allen & Baker, 2001). In the past sixty years, a variety of approaches to the inclusion of the history of science have been proposed and these will be discussed in subsequent sections of this chapter. Accompanying these approaches is an impressive number of justifications for the use of HOS which are offered as a group in Table 1 but are drawn primarily from Sherratt (1982, 1983), Matthews (1994), Monk and Osborne (1997), Rasmussen (2007), Rudge and Howe (2009) and Wider (2006). 39
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Table 1. Rationales offered from a variety of sources in support of the inclusion of the history of science in science teaching Inclusion of the History of Science in Science Instruction potentially can: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13.
14. 15.
Increase student motivation Increase admiration for scientists Help students develop better attitudes toward science Humanize the sciences Demonstrate that science has a history Assist students in understanding and appreciating the interaction between science and society Provide authentic illustrations for the way science actually functions Reveal both the link and distinction between science and technology Help to connect the science disciplines by showing the commonalities Make instruction more challenging and thus will enhance reasoning Provide opportunities for the development of higher order thinking skills Contribute to a fuller understanding of basic science content Help to reveal and dispel classic science misconceptions (this rationale is linked to what is called historical recapitulation in which some learners are seen to proceed through stages of misconceptions that are occasionally linked to incorrect ideas held by scientists in the past) Provide an interdisciplinary link between science and other school subjects with a particular emphasis on bridging the gap between the “two cultures” (humanities and sciences) Improve teacher education by helping teachers with their own science learning
Readers should understand that these rationales do not pertain to the incorporation of all particular HOS approaches in science teaching only that, as a group, these justifications have been offered to support the use of the history of science in the classroom. These rationales come from a variety of sources; some are frequently mentioned by various authors, a few have been validated by research studies while others lack such support and exist primarily as suggestions. In reviewing the various HOS instructional methods it is clear that there are as many distinct types as there are rationales for the incorporation of HOS in instruction. As we move forward in recommending the use of HOS it is now necessary to provide some definitions about exactly what is meant by a HOS-based curriculum, a task that we will consider in the next section. 3. WHY PROPOSE A CLASSIFICATION SCHEME FOR HOS CURRICULUM AND INSTRUCTIONAL DESIGNS?
The classification plan or typology proposed here is designed to do several things. First, there is the goal to provide a range of approaches and examples for the way in which HOS may be used in science instruction. This goal builds on some earlier work in this regard by Allchin (1997). The next element considered in the design of this proposal is the assumption that not all HOS educational approaches are the same, are not as easily integrated into instruction, do not all make the same demands on teachers and students and will not necessarily produce the same impact on students. 40
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As the proposal, the author is acutely aware that some may disagree with the distinctions made between types and that too is to be encouraged. An NOS typology is a worthy and perhaps even necessary first step in establishing a framework for examining and discussing the roles, advantages and disadvantages of each of these instructional types. This proposed taxonomy is based on several factors starting with a review of actual HOS instructional models that have been used in preference to ones that are possible or ideal. Even with this apparent limitation, it seems that almost every conceivable way to integrate HOS into science instruction has been attempted; the degree of success of these attempts has generally not be measured well. Another element that factors into the taxonomy offered here addresses the cognitive and affective impact that is likely made by the method. One can assume that watching a film is different from reading an original manuscript. Even here there can be no a priori judgment about the ultimate kind of impact that each presentation type might make. In fact, it is reasonable to suggest that the impact may lie in the eye of the beholder; some students may react more positively to some instructional approaches than others while other learners may have quite a different response to the same technique. The classification scheme is also based in part on what might be called the “distance” from the primary source material. The question is asked how much of the original work of the scientist is encountered by the student in comparison to the view of a scientist’s achievement as interpreted by others. We will consider how much of the source material is encountered by students. This will become clear when examining, for instance, the distinction between having students read original works by Darwin and examining a case study on the history of evolution as a scientific principle. Finally there is the distinction built into the taxonomy which accounts for those approaches featuring a “hands-on” aspect of use of HOS. In some HOS approaches, students are asked to (re)conduct or in some other way personally experience a noteworthy experiment or a series of experiments from the history of science. Readers are cautioned not to assume that the taxonomy is based on a hierarchy of effectiveness or rigor. This would be useful, but the simple fact is that in most cases we do not have sufficient empirical evidence of the effectiveness with respect to any particular application of the history of science as an instructional technique. For instance, there is no implication that recreating a historical experiment is “better” than reading the report of that experiment in the words of the scientist who conducted the work. Rather, in developing the plan offered here, the issue is one of difference. This taxonomy defines and distinguishes one HOS approach from another with the presumption that these distinct approaches probably do impact students in different ways. At each level of the taxonomy examples will be provided to illustrate either the approach itself or the source material for such an approach. No attempt has been made to include every illustration of every technique appearing in the literature, but the goal is to provide enough detail for readers to evaluate why one HOS instructional plan is distinct from another. One aspect of the HOS approach that is not captured by this taxonomy is that of integration and synergy. For instance, there is no classification provided for an 41
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approach which has students reenact a classic experiment and read the scientists’ report. One could infer that such an approach would be different from the use of either method in isolation from the others that might be combined with it. There is also no useful way to categorize an approach that uses a video case study approach linking biographical elements of individual scientists such as Galileo with an overview of the science of mechanics. Perhaps there is an advantage in proposing an additional level for such “mixed” approaches. The challenge in the development of any taxonomy is to avoid making everything a special case or providing such all encompassing categories that no distinctions can be made; this, of course, is the classic dilemma of “lumping and splitting”. The plan provided here is offered simply as a way to review and organize the various HOS approaches discovered thus far in a review of the literature and, as with all such plans, is open to critique and modification. 4. A HISTORY OF SCIENCE INSTRUCTIONAL TAXONOMY
To introduce the scope and scale of the proposed typology, consider the plan provided in Table 2. Each level is discussed in more detail in the subsequent sections of this chapter. Table 2. A proposed taxonomy for the kinds of HOS approaches applied in science instruction during the past 60 years
1.0
Interactions with original works (or selections) in the history of science 1.1 Original works in their entirety (may include additional commentary) 1.2 Original works abstracted (may include additional commentary) 2.0 Case studies, stories and other similar illustrations of the history of science (including those with original written materials) 2.1 Case studies (with original content) 2.2 Science stories 2.3 Shorter illustrations, vignettes and examples 3.0 Biographies and autobiographies of scientists and their discoveries 3.1 Autobiography of a Scientist 3.2 Biography of Scientist (Written) 3.3 Biography of Scientist (Dramatic Presentation) 4.0 Book length presentations of some aspect of the history of science 4.1 Account of the General History of Science 4.2 History of a Particular Scientific Discipline 4.3 History of a Particular Scientific Sub-discipline such as genetics, evolution or quantum physics 4.4 History of a Single Discovery of Event (such as an eclipse, the problem of longitude, appearance of Halley’s Comet, etc.) 4.5 Accounts of classic experiments 5.0 Role playing and related activities with respect to historical personages 6.0 Textbook inclusions related to the history of science 7.0 Experimental reenactments and other “hands-on” approaches for engagement with historical aspects of science
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Domain 1.0: First hand interactions with original works This level of the taxonomy essentially represents the “Great Books” (Bloom, 1994) approach to the history of science in which students read the actual accounts of science as written by the scientists themselves and then engage in guided discussions regarding what they have read. Such accounts are most likely limited to the original papers appearing in scientific journals but in rare cases, might also consist of a review of working documents (such as laboratory notebooks, etc.). The classification at this level is further subdivided in recognition of the fact that students may read the original works in their entirety, may read abstracts of those works, may encounter a single paper or read sets of related papers from the same scientist or scientists associated with the same discovery or phenomenon. Such original works are available in collections with commentaries such as found in the “critical editions” produced by some publishers. An example includes the Norton Critical Edition of the discovery of the structure of DNA which includes a selection of related papers (Watson & Stent, 1980) or an original seminal work alone such as that written by Watson and Crick (1953). Many scientists (Einstein and Darwin for example) are represented by extensive collections sometimes called “paper projects” that have so completely documented the life and times of individuals through their own writing that it is almost possible to know what a famous scientist was doing on a daily basis; such is the case with Darwin for instance (http://darwin-online.org.uk) whose works have been digitized and are easily accessible on line. At the upper levels of the classification plan, students (presumably with help from teachers) make sense of what they have read without relying on the interpretation provided by an interceding authority (such as a historian or other interpreter). In our increasingly wired world it is now possible to download important papers and entire books making this approach somewhat easier than it was just a few years ago. Even so, teachers are reminded of the impact on the affective domain that may be made by actual objects and whether students could have the opportunity to see an original paper or an actual book from an important episode in the history of science (called realia). A visit to the rare books section of a library may be able to put students in “touch” with the history of science directly. The additional levels of the taxonomy are provided to make the distinction between works that are encountered in their original form and those encountered either as abstracts or with some additional commentary from experts. Illustrative of this approach are contributions such as What’s the Matter? Readings in Physics (Whitefield, 2007), Biology: It’s People and its Papers (Baumel & Berger, 1973) and Kampourakis and McComas (2009a). Domain 2.0: Case studies, stories and other similar illustrations of the history of science (may include interaction with original written materials and laboratory experiences) The case study or case method approach to instruction has been attempted in many disciplines and science is no exception. For instance, there even exists a center for the use of case studies in the teaching of science (http://library.buffalo.edu/libraries/ projects/cases/case.html) with an extensive set of such studies along with rationales 43
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for their use (Herreid, 1994). The explicit use of the history of science has also been used in a case method format. Much of the early inspiration and advocacy for the use of the history of science in science instruction came from James B. Conant, scientist and president of Harvard University who expressed the view that “… it is my contention that science can best be understood by laymen through close study of a few relatively simple case histories…” (1947, p. 1). Conant’s passion for the use of history of science resulted in what is the most noteworthy example of the case approach, the Harvard Case Studies in Experimental Science (Conant & Nash, 1948). The titles of the cases are provided in Table 3. Table 3. The seven case studies included in the Harvard cases in experimental science (Conant & Nash, 1948) – – – – – – –
Robert Boyles Experiments in Pneumatics (64 pgs) The Overthrow of the Phlogiston Theory: The Chemical Revolution of 1775–1789 (52 pgs) The Early Development of the Concepts of Temperature and Heat; The Rise and Decline of the Caloric Theory (98 pgs) The Atomic-molecular Theory (108 pgs) Plants and the Atmosphere (114 pgs) Pasteur’s and Tyndall’s Study of Spontaneous Generation (54 pgs) The Development of the Concept of Electric Charge: Electricity from the Greeks to Columb (98 pgs)
Later, Conant’s student and later fellow Harvard professor, Leo Klopfer (1964), adapted the case study approach for use in high schools with the History of Science Cases (HOSC). Each of these units included the exploration of a major scientific idea through the examination of excerpts of historical documents and experimentation carried out either by students themselves or as a demonstration by the teacher (Lind, 1979). Table 4 features a list of the nine titles proposed or developed for HOSC each of which was represented by individual guides for teachers and students. The overarching goals for HOSC were to show students the methods used by scientists, the means by which science advances and the conditions under which it flourishes, Table 4. The cases developed (or proposed) for the History of Science Cases (HOSC) (Klopfer, 1964). Note there is a good chance that some of these planned titles were never published – – – – – – – –
– – 44
The Cells of Life The Chemistry of Fixed Air Fraunhofer Lines Frogs and Batteries The Discovery of Halogen Elements Air Pressure The Sexuality of Plants Rejection of Atomic Theory The Speed of Light
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the personalities and human qualities of science, the interplay of social, economic, technological, and psychological factors with the progress of science and the importance to science of accurate and accessible records, constantly improved instruments, and free communication between scientists (Klopfer, 1964). Strategies at the level of Science Stories (2.2) of the typology include “science stories” a term coined by Clough and Olson (2004) and further developed by Clough (2008). Such narratives are written specifically for instructional purposes without much original material. Roach (1995) and Roach and Wandersee (1993) pioneered this approach in the use of short stories to share important lessons about science purpose-written stories. Sometimes scientists’ dialogue is created for dramatic and instructional purposes. The goal is generally for students to learn a very specific lesson about how science works or about science content and the stories have been crafted with such goals in mind. Current examples include those by Clough (2008) and Klassen (2006). Even shorter HOS illustrations (Level 2.3) can be used to make points within existing lessons. An example of this approach would be for a teacher to tell the story of how Kekule imagined a chain of snakes one biting the tail of another to form a circle inspiring him to conclude the some hydrocarbons formed ring structures rather than the linear chains that was thought to be the only option. The story is perfectly suited for a chemistry teacher to make the point that creativity plays a major role in scientific discovery. Of course, this approach requires that teachers have such examples from which they may draw in instruction. McComas (2008b) and Kampourakis and McComas (2009b) further illustrate this technique and provide such examples. Domain 3.0: Biographies and autobiographies of scientists and their discoveries Here we find the life and research of scientists reported directly. The three types within this strategy will be discussed as a group even though there is likely a difference in impact on students linked to the way in which the information is delivered and to the “voice” of the author. There are countless examples of this HOS approach with first person narratives such as those by Charles Darwin (2002) Autobiographies, James Watson (1996) The Double Helix and Richard Feynman (2005) The Meaning of it All and biographies such as Galileo’s Daughter (Sobel, 1999), Einstein (Issacson, 2007), Rosalind Franklin (Maddox, 2002) and Issac Newton (Gleick, 2003). Fingon and Fingon (2009) share an effectively updated version of the traditional strategy of having student’s present scientists’ biographies guided by a rubric for evaluation of these presentations. Dagher and Ford do provide a cautionary note associated with the use of this strategy in reporting that some biographies written for younger children “were characterized by a relative absence of description of how science arrived at their knowledge...” (p. 377). A strategy to reading about the life and work of a scientist is that of a dramatic presentation delivered on stage or in recorded format. An excellent example of this is the play QED by playwright Peter Parnell on the life of Richard Feynman. This play brought science and its history to life for theatre-goers (and presumably for students too) as actor Alan Alda starred as the eccentric physicist. In 1996 the 45
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movie Infinity dramatized the earlier life of Feynman during his time as a young scientist working on the development of the atomic bomb during the Manhattan Project. The only caution in using such dramatizations is the degree to which these products depart from the truth. Finally, there are many products have been produced exclusively for the education market that present the lives and work of scientists in video format. Many of the products of the PBS NOVA series include historical recreations. Recent examples include Einsteins’ Big Idea, Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, Newton’s Dark Secret and Galileo’s Battle for the Heavens (Public Broadcasting System (PBS). Other noteworthy examples of this genre include the series of eight modules, entitled MindWorks (Becker, 2000) that extend, complement, and enrich existing curricular materials on various subjects (Table 5) and the Mechanical Universe Project produced by the California Institute of Technology (1985) that provides explanations of many concepts in physics frequently accompanied by recreations of the actual personages, events and experiments with actors in period costumes. Even without viewing the Mechanical Universe segments in their traditional fashion it would be possible to extract these dramatic recreations as classroom illustrations of the history of science. In conclusion, there seems to be no particular strategy reported in the literature for the way in which biography and autobiography can be used in the science classroom but this approach to the history of science would seem to stand as distinct from some of the others. Table 5. The video titles produced by Becker (2000) as part of the MindWorks project featuring recreations of Kinematics (Galileo: Falling Objects) Dynamics (DuChatelet and Voltaire: Collisions) Thermodynamics (Count Rumford: Heat) Statics & Structures (Ferris and the Ferris Wheel) Electricity & Magnetism (Woods: Communication / Railway Telegraphy) Light & Color (Newton and Wickins: Refraction of Light and Color) Atoms & Matter (Curie and Huggins: Radioactivity) Tomorrow’s Challenges (Shirley and the Mars Pathfinder Mission)
Domain 4.0: Book length presentations of some aspect of the history of science The impact of the strategies in this category relate to those just discussed but have been separated because of their focus. Instead of featuring the work of a single individual with emphasis on the “life, times and work” of that individual from a biographical perspective there are more generalized discussions. The subcategories have been arranged from those that are most generic (such as a narrative account of science itself as might be found in the three book series The Story of Science (Hakim, 2005), to historical treatments of the history of a discipline (such as biology as exemplified by The Epic History of Biology; Serafini, 2001) to a subdiscipline (such as molecular biology like The Eighth Day of Creation; Judson, 1996) or even the history of a specific event (Longitude; Sobel, 1995, is an excellent example of 46
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this genre). A somewhat less related category, accounts of classic experiments, is also included here. There is little research to show how materials in this category of the history of science are used and what impact such use would have on students but original materials have been applied successfully in a wide number of other areas of instruction (for example Bowler & Morus, 2005). Domain 5.0: Role playing and related activities with respect to historical personages Admittedly, this level of the typology is the most tentative. Since there are a few inclusions in the literature to the use of direct and indirect role playing activities in science instruction and because such techniques seem unique from the others provided here, this category was established. Instructional techniques in this category would include those in which students take on the roles of historical personages in the history of science to act out, debate or respond to questions as those persons. This may or may not involve having students dress up as the personages they portray. One could imagine students writing a play or otherwise reenacting the trail of Galileo more fully to understand and communicate the central issues of that debate. This would be characterized as a direct application of the use of role playing in the history of science. Alternatively, the teacher, or even an actor might dress up as a famous scientist and take on the character of that person to give lectures and respond to questions as that person. Mendel, Darwin, Newton, Einstein and other such distinctive scientists have all been the focus of this technique. Regrettably, nothing of substance has been found in the literature regarding the impact of the application of this strategy or on any robust discussion for how this might be used in a general way but the technique would seem to hold some promise. Domain 6.0: Textbook inclusions related to the history of science This category is offered to reflect a reality rather than an ideal state for the use of HOS in science teaching. Presently, relatively little NOS/HOS content is contained in textbooks and in classroom discussions. Typically, the few major scientific discoveries explicitly tied to those who made the contributions are discussed from such a human historical perspective. Galileo, Newton, Einstein, Darwin and Watson/ Crick are commonly mentioned even as the specifics of their work (often the most interesting and illustrative parts) are omitted. A number of studies substantiate this point. However, Leite (2002) did a particularly good job in describing how to look for the historical content in textbooks –physics in her case– and reported the finding that in the books examined the historical content did not give students and adequate image of scientists and their work. When scientists are mentioned, their contributions are limited to a few sentences, perhaps a picture, and birth and death dates –usually in a side bar in the textbook. Even this positioning almost guarantees that students and teachers alike will ignore the potential offered by such content. While this use of HOS is not particularly robust or compelling, it should be acknowledged as a way to account for as many possibilities of the incorporation of HOS as possible. One exception to the current state of inclusion of the history of science in science texts was the Project Physics 47
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curriculum developed in the 1960’s and updated as Physics, the Human Adventure (Holton & Brush, 2001). This project, which had as a co-author science historian Gerald Holton, deliberated included a rich historical treatment along with discussion of the science of physics (Holton, 1969, 2003). While there have been studies of what history content is mentioned in science texts there have been no comprehensive examinations of what use teachers make of such content or what impressions students have of this dimension of science teachers. It is probably not too great a conclusion to reach that HOS inclusion in science textbooks makes almost no impact on students or teachers unless it is explicitly woven into the curriculum. That is likely to happen only in the classrooms of teachers who already possess a strong interest in the subject. Domain 7.0: Experimental reenactments and other “hands-on” approaches for engagement with various historical aspects of science The final level in our proposed classification plan is that of the use of classic or historical experiments in the teaching of science. Of course, investigations such as the electrostatic effect of rubbing various fabrics on a glass rod are done frequently, but in the majority of cases are not tied to specific persons or events in the history of the discovery of static electricity. The kinds of investigations that are considered for inclusion in this domain of the classification plan are those that are explicitly linked to the history of science. This aspect of history of science teaching is confounded by the reality that rarely are these hands-on approaches done in isolation from other techniques. Consider the History of Science Cases, discussed earlier in this chapter; they too used engaged students in conducting experiments but blended this with reading about the scientist and the work being pursued. However, given the special nature of hands-on investigations and the unique impact that they may make, it seems reasonable to include such approaches in their own domain in the taxonomy. Resources of the use of this approach are relatively limited. Several books feature discussions of experiments that could be used as source material for either reading about or actually conducting (re-conducting) some of these classic experiments. The Ten Most Beautiful Experiments in Science (Johnson, 2009), Great Experiments in Physics (Shamos, 1987) and Great Scientific Experiments (Harre, 1981) are among the most useful. An extensive compendium of classroom-ready classic experiments covering all of the sciences has been released as Historical Science Experiments on File (Walker, 1993). A number of educators have used various permutations of experimental reenactments. Kipnis (1996) developed what he calls the historical investigative approach and applied it to the study of optics and electricity. Heerring at the University of Oldenburg (2000, 2003) has become the expert in the construction of exact replicas of many important devices in the history of physics for use in teacher education programs. Most recently, Cavicchi (2008) has found that such an approach had “value in recovering some of the interrelatedness inherent in the history and reintroducing the wonder of science phenomena to students today” (p. 717) 48
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but adds that “the history of science with its experimental legacy has yet to be plumbed as an educational resource for countering the fragmenting of science knowledge” (p. 719). 5. CONSIDERING THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE IN SCIENCE EDUCATION
Even if we agree on the general structure of the proposed taxonomy there are at least three additional major elements of HOS instruction worth considering. These would include some focus on the curriculum, pedagogy and the affective domain illustrated in a model provided in Figure 1. From a curricular perspective it would seem that HOS can only be effectively included in instruction if it is integrated within rather than appended to instruction, if HOS is somehow alighted with standards and other curricular goals and if the focus of HOS (and HOS derived learning) is featured in science assessment so that students take it seriously.
Figure 1. Three educational considerations (level of engagement, level of explicitness and level of integratedness) related to the inclusion of the history of science in science instruction. The letters are included for illustration purposes only. “A” represents a HOS approach with a high level of implicit treatment of HOS and medium levels of both engagement and integratedness. “B” represents high levels of all three elements.
The pedagogical element of this model is quite straightforward, HOS-derived learning must be discussed explicitly (rather than implicitly) (Abd-El-Khalick and 49
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Lederman, 2000ab; Rudge and Howe (2009). As with nature of science itself, if the ideas that teachers hope to share through a history of science approach are only implied it is very likely that the will be ignored. Lastly, there is an affective domain consideration. If the HOS content and instructional approach is not engaging, interesting and developmentally appropriate it will likely not be responded to positively by students and, in turn, by teachers. If teachers alone value the incorporation of HOS in science instruction there is a very good possibility that the innovation will not last since students themselves will reject it. With the press of time and demands of coverage presently on the science curriculum, ideas most likely to inform curriculum development are those that work. Figure 1 provides some direction in predicting what combination of dimensions HOS will be effective in the classroom. 6. CHALLENGES FACED IN INCORPORATING HOS IN SCIENCE INSTRUCTION
There exists a long heritage both of advocacy for (McComas, 1997) and innovation in the incorporation of the history of science in science instruction and even instructive criticism (Allchin, 2003 and Kindi, 2005). Even as we laud the depth of scholarship and practical suggestion for the incorporation of history of science in science teaching, it must be stated that this approach to science teaching remains uncommon and generally untested for a number of reasons. First, science teacher education programs must be upgraded to include the effective use of HOS as part of generating appropriate PCK. Perhaps with guidance from the taxonomy, we must have a new focus on curriculum models for the effective and engaging inclusion of HOS into the science classroom. Finally, we should devote some of our research initiatives to the examination of the role and nature of HOS in the service of science teaching. Little has been done to determine the degree to which HOS should be included as an instructional imperative or in gauging the relative effectiveness of the various techniques for its use in school science teaching. We do not know what elements of HOS are effective for what science teaching purposes. We must consider the roles to be played by recapitulation (reenactment) vs. reconstruction (the writing of history for instructional purposes). We should be concerned that exposure to “old” science may be problematic as we try to communicate “current” science (Lind, 1979). As we conclude this review of methodologies for the use of history of science it seems clear that the inclusion of science history in science instruction should be a high priority. We must humanize sciences by revealing to students the diverse and interested people who have contributed to science in the past and continue daily. We should consider again the multitude of ways that educators and scholars have suggested that we incorporate HOS and consider which ones make sense in our new world of standards and benchmark tests. The challenge may be to integrate HOS in subtle yet appropriate ways that do not make large demands on classroom time and on teacher knowledge but there is little doubt that the science curriculum would be enriched and enlivened if we can demonstrate to students where science comes from who has contributed to its development. 50
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to thank Carole Lee and Kostas Kampourakis for their many helpful additions and corrections to the manuscript. Nevertheless, all opinions and errors are of course the responsibility of the author. REFERENCES Abd-El-Khalick, F., & Lederman, N. (2000a). The influence of history of science courses on students’ views of nature of science. Journal of Research in Science Teaching, 37, 1057–1095. Abd-El-Khalick, F., & Lederman, N. G. (2000b). Improving science teachers’ conceptions of the nature of science: A critical review of the literature. International Journal of Science Education, 22, 665–701. Allchin, D. (1997). The power of history as a tool for teaching science. In A. Dally, T. Nielsen, & F. Reiss (Eds.), History and philosophy of science: A means to better scientific literacy? (pp. 70–98). Loccum: Evangelische Akadamie Loccum. Allchin, D. (2003). Scientific myth conceptions. Science education, 87, 329–351. Allen, G., & Baker, J. (2001). Biology: scientific process and social issues. Maryland, MD: Fitzgerald Science Press. Baumel, H. B., & Berger, J. J. (1973). Biology: Its people and its papers. Washington, DC: National Science Teachers Association. Becker, B. (2000). Mindworks. San Francisco: WestEd. Bloom, H. (1994). The western canon: The books and school of the ages. New York: Harcourt Brace & Company. Bowler, P. J., & Morus I. R. (2005). Making modern science: a historical survey. Chicago and New York: The University of Chicago Press. Carey, L. R., & Stauss, A. N. (1970). An analysis of the understanding of the nature of science by prospective secondary science teachers. Science Education, 52(4), 358–363. California Institute of Technology. (1985). The mechanical universe and beyond. Retrieved April 30, 2009, from http://www.learner.org/resources Cavicchi, E. M. (2008). Historical experiments in students’ hands: Unfragmenting science through action and history. Science & Education, 17, 717–749. Clough, M. (2008). A very deep question: Just how old is the earth? Part of a new series of “science stories”. Unpublished Document, Iowa State University, Ames, IA. Clough, M. P., & Joanne, K. O. (2004). The nature of science: always part of the science story. The Science Teacher, 71, 28–31. Conant, J. B. (1947). On understanding science. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Conant, J. B., & Nash, L. K. (1948). Harvard case histories in experimental science (Vols. I and II). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Dagher, Z., & Ford, D. (2005). How are scientists portrayed in children’s science biographies. Science & Education, 14, 377–393. Darwin, C. (2002). Autobiographies. New York: Penguin Group. DeBoer, G. E. (1991). A history of ideas in science education: Implications for practice. New York: Teachers College Press. Duschl, R. A. (1990). Restructuring science education: The importance of theories and their development. New York: Teachers College Press. Education Policies Commission Report. (1944). Education for all American youth. National Education Association of the United States. Eichman, P. (1996). Using history to teach biology. The American Biology Teacher, 58, 200–202. Feynman, R. P. (2005). The meaning of it all: Thoughts of a citizen scientist. New York: Basic Books. Fingon, J. C., & Fingon, S. D. (2009). What about Albert Einstein? Using biographies to promote students’ scientific thinking. Science Scope, 32, 51–55.
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MCCOMAS Gleick, J. (2003). Isaac Newton. New York: Pantheon Books. Hakin, J. (2005). The story of science: Newton at the center. Arlington, VA: NSTA Press. Harre, R. (1981). Great scientific experiments. Twenty experiments that changed our view of the world. Chelmsford, MA: Courier Dover Publications. Herreid, C. F. (1994). Case Studies in science-A novel method of science education. Journal of College Science Teaching, 23, 221–229. Heering, P. (2003). History-science-epistemology: On the use of historical experiments in physics teacher training. In W. F. McComas (Ed.), Proceeding of the 6th international history, philosophy and science teaching group meeting. Denver, USA. [File 58 on CD ROM from IHPST.ORG]. Heering, P. (2000). Getting shocks: Teaching secondary school physics through history. Science & Education, 9, 363–373. Hodson, D. (2008). Towards scientific literacy: A teacher’s guide to the history, philosophy and sociology of science. Rotterdam: Sense Publishers. Holton, G. (1969). Harvard project physics: A report on its aims and current status. Physics Education, 4(1), 19–25. Holton, G. (2003). The project physics course, then and now. Science & Education, 12, 779–785. Holton, G., & Brush, S. G. (2001). Physics, the human adventure: From Copernicus to Einstein and beyond. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press. Howe, E. M., & Rudge, D. W. (2005). Recapitulating the history of Sickle-Cell Anemia Research: Improving students’ NOS views explicitly and reflectively. Science & Education, 14(3), 423–441. Isaacson, W. (2007). Einstein: His life and universe. New York: Simon and Schuster. Johnson, G. (2009). The ten most beautiful experiments. New York: Knopf. Judson, H. F. (1996). The eight day of creation. Cold Springs Harbor, NY: Cold Springs Harbor Laboratory Press. Kampourakis, K., & McComas, W. F. (2009a, in review). Charles Darwin and the human elements of science: Creativity, social influences and subjectivity. Under review by Science & Education. Kampourakis, K., & McComas, W. F. (2009b). Using the history of biology to illustrate core nature of science ideas. Proceedings of the 5th Greek conference on history, philosophy & teaching of natural sciences: “The great scientific theories in the teaching of natural sciences”, Nicosia, Cyprus. Kindi, V. (2005). Should science teaching involve the history of science? An assessment of Kuhn’s view. Science & Education, 14, 721–731. Kipnis, N. (1996). The “historical-investigative” approach to teaching science. Science & Education, 5, 277–292. Klassen, S. (2006). The application of historical narrative in science learning: The Atlantic cable story. Science & Education, 16, 335–352. Klopfer, L. E (1964). History of Science Cases (HOSC). Chicago: Science Research Associates. Kragh, H. (1994). An introduction to the historiography of science. New York: Cambridge University Press. Lederman, N. G. (2002). The state of science education: Subject matter without context. Electronic Journal of Science Education [On-Line], 3(2), December. http://unr.edu/homepage/jcannon/ejse/ ejse.html. Leite, L. (2002). History of science in science education: Development and validation of a checklist for analyzing the historical content of science textbooks. Science & Education, 11, 353–359. Lind, G. (1979). The History of Science Cases (HOSC): Nine units of instruction in the history of science. European Journal of Science Education, 1(3), 293–299. Maddox, B. (2002). Rosalind Franklin: The dark lady of DNA. New York: HarperCollins. Matthews, M. (1992). History, philosophy and science teaching: The present rapprochement. Science & Education, 1, 11–47. Matthews, M. R. (1994). Science teaching, the role of history and philosophy of science. New York: Routledge. McComas, W. F., Clough, M. P., & Almazroa, H. (1998). A review of the role and character of the nature of science in science education. In W. F. McComas (Ed.), The nature of science in science education: Rationales and strategies (pp. 3–39). Kluwer/Springer Academic Publishers. 52
THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE McComas, W. F. (2008a). Proposals for core nature of science content in popular books on the history and philosophy of science: Lessons for science education. In Y. J. Lee, & A. L. Tan (Eds.), Science education at the nexus of theory and practice. Rotterdam: Sense Publishers. McComas, W. F. (2008b). Seeking historical examples to illustrate key aspects of the nature of science. Science & Education, 17(2/3), 249–263. McComas, W. F. (1997). The discovery and nature of evolution by natural selection: Misconceptions and lessons learned from the history of science. American Biology Teacher, 59, 492–500. Monk, M., & Osborne, J. (1997). Placing the history and philosophy of science on the curriculum: a model for the development of pedagogy. Science Education, 81(4), 405–424. National Research Council. (1996). The national science education standards. Washington, DC: National Academy Press. Osborne, J., Collins, S., Ratcliffe, M., Millar, R., & Duschl, R. (2003). What “ideas-about-science” should be taught in school science? A Delphi study of the expert community. Journal of Research in Science Teaching, 40, 692–720. Public Broadcasting System (PBS). Science programming on air and online. http://pbs.org/ wgbh.nova/. Rasmussen, S. C. (2007). The history of science as a tool to identify and confront pseudo-science. Journal of Chemical Education, 84, 949–951. Roach, L. E. (1995). Putting people back in science: Using historical vignettes. School Science and Mathematics, 95, 365–370. Roach, L. E., & Wandersee, J. H. (1993). Short story science. The Science Teacher, 60, 18–21. Rudge, D. W., & Howe, E. M. (2009). An explicit and reflective approach to the use of history to promote understanding of the nature of science. Science & Education, (online first article). Serafini, A. (2001). The epic history of biology. Boulder, CO: Perseus Publishing Company. Shamos, M. (1987). Great experiments in physics. New York: Dover Publications. Sherratt, W. J. (1982). History of science in the science curriculum: An historical perspective Part I: Early interest and role advocated. School Science Review, 64, 225–236. Sherratt, W. J. (1983). History of science in the science curriculum: An historical perspective. Part II: Interest shown by teachers. School Science Review, 64, 418–424. Sobel, D. (1995). Longitude: The true story of along genius who solved the greatest problem of his time. New York: Walker and Co. Sobel, D. (1999). Galileo’s daughter: A historical memoir of science, faith, and love. New York: Walker and Co. Steelman, J. R. (1947). Manpower for research: Volume 4 of science and public policy. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. Walker, R. (1993). Historical science experiments on file. New York: Facts on File, Inc. Watson, J. D. (1996). The double helix: A personal account of the discovery of the structure of DNA. New York: Simon and Schuster. Watson, J. D., & Crick, F. H. C. (1953). Molecular structure of nucleic acids: A structure for deoxyribose nucleic acid. Nature, 171, 737–738. Watson, J. D., & Stent, G. S. (Ed.), (1980). Double helix: A personal account of the discovery of the structure of DNA. New York: W.W. Norton and Company. Wider, W. (2006). Science as story communicating the nature of science through historical perspectives on science. American Biology Teacher, 68, 200–205. Whitfield, D. H. (2007). What’s the matter? Readings in physics. Chicago: Great Books Foundation.
William F. McComas Parks Family Professor of Science Education University of Arkansas College of Education and Health Professions Project to Advance Science Education (PASE) e-mail:
[email protected] 53
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4. TEXTBOOKS OF THE PHYSICAL SCIENCES AND THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE ǹ Problematic Coexistence
That the use of episodes from the history of science and technology is particularly beneficial to the teaching of the sciences has been well documented and there have been interesting proposals of how to further elaborate a trend that has already been welcomed by many teachers and textbook writers. No one doubts the positive effects of historically informed science textbooks. All too often, historical notes interspersed throughout the text books, photographs of old instruments or of well known scientific figures, short biographies, stories about priority disputes, anecdotes from the lives of scientists, even excerpts from original texts, excite the imagination of students and give the opportunity to many teachers to make their teaching more lively and effective. There are two questions worth pursuing from the point of view of a historian of science. The first is whether such historically informed textbooks play any role in making students understand what history of science is. The second question is whether pedagogic expediency is always in tandem with the scholarship of history of science? Might it be the case that what one wants to achieve in pedagogic terms may be in conflict with what one wants to convey in historical terms? In order to discuss these questions we need to make some preliminary comments. One of them is the need to clarify what we mean by history of science. This is not a “definition” of what history of science is, but rather, a way of clarifying the difference between references to episodes from the past of the sciences, and history of science, as practised by the members of the community of historians of science. For many decades since the end of the 19th century, the great majority of historians and philosophers of science believed that the development of the sciences was the gradual appearance of a pre-existing objective structure of nature, and that the origins of the sciences had no effect on their character. In other words, they believed that what we have come to refer to as science was something independent of human activities. This view has been radically modified since the 1970s. Few, if any, would deny that the sciences have come into being as a result of complicated intellectual and social processes, and their character has been deeply influenced by the scientists’ ideological orientations, their cultural environment, their philosophical beliefs as well as their ontological commitments. History of science is the history of the people who tried to investigate and understand the structure and function of nature. At the same time, however, history of science studies the institutions that have been created in specific historical conditions where the sciences were nurtured and P.V. Kokkotas et al., (eds.), Adapting Historical Science Knowledge Production to the Classroom, 55–59. © 2011 Sense Publishers. All rights reserved.
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various of its theoretical practices and experimental techniques had been established. Though these institutions many people attempted to convince others of the truth of their ideas about nature, and to legitimise the ways they went about understanding nature. The sciences have been formed and molded by the ideas, techniques and practices devised by people in order to further investigate nature, its entities, the principles they postulated and the laws they discovered, the institutions they created and the applications they thought up. But the development of the sciences has also been influenced by the different philosophical, aesthetic, religious, and political outlooks and social practices of those who were actively involved in the scientific enterprise. It is for these reasons that history of science views science as a social and cultural phenomenon, and historians of science are obliged to study the history of the sciences within their spatial, temporal and cultural contexts. The attempt to describe what historians of science and technology do, is not an attempt to project that all historians (should) follow a particular historiographic approach of how they would go about doing history of science. What is being emphasised is that independent of what aspects each historian of science chooses to bring to surface, and independent of what aspects each historian of science thinks are relevant for an understanding of the development of the sciences, they are all aware that the historical study of the sciences involves a complex framework comprised of all these parameters. Another point is that historians of science pose and attempt to answer questions. In all the articles appearing in professional journals and conference proceedings, in all the books and seminar talks, there is always a specific set of questions being posed and arguments constructed in order to answer the question(s). This is exactly what makes the decisive difference between, say, an article in an encyclopaedia and an article in a professional journal. In an article in an encyclopaedia what is important is that the facts are correct. In an article in a professional journal, the facts have to be correct, of course. But the rules of the discipline, the rules that the members of the community of historians of science agree by consensus, is that the author is obliged to raise questions and follow a series of rules of how to answer them. Again what is implied here is not a historiographically homogeneous approach, but rules such as the careful reading of published and unpublished material not through the prism of presentism, but by trying to understand how these texts were read at the past, the study of the correspondence, the study of the resistances against the new proposals, etc. What is being emphasised here is that there are serious differences between what is considered as texts of history of science and those texts where historical aspects of science appear. In a way, the differences may be analogous to the differences between the textbooks of a scientific discipline and the popular books about that particular discipline. No one demands rigour from a popular account. No one would accept as textbook that lacks rigour. Another set of issues which is relevant for answering the questions we raised, is to understand the character of textbooks vis a vis the historical development of the sciences. In no text book do we find the expressions of a particular theory or experiment as it was originally formulated. The aim of a textbook writer is to articulate the archetypal form of a particular theory and try to express it in a way 56
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that is free of any of its local origins or any of its idiosyncratic characteristics. What characterises textbooks, is the presentation of, say, a theory in such a manner as to provide some kind of continuity with what preceded it and what will follows. Hence, science textbooks by the sheer way they organise their material, express a kind of historical narrative. Or, to be more exact, they imply a historicity, since, otherwise there is the danger that various parts will appear to be extraneous and disjointed – something rather catastrophic for a textbook. The way a textbook is organised is dictated by pedagogic considerations. The aim of a textbook is to assist the teacher and the student to get the best possible grasp of the particular discipline depending on the age group or the level of background of a particular audience. Perhaps the efficiency of a textbook is gauged by how coherent the whole framework is. This is not to criticize textbooks in general, since their role is to teach the particular sciences. And textbook writers are morally justified to distort history, if through such a distortion they feel that they can create a pedagogically more efficient textbook. Let us take an example. In the great majority of text books the Special Theory of Relativity is introduced through the “negative” result of the Michelson Morley experiment. The story, roughly, is as follows. The discovery of the electromagnetic waves by Hertz which were predicted by Maxwell’s theory of electromagnetism, gave credence to the view that, like all waves, the electromagnetic waves, and, hence, light which was shown by Maxwell to be a form of electromagnetic wave, travel through a medium - the ether. Though the properties of this medium were turning out to be more and more “unphysical”, the scientific community had much to gain in its symbiosis with the problematic ether (which could be elucidated one day, as it happened so many times in the past) than to abandon it. However, independent of the properties of the medium, it was, on principle, possible to measure the relative velocity of the earth and the ether. It was a value that would appear as a second order effect, something that became possible after the improvement of the interferometer by A. A. Michelson. In a series of carefully conducted experiments, started in 1887 in collaboration with E. Morley, what was expected to be a finite value (the relative velocity of the earth with respect to the ether) turned out to be zero. The unexpected zero value was repeatedly found in the subsequent redesigned experiments, whereas its theoretical explanation, within the framework of classical mechanics and electromagnetism, brought about serious problems. The presentation of the Special Theory of Relativity, in most textbooks, continues as follows. In 1905, and in order to get out of the deadlock created by the zero result of the Michelson-Morley experiment, Einstein postulated two new axioms that should be valid for any theory: that the velocity of light is the maximum velocity and is, thus, a constant of nature, and that every theory should be invariant under a particular set of transformations. This approach explained the zero result of the Michelson-Morley experiment and, furthermore, rendered the ether irrelevant for electromagnetism. And the presentation of the Special Theory of Relativity continues by introducing all the novelties of the theory etc. Such an introduction to the Special Theory of Relativity appears to be faithful to history. Furthermore, it follows a schema particularly dear to the physicists’ view 57
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of history: that there is a fundamental theory (electromagnetism), one of its crucial predictions is verified (electromagnetic waves), an experiment is performed to further test the possibilities provided by the theory (Michelson-Morley experiments), there is an unexpected result (zero relative velocity between the earth and the ether), there is new theory (Special Theory of Relativity) which explains everything preceding it and also provides an explanation for what was an anomaly within the framework of the previous theory. Such a positivist view of history is at the core of many science textbooks: Theory - predictions - experiments to test the predictions difficulty - a hypothesis which solves the difficulty without affecting the explanation of other experimental results - new theory - new experiments. Such an approach, however, is in serious conflict both with the historical facts as well as with historical scholarship. As to the historical facts, in the actual 1905 paper of Einstein, there is no reference to the Michelson-Morley experiment, and, at the very best, one can consider that there is an indirect reference to it, without such a reference playing any crucial role in the construction of the theory. Furthermore, through the work of historians of science, and more specifically that of Gerald Holton1, who have systematically studied this issue, there is a consensus that though Einstein knew of the experiment, he did not give to it any significance at all. In fact, Einstein thought that what was problematic in electromagnetic theory was the “asymmetric” explanation of what appeared to be symmetric phenomena. The motion of a conductor with respect to a magnet and, inversely, the motion of a magnet with respect to a conductor have exactly the same effect: the induction of an electric current in the conductor. According to electromagnetic theory these two phenomena had different kinds of explanations. In the first case the appearance of the current was considered to be the result of the appearance of an electromotive force at the ends of the conductor, whereas for the second case the current appears because of the appearance of an electric field where the conductor is. According to Einstein the two phenomena should have had essentially the same explanation, since the only thing that mattered was the relative motion between the magnet and the conductor. What we see here is that the pedagogically effective presentation gives us a particular view on the way science develops. What is historically inexact is far easier communicate. To try to introduce the Special Theory of Relativity by sticking to the approach of the original paper of Einstein is a particularly trying job; it is far more effective to adopt the method where the Special Theory of Relativity provides a way out of the deadlock of the Michelson Morley experiment. Might it be the case that a physics textbook may not be able to teach physics as well as history of physics? The example we discussed above might be considered as the easy case. Historical issues are more often than not, complicated matters that transcend the ways facts are presented and are rearranged. Let us take another example. If asked to respond to the question as to whose jurisdiction the atom is, the great majority of students will answer that it is the physicists’. The atom is an entity that is studied by the physicists, and the physics of the atom has come to express the label identifying the particular discipline which deals with the atom. All this is absolutely true. Yet, it was not so for many decades. The atom was postulated by Dalton in 1803 in order to provide an explanatory framework for all the chemical laws and rules that had 58
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been empirically derived. The atom was an entity which played a theoretical role and at the same time it defined an ontology for chemistry. Notwithstanding the various disputes among the chemists as to its role and character, the atom was from the beginning of the 19th century in the chemists’ jurisdiction. The periodic table itself could not be grasped without recourse to atomism. So what happened from the beginning of the 19th century to the beginning of the twentieth when the atom became the physicists’ entity? The move over was a slow and very complicated process of appropriation of the atom by the physicists. This involved public negotiations through presidential addresses and commemorations, forceful statements in articles and encyclopedia entries (one is reminded of the entry “atom” to the 9th edition of Encyclopedia Britannica whose author was Maxwell where there is no mention of Dalton and atoms are considered as the vortex atoms of Lord Kelvin!), mathematical treatments of the atom that were so foreign to the chemists’ culture, institutional developments, university courses etc. One can go on to discuss the details of these processes of appropriation, but the point to be underlined is clear: one of the more interesting things historians of science do is to study changes of viewpoints, changes of mentalities, practices of subcultures. It is these aspects of the historical development of the sciences that are particularly difficult to be incorporated in science textbooks. History of science has gone a long way. It has not only unearthed a wealth of information about the past of the sciences. It has developed its own multifarious methods of how to deal with the past of the sciences, and, most, importantly, it has kept in pace with what historians do: ask questions and provide answers. History of science is not a discipline which provides a narrative of the past where facts and events simply follow the “correct” order. History of science is almost exclusively concerned with explanations. Hence, it has considerably distanced itself from its own past when scientists tried to write the correct narratives, tried to present the past as it “really was”. What, perhaps, we need to do is to encourage the writing of historically informed textbooks. But let us have no self-deceptions that one can grasp even the basics of history of science through a science textbook. In exactly the same way that one cannot learn science from a history of science textbook. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to thank Prof. P. Kokkotas of Athens University, for inviting me to the 7th International Conference on History of Science and Science Education, where some aspects of this article have been presented. NOTES 1
G. Holton, “Einstein, Michelson and the ‘Crucial’ Experiment”, ISIS, vol. 60, 1969, pp.133–197.
Kostas Gavroglu Department of History and Philosophy of Science University of Athens, Athens, Greece 59
PANAGIOTIS KOKKOTAS AND AIKATERINI RIZAKI
5. DOES HISTORY OF SCIENCE CONTRIBUTE TO THE CONSTRUCTION OF KNOWLEDGE IN THE CONSTRUCTIVIST ENVIRONMENTS OF LEARNING?
1. INTRODUCTION: ATTEMPTS TO INTRODUCE HISTORY OF SCIENCE (HOS) IN SCIENCE EDUCATION
Over the last twenty years, an increasing interest has been developed in what concerns the contribution of HOS to the teaching of science in all levels of education. This interest has been expressed with: a) the creation of the International History, Philosophy and Science Teaching Group b) the organization of European and International Conferences (Paris 1988; Tallahassee-Florida 1989; Cambridge 1990; Madrid 1992; Szombathely 1994; Minneapolis 1995; Bratislava 1996; Pavia 1999; Calgary 2007; Notre Dame 2009) and c) the publication of the Journal: Science & Education. The interest in the use of HOS in teaching science is not new. For example, Ernest Mach claimed that the use of HOS as a vehicle to obtain a genuine understanding of modern scientific contents, to appropriately face new problems and prompt further progress in science, is unique (Galili & Hazan, 2001). Mach argued that: A person who has read and understood the Greek and Roman authors, has felt and experienced, more than one who is restricted to the impression of the present. He sees how men, placed in different circumstances, judge quite differently the same things from what we do today. His own judgments will be rendered thus more independent (Mach, 1886/1986, p. 347 cited by Galili & Hazan, 2001). This opinion of Mach becomes more significant in the context of science teaching. Since 1927 and until recently the prevailing view for using HOS in science teaching was that of Haywood (1927). Although he believed in the importance of the historical approach to science teaching, he had the certainty that students will not benefit as much from it in their examinations. Even today the situation remains much the same (Matthews, 1994), since many teachers don’t use HOS in their teaching. Furthermore, it is accepted that present and past science textbooks make only passing reference to HOS. Where history is included, it all too often becomes fictionalized conveys the Whig view on history (Brush, 1974). Monk & Osborne (1997) describe Whig view as a historical approach which interprets the past in terms of present ideas and values, elevating in significance all incidents and work that have contributed to the formation of current society, rather than attempting to P.V. Kokkotas et al., (eds.), Adapting Historical Science Knowledge Production to the Classroom, 61–84. © 2011 Sense Publishers. All rights reserved.
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understand social context of the era and the contingent factors that contributed its production. The contribution of HOS in teaching science even in the form of the Whig view could be accepted to the extent, it serves science education. Furthermore, whiggism, according to Nickels’s point, is invaluable in the practice of science; it is the condition for conducting good research (Nickels, 1992, p. 98). Another direction for the exploitation of HOS in science teaching is that described by Kuhn, who distinguishes between HOS for scientists (textbook history) and HOS for historians and philosophers. The importance of Kuhn’s distinction rests on his intention to advance and recommend the orderly and heroic history of scientists as a myth that will entice and blind them (Kindi, 2005). According to her, Kuhn by recognizing the significance of textbook history in science education highlights the importance of the ‘bad’ history of textbooks, since this history is an indelible condition of scientific practice and it is conductive to forming the scientist’s course of action. Kuhn perceives science as a practice and not as a set of propositions forming a theory. The systematic use of HOS in science education started in the USA at the middle of the 20th century. HOS in education was used by Conant in his work: Harvard Case Histories in Experimental Science (Conant, 1957). Another attempt to introduce HOS in teaching secondary school science was made by Klopher (1964–1966) in his project: “History of Science Cases for Schools”. Perhaps the most integrated approach arguing for the introduction of History and Philosophy of Science (HPS) in science teaching is the Harvard Project Physics Course (HPPC) developed by Rutherford, Holton and Watson (1970). This project had a humanistic orientation and aimed to attract and motivate students of secondary education in the study of physics (Bruch, 1989). Even today this aim has not been achieved in all European countries. For this reason the European Union (EU) calls for proposals for projects with humanistic orientation to be produced in order to attract and motivate a wider range of students to study physics or science at post secondary and university levels. Over the last decades in the USA and the EU research programs dealing with the nature of science (NOS) and (HOS) have been developed. For example three important reports for science education have been introduced: Science for All Americans (American Association for the Advancement of Science, 1989), Benchmarks for Science Literacy (American Association for the Advancement of Science, 1993), and the National Science Education Standards (National Research Council, 1996). This inclusion of HOS in science education is justified on the following grounds: a) HOS is both a tool for teaching science well, and b) HOS is a part of the substance of science literacy (Rutherford, 2001). In two of the reports mentioned above an integrated program containing natural and social sciences, mathematics and technology has been developed in an interdisciplinary way, using cases of HOS and reflecting on the values of the educational paradigm: Science Technology Society (DeBoer, 1991, p. 178–184). In this paper we attempt to answer the question whether HOS contributes to better quality science teaching and how accomplishes it. For technical reasons our study is restricted only to constructivist environments and especially to individual and socioconstructivism. 62
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2. FROM BEHAVIORISM AND DISCOVERY LEARNING TO CONSTRUCTIVIST THEORIES
The most well known theories of learning in science education still in use are: behaviorism, discovery learning, constructivist theories, and sociocultural approaches to learning. Behaviorism was the prevailing theory of learning in science education over the last century. This theory is still in practice in many countries of the world. For behaviorism a stimulus (S) from the environment produces a response (R) from the organism, and with repetition, a S-R bond formed so that a given S is almost inevitably associated with a given R. Behaviorism was largely based on animal experimentation in laboratories and was extensively practiced in ancient Greece, where it was believed that “repetition is the mother of every learning”. Learning in behaviorism is defined as the change of the behavior of the subject due to knowledge gained. For this theory knowledge is objective and transmittable. The rigid prescriptive nature of beheviorism was consistent with and supported by the positivist or empiricist view of the nature of knowledge and knowing made popular by Bacon, Hume and later by Pearson (1900) and other philosophers of the Vienna School (Novak, 1993). According to Novak the failure of these ideas to describe and predict how scholars produce knowledge and how humans learn allowed new views of knowledge as paradigm construction (Kuhn, 1962) and evolving populations of concepts (Toulmin, 1972). The epistemology of the discovery of knowledge by scientists and consequently the discovery of learning by students are best described by von Glasersfeld. According to him, to most traditional philosophers true knowledge is a commodity supposed to exist as such, independent of experience, waiting to be discovered by a human knower. It is timeless and requires no development, except that the human share of it increases as exploration goes on (von Glasersfeld, 2001). In discovery learning, knowledge is regarded as objective and independent of the learner. Both the above theories regard students’ minds as empty vessels, ignoring their previous knowledge. As the beheviorist theory of learning, so discovery learning failed to describe and predict how humans learn and how knowledge is produced. Therefore, it was gradually replaced by new theories, very well rooted in epistemology, i.e. constructivism and sociocultural theories of learning. Both these theories reject the traditional epistemological claims about knowledge as an objective representation of reality. 3. THE CONSTRUCTION OF MEANING AND KNOWLEDGE IN CONSTRUCTIVIST THEORIES
There is a belief shared by most psychologists who study learning, that from birth to death individuals construct and reconstruct the meaning of events and objects they observe. It is an ongoing process, and a distinctly human process. This reality has been recognized by educators for at least the last two millennia, but it was only relatively recently that scholars developed methods and tools for the characterization of personal meanings. Foremost among these tools have been Piaget’s (1926) clinical interview; Kelly’s (1955) repertory grid for eliciting personal constructs and Novak’s concept maps (Novak, 1993). 63
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The psychological processes by which an individual constructs his/her own new meanings are essentially the same as the epistemological processes by which new knowledge is constructed by the professionals in a discipline (Schwab, 1964; Toulmin, 1972). A better understanding of the individual’s acquisition and organization of knowledge leads to an understanding of the structure of the knowledge constructed by scholars in a discipline. In both cases, knowledge construction is a complex product of the human capacity to build meaning (Novak, 1993). Constructivism can be connected to Plato and to Aristotle and later to Kant, Giambattista Vico, and in the 20th century to Dewey. More recently, different researchers have identified different forms of constructivism. For example, Steffe and Gale distinguished six different core paradigms of it: social constructivism, radical constructivism, social constructionism, informationprocessing constructivism, cybernetic systems, and sociocultural approaches to mediated action (Steffe & Gale, 1995, p. xiii). We believe that the most important of the constructivist theories are: a) individual constructivism –e.g. Piagetian constructivism or von Glasersfeld’s constructivismradical constructivism b) social-constructivism and c) sociocultural theories1. In recent years there has been a shift from perspectives that adopt individual constructivist assumptions (Tobin, 1993; Von Glasersfeld, 1995; Mintzes, Wandersee & Novak, 1998) to socioconstructivist, sociocultural ones (Lemke, 2001; Wells, 1999). We are of the opinion that the contribution of HOS to science learning varies in reference to the theory of learning used. For example HOS is used differently in a behaviorist learning environment than in a discovery, constructivist, or a sociocultural one. Also the role of the teacher as well as that of the student is different in each of the above learning environments. Individual constructivism is rooted in the Piagetian theory of structuralism and is regarded by some educators as an epistemology, focusing on the nature, methods, and limitations of knowledge. It is a model of knowing in which the mental representations that people construct are regarded as learning with no necessary correspondence to an objective and a priori scientific ontology (Cobb, 1994a, 1994b). In the same category belongs also the radical constructivism of von Glasersfeld (1988, 1999), who has stressed that the construction of knowledge is a personal concern and its function is to organize the experiential world. According to von Clasersfeld (1988, p. 83) “Cognition serves the experimental world, not the discovery of an objective reality”. Furthermore for him every individual constructs his/her on own reality and the notion of objectivity where observations could be made without an observer is a delusion. For radical constructivism the question: “What is knowledge?” is meaningless. On the contrary of great interest is the question: “How is knowledge generated?”, which ought to be the subject of investigations. We are not passively floored by information from the outside; we actively construct our world (Glasersfeld, 1995). Radical constructivism, as its name suggests, by applying the idea of viable constructions also to itself rather than proposing a dogmatic world-view, is consistent in its claim (Riegler, 2001). Furthermore, von Glasersfeld, by introducing the notion of ‘functional fit’, clearly defines what it means to know in a radical constructivism context. It possess ways and means to acting and thinking that allow one to attain 64
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one’s own goals, rather than to posses a true representation of reality. Radical constructivism is associated with knowledge of the experiential world of which von Glaserfeld is most commonly concerned. Also, this type of constructivism tends to have a focus on individual self regulation, similar to the Piagetian view, and the building of conceptual structures. This view is concerned with mostly cognitive processes. O’Loughlin argues that the above version of constructivism is problematic because: a) it ignores the subjectivity of the learner and the socially and historically situated nature of knowing; b) it denies the essentially collaborative and social nature of meaning making; and c) it privileges only one form of knowledge namely, the technical rational (O’Loughlin, 1992). In individual constructivism, the learning of science has to do with the students and the teacher seeing and coming to see in certain ways. In social constructivism, the fundamental hypothesis is that the mental representations of the students and the teacher are regarded as socially constructed. Social constructivism emerged out of radical and Piagetian constructivism and is concerned with the contributions of social interactions to the construction of the self which includes a construction of “who I am,” including the self as a science learner (Atwater, 1996). According to Gergen (1995) social construction begins with language as its fundamental presupposition. He argued that meaning in language is achieved through social interdependence and it is context-dependent. Language basically aids communal functions and for him there is only a social mind, not an individual one. Social constructivism attributes prevailing role to language in what concerns meaning making and the legitimisation of knowledge. In this form of constructivism the socially and culturally situated nature of mental activities is of prime importance. Vygotsky could be regarded as a social constructivist. Amongst the most contemporary scientists is Rosalind Driver who would be mostly associated with this version of constructivism. In all forms of constructivism people construct their own knowledge. Perhaps the main distinction between individual and social constructivism is the following: “in individual constructivism, the focus is on cognition and the individual; in social constructivism, the focus is on language and the group”. Attempts have been made to integrate these two different perspectives (e.g., Cobb, 1994a). Millar and Driver (1987) stressed that scientific knowledge is personally and socially constructed, rather than objective and revealed, science theories are provisional, rather than absolute and unchanging. They maintained that science learning depends on the representations a student brings to a situation and the characteristics of the learning situation itself. Learning occurs when students interact with others, so, their ideas become modified, extended or changed in the process. The implication of this epistemology for learning is that what students observe or predict about natural phenomena and the approaches they take in problem solving and experimenting depend crucially on the way they construct their world. Whereas, Driver, et al (1994) emphasized the social aspect of constructivism when they stated: Scientific knowledge is symbolic in nature and socially negotiated. The objects of science are not the phenomena of nature but constructs that are advanced by the scientific community to interpret nature (p. 5). 65
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Fosnot (1996) proposes a theory of constructivism that describes knowledge as temporary, developmental, non objective, internally constructed, and socially and culturally mediated. According to Vygotsky, the fundamental assumption of development and learning is that higher mental functions in the individual derive from social life (Vygotsky 1978, p. 128). Leach & Scott (2003, p. 99) by using Vygotsky’s view of internalization argue that language and other semiotic mechanisms provide the means for scientific ideas to be discussed by people on the social (or intermental) level. The process of internalization (Vygotsky, 1987) is where individuals appropriate and become able to use for themselves (on the intramental level) conceptual tools first encountered on the social level. The products of internalization will be different for different individuals. Following the process of internalization, language provides the tools for individual thinking. Central to this view is the interdependence between language and thought. It is not true that language offers some ‘neutral’ means for communicating personally and internally generated thoughts; language provides the very tools through which those thoughts are first rehearsed on the intermental level and then processed and used on the intramental level. A main characteristic of Vygotsky’s view of human mental development is that higher order functions develop out of social interaction. Unlike Piaget, Vygotsky argues that a child’s development cannot be understood by the study of the individual. We must also study the social environment in which the individual has developed. Vygotsky (1934/1986) described learning as being embedded in social events and occurring as a child interacts with people, objects, and events in the environment. According to Tharp and Gallimore (1988): Through participation in activities that require cognitive and communicative functions, children are drawn into the use of these functions in ways that nurture and ‘scaffold’ them (p. 6). The objective of social constructivism is to understand the construction of knowledge in terms of social interaction. Social constructivists recognize the importance of contextual values. Much of a person’s actions (including the knowledge and intentions of the person) can be understood only in terms of the norms of the society in which that person is a member. Students’ cultural realities, including concepts of self and social roles, are constructed through social interactions (Bauersfeld, 1995, in Atwater, 1996). Cobb (1995) asserts that learning is a social activity that cannot be reduced to a psychological construct. In our opinion Piagetian constructivism focuses on individual knowing, whereas social constructivism focuses in collaborative knowing. The word knowing should be used to indicate the subjective meaning of the person and the word knowledge should be used to “indicate socially negotiated and accepted forms of language” (Smith, 1995, p. 24). Students from various cultures, regardless of class, disability, or ethnicity, construct their own knowledge socially (Novak, 1985; Strike & Posner, 1985). Hence, “cognitive abilities” are socially transmitted, socially constrained, socially nurtured, and socially encouraged (Day, French & Hall, 1985). Cobb (1994a) maintained that 66
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the critical issue for researchers is the quality of those socially and culturally situated constructions of students’ science conceptions. According to Bingle & Gaskell (1994), there are two kinds of science knowledge: (a) “ready-made science knowledge,” which is taken for granted and seen as undisputed and unrelated to the specific contexts of its development and includes scientific facts or “statements about reality” and (b) “science-in-the-making knowledge”, which is statements about scientific knowledge that are viewed as contestable and unstable claims. In our opinion “ready- made science knowledge” is not really knowledge but it is just information consisting of memorized facts and rules, which is difficult to be exploited by the learner. Ready-made science knowledge’ is at the bottom of Bloom’s hierarchical system of the taxonomy of educational objectives (Bloom, 1956). We argue that learning is a voluntary and pleasant activity and as such it needs contexts that are attractive to students and allow them through on-going personal reflection and verbal and written discourse to become “socialized to a greater and lesser extent into practices of the scientific community” (Driver et al., 1994, p. 8). Stinner (1996) believes that such contexts should provide opportunities for personal reflections and problem solving as well as participation in group discussions and experimental activities. 4. THE CONTRIBUTION OF HOS TO THE CONSTRUCTION OF KNOWLEDGE IN CONSTRUCTIVIST THEORIES
The interest for using HOS in science teaching in relation to the arguments which question how it could advance the conceptual change are based on two assumptions: a) the similarity between the conceptions of students and of those of scientists or philosophers of the past, and b) the parallelism between the development of students’ understanding and the evolution of scientific concepts in HOS (Masson & VazquezAbad, 2006). 4.1 The Use of HOS for the Detection of Misconceptions There are many empirical researches, which support the thesis of the relation between students’ and past scientists’ or philosophers’ conceptions. For example it was found in a comparative bibliographic study of the conceptions of early philosophers and those of children relating to the role of light on the one hand and the role of eye on the other in the process of vision, contacted by Dedes (2005), that the historical models and the alternative conceptions of children, regarding the process of vision have a number of common ideas. He noticed that the Pythagorean, atomist and mathematician philosophers, irrespective of the adoption of emission or reception theories, do not recognize any role for the external light. For them vision is possible either with the exclusive emission of visual rays or with the reception of images. Evidently pupils who adopt interpretations (any systematic relationship between light, object and eye e.g. ‘we see because our eyes have the ability to see’) and interpretations (the passage of light from the source to the object without 67
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providing any further detail of the role played by light in the visual process) as well as children who advocate the first scheme among those where directionality is suggested, appear to come to the same conclusion. We see an abstract, ambiguous and unspecified process, in which light plays no role. Galileo’s dialogs (Azcarate, Doncel & Romo, 1988) could be used as a good example offered by the HOS of how to deal with students’ alternative ideas. On the basis of these findings the role of HOS obtains a new significance, namely how it could help educators not only anticipate students’ misconceptions but also to assist them to teach effectively science to them. According to Monk and Osborne (1997) the studies on children’s misconceptions show that this thinking is more akin to preparadigmatic thinking. They quote (Wandersee, 1985): ….often (the studies) harbour misconceptions which were similar to views held at one time or another during historical development of that science conceptthus making the history of science a useful heuristic device for anticipating some students’ conceptual difficulties (Monk and Osborne, 1997, p. 413). According to our view teachers studying the evolution of scientific concepts could have an indication about the difficulties students face when they study these concepts. Consequently teachers taking into account the above difficulties could organize effective learning environments for their students. In this case the difficulties themselves could not be regarded as real obstacles but as means to be used for fruitful learning. Aristotelian thinking and children’s thinking are similar, since both emphasize the nature of essence of objects and teleological nature of causality. Aristotle believed that heavier objects fall faster than lighter ones a notion that children also believe. Other researchers have announced findings similar to the above. For example Sequera and Leite (1991) identified some analogies of content between historical and alternative ideas. Moreover the same findings indicated that HOS can anticipate students’ alternative ideas, can give physics teachers some insight on how to deal with these ideas, and provides some teaching materials and approaches, which can be used in the classroom in order to change students’ ideas under the perspective of a constructivist theory of learning. Alternative ideas on mechanics are very resistant to change (Pozo, 1987) and can be found in students even after several years of formal teaching of Newtonian physics. Besides, pre-Newtonian concepts of mechanics also had a strong appeal to scientists and were at least as resistant to change as students’ concepts are (Clement, 1982). 4.2 The Relation of Ontogenesis and Phylogenesis In relation to the second argument i.e. the parallelism among the development of children’s understanding and the evolution of scientific concepts in HOS the terms of ontogenesis and phylogenesis describe this evolution. Ontogenesis refers to the evolution of an individual’s thought, whereas phylogenesis refers to the evolution of scientific ideas in human history. Many researchers have pointed to such correspondences (McDermott, 1984; Viennot, 1979; Vosniadou & Brewer, 1987, etc). 68
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This view is reinforced by the opinion of Duhem, who claimed that there is an analogy between the development of scientific knowledge and the growth of individual understanding of nature (Duhem, 1954). Niaz (2000) in a research aiming to establish a relationship between students’ understanding of gases and its parallels in HOS found that their reasoning represents a form of idealization process used frequently by scientists to understand complex phenomena. Furthermore, idealization according to him enables students as well as scientists to separate the ideal or scientific object of knowledge from real objects and is considered to be the defining characteristic of modern non-Aristotelian science (McMullin, 1985; Niaz, 1993; Matthews, 1994). He quotes Matthews (1994) that: History and Philosophy of Science can make the idealization of science more understandable, and can explain them as scientific tools of trade, or instruments (idealized lattices in this case) whereby the complex concrete world can be investigated (p. 212). There is also the opposite view which supports that ontogenesis and phylogenesis do not go in parallel. Namely, that it is not supported by the evidence of detailed examinations of the historical evolution of scientific concepts that ontogenesis recapitulates/ complements phylogenies. For example, Wiser and Carey (1983) verified this view by exploring the elaboration of the concepts of heat and temperature, also Wandersee (1985) when he examined students’ understanding of photosynthesis, and Vosniadou and Brewer (1987) when they investigated the development of the concept of the Earth as a round sphere where ‘down’ is toward the center of the Earth. All the above researchers found that there are important differences between children’s thinking and the phylogenetic origins of these concepts. Nersessian (1989) trying to explain these differences argued that these could be attributed to metaphysical, epistemological and sociological factors, which play an important role in the formation of a representation. 4.3 The Use of HOS for the Design of Learning Constructivist Environments In our view the contribution of HOS in science teaching and learning has three main dimensions. The exploitation of HOS is used for the design and development of: i. educational activities for students’ conceptual change, ii. environments for understanding the nature of science (NOS) and iii. affective tools (e.g. stories, vignettes, role-playing) for science teaching. 4.3 i The exploitation of HOS for students’ conceptual change. In this section we shall study the use of HOS for the creation of educational activities such as crucial experiments, teaching models, and simulations for students’ conceptual change. We shall also present indicative examples of how the HOS could be used in the process of teaching and learning science. As we have seen in the previous paragraph we can find students’ misconceptions as well as the evolution of them by using the HOS. Based on this fact we can design learning environments aiming to achieve students’ conceptual change, as an individual’s process in the case of the personal constructivism, or as an interactive process in the case of social constructivism. 69
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From the study of the historical sources i.e. the arguments, the means and the methods, which helped the scientists change their views, we could choose materials to be used for the design and development of the educational content which can contribute to the conceptual change of students. Such an example is the teaching model of Monk and Osborne (1997). We could say that their model is a transformation of the teaching model of Driver and Oldham (1985). Actually in the phase of elicitation of students’ ideas in the above mentioned model, where the ideas of the groups of students are presented, Monk and Osborne added the “historical study” to be presented by the teacher. The “historical study” includes material from HOS as described in this paragraph. So, in this teaching approach students have the opportunity to use the language in a figurative and flexible manner so that they might recognize that the role of the scientist is not just to discover the ‘facts of science’ but also to construct them. In this sense students could perhaps better understand the NOS. Moreover students will become aware that there are often parallelisms between their thought and earlier scientific thought. This is a possibility which has been provided to students in order for them to be able to articulate and clarify their own understanding and interpretation of the phenomenon in question (ibid). We argue that a teaching model based on discussion is proper for the effective teaching difficult concepts, such us the laws of Newton where students’ conceptions have been constructed over many years and have meaning for them due to their experience. In this case, it is important that the students will be encouraged to discuss their ideas with their teacher and colleagues in order to clearly perceive their own misconceptions when compared to the Newtonian ideas. This teaching strategy has been advocated over the last decades by researchers and educators concerned with the students’ conceptual change. However, it is interesting to point out that a similar strategy was already used by Galileo (Clement, 1982), in order to show that his theory was more accurate than the prevalent ideas of the time. It has been argued that HOS can provide incentives for and support students’ attempts to reconstruct their views because it offers fitting material to illustrate the modification and revision, the rejection and reinstatement of models, their relativity and dependence on the spirit of the age. Pupils can critically view historical models more easily than their own (Lind, 1980, cited by Sequeira & Leite, 1991, p. 55). Rudge and Howe (2009) have also proposed their own teaching model, which exploits HOS for students’ construction of current scientific views. This model suggests to teachers a new way to use HOS to explore the prior conceptions of their students and to provide opportunities to them to think along the lines that past scientists did, as an exercise in thinking like scientists, rather than studying exactly what happened historically. It gives to students the opportunity to construct their own scientific knowledge. They think that the HOS is the best instrument to help students overcome misconceptions they have about scientific concepts. Students are invited to study the sorts of considerations that led the scientists to overcome similar misconceptions. The fact that the conceptions usually change from complex to more complex forces the teachers to teach science qualitatively. 70
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As Confrey (1990) argues, discussions on historical conceptions have the advantage to show to students an evolutionary sequence of their conceptions towards actual scientific conceptions. The comparison of students’ concepts with those of HOS gives the potential to students to understand their advantages and disadvantages in specific contexts by exposing the differences between ways to think before and after (Monk & Osborne, 1997). We believe that on the basis of this view the role of HOS obtains a new perspective, i.e. HOS offers the possibility to teachers, educators, and designers of the curriculum to anticipate the evolution of student’s misconceptions on the basis of the evolution of scientific ideas. These findings are in accordance with Piaget’s work, focusing on the phylogenesis of science concepts and HOS (Piaget & Garcia, 1987). Binnie (2001) argues that the development of contemporary conceptions of electricity, magnetism and electromagnetism do not appear in a linear progression in the HOS. Students observe phenomena in order to explain their observations in terms of a model usually engaged in discourse. The models that they construct at first are later modified, altered, or expanded in order to explain new phenomena. Given that HOS could provide the strategic knowledge of the way scientific concepts are constructed, change or spread (Izquierdo, 1995), we argue that on this basis HOS could contribute to the development of the necessary educational material by science teachers to be used by students for the construction of their knowledge. As a characteristic example of the exploitation of HOS for the development of educational material for the teaching of the concept of energy at the 6th grade of primary school we mention the Rizaki and Kokkotas proposal (2010, in press). The historiographic study of the concept of energy offered all these characteristics, such as the unifying and the causal characters of the concept of energy which constitute the core of the development of the educational material for the teaching of this concept. Because science is fundamentally–among other things- a cognitive activity, we believe that HOS not only could be used for the design of educational material, but it could also help teachers devise the methodology so that it can be introduced in the teaching process with the aim solving realistic scientific problems. An indicative case is the one used by Nersessian (1995) who applied her analysis on historical episodes in order to understand the way the representational resources are utilized during the process of problem-solving through which new concepts emerge. She supports the view that the cognitive dimension of analogies, thought experiments, and metaphors is central, in the sense that it is these tactics which suggest the inferential reasoning, which, from the existing representations, produces new ones (Yamalidou, 2001). HOS could make people more conscious about the idealization of science, as it worked in the case of Galileo, and help students discern the explanation of the phenomena on the basis of experience and idealizations (Matthews, 1994). As an example of this one can mention the dialogues of Galileo with del Monde (see the paper of Stefanidou & Vlachos in this volume). The dialogues could help students recognize that science is a cooperative activity and not an effort of isolated individual scientists. Furthermore, the presentation of the argumentations in the classroom and their employment in the teaching process, in parallel with students’ alternative 71
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ideas, facilitates them to construct their own scientific knowledge. The exposure of the students to HOS may help them make sense of scientific claims, and the reconstruction of scientific ideas Gallili and Hazan (2000). Another case for the use of HOS for the design of educational material is the experimental simulations: for example Masson and Vázquez-Abad (2006) proposed a new way to integrate HOS in science education to promote conceptual change by introducing the notion of historical microworld, which is a computer-based interactive learning environment in built reference to the particular historical conceptions. Historical microworlds developed not only to help students understand scientific conceptions of the past, but also to understand the weakness of their own conceptions. Our project “The Science Teacher e-Training (STeT)”, funded by European Union, seeks, using the advantages of ICT technologies, to broaden the supply of training opportunities to science teachers by using HOS in science teaching. This can be achieved since the program brings HOS and science education into productive contact and meets the training needs of teachers by making teaching more cooperative and, related to historical and cultural factors. The program can enable teachers to plan learning experiences in science lessons that empower their students and also enhance the computer literacy of teachers and build their skills in using multimedia-based resources and strategies in their teaching (Kokkotas et al., 2009). HOS offers a greater possibility for the design of educational material and the exploitation of the historical instruments-replicas (e.g. Heering, 1994; Riess, 1995). Experimental work, based on the original experiments can be readily performed in most classrooms and enhance the excitement of discovery (Binnie, 2001). 4.3 ii Making use of HOS for the understanding of the nature of science (NOS). HOS was used as a source for the development of education material for the teaching of science methodology in order for students to develop cognitive skills (Kipnis, 1996, Arons, 1990; Dunn, 1993). In what it concerns these attempts, until some years ago, the interest around HOS was how it could be used for the exploitation of inquiry practices of scientists, aiming at the introduction of students in science methodology. Over the last few years the constructivist approach in science teaching and the understanding of scientific inquiry has acquired an increasing interest for its epistemological dimension. This means that there is a need not only for the understanding of the empirical processes of inquiry, but also of concepts and theories, to the degree that they shape the explanation of the results. The use of HOS could contribute to this direction since it helps students understand the nature of science methodology. Indeed this is so since it compares different methodologies and offers the possibility to students to accept that there is not only one scientific method. For example when students compare the different contexts of scientific methodology they establish the view that there are different scientific methods, which lead them to better understand the nature of science (Stinner, 1995a). When students are studying experiments and the methodology of science, both of which originate from HOS, they discuss about the scientific inquiry, realize the controversies and the incomplete nature of scientific knowledge (Matthews, 1992). 72
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Monk and Osborne (1997) propose the use of HOS, whose focus is always the conceptual explanation and its justification, would not only support the learning of science but also the learning about science. They think that the process approach gives the strong impression that scientific investigation is an empirical process in which the rigid application of the standard rules of knowing will lead inexorably to the derivation of certain knowledge of the ‘laws of science’. They also think that the study of scientific ideas in their original context of discovery will help students develop their conceptual understanding. For them neither the study of process nor the study of the products of science can provide either an adequate account of science or an adequate education in science without the incorporation of some HOS. According to Kipnis (1998) experiments by themselves do not produce any new knowledge: they are useful only if students learn how to put together experiment and theory. With this approach, students understand how and why theories emerge and replace their predecessors. It can be emphasized that the process of scientific progress is fluid and constantly changing and should never be taught as a set of immutable facts (Binnie, 2001). As Kyle (1997, p. 852) noticed, and we agree with him, “…students ought to experience the how of scientific enquiry, rather than merely being exposed to what is known about and by science”. In this context our interpretation of the “how of scientific enquiry” includes the intellectual struggles faced by scientists within the relevant historical context. HOS could contribute to the understanding of the nature of the content of science not only when students ascertain its evolutionary nature but also its creativity. Especially, when they study current theories and concepts in comparison to those which were valid in the past (by discussing theories at length, including their origin, development and the replacement by other theories), they have the opportunity to understand the evolutionary procedure of these theories and concepts and also of science itself (Kipnis, 1998). When students are engaged in the development of educational material which encompasses the history of the formulation of a scientific theory they can perceive its creative potentiality. In our opinion a characteristic example could be the study of Einstein’s theory of relativity based on the history of its formulation. This could help students grasp not only its originality but also the notion that science does not proceed inductionally. In this context they could understand what science is. The study of Einstein’s thought experiments, as well as of experiments in general, as they function in science, according to Bevilacqua and Ganneto (1996) offers the possibility to students to understand that these are used not only to falsify a theory but also to argue about its correctness. Students, using educational material from HOS, could understand the different explanations of a phenomenon given by the scientists in different times in the past. A concrete example of this is the Pavia Project Physics where students facing the different explanations of the natural phenomena realize that there is not only one truth, but one acceptable view for the explanation of the same phenomenon in each period of time. According to our view this fact helps students adopt the opinion that scientific knowledge does not represent the objective reality. 73
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Gallili and Hazan researched in students’ conceptions about light and vision and proposed a broader approach to science teaching which accompanies HPS to teaching science, replaces the traditional focus on the “correct” –for now scientific contents and problem solving training. As such, it reflects a cardinal change in the philosophy of education. History-based instruction uncovers the non-linear process by which current scientific knowledge was attainted. A special feature, which soundly contrasted their course from a typical one, was its essential incorporation of historical contents: the ideas, views and conceptions which constituted the early understanding of light and vision. They presented the assessment which concerns the course’s impact on the students’ views about science and some related technological and cultural issues. According to their research strong differences were found between the views elicited in the experimental group and parallel data regarding students in the control group. This study demonstrated the advantage of utilizing historical materials in a way which is additional to their intention: to improve students’ disciplinary knowledge and to affect their views about science (Gallili & Hazan, 2001). A concrete example for using HOS in science teaching offers our project “The MAP prOject”, funded by the European Union. “The MAP prOject”, was an inservice training program for primary and secondary school science teachers, for promoting the learning of physics based on HOS. It aimed to exploit authentic historical events on the topic of falling bodies (Aristotle’s, Galileo’s and Newton’s theories on falling bodies), by using students’ conceptions about the Nature of Science (NOS), the Nature of Learning (NOL) and the Nature of Teaching (NOT). This program is based on social constructivist learning principles using a variety of teaching strategies (e.g. group work, simulations) that utilize historical scientific materials on the issue of falling bodies (Kokkotas et al., 2009). Although there are many proponents of the contribution of HOS to the improvement of students’ NOS views (e.g., Duschl, 1990; Matthews, 1994; Monk & Osborne, 1997; Wandersee, 1992), there are also other researches, which suggest different findings. For example, the research contacted by Adb-El-Khalick and Lederman (2000) examined the effect on college students’ conceptions about the NOS and studied three different courses whose curriculum used HOS. The research findings do not indicate empirical support to the assertion that coursework in HOS would improve students’ NOS views. 4.3 iii The use of HOS for the development of affective tools (e.g. stories, vignettes, role- playing). The use of HOS in science teaching aiming to raise the interest of students and cultivate their emotions, gradually gets more attention from educators, science researchers and science teachers. HOS obtains a new role in the context of viewing science as a human activity (Nielsen & Thomson, 1990). This view was introduced in Danish secondary schools in the 1988–1990 reform of the physics curriculum, where elements of the History and Philosophy of Science were incorporated in the teaching process (Thomsen, 1998). Stinner and Teichmann (2003, p. 214) have developed dramatic settings to illustrate confrontations (for example, ‘Copernicus and the Aristotelians’, ‘Newton 74
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discusses the nature of light with Robert Hooke’ in the HOS classes at the University of Manitoba). The Manitoba group believes that new ideas in science become more accessible through dramatization. We also argue that the dramatization of events based on the HOS offers the opportunity to students to develop positive attitudes and be motivated for science learning, especially when they play roles of scientists. Today, we acknowledge that science teaching needs revision because school science ignores the needs of students to obtain skills for investigation processes and for the cultivation of their imagination and inspiration. For the improvement of this situation the abandoning of the academic tradition in the primary and secondary science education curriculum is proposed, and at the same time its connection with the human element (AAAS, 1990; UNESCO, 2000). In this context the exploitation of HOS could have a vital role in science education. Some writers argue that the humanizing and clarifying influence of HOS brings the science to life and enables students to construct relationships that would have been impossible in the traditional decontextualized way in which science has been taught (Jung, 1994; Kipnis, 1996; Koul & Dana, 1997). Such a teaching approach could probably help students appreciate science as a value-laden procedure where values such as objectivity, curiosity, the pursuit of truth, intellectual honesty, humility and commitment to human welfare are central (Stevenson & Byerly, 2000). Students are helped to perceive that scientific knowledge is not as objective as it is presented in science textbooks, since it is the outcome of a human endeavor full of successes but also of failures. If we accept that knowledge is indeed a human construction then not only the prior conceptions of the learner but also his/her sentimentalities such as fears, anxieties, hopes and expectations should be taken into account in the teaching process (Egan, 1990). Other writers and science education researchers e.g. Arons (1989) and Luth (1990) have elaborated on the notion of using a ‘story line’ approach to the teaching of science, via the construction of historical vignettes. These are stories that describe a brief episode from the life of a scientist, which characterizes the HPS, demonstrates scientific attributes, and provides students with a historical perspective of the topic illustrated. Arons (1989) argued that good science stories that have intrinsic interest and show connections that are not to be found in textbooks. Egan (1988, 1989a) has also proposed a procedure based on the story form. According to research based on the ‘constructivist nature of human sense making’ (Egan, 1986) the story metaphor is more appropriate in describing what we learn about the world. Stinner (1996, p. 263) presents a program of activities placed around contextual settings, where science stories and contemporary issues of interest are recommended in order to facilitate the passage of children from the early apprehension of the world to a personal scientific knowledge rooted in language and to the comprehension of organized scientific knowledge. We believe that stories from HOS and storytelling as a teaching strategy can contribute to the humanizing of teaching, the improvement of the climate in science classrooms among students and student-teachers and the development of positive 75
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attitudes towards science learning. In this context the understanding of science concepts can be improved. Noddings and Witherell (1991) write: We learn from stories. More important, we come to understand – ourselves, others, and even the subjects we teach and learn. Stories engage us. … Stories can help us to understand by making the abstract concrete and accessible. What is only dimly perceived at the level of principle may become vivid and powerful in the concrete. Further, stories motivate us. Even that which, we understand at the abstract level, may not move us to action, whereas a story often does (p. 279–280). Nevertheless, science teaching with the use of stories is not an easy process. According to Egan it is quite complex and difficult to convey in a condensed fashion (Egan, 1979, 1986, 1992, 1997, 2005). This is true since it has as a prerequisite that the teacher creates an affective environment and engages his/her students in discourse. Given that stories facilitate understanding, stimulate engagement and produce motivation and even help us to understand ourselves, the appropriate use of the story form in science teaching can, indeed, become an heuristic teaching device that is not only attractive, but also self-sustaining (Klassen, 2006). Furthermore, stories constitute a natural and effective way of thinking and can be used as a means of communication and cultural expression (Manna & Minichiello, 2005). We believe that HOS could be an important resource from which we can get appropriate material for composing stories in science education, because it links concepts, theories, phenomena and events of science with the scientists who lived, worked and were affected from the specific sociocultural environment of their era. But, it should be realized that the place of history is neither to make only a conceptual point nor just to place entertaining vignettes in the text but also to introduce the humanistic element and aspects of the NOS into the process of learning science (Klassen, 2006). However, we emphasize that the story should be chosen in a manner that shows respect to the originators and portrays them in a fair and balanced way. Specifically, storytelling helps the understanding of science concepts, and consequently to the construction of knowledge, since it helps the development of romantic understanding due to the fact that it makes students experience curiosity, mystery and even wonder. Some writers argue that romantic understanding is an alternative to conceptual understanding, on the following grounds a) it represents a different way of making sense of the world and of human experience through an attraction to their exotic, strange and mysterious features and the desire to transcend everyday reality, b) it gives the idea that knowledge is a human construction that, cannot be even considered outside of the context of its construction, c) it makes use of the students’ imagination and d) it has an aesthetic dimension (Egan, 1990; Hadzigeorgiou, 2005). Thus, romantic understanding could stimulate the development of inspiration which has a cognitive and an emotional dimension and can also lead students to some kind of action and the development of a special interest for science in general or a specific topic in particular. Stories and storytelling also develop the students’ anticipation. Dewey (1934) talked about anticipation and argued that consummation 76
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does not wait in consciousness for the whole undertaking to be finished. It is anticipated throughout and is recurrently savoured with special intensity (p. 55). Therefore students should have ample opportunities to experience anticipation and this can be added to the experience of mystery and wonder that a good story usually creates, so the anticipation can help the development of romantic understanding. Teachers can use narratives into which scientific ideas are embedded (Hadzigeorgiou & Stefanich, 2001; Stinner, 1995b) and which provide students with opportunities for “reconnecting the knowledge with the transcendent qualities of the individuals who produced it” (Egan, 1990, p. 139). Anticipation can also be experienced if the students can study the life of the great scientists and dramatize important events of it. Narration as an art of speech can facilitate the development of students’ imagination since: The development of imagination is linked to the development of speech, to the development of child’s social interaction with those around him, to the basics of the collective social activity of the child’s consciousness (Vygotsky, 1987, p. 346). So, the extension in narration helps the development of romantic understanding since imagination is one of its characteristics. According to Vygotsky (1998): imagination is...a function which is linked to emotional life, the life of drives and attitudes, is linked to intellectual life ...everything that requires artistic transformation of reality, everything that is connected with interpretation and construction of something new, requires the indispensable participation of imagination. In our opinion, imagination as the basis of all creative activity is an important component of all aspects of cultural life, enabling artistic, scientific and technical creation alike. In this sense, everything around us that was created by the hand of man, the entire world of human imagination and creation is based on this imagination (Vygotsky, 2003, p. 9–10). Vygotsky considered the development of imagination as necessary for the technical, scientific creativity of children as it is for the arts. The arts and sciences are not divided and both demand the need for the cultivation of imagination in our school curriculum (Gajdamaschko, 2005). Vygotsky proposed the development of imagination through the mechanism of acquisition of cultural tools in the curriculum that could become the content of the children’s imaginative activities. In addition, Egan suggested “story” as congruent with Vygotskian requirements for cognitive tools because, stories are crystallized in culture and therefore they could be used as mediator’s tools for engaging the imagination of children (Egan, 1992, p. 56). Furthermore, narratives with stories from HOS used in science education assigns tasks to children for the development of the imagination. Another important ability 77
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which is developed concurrently with imagination is the ability to transfer the function from one object into other. This ability is very closely connected to the development of symbolic function in a child which means that the development of imagination could help the development of abstract thought (Vygotsky, 1978) and also in the understanding the abstract concepts in science. From the arguments developed above, it is deduced that stories and storytelling strategy develop: the inspiration, the anticipation, the imagination and the romantic understanding of students. The bridge between romantic understanding and science education are inspiration, imagination and anticipation. Students in developing romantic associations with people, events and ideas are inspired as, they are presented with questions that challenge their beliefs. Additionally stories present the human element and unfold strange and mysterious situations. This inspiration can lead to worthwhile experiences since it unites feeling with knowledge in a context of action and secure the continuity of experiences. If we accept that romantic understanding not only paves the way for conceptual understanding, but it can also be a prerequisite for such an understanding (Hadzigeorgiou, 2005), we can strongly argue that storytelling is an important pedagogical strategy which can contribute to the development of both conceptual and romantic understanding. Although many researchers propose the adoption of stories and storytelling for teaching, a few empirical researches in the literature proved their effectiveness in science teaching. For example Maria & Johnson (1989) examined the effectiveness of narrative in learning related to scientific reasons for seasonal change on seventh and fifth graders in different types of texts. Expository and soft expository texts (a hybrid of narrative and expository text) were used. The researchers concluded that the subjects understood the scientific explanation of seasonal change better with the soft expository text which included narrative than with the expository text. Kokkotas, Malamitsa and Rizaki (2008) proposed a storytelling teaching model for teaching science. The researchers in their model used the real stories from HOS together with other activities, such as experiments, discourses and, role playing in a constructivist environment. Students were able to use the information from the storytelling, and engage in discourse with their peers in order to answer the questions related to the design of the experimental activities. The outcome was that the students answered all the questions designed and elaborated all the experimental activities very efficiently without guidance. The researchers concluded that storytelling could help the students understand the scientific concepts. Narrative and storytelling could also be used effectively in virtual environments of various models of information and communication technologies, which enable children to be story constructors and storytellers with collaborative multimedia environments (Mott & Lester, 2006). These researchers propose an inquiry- based learning environment for middle school students by using narrative in teaching and learning. In these environments narrative and storytelling could be accompanied with a variety of tools such as role-playing, autobiographical writing and, simulations. Bostrom in his research examined teachers’ and students’ narrative in an effort to make school chemistry more meaningful to students. He asserted that narrative made chemistry more pluralistic, giving the opportunity to the lived experiences of 78
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the teachers and students to interact with the scientific facts. Such an approach, suggests a role of narrative as an instructional tool (Bostrom, 2006, in Avraamidou & Osborne, 2009). 5. IMPLICATIONS FOR SCIENCE TEACHING
We hope that from the text above it has become apparent that the role of HOS in science teaching has obtained a greater significance among science educators, researchers and science teachers, since it contributes in various ways to the construction of knowledge. According to constructivist theories of learning knowledge can not be transmitted from the teacher to the student, but can be constructed by the latter on the basis of his/hers conceptions and his/her interactions with others and language. The use of HOS in the construction of knowledge creates new perspectives for science teaching, the design and development of curricula, the initial education and the in-service training of science teachers and their practices in the classrooms. Especially, the design and development of curricula is necessary in order to utilize the conceptions of the scientists of the past, their controversies, their unanimous decisions, the cooperative character of the development of science, the nature of science etc. and contributes to a better understanding of science concepts by students. The incorporation of HOS in science teaching, as described above, contributes to the unfolding of its character as a human activity. Furthermore the inclusion in the curriculum of stories from the life and work of scientists in the form of narrative could contribute to the emotional development of the students, something that may result to the development of their romantic understanding and constitute the bridge to conceptual understanding. The trend towards the incorporation of HOS in science teaching marks the change of the orientation of initial teachers’ education and their in- service training so that they will become able to employ these practices in the context of socioconstructivist environments of learning. Of course, there is a need to research further the different ways of the introduction of HOS into the teaching practices. For example: “In what ways do the narratives support science learning?”, “How do the narratives improve conceptual understanding?”, “What are the possibilities of the exploitation of HOS in the teaching of science in order to contribute to the understanding and the development of science?”… NOTES 1
Our paper is restricted to individual and socio- constructivism theories only.
REFERENCES Abd-El-Khalick, F., & Lederman, N. (2000). The influence of history of science courses on students’ views of nature of science. Journal of Research in Science Teaching, 37(10), 1057–1095. American Association for the Advancement of Science. (1993). Benchmarks for science literacy. New York: Oxford University Press. American Association for the Advancement of Science. (1989). Science for all Americas. New York: Oxford University Press. 79
KOKKOTAS AND RIZAKI Arons, A. B. (1989). Historical and philosophical perspectives attainable in introductory physics courses. Educational Philosophy and Theory, 20(2), 13–23. Arons, A. B. (1990). A guide to introductory physics teaching. New York: John Wiley. Atwater, M. M. (1996). Social constructivism: Infusion into the multicultural science education research agenda. Journal of Research in Science Teaching, 33, 821–837. Avraamidou, L., & Osborn, J. (2009). The role of narrative in communicating science. International Journal of Science Education, 31(12), 1683–1707. Azcarate, C., Donel, M. G., & Romo, J. (1988). Galileo Galilei, la nueva ciencia del motimiato. De Catalunya, Bellatorra: Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona y Universitat Politencina. Bauersfeld, H. (1995). The structuring of the structures: Development and function of mathematizing as a social practice. In L. P. Steffe, & J. Gale (Eds.), Constructivism in education (pp. 137–158). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Bevilacqua, F., & Gianneto, E. (1996). The history of physics and European physics education. Science & Education, 5, 235–246. Bingle, W. H., & Gaskell, P. J. (1994). Scientific literacy for decision making and the social construction of scientific knowledge. Science Education, 78, 185–201. Binnie, A. (2001). Using the history of electricity and magnetism to enhance teaching. Science & Education, 10, 379–389. Bloom, B. S. (1956). Taxonomy of educational objectives, the classification of educational goals. New York: McKay: Handbook I: Cognitive Domain. Bostrom, A. (2006). Sharing lived experience. How upper secondary school chemistry teachers and students use narratives to make chemistry more meaningful. Unpublished Ph Disseratation, Stockholm University Press, Stockholm. Brush, S. G. (1974). Should the history of science be rated X? Science, 183, 1164–1172. Brush, S. J. (1989). History of science and science education. Interchange, 20(2), 60–70. Clement, J. (1982). Students’ preconceptions in introductory mechanics. American Journal of Physics, 50(1), 66–71. Cobb, P. (1994a). Constructivism in mathematics and science education. Educational Researcher, 23, 4. Cobb, P. (1994b). Where is the mind? Constructivist and sociocultural perspectives on mathematical development. Educational Researcher, 23, 13–20. Cobb, P. (1995). Continuing the conversation: A response to Smith. Educational Researcher, 24(6), 25–27. Conant, J. (1957). Harvard case histories in experimental science. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Confrey, J. (1990). A review of research on student conceptions in mathematics, science and programming. Review of Research in Education, 16, 3–56. Day J. D., French, L. A., & Hall, I. K. (1985). Social influences on cognitive development. In D. L ForrestPressley, G. E. MacKinnon, & T. G. Waller (Eds.), Metacognition, cognition, and human performance (Vol. 1, pp. 33–56). Theoretical perspectives. New York: Academic Press. DeBoer, G. (1991). A history of ideas in science education: Implications for practice, teachers. New York: College Press. Dedes, C. (2005). The mechanism of vision: conceptual similarities between historical models and children’s representations. Science & Education, 14, 699–712. Dewey, J. (1934). Art as experience. New York: Perigree. Driver, R., & Oldham, V. (1985). A constructivist approach to curriculum development. Studies in Science Education, 13, 105–122. Driver, R., Asoko, H., Leach, J., Mortimer, E., & Scott, P. (1994). Constructing scientific knowledge in the classroom. Educational Researcher, 23(7), 5–12. Duhem, P. (1905/1954). The aim and structure of physical theory. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Dunn, R. (1993). Empires of physics - a new initiative in science education. School Science Review, 75, 135–137. Duschl, R. A. (1990). Restructuring science education. New York: Teachers College Press. Egan, K. (1988). Primary understanding. New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 80
CONSTRUCTION OF KNOWLEDGE Egan, K. (1986). Teaching as story telling. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Egan, K. (1989). The shape of the science text: A function of stories. In S. de Castell, A. Luke, & C. Luke (Eds.), Language, authority and criticism: Readings on the school textbook (pp. 96–108). New York: The Falmer Press. Egan, K. (1990). Romantic understanding. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Egan, K. (1992). Imagination in teaching and learning. Chicago: University of Chicago. Egan, K. (1997). The educated mind. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Egan, K. (2005). An imaginative approach to teaching. San Francisco: Jossey - Bass. Fosnot, C. T. (Ed.), (1996). Constructivism: theory, perspectives, and practice. New York: Teachers College Press. Gajdamaschko, N. (2005). Vygotsky on imagination: Why an understanding of the imagination is an important issue for schoolteachers. Teaching Education, 16(1), 13–22. Galili, I., & Hazan, A. (2001a). Experts’ views on using history and philosophy of science in the practice of physics instruction. Science & Education, 10, 345–367. Gallili, I., & Hazan, A. (2000). The influence of an historically oriented course on students’ content knowledge in optics evaluated by means of facets- schemes analysis. American Journal of Physics, 68, 3–15. Gallili, I., & Hazan, A. (2001). The effect of a history-based course in optics on Students’ views about science. Science & Education, 10, 7–32. Gergen, K. J. (1995). Social construction and the educational process. In L. P. Steffe, & J. Gale (Eds.), Constructivism in education (pp. 17–40). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. Hadzigeorgiou, Y., & Stefanich, G. (2001). Imagination in science education. Contemporary Education, 71, 23–28. Hadzigeorgiou, Y. (2005). Romantic understanding and science education. Teaching Education, 16, 23–32. Haywood, H. (1927). Fundamental laws of chemistry. School Science Review, 9, 92. Heering, P. (1994). The replication of the torsion balance experiment, the inverse square law and its refutation by early 19th-century German physicists. In C. Blondel & M. Dorries (Eds.), Restaging Coulomb. Usages, controverses et réplications autour de la balance de torsion (pp. 47–67). Firenze: Leo S. Olschki. Izquierdo, M. (1995). Cognitive models of Science and the teaching of science, history of science and curriculum. In D. Phillos (Eds.), European research in science education-Proceeding of the second Ph D. summer school, art of text. Thessaloniki. Jung, W. (1994). Toward preparing students for change: A critical discussion of the contribution of the history of physics in physics teaching. Science & Education, 3, 99–130. Kelly, G. A. (1955). The psychology of personal constructs. New York: Norton. Kindi, V. (2005). Should science teaching involve the history of science? An assessment of Kuhn’s view. Science & Education, 14, 721–731. Kipnis, N. (1996). The ‘historical-investigative’ approach to teaching science. Science & Education, 5, 277–292. Kipnis, N. (1998). Theories as models in teaching physics. Science & Education, 7, 245–260. Klassen, S. (2006). A theoretical framework for contextual science teaching. Interchange, 37(1–2), 31–61. Klopfer, L. (1969). The teaching of science and the history of science. International Journal of Science Education, 6, 87–96. Kokkotas, P., Malamitsa, K., & Rizaki, ǹ. (2008). Story telling as a strategy for understanding concepts of electricity and electromagnetism. In Proceedings of the Munich conference “The second international conference on story in science teaching”. Available at http://scied.org/Story-08-Proc.htm Kokkotas, P., Piliouras P., Malamitsa, K., & Stamoulis, E. (2009).Teaching physics to in-service primary school teachers in the context of the history of science: The case of falling bodies. Science & Education, 18, 609–629. Kokkotas, P., Piliouras, P., Malamitsa, K., Kokkotas, V., Stamoulis, E., Maurogiannakis, M., et al. (2009). The pedagogogical foundations of science teachers professional development. In P. Kokkotas & F. Bevilacqua, (Eds.), Professional development of science teachers, teaching science using case 81
KOKKOTAS AND RIZAKI studies from the history of science. Amazon: Electronic Book. https://www.createspace.com:443/ 3362423. Koul, R., & Dana, R. (1997). Contextualized science for teaching science and technology. Interchange, 28(2–3), 121–144. Kuhn, T. S. (1962). The structure of scientific revolutions. In International encyclopedia of unified science (2nd ed.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Kyle, W. C. (1997). Assessing students’ understanding of science. Journal Research Science Teaching, 34, 851–852. Leach, J., & Scott, P. (2003), Individual and sociocultural views of learning in science education. Science & Education, 12, 91–113. Lemke, J. L. (2001). Articulating communities: Sociocultural perspectives on science education. Journal of Research in Science Teaching, 38, 296–316. Luhl, J. (1990). The history of atomic theory with it societal and philosophical implications in chemistry classes. In D. E. Hergit (Eds.), More history and philosophy of science in science teaching (pp. 266–273). Tallahassee, FL: University of Florida Science Education Dept. Mach, E. (1886/1986). On instruction the classics and the sciences. In Popular scientific lectures. La Sale, IL: Open Court Publishing Company. Manna, C., & Minichiello, G. (2005). Imagination without images. Teaching Education, 16(1), 51–60. Maria, K., & Johnson, J. M. (1989). Correcting misconceptions: Effects of type of text. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the National Reading conference, Austin, TX. Masson, S., & Vazquez-Abad, J. (2006). Integrating history of science in science education through historical microworlds to promote conceptual change. Journal of Science Education and Technology, 15(3), 257–268. Matthews, M. (1994). Science teaching: The role of history and philosophy of science. London: Routledge. Matthews, M. R. (1992). History, philosophy and science teaching: The present rapprochement. Science & Education, 1(1), 11–47. McDermott, L. C. (1984). Research on conceptual understanding in mechanics. Physics Today, 22, 2–10. McMullin, E. (1985). Galilean idealization. Studies in history and philosophy of science, 16, 247–273. Millar, R., & Driver, R. (1987). Beyond processes. Studies in Science Education, 14, 33–62. Mintzes, J. J., Wandersee J. H., & Novak, J. D. (Eds.), (1998). Teaching science for understanding: A human constructivist view. San Diego, CA: Academic Press. Monk, M., & Osborne, J. (1997). Placing the history and philosophy of science on the curriculum: A model for the development of pedagogy. Science Education, 81, 405–427. Mott, W. B., & Lester, J. (2006). Narrative- centered tutorial planning for inquiry-based learning environments. In Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Intelligent Tutoring Systems (ITS). Jhongli, Taiwan. National Research Council. (1996). National science education standards. Washington, DC: National Academy Press. Nerssessian, N. J. (1989). Conceptual change in science and in science education. Synthese, 80, 163–183. Nerssessian, N. J. (1995). Should physicists preach? What they practice? Science of Education, 4, 203–226. Niaz, M. (1993). If Piaget’s epistemic subject is dead, shall we bury the scientific research methodology of idealization? Journal of Research in Science Teaching, 30, 809–812. Niaz, M. (2000). Cases as idealized lattices: A rational reconstruction of students’ understanding of the behavior of cases. Science & Education, 9, 279–287. Nickels, T. (1992). Good science as bad history: From order of knowing to order of being. In E. McMullin (Eds.), The social dimensions of science. Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame Press. Nielsen, H., & Thomson, P. (1990). History and philosophy of science in physics education. International Journal of Science Education, 12(3), 308–316. Noddings, N., & Witherell, C. (1991). Epilogue: Themes remembered and foreseen. In C. Witherell & N. Noddings (Eds.), Stories lives tell: Narrative and Dialogue in Education (pp. 279–280). New York: Teachers College Press.
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CONSTRUCTION OF KNOWLEDGE Novak, J. (1993). Human constructivism: A unification of pcychological and epistemological phenomena in meaning making. International Journal of Personal Construct Psychology, 6, 167–193. Novak, J. D. (1985). Metalearning and metaknowledge strategies to help students to learn how to learn. In L. H. T. West & A. L. Pines (Eds.), Cognitive structures and conceptual change. Orlando, FL: Academic. O’Loughlin, M. (1992). Rethinking science education: Beyond Piagetian constructivism toward a sociocultural model of teaching and learning. Journal of Research in Science Teaching, 29, 791–820. Pearson, K. (1900). The grammar of science (2nd ed.). London: Adam and Charles Black. Piaget, J., & Garcia, R. (1987). Psychogenesis and the history of science. New York: Columbia University Press. Piaget, J. (1926). The language and thought of the child. New York: Harcourt Brace. Pozo, J. (1987). Aprendidizaje de la ciencia y pensamiento causal. Madrid: Visor Libros. Riegler, A. (2001). Towards a radical constructivist understanding of science. Foundations of Science, 6, 1–30. Rizaki, A., & Kokkotas, P. (2010). The use of history and philosophy of science as a core for a socioconstructivist teaching approach of the concept of energy in primary education. Science & Education (in press). Rudge, D., & Howe, E. (2009). An explicit and reflective approach to the use of history to promote understanding of the nature of science. Science & Education, 18, 561–580. Rutherford, F., Holton, G., & Watson, F. (1970). The project physics course: Text. New York: Holt, Rienhart and Wintson. Rutherford, J. (2001). Fostering the history of science in American science education. Science & Education, 10, 569–580. Schwab, J. J. (1964). Problems, topics, and issues. In S. Elam (Ed.), Education and the structure of knowledge. Chicago: Rand McNally. Sequera, M., & Leite, L. (1991). Alternative conceptions and history of science in physics teacher education. Science Education, 75(1), 45–56. Smith, E. (1995). Where is the mind? Knowing and knowledge in Cobb’s constructivist and sociocultural perspectives. Educational Researcher, 24, 23–24. Stefanidou, C., & Vlachos, I. (2010). Could scientific controversies be used as a tool for teaching science in the compulsory education? The results of a pilot based on the Galileo-del Monte controversy about the motion of the pendulum. In P. V. Kokkotas, K. S Malamitsa, & A. A. Rizaki (Eds.), Adapting historical science knowledge production to the classroom. The Netherlands: Sense Publishers (in press). Steffe, L., & Gale, J. (1995). Constructivism in education. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. Stevenson, L., & Byerly, H. (2000). The many faces of science. An introduction to scientists, values, and society. Boulder, CO: Westview. Stinner, A., & Teichmann, J. (2003). Lord Kelvin and the age-of-the-Earth debate: A dramatization. Science & Education, 12, 213–228. Stinner, A. (1995a). Contextual settings, science stories, and large context problems: Toward a more humanistic science education. Science Education, 79(5), 555–581. Stinner, A. (1995b). The contexts of inquiry in physics education: Supporting a motivational base and providing a theoretical structure. In L. Kovacs (Eds.), History of science in teaching physics. Extended proceedings of history teaching physics conference Szombathely (pp. 160–170). Stinner, A. (1996). Providing a contextual base and a theoretical structure to guide the teaching of science from early years to senior years. Science & Education, 5, 247–266. Strike, K. A., & Posner, G. J. (1992). A revisionist theory of conceptual change. In R. A. Duschl & R. J. Hamilton (Eds.), Philosophy of science, cognitive psychology, and educational theory and practice (pp. 147–176). Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. Tharp, R. G., & Gallimore, R. (1988). Rousing minds to life: Teaching, learning, and schooling in social context. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
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KOKKOTAS AND RIZAKI Thomson, P. (1998). The Historical-Philosophical dimension in physics teaching: Danish experiences. Science & Education, 7, 493–503. Tobin, K. (1993). The Practice of constructivism in science and mathematics education. Washington, DC: AAAS Press. Toulmin, S. (1972). Human understanding: Vol. 1. The collective use and evolution of concepts. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. UNESCO. (2000). Report of the world conference on science: Framework for action science sector. Paris Unesco. Viennot, L. (1979). Spontaneous learning in elementary dynamics. European Journal of Science Education, I, 205–221. von Clasersfeld, E. (2001). The radical constructivist view of science. Foundations of Science, 6, 31–43. von Glasersfeld, E. (1988). The reluctance to change a way of thinking. Special issue: Radical constructivism, autopoiesis and psychotherapy. Irish Journal of Psychology, 9, 83–90. von Glasersfeld, E. (1995). A constructivist approach to teaching. In L. P. Steffe & J. Gale (Eds.), Constructivism in education (pp. 3–16). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. von Glasersfeld, E. (1999). How do we mean? A constructivist sketch of semantics. Cybernetics & Human Learning, 6(1), 9–16. Vosniadou, S., & Brewer, W. F. (1987). Theories of knowledge restructuring in development. Review of Educational Research, 51, 51–67. Vygotsky, L. (1986). Thought and language. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. Vygotsky, L. S. (1987). The collected works of L.S. Vygotsky (Vol. 1) (R. W. Rieber & J. Wollock, (Eds.). New York: Plenum Press. Vygotsky, L. S. (1998). The collected works of L.S. Vygotsky (Vol. 5) (R. W. Rieber, & J. Wollock, (Eds.). New York: Plenum Press. Vygotsky, L. S. (2003). Imagination and creativity in childhood. Journal of Russian and East European Psychology, 42(1), 7–97. Vygotsky, L. S. (1978). Mind in society: The development of higher psychological processes. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Wandersee, J. H. (1985). Can the history of science help science educators anticipate student’s misconceptions. Journal of Research in Science Teaching, 23, 581–597. Wandersee, J. H. (1992). The historicality of cognition: Implications for science education research. Journal of Research in Science Teaching, 29, 423–434. Wells, G. (1999). Dialogic inquiry: Towards a sociocultural practice and theory of education. New York: Cambridge University Press. Wiser, M., & Carey, S. (1983). When heat and temperature were one. In D. Gentner & A. Stevens (Eds.), Mental Models (pp. 267–297). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. Yamalidou, M. (2001). Molecular representations: Building tentative links between the history of science and the study of cognition. Science & Education, 10, 423–451.
Panagiotis Kokkotas, profesor and Aikaterini Rizaki, PhD Faculty of Primary Education National and Kapodistrian University of Athens, Greece e-mail:
[email protected]
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6. ON THE CONCEPT OF ENERGY History of Science for Teaching
1. WHAT IS ENERGY?
These instructions are intended to provide guidance to authors “It is important to realize that in physics today we have no knowledge of what energy is”, said the Nobel Laureate Richard Feynman in his Lectures. “Nobody knows what energy really is”, one reads in Bergmann and Schaefer’s Experimental Physics (1998). We cannot answer the question of what energy really is, explain Dransfeld et al. (2001). Although everybody has a feeling of what energy is, wrote Çengel and Boles (2002), it is difficult to give a precise definition for it. According to Halliday et al. (2003), it is very difficult to give a simple definition of energy. If we cannot explain in a clear way what energy is, the concept of energy must be a problem in science teaching. Students’ preconceptions or misunderstandings have been subject of much research (Watts, 1983; Duit, 1986; Nicholls & Ogborn, 1993; Trumper, 1990, 1991; Cotignola et al., 2002; Barbosa & Borges, 2006; de Berg, 2008; and many others). Empirical educational research shows alternative ideas, such as ‘Energy is fuel’ or ‘Energy is stored within objects’ (Ogborn, 1993, p. 73; Prideaux, 1995, p. 278). There is so much confusion with energy, according to Beynon “because it is not treated as an abstract physical quantity but something real, just like a piece of cheese” (1990, p. 315). The most common notion of energy in textbooks can, however, lead to the idea of energy as something real. The principle of conservation of energy or the concept of energy is frequently presented as follows: energy can neither be created nor destroyed but only transformed1. If energy cannot be destroyed, it must be a real existing thing. If energy can be transformed, it must be a real thing, which appears in the form A, B, C, and so on. Thus, the concept of energy as a substance is understandable (see Arons 1999, p. 1064). If energy can be transformed and heat is the end product of such a transformation, it is understandable that heat is considered a form of energy (Böge & Eichler, 2002, p. 83; Nolting, 2002, p. 148). However, Cotignola et al. (2002, p. 285), Doménech et al. (2007, p. 54) criticised the definition of heat as a form of energy, presented in some textbooks. In some textbooks, heat is not a form of energy (Hertel 2007, p. 135) and is defined as energy transferred (Keller et al. 1993, p. 423). Different points of view concerning the concepts of heat and energy can become confusing for a student or even for a teacher (see Galili, 2006). P.V. Kokkotas et al., (eds.), Adapting Historical Science Knowledge Production to the Classroom, 85–101. © 2011 Sense Publishers. All rights reserved.
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Such difficulties in teaching thermodynamics do not appear in textbooks published towards the end of the nineteenth century or the beginning of the following century. Concerning the heat-motion relationship, Verdet (1868) used the expression “principle of equivalence”. The same holds for Poincaré’s Thermodynamics (1892). The first law of thermodynamics is called principle of equivalence by Preston, 19192. According to Müller and Pouillet, the law is to be formulated in the form: heat and mechanical work are equivalents3. In the same chapter “Principle of Equivalence”, the authors pointed out that with the thesis, energy is indestructible, the principle is not an experimental law anymore but a postulate4. The understanding of the mechanical equivalent of heat as an equivalence factor, which is determined experimentally, and the principle of energy conservation as a principle of equivalence can be justified by the authors who discovered the energy conservation. The history of science teaches us that energy was discovered in the 1840s. Mayer, Joule, Colding and Helmholtz are generally considered the discoverers5. They did not speak of conservation or transformation of energy but rather of force (Mayer, Colding or Helmholtz) or conversion of mechanical power into heat and vice-versa (Joule). The term energy was introduced by William Thomson in 1851. Towards the end of the nineteenth century, energy was understood as a substance by some scientists, such as Lodge, Poynting or Ostwald. This concept was, however, criticised by others, such as Planck, Hertz or William Thomson. The historical development of the concept is reflected in the terminology concerning energy in contemporary textbooks. Hence, some of our terminology becomes more understandable through the past. Historical topics linkable with properties of energy (indestructible and transformable), forms (kinetic and potential) and transference of energy will be presented. Some consequences for teaching are explicitly dealt with in the last section. The present paper is based on Coelho (2007). 2. INDESTRUCTIBILITY AND TRANSFORMABILITY
These instructions are intended to provide guidance to authors Indestructibility and transformability of energy have their roots in Mayer’s theory. According to this theory, “force” is indestructible in quantity and transformable in quality. These properties were justified in the following way. ‘Forces are causes’ states Mayer, without any proof or further explanation, in his 1842 article “Observations on the Forces of Inorganic Nature”. This statement is used to apply to forces the classical saying ‘causa aequat effectum’6. If c causes an effect e, then c=e. If e becomes a cause of an effect f, then e=f, and so on. On account of these equations, Mayer justifies the two properties of force. As c=e=f…=c, the quantity holds constant. Mayer says force is indestructible7. As c=e, Mayer says that c is transformed into e because when there is e, no part of c can exist, and when there is c no part of e exists8. Let us consider what these properties mean concerning phenomena, the first of which is the falling of bodies. According to Mayer, the weight and height of a body form together the cause of falling. At that time, weight was considered the cause of falling. However, 86
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Mayer argues, height is also necessary for falling. In order to determine the cause quantitatively, Mayer proposes the product of the mass and the height of the body9. On account of the relationship between height and velocity of falling from Leibniz’s conservation principle (1686), the height is equal to the square of the velocity10. Mayer takes the product of mass and square of the velocity as the effect of the cause referred to. Admitting that cause equals effect, he writes mh = mv2. Let us move on to phenomena which involve heat and motion. Mayer set up an experiment to prove that motion causes heat: he agitated water in a recipient vehemently and the temperature of the water rose 12 or 13 degrees11. The steam-engine gives an example of the inverse relationship: heat produces motion12. Thus, he continues, he prefers to admit that heat produces motion or motion heat, instead of admitting that there is a cause without effect or an effect without cause13. If there is a causal relationship between heat and motion, an equation of the form “cause=effect” is justified by the theory seen above. To write an equation relating heat to motion, Mayer made recourse to the specific heat of atmospheric air at constant pressure and constant volume. In order to increase the temperature of one cubic centimetre of atmospheric air without changing its volume, a certain quantity of heat, Cv, is necessary. To increase the temperature of the same value but with a variation in volume, a greater quantity of heat, Cp, is necessary14. As Cp is greater than Cv, but in the first case there is some motion and in the second there is none, Mayer considers the difference of these quantities equal to the force performed in the variation of volume against atmospheric pressure. Thus, Cp-Cv corresponds to the mechanical effect produced. This effect is expressed by the weight of the column of air, W, and the change in the height, h. According to the values known at that time, Cp-Cv = Wh leads to the result: one unit of heat is equivalent to one unit of weight raised to 366 metres15. In Mayer’s dealing with the phenomena, two steps are evident: 1. he verifies if a cause-effect relationship can be applied to the phenomena considered; 2. he writes an equation, whose sides are constituted by the quantities which characterise the cause and effect involved. The writing of an equation of the form force (cause) = force (effect) is based on the classical statement “causa aequat effectum”. This statement implies that the quantity taken as cause must be equal to the quantity taken as effect. As the right hand-side and the left hand-side of this equation is called force, it can be said that the quantity of force is constant. Mayer expresses this by saying that force is indestructible. Let us move on to the other property of force. Mayer says, ‘transformation of heat into mechanical effect’ expresses a fact and does not explain the transformation. It is said, for instance, that ice is transformed into water and this is not dependent on how and why the transformation happens. These kinds of questions, he adds, are useless. Mayer states as well that the relationship between heat and motion is quantitative and not qualitative16 and that 87
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‘transformation from falling force into motion’ cannot express anything but a numerical relation between both17. According to these statements, transformation does not explain what is going on in a physical process and the established relationship is only a numerical one. In conclusion, indestructibility and transformability do not mean that any substance with those properties had been found. Using observable or measurable data, Mayer established numerical relationships between certain quantities and determined equivalences between magnitudes, which were until then non-connected. Thus, it can be said, Mayer found a methodology for dealing with phenomena. In so far as the equivalence between mechanical units and units of heat was included in physics, the concept “principle of equivalence” becomes understandable (Verdet, Poincaré, Müller and Pouillet, among others). 3. THE HEAT-MOTION CONVERSION
The conversion of heat into motion and motion into heat, was the thesis defended by Joule in his first article concerning this issue “On the Calorific Effects of MagnetoElectricity, and on the Mechanical Value of Heat” (1843). This thesis is connected with the concept of heat as a kind of motion. This concept of heat represented a conditio sine qua non for the acceptance of the heat-motion conversion by the scientific community. Within the framework of the science of that time, heat could be a substance or a kind of motion. Despite the fact that Rumford (1798, p. 99) and Davy (1799, p. 13–14) have defended that heat was motion, the common thesis concerning the nature of heat during the first part of the nineteenth century was ‘heat is a substance’ (Haldat, 1807; Berthollet, in cooperation with Pictet and Biot, 1809; Carnot, 1824; Colladon & Sturm, 1828, among others). If heat is a substance, it cannot be created by motion, since, if heat is a substance, its quantity must be constant. Joule tried to show experimentally that heat can be generated by motion. The first attempt is presented in the article referred to. ‘Magneto-electricity’ was the name given to the induced electric current, discovered by Faraday in 183118. Joule constructed a magneto-electric machine: an electromagnet rotates in the proximity of a large magnet or an electromagnet. The following picture, drawn from Verdet’s Thermodynamics, where Joule’s experiments and results are dealt with in detail, does not represent the large electromagnet. If the axle on the right side is cranked, it brings the other axle into rotation. Perpendicular to this axle, there is a hollow box, in which an electromagnet was introduced. This element is immersed in a tube of water and thermally isolated. The temperature of the water is measured before the rotation and after it and the heat evolved is determined. From all the experiments set up with this experimental configuration, Joule concluded that motion creates heat. As heat could be increased through the magneto-electric machine and this function by means of motion, Joule tried to determine a proportion between the heat evolved and the mechanical power used. To estimate the mechanical power, he replaced the crank with the system represented in the following image19. 88
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Figure 1. Joule’s machine (Verdet 1870, p. 157, fig. 38).
Figure 2. From Joule’s paper (Joule 1884, p. 150, fig. 51).
The product of the weights and the height make up the value of the mechanical power. To determine the mechanical power which will be equated with the value of the heat evolved, Joule took the difference between the mechanical power necessary to bring the machine into motion as an electromagnetic one, Weightmag.-elec. x Height, and as a mechanical one Weightmec. x Height. The following equation subsumes the set of experiments referred to above (Weight mag.-elec. - Weight mec.) x Height = Heat mag.-elec..
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As the equation states that Į units of mechanical power = ȕ units of heat, Joule calculates how many mechanical units correspond to one unit of heat. The value of mechanical power that corresponds to one unit of heat is termed ‘mechanical equivalent of heat’. Let us move on to the interpretation. If heat can be created by motion, it cannot be a substance. If it is not a substance, it must be a kind of motion. If heat is motion and the calorific effects of the magnetoelectricity are produced through motion, then we have a motion that causes another motion. The quantity of one kind is converted into the other kind of motion. The concept of heat as a state of vibration, a kind of motion, connects from a conceptual point of view, two entities, which were completely different, heat and motion. (This connecting role of motion in Joule’s theory is played by the concept of force in Mayer’s theory.) In 1845, Joule presented for the first time the paddle-wheel experiment. The apparatus used consists of a brass paddle-wheel working horizontally in a can of peculiar construction and filled with water. This paddle-wheel moves by means of weights thrown over two pulleys working in opposite directions. The paddle moved with great resistance in the can of water, says Joule. When the weights had descended through that distance, they had to be wound up again in order to renew the motion of the paddle. After this operation had been repeated sixteen times, the increase of the temperature of the water was ascertained by means of a very sensible and accurate thermometer (p. 203). The schema of the apparatus was presented in the article published in Philosophical Transactions, 1850. The following picture is drawn from Verdet’s reproduction of Joule’s schema.
Figure 3. Joule’s paddle-wheel experiment (Verdet 1868, p. 42, fig. 5). 90
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Figure 4. Joule’s schema: detail of the inside of the can, from Joule’s paper (Joule 1884, Plate II, fig. 70, 69).
Joule’s conclusion states: 1. “the quantity of heat produced by the friction of bodies […] is always proportional to the quantity of force expended ” 2. “the quantity of heat capable of increasing the temperature of a pound of water […] by 1q Fahr. requires for its evolution the expenditure of a mechanical force represented by the fall of 772 lb. through the space of one foot” (p. 328). A third proposition, which was suppressed in accordance with the wish of the Committee who reviewed the paper, stated that friction consisted in the conversion of mechanical power into heat20. Let us consider if there were evidence for this thesis. Joule determined the weights on the scales and the height covered by them. Measuring the temperature of the water at the beginning and at the end, he calculated the heat developed. Thanks to these data, he established the following equivalence weight x height = ȕ units of heat. If Į units of mechanical power correspond to ȕ units of heat, to one unit of heat corresponds x. Thus, Joule determined the mechanical equivalent of heat. To do this, it does not matter, if the phenomenon consists in a conversion from motion into heat. In fact, what happened within the can, where the conversion took place, if it occurred, is not important for the final result. No specific information is drawn from the process of conversion. The ‘conversion’ from the observable motion of the weights into the unobservable motion, of which heat would consist, is an interpretation of the phenomenon, therefore. In sum, Joule did not research the conversion between motion and heat. Instead of this, he found experimental methods for determining the mechanical equivalent of heat. He measured the mechanical power; the heat evolved, established a numerical relation and determined the mechanical equivalent of heat. 4. KINETIC AND POTENTIAL ENERGY
As heat had been understood as motion (Joule, 1884, 1887; Rankine, 1850; and Clausius, 1850) and there was a conversion factor, heat could be translated into mechanical units. Thus, it became meaningful to speak of the mechanical activity 91
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of a body thanks to its heat. In order to express this ‘activity’, Thomson used the term ‘energy’, which etymologically means activity. The mechanical activity of a body, which depends on the total heat in it, is expressed by the “total mechanical energy of a body”. By this, is understood the mechanical value of all effects a body would produce in heat emitted and in resistances overcome, if it were completely cooled21. This is, however, impossible to determine22. Hence, Thomson defines the mechanical energy of a body in a given state23. By this, is understood the mechanical value of the effects the body would produce in passing from that state to a standard one or from this to the given state. In 1852, Thomson divided the stores of mechanical energy available for man into two sets: static and dynamic. A quantity of weights at a height, ready to descend and do work when wanted, an electrified body, a quantity of fuel, contain stores of mechanical energy of the static kind. Masses of matter in motion, a volume of space through which undulations of light or radiant heat are passing are of the dynamic kind (p. 139). Rankine 1853 divided energy into two kinds: “actual or sensible” and “potential or latent”. He writes: Actual energy is a measurable, transferable, and transformable affection of a substance, the presence of which causes the substance to tend to change its state in one or more respects […] by the occurrence of which changes, actual energy disappears, and is replaced by Potential energy (p. 106). Thomson 1854 adopted Rankine’s concepts: actual or dynamic for the energy of motion and potential energy for the other24. In 1862, Thomson and Tait introduced the concept ‘kinetic energy’ instead of ‘actual energy’25. This alteration was only a consequence of a terminological reform of mechanics26. 5. ‘CAPACITY OF DOING WORK’ AND TRANSFERENCE OF ENERGY
In Maxwell’s Theory of Heat, energy of a body is defined as its capacity of doing work27. This concept comes from Thomson. Connected with this, is the distinction between kinetic and potential energy. Maxwell pointed out that we do not know if there are other forms. We cannot, however, conceive of any other form. Maxwell adopted also the other meaning of ‘forms of energy’, which comes originally from Mayer. According to this, heat is a form of energy. However, Maxwell did not categorically assert that heat is a form of energy but rather that it is better to understand it as such because one can obtain heat through work. He writes: The reason for believing heat to be a form of energy is that heat may be generated by the application of work (p. 93). In 1879, Lodge criticised the definition of energy as the power of doing work28. One says that a body has some energy. Nevertheless, he argues, it does not mean necessarily that it can do work29. Hence, Lodge proposed understanding energy as the work already done upon a body30. The conservation of energy is then expressed in the form: energy is neither produced nor destroyed but only transferred31. Lodge will come back to the subject due to Poynting’s article ‘On the Transfer of Energy in the Electromagnetic Field’ (1884). 92
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According to Lodge 1885, energy exists in space, in bodies and in the ether and it can be transferred between them32. With a transference, there is a transformation of energy. Thanks to this new doctrine, it would be possible to give an explanation of potential energy, which had been a problem, according to Lodge33. He writes about the falling of a stone as follows: the common mode of treating a falling weight, saying that its energy gradually transforms itself from potential to kinetic but remains in the stone all the time, is, strictly speaking, nonsense. The fact is the stone never had any potential energy, no rigid body can have any; the gravitation medium had it however, and kept on transferring it to the stone all the time it was descending (p. 486). There was some criticism on this concept of energy. Planck pointed out the following difficulty. The energy of an isolated system remains constant. The same quantity of energy must, therefore, be there. It is, however, not possible, continues Planck, to localise the energy in the system34. Energy, as a substance, is then considered by him as a concept, which one day should be overcome35. Hertz also criticised the concept of energy as a substance36. He pointed out that what we say about potential energy does not comply with our concept of substance. The quantity of a substance, for instance, depends upon the substance itself and not on the existence of other substances. The potential energy of a body is, however, dependent on other bodies37. The quantity of a substance, further argues Hertz, is a positive quantity, whereas the potential energy of a system can be negative38. As energy has properties which contradict the concept of substance itself, such a theory of energy is not logically permissible, according to Hertz. Ostwald, Nobel Laureate for Chemistry, claimed, however, that energy is what is really real39. Energy can subsume matter, the properties of matter, like heat, as well as what had been ascribed to the spirit. Thus, the traditional distinction between matter and spirit could be overcome thanks to the concept of energy, according to Ostwald40. 6. HISTORICAL TOPICS IN THE CLASSROOM
The following picture represents a schema of Joule’s paddle-wheel experiment in a textbook (Tipler, 2000, p. 554; see also Young & Freedman, 2004, p. 653). From a historical point of view, this is not Joule’s schema. From a physical point a view, such a paddle-wheel would not lead to the value of the mechanical equivalent of heat. From a pedagogical point of view, it would be useful to give the idea of friction for different reasons. Joule’s experiment is explained as follows: mechanical work is converted into heat (Arons, 1999, p. 1065) or the potential energy is transformed into heat (Bergmann & Schaefer, 1998, p. 1032; Halliday & Resnick, 1993, p. 614). As the friction, which could increase the temperature of the water in a reasonable way, is not shown, a student will accept that there was a transformation of energy, but will not understand the reason for it. This can lead to the idea of energy as something with somewhat strange properties. Furthermore, if Joule’s experiment is considered as transformation of energy, energy being something real, the end product of the process -the heat- is a form of energy. This conclusion is conceptually required. 93
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Figure 5. Tipler’s schema (Tipler 2000, p. 554).
If something changes its form in a process, what appears as end product must be a form of that entity. If not, we cannot speak of transformation. The concept of heat as a form of energy has, however, been criticised (Cotignola et al., 2002, p. 285; Domémech et al., 2007). Let us consider if the difficulties could be avoided. In 1878, Joule took up the experimental configuration of 1850 again with some improvements.
Figure 6. From Joule’s article (Joule 1884, Plate IV, fig. 113). 94
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The schema of the section of the calorimeter is not very different from the first one.
Figure 7. From Joule’s article (Joule 1884, Plate IV, fig. 114).
In 1879, Rowland carried out an analogous experiment, which can be useful to show in the classroom.
Figure 8. A perspective view of the apparatus, from Rowland’s article (Rowland 1902, p. 425, fig. 6). 95
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The following pictures show the section of the calorimeter (left) and a perspective view of the revolving paddles removed from the apparatus (right):
Figure 9. From Rowland’s article (Rowland 1902, p. 427, fig. 7, 8).
This picture clearly shows the friction necessary to increase the temperature of the water. Let us interpret the paddle-wheel experiment thanks to Mayer’s methodology. Mayer established equivalences between different domains, such as those which concern position, motion and heat. Let us now suppose that we use his methodology for dealing with phenomena. In this case, we are aware that we established an equivalence between certain magnitudes. Thus, we do not need the ‘indestructibility’ of a general or abstract entity to express that its quantity remains constant. As we have established an equivalence between different domains, the mechanical and the thermal one, we do not need the ‘transformability’ of the same entity to justify the connection. We know in advance that we are dealing with measurement processes and units of different domains. Thus, using the concept of equivalence, we can understand the conservation of energy as a consequence of our dealing with the phenomena and dispense with the unknown entity. In doing so, we will not ask the question of what energy is. Some empirical research has been carried out within the framework of the European project History and Philosophy in Science Teaching41. Problem solving strategies based on the concept outlined above are being developed. NOTES 1
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See, for instance, Chalmers, 1963, p. 43; Bueche, 1972, p. 95; Hänsel & Neumann, 1993, p. 222; Cutnell & Johnson, 1998, p. 177; Young & Freedman, 2004, p. 264.
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“The modern science of thermodynamics is based on two fundamental principles […] The first of these is the principle of equivalence established by Joule, and is represented algebraically by the equation W = JH.
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This principle, which is known as the first law of thermodynamics, asserts […]” (p. 667). “Die am engsten an die unmittelbare Erfahrung sich anschließende Formulierung des ersten Hauptsatzes, die von jeder Hypothese, etwa über die Natur der Wärme frei ist, besagt daher einfach: Wärme und mechanische Arbeit sind äquivalent” (p. 109). “Energie wird als unzerstörbar angesehen. Das Energieprinzip ist somit zunächst kein empirisches Gesetz, sondern ein Postulat, das sich allerdings mit den Erfahrungstatsachen (Äquivalenzgesetz) durchaus im Einklang befindet” (p. 126). See, for instance, Breger, 1982; Schirra, 1989; Smith, 1998; Guedj, 2000; or Caneva, 1993; Cardwell, 1989; Dahl, 1963; and Bevilacqua, 1983. “Kräfte sind Ursachen, mithin findet auf dieselbe volle Anwendung der Grundsatz: causa aequat effectum” (p. 233). “In einer Kette von Ursachen und Wirkungen kann, wie aus der Natur einer Gleichung erhellt, nie ein Glied oder ein Theil eines Gliedes zu Null werden. Diese erste Eigenschaft aller Ursachen nennen wir ihre Unzerstörlichkeit” (p. 233). “Hat die gegebene Ursache c eine ihr gleiche Wirkung e hervorgebracht, so hat eben damit c zu seyn aufgehört; c ist zu e geworden” (p. 234). “Die Größe der Fallkraft v steht [...] - mit der Größe der Masse m und mit der ihrer Erhebung d, in geradem Verhältnisse; v=md” (p. 236). “Geht die Erhebung d=1 der Masse m in Bewegung dieser Masse von der Endgeschwindigkeit c=1 über, so wird auch v=mc; aus den bekannten zwischen d und c stattfindenden Relationen ergiebt sich aber für andere Werthe von d oder c, mc² als das Maß der Kraft v” (p. 236). “Wasser erfährt, wie der Verfasser fand, durch starkes Schütteln eine Temperaturerhöhung. Das erwärmte Wasser (von 12q und 13qC.) [..]” (p. 238). “umgekehrt dienen wieder die Dampfmaschinen zur Zerlegung der Wärme in Bewegung oder Lasterhebung” (p. 239). “Ist es nun ausgemacht, daß für die verschwindende Bewegung in vielen Fällen (exceptio confirmat regulam) keine andere Wirkung gefunden werden kann, als die Wärme, für die enstandene Wärme keine andere Ursache als die Bewegung, so ziehen wir die Annahme, Wärme entsteht aus Bewegung, der Annahme einer Ursache ohne Wirkung und einer Wirkung ohne Ursache vor” (p. 238). “Angenommen, ein Kubikzoll Luft von 0q und 27 Zoll Quecksilber Druck, sey durch die Wärmemenge x bei constantem Volumen um 274qC. erwärmt worden [...] Ein andermal aber werde unser Cubikzoll Luft nicht unter constantem Volumen, sondern unter constantem Drucke der 27zölligen Quecksilbersäule von 0 auf 274q erwärmt. Diessmal ist eine grössere Wärmemenge erforderlich als zuvor; es sey dieselbe = x+y” (p. 12). “hiernach gerechnet ist die Wärmemenge, die unseren Kubikcentimeter Luft bei constantem Volumen um 1q erhöht, =0,000347/1,421 = 0,000244 Grad. Es ist folglich die Differenz y=0,000347-0,000244=0,000103 Grad Wärme, durch deren Aufwand das Gewicht P=1033 Gramme auf h=1/274 Centimeter, gehoben wurde. Durch Reduktion dieser Zahlen findet man 1q Wärme=1Grm. auf 367m [...] Höhe” (p. 14–5).
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“Der Zusammenhang, in welchem, wie wir gesehen haben, die Wärme mit der Bewegung steht, bezieht sich auf die Quantität, nicht auf die Qualität, denn es sind - um mit Euklid zu reden - Gegenstände, die einander gleich sind, sich desshalb noch nicht ähnlich” (p. 43). 97
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“Diese, zwischen der Fallkraft und der Bewegung bestehende constante Proportion, welche in der höheren Mechanik unter dem Namen “Princip der Erhaltung lebendiger Kräfte” aufgeführt wird, kann kurz und passend mit dem Ausdrucke “Umwandlung” bezeichnet werden. [...] Etwas anderes, als eine constante numerische Beziehung soll und kann hier das Wort “Umwandeln” nicht ausdrücken” (p. 41–2). “The various experiments of this section prove, I think, most completely the production of electricity from ordinary magnetism” (p. 138). “I propose to call the agency thus exerted by ordinary magnets, magneto-electric or magnelectric induction” (p. 139). “The axle b [...] was wound with a double strand of fine twine, and the strings [...] were carried over very easily-working pulleys, placed on opposite sides of the axle [...] By means of weights placed in the scales attached to the ends of the strings, I could easily ascertain the force necessary to move the apparatus at any given velocity” (p. 150). “A third proposition, suppressed in accordance with the wish of the Committee to whom the paper was referred, stated that friction consisted in the conversion of mechanical power into heat” (p. 328). “The total mechanical energy of a body might be defined as the mechanical value of all the effect it would produce, in heat emitted and in resistances overcome, if it were cooled to the utmost, and allowed to contract indefinitely or to expand indefinitely according as the forces between its particles are attractive or repulsive, when the thermal motions within it are all stopped” (p. 475). “in our present state of ignorance regarding perfect cold, and the nature of molecular forces, we cannot determine this “total mechanical energy” for any portion of matter” (p. 475). “ the “mechanical energy of a body in a given state,” will denote the mechanical value of the effects the body would produce in passing from the state in which it is given, to the standard state, or the mechanical value of the whole agency that would be required to bring the body from the standard state to the state in which it is given” (p. 475). “The energy of motion may be called either “dynamical energy” or “actual energy”. The energy of a material system at rest, in virtue of which it can get into motion, is called “potential energy.” (p. 34). “[...] It had kinetic or (as it has sometimes been called) actual energy. We prefer the first term, which indicates motion as the form in which the energy is displayed” (p. 602). “ A few years later, in advocating a restoration of the original and natural nomenclature, – “mechanics the science of machines,” – “dynamics the science of force,” I suggested (instead of statics and dynamics the two divisions of mechanics according to the then usual nomenclature) that statics and kinetics should be adopted to designate the two divisions of dynamics. At the same time I gave, instead of “dynamical energy,” or “actual energy,” the name “kinetic energy” which is now in general use to designate the energy of motion” (1884, Vol. II, p. 34). “the energy of a body may be defined as the capacity which it has of doing work” (p. 90). “This definition of energy, as the effect produced in a body by an act of work, is not so simple as the usual one – “the power of doing work” but this latter definition seems a little unhappy” (p. 279). “energy is power of doing work in precisely the same sense as capital is the power of buying goods. […] money is a power of buying goods. It does not, however, necessarily confer upon its owner any buying-power, because there may not be any accessible person to buy from; and if there be, he may have nothing to sell. Just so with energy: it usually […] confers upon the body possessing it a certain power of doing work, which power it loses when it has transferred it” (p. 279). “Whenever work is done upon a body, an effect is produced in it which is found to increase the working-power of that body (by an amount not greater than the work done); hence this effect is called energy” (278–9). “But in every action taking place between two bodies the work is equal to the antiwork (§ 3); hence the energy gained by the first body is equal to the energy lost by the second; or, on the whole, energy is neither produced nor destroyed, but is simply transferred from the second body to the first” (p. 279). “The energy may be watched at every instant. Its existence is continuous; it possesses identity” (p. 483). “In the older and more hazy view of conservation of energy the idea of “potential energy” has always been felt to be a difficulty [...] it was not easy or possible always to form a clear and consistent
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mental image of what was physically meant by it [...] The usual ideas and language current about potential energy are proper to notions of action at a distance” (p. 484). “die Unbestimmtheit liegt dann im Begriff der Energie, man kennt den Platz nicht, den man ihr anweisen soll, und hat auch kein Mittel, ihn zu finden” (p. 117). “Gewiß ist zuzugeben, daß diese (sozusagen materielle) Auffassung der Energie als eines Vorrats von Wirkungen, dessen Menge durch den augenblicklichen Zustand des materiellen Systems bestimmt ist, möglicherweise später einmal ihre Dienste getan haben und einer anderen, allgemeineren und höheren, Vorstellung Platz machen wird” (p. 118). “Mehrere ausgezeichnete Physiker versuchen heutzutage, der Energie so sehr die Eigenschaften der Substanz zu leihen, daß sie annehmen, jede kleinste Menge derselben sei zu jeder Zeit an einen bestimmten Ort des Raumes geknüpft und bewahre bei allem Wechsel desselben und bei aller Verwandlung der Energie in neue Formen dennoch ihre Identität” (p. 25–6) . “[...] kann der Inhalt eines physikalischen Systems an einer Substanz nur abhängen von dem Zustande des Systems selbst; der Inhalt gegebener Materie an potentieller Energie aber hängt ab von dem Vorhandensein entfernter Massen, welche vielleicht niemals Einfluß auf das System hatten” (p. 26). “Die Menge einer Substanz ist eine notwendig positive Größe; die in einem System enthaltene potentielle Energie scheuen wir uns nicht, als negativ anzunehmen” (p. 26). “Die Energie ist daher in allen realen oder konkreten Dingen als wesentlicher Bestandteil enthalten, der niemals fehlt, und insofern können wir sagen, daß in der Energie sich das eigentlich Reale verkörpert [...] Sie ist das Wirkliche insofern, als sie das Wirkende ist [...] Und zweitens ist sie das Wirkliche insofern, als sie den Inhalt des Geschehens anzugeben gestattet” (p. 5). “Es besteht [...] gar nicht mehr die Aufgabe, zu ermitteln, wie Geist und Materie in Wechselwirkung treten können, sondern es entsteht die Frage, wie sich der Begriff der Energie, der viel weiter als der der Materie ist, zu dem Begriff des Geistes stellt” (p. 144). The different elements for introducing the concept of energy consist of short texts on Mayer’s and Joule’s biographies and theories; “reconstruction” of Mayer’s experiment – vehement agitation of water – carried out by the pupils in the classroom. The texts on the theories are read and explained in the classroom. For the vehement agitation, glasses with different forms and different liquids have also been used.
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ON THE CONCEPT OF ENERGY Nicholls, G., & Ogborn, J., (1993). Dimensions of children’s conceptions of energy. International Journal of Science Education, 15, 73–81. Nolting, W. (2002). Theoretische Physik (Vol. 4, 5th ed.). Wiesbaden: Vieweg. Ostwald, W. (1908). Die Energie (2nd ed.). Leipzig: J. A. Barth. 1912. Planck, M. (1887). Das Prinzip der Erhaltung der Energie (4th ed.). (1921). Leipzig, Berlin: Teubner. Poincaré, H. (1892). Cours de Physique Mathématique, 3. Thermodynamique: Leçons professés pendant le premier semestre 1888-89. Paris: J. Blondin. Poynting, J. H. (1884). On the transfer of energy in the electromagnetic field. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, 343–361. Preston, T. (1919). The theory of heat (3rd ed., R. Cotter, Ed.). London: Macmillan. Prideaux, N. (1995). Different approaches to the teaching of the energy concept. School Science Review, 77, 49–57. Rankine, W. (185