A Historical Commentary on Polybius, Vol. 1: Commentary on Books 1-6

mi.vToO~:v ap.a p.axotVTO. But the Punic line was not necessarily at right angles to the centre, i.e. advancing in column. See further v. 82. 9 n. 5. £1T(1TAovs: naues rostratas (Casaubon): cf. so. 6. Also found in Philo Mech. Belop. 104. 16. 'Avvwv 6 .•. Aetcp9ds Tft 1Ta.pa.Tn~e~: cf. 19. 8 ff. 6. :AJ.LLAKa.s o 1TEpt TT-jv T vv5a.p(5a. v
l. 2].

II

THE FIRST PUNIC \VAR

known as SdK1TAovs, so putting his oars out of action, ftET
THE FIRST PUNIC WAR

l. JO. ]

at Ecnomus (on the horse see Thiel, Hist. 216-I7). Probably between 2,ooo and 3,ooo marines went down in the 24 ships lost at Ecnomus (28. 14) ; and the original total of soldiers on board was c. 27 ,6oo (i.e. 9,2oo permanent garrison from Italy and c. I8,4oo embarked in Sicily from the legions there). Since 40 ships remained behind in Africa, the 210 which returned (for the total of 250 see 25. 7--9 n.) would require 8,4oo marines and the 40 at Clupea some I,6oo, as permanent garrison, i.e. Io,ooo in all. This figure, taken from the c. 25,ooo which survived Ecnomus, gives almost exactly Regulus' rs,ooo. Manlius' return is dated to autumn (256) by Zon. viii. I3· He triumphed: 'cos. de Poeneis naualem egit VIII k .. .' (act. tr.). 30-34. Reg1dus in Africa: in contrast to 29, which is written from the Roman point of view, and probably comes from Fabius, chs. 3o34 seem to follow Philinus almost exclusively, as can be seen from a comparison "'ith Diodorus, from the stress on the Carthaginian point of view, and from the exaltation of Xanthippus, a Greek (like Philinus) in Punic service. Cf. De Sanctis, iii. r. 226-7; Bung, I I r-rs (contra Laqueur, RE, 'Philinus', col. 2186, who argues for contamination of Fabius and Philinus). 30. 1. 1t.aopou~a.v ~ea.t BwaTa.pov: Hasdrubal, son of Hanno, here makes his first appearance; he plays an important role down to his execution in 25I (d. 40. r-Is). Bostar is not otherwise known: he may be the Vodostor (or Bodostor) who died from ill-treatment in Roman captivity, c. 243 (Diod. xxiv. 9· I, 12). Orosius (iv. 8. r6) speaks of Hasdrubales duo. The divided command was unusual, though not unprecedented; Meltzer, ii. 72· 2. e~ouAeueTo f1ET0. Twv 1rept Tov A.aopou~a.v: 'with Hasdrubal and his staff' (Paton), 'with Hasdrubal and his colleague' (Shuckburgh); but Polybian usage sanctions the simple translation 'with Hasdrubal'. 5. 1rpos m)1uv A.8Uv: not mentioned elsewhere; the nominative is therefore irrecoverable. It is perhaps identical with the Roman town of Uthina (modern Oudna), about IS miles south of Tunis, and somewhat east of the Wadi Meliane and the railway from Tunis to Pont du Fahs and Zaghouan. Meltzer, ii. 569-70; De Sanctis, iii. I.

•47 n. 5·

7. acflUfj OE Ta.is ta.uTWV OuVUf1EO'~V : the folly of the Carthaginians prior to Xanthippus' arrival (d. 32. 2) is part of Philinus' version; but the Punic generals may have feared the superiority of the Roman infantry on the plains (De Sanctis, iii. r. I47-8). That they did not have to wait for a Greek to tell them that cavalry and elephants are most useful on level ground had already been observed by :Mommsen, Rom. Gesch. i. 523 n. Zon. viii. 13 mentions this battle; so too Oros. iv. 8. I6 and Eutrop. ii. 21. 3 (with exaggerated Punic losses from Livy). 8g

l.

30. Ij

THE FIRST PUNIC WAR

15. TuvTJTos: Tunis lay at the mouth of the R. Catada, on a slight eminence between a lagoon, modern El Bahira (on the north-east), and a salt marsh, modern Sebka es Sedjoumi (on the south-west): d. 73· 5, 1Tapd. r0v :\lpv1JV (the lagoon). It played a prominent part in any fighting near Carthage (Diod. xiv. 77. J, xx. 8. 7, etc.). Its distance from Carthage is given as 120 stades = r8·5 km. (67. IJ, xiv. 10. 5); but Livy, xxx. 9· II makes it 15 milia passuum. 31. 4. aywvtwv ••• J..L~ O'UJ..L~TI KTA.: the motivation here contradicts that in the rest of the tradition. Here l~egulus takes the initiative 'With peace terms, lest he be superseded; elsewhere it is unanimously stated that the Carthaginians took the initiative from weariness (Oros. iv. g. r; Zon. viii. 13; Diod. xxiii. r2. r), and that Regulus' command was prolonged against his wishes (Livy, ep. r8; Frontin. Strat. iv. 3· 3; Val. Max. iv. 4· 6). The latter statement is probably part of the Regulus saga; but the harshness of the terms offered by Regulus suggests that the Carthaginians did in fact make the offer, and this version, which is in Diodorus, \.\'as probably that of Philinus. P.'s stress on Regulus' fear of supersession may come from Fabius (De Sanctis, iii. 1. 227; Gelzer, Hermes, 1933, 140 n. :2, who compares ii. 27. 5, 34· r (not a good parallel), and Livy, viii. 30. 9), or may indeed be a general deduction from similar situations of which he was cognizant (e.g. that of Flamininus, xviii. rr. z); Zon. viii. I7 attributes the same motives to Catulus in 24r; and indeed the situation was inherent in a system of annual commands. T. Frank (CAH, vii. 683) offers a pretty example of compromise: 'he announced his readiness to receive offers of peace.' On the phrase rrJV Jmyparf;ijv rwl' 1Tpayparwv see ii. 2. 9 n. 5. -rb j30.pos Twv emTay!J-0.-rwv: according to Dio, fg. 43· 2:2~23 (who alone records them), they required the payment of an indemnity, the surrender of Roman and ransoming of Punic prisoners, and also the evacuation of Sicily and Sardinia, the signing of a foedus iniquum, the surrender of the whole Punic fleet but for one ship, and an undertaking to furnish a squadron of fifty vessels for Rome at any time upon demand. This version is accepted by Meltzer (ii. 299, 570-1), Arnold (Oorzaak, 71), and Frank (CAH, vii. 683, 'Dio's account may be correct, and as such a fair commentary on the consul's stupidity'); but (a) it is not clear by what channel Dio could have obtained a faithful record, (b) if the annexation of Sardinia was envisaged in 256, its omission from the Treaty of Catulus is odd (62. 8~ 63. 3). Hence Dio's account is probably to be rejected. The harsh terms are also mentioned by Diod. xxiii. r:2. r5; Eutrop. ii. 2r. 4; Oros. iv. 9· I; Zon. viii. IJ. In fact a successful outcome at this stage was mled out, since the Romans were bound to demand, and the Carthaginians bound to reject, the evacuation of Sicily. 90

THE FIRST PUNIC WAR

1.32. 9

8 . .ivSpwSws •.. Kat yevva~ws: this praise of the Carthaginian aw{8pwv (on which see 21. 6 n.) reveals the source, Philinus (d. 14. 3). 32. 1. =:av9~n..rrov ..• Antte5at!Jovwv: Diod. xxiii. I-J.. 1 calls him a Spartiate, which would fit the words rii> AaKWVtKij> aywyij;:; J.LISTEOXTJKOTa (a training still admired, though its rigours were much diminished, Plut. Ag£s, 5); he was a mercenary (cf. Diod. xxiii. 15. 7), despite Eutropius (ii. 21. ..J.) and Appian (Lib. 3), who make him an

ally sent by Sparta, and Oros. iv. 9· z, who calls him Lacedaemoniorum regem. For a useful summary of the history of Spartan mercenaries in the Hellenistic period see Launey, i. IIJ ff. 5. auT ..• Tns Suvh. ..u:~s evexdp~aav: Zon. viii. IJ describes him as r~v aihoKpdropa ••• d.px~v dATJd,. But despite some ambiguity (e.g. 32. 7, rwv 7Tporepov orpar"f/ywv) the generals did not (nor indeed could they) hand over an official command to Xanthippus. 8. J.I.ET' oA.iyas i)J.tipu<.; wp~TJOClY: the dating of Regulus' defeat and the subsequent Roman relief expedition have caused unnecessary difficulties. The consuls for 255 set sail rij;:; O•pda, dpxoJ.L~II"f/> (36. ro); but as they stayed in Africa only long enough to pick up the survivors (36. 12 n.), and were wrecked 'between the risings of Orion and Sirius', i.e. in July (37· 4 n.), this expression must refer to a date not earlier than late May or early June (the same phrase is used very vaguely at v. 1. 3). News of Regulus' disaster reached Rome before the fleet set out (36. 5); but it is quite possible that its fitting out was already advanced, since the Romans w1Jl hardly have intended lea\·ing Regulus for the summer ·without supplies or reinforcements. Since a message could be in Rome from Carthage in three days (Plut. Cato mai. 27. r), the battle can easily have been fought in early May, and news of it have reached Rome in time for the sending of the fleet to look like an expedition of succour. With this chronology it is necessary neither to reject P.'s statement that the sending of the fleet followed news of the disaster (with De Sanctis, iii. r. nor to adopt with many scholars (Reuss, Phil., r9or, 108 ff.; Igog, 4r7, Gsell, iii. 90 n. 4; Munzer, RE, 'Fulvius (97)', coL 269; Beloch, iv. 2. 288; Bung, u6) the improbable hypothesis that the expedition of relief was not sent until 254 (against this see the convincing arguments of De iii. I. 257-60). The words wpq, KaUJ.LClTOS in App. Lib. 3 (in any case, an unreliable account) refer to the time of day, and not to the season of the disaster; and though there is substantial evidence for the prorogation of Regulus' command (Frontin. Strat. iv. 3· 3; VaL Max. iv. 4· 6; Sen. de ben. v. 3· 2; cons. ad Helv. rz. 5; auct. de uir. ill. 40), this might be granted well before the end of his year of office, and is no evidence for the date of his defeat. 9. Carthaginian numbers. An army of only r6,ooo in Africa seems very small; and Philinus may have reduced the number to enhance 9I

L 32. 9

THE FIRST PUNIC WAR

Xanthippus' victory (De Sanctis, iii. I. 150-I n. 13)· The Roman tradition (Appian, Eutropius, Orosius) gives Regulus 3o,ooo to 32,ooo men; but even with Libyans he can hardly have raised his rs,ooo to more than 2o,ooo. 33. 6. Ti]v •.• .p&.Xa.yya. Twv Ka.pxTJSovlwv: citizen-soldiers, who only come into the picture when Africa is invaded. Meltzer (ii. rr6-r7, 508--9) estimates that two-thirds of the Punic force was made up of citizen troops. 9. Taus ypocr.pop.axous: the uelites,lit. 'javelin-fighters'. See vi. 2r. 7 n. The UTJp.£1:at are 'maniples'; meaning primarily uexillum, this word is also extended to refer to the soldiers serving beneath it. 10. TfjS ••• rrpbs Ta OT)p(a. p.axTJs SeoVTWS .•• EO'Toxa.crp.evol: P. here seems oblivious of the lesson of Zama, that elephants should be met with an open formation. But he had no first-hand experience of elephants, since these were last used in a major battle at Magnesia: Griffith, 214. 34. 2. cruvelj!o.PTJO'O.V TOlS orrhots KTA.: d. Caesar, BC, iii. 92· 5: 'neque frustra antiquitus institutum est ut signa undique concinerent clamoremque uniuersi tollerent; quibus rebus et hostis terreri et suos incitari existimauerunt.' De Sanctis (iii. r. 227) questions the accuracy of P.'s comment (from Philinus) for soldiers carrying leather shields; but it was always possible to strike the iron boss or rims (vi. 23. 4-5). 4. Twv p.tcrOo,Popwv: i.e. on the Carthaginian right (d. 33· 7). These were apparently the mercenaries of Xanthippus, who did his best to rally them (Diod. xxiii. 14. 2); DeSanctis, iii. I. 152 n. 15. 5. Twv ••. Ka.Ta To us iXe,Pa.vTa.s Ta.xOevTwv: according to 33· 6 the elephantS had been posted 7Tp0 7TaUTj<; Ti]<; Ovvap.€ln<; lv fLETWmp, and SO opposite the whole Roman front. P. must therefore mean 'of those left drawn up opposite the elephants' after the legion on the left had broken away in pursuit of the Carthaginian right. 6. KuKXoup.evot rro.vTo.x68ev u1To Twv trrrrewv: De Sanctis (iii. r. 152) suggests that the Carthaginian cavalry attacked the Roman legions in the flank and rear only after a successful pursuit of the horse (§ 3) ; this would explain how the Roman left had the chance to break away against the mercenaries.

35. Reflections on the fate of Regulus. In this chapter P. singles out the double peripeteia of Regulus and of Carthage under Xanthippus as an example of the moral uses of history (d. r. z), which allows the reader to gain his experience vicariously. Regulus, inexorable in his terms when victorious, but soon after forced to sue for terms from his Punic captors, illustrates the peripeteia wrought by a fortune, 92

THE FIRST PU:'{IC WAR

I. 35

which is conceived as a force which suddenly reverses one's lot at the moment of extreme prosperity (~rfvTJaE T~v d:ruxtav, Tovnuv ~vayKd.aBTJ T~v tt'Q

\

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I

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I

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I

Vl"'ptv Ka' TTJV EsOVO'Lal! 't'EpEW, 7rpoa't'TJPTJ/LfiJJOS E'O.VTOV TTJV O'!JyYVWp.TJV Kal TOJJ avy~<•xwpT}p.lvov Tofs tlTTTatKomv E',\r::ov (§ 4); and likewise he stresses the role of a single man in raising up Carthage: 'TTapaSo[ov yap lrf>ali'ETo mi.au• el "11'poayEvop.lvou Tois KapxTJoovlot> ivos p.avov dvop6s, TTJALKUVTTJ Ttlll' oAwv ,;ylveTO p.e-rafloJ.~ KTA. (§ s). Diodorus, it is true,

introduces an idea not present in P. when he makes Regulus' overbearing conduct, WUTE TO ••. ocup.oVLOV vr::p.euijaat (§ 2), the 'metaphysical' cause of his reversal, for there is no trace in P. of the notion that Regulus' peripeteia was due to his arrogance (so, correctly, Balsdon, CQ, 1953. 159 n. 2, criticizing what I wrote in CQ, 1945, 10); but whether this was cut out of a common source by P. (who adopts the view that a peripeteia follows upon hybris only in one passage, xxvii. 8. 4), or Diodorus added it (he is fond of the theme: cf. xxvii. 6. 2, 15. 2, xxxi. rr. 3), it seems probable that both P. and Diodorus are here follo>Ving a common source, Philinus. It is not an argument against this hypothesis th:at P. has parallels elsewhere both for his view of Tyche and his stress on the role of one man (cf. viii. 3· J, 7· 7, ix. 2:::. I, 2:z. 6, xxxii. 4· 2) for both are common (for the latter cf. Plut. lrfor. 325 A, ann Ennius, 'unus homo nobis cunctando restituit rem'). This conclusion is rejected both by Bung (us n. 3) and by Pedech (REA, r95Z, 255-{i). Pedech asserts (a) that the word TVXTJ as well as the theme of the caprice of fortune are both absent from Diodorus (Philinus), (b) that for Philinus the example of Xanthippus illustrates not the triumph of the individual but the victory of intelligence and skill over brute force. But: (a) though Diodorus does not use the word TUXTJ• he attributes Regulus' downfall to TO Satp.ol•Lov (§ 2) ; and there is no reason to think that he distinguished between the two any more than does P. (d. i. 84. Io); (b) the second distinction is artificial, for Diodorus stresses the words Jvos p.6vov avSpos and P. quotes Euripides' words on €v aorf>ov povJ.wp.a. The power of the individual resid.es in his intelligence. The slightly different attitude towards Tyche's role in the two authors is mentioned above; it is no serious obstacle to the view that the common source is Philinus, and Bung's thesis that Diodorus has introduced Polybian material in the middle of his Philinian account is not well grounded. P. here makes no reference to the famous legend of Regulus' visit to Rome on a peace-mission, under oath to return to Carthage if he failed, and of his return and death by torture; and had he 93

I. 35

THE FIRST PUNIC WAR

known of it, he must have made some mention of it in this d~dactic passage. It seems well established that this story was wholly legendary, and invented by annalists to cover up the well-founded tradition that after Regulus' (natural) death in captivity, his widow tortured two Punic prisoners held in the custody of the Atilii, so that one died (Diod. xxiv. 12). There is an excellent analysis of the growth of the Regulus legend by Klebs, RE, 'Atilius (51)', cols. 2088-92: see also DeSanctis, iii. 1. I54-6. T. Frank has argued for the authenticity of the peace-mission (CP, I926, 311 ff.); but the legend seems to stand or fall as a whole. 4. To 1ra.p' Eupl1TH5n: Nauck, fg. no. 3 from the Antiope, a frequently quoted line (d. Plut. M or. 790 A; Sex. Emp. adu. math. i. 279; Galen, Protrept. I3; Eustath. ad Iliad. ii. 372, p. 240. 42; Themistius, or. I6, p. 207 D), which refers to the strength of autocracy as against ochlocracy. P. quotes Euripides elsewhere at v. 106. 4 and xii. 26. s. and perhaps echoes him at xv. 33· I; but he may owe his acquaintance to some collection of passages (Wunderer, ii. 57-58). 7. OuE'Lv y4ip llvnJV Tpcmwv KTA.: cf. 1. 2 for the theme: for the parallel in Philinus here see Diod. xxiii. 15. 4: Tot<; 8~ lStot<; avp.r.nl>p.aat TOV<; a.\.\ov<; JS{oag<e p.hpw 9povELV Jv Tat<; Jgovafat<;. On npayp.anK-l] taTop{a (§ 9) see 2. 8 n. 36. 3. cf>Oovous • • • OLa.~oA.O.s: these reflections may also echo Philinus, whose interest in mercenary captains (cf. 43· 2 ff.) perhaps indicates another Greek in Carthaginian service. But the theme appears elsewhere in P.: cf. vii. 8. 4, ix. ro. 6. 4. £npos •.. A.Oyos: for the version that the faithless Carthaginians drowned (or tried to drown) Xanthippus on his way home see Zon. viii. 13; Val. Max. ix. 6. ext. I; Sil. It. vi. 682; App. Lib. 4; Tzetzes, Hist. iii. 38o-6 = Diod. xxiii. I6. But if this is what P. had in mind, he clearly disbelieved it. That the Xanthippus whom Ptolemy III appointed governor of the newly-won prouinciae lrans Euphraten before June 245 (Hieron. in Daniel. xi. 7---9) is the same man, was suggested by Droysen, iii. 1. 386 f., and half accepted by DeSanctis, Atti Ace. Torino, 1911-I2, 963 ('forse'), but remains uncertain: cf. Bengtson, Strat. ii. 84, iii. 172-3. If it is true, P. may have resen:ed his (lost) €npo<; Aoyo<; for some context treating Egypt. 7. ITjv yEvvmoT'lTa. Ka.i. ToAfJ-a.v: it has been suggested by Cichorius, 41-42, that Naevius, fg. 42-43 ~for. refers to these Roman survivors. The lines

'seseque ei perire mauolunt ibidem, quam cum stupro redire ad suos popularis' (fg. 42) are thought to imply the rejection by the garrison of a Punic offer of ships to transport them to Sicily (though in fact the Romans had 94

THE FIRST PUNIC WAR

I. 36. II

their own forty vessels); and 'sin illos deserant fortissumos uiros magnum stuprum populo fieri per gentes' {fg. 43) suggest some opposition at Rome to the sending of a relief expedition. Neither detail is in P.; but whereas the first contradicts his statement that the Carthaginian object was to reduce the garrison,not to let it get away (§6), the second is at least consistent with P.'s version that news of the disaster reached Rome before the expedition of 255 set sail. 9-10. The rival fleets in 255. The Punic figure of 2oo is usually accepted as inherently probable: the difficulties in the Roman figure have been discussed at 25. 7--{) n. :Meltzer (ii. 307) would reconcile the figures here with the losses in the subsequent storm (37· 2) by raising the latter from 364 to 464; Frank (CAH, vii. 684 n. r) and DeSanctis (iii. I. 157 n. 25) prefer to accept Diodorus' figure (Diod. xxiii. r8. r) of 24 prizes at C. Hermaea rather than P.'s n4, and assume some Roman losses--Orosius mentions 9-to reduce the resulting 374 to 364. But it is difficult to accept a fleet of 350 ships for the relief expedition; and the subsequent erection of a columna rostrata on the Capitol (Livy, xlii. 2o. r) and the granting of a triumph to both consuls (celebrated in January 253, after their year as proconsuls in Sicily) favours the higher figure for the Punic prizes, as does the description of the victory as €g icpoSov Kat r)q.8iw; (§ n). Tarn's solution, to reduce the figures for the relieving fleet, thus seems the most probable. As we saw (25. 7~9 n.) the error of an additional roo vessels goes back to P.'s source for Ecnomus. In fact, the relieving fleet will have been 2ro, not 250 strong, for 40 ships had been left behind at Aspis (29. 9). According to Zonaras (viii. 14), these ships arrived to join the main fleet during the battle. Laqueur's explanation of the discrepancy, namely that the figure in 36. ro is from Philinus and that in 37· 2 from Fabius (RE, 'Philinos', col. 2187), rests on a fallacious criterion for isolating passages derived from Philinus. 10. MapKov At(-!iAwv Ka.l. Iepou~ov 4>oAoutov: the consuls for A.U.c. 499 = 255/4 B.C., M. Aemilius M.f. Ln. Paullus and Ser. Fulvius M:.f. M.n. Paetinus l\obilior {Klebs, RE, 'Aemilius {rq)', cols. sso~r; Munzer, RE, 'Fulvius (97)', cols. 269~7o). E1TAeov 1ra.pn TlJV ILKEAia.v: the compression may be to compensate for the long account of Ecnomus (Tarn, JHS, 19o7, 53). Zon. viii. 14 records that the fleet, overtaken by a storm, put in at and occupied Cossyra (modern Pantelleria), which was recovered by the Carthaginians the following year. This is confirmed by the consuls' triumph which each of them 'procos. de Cossurensibus et Poeneis naualem egit' (act. tr.), in January 253. 11. TouTous (-!EV ••• Tpe"'a(-ievol: this battle off C. Hermaea (cf. 29.2) is also described by Diod. xxiii. r8. I; Zon. viii. 14; Eutrop. ii. 22. I; 95

!. 36.

I I

THE FIRST PUNIC WAR

Oros. iv. 9· 5 f. According to Zonaras it was laxupd vauJLaxla, and this version, including the 24 Punic losses instead of II4 (Diodorus), probably goes back to Philinus. 12. -rovs 8' ~~~ AL~on ... veo.v(O"~
37. 1. 1Tp00'fl£€o.vns TU TW\1 Ko.f!o.pwo.(wv xwpq;: i.e. towards c. Pachynus. 2. Roman losses: see above 36. 9-10 n. Eutrop. ii. 22. 3 and Oros. iv. 9· 8 also record So ships surviving, but give the total fleet as 464 and 300 ships respectively. The losses are given in Diod. xxiii. r8. I as 340 warships and 300 transports sunk. 4. fl~ 1TAE'i:v 1rapO. T~\1 e~w 1TAeup6.v: a criticism which evidently entered the tradition later, since, with Lilybaeum, Drepana, and Panormus in Punic hands, ancient methods of navigation allowed the Romans no choice of route besides that round C. Pachynus. Meltzer, ii. 308; DeSanctis, iii. r. rs8. T~v f!EV ooSe1rw Iepe0"9aL: cf. Diod. i. 49· s, 7TapayEypaJLJLrfvwv TWV KO.Ta ¢rJatv ywoJLr!vwv TOtS' aarpots avaToAwv TE Kai BvaEWV Kat Bta TO.VTO.<; E1TLTEAO!!JLEVWJ.J E7Tta7JJLaatwJJ KO.Tct Toil<; Alyv7TTlovs aaTpo.\6you<;. These E7TtU7JJLaalat are the risings and

settings of constellations, and other astronomical phenomena with which changes of weather were believed to be connected, in this case the risings of Orion and Sirius. Such phenomena are discussed in the weather-calendar appended to the Eisagoge of Geminus (d. Tittel, RE, 'Geminos (r)', cols. 1035-6), in which JmaTJJLaaf.a appears to denote specifically a phenomenon heralding bad weather (as here). In Eisagoge, 17 Manit. Geminus insists that such calendars have only empirical, and no scientific, value-a point of view in advance of that expressed here. flETa.~u ••• Ti}S '.Qp(wvos ~mvoJLlv71 , 'the morning appearance of the rising g6

THE FIRST PUNIC WAR

I. 38.

I

before sunrise'. By the setting of a star (cf. iii. 54· r) P. means the date at which it first sets before sunrise, having hitherto become inv1.sible while still above the horizon. This is Ptolemy's third O'X.TJJl.anap..lou J7Ti TOV 7TpOs avaTOAas dpl,oVTOS ()VTOS 6 aO'T~p fJ i1Tt TOV 1TpD<; 3uap.ds, and defined as lc.{;a 11po3uats if>atvop.,vTJ, 'the morning appearance of the setting before sunrise'. Strachan-Davidson (15-zr) discusses the relationship between these two axryp.aTtap.ot and appends calculations of the dates of the rising of the Pleiades, of Orion, and of Sirius, for P.'s date and the latitude of Rome. The rising of Orion he makes 4 July, of Sirius z8 July (Gregor.): other scholars (e.g. De Sanctis, iii. r. 258) vary by a day or two. dates-July for Sirius and December for Orion-make nonsense of the passage; and Luterbacher's interpretation of rising as the 'sunset rising' (Ptolemy's seventh 'aspect') is equally impossible, since it would set the Roman voyage in December (Phil., 1907, 412).) Ps.-Aristotle (Problem. z6. 13. 941 b) also associates the rising of Orion with uncertain weather; and (ibid. rz. 941 a-b) associates the rising of Sirius with the south wind. 7-10. Criticism of Roman headstrong behaviour: this follows P.'s consistent interpretation of the return of this expedition (cf. 37· 4-6), which, as we saw, seems based on an anachronistic judgement on the consuls. The didacticism recalls that of 35, and there is the same stress on v{3pts, which turns good qualities such as ToAp.a (cf. 20. n-r3) into vices. The repetition of such words as {3ta (§§ 7 and IO), 8p!L7J (§ 7), ToAp.a (§ IO), {3tawp.ax.dv (§ 9) is noteworthy, but need not indicate the use of specifically Stoic terminology (so Lorenz, 45). P. is especially interested in Roman naval policy, and in vi. 52 he assesses the Roman performance at sea more favourably; Laqueur's view that his criticism here is taken straight out of Philinus (RE, 'Philinos', col. zr87) is neither proved nor probable. 38. 1-4. Dispatch of Hasdrubal to Sicily. This is Hasdrubal, son of Hanno (cf. 30. r n.), and the source will be Philinus. His arrival in Sicily is dated to 251 by Orosius (iv. 9· r4) and Eutropius (ii. 24); and P.'s silence on Hasdrubal's action at the time of the capture of Panormus (§§ 7-ro) is in favour of the view that he was not yet in Sicily. DeSanctis (iii. r. r64 n. 46, :227) makes the plausible suggestion that Philinus related Hasdrubal's dispatch after a Roman naval disaster, in fact that of 253 (39· 6), and that P. confused it with the shipwreck off Camarina. Meltzer (ii. 309, 574-5) also dates Hasdrubal's dispatch to 252 (cf. 39· rz n.); see also Thiel, Hist. :243 n. 584. P. argues (probably again with Philinus) that the Carthaginians now commanded the sea; but this is not the picture that emerges from the next few years' campaigning, especially during the blockade of 486!!

H

97

I. 38.

I

THE FIRST PUNIC WAR

Lilybaeum (42. 7 ff.); on this see especially Thiel, Iiist. 252 n. 6n. The 2oo ships of § 3 never appear to accomplish anything, and Tarn (]HS, r9o7, 56) is probably right in thinking that they were really transports used to convey Hasdrubal. He is wrong, however, in supposing that this is implied by P., who, judging from the text, pretty clearly took them to be warships prepared after Hasdrubal's crossing (cf. too 38. r, vavnt<
THE FIRST PUNIC WAR

I. 39· 1

'Panormos (15)', cols. 668-77 (with earlier bibliography). Columba has argued that both the IlaAatd. 7TOA<s- (dpxala m5Ats-, Diodorus; aKpa, Zonaras) and the Nia '1TOA£S' (EKTOS' 'lTOAts, Diodorus; KllTw 1TOAts, Zonaras) are contained within the central area (modern Cassaro) west of the (then much extended) harbour (the Kala), and between two streams, the Fiume del Papireto on the north and the Fiume di Mal Tempo on the south; and that the Old To·wn lay at the west end of this oval enclosure, in a district of about 10 ha. known as the Galea. But it seems unlikely that the original Phoenician settlement was so far away from the sheltered harbour; and Cassaro with its 43 ha. seems very small for Old Town and New Town together. Hence it seems likely that Cassaro was the Old Town (Cassaro AI Qa$r. 'the fortress'), and that the New Town lay south of the Fiume di Mal Tempo, towards, and probably including, the modern Kalsa. See De Sanctis, iii. 1. r6o-1 n. 33· The assault is described also in Diod. xxiii. r8. 3-5, after his mention of the Roman seizure of Cephaloedium (modern Cefalu) and an unsuccessful attempt on Drepana; and by Zon. viii. 14. According to Diodorus 14,ooo escaped from the Old Tmm by paying a two minae ransom, and the remaining 13,ooo were enslaved: this would include former slaves (De Sanctis). Only Scipio triumphed procos. de Poetteis X k. april. (hence :zs:z); consequently, despite P., Atilius did not share in the assault on Panormus (Zonaras also speaks of I17TaTot). 10. nwE1TAEUO'(l,V d':i TTJV 'Pti>JLTJV: before this Soluntum (ro miles east of Panormus), Tyndaris (12 miles west of Mylae), and three other places came over (Diod. xxiii. 18. 5: leta, Petra, and Imachara); and the Carthaginians under Carthalo took, and, being unable to hold it, burnt Agrigentum (Diod. ibid.), and recaptured Cossyra (Zon. viii. 14).

39. 1. fvluo'i I10poulhLO'i M:o.l f6.1o'i IEjl'lrpWvLo'i: the consuls for

A.U.C. SOl = 253/2 B.C., Cn. Servilius Cn.f. Cn.n. Caepio and c. Sempronius Ti.f. Ti.n. Blaesus (Munzer, RE, 'Servilius (43)', col. 178o; 'Sempronius (28)', cols. IJ68-9)· Eutropius (ii. 23), Orosius (iv. 9· 10), and Zonaras (viii. 14) agree in putting both consuls in charge of the fleet; but as in the former year, only one consul triumphed, Sempronius, cos. de Poeneis k. april. (i.e. 252). Probably Servilius operated in Sicily with Cornelius Asina, the proconsul; De Sanctis, iii. 1. r63. Eutropius and Orosius put the size of the fleet at 26o ships: Tarn (] HS, 1907, 55) makes it 220 as in the previous year (on his calculation cf. 38. 5 n.). Zon. viii. 14 records a fruitless attack on Lilybaeum, probably true, as the Romans could now, since the capture of Panormus, take the northern route round Sicily (§ 5). The policy of using the fleet to raid Africa instead of pressing on with combined operations against western Sicily seems to have been a serious error, even on the assumption that the raids were designed to stimulate

99

J. 39·

I

THE FIRST PUNIC WAR

native revolts and to hinder the Punic naval programme; see Thiel, Hist. 247-8, J23· 2. TTJV Twv AwTotfl6.ywv vf)crov: cf. xxxiv. 3· I2. The identification of Meninx (modern Djerba, off the Tunisian coast, about 35 miles south-west of Gabes} with the Homeric island was made by Eratosthenes (Pliny, Nat. hist. v. 41); and the name Lotophagitis was extended to the Lesser Syrtis (Strabo, xvii. 834; Eustath. ad Dion. Perieg. 198 (GGM, ii. 252); Agathem. v. 22 (GGM, ii. 483)); Schwabe, RE, 'Lotophagitis', col. ISIS· The raids made en roztte for Meninx are exaggerated by Eutropius and Orosius into the capture of plurimae cittitates with much plunder. 3. 1rpooupwv: the consuls for A.U.C. 503 zsrfo B.C., L. Caedlius L.f. C.n. Metellus and c. Furius C.f. C.n. Pacilius (Munzer, RE, 'Caecilius (72)', cols. I203-4; 'Furius (75)', col. 359). Those for 252/r B.C. are omitted, like those of 259 (24. 8 n.), as having accomplished nothing of note: they were C. Aurelius L.f. 100

THE FIRST PUNIC WAR

I. 40.

I

C.n. Cotta and P. Servilius Q.f. Cn.n. Geminus (Klebs, RE, 'Aurelius (94)', cols. 2481-2; Munzer, RE, 'Servilius (6z)', cols. 1795-6). 10. Tijs ••. Oo.XaTTTJS ••• ~'II"Etcpa.Touv: echoing Philinus: on the true picture cf. 38. 1-4 n. On this occasion the Romans sent reinforcements with a convoy of only sixty ships (§ 8) ; and for whatever reason their enemy made no effective moves against them. 12. £'ITt So' evLo.u·mvs: apparently the two years following the wreck off C. Palinurus, viz. 252 and 251 (De Sanctis, iii. r. r65 with n. 46, who, however, is surely wrong in speaking of 'consul years' (cf. 39· IS n.}: for the source is Philinus). ~!eltzer (ii. 574-6) dates the two years from Hasdrubal's arrival in Sicily to the battle of Panormus (2s2-june zso); but the change seems to date from the resumption of a naval policy (§ IS), the thing P. is interested in. 13. 0Eplla.v ••• KaL A.mapav: so too Diod. xxiii. 19. 20, who also mentions an unsuccessful attack on Heirkte. On Lipara see zr. 5, 24. 13; on Tbermae (of Himera: c£. Zon. viii. 14) see 24. 4· Zon., ibid., dates the capture to the consulship of Aurelius and Servilius (252/1), and this is confirmed by the coins struck in imitation of those of Lipara by L. Aurelius Cotta, consul in 65 B.C. Aurelius triumphed 'cos. de Poeneis et Siculeis idibus apriL' (z51). 15. r aLOV J\T0..LOV tca.i Aeotuov MaXLOv: the consuls for A.U.C. 504 zso/49 B.C. were experienced in naval warfare-C. Atilius Regulus, the victor of Tyndaris (25. In.) and L. Manlius Vulso, ·who shared in that at Ecnornus (26. I I n.). The building of tbe fleet will obviously have begun before 11ay, as an integral part of the policy ..........~.,_,.,,"'"' in the election of these two men; but the words Ka:racrn}crai!TES' crTpaTY)yous mean simply 'electing as consuls'; and De Sanctis (iii. r. 263) is forcing the Greek when he translates 'appointing as commanders of the fleet', i.e. after their entry into office (crTpetTY)y&> is used in this sense only when there is no ambiguity, e.g. II, 3. 59· 8; but for a parallel to this passage cf. 52. s). DeSanctis is misled by his desire to postpone Roman activity till after the end of the two 'consul years' 2s2/1 and 251/o (39· 12 n.). 'ITEVT~tcovTa. aK6.
40. 1.

IOI

I.

40. I

THE FIRST PUNIC WAR

G1Cjla.too1711s TllS auy~eojlLS-i)s: d. 17. 9; it was June: but of which year? The battle of Panormus is variously dated to 251 (Mommsen, Holm, Reuss (Phil., r9or: less certainly 1909)) and 250 (Meltzer, Beloch, De

Sanctis, Frank, Luterbacher, Scullard). Furius' departure would naturally point to 25o: but against this it has been argued (r) that Caedlius fought as consul; so Florus, i. r8. 27; Eutrop. ii. 24; Oros. iv. 9· 14; and less definitely, Frontin. Strat. ii. 5· 4; Pliny, Nat. hist. vii. 140; Diod. xxiii. 2r; (z) that there is a tradition of peace negotiations after the battle; but that as Caecilius triumphed in early September 250, his successors must have left Rome no later than the end of July, thus leaving no room for such negotiations in 250. De Sanctis (iii. I. 262-3) has shown that the tradition that Caecilius fought as consul derives from Livy, who elsewhere confuses consuls and proconsuls at this time; and the peace embassy is part of the Regulus myth, and quite worthless (35 n.). Moreover, the 251 dating has its own difficulties, best set out by Leuze (Phil., 1907, 137-9; but his own dating of the battle to April or early May zso involves translating dKp.a{ovmy; ri)s avyKop.tSijs 'when the time of harvest should be at hand', op. cit. 145-6). The date of the battle, then, was June 250, probably after the entry of the new consuls into office (though this is not to be deduced from 39· 15). 4. StO. TWV an:vwv El$ TTjv na.vopjltTw: d. Diod. xxiii. 21, S"t Tfjs 1J£1ttvomJTws Svaxwp{as ~lt8£v Els 'T(J II&.vopp.ov. Probably the route via Iaitia (modern S. Giuseppe, 15 miles south-west of Palermo) over into the valley of the Orethus (modern Oreto, Tdv 7Tpb Tijs 1TDA£ws 7ToTap.ov), which reaches the sea through the plain of the Conca d'Oro, just south of Palermo. 6-16. The battle of Panormus. Diod. xxiii. 21 records how the Carthaginians' Celtic mercenaries contributed to the disaster by their drunkenness; Zon. viii. 14 gives the Punic fleet a sensational but ineffective part in operations (accepted by Thiel, Hist. 261-2), and describes how Metellus eliminated a potential fifth column, and later transported his captured elephants across the Straits of Messana {cf. Pliny, Nat. hist. viii. r6; Frontin. Strat. i. 7· r). Eutrop. ii. 24 and Oros. iv. 9· 15 give Punic losses as 2o,ooo (out of 3o,ooo: Orosius); and Orosius records that Hasdrubal was condemned to death. 10. Toi<;
THE FIRST PUNIC WAR

I. 41. 4

is variously given as 142 or qo (Pliny), r2o (Livy, Seneca, Zonaras), 104 (with 26 killed: Orosius), roo (Florus), and 6o (Diodorus). They were butchered in the circus; and henceforth coins of the Caecilii Metelli frequently display an elephant; cf. B.M.C. Rom. Rep. i. xss-6, ii. 3S7 J 570. 41. 2. 1T6.Aw i1Teppwa9"1aav •.. tcaTA Tl)v t~ O.px* 1Tpo9Emv: 'they were again encouraged to send out ... in accordance with their original plan'. See 20. 7 for this plan: abandoned after the shipwreck of 39· 6, it was resumed as a policy of desperation (39· 14-rs) after a two years' interval (39· 12). The victory of Panormus led the Romans to pursue it with the hope of bringing the war to a successful conclusion. The change in policy has already been recorded (39· rs): the important thing here is the change in spirit. 3. l11TAEOV ••• StaKOO'l(11S vauaiv: having been mentioned in 39· rs, the consuls are not named here. P.'s total of 2oo ships (also in Oros. iv. 10. z) depends on his belief that the total in 2S4 was 300 (38. 7); this figure was reduced to ISO by the losses off C. Palinurus (39· 6) and is now raised to 200 by the building of an additional so {39· 15). These figures are consistent, and probably go back to Fabius; but they are probably all So too large, since the 220 ships of 254 almost certainly included the So surviving from the storm (37· 2). Hence the real figure for 2so D.c. is 120 ships (cf. Thiel, Hist. 88-Sg). Philinus in Diodorus (xxiv. 1. 1) gave 240 quinqueremes and 6o cerwri (light warships; cf. Livy, xxiii. 34· 4; App. Lib. 75), an exaggeration. De Sanctis (iii. r. 171 n. 6s) wavers between the view that P. has 'corrected' this figure from Fabius and that the words (t.:ai n7'1'a.pdKoV7'a) have fallen out of his text; and he mentions 2oo ships on p. 166 and 240 on p. r68. In fact P.'s figures are quite consistent; but wTong. Philinus' total may be due to confusion with the combined total for Claudius' and Junius' squadrons in 249 (so Thiel, His!. 257 n. 63z); but this is quite uncertain. 4. lhos ••• TETTapEcrtcm5ktcaTov: it is the departure of the consuls of 250/49 for Sicily which-probably following Philinus (CQ, 1945, P. so dates. If Ap. Claudius crossed to Messana in fate summer, 264 (s. I-S n.), the departure of Atilius and Manlius shortly after the battle of Panormus (June zso) will still be in the fourteenth year of the war. Supporting his view that Ap. Claudius crossed in spring 263, Beloch (iv. 2. 285-6) argues that P. can never have mentioned what year it is in connexion \vith an event occurring at the end of a year: P., he insists, must have referred the beginning of the siege of Lilybaeum to the fifteenth year, if in fact his (i.e. Philinus') 'years of the war' began in late summer. But both Beloch and DeSanctis, whom he is criticizing, miss the point that it is not the siege of Lilybaeum which matters to P. and is being dated here: it is the 103

L 41. 4

THE FIRST PUNIC WAR

active resumption of a naval policy, a critical moment (cf. 41. 2 n.). Since this came clearly within the fourteenth year, P.'s date is without difficulty. 6. cicj:opfltJV: 'military base': cf. Thuc. i. 90. 2, T~v ••• IkAo7TOW'f/aov ••• €cf>aaav .•• d.cf>opf-L¥ LKav~v li£lvat. Understand: 'if Lilybaeum fell'. -rrXY)v Ape-rravwv: modern Trapani, lay at the west end of Sicily, about 20 miles north of Lilybaeum (42. 7 ff.). Drepana was one of the most important remaining Punic bases. (The plural form is more correct: in Diod. xxiii. 9 To .1p~7Tavov may be the peninsula.) 42. 1-7. Geography of Sicily and Lilybaeum. The comparison with the Peloponnese, clearly intended for Greek readers (cf. 3· 8), perhaps hints at the tradition that Sicily too was once part of the mainland, Rhegium being the 'town of the break-through' (Myvvf.Lt) : Aesch. fg. 402 (Strabo, vi. 258); Diod. iv. 85. 2 f.; authorities quoted by Ziegler, RE, '£LK<)..{a ', col. 2467. Though superficially plausible (Cuntz, 71), P.'s account of the shape and bearings of Sicily is faulty. The direction of the three capes is given as: Pachynus 7rpos f-LW"fJf.LfJplav, south (§ 4). Pelorias Els Tns apKTOVS KEKALf-L~l!OV, north (§ s), Lilybaeum ds xaf.LEptvas Mans, south-west (qualified as 'turned towards Libya': § 6). The two latter bearings are found elsewhere. Pelorias is the north tip of the island in Strabo, vi. 265 and Pliny, Nat. hist. iii. 87, though in fact it is not so far north as the Phalacrian Promontory (Ptol. Geog. iii. 4· 2), modern C. Rasocolmo, ro km. to the northwest; and of Lilybaeum Strabo, ibid., writes, Tp{TrJ o' iaTLV (axpa) ~ 7Tpoa<x~s Tfj AtfJvv. {JAl7TOVaa 7Tp6s TUVT'f!V apa Kat T~l! XHf-L
(modern C. Boco) is the most westerly tip of Sicily. Both Strabo and Pliny make Pachynus project east towards Greece; and the explanation of their bearings (which derive from Poseidonius) is that the island has been distorted thus: Pe!orias

r/Pachynus

.N.

t

lt7ybaeom//

The real east-south-east side is here represented as north-north-east, the north side as north-west, and the south-west side as southeast; the island is about 90° out of true position, and the distortion perhaps goes back to Eratosthenes, who placed Rome, Messana, and Carthage on a single meridian (Strabo, i. 93), which implies that the north coast of Sicily runs virtually north-south (map in Thomson, 142 ), and the other sides with corresponding errors. Despite his correction 104

THE FIRST PUNIC WAR

L 42.7

of Pachynus, which lies 1rpos fWJYJfLflplav, P.'s account especially of Lilybaeum suggests that he is partly the victim of the same distorted picture. Ziegler, loc. cit., cols. 2468~, 247r. 4. To ILt<~Au(ov TrEAa.yos: Strabo, vi. 265, also makes Pach_y'llus extend into the Sicilian Sea, which washes the northern part of the shore between Pachynus and Lilybaeum (the southern part being washed by the Libyan Sea); see the diagram above. (In ii. r23, where he follows a better tradition for the bearings of the capes, he defines the Sicilian Sea on the west by C. Pachynus, by Locri Epizeph_yTii in Italy, and by the west end of Crete.) To P. the Sicilian Sea was separated from the Ionian Sea in the north by C. Cocynthus (ii. 14. 5); and it included the Gulfs of Corinth and Ambracia (iv. 63. s. v. 3· g, 5· IJ). Whether its southern boundary was a line going east from Pachynus (so Burr, 54-56) is by no means clear. Ziegler, Joe. cit., cols. 247I-2. 5. op(~El ••• TO Trpos 8uO'El<; !J.Epos: P. has a correct picture of the Straits of Messana as running north-south. His 12 stades are in Pliny, Nat. hist. iii. 73 (cf. iii. 86: MD passus); and in Ps.-Scyla.x, 13 (Pelorias to Rhegium, rather too little). The narrowest width today is 17! stades; but there may have been an increase since ancient times (so Ziegler, loc. cit., coL 2473; Holm, Gesch. Sic. i. 328, is dubious). 6. TOLS ••• nKpWTTJp(OLS: c. Bon and c. Farina: see iii. 22. 5 n. (a). The distance to Africa is variously given as r,soo stades (Strabo, vi. 267; Eustath. ad Dion. Perieg. 473 (GGM, ii. 306); !tin. Ant. 494). and r8o milia passuum (Pliny, Nat. hist. iii. 87). P.'s figure of r,ooo stades (i.e. IIS miles or 125 milia passuum) is nearest to the actual distance of 140 km. (c. 88 miles). Ziegler, RE, 'Lilybaeum (r)', col. 542. &ta.LpEi: ••• To ALf3utcbv tcal. To Ia.p&~ov Traayo<;: the reference to the mare Sardoum raises difficulties. The sea north (here read north-west) of Sicily is the Tyrrhenian Sea, ii. 14. 4, r6. r, iii. 6r. 3, no. 9; and the mare Sardown lay west of Sardinia (ro. 5 n.; cf. Herod. i. r66). Ziegler (RE, EtKr:.Ala, coL 2471) argues that P.'s meaning is 'that Lilybaeum marks the eastern terminus of the line of demarcation between the Libyan and Sardinian Seas', and quotes Eratosthenes (ap. Pliny, Nat. hist. iii. 75). But why should such a line of demarcation extend 200 miles east of Sardinia, when the Sardinian Sea lay to its west? 7. TroAts OfLWVVfLOS: Lilybaeum, modern Marsala, the main centre of Punic Sicily. P. may have visited it en route for Africa in 149, and perhaps on his return in 146 (d. xxxvi. II. r for his broken-off journey thither) ; but his detailed account of the topography is not without difficulties, and though De Sanctis (iii. I. 228) speaks of the 'fleeting impressions of a traveller who once landed at Lilvbaeum', it is unlikely that these lines were written after his visit. Cf. Cuntz, 105

0 w

2. LILYBAEUM.

to6

Based on Freeman

THE FIRST PUNIC WAR

L 42. n

J. Schubring, Phil. xxiv, 1866, 62 ff.; Freeman, History of Sicily, iv. 93 ff. (map on p. 74). Diod. xxiv. I-4 precedes his account of the operations with the statement that at some unspecified date (but evidently recently: cf. 39· 12) Selin us had been destroyed by the Carthaginians and its population transferred to Lilybaeum. On the operations here P., like Diodorus, seems to follow Philinus; but not exclusively (cf. Bung, 57-58). The discrepancies between P. and Diodorus (cf. Pedech, REA, I952, 258-62) are explicable on the assumption of a different selection of material and the correction of Philinus' figures from Fabius in P. Tcici>p'l.J !3a.llEL4: 6o cubits wide and 40 deep (Diod. xxiv. 1. 2) ; a cubit is about 1! ft. T£vaymw EK lla.AciTT1)S: cf. 46. 9· The ancient harbour had an artificial mole north of the town (the modern one lies south of Marsala); on the shoals cf. Virg. A en. iii. 706, 'uada dura ... saxis Lilybeia caecis'. £LS To(,s ALp.tvo.s: 'into the harbour' (not plural): cf. Schweighaeuser, Lex. Polyb. s. v. ALJ.L~v. 8. 1Tpoucnpa.T01T£8£0uo.vTE<; ••• oi 'Pwp.a.'LoL: their numbers are a problem. Philinus (Diod. xxiv. 1. I) made them 11o,ooo, of which at least 84,ooo were no doubt ships' crews and marines (he assumed a :fleet of 240 ships: 41. 3 n). In addition there were the land forces (41. 4), which Orosius (iv. Io. 2) not unreasonably reckons at four legions. On the other hand, the fleet was in reality only 120 ships strong. In 45· 8, where the defenders are reckoned at 2o,ooo, the attackers are only €-n 7TA<'lov>. This would appear to rule out Thiel's belief (Hist. 263) that they came to 3o,ooo. The probability is that P. is not including oarsmen in his purview. Four legions of 3,ooo gives 32,ooo men; 1oo marines for I20 ships another I2,ooo. But both figures may well have been smaller, and the effective soldiers (excluding ships' crews) outside Lilybaeum probably came to 35,ooo-4o,ooo men. For Roman losses see 42. 12 n. The Roman fortifications are mentioned by Diod. xxiv. I. I, -.Yjv J.LEV yijv am) 8a>..d.cra'1]> tl> 80.>..aaaav

69-71; and, for the topography,

7dfpo/ U7TtoT£fxwav. 9, 1TpOUKnTnUK£UatovTE<; • , , a£l TOlS li'TTOKELj.LEVOL<;: 'constantly

adding something to what they had already constructed' (Shuckburgh). (In xxi. 11. 6 :rrpoaKa-raaK£Vd,£tv means 'to create new (kings) in addition to those already existing'.) Paton's translation, 'gradually advancing from the base thus acquired', gives the false impression that the southern tower 7Tp6> -ro At{3vK6v m£>..ayo> fell; the fall of the six adjacent towers suggests that this was not so. 11. T~JV j-1-Lullocpopwv elc; p.up£ouc;: 'about Io,ooo', partly Greeks, partly Celts (43· 4, 48. 3), under Himilco (who is otherwise unknown). Diod. xxiv. 1. I gives 7,ooo foot and 7oo horse, later reinforced by 4,ooo under Adherbal (Diod. xxiv. I. 2; below, 44· I n.); P. probably rounds off these u,7oo to 1o,ooo (Thiel, Hist. 263-4). 107

I.

{2. 12

THE FIRST PUNIC "\VAR

12. ouS€v 1TO.pEAEL1T~ TWV SuvaTWV: P.'s UVTotKOOop.wv is expanded in Diod. xxiv. 1. 2 (cf. Zon. viii. 15), which records the building of a second wall (behind that linking the six towers) ; Diodorus gives the exaggerated figure of 1o,ooo Roman casualties, and attributes a further 1o,ooo deaths (§ 4) to an epidemic caused by an exclusively meat diet. 43. Alexan saves the Carthaginians from the treachery of their mercenaries. This incident, which is described at quite disproportionate length, is clearly from Philinus (that 43-48 are taken from this source is generally admitted; De Sanctis, iii. 1. 228; Gelzer, Hermes, 1933, 141; Bung, 56: contra Pedech, REA, 1952, 258 ff.). The loyalty of a Greek in Punic service, who had helped Agrigentum, naturally appealed to the historian of that city; and the Achaean historian was sufficiently interested to allot this digression to a fellow-countryman. The story occurs, with slight variations, in Zon. viii. 15. The identification of the incident at Agrigentum has caused difficulties. The 'mercenaries of Syracuse' are apparently the Mamertini (7. 2 n.) who, either before or after seizing Messana, made several similar plundering expeditions; cf. Diod. xxiii. 1. 4 (destruction of Gela and Camarina). It has been suggested, however, that the incident here mentioned is that in ii. 7· 7, where Gallic mercenaries in Carthaginian pay plunder Agrigentum (which became Punic shortly after Pyrrhus' departure): De Sanctis, iii. 1. 91-92; Kirchner, RE, 'Alexan (1}', col. 1471; Beloch, iv. 1. 558 n. 2. But P. speaks definitely of Syracusan mercenaries, and he says that Alexan saved Agrigentum (whereas the Gallic mercenaries plundered it). Consequently, the two incidents must be distinct. The present one is linked with the death of the tyrant Phintias, c. 28o, by "Meltzer (ii. 544); and Holm (Gesch. Sic. ii. 487} puts it even earlier, before the Mamertini broke away from Syracuse, i.e. before 288-283. But a date before 280 would perhaps make Alexan rather old for a mercenary captain. 2. 1ra.pa0"1TovSe~v: used by P. to describe the seizure of Messana and Rhegium by mercenary garrisons: cf. 7· 2, 7· 8, 10.4,43· 7, iii.26. 6. But it can also refer to any treacherous onslaught; cf. ii. 7. 6, 46. 3, 58. 4, 6o. J, xxxiii. 10. J, xxxviii. 7· 10. Reuss, Volk. Grund. 71 n., '1Tapaa1Tovoefv • • • ist im allgemeinen ein Ausdruck fiir ein unredliches Verhalten'; cf. Hesselbarth, 86. 4. >\vv(~av TOV utov TOU >\vv(~ou: 24. 5-7 n.; cf. 18. 7 n. Nothing further is known of the son. 8. To us voflous Kat -nlv EA~u9Epta.v: suggests a time when Agrigentum was independent. 44. 1. >\vv£!3o.v, Ss ~v 1l.fltAKou ••• u~o<; KTA.: from Oros. iv. 10. 2, 'Hannibale qui Hamilcaris filius fuit uicti' (where uicti evidently I08

THE FIRST PUNIC WAR

I. 45· 9

refers to Ecnomus (26. r) and Adys (3o. 5}), this Hamilcar is clearly the commander in these battles {24. 3 n.}, who since Regulus' defeat had been active in reducing the revolted Numidians and Moors (Oros. iv. 9· 9). Diod. xxiv. r. 2 mentions 4,ooo reinforcements under Adherbal; and the name cannot be a copyist's slip; cf. Zon. viii. 15, JtpS€f3a.v Q't)v vava11T/..El(TTatS: ••• atmv dyoJaa.~s: Kat XP~fl.a.Ta {and Dio's source was not Diodorus). The discrepancy can be explained in various ways. There may have been two separate expeditions; or P. may have 'corrected' Philinus from Fabius (though this is unlikely for a detail of this kind). But the most likely explanation is that Adherbal was in charge of the expedition, but went on to Drepana (46. r), leaving Hannibal (Tp•~pa.pxos: Ka1 l/..os: Jt--rdpf3ov 1TpwTos:) at the Aegates Islands to run the blockade of Lilybaeum. Cf. De Sanctis, iii. r. 232-3. The phrase 1TpWTo:; l,/..os: is normally used of the intimate circle round the king in a Hellenistic court; Bikerman, Sileucides, 40-42; Holleaux, Etudes, iii. 220 ff. = BCH, 1933, 31 ff.; its use here suggests the importance of Adherbal, and Hannibal's position of trust relative to him. 2. ~v Tnl:s ••• Atyoucrall~S: the Aegates Islands lie off the west tip of Sicily between Drepana and Lilybaeum, and include Aegusa (modern Favignana) and Phorbantia (modern Levanzo), and in some writers Riera Nesos (modern Maritima), 15 miles farther west (cf. 6o. 3; Pliny, Nat. hist. iii. 92). That they lie 'between Lilybaeum and Carthage' is true only on P.'s bearings (42. 1-7 n.); Biittner-Wobst's explanation, that P. means simply that Hannibal's course was via the Aegates Islands (Klio, 1905, 94), is unconvincing. E1TET1'JpE~ Tov 1TAouv: 'he waited for favourable weather'; for this sense of 1r'Aoiis d. iv. Si· 2, 57· 6. 4-5. Reaction to Hannibal's action. The contrast between the reaction of the Romans and the besieged population, with Hannibal between, creates a picture which is reproduced else·where; cf. the scene at Hannibal's crossing of the Rhone (iii. 43· 7-8), or the clash at Cynoscephalae (xviii. 25. 1), which show the same rhetorical influence and stress on the sensationaL The ultimate forebear may be Thucydides' famous description of the battle in the Great Harbour of Syracuse (Thuc. vii. 71). In xxix. 12. ro P. shows himself to be conscious of such repetitions. 45. 8. oliK ~Aa.TTous Swr-tup(wv: i.e. ro,ooo of the original garrison (42. n), with ro,ooo reinforcements (44· z). 9. KilT' livSpll Kill KllTa ~uyov: 'man to man and rank to rank', cf. iii. 81. 2, ii. 69. 5 (KaT' avOpa Kat KO.Ta nf.yp.a.). 'V}'OIJ is Strictly a rank of soldiers, ordo, in contrast to (TTot:xos:, a file; xviii. 29. 5, 30. :2. Here it is used loosely, as the parallel example with Ka.Ta rdyp.a shows. 109

THE FIRST PUNIC WAR

46. 3. w~ ll.v EKO.TOV Ka.l E'lKOO'~ O'TtLO~a.: about 25 miles, a figure rather on the low side; cf. Meltzer, ii. 326-7. 46.4--47. 10. The blockade-running of Hannibal 'the Rhodian'. De Sanctis (iii. r. 228) suggests that Philinus, to whom this meticulous detail is ultimately due, was perhaps an eyewitness and shared the ; so too Cuntz, 69. It must go back ultimately to an eyewitness, whether Philinus or his source. Xicknames were common at Carthage, where the same personal names were used to excess; and these are often taken from some locality; cf. ix. 25. 4, MO:yuwos 'ToiJ l.:auvl'Tou 1rpooayopevopivou; xxxvi. 5· 1, Maywva -rcivBpl:rrwv. \Vere such names hereditary, like Roman cognomina? A Punic emissary to Alexander's court, named Hamilcar, was nicknamed Rhodanus (Oros. iv. 6. 21; cf. lustin. xxi. 6. r) or Rodinus (Frontin. Strat. i. 2. 3). If the real form was Rhodius (or the Punic equivalent), he may be an ancestor of this Hannibal. 46. 9. errTepwKuia.t: cf. §II, 7TT€pt.!Joas -r~v vauv. The phrase means 'to have the oars stretched out like wings ready to strike thewater': cf. Plut. Anton. 63; Eurip. I.T. 1346. 47. 2. E1TE~T· ll.v ••• emrrpoa6et:v O.rra.a~: 'coming from the direction of Italy he would keep the sea-tower on his bows, so as to cover the whole line of the city's towers in the direction of Africa'. The words dm~ -rwv • •. fLEpwv can hardly go with -rdv 7Tllpyov (as Paton). The seatower is not that mentioned in 42. 8, but another at the western extremity of the fortifications (Meltzer, ii. 577). Hannibal sailed in along a line which kept this tower covering other towers on the south side; he came 'from the Italian direction', i.e. from the north (for the sake of the manceuvre; that the Aegates Islands were north-west of Lilybaeum (so Cuntz, 69) is irrelevant). Though P. does not say so, at some point Hannibal must have swerved left from the above course to enter the harbour: the use of the towers as sights was to evade the shoals (Twv 1rpof5paxiwv). lumpoolhrv, 'to cover one thing by another', is Schweighaeuser's certain emendation. 3. XWVVUEW ••• errexECp'J0'<1V: cf. Diod. xxiv. I. z; the Romans had already sunkrs cercuri in the entrance (r. r), but without completely blocking it. 7. eK Ka.Ta.~oXfjs: either 'anew' (cf. 8), i.e. after the Romans had for some time made no attempt to take him (Paton and Shuckburgh) ; or 'from the start', i.e. starting the moment he left harbour (Reiske); or 'deliberately' (so LSJ, quoting xxiv. 8. 9, where, however, the sense 'from the outset' is equally in place). Schwcighaeuser, in Lex. Polyb. Ka-raf5ol.:r], finally comes down in favour of a most forced interpretation: 'uidensquadriremem,quaeolim simul cumipso (et cum ipsius naui) primum e statuminibus in mare excurrerat (cui us structura adeo probe ei nota erat)'. Reiske's interpretation seems the most likely; but there are probably overtones from the other two. IIO

I. 48.

THE FIRST PUNIC WAR

2

10. KUPLEOC1
48. 2. y(vETa.l TL!) aVE!J.OU Q'TaO'L!): cf. 75· 8, ix. 25. 3. v. 5· 3. TWV 'ETY}alwv ifo7J araa£V Jx6vrwv. Paton and Shuckburgh translate a storm of wind', 'a turbulent storm of wind', Schweighaeuser uenti tempestas -but wrongly, as he later realized. d.v£p.ov arams has three meanings: the first, 'a dropping, cessation of the wind', may be neglected here; the second is that found in the three Polybian passages mentioned above, 'the direction, state of the wind' or simply 'the wind in a certain direction'. Finally, by a metaphor taken from civil discord, it may mean' seditio uentorum, a squall'. This is the sense in Alcaeus, fg. 30 Diehl, davvv£TY}p.£ TWV avl.p.wv aramv (which Heracleitus, alleg. Homer. s. p. 6 ed. Bonn., took as an allegorical reference to the rvpavv£Kai rapaxui at Mytilene); so too Aesch. P. V., 1086, d.vl.p.wv 71'V€Jp.ara . . . aramv avT{TI'VOOV d.TI'o0E£KVJp.eva. Similarly in Virgil (Aen. i. I48) the quelling of the storm by Neptune is likened to the calming of seditio in a city. But in all these examples there is a clash of winds; and this idea is quite inappropriate here, where the plan of the Greek mercenaries depends solely on the fact that the wind is blowing steadily from the city towards the Roman camp, so that it becomes an ally in spreading the fire and driving the smoke and sparks in the faces of the defenders (§ 6, vmj Tfj-; Els avroi:J<; rp€pop.EV7J'> Atyvvos). As Schweighaeuser points out in his commentary, the idea of force and violence is separately expressed and need not be present in araa,.,, which therefore means uenti directio. Suidas, s.v. an:lmv, referring to this passage, says that the word is applied JTI'i Tl'voijs f3wlov avl.p.ov ; but there is no evidence for this meaning unless there are conflicting winds. Translate 'a steady wind' (correct in LSJ). Diod. xxiv. 1. 3 also records the incident. Tas Twv ll"lXa.v"lf.£6.Twv rrpoaa.ywy6.s: 'the apparatus for advancing the engines' (Paton): less satisfactory Schweighaeuser (in his note ad loc.), in ipsas machinas quae admouebantur. In xiv. Io. 9 the sense is abstract: 7rpoaaywylis TWV opyavwv, 'the bringing up of siege engines'; but here P. refers to uineae, etc., under shelter of which the engines were advanced. See next note. Tas aToas ~haaa.AE{n;w: uineas concutere. A uinea is a shed or penthouse to protect men of a besieging force. Caesar, BC, ii. 2. 3, similarly calls it a porticus. In xxi. 28. 4 P. refers to a arod which Livy, xxxviii. 7· 6, translates by uineae. See Veith in KromayerVeith, Heerwesen, 444· I

III

m.1000

----

0

tt!JliH!!j

3·

Il2

1 km. I

Roman

flflet

Carthag/nian flee/;

THE BATTLE OF DREPANA.

Based on Kromayer

THE FIRST PUNIC WAR

I. 49· 6

5. TlJV ... vo~l]v Tau 'n'Upos: 'the action of the flames' (Paton). For this metaphor of grazing cf. xi. 4· 4· 8. E-rr! TE Taus ~oTJBouVTGS KGi T~v TWV ~pywv 8Ln+Oop4v: 'against the rescuers and to secure the destruction of the works'. i7Tt is used in two different senses. 9. Ta aT\J1TTJ Twv ~
113

I. 49· 6

THE FIRST PUNIC WAR

neither P. nor Diodoms. On the number of ships involved see sr. uI2 n. For discussion see Rodgers, Greek and Roman Naval ·warfare (U.S. Naval Institute, I937). 297--9; Thiel, Hist. 275-81. 50. 5. eAa.~E T~v du.:wu1-1ov ••• Ta~LV: Drepana lies on a small peninsula extending to the west and prolonged in a south-westerly direction by rocks and small islands: see the maps in Kromayer, AS, iii. I, and in Enc. it. s.v.; there is a map of the battle in KromayerVeith, Schlachtenatlas, Rom. Abt. i, Blatt r. The harbour opens to the south and is covered by the island of Colombaia; having cleared it Claudius reformed his line with the right flank hugging the coast south of the harbour mouth, and himself on the left. But Adherbal's five ships succeeded in getting between him and the open sea. 9. JLEyaAa. , •• ~AMTw9fjva.L: the Roman fleet had been mana:uvred into the situation of the Punic left at Ecnomus, 28. Ion.

51. 6. To'L<; 1rpo'ITi'ITTOUO'L Twv SLwKovTwv: 'the foremost of their pursuers'; Paton's 'the ships that pursued and fell on them' translates the MS. reading 7rpomrl7TTovat (but he prints the generally accepted emendation of Hervagius). 9. SLEK'ITAe'Lv ••• o'ITep ••• tun 'ITpaKnl<wTa.Tov: a classic mana:uvre, but never employed by the Romans. Indeed in Hellenistic times it tended to disappear with the adoption of boarding tactics, though the Rhodians used it successfully at Chios (xvi. 4· I4); 27. 11 n.; Tarn, HMND, I44 ff. 11-12. Size of the Roman squadron. P. gives the total of ships escaping as about 30, and 93 Twv .\o£7Twv as captured. Tam (]HS, I9o7, 54 ff.} assumes that these figures together give the size of the Roman squadron; and, indeed, if P.'s 7TEpl rpuf.Kovra vi}E'> are really 27 (as they well might be), the total of 120 is precisely the number of ships available since the building of so in 250 (cf. 41. 3 n.). Against this is the reference to many sinkages in § 6 (7ro,\,\d ... ij3a7Tn~ov); but as Thiel (Hist. 279 n. 7I6) points out, 'the character of the inshore battle does not admit of the sinking of a large number of ships'. P., who believed that Claudius had 2oo ships (41. 3) would be naturally disposed to exaggerate the number of sinkages; the few which really took place may well be included in the 93 captured. Diodoms (xxiv. 1. s} reckons the Roman total as 2Io and the losses at 117. De Sanctis (iii. r. 170-I n. 65) adds in Io ships which appear in a corrupt passage at the end of Diod. xxiv. 1. 5, to give the Romans a total of 22o, and assumes that of the squadron of 240 which Philinus gave Claudius (Diod. xxiv. 1. I) 20 ships had been left behind at Lilybaeum; but P. (49· 3) says that Claudius proposed sailing from Lilybaeum to Drepana 7Tavn rep ar6Ao/, and it is dangerous to use the Io ships as part of any argument (cf. Thiel, Hist. 28o n. p6). De

THE FIRST PUNIC WAR

I. 52. 5

Sanctis also suggests that the n7 lost vessels are obtained by subtracting the 93 which P. gives as captured from 210: but these II7 are not simply sinkages, but losses in general, and probably represent Philinus' exaggerated version of those losses. As we saw (4r. 3), Philinus' figures are to be rejected. Other f1gures, which can be neglected, are: escaped, 30 (Eutropius, Orosi us), 20 (Frontinus); sunk, 120 (Schol. Bob.), Ioo (Eutropius); captured, 9o (Eutropius). P. gives no losses of men. Orosius (iv. Io. 3) records 8,ooo dead and 2o,ooo prisoners; and the latter figure receives slight confirmation from Diod. xxiv. r. 5 (2o,ooo losses; the 35,ooo dead and an equal number of prisoners of Diod. xxiv. I. u may be ignored). Roman losses were probably reduced through survivors-marines more easily than rowers -swimming ashore (51. 12). No figures survive for the Punic side. 52. 3. JlEyaAQ.L') tT}Jl(nL') KQ.LKLVOUVOL') KpL9ELS nEpLtE'ITEO'EY: the initiative came from two tribunes, and the movement against Claudius was apparently popular. P. probably follows a Roman tradition here (Bung, 63 n. I, is less certain); for other sources on his downfall see the authorities quoted at 49· 6-51. 12 n. According to Valerius Maximus he was charged with perduellio but acquitted; Schol. Bob. records a second trial on a reduced charge and a fine aeris grauis cxx milibus. Modern historians have judged him less harshly. Tarn (JHS, r9oj, 54) suggests that he attacked hoping to forestall the arrival of the reinforcements under Carthalo, of which he knew (53· 2 n. : Meltzer (ii. 326) thinks they came before the battle; but the order is clear from Diodorus); and though his tactics were faulty, the general plan was by no means ill-conceived; De Sanctis, iii. I. 170; Scullard, Hist. 168. 5. AeuKlov 'louvLov: in fact Claudius' colleague for 249/8, not his successor, 49· 3 n. Beloch (iv. :z. 289) suggests in explanation of P.'s error that Iunius did not come to Sicily till spring 2¥, after the consuls for 248/7 had already been elected; and that P. confused him with one of these. But after Iunius' naval disaster (54· 8} Claudius was constrained to appoint a dictator, and named M. Claudius Glicia, whom the Senate rejected (Livy, ep. 19); A. Atilius Caiatinus (24. 9 n.) was then appointed in his stead. But, if Iunius did not leave for Sicily till spring 248, there is no time for this before I May (and little before I8 June, which is Beloch's Julian equivalent for I May in accordance with his unacceptable view of the calendar) ; and it is unlikely that the Senate would have required the nomination of a dictator if the consular year was almost at an end. Further, Iunius' considerable activity after the naval catastrophe suggests that he came out to Sicily in 249. De Sanctis (iii. I. 263-4) suggests that he arrived in the second half of the summer, and so in the sixteenth year of the war by Philinus' calculations (41. 4). This II.)

I. 52. 5

THE FIRST PUNIC WAR

would explain how P.'s error arose; and since, if Iunius already knew of his colleague's disaster, it is hard to understand his decision to send half his fleet ahead without adequate protection (52. 7; cf. Meltzer, ii. 330; Reuss, Phil., I90I, 119), it is possible that when he sent the ships on from Messana he had not yet heard of the defeat at Drepana. No conclusions as to date can be drawn from the reference to corn in 52. 8 ; there is no evidence that it was part of the 249 harvest (so Meltzer, ii. 330). Ta~ onapx£a~: here 'corn allowance'; on the various meanings of this and similar words see 66. 3 n. 6. &no ... 'TOu aTpaTo11'Hiou: perhaps Lilybaeum is meant (so Paton): but if any of the 6o ships which joined Iunius in Sicily (cf. 52. 5, 52. 6; Diod. xxiv. 1. 9 also gave him a total of I2o, i.e. I3 burnt+105 sunk+2 survivors) were from Lilybaeum, they left before Drepana, for aftenvards Carthalo and his fleet lay between Lilybaeum and Messana (Tarn, J HS, I9o7, 55 n. 38) ; and that the 30 survivors (51. n) had not got away to Messana is clear from 53· 3 f. Thiel (Hist. 88) suggests that the 6o ships which joined Iunius at .Messana were in fact allied auxiliaries; and he despairs of finding any reasonable sense for the words am:\ TOV UTpaT07dSov. KaLpou~: a loose link; but here correct, for Iunius cannot have reached Sicily much later than the battle of Drepana (52. 5 n.). 2. Kap90.Awva: in 254 Carthalo had relieved Drepana, after sacking Agrigentum (Diod. xxiii. I8. 2-3): 38. 7 n., 38. Ion. Diodorus (xxiv. 1. 6-7) dates his arrival at Drepana in 249 (with 70 ships and supplies) after the naval battle; between the two he relates the dispatch of Hannibal (cf. 44· I) to seize a Roman convoy off Panormus. Carthalo appears to be Aclherbal's subordinate. Sou~ TpLaKOVT11 vau<;: the size of Aclherbal's fleet at this time is not recorded; but it seems likely that the Punic fleet at Drepana was smaller than the Roman, though in view of its success perhaps not very much smaller (cf. Tarn, JHS, I9o7, 54-55). It is possible that Claudius attacked when he did in order to forestall the arrival of the 70 reinforcements, fearing that he would then be outnumbered (Thiel, Hist. 272; above, 52. 3 n.). Hence Tarn's figure of Ioo (before the arrival of Carthalo) is likely to be about right (Thiel, Hi st. 266 n. 667). 7. oA[ya •.• Ta flEV a1I'OO"TI'a0'11<;, Ta OE O'UVTptljia~: 'contented himself with either towing off or breaking up some few of the vessels' (Shuckburgh). Schweighaeuser omits dMya from his translation, Paton takes it with a1roamiaas- only; the point is that the total Roman loss was small. Diod. xxiv. 1. 7 gives some sunk and five dragged off. 10. 1rp6<; n 11'0ALu!-lnnov: according to Diod. xxiv. I. 7 the fleets

53. 1. Ka'Ta ••• Touo; all'Tou<;

II6

THE FIRST PUNIC WAR

sighted each other near Gela, and this roadstead was off Phintias (modern Alicata), east of the river Himera, and opposite Mt Ecnomus. Diodorus puts Carthalo's fleet at 120 ships. 13. bMyu Twv ••• TrAOt{)JV 6.Troamia!lvT£i: according to Diodorus (loc. cit) the Carthaginians sank so transports and I7 warships, and put 13 warships out of action. P. omits these Roman losses (which were probably not in Fabius), evidently because he mistrusts Philinus; cf. De Sanctis, iii. I. 233-4. Thiel argues that they should be accepted (Hist. 285 n. 731); but P.'s account of the quaestors falling back on shore fire from catapults to defend their ships is plausible, and would explain Carthalo's failure .

•

54. The shipwreck off Caman:na. According to Diod. xxiv. I. 7-9, Carthalo retired to the R. Halycus (modern Platani) near Heraclea Minoa to attend to his wounded. Iunius advanced to Phintias, where he was joined by the remnants of the first convoy, but on sighting the Punic fleet burnt the r3 damaged vessels and set off back for Syracuse; overtaken near Camarina o;l, T~v yfjv Ko.Tlcjwyt£ 7tpos T(l1TOt!S' Tpax£i:s Kat vif;a/..wSets. A storm got up, Carthalo rounded Pachynus and was saved; Iunius lost all his transports, and all but 2 of his ro7 warships. P.'s account is quite different. Here, too, Carthalo puts into a river, unnamed; but as he hopes to prevent a union between the two Roman squadrons (§ 2), this can hardly be the Halycus, about 45 miles north-west of the scene of the disaster. After Iunius has anchored off the dangerous coast (§ 3), Carthalo gains a cape from which he can watch both squadrons (§ 5) ; the storm breaks and Carthalo escapes as in Diodorus. The discrepancy is clear; and since the Carthaginian standpoint in P. prevents our assuming that he is giving Fabius' version, the likelihood is that he has merely 'corrected' Philinus, Diodorus' source, and that his version is a contamination with Fabian tradition. In fact, he must have felt Philinus' account to be less probable on comparing the two; and his refusal to identify the scene of the first disaster with Phintias, and the river whither Carthalo retired as the Halycus, is probably deliberate. We are not justified in rejecting P.'s considered account in favour of an abridged version of Philinus (certainly abridged: e.g. Diodorus has no reference to Iunius' putting in at Syracuse, xxiv. r. 8). Thiel (Hist. 287 n. 734) defends Diodorus' version from Philinus against P.'s on the assumption that the latter gives an account contaminated with Fabius (which may well be true) and that Fabius has concealed the Roman losses in the quaestars' squadron at Phintias; and he deduces all the other variants in P.'s account from this 'original sin' of Fabius. Carthalo must have tried to destroy some of the Roman ships; and 'it is absurd to suppose he could not destroy them'. In fact, he did not-thanks to II7

THE FIRST PUNIC WAR

the catapults (53· IJ n.). P. is therefore to be followed. Cf. Meltzer, ii. 33I-2, 579; and for the topography, J. Schubring, Phil., I873, 504 ff., especially 526; Rh. Mus., I873, 137 f. Schubring thinks Iunius took refuge in the harbour of Caucana, a little south-east of Camarina, while Carthalo anchored off the promontory of Bucra (modern Braccetto). Other sources for the shipwreck are Eutrop. ii. 26. 2; Oros. iv. ro. 3; Zon. viii. 15; Iunius was said also to have disregarded the auspices, and subsequently to have committed suicide: Cic. nat. deor. ii. 7; de diu. ii. 7I; Val. Max. i. 4· 4; Minuc. Felix, 7. 4, 26. 2. The date cannot be fixed with certainty; Meltzer (ii. 33o) makes it July, like that of 255 in the same waters (37· I), but this is not compelling, since storms are not limited to that month. 2. O'TJJLTJVavToov Twv aKo1Twv •.• TTJV &m4>6.veLa.v: this seems to exclude the view that Carthalo was at the Halycus. 6. 1TEptaTaaEOOS ••• oAoaxepEaTepa.s! 'a peril of some magnitude'; contrast 32. 3 and 35· ro, where 1T£pfarar:ns = 'situation, Circumstances'. On this word see Strachan-Davidson, II.

55. 2. Ka.pxTJS6vLOL s~ Tils JLEV 9a.AaTTTJS &Kup(EUOV: but they never exploited this superiority, perhaps because they were occupied for several years with war in Africa, where Hanno took Hecatompylus (73. I n.). It is possible that Hanno, a later enemy of the Barcid family, stood for a policy of African expansion rather than foreign conquests in the interests of the merchant class (T. Frank, CP, 1926, 313-I4; CAH, vii. 689); this would be a situation not unlike that which developed between the Senate and equites at Rome 150 years later. See also De Sanctis, iii. r. I79; Tarn, ]HS, 1907, 56. Bung (65 n. 4) follows Campe's view that the words KapxTJMvtot •.• d.m).\m~ov are an interpolation, but quite unnecessarily. 7. "Epu~: modern Mte San Giuliano. It is 75I m. above sea-level, and manifestly not the next highest mountain in Sicily after Etna (3,3I3 m.); for one cannot distinguish J.tEY£0os, bulk, and uifios, height, with Biittner-Wobst (Klio, I905, 95-96). On its topography see Kromayer (AS, iii. r. 25 ff.), who explains the mistake as easily made if one approaches Trapani from the sea, when Mte San Giuliano stands out in imposing isolation. (But P.'s own visit will probably have been later than the composition of this passage; Cuntz, 7o.) The vast height of Eryx becomes an established tradition; cf. Solin. 5· 9; Virg. A en. xii. 701; Val. Flacc. ii. 523. Here the north coast of Sicily correctly 'faces Italy' (42. 1-7 n.). 8. T6 TTlS :t\.4>po~HTT)s .•• ~ep6v: a temple of great antiquity and betraying, by its system of temple-prostitution, an eastern origin. Diod. iv. 83 describes it in Roman times; and Pans. viii. 24. 6 compares it to the temple of Aphrodite at Paphos. Its goddess, whom the Phoenicians identified with Astarte, was linked with Venus in II8

THE FIRST PUNIC WAR

L 56. r

Roman legend; and the founding of the temple was attributed to Aeneas (Virg. A en. v. 759 ff.; cf. i. 570; Mela, ii. II9; etc.). Later Venus Erycina was one of the most venerable deities at Rome, especially when she could be linked significantly with the gens Julia (e.g. Hor. Odes, i. 2. 33). Jessen, RE, 'Erycina', cols. 562-5; Hiilsen, RE, 'Eryx (I)', cols. 6o2-4. On the plunder of this temple by Gallic mercenaries see ii. 7. 8. 9. t\8E 1TOAlS U1T' aun1v TTJV Kopu
I. 56. r

THE FIRST PUNIC WAR

i.e. in the eighteenth year of the war (which began in late summer 264; 4r. 4 n., 5· r-s n.). De Sanctis, iii. I. 253. This chronology is confirmed by the later course of Hamilcar's command; 56. II, he was axt"86v lrr£ Tp&; EVLCWTOUS on Heircte (247/6, 246/s. 245/4); sS. 6, the struggle continued for two years more on Eryx, until the war was settled by other means (244/3, 243/2). This brings us to the arrival of Lutatius Catulus in Sicily in 242 (which signifies the Roman resumption of a naval policy after a five years' lapse (59· I n.)-for this, not the battle of the Aegates Islands {so Beloch, iv. 2. 285), is the decisive point to P. (d. 20. 8)). See DeSanctis, loc. cit.; Luterbacher, Phil., r9o7, 419-20. 3. KO.TO.O"Upa.s ••• TTJV AoKp(lia. KO.l TTJV BpETT~a.vtiv xwpa.v: following up similar raids by Carthalo in 248 (Zon. viii. r6; Oros. iv. ro. 4). The Romans replied with citizen colonies at Alsium {247) and Fregcnae (245) on the Etruscan coast (VeiL Pat. i. 14. 8). TOv t1rt TTjs EpKTijs AEY61-'evov To1rov: 'the so-called position near (above?) Heircte'. (Diodorus reads 'EpKml or 'EpKn) (xxiL ro. 4, xxiii. zo) and Hultsch adopts Tats ElpKm"i:s here). Heircte is thus the name of a strong-point, applied by extension to the hill above. This hill is usually identified with :Mte Pellegrino, the 6oo m. hill which rises in isolation to the north of Panormus; d. J. Schubring, H~'sto­ rische Topographic von Panormos, i (Progr. Liibeck, 187o), 24 ff.; Holm, Gesclt. Sic. i. rs. 334 f.; iii. 28 f., 354 ; De Sanctis, iii. I. I8I n. 83; K. Ziegler, RE, 'Heirkte', col. 2645; Cary, IJR, 155 n. 17. However, there are strong arguments against this identification; and Kromaycr (AS, iii. r. 4 ff.} has a cogent defence of the view that Heircte is Mte Castellacio, an 890 m. hill about ro km. north-west of Palermo, and more particularly of the fort which he would locate in the pass which lies between the north-east spurs of Mte Castellacio and Mte Gallo, just above (and south of} the modern coastal village of Sferracavallo (the name Heircte will then mean 'obstruction' (in the pass)). Thus F.'s description of Heircte as lying between Eryx and Panormus, though highly inaccurate (and a sign of F.'s meagre knowledge of Sicilian geography when he was writing this), is perhaps less unsuitable to Mte Castellacio than to Mte Pellegrino. The perimeter of the mountain {§ 4), roo stadcs (u! miles), corresponds fairly closely to that of the plateau of Mte Castellacio, but it is a third too much for that of Mte Pellegrino (Holm, Gesch. Sic. i. 15), which Kromayer makes only n! km. (7-7! miles). The convenient harbour (§ 7) is hard to identify if Heircte is .Mte Pellegrino. Meltzer (ii. 341-2) speaks of Mondello to the north-west; but the connexion between :Mondello and the mountain is difficult. DeSanctis (loc. cit.) therefore follows G.M. Columba, and locates it in the bay of Palermowhich can hardly be feasible. But on the view that Heircte is Mte Castellacio, the harbour will be that at! sola delle Femmine. Finally, the

THE FIRST PUNIC WAR

I. 5 8.

I

phrase 1rpos Tds 1T£Aa.yEovs 1rlloLas Ellvw> KdJ-Lello> (§ 4), though usually taken (since Schweighaeuser) as 'well placed to receive the breezes' (and regarded as an example of P.'s belief that climate affects men's characters; cf. Class. et med., r948, 178-8r), probably means 'lying well-protected against the sharp sea-winds' ; and this applies far more to Mte Castellacio than to Mte Pellegrino. Frank (CAll, vii. 6go) puts the choice between Mte Pellegrino and Mte Billiemi (a col and slope 2 km. east of Mte Castellacio); but Kromayer's identification seems in all respects the most satisfactory. 11. va.pa.aTpa.TovEOEuaciv1'wv ••• tv 'Laws vivTE aTa.8(o~<;: the Romans' position cannot be located; nor is one to suppose that they maintained the same camp for three years. 57. The fighting romzd II eircte. The details of this protracted struggle are compressed into this general characterization, whereas P.'s sources no doubt emphasized details; some fragments of these are preserved in Diod. xxiv. P. uses metaphors taken from athletes elsewhere, perhaps ii. 65. rr, xvi. 28. 9 (runners in the stadium), xxvii. g. 2 (boxing), xxxix. r. 8 (pancration or boxing); shorter examples, xxix. 8. s. 8. g, 17. 4. xxxviii. 18. 8. They clearly reflect his own interests, and it is unnecessary to assume Isocratean or Stoic influence (so von Scala, 22; and, with reservations, Wunderer, iii. rr2). 2. T(;'w vuv AeyotJ-EvWv aTpa.ntywv: P. has mentioned only Hamilcar and L. Iunius Pullus; but Iunius had probably left the scene before Hamilcar arrived (55· Ion.). In fact Hamilcar's activity on Heircte coincided with a succession of consuls in Sicily, L. Caecilius Metellus and N. Fabius Buteo (247/6), M'. Otacilius Crassus and M. Fabius Lidnus (246/5), M. Fabius Buteo and C. Atilius Bulbus (245/4). That P.'s metaphor has led him into a careless expression is more likely than a fault in the text (aTpaTwv, aTparWJ-LaTwv, and a-rparo1riDw11 have been suggested: but AEyoJ-Levwll is against such an emendation, and the language of 57 is more appropriate to two individuals than two armies; the comparison of the two sides begins in 58). 6. a.t ••• 8uvcitJ-ElS ••• E;JlcitJ-~).o~: Kromayer (AS, iii. I. ron. r) estimates Hamilcar's force on Heircte at 15,ooo-zo,ooo men. TU TE Ka.Ta TOU<; xd.pa.Ka.<.;: 'their camps' (not 'trenches'. Paton). 58. l. wcrm;p 0,ya.9o<; j3pa.~EUT~S ~ TIJXTJ: i.e. in Order to Secure a decision between the closely matched pair, Fortune as umpire redefines the terms of the conquest, so as to render it a more severe test. The word f3paf3eveu• is often used with rvx11 (e.g. xxvii. r6. 4, xxix. 27. r2); but the full metaphorical force is not necessarily felt. The phrase is found in Diodorus not only in a Polybian passage (xxviii. 4), but elsewhere (xiii. 53· 2 (Timaeus?), xxxiv. 27 (Poseidonius ?). Elsewhere P. makes Tyche distribute prizes (iii. 6J. J, 121

I. 58.

I

THE FIRST PUNIC WAR

xv. 9· 4, to. s. xxxii. 4· 3) and crowns (ii. 2. 10). In such passages the personification is formal and rhetorical; it represents part of the common reservoir of expression on which P. drew. Siegfried, 81, ' ... pure metaphor, springing for the most part from an atmosphere heightened to match the situation'. See above, p. 25 n. r. 1Tapa~6Aws: 'in a remarkable manner' {Strachan-Davidson); 'by a bold stroke' (Shuckburgh) : Paton's 'unexpectedly' does not quite get the sense. 2. Twv 'Pwllalwv Tov "EpuKa. TllpoOVTwv: i.e. at the temple of Venus, and on the slope from Drepana, 55· ro. KaTEAa~ETo Tt,v ,.6}\w: evidently in 244, judging by the order of events in Diodorus, who {xxiv. 8--9) adds that Hamilcar slew the Roman garrison, and transferred the inhabitants (such as had returned, presumably, 24. 8 n.) to Drepana. Following Kromayer, De Sanctis (iii. I. 183) puts the Punic landing at modern Tonnara di Bonagia, north of Eryx. Already Hamilcar had made one attempt to ease the blockade of Drepana by an unsuccessful attempt on the island of Pelias (modern Columbara) at the harbour-entrance, which had been seized by N. Fabius Buteo, the consul for 247 (Zon. viii. r6). 3. 1Tapa~oAWS •• , {J1TOJlEVEW Kat ~ho.kLV5UVEUELV 'ITOALOpKOUJlEVOUS; 'a siege of the Romans ... supported by them with extraordinary hardihood and adventurous daring' {Shuckburgh). Paton is here quite misleading: 'the Romans-a thing they had never expectedremained besieged and in considerable peril'. 5. 1Epov ~1Toh1uo.v Tov a-Teter the other, although they had continued the conflict in this spot for another two years, it came about that the war was decided in another fashion.' It was decided by the Roman decision once again to resume her naval policy (59· z); and this was in 242. Hence the two years of warfare around Eryx are 244{3 and 243/2 (56. In.). If the decisive point is taken to be the battle of the Aegates Islands, either one must force the evidence to date this :242 (Reuss, Phil., 19o1, rzr-3) or date Hamilcar's arrival in Sicily 246 (Beloch, iv. 2. 285), both unsatisfactory. Paton mistranslates, 'though the struggle in this place lasted for another two years, the war had been decided by other means'. 7. Tot; o/uxollaxouut Twv Ellyevwv 6pvi9wv: the change of metaphor to a cock-fight {a common sport at all times in Greece; K. Schneider, RE, 'Hahnenkampfe', cols. zzro-15) varies the picture. Such a metaphor, IZZ

THE FIRST PUNIC WAR

I. 59· 6

already in Plato, Theaet. 164 c, need be neither a borrowing from Fabius (so \Vunderer, iii. ros; Gelzer, Hermes, 1933, 141), nor a proof of Stoic influence (von Scala, 327: d. Epictet. ii. 2, 13, iv. r. 124; Clem. Al. Paed. iii. r8, p. 262 P.). P. could surely draw on his own experience. The parallel is closely developed ; the loss of the use of their "rings corresponds to the five-year duel on land, the death grapple to the new naval policy culminating in the battle of the Aegates Islands. 8. i!ws O.v cuhofJ-aTws ~
ET1'J crxeSov ~bYJ 'II'EVTE: from the shipwreck off Camarina in 249. to the new decision (of winter 243/2) is in fact six complete years. P.'s error

is due to his identification of the period of land activity with Hamilcar's command in Sicily, i.e. 247-243; and this identification is made easier because P. imagines Iunius Pullus to be Claudius' successor, and hence dates his shipwreck to 248 (52. 5 n.). P.'s view that the Romans had envisaged finishing the war by land fighting is dismissed by Thiel (Hist. 333 n. 85r) as nonsensical. 2. ou 'll'poxwpouv auTo'Ls Toupyov: the motive alleged is the same as that which led to the change of policy before Drepana (39· 14; cf. 41. 2 n.). 4. er~avTEs Tois ~I( TTJS TUXYJS aufJ.'II'TWJJ.aaw: i.e. the shipwrecks off Camarina (255) and C. Palinurus (253), 37· r-2, 39· 6-7. ~AaTTw9evTEs TU 1repi Ta Api'll'ava vaut:J.ax£~: in 249; 49· 7 f. But an equal motive was the second shipwreck off Camarina the same year (SS· r-2); its omission here helps P. to make a rhetorical distinction between the blows of Fortune and the blows of the enemy. 6. ~v Se ••• To 1rAeiov o/uxot:J.ax(a: 'in this undertaking resolution had to supply for the most part the want of material resources' (Strachan-Davidson). ifivxof-Laxla means fighting by the aid of the psyche, not to save it (as Paton, who translates 'a struggle for existence'). The source for this characterization may well be Fabius; but the concept appears elsewhere in P., e.g. ii. 30. 7 (on the Celts), iii. 9· 7 (on Hamilcar): cf. Gelzer, Hermes, 1933, 141. T~v n7.1v 1rpoeaTwTwv O.vSpwv ••• <JitAOTL(J-tav I
I. 59· 6

THE FIRST PUKIC WAR

iii. I. :z:z8 (d. 184 n. 87, where he observes that P.'s account of this 'sacrifice' on the part of the senators is much exaggerated; 'in fact the sacrifice of the Athenian trierarchs at the end of the Peloponnesian \Var was proportionately much heavier'), and Thiel, Hist. 303, who points out that P.'s words do not exclude an interestbearing loan. 8. Suucoalwv 1TAOlwv: probably Fabius' figure. The annalistic tradition gave 300 (Eutrop. ii. 27. I; Oros. iv. ro. 5; auct. de uir. ill. 41); also Diod. xxiv. II. I, adding 700 transports. Tam (]HS, 1907, s6) estimates the total Roman fleet (including the ships surviving after Drepana) at about 220; but the Romans probably did not include the 20 survh'ing ships built on a heavier model than their new fleet (Thiel, }fist. 93, 305 n. 786). 1Tpos TTjv ToG 'Polilou va.Ov: cf. 47. 1o n. This new fleet of lighter vessels was necessarily committed to Punic tactics (d. Thiel, Hist. 304). raLOV AuTaTLov: 'appointing c. Lutatius to the command', cf. 6o. 3, II. 2 n., 39· 15 n. The consuls for A.U.c. 512 =- 242/I B.C. were C. Lutatius C.f. C.n. Catulus and A. Postumius A.f. L.n. Albinus (Munzer, RE, 'Lutatius (4)', cots. zo68-71; 'Postumius (3o)', col. 902). The plebeian pontifex maximussecured the command for the plebeian Lutatius by forbidding Postumius, as flamen Martialis, to leave Rome (Livy, ep. 19, xxxvii. 51. r-2; VaL Max. i. r. 2; Tac. Ann. iii. 71; Munzer, Adelsparteien, 261); the command was shared by Q. Valerius Falto, the praetor urbanus (Val. Max. ii. 8. :z; Zon. viii. 17), who celebrated a naval triumph pro praetore ex Sic::lia in 241/o (act. tr.). 9. 1TO.VTOS O.vo.I<£XWPTJKOTOS Ets TTjv ot~eEio.v ToG ••• vo.uTLKOu; the reasons behind this policy can only be the object of speculation. Frank (CAli, vii. 691-2) attributes it to the ascendancy of Hanno and the anti-Barcan faction, De Sanctis (iii. 1. 185) to Hamilcar himself, who 'had let himself become so engrossed in his guerilla warfare around Eryx and Heircte that he lost sight of the primary importance of controlling the seas'; against the latter view see Thiel, 1list. 306. 60-61. Battle of the Aegates Islands. The substantial agreement with Diod. xxiv. I I points to the continued use of Philinus as P.'s main source (though he corrects the numbers from Fabius, 6r. 6 n.); see also Zon. viii. 17. Eutrop. ii. 27. 2 dates the battle VI idus martias, i.e. ro March; Zon. viii. 17 puts it at the end of Lutatius' consulship; and the act. tr. give him a naval triumph de Poenis ex Sicilia as proconsul on 4 October 241. Beloch (iv. 2. 261-2) argues that Lutatius did not reach Sicily till April 241 (59· 8, apxof-Livr;r; TfjS' 8epda.:;), and that at this time 10 March fell in May (Jul.); but De Sanctis (iii. 1. 264-7) shows that, if Lutatius went out in April, it would have been impossible for the battle to take place before July at the earliest.

THE FIRST PUNIC WAR

I. 6I. 6

P.'s account is indecisive. But it seems unlikely that the Carthaginians could have been ready as quickly as Beloch suggests, despite the stress on their speed in§ 2; they must have needed a considerable time, perhaps even six months (Luterbacher, Phil., 424). Hence De Sanctis's arguments seem conclusive. And if P. narrative nowhere makes dear that a winter intervened between Lutatius' arrival and the battle of the Aegates Islands, he was perhaps misled by stress on the speed of Punic preparations in Philinus, who may have used this theme partly to excuse the defeat {cf. 6r. 4, uAiw-; avaO'K'If7'a). It may be assumed that Lutatius left for Sicily in summer, 242, and won his victory in March 241 {Meltzer, ii. 347-9; DeSanctis, iii. r. 264-7; Munzer, RE, 'Lutatius (4)', col. 2069; Frank, CAH, vii. ; Scullard, Hist. qo). Reuss (Phil., r9or, r2r-6) has argued that the battle was in 242, largely on the basis of a synchronism in ii. 43· 6; but this can be otherwise explained (see ad loc.), and Reuss's theory is too ruthless towards the other evidence to be seriously considered. 60. 3. 'Avvwva: perhaps the vanquished general at Agrigcntum (r8. 8), who was defeated at Ecnomus (28. 1 ff.); but Punic precedent would not lead us to that he survived this second defeat (he returned to Carthage, Zon. viii. r2), and this is probably another:man. 6. cpopov nV€j.lOV ••• Kai. AO.j.l1Tpov: 'a fresh (AafL7rpov) and favourable (,Popov) wind'; cf. 44· 3. ovp~ov Kal AtlfL7rpov aVEfLOV, with the same Sense; XXXi. 15. 8, rpop011 UliEfLOV. 7. auAAoyL~Of-LEvos KTh.: Lutatius is made to foresee Hanno's purpose as expressed in § 3 (d. 27. r for an example of the same technique). The source is probably Philinus; cf. Klotz, La nMtvelle Clio, 1953, 238. 10. E1Tl. 1-l(a.v vaGv: 'in line one deep', 26. I 2 n.

61. 1. Ka8EAOf-L£VoL Tous la-rous: they were sailing, not rov.ing, as this was faster with a favourable wind; cf. Caesar, BC, iii. 26, for the example of the Pompeian squadron under saiL For fighting, the fuller control by oars was essential. See Strachan-Davidson, ad lac. 6. Losses in the battle. P. gives the Punic losses as so ships sunk and 70 captured with their crews; the prisoners amount to nearly Io,ooo (§ 8). Diod. xxiv. r x. 1 gives II7 ships lost, 20 of them with their crews; and 6,ooo prisoners (i.e. 300 for each of zo crews) according to Philinus, 4,040 according to others (but De Sanctis, iii. I. 235 emends to give 6,ooo Carthaginians and 4,o4o Tuw lT€pwv, i.e. c. Io,ooo in all). The annalistic tradition (Eutrop. ii. 27. 2; Oros. iv. Io. 7) gives 63 ships taken, 125 sunk, 32,ooo prisoners, and I_),oooI4,ooo killed. Diodorus makes the Punic fleet 25o ships, excluding transports; the annalistic tradition raises it to 400 or even 6oo, to make the Roman victory the more glorious. two separate methods 125

I. 6r. 6

THE FIRST PUNIC WAR

of calculation Tam (JHS, 1907, 56-57) arrives at a total of c. qo. Diodorus puts the Roman losses (including damaged ships) at So, the annalistic tradition at only 12. F.'s total of Punic losses (so+7o = r2o) does not differ greatly from Diodorus' total of rq; and Jacoby, FGH, 174 F 5 (commentary), suggests that Diodorus' figure of 2o ships lost with their crews may be corrupt, and that in fact P. is here reproducing Philinus (cf. Reuss, Phil., r9or, 146). Alternatively, P. may have corrected Philinus' figures from Fabius, as he has done elsewhere. 7. ~'ITa.pafl.-;:vov ToOs luTous: a very difficult, if not impossible, manceuvre at sea; perhaps the Punic ships got away with the aid of the dolon, a subsidiary sail attached to the foremast (d. Thiel, Hist. 314 n. 8r8). 62. 1. Ta.~s flEV opfla.L's Ka.l TaL's 4nAonf11a.~s KTA.: 'as far as resolution of mind and will to conquer went, they were still ready to fight on'. Paton's translation, 'had they let themselves be guided by passion and ambition', introduces a critical note absent from a phrase which echoes Philinus' defence of the Carthaginians' courage. Similarly P. gives full credit to Hamilcar (§§ 3-5; d. 6o. 8, iii. 9· 7, and Diod. xxiv. 5· r-2); whereas to the Roman annalistic tradition Sicily was nimis celeri desperatione rerum concessam (Livy, xxi. r. 5); Reuss, Phil., 1901, 147; DeSanctis, iii. 1. 229. 7. '1Tpo9uflws o.-;:~a.flivou Ta 'ITa.pa.Ka.AOlJj.L€Va.: according to Diod. xxiv. 13 Lutatius demanded the surrender of arms and deserters, according to Nepos, Ham. r. 5, the laying down of arms; the source is probably Philinus. But when Hamilcar refused, Lutatius seems not to have pressed these demands, perhaps because he wished to anticipate his successor's arrival in concluding terms (Zon. viii. 17; the demand, here mentioned, that Hamilcar and his forces should pass under the yoke, is improbable). TOLO{IT(oJV nvwv uuv9YJKWV: F.'s source for the text of this preliminary draft treaty is unknown. The words TowvTwv nvwv are no indication of a literary source (so Thommen, Hermes, 1885, 203: d., however, iii. 22. 4, 24. 3, where the source is documentary) ; but the general absence of hiatus (Hultsch, Phil., 1859, 288-319) indicates that P. is not reproducing any document uerbatim (see Schulte, 19 f.). Probably the account goes back ultimately to a document, but through Fabius; though in view of the probable origin of F.'s account of the Punic treaties in iii. 22 ff., direct access to a documentary source is possible (De Sanctis, iii. I. 229). N aevius, fg. 49 and so Mor. are concerned with this treaty (d. Cichorius, so-52; Taubler, Hermes, 1922, 156 ff.; E. Fraenkel, RE, 'Naevius', Suppl.-B. vi, col. 639) but do not necessarily derive from the same source as P. See further iii. 27. 1-6 nn. for the emended treaty. Meltzer, De pace a.u.c. SIJ inter I:Z6

THE FIRST PUXIC WAR

L 63.4

Romanos Poenosque constituta (Festschr. des \Vettiner Gymnasiums zu Dresden, r884); Ttiubler, r88 ff.; Vorgesch. 108 ff. 8. M.v Kal T~ OTJIJ-
63. 1. ou 1Tpo here cloaks the activities of the equites (cf. II. 2 n.), or De Sanctis's assumption (iii. I. 190) that the people voted to continue the war, and that the Commission was sent out by the Senate as a wise compromise. 2-3. ~pax£a. 8E 1Tpo
L 63. 1

THE FIRST PUNIC WAR

shorter, but no less in scope and significance.) (b) The light thrown on the special characteristics of the two powers (13. 12) : the moral aspects are discussed (64. s-6), and also the political institutions of Rome, which will be treated below (book vi). Thus P. stresses both the moral and the political virtues of Rome at the outset (contra Komemann, Phil., 1931, 175; cf. CQ, 1943, 81). The reference back is underlined by the phrase 'Pwrtaf.o•s Kct~ KapxTJSovlo~s avo-Tas 7T€p/. .EoKr).to.s m5A
o...

128

THE FIRST PUNIC WAR

I. 63. 9

7. ))..vnyovou Ka.l nTOAE!L(I.LOU Ka.~ ATI!L'lTPLOU: e.g. Salamis (Jo6), where Demetrius Poliorcetes defeated Ptolemy I, Cos, Andros, and Ephesus (Egyptian defeats: all three dates uncertain: see A. Momigliano and P. Fraser, CQ, 1950, 107-18; E. Manni, Athen., 1952, 182 ff.; Treves, Eujorione, 75-83, 124-8 (with notes)). v~;pt TouTwv {aTopftaavTa.s: 'if they were to read the account of this war' (Strachan-Davidson : cf. Schweighaeuser; for this sense of laTop£iv cf. ii. 6z. 6, xii. 3· 5; perhaps ii. 17. 2) ; 'if they had to tell the story of this war' (cf. 13. j) (Shuckburgh). But the latter interpretation involves taking 'l"oos 8avp.d~oVTa:; as historians; whereas it is clearly with readers of history that P. is concerned. Paton's translation is satisfactory, 'if they inquired into the history of this war'. 8. ou8' O.v ... 8uv119t:t11 ••• EUpEiV: for the claim cf. 2 nn. Indirectly P. is here challenging comparison with Herodotus and Thucydides. On the change from trireme to quinquereme see Tarn, liMN D, 122 ff. 9. TO vpoTE9€v ft!LiV ~s npxf\s: in 3· g-Io P. undertook to explain the grounds (ri<{>opfLal) which led the Romans to conceive the ambition of a world-empire, and gave them the means to acquire it. The First Punic \Var, and especially Roman naval policy, provide the answer. Not by chance, nor by purely fortuitous circumstances (rox"7 and Ta.vT<~fLarov are virtually synonymous: cf. x. 2. s. xv. 16. 6, xxi. z6. 16, xxxi. 30. J. and other passages quoted in Siegfried, 6o--66 ; Susemihl, ii. Ioi n. 79 compares Arist. Phys. ii. 4--6), but by deliberately schooling themselves amid dangers, the Romans conceived their ambition (€7re{3a.Aovro . • • 'ToAfL'Y]pws) and accomplished it (Ka8lKovro rfjs 1rpo8laews). Thus this passage was clearly written in close relationship to 3· 7-10, part of the introduction to books i and ii (cf. Shorey,CP, 1921, 282). von Scala (182), Susemihl (ii. non. 104), and Cuntz (46) have argued that it represents a later stage in P.' s thought, when he has modified or rejected his belief in the power of Fortune (cf. ii. 38. 5). The assumption is unnecessary and unconvincing. P.'s concept of Tycke varies from one part of his work to another; but even so positive a concept as that of 4· 4 is complementary to a belief in causation, and not exclusive of it. In the case of the Roman Empire P. was faced with a dilemma, and the present passage is his solution. The rise of Rome to world dominion was the act of Tyche (4. 1 ff.); yet if it was that and nothing more, P.'s history had no lesson to teach. The answer to this aporia is that Fortune favoured the Romans because they were worthy. It was the a<{>opwd as analysed in the First Punic War which marked them out to become the proteges of Fortune, so that the rise of Rome to world power defined itself as the main-stream of history and the will of Providence. It was no doubt from a similar passage in book vi, now lost, that Cicero borrowed the statement (de re pub. ii. 30) that 'non fortuito K

129

THE FIRST PUNIC WAR

populum Homanum, sed consilio et disciplina confirmatum esse nee tamen aduersante fortuna' (where nott fortuito does not exclude the positive aid of fortuna, just as here ov -r6X'll does not exclude the guidance of 4· 1 :ff.). See above, pp. 2I-22, Ka.9a1TEp €vaol 5oKouaL -rldv 'EAAt}vwv: who they are is uncertain. P. may be thinking of some of the unidentified writers on the Roman constitution, attacked in 3-4 (if these were Greeks); or he may simply be referring to orally expressed opinions. 64. 1. olJ-r' O.v 1TA1]pldaa.a ••• ou-r' avt:mAEuaa.a ..• 0UV1]9E~ev: the promised discussion has not survived among our fragments of book vi, but the difficulty appears to be in assembling the crews rather than in building the ships. The passage is of interest as an indication that at the very outset of his history P. was awake to signs of deterioration at Rome after her acquisition of world dominion, i.e. after 167 (KtrKpa.T7JICO'T€S 'TWV oAwv). 3-4. Twv 1TEpl a.1hfjc; uuyyEypo.cjll)-rwv: who these authors were, whether Greeks or Romans, is not known. For the utilitarian criterion applied to their work (uMws- dvw¢f.Mj) see 1. In. 6. Tous ye JlTJV O.vSpa.s: 'individual soldiers'. P. here puts his finger on an essential factor in the Homan victory, the quality of the citizen troops compared with the mercenaries of Carthage. ~lltAKa.v ••. Tov BapKa.v (mKa.AoullEvov KTA.: the full description both identifies Hamilcar and prepares the ground for the later discussion of the causes of the Second Punic War; cf. iii. 9· 6, where the description recurs in that context. The phrase KaTa ¢va'" is used by P. (I) in contrast to Ka.Ta (Um.v, 'natural' as opposed to 'adoptive' (e.g. iv. 2. s, cf. iv. 25. 6 (Philip V of .l\facedon, natural son of Demetrius II, but adopted son of Doson), xviii. 35· 9, xxxi. 25. Io, 26. I {Scipio and Fabius the natural sons of L. Aemilius Paullus)); (z) to express genuine relationship where it is called in question, i.e. 'natural' as opposed to 'supposititious' {without reference to legitimacy) (e.g. xxx. 2. 6, Eumenes' successor his son K!ua ¢Jaw, though not as yet recognized as such (dva.oeoe,yptf"o>)). But in the case of Hannibal and Hamilcar P. frequently uses the phrase {iii. 9· 6, 12. 3, cf. xi. 2. 2, Hasdrubal is Hannibal's brother Ka'Ta ¢6a~v), though there was never any question of adoption or doubt concerning Hannibal's direct descent from Hamilcar. Hence the meaning (as in xxxi. 13. 3) seems to be no more than 'own'. 65-88. The Carthaginian Mercenary War

Besides P. there is the account in Diod. xxv, which is usually assumed to be derived directly from P. (Mommsen, Rom. Forsch. ii. 266; Schwartz, RE, 'Diodorus (37)', col. 689; De Sanctis, iii. I. 130

THE CARTHAGINIAN MERCENARY WAR

1. 65.

s

385 n. 10); but the theory of a common source for P. and Diodorus has been put forward by Meyer (Kl. Schr. ii. 357) and by Laqueur (RE, 'Philinos (8)', col. 2I9o), who believe this source to be Philinus (cf. Unger, Rh. Mus., I879, 90-105). For the view that Philinus wrote a monograph on the First Punic ·war, however, see 14· n n. P.'s source is on this assumption unidentified. He is a military historian, rather less competent than Philinus, but sharing his enthusiasm for the Barca family, and hostile to the mercenaries (whose case is consequently to be recovered only by conjecture).

65. 2. 1TOAEJJ-05 £JJ-cpUAl05: cf. iii. 9· 9, lp.vMw; Tapaxars. The Falisci were allies; and the Carthaginian mercenaries were assisted by Libyan subjects of Carthage, who were probably themselves largely Carthaginianized. o 1Tpos Tous ca>a.A.io"Kouo;; Ka.AOUJJ-Evous: the usual Greek form is tPaAEplot, and the participle softens the use of the Latin word. Further, the phrase o 7Tpos Tovs tPaAlaKovs parallels o 7Tpos Tovs ••• Alf3vos (§ 3). This is against accepting KaAovp.Evos, the reading of D and E, with Schweighaeuser, despite the passages i. 70. 7, o 7Tpos TDV<; tivovs KaL Avj3tKo<; lmKA-qBds 7ToAEp.os, and iv. 33· 6, Tj fLUX7J 1} KaAovp.€117] 7TEpL Tapov. Faleria, the capital of the Falisci, lay c. 30 miles north of Rome in south Etruria; but its people were probably of Italic origin (Strabo, v. 226; Hiilsen, RE, 'Falisci', col. I9p). The revolt, in 24I, may have followed the expiry of a fifty years' treaty two years earlier (De Sanctis, ii. 362, iii. I. 279). The Romans took the revolt seriously and sent a double consular army to suppress it (which it did in six days). On I and 4 March 240 the two consuls Q. Lutatius C.f. C.n. Cerco and A. Manlius T.f. T.n. Torquatus Atticus celebrated triumphs de Falisceis (act. tr.). See Livy, ep. 20; Val. Max. vi. 5· 1; Eutrop. ii. 28; Zon. viii. I8; Oros. iv. II. 5-ro. The Falisci were harshly treated; deprived of arms, horses, slaves, household effects, and half their land (which became ager publicus), they were forced to migrate from their hill-city (the modern Civita Castellana) to the plain at the site of the church (now ruined) of S. Maria di Falleri (Hiilsen, RE, 'Falerii', cols. I97o-r). 5. Ka.Tu Ti]v ~~ 6.pxi]s 1Tpo0EoW: cf. I3. 3, oAtj3vKos 7TOAEp.os. 5-9. Reasons for narrating the Mercenary War. P. gives four: (a) It is a good example of a 'truceless war'. (The phrase d.U7Tovoos 'TTOAEp.os occurs in Aeschines (ii. 8o), and in Demosthenes (xviii. 262), in both authors in conjunction with the word &.wr)pvKTDS', 'relentless' (on which see J. L. Myres, CR, I943· 66-67); it means a war shorn of the normal usages of international law, and fought out to a finish.) (b) It affords a useful lesson to the employers of mercenaries. IJI

I. 65- 5

THE CARTHAGINIAN MERCENARY WAR

(c) It gives a clear picture of the difference between barbarians and civilized men (a subject in which P. was interested, cf. iv. 20-21). (d) It is the key to an understanding of the causes of the Hannibalic War. In fact the link with the Hannibalic War is very tenuous, and amounts to no more than the Roman seizure of Sardinia during the Libyan War (88. 8 n.; but in iii. ro. 4 this seizure is admittedly regarded as the greatest cause of the Hannibalic War); Laqueur, 159. Having decided on a detailed account of the Libyan War, P. is determined to justify it in terms of the whole work. Laqueur's view that the Libyan War was a later addition to the Histories may be neglected. 7. €K TTJS Ton 11"£pLaTna£ws: 'from the circumstances of that war' (cf. 35· 1o); or 'from the danger Carthage underwent' (cf. iii. II2. 9). On the two meanings of 7rEpla-ramo: in P. see Strachan-Davidson, II-12.

9. Ka.l1ra.pa To'Ls 11"£11"0A£!1TJKOan•: i.e. many combatants in the Second Punic War were still alive. P. appears to be referring to general discussions on the causes of the war such as had continued since the works of Fabius Pictor and writers on Hannibal (iii. 6. r ff.); it is not necessary to see here a reference to the sharp debates on war-guilt which arose from 152 onwards, when the text of the treaties was circulating in senatorial circles (iii. 21. 9-10 n.); so Taubler, Vorgesch. 8 (see rather Thommen, Hermes, r885, 201-2). The present passage is likely to have been written long before 152. 66. l. cm£9£To Ttl" cl.pxfJv: the mercenaries thought that he resigned voluntarily; cf. 68. 12, where, however, Do~<Eiv seems to imply that this was not so. De Sanctis (iii. r. 383 n. 3) argues that Hamilcar's appointment would automatically terminate with the end of the war in Sicily; but it seems more probable that he was ousted by political opponents (Meltzer, ii. 369; Veith, AS, iii. 2. 525 f.). o €1rl TTJS 11"0A£WS cnp«TTJyos rEaKwv: evidently the man who took part in the preliminary peace negotiations (Diod. xxiv. 13) ; he is important in the opening stages of the Mercenary War. Niese, RE, 'Geskon (3)', cols. 1322-3. 3. Ta 1rpoaocji£LA0!1£VO. TWV otjlwv(wv: 'the pay owing to them' (the compound verb has no special significance). o.f;wvtov (from o.f;ov, 'relish'), perhaps originally soldiers' slang, had become the regular word for the classicalJ.naOo> in Hellenistic times, and it frequently occurs on papyri and inscriptions. Normally it is distinct from cn-rwvtov, a cash allowance in lieu of rations, and atToJu-rpla, rations in kind (68. 9 n.). Another word, at-rapxla, has a looser use; sometimes, as in UPZ, i. 16. 7, it covers both wages and ration-allowance, IJ2

THE CARTHAGINIAN MERCENARY WAR

I. 67. 6

but elsewhere (e.g. § 6; xi. 25. ro, 28. 3; SyU. 421, l. 38) it is the equivalent of &,Pwvtol', 'pay'; and in v. so. r f. it is uncertain whether it means pay, ration-allowance (cf. 52. s), or both. There was no technical expression for the whole of a soldier's allowance (wages+ rations) ; hence the use of the part for the whole. Griffith, 2j4--6; Launey, ii. 725 ff. 4. ixottEvo~ Tc.uTTJ'i Tfj~ ivvo(c.s: the validity of this motivation, presumably from P.'s source, can no longer be tested. Meltzer (ii. 370 ff.) argues that Gisgo had no choice but to convey 2o,ooo men in detachments (so, too, De Sanctis, iii. 1. 383 n. 4); and this seems likely, despite the argument of Veith (AS, iii. 2. 527 n. r) that the provision of sufficient transports would have constituted no difficulty for Carthage. 6. I(KKc.v: Sicca Veneria, a Roman colony under Octavian, lay a little over roo miles (the itineraries made it r22 miles) south-west of Carthage, on the site of the modern El Kef, at the terminus of the road from Tunis through Medjez el Bab. El Kef is still known locally as 'Shikka-Benar'; Dessau, RE, 'Sicca Veneria', col. 2187. Here Carthaginian matrons prostituted themselves in the temple of Venus (Val. Max. ii. 6. rs, who attributes the custom to Cirta); no doubt a licentious atmosphere prevailed. xpuaouv: sc. O'Ta.-n]pa. This payment was evidently as ration-money. The gold stater normally weighed the same as the silver didrachm, and the Carthaginians used a Phoenician standard independent of those current in Greece. Head (877-8o) gives examples of Punic coins of this period, on the standard of a drachma of 59 gr. 7. Ta<; t:ivoaKeuO.s: cf. § 9; 68. 3· Literally 'baggage', the word becomes a technical term in the Hellenistic age, and covers a soldier's private possessions, including persons, e.g. wife, mistress, servants. Holleaux, Etudes, iii. 15-26, especially 19 ( = REG, rg26, 355--66). ll. TTJ'i eaoll~""l'> .•• ivc.vop9waew~: 'the gain that was due to them'; cf. v. 88. 3, xxvii. 7· 12, xxx. r6. 2, for this sense of brav6p8wats, which is missed by Paton and omitted by LSJ. 67. 1. :&.vvwva: called 'the Great' by App. Hisp. 4 and Zon. viii. 22;

leader of the anti-Bardne faction. He survived the Second Punic War. Lenschau, RE, 'Hanna (r4)', cols. 2355-7· To j30.pos TWv +opwv: i.e. the tribute due to Rome (cf. Gsell, iii. roz; Schweighaeuser, grauitatem. tributorum caussatus: Paton and Shuckburgh both translate incorrectly 'taxes'). In xviii. 44· 7 (s.c. dealing with Macedonian tribute after Cynoscephalae) Ka'Ta cfo6povs means 'by instalments', and the plural here may carry a similar meaning. 6. li.1To9"lpLoua9a,: 'be rendered savage'. A favourite word; cf. 70. r, 79· 8, 8r. 5, 8r. 9, iii. 6o. 6, vi. 9· 9, xv. 22. 5· 11'apaaTC.TLKTJV .•. 8u~9eaw: 'a desperate state of mind'.

I. 67. 7

THE CARTHAGINIAN MERCENARY WAR

7. f.u;€A.A.f)VES: Tarn (Bactria, 38) discusses the word (he finds only three other examples: Plut. Crass. 31. r; Hellanicus, FGIJ, 4 F 7I a; Syll. 495, 1. 114): it implies a type of half-breed no longer felt to be Greek, and so despised. Cf. Gsell, ii. 389. The linguistic confusion was an important factor (cf. So. 5). But the sending of Hanno, who had been responsible for the heavy taxation in Libya and the suppression of the recent revolt and capture of Hecatompylus (72. r-3, 73· r), was even more decisive in causing disaffection; for Hanno was known as Hamilcar's opponent (d. 55· 2 n.). Veith, AS, iii. 2. 528. A£(3ut:s: cf. Diad. xxv. 2 (who adds (/>olvtK<S, i.e. Libyphoenicians, by error). Here the Libyans appear, not as subject-allies, but as mercenaries. The reference to increased taxation (72. r ff.) perhaps supports Griffith's suggestion (219-20) that before or during the First Punic War the Carthaginians had substituted a cash tribute for compulsory service among their Libyan subjects, thus leaving the Libyans free to enlist as mercenaries. 13. hrt T<e ••• TuVfJTL: cf. 30. 15, xiv. ro. 5· The mercenaries were encamped near the town (cf. 73· 3), at a point identified by Veith (AS, iii. 2. 530) v:ith Belvedere Park, north of the city. The number of mercenaries is also given by Nepos, Ham. z. z. 68. 5. C..yopO.s Etc1TE!1-1fovns: here O.yopa£ is the technical term for a market set up by the authorities in which the soldiers can spend their amlma (66. 3 n.). In the Egyptian papyri the word has sometimes this sense, sometimes that of 'payment in kind', virtually equivalent to atTOJME-rpta (68. 9 n.), though not restricted to corn. P. often uses it in the broad sense of 'food-supplies', e.g. r8. 5. 52. 5, 82. 6, etc. (cf. Griffith, z8o). For the practice of holding an agora with reduced see Launey, ii. 740, commenting on OGIS, 266, an inscription the agreement between Eumenes I and his revolted troops; in this, as at Carthage, the soldiers appear to fix the price. 6. TO tca.O' €tc6.0'T'fiV tlll-Epav • • • ~1TLVoou11-evov: f.m- here means 'in addition', as in § 8, br{Bruvav, 'they advanced farther' (in their demands). 8. TC~v n0vEW1-wv ~1T1TWV ••• Tas O.s(as: since this is regarded as outrageous, the probability is that Carthage had provided the horses in the first instance (Griffith, 289; d. 28r, n. r; this appears to have been the Ptolemaic practice). 9. Tijs ••• a~Toll-ETpta.s ••• 1"1)v !1-t:YLO'T'fiV ••• T~ll-'l": certain rations (atTOfLE-rpla)-normally paid in advance-were still owing to the mercenaries: and this debt they now demanded should be paid in money. As in all cases of adaeratio, the question arose: At what rate should the debt in corn be transmuted into a debt in cash? The mercenaries answer: At the highest rate reached by corn during the IJ4

THE CARTHAGINIAN MERCENARY WAR

I. 70.3

war. This is the meaning accepted by Paton, Shuckburgh, and Schweighaeuser; so, too, Launey (ii. 729, 'le versement en especes du ble qu'on leur doit'). It is clearly preferable to the explanation of Griffith (288-g), viz. that the mercenaries had already been paid a ration-allowance, but now demanded supplementation sufficient to bring up all past payments to the level represented by the amount paid when commodities were at their dearest. This seems too outrageous a demand even for the mercenaries in the situation described ; and it involves translating atTOf.Lt:Tpla 'ration-allowance' (though elsewhere Griffith commits himself to the correct view that a.nv T~v S.vanll6p.EYa in 6g. 3, 8, and 72. 6, here translated 'extendentes solutionem in earn summam, quae sol vi non poterat', i.e. 'increasing the sum required for a settlement to such a figure as could not be paid'; but the sense suggested above seems more likely. 12. €Kouu£ws SoKELV a1I'OTE9t:i:u9a.l: cf. 66. I n. 69. 4. Ka.p.va.vc)s ••• ovop.a. I1TEV0lOS: \V. Schulze (Eigenn. ZJ6 n. z) suggests that this represents the Oscan praenomen l:7Tf:OLS'. He may have deserted from the Romans during the recent war; Griffith, 220 (who suggests that he had served in the fleet). The motives attributed to him are probably slanderous; De Sanctis, iii. I. 385. The penalty to which he was liable was to be scourged and beheaded. 7. U11'Ept:l0'0VTO.L ••• "~'tt"' ... opyl\v: 'they would vent their anger'; cf. xviii. J6. 4, iva p.ij xwpwfJ/v;rov 'Pwp.a.[wv ..• fls: eKEivov a7T€p£lO'l)T
0

.:fJ/).L1T1TOS'.

12. ~aAAt:: an exaggeration; it is clear from 8o. 6 that they were mostly acquainted with Carthaginian. U11'0 TWV aptuTWV: at this time the midday meal. 70. 3. Twv AL~vwv ooo€1rw KEKOJlLCYJlfvwv ,.Q.s uLTa.pxla.s: the fact that the o!/JWVLOV had been paid (6g. 3) SUggestS that atTapxJa~ are here the 'ration-allowance' : so Griffith, 289; and cf. 66. 3 n. On the other hand it is possible that there is some ground for Spendius' allegation that 135

I. 70. 3

THE CARTHAGINIAN MERCENARY WAR

the Carthaginians were trying to drive a wedge between the Libyans and the rest, and that the Libyans had not yet received their pay. This would imply a degree of Carthaginian treachery which F.'s source has obscured. M6.9w ToY ITrpUTT}yov: ironical. There is no basis for Meltzer's view (ii. 374) that Gisgo's answer was meant to be conciliatory. See De Sanctis, iii. I. 385. 6. 1rnpO. TO. KOLVU Twv 6.v8p6nrwv (9'1: such €67] included respect for heralds (ii. 8. 12), and those who surrendered in battle (xxxviii. 8. 2). From similar references it is possible to reconstruct F.'s conception of international law and a natural ius gentium; see von Scala, 299-324. What oaths the mercenaries swore is left vague. 7. il ... AL~UI<:os ~mKA118Ets -rroAEJ-LOS: P. prefers the form At{:lvKO> 1Tollt:JJ-o>, IJ. J, 88. 5, ii. r. 3, iii. 27. 7; cf. Diod. xxvi. 23; App. Hisp. 4· Livy uses the phrase Africum bellum, xxi. I. 4, 2, r, 4I. 12. 9. Tftv 'ITuKT}V ••• Tous 'I'II''II'UKpha.s; Utica lay on the (then) coast, c. zo miles north-west of Carthage, on the outer spurs of a hill running south-west to north-east, the modern Djebel Menzel Roul (or Ghoul); it was subject to Carthage, but enjoyed special privileges (Meltzer, ii. 75 ff.). The Hippacritae are the inhabitants of Hippo Diarrhytus (modern Bizerta), which was earlier known as Hippou Acra (Diod. XX. 55· 3; Ps.-Scylax (GGM, i. 89). III gives both e lmrov aKpa and" l1T1TOU (' 11T1TciJV Muller) 1TOIIt>); cf. Step h. Byz. "11T1TOU aKpa, 1r6Ats At{.M7]s· J trot..lT7]S 'lmraKp{T7]>· P.'s circumlocutions (cf. 82. 8, 88. 2) suggest some embarrassment about the name of the town. The name Hippo Diarrhytus is not attested before the Roman period. From 77· I it appears that Spendius besieged Utica, and Mathos Hippou Acra. 71. 1. Tous ••• KUT' tSiuv ~£ous ••• 8uga.yny6vns: 'support life individually' (cf. iii. 4· 6, vi. 48. 3, 48. 7); hardly, with Paton, 'depend for their private supplies'. For y~:vJn)JJ-aTa, 'harvests', see the interesting note in Welles, 323, s.v. yiv7]JJ-a. 6. va.uTLKfJ Sova.1.uc;: 'a naval force, sailors', cf. 41. z. ou 1rAo£wv Ka.TUc::rKeu-rl: in 21. 1, 22. 3 (and elsewhere) ~ TwJJ 1rAolwv KaTaaKt:v~ is 'the construction of ships'. Here Schweighaeuser argues that, as in ii. 23. IO (where MSS. vary between trapa<:rKE:tnJv and KaTaaKw~v), KaTaaKw~ means 'supply', and he translates 'they had no supply of ships'. This seems preferable to Paton, 'nor the material left to construct (a fleet)'. o6Se xopT}yLWv 8L6.8£c::rLs: 'no arrangement for supplies' (StrachanDavidson). This seems satisfactory; Paton translates 'no means of providing supplies', and Shuckburgh 'no store of provisions ready'. 72. 1. EOAOyous !36

O.~op!-'cl.s:

'a reasonable pretext'.

THE CARTHAGINIAN MERCENARY WAR

I. 73·

I

1ta.pc:upouJlt;VO~ ••• TWV aAAwv 11'QVTWV TWV 1
2.

exemptions to the townsmen. There is no other evidence on the rate of taxation among the Libyan subjects; but if the burden of the peasants was increased proportionately to that of the townsmen, the normal exaction was evidently a quarter of all crops. Meltzer, ii. 85. Ta.'ls 'll'ohEo': cf. 86. I. These 1r6.\ns-, simple settlements, some fortified, are mentioned in the treaty between Hannibal and Philip V of Macedon, vii. 9· 5· Strabo reckons 300 of them (xvii. 833; cf. Flor. i, r8. rg; Oros. iv. 8. 8), Diod. xx. 17. 6 over 200. Details of their taxation are unknown. Meltzer, i. 381, 426, ii. 496. 3. TWv ••• O"Tpa.T,ywv: evidently the regular governors of the Carthaginian territories in North Africa. See 67. I for Hanno rov imdpxoVTa UTparTJyov f!v rfj .thf36rJ. He was followed by Hamilcar Barca, after the conclusion of the Mercenary War (Diod. xxv. 8), and Hamilcar was subsequently UTpaTTJyos in both Spain and Africa, like Hasdrubal and Hannibal after him (iii. 33· n.). These rrrparTJyol are distinct from the individuals whom Aristotle describes as sent out from Carthage i1TL rds 7TOA€tS' (Pol. ii. II. rs. 1273 b, viii (vi). 5· 9· 1320 b), and perhaps represent a borrowing from the equipment of the Hellenistic states, where a crrparTJy6s held a military command within a prescribed territorial sphere. See H. Bengtson, Aegyptus, 1952, 3i8-82, with the qualifications advanced by A. Aymard, REA, 1953, 138-9. Other minor Punic governors are known; Diod. xvi. 9· 4 (cf. Plut. Dian, 25) records an bnrmiTTJs governing a subject town in Sicily, and in the second century a f3o~8a.pxo> seems to exercise a territorial function (App. Lib. 68; but the f3o-t)8apxos- in 79· 2 (below) is a Carthaginian captain over mercenaries). 1'0\:S I
73. 1. Ta ~
4·

SITUATION OF CARTHAGE

THE CARTHAGINIAN MERCENARY WAR

I. 74· 3

which lay on a high plateau (828 m.) at a point a little over the Algerian frontier, commanding a wide district. Cf. H. Treidler, RE, 'Theveste', cols. 249~52. 3. Eis EvTa p.upuJ.Sas Al~uwv: clearly exaggerated; Veith, AS, iii. 2. 568; De Sanctis, iii. 1. 386 n. 11. Since Spendius had a little over rs,ooo at Utica (76. r), and the armies at Hippou Acra and Tunis had less difficult tasks, and are therefore likely to have been smaller, De Sanctis sets 4o,ooo as a maximum for the total insurgent forces; within these there will have been an increase in the number of native Libyans, and a reduction through losses in that of trained mercenaries. P. gives other figures at 77· 4, 78. 9. 84. 3, and 85. 7 (the two last also exaggerated). 4-5. Situation of Carthage. Since P.'s time the coast round Carthage has changed considerably, mainly through the accretion which had already then begun (75· 8), especially to the north of Carthage, between the town and C. Farina (Ras Sidi Ali el Mekki). Carthage lay on a peninsula stretching due east into the Gulf of Carthage, the KoA1ros of § 4· The northern promontory of the peninsula is C. Camart; and the south side of the peninsula is washed by the Alp.,v7) (§ 4), to which entrance is made between two narrow spits of land. The isthmus linking the city with the mainland (laep.,6s, § 5; avx.Jv, 75· 4; d. App. Lib. 95) is here reckoned at 25 stades, i.e. 4·6 km. (The view of Schulten (AA in ]DAI, 1913, 249), that the la(}p.,os was the neck of the sand-bank of La Goletta, which helps to close the lagoon El Bahira to the so.uth of Carthage, is refuted by Kromayer, GGA, 1917, 451 ff.) The extent of the Punic city is still controversial. See R. Oehler, RE, 'Karthago', cols. 2150-224; A. Audollent, Carthage romaine (Paris, 1901), 143-323; H. P. Hurd, The Topography of Punic Carthage (Williamsport, U.S.A., 1934); H. H. Scullard, OCD, 'Carthage (Topography)'; D. B. Harden, GAR, 1939, 1-12. On Tunis see 30. 15 n.; on Utica, 70. 9 n. 74. 2. i~opp.l]aas S€ p.ETa TTJS Suvcip.Ews:: Hanno can scarcely have been in a position to send aid to Utica before spring, 240; Meltzer, ii. 375-6. De Sanctis (iii. 1. 386-7), who argues, reasonably, that Hanno's force does not appear to have exceeded that of Spcndius, who was in charge at Utica with rs,ooo men (76. r), reckons it at the same figure (against Veith (AS, iii. 2. 566-7), who, arguing from the forces raised at Carthage against Agathocles, makes it 3o,ooo). 3. ds 'ITuKTJV 1rapa~o1181Jaas: along the coast, avoiding Tunis (Meltzer, ii. 376; Veith, AS, iii. 2. 531). Gsell (iii. 107 n. 6) suggests he went by sea; but 73· 6 does not imply the complete isolation of Carthage by land, and to transport roo elephants by sea would have been no easy manceuvre. The criticism of Hanno reflects P.'s proBarcine source ; despite his discomfiture he retained his freedom of 139

L 74· 3

THE CARTHAGINIAN MERCENARY WAR

movement. Cf. De Sanctis, iii. I. 387 n. 14. On the battle of Utica see Veith, AS, iii. z. 53r. 4. EK TTjs r.oXews: 'out of Utica', not 'from Carthage' (as Paton and Shuckburgh); d. § 12 for the artillery which Hanno had brought lK Tfj;; 'TI'oAew> and added to his own; moreover, '11'p6 Tfj;; r.6t\ew;; in the same sentence clearly refers to Utica. The story of the loss of the siege-engines may be una inve1tzione maligna (De Sanctis, iii. I. 387 n. I4). 6. r.pos Twa. Mcpov £puJlvov ~
THE CARTHAGINIAN }'!ERCENARY WAR

I. 75Jl

the east prevents it debouching in (and silting up) the shallow harbour of Porto Farina. In the third century B.C. it skirted the north flank of the Djebel Ahmor and Djebel Naheli, to enter the Gulf of Tunis in an east-north-east direction at a point just north of the modem salt lake, Sebka er Riana (then open sea). The mouth was thus about u miles south of its present position. Gsell, ii. 143-4. 1nos ••. y~cj>upo.s: its situation is controversiaL If the road from Carthage to Utica ran over the Djebel Naheli and through La Sebbala (which lies in the north entrance to the gap between the Djebel Naheli and Djebel Ahmor}, it must have crossed the Bagradas about a mile north-west of La Sebbala, and about 5 miles from its mouth. The modern Tunis-Bizerta road follows the same route (though of course it crosses the river much farther north, owing to the shift in the river's course). However, this assumption raises difficulties (cf. Gsell, iii. III n. 2). Presumably Hamilcar started upstream immediately after crossing the river (§ ro); but before he reached the mercenaries' bridge-head he was met not only by troops from there, but also by those who had come 12 miles from Hippou Acra, after hearing of the crossing from a messenger who had himself covered those 12 miles. Yet Veith's position for the bridge-head (as described above; cf. AS, iii. 2, map u, c, g) is only two hours' march upstream. Hence Gsell locates the bridge-head farther south, near Henchir Bou Djaoua, west of Djebel Ahmor, and about 12 miles from the river mouth. The battle he places north of Sidi Tabet, about 4-5 miles due west of La Sebbala. This hypothesis implies that the bridge lay, not on the Utica road, but on one leading southwest to the xwpa or the upper waters of the Bagradas towards Sicca Veneria, and hence that the important Utica road crossed the river north of La Sebbala by a ford or ferry-which is hard to believe. A possible explanation is that P.'s pro-Barcine source has exaggerated the surprise element in Hamilcar's crossing, and that the insurgents from both Utica and the bridge-head were in motion long before it was completed; but the nearer troops (whose numbers P. exaggerates, 76. r n.) may have hesitated to act alone against a superior force. On this hypothesis Veith's topography can be reconciled with the course of the battle. 11'0AlV rn' O.UTfji ~K080j.l"lKbTCI.S: cf. Gsell, iii. IIO, 'les cantonnements constituaient une sorte de ville'. According to 76. r this camp acted as headquarters for an army of about ro,ooo. For P.'s use of the word 1TOA£s for something much smaller than a city see Poseidonius' criticism in xxv. r (Strabo, iii. 163) ; cf. 72. 2 for the m)A,.,,s of Libya. 8. Ka.TO. TLVa.<; aVEj.lWV OTQaU~: cf. 48. 2 n. Probably the east ·winds; Gsell, iii. uo, on the authority of Bernard, Bull. de geog. historique, I9II 1

9.

213.

To'Ls lv Tfi 1roA~l

tent Tots

U11'Eva.vT{oLS:

which city? Schweighaeuser r ..p

l.tS-9

THE CARTHAGINIAN MERCENARY WAR

and Paton leave this undetermined, but Shuckburgh translates with some probability: 'to the surprise of the citizens of Utica as well as of the enemy'. That the news reached Utica quickly is clear from the arrival of forces from there (76. 1). 76. 1. Numbers of the insurgents. Since Spendius was later prepared to follow Hamilcar's Io,ooo with only 8,ooo (77. 4-5), it is improbable that he had recently been defeated (and sustained losses amounting to 8,ooo) when facing him with 25,000. DeSanctis (iii. I. J88 n. I7) suggests plausibly that the real total of insurgents involved in this battle was not more than Is,ooo. 2-9. The battle of the Bagradas. P.'s account does not permit a wholly satisfactory reconstruction. Hamilcai, he says, was advancing upstream, with elephants in front, cavalry and light-armed behind, and heav-y-armed in the rear (§ 3). On seeing the enemy ready to attack, he ordered the whole army to face about (avaa'Tp'if>•w, § 4), and the front ranks (i.e. elephants, cavalry, and light-armed) to retire quickly; those in the rear (who now had their backs to the enemy) he wheeled round (€~ lrrunpoif>ij<> TrEpunrwv, § 5) and drew up facing the enemy. The mercenaries now pressed on against the Carthaginians in some disorder, but Hamilcar's cavalry, having retreated almost to the hoplites (aw.:yylaai!'Tas Tols 7rapa'TETayfL'"ots, § 7), suddenly turned about once more and resisted (JK fL<ETa{1o>..ijs irrrorn1jvat, cf. xviii. 30. 4, T~v Els To!Jmcr8"v fL"Ta{lo>..~v), while the rest of the Punic forces advanced against the enemy, who fled in confusion. Such is P.'s account; but he leaves it fai from clear what precisely happened to the heavy-armed. lmuTpo~ and 7rfi.ptcr7raafL1)s (cf. x. 23. 3, xii. 18. 3) signify movements in drill, by which a body of troops wheel round through 90° and I8o respectively (see Schweighaeuser on x. 23. 3); but Je l.Trtcrrpoif>ij<> 7r!ptcr7rwv most probably means that the heavyaimed troops, who had their backs to the enemy, were wheeled round (Veith (AS. iii. z. 534-5 and map 12 c, g) thinks to the left) through goo, and then turned left to face the enemy; thus the column had turned through goo and each individual through I8o 0 , since they were now in line. Veith thinks that this manceuvre enabled them to catch Spendius' troops from Utica in the left flank. Other writers have suggested other, less probable, interpretations. C. G. Guichard, M lmoires militaircs sur les Grecs et les Romains, i (Lyon, 176o), 17-25, propounded an involved scheme by which the hoplites divided into columns to let the retiring vanguaid pass through. De Sanctis (iii. I. 388 and n. 17) believes that P. has misunderstood his source, and that in fact Hamilcar, having drawn on the enemy by a mock retreat of the vanguaid, drew up his rear in battle order on the flanks of his retreating troops. Gsell (iii. I II n. I) supposes that the hoplites were ordered to advance obliquely, some to the right, and some to the 0

142

THE CARTHAGINIAN MERCENARY WAR

I. 78.

IZ

left, to meet the two insurgent forces. All these theories go beyond what P. records. The feigned retreat seems certain. It was a difficult manceuvre, which Hannibal later used to great effect in conjunction with such outflanking as De Sanctis postulates for this battle. In fact the last stages of the battle of the Bagradas may have contained the germs of the tactics Hamilcar's son later perfected; but the text does not enable such a hypothesis to be proved. 2. U1Tou8fi 1TUpTJyyuwv &f1a 1TapaKaAouVTES a~as aihous! 'they eagerly passed on the watchword for battle, at the same time exhorting each other.' 1rapt:yyvav is 'to pass the word along the line'; d. vii. IS. 4· 9. ot 8' €1rl. TTJV 1rpos 'lniKn 1Tapef1{3oAt]v: this suggests that Spendius (who subsequently took the greater part of his army from the camp at Tunis, not at Utica, 77· 4) did not abandon the siege of Utica; and the defection of the town (82. 8) points to continued pressure. Hence the statement (75· 3) that by the present action Hamilcar :D\vat: T~v Tfj> 'Inlwq> 1TOALopKlav seems to be part of the pro-Barcine exaggerations of P.'s source. 11. TTJS ••• 8uaeAmaT(as: d. 71. 2. 77. 1. b 8€ MaOws ••• E1TEjlEvev: he had been in charge at Hippou Acra ab initio, 70. 9 n. Mathos' advice is the reverse of that given by Xanthippus to the Carthaginians (3o. 7 n.), the relation of forces being reversed. 4. TOUS (-lET' AuTap(ToU raM.TaS: on the desertion of their companions to the Romans (§ 5), after failure to seize Eryx and hand it over to them, see ii. 7. 8 and Zon. viii. I6; at an earlier date they had tried to seize Agrigentum and plundered it (d. 43 n., ii. 7· 7). They were originally 3,ooo strong (ii. 7· 7); and evidently about I,ooo deserted at Eryx, since the remnants of these, now Soo, turn up in the pay of the Epirotes (ii. 5· 4). On the camp at Eryx see 58. 2 n. 6. Ev TWl 1TE8L'l,l 1TUVTaxOOev apEal 1TEplEXOf1EV'l;): not identifiable. Veith (AS, iii. 2. 539 ff. and map 12 a and d) locates it in the valley of Khangat el Hadjaz, beneath the north slope of Djebel Ressas, between Creteville and Grombalia, c. 20 miles south-east of Tunis. But as Hamilcar's object was to relieve Hippou Acra (and perhaps Utica too, 76. 9 n.) a site north of the Bagradas is perhaps more probable; DeSanctis, iii. I. 389 n. 19. 78. 1. 1TaTplKTJV EXWV auaTaUlV! 'having ancestral ties of friendship'; d. xxiv. 6. 6, SuJ. Ta> 1TpoyovtKa> avaTaaH> 1rpo> T~v f3aaLJ.,{av. 7. UUCfTUIJTJCTOflEVOS aUT~: 'to join his CaUSe'; d. iii. 68. 8, iV. I. 6, for the idea of alliance. Paton, less probably, follows Casaubon and translateS: 'to introduce himself' (d. aVa.-aaL> in § 2). 12. et; j1Up1ous ••• ets TnpaKlOXlMous: these figures, especially the 143

I. 78. 12

THE CARTHAGINIAN

MERCE~ ARY

WAR

former, seem exaggerated in the interest of Harnilcar's reputation. See De Sanctis, iii. 1. 389 n. 20. 79. 1. KaTa . . . Tous auTous Kalpous: that the revolt of the Sardinian mercenaries occurred at the time of the second battle between Hamilcar and Spendius is confirmed by the story of the letter (§ 8). 2. Tiw ••• ~o~8apxov Bwcnapov: a Punic captain of foreign auxiliaries (72. 3 n.); on which acropolis he was shut is not clear. 3. 'Avvwva: it is improbable that he is the Hanna who secured a victory in Sardinia in 258 (Zon. viii. 12) and had fought earlier in Sicily {18. 8), as De Sanctis (iii. 1. 397) suggests. That Hanno is unlikely to have long survived Ecnomus, 6o. 3 n. 5. ~~E1TEaov ••. ElS TTJV 'ITaXiav: see 83. 11, 88. 8. The date of this expulsion, and of the appeal to Rome, is not certain, for in 83. 11 it is mentioned in a digression. It seems not unlikely, however, that the appeal to Rome was in 239, after Hamilcar had destroyed Spendius (85. 5 ff.) and the mercenary cause was declining in Africa; De Sanctis, iii. 1. 398. 6. TTI 1ToAuav9pw1TL~ ••• Sla+.Epouaa: an exaggeration (cf. Beloch, Bevolkerung, 445), perhaps copied from Timaeus, the main source for the early history of the island (J. Geffcken, Timaios' Geographie des Westens (Berlin, I892), 52 ff.); cf. Paus. x. 17. I, p.iydJos .•• Ka~ EfJOmp.ovW.v • .. op.of.a Tats p.cf)..,ara d1Tatvovp.lvats (from Timaeus). The other \\•ri.ters to whom P. refers cannot be identified, unless one is Myrsilus of Methymna (cf. Pliny, Nat. hist. iii. 85), whom Sallust probably used for details in book ii of his Histories; Philipp, RE, 'Sardinia', cols. 2481-2. 8. M0.9ws: not evidence that the insurgents had abandoned the siege of Hippou Acra (so Meltzer, ii. 381). The site of the meeting is not known (though it was not in the camp near Tunis, 79· 14) ; but Mathos may well have come over to it from Hippou Acra, if indeed he was present. Veith (AS, iii. 2. 543 n. I} thinks that he was not (the plural Elm}yayov in § 9 could include Spendius and Autaritus) ; and he certainly did not speak at the meeting. 9. tils a1TEaTaX.Uvov tJ1To Twv ••• atpEncnwv: P. alleges that he was a fake; cf. § 14· The arrest of Gisgo and those with him is related Ill 70. 4·

14. 1rapa1rA,ala • . . Staaa+wv: 'bearing a dispatch containing similar warnings' (Shuckburgh). For Otaaa4>dv 'to give instructions' (especially by letter) cf. § IO, iv. 26. 3· 80. 1. ~+' Bv ••• ~mf3aAwv: 'speaking next in succession'. d1rf.+acc. 'following after', not uncommon in P. (cf. xxviii. 4· 4), is omitted from LSJ. 6. o' 1TAEiaTOl auvEaalvoVTo TD SlaAEKT'tl: 'Phoenician was the

THE

CARTHAGINIA~

MERCENARY WAR

I. 8z. 6

language to which the largest number of men ... could listen with satisfaction' (Shuckburgh). Cf. Soph. Ant. 1214, 7m.t6ds- p.~ aa.lve• ¢86yyos: the compound verb is not found elsewhere. 81. 5-11. Reflections o·n the brutality of the mercenaries. The soul can have diseases comparable to ulcers and tumours (Twv •.• Du<:iiw ~ Tdl€1-1-EVOt TTJV TOtG.UTTjV TOA!-'-~V: 'imagining that such recklessness is to their credit'. 10. Tpoq,T)v EK 1T~(8wv K~Kt}v: on the importance of education for the civilizing of manners cf. iv. 20-21 (on music and the men of Cynaetha). In vi. I I a 7 Tarquin was successful p.a).wTa Sta T~v iK 1ra£8wv dywyr/JJ; and in xxiv. 7· I Chaeron of Sparta is criticized as 8r]p.on;c:fjs aywyfj~ T€Twxws. Prusias' faults are due to a lack of 7Tat8c:la~ Kal {as (xxxvi. 15. 5). Finally, education at Rome was the thing 'in qua una Polybius, noster hospes, nostrorum institutorum neglegcntiam accusat' (Cic. de re pub. iv. 3; cf. P. Friedlander, A]P, 1945, 345 ff.). ,

•

,

•

•

-

A

•

82. 1. Tov 1-1-ev 1a.vvwv~ 1Tpos ~a.uTov EKaAH: this union of the two armies was a vital step in the campaign; De Sanctis, iii. 1. 390 n. 21. 6. EK Twv ••• 'EJ41Top(wv: Emporia was the district around SyTtis Minor, the modern Gulf of Qabes; cf. iii. z:;. 2, xxxL 21. I; Livy, xxix. 25. 12, on the fertility of this area, the granary of Carthage (Pliny, Nat. hist. v. 24, xvii. 41, xviii. 94). Gsell, ii. 127-8. L

I. 82. 7

THE CARTHAGINIAN MERCENARY WAR

7. Ta S€ Ka.Ta T'i-Jv Ia.pSova.: 79· I-7· The loss is mentioned here again partly to reinforce the story of the sudden 7Ta>.lppota Twv 7TpayfLaTwv (§ 3), and partly because it made the loss of supplies from Emporia doubly disastrous. 8. Tous Ka.T' >\ya.9oK}..Ea. Ka.Lpoos: Diod. xx. 54-55 describes the long resistance of Utica; but both towns fell to Agathocles in 307/6, whereas others held out (DeSanctis, iii. 1. 44 n. 12o). TTJV 'Pw...,a.twv E~oSov: there is no suggestion elsewhere that Regulus' expedition threatened Utica or Hippou Acra. 10. TOUS ••• 1TO.pa.~E~OTJ9TJKOTO.S ••• a1TOKTE~VO.VTES: Veith (AS, iii. 2. 543) places this massacre at Utica: but P. leaves the matter open. 12. >\vv(~a.v: perhaps the friend of Adherbal, who ran the Roman blockade at Lilybaeum in 250/49 (44· I ff.): but the identification is quite uncertain. 83. 2-4. Hiero's policy. The praise of his whole-hearted collaboration with Rome in I6. 11 probably follows Fabius Pictor; the more sophisticated comment here may be P.'s own. Gelzer, Hermes, 1933, 138.

5-11. Roman support for Carthage: cf. iii. 28. 3· The Roman tradition

on the events here described is given, with some distortion, in Zon. viii. 17; App. Lib. 5; Sic. 2. 3; Nep. Ham. 2. 3; Val. Max. v. I. I; Eutrop. ii. 27. It is unlikely that the Romans in fact authorized the recruiting of mercenaries by Carthage in their territory. 8. 5La }..6you: such Punic prisoners as were still unransomed after the First Punic War (2,743 in number, according to the Roman tradition; Eutrop. ii. 27; Val. Max. v. 1. I) were exchanged for these Italians (iii. z8. 3). 11. Ka.9' ov KO.lpov ••• a1TEO'TTJO'O.V: 79· 5 n. The appeal was in fact some little time after the revolt. Twv 5' 'ITuKa.twv ~YXELpLtoVTwv O'~cis: probably after Spendius' death (86. 4), and not (so 0. Gilbert, Rom u. Karthago (Leipzig, 1876), 49) before Utica went over to the mercenaries. To have accepted the Utican offer would have been a breach of the Treaty of Catulus, with its rfoJ..la clause (62. 8). 84. 3. ~;is 1TEVTa.KLO'jJ-uptous: unlikely in reality to have been more than zo,ooo (d. 73· 3 n.): the figure is exaggerated in the interest of Hamilcar. On the insurgents' tactics cf. 77· 2 ff. 6. ~jJ-1TELpLa. jJ-E9oSLKTJ Ka.i O'Tpa.nwTLKTJ SUva.jJ-LS: cf. iii. I05. 9 for a similar contrast; in ix. 14. 1-4 ~fL7THpla fLE8ofmcr}, 'experience scientifically acquired' (e.g. geometry and astronomy), is distinguished from aTpanwnK~ Tpt{Jr), 'routine experience of a soldier', obtained partly by doing the job oneself (avTovpyla) and partly by inquiring from others ([aTopla). Together these qualities make the general. In the interest q6

THE CARTHAGINIAN MERCENARY WAR

I. 86. r

of his contrast P. here minimizes the importance of a-rpa.-rtw-rt~<~ -rpt{3~ (which can be 'unreasoning'). Diod. xxv. 4· 2-3 copies the passage. 7. Ev Ta.is ~ta.TO. JL.ipo<; XfnLO.~'i: 'separate actions', as opposed to 'fullscale battles' (ev -rot> o>.oaxEptUL l.oaxEPELS' ~plf:l Ka.i. xO.paKL 1Tt:pLELAij4>9cn: built of course by Hamilcar. 10. ToO Sa.LJ-Lov£ou ••• E'I1'L+£povTos: To Srup.ovwv is virtually equivalent to TVx:rJ (cf. 35 n.), which is a bringer of retribution in iv. 81. 4 (Cheilon's assassination of the ephors) and xx. 7· 2 (the downfall of the Boeotians); d. xv. 20. 5, xxiii. 10 • .2, xo. 12; above, p. 2a. Elsewhere the action of Tyche shades off into caprice: cf. CQ, 1945, 5-6; Mioni, 141. Here the justice of the punishment lies in the directing of the mercenaries' aat{3Eta and 1TapaVOfL{a against themselves. dut{3Eta. and 1Tapa.vollla are again linked in xviii. 54· 10; they imply outrage to the laws of God and man respectively. 85. 7. TOV npLova. KaAOOJlEVOv: cf. App. Jllyr. 25, lllyrian peaks JeErs ota 7rplovEs; and the Spanish 'Sierra'. This 'Saw' is no longer identifiable. Veith (AS, iii. 2. 545--54) locates the surrounding and massacre of the mercenaries in a valley north of the Djebel el Jedidi, c. 10 miles due west of Hammamet, on the road to Zaghouan. But as Harnilcar was concerned to cut off food and reinforcements from the insurgents at Tunis, it is not clear what either he or Spendius could have been doing so near the Gulf of Hammamet (De Sanctis, iii. 1. 392 n. 27). The narrative here suggests a version very favourable to Hamilcar. The mercenary leaders who ventured into his camp and agreed to the surrender of 'any ten he might choose' must have known the implications of their action. The subsequent massacre of the army for whom they had given their lives looks very much like Punica fides. 86. 1. TT)v xwpav E1TtlEL KO.L Tci.S 'll'OAELS: 'he proceeded against the countryside and the towns' (i.e. of Libya, 72. 2). For this sense of bruwa' cf. iv. 83. 5·

I. 86. 3

THE CARTHAGINIAN MERCENARY WAR

3. tca-rcl. -rTjv lnro KapxTJSOvo~ 1TA£upcl.v: i.e. north of the town, on the shores of El Bahira, the lagoon before Tunis. Hamilcar was to the south and the only land communication was round the inner lake, the Sebka es Sedjoumi (cf. 30. IS n.), a distance of IS miles. The Carthaginians of course controlled the shorter communications across El Bahira. 6. -rpuitcov-ra -rwv KapxYJSov[wv -rou~ E'll'lcp«v£u-rcl.-rou~: there is no reason to think these were the thirty members of the Carthaginian gerousia, who had come out to superintend Spendius' execution (so Meltzer, ii. 40). 7. TYJ~ TUXT)~ .•• evaAXcl.~ SLSOUO"T]~ &.cpopp.cl.~ KTX.: here Tyche is a power which delights in change for its own sake, especially when the peripeteia carries an ironic flavour. This is the aspect of Tyche stressed by Demetrius of Phalerum, xxix. 21; and it is not peculiar to P. See von Scala, I64, I/4-S; Siegfried, 75; Walbank, CQ, I945. 6; above, p. IS. 9. '~~'Po~ -rt;i u-rop.an -rou 'II'OT«p.ou: apparently in order to maintain his communications with Carthage, and those of Carthage with the interior.

87. 3. -rpul.tcov-ra -rij~ y£pouuia~: cf. 2r. 6 n. Perhaps the smaller body is here indicated, and all its members visited Hamilcar (Meltzer, ii. 40). Clearly this move represents a growth in the power of Hanno's faction (for his previous dismissal, cf. 82. r2), probably since the setback before Tunis, for which Hamilcar must have been held responsible: Meltzer, ii. 386; Veith, AS, iii. 2. 556-7; De Sanctis, iii. r. 394· The metaphor of olov €axa-r'r)v -rp€xovus -rav-r'rJ" (from the games) occurs also at xviii. 49· r. 7. '11'£pi ••• -rt,v AE'II'TLV: Leptis (or Lepcis) minor, the Phoenician town c. 20 miles south-east of Sousse, where Hannibal landed in 203 (Livy, xxx. 25. 12). The war of movement had recommenced, and evidently Mathos had abandoned Tunis. 8. EKKU~£U£LV U'II'Ep TWV oXwv: for this common metaphor cf. ii. 63. 2 n., iii. 94· 4· 9-10. The last battle. Neither the site nor the numbers involved are known. Veit.h (AS, iii. 2. 565ft.) gives the Carthaginians 4o,ooo, the insurgents 3o,ooo; see his table, p. 57r. 88. 3-4. p.EyaATJV ••• SLa.cpopcl.v ~ f.'ETj)LOTTJ~: a moral not wholly confirmed by the treatment of lJtica and Hippou Acra; for lJtica at least was restored to its former privileged position (vii. 9· 5, 9· 7, treaty between Hannibal and Philip V). 6. ot VEOL: soldiers, like vwviaKot: cf. v. 26. 8. 7. The length of the war. Diod. xxv. 6 gives £-r'r) -rEaaapa Kat p..ijvas TEauapas, Livy, xxi. 2. I, quinque annos. P. may be reckoning from q8

THE CARTHAG-INIAN MERCENARY WAR

I. 88.8

autumn 241 to the end of 238 (De Sanctis, iii. I. 396 n. 3o) : in this case Livy' s iive years probably cover the whole period from the end of the First Punic War to Hamilcar's crossing into Spain. But Diodorus' figures (for what they are worth) are not easily explained. De Sanctis's suggestion that 'il primo TEI7Ua.pa e forse una dittografia del secondo' is not very persuasive. An alternative explanation is that the three years four months are reckoned from the outbreak of fighting at the beginning of 240 until the early summer of 237; Diodorus will be including the preliminaries of 241, and Livy's fl.ve years will be a rounding off of this figure (so Ed. Meyer, Kl. Schr. ii. 382 n. 2). Though neither view can be regarded as certain, the second is perhaps rather more likely; for its implications for the chronology of the annexation of Sardinia see below,§ 8 n. The internal chronology of the war is past recovery. De Sanctis, loc. cit., dates the sending of Hanno to Utica to spring 240 (73 ff.), and the last campaign to 238 (87. 6 ff.); but on Meyer's chronology the latter will be in 237. DeSanctis puts the battle of the Bagradas in 240 (75), and the rebel concentration at Tunis, and the battle of the 'Saw' (85), in 239. But this is all hypothetical. 8. Roman annexation of Sardinia. On hearing of the Roman expedition the Carthaginians evidently sent an embassy to Rome announcing their claim to the island and intention of recovering it (§ 9); whereupon the Romans, alleging their preparations to constitute hostile action directed against themselves, passed a war-resolution (§ to), which was conveyed to Carthage in the form of a rerum repetitio (either ... or ... ) by senatorial legati (see iii. ro. r n., 20. 6 n.}. Upon the Carthaginians' accepting the terms(§ rz, E£gaVTE>: -roi,; t
I. 88.8

THE CARTHAGINIAN MERCENARY WAR

A possible explanation of the divergent traditions for the year in which Sardinia was annexed may be that the original Roman expedition, undertaken on the invitation of the mercenaries (§ 8), was dispatched in Gracchus' consulship (whether in fact the Mercenary War in Africa was already over or not; KaTa Tdv KatpJv TovTov is a loose copula}, but the Roman ultimatum to Carthage and the renunciation of any claim to the island did not occur until the consular year 237/6 (probably summer 237, since peace will have been restored before Hamilcar crossed into Spain in autumn 237, ii. r. 5). Such an hypothesis would explain how the acquisition of the island could be dated either to 238/7, when the expedition was sent, or to 237/6 when its annexation was formally conceded. (ii) The mercenary appeal described in § 8 is clearly subsequent to that of 83. I r, which the Romans rejected. Evidently the Romans had now decided, belatedly (see below), to make the Tyrrhenian Sea a mare clausum by striking before Carthage could recover her strength (Scullard, Hist. r8o). Later propaganda strove to justify the Senate's action in one of two ways: (a) A version, combated by P. in iii. 28, and probably deriving from Fabius Pictor (Gelzer, Hermes, 1933, 142; Bung, 17, thinks rather of Cato), represented the cession of Sardinia as compensation for the seizure of Italians who had carried materials to the rebels during the Mercenary War (83. 7); when the Carthaginians subsequently manned a fleet to recover the island, the Romans were obliged to declare war. Cf. App. Hisp. 4; Lib. 5, 86; Dio, fg. 46; Zon. viii. r8. (b) A later annalistic account associated the ceding of the island with the Treaty of Catulus, Livy, xxii. 54· n, cf. xxi. 40. 5 (contrast xxi. r. 5); Ampel. 46. 3; Eutrop. iii. 2. 2; Oros. iv. II. 2; auct. de uir. ill. 41. 2. But in fact the Roman decision to annex the island was evidently taken after the Treaty of Catulus, for had its acquisition seemed desirable in 241, there was nothing to prevent the Romans from insisting on it. (Mommsen's view that the Carthaginians would have fought on to save Sardinia (Rom. Gesck. i. 543· 4) is unconvincing; and Heuss's suggestion that the popular rejection of the preliminary agreement (63. r) had something to do with Sardinia (HZ, 1949-so, 492) is unsupported by the sources. Cf. Taubler, V orgesch. r6 ff.; Ed. Meyer, Kl. Schr. ii. 384. The reference to Sardinia in Regulus' peace terms (31. 5 n.) is part of the untrustworthy account in Dio. 11. Tov vponpfJvivov voAEJ.lov: the Mercenary War (not the First Punic War, as Laqueur, :to). 12. A,.EaTf)crav T"i~ Iap5ovo~ KTA.: P. has a slightly fuller account of these events in iii. ro. 1-3. ,.poa£8f)Ka.v: 'they agreed to pay in addition' (sc. to the former indemnity, cf. iii. ro. 3. 1rp6; Toi:; 1rponpov).

BOOK II l. Risumi of Book I; Hamilcar in Spain

1. 3. Ttt va.pO.J..oya Twv ~pywv: 'its dramat!c surprises' (Paton). nl lpya are, strictly, the warlike acts on both sides; but 1Tap&.Jo.oyo> is 'unexpected' (cf.i. I.4n.) ratherthan 'monstrous' (soSchweighaeuser: 'facta immania'), an idea already expressed in &.aef3~fLaTa. P. gives especial prominence to the paradoxical elements in the Mercenary War. Cf. Feldmann, 37· 4. ~<E4>aJ..a.1wSw~ . • • ~wtljla.uovn:s: on the summary character of books i and ii see i. 13. 7~. and, for the contrast with the fuller treatment of the history proper (&.1ro8e~1mK~ lcrropia), below, 37· 3; d. iii. I. 3· ' E~ •t BPX"l~ ' ~ wpovEow: '"' 5; P. refers to his scheme as set KaTa.' TfJV Cf . 1.. out at i. 13. 2-5. 5. EU9tw
II.

I.

6

HAMILCAR IN SPAIN

the straits (cf. Meltzer, ii. 4oo); but Lenschau (RE, 'Hamilkar', col. 23o6) and Gsell (iii. 124-5) think he marched to the straits. civEKTii.To: 'set about recovering'; on the earlier Punic empire in Spain see i. Io. 5 n. 7. ~T, crxeSov €vvia.: cf. Livy, xxi. 2. I; Nepos, Ham. 4· 2. Hamilcar died ten years before the outbreak of the Hannibalic War (iii. Io. 7). and so in 229; his governorship is therefore from 237 to 229. 1roAAous .•• 1fOLTjcra.s 'IJ3Tjpwv l111'1')Koous: Meltzer (ii. 399) compares the career of Caesar in Gaul, both militarily and as an example of a military autocrat relying on popular support to counter a landed aristocracy which mistrusted him. Records are slight. Diod. xxv. ro. I relates a victory over the Turdetani, the east coast Iberians, and Celtic (Celtiberian ?) mercenaries. The foundation of Acra Leuce (Alicante) probably marked the limit of Hamilcar's advance, Diod. xxv. Io. 3· See Schulten, CAH, vii. 786-7. 7-8. KC.TEcrTpeljse Tov J3tov ci~iws KTA.: according to Diod. xxv. 10. 3-4 (d. 12, 19, Tzetzes) the king of the Orissi (Oretani; cf. P. iii. 33· 9) marched to relieve Helice (? Ilici, modern Elche), which Hamilcar was besieging, and in the subsequent flight the latter was drowned, still fighting and attending to his family's safety, in an unnamed river (Tzetzes calls it the Ebro) which was in flood (i.e. it was winter, 229/8). Livy, xxiv. 41. 3, puts the disaster near Castrum Album (Alicante ?) . This account, though anti-Barcine, is not inconsistent with P., who prefers to stress Hamilcar's death KaTa Tdv Tov Ktv3uvov Katp6v. A stratagem recorded by App. Hisp. 5; Zon. viii. r8; and Frontin. Strat. ii. 4· 17, will not :fit into Diodorus' account. P.'s high praise of Hamilcar seems to have penetrated the Roman tradition, despite the hatred of his son. Thus Cato crowns a list of those who were happier than kings with the name of Hamilcar (Plut. Cato mai. 8. 14). 9. TTJV .•• UTpa.T1'}yia.v .•• 1ra.pi8ocra.v :A.aSpou~~: on the Carthaginian urpaTT]yia in Spain see Bengtson (Aegyptus, 1952, 378-82); it was in effect a provincial governorship. ol Kap)(1]36vwt is vague; but Diod. xxv. 12 suggests that, like Hannibal later (cf. iii. 13. 4), Hasdrubal was :first acclaimed by the troops in Spain and his appointment subsequently ratified at home (iii. 13. 3). In the distorted account of App. Hisp. 4, Hasdrubal is a popular leader who supported Hamilcar at the time of his impeachment; for his marriage to Hamilcar's daughter see iii. 12. 3; Diod. xxv. ro. 3; App. Hann. 4· The antiBarcine account which made him Hamilcar's minion (Livy, xxi. 3-4; Nepos, Ham. 3) may be neglected. He had been back once to Carthage since 237, to quell a Numidian rising (Diod. xxv. ro. 3; Frontin. Strat. iv. i. 18); but the story of an attempted coup (iii. 8. 2) is suspect as part of the anti-Barcine tradition adopted by Fabius. For his later career see I3 and 36 below. 152

HAMILCA.l't IN SPAIN

II.

2.

4

Tc{l ••• TPlTJpa.px
entrusted to a close friend of the general; d. i. 44· r. 2-12. The First lllyrian vVar (231-228) This war is important to P.'s main theme (2. 2), as it first brought the Romans east of the Adriatic. For the greater part {2-{). 8, 9~10) his source is apparently Greek, and the narrative is strongly pre~ judiced against Aetolia (d. 2. 6-4. s); but 8 and II~I2 represent a Roman tradition, which may well be Fabius (so most historians, e.g. Taubler, Beloch, Gelzer, Holleaux). Bung, 184~. while accepting Fabius as a possible source for u-rz, is impressed by Bauer, who (AEM, r895, 136-47) rather improbably associates the pro-Roman version of 8 with the propagandist account of the affair given by Roman legati in Achaea (u. 4). There are secondary accounts in Dio, fg. 49 (cf. Zon. viii. r9), very unreliable, and App. Ill. (wellinformed on Illyria, but contaminated by annalistic inventions); see Holleaux, 78 n. 2 (worthlessness of Dio); Fluss, RE, 'Teuta', cols. u4o-2; Zippel, 46 ff. On the war in general see Holleaux, Etudes, iv. 9~25 ( REG, 1930, 243-{)r), for chronology; CAH, vii. 822 ff. (with bibliography, 931~3); E. Badian, BSR,, 1952, 72-9,3 with bibliography; G. Walser, Historia, ii, 1954. ,)o8~r8 (preferring Appian toP.); Thiel, Hist. 344 ff. (arguing against Holleaux that the Senate was seeking a chance to intervene). 1. 1. KaTO. 8~ Tous Kalpous TOuTous: a loose synchronism, for Hamilcar died in winter 229{8, whereas the Roman crossing (d. rr. r) was in spring 229, a date confirmed by Holleaux (Etudt's, iv. 9--2.5) against Beloch, who argues (iv. 2. 262-3; cf. Bung, r86) for z28, on the assumption of two to three months' retardation in the Roman calendar. Among other arguments, Holleaux points out that the expedition followed close on Paxos (ro. r, rr. r), which must be in 229, since by zz8 the Achaeans had broken with Aetolia {as Beloch later admitted; Holleaux, op. cit., zs n. 3); also that Demetrius II died early in 229 (44. 2 n.), about the time of the Roman expedition. 2. TTJV ••• ,.p69eow T~V ftf.li!TEpav: i.e. to show the growth of world affairs into an organic whole, i. 3· 3 ff., 4· I ff. In ii. I. 4 rrp69ems was rather the plan of the contents. avs11ow Ka.t KaTaaKe.uf]v: 'formation and growth', with hysteron proteron to avoid hiatus, cf. JI. 2, 3.5· 2, 41. 6, iii. 5· 3, i4· 3, xxiii. r6. 8. av~T)at> refers to the new links established by Rome in Illyria (though there were no territorial acquisitions after this war). 4. 'Aypwv o ... J)acnAEus: the ruler over a group of tribes around Scodra, and the Bay of Rhizon (Cattaro), who lived by piracy, carried out in light galleys (lemhi). His expanded realm controlled a large area from Dalmatia southwards, and included most of the 1 53

II. z. 4

THE FIRST ILLYRIAN WAR

Greek colonies on the Dalmatian islands, Pharos, Black Corcyra (Korcula), but not Issa (cf. vii. 9· IJ). Dio, fg. 49· 2-3 (cf. Zon. viii. 19) calls Agron king of the Ardiaei, and this is accepted by De Sanctis (ill. I. 294 n. 76) ; it is more likely than the suggestion of A. Gitti (Historia, 1935, I83-204) that he came from the Labeates, a tribe never mentioned at this period. The Ardiaei were, however, only part of his realm. See Zippel, 43 ff. ; and, for the dynastic table, Lenschau, RE, 'Pleuratos', cols. 237-8. 5. Allf.l.ll"'Piou Tou ~.Ahnrou 1Ta.Tp6~: Demetrius II, son of Antigonus Gonatas, king of :Macedon, 240/39-229. Philip was his son by the Epirote princess Phthia (v. 89. 7 n.). ME8u.wiol~ lm' AlTw).wv 1TOAlopteoup.~vol~: shortly before 23I a republican revolution had swept Epirus, overthrowing the royal house (Justin. xxviii. 3; Polyaen. viii. 52; Paus. iv. 35· 3), the Epirotes sought Achaean and Aetolian alliances (6. I), and Acarnania declared its independence. In 231 (DeSanctis, iii. I. 293 n. 73 for the date) the Aetolians began the siege of 1\ledion, on the frontier of central Acarnania. (1\ledion, the 1\ledeon of Thuc. iii. Io6. 2, lay on the southeast slope of a fertile ridge, fifteen minutes south of the modern village of Katouna; for its remains see Leake, NG, iii. 503, cf. 575-6; Heuzey, 347 ff.). As an enemy of Achaea and Aetolia (44. I, 46. I, xx. 5· 3) it was in Demetrius' interest to send aid; but communications were difficult and he was occupied against the Dardanians (Trogus, Prol. 28; Justin. xxviii. 3· 14; Livy, xxxi. 28. 2), and so he hired the help of the Illyrians for Medion. This device does not stand alone; the Phocian pirate Ameinias had helped Gonatas to take Cassandreia (Polyaen. iv. 6. 18), and the Cretan pirates were later to help Philip V against Rhodes (xiii. 5· I). 8. auvd.ljta.VTo~ Tou xpovou Twv cipxa.lpEaW..W: the annual election of Aetolian magistrates at Thermum was at the time of the autumn equinox (iv. 37· 2). The year is probably 231, since the fighting and compact in Epirus is :230, and the Roman invasion 229. Autumn 232 is not impossible, but unlikely, since Agron died immediately after the fall of 1\ledion (4. 6), yet his death was unknown to the Roman ambassadors (Dio, fg. 49· z)~indeed App. IU. 7 makes them find him still alive. DeSanctis, iii. I. 293 n. 73· Beloch's date of autumn 230 (iv. r. 636; 2. 531-2) assumes that the Roman invasion was in 228. 2. 9-4. 5. 1be account of the Aetolian peripeteia is developed by P. as anexampleofasuddenchangeoffortune,andalsoasawelcomerebuffto his old enemies, the Aetolia.ns (despite their alliance with Achaea, 6. 1 ). 2. 9. TftV E:mypa.~T)v TWV ~~~ TOJII Trpa.yp.dTwll, 'the credit of the success', for a metaphorical use; v. 42. 8, etc. E.mypa<J>Ii applies literally to inscribing conquered arms, etc., or dedicating them to the gods (here, at Thermum). A famous 154

THE FIRST ILLYRIAN WAR

II. 4· 5

example is Pausanias' inscription on the tripod dedicated at Delphi after Plataea: 'E>v\-,)vwv dpx7Jyo> E'TTEt trrpaTov a!.\.we M-,)Swv Ilawav{a,; (/>o{{Jtp f-Lvfif-L' avH17)KE T<:ille (ap. Thuc. i. 132. 2). 10. 1TEpl8eiva.l ••• TOV aTE~a.vov: for Fortune as the bestower of (metaphorical) crowns cf. v. 42. 8. 3. l. Ka.86.1rep ~Bos icnlv AiTwXoi:s: cf. iv. 67. 1 for the taking of office immediately on election. 1rpos rqv MeSua~v£a.v: though Medion is not a coastal town (xviii. 40. 5; Livy, xxxvi. n. 10), its territory may well have reached the Ambracian Gulf between that of Thyrrheum and the valley of Limnaea. The 'part nearest to the city' is probably the bay of Loutraki, about 7 miles from the town. 3. 2. Ka.Ta a1Te(pa.s: i.e. in small companies (d. ii. 66. 5, iii. rg. 5), probably kinship groups, like those envisaged in Homer, Iliad, ii. 362-3, where Agamemnon is advised Kpiv' avllpa> Ka"Ta , JJ.ycff-LEf-LVOV, w>
Likewise among the German tribes 'non casus nee fortuita conglobatio turmam aut cuneum facit, sed familiae et propinquitates' (Tac. Germ. 7· 3). In recent times the Albanians, descendants of Agron's Illyrians, fought in tribes and 'bairaq'( smaller kinship groups), and the Montenegrin Slavs in 'bratstva' (brotherhoods). 5. T~ 1rXT)8el KO.t T~ ~dopEL TTJS O'UVTdo~EWS: the Illyrian armour was heavy; cf. 66. 5, where Illyrian troops alternate with bronze-shielded Macedonians; 68. 5, g, for the weight of their arms and formation (uVvTa{L,;).

4. 3. rijs TUXTJS ••• evSeLKVUf.LEvT)S TTJV a.uTTjS 8Uva.f.LLV: for Tyche as a power punishing pride and delighting in sensational reversals see i. 35· z; 86. 7; above, pp. 18-rg. For the phraseology see also xi. 5· 8, xxiii. 10. r6, xxix. 19. 2 (where, as in i. 4· 5. Tyche is a play-producer). The phrase ovva.f-L'V • . • ivllnKVI.If-LEVlJ appears at xxix. 21. 5 in a quotation from Demetrius of Phalerum; and the present incident is paralleled, reflections and all, at xxx. ro. r-2, where, after Pydna, Aemilius Paullus appropriates and turns to his OY/11 honour the columns Perseus was constructing at Delphi. 5. G.v8pbi1Tous l>vTa.s: a communis locus (cf. Herod. i. 32; [Soph.] O.T. 1528-3o), cf. 7· I, iii. 31. 3, viii. 21. II, xv. 1. 8, xxi. 14. 4, xxiii. 12. 4, xxiv. ro. n, xxxviii. 20. 3. and several passages in Diodorus drawing on P.; d. von Scala, 165--6. It is common to both Stoic (e.g. [Heraclit.] Ep. 78. IS Bywater) and Peripatetic (e.g. Plut. Mor. 104 A, drawing here on Demetrius of Phalerum) sources. 155

rr. 4 . 6

THE FIRST ILLYRIAN WAR

6. I.I.ET~AAO.SE Tbv ~{ov: in autumn ZJI, €v o>.lyatS' ~p,lpat> after the battle. 7. T ~uTa 8lo.8Esai.I.Ev'1 Tbv ••• xe~pLafL6v: in fact as regent and guardian for Pinnes, the young son of Agron and a secondary wife Triteuta, who subsequently married Demetrius of Pharos; Zon. viii. I9; Dio, fg. 49· J, 53; App. Ill. 7; Livy, xxii. 33· 5 (a tradition independent of P.). In controlling the kingdom (Ta Trpri.yp,a.Ta, cf. i. zo. ::z n.) Teuta uses the normal Hellenistic council of rfoO.oL, found in the courts of all the major powers; cf. v. :z. In. P. follows a tradition on Teuta (d. Dio, fg. 49· 2-5; Zon. viii. I9) which attributes her policy to supposed feminine characteristics of headstrong emotion and lack of reason (cf. § 8, 8. 12), which are typical of Hellenistic historical writing of the more sensational kind. But the collaboration with Scerdila1das (5. 6) shows that the expedition of 230 (§ 9) was part of a policy of planned expansion into Epirus, preceded by attacks on Elis and .Messenia, both partly under Aetolian influence (iv. 59· I, etc., Elis; iv. 3· g, Messenia). Ill:yTian raids had extended as far as Laconia (Plut. Cleom. Io. n). Badian, BSA, 1952, 73· Ka.n~ ciJowtKTjV: the capital of the new federal Epirote republic (d. 2. 5 n.), a town in Chaonia about 8 miles inland from modern Saranda; cf. Syll. 653 A, 4, Td Kowdv Twv 'H1rnpwTWV [Twv] 1T£pt tl>owlt €1r' J4TwTavwv; on

5. 3.

156

THE FIRST ILLYRIAN WAR

II. 6. 8

the boundaries of Atintania see rr. II n.). However, the ceding of the area by the Romans to Philip in 205 (Livy, xxix. 12. 13) suggests that it had recently been Macedon ian; and Antigoneia looks like an Antigonid foundation (cf. Jones, Greek City, 13) despite Beloch's suggestion that Pyrrhus founded it, and named it after his late wife Antigone, to protect the gorges and northern frontiers of his kingdom (iv. 2. 381). Cary suggested (/Jist. 4oo) that Gonatas took Atintania from Epirus after Alexander II's intervention in the Chremonidean Vvar, and that Demetrius II restored it as compensation for the divorcing of Phthia; but it is now clear that Phthia was never divorced (Tarn, Ferguson Stttdies, 1940, 483 ff.), and Macedonian concessions to Epirus about 233 would be odd. Nevertheless, a very recent acquisition of Atintania by Epirus is not to be excluded; it may, for example, have been garrisoned during the period of joint hostility against the Aetolians, and retained when Demetrius came to terms with lli}Tia (to envisage but one out of several possibilities). But, in any case, its possession by Epirus at this date is assured. Twv ••• tCaTA TdS <j>uAa~
157

II. 6.9

THE FIRST ILLYRIAN WAR

9. aUj.Lj.LO.XlO.V ••• t-Ln' )\Ka.pvcivwv 1rpos Tous 'IXXupious: on the Acarnano-Illyrian alignment see 2. 5 ff. The date of this Epirote treaty, which will have pleased Demetrius II of Macedon, was summer or autumn 230. As its price the Epirotes seem to have ceded Atintania to Teuta (from whom the Romans took it the next year, II. n; cf. vii. 9· IJ); Holleaux, Rome, non. I; Beloch, iv. 2. 384; BusoltSwoboda, ii. I476 n. 4· Ambracia and Amphilochia may now have broken away from Epirus and joined Aetolia; cf. iv. 61. 6; Beloch, ibid.; Flaceliere, 252. P.'s didactic digression (6. 9-7. I2) is clearly prompted by his irritation, as an Achaean, at the desertion from the Achaeans (the Aetolians matter less) to the Illyrian side. 7. 6. TT)v a.&hoO TOO auan\j.LO.TOS ~KE(vou 1rpoa.ipeaLv: 'the conduct and reputation of that very band'. '"poalpm's is used by P. to mean either 'reputation' (e.g. ix. 9· 10) or 'conduct' (e.g. xviii. 3· 3); and often, as here, both meanings are present. avarTJp,a is 'a body of soldiers'; cf. i. 81. u, etc. On the history of these Gauls see Jullian, il. 327; Griffith, 252-3; Launey, i. 517; how they had originally betrayed their own friends and kinsmen (§ 6) is unknown. 7. Sui. To Ka.TmEiyea8a.L 1roA€t-L
8. l. Tous 11'Aotto ...€vous: 'traders (by sea)': see Schweighaeuser, Lex. Polyb. s.v.; iv. 42. 7 n. These traders were mainly from the Greek cities of southern Italy; see J. Hatzfeld (Les trafiquants italiens dans l'orient hellinistique (Paris, I9I9)) on their activities. 3. 1ra.pa.Kouovns ••• Twv EyKa.AouvTwv: this is the official Roman version of their reluctance to intervene in the eastern Mediterranean, probably received from Fabius (cf. 2-I2 n.). r a:iov kO.l AEUkLOV KopoyKa.vious: the annalistic version (cf. App. Ill. 7 ; Dio, fg. 49· I-z; Zon. viii. I9) tells how the people of Issa (cf. § 5), molested by Agron, threw themselves on the mercy of Rome. The Coruncanii were accordingly sent, and both a Coruncanius and I

58

THE FIRST ILLYRIAN WAR

II. 8.8

Cleemporus of Issa were murdered by Illyrian pirates. (There are more fantastic details in Livy, ep. 20; Florus, i. 21. 3; Oros. iv. 13. 2; and Pliny, Nat. kist. xxxiv. 24 calls one of the legati P. lunius.) The annalistic account is accepted by DeSanctis (iii. I. 295) and Walser (Historia, ii, 1954. 308-18), but looks like an example of the old legend that the Romans waged only iusta bella, and generally to defend allies. In fact Issa did not join the Romans until 229 (n. 12); for Gelzer (Hermes, 1933, 143) is not convincing, when he argues that Fabius omitted the story of lssa (like that of the Acarnanian embassy; 12. 7 n.) because it damaged his picture of Rome fighting to avenge an outrage, and exposed her to a charge of meddlesomeness. The object of the embassy is likely to have been a general reconnoitring visit (~1rlaKe!f;w 7TOt1Jaop.lvou~); see Badian, BSA, 1952, 76, and in general Munzer, RE, 'Coruncanius (1 and z)', col. 1663; Zippel, 47-50; Holleaux, Rome, 23 n. 6; Niese, ii. 281 n. 5· 5. E11'0AlopteEl Tijv "lava.v: Issa is an island off the Dalmatian coast, west of Pharos, modern Lissa; Fluss, RE, 'Issa', Suppl.-B. v, cols. 346-so. It had never formed part of Teuta's kingdom (d1re£8etv is 'refused to submit'). The Roman arrival was probably in autumn, 230 (Holleaux, CAH, vii. 831), and the interview here most likely gave rise to the false tradition (8. 3 n.) that the Issaeans provoked Roman intervention by their appeal and deditio (Treves, Athen., 1934, 387 n. 1). 8. teolvyj JlEv ••. t&'~ yf. JA-1\": Elizabeth I of England likewise gave letters of marque to her privateers and dismissed protests with contempt (De Sanctis, iii. I. 295). Treves has argued (Athen., 1934, 388 ft.) that Teuta was making a conciliatory offer of aat!Ala, and Badian would justify the Illyrian piracy as in order against Italian blockade-runners. But the Italian traders were not necessarily blockade-runners, nor could the Romans admit the Illyrian claim to blockade all states they were attacking; and Treves' view is hard to accept, since Teuta admitted her inability to control unofficial piracy. Hence an offer of davAla.----even if it is to be deduced from the equivocation P. reports--would have been farcical. P.'s account must be read as a whole, and clearly he believed himself to be recording an insult. The reliability of his narrative is another matter, and turns on the reliability of the Fabian version. Certainly the retort of the younger Coruncanius (probably Lucius; De Sanctis, iii. I. 295 n. 87) has the appearance of a post eventum invention designed to glorify the victim of the subsequent outrage and to reaffirm Roman regard for wrongs committed upon subjects~in short it is part of the Fabian tradition; see Treves, Athen., 1934, 389. Badian (BSA, 1952, 77), following Holleaux (Rome, 99), argues that the Roman reply was in fact a rerum repetitio ; but normally at this time a rerum repetitio was preceded by a conditional war-motion in the Senate and the !59

II. 8. 8

THE FIRST ILL YRIAN WAR

comitia (cf. CP, 1949, 15 ff.), and there is no evidence that the Coruncanii were authorized to do more than reconnoitre (contra Holleaux, Rome, 'f), who thinks that despite P.'s account they had the duty of delivering an ultimatum). Teuta's phraseology is ironically echoed by Coruncanius, e.g. KaT' Ullav &DtK~fJ.aTa Kowfi .•• 1TEtpaa6fJ.l£(Ja • , • § 10. 13. itrl Tfi tra.pa.vo.-~~ TtlS yuva.~Kos: 'at the outrage committed by a woman'.

9. 1. Tfjs l:Jpa.s ~trlYEVOf.\WrJS: i.e. spring 229. Tcuta's policy probably represents a determination to win bases in preparation for an inevitable war (so Treves, Athen., 1934, 391; Badian, BSA, 1952, 77). rather than evidence that she had no idea it was coming (Holleaux, Rome, 101). 2. ~iLO. tropou: 'straight across the high sea', cf. i. 39· 6. This gives a better contrast to putting in at Epidamnus than does the translation 'through the strait (sc. of Corcyra)' (so Paton). Cf. Schweighaeuser, ad loc. Corcyra and Epidamnus were independent Greek cities. 8. :4troAAwvui.Ta.L: the independent city of Apollonia lay just north of the Aous mouth. Its appeal to Achaea and Aetolia, rather than Rome, seems proof that the embassy sent to Rome c. 266 (VaL Max. vi. 6. 5; Dio, fg. 42; Zon. viii. 7; Livy, ep. 15) had had no political sequel; De Sanctis, ii. 428; Holleaux, Rome, 1-5. 9. Tas ... va.us Ka.Ta.+pa~eTous: on the meaning see i. 20, 13 n. 10. 1. 1T€pl TOUS Ka.Aoup.Evous na.€ous: there are two islands, Paxos and Antipaxos, lying 5 miles south of Corcyra, opposite the Acheron mouth; cf. Pliny, Nat. hist. iv. 52. See Johanna Schmidt, RE, 'Paxoi', cols. 2437~8; Hammond, ]HS, 1945, 27 and map (Pl. I). 3. t~ru~a.vTES To us • • • AEJ.I~ous O.vO. Tena.pa.s: lashed together in fours, the light lembi (i. zo. 13 n.) gained in bulk and stability, and once the enemy's beak was embedded in the side of one of the outer ships, boarding became possible. The manreuvre is significant for the general change over to boarding tactics about this time, and points to considerable naval adaptability on the part of the Illyrians. Tarn (HMND, 145) observes that in the First Punic War 'the Roman sword beat the Carthaginian ram'; the Illyrian victory at Paxos underlined the same lesson. 5. trAoiwv •.• TETp'l")plKwv: on these ships see i. 20. 9 n.; so too for the quinquereme. MO.pyos o Ka.puvEos: on his earlier career see 41. 14 (assassination of the tyrant of Bura, 27 5/4), 43· 2 (first holder of the single generalship, 255/4). Later overshadowed by Aratus, he is only mentioned again here, dying a hero's death at an advanced age. As commander of the 160

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quinquereme he was probably navarch of the Achaean squadron (Niese, ii. z83). See Kroll, RE, 'Margos (1)', col. 1709. On the phrase -;rdvTa Td O[Ka'a Tij> KO,Vij> .•. 1rf'1TO'"f/Ktf>'i (cf. iii. JI6. 9), Which iS typical of the phraseology of contemporary laudatory inscriptions, see Schulte, 52. 8 • .AT)IJ.tlTp~ov Tov ILj)cip~ov: Demetrius was apparently a Greek (or possibly a hellenized Illyrian) who governed Pharos (modem U:sina or Hvar) as Teuta's vassal; Gitti (BHlt. comm. Rom., 1935, 13) argues less probably that he was a private citizen of Pharos. 11. 1. K!lTU 8~ Tous ulJTous KaLpoos: d. 2. I n. rvaaos }lEV 1Lj)6Xou~os ••• A3Xos &~ noaTO}ltOS: Cn. Fulvius CnJ. Cn.n. Centumalus and L. Postumius A.f. A.n. Albinus, the consuls for A.u.c. 525 = 229/8 B.c. The correct praenomen is attested for Postumius by Livy, xxii. 35· 6, xxiii. 24. 3, and by the Fast. Cap. P.'s error in giving him his father's praenomen may go back to an error in Fabius or, more probably (cf. Bung, r86 n. 2), is attributable to a }{S. fault. See Munzer, RE, 'Fulvius (42)', coL 235; 'Postumius (4o)', col. 912; Beloch, iv. 1. 665. 4. iv Ota~oXa'Ls wv: Treves (Athen., 19,34. 389---90) argued that Demetrius had already made contact with the envoys of zJo, who at Issa were not far from Pharos. But Badian (BSA, I95z, 77 n. 19) points out that P. clearly distinguishes his contacts with Rome from the disfavour which led to them, and suggests that Demetrius may have been intriguing to obtain the guardianship of Pinnes (which he subsequently obtained by marrying Triteuta; Dio, fg. 53). 5-12. Illyrian towns and tribes join Rome. Corcyra (§ 5), Apollonia (§ 8), Epidamnus (§ ro), the Parthini (§ n), the Atintanes (§ u), and lssa (§ u) made acts of dedit£o to Rome. P. here translates fides by 1rlcrn<;, amicitia by if>,).{a; on the latter relationship, which came into existence with the act of deditio, but did not necessarily imply the making of a joedus, see A. Reuss (Grtmdlagen, 78-s3). All {except Issa, on which see below) feature in the treaty of 215 between Philip V and Hannibal as if subject to Rome (vii. 9· 13). Their subsequent status is not, however, wholly clear. Taubler's belief (i. zs) that they received libertas precaria by a Roman decree (so too Holleaux, CAH, vii. 836) has been refuted by the arguments of Reuss (Grundlagen), demolishing the conception of a category of dediticii with precaria libertas. That they were free is confirmed by App. Ill. 8, 'Pwp.a'io' ..• K.!pKvpo.v p.ev KO.t l11Tolu\wvlav a
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Details are as follows : Corcyra, Apollonia, and Epidamnus retained coining rights, and minted victoriates, drachmae, those for Corcyra having the inscription ROMA (d. Mommsen, Geschichte des romischen Miinzwesens (Berlin, 186o), 394 ff.; Zippel, 90; B.l~·f.C. Rom. Rep., ii. 196-7). It is convincingly argued by Badian (BSA, 1952, Son. 5) that these coins were struck by Corcyra at the request of Rome, 'probably ... to pay Roman troops in the East'; d. De Sanctis (iii. 1. 302 n. 97), who emphasizes the Greek initials of the minting magistrate. Pliny, Nat. hist. iv. 52, refers to Corcyra as a free city; but the coarse remark recorded by Strabo, vii, fg. 8, £Aw(Npa KopKvpa, x€r o1rov 8€Aetr;, may go back to the fourth century or earlier, either 426 (Bursian, ii. 362 n. 2), 372 (De Sanctis, iii. 1. 302 n. 97) or perhaps 353, when the anti-Athenian party was in power (Dem. xxiv. 202). Apollonia (see above for App. Ill. 8) now became the main point for the landing of Roman armies east of the Adriatic (e.g. Livy, xxx.i. 18. 9, 40. 6, xlii. 18. 3, etc.), though in 205 P. Sempronius landed at Epidamnus (subsequently called Dyrrhachium: Pliny, Nat. hist. iii. 145), as did M. Lucretius in 171 (Livy, xxix. 12. 3, xlii. 48. 7). Issa later contributed a useful naval contingent to the Roman fleet (Livy, xxxi. 45· 10, xxxii. 21. 27, xxxvii. 16. 8, xlii. 48. 8). The setting up of this protectorate (the extent of which should not be exaggerated; Badian, BSA, 1952, 78) ensured command of the straits against further piracy. Its basis was the loose relationship of amicitia, which applied the Roman concept of clientela in the sphere of foreign policy. 'The freedom of the Illyrian cities ... leads directly to the Isthmian proclamation (sc. of 196)' (Badian, op. cit. 81). Against Holleaux's thesis (Rome, 109-12) that the Romans were looking beyond Illyria to Macedon see the compelling arguments of Cary (History, 406), who shows how little the Adriatic concerned the Antigonids prior to Philip V. 5. wa.pa.KATJ9Evns: 'encouraging each other' (Emesti, Schweighaeuser, Treves, who makes it reinforce opo6vpao6v), or 'invited (by the Romans)' (Casaubon, Paton, Niese (ii. 283 n. 2)). Schweighaeuser argues that subsequent events showed that Roman exhortation was unnecessary; but the Corcyraeans would not know the procedure of deditio without some explanation and encouragement (for Greek confusion on this matter d. xx. 9· 10 ff., xxxvi. 4). Hence the second version is preferable. (It carries no implications for a Roman policy of imperialism, as Kolbe, 5.-B. Heidelberg, 1933/4,4, 27n. 3.) The views here attributed to the Corcyraeans (plav ... aacp6.Aetav) arc part of the Roman propagandist version of events. 7. Roman land forces. These 2o,ooo foot and 2,ooo horse, like Fulvius' 2oo ships (II. 1), indicate the serious Roman view of the war. But Holleaux is not convincing (Rome, 102 n. 3) in his thesis not only r6z

THE FIRST ILL YRIA:.T WAR

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that these preparations preceded the death of Demetrius II (as they did) but that they were designed to meet a possible Macedonian attack in support of the Illyrians; cf. Badian, BSA, 1952, 76-77. 10. Tous etO"w To1Tous Tfls 'l).i..upioos: not the inland districts, but those parts of Teuta's kingdom lying in the farther recesses of the Adriatic (Zippel, sr); cf. Zon. viii. Ig, Ta xwpla 11"op87]Q'&vTWV Ta mfpa)la. The Ardiaei (the tribe to which the royal family belonged: Dio, fg. 49· 2) were at this time widely extended, and the Romans will not have sailed as far as the Narenta (modem Neretva). their original home; Tomaschek, RE, 'Ardiaioi', col. 6r5. The fate of the Ardiaeans whom the Romans reduced is uncertain; they were perhaps assigned to the Parthini or to Demetrius of Pharos (Badian, BSA, 1952,78 n. 26). 11. na.p&(vwv ..• )\TWTUVW\1: the Parthini seem to have occupied the hinterland of Dyrrhachium, as far south as the Apsus (modern Devol), and eastward towards Lake Lychnidos (Dio, xli. 49· 2; xlii. xo. 1; App. Bell. civ. v. 75; Strabo, vii. 326; Livy, xliv. 30. 13). See Tomaschek, RE, 'Parthini', cols. 2029 ff. The Atintanes (see 5· 6 n.) dwelt inland behind Apollonia and Oricum, as far south as Dodona (Ps.-Scyl. z6, a corrupt passage). Thus Atintania included the lower Aous valley, along ·with that of the Drynos, and the fortress-town of Antigoneia (Tepeleni); cf. 5· 6 n. 12. Tous 'IO'O'a.tous: cf. Zon. viii. rg. The siege lasted from autumn 230 (8. 5) until midsummer, 229; there is no need to assume a break after the Roman demarche and a resumption after Paxos, with Treves (Athen., 1934, 387 n. r). The absence of lssa from the treaty of 215 (vii. 9· 13-14) gives no grounds for accepting any part of the annalistic account of the preliminaries of the war (8. 3 n.) (so Zippel, 47· 92-93; De Sanctis, iii. 1. 301 n. g6) nor yet for assuming a joedus aequum with Rome (DeSanctis, ibid.). See Holleaux. Rome, xo6 n. 3· 13. 1TEpl NouTp(a,v: Dio, fg. 49· 7, 1TO.E~a in his Lex. Polyb., though in his note ad loc. he translates 'qui fructus ex agris deuehebant', and is therein followed by Paton, 'which were conveying away agricultural produce to save it from pillage'). wl/...,,a is very common meaning 'plunder' (e.g. i. :zo. 1, ii. 3· 8, 8. 8, 22. 5. etc.) and is used as a technical expression in Philip V's military code (Feyel, Rev. arch. 6, 1935. 3r), whereas it is not paralleled in the sense of 'produce'. Cf. too Zon. viii. 19, 1rAofa • •• jLETa XP1JflrlTWV EK I1EA011"0Vvfjaou 11"p0(}'1TMoVTa (though iK TfjS' xwpas can hardly refer to the Peloponnese). 15. ot liv TTI •Ap¥: ~ .Papo> is the town in P. (iii. 18. 2, r8. 7, 19. 12), .Pd.po;; the island (v. 108. 7). Polaschek, RE, 'Pharos (2)', col. 186o.

o

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ei.~ Tov ~p~wva.: unknown. Tomaschek (RE, 'Arbon', col. 419) suggests a connexion with Albanopolis (Ptol. Geog. iii. 12. :zo), modern Arbunr;, near Kruja (which Anna Comnena (xiii. s) calls TO }ip{Jav&v); this would be the earliest reference to the modern name 'Albania'. But it seems more probable that this is a distorted reference to Narona, a Dalmatian town opposite Pharos, and near the sea (Pliny, Nat. hist. iii. 142; further references and sketch-map in l\L Fluss, RE, 'Narona', cols. 1743-55; 'Teuta', col. n46), as Schweighaeuser suggested. 16. Ets Tov 'Pltova.: modern Risano, at the head of the Bay of Cattaro, which P. (like Ps.-Scylax, 24) calls & 'Pitwv wo-rafL&s:; cf. Apoll. Rhod. iv. 5I6; Steph. Byz.: Bov8G-'J, £x£1 S' E7Tt TOV fLVXOV 'Pltova 1ToAw Kat TrOTafLo" OfLciWvfLov, where, however, the gulf and the wo-rafLos seem to be distinguished. Hence it is argued by D. Vouksan (Albania, 193z, 77 n. r, plan on p. 78) that 'la riviere, dont la source se trouve aujourd'hui dans une caverne situee au-dessus de Risan, devait etre alors plus abondante que de nos jours et traverser la ville ancienne qui s' etendait en partie sur un emplacement que la mer a maintenant conquis'. But this hardly fits P. and Ps.-Scylax. See in general Oberhummer, RE, 'Pl,wv, cols. 937--9· The words dvaKexwpTJKOS dwo Tijs OaAaTTTJ> signify 'at a distance from the sea', i.e. at the head of the gulf (or supposed river), rather than 'high up above the sea' on a craggy eminence (Treves). 17. fLEyciX,v a.uT~ 1T£pL9ilvTEs 8uva.aTEia.v: P. is clearly thinking of a long-term settlement, and not a mere temporary arrangement (so Badian, BSA, 1952, 79); but he exaggerates Demetrius' Svvaa-reia (contrast App. Ill. 8, .JTJfLTJTplcp o' laTH' a xrupia jlta06v £Sormv Tfj;; 7Tpoooalas). Its extent is unknown; but until he increased his power by marrying Triteuta, Pinnes' mother (4. 7 n; Dio, fg. 53) he probably possessed little more than Pharos and a few coastal places (Beloch, iv. r. 666; Holleaux, Rome, 105; CAH, vii. 835; Badian, op. cit. So), which joined Rome after Teuta's flight from Issa. These possessions can hardly have extended as far south as Lissus (De Sanctis, iii. r. 302 n. 98); cf. Gitti (Bull. comm. Rom., 1935, 14), who, however, includes the Ardiaei in Demetrius' domains.

12. 1-1. q,oAouLos rls T~v •pWfLTJV ciw.E1rAeuae: because Fulvius celebrated a naval triumph pro cos. ex Illurieis on zr June 228, De Sanctis (iii. r. 297 n. 89) suggested that P. has confused the two consuls, and that it was Postumius who returned to Rome in 229. But Holleaux, who was first inclined to reject the reference in the act. tr. (Rome, 102 n. 6), and later accepted De Sanctis's thesis (CAH, vii. 835 n. z), has shown (Etudes, iv. x. 22 ff. REG, I9JO, 258 ff.) that postponed triumphs are relatively common, and may spring from a variety of causes-illness, political opposition, etc. ; 164

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4

in such cases there was a precedent for the late consul's taking a purely formal proconsulship for his triumph, like L. Scipio in 189 (Livy, xxxvii. 59· 6; A. M. Colini, Bull. comm. Rom., 1928, 269-74). Postumius received no triumph at all, though P. gives him the greater credit. Had his losses been too heavy? So Munzer (RE, 'Postumius (4o)', col. 913); but there is no evidence that he rather than Fulvius was responsible for the losses in n. IJ. 3. Sla.1TpEaj3Euaa..,.€v1J 1rpos Taus 'Pw.,.a.(ous: i.e. to Postumius at Epidamnus (§ 4). Peace terms with Teuta. P.'s source was assumed by Valeton (:zo6) and von Scala (:z68) to be the Achaean record office; Schulte (4o) thought it was the Roman records. It is indeed possible, though not very likely, that the Achaeans filed the report made to them by Postumius (§ 4; Bauer, AEM, r895, 137). But it is improbable that P. carried out detailed research for these introductory books, and in any case be is unlikely to have had access to the Achaean record office when he was writing them. His most probable source is Fabius Pictor. (r) 4>opous ••. olanv: probably an indemnity, payable in instalments, like that imposed on Carthage after the First Punic War (i. 62. 9); cf. Beloch, iv. I. 666 n. 1; Holleaux, Rome, 105 n. 5· The amount is not recorded. Livy, xxii. 33· 5 probably refers to a new, but similar, indemnity imposed in 219. (2) 1Ta0'1'JS T' 6.va.xwp~anv '~'il'> 'l>.>.upt8os 1TA~v b>.(:ywv Tlnrwv: according to Appian, Ill. 7, the Romans permitted Pinnes T'i]v a'M:'lv i4ypwvos dpx~v ;X"'v, and Teuta accepted these terms. Probably this means that Teuta agreed to surrender the regency (to Demetrius) and withdraw to a 8vva.a-rda. (as P. here implies). Cf. Dio, fg. 49· 7, 'ITaVTeAws Ka-r€SEuJE Jcal T~v tipx~v &.fjKI£JJ. Badian (BSA, 1952, 8o) suggests plausibly that her ouvaaTda was around Rhizon. (3) .,.1) trA£uaELV 1TAEov f) 8ual. AE.,.~o~s ~sw Toil 1\iaaou: cf. iii. 16. 3· Lissus, modern Lesh or Alessio (cf. Fluss, RE, 'Lissos (2)', cols. 731-3; J. M. F. May, ]RS, 1946, 54) lay on a fortified hill near the mouth of the Drilo (Drin). It is generally assumed that Illyrian land forces were required to respect the same frontier (cf. Holleaux, Rome, 105 n. 4); but this is not certain, as Badian (BSA, 1952, 79; cf. Oost, 12) shows-though with the Parthini and Atintanes both included in the Roman protectorate, Illyrian access to lands south of the Genusus must have been very restricted. This clause secured the freedom of the Ionian Sea for Italian and Greek shipping. P. mentions the latter especially in the general 'philhellenic' context of the sending of envoys to the Greek states(§§ 4-8); it will have been stressed by Fabius, and in any case most of the Italian traders were Greeks from southern Italy. 4-8. Roman embassies to Greece. The results and importance of these have been exaggerated by both ancient and modern historians. 165

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Zonaras (viii. r9) records how at Athens 77oAtTdas atf>wv Twv ,.., p,vanJPlwv JhET~axov. De Sanctis (iii. z. 438 n. 98) would reduce this to a grant of 77potevla; but it should probably be rejected outright (d. Niese, ii. 285 n. 4; Taubler, i. zr6; Ferguson, 21o n. 3, 256 n. 2; Holleaux, Rome, II7 n. r). There is no reason to regard these embassies as anti-)facedonian. Those to Achaea and Aetolia were a purely formal exchange of courtesies, without any political sequel (Holleaux, Rome, II3 ff.); and those to Corinth (an Achaean city, not competent to engage in independent political exchanges) and to Athens will have been motivated by the prestige and perhaps the commercial power of these two cities (Beloch, iv. 1. 667). Moreover, there was little to fear from Macedon in 228, when the regent Doson (guardian to Philip since Demetrius II's death in spring 229 (44. z n.)) was facing a Dardanian invasion and the Aetolian seizure of much of Thessaly (cf. Walbank, Philip, Io-n). In fact, our sources have no reference to Macedon in this context. 4. -rrpos n ·TOu<; Ahw?.ou<; Ka.i. To Twv :A..xa.lwv (8vo<;: who had sent help to the Corcyraeans at Paxos (9. 8 ff.). Since the death of Demetrius II their alliance had been dissolved de facto, if not openly denounced (below, 45-46 nn.). The purpose of the Roman visit was partly formal, partly propagandist; Roman policy in lllyria was portrayed as defending the ius gentium against Illyrian 11apavop,la (n. 5)· Cf. Gelzer, Hermes, H)33· I32. 7. €n S' rnmAoKt, p.t:TU -rrpE:O'~ELCl<;: this statement contradicts Iustinus' account (xxviii. 1. 5 ff.) of an Acarnanian appeal to the Senate, and a Roman demarche in Aetolia, c. 239, which was brusquely rejected. Iustinus' story is accepted by De Sanctis (iii. I. zj8 n. I), Meyer (Kl. Schr. ii. 382 n. r), Kolbe (S.-B. Heidelberg, 1933/4, 4. 26), and Beloch (iv. r. 634 n. 3, 'P. kann seine Grtinde gehabt haben, den diplomatischcn MiBerfolg der Romer zu verschweigen'). Gelzer (Hermes, 1933. 144) suggests that Fabius, P.'s source, was reluctant to spoil his picture of the First Illyrian \Var with an earlier story of Roman interference and failure; but Iustinus' account is vague and inaccurate, and the arguments against its authenticity are strong; cf. Holleaux, Rome, 5-22; Treves, Rend. Line., 1932, 196-7. P. is thinking of political contacts, and this passage does not bear on the authenticity of the tradition of a fifthcentury embassy to Greece to gather materials for the Twelve Tables (Livy, iii. 31 ff.; Dion. Hal. x. 52, 54). 8. -rrpos KopwEILou<; Kal. -rrpos ;t!.STJva.(ous: here 'Pwp,aio£ means 'the Senate' ; Holleaux, Rome, I r4 n. 2. On the purpose of the visit see 12. 4-8 n. That the Romans made a formal proclamation at the Isthmian Games (De Sanctis, iii. r. 303) is an assumption not warranted either by this passage or by Zon. viii. r9 (which merely confirms the admission of the Romans to the festival, adding that 166

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Kat aTa8wv Jv airr.airros- £vtwrp£). This recognition by the Greeks is naturally stressed in P. since it was tantamount to accepting the Romans into the comity of civilized (Greek) peoples; cf. Wilamowitz, Staat und Gesellschajt der Griechen und Romer 2 (Berlin, 1923), rso; Holleaux, Rome, I29· Reference to the Isthmia dates this embassy to the spring of an 'even' year, and probably to 228 (nl8iws-), when Athens was concerned with her freedom (44. 2 n.); but the failure of the Senate to follow up the embassy shows that it had no political background.

13. Hasdrubal in Spain (229-221) The source remains pro-Barcine (d. Gelzer, Hermes, 1933, rs8-iJ). The reference to the Ebro Treaty {§ 7) makes an artistic transition to the Gallic \Vars (14-35), but leaves Hasdrubal's death and Hannibal's succession to the command for 36. I-2. On Hasdrubal's achievements see also Diod. xxv. II. I, 12; App. Hisp. 6; Zon. viii. 19; below, iii. 13. 2 n. 13. 1. EV ••• TOUTOLS a1TEAl-rroJ.LEV Ta KO.Ta T~V 'I~TjpLa.V: see I. 9· Illyrian events have been brought down to the date of Hasdrubal's death (>vinter 229) and P. returns to the Spanish field. Paton's translation, 'we have said nothing of affairs in Spain during these years' (231-228?), is plainly absurd. Ka.pxTJSOva. ••• Ka.Lv~v v6ALv: P. uses both names, cf. iii. 13. 7, 15. 3, 17. I, etc. (Kmv~ 1ToAts-), x. 6. 8, IS· 11, etc. (Kapx:rJ:Sdw) ; an apparent exception is explicable as a gloss, iii. 39· 6 n. The former is a translation, the latter an adaptation of the Phoenician Qart-Chadasht 'New Town' (Ehrenberg, Karthago, 13). New Carthage was founded (cf. Diod. xxv. I2; Zon. viii. 19) about 228 on the site of the older Phoenician settlement Mastia (d. iii. 24. 4 n.), which notably resembled that of Carthage itself. 'This city ... was better placed than Alicante to keep in touch with Africa, because it was nearer and possessed a magnificent harbour, the best on the east coast of Spain, indeed one of the best harbours in the world' (Schulten, CAH, vii. 788).

2. T~v 9£mv ••• Ka.t T~v XPELa.v: cf. x. 9 ft. for the topography; in x. 11. 4 P. states that he writes airr61TTat y"yov6ns. If he visited New Carthage while in Spain with Scipio in 151 (cf. iii. 4-5 n., § 3 (ii), 57-59 n.; De Sanctis, iii. 1. 212), that statement was probably inserted in book x before publication (for composition, though not publication, had certainly progressed beyond book x by then). It would not, however, follow that the present passage is also a later insertion (Susemihl, ii. 110 n.), for P. can have intended writing an account of New Carthage before seeing it personally. If he also 167

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13. 2

HASDRUBAL IN SPAIN (229-221)

discussed its advantages relative to Spain and Africa, his account has not survived. 3. wpf1TJ11C1V hrt To 11'o)\u11'payf1oV€~v Ta KaTa Ti]v 'I~TJp(av: despite P.'s suggestion that the Senate ('Pwp,atm} had hitherto neglected Spanish affairs, Dio's account (fg. 48: probably based on Coelius Antipater; Taubler, Vorgesch. 82) of a Roman embassy to Hamilcar in 231, to question Punic activities in Spain, is quite credible (De Sanctis, iii. 1. 411 n. 59; rejected by Holleaux, Rome, 123 n. 4) ; Hamilcar justified them by the need to raise money to pay the Roman indemnity. The Romans may have entered into their alliance with Saguntum now; but this is far from certain (13. 7 n. (d), iii. 15. I n.). 4-5. Roman policy. P. here implies that the Senate was resolved to act against the Punic empire in Spain, but for reasons of expediency, connected with the Gallic danger, 'smoothed down Hasdrubal' (§ 6} and persuaded him to sign an agreement (§ 7); once free to act, the Romans would proceed against Carthage without scruple (§ 5, lmTaTTHv 7} TToAEp,Ew}; cf. 22. 9-11. In both passages Hasdrubal's empire is a threat to be countered as soon as circumstances allow. This probably makes Roman policy more clearly defined than it really was at this date. 4. Et5 To f-LEynATJV X€~pa KaTauKw0.uau8al: 'to build up a powerful dominion' (Paton), 'the opportunity of consolidating their power' (Shuckburgh), 'creuisse opes Carthaginiensium' (Schweighaeuser), 'per costruirsi un impero' (Treves). But f-1-"YclA'IJ X"tp is 'a large body of men' (cf. i. 44· 7; Herod. vii. I$7. etc.; LSJ, s.v. X"tp, v). P. is considering the danger to Rome inherent in a large army recruited in Spain, and hence interprets Roman action as defensive; cf. iii. 10. 6, the Carthaginians ..-avTats ••• Tais X"pai mant5aavns- .,iJ8apaws €vl.f3'rJaav .,;, T6v ... 7TOA€f.WV. Translate, therefore, 'to build up and equip a large body of troops'. 6. Ka.Tao/TjuavT£5 .•. Kat 1rpauvavTES Tov ~uopoul3av: in contrast to their policy in 231 (r3. 3 n.). P.'s expression does not imply protracted negotiations (Meyer, Kl. Schr. ii. 341), but merely proposals which would seem acceptable to Hasdrubal. 7. The Ebro treaty: cf. 22. 11, iii. 15. 5, 21. I, 27. 9, 29. 2-3, 30. 3· This agreement (avv8i]Kat here and (by implication) in iii. 30. 3. elsewhere, more accurately, 6p,oAoy{at, 8w[.WAoyl)aoo:•s) was made between Hasdrubal and representatives of the Senate, probably between autumn 226 and spring 225 (cf. 23. 6 n.), in view of the Gallic danger, which culminated in 225 (DeSanctis, iii. 1. 4I2 n. 62). Controversy surrounds both the content and the significance of the treaty, and also its role in the diplomatic exchanges which preceded the Hannibalic War. (a) Content. P. mentions only one clause, 'that the Carthaginians were not to cross the Ebro in arms'. But it has been widely argued 168

HASDRUBAL IN SPAIN

(229--221)

II. 13.7

(e.g. by Otto, Groag, Hallward, Treves) that a complementary clause limited the Romans in an identical fashion. Certainly it is hard to believe that the Romans were not bound by such a clause; though many of those historians who do not admit the existence of this (e.g. De Sanctis, Momigliano, Taubler, Schulten), assume that the treaty recognized a Carthaginian right to advance up to the Ebro (Taubler (Vorgesch. 49-5o) argues that this right was accorded in a separate, parallel document agreed by the Romans). Thus on either interpretation the treaty looks like a concession to Carthage, recognizing what had been, or was on the point of being, achieved in Spain south of the R. Ebro. It has frequently been argued (e.g. by De Sanctis, Taubler, Altheim) that the treaty does not demarcate spheres of influence, since this was not a Roman conception at this time; but it can hardly have left either side free to strike alliances or develop commercial contacts across the Ebro, merely limiting military activity (so T. Frank; on this see :Meyer, Kl. Schr. ii. 363 n. 2). To be effective an alliance must allow for the sending of military assistance, and against this the treaty established the Ebro as a substantial barrier. Further, if (as has been plausibly suggested, e.g. by T. Frank and DeSanctis) the driving force behind Rome was Massilia, with which Rome had long enjoyed friendly relations (Diod. xiv. 93· 5; Strabo, iv. r8o; Iustin. xliii. s) and had struck an alliance in the period since the First Punic \Var (Livy, xxi. 20. 8, socii; cf. Philipp, RE, 'Massalia', col. 2132), she would hardly view with equanimity Carthaginian penetration in the areas around her colonies of Rhode (Rosas) and Emporiae (Ampurias), which lay on the coast between the Ebro and the Pyrenees. T. Frank (CAH, vii. 8ro) even suggests that Massilia was a party to the pact, but of this there is no evidence; on the other hand, Schulten's objection (CAH, vii. 788), that the surrender of her colonies south of the Ebro must have left Massilia discontented, is not very substantial, since these had probably gone already (iii. IJ. 2 n.). On balance, therefore, it seems probable that the Romans accepted a limiting clause like that restricting Carthage. (b) Form and validity. The treaty was apparently agreed between Hasdrubal and a senatorial commission. Presumably it was ratified in Rome (contra Taubler, Vorgesch. 49), and from the Roman point of view counted as a valid treaty. But in reply to the alleged Carthaginian argument (see iii. zr. r n.) that it either was nonexistent, or else had never been ratified at Carthage and hence was not valid, the Romans, instead of contradicting the assertion, merely argued that ratification at Carthage was superfluous (cf. iii. 29. 3, ath-OTEAW> brot~(FO.TO ras DJWAoylas }luSpov~as). This suggests that, although the Barcids were normally accompanied by Councillors from Carthage (cf. iii. zo. 8, TOV> fLET' ath-oiJ crvv,Spov>, 71. 5, vii. 9· I, 169

II. 13. 7

HASDRUBAL IN SPAIN (zzg-221)

yepovcnacrrai, signatories to the treaty between Hannibal and Philip V), the Ebro treaty was not ratified at home; cf. Taubler, i. 95· Probably the Barcids had power to make local agreements of this nature (De Sanctis, iii. I. 414 n. 66), a convenient arrangement, which would leave the Carthaginian senate free to repudiate them afterwards. On their side the Romans were playing for time, and, provided Hasdrubal observed the agreement until the Gauls had been defeated, preferred not to press for any formal ratification. Hence the treaty is to be regarded, at least on the Carthaginian side, as a purely local arrangement, and not as an additional clause to the treaty of 24I. (c) Significance. For the Romans, the treaty removed the risk of a Carthaginian alliance with the Gauls, and enabled them to reserve the 'Spanish problem' to a later date; they could thus look forward to rounding off their Italian frontiers, and extending their interests to southern Gaul and northern Spain without encountering the Carthaginians (22. Io-n). On Hasdrubal's side, the treaty recognized the Carthaginian right to advance to the Ebro, though Punic arms had not yet penetrated so far; De Sanctis (iii. I. 4I2) estimates that they had not yet reduced half the area south of the Ebro. It must, therefore, be a largely subjective judgement to decide whether the agreement was a diplomatic triumph for Rome (Mommsen) or Carthage (Egelhaaf). (d) The Ebro treaty and Saguntum. Some years before Hannibal succeeded to the command (2I9) the Iberian city of Saguntum had struck an alliance with the Romans (iii. 30. I, 1TAelouw ~Twtv 7}81) 1TpoTEpov TWV KaT' YJ.wi{Jav I
HASDRUBAL IN SPAIN {22g-zzr)

II. I3. 7

armed assistance; if made earlier (e.g. in 231), it is less clear how it stood in relation to the treaty. Hallward has argued (CAH, viii. 28) that 'the alliance was not invalidated by the Ebro treaty, which, however, carried with it the implied obligation on Rome not to use the town as an instrument to hinder Carthaginian expansion within the sphere recognized as open to her'. De Sanctis (Problemi, 168 ff. ; cf. Hesselbarth, 85, 90) believes that the Ebro treaty virtually sacrificed Saguntum to Hasdrubal. Probably the position was never clarified. But at bottom the Saguntine alliance and the Ebro treaty were irreconcilable; and in the last resort the Romans had no legal redress against a Punic attack on the town, for which the implications of the Ebro treaty were sufficient justification. W. Kolbe (S.-B. Heidelberg, 1933/4, 4, 21 ff.) has argued that the Ebro treaty automatically included allies of both sides, and so gave Saguntum the protection accorded to the allies mentioned in the treaty of 241 (to which he regards the Ebro treaty as a pendant). But the Ebro treaty contained no such clause covering allies, as far as we know (Bikerman, Rev. phil., 1936, 284-8). Moreover, the allies in 241 were actually specified and a list was appended to the treaty (cf. iii. 21. 5; Taubler, Vorgesch. 63 ff.; Meyer, Kl. Schr. ii. 368). Hence there are no grounds for supposing that the Ebro treaty sanctioned the Saguntine alliance. Recently Carcopino has argued (REA, 1953, 258-93) that there were two Ebros, and that Hasdrubal's treaty concerned the southern one, the R. Jucar (Sucro); his thesis implies an unbelievable lack of clarity in P., who is supposed to have been aware of the homonyms, and it is unlikely to win any adherents. (e) Later distortions. In the course of the second century violent discussions on the question of the responsibility for the Hannibalic War gave disproportionate attention to the Ebro treaty; and it became part of the Roman case to prove that Hannibal's attack on Saguntum was, somehow, a breach of this treaty. This confusion sprang from the fact that the Roman declaration of war at Carthage (iii. 20-21, 33) gave to the attack on Saguntum, for reasons of policy, a prominence which really belonged to the crossing of the Ebro, especially if this (despite iii. 40. 2; cf. iii. 20. 6 n.) really preceded the sending of the Roman embassy; and Cato's accusations against the Carthaginians as constant treaty-breakers (HRR, i. 8r, 84) may mean that he played a large part in shaping the Roman version (Gelzer, Phil., 1931, 266--9 = Vom r6mischen Staat (Leipzig, 1943), 86 ff.; Hermes, 1933, 16o). To support this version the terms of the treaty were distorted, either by the insertion of a special clause excepting Saguntum from the treaty, or by locating Saguntum north of the Ebro; and the words T~V J.L~V aAATJV , lfJwtav 7TaptatW1TWV (§ 7) (i.e. they omitted all reference to the rest of Spain) perhaps represent Polybian polemic against the first of these distortions 171

II. IJ. 7

HASDRUBAL IN SPAIN (229-221}

(Otto, HZ, 145, 1932, so1). The second error is, however, to be found in P.'s own discussion (in iii. 15. s. 30. 3, and perhaps iii. 61. 8 and iv. 28. 1). Examples of these distortions are App. Hisp. 7; Hann. 2; Lib. 6 (Saguntum and 'other Greek [sic] towns in Spain' appeal to Rome; the Senate sends envoys to Carthage and makes an agreement which lays down the Ebro as the frontier between the two empires, but guarantees that Saguntum and the Greek towns shall be free and autonomous. This version also puts Saguntum north of the Ebro); Livy, xxi. z. 7, ' . . . Saguntinisque mediis inter imperia duorum populorum libertas seruaretur'; cf. 44· 6; Zon. viii. 21, £~atp€TOvs £1rmot~Kwav. Though important as contributions to the arguments which began soon after the Hannibalic ·war and reached their climax shortly before 150 (iii. zg. 1 ff.), these versions are irrelevant to the treaty itself. The bearing of the treaty on the question of responsibility for the war is discussed below (iii. 21. 1 n.). (f) Bibliography. See the works quoted in CAH, viii. 724-5, and Scullard, His!. 197 n. 1; add: G. De Sanctis, Riv. ji.l., 1932, 426-7; W. Kolbe, S.-B. Heidelberg, 1933/4, 4 (cf. E. Bikerman, Rev. phil., 1936, 284-8; P. Treves, REA, 1935. 136-7); C. J. C. Arnold, Oorzaak en Schuld van den Tweeden Punischen Oorlog (Amsterdam, 1939); G. Giannelli, Roma nell' eta delle guerre puniche (Bologna, 1938) (cf. J. Vogt, Gnomon, 1940, 16-17); F. Altheim, Epochen, ii. 51 ff.; J. Carcopino, REA, 1953, 258-93; F. M. Heichelheim, Historia, 1954, 211-19. e1rt 'II"OAEI-1~: stressed by Taubler (Vorgesch. 61 f.) as evidence that

only military expeditions across the Ebro were meant; but this thesis is not sufficient to reconcile the treaty with the Saguntine alliance (above (d)). The phrase £1ri 1roMp.ftJ occurs frequently in treaties of this period; cf. Schulte, 72-73. 14-35. Rome and the Gauls

The Gallic invasion of 225 gives P. occasion to outline the previous history of the Gauls in Italy, prefixing a geographical survey of Cisalpine Gaul (14-17). In i. 6. 8 the Celts were excepted from the peoples of Italy mastered before the Roman crossing into Sicily. Thus the present digression falls into place as part of the story of how the Romans amassed sufficient resources to justify their ambitions for world-dominion (i. 3· 10); in addition it is relevant to Hannibal's invasion (14. 2). 14. 1. To TllS 1rpoKa.Ta.crKEu1ls otKEi:ov: on its summary character cf. i. IJ. 8, 65 . 5 , ii. I. 4, 35. 10, 40. 4· 14. 4-17. 12. The geography of Cisalpine Gaul. This account of the district and its inhabitants is a minor masterpiece, and derives in part from P.'s own inquiries; for the geometrical simplification of 172

ROME: AND THE GAULS

the shape of Italy and the Po valley cf. i. 42. I-7 (Sicily). It has been argued that P. did not leave Italy during his internment, and hence that he writes from some earlier source (Cuntz, 72 f.); but it seems certain that some at least of P.'s western journeys took place during his detention in Italy, and he may have \'isited Cisalpine Gaul in ISO, accompanying Scipio Aemilianus back from service in Spain (xxxv. 4; cf. Nissen, Rh. M1,s., 1871, 271; De Sanctis, iii. I. 2o8 ff.). In that case his account (if based on autopsy) would be an insertion roughly contemporary with iii. 22 ff. (on the Punic treaties). On the other hand, P. may very well have visited Cisalpine Gaul previously (cf. Thommen, Hermes, I885, 204), and no safe conclusions are to be dra\.\n on the date of composition. 14. 4. T~ ax~~-ta:n TptyU~vou8ous: a very forced and schematic description; the representation of Italy as a triangle is criticized in an eloquent chapter of Strabo (v . .zro), who, however, speaks of the vertex at the Sicilian strait. Evidently P.'s scheme had been borrowed and improved. That P. was aware of the real shape of the peninsula is clear from xxxiv. II. 2 (Strabo, v. 2n). T~v ••• 'lrA..:upuv •.• T~v 1Tpbs civa.ToAus K£KAL!-tEV11V: the east coast extends to Cape Cocynthus (§ s) by ignoring the heel and the Gulf of Tarentum. ;; T' 'lovLo'> 'ITopo'> ~ea.l ••• b Ka.Tu Tov :.\8pia.v ~c:oArro'): on these terms see Partsch, RE, 'Adria', cols. 417-I8; Biirchner, RE, 'Ionisches Meer', col. 18<}7; Burr, 59-67; R. L. Beaumont, ]HS, 1936, 203-4. (a) Adriatic Sea. For the periphrasis cf. I6. 4, 7; elsewhere 6 >l8p{a,; (i. 2. 4, ii. IJ. s, etc.) or d KaTd T~v Jloptav KOA7TDS' (d. § u, where Nissen (It. Land. i. 91) wrongly sees a reference to the town). Beaumont, loc. cit., derives the name from the R. Adrias. In the early fifth century Hecataeus (FGH, 1 F IOI-I02 b) used it of the whole sea south to Epidamnus; but others restrict it to the waters around the Po estuary and the lands of the Veneti (Herod. i. I6J, iv. 33. v. 9; Eurip. Hippol. 736). ToP. it stretched as far as Hydruntum in south-east Calabria, opposite the Acroceraunian range in Epirus, vii. 14 d, x. I. 7; cf. Strabo, vii. 317; Mela, ii. 67; Pliny, Nat. hi st. iii. 100. (b) 'IOvw> 1Topo,;. For the form cf. Pindar, Nem. 4· 53 (linking it with Dodona) and P. v. no. 2. Hecataeus (FGH I F 91) uses •lovto> KOA7To> for the whole Adriatic ; and this is normal fifth-century usage. In the fourth century the Ionian and Adriatic seas were distinguished; the latter included all waters as far south as the Straits of Otranto, while the Ionian Sea was a subdivision, connoting that part of it south of Mons Garganus (Strabo, ii. 123, vii. 317). Later the Ionian Sea came to include waters outside the Adriatic, and is used for the Sicilian Sea (see below; Mela, ii. 37; Pliny, Nat. hist. iii. 100, iv. 9); and the term 'Adrias' also covered waters far to the 173

II. I4. 4

ROME AND THE GAULS

south of the modern Adriatic. But the distinctions were not sharp, and Ps.-Scylax, I4 and 27, identifies the Ionian and Adriatic seas. Here P. refers especially to the Straits of Otranto and the waters to the south of them (d. § s); in v. IIO. 2 he describes Sasona (off Valona) as lying KaTa T~v daf3o>..~v T~v Ei<; Tdv '!6vwv 776pov (i.e. to one approaching from the Adriatic). Beaumont, loc. cit., is incorrect in saying that P. uses the terms Ionian and Adriatic indifferently, though this became the usage under the Roman Empire. Ti]v Se 1rpos f1Ea1Jflf3pta.v Ka.t Suaflas T£TPO.flf1E"1J": correctly, facing south-west. To I~K£A~Kov Ka.L T upp1JVLKOV 1TEAa.yos: on the Sicilian sea d. i. 42. 4 n. The Tyrrhenian or Etruscan sea (d. i. Io. s), the Roman mare inferum, included those waters between the west coast of Italy and the islands of Sicily, Corsica, and Sardinia. To P. it extends north to the foot of the Alps; d. I6. I, iii. 110. 9. xxxiv. Io. 18. Burr, 72-74. The Sicilian sea enters the picture only for the short stretch between Rhegium and C. Cocynthus (see next note), which P. here includes in the west coast. 5. TO 1TpOKELf1EVOV aKpwt"TjpLOV ••• KoKuv9os: identified with Capo s. Maria di Leuca, at the southern tip of Calabria, by Ziegler (RE, I;tK€Ala, col. 2472; cf. Burr, ss) since in X. I. 2 the whole coastal stretch from Rhegium to Tarentum faces the Sicilian sea. But elsewhere P. calls this cape axpa 'la7Tvyla (x. I. 8, xxxiv. II. u), and the likelihood is that he is using a different source for his schematic account here from that used in x. r. The most probable identification for Cocynthus remains the Punta di Stilo, on the Bruttian promontory between Caulonia and the Gulf of Squillace, of which the Punta forms the southern extremity; this is confirmed by Pliny, Nat. kist. iii. 95, and by the fact that the Itinerarium Antoninum, u4, records a place Cocintum, 22 (or I2: the reading is dubious) miles from Squillacium (~issen, It. Land. ii. 2. 948--9). C. Cocynthus marked the southern limit of the Ionian sea; but what P. regarded as the corresponding limit on the Epirote coast is not clear. 6. Ti]v 1TO.pa T£ Tas apKTOUS KO.L Ti]V f1Eaoya.~a.v 1Ta.pa.TelVOuaa.v: 'bordering on the interior to the north'. The wa6yata is the interior of Europe (cf. iii. 47· I), not the Po valley (so Treves); the Po valley appears as something new in § 7. 1] Twv ~A1rewv 1ra.pwpe~a.: P. makes the Alps begin near Massilia (d. iii. 47· 4). This is not because he includes the hills between the Rhone and the Var, but because (as§ 12 makes clear) he believes the plain of the Po to extend to a point roughly above Massilia, where Alps and Apennines join (§ 8). The same misapprehension appears in reference to the Anares, who live on the south bank of the Po (17. 7), and also t.t~ t.taKpav a7To Maaaa>..{a> (32. r). Herod. iv. 49 knows of a tributary of the Danube called Alpis, and Lye. Alex. 1361 has I74

ROME AND THE GAULS

II. q. u

Ed)..mo.; otherwise this is the first extant historical reference to the Alps, which probably attracted notice as a result of Hannibal's crossing (iii. 47 ff. with references to P.'s predecessors). See Partsch, RE, 'Alpes', cols. 1599'-I6oo. Tov Tou 'ITO.VTOOS :.\8p(ou 11ux.6v: i.e. the Gulf of Venice (or more specifically the Gulf of Trieste}. The gap here mentioned is probably the coastal strip below the hills of the Carso, which lie parallel to the shore north-east of Trieste. The Alps were usually reckoned as running from the junction with the Apennines at the Colle di Cadibona (490 m.), north of the Vada Sabatia (modern Vado) (Cic. Ad jam. xi. 13· 2; Strabo, iv. 2or-2, v. 211; Ptol. Geog. iii. L 40}. to the Ocra Pass between Aquileia and Emona in the east (Strabo, iv. 202, 207, v. 2ll). 7. apeTfl KO.t p.ey~Oe~ s~a.+~povTa.: 'surpassing in fertility and size'. For this sense of &.pE"r?) cf. 15. 1, 17. I, iii. 34· 2, 34· 8, 48. rr, xii. 3· r. oua. 'II'E'!TTwKev l)'l!'b TTJV ~!LETEpa.v li7Top(a.v: not unambiguous. The analogy of the use of the phrase in xv. 9· 5 and iv. 2. 2 supports the translation 'which falls within the scope of my history'. But Schweighaeuser takes it as 'which have fallen within the scope of my inquiries', i.e. which I know of from autopsy or by report. Either meaning is appropriate; and perhaps P. does not always closely distinguish the aspect of collecting material from that of recording it, when he uses the word l0'7'opla. 8. Tij<; •.• 'II'Eplypa.+ouutjs ypa.!LJ-Lils: 'of the line enclosing these plains'. Ko.l is 'likewise'; as well as Italy as a whole, Cisalpine Gaul is also triangular. 9. e1rt 8lO')(lAtous Ka.t 8~a.Koa(ouo; aTa.8£ous: cf. xxxiv. ro. 17· 2,200 stades (i.e. about 250 miles) is a serious underestimate. Coelius and Timagenes reckoned the distance from the Varin Provence to the Arsia on the east coast of !stria as 975-x,coo milia passuum, which is excessive unless the watershed is followed (Pliny, Nat. hist. iii. 132). Partsch, RE, 'Alpes', col. 16oo. 10. Tov :c\1TEw~vov f.1Tl TPLIYXlA(ouo; ~sa.Kou(ous: the name was originally applied to the range from the Alps to Ancona, and P. was perhaps the first to use it of the full length of the Apennines (d. 16. 4). Here he is calculating from the supposed junction with the Alps (see§ 6 n.) to the point where the Apennines leave the Po plain, due west of Sena (43" 45' north; cf. § n n.); for this distance 3,6oo stades (4oo miles) is not far out. 11. ~mo 1roAews I~VtJ<;: as in x6. 5 and 19. IJ, Sena Gallica (modem Sinigaglia) is the southern limit of the plain. Geographically Ariminum, sc miUa passuum farther north, makes a better limit, since here the spurs of the mountains come close to the sea ; and in iii. 6I. Il 86. 2, Ariminum iS the last town in the plain (cf. 2I. 5). But for most of the second century, probably till 133, the political 1

175

II. 14.

II

ROME AND THE GAULS

boundary of Italy was the R. Aesis, between Sena and Ancona; for the change to the Rubicon see iii. 61. 11 n. Here P. reckons the distance from Sena to the head of the Adriatic (Aquileia?) as about 2,5oo stades (c. 28o miles} ; for a closer estimate in milia passuum see xxxiv. II. 8 n. -TYJV 1r
15. 1. "TE"T"Tclpwv o~ohwv • , • laoKpL8ov: 'the price of wheat was four obols per Sicilian medimnus, that of barley two obols, a metretes of wine costing the same as a medimnus of barley'. A Sicilian medimnus was c. 5I'5 litres or c. ui gallons (nearly If bushels}, a metretes c. 8i liquid gallons. In Lusitania, either now or a little later (xxxiv. 8. 7-8), a medimnus of barley cost I drachma (i.e. 6 obols), of wheat 9 (Alexander, i.e. Attic) obols, and a metretes of wine cost a drachma, here too being laoKpdlov. Mattingly (]RS, 1937. IOI ff.) argues that P. equates the drachma with 12! asses (rather than Io asses, i.e. I denarius); but this would imply that P. was reckoning with Aeginetic drachmas, whereas xxxiv. 8. 7-8 points to the AtticAlexander standard. (Elsewhere (OCD, 'Coinage (Roman)', 210) Mattingly equates the drachma with the denarius.) In § 6 the equation of 2 asses with the obol is probably an approximation, since if the denarius of Io sextantal asses (introduced about I87 (Mattingly and Robinson, P BA, I932, 211 ff.) and established by 170 (Mattingly, ]RS, 1945, 76)) was equal to the drachma of 6 obols, t as would equal 1~ obol, which could easily be translated as t obol. A century later (Cic. Verr. iii. 72, 84, I74, etc.) the admittedly low price of Sicilian wheat :fluctuated between 2 and 3 sestertii per modius, i.e. 12 to 18 sestertii per medimttus; this indicates clearly the cheapness of F.'s figure of 4 obols, i.e. 2f sestertii per medimnus. These north Italian prices, and the slightly higher ones from Spain, are partly due to exceptional glut conditions; but in general the low price at this date is connected with the unfavourable conditions for export, heavy freight charges, and the Apennine barrier between the Po valley and Rome, as well as with an undeveloped state of the world market, which still allowedgreatlocal price-fluctuations. See Hultsch, RE, 'Frumentum', cols. I46-8; Frank, ES, i. 196; Chilver, 129-30. On the production of corn in Cisalpine Gaul see iii. 44· 8; Strabo, v. 218; Pliny, Nat. hist. xviii. IOI; Cassiod. Var. xii. 27; Nissen, It. Land. i. 444 ff. 2. tM\iou yE i!YJ" Ka.t K€-yxpou: 'millet and panic'. £AvJ.Lo> is Italian millet, Setaria italica (cf. Theoph. HP, viii. 1. I, I. 4; Dsc. ii. 98), Ktyxpor; is Panicum miliaceum, common millet (d. Theoph. ibid.; Dsc. ii. 97). Of the Po valley Strabo writes (v. 2I8} £an Sk Kai KEyxpo4>6por; Sta4>£pov-rwr; Std -r~v £Vuiiplav (perhaps utilizing P.-so Chilver, I3o-but he gives greater detail). 176

ROME AND THE GAULS

II. I6. a

3. -rrAtwTwv yap .:,·iKwv ttpelwv K011'Toj.L£vwv: 'though large numbers of swine are slaughtered for food'. tEpEtov can be used of any animal slaughtered for human consumption; cf. Xen. Cyrop. i. 4· 17 (of game). 8~6, TE Tn!l , • • TrClpa.&to-E~!l: 'for the feeding both Of private individuals and of the army'. The abstract meaning 'provisioning' (so Ernesti; cf. P. Petr. 3, p. 133 (3rd cent. B.c.)) seems more appropriate here than 'stores, storehouses' (Schweighaeuser, cf. iii. 102. ro). 4. Til!l K«Tn j.Llpos tuwvla.s KTA.: 'the cheapness of each separate article of food'. 5. otJ uuj.L+wvouvn~; 11'epl. Twv t<«T: for further details of the course of the Rhone see ill. 47· 1-5. 49; Strabo, iv. r83--6. P. correctly describes it as flowing along the north side of the Alps (before it turns south at Lyons). T a.upiut.vfJtos TplTt.p. They inhabited modern Piedmont, especially the valleys of the Dora Riparia, Stura, and Orco, and have given their name to Turin. Strabo, iv. 204 and Pliny, Nat. hist. iii. 123 made them Ligurian, but toP. they were Celts (cf. iii. 6o. 8); and this is confirmed by their place-names. There were, however, several Ligurian 'pockets' among them. DeSanctis, i. 62 n. 3; Nissen, It. Land. i. 468 ff.; Philipp, RE, 'Taurini'; Fluss, RE, 'Taurisci'. The Agones are otherwise unknown; but their name may have survived in that of the R. Agunia (modern Agogna), which runs into the Po on the left bank, west of the Ticino; if so the Agones may have dwelt around Novara and the Valdossola. De Sanctis, iii. I. 305 n. 103; Nissen, It. Land. ii. 173. 16. 1. A~yuO"T'ivo~ K«TOtKoua~: on the geography see above 14. 6 n., 14. ro n. The Ligurians were an Indo-European-speaking people, whose earlier territories may have been quite considerable, but who in historical times inhabited the Alpes mar#imae and their coast, the mountains surrounding the upper waters of the Po, and the northern Apennines. 2. flEXP~ 1r6Atw<; nl
177

IL 16.

:t

ROME AND THE GAULS

domination, but of it little is kno>vn. As a frontier town and natural operational base for Roman armies attacking the Ligurians it was counted part of Italy, and so of Etruria, perhaps from z8r onwards; cf. 27. r. DeSanctis, iii. r. 290 n. 6o; Banti, RE, 'Pisae', cols. 1756 ff. ews TTJS J\ppTJTlVWV xwpa.s: Arretium, modern Arezzo, lies besid~ the watershed between Arno, Tiber, and Chiana, half-way between Florence and Perugia, on the Umbrian march. See Nissen, It. Land. ii. 315. Arretium was one of the twelve original cities of Etruria. 3. ~sT\s Sf: TuppTJvol: the Etruscans, who gave their name to the Tyrrhenian sea, inhabited the region within the rivers Arno and Tiber, from Pisa to the Tiber mouth. 1'oo-.ms Sf: cruvExeis ••• "OJ.L~po~: the Umbrians were an Italian people to whom, like the Ligurians, tradition accredited much wider bounds than those they occupied in historical times (cf. Pliny, Nat. hist. iii. rr2; Dian. Hal. i. rg. r; DeSanctis, i. roz). Strabo (v. 214) and Pliny (Nat. hist. iii. ns) make the Adriatic coastal towns of Ravenna and Butrium Umbrian; and some \vriters placed the Metaurus in Umbria (cf. De Sanctis, iii. 2. 565). Further, the existence of a R. Umbra and a tractus Umbriae (Pliny, Nat. hist. iii. 51), together with other evidence (cf. P. Ducati, Le problilme itrusque (Paris, 1938), 66-68) points to their having once inhabited what was later Etruria. To P., however, the Umbrians are an inland people dwelling between the Tiber and the Apennines in an area which embraces the valleys on either side of the range. Nissen, It. Land. i. soz-8. 4. a1TEXWV TTJS KO.T0. 1'0V :ASpla.v 9a.Acl.TTT)S KT~.: 500 stades are just under 6o miles. P. exaggerates the abruptness in this change of direction. From the beginning of the Apennines above Genoa as far as Iguvium (Gubbio) and the head-waters of the Tiber and Metaurus the direction is fairly consistently south-east; the range then broadens and runs slightly east of south to the latitude of Rome, after which it breaks up into a series of massifs continuing to Reggio di Calabria. P.'s account places the angle north of Sena Gallica; it is in fact well to the south of that latitude. 5. €1rl. OaAa.TTa.v Ka.t 1ro~LV ••• I1\VTjv: on Sena as P.'s southern coastal limit to the plain of the Po see q. I I n. 6-15. This detailed description of the l)o is the earliest extant, accurate, account. The name Eridanus was originally given to a fabulous amber-producing river of north Europe (Herod. iii. rrs), which Aeschylus fg. 73 (Pliny, Nat. hist. xxxvii. 32) identified with the Rhone. Later, under the influence of Pherecydes (FGH, 3 F 33 c), Aeschylus transferred the Eridanus to the area of the Po (cf. Pliny, .Nat. his!. xxxvii. 31); and to many later \vriters (cf. Strabo, v. us) it remains 1TA"f)crlov TOV Ild.oou. It was probably Apollonius Rhodius (iv. 627) who first identified the Eridanus with the Po, perhaps misled by Euripides (Hippol. 735 ff.) into imagining a 178

ROME AND THE GAULS

II. 16. ro

bifurcation of Rhone and Po. For the legends attached to the Eridanus (and so to the Po) see Ps.-Scyl. 20, Ps.-Scymn. 395 ff., Diod. v. 23. 3· For full discussion see Philipp, RE, 'Padus', cols. 2179 ff. R. L. Beaumont, ]HS, 1936, 197, is misleading. 6 . .)vo Twv rroLTjTWV ••• 9puhouJ.L£Vos: cf. iv. 70. 8 (on the Erymanthus). P. is hinting at the myth of Phaethon and his sisters(§§ 13 ff.). The story is told by Hesiod (fg. 199 Rzach), but P. is probably not referring directly to his version. More probably his criticisms are aimed at sensational historians who retailed this material borrowed from the poets; cf. 17· 6 n. See CQ, 1945, 8 n. s. and, against von Scala (73, Son. 2}, Wunderer (ii. 45-46}. EXEl J.LEv Tas v11yas arro Twv 1-.A.vEwv: on the course of the Po see Nissen (It. Land. i. 183-91). It rises in a boggy valley, the Piano del Re (1,952 m.) at the foot of Monte Viso (Mons Vesulus). voLOUJ.LEVOS Tijv puow ws evl. J.LE
II.

I6. IO

ROME AND THE GAULS

that navigability began at Placentia. Nowadays the Po is usually reckoned as navigable from Casale. Cf. Philipp, RE, 'Padus', col. 2r88. 11. KO.Tu Touo;; ttpoaayopEuofJkvouo;; T pLya~oAouo;;: otherwise unknown, but dearly in the neighbourhood of Ferrara. Nissen, It. Land. i. 205, ii. 21J f. To .,.iv llTEpov .•• naSOa: the name Padua or Padusa was applied to the Po di Primaro, and more specifically (cf. Pliny, Nat. hist. iii. 119 ff.) to a branch of it which diverged south-east from Spina to Ravenna, and was also known as the ostium M essanicum. On the Padua (Padusa) see Catullus (95· 7-8), 'at Volusi annales Paduam morientur ad ipsam et laxas scombris saepe dabunt tunicas', and Virgil (Aen. xi. 457), 'piscosoue amne Padusae dant sonitum rauci per stagna loquacia cycni'. See Philipp, RE, 'Padus', cols. 2179, 2191-2; 'Padusa', cols. 2292-3. 12. B68Ey~eos: on the authority of Metrodorus of Scepsis, Pliny (Nat. kist. iii. 122) states that the name is Ligurian and means ]undo caretts; thus Bodincomagus is an older name for Industria, ubi praecipua altitudo incipit (but magus is Celtic). Bodincus was evidently the Ligurian name for the upper waters of the Po (cf. CIL, vi. 2613), while farther down it bore the Celtic, or more probably Venetie, name of Padus. See Weiss, RE, 'Ligures', coL sz6; Philipp, RE, 'Padus', cols. 2178-9; Nissen, It. Land. i. r83. 13-15. The story of Phaethon; place of myth in history. Above, § 6. The story of Phaethon, his death from Jove's thunderbolt while driving the chariot of his father the sun-god, and the metamorphosis of his sisters into poplars and their tears into amber {cf. Ovid, M etam. ii. 364-{)), is found with variants from the time of Hesiod, and was widely treated by writers and poets (Diod. v. 23). See the discussion by Wilamowitz, Hermes, r8SJ, 3¢--434; C. Robert, ibid., 434-41; G. Turk, RE, 'Phaethon', cols. rsoS ff. These stories P. (like Strabo, v. 215) considers inappropriate to history. But so too did Timaeus, if he is the source of Diodorus' account (cf. Diod. v. 23. 5; Mullenhoff, i. 474-6); and in fact P.'s attack on Timaeus (§ rs) is for his ignorance of the area, not for sensationalism (cf. Pedech, LEC, I956, 19 n. sS). For P.'s stress on the distinction between tragedy and history see further iv. 40. 2 n.; 1 HS, 1938, s6 ff. and CQ, 1945, 8 ff., and the passages there quoted. 13. Touc; jlEAavE(.,.ovo.o;;: Treves suggests an ironical echo of Timaeus' poetical vocabulary; but though Aeschylean (Eumen. 370), the word appears later in prose, in Dionysius and Iosephus, and may well have lost its poetical flavour by P.'s time. 180

ROME AND THE GAULS

II. l7.

I

14. TTJV Tpa.yuc-T)v Ka.l. Ta.uTfi 1rpoaeoLKu'i:a.v 6:\11v: 'material of a tragic character and similar to this legend'. T~ Tfj~ 1rpoKa.Ta.aKEufjo; ykvf:L: 'the character of my introduction'. The rrpo~<:a.Ta.a~<:ev~ covers books i-ii (i. 3· ro), and being written summarily (i. 13. 8, ii. 14. r) affords no space for detailed polemic (a~.oyia) against 'tragic historians'. Paton misses the sense. 15. SLa TTJV TLfLa.tou ••• ilyvoLa.v: if P. reverted to the subject in his polemic against Timaeus in book xii, the passage has not survived. On Timaeus see i. 5· r n.

17. 1. To 1ra.Aa.Lov Evk11ovTo Tupp11voC: the problem of Etruscan origins still arouses violent controversy. Herodotus (i. 94) brought them from Asia Minor, and they themselves accepted this version; cf. Tac. Ann. iv. 55· Dionysius, on the other hand (i. 27-30), claimed them as autochthonous. Modern views are surveyed by R. S. Conway (CAH, iv. 383 ff.), who favours an eastern origin, by H. Last (CAH. vii. 379 ff.), who makes them a mixture of autochthonous elements \\ith Indo-European immigrants from the north, and by DeSanctis (i. 124 ff., 429 ff.), who supports the theory of northern immigration. For a short summary see Scullard, Hist. 15 f.. and, for a complete survey of the history of the problem and the evidence, P. Ducati, Le probteme itrusqtw (Paris, 1938). Ducati argues that the Etruscans are a mixture of native Umbrians using the Villanovan iron-age technique with Tynhenians who brought Aegean cults, culture, and language by sea from Asia Minor. But a recent theory of C. F. Hawkes (Proc. Prehist. Soc., 1948, 205-r6), brings down the date of the Iron Age in Italy to after the arrival of the Etruscans about 8oo, and attributes the impulse of it to them. M. Pallottino, The Etruscans (London, 1955), 46-73, restates the problem as one of ethnic formation out of mixed elements within Etruria. Livy (v. 33· 7) describes the Etruscan advance north over the Apennines into the Po valley, and this was apparently about 525. The Etruscans occupied Felsina (Bologna) and spread to Parma, Mantua, and Melpum (near Milan), and to the Adriatic at Atria and Spina in the Po mouth; but their domination was interrupted by the coming of the Gauls about 450 (cf. DeSanctis, ii. I59-
xpovou~ Ka.t

Ta

4>X£ypa.uJ. ••• TB 'lrEpl

Ka.'lr~"lV

KO.L NwA"lv:

the Etruscans' advance south was in the late seventh century. Seizing Rome they went by the Liris valley into Campania, and there founded a league of twelve cities (Strabo, v. 242). In particular their presence is attested at Nola and Capua (which they are said to have founded: Veil. Pat. i. 7 (contrast Cato, fg. 69 Peter) ; Strabo, ibid.; d. Heurgon, 62 ff.), at Herculaneum and Pompeii (Strabo, I8I

II. I7.

1

ROME AND THE GAULS

v. 246-7), and at :Macrina, which they founded on the Gulf of Salerno (Pliny, Nat. hist. iii. 7o). But in 524 they were defeated by Aristodemus of Cumae (Dion. HaL vii. 3-n); and their sway in Latium was broken, traditionally in 509, with the expulsion of the Tarquins from Rome. On this sec Altheim, Epochcn, i. 89 ff. To later writers the Phlegraean plain is the volcanic area between Cumae, the Gulf of Pozzuoli, and the Gulf of Naples; but P. understands the whole Campanian plain. See iii. 91. 7, where the Phlegraean plain leads to a discussion of the story of the battle of the gods 7ra.pil "TOL> p:v9oyparpou,, just as the Padane plain brought up criticism of the story of Phaethon. Here, too, Timaeus is the source; see Diod. iv. 21. 7, d. v. 71. 4; :Nissen, It. Land. i. 267. The ferti]ity of the plain is attested by Strabo (v. 243). 3. itc f.Htcpiis vpoTaaEws: P. appears to recall the story recorded {and rejected) by Livy (v. 33· 1-4; cf. Plut. Cam. IS; Dion. HaL xiii. 10-n; Cato, fg. 36 Peter), that the Gauls were :first brought into Cisalpine Gaul by a man from Clusium, named Arruns, who showed them wine, figs, and olives, to enlist their aid against the Lucumo, who had seduced his wife. This story implies a date a little before the capture of Rome in 390; but the movement of Sabellian peoples down the highlands towards Campania from c. 450 onwards suggests Gallic penetration of north Italy by then (cf. DeSanctis, ii. r61). However, Livy's account of a series of invasions from the time of Tarquinius Priscus (v. 34; cf. lustin. xx. s. xxiv. 4) is a tissue of inaccuracies; see Meyer (v. 151 ff.), and de Navarro (CAH, vii. 6off.), who discusses the invasion in the light of archaeology. 4. 'II'Ept TclS &.va.ToAas TOV n6.8ou: 'near the source of the Po'. Paton confusedly adds a reference to the east. A6.m teat AE(3EKlOt •.• "lvao~pES: the Aaot are probably the Laeui of Livy (v. 35· z) and Pliny (Nat. hist. iii. 124), though to Pliny they are Ligurians. The AE{31Kwt will then be the Libui of Livy (ibid. ; d. Pliny, Nat. hist. iii. 124, Libicii; Ptol. Geog. iii. 1. 32). These tribes inhabited the valleys of the lower Ticinus and the Sesites (modern Sesia) respectively; Vercellae was the capital of the Libicii (Pliny, Nat. hist. iii. 124). P.'s description of these tribes as the first ncar the source of the Po supports the view (cf. 16. 6 n.) that he identified the Dora Baltea with this source. The Insubres, one of the most important tribes of the plain, had their capital at Mediolanum (cf. 34· 10), and Philipp has argued (RE, 'Insubres', col. 1590) that they controlled several neighbouring peoples, including the Laevi and the Anares (cf. § 7). This might explain how the Laevi, a Ligurian people, are reckoned here as Celts, and also why Ptolemy (Geog. iii. r. 29) counts their capital, Ticinum, an lnsubrian town. See Nissen, It. Land. ii. 177-fJ· P. makes the Insubres neighbours of the Taurini (iii. 6o. 8). 182

ROME AND THE GAULS

II. 17. 7

rovojl6.Vo': the Cenomani (d. Livy, v. 34-35; Strabo, V. 216; Ptol. Geog. iii. I. 27) dwelt rather closer to the Alps than P. suggests. Their lands stretched from the Ollius (Oglio) to the Athesis (Adige), and their towns were Brixia, Verona, Cremona, and {according to Ptolemy) Bergamum, Mantua, and Tridentum. See Nissen, It. Land. ii. 195 f.; Hiilsen, RE, 'Cenomani (3)', cols. r899-rgoo. 5. Oa:.tveTol: the Veneti dwelt between the Adige, the Po, the Adriatic, and {to the east) the lower waters of the Tagliamento (Tiliaventus); to the north they reached the Alps. See Strabo, v. 214; Pliny, Nat. hist. iii. 126; Nissen, It. Land. i. 488 ff.; De Sanctis, i. 155 ff.; Whatmough, Foundations, I7I-8J. Our knowledge of Venetie derives largely from funerary and votive inscriptions, and its origins are still debated; the view that it is akin to lllyrian (cf. R. S. Conway, The Prae-ItaUc Dialects, i (London, 1933), I-2oi), is now generally rejected (cf. 1\-L S. Beeler, The Venetie Language (Berkeley 1949); H. Crabe, S.-B. Heidelberg, 1950, 3, 'Das Venetische', P. Kretschmer, Glotta, 1943, 134-68; recent survey in M. Lejeune, Rev. phil., 1951, 202-4). The first arrival of Venetie culture in Italy is usually dated about rooo B.C. ; see Ninck, 178. 6. ot Tpay't'SlGyp6.cl>oL: 'tragic poets', as in iii. 48. 8 (with similar criticism). However, P. usually employs the word TEpaTela. in connexion with 'tragic' historians (d. ii. 58. 12, 59· 3, iii. 58. 9, xv. 34· 1), and in vii. 7· I the whole phrase rroAvv rwa • .• TEpa.Tdav is repeated of historians who have written sensational accounts of Hieronymus of Syracuse. Here too, then, P. may be hinting at historians, (cf. Wunderer, ii. s6-57). One legend of this area brought Antenor from Troy, along with the Eneti of Paphlagonia, to found Patavium (cf. Strabo, v. 212, xiii. 6o8; Virg. Aett. i. 242 ff. (with Servius); Livy, i. I; DeSanctis, i. rs6-7) but P. may also be thinking o[ some of the current 'wonder-tales', of hens that laid twice a day, sheep that lambed twice a year, with huge litters, the fifty towns of the Veneti, and the richness of the soil (:\issen, It. Land. i. 492). 7. 1l.vapes: cf. 32. r, 34· 5· The MSS. give a variety of forms, and "AvapEs- is due to Mommsen (RG, 554 and 558); recently G. Patroni (Rend. Ac.ltalia, 4, 1942-3, uo-23) has defended 'Ananes'. Mommsen (CIL, v, p. 828) suggested an identification with the Marici, who helped to found Ticinum (Pliny, Nat. hist. iii. 124); but the Anares lived south of the Po between it and the Trebia. See Philipp, RE, 'Massalia (z)', cols. 2152-3 {with the criticism below, 32. In.); Hiilsen, RE, 'Anamares', cols. 2055-6; Mullenhoff, ii. 251"· BoioL ••• Alyyow.:s ••• Itjvwves: Livy (v. 35· z) relates how the Boii crossed the Great St. Bernard (Poeninus), found the area between the Po and the Alps inhabited, and crossed the river to seize modern Emilia, where they occupied Felsinaandrenamed it Bononia; cf. Ruge, RE, 'Boii (r)', cols. 630 ff. (with details of other branches I

183

II. I7. 7

ROME AND THE GAULS

in Germany). At the same time the Lingones, a branch of a people

dwelling about the head-waters of the Marne, Meuse, and Saone, took the low land south of the Po towards Ravenna and Ariminum. The Senones, a branch of those established between the Loire and the Seine, reached Italy last (Livy, v. 35· 3) and occupied the socalled ager Gallicus on the coast between Ravenna and Sena Gallica, driving the Umbrians into the Apennines. On their later clash with Rome see 19. 10. Cf. Keune and Philipp, RE, 'Senones', cols. 1474 ff. 9. Til'> Aol"'l"ij<; K:a.TaaKEuils O.!loLpol: 'without knowledge of the other arts of civilization'. For this sense of KaTaa'KEtnJ, 'instruction, acquired skill. culture' (not in LSJ) cf. xi. 8. I, rijs EK Tot.bov (nuv 07TDJkVTjttchwv) KaTaG'KEv~s, 'lessons from memoirs'. Paton's translation 'furniture' is derived from that of Schweighaeuser (corrected in the Lex. Polyb.). P. means 'civilized arts other than building walled towns' (implied from the previous phrase). On the primitive culture of the Gauls see C. J ullian, i. 36o ff. 10. To aTL~a.8oK:oLTE'iv: 'lying on litter', i.e. to eat as well as sleep. Cf. Strabo, iii. 155 (of the Spanish Bastetani); Diod. v. :28 (of the Transalpine Gauls). Diodorus (ibid.) also mentions their meateating; d. Poseidonius ap. Athen. iv. 151. oih' E"'I"WTTJ!lTJS ••• oun ToEXVTJ'>: an exaggeration, as Treves observes. The Gauls had considerable skill in metallurgy; d. 33 below; Diod. v. 27 for gold ornaments. 11. KD.T
ROME

A~D

THE GAULS

II. 18.6

2. 1-uml. 8€ Twa. xpovov KT)..: on F.'s date (387/6) see i. 6. 1-2, and below, 22. 5 n.; and on the Gallic catastrophe in general Meyer (Kl. Schr. ii. 307 ff.), L. Homo (CAH, vii. 554 ff., with misleading remarks on F.'s sources), F. Schachenneyr (Klio, 1930, 277-305), and Altheim (Epochen, i. 163 ff.). F.'s account, based on Fabius, heads the tradition. Diodorus (xiv. IIJ-I4) probably gives the early annalistic tradition (but not Fabius, as Mommsen (Rom. Forsch. ii. 297 ff.) argued). The later versions in Livy (v. 33-55), Plutarch's Camillus, and Dionysius, Appian, and Dio, build up the figure of Camillus, who is unimportant in Diodorus, and wholly omitted by Polybius (cf. Momigliano, CQ, 1942, III ff.). Tous I'£T<1 TooTwv wa.pa.Ta.~a.l'evous : no other source mentions allies at the Allia, but later tradition may well have preferred to mitigate the disaster by stressing Roman isolation. On the battle of the Allia (I8 July, a dies nefastus) see Homo (CAH, vii. 561 ff.), and De Sanctis (ii. x66 ff.). To Homo's bibliography on the problem of the battle-site (ibid. 920) add Kromayer (AS, iv. 449 ff.) and Schachermeyr (Klio, I9JO, 277 ff.), both favouring the left bank. TpLat rijs l'a.XTIS ~p,epa.ls uO'T£pov ~ so too Diodorus (xiv. us: with exclusive reckoning), Plutarch (Cam. 22) and Verrius Flaccus (in Gell. v. 17. 2). Only Livy (v. 4I. 4) enlivens the story by making the Gauls reach Rome the next day. Later legends elaborated the defence of the Capitol (Livy, v. 43· r ff., 47· Iff.); but perhaps no serious attempt was made against it (DeSanctis, ii. 175-6). 3. T~v 0ll£v£Twv E:l'f3a.MvTWv: the authenticity of this attack, otherwise unattested, has been questioned; and Livy (v. 48. I) makes a pestilence among the Gauls play a similar role in drawing them off. But such an· attack is quite plausible, and no more of a coincidence than the Illyrian invasion which drew Antigonus Doson north after Sellasia (below, 7o. 1). Whether true or not, the story belongs to an earlier layer of the tradition than that which emphasizes Camillus' last-minute rescue (cf. Livy, v. 49). wot,a6.1'£VOL auv&'Y]Ka.s wpos 'Pwl'a.(ous: cf. i. 6. 3 n. for the ransom. which was probably paid; for the Gallic claim see below, 22. 5· 4. 9c;wpouvns tK wapa.9£a£ws: 'observing from close at hand' (d. 17· 3) or 'witnessing in comparison with their own' (cf. i. 86. 7 and passim); a small distinction since proximity encourages comparison. 5. TO. K(lTcl Tovs AaTlvous a09Ls wpciyl'aTa. auvt:O'Tftaa.VTo: see i. 6. 4-6n. 6. ~T£L TpLa.KoO'T~: the chronology of the fourth-century Gallic wars is difficult. It may perhaps be assumed (though not with certainty) (a) that F.'s intervals refer to consul years (not Olympiad years, as Leuze, ]ahrzahlung. 125, argues), (b) that, as in i. 6. 2, l'. is here making 387/6 the date of the seizure of Rome, (c) that he identifies the Attic year 387/6 with the consul year 386 (cf. De Sanctis, i. 185

II. 18. 6

ROME AND THE GAULS

13 n. z). The intervals listed between the Gallic debacle and Sentinum in 295 (19. 5), viz. 30 I2 add Up to only 89 years, whereas from 386 to 295 should be 91 years. The problem is therefore twofold, (a) to account for the two missing years, (b) to reconcile P.'s date of 386 for the Gallic attack with the Varronian 390. For discussion see Niese (Hennes, 1878, 401-r3), L"nger (Hermes, r879, 77--92), Seeck (ibid. Mommsen (Rom. Forsch. ii. 297-38r), Leuze (]ahrzahlung, r2o--45), De Sanctis (ii. 259-6o; cf. i. r3 n. 2), Beloch (RG, 132-43, 314). The four years' discrepancy between the Polybian and Varronian dates for the capture of Rome may be due either to the omission by Polybius' source of the four years in which dictators and their magistri equitum appear as eponymous in the Fasti, viz. 333, 324, 309, and 301 (Livy omits these years), or to the expansion of one year's 'anarchy' to five in the annalistic account of the Licinio-Sextian rogations (viz. 375-371, cf. Livy, vi. 34-42; De Sanctis, ii. 214). Diodorus (xv. 75· r) records only one year's O.va.pxta; but there is no reason to associate his version of the annals with Fabius. Consequently either explanation must be regarded as possible. The two missing years are explained by Beloch on the assumption that the date 387/6 for the capture of Rome came from Timaeus (d. i. 6. 2 n.), but that Fabius put it in 384. In fact, Fabius' date is not known for certain; but if he dated the first plebeian consul (366) twenty-two years after the Gallic capture (Gell. v. 4· 3, duouicesimo), he can hardly have put the latter in 384. In 19. 5-7 P. reckons the interval between Sentinum and the appearance of the Gauls at Arretium as ten years; it was in reality eleven (295-284). This suggests that P.'s figures may in some cases represent a round number, or be based on a reckoning which excludes both terms; but if so, he is not himself awake to the discrepancy, and no distinction is to be made between such phrases as lnt rptaKocrr(j> (r8. 6) and lrYJ Tptd.KoV"Ta. (r9. r) (so Leuze, ]ahrzahlung, 125). Correlation with Livy and the triumphal Fasti is of little use, since Livy at least contains frequent doublets and improvisations. In these circumstances the following table is merely one possible arrangement of the data: Reference Capture of Rome r8. 2

+

Gauls before Alba Gauls invade and retire Peace made Successful invasion

299

Sentinum . Gauls at Arretium

295 284

331

18. 6 ~T€L TpLaKOCfT{j> 18. 7
Livy records no Gallic invasion in 356; but the ravaging of the ager Albanus in 36o (Lh'Y, vii. rr. 3) is thirty years after his date for r86

ROME AND THE GAULS

II. I9. 5

the seizure of Rome, and may refer to this expedition if P.'s chronology has omitted the four 'dictator-years'. 7. t~ ~TrL~oA.1ls ~TEpa.s: 'making another attempt'. This third invasion, forty-two years after the capture of Rome, has nothing corresponding in Livy. However, Livy (vii. 23-24) records an invasion in 350, and the act. tr. assign a triumph to the consul M. Popillius Laenas [de G]alleis; and Beloch has suggested (RG, 137-8) a confusion with Popillius' next consulship in 348 (Beloch prefers Diodorus' date, 347) for the invasion. If the four 'dictator-years' are omitted, 348 becomes 344, which would fit P. But this is highly hypothetical. 9. Tpmt: in 295, the decisive year of the Third Samnite War. Cf. Livy, x. 20 ff. Ia.uv'i:Ta.L t
II. 19.5

ROME AND THE GAULS

and Samnites on the east slope of the Apennines in south Umbria. It was the advance-party which was defeated. Livy (x. 25. u, 26. 7 ff.) has transferred this battle to Clusium in Etruria, qtwd Camars olim appellabant (25. n); but his account, which contains other inaccuracies, cannot stand against that of P. Cf. De Sanctis (ii. 355 n. 2), Beloch (RG, 440) and Adcock (CAH, vii. 6r2). 6. TrpoatlAovuc-ljaa.V"rES 1rpos -ro ••• EAa-r-rw11a.: 'displaying a victorious spirit in the face of the reverse'. ~v -rfi -r<71v IEV"rWO.TWV xwp~: Sentinum lay on the eastern slope of the Apennines on a tributary of the Aesis, about 30 miles north of Camerinum. The Romans employed the two consular armies of Q. Fabius Maximus Rullianus and P. Decius Mus, four legions in all (1riic~ -rofs- a-rpa-ro'tTtOots), some JO,ooo-J6,ooo men. This victory over the 'last resistance of Italian particularism' (De Sanctis) became famous in popular tradition, especially for the deuotio of Decius Mus (cf. Munzer, RE, 'Decius (16)', col. 2284). 7. lha.yEvo!L~vwv 8e TraAlv ETwv 8~Ka.: the Fasti and Livy (ep. 12; cf. Oros. iii. 22. 13) agree in making L. Caecilius MetellusDenter consul in 284, but attribute his death to a praetorship in 283. Mommsen (Rom. Forsch. ii. 365-77) analysed the tradition and showed how the events of Caecilius' consulship were transferred to a supposed praetorship in 283, in the interest of a patriotic compression. This analysis (which is not superseded by a brief and misdated reference in St.-R. ii. 195 n. r) has persuaded both De Sanctis (ii. 376 n. 2) and Beloch (RG, 133) to reject Livy; and indeed rrrpa:rr;yos is consul in P. (see Lex. Pol_vb. s.v.). Against the annalistic version is the unusual appointment ofM'. CuriusDentatus as what would be praetor suffectus (§ 8), if in fact Caecilius was praetor, whereas in P.'s account his appointment will be as consul suffectus (see further§ 8 n.). (In itself, Caecilius' military command as praetor would not be unparalleled at this date; cf. Broughton (i. r88-9), adducing the case of Ap. Claudius Caecus, who held a military command as praetor in 295.) That P. took Caecilius to be consul in 284, and not praetor in 283, is shown by the present reference to ten years, which can be applied to the period 295-284, by the exclusion of both terms, but hardly to 295-283. r a.XO.-ra.l • . • TrOAlOpK~O"OVTES Ti]v :A.pp"lTLVWV 11'0AlV: the Senones, as the later narrative shows. On Arretium see 16. 2 n. Avoiding Umbria, the Senones had traversed the Apennines to win allies in Etruria. 8. AeuK£ou ••• -rEAEU'I'Tjaa.V"ros: he had two legions (Oros. iii. 22. IJI4) and lost seven military tribunes and IJ,ooo men. The defeat was followed by a general revolt of Etruscans, Samnites, Lucanians, and Bruttians (Livy, ep. 12; Oros. iii. 22. 13-14; Augustine, CD, iii. I7)· 188

ROME AND THE GAULS

II.

2.0. I

MO.vtov hnKaTiiO'T'I'lO'a.v T6v K6pl0v: M'. Curius Dentatus was one of the most notable figures of this period and had terminated the Third Samnite War successfully in 290 (cf. Munzer, RE, 'Curius (9)', cols. 1841-5). The later tradition, which dated Caecilius' death to 283, makes him praetor suffectus (above 19. 7 n.). According to this version Caecilius' death was avenged the same year by the victory of P. Cornelius Dolabella, the consul, at Lake Vadimo over the Senones (cf. Broughton, i. r88-9). It has been argued by E. T. Salmon (CP, 1935, 23-31) that both the annalistic version and that of Fabius (i.e. of P.) distort the real course of events, so as to bring the Roman revenge immediately after the setback at Arretium; in one case (Fabius) the revenge was moved back into 284 (and attributed to Curius), in the other (Livy) the defeat was retarded until 283 (and Caecllius becomes a praetor). If this plausible thesis is correct, Dentatus' victory (§ u) is apocryplml; and indeed its disappearance from the later tradition is inexplicable on any other assumption. 9. ~'ll'awlAoVTo Tou~ Tp.!O'~£LS: a not impossible, but perhaps unlikely story; d. 8. 12. See Beloch (RG, 454) and Salmon (CP, 1935, 31 n. 39). The story is probably part of Fabius' version leading to a bellum iustum. TaJ..arlo. is here Cisalpine Gaul; d. 24. 8, etc. 10. 0'11'0 Tov 8ull'ov EK X"'POS ~'II'LO'Tpa.Tc;uO"u!l'.!vwv: 'immediately in their anger' ; the narrative implies that it is still 284. 11. Tfj~ •.• xwpa,~ ... EYKPUTELS: viz. the territory of the Sen ones, the later ager Gallicus (see 21. 7 n., and above, 17. 8 n.). 12. 6.TotK£uv ~O'T£lAUV TTJV I1Jv11v: Livy (ep. n) also associates the founding of Sena Gallica with Curius Dentatus, but dates it after his first consulship (29o). If Curius' victory of 284 is apocryphal (19. 8 n.), the founding of Sena drops out of this year. It may have taken place in 283 after the victory at Vadimo ; but there must be some good reason why both traditions associate it with Curius. Therefore, since it seems perverse to postpone its foundation till Curius' third consulship in 274, with which no authority associates it (so Beloch, RG, 453-4), Livy's date is probably to be accepted. Its foundation implies the ceding of land by the Senones, but not necessarily their defeat and complete expulsion; and this may well have followed the peace which must have been made after Sentinum; see De Sanctis (ii. 358 n. r). P. mentions Sena above (&.prlws) at 14. II and 16. 5·

20. 1. ol S( Boi:o,: though P. mentions no date, he is evidently referring to the next year, 283, when the consuls were P. Cornelius Dolabella and Cn. Domitius Calvinus Maximus. The later tradition makes Dolabella victorious at Lake Vadimo over the Senones, not 189

II.

20. I

ROME AND THE GAULS

the Boii (on the latter see r7. 8 n. and 20. 4 n.); and if the Boii suffered so severely in 283, it is hard to comprehend their confronting the Romans again in 282 (2o. 3). The probability is that P.'s Fabian account, having destroyed the Senones in 284 (19. u), required a new foe for Dolabella's victory in 283. See Sahnon (CP, 1935. 24 ff.). 1ra.pa.tmAiaa.VTES T uppTJvous: Beloch (RG, 451) argues from the site of the battle that these were primarily from Volsinii; but the Gauls may well have attracted allies from a wider area, as they advanced south, and in 28o the consul Ti. Coruncanius triumphed over Vulci as well as Volsinii, and in 281 Q. Marcius Philippus de Etrusceis, which suggests a wider coalition. 2. T-ijv 'OO.S11-ova. ••• ALjlVTJV: Lake Vadimo (V adimonis lac-us, the modern Laghetto di Bassano) lies on fiat ground west of the Tiber, some 42-43 miles due north of Rome. For a description see Pliny, ep. viii. 20; Nissen, It. Land. ii. 342. 4. T~ Ka.T.i ,...68a.c; tvmuT~: viz. 282, in the consulship of C. Fabricius Luscinus and Q. Aemilius Papus. It is recorded in Frontinus (Strat. i. 2. 7) that 'Aemilius Paulus [sic] consul bello Etrusco apud oppidum coloniam' fought against the Boii; and the reference is probably to this campaign. Beloch (RG, 454) would emend coloniam to Vetuloniam or Statoniam, others to Populoniam; but Salmon (CP, 1935, 26-2i) suggests that the colonia is Sena Gallica, and locates the battle on the fringe of Cisalpine Gaul, a possible interpretation, even if Sena was founded not one but eight years previously (19. 12 n.). Aemilius' campaign is also mentioned by Dionysius (xix. 13. r), who places it in Etruria; and this is perhaps less easily reconciled with a Roman (presumably offensive) action in the north-east. 6. Synchronisms : see i. 6. 5 n. Pyrrhus' crossing was in 01. 124, 4 = 281/o (in fact May 28o), the Gallic destruction in 01. 125, 2 = 2i9/8 (probably autumn 279). On the reasonable assumption that consul years are equated with the Olympiad year in which they begin, the peace with the Boii in 282 was, by inclusive reckoning, three years before Pyrrhus' crossing and five years before the Gallic rout at Delphi. 7. AotjlLKTJV TWa. ••• StMeatv: 'epidemic', a medical term; cf. 31. ro, (used literally). For this sense of Stci8mt> cf. jo. 6, viii. 12. 3. and the examples quoted by Welles, 324-5. In afflicting the Gauls thus Tyche is playing the role of capricious deity; cf. CQ, 1945, 6; above, p. 18. 8-10. General observations on the Gallic campaigns. The long duel (§ 8, .iyc.)vwv), drawn out for over a century, had toughened the Romans psychologically and physically; they could be neither daunted by horrors nor worn out by hardships. This fitted them to contest Italy with Pyrrhus, and to struggle with Carthage for Sicily; cf. i. 6. 6 (Italy), and the parallel reflections (i. 63. 9) on the schooling 190

ROME AND THE GAULS

II.

2I.

5

of the First Punic War, which led the Romans to aim at universal dominion, and accomplish that aim. Here too P. is again stressing the function of his introduction (d. i. 3· 9-ro) in explaining the basis on which Rome advanced to world-domination. For the phrase &.B>.TJTa.i TEA~:tat y~:yov6T~:s- cf. i. 6. 6 (and, for the metaphor, i. 59· 12). The Gallic and Etruscan wars take their place in the steady, fated advance of Rome to world-empire; and this phase in the reduction of the Gauls is rounded off with the words T~v ••• TOAfLa.V •.• Ka.Ta.7rA7)~&fL~:vot, which recalls (and reverses) the words Tfj T6AfLTI Ka.Ta.TrmA7)yfLlvm with which it opened (18. r). 21. 1. ETTJ ••• 'ITEVTE t<:a.i TETTa.pat<:ovTa: calculated inclusively by Mornmsen (Rom. Forsch. ii. 362) as 281-237, with the appearance of the Gauls at Ariminum (§ s) in 236. But the forty-five years must be reckoned from 282, the year of the peace (2o. 6), and are therefore 282-238; and P.'s date for the events at Ariminum is consequently 237, which is confirmed by his dating Aemilius Lepidus' consulship (232) five years later (21. 7). (Alternatively P. may be reckoning exclusively, 282-237, with events at Ariminum still in the latter year.) P.'s account of a single campaign in 237 conflicts with the annalistic tradition of a three years' war under the consuls of 238, 5; Eutrop. iii. 2; 237, and 236 (Zon. viii. 18; Oros. iv. r2. 1; Flor. i. Livy, ep. 20), with the Ariminum incident in 236 5 n.). P.'s dates for the remaining Gallic incidents (cf. r8. 6 n.) are: Reference

Gauls at Arretiurn Vadimo . Defeat of Boii. peace Gauls at Ariminum .

284

19. 7

:z83

20. r-2

282

20.

237

2 I. I,

232 2 25

21.

interval omitted

4, 6 TijJ KaTd. Troaas Jv,avTij!

4-5 €T7) 1TWTE Kal TET'Tapa· KOV'Ta

Division of Ager Gallicus Gallic tttmultus

7 €-r~:t 7rEf.L1t'To/ 23. I l-rn ... oyoocp (sic)

The failure of the Gauls to exploit Roman embarrassment during the First Punic War is discussed by De Sanctis (iii. r. 28o), who suggests that it was due to a successful Roman policy of appeasement coupled with Carthaginian failure to develop the necessary contacts and to buy Gallic help. 3. Ta Ka.6EaTWTa. KtVE~v: 'to disturb the equilibrium', viz. the peace of 282. P. ignores the events of 238, which the annalistic tradition, probably following Valerius Antias, magnifies into an astounding victory (after defeat) for the consul, P. Valerius Falto. 5. ~Pll-'tvou: on its site see 14. II n. It was originally Umbrian (Strabo, v. 2Ij), but a Latin colony was set up in 268 (Yell. Pat.

IL 21.5

ROME AND THE GAULS

i. 14. 7); cf. U. Ewins, BSR, 1952, 54· Zonaras (viii. r8) adds details suggesting that the dispute of the Gauls, ending in a pitched battle, was the direct result of a policy of delay and temporizing on the part of the consuls. The Fabian account in P. is very different. Fear of the Gauls ensured the dispatch of a legion from Rome; but on learning of the Gallic broil it returned. Yet clearly the same occasion is meant; and if the date is 237, Zonaras' error may derive from some confusion between the consuls L. Cornelius Lentulus Caudinus (237) and P. Cornelius Lentulus Caudinus (236). 7, iTEI 1!'€f1VT'e , , , KO.TEKATJpOUXT)O'U\1 • , , T~\1 nu(E\IT~\IT)\1 , , , xwpa.v: the reference to the consulship of M. Aemilius Lepidus fixes the year as 232. Cicero (de sen. II; cf. acad. ii. 13), drawing on Atticus, makes it 228, perhaps confusing the second consulship of Q. Fabius Maximus with his first, during which Flaminius entered office (Niccolini, F asti dei tribuni della plebe (Milan, 1934), 88-89); in any case, it is agreed that P.'s date is preferable; d. DeSanctis (iii. 1. 333 n. 181); Mommsen (Rom. Forsch. ii. 401 n. 23); and other authorities quoted by Aymard (REA, 1943, 219 n. 1). Cicero describes Flaminius' bill as the 'lex de agro Gallico et Piceno uiritim diuidundo' (Brut. 57). On the ager Galticus between the Aesis and Ariminum see 17. 8 n.; the Senones were completely expelled after Vadimo (or, according toP., the year before; cf. 19. n). It is described by Cato (fg. 43 Peter): 'ager Gallicus Romanus uocatur, qui uiritim cis Ariminum datus est ultra agrum Picentium.' The ager Picenus, as this quotation indicates, is normally placed south of the Aesis; but it also indicates that Picenum in this sense was excluded from Flaminius' distributions. Nor is there any evidence for the expulsion of the Picentes (on Strabo, v. 251 see Beloch, RG, 475). Moreover, it appears from Livy (ep. 15, Ariminum in Piceno) that P. was not alone in identifying the ager Gallicus and the ager Picenus. The likelihood is therefore that, despite Cicero's formula, Flaminius' bill dealt only with the ager Gallicus; cf. Frank (ES, i. 61) and Beloch (RG, 475-{)); contra De Sanctis (iii. I. 333 n. 184); on the geography, Nissen (It. Land. ii. 377). 8. r a.tou .ACI.JJ-LVlou TC.UTT)\1 TTJ\1 8TtJJ-a.ywy(a.v dO'T)YTJO'UJJ-EVOU: c. Flaminius was a plebeian and a nouus homo. His land measure was designed to restore the firm link between the Roman proletariat and the land, and therein foreshadowed the work of the Gracchi. It met with strong opposition from the senate, which had profited by the occupation of public land, and was eventually carried by Flaminius as tribune in the popular assembly (Cic. de inu. ii. 52; Livy, xxi. 63. 2; VaL Max. v. 4· 5). On Flaminius see Munzer (RE, 'Flaminius (2)', cols. 2496ff.), and on his land bill Frank (CAH, vii. 8o6-7; ES, i. 6o-{)I), De Sanctis (iii. 1. 332-4), Meyer (Kl. Scltr. ii. 39o-3), Fraccaro (Athen., 1919, 76 ff.), K. Jacobs (Caius Flaminius

ROME AND THE GAULS

II. zr. 9

(diss. Leiden, Hoorn, 1937), 37 ff.). P.'s hostile attitude towards Flaminius (cf. 33· 7 ff., iii. 8o, 8z ff.) seems to reflect the hostility of his senatorial opponents transmitted through Fabius Pictor (cf. Gelzer, Hermes, I933, I5o; Klotz, Wj, 1946, 156; contra Bung, I74 n. 3). Why does he regard the land-bill as 'the first step in the demoralization of the people'? The ·view of Ed. Meyer (Kl. Schr. i 2 • 374; cf. Unger, Phil., I88z, 6I7 n. rs), that P. inserted this passage after the Lex Sempronia of Tiberius Gracchus in 133, has been widely accepted by Cuntz, De Sanctis, Bung, and others. But probably too much has been read into P.'s words. ~ €7TI. ro X"'ipov TOV o-.jp.ov OtaCl'Tporf.'lj is simply the outburst of popular assertiveness associated especially with Flaminius' career, which ended in the fiasco of the aequatum imperium of Fabius and Minucius (iii. 103. 4), and the election of such leaders as Flaminius and Varro who, at Trasimene and Cannae, were responsible (in the eyes of the Senate) for bringing Rome within an inch of ruin. Clearly P. had an exaggerated picture of the role of the tribunate at this time (cf. iii. 87. 8), and an exaggeration of Flaminius' maleficent role fits excellently the strange observations on the tribunate at vi. I6. 3-5 (q.v.). Flaminius is further attacked for precipitating the Gallic tumultus of zzs. Against this it has been urged that the tumultus did not occur for seven years (z3. In.), and that when it did come, it took the traditional form of a plundering expedition, not prepared to try the final issue (z6. 4 ff.); see Meyer (Kl. Schr. ii. 395), De Sanctis (iii. 1. 305), and Frank (CAH, vii. 8o7). But, as Gelzer points out (Hermes, I933. ISo), the implementation of the bill took a considerable time, the rallying of Gauls from both sides of the Alps was necessarily slow, and the Romans had anticipated trouble for several years (13. s); and certainly Flaminius is subsequently associated with a policy of expansion in north Italy. 1lv s,; KO.L 'Pwfla.(o~~ ••• «Jla.TEOV apxTJYOV KTA.: 'which we must admit to have proved for the Romans virtually .. .' (so Schweighaeuser, Shuckburgh, Paton, Treves, taking •pwp.aiotr; as dative of disadvantage) or 'which even the Romans must virtually admit .. .' ('Pwp.alotr; dative of the agent with rf.arlov). The second is highly improbable, but is apparently the interpretation of Frank, who writes (CAH, vii. 8o6), 'we hear ... that the Senate considered it a measure which began "the demoralisation of the people" '. But if 'Pwp.almr; were 'the Senate', it would be rather P.'s than Flaminius' contemporaries. On the use of wr; e7ror; Ei7TEtv to soften an expression (here of criticism) see Wunderer (i. 5 n. 1). 9. oux uTr£p TJYEflOVLa.~ En KTA.: the motivation of the Gallic action is probably from Fabius' indictment of Flaminius' policy; though in fact the establishment of further colonies would have aroused Gallic 0

193

II.

21.

9

ROME AND THE GAULS

apprehension equally. The words rov rrpo; a.irrov; rroAEJLOV indicate that the Gauls regarded the land distribution as a preliminary to offensive warfare. In 22. I eUNw; is an exaggeration from the same source.

22. 1. '11'pOaa.yopwo~£vous , . . r O.LO'aTOUS: a misstatement from Fabius; cf. Oros. iv. 13. 5 (Fabius, fg. 23 Peter), 'maxime Gaesatorum, quod nomen non gentis sed mercennariorum Gallorum est'. The word derives from ya.i:ao;, a javelin or throwing-spear (cf. vi. 39· 3, xviii. r8. 4; Diod. xiii. 57; P.Teb. 230 (2nd cent.)), a word of Celtic origin (d. Serv. ad A en. vii. 664; Nonius, p. 555, quoting A en. viii. 661-2, on the Gauls attacking the Capitol, 'duo quisque Alpina coruscant I gaesa manu').

P. uses both the -a.1 and -o1 endings, Strabo, Plutarch, and other Greek writers use -at, and the Latin form is always Gaesati. On the etymology, which connects with words both Celtic and Germanic, see A. Holder (Altceltischer Sprachschatz, i (Leipzig, 1896), 1517 ff.), and R. Much (German. Forsch., 1925, 26); cf. Irish gai, gae, 'spear'; OHG ger, etc. In Caesar (BG, iii. 4· 1) the Celts of Canton Valais use gaesa; and the Gaesatae here come from the Rhone, which may include the uallis Poenina (cf. F. Stahelin, Die Schweiz in riimischer Zeit 3 (Basel, 1948}, 33 n. 1}, and not merely the middle and lower Rhone (R. Heuberger, Klio, 1938, 72-8o). The gaesum was always distinct from the Roman pilum, though Greek writers often use the word for any foreign spear; see Fiebiger (RE, 'gaesum', cols. 463-4). That Gaesatae came to mean 'Celtic mercenaries' is true (cf. Plut. Marc. 3}, and Much (ZDA, 1932, 43) compares the meaning 'bodyguard' acquired by oopvopo;. Much and other Germanists (followed by Degrassi) have argued that they were Germans because (a) the act. tr. record a triumph of Marcellus in 222 'de Galleis Insubribus et Ger(manis'}, (b) Livy (xxi. 38. 8} describes the area north of the Great St. Bernard Pass as inhabited by gentes semigermanae. But the act. tr. here probably contain an error introduced in the time of Augustus (cf. 0. Hirschfeld, Kl. Schr. (Berlin, r9r3). 365 ff.; Stahelin, loc. cit.), and Livy's reference also suggests an anachronism, since the extended use of the name Germani does not appear before the first century (Stahelin, op. cit.}. Heuberger (loc. cit.) believes the Gaesatae are 'warriors', who joined in the expedition for plunder, not as mercenaries; and he rejects P.'s explanation out of hand. In imperial times we hear of a ue[xi]llatio Retorum Gaesa[torum] (Dessau, ILS, 2623; cf. CIL, vii. roo2, viii. 2728); and Strabo (v. 212) mentions Gaesatae who accompanied the Senones in attacking the Romans and seems to regard them (v. 2r6} as a Celtic tribe inhabiting the Po valley. For discussion of the problems 194

ROME AND THE GAULS

II. 23. 4

involved see Meyer (Kl. Schr. ii. 229-30 n. 4), Stahelin (loc. cit.), R. Much, Germ. Forsch. (1925), 26-Qr, 'Der Eintritt der Germanen in die Weltgeschichte'; ZDA, 1932, 17-46 'Die Gaesaten'; H. Jacobsohn, ZDA, 1929, z2o-r; R. Heuberger, Klio, 1938, 6o-8o 'Die Gaesaten'; Degrassi, Inscr. It. xiii. r. sso. 4. olJ j.t6vov EVLK"l<TilV KTA.: at the Allia; cf. r8. 2-3. 5. £8EAovTi Klli J.lETa xapLToc.;: in fact after the payment of a ransom, r8. 3 n. The figure of seven months was well established in the tradition. The dies Alliensis was r8 July, the siege in autumn (Plut. Cam. z8) and the relief in February (in the calendar of Polemius Silvius on id. feb.; cf. CIL, i 2 • I,' p. 259); cf. Mommsen, Rom. Forsch. ii. 328 n. ~· · 7. Ka.Tn 8E To us KllLpouc.; TOuTouc.;: a vague transitional phrase, perhaps deliberately so. KllTilJ.lllV'I"EUOJ.lEVOL To J.lEAAov: 'surmising what would happen', i.e. in contrast to what they heard (dKov6vTES); cf. Arist. Rhet. 1368 a 3I, £K nov 7Tpoyeyov6nuv Td. j.dlloVTa KG.TG.fW-VTEV6p.tiVOf, Kplvop.Ev. Meyer (Kl. Schr. ii. 394 n. I) translates erfuhren durch Weissagungen, and sees a reference to the burial alive of a Gallic and Greek couple in the forum Boarium in response to a Sibylline oracle (Plut. Marc. 3· 6; Dio, fg. so; Zon. viii. I9; Oros. iv. 13. 3) in 228 (ct. Gelzer, Hermes, I933· ISI n. r). But this sense would be without parallel. 8. aTpa.TO'II'E81l Kll'l"a.ypaq,ELv: ten in all, two for each consul (24. 3), two to guard Sicily and Tarentum (z4. 13), and four in reserve at Rome (24. 9). 10. we.; KilL '11'p6a8Ev iJjiiv ELP"lTilL: IJ. s-7 (with note). 23. 1. 86va.J.lLV 'll'oAunMj KilL ~llpEillv: 'a richly-equipped and powerful army', cf. xxxi. I7. 4. ef.'Vf,K~V X€fpa. f3a.pEia.v. Naturally some were light-armed (cf. 27. 6); hence f3a.pt'ta.v is not 'heavy-armed'. ~TEL , , • oy86fl': the year is 225 (cf. ZJ. 5 n.), the eighth after 232 by inclusive reckoning. See 2r. In., 21. 7· 2. ol 8' OOEVE'I"OL KilL r OVOj.taVOL ••• TOUTOLS EtAOVTO
II. 23

5

ROME A ;.rD THE GAULS

5-6. AEliiCLOv ••• Ail'iAtov KTA.: the consuls for A.U.c. 529 225 B.C. were L. Aemilius Q.f. Cn.n. Papus and C. Atilius M.f. M.n. Regulus {§ 6). Cf. Klebs, RE, 'Aemilius (ro8)', cols. 575-6; 'Atilius (.;3)', cols. zoBs-6. Aemilius was sent to Ariminum to defend the ager Gallicus; he triumphed in 224 'de Galleis III nonas mart.' (act. tr.). Atilius was son of the famous Regulus of the First Punic War (i. 26. n ff.). His presence in Sardinia creates a problem. There seems no good reason to question P.'s statement (so Beloch, Hermes, 1922, rz8 f., criticized by Meyer, Kl. Sckr. ii. 396 n. 2); and though the Romans may have been taken by surprise, either through neglect of the northern danger (Holleaux, 123 n. 3) or because they did not foresee where the blow would fall (Gelzer, Hermes, 1933, rso n. s), it seems more likely that Atilius was sent to guard against a possible Punic attack (d. 24. 13 n.). He will have been recalled when the news of the Ebro treaty, sworn probably between autumn 226 and spring zzs (13. 7 n.), secured the Romans against any move by Hasdrubal (27. 1); see Treves ad loc. Zonaras (viii. 19) records a rising in Sardinia which may also connect with Atilius' presence there. The name of the praetor (ita1TtAl'KVS in Greek, since he had six axes and fasces) in Etruria is not recorded. 9. O.va.cflEf>EW •• , O.woypa.cJ!a~ Twv £v Tals TjALKLa.ls: 'to supply lists of men of military age', viz. of the iuniores, from 18 to 46 years inclusive; cf. vi. 19. 5; Mommsen (Rom. Forsch. ii. 404), and StrachanDavidson (28). The details of Roman preparations do not suggest that they were caught by surprise. 24. Roman and Italian forces in 225. P.'s figures evidently go back through Fabius to the actual Ka-raypa¢at, and are mainly reliable (d. §§ u-r2 nn.):

(a) Troops in arms (§§ 3-9, 13)

Infantry With the consuls (four legions} Sabines and Etruscans Umbrians and Sarsinates Veneti and Cenomani In Sicily and Tarentum (two legions) Reserve at Rome (four legions)

20,8oo

I,200

8,400 20,000

400

JO,OOO 2,000 lso,ooo+ 4,ooo 20,000 20,000

I

z,ooo

ROME AND THE GAULS

II. 24

(b) Men capable of bearing arms (§§ ro-12, 14) -

1

Romans

Allies

--····

Romans and Campanians Latins Samnites Iapygians and Messapians Lucanians . Marsi, Marrucini, Frentani, Vestini

I

Infantry

Cavalry

250,000

23,000

.. .. .. .. ..

I 250,000

Total

Infantry

Cavalry

..

..

. . !! .. .. ..

8o,ooo ]0,000 50,000 30,000

r6,ooo 3,000

..

20,000

4,000

250,000

35,000

23,000

I

5,000 ],000

···--·

(c) Polybius' total (§ r6: for the figures in § IS see ad loc.) Infantry

Cavalry

700,ooo+

70,000

For discussion see Mommsen (Rom. Forsch. ii. 382-4o6; St.-R. iii. 575 n. 2), Beloch (Bevolkerung, 355-70; I B, 93 ff.), Strachan-Davidson (22-32), De Sanctis (ii. 385 n. I, 462; iii. 330), T. Frank (CAH, vii. 8U-I2; ES, i. sB-59), Veith (Heerwesen, J05-7L Gelzer (Hermes, I935· 273 ff.), and earlier works quoted by Liebenam (RE, 'dilectus', cols. 6o8 ff.). The main problem is whether the troops in arms are included in, or additional to, those capable of bearing arms. On the assumption that the latter is the case, the sum of the separate items adds up to P.'s total, viz.

Romans: in arms not summoned Allies: in arms not summoned

Infantry

Cavahy

49,200 250,000 I50,000 250,000

3,100 23,000 8,ooo 35,000

__T_o_ta_l____________________~__6_9_9_,2__ o~~9,IOO

Whether or no any addition be made to allow for allies with the legions in Sicily, and for cavalry of the Umbrians, Sarsinates, Veneti, and Cenomani (omitted by P.), clearly these totals correspond closely to P.'s 7oo,ooo infantry and 7o,ooo cavalry. On this assumption, which is M:ommsen's, the whole levy of north Italy was called out, and therefore did not figure under (b); and the contingents actually serving from south Italy are included in the figures of allies with the consuls or in reserve at Rome (§§ 4 and 9), since these forces 197

II. 24

ROME AND THE GAULS

represented contingents from all parts of Italy in addition to the

levee en masse in the north.

On the other hand, the phrasing of §§ IO and I4 (KaTo:ypa<{;ai. s· &.v-ryv€x01JG'O.V ••• , 'Pwttalwv o€ I(O.t Kattrravwv f] 7TA1J0vs ••• ) suggests that P. is recording the full muster for the areas in question, not that muster less troops already serving; and the round figures (25o,ooo Roman and Campanian infantry, 25o,ooo south Italian infantry) look like a maximum based on the Ko.Ta:ypap~ rather than such a maximum less a specific number already serving. Further, it is improbable that the figures under (a) represent a roo-per-cent. turn-out, for instance, the 54,ooo Sabines and Etruscans who marched to Rome (§ 5). Consequently Strachan-Davidson supposes the figures in (a) to be included in (b), but suggests that P. has omitted those from north Italy who were liable to serve but not actually on service; by subtracting the 558,ooo Romans, Campanians, and south Italians from P.'s total of no,ooo, he reaches a figure of 2rz,ooo north Italians liable for service. 1 The truth seems to be that P. has been less logical than either Mommsen or Strachan-Davidson demands. His totals must represent the sum of his individual items- the correspondence is too close for any other assumption; but what he has given is this. For the north Italians who fought as national armies (Sabines, Etruscans, Umbrians, Sarsinates, Veneti, and Cenomani) he records the numbers actually fighting {probably a high percentage of the whole) ; here he has drawn no distinction between the number fighting and the possible maximum. He also the number of Romans serving in the legions, and of the allied auxiliaries attached thereto, whether from north or south Italy (§§ 3-4, 9, IJ). Further he gives the total number of Roman adult male citizens (§ 14), perhaps from the census lists. But for south Italy, which had to be included in a picture of the full strength of Italy at the time of the Second Punic War(§§ I-2), his only figures were those of the Kamypa.pal, and these he gave unaltered (for he cannot have known how many of these were serving as auxiliaries with legions). Finally, P. added up all these figures to give a grand total for Italy. This total omits all north Italians not on service and counts south Italians acting as auxiliaries with the legions twice over; it also counts twice over those Romans and Campanians actually serving in the legions, and ' One may ignore Orosius 7) who gives the number of Roman and Campanian infantry as i.e. 348,200. Mommsen emends this to CCLXXxxvmrcc, i.e. Z99,2oo, which exactly fits his calculations. But Beloch (Bevolkeru~tg, 363) follows Niebuhr (RG, ii'. 8r) in emending to ccxxxxvmcc, which on the assumption that (b) includes (a) is perhaps a more accurate veTsion of P.'s zso,ooo. And indeed Orosius' figure of 23,6oo Roman cavalry is closer to P.'s 23,000 than the 26,roo required by Mommsen's theory. I-<)8

ROME AND THE GAULS

II. 24. 3

the Sabines may also be counted twice since they were full citizens (24. 5 n.). Can the real total be recovered? There are the following basic figures: Infantry

Cavalry

Romans and Campanians available South Italians available

250,000 250,000

North Italians on service .

500,000 9o,ooo+

58,ooo S,ooo (estimating the cavalry for Umbrians, etc., at 4,000)

59o,ooo+

66,ooo

23,000 35,000

····-------·

To these totals add (a) an unknown proportion of the 6o,ooo foot and 4,ooo horse serving with the consuls and at Rome, to represent north Italians included in those figures; (b) a similarly unknown, but probably smaller, proportion of the auxiliaries attached to the legions guarding Sicily and Tarentum, representing north Italians; perhaps the total for all these auxiliaries, whatever their origin, may be reckoned at about ro,ooo foot and r,ooo horse, though this is a guess (Mommsen estimated the total number of north Italians under both these heads as 19,ooo out of 75,ooo, but this is also a guess); (c) the adult males of military age from north Italy not on service. It is clear that these figures are past recovery; but P.'s total looks like a slight overestimate. P.'s source was Fabius; and his total of 8oo,ooo, as recorded by Eutropius (iii. 5) and Orosius (iv. IJ. 6) is clearly a rounding off of P.'s no,ooo. Ultimately going back to Fabius too are Diodorus (xxv. r3: 7oo,ooo foot and 7o,ooo horse under arms), Pliny (Nat. hist. iii. 138: 7oo,ooo foot and 8o,ooo horse under arms) and Livy (ep. zo: 8oo,ooo in all). This suggests that P. has followed Fabius closely, and that he too gave a picture of the potential power of Rome at the time of the Hannibalic War. The errors of calculation probably also go back to Fabius. For the relation of P.'s figures to the third century census lists see § 14 n. Fabius' figures omit the Greeks of south Italy (who were exempt from all military service) and the Bruttians (who were used in a menial capacity); cf. Frank (ES, i. 58), who does not, however, consider the real problems of this chapter. · 3. J.lETu J.lEv 8~ T<7JV urr6.Twv ••• TETTapa. (7Tpa.T6rre8a: i.e. each consul had an army of two legions (Paton's error ('four legions each') is reproduced by Frank, ES, i. 58). The normal complement at this time was 4,ooo-4,2oo foot and 3oo horse (i. r6. 2, vi. 20. 8--9) ; these legions are over-strength, an indication of the crisis (cf. vi. zo. 8). 199

II. 24. 4

ROME AND THE GAULS

4. au!ll..l.o.xo~ S€ 11e8' EKO.TEpwv ..• ot auv6.Jlll>w: 'the allied forces in both consular armies together' (not 'in each consular army': so Paton, and Frank, loc. cit.). According to P. (vi. 26. 7) the allied infantry normally equalled the Roman in number, and the cavalry were three times as many; but before the Social War the allies complained that 'duplici numero se militum equitumque fungi' (Vell. Pat. ii. rs. 3)· Here the allies provide 30,000 foot and 2,000 horse to the Romans' 2o,8oo and r ,2oo; at Rome (§ 9) the proportions are similar, and for the infantry fit Velleius rather than P. In the second century the later books of Livy show two allies being normally enrolled to one citizen (cf. vi. 26. 6--9 n.; Strachan-Davidson, 27); and calculations based on Livy, Appian, and P. (F. Frohlich, Die Gardetruppen der romisclten Republik (Aarau Programm, r882), 6) show that between 296 and r68 allied infantry usually preponderated. 5. eK: Tou K:a.~pou: 'at once, in haste' (cf. x. 43· g, xviii. 26. 8). Schweighaeuser corrected in his Lex. Polyb. his translation 'necessario tempore'; but this has misled Treves ('in que! frangente'), while Paton mis-translates 'temporary assistance'. Shuckburgh's 'for that special occasion', can be supported from vi. 32. 3· Io.~£vwv Ka.t TuppTJvwv i'IT1l'el:s KTA.: the Sabines, an ancient people of central Italy (cf. Strabo, v. 228, r.aAcuoraTov y~os ... Kai aU76x8ovES') and the reputed forebears of the Samnites, dwelt in the Apennines east of the Tiber and Nar, and north of the Anio (Nissen, It. Land. ii. 46.1 ff.; Beloch, RG, ssz). Since they had possessed ciuitas sine suffragio since 290 (Livy, ep. II; VeiL Pat. i. r4. 5; Florus, i. ro; auct. de uir. ill. 33· 3) and full citizenship since 268 (Veil. Pat. i. r4. 7), their mention along with the Etruscans (on whom see r7. r n.) suggests that in the crisis of this year geographical considerations were paramount and led to the calling out of the Sabini along with the socii {so Mommsen, St.-R. iii. 575 n. 2). 6. TOuTous ..• 1rpoeK:6.81aa.v: an army of so,ooo foot and 4,ooo horse (the equivalent of five legions with their auxiliaries) seems very large to entrust to a praetor (d. De Sanctis, iii. r. 307 n. ro7 ). It is possible that Fabius has confused the praetor's force with the maximum levy; but reductions in number (Beloch, IB, 94, would reduce the praetor's army to two legions) must be wholly arbitrary. 7. o{ ••. "Oil~poL Ka.l Ia.paLV6.To~: see 16. 3 n. (Umbrians). Sarsina, Plautus' home (d. Mostell. no), lay on the head-waters of the R. Sapis, to the north of the ager Gall!'ezts, in Umbria; its inhabitants (usually Sarsinates though Pliny (1\'at. h1:st. iii. II4, etc.) and inscriptions have Sassinates) were forcibly enrolled in the alliance and separated from Umbria in 266. Perhaps they originally controlled the whole Sapis valley, with the (later extinct) Sappinates and the tribus Sapinia (d. Livy, xxxi. 2. 6, xxxiii. 37· x). See :Kissen, It. Land. ii. 378, and Philipp, RE, 'Sarsina', cols. so-sr. Beloch (IB, 99) 200

ROME AND THE GAULS

would raise P.'s figure of zo,ooo for these tribes. On the Veneti and Cenomani see I 7. 4-5 n., ZJ. z n. P. has omitted the cavalry of all these four peoples; on the normal ratio this would come to about 4,000 horse in all. Their function in the Roman plan (§ 8) was to carry out a diversionary offensive against the Boii in Emilia. 10. ICO.Ta.ypo.cJ>a.l. S' ilVfJVEX9TtaO.\I: the aTToypwpal of ZJ. 9· The subsequent figures represent maximum levies: see z4 n. AaTlvwv .•• Ia.uv~Twv: after the dissolution of the Latin League in 338, Latini (nomen Latinum, socii nominis Lat1:ni) included (a) the original Latin and Hernican states which had not been incorporated in Rome, (b) the Latin colonies scattered throughout Italy, whose citizens had Latin status. 'Since the Latin Name lacked a specific territorial unity, the term was inevitably interpreted in a political and social sense alone, as meaning persons of a certain status' (Sherwin-White, 95; see especially 91 ff.). It seems unlikely, therefore, that only Latin colonies are here included (Beloch, IE, 99). Samnite territories (cf. i. 6. 4 n.) had been much limited since the Samnite and Tarentine Wars by the planting of Roman and Latin colonies (Beloch, RG, 539·-44); Beloch argues (IE, <)8) that their numbers here include the Hirpini, and perhaps the people of Nola, Nuceria, and even Sidicinum. 11. 'la.'ITuywv ~eal MEaaa'ITU.>v: terms with a somewhat fluid connotation. In iii. 88. 3 the Messapians are part of the Iapygians; here Iapygia probably signifies Apulia (v.ith the Apuli, Daunii, and Peucetii), and Messapia Calabria (with the Sallentini). All these tribes are closely related in tongue and culture. See Philipp, RE, 'Iapyges', cols. 727 ff.; M. Mayer, RE, 'Messapia', cols. IIiS ff.; De Sanctis, ii. 462 n. 3· Since 16,ooo horse is disproportionate to so,ooo foot, it has been widely emended to 6,ooo (Beloch, Eevolkerung, i. 359; IE, 9i; DeSanctis, ii. 462 n. 3; Treves ad Joe.). 12. AEu~eavwv: the Lucanians, Roman allies since the late fourth century, dwelt among the southern Apennines between the R. Silurus {modern Sele) just north of Paestum and the R. Laos (Laino) on the west coast, and between the R. Crathis (Crati) and the R. Bradanus (Bradano) on the Gulf of Tarentum. They had already lost Paestum, where a Latin colony was founded in 273; and their small levy may be due to many of the people's being subject to the Greek cities of the gulf (Nissen, It. Land. i. 535). P.'s figure was questioned byBeloch(Rh. Af.us., r877, 247), but unjustifiably (Mommsen, Rom. Forsch. ii. 394 n. 1z). See further Beloch, RG, 591 ff.; Honigmann, RE, 'Lucania', cols. 1541 ff. Mapawv ••• Mo.ppouKlvwv ••• cj)~pEVTclVWV ••• o.:,.,aT(vwv : tribal confederations of the central Apennines. The Marsi, of Sabine origin, lived around the Fucine Lake and the upper Liris valley. The Marrucini were to the north-east of the Marsi, between the mountains 201

II.

24. 12

ROME AND THE GAULS

and the Adriatic, south of the R. Aternus; their capital was Teate (modem Chieti). The Oscan-speaking Frentani dwelt along the coast south of the Marrucini, as far as the R. Tifernus (or the R. Frento, if one includes the Larinates Frentani). These peoples joined the confederacy in 304 (Diod. xx. ror. 5; Livy, ix. 45· r8; Beloch, RG, 403}. and the Vestini, who lived along and to the north of the R. Aternus, in 302/r (Livy, x. 3· r). The Paeligni, who lived between the Marsi and Marrucini (cf. Li-v-y, viii. 29. 4; DeSanctis, ii. 462 n. 3), though not mentioned here, are probably included in P.'s calculations (Beloch, Bevolkerung, 365). Twenty thousand infantry seems a small number for these Abruzzi tribes, and Reloch (Bevolkerung, 36o; I B, 97--98; cf. DeSanctis, ii, 462 n. 3) suggests that it should be changed to 4o,ooo, which would restore the normal ratio of r : ro between horse and foot. See further Nissen (It. Land. i. srs-18, 527-8). 13. Ka.l. ~v :IlKEMliJ- Ka.L T6.pa.VTl: Tarentum, the principal harbour in south Italy (x. 1), and Sicily both needed protection in case of any move from Carthage. These legions were slightly under strength in cavalry. 14. 'Pw!lo.lwv 8i Kal Ka!l1Tavwv iJ 1TATJ8U'>: these figures probably indude those serving in the legions (24 n.). They must be considered in conjunction with the third-century census figures for Roman citizens: 292,234 (Livy, ep. 16; cf. Eutrop. ii. r8 (text uncertain; cf. DeSanctis, ii. 425 n. 3) .} 297,797 (Livy, ep. r8.) 241,212 (Livy, ep. 19.) 26o,ooo (Hieron. in Euseb. Chron. ii. 123 (Euseb. ibid. 122 gives 25o,ooo).) 270,713 (Livy, ep. 20 (text uncertain).) 137,108 (Livy, xxvii. 36. 7; cf. Frank, ES, i. 56-57·) 2q,ooo (Livy, xxix. 37· s-6.) Against Mommsen's view that these are figures for iuniores only, i.e. men between r8 and 46 (Rom. Farsch. ii. 398 f.; St.-R. ii. 411 n. r) see the arguments of Strachan-Davidson (28 ff.) and Beloch (Bevolkerung, 3IZ ff., 343 ff.). Beloch discusses other theories, and recently Schultz (Mnem., 1937, 161 ff.) has argued that the figures excluded men over 6o. But the most probable view is that they include all adult male citizens. The likelihood is that P.'s figures here are on the same basis, and include both smtiores and iuniores (unlike those for the allies: 23. 9 n.); but whether the ciues sine suffragio (Campanians, Hernicans, etc.) were included in the census is not certain. Clearly P. has given a round figure, and it is possible that he (or his source) has adjusted the census figure to allow for ciues sine suffragio and 202

ROME AND THE GAULS

II. 25. 6

men serving abroad (and so excluded from the census). But these would probably more or less cancel out the number of men over military age included in the census figures, which is what P. most likely gives. His total would fit very well into the list of figures for the third century, 273,000 compared with 270,713 in 234. See Frank (CAH, vii. 8n; ES, i. 58-59), Beloch (op. cit., supra; IB, 96), De Sanctis (ii. 463 n. r), Gelzer (Hermes, 1935, 27,3). On Orosius (iv. 13. 7) see footnote to 24 n.; clearly it must be omitted from consideration in this context. 15. To Kco+6.Aa.Lov T~lV !lEY trpoKa.9"1J.Livwv Tijs 'Pw!ll]S 5uv6.f1Ewv: how these 15o,ooo+ foot and 6,ooo horse 'stationed before Rome' are to be calculated is not clear ; and on any method this figure for thecavalry seems too small. Beloch (I B, 94) argues that the 15o,ooo are a reduction of the twelve legions with their auxiliaries which P. found in Fabius (assuming two under the praetor in Etruria: see 24. 6 n.); but (a) the total of twelve is only achieved by a forced reckoning, (b) P. speaks of over 15o,ooo foot, (c) Beloch himself admits 6,ooo horse to be too few. Mommsen (Rom. Forsch. ii. 38g-go) observed that these figures are not relevant to an account of the strength of the forces facing Hannibal; hence they are best regarded as a gloss (with Hultsch, Blittner-Wobst, and Strachan-Davidson). The words to be bracketed are [K£]. 17. €AaTTous .•• 5uY!lup(wv: on Hannibal's numbers see iii. 35· 1 n.; cf. iii. 33· r8. Here P. neglects his 6o,ooo cavalry. aa.+iuTEpov EKtrmf)uEL Ka.Ta.voEiv: 'it will be possible to win a clearer understanding'; for the impersonal use of EK7TOt£'i cf. xxix. 8. ro.

25. 2. Kl\ouaLov: Clusium (modern Chiusi) lay in the Clanis valley (Val di Chiana) on the route from Rome to Arretium, the later Via Cassia; at r6o km. from Rome it is a long three days' march, and De Sanctis (iii. r. 308 n. w8) suggests emending to 'five', i.e. E for r. But the tradition would exaggerate the proximity of the danger. 3. ol 5' ••• ES U'ITOO'Tpo+ijs a'ITTJVTWV: cf. iii. 14. 5· The Roman forces under the praetor (24. 6) were evidently stationed near Clusium or Perusia, so as to keep in touch with the two legions of Aemilius Papus, the consul, at Ariminum (23. 5). In case of need Aemilius could march south through the Fnrlo Pass to Iguvium and Perusia (cf. z6. r ff.). 6. ti>s etrt .•. 4'a.tuoAav: 'towards Faesulae'; Faesulae is So miles from Clusium and the Gauls obviously did not march there overnight (if Casanbon's emendation of mho~ to ain-ov is to be accepted, P. has not fully understood Fabius). De Sanctis (iii. 1. 3o8) suggests the feigned retreat was only as far as Montepulciano in the Val di Chiana. 7Tap£vl{1al.ov is 'they encamped' (cf. i. 77· 6) or 'they drew up 20}

II. 25.6

ROME AND THE GAULS

for battle' (d. v. 69. 7); § 10 suggests that the second is the meaning here (Schweighaeuser). 26. 1. AEuK,oc; AiJ.LiAtoc; ••• 1Ta.pfjv ~oTJ8wv: having come through the Cales gap into the upper Tiber valley (zs. 3 n.). His arrival ~:ifrvxws­ ds- oiovra Katpov dramatically foreshadows the approaching peripeteia of T elamon. 2. O.vo1TAouc;: 'to facilitate their progress and mitigate their situation in the case of capture' (Treves). 5. To Twv o-WJ.LclTwv Ka.i 8pEJ.LJ.Lchwv 1TATj8oc;: 'the number of prisoners and cattle'. Paton translates awJ.tam 'slaves'; but in P. it is more often used of prisoners, whether free or slaves. Cf. 6. 6,awJ.taTa oovAtKa and €AEv8~:pa, and Schweighaeuser, Lex. Polyb. s.v. 7. Ka.Ta T~v ~VTJpoia-Tou yvwJ.LTJV: Fabius no doubt had information of this conference from Gallic survivors after Telamon. But either he, or possibly P. abbreviating his account, has failed to appreciate the extent to which the Gauls still controlled events. Their present camp was well to the north of Clusium ; they next appear marching north up the Etruscan coast towards Telamon, which lies on a latitude approximately 40 miles south of Clusium. They had thus made a vast sweep to the south-east, perhaps to avoid central Etruria (DeSanctis, iii. r. 309), but certainly with scant respect for Aemilius, who could do little more than hang on their heels in anticipation of 'Fabian' tactics (§ 8). 1Tpofjyov 1TO.pa 86.Aa.TTO.V s,a. TTJS T uppTJVWV xwpa.c;: 'they advanced through Etruria along the sea-coast.' The point at which they reached the coast can only be surmised; De Sanctis (iii. 1. 309) suggests the mouth of the Albegna near Orbetello, but they may have gone farther south. Eventually they would have returned through Liguria or up the Arno valley. 27-30. The battle of Telamon. The source is Fabius (d. Bung, 172). Conflicting details occur in Zonaras (viii. zo) and Orosius (iv. 13. 8), both of whom make Atilius perish in a separate struggle. Whether certain votive offerings discovered at Telamon are connected with the battle is not certain: cf. DeSanctis (iii. 1. 312 n. 1n). 27. 1. EK Ia.pOOVO') ... r 6.i'oc; ~TLALO<; ••• EL<; n£o-a.c; KO.T0.1TE1TAEUKWS: cf. 23. s-6 n. Pisa (16. 3 n.) was not a natural port to use for communications v.·ith Corsica, and its choice here was based on sound strategy. By cutting off the Gauls from Liguria and the north, Atilius made the victory of Telamon possible (though he could hardly have foreseen their choice of the coast road). 2. TEA«J.LWVa. TTJS TuppTJv£a.s: the Etruscan town lay not at the modem Talamone (Nissen, It. Land. ii. 308--9) but farther to the east

ROME AND THE GAULS

II. 29. 8

at Poggio di Talamonaccio, on the right bank of the R. Osa; see Gamurrini (Not. d. scav., r888, 682 ff.), Philipp (RE, 'Telamon (4)', cols. 192-3). ot 1rpovoj1EUOVTE\i: 'their foragers' (not 'their advanced guard' (Paton)). The Romans normally sent an advanced guard to discover a camping ground (vi. 41. r); but on this occasion it was early in the day (cf. § 6, T~v vvKm, the previous night), and though the Romans were not strong on reconnaissance (cf. iii. 83 ff. for Trasirnene), Atilius' 7TporropoSov: 'a direct frontal advance'. Cf. xi. 22. ro. In Thucydides (ii. 90. 4) ships sailing fLu:y. l.."7f-La, however, equating it with e.f,>a7TT{';;, a Soldier's Upper garment (cf. XXX. 25. 10). 11. rslOv ••• Kal. lla.u!lO.O'TOV: cf. 29. I t€vryv Ka.l. 7TUp'I')MayfLEV'Y]V, zg. 7 eK7T>..'I'}KTtK~. The stress on the sensational in P.'s narrative may be imported from Fabius; cf. CQ, 1945, 12; above i. r. 4 n. 29. 1. Ti)v XPE£a.v ••• Tou o-uVTETa.yJLevou: 'the movements of the forces marshalled against each other' (Paton). 8. p.a.vuiKa.L<; Kal 11'EpLxrtpms: 'necklets and bracelets' ; the 1-Lavtdxat (3L s) are torques, the typical Celtic adornment (cf. Euphorion, Polychares (in Et. magtt. 22J. r6), Fat,ijTat 7T~pl s~ip~a XPVao.f,>op~VJITE>). not, as Much (ZDA, 1932, 44) suggests, their wages as mercenaries, drawn in advance. 205

II.

]0. I

ROME AND THE GAULS

30. 1. To us d.KovnaTas: cf. iii. 65. 3 ff., 69. 8; they are iaculatores, javelin-throwers, whom P. often mentions as ypoa,Pof-Laxo~. the equivalent of uelites (cf. i. 33· 9 n.) . .EvEpyo'Ls Ka.i 'II'UKvo'Ls: 'thick and fast' (not, as Paton, 'well-aimed'). 3. TOU ra.Xa.nKOU 8upEou: cf. Livy, xxxviii. 21. 4 (of the Galatians), scuta tonga ... et ... plana. The oval Gallic 8vpEo<; is frequently represented on ancient monuments; cf. P. R. von Bienkowski, Die Darstellung der Gallier in der hellenistischen Kunst (Vienna, 19o8), figs. ro4, ro7, 109, nr, IIJ, 121; and other works quoted by Launey (REA, 1944, 222 n. r). It was too narrow to cover the massive bodies of the Gauls; cf. Plutarch (Philop. 9) on the Achaean shields, prior to Philopoemen's reforms: dnnoTim 8ta T~v AE1rTDT'1JTa Kal aTEvwTipot<; Tov 1TEpurriX\nv TU adJj.LaTa. 7. E'll'' !aov Ta.'Ls !Jruxa.'is: for the factor of morale cf. 35· 8, i. 59· 6 (where, in the rfroxoJLaxla which ended the First Punic War, the Romans had also a worthy opponent), and iii. 9· 7· 8. Schweighaeuser fills the lacuna exe·m.pli gratia: . . . JLEya>.~v Otatfoopav [ifxovaL 'PwJLalw;;, OLa TO TOVTWV JLiV TOV 8vpEOV oAov TO (JWJLU aKE1TEtV, Tov 8€ Ta>.aTLKov {JpaxvTEpov Elvat, Kai Dta TO T~v 'PwJLatK~v JLEV (Kal T~v JLEV 'PwJLULK~V Hultsch) J.Ldxatpav Kal TO KlVTIJJLU 8uJ4>Dpov KaL Kamrf>opdv N; dJL,Po£v Toi:v JLEpofv {Jlawv] lxnv, KTA. For the substance of this see 33· 5, iii. 114. 2 ff., vi. 23. 7, fg. 179. J.Lq6.X1Jv is to be taken with fna..a. ••. T1)v o€ Xt:la.v: the former is the plunder and trophies talcen from the Gauls, the latter the booty they had assembled during their expedition. o[ 1TpomJKDVTE<; are 'the owners' (a sense not listed in LSJ). 4. ds T~\1 TCl\1 Bolwv ..• xtilpa.v: i.e. into Emilia (r7. 8); on the expedition see Diod. xxv. 13; Zon. viii. 20. Aemilius will hardly have returned tv o>.lyat> ~f-Llpat>. Since he triumphed 'III non. mart.' (224), and will not have campaigned in winter, evidently he crossed the Apennines in September-October 225, and returned along the line 206

ROME AND THE GAULS

II. 32.

I

of the Via Flaminia. Diodorus' statement that he invaded the Po valley as proconsul may be neglected, for he triumphed as consul. 5. To ••• Kn1TET6>Atov: Florus {i. zo) and Dio (fg. so. 4; cf. Zon. viii. 20) have a story that the Gauls had sworn an oath not to doff their belts or breastplates till they entered the Capitol (uncaptured in 387); this they fulfilled as prisoners in Aemilius' triumph. The UTJJLt/iat are Gallic standards; on the p.a.wiKa' see 29. 8 (where the definition might have come more appropriately). 8. tenTEA1T£crnvTES' 'Pwjln£ot 5uv..)crecr9nL • • • tK~aAeiv: just as the capture of Agrigentum inspired them with the ambition to seize all Sicily (i. zo. In.). This schematic development of Roman ambitions is probably P.'s own, rather than the work of Fabius Pictor (Heuss, HZ, 169, 1949-5o, 488 n. r, against Gelzer, Hermes, 1933, 151). Ko'(vTov CI>6Xoutov tent T£Tov M&-Atov: T. Manlius T.f. T.n. Torquatus and Q. Fulvius M.f. Q.n. Flaccus, the consuls of A.U.C. 530 224 B.C. The same pair had been elected censors in 231, but abdicated owing to a flaw in their election. That both were sent to Cisalpine Gaul is proof of the seriousness of the Roman effort. See Munzer, RE, 'Manlius (8z)', cols. 1207--9; 'Fulvius (59)'. cols. 243-6. 9. ds n)v 'PwJ.la£wv enuTOUS' 8ovva.t 1T'Lcrnv: this is an act of deditio (n. 5-12 n.). Orosius' story (iv. 13. n), that the Po was crossed, 23,ooo Insubrians slain, and s.ooo taken prisoner, is probably an annalistic invention (nothing to correspond appears in the act. tr.). It is very unlikely that the Romans crossed the Po in this year. See DeSanctis, iii. I. 313 n. 1q.. 10. els TEAOS G'!TpnKTOV dxov: if T6v • •• AoL7r6v xp&vov is the object of 11:lxov, arrpai<.'TOV is predicatiVe, if an adverbial aCCUSative, arrpaKTOV is also adverbial. The sense is the same in either case. 32. 1. no1T'ALOS Cl>ooptos teal rXaJl£vws: P. Furius Sp.f. M.n. Philus and C. Flaminius C.f. L.n. the consuls of A.U.C. 531 223 B.c. See Munzer, RE, 'Furius (8o)', col. 36r; and, on Flaminius, 21. 8 n. Sta TllS' TWV 'Av
II. 32.

2

ROME AND THE GAULS

2. Ka.Tcl TclS auppola.s TOU T' :t\Soa. Ka.i n&Sou: they crossed the Po at its junction with the Addua (modern Adda) between Placentia and Cremona. 3. Aa.(3ovTt:S SE wAfJyas KTA.: this defeat and agreement {which left Flaminius free to march away and link up with the Cenomani) make little sense. Probably the defeat is an exaggeration and the agreement a fiction {§ s); and Flaminius' original object was to join the Cenomani. The distortion, De Sanctis suggests (iii. r. 314 n. II7), is a reflection of the senatorial hostility towards him which permeates our sources, including Fabius; see 21. 8 n. 4. Tov KAouuLov woT«JlOV: should be the modern Chiese, a tributary of the Oglio; but this and not the Chiese formed the western limit of Cenomani country (17. 4 n.), and perhaps the name of the tributary has been applied to the main stream (M:ommsen, CIL, v. 413 n. 2; Nissen, It. Land. ii. 196 n. 2), either inadvertently or following contemporary usage. 6. Tns xpuuO.s O'TJJlEL«s: these standards were dedicated to Minerua, or her Celtic equivalent, of whom Caesar writes (BG, vi. q. 2) that 'Mineruam operum atquc artificiorum initia tradere'. She was, v..Tites Jullian (L 357), 'deesse de Ia guerre et de victoire, qui rappelait ala fois Bellone, Athene ou Minerve'. They were suspended in one of her temples, perhaps at the Insubrian capital of Mediolanum (so Schweighaeuser). The word dKw7}Tous has special point since KU'Ei:v was the technical expression for removing sacred objects from temples (cf. Thuc. i. 143. I, ii. 24. I, vi. 70. 4; see Schweighaeuser on Appian, B.C. ii. 41). In this case the Insubres removed the standards as a source of divine protection. \Vunderer's emendation av~K~Tou.­ (i. 72-73) is to be rejected. See also R. Hercod, 87. 8. T~\1 Tt: r a.Aa.nKTjv tHlEula.v: 'the treachery of the Gauls' ; cf. iii. 49. 2. 70. 4, 78. 2. Paton translates diJw{av 'fickleness' and Treves 'instability, inconstancy' (quoting Caesar's estimate of Gauls as ever eager for novelty, BG, iii. ro. 3, iv. 5· r). But toP. the meaning is stronger, positive treachery rather than negative instability. See Schweighaeuser, Lex. Polyb. &.iJwia, commenting on fg. I a (B-W), 'certe grauius quid P. TI)v diJwlav dicere consueuit quam rif311{5ato77jTa id est leuitatem et inconstantiam'. 9. EVTos Tou woTO.JlOU: i.e. on the right bank of the river. This should be the Clusius (= Oglio, 32. 4 n.), but P.'s topography here is not very clear. The Cenomani were dispatched to the left bank. 33. The battle against the Insubres. The account follows the anti~ Flaminian tone of 21. 7--9 and 32. 3· The innovation of the military tribunes, which is never heard of again, seems invented to contrast with Flaminius' incompetence. On P.'s picture of 1<1aminius, which remains consistent down to his death at Trasimene, see Gelzcr 208

ROME AND THE GAULS

II. 33· 9

(Hermes, 1933, 152-3); and on this passage De Sanctis (iii. 1. 315). P. omits the sensational prodigies, and the letter of recall sent by the Senate to Flaminius, and left unopened until after the battle, which adorn the Livian tradition; cf. Plut. Marc. 4; Fab. 2; Zon. viii. 20; Oros. iv. 13. 12-14; Livy, xxi. 63. z, 63. 7, 63. 12, xxii. 3· 4, 3· r3. See DeSanctis, iii. 1. 314 n. 115. 3 • .,.o.is t.an~ 1-'d:x.mpa 1-'{av elxff XPfflav T~v tK I
;g a7Torrn:i<JEWS'.

6. Et< lho.Xt)+Ewc;: bp9o.is X~flEVOL To.ic;: fL«xa.(po.~c;:: £K Sw.A'lj,PEws, punctim, 'with a thrusting stroke', see Schweighaeuser's long note ad loc. By dp6ats P. may mean that the swords were kept straight, i.e. that the movement, punctim, was along the line of the sword, or alternatively that the Roman swords did not bend. 7 . .,.c, .,.Tjc;: 'PwfLO.i:t<"lc;: flGXlJi 'llhov: room to manreuvre in all directions, including backwards, was essential to manipular fighting; cf. xviii. 25. 4 for the retreat of the Roman left £7Tt TToi'la at Cynoscephalae (Meyer, J(l. Schr. ii. 214 n. 3). The tactic of retiring in battle against the Gauls is discussed by Kromayer (AS, iii. I. 368 ff.). 9. €va.vfiADov Eic;: TT)v 'PwfL"lv: Flaminius triumphed by a popular vote VI idus mart. (222) de Galleis, and "Furius Jill t"dus mart. de Gatleis et Liguribus (act. tr.). Their victories were celebrated on coins 4866

p

209

H. 33· 9

ROME AND THE GAULS

(see B.M.C. Rom. Rep. ii. zj8, z83); and according to Livy (xxiii. 14. 4) the spoils were sufficient to arm 6,ooo men. 34. 1. MapKOS K>.uoliLOS KUt rva.·.:os KopYtlALOS: M. Claudius M.f. M.n. Marcellus and Cn. Cornelius L.f. L.n. Scipio Calvus, consuls A.U.c. 532 222 B.C. Both were to have outstanding careers against Hannibal: see Munzer, RE, 'Claudius (z2o)', cols. 2738-55; Henze, RE, 'Cornelius (345)', cols. 1491-2. Since the previous year's consuls abdicated after their triumphs (Livy, xxi. 63. 2; Plut. Marc. 4· 3, 6. r; Zon. viii. .zo), they probably entered office on the Ides of March; and this seems to have remained the regular date for entry into office until I53· See De Sanctis, iii. I. 316 n. 122; Mommsen, St.-R. i. 598 f.; Broughton, ii. 638-9. There is some evidence that P.'s account is somewhat weighted in favour of Cornelius, at Marcellus' expense, perhaps because of his connexion with the Scipionic family (Munzer, art. cit.). 4. 1T6Aw !A.xippuc.;: the Tabula Peutingeriana puts Acherrae 22 miles from Laus Pompeii {Lodi Vecchio) and 13 from Cremona; it lay on the Addua a little above its confluence with the Po, and corresponds to Gera near Pizzighettone. See Nissen, It. Land. ii. rg2. 5. K>.aaTlBLOv: Clastidium, modern Casteggio, in the territory of the Anares (17. 7, 32. 1-z), lay on the fringe of the hills south of the Po, between I ria (Voghera) and Ticinum (Pavia). See iii. 69. I for its capture by Hannibal; Nissen, It. Land. ii. 271. 6. Ka.t TLVas Twv m;tLKwY: 6oo, according to Plutarch (Marc. 6. 6), who also records that Marcellus took two-thirds of the cavalry. Plutarch (Marc. 6--7) gives a fuller account of this battle than P., very favourable to Marcellus, and probably containing annalistic accretions; see DeSanctis, iii. r. 317 n. u.7. It may be deliberately (34· In.) that P. omits the gaining of spolia opima by Marcellus in his duel with the Insubrian chieftain Viridumarus (act, tr.; Livy, ep. 20; Florus, i. 20. 5; Eutrop. iii. 6; Oros. iv. r3. rs; Ampel. 2I; Val. Max. iii. 2. 5; Frontin. Strat. iv. 5· 4; auct. de uir, ill. 45· r; Plut. Marc. 7--8; Rom. r6. 7-8; comp. Pelop. et Marc. r. z; Serv. ad Aen. vi. 855; also celebrated by many poets including Naevius in his play Clastidium, and Propertius (iv. Io. 39 ff.); see too B.M.C. Rom. Rep.i. 567). 8. a.thoi:s Toi:s t1T1T£ilaw ••• 1Tpoam:cr6VTwv: by extending his cavalry line Marcellus avoided the risk of being outflanked (Plut. Marc. 6. ro). 9 . .,ts Tov 1TOTO.f10Y: its identity is not clear; the Po is 8 miles north of Casteggio. 10. Mc;~ho>.a.vov: the Insubrian capital (17. 4 n.), modern Milan, on the site of Etmscan Melpum (r7. r n.), which the Gauls destroyed in 3¢ (Nepos ap. Pliny, Nat. hist. iii. 125). Cf. Nissen, It. I.and. ii. r8o ff.; Philipp, RE, 'Mediolanum (r)', cols. 91-95. 210

ROME AND THE GAULS

II. 35· 4

15. o S£ fvO.i:os ..• To MtSt6Aa.vov ttAt: after glossing over Scipio's rashness in advancing to Milan with only a third of his cavalry, and underlining his success in rallying his shaken force, P. omits to mention that it was only after Marcellus rejoined him that Milan fell. See Plut. Marc. 7; Eutrop. iii. 6; Oros. iv. 13. 15; Zon. viii. 20. 35. 1. mivTa. •.• hrhptljlav TOL'i 'Pwp.a£oto;: by deditio; how far miv 7TOt1Ja€LI' vmaxvovp./vwv (34• 1) had fallen Short of readineSS to Carry this out is not clear. But obviously both consuls and the war-party were bent on a military demonstration. 2-10. The importance of the Gallic wars. P. underlines the lesson for the benefit of Greek readers (§ 9). It is (a) that in such incidents Fortune and the unexpected play a large part (§§ s. 8). cf. 4· s. (b) that a policy based on courage and reason will outmatch one based on passion (§§ 3, 8). Such digressions are a regular feature of P.'s method; d. i. 65. 5-9 (lessons of the Mercenary War), 84. 6----9 (lessons of Hamilcar's success), iii. 21. 9-10 (reasons for surveying the Romano-Carthaginian treaties in full) ; these examples could be multiplied. 2. TWV .•. lmoAXufL£vwv tca.L 11'a.paTa.TTOfL£vwv: hysteron proteron to avoid hiatus; cf. 2. 2 n. oliSEvos Ka.Ta.SE£aTEpos TWV ~aTOPTJfL£vwv: this is a common To7To:> of ancient historians; cf. Thuc. i. 1. 2, 21. 2 (the Peloponnesian vVar the greatest and most memorable). P. uses it repeatedly; cf. i. 63. 4 f. (comparison with the Persian and Peloponnesian wars), 88. 7 (the Mercenary War the cruellest ever fought), iii. 1. ro (the period of fifty-three years, 22o-167, more packed with serious events than any other); on its usual character see v. 33· I. Lorenz (99 n. 228) quotes examples from later historians. 3. 9ufL~ fLO.AAov ~ AoytafL~ ~pa.~E..)Ea9a.t: cf. 30. 4, V7ro ToiJ 8vp.oiJ Kal ri}> .i.\oytaT{as-, 35· 8. The sentiment is very typical of P. For the metaphor of the umpire in {Jpa{J€!Jw8at cf. i. 58. 1. 4. a.uTous .•• €€wa6£vTa.'i: Cisalpine Gaul was pacified in the two decades following the peace of 201; but details are not contained in the surviving parts of P. The Boii were defeated in 191 (Livy, xxxvi. 38. s-7). and Strabo (v. 213, 216) records their expulsion to the Danube area; but according to Livy (xxxvi. 39· 3) they merely had to cede Bononia and half their land, and Strabo's story may be a false deduction from the presence of Boii in Bohemia. Strabo (ibid.) also records the annihilation of the Senones and Gaesatae; but the Insubres (who were defeated in 197, Livy, xxxii. 30-31) continued, he says, to inhabit their own lands. Pacification was assisted by colonization. In 190 the Latin colonies at Cremona and Placentia (iii. 40) were reinforced (Livy, xxxvii. 46. 9-47. 2), a Latin colony was sent to Bononia in 189 (Livy, xxxvii. 57· 7-8), and two citizen 211

11. 35· 4

ROME AND THE GAULS

colonies were established at Mutina and Panna in r83 {Livy, xxxix. 55· 7-8). Roads too were built, the Via Flaminia from Arretium to Bononia, and the Via Aemilia from A.riminum to Placentia, both in 187. P., like Strabo, has, however, exaggerated the extent to which the Gauls were physically expelled. When Strabo (v. 247) says that the Samnites £g£Trmov from Pompeii, he is apparently referring to their ejection from political control; and J. Whatmough would save F.'s credit with the argument (Harv. Stud., 1944, 8z-8s) that £gwa8l!'r«s has a similar meaning here. But when P. writes avv8w;p1}aavus .•. lgwafl£vms, there can be little doubt what he means. He is, however, incorrect. Hundreds of tombstones with Celtic names dating mainly from imperial times are only the most striking of the evidence proving that the Gauls were not expelled, but romanized; cf. Chilver, 71-8.), and on the settlement in general, De Sanctis, iv. r. 41o-17; T. Frank, CAH, viii. 326 ff. 1TA-i]v b'Alywv T61Twv ••• ICELfl~vwv: P. will be thinking especially of the tribes at the head of the Po valley, the Salassi (xxxiv. ro. r8), who were only partially subdued in 143, and perhaps the Taurini (r5. 8 n.); see DeSanctis, iv. r. 417· TTJV -~ cipxfts i~oSov ••• nis J.lETci TauTu 1Tpa~ELS ••• '~'TJ" TEAEuTutuv t~uvuaTuow: three interpretations are possible: (a) the invasion of 387, the intervening events, the final tumultus of 225 (giving lgavaO"TaaLs this sense with Schweighaeuser); (b) the invasion of 225, the loss and recovery of Cisalpine Gaul, and the final expulsion of the Gauls (£gavaO"TaaLs as in 2r. 9: so Casaubon, Paton, Treves, LSJ, etc.); (c) the invasion of 387, the intervening campaigns (including 225), and the final expulsion. The last seems most probable, since it indudes the whole story of the Gauls in Italy (as P. did in this section and the later lost parts together). Against (a) is the improbability that £gavci.O"TaaLS means tumultus, and against (b) the improbability that the invasion of 225 would be called~ £g dpxf}s lcpoSos immediately after a survey going back to the capture of Rome. 5. Tu TmuiJ,-' ~1TELa6SLu Ti)ll TUXTJS: lusus jortunae, Schweighaeuser (cf. Hor. Od. ii. I, 3, ludumque Forttmae), 'such episodes in the drama of Fortune', Shuckburgh. In his commentary Schweighaeuser suggests that P. means an interlude, dravm from the material provided by Fortune, and inserted as a digression by the author in his history. But it is improbable that P. admitted any part of his work to be without relevance to his design (which he had already (i. 4· r) identified with the design of Tyche). The 'episodes' are rather the interludes provided by Fortune herself in her role as play-producer {on which see i. 4. 4 n. and CQ, I945, 9 n. I; to the passages there quoted add fg. :nz). Strachan-Davidson (ad loc.) suggests that 'the incident of the Gallic invasion is looked upon as a sort of by-play coming between the great Acts of the Punic tragedy, which is the main business of TvxrJ 212:

ROME AND THE GAULS

II. 35· 9

at this period'. But the episodes include the whole series of Gallic invasions of Italy from 387 to the expulsion from the Po valley. They are interludes because they interrupt the direct development of Roman power, to which (despite such a passage as 31. 8) they con· tribute nothing; and yet they are the work of Tyclre, since in their ups and downs, their paradoxical and sensational features, they reveal her typical handiwork. Such interludes, irrelevant interrup· tions, must be faced and mastered; how to meet them is P.'s lesson here (§ 8). 7. 'I"OU'ii 'ri}v nc:pawv ~cJ>o&ov ••• 1((1,' r a.Aa.'!"WV ••• O.ya.yOv'!"a.'ij: Herodotus (cf. i. 63. 8 n.) and Ephorus (praised in v. 33· z) both dealt with the Persian Wars, though Ephorus' work has survived only in the popular abridgement of Diodorus. \Vhom P. has in mind for the Gallic attack on Delphi (cf. i. 6. 5 n., ii. zo. 6) is uncertain, for all our accounts are secondary (Diodorus, Iustinus, and Pausanias), and their sources are not determined. Timaeus may have touched on the subject (so A. Schmidt, Abhandlungen zur alten Geschichte (Leipzig, r888), 3 ff.); and Demetrius of Byzantium, who wrote thirteen books on 'the crossing of the Galatians from Europe into Asia' (Diog. Laert. v. 83) may have included the attack on Delphi. Pausanias' source is especially good (Tarn, AG, 439-42) and may be either Timaeus or, as Segre thought (Historia, r927, r8-4z), Hieronymus of Cardia. 1'0U'ii inrEp Tfjs Kowfls 1'WV 'EAA.t1vwv ~AEu9Ep(a.s O.ywva.s: the old catchword of 'Greek freedom' was as popular and as elastic in the second century as in the fifth; since P. has no difficulty in reconciling it with Macedonian domination in the fourth century and Roman in the second (cf. xviii. 14. 6; CQ, 1943, 7-13), his argument here is perhaps 'singularly frigid and rhetorical' (Treves, ad loc.). Laqueur (275) argues that this passage (35· 4 ff.) is anti-Roman in implication: not so, for throughout the Romans are clearly the civilized element repelling barbarism, not barbarians themselves. 8. TJ ••• a.ipEats Ka.~ liuvnJ.ltS: 'devotion and might'; alternatively a.tp~a<;; may be 'resolve' (consilit~m, Schweighaeuser). Schweighaeuser takes Svvap.t;; to mean 'ability', sollertia (d. i. 84. 6). But the phrase there is crrpa77JYLK~ Svvap.LS'; alone, ovvap.LS' seems to require the more usual meaning. For the stress on reason cf. § 3· 9. c) &' a'ITO r a.Aa.1'WV cJ>6l3os .•. Ka.8' TiJ.lii'ii ••• E~~'ITATJ~E TOUS EAATJVCI.S: P. is thinking specifically of the Galatian wars in Asia Minor in the second century; cf. iii. 3· s. xxi. 41. z, ~x&.p71r:ra.v ••. brl -rij! Tdv a1r6 -rwv {Japf3dpwv ain-ot.;; cpofJov ii
2Il

ROME AND THE GAULS

II. 35· 9

his exile; they have no bearing on the date of composition of the present passage. 10. TTjv O'ITi!p TOUTWV t~t]yqaw: Tov.rwv will be masculine, not neuter (as Paton) ; cf. 14. r, {nr£p wv (i.e. the Celts) SoKEt p.ol x.p*np.ov Elvat • •• 1rm~uauiJa, T~v ig~'}"T}uw, to which P. here clearly refers back. 36. Hannibal succeeds Hasdrubal in Spain (zZI) 36. l. ETTJ Xt:tpiaa.s oKTw: viz. 229-221 ; cf. I. 7 for the earlier date. Diodorus (xxv. rz) makes it nine years, but only by inclusive reckoning. SoA.ocj:.ovTJ8ds ••• om) TLvos Kt:AToO To y£vos: a perhaps less reliable, but early, Greek version (Diod. xxv. 12; Livy, xxi. 2. 6; VaL Max. iii. 3, ext. 7; App. Hisp. 8; Hann. 2; Iustin. xliv. 5· 5, d. z. 4) records that Hasdrubal was murdered by an Iberian slave {Iustinus) during a hunt (Appian) to avenge his master (Appian, Iustinus, Livy) ; the slave died smiling (Iustinus, Livy) under torture (Appian, Iustinus, Livy). De Sanctis (iii. 2. 18r) attributes this story to Coelius Antipater. 2. ollx ouTw Sul. Twv 'ITOA£Jliwv IIpywv KTA.: cf. Livy, xxi. 2. 5, 'plura consilio quam ui gerens, hospitiis magis regulorum conciliandisque per amicitiam principum nouis gentibus quam bello aut armis rem Carthaginiensem auxit'. 3. ol. Ka.pxTJSOvtot: see iii. 13. 4 n. ; Hannibal was the choice of the troops, subsequently ratified by the people. No distinction is made here, where oi Kapx.TJS6vw• are 'the authorities at home' (not, as Laqueur (r5) argues, the Carthaginian army; cf. iii. q. u). Laqueur believes Fabius to be P.'s source; it must be the pro-Barcine source followed in r and 13. A.wi~q. ..• ovTt v£tr: the eldest son of Hamilcar Barca. He was 9 when he accompanied his father to Spain in 237 (r. 6), and so about 25 now (in 221). Cf. Diod. xxv. 19 (Tzetzes, Ch. i. 27 f.); Nepos, Hann. 3· 2, 'minor quinque et uiginti annis natus'; Zon. viii. 21, et ... Kai ErKouw e'Twv yEyovws. Eutrop. iii. 7· 2 ('annum ... uicesimum') is probably corrupt. See Lenschau, RE, 'Hannibal (8)', cols. 2323-4. s~a. TTJV li'ITOcj:.a.woJlEVTJV ••• nyx!vota.v KTA.: Hannibal had served continuously under Hamilcar and Hasdrubal. The story of his return to Carthage, whence Hasdrubal recalled him after 229 (Livy, xxi. 3· 2ft.), is obviously sheer slander; and the tricnnitltn, which he is alleged to have served under Hasdrubal (Livy, xxi. 4· ro), may be a reduplication of the three years spent as independent general in Spain before crossing the Pyrenees (DeSanctis, iii. 1. 415 n. 6g). 4. SiiAos ~v

etc

TWV i'ITlVOTJJlnTWV m)AEC:JlOV i~o(awv 'PWJlO.lOtS: a

view not confirmed by the evidence quoted. Hannibal's first two campaigns (iii. r3. 5-14. ro) are merely part of the general policy of consolidating Punic power south of the Ebro; and in iii. 14. ro P.

HANNIBAL SUCCEEDS HASDRUBAL IN SPAIN (221) II. 37

insists that until his third campaign Hannibal avoided giving the Romans any pretext for war. See Kromayer, HZ, 103, I909· 252-3; Otto, HZ, 145, 1932, 504-5. P. is here giving the Roman version, which made the 'wrath of the Barca family' the main cause of the war (cf. iii. 9· 6); hence (§ 6) the Carthaginians appear as the aggressors, 'forming designs' and 'eager to be avenged for their reverses in Sicily', and the war is treated as inevitable {§ 7, where the propagandist Version is thinly disguised:unde(thelwords TOt) Op8w) f11<01TOUfL.§...Ot>).

37-70. Events in Greece: rise of the Achaean League; the Cleomenean War P. closes his 1Tpo~
II. 37

EVENTS IN GREECE

method in these chapters see Lorenz, 3I; but the argument of Siegfried (Io2 ff.) that P. regards the union of the Peloponnese under Achaea as the realization of a Stoic ideal ('ein verkleinertes Abbild der stoischen Kosmopolis') is unconvincing. 37. 1. Ka"Ta Si "Tous au"Tous Kmpous: a loose sy'Il.chronism. The Social War (iv. 3· I ff.) began in late spring 220. On Philip see iv. 2. 5 and below, ii. 70. 8. Cil-ia. "To~s lii.A.ots aui-LI-Lcixots: the members of the Kotvry avp.p.axla. founded by Antigonus Doson; cf. 54· 4 n. The so-called Social War takes its name from this avp.p.axla which fought the Aetolians; see i. 3· I, iv. 3· I ff. 2. Ka.1'a 1'0 auvexes 1'TJS 1TpoKa.1'a.aKeuTjs: 'next in the series of events described in my introduction'; the phrase goes with ijKop.Ev. P. is referring to the scheme for the introduction enumerated in i. 3· 8-Io. 1'0u Seu1'€pou auO""Tav"Tos • . • 1TOAEj.Lou : it began with the siege of Saguntum in spring 2I9 (iii. 17· In.). On the name 'Hannibalic War' cf. i. 3· 2 n. Ka.1'a ••• 1'-f)v E~ apxfis 1Tpo9EO'LV: cf. i. 3· I-2, iv. 2. I. "Tfjc:; ia.u"Twv auV'Ta~ews: 'my own narrative' (€a.v-rwv = ~p.wv a.v-rwv; cf. Thuc. i. 82. I). 3. 1'f)S a1!'0SELK1'LKfjS l0'1'0pLa.S: 'detailed history', cf. iii. I. 3, fJ.fiT• a1ToSEl~Hos-. P. uses .i7ToSHKTtK6s- to mean 'supported by full reasons, tracing cause and effect' (cf. iii. 31. 12), and opposes 'apodeictic' narrative to an account consisting of mere assertions (iv. 40. I) or, as here, to the 1TpoKaTaO'KEv1} of books i-ii, which is KE
THE ACHAEAN LEAGUE; THE CLEOMENEAN WAR 11.37·8

6. Twv tea.Tel. ~v ;t..a(o.v ••• Af.yuTrTOv tcTA.: the Seleudd and Ptolemaic kingdoms interested P. less than Macedon and Achaea (cf. De Sanctis, Riv. jil., 1934, u8). The reasons he gives for omitting them (despite § 3} from the 7rpoKaTao-Ke~ are: (r} their history before 220 has often been told and is therefore familiar; (z) their history after 220 has shown no surprising changes of fortune (unlike Achaea and Macedon); §§ 7--9· s~a. TO Ti]v ••• LO'Toplo.v UTfO TrAeu)vwv EICOE86ae
II. 37· 8

EVENTS IN GREECE

Achaea is thus an illustration of the general statement there made; and since that was accompanied by a reference forward to full treatment later (aa(f,ianpov f.v &£poLc; D7JAwaop.Ev), th
THE ACHAEAN LEAGUE; THE CLEOMENEAN WAR IL37·ro

League Hoard (Num. Notes and Monographs, 74; New York, 1936), 7 ff., 30 (nos. r62-97), Plate IV. (e) ~pxoum, ~ouA£uTa.is, ~LKa,aTa.i'~ To is a.uTois: this triple distinc-

tion of magistrates, deliberative organ, and judiciary goes back to Aristotle (Pol. vi (iv.} 14· 2. 1298 a: 2v 11-~v ·rl To fJouA.t:u6/l-Evov 7TEpl Twv J<:DWWV, OEVTEpov 8~ TO 7TEpt TaS' apxas •••• TpLTOV 8~ TL TO Ot~ea,ov} and does not correspond exactly with the modern division, popularized by Montesquieu, into legislative, executive, and judicial (see (against Aymard, ACA, 158 f.) Newman, Politics of Aristotle (Oxford, 1902}, iv. 236 commenting on Aristotle, loc. cit.); but the comparison with Aristotle shows that under 'deliberative' are included several functions today classified as legislative. G.pXOIIT£!> (v. I. 6, I. 9, XXii. IO. IO ff., I2. j) is a general term for magistrates; elsewhere they are called oi 7TpawTWTES' ToiJ Ttliv 11xa~wv 7TOALTEV/.LilTDS' (ii. 46. 4), al avvapx£aL (xxvii. 2. II, Xxxviii. IJ. 4, IJ. 5), and oi avvapxoi!TE> (xxiii. !6. 6). The term at avvapxLaL, suggestive of a collegiate organization (Aymard, ACA, 322), is perhaps the official title. A board was formed of the aTpaT'T)yo> and ten Sa/1-Lovpyo{ (xxiii. 5· r6; J. Bingen, BCH, 1954, 402-7, no. r8, ll. 3-4; for the number see Livy, xxxii. 22. :z). In addition there were inferior magistrates, the hipparch (v. 95· 7), secretary (ii. 43- r), under-general (iv. 59· 2). and admiral (v. 94· 7, 95· n). See Freeman, HFG, 219 ff. fJovA.wml are members of the fJovAIJ (cf. Bingen, op. cit., no. 18, l. :z); but what the Achaean {3ovA7] was is a problem linked with that of the avvooos. The Achaeans had two kinds of assembly, the a6yd7JTos, meeting at irregular intervals, and the a6vooo<;, which met at regular times throughout the year. Until recently the a6vo&a> was generally held to have been a representative body, consisting of deputies from the various cities, acting a.<; a council or fJouA~ (cf. Tarn, CAH, vii. 738). It has, however, been argued by Aymard that both auvoOO> and UUyi<:A7]TO> describe a primary assembly open to all citizens, and that P. used {JavA.~ as a synonym for awoi'ios. If this were so, {Jov"AwTal here would be merely those citizens who attended the primary assembly (Aymard, ACA, 157-8). Against this, Cary suggested (]HS, 1939, 154-5; cf. EHR, 1914, 209-2o) that the a6vo8os was a 'bicameral body' consisting of a primary assembly and a fJovA!J of the normal type; and C. A. Robinson (The Greek Political Experiettce. Studies in honour ofW. K. Prentice (Princeton, 1941), ros) argued that a auvoSas was a joint meeting of magistrates and {JavA~. The weak point in Aymard's case was his assumption that a primary assembly de iure, being attended by only a limited number. was treated as a {JavA~ de facto; and recently, starting out from the observation (CP, 1945, 65---97) that the representative council was regarded as normal machinery in federal states of the second century (cf. xxxi. 2. 12, S7Jil-a«paTLKijs x:a.t aw£opta«17> 7TOALnlas)--a 219

II. 37· ro

EVENTS IN GREECE

view challenged by Aymard (CP, 1950, 103-7) as exaggerated-, Larsen has proceeded to a new, full, analysis of Polybius' terminology, and has produced a theory which has the merit of simplicity and seems to cover all the evidence (Representative Government, 75-xos). A .Wvo3os-, he argues, is simply 'a meeting'. Until about zoo, Achaean .Wvo3ot consisted (as Cary had said) of both the boule (Council) and the ecclesia (Assembly), but after zoo of the boule alone. In the second century the eccles£a was summoned only to debate war or alliance, or on instructions from the Roman Senate (xxii. 10. Io--Iz, 12. 6); in short, Achaea enjoyed representative government by a boule perhaps elected on a system of proportional representation (op. cit. 83-84). This boule possessed legislative, and not merely probouleutic powers, such powers in short as were exercised by the populus at Rome (vi. 14. 4ft.). Irregular meetings of either boule or ecclesia (or both) were probably termed auyKJ.:qrm, though P. does not use aVyKA'l)To> of an irregular meeting of the eccles1:a (perhaps because it is his usual term for the Roman Senate: cf. Larsen, 91). Achaean 3tKaaTal appear in xxxviii. 18. 3, condemning a magistrate to death; but the federal assembly could transform itself into a court of justice (xxiii. 4· 5, 4· 14, xxiv. 9· 13; Livy, xxxix. 35· 8, 36. z (cf. Paus. vii. 9· 2), xliL 51.8; Syll. 49o,ll. 4-5. See further Aymard, ACA, 182 n. 4). The 3tKaaTal mentioned in xxviii. 7· 9 are not Achaean, but Rhodians called in to arbitrate (cf. Holleaux, E'tudes, i. 441-3). Naturally judicial rights within the separate cities were not suspended; d. Aymard, ACA, 167 n. 5· Siegfried (1o3) quotes, as evidence that P. saw Achaea as a microcosm of the Stoic cosmopolis, Zeno (SV F, i. z6z) : ••• tva fL~ l(aTd 7TdA€tS" [L'l)3~ ~eanl &)[LOUS' olKwfLEV, l3lot> EKaaTot Stwpta[Livot 3t~ealm>, d.A.M 7TiiVTM aJJOpwwov<; ~YWfLEOa D'l)[LdTaS' Kat 7TDAl7'f1S, EtS' (j£ fllo>

il

Kal KOCTfLO>, wcrrrep d.yiAl]S' CTUVVDfLOV Vd[L

Such parallelism as exists with P.'s account of the League seems purely coincidental, and not significant. 10. TouTo To J.L.\pos: 'this undertaking' (Strachan-Davidson), i.e. the achieving of unity, rather than 'this land', i.e. Achaea {Treves). 11. Sta.AAnTTEW Tov flit J.LIB.~ 1TOAE!.IIS 8ui9Eaw ~xnv: it fell short of being a single city by not having a single walled enclosure for all its inhabitants (as for example Athens had a 1T<.plf1o.\os (Thuc. i. 89. 3) which served the people of Attica). Aristotle (Pol. iii. 3· 4-5. 1276 a) says that it is not the wall that makes the city, since you might build a wall round the Peloponnese. P.'s remark here looks like an answer; but P. is not envisaging a wall all round the Peloponnese (despite Paton's translation, cf. Larsen, Robinson Studies, Sro n. 55), and it is doubtful whether P. knew the Politics. TdAAa. ••• eKUaTol<; -ra.1ha KO.L 1ra.pa.1rAT)a1a.: i.e. in all other respects the inhabitants of the Peloponnese enjoy similar institutions both 220

THE ACHAEAN LEAGUE; THE CLEOMENEAN WAR

II.38.6

federally and within the separate cities. On democracy within the confederacy (of which nothing is said here) see 38. 6 n. 38. 4. vuv £u8oKouaw ••• JUiTEL>.f).ov yO.p: this rejection of the role of Tyche in the growth of Achaea is in contrast with 3i. 6, where Syria and Egypt are omitted from the 7rpoKaTa...,9wfjc; 'niOTl)flO. Ka.l1Tpoa.£p£m.v: 'constitution and principles of true democracy' (Strachan-Davidson, ro). P.'s claim of equality (lCJ11yopla.) and freedom of speech (m:~.pp71ala), the marks of democracy, for the Achaean League, is repeated at 42. 3, 44· 6, iv. r. 5, xxii. 8. 6, xxiii. 12. 8 (cf. iv. 31. 4); see, too, Syll. 665, 1. 17 (though 1. 34 refers to the appointment of dicasts dpLaTMJav; cf. IG, vii. r88, l. 9, 1rAovTlvSa Kal dpLaTMia). Now it is clear that Achaean 'democracy' was something quite other than fifth-century Athenian democracy; and Aymard has argued (PR, q n. ro) that the word is here used metaphorically to describe a confederation in which the 221

II. 38. 6

EVENTS IN GREECE

separate cities possessed equal rights comparable to those of the individual citizen in a democratic 1TOAL>, a view approved by Gelzer (Abh. Berlin. Akad., 1940, Phil.-Hist. Kl. no. 2, 5 n. r). It is true that choice 1TAouTiv8a Kai d.purrtv8a conesponds to the method which, Aristotle (A .P. 3· r, 3· 6) says, was employed for the appointment of magistrates in pre-Draconian Athens, and generally appears to be the mark of an aristocracy (cf. Arist. Pol. ii. II. 8. 1273 a, vi (iv). 7· 3· 1293 b). Nevertheless, P.'s words here are quite precise; and the explanation seems to be rather that in the second century, though the distinctions were still maintained in theoretical and philosophical discussion (such as that in book vi), there was a tendency to use the word 'democratic' loosely, without any implied contrast to 'oligarchic' and almost in the sense 'self-governing' (cf. \Valbank, Philip, 225 n. 2; Larsen, CP, 1945, 88-89). In that sense Achaea was a democracy; but it is perhaps not without significance that Syll. 665, 1. 19 refers to EVVofLla rather than to the more democratic laovofLla. In practice the democratic principle was modified by a high minimum age (3o years) for access to assemblies; the absence of payment for attendance at assemblies limited these to the richer class ; and officeholding, as at Rome, was often expensive (cf. xviii. 7· 7). See further Freeman (HFG, 205 ff.) for a valuable comparison with fifth-century Athens, and some valid analogies between Achaean and nineteenthcentury British democracy. 7. 1Ta.pa.xpi\!J.a. 1r6.Aw e{,8otceiv ~1TOL'f}O'EV a.uTft: true perhaps of Corinth (seized by Aratus in 243, cf. 43· 4), but not of Messenia and Sparta, annexed during the second century. 8. taoT'f}n tca.t cf>t>.a.v9pw1T£~: 'equality and humanity'. la6rT)> (cf. vi. 8. 4) is equivalent to l07Jyopla (§ 6) ; and both are associated with Trapp'T)ala (42. 3). In the jargon of the Hellenistic chancelleries cfnAavfJpomla implies the bestowal of benefits upon the citizens of a state. Identification with the liberttf, egalite, and jraternite of the French Revolution (E. Rand, The Building of Eternal Rome (Harvard, 1943), 6) is anachronistic and misleading. 39. 1. tea.Tel. T~v Mey6.A'f}V 'E).).6.8a.: Magna Graecia signified the Greek cities of south Italy from Locri to Tarentum (Pliny, Nat. hist. iii. 95) or even as far as Terina on the west coast (Ps.-Scymn. 303 ff.), or Sicily (Strabo, vi. 253). It was in use by the fourth century (cf. Timaeus, FGH, 566 F 13, if the phrase there goes back to him), and here P. seems to associate it with the influence of the Pythagoreans (cf. Val. Max. viii. 7, ext. 2), which would bring it back to the late sixth or early fifth century. See E. Meyer, Phil. xlviii, r889, 274; E. Pais, Storia della Sicilia e della Magna Grecia, i (Torino, 1894), 513-26; \Veiss, 'Graecia Magna', cols. 169o-r. tca.9' oi:l; tca.tpou; • • • ~YE1Tpl]a91} Tel. O'UYEOpta. TWY nuaa.yopdwv: 222

THE ACHAEAN LEAGUE; THE CLEOMENEAN WAR

II.39.I

the influence of the Pythagoreans in south Italy began with Pythagoras' migration from Samos to Croton about 530 (von Fritz, 92; Minar, 133; Dunbabin, 359). Despite opposition, members of the association obtained positions of influence in many of the cities, where they established governments based on the philosophical and religious teachings of their leader. The general complexion of these governments seems to have been aristocratic; but the sources are so worked over, and indeed contradictory, that little agreement has been possible about their real character. It is difficult to ascertain how far Pythagorean government was co-ordinated between the various cities, and how far its existence outside reflected the domination of Croton (Minar, 38), which is attested by the evidence of coinage (Kahrstedt, Hermes, 1918, 180-7) for the early half of the fifth century. Pythagorean rule has been compared to the 'commercial theocracy' of the Calvinists at Geneva (Thomson, Aeschylus and Athens (London, 1941), 213 ff.; Aeschylus' Oresteia (Cambridge, 1938), ii. 350-1), and to the role of the Freemasons in the eighteenth century, who took part in politics as individuals rather than as a society (von Fritz, 96 f.). Burnet (EGP4, 87-91) is inclined to regard them as democratic in so far as they had any political colour. By the date of the rising mentioned by P., however, they were certainly a reactionary group (von Fritz, 97--98). The burning-down of the avv€Bp~a. or club-houses (for the expression cf. Plut. Mor. 583 A; Dicaearchus in Porph. VP, 56), is also described in Iamblichus (VP, 249), who, however, restricts it to the 'house of Milo' at Croton; and the subsequent visit of the Achaean mediators(§ 4) is also in Iamblichus (VP, 263). Of these two passages, Iamblichus follows Aristoxenus in the former; and it is probably Aristoxenus' desire to minimize the extent of the rising, which restricts it to Croton (d. von Fritz, 30-31). In the latter, Iamblichus' source is ultimately Timaeus, via Apollonius of Tyana (von Fritz, 33 ff.; Minar, 6o-65); but it is Timaeus in a much worked-over and distorted form. P.'s source is also likely to be Timaeus. He uses him elsewhere for western affairs (e.g. i. 8. 39· 8 n.), and like Iamblichus he has the record of Achaean intervention. On the other hand, Iamblichus makes this intervention lead to a reconciliation between the citizens of Croton and the Pythagorean exiles, of which P. says nothing; and the similarity is therefore not sufficient to allow P.'s source to be identified with certainty (cf. Minar, 76 n. 86), though Timaeus remains most probable. Delatte's argument (Essai, 224) that P. has also used the popular version of Dicaearchus depends on his view that it was from here that P. took the reference to disturbances in cities other than Croton; but this may well have been in Timaeus himself. Timaeus' account was probably based on inquiry, but he is likely to have used also documents such as the V1TOfLV~JLa'Ta KpoTWVLa'T(ijj) and the opKO£ deposited at Delphi after the 223

II. 39·

I

EVENTS IN GREECE

reconciliation between the Pythagoreans and their opponents (Iamb I. VP, z6z-3); his version, which also survives in part in Iustinus (xx. 4), Diodoms (xi-xii), and Porphyry's L~fe of Pythagoras (von Fritz, 33-67; cf. Minar, so, 54 ff.), seems to have been free from political bias and to have set the events within the general framework of southern Italian history. The date of the attack on the auv~8pta is disputed. But Aristoxenus (Iambl. VP, z48-sr) describes how Lysis, Epaminondas'later teacher, escaped from the holocaust; and from this, taken in conjunction with Epaminondas' age (he was born not later than 4ro-4os), von Fritz {78-79. 97-98) deduces that the revolt took place about 445; but the material for this deduction is tenuous, and Minar (77-78) may well be right in placing the fall of the Pythagoreans before the rebuilding of Sybaris in 453, a view which would fit Kahrstedt's findings on the basis of the coinage, which points to a collapse in the power of Croton about this time. For though P. makes it clear (against Aristoxenus) that the revolt was in many cities, the centre of Pythagorean influence and most likely the core of the revolt were at Croton (von Fritz, 8o ff.). Iustinus' version (xx. 4), putting these events in Pythagoras' lifetime, though also derived from Timaeus, is a doublet of the events of c. 454. inspired by the common tendency to associate all Pythagorean details with the master (von Fritz, 87 ff.}. 2. tuvf).,.a:ro; bf.oo-xEpou;: this did not last long, and P. exaggerates the destruction of the leaders, for while Lysis and Archippus emigrated to Greece, where they set up centres at Thebes and Phlius, others remained active in south Italy, especially at Rhegium (Aristoxenus ap. Iambl. VP, 248-sr). 4. !A.xaw"l; ••• o-uv~>xp'l\uav-ro: the Achaean mediation is a considerable time after the burning of the avvi8pta, for this is followed by a period of crrcfrns in the cities (§§ 2-3). In 417 the Spartans set up oligarchies in Achaea (Thuc. v. 82. I; Xen. Hell. vii. I. 43); and it is a reasonable supposition (Unger, 5.-B. Munchen, r883, r78 ff.) that the establishment of the League of Croton, Sybaris, and Caulonia, with its imitation of Achaean democratic institutions, antedated their destruction at home (§ 6 n.). But there can well have been an interval between the Achaean mediation and the formation of this League. von Fritz (73-74} dates the mediation to c. 445, associating it with the founding of Thurii. in which the Achaeans shared (cf. Diod. xii. II. 3, one of its cpv>..al called i1xats-}; but Minar (83-84) points out that according to Iamblichus (VP, 263: Timaeus via Apollonius) Achaean mediation led to a reconciliation, and that this points to a longer passage of time. He therefore prefers c. 430, a date adopted by Delatte (Essai, 224 n.), who rightly emphasizes the lack of precision in P.'s indications. The Achaean mediation may have had something to do \>vith Lysis' stay in Achaea, on his way from 224

THE ACHAEAN LEAGUE; THE CLEOMENEAN WAR II. 39.6

Croton to Thebes (Iambl. VP, 248-sr: from Aristoxenus); but more likely it connects with the ancient bond between Magna Graecia and the people which founded so many of her cities, including Croton. Strabo (viii. 384) also records these events, following P.; Lenschau (Klio, 1944, 209-10) has argued for a common source in some .:4xaiK~ for this early history of the Achaean League, but Strabo need not have used the same source for the mythical history as for these events, on which he gives nothing not in P. For a convenient summary of earlier suggestions for the chronology of the Achaean mediation see Delatte (Essai, 223 n. 1). 5. 4!i.'!TES~£a.vTo TYJV a.tpEm.v TWV )\xa...Wv: 'approved the Achaean political system' (rather than 'their character', Strachan-Davidson, 8): P. is concerned with Td rijs 1roAm:las lf>twp..a. 6. auJ.Lcjlpov~aa.vTES KpoTwv~O.-ra.~, Iu~a.p~-ra.~, Ka.uAwvLaTa.L: the date of this confederation, set up in imitation of the fifth-century Achaean League (38. 10; cf. Herod. i. 145), is uncertain. It has been associated with the union of ol T~v 'ha),Lav KaTott<:oilvT~;;; (Diod. xiv. 91) against the threat from Dionysius of (Oldfather, RE, 'Kaulonia', col. 74; Philipp, RE, 'Kroton (r)', col. 2024); and from Diodorus (xiv. ror) E. Meyer (v. 8o4) concludes that it was earlier and against the Lucanians. But the form of the alliance suggests that it was made before 417 (§ 4 n.). There is also the problem of Sybaris. Croton destroyed Sybaris in 510 (Philipp, RE, 'Sybaris (ro)', col. Ioo8). It was rebuilt in 453 (Diod. xi. go. 3, cf. xii. ro), probably following on the fall of the Pythagorcans at Croton (§ 1 n.); and its destruction once more in 448 may signify a turn in their favour at Croton (Minar, 8o). Thurii, founded as successor to Sybaris in 446 or 445, for a time bore its name (V£t. X arat.: Lysias, 835 D; Herod. v. 45; evidence from coins, cf. von Fritz, 70); but the Sybarites, who shared in its foundation, soon quarrelled, and left to form a new settlement on the Traeis, from which the Bmttians subsequently expelled them (Diod. xii. u, 22. I; cf. Strabo, vi. 263). The Bruttians only became important about the time of Dion's expedition against Dionysius in 357 (cf. Strabo, vi. 255-6; Iustin. xxiii. r); Diodorus (xvi. 15) describes how they overran Terina, Hipponium, Thurii, Ka~ 1roAAd;; aAt\n;;, probably including Sybaris on the Traeis. To which Sybaris does P. here refer? It is true that Sybaris on the Traeis was founded in feud against Thurii, in the setting up of which the Achaeans had shared (§ 4 n.); but this is no real obstacle to its having taken part in the present alliance, if this was considerably later than the Achaean mediation at Croton and elsewhere. von Fritz (74) is inclined to identify this Sybaris (of the confederation) with Thurii, and quotes Diodorus' reference (xii. rr. 2) to an alliance between Croton and the newly-founded Thurii, when it must still have been called Sybaris. But on the whole it seems more likely that P. is Q

II. 39· 6

EVENTS I::-< GREECE

referring to Sybaris on the Traeis, and that the confederation is to be dated about 420, perhaps to the time of the war of Croton against Thurii (Iambl. VP, 264); cf. Minar, 82-8.4, 139. It is far more difficult to assume that P. is referring to events of about 400 (Oldfather and Philipp, locc. citt.; Beloch, ii. I. zoo; De Sanctis, ii. r8g n. 4), with the implication that Achaean institutions were copied after 417. Diodorus (xiv. 91) dates the League to 393; but this inconsistency disappears if an original confederacy of Croton, Sybaris, and Caulonia was subsequently joined by other cities such as Heraclea, Metapontum, Elea, and Tarentum, during the years preceding 393, under the threat from Dionysius and his Lucanian allies (Diod. xiv. 91. r). See Glotz-Cohen, iii. 398 ; E. Ciaceri, Storia della magna Grecia, ii (Milan, 1927),4o8f.,4I3 f.; and, on Thurii, Ehrenberg, AJP, 1948, 14970. 0.1reSeL~o.v ALos ·o.,.a.p£ou ~~:owov U.pov ~~:o.t T61rov: cf. v. 93· ro. The sacred cult centre of the Achaean League was the enclosure of Zeus Homarios, near Aegium. On its situation see Aymard, ACA, 277~93, resuming the arguments (d. Melanges offerts a M. Octave Navarre (Toulouse, 1935), 453-70) for accepting Hamarios and Homarios as permissible forms of the word; Bingen, BCH, 1953. 626-7. The sense is probably 'who unites together' (&J.Wii' +ap-) ; see Schweighaeuser, ad loc. Zeus Homarios figures on coins of the Achaean League. The site of the south I tali an Homarion is unknown. TU\; 1'E auvoSous Ka.l Tel. OLa.J'ouALa.: 'meetings and deliberations'. Cf. Strabo, viii. 3R~ (following P.). auvo8os- may have its technical sense of 'a regular meeting' (cf. 37· Io-II n. (e)), since there were probably no atfyKA'f/TO£ in the fifth century (Aymard, ACA, 35 n. 3). 7. irrro o€ Tfjs ALO\IUO"lOU Iupa.~~:ou(ou Suva.an:[a.s: on Dionysius' invasion of Italy see i. 6. z n. His victory at Elleporus ended Crotonian influence in south Italy and also, apparently, the alliance on the Achaean model. The 'surrounding barbarians' are the Bruttians (§6n.). 8. An~~:t:Sa.tl-'ov[wv • • • 1TTa.ta6.vTwv 1Tt:pi Tijv £v At:~•npoLs tJ.6.XTJ": cf. i. 6. I, iv. 8I. 12; Dem. ix. 23, raxvaav 8.£ 'TL Kal e,{3atoL TOVTOV
"' ,;v

226

THE ACHAEAN LEAGUE; THE CLEOMENEAN WAR II. 40.2

to a policy of neutrality. Hence the reality of the arbitration has been questioned (cf. Grote, History of Greece 4 (London, I872), viii. I89 n. ; E. von Stern, Geschichte der spartanischen und thebanischen Hegemonic, Diss. Dorpat, I884, I53-5; Aymard, REA, I937. 2I n. 2); and indeed neither its place in the picture nor the identification of Ta afufnaf3YJT0-6fLEYU (perhaps the status of the smaller Boeotian towns) is immediately apparent. Cary (CQ, 1925, I65-6) suggests a date immediately after the alliance between Athens and the smaller Peloponnesian states in autumn 37I (Xen. Hell. vi. 5· 1-3), but regards any period during the following twelve months as possible. He answers some of the objections of Grote and von Stern; but the whole incident remains dubious, and may go back to a piece of Achaean falsification. In any case it had no appreciable effect on the subsequent events. 12. ToY u"n"oOE(~a.YTa.: 'anyone making such a claim'; cf. 47· Io, v. 46. 9 for this sense, which is in Thucydides (iv. 86. 5). P. here quickly passes over the long period of Achaean depression which lasted from the middle of the fourth century to 28o. It included co-operation with Agis III of Sparta against Antipater in 330, and the occupation of Achaea by Demetrius Poliorcetes (Brandis, RE, 'Achaia (I)', cols. I62-3). There is no external evidence of either achievement or high principle in Achaea at this time.

40. 1. TO K~~~I.O"TOY ~pyoy, TTJY nE~O"II"OVYlJULWY bfJ-OYOLO.Y: cf. 37. 9-II' 38. 6-9. The same slogan, extended to all Greece, appears in the famous Athenian decree recording the alliance of the Chremonidean War (Syll. 434/5. 11. 32 ff.): the allies, including the Achaeans Kotvi'j> 6p.ovolaS" y.:;vop.lYYJS" TOtS" "EAAYjat 7rpOS" TE TOVS" vvv TjOtKYjK(JTaS" Kal 7rapEU"1ToYOYJKOTa S"Tct> TToAEt> (viz. Gonatas and his tyrants) 7rpo0vp.ot fLETa Tov f3amAlwS" liToAEp.a{ov Kal fLET' WU.?)..\wv imapxwmv d.ywvtaTal Kai TO ..\omov fLEO' 6p.ovoia> adn{watv TaS" m)..\nS". 2. 'Apa.ToY ••• TOY IucuwYLOY: Aratus (27I-2I3) founded the Con-

federation in the form in which it played so vital a part in the history of the third and second centuries. For his early career see 43· 3 ff., for his Memoirs, 40. 4, and on his character iv. 8. For discussion of all questions relating to Aratus see Walbank, Aratos; W. H. Porter, xiii-cv. ci>L~ovo1fJ-EYa. ToY MEya.~owo~LTlJY: Philopoemen (252-I82) fought at Sellasia (67. 4 ff.) in 222, reformed the Achaean army and defeated the Spartans in 206 (xi. 8 ff.), and became the most famous Achaean statesman of the second century. Though highly praised by P., who wrote his biography in three books (x. 21. s-8), his policy may be justly criticized as negative. On his character see De Sanctis, iv. I. 243-4; and in general W. Hoffmann, RE, 'Philopoimen', cols. 76--95. AuKopTa.v: Lycortas of Megalopolis, the son of Thearid<1s, and father 227

II.

40. 2

EVENTS IN GREECE

of P. (xxii. 3· 6), first appears in 192 as hipparch (Livy, xxxv. 29. 1). During a long political career he urged a policy of neutrality towards Rome, and friendship with the Attalids and Ptolemies. P., normally favourable, as one would expect, criticizes him in xxii. 9· The theory that Lycortas married Philopoemen's daughter (cf. Hiller von Gaertringen on Syll. 6z6; Stahelin, RE, 'Lykortas', cols. 2386-9; von Scala, rs) is based on the fact that P.'s brother Thearidas called his son Philopoemen (IG, v. 2. 535); but were it true, P. would not have omitted to mention it (Ziegler, RE, 'Polybios (r)', col. 1445). 3, nEt I(Q;TQ. TtJ 1rpE1rOV TTI ypa.cflfi 'I:I'O~OUj.LEVOl TftV ~'lr~UTO.OW: 'making mention of them from time to time in such a way as not to conflict with the scheme of this work'; P. probably means that he will not confound the canons of history and biography (x. 21. 8). Paton's translation, 'without transgressing the limits I have set to this part of my work', is misleading; he is not concerned here with the npoKa7aaKetn). On the repetition of iTT[OTauts in the sense 'beginning' in § 5 see i. 14. 2~3 n. 4. Ka.l vuv t 7Tap' l4p6.7ov ••. uvn, cf. xxiii. 2. 4 ; Welles, 283-4. 372; Bickermann, Aegyptus, 1933, 349~55). 5. Ka.Ta m)Alv lha.l.u9iVTo~ Tou ••• 18vous: cf. 41. 9, iv. 1. 5, both ::Z28

THE ACHAEAN LEAGUE: THE CLEOMENEAN WAR II.41.5

referring to 'the kings of Macedon'; Strabo, viii. 384 (following P.). The process, evidently protracted (41. 9 n.), was between 323 and z8r/o. The 'kings' probably include Cassander, Demetrius I, and Antigonus Gonatas, as well as Antipater and Polyperchon. O.pxti wa~w tyf.vETo t
b~u~Tnas

124

284-280. Ptolemy I died sometime between

• • • EtKoO'T,; Ka.t TETnpTTJ wpbs TO.t') EKa.Tbv: 01. 2 November 283 and I November 282, but the exact date is unknown (T. C. Skeat, Mizraim, vi, 1937, 31). Lysimachus perished in the battle of Coru-

pedium in 281 (Tarn, CAH, vii. 98 n. 1), seven months before the murder of Seleucus (Iustin. xvii. 2, 4), which fell between 25 August and 24 September 281 (Sachs and Wiseman, Iraq, 1954, 202-12). The date of Ceraunus' death is still uncertain (d. i. 6. 5 n.). Such synchronisms (which P. liked; cf. Livy, xxxix. so. 10, 52. I, deaths of Philopoemen, Hannibal, and Scipio in one year; Livy's source is P., cf. xxiii. 12 f.) were a regular feature of Hellenistic histories. Thus Duris of Samos opened his work with the deaths of Amyntas of Macedon, Agesipolis of Sparta, and Jason of Pherae (Diod. xv. 6o, 3-6), and may have ended with a general dynastic shuffle (FGH, 76 F 55, an episode from Lysimachus' funeral; Lorenz, 86 n. 89, contra Jacoby, FGH, ii C 117). P. opens his main narrative with the deaths of Ptolemy III, Seleucus III, and Antigonus Doson in 01. 139 (71. 3-4); and it seems clear that in such coincidences he saw the working of Tyche (cf. iv. 2. 4 ff., xxxix. 8. 5 f.: simultaneous changes affect Macedon, Cis-Taurus, Syria, Egypt, Cappadocia, Sparta, and Carthage). See Lorenz, :u. On Patrae and Dyme see§§ 8 and Iz. 4-5. Awo . . • Tlua.~evou ••• ~ws 'fiyuyou: cf. Strabo, viii. 384. Tisamenus was the son of Orestes and Hermione (Paus. ii. r8. 6). In the tradition here followed he led the Achaeans from Argos and Laconia, at the time of the 'return of the Heraclids' (the Dorian invasion), to the north coast of the Peloponnese, and drove out the Ionians (Apollod. ii. 8. 2 ff.; Paus. ii. 18. 6 :ff., 38. 1, vii. 6. 2) who, after holding out in Helice, eventually retired to Attica; see D.M. Leahy, Hisforia, r9ssf6, 32. The tradition of a Tisamenid dynasty is also in Pausanias (vii. 6. 2), but its details were probably a later compilation. Ogygus (cf. iv. r. s) is not mentioned elsewhere. 5. ~ETEO'TT!O'O.V ds ST!~oKpa.T(a.v Ti}v 'ITO~tTda.v: cf. Strabo, viii. 384. Aristotle (Pol. vii (v). r2. 7 :ff., 1316 a) envisages the possibility of any 229

II. 4I. 5

EVENTS IN GREECE

type of constitution turning into any other; but primitive monarchy would hardly become democracy without the intervening stage of aristocracy which normally followed both in reality and in F.'s mvn scheme in book vi (vi. 4· 8, 8. I). This scheme is suggested by the story of Ogygus' sons ruling p,~ vop,lp,w>, &M..t 8w1ro-rH<:w> (cf. vi. 7· 6--9 contrasted v;ith vi. 6. 9-7. 5). The Achaean cities were in fact democracies in the fifth century, but after the setting up of oligarchies by Sparta in 4!7 (39· 4 n.) they remained devoted to these, and a Theban attempt to restore democracy violently soon failed (Xen. Hell. vii. L 41-4, :z. 18, 4· 17, 5· 1-3, 5· 18; Diod. xv. 75); throughout most of the fourth century the Achaeans are tools in the hands of Thebes or Sparta. P.'s claim that the democracy was maintained is therefore false, unless indeed he is using the word 'democracy' in the loose sense indicated in 38. 6 n. (cf. Aymard, CP, 1950, 102 n. 33; Larsen, 26-27). 6. J.LEXP' Tfjs 1t.At:~iw6pou Kat CfJtAC1T1rou: on the hysteron prater an to avoid hiatus cf. 2. 2 n. By its adhesion to the League of Corinth the Achaean League lost its freedom in external affairs (Sytl. 26o,U. n ff.) ; and internally the existence of the tyrant Chaeron at Pellene, supported by Alexander ([Dem.] xvii. 10; Athen. xi. 509 B), is indicative of the pressure exercised from Macedon. Antipater's victory over Agis at Megalopolis in 331 may also have been followed by interference in the cities of Achaea, which had supported Sparta (Aeschin. Ctes. 165). See Aymard, REA, 1937, :zo n. 4· 7-8. The trt•elve cit£es of Achaea. Lists are given by Strabo (viii. 385-6) and Herodotus (i. 145); the latter states that the Achaeans took them over from the Ionians they displaced, and both give Aegae and Rhypes in place of Leontium and Ceryneia. Pausanias' list (vii. 6. 1) is the same, except that it omits Patrae and includes Ceryneia. Aegae and Rhypes were evidently abandoned before the rebirth of the Confederation in 28rjo (Strabo, viii. 386-7; Paus. vii. 23. 4, 25. I2); on the site of Rhypes, on the hill above Kumari, 7 km. west of Aegium, see Bolte, RE, 'Rhypes', cols. 1288-92, with map, (hesitant); E. Meyer, Pel. JiVand. 123 ff. The disappearance of Oloms and Helice is widely attested (Strabo, viii. 385; Paus. vii. 22. 1, 24.6 f.; Diod. xv.48 etc.). Olen us lay just over 4miles (4o stades) east of Dyme, in west Achaea, Helice about 5 miles east of Aegium, on the right bank of the modem Vuphusia (Meyer, Pel. Wand. qo). Meyer has explored all this district and locates Olenus on the coast, somewhat west of Tsukale!ka (op. cit. n9-22). Helice perished in 373 after an earthquake and tidal wave, and its territory went to Aegium (Strabo, viii. 385, following Heracleides Ponticus; Paus. vii. 25. 4). It had been the political centre of the 1ww6v, and the Homarion (39· 6 n.) perhaps lay on what was originally territory of Helice (Ayrnard, ACA, 284 ff.; see however, Bingen, BCH, 1953, 626-7). Olenus declined to 230

THE ACHAEAN LEAGUE; THE CLEOMENEAN WAR II. 41.7

join the Confederation in 281/o (Strabo, viii. 384); it had disappeared by P.'s time (for BtaJJ.1vw) will be 'exist', not 'remain in the confederacy', as Schweighaeuser takes it). Leontium andCeryneia are not in Herodotus and Strabo, Leontium not in Pausanias. Ceryneia (spelt locally Kapvv£la.) lay on the hillside between the rivers Vuphusia and Kalavryta, just north of the modern village of Mamousia, on a site long thought to be Bura; d. Meyer, Pel. Wand. 127 ff. Bura itself must have been in the hills around Diakophto, east of the Kalavryta (Meyer, op. cit. 133 ff.); Strabo (viii. 386) puts it 40 stades, i.e. 7 km., above the sea, and in the fuller text of Vat. gr. 2306 (see below) he puts Ceryneia equally far from Bura and the sea (viii. 387). Leontium lay in the hills about 30 km. south-west of Aegium, at Kastritsi, ruins 3 km. north of Vlasia, commanding the pass between Mt. Olonos (Erymanthus) and Mt. Kalliphoni; see F. BOlte (AM, 1925, 71-76, with map), who argues against Leake's view that Leontium \Vas the ruin of H. Andreas near Guzumistra. Bolte's view i<> confirmed by Meyer (Pel. Wand. TII ff.), who describes the site from autopsy. A text of prime importance for this part of Achaea (in addition toP. v. 94· 34) is now Strabo viii. 388 with additions from the palimpsest (Vat. gr. z3o6) published by G. Cozza-Luzi (Della geografia di Strabone frammenti scoperti in membrane palinseste (Rome, 1887), iii. 19 fg. lxxYi, ll. 25 ff.), ~ ()~ t!>apd avvopEi p.~v lv Tfj LJvp.a.lg (KAet[TO]ptKfi Kat AeovT"r]a{'} ~v f1VTlyovo> Eh• 'Tof> ftxmof> c{JK71uev (read c{JKtaev)). For KAEL[TD]ptKfj Bolte read Kat TptTa'iKfj (AM, 1925, 73), emended later to Ka~ Ila-rpLKfj (RE, 'Phara, Pharai (1)', col. 1796), followingW. Aly, 5.-B. Heidelberg, I9JI/z, 1. 14). Leontium seems to have inherited the territory of Rhypes (see above) ; but whether this statement of Strabo that Antigonus (Gonatas) founded it merely means that he strengthened it and put it under one of his men (so Bolte) is dubious. This text is also relevant to the situation of Pharae; add CozzaLuzi, ibid. 23 (= fg. lxxvi, u. 37 ff.), o€ TptTala Tfj:; t!>apatKfj<; €¢&:rrrua.t Ka.[t AE]oVT"r]aia> Kat Aa.cnwvla> . • .. Pharae lay on the middle course of the R. Pierus (modern Kamenitsa) near Lalikosta, south-east of !sari (cf. Bolte, RE, 'Phara, Pharai (r)', cols. 1796-8). Tritaea was successfully located by A. Wilhelm (]ahresh., 19<JI, 74; Neue Beitrage, I9II, 37) near H . .Marina, west of Mt. Olonos, on the plateau of Vundukla, which lies south of the upper waters of the R. Picrus. In placing it rzo stades (i.e. 21-23 km.) above Pharae, Pausanias (vii. zz. 6) is on the high side. See E . .Meyer, RE, 'Tritaia (1)', cols. 237-41. Dyme lay near the frontier \•lith Elis, on the site of modern Kato-Achaia; d. Bolte (RE, 'Hekatombaion (r)',col. 2785; 'Olenos (4)', col. 2436) following Duhn (AM, r878, 75-78). For epigraphical evidence confirming the identification see Bingen, BCH, 1954, 396, nos. 7-8. Patrae occupied the site of the modern town.

IL 4I. 7

EVENTS IN GREECE

Pellene, the most easterly city towards Sicyon, pursued a separatist course in the fifth and fourth centuries. She joined Sparta independently at the outset of the Peloponnesian War (Thuc. ii. 9· z), in 4I8 she was the only Achaean state to send her help {Thuc. v. 58. 4, 59· 3, 6o. 3). and in 413 she again acted separately (Thuc. viii. 3· 2). In 394 the men of Pellene fought beside the other Achaeans as Spartan allies {Xen. Hell. iv. 2. r8, 2. 2o), but were not necessarily in the League. After Leuctra they supported Sparta enthusiastically for longer than the other Achaeans (Xen. Hell. vi. 5· 29, vii. 2. 2), had gone over to Thebes by 369 (Xen. Hell. vii. I. r8, 2. II ff.), but later expelled the democrats and rejoined Sparta (Xen. Hell. vii. 4· r8). In 345/4 Pellene treated separately with Athens (IG. ii-iiP. 220; SEG, iii. 83); and in 331 she was the only Achaean state not to support Agis (Aeschin. Ctes. 165), perhaps under the tyrant Chaeron (4r. 6). This separatism is not apparent in the third century. The site of Pellene (Paus. vii. 26. I2 ff.) has been identified near the modern village of Zugra, on a 6oo m. terrace between the rivers Trikkaliotikos and Phonissa, some 1o·6 km. from the sea (cf. Strabo, viii. 386, 6o stades). See E. Meyer, RE, 'Pellene (I)', cols. 354-66. Aegeira lay on a hill (Strabo, viii. 386) about 27 miles west of Sicyon; its remains still stand on a spur of the Evrostina, about 20 minutes from the sea (cf. Hirschfeld, RE, 'Aigeira', cols. 950- I). In iv. 57· 5 P. puts it only 7 stades from the sea, but there has no doubt been silting from the river since then. Aegium occupied the site of the modern city of that name. P.'s omission of Olenus and inclusion of Leontium suggests that, despite his reference to the period before Philip and Alexander, his list is really that of the third-century cities; cf. Bingen, BC H, 1954, 404-6. 9. tc:a.TA S£ TOu<; lHTTEpou<; ttTA.: i.e. between 323 and 281. Until recently Alexander was commonly believed to have dissolved all Greek Kotvd in 324. That view, which runs directly counter to this passage, depended on the combination of a fragmentary passage in Hypereides' speech against Demosthenes (i. r8-rg, Jensen) with 41. 6 above. It was rejected by Tarn (]HS, I92Z, 205) and refuted by Aymard (REA, 1937. 5-28). 10. TUS 1:1£v ~Jlq,poupous •.. yEvEa8a.L •.• , TUS S£ tc:a.t TupavvEta8aL: Demetrius Poliorcetcs, son of Antigonus I, was powerful in Greece and Macedon from 307, and held the title of king from 294. Cassander, the son of Alexander's viceroy in Macedon, Antipater, was powerful from about 317 to his death in 297. Antigonus Gonatas, Demetrius' son, was king of Macedon from 283 to 240{39· A few details from the wars of the Diadochi in Achaea survive in Diodorus (xix. 66. 3-6, liberation of Achaean cities in 314 from Cassander's garrisons by Aristodemus, a general of Antigonus I ; xx. ro3. 4, capture of Bura

THE ACHAEAN LEAGUE; THE CLEOMENEAN WAR II. 41. I3

from Cassander by Demetrius in 303). These passages mention Cassander's garrisons in Dyme, Patrae, Aegium, and Bura; this system and that of installing friendly tyrants were employed by Demetrius and Antigonus. Cf. ix. 29. 6, where Chlaeneas of Aetolia speaks of Cassander, Demetrius, and Antigonus tlv oi f.L£" rppovpas dt:raj'OVTf<; ds Tas 7T(JAHS I o[ [j~ Tvpawovs ij.Lrp!Yrr;VOJ)'T€<; oOSEJ.L{av 7TOAW aj.LOtpov iTTo{:ryaav 'TOU rijs OOVA£las 6v6j.La'TO<;, rr~E(uTovs

••• ~ovapxous o~Tos Erui>uTEuua.~ lioKE'i To'Ls "E~~TJut:

a strong case has been argued by W. Fellmann (Antigonos Gonatas, Konig der Makedonen, und die griechischen Staaten, Diss. Wiirzburg, 1930, 56-{i3; cf. Porter, xxv-xxvii) for the view that Gonatas' system of tyrants was first established after the death of Alexander of Corinth about 245. But the evidence is inconclusive; for though not every tyrant was Gonatas' man, once in power a tyrant would be likely to look to Macedon, and if Gonatas was interested enough to maintain a garrison at Aegium (§ 12) and to found a strong-point at Leontium (41. 7-8 n.), he may have been not wholly without interest in what happened at Ceryneia and Bura (§ 14}. The metaphorical use of iJ.Lrpv-refktat is not uncommon (cf. Plato, T£maeus, 42 A) and there is no reason to think P. borrowed it fromAratus' Memoirs (so Treves). 11. KO.Ta T~V nuppov Sta~aaw: d. i. 6. 5 n., ii. 20. 6 n. 12. AujLO.LOL, na.TpEis, T PLTO.LELS, 4>apa.uil's: cf. iv. 6o. IO, dpxTJYOUS Tofi Twv 11xaww uvrrr-TjJ.LaTos. All four of these western towns are small, though Dyme and Tritaea were probably larger than the other two (Plut. Arat. 11. x); on their sites see 4r. 7-8 n. Their union is probably to be connected V>ith the rising of Areus of Sparta and various Peloponnesian states against Macedon (Justin. xxiv. x), following on Gonatas' naval defeat at the hands of Ptolemy Ceraunus in z8o (Memnon, FGH, 434 F I (8. 4 ff.); Justin. xxiv. 1. 8). See Tarn, AG, 131-3; CAH, vii. 99-1oo; Beloch, iv. I. 249· lhorrep ov8~ O'TIJ~TJV ••• TllS O'Uj11TO~lTE(ag: since they did not enter the League, but formed it; and in any case until Aegium entered the League they had no access to the federal sanctuary and could not set up a stele there (Aymard, Melanges Franz Cumont (Brussels, 1936), 12). Swoboda has argued (Staatsaltertumer, 375 n. 2) that UVJ.LTToAtnla is here rather less than full federal union, and nearer to luono.\tn[a. It is true that in 279 the people of Patrae, llxat.ague was not constituted in z8o is an hypothesis running counter to the whole of P.'s narrative. Cf. Busolt-Swoboda, ii. 1537 n. I; Niccolini, 6 n. 6. 13. J16.A,uT6. 1TIIl'i €TE~ 1TEjLrrT~: Aegium expelled its Macedonian garrison and entered the League in the fifth year after its foundation in 233

IL .p. 13

EVENTS IN GREECE

Ol. 124, 4 = 28rjo. But for his dates in 41-43 P. seems to be using the Achaean aTparqyia year, which at this time began with the rising of the Pleiades, in May (v. r. 1). The following table can be con~ structed on the basis of exclusive calculation: Achaean Year Foundation of the League {01. 124, 4 = 28rjo} First year . . May 28ofMay 279 Aegium joins five years later (4r. 13} 275{4 Margus elected sole general after twenty-five years (43· 2} 255/4 Aratus frees Sicyon four years later (43· 3) 251/0 Corinth freed eight years later (43· 4} 243/2 i.e. one year before the battle of the Aegates Islands (43· 6) which was in spring 24r (cf. i. 6o-6I n.}.

Cf. Beloch, iv. 2. 226-7; other discussion in Mommsen, Rom. Forsch. ii. 36o (unconvincing); Niccolini, 267 ff.; Niese, Hermes, rgoo, 53 ff.; Leuze, ]ahrziihlung, 137 n. r68. f.~fjs S.l TOuTOlS Bouplol • • • Ka.puv£'i:s: whether, like Aegium, in 275/4 is not known. On the site of Bura and Ceryneia see above, 4r. 7-8 n. !seas, the tyrant of Ceryneia, is otherwise unknown. 14. Su1 MO.pyou Kal TWV ~Xa.lWv: Margus (ro. 5 n.) was evidently active in the Confederation as a refugee from Ceryneia. !seas will have anticipated just such an attack as Aratus carried out against his own city of Sicyon in 251/o (43· 3). 42. 4. TT)v TWv ~xa.lwv 1rpoa.ipt::ow: 'the political principles of the Achaeans', as in § 2. Strachan-Davidson (n), followed by LSJ, assumes a special meaning 'advice, policy advocated' here and in three other places; but in vii. IJ. 4 and vii. q. r 1TpoalpEatS is 'principle, character', and in xxxix. 3· 9 (as he admits) 'intentions' or 'attitude'. P. is claiming that in so far as Achaean allies have helped (a) to extend equality and liberty, (b) to crush those who would enslave their native cities on their own behalf or on behalf of 'the kings', the credit should go to Achaea. The implication of § 5 would be that Achaea deserved the credit for the Romans' achievements in this direction, e.g. the extension of equality and liberty in Flamininus' declaration at Corinth in rg6 (xviii. 46. 5), the crushing of Nabis, one of those who enslaved cities St' a{JTwv (Livy, xxxiv. 22 ff.: source P.), or of the Aetolians, allies of Antiochus (xx. r ff.), who did the same 8ta TWV f3aatMwv. On Achaean independence relative to Rome at that period cf. xxii. ro. g. ' EKUO'TWV ' ' ,.._ n , KO.l\ TTJV ' ' , nE/\O'ITOVVTJO'lWV: \. ' 6 • TTJV E/\EUvEpUlV KOLV,J.1V OfJ.OVOla.V a very favourable picture of the Achaean policy of uniting the Peloponnese, willy-nilly, under the Confederation. For the op.ovow. 134

THE ACHAEAN LEAGUE; THE CLEOMENEAN WAR II. 43· 3

of the League cf. 37· n, 40. 1, iv. I. 7; it was frequently used as the slogan of middle-class stability against the demands of social revolution, cf. Tarn, HC. goff., 1.2:2 ff. 43. 1. e'LKoaL ••• ~TTJ T4 1rpwTa Kat 1TEvTE: i.e. 280/79-256/s inclusive. Mommsen (Rom. Forsch. ii. 36o) assumes all P.'s calculations to be based on inclusive reckoning, and calculates these twenty-five years from the accession of Aegium; but Ta 1rpwTa. is against this, as also is the fact that Strabo (viii. 385), who adds the detail that meetings were at this time held at the Homarion, allows only twenty years, i.e. from the accession of Aegium, in whose territory the Homarion lay (Aymard, 111elanges Cumont, 19-20). ypa"'p.a.Tta. KOLVOV EK 1TEptoSou 1TPOXELptt6~-LEVaL teal 8uo aTpaT1'JYOU~: iK 1TEpt68ov, 'in rotation' (not 'for a certain period', Paton); cf. vi. 20. 7· Secretary and generals were chosen from a fresh city each year, on a rota (though probably each from a separate city). 7rpoxetpt{6p.evat, agreeing with 1r6Aets, may mean that the citizens of the city in question elected, and not the federal assembly (Aymard, ACA, 390 n. 3) ; but the point is a fme one, and in any case such a manner of election can have existed only until the reorganization of 256/5 (cf. Busolt-Swoboda, ii. 1537 n. 3). One may not press the prefix 7rpo- in 7rpoxnpt{w8at (with Aymard) to indicate prior designation; P. uses it regularly for 'to appoint' (cf. L II • .3, iii. 106. 2, etc.). 2. ~va Ka8taTavuv KTA.: i.e. in 255/4, with Margus. This reform probably implied a diminution in the importance of the grammateus, as the League became increasingly preoccupied with problems of external and military policy (Aymard, Melanges offerts aM. Nicolas Iorga (Paris, 1933), 96-ro3), and was accompanied by the transfer of rnJvoSot from the Homarion to Aegium itself (Aymard, ACA, 294 ff.). 3. TETapTtt~ 8' uaTepov ~TEL ••• aTpllTTJYOUVTo~: 'four years after his term of office', not (as Paton, following Casaubon) 'during his term of office'. The present participle is used for the aorist, as in iii. u4. 6; cf. i. 1. I, Toi:s dvayp&.povm, ii. 2. II, T{jl 1Tpoii1Tapxovn. See Schweighaeuser, ad loc.; and Porter, 54 (on Plut. Arat. 9· 6). This passage dates Aratus' birth to :271; cf. Walbank, ]HS, 1936, 65 n. 9; Porter, loc. cit., against Beloch's argument (iv. 2. 228) that he was born in 276 or 275. Tupa.vvoup.EVTJV 8' ~Xw8epcilaa.~ T,;v 1TilTpt8a.: cf. Plut. A rat. 5-9; Walbank, Araios, 31-.34· The tyrant of Sicyon was Nicocles, who had seized power after Pascas' murder four months previously (Plut. A rat. 4· r); neither can be shown to be a creature of Antigonus. The liberation took place on 5 Daisios, i.e. May (Plut. A rat. 53· 5; cf. Cam. 19; Alex. 16 for equation with the Attic month Thargelion); but P. does not give the year, as indeed he had no occasion to do. Porter (xxxiii-xxxiv), who favours 252, lists the events between the

235

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liberation and the accession to the League. But Plut. Arat. 9· 6, o(hv JK 'TWV TTO.povrwv apW'TO. Kptva.s TTpoa/p.~f~v a.iJrryv r/Jepwv (i.e. 'promptly') Tots .lixawis, is rather in favour of making the liberation May 251; and the straightforward interpretation of P. would put both events in the same year. Sicyon will then have joined the Confederation in autnmnfwinter 251. See }HS, 1936, 67 for a table of dates, 251-248. 4. oybo
in :ZIJ/I:z; for details and discussion of the general list see Beloch, iv. z. 219 ff.; Tarn, CAH, vii. 863; Ferrabino, 272-5; Walbank, Aratos, 167-75; d. CR, 1937, 224; Niccolini, 267 ff.; Porter, lxxviilxxxi. 8. To MaKE8ova.s 11£v ~IC~a.A~tiv KTA.: this paragraph summarizes Aratus' aims down to the time of the Cleomenean War, when the Spartan threat caused their radical revision. This threat revealed the inadequacy of Aratus' programme when faced by a determined enemy combining social and patriotic slogans in support of a powerful army. Faced by Cleomenes Aratus recalled the Macedonians into Greece, and handed over the Acrocorinth. On this issue see Treves, Rend. Line., 1932, 177 ff., 188-9; Athen., 1935, 30 ff. TfJ\1 ICOlVTJV Ka.i 'IT~lTpLov ~A£u9Epla.v: cf. 42. 6; freedom both as individual cities, enjoying their ancestral institutions, and as a federal body. 236

THE ACHAEAN LEAGUE; THE CLEOMENEAN WAR II-44·1

9. -rrpos 'T1,v At'TwAwv -rrAEovE~La.v: the Aetolians, ancient enemies of Achaea, are harshly criticized by P.; cf. 3· 3, 4· 6, 45· I, 46. 3, 49· 3, iv. 3· I, 3· 5, 67. 4, v. 81. I, ix. 38. 6, xviii. 4· I, 34· 1. The Aetolians were allied with Antigonus, and on his recovering the Isthmus in 245 invaded the Peloponnese. Triphylia was seized from the Arcadians and annexed to Elis; Arcadia was raided, the temple of Artemis at Lusi was plundered, and the Arcadian League disintegrated. At Megalopolis Lydiades seized the tyranny, probably with Aetolian and Elean help. See Walbank, JHS, 1936, 67 ff. 11'Aeov~;gia is 'lust for plunder' (cf. I9. 3, 45· I, iv. 3· 5, Vi. 56. 3), not 'lust for power' (as Paton). 10. wcrn -rro~T)cra.cr9a.L cruv9T)Ka.s K'TA.: cf. 45· I, ix. 34- 6, 38. 9· Aratus countered this proposed partition, 'in a statesmanlike fashion' (11'payp..anKwc;), by an alliance with Agis of Sparta in autumn 243 (Plut. Agis, I3). Only in summer 24I, in Aratus' third C1'TpaT1]yia, did the Aetolians cross the Isthmus, to be decisively defeated at Pellene (Plut. Arat. 31. 3-5, 32. s--6). That invasion was probably a reply to Aratus' policy of expansion against the allies of Aetolia in Arcadia, which he initiated with an unsuccessful attack on Cynaetha in the spring (ix. 17); but by now it was clear that Antigonus had no real help to give. See]HS, I936, 69-70. 44. 1. cruv9eJ.dvwv ••. cruJ-1-JJ-a.x(a.v -rrpos At'TwAous: for Aratus' alliance with Pantaleon of Aetolia see Plutarch (Arat. 33· I); it seems to have followed immediately on Gonatas' death, which was in the Olympiad year 240/39 (for a closer approximation is impossible on the evidence available; Tarn, Ferguson Studies, 490 n. 3· It follows from the date of Demetrius' death, § 2). The subsequent war between the two confederacies and Gonatas' successor, his son Demetrius II, sprang from Demetrius' marriage to Phthia; this involved the sending of help to her mother, Olympias, the queen of Epirus, against the Aetolians who were trying to annex the Epirote half of Acarnania. On the Achaean side it sprang from the policy of unifying the Peloponnese. The Demetrian War broke out in the Attic year 239/8 (JG, ii 2 • I299, 1. 57 = Syll. 485: archonship of Lysias; cf. Meritt, Hesperia, I938, I23-36). P. exaggerates the self-sacrifice and generosity of the Achaeans in this war (cf. 46. I}. Demetrius was occupied during most of this obscure war against the nearer foe, Aetolia, and successfully, judging from his title Aetolicus (Strabo, x. 45I). Meanwhile, the Achaeans made considerable gains in the Peloponnese (d. § 5, Megalopolis, who brought Orchomenus and Mantinea with her), despite Aratus' defeat at the hands of the Macedonian general Bithys at Phylacia: both place and date are unknown (it may lie near Kryavrysi between Tegea and Sparta (cf. Walbank, Aratos, 64 n. 5), and Feyel (Ioo) gives strong arguments for dating it in 237/6 before Demetrius entered Boeotia, 237

II. 44·

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xx. 5· 3). On their side, the Aetolians supported the Achaean campaign against Macedonian-occupicd Athens with piratical raids on the coast of Attica (IG, iiz. 834, 844; Wilhelm, Attische Urkunden, iii, 1925, 57-58). See in general Tarn, CAH, vii. 744 ff.; Walbank, Aratos, ; Treves. Rend. Line., 1932, I67-zos; Feyel, Only when the Aetolian alliance began to involve Achaea in serious struggles (cf. 9· 9 ff.) did the compact break down; but the alliance was never formally cancelled (iv. 7· 4). 2. ATJV.TJTptou 8t! ~ac:nAeuaa.vTos 8£Ka ~J.ovov ~T"J: so, too, Porphyry in Eusebius' lists; FGH, z6o F 3 (13). Demetrius II's death and the accession of Antigonus III (Doson) is to be dated to spring 229. See Holleaux (REG, 1930, 255 ff. = Etudes, iv. 19 ff.) against Beloch (iv. I. 637; 2. II2; 2. ; Dinsmoor's date (Archmts, I08), autumn 230, is due to a misapplication of Beloch's theory of the Roman calendar. On the date of the Roman crossing into Illyria (summer 229) see z. I n. A termintts ante quem for Demetrius' death is further furnished by the fact that it preceded May 229, since Aratus, who was general 229/8, initiated negotiations for the surrender of Athens before the expiry of Lydiades' year (Plut. A rat. 34· 6; Walbank, Aratos, 189go; Feyel, 123 n. 3). De Sanctis' statement that Demetrius died fighting against the Dardanians (iii. I. 297) rests on a false deduction from Trogus (pro/. xxviii). 5. Au8u~.8a.s ••• b MeyaAo'll'oALTTJS: Lydiades, the son of Eudamus (Syll. 504). had seized the tyranny shortly after Gonatas recovered Corinth in 245 (43· 9 n.). For his gift of Alipheira to Elis 1rpo> nvas lSlos 1TpagEt> see iv. 77· ron. Previously Lydiades had led the Megalopolitan detachment along with Leotychidas at the battle fought at Mantinea against Sparta in 251, shortly after the liberation of Sicyon (Paus. ·viii. ro. 5, a poor text but not wholly false; see Schoch, RE, 'Lydiadas', col. 22o2). Lydiades was a man of considerable political talent, and his tyranny had brought some real benefits at a time of weakness in Arcadia. On his motives in joining the Achaean Confederation (less disinterested than Droysen {iii. 2. 39) and Freeman (HFG, 315 ff.) thought) see Walbank (Aratos, 62--63) and Treves (Rend. Line., 1932, r9o-1). On the annexation of Megalopolis to the League in 235 (Walbank, Aratos, 169), see Plutarch (Arat. 30. 4; Mor. 552 B). For Lydiades' death see 51. 3· 6. ~p~aTOIJ.IlXOS ••• ::evwv ••. KAEwvuv-os ••• T6T' a'!l'o9EtJ.EVOL Tas Jlovapx(a.s: Aristomachus had seized Argos in 235. after the tyrant Aristippus, his brother, had fallen trying to recoVCI Cleonae from Aratus (Plut. A rat. 27-29; for the chronology, Walbank, Aratos, 186-7). He joined the League in 229/8 {6o. 4; Plut. A rat. 35· r ff.), and was elected general for 228/7 (as Lydiades had been rewarded \'lith the (]'Tpar7Jyla for 234/3). On his family see 59· r n. On Xenon of Hermione (in the Argolid) and Clconymus of Phlius see Plutarch 238

THE ACHAEAN LEAGUE; THE CLEOMENEAN WAR II. 45.1

(A rat. 34· 7. 35· 5}. Plutarch links the accession of Hermione to the League with that of Aegina, which had been among llia -rd TaTT0/-1-Eva ,U£Ta TOV Ile£pat~W> (IG. ii2 • 1225, 11. 9-Io}; hence it is likely that both came over after the liberation of Athens (which was in 229: cf. 44· 2 n.). Phlius seems to have come over at the same time as Argos. On Aristomachus' subsequent career and fate see 59-60.

45-46. E11ents leading up to th13 Cleome-nean War. P. reproduces the tendentious account of Aratus' M emo£rs, designed to justify Achaean policy and throw the blame for its failure upon the Aetolians. To this end the chronology is obscured and the facts are therefore unreliable. The best analysis is that of J. V. A. Fine (A]P, 1940, 130 ff., !44 ff.). 45. 1. D11rlaa.vTES Ko.T0.81EA€a6a.~ TUS 1TOAELS: that the Aetolians compacted with Antigonus and Cleomenes to partition Achaea is wholly improbable. The thesis is contradicted (a) by the fact that the Achaean embassy to Antigonus (47-49: date 227{6) spoke only of the possibility of a coalition between Sparta and Aetolia, (b) by Cleomenes' abuse of the Aetolians at the time of his coup (Plut. Cleom. ro. 6: date 227). (c) by Aratus' appeal to the Aetolians (Plut. A rat. 41. 3: date, winter 225{4); see Fine (A]P, 1940, 134}. Further, the Aetolians would not have attempted an alliance with Antigonus after his recovery of much of Thessaly from them in 228 (Fine, TAPA, 1932, 140-3); and 47· 3·-9 makes it clear that they did not do so. P. is giving Aratus' version, which was intended to justify the Achaean appeal to Macedon. Aratus' real enemy was Cleomenes; but many in Achaea preferred Cleomenes to Antigonus. Hence Aratus misrepresented the danger as one of combined attack from Sparta, Aetolia, and Macedon, to partition the League, whereas in reality Aetolian policy throughout this decade was one of strict neutrality (Fine, A]P, 1940, I45-<J). 'l'a~ 11~v !6.Ko.pvO.vwv l>u;veL!l
II. 45·

I

EVENTS IN GREECE

the Acarnano-Aetolian treaty must date between 2 71 fo (an Aetolian officer referred to in it comes from Doris, which may have joined the Aetolian League in that year, if Bousquet (BCH, 1938, 388 ff.) is right in counting six Aetolian hieromnemones at the spring Pylaea of 270) and the partitioning of Acarnania, though whether before or after Alexander's flight from his kingdom (c. 263) is not attested. In 1931 Klaffenbach argued that the fugitive Alexander granted the Acarnanians independence in return for help in mediating with Gonatas. On this assumption the treaty with Aetolia was an Acarnanian insurance against a renewed attempt at Epirote domination, and the partitioning (dated c. :z6o by Klaffenbach) Alexander's reply to the treaty. But such a reversion to an aggressive policy seems improbable so soon after Alexander's recovery of the throne (cf. Treves, Riv. fil., 1932, 276-7); and this would be no moment to challenge a successful Macedonia by absorbing its Acarnanian allies. Moreover, the existence of a treaty between Acamania and Pyrrhus (mentioned on a now lost Acarnanian inscription; d. Tarn, AG, rzr n. 2o; Klaffenbach, Historia, 1955/6, 47-8) is evidence that Acarnania was already independent of Epirus before Pyrrhus' death in 272. Hence Klaffenbach has put forward a new and more convincing arrangement of these events. The Acamano-Aetolian treaty and the partitioning of Acarnania, he suggests, both fall after Alexander's flight. The former, dated to 263 or 262, will have been engineered by Alexander himself as a move against :Macedon, and probably led to his restoration in 262. The partitioning, as Cross had already seen, is most likely to have occurred some considerable time after the Acarnano-Aetolian treaty, and will have coincided with some period of Macedonian weakness. This would give two possible dates: the revolt of Alexander, the governor of Corinth, in 249 (43· 4 n.; dated by Cross to 252), or Gonatas' loss of Corinth to Aratus in 243 (43· 4 n.). If 243 was the date, the partition coincided with that proposed between Gonatas and the Aetolians for the partition of Achaea; if in addition it was with his connivance, P.'s error in ix. 38. 9 would be easier to comprehend. The Aetolians took eastern Acarnania with Stratus, Oeniadae, Metropolis, and Phoetiae; Epirus western Acarnania and Leu cas (Busolt-Swoboda, ii. 1466-7; Beloch, iv. I. 596 n. r). The statue erected by the Aetolians at Delphi in celebration of this success IG, ix 1• 1 (Paus. x. r6. 6) has been identified (F D, ii. 3· 312 18o). TO.s Se TWV :Axcuwv .•• npos :AvTiyovov: d. ix. 34· 6, J8. 9; above, 43· 10 n. Paton's translation is misleading; it suggests that the proposed partitioning of Achaea is previous to that of Acarnania. P. does not say so. 2. TOT€ 1Ta.pcnrA1Jalcns £A1rtaw ~na.p9eVTES: the date of this pretended 240

THE ACHAEAN LEAGUE; THE CLEO:MENEAN WAR II-45·5

compact is, at the earliest, winter 229/8; since (a) it follows the accession of Argos, Hermione, and Phlius to the League (44- 6), (b) Doson is undisputed master of Macedon (§ 3), which is true only after his recovery of Phthiotis, Thessaliotis, and Hestiaeotis from the Aetolians, who had seized them on Demetrius' death (Walbank, Philip, I I nn. 2-3). Perhaps the agreement between Doson and the Aetolians which followed this recovery, and apparently left Phthiotic Achaea in Aetolian hands, is behind P.'s distorted version. For an apparent difficulty see 45· 6 n. ~VTLYOV
11. 45· 5

EVENTS IN GREECE

emergency' (Paton). Thus the non-fulfilment of these imaginary plans is turned to the greater glory of Aratus, a theme clearly reproduced from his Memoirs. 6. 1t..pa.Tov TOTE vpoeo-TwTa: 'who was then general' for the ninth time, 229j8. The supposed pact will date to winter 229/8 or 228 (45· 2 n.); but inch. 46 P. gives as its result events which occurred in the summer of 229. This is a further argument against the reality of the pact. 46. 1. Tiw j.LEV TroAEj.LOV ••• alo-xuvo11€vou, civaA.a.JkLv: a suggestion hard to reconcile with P.'s usual picture of the Aetolians. On Achaean d.!€pywta, see 44· r n. 2. KA.eo11~vou, ••• vapnpTJj.LEvou Teyiav, MavTfve~av, 'Opxo11evov: to these towns, annexed by Cleomenes in 229, add Caphyae, which P. omits because Aratus recovered it by a coup in 228 (Plut. Cleom. 4· 7). Their previous history is controversial (Swoboda, Staatsaltertiimer, 350 n. r) and best considered separately. llfantinea lay in the east Arcadian plain r 2 km. north of modem Tripolis. That she was a member of the Achaean League at the time of the battle of Mantinea in 251 (44. 5 n.) is not proved (despite Beloch, iv. 2. 525); and the fact that Man tinea was asked to arbitrate between Aratus and Aristippus of Argos, after Aratus' attack on Argos (c. 240) (Plut. Arat. 25. 5), shows that Mantinea was not then Achaean, though she was not necessarily Aetolian either (Bolte, RE, 'Mantinea', col. 1327). At some time between this date and 229 the city joined Achaea, since it was Achaean before it joined Aetolia (57· r), and the present passage makes it clear that it was Aetolian in 229. Orchomenus, which lay 17 km. north of Mantinea, had also previously belonged to Achaea (iv. 6. 5; Livy, xxxii. 5· 4), and is likely to have shared the fortunes of Mantinea. The treaty of alliance between Orchomenus and the Achaean League (IG, v. 2. 344 = Syll. 490) contains certain stipulations in favour of Megalopolis, which date it after the accession of that city to the League in 235 (44. 5 n.). Orchomenus like Mantinea was Aetolian in 229 ; hence it seems certain that Orchomenus (and likely that Mantinea) went over to the Aetolians with Achaean consent between 234 and 229, perhaps in compensation for the Aetolian losses in central Greece (Tam, CAH, vii. 747). On the site of Orchomenus see R. Martin, Rev. arch., r944, 107-14.

Tegea lay 20 km. south of Mantinea and 8 km. south-east of Tripolis. Several proxeny decrees (IG. v. 2. ro-rs) show Aetolian influence in the magistrates and in their phraseology, but they cannot be accurately dated. Caphyae lay at the north-west end of the east Arcadian plain,

THE ACHAEAN LEAGUE; THE CLEOMENEAN WAR II. 46.5

8 km. north-west of Orchomenus, near the modern village of Kotussa. Of its history between the collapse of Aristodamus' tyranny at Megalopolis and 229 nothing is known. It seems reasonable to assume that despite P.'s silence on Caphyae, these four cities, which had learnt to act together at the time of the Chremonidean War (cf. IG, iiz. 687, 11. 24-25), followed the same fortunes now; what these probably were has been indicated under Orchomentls. But there is no agreement among scholars on this question. See E. Meyer, RE, 'Orchomenos (4)', cols. 889-95 (site), 899-90; Bolte, RE, 'J'I.fantinea', cols. 1292 ff. (site), 1327-8; von Geisau, RE, 'Kaphy(i)a(i)', cols. r896-7 (site), r898; Hiller von Gaertringen, RE, 'Tegea (1)', cols. 107 8 (site), II5; Busolt-Swoboda, ii. 1539 n. 5, 1540 n. r. Against Beloch's view (i\'. 2. 524-5; d. Treves, Athen., 1934, 4og-ro) that Mantinea and Orchomenus joined Achaea c. 251 and were seized by the Aetolians in one of their raids, 243-240, is Syll. 490, which indicates (see above) that Orchomenus (and so probably the other three towns) followed Megalopolis into the Achaean League. O'UJ.L'IToXtTEOOJ.1EV
5. TOV KXEOJ.LEV'l ••• i'ITou
EVENTS IN GREECE

waters of the Eurotas, on what is now Mt. Khelmos; cf. 54· 3, iv. 11. It is not to be confused with the Athenaeum near Asea (Paus. viii. 44· z f.), as by Oberhummer (RE, 'Athenaion (2)', col. 2023). On its location see Loring, ]HS, 1895, 36-4o, 72 (with a plan); Frazer on Paus. iii. 21. 3; Bolte, RE, 'Sparta', cols. 13o9-1o. At this time Megalopolis held the area as a result of the decision of the Synedrion of the Hellenic League, which arbitrated on the frontier disputes of Messenia, Megalopolis, Argos, and Tegea with Sparta (d. ix. 33· 12, Kowdv EK 1rav-rwv -rwv 'l!.'AA{;vuw KaOlaa'; Kpt-n}pwv; Syll. 665, 11. rg-zo (quoted, 48. 2 n.); Roebuck, 53-56} after Philip II's invasion of Laconia in 338. When Livy (xxxviii. 34· 8) makes the transfer follow ex decreto uetere Achaeorum he is confusing Achaei with "EM7JI'"' (cf. Livy, xxvii. 30. 6, where concilium Achaeorum seems to be an assembly of the allies); see \.Veissenborn-Mi.iller, ad loc. 6. auva.9potaa.vTES To~s !A.xa.to~s ~Kpwa.v p.ET(!. Tijs ~ou>.fts: this passage appears to describe an extraordinary meeting of the Achaean assembly. In the second century such an extraordinary meeting would have been termed a m)yKAlJ-ros (cf. xxix. 24. 6); but Aymard (ACA, 4IJ-ZI} has demonstrated that the avyKAT)TOS' was not differentiated as a separate meeting until about zoo, and it was only after zoo that competence in such matters as peace and war was removed from the regular aV~·o8os to a auyK,\7J-ros (xxix. 24. 5). What term was employed for an extraordinary meeting in this century is not recorded. Aymard has further argued (ACA, 68-75) that P. here identifies the {JovAf) with 'the Achaeans', hence that this is simply an extraordinary meeting of the primary assembly. But this thesis involves some strain on the Greek, which seems to distinguish clearly between ot M.xaw£ and the fJovih}. On Cary's theory (]HS, 1939, 154-5), this is a joint meeting of a bicameral body consisting of the primary assembly and a normal council; and this view, as integrated by Larsen (78-9, 165, 217 n. 24} into his general theory of the Achaean assemblies (cf. 37, ro-n n. (e)), seems convincing. This will be an irregular meeting of the ecclesia and the boule, at which the latter, acting in a proboulcutic capacity, prepared a war-motion which the primary assembly approved. civa.>.a.p.~6.vnv cpa.vepws Ti}v ••. o:rrex8Emv: this declaration of war took place in autumn 229 or spring 228, and before the expiry of Aratus' ninth a-rpa-r7Jyla in May 228 (Holleaux, REG, I9JO, 249 n. 1 Etudes, iv. 14 n. r; against Tarn, CAH, vii. 753; Treves, A then., 1935, 24; Fine, A]P, 1940, 137; and Porter, lxvii, who put the wardecision in the arpa-r7Jyla of Aristomachus, 228/7). Plutarch (Cleom. 4) records an attempt by Aratus to seize Tegea and Orchomenus by night, which failed, and shortly afterwards the successful capture of Caphyae. These events belong to Aratus' ninth a-rpa-r7Jy{a, and the 37· 6, 6o. 3, 81.

THE ACHAEAN LEAGUE; THE CLEOMENEAN WAR II. 47·3

attack on T egea and Orchomenus at least seems to have preceded the Achaean declaration of war (Aymard, ACA, 72 n.). Attempts have been made to treat this decision as less than a full declaration of war (cf. Busolt-Swoboda, ii. 156on.), often to avoid the supposed dilemma which arose if such a declaration was made by a o-VvoSos. But P.'s rather odd phraseology is probably chosen to counter the accusation (cf. Phylarchus in Plutarch, Cleom. 3· r-8) that the personal responsibility was that of Aratus; P. of course follows the iU emoirs. See Aymard, ACA, 70-72. 7. ;, ... K).EOJ.I-EVLKOS vpoaa.yopeu9EtS ,.6).EJ.LOS: cf. i. IJ. s. ii. s6. 2 (-ra KA.Eop.evtKd), iv. 5· 5· The date of its beginning is thus autumn 229 or spring 228, and it continued till 222. 47. 1. TO J-1~" 1TpwTov 81t.. TllS l8~a.s 8uvO.J.1ews: the period of independent Achaean resistance goes dov.'11 to Cleomenes' coup at Sparta (winter 227/6). The stress on Achaean isolation is meant to extenuate Achaean defeats. 2. Tt)v 1TpOS nTo).EJ.LO.iov ••• quMa.v: i.e. Ptolemy III Euergetes. By an arrangement made with Ptolemy II Philadelphus, after a visit to Egypt in 251 (Plut. Arat. 12. I; Cic. off. ii. 82), Aratus received an annual subvention of 6 talents (Plut. A rat. 41. 5; Cleom. 19. 8) until well into the Cleomenean War (5r. z n.). TtLS 1TpoyeyE\IT}J.I-EVO.S eu~:pyeata.s: as well as the pension, the ISO talents given by Ptolemy II to Aratus in 251, after a preliminary zs talents (Plut. Arat. II. z, where the {JaatA.eus- is Ptolemy, not Antigonus (Porter, xli); 13. 6) given to solve an economic problem arising out of the return of exiles to Sicyon. 3. Tou K>.eoJ.LEvous To TE vO.Tpwv 1TOMTEuJ.La. ~ta.Ta.>.uaa.vTos: cf. Plut. Cleom. i· 1 ff. Cleomenes' revolution was in autumn 227 (Tarn, C AH, vii. i54; Beloch, iv. I. 702; Walbank, Philip, 14). After tiring out the army, which included his opponents of the rich party, by long and apparently purposeless marches, Cleomenes left it at its own request in Arcadia, and descending one evening upon Sparta, fell on the Ephors (of whom he slew four) and seized power. He then carried through the 'Lycurgan' programme, on which Agis had fallen. Property was put into a common pool, debts were cancelled, the land was divided into 400 Spartan lots, and the citizens were made up to this number by additions from perioeci and metics. Eighty of the leading opponents were proscribed and went into exile; the ephorate was abolished; and the old common training with its classes for boys and messes for citizen soldiers were reinstituted. Behind all this was the ambition to establish a Spartan hegemony in Greece. Cf. \Valbank, Aratos, 84-86, 165-6. Plutarch's account follows Phylarchus, who supported Cleomenes (56 ff.); but to Aratus, F.'s source, Cleomenes' reforms are a threat to social stability and signify 245

EVENTt~;

II. 47· 3

IN GREECE

not a return to but an overthrow of the Tr in vi.

Tupawls

7· 6-8. XPW!LEvou

oe Ka.~ T¥ voAE!L.ws: cf. Plut. Arat. 35· 6, T~ K.Aeof.dJJf.t 8pauos EXOJJTt Kat 7Tapa{36'Awr; aveaJJOf.LEVcp (Aratus' words in a letter to Lydiades). 7Tapaf36'Aws here is 'with great daring' (Paton) or 'in a remarkable way' (cf. i. 58. I); Schweighaeuser turns it 'acriter', and Porter, commenting on the passage in Plutarch, renders 'in a dangerous manner', i.e. to the enemy. In fact the word has all these nuances. P. refers to Cleomenes' capture of 1\lethydrium, and his victory at Pallantium, where Aratus persuaded the general Aristomachus to decline battle (Plut. Arat. 35· 7 ; Cleom. 4) in n8, and his victories at Mt. Lycaeum (Plut. Arat. 36. I; Cleom. 5· 1) and Ladoceia (51. 3; Plut. Arat. 36. 4-37. 5; Cleom. 6) in 227. 5. Tous OE ~a.aLA€i<; ••• Ta.is .•• -rou au!L~~povTo; ljti)~ot; a1.El. J.L€~ TpouvTas K'I"A·: cf. Thuc. vi. ss. I, avSpl SJ Tvpawte ~ 7TOAH apxTiv lxor5Uf1 ovo~v riAoyov

on

tv~pov ovS' olK.eiov Ch-t f.L~ r.
()*'' ~ lxfJp6v 7} ,PO..ov f.J.f.Td. Katpofi ytyvfiufJcu. For the phrase which A and R give as OVT lxBpov oifu r.oM.f.Ltoll, either Hultsch's reading, olin aVf.Lf.Laxov oVTE 'lTOAtf.Ltov, or that of Bfittner-'Nobst, ovn iith Treves, that 1

246

THE ACHAEAN LEAGUE; THE CLEOMENEAN WAR II. 48.4

resistance to Cleomenes and attempts to enlist outside support in Aetolia, Athens, and Eg-ypt (Plut. A rat. 41. 3; P. ii. 51. 2) were not genuine efforts to avoid calling in Antigonus. See so. 7, a fair statement of Aratus' position. 11. EvLO. TOUTWV ou8' EV TOL<; il1TO!-LVTJf'O.O'L KUTETO.~Ev: he did not suppress the Megalopolitan embassy, for it was an essential part of his apologia to show the Megalopolitans taking the initiative, independently, in the course for which he had been criticized (cf. § 8 Ka.Ta.<j>£vywv brt To us ix8povs-; Plut. A rat. 38. 6; Cleom. 16. 3-4). What he suppressed was (a) his own prior negotiations(§ 7 n.), (b) the fact that he had instigated the Megalopolitan embassy to Pella (d. Plut. Arat. J8. II, Tovs M£yaMmoAlTa.> 7rpoKafhlvat 3£oJ.L&ovs ~xatwv imKa.Aeta8a.L Tov liVT{yovov). These two details P. added, either from an independent Megalopolitan source connected with his own circle (Walbank, Aratos, 12; Treves ad ii. 48. I ; Gelzer, A bh. Berlin. A kad., 1940, no. 2, r3) or possibly (despite 56. 1-2) from Phylarchus (cf. Plut. A rat. 38. rz, dJ.Lofwc; o~ Ka.~ ([>VA.a.pxo> tO"T6p"ljKE m:pt ToJ..rwv). 48. 2. olKELW'il 8La.Ku.,.Evouc; ••• EK Twv ••• EuEpyt:uLWv: close relations existed between Megalopolis and Macedon throughout the third century until Lydiades resigned his tyranny in 235. The r:vEpymlat conferred by Philip II {cf. ix. 28. 7, 33· 8-12, xviii. 14. 6-7) were territorial additions taken from Sparta after Chaeronea and the invasion of the Peloponnese in 338 ; these assignments were made through the Hellenic League (d. 46. 5 n.), as an inscription confirms for Megalopolis; cf. Syll. 665, 11. I9-20 (a second-century arbitration settlement between Megalopolis and Sparta)' arT' f.v Tof[c;J"Ellauw Ka.i O'VJ.LJ.Laxot~ )'E)'IEV"ljJ.Llva.t 7rpor1Epov [K]p[l]aELS f31J3ata.L t] K(J.' aK~paTOL S[t ]aJ.LlvwVTt r:ls rov d.d XP6vov. The districts concerned were Sciritis, Aegytis, and Belbinatis {46. 5 n.). 4. N~Ko glvos of Aratus, whose father Cleinias, an eminent Sicyonian, enjoyed ties with the rulers of Macedon and Eg-ypt (Plut. Arat. 4· 2-3). The Megalopolitan embassy was to raise 247

EVENTS I)[ GREECE

the matter before the Achaean synodos (Aymard, AC A, 352--4), probably that which met between mid-September and early November 227 (d. Porter, lxxii), with a view to obtaining federal consent to its proceeding to Pella. The embassy, however, remained Megalopolitan, not Achaean (§ 8, so. z; Freeman, HFG, J6,)-·-6; Bikerman, REG, 1943, 290 ff.)-whatever the ultimate implications of this move. 'L'habilete supr~me d' .t\ratos fut done de provoquer les negociations entre Megalopolis et Antigonos pour traiter sous leur couvert de I' alliance generale entre la Confederation et la Macedoine' (Bikerman, loc. cit. 294). 49. The embassy to DosotJ. In general P.'s source is Aratus' }'yfemoirs,

though he stresses \\ith his other source (whether Phylarchus or a private Megalopolitan informant, 47· n n.) that Nicophanes and Cercidas were acting as figure-heads for Aratus. The stress on the Aetolian menace is of course from Aratus. But this was meant for internal Achaean consumption: did the Megalopolitans really use these arguments to Doson? He will have known well enough hm.v slight was the danger of an Aetolo-Spartan alliance; nor is there any evidence that Spartan domination in the Peloponnese would have been a real threat to Macedon. We must conclude (despite the arguments of Bikerman, REG, 1943, 299 ff.) that this chapter presents arguments ex eventu, and reproduces the tendentious form of Aratus' apologia. The earlier legend (cf. 45· z) of a triple alliance of Cleomcnes, Doson, and the Actolians has now receded, an indication that this alliance never really existed. 6. J.Ln' »-xa~wv Kat BolwTi:JV: for Boeotian policy at this time cf. xx. 5· r ff. The Boeotians had formed a close tie with Macedon under Demetrius II (xx. 5· 3), but from the time of his death maintained a friendly, but independent, attitude; however, to placate the Aetolians, who temporarily occupied much of Thessaly, they sent hieromttemones to Delphi (Flaceliere, 257 ff.). The fact that the proMacedonian Neon was hipparch in Boeotia in Z2j (xx. 5· 8) indicates the predominant sentiments in the country. The present passage implies, however, that in 227/6 Boeotia was allied with Achaea, and that her support could be promised in part-exchange for Doson's help; the alternative assumption that it indicates an already existing alliance between Boeotia and Macedon (cf. Dow and Edson, H arv. Stud., 1937, 179-8o; Fine, A]P, 1940, 142) cannot be sustained in view of the absence from xx. 5· n-r2 of any reference to such an alliance (cf. Feyel, 121 t). This Achaeo-Boeotian alliance was evidently concluded between 228 and 227/6, since Syll. 519, celebrating honours bestowed on certain hostages deposited in Achaea by Boeotia ar..d Phocis, will refer to hostages deposited when alliances were struck between Achaea and Boeotia, and Achaea and Phocis,

THE ACHAEAN LEAGUE; THE CLEOMENEAN WAR l1.5o.ro

and returned either in spring 224, when Boeotia adhered to the general alliance against Cleomenes (cf. 52. 7 n., xx. 6. 8) or, as Feyel suggests, in winter 224/3 when the Symmachy was established (54· 4 n.). The striking of these two alliances was probably simultaneous; if so, since eastern Phocis became independent of Aetolia in zz8 (Feyel, rrs, IZI-4; Treves. A then., 1934· 4o6-7). this will be a terminus past quem for the alliances. See Feyel, ro6~Js, for a full discussion of Boeoto-Macedonian relations during this period. u11"ep n]5 Twv 'H.Xfjvwv ~YEf.Lovlo.s: cf. § 4· This counterposing of Antigonus and Cleomenes is part of Aratus' propaganda, which seeks to limit the alternatives to two, and so to justify his policy of rapprochement with Macedon. But in fact there was no clash between Antigonus and Cleomenes until the former came to the help of Achaea. The 'hegemony over Greece' is Aratus' magnification of his O\Vn dilemma. tv 0ETTaAlc,t: most of Thessaly was now back in Antigonus' hands, though Aetolia still held Phthiotic Achaea, Dolopia, and Athamania: see Fine, TAPA, 1932, '33 ff.; Walbank, Philip, II. 7. Eav • . • TTJV • • • Eiivomv • • • ~VTpE11"0f.LEVOL TTJV ~auxlav ayEw u1l"oKpLvwVTm: 'if. through respect for the goodwill ... they should pretend to maintain the peace ... .' Here P. reveals the truth, that Aetolia was neutral at this time (KaO&.rrEp Kal vvv). 1-1~ BEia6at xpElas Twv ~o11811a6VTwv: unconvincing, Treves argues (ad loc.). in a speech of envoys sent orrF.p {3o7J8dai; (48. 5). But why doubt P.'s statement (so. 7) that Aratus' object was to ensure Macedanian help if it proved necessary, and that Doson was sufficiently realistic to discuss the situation on that basis? At the same time, if Aratus doubted the power of the I"eague to survive without Macedanian help, his actions must have been directed towards inveigling the Achaean authorities into taking the steps he judged to be necessary. 50. 2. l:O.v Kat Tois :AxatOL5 ToiiTo f3ouAOf.LEVOl!l ii: i.e. the invitation must come from the whole Confederation, not merely from Megalopolis. 9. TTJV .•• ciBlKLuv 11"Ept Tov :A.KpoKopLVSov: 43· 4 n., 52. 4· The seizure was an d&~da, because in 243 Macedon and Achaea were at peace, 10. ds TO Kmvov ~ouAEuT/jptov: probably at the spring at5vo8os, zz6 (Porter, lxxiii; Fine, AJP, 1940, r4o n. 47). The phrase Kowov {3ouAeurr)pwv is discussed by Aymard (ACA, 65-67), who argues that {JovAEv-r~pwv is hardly more than an alternative to {3ouil~. itself a synonym for avvo&os. But PouAe!J7'1/pLDV is normally 'council chamber' (cf. xi. 9· 8, xxii. 9· 6) ; and 'what was theoretically a meeting Of a primary assembly might at times be held in a council chamber' (Larsen, 77). In using the adjective Kow6v P. is contrasting the federal 249

II. 50. to

EVENTS IN GREECE

chamber with the Megalopolitan assembly to which the envoys had first reported (so. 3-4). The terms Td 1rAfj8os- and ol 1roAAot (§ rr) are properly used of a meeting open to all citizens; see Aymard (ACA, Sr ff.). 12. Ka.mc!>EuyEw brt n1.s TW\1 4>£Awv ~o,&Eia.s: cf. 47· 8, Kt:J.Tac/>Evywv e1Tt TOVS' ix8pov<;, also referring to Antigonus. Treves (A then., 1935· 26) underlines Aratus' adroitness in turning the accusation made against him. His duplicity as counsellor of resistance shows through despite P.'s admiration and an account based on his Memoirs. 51. 2. nToAEj.LO.LOS ••• KAEoj.Lf.vEt XOP'I'JYEL\1 l'II'E~uAETO: see 47.

2 n. for Egyptian subventions to Aratus. The date when they were discontinued was probably winter 226/s (Beloch, iv. r. 709 n. I; Walbank, Aratos, 200-1; against Ferrabino's view (84, 258) that it was summer 227). P. mentions this first, since he had held up the Ptolemaic tie as a moral obstacle to an Achaeo--Macedonian rapprochement (47· 2). Later Cleomenes was driven to rely increasingly on Ptolemy, who extracted his mother and sons as hostages and a promise not to make peace without his consent (Plut. Cleom. 22. 4-9), yet withdrew his subsidies at the critical moment (63. r ff.). 3. To AuKa.tov ••• f.v Tois Aa.8oKEiots ••• 'E~eam!'fL~O.lOV: Aratus, in his tenth rnpa.TI)yta. (227 /6), while retiring from an assault on Elis, was attacked by Cleomenes on the slopes of Mt. Lycaeum (modern Diaphorti, south-east of Andritsaena) and heavily defeated (227); d. Plut. Cleom. 5· I; Arat. 36. r-2. Pausanias (viii. 28. 7) mentions the monument to the Achaean dead as standing near Brenthe, at the foot of the hill of Karytaena; cf. E. Meyer, RE, 'Lykaion', col. 2236. Later in 227 Cleomenes seized the fortress of Leuctra near Megalopolis. Aratus drove him back from the walls of Megalopolis. but would not follow up the victory. Lydiades (44. 5 n.) charged with the cavalry against orders, and was killed near the village of Ladoceia on the Asea road, an incident which brought considerable obloquy on Aratus; cf. Walbank, Aratos, 83-84; Plut. Cleom. 6; A rat. 36. 437· 5· In early summer 226 Cleomenes, now supreme at Sparta (47· 3 n.), took the Arcadian town of Mantinea, invaded western Achaea, and brought Hyperbatas, the general for 226/s. one of Aratus' supporters, to battle between Dyme and the Hecatombaeum. Cleomenes was wholly victorious, and Achaean losses were heavy, the whole federal force being engaged (7ra.v87Jp.el). See Plut. Cleom. r4. 4-5; Arat. 39· I ; Paus. \ii. 7. 3· Though the first two of these disasters preceded Cleomenes' coup and the sending of the Megalopolitans to Antigonus, P. has enumerated all three to underline the extent of the Achaean collapse; cf. Bettingen, 37 n.; Treves, Athen., r935, 27; Fine, AJP, 1940, 140 n. 48. 4. Twv,.pa.yj.Lcl.Twv oOKlTt lh86vTtt.JV &.va.o-Tpocl>i}v: 'the situation no longer

THE ACHAEAN LEAGUE; THE CLEOMENEAN WAR

II.y~. 2

giving any respite', i.e. for recovery (not 'circumstances no longer permitting any delay', i.e. in appealing to Doson, as Paton; cf. Porter, lxxiv). &.vaaTpo~~ is 'a breathing-space to do something'; d. i. 66. 3, ii. 33· 3, etc. The appeal op.o8vp.aoov is part of Aratus' apologia. 5. €v ~ Ka.lp~: 'in this crisis'. From a little after Hecatombaeum until] unef July 225 there was a truce and ne-~otiations with Cleomenes (Plut. Arat. 39; Cleom. 15). A first conference, fixed for early in 225, was postponed owing to Cleomenes' illness. Meanwhile Aratus refused to stand as general for 225/4, letting a supporter Timoxenus stand and be elected in his place. There is little doubt that during this period he had secretly resumed conversations with Doson. After the breakdown in the negotiations with Cleomenes in summer, the king carried out a series of campaigns in Arcadia and Achaea which shook the League to its foundations (see 52 ff.). Meanwhile, at some unascertained date (probably late summer 225, cf. Porter, lxxv) the Achaeans decided to send the younger Aratus to Doson to discover his final tem1s. On the younger Aratus see iv. 37· r (general for 219/18), vii. 12. 9 (relations with Philip V). First Philip's lo\·er, he became his enemy when the king carried off his wife Polycrateia to Macedon (Plut. Arat. 49· 2, so. 2; Livy, xxvii. 31. 8, xxxii. 2r. 23-24; \Valbank, Philip, 78-79). Later rumour attributed his madness and early death (probably falsely) to Philip's poison (Piut. Arat. 54· 2-3; Walbank, CQ, 1943, 4 n. J). £(3Ej3a.u:,O"o.To Ta m:pt Tfjs ~o,&E(a.s: 'confirmed the details of assis~ tance', cf. 49· 9· The younger Aratus was sent to learn the exact price Doson demanded for his help; and this (§ 6) proved to be the depositing of hostages and cession of Acrocorinth. Presumably Aratus junior reported back these terms, for they at first proved unacceptable (§ 7). The final decision to accept was not taken until spring 224 (52. 4), when the younger Aratus again made the journey to Macedon, this time as one of the hostages (Plut. A rat. 42. 3; Cleom. 19. 9). Treves (ad loc.) refers this passage to the final acceptance of Doson's terms in 224; Aratus junior thus makes only one journey to Pella, to convey the Achaean decision (P.), and to remain as a hostage (Plutarch). and sr. 6-7 is parenthetical, describing Achaean hesitation before sending the younger Aratus. It is clear, however, that at some point an embassy had to go to Macedon to establish the details hitherto left vague (49· 9); and the likelihood is that it is to this embassy P. is here referring. 7. U1T~p8EO'lV EO'XE TO fila~ouAlov: if TO a~afiouA£oV, 'the deliberations', implies a uwollo5', this will be the autumn meeting of 225, at which the younger Aratus reported Doson's terms. It was probably Achaean reluctance to pay the price demanded that led Aratus to make his unsuccessful appeals for help to Aetolia and Athens (Plut. A rat. 41. 3). 52. 2. 1rpoO'Aa.~wv S£ . . . Ka.4>ua5 KTA.: after the collapse of

H. 52. 2

EVENTS IN GREECE

negotiations in summer 225 (51. 5), Cleomenes again declared war and invaded Achaea (Plut. Cleom. 17. 3 ff.; A rat. 39· 4 ff.). From Tegea he marched towards Sicyon which he almost captured; then, swerving west, he seized Pellene, and returned south to take Pheneus in Arcadia (and the citadel of Penteleium: Plut. Cleom. q. 6; A rat. 39· 4). \\'bet her he continued south to Caphyae, or the town went over of its own accord is not known. These successes carried Spartan territory to the gulf of Corinth, and split the Confederation in two. Cleomenes now concentrated on the eastern half. Argos was taken during the Nemean truce, and a garrison sent to occupy Cleonae and Phlius (Plut. Cleom. 19. r ; A rat. 39· 5) ; meanwhile, in a campaign in the south-east of the Argolid Cleomenes took Hermione, Troezen, and Epidaurus. Finally, on the invitation of its people he occupied Corinth. The whole campaign was very rapid (Plutarch (Cleom. 17· 5), following Phylarchus, stresses the appeal made by Cleomenes' social programme of debt-cancellation and land-division to the masses in Achaea) and the capture of Corinth will be about August 225. See Walbank, Aratos, 95~; Porter, lxxiv-lxxv. '11'poaEaTpa.To'll'e8EuaE TU TWv I,Kuwvlwv 'II'OAEt: the narrative must again be supplemented from Plutarch. Aratus, having been invested with special judicial powers for the 'purging' of pro-Spartan elements in Sicyon and Corinth (Plut. Arat. 40. 2, t1T1. ToVTovs- Jf,ovatav &.vV1T£v8uvov •. . >.a{idw), had already carried out his mission at Sicyon, and received news of the fall of Argos while at Corinth. The people of Corinth tried to kill or arrest him, but he escaped to Sicyon. Cleomenes occupied Corinth, but could not expel the Achaean garrison from Acrocorinth, and so threw a palisade around the mountain. Later he made two attempts to strike a bargain with Aratus (Plut. Cleom. 19. 4. 19. 7; Arat. 4I. s) and, when these failed, he laid siege to Sicyon, probably in January 224 (Porter, lxxxi-lxxxii). 3. T~ f.LEV )\paT~ OTpttTt)yoiivTl Kat Tots )\xa~o'ls: i.e. Aratus and the garrison. Since the general of the Confederation for 225/4 was not Aratus, but Timoxenus (Plut. Arat. 38. 2}, and since Cleomenes' capture of Corinth cannot be as late as 224/3, we must assume (a) that aTpa77JyoiJvn here refers to Aratus' position as head of the military tribunal, i.e. a de facto command and not the official aTpa77Jyta (Tarn, CAH, vii. 863---4; Walbank, Aratos, I7o-3), or (b) that the office of aTpa77]yO<; auTOKpd.Twp which (Plut. Arat. 41. r) was allegedly given to Aratus at Sicyon after the fall of Corinth, was in fact one to whicl1 he was appointed several months earlier; in which case the l~ovala dvv'lT(v8vvos held at Sicyon and Corinth was probably held by virtue of Aratus' supreme power (Porter, lxxviii-lxxix). This second view is on the whole the more satisfactory. Aratus was at Sicyon both before and after the debacle at Corinth, and Plutarch mav well have attributed to the second visit what in fact belongs to the first. In

THE ACHAEAN LEAGUE; THE CLEOMENEAN WAR II. 5 2.8

this case the appointment of Aratus as mpaTI}yos aihoKpbwp was the Achaean response to Cleomenes' renewal of the war and the internal crisis within the eastern cities of the Confederacy (cf. Plut. Arat. 39· s, opwvTa T~V JI,),07TOVVYJ JfavwTap..lvas v1ro TWV vewTEpt~ovrwv TTavrax68ev; Cleotn. Ii· 5). 4. Ka1"Exov,-wv :O..xmwv TOTE ,-ov TO'ITov ,-oihov: this the Achaean garrison under Cleopater held after the loss of Corinth (Plut. Arat. 40. 5). The decision to accept Doson's terms was taken at Aegium, probably at the spring avvooos, about April 224; Plut. A rat. 41. 742. 1 (the meeting follows a three months' siege of Sicyon); Porter, lxxxi-lxxxii. For Aratus' lyKA:1Jp..a TTpo> ,.¥ olK{av, the seizure of the Acrocorinth, see so. 9 n. 5. &.vateu~as a'ITo Toil ILtwwvos: after three months' siege (Plut. Arat. 41. 7), and on news of Aratus' escape and the decision at Aegium (§ 4; Plut. A rat. 42. 2, KaAefv TOV .llv,.[yovov J.f7JrplaavTo Kat TTapaot})6vat Tov .:4KpoKoptv8ov) ; on the order of events in Plut. Cleom. I9 see Larsen, r66. s~aAa~wv xapaKL KOL Tn«Jlp'l:J KTA.: for the method cf. v. 99· 9· The gap thus fortified is the valley of the R. Leuka between Acrocorinth (575 m.) and Mt. Oneia (582 m.), where the modern road and railway to Argos run. North of the Acrocorinth (\vhich the Achaeans still held) the fortifications of Corinth and Lechaeum completed Cleomenes' lines; naturally Oneia was also fortified (Plut. Cleom. za. I). See Kromayer, AS, i. 2oi-J. 7. oaov o1lmo.~ 'ITapeivaL TOV KAEOfLEVTJ ... els 0eTTaAiav: in the highest degree improbable; and this reading of Antigonus' mind is evidently part of Aratus' version designed to fit his prophecy that Doson might have to fight in Thessaly (49· 6), and so to represent the compact as less one-sided than it really was. SLa rijs Eu~oias i'ITi. Tov 'la811ov: this route avoided Thermopylae, in Aetolian hands(§ 8), but passed through Boeotia, which was friendly to Macedon and allied with Achaea (49· 6 n.). Aratus and the Achaean damiourgoi met Antigonus at Pagae in the Megarid, sailing there (Plut. Arat. 43· I, 44· r). Megara had recently transferred itself from the Achaean League to the Boeotian, when Cleomenes occupied the Isthmus line (xx. 6. 8); and Feyel (I29-3o) has suggested that although P. says this was done p..~ml riJ> Twv L'txatwv yvwp..7J>, it was perhaps the quid pro quo for which the Boeotians agreed to adhere to the new alliance ¥:ith Antigonus against Sparta (49· 6 n.). Doson's forces amounted to 2o,ooo Macedonian infantry and I,3oo horse (Plut. Arat. 43· I). 8. ot yap AhwA.ol. . . . ~ouAOfLEVoL KwAuaaL Tov :t\v,-(yovov Tijs ~oTJ9eias: that the Aetolians were unwilling to see Antigonus crush Cleomenes is likely, since this would give the Achaeans (though under Macedonian supervision) supremacy in the Peloponnese; see 253

II. 52. 8

EVENTS IN GREECE

Fine, AJP, 1940, 149-50. But their action is no evidence for P.'s thesis of an earlier aggressive policy towards Achaea. 53. 1. Tfis ~v auToi.s tAtr£Sa.s; an echo of Aratus' Memoirs; for what was the invitation to Antigonus but a failure of self-reliance? O.~a. T~ TOV ;6.pL0'1'0T€AYJ TOV ;6.pye'Lov ltravaaTl]Val TOLl> KAeot.U::VlaTai.s: cf. Plut. A rat. 44· 2 ff.; Cleom. zo. 6 ff. Aristoteles was a friend

2.

of Aratus and exploited Cleomenes' failure to carry through the social revolution at Argos. Aratus sailed with 1,5oo men to Epidaurus; and meanwhile the Argives rose, trapped the Spartan garrison on the citadel, and were reinforced by Timoxenus and the Achaean army from Sicyon. Aratus' arrival is mentioned only by Plutarch (Arat. 44· 4). It was argued by M. Klatt (6-39) that P.'s silence on the role of Aratus here shows him to be using a source other than the lvfemoirs. But Plutarch omitted Timoxenus because he was writing a biography of Aratus; it does not follow that the .o/1emoirs omitted him too. P. is here giving an outline sketch, and may well have left Aratus out of an event in which his role was insignificant. Hence Klatt's theory can be rejected. ~ETa TL~o5€vou Toll 0'1'flO.TTJyoO: d. Plut. Cleom. zo. 8. This reference to Timoxenus as general has created a difficulty. On the assumption that the battle of Sellasia was in 222 (below, n.), the following possibilities arise: (a) Timoxenus is general for 225/4. and his position has not been abrogated by Aratus' appointment as crrpa.'TTJYD> a.il'1'oKpa'1'wp. In that case the revolt of Argos is before May 224 (so Porter, Ixxix. n. 45; Ferrabino, z68; Walbank, Aratos, 172}, and there is little information on the rest of the campaigning season of 224 (cf. 54· 3 n.). (b) Timoxenus is general for 224/3. His crrpa'TTJyta for zzs/4 was suspended on Aratus' extraordinary appointment ; but he held office again in 224/3 (what happened to Aratus' office?). This scheme, adopted by Treves (Athen., I935. ss) in modification of one proposed by H. Frank (Arch. Pap., 1933, r ff.). fails to explain why Timoxenus had to resign in 225 but could be re-elected under the same av'ToKpchwp six months later; also it fails to connect satisfactorily with the section of the Achaean General List beginning 'Timoxenus, 221/o' (iv. 7· 10). Beloch (iv. 2. 222) also makes Timoxenus general in 224)3; but his theory that Hyperbatas resigned after the defeat at Hecatombaeum, and Timoxenus' first crrpa'TTJyla was for the remainder of 226/s, has nothing in its favour (Walbank, Aratos, 170). (c) Timoxenus is not general of the Confederation, but holds a de facto command under Aratus as ati'1'oKpd'1't1Jp; so Tam (CAH, vii. 863-4). but such a use of crrpa'1'1)ya> is unparalleled. 254

THE ACHAEAN LEAGUE; THE CLEOMENEAN WAR II.54·3

On present evidence the problem is not soluble with certainty. That Aratus remained a;pa:rryyo> avToKp&.;wp till after Sellasia is possible; but we do not know precisely what that entailed. We cannot argue from the powers given to Critolaus and his successors in 146 (xxxviii. 13. 7), since there was no question then of prolonging office. It seems likely that Aratus may have been especially concerned with relations with Antigonus; and in that case it would be necessary for someone (like Timoxenus on this occasion) to command the Achaean forces. But whether such a commander would be comparable in powers to the normal crrpa;ryyo> we do not know. On the whole we may accept Tarn's hypothesis as the most satisfactory. 6. 1ra.pa.1reu~w S' dt; :Apyos KTA.: cf. Plut. A rat. 44· 3-4; Cleom. 21. According to the latter passage Cleomenes first sent Megistonous, his stepfather, with 2,ooo men; but upon Megistonous' falling in battle he abandoned his Isthmus line, fearing for Sparta itself. He cleared part of the city, but was cut short by Doson close on his heels. P. obscures the role of the Macedonians (and not merely Achaean courage) in completing Cleomenes' withdrawal from Argos. cptAoTLp.ws •.• e~e flETO.flEAEia.s: 'pertinaciter ... ex paenitentia prioris consilii' (Schweighaeuser). Paton gives the \\'TOng emphasis in his version 'with the zeal of renegades'; toP. the Argives were renegades v.·ho had repented. e1ra.vTjAeev ds TtlV I1rcipT"1V: via Tegea, where he heard of the death of his wife, Agiatis (Plut. Cleom. 22. r). 54. 2. 1(0.T0.!7TlJ!7ap.evos Ta Ka.Ta TtlV m~Aw: cf. Plut. A rat. 44· s. /1pa•o> St a;par'lyo> alpe0e1s tm' Mpyelwv (on this phrase see Aymard, ACA, II3-14, n. 2) l1retaEv aV.ov<; Mvnyovtp T&. Te Twv ;vp&.wwv Ka~ T& ;wv 1rpo8oTwv XP~fLaTa 8wpE&v SoiJva,. On Aristomachus' execution see 59· 1 ff.; and for the massacre which followed cf. v. 16. 6. 3. Ttl" AtyuTLV Ka.l BeAJJ.LViinv xwpa.v: Aegytis in north-west Laconia, a district lying around various tributaries of the Alpheius, rising in the north of Taygetus, took its name from an ancient town Aegys, destroyed, tradition reported, by the Spartan kings Archelaus and Charillus, who suspected it of Arcadian sympathies (Paus. iii. 2. s, viii. 27. 4, 34· s; Strabo, viii. 364, x. 446; Bolte, RE, 'Sparta', cols. IJIO-I2). On the Belminatis (Belbinatis) see 46. 5 n.; among the forts handed over to Megalopolis will be the Athenaeum, and, in the Aegytis, Leuctra (Plut. Cleom. 6. 3; cf. Thuc. v. 54; the exact site is disputed). Doson must have marched near Tegea to reach Megalo~ polis, but postponed its capture till the next year (54· 6 ff.). -ijK£ 1rpo; Tl}v TWV ;b.xa.~wv a.)voSov: probably September 224, since .t\ntigonus goes on to winter quarters. That there are so few events in this campaigning season is possibly due to Antigonus' having been held up at the Isthmus longer than P. suggests; in which case the

255

II. 54· 3

EVENTS IN GREECE

revolt of Argos may have been as late as midsummer 224. Ferrabino (z6z-8) compresses Doson's Arcadian campaign into the early months of 224 and dates this o-vvo8o> to February-March 224; but this chronology is only likely in conjunction with his date of 223 for Sellasia, and on other grounds this cannot stand (65-69 n.). See Aymard, ACA, zG9 n., 'on concluera ... que l'automne est probable, mais non certain'. 4. I AVTlyov[O> ~ao-tMws] !LJT)p.T)Tplov Ka[~ MaKe86ves] I «a~ o[ o-vp.p.axo' [a7To ri)s 7TEpl] I EeJJ..ao-lav p.ci.[>..'TJ> :4m:\.:U.wvt].) suggests that the Macedonians were not members of the Symmachy except through their king (as one might expect) (cf. Treves, Athen., 1935, 52-53). 'The Council or Synedrion of the Symmachy could be summoned by the king of Macedon in his capacity of president, and had the power to decide questions of war and peace, the voting of supplies and the co-opting of new members; moreover, the king of Macedon was ex officio commander-in-chief. But the Symmachy possessed no treasury, and all decisions were subject to ratification by the legislative bodies of the separate leagues, which thus maintained a considerable measure of independence. Eventually the Symmachy was to prove a failure; but what should have been immediately clear was that, so long as the king of Macedon was prepared to abide by its terms, the domination which it offered him was largely illusory; on the other hand, Achaea and the other small federal states would profit by Macedonian military protection, without sustaining any appreciable loss of autonomy' (Walbank, Philip, rs-16; bibliography there). At this meeting Antigonus was probably elected hegemon of the Achaean League, a position formerly held by Ptolemy (Plut. A rat. 38. 9, cf. 24. 4), and a law was passed enjoining the Achaean magistrates to summon an assembly whenever the king of Macedon required them (cf. iv. 85. 3, v. r. 6). 5. XPOVOV f1f.V TLVO. 1TO.pO.XELJla~WV: i.e. winter 224/3· xp6vov Ttva need not imply an abnormally short stay in winter quarters. 256

THE ACHAEAN LEAGUE; THE CLEOMENEAN WAR II.jj.I

7. or TEyEciTa.l ••• va.pMioaa.v a.•hous: cf. Plut. Cleom. 2J. I. Doson may have installed a garrison; cf. § 8, dcr4>a)..wdJ-LEVos ·r~l Ka:rd. -r~v n6A.w. See, further, 70. 4 n. 11. T~lV J.1EV 'OpxotJ.EVov ••• dAE: in 226 (for the date see Walbank, Aratos, I94-s), after defeating Megistonous and the Spartans near Orchomenus (Plut. Arat. 38. I), Aratus had failed to recover the town; and Phylarchus (Plut. A rat. 45· I) retails the complaint that he now allowed Antigonus to plunder Orchomenus and to garrison it (cf. iv. 6. s). TT]v Twv Ma.vTwEwv ••• m5Alv: cf. 46. 2. Mantinea was taken by Cleomenes from the Aetolians in 229, captured by Aratus in 227 (Plut. Arat. 36. 2-3; Cleom. 5· I), recaptured with the connivance of the pro-Spartan party in 226 (Plut. Cleom. I4· I), and now (223) taken by Doson and the Achaeans. For Phylarchus' sympathy for its fate, and P.'s reply, see 56. 6 ff.; cf. Plut. A rat. 45· 6--<J; Cleom. 23. I ; F ougeres, soo ff. 12. TTJV tcf 'Hpa.la.s ~ea.l TEA~ouoTJs: Heraea lay on the right bank of the Alpheius, IS stades east of the Ladon (Paus. viii. 26. I-3); cf. Frazer, Pausanias, iv. 295--6; Ziegler, RE, 'Heraia (I)', cols. 407 ff. (with map). Telphusa was about IO miles north of Heraea on the left bank of the Ladon; cf. Frazer, op. cit. iv. 286 f.; E. Meyer, Pel. Wand. 86. Heraea had been taken by the Achaean general Dioetas in 236, and this presupposes the Achaean possession of Telphusa; d. Beloch, iv. I. 632 n. 2; Walbank,] HS, I9J6, 66. Cleomenes had seized Heraea prior to his coup in 227 (Plut. Cleom. 7· 5), and Telphusa either then or in 225. 13. 1ra.pa.A.a.~wv 8E 1ea.l Ta.uTa.s: Doson put a Macedonian garrison into Heraea, as he had done at Orchomenus; for Philip held it in 208, when he offered to restore it to Achaea (Livy, xxviii. 8. 6, cf. xxxii. 5· 4 for the actual restoration in I99/8). Aymard's suggestion (PR, 25-27 n. 5), that the Macedonian garrison dated only from a postulated recovery by Philip from the Aetolians in 2o8, seems overcomplicated; d. Walbank, Philip, I7 n. 2. auva1TTOVTO'i TOU XElJ.1WVO'i: 'since winter was now at hand'. In fact P. uses no word for autumn, and this phrase indicates a time around the autumnal equinox, the beginning of the bad season. Cf. Holleaux, REA, I92J, 354 (=Etudes, iv. 286); REG, I924, 3I4 n. I (=Etudes, ii. I6I n. I); BCH, I9J2, 534--6 (=Etudes, iv. 338-4o); Aymard, Melanges Glotz (Paris, I932), i. 53 n. I. (For the period from early October to early December P. uses the phrase XHJ-LWV Ka-rapxot-L~vos; cf. xvi. 24. I.) Hence the synodos was the regular meeting of autumn 223. 55. 1. J.1ETc!.. Twv J.1la9ocJ115pwv: o?J noUot5s, according to Plutarch (Cleom. 25. 4). The next year Doson had J,Ooo mercenaries (65. 2 n.), but he was relying less on his citizen troops {IJ,ooo as against 2o,ooo s

257

II. 55·

I

EVENTS IN GREECE

when he ftrst marched south, sz. 7 n.). For further discussion see Griffith, 65, &)-7o. 2-7. Cleomenes' capture of Megalopolis. This event, which took place in autumn 223, while the Achaeans were still at the o-Vvooos at Aegium (Plut. Cleom. zs. z), is also described by Plutarch (Cleom. 23~25), who follows Phylarchus, as is clear from a comparison with P.'s criticism of Phylarchus at 61-62. Cf. also Plut. Phil. 5; Paus. viii. 27. 15-16. Plutarch relates how Cleomenes began with a feint march towards Argos, then turned west to descend via Asea on Megalopolis. After taking the city he was persuaded by Lysandridas to send him and Thcaridas as envoys to those who had escaped to Messene, with an offer to spare the city if they would join him; but the Megalopolitans, at Philopoemen's instigation, rejected the offer, whereupon Cleomenes sacked the city. These details P. omits here, but discusses them in his polemic against Phylarchus. 2. s,a. TO !-1Eye9os Ka.t TftV EPT)!-LlD.V: cf. v. 93· s. Ka~ yd.p viJv 7rapd. Tt.l p.iyEOos arh-ijs Ka1 T~v f.p1Jp.la.v f.r:rcpd.AOa., (217, when the dispute on rebuilding Megalopolis turned on its size). As a federal centre for Arcadia, originally garrisoned by the League, Megalopolis was prob· ably planned on too large a scale from the outset; its area of 4,o9o,jz4 square yards (Bury, ]HS, 18<}8, zo) was even larger than that of Messene. On the battles of Lycaeum and Ladoceia see 51. 3 n. 3. Twv fiK MeaaTjvT)s ~wyO.Swv: the reception of Megalopolitan refugees at Messcne after the capture of Megalopolis proves that relations between the cities were good (61. 3-4; Phylarchus in Plut. Cleom. 24. I; Fine, A]P, 1940, 154 ff.). Perhaps, therefore, these Messenian exiles were of the popular democratic party, opposed alike to the neutral oligarchs (cf. iv. 32. 1) and the pro-Achaean, but wealthy, party of Gorgus (cf. vii. 10); this element, to which Philip V later appealed (Plut. A rat. 49· 4-5; d. Walbank, Philip, 72), may have been attracted by Cleomenes' programme. As Roebuck notes (69-7o), the Tritymallus who conveyed Cleomenes' offer to Aratus in 224 (Plut. Cleom. 19. 8; cf. A rat. 41. 5) was also a Messenian, probably of the same party. 4. s~a, Tft'l' euiJtux(av TWV Meya.A01TOA.LTWV: in fact, the escape of all but I,ooo inhabitants, who fought a covering action, suggests that hope of saving the city was abandoned once the Spartans were inside. 5. Ci Sf) Ka.t Tp~at 1-LT)ut 7rpoTEpov a.vT~ auve~T) 1fa.9ei:v: P. gives details in ix. 18. 1--4, where the first attack is dated Trepi T~v Tijs llAmiBos ~mToA~v, i.e. about 12 May (Strachan-Davidson, 20). But this would make the second attack August, whereas it was clearly in autumn (54· 13 n.). Either P. has miscalculated, or 7p£r:r{ is an error for TrEVTE (Beloch, iv. I. 715 n. 2). Clearly the two attacks were just before and just after the Macedonian campaign of 223. 258

THE ACHAEAN LEAGUE; THE CLEOMENEAN WAR

II. 56

tcaTtt TOV KwAaL~W 'll'poaayopEuo~-LEVov TO'Il'OV:

cf. ix. r8. I, Tb Kanl TOV 1/>w>.eov KaAoup.evov. The word cfow>.eo> is found in the sense of Sd>aaKaAeiov (Poll. iv. 19, ix. 41; Suidas and Hesych. s. v.), and this may be the correct form and meaning here; cf. Bolte-Meyer, RE, 'Pholeos', col. 513. 7. o(hw~ .•• 'll'tKpw~ lhE9npEv Kat oua...,Evw~: Phylarchus, however (Plut. Cleom. 25. 1), explains Cleomenes' action as provoked by Philopoemen's intransigence. 8. KaT A 1'a~ TWV ~eaLpwv 'll'EpLaTaO'EL~: 'in all their vicissitudes', nullo unquam tempore, quantumuis dijjidli (Schweighaeuser), rather than 'in the varied circumstances of his career' (Paton). 1-'~a· alpE1'LaTTJV ••• 1-'~TE 'll'pooo'"lv: implicit polemic against Phylarchus, who (cf. Plut. Cleom. 24. 2 ff.) had stressed the readiness of Lysandridas and Thearidas, avSpes f!vSogoL Kat OVVCI.TOt p.aAurra. TWY Mf.ya.Ao1ToAtrwv, to compromise and collaborate with Cleomenes. If this Thearidas was P.'s grandfather, who bore that name (Syll. 6z6; von Scala, 15 n. I; Stahelin, RE, 'Thearidas {1)', col. 1382), P.'s disavowal is even more understandable. Stymphalus, in north-east Arcadia, south ofMt Cyllenc, had probably joined the Achaean League in 235 (Niccolini, 28-29; Beloch, iv. I. 415, dates its accession c. 251). 9. KAELTop£wv: Pausanias (viii. 21. I) places Cleitor 7 stades (emended to 17 by Curtius, Peloponnesos, i (Gotha, I85I), 398 n. z6) west of the conjuncture of the R. Cleitor, on which it lay, with the Aroanius (modem Katsana); cf. Geiger, RE, 'Kleitor', col. 66r; Meyer, Pel. Wand. ro9-ro; Papandreou, IIpa.KTLKa, I92o, 95 ff. It probably joined Achaea about 236/5. but whether before or after Megalopolis is unknown; cf. Niccolini, 29; Beloch, iv. I, 632 (at the time of the conquest of Heraea in 236). Of Thearces nothing more is known.

56-63. Criticism of Phylarchus: a digression in fact inspired by Phylarchus' version of Cleomenes' capture of Megalopolis, which P. has already tacitly combated in 55· 8 and to which he reverts in 6I-<5J. Phylarchus, who is known mainly from these chapters and from fragments preserved in Athenaeus, came from Athens or Naucratis (Suidas, 1/>v>.a.pxo> l!Orwa.fos ~ NavKpa:rlrr;s· ot o€ Euwwvwv, d.\Ao, 8€ Alyt)1TT~ov <&v)lypa.t,/Jav)-he was perhaps a Naucratite who settled as a metic in Athens~ and was probably contemporary with Cleomenes and Aratus (56. In.). He wrote twenty-eight books of larop{a.L, covering the period from Pyrrhus' invasion of the Peloponnese (272) to Cleomenes' death (2zo{I9), as well as other works known to us only by name (Suidas). P. polemizes against Phylarchus, not only as a representative of the 'tragic' school of historians, following the fashion of Duris, but also as a partisan of Cleomenes against Aratus (cf. Plut. Arat. 38. rz). (For criticisms elsewhere of sensational historians see r6. 14 (unnamed historians), iii. 4i· 6-48. 259

II. 56

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I2 (writers on Hannibal), s8. 9. vii. 7· I-2, 7· 6 (writers on Hieronymus of Syracuse), x. 2. 5-ti (writers on Scipio), xii. 24. 5, 26 b 4 (Timaeus), xv. 34· r-36. II (Ptolemy of Megalopolis), xvi. r2. 7-9 (Theopompus), 14. r f., 17. 9, r8. 2 (Zeno of Rhodes), xxix. 12. r2. 8 (unnamed historians); for his own concessions to this style composition see CQ, 1945, 8 ff.) Phylarchus was Plutarch's source, especially in the Agis and C/eomenes, and to a lesser extent in the Aratus and Pyrrhus, and he was also used by Pompeius Trogus (perhaps via Timagenes). Plutarch recognized his faults; cf. Them. 32. 3; Arat. 38. r2. The fragments are collected by Jacoby, 81, See also Walbank, Aratos, 4-ti; ]HS, 1938, 56 ff.; B. L. Ullman, TAPA, r942, 4r-42; Oilier, ii. 88-93· ~ ' uuTous ' ' Ka.Lpous ' '",...puT~ . .I.' 'those KUTa.' Tous yEypu't'oTwv; 56 • 1• Twv writers who were contemporary with Aratus'. Treves (ad Joe.) translates 'those who wrote upon the same period as Aratus'; but this would require rwv ('Td.) Kant rou<; au'Tou,; KTA. 2. :ApaT!¥ 1TPOTIP"1tLEVOtS KUTa.KoJ..ou9Ei'v: cf. 40. 4 n. For this use of KamKo.\ovOefl•, 'to follow an authority', see \Velles, 342. In fact P. also uses Phylarchus in default of other sources; cf. 47. II n., 70. 6; Susemihl (i. 632 n. s6o), however, exaggerates this use. For P.'s stress on truth in history see i. 14. 6 n. 5. 1rpoa.lpeow KUL SuvutLw ev Tfi 1rpa.yjLuTE'~: 'the general purpose and character of his work' (Paton). 7rpoalpHM refers to Phylarchus' prejudice for Cleomenes, ouvarus to his methods of composition; in the immediate case of Mantinea, the criticism of Phylarchus' 7rpoalpwt> is in § 6, of the oul•aru> of his work in § 7. 6. Toos Ma.VTLVEUS yEvo.,..Evous u7TOXEtp1ous: in 223 (cf. 54· II-12). An echo of Phylarchus' charges appears in Plut. Arat. 45· 6-9. Of the men many were massacred, and the rest enslaved along with the women and children; and the wealth of the town was divided between Achaeans and Macedonians, in the proportion of one to two. Subsequently, as general, Aratus refounded the tovvn under the name Antigoneia. This name is common on coins and inscriptions (BOlte, RE, 'Mantinea', col. 1291); but a Delphic list of fhwpoo6~<:o,, dating between 192 and 172 (IG, v. 2, p. xxxvii; cf. Haussoullier, BCH, r883, rgo), mentions the name :Mantinea, which clearly survived. (For discussion of this list and of Achaean coins with tridents which may belong to Mantinea at this time see Crosby and Grace, 15 ff., 25 (1\os. 73-95), Plate II.) In A.D. 125 Hadrian restored the old name (Paus. viii. 8. 12). The fate of Mantinea caused a sensation throughout Greece; it marked a reversion to a standard of warfare which had been mitigated during the third century (d. Tarn, CAH, vii. 2n, 76o), and Phylarchus voices contemporary opinion better than P., who writes from the harder background of the second

260

THE ACHAEAN LEAGUE; THE

CLEO~ENEAN

WAR II.56.Io

century, when the fate of Mantinea had become the common lot of captured towns (cf. Paus. vii. 16. 8 for Corinth in 146). rf]v &.pxcnoT6.TTJV Ka.t ~:u;ylaTTJV 1ToAw: despite a reference to Mav-nvlYJv l.pa-retv'>]v in Homer, Iliad, ii. 607, the synoecism of historical Man tinea in the plain, out of five demes (Strabo, viii. 337) is comparatively late. Beloch (i. I. 335 n. 4) puts it back into the early sixth century. other scholars (cf. Busolt-Swoboda, ii. 1396 n. 2; Bolte, RE, 'Mantinea', coL 1318) make it as late as just before 450. But in any case the present passage is tendentious in Phylarchus, and ironical in P. 7. da6.yeL 1TEpmAo~e:O..,; yvva.LKC!v: i.e. probably embracing altars or statues of the gods like Hecuba in Virgil, Ae'lt. ii. 515-17. HaayHv sometimes means 'to bring a play on the stage'; cf. Plato, Rep. ii. 381 D; Ap. 35 B. 9. To ..• Tij.,; hnopla.s ol.ce'Lov 0.~-ta. Ka.t xpTjalp.ov: 'the nature and use of history' (not, with Paton, 'how far it (i.e. Phylarchus' treatment) is proper or serviceable to history'). P. proposes to distinguish between history and tragedy after the manner of Aristotle. 10. lh;'L • , • ou~e ~1Tt1TATJTTEW KTA.: so MSS., B-\V. 2 ; but Casaubon's emendation lK'1TAo/'retv is wholly convincing, d. § II. P.'s vocabulary, as Ullman points out (TAPA, 1942, 41-42), both here and in similar passages recalls the traditional function of tragedy. Thus the anagnorisis is lK'lrk')KnKov (Arist. Poet. 14. 8. I454 a 4; d. 16. 8. I455 a I7; Vit. Aesch. 7. 1rpos lK1rAYJgw -r€pa-rwoYJ, 9, lK1rA~gat -rov ofjfLov; [Longinus] Subl. I. ·h avv l1mA~g€t -rofJ mOavoiJ ••• KpaT€t TO OavfLd.cnov). See below, xvi. r8. 2 (criticism of Zeno), vr.ep{JoA~Ji

T€pa-rdas .•• lK7TATJgLv -rwv 1roAAwv. Taus i.vSexop.f.vou.,; 'Aoyous tlJn'Lv: 'to seek after men's probable utterances'. P. opposes the traditional procedure by ·which his predecessors (cf. Thuc. i. 22) invented speeches to put into the mouths of their characters; cf. xii. 25 b (contrasting -rove; Ka-r' d.)o.7]8~:tav dp1]fLlvovs and ifiw8ij lmx<tp~fLa.Ta Ka£ OL€gootKovs Myovs}, xxxvi. 1. 7 (only what was said is to be reported). P. regards speeches as important (cf. xii. 25 a J, a axeoov ws K£cpd.Aata 1'WV 7rpag£WV €em KaL avvlx
others, despite the principles here laid down, seem to give a mere rhetorical exposition suitable to the occasion. Wunderer (ii. g--II) sees a development from the position of the present passage to that in xii. 25 i 4 ff.; but the argument there, if properly understood, is 261

II. 56.

IO

EVENTS IN GREECE

completely in agreement with that here. See also La Roche, 66 ff.; Susemihl, ii. II4; and above, pp. 13-14. Ta 1Ta.pe1rbp.eva. To is •.'11ToKelp.evots £€a.pt9p.e~o-tla.t: 'to enumerate the possible consequences of the events under consideration', i.e. whether they are in fact known to have happened or not. Cf. Arist. Poet. 9· I. 1451 a 37 f., lfoallep6v St ... on oo Tb Ta yellbfLElla Mynv, TOVTO 7TOHJTOV lpyov ~aTlv, d,\,\' ola Civ ylllotTo Kal Ta SvvaTa KaTa To ElK6s ~To allayKaiov, ibid. 1451 b 4-5, the difference between the historian and the tragic poet---Tl[) TOll p.€v n:l. yevbjLeva AEy<w, TOll S€ ola i'ill ylllotTo. But

P. rejects Aristotle's conclusion that tragedy is therefore a higher thing (a7Tovoat6Tepoll) than history; cf. §§ u-12, where this judgement is implicitly rejected from P.'s utilitarian, didactic standpoint. Ka.00.1Tep ot Tpa.y't'Stoypa~ol: 'like tragic poets', cf. I7. 6 n. 11-12. Difference between tragedy and history. Tragedy seeks EK7TAfjga, Ka£ t/Jvxaywyfjaat, to thrill and charm the audience, an Aristotelian conception; on EK7TM]gat see 56. Ion., on t/Jvxaywyfjaat cf: Arist. Poet. 6. 13. 1450 a 33 (on peripeteiai and anagnoriseis), 6. 19. 1450 b 17 (of the actual spectacle, ot/Jt>). History, however, seeks Sto&.gat KaL 1rdaat Tovs lfotAop.aBoiJvTa<;, to instruct and convince serious students (cf. iii. 21. 9, xi. 19 a z for the contrast between what charms the casual reader, Tovs aKovoVTas, and what benefits the serious student). Further the charm of tragedy is only KaTa To TTap6ll, the profit of history el> TOll 1r&.vm xp6vov, a distinction which, in its rhetorical formulation, recalls Thucydides' famous claim (i. 22. 4, KTfjp.d TE €s ald p.iiMov ~ dycfmap.a t<; TO 7Tapaxpfjp.a aKOVELJl gtlyKHTat) ; cf. iii. 31. 12 n. In tragedy the governing element is Tb 7Tt8av6ll, Ki'lll ii t/J€uSo<;which is Aristotle's Ttt 8vvaTtt KC1Ttt TO elK6<; (d. 56. IOn.); cf. Poet. 9· 6. 1451 b r6, arnov S' on mBav6v €an Tb ouvaTb!l. In history it is truth. This contrast P. somewhat overstates, so as to limit history to a record of all (7rttp.7Tav) that happened, however commonplace (56. Io, Keill 1rdvv p.hpta Tvyxcillwmv ol'Ta) ; whereas in practice his very urge towards didacticism forces him to apply some principle of selection. 12. s,a TTJV lmaT'TJV TWV 9ewp.evwv: 'to beguile the spectator'. For this non-Attic sense of a7TclT1J cf. iv. 20. 5, music was not introduced l1r' dmhn Kat Y01JTdq.. Schweighaeuser quotes Josephus, AI, viii. s6, fL1JO€v •.. €gw TfjS d,\7JBe{as Myop.£ll, fL1}0t 7Tt8aliOLS nat Kai 7Tpos a7TiiT1Jll Kal nfpt/Jw l1raywyo£s rryll iaToptall OtaAap.{3dliOVTES, T~ll p.€v lgiTaatll lfo€vyv xwpts ouT' "AEE~V ..• olh'' bpy(~eo-tla.t ••. Suva:rbv: by simply relating peripeteiai shorn of their causes and purposes Phylarchus fails to arouse legitimate (EtlA&yws) pity or proper (KaB1JK6vTws) anger. 262

THE ACHAEAN LEAGUE; THE CLEOMENEAN WAR II. 58.1

P. here implies that both these emotions are legitimate for an historian in certain conditions; these were fulfilled when the emotion was harnessed to a didactic purpose. In that case the end justified the means. Ullman, TAP A, 1942, 30-31, would trace this theory back to Ephorus, (d. Strabo, vii. 302); but see Walbank, Bull. Inst. Class. Stud., 1955, 9· 15. Tov KAE1TTT]V T] f10Lxov &.1ToKTe(vas: both in Greece and at Rome an adulterer caught in flagranti delicto might be killed with impunity; d. Lysias, i. 26; Cato ap. Gell. x. 23. 4-5. A similar right existed to kill a thief apprehended at night, or in the daytime if he attempted self-defence with a weapon; this was laid down in the Twelve Tables (Riccobono, Fontes, i. 57-59) and in various Greek codes (d. Hitzig, RE, 'furtum', col. 391). Tov 1rpoSOTT]V f1 Tupavvov: for P.'s views of tyrannicide see 59· 4 ff. Greek opinion traditionally condoned tyrannicide (d. Arist. Pol. ii. 7· 13. 1267 a 12 ff.), and there may have been an actual law at Athens; d. An doc. de my st. 96-97, o8~ d7ToK-relvas -rdv -raiJ-ra 7TO£~aav-ra Ka1 0 GVf.Lf3ovAi;Vaas oaws l!a-rw Kat day~>· See von Scala, 44 n. I, 140.

57. 1. AhwAois evexe(p~aav QUTOUS: d. 46. 2 n. for the earlier fortunes of Mantinea. 2. ~Te~ TeTapn(:l 1rpoTEpov TTJS i\vnyovou 1rapouatas: Aratus' capture of Mantinea (d. iv. 8. 4; Plut. A rat. 36. 2; Cleom. 5· I-2; Paus. ii. 8. 6) was in spring 227, during his tenth a-rpa-rYJyla, and immediately after the defeat at Mt. Lycaeum. Antigonus' presence is probably his presence in the Peloponnese (Beloch, iv. 2. 223, against Ferrabino, 269, who applies the phrase to Antigonus' appearance outside Mantinea); d. 55· 2, 8,0. -r~v .:4v-rty6vov 7Tapova£av. From spring 227 to late summer 224, when Doson entered the Peloponnese (d. 54· 3 n.), is over three years, hence Aratus' capture of Mantinea took place t-re£ -re-rapTttJ 7Tp6-repov -rij> .:4v-rty6vov 7Tapovalas. O~a TTJV , . , iJ.f1apT(av: We do not knOW the circumstanCeS in which

3.

the Mantineans left the Achaeans for the Aetolians; but it is possible that it was with Achaean consent (d. 46. 2 n.), despite P.'s censure here. Normally secession would count as rebellion; d. Aymard, ACA, 2o8. P. exaggerates Achaean leniency. From 58. 2-3 it appears that the Achaeans sent 300 Achaeans chosen by lot and 200 mercenaries to Mantinea. Plutarch (Arat. 36. 3) says that Aratus -rovs f.LETolKovs 7TOA£-ras l7TOLYJGi;V av-rwv, whence Fougeres (494) infers that the Achaeans were settlers and received Mantinean citizenship. See 58. 4 n. P.'s picture of the Mantinean 'conversion' (§§ 6 ff.) represents the ascendancy of a party as a change of mind in the community. 58. 1. Tas . . . O'TaO'E~S KQL Tas {m' AtTwAwv . . . em~ouAas: the pro-Achaean faction, probably the rich landowners (d. Bolte, RE, 263

II. 58.

I

EVENTS IN GREECE

'Mantinea', col. 1328), evidently distrusted their authority, and asked for a garrison. The reference to Aetolia is part of the falsified Aratean version of the Cleomenean \Var; cf. 45· I n., 46. 1-3, 49· 7. 4. aTa.a16.cra.vrEs npos aifO.s: 'becoming involved in internal struggles' (not 'they fell out with the Achaeans' (Paton)). The popular, proSpartan, party gained the ascendancy, and called in Cleomenes (Plut. Arat. 39· r; Cleom. 14. r); the date was early summer 226 (5r. 3 n.). TOUS na.pa. TWV !1\xa.lWV Ola.Tp(~ovra.s ••• KO.T~o-+a.sa.v: i.e. the 300 Achaean settlers. Plutarch's statement (Cteom. q. r), that Tijv t{>povpcw T~V Axataw (J'!JV<'!Kj3aAovTfi<; lvexdpt(J'aV avTOU<;, either represents an alternative account (Phylarchus ?) or refers to the garrison proper of 200 mercenaries, who may well have been expelled while the hated settlers were reserved for a more violent fate. See Niccolini, 40 n. r. 6. KO.TCL TOUS KOWOUS TWV av9pwnwv vop.ous: cf. § ro TOV<; TOV TTOAEJ.LOV voJ.Lov;, 8. 1.2. The concept of general rules governing men's conduct as men (not merely as Greeks) appears in Herod. v'ii. r36. z, the killing of heralds violates Tel 1TUVTWV av8pw1TWV VOJLLJ.La; but in practice the fifth century concerned itself mainly with a code of conduct common to Greeks (cf. Thuc. iii. 58. J, 67. 6 (6 Twv 'EM.~vwv v&JLo;), iv. 97· 3; Eurip. Med. 536 ff., r339 ff., Hec. II99 ff., A~~dr. 173 f., Heracl. 130 ff., roro, d. 965 ff., Supp. 3n, 526). The problem of international laws exercised !socrates' school; cf. Diod. xiii. 2o-2i (probably Ephorus; d. Schwartz, RE, 'Diodoros', col. 6Br), with references to both Tov; nov 'E>..>..~vwv lBL(J'f.WV<; (23. 4) and ·rli KOtvO. VOJLLJ.La (26. 2). Likewise the Aristotelian school, which produced the famous study of comparative law, Theophrastus' Laws, reached out towards a concept of law embracing more than Greeks (Arist. Nic. Eth. viii. r. 3· 1155 a 21 f.; Cic. Fin. v. 65 (peripatetic source)). Cf. von Scala, 299 ff. But whether conceived as applying to Hellenes or to all men, the concept of natural law is one of great importance from early times. 'Though •.. repeatedly challenged ... the idea persisted of an absolute, universal standard of right behind and above the laws of particular political societies' (Calhoun, i4). It is to the principles implied in such a concept that P. refers back in pa5sagcs like this; but the fact that the actual details of what is permissible are so vague prevents our constructing a system out of P.'s incidental remarks, such as von Scala attempts. Here, for example, he demands far greater leniency for an Achaean garrison than he will accord to opponents; cf. § ro, where 'the laws of war' allow the enslavement of men, women, and children in a captured city (cf. 56. 6 n.). Moreover, how do the rules of war apply to a popular revolt inside a city? Clearly P. has no scientific or consistent answer to such questions, but approaches them in the light of party and patriotic prejudices so strong that they lead him to such callous judgements as appear in§ 12 and 6o. 8. 264

THE ACHAEAN LEAGUE; THE CLEOMENEAN WAR II. 59· 6

12. Tous €A.ev9Epous: 'the free population' (not, as Paton, 'the male citizens') ; the masculine form covers both sexes; cf. § 9 fLETd TlKvwv Ka~ yvva~Kwv; Plut. Arat. 45· 6 (from Phylarchus), 1rafoas- o£ Kat yvvaiKas-

~vSpa1ToO[uavTo.

v

TO lj!eu8os chr19a.vov: cf. 56. 12, n\ m8av6v, KUV zfor=iJoos-. Phylarchus, to secure npaTda (cf. 59· 3, and 17. 6 n.), discards the criteria even of

his own 'tragedy'' since his work is a1Tl8avov. 13. To "'ra.pa.ttE(}levov ••• uuvemcrrftua.l: 'to pay attention to an example close at hand'. Kupleuua.vTes TEyea.Twv: cf. 54· 7; the date was late spring or early summer 223. 59. 1. )\pLcrroJ.J-a.xov: cf. 44· 6 n. for his earlier career. In 272 the leader of the pro-Macedonian faction at Argos was Aristippus (I) (Plut. Pyrrh. 30. r). At the time of the revolt of Alexander, son of Craterus, at Corinth in 249, the tyrant of Argos was Aristomachus (I) (JG, iiz. 774), who was murdered in 241/o and succeeded by Aristippus (II) (Plut. A rat. 25. 4), who was succeeded in turn by Aristomachus (II), who joined the Achaean League. Since this man was the son of Aristomachus (Syll. 5IO, cf. IG, iv. IIII), he appears to have been brother to Aristippus (II), son of Aristomachus (I) and grandson of Aristippus (I), who perhaps became tyrant as a result of Pyrrhus' defeat and death. On Apia, daughter of Aristippus (II), and wife of Nabis of Sparta, see xiii. 7. 6. Cf. Beloch, iv. 1. 579-80 n. 3; Freeman, HFG, 297 n. 2. v"'roxe1pLov )\vnyov
2,

Aaf36vus- KaTrt 1TOAEfLOV fm.oxelp~ov.

ets KeyxpeO.s ••• crrpe~Aou~-tevov ci."'ro9a.vel:v:

cf. Plut. A rat. 44· 6 (following Phylarchus), €v Kr=yxpmts- uTpE{3Awuavn:s- KaTm6vnuav. Cenchreae was the Corinthian port on the Saronic Gulf. Plutarch alleges that Aratus was much blamed for the incident; he would be doubly responsible, as UTpaT7Jyos- a?JToKpaTwp of the League, and also since he had been elected general at Argos after its recovery (Plut. Arat. 44· s)-unless, indeed, Plutarch here refers to a purely military commission (Aymard, ACA, 114 n.). 4. Ka.Ta ye TftV Tou ~iov "11"poa.1peuLV: 'in his political conduct throughout his life', i.e. as a tyrant. The argument is illogical; in accepting Aristomachus into the Confederation and electing him general the Achaeans had condoned his earlier career. And if he had resumed his tyranny after Cleomenes took Argos, P. would surely have said so explicitly. 6. Ta.uT"l'i Se ~-tei~w tta.T"lYop(a.v KTA.: cf. Cic. de re pub. ii. 48, 'tyrannus, quo neque taetrius nee foedius nee dis hominibusque 265

II. 59· 6

EVE)l'TS l)l' GREECE

inmsms animal ullum cogitari potest: qui quamquam figura est hominis, morum tamen immanitate uastissimas uincit beluas'; off. iii. 32, 'quem (sc. tyrannum) est honestum necare ... ista in figura hominis feritas et immanitas beluae'. For Cicero the question had achieved a new significance in the career of Caesar, culminating in the Ides of March 44· See 56. rs n. 7. flt&s .qflEpas: in 235 Aratus forced an entry into Argos by night, but on receiving no help from the Argives had to withdraw at the end of the next day, wounded through the thigh. Plutarch (Arat. 27. 3-4) refers this to Aristippus' tyranny, probably rightly; the punishment inflicted by Aristomachus will have been after his seizure of the tyranny on Aristippus' death near Cleonae the same summer (Plut. Arat. 29. ; cf. Walbank, Aratos, r86-7). P.'s indignation probably reflects the polemic of Aratus' lvf emoirs. 9. O.<jlopflfi TaVT!J Kat vpo<jluaet XPTJC"Uflevos: the new tyrant thus rid himself of his political opponents, some of whom were no doubt Aratus' confederates (despite P.'s emphasis on their innocence). 10. TO. ••. athou Kat Twv npoyovwv aa~E~fJflaTa: the offences of Aristomachus' ancestors are unknown, and may derive largely from the rancour of Aratus, who was condemned by a court of arbitration to pay 3o minae for invading Aristippus' territory in peace-time (46. 2 n.). Aratus' Memoirs are probably also the source of Plutarch's statement (Arat. 25. 4) that Aristippus was e~wl.iaTepo<; • •• Tvpavvos than Aristomachus. 60. 2. on ... anEKn'LVav: P. does not admit this accusation, which is made by Phylarchus (d. § 8). He merely argues that Phylarchus' charge, if true, would not expose Antigonus and Aratus to any recrimination, since Aristomachus deserved an even more horrible fate (§ 7). 4, O.veA.niOTws 5i Tfj~ 6.cr<jlaA.e1a~ ~Tuxe: untrue. \Vhen Aristomachus laid down his tyranny in 229/8 (44. 6 n.), the Achaeans made definite terms, guaranteeing his safety (Plut. Arat. 35· 5. iJY'flova Kai O"'TpaTT)yov KaTaaTfjcra.vTES: d. Plut. A rat. 35· 5· This ~yEp.ovla probably means merely that Aristomachus commanded the Achaean forces during his UTpaTT)yta of 228/7, e.g. at Pallantium (Plut. Arat. 35· 7), it is not to be confused with the honorary ~ycp.ovlu. of Ptolemy Euergetes (cf. Plut. Arat. 24. 4, ~yEp.ovlu.v €xm'Ta 'TToAEfLOV Ka1 Ka-rd. yfjv Kat KaTa 8£\arrav), and the double title is used mainly for rhetorical effect, like the inaccurate use of '"ap(i m5Sas (§ rr) to describe a desertion which took place in summer 225, more than two years after Aristomachus' aTpaTYJyla. 7. flETa TlJ.LWp(a~ napa5etyJ.LaTt~6J.Levov: 'tortured as a deterrent spectacle'. On P .' s callousness here cf. 6 n. 266

THE ACHAEAN LEAGUE; THE CLEOMENEAN WAR II. 62.4 1

61. 1. f1ET a.li€-TJaews tta.i Sta.Oeaews: 'with exaggeration and rhetorical elaboration'. 2. 1repl. Tous a.l~To(/s ••• Katpo6s: in fact, autumn 223 (54· 13), a year after Aristomachus' execution. 3. ~TJAWTWV • • • cjleuKTWV: cf. Livy, praef. Io, 'in de tibi tuaeque reipublicae quod imitere capias, inde foedum inceptu foedum exitu quod uites'. For P.'s moral and didactic attitude towards history cf. i. I, 2. 4. eis Tt,v Meu.c:v tds }}rnip-r7Jv, Tijs 8~ 1roAc:ws -r.i 1rAt:i'a-ra Kat p.e'ytaTa p.e'pYJ KaTaaKwpas Kat Dtarp8.:f.pas avl(wgtv E1T OtKOV. Ta StuxfXta. ••• KQ.Ta Tous e9tO'f10US: similarly Aratus persuaded the Argives to present the property of 'the traitors and tyrants' to Antigonus (Plut. A rat. 44· 5); and Aemilius Paullus aroused surprise by refusing any part of the wealth he captured from Perseus (xviii. 35· 4 ff.). Cleomenes, however, must have placed his share in the general exchequer; for though the subsidy was still forthcoming from Ptolemy, Cleomenes knew that he was negotiating with Doson (Pint. Cleom. 22. 7), and had been reduced to raising money by freeing helots (Plut. Cleom. 23. I) that very winter (223). Moreover, he could scarcely accumulate a private fortune after his social revolution. Hence, Phylarchus' statement is to be treated with reserve in this respect also (cf. 63. 3). 4. ev To is Ka.O' T)f1iis Katpois: the period of Peloponnesian unity (rrdv-r.:s EV Kai. TaD-ro >.e'yovns) and prosperity (p.Ey£a-r7JV Kaprrova8at 1

II. 62.4

EVENTS IN GREECE

(!t'!l3a'fLovlav), which P. here contrasts with the second half of the third century, falls clearly between r8r, when Lycortas' efforts brought Sparta into the League (38. 3 n.), and the destruction of Corinth and the dissolution of the Confederacy in 146 (Paus. vii. 16. g). Compare the picture of a desolated Greece in xxxvi. 17. 5· It follows that P. was writing this section of his work before 146; see further, 37-7o n. TocroiJTo 'ITAfj9os XPTJflaTwv: for general discussion of economic conditions in Greece in the light of this and other evidence see A. Wilhelm, Jahresh., 1914, ro8-r6; J. H. Lipsius, Rh. Mus., 1916, r6r ff.; Rostovtzeff, SEHHW, i. 205-6: ii. 750~-3; iii. 1366 n. 31, 1507 n. 20, r6o6-7 n. 85. That the total value of the movable property from the whole Peloponne.se did not amount to 6,ooo talents in 223 is very probably true. Wilhelm (op. cit. ur-12) calculates that its area (21,69o sq. km.)l is roughly 66 to 67 times that of .Mantinea (reckoning this at 325 sq. km. with Fougeres rather than only 275 with Beloch). Since the lrdrrAa of Mantinea probably came to 75 talents (§ I I n.), that of the Peloponnese, on the same basis, would work out at 5,o25 talents. Such a calculation Wilhelm admits to be rough and ready; but it affords some confirmation for P.'s statement. 6. Trs ..• oux h:TTopTJICE: 'who has not read ... ?'; cf. i. 63. 7 n. 6-7. The Athenian valuation of 378 B.C.: for discussion of this controversial topic see Wilhelm, Jahresh., 1914, ro8-16; J. H. Lipsius, Rh. Mus., 1916, 16r-86; A. Zimmern, The Greek Commonwealth"" (Oxford, 1924), 292-3 n.; A. Momigliano, Athen., I9JI, 477 ff.; A. Andreades, History of Greek PubLic Finance, i (Harvard, 1933), :;z648; 'laTopla Tijs 'EAk'JVLidjs OTJp,oalas oll
268

THE ACHAEAN LEAGUE; THE CLEOMENEAN WAR II.62.9

privately held capital of Attica, including fixed and movable property (but excluding state capital and temple possessions) 5,750 talents ( = £r,32B,zso sterling) seems very small. Hence, since Boeckh (Staatshaushaltung der Athener, i 2 (Berlin, rSsr), 636 ff.) attempts have been made to interpret -rlp:ry11-a as 'taxable capita]'; but Beloch's view (Hermes, r885, 237 ff.) that TlfL7JfLO. is a valuation of all capital, which only falls short of completeness through error and fraud, has won wide acceptance (see the bibliography for both views in Busolt-Swoboda, r2r3-15 n.), and is strongly supported by Wilhelm's deductions from second-century Messenian documents, which the n11-aalat based on an area of 407 sq. km. as r,256 talents. The cultivable area of Attica was 2,647 sq. km.; but Messenia was more fertile, and Athenian wealth, being comprised to a larger extent in non-agricultural property, gave greater scope for evasion of assessment. A close comparison cannot therefore be made. But in general the Messenian figures confirm those of P. for Attica; and it seems certain that P. believed his figure of 5.7so talents to represent the total capital. Such a theory as that of Schwahn (Rh. Mus., 1933, 281; RE, 'Tele', cols. 248 ff.), who resurrects Rodbertus's hypothesis that TLfL7JfLO. represents an estimate of income, would imply that the total Athenian capital came to so,ooo talents, and that P. is referring to the of Demosthenes' speech On the Symmories (xiv), i.e. 354/3. and not 378/i; but it seems improbable that P. would prove thus simultaneously crassly ignorant and grossly careless. It is possible that P.'s figure ignores many small properties below the exemption limit for Elaopat (cf. Thuc. iii. r9. I) is the technical Athenian term for a property-tax levied to meet the costs of war. 9. "'I'AElw , , , Tp1a.Kocr£wv: 3oo Attic talents = £69,300 sterling.

II. 62. II

EVENTS IN GREECE

11. ouSaoo<; yO.p OVTE<; OEUTEPOL ••• MnVTlVE~<;: on Man tinea, in comparison with Megalopolis, see Bury, JHS, 1898, 20; cf. Wilhelm, ]ahresh., 1914, ru. The city walls were 3,942 m. long (Fougeres, 14o); and though for the late fifth century Fougeres (571-2) calculates its free population as 18,ooo (his addition of some S,ooo-Io,ooo slaves is dubious; cL Beloch, iii. 1. z8o}, Wilhelm concludes that in 223 its total population will not have exceeded 12,ooo. If, as he suggests, about g,ooo of these were sold into slavery at r5 minae per head, this would make a total of 225 talents, leaving only 75 talents for all movable property an indication of how little the average man possessed apart from his land. For the relevance of these figures for P.'s estimate of the value of movable property in the Peloponnese see§ 4 n. 63. 1. nToi'.Ep.nio<; TO p.Ev xop1]yEiv a:rroAeyEt: d. 5I· 2 n. It is clear from Plutarch (Cleom. 22. 7) that negotiations with Doson had continued for some time before this ultimatum to Cleomencs ; cf. also Plut. Cleom. 27. 1, 27. 4 (from Phylarchus), on the importance of money to Cleomenes. The battle is that of Sellasia, fought in July 222

(65-69 n.).

2. EK.K.U~EvEw To is oAoLs: the metaphor was obvious and common; cf. i. 87. 8, iii. 94· 4; Plut. Caes. 32. 6; Cor.3. 1. That the wordso
64. Cleomenes' devastation of the Argolid: cf. Kromayer, AS, i. zmr-ro; vValbank, Aratos, 108-9. P.'s source is Aratus' Memoirs; for Plutarch 270

THE ACHAEAN LEAGUE; THE CLEOMENEAN WAR II.64. 7

(Cleom. 26) records a second invasion of the Argolid after Doson had left for Tegea, which is known to be from Phylarchus (cf. FGH. 81 F 57 for his use of po!J-ifw.la, found in Plut. Cleom. z6), and is clearly a doublet of the first invasion, which Plutarch describes, after P., in Cleom. 25. A comparison of Plut. Cleom. zs. 4 ff. with P. ii. 64 shows that the former draws directly on the latter, with many verbal repetitions. No question of a common source arises (as Treves suggests); cf. Plut. Cleom. 25. 4, W> tfo7Ja~ llo>t6f3•os. I. JlETd Ti}v Tfj~ MEynATjS 'll'OAEWS axwow: cf. 55· 2-7. It fell in autumn 223; Doson wintered 223/2 at Argos; and Cleomenes' attack on the Argolid will be February-March 222. 2. Iii~ ~:.~.ev Toi~ 'll'oAAo'Ls eooKEL: P. contrasts the view of the layman, who is ignorant of strategy, with the judgement of the expert (himself). His favourable criticism of Cleornenes' strategy at this point will be his own; it can scarcely come from Aratus' Memoirs. ot 7roMol here are not 'the masses'; and this passage is not to be taken as an example of F.'s anti-popular bias, as by von Scala (43). OLd Ti]v oxupontTa. TW\1 ••• TO'ITW\1: Cleornenes marched over Parnon. 'Er zog also nicht den bequemen Weg tiber Tegea, sondern iiber den Pass von Hagios Petros (etwa 10oo Meter) oder den von Kastanitza (1521 Meter) direkt nach Argos' (Krornayer, AS, i. 209 n. +)· The difficulties sprang from snow rather than frontier guards. Cf. also the Phylarchean version of Plut. Cleom. z6. I, KafJ' J·dpas dSo6s(than via Tegea). 3. OLa.cpuKOTa. TdS Svv6.J1ELS: cf. 54· 14, Jn' o{Kov laatfofjsa: 'InfVTas, 55· I. Plutarch (Cleom. 25. 5) says they were D£Ernrap!J-lvov> KaTa n6Atv, evidently referring to the cities of Macedonia (if this is not merely careless transcription of P.). That Doson thus handicapped himself through a critical winter is an indication of the importance of the Macedonian men to the Macedonian fields. Tovs 16.pyELous • • • &.uxnAAEw Ko.i. KO.Tap.i~cpeu(Jal Tov 16.vTtyovov: Cleornenes' plan envisaged two possibilities; either popular indignation would force Doson to fight and be defeated, or the elements formerly favourable to him (§§ 4, 6, oxAo•) would be detached from Macedon. 6. TtYEJlOVlKWS Kai (Ja.uLALKW~: cf. Plut. Cleom. 25. s. W> ~Sn a7'paT7Jyov £11-tfopova. F.'s praise may reflect the views of Aratus, who will have approved Doson's refusal to be coerced by the ox>.ot. Aratus' Memoirs may have contained abuse of Doson (Plut. Clcom. 16. 3~4; cf. Walbank, Aratos, r6I n. r); but their apologetic character must necessarily have involved some praise of the king with whom Aratus carne to terms. 7. O.ucpaA.ws • • • l'll'a.vilADEv: in a \vide sweep through Ph1ius and Orchomenus, if any confidence can be placed in the Phylarchean doublet (Plut. Cleom. 26). 271

II. 65

EVENTS IN GREECE

65-69. The Battle of Sellasia. (a} Date. Defenders have been found for 223, .2::12, and 221. The convincing arguments for 222 are succinctly given by Tarn (C AH, vii. 863; later bibliography in Walbank, Philip, 296 n. 5}; 223 must definitely be rejected (cf. Porter, Hermath. 48, 1933, 270-r). P. states (iv. 35· 8} that in spring 219 Sparta had been without kings axEoov f/871 TpEts ~vtavro15s, a statement hardly reconcilable with Sellasia in July 221. Against 222 is Doson's visit to the Nemean festival after the battle (7o. 4); for the Nemea was held in 'odd' years. But the general situation can well have caused a postponement of the festival of 223 (cf. 70. 4 n.). Account must also be taken of the Achaean general list. If T(j> itpaTq; a7paT7!YofJvn (52. 3) and f.tETO. Ttp.o~l.vou Tov a7pa771yov (53· 2} both refer to full, regular UTPa771yl1u of the Confederation, they must be those of zz4/3 and 223/2 respectively; in that case the return of Argos to the League is in 223 and, since between that event and Sellasia Doson twice went into winter quarters (54· 5, 54· 13-14), Sellasia is in 221. However, the phrases in 52. 3 and 53· z need not and cannot refer to full UTpaT7Jyta, (for alternative interpretations see ad loc.}; for the evidence from Egypt is decisive against Sellasia in 221. Plutarch (Cleom. 32; cf. P. v. 35· r) shows that Cleomenes was in Egypt for some time before Euergetes' death; and Euergetes died between Choiak 2I and Tybi 2 s-I6 February 221 (Skeat, Mizraim, 6, 1937, 32). Hence Sellasia was in 222. (b) P.'s sources. The battle of Sellasia is described 65--{)9; Plut. Cleom. z8; Phil. 6; and the relationship between these three accounts is discussed by Kromayer (AS, i. 266-77) and Ferrabino (Atti Ace. Torino, rgr8-r9, 751-Qo, 8u-rg). Kromayer shows that the details in the Philopoemen correspond closely and often verbally with P.; they are probably taken from P.'s Life of Philopoeme1z. The version in the Cleomenes mentions Phylarchus by name and is clearly favourable to the king, to the extent of attributing his defeat to treachery; Phylarchus will be the source here. Finally, P.'s version is very detailed on the Macedonian side, and especially on the action around the centre and right flank. Hence Kromayer concludes that P.'s source was a Megalopolitan informant from Philopoemen's staff, perhaps even Philopoemen himself. Ferrabino attempts to isolate three sources : (r) The Polybian account, with certain omissions, which makes Antigonus alone take the offensive (Aratus). (2} ii. 67-j-Plut. Phil. 6. Antigonus takes the offensive, but the victory is due to Philopoemen (Megalopolitan source). (3) ii. 66. 4, 70. 3; Plut. Cleom. 27-28. Both kings take the offensive on their right wings. Doson's victory is due to Damotelas' treachery (Phylarchus). 272

THE ACHAEAN LEAGUE; THE CLEOMENEAN WAR IL65.2

But in fact there are no substantial discrepancies between versions (r) and (2), and both of these probably go back to the Megalopolitan source. Some real discrepancies exist between the accounts in 67 and Plut. Phil. 6 (see 66. n n.), but these are not more than can be explained by the greater compression of P. and the carelessness of Plutarch, if both go back ultimately to F.'s biography of Philopoemen. Against the view that Aratus' Memoirs were a source for P. are these two points: (r) The complete omission of Sellasia from Plutarch's Aratus suggests that it was given no prominence in theM emoirs, and hence that Aratus played no important part in it (cf. Walbank, Aratos, 109~10). (z) Cleomenes is treated more favourably than usual (cf. 66. 4). (c) On the strategy, tactics, and location of the battle see the works listed in C AH, vii. 885, § 12 b. Of these the most important is Kromayer, AS, i. 199 ff. (further note in iv. 597~9), which contains an excellent map (repeated with additional modern place-names in BCH, 1910, Pl. XIII). Some valid points have been made against Kromayer by Soteriades; cf. BCH, 191o, s-57 (Soteriades); so8~37 (Kromayer); 1911, 87-107, 241-2 (Soteriades). See also Kahrstedt, Hermes, 1913, z86--91. For the points at issue see 65. 7 n. Earlier bibliography than that in CAH, vii, is listed in Kromayer.

65. 1.

(K TTJS xuJ-Lau(as: d. 54· 14, 64. 1, 64. 3· The joint force did not move till 'early summer'; perhaps the Macedonians were late in returning from their agricultural work at home. 2-5. Doson's forces can be set out in tabular form (cf. Kromayer, AS, i. 228): Macedonian phalangites 10,000} cavalry 300 Macedonian peltasts 3,000 Agrianians 1,000 1,000 Gauls Mercenaries 3,000 cavalry 300 Achaeans 3,000 cavalry 300 Megalopolitans 1,000 Boeotians . 2,000 cavalry 200 Epirotes 1,000 cavalry so Acarnanians 1,000 cavalry so Illyrians 1,6oo Total IIorse 1,200 Foot 27,6oo

This matches F.'s total, except that (§ 5) he rounds off the infantry to 'about z8,ooo'. The small proportion of cavalry in this army is noteworthy. Alexander's army crossed the Hellespont with foot to horse in the proportion of 6: 1. The number of national Macedonian 4866

T

2]3

II. 65.2

EVENTS IN GREECE

troops is also noteworthy for its smallness. For a general discussion of Macedonian armies at this time see Walbank, Philip, 289---94. 2. TrEATaa-r&s: the peltasts of the Antigonid armies were the equivalent of Alexander's hypaspists, a crack force which fought alongside the phalanx in battle, but was called upon for any special duties, e.g. ambushes, forced marches, and special expeditions. At this time their total was probably 3,ooo, though by r68 there were s,ooo; like Alexander's hypaspists they were apparently organized in chiliarchies. Of their uniform nothing definite is known; but, despite their smaller shields, their armour was sufficiently heavy to allow them to fight along with the phalanx. See, further, § 3 n.; and Walbank, Philip, 291-3. :Aypuiva.s: the Agrianians were a Thraco-Macedonian people living about Rhodope and the source of the Strymon (cf. Hirschfeld, RE, 'Agrianes (r)', col. 891; Launey, i. 404 ff.). Their weapon \'v'aS the javelin (Arrian, Anab. i. 14. I, iii. 13. s). sling, or bow and arrow (v. 79· 6), and they formed one of the most useful and energetic corps in Alexander's army (cf. Berve, i. 125, 137 ff.), frequently acting along with the hypaspists on special operations. \\Thether Alexander's Agrianians served as allies or mercenaries is unknown (Griffith, 14). At Sellasia, however, they are distinguished from the mercenaries (Launey, i. 4o6 against Griffith, 7o), and were either subjects or allies. Cf. v. 79· 6. raX4Ta<;: probably Gauls from Europe, not Galatians from Asia Minor (so Treves). On their use as mercenaries see Griffith, 252; but here P. distinguishes them from the mercenaries (J.<~a8oc{>6povr; ••• ToVs- 7TaVTas-), and Launey (i. 517) suggests that they were provided 'par un roitelet barbare, en vertu d'un traite symmachique'. Later Phi:ip V used Gallic cavalry; cf. v. 3· 2, q. 4; but the Gauls at Sellasia are infantry (Schweighaeuser, 'Index Hist. et Geog.', s.v. Galli, makes them cavalry). 3. :Axa~v ••. MEyaAoTroAlTas ..• KEpKL66.s: the Achaean forces are small {though larger than those of any of the other allies). No doubt Doson determined the relative numbers to be furnished by the members of the new Symmachy, and the Achaeans provided what was required. On the meaning of E7TLA
THE ACHAEAN LEAGUE; THE CLEOMENEAN WAR II.6s.6

Cercidas) in the negotiations with Doson {48. 4 n.) and the old ties of that city with Macedon, but mainly by the fact that the Megalopolitans were armed by Doson (see next note). Ets Tov Ma.~<:eSovtK~>V TP01Tov Ka.Bw1T>.ta!J.EVous: these .Megalopolitan forces were armed with bronze shields, Le. they were xaAKtta7TLOI!iS (cf. v. gr. 7, where, however, they include cavalry). Doson armed them because they had lost their own resources {iv. 6g. s). For Macedonian arms cf. Plut. Cleom. 23. I (of Cleomenes)' owxu\lous OS 7TpOaKa8o7TAlaas 1'11aKI!iOOI!£KWS drrrlTayp.a Tais 7Tap' .Mvnyovou AlliVKaam-

aw, ibid.

II. 3 for a description of the arms. Antigonus' '\"'biteshields', like the 'Bronzeshields' in his army at Sellasia (66. 5 n.), recall Alexander's Argyraspides, 'Silvershields' (Arrian, Anab. vii. rr. 3, where these are hypaspists). At Pydna (r68) Perseus' leucaspis phalanx (Livy, xliv. 41. 2 from P.) and his chalcaspides (ibid.) are apparently distinct from his caetrati, i.e. peltasts in P.'s sense of the word (cf. § 2 n.) (cf. Kromayer, AS, ii. 323; iv. 6o7 against Meyer, Kl. Schr. ii. 483 and Tam, liMN D, 17); and in iv. 67. 6 Philip's xu),Kaamollis (who were armed like the .Megalopolitans at Sellasia, cf. iv. 6g. s) are also distinct from the peltasts. However, this does not imply any difference in weight of armour. The peltasts, like the hypaspists before them, frequently take their place in the phalanx, as at Cynoscephalae, where they are classed with the phalangites and distinguished from the light-armed (xviii. 24. 8; Walbank, Philip, 292). Both Cleomenes' recruits and Cercidas' Megalopolitans at Sellasia will have been armed with the Macedonian sarissa (a 21-foot spear), helmet, sword, shield (of 20 in. diameter), breastplate, and greaves; cf. Philip, 289. Macedonianarms were widely adopted by Greek states in the course of this century; for the Boeotian reform of 245 see Feyel (193 ff., 213-I5), and, in general, Launey (i. 36r ff.). 4. BotwTwv: on the relations between Boeotia and Macedon at this time see Feyel, ro(r--35· Wbether an alliance preceded the formation of the Symmachy in 224/3 is unknown; cf. 49· 6 n. The size of the Boeotian contingent, the largest after the Achaean, indicates the importance of this state in the Alliance. •H1TeLpwTwv ••• !6.Ka.pv6.vwv: both friendly with Macedon since the Illyrian alliance of 230 (6. 9 n.). •l>.>.uptwv ••• ~4»' wv ~v ATJIJ.tlTPLOS 6 c~J6.plo'>: Demetrius (10. 8, n. 17 n.) had allied himself with Macedon (d. iii. r6. 3); but whatever his future plans, there are no grounds for thinking of him as already party to a Macedonian 'western policy' (so Treves, Ath.en., 1935, 46). P. reckons Demetrius' forces as allies, not mercenaries {cf. Griffith, 70, against Tam, AG, 425-6); but Demetrius was a personal ally of Doson, not apparently a member of the Hellenic Symmachy (Hol~ leaux, 131 n. 3). 6. Tci.s JlEY nAAo.s'. 'elO'~OAas -TJo-4»a.Mo-o.TO KTA.: see Kromayer, AS,

275

5·

THE BATTLE OF SELLASIA.

Based on Kromayer

THE ACHAEAN LEAGUE; THE CLEOMENEAN WAR Il.6 5 .6

L 210-15. Cleomcnes' defences were merely designed to delay the enemy (should he follow any of these other routes into Laconia) until the Spartan army could march round from the position it had occupied (on which cf. § 7 n.). These other passes were primarily (a) those carrying the roads from Megalopolis and Asea, which joined a little north of the Athenaeum (Mt. Khelmos), and were probably covered by a Spartan force stationed in one of the gorges north or south of Pellene on the Eurotas (see Kromayer, op. cit., Karte I); (b) the coastal road from Argos over Parnon, which could be covered by a force at the (modern) monastery of H. Saranda, south-east of Sellasia. Both positions could be reached from Sellasia within a few hours. 7. The site of the battle: see Kromayer, AS, i. ZIS-Z3, Karten I and V. According to the most probable identification, that of Kromayer, Cleomenes placed his forces astride the Oenus (modern Kelcphina) valley, about I km. south of the (modern) Khan of Krevatas, and 4 km. north of the hill-fortress of Sellasia. Round about this point the routes from Asca and Tegea via the Khan of Kryavrisi, and those from Tegea and Argos via Arachova and the passes of H. Petros and Kastanitza, have all united, and continue for some distance along the Oenus valley (cf. § 9), to leave it again before the river plunges into a narrow gorge some 4 km. downstream. The two hills Euas and Olympus (§ 8) Kromayer has identified with the modern Palaeogoulas (ro8 m. above the river) and Kotselovouni (152 m. above the river) respectively, the latter (also called Melissi) being in fact the forward spur of the hill of Provatares, to the north; see his map. Immediately north of Palaeogoulas, and lying between it and the Heights of Turla, is a side-valley called Kourmeki, along which there now runs a cart-track from the Sparta-Tripolitza road; and this Krornayer identifies with the valley of the Gorgylos (66. 1), which played an important part in the action. This identification was challenged by Soteriades (BCH, I9IO, s-57; rgrr, 87-I07' 24I-2), who argues that the ancient route also left the Oenus valley up that of Kourmeki, <md claims that a fortification, of which traces remain on Palaeogoulas, was a fifth-century work covering this road. Admittedly Soteriades has placed a finger on a weak point in Kromayer's reconstruction. There seems no reason >vhy the ancient route should make an hour's detour south of Palaeogoulas; and though Kromayer has found ancient wheel tracks in the valley of Mylou Rema, where he supposes the ancient road to have ascended to the site of the Khan of Vourlia, they do not prove that this was in fact the road from Tegea. On the other hand, Kahrstedt (Hermes, 1913, :z88) failed to discover the traces of an ancient road up Kourmeki, which Soteriades claimed to have identified; and, in any case, even if the road followed Kourmeki, this would not disprove 277

II. 65.7

EVENTS IN GREECE

Kromayer's identification, since the Kourmeki valley would be controUed by a Spartan force holding Palaeogoulas. This would, of course, mean that F.'s description of the site was at fault in one important particular-the placing of the Spartan army astride the road; and this would in tum imply that his knowledge of the site was less detailed than Kromayer supposes. There is, incidentally, some evidence of a similar confusion in P. concerning a not dissimilar site, the pass of the Viossa, where Philip held the Romans in 198; cf. Walbank, Philip, 149-50 n. I. However, Soteriades has not done more than raise queries; and Kromayer's site still offers the greatest plausibility, and can be easily adapted to F.'s detailed description of the battle. For a convenient summary, substantially accepting Kromayer, see Honigmann (RE, l:£Ma.ala, cols. I3I]-2o), who, on F.'s description of the engagement, rightly concludes that it is 'obviously somewhat schematic and omits subsidiary detail, thereby lending itself to frequent criticism'. Ttl'i •••
THE ACHAEAN LEAGUE; THE

CLEOMENEA~

WAR II. 66.2

!lETa AaKE8alllovlwv Kill Twv !lla9o~opwv: the 'Lacedaemonians' are the Spartiate phalanx of 6,ooo (Plut. Cleom. 28. 8) ; and the mer-

cenaries on Olympus came to nearly the same figure (69. 3, the fight was opened by s,ooo; but there would be others guarding the camp on Olympus (d. 69. 6), and the slopes above the river, and otherwise not directly involved in the phalanx charges (Kromayer, AS, i. 226 n. 2)). They were hired with the Egyptian subsidy (51. 2, 63. r) and perhaps with the help of the Megalopolitan booty (62. 9). 10. Tous L1T1TE~s !lETd llepous TLvos TWv !lla9oc1>6pwv: probably amounting together to r,ooo-2,ooo out of the 7,ooo-8,ooo left for the valley and the manning of Euas. Kromayer (AS, i. 227 n. r) points out that Doson used only 8,6oo men to storm Euas from below (66. s-6), whereas in the centre only the Megalopolitan attack forced the retreat of the mercenaries (67. 4-5). Thus Cleomenes' dispositions were: Right (Olympus) Centre Left (Euas) T::>tal

12,ooo (6,ooo Spartiates, c. 6,ooo mercenaries) 1,ooo-2,ooo (cavalry and mercenaries) s.ooo-6,ooo (perioeci and allies) Under 2o,ooo

1Tiial To'Ls otKdots !lEpEat Tljs 8uva!-LEWS: i.e. the cavalry in the plain, the phalanx on the wide slope of Olympus, etc. TO O'U!l1TuAaK"v: 'for offensive and defensive action alike'. Kromayer (AS. i. 227) compares Epaminondas' tactics; the forces on Euas were the defensive wing, those on Olympus were designed, if necessary, for assault. The Spartan formation thus constituted a 'battle-line drawn up for action' (7rapaTat~s ivEpyos) and a 'fortified camp hard of approach' (1Tapep.{JoA7J 8v•mpouo8os).

11.

66. 1. Xa~wv 1Tpo~ATJ!l

I

E7TtVotas.

279

II. 66. 4

EVENTS IN GREECE

~~ op.oMyou litO. (..1-UXTJS ap.,PoTEpOl 11'po£6evTo KptvEtV Tno; 11'pa~u;: cf. 70. 3· These two passages imply that Cleomenes deliberately

4.

sought a battle, and Ferrabino attributes them to Phylarchus, who made each king take the offensive with his right wing (cf. Plut. Cleom. 27~28). For 70. 3 he is probably right. But it is clear from 6g. 3 that P.'s main source depicted Cleomenes as actively accepting battle; nor does 69. 6 imply that he was intending to avoid a phalanx charge. Consequently there is no inconsistency between the present passage and the remainder of P.'s narrative of the battle. Cleomenes' decision to fight will have been influenced by the news, which arrived ten days earlier, that his Egyptian subsidies were at an end (63. 1). On the significance of Eucleidas' tactics on Euas, which do not indicate a general defensive strategy, see P.'s comments, 68. 3ft. 5. Tous xa.A~
THE ACHAEAN LEAGUE; THE CLEOMENEAN WAR II.66.ro

either (it is generally assumed that they guarded the camp; cf. Kromayer, AS, i. 233 n. 3), hence the text may be correct, and these Cretans mercenaries (so Griffith, 70). For Doson is known to have made treaties with Eleutherna and Hierapytna in Crete, which probably contained clauses authorizing Macedonian recruitment (IC, ii, Eleutherna, 20; iii, Hierapytna, I; Griffith, 69). i~€Ope(a.s AaJ-L~avovTEs Tci~~v: 'as a reserve'; cf. Plut. Phil. 6. 3, T~v JljleopE{a.v Jv TCftet owljlvAa.TTOVTWV. The Achaeans formed a second line behind the Acarnanians, and were evidently intended to close the gap between right and centre, when the troops on the wing facing Euas advanced (Kromayer, AS, i. 235 n. 4); cf. 67. 2. 7. ;t..A.E~a.vopov .ftyeJ-Lova.: this Alexander is probably the man Doson appointed as Philip's chamberlain (iv. 87. 5; cf. v. 28. 6, 96. 4, vii. II. 6). The word hegemon is used, in the Antigonid army, to denote the commander of a chiliarchy of about r,ooo men (Feyel, Rev. arch. 6, I935· 54) ; but it is probably employed here in a non-technical sense for the officer commanding 1,2oo cavalry (65. 5). 8. To us J-L~aeo~opous ••• Kat Tous Ma.K€00va.s: the phalanx of Io,ooo and the 3,ooo mercenaries, together with the I,ooo Agrianians and I,ooo Gauls (65. 2}, I5,ooo in all. Cleomenes had n,ooo-12,ooo men confronting them (65. Ion.). Doson's position in command of the phalanx is discussed by Tarn (HMND, 36), who concludes that he advanced parallel with his men, but on the flank. 9. ouj>a.A.a.yy(a.v euaAAYJAov: the normal depth of the phalanx was I6 ranks (xviii. 30. 1), but here the width was halved and the depth increased to 32 ranks; cf. 69. 9, rijs E1TaAA~Aov ljla"Aayyos. In xii. 18. 5, as a reductio ad absurdum P. speaks of a rptljla"Aayy{a .11TaAAY)Ao<;. See also Arrian, Tact. 28. 6. In vi. 40. 11 the Tptljla"Aayy{a 1TapUAAY)Aos- has three parallel columns, in contrast to the formation envisaged here. 8Li1 TTtV aTEVOTYJTO. Twv T01Twv: Io,ooo men, 16 deep, would give 625 files, and each file normally needed 3 ft. clearance. If Kromayer's position is correct, Antigonus could not afford more than half that distance on the slopes below Melissi (Olympus); hence the double depth, giving about 312 files. 10. a(voova.: 'a white flag', to be shown from Doson's headquarters. According to Plutarch (Cleom. 28. 2) the Acarnanians were drawn up against Euas along with the Illyrians. P. consistently omits them, since apparently his source did not distinguish between the Illyrians (and chalcaspides: cf. § 5) and the Acarnanians (and Epirotes, or Cretans: cf. § 6); but on this point Plutarch's Phylarchean version seems preferable. For the probable position taken up by these Illyrians (and Acarnanians) see Kromayer's map. Together they were able to envelop the whole Spartan left, since their most extended forces were south-west of the summit of Euas. What never emerges from F.'s account (or that in Plut. Phil. 6) is that these 281

II. 66.

10

EVENTS IN GREECE

troops were in hiding, concealed from the Spartans on either Euas or Olympus by the brow of Euas. But the Phylarchean version makes this clear; cf. Plut. Gleam. 28. 2, -roD ydp .:4v-rty6vov -rous 'I::V.upwus Kat -rous .:4Kap>·iivas i.K7Tt:ptt:ABt.lv KpJrpa Kt.A£vaav-ros. See further, 67. 2 n. Soteriades argues that the usually dried-up brook in Kourmeki can hardly be called a 7TOTaJ.u)s; but this argument is not to be pressed, for the stream may have been larger in classical times, and indeed Kahrstedt (Hermes, 1913, 289) has found traces of an eroded river-bed in the valley bottom. In any case, P. himself clearly conceives the Gorgylos to be dried up at this time, since the troops hide in its bed. 11. To'i:s 8E: Mt:yaAo'll"oAlTaLs ••• 4>owLKis e~ap8ft: these were the forces in the centre, 3,200 in all, foot and horse, including I,ooo Achaeans; on their right (but to the left of the concealed troops) were the remaining 2,ooo Achaean infantry. Verbal similarities in Plutarch's Philopoemen point to a similar source; but these have been exa.ggcrated (cf. Nissen, KU, 283, 'c. 6 Schlacht bei Sellasia. Bis zum Eingreifen Philopoemens entspricht Alles der Darstellung ii. 66. 67' .). In fact, Plutarch diverges considerably from P. He puts Illyrians and Achaeans together, the former 'supporting' (7ra.paa-r&:raS') the latter; and the same red flag is to be the signal for both Illyrians and centre. However, the Illyrians anticipate the signal while the Achaeans obey orders and remain in their position. This tendentious account is designed to exonerate the Achaeans and to glorify Philopoemen, and it seems clearly to spring from P.'sLije of Philopoemen. Evidently when he came to compose the present passage P., being concerned more with facts and less with panegyric (cf. x. 21. 8), distinguished more clearly the role of the Illyrians and the separate functions of the centre and the concealed right. Thus the inaccuracies in Plutarch, Phil. 6, reflect P.'s purpose in his biography of the Achaean hero. In the Histories the praise of Philopoemen remains, but the exoneration of the Achaeans is omitted. (This is not the place to discuss the arguments of Wundcrer (i. 87) and Pedech (REG, r9sr, 82-1o3) that P.'s bio~:,>Taphy was written long after books i and ii, and for the younger Scipio; they seem to me quite unconvincing. Cf. x. 2r. 5 n.)

67. 2.

ot S€ ... eutwvo,: i.e. the mercenaries (cf. 6s. Io). 8t:wpouvTes Tas 0"1Te(pas TWV AxaLwv £p~f.Lous eK Twv KaT6'll"w olloas:

Paton translates 'upon seeing that the rear of the Achaean line was exposed'. But as the Achaeans had not moved (cf. Plut. Phil. 6. 2, Twv .:4xatwv, wrr7T

on their right; and according to Plutarch (Phil. 6. 3) it is the IllyTians who arc Jp~Jl-OVS' TWY lmriwv a7ToAdnp.p.€vovs (mentioning 282

THE ACHAEAN LEAGUE; THE CLEOMEXEAN WAR II. 67.7

'cavalry' instead of 'Achaeans' in order to exonerate the latter from responsibility). Accordingly, Kromayer (AS, i. 247 n. I) translates 'when they saw that the units were not covered in the rear by the Achaeans'. The U1TEipa• (cf. 66. 5) are those of the Macedonian right, now visible (in part) to the Spartan centre; specifically they will have been the Acarnanian and Epirote (or Cretan) forces, but P. does not distinguish between these and the Illyrians (66. 10 n.). This explanation surmounts the difficulties in the passage; but it remains possible that Twv .ftxatwv should be simply expunged as a gloss. According to Plutarch (Cleom. 6. 3) it was Eucleidas who, observing the gap, Tovs tAa.fpDTJ:rov;; Twv z/ltAwv 7TEpu1'11'EJLz/1Ev, with orders to attack the Illy.Tians. This is hardly to be reconciled with the assumption that the Illyrians and Acarnanians were in ambush, and their movements hidden from the Spartans (cf. 66. IOn.). Hence Ferrabino (Atti Ace. Torino, I918-·19, 756-6o) suggests, very plausibly, that the advance of the Acarnanians up the lower slopes of Euas to the east was immediately visible to Eucleidas and led him to send his mercenaries round against their rear; but that he remained ignorant of the position of the Illyrians, who were farther up Kourmeki to his west and south-west, until their appearance on the brow of the hill put an end to his hopes. 3. 1'WV ttEV '11'€pl TOV EuKAeloa.v ••• ICC.Ttt vpoO'W11'0V C.UTOI:s e+€0'TWTWV: 'as Eucleidas' troops were facing them from above'. Eucleidas did not, however, advance to meet the enemy (cf. 68. 3 ff.); if he was aware of the Acarnanian advance(§ 2 n.), he was content to deal with it from the rear by means of the mercenaries. 4. 41~Ao11'0(JlTJV b Meya.Ao11'oALTT)S: cf. 40. 2 n. He was serving >vith the Achaean cavalry (69. I) and not with the Megalopolitan chalcaspides; hence he carne under the command of the Macedonian Alexander (66. 7). Cf. Plut. Phil. 6. I, 'ljv p,tv iv Tots £7T7T€Vat p,€76. TWV iaVTofJ 1roAmov TETayp,Evos o 4JtAo"TTolp,7Jv. The present incident is also recounted by Plutarch (Phil. 6), drawing on P.'s biography. Tois 11'po€O"Twa~: they were, like Alexander, Macedonian; cf. Pint. Phil. 6. 3, €rf>pa~E TOtS fJa.c:nAtKot;;. 6. auvt00V1'11S TTJV TWV tvv~wv auwrrAOK~V: Philopoemen had attacked the Spartan cavalry, thus compelling the mercenaries to relinquish their attack on the Acarnanian rear and come to the rescue. In Plutarch (Phil. 6. 3) it is the mercenaries (called zjlt>.oi), not the cavalry, whom Philopoemen attacks. 7. 'TWV 'I.A.Aup~wv Ka.l. Ma.K€0ovwv tea.t 'TWV ••• vpoa~a.wovTwv: the Macedonians are the chalcaspides, 66. 5· But if Krornayer's reconstruction is correct these troops were farther up the gorge of Kourrneki, and it was the Acarnanians who were relieved by Philopoernen's action. Perhaps the Acarnanians and Epirotes (Cretans?) 283

IL 67. 7

EVENTS IN GREECE

come under the phrase TWII af-La TOVT0£5' 7Tpoaf3aw6vTwl!, On F.'s fusion on this question see 66. ron., 67. 2 n.

COD·

68. 1-2. Doson's praise of Pkilopoemen: cf. Plut. Phil. 6. 6-7 for the same anecdote. Ferrabino (Atti Ace. Tot"ino, I9I8-19, 756 ff.) argues that Antigonus was really holding back his centre till he had defeated the Spartan forces on the wings; then he would break through to cut off the Spartan retreat. Philopoemen's move may have helped the Acarnanians a little; but the Ill:yTians were safe from the mercenary attack, and would have overwhelmed Encleidas just the same, had Philopoemen made no move. Thus fundamentally his action was a minor incident, which P. seeks to exaggerate into a major feature of the battle. Doson's praise may be authentic; he could afford playful encouragement to a young and enthusiastic leader from a city with which Macedonian relations were especially close (65. 3 n.). The signal referred to (mJv87Jf-La) is the waving of the red cloak (66. n). 3. bpwvTES ••• 'T'ns am:(pa.s: i.e. of the Illyrians and chalcasp£des. But it was probably the Acarnanians whom Eucleidas saw first (67. 2 n.); the Illyrians will have remained unseen till they reached the brow of Euas (66. ro). 5. ,.c, Tou Ka8o'ITA~aJ.!ou ~ea.t 'T'fls auvTO.sews tliiw11a.: 'the peculiar advantage afforded by their arms and formation'; d. 3· 5 and 68. 9 for the weight of lllyrian arms. It is of the Illyrians rather than the Acarnanians that P. is thinking. 7. ~J.!EVOV ('!Tl, TWV nKpwv: this is true only of Eucleidas' extreme left; it is clear from 65. 9-10 and from Kromayer's analysis of the position (accepting the identification of Euas with Palaeogoulas) that Eucleidas' forces stretched down the shoulder of the hill to link up with the centre on the bottom slopes and the cavalry beside the river (BCH, I9IO, sr6-q). The 'steep and precipitous slope' is that into the valley of the Gorgylos (Kourmeki). 8. s~· a.uTfjs Tfjs ••• Kopu.f.fjs SLa.J.!6.xea8a.t: 'to fight along the very top of the hill'' i.e. along the ridge (cf. iii. 72· 9 for oui 'along and in front of'). 10. KPT'J!lVWST'J Kai SUaf!a'T'OV €xovTWV ••• T~V nva.xwpT'JO'LV: Sotcriades (BCH, 191o, 22: 19u, 94) argues that the southern slope of Palaeogoulas is smooth and gradual, and his photograph confirms this (BCH, 191 t, Pl. 1 facing p. 93). The correct conclusion from this is not, however, that Kromayer has sited the battle wrongly, but that F.'s description at this point has been artificially schematized to create 'balance'. Eucleidas' men retreat for a long way down a steep and precipitous slope because such was the fate they had planned for their opponents (§ 7); cf. § 8, awlf31J ••• TOvvavTlov. For similar schematization in P.'s account of the battles of Drepana and the 284

THE ACHAEAN LEAGUE; THE CLEOMENEAN WAR II.6g,6

Aegates Islands (perhaps derived in that case from Philinus) see CQ, I945. II. On Eucleidas' false tactics see Kromayer, AS, i. 236-7. 69. 1. 'ITEPL rfj~ aurwv EAEuOepia~: the Achaean slogan (42. 6). In fact, Achaean 'freedom' meant recognizing the hegemony of Doson, just as elsewhere the freedom of the Peloponnese in the fourth century is identified with the victory of Philip II (xviii. I4. 6; cf. CQ, I94J, 9 n. I, contrasting xviii. II. 4 and 6). Phylarchus naturally interpreted 'freedom' differently; cf. Iustin. xxviii. 4· z (drawing on Phylarchus), 'inter duas nobilissimas gentes bellum summis utrimque uiribus fuit, cum hi pro uetere Macedonum gloria, illi non solum pro inlibata libertate, sed etiam pro salute certarent'. 2. rov 1-'f.v L'lT'lTOV 'lTEuE"Lv 'lTATJy~vra Kmpiw<;: Plutarch (Phil. 6) makes Philopoemen deliberately abandon his horse in order to pursue the enemy (in his version the light-armed troops ascending Euas, not the cavalry). In this version he is wounded by a thonged javelin, but succeeds in moving his legs so as to break the shaft, and after its extraction resumes the conflict. 3. OLa TWV eu~wvwv Kal J.LLU0o~6pwv: perhaps 'the light-armed mercenaries' (d. v. 36. 3, 53· 3, where Tovs £ivovs Kai f'-ta8o KpV'TrTdas TETayf'-ivov, who had been bribed. It seems probable that the phalanx charged at

z8s

EVENTS IN GREECE

the moment the ambushed troops were making their assault on Euas, but before the Illyrians had scaled the brow of the hill (\Valbank, Aratos, rn-12). Tous o' ... i'lTTre'Ls oaov ouTrw KMvovTo.s: i.e. as a result of the attack initiated by Philopoemen (67. 5). -.lvo.yKa~ETO O -rpd114:1 -rijs lmMa<:ws Kal -rep f30.pn rijs61TAmKfjs 4>aX.ayyos J~f£8Alf57J· One need not suppose any difference in the length of sarissa, etc. (so Kromayer, AS, i. 244 n. 3), since the Spartan phalanx was armed like the Macedonian (this is specifically attested for 2,ooo of Cleomenes' recruits; 65. 3 n.). 9. aup.cflpa~a.VTES Tas a6.pwo.s: 'closing the ranks of their pikes'. In iv. 64. 6-7, where it is a question of defence against hostile cavalry, the phrase uvp.
THE ACHAEAN LEAGUE; THE CLEOMENEAN WAR

II. 70

this formation can hardly have been employed in phalanx action; and P. clearly states that the formation then used, -rnJKvwat> Twv aapwwv (xviii. 30. 3), allowed 3 ft. per man in contrast to the usual6 on march (xii. I9. 7). See Kromayer (AS, iii. 1. 347 ff.; HeertfJesen, I35) and Meyer (Kl. Schr. ii. 203 f.) against Delbriick (Geschichte der Kriegskunst, i2 (Berlin, I92o), 423). In fact, P.'s normal use of these terms is inconsistent. Thus in xii. 21. 3 aAws- avvamrl~nv indicates the 3-ft. formation, yet in xii. 21. 7 (in polemic against Callisthenes) awryamKbTa.> refers to the formation allowing 6 ft. per man. The expression avp,fpaTTnv is also used of the interlocking of shields over the head in the Roman testudo (cf. x. I4. I2, xxviii. 11. 2); but here it clearly refers to the 3-ft. stance of the phalanx -rrvKvwats-. See Cornelius, 26-27; and on the phalanx Kromayer-Veith, Heerwesen, 1 35· XPTJO"nj.l£Vm T~ ••• Uiuilllo.T~: 'taking advantage of the peculiar formation of the double phalanx', cf. 66. 9· Paton's translation fails to distinguish the special feature of the double phalanx, which massed Io,ooo men behind a 3oo-yard line, and the normal procedure of I TTVKVWat<;.

EK TWV oxupwj.laTWV: 'from their position'. 10. a:Tr£XWflTIO'£ ••• acr<j>o.Aws £Ls TTJV ITrapTTJV: Plutarch (Cleom. 29. I ff.) describes Cleomenes' arrival there with much circumstantial and melodramatic detail from Phylarchus (d. Iustin. xxviii. 4· 3 ff.). According to Plutarch all but 2oo of the phalanx fell; Iustinus gives the total survivors on Cleomenes' side as 4,ooo. In the words ,Povw6p,.:vov and &.afaAw> P. echoes contemporary criticism of Cleomenes' failure to die on the field in the tradition of Sparta. Phylarchus' defence is represented in the long, and no doubt apocryphal, conversation between Cleomenes and the Spartan Therycion, which Plutarch relates as taking place on the island of Aegialia (Cleom. 31), before the king left for Egypt. In this moving chapter Cleomenes is made to criticize the easy Stoic solution-suicide; the source is probably Phylarchus, worked over by Plutarch himself. For discussion see F. Oilier, REG, I936, 54I-2. 11. KO.To.~O.s ets fu9wv: Gythium was the main port of Laconia, about 35-40 miles south of the capital (cf. v. 19. 4-8 n.). For Cleomenes' subsequent career in Egypt cf. v. 35-39.

70. A ntigonus in Sparta; Illyrian invasion of Macedon. A comparison of this chapter with Plutarch (Cleom. 27 and 3o), who has many resemblances but is in some respects fuller, suggests that both go back to Phylarchus (Susemihl, i. 632 n. 56o); see especially § 6 n. This hypothesis is not ruled out by the favourable treatment of Antigonus, which can well come from P. himself. See Kromayer, AS, i. 2~ n. I; Valeton, I66.

ZBJ

II.

]0. I

EVENTS IN GREECE

1. eyKpaT-l]S YEVO!J-EVOS E~ e.flo&ou TTJS I-rrd.pTTJ';: cf. i. 24. II, 76. IO, etc. 'having taken Sparta at a single stroke'. Cleomenes had advised against further resistance (Plut. Cleom. 29. I; Iustin. xxviii. 4· 7-9). This was the first time Sparta had been occupied by an enemy. !J-EyaA.oo/uxws: ••• exp-r]aaTO TOlS AaKEOal!J-OVlOlS:: cf. v. 9· 8-IO, TWV fJ.f'YlaTwv aya6wv atnos Yf'VOfLf'VOS Ka~ Ko~vfi Ka~ KaT' lo{av AaKf'Oa~­ fLOV{o~s. There were no reprisals (ix. 29. 12), but Cleomenes' constitution was abrogated (see next note) and Sparta was obliged to aline herself with the Hellenic Symmachy (54· 4 n.); her exact status is not very clear, but Philip's words in iv. 24. 4 suggest that she was a member (cf. iv. 9· 6 n.). Further she was forced to cede the Ager Denthaliatis (between Kalamata and the Langada gorge) to Messenia (if the Antigonus of Tacitus (Ann. iv. 43· 4) is Doson (so Beloch, iv. I. 7I8; Fine, A}P, I940, ISS) and not Gonatas (so Ehrenberg, RE, 'Sparta', cols. I422, I426)); this territory had probably been lost to Sparta at the time of Arcus' Peloponnesian League and the war against Gonatas in 28o (41. I2 n.), when Messenia was pro-Macedanian (Beloch, iv. 2. 370-I). See further Roebuck, 62, 64 n. 24.

<

To -rroA.heufJ-a To -rraTpLov ••• lmo )KaTaaT-r]aa.s: cf. v. 9· 9, To 7TaTpLOv ix. 36. s; Plut. Cleom. 30. I. Antigonus

7ToAlTWfLa Kat T~v dl.w6f'p[av,

abolished Cleomenes' 'Lycurgan' reforms, and restored the Ephors (cf. iv. 22. 5). To what extent Cleomenes' land reforms were reversed is uncertain (cf. Porter, lxxxv-lxxxvi); but the kingship was left in abeyance (iv. 22, 4), and Brachylles, a Boeotian, was left as Macedanian E7Tunanw in the town (xx. 5· I2; d. Feyel, I3I). In this way Doson fulfilled the ambitions of the governing class in Achaea, and crushed the sparks of social revolution. As Tarn (AG, 437-8) has shown, the phrase 7TaTptos 7ToA~nta and similar expressions were commonly used in the third and second centuries in contrast to tyranny; cf. ii. 47· 3 n., iv. Sr. 14, ix. 36. 4 (Sparta), ii. 70. 4 (Tegea), ii. 43· 8 (7TaTptov €>.w6f'p{av of the Peloponnesian cities); Plut. Dem. 8 and Io (Athens); Flam. ro (Greeks); Syll. 434/S. 1. rs (decree leading to the Chremonidean War, referring to TJ5pavvo£ who subvert Tovs TE vofLovs Kai Tas 7TaTptovs JKC!.UTms 7TOALnias); Syll. 390, 1. rs (Island League honouring Ptolemy I). It was a propagandist phrase which did not necessarily imply a return to the previous constitution enjoyed before the 'tyranny'. E\1 oA(yals TJfJ-E:paLc;: cf. Plut. Cleom. 30. I, ~fLipq. TpiT[J. This more explicit version points to the use of a common source. TOUS 'IJ\A.upwus ••• -rrop8~;iv TYJV xwpav: cf. Plut. Cleom. 30· I, 7Top6f'i:u6aL T~V xdJpav V7TO TWV f3ap{3apwv. These will not be the Illyrians of Demetrius of Pharos, but rather rebellious tribes farther east, akin to their Dardanian neighbours (Fine, ]RS, 1936, 2s). There is no reason to think they were financed by Rome, as Droysen suggested (Tarn, CAH, vii. 843 n. r). 288

THE

ACHAEA~

LEAGUE; THE CLEO}fENEAN WAR II.70.5

2-3. The action of Tyche. P.'s comment here seems to be taken from Phylarchus (cf. 66. 4 n.); cf. Plut. Cleom. 27. 6, ~ T
u

289

II. 70.5

EVENTS IN GREECE

other Antigonids, from Gonatas onwards, Doson had no official state cult; but after Sellasia he was widely celebrated throughout Greece in terms which came near to deification. An Achaean Antigoneia was set up in his honour by Aratus (xxviii. 19. 3, xxx. 29. 3), a proceeding strongly condemned by the latter's enemies (cf. Plut. Cleom. 16. 7; A rat. 45· 3, both echoing Phylarchus}. The Antigoneia at Histiaea in Euboea (Syll. 493, 1. 22; d. Roussel and Hatzfeld, BCH, 19Io, 37o) was apparently in Doson's honour. :Mantinea was refounded as Antigoneia (56. 6 n.), with Aratus as olK,O'T'J]s and Doson as its KT/.t.rrrys (Plut. Arat. 45· 8-9), and the latter was here celebrated as awT-T]p Kat d<.py€T7}s (IG, v. 2, 299), as he was also by the Spartans (v. 9· IOn., ix. J6. 5). On the group representing Philip v and Doson, crowned, which the Eleans set up at Olympia (Paus. vi. r6. 3), see Walbank (Philip, 19 n. 1), J. Pouilloux and N. M. Verdelis (BCH, 1950, 44), and Aymard (Aegyptus, 1952, 91-92). Similar expressions of adulation no doubt took place on the present occasion. 6. Tfi 8£ 'TI'a.pa.KAi)aet Ka.t Kpa.uyi:j Tfi Ka.T' a.liTc>V Tbv Klv8uvov: cf. Plut. Cleom. JO. J, O.VTfj Tfj 7TEpi Triv aywvo. Kpo.vyfi. Plutarch attributes the story of Doson's rupturing a blood-vessel, encouraging his men, specifically to Phylarchus. ets atf..LOTOS 0.va.ycuy1)v Ka.l TLVO. TOLO.UT1']V 8ul.9eatv ~f..L'TI'EO'~lV: 'he took to vomiting blood and fell into the morbid condition which accompanies it.' aJp.o.Tos dva.ywy~ is a technical term for vomiting blood; d. Erasistratus in Galen, Libr. propr. (ed. Muller, Galeni scripta minora, ii. 91), I. Plutarch (Cleom. 30. 3), who here has the phrase TO awp.a. 7Tpoaa.vo.pp~[o.s, uses the words 7TAfjBos o.'tp.a.TOS' d.Yl]yaye in connexion with another version (from the rhetorical schools), that the haemorrhage was caused by Doson's shouting JJ KaM)s ~p.lpo.s after the victory. There was a persistent tradition that Doson was already consumptive; cf. Plut. Cleom. r6. 7, 30. 2. 8ta0wts is also a technical medical term; cf. 2o. 7 n. f.-LET' ob 'II'OAu ••• !J.t:TtJA>.a.~E: cf. Plut. Cleom. 30. 4, uuvTdvws ETEAnJTIJO'E. In reality Doson lived till about July (Walbank, Philip, 295-8) or even August 221 (if one follows Bickerman, Berytus, 1944, 73). During the year between his Illyrian victory and his death he appointed guardians for the new king (cf. iv. 87. 6), and sent the latter on a journey to the Peloponnese to make Aratus' acquaintance (Plut. Arat. 46. 2-3). Either now or earlier he appointed Taurion commander of his forces in the Peloponnese (iv. 6. 4). 8. T1)v ••• ~oatAElO.V U'TI'~>.t'TI'E 4>tAL'TI''TI''f T4> A"l!J."lTPfou: Philip V, son of Demetrius II (44. r-2} and the Epirote princess Phthia (Chryseis), was born in 238, and so was 17 upon his accession in 221 (d. iv. 5· 3, 24. r). Iustinus (xxviii. 4· r6, xxix. I. 2) makes him 14; but this figure may be ignored (cf. Fine, CQ, 1934, roo}. That Philip was never coregent with Doson (cf. Walbank, Philip, 19 n. 1) is now confirmed 290

THE ACHAEAN LEAGUE; THE CLEOMENEAN WAR II.71.7

by an inscription from Demetrias, containing the formula {3aatlt.£; .t1vny6vw[t] J Kat
ment of the Cleomenean \Var see 37--70 n. Since it led to the return of Macedon to the Peloponnese and the institution of the Symmachy, it links up in a very real sense with To is il' ~p.wv l.aropEiaBat p.EAAovat (ilp.wv in B-W 2 is a misprint, copied by Paton and Treves). For P.'s starting-point, the 14oth Olympiad (220--216) cf. i. 3· 1--6 n. For the phrase Kanl T~v lg dpxfjs TTpoBwtv cf. 37· 2. 3-6. Synchronisms: to Egypt and Syria P. adds Cappadocia and Sparta in iv. 2. 8-9. Ptolemy III Euergetes reigned from 246 to 22I, and was succeeded (cf. iv. 2. 8, v. 34· I) by Philopator sometime between 5 and I6 February (65--69 n. (a)). In Syria Antiochus III succeeded his elder brother Alexander, who took the dynastic title of Seleucus III (iv. 2. 7), when he succeeded Seleucus II in 225 (iv. 48. 6, v. 40. 5). Seleucus III was assassinated in Phrygia as the result of a conspiracy led by Apaturius, a mercenary leader, and Nicanor, in late summer 223 (iv. 48. 8, v. 40. 6). Seleucus II's title of Callinicus, 'Victorious' (cf. OGIS, 233, 11. 3 f.), celebrated his recovery of Syria from Ptolemy III Euergetes in the Laodicean War; the other title Pogon, 'bearded', is not otherwise attested, but it is confirmed by coin portraits showing Seleucus II with a full beard (cf. Bevan, Seleucus, i, Pl. I, n). On the deaths of Seleucus, Ptolemy I, and Lysimachus in 01. I24 (284-28o), and on the significance of such synchronisms toP., see 41. In. 7-10. Summary of the introductory books: i. I3· 2--5. The Hellenes (§ 9) are the members of Doson's Symmachy; the Social War (d. i. 3· I, ii. 37· 1, iii. 2. 3) is described iv. 3--37, 57-87, v. I--30, 9I-106. The Hannibalic War (d. i. 3· 2, iii. 2. I} is described in books iii and vii-xv, and the Fourth Syrian War between Antiochus and Philopator, which also began in 2I9 (cf. i. 3· I, iii. 2. 4), in v. 3I-87. The phrase o[ KaTa T~v .t1alav {3aatA£is includes Ptolemy, either because Asia was held to include Libya or at least to extend to the Nile (a boundary for which Suez was substituted only in the Christian era; Ruge, RE, 'Asia (I)', col. I534; Honigmann, RE, 'Libye (2)', col. I49; ]. 0. Thomson, 66, 27I), or because Coele-Syria was so often part of the Ptolemaic possessions.

29I

BOOK III 1-5. Introduction to the History proper Chapters 1-3 outline the work, according to the original plan, down to r68~a period of fifty-three years {22o-168); in 4-5 P. gives reasons for continuing his work to cover the years of Roman domination down to 146. {For a structural analysis see Lorenz, 5o-6r.) Although by 168 the growth and advance of Roman power was already complete {4. 2-3), a proper judgement on both conquerors and conquered is only possible from a study of their subsequent conduct {4. 4-5). Accordingly P. will deal with (a) the subsequent policy of Rome, (b) the reactions of the subject peoples, (c) prevailing currents and tendencies in public and private life (4. 6). This will facilitate the passing of judgement on Rome. These chapters raise several queries : (1) When did P. conceive his revised plan, and what was its scope? (2) How many books were already written, and how many published, when the plan was changed? (3) To what extent did the new plan involve revision of earlier parts, whether published or merely written? (4) When were the Histories, as we know them, published? 1. It is usually assumed that P. resolved to extend his history beyond 168 only after the double debacle of 146. This cannot be proved, though Svoboda's attempt to disprove it (Phil., 1913, 46583) fails, and the Histories as we possess them shov.· no trace of a provisional scheme of extension conceived prior to 146. Svoboda argued that there were two stages in revision, (a) an intention to extend the Histories down to an undetermined date, as outlined in 4· I-II, (b) a later decision, taken long after the Achaean War, to finish at 146/s; to this second scheme belongs 4· 12-5. 6. Any passage which mentions Carthage as still existing will have been composed before 146; since SUCh passages include Vi. 52. 1-3, 56. 1-3, XiV. IO. 5, XV. JO. Io, xxxi. 12. 12, 21. 3 (add i. 73· 4, ix. 9· g-xo), P. must have composed down to xx:d. 22 when he was interrupted by the events of c. 150; and this implies that his narrative had already reached r6o (xxxi. 21. 3). Consequently the extension beyond 168 had begun before }J. could know of the catastrophe of 146. De Sanctis (iii. r. 202 f.) has, however, shown that xx:«.i. 2r. 3 does not imply the existence of Carthage, and that xxxi. 12, 12 is part of a passage describing the escape of Demetrius of Syria from Rome with P.'s help, which has every appearance of being based on an account

292

INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY PROPER III. r-5

composed at the time, and only subsequently included in the extended history, cf. Thommen, Hermes, r885, 229. If this is so, xv. 30. 10, dealing with events of 203, is the latest passage which conforms to Svoboda's thesis, and the theory of two stages in the revision collapses. H. Erbse (Rh. Mus., 1951, 170 ff.), who argues for the composition of the whole work after 144, tries to deal with the references to Carthage by adducing the existence of the 'achronistic present tense' used in a syncr£s£s. This theory would account for the references in vi. 52 and 53, but fails to explain the rest except by an arbitrary extension of the usage which in fact surrenders the whole case ; in particular, his thesis breaks down on ix. 9· 9-10 (which he does not COnsider), and appearS to ignore 4• I, KaTJ. T~l' lf apxfis 1Tpo6wtl' (cf. Brink and Walbank, CQ, 1954, 99). It may therefore be taken that P. conceived his revision after q6; and in addition to the reasons he gives he was no doubt prompted by the wish to record events in which he had himself played a considerable part. 2. Can it, however, be shown that P. had written beyond book xv in 150-146? Aymard (REA, 1940, 12 n. 3) has argued that the reference to Aristaenus' preservation of the Achaean League by his agreement with Rome (xviii. 13. 8-9) must have been written before 146; but it might equally be urged that the reference to 'utter destruction' and 'temporary safety' was a hint at 146, and was written after that date. Further, if xviii was written before 146, xviii. 35· 9, with its reference to the fall of Carthage, must be a later insertion (Brink and Walbank, CQ, loc. cit.). Cuntz (34--35) urges that the phrase Dtd ~I' ayvwa[av Tfic; lKTO<; 8aft.aT77J<; (xvi. 29. I2) cannot have been written after P.'s voyages in the Atlantic in I46 (d. xxxiv. rs. 7); but this is not decisive, for there is an implied contrast with the Euxine, compared with which the Atlantic was certainly unknown. Hence, despite Ziegler's assertion (RE, 'Polybios (1)', col. I477) that by rso P. had certainly brought his history nearly to Pydna, there is no clear positive evidence that he had composed beyond xv. 30. ro by that date. How many books had been published before ISo-146? Various arguments have been adduced. (a) Passages designed to affect policy about ISO B.c. These are iii. 21. 9 ff. on the Carthaginian treaties; perhaps iv. 27; iv. 30. 5, on the advantages of an Acarnanian alliance (a passage with which v. 106. 4 has been linked); iv. 31. 3-33. 12, Arcadia and Messenia should combine against Sparta; iv. 73· 6-74. 8, Elis should resume her asylia. These passages point to publication about rso/49, and support the view that iii-iv and probably (in view of its close conncxion with iv) v were published about then. On the details of this publication 293

IIL 1-5 INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY PROPER

Holleaux (J!tttdes, i. 445 ff. = REG, 1923, 480 ff.) has some cogent observations. P.'s discussion of the Rhodian earthquake of 227 is so ill adapted to its context, at v. 88---90, and could so easily have fitted into iv, that it appears probable that iv was already published when P. decided to mention it. This implies (i) that iv and v appeared separately with an interval between (though it tells us nothing of the length of such an interval), (ii) that v. 88---90 was written after iv was published; since there is evidence for last-minute insertions in iv, this is presumably a last-minute insertion in v. Recently J. de Foucault (Rev. phil., 1952, 47-52) has argued that v. 88---90 is in fact displaced from immediately after iv. 56; but his view is too hypothetical, and in fact, had P. originally placed the digression here, he must have introduced it rather differently. (b) Use of proverbs. On general grounds it appears likely that i and ii had already appeared before 146. That ii was written before then is clear from the references to the firmly established Achaean League in ii. 37. 8-40. 6, 62. 4; for the theory that these chapters were a late addition based on an earlier, separate work see ii. 37-70 n. Some support for the orthodox view is afforded by Wunderer's researches into P.'s use of proverbs. He shows (Polybios-Forschungen, i) that, although P. quotes proverbial phrases throughout his Histories, the first example of the phrase Ka.Td 7~v rra.potp.ta.v is at ix. 25. 3, after which it occurs frequently down to the end of the work; and he connects it with the use by P. of a collection of proverbs. It is noteworthy that the Achaean chapters of book ii, like the rest of i-v, and the surviving fragments of vi-ix. 25. 2, show no example of the phrase Ka.Ta -r~v rra.po;p.ia.v. For what it is worth this argumentum ex silentio is against the view that book ii contains late elements. (c) P.'s use of rrpoypa.rpa.i. and rrpoEK8~aw;. In xi. 10. 5 P. states that to the first six books he wrote rrpoypa.rpal, but wpo€;c(JI.cr€t>: to the rest. In fact, we possess no Trpoypa.rpa.l to books i-vi; and De Sanctis (iii. 1. 205, following Leo) supposes they were lost in a second edition. However, such rrpoyparpal (contents lists attached to the outside of the scroll) may well have become detached at any stage in the transmission of the text (Laqueur (Hermes, 19II, 180~4) suggests the period when the work was transferred from scroll to codex) ; and the writing of rrpoyparpa.f for the first six books can be explained from the internal economy of the work, which became more 'oecumenical' after vi, and so more suited to 7rpoEK8~uH;; (cf. xiv. 1 a 1). See also the considerations adduced by Laqueur (ibid.). We can only say that the disappearance of rrpoyparf>al is not inconsistent with the theory of a separate publication of books i-v (or vi), but does not make it necessary. {d) Again following Leo, De Sanctis (ibid.) suggests that the duties entrusted to P. in Greece in 145 (xxxix. 5) are more easily 294

INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY PROPER IlL 1-5

understandable if his pro-Roman attitude had already been indicated by the publication of a substantial part of his Histories. This is a flimsy argument, for the Senate had easy ways of learning about a dose friend of Scipio Aemilianus. (e) In xvi. zo. 5 f. P. relates how he had pointed out errors to Zeno, but too late for correction, as Zeno's book was already published ; and he then asks readers to pardon any honest mistakes in his own work. From this K. J. Neumann (Hermes, 1896, 519 ff.) deduced that when P. resumed his work after 150--144 he had already published i-xv. Clearly, however, this does not follow from the context. P.'s appeal is in general terms, and applies to future generations as well (i.e. readers of his whole work), and it is inserted here merely because of the digression on Zeno. Unless further passages can be adduced from books later than iv and v which seem intended to influence some identifiable contemporary political situation, it remains uncertain that more than five books had appeared before 146. Perhaps, in view of the fact that both its subject-matter and place in the Histories as a whole link vi with i v, this also appeared at the same time (cf. Brink and \Valbank, CQ, 1954. 100); but this is only a presumption, though one not contradicted by an analysis of vi (cf. vi introductory note, 4· 79· 14 n.). Certainly neither evidence nor probability speaks for the hypothesis of Mioni (33-48} that P. not only wrote, but also published, the first fifteen books in the years between 151 and 147; see, in criticism, Brink and Walbank (CQ, 1954, 100, 101 n. 8). 3· Revision of parts already composed or published. Many of the attempts to prove later insertions in i-xv, which were written before 146, break down. (a) Various attempts have been made to frame an account of P.'s views on Tyche which will enable a reader to assign relative dates to observations on this topic. Thus Cuntz (43 ff.) sees F.'s spiritual progress from an orthodox Hellenistic belief in the power of Tyche, reinforced by the writings of Demetrius of Phalerum, to a conviction that the world is governed by Stoic law and order; whereas von Scala (159 ff.) sees a development from a rationalist position, which seeks natural causes for all phenomena (in reaction against an earlier dependence on Demetrius), to an eventual return, after 167, to something nearer Demetrius' position. But all such attempts fail because at all periods P. tends to use the word Tyche in a variety of senses, and with varying intensity of 'belief'; see Walbank, CQ, 1945, 6-7; Mioni, 140-5 (a good analysis); Ziegler, RE, 'Polybios (1)', cols. 1532-43. Thus many passages (e.g. i. 63. 9, ii. 38. 4 ff., x. 5· 8, xviii. 28. 5, xxxi. 30. 1-3) are to be interpreted in the light of P.'s loyalty to Achaea, Rome, or Scipio, rather than as an expression of a particular philosophical attitude. See above, pp. 22-26. 295

III. 1-5 INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY PROPER

(b) It has been argued by Hirzel and von Scala that P. was a convert to Stoicism, largely through Panaetius' influence, and that any passages in the earlier books (for a list see Susemihl, ii. uo n., adding iv. 40. 3 from n. 93) which betray Stoic thought are later insertions. P. was in fact influenced by Stoicism, both in his late years, and also earlier (cf. Class. et med., 1948, 170 ff.); but this is an aspect not to be overstressed in a writer who was not by temperament a philosopher. Nor can the influence on P. of Panaetius, a younger man, the date of whose arrival at Rome is quite uncertain, be proved (cf. CQ, 1943, 86; Brink and Walbank, CQ, 1954, 103 nn. 3-4). In fact Stoicism is a useless criterion for dating P.'s work. (c) Cuntz argued that most of P.'s journeys and voyages took place after 146, and so drew conclusions on the dating of passages referring to them. De Sanctis (iii. 1. 209 ff.) has argued cogently that P.'s journeys in the western Mediterranean were almost all before, or in, 146. Hence no important deductions on composition can be made on this basis. Two points, however, are worth noting: (i) P.'s visits to Sardes (xxi. 38. 7) and Alexandria, under Physcon (xxxiv. 14. 6), were probably made after 146/5; even so they probably preceded the composition of the books in which they are mentioned. (ii) If P. visited New Carthage in 151 (cf. 57-59 n., x. II. 4), it still remains true that x. 11. 4 is probably an insertion in the original composition (cf. ii. 13. 2 n.).

On the other hand, both i-v and also later books up to xv contain passages apparently composed after 146, which imply revision of an original draft or edition. One is the present passage (4-5) ; others (see relevant notes) are: iii. 32. 2, reference to forty books and the fall of Carthage. iii. 37· n, the part of Europe washed by the outer sea has recently come under our notice. Cuntz (34 ff.) argues convincingly that this refers to the campaigns of D. lunius Brutus Callaicus in 138/7. Probably §§ 10-n, with the reference forward to xxxiv, were revised or inserted after that date. iii. 39· 2-12 (or at least 6-8) date to after u8, when the Via Domitia was constructed. iii. 59· 4: the reference to Greek politicians being free from war and politics implies a date after 146. In 59· 7 there is a reference to P.'s journeys (which are probably subsequent to the original composition of iii); hence it is likely that 57-59 is a later insertion. iii. 61. n, 86. 2, probably composed after 133 since they imply the shifting of the Italian frontier from the Aesis to the Rubicon. xii. In the main this book was \\'Titten before 146; cf. xii. 25, where 296

I~TRODUCTIOX

TO THE HISTORY PROPER III. c 5

the discussion of Phalaris' bull omits to mention its recovery by Scipio in r46 (d. CR, 1945, 40). But some passages are later. (?) xii. 2. r, on the lotus. Athenaeus states that P. described this from personal observation, and this would imply composition after the Third Punic War, or rsr at the latest (cf. 57-59 n.). But in fact the passage has the appearance of coming from a literary source, such as Diocles of Carystus (cf. v. 45· 10 n.). xii. 3· on the richness of Africa. If this is described from autopsy, it will be composed after 146 (or rsr): see last note. We have no record of any visit to Corsica (xii. 3· 7-4. 4). xii. 27 ff., the stress on avror.aOEta, and reference to Odysseus' wanderings, date this after 146 (Class. et med., 1948, I7I ff.). 4· Final publication. Since xxxi. z8. 13 and xxxviii. zr. 3 suggest that Scipio is dead and were therefore written after 129, and since there is evidence of insertions as late as 120 (cf. iii. 39), it appears that P. went on working at his History until his death; and indeed the 'obituary' in xxxix. 5 shows that his work appeared posthumously. But whether between rso-146 and his death no fnrther books were published we simply do not know; for there is nothing in x and xii (where alone insertions from after q6 are to be found) which is inconsistent with publication after, say, 140. It has been argued by A. Philippson (Phil. Woch., 1930, rr8r-2) that Cicero, de re pu,b. ii, draws largely on Polybius vi, and that when in § 21 Laelius remarks that Scipio's argument is one 'quae nusquam est in Graecorum libris', he is meant to suggest that at the dramatic date of the dialogue (129 B.c.) Polybius vi was not yet published. But the ratt'o ad disputm~dum noua there mentioned is probably not one copied from P. at all (cf. Laqueur, Phil. Woch., 1924, 334), in which case Philippson's argument on the date of publication of vi collapses. ~v TTI "~~'PWTU ••• ~v~?-.'!1 8e8TJAWKa.fLEV: cf. i. 3· r-6. 3, fLET' (mo8e\~£WS (~a.yy£?-.?-.nv: cf. ll. 37· 3 n., aTrOOELKTLK~ WTop£a. 4. ~vos l1pyou Ka.l. 6e!lf.!a.To'> iva.,: 'a single action and a single spectacle'. fN.ap.a corresponds to dydwtap.a in i. 4· 5· For the stress on the organic unity of the period cf. L 3· 4, and, for the exaggerated reference to the whole known world, i. I. 5· 5, TOVTou 8' EXOVTO'> ••• bJlo?-.oyoufLEVTJV: the Aristotelian theory of the unity of a dramatic work is here applied to history; cf. Poet. 23· I. I459 a 19, 7TEpt p.lav r.pa.;.v OA7JV Kat TEAtdav, ;xouaav apx~v Kal p.daa. «a~ TEAoc;. See further, L 3· 4 n. Kf:ljla.Xmw8ws ••. "11'poeK6ia8a.~: cf. § 7, r.po€xO~aw, i. 13. I. 7rpod~~:Owtc; is P.'s term for a preliminary summary of the events in a book, or a work (here 2~3), included as an integral part of the narrative. Cf. vi. 2. 3, xiv. r a r, xxxix. 8. 3, and viii. 11. 2 (an example from

1. 1.

297

III. r. 5 INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY PROPER

Theopompus); Arist. Rhet. Al. zg. 1436 b I, TO 1Tpfiyp,a TOt> aKOVOV(T~ 1TpoeKTtBtf.vat (i.e. the 1Tpolx:()Em> is not invented by P., as Lorenz (99 n. 229) supposes). In xi. I a I-·5 P. states that i~vi originally possessed only Trpoypa; the reference here is to TrpoeKBE(TEL> of the contents of the separate books. 7. T~v Eg &.p.cf>oi:v E1TL(]'Ta.ow Ka.i 9Eav: 'a preliminary survey based on both' (Paton). Probably a hendiadys for JTfl(TTaaw ri]> 8las (Schweighaeuser). Ola corresponds to the concrete (Nap,a 'spectacle' in § 4· 8. T~V ••• Ka9oA.ov ••• ~p.cf>aaw KTA.: cf. i. I. s-6 n. 10. oaas ouSeas , •• ~v ta~ 1TEp~~Aa~E 8LaaT~p.aTL: on the magnitude and uniqueness of P.'s theme cf. i. r. 5, 4· 4, v. 31. 6, vi. 2. 3, xxxix. 8. 7· The TaTro:; appears in Thuc. i. I. 2, cf. 21. 2, and is common later (d. v. 33· r); see Dion. Hal. i. 2. 1-3; Josephus, AI, i. I-7; Herodian, i. I. 4; Lorenz, 99 n. 228. 11. TOLCLVOE TLVli. ••• T~V ecf>ooov Tf)S EST)YtlO'EWS: 'the following method of procedure in my exposition': for i!.cpooo:; in this sense cf. xxxi. 23. I. For the 14oth Olympiad cf. i. 3· r.

2. 1. TtLS ahLa.s: discussed in 6-33. 4· Laqueur's objection (220) that only the Saguntine apx~ came within the 14oth Olympiad is true but irrelevant, since P. nowhere undertakes not to go back above zzo. Hence his conclusions about an early stage of composition in which the Saguntine affair figured as an nlTla fall to the ground. 3. ci>'AL1T1Tos ••• OLC.l1ToAEp.~aa.s AtTwA.ois KTA,: cf. ii. 71. 7-10 n. for the Social War. The settlement follows the Peace of Naupactus (v. 103-5) in 217. On Philip's project for an alliance with Hannibal cf. V. IOL j-I02, I, 4. :tl.vT\oxos ••• Ka.t nToAE!-la.l:o~: cf. ii. 7I. 7-IO n. for the Fourth

Svrian War.

s: 'Po8Lo~ ••• KCI.t npovala.s ••• 1Tpos Bu~a.vT(ous: cf. iv. 38-sz. On the phrase £;> TOV II6VTov cf. iv. 44· 3--4 n. 6. Tov U1T~p TTJS 'Pw1-1alwv 1TOALTEfa.s ••• A.6yov: cf. i. I. 5, 64. 2, n8. n-r2, vi. 2. 3, x. r6. j, xxi. r3. u, xxxix. 8. 7· This account is in vi. The reconquest (ava~aaaOa.t) of Italy and Sicily was described in vli-xiv; the acquisition (1rpoaAa.f3etv) of Spain was partially effected during the Hannibalic War (d. viii. 38, ix. n, x. 2-zo, 34-40, xi. 20-33), and completed in the second century. P.'s account of the conquest of the Gauls, which had started after the Gallic Wars (ii. rS-35), but had to begin afresh after the defeat of Hannibal, has not survived. On the impetus given to Rome by her defeat of Hannibal to advance to world dominion cf. i. 3· 6, iii. 32. 7 n., v. Io4. 3, XV. 9• 2, IO. 2, 7. TTJV Ka.TnAucrw TTJ'> 'l~pwvos ••• Suva.crTEia.s: for Hieronymus' fall and the capture of Syracuse cf. vii. z-8, viii. 3-7, 37, Why P. describes 298

INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY PROPER III. 3· 6

this as occurring in a digression, Ka.Ta 1Ta.plx:{3a.utv, is not clear (Schweighaeuser). 8. Tas rrepi. TTJV A'LyurrTov -ra.pa.xus: Ptolemy IV's civil war in Upper Egypt (xiv. Iz. 4), the detailed account of which is lost. Errt S(cupkcm TTl'> ••• O.pxils: the plot to dismember Ptolemy V's dominions is discussed at xv. zo. I f. The words x:a.T' Ai'ya.tov are Niebuhr's emendation of the MSS. Ka.T' At)'V'l'I'Tov, Holleaux (Etudes, iii. jon. I; iv. I62 n. 3 BCH, 1907, III n. 2; REG, 1899, 37 n. 3} proposed x:a.Ta Ktov; for a full discussion see xv. 20. In. On the date of Philopator's death and Epiphanes' accession see xv. 25. 1-2. 3. 1. auyKe,Pa.A.a.u.>a6.f.I.EVm Ta<; ••• rrp6.~u<;: cf. § 7, iv. L 9; 'rounding off the affairs'. uvyx:f:cpa.Aa.tavu8a.t is 'to round off, sum up', not (as Schweighaeuser) 'to summarize (in breuem summam contrahere)'. The account of the Second Punic War is rounded off in xv, though fighting had ceased earlier in Spain and Sicily. f.I.ETa(3((3aaof1EV ••• Els TOut) KaTa Tljv 'E).AO.Sa. Torrous: v.~th Philip's campaigns in and around the Aegean, and the Second Macedonian War (xv onwards). Laqueur (5) sees a discrepancy between this statement and the stress on Greek affairs in ii, iv, and v. But P.'s point is simply that the main thread passes over to Greece after the Hannibalic War; and Philip's Aegean campaign is directly relevant to this in a way in which, for example, the war of Rhodes and Prusias against Byzantium is not, since it led to the appeal to Rome and her intervention. For P.'s account of the naval battles see xvi. 2-9 (Chios), Io. I, I4--I5 (Lade). 2. Tov 'Pwf1a1wv Kai. cP(Mrrrrou m)AEflOV: for the Second Macedonian War (2oo-r97) see xvi. 34 (declaration), xviii. r-12, r6-27, 33-39 (action), 42-48 (settlement). 3-4. Tov O.rro Ti)s }.\a(a.s ••• rroAEJlOV: cf. 7. I-3 on the causes of the Syrian War (r92-r87). The a.h·la. was the anger of the Aetolians (cf. xviii. 45· I f., 48. 7), the dpx?] Antioch us' crossing into Europe (of which P.'s account has survived only in Livy's version). For the stress on Europe and Asia, and the contrasting of the two in the warpropaganda see CQ, I942, I4I-2. For Antiochus' evacuation of the districts west of Taurus see xxi. I7. 3; the account of his flight after Thermopylae survives in Livy. 5. KO.Ta.AUaa.vn:s TTJV fa.AO.TWV vj3pw: on Cn. Manlius Vulso's expedition (r89) see xxi. 33-39; and on the fear of the Gauls felt by the Mediterranean peoples d. ii. 35· 9 n. &.S~pLTOV ••• Tljv TTJ'i }.\O'LCll) apxfJv: here 'Asia' is Asia Minor; cf. Xen. Hell. iv. 8. 27. 6. Ta'> AhwA.wv Ka.t Ko:::<jlo.XA.t)vwv 6.Tux£a.s: on the end of the Aetolian War (189) and the siege of Cephallenia (189/8) see xxi. 25-32 b. TOUS EuflEVEL auaTcivTa<; rrpo') TE npoUO'LO.V KO.t

r a.A
rroAkjlOUS:

299

IlL 3· 6

INTRODUCTIO~

TO THE HISTORY PROPER

the lost account of the war of Prusias of Bithynia against Eumenes II of Pergamum (186-r83) was evidently in xxii; cf. xxiii. 1. 4, 3· 1-3; Niese, iii. 71. From an inscription of Telmessus, published by M. Segre (Riv. fil., 1932, 446; cf. L. Robert, Rev. phil., 1934, 284 n. r; E't. anat. 73 n. 1), in which relief at Eumenes' victory finds expression, it is clear that the Galatian rising was part of Prusias' war (8wywv~ud­ fLEvos: 1rpos 'TE Jlpovufav [Ka]~ 'OpnayovTa Kat 'TOV<; ra,\cf.Ta<; Kal 'TOfJ<; [uv]fLfLdxovs: avnvv), asP. here suggests; cf. Trogus, prol. 32, 'in Asia bellum ab rege Eumene gestum aduersus Gallum Ortiagontem, Pharnacem Ponticum et Prusian, adiuuante Prusian Hannibale Poeno'. Following on his victory Eumenes received the title of Soter, henceforward attached to his name in decrees of cities within his kingdom; on the problem of the Nicephoria see iv. 49· 3 n. and the works listed there. On Ortiagon, who perhaps fell in this war, see xxi. 38, xxii. 21. I. F.'s account may have drawn on the personal reminiscences of Ortiagon's wife, Chiomara; xxi. 38. 7· A Delian epigram in honour of the Pergamene prince Philetaerus has been referred to this war; but the ascription is uncertain (cf. E. Loewy, Jnschrijten griechischer Bildhauer (Leipzig, 1885), ro9 f., no. 147). \Vhether after their defeat the Galatians were left independent (Niese) or incorporated in Pergamum (Brandis; cf. Hansen, 96) is not clear; xxiv. rs. 6 merely proves Galatia to be non-Pontic, but not necessarily Pergamene, territory, and xxv. 2. 4 (Pharnaces not to invade Galatia; treaties made with Galatia null and void) only shows, as one might expect, that Galatia assumed a relationship of clientship towards Pergamum, without necessarily losing its independence. TOv p.n' ~pLapa8ou rrpos ~a.pv6.K1JV: for Pharnaces' attack on Ariarathes of Cappadocia, Eumenes' ally, and the subsequent war (I83-r8o/7g) see xxiii. g. 1-3, xxiv. I. r-3, 5· r, 14-15, xxv. 2. 7, rijs 1r0.pa neA011'0VVTJCI'tWv OflOVOlO.S Kat KO.TO.CJ'TaCJ'EWS: 'the unity and settled condition of the Peloponnese'. Paton translates 'the unification and pacification'; but &fL6vota is a state, not a process. Cf. ii. 37· 8. The consolidation of Peloponnesian unity dates from the readmission of Messene and Sparta into the Achaean League in 183 (xxiii. 17-18). Tfjs a.us~crews ToG 'Po81wv TOA\Teop.a.Tos: for Rhodian acquisitions in Asia Minor after the defeat of Antiochus see xxi. 24. 7, 46. 8 (Lycia and Caria as far as the Maeander, except Telmessus). cruyKecpaAa.~wcr6p.e8a. T~V OATJV 8l~YTJCI'tV nJlO. Kat TclS rrpas£\S: cf. § I n. 'I shall bring the whole narrative of events to a conclusion' (Paton). The rounding off is explained in the words J1ri ?Tautv .•• {3autAdac;. Schweighaeuser mistranslates 'uniuersam narrationem nostram et res ante positas in pauca uerba contrahemus'. For Antiochus IV Epiphanes' expedition against Egypt (168) see xxvii. 19, xxviii. 300

INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY PROPER III. 4· xo

I8-zJ, xxix. 2, 23 f., 27, for the Third Macedonian War (171-I68) xxvii. I-Io, 14-16, xxviii. 3-13, xxix. 3-9, I4-2I. 9. 'll'aao.v eTtoLt1ao.vTo TTJV otKou._..~"ll" il'll't1Koov o.uTois: the summary ends on the keynote; cf. r. 4, I. 9·

4. 1-4. el (LEv oov ••• t'll'el 8€ ••• : on this formula cf. i. 3· 7 n., iv. 28. 2-3. In this addition to his introduction P. insists that judgement must rest, not on immediate failure or success, but on a consideration of the results of actions over a long period. Cf. § 3 n., Aymard, REA, 1940, 19 n. I, 1. Kll.Til Tr)v

es 6.px1ls 1Tpo8eaw: d. i. I. 5-6 n. for P.'s intention to stop at 168{7, the conclusion of the fifty-three years. At i. 65. 5, ii. r. 4, 71· 2 this phrase is used of the plan to describe events down to 220 in a summary fashion. 2. l] T' o.1is"laLs ••• ETETEAe(wTo: untrue; but P. was committed to the view that Roman power reached its maximum growth in 167, hence what followed must be consolidation and moral trial. 4. ooK CLUToTEAe1s ••• at ••• 8Lo.At}ljlw;: 'judgements ... are not final'. The real character of an apparent success can be judged only from its sequel, and how it is employed. P. is here moving towards, but never clearly expresses (cf. the use of av~i-•povTwv in § II; interest of whom?), the idea eventually formulated by Panaetius and the Stoics, and taken over by the Romans (cf. Capelle, Klio, 1932, 86 ff.), that the true justification of Roman world-dominion is one which takes into account the advantage of both rulers and ruled. 7. Tois ._..ev vuv ooaLv ••• Tois 8' t'II'LyEvo._..~voLS: for his contemporaries, P.'s history is to afford a political lesson leading to action relative to Roman rule, viz. rroT<pa ,PwKT~v ~ TovvavTiov alp-.wr't]v ~ .jleKr't]v yeyovevat vo11-urreov (cf. § I). The political action of P.'s contemporaries also, of course, rests upon a moral judgement. 10. ou8ets ••• 'II'AEi TU 'II'EAO.y"l xcipw TOU 1TEpmw9t}vo.L ..,.Ovov: perhaps proverbial (cf. Wunderer, i. I2J). P. reflects the normal classical attitude towards sea-travel, always dangerous and uncomfortable. OU 's E· TO.\; · E,....1tE:LpLO.~ · , • , "E\IEKO. TT)'li - Ei1TL<7Tt' • ·!Jl.T)'li 0.\10./\0.Jl.t'CLVEL; • ' R• r:., 'S a tt'1~ tude towards knowledge is strictly utilitarian (cf. ix. 20. 6), and this distinguishes him from the Alexandrian school, ·with its spirit of free speculation and the acquisition of knowledge for its own sake (cf. Class. et med., 1948, rp-3). Cf. Cic. de re pub. i. 33, 'cas artis, quae efficiant ut usui ciuitati simus'. There may well be Stoic influence here; cf. Cic. off. i. 22, 'placet Stoicis, quae in terris gignantur, ad usum hominum omnia creari' (quoted by Lorenz, 77 n. 36). Certainly the distinction in§ I I of ~3v, KaAOV, and aoll-4•pov, though 30I

III. 4· ro INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY PROPER

not contrasted (as for instance Ka,\6v and JJrpl-\,p.ov are contrasted in i. 4· 4, 4· II, iii. 31. 12), suggests Stoic terminology; cf. xxiv. 12. 2, Suo ... CFKorroir;; .•. rraaij> rroi\tT€/as, TO TE Ka-\ov !((].' Td avp.rpti.pov. For the Stoic concepts of ~
the subject-matter of the Histories.

a.iho'll'Tl)'i •.• wv fl.EY auvEpyos wv SE Ka.t xup~CTTJS yEyoveVO.l: for p .' s stress on autopsy for the historian d. xii. 25 h 4, xx. 12. 8. P.'s share in the major events comes out clearly in the last books, from xxxv onwards (cf. 5· In.). In particular, he was auv£py6> at Carthage in the Third Punic War (Ziegler (RE, 'Polybios (r)', col. 1489) recalls the phrase crrJp.p.axos 'Pwp.alwv on the stele erected in P .' s honour at Megalopolis, Paus. viii. 30. 8) and xnp•aT~s in the settlement of Achaea. 30Z

INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY PROPER IlLs. r

o!ov 6.px~v 1TO~T)crajlEVOS aAATJV: this 'fresh start' applies, not to the

period after 167 (so Thommen, Hermes, 1885, 199; Susemihl, ii. 108 n. 104), but to the years of rapax~ Ka~ KiV"IJ<ns' (cf. § 13, 1nr€p 7}s-). Thus the additional years fall into two groups: (a) 168/7-c. ISI: pendant to the period of conquest; testing time for Rome, included to facilitate the judging of conqueror and conquered by contemporaries and posterity. (b) c. I5I-I45/4: rapax~ Ka~ KivYJm>; begun 'as if a new work' because of the extraordinary events and P.'s own part in them. But in practice the two are not rigidly distinguished (though xxxiv seems to act as a line of demarcation; cf. § 5· In.), for the events of the second group also serve in the passing of judgements.

5. 1. ~ 1TpoupTJjlEVTJ KivTJa~s: this chapter purports to summarize the events of the years of rapax~. just as z-3 summarize those of zzo-I68. But this fails to account for the years between I68 and the onset of the rapax~- ·when did P. regard this as beginning? Of events mentioned in this chapter the earliest is the expulsion of Ariarathes from Cappadocia (§ z) in I 58; the war between Attalus and Prusias was I56-I54, and the Celtiberian War began in 153 and lasted till I5I (§I). This would suggest that the rapax~ began in I58. But in fact P.'s scheme here is not easily reconciled with the more rigid system of his 'olympiad' chronology. There is no specific date dividing the 'pendant to the conquest' from the 'period of disturbance', but only a gradual increase in warfare as I 50 approached, and finally the culminating disasters in Carthage, Macedonia, and Greece. Hence, though P. here mentions events earlier than ISI, it seems likely that he intended the line of demarcation before the events distinguished by his own autopsy, collaboration, and direction, to be xxxiv, with its description of the oecumene. Similarly, vi served to separate the period up to Cannae from the period after, when events throughout the whole world became intertwined. Cf. Lorenz, 68 f. (who is not, however, to be followed in his conclusion that P. regarded the 'years of trouble' as a condemnation of the Roman imperium). Thus xxxiv provides a climax to vii-xxxiii, and 'insulates' them from the last books in which P. plays a more personal part. The present passage is an attempt to do two logically different things, to summarize the period I67-145, and to summarize the 'time of trouble' which is defined schematically, and with some violence to the arrangement by Olympiad years, as c. I5I-I45· 'Pwjla.'lol .•• 1rpos KEArif3lJpa.s Ka.L Oila.KKa.(ous: fragments on the Second Celtiberian War (I53-I5I) are preserved in xxxv. I-S· Ma.aa.wO.aa.v ~a.a~A£a. rwv Al~uwv: Carthage declared war on

III.s.

1

INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY PROPER

Masinissa in winter rsr/o; but the only surviving fragment on the differences between Carthage and Numidia (xxxi. 21) refers to r61. 2. 'AnaAo~ ••• Kal. npoua(a~: the war between Attalus II and Prusias II opened in rs6, and ended with Prusias' defeat in 154. Ct. xxxii. rs-r6, xxxiii. I. I-2, 12-IJ. :A.ptapci91'}~: Ariarathes V was expelled from Cappadocia in rs8 by his half-brother Orophernes, helped by Demetrius I of Syria (the son of Seleucus IV). Attalus II helped in his restoration in rs6. Cf. xxxii. ro, xxxiii. 6. 3. Al'}p-tiTpLOS: after reigning from 162 to rso, Demetrius I fell in battle against Alexander Balas, a pretender suborned by Attalus II and Ptolemy VI of Egypt (Twv CiM.wv Pam.>.€wv). Cf. xxxi. 2, u-rs (escape from Rome), xxxiii. s. r8. 8 f. For the hysteron proteron of TOV Pu5v Kat Tfj<; apxfi> to avoid hiatus cf. ii. 2. 2 n. 4. a1TOKaTEO"TT)O"av ••• TOU~ "EAAT)Va~: the remnants of the thousand Achaeans, who were kept in Italy without trial after Pydna (xxx. 13. 6 ff., xxxi. 23. s), were allowed to return home in rsr (xxxv. 6). 5. Kapx11ooviot~: for the Third Punic War (149-146) see xxxvi. r-g, r6, xxxviii. 7-8, 19-22. 6. ot~ KaTaAAT)Aa: 'simultaneously' (cf. 32. 5, Td> KaTa.M~>.ov> Twv -rrpa[Ewv, 'contemporary events'), not, as Paton, 'close upon this'. The list of events in the era of Tapax~ does not follow a strictly chronological order. The Macedonian revolt under Andriscus was in 149/8; cf. xxxvi. 9-ro, 17. Trouble arose between Sparta and Achaea in rso, and in winter 149/8 the Senate authorized the independence of Sparta, which led to the outbreak of war between Achaea and Sparta, and so to the Achaean \Var with Rome; cf. xxxviii. r-6, 9-18, xxxix. r-6. all-a Ti]v apxf)v Ka~ TO TEAO~: for disaster was swift; cf. xxxviii. r8. 12, El flTJ Tax€w<; a1TwAop.E8a, oOK av iaw87Jp.Ev. For the proverbial linking of dpx~ Katr.fAo> cf. i. r. 2, vi. 6. 7 n. 7-8. It is uncertain whether this paragraph is part of the first draft or of the additional material; the reference to long life is perhaps more likely to come from an older man, but not necessarily so. 8. 1TE1TE1a1-1-m !-LEv ycl.p, ••• : 'yet I am sure .. .' ; for this sense of yap, 'yet, jreilich' (ct. Stahl, Rh. Mus., 1902, r ff.), see Aristoph. Ran. 262, TOVrt;J yctp ov vtK~a
INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY PROPER III.6.3

'will become entangled', a sense which the word acquires from the idea of arrest connected with the demanding of surety (cf. Thales in Stob. Anth. iv. 22. 65 (W.-H. iv. 521), TO tfjv Atl7T(US av8atp~TmS Ko.nyyvryaat).

6. l-33. 4. Causes and Preliminaries of the Hannibalic War; the Second Illyrian War

6. 1. ;VLOl • • • 1'Wv auyyEypn4>chwv TdS KelT' i6..vvt{3nv rrprtSElS: who are these historians of Hannibal who make the siege of Saguntum the first, and the crossing of the Ebro the second, cause of the war? Chiefly Silenus (cf. i. 3· 2 n.}, in the opinion of Hesselbarth (r3); but Arnold (Oorzaak, r8) suggests they are Chaereas and Sosylus (cf. i. 3· 2 n.), and perhaps Cato (to whom he mistakenly sees a reference in 20. I f.). However, pro-Carthaginian writers like Chaereas and Sosylus (cf. 2o. 5) will scarcely have given so anti-Barcine a version of the causes of the war; and P. is more likely to be thinking of the second-century senatorial historians at Rome (d. Tii.ubler, Vorgesch. 84, 86-87; Gelzer, Hermes, 1933, 159; McDonald, CR, 1940, 42), who concocted this version of Carthaginian responsibility, as it appears, for instance, in Zonaras (viii. 22). That Cato and Cassius Hemina had this version (Arnold's further suggestion) is possible, though it remains uncertain, and even unlikely, that the relevant books of Cato were accessible to P. before rso. Postumius Albinus may be meant, though Taubler's argument (Vorgesch. 87) that P. is hitting at his claim to write -rrpayp.anK~ [a,.opla (xxxix. 1. 4) rests on the false assumption that by this phrase P. means 'history dealing with cause and effect' (cf. i. 2. 7-8 n.; Walbank, CQ, r945. r6). In any case P. is probably referring not merely to writers on Hannibal, but also to historians who have covered the Second Punic War in the course of their work. 2. -rra.pcl. ,.Q.s auv8,t<ns: the Ebro treaty of 226 (ii. r3. 7 n.). 3 . .ipx&.s ••• nhlns: to Thucydides (i. 23. 6) ahlat, 'grievances' (and so proximate casus belli; cf. Adcock, CA. II, v. 481 n.), are distinguishable from the aA7]81iaTri.TTf -rrporpaa-,r;, 'the truest explanation' (cf. L. Pearson, TAPA, 1952, 205-23). P.'s usage is different. He uses ahta to describe such events as lead the individual to conceive a will to war; the pretext for war then given (which may or may not be genuine) is the -rrp&rpaa<>. The first action of the war itself (which is not necessarily fought by the person who conceived it; cf. xxii. r8. 9 ff.) is the dpxl). Clearly this is a more mechanical concept than that ofThucydides, for whom a war breaks out because of grievances, which are simply the form in which a deeper antagonism (the real cause or -rrporpaatr;) finds expression. It is, moreover, noteworthy that none of P.'s three terms covers the actual decis£ott to go to war; this, ~866

X

III. 6. 3

CAUSES A:ND PRELIMINARIES OF

an all-important stage in his sequence, is neither cause, pretext, nor beginning, but will fall in point of time between the al-rla and the -rrp6,Pafn-;;. P. draws the same distinctions in xxii. I8. 6; cf. iv. IJ. 6 for al-r{a, a.f>opf-t~, and apx~, iv. 56. I for apx~ and -rrpo.f>aut-;; ; for general emphasis on establishing causes see ii. 38. 5, iii. JI, vi. 2. 8, xi. I9 a I-J. Though he makes no reference to Thucydides' system, his silence spells criticism of it, for in 31. I2 f. he shows by reminiscence his familiarity with his predecessor. P. here regards the war as beginning with Hannibal's attack on Saguntum, not with the Roman declaration of war at Carthage; this is the Roman case (d. xv. 17. J, Scipio's accusation after Zama), and the (subsequent) reply to the clever tactics by which Hannibal forced them to take the responsibility for the formal outbreak. 4. -rl\v ~). e~civopou Sta~aow E~S -rl\v :A.a(av: his crossing of the Hellespont from Sestus to Abydus in 334, the beginning of the war against the Persian Empire of Darius Codomannus. (P. ignores the force which had been operating in Asia Minor under Parmenion since 336.) -rov Avnoxou Ka-rcirrXouv eis l:t..TJilTJTpLaOa: Antiochus III's crossing from Asia to Pteleum in Thessaly in autumn I92 (cf. Livy, xxxv. 43· I-6; below, xx. In.), an action which initiated the war with Rome. Since previous preparations were made for the crossings of both Alexander and Antiochus, these cannot, P. argues, in themselves be regarded as primary causes. 6. ~pn ••. at-r(as Kat rrpoaaEws: cf. § 3 n. P. here puts alTla and -rrpo.f>mn-;; together, because his immediate concern is not to distinguish between them, but to expose the cruder confusion of those who confound either of them with a totally different event, the first action of the war itself. -rrpo,Paat> is still 'pretext'; Paton's translation 'purpose' is misleading. 7. -ras rrpoKa9T)youf1€vas -rwv KpLaEwv Kat OtaXT)Ij!Ewv: 'the events which influence in advance our purposes and decisions' (Ta> -rrpoKaBTJyovf-tlvas is attracted into the gender of alTla-;;). In vi. 2. 8-10 a state's constitution is said to be the wylaTTJ alTla of success or failure in politics; that is because the constitution is the factor which above all others shapes political decisions. Paton here translates 'judgements and opinions'; but this misses the idea of 'decision to take action', present in both words and essential to P.'s argument. It is taken up in the verbs Kptval n Kat -rrpoBlaBm, 'to reach decisions and projects' (Paton). LSJ omits this sense of StJ)..TJtft>; cf., however, ii. 46. 5, iii. 89. 2, IOJ. 6, and passim. (P. does not always keep to this rigid definition of alTla; in 28. I it means 'justification', and in 28. 5 'guilt' (cf. Bung, Ion. I).) 10. T) -rwv flETa =:evowv-ros 'EXX~vwv •.• ~rrO.voSos: the march of the Io,ooo Greek mercenaries, who had gone against Artaxerxes under J06

THE IL\"!'l"NIBALIC WAR

III. 6. I3

Cyrus and Clearchus in 401, and after Cyrus' defeat and death at Cunaxa near Babylon, and the treacherous murder of Clearchus, had made their way north under the command of Xenophon, through Armenia to the Black Sea coast at Trapezus, and thence to Calchedon, which some half of them reached eventually in 4oo (Tarn, CAH, vi. 4-18). Xenophon recounted the story of the march in his Anabasis; and an absurdly exaggerated account of the achievement was given by !socrates in his Panegyricus (145-9) in 38o, and his Philippus (9o ff.) of 346, as an argument in favour of his programme of uniting Greece in a campaign against Persia. Philip will have welcomed !socrates' propaganda, but neither he nor Alexander is likely to have been directly influenced by it. However, they too must have drawn the obvious conclusions fromXenophon's exploit~the weakness of Persian infantry, and the indispensability of strong cavalry for any success in Asia. Subsequently it was natural that post hoc became propter hoc; and P. here gives an advanced version of the association of Alexander's expedition with that of the ro,ooo. Later Arrian, writing in the middle of the second century A.D., entitled his History of Alexander Anabasis in open imitation of Xenophon. By 'Asia' P. here means 'the Persian Empire'; cf. Lysias, ii. 21; Isoc. Panegyr., passim. 11. 1j Tou Ao.KE8cup.ov£wv f3o.mXEws ~y'l'la'M.ou 8~0.f3o.o-Ls: in 396 the Spartan king Agesilaus crossed to Asia with a force of 8,ooo Spartans and allies, and in 396 and 395 operated there against the satraps Tissaphernes, Pharnabazus, and Tithraustes. In the absence of a strong cavalry force and siege-train he could not do more than make a series of forays to protect the Greek towns; but P. fairly observes that 'he found no opposition of any moment'. His return was brought about by the so-called Corinthian War, which was precipitated in summer 395 by a Theban invasion of Phocis, the ally of Sparta, and soon developed into a coalition of Thebes, Athens, Corinth, and Argos against Sparta. Consequently in spring 394 the ephors recalled Agesilaus, who marched back through Macedonia and Thessaly. See Cary, CAH, vi. 40-47. Like Alexander after him, Agesilaus saw himself as a second Agamemnon re~enacting the destruction of Troy; before setting out he had tried to sacrifice at Aulis, but was driven off by the Boeotians (d. Niese, RE, 'Agesilaos (4)', cols. 796~7). But in making his expedition a 'cause' of Alexander's, P. seems again to be following !socrates, who asserted (Phitippus, 86-87) that he failed because he had not secured Greek unity, but had preferred to put his friends in charge of the cities; hence his recall Std T~v -rapax~v 'Tijv €v8ao€ (i.e. in Greece) y•yvo!LtV'ryv. F.'s remark on Agesilaus in ix. 23. 7 reveals the hostile tradition also to be found in Plutarch (Ages. 25) and Diodorus (xv. 19. 4). 13. eu9ews 11"poq.&ae\ XPWf-LEVOi [)or, 0'11"f.U0n ••• 11"0.pCI.VOf-LlO.V j cf. v. IO, 3

III. 6. 13

CAUSES AND PRELIMINARIES OF

(of Alexander), ~nafJd.s els rqv Autav fLtTE1TOp€V£7'0 rqv llepuwv aaefJ•tav f.ls -rovs "EI\i\7Jvas. a1T£6on, 'was eager', not 'it was his duty' (Paton). The idea of a national crusade against Persia recurs frequently in fourth-century Greek political thought, and it is supported by references to legend and history, to the Trojan War and the Persian invasion. Gorgias was the first to preach on the theme of homonoia and war against Persia, probably in 392 (Momigliano, Riv. fil., 1933, 478; Wilamowitz, Aristoteles und Athen, i (Berlin, 1893), 172 made it 408), shortly after the 'Homeric' expedition of Agesilaus (§ I I n.). In 388 Lysias advocated the same policy at Olympia, combining it with a campaign against Dionysius I in Sicily (his 'Oi\vfLmaK6s); and in 38o Gorgias' pupil, !socrates, produced his famous Panegyricus, in which he called on Athens and Sparta, especially Athens, to reconcile their differences, and to lead an anti-Persian crusade, which would win the wealth of Asia and avenge the King's Peace (i. 6. 2). In the years after 374 this programme was actively taken up by Jason of Pherae (lsoc. Phil. II9; Xen. Hell. vi. 1. u), who was a great admirer of Gorgias (Paus. vi. 17· 9) and a guest-friend of !socrates (Isoc. Epist. 6. 1), but it was cut short by his murder in 370. Finally, in 346 !socrates directly appealed to Philip II of Macedonia to lead the crusade, in hls Philippus, published that year. He was not alone; we hear of Delius (or Dias, Philostr. VS. i. 3· p. 485) of Ephesus giving similar counsel to both Phllip and Alexander (l'lut. Mor. nz6 n). That Philip was convinced by !socrates' pan-hellenic propaganda is unlikely; but Alexander's sacrifice at Ilium (cf. H. U. lnstinsky, Alexander der Grosse am Hellespont (Godesberg, 1949), 54 ff.; with my criticism, ]HS, rgso, 79-Br) showed that he, no less than his father, knew how to exploit it, and also that he could make a genuine response to its more romantic aspects. The 1rp6aa~s here mentioned, revenge for Xerxes' sacrilege, was part of the programme put forward at the conference of Greek states at Corinth in winter 338/7 (cf. Diod. xvi. 89. 2, 1\a{JEtv 1rap' athwv StKas {J1Tep -rijs els -rd. ifpa JlfVDfL~V7Js 1rapavoftlas) ; it does not appear in this form in !socrates, and was probably Philip's own idea (cf. Wilcken, Alexander, 47), though Plutarch (Per. q) records a similar scheme of Pericles. Wilcken also points out that the Kotvi} •lp~v7J set up at Corinth was designed to recapture the atmosphere of the years of resistance to the Persians, when a similar internal peace was in operation. 14. a.h(as ..• TJYTJTiov: viz. the anabasis of the ro,ooo and Agesilaus' invasion of Asia. These two events suggested the Macedonian expedition, and gave promise of its success; hence by leading Philip (and Alexander) to conceive the purpose of going to war, they are its 'causes', in the sense defined in § 3· The 1rp6aa~s is the progranune of avenging the wrongs of Hellas. For such a programme of action P. often uses the word 1TpoalpHttS (cf. 8. 4, 8. s, etc.). 308

THE HANNIBALIC WAR

III. 7· 7

7. 1-3. Cause of the Syrian War: here, too, P. distinguishes three events, (a) the anger of the Aetolians against Rome (3. 3-4 n.), which inspired their will to war; (b) the programme of liberating Greece, the 1rp6rpams (here undoubtedly 'pretext' in the bad sense; cf. § 3, d..\6yws Kal iftwows); (c) Antiochus' crossing into Europe, the apX1}. Here again the actual decision to invite Antiochus (with the readiness to 'do and suffer anything',§ 2) is excluded from the three categories. It is noteworthy that the Achaean historian makes the Aetolians responsible for the war, not because of their dpy?], but because they took the vital decision and carried out the subsequent action of bringing over Antiochus. He thus shows once more his superficial conception of historical causality, which would attribute the responsibility for a war to the 'unilateral' actions of one side. On the Aetolian propaganda of liberation see Livy, xxxv. 33· 8, 46. 6, 48.8 (based on P.); on Antiochus' crossing to Demetrias, 6. 4 n. 4-7. Importance of discovering causes: cf. 6. 3 n. and passages there quoted. The function of history is to give practical assistance, particularly to the statesman; cf. i. I. 2, ii. 35· 5-10, iii. 31, 118. 12, vii. n. 2 (and many passages which mention merely the utility of history without referring to the statesman, i. 4· II, ii. s6. 10-IZ, iii. 4. S7-S9. vi. 2. 8, vii. 7· 8, ix. 2, x. 21. 3, 47· 12-13, xi. 19 a 1-3, xii. 7· 3-6, zs b, 25 g, 25 i 4 ff., xv. 35· 7, 36. 3. xxxix. 8. 7). For the correction of ol rptAol'-a8oiJvn:s (§ 4, 'students of history') see i. 65. 9; cf. i. 13. 9, iii. 21. 9-10, 59· 4, vii. 7· 8, ix. z. s. xi. 19 a 2. 5. ,-[ yttp ilc!>~::Xoc; ta,-pou KTA.: P. is fond of medical comparisons, cf. xi. 25. z ff. (implied comparison between Scipio tackling a mutiny and a doctor treating an abscess), xii. z7. 8 (approval of Theopompus' comparison of statesmen, doctors, and pilots), xxix. 8. 8 (Eumenes like a bad physician), xxxiii. 17. 1-2 (Rhodians like sick men who turn from their physicians to the help of soothsayers, etc.), fg. 41, o~::i Touc; dp8ws {3ouA~::uol'-ivous 1Ttop1. TOii 1ToAil'-ou, Ka8am::p Kal TOV> lv Tats appwaTtats, 1'-TJOJv .ryTTOV TWV r!myt::VVTJ!LdTWV 1TOtt::'ia8m AOyov ~ TWV ig dpxfj> {J1ToKt::t!'-ivwv 1ra8wv. In xii. d medicine is compared to

zs

historical writing. This comparison is common to both the Socratic school and the Stoics. 6. au<J"TJ]aa.o6a.L Tac; TWY aWJ.LUTWY 9Epa.vEi.a.c;: 'to institute proper treatment for the body' rather than 'to recommend', etc. (Paton). 7. ouoEv ouTw c!>uAa.KTEov: 'there is nothing we ought to be more alive to' (Shuckburgh); for if a statesman acts in good time, he may prevent some disastrous event by remedying 'the initial impulses and decisions'. 309

III. 8.

I

CAUSES AND PRELIMINARIES OF

8. 1-9. 5. Criticism of Fabius' view on the causes of the war: on Fabius cf. i. 14. In. According toP. Fabius gave two causes for the war, (a) the outrage at Saguntum, i.e. Hannibal's seizure and sack, (b) Hasdrubal's 7TAWJ.!Egla Kai cpL>.apx!.a, which led him to govern Spain as an independent ruler (Diod. xxv. 12; App. Hisp. 4-13); so too Hannibal, who accordingly began the war \\ithout the approval of his government. P. has dealt with (a) in 6, and does not return to it. He refutes the picture of Hannibal's independence by showing the Carthaginians unwilling to surrender him in reply to the Roman ultimatum. Hasdrubal's 1TAEOJ.!Egla Kal cfo,}.,a.pxta are not specifically dealt with; but in 9· 6 P. takes the cause one step farther back by referring the war to the wrath of Hamilcar. Fabius' account calls for discussion in relation both to its origin and its truth. It seems likely that it came from the anti-Barcine party which, after the defeat, tried to lay the responsibility on Hannibal and his predecessor (DeSanctis, iii. 2. :z); cf. the behaviour of the Punic inter~ mediaries after the Hannibalic War (xv. I. 7-8, 17. 3; Livy, xxx. 16. 5--{) (Polybian), 22. 1-3.42. 12 (annalistic)). But why did Fabius accept it? Because, Gelzer argues (Hermes, 1933, 157 ff.), it was true. \Vhen the first Roman envoys went to Carthage from Spain in 220/19 {15. 12) they found the Carthaginian Senate in anti-Bardne hands and ready to disavow Hannibal. Reassured, they therefore took no steps to save Saguntum. But Hannibal's success in the siege strengthened his position {17. 7), and the Senate refused to disavow him. This version, says Gelzer, helps to explain how Rome seemed to have let down an allied state, Saguntum. The thesis is unconvincing. As Arnold (Oorzaak, 28) points out, Punic disavowal of Hannibal in 22ojrg could make no clifference to the Roman obligation to succour Saguntum; and it implies great clishonesty in P., if he hoped to refute Fabius' account of Hannibal's independent action by pointing to Punic support of Hannibal throughout the war, when (on Gelzer's theory) Fabius had recorded a change in the attitude of the Carthaginian Senate towards him between the two Roman embassies. The accusation of dishonesty is specifically made by P. Schnabel (Klio, 1926, ns~16), who here anticipated Gelzer. P., he supposes, deliberately suppressed the peaceable answer of the Carthaginian Senate because it clashed with his general picture. The version that Hannibal acted independently of the government is not supported by the annalistic traclition; this emphasizes the factional opposition to Hannibal (cf. Livy, xxi. 1o-u; App. Hisp. xo; Zon. viii. 21). and Appian even records the absurd story that he went to war to save his political supporters at home (Hann. 3), but the general impression is of a Senate giving him its support. P.'s evidence (r3. 4, ii. 36. 3 n.) points in the same direction. Equally unconvincing is Fabius' picture of an ambitious and 310

THE IIANNTBALIC WAR

III. 8. 5

power·loving Hasdrubal. Against it is the fact of the Ebro Frontier Treaty, sworn at a time when Rome was hard pressed and eager to prevent an alliance between Carthage and the Gauls (ii. 13. in.). This treaty was a concession to Carthage; but Hasdrubal's preference for a concession rather than a war is an argument against Fabius. More~ over, Hasdrubal's actions nowhere reveal a will to war; cf. 12. 4; Diod. xxv. rr. r, on ltuiipov{las ILafJ6w 1Tpa1CrtKWTipa11 o?iaa11 rijs {lias T~l1lmf£lKr£tal1, 1Tp0EKpi.V€ ~11 r:lp~V1]11TOV1TO/..€fLOl.!; Livy, XXi. 2. 5 (quoted, ii. 36. 2 n.). His pacific nature is firmly rooted in the tradition. In short, Fabius' version must be rejected. A more likely explanation of why he adopted it may be that it is to be connected with the agitation which led to Hannibal's expulsion from Carthage in 195 (Livy, xxxiii. 49· 6). In this the antiBarcine party was prominent; and their case for Hannibal's guilt would be useful propaganda in where otherwise the Roman policy towards him in 195 might have been regarded as rancorous. 8. 2. tLEYahTJV avfllhTJcp6TO. T~V SuvO.O'TE(o.v KTA.: 'having obtained a command of great importance' (or 'of vast extent'). Meyer (Kl. Schr. ii. 352) assumes Hasdrubal's supposed visit to Africa to have occurred immediately after he had succeeded Hamilcar, in which case 8uvauu{a is imperium, 'command' (cf. Taubler, Vorgesch. 68 n. II4) ; and Schweighaeuser translates T~v 3waaTTous 0.v8pa.s: the a~to/..oyot of § 7, the anti-Barcine party of Hanno and his followers. 4. Ta Ko.Ta TTJV 'I~T)pia.v XELpi~£Lv Ko.TO. ~v o.ihoG 1Tpoa1pEcnv: in fact Hannibal. and presumably Hasdrubal too, were accompanied by Councillors from Carthage (d. ii. 13. in. (b)). On the Councils at Carthage see i. zr. 6 n. 5. 8la.SEga!L£VOV Til KO.Tcl T~V '(~T)pLa.v: in 221; cf. ii. 36. I n. T~v o.uT~v O.ywy.fJv i\uSpou~«i!-: but Hannibal declared war, not Hasdrubal. \Vhat, in Fabius' exposition, occasioned this step? P. does not inform us. E. Meyer (Kl. Schr. ii. 352 n. 1) conjectures that 'Hannibal hoped so to extend his power through war as to be able 3II

IIL 8. 5

CAUSES AND PRELIMINARIES OF

to make himself master of Carthage' ; Ta.u bler (V orgesch. 68) thinks that Hasdrubal was pictured as precipitating the Roman policy described in ii. 13. 4, and that as Hannibal shared Hasdrubal's ambition it was immaterial whether war broke out in zz6 or 218. 10. TOG ••• EtcSoGvaL Jl-EV Tiw aXTLov Twv &.SLtcT)f1clTWv: this demand (cf. 20. 8) followed Roman practice. To omit earlier examples such as the surrender of Sp. Postumius to the Samnites after the Caudine Forks disaster (Livy, ix. w. g--ro), in 266 Q. Fabius was handed over to Apollonia for an outrage on ambassadors (Dio, fg. 42; Zon. viii. 7; Livy, ep. 15), in 236/5 M. Claudius Clineas was handed over to the Corsicans for making an unauthorized peace (Val. Max. vi. 3· 3; Zon. viii. r8), in r38 L. Minucius Myrtilus and L. Manlius were handed over to the Carthaginians for an outrage on ambassadors (Livy, xxxviii. 42. 7), and in 137 C. Hostilius Mancinus was handed over to the Iberians after the Senate had refused to ratify his capitulation (Cic. off. iii. ro9, and many other authorities; cf. Munzer, RE, 'Hostilius (r8)', coL 25n). T~v EKOLKTJOW 1TOLTJO"O.f1Evous: 'giving satisfaction' to the Romans. So Schweighaeuser (Lex. Polyb. ~KSlK'I)CJ't>). Paton follows the version in Schweighaeuser's translation and renders 'accomplish their vengeance'; this is not very likely. 11. evTa.Ka(OEtc' ETTJ O"UVEXWS voAEf1f)aa.vTES: viz. 2I8-2o2 inclusive. On the full support given to Hannibal from Carthage see Meyer (Kl. Schr. ii. 353) and Hallward (CAE, viii. JI-J2). 9. 3. 11-~ vpos TTJV EvLypa.~f)v: 'not to the authority of the author's name'; cf. § 4, £17"' a&r6v T6v >.iyoi!Ta. For this sense of €myparf>~ cf. ii. 2. 9, TTJII (myparpT)v "TWII OAWII where the essential feature iS the inscribing of the victor's name (hence the metaphorical sense of 'credit', i. 31. 4). The Greek title of Fabius' work is unknown (cf. Peter, HRR, i. lxxvii); but Cicero (de diu. i. 21. 43) speaks of Fabi Pictoris Graeci annates, and it seems unlikely that the title was such as to give any sense to the translation of the present phrase 'not to the title of the book' (Schweighaeuser, LSJ, Paton). 4. ToG o-uvESplou flETEiX£ TWv 'Pw1-1a.£wv: there is no reason to question this fact (which is consonant with the high regard with which he is mentioned in i. 14. 2), though it is not otherwise attested. 6. First cause: the wrath of Hamilcar. Against this thesis, which became the established Roman tradition (Nepos, Ham. r. 4, 4· 2; Livy, xxi. r. s-z. z), is the fact that no hostile move against Rome is recorded of Hamilcar. Secondly, his neglect of the fleet, which was insignificant even at the outbreak of the war (cf. 95· z n.), is against the view that he planned a war against Rome (cf. Ehrenberg, Karthago, 31) ; though one might argue (with De Sanctis, Problemi, 172-3) that Hamilcar had a war-plan, in which the fleet was to play 1

312

THE HANNIBALIC WAR

III.

IO. l

a very secondary role--for he could hardly foresee how fatal naval weakness would ultimately prove. Finally, Fabius only put back the guilt as far as Hasdrubal; in short, the 'wrath of Hamilcar' was a later invention, designed to establish a long-cherished Barcine plan of revenge, and no doubt supported, as P. supports it, by the story of Hannibal's oath. On the historicity and significance of this see II, with notes. On Hamilcar's peaceful reception of the Roman embassy of c. 231 see ii. 13. 3 n. In putting the first cause of the war back into the time of Hamilcar P. may be following the polemical version developed by Cato (Taubler, Vorgesch. 90), but this is not proved. 7. oux TJTT1)9ds .•. TTI .Pvxn: Hamilcar was beaten (i. 62. s~6) but not personally defeated in the First Punic War. For P.'s interest in morale see i. 59· 6, ii. 30. 7. ' ' " ' ~ • ~ 'J..' WY .. C.UTOS , \ 3., v: sChWelg. O.KEp11LO. oLC.TETT)pTJKEYC.l • • • TO.LS Op!-LC.LS E'l' 1 haeuser's note is worth transcribing. 'If the reading is sound, there lS SOme ambiguity aS to (1) Whether Tat<; Opp.af<; Should be taken With aKlpaw, vlZ. "he had maintained their martial Spirit Unimpaired"; or the words should be construed Tafc; opp.ai:s lcf>' if)v atho,; ~~~ 8ta-r<::T1JP1JKlvat aKlpam T' v>.w, Tapaxal (§ 9) see i. 65. 2 n, 10. 1-6. Second cause: tlte unjust Roman annexation of Sardinia. This is the greatest cause(§ 4), since it contributed most towards Hamilcar's will to war. On the incident and its chronology d. i. 88. 8 n. 1. 1rpwTov ets 1rnv avyKa.TE~a.wov: 'first of all they were ready to negotiate on all points'. So Paton, correctly. Schweighaeuser and LSJ both take the meaning to be 'they were ready to consent to anything' (as in xxi. 15. n). But 'consenting to anything' would not enable the Carthaginians 'to conquer by the justice of their cause' (vtK~cr.::tv "Tots iiLKalo~s); nor would it differ from 'yielding to circumstances' (§ 3, dtaVTf;'> -rfi 1T<::pLaTdaet), which is clearly a pis aller, when the Romans reject their offer to negotiate. P. is evidently describing an interview at Carthage, at which the Roman legati announce the rerum repetitio (a1Tayy.::LMvTwv auTols 1r6>..::p.ov) to the Carthaginians. They seek to argue the rights and wrongs (ds- miv fTIYJIKaTlf3awov), but the Romans demand a plain or 'no' (§ J, ovK &rp.::1rop.ivwv) ; 3I3

III.

10. I

CAUSES AND PRELIMINARIES OF

whereupon the Carthaginians accept the terms and so avert the threatened war. The interview thus parallels that of zr8 (d. 20. 62I. 8, 33· 1~4 (d. Taubler, Vorgesch. 23)), except that then the Carthaginians chose war. For a detailed comparison and fuller discussion see Walbank, CP, 1949, rs-r6. Ka.M'IT'Ep Ev Ta.~s 1Tpo Ta.UTT)S ~u~Ams 'ITEpl TouTwv SdiT)AWKa.!-lev: the Sardinian affair is discussed in i. 88, but nowhere in ii; hence the plural can only be explained on the assumption that P. is thinking of the two preliminary books as comprising a single block. Further, i. 88 makes no reference to the Carthaginian offer to negotiate; the immediate reaction to the Roman ultimatum is complete capitulation to the Roman terms {i. 88. 12). For a similar error in crossreferencing see 28. 4 n. 3. O'UVEXWPT)O'O.V o' daolae&v KTA.: cf. i. 88. 12. 5. O''II'OUSO.twv T(I.UTU xpi)anotlo.& 'ITC.pnaKEufi 1Tpos TOV KC.TU 'Pw ....a.lwv 'II'OAE!-Lov: a deduction by P. or his source (not Fabius); cf. 9· 6 n. 6. Third cause: Carthagt:nian success in Spain. This also contributes to the Carthaginian will to war. On the importance of Spanish manpower see ii. 13. 4 n. P.'s limited view of causation, which finds no place for mutual irritation, or a combination of causes on both sides, prevents his stressing the equally important fact that the success of the Barcas in Spain must have increased Roman suspicion. 7. TETEAEUTT)KW\l eTEa& Sk.cn 'll'poTEpov Tijs .ca.Tnpxfis n(JTou: i.e. in 229; d. ii. r. 7 n. Of the 'many proofs' of his complicity in the war neither P. nor any other source records any besides the story of Hannibal's oath.

11. 1-12. 6. Hannibal's oath. Despite the suspicions of some scholars Groag, 2o n. r; Arnold, Oorzaak, 24-25, so), there is no reason to question the authenticity of this anecdote, which goes back to a good source, Hannibal's own information to Antiochus. By what route the story reached P. is uncertain. Meltzer {ii. 399; cf. Bung, 12) thought it came through the oral traditions of the Scipionic circle; but this theory rests partly on the view that African us was a member of the Roman embassy to Antiochus (n. r), a view now discredited (DeSanctis, iv. r. 131 n. 47; Leuze, Hermes, 1923, 247-68). It is not impossible that P. had it from one of the Aetolian exiles in Italy, who had been in touch with Antiochus, such as Nicander of Trichonium (cf. Walbank, Philip, 279 n. 6); but it must soon have achieved wide circulation, and is found in the annalistic tradition (d. Livy, xxi. I, 4, xxxv. 19. 2 ff.; Nepos, Hann. 2. 4; Val. Max. ix. 3 ext. 3; App. Hann. 3; }fartiaJ, ix. 43· 9; Sil. It. i. 8r ff.; Oros. iv. 14· 3; Florus, i. 22. 2; auct. de uir. ill. 42; on the wording cf. II. 7 n.). There seems no good reason to think that P. had it through Silenus or Sosylus (so Klotz, Appians Darst-ellungen, 19). 314

THE HANNIBALIC WAR

III. 13

Assuming its genuineness, the story tells nothing, however, of Hamilcar's war plans, but only the indubitable fact that he hated Rome (Otto, HZ, 145, 1932,493; DeSanctis, Problemi, 172 ff.). Hatred, or even a resolve to be prepared for further Roman aggression, is by no means identical with a determination on war; but the story was so useful a confirmation of the Roman thesis of war-guilt that the conclusion was bound to be drawn. 11. 1. KMo.1ToAEt-L'118eis ••• TEAos ••• e~exwpl]CYE: in 195 (Livy, xxxiii. 47· 7; cf. Holleaux, REA, 1913, 1 ff.). Appian (Syr. 4; cf. Nepos, Hann. 1· 6) dates Hannibal's flight to r¢, and this is defended by DeSanctis (iv. 1. usn. 3); but Appian appears to have run together the events of 1¢ and 195· e~o.'II'EcrmAo.v 1Tpea~euTcl.s: in r93, in reply to the embassy of Menippus to Rome in 194/3. The legati were P. Sulpicius, P. Villius, and P. Aelius (Livy, xxxiv. 59· 4-8 (Polybian)); there is a full account of this embassy, based on P., in Livy, XXXV. rs. I-17. z. On Appian's inclusion of Scipio Africanus (Syr. 9) cf. n. 1-12. 6 n.; Walbank, Philip, 192 n. 1. 5. hfl 11ev ~xnv lvvea: cf. xv. 19. 3· The sources are unanimous on this figure. The year was 237 ; cf. ii. 1. 7 n. 8uovTos 5' aihou T(ii A'': probably to Balsamem (cf. Plaut. Poen. 1027) or Bee'Aad.p:rl''• the highest male deity at Carthage (De Sanctis, iii. r. 68-D9; Cumont, RE, 'Balsamem', cols. 2839-40). For the identification see Philo Bybl. (FHG, iii. 565 ff.), fg. z. 5, ToiJTov yap, ,Pr;al, 8€tJV Jv&p.t{ov p.ovov oupavofJ KVpwv, Bee'Auap.r;v KaAovvn;s, 0 Jrn~ 1Tapa ..8ot; Livy, xxi. I. 4, 'cum primum posset hostem fore populo Romano'. The negative, and more forceful, phrasing occurs in Livy (xxxv. 19. 3), taken directly from P., 'me •.• iureiurando adegit numquarn amicum fore populi H.omani'. De Sanctis (iii. 2. 202-3) attributes the positive formulation to Caelius Antipater; and he, Arnold suggests (Oorzaak, 25), had it from Silenus. But this is very speculative.

13-30. The dpxal of the war. P. here gives the immediate events leading up to it, and reverts towards the end to the question of responsibility (z8. s). His account is punctuated by three digressions: (a) on the Second Illyrian War (16. 1-7, 18. 1-19. 13); (b) on the treaties between Rome and Carthage (21. 9-28. 5); (c) on the merits of universal history (31-32).

Ill. 13.

I

CA l:SES AND PRELIMINARIES OF

13. 1. Ka.M.vt:p ~v6.vw vpot:ivov: 10. 3-4. 2. Td 'II'AEt' a.UTOUS volt;CTa.~a.L: exaggeration, to support the Roman thesis of Punic aggression. Diodorus (xxv. 12) has a similar account. After avenging Hamilcar's death on the Orissi {cf. ii. I. 7-8 n.), Hasdrubal took twelve of their cities, Ka~ 1rd.aas T
THE

HAN~IBALIC

WAR

III.

14. 2

imperii esset amnis Hiberus'. The Olcades are mentioned elsewhere only in 33· 9 (among troops sent to Africa) ; probably they lived about the upper waters of the Anas (Guadiana), in what is now La Mancha. !6.Aea.[av: MSS. i1.\8{av, but the correct form is given in Suidas and Steph. Byz. J4).8a[a, 1ToAt> '0>,Kci8wv. o[ 8J '0.\KciOE> l8vo<; 'I{Jryplas, 1TA7Jat6xwpot Kapx7]86vo<;, ~v lKci>.ovv Ka~ Kaw~v m)>.w, a notice clearly derived from this passage. Livy (xxi. 5· 4) calls the town Cartala, adding that it was urbs opulenta, which Hannibal expugnat diripitque. The site is unknown. 14. 1. v.iAw DPJ.LTJUO.S evt TOUS Olla.KKO.lOUS: 'he set out again and attacked the Vaccaei' (not 'he made a fresh attack on the Vaccaei' (Paton); they had not been attacked before). The date is 220 (n!l ... £mywofLEVcp 8lpn; Livy, xxi. 5· 5, uere primo). The Vaccaei are to be sought on the middle waters of the Douro, around the borders of Leon and Old Castile. 'EAJ.LavnKl]v: Livy, xxi. 5· 6, Hermandica. Details ofits capture from a different, but good, source (perhaps Sosylus of Lacedaemon (FGH, 176; below, 20. 5) ; Meyer, Kl. Schr. ii. 405) are preserved in Plutarch (Mor. 248 E f. = Polyaen. vii. 48). Plutarch calls the town.Ea>.fLanK~, Polyaenus .Ea>.fLarl<;; it is clearly the Salmatice of the It. Ant. (434· 4). modern Salamanca. See Schulten, RE, 'Salmantica', col. 1985. !6.p~ouKUATJV: Livy, xxi. 5· 6, Arbocala; Ptol. Geog. ii. 6. 49, :4.\{:ioKEAa; It. Ant. 434· 7, Albocela. This will be the mining town of Albocola near Salamanca (GIL, ii. 88o, 2598), modern Toro on the Douro, a little east of Zamora near the border between Leon and Old Castile (Meyer, Kl. Schr. ii. 403; Schulten, CAH, vii. 789). Hannibal's route. He evidently crossed the slopes of the Sierra Morena by what is now the Peiiarroya pass, and followed the direction of the later Roman road Emerita (Merida)-Salmatice (Salamanca) (It. Ant. 433 f.), since it was only on the return march that he ran up against the Carpetani. This led him over the southern part of the Guadarrama, via the sites of Segovia and Madrid, and subsequently over the Valdepeiias pass into Andalusia; and the battle on the Tagus was probably fought not far from Toledo (Meyer, ibid.; Schulten, ibid.). 'If this was his route, he discovered the two best north-and-south roads across the heart of the peninsula', Cary, Geographical Background, 241. 2. uuv8pa.J.LOVTWV ••• Twv Kap'IT'Ju(wv: Livy, xxi. 5· 8, Carpetani (cf. P. x. 7· 5). This people inhabited the mountainous regions north of the Tagus, the modern Sierra di Guadarrama and the head-waters of the river (Strabo, iii. 139, 141-2, 152). Livy (xxxix. 30. 2) names Toletum (Toledo) as one of their towns. They thus covered the eastern part of New Castile (not Old Castile, as De Sanctis, iii. I. 416). 31 7

III. 14· 4

CAUSES AND PRELIMINARIES OF

4. el jlEV be 1ra.pcmi€ews ~va.yttaa9lJaa.v ••• ~ha.t<wouveoeLV: cf. Livy,

xxi. 5· II, 'inuicta acies, si aequo dimicaretur campo' (of the Carpetani). 5-8. The battle at the Tagus: cf. Livy, xxi. 5· 8-r6. Here discrepancies between P. and Livy are most marked (cf. IJ. 5-14. 8 n.). In both accounts Hannibal is on his way back, and so marching south (§ 2, bravaywv; Livy, § 8, regressum ex Vaccaeis), when he finds the Car~ petani and neighbouring tribes preparing to attack him (§ 2, crw~ apap.l!VTWV br' mhov). Here the accounts diverge. According to P. Hannibal 'turned round and retired' (€~ {nrocrrpocpfjs d.vaxwp~cravros), so putting the Tagus in front of him (cf. ii. 66. 1). Evidently he was already south of the Tagus, learnt that the enemy were close on his heels, and, instead of risking their overtaking him in land not of his own choosing, wheeled round and returned to meet them at the river. (Similarly, at Clusium (ii. 25. 3), the Gauls heard that the Romans Were close behind them and SO €g lnTOC1Tpo~fjS a71'~VT(JJV.) clvaxwpErv does not here imply retiring from the enemy, but retracing one's steps. Later, Hannibal goes back (§ 8, roif{Lrra'A•v) across the Tagus in pursuit of the enemy, that is from the south to the north bank. This account Livy or his source has apparently misunderstood; hence his version, though more detailed, is inconsistent with that of P. In Livy the Carpetani attack the Carthaginians while they are apparently still north of the Tagus. Hannibal declines battle, pitches a camp on the bank, and then takes advantage of the night to cross by the ford. Once across he builds a protective uallum, in such a way as to give the enemy a place to cross ('ualloque ita praeducto (so Walters; l\1SS. producto} ut locum ad transgrediendum hostes haberent', § 9). The enemy are then attacked and defeated while crossing the river (from north to south). There is no reference to this uallum in P., and its function is not altogether clear. The possibility is not to be ruled out that it is due to a misunderstanding (by Coelius ?) of the phrase in P. (and perhaps taken by him from Silenus), rrpo{3A7jf.La rrm"'crawf.vou. Alternatively, Livy's source has given details which P.'s abbreviated version omits. The existence of a common source is consistent with considerable variations in two selective acc01mts, though a complete reconciliation of P. and Livy is here impossible (pace Meyer, Kl. Schr. ii. 403 n. 1). 5. 1Tpa.yjla.TLKWS Ka.t vouv€xws: \vi.sely and skilfully', because by retracing his steps Hannibal was able to meet the enemy at a point of his own choosing. 6-7. TWV &T[piwv ••• 01ro TWV {1Tm!wv ••• : cf. Livy, § 10, 'equitibus praecepit ut, cum ingressos aquam uiderent, adorirentur impediturn agrnen; in ripa elephantos-quadraginta au tern erant~disponit'. 8. TOUtJ-1Ta.Aw E1TLOLa.~6.vTEs: cf. Livy, § r6, 'Hannibal agmine quadrato arnnem ingressus fugarn ex ripa fecit'; the detail agmine 318

THE HANNIBALIC WAR

III. 15

quadrato may be a point kept by Coelius and omitted by P. or alternatively Livian elaboration to point the contrast with the undisciplined barbarians. 1TAE(ous 11 S€Ka. JJ-Upuioa.s: cf. Livy, § n, 'Carpetanorum cum adpendicibus ... centum milia fuere'. Livy adds (§ 16) that Hannibal Carpetattos quoque in deditionem accepit, a detail of which P. has no mention. 9. ouoets ~TL n7w ~VTOS "lj3T)pos 1TOTO.JA-OU: p. reveals his pro-Carthaginian source in the use of this phrase to mean 'south of the Ebro'; in 76. 6 (from a Roman source) it signifies 'north of the Ebro' (cf. x. 7· 3, 35· 3). Livy, § q, is more positive, 'et iam omnia trans Hiberum praeter Saguntinos Carthaginiensium erant'. On the extent of the Punic empire in Spain after these campaigns see Schulten (CAH, vii. 791-2). 10. Ta.uTTJS Se Tijs 1ToAews e1T€LpaTo ••• a1rexecr6a.L: in ii. 36.4-7 Hannibal's war-policy against Rome is manifest from his taking command: here he refrains from attacking Saguntum so as to conceal it. In fact, Hannibal's campaigns in central and north-west Spain represent a continuation of the policy of consolidating power in Spain already followed by Hamilcar and Hasdrubal, and favour the view that, whatever his future plans, Hannibal was not envisaging an immediate war with Rome (Kromayer, HZ, 103, 1909, 252-3; Groag, 51; Kolbe, 5.-B. Heidelberg, 1933/4, no. 4, 7); P. naturally assumes dissimulation. According to Livy (xxi. 5· 3) the purpose of the campaigns was 'ut non petisse Saguntinos sed rerum serie finitimis domitis gentibus iungendoque tractus ad id bellum uideri posset'. j3ouAOJJ-EVOS JJ-T)OEflLO.V O.cpopfllJV OflOAoyouflEVT)V Souvo.L ToG 1TOAEflOU 'PwJJ-aLOLS: whether true or false, this statement shows that P. re-

garded Saguntum as bound to Rome at the time of Hannibal's appointment in such a way that to attack her would be to court war with Rome. On the date of this alliance cf. ii. 13. 7 n. (d).

15. The first Roman embassy on Saguntum. Saguntum was an Iberian town on the east coast of Spain between New Carthage and the Ebro, on the site of the modern Murviedro (since 1877 renamed Sagunto). Tradition connected it with Zacynthus, of which it was declared to be a colony owing to the similarity of name (cf. Livy, xxi. 7· 2, 'oriundi a Zacyntho insula dicuntur, mixtique etiam ab Ardea Rutulorum quidam generis'; Strabo, iii. 159; Pliny, Nat. hist. xvi. 216; App. Hisp. 7); but its Iberian character is clear from the coin inscriptions which read arse and, on one example, arsesken (or, less probably, arsesaken) (GIL, ii, Suppl. lxxxiv, p. 967; De Sanctis, iii. 1, 417 n. 74; Vallejo, xl-lv). Its native name gave rise to the Roman connexion with Ardea (Livy, loc. cit.). P. describes it (17. 2) as lying on a spur of the mountains about! mile (7 stades) from the 319

IlL 15

CAUSES AND PRELIMINARIES OF

sea; its remains show that it stood upon a narrow plateau directly south of the R. Palancia, about I,ooo yards from east to west, and IIo to 130 yards broad, its west side alone being accessible to a besieging force. See Schulten, RE, 'Saguntum', cols. 1755~; CAH, vii. 790; P. Paris, Promenades archiol{)giques en Espagne, ii (Paris, 1921), u7 (on the site); DeSanctis, iii. r. 421-2; A. Chabret, Historia di Sagunto (Barcelona, 1888), 2 vols. For the commercial relations between Saguntum and .Massilia, which may have been originally responsible for causing the Roman alliance, see Schulten, Phil. W och., 1927, col. 1582. 15. 1. ol of: Za.Ka.v9a.tm O"OVt:XW!> g11'ElJ-11'0V Els TTJV 'PWlJ-TJV: these constant appeals are of uncertain date, but no doubt link up with conflicts inside Sagnntum between the pro-Roman and pro-Carthaginian parties (§ 7). Sagnntum was at this time allied with Rome (14. 9), perhaps since 231 (ii. 13. 3 n., IJ. 7 n. (d)); but in that case the pro-Roman elements must, since the Ebro treaty, have felt uncertain about their position and anxious to reinforce the Senate's commitments. The Senate, however, had hitherto proved reluctant to be committed (§ 2, 1TAEOJ8il o.?rrwv 1Tapa1<7J~). 2. TOn 1rpeo-~euTas isa11't\O"Te~Aa.v; apparently in autumn 22o, after Hannibal's successful campaign of that year (§ I, -r~v ••• dJpotav ••. rwv Ka.r' 'lf37Jpla.v 1rpayp.c£rwv}. The annalistic tradition (Livy, xxi. 6. 5, 9· 3-u. 2; App. Hisp. II; Zon. viii. 21) records that the siege had already begun when they arrived, and Hannibal refused them audience; this version is clearly designed to put Hannibal in the wrong and to conceal the failure of the Romans to send Saguntum adequate help (Meltzer, ii. 6o4-5). The names of the legati are given by Livy (cf. Cic. Phil. v. 27) as P. Valerius Flaccus and Q. Baebius Tamphilus, which may well be correct. To us E11'~C1KEI{tolJ-Evovs u1r~p Twv 1rpo0"11'~11'TOVTWV: 'to investigate the report' (for rd. 'TTpocnri1rrovra, 'what is announced', see 6r. 7, 61. 12, 75· 2, cf. IoJ. 1). Such a function does not cover the veiled ultimatum of § 5; and much remains obscure about the Senate's purpose in sending the embassy. The certainty of the Saguntines that they were to be attacked is inconsistent with 14. ro; and the sending of the embassy should perhaps be related to recent Roman interference in party conflicts (§ 7). 'After enjoying the benefits of the Ebro Treaty, Rome began to use Saguntum as a tool to undermine Punic power south of the river and to loosen the hold of Carthage on the enviable wealth of Spain' (Hallward, C AH, viii. 28). Now that the Gallic danger was past, the Senate probably hoped to reassert the validity of the Saguntine treaty, if indeed it dated to before the Ebro treaty (cf. ii. 13. 7 n. (d)), and to bully Hannibal into admitting a check without having to resort to war. To reject the embassy outright (Hoffmann, Rh. Mus., 1951, 69-73) is unnecessarily radical. 320

THE HANNIBALIC WAR

III.

rs.

6

3. 'l!'a.p1]v ••• '11'a.pa.xuJL6.awv El~ Ka.~viJv 'II'OAlV: for winter 22ojr9. F.:>r 1rp6crx1J/La 'ornament', cf. Herod. v. 28, Miletus is rijs 'lwvl1J> 1rp6ax1Jp.a. 5. s~EJLO.pTVpOVTO Za.Ka.v9a.lu.!v U'II'Exeaea.~ KTA.; 'the Romans called upon Hannibal to leave Saguntum alone' (not, with Paton, 'the Romans protested against his attacking Saguntum' ; the attack had not yet begun); cf. Livy, xxi. 6. 4, 'ut ab Saguntinis, sociis populi Romani, abstineret'. KEi0'9a.~ yup O.lhous ~v Til acjiETep~ 'II'LO'TEo: cf. 30. I' ii. II. s-12 n. The n(crT'<> relationship is that defined in Latin as 'in fidem populi Romani se permittere', and involving the act of deditio or unconditional surrender (cf. xx. 9· ro-rx. 9, xxxvi. 4); such an act could be followed by ajoedus (cf. § 8, Tjj •.. crup.p.axlq.) but it seems doubtful whether in fact the Saguntines had ever been dediticii. The present phrase gives no grounds for assuming (so Groag, 38, 53-55) that the alliance was recent and was being announced for the first time to the Carthaginians. KQ.~ TCIV "I~TJPO. 'II'OTO.jJ-OV t.t.iJ s,a.~a.£VElV KTA.: this clause is a difficulty' since it is not apparent why any reference to the Ebro treaty should have been made. Even if Hannibal meant to attack Saguntum, he v1ras still roo miles south of the R. Ebro. It has been suggested that the Saguntines had exaggerated Hannibal's military achievements, and the Romans thought it well to remind him of his obligations, inherited from Hasdrubal; though admittedly any reference to the Ebro treaty must have appeared tactless at a time when the Romans had recently violated its spirit by interfering in Saguntum (§ 7). Taken alone, the reference to the Ebro might be accepted as his~ torically accurate, provocative but not wholly unreasonable (cf. Gelzer, Hermes, I933· rs8). On the other hand, the linking together of the Ebro treaty and Saguntum is a mark of the later annalistic tradition, which saw in the taking of the latter a breach of the former (ii. 13. 7 n. (c)}. In the light of 30. 3, where the destruction of Saguntum is characterized as a breach of the Ebro treaty, it seems at least possible that here, too, P. is assuming that Saguntum lay to the north of the Ebro (cf. 30. 3 n.). If so, he was evidently fogged by the confused discussions carried out throughout two generations, and having accepted the Roman case for Carthaginian responsibility, was deceived into accepting the connexion between the treaty and the attack on Saguntum (cf. Meyer, Kl. Schr. ii. 346; De Sanctis, iii. r. 429-30). It is, of course, unquestionable that elsewhere he is quite clear on the relative geographical positions of town and river; cf. 14. 9• 35· 2, 91· 6, 98.6-7, iv. 28. 1. 6. veo~ tJ.Ev wv, 'II'ATJpTJo; 5t 'II'OAEtJ.LKTJS optJ.iJ~: Hannibal was 9 when he went to Spain in 237 (n. 5 n.), and over 45 in 202 (xv. 19. 3); hence he was born in 247 and was now 27 years of age (cf. Zon. viii. 21 ; he was 26 on Hasdrubal's death). Hannibal's martial ardour is mentioned 4SCO

y

32I

CAUSES AND PRELIMINARIES OF

III. IS. 6

as fitting the man who provoked the war-whether from Fabius or part of P.'s own elaboration. 7. Roman arbitration: d. 30. 2, where the reference to the Carthaginians as .!yyvs ovTwv •.• Kat Ta KaTa TI]v 'IfJYJp{av 1}oYJ 7TpaTTovTwv suggests that this arbitration was quite recent, in 220 (Oertel) or 22I (Hallward, Scullard), rather than 223 or 222 (De Sanctis). It is not to be confused with the original alliance (as by Kromayer (HZ, Io3, I909, 257) and Reid (]RS, I9I3, 179-8I), who sees some confusion lurking in the word .!mTpom], with its double meaning deditio or 'arbitration'); this was earlier (contrast fLLKpofs EfL7Tpoa8<e:v XPOJJOLS' with 30. I, 7TAELt:btv :lnaw r}DYJ 7TpoT€pov TWJJ KaT' :4)J)J{{Jav Katpwv). The party struggle must have been between pro-Roman and pro-Carthaginian factions (Meyer, Kl. Schr. ii. 36I n. 2 against Taubler, Vorgesch. 44; Meyer compares the situation in Messana in 264), and the appeal to Rome suggests that the pro-Roman party got the upper hand. otl~ ou 1TEptoiJ!eu9aL 1TapeaTTovSTUJ.Evou~: by this answer Hannibal challenged the Roman claim to represent Saguntum, and forced into the open the question of the validity of the Romano-Saguntine alliance. The absence from it of any reference to the injunction not to cross the Ebro is perhaps confirmation of the view that this clause has only been introduced into the account of this embassy through confusion. 'The Romans had the will to peace and Hannibal the will to war, but the will to war of Hannibal was the will to enjoy the rights, implicit and explicit, guaranteed by the treaties, the peace willed by the Romans was a peace which permitted them to disallow those rights' (De Sanctis, Problemi, I 79; cf. Ehrenberg, Karthago, 32). In short, the Romans provoked the Saguntine affair, but found to their surprise (2o. I n.) that Hannibal preferred fighting to yielding ground. What treaty, if any, the Roman actions inside Saguntum had violated (7TapEmrovSYJfLlvovs) is obscure. It can hardly be the Saguntine alliance (Ta.ubler, Vorgesch. 45-46). Otto (HZ, I45. I932, 5o8) thinks it was the treaty of Catulus, which will have prohibited Roman interference in Punic dominions; and Groag (58 n. 3, 6I) and Oertel (Rh. Mus., I932, 226 n. 2) the Ebro treaty. But P. is probably using the word 7Tapaa7Tov8Efv in a general sense, 'to seize treacherously' ; d. i. 43· 2 n. ; Hesselbarth, 86. The Romans had abused their power in the town, like the Mamertines in Messana; they had broken, not a treaty, but their faith. 1TaTpLov yap dvm KapxTJSov(o,~ KTA.: this ironical echo of the contemporary Roman propaganda (cf. ii. 8. ro-n, Coruncanius' speech to Teuta) must come from a Roman source; d. above, ws KYJOofLEvos ZaKav8a{wv.

8.

1rpo~ 322

Se Ko.pxTJSov1ou~ 6tme...-1TETo: P. does not record the Punic

THE HA:\NIBALIC WAR

IlL

I5. I:Z

answer; but, despite annalistic emphasis on the opposition of Hanno (Livy, xxi. 10 ff.), he was probably authorized to take what steps seemed necessary (cf. App. Hisp. 1o). Cf. Schnabel, Klio, rg26, us. nvas TWV uq,' O.UTOOS TO.TTOf1EliWV 0.8LkOUO'L: the Torboletae, according to Appian (Hisp. Io); Livy (xxi. 6. I, 12. s) makes them Turdetani, which is impossible (in Livy, xxviii. 39· 8 they are Turduli). P. makes Hannibal connect this dispute with the recent accession to power of the pro-Roman party in Saguntum (muT.;Vm•r.;s rfj 'Pwp.alwv avp.p.axlq.); both events reflect a more aggressive Roman policy in Spain. 9. 'ITAYJPTJ'i &..Aoy(o.s ~<:o.t 8uf1ou ~Lalou: the Roman picture, which is not borne out by Hannibal's actions; it continues the 'wrath of Hamilcar'. A fairer estimate will take into account that in all his actions Hannibal was accompanied by representatives of the home government (20. 8 n., cf. ii. 13. 7 n. (b)). 0.ATJ8LVo.t:s o.tTLaL'i • • • 'ITpoq,aO'EL'i aMyou<;: cf. 6. 3 n. The present passage fills a gap in P.'s exposition of the preliminaries to the war. He has already stated the ai.rla£ (9. 6, Io. 4, Io. 6) and the d.pxat (6. I 3); here he gives the '11'porf>oms:, the Saguntine interference with the Torboletae. 10. 'IToa'l? yap ~v Ci.f.LELVov KTA.: on the cession of Sardinia as the greatest ca.use of the war see 10. I-6; here and in 30. 3-4 P. writes as if it were the only cause. His didactic, moralizing tone shows little appreciation of the psychological background to the clash ; cf. .Meyer (Kl. Schr. ii. 360), 'die ktihlc, krass rationalistische Denkweise dieses Historikers, dem fur das psychologische Moment und die im Hintergrunde des Bewusstseins wirkenden geschichtlichen Faktoren das Verstandnis fehlt, gewinnt darin drastischen Ausdruck'. On orm8at 8.;fv, 'demand', see Schulte, 7o. 12. oi. 8€ ••• rrpea~os •.• arr~'ITAEUO'O.V Ets Ka.pxTJSOVo.: P. docs not describe the interview at Carthage, perhaps because it seemed irrelevant once Hannibal had made clear his will to war, and because it did not mark an important stage in the development. From 20. 2 it appears that the Carthaginian senate was warned that an attack on Saguntum would be a casus belli; and this, together with the stress here on the envoys' certainty that they would have to fight, creates the picture of a Rome unhesitatingly resolved to defend its allies. This will have been the picture in Fabius; and Klotz (Livius, 122 ff.; w], I94U, rs6) attributes this chapter to Fabius, rather than Silenus (cf. I3. s-r4. 8 n.). Bung (26-27) argues, however, that the reference to the Carthaginian senate is inconsistent with Fabius' thesis that Hannibal acted independently of the home government (8. 6), and makes Silenus the foundation of what is in any case a chapter moulded through and through by P. to suit his own purposes. Taubler has argued (Vorgesch. 58; cf. Meyer, Kl. Schr. ii. 364 n. 2; 323

III.

Ij. 12

CAUSES OF

Otto, HZ, I4S. I9J2, sog-ro) that P. has recorded the Carthaginian reply to this embassy as part of the discussion of the reception of the second embassy of zi8 (zo. 6 ff.), i.e. he thinks that it was in autumn 220 that the Carthaginians refused to discuss the Ebro treaty and stressed the treaty of Catulus. This view, however, assumes inaccuracy in P. of a serious kind, nor is it necessary, since the role played by the Ebro treaty in the interview of 218 is easily explicable (21. r n.). See further 8. 1-9. 5 n. for the unconvincing argument of Gelzer and Schnabel that at the present interview the Carthaginians agreed to disown Hannibal but later went back on this decision. 13. ou 1-LYJY l.v •ITa>..£~ YE 'II'OAE!-LtlCJ'ELY ~A'II'laav I(TA.: the dilatory Roman policy after Hannibal's attack on Saguntum is hardly reconcilaHe with a firm decision to fight, still less with a decision to fight in Spain from Saguntum. The real purpose of P.'s remark is to bridge the gap to the Second Illyrian War, which is here introduced as an operation to 'close the back door' before a long struggle (cf. r6. 6 rounding off the digression). 16. Causes of the Second lllyrian War. P. motivates this war as designed to secure the rear before the clash with Carthage, and this seems likely, even if the Romans were not so convinced of the inevitability of the Hannibalic War in spring 219 as he suggests (cf. rs. 12, 2o. I n.). Less convincing is the picture, common to both P. and the annalists, of an aggressive and reckless Demetrius. According to the annalistic tradition (cf. Gelzer, Hermes, I9JJ, 147 n. I) the expulsion of Demetrius (App. Ill. 8) was the sequel to an Adriatic policy which included two Roman expeditions (in 22r and zzo) to Istria, where Demetrius was said to have intrigued (cf. Zon. viii. zo; Livy, ep. zo; Eutrop. iii. 7· r; Oros. iv. IJ. I6). This allegation may well be part of an annalistic apologia for the war against him (Holleaux, 134 n. r; Badian, BSA, 1952, 84 n. 58), and deserve no credence. But when Holleaux argues further that because such an expedition must have deterred Demetrius from his outburst against Rome in 220, it is therefore apocryphal, he may be drawing the wrong conclusion (Badian, ibid.); it may well be that Demetrius' actions were less reckless and less clearly a defiance of Rome than P. would have us suppose. As Badian (op. cit. 8r ff.) points out, 220/19 was the very worst time for Demetrius to provoke the Romans. They were free of the trouble with the Gauls, and not yet involved in Spain; and Demetrius' ally, Antigonus Doson, had recently died leaving his kingdom to a boy (ii. 70. 8). On the other hand, Demetrius was perhaps an lllyrian, a member of a semi-barbarous people, and so liable to act with what would have been irresponsibility in a Greek or a Roman (Oost, 22). How far he was bound by Teuta's treaty may 324

THE SECO.ND ILLYRIAN WAR

III. I6 . .z

have been uncertain (16. 3 n.); and the reference (§ 3) to his 'sacking and destroying the Illyrian cities "Tas vTr6 'Pwf.Lalov,; "TaTTofL{vos' may be strongly coloured by the propaganda of its Roman source. But Radian (op. cit. 8r ff.) goes too far in his defence of Demetrius (cf. 16. 3 n.). The Romans only crossed over to close the back door because they feared what stood outside; and Demetrius will hardly have inspired such an action merely by installing his own supporters (who 'may well have been the pro-Roman parties' (Badian, op. cit. 85)) in the territory of the Parthini and Atintanes. Both Holleaux (r38 n. 2) and Gelzer (Hermes, 1933, 147) assume that P.'s source is Fabius; but if it is (and this view is contested by Bung, 19o-4). it is evidently contaminated both with information from a Greek source, and also with some family tradition of the Aemilii, which stresses the achievements of L. Aemilius Paullus, the grandfather of Scipio Aemilianus, to the exclusion of his colleague M. Livius Salinator (r8. 3-19. 6, 19. 12; cf. DeSanctis, iii. 2. 169-70). 2. ICilT' iKf-lvous To us 1ta1pous: a vague synchronism. Any senatorial decision following the return of the envoys from Carthage cannot be earlier than winter 220/19; but Demetrius sailed beyond Lissus into the Cyclades in summer 220 (cf. iv. r6. 6, r6. 11, 19. 7. synchronism with affairs at Cynactha). The order in which P. describes his actions might suggest that he attacked the Illyrian towns first, and that is the communis op£nio (cf. Holleaux, 134 n. 4). But the perfect infinitives TrmAe:vK€va£ and 7Turop8TJKI.vat must refer to acts earlier than those signified by the present infinitives 7ropfJefv and Ka"Ta•npbpmf1at (§ 3) ; the latter are mentioned first as weighing most with the Romans and nearest in date to 220/19 (cf. Hultsch, Die erziihlenden Zeitformen bei Polybios (Leipzig, 1891), i. rsz~3; iii. 87 (quoted by Holleaux, loc. cit.); Badian, BSA, 1952, 83 n. sz). Consequently the attack on the Roman protectorate followed the expedition in the Cyclades described in iv. 16. 6, 19. 7-8; so, correctly, BiittnerWobst, RE, Suppl.-ll. i, 'Demetrios (44 a)', coL 343· It was evidently in autumn zzo, and led to the capture of Dimale (r6. 3). Ayt~J-,;Tptov n]v tl>nplov: d. ii. 10. 8, n, 17, for his gains after the First Illyrian War. By 220 he has acquired control over the whole of the curtailed kingdom of Teuta, marrying Triteuta, the mother of Pinnes, Agron's son and heir (Dio, fg. 53); cf. ii. 4· 7 n. He may have gained confidence for an independent policy from seeing the Romans occupied until 222 with the Gallic tumzlltus; but Roman danger from Carthage is unlikely to have influenced Demetrius' calculations in early summer 220, several months before the first Roman embassy went to Saguntum (15. z). Had he in fact foreseen the Second Punic War, elementary prudence would have suggested waiting for its outbreak before challenging Rome. Cf. Ti:iubler, Vorgesch. 13; Holleaux, 133 n. r (underestimating the Celtic danger to Rome).

Ill. r6. 3

CAL:SES OF

3. 1racra.s ••• t>...rr£8a.s ev Tfi Ma.t<E8ovwv ohd'i!-: Demetrius' links with Doson probably go back to c. 225, the time of the Gallic tumultus (d. Holleaux, IJI-2). Our earliest specific evidence is for Demetrius' help at Sellasia (ii. 65. 4). The present passage is not evidence that Demetrius' moves now had the backing of Macedonia, where Philip had succeeded. TclS tea..rb. TT]v 'IA.Aup[8a. 'ITOAE~S ..• TO.TTop.Eva.s: the phrase lacks precision, for the Illyrian towns were very loosely under the protectorate of Rome (d. ii. II. s-12 n.; Holleaux,Etudes, iv. JOI n. J). The towns in question are south of Lissus in the territory of the Parthini, and may include Dimale {18. r) and the unidentified Eugenium and Bargullum (Livy, xxix. 12. 13}. Epidamnus is not mentioned, nor is there reason to suppose that Demetrius seized any other large towns in the protectorate. Appian's statement (Ill. 8} that he seized all southern Illyria including Atintania is probably a propagandist account designed to exaggerate the danger he constituted to Rome (Holleaux, 135 n. r). That P. also exaggerates is comincingly argued by Badian (BSA, 1952, 85}; but he goes too far in reducing the facts behind P.'s account to the mere installation of Demetrius' supporters in the towns (cf. 18. r). 'ITE'ITAEute~vo.L ••• '!To.pb. Tiis cruv&r\Ka.s: for this expedition, during the first part of which Demetrius was acting with Scerdila'idas (who contributed 40 lemhi to Demetrius' so) see iv. I6. 6-g, H). 7-9· The treaty (ii. Iz. 3} which forbade more than hvo Illyrian lemb£ to sail south of Lissus had been made with Teuta, not Demetrius, who was then a Roman ally. As Teuta's successor he probably inherited her obligations; but Badian (BSA, 1952, 85) argues (a) that Tenta cannot have spoken for every dynast in her kingdom, (b) that Demetrius, like Scerdila'idas, sailed with the ships of his private DtJJ'a.ar•da, not of the Illyrian kingdom. But the point is a fine one, and hardly likely to convince the Romans. At the most we can grant that Demetrius' obligations were perhaps not so clear as our Roman sources assume. 4. BEwpouvTEs O.vSouacw Tijv MaKEMvwv oit
THE SECOND ILLYRIAN WAR

III. 17

was not felt to be the danger, and it is a distortion of the evidence to suggest (so Kolbe, 5.-B. Heidelberg, 1933/4. no. 4, 29 n. 3) that the Senate deliberately attacked Demetrius at a moment when Doson was dead and Philip not firmly on his throne. But Demetrius' presence at Sellasia will have been noted, and was no doubt a subsidiary reason for suddenly deciding to take strong action when to Roman eyes the treaty appeared to have been flouted. 5. 6LEijtEua61Jac.v 8' -roi<; XoyLaflo'L~: unlike Hannibal at Saguntum (17. n). The parallelism is deliberate, and forms part of the apology for Rome, prevented by· this miscalculation from sending help in time to Saguntum. In fact, the IllyTian War constitutes no justification for the Roman failure to help Saguntum. 6. Kc.T(J 1rO.aa.v ••• 'ITaALc.v: contrast I5· I3. 7. AeuKtov Tbv Alf1LALOv: L. Aemilius M.f. M.n. Paullus, consul A.U.c. 535 219 B.C. together with M. Livius M.f. M.n. Salinator (d. Klebs, RE, 'Aemilius (n8)', coL 58r (correct M. to L.); Munzer, RE, 'Livius (Salina tor) (33)', col. 892. As in the former war (ii. II. I), both consuls were sent to Illyria {Dio, fg. 53; Zon. viii. 20; auct. de uir. ill. so), Aemilius in charge of the fleet and Livius of the land forces; clearly the Romans were taking the war seriously. Holleaux (r38 n. 2) rejects the non-Polybian tradition here; but it is confirmed by Livy (xxii. 35· 3, 40. 3, 49· II, xxvii. 34· 3, xxix. 37· I3), and there can be little doubt that P. has suppressed Livius' role either out of consideration for the familr of his patron, Scipio Aemilianus, or else following a source which favours Aemilius (d. Bung, I9r~2; cf. for a similar explanation of the apparent prejudice in favour of Cn. Cornelius Scipio Calvus {ii. 34· I n.)). The size of the Roman forces is not recorded. KUTa TO 1rpwTov eTos KTA.: in 01. year 140, 1 22o/I9 B.c. P. thus emphasizes that the Second Illyrian War falls within his history proper. 17. The fall ofSaguntum. P. clearly follows a pro-Carthaginian source for his account of the siege, probably Silenus (Kahrstedt, iii. 146 ff.; Beloch, Hermes, 1915, 357 ff., and especially 362; Gelzer, Hermes, I9J3, rs6 ff.; Klotz, Livius, l i i ; Bung, 29)· More detailed but less reliable accounts occur in Livy, xxi. 7· 4-9· 2, u. 3~rs. 2: Diod. xxv. 15; App. Hisp. ro-12; Zon. viii. 2r; of these Uvy and Zonaras (Dio) are closely related, and even more closely Diodorus and Appian (De Sanctis, iii. I. 423 n. 83). The military aspect of the siege is discussed by R. Oehler {jahrb., 189r, 421-8), drawing on the siege of Murviedro (Sagunto) by Marshal Suchet in Sept.-Oct. I8Il; he, like Meltzer, supplements P. from Livy, where his account seems to fit the geography of the site. Chronology. Livy compresses all the events from the opening of 327

III. I7

CAUSES

A~D

PRELIMINARIES OF

the siege to the battle of Trebia into A.u.c. 536 218 B.C. (d. Livy, xxi. 6. 3. 'consules tunc Romae erant P. Cornelius Scipio et Ti. Sempronius Longus') and may be neglected. (He recognizes the error in xxi. IS. 3-6, based on P.) The real dating depends on synchronisms in P. From I7· I it appears that the siege began in spring 219; and since it lasted eight months (17. 9) it must have ended in late autumn or early winter of the same year. This dating is confirmed by iv. 37. 4, and not contradicted by 20. I; nor need iv. 66. 8 be considered, when it seems to refer Hannibal's conclusion of the siege to the harvest season of 2r9, for this synchronism assembles events as widely separated as Hannibal's return to \\-inter quarters, the arrival of the news of the fall of Saguntum at Rome, the sending of envoys to Carthage, and the elections for 2r8. The only difficulty is iv. 28. I, where events of autumn 220 occurred Ka8' ovs- (Kw.poilt;) )!wl{Jas ••• i7TO££tTo ~" &pp.~v E7Tl T~V ZaKav8alwv 7T6Atv, 'was setting out for Saguntum'; whence Schnabel (Klio, I926, II3-I5) argues that the blocl\ade began in autumn 220, and tries to dispose of iv. 37· 4 by drawing a distinction between the blockade and the assault (7ToAtopKla), which is quite unjustifiable. In iv. 28. I P. has been led to make a false synchronism by his desire to insert the didactic observations contained in iv. 28. 2-6; and the traditional dating is to be accepted (Meltzer, ii. 433; Meyer, Kl. Schr. ii. 365; DeSanctis, iii. I. 420, 431), though the evidence does not allow the determination of the exact months of the siege. 2-3. Descript·ion of Saguntum. Probably from the same source as the rest of the chapter (17 n.) ; see rs n. The 'range of hills connecting Iberia and Celtiberia' is evidently the range of mountains between New Castile and Aragon, which forms the watershed between the valleys of the Tagus and Guadiana in the west and the tributaries of the Ebro in the east, and approaches the coast behind Sagunto. By Celtiberia P. usually means north-east Spain, and he restricts Iberia to the coastal area as far as the Straits of Gibraltar (37. Ion.). But he has no clear conception of the geographical boundaries of the two regions, and in xxxiv. 9· I2 describes the Baetis and Anas as taking their rise in Celtiberia; cf. Hubner, RE, 'Celtiberi', col. I886; A. Schulten, Hermes, 19II, 575-6. The Celtiberi were first clearly defined in the time of Poseidonius. 2. a:rri!xu ... ti>s E'II'TO. aT6.8m: x·3 km., between ! and 1 mile; cf. Livy, xxi. 7· 2, passus mille ferme. By Pliny's time (Nat. hist. iii. zo), as a result of coastal accretion from the alluvial deposit of the R. Palancia, Saguntum lay 3 miles from the coast; today Schulten (RE, 'Saguntum', col. 1756) makes the distance 5 km. 4. ev€pyos E:yivf:To 1npl ff]v 'II'OALOpteinv: Livy (xxi. 8. 4) gives him rso,ooo men, an absurd exaggeration (De Sanctis, iii. r. 423 n. 83), since there was a low limit to the number of troops that could 328

THE HANNIBALIC WAR

Ill. r7. 9

profitably be used outside a small fort only double the size of the Acropolis at Athens. Hannibal will have employed only a part of his forces at Saguntum; and Lh'Y (xxi. n. IJ) records a contemporary expedition against the Oretani and Carpetani which may well be genuine. 5-7. Hannibal's reasons for taking Saguntum. These, and not the details of the siege, are what really interest P. (cf. Bung, 29). P. gives four: (a) to deprive the Romans of a base for an Iberian campaign; (b) to cow, by example, those tribes already under Hannibal; and

to make those still independent more willing to submit; (c) to leave no enemy in the rear, during his march on Italy (the most important) ; (d) to raise funds to finance the expedition, reward the soldiers, and bribe the government at home. These reasons are probably P.'s own deductions; though the reference to bribing the home government (§ 7} suggests a trait taken from Fabius (cf. Bung, 30). In fact, the town lacked the military importance P. claims for it, since it was neither a useful harbour nor yet large enough to act as base for a strong army (d. De Sanctis, iii. I. 42o). Hannibal's reasons for taking it were mainly political; either Rome must give way or she must go to war to avenge an action which fell within the terms of the Ebro treaty (in which case Hannibal could count on full support at Carthage}. If it was to be war, Hannibal would fight under the most favourable conditions, if peace, the empire in Spain could be extended and consolidated without challenge. 7. '11"poKa.X£cmrl)aL &~ T~v Elivo~a.v TWV bl otK~ Ka.pxTJ&ovU.Uv: cf. § II. For the tradition of the hostile Carthaginian senate, probably from Fabius, cf. 8. I·-<). 5 n. The nucleus of truth in it is the existence of a strong party, hostile to the Barcas, and representing the rich landowners who feared that the new imperialism might spell tyranny; whereas the Barcas, like Marius and Caesar at Rome a century and a half later, relied on the masses; cf. Lh'Y, xxi. 2. 4, 'factionis Barcinae opibus quae apud milites plebemque plus quam modicae erant'. Cf. De Sane tis, iii. 1. 406 n. 45· See also vi. 5I. 3--6 n. Twv imoaTaAfJvpa. represent spoil paid into the treasury (here KnTa.t:rKEVl}, 'miscellaneous property'), in contrast to dJcj>Ow.a, booty distributed to individuals (here the money that would be raised by the sale of slaves) (§ ro). 8. TOLOUTO~~ • • • &ta.Aoytuflot~: the parallelism with the Romans' calculations {I6. 7) is deliberate. 9. T~Ao~ £v bteTw J.l.'l]
III. I7. 9

THE SECOND ILLYRIAN WAR

their attack from the extreme western angle, the only point where the town is not impregnable; this was defended by the citadel, which rose about 100 yards farther to the east, leaving a small causeway at the extreme point. It was towards this point that the Punic attack was directed (Lhy', xxi. 7· 5). Eventually Hannibal offered what were mild terms, life and liberty to the survivors if they would settle on a less formidable site; upon their rejection, the town fell after a desperate resistance. See De Sanctis, iii. r. 422-3. 10. ~eaT.i T-i)v &g[av: 'according to their deserts', not (as Paton) 'according to their rank'; cf. v. 90. S, vi. 6. n.

18. 1. e:ls ~v A~!J.ciAllv: cf. vii. 9· 13. Dimale lay behind Dyrrhachium, probably not on the coast (so Zippel, 56); Holleaux (135 n. r) puts it in the territory of the Parthini, but the fact that it is mentioned separately, though in association with them, suggests that it was outside their land (Badian, BSA, 1952, 86 n. 72); cf. Zippel {56), 'in der Nachbarschaft dieses Volkes'. It is the Dimallum of Livy, xxix. rz. 3· rz. IJ. Twv Aomwv 1ToAewv: not of course the Greek coastal towns, but the townships of the Parthini such as Bargullum and Eugenium (Livy, xxix. 12. 1,3), if these were not already captured (r6. 3). (For P.'s loose use of the word .,.oAts see Poseidonius' criticism recorded xxv. I ( = Strabo, iii. r6.)), ·mv> .,.vpyovs KaAovwra 11oAELs; and Livy (xliii. 2.3. 6), following P., mentions Parthinorum ... urbes.) These townships in which Demetrius now installed his party by a cmtp d'etat were evidently not within his direct control, otherwise his supporters would have been already in power; this action is the culmination of a policy of political infiltration (Badian, BSA, 195:2,86 n. 73). 8. T-i)v m)Aw: the city of Pharos, on the site of modern Starigrad (Civitavecchia), in a fertile plain at the head of a long gulf to the north-west of the island ; the identity is confirmed by inscriptions. R. L. Beaumont has argued that this site cannot be reconciled with P.'s account (]HS, 19.36, r88 n. zoo); and E. Polaschek (RE, 'Pharos (z)', col. r862) thinks that P.'s 1TOALS' suits the site of modern Hvar better than Starigrad, where there is no >..6cpos ~pup.v6s between town and harbour. Excavation may one day help to solve this problem; certainly P. was aware of only one mSAts-, and that Pharos (r9. 12). The attack on Issa recorded by Dio (fg. 5.3) may be rejected as a doublet from the liberation of Issa in the First Illyrian War (cf. ii. II. 12). 19. 5. ftvT~1Tecrav Tais am:(pats: 'fell upon their formations'. Paton, following Shuckburgh, translates 'formed their ranks and delivered ... a charge'; and this was Schweighaeuser's original interpretation. But in the note ad Joe., and in the Oxford edition, he 330

THE SECOND ILLYRIAN WAR

IlL

20. I

rendered 'in eorum manipulos irruunt'. Since the formation Ka'Ta !I'1T'dpa<; is typically Illyrian (cf. ii. 3· 2 n.) and dVTe'mo-o-av calls for an object, this later view seems preferable. 8. Stt:Koj-l(o-911 "rrapaSO~ws "rrpos Tov ~aapov ••• KaTEaKaljlt:: clearly the city (in P. the island is masculine; cf. v. ro8. 7). Cf. App. Ill. 8, -r¥ 7Ta-rpl3a ai'n-0 Wapov o-vvaJ.tap-rovaav JmKa-re'o-Ka{Jav (with a confused order of events). If it was Pharos which the Romans destroyed (cf. r8. 8 n.), it was subsequently rebuilt, since it later minted coins as a free city (cf. DeSanctis, iii. 1. 325 n. rso; Head, 318; Drunsmid, Die Inschrijten und 1\fiinzen der r;riechischen Stiidte I>a!matiens (Vienna, r898), .39, 47 ff. (nos. 25-so). Moreover, it appears in a clause of the treaty between Hannibal and Philip in 215 (vii. 9- 13) among the other cities of the Illyrian protectorate. TllS 8~ AomTjs 'IA.Aupi&os iyKpaTtlS: clearly exaggerated, for vii. 9· 13 mentions no part of upper Illyria except Pharos as dependent on Rome; cf. Holleaux, 140 n. r; Badian, BSA, 1952, 87 n. 75, 'the phrase ... probably means that the Romans had the Illyrian king at their mercy'. T-f)v ElaoSov E"rro~t1aaTo j-lt:Ta 9pt6.j-1~ou: cf. iv. 66. 8. The time is late summer 219. Not only Aemilius, but also Livius (r6. 7 n.) triumphed over the Illyrians (auct. de uir. ill. so. r; cf. Suet. Tib. 3· r). Livius was later condemned for unequal dhrision of the booty (Frontin. Strat. iv. r. 45) or peculatus (auct. de uir. ill. so. r); see Mommsen (Rom. Forsch. ii. 453 f.; St.-R. ii. 321 n. 3; Strafr. 765); and according to Livy (xxii. 35· 3, cf. 40. 3, 49· n) Aemilius Paullus damnatione collegae prope ambustus euaserat. The consuls took no action against ScerdilaYdas, though he too had broken the treaty (iv. r6. 6) and allied himself with Philip (iv. 29. :z; winter 2zo/19). For the praise of Aemilius (§ r3) cf. ro7. 8.

20. 1. "n'JWO'"n'fi,.TWKU(as UIJTOtS ii8TJ TtlS TWV Za~mv9a(wv aAWO'fiWS: the perfect tense and 1f3"1 relate to the phrase oti ... -ron 3wf5ovAtov J3I

III.

20. I

CAUSES AND PRELIMINARIES OF

~yov, not to Aemilius' triumph ATJYOVUTJ> ••. rijs: f:hpelas: (r9. 12), as Schnabel takes it (Klio, 1926, II4). Ha\·ing explained Roman inaction during the siege by the Illyrian War, P. echoes the Fabian version that the news of the fall of Saguntum was followed by an immediate ultimatum. But in fact the embassy cannot have left before rs March 218, and probably left much later (§ 6 n.); nor was the Illyrian expedition a bar to action in 219, though the presence of both consuls shows that it was rather more than a miserable raid (}1ommsen, RG, i. 573). The annalistic tradition reveals considerable opposition to the war both before and after the fall of Saguntum (Livy, xxi. 6. 7, I6. 2; Dio, fg. 55; Zon. viii. 22, debate between L. Cornelius Lentulus and Q. Fabius Maximus; cf. Otto, HZ, 145, 1932, 513); for, since DioZonaras accepts the causes of the war which appear in the secondcentury senatorial writers (6. In.), his source is clearly pro-Roman, and the account of these discussions seems to have been in the early annalists as well as in the pro-Carthaginian tradition. They may, therefore, be taken as authentic (Meyer, Kl. Schr. ii. 348--9, 365). It has been argued that in omitting them P. is following Fabius, to whom the argument of his kinsman Fabius Maximus will have appeared discreditable (Gelzer, Hermes, 1933, r62); but this is by no means certain, and Taubler has argued (Vorgesch. 89-90) that F.'s silence followed the version of Cato against both Fabius and the other annalists. On the whole it seems most likely that the speeches were in Fabius, though not necessarily in extenso (Bung, 34-35). ~VLOLTwv auyypa.4>E~tw; in view of§ s, it seems clear that these authors are Chaereas and Sosylus (d. DeSanctis, iii. r. 424 n. 86; Schwartz, RE, 'Chaireas (6)', col. 2023; Jacoby, RE, 'Sosylos', cols. r2o4-{i). The 'speeches made on both sides' suggest writers of the rhetorical kind, like Timaeus and Phylarchus, and evidently Chaereas and Sosylus were such (Meyer, Kl. Schr. ii. 348). Taubler (Vorgesch. 84-85) suggests that Sosylus learnt of this debate from the Roman historian, L. Cincius Alimentus, whom Hannibal took prisoner in 208 (Livy, xxi. 38. 3). There is no reason to suppose that Chaereas and Sosylus were F.'s sources only for the anecdote of the boys (§ 3) (so Laqueur, 75); nor is it probable that P. was here attacking Fabius (Meltzer, ii. 597; Klotz, La nouvelle Clio, 1953, 239). See further, § 3 n. 2. t·n"'lYYEA~elha.~ TrOAE!Lov: d. IS· 12 for this embassy, which went on to Carthage from Saguntum in 220/19. If the demarche there took the same form as in Spain, P. its positive character; it was a veiled ultimatum which by no means committed the Romans to war (cf. 15. 2 n.). 3. Tijv aTuyvoTTJTO. . • . 1Tap£ta6.youat 8a.u116.atov: 'they present a wonderful picture of the gloomy aspect of the Senate' (Paton) ; on this sense of uTuyv67rJs- see Strachan-Davidson ad loc. E. Harrison

332

THE HANNIBALIC WAR

CCR, I924, 54) recalls Reiske's 'palmary emendation',

III.

20.

6

aT~:yvoT1)Ta,

'costiveness', and so 'secretiveness'. But this misses P.'s point. He is criticizing the authenticity of the sensational picture drawn by the Greek historians of the sitting of the Roman Senate by contrasting it with their own anecdote of the boys who refuse to divulge a word-which is proof of the secrecy surrounding their debates; hence either the account of the sitting, or the anecdote, or both, are false. TTapt;.tad.ynv is often used by P. of the material introduced by sensational and 'tragic' historians into their work; cf. 4i· i (picture of Hannibal), v. 2. 6 (sons of Aeacus introduced into a poem by Hesiod), vi. 56. 8 (introduction of superstition into Roman life). See CQ, I945· Ion. I. To us u[ouc; ••• liyc;w ••• de; To cruvHip~ov: Cato told the same story 'in oratione qua usus est ad milites contra Galbam' (Gell. i. 23. I ; cf. Macrob. Sat. i. 6. I9 ff.), but implied that the custom ceased during the Samnite Wars (if the boy in his story is the L. Papirius Praetextatus who was censor in A.U.c. 482 272 B.c.; cf. Munzer, RE, 'Papirius (72)', cols. I073-4). But it is not to be supposed that P. is indulging in polemic against Cato ('in such terms', De Sanctis, iii. 1. 424 n. 86), as was suggested by Hirschfeld (Kl. Schr. 755 ff.) and Arnold (Oorzaak, 2I), though he may be hitting at others besides the Greeks; for example, Adlius and Postumius Albinus (Jacoby, FGH, ii D, p. 6os) or Cincius Alimentus (Taubler, Vorgesch. 86). 5. Xa.~pea.s tca.t IwcruXos: cf. i. 3· 2 n.; Jacoby on FGH, q6 (Sosylus) and I77 (Chaereas); RE articles quoted § In. On Sosylus see also Meyer, Kl. Schr. ii. 370-5. Sosylus of Lacedaemon, together with Silenus of Caleacte, accompanied Hannibal quamdiu fortuna passa est, and taught him Greek (Nepos, Hamz. IJ. 3); according to Diodorus (xxvi. 4) he wrote Trt TTEpt :4vvt{5av in seven books. A Wiirzburg papyrus {FGH, q6 F I) contains part of an account of a naval battle at the Ebro mouth (95--99 n.) by Sosylus, which puts him in a much better light than P. here would suggest. Of Chaereas nothing further is known. In dismissing these historians' work as 'the common gossip of the barber's shop' (for the KovpEtov as a centre for lounging cf. Aristoph. Plut. 33i-8, KalTot .\6yo> y' 7lv vTj Tov 'HpaKAla TTDAV> I €TTl Tofat KovptdotO't T
III.

20.

6

CAl:SES AND PRELIMJ:"ARIES OF

but P. seems dearly to exaggerate the speed of the response (d. 66. g). Pointing to the fact that the consuls did not leave for their prouinciae until late August (41. 2 n.), W. Hoffmann (Rh. Mus., 1951, 7i ff.) suggests with some plausibility that this embassy was not sent to Carthage until news reached Rome of Hannibal's crossing of the Ebro, i.e. in early June. In 40. z P. makes the return of the embassy precede the arrival of this news; but if opposition to a declaration of war, and prolonged discussion (§ r n.) delayed a decision until the fresh news of the crossing of the Ebro made Hannibal's aggressive intentions manifest, we have an adequate reason why the embassy at Carthage invoked the Ebro treaty (see further, 2r. 1 n.). Later the emotional value of a cause based on succouring a \'lronged ally is enough to explain how Saguntum was thrust into the centre of the picture, and the awkward delays of 219 and spring n8 obscured by tampering with the chronology. P.'s account of this embassy certainly comes from a Roman source; but P. has suppressed the opposition to Hannibal in accordance with the view expressed in 8. II (cf. DeSanctis, iii. 2. 170). The juridical position of this embassy has not always been understood. Ed. Meyer (Kl. Schr. ii. 366 n. z, 367) declares that it 'did not actually declare war, but up to the last presented an alternative', and he dates the putting of the war-motion to the Comitia after its return. This view is contradicted by Livy's reliable account (Livy, xxi. IJ. 4). In fact at this time and throughout the second century the war-motion went through the Comitia in a conditional form; senatorial legati were then sent on a mission which combined the older rerum repetitio and the formal imiictio betli. This is explicit in Livy, xlii. 30. ro-rr (war with Perseus); but it was true at the time of the annexation of Sardinia (i. 88. 8 n., iii. ro. In.), and it was true now, as the form of the ultimatum shows (33· 2, tvTaiJIJa Kal Tov 7ToAt=fWV auTOtr; ;rPTJ 11:al TiJv t=lp~v-qv t/;ip.=w). From the time of the envoy's last words the two states were at war. The precedent of 238 {cf. i. 88. 8 n.) disposes of the suggestion of Taubler (Vorgesch. 79) that the procedure of 218 was a compromise between the views of L. Cornelius Lentulus, who wanted war, and Q. Fabius Maximus, who still hoped to negotiate. )1eyer (loc. cit.) is probably right in placing the war-motion after the arrival of news of the Ebro crossing; but this motion preceded the sending of the embassy to Carthage. See further, ]RS, 1937, 192-7; 1941, 87-91. 8. "TOU'i fle-T' GU"TOU auveSpous: probably representatives of the Punic government, cf. vii. 9· I, y.=povaw.a"Tal (ignored by J. S. Reid (]RS, I9IJ, rSs), who takes auvt=Opot to be simply Hannibal's associates, in particular his brothers). Meltzer (ii. 7o) compares the attendance of the ephors on the Spartan kings when they were campaigning. The Roman demand thus implied that the Carthaginian Senate must

THE HANNIBALIC WAR

Ill.

2I. 2

disown not only Hannibal but its own representatives too, On the Carthaginian Senate, or Council, sec i. 21. 6 n. 21. 1. Tac; ••• ,.poe; ~a5poo~a.v of1oAoy£o.s- ,.a.pealC:lTrwv: 'they declined to discuss the agreement with Hasdrubal on the grounds, etc.', literally 'they were for passing over it undiscussed' (cf. iv. 15. ro, c"'T~yyEAAov, 'they \Vere for declaring war', ... E"'Towvv, 'they were for offering a separate peace'). For this common use of the imperfect (e.g. v. 67. 4, lvo!Lt~E) see Hesselbarth (87). Such must be the meaning, since the Carthaginians justify their 'silence' on the subject-which they cannot do without breaking it. (Bung (37) thinks the justification is P.'s addition; but this would be extremely clumsy writing.) The alternative reasons (w> oiJn YEYEV7]!L€vas, d Te YEYOF<WtV, ouDEV oiJaas 7TpO!: O.lhov>) are not exclusive, but represent the alternative pleas common to legal contexts. The Carthaginian refusal to discuss the Ebro treaty implies that the Romans had brought it into discussion; and this is best explained on Hoffmann's assumption (Rh. Mus., 1951, 85) that when the embassy left Rome, news had already arrived of Hannibal's crossing of the Ebro. It is less easy to understand why the Romans raised it (and actually demanded the surrender of Hannibal) if the breach of the Ebro treaty was merely judged to be imminent (so Scullard, Rh. Mus., 1952, nz). The later Roman version, which pushed Saguntum into the centre of the picture, and eliminated the Roman delay in acting, solved its difficulties by assuming that the attack on Saguntum was itself a breach of the Ebro treaty (cf. ii. 13. 7 n. (e)); but this confusion was of later origin (zg. r). Many scholars have assumed that the Ebro treaty was not mentioned at all, as being irrelevant; but in that case the Carthaginians could not have explained their silence. (See Meyer, Kl. Schr. ii. 346 ff.; Hallward, C AH, viii. 29; Gelzer, Hermes, r933, 16o.) On the hypothesis accepted above, the Carthaginians refused to discuss it because it had in fact been broken by Hannibal's crossing of the Ebro. For other views see Otto, HZ, 145, 1932, 509 (d. Hesselbarth, 89; Drachmann, 14 f.; Schnabel, Klio, 1926, u6; Taeger, Phil. Woch., 1930, 353 ff.), viz. that the Carthaginians refused to discuss the Ebro treaty because it was an unwelcome limitation on their empire in Spain; Oertel, Rh. Mw;., 1932, 226-7, viz. that it was excluded from the discussion as too vague in its terms. For the view that the answers of the Carthaginians recorded here were really delivered a year earlier in nofrg see 15. IZ n. ws- ouTE YEYWTJJlGva.') KTA.: the treaty 'vas probably never ratified at Carthage; cf. ii. r3. 7 n. (b). 2. expwvTo S' E~ auTiilv 'Pw1-1a.£wv ••• 11'o.pnoely~J.a.T~: 'they followed in this a precedent of the Romans themselves' (cf. i. zo. rs) ; not (as Paton) 'they quoted a precedent, etc.' The words J.xpwVTO 3' ... yvdJ!L1J~ are a parenthesis inserted by P., which finds its full 335

III.

21. 2

THE TREATIES BETWEEN

explanation in 29. 2 f.;

brlE~ov

S.f (§ 3) then takes up the 1.dv of Tcts (§ I). On the change made in the

J.'-EV ovv 7rpo<; JiuSpouf3av opo>..oy{a<;

treaty of Catulus cf. i. 63. 1 n. 3. Tas TEAEuTa.(a.s uuvOT)Kns Tas yEvo~€va.s ~v TQ 1TEpt ILKEA(a.s 1ToA€~: 'the last treaty, which had been made in the war for Sicily' (not, as Paton, 'the treaty at the end of the war for Sicily'). The treaty of Catulus is the last treaty because (a) the subsequent agreement about Sardinia (i. 88. 12) was specifically an annexe (cf. 27. 7, lmcrvv8~Kar;), (b) the Ebro agreement was never ratified at Carthage and so remained, strictly, opo>..oylat (cf. ii. IJ. 7 n.). Cf. Taubler, 95 n. 2.

5.

ouK ovTas TOTE 'Pw~a.~wv uu~~axous:

taken up and answered in

29. 4· 1TapavEy(vwuKov ••• 1TAEovaKLS Tas uuvOT)Kas: 'they several times read aloud the terms of the treaty', not (as Paton) 'they read aloud extracts from the treaty'. The absence of a name from a treaty can only be demonstrated by reading the whole of it. From this passage Taubler (Vorgesch. 63 ff.) deduces convincingly that the list of allies on both sides was appended as an annexe to the treaty. 7. TO.UTT)S 0~ 1TapE0'1TOVOT)~EVT)S: conveniently ambiguous; cf. XV. 1. 7 (Punic admission that they had broken Tcts lt &.pxij> yEvop€var; avvii~Ka>); q. 3 (Scipio accuses the Carthaginians of enslaving the Saguntines Trapa Ta> uvv8~Ka>). Which treaty had been violated? The answer is rendered difficult by the Roman attempt to base their case on the attack on Saguntum rather than on the sounder ground of the crossing of the Ebro (d. 20. 6 n.); and as the two pretexts became increasingly confused in the polemics of the next seventy years, and falsifications were added (ii. 13. 7 n. (e)), a clear answer became increasingly hard to give. A similar ambiguity is found in the use of the same word in Hannibal's mouth in reference to Roman interference in Saguntum; see IS. 7 n. 9-10. Why P. proposes to survey all the treaties between Rome and Carthage. Since Mommsen (Rom. Chron. 320 ff.) it has been generally accepted that the Punic treaties came into prominence about I52 B.c., and were the object of lively discussion in the years before the Third Punic War (29. In.). P. admits that they had not been known long (26. 2), and Mommsen suggested that Cato drew attention to them and was indirectly responsible for P.'s knowledge of them. If so, they will have been translated and passed about in senatorial circles, and will have reached P. in this form; that they were included in Cato's Origines is improbable (Taubler, 257). On this hypothesis, P. added the details of the treaties (21. g--28. 5) to his text about ISO B.C. (d. DeSanctis, iii. 1. 204; below, 28. 4 n.), just before the publication of a substantial part of his work (I-5 n.), with a

336

ROME AND CARTHAGE

III. 22

view to enlightening a11d influencing politicians of his day, and giving to a wider public (especially Greeks; cf. von Scala, 289) information available only to a small group. 9. ots Ka.91}KEL .•. ro aa.<jl&>s El8~va.L KTA.: statesmen (elsewhere 1ToAtrwdfL"Vot, 1TpaKrLKo{, 1Tpayftar,Ko[) ; the other category are students (qnAofLa8ovvrEc;, cf. r. 6). (Strachan-Davidson, ad loc., wrongly takes the former group to be 'students and \\>Titers of history' and the latter 'the general public who are at the mercy of the historians'.) Both statesmen and students benefit from history; cf. uS. 12, vii. 7· 8 where q,,>.ofLa8ovVTE> to whom history is XPTf£1LfLWUpoc; are distinguished from the casual reader, cpLA~KooL, to whom it is merely ~Stwv; xi. 19 a. Here the distinction corresponds to the Aristotelian contrast between the 8£wpTJruaSc; and the 1ToAmKoc; {3{oc; (cf. Nic. Eth. i. 5· 1095 b 19). In his references to debates P. is probably thinking of those of the Senate in the critical years before the outbreak of the Third Punic War; the historians whose ignorance may mislead students can be exemplified by Philinus (cf. 26). 10. lwc; Eis Touc; Ka.O' ,;...,as Ka.Lpous: in effect, down to 218 B.c. The treaty after Zama is dealt with in the body of the work. 22-25. The earlier treaties. Their chronology, authenticity of text, and historical context and significance have all been widely discussed. Only a bare sketch of the problems and a suggested interpretation can be given here. (a) Chronology. P. records three treaties prior to the First Punic War, and dates the first (P.L: 22. 4-13) to the first year of the Republic, and the third (P.III: 25. 2-5) to Pyrrhus' crossing over to Italy; the second (P.II. 24. 3-13) is not dated. Further, Diodorus mentions two treaties; the first he dates to 347, but puts it under the consuls for 348 Varr. (Diod. xvi. 69. I, 1rpwrov uw81jKI.:tt JylvoVTo), the second he makes contemporary with the war with Pyrrhus (Diod. xxii. 7· 5). Livy (vii. 27. 2) records a treaty in 348, and (ix. 43· 26) states that in JOO a joedus was tertia renouatum; and somewhere in book xiii (ep. 13), under 279/8, he spoke of quarto joedus renouatum. Further, in ix. 19. 13 he speaks of Rome and Carthage being united, at the time of Alexander, foederibus uetustis, which suggests something more and something earlier than the treaty of 348; if he here understands a treaty in 509, it will have been tertio and quarto renouatum in 3o6 and 279/8. Since the time of Mommsen attempts have been made to correlate the treaties in P. and in Livy. Mommsen (Rom. Chron. 320 fi.) wished to reject P.'s date for P.I, and identify this with the Livian treaty of 348; P.Il was then dated 306 and equated with that which Livy described as tertio renouatum. Against this, Nissen (]ahrb., 1867, 321-32) accepted P.'s date for P.l and 348 for P.II, and took Livy's renewal of 3o6 to be the original of P.III 4856

z

337

III.

22

THE TREATIES BETWEEN

without the conditions of 25. 3-5. Later scholars have in the main followed one or other of these views. P.I is dated to the first year of the republic by Ed. Meyer, Altheim, Gelzer, Gsell, Strachan-Davidson, Lenschau, Last, Scullard, Sherwin-\Vhite, Beaumont, Wickert, and Scevola, and to 348 by DeSanctis, Kornemann, Taubler, Rosenberg, Kahrstedt, Cary, Hasebroek, Schachermeyr, .Meltzer, Unger, Soltau, Schur, and von Scala (bibliography below). To the writer P.'s date seems more likely to be right. For a defence of this view see H. Last, CAH, vii. 859-62. Attempts to find new and more decisive arguments by R. L. Beaumont (]RS, 1939, 74-86) and L. \Vickert (Klio, 1938, 349-64) are to some extent contradictory and cannot be adjudged successful. Detailed criticism is reserved to the commentary. (b) Text of the treaties. On P.'s probable source cf. 21. 9-10 n. In a detailed examination of the diplomatic form of the treaties Taubler (254-76) has shown that P.'s immediate source cannot have been oral; and he argues that we have the text from a written source in a fairly complete form. However, it must be remembered that (i) the originals were in Latin, and in the case of P.I, very old and difficult Latin. P. or his intermediary had to turn them into Greek and certain passages may well have been misunderstood; (ii) some parts P. only claims to summarize (e.g. 25. 2); (iii) the preliminaries are omitted; thus in 25. 6 ff. the oaths are retailed separately; (iv) in three places (23. 3, 23. 4, 24. r6) P.'s commentary implies something not included in his text. Consequently P.'s text may not be treated as anything like a verbatim record; yet it is much more than a summary (so Meltzer, i. 173 f., 520). For example, contrary to his usual practice (cf. Hultsch, Phil., 1859. 288-319; and works by Benseler, Brief, Blittner-Wobst, and Schlachter listed in Ziegler, RE, 'Polybios (r)', cols. rs71-2), P. in these documents allows himself hiatus. (c) Context and significance of the treaties. For the historical background see the detailed commentary. The first two are general treaties defining a modus vivendi between two states, of which one was mainly interested in commerce, the other primarily in her political relationship with Latium. See F. Altheim (Epochen, i. 99roo) for the significance of this distinction for the historical character of the two states. The third treaty contains a specifically political agreement relative to a common enemy, Pyrrhus. All three correspond to the relationship existing between the two states at the time of the compact. (d) Bibliography. The most important works are listed in C AH, vii (1928), 914, § 6; F. Schachermeyr, Rh. Mus., 1930, 350 n. r; and 338

ROME AND CARTHAGE

III.

22. I

F. Altheim, Epochen, i. 99 n. Ii; add R. L. Beaumont and L. Wickert (quoted under (a) above); W. Hoffmann, Rom und die griechische Welt im 4. ]ahrhundert (Phil. Suppl.-B. xxvii. r, 1935), r-r7; T. Frank, ES, i. 6-8, 35-37; E. Rupprecht, K!io, 1939, ro6--8, Maria Luisa Scevola, Athen., 1943, r22-4. The treaties are studied from the point of view of private law by M. David, .)ymbolae . .. van Oven dedicatae (Lei den, 1946), 231-so. 22. 1-3. Introduction to the first treaty. 1. Ka:ru Af!.uKtov 'louvLOv BpouTOv Kal. Map~v that Horatius was consul suf!ectus after Brutus' death; and he eventually appears as colleague to F. Valerius Volusi f. Fublicola, after L. Tarquinius Egeri f. Collatinus had been banished, Brutus had fallen in battle against the Etruscans, and Brutus' immediate successor, Sp. Lucretius Tricipitinus, had died within a few days of his election. Cf. Stuart Jones, CAH, vii. 436; De Sanctis, i. 407; Broughton, i. r-~.3. All five are usually treated as legendary; and this has been held against F.'s date since, it is alleged, such names cannot have figured in a contemporary treaty and so brand it as late (cL Schur, RE, Suppl.-B. v, 'Iunius (46 a)', col. 364; Taubler, 270 f.). Further, ·mubler (ibid.) argues that the treaty is drawn up, following Carthaginian precedent, in the form of an oath, •vithout date or personal names. In reply, Last (CAH, vii. 86r) observes that a note of the responsible Roman officers may very well have been added to the Roman copy; and he envisages at least the possibility that both Brutus and Horatius were historical figures. Munzer too (RE, 'Horatius (r5)', cols. 2401-4) has argued cogently for the view that Horatius was the man who dedicated the temple of Iuppiter Capitolinus in 507 (whether as consul or not, he leaves open); and Cary (JIR, 6263) believes L. Junius Brutus to be an historical figure. However, to accept P.'s date is not necessarily to accept the historicity of both Brutus and Horatius. It is possible that only Horatius' name stood on the treaty, and that F. added that of Brutus from the traditions of his own time (cf. K. Hanell, 175, 'cine Nonnalisierung, die in der selben "Weise zu beurteilen ist wie Ciceros Verfahren, wenn er,pro Balbo 53, dasfoedus Cassiamtm als ictum Sp. Cassio Postumo Cominio consulibus kennzeichnet, obwohl in der Urkunde selbst nur Sp. Cassius erwalmt war'), or even that both names were a late addition to a treaty which a wellestablished temple tradition dated to the very year of its dedication. In the latter case, the names of the consuls would neither support F.'s date nor count against it; and DeSanctis's objection (ii. 252) to the appearance of the cognomen Brutus would fall to the ground. 339

III. zz.

1

THE TREATIES BET\VEEN

u!J>' wv auve~1'1 Ka.lhepwOfrva.t l((l.t TO TOU Atos ~epov TOU Ka.vETwA(ou: the temple of Iuppiter Optimus Maximus (with luno and Minerva) lay on the southern summit of the Capitoline. lts foundation is ascribed almost universally to Tarquinius Priscus (Cic. de re pub. ii. 36; Livy, i. 38. 7. 55· 3; Dion. Hal. iii. 69, iv. 59, 6r; Plut. Pub/. 13; Tac. Hist. iii. 72), and its dedication to M. Horatius. Livy (ii. 8, vii. 3) and Plutarch (Publ. 14) agree ·with P. in ascribing its dedication to the first year of the Republic; but Tacitus (Hist. iii. 72) and Dionysius (v. 35· 3) date it to Horatius' second consulship, A.P.c. 247 = 507 B.c., when Valerius was again his colleague. The discrepancy can be explained from Pliny, who records that Cn. Flavius' dedicatory inscription on the temple of Concord (304 B.C. or, omitting the dictator year of 301, 303 B.c.) dated its construction ccii£ (ccciiii MS.) annis post Capitolinam dedicatam (xxxiii. 19 f.). Reckoning back from 303 gives 507 for Horatius' dedication, which was the first year of the Republic by F.'s reckoning (see next note); but the Varronian system made 509 the first year, hence the second consulship in 507 to overcome the discrepancy of two years. This confusion, and the uncertainty whether Horatius was consul or pontifex (cf. Cic. dom. 139: VaL Max. v. ro. 1; Sen. cons. ad Afarc. 13), suggest that Horatius' dedication (d. Dion. Hal. v. 35· J, T'?v /3' rl.vdpwatv ... Ka~ T'?v ~7TL· ypa~rJl' tAaf3e Mr5.pKoS 'OpaTws) recorded neither year nor office (d. Munzer, RE, 'Horatius (15}', col. :z-to4)· Brutus is nowhere else named as a dedicator of the temple; whence Villoison proposed emending v~· J.w to i¢/ Jiv, quibus CO'nsulibus. On the later history of the temple, culminating in the fire of 6 july 83 B.c., see Hiilsen, RE, 'Capitolium (r)', col. 1532· :ep~ou ~la.fJO.aews •.• TplaKovTa. ~Teal A.et'ITOIJO'l 8ueiv: though Xerxes crossed the Hellespont in spring 480, i.e. 01.

2. np6T£pa. Tf\s

74, 4, P. speaks of his crossing 'into Greece'; and when, as in Eratosthenes or the Parian Marble, Xerxes' crossing is used to give a date, 01. 75· r, the year of Salamis, always seems to be implied (cf. Dion. HaL ix. r; Diod. xi. r; Leuze, ]ahrzahlung, I48-9). Hence the first year of the republic will be equated v.-ith 01. 68, I soS/7. Mommsen (Rom. Chron. rz8) attributes this synchronism to Fabius; d. Beloch (RG, roo) and below, vi. II a 2 n. The Varronian system put the foundation of Rome in 754/3 and the institution of the republic 244 years later in sro/9. 3. ~vta. !LOAtS eg emaTacrews OlE!Jt
ROME AND CARTHAGE

III. n. 5

written in the middle of the fourth century, only four decades before the publication of the Jasti and legis actiones by Cn. Flavius (cf. Meyer, Kl. Schr. ii. 297), or even about 400, the date adopted by Beloch (RG, 298). P. does not claim to have seen the original documents himself. 4-13. The first treaty. Best set out in clauses by Taubler (254 and 258). The treaty is in two parts, and is cast in negative form: (r) The Romans (i) shall not pass the Fair Promontory; and anyone driven thither by storm shall conform to certain regulations; (ii) shall trade in Libya and Sardinia only on certain conditions; (iii) shall be free to trade in the Carthaginian province of Sicily on the same terms as anyone else. (z) The Carthaginians (i) shall do no wrong to certain specified Latin towns subject to Rome; (ii) shall not touch any other Latin city; or if they do, they shall hand it over to Rome; (iii) shall make any stay in Latium conform to certain rules. On the general 'shapelessness' of this treaty see Altheim (Epochen, i. 101). The Punic interests are commercial, the establishing of a mare clausum and regulation of trade, the Roman political, the recognition of rights over Latium. On Roman relations with Latium after the expulsion of the Tarquins see §§ u-12 n., on the extent of Roman trade, §§ 6 ff. The treaty is probably to be associated with the series of agreements by which Carthage regulated her trading relations with the Etruscans (d. Arist. Pol. iii. 9· 6-7. 128o a 38 ff.); it would be agreed by the new republic in order to obtain acknowledgement of the claim to dominions held under the kings. 4. e1rt .,-o'iaSe ~tMa.v dva.~: probably not a reproduction of the real introductory phrase, for P. uses this formula in the proposed treaty at the end of the First Punic War (i. 62. 8), whereas the present treaty is cast in Carthaginian form. 5. 1-LTJ 1TAELV 'PwfJ-a.(ous • . • Eli'EK€WO. TOU Ka.A.oG aKpWT11PlOU: this stipulation occasions difficulties. (a) I dentijication of the Fair Promontory. Three African capes come in question; they are (from west to east) Cap Blanc (Ras Abiad), known to the Romans as Promunturium Candidum (Pliny, Nat. hist. v. 23); Cap Farina (Ras Sidi Ali el Mekki), the Roman Promuuturium Pulchri (Livy, xxix. 27. 8 ff.); and Cap Bon (Ras Adder), the Roman Promunturium Mercuri (Livy, ibid.), which P. calls f) fiKpo. -Q 'Epf.Lo.ia (i. 29. 2, 36. n). Carthage lies in the bay between Cap Fanna and Cap Bon. In 23 P. explains this passage to mean that Roman ships 341

III.

22.5

THE TREATIES BETWEEN

might not sail south into the Syrtes; thus iniKewa means 'south and east of'. This, if tme, would involve identifying the Fair Promontory with Cap Bon, since 'south and east of Cap Farina would exclude the Romans from Carthage itself; and the second treaty at least, which contains similar stipulations, clearly envisages the presence of Romans at Carthage (24. 12; cf. 23. 4). The identification of Cap Bon with the Fair Promontory was the oldest one (see Schweighaeuser, ad Joe.) and has been recently defended by R. L. Beaumont (JRS, 1939, 74 ff.). But it is hard to reject the identification of the Fair Promontory with the Promunturium Pulchri, especially as P. already has a name for Cap Bon; and most modern scholars (cf. Meltzer, i. 181, 488) have made this identification and assumed that P. has misunderstood the treaty; the area from 'vhich the Romans are excluded lies to the west of Cap Farina, towards Mauretania (cf. Gsell, i. 457; Strachan- David'Son, 67-70; Scullard, Scip. 187 n. 2; De Sanctis, iii. :z. 58o-I). For several not very cogent reasons, however, L. ·Wickert (Klio, I9,38, 352 ff.) has proposed to seek the Fair Promontory outside Africa, and (following several older scholars) to identify it with the Cabo de Palos, north of Cartagena; he suggests that in 509 Rome had wide trading connexions, but that the treaty (if not common form to all made by Carthage at that time) applied particularly to "Massilia. However, no evidence points to relations between Rome and ~Iassilia before the fourth century, nor is it clear how Rome could commit Massilia; thus Wickert's hypothesis is unconvincing. The most likely hypothesis is that the Fair Promontory is Cap Farina, and that the Carthaginians were protecting the thinly scattered settlements along the north coast of Africa. (b) On the Roman avppaxo• see below, § II n. 6. 11, ESEO'TW auT~ I-"TJ5EV uyopu~ELV: about the same date Naucratis in Egypt enforced similar conditions; cf. Herod. ii. 179, el o£ n> ls TWV TL a.\,\o a-rop.O:rwv TOU N<E{).ov ani~eo•To, xpfjv op.oaa• JL~ fLEv l~e6vra €A8el:v, d.nop.oaavra 3~ rfj ll'fj~ avrfj nAh.Lv is n\ Kavw{3LKOil' ~ el fL~ ')'E ofa 7'€ Et7] np6<; avlp.ov<; avr[ovc; 1TAEELV, Td cpop{a ;Sn: nepuiyov lv {3aptat nepi -rd Ll€..\-ra, p.lxpt. ov dn{Kot.ro €s NavKpart.v. See Hasebroek, Trade and Politics in Ancient Greece (London, I93J), 63, ng.

The conditions reflected in this treaty are still those of Rome under the Tarquins; and the Carthaginian stipulations have been taken as evidence that Rome was then a trading city of importance. This is quite wrong. There is some evidence for the development of domestic manufacture and guilds under Numa (P!ut. Numa, q. 2), but none for foreign trade on any large scale. The Tiber is not a good river for navigation; and evidence is still lach:ing for Ostia as a port before the fourth century, despite the tradition assigning it to Ancus :Yfartius (cf. vi. I I a 6 n.). Roman trade at this time was more likely to develop along the salt-route beside the Tiber, and there

J4Z

ROME AND CARTHAGE

III.

22.

9

may have been some transit traffic between Etruria and Campania. See Last (CAH, vii. 464--6) against Ed. Meyer (Kl. Schr. ii. 298}, Beloch (RG, 336), and T. Frank (ES, i. 5). This does not mean that Rome had no overseas trade. But the probability is that this is but one of a number of treaties struck by Carthage with the cities of Etruria, of which Rome may well have been reckoned one (cf. Dion. Hal. i. 29. 2, T~v 'PwJL7JV mh~v 1roAAoi Twv uvyyparplwv Tvpp7Jv{Sa 1r6Atv €lvat {nr/.Aa{3ov}; see §§ 4-13 n. The stipulations may have been the same in all these treaties and will reflect general Carthaginian interests and practices. Rome's political claims figure in §§ n-13. 7. (tv 'ITEYT€ o' ~(.LEP
that the state underwrites any debts of a defaulting national, a clause which would be unparalleled in the history of public law, but rather that it compels a defaulting national to give satisfaction, if he has the wherewithal to pay. Strachan-Davidson (io-j2) quotes parallel clauses in Italian treaties; for instance a clause in a treaty between Bologna and Modena in A.D. n66 reads, 'si quis de nostris ciuibus ... debitor est ... soluere faciemus si habeat unde soluat, si uero non habeat unde soluat de Ciuitate et nostro districtu expellemus bonis ablatis et destructis'. 343

III.

22.

9

THE TREATIES BETWEEN

€v Al~un: evidently representing Africa in the original Latin. Here it must refer primarily to the area around the Bay of Tunis, since the coast west of Cap Farina was closed to foreign trade(§ 5 n.), and the Syrtes coast was so treacherous that it will have seen few foreign merchants; d. i. 39· z-s; De Sanctis, iii. 2. 581. That 'Africa' is thus used in a sense limited by the context need cause no difficulties, and affords· Wickert no support for his theory (Klio, 1938, 353-4) that the 'dosed coast' was in Spain. 10. EtS IU<EMav • . • tis KupxTJ8cwlol thrapxouaw: cf. 23. 5· On the Punic J.Trapxla in Sicily towards the end of the sixth century see Hackforth (CAH, iv. 356 ff.). From their base in the north-west round Motya, Soluntum, and Panormus, the Carthaginians had begun to advance somewhat before 550 under Malchus (Justin. xviii. 7; on his name see Meltzer, i. 484-5), mainly at the expense of the Greeks; and about 5ro they defeated and killed the Spartan Dorieus, who had tried to found a colony at Eryx (Herod. v. 46; Diod. iv. 23. 3; Paus. iii. 16. 4; Dunbabin, 35o-1). But in 480, at Himera, Punic power received a severe setback at the hands of the Syracusans. For a possible reference to Carthage in the original treaty at this point see 23. 4 n. ta<1 E
344

ROME AND CARTHAGE

III.

2+ I

(Hermes, 1919, r64) suspects the emendation (which is usually accepted); and apEnvwv may perhaps be a corruption of ltpow.T£7w or }1vna<wv written twice by dittography. The absence of any reference to Ostia has no bearing on the date (d. vi. II a 6 n.). ouoL liv (,~KooL: probably implies an alliance recognizing Rome's military leadership, based on a series of separate treaties (like that with Gabii, Dion. Hal. iv. 58. 4), and independent of the relations between Rome and the Latin League. These ~~Koo' are the crop.p.axo' of § 4; the Latin would be socii. See Sherwin-White, r6~r7; Gelzer, RE, 'Latium', cols. 951-2; Last, CAH, vii. 405. 12. loav S€ nvEs fl.ti &mv u1rtJKOOL: probably the cities of the Latin League of Ferentina (Li>ry, i. so~sr ; Dion. Hal. iii. SI-53); possibly Rome was a member, and even the predominant member of this League (d. Livy, i. 52. 4). If so, Roman relations with Latium took two separate forms, treaties with socii, and predominance inside a league of nominal equals. See Sherwin-White, loc. cit.

23. l-6. Commentary on the first treaty. P. dearly thinks that the Romans were not to sail east of the Fair Promontory (22. 5 n.); in § 2 Paton's translation 'to sail south of this on its western side' makes nonsense of his argument. P.'s reference to warships (§ 2 p,aKpats vavO'l) finds no parallel in the clauses of the treaty (in 22. 5 Paton has no warrant for inserting the words (p.aKpats va1ml) from here), and is due to a misunderstanding; the treaty was concerned with trading vessels, and P. has read later conditions into it. 2. TOU'i KaTa Tijv Buuuanv ••. T<)nous: cf. xii. I. r for Byssatis, Latin Byzacium. It was the area from the Gulf of Hammamet to the Gulf of Gabes (~ ll.'Kpd. E.Jpr,s), with the hinterland. For a list of its cities see Pliny (Nat. hist. v. 24; cf. Livy, xxxiii. 48), and for its fertility the passages quoted at i. 82. 6 n. 3. ev nEv9' T)~paLS &.na.AAaTTEu6aL: see 22. 7 n. But an alternative explanation is that P. added this point erroneously from the second treaty, 24. 11. 4. Ets Se Ka.px11S6va.: not mentioned in our text of the first treaty; but in the second (24. 12) it appears beside Sicily. It would be odd for the Romans to be excluded from Carthage, and a simple solution would be to assume the omission of some such phrase as Kat Ets Kapx'f/odva after Emipxova~v in 22. 10. But P.'s other inaccuracies do not allow one to accept this suggestion with any confidence. 1TQUO.V Tijv E1Tl Ta8E TOU Ka.Aou aKpWT1'\p£ou Tfjs ALj3V1'\S: cf. 22. 9; all parts west of Cap Bon (but in fact P. means east of Cap Farina; cf. 22. 5 n.). 24. 1-2. Introduction to the second treaty. If P.I dates to 509, then P.II (to which he as..signs no date) is probably identical with Livy's 345

III. 24. I

THE TREATIES BETWEEN

and Diodorus' first treaty (Livy, vii. 27. 2; Diod. xvi. 69. 1), and to be dated to 348. But if Mommsen is right in dating P.I to 348, P.II must be thejoedus tertia renouatum of Livy, ix. 43· 26 (3o6). However, there can scarcely have been towns in Latium not subject to Rome (24. 5) in 3o6 after the Samnite struggle and the Roman conquest of the coast from Caere to Campania (Meyer, Kl. Schr. ii. 296); nor is it likely that a treaty made in 306 would have contained no stipulations about the protection of Etruria and Campania, closely related to Rome since 343 and 310 (Lake Vadimo) respectively. The construction of the Via Appia by 308 puts the seal on Roman control to the south; d. Last, CAH, vii. 861. It has been argued that the Campanians are included in the aVf-Lf-Laxot of§ 3 (Schachermeyr, Rh. Mus., 1930, 377 ff.); but this would still leave unexplained the separate mention of Latium in § 5· 3-13. The second treaty. Set out by Taubler (255; comment, 26o ff.). Unlike P.I this is arranged item by item, with both parties mentioned in each. Taubler notes that §§ 8-IO form a avf-Lf3oAov '11'Ept TOV f-L~ d8tKEi'v, such as were a feature of treaties drawn up between Carthage and the Etrurian towns (Arist. Pol. iii. 9· 6-7, 128o a 36 ff.). An example of this kind of contract, which probably originated at Tyre, is the treaty between Assarhadon of Assyria and his vassal Balu of Tyre, 677 (Langdon, Rev. d' Ass., 1929, 189-94) ; see Laqueur (Hermes, 1936, 469-72), who compares Herodotus' account (ii. us) of how Proteus of Memphis, who lived in a Tvplwv aTpaTcmE8ov, treated Alexander precisely as is provided for in Assarhadon's treaty. The scheme of the treaty is: (1) (a) Limits within which the Romans may not plunder, trade, or colonize. (b) (i) If the Carthaginians take any Latin town not subject to Rome they may keep the men and goods, but must surrender the town to Rome. (ii) The Carthaginians shall not bring prisoners taken from states allied with Rome into Roman ports; the Romans to do likewise in regard to Punic ports. (2) (a) The Romans are not to abuse the right of provisioning to harm an ally of Carthage. (b) The Carthaginians are not to abuse the right of provisioning to harm an ally of Rome. (3) Special conditions of intercourse. (a) For the Romans (i) in Sardinia and Libya, (ii) in Carthage and ·Sicily. (b) For the Carthaginians at Rome. This arrangement by categories, typical of Greek treaties (Schachermeyr, Rh. Mus., 1930, 362 ff.), suggests Carthaginian drafting. 346

ROME AND CARTHAGE

IIL 24. 5

3. Tup(wv Kat 'huKatwv 8,1LI{l: the inclusion of Utica among the

allies of Carthage marks an extension of her power since 509. On the privileged position of Utica (here more nominal than real) see Meltzer (ii. 76-7i); it continued after the reduction of Utica in the Mercenary War (i. 88. 3-4; vii. 4· 5). The reference to Tyre creates a problem, for an alliance ;vith Carthage seems improbable if the Syrian city is meant (though in that case no argument can be drawn as to the date of the treaty, since despite Alexander's destruction in 332, Tyre was already sufficiently recovered in 310 to receive gifts from her daughter-city of Carthage (Diod. xx. r4. r): see Gsell (iii. 70 n. 6)). However, this sense has been questioned. Hirschfeld (Rh. Mus., r8g6, 475) emended Tup{wv to Kvplwv (cf. vii. 9· 5); and Beloch (Klio, i. 284) would omit Ked (cf. Taubler, 257). But any such emendation is ruled out by § r; and it seems more likely (cf. Kahrstedt, Gott. Nachr., 1923, IOo) that the phrase conceals a misunderstanding of a Punic expression 'the Tyrians of Carthage', their official title (d. Ehrenberg (Karthago, 25), who also suggests that the name wupwt KapxTJoovwt (vii. 9· 5) was adopted after the destruction of Tyre). 4. Ma.crTtas Tapcr"l(ou: variously translated as 'Mastia in Tarsis', 'Mastia and Tarseum' (so P. takes th~m in 24. 2), and 'Tarseum in Mastia'. Mastia is usually assumed to connect with the Maunavo{ (33· 9; cf. Steph. Byz. Maunavol, l.Ovo<; 1rpo<; Tai:<; 'HpaKAe{at;; uT~Aat<;, 'EKaTato<; E?Jpt.!mv. <JpTJTCtt oe a1TO MauTias 1TOAEws), and it has been suggested that it occupied the site of the later New Carthage; cf. Avien. Or. mar. 451-2, 'sinuque in imo surgit altis moenibus urbs Massiena'; Schulten, RE, 'Massieni', col. 2153. However interpreted, TapaTJlou seems to be connected with Tarshish; and Meltzer (i. 520) proposed Maarla TapuTJlwv, 'Mastia of the Tartessians'. It has been plausibly suggested by L. Wickert (Klio, 1938, 354--6) that P. has misunderstood an archaic Latin genitive plural, Mastiam Tarseiom. It is significant that Avienus (Or. mar. 462), after mentioning the R. Tader (modern Segura), just north of Cartagena, adds 'hie terminus quondam stetit Tartessiorum'. That P. knew where 'Mastia of the Tartessians' lay is dubious; and Schweighaeuser may well be representing P.'s 0\-\'11 belief in describing Afastia as 'Africae (ut uidetur) oppidum, etc.', for P. appears to regard the town (or tov.Tis) as lying near the Fair Promontory. The effect of this clause W
III. 24.5

THE TREATIES BETWEEN

de Volscis Antiatibus in 346 (act. tr.; cf. Livy, vii. 27); it lost its independence in 341-338 (Livy, viii. q. 8). See Gelzer, RE, 'Latium', col. 961 ; Altheim, Epochen, i. 193· 6. vpo~ ou~ ELPTJV1'J ...,Ev EO'TlV £yypa1TTO~ 'Pwj!QLOl~: primarily the Latin towns of Tibur and Praeneste, which had separate treaties as Joederati (Livy, vi. 29. 7; Diod. xvi. 45· 8 (Praeneste); Oxyr. Chron. (Bilabel, 12), 4-7, under 01. 106, 3 (Tibur)); Lanuvium, which was independent till338, would probably come under§ 5· See Gelzer, RE, 'Latium', col. 96o; Shenvin-\iVhite, 29. In addition, these independent towns probably include allied states such as Massilia, Tarentum, Tarquinii, and Caere; for the treaty implies that some at least of these allies have sea communications with Rome. See further Schachermeyr (Rh. Mus., 1930, 374). Taubler (275), who dates P.II to 306, explains the absence of any reference to the people of Samnium and Campania by the hypothesis that they are included partly among the ~m/Koot {implied by § 5, J.L~ o~ua ~m/Koo~) and partly here; but his date is unconvincing. On the possible international complications if slaves taken from allied states entered Roman ports see Schachermeyr (ibid. 375). £av 1)£ ••• £vtAa~llTat b 'Pwj!a.io~: if the treaty is of Carthaginian drafting, this evidently represents some Carthaginian practice; but it is clearly parallel to the Roman custom of manumission per -uindictam, in which the assertor libertatis, usually a magistrate's lictor touched the slave with a rod and declared him free (d. A. Duff, Freedmen in the Early Roman Empire (Oxford, 1928), 23), though the present ceremony is distinguished by the use of the hand and, apparently, the absence of any formula (cf. David, Symbolae ... van Oven, 242-3). Paton (ad loc.) suggests that the Roman 'claims him as his slave'; but this would involve a subsequent legal fiction of manumission, and seems improbable. 10. d Se, flti t8i~ flETavopeu£a9w: 'if Roman or Carthaginian break the uVJ.Lf3oAov 71'Epi TOV J.L~ aOtKEiv (cf. 24. 3-13 n.), the other party shall not take private vengeance'; cf. ii. 8. 10, Tct KaT' lolav dotKJ/J.LaTa Kowfi J.LET0.7r0pEIJEU8at. EQV I)E. n~ TOUTO 1TOlTJUU• Sllf100'l0V yev£a9w TO a8lK'I')jlQ: 'but if anyone does break the u6J.Lf3oAov, the wrong shall be a matter for state adjustment (o7JJ.L6uwv)'. Paton translates 'the aggrieved party shall not

take private vengeance, and if he do, his wrong-doing shall be public' (whatever that may mean). But the clause surely gives in positive form the procedure in the case of a breach of the avJ.Lf3ol.ov, not the sanction to be applied to the man who has taken the law into his own hands. There is no real parallel between this clause and that in 22. 9· 11. ev IapMvl Kai At~un: Sardinia and Libya, which were open to trade on certain conditions in P.I, are now completely closed to the 348

ROME AND CARTHAGE

III. 25.

2

Romans; the lacuna after Kn~hw (first detected by Casaubon) must have contained words meaning something like 'nor to land for any other purpose', and there may also have been a reference to piracy (d. § 4); d. Wickert, Klio, 1938, 362 n. 3· The Punic province in Sicily is still open (§ 12); on Carthage itself see 23. 4 n. 14-16. Commentary on the second treaty. 14. 1TpouemTe(vouow £gLSmtoJ-LEVOL: 'they insist with great stringency on their claim' (Strachan-Davidson); cf. i. 63. 2. The lm{Jaflpm, 'approaches', which they deny to the Romans, are probably Libya and Sardinia themselves, regarded as approaches to the Punic sphere of influence; d. xvi. 29. 1-2, Abydus and near-by towns are lm{JaflpaL to Asia. Paton and Shuckburgh take the lm{Jaflpm to be landingplaces on the islands. 16. OJ-LOLW~ Sf: Kat 'PwJ-LaioL 1Tept T* AaTLVTJ~: 'similarly the Romans concern themselves with Latium'; d. 23. 6. In adducing the mJp.{JoAov of§§ 8-10 as if it referred to the coastal towns of Latium P. appears to be erroneously quoting from the earlier treaty (22. n); and this is possible, for he is here concerned with features he believes to be common to both documents. There is no good reason for treating the sentences ovK otoV"Tm ..• Tas mJv{/-qKao; as a non-Polybian interpolation (so Rupprecht, Klio, 1939, 106-8), especially in view of P.'s other blunders in his commentary on the treaties. The phrase !5rr€p ljo;, which Rupprecht finds awkward (op. cit. 107, 'die Romer schliessen die Vertrage nicht fur Latium, sondem fiir sich und ihre Bundesgenossen') is a common Polybian synonym for m;;p~ ljo;.

25. 1-5. The third treaty. Evidently the alliance of Diodorus (xxii. 7· s. avp.p.axia) and the treaty renewal of Livy (ep. 13, quarto foedus renouatum), which he dates to 279/8. P. makes it a renewal of the older treaties with the addition of certain new clauses specifically concerned with Pyrrhus. The most likely explanation of the historical context of this treaty is that the Carthaginians feared a Roman peace with Pyrrhus after the defeat at Ausculum in 279 (Fabricius was already negotiating) and wished to keep the war going in Italy; hence the form of the treaty (see below). Cf. Justin. xviii. 2. 1-3; Frank, CAH, vii. 649; Wuilleumier, 125-31, for the general situation; on the additional clauses see Beloch, Klio, 1901, 282-3 ( = iv. 2. 476-9); Biittner-Wobst, Klio, 1903, 164 ff.; Klotz, Phil. Woch., 1908, 443-7; Taubler, 264-8. The phrase KUTa T¥ Ilvppov ?iLa{Jaatv (cf. ii. 41. n) is here used somewhat loosely (cf. 32. 2, arro TWV KaTd Ilvppov), for Pyrrhus crossed into Italy in May 28o. The 'war for Sicily' is the First Punic War. 2. Ta J-LEV nAAa. TTJPOUO'L 1TUVTa.: yet Roman interests now extended far beyond Latium. P. may have ignored new clauses designed to safeguard those interests; but the likelihood is that the negotiations 349

III.

25. 2

THE TREATIES BETWEEN

after Ausculum were restricted to what mattered most to both sidcsPyrrhus. See Strachan-Davidson (63-64) and, for the possible relevance of 'Philinus' treaty', belm;r 26. 3-4 n. 3-5. The add£tional clauses. The punctuation, construction, and purpose of these have been much debated. In§ 3 the traditional punctuation with a comma after i!yypa'ITTov was abandoned for a time in favour of reading a comma after llvppov, and thus linking ~yypa'ITTOl' with 1roLdaOwaav (so Madvig, Adu. crit. i (Hauniae, 1871), 481); it was, however, defended, rightly, by Beloch (Klio, 1901, 282-3 iv. 2. 476-g), and restored in B-\V 2 • For auttrmxla i!yypa.1TTo> cf. iv. 82. 5; similar expressions at iii. 24. 6, ix. 36. 12, xi. 34· ro, xv. 8. 7, 17. 3. etc. Some scholars have taken 1rpcJ<; llvppov to mean 'against Pyrrhus'; but this would involve the assumption that the agreement to be made was still hypothetical, and the present document, despite§ r, merely a preliminary draft (so Meltzer, ii. 547; Klotz, Phil. Jiloch., 19o8, 445); moreover, avttttaxla 1rp6s TLVa normally means 'alliance with someone' (cf. Herod. v. 73; Xen. Hell. iii. 2. 21). A third difficulty is the interpretation of the clause i.'va ••• x<.!Jpq,. Beloch (loc. cit.) proposes to transpose 8' from after !Y!Ton;po£, and placing it after fva, renders 'in order that they may give help ... whichever side needs assistance, the Carthaginians shall provide ships'. Others, while rejecting so violent an interference with the text, are embarrassed by the difficulty of attaching the clause to what precedes; and Taubler (268), here following Niese (Hermes, r896, 497 n. z) and Meltzer (ii. 547), interprets the clause as if it were independent, with iva as the equivalent of the Latin uti common in documents (Niese compares on). Unfortunately, though uti is rendered by 07TWS' in IG, xiv. 951, I. 12 f. CIL, i2 . 2. 588, there is no parallel for Cva in this sense. And in fact, the passage can be translated without this improbable assumption, if the historical context is kept clearly in mind. The Carthaginians fear a Roman peace with Pyrrhus, and possibly an alliance with him, which will set him free to come to the help of the Greek cities in Sicily; they arc anxious to prevent such a peace and failing that to keep the way open for Roman help in the event of Pyrrhus' attacking them in Sicily. Such provisions between allies can be paralleled; cf. vii. 9· 15 (treaty between Philip and Hannibal) ; Livy, xxvi. 24. 8 ff. (treaty between Rome and Aetolia, from P.), 'si Aetoli pacem cum Philippo facerent, foederi adscriberent ita ratam fore pacem, si Philippus arma ab Romanis sociisque ... abstinuisset; item si populus Romanus foedere iungeretur regi, ut cauerct ne ius ei belli inierendi Actolis sociisque co rum esset'. P. therefore records: 'If they make a written alliance with Pyrrhus, let them make it, each or both, 'A-'"ith such provision that they may be allowed to assist each other in the territory of the party who is the victim of aggression.' Carthage is not yet at war 350

ROME AND CARTHAGE

IlL 25.6

V>'ith Pyrrhus, and the sending of help to Rome would not in itself involve her in a state of war with him (d. Bickerman, Approaches to World Peace {cd. Bryson, New 1944), zo7 f.); P. uses the term crvfl-11-axla, 'alliance' to describe any possible pact that might be made between Carthage and Pyrrhus, or (the real issue) Rome and Pyrrhus. Such an alliance was to contain a proviso, reserving the right to send aid to Carthage (or Rome, as the case may be), if attacked (by anyone) in its own territory (d. Thuc. v. 47· 3). Again, such help would not in itself involve committing the partner sending it to a state of war with the aggressor; and in any case the clause is merely permissive, l:va i~fj {Jor/h'iv. The words 1Totdcr1Jwcrav dwpon.pot have often been taken to mean 'let them both make it in common'. The sense is rather 'let either (or both, as the case may be) make it with the stipulation that .. .'; any apparent ambiguity springs from the use of a single sentence (deliberately) to cover the eventuality of a Roman or a Punic crVfLf.l-ax{a with Pyrrhus. iva is apparently used as the equivalent of (ita . . . ) ut, in a final sense. 1 The two remaining clauses (§ 4) concern the help to be given to the Romansthe bait which led them to discontinue treating with Pyrrhus. To both is added the normal proviso (cf. Taubler, 55, z66-7) that help shall be sent only as required the party attacked, here Rome. The advantage of this treaty to both sides is well summarized by Frank (CAH, vii. 649-50). Rome got money and ships; and if Pyrrhus left for Italy, she was committed to nothing, for she need send no help to Carthage unless she wished. Mago had scotched an immediate peace, and secured the inclusion in any subsequent compact with Pyrrhus of a clause likely to intimidate him, not least by its ominous hints at a secret clause committing the Romans to action in Sicily. 'The document reveals shrewd thinking on the part of both negotiators.' 4. eto; TTJV a.pooov; 'for the return journey'' so Reiske (and independently Wachsmuth) for the MS. elJ>o8ov, probably rightly since 'attack by sea cannot be meant, as the last section expressly deals with naval battles' (Biittner-Wobst, Klio, 1903, 166); Emivo8os (Klotz) is less easy, though it is P.'s usual word for 'return'. 5. -rei OE rrA!JpWj.lO.TO. ••• nKOUO'LWt;: a proviso to the previous sentence, not a separate clause. 6-9. The oaths. That P. gives these separately is proof that he has not reproduced the complete texts above. For the Carthaginian Bw~ 1Ta1pij;ot d. vii. 9· 2-3, where they are listed. The Roman oath by Llta l.t(Jov is discussed by C. Wunderer (Phil., 1897, 189-92), Kettleship (Essays, 35 n. r), Strachan-Davidson (n-8o). Reid (]RS, 1912, 49-52). 1 This use of iea is akin to that found in P. in place of a1rws with the optative to render c·urare ul, or the i'ea used by him after uerba imperandi e/ petendi; cf. Fassbaender, Quaestiones grammaticae ad P. pertinentes (Progr. Crefeld), 6-7.

351

III. 25. 6

THE TREATIES BETWEEN

Deubner (Jahrb., r9n, 334), E. Harrison (Ridge<e'ay Studies, 92-98), H. J. Rose (]RS, 19r3, 238), Wissowa (552). An oath of great solemnity by louem lapidem is known from Cicero (jam. vii. 12, z), Gellius (i. 21. 4), and Apuleius (de deo Soc. 5); but none of these passages describes the form of such an oath. On the other hand, the ceremony described by P. is also known from Plutarch (Sull. ro. 4) and Paulus (epit. Fest., p. roz L., s.v. 'lapidem'), and can be paralleled from many places and times; cf. Homer (/l. iii. 300), woE <J
ROME AND CARTHAGE

III. 26.

I

and that in the present passage the MSS. reading Sta A.l8wv (or S,d_ Al8ou) should be kept, and all reference to Zeus eliminated. This view is unconvincing in the light of references to Iouem lapidem in Cicero, Gellius, and Apuleius, and the choice seems to be between the view that P. has confused two distinct ceremonies, applying the phrase I ouem lap idem iurare to the hurling of the stone, when it should in fact belong to the fetial sacrifice of the pig, and the hypothesis of Nettleship, that he has described the right ceremony, but that the phrase is to be interpreted 'to invoke Iuppiter in the ceremony of the stone'. Against the former view is perhaps the fact that, according to Festus, the oath in the fetial sacrifice was taken not on the silex but on a sceptrt~m kept with it. On the whole, therefore, Nettleship's interpretation seems the more convincing. The oath Lila ).{f!ov was used br!, rwv 7rpwrwv aw87]Kwv, and that by Arcs and Enyalios £'"2 rourwv. As there are three treaties the meaning is not clear. But, as the third treaty is regarded as an amplification of the second, it is likely that the same oaths were repeated, and the oath L1ta '/..ll!ov restricted to the one made in 509 (hence Ka-n:£ n 7TaAatov €8os). Ares is Mars, Enyalios Quirinus (cf. Dion. Hal. ii. 48; Plut. Rmn. 29. 1); but there is no parallel for an oath by Mars and Quirinus alone. One of the oldest cults at Rome was, however, that of the triad, Iuppiter, Mars, and Quirin us; and here Iuppiter seems to have been Iuppiter Feretrius (cf. Paul. epit. Fest., p. 189M., s.v.' Opis'; CIL, x. 8o9). It figures in the devotion of P. Decius Mus (Livy, viii. 9· 6), in the Salian ritual (Serv. ad Aen. viii. 663) and in the dedication of spolia opima (Paul. epit. Fest., ibid.; Plut. Marc. 8; Serv. ad A en. vi .86o), and it was served by the jlamines maiores. In Umbria it appears as the cult of Iuppiter, Mars, and Vofionus (Wissowa, 23). Hence it seems certain that the oath employed in the treaties of 348 and 279/8 was by this triad, and not by Mars and Quirinus alone. 26. 1. tra.pO. TOV A£a. Tiw Ka.tr£TWAtov ~v n~ Twv C.yopa.vbfLWV TO.fLtE~: the aediles (&.yopavop.ot) shared with the quaestors the care of records deposited in the aerarium in the Temple of Saturn below the Capitol (d. Dio, liv. 36); but here P. is clearly referring to a separate building under the exclusive control of the aediles, and situated on the Capitol. HUlsen (RE, 'Capitolium (r)', coL 1537) identifies it with the atrium publicum in Capitolio, which was struck by lightning in 214 {Livy, xxiv. 10. 9), Mommsen (St.-R, ii. I. soo n. r) more probably with aedes thensarum (CIL, iii, p. 845, l. 22; cf. Suet. ·vesp. 5· 7), in which was kept the apparatus for religious processions, which was certainly under aedilician controL Mommsen mentions the keeping of standard weights and measures in the temple of Iuppiter Capitolinus, under the supervision of the aediles. Certainly the reference 4866

353

II'I.

26. I

THE TREATIES BETWEEN

to bronze tablets suggests that the treaties were affixed to the walls of some building, and not records deposited in an archive; and the fact that the treaties had only recently come into prominence (cf. § 2, above 21. 9-Io n.) would be hard to explain, were that building the temple of Iuppiter itself (so Wissowa, 128). Trapa T6v Ll£a Tov KaTrETWALov will be 'beside the temple of Iuppiter', and the 'treasury of the aediles' a comparatively little-known building. 3-4. Philinus' alleged treaty. A treaty defining Italy and Sicily as Roman and Punic spheres of interest respectively, and forbidding either party to enter the other's territory, is mentioned by Servius (ad Aen. iv. 628, 'in foedere cautum fuit ut neque Romani ad litora Carthaginiensium accederent neque Carthaginienses ad litora Romanorum') ; but he adds other and dubious explanations of the lines on which he is commenting, and can only be treated as testifying to the existence of a tradition, not confirming the truth of it. The treaty is also implied in Livy (ep. I4 (272 B.c.)), 'Carthaginiensium classis auxilio Tarentinis uenit; quo facto ab his foedus uiolatum est', which clearly refers to a breach of 'Philinus' treaty' and not that of 279 (so Strachan-Davidson, 64 n. I); for, according to Livy, xxi. Io. 5-8, Hanno attributed the First Punic War to Punic intervention at Tarentum (d. § 8, 'Tarento, id est Italia, non abstinueramus ex foedere, sicut nunc Sagunto non abstinemus' : 'I talia abstinere' = a7rlxw8aL '1Ta>..£ac;). This treaty can hardly be that referred by Livy (ix. 43· 26) to 306 (d. 22-25 n.)-so Thiel, Hist. I4-I7, I3o ff.-, for it is impossible that at so early a date the Romans claimed Italy as their sphere of influence, with Tarentum untouched and the Samnites not yet finally defeated; still less was it necessary to warn them off Sicily (cf. Schachermeyr, Rh. Mus., I93o, 377 ff.). Philinus' treaty may have been an unpublished agreement towards the end of the war with Pyrrhus; it is hardly likely to represent a secret clause in P.III (279) as both Schachermeyr and Reuss (HZ, 169, 1949, 459-6o) urge, for 25. 4 shows that that agreement envisaged the sending of troops (on Carthaginian ships) to what could only be Italy or Sicily, and this cannot be reconciled with a private agreement to do nothing of the kind. It is, however, possible that P.III contained a much vaguer recognition of spheres of interest (De Sanctis, iii. 1. Ioo), and that this agreement, or even the general clauses of P.II, reaffirmed in P.III (so Altheim, Epochen, i. 19I n. 68), were reduced to a formal shape as pro-Carthaginian propaganda in the years after 264; for Philinus' clause is precisely the one on which to condemn the Romans as aggressors in 264. Later Roman propaganda may have seized on the appearance of the Punic fleet at Tarentum to make Carthage the aggressor; hence Livy's version (ep. I4, xxi. 10. 5-8), also found in Dio (fg. 43· I, d. Zon. viii. 8), and exaggerated by Orosius (iv. 3· I) into a battle. 354

ROME AND CARTHAGE

III. 27. 9

5. vEpl. ~v i)p.Ei!l . . . p.vfJaflEvTE'il: whether P. is thinking of his discussion of the Roman crossing to Messana (i. ro-n) or his criticism of Philinus' reliability (i. 14. 3 ff.) is not clear; he nowhere in book i mentions Philinus' treaty. 6. Et Ka.TO. TouTo TLS imXap.~6.v£TaL 'Pwp.a.twv: cf. 28. r for criticism of the Roman seizure of Sardinia. The seizure of Messana and Rhegium is recounted in i. 7. r ff. The wording here supports the view that the subject debated at Rome was in the first instance whether to admit the Mamertines into alliance (cf. i. n. r n.), and that the decision to send help followed (cf. Reuss, Phil., 1901, Ios). 27-28. Later agreements between Rome and Carthage (241-218 B.c.). For completeness P. gives summarily the peace treaty of 241, the agreement of 238, and the Ebro compact. 27.2-6. Treaty of 241. On the preliminary draft and the later modifications see i. 62. 8-9, 63. r-3 ; also App. Sic. 2 ; Zon. viii. 17 ; Diod. xxiv. 13. The islands between Italy and Sicily will be the Lipari and Aegates islands; this was a logical corollary to the loss of Sicily, and its addition in the revised version (i. 63. 3) perhaps mere windowdressing. The phrase da
III. 27. 9

CAUSES AND PRELIMINARIES OF

authority; d. App. Hisp. 7, ~rat Ta8£ Ta.t!i avvO-?Kat!i Tats 'PwJ.Laf.wv Kat KapX!JSovlwv 1rpoa£ypd4>-ri; cf. Hann. 2; Livy, xxxiv. 13. 7, 'patres nostri . . . addi hoc in foedere uoluerunt, ut imperii sui Hiberus fluuius esset finis' (Cato speaking). On the various problems of the Ebro treaty see ii. 13. 7 n. 28. 2-3. The Romans and Sardinia. For criticism of Roman policy here d. i. 83. s. iii. 26. 6. (Other passages in which P. is critical of aspects of Roman policy are i. 37· 7-ro (headstrong behaviour), ii. 21. 8 (Flarninius), ix. ro (plunder of Syracuse), xxxi. ro. 7 ploitation of others' mistakes-if this is critical!), 25. 2 ff. (laxity among Roman youths), xxxv. 4· 3 (cowardice among young soldiers).) On the Roman justification here combated by P. see L 88. 8 n. Taubler (Vorgesch. 27) argues that P. is here admitting that the Romans justified their action in this way, but questions the validity of the case ; hence he is following a different source from that used in L 88, where there is no mention of such a case being put. But To ... imo 'PwfLa.lwv . . . AEyofLEvov lyKATJfLa will refer, not to any demarche at the time, but to the 'charge now being made the Carthaginians', i.e. about I52. As in 29. I he is dealing with contemporary polemics. See Gsell, iii. rq n. 6; Arnold, Oorzaak, sr ff. 4. EY TTI '!l"po TC11lT"l~ ~u~A~ OEOTJMIIWJ.LEY: in fact, i. 83. 7· Cf. IO. r where P. refers to i. 88. 8 as lv rats 1rpo rain-T)s flufl,\ms. Laqueur (231) sees the trace of an early draft in which the present third book was the second; but more probably this digression on the treaties was an insertion just before ISO (2r. g-IO n.}, and the fa)se reference lS due to carelessness. This seems more probable than Schweighaeuser's suggestion of a textual corruption, i.e. lv rfi (y') 1rpo TaVTYJS fJuflJtcp, though that is probably the explanation of a similar error in v. III. IO.

29-30. The Roman case against Carthage. 29. 1. Ta 8' ll'll"O 'Pwf-La.(wv AeyOJ.LEYC1 YUY epOUf-LEY: P. will now give the reply made by the Romans in stating their case in the course of the discussions of c. 152-I5o (Meyer, Kl. Schr. ii. 340 ff.). Gelzer (Hermes, 1933, r6o) v,rrites, ' ... sagt er mit aller Deutlichkeit, dass der vertragswidrige Ebroiibergang erst "jetzt", d. h. urn 152 v. Chr., von den Romern genannt wird'. But viiv ~poDfL
ol Kapx11Mvtol A.(yetv ~96.ppouv: cf. 2r. r n. e!vm TaOTa.~ KTA.: cf. i. 62. 8 for this clause in the treaty of Catulus (omitted from the final draft when ratified, iii. 27. 2·-6). The Roman argument is that the agreement was not subject to ratification at Carthage (cf. 21. r, Std. nl xwpls Tfjs arf>•mfpas 1Tf:rrpax0at

2. 3.

~<:aOn'!l"ep ~<:up1a.~

356

THE HANNIBALIC WAR

III. 30.

2

yvwJLTJS) but that Hasdrubal acted with full authority (ai>Ton:.\ws}. Cf. Livy, xxi. 19. 2~3. 4. To'Ls &j.~-if>oTipwv aul-l-!A-6.xolc;: to use Saguntum in the case against

Carthage, the Romans must justify her status as a Roman ally. For the clause of the treaty of Catulus here quoted see 27. z-6 n. Did this guarantee allies who joined one or the other side later? Cf. Livy, xxi. 19. 5, 'nam neque additum erat "iis qui tunc essent" nee "ne qui postea adsumerentur" '. The Roman case is that in default of closer definition in the treaty, subsequent allies automatically enjoyed the benefit of the clause; the Carthaginian view is in zr. 5· Taubler (Vorgesch. 64 f.) argues that an annexe with a list of names was appended when the general provision about allies was substituted for the phrase protecting Hiero (cf. 27. z~6 n.) at the request of Hamilcar ; the Carthaginians regarded this list as a binding and integral part of the treaty, in the Greek (and probably Punic) manner, while to the Romans it remained a memorandum outside the sworn document (cf. Otto, HZ, 145, 1932, 51o). This seems attractive and plausible, though not susceptible of proof. 9-10. aJ...'A' fiv aj.~-lf>OTepwv TO auv€xov KTA.: 'the main point present in the minds of both parties was .. .'or 'the main point of the sense of the treaty related to both classes of allies'. This P. elucidates: (1) already existing allies to be free from canvassing by the other side (d. 27. 4, fl-TfDE nporrAap.{3all£tv . .. aup.p.axov>); (z) for those to be subsequently attached precisely the following clause (aJT6 Tm)To) applies, that the other party refrain from enlisting mercenaries or levying contributions in their territory (cf. 27. 4, JLTJDETI.povs • .• t€vo.\oyd'v); (3) all allies on both sides are to enjoy immunity from attack (d. 27. 3}. The implication of this somewhat arbitrary dis~ tinction is that there would scarcely be any question of enlisting mercenaries or levying contributions in the old-established allied territories of the other side; and therefore that the treaty envisaged the addition of new allies. But this is very obviously special pleading. 30. 1. ZaKnv9a'Lot ••• €8diwtmaav a.oTouc; t ovTwv suggests that the Saguntine uTauts was recent. 357

III. 30. 3

CAUSES

A~D

PRELIMINARIES OF

3. Et j.Liv ns T~v Za.Kav&Tts &:rrwAELa.v a.tTia.v TUITt (with hiatus!) 8u:lpaaw Kat T~v) ZaKavOT)S' tt77
<

31-32. The study of causality in history. P. stresses its importance (31). and defends himself against the criticism that this has made his work long and difficult (32). The reference to forty books and to the fall of Carthage (32. 2) dates this chapter to the 'second edition' of the Histories (cf. 1-5 n. (3)). 31 could belong to either the original draft or the later revision; in the former case, it is likely to belong with the discussion of the treaties to the last-minute addition before publication about the time of the Third Punic War (21. 9-1o). For the view that both JI and 32 are part of the revision after 146 see Svoboda, Phil., 19IJ, 4&). P. emphasizes causality also in 7· 4-7, 21. 9-10; for references to the merits of 'universal' history see i. 4· 2, iii. r. 4, 4, iv. 2. I ff., vii. 7· 6, viii. 2. r-II, ix. 44, xxix. 12. 31. 2. T~v TWv 'ITpoyEyovoTwv ~'IT~a-nlllTJV: 'knowledge of the past' in general. 3. I.LTJSds . . . O.v9pw1fos wv: cf. ii. 4-5 for the commonplace. The translation 'no one in this world' (Paton) rather misses the point; it means 'no one possessed of the failings and liable to the misfortunes of a mortal man'. For the doctrine that no man knows if his prosperity will last cf. i. 35· 2, viii. 2r. II, and especially xxiii. 12. 4· 358

THE HANNIBALIC WAR

III. 32.

2

It is common throughout Greek thought, from the story of Cyrus and Croesus onwards (cf. Herod. i. 86. 6). 5. Kn]aa.o-9a.£ T~ tca.t "11'potca.r6.p€a.o-9 see 6. 7 n. 12. C.ywvwp.a. p.h p.6.9rnJ.a. 8' ou y£v£Ta.~: as Meyer (Kl. Schr. ii. 343 n. 2) observes, this phrase deliberately echoes Thucydides, i. \

')

\

)

I

Jf

\

..,).

£).-fo:-

)

-

,

I

22, 4 1 Kat €S' fl-€1.1 aKpoaatV tO"WS TO f:l.•t f:J.VUWU!S aVTWV O.T€fY'I'IiO"T€(>0V £s O"Kom:tv Kat TWJI p.tcAAOVTWV 7TOT~ av9ts KaTO. Td d.vOpt.hmvov Towlf.rwv Kat 7Tapa7TA1)0"LWV [ucufJaL, wt/>{ALf:J.O. Kpl~·ELV O.VTa apKotJVTWS €get, Kri'jp.a T€ J.s alEt p.fi.IJ..ov tj dywvtup.a is Td 1rapaxpfjp.a dKovctv gvyKE:tTm. On the sentiment see xii. 25 g 2. An echo of this passage of Thucydides may be present in ii. 56. n and xxxviii. 4· 8 (Ziegler, RE, 'Polybios (I)', coL ISOJ, adds iii. 57· 8, but this seems unlikely). For the opposition of KaA6v (Tlp1rn) and JJt/>llo.tp.ov (d.Jtfo!AE:r) see i. 4· 4 n., 4· u, iii. 4· 10 n. There

is a useful discussion of this passage in Howald, 95· 32. 1. 5UatcTTJTov ••• Kal 8uo-(a.v6.)yv(ll(J'Tov: P. seems here to echo

specific complaints that his work was hard to come by and difficult to read because of its scope and length; and this chapter, written at the earliest when P. had started on his extension beyond 167 (cf. 4· I-5· 6), is a defence against both charges. The reference to forty books shows that the whole work was certainly planned, and perhaps ~Titten, when P. added this chapter; but it need not be assumed that a full edition of forty books had already appeared (cf. 1-5 n. (4)). The complaints may have been verbal and based on private knowledge of P.'s work combined with experience of the earlier books already on the market. 2. Ka.9a."l!'£pa.vEl tc:a.rO. p.£rov ~su+a.o-p.~a.s: the expression KaTd. p.f.Tov (here Ursinus's emendation of MS. KaTap.tKTov) is proverbial (cf. Cic. Att. xiv. 16. J, 'Herodi mandaram ut mihi KaTa p.lTov scriberet'). and means 'thread by thread, i.e. in detail, or in due order, in an unbroken continuously' (LSJ). With vt/>aup.€vas the full sense is evidently 'woven together in an unbroken series'. F.'s forty books 359

III. 32. z

CAUSES AND PRELIM IN ARIES OF

resemble the threads of the warp, which lie side by side, KaTrt /L£Tov, and are woven together into a piece of fabric by the weft, here symbolized by the 'universal' aspect of P.'s theme. This seems better than taking KaTa /LlTov to mean 'by a single, continuous thread' (Schweighaeuser, Paton). lnro TWV Ka:n1 nuppav KTA.: cf. i. 5· I. The words Kat Tt/Lawv ..• €6-Jy~aEw>, which vary in detail in different MSS., are rightly bracketed as a gloss in B-W2 • 3. atrO TfjS KAEOJ.lEVOU') TOU ItrapnaTOU <J>uyfjs: i.e. from 222 (cf. ii. 69. u). As in xxxix. 8. 4-5 P. omits any reference to his account of the Cleomenean War (ii. 37-70); hence the theory of Laqueur, developed by Gelzer (Hermes, 1940, 27-37), that the 'Hellenic 7TpoKaTaaKw~' was composed late and inserted into the Histories late. Against this see ii. 37-70 n. Although P. also omits from both passages all reference to the careers of Hamilcar and Hasdrubal in Spain (ii. 1. 5-9. I3. I-], 36. I-2), no one has suggested that these are also a late insertion. On the battle at the Isthmus (r46} see xxxviii. I4. 3; in the main P.'s account of it has not survived. T<1c; TWV Kanl. J.lEpos ypa<J>ovTwv O'UYTa€us: cf. i. 4· 3 n. The reference is vague and includes for instance those who wrote on Philip and Perseus (viii. 8. 5, xxii. rS. 5, and§ 8 below), the Hannibal-historians, etc., not merely the second-century Roman senatorial historians (McDonald, CR, 1940, 42), of whom he is thinking mainly in 6. 2. 5. Tac; Ka-raAAtjAouo; Twv trpa€ewv: cf. v. 3r. 5· LSJ gives the meaning of KaTaAATJAo> as 'one after the other, successive'; but, as so often, the truth is in Schweighaeuser, 'i.q. avyxpovoi. P.'s criticism of 'episodic' historians is threefold: (I} they give different versions of the same events, (2} being restricted to certain fields they cannot discuss parallel events elsewhere, (3) above all, they neglect causality. If LSJ is correct, (2) and (3) are identical, since it is in the succession of events that an historian finds the basis for investigating causes. P. is, however, thinking of the occurrence of events simultaneously in different parts of the world; cf. 5· 6, ot> KaTcD..ATJAa, 'at the same time' (see note there). On the significance of synchronisms as a mark of the working of Tyche see ii. 4r. I n. 0.AAoloTepas ••• SoKlJ.laO"Ias: 'a different estimation' and, P. implies, a juster one. 6. TU T, etrlYlVOJ.lEVC!. TOl') epyols KTA.: 'the consequences of events, the concomitant circumstances, and above all their causes' ; in these three categories of past., present, and future P. subsumes the various aspects of the cause nexus as it affects each historical event. By translating Trt naperr6w;va as 'the immediate consequences' Paton misses this point. 7. The cause nexus from the First Punic War to that with A ntiochus. ToP. these events are part of a single texture. How the Sicilian War, 360

THE HANNIBALIC WAR

III. 33· 5

and its pendant, the seizure of Sardinia, led to the Hannibalic War has been analysed at iii. 6 ff. In i. 3· 6 P. explains how, having defeated Hannibal and taken the first and hardest step 1rpos: ~~~ Twv oAwv £mf3oA~v, Rome was emboldened to reach out to Greece and Asia; for, as here, he treats the wars against Philip and Antioch us as acts of Roman expansion (in fulfilment of the purpose of Tyche, cf. naaas; •.• auvvwovaas; 1rp6s; T~V aVT~V {m6fJmw), following upon the war with Hannibal, which he sometimes regards as the first step in the Roman plan for world-dominion (i. 3· 6-9), and sometimes as the event which led them to conceive it (z. 6). 8. otov TOV) n€pCTlKOV 11 TOV lAlTnl'lKOV: perhaps such writers are meant as the Strato (of uncertain date) who dealt with these wars (Diog. Laert. v. 61), or the Poseidonius mentioned by Plutarch (Aem. Paul. rg), a contemporary of Perseus, cf. § 3 n.

<

33. 1-4. The declaration of war at Carthage: cf. Livy, xxi. 18. IJ-14. On the embassy see zo. 6 n. P. takes up the narrative from 21. 8 (T7]v • • . 1Tap!K{3aatv JvniJfJEv E1TOt7J<:UiJ.u:Oa, § I), though the words a:\Ao f.LEV ou~€v d1TaV do not wholly link up. The Romans had explained that since Saguntum had fallen, further discussion was impossible, and the Carthaginians must either make amends or accept war, and there is no reference to any further speech by the Carthaginians; indeed in Livy (xxi. r8) the incident of the toga occurs immediately after the Carthaginian statement which P. records in zr. r-s. Thus 21. 6--8 and 33· 1-3 are mutually exclusive accounts of the Roman reply, which perhaps go back to separate sources (Hesselbarth, r4). If so, the toga incident probably comes from Fabius Pictor, who will have introduced its dramatic element into the Roman tradition (cf. Meltzer, ii. 6n n. 6o; Bung, 4o). Livy adds to the drama with such phrases as sinu ex toga facto and iterum sinu eifuso. 3. o 8~ (3acr&Aeu~ TWV Ka.pxTJ8ov(wv: the sufete; cf. Livy, xxviii. 37· 2, 'sufetes . . . qui summus Poenis est magistratus'. The two sufetes or judges were elected annually, and acted as the supreme magistrates, like the consuls at Rome. Normally one seems to have presided over sittings of the council (on which see i. 21. 6). 4. five«flwVTJcra.v iif1a. Kai 1TAdov~: omnes respondemnt, \\Tites Livy (xxi. rB. 14), with an eye to dramatic effect. But if 11Adovs; suggests that some kept silence, this is not sufficient evidence for a minority favouring peace (Meyer, Kl. Schr. ii. 366 n. 3); silence may not necessarily have implied dissent. 33. 5-59. 9. Hannibal's March to Italy 33. 5-16. Hannibal's preparatt'ons. For the figures of troops left in Spain and Africa see Livy, xxi. 21. ro-22. 4, who draws on the same tradition. See E. von Stern, Das hannibalische Truppen·uerzeichnis 36I

IIL 33· 5

HANNIBAL'S MARCH TO ITALY

bei Livius (Berlin, r891). The moving of troops between Spain and Africa indicates that Hannibal was strategos in both areas; cf. i. 72. 3 n.; Ed. Meyer, Kl. Schr. ii. 355 n. 3; Bengtson, Aegyptus, 1952, 38o. 5. 'ITapaxoap.atwv £v Kcuvft 'ITb~E~: winter 219/18. Hannibal evidently returned to New Carthage after the fall of Saguntum in autumn 219 (17. 9-u). The dispositions here described did not necessarily all date to this winter. As De Sanctis observes (iii. 2. 13 n. ZI), the Ladnian inscription {§ r8) is likely merely to have given the figures, and the date ;viii be P.'s own hypothesis. 81a4>fjKE Tous "I~1Jpa.s: expanded by Livy (xxi. 21. r-8) into a whole chapter, with a speech by Hannibal (perhaps derived from Coelius; Soltau, 65). which is partly conflated from that mentioned below, 34· ]-8.

6. :A.a8pov~q: Ti£8E~tPt'i>: Hasdrubal was the eldest of Hannibal's younger brothers (ix. 22. z). 9. Troops sent to Africa. The Thersitae are othenvise unknown, and many scholars have followed Ursinus's emendation to T apa7Jl-ra~ (ct. 24. 4); E. Meyer (Kl. Schr. ii. 402) says 'Tartessier oder Turdetani'; and Schulten (RE. 'Tartessos', coL 2448) attributes the form to the Punic source. The M astiani were a tribe in Andalusia, with their capital at Mastia (see above, 24. 4 n.); as well as to Avienus they are known to Theopompus (FGii, us F zoo) and Hecataeus (FGH, I F 4o-41). They are the later BaaT1)Tavol (or Bastuli) who, according to Strabo (iii. 141), live between Gades and New Carthage. The Iberian Oretes are probably the same as the Orissi (or Orissae), fighting against whom Hamilcar Barca lost his life (ii. I. 7-8 n.). The Romans knew them as Oretani, and they dwelt south of the Carpetani (14, 2 n.), according to Strabo, who says they reached the sea near the Bastetani (Strabo, iii. 152, 156), together with whom they occupied as far as l\falaca (Strabo, iii. 163). Their territory probably lay on the Anas (Guadiana) and Baetis (Guadalquivir) around Castulo, and west of the Olcades (on whom see 13. 5 n.). The capital of the Oretes lay south-west of Ciudad Real and was called "fJp1J-rov FEpp.avwv (Ptol. Geog. ii. 6. 58; cf. Pliny, Nat. hist. iii. 25, Oretani quiet Germani cognominantur). Schulten (RE, 'Oretani', cols. roi8-19) suggests that the people included settlements of Germans who came in with the Celts about 6oo; see further P. Bosch-Gimpera, P BA, 1940, 96 ff. This distinction may explain P.'s use of the adjective • IfJ7JP"-" here. 11. Ba>.tapEis 0KTaK6aun £~Sop.1}ttovTn): cf. Livy, xxi. 21. I2,jundatores Baleares octingentos septuaginta. Livy here follows P.'s figures closely, and Gronovius's restoration is certain; wo' may have dropped out before ous. For Balearic mercenaries see i. 67. 7· oi'ls ~~:vp(ws p.f:v Ka~oGat ati>EvSov..]Ta.s: 'which is the name they properly give to slingers'; cf. ii. 22. r. ~ ytip >..i6> UVTTJ (sc. ra~a&-ro~) -roii-ro (i.e. mercenaries) U7Jp.aLvn Kuplw>. P. means that the word

<

362

HANNIBAL'S MARCH TO ITALY

III. 33· 15

Baleares in the native Iberian tongue signified 'slingers', but that it was extended to the people and their island so as to form a proper name (so correctly Reiske). Diodorus (v. 17. x) records the false derivation a1TO TOV {l&>.AEtv; and both Paton and Shuck burgh introduce a misleading reference to this into their translations. As in the case of the Gaesatae P. is concerned to explain the original meaning of a non-Greek word, which had acquired a wider significance; Kvplw<;, the 'real' meaning, is contrasted with U1TO Tij<; xpda<; TU.VTTJ<;, 'from this mode of fighting' {d. ii. 33· 5). the derivative meaning. To £9voos .•. Ka.t T~v vijaov : the Greeks originally called the Balearic islands Fvp.vr]ataL (Diod. v. 17. x), apparently after the Gymnetes, as the half-naked Iberian cavalry of the mainland were called by the earliest Greek traders (Hubner, RE, 'Baliares', col. 2823). P. follows the error also found in the periplous which was Avienus' ultimate source and spoke of a single island, Gyrnnesia (Or. mar. 467). 12. £t'i Ta M£To.ywvLa Tijos AL~UTJ'i: e·vidently an official grouping of cities taking its name from Cape Metagonium, perhaps Cap de l'Agua, near the mouth of the Muluchath (Strabo, xvii. 827; d. Ptol. Geog. iv. 1. 3) on the eastern border of Spanish Morocco. Strabo (iii. 170) also records a vop.aOLKov €8vo<; of this name in Tingitana. Mela (i. 7. 33) also gives the name Metagonium to Cape Tretum, the modern Bougaroun or Ras Sebaa Rous; and apparently Timosthenes (in Strabo, xvii. 827) knew of a Metagonium opposite Massilia. This eastern Metagonium is also referred to in Pliny (Nat. hist. v. 22), who records that the Greeks called Numidia, eastwards from the R. Ampsaga, Metagonitis. Kahrstedt (iii. 97) assumes that the Metagonian towns stretch westward from this area, and includes a list of those with archaeological remains from Rusicade (Philippeville) to Gunugu (criticism in De Sanctis (iii. x. 31 n. 83)); but it is not impossible that the western and eastern areas are quite separate, and that P. here refers only to one (the western) (d. Schwabe, RE, 'Metagonium (1 and 2)', cols. 1320-1). The garrisons stationed in these towns would be usefully placed to reinforce either Spain or Carthage (De Sanctis, iii. 2. 12). Whether the inhabitants of the Metagonian towns were wholly Phoenician or partly Libyan as well is not certain. 15. AL~uq,ow(Kwv: the Phoenicians inhabiting the towns between the Syrtes (Pliny, Nat. hist. v. 24) and the Atlantic coast, and possessing the right of conubium with Carthage (Diod. xx. 55· 4). It is clear from Hannibal's treaty with Philip (vii. 9· 5) that they were her subjects. See Mommsen, RG, i. 491; De Sanctis, iii. 1. 33 n. 89. The Libyans were native inhabitants of the Carthaginian province (Diod. ibid.). AEPY1'JTWV: Livy, xxi. 22. 3, parua Ilergetum manus ex Hispania. As Schweighaeuser noted, this reference to a Spanish tribe among the 363

III. 33· 15

HANNIBAL'S MARCH TO ITALY

African contingents is odd; and the Lergetes may be some otherwise unknown African tribe (Kahrstedt, iii. 17r). They are, however, distinct from both Libyans and Numidians. If they were from Spain (cf. Meltzer, ii. 448: DeSanctis, iiL z. 13) these cavalry were evidently enrolled later, after the reduction of the Ilergetes in 218 (35· z), unless they came as mercenaries (Meltzer, ibid.). The orthography is no help, since the MSS. of P. are shaky on this name; cf. x. 18. 7 where "-"YX?JTwv, AeyY?)TCJiv, and AEx:rJT(;w are all found. No1-10.Swv: of these tribes the Massyli dwelt between Cape Tretum and the (later) Roman province of Africa (Strabo, ii. 131, xvii. 829); later their king was the famous Masinissa (xi. 21. r, etc.), the son of Gaia, who was probably king now (cf. Stahelin, RE, Suppl.-B. iii, 'Gaia (4)', col. 534). The M asaesyli, often mentioned along with the Massyli, lived on the coast west of them; Strabo (xviL 829) puts them between the l\Iuluchath and Cape Tretum. Their king was Syphax. The M accoei are lP.ss easily identified. They may be the Macae of Herodotus (iv. 175), who dwelt on the Syrtes, or the .ll,fa~<~<:6ot of Ptolemy (Geog. iv. 6. 6), whose home was in the oases of the eastern Sahara. However, the Maurusii (or Mauri), the inhabitants of Mauretania (l\1orocco) are described as Twv 1rapd. Tov dJKmv6v (cf. Livy, xxiv. 49· 5. 'extremi prope Oceanum aduersus Gades colunt'). Hence, if P. (following his inscription) is enumerating the tribes in geographical order from east to west, it seems reasonable to seek the Maccoei between the Muluchatll and the Straits. Schweighaeuser, who himself suspects a corruption of Ba~<:~<:alwv (cf. Sall. lug. 66, Vaccenses), admits that this principle would favour Grono~ius's emendation to Ma,vwv; for although the l\fazices (or Maxyes) lived, according to Herodotus (iv. 191) to the west of the Lesser Syrtes and north of Lake Triton, and according to Eustathius (ad Dian. Perieg. (GGM, ii), p. 25r) on the site of what was later Carthage, they shifted their seat several times, and appear in Tingitana in Ptolemy (Geog. iv. I. s. 2. 5, Md~£~<Es). Another possibility is that they are the Baquates who dwelt between the Muluchath and the straits in imperial times, and appear in the Chron. Pasch. (i, p. 46. 17 ed. Bonn) as Mo.Kovo.~<:ol. The status of these Numidian troops, whether levies or mercenaries, is obscure; cf. Griffith, 223 ff. A~yucrT1vous: for the Carthaginian use of Ligurian mercenaries see i. q. 4, 67. 7, for the Baleares above§ I I . 18. ~'lfi. Aa.ruvi<(l: 'on Cape Lacinium', about 6 miles from Croton, on the south coast of Italy. Today it is Capo Colonne, from the remains of the temple of Hera Lacinia, where Hannibal set up this account on a bronze pillar, in Punic and Greek, in the summer of 205 (cf. 56. 4; Livy, xxviii. 4/'i. r6); on the temple cf. xxxiv. u. 9· When P. visited this temple is not recorded, but it may well have been in the course of his internment in Italy, and not, as Cuntz 364

HANNIBAL'S MARCH TO ITALY

III. 34· 7

supposes (63), after his return to Greece (with unacceptable implications for the composition of this chapter). Klotz (Livit~s. 190) hazards the guess that P. learnt of the existence of the inscription from Silenus; he attributes Livy, xxviii. 46. I6 to Silenus via Coelius. 34. 2. oacjlws yap £~TJ.,.c1KE~ KTA.: cf. 48. 11. On the fertility of the Po valley cf. ii. IS, iii. 44· 8, 48. 11. The war against the Romans (§ 3) is the Gallic tumultus of zzs and its aftermath; cf. ii. z3 ff. 4. Tovs £1rt .,-cl.SE: on the Italian side, cf. iv. 48. 7· 5. (lOVWS O.v u1ToAa(l~cl.vwv £v 'ITaA(<;!- auaTl)aaa9aL KTA.: 'thinking that on one condition only would he be able to wage war in Italy'. Shuckburgh follows Schweighaeuser, who takes the phrase to mean 'in Italy alone', contrasting IS. 13; but fLOVW> is explained by El 8vvr/h[1J KT,\.; cf. i. 4· II. Paton's rendering here is correct. 6. acjlLKOfLEVWV Sf: TWV ayyeAwv: the messengers from the Celts (§ I). §§ z-s are a parenthesis explaining why the messengers came to be expected. Laqueur (132-3) makes unnecessary difficulties here through missing this point. ouvi)yE TUS Suva(lELS . • • li1TO T1jv £apLv1jv wpav: when Hannibal reached the top of the pass over the Alps snow had already fallen, i.e. it was about the third week of September (54· r n. : the reference to the setting of the Pleiades is a general expression for the approach of the bad season). Since the march from New Carthage to the Po valley took five months (56. 3), Hannibal must have left about the end of April. His late start was probably designed to allow the spring flooding of the Spanish rivers to subside (Hallward, CAH, viii. 36). See DeSanctis, iii. 2. 79 ff. The phrase apxofLiV7J> Tij> Ot=pda,; in v. I. 3 is vague, nor is it clear to what precisely it refers-the departure from New Carthage or the crossing of the Ebro; it can therefore be neglected. Recently Hoffmann has argued that Hannibal set out intending merely to subdue northern Spain, and that he changed his plan and decided to march on Italy only at the point indicated in 35· 4, having then heard of the Roman declaration of war (Rh. Mus., I9SI, 79-82). Admittedly, an advance into Italy depended on success in northern Spain (Scullard, Rh. Mus., I952, ZIS-I6); but the whole tenor of P.'s narrative, with its messengers from the Po valley, implies that invasion of Italy was Hannibal's firm plan. 7. vpoavEvTwKoTwv Sf: ••• KapxTJSovos: i.e. messengers carrying news of the Roman indictio belli. This, on P.'s chronology (2o. 6), was delivered by an embassy sent from Rome immediately news of the fall of Saguntum arrived there, i.e. late autumn or early winter 219/18 (17 n.). Livy (xxi. zr. I) in fact makes Hannibal hear of the Roman indictio at the beginning of winter. But it is clear that the ultimatum was not in fact delivered till late March n8 at the earliest, and probably in June (zo. 6 n.). Hence this speech of Hannibal 365

Ill. 34· 7

HANNIBAL'S MARCH TO ITALY

is made up of imaginary commonplaces (perhaps m P.'s source). For the surrender of Hannibal (§ 8) cf. 21. 7·

35. 1. Hannibal's forces. Hannibal reached the Po with 2o,ooo foot and 6,ooo horse (56. 4, evidence of the Lacinian inscription). Delbriick (i. 326--8) argues that these figures are too small, and that the lightarmed have been omitted; but, as Kromayer observes (AS, iii. 1. 94) the Lacinian inscription gave its numbers according to nationalities, not different sections of the army. See also ii. 24. 17 and Livy, xxi. 38. 2. P. gives Hannibal's figures at the Pyrenees as so,ooo foot and 9,ooo horse (§ 7), at the Rhone as 38,ooo foot and 8,ooo horse (6o. 5); and he left 1o,ooo foot and 1,ooo horse with Hanno (§ 5) and dismissed the same number (§ 6). Apart from the figures at the Po, these numbers are hardly credible, but it seems unlikely that P. simply invented them on an arbitrary plan, as De Sanctis (iii. 2. 83--84) suggests, arguing that P. had merely two figures-1oo,ooo for the outset of the march, and so,ooo losses; nor is the matter solved by Kahrstedt's theory (iii. 374 n.) that at each step the infantry figures should include the cavalry. Detailed, if exaggerated, figures existed for sections of the march; thus L. Cincius Alimentus gave the starting figures as 8o,ooo foot and 1o,ooo horse, and the losses between the Rhone and the Po as 36,ooo foot 'ingentemque numerum equorum et aliorum iumentorum' (Livy, xxi. 38. 3-5, misunderstood by Kahrstedt), allegedly on Hannibal's personal information. Such exaggerated figures rnay well have misled P. ; whether his source depended on such calculations as DeSanctis postulates must remain open. For earlier bibliography see DeSanctis, loc. cit. 2. KaTEaTflE4-ETo , •• nupl]VTJS; of the tribes here mentioned the Ilurgetes (Ilergetes: cf. 33· rs n.) lay between Salduba (Saragossa) and Ilerda (Lerida), in what is now the province of Huesca; cf. x. 18. 7 for their king Andobales (Indibilis). The Bargusii, Aerenosii (cf. Sall. Hist. iii, fg. 5 Maur., Aresinarii), and Andosini are virtually unknown tribes lying between Salduba and the Mediterranean. Livy (xxi. 23. 2) omits the two latter, but adds the Ausetani (near Vich) and a tribe which is probably the Lacetani, who lived immediately south of the Pyrenees, near modern Barcelona (cf. Schulten, RE, 'Lacetaner', col. 331, correcting his earlier article 'Jaca', col. 545; Hermes, 1925, 68-70; G. Barbieri, Athen., 1943, 113-21; Vallejo, lxiiilxviii). 3. Ta.xews }lEV Ka.l 'Tra.p' tA'Tr£8a.: Hannibal's speed, like his losses, may be exaggerated by P.'s source. De Sanctis (iii. 2. So) estimates that he spent two months over the 225 Roman miles between Ebro and Pyrenees, a delay which he attributes (iii. 2. 9-10) to deliberate policy (cf. Scullard, Rh. Mus., 1952, 215); Hannibal meant to leave the Romans guessing about the speed of his advance, so that he 366

HANNIBAL'S MARCH TO ITALY

III. 36.

2

might accelerate and take them unprepared by crossing the Alps just before the snow fell. This is possible; but the opposition may have been heavier than he anticipated. See also 34· 6 n. for Hoff· mann's theory of a change of plan. 4. ':1\vvwva.: cf. Livy, xxi. 23. 2-3. Of Hanno, whose capture is recorded in 76. 6, nothing further is known. The reference to the €vvma of the Bargusii towards Rome is confirmed by the account of Roman contacts in Livy, xxi. 19. 7· Cf. Hesselbarth, 12 f. On the a1roaK€val (§ s) cf. i. 66. 7 n. 6. O.wEXuaE -rous taous Tois wpoELPTJl.I.~YOLS: dismissed by De Sanctis (iii. 2. 83-84) as part of the process by which P. reduces his inflated figures to the modest total of the Lacini.an inscription (§ 1 n.). According to Livy (xxi. 23. 4) 3,ooo Carpetani deserted in the Pyrenaean passes, and Hannibal dismissed another 7,ooo partly to eliminate unreliable troops, partly to cover the desertion. Whether this is derived from P.'s source, or is merely an elaboration of P.'s figures, is uncertain. 8. oux OUTW<; 1ToXAl)v Suva.p.w we:; XPTIO'l!l-YJV KTA.: 'not so much numerous as highly efficient' (Shuckburgh). P. is stressing the quality of the troops, not implying that they were particularly small in number (DeSanctis, iii. 2, 169). 36-38. Digression on the geographical divisions of the oecumene. In dealing with geographical data the historian should (1) avoid proper names in distant lands, since they can have no significance for a Greek reader (cf. Strabo, iii. 155), (2) classify the oecumene as a whole in relation to the primary points of the compass (north, south, east, and west) (36. 6), and demarcate the three continents (36. 7). As general principles these are somewhat meagre and inadequate (cf. Reid, ]RS, I9IJ, 191-2); and in fact P. quotes many names unknown to us otherwise. However, he does make good use of indications based on compass points, including 'half-directions' such as north-east, north-west, south-east, and south·west (e.g. iii. 47· 2, iv. 77· 8, v. 22. J, xxxiv. 7· 9-1o}. P. repeats his principles at v. 21. 3 f., with Sparta, a Greek site, in mind; for a discussion of the application of these principles to Greek topography see Cuntz (J-8). His failure adequately tO describe 7TlJflf:v opp.~aa.r; J1vvl{3ar; , , • €lr; 7TOfu p.lfY11 Karijp€ -rijs 'ha.Atas is shown by the still inconclusive discussion on which Alpine pass Hannibal used (49· 5-56. 4 n.). 36. 2. owEp ~V~O\ 1TO\OUO'L TWY auyypa.cplwv: probably Sosylus and Silenus, who accompanied Hannibal (zo. 5 n., cf. i. 3· 2). They imagine that the listing of names of countries, rivers, and cities is 'a decisive means of securing knowledge and lucidity in each case' (iv 1ra.v-rt) (Schweighaeuser), or 'a wholly sufficient means of securing clear knowledge' (Shuckburgh and Paton: as if l.v 1rav-rl were -rep 1ra.v-rl). 367

HANNIBAL'S MARCH TO ITALY

3. 1-uyO.A.a. auJLPO.}.}.wEla.t 11'e11'o£7Jtce 1rpos civO.,.w,cnv: 'has the effect of contributing considerably in the recalling of the places' ; this use of '""wotr;K< +infinitive is not listed in LS J (though 1TO~E£v -L- accusative and infinitive is common). For the sense cf. v. :!I. 7 on the use of local names (xwpa~s l1Twvvp.otr;). tcpouaJLa.ntca.'i<> A.e5eal: 'inarticulate sounds'. Kpov(a)p.a-ra are the notes of a musical instrument, and the expression here means literally 'words which are musical sounds' without meaning (d8£avo~-rots). P. may be thinking of meaningless words such as BpE-r-rave/..o (Aristoph. Pl. 290), imitating the sound of a musical instrument. 4. E11'' ouSev a1TEpeLSOJLEVTJS: 'having no point d' appui' (Reid). O.vu1ToTa.tcTo'> teat tcwrp~: lit. 'without any principle of classification'; cf. § 7, (mo-raTTOVT€<;. See also 38. 4, v. zL 4· 6. lley(aTTJ yv~ats: 'most important concept', not 'general concept' (Paton), an idea contained in the next phrase. For P.'s emphasis on astronomy see ix. 14. 5· 7. etcaO'Tll Sta+op~ Twv 1rpo.:apTJ""'vwv: 'under each of these divisions' (Paton), i.e. north, south, east, and west; cf. v. 21. 8, Ta~s EK Toi! 1TEptlxovTo<; Sm
37. I. TTt'> tca9' tllliiS ottcoujlEVTJS: that part of the world known to the Greeks and Romans of P.'s time. 2-8. Division into continents and their position beneath the heavens. The division into continents evidently go<'~ back to the colonizing period; they were originally two, Europe and Asia (d. Hippoc. aer. 13), but by Herodotus' time the threefold division was established (Herod. iv. 45· 5· TOtat ydp vop.t~op.lvota~ aOTWV xpr;aop.Eea; H. r6~r7)· The earliest boundary between Europe and Asia was the Phasis at the eastern end of the Euxine (Berger, 77 f.), but the Ionians reckoned the Cimmerian Bosphorus, :Maeotic Lake, and Tanais (Don) as the boundary (cf. Hecataeus, FGH, r F 212; Herod. iv. 45· 2, for both limits). It is this Ionian tradition which P. here follows, no doubt after Ephorus. The Nile was for long the accepted boundary between Asia and Libya; but in response to the objection that this resulted in the division of Egypt between the two continents (cf. Strabo, i. 32; auct. Bell. Alex. 14. s), some geographers, perhaps beginning with Ephorus, shifted the boundary to the Red Sea and the Isthmus of Suez (Strabo, i. 65). This issue had been by-passed by Eratosthenes, who devised a physical basis for dividing up the earth on the grounds that the old division into continents was meaningless (Strabo, loc. cit.); but P. ignores this criticism, thus shuwing 'how little he had followed the scientific advances in geography' (MUllenhoff, i. 242 n.). Instead he tries to apply the principles indicated in 36. 7· Asia is situated beneath that portion of the heavens lying between the north-east and south, Libya beneath that lying between J68

HANNIBAL'S MARCH TO ITALY

III. 37·

IO

the south, the south-west, and as far round as the north. An interesting and valid criticism of this procedure has survived in Strabo (ii. 108), who attacks P. for linking up geographical parts with compass directions, despite the fact that all directions are relative to the position of the observer: Tavai:v 1-LJv oJv Kat N€fAov OVK aTOTrOV 7rEpa> 7rot€ta8at, BEpLV~V o' dvaroA~v ~ laTJ!L"PtV~V Katvov. The cause of P.'s confusion is not far to seek. He is known to have believed the course of the Tanais to be north-east to south-west (xxxiv. 7· 10), a view which Strabo contests (ii. 107); similarly he asserted that the Straits at the Pillars of Heracles ran due west (xxxiv. 7· 9); and it was common knowledge that the Nile ran from south to north. Thus P. has confused the direction of the course of the Straits, the Nile, and the Tanais with the supposed direction of their mouths from an ideal spectator, situated perhaps in Greece. Cf. Class. et med., 1948, I67-8.

P.'s assertion that Asia and Libya 'considered generally' (§ 6) lie to the south of the Mediterranean may seem hard to reconcile with the statement that Asia stretches round to the Tanais 'in the northeast' (§ 4). P. expanded his view in a passage discussed by Strabo (ii. Io7 = P. xxxiv. 7· 8-ro, where the 'fragment' breaks off illogically), whence it is clear that he did not forget this section of Asia lying north of the prolongation eastward of the line of the Straits of Gibraltar, but indeed used it to justify his argument that Europe was shorter than Africa and Asia combined. Here, however, his scheme is drawn in the broadest outline. 8. T6 ji-Ev oAoaxepe
Bb

IlL 37·

10

HANNIBAL'S MARCH TO ITALY

between the Ebro and the Pyrenees, but ol. vvv used Iberia and Hispania as synonyms (cf. Miillenhoff, i. 12o--2). P.'s distinction (for his use of 'Celtiberia' cf. 17. 2-3 n.) marks a stage on the way to the use of 'Iberia' for the whole peninsula; but Eratosthenes may already have taken this further step (Strabo, ii. 108, iii. 148). P.'s knowledge of the Spanish coast outside the Straits is inferior to that of Eratosthenes, who accepted the reports of Pytheas (cf. xxxiv. 5· I ff.); cf. Schulten, RE, 'Hispania', col. rg67. His reference here to its 'recently having come under notice' (§ u) is probably to the expedition of D. Iunius Brutus Callaicus as far as the R. 1\finho in 138/7 (so Cuntz, 34-37); it is Certainly in COntrast tO the mention Of T~V ayvwu{av rfjs l.~<.Tos 8aAaaa1]s in xvi. 29. 12, If this is so, this passage was evidently recast at some date subsequent to Brutus' expedition; cf. 1-5 n. (3). The reference forward(§ u) is to book xxxiv. 8 ff. 38. 1. 1
HANNIBAL'S MARCH TO ITALY

III. 39

5. 1rpos To Ka.TO. T1\v £v5E~~w li1To8EIKVUfJ.Evov: 'towards any object pointed out to us' (Paton) ; cf. 54· 3. tv8n~<:vvflEVos ••• ra ... m:olu. 39. Statistics on the distance of 1/am>ibal's march. P. estimates the distance covered by Hannibal between New Carthage and Italy, calculating as follows: Pillars-New Carthage New Carthage-Ebro Ebro-Emporiae

3,000

stades

2,600

I,6oo 7,200

Emporiae-Rhone crossing

. c.

Rhone crossing-Alpine foothills Alpine foothills-Po valley

. c.

1,6oo 1,200

4,200

This makes the total distance from New Carthage to the Po valley about 8,400 stades, whereas P. makes it 9,ooo (§ u), and the distance from the Pillars to the Pyrenees 8,ooo. Editors from Schweighaeuser onwards have assumed a lacuna in §§ 7-8, after the word e~aKocrlots, so as to add some 6oo stades, and bring the separate figures into line with the totals; but this procedure is demonstrably wrong, for P.'s figures for the separate sections have been shown to coincide \\ith those obtained by adding up the detailed distances recorded in the imperial itineraries (cf. Cuntz, zo--27). Thus the total distance from the Pillars to Emporiae comes to 7.'2I7 stades (reckoning 8! stades as mille passus: cf. § 8 n.), and that from Emporiae to the Rhone crossing at Ugernum (Beaucaire) at 199 m.p., which is 1,658 stades on the same basis. Cuntz (loc. cit.) attempts to explain the dis~ crepancy between the detailed figures and the two totals of 8,ooo (§ s) and 9,000 (§ n) stades as somehow due to P.'s having revised the separate distances from the more accurate records available after the laying down of the Via Domitia in 120 (cf. § 8 n.); but it can hardly have affected the section beyond Emporiae (and so the total of 8,ooo stades) so early as this. On the other hand, Viedebantt's suggestion (Hermes, 1919, 348-so) that P.'s separate figures were altered by the posthumous editor, who omitted to change the total, is a desperate hypothesis. Perhaps the likeliest explanation of the discrepancy is that P.'s 8,ooo and 9,000 stades represent round totals to the next I,ooo stades. On this hypothesis the statement that when Hannibal reached the Pyrenees he had covered nearly half the distance (§ u) is correct on the separate figures, but not correct for the total of 9,000 stades which immediate!y precedes it. F.'s source for these figures is not known. The reference in § 8 to the Via Domitia must represent a late insertion (probably by P. himself) ; but it would be rash to conclude that he revised his figures to fit readings which he had obtained from the new milestones. Klotz 371

III. 39

HANNIBAL'S MARCH TO ITALY

( W], I946, I54-5) argues that §§ s-I2 are taken from Silenus; and it is highly likely that records of the distances marched were kept in Hannibal's army (though the distance from the Pillars to New Carthage would not come from such a source). On the other hand, the figures for the section between the 'Island' and the Po valley seem to be averaged out on the rough basis of 8o stades a day (49· 5 n. and so. I n.); it is possible that this also goes back to Silenus, and was adopted because the bematists' records broke down for this difficult part of the journey. See further, Cuntz, 2o-27; De Sanctis, iii. I. 212-13; B-W2, i, introduction, p. xxix. 39. 1. TpEijlofiE9a.1Tpo~ To avvEXEs Tfjs ••• Su'JYtJO'IOWS: this P. appears not to do. Two obvious explanations suggest themselves: (a) 39· 2-12 is a later addition to the text, interrupting a narrative in which 39· I was followed immediately by 40. I, (b) 36-38 is a later addition which P. rounded off with the remark in 39· I, not noticing that 39 was itself a digression. For the view that 36-38 was a later insertion see Gidion, 41-51, u6-19; Ziegler, RE, 'Polybios (r)', col. 1486; but the close parallel with v. zr. 3 f. is against it, and perhaps one should not rule out the possibility that P. would have regarded the statistics in 39 as avvEXE> rfj> • • • OtTJJ'11cu:ws-. 2. Twv ~LAa.tvov ~wfiwv: d. x. 40. 7, for the same definition of the Carthaginian empire in Africa. The Altars of Philaenus (or the Philaeni) lay in the Syrtes 6 km. inland from the promontory of Ras el-Aali, at Graret Gser el-Trab; this identification was confirmed by the 1951 campaign of the Map of Roman Libya Committee (d. R. G. Goodchild, ]RS, 1951, ; BSR, 1952, 94-no). For the legend connected with the Altars see Sallust, Iugurtha, 19· For the Punic empire at this date see i. ro. 5 n. 4. liws Tfjs pa.x(a.~, 8 1Tepa.s EO'Tt .•• opwv: P.'s source evidently calculated to the famous temple of Aphrodite Pyrenaea, which lay on the frontier between Narbonensis and Spain (Strabo, iv. q8, 181; Pliny, Nat. hist. iii. 22); payJa is 'promontory' (d. Thuc. iv. IO. s). Hannibal himself probably crossed the a little way inland by the Col du Perthus (Jullian, i. 458 n. z), since he descended at Elne (Iliberris), Livy, xxi. 24. r. 6. TP~O"XLAious: 357 m.p. = 2,97 5 stades, according to Cuntz's calculations (24) based on the Antonine Itinerary. Strabo (iii. 156) gives the distance as, reputedly, 2,2oo stades, probably his account on Poseidonius (Schulten, Hermes, I9Il, s87}. [T~v S£ Ka.wijv . , . K!lAouowJ: N€a Kapx·YJM>V is not used by P. (in xxxiv. 9· 8 the expression is Strabo's); and this sentence is rightly excluded as a gloss by Bi.ittner-Wobst. Cf. ii. 13. 1 n. i1rt ... Tov "I~T)pa. "'fOTD.fiOV: from New Carthage to the Ebro is 312 m.p. 2,6oo stades (Cuntz, 25), P.'s figure; Strabo (loc. cit.) makes it 2,2oo stades.

ro

372

HANNIBAL'S MARCH TO ITALY

IlL 39· 8

'EtJ.Trop~ov: to Emporiae (Ampurias, cf. Schulten, Hermes, 1925, 66-73) from the Ebro is 197 m.p. r,6.42 stades (Cuntz, 25); P. gives 1,6oo stades, and Strabo {loc. cit.) gives the same figure for

7. Eis

the distance from the Ebro to the Trophies of Pompey (near modern La Junquera; Sall. Hist. iii, fg. 89 M.). 8. EVTeu&ev brl. TTJV TOU 'PoSa.voG s~a.~a.ow: from Emporiae {see 59 n. on the arbitrary insertion (dm) o' 'Ep.1roplou ... e~aKoa{ov<;) which alters the meaning of €vuueev) to the Rhone is calculated by Cuntz {z5), via the Col du Perthus and ending at Ugernum (Beaucaire), as 199 m.p. r,658 stades (on the basis of the Itineraries) ; but P.'s source may be by-passing :-.lemausus, and consequently may be shorter. Strabo {iv. q8) reckons from the Trophies of Pompey to :-.larbo as 63 m.p. and from Narbo to Nemausus as 88; if these distances are accepted rather than those of Cuntz, his total is reduced by 5 m.p. to 194 m.p. 1,6r6 stades. These calculations do not take into account the possibility that Hannibal's crossing of the Rhone was not the later one at Beaucaire-Tarascon; cf. 42. r n. Taiha. yO.p vGv ~e~f1f.L6.TI.O'Tcu KTA.: 'for this part has now been carefully measured and marked \vith milestones by the Romans, at intervals of eight stades'. This applies only to the section from Emporiae {i.e. the Pyrenees) to the Rhone, and the reference is evidently to the laying down of the Via Domitia in n8, after the conquests of Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus {cf. P.-M. Duval, CRAI, 1951, I6I-S, for a milestone found at Pont-de-Treilles {Aude), bearing Ahenobarbus' name). Elsewhere (xxxiv. 12. 3-4) P. allows 8l stades to the mille passus (d. M. C. P. Schmidt, 7 ff.) ; and his detailed measurements here correspond with the Roman itineraries on that basis. Nevertheless, he can easily have used the looser phrase, as he apparently did in i. q. 8, and this cannot be made an argument against the genuineness of the present passage. Several scholars, however, have omitted the sentence as a later insertion {cf. Jullian, iii. 36; Schmidt, loc. cit.; Hartstein, Phil., 1886, 7!7; I894. 757; I~enchantin de Gubernatis, Boll. fil. class., 1908, s:z-ss). and Wilamowitz (in Meyer, Kl. Schr. ii. 333 n. r) suggests it was the work of the posthumous editor {cf. 1-5 n. {4)); its authenticity is defended by Thommen (Hermes, r885, 216), Mommsen and Hirschfeld (CIL, v. 2, p. 885; xii, p. 666), E. Desjardins (Geographie historique et administrative de la Gaule romaine (Paris, 1878), ii. 264), and Ziegler (RE, 'Polybios {r)', col. 1445). Mioni (46) argues improbably that the Via Domitia may have been begun early enough for P. to see it in I 50; and DeSanctis (iii. r. :zr3) suggests that P. is referring to the opening up of the Ligurian coast road by Q. Opimius in 154 {d. xxxiii. 9-ro), though clearly it is with the district west of the Rhone that P. if concerned. TI1ere is no real difficulty if this passage was inserted by P. about n8 as one of the last things he ever wTote. 373

III. 39· 9

HANNIBAL'S MARCH TO ITALY

9. 17ctp' O.UTOV TOV 170TCI.jlOV ws E17i T(,.S mwas : the river is the Rhone (cf. 47· In.); but for P.'s confusion about the upper part of Hannibal's route see so. I n., and for the general problem of the pass he used, 49· s-s6. 4 n. 11. 1rept Evva.K~~~.Mous: 8,400 stades if the separate stages are added up (cf. 39 n.). 12. axeSOv Tous ~JlLaE~S Su:AYJXUOe~: as Hannibal had covered 4,2oo stades at the Pyrenees this is roughly true for the detailed figures, though it does not fit the rounded off total of 9,000.

40. 1-2. Chronology. P. here suggests (rather than asserts) that news of the crossing of the Ebro by Hannibal arrived at Rome after the return of the embassy from Carthage. It has been argued above (2o. 6 n.).that Hoffmann is right in dating the dispatch of this embassy to early June, when news of the crossing of the Ebro was already at Rome. Thus the decision to send the consuls of 2I8 to Spain and Africa belongs to late June or early July. For an apparent contradiction of this passage see 61. 8 n. 2. nlmX~ov j!EV KopvfJX~ov ••. T e[3€p~ov Se IEjl17pWVlOV: P. Cornelius L.f. Ln. Scipio and Ti. Sempronius C.f. C.n. Longus, the consuls for A.U.c. 536 = 218 B.C. (cf. Henze, RE, 'Cornelius (33o)', cols. I434 ff.; Munzer, RE, 'Sempronius (66)', cols. I43o ff.). The Roman war plan involved sending Scipio, with 8,ooo legionaries, 6oo Roman cavalry, q,ooo allied infantry, and 1,6oo allied cavalry (Livy, xxi. 17. 8) to Massilia, whence he should invade Spain; Sempronius, with a similar body of citizen troops, but with I6,ooo allied infantry and I,8oo allied cavalry (Livy, ibid. 5) was to establish a base in Sicily for the eventual invasion of Africa (cf. 61. 8). On Livy's figures see De Sanctis (iii. 2. 87-88); and in general, Hallward (CAH, viii. 33-34). 5. n>..a.KEVTia.v ••• Kpej!WVT)V: 'Placentiam coloniam deductam pridie kal. Iun. (Ian. codd.: emend. Madvig) primo anno eius belli' (Asc. in Pis., p. 3 Clark). The decision to found these two Roman colonies was taken in 2I9 (Livy, ep. 2o), and they were designed to watch the Boii and Insubres, who had taken the lead in the movement of 230-225 (cf. ii. 22. I). The expression Tcts ••• 1roAEtS' iw;pyws helx,,ov (§ 4) suggests that the colonies were founded on the site of already existing settlements (cf. Hanslik, RE, 'Placentia', col. I898). 6. otov AoxwvTes TT)v 11pos 'Pwila.£ous ~lMa.v: 'as it were laying a trap of friendship with the Romans' (LSJ), i.e. laying a trap for the Romans by a pretence of friendship (following the deditio of 224 (ii. 31. 9), whereby the hostages of§ 7 were evidently surrendered). No change is needed in the text at ouK JxoVTes 8€ Ton: Katpov, where ToTe refers to the same period of time as that indicated in mi:Aat; see Schweighaeuser, ad loc. 7. ev Tfi 'II'POTEPY- f3of3X
HANNIBAL'S MARCH TO ITALY

III. 40. 14

8. ili MoTlVTtV, a'ITOU(LO.'II ••• 'Pw...a.(wv: true only for P.'s own time; 'Mutina was an Etruscan town, which had perhaps already joined Rome (d. Livy, xxi. 25); but it was not settled as a Roman colony till r83 (Livy, xxxix. 55· 7-8), when it received 2,ooo colonists. U. E\\ins (BSR, 1952, 55) thinks there was a garrison, not a regular colony, in 218; but d7TotKta implies more than a garrison. 9. Tp€iS ll.v8pa.s TWV i'ITL~a.vwv ••• (,.t TTjv 8La.£pEOW ••• a1t€CTTO.h!-11tVOIJS: II!z~iri coloniae deducendae (cf. Mommsen, St.-R. ii. 624 ff.). C. Lutatius Catulus (cf. Miinzer, RE, 'Lutatius (5)', cols. 2071-2), the son of the victor of the Aegates Islands (i. 59· 8), had been consul in A.U.c. 534 = 220 B.C.; the two praetorians, according to Livy (xxi. 25.3 ff.), were C. Servilius and M. Annius (but he records alternatives from annalistic sources). The name of Servilius is confirmed by his later captivity (Livy, xxvii. zz. 10, xxx. 19. 9; cf. Aymard, REA, 1943. 201 ff.). But the alternative names may be those of a second and separate commission, rather than a doublet. See further, Scullard (Pol. 273-4). and Broughton (i. 241-2 n. 12). H. A€uKLO'i 8E M6.A~\Los E~a.1teAEKu'i &,.6.pxwv: cf. Uvy, xxi. zs. 8. Probably the L. Manlius Vulso who failed to be elected consul in 216 (Livy, xxii. 35· 1; cf. Munzer, RE, 'Manlius (92)', cols. 1222-3). He was probably praetor peregrinus in 218 (cf. Broughton, i. 240 n. 4, who discusses the theory, based on Livy, xxii. 33· 7-8, that Manlius was not praetor but pro-praetor this year). On his forces see § 14 n. 13. Twv IJ!LI.wv fltiJta.VTo xwp(wv: Twv uifni'Awv AR, corr. Wolffiin. Cf. Livy, xxi. zs. 9, aegre in apertos campos emersit. 14. To TiTa.pTov aTpa.To1tE8ov: this should mean 'the fourth legion'. Kahrstedt (iii. t8o) has argued that the Romans did not yet number their legions, and takes the phrase as 'one of the four legions' raised in 218. Against this is i. 26. 5 (where the legionary numbers are transferred to squadrons of the fleet), i. 30. u ('ro TrpW'Tov (npaTir Treoov), and Livy, xxiv. 36. 4, legio prima. Indeed numeration is an obvious provision where legions may serve under a series of commanders (cf. Klotz, Phil., 1933, 46); and it is independently attested for the time of the Elder Cato (M. E. Agnew, A]P, 1939, 214-19). Emendation to Toiho To CTTpaT67reoov (Hesselbarth, 71) is therefore quite uncalled for. The accounts of Roman troops in Gaul in 218 given by P. and by Livy create difficulties. According to Livy (xxi. 17. 9) there were two legions in Gaul, and L. Manlius, with reinforcements (Livy, xxi. 17. 7), took command of these; later C. Atilius came to his aid with one of Scipio's legions, and Scipio enrolled a new one in its place (Livy, xxi. :z6. 2-3). P. gives Manlius only one legion, the Fourth, but later the other praetor reinforces him with both Scipio's legions, for which Scipio then substitutes two newly raised ones. Both accounts agree that there were eventually three legions in the 375

Ill. 40. r4

HANNIBAL'S MARCH TO ITALY

Po valley this year, but disagree on the order of their dispatch. The crux is discussed by Kahrstedt (loc. cit.), De Sanctis (iii. 2. 87-88), Kromayer (AS, iii. r. 98 n. r), Klotz (Phil., 1933, 44-5o), Gelzer (Hermes, I935, 275--D), and Vallejo (lxix-lxxix). Kahrstedt and Gelzer treat Livy's details with distrust, whereas Klotz and De Sanctis think they are ultimately based on official records; but while De Sanctis and Kahrstedt both assume that eventually there were two legions in the Po valley, Gelzer and Klotz follow the statement of both P. and Livy that there were three. Their separate views are appended: K ahrstedt: four legions in all at first; original plan, two for Africa and two for Spain. Manlius takes one of the Spanish legions to Gaul, Atilius a second; Scipio enrols one new legion and sails with that to Spain. Final total: five legions. DeSanctis and Kromayer: four legions in all at first; original plan, two for Africa and two for Spain. Manlius takes one of the Spanish legions to Gaul, Atilius a second; Scipio enrols two new legions and sails with these to Spain. Final total: six legions. Klot.z: six legions in all (Livy) at first, the two in Gaul perhaps from 219 •.Manlius takes over the latter with reinforcements. Atilius takes one of Scipio's to Gaul; Scipio enrols one in its place and sails with two legions to Spain. Final total: seven legions. Gelzer: five legions in all at first (one, the Fourth, from 219, in Gaul). Manlius put in charge of the Gallic legion (P.); Atilius sent to reinforce him with Scipio's two legions: Scipio raises two more and sails with them to Spain. Final total: seven legions. Vallejo: five legions in all at first (one, the Fourth, from 219, in Gaul). Manlius put in charge of the Gallic legion; Atilius sent to reinforce him with one of Scipio's legions: Scipio enrols one in its place, and sails with two legions to Spain. Final total, six legions. Vallejo assumes that here Td. 7rpOKf:)(€1pta}J.~a aTpa-rlm~oa can mean one legion, as it may do elsewhere (cf. ro7. 9, but see ro7-r7 n. (c); Hallward, CAH, viii, chart opposite ro4); this involves the improbable assumption that for these details P. is following a Greek source. No scheme succeeds in reconciling P. and Livy, hence any decision must rest on one's general view of the sources of the legion lists. For these P. appears to follow Fabius, while Livy's source is controversial. De Sanctis has made out a strong case for its reliability and even Gelzer, its latest critic (Hermes, 1935, 297), grants it a substratum of truth; this of course does not exclude the possibility of inaccuracies. Here the most satisfactory explanation is that of De Sanctis. Both P.'s source and Livy's knew that there were two legions in the Po valley; P. also knew these to have been originally Scipio's, but wrongly assumed that Atilius took them both, and so had to make Manlius' Fourth Legion a separate one. Livy's source 376

HANNIBAL'S MARCH TO ITALY

III.

42. I

knew that Atilius had only one legion, but wrongly assumed the final two to be the original number in Gaul under Manlius; hence his total of three. In fact, two was the final number, after Manlius and Atilius had in turn borrowed each one of Scipio's legions (and Scipio had made these up by new levies); at the year end there were thus six legions enrolled, as Livy records (xxi. 17· 2, q. 5----9). Klotz and Gelzer argue for three legions in the Po valley; but at the battle of Trebia, including Sempronius' consular army, there were only four, not five (72. 2 n.), nor were Manlius' losses (4o. 12; d. Livy, xxi. 25. 10) sufficient to eliminate one legion. t)ye~va. aucrrT)aa.vTE~: he was C. Atilius Serranus (Livy, xxi. 26. 2, 39· 3; App. Hann. 5); see Klebs, RE, 'Atilius (62)', cols. 2097-8. 41. 2. E~E1fAEOV E1fL TiJv wpa.(a.v: despite this phrase, the consuls' departure was in August. Hannibal reached the Po valley about the end of September (34· 6 n., 54· r), and from 49· 5, so. r, and 56. 3 it may be assumed that, allowing several days' rest at the 'Island' (49· 5-13), he had crossed the Rhone about a month earlier, i.e. towards the end of August. As Scipio missed him there by three days (49· r), he evidently left Pisa some ten days earlier, i.e. about 15-20 August, and Rome a little before that (Hoffmann, Rh. Mus., 1951, 76-78). This late start is best explained by the late decision to declare war (4o. r-2 n.) rather than by the diversion of Scipio's troops against the Boii (d. Scullard, Rh. Mt~s., 1953, 213-14); for this would not account for Sempronius' delay. ~~T)~eovTa. va.ua(: d. Livy, xxi. 17. 8, and 17. 5 for Sempronius' r6o ships. In addition Livy gives Sempronius ce.loces duodecim. It is unlikely that all Sempronius' r6o ships were quinqueremes; d. i. 20. 9 n. The fleets of this year are discussed by Thiel (35 n. u), who points out that Scipio's 6o ships just outnumbered the Punic fleet in Spain (33· 14), on which the Romans were therefore apparently well informed. The bulk of the Roman fleet was reserved for what was expected to be the main front (though Scipio will have had transports for his two legions). On Sempronius' arrival in Sicily see the fuller account in Livy (xxi. 49-50, Punic attack on Lilybaeum before Sempronius' arrival thwarted by Hiero); d. too App. Hisp. 14. 4. a.,.b nLawv: for the use of Pisa as a base for operations in the north-west d. ii. r6. 2, 27. r. 5. To Ma.aaa.ALwn~eov: d. xxxiv. ro. 5 ( = Strabo, iv. 183) : the Rhone has two mouths, not five, as Timaeus said (cf. Diod. v. 25. 4). Ptolemy (Geog. ii. ro. 2) also gave it two. On Scipio's voyage see Livy, xxi. 26. 3-4. 9. K0.6TJYEJ.LOVO.~ CLJ.LO. KO.L auva.ywvLaTn<; KeATOU~: Livy (xxi. 26. s) makes them Massaliotes. 42. 1.

,.poaJ.Li~a.s Tois 1Tepi Tbv 1foTa.J.Lbv Tbn-OLs: 41.

7, compared with 377

III. 42. r

HANNIBAL'S MARCH TO ITALY

39· 8, suggests this was the regular Rhone crossing at Beaucaire, and this is the view of Jullian {i. 464 n. 4; cf. Torr, 3-4; Bourgery, Ret<. phil., 1938, 126 n. r), though he admits that a crossing south of

the Durance would leave Hannibal exposed to Scipio's attack. The same is true of Arles, de Beer's suggestion. More probably, therefore, the crossing was north of the Durance, but whether at Avignon {~fommsen, Neumann), Roquemaure or Montfaucon (de Luc, Larauza, Hennebert, Berthelot) or even so far north as SaintEtienne-des-Sorts (Lehmann), Pont-Saint-Esprit (Osiander), or Bourg-Saint-Andeol {Maissiat), cannot be determined. Comparison of 42. r and 49· 5 suggests that the crossing was roughly half-way between the sea and the confluence of Rhone and Isere; and though this cannot be pressed, it confirms the view that the crossing was above the Durance. For bibliography see Jullian, loc. cit.; and for discussion De Sanctis, iii. 2. 7o-7r. On the preparations for crossing (§§ 2-3) cf. Livy, xxi. 26. 7--<J· 4. 11"Af\9os ••• ~a.p~apwv: cf. Livy, xxi. 26. 6, 27. r; they were Volcae, inhabitants of both banks, who had assembled on the left bank to oppose HannibaL 6. J.Lipos T~ TllS 8uvajUWS: including cavalry, according to Livy (xxi. 27. 5). who adds some independent detail; cf. Jullian, i. 468 n. I. On this Hanno, one of Hannibal's most competent generals, see Livy, xxi. 27. 2 ff.; Lenschau, RE, 'Hanno (r6L cols. 2357-8. 7. ~11"~ s~a.ICOtr\0. <7Ta8u1: 20-25 miles. Livy (xxi. 27. 4) makes it milia quinque et uiginti ferme, and adds that the river-bed was shallower, an irrelevant detail in a crossing on rafts. 9. 'll'pos Tl]v i-rr~ou<7a.V XP'\a.v ~ta.Ta -ro cruvTna.yj-lE:vov: 'for the coming action in accordance with instructions' ; for XPela cf. ii. 29. I (where, however, Tofi uuvTeTayp.lvov means 'of the forces marshalled against each other'). 43. 1. -rils 'll'EJ.111"TTJS vuKTOS: i.e. since the Rhone was reached. Hannibal had spent two days building and acquiring boats (42. 3). On the third day barbarians contested the crossing, and Hanno marched north the third night (42. 6). After marching 25 miles he stopped, built rafts, crossed the river, occupied a strong point and rested EKElVTJY T1jv ryp.€pm' {42. 9). This is apparently the day after Hanno set out; and P. seems to imply that he started back the next night a little before dawn. This night, evidently the fourth, P. here speaks of as Tfjs Trlp.1TTTJ>; either this is an error or P. has compressed the events of his source so as to omit one day. Certainly a little over 24 hours is short enough time for a 25-mile march, a river crossing, and the rest preparatory to a further 20 miles with a battle at the end; and Livy (xxi. :j. 6) records that 'exercitus (i.e. Hannonis) ... fessus quiete unius diei refidtur ... postero die profecti .. .'. 378

HANNIBAL'S MARCH TO ITALY

III. 45· 6

3. t~ u'!repSe~(ou Kat 1rapd. TO f!eulla.: 'upstream and directly aga.inst the current·. 4. Tois O.ywyeucnv ••. ola.K~tov-ros: cf. Livy, xxi. 27. g, 'equorum pars magna nantes loris a puppibus trahebantur'. Livy adds that several were carried across on the ships with saddles and reins, ready for immediate action. 8. lK'ITAT}KnKOV Kai 1rapa.aTO.TtKOV aywv(as: cf. XViii. 25. I for a parallel description, involving two armies and spectators (at Cynoscephalae). In both cases (as also in v. 48. 5 ff.) there is conscious writing up; and, as in i. 44· 5, P. may be influenced by Thucydides' description of the battle in Syracuse harbour. Such passages deviate from the austere standard demanded (e.g. in ix. r), and make concessions to the more sensational form of composition which P. derides (e.g. ii. 56. IQ-13, etc.). On the words 1TO.paoogws (§g), 7Tapa.\6yov (§ 10), and 7Tapdbo~ov (§ 12) cf. CQ, 1945, 8--9.

44. 5. -rous ~aatAlO'Kous -rous 'ITepi MaytAov: cf. Livy, xxi. 29. 6, 'Boiorum legatorum regulique Magali aduentus'. Livy puts the arrival and speech of the Gauls after the cavalry skirmish with Scipio's men had been reported to Hannibal; in P. this news reaches him only in 45· This divergence, and Livy's reference to the Boii, shows him to be following not P. but probably Silenus via Coelius (cf. De Sanctis, iii. 2. 183). 10-12. Hannibal's speech. This bears little resemblance to the highly coloured version in Livy (xxi. .30. 2-n), which is designed to encourage an army depressed by the news of the cavalry defeat. The parallel between To p.t!ytO'Tov 7]vvaTat nov €pywv (§ n) and 'postquam multo maiorem partem itineris emensam cernant' (Livy, xxi. 30. 5) may be coincidental; and it remains uncertain whether P.'s speech is wholy fictitious. however, above, p. 14. 12. uvOpas aya6ous y(vea6at Kat .• , Q.~(ous: cf. II6. II, XVi. 9· 2, avl]p ..• dya8os yev6p.evo<; Kal •.• fhvrlfh'I')S' ~to<;, etc. For the phraseology. borrowed from chancellery jargon, cf. Schulte, 49· 45. 2. Losses itt the skirmish; d. Livy, xxi. zg. 3, 'uictores ad centum sexaginta (quadragintaGrott.) nee omnes Romani, sed pars Gallorum. uicti amplius ducenti ceciderunt'. 6. T) s~aiCOlltST] TWV &']piwv: cf. Livy, xxi. z8. s-r2, who also retails the version found in Frontinus (Strat. i. 7· 2). The problem interested P. as a student of tactics. Whether boats could have successfully towed a raft of elephants across the Rhone, which in its lower reaches flows at the rate of 2·5 metres a second, is questionable. But the reconstruction of J. Philipp (Klio, rgn, 343-54), favourably mentioned by Klotz (Livius, r28), according to which the boats were anchored at intervals across the river, and the raft forced across from 379

III. 45· 6

HANNIBAL'S MARCH TO ITALY

one set of guide-ropes to another by the current, though it does credit to his technical ingenuity, can be reconciled with the authorities only by a wholly arbitrary contamination of Livy and P., and by the utmost violence to both texts. Philipp contends that both accounts go back ultimately to Silenus, but that P. followed him slavishly into error, an improbable view. 46. I. K.o.Ta T~v li~~o.ow Toil 'ITOTo.~ou: 'at the point of entrance into the river', i.e. the point where the raft entered it The first two rafts thus appear to have been wholly on land. For their width cf. Livy, xxi. 28. 7, quinquaginta (pedes) latam. Thus a platform of this width, and several rafts long, projected into the river at right-angles to the bank; the upper (northern) side of this platform, 200ft. long, was fastened to trees on the bank (§ s). 4. To 'IT8.v ~t"uy~a. Tijs 'ITpo~oM]s: 'the whole projecting pier'. For its length cf. Livy, xxi. 28. 7, ducentos longam pedes. P.'s phrase suggests that the two rafts on land(§ r) are excluded from the zoo ft. S{Jo 'ITI<1l't'JYOLO.S axeS(o.s S~a.cJ>epovTWS: 'two extremely well-constructed rafts' (for they have to stand up to the crossing); a further point is added in TTpa> a.U-ra;; ••. O€Cuopiva;;. Philipp (Klio, rgii, 348) renders 'peczJ-liarly constructed', to suit his theory; but fna.~Ep6vTw;; never means this in P. 5. pu~ou~K.ouvT~<S: cf. i. 27. 9, 28. 2, for the towing of the horsetransports at Ecnomus. Philipp (ibid.) states that the boats were in mid-stream before the platform was covered with earth; neither P. nor Livy says anything like this. 47. 1. 'l!'pofjye TOUTOlS 6.'1!'oupa.ywv: though aTTovpa.yEij,! elsewhere takes a dative of advantage (d. 49· IJ, v. 7· II, vi. 40. 7), TOVTots here seems to be instrumental; 'he advanced with these as his rear-guard' (Paton). TOvTot;; refers to both cavalry and elephants, without any indication which came last. Jullian (i. 472) w-rites: 'les fantassins d'abord, puis les cavaliers, et, a l'arriere-garde, Hannibal et les elephants'; but 45· s-6 may suggest that the cavalry came at the rear. 'ITa. pel. Tov 'IToTa.~ov KT>-..: clearly the Rhone; d. Livy, xxi. 3r. 2, 'postero die profectus aduersa ripa Rhodani mediterranea Galliae petit'. Livy adds that Hannibal did this in order to avoid a clash with the Romans before he reached Italy. P. makes Scipio allege the same (64. 7), but without committing himself to the theory (as Kahrstedt thinks, iii. 182). Probably the detour was planned from the outset with the Allobroges, who will hardly have improvised the provisioning of Hannibal's army overnight (49· ro-rz; d. Viedebantt, Hermes, I9I9, J62). On the topography see 49· s-s6. 4 n. 2-5. Direction of the Rhone. Viedebantt (Hermes, 19r9, 346 ff.) argues 380

HANNIBAL'S MARCH TO ITALY

III. 47· 6

ws

that the phrase J.rrl. 7"~11 lw (§ r) comes from a tradition which made Hannibal ascend the Durance, and that P. has erroneously transferred its direction to the Rhone; and this he regards as at the root of P.'s schematic picture of the river and the Alps, as found in ii. 14-16 (the passage referred to in § 4). But Viedebantt's Durance theory is unconvincing (cf. 49· 4 n. (r)), and it is more probable that the schematization accounts the directions given here. Since toP. the Alps run east and west (ii. 14. 6-7), the Rhone, which flows parallel with and north of the range (§ 3), might be expected to flow in a westerly direction. In§ zit is said to have its source beyond the recess of the Adriatic, 1Tpos T~v ~cl1Tepav veuovaas: this Paton translates 'north-west of the head of the Adriatic' (cf. Cardona), but vEvnv 1Tpo;; means 'to face towards'. This phrase, taken with the reference to the ai\,\a)v of § 3, which clearly runs east and west, suggests that the Rhone flowed in a westerly direction; but this is modified in § 2, pEi St 1TpOs [ nh-] ovans- XE~p.epwd.s. In this the article has been omitted since Hultsch (Quaestiones Polybianae (Zwickauer Programm, r859), r8) pointed out that P. does not normally employ it with secondary compass directions. However, it is not easy to see why it should have crept in; and there is much to be said for the hypothesis of Cuntz (62; cf. Viedebantt, Hermes, 1919, 347) that P. inserted the word XELf.LEptvas later (or perhaps added it in the margin) on the basis of fresh information, when he learnt (not necessarily as a result of his own crossing of the Alps) that the course of the Rhone was not due east and west. 3. )\p8ues K~::XTot: not otherwise knov;•rt. The Celtic word ardu means 'high', and emendation to bring in a reference to the Aedui is uncalled for. 47. 6-48. 12. Earlier accounts of Hannibal's crossing of the Alps. Which of the Hannibal-historians P. is here attacking is uncertain; but they were clearly writers in the sensational fashion which he condemns in Timaeus and Phylarchus (cf. ii. r6. I4, s6. IO-I3; CQ, 1945. 8 ££.). Wunderer (ii. u) thinks ofChaereasandSosylus (cf. 20.5 n.), and both .Meyer (Kl. Sckr. ii. 374) and Hesselbarth (36) agree; others (e.g. Arnold, Oorzaak, 23; Cornelius, 81-82; Taubler, Jlcrgesck. 84 n. r49) see a reference to Silenus of Caleacte (i. 3· 2 n., iii. r3. s-r4. 8 n.), who was a source for Coelius and retailed the famous story of Hannibal's dream (Cic. de diu. i. 49; cf. .Meyer, Kl. Sckr. ii. 368 ff.). All three authors may be in P.'s mind. On the date of this digression see 48. r2 n. 47. 6. Suo Tel '!l"6.0""1S taTopla.s aAAoTpU~TO.TO.; for P.'s stress on truth see the passages quoted in i. 14· 5 n. ; for consistency see viii. 9 (criticism of Theopompus on this score). For 1TapEtaaynv (§ 7) cf. 20.3 n.

III. 47· 8

HANNIBAL'S MARCH TO ITALY

8. Ka.Ta.aTpoTftv: an end; but also the denouement of a dramatic plot, cf. 48. 8. 9. &eo~ i] TL~ fipw~: cf. 48. 9· ijpw> corresponds to (JdiJv 7TatDa> in § 8. See further, 48. 8 n.

48. 6. Ka.9ciwep TJIJ-EL~ .•• HIT!Awo-a.IJ-EV: d. ii. 2I. 5, 22. I ff. 8. 9eou Ka.l. 1-'-T!Xa.vfj~: a deus ex machina, by hendiadys. N. S. de Witt argues plausibly that this god was Heracles (TAP A, I94I, 6o-6I); part of the propaganda promoted on the Punic side, and in Greek (and suppressed by the Romans), associated Hannibal's march with that of Heracles (d. Livy, xxi. 21. 9, 37· 2). 1Tfimv is of course an exaggeration. For the expression ·nis 1rpwTas 1maeluet> iflwoel:s d. i. IS. 9 (on Philinus). 12. Twv wa.pa.TETeuxoTwv To'l~ Ka.Lpoi<;: unidentifiable; they may have been either Greeks or Carthaginians (d. ix. 25. 2), whom P. met in Greece before the war with Perseus, or in Italy later on. Tfl oul. TWV 1\A1TEWV O.UTOl KEXpfio-9a.L 1TOpEL~: Cuntz (s8-S9) believes that as an internee P. would not be allowed to leave Italy before I 50; and he dates P.'s crossing of the Alps in I32, on his return from attending Scipio's headquarters at Numantia. It is not, however, established that P. was present at Numantia; and indeed it is highly improbable that he undertook a journey across the Alps at the age of about 70. There is evidence that P. was not restricted to Latium during his internment; and he most likely made his Alpine journey in connexion with a visit to Spain with Scipio in ISI, when he was legatus to the consul L. Licinius Lucullus (d. xxxv. 4-8; Livy, ep. 48; Oros. iv. 21. I ; Val. Max. iii. 2. 6), perhaps on the return journey in ISO; d. Nissen, Rh. Mus., I87I, 27I (outward journey); DeSanctis, iii. 1. 2II-I2. If so, P. may have added this sentence, or indeed the whole digression, just before the publication of this part of his history about ISO; see above 21. 9-Io n. (on the Punic treaties). On the other hand, the similar digression 57-59 appears to have been written after I46 (d. 59· 4 n.), and this too may be an insertion designed for a later edition (cf. DeSanctis, iii. I. 2r2); Ziegler (RE, 'Polybios (I)', col. I486) regards it as late, but he bases his view on Cuntz's theory of P.'s restriction to Latium during his internment.

49. 1-4. P. Scipio returns to Italy: cf. Livy, xxi. 32. r-s. His brother (§ 4) was Cn. Cornelius L.f. Ln. Scipio Calvus, the consul of 222 (cf. ii. 34· I). On &Bwia (§ 2) see ii. 32. 8 n.; 'unruly character' (Paton) is too mild a translation. 49. 5-56. 4. Hannibal's crossing of the Alps. 1. Bibliography. See the works listed in CAH, viii. 725, which contain references to earlier literature. Add: R. L. Dunbabin, CR, I93I, 52-57, IZI-6 (Col du Clapier); J. Knofl.ach, Klio, I932, 403-2I 382

HANNIBAL'S MARCH TO ITALY

111.49·5

(Col du Clapier); A. Klotz, Rh. Mus., 1933. 10-12 (Silius' version); W. W. Hyde, Roman Alpine Routes (Philadelphia, 1935), 197-210 (Little St. Bernard); A. Berthelot, REA, 1935, 185-204; 1936, 35-38 with map (Col du Clapier); J. van Ooteghem, LEC, 1936, 35-6o (survey of recent work); cf. AIPhO, 1949 (=Melanges Gregoire, i), 583--92 (new theory on the Rhone); A. Bourgery, Rev. Phil., 1938, 12o-32 (undecided); Klotz, Livius, 105, 130 (Little St. Bernard); Vallejo, lxxx-ciii (undecided); M. Cary, GB, 248 n. 2 (perhaps Col du Clapier); G. de Beer, Alps and Elephants (London, 1955) (Col de la Traversette). As several scholars have observed, the problem of Hannibal's route across the Alps is primarily one of source criticism. Discussion here will be restricted as far as possible to P.'s text and what it either states or allows to be reasonably inferred; but unfortunately this involves considering the salient features of Livy's account, and its relation to that in P. 2. Livy. Livy believes that Hannibal came down among the Taurini (xxi. 38. 5), cum id inter omnes constet; he criticizes both Coelius Antipater (xxi. 38. 6) for the view that Hannibal crossed per Cremonis iugum (i.e. the Little St. Bernard; see further Hyde, op. cit. 79-8o), and the vulgar belief that he crossed ad Poeninum (xxi. 38. 8), i.e. by the Great St. Bernard. But Livy's own account contaminates two different sources. After bringing Hannibal to the so-called 'Island' between the Rhone and the Isere (see below), and after letting him there settle the problem of the two brothers (whom he specifically calls Allobroges, xxi. 31. 5 ff.)-so far following the same tradition as P.-Livy goes on (xxi. 31. 9 ff.): '(9) sedatis Hannibal certaminibus Allobrogum cum iam Alpes peteret, non recta regione iter instituit, sed ad laeuam in Tricastinos flexit; inde per extremam oram Vocontiorum agri tendit in Trigorios, haud usquam impedita uia, priusquam ad Druentiam flumen peruenit . . .' (10-12, description of the Druentia, 'amnis Galliae fluminum difficillimus transitu'; 32. 1-5 account of Scipio's action = P. iii. 49· 1-4) (32. 6) 'Hannibal ab Druentia campestri maxime itinere ad Alpes cum bona pace incolentium ea loca Gallorum peruenit' (cf. P. iii. so. z). It has been widely (and correctly) recognized that Livy has here turned to a second source; further, that he has taken up this source at an earlier point than that at which he leaves the tradition common toP. The phrase ad laeuam will thus refer to Hannibal's direction immediately after crossing the Rhone (or, according to those who put the crossing at Beaucaire, and believe the original direction to have been east along the Durance, at some point such as Cavaillon, where Hannibal suddenly turned north across that river and up the Rhone; but a Rhone crossing at Beaucaire is unlikely). Livy's route JSJ

Ill. 49· 5

HANNIBAL'S MARCH TO ITALY

can only be identified if the location of the three tribes he mentions can be determined within the block of high land between the Durance, the Rhone, the Isere, and the Alps; and clearly there can have been changes in the territories of all or any of these peoples between 218 and the date when Strabo describes them. Livy makes Hannibal enter their territory by turning ad laeuam, after leaving the 'Island'; and the most convincing explanation of this is that he has transferred to this point in his narrative a description of a part of Hannibal's march which followed immediately on the Rhone crossing, when Hannibal turned ad laeuam, and passed through the territories of these three tribes going from south to north; whereas now they lie on a march from north-west to south-east, beginning near Pont de l'Isere and ending on the upper Durance. For discussion see De Sanctis, iii. 2. 72-73; Viedebantt, Hermes, 1919, 355-8. The reference to the Druentia is the main evidence for supposing that Hannibal returned from the 'Island' to the :Mt. Genevre pass. The account in Livy, xxi. 32. 6, however, scarcely fits the upper Durance valley; nor can the torrent of Livy, xxi. 31. ro-12 be reconciled with the river in its upper reaches. Finally, it was unnecessary for Hannibal to cross the Durance to reach the Mt. Genevre pass, if he crossed either the Col de Bayard or the Col du Lautaret from the Isere. The first difficulty vanishes once one observes that at 32. 6 Livy has reverted to his original source; the campestre iter is that along the valley of P. so. 1-2, and from this point on there is once again close correspondence between the two authorities. As for the two remaining difficulties, two solutions offer themselves. Livy may have adapted to the upper Durance a crossing which in his original source applied to a point much farther west, e.g. at Cavaillon, if the Rhone crossing was at Beaucaire (so Viedebantt and Dunbabin); but as we saw, the Rhone was probably crossed above the conjunction with the Durance (42. r n.). Alternatively, one may assume that Druentia in Livy here refers to some other river (so Osiander, Der Hmtnibalweg (Berlin, rgoo), 73 f., Druentia Drac; others would make it the Drome (Druna)). This is not easy; and an amendation of the text is excluded by the form Druentia in Silius (iii. 468) and Ammianus (xv. 10. rr), both following the same tradition. On either assumption Hannibal did not approach the upper Durance valley near Briam;on. Some scholars, including De Sanctis, admit the existence of two traditions in Livy, but attempt to combine them with P. to obtain a consistent account. Hannibal ascends the Isere, and then marches either up the Drac and over the Col de Bayard, or more directly from Grenoble to Brian<;on over the Col du Lautaret, to complete the crossing by the Mt. Genevre. But this hypothesis involves two Alpine crossings, which are quite without reference in our sources 384

HANNIBAL'S MARCH TO ITALY

Ill. 49· 5

(and the Col du Lautaret is II5 m. higher than the Mt. Genevre). It seems more likely that the two traditions are irreconcilable, that the Druentia is in fact the Durance, and that, whatever the point at which it was crossed in Livy's source, its appearance here is designed to bring Hannibal into Italy by the Mt. Genevre. Livy evidently realized that his main source was taking Hannibal over what he believed to be the wrong pass; so at 31. 9 he turned to a fresh source, which, either as it stood or with a little adaptation, brought Hannibal into the upper Durance valley (31. 9-12,32. 6). This done he could revert without hesitation (32. 7 ff.} to the main source for a description of the details of the march, which now applied to what he believed to be the genuine route over the Mt. Genevre. This main source was probably Coelius (cf. Kahrstedt, iii. rso); and Coelius is known to have brought Hannibal over the Little St. Bernard (above). Livy, however, knew (id cum inter omnes constet) that Hannibal descended among the Taurini; and so he turned to another source (which also appears in Silius Italicus (iii. 466 ff.) and Ammianus Marcellinus (xv. ro. n)), and used it to bring Hannibal via the Tricastini, Vocontii, and Trigorii to the Durance and (by implication) the .Mt. Genevre, before reverting to Coelius. 1 3· Polybius. Livy's main tradition was also P.'s; and probably both go back, P. directly and Livy via Coelius, to Silenus. What is P.'s relation to the Little St. Bernard hypothesis, represented by Coelius? It is not easy to decide. In his narrative in this book P. mentions only the Allobroges and the Insubres (56. 3), both of whom fit the theory of an advance up the Isere to Bourg-Saint-Maurice and the crossing of the Little St. Bernard to the Val d'Aosta. P.'s words are KaTfip€ ro>.p:Y]pWS' €l!> rtt m:p~ rov fl&oov 1T€Ola KaL 'TO 'TWV >lvu&p.fJpwv €1Jvo> (56. 3). On the other hand, P. elsewhere (xxxiv. ro. r8, Strabo) stated that Hannibal crossed a pass S,a Tavplvwv; and though the reference to Hannibal is not in all MSS. of Strabo, and has been impugned as non-Polybian, there seems no good reason to reject it (DeSanctis, iii. 2. 65). It is quite possible that in iii. 56. 3 P. is merely indicating a general direction; if Hannibal had already contacts with the Insubres, their territory may well have been his first important goal. According to Livy (quoted above, 44. 5 n.), his guides were Boii, but they may have included Insubres, since Boii and Insubres were at this time (d. 40. 8), as on several former occasions (cf. ii. 22 ff.), working closely together against the Romans. Moreover, Coelius' pass was not necessarily Silenus'; he may well have supplemented Silenus from other sources. On the other hand, the reference to the Insubres in P., taken together with Coelius' known support for the Little St. Bernard, and Livy's switch from a source of 1 Klotr. (Livius, 130) suggests that the confusion goes back to Coelius himself, who contaminated Silenus and Fabius; but this seems less likely.

cc

III. 49· 5

HANNIBAL'S MARCH TO ITALY

Polybian colour, in order to bring Hannibal over the Mt. Genevre into the Taurini, creates a strong case for anyone who cares to interpret P.'s account as one of a march through the Little St. Bernard; and this pass is adopted by Klotz (Livius, 105, IJo), who thinks that Coelius took the reference to the Cremonis iugum from Silenus, but also had the inconsistent mention of the Taurini (from Fabius). Summarizing, one may say that P.'s narrative of the approach to and crossing of the Alps can be reconciled with either this pass or one of the group debouching on the valley of Susa and Turin. It is, however, illegitimate to combine this version with Livy in the hope of gaining further details, since Livy has contaminated two traditions. 4· The Pass. Any final decision will depend on the relative weight assigned to the evidence quoted above. Despite P.'s reference to the Insubres in iii. 56. 3, Hannibal's first action in the Po valley was apparently the taking of the chief town of the Taurini (6o. 9), which Appian (Hann. s) calls Taurasia, and which is likely to have stood on the site of Turin (De Sanctis, iii. 2. 68); and Livy has recorded the strong consensus of opinion in favour of the view that Hannibal came down among the Taurini. Arguing against Viedebantt, Ed. Meyer (Kl. Schr. ii. 4rr n. r) has shown how unlikely it is that Hannibal, having come down the Dora Baltea, should then have lost time marching west to Turin, with Scipio at Placentia. Thus it seems very likely (though not certain) that Hannibal reached the Po valley via the Vaile di Susa, and so that he crossed by either the Mt. Genevre (or one of the passes from the Durance valley a little to its south) or the Mt. Cenis (Great or Little, or the subsidiary Col du Clapier). Those who accept Livy's reference to the Druentia as true and important evidence must choose the former. But if one neglects his secondary source (above (z)), then the details of Hannibal's march to the 'Island', and subsequently through the territory of the Allobroges (i.e. up the Isere valley), make it probable that his pass was one in the Mt. Cenis group, approached by way of the Isere and the Maurienne (the valley of the Arc). As has been pointed out, the Mt. Genevre can be reached from the junction of the Rhone and the I sere only by passing over two cols ; and the only reason for making Hannibal take so difficult a route is Livy's reference to the Druentia. The argument that the Mt. Cenis passes were not used in antiquity has been adequately refuted, most recently by Knoflach (Klio, 1932, 405-6) who emphasizes the effects of a built road over the Mt. Genevre in concentrating traffic through the western Alps. Thus, on balance, the evidence seems to favour one of this group of passes. However, a detailed identification of the various points of Hannibal's 386

HANNIBAL'S MARCH TO ITALY

III. 49· 7

march, asP. describes it, is not very feasible, for P., though drawing on a good source, is influenced to some extent by his schematic picture of an advance up a river Rhone which runs east to west, parallel to the Alps (cf. 47· 2-s. so. r). Such identifications have frequently been attempted but no two agree. This discussion is not intended to be exhaustive, but merely to indicate the general view of the sources on which the commentary is based; and detailed problems are reserved for treatment there. 49. 5. 1rpbs Tijv KaAou!LEV'IlV N1]aov: cf. Livy, xxi. 3r. 4, quartis castris ad Insulam peruenit. Presumably the Gaulish name had this meaning (d. de Beer, 23). In§ 6 P. reads -rj 8tjaKapas-; and Livy (xxi. 3r. 4) has ibi (s)arar. Editors generally emend to read fi 8' 'la&.pas and ibi [sara, perhaps without good reason (cf. Meyer, Kl. Schr. ii. 413 n. r); but undoubtedly, whatever name stood in the original source common toP. and Livy, the river indicated is the Isere. The Saone (Arar) lies far beyond Hannibal's likely line of march; and though it is sometimes argued that Liv'}''s reading is confirmed by the reference to the Arar in Silius Italicus (iii. 452), Silius is in fact not describing Hannibal's march to the 'Island', but giving a general account of the Rhone; and since Silius took his geographical embroideries from separate sources (cf. J. Nicol, The Historical and Geographical Sources used by Silius Italicus (Oxford, 1936), 129 ff.), and a reference to the Arar, its main tributary, was part of the regular description of the Rhone (cf. SiL It. xv. SOI), Silius may be left out of the discussion. In any case, the Saone would not correspond to the distance from the Rhone crossing. Comparison of 39· 9 (1,400 stades from the Rhone crossing 7rpos 'T~v &.vaf3oil~v n»v .tli\7Tewv) with so. I (8oo stades from the 'Island' to ~ Twv .tlAm;wv d.vaf3o,\1)) shows the 'Island' to have been about 6oo stades from the crossing (probably P. obtained his 1,400 stades by adding an attested 6oo stades up the Rhone valley to the 8oo calculated at the rate of 8o a day for the stretch from the Isere to the 'foot of the pass': cf. so. I n.). Six hundred stades (just under 70 miles) from Pont de l'Isere brings one to a point between Orange and Avignon, which seems likely enough for the crossing (cf. 42· 1 n.). This figure of 6oo stades is fatal to de Beer's identification (14-24, cf. 26) of the aKapas with the Aygues, which is only 39 miles north of his proposed crossing at Arles. Various other suggested identifications of the aKapa>, ranging from the Durance to the Saone, and including Wilkinson's Sorgue, accepted by Conway (see the app. crit. to the Oxford Livy ad loc.), cannot be dealt with here. For discussion see Viedebantt, Hermes, 1919, 353 n. I; DeSanctis, iii. z. 70; Jullian, i. 474 n. 3· Viedebantt (ibid.) suggests that P. has inserted the words 7Toilvoxllov Kat mT6opov by deduction from the fact that Hannibal refitted here (§§ II-12). 7. Comparison with the Nile Delta. Jullian (i. 474 n. 3) considers this 387

III. 49· 7

HANNIBAL'S MARCH TO ITALY

forced comparison (in which the rivers and an approximately triangular axfi!'-a form the only common feature) the work of one of the Hannibal-historians; but it may well be P.'s own contribution. The comparison Tcf 1'-"y.fBH is obviously absurd. The mountainsSva7Tpoao8a Kal 8va.ip.f3o>.a Kat axo;oov ws €t1TEtV &npocnm-will be the Grande-Chartreuse. The inconsistency between this description and the comments in 47· 9 (d. Reid, JRS, 1913, 195) is only apparent, for there P. was criticizing accounts which made the Alps as a whole inaccessible, but here he is speaking only of a single range. The phrase TI]v 1'-[av 7TAo:vpav •.• i7Tt~o:V,vvat reads oddly, and Schweighaeuser may well be right in suspecting that opt~"' has dropped out after 1rAwpav (d. ii. 14. 4, 14. 6). 8. SU' cHi€A4>ous ••• OTO.o~O.tovTO.S: Allobroges in Livy {xxi. 31. s-6) who calls the elder Braneus. P. appears {so. z) to distinguish oi KaTa ftEpos ~Y"ftoV£> nvv L4>.Aof3plywv from the f3apf3apm who accompanied Hannibal from the 'Island' ; whereas to Livy the attacking chiefs are simply Galli. Nevertheless, P.'s account is not inconsistent with an assumption that the two brothers in the 'Island' were Allobroges, and the attackers dissident chieftains of a people in a state of aTd.atsperhaps supporters of the younger brother. Livy may have substituted Galli, because he has meanwhile inserted 31. 9-12, taking Hannibal across country to the Durance (cf. 49· 5-56. 4 n. (z)). Livy represents Hannibal's aid as an act of solicited arbitration, P. as an alliance with one side. On P.'s statement that Hannibal's attackers were Allobroges Jullian's comment (i. 48o n. 3) is: 'il doit s'agir de Ia tribu ligure qui occupait Ia Basse Maurienne et dont Ia capitale (castellum ... caput regionis, T.-L. xxi. 33· n) etait non loin de Ia.' This is a good example of the fatal method of choosing a location and then forcing the sources into their Procrustean bed. 11. Twv ovAwv Tn va.Aa.~a. Ka.i Tli v€vOVTJK4ha.: but an extensive replacement with Gallic weapons would raise many problems (cf. Jullian, i. 475 n. 5), and probably it was a question merely of spears and javelins. Cf. Livy, xxi. 31. 8, 'ob id meritum commeatu copiaque rerum omnium, maxime uestis, est adiutus, quam infames frigoribus Alpes praeparari cogebant'.

50. 1. va.pci. Tov voTO.J.LOV: which river? To P. clearly the Rhone; cf. 39· 9· a7TO 0~ ri]> 8ta{3&.ao:ws TOV 'Po'f5avoii 7TOpEVOftlVots 7Tap' ath-ov TOV 7TOTaftOV ws l7T1 TaS 7T1)yas lws 7Tpos T~V avaf3o>.~v KT>.. But the reason is his false picture of the Rhone's direction and relation to the Alps (cf. 47· 2-5 n.), which would make Hannibal follow its bank up to the point when he turns right and begins the ascent of the Alps. In reality Hannibal must have left the 'Island' up the valley of the Isere (cf. 49· s-56. 4n. (4)). €is oKTa.Kooious oTa.Sious: this figure, about 92 miles, would bring 388

HANNIBAL'S MARCH TO ITALY

III. 5:1:. 3

Hannibal from Pont de l'Isere to Montmelian, at the confluence of the !sere and the Arc, and so to the bounds of Allobrogian territory (Jullian, i. 477). But P.'s source appears to record the days spent on the stages from the Rhone to the Po valley, but (from the 'Island' at least) to calculate the distances on the basis of 8o stades a day (cf. 39 n.). Here for instance ro days are spent on Soo stades; yet the distance over the Alps from here to the Po, which is 1,200 stades (39. Io), only occupied 15 days (56. 3). That Hannibal's daily average was the same in the Alps and in the Isere valley is manifestly absurd; and the distances for the stages from the 'Island' onwards are not to be taken at face value. See C. Torr, r-2. 2. €v Tois €'1Tm£fio~s: cf. Livy, xxi. 32. 6, 'Hannibal ab Druentia [sic] campestri maxime itinere ad Alpes cum bona pace incolentium ea loca Gallorum peruenit' (on the 'Druentia' cf. 49· 5-56. 4 n. {2); on the Galli cf. 49· 8 n.). 5. Ka.Ta.aTpa.To'll'iS.:uaa.s ••• E'II'E!-LEVE: cf. Livy, xxi. 32. 9, 'Hannibal consistere signa iussit'. Jullian's attempted localization at the mouth of the Maurienne (i. 48o) depends on the doubtful assumptions (a) that Livy's precision of detail is not mere rhetorical elaboration, and (b) that P.'s distances here are trustworthy. 6. TWV Ka.&TJYOUtUVWV a.C.Toi:!; r a.Aa.TWV: i.e. the Boii under Magilus (44. 5). Kahrstedt (iii. r8z) argues that they are here used as scouts because of their familiarity with the Alps; but that local men have been used as guides(§ 2), not the Boii, because Hannibal has taken a route different from that he originally intended. This is a non sequitur. P. never says that Magilus' services were dispensed with. The f3&.pf3a.pot from the 'Island' were protectors (49· 13), not guides (along the river-bank) ; and it was natural enough to use local guides for the hardest part (52. 7}, to supplement the limited knowledge of Boii from the Po valley. In short, there is no reason to doubt that Hannibal followed the route intended from the first (cf. 47· 1 n.). 7. et11 nva. 'll'a.pa.Kta.UvTJv 11'6Aw: a castellum in Livy, xxi. 33· n. Jullian (i. 48r) suggests 'Saint-Georges?'.

52. 2. TETa.pTa.ios wv ••• Ets tuvSUvous 'I!'O.f>€YEV€TO luyO.Aous: these are the events mentioned in§ 8, not the immediate meeting with the natives (§ 3) ; and T£Ta.pTatos is reckoned from leaving the 7ToA~s of 51. 10. 3. 9a.A~oos ••• Ka.t aT€cpavou!l: 8o)).o{ are often olive-branches, but hardly here in an Alpine valley (cf. Ju11ian, i. 483 n. 2). The custom is paralleled by the branches borne by the Roman fetiales {cf. Livy, i. 24. 6) and by suppliants generally (cf. Cic. V err. ii. 4· no). For the Greek ICI)p6Knov or 'rod of truce' see Herod. ix. roo. I ; Thuc. i. 53· I ; Dem. li. 13. A scholiast to Thucydides describes it as fJ.\ov dp96v < > 8 "..J. \ EXOll £1
'>I

I

\

'

1

\

III. 52. 3

HANNIBAL'S MARCH TO ITALY

&.\A~.\ovs

t<et,.dvovs. It was used for communications between belligerents, and eventually became a general symbol for peace; but to call it aJvftrJp.a cpiAtas is loose writing. When it reached Rome, as the caduceus, is uncertain. See further R. Boetzkes, RE, 'Kerykeion', cols. 33o-42. 6. rrpoB~Aous ~gu rroAE!l(ous: cf. Livy, xxi. 34· 4, 'ne repudiati aperte hostes fierent'. Livy here adds a few details not in P. (e.g. the envoys were principes castellorum) and omits others. 53. 4. Tous 8' iK XE~pos ••• TtmTovns: 'striking down others at dose quarters'. For iK xetp6s, comminus (missed by Paton), see i. 76. 8, etc. 5. m;p( n AEiuK6rrnpov bxup6v: 'near a certain bare rock forming a strong point'. Jullian (i. 484 n. 3) mentions the white gypsum rocks of the Maurienne; but his attempt to identify the one referred to here is not very convincing. Ta0Ta 1-16A~S ~gEJLTJpUao.To: 'these extricated themselves with difficulty' or (d. 51. z) 'Hannibal extricated these' (cf. fig. 132). See Schweighaeuser, ad loc.

54. 1. Sui TO auvO.rrTU\1 -n;v TTJS n).u6.8os 86a~v: cf. Livy, xxi. 35· 6, 'niuis etiam casus, occidente iam sidere Vergiliarum, ingentem terrorem adiecit'. The 'morning-setting' (cf. i. 37. 5 n.) of the Pleiades is calculated as 7 November or 9 November (d. De Sanctis, iii. 2. 79; Strachan-Davidson, zo-ZI). But from the time of Hesiod (Op. 383 ff.), the setting of the Pleiades was an indication of the approach of winter (cf. Pliny, Nat. hist. ii. 125, 'Vergiliarum occasus hiemem incohat'); and the fact that new snow had just fallen suggests that Hannibal was on the summit about the third week in September (cf. Jullian, i. ¥7 n. 3; DeSanctis, iii. 2. 79), not late in October (as Kahrstedt, iii. 370 n. 2, 375 n. z; Dunbabin, CR, 193I, 122; de Beer, too-3). In 1947 the tirst snow was reported from Switzerland (2ft. on the Furka Pass, 7,990 ft.) on 24 September. 2. T~v TTJS 'ho.Mas Ev6.pyEiLO.v: d. Livy, xxi. 35· 8, where Hannibal advances in promunturio quodam. This story of the view of Italy (and the situation of Rome!) will be rhetorical embellishment (De Sanctis, iii. 2. 76), though it has been used to confirm or discredit various identifications of Hannibal's pass. Views of the plain are in fact to be had from the Mt. Cenis and Col du Clapier (De Sanctis, iii. 2. 77; Jullian, i. 488 n.; Knofiach, Klio, 1932, 411~13; Dunbabin, CR, 1931, 56-57), as also from the Col de la Traversette (de Beer, 68-D9). The striking comparison of the Alps to fortress walls was originally in Cato; cf. Servius ad Aen. x. 13 (= HRR, Cato, 85), 'Alpes ... quae secundum Catonem et Liuium muri uice tuebantur Italiam'. Cf. Herodian, ii. II. 8, Jv TElxovs ux:IJftaT£ rr~;plKEtTat Kat 7Tpof3'f3A7JTa£ 'haA.{as; Isid. Etym. xiv. 8. xS, 'Italiae murorum exhibent (sc. Alpes) uicem'. 390

HANNIBAL'S MARCH TO ITALY

III. s6. 3

7. T01Tov, Sv oCITE •.. SuvaT~IV ~v 1rapeX8e'iv: for the following incident cf. Livy (xxi. 36. 1-37. 6) who, however, follows a version which has misunderstood P. or his source in several places (e.g. 36. 2, 'natura locus iam ante praeceps recenti lapsu terrae in pedum mille admodum altitudinem abruptus erat' is a confused version of what P. describes in 54· 7) and contains such rhetorical elaboration as the use of fire and vinegar to break the rock (cf. De Sanctis, iii. 2. 77-78, deriving Livy's account from Coelius; Jullian, i. 489 n. 2). The spot is no longer identifiable, though many attempts have been made. 55. 1. rs~ov ••• Kat 1Tap,AAayp.evov: for this pointer to the sensational cf. ii. 28. n n. 56. 3-4. Statistics of the march. On the probable date of Hannibal's departure from New Carthage and arrival in the Po valley see 34· 6 n. and 54· 1 n. The figure of five months is also in Livy, xxi. 38. I, 'quinto mense a Carthagine Noua, ut quidam auctores sunt'; cf. Appian, Hann. 4, lKTitJ p.oAtr; •• . f:LYJ"l; Tzetzes, Hist. i. 27, L 748 (quoting Diodorus and Dio). How P. calculates the fifteen days spent on the crossing is not wholly clear. From the time Hannibal leaves the river his time-table appears to be as follows:

Day.

1. Hannibal encamps 7Tp6> mi> (J7T€p{3o:\at> (so. 5). On the basis of fresh information (so. 7) he moves nearer the enemy. (F.'s account might be taken to mean that this was still the first day (so De Sanctis, iii. 2. 82); but then one is a day short at the ninth day (q.v.). Further this is the second day in Livy, xxi. 32. 9 and ro.) 3· Battle and capture of 7TOAt> (51. 10); camp there (52. r). 4· Hannibal spends one day there (52. I). s. 6, and 7· (Three) days' safe advance (52. 2). On days 6 and 7 he had barbarian guides (52. 7-8). 8. On the fourth day after leaving the 7TOA"i (52. 2, T€TapTaior;) Hannibal, in danger, encamped 7T€p{ n AwK07T€Tpov (53· s). 9· Next day he regained his vanguard and reached the summit (53· 6), where lvaTai:o<; . •• Stavt!aa<; he encamped (53· 9). Clearly this is the ninth day since Hannibal left the river, not (like T€TapTaio>, 52. 2) since he left the 7TOAt<; (so Dunbabin, CR, 1931, 122); and DeSanctis's argument (iii. 2. 82) that the reunion with the vanguard and the arrival at the summit occurred on separate days is contradicted by 53· 6. ro and II. Two days spent on the summit (53· 9). It is not impossible that one of these is the day of Hannibal's arrival (so De Sanctis, loc. cit.); but the advance from the previous camp was not unopposed (53· 6-8) and probably occupied most of the day. 2.

391

III. 56.3 12.

HAN'NIBAL'S

~lARCH

TO ITALY

Hannibal descended to the paxts (54· 4, 55· 6).

13, 14, and 15. In one day Hannibal got his cavalry over the chasm

(55· 7) ; in three days he got his elephants across too (55· 8). These three days very likely include the one day in which the horse crossed, though P. does not make this clear. r6, l7, and r8. TP'Tai:os dml Twv wpoHpTjplvwv KPTJfl-YwY Hannibal reached the plain (56. r); but TPLTafos might indicate day 17, if Hannibal marched down a little after getting his elephants over on day rs. This calculation allows three days more than the fifteen of 56. 3, two more if Hannibal reached the plain on day I7, one more if the two days on the summit include that on which Hannibal arrived. De Sanctis (iii. 2. 82-83) has similar calculations (his reckoning of days I and 2 as a single day, and his expansion of day 9 into two {with Livy) have been mentioned above) ; and by accepting both the above assumptions he brings Hannibal to the plain 'sulla mattina del sedicesimo ... avendo impiegato nella marcia quindici giorni', thus reconciling P.'s total and his separate data. A possible alternative explanation is that P. had his total from the Lacinian inscription (§ 4) and his detailed account from a written source. In either case the discrepancy is small (though Dunbabin (CR, 1931, manages to expand it by a curious form of calculation which extends the crossing to twenty-one days, and explains P.'s fifteen days as 'made up of the fifteen days' marching and fighting', excluding restswhich is not what P. says). Livy's account is very similar (xxi. 32. 9-37. 6). His total adds up to eighteen days; the castellum (w6A£S) falls on the third day (Livy, xxi. 33· n), as in P., but Livy omits the day spent here (52. r), hence when he describes Hannibal's advance after encamping without his cavalry (Livy, xxi. 35· r = P. 53· 6) he is still at the eighth day, and one must assume a night between this incident and the arrival on the summit. In fact this eighth night's camp is not mentioned by Livy, for it did not exist. Beyond doubt P. is here more reliable, and Hannibal spent a day after taking the w6ALs, and then reached the top on the (ninth) day on which he left the AevK67reTpov. 3. ets ... To Twv 'lva6JLPpwv l!8vos: on their location cf. ii. I7. 4 n. This passage seems to favour the view that Hannibal crossed the Little St. Bernard Pass and descended the Dora Baltea valley to Ivrea (cf. Hesselbarth, 29). But since his first action was to take Turin {6o. g), P. is probably giving only the general direction and goal (cf. 49· 5-s6. 4 n. {4)). 4. Hannibal's numbers: see 35· r n., and, for the Lacinian inscription, 33· r8. 5. n6'!T~~05 .•• ICC.'TE'!T~EUaE ••• Els n£ac.s: cf. 49· 4· For Scipio's arrival at Pisa cf. Livy, xxi. 39· 3 (32. s, 'cum admodum exiguis 392

HANNIBAL'S MARCH TO ITALY

III. 57

copiis Genuam repetit' (cf. Amm. Marc. xv. 10. 10) is not really a contradiction since the route would go via Genua; cf. Klotz, Phil., 1933. 48 n. 18). From Massilia to Pisa is about 300 nautical miles, and Scipio will have left :\lassilia about seven days after Hannibal crossed the Rhone; from Pisa his route was probably via Pistoria, Bononia, and Placentia (De Sanctis, iii. z. 84), though Dunbabin (CR, 1931, 123) thinks he went via Florence and estimates the distance Pisa-Florence-Bononia-Placentia at nz milia passuum (or 266 m.p. via Faventia). On the whole it is likely that he spent rather less time than P. suggests on the sea voyage, and more on the march. Despite the words pe,.' d>.lywv, Scipio brought back at least 30 of his 65 men-of-war from Massilia to Italy; for (a) the total fleet in Spain twice appears as 35 ships (95· 5, x. 17. 13), (b) although 50 of Sempronius' fleet of r6o (41. 2) were left at Lilybaeum (Livy, xxi. 51. 7), thus making only no available for north Italy, we hear of the sending of 120 {96. ro) and 2o (97· 2) ships from this fleet simultaneously. See Thiel, 39 ff. 6. TB 1ro.p«l Twv E~o.1reX~KEwv uTpaTlmeSa.: two (cf. 40. 14 n.) under the praetors L. Manlius and C. Atilius.

57-59. The place of geographical information in a history. This digression is clearly composed after P.'s journeys in Africa, Spain, and Gaul (59· 7-8) ; but the date of these is controversial. That through Spain and Gaul has been dated with some probability to 150, when P. returned from accompanying Scipio Aemilianus, who was serving under L. Licinius Lucullus (d. ii. 14. 4-17. 12 n.; iii. 48. 12 n.; cf. Nissen, Rk. J.1f.us., 1871, 271, who, however, puts it on the outward journey in 151), and it is likely that he visited Africa from Spain with Scipio (xxxiv. 16. 2, xxxvi. r6. 12) in ISI, to meet Masinissa (ix. 25. 4), who died in 149 or early 148 (cf. De Sanctis, iii. I. 2II)though Ziegler (RE, 'Polybios (r)', col. 1454) argues that P. first visited Africa in 149. The voyage of exploration mentioned by Pliny (Nat. kist. v. 9 = P. xxxiv. 15. 7), outside the Pillars, down the African coast, perhaps to the R Lixus, and some distance up the coast of Spain, is dated by Cuntz (53) to 148 and by Ziegler (op. cit. 1455) to 147; but Cuntz's argument against P.'s having left during the siege is cogent, and the voyage is probably to be dated to 146, after the fall of Carthage and before he went back to Achaea (cf. Class. et med., 1948, 16o; ]HS, 1954, 185)· On the whole, then, these dates support the view that this digression is a later insertion (cf. Ziegler, op. cit. 1486); and this is confirmed by the reference to Greeks as free from the burden of military and political careers (59· 4), which must refer to the period after 146-for Thommen (Hermes, r885, 215) can scarcely be right in associating it with the internment of the Achaeans between 167 and 150. These chapters 393

III. 57

HANNIBAL'S MARCH TO ITALY

must therefore be regarded as written for the second edition of the work (d. 1-5 n., § 3 c) ; cf. Susemihl, ii. 86 n. 24 b; De Sanctis, iii. I. 212.

57. 3. oL a-uyypa.4>eis &.f.upLa-J3"1TouvTES: cf. 37. II, 38. 3· Who are these historians with controversial accounts of the Pillars, the Ocean, the tin-mines of Britain (here mentioned for the first time: cf. Collingwood in Frank, ES, iii. 46), and the Spanish gold- and silvermines? Almost certainly Dicaearchus, Eratosthenes, and Pytheas; cf. xxxiv. 5· 1-2. Pytheas' account of the Cornish tin-mines survives, via Timaeus, in Diodorus (v. 22); see Miillenhoff, i. 469 ff. The present passage suggests that Poseidonius' famous account of the Spanish mines (Diod. v. 35 ff.; Strabo, iii. 147) was based on earlier, extravagant stories; cf. Strabo (loc. cit.), ou yap a'/T~
concerned with being diverted from the main point of a discussion or narrative (though there are many differences between them, and a direct echo of Plato cannot be proved); P.'s contrast between present pleasure and future profit is exceedingly forced. 9. TTJ'i 1Ta.pa.uTlKa. OLO.YWYTJ'i: cf. v. 75· 6, av!.I'ITO.VUEWS' ap.a Kai s~ayw­ y7js lt< rijs L
diffi cile est. 9. ~a.uTou x6.pw: this, the MS. reading, is taken by Shuck burgh and Strachan-Davidson with uparelas, 'for the sake of self-glorification', and Reiske (iv. 230) proposed iaurijs, 'truth for its o¥m sake'. However, Hultsch W. p. lxi} successfully argued that since laurijs would be naturally taken to apply to 1Tapaooto>..oylas Kat npaTdas, P. wrote iauTofJ with the same meaning, as if To ri}v aA7J0tda.v Myf'Lv had preceded. Translate, therefore, 'truth for its own sake'.

59. 3. axe8ov ci'll'aVTWV 'ITAWTWV KO.l 'II'OpEUTWV YfiYOVOTWV: cf. iv. 40, 2. 4. cl'ITOAEAUf1EVWV , , , TllS , , , 4>~AOTLf1La.s: for the date of composition implied in this phrase see 57-59 n. 6. To us Tfi
HANNIBAL'S MARCH TO ITALY

III. 6I. 5

7. P.'s voyages and journeys: cf. 57-59 n. For P.'s pride in these cf. xii. z8. I. 8oKet Sl /LO~ Ka.i TO Ti)S' tO'Top{a.s npO
60-75. Hannibal in the Po Valley: Battle of the Trebia 60. 1. TO ••• 1T~Tj9os ••• ~s, 8e8TJAWK!ljlEV: s6. 4· 2. KaTaaTpaTo1Tr8euaas tr1T' a.-.h.fJv TTJ" 1TapwpeLa.v: in the Dora Riparia valley (if his pass was the Mt. Cenis). Jullian (i. 489) locates the camp 'a Novalese', De Sanctis (iii. z. 24) 'presso Susa'; but any attempt at a detailed identification is futile. On the exhaustion of the troops cf. Livy, xxi. 39· I-2. 5. Hannibal's losses: cf. ii. 24. I7, iii. 35· I n. It is scarcely credible that after the inquiries of 48. IO-IZ Hannibal nevertheless lost over zo,ooo men in the Alps, and the earlier figures are probably exaggerated. For variants in the tradition see Livy, xxi. 38. 5· P. nowhere above (Ka0cl1Tep iml.vw 1rpoei1Tov) states that Hannibal lost half his force ; but he stresses his losses at 56. 2 and gives his numbers on reaching Italy at 56. 4· 8. TWV T a.uptvwv: cf. ii. rs. 8 n.; and, for the extension of Insubrian power at this time, ii. 17. 4 n. P.'s use of the word a"raaw~6VTwv is not, however, evidence for an Insubrian hegemony over the Taurini (cf. Philipp, RE, 'Insubres', col. I59o), since elsewhere (ii. 19. 3) the word is used of Gauls quarrelling without such implication. 9. TTJV [3apvTaTTJV 1TOAw: cf. Livy, xxi. 39· 4, unam urbem, caput eius gentis. Appian (Hann. 5) calls it Taurasia; and despite Pais (Ricerche, 492), who would put it on the site of Roman Industria (Monteu da Po), it is more likely to be the forerunner of Augusta Taurinorum (Turin). Cf. DeSanctis, iii. :2. 79; Nissen, It. La1zd. ii. I64-S· The word n6A~s should not be pressed; cf. Pais, Stud. it., I897, 285. 61. 5. TO 8~ 1Tapa1TAtlO'LO\I O'U\IE~!lt\IE TTO.axew KO.L T0\1 no1TALOV: the typical parallelism (cf. i. sr. 8, 6r. 4) foreshadows the parallel speeches of 62-64, and is part of the dramatization of the two leaders, reflecting for Scipio the influence of Laelius and the circle of Aemilianus; for in fact (cf. DeSanctis, iii. 2. qo-I), though Hannibal's arrival may have surprised Scipio, it is improbable that Hannibal either knew or cared about the name of the commander with whom he had crossed swords at the Rhone, and he would have had cause for amazement had he not encountered legions on Rome's northern 395

III. 6t. .5

HANNIBAL IN THE PO VALLEY

frontiers. Scipio's surprise that Hannibal should have crossed the Alps contradicts 49· 4 where Scipio naturally assumes Hannibal to be making for the Po, and forms part of the rhetorical elaboration; so too the reference to Taurasia as -nvds 7To.:\ns- Jv 'haAtq. (§ 6). 8. lipT~ yap ri}s TEAEuTaCa.s cl>tltJ.TJS KaTa.AT)youCTT]s: but Hannibal was already reported across the Ebro {40. z). Probably the exaggeration is simply part of the working up of the surprise at Hannibal's arrival; it is less likely that P. is here thinking of Saguntum as north of the Ebro (cf. ii. 13. 7 n. (e); iii. 30. 3 n.). Laqueur's suggestion (uz) that ~P-71 is here 'rumour' is not to the point. 9. 11'pos Tov T e~ep,ov ••• E~r:miOTEAAov: this must have been sent upon the receipt of news from Scipio; to have waited for Hannibal's arrival in Cisalpine Gaul would have been folly and implies an impossible chronology (De Sanctis, iii. 2. 85; Hallward, CAH, viii. 40 n. 2; Dunbabin, CR, 1931, 124-5). 10. TOV 'II'Aouv ws ~'If· otiCou: i.e. to Italy (not to Rome). De Sanctis (iii. 2. 85) calculates the date, with probability, to the middle of September. According to Livy (xxi. 51. 6-7: cf. App. H ann. 6), Sempronius sent the army by sea to Ariminum, dispatched Sex. Pomponius with twenty-five warships to guard the ager Vibonensis and the Italian coast, and made up the fleet of the praetor M. Aemilius to fifty ships. After settling affairs in Sicily he himself coasted to Ariminum with ten ships. In however, he sends the troops by land, on oath to reassemble in forty days at Ariminum (68. 14), and himself goes by land via Rome (68. 12). That the army went by land seems more likely, in view of the hazards of a seavoyage in late September, but Livy may well be right in sending the consul by sea (he is following a Roman source); cf. 68. r2-13 n., 72. 3 n. See De Sanctis, iii. z. 86. The administering of the oath to the troops is an adaptation of the procedure used in enrolling them; cf. vi. zr. 6. Despite 68. 14, it is unlikely that they will have been dismissed at Lilybaeum in provincial territory; and De Sanctis {iii. 2. 85) argues that the forty days {68. 14} were for the march from Rhegium to Ariminum. If this is so, the march from Lilybaeum to Ariminum will have consumed sixty days, and the arrival there will have been about the middle of November. 11. Situation of A riminum: d. ii. 19. 13 where Sena, so m.p. to the south, is described with the same phrase. Cuntz (27-34} has argued plausibly that the present passage and 86. 2 were vnitten after the shifting of the Italian frontier northward to the Rubicon-a shift which Mommsen attributed to Sulla (RG, ii. 355 n.), but which was already known to P. (d. xxxiv. u. 8, where the boundary is Sena (MS. lX/..av), but the measurements apply to the Rubicon frontier), and must be assumed in GIL, i 2 • z. 719, which shows the Gracchan 111 uiri agris dandis adsignandis iudicandis of 132 active near Fanum 396

BATTLE OF THE TREBIA

and Pisaurum in the ager Gallicus. The shift of the frontier to the Rubicon in fact brought Ariminum within Italy (for it lay I2 m.p. south of the river) ; but P. may well have associated it with the new frontier which bounded its territory on the north. See Philipp, RE, 'Rubico', cols. 1165--6. Ariminum was founded as a Latin colony in 268, after the defeat of the Senones (Vell. Pat. i. I4; Eutrop. ii. I6; Livy, ep. IS). 62-64. Hannibal and Scipio address their troops: cf. Livy, xxi. 40-44, frequently echoing the version in P.; on the difference in treatment seeR. Ullmann, Symb. Osl., I932, 57--60. In both authors the speeches are based on commonplaces about the strength of forces and the chances of battle (cf. Kahrstedt, iii. I65-6). Since Scipio did not expect a major battle at this stage, his speech is clearly unhistorical, and included partly to balance Hannibal's, partly to inflate Scipio into a figure comparable with his opponent (d. 61. 5 n.); DeSanctis, iii. 2. I7I. This treatment may go back to P.'s source, perhaps Fabius (Klotz, Livius, I3I). 62. 2-11. The duel of the prisoners: cf. Livy, xxi. 42. I-4 (several pairs fight); Zon. viii. 23. The story, probably apocryphal, interests P. for the moral Hannibal drew from it (63. 2). 63. 3. Ti]v TUXTJV ••• a.exa.1TpOTE0ELKEVa.L: cf. Livy, xxi. 43· 5.fortuna ... praemia ... proponit. For Fortune as a power handing out prizes for valour cf. xv. 9· 4, IO. 5, xxxii. 4· 3 (n)v dOavaa{av); von Scala, 172; Siegfried, 8I f. But often, as here, the phrase is purely formal and 'Fortune' a mere figure of speech. See above, p. I6. 64. 1. n61TAlOS •• TOV na.oov ••• ~OT) 1TE1TEpa.LWflEVOS: cf. 6I. I. The site is uncertain, but probability points to Placentia, for Scipio left no garrison for the bridge, as at the Ticinus (Livy, xxi. 45· I}, and he returned to Placentia (Kromayer, AS, iii. I. 58 n. I}; this seems preferable to the view that the bridge crossed between the confluence with the Trebia and that with the Ticinus (K. Lehmann, HZ, n6, 19I6, Io9). On the Ticinus (modern Ticino}, the largest tributary of the Po, which flows from Lago Maggiore to a confluence near Pavia, see Nissen (It. Land. ii. I73l· 5. 116vov ou TOAflWaL Ka.Ta 1Tp0aw1Tov tSEiv t111iis: Reiske, Schweighaeuser, and B-W2 keep this reading and render either 'they do not even dare to look us in the face' (but no parallels are given for 11-ovov ov = ovoi), or 'they do not dare to look at even our mere faces' (but this is a very strained order even for P., and 11-ovov ov are hard to separate). H ultsch 2 reads fl-EVHv ov roAfl-Wa£ Kard. 7rpoaw7Tov iSovr£~ ~11-a> (following an earlier suggestion of Bi.ittner-Wobst to read 11-€vovns ov for fl-OVOV ov). But perhaps the simplest correction is to omit fl-OVOV with Bekker. 0

397

-~OMANJ'

0 ~ !

6,

THE BATTLE OF THE TREBIA.

Based on DeSanctis.

2

3

4 Km.

BATTLE OF THE TREBIA

UL 66

7. 1Tapc1 -rt1v a.{m7"" 1rpoa.lpeow ••• ICEXpiJu9a.l Ttl ••• '!Tope(~: the tradition that Hannibal changed his original route is in Livy (xxi. 31. 2) and Zonaras (viii. 23), but is probably to be rejected (cf. 47· I n.). P.'s phraseology here suggests that Hannibal had originally proposed to follow the Ligurian coast route. 10. d lltl ~~:a.l 1\la.v t~e Twv Ka.TQ, 1\oyov ~wpa.: 'had he not seen it to be most evident'. 65. Tlte battle of Ticinus: d. Livy, xxi. 46. 3-7, 9-ro (Polybian tradition); Zon. viii. 23; App. Hann. 5· In x. 3· 3 P. calls it TI]v lTnrop.axlav • • • 1rept Tov Ilaoov K.aAovp.evov mm~p.&v. The skirmish probably occurred near modern Lomello, north of the Po between the Tic! no and the Sesia; for P. mentions no second river after the Ticinus, yet Scipio advanced westward cautiously for one day (65. r) and part of another (65. 2). Livy (xxi. 45· 3) puts it near Victumulae; this is either an annalistic invention or Victumulae is not Biella (a mining town east of Ivrea) but some unknown village west of the Ticinus (De Sanctis, iii. 2. 91-92). Nepos' statement (Hann. 4· r) that the battle was fought Clastidii apud Padum is sheer confusion; both Valerius Maximus (v. 4· 2) and Florus (i. 22. 12) speak of the battle of the Ticinus. P.'s source appears still to be the pro-Carthaginian Greek writer whom he used for Hannibal's crossing of the Alps, and who is distinguished for his exact indications of timeprobably Silenus. Cf. DeSanctis, iii. 2. 172; Beloch, HZ, rJ4, 1915, Iff. 5. wpo8E!1Evos Tous O.~~:oVTlO'TQ,; ~~:a.l. ••• l1Twe'i:s: cf. Livy, xxi. 46. 5, 'iaculatores et Gallos equites in fronte locat'. To us S!l 1\o~wous ev 11nwm~ Ka.Ta.O'T~ua.;: cf. Livy, ibid., 'Romanos sociorumque quod roboris fuit in subsidiis'. But in subsidiis is a misunderstanding of Livy or his source (Coelius), for tv p.mlJ1T4J means here 'in jne facing the front' (d. i. 26. 13 n., v. 82. ro), not 'behind' (Paton). 7. 1~mo TQ,S '!Tap' auTwv 'lJ\.a.s: 'behind (not "between" (Paton)) their own cavalry squadrons'.

66-74. Events leading up to the battle of the Trebia: the battle. P.'s account of the battle best fits a site on the left bank of the Trebia, but Livy locates the battle clearly on the right bank. The problem is conveniently summarized by B. L. Hallward (CAH, viii. 709, with bibliography, 726, supplementing Kromayer, AS, iii. r. 47 ff.). Kromayer's discussion (AS, iii. 1. 47-103) forms the basis for all detailed consideration of the battle, and his account is in essentials convincing; cf. De Sanctis, iii. 2. 92-99. Livy's evidence and points of controversy are discussed in the notes. There are useful maps in Kromayer, AS, iii. r, Karte 3; Kromayer-Veith, Schlachtenatlas, Rom. Abt. i, Blatt 3; and De Sanctis, iii. z (at end). 399

III. 66.

I

HANNIBAL IN THE PO VALLEY

66. 1. ivl TTjv Toll n&.Sou y£q,upa.v: i.e. that by which he had crossed (64. r). av£o8wv q,Maa.l Sla.~l~aaa.s Ta ..o,Povs), viz. the Ticinus and its bridge (cf. 64. r), not the Po bridge (so Klotz, Livius, 132). Livy (xxi. 47. 2-3), who follows the same tradition, has been misled into imagining that Hannibal was checked at the Po, and omits any reference here to the Ticinus. Livy also mentions the capture of the 6oo Romans; but they are taken segniter ratem soluentes, for the Po bridge was a bridge of boats (whereas P.'s is made of planks; cf. § 4, Tas 11Ada-ras niJv aavLSwv w.:ll1Taafdvas (as in ii. 5· 5); Livy, xxi. 45· r (on the Ticinus bridge)). Not to have destroyed the Ticinus bridge would have been sheer folly (cf. Kromayer, AS, iii. 1. 58 n. z). 5. ~L£Ta.~a.M~L£Vos a.o8ls Ets Tuva.vT£a. KTA.: viz. Hannibal wheeled round and for two days (§ 6) marched westward up the left bank of the Po, looking for a convenient place to cross. Kromayer (loc. cit.) locates his crossing just below the confluence with the Tanaro; but this is necessarily hypothetical. Livy (xxi. 47· s-6) rejects Coelius' story that Hannibal forded the river with the elephants on his right to break the current in favour of the version of potiores auctores, which coincides with that of P. (cf. Klotz, Livius, Ios). 6. iA.a5pou~q,: cf. 93· 4, ol11£ nvv >..u;ovpy,wv T.:Tayp)vos, the officer in command of the service corps, mentioned elsewhere (ro2. 6, n4. 7, u6. 6; Livy, xxii. 46. 7); cf. Lenschau, RE, 'Hasdrubal (8)', cols. :2473-4 (inaccurate on this passage). tXPT)I!ant£ Tois ••• vp£o-~£uTa.is: cf. Livy, xxi. 47· 7, legationibus Gallomm audiendis moratus. Livy adds that Mago and the cavalry pressed straight on down stream, after crossing, and in a single day Placentiam ad hastes contendunt. For XPTJf.4aTt~nv, 'give audience to', d. P. Petr. iii. clxiv (the Gurob papyrus), col. iv, l. 24 (cf. Holleaux, Etudes, iii. 290). 9. O'Tpa.T01TE8t:UO'O.S vt:plvoAlV n>.o.KEVTlO.V: cf. Livy, xxi. 47· 3· 'prius Placentiam peruenere, quam satis sciret Hannibal ab Ticino profectos'. The site of this camp, Scipio's first after the cavalry skirmish, is a crucial point in the controversy about the subsequent battle. In the manceuvres which now followed, the Roman army twice crossed the Trebia, once in retirement after Gallic desertions (68. 4-5), and

BATTLE OF THE TREBIA

III. 66.

I I

again just before the battle (72. 4-5); hence the battle-site and this camp were on the same side of the Trebia, If Scipio's camp (and so by implication Hannibal's) was on the right bank (so Livy), it follows that after the Gallic desertions Scipio marched west across the Trebia and away from his base at Placentia-a highly improbable move, which would put the Trebia between himself and the approaching troops of Sempronius; cf. Kromayer, AS, iii. I. so ff. The likelihood is that Scipio camped west of the Trebia, and retired east to await Sempronius in the shelter of Placentia; which would imply that the battle was fought on the left bank. Kromayer (AS, iii. I. 59) identifies Scipio's camp with Stradella, a point 30 km. west of Placentia, where the spurs of the Apennines descend to within 3 km. of the Po, and possessing strategic advantages already noted by Napoleon I (Commentaires, i (Paris, x867), 126, quoted by Kromayer, AS, iii. I. 6o n. I). But Stradella lies nearer to Clastidium, and can hardly be described as 1r1:pl. 1r6Aw IIAa.KevTlav. Moreover, a retreat to the Trebia from Stradella in the face of Hannibal's cavalry superiority presents 'certain difficulties' (Hallward, C AH, viii. 709). It therefore seems safer to assume (cf. Kahrstedt, iii. 390 n. 2; Lehmann, HZ, n6, 1916, 107) that Scipio's camp was not far west of the Trebia, in some place such as Rottofreno, behind the R. Loggia and the rather larger R. Tidone. An ingenious hypothesis, which would remove most of the difficulties, is T. Frank's suggestion (]RS, 1919, 202-7; cf. U. Ewins, BSR, 1952, 55) that before its destruction in 2oo and refounding in 190 Placentia was situated at Stradella; Scipio's camp 1repl 1roAtv IIAa.KeVTlav would be there, and the contradictions in Livy and P. would be reconciled. But on this assumption there are no good grounds for Scipio's retreat to the right bank of the Trebia away from Placentia, after the Gallic desertion (68. 4) ; cf. Hallward, C AH, viii. 709. See further the arguments of R. Hanslik (RE, 'Placentia', cols. 18g8-9) on the relationship of the historical Placentia to the earlier Celtic road system. Hence without archaeological evidence Frank's hypothesis must be rejected. On the founding of Placentia. cf. 40. 5 n. 10-ll. va.po.y£v6ru;:vos 8EuTEpo.'ios ••• TU Tphn va.p~Ta.~E KTX.: cf. Livy, xxi. 47· 8, 'paucis post diebus sex milia a Placentia castra communiuit et postero die in conspectu hostium acie derecta potestatem pugnae fecit'. P. makes Hannibal encamp after Scipio rejects his challenge, Livy before-perhaps because he or his source attributed to Hannibal the Roman custom of encamping each night. P. (§ n) puts Hannibal's camp about so stades from the Roman, Livy (loc. cit.) 6 m.p. from Placentia. The distances tally, but Livy has WIOngly assumed Scipio's camp to be close to the city, whereas in fact it was some distance west of it. Dd

HANNIBAL IN THE PO VALLEY

III. 67. I

67. 1-3. The Gallic desertion- cf. Livy, xxi. 48. 1-2 (less detailed). Livy gives the same figures, but minimizes the caedes. 6. Tm)s Tpei:s O.vopas: cf. 40. 9, for these I I Iuiri coloniae deducendae. On the Boian hostages with the Romans (§ 7) cf. 40. 6 n., 40. 7, 40. Io.

8. hr~ T4i yeyovcm rrapaarrov8'1]..-a.TL: the Gallic massacre and desertion, as well as the Boian action. 9. ~myevo..-EVTJS Tfls vuKT6s: 'when night came on', evidently the next night, for the Gauls did not desert until the morning watch (§ 2); cf. Livy, xxi. 48. 4, quarta uigilia noctis insequentis projectus. (Paton, 'that same night', is misleading.) ws errt TOV Tpe~(av 1TOTO....OV KTA.: cf. Uvy, xxi. 48. 4. 'ad Trebiam fluuium iam in loca altiora collesque impeditiores equiti castra mouet'. On the hypothesis adopted (66. 9) Scipio retired south-east across the Trebia to the protection of the hills on the east bank, and of Placentia. Kromayer (AS, iii. I. 6z) calculates the time required for both sides to reach the Trebia, assuming Scipio's camp to have been at Stradella; but such calculations depend on many imponderables. Certainly a march of 25 km. to the Trebia (if Scipio kept to the foothills) would have been extremely hazardous in view of Hannibal's cavalry superiority; for even setting out before dawn Scipio had little start of Hannibal's Numidians. If Scipio's camp was nearer the Trebia, the risk was proportionately less. Beloch (HZ, II4, 1915, 3) regards the retreat to the Trebia as a doublet of that after the Ticinus skirmish, based on an annalistic account which attributed it to Gallic treachery rather than to Scipio's defeat; for a valid criticism of this radical treatment of the sources see Lehmann, HZ, II6, I9I6, I

101

ff.

) f ' "' ""' """ oxupOTTJT~ KO.L TOl'i rrapOtKOUCI"l TWV aup.~ p.6.xwv: Livy (loc. cit.) omits the second factor. The Gauls who con-

1T~O"Tfi.UWV

1 Ttl..., TE TWV T01TWV r<

trolled the A pennine passes towards Genua were the friendly Anares (ii. !7• 7, 32. I, 34· 5). 68. 1-4. Hannibal's pursuit: cf. Livy, xxi. 48. s-6. 5. rrEpl To us rrpWTOU'i Mcjlous: Kromayer (AS, iii. I. 63 ff. and Karte J d) locates this second camp of Scipio on the edge of the hills, east of the Trebia near Pieve-Dugliara, about IJ km. south of Piacenza. This position, accepted by De Sanctis, seems very probable. 7. rrEpl. TETTa.paKOVT(l O"Ta8(ous a1TOc:T)(WV KTA.: i.e. about 5 miles. Kromayer (op. cit. 63 and Karte 3d) puts Hannibal's camp on the west side of the Trebia (and the east side of the Luretta) somewhat south of Campremoldo di sopra. 12-13. Sunpronius' journey to Ariminum: cf. 61. ron. Livy's account of Sempronius' sea-journey is accepted by De Sanctis {iii. 2. 86), who attaches weight to Livy's statement (xxi. 57· 4) that Sempronius

BATTLE OF THE TREBIA

III. 70

returned from Placentia to hold the elections, which he might (on P.'s version) have held on his way through Rome. Beloch (HZ, n4, 1915, 13) prefers to follow P. and reject Livy's story of Sempronius' return. But P.'s account as it stands offers many difficulties, despite the fact that both Livy and P. go back, most probably, to Roman sources. In § 12 Sempronius marches through Rome with his army, whereas the arrival of the troops at Ariminum (§ 13) clearly links with the oath of 61. ro, which implies that the men make their own way there (Laqueur, ro6). Klotz (Appians Darstellu·ng, 31 n. r) asserts that "8ta7Top.:vot-dvwv ota Tfj> 'Pwf.LTJ> refers only to the troops'; but, despite the singular auvao.jJaVTO<;, agreeing with T£{Jt:plov, the words Tt:{1Eplov Kat Twv f.LET' iKt:!vov tJTpaTo7Tlowv all go with 3ta7Topwof.LEVwv. In fact a consul with his army might not march through Rome; whence Schweighaeuser's unconvincing translation per agrum Romanum or (with Reiske) praeter urbem, i.e. sub moenibus Romae (for which ii. 68. 8 offers no parallel). If the account of Sempronius' march through Rome is untrue, these inconsistencies are merely a sign of carelessness in P. and his source (cf. Kahrstedt, iii. 167). 14. Ka:raaTpaT01TE0Euaac; 1rap' UTOL<;); thUS forming a double Camp; cf. vi. 32. 6-8. On the march cf. 61. ron.; the forty days are probably to be calculated from Rhegium, which is over 1,roo km. from Ariminum. From Lilybaeum to Messana is a further 400 km. Cf. Dunbabin, CR, 1931, 126, 'no historian seems to have noticed that, if this (i.e. the march from Lilybaeum to Ariminum in 40 days) really happened, it was one of the greatest marches in history, for it is ... about 832 English miles'. Dunbabin's own chronology is unacceptable.

a<

69. 1. 1rpa~lKo1r1]aac; ••• KA.aaT(Olov: cf. Livy, xxi. 48. 9-10, who calls the Brundisian traitor Dasius, and gives the bribe as nummi aurei quadringenti. 3. 0ELyJ1a ••• tK<jlEpElV TTJS acjlETepac; 1TpOalpeaEW'); 'to provide an example of his policy'; cf. iv. 24. 9, xxxix. 5· r, KaAov odyf.La Tij> •pwf.Lalwv 7rpoatp.!at:ws. (Paton, 'make a display of leniency', is inaccurate.) 4. ETLJl"lae J1EyaA.etws: 'he rewarded ... generously'; d. Xen. Cyrop. iii. 3· 6 for this sense of rtf.LB.v (and P. iii. 99· 6). Despite Livy, xxi. 48. 9, nee sane magno pretio, both honour and rewards are involved. 5-14. Sempronius assists the Gauls against Hannibal: cf. Livy, xxi. 52. On Livy's treatment of the incident cf. Sontheimer, Klio, 1934, 103 ff. 10. TaL'> ~cjleope(alS: 'with reserves', rather than 'from the garrison post' (Schweighaeuser). 70. Motives and objects of Sempronius, P. Scipio, and Hannibal: cf. Livy, xxi. 53, where similar considerations are worked up by the author (Sontheimer, Klio, 1934, 105-6).

HANNIBAL IN THE PO VALLEY

2. vpoaXa~ea9cu Ka.l TTJV ToO auv6.pxovTo~ yv&>iJ.TJV: 'to gain his colleague's consent as well'. 4. TTJV ••• Twv Klii'ATwv 6.9ea£a.v: 'the treacherous Gauls' ; cf. ii. 32. 8 n. 5. &.XYJ&~v.qv va.p€sEa8a\ xpdnv: on Scipio's wound cf. 66. 2. But this 'hope' is not historical, for Scipio must also have known that the new consuls would soon be there to relieve both himself and Sempronius (§ 7); cf. Beloch, HZ, II4, 1915, ro. P., however, following a pro-Scipionic tradition, makes Sempronius by contrast ambitious, full of false confidence, and jealous of both his colleague and his successors. This prejudice must be disallowed. 7. To us evLKn8taTal'€vous aTpaTTJyoos: 'the consuls designate' without any indication whether they were already elected or not (difficulties arise only if one accepts the emendation bnKafJ~;arapi.vov~ of Kondos, BCH, 1877, 63 f.). In fact, Sempronius probably returned to Rome after the battle to hold elections (for the battle was in late December, 72. 3); cf. 68. 12-13 n.; Livy, xxi. 57· 3-4. 71-74. The battle of the Trebia: cf. Livy, xxi. 54-56. 8. P. depends in the main on his pro-Carthaginian Greek source (probably Silenus); Livy is very close toP., and the likelihood is that he foiiows Silen us via Coelius (the detail of the elephants in s6. I may be from that source: it is not in P. ; cf. Kahrstedt, iii. r68). De Sanctis (iii. 2. 172, 177) argues that Livy's account goes 'Qack indirectly to P. himself, and that divergences have been introduced by an intermediate source. For a stylistic discussion of the two accounts see Sontheimer, Klio, 1934, 106 ff. 71. l. ey£veTo vpos T/il O'Tf>llTTJYEiv: 'he set himself to outmanreuvre'. The comments on ambushes in§§ 2-4 read like P.'s own. 4. nl. .•• ev£aTJiJ.O. Twv ovXwv: 'the blazoned shields'. 5. TOlS auv€8po's: cf. 20. 8 n. 8. 8€Ka ••• EKnaTov E'!T'LAEsal'evov: cf. Uvy, xxi. 54· 3, 'singuli uobis nouenos ex turmis manipulisque uestri similes eligite'. Livy is the more correct, for P. gives the total(§ 9) as r,ooo foot and r,ooo horse. 9. Ets TftV eve8pav: as the possible site of Mago's ambush Kromayer (AS, iii. r. 67-69) suggests the bed of the Rio Colomba or Rio Gerosa, small streams to the west of the Trebia, running north into that river: Delbri.ick (i. 303) and Beloch (HZ, n4, 1915, 9) reject the story of the ambush as Roman propaganda designed to mitigate the defeat; but P. was a serious judge of such matters, and is to be followed here.

72. 2. eis €saKwxLXlous: for the numbers on both sides see Kromayer, AS, iii. r. 94-98; DeSanctis, iii. 2. 88-<:Jo; Hermes, 1935, 275-7. (a) Carthaginian: Hannibal's total force is given (§ 8) as 20,000 infantry (Spaniards, Gauls, and Africans), over ro,ooo cavalry, 404

BATTLE OF THE TREBIA

III.

72. 2

and 8,ooo "Aoyxo~opovi: Kat Ba"Ata.pE£1:. Livy (xxi. 55· 2) gives the same figures for cavalry and light-armed, but includes none for the infantry. Taken literally P.'s figures should exclude Mago's I,ooo foot and 1,ooo horse (p. g), and the ::-.lumidian cavalry already sent ahead (71. 10). But the latter at least are probably included, since at Cannae the cavalry were c. :to,ooo (II4. 5); moreover, P.'s source probably had the total number of Numidians, but is less likely to have known the number sent ahead (which is not given). Mago's numbers are known however, and added to the rest bring the total to 4o,ooo, which looks suspiciously like an estimate. If it is, then so presumably are the figures for foot, horse, and light-armed. But even as an estimate the total may still be approximately correct; if so, Hannibal's army had been swelled by 14,ooo Gauls (d. 56.4 for the 26,ooo troops with which he entered Italy). That this is not greatly exaggerated is clear from the fact that the Gauls constituted Hannibal's centre and suffered the heaviest losses (Kromayer, AS, iii. r. 96 n. 2; De Sanctis, iii. 2. 90) ; hence Hannibal's total was perhaps slightly under, or around, 4o,ooo. (b) Roman: these are given (§ n) as 16,ooo foot, 2o,ooo allied foot, and4,ooo cavalry. Livy (xxi. 55· 4) omits to mention the cavalry, adds auxilia Cenomanorwm, and erroneously makes the foot 18,ooo--a discrepancy which may go back to Coelius, but in any case is of no significance. According to Livy (xxi. 17. 5 ff.) the total number of troops assigned to Sempronius and Scipio in 218 was 42,ooo foot and 4,ooo horse; and both Scipio's original legions had been transferred to the Po valley (4o. 14 n.). These figures tally with those for the Trebia, if one reckons the 6,ooo 11'E,aKOVTta7'a.i mentioned here (§ 2) as additional to the forces listed in § u. Because P. states (§ 12) that the Roman forces drawn up amounted to the usual strength of a double consular army, Gelzer (Hermes, 1935, 276 n. 1) assumes that the figures in § n include these 6,ooo 11'E,aKollTLC17'al, and hence that there is no correlation between P.'s figures and those of Livy. But it seems more likely that P.'s figures for the Trebia, i.e. 46,ooo adding in the 6,ooo 7TE,aKovTLC17'a.l, represent the total of the two consular armies present; that is why they coincide with those given by Livy. But the real number at the Trebia could only be arrived at by subtracting something for the heavy casualties beforehand (e.g. 40. 12), and adding a few for the troops brought by P. Scipio from his Spanish-bound legions (56. 5, p,€7 o"Alywv; cf. Livy, xxi. 32. 5), and for the loyal Cenomani who fought with the Romans (Livy, xxi. 55· 4)-despite Kromayer's scepticism (AS, iii. 1. 98 n. 4, 'nur erfunden, urn jemand zu haben, der zuerst vor den Elefanten fliehen konnte'). These figures are irrecoverable; but the Roman total was probably well below 46,ooo. DeSanctis (iii. 2. 89) estimates it at 4o,ooo; but his calculations are hard to follow, and in any case 405

III.

72. 2

HAXNIBAL IN THE PO VALLEY

the words J1TatpoJ1-<:Vo> Tip •. • 11A~OH (§ z) imply that the Romans had a numerical superiority, even though the Carthaginians had the advantage in horse. The fact that the phrase is used in a passage prejudiced against Sempronius (cf. 68. 12) does not invalidate it as evidence for the Roman numbers. 'ITEtaKoVTI.O'Tao;: i.e. uetites: elsewhere translated ypourfooJl.O.xot. 3. TrEpi. XELJ.lEp~vO.o; Tpomio;: i.e. December. If Hannibal was on the top of the pass in late September (34. 6 n., 54· I n.), the Ticinus skirmish fell at the end of that month. But Sempronius could have received orders to leave Sicily by mid-September, if the message was dispatched on Scipio's arrival at Pisa at the end of August (cf. 61. 9 n.). Forty days from Rhegium (not Lilybaeum; cf. 6I. ron., 68. I4 n.) to Ariminum implies two months for the journey from Lilybaeum. Hence Sempronius' army will have reassembled at Ariminum about IS November and reached Placentia about the end of that month. How long was spent in the camp beside the Trebia is not known; but these calculations put the battle in December. Dunbabin (CR, 1931, I22 5) has a chronology which puts the battle into January 217; but this is based on what has been argued is the erroneous view that Hannibal was on the pass in mid-October (d. 54· In.). See further Miltner, Hermes, 1943, 3 (c. IS December). 8. 1Tpoayaywv ws OKTW cnalha: Beloch (HZ, 1!4, I915, ro) detects a mille passus); but see i. 17. 8 n. Roman source (8 stades 9. 8~' clJ.l..o.yyos KepdTwv), where the elephants attack what are clearly the legionaries KaT
BATTLE OF THE TREBIA

III. 74· 8

rear; cf. vi. 21. 7 ff.; E. Meyer, Kl. Schr. ii. 199 ff. The information on strength which follows {§ 12) is especially meant for Greek readers. 73. 1. auveyyus 5vTWY aAA~>..oLs: Kromayer (AS, iii. I. 69) makes the Romans cross the Trebia a little north of (modern) 1.\lolinazzo, and puts the actual battle-ground in an area about 4 km. long, immediately west of the villages of Casaliggio and Tuna. The lightarmed are Hannibal's Aoyxofopot Kat Bb.A.tapds (72. 7) and Sempronius' TT€~aKovnaTa[ (72. 2). 3. Sla TTJY auv.Exela.v Tijs voT(Sos: cf. Livy, xxxvii. 41. 4 (battle of Magnesia), 'umor arcus fundasque et iaculorum amenta emollierat'. 5. u1rijpxe Tava.vTia. TouTwv: for the schematization cf. i. 51. 8, 61. 4· 6. Sla T<7w Sla.aTT)iJ.tJ.Twv: cf. 65. 7. The phrase ETTt p.iav dlle'iav used of the infantry (72. 8) is contrasted with the three Roman lines and does not exclude gaps between the units. 7. u1repa.£povTe<; To us 1TpoTETO.YiJ.EYous T(;w tSiwv: the light-armed seize the moment when the Punic cavalry has routed the Roman to issue out on either side of their infantry and attack the Roman infantry on the flank. Livy (xxi. 55· 5) lets these light-armed first attack the Roman cavalry; but this is designed to make the defeat of the latter less ignominious by increasing the odds against them (Kromayer, AS, iii. 1. 72 n. r; Sontheimer, Klio, 1934, 112-13).

74. 1. TWY EIC TijS eveSpa.s No .... o:l.Swv: cf. Livy, xxi. 55· 9· M ago Numidaeque. There were of course r,ooo foot as well as cavalry; but Holzapfel's emendation Aoyaowv is unlikely in view of Livy. 2. 1rpos Tov U1To~<e£11evov 1ToTa.iJ.ov: i.e. the Trebia. The KEpaTa which flee are the wings of the infantry (cf. 73· 7), not the cavalry which formed the wings of the whole line. 4. oi Se 1TEpl. Ta<; 1TpWTO.S xwpa.s: i.e. the hastati and principes. 6. !lET' aacjla.Aeta.s C11TEXWPTJGO.Y ELS nxa.KEYTLO.Y: it is reasonable to assume a bridge over the Trebia near its confluence with the Po, over which these 1o,ooo survivors could have fled. On the hypothesis that the battle was fought on the right bank, or if Placentia was at Stradella (d. 66. 9 n.), there was no river to cross; but a march of 20-25 km. to Stradella with Hannibal's cavalry abroad seems improbable. Livy's account (xxi. 56. 3 ff.) assumes the battle to be on the right bank; but this is probably a misunderstanding of the tradition more correctly recorded in P. Cf. Hallward, CAH, viii. 709. 7. U1To TE TWY 9T)p(wv Ka.l. TWY l1mewv: i.e. the Punic cavalry had returned from pursuing the Roman in time to help wipe out the remnants of the Roman infantry. 8. ot ••. Sla.cjluyovTEs Twv 1re~wv Ka.i To 1TAE~O"Tov iJ.Epos Twv i1r1Tewv KTA.: Kromayer (AS, iii. r. 74 n. r) takes ot owfvyovns to mean such

4°7

IlL 74· 8

HANNIBAL IN THE PO VALLEY

remnants as were left behind in Scipio's camp; but they are clearly a subdivision Twv Aomwv, who are those left when the 1o,ooo have escaped from the battle, and they survived by making their way, like the bulk of the cavalry, across the Trebia. Joined no doubt by any men from Scipio's camp (though P. does not mention these), they v.rill have fallen in with the 1o,ooo (TJ 7Tponp1Jp.ivov avanJp.a.) near Placentia. 10. -rou~; 8£ uAEiou~; O.uoAwA~vcu Twv KEATCJv: for Hannibal had put them in the centre, where the Romans broke through (72. 8, 74· 4). The subsequent deaths from rain and snow(§ u} are after the battle (cf. Miltner, Hermes, 1943, 1o-u}; according to Livy (xxi 56. 6) elephanti prope omnes perished at the Trebia, seven more in the course of the winter (xxi. 58. u), leaving one (as here} on which Hannibal crossed the marshes of the Arno (xxii. z. 10). 75. Reactions at Rome. From a clearly Roman source (De Sanctis, iii. 2. 172; Kahrstedt, iii. 169). 1. -r~v vlJC'IlV a.u-rwv o XEtJ.Udv 0.4>ElAE-ro: it has been suggested that this false report lies behind Livy's account of a further battle between Hannibal and Sempronius (Livy, x:xi. 59); cf. Sieglin, Rh. Mus., 1883, 363 ff. ; Meyer, Kl. Schr. ii. 337 n. ; De Sanctis, iii. 2. 99-102. Livy (xxi. 57· s-59· 1o) contains a record of widespread activity by Hannibal, including an unsuccessful attempt to cross the Apennines, which has been treated, since Seeck (Hermes, 1874, 152 ff.), as apocryphal. Miltner (Hermes, 1943, 1 ff.) has demonstrated that these incidents are possible chronologically; but the case for regarding them as in the main annalistic invention remains strong. 3. Ets -rns u6AELS: Placentia and Cremona, as Livy (xxi. s6. 9) explicitly states. 4. ds Ia.p86va. JCa.l ILKEAta.v: cf. App. H ann. 8, ToVs p.tv ls 'lf31Jpla.v lm:p7TDV, TDVS s· ls .Ea.pDova. KaKelv'Y/V 7ToAep.ovp.lV1JV, TDVS o' ls .E£Kt.Ala.v. In 216 there were two legions in Sicily (Livy, xxiii. 25. 1o), and in 215 one in Sardinia (Livy, xxiii. 34· 12}, evidently those sent in winter 218/17. Cf. De Sanctis, iii. 2. u8; Klotz, Phil., 1933. 55; against Gelzer, Hermes, 1935, 278--9 (unconvincing). In the table facing p. 104 in CAH, viii, these legions are incorrectly shovrn as being sent out

after Trasimene. Ets Tapa.v-ra. upo4>vAa.JCas KTh.: not mentioned elsewhere; their num~ ber is uncertain. Klotz (Phil., I933· ss} reckons them one legion strong, bringing the total at the beginning of 217 to twelve (four under the consuls, two in Spain, two in Sicily, two at Rome, and one in Sardinia). Appian (Hann. 8) gives a total of thirteen; but if this figure is based on calculations which included the two supplementary legions raised after Trasimene {Livy, xxii. n. 3), it does not allow for a full legion here. 408

BATTLE OF THE TREBIA

III. 76. 5

va.us E~~KovTa. 'ITEVTTJPE~S: evidently replacements of old vessels, faults in which had become apparent in the course of 218; cf. Thiel, 48. 5. r vcuos ••• IEpou(A~os Ka.l r a.~os .PA.a.!LLVLOS: Cn. Servilius P.f. Q.n. Geminus and C. Flaminius C.f. Ln., the consuls of A.u.c. 537 = 217 B.c. Servilius (d. Munzer, RE, 'Servilius (61)', cols. 1794-5) was probably son of the consul of 252 (i. 39· 8 n.); on Flaminius cf. ii. 21. 8 n.; 32. Iff. This was Flaminius' second consulship, and his election

represents a popular reaction against the nobility in view of the setbacks of 218 (d. De Sanctis, iii. 2. 33; Scullard, Pol. 44). Sempronius will have returned to Rome to hold the elections after the battle (cf. 68. 12-13 n.; Livy, xxi. 57· 4; Miltner, Hermes, I943· 8-9). That P. is here referring to the activity of Servilius and Flaminius as consuls designate before their entry into office (Miltner, Hermes, I943· 14 n. 3) is not clearly indicated by the Greek words v1raTo~ n>n Ka0EaTaJLEVm.

7. '1TEATo~6pous: in Xenophon (Cyrop. vii. 1. 24) 1T€ATo,P6po! are peltasts. In third-century Boeotia, after the adoption of Macedonian equipment, they form the essential element in the army (d. Feyel, 202) and, like the Macedonian peltasts (ii. 65. 2 n.), may well be heavy-armed (cf. CR, 1946, 42). But these 1T€ATo,P6po' are no doubt the mille sagittarii ac funditores, whom Hiero sent as part of a valuable convoy of men and materials early in 216 (Livy, xxii. 37· 8). 76. Cn. Scipio in Spain (2IB) Although this chapter contains elements designed to glorify Scipio, like the capture of the d7ToaKEmJ, its main source is uncertain. Cf. Livy, xxi. 6o. 1-61. 4 (s-n is a doublet, perhaps due to Coelius); De Sanctis, iii. 2. 172-3, 241 n. 76. 1. o Ka.Ta.Au~8El:s ••• aTpa.T'I'Jyos: cf. 49· 4, where, however, the fleet is not mentioned; for Emporiae see 39· 7. 5. 'ITEpi 'ITOALV • • • K£aaa.v: near Tarraco, according to Hubner {Hermes, 1866, 77 ff., 337 ff.; RE, 'Cessetani', col. 1995), who suggests Cissa (Livy: Cissis) was the main town of the regia Cessetania (Pliny, Nat. hist. iii. 21). For the coins see Mon. ling. iber. 21; those with Iberian legends only are inscribed Cese, and Vallejo (xlviii ff.), who adduces the parallel of Arse-Saguntum (cf. 15 n.), plausibly suggests that Cese was the Iberian name for Tarraco. Frontinus (Strat. ii. 3· I} gives some details of the battle of Cissa; and Livy (xxi. 6o. 7) puts the Carthaginian losses at the unlikely figure of 6,ooo killed and 2,ooo prisoners. a'ITnaT]s TTJS n'IToaKeufjs ••• n'IToAEAEL!L!livTJS: cf. 35· 5· The d1roaKw~ included persons (i. 66. 7) who would have been a hindrance in the Alps, and left in Spain served as a guarantee of loyalty. DeSanctis 409

III. 76. 5

CN. SCIPIO IN SPAIN

(iii. 2. 172, 240) calls this account afavola romana; but drroaKwa.l not infrequently remained at base. Cf. i. 66. 7 f.; Diod. xx. 47· 4, where soldiers taken prisoner by Demetrius Poliorcetes desert at the first opportunity to the Ptolemaic governor of Cyprus oul ro ras d.rroaKwds €v Alyti7T7'4J KO.Ta.AEAoomfva' -rra.pd IhoAep.a.£41 (Holleaux, Etudes, iii. 22 n. 1). 6. Tous tvToS "I~1Jpos: i.e. north of the Ebro (suggesting a Roman source in contrast to§ II, 14. 9, iv. 28. I; cf. x. 7. 3, 35· 3). 7. ~voo~C..A1JV: Latin I ndibilis. He was {1a.aoAEv;; rwv '1Aepy7Jrwv (x. 18. 7; cf. Livy, xxii. 21. 2, xxix. I. 19; Dio, fg. 57. 42); cf. 35· 2 n. Elsewhere he has close relations with the Lacetani (Livy, xxviii. 24. 4) and Suessetani (xxv. 34· 6), which confirms P.'s description of him here. When he was released is not recorded; but in 217 he is again fighting on the Punic side (Livy, xxii. 21. 2). 10.
77-79. Hannibal crosses the Apennines. The main source is Carthaginian, and probably that used for the crossing of the Alps (Silenus). The worthless anecdote in 78. 1-4 may be either Greek or Roman (cf. De Sanctis, iii. 2. 168, 173); it appears also in Zon. viii. 24. 77. 1. Dispositions of Flaminius and Servitius. According to Livy, xxi. 63. 15, Flaminius had four legions in 217; but Kahrstedt (iii. 404~5) has shown that such numbers cannot be fitted into the terrain at Trasimene, and it can be assumed that Flaminius had two legions only. Livy, xxii. 27. Io, shows Fabius in command of four legions after Trasimene, of which two had belonged to Servilius (cf. Livy, xxii. II. 2-3). Because Servilius had 4,ooo horse in 217 (86. 3) Kahrstedt argues that he was in command of four legions; but this again seems unlikely (see notes ad Joe.). Certainly 107. 9-1o suggests no doubling of consular armies untiln6. If each consul commanded two legions, what was their origin? P. here suggests that they were newly enrolled (cf. too Cic. de diu. i. n '(Flaminius) qui exerdtu lustrato cum Arretium uersus castra mouisset et contra Hannibalem legiones HRR, Coelius Antipater, fg. 2o) ; but this does not duceret .. .' explain what happened to the experienced troops wintering in the Po valley. Livy (xxi. 63. 15) makes Flaminius enter on his consulship at Ariminum, and march with four legions from there to Arretium; but this is suspect as part of the noble tradition which is critical of the behaviour of the popular leader. That Flaminius took over the 410

THE CAMPAIGN OF 217 IN ITALY; TRASDfENE

Ill. 77·

1

remnants of Sempronius' two legions quae Placentiae hibernabant may, however, be correct (Livy, xxi. 63. 1), for it fits Appian's statement (Hann. 8) that Servilius took over those of Scipio. An additional complication is Livy, xxi. 59· 10, Sempronius Lucam contendit. Flaminius could have instructed Sempronius to march from Placentia to Luca (Livy, xxi. 56. 9) ; but the journey would be as difficult as Hannibal's, and it would contradict Livy, xxi. 63. I. Miltner, who accepts the credibility of Livy, xxi. 57· 5-59. 1o, believes (Hermes, 1943, 13 ff.) that Sempronius marched to Luca to counter a supposed march of Hannibal into Liguria, with consequent threat from the coast road into Etruria; but if this section of Livy is rejected (75· 1 n., cf. De Sanctis, iii. 2. r86), Luca is probably best left out of the picture (Klotz, Rh. Mus., 1936, 107). Various attempts have been made to reconcile P. and Livy. Thus Miltner (Hermes, 1943, r ff.) argues that Sempronius marched his army from Cremona to Luca; the praetor Atilius took Scipio's men from Placentia to Ariminum; then, when Hannibal marched back from Liguria into Cisalpine Gaul [sic], Sempronius shifted his forces from Luca to Arretium; Sempronius crossed the Apennines to Ariminum to hand over his troops (still at Arretium !) to Flaminius; Flaminius, upon the arrival of Servilius with his new troops at Ariminum, then marched, with the troops which he had taken over from Atilius, back to Arretium. Against any account so complicated as this Kahrstedt (iii. 403) argues for the improbability of bringing the Po legions into Etruria, while new recruits were taken from Rome to Ariminum; and his argument seems to have influenced Hallward, who writes (C AH, viii. 44): 'The defeated army of the Po, strengthened to two legions, was taken over at Ariminum, to which it had retired, by the new consul Cn. Servilius, while Flaminius with two newly raised legions marched to Arretium in Etruria' (in the table facing p. II4, however, following De Sanctis, he gives Sempronius' legions to Flaminius). Kahrstedt, however, does not allow for the possibility of a policy of dividing the Po veterans between the two armies, as a stiffening for raw recruits. This would appear reasonable, and would explain the tradition that Flaminius received Sempronius' remnants, and Servilius Scipio's (see above); it would also explain how Flaminius came to be at Ariminum. But because the armies of 217, though nominally the legions of Trebia, were in fact mainly new levies, P. has chosen to stress this aspect; hence his account here. See further below, 84. 7, 88. 7; for discussion DeSanctis, iii. 2. n6-r7; Kahrstedt, iii. 403 ff.; Klotz, Phil., 1933, 51 ff.; Rh. Mus., 1936, 104 ff.; Gelzer, Hermes, 1935, 278 ff.; Banti, Atene e Roma, 1932, 98-120; Miltner, Hermes, 1943. 1-21; Vallejo, 129-32. On the situation of Arretium see ii. r6. 2 n., of Ariminum, ii.

III. 77·

1

THE CAMPAIGN OF 217 IN ITALY; TRASIMENE

14. n n., iii. 6r. n n. For a sound appraisal of the Roman defensive plan see Hallward, CAH, viii. 44-45. 7. TrOAEow 1] ALJLEow l]Aa.TTwa9a.( n: 'quos portus Gallis ademerint Romani, difficile dictu fuerit'; so Schweighaeuser, who proposes Anf-twatv for Atf-t€atv. But the sense is 'who had suffered damage to their cities or harbours'; and the lesson was directed not just to the Gauls, but to all the inhabitants of Italy, especially in the south. 78. 1. owLKLK~ !npa.TT)YTJJLO.TL: for the proverbial Punica fides see Sall. lug. Io8. 3; Livy, xxi. 4· 9, xxii. 6. r2, xlii. 47· 7; Cic. off. i. 38; leg. agr. ii. 95; Hor. Odes, iv. 4· 49; Virg. A en. i. 66I; and later authors. Wunderer (i. 114) argues that the proverb was also Greek, quoting Homer, Od. xiv. 288; but the tllotvtKtK6v Tt (ifJt::v8o>) of Plato (Rep. iii. 4I4 c) merely recalls the legend of Cadmus (cf. Laws, ii. 663 E, -rd Tov I:t8wv{ov f-tV6o>..6yryf-l,a); and the tllowtKtK6v >/Jt::u8o> of Eustathius (ad Od. xiv. 289 (p. 1757· 59)) may reflect Roman influence, like P. here. For the attribution of perjidia to other enemies of Rome in Roman tradition see Heinze, V e:rgils epische Technikz (Leipzig, I9o8), IOn. 2. 2. TTJV a9EO·ia.v TWV KEATwv: cf. ii. J2. 8 n. On Hannibal's disguises see Livy, xxii. 1. 2-4; Zon. viii. 24. Miltner (Hermes, I943, I6) argues that the Gallic hostility towards Hannibal (cf. § 5) was due to his return into their territory from Liguria (Livy, xxi. 59· ro); but this depends on accepting the annalistic account of the events of winter 2I8/I7 (75· In.). 6. UflO. T~ TTJV wpa.v flETa.~ci.AAELV: this phrase suggests early April, which would make the battle of Trasimene May (for Hannibal moved fairly rapidly); and many scholars accept this dating (e.g. Cornelius, s-<5. who makes the battle c. I May; Miltner, Hermes, I943. 3 ff.). It gets some support from the dates of Fabius' dictatorship, which he surrendered before 'autumn' was over (Livy, xxii. 32. I), exacto iam prope semenstri imperio (Livy, xxii. 31. 7). On the other hand, this last phrase is loose, and does not rule out the possibility that Fabius entered his dictatorship in June and resigned it in November. Moreover, (a) it is unlikely that Hannibal left camp before the snow had cleared from the passes and the crops were sufficiently advanced to afford foraging for his cavalry; (b) Ovid (Fasti, vi. 767-8) dates the battle to 2I June: tempora si ueteris quaeris temeraria damni, quintus ab extremo mense bis ille dies.

(quartus in two inferior MSS. may be ignored.) (c) The news of the battle reached Philip Vat Argos at the time of the Nemea (v. 101. 6), which fell in July.

THE CAMPAIGN OF 217 IN ITALY; TRASIMENE

III. BI.

li

It may therefore be assumed that Ovid's date is reliable, that the

calendar was at this time running approximately true, and that Hannibal left his winter quarters in May. See De Sanctis, iii. 2. II9-21. 1'fJV ••. s~a. TWV ~Awv Ets TuppT)vla.v tPEpouua.v: both Kromayer (AS, iii. 1. Io4-47) and DeSanctis {iii. 2. 104--9) agree that the most probable pass is that v-ia Bologna-Porretta-Pistoia (the Pass of Collina, 3,o4o ft.). Those farther west would have brought Hannibal to the coast, which is excluded by 87. 4, or to the marshes of the lower Arno, which must have been virtually impassable for an army, while that farther east via Forli would expose Hannibal to an attack from Arretium, and does not touch on any marshland. The marshes through which Hannibal passed are those of the middle Arno between Pistoia and Fiesole (8o. In.); cf. Livy, xxii. 2. 2, 'per paludes ... qua fluuius Am us per eos dies soli to magis inundauerat'. (Beloch, HZ, 114, 1915, 15 accepts Strabo's statement (v. 217) that they were in the Po valley; but cf. De Sanctis, iii. 2. 107-8.) On Hannibal's order of march see Livy, xxii. 2. 3-4. 79. 8. TJf:lEpa.s TE1'1'a.pa.s Kat TpEi:s vuKTa.s: cf. Livy, xxii. 2. 7, 'maximeque omnium uigiliae conficiebant per quadriduum iam et tres nodes toleratae'. From Pistoia to Florence is only 35 km.; hence there is either exaggeration or misunderstanding. Perhaps the four days and three nights represent the time taken by the whole army (Kromayer, AS, iii. r. 13o-2); or they may originally have covered a longer section of the march. Certainly it is physically impossible for an army to maintain an unbroken march for 84 hours. See DeSanctis, iii. 2. 107. ~Aeu~ Ka.TeaTpa.ToTI'EOEuae: this does not imply that the marsh was in close proximity to Arretium, for Hannibal may have learnt indirectly of Flaminius' whereabouts (Livy, xxii. 3· I, says per praemissos exploratores). In fact 82. I makes it clear that the camp was near Faesulae. 3. oxAoKOTI'OV ••• Ka.l OT)f:l«ywyov; on the hostility shown by P. and his source towards Flaminius cf. ii. 21. 8 n.

80. L Trpos Tois

81. 1. &.yvoei Ka.l. TETu4>wTa.L: originally medical terms, TiJt/>o> and Tv6w are used metaphorically by Plato and especially Demosthenes (ix. 20, xviii. n); later they became a Cynic-Stoic catchword meaning 'false dogmatism' (as here) or 'false pride' (cf. § 9, xvi. 22. 4). See Wunderer, i. 89; Tarn, AG, 240-1 n. 70; Alex. ii. 123 n. r. 2. Ka.T' liv8pa. Ka.l ~uy6v: cf. i. 45· 9 n. 11. Ka.8u1rep yO.p ve.»s KTA.: for the metaphor cf. vi. 44· 3, x. 33· S· 413

III.&:

THE CAMPAIGN OF 217 IN ITALY; TRASIMENE

82. Flaminius indted to seek battle. He was moved by fear of popular opinion when Hannibal ravaged the land ax€oov ~ws 1'1'pd;; a?rrTjv TTJV 'Pwp.TJv (§ 6). De Sanctis (iii. z. 37-38) questions this interpretation. Hannibal is described (§ 9) as marching ws 7rpos T~j) 'Pwp.TJ" ..• Tfjs- TuppTJvlas-; but in fact the road to Rome from Cortona led west of Trasimcne via Clusium (cf. the Gallic route in ii. 25. z), consequently when Hannibal branched off to the north of Trasimene, he was clearly not making for Rome (and his movements after the battle confirm this). Had Flaminius really intended a battle, he would have caught Hannibal emerging from the marshes; but in fact the consuls had arranged that he should keep in touch with Hannibal while Servilius hastened down the Via Flaminia to protect Rome or, if he outstripped Hannibal, return north through Perusia and Cortona to join his colleague. P.'s account of Flaminius is admittedly from a hostile tradition; but his clear statement that Flaminius sought the battle is not to be so lightly dismissed, for his plan of campaign must have been known and reported at Rome by survivors. Moreover, the reference to Rome is§ 6 is not to be dismissed (as De Sanctis dismisses it) because of Hannibal's ultimate direction; for no doubts are likely to have arisen about this in Flaminius' mind until Hannibal turned cast along the north shore of Trasimene. Nor is the reference to Rome in § 9 as wholly wrong as has been supposed ; for Hannibal cannot have had Cortona on his left and Trasimene on his right simultaneously, and this phrase probably compresses two stages in his advance, one in which Cortona was left behind (and Rome was still apparently Hannibal's goal) and a second when he switched east along the north shore of the lake (cf. Caspari, EHR, 19ro, 420 n. ro). The area devastated at this point (cf. Livy, xxii. 4· r, 'quod agri est inter Cortonam urbem Trasumennumque lacum') is probably the plain of the Chiana (cf. Krornayer, AS, iii. I. 135 n. r). When Hannibal turned east he apparently placed himself between the two consular armies (Hallward, C AH, viii. 46); and Flaminius does not seem to have been the sort of man to forgo such easy prey. 1. JLLKpov l11rep6.pa.s T~v Twv 'PwJ.Lo.twv C1TpaTo1Te8e1o.v : Hannibal marched south leaving Flaminius on his left at Arretium (probably to attract an attack: Zon. viii. zs; Hallward, C AH, viii. 46); d. Livy, xxii. 3· 6, 'laeua relicto hoste Faesulas petcns (praeteriens Conway) mcdio Etruriae agro praedatum profectus . . .'. Livy's Facsulas petens may be a distorted referencetotheoriginalofP.'sdm) Twv twTa TTJil tf>ata6Aav T67rwv, but is nonsense as it stands; nor is Con· way's emendation much better, since Faesulaewas so miles in the rear when Hannibal passed Flaminius. Dunbabin (CR, 1931, 125-6) proposed Cortonam petens; but the error probably goes behind Livy's text. 8, &..MO'eLS ~
a,a

414

THE CAMPAIGN OF 217 IN ITALY; TRASIMENE

III. 83

9. Kup-rwvLov: Cortona lay 28 km. south of Arretium. -rl-Jv T npaLJ.L~""Tl" KnAoUtJ-EVTjV XLJ.Lvt'jv: Hannibal's route from Faesulae to the Val di Chiana and the Lago di Trasimeno is not recorded; for the topography see Kromayer, AS, iii. L rso ff. and Karten 4 and 5; maps of the battle area in De Sanctis, iii. 2 and CAH, viii, facing p. 45·

83-85. 6. The battle of Trasimene: cf. Livy, xxii. 4· 2-7. 4; App. Hann. 9-ro; Zon. viii. 25. Site and tactics are discussed by De Sanctis, iii. 2. ro9-I6; Kromaycr, iii. r. rso--93; Caspari, EHR, 1910, 417-29; Hallward, C A 1!, viii. 7IO; and the main hypotheses are illustrated in Kromayer, AS, iii. I, Karte 5 and Kromayer-Veith, Schlachtenatlas, Rom. Abt. i, Blatt 4· The site depends essentially on the identification of the av>..
(i) The avA..wv Mapcruas is a defile between two mountain ranges; and in vii. 6. 2 an av.:\wv brlTTecw; (like that at Trasimene) runs through the middle of Leontini, TOV 8' avAwe'O!> 1Tap' €Ka.TI.pav rryv 1TA€updv 1Tap~KEL >..6os:. In each case the av>.ov mhos KanAct~ETo (83. 2). The M~os is clearly that in § r; otherwise there is no sense in mentioning the latter. But what

4I5

•zn

{';)

Dt.Utitore

~ /sol11

l. A I< E

Poslt!c/1 in amtJt)sl>

=}

Battle pcsitioa

-

'L

Maggiore

THASIMEIVE

I

HannJoil

• - Komnns

km, 1000

0

,

m. ~3---~

7•

THE BATTLE OF TRASIMENE.

Based on Kromayer.

THE CAMPAIGN OF 217 IN ITALY; TRASIMENE

III. 83

of the phrase 8u),Odiv 'Tbv a.ti>.wva. 71'a.pd. T~v Mp.v'fJv? De Sanctis (iii. 2. nr) argues that though the a.ti>.wv is described as from the end by the lake, Hannibal crossed it parallel to the lake; thus 'non permette il testo di P. d'identificare il colle di rimpetto (Ka.-ra.VT£Kpv) all' osservatore che volga le spalle allago con quello di fronte alia strada che segue la sponda'. But De Sanctis's observer, with his back to the lake (Hallward, CAH, viii. 710, puts him in a boat), corresponds on this hypothesis to neither the Carthaginian nor the Roman view of the battle, and is wholly otiose; P. further mentions in one half of the sentence a M7>os which never appears again, and in the second half -r6v .•• >.64>ov which is apparently quite distinct from it; finally, he describes Hannibal's troop dispositions on the right and left (§§ 3-4), when in fact he has allowed him only a right, because the lake is on the left. Clearly S,t::>.Od!v -rov a.v>.wva. 71'a.pd. -r~v >.lp.VTJv must mean something else; and the easiest explanation is that it is a compressed phrase (cf. 82 n.) meaning 'along the lake side and through the valley' (as Paton takes it). In § 7 Flaminius marches 71'apd. -r~v Alp.VTJV t::ls 'TOll ••. av>.wva. P.'s failure to make a sharp distinction between the av>.wv proper and the approach along the lake side is evident in his account of the troop dispositions (§ 2). (ii) Hannibal's troop dispositions. Hannibal occupied the A64>o> with his Iberians and Libyans, and encamped there (§ 2) ; his slingers and pikemen he brought round from the vanguard and concealed them behind the hills to the right of the av>.wv, extending his line; his cavalry and Celts he brought round behind the hills on the left in a continuous line (uuvt::xt::fs). Right and left would perhaps most naturally be from Hannibal's standpoint in the battle; but the last of the cavalry are said to be at the entrance to the defile between the hillside and the lake (§ 4), and since the Romans were approaching along the lake in a clockwise direction, the entrance to the defile is clearly west of the av>.wv; hence it follows that right and left refer to Hannibal's original direction of march. Nor is this odd, since the manreuvres were executed from march order (cf. § 3, Ka-ra ,.~v 71'pw-ro71'opt::lav) ; nor would the troops ambushed in the hills march to the far end of the av>.wv before being sent to their place of concealment (cf. Kromayer, AS, iii. r. 157 n. 2). Thus, cavalry and Gauls lay to the left of the av>.wv, as one ascended from the lake; and on the right were the slingers. Once the Romans had entered the defile they were attacked from the front, the rear, and the flanks (84. 3, J.K -rwv 71'Aaylwv). Distinct, however, from these troops already in the defile (84. 7, €71't::uov ••• Ka.-ra -r6v a.v>.wva) are those who were caught on the march (Ka-rd. 71'opdav) between lake and hills, in the narrows (84. 8, ~~~ -rof> unvof>), and met a more pitiable fate, being driven into the lake and either cut down or drowned (84. 9-10). This implies that the u-rt::H:I. were included in the ambush as well as the av>.wv

III. 83

THE CAMPAIGN OF 217 IN ITALY; TRASIMENE

proper, and helps to explain why P. does not everywhere distinguish between the two so clearly as he does in his account of the actual fighting. Finally (84. II), P. returns, from the approaches, to the avA.wv to describe how about 6,000 found their way forward to the high ground, only to be surrounded and forced to surrender. This account, with its clear distinction between the fighting in the avA.wv and that beside the lake, fits the rest of P.'s picture; so an attempt may now be made to relate it to the topography of Lake Trasimene. (iii) The site of the battle. Of the views listed above, (c) and (d) do not allow sufficient room for manceuvring, nor for Flaminius' numbers (see below); and the arguments against (a) have already been stated under (i). There remains (b), the view of Henderson and Kromayer. Against it is the smallness of the valley between Torricella and Montecolognola. But if in fact the ambush stretched beyond this avA.wv, and along the shore of the lake from Torricella as far west as Montigeto, so that fighting occurred along the whole of this route, most of DeSanctis's objections are answered; and in fact this view is supported by the fact that one side of the at)A.wv was covered by a mere 8,ooo slingers, while the other (including, we must suppose, the extension along the lake) contained perhaps 3o,ooo Gallic in~ fantry and cavalry of all kinds (on the numbers, which depend on those at II4. 5, see Kromayer, AS, iii. 1. 210-II); see further, 83. 3-4 n. The importance P. attributes to the fighting in the avA.wv proper would be explained if one of his main sources (e.g. Silenus) was an eyewitness in Hannibal's camp (cf. Kromayer, AS, iii. I. I72 n. 3; De Sanctis, iii. :z. IJJ). The follm'
THE CAMPAIGN OF 217 IN ITALY; TRASIMENE

III. 84. 7

Baleares and spearsmen from the vanguard'; cf. Livy, xxii. 4. 3, Baleares ceteramque leuem annaturam. inro Touc; ••• l3ouvouc; ••• O"'l'~o-TnAE: 'he stationed them in conceal~ ment behind the hills'; cf. xi. 21. 2. 3-4. E"'l't 11'0Au "'l'a.pa.TE&va.c; ••. 11'ape€ETE&VE o-uvexe'Lc;: arguing against Kromayer's position for the battle De Sanctis (iii. 2. rr5) observes that the S,ooo Baleares and light troops, spread over a mere Soo metres, would in fact be closely ordered, whereas the Gauls, whom Kromayer reckons at 2o,ooo, had to cover 5 km., and were therefore extended. It is, however, dubious whether J.rr' 1To:l.v 1Tap6.TE,va;; implies deployment in a less compact line than does 1rapeg./.retv£ uvvEXEt;;; the former may simply mean 'deploying them over a \\ide area' (including depth as well as length), and the latter 'he extended them in a continuous line', i.e. such that they did not lose contact, an important point in such an extended position. On the position of the cavalry (between Montigeto and Passignano) cf. Livy, xxii. 4· 3, 'equites ad ipsas fauces saltus tumulis apte tegentibus locat, ut, ubi intrassent Romani, obiecto equitatu clausa omnia lacu ac mantibus essent'; and more specifically Zon. viii. 25, Toii J.LEV 1re,oil To 1TAdov Ka.Ta Ta DP7J i\oxav iTa.~E, TO a· l7NrtKC>V cnJj.tTTaY tgw TWV un:vwv &.rf>avw;; irf>Eop~vnv iKei\<::vuE. Kromayer, AS, iii. 1. 159 n. I. 4. TTJV e'lao5ov: the unvq mipooo;; of § I. 7. KaT£o-TpaTO"'I'E5EuKwc; ••• '!!'poe; a. TTI A£1-wn: probably east of Mte Gualandro, between its slopes and the R. Sanguineto; on De Sanctis's theory this camp lies west of the mountain, since he puts the entrance to the avi\wv at the defile of Borghetto. "'l'apa TTJV At~J.V'lv Etc; Tov ••• a.~Awva.: past Montigeto and Passignano to Torricella; the rearguard would be well behind.

om

84. 1. 0.1-1-a. T~ To 11'A£LCM'ov IJ-~poc; ••• 11'poao€ga.a9a.L: cf. 83. 2 n. The avi\wv in the strict sense, from Torricella inland, could not have contained the greater part of Flaminius' army. · O&a'll'£jJ.\jiQ.iJ.EVoc; 1Tp6<;; Touc; tv Tais Ev~Spa.Ls: easily organized, since the Gauls and cavalry were all in touch (uvv€xti';;). 3. ot s· EK TWV 11'Aay«uv: strictly true only for those already beyond Torricella; the rest in the uT€vd. were attacked only on the left. 4. U"'I'O Tfjc; TOU 11'p0€CM'WTO<; aKp~ala.c;: a favourite phrase; cf. v. I06. 8; vii. 5· 3· The death of Flaminius (§ 6) is attributed by Livy (xxii. 6. 3) and Silius (v. 645) to Ducarius, an Insubrian who recognized his national enemy. 7. E11'mov ••• o-xe5bv E:s !J-up(ou<;; Ka.t 11'£VTaKLaxtX£ouc;: probably the total figure for the Roman dead, including those who fell in the un:vd., and for whom P. gives no separate figure; cf. Livy, xxii. 7· 2, 'quindecim milia Romanorum in acie caesa' (Fabius); Plut. Fab. 3· P. (85. 1) gives a further 15,ooo prisoners (cf. Plut. loc. cit.); and Fabius •P9

III.84.7

THE CAMPAIGN OF 217 IN ITALY; TRASIMENE

(Livy, xxii. 7· z) 1o,ooo survivors. Fabius mentions no prisoners, and it seems likely that his figure of w,ooo preserves the number of those who actually got away, including released allies (85. 3); this implies a total of 25,ooo and is to be followed in preference toP. who will go back to a Punic source (De Sanctis, iii. 2. 117-18). Livy (xxi. 17. 5) gives Sempronius' forces in the Po valley in 218 as 24,ooo foot and 2,400 horse; there is no reason why Flaminius' two legions should not have come to 25,ooo in all; cf. Kromayer, AS, iii. 1. 213. 8. ot Se K<ml. vope(a.v KTA.: those still between Passignano and Torricella. 10. nves Se va.pa.Ka.AEO'UVTES a.lhous Sle~Oc:i.ptjO'UV: 'steeled themselves to self-destruction'; cf. Livy, xxii. 6. 6, sese immergunt. With this text Paton translates 'they were dispatched ... by begging their comrades to do them this service' (perhaps misled by Schweighaeuser's rendering of a different reading). 11. e~a.KLU):IALOL ••• Tous Ka.Tu vpouwvov VLKTJO'UVTES: Kromayer (AS, iii. 1. 164) assumes that this break-through took place against the light troops on Hannibal's left wing (despite the words Tovs KaTa 7Tpoaw7Tov); and this is perhaps confirmed by their expectation that they would meet further opponents(§ 12), which would not have been likely had they broken through the heavy infantry. The high ground which they reached (§ 13) will be the hills behind Montecolognola. 14. Tou uTpa.TT)you ••. Ma.O.p~a.: often mentioned by Livy (xxi. 12. 1, 45· z, etc.); cf. Ehrenberg, RE, 'Maharbal (2)', cols. 523-4. Livy (xxii. 6. n) puts him in charge of cavalry for this pursuit, an impossibility in this terrain; cf. De Sanctis, iii. 2. 42 n. 62. ws TEu~oJ.LEVoL TllS uWTTJp(a.s: their lives were to be spared (but they were not, as Livy, xxii. 6. n and App. H ann. 10 state, to go free). 85. 1. i>VTaS v.heCous TWV J.LUplwv Ka.i 1TEV'TUKU.7XLAiwv: cf. 84. 7 n. 4. Tov a.6Tov ••• Myov: cf. 77. 3-7. 5. eis XLAious Ka.t vevTa.Koulous: Klotz (Livius, 138) would read (ow)xtMovs, comparing Livy, xxii. 7· 3, duo milia quingenti; but

the discrepancy can be otherwise explained. 7-10. The news reaches Rome: cf. Livy, xxii. 7· 6--q, where the praetor who announces the defeatisM. Pomponius Matho. P.'s prosenatorial narrative probably derives from Fabius; cf. Gelzer, Hermes, 1933, 153; Klotz, Livius, 139. The gfLf3o>.m are the rostra; cf. vi. 53· 1. 86. 1-7. Defeat of C. Centenius: news received at Rome: cf. Livy, xxii. 8. 1-4; App. Hann. 9-11; Nepos, Hann. 4· 3; Zon. viii. 25. Appian's account is wholly at variance with P. and Livy; and though Klotz (Phil., 1933. s6), following]. ]ung (Wien. Stud., I896, 99-115), distinguishes two separate actions under two separate men called

THE CAMPAIGN OF 217 IN ITALY; TRASIMENE

IIL86.9

Centenius, it seems probable that Appian's account contains a doublet from the battle of M. Centenius in Lucania in zrz (Li'vy, xxv. 19); cf. Pareti, Riv. jil., 1912, 402-10; Hallward, CAH, viii. 47· Kromayer (AS, iii. 1. r93-9) rejects Appian, but accepts his location of Centenius' defeat near Lake Plestia, which is to be identified with a marshy lake near the Pass of Colfiorito in the Apennines east of Foligno, leading into Picenum. However, from Passignano to Plestia is 90 km., and it is unlikely that Maharbal could advance so far and yet that news of his victory could reach Rome three days after that of Trasimene (§ 6). De Sanctis (iii. z. rz:z-4) therefore locates the defeat near the Lacus Umber at the junction of the Chiascio and Topino, near Assisi, and suggests that an annalist took the name Umber in a general sense and added a false specification. The exact site of the battle remains uncertain. 1. rva.~os IepouOuos: cf. 15· 5 n., and for his forces, 77. I n. On the situation of Ariminum cf. 61. I I n.; on the mouths of the Po cf. ii. r6. 7 n.

3.

ra.~ov Kev-n)vLo\1: Livy (xxii. 8. I) calls him propraetore; on the propriety of such a title doubts are thrown by Mommsen, who suggests that he may possibly have been so designated by the praetor urbcmus (St.-R. i. 68r n. 4). In Zonaras (viii. 25) he is aTpaT7]y6s. TETpa.KIUXLAlous t'IMTets: cf. Livy, loc. cit., quattuor milia equitum. Appian (Hann. 9-n) makes Centenius a priuatus, dispatched from Rome with a force of 8,ooo men, not specifically cavalry. Kahrstedt (iii. 405) argues that 4,ooo cavalry imply an army of four legions; and Appian (Hann. 1o) assigns 4o,ooo men to Servilius {perhaps going back to a Greek source which, like P. apud Livy xxxvii. 39· 7, equates a legion plus its auxiliaries with two 0'7'por6'1Te<5a; cf. x. r6. 4; DeSanctis, iii. 2. u6). Whether P.'s source l:tere is Carthaginian (De Sanctis, iii. z. n7) or Roman {Gelzer, Hermes, 1935, 283 n. 3), Kahrstedt's assumption is not essential; and it is contradicted by ro7. 9-10; see further 77. I n. 6. Tov '!T0.8ous . • . i!:la-a.vet ~AEyj.La.lvovTos: for the metaphor cf. Plato, Rep. ii. 372 E, 'lToAts ,PI.eyp.alvovaa. 7. a.uTotcpchopos ••• aTpa.nwou: a dictator; cf. Livy, xxii. 8. 5· 86. 8-87. 5. Hannibal's advance to the Adriatic. Probably from a Carthaginian source; De Sanctis, iii. 2. I73· Cf. Livy, xxii. 9· 1-4. It is in fact improbable that Hannibal ever proposed marching directly on Rome (though Flaminius could not know that) ; his plan was to raise all Italy against her. Cf. Hallward, CAH, viii. 47· 86. 9. i]Kev 5etca.Tai.'os 'ITpos Taos tca.Tn Tov ;A.Spla.v TO'ITovs: probably calculated from a date four or five days after Trasimene. Since the latter was about 21 June (78. 6 n.), he will have reached the coast about 5 July; DeSanctis, iii. 2. rzr. The attack on Spoletium mentioned by Livy (xxii. 9· r) and Zonaras (viii. 25) may be an annalistic

421

III.86.9

THE CAMPAIGN OF 217 IN ITALY; TRASIMENE

forgery (Kahrstedt, iii. 4I3 n. 4; contra Klotz, Livius, I39); it would involve an improbable deviation, is hard to fit into the time-table of ten days, and seems to belong to a version in which Hannibal is diverted from Rome by ·a successful resistance and the destruction of the bridge over theNar.

87. 2. A~ll61fwpos: 'scurvy'; dVTJXHtj;la, 'lack of oil-massage', is also a technical medical term. 6. KowTov .Pa(3~ov: Q. Fabius Q.f. Q.n. Maximus Verrucosus, consul in 233 and 228, censor in 230, and dictator already between 22I and 2I9 (probably in 22I: see Broughton, i. 235). F.'s explanation of the cognomen ~~Iaximus is incorrect, for this goes back to Q. Fabius Maximus Rullianus, the consul of 322 (cf. Flut. Fab. I. I; Livy, ix. 46. IS; xxx. 26. 8); cf. Dessau, Hermes, I9I6, 363 n. 2; Bung, 6o n. I. In Servilius' absence, the comitia centuriata elected Fabius dictator, and Minucius magister equitum (instead of leaving the nomination to this post to the dictator); Livy, xxii. 8. 6; Flut. Fab. 4-5; App. Hann. n; Dio, fg. 57· 8; Zon. viii. 25. The unusual procedure is probably behind the juristic conjectures which lead Livy (xxii. 3I. 8-n) to call Fabius pro dictatore (cf. De Sanctis, iii. 2. 46 n. 67), and Mommsen to insist (St.-R. ii. I47 n. 4) that Fabius must have been appointed by a praetor. Cf. Munzer, RE, 'Fabius (n6)', cols. I8I4 ff.

7-8. 'Tl'EAEKHS ••• d~<:oa~ Ka.L TeTTapes: cf. Dion. Hal. x. 24; Flut. Fab. 4; App. BC, i. Ioo; Dio, liv. I. According to Cicero (de leg. iii. 9) this signified power equal to that of both consuls combined. Cf. Mommsen, St.-R. i. 383, ii. ISS. who suggests that before the time of Sulla (cf. Livy, ep. 89) the use of 24 lictors (with axes and fasces) was limited to outside the pomerium. 8. 'T!'apaxpfjjla s~aMeaOa~ .•• 'T!'claas TclS O.pxO.s: F.'s statement is untrue; but his error, which escaped correction owing to the desuetude into which the office had fallen in the second century, reappears in App. Hann. I2; Plut. Cam. 5· I; Anton. 8. 5; Mor. :283 B; Dion. Hal. v. 70. I, 72. 3, 77· I f., xi. 20. 3· In fact the current officers, including the consuls (and not merely the tribunes) continued in office under the orders of the dictator; cf. Mommsen, St.-R. ii. ISS n. 4; Liebenam, RE, 'dictator', cols. 382-3; H. Last, JRS, I947, I59· F.'s later treatment of this subject has not survived. For discussion see von Fritz, Constitution, 469-70. 9. Map~eov Mwo~eLov: M. Minucius C. f. C.n. Rufus, consul in 22I; cf. Munzer, RE, 'Minucius (52)', cols. I957--62. 88. 3. TTJV npa.tTETTLO.V~v: this form, with -TT-, restored by Schweighaeuser from Stephanus, is confirmed by inscriptions, e.g. CIL, ix. so66. The ager Praetuttianus Hadrianus included southern Ficenum around Interamnia, Hadria, and the rivers Batinus (Tordino) and 422

THE CAMPAIGN OF 217 IN ITALY; TRASIMENE

III. 88,8

Vomanus (Vomano); the inhabitants were of Sabine stock and were taken over by M.' Curius in 290, probably as ciues sine sujjragio (d. Beloch, RG, 554, 598, 6o3; Nissen, It. Land. ii. 428 ff.). TT)v Ma.ppouKLVYJV Kal ~pEVTavT)v xwpa.v: cf. ii. 24. 12 n. Livy (xxii. 9· 5) also mentions the Marsi and Paeligni; but it is unlikely that Hannibal ventured so far inland out of his line of march. et-; TT)v 'la.'lt'uyla.v: cf. ii. 24. II n. ; there P. distinguishes Iapygia from Messapia. Here it seems to include both Apulia and Calabria. P.'s division here is that of Nicander (in Antoninus Liberalis, 1l,fythographi Graeci, ii. I. III, ed. Martini, Leipzig, 1896), who includes Daunii, Peucetii, and Messapii under the generic title of Iapygians. Daunia is the district from Mons Garganus southward, including the towns of Luceria, Vibonium, Arpi, and (v. 108. 9) Gerunium. The Peucetii lived behind Bari, and the Messapii in the hinterland of Brundisium and Tarentum. 5. AouKa.pla.s: Luceria (modern Lucera) supported Rome in the Samnite Wars. It was surrendered to Samnium after the Caudine Forks disaster, recovered, and settled with 2,5oo colonists iuris Latini in 314 (Livy, ix. 26. 5) or 3I5 (Diad. xix. 72. 8---9)· 6. m(3wvLOV ••• TT)v :A.pyupL1t'1TQV~V: Vibinum (modern Bovino) lay on a hill commanding the upper stream of the Cerbalus (Cervaro); Arpi (Arpe) lay on the Aquila (Celone) between Luceria and Sipontum on the coast (its coins have Ap1ravov or Aprra). 88.7-94. 10. Duel between Fabius and Hannibal: cf. Livy, xxii. 9· 718. 4· P. seems to be using both Roman and Carthaginian (Greek) sources; thus the account of religious measures at Rome, reported so much more fully in Livy, will go back to Fabius (cf. Cic. de diu. ii. 71 for Fabius Maximus' role as augur; Gelzer, Hermes, 1933. 154), whereas the account of Hannibal's trick with the oxen suggests a source in his camp. Cf. De Sanctis, iii. 2. 173-4. 88. 7. lluaa.-; Tois lleois: the details, which P. can hardly have viewed other than cynically, appear in Livy, xxii. 9-10, and include consulting the Sibylline books, the decision to offer magni ludi to Iuppiter and temples to Venus Erycina and Mens, the holding of a lectisternium, and the decree to have a uer sacrum in the event of success. TWv T£TTapwv aTpa.To1T~8wv: cf. 77. r n. Fabius' total army was of four legions (Livy, xxii. 27. 1o), of which two had been Servilius' (cf. § 9; Livy, xxii. n. 3). Hence it is probable that P. is here confusing the number of legions Fabius brought from Rome with his ultimate total-unless aTpa:rom:oov is used in the sense in which a legion together with its auxiliaries is reckoned as two 07paTom:oa (cf. 86. 3 n.). Cf. Klotz, Phil., 1933, 57; Rh. Mus., 1936, ro3 n.; Gelzer, Hermes, 1935, 28o; DeSanctis, iii. 2. n6. 8. 1t'Epl TT)v Na.pvlav: the MSS. Llawlav was corrected by Seeck, 423

III. 88.8

THE CAMPAIGN OF 217 IN ITALY; TRASIMENE

Hermes, 1877, 509-10; see also Klotz, Rh. Mus., 1936, 103n. Livy (xxii. II. 3) gives the place of assembly for the army as Tibur, and the point of juncture with Servilius' forces as circa Ocriculum (§ 5). Ocriculum and Narnia lie about 8 miles apatt on the Via Flaminia about 40-50 miles north of Rome; hence Seeck's emendation seems probable. Livy (xxii. n. 7) records that Servilius was sent to Ostia. 9. 1TEpt Tas A'l~~:o.s: Livy, xxii. rz. 3, haud proc1tl Arpis. Aecae (modem Troja) lies about zo miles up the Aquila from Arpi. Gelzer (Hermes, 1935, z8o) takes P.'s A£Kat as a variant for Arpi, but this seems unlikely. Fifty stades is a little under 6 miles. The subsequent appreciation of 'Fabian' tactics no doubt goes back to Fabius Pictor (Gelzer, Hermes, 1933. 153-4; Klotz, Livius, 141). 89. 6. SLs Sll 'Pw1-1o.wus KTA.: at Trebia and Trasimene, omitting Ticinus; cf. 90. 13, 108. 8--9; contrast III. 7, where Hannibal speaks.

90. 1. avT~1TO.pfjyEv TOLS 1TOAEj.1tOlS: 'he moved parallel to the enemy' ; the same tactics are employed by Autaritus and Spendius in the Mercenary War (i. n. z). 8. T~v Ou~;voavTav.f)v: Beneventum (Benevento), originally a town of the Hirpini (Pliny, Nat. hist. iii. 105), lay in an enclosed plain between the Apennines and the Mons Taburnus in south Samnium; according to Pliny (Joe. cit.), its original name of Maleventum was transformed boni ominis gratia when in z68 it received a colony of citizens iuris Latini (cf. Livy, ep. 15; Vell. Pat. i. 14; Eutrop. ii. r6). m)Aw Ouevoucr[av: an unfortified Venusia in Samnium is unknown, and Livy, xxii. 13. 1 reads Telesiam urbem cepit. But, as Nissen points out (It. Land. ii. 8or), an attack on the mountain-town of Telesia would be both dangerous and useless, and therefore improbable; and he assumes an error in Livy or his source, which could not identify Venusia. Nissen himself suggests it lay on the site of the village Castel Venere, 3 miles north-east of Telesia (which lies about 5 miles north-east of the junction of the Volturnus and the Calor); cf. Philipp, RE, 'Telesia', cols. 382-3 (confused, but approving Nissen's suggestion), Klotz, Rh. Mus., 1936, 103 n. (accepting Livy). 10. TIJV • • • aAEpvov To1rov: the ager Falernus, covering in its broadest sense the whole plain included within the southern course of the Volturno, Mte Massico and Rocca Monfina in the north-west, and the hilly land around Pietramelara and Caiazzo in the northeast; see Kromayer, iii. r, Karten 6 and 7; Beloch, RG, 536-7. It was ceded by Capua to Rome in 340 (Livy, viii. 11. 13), and in 318 the Roman citizens settled there were enrolled in the tribus Falerna (Diod. xix. ro. 2; Livy, ix. zo. 6). On Hannibal's route cf. 92. r n.

THE CAMPAIGN OF 217 IN ITALY; TRASIMENE

III. 91. 5

91. 2. Ta. '. 1TE8la. Ta ICO.Ta Ka.1TIJT)V: on its fertility cf. ii. I7. I; XXXlV. II.

I-7·

4. The coastal towns. Sinuessa (modern Mondragone) closed the pass between Mons Massicus and the sea at the north end of the plain; it was reckoned sometimes as part of Latium, sometimes as in Campania (Nissen, It. Land. ii. 553), but was originally a town of the Aurunci. A citizen colony was founded here in 296. Cumae, at this time Oscan, had had ciuitas sine suffragio since 338 (Livy, viii. I4. II), and ranked as a municipi~tm (Sherwin-\Vhite, 38). Dicaearchia, like Cumae, was originally a Greek colony, but fell to the Oscan tribes and became known as Puteoli (Pozzuoli); it was subsequently the most important harbour in Campania. Neapolis (Naples} was a fifthcentury foundation from Cumae, which later received Campanian elements; after 3.26 it enjoyed the protection of a foedus aequum. Nuceria (Kocera de' Pagani) is not on the coast, but lies I2 miles east of Pompeii on the Via Popillia, the main southern road from Capua; it was a town of the Alfaterni, and after its capture in 308 it entered the Roman alliance (Livy, ix. 41. 3; cf. Diod. xix. 65. 7). 5. Tlte cities of the interior. Cales and Teanum lie to the north-east of the ager Falernus; Cales (Calvi) was a tOVI'Tl of the Aurund, and received a Latin colony of 2,500 men in 334 (Livy, viii. I6. IJ-I4); Teanum (Teano), 5 miles to the north, belonged to the Oscan Sidicini, and received ciuitas sine suffragio the same year (Nissen, It. Land. ii. 6<)2). Nola was now an Oscan town, the main one in southern Campania, and situated on the Via Popillia directly east of Mt. Vesuvius; it joined the Roman alliance in 3I3 (Livy, ix. 28. 5; Diod. xix. roi, 3). The Da~mii create a difficulty, and since Gronovius doubts have been cast on the reading; Schaefer suggested Ka.Aa.Ti:vot (Phil., 1863, 176), but in the main Holstein's Kav8lvot has been accepted. Caudium was normally reckoned part of Samnium, but as a municipium it was enrolled in the tribus Falerna (Pliny, Nat. hist. iii. I05; Ptol. Geog. iii. I. 58; GIL, ix, p. I98), and this has been held to justify the emendation. But P. is speaking of cities (§ 3) within the Campanian plain; and, as Caudium cannot be forced into this category, it is possible that the reading of P. should be left unchanged. Coins from Campania inscribed Hyria, Uria, or Orina (Head, 37) are of a type showing close relations with those of Nola; and it is generally assumed that Hyria is the older name of that town (cf. Nissen, It. Land. ii. 757; J. Friedlander, Oskische Miinzen (Leipzig, 185o), 37; Philipp, RE, 'Nola', col. 8rz). Whether this identification is accepted, or one prefers to follow the rather fine-spun argument of Pais (Italia antica, ii (Bologna, I922), 277-93), making Hyria a near Nuceria, it is clear separate town in the valley of the that the name Hyria connects with Iapygia, and so with the Daunii (cf. Strabo, vi. 284; Pliny, Nat. kist. iii. 103; Pais, op. cit. 286 n. 1). 42 5

IlL gr. 5

THE CAMPAIGN OF 217 IK ITALY; TRASIMEKE

Moreover, the general assault on Cumae in 524 was carried out by Etruscans, Umbrians, and Daunians (Dion. Hal. vii. 3). In view of this evidence linking the Daunians with Campania, it seems safer to retain the MS. reading (contra De Sanctis, iii. 2. 126; less certain in Riv. fil., 1935, 297), while admitting uncertainty as to which city is meant. 6. KcnruTJv: Cato (HRR, fg. 69) made it a fifth-century Etrurian foundation, but its earliest known inhabitants are Samnites and speak Oscan; cf. Nissen, It. Land. ii. 696 ff. After 338 the Campanians had ci,uitas sine suifragio (Livy, viii. I4. 10) ; on their status see Sherwin-White, 38-39. 7. Xeypa.'i:a.: cf. ii. 17. I n. The original Phlegraean plain was that of Pallene in Chalcidice, the site of the battle between the gods and the giants; cf. Herod. vii. I23; Aristoph. Av. 824; Pindar, Nem. i. 67; Isth. 6. 33, etc. The original fire (Myw•) was of heavenly origin (Dion. Per. 327 = GGM, ii. I21), and Pallene was not volcanic; but later the name was transferred to other districts such as Thessaly (Serv. ad Aen. iii. 578), the region round Cumae and Puteoli (Prop. i. 20. 9, iii. II. 37 (Naples); Pliny, Nat. kist. iii. 6r), or the Campanian plain as a whole (as here). The Gigantomachia was also located in Arcadia, which like Campania shows signs of volcanic activity. See Weser, RE, SuppL-E. iii, 'Giganten', cols. 66I-6; Oberhummer, RE, 'Phlegra', col. 265. 8. oxupa •.. KO.l SuO'Efl~OAa.: an exaggeration. The hills round the Campanian plain provide at least eight approaches (Kromayer, AS, iii. I. 221 ff.), and the identification of P.'s three passes is hindered by the lacuna in the text. Following Nissen (It. Land. ii. 68I-2, 687 n. 3} De Sanctis (iii. 2. I26) argues that P. is thinking only of the ager Falernus and not the whole Campanian plain, and identifies the passes as (a) from Teanum down the Savo valley, (b) from Teanum via Cales, (c) from Beneventum down the Volturno; he argues that from the point of view of the ager Falernus and the strategical problem confronting Fabius, the routes via the Savo and via Cales were quite distinct lines of escape for Hannibal. Against this view there are, however, serious objections. First, the lacuna, which Nissen (It. Land. ii. 687 n. 3) fills: <Su~ -rijs TWV r~aVtTWV xdJpas, DEv-r.fpa 8~ Ka-rd -rdv 'Ept{3tavdv Kat -rovs KaA7Jvm5s); against this, which De Sanctis accepts, is the fact that, even though C reads OEv-r.f.pa o~ ~ dm~ roD lpt{3dvov (with hiatus!), the use of KaAovfLEVov in 92. I is against any reference to 'Ept{3tav6s here. Indeed, since (a) and (c) are defined by the districts from which they proceed Btittner-Wobst's <Sw-r.f.pa 8' dm) -rij> Aa-rl"'Y}>) seems the most probable supplement. But this merely serves to emphasize a weakness of Nissen's theory, namely that Teanum, which lies within Campania, is common to both (a) and (b), so that the routes via the Savo and via Cales both 426

THE CAMPAIGN OF 217 IN ITALY; TRASIMENE

III. gz. r

lead ultimately to either Latium or Samnium, and cannot therefore be distinguished by references to their ultimate origin (or goal). Further, as Kromayer observes (AS, iii. r. 222 n.), the route down the Volturnus from Beneventum can hardly be described as a?To Twv KaTa ToVs 'lp?Tlvovs T61rwv (cf. Livy, xxii. IJ. r). It therefore seems preferable to regard P.'s passes as the main strategic routes into the Campanian plain as a whole, viz. (a) the Via Appia coming down the Caudine Pass from Beneventum (dm) Tfjs I:avvtTtl5os), (b) the Via Latina from Venafrum, debouching in the plain via Teanum and Cales (
92. 1. Hannibal's route from Samnium into Campania. From § ro it is clear that Hannibal entered and left the north Campanian plain by the same route; and since he comes from Samnium one would expect his general approach to be some variant of the first route mentioned in 91. 9 (where, however, P. is giving only general approaches). According to Livy, xxii. 13, a guide who misunderstood his pronunciation led Hannibal to Casilinum in mistake for Casinum, a worthless and confused anecdote; but the route there recorded is helpful (§ 6), 'per Allifanum, Calatinumque et Calenum agrum in campum Stellatern'. Calat-inum is evidently wrong, since Calatia lay south of Capua and the Volturnus; Hallward (CAH, viii. 49 n. 1) accepts Conway's Caiatinum, which still implies a detour, DeSanctis (iii. 2. 125) quotes Madvig's Callijanum, but tentatively suggests Teanense ('rna sarebbe alterare non correggere il testo'). Evidently Hannibal descended the R. Calor from Beneuentum, turned up the Volturnus into the territory of Allifae, then west over the hills towards Cales; the campus Stellas lay between Cales and the lower waters of the Voltumus (Nissen, It. Land. ii. 689). P.'s 'Ept{3tavosKaAovp.Evos- >..6fos- is apparently the mons Callicttla of Livy, xxii. 15. 3, r6. 5; neither name occurs elsewhere. (Pais-Bayet, 285 n. 105, suggest a connexion with Mte Ebano, north of Allifae; but this is impossible as the scene of Hannibal's break-out.) Kromayer (AS, iii. r. 226, with Karten 6 and 7) identifies the pass of the break-through as that of Borgo S. Antonio, and Callicula-'Ept{3tav6s- with the mountain behind Pietravairano, west of that pass. De Sanctis (iii. 2. 127) who accepts the position proposed by Nissen-a view already subjected to criticism by Kromayer (AS, iii. r. 224)-urges against the latter the fact that Hannibal had an easier escape west of the hill of Pietravairano, if he merely passed between it and the Rocca Monfina, along the route of the Via Latina. But Kromayer points out that if Fabius was stationed at Marzanello, at the south-west end of the hill he identifies with Callicula, he would have covered the Via Latina; and the further slopes of Rocca Monfina may well have been 427

-

Hannibal

ID:J -• Fabius 1. 2.

Posi~ion according

8.

to Krom01yer •• Nissen

CALLICULA.

Based on Kromayer.

:z.

THE CAMPAIGN OF 217 IN ITALY; TRASIMENE

III. 93· 5

wooded. Against Nissen's location is the fact that his supposed pass between Cales and Teanum does not lead out of Campania at alL Kromayer's hypothesis is therefore the most probable. 1ra.pn Tov 1>.9upvov 1ToTnl-lov: this must clearly be the Volturnus, the only river which cuts the Campanian plain in two; d. Livy, xxii. 14. r, 'postquam ad Volturnum fiumen castra sunt posita'; 15. 4, 'Casilinum ... quae urbs Volturno fiumine dirempta Falernum a Campano agro diuidit'. Teuffel's attempt (Rh. Mus., r8so, 471 ff.) to identify the Athyrnus with a brook, the Turno, near Cerreto in Samnium, is wildly wrong. 5. Ecr1TEuBE Ka.l cruvu'II'EKp(vETo: 'made a pretence of showing the same eagerness'; d. Livy, x:xii. 14. 2. 11. Fabius' position. Livy records that Fabius early garrisoned Callicula (§ In.) and the Voltumus crossing at Casilinum (Livy, xxii. rs. 3} and sent Minucius to cover the pass above Tarracina, which might have given Hannibal access to districts nearer Rome (Livy, xxii. rs. n}. In taking up his main position Fabius was now joined by Minucius, who presumably left a force behind at Tarracina. The most likely view of Fabius' position is that of Kromayer (AS, iii. r. 225 ff.}; his camp lay at the south-west end of the hill of Vairano overlooking, on the west, a gap of 2·3 km. containing the Via Latina, and facing the slopes of Rocca Mon:fina. The 4,ooo men (§ w) were placed holding the pass to the east of the hill, that of Borgo S. Antonio. In this way Fabius covered both ways through into the Volturnus valley.

93. 1. Hannibal's position: d. Livy, xxii. 15. 12, duo inde milia hastes aberant. On Kromayer's thesis Hannibal lay under the hill of S. Felice directly opposite Borgo S. Antonio and Pietravairano. 93. 3-94. 6. The stratagem of the oxen: d. Livy, xxii. r6-18; Sil. It. vii. 272 ff.; Plut. Fab. 6-7; App. Hann. 14-15; Zon. viii. 26; Nepos, I!ann. 5· 2; Frontin. Strat. i. 5· 28; Polyaen. exc. 46. ro. The story, though fantastic, appears to be true; a similar ruse was employed during the war of 1914-18 when a herd of buffaloes was used to force a mined position on the Halo-Austrian front (De Sanctis, iii. 2. so n. 79). The source appears to be from the Carthaginian side (De Sanctis, iii. 2. 173}. On Hasdrubal (§ 4} cf. 66. 6 n. 93. 5. il'II'EpJ3oXT]v nva tJ-Em~u K£~l1Ev'I}V ••• crnvwv: the depression adjoining Pietravairano, on Kromayer's hypothesis (AS, iii. x. 228 ff., with photographs}. DeSanctis (iii. 2. 127), who recognizes the faults in Nissen's reconstruction at this point, himself suggests that the demonstration with the oxen was made on the far (i.e. north} side of his assumed pass between Cales and Teanum, towards Visciano; but this cannot be described as between Hannibal's camp and the pass, however far the former is moved 'a nord-est (DeSanctis \vrites 429

III. 93· 5

THE CAMPAIGN OF 217 IN ITALY; TRASIMENE

"nord-ovest") di quel che non sia collocato sulla carta del Kromayer'. 7. all-a. Se T~ KAiva.~ To TplTov llEpo~ Tfj~ vu~
94. 4. Ka.Tcl. Tov vo~TJTTJV: Homer, Od. x. 232, 258; the quotation adds absolutely nothing to the passage, and looks like a piece of mere ornament; cf. Wunderer, ii. 27-28. Cf. v. 38. Io, xii. 27. Io-u, xv. I2. 9, I6. 3, xxxiv. I4- 8, fg. 208. 7-10. Fabius returns to Rome; Hannibal thinks of winter quarters. Hannibal had reached the Adriatic about 5 July (86. 9 n.), and his stay in Daunia probably took him to the end of the month. On this reckoning he could be in the ager F alern·us by 7 August, but will hardly have stayed long in this dangerous situation. Livy's statement (xxii. IS- 2), that Fabius 'aestatis reliquum extraxit, ut Hannibal destitutus ab spe summa ope petiti certaminis iam hibernis locum circumspectaret', need not imply a date later than the second half of August; and Hannibal can easily have been back in Daunia (Ioo. I f.) by the beginning of September. See DeSanctis, iii. 2. I2I; below Ioo. 6 n. 9. iv[ nva.~ ••• 9ucr(a.~ et~ TTJV 'Pwi.LTJV: cf. Livy, xxii. I8. 8; Plut. Fab. 8. I; App. Hann. I2; Zon. viii. 26; Sil. It. vii. 38I ff. Fabius' recall was probably a reflection of a growing popular feeling against his policy (cf. De Sanctis, iii. 2. 5I). Livy records that Hannibal retired gradually through the country of the Paeligni into Apulia, and was at Gereonium (Gerunium), withFabiusencamped inLarinate agro near by, when the latter was recalled. See Ioo. I-2. 95-99. The Events of 2I7 in Spain and at Sea; the Ebro Naval Battle Cf. Livy, xxii. I9-2o. 2; Frontin. Strat. iv. 7· 9; Zon. ix. I; also a fragment of Sosylus (FGH, 176 F I). P.'s source is uncertain; but as Livy contains both Polybian and non-Polybian material, he is probably following Coelius, who in turn diew on the same source as P. (cf. Klotz, Livius, I43; Hoffmann, 29)-perhaps Silenus. Livy, P., and Sosylus are not contradictory, and their accounts may be combined; Sosylus' reference to a SdK'TTAovs suggests, however, that the Ebro battle was more protracted and harder fought than P. implies (96. z, 96. 6, it iif>6Sov). The details in Frontinus and Dio (Zonaras) are suspect, however. See De Sanctis, iii. 2. 24I ff.; Thiel, 49 ff. The date of the Ebro battle is April or May (DeSanctis, iii. 2. 242 n. 6I). 95. 2. Tcl.s ••• TPLclKOVTO. vails: cf. 33· I4 for thirty-two quinqueremes manned in 218; P. here gives round figures (cf. Livy, xxii. I9. 2). By manning ten more Hasdrubal could outnumber the thirty-five Roman ships (§ 5). 430

THE EBRO NAVAL BATTLE

liL97·Z

:A.~.~-tXKav:

both Klotz (Livius, 143) and Thiel (49) prefer Livy's form (xxii. 19. 3, Himilco); for confusion between the two names cf. viii. I. 8 with Livy, xxiv. 35· 3· Lenschau (RE, 'Hamilkar', col. 2297) remarks on the common confusion, but accepts 'Hamilcar' here (ibid., col. 2308). 5. TI'EV1'E Kat 'l'pul.KOVTa vaGs: cf. s6. 5 n. This figure probably includes the Massaliote squadron implied in §§ 6-7 ; and if the twenty ships sent from Rome later this year (97· 1-2) still left the Spanish fleet at thirty-five (x. 17. 13). this is probably because they replaced a Massaliote squadron of that size; cf. Thiel, 40-42. ' TOVS ' 1Tt:p~' TOV ' "lr:l ' T01TOUS: ' .. 19. 5, 'd ecem E~S Cf . L'IVy, XXll. 1. o'!Jpa 1TOTaJLOV milia passuum distantem ab ostio Hiberi amnis'; this is P.'s 8o stades. 7. e:uyevws ••• KEKOivwv,Kaa~ 'PwJLa(oL<; 11'pay1.1-a1'Wv Kat Ma.aaaAiw1'al: Sosylus attributes the Roman victory to the success of the Massaliote squadron in paralysing the Punic manceuvre of o~i~~:w.\ov> by forming a second line to receive such ships as got through. But Jacoby {on FGH, q6 F r) thinks it unlikely that P. would have so radically changed Sosylus' tradition, had he known it, and therefore questions whether the battle in Sosylus is that of the Ebro. 96. 4-6. Ptmic losses: cf. Livy, xxii. 19. 12-20. z {asP.). There is no evidence that the twenty-five captured ships were incorporated in the Roman fleet. Thiel (so) suggests that they were presented to the Massaliotes, 'a method of acknowledging the services of faithful allies which was not unusual with the Romans'; but this is hypotheticaL The figures in Sosylus depend on restorations and are safer neglected. 8-10. Pu1tic expedition in Italian waters. According to Livy (xxii. n. 6) it successfully intercepted a fleet of unprotected transports bound for Spain, near Cosa. On Servilius' command cf. 88. 8. 12. A~Xv~a£
IIL 97· 6

EVENTS OF 217 IN SPAIN AND AT SEA

6. 'II'Epl TO Tfls J\4>poSLTTJS U:pov xa.TEaTpa.To'!l't8Euaa.v: the scanty remains of this temple, a building 15 by 12 m. in size, lie on a cape of the original coastline, but now about z km. from the sea, at a point some 9 km. north of Saguntum; it was probably built by the Phocaeans. The harbour used on this occasion by the Scipios is still to be detected in a lagoon below the temple. The camp of the Scipios has been identified near-by, about 1 km. inland from the temple, and z km. from Almenara, in a situation overlooking Saguntum and the coastal plain from Castellon to Valencia. The measurements of the camp, which stands on a hill with a crescent-shaped depression, and has the form of a trapezoid, are c. zoo m. on the north, c. 300 m. on the south, and the other two sides c. soo m.; the walls are reinforced with about sixteen towers. For a report and photograph see A. Schulten,JDAI, 1927,232-5. 98-99. )\~£Au~: the story of the hostages is also in Livy, xxii. zz. 6-21 and Zon. ix. I ; the ultimate source is uncertain, but it seems to be one common to all three, despite smaU variants (e.g. the Spaniard is ':Aj1£Ao:,; in Zonaras); Kahrstedt, iii. 204. The importance of the incident is greatly exaggerated (De Sanctis, iii. z. 174, 244 n. 45), even if it is not (as Beloch, Hermes, 1915, 361, plausibly suggested) a duplication of P. Scipio's capture of the hostages at New Carthage (x. r8. 3 fL). 99. 6. ETl!lTJaa.v , •• Sul4>EpovTws: cf. 69. 4 n.

100-105. Events in Apulia; !vfinucius and Fabit's On the events around Gerunium see the exaggerated account in Livy, xxii. I8. 5-Io, 23· 9-29. 6; also App. Hann. I5-I6. For discussion see De Sanctis, iii. z. 128-31; Kromayer, AS, iii. r. 248-77, especially z66-!), where Kromayer underlines the importance of these chapters as our sole evidence for Hannibal's methods in positional warfare, dominated by the intention to force a battle under the most favourable tactical conditions. 100. 1. Aouxa.p~a.v ••• r Epouv~ov: for Luceria d. 88. 5 n. Gerunium, also in Apulia (Livy, xxii. 18. 7, 39· 16), was zoo stades, i.e. about 35'5 krn., from Luceria (§ 3) and, according to the Tabula Peutingeriana, 8 milia passuum from a cross-roads near Teanum where the coastal route meets the route to Bovianum; it therefore lay between Dragonara and Casalnuovo Monterotaro (cf. Kromayer, AS, iii. I, Karte 6). Various suggestions have been made for its position; see De Sanctis, iii. 2. 129, for criticism of Raimondi (Gerunium l\fte Gerione, 8 km. south-west of Larino). Kromayer (AS, iii. 1. 248 ff.) makes out a case for the Colle d' Armi, on the right bank of the R. Fortore (photographs opposite p. 264) ; but the site is not certain. 432

EVENTS IN APULIA; MINUCIUS AND FABIUS

III.

IOI.

4

2. 'lia.pO. To A(~upvov Spos: unknown and probably corrupt. Schweighaeuser thought of Mons Taburnus near Caud.ium in Samnium, Nissen (It. Land. ii. 786 n. 2) reads Tt{Jupvov, understanding Mons Tijernus (modern Matese). The latter must be right. Hannibal prob· ably marched north of this massif, and then via Bovianum (Bojano) and Campobasso. Kromayer (AS, iii. I. 252 ff.) takes Hannibal northwards towards Sulmo and Corfmium, then back through Bovianum (Pietrabbondante), in order to combine P. with Livy, xxii. 18. 6; but such a detour with the cattle from Campania seems highly unlikely and Livy's account is in other respects less probable, e.g. he postpones Fabius' return to Rome until the arrival of the Roman army in Apulia (xxii. 18. 8; on the greater likelihood of P.'s version of an immediate return to Rome see De Sanctis, iii. 2. 128). 6. E'lit ,;v ouoAoy(a.v: cf. 94· 7-10 n.; Livy, xxii. 23. 10. Hannibal will not have reached Apulia before early September, when the corn would not normally have been still unharvested. Both here, and in Livy, xxii. 32. 2 (where jrumentatum exeunti refers to autumn), the reference may therefore be to com from granaries or possibly to forage for the horses (d. De Sanctis, iii. 2. 12r). But Sallust, Hist. fg. iii. g8 M. 'et tum mat(ura in agri)s erant autu(mni frume)nta', seems clearly to refer to standing com in autumn. It is possible, therefore, that in 217 war conditions had held up the reaping. 1TpouT6.~a.s ••• T!lUTTJV: 'ordering each didsion (£KaUTov sc. p.lpo>} for the use of its own men to bring in daily a specified amount, namely the quota for the detachment, to those in command of its commissariat'. Td.yp.a is the same as p./.pos (i.e. a third of the army) and goes with l1n{Jo1l~v; Tois l8{ots is to be taken closely with fiKactTov as a datiuu,s commodi; and Tot's 1TpOK£Xttptap.lvot> is indirect object after dva¢lpEtv. Reiske's interpretation (adopted by B-Wz app. crit.) makes Tols lStots indirect object after dva¢lpnv, and Tois 1TpOK€Xttptctp.lvot> dative after Jm{JoA~v, as if it were E1Tt{1£{JA'fJp.lvov, viz. 'the quota enjoined (by Hannibal) upon those in command of the commissariat in each detachment'; but so forced a meaning of €1r~{Jo>..~ with a dative is hardly tolerable. To take Tofs 1TpOK€X€tptap.lvot> in apposition to Tofs l8lots, both after dva¢lpHv, is possible but very forced; and it is even harder to make Toi:s 1TpoK€X€tpu:rp.lvots dative of the agent after TO.KT6v. For discussion see Schweighaeuser and B-Wz.

101. 3. KaA~V1]: Kromayer (AS, iii. I. 261) thinks of Mte Calvo on the left bank of the R. Fortore; but this is uncertain. The earlier identification with Casacalenda near Larino is undoubtedly to be rejected. 4. ~Kka.L8EKa
433

III.

101.

4

EVENTS IN APULIA; MINUCIUS AND FABIUS

2o6). The relationship between Livy's account and P.'s is obscure, though they are clearly connected. DeSanctis (iii. 2. 190) sees direct

or indirect use of P. by Livy; the latter seems more probable in view of Livy's general practice in these books. ~:rr( Twoc; ~ouvou: Kromayer puts this second camp of Hannibal on the hill of Casalnuovo near Casa Purgatorio (AS, iii. r, Karte 7); but neither this hill, nor that which Hannibal occupied during the night(§ s-across the river, according to Kromayer) can be identified with certainty. That Hannibal deliberately put the river between his outpost and his camp seems unlikely (De Sanctis, iii. 2. IJo). 103. 4. a.uToKpaTopa ••• KaKeivov KaTEO"TTJaav: cf. Livy, xxii. 25--6; Plut. Fab. 8; App. Hann. 12; Dio, fg. 56. r6; Zon. viii. 26; Val. Max. iii. 8. 2, v. 2. 4; auct. de uir. ill. 43· 3· DeSanctis (iii. 2. 53 n. 84) regards the details of this aequatum imperium as largely apocryphal; but the broad outline of the tradition seems confirmed by the subsequent disappearance of the dictatorship as an ofiice of importance until the first century (M. Iunius Pera in 216 is the last military dictator in the middle republic). Cf. Mommsen, St.-R. ii. r48, 169. Livy (xxii. 25. 10), however, speaks of 'rogationem ... de aequando magistri equitum et dictatoris iure' ; and Minucius' dedication to Hercules while dictator (CIL, i2 • 2. 6o7) may refer to an earlier dictatorship, e.g. comitiorum habendorum causa in 220 (so T. A. Dorey, ]RS, 1955, 92---96, adducing Plut. Marc. S· 4). Hence Livy may be right, and P. wrong: Minucius may have had an aequatum imperium without a duplication of the ofiice of dictator. P.'s words hardly imply that contemporaneous dictators, appointed for separate Trpagn,, were not unprecedented (so De Sanctis, iii. 2. 122); such an implication would be incorrect, for a collegiate dictatorship is contrary to the whole purpose of the office, and no earlier examples are known. See Munzer, RE, 'Minucius (52)', col. rg6o; Dorey, loc. cit. 5. rijc; vapd. TOU 8TjjLOU 8e8ojLEVTjs apxi]s: according to Livy (xxii. 25. 17) Minucius' new authority was conferred by plebiscitum. 8. ws 8w8eKa aTa8(ous: about I'5 Roman miles; cf. roL 4 n. Minucius probably occupied the camp taken from Hannibal (ro2. 9), and Fabius the hill between the two armies which Minucius had previously captured from Hannibal's pike-men (ror. 7); cf. De Sanctis, iii. 2. 130; Kromayer, AS, iii. 1. 263 and Karte 7 (though the identifications here cannot be confidently accepted). 104. 4. vavTo8avd.s ••• vep~KAaae~s Kat KOLAOTTJTO.S: the general nature of the terrain in this district can be appreciated from Kromayer's photographs (AS, iii. r. 264). 105. 9. Ti s~aepeL ••• O'TPO.TTJYLKTJ vpoVOLO. KTA.: for the didactic note cf. i. 84. 6, ix. 14. 1-4, drawing the same distinction between the reasoning power of the general and the qualities of the mere soldier. 434

THE CAMPAIGN OF 218 IN ITALY; CANNAE

III.

107

106-118. The Campaign of 2IJ in Italy; Cannae 106. 1-2. A€ul
107-17. The campaign of Cannae. Cannae possesses a literature which can be touched on here only in so far as it concerns the interpretation of what P. says. To the bibliography in CAH, viii. 726-7 add Kromayer, AS, iv (r93r), 6xo-25; K. Lehmann, Klio, 1931, 70~9; Rh. Mus., 1931, 321-41; Scullard, Hist. 460 (ed. ::1: 428-9, summary of views); F. Cornelius, Cannae (r932); A. Klotz, Geist. Arb., 1938, no. 12, rr-12; M. Gervasio, I apigia, 1938, 390-491; D. Ludovico, Topografia della baUaglia di Canne {Florence, 1954). (a) Topography. The best discussion remains Kromayer, AS, iii. r. 278-307; iv. 6ro-25; see also De Sanctis, iii. 2. 137-43. For maps of the site see Kromayer, AS, iii. r, Karte 8; Schlachtenatlas, Rom. Abt. i, Blatt 6; DeSanctis, iii. 2, no. 3; Strachan-Davidson (at end). The battle was fought on level ground beside the Aufidus (Ofanto) near Cannae (modern Monte eli Canne), with the Roman right next 435

III. 107

THE CAMPAIGN OF 216 IN ITALY; CANNAE

to the river (n3. 3); the site has been variously placed: (i} on the left bank (De Sanctis, J udeich, Hallward, Scullard} ; (ii) on the right bank upstream from the fortress of Cannae (Arnold, Hesselbarth, Lehmann) ; (iii) on the right bank downstream from Cannae (Kromayer, Kahrstedt, Cornelius). Of these (ii) has little to commend it, for no ground south-west of Cannae meets the requirements of the battle (cf. Kromayer, AS, iii. r. 293 ff.), unless, with Reusch, one shifts the river-bed to the north; but between (i) and (iii) a decision is difficult. I P. states that the Roman army, with its right flank against the river, faced south (n3. 2-3), and the Carthaginians north (n4. 8); hence 'neither side was inconvenienced by the rising sun'. If the battle was in August (§ (b)), the sun rose a little north of east, and presumably P. means what he says-the lines faced north and south. But the remark about the sun may be his own deduction, introduced to combat a Roman version which suggested that the Romans were at a disadvantage because of the sun; if so, it is not independent evidence for the site and orientation. Moreover, though its general course is from south-west to north-east, the Aufidus here twists and turns so much that it is possible to arrange lines at right-angles to it which face in almost any direction. De Sanctis (iii. 2. 139) argues that because in ii. 14 P. has described Italy schematically as a triangle based on the Alps, with its apex at C. Cocynthus, and bisected lengthwise by the Apennines, it therefore follows that he believed the Aufidus to flow in a south-easterly direction, just as the rivers running into the Tyrrhenian Sea flow in a south-westerly direction. This is a twtt seqztitur. The triangulation of Italy carries no implications for the direction of its rivers (Judeich, HZ, 136, 1927, 15 n.); and a likelier hypothesis is that P. gained his impression of the direction of the Aufidus on a journey from Brundisium to Romea journey which he will have regarded as in essence from east to west (cf. Cornelius, 66 n. 2}. Such a journey P. must have made, and it may well have given him the impression of a river flowing from south to north; and whether for this reason or not, this does in fact appear to be P.'s view of the course of the Aufidus (cf. StrachanDavidson, 35-36), as his account of the Roman advance to the battlefield makes clear. From the point where the new consuls joined the army (ro8. 2 n.) I Bones found in a cemetery in the contrada Fontanella, 400 m. south-west of Cannae (Gervasio, loc. cit.) have been variously dated to the Lombard period and the Middle Ages; Ludovico (op. cit.) uses them to support a reconstruction of the battle, which locates the final clash between the hills of Cannae and Fontanella. This view was published too late for detailed consideration here; it seems unlikely.

436

THE CAMPAIGN OF 216 IN ITALY; CANNAE

III. ro7

to the river was a three days' march. At the end of the second day they encamped about 6 miles (so stades) from Hannibal (no. 1), in a flat and treeless country, suited to cavalry, and Aemilius wished to advance into the hills; but Varro, who commanded the third day, continued towards the enemy, and was involved with them. On the fourth day (ds -r~v l7Tavpwv) Aemilius, judging it inadvisable to fight and dangerous to withdraw, encamped on the bank of the Aufidus (no. 8}; -rip 8~ -rpt-rr.p 7TI.pav, dm:l O~af3aaEWS 7Tpds nl.s ava-roA&.s, lj3d).ETO xap:um, about 10 stades from his main camp (no. xo). The natural sense of this is that the Romans carne east or south-east towards the Aufidus, encamped on its left bank and sent a third of their forces over to make a smaller camp east of the ford, on the right bank. If P. pictured the Aufidus flowing north, there is no difficulty; and the battle will have been fought on the right bank (n3. z}. Against this De Sanctis (iii. z. 137) urges these objections: (i} The Romans will not have marched straight across the plain of Tavoliere to the Aufidus, but must have followed the hillier route via Aecae and Herdonia; for it was only when they were so stades from Hannibal that they reached flat country. In fact no. 1-2 warrants the opposite conclusion. P. here describes -rovs 7TEp£g -r67Tovs as flat and treeless; this does not, however, imply that the Romans had now for the first time reached the plain, but simply that on coming in sight of Hannibal Aernilius realized that this was no country in which to meet him. He therefore proposed advancing into the hills. In a detailed analysis of the gradients and terrain Kromayer shows (AS, iv. 6rs} that the route through Luceria, Aecae, Herdonia, and Canusium is not safer than that via Arpi; nor were the Romans seeking to evade battle, rather they were seeking it (108. 1). Moreover, if the Romans came via Canusium, it was evidently near that town that they caught sight of Hannibal; but the area between Canusiurn and Cannae is hillier than that between Herdonea and Canusium, and there is no plain in that part of the Aufidus valley corresponding to that in which Hannibal attacked Varro, (ii} In no. 10 the smaller Roman camp is 'east of the ford'; this implies that the Romans were advancing along the river eastwards, and that the Carthaginians were nearer the sea. De Sanctis believes the little camp to have been on the left bank; hence, when Hannibal moves his camp over to the same side as the larger Roman camp (ru. n}, he is moving from the left bank to the right. in order to unite all his forces near Cannae. But P. clearly regards his move, following a battle speech to his troops, as aggressive. Moreover, this interpretation depends on the faulty view that P. believed the Aufidus to flow to the south-east (see above) ; whereas if it flowed north, 'east of the ford' clearly means 'on the right bank'. 437

III.

107

THE CAMPAIGN OF 216 IN ITALY; CANNAE

(iii) Various secondary sources refer to the effects of the Volturnus wind blowing in the faces of the Romans during the battle (Livy, xxii. 46. g; App. Hann. 2o; Zan. ix. r); and this was the south-east or east-south-east wind (Eurus) or scirocco (Sen.Qu.aest. nat. v. I6. 4; Pliny, Nat. Mst. ii. ug). P., however, has no reference to this wind, and it may well be an invention of Roman propaganda, like the story of the sun which P. rejects (II4. 8). Even if it is true, it still remains possible for troops facing south-south-west to be troubled by a south-east wind. Thus De Sanctis's objections prove to be unsubstantial. To place the battle on the left bank is to reject P.'s statement that the Romans faced south; it also involves assuming that Hannibal offered battle on the right bank above Cannae, on ground singularly ill-adapted to cavalry, only to have it rejected by Aemilius (nz. I-2: 3vaapE(]Tov,..evos ..• Toi:s- Twot:;), and that the next day Varro deliberately crossed over to fight on the plain. So foolish he can scarcely have been. It has therefore been assumed below that the battle took place on the right bank, with the Romans drawn up with their backs to the sea. (b) Chronology. Claudius Quadrigarius is our authority for the fact that Cannae was fought a.d. iv non. sext., i.e. 2 August (Gell. v. 17. 5; Macrob. Sat. i. r6. z6). Since the calendar appears to have been running true in 217 (78. 6 n.) there is a probability that the same was true in 216, and that Cannae was fought in August; but De Sanctis's arguments (iii. 2. 136) fall short of proof. Hannibal left his winter quarters near Gerunium when the corn harvest was ripe (ro7. I), and so in June; he then marched 6o miles to Cannae to take it. News had to reach the consuls of 217, who in turn sent repeated (aw.-xws, 107. 6) messages to Rome asking for counsel. The senate resolved to send the new consuls, who joined their forces at an unnamed point, whence it was possible to come within so stades of Hannibal in two days (no. I). After haranguing the troops, Varro and Aemilius at once set out for Cannae. De Sanctis (iii. 2. r36) argues that this will have brought the year to August; possibly, but his argument is partly invalidated by his interpretation of 108. 2 as una concione al popolo held before the consuls left Rome, and his assumption of a lacuna at no. r ; the 1roMol of 109. 13 are of course the army. A further argument from a Greek synchronism is also indecisive. In 216 Philip V assembled his troops in Macedonia d.pxo,_.IVTJ> 8te.pdas (v. 109. 4), trained them as rowers and sailed round Malea for Illyria; leaving Cassandreia in late April or early May he will have covered the 1,200 km. from there to Sasona in anything from two to four weeks. Here he turned back suddenly, though 'now was the time to seize Illyria 3ta 7"0 rov;; 'Pw,..a.lovs m:f.aa.~s 7"0.LS E7T~l'O{a,,. , ..... , , );l 'a , ' , K,O.VVO.V f.40.X1Jll , , eat , K.a.L 7TO.pa.aKEVO.L<; 1TEp~ 7"0V .t:ll'V~/"'a.v KO.£ 'TrJV 7T€p1 ywEa

THE CAMPAIGN OF 216 IN ITALY; CANNAE

III.

107

(v. no. 10). Unfortunately this does not make clear whether Cannae had yet been fought or not; and DeSanctis's argument that it had not is not well based. However, this does not mean that the August date for Cannae is to be rejected, and the argument for a calendar several months in advance, and Cannae fought in June (Cornelius, 2 ff.) accepted. Probability still favours the later date. (c) Forces; see especially De Sanctis, iii. 2. 131-5; Kromayer, AS, iii. I, 341-6; Klotz, Phil., 1933. 57-66; Gelzer, Hermes, 1935, 281-3; Cornelius, 20-24. Hannibal had over 4o,ooo infantry and about ro,ooo cavalry (n4. s), a figure which probably includes the forces left to garrison the camp (cf. u3. 5, where this principle is followed for the Roman figures). Since he had reached the Po with 26,ooo men (56. 4), a large proportion of his army must have consisted of Celtic recruits. His casualties are 5,700 in all, mostly Gauls (Iq. 6); Livy (xxii. 52. 6) makes them about 8,ooo. The Roman figures create more difficulties. In 109. 4 Aemilius says they outnumber the Carthaginians by more than two to one (cf. Plut. Fab. IS, ovo' ~fLLGV p..!.por; QM'ES, referring to the Carthaginians); and P. says (ro7. 9) there were eight legions, each of 5,ooo Romans and s.ooo socii (cf. u3. s. 8o,ooo foot), and supported by 3oo Roman and an unstated number of allied cavalry (107. 9-u). 107. 12 says that normally the allied cavalry were three times the Roman, but not that this was true at Cannae; and from I IJ. 5 it appears that the total cavalry were something over 6,ooo, which would make the allied contingent over 3,6oo, i.e. over 450 per legion. The total force is thus given as 86,ooo, of whom all but 1o,ooo (117. 8) took part in the battle. Livy (xxii. 36. 3) makes a total of 8poo, but records (xxii. 36. 2) an alternative tradition that the Romans put only four legions in the field, but supplemented them with an extra ro,ooo men, giving a total of some 5o,ooo-s5,ooo; he also mentions the Polybian eight legions. DeSanctis (loc. cit.) accepts the lower figures, and for rejecting P. gives these reasons:

(i) the smaller of two figures is a priori the more probable; (ii) it is hard to see how eight legions could be reduced to four in the tradition, whereas a-rpa.-rorrEOov might easily be used of a Roman legion without its socii (cf. 86. 3 n.); (iii) 6,ooo cavalry are not enough for eight legions, for in 219 the Romans raised !,200 per legion {Livy, xxi. I7· s). But it cannot be a universal rule always to accept the lower figure; each case must be judged on its merits. Further, if U7'pa:r6rrEDov could be used in Greek for a legion without its socii (and for the socii without the legion), equally it could be used of a consular army 439

III. ro7

THE CAMPAIGN OF 216 IN ITALY; CANNAE

of two legions (viii. 1. 4, xi. 26. 6; De Sanctis himself, iii. 2. 320); hence a Greek source might describe eight legions as four 0'7'pa'T01T€Oa. Lastly, the proportion of cavalry is not to be confused with the absolute number. The Romans may well have enrolled as many as they could in 216; because they could not raise more was not a reason for reducing the number of foot. It therefore seems inadvisable to reject P.'s precise statement (Io7. 9) that eight legions-took the field at Cannae. According to P. (u7. z) the survivors were 70 Roman and 300 allied cavalry, and 3,ooo infantry; in addition Io,ooo infantry prisoners were taken. The remainder, 7o,ooo, perished. These figures are from a Carthaginian source, and the number killed is clearly obtained by subtracting the number of prisoners from the legionary total (excluding horse) and neglecting survivors. Livy (xxii. 49· I3I8, so. 11, 52. 4, 54- I-4, 6o. g, 6o. 19; d. Kromayer, AS, iii. I. 344) gives, from a Roman source, 48,2oo dead, 19,300 prisoners, and I4,5oo who escaped; total8z,ooo. De Sanctis (iii. 2. I35) observes that for survivors only the Roman source is reliable, for prisoners only the Punic. The relevant figures are 14,500 and Io,ooo respectively; and the casualties can be reached by taking this figure from the full Roman contingent, which De Sanctis reckons at 5o,ooo, but which, on P.'s figures, here accepted, comes to 86,ooo. This total less 24,500 gives 6I,5oo casualties. But P.'s fLvp[o~ of captured infantry looks like a round number, and it is doubly suspicious when after losing z,ooo casualties (117. n), they are brought up to strength by the inclusion of a further z,ooo cavalry prisoners (117. 12). Thus any estimate of casualties is likely to be unreliable. The tradition of the so-called 'legions of Cannae' in the later books of Livy is analysed by Cornelius (51--{)3). He minimizes the discrepancy between Livy and P. on the number of survivors, and seeks to discredit Livy's figure of 14,500; but if this is reliable, there are still sufficient troops for these legions without accepting Kromayer's unlikely hypothesis (AS, iii. I. 318) of a large-scale successful break through the Punic centre. (d) Sources: cf. DeSanctis, iii. 2. I74; Cornelius, 63--{)8; Kahrstedt, iii. 2I2; Klotz, Livius, I45-5o. P. has clearly combined Roman and Carthaginian sources; thus the differences between Aemilius and Varro suggest a Roman authority (perhaps Fabius), whereas the cavalry movements during the battle are described from the Punic side. But the material has been welded into a single narrative which cannot be analysed with confidence, but is in the main of Carthaginian origin. Livy (xxii. 40. 5-49. I4) has an account which combines the Polybian tradition with other material; the military events during the battle proper (45· 1-47. m) are Polybian. There is little in Livy which appears to go beyond P. to his original source (though 440

THE CAMPAIGN OF 216 IN ITALY; CANNAE

III. ro8.

2

Livy, xxii. 47· z may be an exception); hence it is not easy to determine the origin of the Polybian material in Livy, though the precedent of earlier passages suggests a common source rather than use by Livy of a source dra\\ing directly on P. Other evidence is found in App. Hattn. 19-25; Plut. Fab. I5-I6; Dio, fg. 56. 23-29; Zon. ix. r; Nepos, Hann. 4· 4; Polyaen. vi. 38. 3-4; Frontin. Strat. ii. z. 7' 3· 7' 5· 27 I iv. 5· 5-7; Flor. i. 22. I5-I8: Eutrop. iii. IO; Oros. iv. r6. r-5; Val. Max. iii. 2. rr, v. 6. 4, vii. 4 ext. 2; but none gives substantial, reliable information not in P., and it is to him that any reconstruction of the battle must go back; cf. De Sanctis, iii. z. 64 n. 95; Kromayer, AS, iii. I, 383-8.

107. 1. -!18YJ 8£ 1TO.po.8L86v..,.os ••• xopYJ-ylo.v: the corn-harvest, rather than hay (Judeich, HZ, r36, 1927, in.), making the date early June. 2. Ka:vv'Y(s: modern Monte di Canne, on the right bank of the R. Ofanto (Aufidus) in Apulia, about 5 miles from its mouth, as the crow flies, and about 6 miles north-east of the important tovvn of Canusium. Cannae was about 6o miles south of the R. Fortore and Hannibal's previous position. 8. Tov 1rpos 'IAAupwus 1TtlhEJ.lov: cf. r9. r3 for P.'s favourable attitude towards Aemilius Paullus. 9. aTpo.To1T~8ols oKTW ~ho.Kw8uvElJEW: d. I07-Ii n. (c). That something happened 'for the first time in Roman history' is a theme found in ii. 21. 8; Diod. xiv. rr3. 8; Livy, xxii. 8. 6, and ascribed by Gelzer (Hermes, 1935, 282 n. r) both there and here to a senatorial source; but in all these other passages the comment is on a change for the worse, and consequently they offer no parallel to the present example. The source nevertheless is probably Roman. The legionary figures here given are confirmed at i. r6. 2 (§ ro, Ka8a 1rov Ka.t 1rp6·n;pov dP'llKalt£~) and vi. 20. 8--9. 12. TPL1TA
III.w8.2

THE CAMPAIGN OF 216 IN ITALY; CANSAE

Aemilius' speech and that of Hannibal (ur. 2-n) are full of commonplaces and it is unlikely that they go back to a genuine record; cf. La-Roche, 65; Susemihl, ii. II4 n. IIJ. They may well come from Fabius (Klotz, Livius, 145; La nouvelle Clio, 1953, 238}. 8. 1'ft vpo1'Epa.£~ va.pa.y£vYJ9EV1'ES: rhetorical exaggeration. Here again (cf. 8g. 6 n.) the Ticinus battle is omitted.

1roA>.ovs.

109.1. 1'ou<; tK 1'ou vponpov ~1'ous iipxov1'a.<;: d. u4. 6, u6. II. According to Livy (xxii. 40. 6), Varro sent M. Atilius, aetatem excusantem, back to Rome, and kept Servilius with the army; but M. Minucius, the previous year's magister equitum, was also in the army and perished (Livy, xxii. 49· 16) along with Servilius. It seems likely that P.'s source has confused M. Atilius with M. Minucius. For an alternative explanation see Klotz, La nouvelle Clio, I953. 242. 3. et~
110. 1. vept 1TEV1'Tjia.AepW,.a.,.ov: a typical, didactic triviality. 8. ou1'e •.• Q.,-c\.yew lla4>a,.hws 1'~v a1'pa.nciv: d. I I 1. 4· Any attempt to retire from the Aufidus to Salapia or to reach the hills must now expose Aemilius to a flank attack from Hannibal's cavalry; d. Kromayer, AS, iii. I. 303 n. 2. His camp by the river was probably in the vicinity of Au:fidena. 9. 1'as ••• 1TTJYUS ~xew Ev 1'o'ls 1rpos 1'0 T uppYJVlKtw KA,!la.a~: the Aufidus rises in the mountains between Samnium and Lucania (Nissen, It. Land. i. 337), a bare 15 miles from the coast at Salerno. 10. dm) 8~a.f36.aEWS 1rpos 1'aS dVa.1'oAas: 'to the east of the ford', i.e. on the right bank (cf. 107-17 n. (a)). This smaller camp was evidently on the edge of the plateau north-east of Cannae towards the river mouth. The two camps were a little over a mile apart (10 stades I-2 miles) and that on the right bank was a little farther than this (p.tt
THE CAMPAIGN OF 216 IN ITALY; CANNAE

III.

IIJ. 2

7. Tptal. 1-'-0.xa\S: Hannibal includes Ticinus; d. 89. 6 n. 11. Trapa TTJV aun)v TrAEupav ••• TWV UTI'EvavTLwv: Hannibal crosses to the left bank and encamps on the same side as the larger camp of the Romans, an offensive move (as the whole speech suggests) which would help to counter any depression after the previous day's setback(§ r), and would facilitate harassing the Romans. Livy, xxii. 44· 4, omits to mention the crossing of the river.

TU 0' tfijs is therefore the sixth, and so Aemilius' day to command. Hannibal's troops, drawn up 1rapa Tov 7TOTaJ.L6v, are on the left bank. 2. 5\a Tcw TroptajloV Twv €mTT)lie£wv: cf. App. Hann. r7, 6 Xwlj3as- .•. rijs a7roplas; a~ov lvoxA.oU0'7jS £t£Taaa€ G'VVEX<~k ES J.L&.)(flv. It might be supposed that the problem of supplies would be as urgent for the Romans as for the Carthaginians. There certainly seems little ground for Kromayer's theory (AS, iii. I. 3or ff.) that the Romans were provisioned by sea from the Aufidus mouth (d. De Sanctis, iii. 2. 141-2); and for an army of that size provisions must have been a matter of grave concern. On the other hand, we do not know how much com the Romans had brought with them, and Aemilius' motives in declining battle are perhaps not to be pressed; they may represent a guess by P. or his source. 3. Toos NojlO.lia!> ETracjlfJKE: i.e. across the river to the right bank; cf. Livy, xxii. 45· 2: 'Numidas ad inuadendos ex minoribus castris Romanorum aquatores trans flumen mittit'. 5. (ha.v 5' a,.,.a.~ tcp\9ii; 'when once the decision has been taken', rather than Paton and Strachan-Davidson 'when the issue has once been decided' (which suggests that the battle is over, or its result now clear). 8-9. Superstitious demonstrations at Rome. These arouse a slightly contemptuous surprise in the Greek rationalist (J.L")3€v d7Tpm€.,; 11:'1f/ &.y.. vvis); but in vi. 56. 6~rz he could admire a statesmanship which (he believed) exploited and encouraged such superstition for reasons of state. In neither instance does he reveal any real sympathy with the character of Roman religion. B<.wv li<
113. 1. Til KaTO. ,.,.otias ~jl£p~: the seventh day. Varro crosses to the right bank below Cannae (§ z). 2. TT]v £,.,.\q,avna.v T~v ,.,.pbs jlEO"TJ!l~plav: cf. Io7-I7 n. (a).

443

IlL IIJ. 3

THE CAMPAIGN OF 216 IN ITALY; CANNAE

3. 'ITUKVoT~pa.s • . • Toil .,.ETwvou: in order to burst through the weaker enemy centre by sheer weight and so decide the issue before the Carthaginian superiority in cavalry told, Varro reduced the gaps between the maniples (TTvKvo-rlpas ••• Ka8tOTdvwv), and inside each maniple reduced the number of files and increased the number of ranks (Veith, Heerwesen, 29I; Cornelius, 37 n. I). Of the depth of the Roman infantry in this formation various calculations have been made. Kromayer assumes (AS, iii. r. 323 ff.) that the hastati and principes of these maniples carne to 146 men, and that the depth was double, and the front consequently half the normal one. If, as he believes (AS, iii. I. 356 n.), the normal maniple was r2 files wide, it was now reduced to 6; and the depth running through hastati, principes, and triarii, and including uelites, he works out as 82 men. But the maniple may well have normally had zo files (Meyer, Kl. Schr. ii. :219 n. z), and it is doubtful if the uelites should be included. DeSanctis (iii. z. I57-8), basing his conclusions on a total of 4legions, not 8, concludes that the Roman line was perhaps 30 men deep (with a maniple 20 files wide). The uncertainties are too many for anything more than a controlled guess; but TToMaTTAamov at least implies that the depth of each maniple is greater than its width, which allows hardly less than so men for the total depth of the 3 lines. 6. Ka.Tu SLnoos To,.ous: at two separate fords; cf. v. 52. r. 8. ~,.t .,_£a.v Et)lki:a.v: Hannibal first draws up all his forces in a single line, viz. (from left to right) the Spanish and Gallic horse, half the Libyan heavy infantry, the Spanish and Gallic infantry (in the centre), the rest of the Libyans, the Numidian horse. TU .,.Eaa. TWV 'l~~pwv Ka.l KEATwv Tay.,.a.Ta.: i.e. not all. K. Lehmann (Rh. Mzts., I9JI, 321-41), translates 'the centre, which consisted of Iberians and Celts' ; but -rt:L\Aa makes this unlikely, for the following phrase means 'and placed the remainder (of the Iberians and Celts) in rank beside him'. 'uydv is 'to form a rank', and TTa.pla-rav£ 'vyoOJJTa. is tautologous; cf. Kromayer, AS, iii. I. 335 n. I. tK Tou Ka.Ttl. Myov: the root meaning of this phrase is 'conforming to someone's intentions' or 'conforming to reason'; where there is a comparative idea in the sentence, as in vi. 28. 5 (p.el,oat) or ix. zo. 3 (a.i!getv 7) p.noiiv), the phrase comes to mean 'proportionately'. But that cannot be the sense here (as Kromayer, AS, iii. r. JI4 n. 1, 335 n. I , d. Cornelius, 38, in entsprechendem Verhiiltnis-to what?), where there is no comparative. It must be 'to suit his plan', which is defined in the next few words. See Strachan·Davidson ad loc., Casaubon's note printed in Schweighaeuser's Lex. Polyb . .:\6yos, and Schweighaeuser's note: 'pro ea ratione, quam requirebat conuexitas lunata quam efficere UOluif; this corrects his translation Where eK -roO Ka'T'd A6yov is taken with Am-ruvwv to mean 'pro portione', This, he adds, ad sententiam parum refert.

THE CAMPAIGN OF 216 IN ITALY; CANNAE

III. II4. 5

f-L'1VoE~8£s

rrmwv To KupTwf-La.: 'producing a crescent-shaped bulge'. 'Una marcia per linee curve, checche dica P., non si fa', says De Sanctis (iii. 2. 162). But as a military man P. will scarcely have written nonsense (cf. Cornelius, 38 f.). \-Vhatever the movement was, us. I I suggests that Hannibal planned it, and this is decisive against De Sanctis's suggestion that the centre merely got a little ahead of the wings. Kromayer (AS, iii. 1. 314-15) thinks P. is really describing a formation in echelon: the centre advanced 150 metres and the rest progressively shorter distances as one reached the wings. But there is no reference to this in P. and the phrase KaTa Aoyov, mistranslated by Kromayer (see above), contains no such idea. The 'thinning of the line' (.\mnlvwv To ToVr-wv mhwv crx_fjpa) Kromayer refers to the weakening at the points where the different companies in echelon make contact ; but AeiTTVO'fLOS is specifically a thinning of the line (Ael. Tact. 38. 3) and P. states quite unequivocally (us. 6} that the centre was l1r~ A;;:1TTov lKnTayplvwv. 9. {cpe8pEta.s f-LEV Ta~w ••• a.uTwv exe~v: this use of Libyans as a reserve, to come into action when the Romans were driving into the centre, is one of the most important features of Hannibal's masterly tactics in this battle. Despite its separation from l
114. I. b Ka.ilorrA~O}LOS ••• 'PwtJ.a.'LKOS: d. 87. 3· 2. o f-LEV ilopEos .jljv rra.pa.rrATJO'LOS: cf. ii. 30. 3 on the Gallic 8vp~£6s; also CR, 1946, 42. 3. Spanish and Gallic swords: cf. ii. 30. 8, vi. 23. 7· As StrachanDavidson (ad loc.) observes, KaTa
III. n4. 5

THE CAMPAIGN OF 216 IN ITALY; CANNAE

the numbers of the different bodies of troops are made by Kromayer (AS, iii. r. 342) and De Sanctis (iii. 2. r63~4). 6-7. Roman and Carthaginian command. The consuls commanded the wings, and the centre was under 'Marcus' and Gnaeus (Servilius); cf. ro9. r for P.'s probable confusion between M. Atilius and M. Minucius. Hannibal was in the centre, for it was on this that the result of the battle depended (n4. 7); at the outset he advanced with the Gauls and Spaniards (IIJ. 8), but was subsequently with the Libyans (rr6. 4), having no doubt extricated himself from the former before their expected retreat. 8. &.J'>.a.J'ij ••• T~v Ka.Ta Tov {iAlOV civa.ToAt]v: cf. 107-17 n. (a) for the suggestion that this is polemic against a Roman version which pleaded the sun in mitigation of defeat. Though not inconsistent with autopsy, as P.'s orientation of New Carthage and the Alps shows, this passage cannot be regarded as proof that P. visited the battlefield (so Cornelius, 66).

115. 3. i~ civa.cnpoT\~> Ko1 J-LETa.~oM}c;: cf. i. 76. 5· O.vaa7po4>~ means wheeling round to recover a former position after an Jma7po4>~, a turn through ninety degrees; J.Leraf3o'A7} is a right about turn (cf. Ael. Tact. 24). But here P. means nothing more than 'the normal wheeling evolutions' (Paton) of which these two (coupled together in x. 23. 2) are taken as examples. 5. KA£vovTec; u'l!'exwpouv Ei.s Tou'1!'£uw: Kromayer (AS, iii. r. 318 n. z) argues that if the Gauls and Spaniards in fact turned tail at the very outset of their withdrawal and were then driven back by the Romans as far as the level of the Libyans, such a flight would have spelt complete disaster; and he assumes a controlled withdrawal until the Romans were in a line with the Libyans, and then the turning-tail of the Gauls and Spaniards and the Roman breakthrough. De Sanctis (iii. z. 164-6) also admits a controlled retreat; but he translateS the WOrds OttfKo!fav rryv 'TWV VrT KTA.: the crescent-formation had brought the Roman centre into action before the wings were in contact >vith the enemy (§ 7); and this formation, gradually retiring, held long enough to draw the Romans on the wings towards the fighting. 446

THE CAMPAIGN OF 216 IN ITALY; CANNAE

III. n6.

II

This concentration prevented the maniples from ever coming properly into action, for the Roman line, already concentrated, was compressed into a solid body which began to pour into the Punic centre. 9-10. M anreuvre of the Libyans. Those on the right wing turned left (KMvaVT€S br' acnr£8a), SO that the file on the left became the front rank; and in this position they dressed ranks from the right, which was nearest the original battle line (T~v ~f-Lf3ol..~v EK 86paTos 1Tmotif-L€110t). Those on the left did the opposite. The technical term bn1Tapef-Lf3J.>.Aetv, 'to fall into straight line with the rest, to dress ranks', is here paraphrased. For the technical expressions ~7T1 86pv and E7T' aU1Tloa cf. vi. 40. 12; the corresponding terms for cavalry are J1rl o&pu and Jrf>' ~vlav (x. 23. 2). Schweighaeuser (ad loc.) seems to imply some kind of wheeling manceuvre; but this would be impossible in the melee, and KMvew is used of an individual facing. On the above interpretation two orders, 'Right (left) turn! Dress ranks on the left (right)!', were enough to bring the Libyans into a position to attack the Romans on the flank. The effect of the flank attack is described in § 12. It completely broke the maniple formation (KaT' G.v8pa Ka~ KaTd cnrdpas), and so destroyed the Roman advantage of superior numbers. 'Vereinzelt ist ein 1\Ianipel gegen eine Phalanx verloren' (Cornelius, 41). The fate of the fleeing Gauls and Spaniards is not recorded; but presumably with the Libyan attack and the checking of the Roman pursuit they recovered to share in the final encirclement. 11. Ka.Tii TTJV ~1Tt To us KEATous 1Ta.p6.1TTWaLv: 'owing to their excessive ardour in pursuit of the Gauls'. For 1Tapd7TTwats cf. xi. 11· 3, Ka.T
22,

5, Jf(.rr)\7/TT€

Kai

1Tf.pdU1Ta 'Pw[-Lalovs.

7. 1Tpa.y(.UlnKi>V SoKEi: 1Todjaa.L ••• lt\a8pouJ3a.c;: clearly from a Carthaginian source. But the role of Hasdrubal's cavalry in the final encirclement may well have been part of Hannibal's original plan rather than an improvisation. The immense advantage of cavalry superiority comes out repeatedly; cf. no. 2, 111. 2, II7. 4-5. 9. 1TclvTa. Ta SLKcua TU1Ta.Tp(S, ••• 1To,,aa.s: for the formula, common in Hellenistic inscriptions (cf. Schulte, 52) see ii. 10. 5 (on Margus). 10. Ka.Ta Tas ~1TL4>a.ve£a.<;; aTpE4>of1EVot: 'turning and presenting a front'. 11. MapKOS KO.l rvaLOS: cf. I09· I n. M. Atilius in fact lived to be triumuir mensarius in 216 (Livy, xxiii. 21. 6) and censor in 214 (Livy, xxiv. II. 6). For the formula avSpES .iyaOol Ka£ ••• tigw, YHO[-Lf.VO' cf. 447

III. n6.

II

THE CAMPAIGN OF 216 IN ITALY; CANNAE

44· 12, iv. 62. 4, viii. 26. 7, xi. 2. I, xv. 10. 2, xvi. 9· 2, xxi. 9· 3; it is also common in the language of the Hellenistic inscriptions; cf. Schulte, 49-50. 12. TouTwv: the Romans in general, not merely Marcus and Gnaeus. 13. Ouevoua[a.v: the Latin colony of Venusia in Apulia, which lay 30 miles south-west of the battlefield. O.vT)p a.taxpnv !J.EV Ti]v IJtuxi]v KTA.: this judgement on Varro is that of the Roman senatorial source, probably Fabius. In fact he maintained his popularity and continued to hold important military posts; he was proconsul in Picenum in 215-2I3 (Livy, xxiii. 25. n, 32. 19, xxiv. 10. 3· II. 3· 44· 5}. and held imperium pro praetore in Etruria in 2o8(7 (Livy, xxvii. 24. 1---9, 35· 2, 36. 13, xxviii. 10. II). 117. 2-3. Survivors: cf. 107-17 n. (c). Stax~>..wus TWV ••• bnrewv: these cavalry are not mentioned elsewhere, but can hardly be identified with the 2,ooo prisoners which Livy (xxii. 49· 13} records as having been taken at Cannae (so Judeich, HZ, I36, 1927, 8 n.). Added to the survivors of the Io,ooo infantry prisoners (n7. 3, 117. n) they restore the total to Io,ooo; but the statement in 117. 3 remains inaccurate.

12.

118. 2. Ti]s ••• AoL1Ti]S va.pa.>..ta.s: De Sanctis (iii. 2. 2u} prefers the marginal reading of the Augustan us (D) and Regius (E), 'lraJ.La;;; but 1TapaAla;; is well defended by Schweighaeuser, ad loc., and by Costanzi (Riv. fil., 1920, 346--8); cf. x. I. 4, Twv 'E>J..TJv{f.wv 1TOA£wv 'P~ywv KTA . .•. TUVTTJI' bd.xov<J~ r~v 7Tapa,\iav; Livy, xxii. 61. II f., 'defecere autem ad Poenos ... et Graecorum omnis ferme ora'. De Sanctis (ibid.} also proposes L'a.\a7Ti:vm for Tapavrivo~ since Tarentum did not revolt till 2I3 (viii. 24-34}, and Salapia, a town on the Apulian coast a few miles north of the Aufidus, was in Roman hands before 214 (Livy, xxiv. 20. 15}; on the other hand, Livy (xxii. 61. 12} lists the Tarentini among those revolting, and there is independent evidence for chronological compression in this chapter (§ 6 n.}. 6. wavep EV~!J.E"TpOUO'T)S Ka.~ auveva.ywv~~O!J.EVT)S ••• "Ti]S TUXT)S: 'as if Fortune in addition to what had happened were giving them overmeasure and joining in to stir up new contests against them'. TOV E~S Ti]v r a.Aa.TLO.V aTpO."TT)YOV O.voa"Ta.AEVTa.: L. Postumius Albinus; cf. ro6. 6; Livy, xxiii. 24. 6 ff.; Frontin. Strat. i. 6. 4; Zon. ix. 3· Livy and Zonaras state that Postumius was killed while consul designate for 215, while the Fast. Cap. give him as one of the consuls for 2I5, adding that 'in praetura in Gall. occis. est quod antequam ciretur ... '. De Sanctis (iii. 2. 327---9) has suggested that Postumius was in fact consul suffect~{S for Aemilius Paullus in 2I6, but that his death caused some confusion in the tradition so that both he and 1\L Claudius Marcellus (consul suffectus after him) were attached to 2I5 by error. 448

THE CAMPAIGN OF 216 IN ITALY; CANNAE

III. n8.n

But there was no need to elect a suffectus in Aemilius' place, even after the expiry of the dictatorship of M. Iunius Pera (d. Mommsen, St.·R. i. 29 n. 3; Broughton, i. 257); further, Livy's account is reasonable and consistent, and the reference to Postumius' death in praetura (in the Fasti) is against the hypothesis that he was consul sujfectus. It therefore looks as if Postumius' death was, as Livy says, shortly before his entry into office, at the end of winter zt6/I5, and not a few days after Cannae (cf. Scullard, Pol. 275-6). P. has brought it forward in order to complete the picture of unmitigated disaster which book iii was to give; and it is perhaps for the same reason that this book omits to record the compensating successes of the Scipios in Spain during :n6 (Uvy, :xxiii. 26. 1-29. 17); cf. Klotz,Livius, I 55· Two legions perished with Postumius (106. 6 n.), whose head was lodged, embossed with gold, in a temple of the Boii, where it served as a goblet for the priests (Livy, xxiii. 24. 12). That fg. 102 refers to Postumius is no more than a possibility. 7. 11 YE ouyKAt)TO'i ••• 'n'apEtt11AE~ ' • ' TOU'i 'n'OAAOU'i: the formulation suggests the use of Fabius. 9. Roman -recovery. In thus ending on the keynote of his history, P. leads up to the discussion in book vi (after the account of Greek and eastern Mediterranean affairs in iv and v) of the Roman constitution (-rii -rov '7TOAt-rEVJ.to.-ros lotr1T1)n) and Roman morale (T

.6yov : 'I shall give a separate account'. The purpose of this account is in part to assist -rots r/JMo~-ta8oucrt Ka.' rrpay~-ta.nKots; on the distinction cf. 21. 9 n., and for P.'s didactic purpose, vii. u. 2, 14. 6, ix. 9· 9·

449

BOOK IV 1-2. Introduction; Reasons for Beginning at Ol. r4o 1. 4. Tijs Ka.Ta.aKeuijs ••• 1repl. Twv 'E).),TJv~Kwv: i.e. ii. 37-70. Here, as in i. I3. 5, KaTaaKw~ is 'introductory sketch'; in ii. 37. 5 it is the main narrative, contrasted with the introduction. LSJ gives neither sense. 5-8. Achaean events: Tisamenus and Ogygus, ii. 41. 4; democratic constitution, ii. 38. 6, 41. 5; dissolution by the Macedonian kings, ii. 41. 9; League reformed, ii. 41. 11-12; principles and scheme for Peloponnesian unity, ii. 42. 3-7; survey, ii. 43-44; Cleomenean War, ii. 45-70. 9. auyKecf>a.Xa.uAJaaJ-Levo~: 'rounding off', cf. iii. 3· I n.; on the synchronism see ii. 71. 2. 1. TTJV :A..paTou auvTa.~LV: cf. i. 3· 2, for P. as Aratus' continuator. 2. Tous 1TL1TTOVTa.s C11ro TTJV .;IJlETepa.v taTop(a.v: cf. ii. I4. 7 n. on this phrase. The Greek conception of history is traditionally one covering a period for which oral communications or personal experiences are available; cf. R. G. Collingwood, The Idea of History (Oxford, I946), 24, who contrasts the Roman tradition of a history ab urbe condita. 3. TO ••• &.vwTepw 1TpoaAa..... ~O.veLV Tois xpovo~s: 'to go farther back chronologically as well'; cf. 1TpoaavaTp~xHv, i. 5· 4, I2. 8. This use of 1TpoaAaJLf3avf;tv is not in LS J. OUTE Tas s~a.A-/jljle~s OUTE Tas &.1Tocf>O.ae~s: 'neither in my judgements nor in my assertions'. 4. KEKa.~vo1TO~TJKeva.~ 1ravTa. KTA.: for Tyche as a force favouring novelty cf. i. 4· s. 86. 7, ii. 37. 6, xxix. 21. 5 (Demetrius of Phalerum) ; CQ, I945, 6. The outward sign of Tyche's intentions is the synchronism in the change of rulers; cf. ii. 41. I n. 5. 4lLAL1T1TOS •.• b dTIJlTJTPLOU Ka.Ta cf>uaLV utos: cf. 25. 6. See ii. 70. 8, and for the phrase KaTa 4>vatv, i. 64. 6 n. He was 17; cf. 5· 3, 24. r. 6. :A..xa.~os: on the relationship of Achaeus, son of Andromachus, to Seleucus III Soter and Antiochus III see 48. 5 n.; for the events leading up to his assumption of the royal title west of Taurus see 48. 3-13, V. 40. 4 ff. 7. Meya.s ••• :A..vT(oxos: cf. ii. 71. 4, for Antiochus' accession, on the death of Seleucus III, in 223. Born in 242 or 241, he was 22 in 220 (cf. xx. 8. I, he was so in the early part of 191). The title M~ya> is confirmed epigraphically for Antiochus (cf. OGIS, 230 (from Soli; dedication by Ptolemy, son of Thraseas; cf. v. 65. 3 n.), OGIS, 746 = TAM, ii. 266 (dedication by Antiochus over one of the gates ofXanthus), OGIS, 237 (decree of Iasus in Antiochus' honour), OGIS,

450

INTRODUCTION; REASONS FOR BEGINNING AT OL. 140 IV. 3

240 (dedication from Pergamum, restored), IG, xi. 4· rnr (dedication to Antiochus by Menippus at Delos, restored), Welles, 64 (inscription from Nysa on the Maeander mentioning [J1vnJ6xou -roil p.eyc£\.ou)). The likelihood is that he took it in imitation of the Achaemenidae (Bevan, ]HS, 1902, 241 :ff.) on his return in 205 from his eastern expedition against Euthydemus of Bactria, when he crossed the Hindu Kush into the Kabul valley, and came back through Arachosia, Drangiana, and Carmania (d. xi. 34; App. Syr. r, cb6 -rouSe KA7J8e£r;); cf. Holleaux,Ebttdes, iii. 159-63 ( = BCH, 1908, 266-7o). The edict of Eriza, which, by its omission of the title p.l.ya> despite its supposed dating to 204, led Holleaux (EttJdes, iii. r6s-8r BCH, 1930, 245-62) in his republication of it to date Antiochus' assumption of the title to c. 2oo after Panium, has now, since the discovery of the Nehavend copy (Robert, Hellenica, 7, 1949, 5-22; cf. Clairmont, M~tJs. H elv., 1949, 218-26; A. G. Roos, lrfnem., r9so, 54-63; 1951, 70-72; Aymard, REA, 1949, 327-45), been dated with certainty to 193, and Bikerman's insistence (Seleucides, 193 n. 3) that no chronological conclusions concerning Antiochus' assumption of the title can be drawn from its omission from letters seems confirmed. Of the inscriptions with the title, listed above, those from Nysa and Pergamum are of uncertain date and the rest later than 205. 8. )\pLa.p6.91)'i: Ariarathes IV Eusebes inherited the throne of Cappadacia from his father in c. 220; cf. Diad. xxxi. 19. 6, V7J7TLI.f> 7Ta~·-re.\wr; ovn ~v ~AtKtav; Justin. xxix. r. 4· He married Antiochus' daughter and reigned until c. 163. 4>LAov6.'1'wp: on his accession see ii. 65-69 n. (a). 9. AuKoupyoo;;: for his accession, winter 22ojr9, see 35· 14 n. )\vv£f3a.v: cf. ii. 36. 3 for his appointment in 221. 10. 8 ... auv~J3'l yEvea&a.L: P. the contents of i. 3· r-2. On the occasional use of the phrase Jixatot . •• Kal. IP£.\t1T1Tos to describe the Symmachy (cf. 55· I, v. ros. 3) by the Achaean historian see Feyel, 142 n. S·

3-37. Origins ofihe Social War; its Course till Spring

2I9

3-6. Preliminaries. P. assigns the responsibility for the war to the Aetolian love of plunder; and for a state with an economy such as that of Aetolia this must have been a motive of some weight. But equally important was the new political constellation, since the Symmachy created by Doson hemmed in the Aetolians on all sides (ii. 54· 4 n.), and the Achaeans were trying to win over Messenia (Fine, A}P. 1940, rso ff.; Walbank, Philip, 24). Dorimachus' object in provoking trouble in Messenia was probably to create an incident which might be exploited to justify Aetolian intervention ; cf. Roebuck, 72 n. 26. For P.'s strictures on Aetolian character (3. r) 451

IV. 3

ORIGINS OF THE SOCIAL WAR

cf. ii. 43· 9, 45· I, 45· 3-4; and for his treatment of Aetolia generally cf. Brandstaeter, 257 ff. 3. 3. ~ea.Ta To 1Ta.Aa.tov ~9o~: for the early prevalence of piracy see Thuc. i. S· a.UToi~ :.\xa.toi~: 'the Achaeans now that they were alone'. 5. uto~ Nl~eoaTpaTou KTA.: cf. ix. 34· II, for the violation of the Pamboeotian truce; the plundering of the temple of Athena ltonia (25. 2) is part of the same incident, which evidently occurred when Boeotia was at peace with Aetolia, yet not protected by the Macedanian alliance of 224 (cf. xx. 6. 8), i.e. between 229 and 224 (Feyel, 137-8). Flaceliere (289) and Klaffenbach (IG, ix. i2 • xxv, 11. 6s ff.; DLZ, 1948, 98) date it to 220, but less probably. The Pamboeotia was held at the temple of Athena ltonia at Coronea (Strabo, ix. 4II; Paus. ix. 34· I), near the modern village of Mamoura. The temple possessed asylia (Plut. Ages. 19. 2). What little is known of this festival A. Plassart has assembled in BCH, 1926, 397-8; cf. Feyel, Epig. 58 ff. ; Flaceliere, 289 n. 2. EL~ TTJV Twv ~tya.Hwv 1TOAw: Phigaleia (modern Pavlitsa) lay in the western Peloponnese, north of Messene, £1rl JLE-rewpov Kai d1ro-roJLov (Paus. viii. 39· s); impressively situated above the gorge of the Neda (Meyer, RE, 'Phigaleia', cols. 2o67 ff.), it afforded an excellent stronghold for raids into Messenia. Phigaleia had been an Aetolian ally since c. 244, when the Aetolians appeared as allies of the Phigaleans in an agreement of lu01roAm:la between Phigaleia and Messenia (Syll. 472 = IG, v. 2. 419; cf. ]HS, 1936, 68 n. 30); this inscription records provisions for regulating frontier disputes with Messenia. On the expression UVJL1ToAt-rEVoJLivq, which probably here means no more than luo1roAt-reta, see ii. 46. 2 n. 8. TTJV ~eow~v t:tp~VTJV • • • auvTEAEa9E(aa.v: i.e. the general peace established after the war with Cleomenes. Kotvq £lf117v7J is not to be taken in a technical sense, as including all Greek states, among them Aetolia (Bickermann, Rev. phil., I93S· 70-71); it simply indicates a general state of peace in Greece, so that the Aetolians could not find belligerents against whom to practise the custom described in xviii. S· I-3· €t£LVUL 'TOLS' Al-rwAOLS' avEV KOtVOU SOyJLa'TOS' ..• TI]v xwpav ay£w ri]v dJLrpOTipwv. See Larsen, CP, 1937, 27 n. 34· 9. +t).wv ovTwv ~ea.l au11.W.xwv: cf. 6. II, IS. 10. How far the alliance still existed de facto is uncertain, since it was based on an antiSpartan interest which the Aetolians had abandoned some time ago. In IS· IO P. speaks as if it still existed after Caphyae (II-I2). See Fine, AJP, 1940, IS4·

4. 1. To Xupwvo~ Ka.AoOJlEvov E1Ta.UAlov: 'the farmstead known as Chyron's'; on £1ravAtov see Welles, p. 334· 2. EL~ Tn~ auva.px(a.s: 'magistrates' council'; the word designates a

ITS COURSE TILL SPRING 219

IV. 5·9

college of magistrates exercising certain functions in common, and is found in several states, both in Achaea (cf. xxvii. 2. u, xxxviii. 13. 4) and elsewhere; cf. Aymard, ACA, I7J n. I, 322. In Messenia at this date it probably indicates the board of ephors (d. 31. 2). 9. s~· a.UTO ToilTo ••• e€tKa.UaE TOV TOXEJ.10V: the responsibility for the war is to be attributed neither to so small a group as Dorimachus and his colleagues, nor to an incident so trivial as this insult; these are clearly excuses for a policy already decided. See Fine, A] P, 1940, I 57-8. 5. 1. aTpa.TIJyo~ ..• ~p(O"Twv: the chief annual magistrate of the Confederation, elected at an assembly held at Thermum each autumn (cf. Busolt-Swoboda, ii. 152o-1). Ariston was general for 22I/o; his relationship to Dorimachus and Scopas is unknown. On Scopas see Dumrese, RE, Suppl.-B. vii, 'Skopas (6)', cols. I2II-q. 5. To 8€ auv€xov Ti'j~ AhwXlKi'j~ 1rpoTpoTij~: 'the chief argument in his typically Aetolian exhortation'; cf. 3· s. v. 81. I, xviii. 4· I, for this use of the adjective. 7. oOK epEiv EyKAtJI..la.Ta. Toi~ ci.J.Luvo...,Evols: 'they would not (reasonably) lay complaints against them if they defended themselves'; the dative is similar to that found after lyKATJp.a. Aa.yxavm, (cf. Dem. xxxiv. 16), and lpetv though unparalleled in this phrase is probably to be retained. Dorimachus' arguments are probably of Polybian invention, for P. is unlikely to have had reliable information on what Dorimachus told Scopas. 8. ~xa.loi;- Ka~ Ma.KE86ow • • • rijs au...,._.,a.x(a.~: 'promising the Achaeans and Macedonians to join the alliance'. How far this had gone is uncertain; Fine (A}P, 1940, 156) exaggerates it, assuming that the Messenians had fought at Sellasia (Paus. iv. 29. 9; P. is silent). Perhaps there had been a definite move, which had foundered on the possession of Cyparissia and Pylos by Achaea (cf. 25. 4, xviii. 42. 7, Pylos; v. 92. s. xi. 18. 2, Cyparissia; Niese, ii. 4II n. I). 9. oGn I(Olvi}v TWV AhwXwv 1rpoa8E€Q....EV0l auvo&ov: 'without waiting for a general assembly of the Aetolians'. The Aetolians had two annual assemblies of the people, the Thermica held each autumn at Thermum, at which the annual elections took place (cf. v. 8. 5), and the Panaetolica, held at different towns each year, in late winter or early spring; these names apply strictly to festivals with which the assemblies were associated, but are conveniently used of the latter :as well. In addition special assemblies could be called (d. IS· 8). Recently, Kahrstedt has argued (RE, Evvlf>p,ov, I339-44) that the Aetolians possessed no primary assembly, and M. Mitsos (Hesp., 1947. :256--61} that they had more than two (and that of these none was called Thermica or Panaetolica) ; for a refutation of both these views see Larsen, TAPA, I952, 1~33, who also discusses the names applied to the assembly, and its powers and functioning (the latter 453

IV. 5· 9

ORIGINS OF THE SOCIAL WAR

vigorous, the former wide). See further Holleaux, fitudes, i. 219-27 (= BCH, 1905, 362-72), 229-30 Klio, 1907, 294-5); Swoboda, Klio, 19II, 456; Busolt-Swoboda, 1521-2. In the present passage P. is speaking quite generally of any assembly, regular or irregular. ollTE TOLS a'II"OKAl]To~s <1UJ.Lf.LET0.80VTES: 'o:r communicating their plan to the special council'. The d1TOKArJ7·o• were a committee of the Synedrion, a council of the League on which the cities had representation proportionate to their populations; on the apocleti d. xx. r; Livy, xxxv. 34· 2, 'ita uocant sanctius consilium; ex delectis constat uiris', 35· s, xxxvi. 28. 8. They were evidently more than thirty in number and the strategos acted as their president; they were left with great authority in most fields, though vital issues of foreign policy were decided by the assembly (Larsen, TAP A, 1952, 23-33). See further Busolt-Swoboda, ii. 1526 (with bibliography). 10. Meaa11vto~s ••• Mo.tcE86a~: d. 6. I (Macedon), 6. 2 (Epirus and Acarnania), 6. 3 (Achaea), 6. II (Messenia).

6. 1. To us ••• vo.utcAl]pous: evidently 'ships' officers'; though often it means 'shipowner', va.VKA7Jpos can also be the skipper, and it is unnecessary to accept Capes's suggestion that the ship was privately owned, but engaged in transporting produce of royal lands or mines (which would not make it {3a.aLALKov). 2. To.is Twv Ke<J!o.A.A.fJvwv vo.ua£v: Cephallenia had entered into isopolity with Aetolia since the death of Demetrius II, and probably c. 226; cf. Beloch, iv. I. 719 n. 3; Klaffenbach, IG, ix. r 2 , introduction, xxiii; Flaceliere, 258, 284. On Cephallenia cf. v. 3· 9· 9up~ov: cf. 25. 3, xviii. Io. ro, xxv:iii. 5· r (with variant spellings). The town lay about 3 miles from the Ambracian Gulf, on the site of modern Hagios Vasilios. Cf. Bursian, i. 112; Fiehn, RE, 'Thyrrheion', cols. 744-7; Klaffenbach, S.-B. Berlin, 1954, 22 ff. 3. To tco.Aouf.Levov 6xupwf.Lo. KM.p~ov: site unknown; probably between Phigaleia and Megalopolis. 4. T ~f.L6~evos ••• 1ro.po.Ao.~wv T o.up(wvo.: 'Tim oxenus ... with Taurion as ally'. Timoxenus was the Achaean general for 221/2o. Taurion's position (here he is called Tbv £1ri Twv lv IlvAaKf'js Ka.TaAeAHf.Lf.Llvos at the time of the League of Demetrius Poliorcetes (IG, iv2 • 68, I. 68/9; Bengtson, Strategie, i. 154 ff.): d. Treves, Athen., 1935. 54· But whereas that official was responsible for Greek affairs generally, Taurion's competence was limited to the Peloponnese, though his official residence like his predecessor's was Corinth (Bengtson, Strategie, i. r6s ff.; ii. 357-6o); presumably he was concerned >Vitll Macedonian possessions and foreign relations in the Peloponnese, but had no special position relative to the Symmachy. 454

ITS COURSE TILL SPRING 219

IV. 7·

1

5. KopLvOov ••• 'Opxo1uvov: for Macedonian possession of Corinth d. ii. 54· I; of Orchomenus, ii. 54· Io; Plut. Cleom. 23. I; A rat. 45· 1. Philip also held Heraea; d. ii. 54· I2; Livy, xxviii. 8. 6. 7. :a..pa.Tos liE ~ea.O(aTa.To KTA.: i.e. Aratus was general-designate for 22oji9. The date of the Achaean elections at this time cannot be closely determined; the general entered office 'at the beginning of the good season' (v. 30. 7), or 'towards the rising of the Pleiades', viz. 22 May (37· 2 n.), but the election could be held at either the last or the penultimate synodos of the year, and so between February and May inclusive. See the discussion in Aymard, ACA, 233-76.

8. 1ra.vliTIJ.Ld: probably exaggeration by P. or his source, intended to condone the Achaean defeat; Aetolia will not have been left undefended. 9. liLa Ti')S na.Tp~wv Ka.l. cl>a.pa.LEWV Ka.L T pLTa.L~WV xwpa.s: on the site of these towns see ii. 41. 7-8 n. In 7· z and 25. 4 Tritaea is inadvertently omitted (my note, Aratus, 115 n. I, following Ferrabino, I25 n. 2, is incorrect); but the absence of complaints from Psophis, Telphusa, and Heraea shows that the Aetolians passed west of Mt Erymanthus and so through the allied territory of Elis, not via the Erymanthus and Ladon valleys. 11. Tf)s u1ra.pxouOT)s ••• 4nX(a.s ~ea.l. auJ.LJ.La.xta.s: 3· 9 n. TWV Ka.Tn KOLVOV wpLUJ.L~VWV liLKO.LWV: i.e. they had not declared war (d. I6. 4). In xiii. 3· 2-5 P. deplores the deterioration of international

morality; nowadays only the Romans declare war. For discussion of P.'s attitude towards the declaration of war, and his attempt to formulate a code of right and wrong in international relations, see ii. 58. 6 n. 7-13. Achaean decisions: the battle ojCaphyae. There is some evidence for the suggestion of Ferrabino (126 ff.) that P. has used a Megalopolitan source in these chapters (though much of Ferrabino's reconstruction is extremely hazardous and unconvincing). The critical tone adopted towards Aratus (d. I9. 12) reflects the violent feelings inspired by his failure at Caphyae (n. I, I4. I-6); and from I3. 1 one may deduce that the Megalopolitans had been attacked for arriving late at the battlefield (the detail a11o adAmyyo> emphasizing the speed with which they responded). The criticism of Sparta in 9· 6 is not, however, specifically 'Megalopolitan' but could have come from any Achaean source. 7. 1. K0.8T)KOUUT)S ••• auvoliou: on the aUVODOS' see ii. 37· Io-II n. (e). Since it virtually coincides with the taking over of office by Aratus, this will be the av.-oDOS' of mid-May 220; and the Aetolian raid will have begun about mid-April (d. Aymard, ACA, 253 n. 6). The reference to assembling in the iKKATJaia is noteworthy; it is clear 455

IV. 7·

ORIGINS OF THE SOCIAL WAR

I

evidence that a ativo8o;; at this date included a meeting of the primary assembly. 4. uuyxwp~ua.YTos •.• l.l.fJ8Evoc; Ti]v 8Co8ov: such leave of passage might have been granted without breach of neutrality; cf. IJ. 5 n. for the Aetolian passage through Boeotia. 1rapa Tas uuv!hlKas: cf. rs. 2; evidently the treaty of 239 (ii. 44· I n.), still technically in force (cf. 3· 9 n.). 5. ~lJrrl~luavTo ~ofJ8Eiv Toic; MEu
8~

TotoOTwv KTA.: 'Of this there are many dear proofs,

ITS COURSE TILL SPRING 219

IV.g.S

but the most conspicuous examples are afforded if one considers in detail ... .' Cf. vi. 44· 2. Paton prints Hultsch's conjecture rrA€Uo 11-lv f.tcrpa.~ofj 'O"Tt -rot's l.rrropT)t~-aTQvc;w sc. Ja.UTous, 'those willing to pay attention'; cf. vi. 32. 2. IJ. ~ Ta.'Ls KuVT)y(a.ls: P., a keen huntsman (xxxi. 29. 8), draws on his own experience. 10. AlTwAol Se TOLIT<~JV Tava.vT(a.: cf. rr. 8, where the present characterization of Aetolian and Achaean tactics is brought out in relation to Aratus' mismanagement of the battle of Caphyae. 11. Axcnot Se KTA.: yet Aratus, the starting-point of the digression, is exactly described by the phrases here applied to the Cretans. 12. tiav 'l!'ou ••• wavT(a~ &.'1To+aa•n~ 'll'Oll:,l.u;8a: for a similar recogni· tion of changes in men's character at various times cf. xvi. 28. r-6. 9. 2. Tijs Kolvij~ aup.~axCa~ p.t!Ta.axEiv: i.e. to join Doson's Symmachy; on its membership see § 4 and ii. 54· 4 n. 3. o[ 'l!'poeaTwTE:~ Twv Axa.lwv: i.e. the general and the damiurgi; but the main influence was exercised by Aratus (§ 7). 5. eAv O!J-T)pa. Swaw: this demand (which was evidently conceded) reveals Aratus' distrust of the Messenians. It was justified; cf. JI. I ff.; Roebuck, 74 n. JI. The choice of Sparta to hold the hostages was intended to strengthen its doubtful friendship with Achaea, and was not anti-Megalopolitan (so Ferrabino, 127, who indeed believes (IJI) that the hostages were never deposited). 6. uTA T1]v au~p.a.x(a.v: i.e. with Achaea. Since the Symmachy took no decisions until after Caphyae (13. 6--']}, only obligations towards Achaea could at this stage compel a Spartan mobilization. Taurion's help (6. 4) had been separately negotiated. Hence this passage is not evidence for the status of Sparta relative to the Symmachy (as Reuss, Stadt und Herrscher, 30), though indeed 24. 4 suggests that Reuss is right in thinking that Sparta was a member by now (not simply allied to it, Walbank, Philip, x6 n. 3). 7. 'll'pos Tou~ AtTwAoo<;: i.e. to Scopas and Dorimachus (cf. § 8). 8. T£8~;a9al Tot:<; 'l!'apayy~;AAop.(vo's: the sense 'yield to the demands' is hard to extract from this reading, and Ursinus's emendation 'li'El8Eu8a.t seems both easy and satisfactory. 457

IV. 9· 9

ORIGINS OF THE SOCIAL WAR

9. Ers TE KuJ\A:fJVTJv: this port on the west coast of Elis has not been satisfactorily identified; but it is now generally thought that it lay somewhere near Kounoupeli, rather than at Cape Glarentza farther south; for the evidence see Bolte, RE, ix, Nachtrage, 'Hyrmine', col. II7o; cf. Pieske, RE, 'Kyllene (3)', col. 2457. Ariston had crossed over from Aetolia to Elis. Tijs 'HJ\E(a.s ELS TTJV cl>naSa. •.. vfiO"ov: cf. Strabo, viii. 342-3. Phea was the ancient port of Olympia, and lay at the foot of the promontory of Ichthys (Katikolo), on the seaward side; it was protected by the island P. mentions, and its remains form the foundation of the medieval fortress of Pondik6kastro. See Leake, Morea, i. 21; ii. I9I; Bolte, RE, 'Phea', cols. I909-I3 (who reads tP€&0a here: MS. if>l.uioa). Why P. gives the name Phea to the island rather than to the port is not clear; but vijuos cannot mean 'Kiistenplatz' (so Bursian, ii. 30I n. I). 10. 2. Achaean numbers: 3,ooo foot and 300 horse are the numbers of the Achaean brl/..o(rot at Sellasia (ii. 65. 3 n.); they appear again at v. 91. 6. Hence it seems likely that Aratus had dismissed the ordinary levy, and that the forces here mentioned are the briAeKrot; that some were later placed under an officer who was probably a mercenary captain (n. 6 n.) is not evidence for dilution of the force with mercenary troops (on this see Griffith, 106 n. 5). 11'poijyE TTJV i'II'L naTpa.s: evidently down the Alpheius valley to Heraea, and thence north through Psophis. Why he marched east to Cleitor (§ 6, II. 2) is not apparent. 4. 1rpos To 'P(ov: the low-lying Achaean promontory 5 miles northeast of Patrae; cf. xii. I2 a I-3 for the crossing of the Heraclidae by this route. The thought-sequence is complex. Dorimachus is actuated by two motiVeS, Tct p.Jv ~l£aywv£uaVT€S' , , , Tct 0€ U7TOVoa~OVT€S' (§ 3) ; and these are then taken up in the account of his own actions (§ 5. avrol}, the first (his fear) by ro p.~v np&rov J¢>-qop€vov, the second (his desire to provoke the Achaeans) by Jl-€Tct oJ raiiTa 1Tpofjyov KTA. Fine (AJP, I940, I6I n. I44) misses this, when he summarizes: 'Dorimachus, fearing lest the Achaeans should attack him while embarking, sent off his booty and then marched into Arcadia' ; once the booty was aboard, Dorimachus' fear was over, and henceforward he is actuated by quite different motives. 5. 1rpoijyov ..• ws i'll'' '0AUf..L11'la.s: P. appears to misinterpret the Aetolian plan. Presumably he had some authority for stating (§ 4) that the Aetolian fleet had been ordered to pick up Dorimachus at Rhium; hence we may reasonably assume that Dorimachus originally proposed to march through Achaea to Rhium, plundering and provoking war (§ 3). But the thoughts attributed to Dorimachus in 458

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IV. ro.

IO

§§ 7-9 are Polybian hypothesis, to be judged from their inherent plausibility and what the Aetolians actually did. (a) Dorimachus did in fact retire from Achaea via the Isthmus, not via Rhium, i.e. he changed his plans. (b) P. says (§ 6) that the knowledge that Taurion was at Cleitor caused this change of plan. This is plausible. Taurion is mentioned because the Aetolians were especially afraid of the Macedonians (cf. 19. 6). Had Dorimachus originally intended to march to Rhium through Psophis and Leontium, news that Taurion was at Cleitor would be an indication that he was likely to be cut off; hence the change of route. (c) Dorimachus' change of route took him east through the Langadia-Vytina gap (cf. Meyer, Pel. Wand. 31-47; Leake, Morea, iii. 125) to Methydrium. This suggests that he had now substituted the Isthmus for Rhium as his goal; if so, he hoped to avoid an encounter with Taurion. (d) In §§ 7-8 he is said to have planned to encounter Aratus. But Arates was with Taurion at Cleitor (ro. 2, n. 2), and Dorimachus had no reason to suppose that they would separate. Moreover, it was Aratus who attacked Dorimachus, not the reverse (rr. 5 ff.). Hence it would appear that Dorimachus was not seeking an encounter. His original plan was to plunder and return through Rhium; when faced with the risk of an encounter, he substituted a highland route through Methydrium, Orchomenus, and perhaps Phlius, Nemea, and the Isthmus (the diversion to Pellene, I3. s. was perhaps an afterthought after the victory at Caphyae}. (e) Three further conclusions emerge. First: the reference to Rhium in ro, 8 is to be ignored; for once Dorimachus learnt that the Achaean forces \\ith Aratus and Taurion were still at Cleitor, Rhium was no longer a feasible plan. Second: the Aetolian force at Caphyae was not very large, since it shunned battle with Aratus' depleted force . .Either P. has exaggerated the original numbers (6. 8 n.) or the bulk of the men had embarked at Phea (10. 4). Third: P.'s distinction between Taurion's forces (which Dorimachus feared} and Aratus' forces (which he wished to encounter) is confused and misleading. From ro. 2 and II. 2 it appears that Aratus and Taurion were together during the march from Megalopolis to Cleitor. That they subsequently separated is not stated; but it is possible, for Caphyae is always spoken of as a purely Achaean disaster. It does not seem profitable to discuss Ferrabino's reconstruction (r.v ff.) of these events, since it involves a complete departure from P. 's account. 6. T a.up£wva. j.LETd Tou .•. 1TAlj9ous: cf. 6. 4, Io. 2. 8. 1Tpo~ta.TilaOpllvns: 'ravaging the country ahead, far and wide'; Paton takes the prefix in a temporal sense. 10. 1TEpt MdoSplov Tfjs MEya.Ao1ToA£nSoc;: Methydrium lay about 459

IV.

IO. 10

ORIGINS OF THE SOCIAL WAR

3 miles south of modern Vytfna on the river of that name; its ruins, Palatia, stand a little to the north of the village of Nemnitsa. See Meyer, RE, 'Methydrion (I)', cols. I387-9I; Pel. Wand. 3I ff. (for the surrounding district). 11. 1. ol 6E TWll :.\xa~wll iJYEllOllt:S: in effect, Aratus. 2. allaOTpel(taliTES ••. ~K Ti}s K>.t:,Top£as: on the advance north from Megalopolis by Aratus and Taurion see Io. z n., Io. 5 n. (e). 'ITEpl Kacpvas: cf. ii. 52. 2. Caphyae lay at the north-west end of the northern plain of Orchomenus, near modern Kotussa; cf. von Geisau, RE, 'Kaphy(i)a(i)', cols. 1896-7. Aratus' route 'led down the narrow valley of the Aroanius to Tara [Dara], thence ... over Mt Kastania to Khotussa' (Leake, Morea, iii. I25). The Aetolians evidently came via the modern village of Bezeniko into the upper plain of Orchomenus, leaving Orchomenus itself well to the right. 3. TOll lh' a1hou (XoliTO. 'II'OTalloll: not easily identifiable. The western end of this plain was artificially drained (d. Paus. viii. 23. z; cf. § 4, -racfopm Ka.i -rrAElovs 8vafJa..as e'll'l TOll 'OMyupTOY: this is the hill north-east of the plain of Caphyae, modern Mt Skipieza; cf. 70. I, which shows that it lay between Caphyae and Stymphalus, which was presumably Dorimachus' immediate goal. The pass is that leading north-east past modern Kandyla (between Mt Skipieza and H. Konstantinos), and then north between Mt Skipieza and the ancient Apelauron (d. 6g. I n.) along the gorge called Lykorrhevma; cf. E. Meyer, RE, 'Oligyrtos', cols. 2477-9; Frazer, Pausanias, iv. 229-30. 6. Tit~ 'll'poaa.yopEUOllEY(f:l npo'!l'o!iL: Leake (Morea, iii. 129) identifies this with a hill near the entrance to the valley where Kandyla lies, and which leads to the Pass of Lykorrhevma; cf. Frazer, loc. cit. 'E'II'tOTpa.Tov emOT~aa.liTES Toll :.\~ea.pviiva: probably a mercenary captain ; see ro. 2 n. 8. 6l6. TE T0'\1 tca.8o'!I'Ati7!10Y tca.i T~ll OATj'\1 17UliTO.~l'\l: cf. xviii. 22, 5' and, for the comment in general, 8. ro-II (on Thessalians and Cretans). What was specifically noteworthy in the Aetolian KaBo'fTAtap.&s we do not know. In ii. 3· 4 they have the normal branches of an army; and the distinction in IG, ix2 • I. 3, ll. 39-40, between those with -rra.vo'fTAta or ~p.dJwpaKwv, and ,PLA.ol, is quite usual (Launey, i. 200 n. 2). 12. 3. ewpa.tc£TO.\;: 'cuirassed troops' ; evidently distinct from lightarmed (§§ I and 6, £v,wvo~, ,PLA.ol) and heavy-armed (§§ ro and Iz, •a fJa.pla <wv 0-n->..wv, if>a>.a.yyf;a,; cf. x. 29. 6) and probably something 460

ITS COURSE TILL SPRING 219

IV.

14. I

between. At the battle of Mantinea they are classed with the Illyrian mercenaries (xi. II. 4). bt ~ Ka.i Ka.Ta.~e.6pws: 'insolent and excessive', metaphors from medicine and eating, respectively; cf. Wunderer, i. 89, iii. 14. 13. 1. &.'ll'b a6.Amyyos '!l'a.v8-rnui. ~otJ9ouvTE'>: cf. 7-13 n. The Megalopolitan levy is of the whole people, an emergency measure. It does not follow that Megalopolitan reinforcements were part of the original Achaean strategy, nor yet that Aratus' 3,3oo troops (1o. 1-2) contained no Megalopolitans (despite the separate Megalopolitan contingent, over and above the brlAeK-rot, at Sellasia; ii. 65. 3 n.). T'fi Ka.TO. m~Sa.~ f).,_Epq.: from Megalopolis to Caphyae, via Methydrium, the route which must have been followed, is zs-JO miles. 2. !-'E9' tilv tQvTwv ••• TETEAEUTfJK6Ta.<;;: the elaborate contrasts, as a way to underline the ironical reversal of fortune, are worth attention; J.te8' wv •.• Kn-bvveva~w : Tol1-rovs ••• 8cf'!I'Tew; {wnwv : T£T£A£VT7)K6-ra.>; ifil.nwav : ~vayK&.{ono; np/;s TOVS vnevanlovs : imo TWV q8pwv. 5. Tf\S nEAAt]viwv 11'6AEW<;: cf. ii. 41. 7-8 for the site. From Pellene

and Sicyon the Aetolians evidently withdrew, keeping south of Acrocorinth, and crossing the Isthmus; they will hardly have forced the walls between Corinth and Lechaeum. At this time Megara was part of Boeotia (ii. 52. 7 n., xx. 6. 8}; and the Boeotians apparently gave the Aetolians free passage, for there are no Boeotian complaints, and Boeotia remains neutral in the forthcoming war (Feyel, 145 n. 4}. 6. 0 aup.p.a.XLKOS 11'6AE!-'OS: the so-called Social vVar, i.e. the war of the members of Doson's Symmachy against the Aetolians; but from those members must be excluded Boeotia and (probably) Phocis; cf. Feyel, 142 ff. a.hLO.V KO.l • • , Ocjlop!-'t,V , , , OPXftV! 'CaUSe and pretext ... beginning' ; cf. iii. 6. 3 n. for the distinction. ahlat are such events as lead someone to take a decision, here the various acts of Aetolian aggression, which lead to the decision of the allied states to pass the warmeasure. The passing of this constitutes the d.px1 of the war. d.cfoopJ.t/j appears to be equivalent here to 'TTpoams (cf. ii. 52. 3 d.cfoopJ.t~ Kat npoaats dlil.oyo;;; ii. 59· g, &.opJ.tfi Ta.Jry Ka.tnpo&.cm XP'/IT&.J.tevos), and denotes the official pretext with which the war is justified (whether true or false). For the war-measure (Tofi • •• SOyJ.taTos} cf. 25. 6 ff. 14, 1. ds TTJV Ka.9tlKouaav auvo8ov: this synodOS, held a few days after Caphyae, was the third of that year (the electoral assembly and 401

IV.

14. I

ORIGINS OF THE SOCIAL WAR

that of 7· I had preceded it), and(§ 9 n.) it coincided with the end of the Olympiad year, and so fell about August or late July 220. See Aymard, ACA, 263 ff.; Larsen, 8o. "'l'ltcpw<; SI.EtcElTO ••• "'l'pbi "l'Ov 'Apa.Tov: this chapter, v.t:ith its marked hostility towards Aratus may well reflect a Megalopolitan source (cf. 7-13 n.); but when he goes farther, and tiies to attribute complaints one and three to a pacifist, and complaints two and four to a Megalopolitan source, Ferrabino (137 f.) seems to enter the realm of fantasv. 9. Chron~logical note. In 15 P. proceeds to enumerate the resolutions passed at this synodos. Can he mean that the Olympiad year came to an end in the middle of the synodos? It seems improbable, and if true of no significance, to warrant this odd and pedantic interruption. On the whole § 9 looks like an insertion by some reader anxious to indicate the point where the synchronism with book iii begins. Cf. Aymard, ACA, 263 n. 6.

15. 1. "~~'P'"'~EuEw tc"l'~·: these are the members of the Symmachy; cf. ii. 54· 4 n. 2. 8i.s Eta~EJ3AfJKOTE<;: 25. 4 shows that the two invasions were the seizure of Clarium (6. 3) and the advance through the territory of Patrae, Pharae, and Tritaea (6. g). Neither here nor at 25. 4 is the Caphyae affair mentioned, probably because having adopted selfhelp (though disastiously) Aratus felt this expedition was honours even; in any case, it was a business better forgotten, since the attack on Pellene (I3. 5) had probably been beaten off, and Aratus was in a strong position for ignoring the misfortunes of Sicyon (13. 5). Ferrabino's hypothesis (133) that the Achaeans attacked the Aetolians while embarking in Elis is unconvincing (10. 5 n.). On the CJV~~lJfj~eaL violated by the Aetolians cf. 7. 4 n. Ka.Td Td<; OJlOAoy~a.<;: according to the terms of the Symmachy. The two proposals of the Achaeans-assistance to Messenia and their admission into the Symmachy-would have to go before the Synedrion of the Symmachy (25. r); but any decisions there taken had subsequently to be ratified by the various members. For the Messenian request cf. 9· 2. 6. Forces from Sparta and Messenia. The total, together with the League forces, of 1o,ooo foot and 1 ,ooo horse, is smalL Either Aratus was relying on Philip; or he could not raise a larger force-perhaps through internal disaffection such as appears in Cynaetha (17. 4 ff.). 8. "'l'(l.pa.yEYOJliVfJ'i , , , Til'> IC0.9lJKOU"'fJS ~KICATjata.<;: since this meeting is in summer, and not long before the regular autumn meeting of the Aetolian League (27. r), it must, despite the wording, be a special meeting called to consider the Achaean decision; cf. M. Klatt, Beitriige, 28; Holleaux, Etudes, i. 22o n. 2 BCH, 1905, 363 n. z; 462

ITS COURSE TILL SPRING 219

IV. 16.9

Larsen, TAPA, 1952, 5 n. ro. Translate. 'when the appropriate assembly met'. 8-9. ELPtlV'IlV ayELv KTA.: i.e. the Aetolians sought to limit the war to a conflict between Aetolia and Achaea, and in particular to detach Messenia and Sparta. The decision to make peace with Achaea depend on the abandonment of the Messenian alliance reveals the Aetolian fear lest Messenia should be absorbed into the Achaean Confederation (Walbank, Philip, 27). On the Aetolian 'alliance' with Achaea cf. 3· 9 n. 10. d 8' ~x9pa.v EAoLVTo: sophistry; ;xflpa is not the only alternative to CTVfLfLaxta. 16. 1. ets Tfjv auJ.LJ.LC.Xl«V '1'1'poaEAa.J3ov: 'were for receiving the Messenians into the Syrnrnachy'. Presumably the other states concurred, for Messenia was admitted to membership of the Symrnachy. Despite the immediate decision to remain at peace with Aetolia, the admission of Messenia was a clear warning to the Aetolians of the consequences of further attacks upon her. But the omission of any reference to past acts of aggression must have offered encouraging evidence of the element of weakness in the counsels of the Symmachy (Walbank, Philip, 28}. From the reference to the Epirotes Holleaux (141 n. 4} deduces that Philip was at this time (summer 220) in Epirus; this is a dubious conclusion, and no foundation for hypotheses on supposed concern with the affairs of Rome and Illyria (cf. Fine, ]RS, l9J6, 38-39)· 4. 'I'I'OAEJ.LOUS nVE'I'I'a.yyEATous: cf. 6. I I n. 5. t}AEu9EpwJ.L€voL: cf. ii. 70. r, iv. 22. 4, v. 9· 9· To the Achaeans Cleomenes was a tyrant; but to many Spartans 'liberation' obviously had a different look. The move towards Aetolia signifies a resurgence of the Cleomenean party (d. v. 35· z), though rfot.Alav •• • Kai CTVfLfLaxtav (even s~· a1Topp~Tlvv) seems an exaggeration at this date. See 22. 3 ff. for the internal struggle at Sparta. 6. vEa.vLuKwv: the word signifies 'men of military age'; cf. i. 36. rzn. On the date cf. 19. 1 n. l:KEp8LAa.t8as ••• KO.l A'IJ.LtlTPLo;: cf. ii. 5· 6 n., ro. 8 n.; and iii. r6. 2-3 nn. for an earlier reference to Demetrius' breach of the treaty made with Teuta (ii. 12. 3). 7. TU nuA
IV. r6. 9

ORIGINS OF THE SOCIAL WAR

(cf. ii. 1. 9, xv. 22. I), and this would favour the view that Amynas was a younger man, and so perhaps make the identification more likely; but the matter is uncertain. Amynander later is married to Apama of Megalopolis (Livy, xxxv. 47· 5 ff.). The Athamanians were akin to the Epirotes, and inhabited the district between the Arachthus and the western slope of Pindus. 10. !A.yf:Aciou: Agelaus of Naupactus, famous for his speech at Naupactus in 217 (v. 3· I, Io3. 9-105. r). 11. TtlS Twv Kuva.L9Ewv 11'0A€WS: Cynaetha was an Arcadian city on the site of modern Kalavryta; see E. Meyer, Pel. Wand. I07---<), for a description.

17.4-5. Class-conflicts in Cynaetha. It is clear from§ 5 that the split was connected with Cleomenes' reforms, and the appeal these made throughout the Peloponnese. Confiscation of property and redivision of land were part of the revolutionary programme, and the installation of an Achaean garrison and a military governor recalls the steps taken in similar circumstances at Mantinea (ii. 58. I ff.) in 227. Clearly the Aetolians were exploiting revolutionary sentiments, and this matches the Spartan moves (r6. 5). The indiscriminate massacre inside the town is not an argument against such a policy, for it may have been the work of an undisciplined rank and file. Cf. Ferrabino, 142-4; Walbank, Philip, 29-30. If the Delphian dedication published by P. Amandry (BCH, I94o-I, 70-75, no. 5), which shows an Aetolian, Simos, settling Achaean refugees in Sciritis in north Laconia (the inscription reads [L']~tpov), is to be dated at this time, it throws light on the class-aspect of the Achaeo-Aetolian conflict and the links between Aetolia and Sparta. For earlier GTaat> at Cynaetha cf. ix. q. 12. TouToLs ~11'pa.TTov TTJV 'II'OALV: 'they were for betraying the city to them'. 18. 7. TWV aSLKWV ~pywv EV ••• SLKa.LOTa.Tov: cf. 19. I3, XV. 26 a I, which indicates that the phrase is proverbial; perhaps, as Co bet suggested, it comes from a metrical source (cf. Wunderer, i. 6. I8, 47; von Scala, 75; Bergk, PLG, iii 4• 69I, fg. adesp. 11 B, -rofh-o 7TOL~aa> I -rwv d.lilKwv lpywv 2v

-ro lltKato-ra-rov).

8. SLci<Jlopov 1i Ka.Ta.aK€uciaj.La.Ta.: 'money or plate'. 9-10. 11'pot1yov ws E'II'L Aouawv: Lusi lay in the valley of Sudena between Cynaetha and Cleitor; its site on the north-west slopes of the hill H. Ilias was confirmed by Austrian excavations in I898---9. The temple of Artemis (cf. ix. 34· 9 for its plundering by Timaeus, probably in 24o) lay about a quarter of an hour's walk east of the town. The games associated with it, -ra 'HfL£paata, are known to us from several inscriptions, and its inviolability (aav.\ov ... vf:vofLLGTat) 464

ITS COURSE TJLL SPRJNG 219

IV.

20

was probably guaranteed by grants of asylia. For the Aetolian grant see IG, ix 2 • I. 135 (cf. F. Poulsen-K. Rhomaios,J. vorliiufiger Bericht uber die diinisch-griechischen A usgrabungen von Kalydon (Danske Videnskabernes Selskab, xiv, 1927, 3· 45)). There is no evidence for the continued existence of Lusi after about 200 B.c., and its territory was ultimately absorbed by Cleitor. For a map, and full discussion of the site, temple, and history see F. Bolte, RE, 'Lusoi', cols. 189<>-9· 10. Ta 8pi~~a.Ta. Ti]s 8eoG: sacred herds; they are often mentioned in connexion with sanctuaries, e.g. Syll. 407 (fifty oxen given by the coastal Lacedaemonian village of Tyrus to Delphi in 275), 636 (Delphic decree on sacred cattle in 178), 826 G {Amphictyonic decree on revenue therefrom in 117). 12. 1rpoaeo-rpa.T011'E8euaa.v Tfi Twv KXe~Toplwv 1roAe~: having gone via the Aroanios valley, turning west near the site of Maseika, or else west of H. Ilias and down the valley of the Karnesi (see BOlte's map, RE, 'Lusoi', cols. 1893-4). 19. 1. tca.TO. •.• To us tca.~pous TOOTous: here Aratus is said to be collecting the Achaean levy, whereas in 16. 6 the levy is already enrolled before Scerdilai:das' outbreak, the attack on Pylos, and the arrangement with the Aetolians. Clearly the synchronism cannot be pressed to date the Aetolian invasion to August, as the present passage, and the same details in 15. 6, suggest. 5. Eup~1rL8a.v: frequently figures as an Aetolian leader; cf. 59, 6o. 3, 68. 1-69. 2; etc. 8. s~t.. TOY TWV 'Po8lwv E1r' O.UTOV O.ve11'AOuv: since both Macedon and Egypt had abandoned their control of the Aegean, its policing had fallen to Rhodes; cf. 46. 2 n., Costanzi, Klio, 1911, 282-3; Tam, CAH, vii. 718, 752; Holleaux, CAH, viii. 143. 9. u1rep~a8~Laa.s: cf. v. 101. 4· Ships could be taken over the isthmus by means of the 8lo)ucos, a system of rollers for getting them across the 40 stades (5 miles) separating the two seas; cf. Strabo, viii. 335· 11. 1roA~T~KWTEpov ft o-rpO.TTJYlKWTepov: contrast xxii. 10. 4 of Diophanes, iivBpwTros crrpa.T1]ytK. By his action at Caphyae Aratus had weakened the Achaean position and the force of their complaints; now he was determined to have Aetolian provocation accepted as an act of war by the whole Symmachy (cf. 26. 4), and so made no move during this invasion (Ferrabino, 143-4; Walbank, Aratos, 122). 13. tlTUXTJKEva.~ 8Ltca.L6Ta.Ta.: for the oxymoron cf. 18. 7 n. 20-21. Music and Arcadia. P. here follows the theory which makes man's material environment primarily responsible for his character. First propounded by Hippocrates (On climates, waters, and places), it appeats frequently in later writers; cf. Ps.-Arist. Problem. 14. 1. 4866

Hh

465

V. zo

ORIGINS OF THE SOCIAL WAR

909 a, for the effects of excessive heat and cold on the temperament· An important part is played in the development of this milieutheory by Poseidonius who (cf. Cic. nat. de&r. ii. 42) also stressed the cultural effects of racial ~<pam> in the Mediterranean area, whereas the purer and more primitive races lived on the fringes of the oecumene. P. may owe his knowledge of the theory to the Stoics, but this has not been conclusively demonstrated. Hirzel (ii. 891 ff.) points out that Cicero (de Jato, 7) attributes it to Chrysippus; and in de diu. ii. 96 f. he attributes it to Panaetius (cf. Norden, Urgesch. 6z). But Hirzel also admits that it was familiar to Hippocrates, Plato, and Aristotle. von Scala (zo4-5) argues that avY£eofWwOa8at (21. r) is Stoic jargon; this is true, but the word is also found in Theophrastus, and in xxxi. 18. 4 P. uses it without any Stoic implications. See further R. Pohlmann, Hellenische Anschauungen iiber den Zusammetr,hang zwischen Natur und Geschichte (Leipzig, 1879), 12 ff.; K. Triidinger, Studien zur Geschichte der griechisck-romischen Ethnographie (Diss. Basel, 1918); Walbank, Class. et med., 1948, 179-81. 20. 3. cflua~KW5 auvTE8E(I)P'IIleva.: 'studied in their relation to natural conditions' (C'..apes). 4. Tt\v y' 6.ATJ8ws jlOUO"~Kt}v: 'significat, puto, se Musicae nomen nunc propria ac uulgari notione accipere ; non ilia latiore et augustiore, . . . qua humaniorum omnium literarum disciplina atque cultura eodem nomine designabatur' (Schweighaeuser); but F. Wehrli (Eumusia: Festgabe fiir Ernst Howald (ZUrich, 1947), 63 n. I) argues that poetry was also included. Stress on the effects of music is traditionaL Thus the valour of the Spartans was associated with their use of the Dorian mode; cf. Plato, Rep. iii. 398-9; Laches, r88 D; Arist. Pol. v (viii}. 7· 8. IJ42 a, d. 5· 24· I340 b, cpav£pov on SvYaTat 1rou>v Tt To T-ij> 1/Jvx-ii> ~8o> ~ p.ovaiJ(~ 1rapaaKwa''""· The theory may go back ultimately to the sophist Damon (d. Plato, Rep. iv. 424 c; von Jan, RE, 'Damon (I7)', cols. 2072-4). 5. ~5 "E,opos «fl'law ..• pi"'a.s: Ephorus of Cyme in Aeolis was the foremost fourth-century Greek historian. His main work, the •luTop[at, in thirty books, went down to the year 356/5· Of his personal life little is knmvn, but tradition made him a pupil of !socrates (d. Cic. de or. ii. 94). P. expresses considerable regard for his work as the first attempt at a universal history (v. 33· 2), and quotes him (ix. r. 4, xii. 2i. i) ; though elsewhere he criticizes him for misunderstanding the Cretan constitution (vi. 45· I, cf. 45-4i· 6 n.), and for having no conception of a land battle (xii. zs f 1). He several times defends him against Timaeus' criticism, and his geographical book (xxxiv) seems copied from the example of Ephorus, who devoted books iv and v to geography (cf. xxxiv. 1. 1-2). See in general Schwartz, RE, 'Ephoros', cols. I-I6; Laqueur, Hermes, 19II, r6r f., J2I f.; G. Barber, The Historian Ephorus (Cambridge, 1935); frag466

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IV.:o~.o.

9

ments in Jacoby, FGH, 70; commentary in vol. ii c. Each book of Ephorus had a separate introduction, and there was a preface to the work as a whole; cf. Barber, 68-74, who emphasizes the role of the preface as a vehicle of errtp.erpoiJv-rEs Myot (cf. xii. zB. Io). l'lf' a'!f6.11) tca.l. YO'lTE{C2- 'lf«pEtaijx9a.l TOLS &.v9pW'If0lS: 'introduced among (or by) men merely for the purpose of beguiling and bewitching'. Ephorus was probably contrasting p,ova£Krl and lo-ropla., the former, like tragedy, designed to thrill (cf. ii. s6. u), the latter to point a moral and instruct (dm1T7J : ci>,Pe>.da) ; d. Wunderer, ii. 14· P. on the contrary rejects a non-utilitarian view of music. Paton's translation 'for the purpose of deception and delusion' is not quite adequate; see Schweighaeuser's excellent note in Lex. Polyb. drrdT7J. and his translation 'non ad solam oblectationem et ad incantandos animos esse inuentam'. 6. a.uMv tca.l pu81-1ov: 'movement in time to the flute'. Cf. Herodian, iv. z. 9. rrvpp,x.l; Plato, Laws, ii. 665 A, -rfi 8~ -rfjs KL~O'EWS ..,a,gH pvOp.os ovop.a. Thucydides (v. jo) describes the advance of the Spartans at the battle of Mantinea to the sound of many fluteplayers tva &p.a'Ac;Js p.E-rd pv8p.ov {Jalvovm; rrpoal>.Oot£V Ka~ p.~ ou1· r:J1Taa6d17 aV-rot:s ~ TJ.g,,, and later sources (Ps.-Arist. apud Aul. Gell. i. u. I7-I8; Cic. Tusc. ii. 37; Val. Max. ii. 6. 2; Plut. Lye. ;n) agree in making it a Spartan custom. But two proto-Corinthian vases of c. 65o-64o, the Chigi vase (Payne, Protokorinthische F asenmalerci (Berlin, 1933), pls. 28-29) and an aryballos represented in BSA, 1947,93, fig. 7, in an article by H. L. Lorimer on the hoplite phalanx (see aLso ibid. 82), show that the flute-player was also a Corinthian institution. On the Greek av>.os see now K. Schlesinger, The Greek A ulos (London, 1939). The ad.Amyg was primarily an instrument for giving signals like our bugle, and unsuited for marching in step. P.'s point is illustrated in a famous passage of Milton (Paradise Lost, i. 549). 8. tca.Td. vol'ous: ex legibus, Casaubon and Schweighaeuser in his translation, e.~ artis (musicae) legibus, Schweighaeuser in Lex. Polyb. vop.os. Subsequent commentators and translators have chosen one or the other. In view of i. 32. 7 (where the phrase means 'in accordance with military rules') and the usage in § 9, the second is the more likely; cf. Paton, 'in measure'. 9. ~LAo~c\vou Ka.1 T L!-lo9£ou: Philoxenus of Cythera, the dithyrambic poet (435-38o), flourished under Dionysius the younger of Syracuse (Diod. xiv. 46. 6); the story of his being thrown into the quarries for his outspokenness is often told (Diod. xv. 6. 3 ff.; Cic. ad A.tt. iv. 6. 2). Timotheus of Miletus, his contemporary (c. 450-36o), was famous for adding four new strings to the seven-stringed lyre. He was encouraged by Euripides who, Satyrus says (Vit. Eur., fg. 39, col. zz P. Ox. ix, no. u76, p. r67), perhaps correctly, wrote the prologue to the Persae, the famous dithyrambic poem, which was 467

IV.

20.9

ORIGINS OF THE SOCIAL WAR

discovered on a fourth-century papyrus (P. Berol. 9875, our oldest extant papyrus, edited by Wilamowitz, Timotheos, die Perser (Berlin, r9o3)) in 1902. Timotheus' authoritative position as a classic model for dithyramb and citharoedic composition, along with Philoxenus and Polyidon, is confirmed by a Teian inscription of about 2oo (Schwyzer, 190). See P. Maas, RE, 'Timotlieos (9)', cols. 1331-7 (who, however, inexplicably attributes this passage to Ephorus; it is dearly personal reminiscence). xopeuouaL ••• TO iS l.LOVUO'LaKOf:S a.lJA'!jT«iS •.• clywvas; 'they institute choral contests to the accompaniment of professional fluteplayers'. The .dwvvataKoi a?JATJTal are professional TexvL-rat organized in guilds (cf. vi. 47· 8, xvi. 21. 8, xxx. 22. 2); see Poland, RE (v A, 2, Nachtrage), 'Technitai', cols. 2473-558; Daux, 356-p. For the dative Reiske compares the phrase TpaycpSot~ Katvot~ in the spurious indictment in Dem. xviii. 54· For epigraphic evidence of these activities in Arcadia cf. Syll. 703, a Delphic inscription of c. n8 honouring two men of Pheneus who set poems to music and produced them with a boys' choir. 10. Tas &.ywyas ••• 11'oLouvTaL: 'they divert themselves'. dywyas appears here only for Staywyck ~1TEL0'0.KTWV clKpOC1j!0.Twv: 'hired musicians'. This sense of aKp6afLa, normal in P., passed into Latin; cf. Cic .. Sest. n6; Arch. 20. &.vel j!Epos (J.Sew AAA'I]AoLs 1TpoaT0.TTovTES: 'calling for a song from each in tum'. Athenaeus (xiv. 29) cites Philochorus for the Spartan custom, at supper, of singing one of Tyrtaeus' hymns in tum as a solo, the polemarch giving a prize of meat to the best. Something similar may be implied here; or P. may refer to the custom of singing alternate verses in an amoebean contest, as in Virgil (Eel. 1· 4), 'ambo florentes aetatibus, Arcades ambo I et can tare et responto the dere parati' (together with Eel. Io our earliest literary 'Arcadia'). T. Keightley, ad loc., attributes the invention to Virgil's acquaintance with P., a conjecture independently developed by B. Snell, Die Entdeckung des Geistes, ed. 2 (Hamburg, 1948), 268 ff. 12. Ejl~«T'I]pL«jlET' a.uAou Ka.i. TO.~ews claKouvTES: 'practising marching strains on the flute while on parade'. i~tf3aT~pta (sc. 4afLaTa or ~tt!AYJ) are v6~tot r.oAefLtKol, the rhythms to which soldiers march into battle; cf. Thuc. v. 70 (quoted in 20. 6 n.); Schweighaeuser quotes a scholiast to Hermogenes: AaKeOat~t6vwt r.po~ TOV i~tf3a~ptov TOV avAoO pvOfLoV KaTa r.o>te~tlwv Jxc.!Jpovv; Polyaen. i. ro; see further the note of I. A. Fabricius to Sex. Empiricus, adv. math. vi. 357· But Capes and Strachan-Davidson prefer to take i~tf3a~pta as 'marches', and it is possible that the sense 'marching to music' has developed out of 'music for marching'. This would certainly give a better contrast with dp~aets; and the absence of parallel examples is not a serious objection. If this meaning is accepted, JfLf3aT~pta and opx~aEtS Will 468

ITS COURSE TILL SPRING 219

IV,

22.

8

be the objects of lmodKvuvra£, as well as the accompanying participles; otherwise bn&lKvuvra£ is used absolutely, 'they make a display, show off'. 21. 1. TT)v ..• a.uToupy£a.v: cf. Thuc. i. 141. 3, aVTovpyol T£ ycip £la£ llcAoTToVll'fJato£.

2. KO.Ta TaS

~6V~KaS

Ka.l TaS OAOOXEPELS 8La.aTci.O'ELS: cf. XXXii. 4· 2,

Tas lfJv£Kas aUaTclO'€£S' Kat TGS o>..oaxcpci:S' 0£a~opas- TijS' olKOVfLEV!JS'·

Translate 'in accordance with our nationality and the distance we are separated from each other'; Strachan-Davidson renders ' ... or according to yet wider diversities' ; but o£ciaTaats- suggests a spatial interval (cf. i. r8. 4, xxxvi. 16. 8, lv omaTclm£), and geographical separation played a part in the milieu-theory (2o--21 n.). 3. To Ti}s cpoa£ws a.~6a.8es Ka.t aKAT)pov: 'the stubbornness and harshness of nature or of their natures' (cf. § 4, T6 T1j> ¢vxfls aTepa.fLvov). 8. TT)v !lEyaAT)V acpa.yf)v 'l!'oLt1aa.VTES: between the entry of Cynaetha into the Achaean Confederation c. 241/o (]HS, 1936, 71) and the events of 220 nothing is known of the internal history of the town beyond the remarks in 17· 4· The 'great massacre' is evidently one of those there referred to, and must have brought the pro-Spartan party into power; and since it is unlikely that this party would have been allowed to send envoys openly to Sparta through the cities of eastern Arcadia, once these were part of the Confederation, it is probable that the incident is to be dated between 241jo and the accession of Mantinea and Orchomenus to the Confederation (which was between 235 and 229: cf. ii. 46. 2 n.). The revulsion against the Cynaethans may have been partly political; but it also expressed the still powerful feelings about blood-guilt (d. § 9, KafJapfUSv). Purification from this involved a sacrifice ; cf. Eurip. Suppl. n96, GV <[> OE TEfLVEW ad.yw XP1J a', aKoVE fLOU. For the purification of a whole community by human sacrifice cf. Herod. vii. 197. See Hamburg, RE, KafJapw)s, cols. 2513-19. 11. av 'II'OT' a.uTOtS 0 6eos eiS 8~: a proverbial expression, quoted by Aristotle (Nic. Eth. ix. 9· I. II69 b) from Eurip. Or. 667, lhav o' 0 oalfLWV €0 0£0tp, Tl Oei·l>..wv; 22. 4. 01ToAa.!l~C..vovTEs taov a.&Tois llneiva.L Tijs 'II'OALTELa.s: P.'s picture of the troubles at Sparta as the growing pains of a people unused to freedom is disingenuous and inadequate; the existence of a strong pro-Cleomenean faction was the real issue, as is evident from the fact that three ofthe five ephors chose theAetolianside (cf. q. 4-5 n.). 8. TO Tijs Xa.XK~oLKou TE!l£vos: the temple of Athena TToA£axos of the Brazen House (through a slip Paton says 'Artemis') was built by Gitiadas (Paus. iii. 17. z) about the middle of the sixth century (cf. Dickins, BSA, 1906/7, I3i ff.). Its remains were discovered by excavators from the British School in 1907 to the north of the 469

IV.

22.

8

ORIGINS OF THE SOCIAL WAR

acropolis, just above the theatre. It was famous for the starving to death of Pausanias (Thuc. i. 134 ff.) and for the asylum and betrayal of Agis (Plut. Agis, 16 ff.). Ferrabino (148 n. :i) argues that the Spartan mobilization preceded the Aetolian departure from the Peloponnese; but P. makes it clear that the object was not to collaborate with the Aetolians, but to carry out an internal coup. 11. TauT• civaKpouol:levou: 'beginning to speak in this fashion'. 23. 1. 5laT'lpei:v •.• rrcivTa Ta 5iKala Kal ~L)u'Jv8pwrra: the phraseology is that of the Hellenistic chancelleries; cf. Syll. 705 B, l. 49, O'I.IVT7)pfjuat Td lK 1TaAaLCUJJ xp6vwv 8£?iopha Tlp.ta Kat ,Ptl.av8pw1Ta. Similarly in § 2' for the wording aup.p.ltaww; ••. Ot~:Alx87Jaav aKoAovOws Tats lvToAai:;; (cf. ii. 48. 8, iv. 64. 2) there are parallels in OGIS, 751, 11. 2 ff.; Insch. Mag. 18, I. 12. Cf. Schulte, 70-71. 2. rrepi. TO nap8evlOV 5pos: :Mt. Parthenium lay between Tegea and Argos (modern H. Elias) ; Philip evidently came via Argos and Hysiae. 5. To Tou ~aalhews auv£5pLov: the King's Council consisted of his Friends, {>.ot; cf. v. 2. I n., and for a sitting of the Council, v. 41. 6 ff. (in Syria). It went back to the Argead kingdom, but possessed none but advisory powers. Sometimes it acted as a court in cases of high treason (d. v. 16. 5-8; cf. Arrian, A nab. i. 25. 5; Diod. xix. 46. 4); and a recently found inscription shows the ,Pl>.ot acting as judges in the distribution of booty (Roussel, Rev. arch. 3, 1934. 39 ff., col. iii). See Beloch, iv. 1. 383; Corradi, 318-43, especially 331 ; Mornigliano, A then., 1933, 136-41 ; Walbank, Philip, 2-3; Bikerman, Seleucides, 40 f.; Ferguson, Gnomon, 1935, 521. It is noteworthy that on this occasion Aratus, an Achaean, took part in the proceedings (24. 3l· 8. ovrre;p :c\A.£~av5pos expt}aaTO e'l~aloLs: cf. v. 10. 6, ix. 28. 8. In 335, on a rumour of Alexander's death, the Theban democrats assaulted the Cadrnea, and seemed likely to cause a revolt throughout Greece. Marching in fourteen days from Peliurn on the Illyrian frontier Alexander defeated the Thebans and seized the city. By a decision nominally of the League of Corinth the city was razed, except for Pindar's house, and many of the population enslaved (Arrian, A nab. i. 7--9; cf. Glotz-Cohen, iv. I. 48-49; Tarn, Alex. i. 6-8). 24. 1. Erri. rriiaLv: 'after all the rest'. Philip's age here is probably a repetition of the statement in 5· 3, where it referred to autumnwinter 221. Cf. 2. 5 n. and Philip, 295. 2. Ka.l. l:lciALaTa Twv 'l!'a.paKeLI:!Evwv: 'especially those very close to him'. P.'s distinction suggests that he is following a source which merely records Philip's decision, and that the attribution to Aratus is P .' s surmise. 4. Twv aul:ltJ.cixwv: this implies that Sparta is a member of the Syrnmachy; cf. 9· 6 n.

470

ITS COURSE TILL SPRING 219

IV. 25. 3

8. E1TLKUp6118£Laf]s . • • Tfjs yvw(-LT]S: a loose expression, since the Council could not ratify in any real sense, 23. 5 n. 'Aratus' motives were to try to win Sparta by clemency; mild punishment would drive her nearer to Aetolia, while annihilation, by altering the balance within the Peloponnese, might create internal problems within the Achaean League itself. There was always a potential rivalry between Achaea proper and Arcadia, and the disappearance of Sparta would have rendered Megalopolis less vulnerable and so more influential' (Philip, 31). Ferrabino's theory (149) of a 'deal' with the proAetolian party at Sparta at the expense of Messenia (postulating the return of the Ager Denthaliates to Sparta) is wholly fantasy. nnpa.'Lov Tc;>V a.uTou cJ!(Xwv : cf. V. I 7. 6. op1eous 1T£pL <1U(-L(-LO.XLa.v: a natural precaution after the rising; one need not suppose the alliance to have been put on a new footing (Ferrabino, 149).

25. 1. auvtjSp£u£: cf. xviii. 45· 7' avv~opw~:: fL€Ta TOVTWV Ka' s,~::M.J.Lf3av~:: ?r~::p' Twv o.\wv (Flamininus and the senatorial commission). Here P. refers to the Council of the Symmachy. The complaints against Aetolia all refer to incidents before summer 220, and were therefore available when the allies resolved to remain at peace with Aetolia {r6. 3; cf. Ferrabino, 145); but this was the first conference at which all the grievances could be aired, and the cumulative effect will have been considerable. The congress thus registered a success for Aratus' policy of war, and the allies were won over to a programme of demands rather than mere complaints. Cf. Ferrabino, 144-7 (who exaggerates the significance of the change in policy of the Symmachy); Walbank, Aratos, 123; Philip, 32. 2. To Tfjs :A.8f]viis Tfjs '1Twv£a.s L£pov: cf. 3· 5 n. aTpa.Teuaa.vTEs e1r' ~(-L~puaov ~ea.L Aa.uXLov : on the eastern slopes of Parnassus; Daulium is more commonly called Daulis (d. Livy, xxxii. r8. 6-8 on its strong position). This attack must have taken place after the separation of Phocis from Aetolia, which Flaceliere (248 n. 3, 286-7) dates to 225, and Feyel (112-15) more probably to 228. Feyel has also shown (124-6) that between the summer of 228 and the winter of 227/6 Phocis joined the Boeotians in an alliance with Achaea (Syll. 519; cf. Treves, Athen., 1934, 407), and in 224 allied herself with Macedon. Hence it is likely that the attacks on Ambrysus and Daulis fell between 228 and 224, like that on the temple of Itonian Athena. All this time the Aetolians continued to hold western Phocis, including Drymaea, Tithronium, Tithorea, and Lilaea, in the upper Cephisus valley (cf. Flaceliere, 287). 3-4. Epirote, Acarnanian, and Achaean complaints. For the two former cf. 6. 2; for the Achaean injuries 6. 3 (Clarium), 6. 9 (Patrae and Pharae), r8. 7-8 (Cynaetha), r8. ro-11, 19. 4 (Lusi), 19. 1-3 471

IV. 25. 3

ORIGINS OF THE SOCIAL WAR

(Cleitor), x6. 7 (Pylas). The earlier reference to Pylos says nothing of the Aetolians, and P. dates the compact between them and Scerdilaidas after the latter returned to Naupactus (16. Io); possibly the Aetolians were being held responsible for the outrages committed by their new ally. Despite some restoration of the text in § 4, it seems clear that the Aetolians were also accused of some enterprise against Megalopolis in conjunction with the Illyrians. This can only refer to the expedition against Cynaetha, for the attack on Pylas is clearly distinguished as KaTa 9£\aTTav; and since it did not get farther than Cleitor (19. 3-4) there can be no question of a direct attack. However, from v. 93 it appears that since its resettlement, after Cleomenes took and destroyed it (ii. 55· 2-7, 61--63 ; the refugees found shelter in Messene), Megalopolis had been the prey of party faction; and it is quite likely that here, as at Cynaetha, there had been a party ready to collaborate with the Illyrians and Aetolians. In view of his concern for the reputation of his native city (cf. ii. 55· 8) it is not surprising that P. omits details and treats the matter as an attempt from outside; but it is not improbable that there was some kind of attempted coup within. Such an hypothesis might help to explain the excess of virtue with which P. reprehends the men of Cynaetha, though a comparison of 17. 4 (Cynaetha) with v. 93· 4 (Megalopolis) is enlightening. 6. 1Tpo9f~Evo~ ••• 1Ta.pa.Ka.n~6.XovTo lji,cjna~a.: P. probably saw a copy of the decree, for the phraseology of § 7 suggests the actual text. For the definition of freedom cf. 84. 5, l>..w9,;pofJs dcf>povp{)Tovs d.cf>opo>.oyryrovs, xpwp.lvovs To's lSlms 1TOA£T<Evp.a.cn ('one long tautology', Tam, Alex. ii. zos n. I, with a good discussion of a.i:rrovop.ta and i>.w9,;pla.), xv. 24. z; OGIS, 223 ( = Welles, 15), 228 (freedom from tribute); Diod. xix. 61. 3, Elva£ Tovs "EA>.11vas /1.1raVTas l>.,;v9lpovs d.cf>povp{)Tovs a{JTov6p.ovs. Cf. Jones, Greek City, IOI ff.; below, 27.4-7 n. 6-7. Claim on Aetolia. It is not clear whether§ 6 and§ 7 refer to two categories of territory or one. If the Symmachy is merely pledging itself to recover the independence of cities and lands annexed by Aetolia since 229, the scope of the resolution is small, and covers only: (a) Epirus: Ambracia and Amphilochia (d. Flaceliere, 252 n. x, 'soit avant, soit peu apres la mort de Demetrios'); perhaps too the town of Cassope (d. Insch. Mag. 32, 1. 51; for the date, Flaceliere, ibid., against Busolt-Swoboda, ii. 1476 n. 5, who make it adhere to Aetolia only in 206-202). See further, Beloch, iv. 2. 384-5. (b) Thessaly: Phthiotic Achaea, annexed on Doson's accession, and not recovered along with Phthiotis, Thessaliotis, and Hestiaeotis. Cf. v. 97· 5. 99· z (Melitaea and Phthiotic Thebes), ii. 45· 2 n.; Fine, TAPA, 1932, 133 ff.; Walbank, Philip, I I n. 3· In practice, however, the allies sought to recover territory annexed by Aetolia long before 229, and the second clause has an air 472

ITS COURSE TILL SPRING 219

IV.

26. 2

of being designed to give them a free hand for almost any territorial claims; for instance, the following territories might be regarded as forcibly annexed: (c) Acarnania: the areas west of the Achelous, where Aetolia held Stratus (63. 10), Oeniadae (65. 5), Metropolis (64. 4), and Phoetiae (63. 7) since her compact with Alexander of Epirus (on the date see ii. 45· 1 n.). (d) Phocis: western Phocis was still largely in Aetolian hands, perhaps since c. 258 (Flaceliere, 199); eastern Phocis had been seized c. 234-230 (Feyel, ro6), but had recovered its independence, probably in 228 (§ 2 n.). The Aetolians had now lost Anticyra, Ambrysus, and Daulis, along with everything east of Parnassus; but this decree would encourage the allies to attack the towns still held. (e) Eastern Locris: the district of Scarpheia and Thronium was Aetolian since before 262 (Flaceliere, 198), and remained so after Opuntian Locris detached itself c. 228 (Feyel, 125). Further, the second clause (§ 7) would serve as a slogan for the 'liberation' of any states in the Aetolian Confederation which, unlike the territories covered in§ 6, had no connexion with the members of the Symmachy. 8. auva.va.KOfU€ia9a.~ • .• To is 1>.f1ci>~KTuoaw ... Tous v611ous: throughout the third century from 290 or even 300 the Aetolians controlled Delphi (which was probably bound to the League by isopoliteia; Flaceliere, 369-70) and the Amphictyonic Council. The Council was controlled by exercising the votes of states forming part of the League, and though Macedon and Thessaly were not excluded they declined to appear on a council dominated by Aetolia. Beloch (iv. 2. 385 ff.) has established that the Aetolian-controlled vote rose in proportion to the territorial expansion of the Confederation (cf. Treves, Athen., 1934, 397). The rest of Greece never acquiesced in the Aetolian usurpation of the oracle, and the first text which testifies clearly to it, the ithyphallos sung by the Athenians at the Eleusinian festival of 291, describes Aetolia as a sphinx which has seized not only Thebes but the whole of Hellas, T~V o' ovx~ f97]{3Wv, ill' 6..\:i)s- ri]> 'E>.>.aoos- I ucf>tyya 7T€p,Kpa-rovuav . .. (d. A then. vi. 63 = Duris of Samos, FGH, 76 F 13); Flaceliere, 65, 372. By the present clause, the allies hoped to convert the war into a Sacred War for the liberation of Delphi.

26. 2. tva. . . . ~Kci>€pwa~ traVT€!; . . . TOV atro Ttl!> xwpa.s tr6A€f10V: cf. 30. 2, xxxix. 3· 8; 'that all might wage offensive war against the Aetolians'. Schweighaeuser is uncertain whether to translate -rdv d7Td Tfj> xwpas- 7TOA€fLOV 'warfare with full forces' or 'offensive warfare'. Strachan-Davidson prefers the former 'by public authority and with all the forces of each community'. But in Xenophon (A nab. iii. 4· 33) lK xwpas- OpfLB.V is 'to take the initiative from one's own position', 473

IV. 26.

2

ORIGINS OF THE SOCIAL WAR

contrasted with fighting an attacking enemy while one is on the march; and in general the sense 'offensive warfare' is to be preferred, cf. Feyel, I39 n. 2. The war-motion required separate ratification by each state. 3. ~'1Te111fe ... TOt9 AhwA.oi9 E'ITtaToA~v: that Philip still hoped to prevent war (so Holleaux, 149 n. I) is unlikely, since the programme framed at Corinth, especially in relation to the Amphictyonic Council, was designed to strengthen the Macedonian hold on Greece ; Walbank, Philip, 32. Perhaps the king hoped to postpone hostilities until spring 219, or merely to put the responsibility for the breach squarely on Aetolian shoulders. The contents of Philip's note may go back to a sound source, but the phraseology is P.'sown (cf. 4· 4, 17. 2). 6. 'IT PO Tfj9 •.• auvo8ou: the autumn meeting held at Thermum for the elections; cf. 5· 9 n., 27. I, 37. 2. 7. Et!; TI,v Ka.9T)Kouaa.v auvo8ov: the regular autumn Achaean assembly, evidently held towards the autumn equinox (Aymard, ACA, 264); cf. § 8, 27. 9, 29. I; also 27. I, 37· 2. See Larsen, 8r. TO A.cl.cjlupov E'ITEK~pu~a.v Ka.Ta Twv AhwA.wv : cf. 36. 6, after achievements by Lycurgus the Spartans E1TEK~pv~av To lvufwpov against the Achaeans, and Machatas 1Tapa7TA*na Alyo117'€<; a1TEp Kat 1Tpo<; TOV<; AaKEOatp.ovlovr;, persuaded the Eleans l~EvlyKHV Toir; 11xawt'r; Tov ?T6Aep.ov. Clearly the two things are parallel; the Spartans have declared war. So, too, here the Achaeans 'declared war on the Aetolians'. See Kahrstedt, RE, AtUpvpov, col. 772, 'der Terminus technicus >.ricpvpov fUr solche Untemehmungen (i.e. privateering and plundering by private individuals) hat dann im spaten III. Jhdt. den Sprachgebrauch dahin beeinflusst, dass M.cpvpov = Krieg ist (P. iv. 36. 6), und dass das kein gehassiger Ausdruck des P. ist, zeigt iv. 26. 7, wo er von einer achaischen Kriegserklarung genau so redet'. This is correct; cf. Strachan-Davidson, ad loc., '"declared the property of the Aetolians to be good prize" -a corollary of the recognition of a state of war' ; it is really an example of pars pro toto. Kahrstedt is, however, wrong in saying that only the Aetolians gave the right to win booty to private individuals. The Aetolians were peculiar in granting letters of marque to their citizens to take part in any war against anybody, even if Aetolia was neutral (cf. xviii. 4· 8 and especially 5· r f.). Private rights of plunder and reprisal were common; cf. 53· 2, xxii. 4· IJ, xxxii. 7· 4, where the term used is pvata. poata KaTayylAAEtV is quite distinct from 7T6AEp.ov lKcplpEw, and often represents a stage in the growing tension between two states which may ultimately end in war. But pvata KamyylA>.Hv is to be clearly distinguished from To >.ricpvpov l?Tt~<''JPVTTELv; and the passage Thuc. v. IIS· 2, EK~pv~av ei Tt> {JovAeTat ?Tapd acpwv )i(J-'Ivalovr; >.uCwOat, normally quoted (since Schweighaeuser) to illustrate the present passage, is in fact relevant only to pvata. 474

ITS COURSE TILL SPRING 219

IV. 27.4

8. npo~ T~v j3ouX~v iv Aly£1f:l: cf. ii. 46. 6. Here the flov/..1) is the League Council, which would normally be present on the occasion of a utivo8os-; cf. Larsen, 81. Ta npoiimi.pxovTa. cjnXO.v9pwna. • • • aVEvEwaa.vTo: a reference to Doson, Philip's only predecessor with whom friendly relations had previously existed; but Trp6yovot is used of a single person in Syll. 434-5 (Ptolemy I) and OGIS, 222 (Seleucus I), cf. Tarn, Bactria, 450 n. 3; Welles, 8I-82. Ta TrpoiiTrapxoVTa tPtitd.v8puma will include the renewal of the annual oath of loyalty to the king of Macedon (Livy, xxxii. 5· 4), the king's right to summon an Achaean assembly (85. 3, v. 1. 6), and the law forbidding the proposal of any measure contrary to the Macedonian alliance (Livy, xxxii. 22. 3).

27. 1. auvuljla.vTO~ TOU Tc7>V apxa.~pEaCII>v xpovou: cf. ii. 2. 8 n.; Strabo, x. 463 (Ephorus). ;,v Blppms- rii> AlTwAlas-, mrov TaS' ¥xatpw·lasTf0L£t(J'8at Trihptov attTOt> l(J"Tlv. On Scopas cf. 5· I ff. 4-7. Parallels to the Aetolian behaviour from Spartan history. For the seizure of the Cadmea in 382 see Xen. Hell. v. 2. 25 ff.; Diod. xv 20. Iff.; Plut. Pelop. 5; Nepos, Pelop. I. Phoebidas, the commander of a Spartan force en route for Chalcidice, was approached by Leontiadas, one of the Theban polemarchs, while encamped near the town, and by his help was able to seize the citadel during the siesta, at the time when this was occupied by a women's festival. Leontiadas then proceeded to Sparta and persuaded the authorities to recognize Phoebidas' action. According to one unreliable version (here .referred to) Phoebidas was fined; but the Spartans continued to maintain their garrison. On the Peace of Antalcidas (387/6) see i. 6. 2 n., vi. 49· 5 ; on the tautology of l/..w8£pla and a?n-ovop.la see Tarn, Alex. 203 ff. against Wilcken (5.-B. Berlin, I929, 292-3), who would distinguish them as freedom from outside domination, and the right to determine one's own constitution. The expulsion of the Mantineans took place a year later, when Agesipolis, the son of Pausanias, made a winter attack on the town, broke down the walls with the aid of a diverted river, and compelled surrender; the leaders of the democratic party were allowed to go into exile but the inhabitants were divided up among the original constituent villages, and these were given oligarchic governments (Xen. Hell. v. 2. Iff.; Diod. xv. 5; Plut. Pelop. 4; Paus. viii. 8. 7). These two incidents, drawn from a period of four years in the second decade of the fourth century, add nothing to the picture of Aetolian behaviour, but fall easily into association with the antiSpartan propaganda of 3I-33 (cf. 31. 3-33. 12 n.); indeed, like those chapters, they give the impression of a last-minute addition to his text made by P. about ISO, when Sparta was stirring up Roman feeling against Achaea. The verbal parallel between § 4 and Diod, 475

ORIGINS OF THE SOCIAL WAR ~ , \ p.£V \ A. tP, 'T xv. 20. 2, aK£ol1.tf.WV£Ot ••• TOV ovot,..,£aav fi'>TJP.'waav XPTJp.a.a,, T~V Ot ppovpd.v OfJK ifijyov eK T(OV 8TJfJwv, is sufficiently close to suggest

IV. 27. 4

• o£ o£

~·A

j

j

a common source. It is generally agreed that Diodorus is here following Ephorus (cf. Schwartz, RE, 'Diodoros (37)', col. 679); and P. may be doing the same. On the other hand, 33 points to the use of Callisthenes, whose Helle1~ica began with the Peace of Antalcidas (33· 2 n.); and it seems established (Jacoby, RE, 'Kallisthenes (2)', coL 1706) that this work was one of Ephorus' sources for the thirty years 387/6-357/6. Hence there is a decided possibility that these last-minute additions in 27 and 31-33 were associated with the reading or re-reading of the appropriately anti-Spartan Hellenica of Callisthenes. 7. E:av TL<; alm)s ~.'lfljlUn, jlTJSE TOU<; 'ITtAa.<; opiiv: this version of our ostrich proverb is probably proverbial in Greek too; cf. Wunderer, i. 64. 9. 6.v€te:u~E ••• E:vt Ma.KE5ovla.s: it is immediately on Philip's return to Macedon that one must date the dispatch of a letter to the people of Larissa in Thessaly (Syll. 543), urging the recruitment of resident aliens to the citizen body. This policy reflects his concern to protect the approaches to southern Macedonia, and the date of the letter (Hyperberetaeus 21 of year II) will be September 220 (assuming that, as in Egypt, a king's first regnal year was reckoned from his accession to the end of the next Hyperberetaeus (Walbank, Philip, 297-8)). It may be noted that if, as Bickerman argues (Berytus, 1944, 73-76}, the Macedonian regnal year was reckoned from the actual accession of each king, Hyperberetaeus 21 ( September) 220 would still be in Philip's second regnal year, but towards its beginning rather than at its end. 28. Independence hitherto of events in Italy, Greece, and Asia. These observations appear to arise out of the synchronism in § r ; but this is in fact false, and a mere excuse for the digression (cf. iii. I7 n. : the attack on Saguntum did not take place till spring 219). For stress on the fact that it is only towards the end of the Olympiad (22o-216) that events in various parts of the Mediterranean become interwoven see v. 31. 4 f., 105. 9-1o. P.'s wording here may (but does not necessarily) imply the confused notion of Saguntum as lying north of the Ebro (cf. ii. 13. 7 n. (e)). 3. auvE'ITAOKTJaav: cf. i. 3· 4, crop.'1T'MK€a8rn, v. 105. 9· It is to the former passage P. refers back in § 4· 5. EYEVETO s· "' O'Ujl'ITAo.al: elucidated in v. 105. 4 ff.; the decisive events of 217 are Trasimene, Raphia, and the Conference of Naupactus. Henceforth all eyes are on Rome. 6. Euva.pctKohouBTJTOt; ••• Ka.i KaTa'ITATJKTLK~: cf. viii. 2. 10, aapfj ••• Ka' 8avp.aaT&.. Despite his condemnation of the emotional and tragic approach to history, P. likes to arouse the wonder of his readers; cf. La-Roche, 54 f.; above, pp. 14 f. 476

ITS COURSE TILL SPRING 219

IV. 31. z

29. 7. iJ-E9~;etv Tils teotvi}s O"UiJ-iJ-«x£a.s: Scerdilaidas thus became a member of the Symmachy; cf. Holleaux, 131 n. 3· The subsidy of twenty talents a year evidently came from Philip. 30. 3. 5ul. TO ••• 1l'Eipa.v ~:tA'lcptva.t TWV 5uvOTtyaA.das ••• Ta.TTOiJ-~S li1r' AtTwAous: cf. 3· 5 n. 2. lcpopeuovTES: for the Messenian ephorate cf. 4· :2 n. Oenis and Nicippus are not otherwise known. 477

IV. 31. 3

ORIGINS OF THE SOCIAL WAR

31. 3-33. 12. This is the second of two passages which seem designed to advise the Greeks on current policy, and are best explained as last-minute insertions in the manuscript before the publication of this book about 150/49· The first is 30. s. one should willingly embrace an Acarnanian alliance; the argument in the second passage is that war is not the worst of evils, and that Arcadia and Messenia should combine against Sparta. Svoboda (Phil., 1913, 469-71) points out the appropriateness of this advice to a period when Sparta had broken away from the Achaean League and was seeking help at Rome; cf. DeSanctis, iii. I. 204. For Messenian disaffection towards Achaea at this time see Livy, xlii. 37· 8---9 (Messenian and Elean complaints). Aymard (ACA, 307 n. 8) suggests that no Achaean assembly was ever (to our knowledge) held in Messenia because of suspicions of its disaffection. In fact the Messenians sent no help to Diaeus (cf. xxxviii. I6. 3). For a similar passage see 73· 6-74. 8 n. 31. 3-4. War not the worst of evils : cf. § 8. The idea is not new: see Thuc. i. So. I (d. I24. 2)-but Eurip. Troad. 400, quoted by von Scala (3o6), is rather different. P.'s views on war are assembled by von Scala (loc. cit.); peace is a recognized good (§ 8, 32. 9, 74· 3), war terrible and unprofitable (xi. 4· 7), every war being in some sense a breach of the moral order (Diod. xxx. 18. 2, deriving from P.). But in certain circumstances (as here) war may be the lesser evil. On the date of composition of this passage see 31. 3-33. r 2 n. 4. tov

(cf. Stobaeus, A nth. iv. 16. 6 (W.-H. iv. 395)), and refers to concord and peace within the state, not to neutrality in the Persian War (as E. Meyer (ivz. I. 347 n. r) still assumes; he interprets fg. IIo Bergk similarly. Cf. also Ehrenberg, Ost und West, no, with the criticism

478

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IV. 33·::

of Gomme, Essays, 14-15). The misunderstanding suggests that P. was unfamiliar with the context, and perhaps took the extract from an anthology (Wunderer, ii. 48-49, 86). Pindar's real feelings about Theban medism can be seen from lsth. v. 48-53 and viii. 5-18, and in his famous praise of Athens (cf. Bury, CAH, iv. 509-II). 7. a.lax£aTTJv ••• ~ea.l ~Aa.~epw-r6.-rT)v: cf. 27. 8. After Plataea Thebes was invested, and compelled to surrender her medizing leaders, who were put to death at Corinth; further, the Boeotian League was apparently dissolved by the allies (Diod. xi. Sr. 1-2 ; Iustin. iii. 6. xo). P. may also be thinking of the branding of the Boeotians who went over to Xerxes after Thermopylae (Herod. vii. 233· z). 8. elpiJvTJ ••• !lETa ••• ToO SLtca.£ou tca.i 1T~1TOVTOS: cf. 74· 3, 1-uml Toii 8tKalov Ka~ KafJ~KOVTO!:; Thuc. i. 124. 2, ~K 1roMp.ov p.ev yap eip~VTJ p.aAAov f3ef3atofhah

&4' ~(J'vxla!: ()€ p.~ 1TO}u:p.fjO'aL OOX op.o[ws aK[J'8vvov.

32. 8. 01TE!p f\S'I] 1TAE!OVatcLS ••• auv~~T) ••• xp6vo~~: viz. in the Messenian wars (which P. again refers to in 33), especially the second one which ended, according to a tradition with which P. was familiar, in a partial migration to Sicily and the enslaving of the remnants, in the second half of the seventh century (Paus. iv. 15-23; cf., however, L. R. Shero, TAP A, 1938, 525-31, who puts this emigration after a rising early in the fifth century; Plato, Laws, iii. 692 D, 6g8 D, E); one tradition (Paus. iv. 23. 6) made Alcidamidas migrate to Rhegium after the first war, at the end of the eighth century. After the Spartan reduction of Ithome in the third Messenian war which broke out in 464, the Messenians were settled at Naupactus; but after the downfall of Athens at Aegospotami they were again expelled and took refuge in Sicily, Rhegium, and Euhesperidae in Cyrenaica (Paus. iv. 25· I, z6. 2; Diod. xiv. 34· Z-3· 78. 5-6). Paton's translation 'has overtaken them' is misleading, since Messenia had enjoyed tranquillity since Leuctra. 9. T'f)v vuv 01r6.pxouaa.v tca.-r6.a-ra.aw: clearly that existing before 149; cf. 31. 3-33. 12 n. 10. Ka.-rO. 'Ti)v 'E1Ta.jlwi4v8ou yv
IV. 33·

2

ORIGINS OF THE SOCIAL WAR

224o-I). The f3wp.os comprised the very summit of the hill, 20 m. above the Tlp.EVOS; Pausanias (viii. J8. 7) describes it as a yfjS' xwp.a. Excavations have revealed remains of sacrifices, vase fragments, and tiles. The rites were secret and are said to have included human sacrifice down to historical times ; those who partook of the human flesh became werewolves (Plato, Rep. viii. 565 D; Paus. viii. 2. 3). Pausanias (viii. 38. 7) mentions two pillars, surmounted by golden eagles, which stood before the altar, and the bases of these have been found to the east of the summit; in a line with them to the north is a further construction, consisting of a large square block of masonry and several smaller bases, which has been identified with the dedication here mentioned. Pausanias (iv. 22. 7) also records it, but describes it as lying Js Tb Tlp.t:voS' Toil AvKalov. See Ernst Meyer, op. cit., cols. 2242-3. €v -rot~ tcaor' :.\plO'TOj1EV1'jV tcalpoi~: Aristomenes' date and even his existence are subjects of controversy. Callisthenes (see the next note), who is probably P.'s source for all this chapter, clearly made Aristomenes the Messenian leader in the war in which Tyrtaeus took part, three generations after the original subjugation of Messenia (Tyrt. in Strabo, viii. 362) and so in the seventh century. This was the fourth-century tradition followed by Callisthenes and Ephorus; but in the third century Myron put Aristomenes back into the first war in the eighth century (Paus. iv. 6. I-S) and Rhianus brought him down to c. 490 (Jacoby, FGH, 265 F 38-46, commentary). Grote argued that Messenian folk-lore was largely a fourth-century invention; and undoubtedly the romantic form which it assumed in Ephorus, Theopompus, and the third-century writers, and which it retains in Pausanias (iv. I4· 7-24. 3), goes back to the restoration of Messene, and in part to Boeotian sources. But it seems likely that there was also a continuous tradition from early times, containing the figure of Aristomenes, who may well have been a real person, not unlike the Klephts of the Greek War of Independence. For recent discussion see J. Kroymann, Sparta und Messenien (Neue philol. Untersuchungen, xi, I937), passim; E. Schwartz, Phil., I937, I9-46; L. R. Shero, TAPA, I9J8, soo-JI; P. Treves, JHS, 1944, Io2-6; F. Jacoby, FGH, 265 F 38-46, commentary on Rhianus of Bene; Kroymann, Pausanias und Rhianos (Berlin, I943). KaAAL0'9iv1'j~: Callisthenes of Olynthus (c. 37o-327) was Aristotle's nephew. His most important works, in which he adopted a panhellenic point of view, were the Hellenica and the Deeds of Alexander. The former in ten books covered the period from the King's Peace (387/6) to Philomelus' seizure of Delphi in 357/6 (cf. Diod. xiv. n7. 7, xvi. 14. 4). It seems likely that the summary of early Messenian history in Diodorus (xv. 66. Iff.) goes back to Callisthenes through Ephorus; it probably formed a digression inserted in connexion with 48o

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IV. 33· 6

Epaminondas' reconstruction of Messene, and it seems likely that Callisthenes was the first man to write a history of the Messenian wars. For P.'s criticism of Callisthenes both as a stylist and as a military historian see xii. 12 b 2, 17-23; in general see Jacoby, FGH, 124 (ii B, 631-57, fragments; ii D, 4II-32, commentary) ; RE, 'Kallisthenes', cols. 1674-1707. 'f'O ypnJ.LJ.La. Toi:lTo: also in Paus. iv. 22. 7, reading M.:aa-rJll7J> in 1. 2; cf. Preger, Insc. gr. metr. 63; Wilamowitz, Textgesch. 102, 2 (accepting M.:aa1}ll7Js); Schwartz, Hermes, 1899, 448 (accepting Mwa-rJll7J). The rhetorical character of such epigrams is stressed by Schwartz (Hermes, rgoo, 122 f.) ; note here especially ll{KTJV &.Map and P1JLlllw> xetJ\errov. In Pausanias' version the Arcadians set up the stone. About Aristocrates there are various traditions. According to Pausanias (viii. 5· 12, 13. s) he was stoned to death at Orchomenus for violating the priestess of Artemis Hyrnnia; and this was probably the original account, for stoning is rare in Greece, and usually the punishment for sacrilege (cf. Latte, RE, 'Steinigung', col. 2294; Kroymann, Sparta und Messenien, 105). Kroymann suggests that there was a story that in the Aristomenean War the Messenians were betrayed by the Arcadians, that after Leuctra this was undesirable, and therefore the treachery was attributed to Aristocrates and the stoning interpreted as his punishment for this. A 'doublet' of Aristocrates was now made, the 'younger' man being transferred from Orchomenus to Trapezus near the Messenian border (cf. Wade-Gery, CAH, iii. 531 n. 2). Callisthenes was probably responsible for associating Aristocrates with the Aristomenean War, and for making theMessenians stone him; the stoning by the Arcadians, which would seem more plausible, will be a later version (Schwartz is clearly mistaken in supposing that P. quotes Callisthenes as evidence for this view against that of Pausanias). Whether Callisthenes has rightly interpreted the epigram, which is (perhaps deliberately) obscure, is another matter. Indeed the reference to 'Arcadia' points to a date after Leuctra, for the term would not have been used in such a context earlier (Schwartz, Phil., 1937. 24). Certainly the epigram does not date to the seventh century. 6. rt)v :A.purToKpaTous •.• 1rpoSoa£a.v: cf. Paus. iv. 17. 2-9, zz. 1-7. This story, which is evidently implied in the epigram, though it mentions no name, is recorded by Pausanias. Aristocrates led his Arcadians out of the battle for a bribe, and so caused the Messenian defeat. The battle of the (Great) Trench (cf. Paus. iv. 6. 2, J1Tt Tfj Td,Ppq; Tfj Ka.Aovpivn Mey&.>.n) was traditionally the last battle of the Aristomenean \Var; that the word M€y&.A1J may have come in after Callisthenes' time as a reminiscence of Xenophon (A nab. i. 7· rs; cf. Cyrop. iii. 3· 26) (so Schwartz, Hermes, 1899, 440) is not very probable. There are references to the battle in Tyrtaeus (apud schol. ad Arist. d

IV. 33· 6

ORIGINS OF THE SOCIAL WAR

Nic. Eth. iii. 8. 5· III6 b) and Plutarch (Mor. 548 F, also mentioning Aristocrates' treachery). 7. Ta TEAEuTa.'ia. yEyov6Ta. jLETd T~lV ••• auvolKWjL6v: 'what finally happened after the foundation' (cf. Schweighaeuser's commentary ad loc.); rather than Paton, 'the circumstances that followed the recent foundation' (following Schweighaeuser's translation). 8-9. The Peace Settlement of 362/r: cf. Diod. xv. 89. 1-2; Plut. Ages. 35· 3-4. This followed the battle of Mantinea (362). where Epaminondas perished, so rendering the Theban victory ti!Ufoil>l]p,Toll (cf. Xen. Hell. vii. 5· 26--27). From Diodorus it is clear that it took the form of a Ko'vTj Elpi}111J, with a avp,fuJ.xta among the parties to it; and though the uvp,p,axla of § 9 is that of the Arcadian allies of Megalopolis, the statement that the Messenians v1ro TWII uvp,p,&.xwv TTpoua£x8ijva.~ refers to the other participants in the peace, and so confirms Diodorus. Similarities of phrasing (e.g. § 8, dp,rp~ptTov ' , \ 11"(1]11: ' D'10d • aFY'a ' .. .J. f3 TJTOVJI-I!V'f/11 EXOVTI!'S T1}V V£K1]V; § 9, £XOVUTJS 7"rjV AaKESa,p,ovtovs St p,6vov; ~KC17T6vaovs yEvla8a, Twv 'EU.1}vwv : Diod. ot Sc AaKE0tup,6v'o' ••• p,6vot TWII 'EM~vwv lnrijpxov eKCJ1TOvSo,) show that Diodorus also goes back (through Ephorus) to Callisthenes' Hellenica (cf. 33· 2 n.; Treves, ]HS, 1944, 105). The existence of a avp,p,axla in connexion with this peace has been questioned by De Sanctis (Riv.fil., 1934, 147-55), who thinks P. uses uvp,p,cixwv here 'under the influence of the previous passage with its reference to Arcadians sharing in the Megalopolitan alliance', by Hampl (Staatsvertriige, 26 ff., 103 ff.), and by Accame (Lega ateniese, 171 ff.). The problem is complicated by an inscription found at Argos, but now lost (SyU. 182 = Tod, 145), which records the reply of Greeks 'who share the common peace' to an envoy sent by 'the Satraps' ; they state their neutrality and intention to resist by force any attack by the Great King on any of their number. This inscription has been variously dated to 386, 366/5. 371/o, 344, and 338-334; but it probably belongs to the peace of 362/1 (cf. Larsen, CP, 1939, 376 ff.; Taeger, Der Friede von 362-r (Stuttgart, 1930), 3 ff.; Meloni, Riv. stor. it., 1951, 19 ff.). The use of Attic indicates the lead which Athens took in that year; the Satraps speak in their own name, in revolt against the king. See further Tod's commentary, ad loc. This inscription gives some support to the theory of a avp,p,axla in 36zj1, thus confirming what Diodorus says and P. implies. 10. Ta jLlkpif 'TI'pOTEpov ••• 8<E8YJAWjLEva.: viz. the importance of close relations between Messenia and Arcadia. 12. jL~TIE
,

'

I

34. 1. TEAos: Schweighaeuser takes this as equivalent to tl!i' Tl/.M, omnino; but an equally good sense is the usual 'eventually', implying 482

ITS COURSE TILL SPRING 219

IV. 35·

2

some delay. The Spartans preferred not to commit themselves and adopted a neutral policy; so too (though P. omits to mention this) the Phocians and Boeotians {Feyel, 141 ff.). 3. KO.Ta.OTa.9eVTWV E~opwv aAAwv: in autumn 220; the ephors normally entered office at the new moon following the autumn equinox (so Unger, Phil., 188x, g1), though it seems likely that in the year following the intercalation cycle, the ephor year (which formed the official Lacedaemonian year) began with the first or second new moon before the equinox (Pareti, Atti Ace. Torino, 1909-10, 8u; Busolt-Swoboda, ii. 686 n. 5). These ephors were pro-lYiacedonian. ot KLvfjaa.vTE~ ••• O'~a.yii~ a.tnoL: the massacre of 22. u. 5, 1TpOO'J.lEL TO iS E~OpOL~ , , , olO!LEVOL! the lacuna clearly has SOme reference to pressure from the revolutionary party, who form the subject of ol6ft£Vot. It is their interpretation of rct1Td-rpta. as including the kingship which is given here, for elsewhere P. describes the constitution without the kings, and with the restored ephorate, as TraTp,ov TroAlTEVf-1-a (cf. ii. 70. 1 n.). On the strength of monarchical feeling centring round Cleomenes see 22. 4 n., 35· 6-8. 7. auva.x9€vTos •.• Toil 1TA1]9ous: the general assembly of all freeborn Spartans of 30 andover (cf. Michell, Sparta (Cambridge, rg52), 14off.). 9. Tas Sui XnpL~evou Ka.t TL!La.(ou ~l..li~a.s: cf. ix. 34· 9; Plut. Cleom. 18. 3· Following on the death of King Agis in 241 and the temporary eclipse of the revolutionary movement, the Aetolians invaded the Peloponnese, and from a base in allied Messenia ravaged Laconia, led by Charixenus and Timaeus; the date was probably 240. Some so,ooo slaves were carried off (Plut. loc. cit.), and the ravaging of the sanctuary of Poseidon at Taenarum will be an incident of this expedition (ix. 34· g). Charixenus is probably XaplfEvos Kv8plwvos AlTwAOs, who dedicated an equestrian statue, the work of Sonicus, at Delphi about this time (Syll. SIS B), and was several times general of the League-once in the year of Polyeuctus' archonship at Athens (probably between 246 and 240; cf. for a convenient summary of this vexed chronological problem Klaffenbach, RE, 'Polyeuktos (6)', cols. 1623--9), when the Aetolians reorganized the Soteria. He was honoured by Athens (Flaceliere, BCH, 1g27, 34g-5z). See Klaffenbach, IG, ix 2 • i. 18, l. 18 (commentary); Flaceliere, 242 n.. 4, 267; and on the invasion Beloch, iv. I. 628. Timaeus was also a prominent Aetolian leader, one of the three envoys who negotiated the lYiessenian t'sopoliteia in c. 244 (3. 5 n.); in one of his generalships a treaty of asylia was concluded with Miletus (H. Benecke, Die Seepolitik der A itoler (Diss. Hamburg, rg34), 23 no. 5). It was probably in the course of this invasion of the Peloponnese (240) that he plundered the temple of Artemis at Lusi (ix. 34· g). See Flaceliere, BCH, 1g29, 486. The exiles the Aetolians proposed restoring would be Agis' supporters. 35. 2. Cult of Athena Chalcioecus. This procession under arms is not 483

IV. 35·

2

ORIGINS OF THE SOCIAL WAR

mentioned elsewhere, unless (Ziehen, RE, 'Sparta', col. 1455) it is to be identified \'iith the XOavaw mentioned on an Athenian stele listing the victories of Damonon (IG, v. r. 213); but this festival was celebrated with chariot races, which are not mentioned here. On the temple see 22. 8 n. 3-7. The Spartan rising. P. attributes this to devotion to Cleomenes, and Beloch (iv. 1. 724) suggests that news of the rising led to Cleomenes' burst from prison. But there is no trace of this in P. (v. 38. 7 ff.), who treats Cleomenes' action as a forlorn hope (cf. v. 38. 8, f40X87Jpas ti\7Tloas i!xwv imip ToiJ 14l:V.onos). Ferrabino's hypothesis (rs:z), that news of Cleomenes' death precipitated a rising under the new leader Lycurgus, is attractive (cf. Walbank, Philip, 36). 8. axE8ov ~811 TpEi:<,; ivLa.uToo<,;: on the relevance of this passage to the controversy over the date of Sellasia see ii. 65--{)9 n. 9. ·tn:pi TYJ'> KXEofiEvou<,; TEAEVTl]S: cf. v. 35-39, where, however, there is no closer indication of date. 10. lt\.y1]al11'oAw • • , ulbv 8~ rly1]aL11'0ALlio<,; TOU KAEOfi~poTou: Cleombrotus, of a collateral branch of the Agiad house, married Cleomenes' sister Chilonis, and occupied the throne during LeonidaS' exile in 242/r; cf. Plut. Agis, u. 17; Paus. iii. 6. 7; Beloch, iv. 2. 161-2. 13. Eurypontid ho1tse. Archidamus was Agis' younger brother (for his death, allegedly at Cleomenes' hands, see v. 37· r ff., viii. 35· 5; Phylarchus said Cleomenes opposed it, Plut. Cleom. 5· 3). Agesilaus, the father of Hippomedon, was iu a collateral branch of the Eurypontids, and his sister Agesistrata was the mother of King Agis, for whose overthrow he was largely responsible (Plut. Agis, 6. 3 ff.). Hippomedon appears as a Ptolemaic general in the Hellespontine area; cf. Syll. 502; Roussel, BCH, 1939, 137 ff.; Bengtson, Strat. iii. 178-83.

14. Aut
ITS COURSE TILL SPRING 219

IV. 37

36. 4. Tous 1ua8ocp6pov> Kal nvas Twv AaKt:8atp.ovlwv. (Paton is wrong here.) For aTpanWTYJ> = p.w86rpopo> d. Arist. Nic. Eth. iii. 8. 9· 1116 b 15; it is frequent in the inscriptions and papyri (Launey, i. 29 ff.). See also Xenophon, Hell. v. 3· 25 for Td 1roAmK6v, 'the citizen army'. For Hellenistic Sparta as an employer of mercenaries see Griffith, 93-<J8. 5. Lycurgus' attack east of Parnon. The region here was always contested between Sparta and Argos. Argos probably received only the northerly district of Thyreatis in 338, and it is uncertain when she conquered the coast south to Zarax; Bolte (RE, 'Sparta', col. 1304) suggests it was in 262, when the Peloponnesian League was dissolved at the end of the Chremonidean War, Chrimes (Ancient Sparta (Manchester, 1949), 21-22) puts the Spartan loss after Sellasia. On the situation of these places see Bolte, RE, 'Sparta', cols. 1316-17 (with map cols. 13os-6). Polichna stood on the height called Vigla, near the modern village of Poulethra, 7 km. south of Leonidi (d. Wace and Hasluck, BSA, 1908/9. 176). Prasiae was at Plaka, overlooking the plain south of Leonidi. Leucae was on the north-east slope of the plain of Leucae (Strabo, viii. 363) near Katav6thra (d. v. 19. 8; Livy, xxxv. 27. 3, where Leucae is mentioned along with Acriae on the east coast of the Laconian Gulf). Cyphanta lay near K yparissi; Pausanias (iii. 24. 2} puts it €KaT6v 1rov (}'7a8ta (Boblaye for MS. it 1rov) north of Zarax (modern Ieraca), and 2oo stades south of Prasiae by sea; see further Pieske, RE, 'K yphanta', col. 52. Glympeis (d. v. 20. I··IO) is located by Bolte (RE, 'Glympeis', col. 1476) near H. Vasilios, at the fort Tct Avp.1Tta, on the slopes above the torrent of Leonidi near its source; but Wace and Hasluck (BSA, 19o8j9, 165) identify it with the Glyppia of Pausanias (iii. 22. 8) and locate it at Kosmas, north of Mt. Mazaraki. On all this area see Wace and Hasluck, op. cit.; Romaios, IlpaKnKa, 1911, 276 ff. 9. 1TGVTa.xo9ev 1TEpLel:xov a.uTous T~ 1TOAE(.l Jl..\w1.8o> lmToA-r/v). Beloch (iv. 2. z3o) assumed a confusion between the two events; but Aymard (ACA, 248-62) has shown (cf. 6. 7 n.) that the date for the electoral assembly varied considerably, within a period of about three months, from year to year. P. has, however, expressed himself loosely: see 37. 2 n. On the younger Aratus cf. ii. 51. 5 n.

IV. 37

ORIGINS OF THE SOCIAL WAR

(b) Aetolia: for Scopas' election in autumn 220, see 27. I. (c) Hannibal and Saguntum: on the chronology see iii. I7 n. This synchronism, unlike that in 28. I, is accurate. (d) lllyrian War: on the sending of L. Aemilius Paullus against Demetrius see iii. I6. 7 n. (e) A ntiochus and Ptolemy: for the surrender of Tyre and Ptolemais to Antiochus by Theodotus, the Ptolemaic governor of Coele-Syria cf. v. 40. Iff., 6I. 3 f.; for Philopator's preparations cf. v. 63 ff. (f) Sparta and A chaea: for Cleomenes' seizure of the Athenaeum in 228 see ii. 46. 5 n. ; on the significance of Lycurgus' move, 59-6o n. (g) Macedon: Philip's movements are described in 57 ft. His large force is the result of his levies (29. 1). 2. :4xuLol. 8€ TC>Tio KT".: in contrast to the time when P. is writing, and the elections were in autumn. But the sense is loosely expressed, for it was the entry into office which took place 7TEpt rfjv rijs ll>tmioos bnroA~v (cf. v. I. I); on the elections see above. 8. KUTa ••• Tous uuTous tcaLpous: a loose synchronism. The war between Rhodes and Byzantium (see below) fell at any rate in part within the Olympiad year 220/19, for it took place in 220 (cf. 48. 3: Achaeus had recently assumed the royal title, and this was in summer 220 (v. 57· 5)). From 53· 1 it appears that peace was made before winter, since the Rhodian ships sailed on to Crete; Niese, ii. 383 n. 5· 38-52. Situation of Byzantium: War of Rhodes and Bithynia against her 38. 1-45. 8. This study of the situation of Byzantium, its complete control of the Pontus trade by sea, and its vulnerability by land, consists of two topographical sections and sandwiched between them (39· 7-42. 8) a hydrographical section, which arises out of the reference to the strong current through the Bosphorus (39· 7), and seeks to explain in detail the hydrography of the Pontus and Maeotis. For this central section P. probably drew on Strato of Lampsacus, tl tf>vu,Kos (cf. xii. 25 c 3 f.), Theophrastus' pupil, and head of the Peripatetic school from 287 to 269, who in turn drew on such Peripatetic teachings as are to be found in Arist. Meteor. i. 14. J5I a 19ff., ii. I. 353 a 32 ff. See von Scala, I89-2oo (not always convincing); Capelle, RE, 'Straton (13)', cols. 3oo--I (evidence linking P.'s account with that attributed by Strabo to Strato inadequate) ; C. M. Danov, Polybios und seine Nachrichten iiber den Ostbalkan (Sonderschrift des bulgarischen archaologischen Instituts, no. 2, Sofia, I942), 61-64 (German summary); Walbank, Robinson Studies, i. 470-4. That other accounts also existed, to which P. took exception, appears from 39· 11-4o. I, 40. 3, 42. 7; the polemical note here is typically Polybian, and not copied from Strato (so von Scala, I99-200). 486

SITUATION OF BYZANTIUM

IV. 38.6

The two 'geographical' sections (39· r--6 and 4.3· 1-44. 1o) are of a different character, and appear to draw on material derived from '"*'Pt'">.o,, marine handbooks containing lists of coastal towns and harbours, distances, names of capes and temples, and occasional mythological and historical information. P. probably goes back to this through some literary intermediary ; and though this might be Diophantus or Demetrius of Callatis, both of whom wrote on the Black Sea in the third century (Robinson Studies, i. 474 n. z6), there is no evidence which enables us to attach a name to it. That P. had himself visited Byzantium is assumed by Danov (op. cit. 6:z-63); but he does not say so either in 38. II-IJ or in 40. r-J, where one Inight reasonably have expected some such personal reference (cf. Thommen, Hermes, 1885, zr8), and his narrative nowhere requires such an assumption (for the suggestion of oral evidence in 40. 8 may well come from Strato : see ad loc.). Nor is there any reason to assume that this section was written later than the rest of iv {cf. 40. 2 n.). For fuller discussion see Robinson Studies, i. 469-79. 38. 1. Etnca.tpcha.Tov ••• TO'ITov: the splendid situation of Byzantium on its promontory between the Golden Horn, the Bosphorus, and the Propontis was recognized in the famous characterization of Calchedon as 'the city of the blind' (Herod. iv. r44; Strabo, vii. 320; Tac. Ann. xii. 63). P. has the fullest discussion of its site; see also Dio, lxxv. ro; Zosim. ii. 30. z; Procop. Aed. i. 5; and for modern bibliography Oberhummer, RE, 'Byzantion (1)', cols. ur6-27; E. Gibbon, Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, chapter r7; H. Merle, Die Geschichte der Stiidte Byzantion und Kalchedon, Diss. Kiel, 1916. 4. 9pip.p.a.Ta.: 'cattle'; this reading ofF is preferable to AR ~~pf-LaTa, for it goes better with 'slaves' (Beloch, iv. I. 292 against Wunderer); cf. 75· z. P. classes cattle and slaves equally as necessities, not as luxuries (7r€pwvala). ot ICO.TG TOV no\IT0\1 ••. TO'ITOt: the cities of the Euxine and the kingdom of Bosporus. For two centuries the Aegean world had imported Pontic fish, grain, honey, iron, flax, hides, hemp, wax, and slaves; and though the shift of the economic centre to the new monarchies had reduced the importance of the trade between Greece and the Euxine, it remained considerable. P.'s statement that the Black Sea now sometimes imported corn is confirmed by an early secondcentury inscription from Istrus'i(S. Lambrino, Dacia, 3-4, I927-32, 400 ff.), honouring a Carthaginian who imported grain and sold it in the city, grain probably grown at Carthage. See Rostovtzeff, SEHHW, sBs-6oz, I46z n. 20. 6. '!TOT~ p.Ev ra.l.cha.Ls ICTA.: see 45· Ioff. for the clash with Gauls and Thracians. The latter did not become a danger until after the period of which P. is here writing; cf. 46. 4·

IV. 38.

10

SITUATION OF BYZANTIUM

10. EUEpyho.L TrnVTWY uTrnpxovTES KTA.: apparently echoing a Byzantine source, containing the sort of claims which may well have been made by the embassies mentioned in 46. 5· But P. is also thinking of later barbarian attacks {cf. xxii. q. I2; App. Mac. xi. 1. 5; Livy, xlii. r3. 8). 39. 1. Circumference of the Pontus: 22,000 stades = 2,750 milia passuum = 2,567 English miles. This is a fair guess. Strabo (ii. r25) makes it 25,ooo stades; and modern estimates make the Black Sea about 63o miles from east to west (Burghaz to St. Nikolai) and 330 miles from north to south (Odessa to Melen Su), with an area of about 18o,ooo square miles (Black Sea Pilot 1 , 1920, 4). O'TOt'Q.TO. ••. lhTTcl KO.Tcl s~a.t'ETpov .•• KdJlEVa.! viz. the Thracian and Cimmerian Bosphori, which P. elsewhere reckons as soc milia passuum apart (xxxiv. r5. 5 Pliny, Nat. hist. iv. 77), an exaggerated figure. P. does not imply that these two mouths lie on the same meridian, but merely that they are at opposite ends of the sea (cf. Class. et med., 1948, 175 n. r, against R. Uhden, Phil., 1933, 303 f.; Thomson, 209). Circumference of the M aeotic Lake: S,ooo stades = r,ooo milia passuum = 933 English miles. Like all the ancients P. exaggerates its size (d. Herod. iv. 86, almost as big as the Pontus; Strabo (ii. 125, vii. 310) and Agathemerus (3. ro = GGM, ii. 474) make its circumference 9,ooo stades; and in Nat. hist. iv. 78 Pliny gives it 1,4o6 or 1,125 milia passuum). The length from the Egurcha mouth of the Don to the Tonka of Arabat in the extreme south-west is in fact c. 2oo miles (Black Sea Pilot', 1920, 5) and the total area 14,515 square miles. 2. nl" JlE" Ma.wnv O.va.TrA1]pOVJ1Ev1]V l'mo -Tou-Twv: a loose expression, for the Don is the only river of any size running into the Sea of Azov, though it had indeed (cf. iii. 37· 4) both a European and an Asiatic shore. On the rivers of Scythia see Herod. iv. 47 ff. 3. The Cimmerian Bosphorus: 30 stades = c. 3'5 miles. In fact, at its narrow point, between Cape Pavlovski and Tuzla Spit, the channel is not more than three-quarters of a mile wide. The length of the strait depends on the points selected for measuring. P.'s figure of 6o stades is reasonable for the region around Kerch, but the name Straits of Kerch is given to a channel 25 miles long and varying from 8 miles to three-quarters of a mile in breadth. As regards its depth, 'it is much encumbered with shallow banks, but a narrow channel has been dredged through V~.>ith a least depth of 24 ft. A depth of only 22ft. was reported in the Pavlovski channelin 1919' (when no doubt dredging had been neglected) (Black Sea Pilot1 , 1920, 318). 4-6. The Thracian Bosphorus: 120 stades 14 miles. This is the figure given by Herodotus (iv. 85) and Dionysius of Byzantium 488

SITUATION OF BYZANTIUM

IV. 39· 7

(p. z. 10 ed. Glingerich). Arrian (Peripl. M. Eux. q, 37 = GGlYI, i. 38o, 401) makes it 16o stades, adding in the section between the Hieron, which P. (§ 6) takes as the beginning of the strait, and the Black Sea proper. Modern calculations make the length zB·s km. in a straight line, and along the actual water course 31·7 km. (Oberhummer, RE, 'Bosporos (1 )', cols. 742-3); the Black Sea Pilot7 , 3, gives it as 17 miles, including windings. P. records the width at the Hieron and at the Byzantium-Calchedon crossing. The latter he reckons at 14 stades, but other authorities make it 7 (Dion. Byz., p. 3· 4 Giingerich; Pliny, Nat. hist. v. 150, quingenti passus-though it is mille passus in Nat. hist. ix. 51) or 12 (Schol. Dion. Per. 142); straight across from Byzantium it is in fact z·s km. (about 13·5 stades). The width at the Hieron was 7 stades according to Ps.Scylax, 67. Gillius (GGM, ii. 9· l. 15; 13, l. 7) assumes that Dionysius (p. 2. II Giingerich) is referring to the Hieron, when he makes the width at the narrowest point 4 stades; but it is more likely that Dionysius here refers to the crossing at the Hermaeum (cf. 43· 2). P. makes the Hieron crossing 12 stades, but he may be giving the actual distance between the two temples, as Gillius (GGM, ii. 9} suggests. The width of the strait at this point is about I km. P.'s higher figures may of course be due to the use of a different stade; but his figure for the length of the Bosphorus is against this hypothesis. 6. 'l'o KQ.AOIJp.Evov 'IEpov: cf. Dion. Byz., pp. 27. 2o, 29. 31-30. 21 {= Gillius); Oberhummer, RE, 'Bosporos (1}', cols. 752-3. This Hieron was dedicated to Zeus Oilp•os (Arr. Peripl. M. Eux. zs. 4; anon. Peripl. M. Eux. 90), and was traditionally built by Phrixus. It stood on the Asiatic shore near Anadoly Kawaghy, about 7-'0 km. from the mouth of the Pontus. Jason's sacrifice to the twelve gods is mentioned by Apollonius Rhodius (ii. 532). who, however, places it on the outward journey; a scholiast to Apollonius (ad loc.) associates it with this site. Diodorus (iv. 49· 1-2), following Dionysius Scytobrachion (cf. Diod. iii. 52. 3; Schwartz, RE, 'Diodoros (37)', cols. 673 ff.), has the same version asP. The precise date of Dionysius is uncertain, though it will be in the second century B.c., and P. may have known his Argonautica; but more probably he took this information from his general source for this section. For similar mythological derivations cf. 43· 6 (BoOs}, 59· 5 (T£fxos); from these two passages it seems clear that the implied subject of cpao-t here is ot p.fi8ot, 'legend has it that .... ' To KQ.'I'Q.V'I'ttcpu KElp.evov IQ.pQ.'Il'tE~ov: today Rumeli Kawaghy; Oberhummer, RE, loc. cit., col. 751. For the two temples cf. Strabo, vii. 319. 39.7-42. 8. The hydrography of the Pontus: see above, 38. I-45· 8 n., on the probable source.

IV. 39· 7

SITUATION OF BYZANTIUM

39. 7-10. Causes for the current from the Maeotic lake through the Pontus. P. gives two: (1) the overflow of water entering from the many rivers draining into these seas, (2) the overflow of water displaced by alluvial matter deposited by these rivers after heavy rains. Of these arguments the first is already found in Aristotle (Meteor. ii. I. 354 a 12 ff.), and something very like the second in Strato (cf. Strabo, i. so), who also recognized that the large number of rivers flowing into the Pontus and the Maeotis helped to account for the current in the Bosphorus (Strabo, i. 49). Strato differs from P. in that he combines the theory about silting-up with a curious error for which Strabo censures him; because, he argues, as a result of alluvial deposits the Pontus is shallower than the Propontis, there is naturally a flow of water from the one into the other-as if, Strabo comments, seas behaved like rivers. Berger (Die geographischen Fragmente des Eratosthenes (Leipzig, x88o), 61 ff.) argues that Strato cannot have committed this absurdity, and that he must have said, like P., that the current was caused by displacement; but in fact Strata's error is already in Aristotle, who describes the downward slope of the sea-bed from the Maeotis by successive stages to the Atlantic (Meteor. ii. I. 354 a 12 ff.), and like Strato attributes this slope to silting at the upper levels. P. accepts the argument about silting, but has nothing about the behaviour of seas running, like rivers, in the direction of the lowest sea-floor--either because he saw through it or because it was unnecessary in his own simplified account. This omission is not a strong argument against the view that Strata was P.'s source for this section. See, for fuller discussion, Walbank, Robinson Studies, i. 470-4. Modern research confirms P.'s thesis only in part. As a result of observations made by H.M.S. Shearwater, Commander W. J. C. Wharton, R.N., in August and October 1872, it was ascertained that the flow of water through the Bosphorus and Hellespont was considerable, and that it was due most probably to (r) the prevalence of north-east winds in the Black Sea, (2) the excess of water received from the large rivers over the amount lost by evaporation, and (3) the difference in specific gravity between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean ; and that of these the wind was the most important factor. Black Sea Pilot7 , 1920, 21-22 ..

7. t:ts vt:plypa.cpf]v O.yydwv ~ptO}LM.>v: 'into basins of limited circumference' (Paton). For dyy€fov, 'sea-bed', cf. Plato, Cr#ias, III A. u'D'a.pxouawv 8' i~epuat:wv: according to Eratosthenes, following Strato (cf. Strabo, i. 49), the Pontus had originally no outlet, but eventually the water piled up and forced a passage through at the Bosphorus (for a Samothracian legend about this cf. Diod. v. 47· 3-4); similarly at the Pillars of Hercules. P. omits this part of Strata's argument; but it was irrelevant to his point, and the omission (like 490

SITUATION OF BYZANTIUM

lV. 40.5

that of the argument about the sloping sea-bed: 7-ro n.) is not evidence against his use of Strato. 11. oOK E~ Et£1TOp~KWV ••• s~TJYTJI'a.Tio)\1: P. is evidently attacking some specific alternative version based on 'merchants' yarns' ; for his prejudice against merchants and disbelief in their stories see 42. 7; Class. et med., 1948, r6r-2, comparing P.'s attitude towards Pytheas. See Robinson Studies, i. 470 n. 5· ~K riJs KaTO. cpuow 6ewplas: 'from the principles of natural science'; Oewpla is used objectively to mean 'theory' elsewhere; cf. vi. 42. 6, -!] 1rep/, 'Ta crrpan:7TeOa Oewpta, 'military science, military theory'. 40. 1. tLvo8E~KT~Kfi , • • li~TJYYJUI!~: cf. ii. 37 • 3 n. 2. rs~ov ••• TWV vOv K<:up&v: cf. i. 4· I, LOLOV ••• 'TWV Ka8' TJJ-LUS KatpwiJ (unification of the world under Rome), ii. 37· 4, i8t6v n avJ-LPePI.:fiaOa, 'TOl)> Ka8' ~J-Las Katpou> (viz. to make a universal history possible). P. here refers to the same context of ideas; therefore despite the parallel with iii. 59· 3 (d.m:I.VTwv 1TAw'Twv Ka~ 7TOpEV'Twv yeyov6.,.wv), a passage inserted after 146, there is no reason to suppose that the present excursus is also late. 2. OOK ll.v ~T~ vprnov t:lTJ 1TO~T)TULS Ka.t t£U6oypacpo~s xpfjaea.~: this doctrine is at variance with P.'s own practice elsewhere; see especially his defence of Homer in xxxiv. 2 ff. against the scepticism of Eratosthenes (xxxiv. 4· 4), and xxxiv. II. 2o, .,.a f-Lu8woicrra'Tov 8ot
ou

t:l~cr8at 'To/ votrrrii f-Ld17Jv r/>alvecrOat d;\~Oetav, J.rav r/>fi 'TO.J-Lf.av 'TWV aVEJ-LWV 'TOV

'AexBlv, ill' aivttaJ-Llvou Tijv Ato'Aov (Class. et med., I948,

17o-3). \Vunderer (ii. 44) suggests that the present statement reflects

P.'s sources at this point; on the other hand, the more sensational type of myth has already been criticized in ii. r6. 13-14, and there are similar criticisms of the Phaethon myths in the Stoic Strabo (v. 215). Hence it is unsafe to base conclusions about P.'s source here on his attitude towards poets and mythographers. 3. d1TLUTOUS al'ci>~o-13TJTOUf1EVI<)\I vapEXDt£EVO~ (le(la.twTns: Schweighaeuser suggests that Heracleitus was referring to the ears, as in xii. 27. I; cf. H. Diels, Herakleitos von Ephesosz (Berlin, 1909), fg. A. 23. It is quite likely (Wunderer, ii. ~-7o) that P. has taken this quotation from his source (contra von Scala, 88 f.), but there is no reason to think this is Eratosthenes, as Wunderer suggests. 4. Silting up of the Pontus and Maeotis: cf. § 9, 42. 2. The same argument is found in Aristotle (Meteor. i. 14. 353 a Iff., Maeotic lake) and Strato (Strabo, i. so, l>oKEtV S€ Kav xwcrOfjvaL 'TOV Il6VTOV o>.ov El> vcrrepov, ilv f-LI.vwcnv at lmppvcrEt!> 'TOtai!rat; cf. P. fLEVOV<J7!> ye- 0~ rij> ailrij> .,.>:w~ 1repl 'ToOr; 'T07Tovs---'the existing local conditions' (Paton} -Kat 'TWV al-rlwv rijs tyxcfJaEW!> eve-pyOVVTWV Ka'Ta 'TO cruvexls'). 5. 0 ... xpovos &m~pos KT~.: cf. Arist.ltfeteor. i. 14.353 a 15, r/>avepov 'Tolvuv, Em:i 0 'TE. XJ'OVO!> otix I.17ToAebf;n Kai 'TO o>.ov ato,ov, o.,., oin-E 6 1

491

IV. 40. 5

SITUATION OF BYZANTIUM

Tdvais OW€ 0 N£'iAos cl€t €ppn, &>.>.' ..jv 1J'OT~ tYJpds 0 T01J'OS oBev piovaw. Here Aristotle is concerned particularly ;vith infinite time in the past; but, as his phrasing shows, he also regarded it as infinite in the future too (d. Phys. iv. r3. 222 a 29 ff., viii. r. 25r b 10 ff.; Meteor. i. r4. 352 b I7 ... J.LTJ p.b>ToL yivEaw Kal. ,PBopav, el1rep p.ivH -rd miv). von Scala (r9z) suggests that Aristotle was in fact replying to Anaxagoras who, according to Diog. Laert. ii. 3· ro, envisaged the possibility of time stopping; but when Anaxagoras replied to the question whether the mountains of Lampsacus would one day be sea with the words Uv yE o XP6vos p.7] im>.l7171, he was perhaps speaking ironically as of an dSJva-rov. The context in which P. uses this argument about time is so closely parallel to that in Aristotle as to confirm the view that his source is Peripatetic. His argument, like Aristotle's, requires that not only time but also the material universe shall be infinite in duration; and though the Stoics admitted the former (d. Stob. Anth. i. 8. 42 (W.-H. i. 105): Poseidonius said that some things are a1rnpa, ws o aJp.1ras xpovos; Chrysippus said that TOV xpovov m:fv-ra a1J'ELpov Elva~ J,P' €Kanpa), they denied the latter (d. Ps.-Philo, De aet. mundi, 23. 117 ff., recording arguments of Theophrastus (Zeller, Hermes, n, 1876, 422--9) or Critolaus (Diels, Dox. graec. 106 ff.), directed against those who denied the eternal duration of the world, and are, as Zeller (loc. cit.) shows, to be identified with the Stoics). To this extent P.'s argument is antiStoic. Strato, who is ex hypothesi P.'s source here, held different views on the definition of time from Aristotle (d. Robinson Studies, i. 472 n. r6), and von Scala (19off.) fails to show any detailedconnexion between those views and the present passage; but there is nothing in Strato to suggest that he did not accept Aristotle's views on the duration of time, which is the only relevant point here. Kliv To Tuxov d.a4>epT)Ta.~: 'even though the addition should be but trifling'. 6. Completion of any process affecting a finite quantity in infinite time. This is the basis of P. 's contention about the Pontus, and, as von Scala shows (192 ff.), it is Peripatetic; cf. Ps.-Philo, loc. cit.; Arist. Phys. iv. 13. 222 a-b; Eudemus, fg. 52 (FPhG, iii. zso), Jv 8€ -rip XPOV~ m:fv-ra ylvemt Kat ,PBetpe-rat; Ps.-Archytas in Simplic. in Arist. Categ. c. 9· (f. 89r; p. 352 Berlin), Phys. 'corollarium de tempore' (f. r86, p. 785 Berlin). Ct.§ 5 n. O.vayKTJ n:AELw61jva.L Ka.Ta ritv lTpo6Eow: 'the hypothesis requires that the process must be completed'. 8. Shallowness of the Afaeotis. This was widely known in ancient times. Cf. Arist. Afeteor. i. 14. 353 a, &>.>.a p.~v Kat -ra TT£pl ~v MatCmv >./p.v7)v €mS€SwK£ -rfj 1rpoaxli>an -rwv TTo-rap.wv -roaov-rov, wa-rE TToAAtfl €>.0.TTw p.eyi.Bn TTAota vvv ElaTTAE'iv 1rpos -r7]v €pyaaiav ~ €-ros €t7]Koa-rov.

P.'s calculations of an average depth of between 5 and 7 fathoms, 492

SITUATION OF BYZANTIUM

IV. 4L 3

i.e. 30-42 ft., are confirmed by modern soundings which make it only 48 ft. in the deepest part. 'By observations, it is said that from qo6 to the year r8o8 the depth of the gulf (of Taganrog) has diminished 3 ft. ; from the latter date to 1833 it has again diminished 3 ft. ; so that it has lost 6ft. depth in 127 years, but there appears to be some reason to doubt the accuracy of this decrease in depth. The sandbanks have also increased in extent and others have formed' (Black Sea Pilot7, 1920, 6). Shifting sandbanks would explain both Aristotle's statement and the soundings recorded (with such little confidence) in the Pilot. Danov (op. cit. (in 38. I-45· 8 n.), 63) suggests that P.'s information here goes back to someone who had sailed through the straits; but it may equally well come from Strata, who would be as likely as Aristotle to quote evidence of this kind. 9. 86.Aa.TTa. a6ppou<; T~ no11T!f: the 'lTOJ\a.wl who held this view were probably the Ionian natural philosophers (cf. Arist. Gael. ii. 13. 295 b 12, apxatoL = Anaximander; Eratosth. fg. iii A 2 Berger, TOV apxa.tov yewypar{>,Kdv 'lTtva.Ka.; Agathemerus, i. 2, 3 (GGM, ii. 471-2), using both dpxa.tot and Tra.Aaw{; von Scala, I 97). P. quotes the 'lTOJ\a.tol as nearer in time to the circumstances attested, for throughout these chapters he exaggerates the speed of the processes described (as does Aristotle in the passage quoted in 40. 8 n.). vuv lan AlftY'I'J yAuKEta: untrue. The Sea of Azov is less salty than the Black Sea (cf. 42. 3· correctly), but it is not a freshwater lake. According to Strabo (i. so), Strato said that yAvKVTaTTJII elvat T~ll Iloll7'tK~v Od.Aa.TTa.v; he may have said the same of the Maeotis (cf. 42. 3). On the sweet water of the Maeotis ct. Polycleitus (FGH, 128 F 7 Strabo, xi. 509), who confused the Caspian with the Maeotis (on this see Tarn, Alex. ii. s-rs; L Pearson, CQ, 1951, 8o-84) and mentions that its water was th-royAvKv; cf. Curt. vi. 4· r8, there are some who argue that the Maeotis empties into the Caspian, 'et argumentum afferant aquam, quod dulcior sit quam cetera maria'. See also Dion. Byz. p. z. 6--8 Giingerich.

41. I. TOU ••• "laTpou "11'AE£oa' aT6.,.aaw . • • daf36.AAOVTOS: the mouths of the Danube were reckoned from the time of Herodotus (iv. 47) as five in number, from the age of Augustus as seven. auft~alvu .,-pbs To(hov KTA.: 'a bank has formed opposite the river, about a thousand stades in length, and a day's journey out to sea'. Schweighaeuser takes 'lTpOf -roih-ov to refer to the Pont us; it is more probably 'with reference to (the river)'. Paton mistranslates ~p.epa.f •.• yfj> 'reaching out to sea for a day's journey'. 2. Ka.Aoual 8' auTous ••• In1911: they were mentioned by Strato (cf. Strabo, i. so, 52) along with Salmydessus and the 'Scythian desert' as already covered with shoal waters, and so evidence for the future silting up of the whole sea. 493

IV. 41. 3

SITUATION OF BYZANTIUM

3-9. Why the silt does not accumulate near the shore. In i. 53 Strabo asks why the alluvium does not reach the open sea; the answer is that the refiuen t sea drives it back. He does not say that the question and answer are from Strato; but Strato has been mentioned and it is very probable. In that case, it may well be that Strato has concerned himself with the whole problem of the depositing of alluvial silt, and why it should reach the point it does; of his argument P. has reproduced one side, Strabo the other (cf. Robinson Studies, i. 473). 7. vpbs Aoyov ••. pEUJ.ul.Twv: 'the distance of each is proportionate to the force with which the streams flow in'. 9. TOV TuxlwTa. xnJ.Lappouv: 'an insignificant winter-torrent'. On XE•p.appot d. Curtius, S.-B. Berlin, r888, rzr4-I5. Here it seems to be the typical Greek beck, swollen in winter and dry in summer, contrasted with the rroTap.ol, awExws pl.ovrEs (42. r) of the Pontus area. 42. 3. rj Ma.LGJTLS yAuKUT,pa. KTA.: d. 40. 9 n. On the waters of the Pont us cf. Sallust, Hi st. iii, fg. 65 M. ; Arrian, Peripl. M. Eux. ro; Black Sea Pilot', 1920, 4: 'each square mile of its surface receives the drainage of si square miles, which will account for the small degree of saltness of its waters. The specific gravity of the surface compared with that of fresh water is as IOI4 to xooo.' P.'s source is probably Strato (cf. Strabo, i. so, quoted in 40. 9 n.). 4. ~s cilv 8i]"Aov KTA.: Schweighaeuser admitted that 'non satis expedio totam bane loquendi rationem' and suggested that rrp(ls n)v XP6vov is an intrusion. The sentence is certainly complicated by the placing of rrpos Tov xp6vov between ov and its antecedent t\6yov; but the phrase 7rpOs TOv XP6vov is essential to the sense: 'from this it is clear that when the time required to :fill the Palus Maeotis bears the same relation to the time (then> that the size of its basin bears to (that of> the basin (of the Pontus\ then the Pontus too will become, like the Palus :Maeotis, a sha11ow freshwater lake.' In the phrase 7rpos TOv xpovov the last word indicates the period of time up to (and measured by) the moment indicated by 6-rav. If, for the sake of the argument, we assume the basin of the Pontus to be three times the size of that of the Maeotis, and that it takes a thousand years from the beginning of the process to :fill the Maeotis, when that period of a thousand years bears the same relation to the time then (which will be three thousand years from the beginning of the process) that the size of its basin (1) bears to that of the basin of the Pontus (3), the Pontus will also become a freshwater marsh. Apart from the clumsiness of P.'s formulation, it contains a slight illogicality in as much as he does not distinguish between the complete :filling up of the basin and its becoming a freshwater marsh, though clearly these are successive stages and not the same stage in the process envisaged. 5. eaTToV 8i 'I"OUTOV U'II'OATJVTEOV: i.e. the process will be quicker than 494

SITUATION OF BYZANTIUM

IV. 43· 3

the formula given in the previous sentence allows, in so far as there are larger and more rivers flowing into the Pontus in addition to those flowing into the Maeotis. 7. Ti\s T&iv TAo'itoj.tEvwv \(Je:u5oll.oy£a.s: 'the lies of merchants', not 'sea-farers' (Paton); cf. 39· II; and, for TAl>t,EaBa,, commercium maritimum exercere (Schweighaeuser), ii. 8. I, iv. 47· 1, v. 88. 7, 89. 8, xxx. 8. 5· This sense is missed by LSJ. 43-44. Advantages of the situation of Byzantium. With ~1nivLp.€v (42. 8) P. reverts to the argument of 39· 6; 43· 1 resumes the information contained in 39· 4-6. 43. 2. ·epj.La.iov: 11'poox~ is found nowhere else; Strabo uses aKpW7'1}P'&.'w in this sense. The point referred to is Roumeli Hissar, which now bears the castle of Boghas Kessen, built by Mohammed II. Here Mandrocles of Samos fixed a bridge for Darius (Herod. iv. 85-88). The width is given as 4 stades by Herodotus (iv. 85, 87 f.), Strabo (ii. us). and Dionysius of Byzantium (p. 2. II Giingerich, 'at the narrowest point'; p. 24. 7 (Gillins); cf. 39· 4-6 n.); but Strabo (vii. 319) and Mela (i. 101) agree with P. in making it 5· Dionysius of Byzantium (p. 24. 3 Giingerich Gillius)) calls the spot Ilvpplas Kvwv. On Darius' crossing cf. i. 2. 2 n. 3-10. The current of the Bosphorus. See the comparable accounts in P. Gillins, De Bosporo Thracio, i. 4 (GGM, ii. 14-16), with Dionysius of Byzantium, p. 3· I f. Giingerich; Black Sea Pilot', 1920, 26-27; A. Moller and L. Merz, Hydrographische Untersuchungen in Bosporus und DardaneUen (Veroffentlichungen des Inst. fiir Meereskunde ... an der Universitat Berlin, N.F. Geog.-naturwissenschaftliche Reihe, Heft 18, 1928), 127 ff. The relevant passages are set out in tabular form in Robinson Studies, i. 476-7. Authorities are agreed that the current in fact rebounds twice before reaching the Hermaeum, once from the European shore at Dicaea Petra (near Kire9 Burnu), and once from the Asiatic coast, which it strikes at Glarium (Pa~a. Bah9e) and follows as far as Kanlica. 'Tertius in Europam contra Hermaeum promunturium' (Gillius); 'it there turns towards the European coast, and runs along Roumeli Hissar' (i.e. Hermaeum) (Black Sea Pilot). 'Quartus decursus fert in Asiae promunturium uulgo nominatum Moletrinum' (Gillius) ; this is the Kandili point of the Pilot and the Kandeli-Leuchtturm of Merz-Moller (which is mentioned next), and P.'s 'TOtS aV'Tl11'1ipa> rii> i!ala> 'T61I'OL> (§ 4). 'Quintus in Europam ad promunturium Hestias' (Gillins) ; 'the main stream strikes the western shore at Arnaut point' (Pilot). From here, according to Gillins, it is driven violently against the Asiatic shore, and flows along it past the two promontories which enclose Chrysoceramum and promunturium dictum Bouem siue Damalim; 'from Arnaut point the main current sets towards the Asiatic shore, along 495

IV. 43· 3

SITUATION OF BYZANTIUM

which it runs as far as Leander tower' (Pilot). From here a seventh recoil is made towards Byzantium; 'cuius mucrone discissus defluit in duas partes, quarum rapidior praecipitat in fretum ad Propontidem versus, altera debilior exsilit in sinum Cornu appellatum' (Gillius); cf. Dion. Byz. p. 3· S f. KaTd S' o~v p1Jyvup.€vov rrepl airrr1v Toil pevp.a'TOS 'TO fLEIJ 1TOAV Kat {3tawv w8et Ka'Td 'Tf}S' llpoTTOIJ'TiSOS', oaov Se rrpati Kat 8~pas lx8vwv aywyov, {moSexe'Tat 'Tip KaAovp.evtp Kepa'TL; 'the

main current, passing Leander tower, sets strongly on to Old Seraglio point, and divides into two branches; the southern and larger flows into the Sea of Marmara, and the western into the Golden Horn' (Pilot). Throughout Gillins has had P.'s account as well as that of Dionysius before him; but he appends many details which confirm his statement that he bases his own version on personal experience. The Black Sea Pilot is summarizing the Russian Black Sea Pilot but also gives modern details (e.g. that the current up the Golden Horn is frequently lost before reaching the first bridge) and facts about counter-currents contained in neither P. nor Gillius. Thus the later evidence offers independent confirmation of P.'s accuracy, at any rate for the part south of the Hermaeum. His statement that between the Pontus and the Hermaeum the current is uniform (§ 3) shows an ignorance on the part of his source of what happened at the northern end of the Straits, which is best explained by the hypothesis that this source was more especially concerned with the area around Byzantium, and indeed probably had access to information possessed by the fishermen of that city (cf. Robinson Studies, i. 47S n. 30). von Scala (i. 196) suggests that P.'s source was concerned with the tunny route from the Pontus (cf. Strabo, vii. 32o), and that P. adapted it to his own purpose, the advantages of the situation of Byzantium-a plausible suggestion (cf. xxxiv. 2. I4). P. shows no knowledge of the reverse under-water current running towards (though not in fact reaching) the Pontus; this is first mentioned by Macrobius (Sat. vii. I2. 34-37) and Procopius (de bell. viii. 6. 27-28); cf. Robinson Studies, i. 477-8. 5. Tn 1TEpl. Tn!; 'EaTLQ!; aKpa KQAOUiJ.EVa: cf. Dion. Byz., pp. 21. 823· 8 (Giingerich). This corresponds to the modern Arnautk6i. Its name is attested by Pliny (Nat. hist. v. ISo). Hesychius Illustris of Miletus (FGH, 390 F I, 22) also records the name A.varrAovs for this area; this is found in various authors (cf. Gi.ingerich, Dionysii Byzantini Anaplous, p. xlvi). The strength of the current at this point is mentioned by Gillins (GGM, ii. IS)· 6. TiJv Boilv KaAouiJ.EVT)v: cf. Dion. Byz. p. 34· I-<) (Gi.ingerich). The heaclland of Bous is usually associated with the grave of Boidion (or Damalis), the mistress of the fourth-century Athenian general Chares ; she died and was buried here while Chares was helping the Byzantines against Philip II of Macedon in 340; cf. Hesychius of 496

SITUATION OF BYZANTIUM

IV. 44· 3

Miletus (FGH, 390 F 1, §§ 28-3o), and, for the epigram recording the name Botowv, Anth. Pal. vii. 169. No other authority follows P. in associating the name Bous with Io's crossing, but Arrian (Bithyn. fg. 35 = FGH, 156 F 20 b) records the version that the cow is that which led the Phrygians over the Bosphorus. The identity of the headland is uncertain. It may be the west promontory of Scutari, or even the small island off Scutari, which bears a tower erected by Mohammed II (the Tower of Leander); and it is apparently identical with the AwK~ -ns 1ri.Tpa of Strabo (vii. 320) and the saxum miri candoris of Pliny (Nat. hist. ix. 51), from which the tunnies rebound to the European shore and are carried to Byzantium and the Golden Horn, missing Calchedon. 7. Tov ~
497

IV. 44· 3

SITUATION OF BYZANTIUM

domination which Athens secured by her control of the straits see Miltner, Klio, 1935, 10 ff. 4. To 8' ~~1rpoo-8n• &.~LCiaL tca.TO. poGv: 'for the rest they entrust themselves (or their ships) to the current'. 5. TO. tca.TO. Tov t1rlll6.n:pa. 1r'Aouv: 'the approaches on the other side', i.e. to the south and west. Whether one is going up or do-wn the Marmara, the European coast and route by Byzantium are the easier. av TE ydp ••• v6rOtS' corresponds to KaK£UJ~v • •• Bv~aVTLOII, av T. l1ri ••• lTTJalotr; to l1r~ Ttt Tijs llpo1roVTf.aos •• • l:TJO'TOv, and the sentence as a whole is cast in chiastic form. For the Etesian winds Schweighaeuser quotes Apoll. Rhod. ii. 525 and the scholiast on 528, omt.p' , , • 'I;'- , , \, , n·OVTOV OVT£S' Bopp
M

A

1

KaT' l~<.~:lvous Toils Tb1rovs (cf. § ro). On the duration and character of

these north winds, the onset of which was a.<>Sociated with the morning rising of Sirius in the late summer, see Rehm, RE, 'Etesiai', cols. 7I5-I7. They cooled the summer air, and Diodorus (xii. 58. 4) makes their absence one of the causes of the famous plague at Athens. 6. eu1Ta.pa.tc6~LaTo;: 'easy to steer'. tca.T' ~~uSov tca.i. l1JaTOV: on their situation on the Hellespont see xvi. 29. 3 ff. 7. lmo 5£ Ka.'Ax1J56vos ••• Tdva.vTia. TouToLs: coastal sailing would involve a long detour round the gulf of Nicomedia, the gulf of Cius, and the promontory of Cyzicus. On the latter see Strabo, xii. 575· t' \ ' \ ) < (.1 ~ t ' t th e f aC t 9 , oLO. TO TOUS Q.V(~OUS EKO.T!iipOUS , , • ('TTLt-'0/\0.S: OWing 0 that both (the north and south) winds are adverse to both attempts', i.e. to sail from Byzantium to Calchedon, or from Calchedon direct to Thrace. f

I

•

I

45-46. Disadvantages of Byzantium by land: payment of danegeld to the Gauls. 45, 3. -rpeis l'TTL~O.L\IOUO"L\1 t1Ti. fl)v TOUTc.l\1 xwpa.v: 'three others ... invade his territory', TotiTwv = 'of the ruler and his people'; Paton's translation 'their territory' suggests an invasion of Byzantine land. 6. Tl~wpia.v T a.VTaAELov, tca.TO. Tov 1TOI1JT~v: 'the poet' in P. is usually Homer; and since he mentions Tantalus' sufferings in Od. xi. 582 ff., there is no reason to assume that Euripides is meant (so von Scala, 8z). Later the phrase was proverbial, as indeed it is here; cf. Philo, De concup. I; Lucian, Am. 53 Ta.VTaAEla> o{l(as il1TolpEtv. But this is no reason for regarding the words ~<.a.nlc Tov 1TO,TJT~v as an insertion (so Wunderer, i. 99). 10. 1Tp0t1(1TIYEVO~E\Ic.JV S£ r a.Aa.TW\1: cf. i. 6. 5 n. for a general outline of the Gallic invasion of 279. A third detachment under Cerethrius invaded Thrace (Paus. x. 19. 7) and fought the Getae and Triballi (Iustin. xxv. r. 2); and this group, reinforced from the remnants of 498

SITUATION OF BYZANTIUM

IV. 46.3

Brennus' army, was defeated by Antigonus Gonatas at Lysimacheia in 277 (Tarn, AG, 165). Its survivors, under Comontorius, then turned inland to form a kingdom at Tylis (cf. Trog. prol. 25). P.'s source of information about this kingdom is uncertain. van Gelder (g6) suggests Demetrius of Byzantium, who wrote thirteen books on tip! Ta/..arwv [l,&fJacnv EvprlnrrJs Els J4alav; but there is no evidence that Demetrius dealt with Tylis. Danov (op. cit. 63) also thinks of Demetrius, together with Nymphis of Heracleia (d. FGH, 162 (Demetrius), 432 (Nymphis)). ~ha.4>uyovT£S Tov 1TEpl 4EA4>ovs KlvSuvov, Ka.l • • Tov 'EA.A.'I]o-1TovTov: 'having escaped the disaster at Delphi reached the

46. 1.

Hellespont'. Comontorius' men had never for the most part been members of Brenn us' force: they escaped the Delphic disaster by being elsewhere. (Paton is misleading here.) But, as in i. 6. 5• P. is following a tradition which identifies the campaign against Greece, and the preservation of Greece, in autumn 279 with the small incident at Delphi. e.ls ••• T~v )\crLa.v o(nc i1'1'Epa.~81Jcra.v: unlike the Tolistoagii, Tectosages, and Trocmi, whom Leonnorius and Lutarius led across to Asia in winter 278 (Livy, xxxviii. 16); cf. Launey, REA, 1944, 226-36. 2. TuA.w: Stephanus of Byzantium (s.v.) puts Tylis near Mt. Haemus; Jiretceki and Tomaschek identified it with Tulowo in Tulowsko-Pole on the upper Tonzos-Tundscha (cf. Lenk, RE, 'Thrake', coL 433). The Tylenian kingdom seems to have covered the fonner Odrysian area ; but the coast remained in Seleucid hands until, with the war of the Brothers, it fell to the Ptolemies (cf. v. 34· 8; Niese, ii. 150 ff.). An inscription published by Balalakis and Scranton (A]P, 1939, 4511-8) shows a Ptolemaic officer Epinicus helping in the defences of the mainland possessions of Samothrace against {Jdp{Japo£, who may be either Thracians or the Gauls of Tylis, at some date after 240 (cf. P. Roussel, BCH, 1939 (published 1941), 133 ff.; M. Rostovtzeff, A]P, 1940, 207; Chr. Danov, Bull. de l'£nst. arch. bulgar. xii, 1938, 216, 253; Bengtson, Strat. iii. 179). 3. iv -Ta.'ls i4>68oL<;: for lo8os used in reference to the Gauls cf. i. 6. 5 n. nvn TPWXlMovo; •.• xpucroOs: the XPVGOUS is the gold stater (cf. Poll. ix. 59), and several units existed, varying in weight between 8·1 and 8·6 g. Probably staters on an Attic standard of 8·6 g. (didrachms) are indicated here, for these, minted by the Diadochi, had become a world-currency since Alexander: each one was worth 20 Attic silver drachmae. See Regling, RE, 'stater', col. 2I73; below, s6. 3· x.pvaot E1TUTTU.LO£. oy8o~KOVTO. TnAa.VTa.: i.e. silver talents. I talent = 6o minae = 6,000 drachmae; and since :zo Attic silver drachmae are equivalent to 499

IV. 46.3

SITUATION OF BYZANTIUM: WAR OF

I gold stater, this indemnity came to 24,000 gold staters per annum. If the talent is worth £231 (cf. i. 6:z. 9 n.), the total comes to over f!8,ooo. 4. Ka.ua.pov: Cavarus was contemporary with the Byzantine-Rhodian war; cf. 52. r. On his fall cf. viii. 22 (c. 212). 5. 01To Twv tJlopwv me~oUJJ.EVOl: the extraordinary measures adopted by the Byzantines to raise money, recorded in Ps.-Arist. Oec. ii. 2. 3· .1346 b, may refer to this period; they included sale of public land, taxes on fishing, trade in salt, miracle-workers soothsayers and apothecaries, a sales tax, bank-monopoly, sale of citizenship, and (to metics) sale of the right to acquire land. But the date of the Oeconomica is uncertain, and Rostovtzeff (SEHHW, 1287) may be right in referring this passage to the fourth century. For how long before :z:zo/19 the crisis had existed is not clear. The "EiiATJvfis; to whom envoys were sent will have been the free states interested in the Pontus trade, Rhodes, Cyzicus, Chios, Sinope, and perhaps Athens. Cf. Niese, ii. 384 n. 4· 6. £vexetp11aa.v ••• 1Ta.pa.ywyul.~eLV: P. clearly follows a Byzantine source for this very sympathetic interpretation of this measure, which places the responsibility on the other Greek states (cf. 38. 9-10).

47. 1. ou1 TO • • • 1TpOEUTaVa.L TWV KI1Ta 80-Aa.na.v: on the Rhodian naval pre-eminence at this time see Rostovtzeff (CAH, viii. 6:z4). This pre-eminence was moral, for there was no longer a Kowov Twv 117JGtumn"' (cf. Fraser and Bean, 157-8); but from IG, xi. 4· 596 (between 250 and 220) we know of a Rhodian va.vapxos- br1 Tfjs ..axTjs T[wv v~awv Ka1] i1ri. awrt]plat 7'wv 'E>..>..~vwv. For Rhodian activity against pirates see Strabo, xiv. 652, .,..a >..ua;~pta Ka.8fitAe KTA.; above, 19. 8 n.; Syll. 581. 51 ff., 79 ff. (treaty between Rhodes and Hierapytna) = IC, iii, Hierapytna, 3A. P. probably drew on a Rhodian source as well as a Byzantine (perhaps, but not certainly, Zeno; cf. Ullrich, 22); this source will have used the Rhodian record office, and will have given details of Rhodian embassies sent at this time (e.g. 47· 3• 47· 7, 5L 1). 5. 1TpoeaT'laa.v Tou ••• 1TOA~TEUJJ.O.TOS: probably a;part]yol, of whom two held office together (Polyaen. ii. 2. 7; GDI, 3059). The declaration of war (§ 6) would be passed by the assembly. 7. 1Tpos npouata.v: Prusias had succeeded his father Ziaelas in Bithynia about 229 (Beloch, iv. 2. 213); his grievances against Byzantium are outlined in 49· 48.1. 'Ana.Aov: Attalus I was thegreat-nephewof Philetaerus, founder of the Pergamene dynasty; he succeeded his father in 241, secured a striking victory over the Galatians, and took the title of king. On the successes scored against him by Achaeus see v. 77· 2-5 nn. 500

RHODES AND BITHYNIA AGAINST HER

IV. 48.5

5. :Axa.uJs •.• :AvTtoxou
~~----·----~-·-L___ --- l Antiochus I

Achaeus

,~--'--]

I Antiochus II. rn. Laodice I ~l

Seleucus II, m. Laodice II

r-

Seleucus III

Antiochus

Hierax

Andromachus

I

Laodice I, m. Antixhus II

~---~-·

Laodice II, m. Seleucus II

Achaeus, m. Laodice B, d. ofMithridates

Antiochus III, m. Laodice A, d. of Mithridates

IV. 48. 5

SITUATION OF BYZANTIUM: WAR OF

For recent bibliography, and a defence of Corradi's view, see P. Meloni, Rend. Line., 1949, 536-7 n. I. 6. auvuvepi~a.AE Tov TClupov: Seleucus III succeeded Seleucus II in 225 (Beloch, iv. 2. 193-6; Tam, CAH, vii. 722 prefers 226); but, despite the words diS' Ofi:r-rov rraptA.a{Je -r~v {JafYtAf.lav, his expedition was evidently in 223; for he had only reached Phrygia when he was murdered (Porphyry, FGH, 26o F 32. 9, 44), and it is known that Antiochus III succeeded in summer 223. Seleucus III's expedition evidently followed on an unsuccessful one led by his generals, whose defeat is recorded in OGIS, 277 (cf. 272); the dynast Lysias had fought on the Seleucid side, and it seems probable that Egypt stood behind Attalus (cf. 5r. 1, Achaeus' father Andromachus a prisoner at Alexandria). Attains had gained Cistauric Asia Minor by defeating Antioch us Hierax, Seleucus II's opponent in the War of the Brothers. P.'s phrase l'lvat p.&.Ata-r& rrws €·wn TrpOupov -rwv vilv >..eyop.lvwv Ka,pci"JV is difficult, since he is here concerned with 22o/19: but Vitucci, 38 n. I, suggests that he is reckoning back from the date of the imposition of the duties, which may have occurred some time before the outbreak of war. On Seleucus III's murder see Bouche-Leclercq, Seleueides, i. 121-2: Meloni, Rend. Line., 1949, 535· Appian (Syr. 66) has him poisoned by cptAot. 10. Tij!; TWV ox>.wv OpfLf}!; 17UVEPYOU171]!> KTA.: ol ox>..ot are the soldiers (cf. i. 15. 4, 32. 7-8), not townsfolk (so Bouche-Leclercq, Seleueides, i. 122 n. 2; Granier, x66); cf. Bikerman, Seleucides, 10 n. 3· 12. Su.lSYJfLO. vEpl8EfL€VO!> KO.l ~Clat.AEa. vpoaa.yopt:uaCl!;: it is clear from v. 57· 5 that Achaeus took this step at Laodiceia in Phrygia in autumn 220, while Antiochus was in Atropatene. Achaeus' revolt seems to have been provoked by Ptolemy (d. Bouche-Leclercq, Lagides, i. 297~; Seleueides, i. 139; Niese, ii. 371; 386 n. 2; Holleaux, REA, 1916, 239 Etudes, iii. r31). In v. 42. 7 the grand vizier, Hermeias, produces a letter, allegedly from Achaeus, setting forth an offer by Ptolemy; P. calls it a forgery, but his source is hostile to Hermeias, and it may have been genuine. Further, on Achaeus' revolting Ptolemy released his father (cf. 51. 1-5); and in 219 Achaeus and Ptolemy were working together openly (v. 66. 3, cf. v. 57· 2), so that in the negotiations of zr9/18 Ptolemy asked for Achaeus' inclusion in the treaty (v. 67. 12-13 n.). For coins of Achaeus with the legend BarnMws .Mxalov see Babelon, Les Rois de Syrie, d' Arminie et de Commagene (Paris, r8go), lxxxvii f. and 6o f.; Head, 762; full references in Meloni, Rend. Line., 1949, sso nn. 1 and 2. Twv i1Tt ,.a.sE Tou T a.opou ~a.alA~wv K
RHODES AND BITHYNIA AGAINST HER

IV. 49· 3

victories (OGIS, 273-9. dated 226--2~3). The present passage suggests that the Byzantines had recently accepted a Pergamene invitation to send 8€wpol to her festival; and Holleaux (REA, 1916, 170 = Etudes, ii. 6x) took this to be the Nicephoria, the title having been given to Athena on this occasion. Segre (in Robert's Hellmica, 5, 1948, 102-28) argued against this that the earliest application of the title Nicephoros to Athena (OGIS, 283) dates to 201; and he reconstructed the history of the festival of Athena Nicephoros with the following stages: (a) a local 1ravl]yvp~s with 8vala,, but no dywvE>, first celebrated in 197 or 196, (b) a penteteric festival, not panhellenic, but attended by representatives of neighbouring cities (including Cos), held in 189 after Magnesia, and again in 185, (c) a trieteric, panhellenic festival instituted in 181. This chronology was proposed by Segre (op. cit. II4 ff.) on the basis of his restoration of a Coan inscription recording a letter from Eumenes II to the city; he suggested that the name Nicephoros was first given to Athena after a postulated epiphany at the battle of Chios in 201. But this implies that the use of the word N~K:I)r/;6ptov as the name of the sacred enclosure ravaged by Philip in 201 before the battle of Chios (xvi. I. 6, cf. xviii. 2. 2, 6. 4) is an anachronism-'celui qui devint fameux plus tard, lorsque Eumene le reconstruisit' (Segre, op. cit. II9)-an unlikely hypothesis. Segre's reconstruction has been challenged by Klaffenbach (;.UDAl, 1950, 99-1o6), who offers alternative, and in many cases more convincing, restorations to the Coan inscription; and his article is criticized by L. Robert (Bull. ep., 1952, no. 127), who promises a full treatment of the question in his forthcoming Etudes pergameniennes ei attalides. It is established with certainty that Athena received the title of 'Nicephoros' after 223 (when it was not included in the dedications of the great trophy celebrating Attalus I's Galatian victories); and equally the existence of the Nicephorium in 201 dates it before the battle of Chios. On the other hand, a cult of Athena Nicephoros is not the same as a festival, and it is noteworthy that P. does not give Athena the title here. Hence, though Klaffenbach (op. cit. 1o6) returns to the view of Holleaux, it seems safer to conclude that P. is here referring to some different festival of Athena, such as the Panathenaea, a local festival known from OGIS, 267 ( Welles, 23), 1. 17 (a letter of Eumenes I to the people of Pergamum). P. does not imply that a new festival has been instituted. For earlier discussion of the Nicephoria see Kolbe, Hermes, 1933, 445 f.; S.-B. Heidelberg, 1942{3, I, 8 ff.; L. Robert, BCH, 1930, 332--6; Hansen, 99, 407-8. 'IwTl]p~a.: of the occasion for this festival, evidently instituted since Prusias' accession in 229/8, nothing is known. His defeat of the Gauls was later (v. III. 6-7); cf. Holleaux, REA, 1916, 171 n. 3 =Etudes, ii. 62 n. 4.

IV. 49· 4

SITUATION OF BYZANTIUM: WAR OF

4. Ka.Tn yi)v: i.e. on the Asiatic side where there were Byzantine possessions (so. 2-4). 50. 1. .,.ov T~f3oLTTJV •.• E1Ta.ya.yovT£S: Tiboetes (perhaps the same as Zipoetas, a well-attested Bithynian royal name) was a son of Nicomedes I, and, as younger half-brother of Prusias' father Ziaelas, he was Prusias' uncle (§ 9). When on Nicomedes' death Ziaelas seized the throne, Tiboetes was forced to flee the country. P. Treves (]HS, 1943, u8) has argued that his return from Macedon to Byzantium was engineered by Philip V to embarrass Rhodes; and indeed Rhodes is very soon afterwards intervening in the war in Crete on the side of Cnossus and the Aetolians against Gortyn and the alliance which enjoyed Macedonian and symmachic support (53· I, 55· Iff.). There may, therefore, have been some tension between Rhodes and Macedon now (see below, 53· 1 n.). On the other hand, Philip's policy towards Rhodes remained nominally friendly for a good many years after this, like that of Doson before him (d. v. 89. 6-j); see Holleaux, BCH, I90i, non. 2 =Etudes, iii. 69 n. I. Nor had he any reason to detain Tiboetes in Macedon if he chose to leave. Hence Treves' hypothesis must be regarded as unproved. 3. To •.. 'l.;:pov: cf. 39· 6 n. According to Dionysius of Byzantium (p. 30. 3 Giingerich), the Byzantines bought this strong point from Callimedes, Seleuci exercitus dux. Nothing further is known of this man; but exercitus dux will be aTpaTTJyos, and Bengtson (Strat. ii. n8) suggests he may have sold the Hieron to prevent its falling into hostile hands, as Ptolemaic generals later sold Caunus to the Rhodians (xxx. 31. 6). Which Seleucus is meant, and what date is to be assigned to the transaction, is not, however, clear, for P.'Kpots O.vwnpov xp6vots is an elastic phrase . .,.a.s a.o"Ti)s Ti)s 8a.>.cl..,.TTJs Epya.o-la.s: 'gain from the sea itself', i.e. from fishing. 4. xwpa.v ••• Ti)s Muo-la.s: it is clear from Strabo (xii. si6) that under the Roman empire Byzantium possessed territory south of the Propontis, and west of Prusa, near the lake of Dascylium (which has not been identified). But three Dorian inscriptions, two associated with the worship of Zeus Brontaios, and the third (which is dated by a hieromnemon) with that of Zeus Pratomysios, from the district of Yalova on the Gulf of Izmid, and dating to the Empire, are evidence that this area was associated with Mysia (as indeed may be deduced from Strabo, xii. 566 and from Ps.-Scylax, 93 (GGM, i. 68)), and that the name Mysia could be applied to the promontory between the Gulf of Nicomedeia (Gulf of Izmid) and the Gulf of Cius ; and further that this district belonged to Byzantium (d. 52. 4 n.). See the publication and discussion by L. Robert, Hellenica, "], 1949, 3o-44; as he points out (op. cit. 41 n. 2), it ~ill be this district near Y alova,

is

504

RHODES AND BITHYNIA AGAINST HER

IV. 52. 4

the coast of Arganthonios, which Prusia.'> now seized (cf. Ernst Meyer, Grenzen, IIJ). When the Byzantines had acquired this 'Peraea' is not known; but wo.\.\o~s if~ xpovovs is contrasted with p.tKpois O.vclrrEpov XPovots in § 3· Niese (ii. 81) suggests that the acquisition of the territories in Mysia followed the peace between Nicomedes of Bithynia (Byzantium was his ally) and Antiochus I about 276; but this is purely hypothetical. 5. va.ua.pxov ••• Eevoct>a.vrov: Xenophantus the son of Agestratus. To commemorate his successful return to Rhodes from this voyage a statue was set up to him by r6 'Epam8t:{wl• Kowciv and his own son VOO'TOV xapLv, according to the epigram beneath it (IG, xii. I. 40 = Hiller von Gaertringen, Hist. gr. Epig. 101); the statue was the work of Timocharis from Eleutherna in Crete. 9. oox fjTTov ••• Tl~OL'f11 Ka.9t}Kew: this claim was based on the fact that Nicomedes I had intended his children by Heptazeta (including Tiboetes) to succeed him rather than Ziaelas, his son by his first wife, Ditizele, and had made the people of Byzantium their joint guardians along with Ptolemy II, Antigonus Gonatas, and the peoples of Heracleia and Cius (Memnon, FGH, 434 F 14). But Ziaelas had established himself by force of arms, and Tiboetes' supporters might argue that neither he nor his son Prusias had a proper title to the throne. Cf. Arrian, Bithyn. 75 FGH, 156 F 29; Niese, ii. 136; Geyer, RE, 'Nikomedes (3)', col. 494· 51. 4. !.t\v8p6tuJ.XO'i ••• yuva.lKO'i: cf. 48. 5 n. for the probability of an error here and in viii. :zo. II; Seleucus II will have married the

sister of Achaeus, not of Andrornachus. How Andromachus carne to be imprisoned in Egypt is not recorded. Beloch has suggested (iv. r. 686 n. 3), with great plausibility, that Attalus took him in his war with Seleucus III, and lodged him for safety at Alexandria; this view is accepted by Tam (CAH, vii. 723) and Meloni (Rend. Line., 1949, 543 n. :z). Andromachus' liberation after Achaeus' revolt is some indication of the man<:euvres which had surrounded the figure of Achaeus, and may have influenced the attitude of Herrneias (48. 12 n., v. 42· 7). 8. TOU<; epq.Ka.<; j.L~0'9wu6.j.LEVO'i: i.e. he paid them subsidies for their help; cf. Launey, i. 378.

52. 1. OLEXOVTO<; TQ.S XE'ipa.s: 'spreading his hands between them', i.e. to part the combatants. 3. !.t\pt8iKTJv: perhaps the Arideices, son of Eumoereas, the Platonist, whose epitaph has survived (BCH, 1912, 230 Hiller von Gaertringen, Hist. gr. Epig. 102). 4. To 86pu tta.l. To KfJpUKeLov: cf. xxiv. 12. I for this proverbial

IV.

sz. 4

SITUATION OF BYZANTIUM: WAR OF

expression. Eustathius (ad Iliad. iii. 222 (p. 408. 4)) connects it with the legend of the Gephyraei at Tanagra, and Wilamowitz (Hermes, 1886, 106) accepts the relevance of this account, attributing it to the atthidographer Demon: 'Tanagras Gott ist Hermes, es liegt am Berge KYJpVKEwv und verehrt Hermes als 1rp6p.axo,;. Offenbar liegt also ein alter Tanagraeischer Ritus zu Grunde.' According to Eustathius the Gephyraei marched Mvrt:s T(jJ 7TpoYJyovp.€v