Chıistopher Stead
Doctrine and Philosophy in Early Christianity
Alius, Athanasius, Augustine
Ashgate VARIORUM Aldershot
Burlington USA Singapore Sydney
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This edition copyright © 2000 Christopher Siead Published in the Variorum Collected Studies Series by Ashgate PubtishingL imited Gower House, Croft Road, Aldershot, Hampshire GU11 3HR Great Britain
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CONTENTS Introduction
Asbgate website: http://www ashgate com
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ix-xviii
Greek Influence on Christian Thought
ISBN 0-86078-830-X
175-185
Early Christianity Origins and Evolution to AD 600 festschrift in Honow ofW.HC Frend, ed I Hazlett London 1991
British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data Stead, G.C (George Christopher), 1913 Doctrine and Philosophy in Early Christianity: Arius, Athanasius, Augustine (VariorumCollected Studies Series; CS224) 1 Christianity-Philosophy. 2 Philosophy, Ancient. 3 Theology, Doctrinal-History-Early Church, ca 30-600 Title. 189
II
The A p p r o p r i a t i o n of the Philosophical Concept o f G o d by Early Christian Theologians: W Pannenberg's Thesis Reconsidered English Translation of Die Aufnahme des philosophischen Gottesbegriffs W. Pannenberg's neu bedacht', Theologische Rundschau Tubingen,
III US Library of Congress Control Number: 00-100058
VIII
1 Oxford,
1994
Patrística
32
Leuven
.39-52 1997
of Theological
Studies
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153-157 Oxford,
198.5
The W o r d ' F r o m N o t h i n g ' Journal
The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of the American National Standard for Information Sciences - Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI Z39 48-1984 ( g ) ™
24-36 45 pt
A r i u s on God's ' M a n y W o r d s ' Journal
VII
Studies
Was A r i u s a Neoplatonist? Studio
VI
140-150
Abramowski
A r i u s in M o d e r n Research lour nal ofTheological
V
These 1986
M a r c e l Richard on M a l c h i o n and Paul of Samosata Logos Festschrift in Honour of Luise ed HC Brennecke et al Berlin, 1993
IV
of Theological
Studies
671-684 49, pt
2 Oxford
1998
The A r i a n Controversy: A New Perspective EPMHNEYMATA CEp\n\\'Z\)\xa%a) Festschrift in of Hadwig Horner, ed H Eisenberger: Heidelberg 1990
Printed by St Edmundsbury Press, Bury St Edmunds, Suffolk
V A R I O R U M C O L L EC T ED S T U D I E S SERIES CS684
i
Í-18
51-59 Honour
CONTENTS
CONTENTS
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IX
K n o w l e d g e of G o d i n Eusebius and Athanasius The Knowledge of God in the Greco-Roman World, ed J Mansfeld et al Leiden, 1989
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Athanasius' Earliest W r i t t e n W o r k Journal of Theological Studies 39, pt 1 Oxford
XI
229-242
Athanasius als Exeget
Christianae
St Athanasius on the Psalms Vigiliae Christianae 39 Leiden 198.5 W h y N o t Three Gods? The L o g i c of G r e g o r y o f
A u g u s t i n e ' s P h i l o s o p h y of B e i n g The Philosophy of Christianity, ed G Vesey. 1989
PUBLISHER'S NOTE
71-84 Cambridge
1-14
Publication
Augustine's Universe Fir st Publication A u g u s t i n e ' s De Maghtro:
1-13
A Philosopher's V i e w
63-73
Signum Pietatis Festchrist in Honour of Cornelius Petrus Mayer, ed. A Zumkeller. Würzburg, 1989 A u g u s t i n e ' s De Maghtro: XIX
This v o l u m e contains x v i i i + 294 pages
149-163
The I n t e l l i g i b l e W o r l d i n P l a t o n i c T r a d i t i o n , First
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65-78
M a r i u s V i c t o r i n u s and A u g u s t i n e
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255-269
1982
Studien zu Gregor von Nyssa und der christlichen Spätantike, ed H R Drobner and C Klock (Supplements to Vigiliae Christianae 12). Leiden 1990
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D i v i n e S i m p l i c i t y as a P r o b l e m for O r t h o d o x y The Making of Orthodoxy. Essays in Honour of Henry Chadwick ed R Williams Cambridge 1989
Index
233-250 36 Leiden,
Nyssa's T r i n i t a r i a n D o c t r i n e
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XXI
The Scriptures and the Soul o f C h r i s t i n Vigiliae
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303-320
174-184
Athanasius
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L o g i c and the A p p l i c a t i o n o f Names to G o d El 'Contra Eunomium I en la producción literaria de Gregorio de Nisa, ed L F. Mateo-Seco and I L Bastero Pamplona, 1988
76-91 1988
Christliche Exegese zwischen Nicaea und Chalcedon ed. J. van Oort and U. Wickert Kampen Neth 1992 XII
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A n Addendum
A u g u s t i n e , the Meno and the Subconscious M i n d Die Weltlichkeit des Glaubens in der Alten Kirche Festschrift in Honour of Ulrich Wickert, ed D Wyrva et al Berlin, 1997
1-2 339-345
The articles in this volume as in all others in the Variorum Collected Studies Series, have not been given a new, continuous pagination In order to avoid confusion and to facilitate their use where these same studies have been refer red to elsewhere the original pagination has been maintained wherever possible Each article has beengiven a Roman number in order of appearance, as listed in the Contents above This number is repeated on each page and is quoted in the index entries
INTRODUCTION
I have collected i n this volume the most important of the papers that I published in 1985-1997, as a sequel to m y Doctrine and Illusion in the Christian Fathers (Aldershot, Variorum, 1985) M o s t of them deal with three notable theologians o f the 4th-5th century, as my title suggests B u t I start w i t h the beginnings o f Christian doctrine, and thereafter f o l l o w a chronological order The fust two pieces turn on the influence of Greek philosophy on early Christian doctrine. To begin w i t h , I have deliberately chosen a very simple i n troductory essay; well-informed readers w i l l find nothing new, except perhaps the choice o f philosophers who need to be considered The discussion that f o l lows is inevitably much more complex, as it involves the Greek philosophers' views o f the nature o f God, and is prompted by the w o r k o f the well-known dogmatic theologian Wolfhait Pannenberg, set fotth in an essay w h i c h has been reproduced i n English i n his Basic Questions in Theology. This has been quoted w i t h evident approval by English writers, and may w e l l be still influential. I have examined it very closely, as Pannenberg's reputation demands, and have concluded w i t h reluctance that, although he makes some good points, his conclusions as to the philosophers' views o f God's nature and their influence, are incoherent, i f not self-contradictory The critical tone o f my paper cannot be mistaken; but no answer has reached me, either (so far as I am aware) i n print or by private communication; for that matter, Pannenberg's essay itself remained virtually unchallenged, apart f r o m the indignant ('temper amentvolV) reply b y Professor de Vogel and an excellent short summary by Professor Ritter The paper is complex, but ends with a summary w h i c h states m y own conclusions i n simple terms The third essay considers the testimony concerning Paul o f Samosata, Bishop o f Antioch, 260-268 Paul is conventionally written off as a heretic, but on two quite different grounds: first, that he was an Adoptionist, holding that Jesus Christ was a mere man, inspired like other good men by the H o l y Spirit (according to Eusebius H.E.I 29, 'he strutted about i n the abominable heresy o f Attemas'); alternatively, that he was a Sabellian, denying that G o d is a real Trinity o f Persons What is certain is that he was an able disputant, and was only dislodged f r o m his see by a powerful group of Alexandrian-type theologians, who had to engage a professional rhetorician named Malchion to put their case. They gained the upper hand; Paul was condemned and discredited; and the
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Paulianists, his professed followers, had very little influence But how much do we really k n o w of his teaching? Eusebius does not report it in detail, though he expatiates on Paul's alleged misconduct B u t he does tell us that Paul's debate w i t h M a l c h i o n was taken down by stenographers, in w h i c h case it may have been accessible i n Eusebius' time However, an essay by the redoubtable Marcel Richard has argued that 'stenographers' is a mistranslation; they were in fact simply 'spies', w h o gave their o w n version o f his teaching I give evidence to show that Richard himself has mistranslated the critical term, and that Eusebius really d i d report that stenogr aphers were present, In that case we can make a slightly more confident approach to the 'fragments' of Paul, especially those drawn from the debate w i t h Malchion, i n which he seems to speak for himself The whole material has been carefully edited by G Bardy, and again by Henri de Riedmatten, w h o argues for its substantial authenticity. I think myself that Paul was a much more interesting theologian than his detractors allege. This is too complex a question to be considered i n detail here; but it does involve a problem o f the highest theological importance, namely the divinity of our L o r d , and the question whether his real human sufferings impair, or contrariwise reveal, that divinity Moreover, the victory o f the Alexandrian party had momentous consequences for the shaping of Christian doctrine They were concerned above all things to uphold the Tohannine avowal that Hhe Word became flesh'; the complementary truth that 'God sent his Son, born of a woman, born under the L a w ' was to them o f less account. They were thus inclined to argue that the acknowledged sufferings of Christ were something external to his real nature; Tesus had no natural human soul; its place was taken by the i n d w e l l ing W o r d ; i n Athanasius' phrasing, his sufferings impinged only on his flesh The absence o f a human soul was clearly stated by Apollinaris, and officially condemned; but i n Cyril of Alexandria and others this human soul was given little more than formal recognition; Christ had one nature only, and that was divine Thus the Monophysites obtained a commanding position in the Eastern church; the Chalcedonian doctrine of Christ as 'true God and true man', o f two natures united i n this single individual ('hypostasis'), was either rejected or so much diluted in the interests of concord that its significance was lost. The Monophysites drew away some of the best elements i n the Eastern church, and the schism still continues in being. I n the f o l l o w i n g pages you w i l l f i n d five essays devoted to Ar ius, five to Athanasius, and five to Augustine This neat and symmetrical arrangement is i n fact misleading, since the fortunes o f A t ius and of Athanasius are closely connected Right down to c 1950 it was customary to treat Athanasius as a fully trustworhy source for the period f r o m 318 to 3 73, when he died aged about 75 years Modern scholarship has brought about a reassessment of his conduct, his controversial politics and even of his theology; while his conception o f Arius, and o f the theologians w h o m he scornfully nick-named 'Ariomaniacs' is now
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seen to be prejudiced and misconceived Even Athanasius' defenders have accepted his 'forceful' treatment of the opposing party. Many modern scholars go much further. Richard Hanson, in a lively survey of fourth-century theology ('The attainment o f orthodoxy in the Fourth Century A D ' , in The Making of Orthodoxy: Festschrift in Honour of Henry Chadwick, ed Rowan Williams) refers to his 'unscrupulous violence', highlighted by two papyrus letters discovered i n the 1920s (ibid , p 151) A n d the so-called 'Ariomaniacs' were i n fact a diffuse collection o f theologians w h o distrusted the Nicene term 'consubstantial', homoousios, as suggesting an identity o f the Father and the Son, and who expressly stated that they were not followers of Arius Further, my o w n studies have shown that even where Athanasius' theology was sound - and i t very often is so - the arguments he used against these opponents often rely upon ambiguous phrases and faulty inference; this w i l l be shown i n paper s V I and V I I of this collection Perhaps his pr incipal weakness as a theologian was to share the perspective o f the 'Alexandrians' already mentioned; his occasional r efer ences to Chr ist's human soul are quite insufficient to make his position clear M y papers X I I and X I I I have some bearing on this subject 'Insufficient' because his attribution of the Lord's sufferings to his 'flesh', understood i n a broad sense, ignores the agony o f mind which the Gospels attest, and makes him far too much like a Stoic sage A n d in any case the two passages which have been quoted i n his favour only hint indirectly at a soul; w h i l e Athanasius' alleged authorship o f the Contra Apollinarem has been disproved by m y o w n review o f George Dragas's edition {Journal of Theological Studies 39 [1988], 250-53). Needless to say, much o f Athanasius' teaching is very good indeed; his little w o r k on the Incarnation has always been acclaimed as a masterpiece The next two pieces, nos I V and V, deal w i t h A r i u s ' theology, but in very different idioms. N o I V is a fairly straightforward examination o f A r i u s ' teaching as it appears to me; it was written to be delivered at Mainz, at Gerhard M a y ' s k i n d suggestion, and was repeated b y invitation at Heidelberg and Marburg No. V is a detailed critique o f the remarkable theory proposed, w i t h all due caution, by D r Rowan Williams, to the effect that Arius was an up-to-the minute student o f the Neoplatonists, including even his near-contemporary Iamblichus, as w e l l as Porphyry Despite m y admiration for Dr W i l l i a m s ' wideranging scholarly and devotional works, I have to say that the evidence he propounds for this particular view is w h o l l y inadequate The next two essays consider two A r i a n pronouncements w h i c h were held up for ridicule by 'orthodox' theologians, f o l l o w i n g Athanasius I have argued that both the phr ases attr ibuted to A r i u s ar e patient o f a number of different interpretations; and there is no evidence at all that Ar ius understood them i n the objectionable sense, or senses, fathered upon them by his critics The first is a fairly simple point; the Bible represents God as speaking to his people o n many different occasions, and o f course using different phrases as the occasion
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demands There is no evidence that A l i u s himself thought that the divine Word was comparable to these occasional pronouncements; on the contrary, though he states that the Word was created, in accordance w i t h Proverbs 8:22 L X X , he clearly regarded him as an 'only-begotten Son', to be described in Isaiah's phrase as 'mighty G o d ' , though personally distinct f r o m 'the God' and Father o f all, as w e l l as flom all other creatures and words The next piece, no V I I , is longer and more substantial The phrase that the W o r d is ' f r o m nothing' is capable o f various meanings; several o f these were used in malam partem by critics intent upon showing that A r i u s ' teaching was blasphemous or absurd In my opinion, b y far the most likely meaning o f the phrase as used by Arius conveyed the doctrine that the Word, being in a carefully guarded sense 'a creature', was not created by God's imposition of order on a pre-existing unformed matter, as several Greek philosophers had held; rather, in the beginning, before time began, only God the Father existed This doctrine resembles that taught by Irenaeus, and by Tertullian (in the beginning God was Deus, but was not Dominus, since there was nothing for him to dominate) B y A r i u s ' time i t had become accepted doctrine that God created ex nihilo. A n d the doctrine that the Son was coeternal w i t h H i m , though widely accepted, had not yet become a requirement for orthodox belief. Even the Nicene Creed o f 3 8 1 , which we commonly use today, contents itself w i t h the phrase 'begotten of his Father before all w o r l d s ' ; not, o f course, the rendering 'eternally begotten o f the Father', which has been ignorantly intruded into the Creed by the authors of the Anglican Alternative Service Book There is thus a good deal o f evidence that A r i u s ' teaching has been m a l i ciously caricatured by his opponents, though I do not o f course think it defensible in toto; also that his treatment, and that of his followers by Athanasius and his adherents, was harsh and unchristian I sought to express this opinion in simple and dramatic terms by a piece o f pure invention; though I could also say that it has precedents in the practice o f ancient historians, who even when they knew what was actually said on a given occasion were often prepared to substitute a composition of their own, reflecting their own awareness o f the speaker's character and circumstances M y little piece does not even profess to report what Arius, or an Arian, said on any particular occasion; but I think I have expressed his opinions as discovered f r o m a careful study o f what was said of him, especially by Athanasius in his De Synodh; and have given f u l l references to the relevant passages. This piece was delivered at a session of the Patristic Seminar at Cambridge, and was well received; though my intention o f reading it w i t h a perfectly dead-pan expression was not sufficiently w e l l maintained to take in the more alert o f my hear er s, whose suspicions in any case should have been aroused by my failure to indicate the provenance o f the supposed A n a n document I had hoped the proverb dulce est desipere in loco w o u l d suffice to teveal my intentions to my readers; but it seems that truth w o r n lightly is less familiar in
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Germany, for example, than I had thought; German scholars are accustomed to discuss a serious subject w i t h unrelieved gravity, at least in print, though in spoken lectures and in conversation they can display a delightful humour Nos I X and X I are short pieces both written by invitation for conferences, and can I think be left to speak for themselves The case is different with the more controversial no X M y close stylistic examination of the letters'Evöq ocoumof; and ' H
%f\ which brings out its decisive theological importance as affirming a common humanity w i t h ours From this point on I pass to consider the evidence o f the Expositio in Psalmos, which had long been accepted as an authentic work o f St Athanasius I had not realised that it had
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been shown very recently by Dr Gilles Dor ival that this w o r k must assigned to a fifth-century author, as noted i n Paper X I I I . Nevertheless, I had no. X I I reprinted, as the w o r k i n question had never, I think, received a f u l l examination In the next paper I returned to this subject, but here m y main emphasis falls on the undoubtedly authentic Ephtula ad Marcellinum M o s t o f this, I confess, strikes me as rather prosy and unoriginal; but chapters 27-9 are interesting, first as showing some acquaintance w i t h Plato's so-called doctrine o f a tripartite soul, which does not appear elsewhere; and secondly as indicating Athanasius' attitude to the use o f music i n worship. Singing he regards as completely acceptible as pointing to 'the rhythmical and tranquil condition of the m i n d ' , but he refuses to endorse the Psalter's robust acceptance of trumpets, shawms and the like The references to a well-tuned orchestra become for h i m a symbol o f the proper coordination o f our thoughts, though his br i e f reference to symbolic interpretation falls far short o f the elabor ation o f this theme by the author o f the Expositiones. Paper X I V deals w i t h Gregory of Nyssa's theology of the f t inity I need not return to his argument in its general lines, which is convincing enough; but there is r o o m for some further comment on the remarkable claim put forward i n the treatise 'On N o t Three Gods', also k n o w n as the Epistle to Cledonius The Father is God, the Son is God, and the H o l y Ghost is God, says Gregory, and yet we do not confess three Gods, but one God He uses the analogy o f thr ee men, say Peter, Paul and John; we commonly speak o f them as thr ee men; but i n a correct use of language, we should speak of them as one man, since their manhood is one and the same I have to say that m y careful examination of Gregory's argument has convinced me that it has all the attributes o f a philosopher's paradox, putting forward a case which we w o u l d not dream of accepting i f i t were concerned w i t h common life and not w i t h transcendent realities According to his argument, we could infer quite properly that every chariot is a one-horse chariot, since wher e ther e seem to be t w o , both o f them ar e in fact one hor se, i f we take 'one' in its proper sense as indicating unity o f species Or again, that the plural number, and indeed numerals themselves, can now be dispensed with M y objection would of course fail i f we could show that in Gregory's view, when we refer to to divine realities, our ordinary logic w i l l not apply But I do not think this is the case; he seems to found his argument on perfectly general considerations o f correct usage, though he also makes the point that the Bible itself adopts an incorrect usage as a concession to our human frailty. B u t there is an even more disturbing aspect o f Gregory's argument, remaining strictly w i t h i n the theological field I f we agree that, f o l l o w i n g the correct use of language, three men are really one man, should we not apply the same principle to the three divine Persons? In that case, while Gregory attempts to rebut the charge that he is a tritheist, his argument also proves him a Sabellian! The best answer, I think, is to say that his case is established on quite different,
theological considerations; the appeal to logic is a mere façade But I do not for a moment suppose that Gregory himself saw it i n this light; much more probably, he saw it as a triumphant vindication of his position, and many orthodox scholars have contentedly followed his lead
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Gregory has of course a reply to the objectionable inference about the divine Persons He argues that they differ in their mode o f origination. But this cannot be sufficient; there would be no point in different modes o f origination i f they produced mere replicas o f the original Source We have to admit that the Persons, while equal in dignity, have different functions So much can be said by way of summary M y argument, as I said, is a challenge to orthodox opinion B u t perhaps I could say that even such a very careful scholar, and fervent admirer o f Gregory, as Dr Andreas Spira, wrote to me privately about my essay as first printed, expressing his regretful acceptance o f my view Augustine is the subject o f nos X V to X X . Once again, I have included a relatively simple piece to begin w i t h , though i t also deals w i t h a concept that is both central and highly abstract i n its verbal expression, but embodies the paradox that the abstract term in fact names the fullness o f concrete existence and life N o X V I is more technical, but once again we meet the Platonic paradox that the highest reality must be all-embracing as well as unique Mar ius Victorinus shows us one possible reductio ad abautdum o f this view; conceptual generality is in itself a mark o f higher status and authority Augustine takes a bolder and more original line: Platonism is for him a useful ally to theology, but not a master to be slavishly followed; the concept of divine Being has always to be modified in accordance w i t h the teaching o f H o l y Scripture Much the same w i l l apply to the doctrine of divine simplicity, on w h i c h I shall comment i n no. X X I I . N o X V I I took shape as a talk deliver ed to a cultivated but mostly nonspecialist audience I have included it since to m y knowledge there has been no full-scale study o f Augustine's cosmology I enjoyed w r i t i n g i t , and i t was well received The text under discussion was Augustine's third attempt to comment in detail on the Book of Genesis, but the only one to approach the obvious difficulty of reconciling the Hebrew concept o f the world's beginning with his fairly considerable knowledge of Greek science in his day The reader w i l l see at once that he has set himself an intractable problem i n trying to harmonize them; but despite his deference to the literal sense o f Scripture he realises the importance o f trying to do so, and defends himself against the all too common charge o f idle curiosity The reader, I think, w i l l seldom be convinced but w i l l always be fascinated by his ingenuity. N o X V I I I and deals w i t h the De Magistro, T'heMaster, in whichAugustine sets out his views on human language and especially the use o f statements in imparting knowlege His teaching, as I note, has been summarily condemned by D r C A K i r w a n , but has been defended i n great detail b y no less an authority than Professor Myles Burnyeat in his Inaugural Address to the Aristotelian So-
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ciety, 1987 Burnyeat's article seems to me extraordinarily valuable i f one wishes to learn something of the truth about the theory o f meaning On the other hand, he seems to be attributing to Augustine views which no competent teacher would dream of expounding i f he were w r i t i n g for an intelligent p u p i l on the level, say, of Adeodatus. I n fact I should be surprised i f Burnyeat's own paper, as a spoken lecture, could have been followed even b y the extremely sophisticated and wellinformed members o f the Aristotelian Society For present purposes, I must be content to write far more simply, though 1 think I shall be on safe ground in dismissing Dr Kirwan's view I am not convinced by Burnyeat's suggestion that in his early chapters (down to 11 36) Augustine deliberately incorporates some mistakes w h i c h the alert reader w i l l recognise; he does not suggest any parallel i n Augustine for this extremely demanding procedure Thus I am not convinced by his suggestion (p 8, c f my X V I I I , p 1, note) that Augustine makes a clear division between purely dialectical suggestions and his o w n vision o f the truth, since in the sec ond section there are patent fallacies w h i c h he does not try to correct M y own opinion is that, despite some useful clarifications, Augustine has never shaken o f f the fatal attraction of the view that all words are names; see, e g 11 36, 'words b i d us look for things' He does not see that some words can only be understood by their function, in the context o f a sentence, of modifying the meaning of other word-groups; ' i f and 'not' are obvious examples But I can not, İn the limits of this Introduction, develop my views on so complex a sub ject, even i f I were capable o f doing so Professor Rist, writing more simply for the non-specialist, seems to de fend the view, deriving f r o m Porphyry, that all statements can be seen as the conjunction o f a subject and a predicate. I f 'predicate' here means simply 'some thing other than the subject', this is uninformative; but since Porphyry seems to take 'predicate' as having the force o f an adjective, his view fails to explain an enormous number o f ordinary statements; I have cited 'a man learns', but per haps a clearer example is 'the Queen was in the garden'; this does not tell us who or what the Queen was, i.e 'the disambiguating features of the subject', but where she was; and though it is true that it tells us something about the Queen, i t is equally true that it tells us something about the garden; that is where the Queen was For the rest, my paper must speak for itself N o X I X , again, seems fairly straightforward It does of course advert to the controversial question o f Augustine's knowledge o f Platonism, We are t o l d that (his) 'fust-hand knowlege o f Plato was confined to the portion o f the Timaeus translated by Cicero', and that 'he refers to the Meno often enough' but does not know o f it in detail, relying instead on Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, I 57-8 - so Burnyeat, op c i t , p 22, n 30 But a footnote cannot convey the proper sense o f a well-stocked mind accustomed to thrashing out his ideas in discus sion; the scissors-and-paste approach inevitably suggested in this context is w h o l l y alien to his m i n d
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I might perhaps have added a further w o r d on memory I remember being puzzled by Augustine's comprehensive use o f the word, which I myself had always understood in a more specific sense B u t in the modern w o r l d , where 'memory' names a vital function o f computers and word-processors, there is no need to be puzzled; though our computers have not as yet developed anything very like the sorting-out process which I have attributed to the subconscious m i n d , or even to vague and ill-defined memories On such questions, Augustine is far ahead o f his time. N o X X was delivered at Pamplona to a conference o f theologians dis cussing St Gregory o f Nyssa's work directed against the extreme Arian Eunomius Eunomius was a thorough going rationalist who held, inter alia, that the Greek w o r d aTEVVTiTOt;, 'ingenerate', 'having no beginning', was the sole and all-suf ficient designation that could be used to name the divine nature But m y essay has to take the form suggested by its title, namely an examination o f the theories o f names in the philosophical tradition which was available to Gregory, though I t h i n k very inadequately explored or criticized by him D i d names correspond w i t h the nature o f what they represented, or were they merely the products of social convention? In the former case, did they in some way picture the realities they represented? H o w were they chosen? - could one imagine some anony mous 'name-giver', who fulfils the function assigned to A d a m in Genesis 2:19¬ 20? I then come to the distinct question whether God himself can be named; but before this can get o f f the ground, I have to give some space to the w o r d eni'vota, w h i c h is used for the 'designations' applied to God's activities, assuming that there are many such activities which can be distinguished and named, as against the one mysterious divine nature, to w h i c h no name can be given. This discus sion to some extent overlaps w i t h no X X I , which gives further thought to the concept o f divine simplicity M y researches seemed to indicate that the word ETtivoia had not been adequately discussed; whereas ojikov^c,, the w o r d com monly used for 'simplicity', had been interpreted only in a moral sense, the 'sincerity' or 'unaffectedness' displayed by good men Returning to paper X X , I return to the problem that the O l d Testament teaches variously that God himself cannot be named, and that He himself has indicated his name; though later Jewish tradition came to hold that the proper name Mahweh' was too sacred to be pronounced, so that in reading the Scrip tures, where the reader w o u l d f i n d the purely consonantal spelling I H W H , he w o u l d pronounce the w o r d Adonai, 'my L o r d ' ; so that later Latin authors re ferred to God by the composite name ' Jehovah'. More generally, I note that a proper name is not necessarily a-personal name, as was often assumed In con clusion I refer to the theories of Eunomius himself, who seems to suggest that the actual word a y t w r i T O ^ is indispensable for sound theology The objection is obvious: i f the actual Greek w o r d must be used, only a Greek-speaker can formulate a sound theology; but i f translation is allowable, an element o f inter pretation cannot be avoided M o r e generally, while Eunomius, like his elder
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colleague Aetius, had some merits as a logician, his theology has the defect of eliminating any element of mystery f r o m our conception of the Godhead, as w e l l as making the divine Son and Spirit 'unlike' and thus inferior to the Father No.. X X I returns to the words anhSvi\q and sjuvotoc, mentioned above. I think m y discussion can be followed without further comment; but i f space had allowed I w o u l d have liked to mention the very interesting position adopted by Augustine, who assents to the traditional doctr ine o f divine simplicity, but is far f r o m endorsing the extreme position adopted by Plotinus. Augustine has a considerable debt to Plotinus, amply documented in the footnotes to Henry Chadwick's translation of the Confessions; but he is far f r o m adopting the view that the highest principle, as a perfect unity, can neither think nor be thought, since either activity would import a duality o f subject and predicate Plotinus apparently was not satisfied by the answer that perfect knowledge implies a perfect identification o f the knower and the thing known B u t this is not Augustine's method of argument Rather, where there is an irremovable conflict beween the inferences o f philosophy and the deliverances o f Holy Scripture, we must be guided by the divine Word Thus God must be fully personal; he must love us himself, and not delegate this divine work. Every line o f Augustine recalls us to this tremendous mystery CHRISTOPHER STEAD Haddenham, February
Cambridgeshire 2000
Greek Influence on Christian Thought C h r i s t i a n i t y was f i r s t p r e a c h e d as an i n v i t a t i o n t o accept Jesus as L o r d ; his c o m i n g was seen as t h e f u l f i l m e n t o f G o d ' s purpose f o r the h u m a n race. B u t t h e earliest preachers c o u l d take for g r a n t e d a belief i n G o d ' s existence a n d his p r o v i d e n c e , already w e l l r e c o g n i z e d in J u d a i s m W h e n t h e C h u r c h began t o expand i n t o non-Jewish societies, i t m e t w i t h e n q u i r e r s w h o d o u b t e d or d e n i e d such beliefs, a n d was f o r c e d t o d e f e n d t h e m b y a r g u m e n t ; St L u k e presents an e a r l y stage o f t h i s d e v e l o p m e n t i n Acts 17 1 6 f f , w h e r e St Paul e n c o u n t e r s E p i c u r e a n and S t o i c p h i l o s o p h e r s B y t h e second cent u r y , C h r i s t i a n w r i t e r s had b e g u n t o restate their f a i t h as a c o h e r e n t t h e o l o g y , d r a w i n g l a r g e l y u p o n G r e e k t h o u g h t , w h i c h was b y far the m o s t i m p o r t a n t i n t e l l e c t u a l i n f l u e n c e o n t h e R o m a n E m p i r e , and i n d e e d since t h e Renaissance has r e i n v i g o r a t e d our o w n a r t , science and p h i l o s o p h y . T h e G r e e k s ' m o s t creative p e r i o d can be r o u g h l y d e f i n e d as 5 0 0 - 2 0 0 B C B y e a r l y C h r i s t i a n times t h e y had b e c o m e less b o l d and e x p e r i m e n t a l , m o r e accustomed to i m i t a t e classical m o d e l s , and m o r e i n c l i n e d t o w a r d s r e l i g i o n ; atheism and scepticism w e r e still t a u g h t , b u t w e r e less p o p u l a r i n a society w h i c h s o u g h t reassurance N e v e r t h e l e s s G r e e k c u l t u r e r e t a i n e d an a t t r a c t i o n a n d power w h i c h c a n n o t be a p p r e c i a t e d w i t h o u t some u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f i t s great classical masterpieces. A m o n g t h e G r e e k s t h e visual ar ts w e r e better developed t h a n their m u s i c , w h i c h r e m a i n e d v e r y s i m p l e ; and t h e i r s c u l p t u r e was far m o r e impressive t h a n t h e i r p a i n t i n g . E a r l y C h r i s t i a n m o n u m e n t s echo c o n t e m p o r a r y G r a e c o - R o m a n styles, i n f l u e n c e d b y t h e great G r e e k masterpieces o f t h e f o u r t h c e n t u r y BC; t h u s the earliest p o r t r a i t s of C h r i s t d e p i c t h i m as a h a n d s o m e y o u t h n o t u n l i k e t h e G r e e k A p o l l o T h e severe lines o f the later B y z a n t i n e p o r t r a i t s , h o w e v e r , owe s o m e t h i n g t o G r a e c o - R o m a n p a i n t i n g s l i k e those discovered at
Greek
P o m p e i i G r e e k a r c h i t e c t u r e also m a d e its c o n t r i b u t i o n ; t h e earliest large C h r i s t i a n churches w e r e rectangular p i l l a r e d halls, r e s e m b l i n g t h e secular 'basilica' ( l a w - c o u r t and c o m m e r c i a l exchange). L a t e r examples a d o p t e d the d i s t i n c t i v e R o m a n use o f arches a n d d o m e s , w h i c h was finely e x p l o i t e d i n t h e B y z a n t i n e p e r i o d . G r e e k l i t e r a t u r e d i d n o t always appeal t o C h r i s t i a n w r i t e r s . T h e y o f t e n profess t o despise fine w r i t i n g ; and o f course t h e G r e e k s had p r o d u c e d , inter alia, b a w d y comedies and e r o t i c l y r i c s w h i c h w e r e offensive t o serious m e n . C h r i s t i a n s m a d e use o f t h e G r e e k o r a t o r s for t r a i n i n g preachers, a n d o f t h e h i s t o r i a n s , t o s u p p l e m e n t t h e b i b l i c a l narratives; b u t t h e great G r e e k dramatists w e r e u n d e r v a l u e d , as p r e s e n t i n g t h e gods i n h u m a n guise T h e a t t i t u d e o f St C y p r i a n is i n s t r u c t i v e ; o n b e c o m i n g a b i s h o p he t h r e w away his p a g a n b o o k s , and pr ofessed t h a t he o w e d n o t h i n g t o p a g a n i s m , w h i l e c o n t i n u i n g t o w r i t e t h e i m p e c c a b l e f o r m a l prose w h i c h he had l e a r n t f r o m his pagan schoolmasters T e r t u l l i a n , J e r o m e a n d o t h e r s s h o w a s i m i l a r c o m b i n a t i o n o f affected d i s d a i n w i t h actual indebtedness. B u t such attitudes w e r e n o t u n k n o w n i n t h e p a g a n w o r l d P a g a n teachers w o u l d i n t r o d u c e t h e i r charges t o t h e great G r e e k classics, especially t h e p o e t r y o f H o m e r ; b u t t h e y a p p r o a c h e d t h e m i n t h e serious, q u e s t i o n i n g f r a m e o f m i n d t h a t was c o m m o n i n late a n t i q u i t y , t r e a t i n g t h e H o m e r i c p o e m s as i n s t r u c t i v e w o r k s , i n d e e d as actually i n t e n d e d t o c o n v e y lessons a b o u t h u m a n l i f e a n d d e s t i n y w h i c h t h e c a r e f u l s t u d e n t c o u l d d e t e c t T h e p h i l o s o p h e r s also w e r e o f course c o n s u l t e d for m o r a l and r e l i g i o u s g u i d a n c e ; b u t whereas P l a t o , for example, w r o t e m a n y o f his dialogues i n a v e i n o f l i g h t - h e a r t e d , t e n t a t i v e e n q u i r y , his f o l l o w e r s u s u a l l y r e g a r d t h e m as a n a u t h o r i t a t i v e text i n w h i c h a p p a r e n t inconsistencies m u s t be explained away. O n e reason for t h i s was t h e i m p o r t a n c e w h i c h p a g a n educators attached t o r h e t o r i c , t h e a r t o f persuasion and p u b l i c speaking, w h e r e s e l f - c o n t r a d i c t i o n is a f a u l t t o be a v o i d e d at a n y cost C h r i s t i a n s a c c o r d i n g l y m a d e strenuous e f f o r t s t o present t h e B i b l e as an i n s p i r e d b o o k , consistent and h a r m o n i o u s i n all its parts. W h a t w e r e g a r d as crude and p r i m i t i v e ideas expressed i n t h e O l d T e s t a m e n t c o u l d be defused b y s p i r i t u a l i z i n g i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s l i k e those i n v e n t e d b y h i g h - m i n d e d expositors o f H o m e r
Influence on Christian
Thought
1 5 . 1 8 f f ) . A first-century c o m m e n t a t o r explains t h a t 'the w o r d s of Z e u s t o H e r a are t h e w o r d s o f G o d t o m a t t e r ' ; h e t r a n s f o r m s the w r o n g e d h u s b a n d i n t o a s u p r e m e creator w h o imposes restr aints o n m a t t e r t o p r o d u c e an o r d e r l y w o r l d T h e m e t h o d o f a l l e g o r y g r e w up at A l e x a n d r i a and was already a p p l i e d t o S c r i p t u r e b y t h e Greeks p e a k i n g Jewish aristocrat P h i l o , w h o d i e d t A D 50 O r i g e n , w h o r e c o r d s t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f Zeus and H e r a , {Against Celsus 6 42, w r i t t e n c. A D 250) uses s i m i l a r m e t h o d s t o e x p l a i n p u z z l i n g or o b j e c t i o n a b l e passages o f S c r i p t u r e ; m a n y examples are g i v e n i n his On First Principles, 4. 3 B u t i t was G r e e k p h i l o s o p h y t o w h i c h C h r i s t i a n t h o u g h t was c h i e f l y i n d e b t e d ' P h i l o s o p h y ' means ' t h e love o f w i s d o m ' ; i n ancient t i m e s i t i n c l u d e d a great v a r i e t y o f subjects w h i c h are nowadays r e g a r d e d as separate disciplines I n e a r l y C h r i s t i a n times i t was c o n v e n t i o n a l l y d i v i d e d i n t o t h r e e d e p a r t m e n t s : l o g i c , e t h i c s , and physics ' L o g i c ' a n d 'ethics' m e a n t r o u g h l y w h a t t h e y m e a n today, despite d r a m a t i c d e v e l o p m e n t s i n b o t h subjects i n the last h u n d r e d years. E t h i c s i n A r i s t o t l e ' s day h a d i n c l u d e d p o l i t i c a l science a n d the g e r m o f e c o n o m i c s , b u t these had l i t t l e interest f o r later t h i n k e r s . 'Physics' was a general t e r m for t h e s t u d y o f t h e universe; i t i n c l u d e d all t h a t was t h e n k n o w n o f physics p r o p e r , c o s m o l o g y , a s t r o n o m y , g e o g r a p h y , b i o l o g y , p s y c h o l o g y , and t h e o l o g y t o o , for those w h o believed i n d i v i n e a c t i o n a f f e c t i n g t h e w o r l d . W e s h o u l d also notice t w o studies closely a l l i e d to p h i l o s o p h y , b u t n o t n o r m a l l y r e c k o n e d as b e l o n g i n g t o i t , n a m e l y m e d i c i n e a n d mathematics. T h e s e had l i t t l e d i r e c t i n f l u e n c e o n C h r i s t i a n t h o u g h t , b u t t h e sheer b r i l l i a n c e o f G r e e k m a t h e m a t i c s i n p a r t i c u l a r c o m p e l s our a t t e n t i o n
O n e f a v o u r i t e m e t h o d a m o n g o t h e r s was t o t r e a t t h e o f f e n d i n g passage as an a l l e g o r y T h u s H o m e r describes the h i g h g o d Z e u s r e m i n d i n g his c o n s o r t H e r a o f her a d u l t e r y w i t h t h e f i r e - g o d Hephaestus, for w h i c h she was b o u n d i n g o l d e n chains {Iliad
L o g i c was v i r t u a l l y t h e c r e a t i o n o f A r i s t o t l e , w h o was also accepted as t h e p r i m a r y a u t h o r i t y u n t i l w e l l o n i n the n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y C h r i s t i a n w r i t e r s t e n d e d to c r i t i c i z e his minutiloquium, his obsession w i t h exact d e t a i l ; and i t is c e r t a i n l y t r u e t h a t the m i n o r i t y o f t h e o l o g i a n s w h o d i d t r y t o a d o p t his m e t h o d s , b y expr essing their t e a c h i n g as a series o f syllogisms, make n o t a b l y d i s m a l r e a d i n g . T h e reason is n o t t h a t C h r i s t i a n t e a c h i n g is necessarily i l l o g i c a l , but rather t h a t l o g i c a l m e t h o d r e q u i r e s exact d e f i n i t i o n and consistent use of t e r m s ; and t h i s is h a r d t o achieve w h e r e r e l i g i o u s t r u t h s have been expressed i n p o e t i c language or i n m e t a p h o r s d r a w n f r o m everyday l i f e I t is especially m i s l e a d i n g if, o n a p r e t e x t o f exact d e f i n i t i o n , one represents a n c i e n t w r i t e r s as a r g u i n g for o r against a p r o p o s i t i o n d e f i n e d i n c o n t e m p o r a r y t e r m s T h e better course was
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I Greek Influence on Christian Thought t o p a y a t t e n t i o n t o t h e uses o f m e t a p h o r ; and her e t h e G r eek liter a r y c r i t i c s and their L a t i n i m i t a t o r s c o u l d o f f e r valuable g u i d a n c e . B u t t h e w a y was c o n s t a n t l y b l o c k e d b y t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t t h e B i b l e m u s t be a w h o l l y consistent and u n i f o r m l y u p l i f t i n g t e x t , r ather t h a n t h e legacy o f m a n y d i f f e r e n t w r i t e r s o f d i f f e r e n t p e r i o d s and d i f f e r e n t levels o f c u l t u r e , as we t e n d t o see i t today. G r e e k ethics, i n e a r l y C h r i s t i a n t i m e s , u s u a l l y assumes a d i s t i n c tive t h e o r y o f h u m a n nature. M o s t p h i l o s o p h e r s , P y t h a g o r e a n s , P l a t o n i s t s and m a n y Stoics, h e l d t h a t consciousness arises w i t h i n t h e s o u l , a personal b e i n g w h i c h can f u n c t i o n i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f t h e b o d y a n d survives its d e a t h (whereas for t h e H e b r e w s t h e so-called ' s o u l ' is a n i m p e r s o n a l a n i m a t i n g p r i n c i p l e , a n d consciousness can o n l y arise w i t h i n a n a n i m a t e d b o d y ) . Y e t P l a t o suggested t w o d i s t i n c t l y d i f f e r e n t pictures o f t h e soul. T h e Phaedo sees i t as essentially c o n c e r n e d w i t h higher truths, i n contrast w i t h the distracted pleasure-loving b o d y ; b u t t h e Republic describes i t as h a v i n g t h r e e p a r t s , o f w h i c h o n l y t h e highest, t h e m i n d or i n t e l l e c t , is capable o f real v i r t u e ; i t is t h e d i r e c t i v e p r i n c i p l e w h i c h our e m o t i o n s a n d impulses o u g h t t o o b e y Plato's s t r o n g l y idealized v i e w o f t h e i n t e l l e c t w i l l h a r d l y c o n v i n c e us m o d e r n s ; we see t o o c l e a r l y t h a t t h e i n t e l l e c t i t s e l f can be misused or c o r r u p t e d M o r e o v e r i t d i s t o r t e d t h e C h r i s t i a n m o r a l t r a d i t i o n . St P a u l , t h o u g h he spoke o f a n t a g o n i s m b e t w e e n flesh and s p i r i t ( G a l 5.17), accepted self-denial f o r t h e sake o f his m i s s i o n ( P h i l 4.12) w i t h o u t c o n d e m n i n g b o d i l y satisfactions; b u t later C h r i s t i a n s , l i k e m a n y pagans, o f t e n assumed t h a t t h e f i r s t step t o w a r d s m o r a l i m p r o v e m e n t was t o neglect t h e b o d y and c u l t i v a t e t h e m i n d C h a r i t y , i f i t m e a n t c o n c e r n for t h e bodily needs o f o t h e r s , was t h u s often undervalued C h r i s t i a n s m a d e o n l y a rather selective use o f t h e G r e e k m o r a l i s t s P l a t o was w i d e l y praised, for reasons w h i c h w i l l s o o n appear; e v e n so, his Republic caused o f f e n c e b y its e c c e n t r i c p r o g r a m m e f o r w o m e n i n society, as m e r e child-bearers w i t h o u t a t t a c h m e n t s either t o h u s bands or c h i l d r e n ; w h i l e his Symposium, a m a g n i f i c e n t defence o f physical love as a gateway t o h i g h e r affections, presupposed t h e G r e e k acceptance o f h o m o s e x u a l i t y . A r i s t o t l e , w h o w r o t e i m p o r t a n t treatises o n ethics, was c r i t i c i z e d f o r w h a t seemed an u n h e r o i c v i e w , t h a t p e r f e c t happiness r e q u i r e s some degree o f o u t w a r d p r o s p e r i t y ; also, less f a i r l y , for his c o n c e p t o f v i r t u e as a m i d d l e course b e t w e e n t w o o p p o s i t e failings (e.g.. c o w a r d i c e and rashness); t h i s ' d o c t r i n e o f t h e m e a n ' was o f t e n m i s c o n s t r u e d as i m p l y i n g o n l y a m o d e r a t e
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e n t h u s i a s m for v i r t u e T h e Stoics w e r e o f t e n t e d i o u s t o r e a d , and m o r e o v e r changed t h e i r g r o u n d ; the earlier Stoics preached a fierce a n d exclusive m o r a l i t y ; p e r f e c t w i s d o m was d e m a n d e d , a n d the slightest occasional lapse c o n d e m n e d ; a l l o t h e r supposed goods were c o n s i d e r e d w o r t h l e s s . B u t t h e later Stoics t o o k a m o r e m o d e r a t e v i e w : our n a t u r e , t h e y said, p r o m p t s us t o seek c e r t a i n advantages, s u c h as b o d i l y h e a l t h and t r a n q u i l l i t y ; these were n o t g o o d i n the absolute sense, y e t i t was ' p r e f e r a b l e ' t o seek t h e m , at least f o r other people. I t is t h i s later phase o f S t o i c ethics, w i t h its str ess o n c o m m o n duties, w h i c h i n f l u e n c e d St Paul's t e a c h i n g T h e r e was thus n o u n i v e r s a l l y a p p r o v e d a u t h o r i t y ; t h e most c o n v e n i e n t h a n d b o o k s were p r o b a b l y C i c e r o ' s p o p u l a r i z i n g L a t i n adaptations, w h i c h set various systems side b y side. A n d t h e f u r t h e r d i f f i c u l t y o f a m a l g a m a t i n g G r e e k and b i b l i c a l t e a c h i n g m e a n t that C h r i s t i a n ethics was s l o w t o d e v e l o p a c o h e r e n t f r a m e w o r k . T h e B i b l e p r o v i d e d s i m p l e f o l k w i t h d i v i n e laws and vir tuous examples T h e s e w e r e s u p p l e m e n t e d b y t h e d o c t r i n e , d e r i v e d f r o m t h e Stoics, o f a ' n a t u r a l law', w h i c h i m p l i e d t h a t a l l m e n have the same perc e p t i o n o f basic m o r a l duties (1 C o r 11.14); this i g n o r e d t h e actual evidence o f d i v e r s i t y a m o n g d i f f e r e n t races, and even suggested, a b s u r d l y , t h a t w r o n g d o e r s are adequately p u n i s h e d b y the agonies o f conscience t h a t t h e y are b o u n d t o feel B u t C h r i s t i a n Platonists t e n d e d t o define goodness as a r i g h t c h o i c e o f objectives; our affect i o n s m u s t be fixed o n t h e e t e r n a l rewards. I n d e e d A u g u s t i n e , f o r i n stance, tends t o suggest t h a t all o u r feelings are f o r m s o f a f f e c t i o n ; fear, e g. o f r o b b e r y , is r e a l l y a b y e - f o r m o f t h e love o f riches a n d ease M o r e o v e r t h e clash b e t w e e n P l a t o n i c a n d b i b l i c a l views o f t h e soul confused the C h r i s t i a n teaching o n the afterlife T h e Hebrews l o o k e d f o r w a r d t o a r e s u r r e c t i o n o f t h e b o d y ; o n l y so c o u l d c o n sciousness be r estor e d ; and i t w o u l d take place o n a day of j u d g e m e n t after a p e r i o d o f absolute non-existence, B u t C h r i s t i a n s t e n d e d (as m a n y s t i l l do) t o accept also t h e s u r v i v a l of t h e soul as Plato c o n c e i v e d i t , so t h a t consciousness c o n t i n u e s w i t h o u t i n t e r r u p t i o n b e y o n d t h e m o m e n t o f d e a t h ( c f L u k e 23.43) B u t g r a n t e d the p r o m i s e o f a f u l l y s u r v i v i n g consciousness, i t is h a r d t o see t h e p o i n t o f a subsequent r e s u r r e c t i o n o f t h e b o d y , w h i c h C h r i s t i a n s were b o u n d t o accept i n accordance w i t h t h e i r Creeds B e f o r e c o m i n g t o t h e c e n t r a l topics o f G r e e k p h i l o s o p h y , somet h i n g s h o u l d be said a b o u t t h e i r m a t h e m a t i c s T h e Greeks excelled h e r e t h r o u g h their intense i n t e r e s t i n s o l v i n g p r o b l e m s for t h e i r o w n 179
I Greek Influence on Christian Thought sake, i r r e s p e c t i v e o f a n y p r a c t i c a l value T h e i r g e o m e t r y , as f o r m u l a t e d b y E u c l i d (c 300 BC) h e l d t h e field u n t i l t h e n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y , a n d is s t i l l acceptable as a basic d i s c i p l i n e . I n a r i t h m e t i c t h e y achieved r e m a r k a b l e r esults despite t h e h a n d i c a p o f a c l u m s y system o f n u m e r a t i o n , u s i n g t h i r t y l e t t e r s o f t h e alphabet t o d e n o t e u n i t s , tens and h u n d r e d s u p t o 1000, w h e r e t h e system b e g a n t o repeat. C o n s e q u e n t l y , t o k n o w t h a t t w i c e t h r ee is six d i d n o t at o n c e i n d i c a t e h o w t o m u l t i p l y t w e n t y b y t h i r t y ; i t was as i f w e w r o t e t h e t w o sums as ' b x c = P and ' k x l = x'. T h e B i b l e , i n 1 K i n g s 7.23, states t h a t S o l o m o n m a d e a 'sea', or c e r e m o n i a l water-tank, t e n c u b i t s i n d i a m e t e r a n d t h i r t y c u b i t s r o u n d , thus i m p l y i n g t h a t t h e c o n s t a n t we k n o w as TT is 3.0. T h e G r eeks n o t o n l y k n e w t h a t i t was n o t a n exact w h o l e n u m b e r , b u t t h a t i t was n o t expressible b y any r a t i o o f w h o l e n u m b e r s : A r c h i m e d e s (c. 2 8 7 - 2 1 2 BC) c o m p u t e d i t b y a p p r o x i m a t i o n as b e t w e e n V/? a n d 3 / 7 i , i.e.. r o u g h l y b e t w e e n 3 142857 a n d 3.140845 M a n y f u r t h e r examples c o u l d be g i v e n , i f space a l l o w e d , 10
O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , t h e G r e e k s d i d n o t solve t h e m u c h m o r e d i f f i c u l t p r o b l e m o f t h e n a t u r e o f n u m b e r itself, w h i c h was e l u c i dated b y B e r t r a n d Russell some t i m e ago, I f I u n d e r s t a n d h i m r i g h t , t h e p r i m a r y f u n c t i o n o f n u m b e r s is t h a t b y w h i c h (e g.) w e ' n u m b e r o f f ' t h e houses i n a street; c a r d i n a l n u m b e r s , w h i c h w e use t o q u a n tify a group, depend o n the further operation o f ' s u m m i n g up' h o w m a n y houses w e have passed T h e G r e e k s , h o w e v e r , assumed t h a t t h e c a r d i n a l n u m b e r s w e r e p r i m a r y , and t h a t t h e w h o l e system o f n u m b e r s o r i g i n a t e d f r o m t h e ' m o n a d ' , t h e n u m b e r o n e ; their a r i t h m e t i c l a c k i n g a zero. M a t h e m a t i c a l l y m i n d e d p h i l o s o p h e r s such as P y t h a g o r as a n d his f o l l o w e r s c o u l d t h u s suppose t h a t t h e M o n a d was t h e source o f a l l r a t i o n a l order i n t h e universe; o r , p u t conversely, t h a t t h e creative p o w e r b e h i n d i t had t h e characteristics o f t h e M o n a d . T h i s p r o m p t e d C h r i s t i a n s t o t h i n k t h a t G o d m u s t be c o m p l e t e l y s i m p l e and s t r i c t l y i m m u t a b l e , a v i e w w h i c h s t i l l r e m a i n s t h e o f f i c i a l o r t h o d o x y , t h o u g h i t has r e c e n t l y c o m e i n for v i g o r o u s attacks T h i s d o c t r i n e o f G o d was c o m b i n e d , rather a w k w a r d l y , w i t h t h e b i b l i c a l p i c t u r e o f G o d as a creator and l o v i n g Father o f t h e w o r l d a n d m a n k i n d . P l a t o , m o r e o v e r , gave s u p p o r t t o this t h e o l o g y t h r o u g h an i n f l u e n t i a l d i a l o g u e , t h e Timaeus, w h i c h p i c t u r e s t h e c r e a t i o n o f t h e w o r l d b y a d i v i n e ' c r a f t s m a n ' or ' a r t i f i c e r ' I t was never clear w h e t h e r t h i s d i v i n i t y was m e a n t t o be t h e source o f all p e r f e c t i o n (as i n C h r i s t i a n i t y ) , or m e r e l y t o i m i t a t e some r e a l i t y
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h i g h e r t h a n h i m s e l f B u t Plato's w o r k was valued b y C h r i s t i a n s as c o n f i r m i n g t h e b i b l i c a l a c c o u n t o f the cr eation. Y e t w h e n G o d came t o be described i n m a t h e m a t i c a l t e r m s as s i m p l e a n d i m m u t a b l e , i t became less easy t o u n d e r s t a n d his p r o v i d e n t i a l care o f t h e w o r l d ; t h i s m u s t , i t w o u l d seem, r e q u i r e a d i v i n e m i n d w h i c h can a t t e n d t o m a n y d i f f e r e n t concerns C h r i s t i a n s t e n d e d to solve the p r o b l e m by d e v e l o p i n g St J o h n ' s c o n c e p t o f t h e d i v i n e W o r d or L o g o s i n a m a n n e r already f o r e s h a d o w e d b y t h e Stoics; G o d the F a t h e r was seen as w h o l l y t r a n s c e n d e n t ; h e exercised his p r o v i d e n t i a l care n o t d i r e c t l y , b u t t h r o u g h his L o g o s ; w h o is sometimes d e s c r i b e d , e g. b y A t h a n a s i u s , as a c t u a l l y p e r v a d i n g t h e physical w o r l d , and indeed i n h e r i t s t h e Father 's t i t l e o f ' C r a f t s m a n ' , demiourgos. G r e e k p h i l o s o p h y affected C h r i s t i a n i t y m o s t d i r e c t l y t h r o u g h the d e p a r t m e n t o f 'physics' t o g e t h e r w i t h t h e v e r y abstract s t u d y w h i c h came t o be called m e t a p h y s i c s . T h e e a r l y h i s t o r y o f this s u b j e c t is far t o o c o m p l e x t o be s u m m a r i z e d h e r e ; b u t we m a y n o t i c e t w o p h i l osophers earlier t h a n P l a t o w h o left t h e i r m a r k o n all subsequent thought P a r m e n i d e s (t 5 1 5 - 4 5 0 ) a t t e m p t e d t o deduce t h e n a t u r e o f the universe, b y p u r e l y l o g i c a l m e t h o d s , f r o m the n a t u r e o f b e i n g as s u c h H e t r e a t e d ' b e i n g ' as a s i m p l e c o n c e p t , a v i e w w h i c h logicians have n o w discarded; f o r i t can i n d i c a t e b o t h passing states ('he is i l l ' ) a n d i n v a r i a b l e facts ('he is a m a n ' ) ; or again, m e r e existence, as o p p o s e d t o fantasy; o r again t r u t h , as o p p o s e d t o falsehood ('that is so') B u t f o r P a r m e n i d e s these concepts w e r e i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e ; thus t h e necessities o f l o g i c r e q u i r e d t h a t t h e w o r l d , despite appearances, m u s t be u n c h a n g i n g , s i m p l e a n d c o m p a c t (for e m p t y space w o u l d i m p l y t h e c o n t r a d i c t i o n t h a t ' n o t - b e i n g is'). I n sharp c o n t r a s t H e r a c l i t u s (c. 5 4 4 - 4 8 4 ) saw the w o r l d as a p e r p e t u a l process o f change; b u t f a r s i g h t e d l y perceived t h a t this need n o t m a k e i t u n i n t e l l i g i b l e , since its changes take place i n an o r d e r l y sequence and i n p r i n c i p l e can be measured. T h e y were g o v e r n e d , he t h o u g h t , b y a 'logos', a c o n t r o l l i n g agency diffused t h r o u g h o u t t h e u n i v e r s e ; H e r a c l i t u s ' obscure language does n o t m a k e i t clear w h e t h e r this l o g o s s h o u l d be considered s i m p l y as a m a t h e m a t i c a l measure or r a t i o , or as a c o n t r o l l i n g mind.. P l a t o (t 4 2 9 - 3 4 7 ) was n o t impressed b y H e r a c l i t u s ' c l a i m that change can be measured. H e s o u g h t n o t o n l y m a t h e m a t i c a l but m o r a l t r u t h s , w h e r e i t is h a r d e r t o d i s t i n g u i s h o b j e c t i v e changes f r o m changes a n d u n c e r t a i n t i e s i n h u m a n j u d g e m e n t H e t h e r e f o r e saw 181
I
I Greek Influence on Christian Thought r e a l i t y or b e i n g {ousia) as t w o f o l d ; a n e t e r n a l w o r l d o f p e r f e c t F o r m s , p e r c e i v e d o n l y b y t h e m i n d , a n d t h e c o n f u s e d and changeable w o r l d o f p e r c e p t i b l e t h i n g s , w h i c h b e c o m e real a n d d e f i n i t e o n l y i n so far as t h e y i m i t a t e those e t e r n a l p r o t o t y p e s T h i s v i e w is k n o w n as 'Plato's T h e o r y o f Ideas'; b u t i t is i m p o r t a n t t o n o t e t h a t these are o b j e c t i v e realities, n o t just p r o d u c t s o f our t h i n k i n g ; P l a t o calls t h e m b o t h ideal, Ideas, and eide, F o r m s . P l a t o never made i t clear w h a t k i n d s o f F o r m s t h e r e are; i t s o m e t i m e s appears t h a t t h e r e is a F o r m f o r every class o f n a t u r a l p h e n o m e n a (e g even for diseases!); b u t s o m e t i m e s o n l y w h e r e p e r f e c t i o n is possible S o m e later P l a t o n i s t s r e g a r d e d t h e F o r m s n o t o n l y as ' t h i n k a b l e ' (noeta) b u t as t h i n k i n g beings {noerd), p l a y i n g d o w n the o r i g i n a l emphasis o n t h e i r u n c h a n g i n g character; t h u s C h r i s t i a n s c o u l d easily r e g a r d t h e m n o t o n l y as m o r a l ideals b u t as e q u i v a l e n t t o t h e b i b l i c a l angels. T h i s was a drastic d e p a r t u r e P l a t o h a d p i c t u r e d t h e F o r m s as a h i e r a r c h y , such t h a t t h e m o r e i n c l u s i v e F o r m s are n o b l e r and better B u t t h e r e can be n o society b e t w e e n beings o f d i f f e r e n t l o g i c a l levels; Socrates m a y converse w i t h a n o b ler a n d better m a n , say P a r m e n i d e s ; b u t n o t w i t h i d e a l m a n h o o d i t self, a n y m o r e t h a n a w o m a n can mar r y t h e aver age m a n A fortiori t h e all-inclusive F o r m , p u r e B e i n g itself, c o u l d have n o c o n t a c t w i t h h u m a n beings N e v e r t h e l e s s C h r i s t i a n w r i t e r s a d o p t e d ' p u r e B e i n g ' as an appropriate symbol o f God's supremacy and unchanging power. A r i s t o t l e (384-322) raised l o g i c a l o b j e c t i o n s t o Plato's d o c t r i n e o f tr anscendent F o r m s , b u t r etained t h e n o t i o n o f f o r m as a n i m m a n e n t p r i n c i p l e w h i c h , e g., guides t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f l i v i n g t h i n g s T h e f o r m (small ' f ' n o w b e t t e r ! ) b e l o n g s t o t h e species; i n d i v i d u a l beings e x h i b i t t h e same f o r m i n a separate b i t o f m a t t e r ; a n d t h e w o r d ' b e i n g ' {ousia) can d e n o t e either t h e f o r m , o r t h e m a t t e r , o r t h e c o m p o u n d i n d i v i d u a l w h i c h results f r o m t h e i r u n i o n . B u t t h i s r e l a t i v e l y clear p i c t u r e is c o n f u s e d b y t w o o t h e r d e v e l o p m e n t s . F i r s t , A r i s t o t l e m o d i f i e s t h e sense o f ' b e i n g ' b y r e c o g n i z i n g a special sense w h i c h came t o be k n o w n as 'substance' A t h i n g ' s 'substance' is t h e character w h i c h i t m u s t have a n d can never lose ( c o n t i ast t h e sense o f ' b e i n g ' i n 'he is a m a n ' a n d 'he is h e r e ' ) ; a n d 'substances' are t h i n g s w h i c h r e t a i n t h e i r i d e n t i t y despite changes o f size, c o n d i t i o n , etc. Secondly, despite his emphasis o n f o r m a n d species, A r i s t o t l e asserted, i n t h e Categories, t h a t t h e i n d i v i d u a l , n o t t h e species, is t h e p r i m a r y f o r m o f b e i n g , or ' p r i m a r y substance' T h e n o t i o n o f substance became a b a t t l e - g r o u n d for later C h r i s 182
t i a n t h e o l o g i a n s ; b u t b e f o r e d e s c r i b i n g t h i s , we m u s t i n t r o d u c e a r e l a t e d t e r m , 'hypostasis', w h i c h owes i t s p o p u l a r i t y to t h e Stoics, b e g i n n i n g i n t h e c e n t u r y after A r i s t o t l e ( Z e n o , c 3 3 2 - 2 6 2 ; C h r y s i p p u s , t 2 8 0 - 2 0 7 BC). T h e Stoics w h o l e h e a r t e d l y accepted H e r aclitus' p i c t u r e o f t h e universe as a process o f p e r p e t u a l change (whereas A r i s t o t l e saw i t as basically u n c h a n g i n g , and i n d e e d e t e r n a l ) . T h e y h e l d t h a t m a t t e r is t h e o n l y t r u e r eality; t h o u g h t s a n d concepts arise i n m e n ' s m a t e r i a l o r g a n o f t h o u g h t B u t t h e y also h e l d t h a t every k i n d o f m a t t e r e x h i b i t s some degree o f o r d e r ; t h i s increases as we pass t o plants, t o animals a n d h u m a n beings, a n d finally t o the universe itself, w h i c h is p e r v a d e d b y a s u p r e m e l y r a t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e or L o g o s , w h o can a p p r o p r i a t e l y be h o n o u r e d as a g o d ' H y p o s t a s i s ' liter a l l y m e a n s ' t h a t w h i c h u n d e r l i e s or s u p p o r t s ' , e g t h e legs o f an a n i m a l , t h e base o f a statue, T h e w o r d t o o k o n m a n y d i f f e r e n t m e a n i n g s ; b u t we have t o m e n t i o n t w o , w h i c h , strangely, have a l m o s t exactly o p p o s i t e i m p l i c a t i o n s ' H y p o s t a s i s ' can m e a n the ' u n d e r l y i n g r e a l i t y ' o f a t h i n g , w h i c h p r o b a b l y i t w i l l share w i t h other t h i n g s ; or i t can m e a n t h e ' e m e r g e n t p e r c e p t i b l e r e a l i t y ' , w h i c h is m o r e l i k e l y t o be t a k e n as i n d i v i d u a l . T h e f o r m e r m e a n i n g is suggested, e.g., b y a c o u n t e r f e i t c o i n ; t h e c o i n ' r e a l l y is' lead, the base m e t a l u n d e r l y i n g its g i l d e d surface T h e second m e a n i n g stems f r o m t h e use o f 'hypostasis' t o m e a n a 'sediment'. T h e Stoics p i c t u r ed t h e universe as e v o l v i n g f r o m a p r i m a r y c o n d i t i o n o f pure fire, w h i c h b y degrees p r o d u c e s s o l i d m a t t e r , l i k e a s e d i m e n t or p r e c i p i t a t e d e p o s i t e d b y a l i q u i d , a n d so gives rise to persistent i n d i v i d u a l things. T h e n a t u r a l L a t i n e q u i v a l e n t for 'hypostasis' was substantia; b u t t h i s latter w o r d was used t o translate t h e G r e e k ousia; a better L a t i n e q u i v a l e n t here w o u l d have b e e n essentia (cf 'essence'); b u t t h i s w o r d sounded a r t i f i c i a l t o t h e L a t i n s , and was n o t m u c h used before A u g u s t i n e ' s t i m e , t h o u g h i t became p o p u l a r later w i t h the m e d i e v a l philosophers G r e e k t h e o l o g i a n s came t o describe t h e F a t h e r , Son a n d H o l y S p i r i t as a t r i a d , or T r i n i t y , o f d i v i n e beings T h e y o f t e n spoke of t h r e e hypostases, i.e t h r e e d i s t i n c t i n d i v i d u a l beings; t o a c k n o w l edge o n l y one d i v i n e hypostasis m i g h t suggest, e g , t h a t o n l y the Father is d i v i n e . B u t t h e L a t i n s , following T e r t u l l i a n , spoke o f t h e m as t h r e e persons p r o c e e d i n g f r o m a single 'substance', as h a v i n g a c o m m o n o r i g i n i n t h e Father and a c o m m o n d i v i n i t y ; a n d some G r eeks agr eed t o accept t h e idea o f ' o n e hypostasis', t a k i n g t h a t wor d
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I Greek Influence on Christian Thought i n its larger sense T h e L a t i n s d i s l i k e d ' t h r e e hypostases', w h i c h t o t h e m suggested t h r e e gods T h e t e n s i o n and m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g came t o a head w h e n A l i u s (c 2 6 5 - 3 3 7 ) began t o a f f i r m t h a t t h e S o n and S p i r i t w e r e s u b o r d i n a t e a n d hence i n f e r i o r t o t h e Father. T h e C o u n c i l o f N i c a e a , A D 325, r u l e d t h a t t h e y w e r e 'the same i n b e i n g ' (or ' c o n s u b s t a n t i a l ' , or 'coessential'); and t h e p o s i t i o n was c l a r i f i e d b y t h e C a p p a d o c i a n Fathers, h a l f a c e n t u r y later, w h o a r g u e d t h a t t h e r e c o g n i t i o n o f o n e ' b e i n g ' or 'substance' d i d n o t c o n f l i c t w i t h ' t h r e e hypostases', w h i c h t h e y n o w clearly d e f i n e d as individual r e a l i t i e s , or 'persons' M u c h i n k has been wasted i n discussing t h e precise m e a n i n g w h i c h t h e C o u n c i l o f N i c a e a gave t o ' c o n s u b s t a n t i a l ' ; d i d i t i m p l y 'same i n d i v i d u a l b e i n g ' , or m e r e l y 'same species', or s o m e t h i n g else. I t m u s t be emphasized t h a t t h e N i c e n e Fathers w e r e n o t t r a i n e d p h i l o s o p h e r s ; i n p a r t i c u l a r , A r i s t o t l e ' s d i s t i n c t i o n o f ousia, 'substance', as either i n d i v i d u a l or g e n e r i c , was q u i t e u n f a m i l i a r t o t h e m . All t h e ter ms t h e y had available at t h i s stage car r i e d a v a r i e t y o f senses w h i c h their users o n l y h a l f u n d e r s t o o d . T h u s m o d e r n scholars w h o have debated w h e t h e r such-and-such a t e r m was used ' i n t h e sense o f P e r s o n ' , or t h e l i k e , give us a n i m p r e s s i o n o f c l e a r l y d e f i n e d alternatives w h i c h is c o m p l e t e l y u n h i s t o r i c a l S o m e t h i n g m o r e s h o u l d be said o f ' P e r s o n ' , n o n e t h e less L a t i n usage was l a r g e l y based o n legal c o n v e n t i o n ; a ' p e r s o n ' was anyone c o m p e t e n t t o plead i n a l a w - c o u r t , e x c l u d i n g slaves and m i n o r s T h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g G r e e k wordprosopon suggested rather a character i n a p l a y (cf. our phrase dramatis personae) Neither word strongly emphasized t h e qualities w e associate w i t h ' p e r s o n a l i t y ' , viz. o r i g i n a l i t y , e n t e r p r i s e , leadership. M o r e o v e r , as f i r s t used, n e i t h e r w o r d necessarily i m p l i e d an i n d i v i d u a l ; a p a r t y t o a law-suit c o u l d be a g r o u p o f p e o p l e a c t i n g j o i n t l y , and i n a p l a y a c h o r u s o f actors c o u l d take a single p a r t B u t later C h r i s t i a n usage f o l l o w e d t h e C a p p a d o c i a n s ' clear d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n ( i n d i v i d u a l ) P e r s o n a n d ( c o m m o n ) S u b stance; other k i n d s o f i n d i v i d u a l s , e g i n d i v i d u a l islands or stars, wer e l e f t o u t o f account C h r i s t i a n s w e r e d i s a p p o i n t i n g l y s l o w t o realize t h a t the same d i s t i n c t i o n applied t o t h e w o r d phusis, ' n a t u r e ' ; and t h i s l e d t o b i t t e r disputes c o n c e r n i n g t h e d o c t r i n e o f C h r i s t w h i c h s h o u l d have been avoided I t s h o u l d have b e e n clear t h a t C h r i s t existed ' i n twophmeis\ provided t h a t this was clearly u n d e r s t o o d as i n d i c a t i n g t w o states or c o n d i t i o n s , his e t e r n a l f e l l o w s h i p w i t h t h e F a t h e r , and his incarnate 184
l i f e as m a n B u t d e v o u t eastern C h r i s t i a n s were haunted b y the s u s p i c i o n t h a t 'twophusevC m u s t i m p l y t w o d i s t i n c t i n d i v i d u a l beings, a d i v i n e C h r i s t and a h u m a n Jesus, a n d c o n s e q u e n t l y w i t h d r e w to f o r m t h e M o n o p h y s i t e c o m m u n i t i e s T h e o r t h o d o x f a i t h , as d e f i n e d b y t h e C o u n c i l o f C h a l c e d o n , A D 451 agreed w i t h t h e L a t i n s that C h r i s t e x h i b i t s t w o phuseis, t w o m a n n e r s o f b e i n g , d i v i n e and h u m a n , u n i t e d i n t h i s one u n i q u e i n d i v i d u a l , or i n a single hypostasis I n c o n c l u s i o n : C h r i s t i a n i t y d e v e l o p e d o u t o f a J e w i s h sect i n t o a w o r l d r e l i g i o n t h r o u g h t h e use o f its G r e e k i n h e r i t a n c e , by m o u l d i n g its beliefs i n t o a c o h e r e n t system w h i c h c o u l d appeal to t h o u g h t f u l m e n and leaders o f society, w i t h o u t l o s i n g the e l e m e n t o f f a i t h and p e r s o n a l c o m m i t m e n t e x h i b i t e d b y s i m p l e r believers I f w e have l e a r n t t o appreciate t h e d i s t i n c t i v e genius o f H e b r e w r e l i g i o u s t h o u g h t , t h i s has c o m e a b o u t t h r o u g h t h e gradual d e v e l o p m e n t of scholarly methods w h i c h were initiated b y Greek literary critics I t r e m a i n s a live q u e s t i o n w h e t h e r a C h r i s t i a n t h e o l o g y expressed i n G r e e k concepts is s t i l l serviceable f o r a C h u r c h faced w i t h the challenge o f f u r t h e r expansion, e.g. i n A f r i c a and L a t i n A m e r i c a W h a t can be said w i t h assurance is t h a t such questions c o u l d n o t even be raised, let alone c o n s i d e r e d , w i t h o u t t h e arts o f accurate s t a t e m e n t and r a t i o n a l debate w h i c h t h e C h u r c h absorbed f r o m its Greek-speaking adherents
BIBLIOGRAPHY Readers unfamiliar w i t h Greek literature can gain a lively impression from Livingstone, R, The Pageant of Greece (Oxford University Press, 1923). He also edited The Legacy of Greece (Oxford University Press, 1921), a collection o f essays dealing w i t h all aspects o f Gr eek culture There ar e numerous histories of Gr eek philosophy; Armstrong, A H , An Introduction to Ancient Philosophy (London, Methuen, 1965 ; Totowa, Rowman, N J, and Allanheld, repr o f 3rd edn, 1983), has the advantage o f giving generous space to philosophers of early Christian times Hatch, E, The Influence of Greek Ideas and Usages upon the Christian Church (London, W i l l i a m s and Norgate, 7th edn 1898 and r e p r ) , is still well worth consulting Look in libraries or second-hand bookshops for a spine lettered ' T h e H i b b e r t Lectures 1888'. The faint-hearted may prefer to begin with Lecruie I I See also: Jaeger, W , Early Christianity and Gi eek Paideia (Cambridge, Mass Harvard University Press, 1962); Chadwick, H , Early Christian Thought and the Classical Tradition (Oxford University Press, 1966); Markus, R A , Christianity in the Roman World, (London, Thames and Hudson, 1975), with excellent illustrations 4
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The A p p r o p r i a t i o n o f the Philosophical Concept o f G o d by early Christian Theologians: W. Pannenberg's Thesis Reconsidered Patiistic scholars live nowadays under the threat of the axe I do not mean this quite literally; no doubt a radical Marxist government would f i n d other Christian victims to polish o f f more quickly than the modest and retiring scholars w h o m I intend to address But since the time of Harnack at the latest we have had to live w i t h the accusation that the Fathers w h o m we study have falsified the original and authentic message of Christianity; misled by the seductions of Greek philosophy, even when they protested against them, they have bequeathed to us a theology w h i c h misconstrues and abridges the biblical insistence on God's transcendence, his freedom, and his total sovereignty over this and a l l possible worlds. Harnack o f course detects other failings, which w i l l not detain us o n this occasion; for instance, that whereas Jesus taught men to worship his heavenly Father, the Christian Fathers taught them to worship ïesus. This whole complex o f accusations, though often dismissed, has recently acquired new force through the rise of liberation theology in the Third W o r l d , and its newly explicit demand that Christianity should now shake o f f its traditional dependence on European, and therefore on Greco-Roman, forms o f thought Even Roman Catholic scholars, bred in a tradition which speaks of a natural knowledge of God and of grace which perfects nature but does not remove it, are becoming sensitive to this demand; for Protestants i t would seem only to underline a conviction which is integral to their tradition But Protestant scholars, w i t h their Anglican and other allies, have i n fact played a leading part in patristic studies; and in recent years many of them have been impressed by a paper published by Wolfhart Pannenberg some twenty-five years ago, 'Die Aufnahme des philosophischen Gottesbegriffes als dogmatisches Problem der frühchristlichen Theologie', Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte 70 (1959), pp 1-45, which appears i n English i n the second volume o f his Basic
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Questions in Theology, pp 119-83 Professor A d o l f Martin Ritter has said of this piece 'Es ist seinerzeit unter protestantischen Patristikern m i t nahezu einhelligem Jubel begrüsst worden, während es andernorts eher betretenes Schweigen auslöste. Einer ernsthaften Diskussion aber ist es nirgends gewürdigt worden, bis es zwanzig Jahre nach seiner Erstveröffentlichung C J de Vogel einer temperamentvollen K r i t i k unterzog' Dr. Ritter's o w n discussion is excellent w i t h i n the limits he has set himself, occupying seven pages i n a more general survey o f recent w o r k on the relations between Platonism and early Christianity But I believe there is r o o m for a more thorough-going critique In general, the reputation of this famous piece is well deserved; Pannenberg handles questions of crucial importance w i t h a wealth of learning and a good eye for what is relevant; but his w o r k is markedly uneven i n quality. M u c h of i t is true and important; some of i t , I believe, is over-simplified; and i n places Pannenberg seems confused, i f not self-contradictory. As a result, it is not easy to f o r m a clear impression of the course o f his argument
doctrine of God's sovereign freedom in relation to all other beings; in fact, says Pannenberg, 'God, as the origin, is never merely the invisible ground of present reality, but the free, creative source of the ever new and unforeseen'. Hence, he writes, 'wherever philosophical concepts are taken over, they must be remolded i n the light of the history-shaping freedom of the biblical God' (p. 1 3 9 = 15/312)
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The literary structure is simple enough; i t is divided into three parts, preceded by a brief introduction; but the three parts are notably unequal in length and complexity; Part I I I in fact extends to two thirds of the total space, and is divided into five subsections, of which the fourth alone occupies sixteen pages; the f i f t h is also substantial, but its last six pages are i n effect a general summary o f the whole preceding argument The introduction explains 'the adverse judgements of Harnack, Loofs and others upon the Apologists of the second century' and their basis i n the dogmatics of Albrecht Ritschl This is a fairly familiar thesis, w h i c h incidentally was echoed i n an early work by T.F Torrance; I need not consider it further . 3
Of the three main parts that f o l l o w , the first is entitled 'The Philosophical Concept of G o d ' ; the second carries the title 'The Task and Danger i n Theological Linkage w i t h the Philosophical Idea o f God'. I t sets out rather briefly some features of biblical monotheism which Pannenberg takes to be crucial; broadly speaking, he contends that the philosophers' contribution to Christian theology was a two-edged affair; i t was helpful as providing confirmation of the claim that there is only one true God; i t was unhelpful, in that the philosophers thought of God as the origin f r o m which our world is derived, and as a being whose nature is i n some way restricted and indeed deducible f r o m the fact that he is the origin This conflicts w i t h the biblical
This is translated from the German reprint Grundfragen Systematischer Theologie (Göttingen, 1971). pp 296-346 A M Ritter, 'Piatonismus und Christentum in der Spätantike . Theologische Rundschau 49:1 (1984). pp 3S-56; here p 39; C J de Vogel. Scripta Theologita 11 (1979), pp 929-52. Since writing the above I have had the privilege of a brief discussion with Professor de Vogel; but my text remains substantially as delivered in Cambridge in October 1984 1
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In Part I I I , which bears the general title 'The Iheological Appropriation', Pannenberg considers five different aspects of the philosophical concept of God, and tries to show where they helped to articulate the biblical doctrine and where they tended to obscure i t . I shall of course return to this part and review it i n detail; at this stage i t w i l l perhaps be enough to note that Pannenberg's judgement on the contribution of the philosophers is on the whole rather negative; while helpful at times, they have misled the Fathers into neglecting important aspects of biblical theology But this negative judgement takes a most unexpected form Pannenberg's initial remarks about the drawbacks of envisaging God simply as the source f i o m which the world is derived might lead us to expect an argument that the Greeks made the mistake of connecting God too closely w i t h the world, as its origin and explanation whose properties can be deduced f r o m it B u t i n fact Pannenberg comes to precisely the opposite conclusion, namely that the philosophers came to envisage a God who cannot enter into any meaningful relation with the world of time and change. So he writes 'Immutability and timelessness, simplicity, propertylessness, and namelessness, have repeatedly forced the concept of God into an unbridgeable distance f r o m the contingent changes of historical reality in which the salvation of men is decided, and the assertions o f faith regarding God's historical acts of salvation were purchased' - presumably by the best of the Christian Fathers - 'only at the of expense of violating the strict sense of these attributes' (p 180 = 43/343) In other words, the philosophical doctrine which the best of the Fathers had to remould was not an unexciting immanentism, as the early pages might lead us to think, but a baffling transcendence We shall have to consider whether this unexpected TreptTreTeia can be adequately supported by the argument in detail. Let me then return to Part I , w h i c h I have not yet summarized, and which raises troublesome questions i n m y m i n d ; though I do not regard all the questions as equally important First, is Pannenberg justified i n speaking of 'The Philosophical Concept of God'? He notes, quite correctly I think, that early Christian theology was indebted to M i d d l e Platonism for 'the conceptual tools for its reflections upon the nature of God' (p 122 = 3/299); but he also suggests that Middle
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My quotations are taken from the English translation mentioned on p 2 above; I give references to this, followed by references to the original ZKG article, then to the German reprint; here p 138- 14/311 4
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Platonism represents a k i n d of consensus among, the philosophers; so 'The theories that had arisen i n Greek philosophy concerning the divine reality by no means present a chaos of unrelated, merely adjacent, opinions On the contrary, these opinions grew out of a common formulation of the problem and constitute variations on one and the same theme' (p 123 = 3/299) B u t is this really tenable ? N o doubt there was a complex of theological views which was acceptable to many or even most second-century philosophers; nevertheless, some philosophers were sceptics, some were atheists, some were Epicurean polytheists; and i f we comment, quite properly, that such untypical views could not possibly have influenced Christian thinkers, i t is worth remembering that an un-platonized, unassimilated Stoicism has left its mark on Tertullian's aberrant description o f God as a corpus. But this is a fairly trivial point; I pass to the more important question:
knowable w o r l d and 'his essence is exhausted i n this function'; but the third section is headed 'The Otherness and Unknowability of the O r i g i n ' ; moreover this doctrine is exhibited as the outcome of precisely the same tendency as was already described i n section one; so Pannenberg writes, 'nevertheless, the insight into the otherness of the divine was already rooted i n the initial tendency o f the philosophical idea o f God' (p 128 = 7/303). The argument seems to be that the method of rational inference led by successive stages to the theories o f God as m i n d , as completely simple, and as inaccessible to human thought. Nevertheless, these are all products o f the same method; hence even after describing the most extreme theories of divine transcendence, Pannenberg can still write that 'the divine spirit remained bound to a material principle' (p 142 = 17/314) In other words, precisely the same formulation of the problem produced the conviction, first, that God is totally knowable, and secondly, that God is totally unknowable.
Is Pannenberg right i n suggesting that the M i d d l e Platonists were continuing a tradition that goes back to the Olympian deities and to the sages of Miletus? When he speaks of 'a common formulation of the problem' in the passage just quoted, Pannenberg is appealing to a theory developed by Werner Jaeger i n his book The Theology of the Early Greek Philosophers (Oxford, 1947) We are reminded of 'a peculiar feature of the Olympian deities, viz, their peculiar immanental character'; Pannenberg writes, "The fact that the gods are the origin of the reality encountered in normal experience is not i n itself anything specifically Greek but a widespread conviction But that their essence is exhausted i n this function, and does not have a hidden side, which is reserved for a special revelation, is a peculiarity of the Olympian deities' (p 124 = 4, 5/300). A n d he clearly thinks that this formulation of the problem persists i n later Greek philosophy; accordingly 'the truly divine can be grasped by an inference f r o m the known state of reality back to its unknown o r i g i n ' (p 125 = 5/301), introducing a discussion of the early physicists; or the beginning of section two of the first part: 'The question about the true God as the origin of present things and normal processes' (p 126 = 6/302), leading on immediately to a mention of Justin Martyr and of the concern for a unity o f explanatory principles i n second-century Platonism Even the discussion of Plotinus mentions 'the initial tendency of the philosophical question about the f o r m of the divine' and goes on to refer once again to 'the inner unity o f the philosophical concept of God, regardless of all the variations i n its formulation' (p 133 = 11/307) 5
But by this time, halfway through the third section o f the first part, the alert reader of Pannenberg w i l l , as I have just explained, have suffered a powerful intellectual shock In the first section we were told that for the Greeks 'the truly divine can be grasped by inference', etc., because God is the origin of a
References to the method of inference recur throughout the paper; it may suffice to cite the Englishpp 133. 143 157-9 165 ¡77. 179 5
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N o w as a piece of plain reporting this might possibly be correct Individual philosophers often do h o l d mutually conflicting opinions; a fortiori, one and the same movement of thought may harbour opposite views at t w o different stages of its history What is disconcerting is that Pannenberg shows little awareness of having noticed the inconsistency which he discloses Moreover, if two contradictory conclusions emerge, there is at least some reason to suspect that contradictory tendencies were at work, and a careful thinker w o u l d seek to disprove this possibility M y own suspicion is that Greek philosophical thought was never dominated by rationalistic assumptions to the extent that Pannenberg has assumed; rationalist tendencies, though coming easily to the enquiring Greek mind, were often checked by a sense of ultimate mystery; the Olympian religion had no monopoly of attention; the sense of numinous mystery and fascination and honor is powerfully expressed i n the Dionysiac cult; Plato himself pronounced that ultimate Goodness could not be described by any analogy. A n d some at least of the later Platonists, Christians included, tended to emphasize Plato's spirituality and discount his logic; so i t should come as no surprise that some of Plato's o w n most hard-headed bits of reasoning were later treated as a species of revelation; or, for that matter, that Gnostic teachers of no intellectual ability whatsoever dressed up their third-rate philosophical gleanings i n the trappings of divine disclosures But Pannenberg, i t appears, w o u l d accept the judgement that a sense of God's otherness appeared quite early in the Greek philosophical tradition. One of the most baffling features of his v i e w in his insistence that this doctrine is not a late development w h i c h i n some degree qualified the immanentism of the method, of inference, but is actually a product of it: 'the insight into the otherness orthe-divine was already rooted in the initial tendency of the philosophical question about God' (p 128 = 7/303) The mysterious nature of God, he says, was already expressed, by Xenophanes (p. 130 =
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8/304) and in Plato's teaching that the Good 'transcends essence'; Plato's description o f God as m i n d was also an attempt to convey it (p 130 = 9/305), though i t proved an inadequate means of escape f r o m immanentist tendencies and had to be supplemented by the doctrine that God is simple A n d although formal recognition of the incomprehensibility of God arrived late on the scene, the tendency towards i t was already contained in the recognition of God's otherness.
tradition B u t others in both camps ignored the philosophers; given a bit more eloquence and personality they might have had great influence There is no reason why Jewish preachers of the first century A D should not have spoken in the authentic tones o f fifth-century prophecy; and indeed the devout of their time were ready to listen B u t i n fact, as we know, prophecy was by then a spent force. Prophets there were, both Jewish and pagan, as well as Gnostic and Hermetic sages B u t their achievements were insubstantial; before long they were forgotten, and rightly
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Pannenberg therefore seems to be claiming (a) that i n Greek philosophy 'the divine spirit always remained bound to a material principle' though per contra the concept of God was forced 'into an unbridgeable distance f r o m the contingent changes of historical reality', etc. (see pp 2, 3 above); (b) but this need not have happened i f God had been viewed in more personal terms expressing his faithfulness and freedom of action; but (c), as we shall f i n d , his freedom is to be understood i n terms of contingency which 'overturns all expectations and w o r l d pictures' (p 181 = 44/344); (d) it also 'protects' God against any inference as to his nature f r o m his operations (p 1 7 1 - 37/337) I cannot help wondering whether this structure of thought is either coherent or tolerable I t seems to make the 'personal' God more remote than the God of the philosophers; and his 'faithfulness' seems to be presumed in default of any consistency which w o u l d allow i t to be known Let us now take a closer look at Part I I w h i c h I briefly described above It begins by sketching the emergence of monotheism among the lews, and the universalism w h i c h it implies The God of Israel, they claimed, is in fact the God of all nations B u t how could other nations be brought to acknowledge his dominion? Pannenberg replies, quite properly, that the Jews appealed to the monotheistic tradition already developed in Greek philosophy: 'The universal claim of the God of Israel first acquired compelling validity for all men by virtue of the fact that first the Jewish and then the Christian mission presented the God of Israel as the true God sought by philosophy' (p. 136 = 13/309) 'Compelling validity' seems to me a good translation o f the German phrase 'verpflichtende K r a f t ' , i m p l y i n g both the persuasive force of the Jewish claim as thus reformulated, and its absolute authority Pannenberg does not mean, I take i t , that the prophecies of, say, deutero-Isaiah have no authority in their original poetic and Semitic phrasing; but that their authority could only be recognized by 'all men' (or 'all reasonably cultivated Greek speakers'?), and so become 'compelling', when translated into philosophical terms w i t h w h i c h they were familiar N o t that the alliance w i t h philosophy was inescapable or predetermined, as the English term 'compelling' might possibly suggest Some Jewish teachers, and some Christian teachers, attacked the philosophers, condemning their disagreements, their contentious vanity, and their failure to match their principles by their conduct (cf p. 140 = 16/313) In deploying such arguments the Jewish and Christian missioners were no doubt developing familiar themes that lay ready to hand in the Greek
7
Pannenberg then explains that 'the linkage w i t h philosophy was facilitated by the tendency of the philosophical idea of God towards unity' (p 137 = 14/310); but he goes on to explain that much of the force and distinctiveness of the biblical view was lost, or at least endangered, by this linkage I assent to this verdict, but w i t h some reservations on his account of the biblical view; for if we speak of 'the personal mode in w h i c h the l i v i n g God confronted men' (p 138 = 14/311) we certainly do not mean that God speaks to men simply in the accents of another man - as i f this were something the Greeks should have realized. The notion that God can appear in human f o r m , and be mistaken for a man, belongs to a very primitive phase of Israelite tradition (e g Gen 32:24-30, Judges 13:19-22), and i t is only a short advance to imagine God's voice as mistaken for a human voice ( I Sam 3:4-8) The great prophets picture God as a mysterious being who impinges on men in a personal mode only by m o v i n g their o w n minds and their own lips to conceive thoughts and utter prophecies beyond the compass of their o w n unaided powers A n d Greek philosophers developed a not dissimilar theory of divine inspiration M y third criticism of Pannenberg's Part I I is a more technical point, but not I think unimportant He argues that 'the universal claim of the Israelites to worship the one true God' led to 'a linkage w i t h philosophy . facilitated by the tendency of the philosophical idea of God towards unity' (p 137 — 14/310) This is of course true as far as i t goes; but Pannenberg seems to ignore the striking contrast between the Hebrew and the Greek notions of unity For the Hebrew, the claim that 'the L o r d , thy God is one' is relatively straightforward; i t means that there is only one being who can properly be called God, who is rightly to be worshipped, and so on But Greek speculations about unity have a subtlety and complexity, and also a set o f endemic confusions, of which Pannenberg seems unaware I intend to discuss these more fully elsewhere; for the moment let us simply recall the strange interpretations of Deut 6:4 and the l i k e produced by Philo under the influence of Greek philosophy He says, for instance, that God resembles the Monad because of his povsoic., his solitary existence {spec leg. 2 176, cf fuga 92, 6
6
See also ray book Divine Substance (Oxford. 1977) pp 180-89
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Abr 22); where the Bible surrounds God w i t h his heavenly court, Philo makes him the prototypical hermit, w i t h more than a suggestion of the Aristotelian deity engaged i n his voriaic. vor|oecos Again he suggests that God being one is necessarily simple {leg all 2 2, mut nom 184), an idea which goes back to Xenophanes among the Greeks and passes on to Irenaeus, but has no root i n the Hebrew tradition For of course there is no necessary connexion between uniqueness and simplicity A thing can be simple without being unique, as were some at least of the Democritean atoms; or it can be unique without being simple, like the legendary phoenix But I w i l l return to this point in discussing Part I I I
Thus when Pannenberg describes Greek philosophy as an obstructive barrier to be broken through, he offers only a selective account of its achievements We are told once again that 'the divine spirit always remained bound to a material principle' (p 142 = 17/314), and there is a reference to 'the duality of effect and cause' (p 143 = 18/315), which seems to be presented as a faulty premiss, which leads both to the conception of God and the world as a dynamic unity, as in Stoicism, and to the dualistic theories w h i c h sharply differentiate God and matter. I t is not made very clear why the latter are objectionable, and how they differ f r o m Pannenberg's o w n view; he cannot, surely, wish to condemn any theory which thinks of God as causing the w o r l d , while establishing a contrast between them? But at this point Pannenberg seems to be thinking not of God presented as a totally unknowable being, the culmination o f his argument i n Part I , but of the less extreme theory of a God conceived on the analogy of a human mind, a second explanatory principle coupled w i t h matter
Part I I I comprises five sections, together w i t h a brief introduction i n which Pannenberg states that although the early Christian theologians appear to take very different attitudes to Greek philosophy, none of them really escaped its influence; not even those who professed to repudiate i t most strongly On the other hand some of them were more effective at transforming and (one might say) biblicizing it than others I accept this judgement, and no comment is needed It is otherwise w i t h the first main section, headed 'Monotheism and Creation' Here Pannenberg is concerned to show how 'the almighty freedom of the biblical God' was grasped by Christian theologians; he judges that 'early Christian theology was relatively quick and decisive in breaking through the confines of the philosophical concept of God and creating fitting room for the freedom of the biblical God' (p 146 = 20/317) I believe there is a two-fold misrepresentation i n this section; i t both over-praises the achievements of the early Christian theologians and underestimates the positive help which they received f r o m the philosophers. The main argument given for holding that they 'broke through the confines of the philosophical concept of God' is that they rejected the idea of matter as eternally coexisting w i t h God and established the doctrine o f creation ex nihilo. But this, we shall see, is not a distinctively Christian development; i t has important precedents i n the Greek philosophical tradition A subsidiary point is that Irenaeus at least derived the creation f r o m the contingency of the divine w i l l i n g . He does indeed make this point, and the reference given to A H 2 10 4 could have been supplemented by 2 1 1 (sua sententia et libere fecit omnia) and 2.30 9; but the Platonists' understanding of God's PjouAnais was closer to Irenaeus than Pannenberg w i l l admit; he ignores the immensely important text in the Timaeus 41 ab, which was quoted as a commonplace by Philo {quts return 246), used by lustin (Dial 5 4), and echoed by Athenagoras (leg 6 2), not to mention the Epistle of James (1 18) 7
He thus continues by stating that in Greek thought 'the concept of the origin (arche) was not kept reserved for the divine' (p 143 =18/315) and goes on to refer to philosophers such as Albinus who distinguished three originative principles, matter, the ideas, and God; and he represents the notion of creation ex nihilo as an important and characteristically Christian development, admittedly with some Jewish antededents represented by 2 Maccabees; though Christians d i d not arrive at this notion immediately M u c h of this is familiar ground; but it needs to be supplemented and corrected Pannenberg himself notes the opinion that the divine m i n d is the source of the ideas, w h i c h reduced the number of originative principles to t w o ; he fails to mention the Greek philosophers who argued that there can be only one But this theory is already noted i n Aristotle's Physics B o o k T, he attributes it to Parmenides and Melissus, w i t h a side-glance at the early cosmologists w h o thought i n terms of material principles; and it is a natural outcome of Pythagorean theory, since the Pythagoreans taught that everything is derived f r o m numbers, and numbers derive f r o m the One. I n the first century BC we already f i n d a theistic development of such theories which anticipates the Christian doctrine of creation ex nihilo Cicero condemns, and therefore knows, the theory that God created matter; see Lactantius DI 2 8 10; Eudorus defends i t ; see H. D o m e ' s Platonica Minora, p 306; and i t is at least arguable that Philo, another Alexandrian, agrees It should be 8
9
i 0
184 b 15 ff Note also the proof offered in de Philowphia. fr 17 noted by Professor de Vogel, op cit p 935, n 20 See the neo-Pythagorean epitome preserved in Diogenes Laertius 8 25-35 Pannenberg s estimate of Philo's position (on p 144, n 82 as expanded in E T ) is probably justified against Wolfsoa on the basis of the texts he considers; but the contrary view is argued by R. Soiabji on the basis of his de Providentia, in Time Creation and the Continuum (London, 1983). pp 203-9 8
9
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N B also the emphasis on God's ßouAnais in Atticus. fi 4, = Eusebius P E 15 6 1-17 Galen de usu partium xi.14 (discussed in R Walzer Galen on Jews and Christians {Oxford, 1949). pp JI ff 23ff) shows that the word was current in pagan discussions of Jewish cosmology 7
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noted that the phrase ex ouk onton is not i n itself precise enough to define the Christian doctrine, since ouk onto, can refer to things w h i c h have no definite being, a chaos or tohu-wa-bohu; or indeed to things w h i c h are not as they should be; Paul applies the similar phrase ta me onta to despised Christian missionaries, including himself So the verse f r o m 2 Maccabees is probably inconclusive O n the other hand the doctrine of creation ex nihilo i n the f u l l sense was enunciated by the Gnostic Basilides both earlier and w i t h greater force than i t was by any second-century orthodox theologian I conclude, then, that Pannenberg seriously underrates the interest and value of Greek reflections upon God as arche.
God is hidden precisely i n his historical acts', quoting Isaiah 45:15; this agrees w i t h most English versions, including RSV, and w i t h Luther; though I note that the New English Bible renders the verse ' H o w then cannot thou be a god that hidest thyself, O God o f Israel?' But i f God is essentially hidden, Pannenberg is quite consistent i n approving the philosophical tradition which asserted God's incomprehensibility (the inconsistency we noted earlier lay i n supposing that this was derived f r o m , and still limited by, the 'method of inference'); consistent also i n defending those Christian theologians l i k e Justin, Irenaeus and Clement w h o made use of i t ; i n fact he defends Justin against the criticism put by Roman Catholic scholars that he placed an 'exaggerated emphasis on the transcendence of God'. But Irenaeus and Clement at least are not approved without reserve; they made the mistake, he thinks, of regarding our incomprehension of God 'simply as a provisional ignorance that could be set aside by revelation' (p 155 = 26/324); Irenaeus, thus 'took a fateful step in the direction o f a compromise which was actually impossible from the standpoint of philosophy as w e l l as that o f theology' (p 157 = 27/325), a 'two-level structure' which led towards Latin scholasticism; though i t seems that on Pannenberg's showing Irenaeus believed that our natural ignorance of God was to be corrected by divine revelation; whereas the normal scholastic v i e w was that our natural knowledge of God was to be completed by it.
11
The second section of Part I I I is entitled 'God's Otherness and Spirituality' It raises the question whether any predicate, such as M i n d , or Spirit, is adequate as a characterization of God's nature; this is more fully discussed i n the f o l l o w i n g section. For the present, Pannenberg's main contention is that the Greeks, and the Christian theologians who f o l l o w e d them, gave insufficient expression to God's otherness and spirituality, since they were dominated by the thought that God is other than matter, is spirit as opposed to matter Perhaps this could have been put more effectively by saying that the biblical contrast of the creator God and the created w o r l d was weakened because it was assimilated to the existing Greek contrast between m i n d and matter Pannenberg in fact suggests this i n a ponderous sentence which refers to 'the spirit-body dualism o f Platonic anthropology' (p 148 = 21/319) The third section of Part I I I is headed 'God's Otherness as Incomprehensibility and I n e f f a b i l i t y ' Pannenberg begins by considering various reasons given by early Christian thinkers for the doctrine that God cannot be named; some are based on philosophical tradition, he thinks, some are not These two pages are perhaps not of the first importance, and can be passed over without comment; though the subject of naming crops up again at p 154 (26/323), where he remarks 'In every act of naming there is an element of seizing possession (Gen 2:19)'. Perhaps this need not be taken too seriously; when the A l m i g h t y responds to Moses' request for his name (Exod 3:13-15) He is not inviting Moses to seize possession of H i m ! But i n philosophical circles the importance of names lies mainly i n the more or less unconscious assumption that a name should provide an exact and even an unique description o f what is named; this assumption could remain powerful i n theology, even though it was easy to f i n d counter-examples i n common life. B u t this brings us to the important topic of God's incomprehensibility, which occupies the bulk of this section. 'For Israel's faith, God is essentially hidden', says Pannenberg (p 154 = 25/325); 'not because he stays away f r o m men, so to speak On the contrary
Hippolytus Ref. 7 21 1-4
11
What then is Pannenberg's o w n view? Since God is essentially incomprehensible to men (author's italics), even divine revelation must disclose precisely this fact; thus 'only i n v i e w of God's presence i n the destiny of lesus can man endure the incomprehensibility of God and thus even i n the face of the truth of God be truly man' (p. 156 = 26f /324) This is impressive; but i t seems to me to be existentialist rather than Christian, even if it has some basis in Marcan christology; for it seems to i m p l y that Jesus was mistaken i n teaching his disciples to address God as their heavenly Father, or i n declaring plainly to the Samaritan woman that God is a spirit I f God is essentially incomprehensible, then all attempts to explain his nature, even by analogy, must be misleading; and i t is strange to f i n d Pannenberg appearing to desert the sober and biblical profession o f faith i n God the Father A l m i g h t y for the sophisticated and Catholic Quicunque Vult w i t h its demand for belief in 'One Incomprehensible'! Let me throw out a few suggestions about the incomprehensibility of God Since God is an absolute, it seems fitting to describe h i m i n absolute terms; i t sounds patronizing to say that we don't know very much about h i m But i f there is any truth i n Christianity, we must know something; otherwise, inter alia, we should lack any moral guidance; for all we knew, God might be l i k e K a l i , and intend that Christians should strangle unsuspecting travellers A n d it not enough to say, w i t h some of the ancients, that we can have merely negative knowledge, and say what God is not; this w i l l either be a mere linguistic
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substitution, e g 'God is not unrighteous', Hebi 6:10, or i t w i l l faii to tell us what we need
simple and instructive case is that of the predicates 'hot' and ' c o l d ' These look like symmetrical opposites; but scientists assure us that things cannot be cold beyond a certain degree, at w h i c h all motion stops; but there is no l i m i t which restricts their heat Hence i f I say ' X is hot' I need not be taken to i m p l y that X is comparable to a cup of tea, or to Rome i n July
A possible way out is to observe that i n our ordinary discourse we require that statements made to us should be not only true but proportionate Suppose I tell you that the distance f r o m London to Manchester is more than four inches This in perfectly true, but could w e l l be misleading; i f you understand English but know no geography, y o u may be surprised to learn that i t is as much as a mile. Our present problem, of course, is not so simple; i t is not a matter o f incomparability i n a single dimension I t is that, i f we try to describe God at all, we have to use predicates which also apply to finite beings, and which we have learnt to use in these contexts H o w then can we avoid reductionist suggestions? I h e ancients, I believe, were often handicapped in this regard by an 'all-ornothing' theory of knowledge, treating 'knowledge' as a word w h i c h properly applies only to perfect or complete knowledge, and assuming that a statement cannot really be true unless i t states the whole truth (For the former point, N B Plato's treatment of knowledge (emoTriuxi) in Republic 5, 476 f f , and cf Aristotle's doctrine that actual knowledge is identical w i t h its o b j e c t ) But no one can state the whole truth about God; therefore, i t seemed, nothing could truly be said about h i m . I am inclined to think, indeed, that this mode of thought is still w i t h us, in the use, or perhaps the misuse, of what is called 'the paradigm case' We argue thus: the paradigm case o f statements such a ' X is wise' is a statement like 'the Vice-chancellor is wise'. But God is not comparable w i t h the Vice-chancellor Therefore i t makes no sense to say that God is wise 1 2
1 3
But this argument makes the stultifying assumption that our language does not allow of being stretched and adapted to new cases; on which assumption there could have been no development of civilized and expressive language at all Inventing new words is a rather sophisticated business; reapplying old ones is the procedure that originally made man capable of abstract thought. The classic theory of reapplication in theology is of course the doctrine of analogy. This has come under criticism as suggesting a sort of proportion sum w h i c h we have not the means to w o r k out: God's wisdom exceeds man's wisdom in proportion as God's being exceeds man's being But what proportion is that? Is i t perhaps enough to reply that i t is not our business to work out proportion sums in relation to God? God is wise beyond our understanding; this is our faith; and i t is a faith which can be sufficiently defined by hard-headed reasoning to have some definite content We may start by noting that some of our concepts are truly open-ended. A
Be amino 3 5, 430a20; 3 7, 431al;cf 3.8. 431b22 Minucius Felix Octavius 18: magniludinem Dei qui se putat iwsse minuit qui non vult minuete non novit 11
1 3
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I n this example - and indeed in the doctrine of analogy - we are still thinking i n terms of a single scale of measurement. The case of God's wisdom is more complex To say that God is superlatively or transcendently wise w i l l not explain the forms which God's wisdom w i l l take. But we should not expect to k n o w this. Pannenberg introduces the notion of God's contingent action in order to 'protect' the otherness of God against the possibility that his essence could be inferred f r o m his actions (p 171 =37/336f) But I doubt if it is needed; even granted that we can sometimes identify an event as an act of God (or as embodying an act of God) we can never understand all the reasons for i t , or determine what part i t plays in the complex strategy of divine love But we can 'see through a glass, darkly' A n d since Pannenberg himself makes positive statements about God, he must surely agree that God's 'incomprehensibility' should not be taken to mean that our knowledge of God is zero It is a rhetorical way of pointing to riches and resources beyond our comprehension. We come at last to the long and complex fourth section of Part I I I , with its by now familiar heading 'The Consequences of the Method of Causal Inference' The section begins w i t h a reference to proofs of the existence of God i n connection w i t h Romans 1-5 Pannenberg claims that St Paul stands outside the cramping influence of the inferential method, in that he presents man's natural knowledge of God not as a human achievement but as a divine judgement B u t early Christian theologians failed to f o l l o w Paul's lead; at certain points they broke free f r o m the constraints of the inferential method; at other points they were forced into 'a constriction o f the biblical idea o f God, an abridgement of his transcendent freedom and omnipotence' (p 158 = 2 8 f / 3 2 7 ) One might perhaps compress the argument of the t w o f o l l o w i n g subsections in these terms: (a)
the philosophical concept of immutability does not do justice to the biblical notion of God's faithfulness;
(b)
the philosophical concepts of simplicity and absence of properties do not adequately express God's otherness and transcendence
The pages devoted to subsection (a) seem to me the best i n the whole paper I may perhaps quote the f o l l o w i n g lines: 'The concept of immutability rightly says that God is no originated and transitory thing But immutability says too little, since God not only immovably establishes and maintains reality in its lawful course, but has within himself an infinite pleni-
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tude of ever new possibilities i n the realization of which he manifests the freedom of his invisible essence' (p 161 = 30/329) Pannenberg goes on to point out that the concept o f divine immutability leads on to Pelagian errors amongst others; for 'If God is immutable, then surely every change i n man's situation i n relation to salvation must be initiated by a change f r o m a man's side' (p. 163 = 31f/330).
do not wear out easily, and healthy bodies are not prone to disease; good characters also resist temptation B u t a well-made cloak is not immutable i n the way an equilateral triangle is immutable; i t is useless unless i t can flex w i t h its wearer's movements A n d a healthy body does not remain passive i n the face of fatigue or infection; though Plato could not have k n o w n this, i t adjusts itself to the danger, secretes lactic acid, breeds antibodies, and so on A n d of course immutability is not a sufficient recipe for either prudent or Christian conduct; i t excludes response to divine grace and to particular inspirations. I have thrown out these suggestions in the briefest possible f o r m ; I am w e l l aware that much remains to be discussed
14
In general, i f not i n every detail, I warmly welcome these pages; and I must not be taken to criticize them if I add t w o reflections on the philosophical reasoning involved: (i)
Ancient reflections about immutability were much influenced by a passage i n Plato's Republic 2, 380-381, which Pannenberg does not mention Plato argues that i f a god changes, he must either suffer change f r o m an outside influence, or else change himself But being ex hypotheu perfect he cannot change himself for the better; nor of course for the worse Therefore he cannot change at all The argument that God is incapable of improvement becomes a commonplace; it was used, for example, by the not very philosophical Athanasius i n controversy w i t h the Arians; and i f accepted, I think it w o u l d exclude Pannenberg's concept of God's freedom, as 'having w i t h i n himself an infinite plenitude of ever new possibilities'; since any act of God in history brings God himself into new relationships w i t h his creatures The concept of divine immutability thus requires to be complemented by that of predestination; the whole course of w o r l d history is determined i n every detail, and its actual development adds nothing to God's experience, but is only undergone by the human participants God knows eternally that an individual must undergo temptation x at time r; but he cannot know that the individual w i l l undergo i t or has undergone i t , since to God it makes no sense to say ' I t is now time f, and he is undergoing i t now' Thus if we accept the Platonic argument, the biblical concept of God's freedom has to be sacrificed But need we accept it? It seems to me to rest on an over-simplified concept of goodness and badness; if you like, i t fails to distinguish between perfection and the measure of perfection If God does something new, say by creating man, this does not mean that God's previous existence was imperfect; but its perfection was capable of enlargement, i n that he accepted new responsibilities and a new stance as creator For Plato, o f course, any conception of this kind was ruled out by his preoccupation w i t h timeless and mathematical realities as the standard of perfection.
(ii)
For this reason, immutability was conceived primarily as resistance to decay or other changes for the worse B u t even this resistance was misconceived as a purely static obstruction Plato, in the passage I have mentioned, uses the argument that well-made articles like good clothes
15
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The argument of subsection (b) may perhaps be summarized as follows: (i)
'The immutability of the first cause leads to the thought of its simplicity';
(ii)
If God is conceived as simple, he has to be conceived as incomprehensible and indeed without properties (so the E T ) or qualities, apoios; ( i i i ) This, again breaks the connection between God's essence and his action; since an action without properties is inconceivable Pannenberg's criticisms of this structure of thought are mainly directed at point ( i i i ) ; there is a brief glance at point ( i i ) on p. 172 (= 36/337), where he says that the l i n k between simplicity and absence of properties i n only valid i f one takes a realistic v i e w of universals; a previous page, 169 = 36/335, suggests that he is referring to the tough requirement that a valid definition should have a structural correspondence w i t h the thing defined; human beings, e g , consist of rationality combined w i t h animality; cf. Aristotle Metaph 7 10-12. B u t point (i) is merely announced. I think this is a pity, because arguments on this point are often vitiated by a very simple fallacy Ancient thinkers frequently assume that there is a straightforward opposition between what is simple (aTtAous) and what is composite (O"UV6ETOC); hence one can prove that a thing is simple merely by showing that i t is not composite. But this is clearly false; a tree, for instance, is not composite in the sense of having been assembled f r o m pre-existing parts, like a house; but neither is it simple, since it consists of distinguishable parts like roots, a trunk and branches; and these develop by differentiating themselves out of the relatively simple acorn or other seed. Moreover, if i t is false that all complex beings arise from the assembly o f their parts, it is probably also false that all decay and corruption are caused b y
u
Cf
my remarks in H
Dorne s Festschrift
Blume andF Mann (Münster, 1983) p 252
Piatonismus und Christentum, edd
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their separation If a house collapses, it is not usually the case that the various bricks and timbers simply come apart; the process w i l l usually begin when the timbers begin to rot and the bricks to soften and crumble Can one then trace the softening and crumbling to a more intimate separation of the minute particles? No doubt one can; but the ancients were certainly not in a position to prove that simple bodies such as atoms cannot merely pass out of existence; modern science, after all, tells us that they can be transformed into energy, w h i c h is then simply dissipated; still less could they prove (against Plato, Timaeus 41a) that a thing can exist eternally only on condition that i t is immutable, and therefore simple Are we not ourselves promised eternal life? Pannenberg's discussion gives an important place to Irenaeus, and contains the arresting sentence 'For Irenaeus, the concept of God's simplicity means that the fullness o f all perfections and properties is realised by him in the mode of unity' (p 167 = 34/333) One w o u l d have liked to see this idea further developed; failing this, I would assume that Irenaeus' concept of divine unity is a remarkable but not particularly original one which is clearly traceable back to Xenophanes But Pannenberg goes on to explain that if God is really simple, no properties can be ascribed to h i m 'insofar as every attribute is what i t is only in distinction f r o m another' ( i b i d ) . True, God is sometimes described as apoios merely in the sense that he lacks sensory qualities, like the human m i n d ; but the more radical conclusion is justified: 'the simplicity of God requires that he be conceived as propertyless' pp 169 = 36/335) A n d he continues, 'Awareness of the otherness o f God apparently reaches its highest pinnacle w i t h the drawing of this conclusion But this sort of otherness does not express his unforeseeable action; i t is not the otherness of his freedom' Phis leads on to the conclusion that God must be seen as operating contingently, as acting freely, w h i c h is repeated w i t h great force in the concluding section five
THE PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPT OF GOD
17
simplified; (b) Pannenberg's notion of God's free creativity is arresting, but goes far beyond anything realized by early Christian theologians; (c) Pannenberg treats the hiddenness of God as an absolute; even though it is closely connected w i t h specific acts i n history, i t is an essential fact about h i m , not one that revelation can remove B u t his treatment seems to rule out any positive teaching about God, even though he claims that God is not 'propertyless' W e could reply that revelation does enlarge our knowledge, even though it also increasingly reveals our ignorance (2)
Pannenberg claims that the Fathers were justified in appealing to Greek philosophy because of the support it gave to monotheism. Comment: (a) This is by no means true of all Greek philosophy; (b) Greek speculations about unity brought in concepts quite foreign to the Bible
(3)
1 5
Pannenberg claims that the early Fathers were relatively successful in breaking through the philosophical assumptions about God as a generalized cause and asserting his free creativity Comment: This is inadequately supported, and also wrongly assumes that the doctrine of creation ex nihilo is a Jewish or Christian coinage
(4)
Pannenberg rightly criticizes the philosophers' tenet of divine immutability; he fails to note weaknesses in the arguments foi immutability
(5)
Pannenberg gives qualified support to the theory of divine simplicity, as highlighting God's incomprehensibility, but notes that i t ends by making God 'propertyless'. Once again he is uncritical in accepting arguments in favour o f simplicity
(6)
Some doubt must persist as to the coherence of Pannenberg's view that God 'confronts men in the personal mode' but, on the other hand, is essentially incomprehensible', 'essentially hidden', and 'hidden piecisely in his historical acts' This is a rhetorical way o f making a valid point; i f understood at all literally, it makes any theology impossible
It has been a d i f f i c u l t task to describe and criticize a complex and influential article w i t h i n the limits of a single paper Perhaps it may make for clarity if I end by restating my criticisms in the baldest possible summary:
Let me end, then, w i t h two general observations; one on the f o r m of (1)
Pannenberg argues that a single method of inquiry, the 'method of inference', runs through all Greek philosophical theology It leads both to the conclusion that God is part o f the natural order and (surprisingly) to the doctrine that God is incomprehensible. Pannenberg does not seem to reject the notion of God's incomprehensibility as such; but he claims that as conceived by the Greeks it tends to depersonalize and deactivate God; it masks the notion of God's free creativity Comment:
Pannenberg's argument, the second on his theology: (1)
16
(a) I f i e theory of a single philosophical method is over
See my Divine Substance pp i 87-9
We are t o l d that the Christian Fathers were partly successful, but not wholly successful, i n 'remolding' the philosophical conception of God so as to do justice to the biblical conception of a God 'who out of his otherness effects the new and contingent, and is thus the personal L o r d ' (p 180 = 43f / 3 4 3 f ) But what is the status of this 'biblical conception', as Pannenberg presents it? Its roots in the biblical tradition are
1 6
I he German seems to require the rendering and is contingent
II 18
(2)
I HE PHIL OSOPHICAL CONCEPT OF GOD
undeniable; but i t does not echo the biblical tradition as it was understood by the rabbis, or by the Christian Fathers, or as i t might have been explained by the biblical writers themselves It owes something to Bultmann, something to Harnack, something to Luther, something to the schoolmen, and much more to the Greek philosophers themselves It is their labours that have enabled us to extract and refine this concept of God's freedom and otherness and his shaping of history from the vast and varied complex of biblical material I t is f r o m them that we derive the key concept of critical revision; one could have explained this idea to Plato or to Aristotle; one could have made i t intelligible to Origen or to Augustine, and just possibly to Irenaeus It w o u l d have meant nothing at all to the writers of the Bible Arresting and valuable as Pannenberg's theology proves to be, there are some expressions which give rise to misgivings; and among them I would place the notion of God's contingent action I t has this to be said for i t , that i f God acts i n history, and history includes contingent events, including the decisions of human free w i l l , then God adapts his action to contingent events. It also points to God's power of acting i n new, unforeseen and creative ways B u t i t tends to mask the complementary notions that God's actions f l o w appropriately f r o m his own nature, and that they are also appropriate to the moment i n the historical process to which they are directed There is a complexity here which cannot be grasped by either of the conventional alternatives 'necessary' and 'contingent' When Pannenberg says that God's action is contingent, he does not mean that it is arbitrary But when Plotinus, for instance, says that i t is necessary, he does not mean that it is forced.
Ill
Marcel Richard on Malchion and Paul of Samosata
Two third-century crises have long attracted the attention of scholars: the contr oversy between the two Dionysii, and the trial and condemnation of Paul of Samosata: Luise Abramowski has offered us a novel and carefully argued approach to the former, but will, I trust, be content with a more pedestrian approach to the latter, Our main source for this is of course
Eusebius'
Ecclesiastical History; but he tells us much less than we could wish H e describes the events that led up to Paul's condemnation and reproduces part of the Synodal Letter written to justify his deposition. This letter certainly contained a description of Paul's theology and of the proceedings against him, since Eusebius tells us that the writers "make manifest to all their zeal, and also the perverse heterodoxy of Paul, as well as the arguments and questions that they addressed to h i m ; and moreover they describe the man's whole life and conduct" ( H E
I o generalize this comment: the drawback of this concept of God's contingent action is that it expresses God's power mainly in relation to our o w n ignorance of the inner logic and appropriateness of his action I t is better, then, to talk of his freedom and his creativity I n the same way, the notion of God's otherness contains an important lesson; but it suggests strangeness and alienation, w h i c h are notions relative to our human condition; it needs to be corrected by the more positive and absolute concepts of God's fullness, mystery, and depth If we believe that it is God's w i l l to bridge the gap that separates infinite f r o m finite being, the Christian preacher can never give p r i ority to the claim that God is a scandal He must affirm that God is love.
VTI,30, translation by Lawlor and Oulton, 1927) But the passages actually quoted enlarge on Paul's "life and conduct", ignoring his theology, apart from the passing remark that he "strutted about i n the abominable heresy of Artemas"; and Eusebius' own comments i n effect repeat this, agreeing that "he espoused low and mean views of Christ... namely that he was i n his nature an ordinary man". Can we supplement this information? A fairly extensive dossier of texts purporting to reproduce Paul's teaching, and indeed to derive from the acta of the Synod of Antioch, can be collected from fifth- and sixth-century writers, beginning i n 429 with Eusebius of Dorylaeum, who wished to represent Nestorius as reproducing the heresy of Paul A good collection of this material was published by H e n r i de Riedmatten i n 1952, building on earlier works by Bardy
ni
III 141
Marcel Richard on Malchion and Paul of Samosata
142
and Loots De Riedmatten argued that the fragments he printed are authentic 1
forger would not think of reproducing; other known and admitted forgeries in
I have always thought that he made a good case But some notable scholars were
fact make no attempt to avoid the language of what they regard as contemporary
not convinced; and their doubts were increased by Marcel Richard in 1959
orthodoxy
2
3
Amongst other arguments, Richard proposed a new translation of a crucial
Simonetti followed this article with a shorter paper devoted to a review of
passage in Eusebius ( H E. VII,29) which had seemed to support the authenticity
Richard's own arguments Here again I accept his conclusions; but I think it
of the fragments As commonly rendered, this passage asserted that Malchion,
possible to amplify and improve his criticism of Richard. I have neither the time
Paul's accuser, "had stenographers to take notes as he held a disputation with
nor the space to reopen the main question; but the more modest task I have
Paul, which (disputation) we know to be extant even to this day" Richard argued
mentioned may still be useful, and may help to throw light on an obscure but
that the alleged "stenographers" were actually "informers", who did not "take
important episode in the history of doctrine
notes" but rather "gave evidence", presumably of Paul's previous
6
actions or
We begin, like Richard, by considering the crucial passage from Eusebius H E
teaching. A n d he offered other arguments to suggest that the supposed fragments
VTI,29,2: fiàXiaxa o' aÙTÔv eùiK)va<; £7«KpujTTÔp;£vov SI^XEYÇE M a ^ x '
derive from Apollinarian forgeries, a literature with which he is extremely well
words omitted) QUTÔ<; y i T O I èjtLaTiu-etoufiévwv Ta^uypottpuv ^ r r j a i v 7cpôç aÙTÔv
acquainted.
evarrjaoqjxvoi;, ijv Kai ciç rteûpo
Richard's
arguments have been accepted by a number of distinguished
scholars, including I N D
Kelly (1977), A Grillmeier and R L
Sample (both
(1981), W H C Frend (1984) and R D
Lorenz (1979), I D
Barnes
Williams (1987) *
But the whole question has been reopened in a masterly article by Manlio
(30
zpuibÎMouv ôvTa xa£ àîraTT|Xôv
1979), F.W Norris and H C Brennecke (both 1984) and R P C Hanson (1988) Others have appeared unconvinced, including R
u v
(1) I h e verb èicioripietoijaS-ai is a rare word, dating probably from the second century A D Although by etymology it derives from cn)[i.Eioijv (and so from the noun crr)(iefov, one can add), it connects "quant au sens" with the adjective kniuT[\ioc\, "evident" or "well known"
I h e verb should
mean "to reveal"
Simonetti He examines the vocabulary of the "fragments" in detail, and thus
("dévoiler"); i t is balanced against e&9-ûva<; è7«xpu7rr6[ievov above, and the same
developes and greatly strengthens de Riedmatten's claim that they exhibit archaic
object EÛEKJVCXÇ (acc plur.) is to be understood; it can therefore be rendered
features which fit naturally into a third-century context, but which a post-Nicene
"mettre en évidence" (pp 326-8)
5
( 2 ) I t cannot refer to stenographers taking notes (the usual rendering as Les Actes H.e Paul de Samosate (Paradosis 6), Fribourg/CH 1952. G. Bardy, Paul de Samosate (SSL 4), Louvain 1929 F Loofs, Paulus von Samosata etc., T U 3rd series XIV, 5, Leipzig 1924. Notably Bardy in his review of de Riedmatten, R H E 41 (1952) 643 ff, retracting his earlier acceptance of them See also H. Chadwick, TThS 4 (1953) for a cautious approval of de Riedmatten M Richard, Malchion et Paul de Samosate Le Iemoinage d Eusebe dc Cdsaree: E l h L 35 (1959), reprinted in his Opera Minora 2 (Louvain 1977), no 25 * J N.D Kelly, Early Christian Doctrines, London 1977, 159; A. Grillmeier, Jesus der Christus im Glauben der Kirche I, Freiburg 1981, 297; R . L Sample, ChH 48 (1979) 18-21; F W Norris, JThS 35 (1984) 51f; H C Brennecke, ZNW 75 (1984) 274; R P C Hanson, The Search for the Christian Doctrine of God, Edinburgh 1988, 72. On the other side see R Lorenz, Arius ludaizans?, Göttingen 1980, 128-35; T.D Barnes, Constantine and Eusebius, Cambridge 1981, 144; W H . C Frend, The Rise of Christianity, London 1984, 394 no 117; R D Williams, Arius, London 1987, I59f 305 no 27 These authors ignore Richard, though Williams refers to Norris M. Simonetti, Per la Rivolutazione di Alcune Tesiimonianze su Paolo di Samosata: RSLR 24 (1988) 177-210 1
2
2
quoted above); such a procedure would be too commonplace to deserve notice (P 3 2 7 ) . ( 3 ) The phrase ^TTjaiv rcpoç aÙTov èvoTrioà^evoi; cannot refer to a simple
3
5
debate; it must indicate a formal process of trial ("enquête", p 3 2 7 ; "enquête judiciaire", p 3 3 0 ) , at which indeed Paul may not even have been present (p
2
5
3 2 6 ) . I h e supposed parallel with Origen's debates with Heraclides and with Beryllus of Bostra is delusive, since these were amicable discussions with men of
"Paolo di Samosata e Malchione Riesame di Alcune Testimonianze , in: Hestiasis (FS S Calderone), Studi Tardoantichi 1, Messina, 1-25
6
III
Ill 143
144
Marcel Richard on Malchion and Paul of Samosata
good faith (p. 331). The use of Z^TTICIZ
in the singular helps to mark the
distinction (pp 330-3) Richard adds some observations on conciliar procedure
can be gained by paying attention to the noun èmarHizitùaiç» which is surely good evidence for the meaning of the v e r b
7
which I shall leave on one side (pp 333-8) (4)
The common
M y list is as follows:
rendering of £7ti
mistranslations of Rufinus and Jerome, both of whom mistakenly connected it
Pagan authors:
with crritieiov and wrote "excipientibus notariis" (pp, 329-30) .
Diogenes Laertius 7,20 = SVF 1,308 (the noun)
(5) Richard adds evidence to show the growing importance of "tachygraphes
Anonymus Londiniensis (1st century A D ) 21,21
(excerptores, notarii, tribuni et notarii)" i n the third and fourth centuries and
Plutarch, Apophth Lac 55,2,235c Bernardakis.
their employment in responsible tasks apart from stenography (pp 328-9) I n this
Aspasius, In E N ( C A G 19,1), three refs : pp 101,1; 139,6; 165,33
case, then, they acted as informers who "gave evidence" at Paul's trial; and it is
Alexander of Aphrodisias, In SE ( C A G 2,3) p 145,29
this which Eusebius indicates by the phrase £:ucrr](iELou[j.Evwv TaxuYpatpdJv
Sextus Empiricus 5,68
Such is Richard's case But we perceive at once that it involves a certain
Christian authors:
inconsequence Eusebius, he says, cannot have been referring to the presence of
Irenaeus, Haer. 1,8,2 (SC 264, 117-120 Rousseau)
stenographers', this would have been taken for granted But i n this case, whatever
Hippolytus, Haer IV,50,2 (the noun).
Eusebius' words may have meant, stenographers were present! A n d this, coupled
(Ps. Hippolytus fr 26, noted in P G L ( = L a m p e , Patristic Greek Lexicon), is
with Eusebius' reference to the survival of the trial records, is surely a point i n
probably to be discounted, as its authorship and date is uncertain; see GCS
favour of their survival into the fifth century, not against it?
1,2,150, 12 Acheiis.)
As to the supposed
antithesis between
euiKivoK; ETtixpurcTopiEvov and
Origen Cefs 4,12 (GCS 1,282,9 Koetschau)
Ejttmfi(ieLQU[iEvwv, Simonetti surely is right in objecting that the two verbs are too
Horn .1er. 14,5 (GCS 111,110,25 Klostermann), cf Jerome, PL 25,666B
widely separated for this to be probable (Hestiasis, p l O f ) But i n any case there
Comm.
is a certain difficulty in translating the former phrase, which is not entirely
XHI,62,436; plus the noun at X,40,274
in Joh,
five refs: 11,28,171; VI,60,307; X,19,114;
clarified by Richard's "qui dissimulait", still less by Simonetti's "ch' era abile a
M
nascondere le sue prevaricazione" (RSLR, p 179) EuiKivou;, which I agree i n
Africanus, Chron 13, 1, reproduced in Eusebius P E . X,10,2
taking as an accusative plural noun, cannot refer to Paul's "prevarications", but
Eusebius, D E V I I I proem 12; IX,4,2; plus the noun at V.11,3.
X1II,17,104;
Perp. 17 (Acts of the Christian Martyrs, Oxford 1972, 124 Musurillo).
H E VI,24,3 (the noun) and VII,29,2 quoted above
to something which he opposed; either the investigations, or the resultant accusations directed against him The phrase must mean either that Paul was obscuring
the evidence against him, or (with a slightly unusual
sense of
The verb exhibits a fair variety of senses, which itself suggests that i t was not
ETitxpuTtTtcS-ai) that he was evading the accusations that ensued. For this sense
exceptionally rare Let us begin by making a concession to Richard, who argues
of eii&uva cf Eusebius, H E. 111,10,8.
that it was felt to be cognate with the adjective EJUOT]|J.OÇ. This is in fact
We pass to consider Richard's first point, on the word £7ctcrr)[i£toua9-aL By and large we can admit that the verb is uncommon
confirmed by the passage in Hippolytus noted above: ititûc, oi av&pwTîoi Ttpà<;
Richard gives a list of its
occurrences, to which I can make a few additions; but some important insights
7
Cf Richard, 327 n 5
III
Ill 145
146
Marcel Richard on Malchion and Paul of Samosata
è7riaT)fi£Îfjja£v TIVWV aoTpdiv ovofiaTa OÏÏTMÇ èxâXEaav, tva aÙToFç hzitrt^rx. j\,
commonest sense of £7utn)HEio0a9-at, which is that of pointing out what might
"men gave individual names to distinguish certain stars, to make them distinct".
otherwise escape notice.
Africanus (1 c. ) may possibly have felt the same, but this is less probable, since 43 words intervene to separate èmari\Loi... èjïicrrj[i£toûfi£voi; In
other cases, I shall argue, the connection with the noun ai)[X£Îbv is
M y list began with Diogenes Laertius 7,20 = SVF 1,308: [Zfjvwv E^T) BEIV] TOV axouovxa OUTO npod TOI<; XEyofiEvan; yiy\>ea&a.i GJOTE \iri Xay.pa.veiv /povov ELQ
TT]V eiuirrjpxtcdaLv. This can only mean "the hearer should be so absorbed in the
The original sense of the word must be "to take notes", whether
discourse itself as to have no time for taking notes". We cannot of course be sure
in shorthand or otherwise. Thence there is an easy transition to the sense
that Diogenes is giving Zeno's exact words; but it is at least possible that
"observing" (in English, f r o m "taking notes" to "taking note"; i n German f r o m
ETCicmfiEioita^ai was used i n this sense in the third century B.C., long before it
"Notizen machen" to "Notiz nehmen").
appears i n Plutarch and the Anonymus Londiniensis of the first century A D .
unmistakeable
This is clearly the sense i n Sextus
Empiricus 5,68: eïç TOV oûpavôv arcopXeTCuv èitirjiHxeioÛTai TÔ aviajrov ÇyStov,
A p a r t from this passage it is not easy to find confirmation for the sense of
"he watches the sky and observes the constellation as it rises", and i n the
"taking notes" which is suggested for Eusebius, H E .
Martyrdom of Perpétua, iTziGT\[Lzi<ùa<xa$£ Ta npàatùKCL Tjfzwv èrctfieXÎoç Vva x a t
passage from the same work may be relevant A t VI,24,3, discussing the places
£7«YVWTE THISLQ èv ÈXEtvfl Tfj flfiépa: "take note of our faces"; there is no question
where Origen wrote his various books, Eusebius tells us that the ten books of
of "revealing" them ("dévoiler") In Eusebius, D E. V I I I proem. 12 we find the
Stromaters were written at Alexandria £>£ icai TOUTO oXoypottpot BirjXoGatv auTou
closely connected sense of "pointing out", "calling attention to": TOU; eùayyeXticàci
7ip6 T£>V TOfiwv E7uarj[i.£t(i)a£i<;, The word 6X6ypacpo<; can hardly mean "written
cpwvat; èv izptù-zoïç £7uaï]pxt(oaàfj.£voi Hippolytus' rcpoç ETTtarjfiEtuotv is rather
in his own hand", as Lawlor and Oulton translate i t , if LSJ is right i n noting that
similar; and Plutarch speaks of an audience "recognizing" or "marking" some
this sense appears much later It should mean "written out in full" (so PGL
behaviour by applause: TWV 5È navEXXrjvfov èiuaijfxeMoaaiiévctw xpoTtp TÔ E9-OC;
Lampe, cf. p 5) But why should Eusebius say this? The preface to the several
There is no need to follow Cobet and "emend" the text by substituting the more
volumes of a published work would hardly be written in short-hand
familiar word È7ticrr|^aivEa8-aL, for èKiar\\iEioùa&a.i is used by Plutarch's near-
ejiicrrjpiELtjaii; were commonly used to indicate short-hand notes, it would be
contemporary Aspasius, and should be allowed to stand
natural to insert oXoypatpoi; to show that this sense was not intended..
Probably the commonest sense is that of "pointing out" a fact or situation, just
VII,29,2 B u t
another
=
But if
But the chief evidence for the sense is of course the independent testimony of
as i n English one can "observe" or "remark" that something is the case, even
Rufinus and
though not directly visible; OTI follows it i n Aspasius and Origen, and i t occurs
indisputably refers to the taking of short-hand notes; Rufinus in his translation
intransitively with rapt at Origen, Comm.. i n Joh XIII,62,436 Finally, it is used
of Eusebius H E . VII,29,2, Jerome i n his notice of Malchion, closely based upon
with an impersonal subject, where some event or tradition "indicates" some
Eusebius, i n de viris illustribus 71 Simonetti has already rejected Richard's
further fact, as i n Irenaeus, haer 1,8,2: Kou Ta
contention that they simply mistook the sense of the word: "it is hard to think
KO&T)
5È oLÙxr\ç, a. eita^EV,
Terome, who
use
the phrase
"excipientibus notariis", which
e7tiaeaTjfiei£ia9-at TOV Kûptov çâaxouaiv èv T Ù araupij) "it was her sufferings (viz.
that two, so to speak, professional translators, who had lived long years in the
those of Sophia) which, they say, the Lord indicated on the Cross" This, I think,
East, knew Greek less well than Richard"
8
is the nearest we come to Richard's required sense of "revealing" something that at first sight lies hidden; but there is a clear distinction between this and the
R S L R 24 (1988) 181, repeated almost verbatim in ST 1,11
m
III 147
Marcel Richard on Malchion and Paul of Samosata
148
I agree with this judgement, and submit that my examination of the word goes far to confirm i t I n particular I w i l l make three points:
texts which profess to reproduce a dialogue between him and Malchion (esp f r r 22,36) must of course be spurious But this conclusion by no means follows It
(1) Although my list, compiled from easily accessible indexes, is not markedly
would be quite natural at the Council to give evidence of Paul's opinions by
longer than Richard's (for writers down to Eusebius he gives 10 instances,
citing the records of earlier debates, the Xôyoi xtxî Ç7]TTiaeiç of H E VII,28,2
discounting Plutarch, I
Indeed it would be more effective to quote such statements, made in the
give 20, besides
an
additional 4 to
the
noun
eTUCTr]|iEi(oai<;) my list is strengthened for precisely those authors which Rufinus and Jerome are bound to have read; 7 + 1 for Origen, 3 + 2 for Eusebius, as against 2 in each case
(2) Richard, as we have seen, attaches great importance to the use of the single word Çf)TT]civ, used he thinks to signify the "enquête judiciaire" conducted
(2) M y list includes Origen's Fourteenth Homily on Jeremiah, which Jerome translated. A t the relevant point our only Greek
presence of witnesses, than to rely on the testimony of Richard's "informers"
manuscipt
by Malchion at H E. VÏI,29,2, as distinct f r o m the double plural Xoyoi x a i
reads ETCEE
ÇTiTYjOEii; x a t BiaXo-youç, H E. VI,33,2, cf § 3 Obviously, if Paul were not
eoTifieiaiaafiev, but Jerome clearly read £7rErrr)fi£Ltoaa.(iEv, which he translated,
present, there could be no reference to a dialogue But Richard goes to great
quite correctly, as "annotavimus"; and his reading has been adopted by the editor,
lengths to deny any analogy with the case of Beryllus, or with the recently
E Klostermann, for the GCS text. The sense of "observing", "taking note", which
discovered conversations between Origen and Heraclides No doubt there is a
we have seen is frequent in Origen, is obviously close to that of "taking down
difference, i n that these two conversations ended in agreement; and a further
notes" which Jerome and Rufinus give to the word i n connection with Malchion
difference if Paul refused to attend the final Council But there seems to me a
(3) Richard's interpretation of e7ttcrYj[i.eiovio-&ai presumes that both Rufinus
touch of na'ivetée in Richard's unquestioning acceptance of Eusebius' estimate of
and Jerome wholly overlooked its connection with the simple verb O^[A£IQUCJ9-OU
Paul (p. 331): "Bérylle et Héraclide étaient de bonnes évêques, qui enseignaient
and the analogous compound uTroariii£toua&a.i The simple verb occurs not very
de bonne f o i une doctrine erronée et ne songeaient pas à s'en cacher Paul de
seldom i n both Origen and Eusebius. Clement of Alexandria uses the noun
Samosata, au contraire, se dérobait devant les accusations portées contre lui et
uTtoarifiEiwati;, A n d both it and the verb u7torjr)fi£ioua&at are indisputably used
le problème était de prouver 1' objectivité de ces accusations" Only Malchion
in the sense of "taking notes", the noun at Diogenes Laertius 2,122, the verb at
succeeded " à prendre V accusé en flagrant délit (
2,48;' cf also Origen, Cels proem. 6
I have devoted some space to a modest, though necessary, philological task Let me conclude with a few more general observations. (1) Richard suggests that Paul may not have been present at the final Council which pronounced his deposition (pp. 336,337 and no 25); the notice at H E VII,30,19 that Aurelian referred the question to the Bishops of Italy and Rome might suggest that he thought the authority of the Council diminished by Paul's absence A hasty reader would infer that if Paul refused to present himself, the
Richard himself refers to these passages, cited by chapters as 2,13. 2,6 at 330 n 9, noting correctly that there can be no question of stenography in Xenophon s time, but does not deny that they refer to taking notes
9
himself at the Council'? This would not follow, since Eusebius can use tpopàv quite generally of an accusation proved by written argument, e g E T 1,20,40; I I I , 3,47 But what concerns me more is that Richard's account of the events makes no allowance whatever for any polemical bias on the part of Eusebius when he speaks of Paul's "duplicity" We should not overlook the possibility that Paul's accusers were simply puzzled; they were convinced that his teaching was unacceptable, but could not identify it with any of the heresies which they
III
Ill 149
150
Marcel Richard on Malchion and Paul of Samosata
and can be seen in
certainly recognized such a soul ( f r r . 15,17 Sp.) whereas there is no direct
Eusebius himself, who generally brands Paul as an adoptianist and Marcellus as
evidence that Marcellus did so. But if Eusebius looked up the acta around 330
a Sabellian, though sometimes arguing that the latter's theology, per contra,
A D , it becomes easier to suppose that they were used by the homoeousian party
makes h i m a Paulianist
i n 358-9; at all events we have gone some way towards closing the gap between
already recognized
This technique is familiar enough,
10
1J
(3) A much better account of Paul is given by Eusebius in the Ecclesiastical Theology 1,14 If I read h i m right, he recognizes four separate heresies and
268 and 429 - So much by way of tentative positive suggestions as an appendix to my main demolitionary task
distinguishes Paul's teaching from that of Sabellius, from adoptíonism, and from
Dormitat Homerus! Richard at his best is so superbly perceptive as well as
the theology of Marcellus: (1) Sabellius teaches one sole Godhead (§1) but
learned that his less distinguished performances have carried a conviction they do
identifies the Father with the Son (§3); (2) the "Ebionites" confess one God and
not deserve
do not deny the Saviour's body (i.e. bodily reality) but fail to recognize the Son's
Riedmatten's case will not easily be persuaded to change their views But I
divinity; (3) Paul, although he teaches that fesus is the Christ of God,
submit that Richard's attempt to discredit it must be pronounced a failure Paul
and
confesses one Almighty God like Marcellus, was condemned because he did not
Scholars who have accoustomed
of Samosata can once again emerge from the shadows
confess that Christ was both Son of God and God before his generation in the flesh (xaí TÓV ZapioaaTÉa Sé, xaírcep Tr¡aouv TÓV XptaTÓv TQÜ 8-EOÍJ eívai SiSáaxovTa, S-eóv TE EVO. TÓV EÍIÍTCÓIVTDJVb^oítúd opLoXoyoOvTa MapxéXXíp, éicxXTjo-íac TOÜ 9-eoO aXXÓTpiov a7ré
TT¡Q
xai
uEov 9-EOÜ x a i 9-eov rcpó xíjs évaápxou Y£véae
See my paper Rethorical Method in Athanasius': VigChr 30 (1976) 121-37, reprinted in my Substance and Illusion in the Christian Fathers, London 1985, no VIII, esp 131-3, where I show that these techniques were widely practised " The Greek is T<X Tea h auxip U7ri86(i£vac; MapxeXXac rcaS-etv, where UIUS6[A£V0(; must be understood as a passive; '(rightly) suspected of the same fault"; the middle voice would translate, improbably, as ' suspecting that he himself was in the same case
themselves to dismissing de
10
ia
So Simonetti, R S L R 24 (1988) 182
IV
IV A R I U S
I N M O D E R N
ARIUS
R E S E A R C H
T H E R E is n o need t o a r g u e t h e c r u c i a l i m p o r t a n c e of t h e A r i a n controversy i n the early d e v e l o p m e n t o f C h r i s t i a n doctrine, and m u c h n e w l i g h t has b e e n t h r o w n o n i t s h i s t o r y i n r e c e n t years Y e t t h e m o t i v e s a n d i n t e n t i o n s o f A r i u s h i m s e l f are s t i l l d i s p u t e d I have taken the o p p o r t u n i t y to reconsider t h e m i n a f a i r l y n o n technical style, reproducing a lecture generously commissioned b y t h e U n i v e r s i t y o f M a i n z I s h a l l c o n s i d e r t h r e e s u b j e c t s : our e v i d e n c e for A r i u s ' d o c t r i n e ; t h e m a i n i n t e n t i o n of h i s t h e o l o g y ; a n d h i s r e l a t i o n to earlier t h i n k e r s I w i l l m a k e s o m e i n t r o d u c t o r y r e m a r k s o n each o f these p o i n t s i A l i u s ' w r i t i n g s have n o t s u r v i v e d in extenso. O u r k n o w l e d g e o f his t h o u g h t d e p e n d s o n t h r e e sources (a) W e h a v e l e t t e r s w r i t t e n b y A r i u s , w h i c h d i f f e r n o t a b l y i n t h e i r o c c a s i o n a n d t h e i r e m p h a s i s . T h e earliest, O p t i z Urkunde i, is a s h o r t n o t e w r i t t e n t o a n i n f l u e n t i a l f r i e n d , i n w h i c h A r i u s c o m p l a i n s t h a t he has b e e n u n j u s t l y t r e a t e d b y h i s b i s h o p , A l e x a n d e r , a n d sets o u t some p o i n t s of d i s a g r e e m e n t T h e n e x t , Urkunde 6, is a r e s p e c t f u l a p p r o a c h t o A l e x a n d e r i n w h i c h A r i u s explains his theology i n m o r e accommodating terms, apparently i n t h e h o p e of s e c u r i n g t o l e r a t i o n . T h e t h i r d , Urkunde 30, is a s h o r t credal statement addressed to the E m p e r o r Constantine, w h i c h a v o i d s all c o n t r o v e r s i a l p o i n t s T h e f i r s t t w o l e t t e r s w e r e w r i t t e n £ . 3 2 0 A D . , t h e t h i r d , I b e l i e v e , c 333;' i t r e s u l t e d , o f c o u r s e , i n the E m p e r o r ' s w i t h d r a w i n g the condemnation imposed on A r i u s b y t h e C o u n c i l of N i c a e a A f e w phrases f r o m a f o u r t h letter are q u o t e d b y C o n s t a n t i n e ; see O p i t z Urkunde 34 (b) W e h a v e s o m e r e m a i n s o f t h e Thalia, a composition in verse i n w h i c h A r i u s p r e s e n t s h i s t h e o l o g y i n f o r c i b l e t e r m s T h e first seven lines are q u o t e d b y A t h a n a s i u s i n h i s ' F i r s t O r a t i o n against t h e A l l a n s ' , p u b l i s h e d p e r h a p s c 340 A D , s o m e t w e n t y years after t h e p o e m was w r i t t e n . T w e n t y years later again A t h a n a s i u s q u o t e d s o m e f o r t y - t w o lines i n h i s w o r k De Synodis, a l o n g w i t h o t h e r A r i a n d o c u m e n t s T h i s , I b e l i e v e , is v a l u a b l e evidence. (c) T h e r e is a g r e a t mass of m a t e r i a l i n t h e f o r m of r e p o r t s a n d c r i t i c i s m s of A r i u s ' d o c t r i n e b y A l e x a n d e r a n d e s p e c i a l l y b y Athanasius I t i n c l u d e s t w o l e t t e r s w r i t t e n i n t h e n a m e of A l e x a n d e r a n d n u m e r o u s s u m m a r i e s b y A t h a n a s i u s , all p h r a s e d i n r o u g h l y s i m i l a r t e r m s T h e m o s t i n f l u e n t i a l of these has been t h e r e p o r t , based o n t h e Thalia, w h i c h A t h a n a s i u s p r e s e n t s i n his See Annik Martin, RHE
34 2 (1980), 31Q n 2, against Opitz
{327)
RESEARCH
25
' F i r s t O r a t i o n ' , c h a p t e r s 5 and. 6. N o t a l l o f t h i s r e p o r t is r e l i a b l e . I t i n c l u d e s q u o t a t i o n s , or a l l e g e d q u o t a t i o n s , f r o m t h e w r i t i n g s of A r i u s a n d o f h i s c o l l e a g u e A s t e r i u s . B u t these are i n t e r s p e r s e d w i t h h o s t i l e c o m m e n t s , a n d w e also hear o f r e m a r k s t h r o w n off i n c o n v e r s a t i o n b y u n n a m e d A r i a n p a r t i s a n s S c h o l a r s i n t h e past h a v e b e e n far t o o r e a d y t o t r e a t a l l t h i s e v i d e n c e as e q u a l l y v a l i d . I n p a r t i c u l a r , t h e y h a v e p r e f e r 1 e d t h e i n d i i e c t e v i d e n c e of A t h a n a s i u s t o p r o b a b l e q u o t a t i o n s f r o m A r i u s , w h o is a h e r e t i c 2 A r i u s ' c h i e f t h e o l o g i c a l i n t e r e s t , i t has l o n g been s u p p o s e d , was t o u p h o l d t h e u n i q u e d i g n i t y o f G o d t h e F a t h e r , e s p e c i a l l y i n c o m p a r i s o n w i t h t h e d i v i n e L o g o s A l e x a n d r i a n t h e o l o g y at this t i m e was p l u r a l i s t ; i t i n s i s t e d t h a t t h e S e c o n d a n d T h i r d Persons of t h e T r i n i t y were real a n d substantial beings, and n o t mere energies 01 f u n c t i o n s o f t h e F a t h e r , A l e x a n d e r f o l l o w e d O r i g e n i n h o l d i n g t h a t t h e L o g o s was e t e r n a l l y g e n e r a t e d f r o m t h e F a t h e r ; h e d i f f e r e d f r o m O r i g e n i n a s c r i b i n g t o h i m e q u a l d i g n i t y and p o w e r A r i u s r e j e c t e d b o t h these d o c t r i n e s T o m a k e t h e L o g o s c o e t e r n a l a n d e q u a l l y d i v i n e , h e t h o u g h t , was t o p r e a c h t w o G o d s ; t h e L o g o s m u s t be seen as j u n i o r , as r a d i c a l l y i n f e r i o r a n d s u b o r d i n a t e t o t h e F a t h e r T h i s v i e w is s t r o n g l y expressed i n A r i u s ' f i r s t letter a n d i n t h e Thalia fragments N e v e r t h e l e s s A l i u s expresses t h i s d o c t r i n e w i t h i n c e r t a i n l i m i t a t i o n s H e d e s c r i b e s t h e L o g o s , i n I s a i a h ' s w o r d s , as 'a m i g h t y G o d ' A l t h o u g h j u n i o r t o t h e F a t h e r , a n d c r e a t e d b y h i m , the L o g o s was c a l l e d i n t o b e i n g b e f o r e a l l c r e a t i o n a n d e x e c u t e d the F a t h e r ' s c r e a t i v e w o r k So m u c h is r e p e a t e d l y d i s c l o s e d b y Athanasius B u t A r i u s appears t o h a v e b e e n i n c o n s i s t e n t H e e m p h a s i z e d t h e lesser d i g n i t y o f t h e L o g o s b y p o i n t i n g to h u m a n l i m i t a t i o n s w h i c h he u n d e r w e n t as i n c a r n a t e i n Jesus: s u f f e r i n g , u n c e r t a i n t y , t h e need f o r d e c i s i o n , a n d t h e l i k e I t m i g h t s e e m t h a t a L o g o s w h o was, n e x t t o t h e F a t h e r , t h e s u p r e m e a r c h i t e c t of t h e u n i v e r s e s h o u l d eo ipso be w i s e a n d p o w e r f u l a n d p r o o f against h u m a n weakness N e v e r t h e l e s s A r i u s , or s o m e o f h i s f o l l o w e r s , d e s c r i b e d t h e L o g o s as, i n i m p o r t a n t respects, s u b j e c t t o o u r i n f i r m i t i e s ; the o p p o s i n g p a r t y seized o n these a d m i s s i o n s , a n d c o m p l a i n e d that he considered the L o g o s a mere man, n o m o r e t h a n a m a n 2
I t was t h i s side o f A r i u s ' d o c t r i n e t h a t was t a k e n u p b y t w o A m e r i c a n scholars, R o b e r t G r e g g a n d Dennis G r o h I n their v i e w t h e m a i n c o n c e r n o f A l i u s was n o t t o s u b o r d i n a t e t h e L o g o s t o t h e F a t h e r , b u t t o offer a d i s t i n c t i v e a p p r o a c h t o s a l v a t i o n T h e 3
2
n 1
I N M O D E R N
3
R Lorenz, 'Die Christusseele i m arianischen Streit', ZKG (1983), r-51; 36 198 citing Urk. 30 2; 34 14, 32; also much indirect evidence R Gregg and D G r o h , Early Arianhm, a View of Salvation (London, 1981)
IV
IV ARIUS
26 A r i a n L o g o s , t h e y t h i n k , is c o n c e i v e d as a m o r a l l y p e r f e c t m a n , subject to our h u m a n l i m i t a t i o n s , a n d s h o w i n g us b y his example h o w those l i m i t a t i o n s c a n b e o v e r c o m e . T h i s v i e w has m e t w i t h s o m e c r i t i c i s m ; b u t i t has b e e n g i v e n a c a u t i o u s w e l c o m e b y D r R u d o l f L o r e n z . H e has e x p r e s s e d i t i n t h e p r e g n a n t p h r a s e ' A r i u s ist I s o c h r i s t ' H e does n o t m e a n , o f c o u r s e , t h a t A r i u s w a s t h e e q u a l o f C h r i s t ; n o r i n d e e d t h a t h e c l a i m e d t o b e so H e m e a n s t h a t , i n A r i u s ' v i e w , m e n are capable o f a t t a i n i n g e q u a l i t y w i t h C h r i s t ; a n d t h i s e n t a i l s , c o n v e r s e l y , t h a t A l i u s assigns n o greater d i g n i t y to C h r i s t than a perfect m a n c o u l d attain. 4
3 L o r e n z agrees w i t h G r e g g a n d G i o h t h a t A r i u s ' m a i n i n t e r est lies i n C h r i s t o l o g y ; a n d h e seems t o accept t h e i r v i e w t h a t A r i u s ' C h r i s t o l o g y is a n a d o p t i o n i s t o n e , ' a d o p t i a n h t u c K These p o i n t s ar e associated w i t h a d i s t i n c t i v e v i e w o f A r i u s ' antecedents L o r e n z h o l d s t h a t A r i u s ' d o c t r i n e o f t h e L o g o s is i n f l u e n c e d b y O r i g e n ' s teaching o n t h e s o u l of C h r i s t , rather t h a n b y Origen's L o g o s d o c t r i n e i t s e l f F u r t h e r m o r e , h e b e l i e v e s t h a t A l i u s stands i n a line o f t r a d i t i o n w h i c h derives f r o m Paul of Samosata B o t h these s u p p o s i t i o n s l e n d s u p p o r t t o t h e v i e w t h a t A r i u s teaches an adoptionist Chr istology s
6
I h a v e d e s c r i b e d these p o i n t s v e r y b r i e f l y , as I m e a n t o r e t u r n t o t h e m later F o r t h e m o m e n t I w i l l say t h a t t h e s u g g e s t i o n a b o u t t h e s o u l o f t h e L o g o s is m o s t i n t e r e s t i n g a n d s u g g e s t i v e ; b u t i t i n v o l v e s c o m p l i c a t i o n s w h i c h D r L o r e n z m a y p e r h a p s have o v e r l o o k e d . B u t t o p r e s e n t P a u l o f S a m o s a t a as a f o r e r u n n e r o f A r i u s is a n idea w h i c h , I m u s t confess, I b e l i e v e t o b e t o t a l l y misconceived I n o w r e t u r n t o m y first t o p i c , our evidence for A r i u s ' theology. S c h o l a r s i n t h e past h a v e r e l i e d o n t h e t e s t i m o n y o f A t h a n a s i u s and Alexander , and Lorenz followed t h e m i n his fascinating book Arius Judaizans? w r i t t e n i n 1979. H e e x h i b i t e d t h i s t e s t i m o n y i n a s y s t e m o f e i g h t h e a d i n g s , w h i c h has b e e n w i d e l y a d o p t e d . S i n c e t h a t t i m e h e has d o n e m e t h e h o n o u r o f g i v i n g c a r e f u l a t t e n t i o n t o a n essay o f m i n e i n w h i c h I p u t f o r w a r d a v e r y d i f f e r e n t v i e w . I n fact I have entered this discussion w i t h three p r i n c i p a l c o n t r i b u t i o n s M y essay o f 1976, ' R h e t o r i c a l M e t h o d i n A t h a n a s i u s ' , attempted t o show that Athanasius was n o t objectively r e p o r t i n g facts f o r t h e b e n e f i t o f f u t u r e h i s t o r i a n s ; h e was e n g a g e d i n a b i t t e r 7
8
'Christusseeie' 3, cf 41 n 250. Ibid 3, cf. 40 f , 48 R Lorenz, Arius Judaizam? (Gbttingen 1979) 128, cf 'Christusseeie' 48. See n. 2. Vig Christ 30 (1976), 121-37; JTS, N S , 29 (1978), 20-52; ibid 39 (1988), 76-91 4
5
6
7
IN MODERN RESEARCH
27
c o n t r o v e r s y , a n d w a s n o t a b o v e u s i n g t h e p o l e m i c a l devices a l l o w e d b y t h e c o n v e n t i o n s o f h i s t i m e I f m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n served h i s t u r n , h e w o u l d m i s r e p r e s e n t A s e c o n d essay o f r978, o n t h e Thalia, c l a i m e d t h a t OUT b e s t i n f o r m a t i o n o n t h a t w o r k i s t h e e x t r a c t s p r e s e r v e d i n A t h a n a s i u s de Synodis 15, t o w h i c h I w i l l r e t u r n M o s t r e c e n t l y , i n r988, I argued that o n e of t h e letters a t t r i b u t e d t o B i s h o p A l e x a n d e r , b e g i n n i n g ' Evoq G<s>\iaxoq, is i n f a c t t h e w o r k o f A t h a n a s i u s T h i s also affects L o r e n z ' s a r g u m e n t , since he c o u l d c l a i m t h a t o n s o m e p o i n t s t h e t e s t i m o n y of A t h a n a s i u s is c o n f i r m e d b y t h a t o f A l e x a n d e r B u t t h e i r a g r e e m e n t is m u c h r e d u c e d i f w e a d m i t t h a t o n l y t h e l o n g e r l e t t e r , ' H fyiXapxoq, w a s a c t u a l l y c o m p o s e d b y A l e x a n d e r L o i e n z cites i t m u c h less, a n d i t s a g r e e m e n t w i t h A t h a n a s i u s is i n d e e d m u c h less close T h e l i n g u i s t i c a r g u m e n t s f o r m y v i e w , I s t i l l t h i n k , are i r r e f u t a b l e ; i f s o m e scholars h a v e b e e n s c e p t i c a l , i t is m a i n l y because m y v i e w c o n f l i c t s w i t h a c o m m o n v i e w o f A t h a n a s i u s ' a c t i v i t y , n a m e l y t h a t h e w r o t e n o t h i n g u n t i l after h e became b i s h o p i n 328; w h e r e a s I p r e s e n t h i m as w r i t i n g a n i m p o r t a n t d o g m a t i c letter at t h e age o f l i t t l e m o r e t h a n t w e n t y ; i n C h a r l e s Kannengiesser's w o r d s , I make h i m a sort o f theological M o z a r t ! A c c o r d i n g l y , n e x t t o t h e letters of A r i u s himself, o u r most r e l i a b l e s o u r c e is t h e Thalia f r a g m e n t s o f de Synodis 15 W e have s o m e f o r t y - t w o lines w r i t t e n i n rather c r u d e verse. I w a s w r o n g i n t r y i n g t o i d e n t i f y t h e i r m e t r e as anapaestic; since t h e n Professor M . L W e s t has d e s c r i b e d i t as S o t a d e a n , w h i c h agrees w i t h A t h a n a s i u s ' r e m a r k s i n t h e ' F i r s t O r a t i o n ' a n d elsewhere B u t a m e t r i c a l s t r u c t u r e , w h a t e v e r i t b e , suggests t h a t A r i u s ' t e x t has b e e n p r e s e r v e d w i t h o u t s u b s t a n t i a l c h a n g e I m y s e l f see these l i n e s as a sequence o f d i s c o n n e c t e d f r a g m e n t s ; A t h a n a s i u s has i n f a c t selected those l i n e s w h i c h g i v e a n o p e n i n g t o c r i t i c i s m , so t h a t a l m o s t a l l o f t h e m c o r r e s p o n d t o o b j e c t i o n s w h i c h h e has d e v e l o p e d e l s e w h e r e I t is m o s t u n l i k e l y t h a t A l i u s c o u l d have w r i t t e n a t h e o l o g i c a l p o e m i n w h i c h e v e r y l i n e w a s o f f e n s i v e to o r t h o d o x sentiment; b u t i f t h e i e were inoffensive lines, i t w o u l d s u i t A t h a n a s i u s ' p u r p o s e t o o m i t t h e m W h a t t h e n was t h e e x t e n t o f t h e o r i g i n a l p o e m ? W e h a v e n o m e a n s o f k n o w i n g I f pressed f o r a n a n s w e r , I w o u l d c o n s i d e r i t u n l i k e l y t h a t i t was less t h a n r o o lines 01 m o r e t h a n 500; b u t I m u s t e m p h a s i z e t h a t t h i s is mere conjecture, 9
T h e d o c t r i n a l i m p o r t a n c e o f t h i s f i n d i n g is t h a t t h e Thalia fragments p r o v i d e a check o n Athanasius' t e s t i m o n y , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n t h e ' F i r s t O r a t i o n ' , c h a p t e r s 5 a n d 6, w h i c h has l o n g b e e n t a k e n
8
9
JTS
32 (1982), 98-106.
IV ARIUS
28 t o b e t h e best source A t o n e p o i n t i t is c o m p l e t e l y c o n f i r m e d : A l i u s does i n d e e d , i n h i s o w n w o r d s , p r o c l a i m t h e i n f e r i o r i t y of the Logos a n d his substantial unlikeness t o t h e Father i n just the w a y t h a t A t h a n a s i u s c o n d e m n s ; t h o u g h n o d o u b t h e also p r a i s e d t h e F a t h e r i n lines w h i c h w e h a v e l o s t A t another p o i n t A t h a n a s i u s is c l e a r l y at f a u l t ; A l i u s d e s c r i b e s t h e m a n y STtivotai o f t h e S o n i n t e r m s w h i c h r e s e m b l e O r i g e n ' s ; t h e s j t i v o i c a are f u n c t i o n a l t i t l e s o f d i g n i t y B u t A t h a n a s i u s t r e a t s these eTtivoioci as m e r e fictions or p r e t e n c e s , a n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e w o r d w h i c h is p o s s i b l e i n itself b u t e n t i r e l y u n j u s t i f i e d i n t h i s c o n t e x t I t is a d i s c o n c e r t i n g t h o u g h t t h a t A t h a n a s i u s insists o n a n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n w h i c h w i l l later b e f o u n d i n E u n o m i u s , w h e r e a s A r i u s agrees w i t h S t B a s i l . I n g e n e r a l , o n e m i g h t s u m m a r i z e t h e p o s i t i o n b y saying t h a t A t h a n a s i u s has s l i g h t l y , b u t p e r s i s t e n t l y , e x a g g e r a t e d t h e extent of A l i u s ' u n o r t h o d o x y N o apology can t u r n A r i u s into a C h r i s t i a n F a t h e r B u t h e is n o t h i n g l i k e t h e v i l l a i n t h a t t r a d i t i o n has m a d e o f h i m ; a n d at c e r t a i n p o i n t s , w h e r e h e m a d e u n w i s e p r o n o u n c e m e n t s , h e w a s later w i l l i n g t o r e t r a c t t h e m . 1 0
B u t c a n m y r e a d i n g o f t h e Thalia be c o n f i r m e d o n critical g r o u n d s ? I a m n o t aware t h a t t h e r e w a s w i d e s p r e a d dissent f r o m m y 1978 paper N e v e r t h e l e s s t h e r e are t w o scholars at least w h o h o l d s t r o n g l y d i s s e n t i n g v i e w s , w h i c h I w i l l a t t e m p t t o discuss F i r s t , m y greatly respected f r i e n d Charles Kannengiesser m a i n tains the t r a d i t i o n a l v i e w t h a t o u r p r i m e source f o r A r i u s ' teaching is t h e ' F i r s t O r a t i o n ' , c h a p t e r s 5 a n d 6; b u t h e has p r o p o s e d an e n t i r e l y n o v e l e x p l a n a t i o n o f t h e de Synodis m a t e r i a l H e sees i t as a n a r t i s t i c c o m p o s i t i o n d i s p l a y i n g a u n i f i e d s t r u c t u r e , w h i c h I m y s e l f c a n n o t detect. I t seems t o m e t o c o n t a i n a n u m b e r o f f r e s h starts a n d u n e x p l a i n e d t r a n s i t i o n s , as w a s o b s e r v e d l o n g ago b y Bardy, a n d as I h a v e a l r e a d y agreed A s to its content, K a n n e n g i e s s e r t h i n k s t h a t i t is a r e f o r m u l a t i o n o f t h e o r i g i n a l Thalia, m a d e s h o r t l y b e f o r e A t h a n a s i u s w r o t e t h e de Synodis, b y a w r i t e r w h o was m o v i n g t o w a r d s a n e o - A i i a n p o s i t i o n T h i s v i e w , I b e l i e v e , is w h o l l y d i s p r o v e d b y m e t r i c a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s T h e o r i g i n a l Thalia was c o m p o s e d i n v e i s e , as A t h a n a s i u s r e p o r t s B u t t h e v e r s i o n o f i t p r e s e n t e d i n h i s ' F i r s t O r a t i o n ' is a l m o s t e n t i r e l y u n m e t r i c a l I t m u s t therefore have diverged t o some extent f r o m 1 1
1 2
1 3
Cf U r k 6 z; Alexander, U r k u . 4 6 C Kannengiesser, Holy Scripture and Hellenistic Hermenéutica (Berkeley California, 1982), 14-20; R- C Gregg (ed.) 'Arianism' PMS 11 (1983), 59-78; E . Lucchesi and H D. Saffrey (eds.) Memorial A J Festugiére (Geneve, 1984), 1 0
11
143-Si Lucien, 255—7. 7 7 ^ 3 8 ( 1 9 8 7 ) , 199-201 1 2
1 3
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t h e o r i g i n a l t e x t . Y e t w e are t o l d t h a t a later w r i t e r b o t h r e f o r m u l a t e d A r i u s ' verses w i t h a n e w t h e o l o g y i n m i n d a n d r e i n t r o d u c e d t h e o r i g i n a l m e t r e W h e t h e r h e based h i s w o r k o n t h e o r i g i n a l text or o n A t h a n a s i u s ' p a r a p h r a s e , s u c h a p r o c e d u r e defies b e l i e f Kannengiesser's account m i g h t perhaps be t h o u g h t more acceptable i f t a k e n i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h t h e analysis o f t h e ' F i r s t O r a t i o n ' i t s e l f p r o p o s e d i n h i s Athanase, Eveque et Ecrivain, which suggests t h a t c h a p t e r s r - r o are a later a d d i t i o n , c o m p o s e d p e r h a p s i n t h e 350s ( o p . c i t p. 402). T h i s w o u l d m a k e t h e m r o u g h l y c o n t e m p o r a n e o u s w i t h t h e m a j o r w o r k s i n w h i c h A t h a n a s i u s cites a n u m b e r o f d o c u m e n t s verbatim A n d t h e s o l i t a r y appearance of 6u,oo6atOt; at i . 9 c o u l d b e s i m p l y e x p l a i n e d o n t h e h y p o t h e s i s of a later date B u t , as I h a v e a r g u e d w h e n r e v i e w i n g t h e b o o k i n t h i s j o u r n a l (36 r ^ 9 8 5 ) , 226 f ) , t h e s u b t r a c t i o n o f c h a p t e r s 1-10 ( w i t h 3 0 - 3 4 a n d p a r t s o f B o o k i i ) does n o t leave a c o n v i n c i n g remainder K a n n e n g i e s s e r argues f o r h i s r e d a t i n g o f c h a p t e r s r - 1 0 o n the g r o u n d t h a t t h e i r c o n t e n t is n o t d i s c u s s e d i n t h e later c h a p t e r s , w h i c h are m a i n l y c o n c e r n e d w i t h A s t e r i u s B u t t h i s f a c t , I t h i n k , can be s i m p l y explained w i t h o u t r e s o r t i n g t o theories of disloc a t i o n I f t h e ' F i r s t O r a t i o n ' a p p e a r e d , as w e agree, d u r i n g Athanasius' Second Exile, i t w o u l d be natural for h i m t o begin w r i t i n g w i t h the A l e x a n d r i a n situation i n m i n d and make A l i u s h i s p r i n c i p a l t a r g e t . B u t b e f o r e l o n g h e w a s at R o m e i n t h e c o m p a n y o f M a r c e l l u s , w h o h a d p r o v o k e d a f u r o r e b y his a t t a c k o n A s t e r i u s ; i n f a c t t h i s w o r k , a n d t h e r e p l i e s b y E u s e b i u s of Caesarea, w e r e a m a j o r cause o f s t r a i n e d r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n R o m e a n d t h e East. A s t e r i u s ' t h e o l o g y t h e r e f o r e m u s t h a v e b e e n a c t i v e l y d e b a t e d at R o m e , as w e l l as M a r c e l l u s ' a t t a c k , a n d A t h a n a s i u s ' s h i f t of o b j e c t i v e s is t h e r e b y e x p l a i n e d S e c o n d l y , D i R u d o l f L o i e n z has d o n e m e t h e h o n o u r o f subj e c t i n g m y rg78 p a p e r t o v e r y c a r e f u l d i s c u s s i o n ; he t r e a t s i t , i n d e e d , w i t h r e s p e c t , besides o f f e r i n g v a l u a b l e c o r r e c t i o n s Y e t for a l l i t s a c u i t y a n d l e a r n i n g , h i s paper s h o w s signs o f piecemeal c o m p o s i t i o n H e begins b y stating his v i e w o f A l i u s , u s i n g the t r a d i t i o n a l m a t e r i a l a n d t h e w e l l - k n o w n e i g h t headings H e t h e n deals v e r y f u l l y w i t h m y c r i t i c a l w o r k , a n d accepts some o f m y a r g u m e n t s ; b u t t h i s does n o t l e a d h i m t o reconsider t h e rather c o n s e r v a t i v e a c c o u n t o f A r i a n i s m t h a t h e has p r e v i o u s l y g i v e n H i s conclusion is presented i n notably moderate terms: 'Athanasius' reports contain i m p o r t a n t i n f o r m a t i o n , w h i c h should n o t b e d i s r e g a r d e d A r i a n i s m is n o t a n i n v e n t i o n o f o r t h o d o x p o l e m i c s ; a n d A r i u s is n o t t o b e b r a c k e t e d w i t h E u s e b i u s o f Caesaiea ' B u t t h i s sentence leaves i m p o r t a n t t r u t h s u n s a i d
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30 A t h a n a s i u s ' i n f o r m a t i o n is o f c o u r s e i m p o r t a n t a n d w o u l d be i n d i s p e n s a b l e i f w e h a d n o b e t t e r sources b y w h i c h t o c o r r e c t i t B u t at c e r t a i n p o i n t s , I h a v e a r g u e d , w e have b e t t e r sources, w h i c h e n a b l e us t o d e t e c t t h e e l e m e n t o f m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n t h a t r u n s t h r o u g h so m u c h o r t h o d o x p o l e m i c s , a n d so c o m e closer t o t h e r e a l A l i u s D r L o i e n z ' s i m p r e s s i v e c o n s t r u c t i o n is n o t f u l l y r e l i able because i t uses m a t e r i a l f o r w h i c h , u n f o r t u n a t e l y , s u c h c o r r e c t i v e s are l a c k i n g . I agree, o f c o u r s e , t h a t A l i u s m a d e p r o v o c a t i v e c l a i m s w h i c h E u s e b i u s a v o i d e d ; b u t n e i t h e r o f t h e m was w h o l l y c o n s i s t e n t or w h o l l y i n t r a c t a b l e T h e c o m p a r i s o n is i n t r o d u c e d , p r e s u m a b l y , because L o r e n z t h i n k s I h a v e b e e n t o o k i n d t o A r i u s B u t he s u r e l y w i l l n o t c l a i m t h a t I h a v e b e e n careless i n s c r u t i n i z i n g t h e evidence? T h i s account m u s t suffice; i t cannot be stretched t o include a detailed discussion o f texts W e t u r n , then, to the remaining topics, t h e i n t e n t i o n s o f A r i u s a n d h i s antecedents. H e r e D r L o r e n z makes the f o l l o w i n g four points. A r i u s derives his v i e w o f the L o g o s f r o m Origen's teaching on t h e soul of t h e L o g o s , r a t h e r t h a n t h e L o g o s h i m s e l f 2 I n O r i g e n , t h i s s o u l gains d i v i n e status b y a d o p t i o n . 3 A r i u s i n t h e Thalia declares t h a t t h e S o n was a d o p t e d 4. T h i s is c o n f i r m e d b y A l e x a n d e r ' s r e p o r t ( U r k 14 35 f ) w h i c h links A l i u s w i t h Paul of Samosata I t m a y be convenient to begin w i t h a r e m a r k o n the t e r m ' a d o p t i o n i s m ' , since L o r e n z has a t t r i b u t e d t h i s v i e w t o t h e A r i a n s . E n g l i s h scholars s p e l l t h e w o r d w i t h a s e c o n d ' o ' , ' a d o p t i o n i s m ' , so t h a t i t has n o a p p a r e n t c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h e h e r e t i c a l A d o p t i a n i l i k e E l i p a n d u s . . I n pr actice i t suggests t h a t s o m e o n e a t t a i n s a status w h i c h is n o t h i s b y n a t u r e t h r o u g h h i s o w n m o r a l e f f o r t a n d a c h i e v e m e n t . I t seems t h a t t h e G e r m a n t e r m Adoptianhmus gives m u c h t h e same i m p r e s s i o n . B u t a h i g h e r status n e e d n o t be gained b y a d o p t i o n ; s o m e m e n b e c a m e R o m a n e m p e r o r s s i m p l y b y seizi n g power o n the s t r e n g t h of their m i l i t a r y prestige Conversely, if a d o p t i o n takes p l a c e , i t n e e d n o t be a response t o r e c o g n i z e d m e r i t N o r m a l l y , o f c o u r s e , i t w i l l take place o n t h e d o u b l e g r o u n d of m e r i t i n t h e past a n d p r o m i s e f o r t h e f u t u r e B u t a d o p t i o n w h e r e t h e r e is n o p r o m i s e is p o s s i b l e ; one m i g h t i n sheer p i t y adopt a hopelessly d i f f i c u l t c h i l d A d o p t i o n o n performance only is also u n l i k e l y ; y e t a k i n g m i g h t a d o p t a n h o n o u r e d c o u n s e l l o r , say, o n h i s d e a t h b e d , so as t o cheer h i s last h o u r s w i t h t h e t h o u g h t that his c h i l d r e n w o u l d enjoy royal honours T h e n o r m a l situation is a d o p t i o n ex praevius mentis, r a t h e r as S a m u e l j u d g e d t h a t D a v i d w o u l d make a good king 1
B u t i f t h e essential p o i n t is t h a t s o m e o n e a t t a i n s d i v i n i t y b y
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his o w n effort, w e need a better t e r m ; i n E n g l i s h w e m i g h t perhaps speak o f ' p r o m o t i o n i s m ' , i n G e r m a n perhaps of Verbesserungstheologie; this w o u l d correspond w i t h Athanasius' accusations t h a t A r i u s c o n c e i v e d C h r i s t ' s goodness i n t e r m s o f 7tpoKOTtfi a n d fi&k%i(OGic, I t h i n k t h e r e m u s t be s o m e t r u t h u n d e r l y i n g these charges; b u t w e c a n n o t be s u r e , since at this p o i n t t h e r e is n o f i r s t - h a n d e v i d e n c e t o p r o v i d e a check o n the o p p o n e n t s ' r e p o r t s W h a t c a n b e said w i t h s o m e assurance is t h a t i t is m o s t u n l i k e l y t h a t A r i u s t h o u g h t o f s a l v a t i o n e x c l u s i v e l y i n e x e m p l a r i s t t e r m s A l m o s t a l l C h r i s t i a n t h i n k e r s e m p l o y a var iety o f c o n c e p t s a n d s y m b o l s t o i n t e r p r e t t h e m y s t e r y o f our s a l v a t i o n A n A r i u s w h o r e l i e d o n one alone is h a r d l y a c r e d i b l e figure. 1 4
L e t us t u r n , t h e n , t o t h e s u g g e s t i o n t h a t A r i u s ' v i e w o f the L o g o s derives f r o m Origen's treatment o f the soul of Christ. Lorenz provides a very careful and well-documented study, w h i c h c a n n o t be f u l l y c o n s i d e r e d i n t h i s p a p e r ; b u t I w i l l s u m m a r i z e i t as f o l l o w s r
F o r O r i g e n , t h i s s o u l , l i k e o t h e r s o u l s , is a c r e a t e d b e i n g ; t h o u g h its c r e a t i o n m u s t b e seen as a t i m e l e s s c o n d i t i o n 2. L i k e o t h e r s o u l s , i t has f r e e w i l l , a n d can act e i t h e r f o r the better or t h e w o r se 3. B u t t h e s o u l o f Jesus c o n s i s t e n t l y adheres t o t h e L o g o s i n l o v e , a n d so b e c o m e s t o t a l l y f u s e d w i t h h i m i n one s p i r i t . 4 T h i s s o u l t h e r e f o r e receives a l l t h e h o n o r i f i c t i t l e s t h a t o r i g i n a l l y belonged to the Logos, 5 T h e L o g o s assumed this soul i n order to become incarnate B u t t h e L o g o s r e m a i n s d i s t i n c t , a n d is u n a f f e c t e d b y t h e h u m a n emotions that attach to his soul. 6
T h i s soul's p e r s i s t e n c e i n w e l l - d o i n g is h e l d o u t to m a n k i n d as a n e x a m p l e f o r us t o f o l l o w . D r L o r e n z t h e n argues, i n a m u c h b r i e f e r p a r a g r a p h , t h a t A r i u s ' t e a c h i n g r e p r o d u c e s t h e p a t t e r n j u s t set o u t I f i n d this argument impressive and largely convincing N e v e r t h e l e s s t h e r e are s o m e r e s e r v a t i o n s t h a t n e e d to be m a d e r. O r i g e n ' s a c c o u n t is n o t as c o n s i s t e n t as L o r e n z m a k e s o u t . I n s o m e c o n t e x t s h e e m p h a s i z e s t h e t o t a l f u s i o n o f t h e s o u l of C h r i s t w i t h t h e L o g o s ; t h e y b e c o m e 'one s p i r i t ' , t h e y n e e d n o t be s e p a r a t e l y n a m e d , a n d so o n E l s e w h e r e , he d r a w s clear d i s t i n c t i o n s : t h e s o u l is a n i n s t r u m e n t o f t h e L o g o s ; t h e s o u l is passible, In some unpublished notes I have summarized Athanasius' salvation doctrine under some twenty headings Exemplaiist teaching is widespread For Origen, see Princ iv.4 4, p 354-26 F o r Athanasius, EF 2. 5, 10.7, Bp Marc 13 (of Christ's earthly life); also c Ar iii 20 (ureoypttuiioc, from r Pet 2: 21) of Christ's unity with the Father 1 4
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the Logos impassible M o r e o v e i , O i i g e n is u n c l e a i as t o t h e m o m e n t at w h i c h t h e i r u n i o n takes place I n t h e de Principiis ü 6.3, i n R u f i n u s ' t r a n s l a t i o n , i t takes place principaliter; Lorenz paraphrases i t ' v o n A n f a n g der S c h ö p f u n g a n h ä n g t sie u n z e r t r e n n l i c h d e m S o h n G o t t e s a n ' , etc B u t i n C- Cels i i . 9 i t is u n i t e d 'after t h e I n c a r n a t i o n ' . H o w t h e n was i t before? W a s i t n o t y e t i n b e i n g , or n o t y e t o b e d i e n t ? 1 5
1 6
T h e r e is a c o m p l i c a t i o n h e r e O i i g e n h o l d s t h a t our a c t i o n s are f r e e , b u t y e t are f u l l y f o r e s e e n b y G o d I d o n o t m y s e l f t h i n k t h i s c o n j u n c t i o n is p o s s i b l e ; b u t for t h e m o m e n t l e t us accept i t . I t does n o t t h e n f o l l o w t h a t a g o o d a c t i o n e t e r n a l l y f o r e s e e n b y G o d ensures u n c h a n g i n g goodness. I t m i g h t b e n e g a t e d b y another a c t i o n w h i c h G o d e q u a l l y foresees B u t undeviating goodness f o r e seen b y G o d is q u i t e a n o t h e r m a t t e r . T h e r e is n o u n c e r t a i n t y here w h i c h needs t o be d i s p e l l e d I t m a y b e t h a t A t h a n a s i u s has missed t h i s p o i n t H e argues, a b s u r d l y I t h i n k , t h a t o n t h e A r i a n v i e w t h e S a v i o u r d i d n o t b e c o m e L o g o s u n t i l h e h a d p e r f o r m e d the good w o r k s w h i c h secured his d i v i n i t y T h i s is l i k e s a y i n g t h a t D a v i d d i d n o t b e c o m e k i n g u n t i l he h a d succeeded i n r u l i n g w i s e l y , as S a m u e l f o r e t o l d 1 7
2 S o m e o f O r i g e n ' s a s s u m p t i o n s are c l e a r l y n o t shared b y A l i u s , a f a c t w h i c h c o u n t s against L o r e n z ' s e m p h a s i s o n his dependence A r m s clearly d i d believe i n G o d ' s total f o r e k n o w l e d g e ; t h i s p l a y s a n i m p o r t a n t p a r t i n his c o n c e p t i o n o f t h e Son's m o r a l c o n d i t i o n , as free i n p r i n c i p l e b u t u n d e v i a t i n g i n f a c t H e c l e a r l y d i d n o t b e l i e v e i n t h e e t e r n i t y of G o d ' s c r e a t i v e a c t i o n , a n d of t h e c r e a t u r e s t h e m s e l v e s T i m e is p a r t o f t h e order of c r e a t i o n , a n d o u t s i d e t h e t e m p o r a l o r d e r s u c h w o r d s as ' b e f o r e ' and 'after' become obscure and uncertain i n their application N e v e r t h e l e s s A r i u s insists o n a s s e r t i n g t h e p r i o r i t y of G o d over h i s c r e a t u r e s , i n c l u d i n g e v e n h i s S o n , w h o is p r i o r t o a l l t i m e , y e t ajcpovocx; ysvvriBeic; orco T O Ö jcaTpoc; O Ö K f\v npö too
IN M O D E R N R E S E A R C H
3.3
yswriQfivai H e r e L o r e n z v e r y perceptively points out observat i o n s b y O r i g e n w h i c h d o n o t square w i t h his g e n e r a l p i c t u r e , b u t are n o t u n l i k e A r i u s ' o p i n i o n s 3. T h e r e is o n e o b v i o u s o b j e c t i o n t o L o r e n z ' s v i e w A l i u s p l a i n l y believed i n the pre-existence of the L o g o s , t h o u g h n o t i n h i s e t e r n i t y ; t h i s is s h o w n b y h i s l i t e r a l acceptance of P r o v . 8: 22 B u t he c a n n o t h a v e b e l i e v e d i n t h e pre-existence o f souls. For Peter of A l e x a n d r i a is k n o w n t o have a t t a c k e d O r i g e n ' s d o c t r i n e at t h i s p o i n t , a n d A t h a n a s i u s repeats h i s c o n d e m n a t i o n I f Arius h a d accepted t h a t d o c t r i n e , i t is s u r e l y i n c o n c e i v a b l e t h a t Athanasius should have missed the o p p o r t u n i t y to c o n d e m n h i m 1 8
1 9
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I f is o f c o u r s e a c o m m o n o p i n i o n t h a t A r i u s d i d n o t a c k n o w l e d g e any s o u l i n Jesus. B u t I d o n o t r e l y o n t h i s o p i n i o n O u r o n l y f i r m e v i d e n c e f o r i t is a s t a t e m e n t b y E u s t a t h i u s o f A n t i o c h But A l i u s m u s t have f o u n d s o m e m e a n s o f i n t e r p r e t i n g t h e N e w T e s t a m e n t passages w h i c h refer t o C h r i s t ' s s o u l . H e c o u l d w e l l h a v e a c c e p t e d O r i g e n ' s d i c t u m : ' W h e n S c r i p t u r e wishes t o i n d i cate a n y s u f f e r i n g or t r o u b l e t h a t a f f e c t e d h i m , i t uses t h e w o r d " s o u l " , as w h e n i t says " N o w is m y s o u l t r o u b l e d " ' , a n d so o n O i i g e n t h u s dissociates t h e L o g o s f r o m s u f f e r i n g A t h a n a s i u s carries t h i s process f u r t h e r , a n d assigns t h e L o r d ' s s u f f e r i n g s t o his ' f l e s h ' H e c o u l d t h u s c o m p l a i n t h a t t h e A r i a n exegesis o f such texts associates t h e L o g o s t o o closely w i t h s u f f e r i n g ; he does n o t , a n d p i e s u m a b l y c o u l d n o t , c o m p l a i n t h a t the A r i a n s f a i l t o g r a n t the Logos a soul 2 1
T o s u m m a r i z e : A r i u s ' d o c t r i n e of t h e L o g o s was i n d e e d i n f l u e n c e d b y O r i g e n ' s v i e w s o n t h e s o u l o f C h r i s t . B u t one m u s t n o t s u p p o s e w h a t a careless r e a d i n g o f L o r e n z m i g h t easily suggest, t h a t he s i m p l y a d a p t e d O r i g e n ' s t e a c h i n g H e p l a i n l y d i v e r g e s at a c i u c i a l p o i n t , over t h e p i e - e x i s t e n c e o f souls i n g e n e r a l ; a n d he has n o c o n c e r n t o i n s u l a t e t h e L o g o s f r o m s u f f e r i n g T h e t r u t h is rather that O i i g e n expressed a n u m b e r of sharply divergent views; A r i u s adapted some and rejected others to f o i m his o w n synthesis. 22
Origen seems to hold both (i) that the soul of Christ is by nature like other souls, and so permanently distinct from the Logos, and (ii) that its moral union is unshakeable, so that it is permanently united For (i): it is created by the Logos, Print 171, Lorenz n 208 By nature intermediate: flesh/spirit, Co Rom 1 7 45; flesh/deity, ibid 1 7 55, Pnnc ii 6.3. So can do good or evil, Print Ü 6 5, Lorenz n 226, 235 Not by nature God, Cels n 9 init, cf. Princ ii 6. 5 Doesn't change its (created?) essence Cels iv 18 For (ii): It is united to G o d by its free choice, Princ ii 6, iv 4 4 (35413), Cels v 39; but its obedience has become second nature, Princ ii 6 5; it is so fused that it need not be distinguished or separately named, Cels vi 47, Princ iv 4 4 and tr 37; it is in substance divine, Princ ii.6 6 For the notion of acquired substance or 'second nature' see my Divine Substance p 148 n 18 'Christusseele' 38 C Ar . i 38 , s
1 6
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I shall deal r a t h e i b r i e f l y w i t h L o i e n z ' s t h i r d p o i n t H e detects a n act o f a d o p t i o n i n t h e w e l l - k n o w n c o u p l e t f r o m A r i u s ' s Thalia: a p % f j v x o v u i o v s0riKs i d i v yevvTiTuiv 6 a v a p ^ o t ; K a i f i v e y K e v etc; t r i d v eautcp TOV8S t e K v o T r o i f j a a c ; Urkunde 6 4. 'Christusseele' 38 n 223 O n time see R Williams Arius p 122 nn 55, 56; also 'Christusseele' 38 n 218 ref Princ ii 9 1 p. 164 1, eiuvoouuevn 4pxn Peter: Leontius of Byzantium c Monoph , Fr in Routh Rel Sacr iv.50. Athanasius ad Epict. 8, Vit. Ant 74. F r 15, de Riedmatten p roo. It was of course upheld by some later Arians So Lorenz, 'Christusseele' 38 n 223. 1 8
1 9
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A R I U S IN M O D E R N
A r g u m e n t n a t u r a l l y arises o n t w o p o i n t s : does TSKVOTTOIGVV m e a n 'to b e g e t ' o r ' t o a d o p t ' ? A n d does t h e c o u p l e t refer t o t w o separate d i v i n e acts, or t o a s i n g l e act w i t h a d o u b l e d e s c r i p t i o n ? L o r e n z t h i n k s that the first line denotes the begetting of the Son, and the s e c o n d r e f e r s t o a s u b s e q u e n t act o f a d o p t i o n But this interpreta t i o n is d i r e c t l y c o n t r a d i c t e d b y a p h r a s e i n A l i u s ' letter to A l e x a n d e r , Urkunde 6 3: t h e S o n r e c e i v e d f r o m t h e F a t h e r h i s l i f e and being and his d i g n i t i e s , w h i c h the Father b r o u g h t i n t o being s i m u l t a n e o u s l y w i t h h i m , t a t ; &6t,<xq fJuvuTcoaxficravTOt; auxtp xoo Ttaxpoc,. O f c o u r s e t h e o l o g i a n s c a n be i n c o n s i s t e n t , as I have s h o w n ; b u t I d o u b t i f A l i u s w o u l d have c o n t r a d i c t e d h i m s e l f at this vital p o i n t i n a carefully phrased dogmatic letter. 2 3
T h e r e r e m a i n s t h e q u e s t i o n of P a u l o f S a m o s a t a W e m a y start f r o m s o m e a c k n o w l e d g e d facts L u c i a n was h i g h l y r e g a r d e d b y A r i u s a n d h i s s y m p a t h i z e r s . L u c i a n is d e s c r i b e d as a successor of P a u l b y A l e x a n d e r o f A l e x a n d r i a ; t h o u g h t h i s r e p o r t lacks c o n f i r m a t i o n A r i u s is p o r t r a y e d b y A t h a n a s i u s as s h a r i n g t h e e r r o r s o f P a u l , b u t w e have n o s u r v i v i n g s t a t e m e n t b y A r i u s i n his favour. M y d i f f i c u l t y i n f o l l o w i n g D r L o r e n z is t h a t at a c r u c i a l p o i n t A r i u s seems t o have a g r e e d w i t h P a u l ' s accusers, r a t h e r t h a n w i t h Paul himself Certainly we must n o t make the mistake of t h i n k i n g t h a t , w h a t e v e r h i s accusers b e l i e v e d , P a u l a l w a y s t o o k t h e o p p o s i t e v i e w T h e r e a r e , i n f a c t , several p o i n t s o f a g r e e m e n t Paul's accusers a p p a r e n t l y h e l d a p l u r a l i s t i c t h e o l o g y r e s e m b l i n g t h a t of D i o n y s i u s o f A l e x a n d r i a . P a u l a g r e e d w i t h t h e m t o t h e e x t e n t of m a k i n g t h e L o g o s a d i s t i n c t p e r s o n a l b e i n g , i d e n t i f i a b l e w i t h the divine W i s d o m , and substantially distinct f r o m the Father. T h e m a i n p o i n t of d i f f e r e n c e was t h a t t h e accusers h e l d t h a t t h e d i v i n e W i s d o m was s u b s t a n t i a l l y p r e s e n t i n t h e m a n Jesus, or essentially u n i t e d w i t h h i m P a u l c o m p l a i n e d t h a t t h i s was e q u i v a l e n t t o m a k i n g t h e t w o i d e n t i c a l , so t h a t t h e h u m a n s u f f e r i n g s o f Jesus i m p i n g e d i r e c t l y o n t h e d i v i n e W i s d o m . H e h i m s e l f d r e w a sharp distinction between the divine Logos and the m a n b o r n of M a r y ; y e t he p r o t e s t e d t h a t h e h a d a n a d e q u a t e c o n c e p t of t h e i r u n i o n , w h i c h a v o i d e d t h e e r r o r of m a k i n g t h e m i d e n t i c a l T h e m a n Jesus was n o t p i e - e x i s t e n t ; o n t h e o t h e r h a n d h i s c o m i n g was foreseen and appointed b y the Father B u t t h i s s h a r p d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e L o g o s a n d t h e m a n is w h o l l y f o r e i g n to A r i u s ' t h o u g h t I f we t h i n k that he used the h u m a n sufferings o f C h r i s t t o p r o v e the i n f e i i o r i t y of the Logos, t h i s argues s o m e t h i n g l i k e a s u b s t a n t i a l u n i o n b e t w e e n t h e m ; we 2 3
Better in R. Williams Arius
p 102, n
40
RESEARCH
35
h a v e s h o w n t h a t h e d i d n o t use t h e s o u l , or t h e flesh, of C h r i s t as a n e f f e c t i v e b a n i e r b e t w e e n t h e m ; t h i s is t h e t r u t h u n d e r l y i n g E u s t a t h i u s ' c o m p l a i n t B u t t h e lack o f a n adequate d i s t i n c t i o n also e x p l a i n s t h e f a c t t h a t i t w a s p o s s i b l e t o m i s i e p i e s e n t A r i u s as a follower of Paul One of t h e m appeared t o believe i n a m a n guided m e i e l y b y e x t e r n a l i n s p i r a t i o n ; t h e o t h e r i n a passible L o g o s t o o m u c h e n t a n g l e d i n h u m a n l i m i t a t i o n s . B o t h t h e n were accused, though on totally different grounds, of making Christ a mere man I have h a d t o p r e s e n t P a u l ' s o p i n i o n s b r i e f l y a n d d o g m a t i c a l l y , i n a f o r m a p p r o p r i a t e t o a l e c t u r e . I h a v e c o n s u l t e d t h e t e x t s as p r e s e n t e d b y de R i e d m a t t e n , w h i c h I b e l i e v e t o be a u t h e n t i c , t h o u g h n o d o u b t selective A n d I h a v e t r i e d t o a v o i d some c o m m o n m i s c o n c e p t i o n s . I r e m e m b e r m y p u p i l s at O x f o r d asking m e w h e t h e r I t h o u g h t P a u l a n a d o p t i o n i s t 01 a S a b e l l i a n T h e answer I s h o u l d h a v e g i v e n is t h a t t h e s e are n o t t r u e a l t e r n a t i v e s ; b u t b o t h are p o l e m i c a l s t a t e m e n t s w h i c h a i e e x t r e m e l y r e m o t e f r o m t h e facts. P a u l n o d o u b t a t t a c h e d i m p o r t a n c e to t h e h u m a n acts o f Jesus, i n s t e a d o f m a k i n g h i m a m e r e m o u t h p i e c e o f the d i v i n e W i s d o m B u t he d i d n o t make h i m s i m p l y an i n s p i r e d man P a u l ' s W i s d o m f i g u i e is a s u b s t a n t i a l b e i n g , she has a d i g n i t y w h i c h m u s t be u p h e l d , she d w e l l s i n t h e m a n Jesus as i n a t e m p l e O n c e these facts are a d m i t t e d , t h e c h a r g e o f S a b e l l i a n i s m also collapses. W h e i e t h e n does L u c i a n fit i n t o t h e p i c t u r e ? H e r e I a m less certain; b u t I w i l l make a suggestion I start f r o m the f o l l o w i n g facts A r i u s r e g a r d e d L u c i a n as a r e s p e c t e d teacher N e x t , the v i e w s o f t h e L u c i a n i s t p a r t y s h o w s o m e r e s e m b l a n c e t o t h o s e of P a u l ' s accusers. B u t t h e c o n t e m p o r a r y b i s h o p s o f A n t i o c h , P h i l o g o n i u s a n d E u s t a t h i u s , ar e o p p o s e d t o t h e L u c i a n i s t s , t h o u g h t h e y are n o t , o f c o u r s e , p r e p a r e d to d e f e n d t h e m e m o r y o f P a u l . A t s o m e t i m e , t h e n , t h e r e m u s t have b e e n a r e v e r s a l o f t h e o l o g i c a l t r a d i t i o n at A n t i o c h . B u t w e d o n o t h e a i of a n y b r e a k i n the e p i s c o p a l succession I t m a y b e , t h e i e f o i e , t h a t B i s h o p D o m n u s , w h o succeeded P a u l , was n o t a n o u t r i g h t o p p o n e n t , b u t a n u n c o n t r o v e r s i a l figure c a l c u l a t e d t o appeal t o m o d e r a t e m e n o n b o t h sides T h i s w o u l d e x p l a i n w h y t h e a m b i t i o u s a n d i n f l u e n t i a l Paul left b e h i n d h i m no strong b o d y of s y m p a t h i z e s , b u t o n l y a quite i n s i g n i f i c a n t gr o u p o f P a u l i a n i s t s 2 4
For a telling defence see M Simonetti 'Per la Rivalutazione di alcnni Testimonianze su Paolo di Samosata', RSLR 24 (1988), 177-210. H e criticizes M. Richard's attack on the reliability of the fragments, in 'Malchion et Paul de Samosate, L e témoinage d' Eusébe de Cesarée', Eph Theol Lov 35 (1959), 325 ff I hope to reinforce this criticism; see H C Brennecke et al (edd ), Logos, Festschrift fur Luise Abramowski, Gottingen 1993, 140—50 2 4
IV
V
36 A s for L u c i a n , i f he r e a l l y was e x c o m m u n i c a t e d for the duration o f t h r e e episcopates, h i s f a l l m u s t h a v e t a k e n place v e r y soon after P a u l ' s e x p u l s i o n W e m a y see h i m , t h e n , as a n u n c o m p r o m i s i n g p l u r a l i s t , s t r o n g l y opposed t o P a u l , w h o w a s c o n d e m n e d because h e r e f u s e d t o accept t h e p o l i c y o f peace a n d a c c o m m o d a t i o n B y r e p r e s e n t i n g h i m as a successor t o P a u l , B i s h o p A l e x a n d e r means no m o r e t h a n t h a t he was t h e n e x t p r o m i n e n t troublemaker A l e x a n d e r n e e d e d t o g a i n t h e s u p p o r t o f E u s t a t h i u s a n d h i s allies, w h o w o u l d n o t altogether approve o f his p l u r a l i s t i c T r i n i t y , w i t h i t s b a r e l y - c o n c e a l e d d o c t r i n e o f t h r e e hypostases; so h e takes t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o d i s s o c i a t e h i m s e l f f r o m t w o teachers w h o m E u s t a t h i u s is sure t o d i s l i k e B u t w e n e e d n o t accept h i s i n s i n u a t i o n t h a t t h e t w o a g r e e d w i t h each o t h e r
Was Ar ius a Neoplatonist?*
2 5
Dr. R o w a n W i l l i a m s is h i g h l y respected b o t h as a theological scholar and as a master o f Christian spirituality; he has added to his distinction b y accepting the B i s h o p r i c o f M o n m o u t h ; he is moreover a personal friend, w h o has done me the honour o f dedicating to m e his b o o k o n A r i u s , published i n 1987 a n d w i d e l y regarded as the best overall study o f that much maligned theologian, I t is therefore w i t h some hesitance that I undertake to criticize a theory p r o pounded i n that book, namely that A l i u s was influenced b y Neoplatonist thinkers, i n c l u d i n g Plotinus, P o r p h y r y and l a m b l i c h u s , besides Anatolius a n d others I must appeal t o Proverbs 2 7 : 6 ' F a i t h f u l are the wounds o f a f r i e n d ' , recalling A r i s t o t l e ' s p a i n f u l resolve to c r i t i c i z e his f r i e n d s ' convictions (N..E 1.6) I t is unnecessary t o add that Dr. W i l l i a m s himself is a splendid exemplar of controversy conducted w i t h courtesy and i m p a r t i a l judgement. 1
I n a r g u i n g t h i s case, I h a v e d i v e r g e d a l i t t l e f r o m m y p r i n c i p a l t h e m e . M y p u r p o s e has b e e n t o a r g u e t h a t t h e t r a d i t i o n a l estimate o f A r i u s is t h e r i g h t o n e H i s m a i n c o n c e r n w a s t o u p h o l d t h e u n i q u e d i g n i t y o f G o d t h e F a t h e r i n t h e face o f a t t e m p t s t o g l o r i f y t h e L o g o s , as h e t h o u g h t , u n d u l y . T h i s i n t e r e s t is a b u n d a n t l y a t t e s t e d i n h i s s u r v i v i n g f r a g m e n t s I t is a l l o w a b l e , i f rather s t r a i n e d , t o say t h a t h i s m a i n i n t e r e s t w a s C h r i s t o l o g y . B u t t h e i d e a t h a t h e w a s m a i n l y c o n c e r n e d t o p r o p o u n d an exemplar ist t h e o r y o f s a l v a t i o n f i n d s l i t t l e or n o s u p p o r t i n h i s s u r v i v i n g f r a g m e n t s I v e n t u r e t o t h i n k t h a t w e have seen t h e e n d o f a m o s t interesting episode i n t h e h i s t o r y o f A r i a n scholarship; a n d that after D r L o r e n z n o scholar o f e q u a l d i s t i n c t i o n w i l l c o m e f o r w a r d to support this theory
The book was foreshadowed b y an article published i n the Journal of Theological Studies for A p r i l 1983, pp. 56-81, entitled "The L o g i c of A r i a n i s m ' T h e t w o presentations agree i n the m a i n ; and a reference to the article made early i n the book (p 31) may be quoted as an introduction to W i l l i a m s ' thesis, as i t is entirely typical o f his blend of cautious assertion w i t h b o l d theorizing. ' L i k e w i s e ' , he writes, although (Arius) is described as a skilled dialectician , w e cannot w i t h confidence reconstruct a philosophical education I f he was, as has been argued' — i n the article, of course — 'indebted to certain currents i n revived Aristotelianism and lamblichus' version o f Neoplatonism, he could have encountered such teaching i n Syria around 300, when lamblichus himself was teaching at A n t i o c h and Apamea' This, however modestly propounded, is a startling h y p o thesis; i t suggests that A r i u s , whose philosophical education is considered u n certain, consulted lamblichus, whereas his contemporary Eusebius, w h o is w e l l k n o w n as a student o f Greek philosophy, never even mentions lamblichus either i n his Praeparatio Evangélica or i n any other w o r k that I can discover 2
I agree with Bardy (Lucien 48) in seeing Lucian as an opponent of Paul, and in not pressing the sense of Alexander's 8ia8s£auevoc; (Urkunde 14 36) to indicate a formal succession (Lucien p 51 n 66); but I see no need to imagine two Lucians, which would rob Alexander's remark of its point in seeking to discredit a teacher revered by his Arian opponents 2 5
Part of this paper has already appeared in a Spanish version in D Ramos-Lisson et al (edd ), El Diálogo Fe-Cultura en la Antigüedad Cristiana (Pamplona. 1995), the record of a symposium held there under the auspices of the Faculty of Theology I am most grateful both for their generous hospitality and for permission to print ' Arius Heresy and Tradition By Rowan Williams (London 1987) The evidence is late: Socrates, H.E , 1.5, Sozomen, HE, Í 15.. Perhaps more significant is Constantine's reference to his profession of belief 'worked out in bold and extremely detailed terms', o-ofSapwc; root; icai \xáXa áKpipok; ¿^ncncT|uéva, Opitz Urk 34, § 8. 2
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Was Arius a Neoplatonist ?
The article puts forward three points i n favour of Neoplatonic influence o n A l i u s , each of them based o n a phrase to w h i c h he took exception The fust, at p. 5 8 , turns on the description o f the Son as 'integral to his Father's substance', xr\q xou Ttaxpoc; ouatac; 1610c;, w h i c h in Anus* opinion as Williams presents it w o u l d reduce the Son to a mere impersonal property or attribute The second, at p 6 3 , springs from the phrase uepoc; 6u.ooucn.ov, where Williams adduces a parallel in Iamblichus de mysteriis, illustrating the objectionable view that both Son and Father participate i n a prior divine ousia, w h i c h thus would be divisible and negate the divine simplicity This objection is w e l l k n o w n ; but the suggested parallel drawn f r o m Iamblichus is new and surprising The third point i n the article, at p 6 6 . begins from A n u s ' protest against the doctrine that Father and Son are equal i n rank, w h i c h he says w o u l d result i n t w o ingenerate'beings, 8i>o dyevv u x a Williams discusses this i n relation to the concept o f participation, u s x o x f l , as expounded by Aristotelian scholars; but I must postpone any detailed analysis The book does not reproduce the first t w o arguments that I have mentioned, though i t refers to t h e m and makes i t clear that W i l l i a m s was prepared to u p h o l d i n 1 9 8 7 the conclusions he had put out i n 1 9 8 3 I n their place we f i n d t w o n e w suggestions The first begins w i t h an excellent review o f ancient theories o f creation, and o f the Son's role i n i t W i l l i a m s adverts to the term Suae,, the D y a d , as applied to the Son, and tries to explain i t b y c i t i n g numerological treatises b y Anatolius and Iamblichus I t h i n k this is far-fetched, and prefer simpler explanations The second argument discusses the relation between G o d and his Logos, and i n particular the Son's l i m i t e d knowledge o f the Father, w i t h A n u s ' surprising comment that the Son does not k n o w his o w n ousia, let alone the Father's Here W i l l i a m s finds a background i n Plotinus' f i f t h Ennead; once again I remain unconvinced 3
In the third place the b o o k contains a chapter headed ' A n a l o g y and Particip a t i o n ' , w h i c h developes the t h i r d argument already presented i n the article W e m a y say that W i l l i a m s ' argument for Neo-platonic influence o n A r i u s is presented under f i v e headings, and i t w i l l be convenient to discuss them i n the f o l l o w i n g order: ( 1 ) and ( 2 ) , the first t w o points f r o m the article; ( 3 ) and (4), the first t w o points f r o m the b o o k ; and lastly, the concluding point f r o m b o t h w o r k s , w h i c h correspond closely enough to allow o f a single discussion ( 1 ) W i l l i a m s begins b y n o t i n g that A r i u s condemned the phrase ioioc; ir\q ouaiac;, w h i c h he says was 'current i n Alexander's c i r c l e ' as applied to the Logos I t w o u l d , he says, present the Logos as an idion o f the Father i n terms of A r i s t o t e l i a n l o g i c , and thus reduce h i m to a mere impersonal property. W i l l i a m s names Porphyry's hagoge as a l i k e l y source for this deduction, and adds the comment ' G i v e n A r i u s ' reputation for expertise i n l o g i c , i t seems perfectly possible that he was familiar w i t h the hagoge'*
I agree that the phrase was current i n Alexander's c i r c l e : but I d o not t h i n k it originates w i t h Alexander I t is n o t found i n his s u r v i v i n g texts Moreover Alexander seems concerned to m i n i m i z e the difference between the Father a n d the Son w h i l e emphasizing the real distinction between them They are x f j bnoaxdoei Suo asic/\ but the S o n is exactly l i k e the Father (£|i(pepfjc;) , l a c k i n g only the attribute &yevvr|xoc; T h e epithet tSioc; of course appears, notably in § 3 2 w h i c h cites Romans 8 : 3 2 B u t tStoc; xf\c, ouaiac, is especially characteristic o f Athanasius, and consorts w i t h his profoundly suggestive b u t m u c h less l o g i c a l v i e w w h i c h recognize the distinctness o f the L o g o s as S o n but also makes h i m integral to God's being as his Wisdom. Alexander no doubt c o u l d accept such teaching; but his o w n emphasis is perceptibly different. 6
7
It seems to me, rather, that the phrase embodies a reaction against A r i u s ' formulations, real or supposed; a reversal o f W i l l i a m s ' explanation Arius w r o t e in his Thalia the words: tStov ouSev e ^ s i t o o Oeou K a 9 ' UTtoaxamv iSioxnxoc;, an e n i g m a t i c phrase to w h i c h w e must r e t u r n Alexander paraphrases t h i s sentence i n § 1 3 of his letter *H tpiXapxoc;: ouxs y a p tpuast uioc; xic; £axt x o u 0 e o u , 9 a a i v , ouxe xivd e x w v ISioxTixa npbc, auxov, and the same charge is often repeated b y Athanasius i n looser and more polemical expressions, as i n c. AY. 1 6 , 6 Xoyoc; dAAoxpioc; p e v K & I dvournoc; Kaxd Jtdvxa xfjc, x o u Traxpdc; ouaiac; K a i ISIOTTIXOC; £ a x i v The words d v o p o i o c , . . xrjc; . ouaiac; read l i k e a response to A r i u s ' next f o l l o w i n g line ouSe ydp £ a x i v looq, a\,\* ouSs 6 u o o u a t o c ; auxto So far f have been presenting a f a i r l y minor disagreement w i t h W i l l i a m s o n the o r i g i n of the phrase 1810c, xfjc; ouaiac. The case i s very d i f f e r e n t when I t u r n to his comments o n the adjective 1810c; together w i t h its neuter form t S t o v or xo i'8tov; for his argument is gravely weakened b y a failure to distinguish between them. O n ISioc; he writes as f o l l o w s : "The point is s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d : d i v i n e properties are eternal and impersonal O f course G o d 'has' aocpia a n d A-oyoc;, but they are qualities belonging to his substance Thus to say that t h e Son is iSioc, to G o d is to reduce the Son t o being an impersonal quality A r i u s , i n short, is quite clear about the meaning of iStoc;; i t relates only to a q u a l i t y predicated o f a substance' W i l l i a m s then refers to P o i p h y r y ' s hagoge, where he says A r i u s c o u l d have f o u n d a discussion of the meaning of iStoc;, ' m a k i n g i t abundantly clear that iSioc; cannot be used o f something which is a substance i n its o w n r i g h t ' ; moreover a debt t o Porphyry m i g h t account f o r Constantine's reference to the A r i a n s as ' P o r p h y r i a n s ' 8
W i l l i a m s does not make it quite clear whether he h i m s e l f accepts the extraordinary doctrine that he attributes t o P o r p h y r y and A r i u s O f course 1810c;,
5
6
1
J
Op cil p 31, cf 189 196,223 llh S n s 34 (1983), p 60
4 1
7
8
Letter H (pUctpxo^, in Opitz Utk 14, § 38; cf §§ 15, 16, 52 Ibid. § 4 7 : cf § 38 Ibid § 19; cf § 47 I ThS 34 pp 59-60; cf Opitz Urk 33.
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Was Arius a Neoplatonist ?
being an adjective, does not ordinarily name a substance; but i t is normally 'used o f a substance' when i t is applied to a substance; w e need l o o k no further man Romans 8:32, 'God spared not his o w n S o n ' ; and the N e w Testament provides many other examples; i n St M a t t h e w alone w e find 'his o w n c i t y ' , 'his o w n country', 'his o w n field', 'his o w n slaves' There is no evidence whatever that A l i u s would have rejected this usage W i l l i a m s , then, has misled us b y careless formulation The adjective iStoq is essential to his argument, w h i c h begins f r o m the phrase I'Siog tfjc; oucrlag B u t he assumes that Porphyry's use o f i t is dictated b y what he says about its neuter f o r m TO i S t o v . H e refers to P o r p h y r y ' s Isagoge; but the connection with 'impersonal qualities' is made b y turning to another work, where equality, TO I'CTOV, is said to be an i S i o v o f the category of quantity . T h i s , I concede, is a quality: but if W i l l i a m s had followed up the hagoge passage a l i t t l e further, he would have found Porphyry giving examples of the i S i a of mankind, namely laughter, and turning grey-haired i n o l d age. These appear to be, respectively, an activity and a passive affection: i t would be a misuse o f language to call them impersonal qualities. 9
A r i u s does i n fact use the neuter form t 5 i o v i n the Thalia mentioned:
verse already
LOIOV otj8ev s^ei -coo 9eoi) K<X9' unooraorv ISiornTOC, ou5e yap taxiv icroi;, ou8e &uoo6o"io<; aoxcp I am not sure about the meaning of KtzG UTtoaxaatv iSiOTnroc;. I t might conceivably be used metri gratia i n place of Kax 18tOTr|Ta UTtoCTTaaecuc;, which would make good sense I t seems to be an attempt to clarify the sense of 1810V B u t i t is plain that A l i u s objects to the t e r m i n this context for reasons almost exactly contrary to those deduced by W i l l i a m s . A r i u s does not think i t would degrade the Son b y reducing h i m to an impersonal quality, but rather that i t would honour h i m unduly b y promoting h i m to equality with the Father. That is w h y he continues ouSe ydp £ c m v taoq, &W ou8s d p o o u a i o c ; aura).
43
be some force i n this d e n i a l ; and there w o u l d be no force at all i f the items i n question were mere impersonal attributes I f glories are to be inherited, they must be real and substantial T w o further point before w e close this rather l o n g discussion. First, an Alexandrian writer c o u l d easily have based his use o f i S t o v on Clement, w h o knows Aristotle's Topics and conforms to its usage ; there is no need to appeal to Porphyry A n d secondly, theologians can b o r r o w the logicians' terminology w i t h o u t adopting then doctrines Athanasius, for example, can say that i t is the property o f created beings to choose between alternatives; i t is the property o f bodies to be emptied and f i l l e d ; i t is the property o f Christians to be beaten . The i d i o m is rhetorical; Athanasius does not seriously mean that n o one but a Christian ever gets beaten, but rather that they often suffer this fate 11
12
M o r e generally, whether something is to be categorized as a q u a l i t y or n o t depends largely o n the w r i t e r ' s intentions. T a k e the accepted d e f i n i t i o n of m a n as 'a two-footed animal capable o f laughter' ' A n i m a l ' is the summum genus; 'two-footed' defines a sub-class of i t ; but 'capable o f laughter' is the i o f o v , the q u a l i t y w h i c h belongs to m a n universally and uniquely, omni et solo B u t i n describing i t thus, h o w extremely remote one is f r o m the reality under r e v i e w , f r o m the i n f i n i t e l y variable performance w h i c h we c a l l 'a sense o f h u m o u r ' , w h i c h involves b o t h action and response, f o r one can both m a k e jokes and be amused b y t h e m ; n o t f o r g e t t i n g the category of quantity, since everyone k n o w s that a good j o k e can be spoiled b y being overdone.
5
5
10
Our o n l y other evidence for A r i u s ' use o f 18101; is found i n his Letter to Alexander, § 2, where he states that the Father brought his Son into existence I8icp 8eXfju.aTi, b y an act o f w i l l , whatever impersonal qualities may have determined i t B u t A r i u s makes i t abundantly clear i n the same letter that he does not think o f the divine properties as 'impersonal' The Son was 'created b y the w i l l o f G o d before times and ages, and received f r o m his Father his l i f e and being, and his glories, w h i c h the Father brought into substantial existence along with h i m ' , auvoTrooTfjoavTOc; auTcp T O D TtaTpoc; H e adds that 'the Father gave h i m the inheritance of all things without depriving himself of his o w n unoriginate possessions' (cbv dyevvfjTcot; £%ei £v ¿auTcp) B u t there must
9
10
Porphyry, Comm. on Arist. Categories C A G IV ed A. Busse p See e g Porphyry Sent 33. p 37.23 Lamberz
115
A r i u s , then, wrote that the Son has n o t h i n g proper to G o d i n the real sense of ' p r o p e r t y ' His intention is to indicate mysteries and glories i n the Father w h i c h are u n k n o w n even to the Son. W e m a y dislike this d o c t r i n e ; but w e should not c o m m e n d our dislike b y attacking the f o r m o f expression . Arius is using a logician's short-hand that is allowable i n its proper context. We have j u s t observed Dr W i l l i a m s w r i t i n g i n a s i m i l a r v e i n ; and no one, I trust, w i l l dismiss Dr W i l l i a m s as an arid l o g i c i a n I do not propose this as a conclusive demonstration, since the logicians themselves were capable o f rhetorical and tendentious argument; nevertheless I s u b m i t that so far w e have f o u n d no p r o o f that A r i u s was affected b y Porphyrian l o g i c A n d there is another reason to doubt this suggestion Porp h y r y ' s l o g i c a l w o r k s ate not cited either b y Eusebius or by the A l e x a n d r i a n philosopher Alexandet of L y c o p o l i s , though b o t h o f them k n o w his De Ab~ stinentia, nor again b y Methodius W h a t reason have w e to t h i n k that A r i u s was better informed? (2) T h i s first section of W i l l i a m s ' paper has required painstaking examination. The second, I tfiink, can be more briefly considered W i l l i a m s refers to the phrase pepoc; &u.oouoaov, w h i c h A r i u s rejects i n his credal letter, and comments,
II
1 2
Str 1 168.3, p. 105 5; 8.21 2, p 93 3 Oral 1 52; Hist Ai 41
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V Was Arius a Neoplatonist ?
44 correctly, that it was suspect because of its materializing implications Whatever grace or sonship the Father confers o n any other being cannot be viewed as a material substance w h i c h issues f r o m G o d and passes to them, i f God is k n o w n to be simple and i n d i v i s i b l e W i l l i a m s then notes that the t e r m óuooucjiot; appears i n Iamblichus, and suggests, very tentatively, that Iamblichus also m a y have influenced A n u s He refers to a passage discussing d i v i n e insphation. C o u l d this be regarded as a process i n w h i c h d i v i n e inspiration mixes or amalgamates itself w i t h the soul? N o , i t is r e p l i e d ; for i f some one t h i n g is composed out o f t w o , this is always u n i f o r m and connatural and consubstantial B u t the d i v i n i t y , w h i c h is 'uncombinable', d u u c x o v , c o u l d not amalgamate w i t h the s o u l 13
I do not find this parallel c o n v i n c i n g , for several reasons: (i) The context is d i f f e r e n t : d i v i n e generation i n A r i u s , divine insphation of a soul in Iamblichus; both misleadingly compared, but to two contrary processes; d i v i s i o n i n one case, amalgamation i n the other . ( i i ) Iamblichus does not use the term uépoc;, w h i c h is crucial to A r i u s ' argument ' O u o o u r j i o c ; is a sort o f makeweight, used b y the opposite party to strengthen then case; for it w o u l d be ridiculous to t h i n k o f the Son as a pépoc; o f the Father w h i c h was not ó p o o ú m o v , like a l i n e , say, w h i c h is part o f a triangle but is not a plane f i g u r e ( i i i ) I t seems unnecessary to b r i n g i n Iamblichus, for the docttine that i n corporeal substance is i n d i v i s i b l e has a v e r y long history. I t goes back, presumably, to the puzzle propouned i n Plato's Parmenides ( h o w can an Idea be related to its m u l t i p l e instances?) and the subsequent analysis o f absolute U n i t y This concept is taken up by Philo, Moderatus, A l b i n u s , Numenius and Clement, contrasting either w i t h a dyad or w i t h an inferior u n i t y , and is v i v i d l y characterized by O r i g e n De Principiis, especially 1.2.6, ' W e must take care not to f a l l into the absurd fables o f those w h o imagine for themselves certain emanations, splitting the d i v i n e nature i n t o parts and d i v i d i n g G o d the Father'; and 4 4.4, Tt is impossible to speak o f a part of what is incorporeal, or make any division of i t ' Moreover the same point is made by Alexander o f Lycopolis as an objection against the Manichees' docttine o f a divine power analogous to the L o g o s : " I f i t is part of G o d , then . they make out G o d to be composite and corporeal; but this is absurd and i m p o s s i b l e ' A n d i t is precisely as a Manichean doctrine that A r i u s rejects the phrase uépoc; ó u o o ú m o v 14
Turning now to the points made i n the book: the first and second of them have something i n c o m m o n W i l l i a m s attempts to explain A r i u s ' contentions by c i t i n g parallels f r o m Neoplatonic writers, i n one case P o r p h y r y , in the other Iamblichus The passages adduced are correctly interpreted, and have a certain
illustrative value. But they b y no means p r o v e , or even suggest, that Arius was influenced by N e o p l a t o n i s m ; for i n both cases we c a n offer a n alternative explanation w h i c h avoids this assumption (3) W e begin at p 191 o f the b o o k , where W i l l i a m s introduces the puzzling line f r o m the Thalia: a u v e c ; o x i f| jiovdc; f j v , f j Suae; 8' O U K f i v Ttptv u n a p c ^ : i n W i l l i a m s ' Y o u should understand that the M o n a d (always) w a s , but the D y a d was not before it came to b e ' . W i l l i a m s refers to m y o w n account o f the term Suae; , w h i c h I still think was basically correct, but w h i c h admits of better presentation. I w i l l b r i e f l y outline the background T h e Neoplatonic use o f povctt; and SuctQ derives from the antithesis attributed to Plato by Theophrastus and other commentators between the One and the 'Indefinite D y a d ' ; the One, or the U n i t , functions as a measure; the D y a d i s a second or derivative power, and also a d u a l i t y ; it represents those aspects of our experience w h i c h are unquantified, and therefore can be either m o r e or less; accordingly it stands for the indefinite m u l t i p l i c i t y o f the w o r l d ' s constituents w h i c h issue f r o m their p r i m a l source Philo identifies the Suae; w i t h t o y s v o u e v o v , a s opposed to the uov&c,, w h i c h is 6 jtSTtotnKcbc; (masculine, N B ) ; he describes it a s etKcbv JtaSnTTjt; itdi Siaipexfjc; uXr\c, B u t a c o m p l i c a t i o n was introduced b y the later recognition that there are t w o possible concepts of the M o n a d — a theory that was deduced f r o m Plato's Parmenides — namely a One that i s pure s i m p l i c i t y and a One w h i c h i s essentially m u l t i p l e ; applied to theology, this appears as a distinction between a first and a second God, w h i c h is w e l l k n o w n f r o m its appearance i n N u m e n i u s and Origen Numenius does not h i m self use Suae; to denote the second G o d i n any s u r v i v i n g fragment; the w o r d appears o n l y once, identified w i t h matter in the manner o f P h i l o But he certainly holds that there is a secondary G o d w h o is also a duality; so i n fragment 16/25 reproduced by Eusebius 6 y d p Ssutspoc; Sixxdc;
16
n
1 8
19
yap
16
ITh S. art. cit. pp. 63-6 Alex L y c p. 24 Brinkmann; see An Alexandrian Platonist (etc.), ed P W and I Mansfeld (Leiden. 1974), p 80; ed A. Villey (Paris, 1985), p 77 14
1 7
van der Horst
g j t s i , vco p e v
Kaxex£
l v
T
a
v o n x d . a i a O n a t v 8' £ j r d y s t v KOCTUOIC;
—
w h i c h expresses both his secondary position (for i n fr 7 he appears a s 'second m i n d ' ) — and his dual role i n cosmology A n d we c a n recognize this dual r o l e in the A r i a n L o g o s , though admittedly it is not expressed i n a single antithesis, for he both g l o r i f i e s the Father and attends to the created world. I w o u l d n o t assert that A r i u s k n e w the Chaldean Oracles; but since most of the s u r v i v i n g fragments o f N u m e n i u s are preserved by Eusebius they could have reached
1 5
n
45
IR
1 9
flh S. ns. 15 (I960), p 19 W D. Ross, Plato's Theory of Ideas (Oxford, 1951) pp 184-5. Somn ii 70, Spec Leg. iii 180 Fr. 11 des Places, 1 15. La Révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste iii (Paris, 1953), pp 55-6
V
V Was Alius a Neoplatonist ?
46 Axius directly, quite apart f r o m some indirect influence mediated by Origen. I n either case appeal to the Neoplatonic arithmetic is unnecessary, i f not positively misleading Consider this passage f r o m Iamblichus Theologoumena Arithmeticae p 9: Soctc; X e y c x a t rcapd t o 8 u s v a i K a i SiaTtopeueaGat: 7tpd)TT| y a p fj Suae; 8textbpto"£v a d x h v £ K xfjc; u.ovd8oc;, o 0 e v K a i x o X p a K a X s t x a t , and so on. I translate: 'The D y a d is so called because o f its " d i a d y c t i c " and penetrative p o w e r ; for the D y a d was the f i r s t to separate itself f r o m the M o n a d , whence indeed i t is called self-assertion' I need n o t emphasize the contrast between this d i v i s i v e self-originating power and the A r i a n L o g o s , evoked f r o m nothing b y his Father's w i l l and addressed i n the words ' T h o u art m y Son, this day have I begotten thee' (4) The f o l l o w i n g section of the book, entided 'Intellect and B e y o n d ' , is an extended discussion o f the r o l e o f intellect i n the universe, including the distinction between a primary intellect identified as its first principle and a secondary intellect, the divine L o g o s O n p p 208-9 W i l l i a m s discusses A r i u s ' v i e w s on the Son's knowledge o f the Father. A r i u s appears to contradict h i m self; on the one hand he argues for a positive though l i m i t e d knowledge — Thalia 14, 15, 31 W — based o n the Father's self-knowledge ( 1 4 ) ; o n the other he says (35, 36) ' I t is impossible for h i m to search out the mysteries of the Father for the Son does (even) k n o w his o w n substance ( o u o i a ) ; thus (39) 'He cannot k n o w b y comprehension — sv KaxaXntj/ei — the one w h o gave h i m b i r t h ' A c c o r d i n g to W i l l i a m s the Son's ignorance of his o w n oucria 'has l o n g been a puzzle' (p 2 0 9 ) ; and he proposes to explain the contradiction b y c i t i n g Plotinus 5.3 7, w h i c h admittedly bears some resemblance to A r i u s ' words 20
Nevertheless we need not i n v o k e Plotinus, for a far simpler explanation lies ready to hand I t is to be f o u n d in Bishop Alexander's letter ' H (ptXapxoc,, § § 2 0 , 2 1 . Alexander asks, h o w can any sane man explain the hypostasis of the Logos? The prophetic Spirit refers to it, saying ' W h o shall declare his generation?' (Is. 5 3 : 8 ) ; and the Saviour himself, i n h i s kindness towards the Saints, r e l i e v e s them of any responsibility for such knowledge, saying that i t is naturally incomprehensible to them all ( j r a a t [ v ] auxoic; dipocriKdv eiq KaxdA,n y t v ) , a m y s t e i y k n o w n only to the Father; he then quotes a N e w Testament text i d e n t i f i e d b y Opitz as M a t t 11:27, but i n r e a l i t y closer to its parallel at L u k e 1 0 : 2 2 ; Alexander's w o r d i n g i s : ouSeu; y a p eyvco xxq e a x t v 6 uloc, c i urf 6 Ttaxfjp, K d t x o v T t a x e p a o68sic; syvcoKcv s i 6 uioc;. Recalling the same text at § 4 7 , he reverses the order of the t w o clauses, but retains L u k e ' s xicj ¿ 0 x 1 f o r m u l a t i o n i n both cases The text presents problems w h i c h had long been r e c o g n i z e d : Christian theology w o u l d come to a stand i f we had absolutely no k n o w l e d g e of the Son, 21
and y e t had to depend upon the Son for our k n o w l e d g e of the Father The solution must be that we have a degree of k n o w l e d g e sufficient for our needs, but not exact or comprehensive k n o w l e d g e A n d both Alexander and A r i u s t h i n k along these lines; they both introduce the Stoic t e r m KaxdXrpj/n; to i n dicate the complete understanding that we cannot attain I n other respects, o f course, they differ. Alexander says that the Son's hypostasis is 'not naturally comprehensible' (dcpuatKOv etc; KaxdA,ri\|/iv) to anyone but the Father, since he holds that the Son exactly resembles the Father; he tactfully omits any q u a l i f y i n g clause to the effect that our ignorance of the Son cannot be absolute. A n d A r i u s is also concerned w i t h the Son's hypostasis, and is indebted to the same L u c a n text; its opening words Ttdvxa p o t rtapsSoBrj 6no x o u Ttaxpoq u o u are recalled i n his Letter to Alexander, § 5, r t a p d t o o 9eou xd Ttdvxa auxtp 7tape860q Arius is concerned to stress the absolute transcendence o f the Father; and since the Lucan text asserts that only the Father knows ' w h o the Son i s ' , xic; £ c m , it is a simple deduction that even the Son has mysteries w h i c h he cannot explain i v KaxaX.f|\|/et He cannot exactly comprehend either his Father or his origination or his o w n being, his oucria. There is no need, therefore, to appeal to Plotinus (5) I turn n o w to W i l l i a m s ' last p o i n t , set out in § I I I of the paper and e x panded i n Part I I I Section C o f the b o o k , entitled ' A n a l o g y and Participation' A c c o r d i n g to W i l l i a m s ' " P a r t i c i p a t i o n " is p r i m a r i l y the w o r d used by Plato to designate the relation existing between f o r m s or ideas and p a r t i c u l a r s ' ; he means, of course, that particulars participate i n the forms, but not vice versa. B u t A r i s t o t l e denied such f o r m s ; and his successors, w e are t o l d , redefine participation to denote a relationship between equal members o f the same species. 'Substantial participation, then', says W i l l i a m s , 'is understood by tire third-century writers we have mentioned in a " l a t e r a l " rather than a " v e r t i c a l " sense' This leads h i m to make the useful point that not only 6 p o o o a i o c ; b u t 6JIOIO6CTIOC; c o u l d suggest that ' G o d ' is the name of a genus w h i c h has several members H e then refers to the A r i s t o t e l i a n commentators Alexander o f Aphrodisias and P o r p h y r y , suggesting that i t was they w h o put the so-called 'lateral' sense o f participation i n t o c o m m o n usage 22
23
24
W i l l i a m s offers no concrete evidence to suggest that his proposed redefinition influenced Christian writers Alexander 's relevance m i g h t yet be arguable; b u t the evidence taken f r o m Porphyry can be dismissed at once, as i t rests on a sheer mistranslation . W i l l i a m s makes h i m say that i f A and B participate, then they are equal. W h a t he actually says is that i f A and B participate in a third thing, C, then they participate equally i f C is a species or a genus, but may participate unequally i f C is an accident (hagoge, p 17.6, cf. 22.9-10); thus Socrates a n d
1 1
2 0
21
See PGL s v vout; F 3 a, Son as voOc." S e e e g EusebiusDem Ev 5.1.25-6
47
« 2 4
JTkS 34, p 67 Ibid p. 68 Ibid , p 70.
V
V Was Alius a Neoplatonist ?
48 Callias must be equally men, b u t need not be equally wise. This is simply a version of Aristotle's w e l l - k n o w n d i c t u m that substance does n o t admit of degrees Moreover Porphyry clearly sets aside Aristotle's view o f participation as ' a n empty metaphor' and continues to use i t its Platonic sense The w h o l e argument needs to be reconsidered. First, the distinction between t w o senses of p e x s x s t v and its cognates does n o t originate w i t h Platonic metaphysics and its detractors, as W i l l i a m s appears to suggest M e x e x s t v is prePlatonic, and is used w i t h a genitivus rei, for instance by Theognis and Herodotus; and u.sxoxo<; likewise. The looser sense of pxxoxoc; to mean simply 'partner', w i t h a personal genitive to mean 'someone's partner', appears i n the t h i r d century B.C., according to B a u e r ; b u t the most s t r i k i n g case is the L X X version o f Psalm 4 4 ( 4 5 ) ; 3, w h i c h is quoted at Hebrews 1:9: S i d xouxo 8"Xpic>sv °~ ° ©soc;, 6 6s6<; a o u , e X a t o v dyaXXtcoaecoi; Ttapd xouc; jxexoxoui; a o u . T h e j i e x o x o t here may be seen as companions o f inferior rank, but they clearly do n o t participate i n the authority o f the prince as their ideal exemplar; and i n L u k e 5 : 7 , KCU Kaxevsucrav xotc; p c x o x o i c ; £v xcp sxepcp TtXoicp, w e translate quite naturally 'they beckoned to their partners', w h o are fishermen o f equal rank I t f o l l o w s , fust, that Aristotle does not use j i e x e x e i v t o denote a relation between equals, but rather i n its Platonic sense, to express his criticism of Plato; and Porphyry f o l l o w s suit Secondly, that what W i l l i a m s calls 'horizontal participation' was expressed i n texts that were familiar to the C h u r c h almost f r o m its outset 25
26
27
£
A s the distinction of t w o senses does not originate i n philosophical discussion, I w o u l d prefer to contrast them by the p u r e l y f o r m a l point that one is s y m metrical, the other is not. I f A is B ' s partner, then B must be A ' s ; but i f A or B engage i n an activity C, then C does not engage i n them St Paul says that ' w e all partake of one bread'; w e a l l eat this bread, b u t w e ourselves are not eaten I t seems, then, that a reference to Alexander of Aphrodisias is n o t needed t o explain the facts as presented. T h e hypothesis that Aristotelian commentators c o u l d have influenced Christian thought i n the early f o u r t h century w o u l d be hard to disprove; but w e can surely establish that i t is most unlikely. W e can reflect that the A r i s t o t e l i a n commentators examined their master's works w i t h
Categg 5, 3 b 33, 4 a 9 The distinction between substantial and accidental participation should be noticed It is found both in Alexander and in Porphyry But I have not found it in Christian writers Athanasius at least assumes that 'participation' indicates an unstable and impermanent relation; thus (IETOIXTÎCC is regularly contrasted with oûoia The contrast is found in the literature relating to Paul of Samosata; see H. de Riedmatten, Les Actes du Procès de Paul de Samosate (Paradosis 6; Fribourg, 1952), p. 149f (S. 25): Tu vero videris mihi secundum hoc nolle compositionem fateri ut non substantia sit in eo Filius Dei sed sapiemia secundum participationem Cf. also S 31, p 155. and esp S 36. p. 157, 11 4-10. 2 5
2 6
2 7
W Bauer. Griechisch-deutsches Wôrterhuch des NI, etc (6th edn . 1988)
49
the same patient and meticulous care as Christians devoted to the B i b l e ; there is no sign that Christians examined even A r i s t o t l e ' s o w n w o r k s i n this fashion, let alone the commentators upon h i m I n particular Eusebius, the most learned scholar of his generation, k n o w s and quotes P o r p h y r y , b u t never once refers t o his l o g i c a l w o r k s , n o t even the Isagoge A n d as for Alexander, Eusebius quotes his i n f l u e n t i a l De Fato; b u t so far f r o m citing his commentaries, he never even mentions their existence. I t remains nevertheless t o consider a point w h i c h c o u l d seem to support D r . W i l l i a m s ' views o n 'horizontal participation'. I refer to the claim, introduced b y the homoiousian party and attributed b y Athanasius to Paul o f Samosata , that i f t w o beings are homoousia there must be a t h i r d , prior, ousia f r o m w h i c h both are derived. T h i s argument presumably originated i n Christian circles, though perhaps using pagan m a t e r i a l ; homoousios was important for Christians, b u t rather marginal for pagans; yet it seems to involve a fairly sophisticated reflection on the t e r m , contrasting w i t h its loose and ill-defined usage, say, i n Irenaeus and probably at Nicaea. 28
29
The Nicenes replied that the Father himself is the supreme ousia, as o f course the A r i a n s insisted; i t then remained t o be argued whether any other being can be called homoousios w i t h h i m w i t h o u t suggesting some loss of substance or some infringement of his supremacy. T h e Nicenes of course admit that the Son and the S p i r i t are d e r i v e d f r o m the Father, but insist that they nevertheless enjoy f u l l equality w i t h h i m This m i g h t suggest that they reinterpret the language o f participation, g i v i n g importance, i n Dr. W i l l i a m s ' terms, t o ' h o r i z o n t a l ' rather than ' v e r t i c a l ' participation I f a prior ousia be disallowed, homousios can indeed indicate w h a t Ï call a symmetrical relation I t can be used of the Father and Son i n conjunction, or o f the T r i n i t y as a w h o l e B u t the s y m m e t r y is n o t complete; I have n o t yet traced any pronouncement that the Father is homoousios w i t h the Son or the Spirit; such teaching, i f i t ever existed, must have been a rarity M o r e important, i t has n o t been shown that this controversy affected the terms expressing participation, e.g. p e x c x E i v , péxoxoç, p x x o u a i a , i n such a w a y as to c o n f u m D r W i l l i a m s ' proposal O n the contrary, w h e n used i n Trinitarian contexts, they seem to i n dicate an asymmetrical relation w h i c h is also accidental rather than essential; this is particularly clear i n the case of p s x o u o t a . The use o f u x x e x s i v , qualified by ÔXcoç, to denote the Son's relation t o the Father, i n Athanasius c. Ar i 16, is d i s t i n c t l y unusual and perhaps inadvertent, since the w o r d is used i n the f o l l o w i n g sentence to denote our participation i n the Son b y grace; this fact, and its connection w i t h y e v v d v , suggests that he was t h i n k i n g currente calamo
See Hilary syn 81; Athanasius syn 45; Basil Ep 52 1 Excellent discussion in F Dinsen, Homousios (Diss , Kiel, 1976) pp 41-51 2 8
2 9
See for instance Plotinus Enn 6 1 2, presumably based on Aristotle, Metaph T 4, 1000 b 26
V
V Was Arius a Neoplatonist?
50 rathei than f o l l o w i n g any established convention H i s normal use of such terms appears at c. Gent 4 6 , c Ar i 9, and Syn, 5 1 . W e have shown above that fourth-century Christians had access to texts i n w h i c h participation needs to be understood i n a symmetrical sense. B u t it seems most improbable that they recognised this as a distinct usage I k n o w o f no text that points this out; rather, the accidental sense o f participation seems to be taken for granted It is therefore a surprising thesis that fourth-century Christian writers went over to use participation language to denote equal partnership The further suggestion that this was prompted b y a general adoption of A r i s t o t e l i a n metaphysics w h i c h discarded the Platonic F o r m s , I can o n l y regard as fantastic. Ï am quite unable to believe that this aspect of A r i s t o t e l i a n thought influenced either Christians o f the f o u r t h century or contemporary Neoplatonists; though b o t h c o u l d accommodate A r i s t o t e l i a n l o g i c , f o l l o w i n g P o r p h y r y ; and the N e o platonists at least c o u l d find a place for the ëvoXov EÏSOÇ B u t this was not felt as a challenge to the authority o f Plato. B y w a y of c o n f i r m a t i o n , a quick l o o k at the first book of Iamblichus On the Mysteries of Egypt yielded about thirty examples of i i e x e / G i v , péxoxoç and related terms, a l l entirely consonant w i t h the Platonic tradition and w i t h o u t any sense o f participation between equal partners,
distinguishes between c r e a t i o n and the eternal generation of the Son: ' t h e creation o f the w o r l d f r o m n o t h i n g implies a new subsistence and a recent beginning' (xo SG t% O 6 K ovxcov SnpoupyeTaOai xov K O G U O V vecoxepav E%EI x f j v f)7t6axacn.v K a i 7tp6o-q>axov xrjv y e v e c n v ) , w h i c h seems to preclude any suggestion of previous w o r l d s B u t A r i u s takes a more radical l i n e ; as I p r e v i o u s l y expressed i t , ' O r i g e n had placed the Father i n an eternal relationship, not o n l y w i t h the Son, but even i n p r i n c i p l e w i t h the w o r l d A r i u s asserts the Father's p r i o r i t y , not o n l y to the w o r l d , but t o the Son'. A c c o r d i n g l y the Son had a real and momentary b e g i n n i n g , even i f i t is not strictly a beginning i n time 34
B u t this surely means that A r i u s stands at the furthest possible r e m o v e f r o m the m a j o r i t y , or eternalist, school o f Neoplatonic philosophers; f r o m Plotinus, P o r p h y r y , and Iamblichus. I have t r i e d to show that his supposed dependence o n various points o f then doctrine is i l l u s o r y B u t even i f I am here mistaken, and there were some traces o f dependence, nevertheless any sort of general agreement is out of the question. I have to conclude that Dr.. W i l l i a m s has been advancing, w i t h great ingenuity and learning, a theory w h i c h we must reject as unfounded
I w i l l conclude by reverting to a point suggested i n m y 1964 paper w h i c h perhaps needs to be more clearly restated It has been customary among scholars to d i v i d e the later Platonists i n t o t w o groups, distinguished according to their treatment o f Plato's Timaeus. The great m a j o r i t y accepted A r i s t o t l e ' s doctrine o f the eternity o f the w o r l d and the i m p o s s i b i l i t y o f a beginning of t i m e ; accordingly Plato's description o f a quasi-temporal act of creation was treated b y them as a mere pedagogic device, intended f o i simple people to show the w o r l d ' s eternal dependence o n its first principle, O n l y a m i n o r i t y , among w h o m Plutarch and A t t i c u s ate c o m m o n l y named, continued to interpret the Timaeus as describing a real beginning, at least o f an ordered cosmos, though not necessarily o f material being itself, The m a j o r i t y , represented b y Plotinus, P o i p h y r y and Iamblichus, were i n v a r y i n g degrees hostile to Christianity; nevertheless some Christian thinkers, O r i g e n i n particular, were influenced b y their teaching O r i g e n is clearly impressed b y the reasoning that since the Father is eternal, his relationships must be eternal; so just as he always had his eternally begotten Son, so ' a l l genera and species have for ever existed, and possibly even i n d i v i d u a l t h i n g s ' , and the b i b l i c a l doctrine o f creation has to be relativised, as describing the o r i g i n simply o f this w o r l d , considered as one o f a successive series , B i s h o p Alexander rejects this theory, since he sharply 3 0
3 1
32
33
3 0
3 1
3 2
3 3
Gael 3 2, 301 b 33 Metaph 12 6, 1071 b 7 Princ. 1 4 5 Ibid 3 5 3, ci 2.3 5-6.
51
3 4
Opitz Urk
14, § 18
V
VI
52 Appendix Metechein,
metochos,
metoche,
metousia,
methexis,
in late
antiquity
1 Aristotle follows Plato's usage of terms such as metechein while rejecting the ideal theory So also his commentators; e g : Alex Aphr. in Metaph 101 3: K a i TOOTO, UEXEXEIV xd xfjSe sKeivcov, K£voX,oyeTv s a r i Kai ustaipopaig %p"f\aQai noinxucaic, Cf Metaph. A 9 , 991 a 21-2 2 The commentators also continue to use metechein etc. to denote hierarchical relations between individuals, species and genera: see next item. 3. Both Alexander and Porphyry draw a clear distinction between essential and accidental participation: Alex op cit. 91.10: s i 5e urj KtxO' ctirro dXka Kara aojifiejinKoc, JISTEXSI xd evrauOu xcov iSecov .. Porphyry hagoge
17 6: K a i TOO uev VEVOUC, i%iar\q xd pexsxovxa u-Eiexsi, xou
8e aoppepnKoxoc, OUK s^ionc; ercixaoiv yap Kai d v s a i v srtiSexsxai f| xcov autiPsfinKOTGW \ii§it\iq Ibid 21.15: K a i tot) fiev ei'Souc; fj tiexoxfi ETcionq, xou 8s CTUU^SPTIKOTOC,, x d v dxo')ptoxov r j , O6K ^Tri-cnc, Ibid 22 9-10: K a i xcov JIEV eiScov f\ uexoxri, xtov 5e CTuuPePriKOTiov f j u,£v udAAov f\ 5e f j i x o v 4 The distinction is less sharp in some Platonist writers; thus the 'second God' participates in the first, indicating neither complete correspondence nor mere accidental similarity: Numenius fr. 20 (Eus P E 11 22.10) SIKOTCOC, 6 Snuoupyoc, euuep £ori uexoucig xou rtpuVtoo dya9ou dyaQoc,, (dyaBou) i5ea dv ein 6 npiaxoq vovq. Cf. also fr. 19 Origen is similar: In loh 2.2 16: icdv 8e TO itapd TO auxoGeoc, \iexo%r\ xr\q exeivou Oeoxnxoc, GeorcoioDiasvov oux o Oedg &Xka GEOC, Per contra Sel in Ps 135 (Lomm, 13.134): The Logos is God ouaia, not fieroucria Ihis contrast was imitated: see 6 below 5 Metousia can also apply to the created world: Numenius fr 16 (Eus. P E 11 22 5): r\q u i u n u a 6 KrrXoc; KOGUOC,, KSKaAAcurtio"\isvoc, tiExooaia xou Kd^ou: not mere accidental likeness, but obvious inferiority 6 Christian writers often ignore essential participation and imply that any participation is always accidental: Paul of Samosata (as reported), fr. 33 (p 155 de Riedmatten): xf)v 5e cuvdtpetav sxEptoc, Ttpdc, xfjv aocpiav vost, Kara pafhicuv Kai ^erovjaiav, ob%i ouoiav oooicopgvnv £v aebpaxi. (Cf fr. 22 and 25 for background). 7 This contrast is often used as an artifice of controversy; e g by Athanasius; but he is not consistent; thus c Ar i 15 Kara p e t o u o i a v uloc, is supposedly an Arian phrase; yet ib 16, peiplexingly, 6 uloc, ouSsvoc, u,£xsx£t, xo 8e EK xou Jtaxpoc, uetExd(J.SVOV, TOUXO SGTIV 6 i>lOCj
ARIUS
ON
GOD'S
' M A N Y
WORDS'
A F T E R s i f t i n g t h e e v i d e n c e as c a r e f u l l y as I c a n , I a m s t i l l p u z z l e d h o w to answer t h e q u e s t i o n : D i d A r i u s t e a c h a r a d i c a l l y r e d u c t i o n i s t v i e w of the Logos? V j i t u a l l y a l l our k n o w l e d g e of A r i u s ' t e a c h i n g d e r i v e s f r o m his o p p o n e n t s N e v e r t h e l e s s i t is p o s s i b l e t o d i s t i n g u i s h some m a t e r i a l w h i c h is c l e a r l y p r e s e n t e d as actual q u o t a t i o n o f A r i u s ' o w n w r i t i n g s ; s o m e o t h e r m a t e r i a l is g e n e r a l l y a d m i t t e d to b e m e r e p o l e m i c a l t r a v e s t y ; a n d t h e r e is a large d i s p u t e d m i d d l e g r o u n d , to w h i c h u n f o r t u n a t e l y one m u s t assign t h e i m p o r t a n t s u m m a r i e s t r a n s m i t t e d i n A t h a n a s i u s c. A r i . 5-9 W e l l - r e s p e c t e d scholars s u c h as B a r d y a n d K a n n e n g i e s s e i t r e a t these as q u o t a t i o n s ; I and s o m e o t h e r s dissent. I have r e c e n t l y a r g u e d t h a t t h e u n d i s p u t e d d o c u m e n t a r y sources p r e t t y c o n s i s t e n t l y disclose A r i u s as t e a c h i n g a r e l a t i v e l y h i g h v i e w o f t h e L o g o s H e is d e t e r m i n e d t o s a f e g u a r d t h e F a t h e r ' s p r e e m i n e n c e ; b u t , t h i s p o i n t s e c u r e d , h e has n o p r e s s i n g c o n c e r n to r e d u c e t h e h o n o u r s t r a d i t i o n a l l y a c c o r d e d t o t h e L o g o s ; he d e s c r i b e s h i m as ' m i g h t y G o d ' , as Monogenes, as G o d ' s f i i s t - b o t n S o n , as t h e W i s d o m w h o assisted t h e Father at the c r e a t i o n A t h a n a s i u s h i m s e l f , w h i l e c r i t i c i z i n g A r i u s ' p r e s e n t a t i o n o f t h i s last p o i n t , cannot deny t h a t it was m a d e T h e c o n t r a r y view, that A r i u s desct i b e d t h e L o g o s as m e r e l y o n e of t h e c r e a t u r e s , o r a l t e r n a t i v e l y as a m e r e m a n , does n o t rest o n g o o d d o c u m e n t a r y evidence b u t on p o l e m i c a l sallies w h i c h h a v e been w r o n g l y t r e a t e d as q u o t a t i o n s T h i s is t h e case w h i c h I have d e f e n d e d I t seems clear, at least, t h a t t h e c o n t r a r y v i e w so e n g a g i n g l y p r e s e n t e d b y D r s G r e g g and 1
See especially my article ' T h e Thalia of Arius and the Testimony of Athanasius', ]f T $ N s xxix (1978), pp 20-52 T h i s is perhaps the moment to record my appreciation of Professor M L . West's subsequent article "The Metre of Arius' Thalia', ibid (1982), pp 98-105 I will say at once that I bow to Professor West's knowledge of Greek metrics, and apart from small details, I think his analysis is much more likely to be right than my own; Sotadeans let it be! At the same time his analysis does not damage, and was not intended to damage, two points which I regarded as fundamental in my own article: (i) that any convincing metrical analysis of the Thalia text provided by Syn 15 sets that text on a much better critical basis than the material given in c Ar. i. 5-9, apart from the first five lines quoted in i 5; (ii) that the former text shows Arius to be less radically opposed to orthodoxy than his opponents try to make out. 1
VI
VI 154
155
G r o h is o p e n t o g i a v e o b j e c t i o n o n c r i t i c a l g r o u n d s . Professor 5 G H a l l has d r a w n a t t e n t i o n t o s o m e o f t h e i r m i s t a k e s ; t h u s o n p . 21, w h e n q u o t i n g a sentence f r o m c Ar. i i i 24 w h i c h p u r p o r t s t o express t h e A r i a n v i e w , t h e y e n t i r e l y o v e r l o o k t h e i n t r o d u c t o r y clause 'unless t h e y are so r a s h as t o say', w h i c h c l e a r l y i d e n t i f i e s t h e s e q u e l as an A t h a n a s i a n c o n s t r u c t A n o t h e r g e m f r o m t h e i i b o o k , w h i c h H a l l has n o t m e n t i o n e d , is f o o t n o t e 45 o n p. 33, w h e r e a sentence f r o m t h e Thalia is m i s c o n s t r u e d so as t o suggest t h a t Jesus was n o t e v e n ao^os- T h e i r a r g u m e n t rests o n a j u x t a p o s i t i o n o f t h e t w o clauses ' H e is n o t c o n s u b s t a n t i a l w i t h H i m ' , n a m e l y G o d , a n d ' G o d is w i s e ' . B u t o b v i o u s l y t h e c o n c l u s i o n does n o t f o l l o w ; a n d w e c a n n o t e v e n b e s u r e t h a t i t w a s m e a n t t o f o l l o w , since w e c a n n o t p r o v e t h a t A r i u s h i m s e l f m a d e t h e t w o clauses r u n c o n s e c u t i v e l y ; for w h a t i t was w o r t h , B a r d y m a r k s a b r e a k at t h i s p o i n t . 2
M y g e n e r a l stance, o f c o u r s e , a d m i t s of s o m e q u a l i f i c a t i o n s W i t h i n the A r i a n c a m p I t h i n k there were some real reductionists; Athanasius of Anazarba, perhaps, for one; w i t h A e t i u s o c c u p y i n g a p o s i t i o n s l i g h t l y to the left o f A r i u s himself. B u t the discussion m u s t n o w be b r o u g h t t o a p o i n t ; a n d I w i s h t o c o n s i d e r one r e p o r t e d s a y i n g o f A r i u s w h i c h has b e e n i n t e r p r e t e d as e v i n c i n g a r e d u c t i o n i s t v i e w . I t o c c u r s i n de Decreth 16, b u t r a t h e r o d d l y was o m i t t e d b y B a r d y f r o m his a t t e m p t e d c o l l e c t i o n of fragments. A f t e r a r e f e r e n c e t o t h e f o l l o w e r s o f E u s e b i u s , A t h a n a s i u s says t h a t t h e A r i a n p a r t y f i n d t h e i i last r e s o u r c e , eKetvo XOLTTOV exovoiv vnoXenrofxevov, iv TT) eavrov
Kai 6
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JTarpos; r o u g h l y , ' G o d speaks m a n y w o r d s ; w h i c h o f these d o w e say is t h e S o n a n d o n l y - b e g o t t e n W o r d o f t h e F a t h e r ? ' A t h a n a s i u s r e t o r t s t h a t G o d u t t e r s o n l y one W o r d ; t o use m o r e w o u l d b e a s i g n of weakness T h i s o f c o u r s e is a m e r e d e b a t i n g p o i n t , since he h i m self is q u i t e p r e p a r e d t o d e s c r i b e G o d u s i n g a p l u r a l i t y o f w o r d s ; as
a r t i c l e i n ZKG ( 1 9 8 3 ) , p 25, w h i c h suggests a p a r a l l e l f r o m O r i g e n ' s Commentary on John, i i 3 23; O r i g e n , h e says, m e n t i o n s a c o n t r a s t b e t w e e n t h e s u p r e m e L o g o s a n d o t h e r logoi of t h e second a n d t h i r d degree I d o n o t t h i n k he is r i g h t i n his r e a d i n g of t h e text; as I see i t , O r i g e n is n o t r e v i e w i n g a h e a v e n l y h i e r a r c h y , w h i c h m i g h t offer a p a r a l l e l t o t h e A r i a n L o g o s ; he is s a y i n g t h a t t h e w o r d Xoyos has m u c h t h e s a m e v a r i e t y o f senses as t h e w o r d 0eos; 0€os can be u s e d o f t h e F a t h e r , o f (e g ) M o s e s , as p a r t a k i n g of G o d , or of false gods S i m i l a r l y , t h e ' s e c o n d l o g o s ' is t o be i d e n t i f i e d as the d e v o u t m a n ' s reason; t h e ' t h i r d l o g o s ' is t h e d e c e p t i o n w h i c h falsely c l a i m s t h e n a m e o f r e a s o n ; O r i g e n speaks o f VO{JUL]O[J.€VLOV p,ev Xoyov 3
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Xoycov, c o r r e s p o n d i n g t o t h e false gods So t h e suggested p a r a l l e l f r o m O r i g e n does n o t s u p p o r t L o r e n z ' s v i e w I c a n n o t see a n y i n d i c a t i o n t h a t t h e 'false r e a s o n ' is per s o n i f i e d a n d r e g a r d e d as a s p i r i t o f d e c e p t i o n M o r e o v e r , I c a n n o t d i s c e r n t h a t t h e L e x i c o n o f f e r s a n y p a r a l l e l for t h e use of Xoyoi i n t h e p l u r a l t o d e n o t e h e a v e n l y p o w e r s , t h o u g h a d m i t t e d l y several G n o s t i c s y s t e m s i n c o r p o r a t e a singular A6yo$ i n t o t h e i i h i e r a r c h y of s p i r i t u a l b e i n g s I t h i n k t h a t L o r e n z m a y p o s s i b l y have d r a w n his i n t e r p r e t a t i o n f r o m a n essay b y t h a t a d m i r a b l e scholar F r a n z - H e i n r i c h K e t t l e r ( F S R o b e r t S t u p p e r i c h (1969), p 237 n. 4) w h o also m a i n t a i n s t h a t O r i g e n refers to the heavenly h i e r a r c h y by the term XoyoL, t h o u g h o n l y s e l d o m K e t t l e r n o t e s t h r e e passages, o f w h i c h t h e f i r s t is t h a t u s e d b y L o r e n z a n d a l r e a d y d i s c u s s e d T h e second passage o c c u r s earlier i n t h e Commentary on John ( i . 7. 38) a n d the c r u c i a l p h r a s e is b y n o m e a n s c l e a r t o m e ; O r i g e n is p l a i n l y r e f e r r i n g t o t h e umpliciores w h o are i n s t r u c t e d , n o t b y t h e L o g o s h i m s e l f , b u t b y p r e p a r a t o r y agents a d a p t e d t o t h e i r state; t o t h e m oi^ev^poSpo/ioi Xptorov
in ideSr) fir) Kaoi iraiai
tfivxais
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w h i c h t h e L e x i c o n g i v e s p a r a l l e l s , s v I A . 9); b u t i t s h o w s t h a t he t o o k t h e A r i a n t e x t t o m e a n t h a t t h e r e is n o t h i n g d i s t i n c t i v e a b o u t t h e L o g o s ; he is m e r e l y one o f a class of b e i n g s T h e r e is a rather s i m i l a r a r g u m e n t i n c A r i i 36, w h e r e A t h a n a s i u s asserts t h a t m e n u t t e r m a n y w o r d s because each o f t h e m p e r i s h e s w h e n s p o k e n ; b u t G o d has o n l y one W o r d , w h o is u n c h a n g i n g . A t h a n a s i u s ' u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e A r i a n sentence has b e e n g e n e r a l l y a c c e p t e d ; a n d m o s t r e c e n t l y b y R u d o l f L o r e n z i n a fine
d i s c u s s i o n b e g i n s w i t h t h e s t a t e m e n t t h a t t h e G o s p e l is a Xoyos ( i .5 27), a n d a c o n t r a s t b e t w e e n L a w a n d G o s p e l i m m e d i a t e l y f o l l o w s (sect 39); after w h i c h a c o n t r a s t is d r a w n b e t w e e n the S a v i o u r ' s Xoyoi a n d h i s irpa^eis; a l l o f w h i c h suggests t o m e t h a t Aoyot i n i 7 . 38 m o s t p r o b a b l y m e a n s e l e m e n t a r y d o c t r i n e s or s a y i n g s , or p o s s i b l y p r o p h e t i c t i t l e s o f C h r ist. W e c a n n o t , o f c o u r s e , disprove the notion t h a t A l i u s m a y have p e r s o n a l i z e d t h e p h r a s e , t a k i n g i t o u t o f c o n t e x t ; b u t t h i s w o u l d b e g r a s p i n g a s t r a w T h e t h i r d case, a passage f r o m Comm. Matt x i i i , K l . p. 183 r , seems to m e t o be d o u b t f u l t o o , because i t t h r o w s o u t t h e s u g g e s t i o n t h a t E l i j a h m i g h t b e a Aoyos (or ' E l i j a h ' s i g n i f y a Aoyos?), a n d t h i s appears to b e a n a f t e r t h o u g h t ,
Early Arianism—A (London, 1981)
'Die Christusseele i m Arianischen Streit Nebst einigen Bemerkungen zur Quellenkritik des A r i u s u n d zur Glaubwiirdigkeitdes Athanasius', op cit , pp 1-51
i n c, Ar.
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3
VI
VI 156
157
as i f O r i g e n w e r e m e r e l y n o t i n g a n o p i n i o n w h i c h m i g h t be h e l d a n d s h o w i n g t h a t i t does n o t r a d i c a l l y i n t e r f e r e w i t h h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f M a t t x v i i 10 T h i s r e a d i n g o f t h e passage w o u l d be e n d o r s e d i f we were to f o l l o w D i e h l , Koetschau, and the L a t i n translation i n r e a d i n g KCLI ovrcos f o r t h e /cat O U T O S o f t h e G r e e k m a n u s c r i p t s a n d K l o s t e r m a n n ' s t e x t . A s i t i s , w e f i r s t h a v e a sentence w h i c h seems t o t a k e Xoyot as ' s a y i n g s ' or ' c o n s i d e r a t i o n s ' : Kai eot/ce ye 5ta rovrwv (sc.. Mai
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Xoyov novoyevrj rov LJarpos, I f A l i u s w e r e r e a l l y a r g u i n g t h a t t h e r e is n o t h i n g u n i q u e l y d i s t i n c t i v e a b o u t t h e d i v i n e L o g o s , as A t h a n a s i u s alleges, w h y s h o u l d he s p o i l h i s case b y i n t r o d u c i n g a r e f e r e n c e p r e c i s e l y t o t h e unique, or o n l y - b e g o t t o n , S o n a n d W o r d o f t h e F a t h e r ? I f t h e c o n c l u d i n g w o r d s are g e n u i n e , t h e y d e m a n d some o t h e r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ; i f t h e y are n o t , t h e w h o l e q u o t a t i o n is so c o r r u p t t h a t n o c o n c l u s i o n c a n be d r a w n . T h e p o i n t w h i c h I t h i n k A r i u s is m a k i n g is as f o l l o w s : t h e t e r m ' l o g o s ' , t a k e n b y i t s e l f , is i n s u f f i c i e n t l y d i s t i n c t i v e to i n d i c a t e t h e t r u e d i v i n e L o g o s , w h o is G o d ' s o n l y S o n , a n d u n i q u e or o n l y b e g o t t e n W o r d . G o d speaks m a n y w o r d s ; 7roiov avrwv apa Xeyop,ev r)p.eh
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e x p e c t t h e answer ' N o n e ' ; a n d of c o u r s e t h e r e is g o o d p r e c e d e n t i n O r i g e n f o r seeing t h e L o g o s as e n d o w e d w i t h a c o m p l e x o f t i t l e s w h i c h h a v e t o b e t a k e n t o g e t h e r to e x p r e s s h i s f u l l b e i n g , he m u s t n o t be d e s c r i b e d as ' L o g o s ' o n l y A w e l l - k n o w n e x a m p l e is Commentary on John, i 21-4 ( = i 23), t h o u g h t h e passage is t o o l o n g to q u o t e B u t w h y s h o u l d A r i u s a r g u e i n t h i s w a y ? I t w o u l d be n a t u r a l to see i t as a n a r g u m e n t d i r e c t e d against M a r c e l l u s , w h o after a l l was m o r e r a d i c a l l y o p p o s e d t o A l i u s in theology t h a n was h i s b i s h o p ,
A l e x a n d e r , a n d w h o was c o n s i d e r a b l y senior t o A t h a n a s i u s Marc e l l u s h a d a r g u e d t h a t p r i o r t o h i s I n c a r n a t i o n G o d ' s L o g o s was L o g o s a n d n o t h i n g else ( f i 42, 43, 48, 49, 91, e t c . ) ; a n d w e f i n d E u s e b i u s o b j e c t i n g t o t h i s v i e w , a n d a r g u i n g i n several places t h a t a w h o l e c o m p l e x of t i t l e s b e l o n g s to h i m , S o n , G o d , L i f e , L i g h t ( £ T i i 1 0 , p i n , c f . i i r4, p p r r 5 , r r 8 ) T h e r e is also a p a r a l l e l to t h e o p e n i n g s e n t e n c e TTOXXOVS XaXet
Xoyovs
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i n a rather c o m p l e x a r g u m e n t at i i . 24 w h i c h is d i f f i c u l t to q u o t e E u s e b i u s c o m p l a i n s t h a t M a i c e l l u s b i i n g s t o g e t h e r a w h o l e ser ies of t e x t s w h i c h n a m e ' t h e w o i d o f t h e L o r d ' a n d w r o n g l y conflates t h e m w i t h t h e W o r d w h o was i n t h e b e g i n n i n g , t h o u g h i n f a c t t h e y a r e m e r e l y c o m m a n d m e n t s a n d d i i e c t i v e s : so 0 Oavftaoros OVTOS (sc M a r c e l l u s ) rds ivroXds Xoyovs
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dpxfi Xoyov A n d a f t e i q u o t i n g M a i c e l l u s at l e n g t h he adds: ' W h a t w o r d does t h i s t e x t ( A m o s 5: 10) p i e s e n t b u t t h e w o r d o f c o m m a n d m e n t a b o u t h o l y a n d l i g h t e o u s actions? A n d he i n t e n d s a n y t h i n g r a t h e r t h a n a c k n o w l e d g i n g t h e S o n of G o d , as i f he w e r e a s h a m e d to m a k e m e n t i o n of t h e S o n ' — r o yap «ipiaT}aav . Kai Xoyov oaiov ifi&eXv£avro»
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p,vT}p,ov€voai r o v viov. T h e A l l a n sentence m i g h t a l m o s t be d e s c r i b e d as a n a b b r e v i a t i o n o f t h i s passage. C f also c Marc i 1 16 I f t h i s is c o n c e d e d , i t h e l p s t o e s t a b l i s h a p i c t u i e of t h e A i i a n L o g o s s u c h as K e t t l e i h i m s e l f a t t i i b u t e d to O r i g e n C o n t r a s t e d w i t h G o d t h e F a t h e r he m u s t i n e v i t a b l y be seen as b e l o n g i n g t o the c r e a t e d o r d e r ; b u t i f w e c o n s i d e r his p l a c e w i t h i n t h a t o r d e r , he a p p e a l s as f i r s t - b o r n a n d u n i q u e I f m y a r g u m e n t is s o u n d , there is n o n e e d f o r us to accept A t h a n a s i u s ' c l a i m t h a t A r i u s r e g a r d e d t h e L o g o s as m e r e l y one o f t h e c i e a t u i e s
VII T H E FOR
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A R I U S ' d i c t u m t h a t t h e L o g o s is ' f r o m n o t h i n g ' , e| OVK OVTCOV, has a t t r a c t e d s o m e n o t i c e ; b u t I t h i n k t h a t its m e a n i n g has n o t been s u f f i c i e n t l y c l a r i f i e d . I p r o p o s e t o discuss f o u r p a r t i c u l a r s : first, t h e p r o v e n a n c e o f t h e p h r a s e ; s e c o n d l y its c o n t e x t i n A r i u s ' doct r i n e of t h e L o g o s ; t h i r d l y , t h e p a r t i t p l a y e d i n c o n t e m p o r a r y c o n t r o v e r s y ; a n d f o u r t h l y , t h e j u s t i c e or i n j u s t i c e o f the c r i t i c i s m s it incurred 1
i
'FROM
N O I H I N G ' :
PHILOSOPHICAL
BACKGROUND
T h e phrase o c c u r s i n w h a t is c o m m o n l y c o n s i d e r e d A r i u s ' e a r l i est s u r v i v i n g w o r k , t h e letter t o E u s e b i u s of N i c o m e d i a , p r i n t e d b y O p i t z as Urkunde i a n d d a t e d b y h i m c 318 A r i u s w r i t e s : 'We are p e r s e c u t e d also because w e said, he is f r o m n o t h i n g . W e spoke t h u s because he is n e i t h e r a p a r t of G o d nor ( d e r i v e d ) f r o m any ( p r i o r ) s u b s t a n c e ' (SttoKoueda OVTCUS §€ €L7TO[i€V KaOoTl }
Kai
6rt
eLTTop-ev, l | OVK OVTOJV
hariv
OV$€ fX€p0S 6eOV €OTtV OvSe l | V7TOK€Lp,€VOV
TWOS) T h e 'also' r e f e r s b a c k t o t h e p r e v i o u s sentence: ' w e are p e r s e c u t e d because w e said, " t h e S o n has a b e g i n n i n g , whereas G o d (o f?eo's) is w i t h o u t b e g i n n i n g " ' , w h i c h can b e left aside for the moment I d i s c u s s e d A r i u s ' r e a s o n i n g i n m y b o o k Divine Substance p p . 235 f , p o i n t i n g o u t t h a t i t stems f r o m a p h i l o s o p h i c a l c o m m o n p l a c e f o u n d i n I r e n a e u s , T e r t u l l i a n , a V a l e n t i n i a n speaker quoted by M e t h o d i u s , and Theognostus quoted b y Athanasius; i f s o m e t h i n g comes i n t o b e i n g i t m u s t d e r i v e either f r o m somet h i n g or f r o m n o t h i n g , a n d i n t h e f o r m e r case either f r o m G o d or f r o m s o m e t h i n g else R u d o l f L o r e n z has n o t i c e d the same t r i a d i n C l e m e n t o f A l e x a n d r i a , str 2.74 1; a n d I s h o u l d have m e n t i o n e d O r i g e n princ. 4.4 r , a n d t h e o b s e r v a t i o n m a d e b y V e r b e k e t h a t the same t h r e e p o s s i b i l i t i e s are suggested b y P l u t a r c h , Platonic Questions 4, p 1003a: ' f o r t h e s o u l was n o t m a k i n g the n a t u r e of t h e b o d y f r o m i t s e l f , nor f r o m n o t h i n g , b u t ( m a d e ) an o r d e r l y b o d y o u t o f w h a t was w i t h o u t o r d e r a n d u n s h a p e d ' (o£> yap k£ 2
avrfjs
-r) ifivxfj rrjv TOV oiop.aTo$ I S n ^ i o u p y e i voiv ouS'
I K rot) p.r) OVTOS,
See R. P C Hanson, 'Who taught e£ OVK OVTCUV, in R C Gregg (ed ), Ariamsm (Philadelphia, 1985), pp. 79-83; R Lorenz, Arius Judaizant? (Gottingen, 1979) (hereafter Af), pp 38 f ; G C Stead, 'The Platonism of Arius', JTS, NS, 15 (1964), 25 f. Iren., Haer, 2 1 0 4; Tertullian, adv Herm. 2 1; Methodius, Autex 2 9, p 150; Athanasius, Deer 25 1
2
VII
VII 672
673
dXX €K acofiaros
CLT&KTOV Kal do-x-qparioTov
acou-a Teraypevov)
3
There
are s l i g h t v a r i a t i o n s i n t h e w o r d i n g : l £ OVK OVTOJV is t h e f o r m w h i c h o c c u r s i n M e t h o d i u s ; T h e o g n o s t u s has t h e v a r i a n t ex p.7/ ovrvov, w h i l e P l u t a r c h ' s €« rati [nj ovros is u s e d o c c a s i o n a l l y b y A r i u s ' opponents. W e m a y n o t i c e i n A r i u s ' l e t t e r t h e s l i g h t l y a p o l o g e t i c t o n e of ' W e spoke t h u s ..'; a n d i n f a c t t h e r e is a f l a w i n his l o g i c ; b y o p t i n g f o r e£ OVK OVTOJV he e x c l u d e s t h e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t t h e L o g o s is I K f?eoii: t h e reason g i v e n is t h a t ZK deov w o u l d i m p l y t h a t he is piepos 6eov, t h u s r a i s i n g w e l l - f o u n d e d o b j e c t i o n s t o a n y d i v i s i o n or d i m i n u t i o n o f t h e G o d h e a d . A r i u s m a y w e l l be f o l l o w i n g O r i g e n loc. c i t . {non enim dicimus .. partem aliquam substantiae dei in filium versum) w h i l e i g n o r i n g t h e c o r r e c t i o n s w h i c h O r i g e n hastens t o a d d : t h e g e n e r a t i o n of t h e L o g o s does n o t i n v o l v e c o r p o r e a l passions, b u t r e s e m b l e s t h e g e n e r a t i o n of (an act o f ) w i l l f r o m t h e m i n d I n h i s o t h e r w r i t i n g s A l i u s a l l o w s — i n d e e d insists on—e/c 0€ov: so e g Thalia 1 31 ( A t h Syn 15, O p i t z 243 1 12) w h i l e m a i n t a i n i n g h i s p r o t e s t against a n y p h y s i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of i t (Urk 6 §5). T w o o b s e r v a t i o n s are n e e d e d t o e x p l a i n t h e b a c k g r o u n d of the p h r a s e ' f r o m n o t h i n g ' . F i r s t t h e r e is t h e w e l l - k n o w n c o m m o n p l a c e ex nihilo nihil fit, w h i c h o r i g i n a t e s q u i t e e a r l y i n G r e e k p h i l o s o p h y . P o s s i b l y i t s f i r s t o c c u r r e n c e is P a r m e n i d e s f r 8 ( S i m p l i c i u s Phys. 145 i f f ) . . oi)b" I K jj,fj kovros
cf>ao8ai o' ouoe voeiv, 'iuTIV OTTOJS OVK
kdoow
ov yap c£ar6v ouSe vo-qrov €OTlV
nor shall I allow thee to say or to think ' f r o m that which is not'; for it is not to be said or thought that it is not [Or perhaps, more logically, 'for non-existence cannot be described or conceived'] C o m p a r e Empedocles ft r r , [ A r i s t o t l e ] M X G €« re yap ovBafi eoVros ap^avov
eon
2, 975
b r,
yzveaQai
Fot coming into being f r o m that w h i c h i n no way is, is inconceivable N o d o u b t t h e p r i n c i p l e w a s w i d e l y accepted. I t m a y h a v e b e e n c h a l l e n g e d b y w r i t e r s w h o refer t o a b e i n g w h o is avToyevr/s or avToyev(v)T}Tos, t w o w o r d s r e n d e r e d m L S J as ' s e l f - p r o d u c e d ' a n d ' s e l f - g e n e r a t e d ' B u t these m i g h t r e f e r t o a n e t e r n a l g e n e r a t i o n , w h i c h w o u l d n o t e n t a i l t h e e m e r g e n c e of s o m e t h i n g f r o m n o t h i n g A l t e r n a t i v e l y avroyev-qs at least m i g h t m e a n ' u n i q u e i n k i n d ' , an
' i n d i v i d u a l species' ( c f p-ovoyev-qs)', i t can be u s e d , p e r h a p s c o n f u s e d l y , o f a b e i n g w h o is c e r t a i n l y n o t t h e p r i m a r y source (see e g l i e n haer 1 29 2, c i t e d i n P G L ) H o w e v e r i n Orac Sibyl f r 1 17 G o d is avroyevrjs ctyevrjTos, p r e s u m a b l y ' u n i q u e a n d u n d e i i v e d ' N e v e i t h e l e s s t h e p r i n c i p l e ex nihilo nihil was p i o b a b l y r o b u s t e n o u g h to w i t h s t a n d s u c h r a r i f i e d o b j e c t i o n s Secondly, i m p o r t a n t clarifications were made b y A r i s t o t l e , who n o t e s the a m b i g u i t y o f ydveodai, either ' c o m i n g i n t o b e i n g ' absol u t e l y , or ' c o m i n g t o be s u c h a n d s u c h ' I n De Generatione et Corruptione 1 3 , 3 i 7 b 2 f f , h e a p p e a l s t o suggest a n o b j e c t i o n to the former concept: el yap airXCbs curat yevecrts, arrXojs av yivono Xtyeiv on
rial
TO pi] ov
I K prj 'ovros, aior
a\rj8es av e'n?
n's pev yap yeVeois ex pi] OVTOS TWOS, oiov
€K pr) XevKDV Tj prj KaXov, ij Se awAij e£ a^Aiis pr/ OVTOS
W e may translate, rather freely: If there is a case of coming-to-be in an absolute sense, s o m e t h i n g w o u l d c o m e to be f r o m that w h i c h is n o t h i n g , so that it w o u l d be t r u e to say that there are things to w h i c h ' n o t h i n g ' a p p l i e s ; for b e c o m i n g s u c h
and
s u c h p r o c e e d s f r o m w h a t is not s u c h and s u c h , e g w h a t is not w h i t e or not b e a u t i f u l ; but a b s o l u t e b e c o m i n g p r o c e e d s f r o m absolute not-being
T h e a b s u r d i t y lies n o t so m u c h i n t h e last p h r a s e as i n t h e sugg e s t i o n t h a t t h e r e are t h i n g s t h a t are n o t , m a d e i n t h e w o r d s u n d e r l i n e d , a n d i n d e e d s u g g e s t e d b y t h e p h i a s e k£ OVK OVTWV N e v e r t h e l e s s A r i s t o t l e h o l d s t h a t n o t h i n g comes t o be i n a n absol u t e sense, i e. f r o m w h a t is n o t , f o r t h e r e is no s u c h t h i n g (cf.. op cit 317 b 12); i t is a m i s t a k e t o say t h a t n o t - b e i n g exists (Phys 1 3, 187 a 2). A n d i f w e d o say t h a t a s u b s t a n c e X o r i g i n a t e s f r o m w h a t is n o t X , t h i s m u s t be q u a l i f i e d as ' p o t e n t i a l l y t h o u g h not a c t u a l l y X ' ; see Gen. et Con- 317 b 7-26 F u r t h e r c l a r i f i c a t i o n is o f f e r e d b y A r i s t o t l e ' s w e l l - k n o w n t h e o r y o f f o u r causes, w h i c h sheds l i g h t o n t h e a m b i g u o u s p r e p o s i t i o n ex. T h e b r i e f r e s t a t e m e n t i n Metaph 1 3, 983 a 26 f f , r u n s as follows: 4
r d atria Aeyercu rerpa^ajs, cov piav pev alriav <$>ap.£v eivai rijv ovaiav feat TO TI Yjv elvcu Ktvrjaews.
krepav 8e rrjv vXrjv Kal TO urroKeipevov, rpirrjv oe odev 7) a-PX ? 1
rerdprrjv
Se
TO OV kvzxa Kal rtvyadov (TGXOS yap yeveaetos t a i
Kivr/oews rrdarjs TOUT* kariv) Now
t h e i e are four r e c o g n i z e d k i n d s of cause
is the essence or essential n a t u r e of a t h i n g
O f these we hold that one another is the matter or
1 myself find it unconvincing; it fits somt cases, e g a plant emerging from a s t t d ; but quite often if X comes into being, all that is required is the pre-existent factors which make X possible; they need not be consolidated into some supposed *X existing potentially' 4
R. Loren2, Die Chtistusseelc im Arianischen Strdit', ZKG rg83 r-51 (hereafter Christusseele'), 47 n 282; cf G Verbeke, L'Evolution tie la doctrine du pneuma du stoichme a St Auguitin (Louvain, 1945), p 261 n 104 J
vndpxei
VII 675
674 substrate; the t h i r d is the source of m o t i o n ; and the f o u r t h is .. the purpose or good; for this is the end of every generative or motive process T h i s passage was accessible t o f o u r t h - c e n t u r y C h r i s t i a n w r i t e r s , as t w o b r i e f p a r a p h r a s e s o f i t are g i v e n b y C l e m e n t o f A l e x a n d r i a (str 8.18. i a n d 28.2) a n d a n o t h e r is q u o t e d f r o m A l e x a n d r i a o f A p h r o d i s i a s ' De Fato b y E u s e b i u s ( P E 6 9.1) B u t w e s h a l l f i n d that anti-Arian writers were liable t o ignore Aristotle's careful distinctions I f we n o w r e t u r n t o t h e t h r e e f o l d scheme of d e r i v a t i o n , i t w i l l be seen t h a t P l u t a r c h at least a p p l i e s i t i n a m a n n e r w h i c h does n o t c o n f l i c t w i t h t h e p r i n c i p l e ex nihilo nihil, since i t specifies t h r e e w a y s i n w h i c h t h e s o u l m i g h t act; i n each case, t h e r e f o r e , t h e s o u l s u p p l i e s a m o t i v e cause. A n d i t is s u r e l y a r g u a b l e t h a t A n u s ' use o f t h e s c h e m e e m b o d i e s a s i m i l a r a s s u m p t i o n H e c a n t h u s a r g u e t h a t t h e L o g o s is ' f r o m n o t h i n g ' w i t h o u t d e n y i n g t h a t he w a s m a d e by God the Father o u t o f n o t h i n g I n d e e d t h i s is clearly h i s view. Since he holds that t h e L o g o s is, i n a carefully q u a l i f i e d sense, a c r e a t u r e , h e c a n a p p l y t o h i m t h e d o c t r i n e o f c r e a t i o n a c c e p t e d b y second- a n d t h i r d - c e n t u r y F a t h e r s i n o p p o s i t i o n to t h e Platonist v i e w that G o d made t h e universe o u t of p r e v i o u s l y e x i s t i n g u n f o r m e d m a t t e r A n d t h i s is a d m i t t e d b y p r o N i c e n e c o n t r o v e r s i a l i s t s , w h o o b j e c t t o h i s use o f t h e t e r m s ' c r e a t i n g ' a n d ' m a k i n g ' i n place o f ' b e g e t t i n g ' , b u t n e v e r t h e l e s s persist i n c l a i m i n g t h a t A r i u s ' use o f OVK OVTLOV c o n f l i c t s w i t h t h e p r i n c i p l e ex nihilo nihil, as w e shall see. 2
A R I U S ' D O C T R I N E OF THE SON'S
O R I G I N
A r i u s r e p e a t e d l y states t h a t G o d e n g e n d e r e d (yewrjaavra) an o n l y S o n (vlov piovoyevr))', so Urkunde 6§2, cf. yevvrjfia, §3; yevvrjdets, §4, t h o u g h h e also d e s c r i b e s h i s o r i g i n a t i o n i n n e u t r a l t e r m s (VTTo(jTYjoavTo., §2; vTTGOTTj, §4), a n d , as c o m m o n l y r e c o g n i z e d , refers t o i t as a ' c r e a t i o n ' {uriopa, §2; KnaOevTa, §3; KTtoQeis, §4), t h o u g h w i t h a q u a l i f i c a t i o n d e s i g n e d t o set h i m a p a r t f r o m o t h e r creatures {KTiofia TOV deov TGXZLOV, dXK ov)( cLs 'iv rcov KTtofi&Ttov, §2) T h e n e x t f o l l o w i n g p h r a s e is a t a c i t a c k n o w l e d g e m e n t t h a t t h e use o f yew-npia etc does n o t suffice i n i t s e l f t o g u a r a n t e e t h e S o n ' s u n i q u e n e s s : yeVvr/jua, aAA' oi>x o\>$ ev TOJV yevvrjfidrojv, a phrase w h i c h his o p p o n ents d e c r i e d as i n c o n s i s t e n t , a c c u s i n g h i m o f e x p l o i t i n g t h e v a r i able sense o f yevvav a n d i t s d e r i v a t i v e s t o r e p r e s e n t t h e S o n as a c r e a t u r e tout court, w i t h a l l t h e p e j o r a t i v e i m p l i c a t i o n s w h i c h t h e y t h e m s e l v e s a t t a c h e d t o t h e t e r m A r i u s does also use t h e t e r m yevvr/pa i n d e s c r i b i n g t h e d o c t r i n e s o f V a l e n t i n u s a n d M a n e s (§3),
b u t w i t h o u t a n y clear i m p l i c a t i o n t h a t t h e y t h e m s e l v e s u s e d or m i s u s e d t h e t e r m ; t h u s w h e n h e says t h a t V a l e n t i n u s c a l l e d the ( d i v i n e ) yivv-qpa a n ' o f f s h o o t ' (rrpofioXr)), i t is o n l y t h i s latter t e r m that he means t o condemn. A l l t h i s is f a m i l i a r g r o u n d . B u t t h e catalogue o f o p i n i o n s w h i c h A r i u s d i s o w n s c o n c l u d e s as f o l l o w s : ' n o r t h a t h e w h o was b e f o r e , w a s a f t e r w a r d s g e n e r a t e d or n e w - c r e a t e d i n t o a S o n , as t h o u too t h y s e l f , blessed P o p e , i n t h e m i d s t o f t h e C h u r c h a n d i n session hast o f t e n c o n d e m n e d t h o s e w h o i n t r o d u c e these d o c t r i n e s (ovBe TOV
ovra
ov
avTos,
rrporepov, p.a.K&pie
vorepov
yevvrjOevra
TraTra, Kara.
r) kiriKTiudevTa
pi€OT)v Trjv
els vlov,
e/ciiAryrnai' xai ev
cos xai GvveSpiqj
ravTa elo"qyovu.evovs airtyyopevaas, n o t i n g that the three words u n d e r l i n e d a r e o m i t t e d i n R o b e r t s o n ' s t r a n s l a t i o n u s e d above). T h e r e is, I suppose, n o direct evidence t h a t Alexander c o n d e m n e d a n y s u c h v i e w s ; b u t t h e y h a v e been p l a u s i b l y i d e n t i f i e d as those of M a r c e l l u s — a n d , one m i g h t add, o f T e r t u l l i a n . T h e doctrine t h a t t h e S o n was i n i t i a l l y G o d ' s i m m a n e n t W o r d or R e a s o n w h o b e c a m e S o n at t h e c r e a t i o n ( T e r t u l l i a n ) or i n c a r n a t i o n ( M a r c e l l u s ) w o u l d o b v i o u s l y b e d i s o w n e d b y A l e x a n d e r , w h o v i e w e d t h e Son as c o e t e r n a l , b u t also, f o r q u i t e d i f f e r e n t reasons, b y A r i u s , w h o e n v i s a g e d a single p r i m o r d i a l a c t i o n w h i c h b r o u g h t t h e S o n - L o g o s i n t o existence, t h o u g h w i t h o u t d e p r i v i n g the Father o f his eterna l l y p r e - e x i s t e n t a t t r i b u t e s (wv ayevvrjTios e x a h> eavrco). TOUS
6
T h e passage j u s t c o n s i d e r e d seems t o m e t o t h r o w l i g h t o n a d e b a t a b l e c o u p l e t i n t h e Thalia (1 6 f , O p i t z p p . 242 1 14 f . ) : apxfjv TOV vlov edfjue rcov yev{y)rjrcov 6 arap^os «at rjveyKev els vlov eavTto roVSe reKVOTrotrjuas T h i s c o u p l e t , t h o u g h v a r i o u s l y e x p l a i n e d i n d e t a i l , has o f t e n been cited i n s u p p o r t of various f o r m s o f ' p r o m o t i o n ' theory, w h i c h agree i n m a k i n g i t i m p l y t h a t t h e L o g o s a t t a i n e d his present d i g n i t y i n t w o or m o r e d i s t i n c t stages. T h e passage discussed i n t h e last p a r a g r a p h seems t o m e t o c o n t r a d i c t a n y s u c h i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ; i n d e e d i t m a y w e l l be t h a t t h e Thalia h a d already appeared w h e n t h e L e t t e r t o A l e x a n d e r was w r i t t e n , a n d this particular couplet had attracted unfavourable comment, w h i c h A r i u s now seeks t o d i s a r m . T h e ' p r o m o t i o n ' t h e o r y s u r e l y presupposes t h a t t h e L o g o s was p r o m o t e d ' f r o m s o m e t h i n g ' , f r o m some l o w e r state; 7
8
5
'Christusseele' 26, more generally, 'Apologists and Clement'; and see A. Robertson, Athanasius, p. 458 n 12; Tertullian, Prax 7 AJ 66; R. C Gregg and D E . G r o h , Early Arianism, A View Of Salvation (London, 1981), pp 23, 96; Stead, 'Arius in Modern Research', jfTS, m, 45, (1994), 264. A n early date is suggested by C Kannengiesser, Kyriakon, F S Quasten, (Miinster Westf , 1970), pp 349-51; AJ 49 ff , esp 51 6
7
8
5
A t h c Ar ii. 19 f
VII
VII 676
677
a n d t h e p h r a s e I f OVK OVTCOV has t h e e f f e c t o f d e n y i n g t h i s . B u t i n a n y case t h e ' p r o m o t i o n ' t h e o r y is e x c l u d e d b y o t h e r phrases i n t h e l e t t e r , e s p e c i a l l y 6 irar-qp 8ov$ avrto irdvrojv TT)V KXr/povopitav (§4) w i t h its a l l u s i o n to H e b r e w s 1:3, w h i c h c o u p l e s t h e Son's o b t a i n i n g t h a t i n h e r i t a n c e w i t h his r o l e i n c r e a t i n g t h e 'ages' (altovas), no d o u b t b e f o r e our f a m i l i a r years a n d days b e g a n . 9
3
'FROM NOTHING'; F O U R I H - C E N I U R Y INTERPRETATIONS
I t seems t o m e t h a t t h e p h r a s e I f OVK ovrtov, as u s e d b y A r i u s a n d b y his c r i t i c s , c o n v e y s at least f o u r d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e nuances, w h i c h m a y be l i s t e d as f o l l o w s : (a) (b) (c)
T h e S o n , b e i n g ' f r o m n o t h i n g ' , is n o t ' f r o m G o d ' . T h e S o n ' s existence h a d an a b s o l u t e b e g i n n i n g T h e S o n is a c r e a t u r e
(d) T h e S o n is n o t t r u e b e i n g , is a n o n - e n t i t y . O f these p r o p o s i t i o n s , A r i u s h i m s e l f w o u l d c e r t a i n l y d e n y (a), b u t w o u l d a c c e p t , w i t h r e s e r v a t i o n s , (b) a n d (c); (d) e m b o d i e s a s o p h i s t r y ; i n one sense o n l y t h e F a t h e r is t r u e B e i n g ( E x o d 3:14); b u t his c r e a t u r e s possess t h e i r degrees of b e i n g as h i s g i f t . T h e f o u r p r o p o s i t i o n s c o r r e s p o n d w i t h d i f f e r e n t senses o f I K , as d i s t i n g u i s h e d b y L S I ; (a) i m p l i e s sense I I I , o f o r i g i n ; (6) s u g gests sense I I , of t i m e ; ( t ) d e r i v e s i n d i r e c t l y f r o m sense I I I ; (d) i m p l i e s sense I 4, o f s e l e c t i o n f r o m a g r o u p . 1 0
I d o n o t of course i m p l y t h a t e i t h e r A r i u s or h i s c r i t i c s e x p l i c i t l y m a d e these d i s t i n c t i o n s ; b u t c r i t i c a l d i s c u s s i o n m u s t b e g i n f r o m a clear s t a t e m e n t o f p o s s i b i l i t i e s ; w e can t h e n c o n s i d e r w h i c h i m p l i c a t i o n was u p p e r m o s t i n t h e m i n d s of its u s e r s , a n d so pass t o t h e f u r t h e r q u e s t i o n o f h o w d a m a g i n g i t was t o o r t h o d o x b e l i e f , or w h a t degree o f t o l e r a t i o n i t m i g h t h a v e b e e n a c c o r d e d (a) T h i s c h a r g e has b e e n discussed b y R. L o r e n z (AJ p p . 51 f ). A r i u s i n c l u d e s t h e p h r a s e I f avrov rov 0eoO 6 vios i n a l i s t of A l e x a n d e r ' s tenets w h i c h he d i s o w n e d (Urk i , § 2 ) , a n d is said to h a v e b l a m e d A l e x a n d e r f o r s a y i n g I K rov narpds rov vlov, t h o u g h his c o r r e s p o n d e n t G e o r g e o f L a o d i c e a suggests t h a t he s h o u l d h a v e f o u n d t h e p h r a s e acceptable (Urk 13). B u t G e o r g e ' s a r g u m e n t has t h e b a d e f f e c t o f i m p l y i n g t h a t t h e S o n is i n n o w a y distinguishable f r o m the lower creation. A r i u s ' more carefully c o n s i d e r e d Letter to Alexander does n o t discuss t h e p h r a s e I f avrov A paper of mine, delivered at the Colloquium Origenianum Septimum, Hofgeismar-Marburg, in August 1997 adverts to the difficulties which arise from different conceptions of time See note 9 above
per
se, b u t i n c l u d e s i t i n a l i s t of phrases w h i c h can e a s i l y be 6 § 5 : ei he TO ' I f avrov
m i s i n t e r p r e t e d : Urk
e£r)\dov Kal TJKOJ' OJS /xepos avrov voelrai,
ovvderos
eorai
ópoovoíov
ó rrar-qp Kai
Siaiperos
Kai
TO ' I K rod
irarpós
Kai ¿JS rrpo^oXr¡ viró rtvcov etc.
I t is r e a s o n a b l e to
i n f e r t h a t A r i u s d i s l i k e d t h e p h r a s e because i t h a d b e e n u s e d b y h e r e t i c s ( V a l e n t i n u s , M a n i c h a e u s , i b i d §2) i n a w a y w h i c h s u g g e s t e d t h a t t h e S o n was e m i t t e d or p r o j e c t e d f r o m t h e F a t h e r i n s o m e p h y s i c a l sense A s L o r e n z has r i g h t l y o b s e r v e d (AJ p 51 n 30), m u c h t h e same p o i n t is m a d e b y E u s e b i u s o f N i c o m e d i a i n h i s Letter
to Paulinm;
I f avrov
r¡v) cos civ piépos avrov
f) I f
c o u l d be t a k e n t o suggest (árr'
dnoppoías
rf¡s ovalas',
he
adds t h a t
avrov the
t e r m yewr¡róv m i g h t be m i s u n d e r s t o o d t o i m p l y chs av I K rr¡s ovalas rr¡s rrarpLKfjs avrov yeyovóra e t c . , t o w h i c h m u c h t h e same o b j e c t i o n s a p p l y H e r e I f avrov rov irarpós is c l o s e l y associated w i t h I K TJ¡S ovoias rrjs rrarpiKrjs, t a k i n g ovoia to m e a n ' m a t e r i a l substance'. Athanasius, however, alleged that A r i u s denied in the Thalia t h a t t h e S o n was I K rov irarpós (c Ar. i 9 ) — a careless m i s t a k e since (e g.) t h e t e x t of t h e Thalia, w h i c h he h i m s e l f t r a n s c r i b e s i n h i s later de Synodis (15.3, O p i t z p. 243 r. 20), r e f e r s to t h e Son as TOV I K rrarpos ovra. M o r e o v e r i n de Synodis 34 he a d m i t s that h i s o p p o n e n t s d e s c r i b e d h i m as g e n e r a t e d I K roí) irarpós: cf. the ' D a t e d C r e e d ' c i t e d , i b i d , c 8. I n h i s earlier w o r k A t h a n a s i u s seems t o have a s s u m e d t h a t o r i g i n a t i o n I f OVK OVTOJV e x c l u d e s I K TOV irarpós
(loe
c i t , OVK eonv
I K TOV irarpós,
dXX I f OVK OVTOJV vireorrj
Kai avrós), w h i c h i g n o r e s t h e v a r i a b l e sense of I K , p a r t l y e x p l o r e d b y L o r e n z (AJ p. 5 r , ' z w e i e r l e i ' ) W h a t A r i u s d i s l i k e s is t h e m a t e r i a l i z i n g v i e w o f G o d w h i c h I K c o u l d suggest i f t a k e n i n a spatial sense; b u t he makes i t a b u n d a n t l y clear t h a t t h e S o n o r i g i n a t e s f r o m t h e F a t h e r , a n d i n d e e d b y t h e d i v i n e w i l l (¿Tn)pfe OeX-qaei irarptpa)—(Opitz p . 243, 11 3, 5, 11 f , 19).. A t h a n a s i u s a t t a c k s this last p o i n t also: A r i u s s h o u l d h a v e said t h a t he d e r i v e s f r o m the d i v i n e essence B u t t h e r e are o b v i o u s o b j e c t i o n s t o a n y s u g g e s t i o n t h a t G o d ' s w i l l m i g h t c o n f l i c t w i t h h i s essence. Athanasius s h o u l d have said t h a t t h e S o n d e r i v e s i n d e e d f r o m his i m m a t e r i a l essence, i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h h i s w i l l . T h e c r i t i c i s m s o f A r i u s w h i c h w e have j u s t n o t e d w i l l n o t s t a n d 11
(b) ' E f OVK ovrtov c a n be t a k e n t o m e a n t h a t t h e Son's existence h a d an a b s o l u t e b e g i n n i n g ; see f o r i n s t a n c e Urk. 4b, t h e letter 'Evos
oojpiaros
§7:
OL>K áe£
r¡v ó rov
6eov
Xóyos,
dXX
If
OVK OVTOJV
yéyovev (the W o r d o f G o d w a s n o t a l w a y s , b u t o r i g i n a t e d f r o m n o t - b e i n g ) . T h e first clause a t least is a p e r f e c t l y fair a c c o u n t of
9
1 0
G C . Stead, ' T h e Freedom of the Will and the Arian Controversy', in H -D Blume and F Mann, (eds.), Platomsmus und Christentum, FS H . Dórrie, (Munster Westf , 1983), pp 256 f ( = Substance and Illusion, London, 1985, X V I ) 11
VII
VII 679
678 A n u s ' t e a c h i n g ; see e s p e c i a l l y Urk. i 5: Kai rrpiv yewrjOf/ .. . OVK rjv, s h o r t l y f o l l o w e d b y t h e defence o f I f OVK OVTOJV e x a m i n e d above. T h e r e p o r t i n Deer 5 b r i n g s t h e phrases c l o s e l y t o g e t h e r : ov yap fjv b vids irpiv yewr/df),
dXX I f OVK OVTOJV yeyove
o w n w o r d s i n t h e Thalia
Kai avros,
and A l i u s '
m a k e h i s p o s i t i o n clear:
avves STI r\ povas r/v, Tj Svas o" OVK rjv irplv vwdp^Tj. avTiKa yovv v\ov prj OVTOS o nctTr^p 9eos kern Xomov o vto$ OVK OJV (uTTTjpfe §e $eXrjoei warpojq) povoyevr/s 8e6s hart ( A t h Syn 15: Opitz p 243 11. 1-4)
Perhaps w e should render this: Understand that the M o n a d was, b u t the D y a d was not before i t came into existence For first, while the Son is n o t , the Father is G o d ; and next, the Son w h o was not, b u t came into being by the Father's w i l l , is G o d the only-begotten M y v a r i a t i o n o f ' i s ' a n d ' w a s ' is s u g g e s t e d b y t h e tense o f t h e associated v e r b W e are d e a l i n g h e r e w i t h a s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d c o n f l i c t o f v i e w s . Alexander a n d Athanasius h e l d that t h e Son was eternally begott e n , A r i u s t h a t h i s existence h a d a b e g i n n i n g . P e r h a p s t h e m o r e i n t e r e s t i n g debate centres o n t h e associated p h r a s e rjv ore OVK rjv, o n w h i c h I h a v e a l r e a d y c o m m e n t e d i n m y 1964 paper A l e x a n d e r argues t h a t t h e use o f t h e i m p e r f e c t tense is i l l e g i t i m a t e (Urk.. i 4 § 2 2 f ) , since i t p r e s u p p o s e s t i m e , w h e r e a s t i m e c a m e i n t o b e i n g t h r o u g h t h e L o g o s ; l i k e w i s e A t h a n a s i u s , c. Ar i 14, argues t h a t t h e A r i a n d i s c l a i m e r rrpo xpdvojv is i l l e g i t i m a t e , since t h e y s t i l l a c k n o w l e d g e p e r i o d s (oiaorqpiaTa TWO) i n w h i c h t h e y i m a g i n e he was n o t , so n o n e t h e less i n d i c a t i n g t i m e s (ovokv T\TTOV xpoeous o-qpiaivovTts) a n d c h a r g i n g G o d w i t h u n r e a s o n (dXoyCa), v i z . absence o f L o g o s T h i s a r g u m e n t c a n f a i r l y easily b e c o u n t e r e d , since i t is i n p r a c t i c e i m p o s s i b l e t o a v o i d t e m p o r a l l a n g u a g e w h e n one a t t e m p t s t o deal w i t h e t e r n a l r e a l i t i e s A l e x a n d e r h i m s e l f has q u o t e d kv dpxtj rjv 6 Xoyos etc , a n d h o w e v e r t h i s is t o b e u n d e r s t o o d , i t c e r t a i n l y does n o t i n d i c a t e a p e r i o d o f t i m e i n w h i c h t h e W o r d was i n t h e b e g i n n i n g , etc. A n d A t h a n a s i u s is p a r t i c u l a r l y exposed to t h e tu quoque a r g u m e n t , since h e r e f e r s t o G o d c r e a t i n g t h i n g s ' w h e n h e saw t h a t t h e y w e r e c a p a b l e o f e x i s t i n g ' , ' w h e n h e w i l l e d , a n d i t was e x p e d i e n t f o r t h e m ' (c. Ar. 1 29). I t m i g h t m a k e sense t o t a l k o f G o d c r e a t i n g i n d i v i d u a l s , or even species, w h e n h e saw t h a t c o n d i t i o n s w e r e r i g h t f o r t h e m : fishes n e e d a sea t o s w i m i n ; b u t w h a t e x t e r n a l f a c t o r s c o u l d suggest t h e r i g h t m o m e n t f o r i n i t i a t i n g c r e a t i o n as a w h o l e ? B u t f u r t h e r d i s c u s s i o n m u s t be o m i t t e d , since i t w o u l d h a v e t o deal at l e n g t h w i t h a n c i e n t t h e o r i e s of t i m e , a l r e a d y d i s c u s s e d i n m y 1964 paper a n d e l s e w h e r e . 12
12
See note 9 above
(c) A s f o r t h e i m p l i c a t i o n t h a t t h e S o n is a c r e a t u r e : i n t e r m s o f f o r m a l d e f i n i t i o n , t h i s is a p e r f e c t l y c l e a r - c u t issue S i n c e the late s e c o n d c e n t u r y i t h a d b e e n g e n e r a l l y agreed a m o n g C h r i s t i a n s t h a t G o d created all beings, b o t h material a n d s p i r i t u a l , f r o m n o t h i n g T h i s excluded any doctrine o f u n f o r m e d matter existing t o g e t h e r w i t h G o d b e f o r e t h e c r e a t i o n ; a d o c t r i n e h e l d , as w e have seen, b y P l u t a r c h , a n d also b y H e r m o g e n e s , w h o was a n s w e r e d b y T e r t u l l i a n . S i n c e G o d is t h e sole s o u r c e , i t seems clear t h a t n o t h i n g else b u t h i s c r e a t i o n c a m e i n t o b e i n g I f OVK OVTOJV, SO that t h e r e f e r e n c e o f KTLOIS a n d I f OVK OVTOJV is i d e n t i c a l , t h o u g h their sense is d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e B u t p r o b l e m s r e m a i n ; w e m a y ask, is I f OVK OVTOJV an a l l o w a b l e p h r a s e , e v e n i f w e d i s t i n g u i s h G o d as t h e ' m o v i n g cause' of c r e a t i o n ? W e h a v e n o t e d t h e v a r i a n t p h r a s e I K TOC/AT) OVTOS', we k n o w f o r c e r t a i n t h a t A r i u s h i m s e l f u s e d t h e f o r m e r phrase, w h e r e a s t h e latter is a t t r i b u t e d t o t h e A r i a n p a r t y (Urk. 4b §7; A t h c Ar i 22, i i . 18). A r e t h e y r e a l l y e q u i v a l e n t ? T h e latter appears t o s i g n i f y c o m p l e t e absence o f being.. B u t i n s u c h a case i t m i g h t seem t h a t t h e r e is n o t h i n g w h i c h can b e i d e n t i f i e d or c o u n t e d , so as t o j u s t i f y t h e p l u r a l n u m b e r T a k e n l i t e r a l l y ret OVK ovra s h o u l d i m p l y 'at least t w o n o t h i n g ' ! — a n d t h e s i n g u l a r p h r a s e , b e i n g r e l a t i v e l y n o n - c o m m i t t a l , m i g h t seem t o be preferable W e c a n r e p l y b y c o n s i d e r i n g t h e c o n t e x t T h e p h r a s e I f OVK OVTOJV was u n d e r s t o o d , f r o m t h e late s e c o n d c e n t u r y , as e x c l u d i n g the theory that G o d brought things into being b y imposing f o r m o n a p r e - e x i s t e n t u n f o r m e d m a t t e r ; t h e r e are w e l l - k n o w n a r g u m e n t s against m a k i n g m a t t e r c o e x i s t e n t w i t h G o d . B u t these w o u l d n o t a p p l y t o p r e - e x i s t i n g f o r m s o f t h i n g s t o be c r e a t e d , w h i c h c o u l d b e seen as e x i s t i n g i n t h e m i n d o f G o d . I n d e e d , some a n t i - A r i a n w r i t e r s g o f u r t h e r ; t h u s A t h a n a s i u s i n c. Ar 11.75 quotes E p h 1:3-5 d T i m r : 2 - i o : t h e c h o i c e o f t h e elect was foreseen b e f o r e t h e f o u n d a t i o n o f t h e w o r l d B u t G o d c a n h a r d l y have c h o s e n t h e elect w i t h o u t f o r e s e e i n g t h e i r c i r c u m s t a n c e s ; so i t seems t h a t G o d ' s f o r e k n o w l e d g e m u s t e x t e n d b e y o n d t h e 'species and p o s s i b l y i n d i v i d u a l t h i n g s ' m e n t i o n e d b y O r i g e n (Princ 1.4 5) to i n c l u d e t h e d e s t i n i e s o f each i n d i v i d u a l ; O r i g e n i n d e e d t h o u g h t t h a t (as a l w a y s p e r f e c t l y f o r e k n o w n ) t h e y m u s t a l w a y s have e x i s t e d . I c a n n o t m y s e l f accept a n y s u c h t h e o r y o f t o t a l p r e d e t e r m i n a t i o n , b u t t h i s is n o t t h e p l a c e f o r i t s f u r t h e r d i s c u s s i o n . Y e t t h e v i e w t h a t t h i n g s c a n e x i s t ' i n idea' b e f o r e (or w i t h o u t ) a t t a i n i n g e x i s t e n c e i n r e a l i t y seems t o i m p l y t h a t e x i s t i n g is an a
n
2
13
13
See my Philosophy in Christian Antiquity (Cambridge, 1994), pp 232-35
VII
VIT
681
680 a c t i v i t y w h i c h can he e x e r c i s e d i n v a r i o u s f o r m s I t c o n t r a s t s w i t h a t o t a l l y d i f f e r e n t t h e o r y o f existence p r o p o u n d e d b y m o d e r n l o g i c i a n s , w h i c h e l i m i n a t e s t h i s s u p p o s e d a c t i v i t y a n d e x p l a i n s '% e x i s t s ' b y ' s o m e t h i n g is x\ i n w h i c h p h r a s e t h e ' i s ' is a n e n t i r e l y c o l o u r l e s s t e r m e x p r e s s i n g p r e d i c a t i o n , as o p p o s e d t o d e n o t i n g a n a c t i v i t y w h i c h x p e r f o r m s a c c o r d i n g t o i t s n a t u r e I have t r i e d t o e x p l a i n t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n i n s i m p l e t e r m s i n m y b o o k Philosophy in Christian Antiquity, pp. 120-26; b u t I c o u l d w e l l emphasize that n e i t h e r t h e o r y can easily e x p l a i n t h e w h o l e r a n g e o f cases i n w h i c h t h e n o t i o n o f ' e x i s t i n g ' is u s e d T h e s e c o n d t h e o r y w o r k s a d m i r a b l y w h e n w e w i s h t o c o n t r a s t t h i n g s t h a t a c t u a l l y exist w i t h m e r e fictions; b u t i t is n o t easy t o a p p l y t o cases w h e r e s o m e t h i n g comes i n t o existence b y r e c o g n i z a b l e stages. T h i s p o i n t can be m a d e w i t h o u t a n y r e f e r e n c e t o t r a n s c e n d e n t a l r e a l i t i e s , o r ideas i n t h e m i n d o f G o d , t h o u g h i t does n o t exclude t h e m . W e still distinguish between intellect and matter P y t h a g o r a s ' t h e o r e m , f o r i n s t a n c e , c o m e s i n t o b e i n g at t h e m o m e n t w h e n i t is c o n c e i v e d ; i f t h e r e are stages i n t h i s process, t h e y are stages i n P y t h a g o r a s ' m e n t a l t r a v a i l ; w h e r e a s A r c h i m e d e s ' 'eureka' seems t o c e l e b r a t e a n i n s t a n t a n e o u s d i s c o v e r y B u t a t h i n g ' s c o m i n g into being may w e l l involve b o t h mental and material o p e r a t i o n s A b r i d g e m i g h t b e g i n s i m p l y as a d e s i d e r a t u m ; i t b e c o m e s a p r o j e c t w h e n p o s s i b l e m e t h o d s are s u g g e s t e d ; m o d e l s m a y be m a d e t o t r y o u t a l t e r n a t i v e s o l u t i o n s ; finally t h e b r i d g e is b u i l t B e f o r e t h a t t i m e one m i g h t w e l l say t h a t t h e b r i d g e d i d n o t e x i s t B u t t h e p r e l i m i n a r y stages c a n easily be i d e n t i f i e d , for e x a m p l e , as ' w o r k o n t h e S y d n e y H a r b o u r B r i d g e ' . Per c o n t r a , w e c o u l d say, ' I n 1900 t h e S y d n e y H a r b o u r B r i d g e d i d n o t e x i s t ' , or a d d u c e t h e goat-stag or t h e c h i m e r a as t h i n g s t h a t never c o u l d e x i s t I n s u c h cases t h e r e was n o t , or is n o t , a n y t h i n g t h a t answers t o t h e d e s c r i p t i o n , a n d t h e y c a n be d e a l t w i t h b y t h e t h e o r y discussed above T h e s e r e m a r k s o f c o u r s e take us s o m e w a y b e y o n d t h e c i r c l e of ideas c o m m o n l y r e c e i v e d i n a n t i q u i t y , w h e n w e hear s o m e t h i n g about the m e n t a l labour of conceiving a project, b u t v e r y little a b o u t t h e e x p e r i m e n t a l t e s t i n g o f m a t e r i a l devices B u t t h e f a c t t h a t e x t e n s i o n is p o s s i b l e does n o t m a k e t h e m i n a p p l i c a b l e t o a n c i e n t p r o b l e m s W e n e e d n o t suggest t h a t a h u m a n a r t e f a c t must b e g i n as a p r o j e c t ; t a k i n g A r i s t o t l e ' s e x a m p l e , a m a n m i g h t b e g i n w i t h a mass o f b r o n z e f o r t u i t o u s l y a c q u i r e d , a n d t h e n d e c i d e t o make it i n t o a statue, rather t h a n b e g i n n i n g w i t h the project and t h e n a c q u i r i n g t h e necessary m a t e r i a l B u t i f t h e r e are a n y p r i o r i t ies i n G o d ' s a l l - p e r f e c t a c t i o n , he w i l l f i r s t c o n c e i v e a n d t h e n execute
I n A r i a n t h e o l o g y t h i s p r i n c i p l e , i t seems, w o u l d a p p l y to the L o g o s ' T h e r e w a s ' — t h o u g h n o t ' t h e r e was a t i m e ' — ' w h e n he w a s n o t ' B u t f r o m a l l e t e r n i t y t h e r e e x i s t e d i n G o d his inseparable W i s d o m , w h i c h is t h e p r o t o t y p e of his p e r s o n a l L o g o s . T h i s w o u l d b e e s p e c i a l l y clear i f w e c o u l d accept t h e r e a d i n g ( A t h . c. Ar 15) 7] oofiia TTj oocp'Ca urri/pfe trot/iot) 6eov dcA-joei. B u t h a v e w e a r r i v e d at a p r o p e r a n a l o g y f o r G o d ' s creative w o r k ? I t d e p e n d s , I t h i n k , o n w h e t h e r w e accept or d e n y the d o c t r i n e o f t o t a l p r e d e t e r m i n a t i o n b y t h e d i v i n e w i l l . I f w e accept i t , t h e n p r e s u m a b l y t h e w h o l e c o n c e p t o f a l l f u t u r e events o r i g i n a t e d w i t h o u t a n y lapse of t i m e , t h o u g h i t is a c o n c e p t o f events to b e e n a c t e d i n t i m e B u t i f t h e c o u r s e o f t h i s w o r l d is at least p a r t l y u n d e t e r m i n e d , a n d t h u s a l l o w s scope f o r h u m a n f r e e d o m i n a r a d i c a l sense, w e m a y h a v e t o say t h a t G o d a l l o w s t h i n g s t o exist and w i t h i n l i m i t s to d e t e r m i n e their f u t u r e w h i l e still exercising o v e r a l l c o n t r o l . T h i s at least e l i m i n a t e s a d i f f i c u l t y w h i c h m i g h t e m b a r r a s s t h e d o c t r i n e o f t o t a l d i v i n e f o r e k n o w l e d g e . T h e ancients o f t e n r e g a r d e d k n o w l e d g e as a k i n d o f i d e n t i t y o f t h e k n o w i n g m i n d w i t h t h e o b j e c t k n o w n . B u t i n t h a t case, w o u l d n o t the d i v i n e p l a n collapse i n t o t o t a l i d e n t i t y w i t h t h e events i t s u p p o s e d l y k n o w s ? B u t i f d e t e r m i n a t i o n is n o t a l l - e m b r a c i n g , o n e m i g h t suppose t h a t G o d h a d f r o m all e t e r n i t y an o u t l i n e plan o f what was t o b e , b u t a l l o w e d f o r p h y s i c a l i n d é t e r m i n a t i o n a n d f u l l h u m a n freedom. (d) W h a t of t h e f o u r t h p o s s i b i l i t y , or s u g g e s t i o n , t h a t f r o m the language u s e d i t f o l l o w s t h a t t h e Son is n o t t r u e B e i n g , or is n o t a t r u e b e i n g , or is a n o n - e n t i t y ? I t d e p e n d s o n t h e exact phraseology W e have c o n s i d e r e d t h e l e g i t i m a c y of t h e phrase I f OVK OVTLOV itself. W h a t I have n o t so far d e t e r m i n e d is, w h e t h e r i t was used b y A r i u s ' o p p o n e n t s t o i m p l y t h a t A r i u s ' v i e w m a d e t h e S o n one of t h e 'things t h a t are n o t ' c o n d e m n e d b y St P a u l i n 1 Cor 1:28 For t h e m o m e n t , I t h i n k t h i s idea was p r e s e n t as n o m o r e t h a n an i n n u e n d o T h e case is rather d i f f e r e n t w i t h t h e a l t e r n a t i v e phrase rov /tr) ovra, w h i c h is a t t r i b u t e d to t h e A r i a n p a r t y b u t n o t d i r e c t l y attested i n A r i u s ' o w n w r i t i n g s P r o b a b l y our best source is Urk. 4b, a letter w r i t t e n i n the n a m e of A l e x a n d e r b u t d r a f t e d , I b e l i e v e , b y A t h a n a s i u s ; A r i u s is said t o believe ô yàp tov rov pi] ovra l/c rov IXT) ovros TTCTToirjKe. C l e a r l y t h e s y n t a x a l l o w s us t o t r a n s l a t e t h e p a r t i c i p l e either as ' h i m that was n o t ' or as ' h i m t h a t is n o t ' , j u s t as one can either make a statue, sc. o u t o f b r o n z e , or m a k e b r o n z e , sc. i n t o a statue. T h e exegesis ' h i m w h o was n o t ' makes t h e p o i n t already c o n s i d e r e d u n d e r (b), a n d c o u l d have been accepted b y A r i u s ; see e. g Thalia 1 20 (p. 243 14
See my 'Athanasius' Earliest Written Work', JTS,
MÎ, 39, (1988),
76-91
VII
VII 682
683
1. i ) ovve;
o n rj piovds rjv, T) 8va$ Se OVK yjv -npiv v-ndp^n T h e exegesis ' h i m w h o is n o t ' seems m o r e e m p h a t i c ; one m i g h t p e r h a p s deduce
i t f r o m A r i u s , o p c i t . , XOVTOV 6 vids OVK SJV vrrr/p^e )
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p,ovoy£vr)s 9e6s I o n T h e p r o b a b l e basis is t h a t A n u s r e f u s e d t o a p p l y t o t h e S o n t h e kyoj elpu 6 wv o f E x o d u s 3:14 E u s e b i u s ' t h e o l o g y m o v e d away f r o m t h i s p o s i t i o n . I n DE 5 3 r6 ( p p 2 2 r 28 f f ) he appears to suggest t h i s concession; b u t i t is o n l y i n h i s m a t u r e Ecclesiastical effi
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t h a t h e c a n say d i r e c t l y e t r ' ovv 6 TraTt)p
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(2 20.15,
p p T29, 1 28 f . ) N e v e r t h e l e s s t h i s c r u c i a l t e x t uses o civ i n a h i g h l y d i s t i n c t i v e sense; i t c a n n o t b e r i g h t t o argue t h a t i f A r i u s d e n i e d t h i s t i t l e t o t h e S o n , he m u s t have r e g a r d e d h i m as TOV psr) t W a i n whatever sense w e ourselves care t o a t t a c h t o t h e phrase
D i o n y s i i , A r i u s accepting t h e m o r e extreme statements of the A l e x a n d r i a n w h i l e A l e x a n d e r t r i e d r a t h e r i n c o n s i s t e n t l y t o meet t h e a r g u m e n t s o f t h e R o m a n p o p e w h i l e m a i n t a i n i n g an insistence o n Teal d i s t i n c t i o n s i n t h e Persons o f t h e T r i n i t y S i n c e t h e A l e x a n d r i a n D i o n y s i u s was i n c o n t r o v e r s y w i t h Sabellians i n L i b y a , i t has been p l a u s i b l y m a i n t a i n e d t h a t he f o s t e r e d a m a r k e d anti-Sabellian reaction towards w h i c h A r i u s was d r a w n Such e x p l a n a t i o n s appear t o m e m u c h m o r e c o n v i n c i n g t h a n a supposed i n f l u e n c e f r o m A n t i o c h e n e t h e o l o g y , or a d e b t t o P a u l o f Samosata, w h i l e L u c i a n remains an enigma I t m a y well b e , however, that i n A l e x a n d r i a the doctrine of eternal generation was already established ( f o l l o w i n g O r i g e n and no doubt influenced b y Dionysius o f R o m e ) , so t h a t A r i u s was u p h o l d i n g a m i n o r i t y v i e w I n other p a t r i a r c h a t e s h i s d o c t r i n e t h a t t h e S o n was b e g o t t e n irpd xpdvcov KCLI alojvcov w o u l d h a v e been t h o u g h t s u f f i c i e n t ; i t was e v i d e n t l y a c c e p t a b l e t o E u s e b i u s of Caesarea, w h o w i t h o u t a g r e e i n g e n t i r e l y w i t h A r i u s nevertheless v e n t u r e d t o take h i s side against A l e x a n d e r b e f o r e h i s p a r t i a l c a p i t u l a t i o n at N i c a e a W h e r e I t h i n k A r i u s is v u l n e r a b l e is t h a t h e r e l i e d so largely o n P r o v e r b s 8:22 t a k e n i n i s o l a t i o n H i s e x p o s i t i o n o f t h i s text was u n d o u b t e d l y c o r r e c t , i n t h a t i t r e p r o d u c e d t h e b i b l i c a l w r i t e r ' s i n t e n t i o n s , as n o t m e a n i n g t o d i f f e r e n t i a t e b e t w e e n ' b e g e t t i n g ' and ' m a k i n g ' , or d e l i b e r a t e l y c o n t r a s t i n g t h e i r tenses, as i n t h e L X X eKnae ytwa B u t i t was a breach w i t h t r a d i t i o n ; Christian scholars h a d l o n g p u z z l e d over t h e t e x t , a n d t r i e d v a r i o u s means t o a v o i d e q u a t i n g t h e t w o v e r b s . T h e A r i a n a r g u m e n t s f o r equat i o n w e r e n o t n o t a b l y s u c c e s s f u l ; i n p a r t i c u l a r , their o b s e r v a t i o n t h a t yewav can b e u s e d i n a v e r y general sense w a s taken t o p r o v e t h a t t h e y r e g a r d e d t h e S o n as a c r e a t u r e tout court, as n o m o r e t h a n o n e o f t h e ' d r o p s o f d e w ' ( J o b 38:28; see p 6 7 4 ) B u t A t h a n a s i u s ' c o u n t e r - a r g u m e n t s are t h e m s e l v e s i n c o h e r e n t ; he can a r g u e t h a t G o d ' s acts o f c r e a t i n g , a n d again o f b e g e t t i n g , are t o t a l l y r e m o v e d f r o m h u m a n e x p e r i e n c e (c. Ar. i 24, 28 i n i t . ) a n d y e t appeal t o h u m a n e x p e r i e n c e t o p r e s e n t i t as a m a t t e r o f course t h a t b e g e t t i n g a n d m a k i n g are t w o d i f f e r e n t t h i n g s ( i b i d 24, 29) I t is d i f f i c u l t t o a v o i d t h e s u s p i c i o n t h a t h e goes far b e y o n d most earlier o r t h o d o x C h r i s t i a n s i n e m p h a s i z i n g t h e f r a g i l i t y a n d imper¬ m a n e n c e o f G o d ' s c r e a t i o n , i n o r d e r t o arouse h o s t i l i t y against A r i u s ' c l a i m t h a t t h e S o n is a c r e a t u r e ; after a l l , t h e relative 1 7
1 8
S e c t i o n 3 has s h o w n t h a t i n t h e c o u r s e o f t h e A r i a n c o n t r o v e r s y t h e phrase I f OVK OVTLOV a c q u i r e d v a r i o u s n u a n c e s w h i c h d i d n o t a t t a c h t o its o r i g i n a l use a p p l y i n g t o c r e a t e d n a t u r e A l l i t i n t e n d e d t o e x c l u d e w a s , i n A r i s t o t l e ' s t e r m s , a m a t e r i a l cause; t h e m o v i n g , f o r m a l a n d f i n a l causes are n o t e x c l u d e d A n d t h e same w i l l a p p l y t o t h e A r i a n L o g o s T h e o b j e c t i o n s r a i s e d against h i s o r i g i n a t i o n I f OVK 'OVTOJV are l a r g e l y p o l e m i c a l devices T h e real b o n e o f c o n t e n t i o n w a s , w h e t h e r A r i u s was r i g h t i n r e t a i n i n g t h e i n c l u s i v e sense o f ' c r e a t i o n ' so t h a t e v e r y b e i n g a p a r t f r o m t h e F a t h e r h i m s e l f m u s t r a n k as a ' c r e a t u r e ' 4
'FROM
N O T H I N G ' : PERVERSE
OR DEFENSIBLE?
We come, then, to a controversial a n d very familiar theme I w i l l begin w i t h a f e w generalities I do n o t t h i n k that A r i a n i s m s h o u l d b e e x p l a i n e d as a n i n t r u s i o n f r o m a l i e n p h i l o s o p h y i n t o Christian debate Moreover I t h i n k i t was predominantly a n A l e x a n d r i a n d e v e l o p m e n t . B u t t h a t does n o t i m p l y t h a t A l e x a n d r i a n t h e o l o g y was a u n i f i e d c o r p u s O r i g e n ' s i n f l u e n c e was o b v i o u s l y p o w e r f u l ; b u t t h e r e is reason t o suspect a n t i - O t i g e n i s t i c currents M o r e o v e r O r i g e n ' s o w n t e a c h i n g is many-faceted N o t a b l y he c o m b i n e d a d o c t r i n e of eternal generation w i t h a m a r k e d s u b o r d i n a t i o n i s m , a n uneasy c o m b i n a t i o n , b u t one f a m i l iar i n c o n t e m p o r a r y P l a t o n i s m . A r i u s w h o l l y r e j e c t e d t h e f o r m e r , A l e x a n d e r reacted s t r o n g l y against t h e latter M o r e o v e r t h e y w i l l have t a k e n d i f f e r e n t v i e w s o f t h e c o n t r o v e r s y b e t w e e n t h e t w o 1 5
1 6
See my 'Platonism of Arius' (n 1) and 'Was A l i u s a Neoplatonist?', Studia PatiViLita 32 (1997), 39-52 (against R D. Williams, Arms pp 181-232), and 'Platonism in Origen and Arius' (lecture at the Colloquium Origenianum Septimum, Hofgeismar-Marburg, 1997) See W A Bienert, Dionysius von Alexandrien, P7S, 21, (Berlin/New York, 1978) 15
16
1 9
See my 'Arius in Modern Research', (n. 7), esp. 34-36 See 'Dionysius of Rome's Letter', in C L Feltoe, Dionysius of Alexandria (Cambridge, 1904), on the distinction between yeyewijodat and yeyavivai See esp M Simonetti, Studi sull'Arianesimo (VS 5) (Rome, ^ 6 5 ) , pp 9-87 17
16
19
VII 684 goodness of t h e c r e a t i o n h a d b e e n a n i m p o r t a n t p o i n t t o argue against t h e M a n i c h e e s A n d h i s a r g u m e n t ( i b i d . i i . 19) t h a t i t is l o g i c a l l y u n s o u n d t o d e s c r i b e t h e S o n as KrCop,a . dXX oi>x OJS h Ttuv KTtojxdroiVj,
yevvrjfxa
dXX ov\ cos ev TOJV yevvyjftdrtov
is f a r
from
impressive T h e o l o g y demands an element of paradox; a n d surely n o N i c e n e s h o u l d o b j e c t t o d e s c r i b i n g C h r i s t as dvQpomos, dXX oi>x tbs €is TWV dv8pci>7To)v, r e m e m b e r i n g t h a t f o r A t h a n a s i u s h i m s e l f h e is b o t h dvdptoiTos a n d OVK 'dvdpojiros b y t u r n s 2 0
A t i u s , w e s a i d , r e l i e d t o o l a r g e l y o n P r o v e r b s 8:22 t a k e n b y i t s e l f B u t w h e n A t h a n a s i u s i n r e p l y a f f e c t e d t o d e f i n e t h e 'scope' o f S c r i p t u r e as a w h o l e , h e m u s t b e accused o f special p l e a d i n g ; as i f t h e w h o l e B i b l e w e r e d i r e c t e d t o w a r d s h i s o w n f o u r t h - c e n t u r y problems N e v e r t h e l e s s i t is t r u e t h a t a great mass o f i m p o r t a n t t e x t s assign a r o l e t o t h e S o n w h i c h A r i u s a p p e a r e d t o deny. T o d e c l a r e t h a t h e was e f OVK OVTOJV w a s a p o l e m i c a l s t a t e m e n t , a n d a tactical error. T h e u n d e r l y i n g d o c t r i n e , that t h e S o n was n o t c o e t e r n a l w i t h t h e F a t h e r , w o u l d n o d o u b t h a v e b e e n acceptable i n A l e x a n d r i a i n t h e t i m e o f B i s h o p D i o n y s i u s , as i t w a s i n other patriarchates i n A r i u s ' o w n time. B u t Alexander and Athanasius had advanced to a n e w p o s i t i o n , w h i c h they were prepared to d e f e n d w i t h t h e u t m o s t s e l f - c o n f i d e n c e , a n d w i t h c o m p l e t e lack o f s c r u p l e — t o say n o t h i n g o f C h r i s t i a n c h a r i t y — i n t h e i r t r e a t m e n t o f t h e i r o p p o n e n t s . A l i u s ' ef OVK OVTOJV m a d e h i m v u l n e r a b l e N o d o u b t h e w a s p r o t e s t i n g against c r u d e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s o f IK TOV irarpds: b u t h e t h u s a p p e a r e d t o d e n y , w h a t e l s e w h e r e h e c l e a r l y states, t h a t t h e S o n d i d o r i g i n a t e f r o m t h e F a t h e r H e r e p e a t e d t h i s s t a t e m e n t at t h e e n d o f h i s days i n a c o n c i l i a t o r y f o r m u l a sent t o C o n s t a n t i n e (Urk. 30, 2) B u t h i s o p p o n e n t s r e q u i r e d m o r e t h a n h e w a s p r e p a r e d t o c o n c e d e , at t h e same t i m e a c c u s i n g h i m of h y p o c r i s y A p p a r e n t l y t h e o n l y w a y t o a v o i d the charge of hypocrisy was to c o m m i t the sin 2 1
2 2
A r i u s , o f c o u r s e , was n o t w h o l l y f r e e f r o m b l a m e Y e t t h e C h r i s t i a n C h u r c h has m u c h t o d e p l o r e i n its t r e a t m e n t o f h i m . . T h e c a r e f u l l y c o n s i d e r e d phrases o f h i s Letter to Alexander attracted the same i n t e m p e r a t e abuse as h i s a d m i t t e d l y p r o v o c a t i v e Thalia. P e r h a p s t h e m o s t u s e f u l lesson w e can d r a w is t h e u n w i s d o m o f b e f o g g i n g t h e m i n d s o f s i m p l e believers w i t h expressions t h a t are better s u i t e d t o t h e l e c t u r e - r o o m a n d t h e t h e o l o g i c a l j o u r n a l
See C Kannengresser, Sur ITncarnation du Verbe (SC 199) (Paris, 1973), pp.48-51 See my 'Athanasius als Exeget', in J van Oort and U Wrckert, (eds), Christliche Exegese zwnchen Nicaea und Chalcedon (Kampen, 1992), 174-84, here pp. 177 f See Athanasius, Ep 54.2 2 0
2 1
2 2
VIII
The Aiian Controversy: A New Perspective (Magistra, fons dulcedinis, hoc i n loco desipere liceat!)
I h e text that I shall try to introduce to y o u should i think be classed as pseudepigraphical Its historical value I judge to be slight. It is indeed written i n the name o f Alius, and is presumably the work of an Arian writer, or at least of one who had some measure of sympathy with the Arian cause But it cannot have been written by Arius himself, nor indeed during his lifetime, since it clearly shows knowledge of Athanasian theology, not simply f r o m oral tradition but as it is presented i n his writings. Its evident acquaintance w i t h the Orations against the Arians shows that the work must be dated some five or ten years after the heresiaich's death, at the earliest; and i f it is seen to have used the de Synodis also, this indicates a date i n the 360's as a terminus a quo. I n view of t h e intrinsic interest o f the questions i n dispute I do not pr opose to give further attention t o its provenance and transmission, but w i l l lay it before you at once i n the English version which I have prepared I t runs as follows: f he prophet of old instructed his disciple saying " M y son, if thou comest to serve the L o r d , prepare thy soul for trials; cleave unto h i m and depart not, and endure the vicissitudes of humiliation". Indeed the Lord himself said to his apostles " I f a man do not take up his cross and follow me, he cannot be m y disciple".. Now we w i l l not exalt ourselves above measure, or presume to compare ourselves w i t h the apostles; but as followers o f them, and of the holy prophets, and of our blessed and orthodox teachers in the Church, we have indeed suffered grievous trials at the hands of proud and selfwilled m e n who malign our persistence i n the orthodox faith For as to the blessed Alexander, at one time our Bishop, we shall say nothing, though we grieved over his errors; for he showed us many kindnesses, and for a time was willing to listen to us and inquire peaceably, if by any means we could come together i n the bond of orthodoxy But i n the end he was persuaded by evil counsellors, and those not grave and experienced men, nor many in number, but by a violent and ambitious youth whose honourable name I will not disgrace by pronouncing it, since i n every place he has promoted violence and discord rather than the concord and fellowship which disposes to (auavaoiav) eternal life N o w the impious Rehoboam listened to the evil counsel of the young m e n after the death of his father Solomon; but this new tyrant, young though he was, accepted n o man's counsel, nor did he submit himself to the wisdom of that good Solomon while he was alive; but stole his affections and usurped his authority, not waiting for that death
VIII
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The Arian Controversy
which was to him the opportunity for his ambition; and after the blessed Alexander fell asleep he was secretly appointed, as he claims, by some two or three confederates, and by specious words and gifts and promises, and by threats as well, he has corrupted the minds of the innocent, and now persecutes and drives away the orthodox and faithful brethren A n d in all this time we ourselves have done h i m no violence, nor have we incited others to this effect; for not even he himself has ever alleged this; but only, it may be, some of our brethren were provoked by his violence and injustice towards us, or sought retaliation for the wrongs they had suffered. But we for our part have never ceased to strive for communion and fellowship; or if the enmity shown towards us cannot be quenched, we have asked leave to occupy a place of worship where our brethren can assemble without fear or distraction, desiring only that God's holy altar and the sacred vessels and ministers of the sanctuary be not violated by men who are robbers, not givers o f peace But though so often disappointed, by God's grace we have not been idle, but have continued to teach and expound the scriptures as our fathers have taught us. A n d those who are free from ill-will may judge of our faith by the things we have formerly written But since the proud man does not cease to incite oui fellow-Christians against us, reviling us as madmen and blasphemers, we are moved by the divine Reason himself to come to the aid of the truth, not spewing out interminable and repetitious harangues like those of our assailant, but concisely, as Christian modesty and decency prescribe For he has inquired in some place whether names are better than the realities they denote, or inferior to them; and he goes on to complain at us for saying that God uses many words to instruct us, alleging that each word i n that case must be feeble and need the help of others to correct i t W h y then does he himself add word to word, nay rather treatise to treatise? Should he not rather follow blessed Paul, who teaches that the kingdom of God is not i n word but in power? Should he not be ashamed of his inquiry, nay rather his foolish conundrum which any Grecian sophist would have despised? But if we may answer a fool according to his folly, let him learn that there are honorable names, and also names of dishonour; for as to the word 'power', no doubt the reality is greater than the word; but if we speak of 'powerlessness', then the word is greater; for the word at least has power to signify, whereas the reality is a lack of any power So then we must distinguish between word and word, as the blessed Matthew tells us: "for by thy words thou shalt be justified, and by thy words thou shall be condemned". But you, proud bishop, or rather busybody (áMoipieiríoxoire), do not agree, for you contradict yourself many times over, as we shall shortly demonstrate; and i n one place you say that we should pay careful attention to the words, observing the place and the time and the character that is presented; and again you say that the words are things indif1
2
3
ferent and fit to be ignored when some person attends to the facts A n d you do not accept blessed Paul when he proclaims Christ as the power of God and the wisdom of God; for he has used two names, and thus forsooth has demonstrated the weakness of both; and you would have him say "Christ the power of God and the power of God", since it is power without wisdom that you covet and enjoy But I shall not fail to expose the falsity of those words which you misuse against us. For in the first place you traduce us as i f we had said that Christ was a mere man; and you tax us with taking the part o f the Jews and of Caiaphas and of Paul the Samosatene. But first of all, we have never said this, nor is there any writing of ours which you can quote to this effect; indeed we have proclaimed him a mighty god, as you very well know, since you quote our own words in this r e g a r d A n d we have always taught, in accordance with St Paul, that he is the first-born of all creation, and that he was with God as a beginning, and as Wisdom was present w i t h him, giving harmony at the creation o f all things. We say indeed that he was in existence before the ages and before the creation o f the heavens; and you yourself know that this is our doctrine, for you acknowledge us, and Eusebius and Asterius too, as teaching that it was by his means that God created all things. Y o u report our declaration that when God willed to create originate nature, then he first, and he alone, created one, and one alone, and called h i m Son and W o r d , that by his means all things should come into b e i n g This then is your testimony; how then do you dare to slander us, who have called him God's only Son and W o r d , as if we reckoned him a mere man and numbered him indifferently among the creatures? 5
6
7
8
9
I t is not on this account that we have called him a creature; for we have made clear his own proper dignity, proclaiming him "a creature, yet not as one of the creatures, an offspring, yet not as one of the offspring" Now that we have called h i m a creature, is both reasonable and devout; nay, we are bound to do so, confirming to the truly theological Solomon, who proclaims in the person of Wisdom "The Lord created me the beginning o f his ways with a view to his works; before the age he founded me in the beginning" But you will not have it so; for you tell us that he was created, and yet was not a creature, as if God were unable to perfect the work which he intended; and whereas Solomon says that he was created before the age, in the beginning, you vainly allege that he was installed in some new dignity quite recently, now at the end of t i m e ; and after all this you revile us as if we had said that he was i n some way improved or 10
11
12
13
5
4
6
7
8
9
1
3
1
4
See Deer. 16 Ibid Mt 12:37 Or c Ar r 54
53
10
11
11
u
Ibid. II 3 Or c Ar I 38, II 17; Deer 10; Sent Dion 3 Syn 15 Col 1:15, Jn 1:1, Prov 8:30 Or II. 24 Syn 16, cf. Or II 19 Prov 8:22-3 Or c. Ar. II 45 Ibid II 74
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The Arian Controversy
promoted during his earthly life, which is false; while you dare to uphold that very doctrine which you condemn in ourselves! Now that he is coeternal with the Father, or shares with h i m the title 'unoriginate', we are bound in Christian duty to deny; since we have learnt from the saints that the Father himself is the beginning, and that there cannot be two unoriginates; for in that case there must be a third to mediate and distinguish between them; and if a third, then a fourth and f i f t h So we say, framing words to the best o f our ability, that he was not before he was generated. A n d you yourself must accept this view, since it is beyond question that the Father is prior to the Son; and even you will not be so reckless as to say that the Son can beget himself or can beget his own Father, or (though heaven forbid such vile insinuations!) that they mutually beget one another. But we say that the Son was begotten before all ages, for the ages themselves belong to that created nature which the Father laid down with the presence and assistance o f his Son A n d in this you agree, even though you tax us w i t h senseless riddles about the before and the after; for you yourself declare that the W o r d is the Father's counsel, and again that his counsel and purpose was made ready before the ages W h y then do you condemn us, who have but followed the Scriptures in expounding these mysteries - why, I say, do you condemn us when you yourself use the same expressions as we do? 1 4
15
16
17
Yet again, we have amply declared his proper dignity beyond all other creatures, enlightened by the blessed Paul, who declares h i m made so much better than the angels as he has inherited a more excellent name than they But this sentence does not please you, and you give to it a sense of your own, saying that no comparison is intended Moreover, when you wish to deny that the Son is a creature, though exalted above all other creatures, you are not content w i t h changing the meaning of Scripture; no, you write as if Paul had never spoken For 1 w i l l quote your very words in part, as follows: " I f the Son were a creature, but not as one of the creatures because o f his excelling them in glory, it were natural that Scripture should describe h i m by a comparison with the other works; for instance, that it should say that he is greater than the archangels... But he is not in fact thus referred to " T his is what you wrote against us. What, have you forgotten Paul's words? Or do you blame h i m for speaking incorrectly of angels when you yourself would in your wisdom have referred to archangels? W h y do you say that the Scripture does not compare h i m with the visible things of creation, or praise h i m as brighter than the sun and moon, and greater than the heavens? Do you then suppose we are ignorant of the Scriptures, that you toss them out so boldly? 18
19
2 0
21
For Job, and Solomon too, compare h i m , not even with those great lights, but w i t h rubies, pronouncing him the better A n d the inspired Paul tells us that he saw a light f r o m heaven above the brightness o f the sun. N o w what was that light but the L o r d , who spoke with h i m and gave h i m commandment? A n d that he is more honorable than thrones we learn f r o m Daniel, who writes: I beheld till thrones were placed, and one that was ancient of days did sit; for how shall the throne be more glorious than h i m that sitteth upon it? 22
23
24
But here is further proof of your unscrupulous deceit Since you will not accept that the L o r d is reverently to be called a creature in accordance w i t h Scripture, you intend by every means to make the wor d 'cr eature' a term o f dishonour , to make it appear that we dishonour h i m . A n d to that end you are not ashamed to disparage the works of creation; though even here you are not consistent, but contradict yourself in what you say For we have read that God saw everything that he had made, and behold it was very g o o d A n d in part you agree; for you speak of the order and harmony of all things which, as Wisdom tells us, indicates their maker. A n d in your writing against the gentiles you quote David, who praises the all-embracing providence and disposition of the W o r d , as you explain Yet again you retract and contradict yourself, alleging that the nature of all things created is fugitive and changeable, though elsewhere y o u affirm that each one exists and remains i n its own essence as it was made. A n d as to mankind you say that they are corruptible by nature, since they are made out of nothing, supposing that they are subject to some other origin and law than the will of their Creator; and again you say that God foresaw their weakness and instability before he created them, as i f he were a meddlesome workman whose pride forbad him t o abandon his construction even though he knew it would be bad. 2 5
26
2 7
28
29
30
31
N o w that the rational creation is by nature changeable, o f course we shall admit; for both men and the higher powers are capable o f turning either towards the good or to the reverse; and what praise or merit could there be in so-called goodness i f no choice is involved, and men obey their Creator blindly, like the winds and waves, or rest immovable, like stocks and stones? W i t h good reason, therefore, we say that the Lord is changeable by nature, like every rational being; for he was not dumb and insensible, but knew how to refuse the evil and choose the good But by the resolve of his own will he is unchangeable, as we have many times declared; moreover this good resolve of his was k n o w n to the Father himself before all ages, and he is therefore worthy to be 22
23
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
Cf. ibid II 26 Ibid. I 13 Or II. 2 Ibid 77 Hebr 1:4 Or I 55-7 Ibid II 23 Ibid
55
24
25
16
27
28
29
30
31
Job 28:18, Prov 3:15, 8:11 Acts 26:13. Dan 7:9 Gen. 1:31. Or II 32 Gent Or I. Or II Inc 4 Or II
46 36. 19 77
VIII
VIII The Aiian Controversy
56
acknowledged as the true W o r d and Wisdom of the Father, who also willed to beget h i m as Son But you make light of the Father's foreknowledge and reasonable ordinance, as it seems; and though we have declared h i m unchangeable through his perfection i n goodness, which G o d foreknew, you declare that these are things of no account, and give h i m no greater authority than Peter or Paul or any other man. A n d so because of your malice towards us, or it may be through pride at being Bishop of the Alexandrians, you exalt yourself like Lucifer and dare to insult the wise foreknowledge of your own Creator. Moreover you make it a matter of complaint that we speak of two Wisdoms, one in the Father and one i n the Son, just as they are two persons and two dignities; and indeed we do not deny this, and have truly said that Wisdom came into being as Wisdom by the will of the wise G o d . For the Father himself is the source of Wisdom and o f all good things, as you doubtless agree, and of this Wisdom he has given to the Son i n surpassing measure, so that he alone among God's offspring and creatures and works is honoured with the name of Wisdom. Yet i n bestowing this Wisdom the Father has not deprived himself o f Wisdom, perish the thought! - but he remains unchangeably wise, as he ever was, so that the Son converses w i t h his Father as glory w i t h glory and as Wisdom w i t h Wisdom But you do not agree; for you say that the Son is himself the essential Wisdom of the Father, so that there is nothing which the Father has kept i n his own power, unless perhaps it be an inessential and inferior wisdom, but that he must borrow f r o m his Son, like some needy householder. A n d though you affect to despise the fables of the Gnostics, which we also condemn, yet you portray the Father i n the guise of the archon falsely conceived by Basilides, who gives rise to a son who is better and wiser than h i m s e l f Nay further, if all wisdom is found only i n the Son, by what means does the Father know where to seek it, that he may borrow it? Perhaps, being himself devoid of wisdom, he does not even know his own Son, but has become which heaven forbid! - like those lustful deities of the Greeks who committed adulteries w i t h impure women, whose deeds y o u have rightly condemned Into this depth of folly, then, does your heresy lead you; nay rather, o f atheism; for to proclaim a God who is ignorant and indigent is to acknowledge no God at a l l 32
33
34
35
Nevertheless, though sunk i n such blasphemous error, you do not cease to pour scorn on our doctrine of Wisdom; for you complain that, as we expound h i m , he has the name of Wisdom but lacks the reality But who gave h i m that name, we shall ask Attend to what you have said yourself, as expressing our doctrine: "Then wishing to create us, he then made a certain one, and thenceforth named him W o r d and Son, that he might create us through him " Now you indeed present us as speaking scornfully of "a certain one", before w h o m i n fact we bow; but we shall not otherwise deny this 36
Oi I 5, Syn 16 Syn 41. Hippolytus, Ref. V I I 23 5 Gent 11-12 Or I 5
57
teaching, and we require you i n turn to uphold what you have here admitted We have shown, you have said, that it was God, the Almighty and All-Sovereign, who gave to his W o r d the name of Wisdom; and do you then turn back and insult that name, and say that on our showing it was given improperly and incorrectly, and that it is a name and nothing more - that very name which the wise G o d gave to his Only-begotten? Doubtless y o u have read, in the cosmogony of the godloving Moses, that the Lord G o d created every beast and every fowl of the air, and brought them to Adam to see what he would call them; and whatsoever A d a m called every living creature, that was the name t h e r e o f Do you not see that even Adam, a weak and fallible creature as you allege, has received such authority that the names he has given persist i n truth; and do y o u think the name which God himself has given, and not Adam, to no beast but to his Son, should be of no account? W h y , even those names which human fathers bestow upon their sons to this day are valid before magistrates and governors; you yourself bear the name Athanasius; and even though you misconduct your self and abuse us i n a manner unworthy of eternal life, yet we do not deny that that is your name; then do you think it a light matter that the Father of all has named his Son after his own most precious possession, and has given him moreover the fullest measure of all that belongs to that name? But if you despise our admonition, attend once more to blessed Paul, who says that he has inherited the most excellent name; and from w h o m did he inherit, if not f r o m the Father, who is the first and original possessor of that name? 37
38
Now we have given many instances o f your deceitfulness and double-dealing; but we shall not prolong our discourse, for we have no desire to imitate the torrent of turbulent and spiteful words which your malice, rather than your piety, has poured forth. Nevertheless one chapter shall be added, i n the hope that even now you may repent and acknowledge your delusions and the injustice i n which you have indulged We o n our part have said that the W o r d was begotten before the ages by the w i l l and determinate counsel of the Father. But this doctrine does not please you; for you say that the Son is the offspring, not of God's will, but of his nature; and you have many times described the generation of the W o r d , comparing it with an outpouring of (solar) radiance f r o m the sun; and that though you yourself denounce us for comparing the Lord with created things For consider, we entreat you, what you think of these heavenly bodies D o you believe the sun to be a thing inanimate, as some of the Greeks have declared him to be a fiery mass of stone? I n that case he has neither reason nor will, and acts according to the nature that God has assigned h i m ; and how is it lawful to imagine God's Fatherhood in the likeness of such dumb and irrational beings? Or do you consider that luminary to be a rational and logical being, as the industrious Origen has maintained? I n that case it is by his will that he gives forth his rays i n obedience to his L o r d , and follows the dictates of his nature, as God has commanded, and as y o u 39
40
Gen 2:19 Hebr. 1:4. Or III. 65-7 Ibid II 33 etc
VIII
VIII
58
The Arian Controversy
yourself have asserted So then in neither case is there a conflict between will and nature; for either there is no reason and no will, or else he wills to act according to the nature which God has assigned h i m ; and so your comparison fails But you, it appears, have not only spoken contrary to the plain and well-grounded evidence of the truth; you have also, as one might expect, refuted yourself by your own admissions For you have said, we repeat, that the W o r d is the offspring, not of God's will but of his nature; and nature, you say, transcends w i l l Now how the matter stands w i t h the creatures we have already explained; but w i t h regard to the L o r d of all things, you yourself have declared that he is wholly simple and uncompounded, and is all essence, and that there are no accidents in h i m Now if this indeed be the truth, as you confidently declare, it must needs follow that his dignities and titles are identical one w i t h another, and that there is in his essence no better and worse, no before and after, but that his being consists in one equal perfection How then do you dare discriminate between his nature and his will, saying that the one transcends the other? - when truth and reason assure us that his nature is to will what is good, and his will is to express the goodness of his nature? Your doctrine is manifest folly For ourselves, we do not boast - God forbid - that we can discern the incomprehensible depths of his holiness, before whom the very angels hide their faces; but we have learnt by faith to call him the God ofpeace, and to know that there is no unrighteousness in h i m ; and if no unrighteousness, then no injustice, no distinction, and nothing greater or less A n d this truth you have in part perceived, though in your haste to condemn us you have forsworn your own sound doctrine, and blasphemously denied the indivisible unity of H i m who is all in all. 41
4 2
4 3
44
45
Nay more, this unity itself refutes that opinion that you have lately begun to flaunt, namely that the Son is one in essence w i t h the Father. For if that essence is simple and indivisible, as we have shown, how can it be conveyed or distributed to another? I h e W o r d indeed has declared " A l l things that the Father hath are mine", signifying that the Father has given h i m full measure o f all his dignities and glories; but in so saying he has distinguished between the Father and himself For did the blessed l o h n report him as saying " A l l things that I have are mine"? Or did he make the Father bestow those dignities on his own person? Yet these absurdities cannot fail to follow f r o m your doctrine If, as you say, the divine essence is one and undivided, how can there be any that shares or partakes in that essence, so as to be coessential with the Father? For if that undivided essence is wholly communicated to another, there will be two Fathers and two Creators and two First Principles and two Supreme Beings, which is abhorrent to reason and Christian piety; but if it suffers no division or distribution, then there can be no distinction of persons, but the Father himself will be Son, and the Son himself the Father,
41
42
43
44
45
Cf. Gent 40, [n illud omnia 4. Or II 2, III 62 Deer 11, 22; Syn 35 Rev 7:11. Rom 15:33, Hebr 13:20
59
even as the imprudent Galatian has declared them to be one and the same; and so by your unlawful innovations you revive the heresy of the execrable Sabellius and demolish the Church's confession of the holy Trinity - that very faith which you claim to cherish and uphold Reflect, we entreat you, on what we have said, beseeching the Lord to restore to y o u a temperate and peaceable m i n d ; put away your fury and your sophistries, and accept us even now as fellow-workers and fellow-servants. Correct what we have taught, if y o u are able, but with judgement, remembering that both together we shall stand before the judgement seat; or if we have spoken truly, then join w i t h us and with our orthodox fathers in confessing the sole ingenerate, the one Eternal, the only wise God, to w h o m Wisdom herself pays adoration
IX K N O W L E D G E OF GOD I N E U S E B I U S A N D A T H A N A S I U S
The knowledge of God i n Eusebius and Athanasius is a subject which i n competent hands might f o r m an impressive conclusion to our conference. To do it justice i n a single paper is quite another matter; it opens up a wide range of enquiries, and touches on some of the most intractable problems of philosophical theology. For instance, are we to consider what can be said about God?— that is, what sort of human language can be so adapted as to describe the hidden and comprehensive reality which underlies our whole existence? O r should we be looking for some experience of contact w i t h God which is necessarily so remote f r o m our usual acts and thoughts that i t cannot be described i n normal terms and has to be indicated in the language of paradox? Or again, should we judge it a mistake to present these alternatives? I have suggested that knowledge of God may be conceived either i n terms of rational statements or of mystical consciousness; but in pointing this contrast, I am using the categories of modern Western philosophy; we shall f i n d , I think, that our chosen authors conceive their problem quite otherwise; their most important category being the intellect, nous, which implies b o t h rational content and the directness o f intuitive perception 1.. We need, therefore, to find a simple down-to-earth point of departure; and I propose to begin f r o m a well-known passage i n the De Incarnatione, c. 12.. I n this chapter Athanasius enumerates the various means of knowing G o d which had been devised by his divine providence; previous to the Fall, it w o u l d seem, and anticipating its possibility, G o d provided for man's negligence: jrpoevoTioaxo Kai rn<; au,E>.£ia<; TOUTCOV, i v ' £av aiieXrioaisv 8 i £auTcdv TOV 0e6v STtiyvcovai, excooi r o v Srinioupydv p-fl ayvosiv He mentions first what we may call ideal knowledge, which should have been sufficient for man i f he had not sinned. Next comes the possibility of recognizing the Creator through attending to the works of his creation. Thirdly, God provided for the Law and the Prophets, whose teaching is more accessible, since i n that case mankind can learn f r o m other men. But since all these means were ineffective i n the face of human wickedness, God finally adopted the expedient of renewing men through the presence of his o w n Image, the Logos, after whom they were first created; so the W o r d of God came down to earth i n his own person: 68ev 6 xoO ©eou Aoyoc; 6 i £CCUTOO Ttapeyevero, c 13. 7 There are thus f o u r possible !
IX
IX 230
KNOWLEDGE OF GOD IN EUSEBIUS AND AIHANASIUS
ways of knowing G o d , if we may trust Dr. Meijering's analysis in Athanasius contra Gentes, p 114; though Athanasius' treatment of the third way contains a rather complicated resumptive clause and refers to the 'saints', o i dyiot, who may possibly be Christian teachers distinct f r o m the Prophets, the p a K a p t o i SiSdcKaXoi mentioned in c 1 For the purpose of this paper I intend to consider only the first item on the list; I shall t r y to examine the ways in which Athanasius and Eusebius explain our ideal knowledge of God
231
TtptüTou 7tA,ao8£VTO(; dvOpcoTiou—who at first attended to God and the contemplation of God, but then at the instigation of the serpent fell away. And this leads back to the general statement that i n their pursuit of pleasure men began to devise vaiious forms of idolatry and vice, where there is not the smallest doubt that Athanasius intends to describe actual practices of Egyptians, Greeks and Romans, including a reference to the Emperor
Hadrian's
favourite, Antinous N o w of course the DI does present a rather different picture, and Dr. Louth
2. A n y treatment of the De Incarnatione w i l l naturally refer to its companion piece, the Contra Gentes; and we must take account of a certain difference in perspective between these two w o r k s , which compare rather differently with the thought of Eusebius The divergence is especially marked in their early chapters, and it prompted a young O x f o r d scholar, as he then was, Dr. Andrew L o u t h , to draw a sharp contrast between them They d i f f e r , he maintains, in the account they give o f the Fall of man, but also i n the assumptions they make about our knowledge of God.. 'The Contra Gentes gives an account o f man's fall f r o m a state of contemplation to a state subject to sensual pleasures. It is a timeless account.. It is untypical of Athanasius—but typical of Alexandrian theology generally—in using allegorical exegesis. De Incarnatione is historical, realist, and turns, not on intellectual contemplation, but on the obedience and disobedience of man ' 1
I agree w i t h D r . Meijering that this contrast is overstated I n m y o w n opini o n , neither book presents a perfectly consistent picture. The case is rather, that i n each o f them Athanasius is drawing upon traditional themes, and selects rather different points for emphasis. But it is certainly not the case that the theology of one book contrasts en bloc w i t h that of the other. First, then, the CG certainly does not begin by considering the Fall of man in allegorical terms.. One can see this clearly if one contrasts Athanasius w i t h Phrlo. Philo repeatedly suggests that the first man symbolizes intellect, nous, and the first woman symbolizes sensation, aistMsis But Athanasius does not tell us that the first man symbolizes anything at a l l ; at most, we can say that he treats h i m as an example of a general t r u t h He states that God's purpose was that men should enjoy uninterrupted communion with h i m , and adds that this actually happened i n the case of 'the first man who was called A d a m i n the Hebrew tongue;' the only hint of allegory here is a reference to the place which Moses figuratively called the Garden—TPOTUKCSC, 7rapd5sioov (bvoiiaosv, c. 2. Athanasius then states that men, o i dvOpomoi,neglected the contemplation of God and sought for satisfactions close at hand, i n the pleasures o f the body; and this again is illustrated by the case of the first man—TOU 2
is perfectly right in emphasizing the divine command of Genesis 2:16 and the stress on disobedience as opposed to the neglect of contemplation and pursuit of sensual pleasure. Indeed we could go further Many readers of the DI find that it comes like a breath of fresh air; here at last, they think, is a straightf o r w a r d biblical account, as opposed to the foggy generalities found i n the CG and also in Eusebius. But I think we gain this impression because we have all been influenced by Augustine and his intense concentration on Romans, especially Romans 5:12, together of course with 1 Cor.. 15:21-2.. Athanasius does reproduce this Pauline perspective; but this is not the view of all the biblical writers The Book of W i s d o m , which Athanasius uses f a i r l y freely, considers that human wickedness results f r o m idolatry; the creation o f man is mentioned only in general terms at 2:33 and 9:2; there is no mention of A d a m b y name; his creation appears only incidentally at 7:1, while his f a l l only comes to light at 10:1 i n the claim that 'Wisdom delivered h i m out of his own transgression.' Even St Paul in Romans begins w i t h a general denunciation of human wickedness and discusses the role o f the Law and the faith of A b r a h a m before coming to Adam's transgression at 5:12-14; and this is specif ically named as 7rapaKori first at 5:9
A n d of course there are other biblical traditions, including that
which lays the blame on Eve.
3
There is no call for surprise, then, if we f i n d Eusebius writing largely in the tradition of the Wisdom writer, making general statements about human wickedness prompted by idolatry, and emphasizing
the Origenistic theme of
neglect and contempt rather than some single act of disobedience. The Laus Constantini, Praeparatio
so far as I can discover, consistently follows this line
The
Evangélica Book V I I begins w i t h a passage recalling the CG c. 3,
i n which mankind—or rather the Gentiles—are reproached for giving themselves over to bodily pleasures, and so learning to worship the sun and other heavenly bodies on which those pleasures depend; there follows a quotation of Wisdom 14:12, ' A p ^ f ] ydp Ttopvsíac, éíiívoia eiScóXcov, which w i l l recur in Athanasius, i n CG 9 and 11 Eusebius occasionally refers to Adam by name, but hardly emphasizes his role as progenitor, or his failure and disobedience;
A Louth, The Concept of the Soul in Athanasius' Contra Gentes—De Incarnatione, in: E A. Livingstone Studio Patristica 13 = TU 116, Berlin 1975, 228 2 Philo Leg. All 1 92 2.5-8. 16, 31 38 40, 70f etc 1
;
this only appears rather incidentally at 7.18. 8, tóv 5' aüBeKouaíop aípéasi
3
1 lim 2:14, Justin Dial 10 Iren 1.30 7, 3 22 4, 5 19 1 (sec Massuet)
IX
I X
232
KNOWLEDGE OF GOD IN EUSEBIUS AND AIHANASIUS
TCOV KpeiTxovojv d7t07T-sa£Tv
.. evToXfjc; oAiycapta, where the theme of neglect
233
w h e n he writes: KCLT* e i K o v a y e y o v a u x v , eaopeOa K a i KO.6' 6u.oicoaiv
But
is still prominent. A d a m , the earth-born ynysvfic,, seems undistinguished
Eusebius I think shows a f a i r l y m a r k e d preference f o r identifying the two
when contrasted w i t h the perfectly righteous Enosh; the very name ' A d a m '
p h r a s e s ; typical isPE
can symbolize TOV KOIVOV K d i TCOXUV dvOpamov (7 8 8 ) I n the
ounicoaiv 7tpo<; a u r o u xou QsoO .
Demonstrate
there is no mention o f A d a m by name, and I think only one reference to his
sage (PE
fall t h r o u g h the misuse of his free w i l l .
achieved
4
7.18.5, TOUTOV U.EV OUV K a i ' e i K o v a (paoiSeou K a i K a 8 u n o o r f i v a i , a n d I have found o n l y one pas-
11 27.4) w h i c h suggests that our ouoicooic, is something still to be
H o w does Athanasius appear by comparison? We can admit that there is
Very likely, theref o r e , it w a s Eusebius who taught Athanasius that A d a m al-
some contrast between the two early works; the CG shows a rather closer
ready possessed both image and likeness. Athanasius identifies these concepts,
agreement w i t h Eusebius. But the contrast is far less acute than L o u t h makes
whether he is describing the c r e a t i o n of m a n k i n d in general, as in CG
out Athanasius does not say, like Eusebius, that A d a m represents the com-
34, f| \\iu%i\ KaET otioicoaiv
y e y o v s v , a n d DI
2 and
11, 7ioi£i TOUTOUC, K a 9 '
m o n man. A d m i t t e d l y the CG describes the misdeeds of mankind i n general,
6u.oicociv: or that of A d a m in p a r t i c u l a r , w h o was xiXsxoc, KTio0£ic;, c
rather than a specific sin of A d a m ; but these general condemnations reappear
2 66, and w h o m God w i s h e d s i m p l y to persist in his original c o n d i t i o n , CG 3,
quite frequently i n the DI; the Fall is introduced by a general statement i n 3.4;
OUTGO K a i u i v s i v fiSeXnoev, with s i m i l a r phrases at CG 34 and DI 4, There is
and although Athanasius quotes the divine p r o h i b i t i o n of Gen. 2:16, he does
no thought of opnitooic; as a further perfection still to be acquired.
not mention A d a m by name u n t i l the genealogy i n c. 35 The theme of idola-
Ar.
O n this basis, Athanasius c a n describe m a n ' s ideal knowledge o f God
in
t r y , again, is still quite prominent. Can one then see a contrast i n that Euse-
highly optimistic terms in the second chapter of CG.
bius and the CG dwell o n the Origenistic idea of neglecting the contemplation
p o i n t s : (1) Man's c r e a t i o n ensures for h i m a knowledge of God.
(2)
of God rather than the specific sin of disobedience? Certainly the reference to
knowledge resides in the s o u l , (3) or m o r e p r o p e r l y in the m i n d , nous
I n either
disobedience as such are not very prominent i n Eusebius; but the idea is f o u n d ,
c a s e , to exercize it, one m u s t t u r n a w a y f r o m bodily sensations and attend to
e.g., i n PE 2.6 12-15; again, the CG does n o t refer t o theparabasis of men,
noeta
and only once to their parakoe,
c 5 O n the other hand the theme of neglect
reflect the Logos w h o m it resembles
is well represented i n the DI
M e n are still blamed, as i n the CG,
in Eusebius, though he states t h e m m o r e fully a n d less forcefully. Athanasius
5
5
because
they failed t o devote themselves t o the contemplation of God
We m a y n o t e these This
(4) Given this c o n d i t i o n , the soul is self-sufficient; in its p u r i t y , it can These p o i n t s , I believe, can a l l be found
e n o r m o u s l y improves o n Eusebius; but his merit, i n dealing with o u r present topic, lies in clarity a n d e c o n o m y of statement rather t h a n in originality of
3. This contemplation is what I have called ideal knowledge; it was enjoyed by
thought..
A d a m i n his unf alien state. Athanasius* view of A d a m is closely bound up w i t h
3.1
The first point is w e l l stated in CG 2:6 7cau.[}aaiXsuc, 0EOC„ 6u7tspEK£iva
his exegesis of Gen 1:26. L i k e P h i l o , he explains that the eiKtbv is God's Logos
7caartc, oi>aiac, K a i dvOpaimvnc, E7n.voi.at; urtdpxcov .
himself; i n one passage, c. Ar
K a r iSiav E i K o v a rc£7ioin,K£ K a i TCQV OVTCOV a u r o v eecopnTfiv K a i ETucTrjuova
2.49, he designates h i m t o o dXnBwoO 0EOU
. T O dv9pcimivov ysvoc,
eiKtbv KCU 6u,oicflou;, But man was created KCIT' s i K o v a K a i K a 9 ' duoicoatv,
S i d Tfjc, Ttpoc, atJTOv 6UOICOGECD<; KaTsoK£Vjac£,
and the t w o phrases are treated as synonymous This was a long-standing prob-
diSiOTriTOC, s v v o i a v K a i yvcoaiv . We note the apparent c o n t r a d i t i o n ; God is
5oij<; auTCp K a i TTIC; tSiac,
lem of exegesis; Irenaeus, Clement and Origen all offer t w o distinct interpreta-
s a i d to be b e y o n d h u m a n a p p r e h e n s i o n , in the conventional version of Plato
tions, sometimes identifying the t w o phrases, sometimes distinguishing, so as
Rep.
to make ouoicocue, refer t o a spiritual condition which we are to achieve by our
statements c a n be f o u n d i n Eusebius; but w h e n carefully examined, Eusebius
own effort and v i r t u e . Origen puts this very clearly i n Comm
proves to be passing on two quite distinct traditions
6
Joh. 20.22.183,
509 b; yet he has given m a n
k n o w l e d g e of his o w n eternity
Similar
First, he reproduces the
old apologetic assertion that all m e n are really theists; this appears v e r y clearly 7
+ Ens PE 2 6.12, 7 8.8-9, 116 10—15; DE 4.6.7; but cf. PE 7 18.5 cited below. Ath D/condemns mankind generally, I I , 15, 36, 40 etc.; idolatry.. 1 If , 14, 20, 30f.,40, 46; neglect of contemplation, 4 4, 5.1, 11 4, 12 1, 14 7. Eixtöv and öuoitüoic, equated: Iren 3 23 2, 4 20 1, 5 t.3, 15.4; Clement Protr 98 4, Paed 3 66 2, Str. 2 19; Origen Princ 1.2 6, 2.10 7, 11 3, 3.1.13, 4.4.10; Horn Gen. 1.13, 13.4; Horn. Lev. 3.2; Sei. Ps. 4.3; Horn Lk. 39; Comm Jo 2 23.144; Eusebius HE 1 2.4, PE 3 10.16, 7.12.10, 17.3f , EI 1.20 8 Distinguished: Iren. 5.6.1, 16.1; Clement Paed. 1.3, Str. 2.22; Origen Princ 3 6 1, Horn Ezek 13 2, Comm Jo 20 22 183, Cels. 4 30, Orat. 27 2; Eusebius PE 11 27 (?). 5
6
in E 7 1 20 6, TOV SE E H I rcavxcov 0 e 6 v cpuaiKaic; Evvoiaiq ajtavTEC, 6u.oA.oyoOo i v avOpcoTcoi, w h i c h of c o u r s e c o n f l i c t s very sharply w i t h the doctrine of an u n k n o w a b l e God, But secondly, there are relics of the tradition f o u n d in Philo of a n ideal a n d sinless first m a n , i n c o r p o r e a l a n d asexual and naturally en-
7
Minucius Felix Oct 19.. Eusebius PE 2.6 I I , ET 1.20.6.
!
I X
I X
234
K N O W I E D G E OF GOD I N EUSEBIUS A N D ATHANASIUS
235
dowed with the knowledge of God So Eusebius writes, PE 1 17 3: TtovsvfjLiiv
sebius; and both authors use intellectualist terms like evvota, KaxavoEtv and
TO usv TL tpaal Gstov Kai d.9dvarov, daapKOv Trfv (puaiv Kai doojiiaxov, TOU-
XoyityaBai
TOV 8i K a i tov dX,rj0ii xuyxdvstv avSpainov, KaT' stKova 9eou K a i ounicoaiv
phors like OEGJPETV and 6£copia, and the Platonic image of the nous as dufia
y£Y£vr|LL£vov: and this ideal man is sharply distinguished from the earth-born
Tfjt; \\i\jxr\c,, to which I shall return
Adam of Genesis 2 and 3. Athanasius here is simpler and more consistent;
to indicate our knowledge of God, together with associated meta-
The use of the actual word opdv is naturally rather more restricted, but it
Adam for him is morally perfect, but he is a man like ourselves, equipped with
does occur, encouraged perhaps by the quotation of Mt
a body and subject to bodily desires when he neglects his vocation of contem-
state of innocence, the mind is raised aloft, dvco HExdpcuoi; yivExai, Kai TOV
5:8, in CG 2: in its
plating God. But Athanasius again is not wholly consistent; his combination
Adyov iScbv, opa sv aurco Kai TOV TOU Adyou TTaxEpa Conversely, in a 7 the
of traditions presents us with an Adam who is supposed to be perfect, but
guilty soul is described as Kapp,vjoaaa TOV 6
whose virtue and spirituality is in fact corruptible
Suvaxat, a biblical phrase often repeated in his later works.
3.2 Secondly, where do we possess the knowledge of God? 'In the soul,'
Athanasius thus appears to treat the nous, not only as the eye of the soul,
seems the obvious answer Athanasius is clearly affected by the idealized view
but as its only source of good impulses I think he only once refers to other
of the soul propounded in Plato' Phaedo,
which attributes true perceptions to
powers in the soul in complimentary terms. Accordingly, as Charles Kannen¬
This view is developed in
giesser has observed, when Athanasius comes to speak of human corruption,
the soul and makes the body the source of error
8
10
CG 2-4, and appears again in 31-4 God is incorporeal, and knowledge of
it is always the soul that is involved; so CG 3.4, 4 4, and DI 11 4, s96Acoaav
God depends upon our dissociating ourselves from corporeal things, CG 2 3
SauTCOv xhv yv%r)\> The soul is infected when it rebels against the guidance of
Athanasius even affirms that the body 'could not consider what is outside it-
the nous, or when it neglects to keep its attention fixed on God; but there
self—OUK dv r d s£co0sv sauTou Aoyi^oixo—for it is mortal and transitory,' c.
seems to be no suggestion that the nous itself can be corrupted No suggestion,
32 In c. 4 he says, more reasonably, that our bodily members can be occupied
that is, within this particular topic of discussion; in practice, when criticizing
either with reality or with unreality; our eyes can be used to admire the crea-
his opponents, Athanasius is quite ready to say that their minds are unsound,
tion, and our ears to listen to the laws of God But this point is soon forgotten;
oi>x uyiaivovTEc;, or crippled, nsjinpcopEvoi, or perverse, 6iaaTp£(p£a9at;
Athanasius continues to point out the religious benefits of our sense of sight
and there is a mention of the corrupt nous of 2 Tim. 3:8 in the Letter to Adel-
without reminding us that our eyes are parts of the body
phius, c I.
9
3 3. When Athanasius idealizes the soul, he almost invariably refers to it as the seat of reason, nous
u
But the optimistic view of nous is reflected in what Athanasius says about
The notion that man perceives God through his nous
noeta; these are always presented as ideal realities and truths—which indeed
is especially frequent in the early chapters of the CG, for instance when he
is the normal use of the term. In the CG 4 there seems to be no distinction
declares Adam K a r a TTIV dpxTjv dvaiaxovTtp Ttappncia TOV voOv saxnKsvat
drawn between
Trpdc, TOV @£dv, 2 4 Eusebius takes the same view, which of course is exceed-
xpoc, xd KaXd 9ecoptac;, and both these phrases seem to be equivalent to the
dTtoaxfivai
XTJC, TCOV VOTITCOV OEtopiac, and dTtooxfjvai xfjc,
ingly common and is well represented in Philo, for instance in opif. 69, where
dTcocTp£cp£a6ai xfiv rtpoc, TOV 0 £ d v 9£(opiav of DI 15 1, or indeed dicoo-
the nous takes the place of God's image in man: f| 6s ELKCOV XEA-EKTOI K a r a
Tp£(pEo9ai TOV 0E6V, ibid
TOV Tfjc; yuxnc, f|y£uova vouv
114
The connection of soul and mind is variously
3.4 A specially striking phrase which appears at the end of CG 2 claims that
represented; in their idealized state they can be simply coupled together; so E u -
the purity of the soul is capable of reflecting God through itself as in a mirror:
sebius PE 3 10 16, (ffu^fi XoyiKf) .
K a i vouc, d7ca6f\<;: and Athanasius al-
ludes to the Logos who sees both soul and mind, DI14
4 Sometimes the mind
seems to be conceived as part of the soul, or its directive part; so CG 34, men
ixavf| 5s f| Tfjq
(puxfit;
KaGapoTni; EOTI
Kai TOV 0EOV S t
EauTfjc,
Kaxo7txpi^£a9ai. This brings together three suggestive ideas: (a) the selfsufficiency of the soul, (b) its purity, and (c), the metaphor of the mirror
can ascend, dvapfjvai, xo> vco rite viruxfic,; thus the soul consorts with angels
(a) The self-sufficiency theme recurs in c. 30, slightly modified by biblical
'confident in the purity o f its mind,' xfj TOU vou 6appouoa Ka9ap6xT|xi, ibid.
texts which limit its application to Christians, who have faith and have the
33 Much the same view can be suggested without explicit reference to the
kingdom of God wiihin them In c 2 the claim is far bolder; the context sug-
nous; the phrase \L/UX"H XoyiKii is common enough in Athanasius, as it is in EuEjufiuuia condemned CG 34 a[ ; with 9uu.6c„ Vit Ant 21 init; contrast Ep ad Marc 27, PG 27, 40A Soul corrupted. CG 3 4, 4 4, DI 11 4 Mind corrupted, Deer 21, Dion 12 3, c Ar ¡2 10
8
9
Op til , 64 c-67 d; cf. Eusebius PE 2 6.12t , 3.10.15. Athanasius CG 4 4 35f., 40 fin , 45; DI 12 3, 32 1, 45 3
11
I X
IX
236
gests that the soul's power of rising above perceptible things, which the body desires, and consorting with itself—feotuTcpauvcov—makes it capable of uniting with the divine and intelligible realities i n heaven, just as Adam 'associated with the saints i n the contemplation of intelligible reality,' EV xfj TCOV vonrcov Secopia Athanasius appears to draw no distinction between the soul's contemplation of the noeta and its contemplation of the Logos, i n whom the Father himself can be seen.. (b) The theme of purity in the soul is of course a very common one, which indeed Athanasius has already mentioned earlier, in CG 2.. There is a biblical basis in Wisdom 7 : 2 4 , though strange to say the noun Ka6ap6rnc, occurs only once in the New Testament, where it refers to the flesh, and not at all in Philo. Purity is closely associated with knowledge; so Eusebius DE 4 8 3 , vco Siauyet tcai yv%T} K £ K a 8 a p p £ v r j , followed by Athanasius Deer 2 4 , KaOapd rfj yuxf) Kcti uovcp TCO vco More exactly, both authors associate purity with the socalled 'eye of the soul,' which needs to be cleansed in order to contemplate reality: the op.Lia Tfjc; y u x i k of Plato Rep 5 0 8 , 5 3 3 d Plato speaks here (and at 5 4 0 a) of redirecting or of training the eye; but the metaphor of cleansing is used at 5 2 7 d and is again suggested when he speaks of removing accretions from the soul, ibid 6 1 1 The metaphor is used by Eusebius at PE 2 4 . 4 and again at 2 . 6 1 2 , Siavoidc, 6u.u.aat KEKaQappEvoic, auvevoriaav. Athanasius imitates this phrase with the slight rewording otpQaXpoc; Tfjc; Siavoiac,, CG 2 7 , DI 3 0 , and the metaphor of intellectual vision is quite elaborately developed in CG 3 4 and DI 5 7 , where Dr Meijering aptly compares Plotinus 1. 6 9 ; the eye cannot see the sun unless it becomes sunlike (c) Athanasius associates the pure eye of the soul with the metaphor of a mirror, KdiortTpov, CG 2, 8 , and 3 4 . This has a complex history, which includes Wisdom 7 : 2 6 , where the word is Eoorcrpov: Philo migr 9 8 , which shows that the comparison of the soul to a mirror, KdroTcxpov, was an accepted commonplace in his day; and St. Paul, especially the much discussed phrase in 2 Cor. 3 : 1 8 , dvaKEKaXupirevcp Tcpoocorca) xfiv S6i;av TOO Kupioo KaroTirpi^op-Evoi. Scholars have been unable to decide whether KaTOTtTpi^dtievoi means 'beholding' or 'reflecting'; the verb is something of a rarity, though it occurs in Philo L A 3 1 0 1 , where the sense 'beholding' is the more natural. Bettter evidence can be found in Christian authors, who are naturally drawn to the arresting phrases of St Paul. Meijering refers to Theophilus and Clement; of whom Theophilus undoubtedly provides the closer parallel, since he connects the mirror with cleansing our eyes so that we can see the sun (Aut. 1 2 ; cf CG 3 4 , DI 57). In my opinion, however, the most important parallels are found in Gregory Thaumaturgus and in Eusebius. Gregory describes the soul learning to contemplate itself as in a mirror and thus beholding the divine mind: auTfic, TTjc, vj/uxfK Eaurfiv cboTtEp EV Kai67CTpco opdv P-EXETCOOTH;, KCEI TOV BEIOV VOOV
EV saurf} KaTOTtTpi^ouivnc, (pan Or 1 1 142). Eusebius quotes a passage from
KNOWLEDGE OF GOD IN EUSEBIUS A N D AIHANASIUS
237
the First Alcibiades of Plato (p 1 3 3 , at PE 1 1 . 2 7 . 5 ) where the full text adds some suggestive new touches to the comparison. The eye itself is a mirror, since one can see things reflected in the pupil of the eye ( 1 3 3 a); in fact, says Socrates, the eye can only see itself in some such way; nevertheless there are better mirrors available ( 1 3 3 c); likewise, although the soul itself is a mirror in which it can see itself, the purest and brightest mirror is the god who is present within it. We shall criticize this reasoning a little later; for the moment, we note that this passage suggests, more clearly than most, that there is an identity between the observer and the reflecting medium.. I think we can conclude that there is no point in discussing the precise significance of Kar07tTpiCEa9ai in 2 Cor., since the whole comparison turns on the claim that the soul can observe itself as in a mirror. It follows that the soul, as observer, sees itself, but the soul, as observed, reflects itself.. Both senses are perfectly appropriate. Cadit quaestio.. 3.5. As a footnote to what I have called the optimistic theory, we need to note a contrasting perspective which comes into view in the DI Two points we have noted so far are the natural purity of the soul expounded in CG 2 , and the suggestion that the crucial move in attaining a knowledge of God is the ascent from aistheta to noeta On the first point, the DI seems to present a sharp corrective, in cc 3 - 4 and 1 1 - 1 2 Here the whole human race is seen as handicapped by its created and its corporeal nature, which make it incapable of continuing in existence, let alone attaining a conception and knowledge of God, without special assistance; so that their share in God's image results from an additional act of pity (sXETiaac,) independent of their creation (TTXEOV T I xapi^6u,£vo<;, c. 3 ) . As in the CG, they have an ability which is sufficient, aurdpKTic;, to provide the knowledge of G o d ; but in the DI this is not the natural purity of the soul, but a special gift of grace, r\ KCIT' Eucdva xdpic, (c 1 2 ) , designed to offset its inherent weakness. A s to the second point, it seems that in the DI Athanasius simply loses interest in the nosta; they are not mentioned; in fact there are only two further references to them, it appears, in all Athanasius' personal output It would be very easy to interpret this contrast as a divergence between the two works, assuming a more Platonic standpoint in the C G , perhaps inspired by Eusebius, as against a more biblical perspective in the DI But this would be a serious mistake. For first, the theme of human incapacity is clearly stated in the CG itself , in c. 3 5 : God is above all created being, whereas the human race was created from nothing, so that they were liable to be deprived (druxsTv) of knowledge of him.. And this theme of natural incapacity is already foreshadowed in Eusebius; see for instance DE 4 , 6 6 , the Father appointed the Logos cue, dv u,fi rcavTs^coc; fi TCOV YEVUTCOV d7r.07r.Ecot (pumc,, 5i* oiKEiav dxoviav Kai dSuvatiiav Tfjc; dysvhjou KCC'I dxcophjou TccrrpiKftc; ooaiac, oisaTcooa Similar teaching is found in the Lam Constantini, which of course I would not
IX
IX KN0W1EDGE OF GOD I N EUSEBIUS A N D ATHANASIUS
238 claim was prior to the CG; in contrast to the divine being, human nature was it, OÙK ôvTCûv TrpopepXnuivri noppcoxdxto xe Ôieaxcoaa K a i u-ctKpôv xijç; dyevVIÎTOU (pooecoç, dTteaxoiviauévri (c. 11). This contrast is a mere commonplace, and is probably more typical of Eusebius than the theme of ideal human inno-
one cannot appreciate intelligence unless one is in some degree intelligent, or unselfishness if one is wholly self-regarding. A n d we can appreciate the mistakes and confusions of other people, not indeed by simply sharing them, but by intelligent reflection on our own. Origen does indeed suggest that we can learn something about G o d simply
cence, which, we have seen, is not represented by the earth-born A d a m , and is later displayed only occasionally by virtuous heroes like Enosh As for the status of noëta, there are favourable estimates to be found i n Eusebius, as at PR 3.10 11, where he argues that even the works of God's creation are o u i K p d e n K a i ppaxéa, xaîç àacoLtàxoiç K a i voepaïç oùciaiç 7iapafiaA.X6u.sva. But there are two striking passages at least where he puts the opposite case; at 11 21. 6, expounding Plato Rep. 509 b, he claims that the v o n x a i o ù a i a i derive their being f r o m the transcendent Goodness, Cùoxe un, ôu.ooûaia a ô x à T i 8 e a 9 a i , àXkà unoe àyevvTiTa vou-iÇetv. A t 13 15.3 he complains of Plato's inconsistency, in first making the intelligibles dysvrjxouç, but then saying that they derive by emanation f r o m the first cause: oùôè y à p èK r o ù un. ôvxoc, a ù x à ç yeyovévai ôiSôvai (JouA^xai Thus what we provisionally noted as new points in the DI are i n fact anticipated i n Eusebius. But I do not wish to argue that Athanasius introduced corrections as a result of reading Eusebius
It seems to me more likely that both
writers are inconsistent because they reproduce conflicting items of traditional teaching w i t h o u t noticing the disharmonies that modern scholars detect.. 4. We have tried to describe the teaching of Athanasius and Eusebius on our knowledge of G o d , w i t h frequent quotation f r o m both writers. But to complete the picture, we need to stand back a little and ask ourselves how much we have learnt, and what questions still need to be asked Granted that we have a share in God's image, the Logos, how is this eixcov, or more properly the state of being K a i ' eÎKÔva, manifested in our minds, and what effects does it produce? 4 1. This teaching is clearly built on the traditional maxim that like is known by like.. I have not yet discovered an explicit statement of this general principle
239
by reflecting on the nature of the m i n d , ex no.sirae mends contemplatione;
the
m i n d has no need of space in which to move, or of physical magnitude, or of visible appearance (Princ
1.1.6-7)
This claim suggests a purely theoretical
consideration, a psychology, for which good moral dispositions are not required; but it is generally taken for granted that the use of the intellect implies a detachment f r o m bodily concerns and an attachment to pure and intelligible virtues; thus Origen continues: quod propinquitas deum, cuius ipsa mens intellectual^
quaedam
imago sit, et per hocpossit
tatis natura sentiré, máxime si expurgatior
sit a natura corporali
sit mentis ad aliquid
de dei-
Rather simi-
lar indications are given i n Cels. 7 33 The modern critic may well be surprised to learn that the mind can apprehend theological truth by mere discursive reflection on itself and its activities; he might argue, moreover, that the Fathers held that God is perfectly simple; thus on the principle that like is k n o w n by l i k e , they must have recommended some f o r m of simplification or concentration of thought such as was advocated by Plotinus. There are indeed some passages which might allow this interpret a t i o n , such as CG 2; but on the whole I t h i n k the texts do not encourage it. The Fathers worked mainly w i t h a fairly simple antithesis of body and mind. I f sensual thoughts are discarded and the m i n d be occupied with itself and its o w n proper objects, they make no further demand I have found no texts of our period which clearly suggest that some intellectual pursuits should be embraced and others avoided. A n d their doctrine that the Father must be approached through the Logos w o u l d seem to exclude any depreciation of expressed and formulated thought i n favour of a Plotinian simplicity of formless contemplation.. Does the mind's likeness to God entitle us actually to describe God as mind?
either in Origen or Eusebius or Athanasius; but it is clearly presupposed by a
This was a much debated problem
phrase we cited f r o m CG 2, ôtà xf[q Ttpôç aùxôv ÔUOIOÎOSÛJÇ; and it underlies
God is intellectuals
natura
O n the whole, Origen accepts this view;
simplex, Princ
1 1 6, as rendered by Rufinus
1 2
the striking illustration of DI 57, where Athanasius claims that in order to look
Eusebius is more cautious, and reveals his hesitations at PR 3.10 3 - 4 ; one
at the sun one must cleanse the eye so that it becomes bright; in the back-
must not t h i n k of God as a kind of directive m i n d residing within the world
ground is Plato's theory of vision propounded in Timaeus 45, as well as the
However at RT 2 17 4 he appeals to the commonplace that the human mind
passage cited by D r . Meijering, Plotinus I 6 9, Posidonius in Sextus 7.93, and
is mysterious, though its operations are familiar
Irenaeus 4.36.6.
surprisingly, that God's Togos is comprehensible to all men, xotq EKXOC,
1 3
This enables h i m to say,
As a theory of vision, this is plainly mistaken. Good sight requires good clear eyes, rather than eyes which resemble their objects It is no advantage to be dim-sighted if one is trying to decipher faded and illegible writing. But in the intellectual and m o r a l field there is rather more to be said for the theory;
God as Mind, Origen Princ 1 1.6 a , Eus. PE 3 10 14, but cf. ibid 10 3 Mind mysterious, though its actions familiar: Philo LA 1 91, Mut Nom 10, Somn 1 30 56; Eus En 17 4 12
13
IX
IX 240
K N O W L E D G E OF GOD I N EUSEBIUS A N D ATHANASIUS
rtdatv Ka9icnaTcu yvcopiLioc,, while he refers to the Father as xóv dcpavfj Kai á ó p a t o v vouv. This t r a d i t i o n , however, does not make even the Father completely unknowable; as we have observed, he can be 'seen' by the transclucent mind and soul; as Athanasius puts i t , Ka0apa r f j yv%f\ Kai uóvcp rep vcp.. 4.2. I f we now ask, what sort of activity will enable us to receive virtue and wisdom, the answer w o u l d seem to be, by meditating on their celestial prototypes conceived on the modei of Platonic Forms, but also vaguely personalized and sometimes assimilated to the angels In other words, it is usually a contemplative devotion that is required, w i t h practical good works t h r o w n in as a laudable but regretted interruption.. There is seldom any suggestion that we might profitably imitate the Logos i n his creative and providential functions; our authors never suggest that the artist or craftsman may gain a distinctive knowledge of the Logos through the exercize of his professional skill; the painter in particular remains a source of literary metaphors rather than a respected fellow-traveller on the heavenly road Regarded i n this fight, is there not after all something to be said f o r what we all instinctively detest, namely the sycophantic comparisons which Eusebius draws between the Logos and the Emperor? 14
4.3.. We have referred to the imagery of the mirror,. Athanasius teaches that man, i n his original state of innocence, can gain knowledge of the Logos by considering his o w n m i n d , an activity which we still refer to as reflection or i n trospection I t is of course misleading to t h i n k of self-awareness as a kind of sense-perception; as the ancients clearly recognized, each of our senses has its o w n distinctive sense-qualities; see for instance Origen Princ. 1 1 7 ; but selfawareness can involve them all. Sometimes, i t may be, I take notice of my own visual experience; but alternatively, I may catch myself recalling a melody; the idea that I see what is going on w i t h i n my m i n d is obviously absurd i n the latter case, so it should be excluded also i n the former O n the other hand, it was a commonplace that sight is the best of the senses; and it is often used metaphorically for other kinds of knowledge Visual metaphors t u r n up i n the most unexpected places. One example is the statement found in the CG that we have a cpavraata 8eo0 I n this context tpavraaia must of course indicate a true impression, a sense which the PGL does not r e c o r d ; it occurs five of six times i n the CG (c. 2 twice, 7, 9, 45) but elsewhere in Athanasius only at c A T 2.78, conjoined with TÚrcoq, as the image of himself which the divine Wisdom impresses on creation But I have found two examples i n Eusebius (PE 7.17.5, LC 4) and it is not uncommon i n Philo; an es15
God knowable by mind: Ens. DE 4 8 3 (?), PE 3 30.18; Ath Deer 24 Oavxaoia reliable (racer P G L ! ) : Philo Opif. 166, LA 3.61, Heres 119. Mut. Nom. 3; Eus PE1 17 5, Z C 4 ; Alh CG 2 2 (twice), 7.3, 9 2, 45 c Ar ii 78 This usage is common in Greek philosophy; see L SI 14
15
24)
pecially interesting parallel is Mut.. Nom 3, TO SSXOLLEVOV XT\V 0eiav cpavxao t a v TO T^c, i|/uxite SOTIV 6u.u.a, and L A 3.61 takes the self-exculpation of Eve in Gen 3:13 to mean that the sense-qualities, symbolized by Eve, are trustw o r t h y , whereas pleasure, the serpent, is a deceiver. Visual symbolism is very commonly used i n discussing the knowledge of G o d , and if we wish to find in Athanasius an acceptable use of i t , we must somehow discount the misleading implications of the idea that the m i n d sees itself Some writers indeed maintain the opposite view, perhaps alluding to Socrates' parable of the eye seeing its o w n reflection; for of course, although the eye can see itself reflected i n an eye, it cannot see itself reflected in itself, unless we imagine that it is reflected three times i n succession. Hence, it was said, the eye can see everything else, but not itself; similarly the mind can know everything, but not itself (Philo, L A 1.91). This tradition is reproduced in those writers w h o hold both that G o d is mind, and that God is unknown Nevertheless we should not underestimate Athanasius. He is admittedly limited by the idiom of his own time; but we must not think that every inconsistency is a sign of incompetence; we must allow for deliberate paradox, or perhaps rather the willing acceptance of traditional paradox; an example, I t h i n k , is CG 2, where Athanasius i n effect tells us that the soul can rise above itself by remaining w i t h i n itself: oxe 6A,oc, ECTIV [dvco] eauTco cuvcov . . TOTS Sff . . .. ava) u.sT&paio<; yiverai.. Eusebius again tells us (PE 7.17.5) that man was created in the image and likeness of God u.srd TVVOC, Siatpepoucmc; u7cspoxf|q, as compared w i t h the animals: 5i6 Kai 6co0 swoiac, sic; tpavTaciav isvat ootpiac, re K a i otKaioauvnc, Kai Ttdorn; apsTfji; dvTiA.fjvEi<; 7roisio8at, and then after recalling the story of our transgression (svTOAfjc, dXivcopia, itA.rip.u.eA.eTv, drcoocpdXXsiv) he adds: 5i6 x p f i v a i TO Ka8ap6v au8i<; K a i TO 8eosi.KeA.ov dvaKTrjaaaSat TTIC, SV f|m.tv vospac; ouaiac, The basic theory of our knowledge of God is, I believe, very simple.. I t is that in a state of innocence we have an idea of G o d , as Father or Ruler or Supreme Being, and we possess virtues such as wisdom and justice, implanted by God's Logos, which we also attribute to G o d , thus giving content to our basic e w o i a But the theory is complicated, partly by the confusing influence of the notion that the mind can see itself, and so see reflections of the divine Logos; and partly by the confusions attaching to the phrase vospd ouata For it seems that a thing can qualify to be voepd ouoia simply by being, as we should say, mental or psychological in character O n this interpretation, very little is gained if we say that our human virtues are vospai ovjoiai; this could mean that they are mere illusions But Eusebius and Athanasius w i l l think that we only recognize these virtues by relating them to their divine archetype; hence to see them within ourselves is also to be carried beyond ourselves to the realm of noeta, the objective and eternal Forms of all things. B u t even this is not the end of the
IX
X
242 story, at least for Eusebius For k is possible to see these noëta as created beings, comparable with the angels, but not homoousios with God. And Athanasius passes quite easily from the thought of TÔU VOÛV èaxnKévai Ttpôç röv 0eöv to that of GüvSicuTäaSai TOÏÇ, ayioiq sv if} TCÜV vonrcov ôscopta, which seems to suggest that Unfällen man can associate with the angels in the contemplation of a higher reality Wisdom and Justice, then, are the created prototypes of human virtues, sometimes depicted as the trees of the first intelligible paradise; but they are also èittvoiai of the Logos himself, who is aÙToaoqria and aÙTOÔLKatoouvri. In conclusion, I return to the problem which I raised at the beginning. My tentative opinion is that the ideal knowledge of the Logos, as described by Eusebius and Athanasius, is not based on any recognizably mystical experience, such as we detect in Philo and much more clearly, say, in Gregory of Nyssa The evidence, which might suggest this is, 1 think, inadequate Athanasius does of course recommend detachment from the body and its concerns; he is an enthusiast for the solitary life, as practised by Anthony; and he endorses the traditional theme that G o d is inexpressible and incomprehensible But he makes no reference to the divine darkness of Sinai, such as we find in Philo and is creatively developed by Gregory of Nyssa His ideal monk is no quietist, but is actively involved in noisy and troublesome encounters with demons. And it is interesting to note that he reinterprets Plato's maxim about philosophers practising death Plato thinks that philosophers should disregard the body and attend to the intelligible world, just as if they were finally freed from the body's distractions.. Athanasius of course reproduces this idea; but he understands Plato's maxim as an injunction to prepare for martyrdom, which he regards almost as a social activity, so much stress is laid on the great company of ones fellow-sufferers for Christ. The encouragment to concern oneself with noëta suggests to me, not a distinctively mystical consciousness, but something much more like the traditional catholic practice of meditating on the cardinal virtues And lastly, we should not build too much on his admission that the divine nature is inexpressible, for inexpressible knowledge is more commonplace than we are apt to suppose. Origen tells us that we can distinguish between tastes, though we have no words to describe them. Indeed even a dog can know the way to Larissa, if that is where his master lives; though to be sure, he cannot know that it is the way to Larissa! It may, then, be a necessary condition for knowledge of God that it be inexpressible; but it is certainly not a sufficient condition. This estimate of Athanasius, and of Eusebius too, may perhaps be criticized as robbing them of a distinction with which we would like to invest them; but it has the advantage of bringing them closer to realms of thought which we ourselves can understand. 1 6
A T H A N A S I U S '
E A R L I E S T
W R I T T E N
W O R K
I N r844 the work of J A. Möhler, Athanasius der Grosse, was published at M a i n z ; and o n p r 74 of that work Möhler expressed the opinion that the letter 'Evoc, oojuaxoc, attributed to Bishop Alexander of Alexandria was in fact drafted for h i m b y Athanasius, T h i s opinion received favourable notice both from J o h n Henry N e w m a n and from A r c h i b a l d R o b e r t s o n , ' and I have long considered it probable; yet it seems not to have been widely accepted, and the letter has been quoted as the work o f Alexander by a succession of distinguished scholars including E d u a r d S c h w a r t z , Gustave B a r d y , Hans L i e t z m a n n , Manlio S i m o n e t t i , John K e l l y , R u d o l f L o r e n z , and T i m o t h y B a r n e s , to name only a few I propose to argue the opposite case, in agreement with M ö h l e r ; I claim that the Athanasian authorship of 'Evoc, acuucrcog is not merely probable, as Möhler, N e w m a n , and Robertson affirmed, but demonstrably certain I t can thus be regarded as Athanasius' earliest written work, 2
4
5
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6
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8
M y argument will take the following form. First, I shall submit that the two letters attributed to Alexander, the encyclical 'Evoc, owiraxoc; and the longer letter ' H (hiXaoxoc, addressed to another Bishop Alexander, cannot possibly have come from the same h a n d ; they differ in style, in vocabulary, and again i n their treatment of their A r i a n opponents Secondly, it will be shown that the style, the vocabulary, and the treatment of A r i a n i s m in 'Evoc, ocbfiaxoc, are perfectly consonant with the undisputed works of Athanasius, while those of ' H iA,aQxog, as 'Evoc; acoLiatoc, is almost devoid of positive theological statements I t is a surprising fact that a document issued at A n t i o c h at the instance of the Western r a c t
t
n
e
9
1
Newman, Historical
Treatises,
p 297; Robertson, Athanasius
GVs Sehr 3 ni=NAG (1905), p, 265 Luden, p. 246 al * Gesch d alten Kirche 3. o8=ET (Comtantine to Julian) La Crisi Anana, p 44; Studt sulT Arianesimo, p i n Early Christian Doctrines (51h edn , 1977), p 2*4 Arius Judaizans?, p 47 Comtantine and Eusebius, p 203
(NPNF), p. 68
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3
p
no
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8
Ges. Sehr 3. 154 However, the resemblance largely rests upon a common use of Alexandrian credal formulae. Luise Abramowski has noted that the Antiochene letter suppresses Alexander's allusions to three hypostases: ZKG 86 (1975)1 P 3 ° 4 > 35 9
Phaedo 64 A , 67 E , 81 A; Ath Dl 27 3, 28 1 Cf Philo Gig 14, De/. 34, Iren. fr. I I , Clement S/r 3 17 5, 4 58 2 (which anlicipates Athanasius' literalist interpretation). 5 67 2 16
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B i s h o p Ossius of C o r d o b a sets o u t a t h e o l o g y t h a t is u n m i s t a k a b l y A l e x a n d r i a n ; and t h i s can h a r d l y be e x p l a i n e d unless i t be seen as e x p o u n d i n g t h e v i e w s of t h e P a t r i a r c h h i m s e l f . B e f o r e d r a w i n g t h e contrasts I have m e n t i o n e d , i t w i l l be c o n v e n i e n t to give a b r i e f d e s c r i p t i o n o f t h e t w o letters ' H
c
D
r r. H o w do t h e t w o letters c o m p a r e i n style? I t seems to me that there is an o b v i o u s c o n t r a s t , w h i c h i t is s u r p r i s i n g t h a t so m a n y scholars have o v e r l o o k e d . T h e language of 'Evog a
I shall n o t b u i l d t o o m u c h o n t h i s r e s u l t , since t h e G r e e k language is such that q u i t e u n s o p h i s t i c a t e d w r i t e r s o f t e n use p o l y s y l l a b i c n o u n s , like Evayyikiov, or v e r b a l f o r m s , like dcbe8r|0£T.aL T h e figure for the b e g i n n i n g of St M a r k ' s G o s p e l is 45 per 1,000 M o r e o v e r , most w r i t e r s w i l l v a r y t h e i r s t y l e ; f o r instance, the b e g i n n i n g of a treatise o f t e n calls for a f o r m a l i n t r o d u c t i o n i n w h i c h m o r e l o n g w o r d s are used T h u s t h e f i g u r e for t h e b e g i n n i n g of A t h a n a s i u s ' De Incarna-
tione is 51, and t h a t f o r t h e F i r s t O r a t i o n against the A i i a n s , its o p e n i n g s e c t i o n , no less t h a n 6 6 ; whereas a sample taken f r o m the same O r a t i o n b e g i n n i n g at C h a p t e r Seven gives t h e figure 39, closely c o m p a r a b l e w i t h t h e 36 of 'Evog ad>ucixog St A t h a n a s i u s u n d o u b t e d l y v a r i e d his style i n the course of a single w o r k , as Charles Kannengiesser has s h o w n i n h i s fine b o o k o n the Contra Ananos; i t w i l l be m o r e p r o f i t a b l e , t h e r e f o r e , to consider t h e v o c a b u l a r y of the t w o letters i n detail r 2 H e r e , t h o u g h , w e can again use m a t h e m a t i c a l means T a k i n g t h e same t w o samples of 1,000 w o r d s , I a t t e m p t e d t o d e t e r m i n e how m a n y do n o t occur i n the u n d i s p u t e d w o r k s of A t h a n a s i u s F o r this p u r p o s e I used G u i d o Müller's Lexicon Athanasianum, discounting those w o r k s w h i c h are g e n e r a l l y c o n s i d e r e d i n a u t h e n t i c , n o t a b l y the Contra Apoilinarem a n d the De virginitate, w h i l e t a k i n g account of t h e u n d o u b t e d l y A t h a n a s i a n Epistula ad Marcellinum I f o u n d that ' H <J>LXCIQX S e x h i b i t s 36 non-Athanasian w o r d s i n t h e first 1,000; the figure for 'Evog oróiraxog is a r g u a b l y 7, a d i s p r o p o r t i o n of 5 : r O
T h e latter list is s h o r t e n o u g h to be w o r t h c o n s i d e r i n g i n detail F i r s t of a l l , a p u r i s t m i g h t p o i n t to §4, w h e r e A t h a n a s i u s describes E u s e b i u s as casting envious glances at t h e c h u r c h of N i c o m e d i a , éno<J)6aA,LJÍoag xfj exxAnaia NiTíOLinóéojv T h i s phrase has w e l l - k n o w n parallels i n the Apologia c Aíranos, 6 and t h e Historia Arianorum, 7, b u t t h e w o r d used t h e r e is érroct)0aA,|jiáv; s t r i c t l y speaking, én:oct>0cd¡iií¡eiv does n o t b e l o n g t o A t h a n a s i u s ' k n o w n v o c a b u l a r y B u t I shall d i s r e g a r d t h i s case; a s i m p l e e m e n d a t i o n w o u l d give us Éjio
T h e n e x t instance is the v e r b j3úeiv i n § 1 2 T h i s is clearly a w o r d w h i c h belongs to c o m m o n speech, and w h i c h any w r i t e r w o u l d use on occasion, b u t w h i c h w i l l n o t o c c u r v e r y o f t e n I t is f o u n d i n the S e p t u a g i n t , Ps 57: 5, and i n I g n a t i u s , Eph 9: 1 A t h a n a s i u s w i l l u n d o u b t e d l y have k n o w n i t , a n d its absence elsewhere is easily explained
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T h e adjective doudöıoç is n o t f o u n d in A t h a n a s i u s ' u n d i s p u t e d w o r k s : h o w e v e r , its a d v e r b i a l f o r m douoÖLtoç occurs in Contra Gentes, 31, T h e v e r b XQtoxoLiaxeiv also has n o p a r a l l e l , t h o u g h the adjective Xeıorotxdxoç is v e r y f r e q u e n t i n A t h a n a s i u s , besides o c c u r r i n g elsewhere i n 'Evöç ocoLiato;. T h e s e t w o cases s h o u l d c e r t a i n l y be r e c o r d e d , b u t c a n n o t be o f decisive i m p o r t a n c e I n § 1 6 t h e w r i t e r uses dvajtxuaoEtv f o r his q u o t a t i o n s f r o m t h e S c r i p t u r e s . T h i s again is a N e w T e s t a m e n t w o r d , o c c u r r i n g at L u k e 4 : 17 F i n a l l y , t h e w o r d EC^EXXEIV is used in § 1 6 ; t h e heretics ' d r a w d o w n ' u p o n themselves t h e c o n d e m n a t i o n expressed i n Prov. r 8 : 3 'Ecbetateiv is n o t f o u n d i n A t h a n a s i u s ' accepted w o r k s ; nevertheless, a close p a r a l l e l t o t h i s passage appears at c Ar 3. r ; t h e same text is q u o t e d , a n d t h e heretics again i n v i t e t h e i r c o n d e m n a t i o n , t h e sole d i f f e r e n c e b e i n g t h e use of t h e s i m p l e v e r b EXXEIV; i n 'Evogowiraxogwe read (fiiAoveixoOvTee, elç eautoûç £E?aciJom TO yeygaLiLievov, in the O r a t i o n , ibıXoveLxoûaıv eiç eauTouç eXxuaai TO yeypaLiuivov. W e began by c i t i n g ecbetateiv as a p r o b a b l e instance o f non- A t h a n a s i a n v o c a b u l a r y ; w h a t w e have d i s c o v e r e d is a s t r o n g i n d i c a t i o n of A t h a n a s i a n authorship. W e have n o w c o n s i d e r e d t h e s h o r t list of seven non-Athanasian w o r d s o u t of t h e f u s t r . o o o ; some of these cases appear u n i m p o r t a n t , a n d one at least is c o u n t e r - i n d i c a t i v e . T h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g list f r o m H cf)iX,a0xoç a m o u n t s to 36, as w e r e m a r k e d : in § r , <J>iUtoxoç, (juXdoyupoç, otatpnXaTEEv, d j i o a x i p x d v ; İn §2, XOLUJIEUEIV; i n §3 t h e adverb evctyxoc,, repeated i n § 3 5 , also (pikag%ia, xpiorEUJtopia a n d abıakeınTOÇ I n §4, rcpooxfjua, auvay£Îp£iv, a.pxr|0Ev, I n §5 t h e contrast m a r k e r s TOÛTO LIEV . xoDxo 6e, w h i c h I t h i n k are absent f r o m t h e A t h a n a s i a n c o r p u s , but recur here at § 5 9 ; also ftEpiTpoxd^Eiv and d y u i d . I n §7 rtapExp atv£iv,auvapjtdE;£Lv, repeated i n §9, xprjoxoXoyia, OTa)tıijX,oç, jraçavayıvcocoteıv, du.Exavör|xoç I n §9, (itoudXoxog, 4>8OQojtoıöç, eyîtELoBaı, eİaöexea6at, itttExxaiEiv I n § 1 0 , öıavLordvat. I n § 1 1 , ouvavaXau.|3dv£tv, EJUÖ£XTIXÖÇ. I n § r 2 , JtpoBEtopia. I n § 14, Jtapdoraaıç i n t h e sense of ' s u p p o r t ' , also (t>pEvo[3Xa($rjç a n d İÖIÖTOOr
,
ÎTOÇ,
repeated
in
§32..
In
r8,
chavxaaioiiv a n d
OUÖLÜJCTIÇ
In
§19,
ouooroixog W e c a n , of course, a d m i t t h a t t h e r e is a chance factor at w o r k ; n o t all these instances are s i g n i f i c a n t ; I w i l l n o t b u i l d m u c h o n t h e presence of d y u t d , n o r of t h e v e r b eyxetoeai. B u t t h e list as a w h o l e seems to i n d i c a t e a c o n s c i o u s l y s t y l i s t i c w r i t e r . H e has a l i k i n g f o r d o u b l y c o m p o u n d e d v e r b s : jiapExpaivEiv, i m p a v a y i v t o o x E i v , itJiexxaieLv, ö t a v ı o r d v a ı , auvavaXaufidvEiv, besides ouvavcuoeiv, § 1 1 , a n d ELUTOLQoivetv, § 14, w h i c h have some A t h a n a s i a n c u r r e n c y : seven examples in
o u r chosen passage against one i n 'Evog atbuctxog, Eyxaxatu^cu i n § 1 5 . S o m e o f h i s w o r d s appear t o be d r a w n f r o m t h e t r a d i t i o n of anti-heretical r h e t o r i c , f o r instance oiorpTiXaxEiv, d j i o a x i p x d v , EUJiapotvetv; xpioreiUTOQta, says O p i t z , is suggested b y t h e D i d a c h e A n d t h e r e is some significance, I t h i n k , i n h i s use of t h e v e r b jtEpixpoxd£ E I V , since t h i s can h a r d l y be a n y t h i n g b u t a deliber ate s t y l i s t i c variant for JCEQITQEXEIV rUptxpEXELv is e x t r e m e l y c o m m o n i n A t h a n a s i u s , b u t A l e x a n d e r appears t o have t h o u g h t i t u n a c c e p t a b l y c o m m o n p l a c e ; i n §7 h e avoids t h e p a r t i c i p l e ^EOLXQEXOVTEC; b y w r i t i n g Jtegi&pouaEg XetotiEvot I t is d i f f i c u l t t o c o n v e y t h e flavour o f a w r i t e r b y c o m p i l i n g lists of w o r d s ; a n d I d o n o t p r e t e n d t h a t t h e c o n t r a s t i n s t y l e b e t w e e n Ev6g owriaTog, a n d H 4>iXapxog is a b s o l u t e ; t h e f o r m e r w r i t e r does i n places p e r m i t h i m s e l f some m o d e s t d e c o r a t i o n T h u s i n §3 he w r i t e s : EV xf\ n,Li£TEQCi xoiVuv J t a p o i x i a £^f|X0ov vTJv dvSQEC. jrapdvouot x a l xeiaxoudxot Si&daxovxEg d j t o a x a o i a v , fyv etxoxcog ctv xtg Jipo6pouov xofj dvxixptaxou vmovorjosiE x a l XCCXEOEIEV : note t h e t w o parallelisms a n d the c o r r e c t l y used o p t a t i v e c o n s t r u c t i o n T h e o v e r l o a d e d style of H (tnXagxog, as I t h i n k i t , m a y b e i l l u s t r a t e d f t o m § 7 : 'EjiExeipnaav 6e jteoLdoo^cug xpdiLiEvot x a 0 ' r\\L(bv jtapex|3aLV£iv itpog xoiig 6uoci>povag auXXEixoupyoiig, axTiuxxxi LIEV eiprjvrig x a l EvcooEtog d^itooiv iuioxpiVOLIEVOL, xo 6' dXrjSec; avjvapjtdoaL xivag auxcbv £ig xf|v LSiav v6aov &id XpnoxoXoytag ajrou6a£ovx£g x a i crtro[njXd>x£pa ypduurtxa jcap' axixcbv aLxoiivxEg, i v a JtapavayivwaxovxEg a u x d xotg vn' auxcov r^Jiaxntrivoig dixExavofixovjg E(f/ o l g Earj)dXnaav xaxaaxEudatooiv, EJuxpiPou.Evo'ug elg doEfJeiav, tog d v cnju,i|)r(cboug auxotg x a i 6uo(bpovag EXOVXEg EJtioxojtoug. T h e r e m u s t i n e v i t a b l y be a s u b j e c t i v e factor i n s u c h j u d g e m e n t s of s t y l e ; b u t r e v e r t i n g f o r a m o m e n t to c a l c u l a t i o n , I n o t e that i n t h e sixty w o r d s j u s t q u o t e d t h e r e are n i n e h a v i n g five syllables or m o r e , an i m p r e s s i v e p r o p o r t i o n of r50 per t h o u s a n d . c
C
!
2. I come t o m y second m a i n p o i n t A g a i n a n d again w e f i n d the p h r a s e o l o g y o f Ev6g ocoiiaxog echoed i n t h e u n d i s p u t e d w o r k s of Athanasius I must acknowledge m y debt to Newman's pioneering o b s e r v a t i o n s ; b u t his case can easily be s t r e n g t h e n e d b y u s i n g m o d e r n aids t o s t u d y . I b e g i n w i t h t h e passage j u s t q u o t e d f r o m §3, f\v slxoxcog ctv xig JtpoSpouov xou avxixQicrroi) x)jtovor|o£LE A t h a n a s i u s repeatedly c o n d e m s A r i a n i s m as t h e f o r e r u n n e r o f A n t i c h r i s t , for instance i n Apol c Ar 90, xnv 'ApEi.dvr|v algeoLv XQimo^aypv oiiaav x a l TOO ctvxi.X9tOTOijjtg66oou.ov, S i m i l a r texts are f o u n d i n O r a t i o n , r . 1, 1 7, de Synodh, 5, VitaAntomi, 69, a n d H i s t o r i a A r i a n o r u m , 77. N e w m a n goes o n t o c o m m e n t o n t h e w r i t e r ' s d e c l a r a t i o n i n §4 that h e w o u l d w i l l i n g l y have k e p t silent a b o u t t h e A r i a n s ; b u t t h e parallels adduced b y N e w m a n are n o t v e r y close, a n d I t h i n k this sentence is a mere literary commonplace A n c i e n t a u t h o r s h a b i t u a l l y i n t r o d u c e their c
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books b y e x p l a i n i n g t h a t t h e r e s h o u l d be no need f o r t h e m , I t is q u i t e o t h e r w i s e w i t h the reason t h e a u t h o r gives here f o r k e e p i n g s i l e n t , §4, ojtcoc, uf| QUJtiboTj Tivcbv axeoaioyv xdg anode,, c o m p a r e § 1 2 , anyone w h o hears of i t stops his ears, xdc, dxode, ßÜEL UJIEQ tori u.rj xöv QUJIOV xouxoov xtov onLidxaw Tjiauaai xfjc; axo-pc, A t h a n a s i u s o f t e n uses öiijtoc, and r e l a t e d w o r d s t o i n d i c a t e t h e f i l t h of heresy, and a specific reference to w o r d s w h i c h one s h o u l d n o t hear is f o u n d i n O r a t i o n , 3.. 28, curö6Eo8e xryv ' A Q E L O U rravtav, tn/v XE axorpv ti^öVv xf|v öujrtoÖELaav d j r a xebv ßXaochfiu,a)v driudxtov dJT.ovu|>aa8£. A g a i n , he o f t e n expresses c o n c e r n for the d x E o a t o i , especially b y accusing the heretics of d e c e i v i n g t h e m , for e x a m p l e , O r a t i o n , 2 34, i v a xdg d x o d g xapdaatoai xtov dxEpaiotepoov A f t e r t h e r e m a r k a b o u t E u s e b i u s ' e n v i o u s glances at N i c o m e d i a the a u t h o r m e n t i o n s his letters of c o m m e n d a t i o n , devised ÖJHÜC, ÜJtootiori t i v d g d y v o o u v t a g etg xnv a i a x i a x n v xauxryv x a i x Q o r i d x o v aioEaiv; c o m p a r e A t h a n a s i u s ' L e t t e r to t h e B i s h o p s of E g y p t §4, 6 djtAo-Oc; tijEooupExai xaic, Exeivarv iiEÖoöeiatc;. Lcrc
I n §5 w e hear of t h e A r i a n s ' öüarnva pnuaxa T h i s has a close p a r a l l e l i n O r a t i o n , 1 4, w h e r e A t h a n a s i u s makes A r i u s express his 6uaxrjvaQnri,dxLa'in dissolute a n d g a n g l i n g m e t r e s ' I t m a y b e , i n d e e d , t h a t t h e agreement is exact, since O p i t z ' s text reads ÖT|tidxia at § 1 6 , as against Qf\\xaxa i n §§5 a n d 12; a n d for w h a t i t is w o r t h , Socrates' t r a n s c r i p t of t h e l e t t e r has pnuotxia at §5. T h e w o r d occurs elsewhere i n A t h a n a s i u s ; see, for instance, a rather u n u s u a l l y ornate passage i n Deer. 18.. 5, x d u.ev otiv n p o e t o n u i v a xtov X Q ^ o ^ X ^ XO.\iatty\ka Qnudxia jtpoajiEÖEi^Ev 6 Xöyog; A t h a n a s i u s , as I r e m a r k e d , can v a r y his style a n d is n o t always c o n t e n t w i t h u n a d o r n e d s i m p l i c i t y , C o n s i d e r a t i o n of §§7~ro m a y be p o s t p o n e d u n t i l w e come to e x a m i n e t h e w r i t e r ' s t r e a t m e n t of A r i a n d o c t r i n e R e s u m i n g at § r i , w e note t h a t E u s e b i u s ' c o m p a n i o n s are d e s c r i b e d as ajiouöd^ovxec, Eyxaxatui;ai xö ipEuÖog xf\ dXn6eia; c o m p a r e Hist Ar 41, 0£X,tiaavx£C, EyxaxariL^at XT)V daEßeiav. I n t h e same § 1 1 comes the j i b e a b o u t the agreement o f C h r i s t w i t h B e l i a l , one of t h e f e w g e n u i n e parallels b e t w e e n 'Evdc, atouaxoc, a n d ' H (tfikaQxoq. I t seems, h o w e v e r , t o be a c o m m o n p l a c e ; i t is used b y O r i g e n a n d occurs i n t h e Serdiceme, w h i l e t h e c o m p a n i o n clause a b o u t l i g h t and dar kness appears i n Vit Ant 69 a n d Festal L e t t e r , 7,, 4, I n § 1 6 , a f t e r s a y i n g t h a t t h e heretics i n v i t e t h e c o n d e m n a t i o n of P r o v 18: 3, t h e w r i t e r pleasingly compares the A r i a n p a r t y w i t h chamaeleons T h i s figure appears again i n Deer 1 and Hist. Ar 79, a n d is p e r f e c t l y t y p i c a l of A t h a n a s i u s ; he likes to c o m p a r e his o p p o n e n t s w i t h v a r i o u s k i n d s of w i l d beasts and r e p t i l e s , as N e w m a n observed,, 10
l u
Robertson, op. cit., p. 371
n. 8
82
Parallels can also be f o u n d for Eusebius' x a x o v o i a , §5 ; for aJtou&a^Eiv used of A r i a n manœuvres i n § r 1, and f o r jiaoaxoouELv, of t h e i r perverse exegesis, i n § 1 5 . I f the parallels I have g i v e n are n o t already c o n v i n c i n g , let me add t h a t a v a l i d p r o o f can o n l y be based o n c o m p a r a t i v e data. T h e r e are, of course, parallels also b e t w e e n H <$>ïka.Qxoç a n d the authentic A t h a n a s i u s ; b u t these are m o s t l y s u b s t a n t i a l p o i n t s of t h e o l o g y , where one m i g h t expect A l e x a n d e r ' s deacon to f o l l o w his master.. E x a m p l e s are the a b s u r d i t y o f s a y i n g t h a t G o d ' s W i s d o m was once non-existent ( § 2 7 ) ; the d i c t u m t h a t he is Son b y n a t u r e , chuoEt, a n d not b y c o n v e n t i o n , GÉOEL (§29) ; t h e c o n t e n t i o n t h a t the S o n cannot progress o r be i m p r o v e d ( § § 3 0 - 4 ) . B u t t h e p a r a l l e l i s m b e t w e e n 'Evôç, oœtraxoç a n d A t h a n a s i u s e x t e n d s t o u n i m p o r t a n t details o f v o c a b u l a r y and character istic t u r n s o f phrase, w h i c h are far b e t t e r p r o o f s of i d e n t i t y of a u t h o r s h i p E v e n w h e n A l e x a n d e r makes theological p o i n t s w h i c h A t h a n a s i u s w i l l f o l l o w , t h e r e is f r e q u e n t l y a contrast b e t w e e n an o r n a t e a n d a s i m p l e style. T h u s t h e p o i n t about G o d ' s eternal W i s d o m is m a d e i n Evôç aœuaxoç § 1 3 i n a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y terse Athanasian phrase : I f t h e Son is G o d ' s W i s d o m , h o w a b s u r d t o say fjv JIOXE OXE OV% f\v taov y à p èaxiv aùxoùç XéyEiv dXoyov x a i âaoctrôv jtoxe xèv 8EÔV A l e x a n d e r is c u m b e r s o m e b y c o m p a r i s o n C
r
3. H a v i n g n o w c o n s i d e r e d t h e evidence of style and v o c a b u l a r y , I w i s h to c o m p a r e t h e t w o letters i n t h e i r t r e a t m e n t of t h e A r i a n o p p o s i t i o n . I shall p o i n t first to a contrast of f o r m , i n t h e w a y they present a n d organize t h e i r m a t e r i a l N e x t I shall argue for a difference i n c o n t e n t , i n v o l v i n g their use and disuse of A r i u s ' Thalia W e shall t h e n consider the r e l a t i v e d a t i n g of t h e t w o letters ; t h e accepted order, I c l a i m , presents a d i l e m m a w h i c h can o n l y be resolved b y assigning Evôç ocôp.axoç to A t h a n a s i u s c
3 r. T h i s l e t t e r presents a concise s u m m a r y of A r i a n d o c t r i n e w i t h i n a compass o f 226 w o r d s R u d o l f L o r e n z has taken i t as his s t a n d a r d for c o m p a r a t i v e purposes, a n d d i v i d e s its contents i n t o eight headings. T h i s d i v i s i o n , I t h i n k , is n o t p e r f e c t l y satisfactory, f o r the headings v a r y a g o o d deal i n c o m p l e x i t y and i m p o r t a n c e . I w o u l d be i n c l i n e d to t r e a t h e a d i n g I as a mere preface t o I I , and V I I as an a p p e n d i x to V I ; b u t L o r e n z ' s scheme is w e l l k n o w n , a n d is quite serviceable for our p u r p o s e L o r e n z adds a n i n t h h e a d i n g , rather c o n f u s i n g l y , for w h i c h he quotes no evidence f r o m 'Evôg ocotiaxoç T h i s deals w i t h t h e i n e q u a l i t y of t h e A r i a n T r i n i t y , for w h i c h t h e m a i n t e x t is O r a t i o n , 1 6, w i t h p a r t i a l parallels i n Syn i$\ b u t there is s i m i l a r m a t t e r i n 'Evoç oœiiaxoç under headings I I and V , w h i c h present t h e v i e w t h a t t h e S o n is u n l i k e t h e Father i n essence, and is strange a n d alien a n d d i v i d e d f r o m i t ; t h e w o r d s ^évoç x a i àXKoxpioç xfjç xoû JiaxQÔç oûotaç aie closely paralleled i n the O r a t i o n ,
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L e t us n o w c o m p a r e t h i s s u m m a r y of A r i a n d o c t r i n e , §§7~ro, w i t h t h e rather longer p o l e m i c a l r e p l y w h i c h f o l l o w s i n § § 1 1 - 1 5 I find t h a t t h e s u m m a r y a n d t h e r e p l y do n o t deal w i t h t h e same topics i n exactly t h e same o r d e r , as i f t h e w r i t e r h a d m a d e notes of his c r i t i c i s m s a n d t i c k e d t h e m o f f one b y o n e . O n t h e other h a n d , almost every p o i n t m e n t i o n e d i n t h e s u m m a r y is t a k e n u p s o m e w h e r e i n the r e p l y T h i s suggests a clear-minded a u t h o r w h o k n o w s exactly w h a t he w a n t s to say, a n d can dispense w i t h m e c h a n i c a l m e t h o d s . T h e facts c a n best be s h o w n b y a t a b l e , b u t w e m a y r e v i e w t h e m i n b r i e f , L o r e n z ' s h e a d i n g I p i c k s o u t t h e A r i a n c l a i m t h a t G o d was n o t always F a t h e r ,, T h i s is n o t t a k e n u p i n the r e p l y , t h o u g h i t was clearly i m p o r t a n t f o r A t h a n a s i u s , w h o repeats t h i s c o m p l a i n t i n f o u r other s u m m a r i e s of A r i a n i s m (see L o r e n z , p p 38-9)., B u t t h i s first h e a d i n g serves t o i n t r o d u c e t h e m u c h m o t e s t r i k i n g a n d c o m p l e x h e a d i n g I I , i n w h i c h occur the c o n t r o v e r s i a l phrases E£ oi»t ovxcov a n d f|v ÖTE o i w fjv,. M y o w n analysis breaks t h i s h e a d i n g d o w n i n t o six sub-sections, all of w h i c h receive some f o r m of a n s w e r ; İn some cases q u i t e d i r e c t , like t h e answer t o r|v ore o i i x rjv a n d t o s£= ot)x ovxcov i n § r 2, sometimes rather a l l u s i v e , l i k e t h e answer t o 6 y d o ö v 0EÖÇ TÖV uf| övxa JT8JCOLT|XE, w h e r e JiEJtoirjxe is c o u n t e r e d b y c i t i n g Ps. 4 4 : 2 a n d r 0 9 ; 3 (E|EQEi3|aTO,Eyevvrjoao£), H e a d i n g I I I criticizes t h e A r i a n d o c t r i n e of a secondary W i s d o m ; n o t a l l its p o i n t s are d i r e c t l y a n s w e r e d ; b u t , f o r i n s t a n c e , t h e o i k s dXr|6ıvöç Köyoç x a i aoctua, d M . ' elç t û v jıotr(u,dTO)v of §7 is m e t b y t h e a s s u m p t i o n i n § 1 3 , el Xoyoc, xcd oo
L e t us n o w e x a m i n e t h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g m a t e t i a l i n H $ıka.Q%oç A s C
TABLE I Arianisms and replies in Evd; acbjiaTO; §7 L I Oiw &EÎ 6 8EÖÇ Jiatijg r|V 6Xk' T|V ÖTE 6 8EÖÇ Jtaurıp oiix f\v L II ow. 6ei fiv 6 TOÛ 9EOÛ J.öyoç. tûl E | oiix ÖVTCUV VEVOVEV 6 yâç arv 8eöç TOV \ıi\ övra £x TOÛ \ıf\ övto; îiei[oir|XE 6 ıo xai rjv ÖTE ovx f|v xriana yüg fori xai Jioiıma ö vioç oöre ÖE öftoıoç xaı' ovoiav z& jcatgi fcmv L III OVTE ftXtı8tvöç xal I^ÛOEI X6voç EOTİV OÛTC &XT|6IVÎ] ooı(ıia aÎiToû icrıv ĞJJ.' EÎÇ TtÖV JtOLT||l6lDV Kttt YEVTTCÛV ÎÖTl, xaraXQ*\ îöiıp TOÛ 8EOÛ Xöytp xai xfi iv t(j> Öeiji 00$ ia £v ij xai TÖ Jiövra xai aûtöv nsııo'n\xev ö 8EÖÇ 8 L IV ötö xai TOEnTOç farı xai AU.OLıjıjıv tbç xai ıravıa tâ Xoyixd [cf also §10] L V i|£vo; t£ xai oiAoretoç *aİ 6I£EOXOIVKJHEVOÇ £axıv 6 Xöyo; tijç TOÖ 8EOÛ ovoiaç L VI xai âöoaTÖç ÎOTLV 6 naTf|o vlıij OVTE yap TEUÎÜIÇ xai âxgıpwç yıvuımcEi 6 Xövoç töv naıiça, OÛTE TEXÎÎOJÇ 6pav aiiTÖv öûvaraı L VII xoi yao xui havrov \r\v oûoiav OVK Oİ6E\ 6 vlöç 6ç EITTI 1 L VIII 6ı'fıııâç yao jısnotrıtaı îva /ınâç öı' aiiToû mç 6ı' bqymov xıiuf\ 6 6e6ç § 1 0 xai oüx &v İ>JT£<7TT| E[ (lij T([idç 6 ÖEÖÇ ^Öei-tıOE noiî)aaı i)eu)Tt]OE yoûv Tocutrjvat ete
(cf. § 1 3 , ™ ? aXoyov note TOY Beov;) (cf. on rtv OTE ovx. i\v below) §9: 3tu)5 i| ovx ovrtov, etc cf §9 above. §12: Tig itKOiiiov []o. 1: ij oi KttTttyiWCTXE 1 (§12 condemns E!C EOTI TWV jtoiiiiidtcuv) §13: T) 6v6noiog rfj oiioiqi TOV TOTO6; etc cf. § 1 3 : el X6yo£ xai aofyia tail tov 6EOU 6 vi6q §12 condemns cig £tra TOIV jiouinaTtov v
cf. § 1 2 6 1 aÜTOû iyivETO jtdvra and §14 öt' oû TO jidvra §14 jıâ>5 ÖE T@EJTT6Ç xai aU.oiıuToç {cf § 1 4 : «al yevâ|iEvoç dv^çmnog oûx f|)AoiıuTaı) §13 f) jtıîıç ûvöjıoıoç Tfl oiıotçToö jtaToo; etc § 15 condemns ovx OLÖEV TEUÎIOÇ 6 ^6705 TOV jıaıtça
§14 condemns öı f^ııâç yEyovE
cf §14 cited against §8 above.
we observed, t h i s letter has a more complex s t r u c t u r e ; there is a s u m m a r y of A r i a n teaching i n § § r o - i 4 , c o m p r i s i n g 270 words, r o u g h l y equal t o t h e 226 o f 'Evog atoriaxog, f o l l o w e d by a polemical r e p l y i n § § 1 5 - 2 5 , T h i s , h o w e v e r , leads o n t o a positive statement of anti-Arian theology, §§26-34, ' f u r t h e r theological remarks w
t
n
s
o
m
e
i n § § 3 7 - 4 0 and § § 4 6 - 5 4 H o w does the i n i t i a l s u m m a r y compare w i t h t h a t given i n 'Evdc, oibtraxog? W e n o t e d t h a t t h e latter records eight d i s t i n c t p o i n t s , by Lorenz's r e c k o n i n g ; the c o r r e s p o n d i n g passages i n 'HdpiXapxog notes o n l y f o u r ; L o r e n z ' s 11, o n t h e non-eternity of the L o g o s , is adequately t r e a t e d ; his I V , o n c h a n g e a b i l i t y , is so m u c h expanded that i t occupies m o t e t h a n h a l f the t o t a l space; there is a rather s l i g h t reminiscence of V , the Son's unlikeness t o t h e F a t h e r , i n §i3:ome
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§ 1 4 T h e r e is no m e n t i o n at a l l of L o r e n z ' s p o i n t s I , I I I , V I , V I I , or VIII. A r i a n s say r\v KOXB ÖTE ovx. t|v ö vjiöç TOV) 9EOÛ, x c d yeyovev UOTEQOV Ö itQOxeQOv Lifj vjjtdQxtov, § 1 0 , w h i c h h e f o l l o w s i m m e d i a t e l y b y the n e w p o i n t e q u a t i n g t h e S o n w i t h every m a n . T h e next s e c t i o n , § 1 1 , b r i e f l y
w i l l a d d one other p o i n t to t h e same e f f e c t A l e x a n d e r ' s s u m m a r y of A r i a n d o c t r i n e , § § i o - r 4 , and indeed h i s i n i t i a l r e p l y i n § § 1 5 - 2 5 , s i m p l y o m i t s o b j e c t i o n a b l e p o i n t s of A r i a n d o c t r i n e w h i c h he nevertheless k n o w s a n d w h i c h a t t r a c t i n c i d e n t a l n o t i c e later o n . T h u s he does n o t i n c l u d e L o r e n z ' s p o i n t I , t h a t G o d w a s n o t always Father. B u t i n §26 he s u d d e n l y s w i t c h e s f r o m c o n d e m n i n g t h e i% OVK ovxcov to
r e s u m e s Lorenz's h e a d i n g I I , a s s e r t i n g that the A r i a n s consider
state dvdyxT] xov j t a T e o a d e l EIVCU j r a x E o a A n d p o i n t V I , t h a t t h e
T o e x p a n d these c o m m e n t s a little . A l e x a n d e r c o m p l a i n s t h a t the
the
S o n as made eB, ovv. OVTXOV, t h e w o r d ercoinog p r o v i d i n g a l i n k w i t h the t e r m Jtotnita f o u n d i n 'Evöç atûLiatoç. B u t i n § r r , i n t h e t h i r d sentence of his s u m m a r y , A l e x a n d e r t u r n s to the A r i a n c l a i m , a s he believes, t h a t t h e S o n is TO£jr.Trjg tfnjoEiog. T h e r e f o l l o w s a f u l l a n d m o s t i n t e r e s t i n g d i s c u s s i o n of t h i s p o i n t , to w h i c h I s h a l l r e t u r n ; b u t this
point, Lorenz's n o I V , and the new point about o r d i n a r y manhood, o c c u p y the w h o l e r e m a i n d e r of t h e s u m m a r y . M o r e o v e r , h a v i n g selected t h e s e f e w p o i n t s for emphasis, A l e x a n d e r i s b y n o m e a n s disposed to t h i n k t h a t he has said e n o u g h T h e p h r a s e fyv ÖTE OVK r|v, a t t a c k e d i n t h e r e f u t a t i o n , § § 15 and 23, is again c o n d e m n e d i n §27, a n d i n d i r e c t l y a g a i n b y the r e f e r e n c e s to t h e Son's e t e r n a l e x i s t e n c e i n §§48 a n d 51.
T h e phrase ğ|oÎıxövTtov,
condemned
i n t h e r e f u t a t i o n , § § 1 5 , r 6 , 18, and 22, is n o t i c e d again i n 26, i n d i r e c t l y i n 36, a n d d i r e c t l y a g a i n at 4 4 , 4 5 a n d 46. L o r e n z ' s p o i n t I V , t h a t t h e S o n m u s t be dTgejixog, f i r s t a p p e a r i n g i n §§r 1-14,
is r e s u m e d
i n 29, 30, 34, a n d 47. T h e A r i a n s ' v i e w s of t h e L o g o s are p r e s e n t e d İn v a r i o u s guises; t h e y make h i m TOtçjtdöLVLoov, § 4 ; a m e r e m a n , § § r o , r 4 ; t h e y r e v i v e t h e e r r o r s of J u d a i s m , §4, of Paul o f Samosata, §35. T h e i r r e a s o n i n g i s v a r i o u s l y e x p l a i n e d ; t h e y select h u m a n i z i n g texts f r o m t h e B i b l e , §§4, 37; t h e y m a k e t h e S o n changeable, l i k e e v e r y man,
§ro,
eternity,
But §10,
his c h a n g e a b i l i t y and
presented
is b o t h d e d u c e d
as actually
taught
from by
the
his
non-
Arians,
§ § i o - r 4 . I a m i n c l i n e d t o t h i n k t h a t t h e reference to P a u l of Samosata İs a m e r e a r t i f i c e of c o n t r o v e r s y T h e Thalia e x t r a c t s show t h a t A r i u s r e g a r d e d t h e L o g o s , p e r h a p s as a k i n d of c r e a t u r e , b u t a l s o as a k i n d of
g o d , î a / u p o ç 8eöç, a n d c e r t a i n l y n o t a s a m e r e m a n ; b u t possibly the P a u l i a n i s t v i e w s c o m p l a i n e d of are r e a l l y t h o s e of t h e S y r i a n b i s h o p s
m e n t i o n e d i n §37
T o r e s u m e t h e catalogue of r e p e t i t i o n s , t h e c l a i m
that Christ's goodness
is a c h i e v e d t h r o u g h itgoxojir|,
censured
in
§§13—14, is r e v i s i t e d i n §§30, 34, a n d 46, F i n a l l y , L o r e n z ' s p o i n t V , t h e A r i a n Son's u n l i k e n e s s to t h e F a t h e r , i n i t i a l l y s k e t c h e d i n § 1 3 , is r e p e a t e d l y r e h a n d l e d ; §§28, 29, 31, 32, 34, and 37 a l l take u p t h i s point in slightly varying terms
3. 2 I t r e m a i n s t o consider t h e t w o letters i n r e l a t i o n t o A r i u s ' Thalia I w i s h to m a k e t h e rather precise c l a i m t h a t the m a t e r i a l p r e s e n t e d i n 'Evog oojLtaTog is d e d u c i b l e , w i t h f e w e x c e p t i o n s , f r o m t h e extracts p r e s e r v e d i n Syn. 15. I suppose t h a t t h i s set of extracts was assembled i m m e d i a t e l y a f t e r t h e T h a l i a was w r i t t e n , and w a s filed a w a y , to be p u b l i s h e d some f o r t y years l a t e r a l o n g w i t h A r i u s ' Letter t o A l e x a n d e r , O p i t z ' s U r k u n d e , 6. B u t if t h i s rather far-teaching claim i s n o t acceptable, t h e mater i a l I present s t i l l serves t o show t h a t 'Evog otbu-ctxog is closely r e l a t e d to t h e Thalia, whereas ' H (tnXaoxog is not 11
L o r e n z b e g i n s w i t h t h e thesis t h a t G o d was n o t always F a t h e r . T h i s can be d e d u c e d f r o m T h a l i a 1, 21: camxct y o i v mov) uf| ovxog 6 xaxr\Q 6Eog k m . A r i u s m a y have m e a n t o n l y t h a t t h e F a t h e r was i n existence b e f o r e t h e S o n ; b u t t h e verse c o u l d easily b e i n t e r p r e t e d : ' W h e n the S o n d i d n o t e x i s t , t h e F a t h e r was G o d ' , t h a t i s G o d simpliciter a n d not F a t h e r A t h a n a s i u s r e p e a t e d l y claims t h a t the v e r y name 'Father' i m p l i e s t h e existence of a s o n ; w i t h o u t a Son G o d w o u l d n o t be F a t h e r . ( H o w c o n v i n c i n g t h i s a r g u m e n t was to t h e ancients, we m o d e r n s m a y observe w i t h a s m i l e , and h o w u t t e r l y r e m o t e f r o m t h e m was the r e f l e c t i o n t h a t to b e c o m e a f a t h e r , a l l one actually needs is a daughter!) 1Z
0
L o r e n z ' s h e a d i n g I I i s c o m p l e x , as already n o t e d . I t b e g i n s : o v x d e i r)v 6 TOO 8EO0 Xoyog A r i u s expresses t h i s q u i t e c l e a r l y i n T h a l i a 20-2; besides t h e v e r s e already q u o t e d , see 1. 20, rj 6udg 8' OVK ryv jtotv v m d o l n , a n d 22, koinbv
I apologize for t h i s t e d i o u s catalogue of d e t a i l s , b u t I t h i n k i t s h o w s
11
t h a t A l e x a n d e r ' s m e t h o d — o r l a c k of m e t h o d — i n t r e a t i n g t h e same
text
p o i n t s a g a i n a n d a g a i n w i t h o u t any o v e r all c o n t r o l l i n g d e s i g n contrasts v e r y s t r o n g l y w i t h t h e o r d e r l y p r o c e d u r e f o l l o w e d i n 'Evöç öü>Liaxoç. I
Son
has n o k n o w l e d g e of t h e F a t h e r , i g n o r e d at f i r s t , is t a k e n up i n § § 4 6 - 7 ; a f t e r s a y i n g t h a t r a t i o n a l c r e a t u r e s , xdXoyLxd, cannot c o m p r e h e n d the F a t h e r ' s n a t u r e , he quotes M a t t . 11: 27, oii&eig otSe 115 eoxiv 6 Ttaxr\Q, EL Ltrf 6 uiog. I n o t h e r w o r d s , A l e x a n d e r k n o w s m u c h m o r e about A r i a n i s m t h a n he reveals i n t h e s u m m a r y ; he s i m p l y fails t o ptesent w h a t he k n o w s i n t h e e f f e c t i v e a n d logical place, O n c e again, t h e r e is a r e m a r k a b l e c o n t r a s t w i t h the l u c i d a n d o r d e r l y p r o c e d u r e of t h e 'Evdg oo>u.axog.
6 v l o g OVK wv VXY\Q%E.
T h e n e x t clause i n the
See J TS xxix {19 78), 20-38 for the claim that these conform fairly closely to Arius'
I cite Bardy's lines for brevity. Line i ^ O p i t z 242. 9; line 20—243. subtract 19 to obtain Opitz's reference Or c AT 1 33 al passim 12
13
1
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L I oiix áet ó 9£Ög JTOTTIQ r\v
L H
oiix aei ijv ó lov Beov í.óyog
iüX 1% oöx ÖVTÜJV yéyovev ó yäp <í>v 9eö;
iteJioínxe
Siö xai fjv JIOTE ore oix
XTÍajia yáo étm xai noEt^ia ó utóg L I I I OÍTE 6é ö^oiog xai'otioíav tq) JIOTOÍ éariv OÚTE aXn9ivÓ£ xai 4>¿OEI tóyog ÉITTIV oíixe äXtiÖLvf) aofyía afaov ÉOTIV
L IV L V L VI
L VII L VIII
áX^ eis T-wv iioir|íiÓTü>v xai yevrjTiiiv éari xaTaxeT](nixñs 6é í-éyerai táyo; nal ao<|Ha yevónevog xai aúiog t(b toiw TOÜ 6EOC Xoyip/ooitJÍa Év f| xai Ta návra xai aÜTÓv JIE;IOÍJ]XEV Ó 6 ÖL° *e«i TQEJTTÓ5 éori etc £évo; TE xai áXXótpiog . nai áóoaTÓg éauv ó icatíig TIU vtcu OÖTE yäo xe^eíio; xai áxotfiw; yiv6axei OÜTE TEXEMOÍ ópav aíitóv öivatai " a i yäo xai éauTofi xr\\ oúaíav oiix OÍÓEV Ó tilóg dig ími 6L" f^iiág yäo JienoliiTai iva fellas öi' at)TOü XTÍOT} Ó Beóg xai oítx av firtéorrj el yr| íjuág ó 9EÓS T)8Éí.í|aE naifjoai
15)
21 aÖTixa yovv uioC (li} övrog 6 naxfio 8EÖ; tun 4 . . 6iä TÖv aox>) lx 20 ij &uag 6' oiix r|v Jtpiv (inao^n 22 ö uiög oiix Äv (iiiriip^E bi 8EXr|0Ei jtaTodia) [31. 38 are similar] but cf 39 TÖV EX TtaTQOg övra: but NB also Opitz Urk. 1 § 5 jtoiEiv deest, but cf, 7, TExvojionioag also öjcfiogE, i>niovr\ passim 22 oiix 6iv Ö7ir|o|e, also utoü nf| övrog (above). xTiaiia. XTL^EIV desunt: cf. on TEETKHTIXE above 2, 8, and esp 9 a U OÜÖE ÖLiooiiaiog ainm 25-6 imvoeixat aotpia Xöyog; elsewhere ulog is used io ao
11-15,
e s
P
ovca
' $ **P äöpaTog yEwiioavra yvwvai ev xaTaXf]t(iEL 11-15 esp. 14 f löioiai TE nerooig . tÖEiv 37 avTÖg yap ö uiög TJ)VfcauToüoüaiav OVK OIÖEV
cf 40
3: 2 a n d t h e p r e c e d e n t set b y D i o n y s i u s o f A l e x a n d r i a ; b u t , of c o u r s e , w i t h o u t s h a r p l y o p p o s i n g JIOLELV t o ysvvav, as Athanasius d i d T h e o r t h o d o x v i e w , i f I u n d e r s t a n d i t r i g h t , is (a) that t h e Son's g e n e r a t i o n is t o t a l l y m y s t e r i o u s , b u t (b) i t is o b v i o u s l y not the same as c r e a t i o n I m y s e l f can excuse A r i u s f o r b e i n g a l i t t l e less dogmatic, 15
II
Evöt; oa/ftatoi and the Thalia (Syn
I 2
T
V
OÖTÖV TÖV
6 aox*)
v T O V u
T h e n e x t sentence, S16 x a i f|v JIOXE OXE oux f j v , is easily deducible f r o m verses already c i t e d ; t h e n f o l l o w s x x i o t i a y a p l a x i x a i jroirjiia T h e n o u n x x i o t i a f i g u r e s i n A r i u s ' L e t t e r t o A l e x a n d e r w i t h the w e l l - k n o w n q u a l i f i c a t i o n b.W o u x wc, EV xd>v xxioLtaxtov; i t is coupled w i t h yevvnita, s i m i l a r l y q u a l i f i e d , n o t w i t h jtoinLia,, A t h a n a s i u s as we k n o w dismisses t h e q u a l i f i c a t i o n s as v a l u e l e s s ; b u t he is h a r d l y j u s t i f i e d i n c l a i m i n g t h a t A r ius called t h e L o g o s EIC, xebv jioLnLtaxwv, since Thalia 11,, 2 8 - 9 a f f i r m h i s e x c e p t i o n a l d i g n i t y — n o t even G o d can generate a n y t h i n g better, o n l y s o m e t h i n g e q u a l l y good, O n the o t h e r h a n d , t h e next c o m p l a i n t , oi)xe Se oiiotog x a x ' ouotav, etc , is c l e a r l y consonant w i t h Thalia, 11, 2, 8 - 9 , a n d r9, w h i c h i n c l u d e OII6E OLioiov, ot)6e ouoouoiog, a n d ^evog x a x ' o u o t a v 16
W e next hear ( L o r e n z , I I I ) t h a t the A i i a n L o g o s is not t h e genuine L o g o s o r W i s d o m , b u t is i m p r o p e r l y so called,, T h i s m a y w e l l b e based o n Thalia, 1. 25, emvoeCTai y o u v LxupLaig oaaig ejuvoiaic., JtvEutxa, o u v a u i g , aorjna: i g n o r i n g t h e h o n o r i f i c effect o f t h i s series o f titles, A t h a n a s i u s concentrates his fire o n the single w o r d fenivoEtxai, w h i c h h e r e p e a t e d l y takes t o s i g n i f y a baseless f a n c y , an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n w h i c h was later t a k e n u p b y E u n o m i u s a n d was q u i t e p r o p e r l y c o n d e m n e d b y Basil Possibly t h e v e r y various w a y s i n w h i c h Athanasius expresses t h e A i i a n p o i n t reveal that he is n o t dealing w i t h an o b v i o u s l y o b j e c t i o n a b l e c a t c h - w o r d l i k e rjv JIOXE OTE oiix f|v. B u t the n e x t c o m m e n t , yEv6u.£vog x a i aiixog e t c , is p e r f e c t l y fair,. A r i u s u n d o u b t e d l y d i d a c k n o w l e d g e t w o W i s d o m s , his L o g o s b e i n g the e x p r e s s i o n o f G o d ' s i n h e r e n t W i s d o m ; see Thalia 1 24, i\ ooou QEOV 8EX.r|aEi; t h o u g h p r o b a b l y w i t h o u t u n d e r l i n i n g the p o i n t b y w r i t i n g t h e second oocfria as a d a t i v e , as i n Oration, 1.5 H e c l e a r l y t a u g h t , l i k e A s t e r i u s , t h a t t h e S o n was t h e Father's agent i n c r e a t i o n (see Thalia, 1 6 ctQxt|v xov v l o v ESUXE xebv yEvnxcbv 6 otvaQXog) H i s c r i t i c suppresses t h i s p o i n t , a n d substitutes t h e charge t h a t i t was b y his o w n ' r e a l ' W i s d o m t h a t G o d m a d e b o t h the S o n and e v e r y t h i n g else: EV f j x a i x d Jtdvxa x a i a v t o v jrEJioirixEv 6 9Eog, 1 7
'°v ^Brixe t
l e t t e r , akX' o i i x OVTWV yiyovex, has n o cleai p a r a l l e l i n t h e Thalia e x t r a c t s , a n d I t h i n k was n o t an essential A i i a n t e n e t ; A r i u s presents i t as a d e d u c t i o n i n his L e t t e r t o E u s e b i u s , Urk. i §5, a n d t a c i t l y retracts i t later b y a l l o w i n g t h e phrase EH jratpdc, (Thalia 39) o r EJCTOU j t c a o o g , T h e t h i r d clause, 6 ycto cov 8eoc, TOV IITI 6 v t a . Jtejtoirixe, raises t h e q u e s t i o n w h e t h e r A r i u s r e a l l y d i d say t h a t t h e F a t h e r 'made* t h e S o n , as A t h a n a s i u s o f t e n affir m s . T h e r e is n o p r i m a r y evidence f o r t h i s ; t h e Thalia says t h a t t h e F a t h e r b e g o t h i m (XEHVOJIOIELV, 1. 7, y E w a v , 11.. 28 a n d 4 0 ) , b u t also uses t h e n o n - c o m m i t t a l t e r m s ujifjo^Ev a n d ujceoxr|, C r i t i c s o f A r i u s c o m m o n l y say t h a t he gave t h e t e r m ' b e g e t t i n g ' a p u r e l y n o m i n a l , i n d e e d a n u g a t o r y sense; a n d , o f course, he does c o u p l e yevvav w i t h MXL^EIV, 6pif;£iv a n d 8eLiE^iouv i n his L e t t e r t o Eusebius, I t h i n k h e p r o b a b l y d i d use t h e w o r d TIOIEIV, i n v i e w o f H e b 14
L o r e n z ' s H e a d i n g I V i n t r o d u c e s the w o r d s 616 x a i xQEJtxog ¿0x1 x a i dXXoicoxog, T h i s is a n o t o r i o u s d i f f i c u l t y w h i c h I have discussed See W A. Bienert, Dion v Alex (1978), p 64; D de Bruyne, Z N W , xxvii (1928), 106-10.. Or c Ar 2. 19. Eunomius Apologia 8; Basil c Eun 1 6-7; see T A Kopecek, A History of Neo-Arianism 2 375-8, and refs 1S
lb
17
14
Opitz Urk. 30 §2 (é| aútofi); cf ibid., 13, 14, §§45-8, Ath Deer
19
X 89
A T H A N AS [ U S ' E A R L I E S T W R I T T E N
90
WORK
elsewhere T h e Thalia selections do n o t say t h a t t h e S o n is changeable, and A r i u s ' l e t t e r s , Urk i a n d 6, a f f i r m e x a c t l y the opposite I t m a y perhaps be s i g n i f i c a n t t h a t i n t h i s one instance w h e r e the Thalia p r o v i d e s n o t a r g e t , its c r i t i c s u p p o r t s his case b y an alleged conversat i o n w i t h A r i a n s , n o t necessarily i n v o l v i n g A r i u s h i m s e l f ; t h i s t h e m e is, of c o u r s e , d e v e l o p e d at m u c h greater l e n g t h i n ' H (JuXapxog 1 8
H e a d i n g V is m e r e l y an e m p h a t i c r e s t a t e m e n t of p o i n t s m a d e i n I I , b u t is s u p p o r t e d b y t h e c l a i m u n d e r H e a d i n g V I , t h a t t h e S o n does n o t k n o w t h e F a t h e r reXeiioc, xcd dxoiPwc,, nor see h i m TEXEUOC, T h i s resembles Thalia, r r - r 5 a n d 39-40 D e s p i t e his p r o m i s e of an e x p l a n a t i o n , A r i u s a p p a r e n t l y does n o t make i t clear w h e t h e r t h e Son can see the F a t h e r . T h e phrasexcpulcp ctopctxogd ovuxog, 1. iz, suggests he does n o t , perhaps because t h e Father is i n his v e r y n a t u r e i n v i s i b l e ; b u t A r i u s also claims t h a t t h e S o n enjoys a l i m i t e d v i s i o n , 11 14-15, t 8 i o i o i xe iiexpotg ureoiievEi 6 v i d g I & E I V xov jtaxepa, d>g BEfitg EOTLV. T h e w o r d vjrouEVEL, c o u l d w e l l suggest t h a t the Father's g l o r y is too d a z z l i n g to be easily b o r n e , cf, E u s e b i u s , DE 4. 6, 2. A r i u s does say, h o w e v e r , t h a t the S o n c a n n o t c l e a r l y c o m p r e h e n d his o w n F a t h e r , cnjTOv xov yevvfioccvxct yvoWai ev xaxa>.r|ij)£L, 1 40.. H e r e possibly c o m p a r e 11 32-6: t h e S o n c a n n o t e x p o u n d t h e Father's a t t r i b u t e s c o m p r e h e n d i n g l y , x a x a xax&A.n'ijHv, b u t he does address h i m discreetl y i n h y m n s T h e a p p e n d e d p o i n t , t h a t t h e S o n does n o t k n o w his o w n o u o i a , comes almost w o r d - f o r - w o r d f r o m Thalia, 1, 37 L o r e n z ' s H e a d i n g V I I I raises a c u r i o u s p r o b l e m w i t h whose discussion I m u s t c o n c l u d e O u r t e x t runs ( § 9 ) : bi f|Liag yap jtEJEoinxai, t v a finag 6C auxofj tog 61 opy&vou xxiar| 6 GEog m i ovjx av VJIEOTT), el
%«ig
6 GEOC, T|6ekT|0£ Jtoirjoca
A r i u s , as w e
observed,
c e r t a i n l y h e l d t h a t t h e S o n was the Father's agent i n c r e a t i o n ; the Thalia calls h i m ctpxT)v xdW yEvnxcbv. B u t our letter makes an ingenious use of the fact t h a t t h a t A r i u s i m m e d i a t e l y f o l l o w s t h i s verse 6 b y s a y i n g t h a t t h e F a t h e r c o n s t i t u t e d h i m S o n , TOVSE X£Xvojtoir|aag, w h i c h I believe i m p l i e s b e g e t t i n g , n o t a d o p t i o n T h e writer thus argues, post hoc, propter hoc: a n d b y c h a r g i n g A r i u s w i t h the v i e w that t h e S o n was b e g o t t e n s i m p l y for t h e p u r p o s e of c r e a t i o n , he is able to i m p l y , b y g o o d A r i s t o t e l i a n l o g i c , t h a t t h e S o n , b e i n g a m e r e means, is less valuable t h a n t h e c r e a t i o n for w h i c h he was b e g o t t e n 1 9
2 0
D i d A r i u s i n fact h o l d t h a t t h e S o n was b e g o t t e n f o r the p u r p o s e of 'The Freedom of the Will and the Arian Controversy', Platonhmm Chmtentum ( F s . H Dorrie, ed H - D B l u m e a n d F Mann), pp 245-57, repr Substance and Illusion (1985), X V I .
und
18
i n
m
v
'Begetting'is understood by R D Wiliiamsand S G. Hall; see R. C. Gregg (ed.), Arianhm (Pair Monogr. r1 (1985)), pp. 9n. 4 3 a n d 4 9 n 16;'adoption by R C Gregg a n d D E . G r o h , Early Arianhm, (1981), pp. 23, 56, 96; R Lorenz, Anusjudaizans?, pp. 77-8, 123 Nit Eth 1 1, 1094a 5-6
creation? W e have no evidence f r o m the p r i m a r y t e x t s ; b u t I t h i n k it is n o t u n l i k e l y . T h e v i e w was w i d e l y h e l d i n early C h r i s t i a n t e a c h i n g , for instance b y T e r t u l l i a n , a n d was m a i n t a i n e d i n the f o u r t h c e n t u r y by Marcellus and by Constantine T h e w r i t e r i n t e n d s to be seen as a t t a c k i n g a v i e w p e c u l i a r to A r i u s ; b u t t h i s is a d e c e p t i o n 21
B u t t h e a r g u m e n t against i t , w h e t h e r j u s t i f i e d o r n o t , i n v o l v e s the a d m i s s i o n t h a t t h e S o n p l a y e d an active part i n the c r e a t i o n . I t m a n i f e s t l y c o n f l i c t s w i t h the charge w h i c h is m a d e elsewhere, that A r i u s r e g a r d e d the S o n m e r e l y as etc; xcov jtOLTiLiáxcav B u t A t h a n a s i u s , if he i t i s , n o d o u b t assumed t h a t p r o v i d e d he d i d not t o o closely j u x t a p o s e t h e t w o charges, t h e d i s c r e p a n c y w o u l d n o t be n o t i c e d I f , so, he was p e r f e c t l y r i g h t ; some h u n d r e d s of o r t h o d o x c r i t i c s have r e p r o d u c e d his attacks u p o n A r i u s w i t h o u t o b s e r v i n g the c o n t r a d i c tion. B u t to c o n v i n c e a n y o n e w h o a c t u a l l y k n e w the Thalia, t h e writer m u s t n o t overstate his d e p r e c i a t i o n of t h e A r i a n L o g o s ; A r i u s had after a l l d e s c r i b e d h i m as io/upóg 6EÓg, a p o w e r f u l phrase based on Isa 9 : 5 , a n d as b e g o t t e n b e f o r e c r e a t i o n H i s o p p o n e n t , t h e r e f o r e , is n o t t o o specific T h e A r i a n L o g o s , he says, is ele; xáw Jtoinirdxtov and is c o m p a r a b l e w i t h jtávxaxct tayixá (§8), H e does not say that t h e A r i a n s t r e a t e d C h r i s t as a m e r e man.. T h e r e is a d m i t t e d l y some c o n t r a s t here w i t h t h e b e s t - k n o w n w o r k s o f A t h a n a s i u s , b u t I t h i n k t h i s can be e x p l a i n e d H i s c o n f i d e n c e no d o u b t g r o w i n g w i t h t h e r e p e t i t i o n of a f a m i l i a r t h e m e , A t h a n a s i u s was able to charge the A r i a n s b o t h w i t h r e d u c i n g t h e L o g o s to t h e level of h u m a n i t y and w i t h m a k i n g h i m the means b y w h i c h h u m a n i t y was made A n d , of c o u r s e , for a l l w e can a c t u a l l y prove, some A r i a n s m a y have been s u f f i c i e n t l y c o n f u s e d to accept b o t h these ideas i n c o n j u n c t i o n ; t h o u g h I h a r d l y believe this of A r i u s h i m s e l f A t a l l events, A t h a n a s i u s does n o t t a x h i m w i t h the contradiction. 2 2
3 3 I have t r i e d t o s h o w t h a t the a n t i - A r i a n p o l e m i c o f 'Evóc. ocÓLiaxog is closely based o n t h e Thalia, precisely as e x c e r p t e d i n the de Synodis T h e m e t h o d of H 4>&apxog is c o m p l e t e l y d i f f e r e n t A l e x a n d e r does n o t base his accusations o n A r i u s ' w r i t i n g s ; he d e p e n d s rather o n A r i a n u t t e r a n c e s , h e a r d or r e p o r t e d , H e c o m p l a i n s t h a t the A r i a n s misuse t h e s c r i p t u r a l texts a t t e s t i n g our L o r d ' s h u m a n i t y H e ignores the w h o l e n o t i o n of an assistant creator and presses t h e charge t h a t the A r i a n s treated C h r i s t as a mere m a n C
T h i s general character of 'H d^tXapxog was n o t e d b y B a r d y i n rg26, a n d d i s t i n g u i s h e d f r o m t h a t o f 'EvógaÓLiaxog, w h i c h he saw was based
19
20
Marcellus, see Eusebius, ET 3 3 43 Constantine, Opitz Urk 27 §3 is similar, despite the disclaimer in §1 (a)e.g c At 1. 38 (óXováv6ocüJioveivaL
u
91
ATHANASIUS' EARLIEST
W R I T T E N
on the Thalia; though he did not relate it, as I have done, precisely to the de Synodis extracts. Bardy of course assumed that 'Evog acbuatoc, was written by Alexander, and sought to explain its contrasting character in terms of chronology, suggesting that ' H fyikaQxoc, was written first, before Alexander had any knowledge of the Thalia. But this dating is impossible; O p i t z is clearly right in arguing that ' H (biXaoxoc, was written l a t e r , the clinching argument, surely, being the reference to Colluthus, who appears as one of the signatories to the deposition of A r i u s ( § 2 1 ) but is described in ' H tpilaoxog as having previously condemned the A r i a n s , but only as a pretext for his own evil purpose, and having subsequently given them an example of XQioTEUjiogta and disobedience to the C h u r c h 23
T h i s and other puzzles are fully resolved if we acknowledge Athanasius as the real author of 'Evoc, otonatog. N o other writer agrees so exactly with its style, its vocabulary, its view of A r i a n i s m , and the controversial tactics which it employs, I gave this paper the title 'Athanasius' Earliest Written W o r k ' But perhaps a brief postscript is called fot; should I have added a note of interrogation? We all know that there is a strong case for dating the Contra Gentes and the De Incarnatione to the 330s; but I think I have shown that Athanasius was charged with an important task by his diocesan at the age of little more than 20 years, and fulfilled it with distinction.. I n this light it is clearly possible that he should have written the works I have mentioned a year or two earlier. T h e case is not closed; but any doubts on the score of youth and inexperience must be banished for ever
'Die Zeitfolge des arianischen Streites',2A Wxxxiii (1934), 149. This chronology has now been challenged by Rowan Williams (Arius Heresy and Tradition, pp 48-60) But I do not find it easy to believe that 'Evb; oxiiyaTog was written as late as the beginning of 325 There would surely be some allusion to Constantine's Letter, Opitz Urkunde 1 7, which is assigned to October 324 n
;
XI
WORK
A t h a n a s i u s
a l s
E x e g e t
Im technischen Sinn kommt Athanasius als Exeget kaum in Betracht Er hat kein einziges Buch, ja sogar kein einziges Kapitel der heiligen Schrift fortlaufend kommentiert. Als Schriftausleger von Fall zu Fall ist er jedoch außerordentlich einflußreich gewesen; seine ausgezeichnete Kenntnis der Bibel wird immer wieder gelobt, und die Prinzipien der Exegese, die er formuliert hat, haben weitverbreiteten Beifall gefunden. Zur Bekräftigung des ersten Punktes: Wir gestehen zwar zu, daß einige exegetische Traktate als Schrif ten des Athanasius gezählt worden sind; hauptsächlich die Exposiäones in Psahnos, Migne 27, 55-590. Dieser Text ist aber, wie bekannt, auf unglückliche Art interpoliert; zwar hat der italienische Gelehrte Giovanni Maria Vian in einer wichtigen Untersuchung die Möglichkeit geboten, einen verbesserten Text wiederherzustellen (das Büchlein erschien 1978). Fast gleichzeitig stellte sich abd heraus, daß selbst der gereinigte Text keineswegs als Werk des Athanasius gelten kann. Erstens hat es den Anschein, daß der Kommentar, wenigstens bei den Psalmen 39 bis 41, Ausschnitte aus Didymus und sogar aus Kyrill einschließt und deshalb nicht f rüher als 440 datiert werden sollte; so Dorival und Rondeau Zweitens suchte ich selbst zu zeigen, daß die hier überlieferte Psalmenexegese zu der zweifellos echten Epistula ad MarceVinum mehrmals im Widerspruch steht; im ganzen muß das Werk deswegen als unecht betrachtet werden Zwar hat Vian in einem demnächst erscheinenden Aufsatz, den er mir freundlich mitgeteilt hat, solche Bedenken zu entkräften versucht; meine eigenen Einwände sind jedoch nicht widerlegt worden. 1
2
3
1 G . M . V i a n , Testi Inediti dal Commento ai Sabni di Atanasio, SEA 14, R o m 1978. 2 G. C. S t e a d , St Athanasius on the Psalms, i n : V C h r 3 9 , 1985, 65-78. 3 G. M . V i a n , R 'De Psalmorum Titulis'; L'Esegesi di Atanasio tra Eusebio e Cirülo, i n : Orpheus 12, 1991, 3-42.
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XI ATHANASIUS ALS EXEGET
Die anderen exegetischen Fragmente lassen wir vorläufig außer acht, Welche Belege bleiben uns dann noch zur Verfügung? Zuerst erwähnt sei die genannte Epistula ad MarceUinum in Interpretationem Psahnontm, PG 27, 12-45. Sie enthält zwar keine fortlaufende Auslegung, obgleich sämtliche Verse zitiert und kommentier t wer den. Viel wichtiger ist die Er klär ung der Absicht und Nützlichkeit des Psalmenbuches als ganzen, sowie die Belehrung für die Anwendung einzelner Psalmen zur Andacht, als Erbauungsmittel oder auch zum Trost bei Gefahr oder Verfolgung,, Daneben gibt es noch einige kurze Traktate über einzelne Texte, die sich als rätselhaft oder umstritten erwiesen; zum Beispiel In lUud Omnia, eine Auslegung von Lukas 10, 22, sowie die letzte Hälfte des vierten Briefes an Serapion. Diese aber sind rnit der in den Orationes und anderswo befindlichen dogmatischen Auslegung ausgewählter Bibelstellen völlig vergleichbar: Da diese Texte sehr gut bekannt und sozusagen unendlich diskutiert wor den sind, ziehe ich es vor, wo möglich, die weniger bekannten Schriften des Athanasius zu berücksichtigen, unter anderen die Epistulae Festales, nur fragmentarisch im griechischen Urtext zugänglich, zum Teil aber in der syrischen, zum Teil auch in der koptischen Fassung verfügbar: Athanasius' Kanon der biblischen Bücher ist bekanntlich in Ep. Fest 39, samt dem griechischen Text, aufbewahrt worden. Auf die 22 alttestamentlichen Bücher folgt eine zusätzliche Aufzählung nützlicher Bücher, die außerhalb des Kanons bleiben; nämlich die Weisheit Salomos und das Buch Jesus Sirach, ferner 4
5
4 Für d e n s y r i s c h e n T e x t u n d d i e g r i e c h i s c h e n F r a g m e n t e i n e n g l i scher Übersetzung siehe A . R o b e r t s o n , St Athanasius, N P N F 4, N a c h d r u c k , G r a n d Rapids 1976 Für d i e k o p t i s c h e n F r a g m e n t e siehe Th., L e f o r t ( H r s g . ) , L ettres festoies et pastorales en copte, C S C O 150 ( T e x t ) u n d 151 (französische Übersetzung), L ö w e n 1955; m i t S u p p l e m e n t e n v o n R. G, C o q u i n / E . L u c c h e s i , Un complément au corps copte des lettres festoies d'Athanase, i n : O L o P 13, 1982, 137-142; R G, C o q u i n , L es lettr es festoies d'Athanase CPG 2102 Un nouveau complément: le manuscrit IFAO copte 25, i n : O L o P 15, 1984, 133-158 ( T e x t u n d französische Übersetzung) Außerdem: P. Merendino, Osterfestbriefe des Apa Athanasius. Aus dem Koptischen übersetzt und erläutert, Düsseldorf 1965 ( m i r n i c h t zugänglich) 5 P G 2 6 , 1435-1440 175
Esther, Judit, Tobias, aber auch die Didache und der Hirt des Hermas Von den Makkabäerbüchem wird nichts gesagt, noch werden sie überhaupt einmal zitiert Die anderen genannten Schriften werden nicht als Apokryphen bezeichnet Als Apokryphen, oder sogar Apographen, werden gefälschte Bücher des Henoch, des Jesaja und des Mose erwähnt: "Die Apographen sind Geschwätz; es ist vergeblich, jene zu beachten, da sie nutzlose und abscheuliche Aussagen sind " (Ep, 39, koptisch bei Lefort), Wir bemerken hier erstens: die Grenzen des Kanons der heiligen Schrift sind hier nicht völlig erklärt worden, Die Anzahl von 22 kanonischen Büchern ist zweifellos herkömmlich; sie kommt bei Josephus c. Apionem vor, und die zitierte Liste stimmt ungefähr, wenn auch nicht völlig, mit dem hebräischen Kanon überein (Nebenbei sei bemerkt, daß Athanasius nur gehör t" hat, daß das hebräische Alphabet gleichfalls aus 22 Buchstaben besteht; offensichtlich hat er keine Kenntnis der hebräischen Sprache. Ferner, während Eusebius die verschiedenen griechischen Versionen des Alten Testaments regelmäßig zitiert und vergleicht, ist Athanasius ausschließlich mit der Septuaginta vertraut, die so selbstverständlich als Bibel der Kirche identifiziert ist, daß selbst eine Ver weisung auf die eßSoririxo-uxa nur in der Exposiäo Fidei einmal vorkommt ) - Zweitens zählt Athanasius andere Bücher auf, "die nicht kanonisiert werden, die aber von den Vätern den Neugekommenen zum Lesen vorgeschrieben (xeTUTtwuiva) worden sind" usw. Die "Väter" werden nicht namentlich identifiziert, und allem Anschein nach bezieht sich Athanasius auf die Praxis der alexandrinischen Kirche, die offensichtlich nicht aligemeingülüg war; man beachte die Einbeziehung der Didache und des Hermas - Drittens, obgleich er keine Kommentare hinterlassen hat, scheint Athanasius mit dergleichen gut vertraut zu sein; als Zeichen dafür vermerken wir, daß er über eine reiche Fülle technischer Ausdrücke verfügt, wie etwa aXXriyopeiv, TÜ7IOQ, Ttpoxetpoc, Xe£ic,, ßadsia Stavoia usw., - von denen nur wenige häufig vorkommen, die aber als Gesamtheit auf tiefgehendes Studium verweisen. - Und vier tens, als Exeget hat Athanasius den Vor teil, daß er die Regeln der Schriftauslegung bedacht hat 6
6 C Ap
1 38 , 176
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Eine Skizze seiner exegetischen Prinzipien wurde von T E . Pollard 1959 geliefert und hat zum Beispiel bei H. I. Sieben (1974) und Bertrand de Margerie (1980) Beifall gefunden Pollard zählt sechs Prinzipien auf: (I) die Suffizienz der heiligen Schrift, (II) die Abzweckung, dxomSc,, derselben, (HI) ihre Gewohnheit, EÖOQ, womit (IV) der Sinn der Schrift beinahe zusammenfallt sowie (V) der sogenannte "Stil" derselben, womit das griechische Wort iSiwtxa übersetzt wird, und (VI) die Notwendigkeit, den Kontext des jeweiligen Passus zu beachten, mit Hinweisen auf die wohlbekannte Formel xcapoc,, Ttpoöüjrtov, Jipäyua. Diese Pr inzipien sind, meines Erachtens, sehr unterschiedlich wichtig. Das erste, die Suffizienz, ist zweifellos wesentlich; so auch das letzte; doch wird die Suffizienz der Schrift als Tatsache behauptet, die Beachtung des Kontextes dagegen als Aufgabe gefordert Im Gegensatz dazu sind der sogenannte "Sinn" und "Stil" der Heiligen Schrift nur je einmal erwähnt Und wenn Athanasius wagt, das Ziel, O-XOKOC,, der heiligen Schrift als ganzer zu erklären, so fühle ich mich, wie oft, ein bißchen skeptisch gesonnen Ganz anders Sieben und de Margerie, die beide den einschlägigen Passus mit Begeisterung hervorheben; und zwar Or 3 29: "Dies aber ist die Bedeutung und das Kennzeichen der heiligen Schrift (öxoTtöc, xoivuv xoct yjzt\a.-xxr\o xrjc; OVYICXC; YpoupTjc,), Wie wir oft gesagt haben, daß das Evangelium des Heilands, das sie enthält, zweierlei ist, nämlich daß er ewig Gott war und Sohn ist, und daß er unsertwegen Mensch geworden ist" Daß diese zweifache Kenntnis der Kern oder Höhepunkt der heiligen Schrift sei, muß nicht verneint werden; selbstverständlich jedoch ist die göttliche Absicht der Schrift mit diesem Bekenntnis nicht erschöpft; wozu sonst die zehn Gebote? Mit der sogenannten "Bedeutung" der heiligen Schrift weist Athanasius auf ein Theologumenon, das sich seinerzeit als wesentlich erwies, und der Kirche überragend 1
8
7 T E P o l l a r d , The Exegesis of Scripture and the Arian Controversy, i n : B u l l e t i n o f t h e John Rylands L i b r a r y 4 1 , 1959, 414-429 H . J. S i e b e n , Herméneutique de l'exégèse dogmatique d'Athanase, b e i C Kannengießer ( H r s g . ) . P o l i t i q u e e t T h e o l o g i e chez A t h a n a s e d ' A l e x a n d r i e , T h H 27, Par is 1974, 195-214. B de M a r g e r i e , Introduction à l'histoire de Vexégèse, Paris 1980,1983. 8 Sieben S. 2 0 6 , de M a r g e r i e S 139. 177
9
wichtig geworden ist Allerdings mit gleichem Recht konnte etwa Irenaus die Einheit Gottes als Schöpfer und zugleich als Vater oder Augustinus die Notwendigkeit der göttlichen Gnade für den sündigen Menschen als Ker n und Kennzeichen der heiligen Schrift betonen.. Diesen einleitenden Bemerkungen füge ich nur folgendes hinzu: Es genügt nicht, die Prinzipien der Schriftauslegung, wie sie Athanasius angibt, aus seinen Schriften zu sammeln; es muß darüber hinaus untersucht werden, inwieweit er tatsächlich jenen Prinzipien gefolgt ist Diese Aufgabe, die bisher ein wenig vernachlässigt worden zu sein scheint, will ich im folgenden bedenken (1) Die Suffizienz der heiligen Schrift wird oft behauptet; so bekanntlich Contra Gentes 1, De Synodis 6, dazu Ep.. Fest
39,
koptisch bei Lefort: "Also, da es auf der Hand liegt, daß das Zeugnis der Apogr aphen überflüssig sowie belanglos ist - da die Schrift in jeder Hinsicht vollkommen ist -, soll der Lehrer nach den Worten der Schrift unterrichten". In der Tat lehrt jedoch Athanasius nicht, daß die Worte der Schrift ohne weiteres hinreichen, die Wahrheit mitzuteilen Pollard und Sieben haben r ichtig bemerkt, daß er keine Konkurrenz zwischen den Worten der Schrift und ihrer herkömmlichen Auslegung kennt; vielmehr ist mit der Schrift die kirchliche Exegese derselben - und das heißt natürlich, die der zeitgenössischen alexandr mischen Kirche mit einbezogen . "Diese Kennzeichen" - nämlich der heiligen Schrift - "kommen von den Aposteln durch die Väter", sagt er Ep.. Serp.. 2.8.. Die Häretiker gehen in die Irre, weil sie, vom Teufel verleitet, Sätze der Schrift behaupten, den Sinn der Schrift als ganzer dagegen mißdeuten. Ad Ep. Aeg 4: 'Also der Gläubige (TUÖXOC.), der die Gnade besitzt, die geistlichen Dinge zu unterscheiden (xoü Staxpt-uetv xa 7rveuuaxixa), steht fest usw ; der Einfältige dagegen, der nicht gründlich katechisiert worden ist, da ein solcher nur die gespr ochenen Wor te versteht und der Bedeutung nicht inne wird, wird zugleich von ihren Ränken (ue&oSeiaic.) verführt", ebenda. In der oben zitierten Ep Fest. 39 fährt 10
9 V g l . Ep.. a d M a r c . 2-5: D e r Psalter r e k a p i t u l i e r e d i e ganze Schrift, Christologische Auslegung w i r d jedoch erst i n c 5 angedeutet.. 10 E p E n c . 1 a d f i n . 178
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Athanasius fort: "Es geht nicht an, denen, die als Katechumenen mit ihrem Unterricht anfangen, die Worte der Schrift, die wie Mysterien verhüllt sind, auszulegen, diejenige Lehre dagegen, die sie benötigen, zu übergehen." Die Sehr ift und ihre Auslegung bilden damit ein geschlossenes System Im Vergleich zu Origenes finden wir Athanasius viel weniger bereit, auswärtige oder neugefundene Exegesen zu berücksichtigen, geschweige denn zu akzeptieren Die Wahrheit ist ein für allemal überliefert worden; ein tieferes Verständnis derselben - ßaöuxepa Stavota - kann zwar gesucht werden; korrigiert oder sogar erweitert werden kann sie nicht. Aus der Suffizienz der Schrif t scheint zu folgen, daß die hellenische Weisheit dem christlichen Glauben keinen Beitrag liefern konnte Und in der Tat kann Athanasius die übliche Kritik an den Philosophen, als sich widersprechend, übernehmen; so Decr 4. Und bekanntlich hält er es für nützlich, die griechischen Mythen zu rügen; so besonders in Contra Gentes. Seine Kritik ist jedoch beträchtlich von den Philosophen beeinflußt. Diese - und hauptsächlich Piaton - werden gelegentlich zitiert (so z. B Politikos 27.3 bei De Inc 43) ; oder nachgeahmt. In Ep. ad Marc 27 wir d die dreiteilige Seele erwähnt, worüber die heilige Schrift natürlich schweigt . Viel wichtiger ist meines Erachtens der Gegensatz zwischen aio^zd und vonta, der so tief in der alexandrinischen Tradition verwurzelt ist, daß er vermutlich ohne jedes Bewußtsein von seinem heidnischen Ursprung bemüht werden kann. Die Schrift kennt zwar den Gegensatz zwischen Himmel und Erde, zwischen Sichtbarem und Unsichtbarem, ferner zwischen dem wörtlichen Sinn ihr er Ausdrücke und ihr er höheren Bedeutung - vgl. die Verwendung der Allegor ie bei Paulus. Solchen Gegensatz versteht Athanasius ohne jedes philosophische Gerüst zu erklären; so Oy 3.18: "Es ist die Gewohnheit der göttlichen Schrift, die natürlichen Wesen als Bilder und Beispiele für die Menschen zu nehmen, damit die freiwilligen Handlungen derselben gezeigt werden können. " Aber er scheut sich nicht, denselben Gegensatz mit Hilfe recht platonischer Wendungen zu benennen Der Christ soll sich mit aöwuaxa beschäftigen (Or 11
11 V g l . Eus P. E. 11. 3 4 . 4, genaue Z i t i e r u n g , b e i A t h a n a s i u s v i e l leicht auswendig wiedergegeben 179
3.1) Gott selbst ist aüXoc, xai aöwuaxoq (Decr. 10 5) Solche philosophischen Ausdrücke können gelegentlich mit Unterstützung der Schrift benutzt werden; z B vorjxuc, VOELV xa nagaxidi\i£vcx wird Sprüche 23, 1 als Regel des Tischbenehmens, Syn 42 und Ep. Marc. 17 dagegen als Prinzip der Schriftauslegung verstanden Die Schrift aber lehrt nicht, den Sündenfall als aTtocxaöic, xrje, xwv vorjxwv dEtopiaq, wie Contra Gentes 4, zu betrachten (2) Die Konsequenz der Heiligen Schrift im allgemeinen wird meines Wissens nur zweimal behauptet, und zwar Ep. Marc. 9 und Ep Fest 19.. 3; die Überemstirnmung des Alten und Neuen Testaments dagegen kommt häufig zum Ausdruck Die vieldiskutier ten Diskrepanzen der Schrift - so z. B. im Stammbaum des Heilands - werden anscheinend nicht beachtet. Als Beispiel solcher Erörterung darf jedoch folgendes mitgeteilt werden. Im allgemeinen - und das wieder im Gegensatz zu Origenes - kommt es nur selten vor, daß Athanasius seine persönliche Auffassung eines biblischen Textes vor führen will. Das tut er jedoch in Ep.. Fest. 39, koptisch bei Coquin (1984) "Der Heiland ", schreibt er, "hat es befohlen: 'Ihr sollt euch nicht Lehrer nennen lassen' (Mt. 23, 10); der heilige Jakobus dagegen mahnt: *Es sollen nicht zu viele von euch Lehrer werden' ''woraus natürlich gefolgert werden kann, daß es einigen gestattet sei, Lehrer zu heißen; ferner nennt sich Paulus "Lehrer der Heiden in Glauben und Wahrheit" Athanasius schreibt dazu: "Da ich dieses durchdachte, kam mir ein Einfall in den Sinn, den ihr prüfen sollt" - worauf er erklärt, daß die sogenannten christlichen Lehrer eigentlich auch Jünger sind; sie hören die Worte des einzigen wahren Lehrers, um sie mitzuteilen. Wie bekannt, pflegt Athanasius die Arianer zu tadeln, "weil sie sorgfältig ausgewählte Texte aus deren Kontext absondern, die sie dann buchstäblich auslegen, deren Kontext jedoch samt der allgemeinen Lehre der Scrrrrft vernachlässigen" ; so Pollard 416 Athanasius selbst sucht diesen Fehler dadurch zu vermeiden, daß er eine ganze Reihe von ver wandten Texten anführ t, die einander bestätigen sollen (Als Beispiel finden wir im ersten Brief an Serapion 55 Zitate aus 10 Büchern des Alten und 16 Büchern 12
1 3
12 Siehe j e d o c h E p . Fest. 19 (unten) u n d E p Ser. 4 11 13 Siehe A n m 4 180
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des Neuen Testaments gesammelt) Ob die Arianer dieses Verfahren tatsächlich nicht nachzuahmen verstanden, darüber kann nichts sicher behauptet werden Fr agen wir doch: Hält sich Athanasius an seine eigenen Prinzipien? - nämlich daß biblische Texte nicht abgesondert behandelt werden sollen? Im großen und ganzen neige ich dazu, dies zu bejahen Trotzdem sei folgendes Beispiel beachtet Athanasius zitiert dr eimal Jesaja 1 , 1 1 TtX-ripnc, elut, dem Kontext zum Trotz, als Ausdruck göttlichen Reichtums Das Vorbild steht möglicherweise bei Origenes in einem Katenenfragment des verlorenen fünften Buchs des .Johanneskommentars (Preuschen S. 4 9 1 ) ; andere Fxegeten - Ps Barnabas, Athenagoras, Irenaus und Clemens deuten es richtig: Gott sei der Opfer satt.. Athanasius könnte jedoch er widern, daß er .Jesaja dem Sinn der Schrift gemäß gedeutet hat; lesen wir nicht, Epheser 1, 23, "die Fülle dessen, der alles in allem erfüllt"? Als weiteres Beispiel erwähnen wir die Exegese von Ps. 105, 15, "Tastet meine Gesalbten nicht an ". Mit dieser Bibelstelle tadelt Athanasius die Meletianer, die anscheinend die Leichname der Heiligen ausgraben wollten, um sie mumifizieren zu lassen Diese Anwendung jenes Passus ist vermutlich in der ganzen christlichen Literatur ohne Parallele. Hieraus leuchtet ein, daß Athanasius ein idealisier tes BÜd von der Tragweite der Schrift besitzt Natürlich hat er keine Ahnung davon, daß ihre Worte mit Rücksicht auf die Umstände und die Sprechweise der einzelnen Schriftsteller ausgelegt werden müssen.. (3) Den Kontext jedes einzelnen Passus der Schrift zu beachten, kommt daher als Aufgabe in Betracht, die mit der Behauptung ihrer jeweiligen Tragweite verbunden ist. Laut Athanasius zitieren die Arianer ihre Beweistexte ohne Rücksicht darauf; man sollte dagegen jedesmal "das Ziel, die Person, die Sache", bzw. "die Absicht" erforschen. Die genannten Formeln sind von Sieben mit Hinweis auf Tertullian, Origenes und Hilarius ausführlich diskutiert worden. Ich bin selbst dazu geneigt, den Ursprung derselben in den rhetorischen Lehrbüchern zu suchen, 1 4
1 5
14 Or. 2.. 2 9 , Ep. Ser. 3. 6, E p . Fest.. 19.. 2. 15 Ep. Fest.. 4 1 , S. 43 L e f o r t . 181
die die Themen, ôxctôetç, des Redners verschiedenartig aufzählen; typisch ist die spätere lateinische Formel: Quis, quid, ubi, quibus auxiliis, cur, quomodo, quando. So finden wir Or. 1 . 5 4 xcapoç, TTpoöomov, Trpaytia, d.h. quis, quid, quando; ebd. 2 8 S t a v o t a , xcupoç, Trpoöamov, ungefähr entsprechend Beer 1 4 x a t p o ç , jrp6öa)7cov, xpeta, d.h. quis, cur, quando Hier allerdings ergibt sich eigentlich keine 'triade herméneutique', kein Prinzip der Schriftauslegung im allgemeinen, wie es Sieben sehen will. Die genannten Kriterien werden ausnahmslos dazu benutzt, die arianische Bibelauslegung zu entkräften, d.h. den Befund der Schrift mit der kirchlichen Doktrin der Menschwerdung in Einklang zu bringen. Wenden wir uns abschließend von den Pr inzipien der Bibelauslegung ab, um die Praxis des Athanasius, die von der Theorie manchmal abweicht, kurz zu skizzieren Es besteht meines Erachtens ein erheblicher Unterschied zwischen der Behandlung der geschichtlichen und derjenigen der prophetischen Bücher des Alten Testaments Hinsichtlich der erstgenannten herrscht weitgehend ein geschichtlicher Realismus. Athanasius pflegt zum Beispiel die Patriarchen aufzuzählen: Sie zeugten Söhne {Inc. .35), sie besuchten die Wüste (Ep Fest 2 4 ) , sie litten (ebd.. 2 9 ) , sie starben und wurden begraben (ebd. 41). Eine chronologische Beweisführung - und das wieder einmal als persönliche Erwägung angeführt - finden wir in Ep Fest.. 19.. Anfänglich wurden die moralischen Gebote am Berg Sinai übergeben; erst später, als das Volk die Götzen zu verehren anfing, wurden Opfer gefordert. Die scheinbare Diskrepanz, etwa bei Jesaja 1, 12, wird damit gelöst.. Die Geschichte des Sündenfälls wird nicht - wie gelegentlich behauptet wir d - allegor isiert: Adam wir d nicht, wie bei Philon, als Symbol des menschlichen Geistes betrachtet, sondern als idealisierter' Platoniker dargestellt Sein Verbrechen ein Mangel, freilich, an Theoria - bleibt geschichtliches Er eignis; der Heiland hat das Tor des Himmels geöffnet, das, seit er Adam aus dem Garten vertrieben hatte, verschlossen war, so Ep. Fest, 1 6
4.3.17 16 V g l a u c h Or. 1. 55, u n d kürzer e b d 2, 7 (TTOXE, 7ip6q xO, Sent. Dion.. 4.. 4 (xocipoq, TcpoötoTtov). Quelle vielleicht Origenes P r i n c 1.1. 4; v g l . a u c h C l e m e n s Paed.. 2.14.. 4, Str.. 2.. 137. 3. 17 Gr. T e x t ( K o s m a s ) b e i L e f o r t S. 5 2 ; v g l a u c h S . 2 0 A n m ' E t p o s t alia .. 5
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Mit geschichtlichem Realismus meinen wir natürlich nicht, daß Athanasius die Geschichte säkularisiert Selbstverständlich sieht er den göttlichen Logos in den Ereignissen tätig "Dieser ist es, der ehedem das Volk aus Ägypten holte, der aber nachher uns alle erlöst hat" - so in Ep. Fest. 10. Meist ist die Exegese im strikten Sinn typologisch; der Unterschied zwischen Typ oder Schatten und Wahrheit kommt in den Epistulae Festales besonders häufig zum Ausdruck Die Ereignisse jedoch, die als Typ oder Schatten beschrieben werden, kamen wirklich vor Als Beispiel vergleicht Athanasius den Schall der Festtrompeten mit der christlichen Verkündigung; es wird aber niemals angedeutet, daß sie keine wirklichen Blasinstrumente waren. Die Überlegenheit des Evangeliums besteht gerade darin, daß es ein geistliches Faktum ist. Eigentliche Allegorisierung kommt also verhältnismäßig selten vor Als Beispiel zitieren wir folgendes, aus Ep Fest 24: "Der große Mose, als er sich von Ägypten entfernte - das heißt aber von den irdischen Wer ken, die uns in der Finsternis halten sprach mit Gott von Angesicht zu Angesicht".. Mit der Auslegung der Prophetenbücher steht es etwas anders, und das natürlich, weil bildhafte Ausdrücke bei den Propheten häufig benutzt werden. Freilich ist die prophetische Einsicht auch außerhalb dieser Bücher zu finden So Ep.. Fest 6: Abraham, 'Verehrte, als er seinen Sohn opferte, den Sohn Gottes; und als er dar an gehindert wurde, Isaak zu opfer n, sah er den Messias in dem Widder" In Ep Fest 1 finden wir eine Weiterentwicklung der Allegorie der Sprüche 9, 1-5: "Kommt, esset von meinem Brot und tr inkt von dem Wein, den ich gemischt habe", samt Hinweis auf Jon 6, 48: "Ich bin das Brot des Lebens" Auch wird das Gesetz allegorisiert; ein auffällendes Beispiel bietet sich in demselben Brief. Die Sünder "begraben die Seele in Sünden und Torheiten, indem sie sich mit toter Nahrung sättigen die das Gesetz verboten hat, indem es figürlich mahnt: 'Ihr sollt nicht den Adler essen, samt jedem toten Vogel, der Leichname ißt' ".. Mit dieser ziemlich freien Wiedergabe von Leviticus 11
werden eher die Genußmenschen getadelt als, wie üblich, die Angriffslustigen. Höchstwahrscheinlich denkt Athanasius an den Paidagogos des Clemens, der mit Hinweis auf dieselbe Bibelstelle jene zwei Laster unmittelbar nacheinander verurteilt Mittels Allegorese wagt es Athanasius sogar, den Patriarchen Issaschar als seinen Vorläufer in der exegetischen Arbeit zu feiern In Ep Fest 13 wird Genesis 49,14 zitier t: "Issaschar hat das Gute begehrt, da er zwischen den Erbgütern (x\r]po<;) ausruhte Da er nämlich von göttlicher Liebe verwundet war, so wie die Braut im Hohenlied, hat er aus der heiligen Schrift Wohlstand gesammelt; denn sein Geist wurde nicht lediglich vom alten, sondern von beiden Erbgütern bezaubert. Daher, als er seine Flügel sozusagen ausbreitete, sah er von ferne die himmlische Ruhe. Und da das hiesige Land aus solch schönen Werken besteht, um wieviel mehr soll wahrlich das himrnlische aus solchen bestehen, da es immer neu ist und nimmer alt wird." Eine halbe Stunde genügt nicht, um die Exegese des Athanasius hinreichend zu erläutern. Ich hoffe, wenigstens gezeigt zu haben, daß diese Aufgabe der Mühe wert ist.
18 Vgl.. E p . , 4 1 , C o q u i n 1984 S 156: 'Es w a r n i c h t das B l u t des L a m m e s selbst, das den Verderber v e r h i n d e r t e u n d das V o l k aus Ägypten freiließ, s o n d e r n es i s t der H e i l a n d , der i m B l u t w a r , der dies g e t a n hat '
19 Z u G e n 4 9 , 14-16 l i e f e r t d i e B i b l i a P a t r i s t i c a b i s a u f Epiphanius k e i n e w e i t e r e n Z i t i e r u n g e n . D a s W o r t x X i j p o i i m S i n n der z w e i Testam e n t e k o m m t i n Eus Ps. - K o m m . P G 2 3 , 700 vor. D e r d o r t v o r l i e g ende T e x t , Ps. 67, 14 L X X , w i r d b e i A t h a n a s i u s n i c h t z i t i e r t .
18
183
1 9
184
XII
I H E S C R I P T U R E S A N D T H E S O U L OF C H R I S T
IN
ATHANASIUS
No
general agreement
has yet been reached a b o u t
Athanasius'
teaching, or absence o f teaching, o n the soul of C h r i s t The great maj o r i t y of scholars n o w agree t h a t the t w o b o o k s against A p o l l i n a r i s are n o t f r o m his h a n d ; so those w h o u p h o l d the t r a d i t i o n a l o p i n i o n that A t h a n a s i u s d i d n o t f a i l t o a t t r i b u t e a soul t o C h r i s t are faced w i t h the d i f f i c u l t y t h a t he never makes a direct a v o w a l of i t ; the nearest approaches are a passage i n the Tomus
ad Antiochenos
d i n g the confession t h a t ou awu/x a4> X u
o f 362, c 7, recor-
avaiaOrj-cov oo§' avo^-rov dyw 6
0V
2toTT]p, since he b r o u g h t salvation n o t o n l y t o the b o d y b u t t o t h e soul; a n d a passage i n the ad Epictetum
7 w h i c h repeats the latter p o i n t . I t is
noted t h a t n o n o u n is used f o r the soul of C h r i s t , a n d t h a t the phrase oux aci>uxov c o u l d mean s i m p l y ' n o t lifeless'; a n d f u r t h e r , t h a t Athanasius* 1
n o r m a l way o f describing Christ's incarnate l i f e persists unaltered i n his latest w o r k s ; he conceives the L o g o s b e c o m i n g , or assuming, aapi;, and locates his h u m a n emotions a n d experiences i n that cap!; V a r i o u s replies have been m a d e t o these objections O n the one hand i t has been explained ( r i g h t l y ,
I t h i n k ) t h a t Athanasius
h a b i t u a l l y t h i n k o f aapi; as just one element i n the h u m a n
does
not
compositum;
m o s t c o m m o n l y i t means, r a t h e r , ' h u m a n i t y ' . I n t h a t case the cap!; of C h r i s t is n o t t o be u n d e r s t o o d as c o n t r a s t i n g w i t h , or e x c l u d i n g , a CJ>OXT); i n d e e d , i t is added, A t h a n a s i u s ' w h o l e understanding of the h u m a n i t y assumed b y the Logos implies the presence o f a soul.. B u t i t remains diff i c u l t t o see w h y , o n this s h o w i n g , Athanasius d i d n o t make the implicat i o n clear O n the other h a n d i t has been argued ( w r o n g l y , I t h i n k ) that the question of C h r i s t ' s soul was n o t a matter of debate before 362, or at least t h a t i t was eclipsed b y the m o r e pressing question o f his d i v i n i t y
1
It
has also been c l a i m e d ( m o r e j u s t i f i a b l y ) t h a t t o a t t r i b u t e a h u m a n soul to C h r i s t w o u l d have been a n embarrassment;
either as recalling
Origen's d o c t r i n e a n d suggesting a separate personality l i n k e d w i t h the
XII
XII THE SCRIPTURES AND THE SOUL OF CHRIST IN ATHANASIUS
234
235
L o g o s by a merely m o r a l u n i o n ; or as a c c o u n t i n g f o r Christ's thoughts
v i v e d ; and the most considerable o f these, the Expositiones
a n d actions i n terms of a complete h u m a n i t y , so t h a t the operation o f
has n o t come d o w n t o us i n a complete and reliable text Nevertheless we
the Logos is reduced to a mere external i n s p i r a t i o n — a f a u l t alleged
can and s h o u l d i n q u i r e h o w Athanasius treated the texts i n scripture
against Paul of Samosata and later against Marcellus. This argument,
which
however, is two-edged; i f i t explains w h y Athanasius was reluctant to
christological significance.
profess such a belief, m i g h t i t n o t also suggest t h a t he was reluctant to
speak
of
a fyuyr\
a n a
*
have,
or
were t h o u g h t
in
to
Psalmos,
have,
a
I n the N e w Testament the ' s o u l ' of C h r i s t , his c ^ r i , is m e n t i o n e d in t h i r t e e n places. N o t all of these are significant f o r our purpose; at M t
h o l d it? M o s t recent discussion has been i n f l u e n c e d b y the w o r k of
M.
2:20 oi CriTouv-cei; TT)V <|>uxr)v xou TicaSiou c o u l d arguably be discounted, since
R i c h a r d a n d A . Grilfmeier R i c h a r d considered A t h a n a s i u s ' reply t o the
it is n a t u r a l l y rendered 'those w h o sought the y o u n g child's l i f e ' (cf i l l
A r i a n argument that the h u m a n emotions a n d experience of C h r i s t p r o -
Kings
ve h i m i n f e r i o r t o the Father; A t h a n a s i u s , he p o i n t s o u t , never makes
duplicate corresponding texts i n M a t t h e w ; and i n J o h n 10:11-18 four
the obvious r e p l y b y saying t h a t these experiences attach t o the soul of
references t o Christ's c|>ux"n appear w i t h i n a single context of thought.
C h r i s t a n d n o t directly t o the L o g o s , a l t h o u g h Eustathius is k n o w n t o
This leaves us w i t h a m i n i m u m
have used this argument a n d Athanasius can h a r d l y have been i g n o r a n t
20:28 = M k
of i t . G r i l i m e i e r showed t h a t A t h a n a s i u s pictures the death o f Christ as
15:13; A c t s 2:27 ( f r o m P s a l m 15:10 L X X ) ; and I J o h n 3:16 These texts,
a separation o f the Logos f r o m his flesh, the Logos descending t o the
again, are n o t w h o l l y independent,
u n d e r w o r l d , the flesh discarded, the soul i g n o r e d . Grilimeier however
Jesus t r o u b l e d i n his 4>ux"n ( M t . 26:38 parr , J o h n 12:27); (ii) H i s sur-
concludes w i t h w h a t looks like a 'crossbench' p o s i t i o n , h o l d i n g t h a t for
render and recovery o f his 4)uxii ( M t . 20:28 parr , J o h n 10:11-18, 15:13,
Athanasius the soul of C h r i s t is n o t a ' t h e o l o g i c a l f a c t o r ' b u t is perhaps
I J o h n 3:16); ( i i i ) The deliverance of his c^ux^U Acts 2:27
3
4
a 'physical f a c t o r ' I t is n o t necessary for his p i c t u r e o f the person and
19:10 L X X ) ; t w o references i n M a r k (10:45, 14:34) merely
list of seven passages, namely
Mt
10:45; M t . 26:38 = M k . 14:34; J o h n 10:11-18, 12:27 and but e m b o d y three t r a d i t i o n s : (i)
H o w does Athanasius treat these texts? W e may begin by considering
A n d certainly
the w o r k s most c o m m o n l y studied, viz.. those indexed by M i i l l e r f r o m
Athanasius was n o t t h o u g h t t o have excluded i t ; the c o n d e m n a t i o n of
P G 25 a n d 26, deducting (as I t h i n k we must) the F o u r t h O r a t i o n , the de
A p o l l i n a r i s i n n o way d i m i n i s h e d the h i g h regard i n w h i c h Athanasius
Incarnatione
was held b y b o t h A l e x a n d r i a n a n d A n t i o c h e n e theologians.
Sermo
w o r k of C h r i s t ; o n the other h a n d i t is n o t excluded
s
Never-
theless attempts are still being m a d e t o rescue Athanasius f r o m the u n -
Maior,
et c. Arianos,
the t w o b o o k s against A p o l l i n a r i s a n d the
besides some smaller pieces, and also the de
virginitate
p r i n t e d i n T U 29. This still leaves a large corpus e m b o d y i n g w e l l over
f a v o u r a b l e l i g h t i n w h i c h R i c h a r d a n d Grilimeier are t h o u g h t t o have
1000 N e w Testament q u o t a t i o n s i n a l l B u t o n l y t w o of our seven texts
placed h i m .
are ever q u o t e d w i t h the w o r d CJJUXTI i n c l u d e d , and they are q u o t e d only
6
I n this complex debate, i t seems t o me t h a t t o o l i t t l e a t t e n t i o n has been p a i d t o the possible relevance o f A t h a n a s i a n
exegesis.
Some
i n controversy w i t h the A r i a n s over the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the Passion. J o h n 12:27 appears i n a list of texts used b y the A r i a n s at c Ar.
3.26,
scholars have even appeared t o suggest t h a t exegetical texts p r o v i d e no
a n d reappears i n A t h a n a s i u s ' r e p l y , i b i d 54 and 57; and J o h n 10:18,
evidence for the w r i t e r ' s real views. I n a n a d m i r a b l e piece of research
p r o c l a i m i n g Christ's a u t h o r i t y over his fyuyj\, is used as a k i n d of
H e n r i de R i e d m a t t e n showed t h a t Eusebius never mentions a soul i n
counterweight t o the other i n t h e same t w o chapters.. The use o f John
C h r i s t except i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h s c r i p t u r a l texts; b u t he has been inter-
12:27 by the A r i a n s is w o r t h n o t i n g , i n view of the communis
preted as s h o w i n g t h a t Eusebius denied C h r i s t a soul.. C l e a r l y one needs
t h a t they denied C h r i s t a soul.
7
opinio
t o determine h o w Eusebius understands the relevant texts i f one is to see
A few m o r e such q u o t a t i o n s can be f o u n d , however, i n some less
w h y he makes n o dogmatic use of them. A n d the same can be done for
f a m i l i a r texts. M t . 26:38 is q u o t e d i n Festal Letter 6 7 (Syriac version,
A t h a n a s i u s , t h o u g h a d m i t t e d l y the m a t e r i a l is less a b u n d a n t ; for t h o u g h
translated at P G 26, 1387A) a n d 24 ( C o p t i c version, p. 41 = p. 13 of
one can f i n d some relevant comments o n scripture i n the w o r k s most
French translation).
c o m m o n l y consulted, m u c h less of his p u r e l y exegetical w r i t i n g s has sur-
quotes J o h n 10:11 c o n f l a t e d w i t h 15:13 ( i b i d p. 111 = 89 of F T ). There
8
The C o p t i c h o m i l y O n C h a r i t y and
Temperance
XII
XII 236
THE SCRIPTURES AND THE SOUL OF CHRIST IN ATHANASIUS
237
is a n a l l u s i o n , t h o u g h n o t a direct q u o t a t i o n , t o J o h n 10:11 also i n the
said—Gei'xwi, he observes—dljouaiav e'xw Belvai TTIV fyvyip LCOU etc. S h o r t l y
Expositiones
a f t e t w a r d s he quotes Ps,
in Psalmos,
o n Ps. 46:5 ( P G 27, 217 C 3 ) ; a n d l o h n 10:18
is quoted o n 87:5, i b i d 380 C
remarked, by Richard
W e can enlarge our f i e l d o f v i e w , however, b y considering some O l d
9
15:10 complete; b u t i t has of course been
and others, t h a t his comments
o n a l l these
passages, w i t h one e x c e p t i o n , ignore the w o r d c]>ux*l> assign the ' t r o u b l -
Testament texts w h i c h were i n t e r p r e t e d i n a c h r i s t o l o g i c a l sense. M o s t
ing' t o his flesh,
o f these occur i n the Psalms; i n f a c t I have n o t been able t o t h i n k o f any
w i t h his flesh or his b o d y ; so TO LIEV yap TapavteaScii vr\<; aapxo? iSiov rjv (!),
other such text c o n t a i n i n g the w o r d
TO Se ££ouaiav I'x&iv Setvai xcd Xa[3eTv, oxt POUX&TOCI, TTJV tyuyrp, ouxe-ci xoOxo
except Is 53:11-12 a n d 61:10.
and t a l k simply o f the u n i o n and r e u n i o n of t h e
Logos
Athanasius does n o t appear to quote either o f these, t h o u g h (as one
iSiov avGpcimojv ... "AvBptoxo? yap
w o u l d expect) he uses is. 53:1-8; perhaps v. 10a m a y have presented a
aGavaTO; a i k o ; wv, aapxa Be BvrjTnv e'xcov, eV s^oudia? EIXEV . . ¿710 aeo|xaTos
dif f i c u l t y w h i c h discouraged h i m f r o m c o n t i n u i n g the q u o t a t i o n , since i t
XiopiaOrjvai xai TOUTO TudXiv avaXapEtv ,,, A n d after the q u o t a t i o n o f Ps
c o u l d suggest t h a t the Father must 'cleanse' the S o n , presumably f r o m
15:10 he adds: "E7rpe7rE yap y(iapxr\v ouaav TT]V aapxa „ , 81a T6V IvSuaajxevov
some m o r a l i n j u r y ,
auxfjv Aoyov a
There is, t h e n , a g r o u p of passages i n the Psalms i n w h i c h the w o r d
... \ir\ OeXcov a7to0vr|(jxei 6 hi xupio;,
c o m m e n t t h a t a l t h o u g h he uses s c r i p t u r a l references t o the <\>i>xn of
fyuxh is used, a n d w h i c h were c o m m o n l y read i n a c h r i s t o l o g i c a l sense,,
C h r i s t , Athanasius r e a d i l y slips back i n t o a 'Logos-sarx' descriptive
B y far the most i m p o r t a n t is Ps, 15:10 ( L X X ) , o n w h i c h a christological
scheme
significance is already imposed b y St, Peter's use o f i t i n A c t s 2:27
The case is perceptibly d i f f e r e n t , however, i f we t u r n to his
( t h o u g h i n the r e p e t i t i o n at 2:31 the w o r d fyuxr) disappears), This psalm
tiones
is also the o n l y one o f the g r o u p t o be used i n A t h a n a s i u s ' w o r k s ; a n d t h a t i n t w o contexts
I t appears
paraphrase o f Peter's speech i n c Ar
twice i n a
10
in Psalmos.
Exposi-
This w o r k has been relatively l i t t l e used because o f its
dogmatic
p o o r text, I t has n o t been t r a n s m i t t e d i n a direct t r a d i t i o n , b u t only
developed
t h r o u g h a n u m b e r e d series o f extracts preserved i n catenae.. T h e stan-
2.16, designed t o show, against
d a r d e d i t i o n o f the Greek extracts b y M o n t f a u c o n , reproduced i n
the A r i a n s , t h a t C h r i s t is n o t a mere m a n as the Jews supposed. I n each
M i g n e , contains m u c h extraneous matter a n d has l o n g been recognized
case the correct L X X w o r d i n g is r e p r o d u c e d ; a n d after the first quota-
as inadequate,
t i o n Athanasius says expressly t h a t this verse, w i t h some other texts, ap-
some 150 f u r t h e r Greek fragments ( t h o u g h m a n y o f them are quite
plies n o t t o D a v i d b u t t o C h r i s t ; cf A c t s 2:25a a n d 31 For A t h a n a s i u s ,
b r i e f ) a n d , perhaps m o r e i m p o r t a n t , provides a list o f passages p r i n t e d
therefore, the phrase ' m y s o u l ' indicates Christ's s o u l , u n d e r s t o o d as a
i n M i g n e w h i c h are n o t t o be assigned t o Athanasius, Some help can be
personal e n t i t y descending t o , a n d delivered f r o m , the u n d e r w o r l d ;
g o t f r o m the Syriac versions, w h i c h V i a n has o f course employed; there
t h o u g h at the second q u o t a t i o n , where o n l y the c r u c i a l f i r s t h a l f of the
is a version in extenso—i
verse is used, we f i n d a characteristic m o d i f i c a t i o n ; he avoids the w o r -
excerpts, t h o u g h n o t o f the w h o l e w o r k as i t once existed—of w h i c h un-
H o w e v e r , a recent p u b l i c a t i o n b y G , M , V i a n " adds
e a n o r i g i n a l l y complete version of t h e Greek
d i n g o f A c t s 2:24 and 32 t h a t ' G o d raised u p ' Jesus (chtovr\at\>), w h i c h no
f o r t u n a t e l y something between one-eighth a n d one-sixth alone survives,
d o u b t he t h o u g h t c o u l d be useful t o the A r i a n s , a n d a f f i r m s the
a n d a n abbreviated version preserved c o m p l e t e ,
sovereign power
v e r s i o n also helps t o c o n f i r m the a u t h e n t i c i t y o f the A t h a n a s i a n t e x t s
of
C h r i s t himself:
Christ not
o n l y rose
himself
(e^avaaTfjvaO b u t roused (dyetpai) f r o m the tombs t h e m e n w h o h a d been l o n g dead
H e r e t h e n , ' m y s o u l ' carries a sense w h i c h is n o t easily
distinguishable f r o m ' m y s e l f .
12
A f r a g m e n t a r y Coptic 1 3
W e shall consider A t h a n a s i u s ' comments o n the f o l l o w i n g verses: Ps, 15:10; 17:5; 21:21 a n d 30; 34:11 and 17; 46:5; 54:17-19; 56:2 and 5; 68:2,
1 1 , 19 a n d 2 1 ; 87:4 and 5 ( a l l L X X references),, Ps,, 15:10 has pride
3 57 a rather d i f f e r e n t i m -
o f place a n d w i l l be l e f t t i l l last, For these verses the Syriac longer ver-
pression is made. Athanasius has been a r g u i n g against the view t h a t the
sion is l a c k i n g , a n d the shorter version I consider u n h e l p f u l , except for
h u m a n experiences o f the Logos p r o v e h i m less t h a n f u l l y d i v i n e H e has
Psalms 68 a n d 87, O n the other h a n d a g o o d deal o f help can be gained
W h e n the psalm verse reappears at c. Ar.
j u s t m e n t i o n e d J o h n 12:27 (vuv rj cj>ux*i M- xETapaxxai,) as said av9ptoxivto?
b y considering parallels i n Eusebius' C o m m e n t a r y o n the Psalms w h i c h ,
b y the Saviour,
i t w i l l be s h o w n b e l o w , was used b y Athanasius
ou
a n d balanced
it by
lohn
10:18, where the L o r d
XII
XII THE SCRIPTURES AND THE SOUL OF CHRIST IN ATHANASIUS
238
239
17:5 deserves o n l y passing m e n t i o n , since Athanasius takes i t t h a t
Eusebius here is less systematic; he tends t o t h i n k o f D a v i d describing
D a v i d is speaking f o r himself a n d t h a n k f u l l y describing his deliverance
his o w n t r o u b l e s , b u t b y an a f t e r t h o u g h t a t p. 305 A he attributes verse 3
Ps
f r o m his enemies; a prophecy o f the 'descent' o f t h e L o r d (Christ) ap-
t o t h e Saviour xaxd TO avSpwrcivov, i n c l u d i n g a reference t o h i s ^uyt]:
pears f i r s t a t v. 8 However t h e c o m m e n t is w o r t h n o t i n g , as showing
Elnov
one o f t h e ways i n w h i c h A t h a n a s i u s w i l l use cjiuxfy riegteoxov
the Father
davdxov.
fie (hhtveq
OUSEVO?, cprjuiv, £VraG9cc TCOXEU-OU QvTjxou fi.euvT)xai, dXXa 8uvau.ecov
acpavwv, evSov X7]v c[iuxfy auxou xuxXouawv. A t h a n a s i u s
n o r m a l l y takes
xfj tpvxfj fiov
Eco-zngia GOV eifii eyed, a prayer o f course addressed t o
So also verse 12, he t h i n k s , can be a t t r i b u t e d either t o D a v i d
(301 D ) or t o t h e Saviour (305 D ) A t h a n a s i u s clearly refers verse 12 t o C h r i s t , b u t his c o m m e n t
appears t o i g n o r e tyuxh, w h i c h Eusebius
'enemies' t o m e a n o p p o s i n g p o w e r s , or demons; a n d the ' s o u l ' here i n -
repeatedly m e n t i o n s ; a t most one m i g h t say t h a t i t helps t o f i x t h e sense
dicates, n o t a b i o l o g i c a l l i f e - p r i n c i p l e , b u t t h e i n w a r d m o r a l
o f t h e w o r d dxexvi'a. A t h a n a s i u s
nature
dyadtov xai dxexviav
w h i c h is exposed t o their assaults Psalm 21 is o f course regularly i n t e r p r e t e d o f the Passion o f C h r i s t A t verse 21 we have a laconic c o m m e n t i n w h i c h t h e w o r d 4>ux*l * i g s
n o r e d : 'Pvuat and Qoiupaiac; zijv ipvxi)v fiov- TTJV xocxiccv TG>V TouSaiwv xcd xr)v civotav Sid TOUTWV aTj[JLatv£.i 8 i a poLKpaia? xai x P
XEpaTcuv LLovoxEptoTtov. M u c h t h e same is f o u n d a t 21:30-1: Kai r\ ipvxt) fiov £fj, xai TO onegfia fiov
oovlevoei
avrcp
' A y i a yap x a i au.wfjL0<; rj Xpiarou yeyove far], 'r)v
¡101 novqqa.
has: 'Avxanehihoadv
dvri
TOUTO cp^at Sid TO avajftou^ auxou^ 6q>6f;vc(i
TOU xXriGfjvai Texva 0EOC 6'jrep [xdXtoTa eyvcopi^ev aux6? xaxd TO, rioadxii; ( M t . 23:37) . Eusebius discusses t h e sense o f dxexvia as lack o f spiritual c h i l d r e n at 301 A B , 304 A , 308 A , n o t i n g t h a t the verse can be assigned either t o D a v i d (304 A ) or t o C h r i s t (.305 D-.308 A ) , a n d i n t r o d u c i n g M t 23:37 i n the latter passage A brief c o m m e n t o n verse 13 is p r i n t e d b y M i g n e a t p.. 172 B 6; b u t t h i s , i t appears, is n o t by A t h a n a s i u s
7C£7C0LT]xaL |i&xa aapxoq em yfj^ Movo? yap auxo^ oux e7co£r]aev auapxtav xaixoi
Athanasius'
x a 9 ' TiLta? ysyovai?, xai adpxa Xa[3wv xfiv 91Xau.apTrju.ova
'Anoxaxdozrjoov
( N . B . ) SxEpu-a 8E
TJJ ysvxfj fiov
surviving
comment
(Vian p
is t o o brief
68), A n d a t verse 17 t o be i n f o r m a t i v e :
xijv ipvx^v fiov and tfjc; xaxovgyiac, avxwv
liavxa oaa Ttdax-
©eou VOTISEIEV av oE 8 i ' aikou xsxXr][xevoi Bid T?K mateoi?.. T h e comments
EL r\ Xey&i, uxip z% Tju-ETEpas a(OTripia<; TtoieX, stopping there according t o
c o u l d easily suggest t h a t A t h a n a s i u s deliberately refrains f r o m t a k i n g u p
Vian,, Possibly he t h i n k s o f t h i s verse as a m o d e l prayer uttered by
the i n d i c a t i o n o f a $uyj\ i n C h r i s t , a n d t h a t o n 21:30 i n i t . l o o k s l i k e a
C h r i s t o n behalf o f h u m a n i t y , or perhaps o f the believer, as i n Eusebius,
classic f o r m u l a t i o n o f Logos-sarx c h r i s t o l o g y Nevertheless there is the
p, 216 A , where C h r i s t 'recites t h e w h o l e psalm w i t h reference t o every
possibility t h a t fj c]>uxii u-ou is s i m p l y t a k e n as a periphrasis f o r iyd>, as we
soul t h a t is dedicated t o h i m ' ; i n w h i c h case ' m y soul' w o u l d be
should say T m y s e l f ; this is clearly the case i n at least t w o non-
u n d e r s t o o d t o refer t o the soul o f the believer
christological passages Thus at 10:1 ( p 93 A ) ncbg egetre TT} tpvxfjfiov, glossed row; u,oi EpEixe; a n d at 102:1 ( p 432 B) EvXdyei, Kvgiov
is
rj yvxy fiov, tov
is explained Auxo? lauxov Im. TOV iiuvov Sieyeipet, t h o u g h c u r i o u s l y
At
46:5 t h e w o r d c^uxri does n o t appear i n t h e L X X t e x t , but
A t h a n a s i u s attributes i t t o C h r i s t by a n a l l u s i o n t o J o h n 10:11, as noted above ( p , 2 3 6 ) : Tijv xaXXovwv
Yaxoj/? r\v j)ydni}oev
Tfjv xaXX6vr]v Taxwp
enough a t 103:1 ( p 463 A ) t h e very same phrase is t a k e n d i f f e r e n t l y :
yrjai xr|V 7tpocpr|TEiav TT}V Ttept xoiv eOvoiv ,,, ( G e n 49:10),, K a i TWI i\ycmf\\ivjr\ r]
AiBdaxei x a i ini T?) [xeydXr] 7tpovoia xou @EOU euXoyeiv xfj fyuyjQ TOV ©eov,
Tto TTJV ^uyr\v aikou TE0EIXOXI uizip a u x i ^ ; The rendering ' l i f e ' o f course easi-
where xfj fyuxti
l y suggests itself; b u t (|wx*l is n o t quite equivalent t o Cwri, for faty Geivai
1 S
a
n
i n s t r u m e n t a l phrase, i m p l y i n g p r e s u m a b l y a con-
scious a n d deliberate act o f w o r s h i p rather t h a n something f o r m a l a n d
sounds u n n a t u r a l ; w h i c h perhaps suggests t h a t fyvxh
mechanical.
substantive sense: n o t merely ' l i f e ' , b u t t h e p r i n c i p l e o f life,
T h e v a r i a t i o n m a y w a r n us against expecting t o o m u c h
m e t h o d i n A t h a n a s i u s ' use o f cjwx ! 1
P s a l m 34, says A t h a n a s i u s , is w r i t t e n f r o m t h e character (EX jtpotxorcou)
n
a
s
a
rather more
P s a l m 54 yields some c o m m e n t s w h i c h are most i n s t r u c t i v e , p r o v i d e d t h a t t h e rather delicate problems o f inter p i e t a t i o n c a n be c o n v i n c i n g l y
o f t h e believer t e m p t e d b y s p i r i t u a l enemies; b u t i t also introduces the
resolved, The psalm n a t u r a l l y suggests t h e Passion o f Christ; b u t there
' p e r s o n ' o f C h r i s t a n d his sufferings. H e notes this a t t r i b u t i o n as begin-
are phrases w h i c h resist this i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , n o t a b l y t h e reference t o the
n i n g at verse 1 1 , so t h a t a c o m m e n t o n verse 7 restored b y V i a n ( f r . 2 4 ,
speaker's 'foolishness' (dSoXtsxEa) i n v 3 a n d t o his dismay a n d terror
p 22), w h i c h mentions 4^XT)> cannot be given a c h r i s t o l o g i c a l reference.
(especially SEiXia Bavdxou) i n v. 5 Eusebius, i n a somewhat
involved
XII THE SCRIPTURES AND THE SOUL OF CHRIST IN ATHANASIUS
240
discussion, explains t h a t D a v i d c a n n o t periences t h r o u g h o u t ;
he r e c o u n t i n g his o w n ex-
he foresees the Passion;
and
i t is he,
'the
241
u.ou is u n d e r s t o o d as T myself',. B u t at v, 5 the clause eppusaxo xrjv ^M%f\v [xou ex Lteaou axuuvtov receives t h e c r y p t i c c o m m e n t axuuvtov x w v vorjxiov
p r o p h e t ' , w h o feels h o r r o r a n d c o n f u s i o n ' w h i c h he calls foolishness' i n
8T[XOV6TI: this I t h i n k means ' s p i r i t u a l lion-cubs', i.e. demons, rather
view of the sufferings o f C h r i s t (p. 4 7 6 A ) . A t h a n a s i u s takes a similar
t h a n s i m p l y ' m e t a p h o r i c a l lion-cubs' w h o c o u l d be physical assailants;
line i n c o m m e n t i n g o n these verses; he makes the ' p r o p h e t ' refer t o the
here, t h e n , the sense o f 'fyuxh inclines to ' s o u l ' rather t h a n ' l i f e ' ; b u t once
Saviour i n the t h i r d person (p. 252 A 6, B 10-12, 15-16), a n d i t is his
again we have a m o d e l prayer a p p r o p r i a t e t o h u m a n i t y rather t h a n a
foreseen experiences w h i c h strike the p r o p h e t w i t h h o r r o r and dismay,
personal profession b y C h r i s t himself.
B u t he has also said, at 252 A 12-14, t h a t the p r o p h e t speaks,for the
P s a l m 68 was r e g u l a r l y a p p l i e d t o the Passion, a n d is so n o t e d i n the
Saviour: Tldvxa yap xd xaxd xou Eioxfjpos auufidvxa itpos xo oixeiov dva^epei
Epistle t o M a r c e l l i n u s , c 26 F o u r verses m e n t i o n a tyuxh w h i c h is at-
r:p6ato7iov; this seems to m e a n t h a t he describes the S a v i o u r ' s experiences
t r i b u t e d t o C h r i s t ; a n d here we have the help of the longer Syriac ver-
as i f they were his o w n , using the f i r s t person; thus ' m y f a m i l i a r f r i e n d '
sion
in v
A t h a n a s i u s ' w o r k closely resembles the extensive treatment o f Eusebius,
14 refers t o Judas; we m i g h t ( a l t e r n a t i v e l y ) say t h a t t h e verse is
spoken ex persona
T w o general p o i n t s are t o be n o t e d . F i r s t , here as elsewhere,
w h i c h at this p o i n t is preserved i n f u l l , a n d o f t e n a f f o r d s clues to the
Christi
P r o b a b l y , t h e r e f o r e , the same is t r u e o f w ,
17-19, where there are
m u c h briefer s u r v i v i n g r e m a r k s of Athanasius
Secondly,
however,
three references t o §ux?\ i n A t h a n a s i u s ' c o m m e n t s , the first t w o based o n
A t h a n a s i u s i n his H y p o t h e s i s describes t h e psalm as c o n t a i n i n g a prayer
the text o f v 19 L X X ; v, 19b t h e n means t h a t C h r i s t is assailed, whereas
ex 7tpoc:co7uou xfjt; dv9p6>x6x7]xo? xpoacpepojxevriv, w h i c h i n this context has t o
Athasasius nowhere suggests t h a t the ' p r o p h e t ' s ' l i f e is i n danger
m e a n ' o f f e r e d i n the person o f h u m a n i t y ' , not ' o f h i s , the S a v i o u r ' s ,
then i n vv
I f so,
17 and 18 we have C h r i s t appealing t o the Father for help
humanity'
This appears clearly i n the e x p o s i t i o n o f verse 3, 'Ev£7udyriv
XuxpwQfjvai xr]v fyuyrp auxou Coco xwv OnxoSvxtov drcoXeaat aikriv, a n d praising
ei? uXrjv puOou, xai oux e'cxtv uTioaxaan;. Eusebius attributes these words
G o d oxi STJ eioaxoiiaa? XeXuxptoaai TTJV fyuxfo ! ^
A n d b o t h these w i l l be
directly t o C h r i s t , recalling the parallel o f Jonah (2:6-7, cf M t . 12:40)
cases where Athanasius has i n t r o d u c e d a reference t o the cjmx ! o f C h r i s t
a n d r e f e r r i n g t h e m t o C h r i s t ' s descent i n t o h e l l Athanasius here takes a
w h i c h is n o t d i r e c t l y i m p o s e d b y the t e x t of the psalm,
d i f f e r e n t l i n e , since the phrase dq u'Xrp [3u9ou suggests a relapse i n t o sin
ou
1
I n these verses i t is n o t q u i t e clear whether A t h a n a s i u s has physical or s p i r i t u a l enemies i n view; b u t he generally prefers the latter i n t e r p r e t a t i o n wherever possible, a n d the use o f Xikpcooai f i t s i t w e l l ; i n w h i c h case the w o r d fyvxh leans rather t o w a r d s the m e a n i n g ' s o u l ' (as liable t o tempt a t i o n ) rather t h a n ' l i f e ' ,
The c o m m e n t o n 19b, h o w e v e r , is "Oxi oi
7uoXXot ouvieaav xax' euou pouX6u.£voi xrjv cjiux^v u.ou eEjaipeiv, w h e r e ' l i f e' is a
( a n y commerce
w i t h u'Xri b e i n g regarded as s i n f u l ! ) ; his
56 A t h a n a s i u s f o l l o w s the preface i n r e f e r r i n g t o D a v i d ' s o w n
comment
t h e r e f o r e is T a u x a yap rj dv9p(07ceia 9601? £7re:i;6v9ei, xaxevex9eicja wuo xiji; au.apx£a? dq Gdvaxov etc.. I n other w o r d s , D a v i d represents the Saviour as u t t e r i n g w o r d s a p p r o p r i a t e , n o t t o h i m personally, b u t to t h e h u m a n race t o w h i c h , as m a n , he belonged A t 68:2, however, this c a u t i o n clearly does n o t apply: Ucoadv fie, 6 Oedg, on etorjXdooav vSata
possible rendering,, I n Ps
xn
dveXa^e,
TCE.pl fifxaiv
Uwq ipv%fjc, fiov
dSuvaxar
'ExeiBrj xd? du.apxias riuwv
eixoxco? xat rcpoaeuxexai pua9fjvai
ex xuv
adventures i n the cave, b u t r e m a r k s t h a t the p s a l m can also a p p l y
7ceipaautov, xeiudp'pou hixr\v xuxXcoaavxcov auxou xrjv uxr)v.. Syriac: Because
to Christ, However
ex icpoo-omou xfj?
he t o o k our sins u p o n himself a n d for our sake was sad (Is, 53:4), f i t -
dv0pwjc6xrixo; C h r i s t t h e r e f o r e utters a prayer w h i c h is really a p p r o p r i a t e
t i n g l y also he prays t o be saved f r o m the trials t h a t s u r r o u n d e d his soul
t o a human
l i k e a t o r r e n t (op
verse 2,
he says,
is spoken
p e t i t i o n e r , a n d indeed at p. 2 5 7 D i t is half i m p l i e d t h a t the
address is made to C h r i s t , n o t t o the F a t h e r , since there is a reference t o
cit
p. 109).
H e r e there is n o a t t e m p t t o evade the suggestion o f a soul i n Christ;
I n t h i s case, t h e n , i t w o u l d
a n d {JJUX^I i i n t e r p r e t e d , not i n t h e sense o f physical l i f e , b u t o f personal
seem t h a t the t w o f o l l o w i n g references t o tyuxn s h o u l d n o t be pressed as
consciousness, as assailed by t e m p t a t i o n Athanasius must sur ely be i n -
evidence for a soul i n C h r i s t ; i n any case the clause ev oot iteicoiOe r) t|)ux^
fluenced here b y Eusebius, w h o introduces the w o r d x ^ d ^ p o u i ; , f r o m
uou is explained lm xfj cfj porjQeia TT\V eXrciBa e'xco Thus i t seems t h a t r\ c^ux^
Ps. 123:4, as a s y m b o l of t e m p t a t i o n , a n d gives a catena o f passages
C h r i s t ' s o f f e r of p r o t e c t i o n i n M t . 23:37
s
XII
XII 242
THE SCRIPTURES AND THE SOUL OF CHRIST IN ATHANASIUS
243
r e f e r r i n g t o the soul of Christ ( J o h n 10:18, 10:15, 12:27, M t . 26:38) . W e
L o g o s ; i t is something over w h i c h death m i g h t have power. W i t h TOU
shall r e t u r n later t o this theme o f the Saviour's t e m p t a t i o n a n d grief f o r
xaxaoxovxoi;, perhaps compare the f i g u r a t i v e use of xaxexeiv at DI15:
our sins, w i t h the use o f Is, 53:4 (outo? xd$ au-apxiat; f)[i.<Sv
hi xat et? vexpou? T\OT\ TOUXOJV fjv 6 vout; xtxxaax^k
riu-wv 68uvaxai), w h i c h recurs at Ps
does not m e a n that t h e Saviour needs t o be rescued f r o m moral
87:4,
The next occurrence o f tyvxh is at verse 1 1 ; b u t A t h a n a s i u s '
comments
El
B u t Athanasius clearly death
Last i n this series comes 6 8 : 2 1 , also w i t h the briefest of comments
are better u n d e r s t o o d i f v.. 10 is also q u o t e d : "On 6 tfikoq xov oixov aov
'Oveibtofibv
xaxiyayi
are^el? auxou? yevouivoui;
aacp&i; xat oi EuayyeXicrrai SiTiyriaavTo. Syriac: M y heart expected op-
7iepi xov olxov xov c6v AirjyeTxai Se TTJV Earoptav tracpcos 6 IcoavvTii; (ref,, t o J o h n
p r o b r i u m a n d misery ( q u o t a t i o n continued). Here he tells o f the pas-
fie. 'Hpvriaavxo \it, cprjciv, ETietBr) r\kzyx
ov
2:13-17),, ( C o m m e n t o n v. 10 b o m i t t e d ) , Kai ovvExdXvya
ev vnoxEta TJ)V
y)v%rjv fiov. 'AXywv, cpT|ai, Sid xr)v iao\Uvr\v auxtov axcoXeiav xcov (Jn>xcov, XO xat TO IxoioGv. Oi 84 \mip a>v xauTa eSpwv, ev Ttavxi xaipt£ xai xo7ca) iid axoLtaxo?
TiQOOE&oxTjoev Tj ipvxf] fiov. 'EvxeuGev ri[xtv TO Tcd9o£ SiriyeTrat 6
s i o n , w h i c h the evangelist also clearly relates to us (lot Since the Passion
has been
cit ).
i n view t h r o u g h o u t , this particular
reference t o i t seems puzzling; unless, of course, this c o m m e n t is drawn
eu.e ecpepov, a? \>nip auxoov e7toio6fJiT]v xaxoicaQet'ai; oveiBi'iovTEc u.e. Syriac: For
f r o m some other w o r k of A t h a n a s i u s ; b u t the compressed style is quite
t h e zeal o f your house has consumed me. They denied me because I
t y p i c a l of this w o r k , Eusebius here reads xapBia fortyx>yj\(compare the
r e p r o v e d t h e m for being i m p i o u s i n y o u r house. T h e evangelist tells the
Syriac), b u t is perhaps h e l p f u l w h e n he explains t h a t Symmachus and
story clearly ... , ( T h e version gives v.. 10 b a n d c o m m e n t , a n d continues
A q u i l a p r o v i d e clearer versions, r e c o r d i n g a n event rather t h a n expecta-
t h e psalm q u o t a t i o n t o v . 13): (v. 13) A n d those w h o sit at the gate
t i o n ; thus A q u i l a : 'OVEIBICU-OS cruvexpLc};e xr\v xapBtav u.ou
t h o u g h t of m e and those w h o d r i n k w i n e h y m n e d m e , w h i l e I grieved over the destruction t h a t w o u l d b e f a l l their souls, I d i d g o o d things; b u t they i n r e t u r n f o r m y d o i n g such things at a l l times a n d i n a l l places were bearing me o n their m o u t h s , a n d m o c k e d the evil things I e n d u r e d for their sake (op. tit. p
110)
P s a l m 8 7 is regularly taken as a prophecy of the Passion we have: 'On Enkr\oQr\ xaxtov r) ipvxv fiov
A t verse 4
Ei xat aik6<; xac; du-apxCa? r\\L&v
epdaxace xai xepi TjLiajv oBuvaxai, eixoTtos xai xaxtov EfX7re7cXrjCTai cpTjai The Syriac long version fails at this p o i n t , but the short v e r s i o n has: For he b o r e our sins a n d e n d u r e d s u f f e r i n g for out sake A n d this he i n -
The curious phrase TO xai TO exoiouv (where the Syriac translator p r o -
dicates by saying (v., 4) M y soul is sated w i t h evil (op. cit p.. 57),
b a b l y read TO xaXov) perhaps picks u p some previous reference t o the
This verse presents m u c h t h e same p r o b l e m s as 68:2: H o w c o u l d the
Saviour's activities w h i c h has n o t been preserved. H o w these were
e m b o d i m e n t o f goodness h a r b o u r evils i n his soul? Eusebius here offers
represented becomes clear i f one compares the phrase a? imep aikwv
three possible explanations
eiioiou[xr|v xaxo7:a9eia? w i t h Eusebius ( P G 2 3 , 740 B-745 C ) , w h o relates
enemies' wickedness, or our sins w h i c h he t o o k u p o n himself; a n d here
t h a t Jesus, distressed a t the sacrilege i n the Temple, p u t o n sackcloth
he quotes Gal, 3:13 (yevoLtevo? orcep fiu-wv xaxdpa), Athanasius then ac-
a n d fasted as the Psalmist f o r e t o l d , w h i l e his enemies m o c k e d h i m w i t h
cepts the t h i r d e x p l a n a t i o n , except that he quotes, instead of Galatians,
d r u n k e n songs; C h r i s t is represented also as dbcoxXatoLtevoi; auxwv TTJV
Isaiah 53:4; b u t an allusion t o Galatians 3:13 appears soon after, at
a7ca)XeLav, 741 A , cf.. 741 C, a n d 745 A B : Tds u.ev yap Xoma? xcov avSpamcov
87:8
<JJUX«? xaxemev 6 QavaTo;,
' E x ' eu.ou hi LIT] yevoiTO TOUTO, S O far as I can see,
neither Athanasius nor Eusebius i n this case q u i t e directly t a k e u p the reference t o the <]>uxr| o f Christ. a n d Eusebius appears t o a f f o r d n o l i g h t : ZTpdo^eg xfi ipvxfj fiov, xai AVTQ~ ex xou xaxaaxovxoi;, SrjXovoxL xou 9avaTOu. Syriac: L o o k o n m y
soul and rescue i t — c l e a r l y f r o m death t h a t held i t (op, cit
I n his c o m m e n t , Athanasius has so far avoided t h e w o r d fyvxr) which appears i n the text; b u t this does n o t seem t o indicate a strong disinclinat i o n , since his remarks o n the next verse, 87:5, w h i l e generally similar t o
A t 68:19 Athanasius's s u r v i v i n g comments are laconic i n the extreme, tooai avxr)v
o f xaxtov; either his sufferings, or his
p.. 111)..
Perhaps a l l t h a t can be said is t h a t i n this case Athanasius clearly does not understand T r ^ u x x i u-ou as a mere periphrasis f o r 'me m y s e l f , i.e. the
those of Eusebius, i n t r o d u c e J o h n 10:18, w h i c h Eusebius has n o t used, W e r e t u r n then t o t h e p r o b l e m s of P s a l m 15:10, Here M o n t f a u c o n ' s text gives o n l y the briefest o f c o m m e n t s : Ovx EyxaxaXet^Etc: fiov
xr)v yv%riv
AUTOS & V £COT) xat £too7toid<;, e^cooTioieiaSai Xeyexai 7tapa TOU ITaTpos Bla
TTJV oixovoLiiav f r a g m e n t s : "En
B u t there is a surprise a w a i t i n g us i n V i a n ' s oe xai i) odo\ /xov xaraoxrjvcboEi
in
new
eXniht (9c) on ovx
XII
XII THE SCRIPTURES AND THE SOUL OF CHRIST IN ATHANASIUS
244
iyxaTaXet'ipeig bta(p8oQ&v.
tr)v
Mexpi
ipvxrjv
a&Tjv
fJ-OV eig
TOU ISETV htatpdoqdv
OVSE
xat xoia
t&Etv
W h a t deductions are t o be d r a w n f r o m these findings? I n the first
eXm? TT]? aapxog auTou
place, the p o o r t e x t u a l transmission makes i t precarious t o b u i l d t o o
OOJOBCC; TOV xiq r]v r\
245
b'oiov
oov
m u c h o n isolated passages; a n d i t has t o be a d m i t t e d that V i a n ' s f r a g -
r) o n avaXf]t}»6Tai xr)v a7roTe8&iaav (JJUXTIV; The Syriac longer version is n o t preserved at this p o i n t ; b u t the shorter version c o n f i r m s the Greek text j u s t q u o t e d : Therefore he also
m e n t 13 is the only text i n w h i c h A t h a n a s i u s ' c o m m e n t couples together t h e Saviour's flesh w i t h his ' s o u l '
O n t h e other h a n d , any reference t o
says to h i m : (v, 9) M y flesh w i l l reside i n hope.. The hope, t h e n , is that
J o h n 10:11-18—and we have seen that there are t w o or three besides the
his flesh w i l l again assume the soul w h i c h was constituted, (v
10) F o r
veiled one i n this passage,—if pursued w i t h any a t t e n t i o n , is enough t o
his soul was n o t left o f Sheol, n o i d i d his b o d y see the c o r r u p t i o n of the
exclude the n o t i o n t h a t thety\>yj\o f the Saviour s i m p l y is the L o g o s seen
grave (op
i n a certain c o n t e x t , rather as the owner o f a ship m a y , i n a c e r t a i n con-
at
p
10)
The order is slightly changed, and the phrase ' w h i c h was c o n s t i t u t e d ' , if c o r r e c t l y translated, suggests a d i f f e r e n t Greek w o r d i n g ; possibly, however,
omoTeSeToccv
was
simply
mistranslated
into
Syriac,
the
translator t h i n k i n g of axo-ceXea0e.Taav B u t the general impression given is surprising; so far f r o m the death o f C h r i s t being represented as a simple departure of the Logos f r o m his b o d y or f l e s h — w h i c h , i t is argued, is
t e x t , also be its c a p t a i n
I n the J o h a n n i n e text, o n t h e other h a n d , c[>ux^
can be tendered ' l i f e ' — t h e p o w e r or p r i n c i p l e o f l i f e rather t h a n some separable c o m p o n e n t o f the l i v i n g being; b u t i t is n o t easy t o g i v e it this sense i n the f r a g m e n t o n 15:10; a capacity m i g h t be ' r e c o v e r e d ' , b u t c o u l d h a r d l y go t o , or be left i n — o r not be left i n — t h e u n d e r w o r l d , Athanasius'
other
allusions
t o a fyuxh i n C h r i s t are rather
cases
<\>\>xn
other m e n , discarding his soul w h i c h descends t o Hades a n d w i l l later be
p e r i p h r a s i s — ' m y s e l f ; so perhaps at 2 1 : 2 1 , 21:30, possibly a t 34:17,
'recovered' b y his flesh
68:19
No
12 i n V i a n ' s c o l l e c t i o n , s t r o n g l y suggests t h a t the Saviour is not
and
68:21.
r\
This leaves
could
five passages o f
be
little
less
A t h a n a s i u s ' n o r m a l v i e w — h e seems t o be represented as d y i n g l i k e I t m a y be added that the previous fragment,
In
some
clear-cut.
l 4
somewhat
more greater
significance, where the CJJUXTI is associated w i t h ( f r u s t r a t e d ) s p i r i t u a l i n -
s i m p l y speaking ' i n the person of h u m a n i t y ' and thus expressing the
fluence (34:11), w i t h t e m p t a t i o n (54:17 a n d 18, 68:2) and w i t h spiritual
hope that men should feel ( w h i c h is i n a n y case u n l i k e l y i n view of TOV
exercizes (68:11),
outov sou). The t w o fragments read l i k e a c o n t i n u o u s t e x t , and i n f r 12 i t is ' G o d '
w h o speaks, r e j o i c i n g over the salvation o f the l o s t , and
because the Father
has been gracious t o m e n . The speaker, t h e n , must
The question n a t u r a l l y suggest itself whether A t h a n a s i u s was f o l l o w U n f o r t u n a t e l y i t is d i f f i c u l t t o answer, since
Eusebius' c o m m e n t o n Psalm 15 has been lost after verse 8, a n d not m u c h can be gathered f r o m such other scattered references as I have traced (Comm 87:6; Dem
in Ps P G 2 3 , 106 C , o n 4:4, 744 D , o n 68:14,1056 C, o n
Ev, 3 2.70, GCS p
107 14; Quaest
et Sol
5 1) I can only
give the general v e r d i c t that Eusebius is noticeably m o r e inclined t o speak of the soul o f C h r i s t t h a n Athanasius.. Thus at 1056 B he gives a christological i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Ps 29:4 (Kupte, avr^yayEs ei; aSou xyjv tyvyfy aou),
though
when
commenting
ad
loc , 260 A ,
he
agrees
with
A t h a n a s i u s i n assigning the verse t o David.. B u t our e x a m i n a t i o n has, I t h i n k , s h o w n t h a t the new text o f c o m m e n t o n Ps entirely alone
m u c h less f r e q u e n t l y t h a n Eusebius, w h o m he o f t e n f o l l o w s . T h i s has n o t prevented some scholars f r o m i n t e r p r e t i n g Eusebius' l i m i t e d use o f
be G o d the L o g o s , i n his o w n p e r s o n , as d i s t i n c t f r o m 'the lost'
i n g Eusebius at this p o i n t
I t appears, t h e n , t h a t A t h a n a s i u s does occasionally speak o f aty\>xt\i n C h r i s t ; t h o u g h o n l y i n direct e x p o s i t i o n o f s c r i p t u r a l passages, and
15:10 does n o t stand
t h e t e r m as evidence t h a t 'he denied C h r i s t a s o u l ' w h i l e strenuous e f f o r t s , w i t h m u c h less evidence, t o d e f e n d A t h a n a s i u s
making Both
m e n , no d o u b t , felt t h a t such language was open t o misunderstanding; neither can have h a d m u c h s y m p a t h y for the b o l d development given i t b y O r i g e n , w h o b y b r i n g i n g i n a created soul w h i c h attaches i t s e l f to the L o g o s by an act of w i l l appears t o suggest a d o c t r i n e of t w o Christs I n general, i t remains t r u e t h a t A t h a n a s i u s sees the W o r d as t h e t r u e subject o f the acts a n d experiences o f C h r i s t , except w h e r e these a r e clearly subject t o h u m a n l i m i t a t i o n s a n d so ate assigned t o his ' f l e s h ' ; and even t h e n i t is the W o r d himself w h o adopts t h e m , as proper t o t h e flesh w h i c h H e has assumed
I n this perspective, to b r i n g i n a h u m a n soul
w o u l d seem t a n t a m o u n t t o i n t r o d u c i n g a second p r i n c i p l e o f a c t i o n Nevertheless, A t h a n a s i u s does n o t consistently e l i m i n a t e , or explain a w a y , the s c r i p t u r a l texts w h i c h speak o f a cjnjx^ i n Christ.. Occasionally
than
a
XII
XII 246
THE SCRIPTURES AND THE SOUL OF CHRIST IN ATHANASIUS
247
he can use such texts, i n t e r p r e t i n g <\>uxh n o t simply as a physical principle
Saviour's earthly
i n the n a r r o w sense, as a basis o f n a t u r a l l i f e , b u t also as the locus of
elsewhere o n l y at DI 33, p. 153 A ; (3) the use of evavGpomTicus, w h i c h oc-
feeling, teaching, a n d s p i r i t u a l e f f o r t H e can h a r d l y be said t o exploit
curs eight times i n DI,
such language to i n t e r p r e t the w o r k of our s a l v a t i o n ; for instance, he
c o n d a n d once i n the Tomus
does n o t depict the divine W o r d as accepting, assimilating a n d p u r i f y i n g
frequency'
b i r t h (reading 68 A 13 at her p.. 423 1. 17), f o u n d three times i n the f i r s t O r a t i o n , twice i n the Sead Antiochenos,
and so ' w i t h decreasing
a h u m a n soul i n the same way as H e accepts and p u r i f i e s h u m a n flesh.
I t h i n k these arguments can be supplemented a n d c o n f i r m e d , As t o
Nevertheless soteriological content is n o t entirely l a c k i n g , i f we attach
Eusebius, M i l e R o n d e a u is disinclined t o accept arguments based on a
f u l l significance to the c o m m e n t o n Ps, 68:2, w i t h its description o f the
comparison
L o r d ' s t e m p t a t i o n a n d the use o f Is. 53:4, w h i c h recurs at Ps. 87:4, for
clesiastical
his t e m p t a t i o n a n d grief are p a r t o f the vicarious sufferings w h i c h he
p r o v e a similar date f o r the Commentaria);
undergoes for our sake
a n exegetical a n d a p o l e m i c a l w o r k , she argues, 'ne p a r a i t pas de nature
B u t we need t o relate these f i n d i n g s t o our general estimate of Athanasius'
t h o u g h t , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the context o f the theological
á
fonder
o f style and t h o u g h t w i t h the c Theology
une
Marcellum
and
o f 336-7 ( t h o u g h i n f a c t these were designed t o
chronologie
relative'.
17
such a c o m p a r i s o n between Nevertheless
significance i n the f a c t t h a t Eusebius i n the Commentaria
I
see
developments o f his l i f e t i m e I t w o u l d o f course be most f o r t u n a t e f o r
freely t o a c^ux?) i n C h r i s t , a n d t h a t he does so also i n the Eclogae pheticae
and
the Demonstrate
Evangélica,
some
refers quite
the t r a d i t i o n a l i s t case i f we c o u l d p r o v e t h a t the Expositiones
were
Ec-
as de Riedmatten
Prohas
a m o n g his later w o r k s , perhaps even r e f l e c t i n g some lessons learnt at
pointed out;
A l e x a n d r i a i n 362 B u t i n m y j u d g e m e n t this cannot be done; there is
Laus Constantini,
g o o d evidence for d a t i n g the w o r k m u c h earlier i n A t h a n a s i u s ' career.
none o f his later w o r k s . A n d w h e n de Riedmatten remarks, m o s t per-
I n a n impressive paper M.-J
t i n e n t l y , t h a t Eusebius never refers to a soul i n C h r i s t except i n connec-
Eusebius' Commentary
R o n d e a u has discussed the influence of
on the Psalms
u p o n Athanasius a n d devotes a
page or t w o to discussing the question o f dates.
1 s
A l t h o u g h the t w o
18
b u t n o t i n the w o r k s directed against M a r c e l l u s ; nor i n the nor the Theophaneia,
as he observes; and therefore i n
t i o n w i t h some passage o f S c r i p t u r e , this surely s h o u l d not m e a n that such references are t o be discounted as merely inadvertent or irrelevant
w o r k s o f t e n diverge, there are a great m a n y passages i n w h i c h the agree-
I w o u l d be i n c l i n e d , t h e r e f o r e , t o m a k e the Commentaria
ment i n t h o u g h t a n d phrasing is extremely close; s u f f i c i e n t , i n fact, to
t e m p o r a r y w i t h the Demonstrate,
exclude any t h e o r y o f mere c o m m o n dependence o n a t h i r d source; and
possibly antedating i t , and a t t r i b u t e t o Eusebius a definite change o f
if one of these writers d r e w u p o n the o t h e r , i t is a b u n d a n t l y clear that i t
mind
is n o t Eusebius
w o r k On the Soul oj Christ,
w h o expands A t h a n a s i u s ,
b u t Athanasius
who
ab-
dated c
318-20, or
This c o u l d w e l l have sprung f r o m a hostile reaction t o Eustathius' presumably t o be dated some t i m e i n the
320's; since we k n o w t h a t the t w o writers were i n c o n f l i c t s o o n after
breviates Eusebius A s t o the d a t i n g , the p o s i t i o n is c o m p l i c a t e d b y the fact t h a t Eusebius' w o r k is said t o have circulated i n t w o editions; b u t i t has generally been dated i n the years 330-337.
commonly
r o u g h l y con-
16
H o w e v e r , there are references t o the
desolation of the h o l y places o f Palestine w h i c h suggest a date p r i o r t o
Nicaea
19
A s regards A t h a n a s i u s , I w o u l d accept M i l e . Rondeau's arguments f o r an early date, a n d extend t h e m as f o l l o w s : (1) B o t h Eusebius a n d Athanasius use the rather
Platonic-sounding
Constantine's restorations; a n d i n the end M i l e . R o n d e a u leaves the
terms avapiwvai, ávapícocis for C h r i s t ' s r e s u r r e c t i o n , noted b y Mile.
question o p e n , apart f r o m r e q u i r i n g a date 'after the peace o f the
R o n d e a u o n p,
C h u r c h ' , A s t o A t h a n a s i u s ' Expositiones,
a m p l i f i e d , as f o l l o w s : PG 27, 84 B ; add 105 B (of the saints); 280 D 8
she gives reasons for t h i n k i n g
t h a t this w o r k belongs t o the same p e r i o d as the Contra
Gentes a n d the
sec
429; and
f o r Athanasius
her list can be slightly
ms ; 300 C 14; 320 D 1 1 ; 388 D 9; a d d 420 B 6 ( o f the h u m a n race).
w h i c h , however, she is prepared t o assign t o the 330's.
A s she notes, Athanasius does n o t use these terms i n his other works.
The reasons are (1) the use o f terms f o r m e d f r o m yaivto t o denote the I n -
H o w e v e r the related w o r d ávéí>)a£ occurs once, and t h a t i n DI 3 1 , p 149
c a r n a t i o n (&7Ti!pdv£t.a, Oeocpaveia, EU-cpaivetv); thus ETcupdveia so used occurs
D6.
De Incarnatione,
ten times i n the DI and nowhere else; (2) the use o f y e w r ^ ? t o denote the
XII
xn 248
THE SCRIPTURES AND THE SOUL OF CHRIST IN ATHANASIUS
( 2 ) i n the Expositiones q u o t e d by Eusebius
2Q
Athanasius
makes use o f Is
5 3 : 4 , often
The clause Ttepi TJU-WV ÓSUVCCTC» stands at 3 0 5 C 4-5
249
o f agreement i n v o c a b u l a r y a n d t h o u g h t about the Passion o f Christ, w h i c h I have n o t been able t o explore i n detail By
and 3 8 0 B 7-8 (on Ps 6 8 : 2 , 8 7 : 4 ) , and the general theme of the Saviour's
the
time
he
came
to
w r i t e against
Marcellus,
Eusebius'
grief for our sins is f o u n d at 1 3 3 C 6-8, 1 7 2 B 2-4 a n d 1 5 , 3 0 8 D 5-6, 3 8 1
christological ideas h a d perceptibly changed
A 5-8 a n d 4 6 0 A 1-2 So far as I can discover, this theme w h o l l y disap-
any r e c o g n i t i o n of a h u m a n fyuxh in C h r i s t was b o u n d u p w i t h a
pears i n A t h a n a s i u s ' other w o r k s , a p a r t f r o m one b r i e f reference at Ep,
t h e o l o g y t h a t he h a d come t o d i s t r u s t , a r e v i v a l of t h e heresy o f Paul o f
Eest
Samosata (as he conceived i t ) w h i c h denied the substantial r e a l i t y of the
2 0 . 1 ; he does indeed quote Is. 5 3 : 3 - 8 i n DI34,
b u t his o n l y c o m -
It n o w seemed t o h i m that
ment here refers t o the Saviour's d i s h o n o u r , n o t t o his grief; a n d a par-
Logos a n d his substantial u n i o n w i t h the flesh of C h r i s t By this t i m e ,
t i a l q u o t a t i o n o f v. 4 i n c, A T 3 . 3 1 (missed b y Müller) omits the clause
we have argued, i t was h a r d l y possible t h a t Athanasius s h o u l d have openly paraded a debt t o Eusebius; moreover his theology h a d m a t u r e d
i n question ( 3 ) I n his Expositiones
A t h a n a s i u s , l i k e Eusebius, makes positive a n d
a n d developed resources o f its o w n . B u t it is perfectly possible that he
u n f o r c e d use of P h i l 2 : 8 , especially the phrase vntpiooq ¡xéxpi Qaváxou; see
f o l l o w e d a similar course t o the extent o f realizing t h a t insistence o n the
1 0 4 B 1 0 , 1 3 7 A 1 1 - 1 3 , 2 6 0 C 1 1 , 3 0 8 A 1 0 - 1 1 , 3 8 4 A 4-5 and 4 6 4 C
Saviour's fyuxh, even i n the t e n t a t i v e , s c r i p t u r a l manner of his e a t l y com-
1-2
I n his other w r i t i n g s this i m p o r t a n t verse is o n l y cited i n order t o refute
m e n t a r y , c o u l d be i n t e r p r e t e d as a gesture of sympathy towards a
A r i a n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s o f it
t h e o l o g y w h i c h — d e s p i t e his personal regard for M a r c e l l u s — h e
( 4 ) A s already n o t e d , Athanasius f o l l o w s Eusebius i n speaking o f the
b o u n d t o distrust, a n d for m u c h the same reasons
was
I n his treatment o f
This theme seems t o be l a c k i n g in the
Christ's Passion he was led t o develope this p o s i t i o n i n a manner which
other w o r k s , w h i c h ignore the f o r t y days i n the wilderness a n d d o n o t
Eusebius never envisaged, a t t r i b u t i n g the h u m a n passions t o ' t h e flesh',
represent the Passion as a nzipcta\LÓt;. The L o r d ' s v i c t o r y over the demons
w i t h w h i c h the d i v i n e W o r d was directly i n contact I t may s t i l l be possi-
is always seen as completed.
ble t o defend this t h e o l o g y as a prudent a n d realistic a c c o m o d a t i o n to
L o r d as encountering t e m p t a t i o n
M o r e o v e r there is the general c o n s i d e r a t i o n t h a t i n the
Expositiones
the exigencies o f his time.
Athanasius imitates a n d adapts Eusebius' w o r k far m o r e extensively t h a n he does i n the DI, the Demonstrate
where there are demonstrable b o r r o w i n g s f r o m
Evangélica
use o f the Theophaneia
in c
I cannot t h i n k i t l i k e l y t h a t Athanasius w o u l d
have published a w o r k whose debt t o Eusebius was unmistakeable aftet the latter had p u b l i c l y declared his s u p p o r t f o r A r i u s . This suggests that the Expositiones
were published at the latest c 3 2 0 , and m a y well be
earlier t h a n the CG a n d DI;
thus I a m inclined t o t h i n k they reflect the
impression m a d e u p o n Athanasius b y Eusebius w h e n the latter visited Alexandria c 3 1 1 A D
31
NOTES
1 7 besides the possible or supposed
Athanasius w o u l d then have been a b o u t 1 5 ,
Eusebius a b o u t 5 0 , w i t h a n established a n d g r o w i n g r e p u t a t i o n as a scholar and teacher.. M o r e o v e r Eusebius apparently s u f f e r e d i m p r i s o n -
1
See A Grillmeier, S J , Christ in Christian
7
Cf I A Dorner, DieLekrevon
History
Tradition'- p 324 n 84 = 'p
der Person Christi,
Stuttgart, 1845-56, vol
of the Doctrine of the Person of Christ, Edinburgh, 1862, 1 2 p 259; G
' L a doctrine christologique de S. Athanase', RHE Alhanase et Tame humaine du Christ', Greg M
Ortiz de Urbina,
20 (1954) p 43.
Richard. 'Saint Athanase et la psychologie du Christ selon les Ariens', MSR
p 231 11 = P G 83, 285 1
A
Grillmeier, 'Der Gottessohn im Totenreich', ZKTh
marized op cit pp
71 (1949) 1-53, 184-293; sum-
315-17 (203-5)
'
Op
had got of f t o o l i g h t l y , " i t does n o t at all f o l l o w t h a t Athanasius w o u l d
'
I am indebted to Dr
have seen the matter i n the same l i g h t ; Eusebius h a d at least p u t himself
research, though to save space I have given here only a condensed account
of
deliberate p r o v o c a t i o n ; i t is clear t h a t his r e p u t a t i o n was n o t generally i m p a i r e d . I n tetms o f this r e l a t i o n we can e x p l a i n t h e very large measure
4
(1947) 5-54 For Eustathius see fr 15 Spanneut - Theodoret£ra«/"s/esed. G. H. Ettlinger
ment for his f a i t h ; a n d t h o u g h P o t a m m o n was later t o c o m p l a i n t h a t he
at r i s k , a n d possibly owed his release merely t o an avoidance
847 = Voisin,
1 (1900) 230-1, 247; P. Galtier, 'S
36 (1955) 582-3; I
'L'anima umana di Christo secundo S Atanasio, OCP 5
214 n 1 lp
'
cit 310,321-2,325-6 (196,210-11,215-17) Alvyn Pettersen of Cambridge for a careful survey of recent
H. de Rtedmatten, Les actes du proces de Paul de Samosate,
Griilmeierop cit , iirst edn , pp
pp
68-81, esp 78; cf
180-1,195 The treatment of Eusebius in the second edi-
tion is much expanded and revised; but see e g p soul in his Christ', which seems accurate
178, 'Eusebius cannot use any human
XII
XIII
250 ' S Athanase, Lettres festoies et pastorales en copte, ed. L.-Th, Lefort, C S C O 150-1 = Scr. Coptici 19-20 (text and translation) Op. tit pp 35-7 It should of course be remembered that our habit of rendering 4»ux^ 'soul' imposes a rather precise sense and makes the transition seem more abrupt than it would to a Greek, for whom the word has a range of senses roughly corresponding to 'life', 'soul', 'consciousness' and 'self
5
10
o v
" Testi inediti dal Commento nianum" 14), Rome, 1978
ai Salmi di Atanasio
(Studia
Ephemeridis
ST
A T H A N A S I U S ON T H E
PSALMS
"Augusti-
Athanasiana Syriaca, ed R. W Thomson, Part I V : C S C O 386-7 = Scr Syri 167-8 (text and translation) In the longer version, the following psalms are preserved complete, or nearly so: 23-4, 70-2,76, 79, 100-104, 106-8, 111-16, 149, 150, with a large portion of 68 and remains of numerous others l !
11
Cf. n 4 above
b y the Expositiones
in Psalmos,'
a r e l a t i v e l y neglected w o r k w h i c h has
recently been made available f o r study b y the labours of Dr
" See e g 305 A , 308 B C , 724 D-725 C , 1053 D-1056 C , 1065 D-1068 A. " 'Une nouvelle preuve de l'influence littéraire d'Eusèbe de Césarée sur Athanase: l'interprétation des psaumes', Rech Se Rel 56 (1968) 385-434 Rondeau, op cit. p 421 n. 64, and p 420 n 60. " Op. cit. p 422 16
18
N o t m a n y m o n t h s ago I w r o t e f o r this j o u r n a l , a t t e m p t i n g t o examine the evidence f o r St. A t h a n a s i u s ' teaching o n the soul o f Christ p r o v i d e d
Les actes du procès de Paul de Samosate (Paradosis
6) p 78 n 75
" "
Socrates, H E 1 23; Sozomen, H E 2.18 See P G 23, 308 B, 736 A , 756 D, 1060 B, 1065 A , 1068 A
" "
Cf F L Cross, The Study of St Athanasius, Epiphanius, Haer 68.8
Oxford, 1945, p. 15
Vian.
2
I s h o u l d have realized at t h e t i m e t h a t Dr
recently published a p a p e r
3
G
M
Gilles D o r i v a l had
w h i c h raises serious doubts as t o the
a u t h e n t i c i t y o f this piece. There is n o need t o question its overall u n i t y , w h i c h Dr
V i a n has m a i n t a i n e d ; b u t i f D r , D o r i v a l is r i g h t i n his
assessment o f the c o m p l e x t e x t u a l t r a d i t i o n p r o v i d e d b y the Catenae, the author has b o r r o w e d m a t e r i a l n o t o n l y f r o m Eusebius of Caesarea (as n o t e d some years ago by Mme.. M.-.J.. R o n d e a u ) but also f r o m 4
O r i g e n , A p o l l i n a r i s , D i d y m u s , a n d even C y r i l of A l e x a n d r i a a u t h o r t h e r e f o r e c a n n o t possibly be A t h a n a s i u s , and D r
This
D o r i v a l thinks
o f a n A l e x a n d r i a n writer at w o r k somewhere between 440 and 500 A D F u r t h e r p u r s u i t of this q u e s t i o n w o u l d i n v o l v e detailed study o f the manuscripts a n d o f the w h o l e Catena t r a d i t i o n , w h i c h at present I have n o o p p o r t u n i t y t o undertake, B u t D r
D o r i v a l ' s paper has p r o m p t e d me
to t a k e a second l o o k at the w o r k , and I t h i n k i t m a y be w o r t h w h i l e to set d o w n some impressions of its style and m e t h o d , c o m p a r i n g i t i n particular w i t h t h e one A t h a n a s i a n Psalms
whose
Marcellinum.
w r i t i n g specifically devoted t o the
authenticity cannot
be
doubted,
the Epistula
ad
I n any case I s h o u l d p r o m p t l y acknowledge the question-
m a r k w h i c h m u s t n o w be attached t o m y earlier paper. The Epistula
ad Marcellinum
is usually considered t o be a w o r k of
A t h a n a s i u s ' m a t u r i t y I t s a t t e s t a t i o n is unusually g o o d , since a p a r t f r o m n u m e r o u s A t h a n a s i a n m a n u s c r i p t s i t is t r a n s m i t t e d b y the Codex Alexa n d r i n u s o f the B i b l e , w h i c h dates f r o m t h e beginning o f the f i f t h cent u r y , and so f r o m n o t m u c h m o r e t h a n f i f t y years after the p r o b a b l e date o f w r i t i n g , N o m o d e r n c r i t i c a l text is available, b u t the text p r i n t e d i n M i g n e m a y be t a k e n as generally reliable
The w o r k has been con-
sidered i n a n excellent study p u b l i s h e d b y M m e
R o n d e a u i n 1968, and 5
XIII
XIII 66
ST ATHANASIUS ON THE PSALMS
there is also a g o o d description a n d analysis b y H
67
J. S i e b e n . 1 w i l l of fer
treated t w i c e ; indeed Nos.. 9 a n d 106 appear three t i m e s ; o n t h e other
m y o w n brief analysis, w h i c h is n o t based o n Sieben's w o r k a n d w h i c h I
h a n d nineteen psalms are not m e n t i o n e d at a l l , i n c l u d i n g the v e r y sur-
hope does n o t t o o o b v i o u s l y duplicate i t , as a basis f o r the argument
p r i s i n g omissions o f N o s
6
that follows.
Section
The w o r k divides i n t o 33 chapters; b u t i t w i l l be convenient to group these i n t o six m a i n sections.. Section
Chapters
23 a n d 50.
1.5-26, is a l o n g section o n w h a t m i g h t be called
the d e v o t i o n a l use of the Psalter. The basic plan adopted here is very simple; Athanasius m e r e l y goes t h r o u g h the psalms i n order, sometimes
1, is an address t o M a r c e l l i n u s , praising h i m for his
a d d i n g a few psalms o f a similar character t o the one he has reached,
c o n d u c t d u r i n g the present persecution, i n w h i c h he suffered greatly,
occasionally t a k i n g one or m o r e o u t of t u r n , and f a i r l y o f t e n o m i t t i n g
a n d his study of the Scriptures after a recent illness, or conceivably a
one or more. I f I have counted r i g h t , n o less t h a n ninety-five psalms
general epidemic, Athanasius undertakes t o repeat a discourse o n the
appear i n the m a i n sequence, t h o u g h a d m i t t e d l y the f i f t e e n 'psalms of
Psalter, w h i c h he says he heard f r o m a
ascents' are t a k e n as a g r o u p B u t twenty-five are passed over e n t i r e l y , if
Section
I, Chapter
IV,
II,
Chapters
2-13, considers the u n i q u e advantages o f the
the p r i n t e d text is reliable These are m o s t l y d i f f e r e n t f r o m the nineteen
Psalter. Athanasius f i r s t shows, i n cc 2-8, h o w the Psalter recapitulates
o m i t t e d i n c. 14; b u t t w o , Nos 86 a n d 135, escape notice altogether. N o t
a l l the m a i n b o o k s o f the B i b l e ; a n i m p o r t a n t passage to w h i c h I shall
surprisingly, the w i s d o m and d e v o t i o n a l value of this section are not
return.. I n c 9 he says that conversely the Psalter is echoed i n all the
m a t c h e d b y a n y literary elegance or even efficiency, since the reader is
other b o o k s ; there is one S p i r i t i n all. Cc
10-12 e x p l a i n that t h e Psalter
k e p t j u m p i n g f r o m subject t o subject.. However i n c. 26 Athanasius
has the special d i s t i n c t i o n t h a t each m a n f i n d s i t expresses the emotions
concludes b y g r o u p i n g together t h e psalms w h i c h prophesy t h e L o r d ' s
(jcLVTiLtaxa) o f his o w n soul. Thus i t n o t o n l y e n j o i n s , b u t invites a n d ex-
I n c a r n a t i o n ; this covers m u c h t h e same g r o u n d as cc. 6-8 already
presses, repentance, endurance
a n d t h a n k s g i v i n g , so t h a t each
man
described, b u t the t r e a t m e n t is b r i e f e r , since only the numbers o f the
adopts its language as his o w n . I n c 13 Athanasius returns t o the theme
psalms are i n d i c a t e d , whereas the earlier section quotes the significant
already handled i n cc
7-8, namely t h a t the Saviour's i n c a r n a t i o n is
verses I n eight cases t h i s chapter f ills i n gaps w h i c h have been l e f t i n the
already foreshadowed i n the Psalms.. This chapter is o f interest i n that i t
previous series; b u t the r e m a i n i n g four psalms have already been men-
introduces our L o r d ' s m o r a l example as w e l l as his teaching, a facet of
t i o n e d , so t h a t once again there is l i t t l e evidence o f c a r e f u l design,
his saving w o r k w h i c h is n o t m u c h emphasized i n A t h a n a s i u s ' dogmatic w r i t i n g s , t h o u g h there are parallels to be f o u n d i n t h e Festal Letters Section
III,
Chapter
Since I shall n o t discuss this section i n d e t a i l , I w i l l give a brief specimen f r o m c 20: ' B u t y o u have sinned, a n d i n your shame y o u re-
14, begins b y representing the Psalter as a guide
pent and call f o r mercy: y o u have the w o r d s of confession a n d repen-
t o the m o r a l a n d s p i r i t u a l l i f e ; b u t this leads almost at once i n t o a
tance i n N o . 50 B u t i f y o u were slanderously accused before a wicked
classification of the psalms b y their l i t e r a r y type a n d subject-matter
k i n g , and see the slanderer t r i u m p h i n g , t h e n retire a n d yourself say No.
The list begins by n o t i n g t h i r t e e n psalms composed iw BLriyrju-aTi, i n nar-
51.. B u t w h e n y o u are persecuted and people slander y o u , w i s h i n g to
r a t i v e f o r m . Perhaps i t is characteristic o f Athanasius t h a t the chapter is
betray y o u , as the Z i p h i t e s and t h e Philistines d i d to D a v i d , do n o t des-
n o t really systematic, either i n t h e classification a d o p t e d or i n the way i t
p o n d , b u t t r u s t i n the L o r d and say 53 and 5 5 ' . I t w o u l d be t e m p t i n g , no
is carried out. Thus the n a r r a t i v e psalms include N o
106 b y the L X X
d o u b t , t o take the ' w i c k e d k i n g ' as a reference to Constantius, or less
n u m e r a t i o n ( w h i c h I shall a d o p t f r o m n o w o n ) ; b u t one looks i n v a i n for
p r o b a b l y J u l i a n , w h i c h m i g h t help t o f i x a date for the Epistle; b u t the
the t w o preceding psalms, w h i c h we s h o u l d p r o b a b l y r e c k o n as nar-
c o n t e x t shows t h a t Athanasius is t h i n k i n g o f Saul M a n y of the psalms,
r a t i v e psalms par
these t w o come u p soon a f t e r , together
however, are treated as conveying general m o r a l lessons, or as advising
w i t h 106, as examples of ^oLtoXo-frjais, t o be u n d e r s t o o d as " t h a n k s -
the c o n t e m p o r a r y C h u r c h ; so clearly Ps 75, w h i c h is made t o refer to
g i v i n g ' ; a n d shortly a f t e r w a r d s 105 and 106, b u t n o t 104, appear i n a list
Greeks and heretics; a n d some others are r e c o m m e n d e d for use o n par-
of
ticular days of the C h r i s t i a n week; but a reference back to D a v i d is
psalms w h i c h
excellence;
combine
narrative w i t h
thanksgiving.
headings o v e r l a p , a n d are n o t consistently applied
Thus
the
Several psalms are
made also f o r Pss. 7, 143 and 144.
XIII
XIII S7 ATHANASIUS ON THE PSALMS
68
Section
V, Chapters
27-29, discusses the reasons for the verse and
melody of the Psalter
Some simple-minded Christians believe that it is
intended t o make a sweet sound and delight the hearing B u t that is u n t r u e ; the Scriptures are not meant to give pleasure reasons
There are i n fact t w o
F i r s t , i t was proper t h a t G o d ' s praises s h o u l d be set f o r t h i n
69
w h i c h he approves: 'Reading t o a chant is a symbol o f the r h y t h m i c a l a n d t r a n q u i l c o n d i t i o n of the m i n d ' (xcu f\ ¿[¡.\itXr\q hi dvdyvwon; ciVPoXov eon Ti\t; £upu6u,ou xai dxeiu-dcTOU xaTacndcietoi; rfjs otavoiac,). The c o n c l u d i n g Section
VI, Chapters
30-33, begins w i t h a recapitula-
t i o n o n the m a n i f o l d usefulness o f the Psalter; this leads, i n c 3 1 , to a
Scripture not o n l y i n prose b u t i n verse, so t h a t m e n m i g h t love the L o r d
w a r n i n g against t r y i n g to i m p r o v e its w o r d i n g
w i t h all their strength and a b i l i t y , Swdu-Eto;.. Secondly, the d i f f e r e n t
w o u l d wish t o do this? C o u l d i t be a veiled reference to the activities of
B u t , one asks, who
xivriuaTa i n men's soul need to be b r o u g h t i n t o h a r m o n y
I q u o t e : 'Since
A p o l l i n a r i s a n d his father i n the t i m e of Julian? There is a slight sugges-
various m o t i o n s appear i n the soul, a n d i t contains b o t h reason (TO
t i o n p o i n t i n g this w a y i n c 32: ' I f a m a n is oppressed w h e n he says these
Xoyt'CtaQaO a n d desire (TO exi9uu.eiv) a n d impulse (TO 0uu.6et.5ec;), and i t is
w o r d s , he w i l l see t h e great c o n s o l a t i o n t h a t is i n t h e m ; or i f he is
f r o m their m o t i o n t h a t the physical a c t i v i t y of t h e b o d y is also c o n -
t e m p t e d a n d persecuted w h e n he sings the psalms t h u s , he w i l l appear
d u c t e d , so reason (or 'the L o g o s ' ) requires t h a t a m a n s h o u l d not be
the m o r e a p p r o v e d a n d be p r o t e c t e d by the L o r d ' . I t is n o t impossible, I
discordant w i t h h i m s e l f , so as t o reason a d m i r a b l y b u t act b a d l y o n i m -
t h i n k , to take this as m e a n i n g t h a t a m a n m i g h t be persecuted
p u l s e ' — l i k e P i l a t e , or the eiders w h o p l o t t e d against Susanna, or the
he says the actual w o r d s of the Psalter, a n d c o u l d have escaped b y using
wavering believers m e n t i o n e d b y St James. So far as 1 am a w a r e , this
a paraphrase
piece of P l a t o n i c psychology occurs n o w h e r e else i n A t h a n a s i u s ; t h o u g h
this i n t e n t i o n ? A p o l l i n a r i s ' paraphrases were intended as a substitute
one doubts i f it is very c a r e f u l l y a p p l i e d , since he attributes Pilate's
f o t the classics o f pagan l i t e r a t u r e , not as a replacement of the biblical
because
B u t have we any evidence f o r paraphrases w r i t t e n w i t h
failure t o his 0uu.6;, whereas a n authentic P l a t o n i s t w o u l d presumably
b o o k s A n d i n the f i n a l chapter A t h a n a s i u s ' elderly mentor is recalled as
say that it was precisely the lack of 0uu.6$, the lack o f courage and self-
g i v i n g a rather d i f f e r e n t w a r n i n g against revisers of t h e sacred text
'He
respect, w h i c h a l l o w e d h i m to disobey his reason a n d conscience
used t o say t h a t those m e n deserved every sort o f c o n d e m n a t i o n
who
But
perhaps this marks a difference between P l a t o and the Neoplatonists of
abandoned
Athanasius' time
phrases f r o m other sources a n d thereby called themselves exorcists.' I n
The section continues by c l a i m i n g t h a t the m e l o d y of the Psalter is a s y m b o l of the c o n c o r d w h i c h should r u l e i n our souls, c o n t r o l l i n g our passions a n d d i r e c t i n g our b o d i l y movements.
There is a w o r d of
r e p r o o f for irresponsible musicians, w h o p e r f o r m for pleasure, and an example d r a w n f r o m D a v i d , w h o pleased G o d by his m u s i c — t h e w o r d
these ( w o r d s ) a n d
composed
for themselves attractive
the authentic words o f the Psalter the L o r d is present; and those who care f o r sufferers are t o say these w o r d s a n d no o t h e r ; they w i l l thus b o t h benefit the sufferers and g a i n G o d ' s a p p r o v a l f o r their f a i t h and his help for those w h o need i t . L e t us n o w t u r n t o the other professedly A t h a n a s i a n w o r k , the Ex-
used is xaTocc|>aAAcov—as well as expelling Saul's c o n f u s i o n a n d madness.
positions
Despite D a v i d ' s example, i t does n o t seem t h a t A t h a n a s i u s approves the
t i o n ; i t is k n o w n o n l y t h r o u g h the catenae,
use of musical instruments: ' P r a i s i n g G o d ' , he w r i t e s , o n resounding
1698 was based o n f o u r Paris manuscripts; some other
cymbals
l
in Psalmos
This has n o t come d o w n t o us i n a d i r e c t t r a d i M o n t f a u c o n ' s e d i t i o n of fragments
a
published later by M o n t f a u c o n , a n d others again edited by B a r b a r o and
symbol'—0-uu.poXov TtaXtv r j v — ' a n d an i n d i c a t i o n of the members o f the
C o r d i e r have been i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o the text p r i n t e d by M i g n e . I t has
b o d y being d u l y co-ordinated l i k e strings and the thoughts of the soul
l o n g been realized t h a t this text is u n r e l i a b l e ; i t o m i t s some fragments
and
on
the
harp
and
the
ten-stringed lute was
thus
b e c o m i n g l i k e cymbals, a l l conducted b y the voice and c o m m a n d of the
that
S p i r i t , so that the i m a g i n a t i o n is quickened by t h e vision o f f u t u r e
A t h a n a s i u s a large number of comments w h i c h are k n o w n to have come
goods'
A t h a n a s i u s ' exegesis here is, we may say, t y p o l o g i c a l ; he does
have
from
since
other
been
writers..
found, In
recent
but,
more
years a
serious,
much
it attributes to
better c r i t e r i o n
for
not d o u b t that the sacred b o o k describes real h i s t o r i c a l events, w h i c h
r e c o n s t r u c t i n g the text has been d i s c o v e r e d , namely the M S
however convey s y m b o l i c i n s t r u c t i o n s ; the phrase he uses contrasts w i t h
Graecus
the i m m e d i a t e l y preceding sentence describing the present practice
sources; b u t these can still be distinguished because their series of
754
Vaticanus
This M S . clearly presents a c o m b i n a t i o n of t w o older
XIII
XUI ST ATHANASIUS ON THE PSALMS
70
fragments
are
numbered
on
two
d i f f e r e n t systems
One
series,
There f o l l o w s the c o m m e n t a r y
71
' H a v e mercy u p o n me, O G o d , ac-
n u m b e r e d i n minuscule letters w i t h a fresh start for each p s a l m , has
c o r d i n g t o t h y great goodness ' H e begs t o gain the great meicy o f G o d ,
been shown to derive f r o m Evagrius; the o t h e r , n u m b e r e d i n uncial let-
seeing it is for a great offence ' A n d a c c o r d i n g to the m u l t i t u d e of thy
ters a n d r u n n i n g o n f r o m psalm to psalm to begin again a f t e r each
mercies b l o t o u t m y o f f e n c e ' For o n l y the mercies o f G o d can cleanse
complete h u n d r e d , claims to come f r o m Athanasius
the murderous hands
' W a s h me t h o r o u g h l y f r o m m y i n i q u i t y : ' he
enabled
means that o f the murder
source
adultery
'For I acknowledge m y i n i q u i t y : ' this again refers t o the
There are also some fragments preserved i n C o p t i c , a n d t w o Syriac ver-
murder
' A n d m y sin is ever b e f o r e me ' Over and over he t u r n s the
sions, an abbreviated version preserved c o m p l e t e , a n d a longer version
recollection of the sin c o m m i t t e d i n his a d u l t e r y
The i n f o r m a t i o n collected f r o m this
Vatican
MS
has
scholars to i d e n t i f y other witnesses to the same A t h a n a s i a n
' A n d cleanse me f r o m m y sin ' That is the
o f w h i c h o n l y a b o u t 1 5 % survives.. The Greek text itself consists of f a i r -
This is n o t quite the A t h a n a s i u s we k n o w ; i t gives the impression of a
ly brief scholia, and m i g h t itself be derived f r o m a still longer w o r k , for
tidy-minded and rather prosaic w r i t e r I t is perhaps u n f a i r to j u d g e h i m
we have no reason t o t h i n k t h a t a l l the missing fragments have n o w been
f r o m such b r i e f comments ( w h i c h however can h a r d l y be the e p i t o m e of
recovered; b u t t h i s , i f i t ever existed, is n o w completely lost; the longer
a longer t r e a t m e n t ) ; b u t when he writes at greater l e n g t h , the results are
Syriac version corresponds w i t h the extant Greek text U s i n g all this evidence, Dr . G
M
n o t always enlivening
V i a n has been able t o p r o d u c e , not
Here is a specimen f r o m the previous psalm,
4 9 : 2 1 : ' T h o u thoughtest w i c k e d l y that I shall be l i k e thee ' For a long
indeed an e d i t i o n , w h i c h is still a w a i t e d , b u t a h a n d b o o k t o the
Exposi-
t i m e , he says, I have been p a t i e n t , b u t I w i l l be so n o longer; f o r I w i l l
tiones
entitled Testi Inediti
Rome,
produce your sins to reprove y o u , sins w h i c h y o u t h o u g h t were no
1978
This b o o k prints 158 new f r a g m e n t s , f o l l o w e d by an elenchus
dal Commento
ai Salmi di Atanasio,
longer i n existence and w o u l d n o t be remembered by anyone
B u t 1, as
s h o w i n g w h i c h passages are to be discarded f r o m the M i g n e e d i t i o n I n
being G o d , w i l l b r i n g t h e m to l i g h t and they shall be exhibited before
the great m a j o r i t y o f cases D t
V i a n is able to indicate the name o f their
y o u ; not concealing t h e m as y o u d o , and becoming l i k e yourself But I
a u t h o r ; a n d quite a large p r o p o r t i o n t u r n o u t to have been already
w i l l produce t h e m , so that by revealing t h e m I w i l l pour shame upon
p r i n t e d elsewhere i n M i g n e ; f o r instance those by Evagrius p r i n t e d
you
under the name of O r i g e n i n V o l
the Psalmist tells us t h a t G o d spoke once; the commentator makes him
12, and those by Theodore o f Mop-
suestia to be f o u n d i n V o l . 80.. The scholar equipped w i t h V i a n ' s w o r k , w i t h photostats of the M i g n e t e x t , a n d w i t h a serviceable blue pencil, can n o w at last m a k e a sound beginning i n his study of the L e t us t r y t o give a general impression o f the w o r k given a p r o l o g u e , called hypothesis,
Expositiones Each psalm is
w h i c h b r i e f l y explains its theme,
generally f o l l o w i n g the Septuagint t i t l e f a i r l y closely
The writer then
1
This c o u l d have been p u t m o r e b r i e f l y a n d effectively, one feels;
repeat himself six times over Further study w i l l disclose a fascinating p r o f i l e , w h i c h c e r t a i n l y has some features w h i c h are characteristic o f Athanasius. For instance, the writer is clearly c o m m i t t e d to the monastic i d e a l , and his s p i r i t u a l i t y has some f a i r l y close parallels w i t h the Vita Antonii
B u t this is n o t a safe
c t i t e r i o n ; the Vita soon became p o p u l a r , a n d any w r i t e r w i t h monastic
quotes the p s a l m clause b y clause, o f t e n g i v i n g a separate c o m m e n t for
sympathies a generation or m o r e later t h a n Athanasius could w e l l have
each
been i n f l u e n c e d b y i t (The same p r o b a b l y goes for the de
M a n y o f these comments are telegrammatic i n the extreme; as a
Incarnatione,
specimen 1 w i l l take the 50th p s a l m , where the L X X title runs: 'For the
a n d m i g h t explain some resemblances n o t e d by M m e . R o n d e a u )
end
other times I seem t o detect a writer of rather l i m i t e d m e n t a l i t y , who
A psalm o f a song by D a v i d . W h e n N a t h a n the prophet came t o
7
At
hypothesis
takes some genuinely A t h a n a s i a n themes a n d w o r k s t h e m to d e a t h ; for
runs as f o l l o w s : ' H e sings this psalm w h i c h contains the confession o f
example, the Psalter's rich v a r i e t y o f imagery d r a w n f r o m Israel's
h i m , when he went i n to Bathsheba ' The c o m m e n t a t o r ' s
He
h i s t o r y , the n a t u r a l a n d created w o r l d , a n d the arts o f music a n d dance
also introduces a prophecy o f the general r e d e m p t i o n of sins t h a t is to
is reduced by a relentlessly stereotypic exegesis t o a few endlessly
come a b o u t t h r o u g h h o l y b a p t i s m , a n d i n s t r u c t i o n a b o u t w o r s h i p i n the
repeated lessons o n the s p i r i t u a l c o m b a t a n d o n life i n the C h u r c h
spirit
such impressions can o n l y be subjective A better c r i t e r i o n , I t h i n k , is to
t w o crimes, the murder o f U r i a h a n d the adultery w i t h Bathsheba
But everywhere y o u w i l l f i n d h i m deprecating his t w o offences'
But
XIII
xm 72
ST ATHANASIUS ON THE PSALMS
take the Epistula
ad Marcellinum,
w h i c h is u n d o u b t e d l y genuine, and
73
prophecy. O n Ps 104:26 f f , ' H e sent M o s e s ' , there is no disagreement;
consider the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f texts f r o m the psalms given i n cc. 6-8, and
b u t f o r Ps
in other contexts where available, for c o m p a r i s o n w i t h the interpreta-
d i f f e r e n t a n d surprising: ' B r i n g u n t o the L o r d , ye sons of G o d '
tions given i n the
of G o d ' refers t o the h o l y A p o s t l e s , f o r he taught t h e m t o say 'Our
Expositiones.
Athanasius, we have seen, explains t h a t the Psalter recapitulates the w h o l e Bible
The creation is praised i n Psalm
28:1 the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n given b y the Expositiones is quite 'Sons
F a t h e r ' . . . ' B r i n g u n t o the L o r d t h e sons o f rams'. 'Sons of r a m s ' means
18:2, ' T h e heavens
those w h o were called b y t h e m o u t of the Jewish n a t i o n t o f a i t h in the
declare', and i n 2 3 : 1 , ' T h e earth is the L o r d ' s ' . The exodus appears at
L o r d , — E u s e b i u s also refers this verse t o the A p o s t l e s , b u t takes the
113:1-2, In exitu
sons of rams t o be converts f r o m paganism, so designated because of
Israel,
a n d 104:26-31, ' H e sent Moses his servant';
w h i l e 2 8 : 1 , ' B r i n g y o u n g rams u n t o the L o r d ' , recalls the w o r s h i p at the tabernacle.
Judges inspires t w o texts f r o m Ps
106, namely vv
36-7,
their lack of reason P s a l m 106 is taken by A t h a n a s i u s in a h i s t o r i c a l sense, as we saw, w i t h
'They planted cities', a n d v. 6, ' T h e n they cried u n t o the L o r d ' . ( H e r e
an exception at verse 20 The Expositiones
we should note t h a t Athanasius is not always consistent i n his exegesis,
cerned—see V i a n ' s new fragment 55; b u t m u c h o f t h e psalm is taken i n
since we later f i n d verse 20 o f the same psalm taken o u t o f its context in
a generalized and spiritualized sense; t h o u g h at verse 21 we read 'He
agrees where verse 6 is con-
Israel's h i s t o r y : ' H e sent his W o r d a n d healed t h e m ' is referred to the
transfers his account t o the H o l y A p o s t l e s ' — w h o after all d i d recount
I n c a r n a t i o n ; so also de Inc
the marvellous w o r k s o f the L o r d , and d i d go d o w n t o the sea i n ships
40, c Ar.
n 32 and Ser. i i 8 ( t h o u g h the
last-named is a paraphrase g i v i n g a m o r e general, cosmological sense)
B u t verse 36, o n sowing fields a n d p l a n t i n g vineyards, is taken t o mean,
N o d o u b t this was a t r a d i t i o n a l t e s t i m o n i u m
The B o o k of Kings is
quite c o n t r a r y t o A t h a n a s i u s , t h a t they sowed the w o r d and established
19:8, 'Some p u t their t r u s t i n chariots and some i n
the C h u r c h , Eusebius also refers t o the s t i l l i n g of t h e s t o r m , b u t incor-
reflected i n Ps
8
horses'; and Esdras i n t w o Psalms of Ascents, Nos 125 a n d 121
Thus
far o n the O l d Testament
porates verses 36-7 i n t o a c r i t i c i s m of the spiritual
husbandry of the
Jews, One disagreement remains a m o n g the O l d Testament passages;
H o w are these verses treated i n the Expositiones'}
O n the f i r s t text,
whereas Athanasius
refers the verse a b o u t t r u s t i n g in chariots and
' T h e heavens declare', there is f a i r l y close agreement; t h o u g h the Ex-
horses t o the B o o k o f K i n g s , i n the Expositiones
positiones
P h a r a o h ' s o v e r t h r o w at the Red Sea; this exegesis also agrees w i t h
characteristically represent this as i n t r o d u c t o r y teaching
i t is connected w i t h
given by the Apostles t o the people, w a r n i n g t h e m n o t t o w o r s h i p the
Eusebius.
heavenly bodies. This latter p o i n t has a g o o d A t h a n a s i a n parallel at c
s i g n i f i c a n t disagreement over the Psalms o f Ascents A p a r t f r o m these,
Gent
in the eight O l d Testament passages actually quoted there is agreement
27
But at Ps
Expositiones
2 3 : 1 , ' T h e earth is the L o r d ' s ' , the w r i t e r of the
takes a line of his o w n
The hypothesis states, quite
This p o i n t has clearly l i t t l e evidential value; and there is no
between the Epistula
a n d the Expositiones
i n only three cases, the other
reasonably, that the psalm is concerned w i t h the L o r d ' s ascension and
five being d i s t i n c t l y d i f f e r e n t ; there are complete or partial parallels
the teaching of the Gentiles. B u t verse 1 is r e f e r r e d , n o t to the c r e a t i o n ,
w i t h Eusebius i n f o u r cases o u t of eight
but t o the sovereignty o f the only-begotten W o r d over the Gentiles i n
T u r n i n g t o the N e w Testament, Athanasius cites nine psalm-texts
consequence of his I n c a r n a t i o n ; reference to the c r e a t i o n only appears
w h i c h refer t o the I n c a r n a t i o n a n d the a c t i v i t y of C h r i s t , six w h i c h refer
at v 2, where i t is presented i n o p p o s i t i o n t o the o p i n i o n of 'enemies',
t o the Passion, and nine w h i c h forecast the Ascension, t h e c o m i n g
possibly M a r c i o n i t e s , w h o supposed t h a t the earth o r i g i n a l l y belonged
Judgement a n d the c a l l of the Gentiles
to Satan
sion texts there is no s i g n i f i c a n t disagreement; b u t I w i l l discuss one or
C o m i n g t o the Exodus passages, Ps the Expositiones
1 1 3 , / « exitu Israel,
is treated i n
n o t as h i s t o r i c a l b u t as p r o p h e t i c ; i t again refers t o the
calling ot the Gentiles
H e r e perhaps a clue can be f o u n d i n Eusebius, i f
O n the deeply t r a d i t i o n a l Pas-
t w o interesting divergences i n the first a n d t h i r d groups. P s a l m 49:2-3, 'Our G o d shall come a n d shall n o t keep silence', clearly p e r m i t s t w o i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s ; Athanasius takes i t of t h e I n c a r n a t i o n , the
the p r i n t e d text is s o u n d ; Eusebius (1353 B) suggests t h a t either inter-
Expositiones
p r e t a t i o n is possible; Athanasius opts for h i s t o r y , the Expositiones
C o m m e n t a r y , p 436 A , b u t elsewhere w i t h A t h a n a s i u s , e g D E
for
of the Second C o m i n g ; Eusebius agrees w i t h this in his vi.3
XIII
XIII ST ATHANASIUS ON THE PSALMS
74
Psalm
44:11,
'Hearken,
Athanasius i n the Epistula
O
daughter,
and
consider',
is t a k e n
by
t o denote G a b r i e l ' s message t o the V i r g i n , I i
Mme.. Rondeau is r i g h t , this is a n early example of a n exegesis w h i c h 9
one
is
missing
And
where
Athanasius of the Epistula,
the Expositiones
75
disagrees
with
the
m o r e o f t e n t h a n n o t i t agrees w i t h Eusebius
Was the writer o f the Expositiones
Athanasius? Q u i t e apart f r o m Dr
became popular m u c h later; the usual t r e a t m e n t was t o m a k e i t a p p l y t o
D o r i v a l ' s arguments, w h i c h I c a n n o t v e r i f y , I have come t o t h i n k t h a t he
the C h u r c h , as the B r i d e o f C h r i s t ; a n d this is w h a t we f i n d i n the Ex-
was n o t
positiones
253 A , 401 C,
themselves, l i k e the w r i t e r ' s use o f the w o r d xayu.axa—five instances at
v,2), B u t the m o s t interesting case of this g r o u p is Psalm 109:3c,
l e a s t — a n d the theologically significant n o u n xEvcotnc,, b o t h absent f r o m
D E
a n d at least three times i n Eusebius (Comm.
There are differences i n v o c a b u l a r y , m o s t l y u n r e m a r k a b l e i n
' F r o m the w o m b before the day-star I have begotten thee', A t h a n a s i u s
M u l l e r ' s L e x i c o n , a n d the f a i r l y f r e q u e n t use of xrjpuS; to denote an
quite regularly refers this t o the begetting o f the Son b y the Father
apostle M o r e i n s t r u c t i v e is the w r i t e r ' s use o f the w o r d s yeveais/yevvriaii;
before a l l c r e a t i o n ; indeed i n Deer. 26 he cites D i o n y s i u s o f R o m e , w h o
a n d their cognates, Prestige a n d R o n d e a u have s h o w n that Athanasius
connects i t w i t h C o l
is particular a b o u t the use o f these w o r d s ; yiwr\ai<;, begetting, is never
1:15
B u t i n the Expositiones
h o w the Father appropriates the human
the c o m m e n t is: 'See
b i r t h o f the only-begotten':
used o f our L o r d ' s h u m a n b i r t h , w i t h the single exception of de Inc
33,
"'Opa Ttw? oixeiouxai xrvv xaxa aápxa yíwr\aw xou MovoyevoG?, N o w this
despite the example of Psalm 86:5, Gal, 4:4, etc ; m u c h m o r e em-
agrees w i t h w h a t Eusebius writes i n his C o m m e n t a r y , p. 1344 A , i f the
p h a t i c a l l y , yeveaig is n o t used o f his divine Sonship, a n d the A r i a n s are
text is reliable; b u t i t is also a d o p t e d b y M a r c e l l u s o f A n c y r a (fr 26 =
e x p l i c i t l y condemned for speaking thus, The writer o f the
31), a n d i t is rejected
against
does n o t share this p r e c i s i o n ; he uses the w o r d yivvquK; at least seven
w h i c h was w r i t t e n m a n y
times of the L o r d ' s h u m a n b i r t h , and the verb yewav at least three
b y Eusebius,
M a r c e l l u s , b u t i n his Demonstrate
n o t o n l y i n his w o r k
Evangélica
years p r e v i o u s l y ; see D..E
i v 15.53, 16 7, 16 56, v.3,.1, 3 7; c.
ii.3 30
something
Does this t e l l us
about
the date
of
Marc
Eusebius'
Commentary?
times,
10
Expositiones
Even m o r e s i g n i f i c a n t , i f we can t r u s t the p r i n t e d text, is the use
of yivoum f o r his divine b i r t h at p.. 208B 11-12, o n P s a l m 44:2, yeyEvriTai yap @eo? ex ©sou, an A r i a n i z i n g phrase w h i c h w o u l d have astounded
T u r n i n g t o the post-resurrection g r o u p o f texts, there is fair agreement i n six cases; i n one case the Expositiones
c o m m e n t has n o t sur-
v i v e d ; b u t this h a r d l y m a t t e r s , since a second passage i n the Epistula
(c
Athanasius! This usage c o u l d be e x p l a i n e d , after M m e , R o n d e a u , as characteristic of A t h a n a s i u s ' early w r i t i n g s , t h o u g h later abandoned by h i m , " But
26, 37 C ) shows t h a t A t h a n a s i u s is p r e t t y f l e x i b l e i n his i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of
there is one phrase w h i c h occurs repeatedly i n the Expositiones
Psalm 7 1 , H o w e v e r i n c, 8 'Give j u d g e m e n t t o the K i n g ' s S o n ' is t a k e n
t h i n k this e x p l a n a t i o n cannot a p p l y , and w h i c h proves that its author is
as f o r e s h a d o w i n g the Last Judgement; i n the Expositiones
i t refers t o
not Athanasius
where I
A s is w e l l k n o w n , he deals w i t h the L o r d ' s self-imposed
the I n c a r n a t i o n and the Passion; Eusebius also relates i t t o the I n c a r n a -
l i m i t a t i o n s i n his I n c a r n a t i o n , a n d especially the expressions o f grief and
t i o n (Comm
789D-792A, and so p r o b a b l y D E. viii.1.52-4, ix.13 10,
distress d u r i n g the Passion w h i c h were recalled by the c h r i s t o l o g i c a l ex-
17 16);
Athanasius
Finally,
egesis of such texts as Psalm 37:9, ' I r o a r e d o u t of the g r o a n i n g o f m y
A t h a n a s i u s sees the Last Judgement prophesied i n P s a l m 8 1 : 1 , ' H e is a
h e a r t ' , 54:4, the B&iXia Qavaxou, and 68:5, ' L o r d t h o u k n o w e s t m y
judge a m o n g g o d s ' ; the Expositiones
connects this verse w i t h the I n -
foolishness', A t h a n a s i u s explains these expressions i n t w o d i f f e r e n t
c a r n a t i o n , t a k i n g 'gods' as a reference t o the Jewish a u t h o r i t i e s ; this
ways, One is t o say t h a t the L o r d had t a k e n a h u m a n b o d y a n d h u m a n
again agrees w i t h Eusebius, 9 8 4 A
flesh, so t h a t he speaks h u m a n l y a n d suffers the things w h i c h n a t u r a l l y
and
also,
in
illud
omnia
2,
213A,
T o sum u p this discussion: of the ten psalm-texts w h i c h A t h a n a s i u s
belong t o the b o d y a n d the flesh (c Ar
h i 55-8) A n o t h e r , w h i c h he
connects w i t h the O l d Testament, there is agreement i n f i v e cases w i t h
shares w i t h Eusebius, is to appeal to G a l , 3:13, ' C h r i s t has become a
the Expositiones,
curse for u s ' , w h i c h explains w h y C h r i s t should utter words w h i c h are
and disagreement i n five, O f nine texts o n the i n c a r -
n a t i o n , four agree and three disagree, w i t h no c o m m e n t o n t w o O f six
really a p p r o p r i a t e o n l y to sinful
texts o n the Passion, p r o b a b l y five agree, none disagree, a n d one lacks
f i n d these w h o l l y A t h a n a s i a n ideas conveyed i n a phrase w h i c h is never
comment
used by the real A t h a n a s i u s — a n d
O f nine post-Resurrection texts, six agree, t w o disagree a n d
humanity
B u t i n the Expositiones
we
so far as I have observed, not by
XIII
XIII 76
ST ATHANASIUS ON THE PSALMS
Eusebius either; C h r i s t is said t o speak ex Tcpoawrcou -ufj? av9pw7roTfVcoc;.. I have counted nine examples, at Ps. 1 5 : 1 , 15:9, 21 Hyp 40:12, 56:2, 68 Hyp
, 69 Hyp
, besides 142 Hyp.
, 21:2, 2 1 : 1 1 ,
w h i c h uses a similar
Next,
can
we a t t e m p t
to
construct a
profile of
77
the
w r i t e r ? — a s s u m i n g , as I t h i n k we m a y , t h a t the Expositiones work
unknown is a u n i t a r y
A s already n o t e d , he repeatedly f o l l o w s Eusebius; but he never
f o l l o w s h i m i n c o m p a r i n g the d i f f e r e n t versions of the Greek t e x t ; he is
phrase b u t is n o t given a c h r i s t o l o g i c a l sense. and
interested o n l y i n the L X X ; D r . Vian's elenchus has n o w m a d e this
r e m a r k e d that i t c o u l d refer either t o h u m a n i t y as a w h o l e , or t o the
clear. N e x t , he is s t r o n g l y interested i n the ascetic i d e a l ; t h o u g h I have
personal h u m a n i t y of C h r i s t I n f a c t the f i r s t sense is perfectly clear a n d
n o t n o t i c e d any passage w h i c h clearly p o i n t s either t o solitary d e v o t i o n
explicit i n several cases; a t y p i c a l example comes at Ps
or t o c o m m u n i t y l i f e
W h a t exactly does i t mean? M m e . R o n d e a u n o t i c e d i t b r i e f l y
me
1 2
1 5 : 1 , 'Preserve
O L o r d , for i n thee have 1 p u t m y t r u s t — A s s u m i n g the c o m m o n
T h i r d l y , he shows n o clearly-marked d o g m a t i c
interests H e is clearly a Nicene; he once uses the t e r m 6u.oouai.oi;, at 21:2,
so t o speak, o f h u m a n i t y , he addresses G o d and the Father;
a n d once m e n t i o n s the T r i s a g i o n , at 26:6; b u t he does not appear t o be
not really o n his o w n account, b u t for us a n d o n our account, as being
greatly w o r r i e d b y A r i a n i s m , a n d when he explains that the L o r d is
one
superior t o the heavenly p o w e r s , at 88:7, the passage turns o u t t o be
prosopon, of
us
through
the
economy'
( T o xotvov coorcep xpoawrcov xfje;
dvOpcoTtOTiqxoi; cxvaXapwv xov<; npdc; ©eov xca FEaxepa Troieirai Xoyou? oux vrcip
b o r r o w e d f r o m Eusebius
ye [xaXXov eauxou, 8 i ' r\\La<; hi x a i uxep T[u.cov CO; el<; ei; r\[Lto\> Sia xrjv
sions t o a s o u l i n C h r i s t , b u t does n o t i g n o r e t h e m altogether; this is a
H e tends t o p l a y d o w n t h e Psalmist's a l l u -
oixovoixiav) A g a i n at 40:12, ' t h a t m y enemy m a y n o t t r i u m p h against
p o s i t i o n w h i c h I f o r m e r l y t h o u g h t was once adopted b y A t h a n a s i u s 1
m e ' , we f i n d a contrast: ' I f C h r i s t says this f r o m the prosopon
of
can f i n d n o clear i n d i c a t i o n o f either m o n o p h y s i t e or diphysite sym-
h u m a n i t y , the enemy w o u l d mean h i m w h o devised our d e a t h ' (sc. the
p a t h i e s — w h i c h seems unexpected i f w i t h D o r i v a l w e make h i m an
d e v i l ) ; ' b u t i f i t comes as f r o m C h r i s t h i m s e l f , he means the rulers of the
A l e x a n d r i a n w r i t i n g i n the half-century after C y r i l ' s death. The phrase
Jews'
TO jtpoacoTTov x r i i avBpcoTcoTrjTO? m i g h t seem t o have an A n t i o c h e n e f l a v o u r ;
A g a i n i n Ps. 68 Hyp.
the phrase ex rcpoaomou -zf\c, av0ptor:6x7]xoi; is
paralleled a few lines b e l o w by ex xpoatimou xr)<; avQpanrou cpuaetoc,. M m e .
b u t as we have seen, i t does n o t d i s t i n c t l y refer t o a personal
Rondeau's second p o s s i b i l i t y , a reference t o the m o r e sophisticated n o -
C h r i s t , t h o u g h again i t does n o t exclude i t ; a n d i t is n o t m a t c h e d b y any
t i o n o f C h r i s t ' s o w n personal h u m a n i t y , is never q u i t e u n a m b i g u o u s l y
c o r r e s p o n d i n g phrase o n the lines o f t o rcpoacoxov xrjc; 9e6xr|xoi;.
expressed, b u t i t is p r o b a b l y present at 2 1 : 1 1 , ' I was cast u p o n thee f r o m
humanity in
W e seem, t h e n , t o have a w r i t e r w h o is strongly c o m m i t t e d t o the
the w o m b * ... ' H e prays again f r o m the person of (his) h u m a n i t y . For
monastic i d e a l , b u t is n o t a b l y uninterested i n d o g m a t i c
indeed the b a n d of disciples had deserted h i m . ' The w r i t e r , t h e n , is
least, i n those w h i c h p r o v o k e d the m a j o r crises of the f o u r t h a n d f i f t h
clearly aware of t w o d i s t i n c t possibilities, b u t m a y n o t have n o t i c e d the
centuries. H e is clearly w e l l g r o u n d e d i n the t r a d i t i o n a l exegesis o f the
possible a m b i g u i t y o f this actual phrase .
Psalter; i f D o r i v a l is r i g h t , besides Eusebius he uses O r i g e n , A p o l l i n a r i s ,
I f our a r g u m e n t is accepted, w h a t f o l l o w s ? F i r s t , i t perceptibly
disputes—at
D i d y m u s a n d C y r i l ; b u t he makes his o w n characteristic selection
changes our p i c t u r e of Athanasius.. I t counters the impression g i v e n ,
Despite his massive debt t o Eusebius, he is really not m u c h interested i n
e.g., b y Quasten, w h o writes ( i i i . 38) ' I t is evident t h a t A t h a n a s i u s had a
establishing the o r i g i n a l meaning of the t e x t ; his concern is t o i n t e r p r e t
p r e d i l e c t i o n for the allegorical a n d t y p o l o g i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the
the Psalter i n terms w h i c h bear o n the C h u r c h ' s l i f e ; and here a n all-
Psalter i n c o n t r a d i s t i n c t i o n t o the m o r e j e j u n e exegesis p r e d o m i n a n t i n
p e r v a d i n g emphasis is t h a t o n evangelism, i n c l u d i n g the conversion of
his
dogmatico-polemical
writings'
Certainly,
as
we
have
seen,
lews as well as Gentiles. Perhaps some scholar better acquainted t h a n I
Athanasius treated some texts f r o m the Psalter as p o i n t i n g f o r w a r d t o
w i t h the post-Athanasian C h u r c h c a n use these clues t o t h r o w m o r e light
the i n c a r n a t i o n and
u p o n his i d e n t i t y .
the C h u r c h ; b u t i n others he is p r e p a r e d t o
recognize a s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d h i s t o r i c a l sense, n o d o u b t r e f l e c t i n g the r e a c t i o n against Origen's allegory w h i c h we are t o l d was set o n f o o t by Bishop Peter of A l e x a n d r i a
XIII
XIV NOTES 1
2
'The Scriptures and the Soul of Christ in Athanasius', Vig Christ. See p 70
5
'Athanase ou Pseudo-Athanase', RSLR
I
'L'Épître à Marcellinus sur les psaumes', Vig Christ
s
See n 4, and cf her recent book Les Commentaires
36 (1982) 233-250.
16 (1980) 80-89 22 (1968) 176-197 Patriotiques
du Psautier,
W h y N o t Three Gods?
Vol I
(Orientalia Christiana Analecta, 219). Rome 1982 6
' 8
" 10
"
'Athanasius über den Psalter
48 (1973) 157-173.
Op cit , 189, 192-3 C f Eusebius HE
İ.2 8, D £
v 5.1, 7 4.
Op cit , 180 YÉWÏ)ŒIÇ: 84A, 124A, 384A, 384D, 461B, 461C, 461D I-EWÔSV, 128C, 388C, 461D 'Une nouvelle preuve de l'influence littéraire d'Eusèbe de Césarée sur Athanase',
RecSR II
T h e Logic o f G r e g o r y o f Nyssa's T r i n i t a r i a n D o c t r i n e
', Theologie und Philosophie
56 (1968) 385-434; esp 404-409; Vig. Christ
RecSR
op cit , 423
22 (1968) 184-185
G r e g o r y o f Nyssa's treatise 'On N o t T h r e e Gods' is an a t t r a c t i v e a n d i n f l u e n t i a l w o r k , a n d I m a k e no apology f o r r e f l e c t i n g o n i t once a g a i n , together w i t h some companion pieces I h a v e come t o t h i n k t h a t i t resembles a n accomplished c o n j u r i n g t r i c k m o r e n e a r l y t h a n a v a l i d theological d e m o n s t r a t i o n ; b u t I t r u s t t h a t i n p r e s e n t i n g this v i e w I s h a l l n o t disconcert our g r e a t l y respected colleague a n d deai f r i e n d , w h o has a l w a y s c o m b i n e d a dedicated p u r s u i t of t o t a l accu r a c y w i t h g r e a t k i n d n e s s t o w a r d s less g i f t e d scholars Gregory's essay is c o n v e n i e n t l y accessible i n F M i i l l e r ' s e d i t i o n , as are t w o other w o r k s w h i c h o f f e r u s e f u l comparisons, the Ad Eustathium de sancta trinitate, a n d t h e Ad Graecos (ex communibus notionibus) I s h a l l also refer, t o 'Basil's' Letter 38, assuming i t was w r i t t e n by Gregory . 1
These f o u r pieces appear t o divide i n t o t w o groups a c c o r d i n g to the s t a n d p o i n t adopted. T h e t w o l a t t e r argue i n p h i l o s o p h i c a l style t h a t t h e confession o f t h r e e d i v i n e hypostases is n o bar to t h e accept ance of t h e single d i v i n e substance, ouotoc, p r o c l a i m e d i n the Nicene Creed; w h e n c o r r e c t l y u n d e r s t o o d , vnoaxaou; r e f e r s to i n d i v i d u a l s , ouotot to t h e c o m m o n n a t u r e t h e y share; a n d i t is t a k e n f o r g r a n t e d t h a t t h e w o r d 0e6c. indicates t h i s d i v i n e substance or n a t u r e ; thus t h e r e are t h r e e Persons b u t one G o d T h e other t w o essays p u t their case m o r e i n f o r m a l l y ; t h e ires dei presents i t t h u s : i f each of t h e d i v i n e Persons is t o be called G o d , w h y s h o u l d we p r o c l a i m o n e God r a t h e r t h a n three? I n these t w o pieces G r e g o r y is s t i l l p r e p a r e d to discuss the v i e w t h a t t h e w o r d 8£oc, r e f e r s t o t h e d i v i n e substance or n a t u r e ( o u o t a , (puotc), b u t he p r e f e r s t o t a k e i t as i n d i c a t i n g t h e d i v i n e a c t i v i t y of p r o v i d e n t i a l o v e r s i g h t , 8eu>petv; h i s a r g u m e n t being t h a t God's n a t u r e is m y s t e r i o u s , a n d so cannot be s i g n i f i e d b y any w o r d , a n d t h e r e f o r e n o t by the w o r d Qzoc? I n the De Trinitate, more2
Tres dei: GHO III/I 37-57; trim ib. 3-16; c o m not: ib. 19-33. Ad Petrum differentia essentiae et hypostaseos - BAS ep 38 (I 81-92 COURTOHNE) 1
2
See e g comm not (GNO I I I / I 22,11-24)
3
liin
(GHO III/I 14,5 ff ); tres
dei (GFO III/I 42,13 ff )
fiatrem
de
XIV
XIV 150
Why Sot Three Gods?
over, a t h i r d p o s s i b i l i t y is m e n t i o n e d , t h o u g h not w a r m l y a p p r o v e d ; n a m e l y t h a t 0eo? is s i m p l y a t e r m expressive of supreme v a l u e B o t h these w o r k s , however, argue t h e case f o r d i v i n e u n i t y i n t e r m s o f the a t t r i b u t e s , o r t h e operations, w h i c h are c o m m o n to t h e t h r e e Persons; a n d w h e n t h e y w i s h to s u m m a r i z e , p r e f e r t h e less f o r m a l t e r m (puoic, as against the m o r e t e c h n i c a l , a n d m o r e c o n t r o v e r s i a l , ouatcc, unoaxotoic, a n d Tcpocrconov A t a b l e s h o w i n g the f r e q u e n c y o f these f o u r nouns w i l l b r i n g o u t the c o n t r a s t 4
comm. not ouata
96
ÛTtoaxaatç. rtpoacùïtov cpuotç
35 58 6
ep 38 19 32 3 11
bin
h es dei
3 6 1 30
4 11 4 62
T h e t w o f o r m e r w o r k s , I t h i n k , were w r i t t e n a t a t i m e w h e n t h e Nicene Creed i t s e l f was the focus o f intense debate; R H i i b n e r ' s suggestion of 379-80, s h o r t l y before t h e C o u n c i l o f C o n s t a n t i n o p l e , seems e x t r e m e l y p r o b a b l e T h e other t w o pieces no d o u b t came l a t e r , w h e n i t was less easy to present a f o r m a l challenge to Nicene theology, h u t w h e n Gregory's o w n o r t h o d o x y m i g h t be q u e s t i o n e d His observations o n t h e w o r d 6e6c, m i g h t w e l l be a c o r r e c t i o n o f his f o r m e r v i e w ; moreover i n tres dei (37,8), t h e r e is a reference to his o l d age. 5
151
t h e m Macedonians; w h i l e i n t h e i i eyes Gregory's confession o f a single D i v i n i t y a m o u n t s to S a b e l l i a n i s m T h e tres dei represents h i m as c o n f r o n t e d w i t h a s i m i l a r , t h o u g h not i d e n t i c a l , d i l e m m a T h e F a t h e r is God, the Son is God, a n d the H o l y S p i r i t is God. I t w o u l d seem to f o l l o w t h a t t h e r e are t h r e e Gods; i f however one m a i n t a i n s a b e l i e f i n one God, t h i s appears t o mean accepting t h e d i v i n i t y of the Father w h i l e d e n y i n g t h a t of the Son and Spirit G r e g o r y t h u s presents h i m s e l f as faced w i t h a choice between t r i t h e i s m a n d e x t r e m e A r i a n i s m His correspondent puts the p r o b l e m i n t h i s f o r m : Peter, James a n d J o h n , t h o u g h t h e y share t h e same m a n h o o d (èv urge ÔVXEÇ xy\ av6pu>Tc6x7)xt) are spoken o f as t h r e e men I f t h e n we acknowledge three d i v i n e Persons (onoaxctaeiç) u n i t e d i n a single n a t u r e a n d single d i v i n i t y , w h a t r i g h t have we to reject a doct r i n e of t h r e e Gods? I t is t h i s f o r m u l a t i o n o f the p r o b l e m t h a t leads G r e g o r y t o develope t h e elegant a n d c a p t i v a t i n g t h e o r y characteristic o f t h e tres dei; n a m e l y t h a t i t is o n l y a loose use of language t h a t perm i t s us to describe t h e aforesaid saints as t h r e e m e n ; p r o p e r l y speaki n g , since t h e i r m a n h o o d is i d e n t i c a l , they are a l l one m a n T h e i m p l i c a t i o n is t h a t a correct u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f the h u m a n s i t u a t i o n w i l l resolve the theological p r o b l e m o f the T r i n i t y 10
1 1
12
6
T h i s a r g u m e n t goes beyond t h e w e l l - k n o w n d i s t i n c t i o n between u n ô o x a a i ç a n d o u a t a presented elsewhere, f o i instance i n 'Basil's' Letter 38; f o r t h a t w o u l d a l l o w us to t r e a t o ù o i a s i m p l y as a generic t e r m f o r t h e c o m m o n a t t r i b u t e of d i v i n i t y w h i c h is shared b y three d i v i n e i n d i v i d u a l s T h e r e s u l t w o u l d be a l u r i d b u t u n d e m a n d i n g p l u r a l i s t i c d o c t r i n e , w h i c h a d m i t t e d l y G r e g o r y w i l l seek to c o r r e c t i n other ways T h e tres dei d i f f e r s ; b u t its r e a l l y s t r i k i n g f e a t u r e , i f I j u d g e c o r r e c t l y , is not the c l a i m t h a t i t is a n i m p r o p e r use of language to speak o f t h r e e h u m a n i n d i v i d u a l s as 'three m e n ' W e c o u l d a v o i d t h e p u r e l y v e r b a l d i f f i c u l t y b y means w h i c h G r e g o r y h i m s e l f suggests, b y s p e a k i n g o f 'three h u m a n persons' or 'instances o f t h e one m a n ' , as i n coram not 29: rtoXXoct ûnocrràoetç xoû ëvôç àvDpwnou m u c h as we speak o f 'three loaves of bread' or 'three golden c o i n s ' A p p l i e d to theology, t h i s p r i n c i p l e w o u l d a l l o w us to a v o i d t h e expression 'three Gods' w h i l e p r o c l a i m i n g t h r e e d i v i n e Persons w h o i n 1 3
1 G r e g o r y e x p l a i n s his general s t a n d p o i n t i n trin pp. 5-7 His c r i t i c s , he says, c o m p l a i n t h a t w h i l e he recognizes three d i s t i n c t hypostases i n t h e Godhead, he speaks o f o n l y one Goodness, P o w e i , a n d D i v i n i t y I t appears f r o m t h e n e x t page t h a t these c r i t i c s are p l u r a l i s t s , w h o themselves confess, n o t o n l y t h r e e hypostases, b u t t h r e e Bubstances ( o u a i a t ) ; t h o u g h according to G r e g o r y t h e y t r e a t o n l y the F a t h e r a n d the Son as t r u l y d i v i n e I f t h i s is c o r r e c t , we w o u l d c a l l 7
8
9
14
10
4
5
I / i n (15,7
ff)
See R. H HUBHER, Ep 38, 490
8
liin
(3,11-7,15); cf tres dei (37,3-10)
7
Tiin
(5,17-19)..
8
lb
6,14 f
8
lb
7,8-15.
lb. 5,10 f
11
Tres
18
lb
dei (38,3- 7) 38,8 f
The phrases 'generic identity', 'generic unity', seem often to be used rather loosely, to include unity of species (e. g of Peter and Paul, who are both men) as well as unity of genus, where the species may differ (e. g. of this man and that horse, who aie both animals) I have not tried to correct this imprecision 1 3
"
Tres
dei (53 f )
XIV
XIV Why Hot Three Gode?
152
f a c t m i g h t d i f f e r e x t r e m e l y i n r a n k a n d goodness T h e m o r e i n t e r e s t i n g f e a t u r e o f t h e ties dei is t h a t i t seems to argue f o r a u n i t y o f n a t u r e i n t h r e e h u m a n i n d i v i d u a l s w h i c h goes beyond the generic u n i t y w h i c h is c o m m o n l y a d m i t t e d I t is t a n t a l i z i n g l y d i f f i c u l t t o d e t e r m i n e w h a t G r e g o r y has i n m i n d ; b u t he lets i t appear t h a t i f t h e h u m a n s i t u a t i o n is u n d e r s t o o d i n t h i s f r e s h a n d c h a l l e n g i n g w a y , i t presents a close a n a l o g y f o r t h e H o l y T r i n i t y . W e m a y pause at t h i s p o i n t t o consider a n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f Gregory's v i e w w h i c h I a m sure s h o u l d be dismissed. P r o p e r l y speaking, he says, the phrase ' m a n y m e n ' is e q u i v a l e n t to ' m a n y n a t u r e s o f m e n ' (reoXXoct tpuoEti; a v O p u n t v a t ) , a phrase w h i c h he c l e a r l y t h i n k s absurd C o u l d we i n t e r p r e t his d i c t u m , t h a t the saints are a l l one m a n , as i n t e n d e d s i m p l y t o exclude t h i s idea b y asserting, n o t t h e i r mere i d e n t i t y 'as m a n , b u t t h a t t h e y are a l l t h e same kind o f man? W e o u r selves m i g h t f i n d t h i s a t t r a c t i v e , as we now recognize t h a t t h e r e have been d i s t i n c t types o f m a n ; at one t i m e homo sapiens a n d N e a n d e r t h a l m a n l i v e d side b y side, e x h i b i t i n g n o t a b l e d i f f e r e n c e s i n physique a n d w a y o f l i f e , a l t h o u g h t h e y belonged to the same species b y the accepted c r i t e r i o n t h a t t h e y c o u l d i n t e r b r e e d . S i m i l a r l y we m i g h t say t h a t J a c k y , Joey a n d P o l l y are ' a l l the same m o n k e y ' , m e a n i n g j u s t t h a t t h e y are a l l chimpanzees B u t G r e g o r y c a n n o t possibly have m e a n t a n y t h i n g l i k e t h i s He f i t s h u m a n i t y i n t o t h e t h r e e f o l d c l a s s i f i c a t i o n established b y A r i s t o t l e , n a m e l y genus, species a n d i n d i v i d ual 'Such-and-such a n a n i m a l ' (itpov toiovoe) is m a n simpliciter, i n c o n t r a s t w i t h t h e h o r s e ; 'such-and-such a m a n ' (xoi6aoe avupwrtoc,) is suggested as a phrase w h i c h m i g h t s i g n i f y a n i n d i v i d u a l , Peter or Paul G r e g o r y t h i n k s t h i s i m p r o p e r ; b u t t h r o u g h o u t his discussion t h e r e is no question o f t h e phrase i n d i c a t i n g s i m p l y a t y p e or v a r i e t y of man 15
1 6
excusable to t a l k of t h r e e m e n w h i l e i t r e m a i n s i n c o r r e c t to r e f e r to t h r e e Gods T h e r e is a v a l u a b l e p o i n t made here, w h i c h corrects the r a t h e r s u p e r f i c i a l assumption w h i c h dominates t h e ires dei; we should indeed give serious a t t e n t i o n t o t h e disanalogies between t h r e e h u m a n i n d i v i d u a l s a n d t h e d i v i n e Persons o f our t r i n i t a r i a n confession I t is q u i t e o t h e r w i s e w i t h the arguments o f f e r e d t o show t h a t our t a l k o f ' m a n y m e n ' , etc., r e f l e c t s h u m a n c o n d i t i o n s w h i c h do n o t app l y t o God. These are q u i t e u n c o n v i n c i n g , a n d can be b r i e f l y dismissed: (i) W e speak o f ' m a n y m e n ' because t h e t o t a l n u m b e r o f m e n is n o t constant, o w i n g t o deaths a n d b i r t h s 2 2
(ii) M e n have d i f f e r e n t o r i g i n s (sc parents), whereas t h e T r i n i t y has o n l y o n e 2 3
( i i i ) W e speak of ' m a n y o r a t o r s ' , e t c , because each o f t h e m w o r k s
1
1 7
18
1 9
W e m a y t h e r e f o r e discount t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n I t is h u m a n i t y as such, p a r a d o x i c a l l y described as 'one m a n ' , w h i c h G r e g o r y p u t s f o r w a r d aB a n analogy f o r t h e T r i n i t y B u t t h e r e is a n a l t e r n a t i v e l i n e o f a r g u m e n t , w h i c h is represented i n t h e ires dei , b u t is m u c h m o r e f u l l y developed i n the ' C o m m o n N o t i o n s ' ; n a m e l y t h a t t h e r e are i m p o r t a n t d i f f e r e n c e s between h u m a n a n d d i v i n e l i f e w h i c h m a k e i t 20
21
40,8 f
15
Ib
1 6
Cf ib
1 7
See comm not (29-31), where he gives ^uov, 'animal', as an example of a genus.
18
Ib
18
Ib
2 0
Ties
21
Comm not (23,21 f f )
independently
2 4
(iv) M o r e g e n e r a l l y , o n l y s p a t i a l a n d m a t e r i a l t h i n g s a r e n u m bered T h i s last c o n t e n t i o n is c l e a r l y false; we can say, 'two two's are f o u r ' , or e n u m e r a t e t h e f o u r - a n d - t w e n t y elders o f t h e Apocalypse A n d i t s f a i l u r e s u f f i c e s to r e f u t e the others M o r e o v e r , as to ( i ) , one suspects t h a t G r e g o r y has become confused T h e f l u c t u a t i n g n u m b e r o f h u m a n i n d i v i d u a l s is a good r e a s o n f o r c a l l i n g t h e m 'many' r a t h e r t h a n s u g g e s t i n g a n e x a c t n u m b e r ; i t gives us no good g r o u n d for a v o i d i n g all p l u r a l designations a n d c a l l i n g t h e m 'one' As f o r ( i i i ) , we o f t e n e n u m e r a t e p a r t n e r s i n a c o m m o n e n t e r p r i s e , l i k e the T w e l v e ; a n d as f o r ( i i ) , we c o u l d meet G r e g o r y w i t h t h e r e p l y t h a t a l l m e n are descended f r o m A d a m ; b u t i f t h e p o i n t at issue is t h e i r immediate o r i g i n , o n l y the Son is immediately (rcpocextocj d e r i v e d f r o m the F a t h e r 2 5
2 6
W e have been describing t w o a l t e r n a t i v e lines o f a r g u m e n t w h i c h c a n n o t easily be c o n j o i n e d T h e f i r s t we h a v e described as a n argum e n t by analogy; i f we u n d e r s t a n d the case of m e n c o r r e c t l y , Kotxa x6v e m a x T j i i o v i K d v Xoyov, we can solve t h e p r o b l e m o f t h e T r i n i t y T h e s e c o n d a d v e r t s t o d i f f e r e n c e s between h u m a n a n d d i v i n e l i f e w h i c h m a k e i t a l l o w a b l e to speak o f t h r e e m e n , t h o u g h we m u s t not speak o f t h r e e Gods B u t perhaps we have already misdescribed the f i r s t a r g u m e n t G r e g o r y m e n t i o n s t h r e e m e n because i t is a c o n v e n i e n t a n d f a m i l i a r e x a m p l e , a n d indeed h a d a c t u a l l y been suggested;
53,6 f 22
lb. 24,1-14.
29,13 f
23
Ib. 24,26-25,4
31,20 ff.; 32,12 ff
24
Tres
25
Ib
dei (53,6
ff)
153
26
dei (47,11 ff ) 53,9
See ires dei (56,5 f }
XIV
XIV 154
Why Hot T h r e e Gods?
b u t his reasoning takes no account o f a n y d i s t i n c t i v e f e a t u r e s o f h u m a n l i f e ; i t is based o n the logic o f genera a n d species as such, a n d i n the ' C o m m o n N o t i o n s ' we f i n d G r e g o r y a p p l y i n g i t t o dogs a n d horses i n e x a c t l y t h e same w a y as he does to m e n . 2 7
T h e p o i n t he is m a k i n g , t h e n , is t h e p e r f e c t l y g e n e r a l one: i f ' x ' names a class or species, e g m a n , i t is never c o r r e c t t o use i t t o n a m e a member o f t h a t class, e g. P a u l . I n o t h e r w o r d s , w h e n s p e a k i n g corr e c t l y , we s h o u l d never use ' m a n ' i n t h e sense o f A r i s t o t l e ' s o xtc, ov8pu>7Toc, to n a m e a n i n d i v i d u a l ; a n d i f S c r i p t u r e does t h i s , i t is not h i n g b u t a k i n d l y accomodation to o u r slipshod h a b i t s I t s h o u l d of course be r e m e m b e r e d t h a t G r e e k has n o t h i n g w h i c h precisely c o r r e sponds to o u r i n d e f i n i t e a r t i c l e ; one has to say, so to speak, ' P a u l is m a n ' B u t G r e g o r y k n o w s the A r i s t o t e l i a n usage, t h o u g h as a good P l a t o n i s t he p r e f e r s the phrase pepiKT) or IOCKT) ouoioc w h i c h c o u l d n o t suggest, l i k e TCpwTn ouoioc, t h a t t h e i n d i v i d u a l is t h e p r i m e r e a l i t y A r i s t o t l e ' s o TIC. ocvSpuTcog is r e c a l l e d i n Letter 38 b y t h e r e f e r e n c e to Job 1:1, avepwrtoc, TIC; T)V, a n d b y the phrase ev Ttp x t v i r r p a y i i a T t . G r e g o r y is t h u s p e r f e c t l y f a m i l i a r w i t h t h e use o f av0p(OTtoc. t o m e a n 'a p a r t i c u l a r m a n ' ; his p o i n t is t h a t w h e n s p e a k i n g c o r r e c t l y one s h o u l d use t h e phrase ' h u m a n i n d i v i d u a l ' ( T o t a v o e urtooTcxotv dvOpcor c o u ) ; t h o u g h u n d e r s t a n d a b l y he does n o t a l w a y s f o l l o w t h i s r u l e , b u t is c o n t e n t to say, e g , ' L u k e or Stephen is m a n ' , acv8pt>i7ioi; y a p 6 2 8
29
30
AOUKCKC, r j 6 ETecpavoc . 31
I n p r e v i o u s l y p u b l i s h e d c o m m e n t s o n Gregory's v i e w , I s t a t e d t h a t his a r g u m e n t is p e r f e c t l y general; so t h a t i f he m a i n t a i n s t h a t Peter, P a u l a n d B a r n a b a s are o n e m a n , t h e same c o u l d be said o f a n y g r o u p of m e n ; i t should also be t r u e t h a t Moses, A r i s t o t l e a n d Jezebel are a l l one m a n T h e a r g u m e n t t h u s f a i l s because i t s consequences a r e p l a i n l y a b s u r d T h i s c r i t i c i s m , I s t i l l t h i n k , is v a l i d as f a r as i t goes; b u t I c o u l d have p o i n t e d o u t , f i r s t , t h a t G r e g o r y does n o t a l w a y s argue on p u r e l y l o g i c a l grounds; b u t secondly, t h a t w h e n he does so, h i s r e a s o n i n g is -perfectly g e n e r a l ; i t is n o t concerned w i t h m e n as such, b u t w i t h w h a t he alleges is the c o r r e c t n o m e n c l a t u r e f o r any system of genera, species a n d i n d i v i d u a l s . 3 2
3 3
27
Comm not (29 ff )
2 8
See e. g ib. 27,4 ff.
29
Ib 23,4 ff
30
Ib 29,9
31
lies
32
Comm not (23,14)
T h i s becomes clear i f we consider the discussion w h i c h begins at p 28 9 i n t h e ' C o m m o n N o t i o n s ' . G r e g o r y t u r n s t o some u n n a m e d c r i t i c s w h o object to his a r g u m e n t as f o l l o w s . A hypostasis, t h e y say, does n o t d i f f e r f r o m a hypostasis qua hypostasis; b u t t h a t does not m e a n t h a t a l l hypostases a r e one hypostasis T h e same can be s a i d of o u o t a , So also a g a i n , t o say t h a t one d i v i n e being, as such, does not d i f f e r f r o m another (Geo? 8eou, h 8e6c., ouoev otoctpepet) does n o t establ i s h the d o c t r i n e t h a t t h e y are one God; j u s t as to say t h a t m a n does n o t d i f f e r f r o m m a n qua m a n does not d e n y t h e f a c t t h a t P e t e r , P a u l a n d B a r n a b a s are t h r e e m e n 'For ouoioc d i f f e r s f r o m ouoioc, n o t qua ouoioc, b u t qua such-and-such a n ouoioc' ( a n d so also w i t h urcoaTocatc); ' s i m i l a r l y m a n ( d i f f e r s ) f r o m m a n qua such-and-such (a) m a n , and again god f r o m god qua such-and-such a god' (Stoccpepei yap ouoioc ouaicxc, ou KOC6O ouoioc, acXXde KocSd xoiaoe oOoia .. GJOOC6TUC, KOK acvGpwrcoc. avGptimou, f i xoi6aoe acv6pwTioc,, m i naXtv 6E6C, 0eou ft TOIOOOE 6e6c, TO 8e xoioao€ r\ TOIOOOE kid Suo r\ xocl rtXetovuv Etw8e XEyecOaci) T o paraphrase t h e l a s t clause, p a r t i c u l a r i z i n g expressions l i k e 'such-andsuch' i m p l y t h a t t w o or m o r e instances o f a class are b e i n g considered Gregory's r e p l y shows t h a t he is a d e q u a t e l y i n s t r u c t e d i n the t e r m i n o l o g y o f logic; b u t w h e n c a r e f u l l y e x a m i n e d i t reveals t h a t o n l y the last clause is e f f e c t i v e l y considered A n d t h e discussion takes a s u r p r i s i n g f o r m , G r e g o r y says t h a t we a t t a c h the w o r d 'such-andsuch' to a w o r d d e n o t i n g a genus, t h e r e b y p i c k i n g o u t a p a r t i c u l a r species . One w o u l d expect h i m to c o n t i n u e , o n t h e same p r i n c i p l e , 'and we a t t a c h t h e wor d 'such-and-such' t o a w o r d d e n o t i n g a species, so as t o p i c k o u t a p a r t i c u l a r i n d i v i d u a l ; s a y i n g f o r instance, ' P a u l is a grey-eyed man'. B u t t h i s is n o t w h a t G r e g o r y says; he argues t h a t since t h e p a r t i c u l a r i z i n g characteristics belong to t h e i n d i v i d u a l , the p a r t i c u l a r i z i n g d e s c r i p t i o n m u s t be a t t a c h e d to the w o r d UTIOOTCIOIC., ' i n d i v i d u a l ' , a n d n o t t o the class-name 'man . W e can t h u s describe P a u l as a grey-eyed i n d i v i d u a l , b u t n o t as a grey-eyed m a n . O n this g r o u n d he c l a i m s t h a t his critics* case collapses He is not f o r c e d to d e n y the obvious f a c t t h a t t h e r e are m a n y h u m a n i n d i v i d u a l s ; what he claims is t h a t t h e y are o n l y one m a n ; a c c o r d i n g l y , he says, we ack n o w l e d g e t h r e e d i v i n e hypostases, b u t confess one God (roXXac. yap UTtooTaoeic, x o u Evdc. dvOpurcou KOU Tpsic, UTtoaTaoEic, TOU evdc, 8eo0 34
1
CpOCUeV OlKQCtGiC,) , 35
dei (40,21 f )
STEAD, Personality 190; reprinted in my 'Substance and Illusion in the Christian Fathers' 3 3
155
E g comm not (29,13): 'man is such-and-such an animal ; cf ib. 30,11-14, where the particularizing characteristics are explained, and 31,14-16. 3 4
35
1
Ib (29,9 ff )
XIV
XIV 156
Why Hot T h r e e G o d s ?
157
I n his r e p l y , t h e n , G r e g o r y has s i m p l y m a i n t a i n e d his insistence t h a t i t is i n c o r r e c t t o use a w o r d w h i c h p r o p e r l y denotes a species to p i c k o u t a member o f t h a t species, as w i t h A r i s t o t l e ' s o TIC, av0pw;r,oc,, 'such-and-such a m a n ' Note t h a t G r e g o r y does n o t generalize t h i s r u l e , as we m i g h t expect; we are a l l o w e d t o say 'an a n i m a l ' i f we w i s h to r e f e r to t h e l i o n , or to m a n ; b u t we m u s t n o t say 'a m a n ' i f o u r i n t e n t i o n is t o indicate P a u l B u t G r e g o r y has neglected p a r t o f his opponents' case; a n d the consequences f o r his o w n v i e w s are embarrassi n g He has acquiesced i n t h e i r use o f p u r e l y l o g i c a l a r g u m e n t s , ass u m i n g a n exact analogy between h u m a n a n d d i v i n e c o n d i t i o n s I t is i n c o r r e c t , he says, to r e f e r t o P a u l as 'such-and-such a m a n ' . Can we indeed c a l l h i m 'a m a n ' , as opposed to 'a hypostasis o f man'? I f n o t , i t w o u l d seem t o f o l l o w t h a t we are n o t p e r m i t t e d to say 'the Father is God ; b u t i n a n y case, i f t h e a n a l o g y holds, we cannot c a l l h i m 'a m e r c i f u l God'.. A n d a l t h o u g h we have h e a r d some sort o f case f o r describi n g t h e t h r e e Persons as one God, i t a l l o w s o f a disastrous w e a k e n i n g o f t h e sense, b o t h o f ' G o d ' a n d o f 'one'; so f a r as t h e a r g u m e n t goes, i t m a y be t h a t t h e t h r e e Persons are one God i n n o m o r e r i g o r o u s sense t h a n P a u l a n d Jezebel are one m a n .
t e n assumed t h a t a thing's proper n a m e served n o t o n l y to designate i t b u t also t o r e v e a l i t s n a t u r e . B u t perhaps we s h o u l d a l l o w h i m to suggest, i n c o n s i s t e n t l y no d o u b t , t h a t t h e r e m a y be aspects o f t h e d i v i n e n a t u r e w h i c h cannot be a p p r o p r i a t e l y h a n d l e d b y our o r d i n a r y classifications of genera a n d species; a n d conceivably also, t h a t there m a y be some c o m m o n l y disregarded u n i t y i n t h e h u m a n species w h i c h m a y o f f e r some analogy t o t h e u n i t y o f God.
M o r e o v e r , his critics are s u r e l y e n t i t l e d to r e p l y : ' B u t t h i s "correct usage" o f y o u r s is a most u n u s u a l c o n v e n t i o n , to w h i c h , y o u a d m i t , the B i b l e does n o t a l w a y s c o n f o r m N o t a g a i n , we observe, does y o u r o w n usage. S u r e l y f o r a l l n o r m a l purposes we needn't be so fussy; a n d y o u s h o u l d a l l o w us to c r e d i t y o u w i t h a belief i n t h r e e gods' I do n o t k n o w w h a t m y readers w i l l t h i n k o f t h i s r e p l y ; i n m y o w n o p i n i o n , i t is q u i t e a good one
B u t w h a t we h a v e called t h e 'disanalogy' p a r t o f his a r g u m e n t does t a k e account o f t h e status of h u m a n i t y ; G r e g o r y contrasts h u m a n a n d d i v i n e e x i s t e n c e ; a n d he doesn't a l w a y s present t h e cont r a s t as one of sheer o p p o s i t i o n ; i n t w o passages a t least he argues t h a t i f h u m a n i n d i v i d u a l s e x h i b i t a single u n d i v i d e d n a t u r e , 'how m u c h m o r e ' (rtoacp uctXXov) m u s t t h i s be t r u e o f t h e d i v i n e P e r s o n s H e r e , t h e n , is t h e suggestion - m u c h v a g u e r , m u c h less f u l l y developed, b u t s t i l l detectable - t h a t the 'one m a n ' a t t r i b u t e d t o Peter, James a n d J o h n stands f o r some sort o f i d e a l h u m a n u n i t y , so t h a t t h e i r f e l l o w s h i p r e f l e c t s , o n t h e h u m a n l e v e l , the u n i t y of t h e three d i v i n e Persons i n one God Unless I a m g r e a t l y m i s t a k e n , i t is this aspect o f Gregory's teaching t h a t has encouraged a u t h o r i t i e s l i k e Prestige a n d K e l l y t o i n s i s t t h a t ' f o r these w r i t e r s ' - t h e Cappadocians - 'the ousia o f the Godhead was n o t a n a b s t r a c t essence b u t a concrete reality' .
1
36
2, So f a r , however, we have g i v e n a r a t h e r one-sided i m p r e s s i o n o f Gregory's case, d r a w i n g h e a v i l y o n t h e ' C o m m o n N o t i o n s ' a n d pres e n t i n g h i m as a r g u i n g i n t e r m s o f a b s t r a c t logic. I n f a i r n e s s , we s h o u l d r e c a l l t h e p o i n t made i n his t w o later essays, to t h e e f f e c t t h a t the d i v i n e n a t u r e is m y s t e r i o u s I do n o t t h i n k he is r i g h t i n i n f e r r i n g ' t h e r e f o r e i t c a n n o t be named', since m a n y m u c h m o r e down-to-earth r e a l i t i e s have been g i v e n names a t a t i m e w h e n almost n o t h i n g was k n o w n o f their n a t u r e ; t h u n d e r , f o r instance, or e l e c t r i c i t y . I t h i n k G r e g o r y m a y have been m i s l e d b y u n t e n a b l e n o t i o n s a b o u t t h e 'proper name', K u p t o v ovopot , since a n c i e n t theories o f language of37
3 6
Tiin
(9,8
37
ff)
Ties
dei (42,17)
3 8
L e t us t h e n consider t h i s other side o f Gregory's a r g u m e n t Once again i t is n o t q u i t e w h a t i t appears a t f i r s t sight. I said e a r l i e r t h a t G r e g o r y sometimes argues as i f t h e r e were a n exact analogy between h u m a n a n d d i v i n e r e a l i t i e s , sometimes d r a w s a t t e n t i o n to f u n d a m e n t a l differences. W e have n o w q u a l i f i e d t h e f i r s t p o i n t ; G r e g o r y does assume such a n a n a l o g y ; b u t t h a t is because he f r a m e s his a r g u m e n t i n t e r m s o f abstract logic Besides m e n , he uses dogs and horses as e x a m p l e s ; t h o u g h , to be sure, n o t n a m e d i n d i v i d u a l horses or dogs, l i k e Bucephalus or A r g u s ; a n d , so f a r as I can see, t h i s p a r t o f his arg u m e n t is u n a f f e c t e d b y considerations o f status or value; i t w o u l d a p p l y e q u a l l y w e l l to angels a n d to m i n e r a l s , to d i v i n i t y a n d t o demons 39
40
41
4 2
3 S
See my p a p e r ' L o g i c a n d t h e A p p l i c a t i o n of Haines to God'
3 9
Comm not
(29,14-30,0
4 0
E g
dei (41,18 f f )
4 1
Comm not
4 2
K E L L Y , E a r l y C h r i s t i a n D o c t r i n e s 268
tres
(22,18 f f ; 32,21
ff.)
XIV
XIV 158
Why Hot T h r e e Gods?
K e l l y q u i t e r i g h t l y brings i n other evidence t o s u p p o r t his j u d g e m e n t , n o t a b l y t h e Cappadocians' b e l i e f i n t h e s i m p l i c i t y o f God. B u t i t w o u l d need some close analysis t o discover w h a t k i n d o f s i m p l i c i t y is c o m p a t i b l e w i t h a belief i n t h r e e d i v i n e P e r s o n s Letter 38 relates t h e m t h u s : 'As t o t h e i r being i n f i n i t e a n d i n c o m p r e h e n s i b l e a n d u n created a n d n o t positioned i n space a n d a l l other such ( a t t r i b u t e s ) , t h e r e is n o v a r i a t i o n i n t h e l i f e - g i v i n g n a t u r e , I m e a n t h a t o f t h e F a t h e r , t h e Son a n d the H o l y S p i r i t , b u t a c e r t a i n c o n t i n u o u s a n d u n b r o k e n c o m m u n i t y is seen i n them'. G r e g o r y does not seem t o be a r g u i n g for d i v i n e s i m p l i c i t y i n t h e r a d i c a l sense, i m p l y i n g t h a t a l l t h e d i v i n e a t t r i b u t e s w h i c h we d i s t i n g u i s h b y separate names a r e i n f a c t i d e n t ical O n t h e other h a n d i t appears f r o m t h e c o n t e x t t h a t t h e w o r d j u s t t r a n s l a t e d as ' c o m m u n i t y ' (xotvwvia) stands f o r t h e ' c o m m o n o w n e r s h i p ' o f these a t t r i b u t e s , r a t h e r t h a n a m o r e d i s t i n c t l y social ' f e l l o w s h i p ' w h i c h m i g h t be p a r a l l e l e d b y h u m a n society at i t s best. I n a n y case, n e i t h e r t h e ' C o m m o n N o t i o n s ' nor t h e ' T h r e e Gods' a f f o r d s m o r e t h a n f a i n t a n d elusive i n d i c a t i o n s o f t h i s l a t t e r v i e w 43
4 4
T o e x p l a i n t h e i r t e a c h i n g , we m a y consider t h r e e conceptions w h i c h G r e g o r y does o u t l i n e w i t h some c l a r i t y : (1) T h e tres dei t r e a t s o f cpuatc,, n a t u r e , i n c o n t r a s t w i t h urcócrtaoic,, as e x e m p l i f i e d b y h u m a n i n d i v i d u a l s l i k e L u k e a n d Stephen ' Y e t the n a t u r e is o n e , u n i t e d i n i t s e l f , a m o n a d c o m p l e t e l y i n d i v i s i b l e , w h i c h is n e i t h e r increased b y a d d i t i o n nor d i m i n i s h e d b y s u b t r a c t i o n ' e t c . . I t is p r e t t y clear t h a t G r e g o r y is t h i n k i n g o f t h e P l a t o n i c F o r m or Idea; t h i s is s t r o n g l y suggested b y t h e c o n c l u d i n g w o r d s ' n o t d i v i d e d b y t h e i n d i v i d u a l s w h o par ticipate i n i t ' a n d b y t h e emphasis o n its u n i t y ; t h e reference t o i t as ' i n d i v i s i b l e ' (ctaxtoxoc) m a y w e l l be a P l a t o n i c v e r s i o n o f t h e A r i s t o t e l i a n d o c t r i n e t h a t substance has n o degrees; the F o r m is indeed distributed a m o n g its v a r i o u s p a r t i c i p a n t s , b u t i n each o f t h e m i t is present i n f u l l For a P l a t o n i s t , such a F o r m is a concrete r e a l i t y ; i t is n o t abstract, i n t h e sense o f being m e r e l y one aspect of s o m e t h i n g else; b u t i t is t r a n s c e n d e n t , n o t p a r t o f o u r 45
4 6
See K f t l V O C H E I H E . I h a v e b e e n a b l e to consult t h i s p a p e r t h r o u g h t h e u s e f u l s u g g e s t i o n s a n d h e l p provided b y Professor C o r n e l i u s PLAHTINGA; see h i s p a p e r ' G r e g o r y of K y s s a a n d t h e S o c i a l A n a l o g y of t h e T r i n i t y ' 4 3
I n G r e g o r y ' s view, God a l o n e i s u n c r e a t e d ; b u t other t h i n g s , s u r e l y , must be non— s p a t i a l ? I f so, t h e properties named by 'uncreated' a n d ' n o n - s p a t i a l ' c a n n o t be identical. C f . trin (8,8 f f . ) , w h e r e h e a r g u e s t h a t t h e v a r i o u s d i v i n e t i t l e s a l l r e f e r to t h e same s u b j e c t (únoKeífZEVov); he does not c l a i m t h a t t h e y a l l h a v e t h e same sense, i . e. t h a t t h e a t t r i b u t e s t h e y name a r e identical He d e n i e s t h i s explicitly a t ties dei (43,9 f f ) 4 4
*
Ties
dei (41,2 if)
C f PARMEH 131 b (I 171 D I E L S ) . B u t tres dei d i f f e r e n t point t h a t t h e ' n a t u r e ' i s a l w a y s singular, number
4 0
(53,6-9) suggests t h e r a t h e r though i t s instances v a r y i n
159
e v e r y d a y w o r l d U n f o r t u n a t e l y G r e g o r y confuses this a p p a r e n t l y clear p i c t u r e b y going o n t o m e n t i o n 'a people . a n a r m y ' , etc. (Xaóc,, STÍUO;, axpáxeuuac, EKKATIOÍOC) as examples o f t h i n g s w h i c h h a v e singular names a l t h o u g h t h e y comprise a m u l t i t u d e o f i n d i v i d u a l s ; f o r i t is a b u n d a n t l y clear t h a t peoples a n d a r m i e s can g a i n i n c r e m e n t s and s u f f e r losses (2) T h i s postscript t h e r e f o r e introduces a second conception, w h i c h G r e g o r y developes i n t h e ' C o m m o n N o t i o n s ' . 'The d e f i n i t i o n o f ' m a n ' is n o t a l w a y s perceived i n t h e same i n d i v i d u a l s ' : ó Spot; xoü ótv0pcÓ7rou OÜK a s i év rote, acÚTOtc, ácxópoic, TiyoCv rEpoc&Ttotc. OeupeÍTOi M e n die, a n d others a r e b o r n , so t h a t t h e h u m a n race is c o n s t a n t l y v a r y i n g i n n u m b e r ; i t is f o r t h i s reason, so G r e g o r y alleges, t h a t we speak o f ' m a n y m e n ' (p. 153 above). I n t h i s case we have a r e a l i t y w h i c h is assuredly concrete, a n d is also perceptible; b u t i t is n o t i n d i v i s i b l e or singular l i k e the ' f o r m ' or ' n a t u r e ' 47
(3) T h i r d l y he r e f e r s t o t h e d e f i n i n g properties o f substances, x a Xotpo!KTTjpiCEtv oúaíac, EÍw0óxa, a n d says t h a t b y speaking o f ' s u c h and-such a substance' we a l l u d e t o t h e s e T h u s b y s p e a k i n g of a f o r m or substance (elooc,, oúoíct) one conveys t h e n o t i o n , e g., of 'a being t h a t is i r r a t i o n a l , m o r t a l , a n d l i a b l e t o n e i g h ' This, w e would s u r e l y say, is a n a b s t r a c t i o n ; i t p i c k s o u t c e r t a i n f e a t u r e s o f horses, such t h a t n o other being possesses a l l o f t h e m together; b u t i t is f a r f r o m g i v i n g a complete d e s c r i p t i o n o f horses T h e horses themselves, of course, are b o t h concrete a n d perceptible 48
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W e ourselves c o u l d easily e x p l a i n h o w a h u m a n i n d i v i d u a l , say P a u l , i s r e l a t e d t o each o f these conceptions. He imitates^ or p a r t i c i pates i n , t h e P l a t o n i c F o r m , assuming we a l l o w such e n t i t i e s a n d can u n d e r s t a n d t h e u n i q u e r e l a t i o n w h i c h is said to connect t h e f o r m s w i t h their instances or copies B u t P a u l belongs to, or is a member o f , the h u m a n race. A n d he exhibits the f e a t u r e s m e n t i o n e d i n t h e d e f i n i t i o n . W e c a n t h u s a v o i d m a n y o f the confusions w h i c h arise f r o m aski n g w h a t Peter a n d P a u l 'are'. G r e g o r y does n o t d r a w these clear d i s t i n c t i o n s W e have seen t h a t he gives every appearance o f c o n f u s i n g t h e P l a t o n i c F o r m o f m a n w i t h t h e h u m a n race, whereas even such a loose t h i n k e r as Philo c o u l d sometimes d i s t i n g u i s h t h e m N o d o u b t Gregory's c o n f u s i o n arises p a r t l y f r o m m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e v e r b ' t o be', w h i c h we 5 0
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XIV 160 have d e l i b e r a t e l y r e m o v e d f r o m our l a s t f e w paragraphs. A g a i n , we noted t h a t G r e e k has no i n d e f i n i t e a r t i c l e G r e g o r y t h u s uses expressions w h i c h seem l i k e 'Paul is man'. B u t r e m e m b e r i n g a g a i n i t s l a c k o f c a p i t a l l e t t e r s , t h i s looks m u c h l i k e ' P a u l is Saul'; i t seems t o i d e n t i f y P a u l w i t h some e n t i t y c a l l e d 'man', w h i c h appears to be single since i t is designated b y a singular n o u n . N o t t h a t t h e v e r b 'to be' is a l w a y s expressed; a n d i n a n y case he o f t e n says, e. g. ' P a u l is-called m a n ' , XeyeTQii, n o t eaxtv. B u t 'is-called' does n o t h e l p h i m t o d i s t i n g u i s h the senses o f ' m a n ' i n t h e w a y we have t r i e d to suggest. U n d e r l y i n g Gregory's c o n f u s i o n is t h e t h o u g h t t h a t i d e a l h u m a n i t y , t h e h u m a n race a t i t s best, w o u l d p r o v i d e a n a n a l o g y f o r t h e h o l y T r i n i t y . He is d r a w n t o w a r d s t h i s v i e w b y t h r e e c o n v e r g i n g a r g u ments T h e r e is f i r s t t h e p o i n t o f p u r e logic, t o t h e e f f e c t t h a t c l a s s names s h o u l d n o t be used f o r i n d i v i d u a l s , because i n d i v i d u a l s d i f f e r whereas t h e class t h e y belong t o is o n e a n d t h e same. Secondly he uses, m o s t l y t h o u g h n o t a l w a y s , t h e e x a m p l e o f t h r e e h u m a n i n d i v i d uals, a r g u i n g t h a t these, qua m a n , are a l l one m a n . A n d t h i r d l y , his h u m a n examples are a l l sets o f New T e s t a m e n t saints; i t is t h e r e f o r e some s o r t o f i d e a l f o r m a n w h i c h is suggested b y t h e 'one m a n ' w h i c h t h e y a l l are. Can we e x p l a i n this last phrase? I d o u b t i f we can f i n d a n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n w h i c h is b o t h coherent a n d reasonably consistent w i t h Gregory's o w n w o r d s B u t as a f i r s t step, I suggest t h a t we s h o u l d disc o u n t t h e P l a t o n i c F o r m , a t a n y r a t e as p h i l o s o p h i c a l c r i t i c s o f Plato n o w u n d e r s t a n d i t , a n d opt f o r s o m e t h i n g m o r e l i k e 'the h u m a n race as God i n t e n d e d i t to be'; observing, however , t h a t C h r i s t i a n Platonists o f Gregory's t i m e had a l r e a d y m o v e d f a r i n t h i s direction.. F o i i f we t r y t o i n t e r p r e t Plato's o w n t h e o r y , i t is h a r d t o escape t h e conc l u s i o n t h a t i d e a l m a n h o o d excludes p l u r a l i t y ; a n d i f we t h i n k m o r e concretely o f 'the i d e a l m a n ' , i t seems t h a t t h e r e m u s t be o n l y one such being, a 'one over m a n y ' , w h i c h w o u l d r u l e o u t a l l p e r s o n a l dist i n c t i o n s . A n d we s h a l l soon i n v o l v e ourselves i n a l l sorts o f d i f f i culties a r i s i n g f r o m t h e c o - o r d i n a t i o n a n d s u b o r d i n a t i o n o f t h e Forms. I s t h e I d e a l M a n i d e n t i c a l w i t h t h e I d e a l A n i m a l , or distinct? Is he - or are t h e y - o n social t e r m s w i t h the I d e a l Ox? T h e p r o b l e m s are insoluble. B u t C h r i s t i a n Platonists h a d l a r g e l y by-passed these problems; t h e y saw n o d i f f i c u l t y i n r e f e r r i n g t o t h e F o r m s as v o n t a , a n d conceiving these as a heavenly p o p u l a t i o n , c o m p r i s i n g v a r i o u s orders o f beings, i d e n t i f i a b l e w i t h t h e angels a n d archangels o f C h r i s t i a n t r a d i t i o n . I t d i d n o t t h e n seem t h a t t h e r e c o u l d be o n l y one o f each k i n d . ( M e d i a e v a l t h e o r i s t s , we k n o w , w o u l d settle t h e p r o b l e m by s a y i n g t h a t each o f t h e angels is a d i s t i n c t species; b u t t h i s r e a l l y
Why Mot T h r e e G o d s ?
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a m o u n t e d t o saying t h a t , since angels are i m m a t e r i a l , the d i f f e r e n c e s between t h e m m u s t be d i f f e r e n c e s o f f o r m , thus e s t a b l i s h i n g a m u l t i t u d e o f sub-species w i t h i n t h e species o f angels T h e r e was t h e n n o d i f f i c u l t y i n i m a g i n i n g 'choirs o f angels'). G r e g o r y r e t a i n s some elements o f t h e o r i g i n a l P l a t o n i c concept i o n ; f o r instance, i n c l a i m i n g t h a t h u m a n n a t u r e is i n d i v i s i b l e , acxioToc, B u t i n saying t h a t Peter, James a n d J o h n are 'one man', he makes i t clear t h a t t h e y do n o t cease t o be t h r e e i n d i v i d u a l s m a r k e d o f f f r o m each other b y i n d i v i d u a t i n g c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ; a n d n o t a l l o f these p u r e l y p h y s i c a l , since t h e y i n c l u d e ' f a t h e r h o o d ' and 'sonship' . T h e i r c o m m o n h u m a n i t y m u s t t h e n p r e s u m a b l y be i n t e r p r e t e d i n t e r m s o f h u m a n s y m p a t h y , agreement, c o m m o n purpose, a n d t h e l i k e A n d i t is, a f t e r a l l , n o t a n a b s u r d suggestion t h a t h u m a n l a n guage s h o u l d r e f l e c t the c o n d i t i o n o f t h e h u m a n race, not as i t is, b u t as God m e a n t i t to be 51
W e can n o w a t last p r o n o u n c e o n t h e o p i n i o n t h a t G r e g o r y understood t h e u n i t y o f t h e d i v i n e Persons i n a concrete sense Those who t h i n k he d i d so c a n o f course appeal t o evidence outside t h e four w o r k s w h i c h I have considered B u t t h e y o f t e n r e l y o n his a r g u m e n t s about t h e u n i t y o f t h e h u m a n race O n e cannot always i d e n t i f y the v i e w w h i c h t h e y a t t r i b u t e t o h i m ; are t h e y t h i n k i n g o f a u n i t y w h i c h holds good notwithstanding a d m i t t e d i n e q u a l i t y a n d c o n f l i c t among m e n , or o f some i d e a l u n i t y w h i c h applies, not t o h u m a n i t y as i t is, b u t t o its d i v i n e l y i n t e n d e d p e r f e c t i o n ? B u t i n m y j u d g e m e n t there is a step t o be t a k e n b e f o r e we can even discuss t h i s p o i n t ; we need t o d i s t i n g u i s h between Gregory's i n t e n t i o n s a n d t h e logic o f h i s a r g u m e n t I f we ask w h a t Gregory's logic a c t u a l l y establishes, t h e answer m u s t be t h a t i t gets us n o f u r t h e r t h a n generic u n i t y F a t h e r , Son and S p i r i t c a n each be e n t i t l e d 'God'; t h o u g h t h e m e r e use o f t h i s t i t l e guarantees v e r y l i t t l e ; the genus o f gods includes some disreputable members B u t i f t h e question is, w h a t d i d G r e g o r y seek t o establish, a n d t h i n k he h a d established, we can b r i n g i n t h e much less clearly a r t i c u l a t e d a r g u m e n t f r o m disanalogy; h u m a n l i f e a t its best provides some sort o f i n d i c a t i o n o f t h e m u t u a l e n j o y m e n t a n d self-giving o f the d i v i n e Persons A n d h u m a n social l i f e , I w o u l d agree, is a concrete r e a l i t y T h e r e is n o need t o d e t e r m i n e t h a t h u m a n beings t h e m selves are concrete, b u t the t h i n g s t h e y do together are not. A n a c t u a l c o n v e r s a t i o n is a concrete r e a l i t y , t h o u g h i t is n o t a t h i n g b u t a shared a c t i o n ; a b s t r a c t i o n comes i n w h e n we characterize i t b y some
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selected f e a t u r e , describing i t v a r i o u s l y as a c o n v e r s a t i o n , a n a r g u m e n t , a r e l a x a t i o n , or w h a t y o u w i l l T h i s of course w i l l not solve a l l our problems c o n c e r n i n g t h e doct r i n e of God T h e u n i t y t h a t we l o n g f o r is neither s o l i t u d e n o r u n i f o r m i t y , b u t a u n i t y secured i n t h e face o f i n e q u a l i t i e s o f t a l e n t , t e m p e r a m e n t a n d education I t is possibly no m o r e t h a n a misnomer f o r c h a r i t y A n d m a n is a social c r e a t u r e ; to a n e x t e n t w h i c h we seldom consider, our f i n e s t v i r t u e s are adapted to social f a i l i n g s . I t is our c a l l i n g to exercize s y m p a t h y as w e l l as i n t e l l i g e n c e , f o r b e a r a n c e as w e l l as courage H o w can we imagine a d i v i n e l o v e a n d m u t u a l s e l f g i v i n g w h i c h is n e i t h e r tested b y a d v e r s i t y nor e n l a r g e d b y f o r g i v e ness? B u t a t this p o i n t I w o u l d c l a i m t h a t m y l i m i t e d u n d e r t a k i n g has been discharged W e cannot scale t h e peaks w i t h o u t t r a v e r s i n g the f o o t h i l l s ; a n d I have a t t e m p t e d no m o r e t h a n to clear a p a t h t h r o u g h some o f the t a n g l e d t h i c k e t s t h a t o b s t r u c t o u r approach t o t h e h o l y mountain.
Resümee Gregor v o n Nyssa e n t w i c k e l t seine Trinitätslehre i n zwei Paaren v o n A b h a n d l u n g e n . I m ersten v e r t e i d i g t er die k a p p a d o k i s c h e Lehre der d r e i Personen (uTtoaxaagtc,), die i n einer Substanz (oüata) geeint s i n d , so wie d r e i menschliche I n d i v i d u e n a n einer gemeinsamen M e n s c h h e i t t e i l h a b e n , während seine K r i t i k e r m e i n e n , er überbetone die göttliche E i n h e i t . I m zweiten Paar b e a n t w o r t e t er den E i n w a n d : "Aber w i r sprechen ohne weiteres v o n d r e i Menschen; w e n n deine A n a l o g i e g i l t , s o l l t e n w i r a u c h v o n d r e i Göttern sprechen". Das ist natürlich e i n S t r e i t p u n k t ; diese Gegner g r e i f e n Gregor's L e h r e der d r e i Hypostasen a n , die i h r e r M e i n u n g n a c h die göttliche E i n h e i t v e r dunkelt Gregor ver wendet zwei H a u p t a r g u m e n t e (1) I m e i g e n t l i c h e n Sinne ist es u n g e n a u , v o n d r e i Menschen zu sprechen; d e n n da i h r e Menschheit eine i s t , sind sie a l l e e i n Mensch Dieses A r g u m e n t ist v e r w o r r e n ; Gregor g i b t v o r , eine l e d i g l i c h allgemeine Aussage über die L o g i k v o n K l a s s i f i z i e r u n g e n zu machen: w e n n X eine A r t bezeichnet (z B Mensch), ist es n i e m a l s k o r r e k t zu sagen " e i n X " , u m e i n G l i e d dieser A r t zu bezeichnen (z. B " e i n Mensch"). Dies ist a l l e r d i n g s eine unrealistische F o r d e r u n g , u n d Gregor v o n Nyssa h ä l t sich selbst n i c h t d a r a n . Sein A r g u m e n t erscheint n u r p l a u s i b e l , w e i l er als t a t sächliches Beispiel d r e i gleichgesinnte Heilige n i m m t , die als " e i n M e n s c h " h a n d e l n a u f g r u n d i h r e r gemeinsamen c h r i s t l i c h e n B i n d u n g
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Aber i n d e m er e i n günstiges B e i s p i e l a n f ü h r t , o f f e n b a r t er das Versagen seines A r g u m e n t s als allgemeines P r i n z i p (2) Das zweite A r g u m e n t besagt: W e n n das menschliche L e b e n i n seiner besten F o r m Hinweise a u f eine u n g e t e i l t e menschliche N a t u r g i b t , " u m w i e v i e l m e h r " m u ß d a n n die göttliche N a t u r u n g e t e i l t sein Das ist überzeugender. Aber Gregor erklärt n i c h t d e u t l i c h , w i e die E i n f a c h h e i t u n d E i n h e i t Gottes zu v e r s t e h e n ist Er v e r g l e i c h t sie m i t der einen p l a t o n i s c h e n F o r m der M e n s c h h e i t , die a l l e n M e n s c h e n gem e i n s a m i s t , m i t der v e r m u t e t e n E i n h e i t der menschlichen Rasse u n d m i t der D e f i n i t i o n des Menschseins Diese A l t e r n a t i v e n s o l l t e n d i f f e r e n z i e r t w e r d e n , was aber n i c h t geschieht. Daher b l e i b t V e r w i r r u n g ; u n d während Gregor s i c h e r l i c h recht h a t , w e n n er d a r a u f besteht, daß die göttliche N a t u r ein Geheimnis i s t , ist er, a u f g r u n d v o n verm e i d b a r e n F e h l e r n , n i c h t h i l f r e i c h , ihr n ä h e r z u k o m m e n
XV Augustine's Philosophy of Being Augustine's philosophy of b e i n g , t h e subject of my lecture, m i g h t be approached i n t w o ways I n t r a d i t i o n a l t e r m s , we m i g h t consider the question quid est esse, or alternatively t h e question quaenam sunt T h i s latter question is easily explained; i t means, roughly speaking, what does the real universe contain or comprise, i n a large and general sense. M a t e r i a l objects, of course, we can all accept; b u t what should be said about m i n d s and spirits a n d the t h i n g s w i t h w h i c h they are concerned? T h e other question is m o r e d i f f i c u l t to explain i n simple terms Suppose we translate i t 'What is being?', w e may seem to be asking a question about the w o r d 'being'; what is t h e sense w h i c h Augustine gives to this word? B u t i n fact w e shall discover a whole spectrum of senses 'Being', for A u g u s t i n e , sometimes appears to express the purely m i n i m a l n o t i o n of mere existence; b u t he also uses i t as a p o w e r f u l symbol t o f o r m u l a t e his deepest reflections o n the spiritual life a n d the nature of G o d . I w i l l therefore tackle the easier question first B u t before I d o so, there must be a prelude Augustine's philosophy so closely reflects his o w n personal hopes and concerns that we have to consider h o w i t was influenced b y the successive changes i n his way of life, and not least by the new responsibilities w h i c h he assumed w h e n he became a Christian bishop at the age of fotty-one I m u s t therefore spend a few minutes i n recalling the chief events of his career; and i f some of m y audience f i n d this a f a m i l i a r tale, t h e y w i l l be the first to a d m i t that i t needs to be t o l d Augustine was b o r n i n A D 354 at Thagaste, a moderate-sized pr ovincial t o w n i n N o r t h A f r i c a , near the eastern boundary of m o d e r n Algeria. H i s mother was a devout C h r i s t i a n , his father a pagan, w h o soon recognized the potential of his gifted son and took steps to give him a good education Augustine's inter est i n philosophy was aroused b y his reading Cicero's exhortation t o philosophy called the Hortensius. L i k e many others of its t y p e , this book recommended the quest for w i s d o m as preferable to all sensual delights and w o r l d l y successes. Augustine's next step, however , seems d i f f i c u l t to explain; he joined the extremist semi-Chiistian sect of the Manichees. N o doubt he was reacting against the rather u n i n s p i r i n g b r a n d of catholic Christianity w h i c h he f o u n d at Thagaste, and later at Carthage. T h e Manichees held out an ideal of ascetic l i v i n g , w h i c h intensified Cicero's message; and
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XV A u g u s t i n e ' s P h i l o s o p h y of B e i n g
they d i d at least profess to set their ethical teaching w i t h i n a comprehensive theory of the w o r l d and its good and evil constituents, Augustine remained w i t h t h e m for ten years, a surprisingly l o n g time if one considers that he still saw himself as a rising orator and statesman; not to m e n t i o n the r i n g i n g tones i n w h i c h he later denounced their teaching as pretentious nonsense. H e seems to have escaped f r o m their influence b y adopting a sceptical philosophy w h i c h t h r e w d o u b t on the v a l i d i t y of all positive convict i o n s ; actual knowledge, i t was h e l d , is unattainable; the best we can attain is a set of probable beliefs. Sceptical views of this k i n d had been urged b y the Platonist philosopher Caineades i n the second century B C , and a sceptical t r a d i t i o n had persisted among Platonists d o w n to Augustine's t i m e . B u t the m a j o r i t y of Platonists had reverted to a positive tr anscendental p h i l o s o p h y ; Augustine soon adopted their posit i o n , and later wrote a treatise Against the Academics, arguing that i n some cases at least i t is indisputable that we really know.. Even i f I am i n d o u b t , I can be cer tain that I am d o u b t i n g , and a fortiori that I exist.. T h i s argument, of course, resembles that later adopted by Descartes: Jepen.se, done je suis Scholars have given m u c h t i m e and t h o u g h t to e n q u i r i n g what exactly was the f o r m of Platonism w h i c h had such a p o w e r f u l appeal for A u g u s t i n e ; i n particular, they have asked whether he was influenced m a i n l y by Plotinus or b y P o r p h y r y T h i s question, I believe, largely misses the p o i n t A u g u s t i n e , i n his early w r i t i n g s at least, represents the Platonists as c o n f i r m i n g many of the doctrines of Christianity. T h e i r concept of three divine principles, 01 hypostases, seemed to h i m a good a p p r o x i m a t i o n to the Christian T r i n i t y ; their belief i n intelligible realities, derived f r o m Plato's theory of Ideas, needed scarcely any m o d i f i c a t i o n ; the t w o m a i n faults he alleges are f i r s t , their failure to envisage any d i v i n e I n c a r n a t i o n , and secondly, their lack of h u m i l i t y i n r e l y i n g on h u m a n reason as against divine revelation i n prophecy and scripture (Civ. Dei 10 .29; Conf 7 9 14) B u t a m o d e r n reader of either P o r p h y r y or Plotinus w i l l judge that they are separated f r o m Christian o r t h o d o x y b y a m u c h w i d e r g u l f ; P o r p h y r y wrote as a determined opponent of C h r i s t i a n i t y ; Plotinus before h i m shows no sign of having encountered main-stream C h r i s t i a n i t y , t h o u g h he w r o t e against Christian Gnostics w h o had some resemblance to Augustine's Manichees Plotinus usually described his three supreme hypostases as U n i t y , M i n d and S o u l ; and these were i n no sense coequal; o n the contrary, the second and t h i r d principles reflect the first i n a descending scale of p u r i t y and value A n d i n t r e a t i n g of the first hypostasis Plotinus gives great weight to the Platonic p r i n c i p l e that pure goodness must be 'beyond m i n d and b e i n g ' ; i t is an u l t i m a t e u n i t y w h i c h has the potential to produce all ordered m u l t i p l i c i t i e s , beginning w i t h M i n d or Intel72
ligence, b u t remains itself undifferentiated.. Thus i t cannot be construed as a personal d i v i n i t y w h o could t h i n k ot be conscious, because t h i n k i n g entails a d i s t i n c t i o n between a t h i n k i n g subject and the object of t h o u g h t ; the One, for Plotinus, does n o t even k n o w itself; i t only generates knowledge of itself i n the cosmic M i n d N o r , strictly speaki n g , can i t be described, since description w o u l d i d e n t i f y it w i t h somet h i n g distinct f r o m itself. A n d although i t is the source of all being, Plotinus cannot envisage any creative design or i n t e n t i o n , but o n l y an eternal o u t f l o w of b e i n g w h i c h descends progressively t h r o u g h m i n d and soul to its humblest embodiment i n matter A l l this seems foreign to A u g u s t i n e , w h o accepted as part of his C h r i s t i a n f a i t h the Nicene doctrine of a T r i n i t y of equal Persons. Can we then f i n d any closer approach i n Porphyry? P o r p h y r y is said t o have softened the distinctions between the three hypostases—or 'telescoped' t h e m , i n Professor A C L l o y d ' s graphic phrase; b u t he seems to have agreed w i t h Plotinus i n detecting a p r i n c i p l e 'beyond m i n d ' , w h i c h is also contemplated ' i n a suspension of t h i n k i n g that is better than t h o u g h t ' (Sent 25) A n d Augustine's philosopher f r i e n d M a r i u s Vict o r i n u s also spoke of a p r i n c i p l e 'prior to b e i n g ' I t is clear, t h e n , t h a t Augustine's philosophy was largely independent of these great Neoplatonists So far as I can discover, he does not describe G o d as 'beyond b e i n g ' ; on the contrary, he tells us, Deus est esse A n d although he takes perfect u n i t y to be an essential feature of divine being, he sees i t as a u n i t y of positive a t t r i b u t e s ; thus God's w i s d o m is w h o l l y good, and his goodness is w h o l l y w i s e ; but we do not misrepresent G o d i f we call h i m wise o i good. Moreover Augustine is content to refer to G o d as M i n d ; he does not t h i n k that mental operations begin w i t h the second Person, the d i v i n e W o r d . A n d he speaks of God's l o v i n g care for his creation. A l l these doctrines correspond w i t h an older t r a d i t i o n of Platonic t h o u g h t w h i c h saw no d i f f i c u l t y i n describing G o d as M i n d , and w h i c h c o u l d envisage the divine act of creation suggested b y a more literal reading of Plato's Timaeus. I t seems, t h e n , that Augustine was influenced more t h a n he admits by older Platonist writers such as A p u l e i u s , and was therefore encouraged to read Plotinus and P o r p h y r y attending m o r e to their c o n t i n u i t y w i t h earlier Platonism t h a n to the distinctive features identified by modern scholars.. I t was for t h i s reason that Platonism appeared to offer an easy approach to C h r i s t i a n i t y . 1
2
T h e rest of Augustine's philosophical development can be briefly t o l d , We soon f i n d h i m at M i l a n , p r o f o u n d l y impressed by the sermons of the eloquent Bishop A m b r o s e , b u t also by the example of self¬ ]
1
Ad Candidum
Mot.
Eccl
2.28, 3.7, 18.2 (Migne, P.L. 8, 1021a,c, 1028b)
2 1.1, cf. En Psalm
134.4, Trin
5 2.3. 73
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sacrifice and devotion presented b y m u c h humbler Christians. H e r e t u r n e d to the B i b l e , and especially St Paul W r i t i n g later o n , i n the Confessions, he represents his conversion as an inspired resolve to f u l f i l the obligations w h i c h his intellect had already accepted; to s u b m i t to the a u t h o r i t y of God's w o r d i n S c r i p t u r e , and to renounce for ever all t h o u g h t of sexual satisfaction. I t is s o m e t h i n g of a surprise to discover that most of his w r i t i n g s d u r i n g the next few years prove to be essays i n Platonist philosophy B u t the explanation has already been given.. T h e final step towards C h r i s t i a n discipleship lay i n acceptance of the Bible and of the ascetic life r e q u i r e d of an u n c o m p r o m i s i n g Christian. For its intellectual substructure he was still content to r e t u r n to Platonism. Augustine's philosophical a c t i v i t y was b y no means over ; indeed its most b r i l l i a n t achievements were yet to come B u t they wer e channelled i n t o a peculiar course by the necessity of reconciling his Platonist assumptions w i t h a C h r i s t i a n obedience to w h i c h his attitude was i n some respects u n c r i t i c a l H e was hamper ed at times b y an over-submissive acceptance of C h u r c h t r a d i t i o n s and b y a literalistic reading of the N e w T e s t a m e n t , not always proof against actual mistranslation; b o t h these factors c o m b i n e d , for instance, to b r i n g h i m to the abominable doctrine that unbaptized infants w i l l inevitably suffer eternal punishment I t is h a r d to imagine the intellectual agony i n w h i c h such a belief imposed itself o n one whose belief i n God's all-embiacing mercy was so p r o f o u n d . B u t his philosophical enterprise and resourcefulness were irrepressible; he remains b y far the most o r i g i n a l and wide-ranging thinker of later a n t i q u i t y , and o n l y a m i n o r i t y of critics have ever supposed that his C h r i s t i a n f a i t h i n some way disqualifies h i m f r o m b e i n g recognized as a philosophical colossus . L e t us t h e n consider Augustine's p i c t u r e of the universe W h a t sorts of things does i t contain? L i k e the m a j o r i t y of ancient thinkers A u g u s t i n e makes a p r i m a r y d i v i s i o n i n t o material and i m m a t e r i a l reali t y , w h i c h r o u g h l y corresponds to the b i b l i c a l d i s t i n c t i o n between the visible and the i n v i s i b l e . A l t e r n a t i v e l y , he often speaks of the w o r l d , the soul and G o d T h i s makes the useful p o i n t that the h u m a n soul acts as a bridge between the physical universe and the higher sphere; on the other hand i t fails to m e n t i o n the invisible part of God's creation, that is, created spirits or angels, w h i c h were f i r m l y established i n the Jewish-Christian t r a d i t i o n , supported b y the 'created gods' of Plato's Timaeus 41a, as i t was c o m m o n l y i n t e r p r e t e d B u t i f we look more closely at the contrast of material and immater ial, we discover a very curious fact. A u g u s t i n e has a clear and consistent 3
4
Being
view of material beings, w h i c h appears several times i n his CttyofGod; there is an ascending scale of value, w h i c h embraces 'stones, plants, animals and intelligent beings', as he puts i t at 5 : 1 1 , the latter class i n c l u d i n g b o t h men and angels, and thus i m p i n g i n g on the higher sphere B u t i f we look f o r a similar brief o u t l i n e of this higher w o r l d , we shall be d i s a p p o i n t e d ; we discover only a m u l t i t u d e of elevated b u t c o n f l i c t i n g suggestions T h e reason for t h i s is that for the material w o r l d A u g u s t i n e can d r a w u p o n a well-established t r a d i t i o n of a scala naturae w h i c h goes back to A r i s t o t l e , and sees the natural w o r l d as arranged i n a series of levels, each of w h i c h enjoys all the advantages of its inferiors b u t possesses some distinctive power of its own. T h u s physical substances are distinguished by t h e i r consistency, hexis; l i v i n g creatures b y phusis, the power to nourish themselves and grow A n i mals also possesspsuche, soul, w h i c h gives t h e m perception and movem e n t ; and the next level is m a r k e d by reason, w h i c h belongs to man, b u t also to i m m o r t a l spirits s
B u t if we look for a similar diagram of the higher w o r l d , we f i n d no such consistent scheme. G o d , the universe itself, the divine Ideas, the soul of the w o r l d , star-gods, demons, angels, demi-gods and heroes, appear and disappear i n a b e w i l d e r i n g v a r i e t y of combination For a brief example, we may t u r n to A p u l e i u s , whose w o r k on Plato was k n o w n to A u g u s t i n e , and w h o presents us w i t h three totally unrelated schemes i n t w o chapters, 6 and 1 1 , of Book I . I n Chapter 6, the p r i m a r y f o r m s of b e i n g are the supreme G o d or M i n d , the F o r m s of things, and the world-soul; this already conflicts w i t h Chapter 5, where the i n i t i a l principles are G o d , the F o r m s , and matter Chapter 11 offers a scheme based o n the four elements, w h i c h crosses the boundary between earth and heaven; there are fiery beings, the star-gods; airy beings, the demons; and those allied to water and earth, namely land-animals and plants. I n the same chapter he mentions three classes of gods; the supreme G o d , star-gods, and local deities 6
I t seems, t h e n , that i n Augustine's t i m e there was no c o m m o n l y accepted map of the i n t e l l i g i b l e w o r l d ; and the reason probably lies i n the perplexities of Platonist philosophy. T h a t venerable construction w h i c h we k n o w as Plato's t h e o r y of Ideas had left behind so many discrepancies and loose ends t h a t the later Platonists could never achieve what they so greatly desired, namely to b r i n g together a l l their master's inspired pronouncements into a consistent scheme. L e t me t r y to indicate the p o s i t i o n i n a m u c h over-simplified sketch Plato was t r y i n g to solve several problems w h i c h he d i d not clearly 5.11, 8 6,11.16. See for instance Xenocrates ft 15 ( i n H . Diels, Doxographi Graeci, 304); cf.. Eusebius, Demomtr Evang. 4 5.12 5
^C.Acad 3 17.37;«?; Dei, see n 5 *Mor. Ecd 1.5 7-6 10,Div Quaest 83,45. 74
6
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distinguish Amongst other questions, he reflected o n the nature of a t e r m like 'justice' T h i s does not seem to refer to a particular t h i n g , in the way that the name 'Socrates' indicates a particular man, or 'Crete' a particular island 'Justice' seems to be an inclusive t e r m w h i c h designates a whole n u m b e r of possible just actions O n the other hand, i t seemed likely that these just actions are so named, and f o r m a coherent class, as a p p r o x i m a t i n g to an ideal standard of justice; after a l l , if a r i n g or a b u i l d i n g are described as circular, this means that they conform to the geometrical pattern of a perfect circle Plato thus envisages a system of classes, each one defined b y its perfect exemplar; his difficulties begin w h e n he sees that there are some classes where no perfection seems to be possible. M u d is no less real than justice; b u t what sense is there i n i m a g i n i n g a perfectly m u d d y m u d , or for that matter a perfect all-disabling disease, or a perfect standard of injustice} Plato himself developed his theory along several different lines w h i c h c o u l d not be b r o u g h t i n t o agreement F i r s t , regarding his Ideas mainly as class-concepts, he sought to arrange t h e m i n a rational h i e r a i c h y , i n w h i c h the more inclusive Ideas were superior. B u t this is only possible if they are reduced to concepts considered in abstracto Obviously the class of animals is larger t h a n the class of horses; but what k i n d of creature is the animal-as-such? A n d w h a t sort of qualities w o u l d the ideal animal possess? Even the ideal horse is none too easy on the m i n d ; can we seriously picture a beast w h i c h combines the virtues of a racehorse and a cait-horse? T h e alternative, i t seems, w o u l d be to say that their virtues are not virtues at a l l ; one is strong and the other is speedy because they b o t h fail to reproduce the qualities of an ideal hoise w h i c h is neither! B u t despite such problems, many Platonists continued to t h i n k of the Ideas as a population of real and co-ordinate beings. Secondly, Plato presented his Ideas as objects of t h o u g h t ; he rejected the view that they were merely thoughts, or patterns of t h o u g h t ; b u t he left i t unclear whether the Ideas themselves exercise t h o u g h t ; whether they are intelligent as w e l l as intelligible T o be sure, i t is hard to believe t h a t , say, a perfect circle can t h i n k ; b u t there are several considerations w h i c h favour the theory of intelligent Ideas F o r one t h i n g , Plato himself declared that the soul was 'akin to the Ideas'; we can then deduce correctly that the Ideas are akin to souls. Secondly, if one accepts the o l d n o t i o n that like is k n o w n b y like, i t follows that the Ideas must resemble the m i n d that knows t h e m T h i r d l y , i t appears that some Ideas at least should be i n t e l l i g e n t ; if intelligence is a v i r t u e , then the ideal man should be intelligent F o u r t h l y , we are t o l d that Plato came to t h i n k of the Ideas as definable i n terms of number, 01 of some quasinumerical p r o p e r t y such as harmony or p r o p o r t i o n ; and Plato's disciple Xenociates u n d o u b t e d l y defined the soul in similar terms Some thinkers, a d m i t t e d l y , treated b o t h numbers and souls as intermediate 76
beings, r a n k i n g below the Ideas b u t above material things B u t if intelligence is good, there is something strange in the doctrine t h a t the highest reality cannot be intelligent. O n the other hand, a salient fact about souls, or personalities, is that they ate strongly i n d i v i d u a l i z e d ; no t w o souls are alike. T h u s any attempt to assimilate Ideas and souls w i l l conflict w i t h the notion of the Idea as a class-concept, a 'one over many'.. Nevertheless even Plotinus, w h o did not in p r i n c i p l e set m u c h value on diversity, came to t h i n k that there must be i n d i v i d u a l Ideas corresponding to each human i n d i v i d u a l ; and less professional w r i t e r s , i n c l u d i n g many Christians, made this equation w i t h o u t any d i f f i c u l t y ; h u m a n souls in their unfallen state, before they enter the b o d y , s i m p l y aie Ideas; and there are similar but purer beings w h o are not attracted by b o d i l y pleasures and r e m a i n in the ideal w o r l d ; these are i d e n t i f i e d as 'demons' i n the pagan t r a d i t i o n , and as 'angels' by Jews and Christians F i n a l l y , we should consider Plato's m y t h of the world's creation in the Timaeus A divine craftsman makes the w o r l d of space and time according to an eternal model I t m i g h t seem, t h e n , that he simply copies patter ns of perfection w h i c h exist outside and above h i m B u t an alternative theory was developed very early, perhaps by Xenocrates; namely that the d i v i n e craftsman himself imagined these patterns w i t h i n his o w n m i n d before p u t t i n g t h e m into concrete f o r m T h i s retains something of the old belief that the Ideas are simply thoughts; b u t it gives then objective v a l i d i t y , as being the archetypal thoughts of the divine creator T h i s view was no doubt more acceptable to religious m i n d s ; and i t is w o r t h n o t i n g t h a t the devout but anti-Christian Porp h y r y came r o u n d to i t under the influence of Plotinus, agreeing w i t h his master that 'the Ideas are n o t outside the Intellect' I f we now r e t u r n to A u g u s t i n e , we can f i n d most of these conceptions reproduced i n his w r i t i n g s . H e gives a blanket approval to Plato's doctrine of an i n t e l l i g i b l e w o r l d , revealed b y dialectics. I n particular he pictures the Ideas as patterns of m o r a l v i r t u e s , and again as archetypes for God's creations existing eternally i n his m i n d . I n d e e d , like many C h r i s t i a n Platonists, he believes that the m i n d is so m u c h superior to the body that intellectual a c t i v i t y as such is the first step towards heavenly v i r t u e , and that t r u t h — a n y t r u t h whatsoever—has divine a u t h o r i t y over our m i n d s H e finds i t h a r d to admit that any mental operation m i g h t be merely pointless or misdirected, Fortunately he is enough of a C h r i s t i a n realist to correct this intellectualist bias on occasion H e notes, f o r instance, that not all mathematicians are w i s e ; 7
8
9
7
Div
Quaest.83,46
*Lib Arb. 2 6.14ff.,esp 2.12.33-4. Ibid 2 11 30f ; Gen ad Lit 2 17 37 9
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he believes that the demons are clever, b u t not g o o d ; and of course he recognizes the importance of material symbols as presented i n the sacraments B u t if Augustine sees the Ideas as archetypes for all God's created w o r k s , does he t h i n k there is an archetype for each i n d i v i d u a l creature? Scholars have alleged that this is s o ; b u t I do not f i n d their evidence convincing. 'Each single t h i n g is created b y its o w n p r i n c i p l e ' , says A u g u s t i n e : singula propnis sunt creata rationibus (Div quaest 8.3,46 2) B u t the context implies that 'each single t h i n g ' should be understood as 'each species'; Augustine has just used the standard examples of 'man' and 'horse' I n any case, the t h e o r y of i n d i v i d u a l archetypes is hardly attractive except as applied to intelligent beings; i t seems absurd to suppose that G o d has an ideal specification for each i n d i v i d u a l flea and every g r a i n of sand, W i t h h u m a n individuals i t may be otherwise Plotinus t h o u g h t so; and Augustine's G o d m i g h t reasonably have an i m m u t a b l e idea of w h a t each of us should be, distinct of course f r o m our all-too-changeable soul T h e question of intelligent Ideas is also d i f f i c u l t to resolve Some of the Platonic arguments should appeal to A u g u s t i n e ; thus ideal f a i t h or ideal w i s d o m can har d l y exist w i t h o u t intelligence; b u t perhaps he d i d not t h i n k of these virtues as distinct intelligent beings; more probably he saw t h e m as God's o w n l i v i n g and creative thoughts w h i c h interpenetrate each other A u g u s t i n e does of course believe i n distinct created intelligences, w h i c h correspond to the spirits or demons of later Platonism. B u t he usually describes t h e m i n biblical and Christian t e r m s ; he recognizes good angels and w i c k e d demons, b u t denounces the m o r a l l y intermediate demons described b y A p u l e i u s . I have so far presented A u g u s t i n e i n fairly conventional terms B u t a different, and rather s t a r t l i n g perspective emerges i f we t r y to regard h i m , not as a Platonizing C h r i s t i a n theologian, b u t as a renegade C h r i s t i a n i z i n g Platonist. Plotinus had seen the universe as an ordered c o n t i n u u m i n w h i c h pure spirit eternally reflects itself i n lower orders of being. A u g u s t i n e adopts the C h r i s t i a n belief i n a divine act of creation inaugurating a w o r l d of t i m e and space, and pictures i n t e l ligent spirits i n transit between the eternal and the spatiotempoial realms ." Theologians have of course defended this concept of creation as essential f o r establishing the u n i q u e and personal d i g n i t y of G o d ; and I shall not dispute this verdict Nevertheless one has to reckon w i t h the complications i t introduces i n t o an already complex and tangled metaphysical scheme. 10
J.. Meyendorff,NewSckol 16 (1942), 36; V J. Bourke, Augustine's View of Reality, S, n 21. Civ. Dei 8-9, passim 10
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F i r s t , we have noted Augustine's belief i n the divine archetypes of m o r a l virtues. These archetypes clearly f u n c t i o n as ideals to w h i c h things ought to c o n f o r m ; b u t s h o u l d we c r e d i t t h e m w i t h some sort of dynamic f u n c t i o n as well? Heavenly f a i t h , we m i g h t say, is the t o u c h stone of earthly f a i t h , or its f o r m a l cause; b u t do we see i t also as an inspir ation w h i c h moves us thr o u g h our love for it ? A n d i f so, do we also see the heavenly right-angled triangle as t h r i l l i n g us w i t h the desire to study mathematics? H o w e v e r t h i s may be, Augustine introduces another set of m o v i n g causes, the so-called seminal reasons, w h i c h originate i n Stoic rather t h a n i n Platonic philosophy, and are principles of g r o w t h and development at t h e physical level Whatever be the case w i t h the d i v i n e archetypes, i t must be that these seminal reasons act o n each i n d i v i d u a l t h i n g ; indeed t h e y are p i c t u r e d as present w i t h i n i t . A n d there is another l i n k between G o d and his i n d i v i d u a l creatures, namely his complete and perfect knowledge of t h e m T h i s knowledge relates to creatures i n space and t i m e , b u t i t is itself eternal and unextended. I t is t e m p t i n g to describe it as a c o m p o u n d of perfect perception, perfect m e m o r y , and perfect foreknowledge; b u t i f G o d is eternal, we cannot credit h i m w i t h these three distinct powers I n a sense, of course, G o d knows when t h i n g s h a p p e n ; he is aware t h a t Judas betrays Jesus on a certain T h u r s d a y evening, perhaps i n 33 B C ; b u t he can never know that this is going to happen, or t h a t i t has happened. B u t he can, I t h i n k , k n o w what i t feels like to k n o w these t h i n g s , since he knows w h a t goes o n i n the m i n d s of his creatures Indeed i n his Confessions (11 13 I S f f . ) Augustine was pr epared to define t i m e itself i n psychological terms: the past is w h a t we remember, the f u t u r e is w h a t we foresee. O n this t h e o r y , i f God knows h o w the experience of r e m e m b e r i n g differs f r o m that of foreseeing, he knows all that can be k n o w n about the lapse of time. B u t i n later life Augustine d i d not insist on this peculiar theory God's knowledge, of course, raises m o r a l problems, which can be mentioned o n l y i n passing. T h e r e is, first, God's knowledge of h u m a n s i n ; how can G o d understand s i n f u l thoughts w i t h o u t i n some sense a d m i t t i n g them? I f G o d is a perfectly simple being, as Augustine holds, we cannot say that he understands sinful thoughts b u t disowns t h e m , for that w o u l d i m p l y a c o n f l i c t between sympathy and repugnance. B u t perhaps the n o t i o n of absolute divine s i m p l i c i t y needs t o be reconsidered Moreover, if G o d creates a w o r l d i n w h i c h he knows t h a t the m a j o r i t y of rational creatures w i l l sin and thus be consigned to eternal p u n i s h m e n t , how is he himself to be cleared of blame? Augustine holds that G o d intends to maximize the a m o u n t of goodness i n the w o r l d , and 12
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does so b y i n c l u d i n g beings of lessei value, w h o are therefore b o u n d to sin B u t this policy is hardly j u s t i f i e d b y its results A second answer is to say that G o d acts justly towards all his creatures, b u t shows undeser ved met cy to some T h e objections t o this view are obvious, b u t h a r d l y belong to our subject; b u t we m a y b r i e f l y notice one subsidiary point.. I t m i g h t appear that if G o d foreknows that X w i l l sin, t h e n i t is inevitable that X w i l l s i n ; and i f i t is inevitable, then X is not free and cannot be blamed Augustine replies, i n his w o r k On Free Choice (3 4.9-11), that G o d does not cause X to sin b y f o r e k n o w i n g i t ; w h a t G o d foreknows is that X w i l l freely choose to sin, and his foreknowledge depends on X's choice. I n t w o later w o r k s he takes a different line, suggesting that G o d does indeed contrive that some individuals shall sin, and sin of their o w n free choice; he does this by o m i t t i n g to supply the grace to overcome t e m p t a t i o n (Qu. Simp 2 13; Sp. et Lit 34 60) .. I do not t h i n k this i n the least acceptable as a way to vindicate God's goodness N o r do I t h i n k A u g u s t i n e gives an adequate account of h u m a n freedom. B u t he does m a i n t a i n , consistently, that G o d does not cause f u t u r e events merely b y f o r e k n o w i n g t h e m We should r e m i n d ourselves t h a t h u m a n beings are not the only rational m o r a l agents. T h e r e are also created spirits, w h i c h exist apart f r o m space and t i m e , b u t are i n some sense capable of change I n practice Augustine divides t h e m i n t o t w o opposing classes. T h e better sort, the angels, choose to attach themselves to G o d , and so enjoy a share i n his i m m u t a b i l i t y ; b u t t h i s is p r o p e r l y a m o r a l constancy, resulting not f r o m nature b u t f r o m choice Contrasted w i t h these are the devils, w h o seem to practise a k i n d of negative i m m u t a b i l i t y i n the f i x i t y of their self-assertion and destructive intent A second order of intelligent beings are destined to enjoy a brief existence i n space and t i m e ; namely, our h u m a n selves. Augustine does not t h i n k , w i t h Plato, that our souls exist i n t i m e before they animate our bodies; indeed he is notably unsure about their o r i g i n T h e y are, he a f f i r m s , God's creatures, and destined for eternal existence; b u t the only eternity we can be sure that they enjoy is one qualified b y their thoughts and actions i n their earthly lives. I t is therefore outside t i m e , b u t we can only conceive i t as beginning after their lives at e completed H o w t h e n does h u m a n life begin? I t seems that G o d eternally p u r poses to create h u m a n souls, or at least to introduce t h e m , i n a vastly complicated t e m p o r a l succession T w o points about this divine p r o cedure may be m e n t i o n e d as especially strange F i r s t , these created intelligences begin to act w i t h i n the w o r l d at moments w h i c h G o d allows the h u m a n animals to determine i n response to their o w n sexual passions. A n d secondly, although the souls proceed i n p u r i t y f r o m the creative hand of G o d , they ar e immediately t h r o w n d o w n into a tainted e n v i r o n m e n t , so that before they have a chance to prove themselves SO
they incur and deserve the i n d i g n a t i o n and righteous vengeance of God.. A n d this apparent f r u s t r a t i o n of God's creative w o r k results f r o m the disobedience of A d a m and E v e , that is, of only t w o among the myriads of h u m a n spirits I t is the measure of Augustine's greatness that he c o u l d w i n widespread approval for a theory w h i c h t o all appearances is so i m p r o b a b l e , inconsistent, and i m m o r a l So m u c h , t h e n , f o r the realities named b y the t e r m 'being' i n Augustine's philosophy We must n o w conclude w i t h some remarks on the more abstruse question quid est esse; i n other w o r d s , how does Augustine i n t e r p r e t the t e r m 'being' itself A convenient starting-point is a passage i n his Letter X I to N e b i i d i u s , w h i c h tells us that there are three aspects of being: primo ut sit, deinde uthoc velillud sit, tertium utin eo quod est maneat quantum potest; that is to say, 'being itself, being this or that, and c o n t i n u i n g to be'. Augustine tells us that these three aspects are distinct but inseparable, like the Persons of the T r i n i t y T h e r e are several similar f o r m ulations, some of t h e m using the technical t e r m 'species' in place of 'being this or that' A n o t h e r series of passages expounds the biblical text ' T h o u hast made all t h i n g s b y measure, number and w e i g h t ' ( W i s d o m 11:21), w h i c h A u g u s t i n e tries to interpret along the same lines. T h i s is not an easy task; i n particular the t e r m 'measure', mensura, does not seem an obvious equivalent for the apparently abstract notion of being itself W i t h the second t e r m , 'number', he is more fortunately placed, since i t recalls the Platonic t h e o r y that species can be explained i n mathematical t e r m s ; so he w r i t e s , numerus omni ret speciem praehet (Gen. ad Lit 4.3 7) H i s treatment of pondus, 'weight', is extraord i n a r i l y ingenious and varied, t h o u g h the details h a r d l y belong to a philosophical lecture; i t stands for the a b i l i t y of things to f i n d their proper level; for the tendency of the rational w i l l to go where i t belongs; and also for a thing's internal coherence, and so for its permanence, w h i c h for Augustine is a mark of value L e t us ask Augustine a few questions about his threefold scheme, along the lines of Aristotle's Categories F i r s t , how w i d e l y does i t apply ? For he sometimes uses the phrase ' E v e r y t h i n g that is', b u t sometimes speaks of 'every nature or substance', thus referring especially to t h i n g s , or what A r i s t o t l e calls substances, rather t h a n to qualities or relations. Augustine does I t h i n k have substances chiefly i n m i n d , w h i c h is natural enough, b u t sometimes misleads h i m ; on the other h a n d he notes the eternal patterns of some qualities, such as virtues, a n d of 13
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quantities or n u m b e r s ; and of course he uses relative terms like 'Father' and 'Son' to denote divine realities So he recognizes the four p r i n c i p a l Aristotelian categories. H e may perhaps have adopted the Neoplatonic t h e o r y that i n the intelligible w o r l d all terms are substantial; but even A r i s t o t l e noted that some things can be b o t h substantial and r e l a t i v e . N e x t , A r i s t o t l e w o u l d like us to ask A u g u s t i n e , does he t h i n k that being is capable of degrees? Can one be intensely, or feebly? Certainly Augustine speaks of greater and less being, and of supreme being (magis esse, minus esse, summe esse, Civ. Dei 12.2.9, Ver Relig 18.35); b u t does this apply to all aspects of being? W i t h regard to the t h i r d of these, permanence, the answer is clear; obviously things can be m o r e and less permanent. B u t to say that one can possess a specific f o r m m o r e and less completely sounds i m p r o b a b l e , and is certainly a direct contradiction of A r i s t o t l e ; w h i l e c o m m o n sense insists that either a creature is a horse, or i t is not B u t A u g u s t i n e clearly d i d believe that a specific f o r m , for instance h u m a n i t y , can be more and less perfectly realized; and this belief is l i n k e d w i t h his t h e o r y of evil as a defect of being W e cannot stay to examine this t h e o r y , t h o u g h I myself distrust it. A t the very best, i t needs a good deal of elaboration to make i t even plausible Physical d e f o r m i t y , mental deficiency, and m o r a l o b l i q u i t y can all stand under the broad u m b r e l l a of defective humanity.. N o d o u b t all are b a d ; b u t they are bad i n very different ways 17
W h a t about the first t e r m of the t r i a d , namely being as such? H e r e I t h i n k Augustine is imprecise. Sometimes his words i m p l y something very like our n o t i o n of bare existence; he uses the phr ases utrum omnino sit and quo constat (Div quaest 83,18), w h i c h recall the language of the law-courts, where one has to establish that a piece of property does actually exist before d i s p u t i n g its o w n e r s h i p . Here there is a straight contrast of the real w i t h the f i c t i t i o u s I n another passage (Civ. Dei 11.27) Augustine uses the phrase ipsum esse to mean the mere existence, or life, w h i c h all creatures t r y to preserve; this makes a rather different p o i n t , for real creatures obviously do not struggle to prevent themselves f r o m becoming f i c t i t i o u s ! But yet again, this same phrase ipsum esse is used to indicate divine being. T h i s has some analogy w i t h mere existence, as i t is i n some sense u n q u a l i f i e d ; G o d clearly does not belong to any created species B u t w h a t exactly is meant by referring to G o d as pure being? I n fact A u g u s t i n e declares that G o d is the source of measur e, number and w e i g h t — o r their various equivalents—but is superior to all of t h e m O n the other h a n d , as we n o t e d , he can say, Deus est esse; he does not appear to have pronounced that G o d is beyond being B u t I am 18
17 18
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Plotinus, Enn 6 1 3; Aristotle, Categ Cf. Quintilian, Imt 7 6 36.
inclined to t h i n k that he has t w o different conceptions in view. H e reproduces the t r a d i t i o n a l Platonic-Christian concept of a creative intelligence w h i c h foreordains w h a t variety of things are to exist i n the w o r l d , because i t is best that i t s h o u l d be so B u t beside this appears the m o r e d i f f i c u l t , and more characteristic idea of the One as a source of b e i n g , pure b e i n g , f r o m w h i c h the distinct varieties of being descend b y a process of d i m i n u t i o n , rather like the refraction of white l i g h t to produce the various c o l o u r s . Pure being, i n this sense, is an intensely p o w e r f u l reality; Augustine describes i t as t h e source of life, sensation and purposive m o t i o n (c. Faust Man. 2 0 . 7 ) ; elsewhere he associates i t w i t h u n i t y , goodness, and t r u t h . B u t he offers us the paradox t h a t the highest f o i m of life is f o u n d i n a B e i n g w h i c h lacks all the characteristics w h i c h we associate w i t h life, unless u n i t y , goodness and permanence can provide some sort of b r i d g e ; and the approach t o such a b e i n g s h o u l d be to lay aside n o t only action b u t t h o u g h t , indeed e v e r y t h i n g that is regulated b y n u m b e r and p r o p o r t i o n , and to lose oneself i n the contemplation of the absolute One. 19
I t h i n k , t h e n , that the alternative conception better expresses the Christian doctrine of creation, indeed of d i v i n e b e i n g ; and it should also be more acceptable t o us moderns, impressed as we are by D a r w i n ian theories of e v o l u t i o n ; for we n o r m a l l y t h i n k that new species have evolved b y developing new positive capacities w h i c h enable t h e m to compete and survive, rather t h a n by t h e self-restriction of an undifferentiated source of being B o t h these theories, however, presuppose an optimistic view of the universe, as expounded b y many Stoics and Platonists; and b o t h are d i f f i c u l t to reconcile w i t h Augustine's vision of a universe w h i c h G o d knows f r o m all eternity w i l l be darkened and corrupted by sin T h e p r o b l e m w o u l d be eased i f we c o u l d believe, w i t h J o h n Lucas, that God's foreknowledge is n o t absolute, so that there was at least a chance t h a t A d a m w o u l d not s i n ; or better s t i l l , if we c o u l d per suade A u g u s t i n e that man's absolute need of God's grace need not i m p l y an absolute entanglement i n c o r r u p t i o n . A s i t is, I suspect that he has i n v o l v e d himself i n a c o n t r a d i c t i o n f r o m w h i c h even his o w n masterful i n g e n u i t y c o u l d f i n d no way of escape I w i l l conclude w i t h some f u r t h e r remarks o n the subject of p e r m a n ence ; for permanence is a characteristic w h i c h Augustine values h i g h l y ; he thinks i t an essential m a r k of true goodness and of God's being B u t the connection between permanence and value is n o t immediately obvious. A r i s t o t l e indeed challenged Plato o n this p o i n t , o b s e r v i n g — perhaps not very seriously—that a w h i t e post that lasts a long time is no whiter than one w h i c h lasts for a day (NE 1096b, 4) We m i g h t of course
7, 8 a 13ff 19
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XVI object that this is not a good analogy for moral qualities i f we call a m a n generous, we mean that he has a permanent disposition towards unselfish g i v i n g T h u s an isolated impulsive action cannot count as generosity; to quote A r i s t o t l e again, i t is v i r t u o u s o n l y i f i t proceeds f r o m a f i x e d i n t e n t i o n ( i b i d 1105a, 34) B u t u n f o r t u n a t e l y for this argument, i t applies to vices as w e l l as to v i r t u e s ; and just as a throwaway largesse doesn't prove a m a n generous, so a momentary panic doesn't b r a n d h i m a cowar d Augustine is obviously captivated b y the old Platonic doctrine that i n s t a b i l i t y is a m a r k of vice, and per contra, that stability is necessary for v i r t u e ; b u t once again, he is not consistent; he can insist that some m e n acquire a habit of self-assertion and wrong-doing w h i c h determines all their actions (Gr Xti. 1 8 f ) . Itseems to f o l l o w that stability or permanence is a necessary c o n d i t i o n of m o r a l goodness; b u t i t cannot possibly be a sufficient c o n d i t i o n I n dealing w i t h G o d himself, A u g u s t i n e introduces the m u c h stronger n o t i o n of i m m u t a b i l i t y , w h i c h we cannot discuss at this stage B u t even the requirement of stability poses problems f o r the m o r a l i s t ; how can one acquire i t w i t h o u t becoming inflexible and insensitive? A n d per contra, w h a t can a philosopher make of those d e l i g h t f u l acts of spontaneous generosity w h i c h we associate w i t h the alabaster cruse of o i n t m e n t and w i t h St Francis of Assisi? N o d o u b t the answer s to such questions are i m p l i c i t i n Augustine's w r i t i n g s ; b u t he does not present t h e m i n woiked-out f o r m A n d the happy t r i b e of A u g u s t i n i a n scholars w h o quote the master's words w i t h placid approval have seldom explored these problems, and give us little help towards their solution. T h e m o r a l , I t h i n k , is that i t is more i m p o r t a n t to be stimulated and inspired b y Augustine t h a n to p u t together an A u g u s t i n i a n system. Augustine is a fascinating character; devout, yet ingenious; a u t h o r i tarian, yet sympathetic. A s a philosopher he has one outstanding weakness, namely his u n c r i t i c a l acceptance of a C h u r c h t r a d i t i o n that had been f i x e d t h r o u g h the labours of lesser m e n ; and this of course includes an approach to the Bible w h i c h we moderns have been forced to discard B u t no one can w h o l l y free himself f r o m the influence of his predecessors Augustine is not o n l y a saint, b u t an innovative genius whose w o r k w i l l h o l d a permanent appeal
The Intelligible World, in Platonic Tradition, Marius Victorinus and Augustine In his Literal Commentary on Genesis (12 10 21) Augustine has a short passage i n which he discusses the meanings of the words 'intelligible' and 'intellectual' The latter, we would suppose, denotes 'that which can t h i n k ' ; the other, 'that w h i c h can be thought' But rather surprisingly Augustine declares that they have the same meaning; whichever word we use, hoc idem signiftcamus Does he mean that the t w o words are strictly synonymous, or merely that their reference is the same? He does not make this at all clear But he notes that some thinkers draw a distinction Everyone, says Augustine, admits that intellect is perceived only by intellect: mens quippe non videtur nisi mente But can there be anything that is intelligible but does not itself think? This, he says, is a question, w h i c h he is not prepared to discuss; he w i l l treat the two terms as equivalent: nunc intellectuale et intelligibile sub eadem significatione appellamus This is a surprising doctrine. It conflicts w i t h our own usage, and indeed w i t h that o f the Greek words voEpoc, and voryros, which are very rarely confused We would suppose that intellectualis refers to an active power, intelligibilis to a passive suitability Not that intelligibilis exactly corresponds to the English w o r d 'intelligible' It certainly does not suggest 'easily intelligible'; i t has, rather, a restrictive sense: 'accessible, i f at all, only to the mind'. We might agree that Einstein's theory is intelligibilis when we could hesitate to call i t intelligible What then is to be counted as intelligible? Augustine's position, I think, is confused He clearly accepts the commonplace distinction between thinking and unthinking beings, and again that between sense and thought w i t h their respective objects But he also holds that intellect plays an essential part in sense perception, which distinguishes i t from mere sensation But i f so, then 1
Lib Arb 2 3.9; Conf. 7 17.23, 10 6 9; Gen Lit 12 10.24. Ihe doctrine of course is known earlier; see e g Cicero Acad 1 40; Sextus Empiricus adv Math 7 297. 11 226; Porphyry in 1
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I HE I N T E L L I G I B L E WORLD IN P L A I O N I C TRADITION
T H E I N T E L L I G I B L E WORLD IN P L A I O N I C I R A D I I I O N
everything we know is i n some sense intelligibile; and i f we equate the two terms, is i n some sense intellectuale This does not establish that every m i n d can be known; but i t does seem to i m p l y that everything that can be known is a mind
notion of value comes to the fore; the Idea is the standard of perfection to w h i c h its counterparts approximate This seems to i m p l y that there can be no Ideas of indifferent or worthless things Yet again, the Idea is conceived as conferring either distinctive character or distinctive value on its participants, as twoness makes things two, an aspect which Aristotle describes as the 'formal cause'; on this score i t has analogies w i t h the soul, traditionally regarded as the source o f movement and life (2) I t w i l l not be possible to chart all these conflicting traditions; but one axiom which is particularly important as assimilating the intellectual soul w i t h its objects is the commonplace that l i k e is k n o w n by like This dictum seems to have gained prestige w i t h the passage of time Aristotle refers to Plato for the doctrine yivcbaKEoocu xcpouoicp T O o u o i o v , but himself develops the theory w h i c h goes by the name of 'the identity of the mind w i t h its object' A n d whatever qualifications Aristotle may have envisaged, the dictum is quoted w i t h surprising assurance by Plotinus and Porphyry a l i k e
Augustine's ontology clearly builds on his Platonism; the problem has been studied i n depth, notably by Pepin, Hadot, Kramer and R i s t Such scholars have tended to consider not simply the relation of the Platonic Ideas, to the m i n d , but i n particular their relation to a supreme m i n d , the Craftsman, the Demiurge or God, or again to the anima mundi which Plato conceives as a soul partaking i n reason, Timaeus 36e B u t i f we intend to explore the background o f Augustine's dictum i n fairly brief compass, it w i l l be preferable, and I think allowable, to take a democratic line and speak only o f the minds and souls w i t h w h i c h we are acquainted 2
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(1) Plato several times declares that the soul is akin to the Ideas The Ideas are intelligible par excellence; the soul's most distinctive activity is that of thinking, vous or vosiv I n what ways does the soul resemble the Ideas? I t is not-composite, invisible, and at least relatively unchanging, aei cbaauxcbs £ X d thus akin to the divine These descriptions are drawn from the Phaedo; but i n a much later work, Laws 10, 898e, Plato declares i t intelligible to the mind alone, voryröv S'sivat vcp u ö v c o o u o a
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Such a manner of thinking is so remote f r o m our own that i t is d i f f i c u l t to perceive the tacit qualifications that must have governed its use In some sense, clearly, i t is the m i n d that knows the way to Larissa - as Augustine w i l l agree But we do not think the mind is long and rough and stony Mathematics, moreover, is a purely intellectual pursuit; but in learning the multiplication table our mind entertains or acquires its particulars, but remains distinct W e do not teach the multiplication table by causing i t to understand us! Aristotle does indeed suggest that teaching and learning are the same process, though differently conceived (Phys 3 2, 202 a 20) But one can learn without being taught; i t cannot then be argued that learning must involve contact w i t h an intelligent being M o r a l knowledge is perhaps more significant; to love is a sine qua non for understanding what love is B u t whatever our own reserves, i t is plain that the axiom was much respected i n antiquity, and that i t influenced Augustine
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B u t as we all know Plato soon developed his views both of the soul and of the Ideas I n the Republic and the Phaedrus we move f r o m the Idealized soul of the philosopher to the diversified and self-conflicting souls of men at large, w i t h the proviso, of course, that intelligence remains their most distinctive and most valuable attribute or activity, though not always the most effective. As for the Ideas, Plato clearly began by thinking o f them as principles of explanation; they are often put forward in answer to the question 'What is so-and-so?', as applied to a general name denoting some moral quality or virtue B u t they soon come to embody a large variety o f interests, both for Plato himself and still more for his successors Considered as principles o f explanation, Plato seems to have maintained the belief, despite all difficulties, that there is an Idea corresponding to every general n a m e In other contexts the 4
J. Pépin Une curieuse déclaration idéaliste de Saint Augustin , Rev. d Hist et Phil. Rel 34 (1954). 373-400; P Hadot, Être, Vie, Pensée chez Plotin et avant Plotin '. Les Sources de Plotin, Entretiens Hardt 5 (1960), 105-41; H J Kràmer Der Ursprung der Geistmetaphysik (Amsterdam 1967); J. Rist Eros and Psyche (Toronto 1964) pp 61-7, Plotinus the Road to Reality (Cambridge.. 1967). pp 85ff Cf n 1. W D Ross Plato s Theory of Ideas (Oxford, 1951), pp 79, 141 172; cf G. Vlastos, Degrees of Reality in Plato', pp 7. 8 n 1 in R Bambrough (ed ) New Essays on Plato and Aristotle (London 1979) 2
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(3) Quite apart f r o m these general considerations, i t must appear that some Ideas at least are intelligent, especially the Ideas of rational beings, whether men or demons Plato's argument i n Sophist 248e points the way; i t is phrased i n abstract terms, contending that movement, l i f e and thought are present i n absolute reality, rep TravxeAcos o v x i , but the latter phrase is explained by an earlier statement (246 b) that real being
Parmenides 130 d Phaedo 101 c; cf Aristotle s criticism, Gen & Corr 2 9 esp 335 b 18; my axe illustration below suggests an answer, without discounting other causes De Anima 1.2,404 b 16; 3 7. 431 a l ; c f n 9 and J Pépin, op cit, pp 393-5 Enn 5 3 5-6; Sent 44: Alex Aphr Mantissa p 108 Bruns 5
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THE I N T E L L I G I B L E WORLD IN PLATONIC I R A D I I I O N
I HE I N T E L L I G I B L E WORLD TN PLATONIC TRADITION
consists in intelligible and, incorporeal Forms: v o r y r d
OCTTCC K O I
ei5r) TT\V dAr|6ivr]V o u a i a v e i v a i Intelligence is part o f
docbuccxa
5
things, y e v r y r d , i t w i l l operate over a period, and its influence w i l l have a beginning I f I split a log into two parts, the Idea of twoness w i l l come into
human perfection; i t must, therefore, attach to the Idea of man B u t this
play the moment the axe falls B u t suppose, instead, that I beget a c h i l d ; in
reflection, as we shall see, leads us away f r o m conceiving of the Ideas as
this event part of his mother's body becomes informed by the Idea of
inclusive concepts arranged i n a hierarchy Our ordinary systems of clas-
humanity, or of a humanity; but also, the Platonist w i l l believe, a soul enters
sification lead us to think that a l l members of a species belong to i t
this body f r o m another realm A r e we to think that these are two distinct
equally; Thersites is a man no less than Achilles B u t the theory o f Ideas
events w h i c h m i g h t occur at different times? I shall offer some evidence that
assumes a connection between generality and value such that a species is
there were M i d d l e Platonists who drew no distinction
more truly embodied i n its best members than i n the average; while even
1 0
One source that must certainly be examined is Philo of Alexandria So far
the best fall short of the Idea itself Nevertheless we only experience
as I can discover, he does not assimilate the words voEpoc, and voryros He
intelligent thinking as an activity of individuals; and there is something
knows the m a x i m that like is known b y like {pet 164) and argues f r o m i t that
impenetrably strange to us i n the notion that the most intelligent man can
mind is k n o w n by m i n d (Gig 9) Hence he concludes that we have intellec-
be out-performed by the Idea of the animal as such.
tual knowledge of cosmic intelligences; but not, I think, that everything known to the m i n d is intelligent Does he then assimilate souls with Ideas? I
W e have given a brief sketch of some of the problems that are suggested by Plato's thought; we must turn to his successors O f these Aristotle, at least
think I sense a certain hesitation, w h i c h is disguised by his habit of giving symbolical meaning to biblical texts Thus when he states that Abraham and
the mature Aristotle, stands largely aside f r o m the development we wish to
Sarah represent Ideas (Qu Gen 4 8) we ought not to conclude that the Ideas
explore; he rejected the notion o f transcendent Forms, and redefined the soul
resemble humans, and are conscious intelligences
as the f o r m o f the body, leaving i t a directive function as controlling the
appear to link the Ideas w i t h angels;
13
There are texts which
but most of these involve the terms
body's development, and recognizing intelligence as the peak of human
A o y o i and 5uvduEi$, w h i c h are too variable i n meaning to support certain
excellence, but locating superhuman intelligence in the moving principles of
conclusions Rather more definite is Qu Ex 2 114, where Philo states that the
the heavenly bodies, and i n a supreme directive intelligence who, we note,
patriarchs are immortalized as souls or Ideas; but so far I have discovered
contemplates himself not only on the general ground of the identity of the
only one text w h i c h clearly states that Ideas are intelligent, at Qu Ex 1 63, a
mind w i t h its object, but because the best m i n d must think that w h i c h is best,
passage w h i c h fortunately survives i n a Greek fragment:
namely himself.
9
Aristotle's contemporaries Speusippus and Xenocrates w i l l have to be
"ESEI
briefly dismissed; the programme that I have outlined allows us to by-pass two famous definitions o f soul, as, ihia
T O U Trdvxfl S i a a T a x o G
yàp
xàç
Trptbxaç
xoû
"OVTOÇ
SuvàuEit;
iSsas
ISECÔV
ÙTrapxoùoaç, xfjs Kd6apcjTQTT]Ç KCÙ àuiyoûç
and as
d p t o u o s EOCUTOV KIVCOV These, I take it, are primarily concerned w i t h the cosmic soul of the Timaeus;
but their application may well have been
extended Xenocrates identified Plato's ideal numbers w i t h ordinary mathematical numbers; thus his definition identifies souls w i t h at least one class of Ideas; and i t becomes less paradoxical i f we recall that d p i 6 u 6 $ can easily
Strictly speaking, of course, this applies to an élite class of Ideas; but it w o u l d be unlike Philo to provide that the common run of Ideas are excluded We can turn now to the M i d d l e Platonist Calvenus Taurus, writing i n the
denote any collection or structure that embodies a computable plurality, as
early second century A D , w h o states that 'souls are sent b y the gods to earth
the soul obviously does. I t seems natural, then, to see Xenocrates as an
(perhaps) in order that there may be as many l i v i n g beings i n the cosmos as
important source for a view w h i c h certainly circulated among the M i d d l e
there are in the intelligible realm'
Platonists and which, discounting a mass o f complications and objections,
vidual beings', because i f i t meant simply 'species', one human soul would
makes a straightforward identification o f souls and Ideas
suffice Taurus' view resembles that found in Plotinus: when the souls are
' L i v i n g beings' here should mean 'indi-
In some ways, of course, this identification can be made extremely plausible Suppose we see the Idea as a formal cause, then i n the case o f transient But not main-stream Platonists, for this possibility is ignored in the conspectus in Porphyry ad Gaurum; F T in Festugiere Rev Herm Trism 3 267-9 Somn 1 127; Spec Leg 1 46-8 329; Qu Gen 3 11 1 0
11
9
Metaph
A 9 1075 a 5; 1074 b 34
XVI
XVI 6
THE I N T E L L I G I B L E WORLD IN PLATONIC TRADITION
THE I N T E L L I G I B L E WORLD IN PLATONIC I R A D I I I O N
7
sent down, theii place i n heaven is not vacated, but remains occupied by their THE P O R P H Y R Y TREE
intelligible counterparts This view contrasts w i t h one found i n Philo, i n the Gnostic teacher Basilides,
12
and i n other Gnostic systems we shall now con-
sider, w h i c h postulates a straightforward descent and reascension of souls or
A f u l l diagram is given by Philo agr
139, Seneca Ep 58:
Ideas "OVTCC
Hippolytus describes a number of sects w h i c h expound a mixture of
Quod est
popular Platonism w i t h unorthodox exposition of the Bible I h e Peratae, we are told, conceive o f the Son, or Logos as a cosmic serpent who glides up and
daebiiCCTCt
acbpara
incorporalia ^corj)Malia
down, and derives f r o m the Father the 5uvduii<;, iSecu or x P K T n p e s a
a
duyuxa
which he then embodies i n matter (5 16 25) These must be individual ideas; for the account continues: ' I f anyone
EU^A/XO:
inanimata
animata
has the strength to comprehend that ctXoycc
he is a character of the Father brought down f r o m above and embodied i n the
XoyiKCt
[plants] 'solo affixa'
animalia
world, he becomes consubstantial w i t h the Father i n heaven and ascends to 8vryTd
that place' Shortly afterwards we hear of the Logos 'carrying up f r o m below
6ETO
mortalia
immortalia
those who have awakened and become characters of the Father' The Peratae, Stoic influence is seen i n the primary division; the incorporalia
of course, were not the first to adopt the m a x i m 'Werde was du bist' Very similar teaching appears i n Hippolytus' account of the Docetists i n
comprise
only grammatical and logical concepts, everything else is corporeal; so
Book V I I I W e hear of ideas or characters coming down f r o m above, and
Philo agr.
being insulted by the Demiurge and imprisoned i n material bodies, though
Ideas incorporeal
1 4 0 f , whereas he normally makes God , the Logos and the
not without some error (rrXavri) on their o w n part; thus 'the ideas are called
The two f o l l o w i n g tables (a) omit this division, so giving more scope
souls, because they have cooled off f r o m the things above and continue i n
for incorporeal beings; (b) pronounce the right-hand classes superior at
darkness', using the word-play y u x n >
each stage, thereby giving the appearance of a scala
S 0 U 1
> 6 X P ° S ' °hd (8 10 1) U
metaphor of cooling is also found i n Origen (Princ
c
The
naturae:
2 8 3, cf M t 24:12; but
he speaks, of V6E$ 'minds', or Xoyitcoi, 'rational beings', rather than Ideas, which he interprets unsympathetically as mere mental concepts
Maximus Tyrius 11 8, p 138 H
Augustine C D 11 16 1 *
(Princ a Deo facta
"Ovra
2.3.6) So much for the thinkers who assimilate Ideas w i t h souls But there is a contrasting tradition at w o r k w i t h i n M i d d l e Platonism w h i c h carries on the project begun by Plato i n the Sophist Politicus
and continued i n the Philebus
ayuxa
non viventia
ëufuxcc
viventia
and
to arrange the Ideas i n a rational order, i n which the more compre-
cpuriKÖv
aiaoxiKÔv
non sentientia [arbores]
hensive take precedence over the more nearly individual This undertaking
sentientia [animalia]
presumes that the Ideas are unchanging, and that each of them is a one-overmany, so that the table culminates i n the most comprehensive and to our
äXoyov
XoytKov
non intelligentia
intelligentia
thinking the most abstract o f all Ideas, namely that of being itself This mortale
diagram is known as the 'Tree o f Porphyry', and examples are found i n
immortales
Aristotle and the Stoics, i n Philo, Seneca, Albinus and Maximus of Tyre, and in Basil and Victorinus as w e l l as Augustine
* I n his enim, quae quoquo modo sunt et non sunt quod Deus est a quo
1 3
It should not be confused w i t h another diagram, commonly known as a scala naturae, w h i c h attempts to classify the main types of being i n an order
facta sunt, praeponuntui viventia non viventibus
et i n his, quae vivunt,
praeponuntur sentientia non sentientibus, sicut arboribus animalia; et i n his quae sentiunt, praeponuntur
intelligentia non intelligentibus, sicut
homines pecoribus; et i n his, quae intelligunt, praeponuntur immortalia Basilides (Hippolytus Ref. 7 22 7ff) uses the term uioxns (not in IS)); yvxh §10; i6ea perhaps only in a general sense. 7 21 5 W Theiler Die Vorbereitung des Neuplatoni sinus (Berlin, 1930), pp 3-7 12
13
is implied at
mortalibus, sicut angeli hominibus
XVI
XVI THE I N T E L L I G I B L E W O R L D IN P L A I O N I C I R A D I I I O N
THE I N I E L L I G I B L E W O R L D IN PLATONIC I R A D I I I O N
based on increasing value and rationality Thus Aristotle divides the natural world into inanimates, plants, animals and rational beings; and attempts were later made to extend the scheme above the human level, though w i t h much less prospect of securing agreement; i t might, for instance, include demons and star-deities, as i n Apuleius Augustine, on Psalm 148, formulates i t w i t h convenient brevity thus: angeli, homines, animalia, arbores et lapides laudunt Deum A n d a late and elaborately christianized version appears i n the heavenly hierarchies o f Dionysius the Areopagite.
need the assistance of the f o r m of animal life, which might ensure, say, that a mare w i l l not give birth to a mushroom I t does not seem to me that the ancient Platonists grasped this point; they held that the move from individual to species was a step up i n terms of dignity and effectiveness, and assumed that the same w o u l d apply to the transition f r o m species to genus, and so on I f I have argued correctly, this view was mistaken W e can now turn to Marius Victorinus, w h o m I see as a pagan philosopher turned Christian, who defends Nicene theology w i t h the simple conviction of a convert, but is still searching for a philosophical substructure i n the Neoplatonist doctrines which he has absorbed, and is far f r o m establishing a coherent system I n his first philosophical w o r k , the ad Candidum, he explains in some detail that intelligibilis and intellectualis apply to different orders of reality; he may therefore be the dissident whom Augustine indicates by the tactful plural quidam There are, he declares, four orders of reality: quae vere sunt, quae sunt, quae non vere non sunt, quae non sunt To get the priorities right we have to read the third clause w i t h a cancelling double negative: 'things that are not absolutely unreal' A n d even the fourth class turns out to have some measure of being; it is distinguished from quae vere non sunt, which he says 'have no claim to exist' ad id ut sint locum non habent
8
14
It should be clear that i n theory these t w o classifications are quite distinct The Porphyry Tree unfolds i n an order of decreasing generality; the Ladder i n an order of increasing value, taking rationality as the criterion, and comparing co-ordinate species or genera I n the Porphyry Tree the species man is placed next above the genus of animal-in-general, T O £COOV, to which he belongs; i n the other scheme man comes, next above irrational animals But confusion arises because i t is d i f f i c u l t to reflect on the Porphyry Tree without introducing some notion of comparative value I f we compare the species man w i t h the genus animal, T O £toov, we are likely to think that man is superior; for the genus T O QCOOV defines a mixed population i n which irrational animals predominate, whereas all men are presumed to be rational Indeed we still import notions of value into our class-terms There are good grounds for claiming that Thersites is a man no less than Achilles; but how natural i t is to say that Achilles is more of a man than Iher sites Let us approach the problem f r o m another angle The system of classification sketched out by Plato i n the Sophist considers the ideas mainly as classconcepts What w i l l be the result i f we emphasize the other aspects o f the Ideas as mentioned above, and think of them as ideal or alternatively as formal causes? Obviously there is no objection i n principle to defining a class i n terms of approximation to an ideal standard; we constantly do this when we describe everyday objects as circles or triangles But i f we do this, we cannot work w i t h a simple concept of participation; we have to think of approximation i n various degrees A n d this w i l l apply at all levels A m o n g the various species of animals, i t is plausible to hold that the most rational is best, namely man; and among men, the best w i l l be the man who most nearly approaches ideal humanity But this means that there is no w o r k to be found for the ideal animal-as-such; its role w i l l be taken over by the ideal man M u c h the same argument applies i f we think of the Ideas as formal causes. Aristotle was able to see the f o r m of the species as playing an important part in the development of l i v i n g organisms; i t ensures, for instance, that a mare w i l l give birth to a foal and not to a calf B u t i f i t does this job, it w i l l not
Numerous examples are given by A S Pease Commentary on Cicero. De Natura Deorum
9
1 5
16
The four classes can be identified as follows: first, Ideas or intelligibles, secondly souls, which are intellectualis, thirdly souls embedded i n matter, and fourthly matter itself I n this passage, then, intellectualis refers to a power o f understanding w h i c h may or may not be exercised; indeed w e hear of animarum in natura intellectualium nondum intellectum habentium But there is no consistency; shortly afterwards the power of G o d is called intellectualis as well as intelligibilis; and since God is simplex, this cannot denote a lesser perfection, let alone an imperfection Turning to the broader question, we find that Victorinus gives a confused impression of the intelligible w o r l d , largely, I think, because he has not appreciated the fundamental distinction between the Tree and the Ladder to which I referred He is familiar enough w i t h a christianized version of the scala naturae; a simple example, given in descending order of value, runs as follows: Deus, Iesus, Spiritus, nous, anima, et deinde corporalia omnia (adv Ar. 1 2 , 5 ) A rather similar passage (ibid 1 4 4 ) enlarges on the orders of angels i n language drawn f r o m Eph 1:21 and C o l 1:16: and a third exam-pie (1 60) begins w i t h the Father and the Son, as mutually indwelling, but continues i n philosophical terms, omitting the Spirit and reverting to the four orders of reality mentioned above: G o d is praeprincipium omnis sub.stantiae,
15
See however A H Armstrong (ed ) Later Greek Philosophy 297f on Iambiichus
1 6
See F W
2 32^10
Kohnke.
Plato's Conception of TO OUK OVTCOS OUK 6V' Phronesis (1956)
XVI
XVI 10
T H E I N I E L L I G I B L E WORLD IN PLATONIC TRADITION
THE I N T E L L I G I B L E WORLD IN PLATONIC TRADITION
intelligibilis hyle
et intellectualh
et animae
et hylicae et univer.sae substantiae
in !
Victoiinus has p r e v i o u s l y explained the highest of these four orders, the things quae vere sunt et omnia supracaelestia He begins, apparently, w i t h its less distinguished members: ut spiritus, vou$, anima, cognoscentia, disci¬ plina, virtutes, X o y o i , opiniones, perfectio, existentia, vita, intelligentia This is a perplexing catalogue; one w o u l d say, surely, that spiritus, vou$, and anima claim to be substances, while the next six look more like attributes or activities which they are supposed to display (and i t seems odd to f i n d opiniones in such distinguished company); whereas existentia, vita and intelligentia are nominalized forms of the familiar triad esse, vivere, intelligere, which can either be sharply distinguished, as marking off three orders of creatures by their highest potential - perhaps stones, plants and men - or identified as belonging to the supreme being and presupposing one another We have taxed Victorinus w i t h confusing the categories; so perhaps we should hear his reply, which conveys standard Neoplatonic doctrine, but has a certain vividness and poetic appeal; he contends that in the intelligible w o r l d , everything that exists in a substance, and is a l i v i n g and thinking being: Etenim in supernis aeternisque, id est in intellectibilibus atque intellectualibus nihil accidens, nihil qualitas, nihil geminum, vel cum altero, sed omnia viventes sunt intelligentesque substantiae, purae, simplices, unius modi, hoc ipso quo sunt, et vivunt et intellegunt, conversimque, quo vivunt, quo intellegunt, hoc ipso etiam sunt His conclusion, I think, is rather less impressive: Vivit igitur ac vita una substantia est This to make time a mere negation of enduring life rather than as a stage in which to act 17
1
1 l
18
B u t I have not finished w i t h Victorinus' catalogue He goes on to mention two higher sorts of reality: et adhuc superius, existentialitas, vitalitas, intelli¬ gentitas, et supra ista omnia, ov solum istud ipsum quod est unum et solum ov But what on earth is the place of these abstracta, 'existentiality, vitality and intelligentity' as distinct f r o m 'existence, life and intelligence', in a scheme o f being which, we have just heard, begins with the Holy Trinity and continues w i t h vous and anima and the divine creations? I suggest that Victorinus has been misled by a faulty theory o f meaning He assumes that all nouns are names; he considers existentia and existentialitas two distinct significant words, and infers that they denote two separate things I n this reasoning he overlooks the vital fact that existentia itself has more than one meaning i t can have a collective sense, indicating all that exists, or some part o f it It can also be used abstractly, to indicate the state or condition which existent things as such possess But in this second sense it seems precisely equivalent to existentialitas; the longer term might perhaps
Ad Cand 7. Adv AT 4 2
be useful as excluding an ambiguity w h i c h existentia permits; but that gives no reason to construe i t as a name for a distinct and higher order of reality One might of course argue that existentialitas conveys a more pronounced suggestion of abstraction; i t seems further removed from the concrete and particular, and so, on Platonic assumptions, more sublime B u t if so, w h y stop there? W h y not speak of existentialitas as something higher still? Irenaeus long ago had castigated charlatans who played this game Meanwhile, let us note that existentialitas is something of a bogus universal; it does not, like most universals, have the dignity of greater comprehensiveness, as the genus animal is more comprehensive than the species man; for existentiality, i f i t is a property at all, is a property which can attach only to existence This argument could be extended, i f time allowed, to include Victorinus' treatment o f God himself Sometimes he uses concrete terms borrowed from everyday life; he is particularly fond o f describing God's substance as spiritus and lumen; or again, unlike Plotinus, as a thinking m i n d that is conscious of itself A t other times he accumulates abstracta; God is not only o v , but Trpoov; or more elaborately, omnium principiorum praeprincipium, omnium intelligentiarum praeintelligentia, and so on I would venture to argue that even the well-tried description of G o d as esse purum harbours confusions It appeals to esse as the most abstract of universals, having the least positive significance, to express the transcendence of God, or his remoteness from ordinary descriptions Y e t at the same time esse must express his creativity; and here one appeals to the infinite variety of positive content, when esse can stand for the distinctive manner of life and existence possessed by so many different kinds o f created beings B u t this is a radically different use of esse; the distinctive esse of the hyena may perhaps be seen as a product o f God's creative intelligence, but i t is not in any sense an aspect of his nature Y e t this apparently sensible caution is ruled out by the traditional reasoning that God is a perfectly simple being, so that all aspects of his esse must coincide This argument is not for me. W e turn at last to Augustine, who like Victorinus attempts a synthesis of Platonism w i t h Nicene Christianity, and whose notions o f the intelligible w o r l d have much in common w i t h his Augustine is by far the more versatile and penetrating thinker He is not captivated by Neoplatonist systematics; he has absorbed the Christian doctrine of creation, including the biblical view that 'God created man f r o m the dust of the earth', and of course the earth itself He therefore sees God as creating beings quite unlike himself, as well as those who can achieve some likeness through their intelligence and their independence of matter He can, therefore, accommodate intellectual spirits 1 9
!
|
11
1 9
Ibid 1 49
XVI
XVI 12
THE I N T E L L I G I B L E WORLD TN PLATONIC IRADITION
in the Platonic style; but he has no special reason to see the supreme Unity founding a series of intelligent beings who diminish only gradually f r o m himself. I h i s I think needs saying; for scholarly research has tended to call attention to the echoes of Plotinus in Augustine His independence, therefore, also needs to be stressed It seems, then, that he approaches the intelligible world by three different routes First, it contains the patterns or prototypes of all created beings Next, it contains all those concepts and relations o f which we have intellectual knowledge; these are more various then we might expect, and figure in mathematical, logical, moral and aesthetic theory Thirdly it has to include those concepts that can be predicated per analogiam of God himself, and i n soon sense identified w i t h him I h e first heading can be simply treated In the Diverse Questions, number 46, Augustine has a straightforward Platonist account of the rationes rerum stabiles atque incommutabiles, quae in divina intelligentia continentur He does not, in this passage, assign them to the divine Wisdom or Logos in particular; and he does not, I believe, include ideas o f individual beings, though this has sometimes been asserted. A n d there is no suggestion that I can discover that the Ideas are intelligent beings The pure and rational mind, he says, excels by its intelligence istas rationes, quarum visions fit beatissima; and the treatise On Free Will describes the Forms of bodies at least as inferior to the powers of the soul, which in turn are inferior to the virtues thems e l v e s Thus the value o f those Forms in proportional, not to the divine intelligence that conceives them, but to the degree o f goodness which the Creator intends them to realize in their embodiments A n d the rationes that inspire the intelligent m i n d are not themselves described as intelligent Secondly, the intelligible w o r l d includes all those things that are k n o w n by the m i n d ; though no doubt we should add the qualification 'without the aid of the senses', for we must not encumber the intelligible world with the road to Larissa W i t h i n this wide-ranging class we can identify Forms of substances, for corporeal Forms appear again under this heading; of qualities, especially moral qualities; and o f relations, for 'likeness' is mentioned i n ver relig 36 66, along w i t h unity and truth Here again, so far as I can see, there is no mention of individual Forms, and no claim that the Forms are intelligent, thinking beings Certainly there is no tendency to assimilate the Forms w i t h souls; for even the angels are conceived as created beings, and in principle subject to change, though capable o f achieving immutability in virtue 20
21
THE I N I E L L I G I B L E W O R L D IN PLATONIC I R A D I I I O N
13
known passage of the City of God, 8 6, he represents the Platonists as teaching that 'whatever exists is either matter or life, and that life is superior to matter, that the Form of matter' - surprisingly - 'is accessible to sense, that the Form of l i f e is accessible to intelligence' ' L i f e ' is clearly to be taken in an inclusive sense, for Augustine has just declared that its ideal Form is realized in the divine intelligence A n d he goes on to explain intellectual knowledge by considering three kinds of beauty, the physical, the conceptual and the ideal beauty, the last being raised above the level of our intellect through its unchanging perfection. A n even more spectacular description of intellectual knowledge is found in the Literal Commentary on Genesis, 12 24 50, where he sees i t apprehending the Christian virtues enumerated by St Paul: 'How else can the intellect itself be seen except by intellection? In this way also we see "love, joy, peace, patience, kindness, goodness, faith, gentleness, self-control" and the rest, by which we draw near to God, and finally God h i m s e l f 23
I n this bold synthesis of Platonic and Christian tradition i t appears that there are philosophical puzzles w h i c h I have neither the time nor the skill to disentangle. Augustine can readily accept the Platonic Forms of man and horse, existing in the divine mind as prototypes of things to be created But there seems no place i n his thought for the F o r m of the living creature as such; he speaks rather of life itself; and this is not part o f God's design for creation, but an aspect of his own being, included in the triad esse-vivereintelligere which, like Victorinus, he can declare to be inseparable one from another, as essential aspects of God's own being In much the same way the notion of perfect intelligence appears, especially in the Soliloquies, to merge w i t h that o f perfect truth, an echo, perhaps, of the claimed identity of the knowing mind w i t h its object; and there is not very lucid transition f r o m truth at its lowest, as seen in the truism that three threes are nine, or that wise men are better than fools, to truth as realised in perfect understanding and intelligence, a truth identical w i t h the being of God 2 4
22
But this sketch of Augustine's views has so far been one-sided I n a well-
When approaching God's being in philosophical teims, Augustine puts him at the summit of the intelligible world. A s an ardent Nicene, Augustine could not accept the formula found i n some earlier Christian Platonists, that God the Father creates pure being God the Son confers on things their distinctive character: for uncharacterised existence is a logician's phrase: nothing can exist unless i t is so-and-so Thus when Augustine speaks of esse purum, he cannot refer to such existence; cf p 11 It may perhaps be
C D 8 6. D Knowles translates speciem corporis as the form of matter and the meaning Form' is indeed suggested earlier in the chapter. Physica! beauty' seems less likely as Augustine goes on to refer to beauty as pulchritudo But species could have a very general sense, contrasting the corporeal 'order' or realm' with the intelligible Ibid Cf Victorinus adv Ar 3 6 ad fin 2 3
J. Meyendorff, New Scholasticism 16 (1942) 36; V J Bourke. Augustine s View of Reality 5 n, 21 2 19 50; cf C D 8 6 Op cit 2 19 49 2 0
21
2 2
2 4
XVI 14
THE I N T E L L I G I B L E WORLD IN P L A I O N I C
XVII
TRADITION
approached in terms of Aristotle's metaphysics God has no accidents, i n the commonly accepted sense; he is never surprised by events To say 'God is perfect justice' perhaps expressed this point But Augustine interprets this 'is' as an 'is' of identity, so reaching the conclusion that all God's attributes are identical w i t h him, and thus identical w i t h one another I t is difficult to make sense of this doctrine I t may be possible, for instance, to conceive a perfect union of justice and mercy; but a synthesis of all God's attributes must escape human comprehension A n d even i f i t were possible, such a scheme might do justice to God's majesty, but could not comprehend his love This must be infinitely adaptable i f , as we believe, God loves both the severe moralist and the warm-hearted undiscriminating open heart which has a welcome for all He loves us, not merely for our likeness to him, but in our inevitable difference, as created beings Augustine, therefore, has not succeeded in presenting an integrated version of Platonic metaphysics, Nevertheless his services to philosophical theology are very great Despite his evident indebtedness to Platonism, he has presented a much more credible version of divine unity, and of God's action i n the w o r l d For all his debt to Plotinus (well recorded i n Henry Chadwick's notes to his translation of the Confessions) Augustine is worlds away f r o m a system in which the unity of the supreme One excludes all multiplicity, to the extent that such a being i n his own person cannot either know or be k n o w n , and his action on the world is an eternal dispersal and dissipation of the original unity; where there is indeed a contrary tendency to return to the One, but a return which promises nothing but Nirvana Augustine, again, has quietly avoided the glorification of abstract concepts which entangled Victorinus A n d it should never be forgotten that his philosophical work, important as it is, occupied only a fraction o f his time and energy Augustine was tirelessly active as a preacher, as an exponent of the Scriptures, as a pastor, as a diocesan administrator, and not least as an expositor of Christian orthodoxy as he conceived i t , w i t h which his philosophy must not conflict No other man has exercised so great an influence on the thought and action of the succeeding millennium
Augustine's Universe (read at O x f o r d on 22nd M a y , 198 7 to a group entitled 'The Theological W i n e ' ) St Augustine is beyond question the greatest m i n d and the rarest spirit of late antiquity; capable both o f calming our inquietudes by the profound assurance o f his faith and of whetting our curiosity by the penetrating ingenuities of his reasoning; no subject he touches can fail to interest his many admirers But there is hardly a subject, it must be said, i n which Augustine himself professed so plain a disinterest as the structure of the physical world; a disinterest, however, which brings some advantage The student of Augustine is too often bewildered by the horrifying industry of his fellows But the enormous b u l k of Augustine literature has seldom attempted to describe i n simple terms the f o r m which the cosmos assumed in the saint's imagination It may be that scholars have followed then master in thinking this a matter of little moment Here, then, i t seems, we have a subject on which, without enormous efforts of mental abstraction or relentless pursuit of insignificant detail, some new light can be thrown I spoke of disinterest It is easy to show that Augustine has - or affects to have - no interest in cosmology for its own sake. 'It is frequently asked', he writes, 'what our belief must be about the f o r m and shape of the heaven according to Sacred Scripture Many scholars engage in lengthy discussions on these matters; but the sacred writers w i t h their deeper wisdom have omitted them Such subjects are of no profit for those who seek beatitude, and, what is worse, they take up very precious time that ought to be given to what is spiritually beneficial What concern is i t of mine whether heaven is like a sphere and the earth enclosed by it and suspended i n the middle of the universe, or whether i t is like a disk above the earth, covering it over on one side?' 1
Gen ad Lit 2 9 20 All references are to this work, unless otherwise noted I am greatly indebted to the admirable translation by J.H Taylor S J (Ancient Christian Writers 41-2) which I have used with only minor changes It has some enterprising but unobjectionable, expansions of Augustine's Latin 1
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'But' he goes on, 'the credibility of Scripture is at stake'; and in a previous passage he explains why a Christian teacher ought to be grounded i n the rudiments o f this apparently frivolous pursuit. 'Usually, even a non-Christian knows something about the earth, the heavens, and the other elements of this world . about the predictable eclipses of the sun and moon about the kinds of animals, plants, minerals and so forth, and this knowledge he holds to as being certain f r o m reason and experience N o w it is a disgraceful and dangerous thing for an individual to hear a Christian, while ostensibly giving the meaning of Holy Scripture, talk nonsense on these topics; and we should take all means to prevent such an embarrassing situation, i n which people show up enormous ignorance in a Christian and laugh it to scorn If they find a Christian mistaken in a field which they themselves know w e l l , and hear h i m basing his foolish opinions on our books, how are they going to believe those books in matters concerning the resurrection of the dead, the hope of eternal life and the kingdom o f heaven . ? Reckless and incompetent expounders of Holy Scripture bring untold trouble and sorrow on their wiser brethren when they are detected in one of their mischievous fallacies and are taken to task by those who do not accept the authority of our sacred writings. ' This extremely prudent and sensible warning might perhaps suggest that Augustine accords to the natural reason an authority comparable to that of Scripture - a notion which w o u l d be pleasing to literal-minded empiricists But on the whole this notion is delusive Augustine w i l l make great efforts to dispel apparent conflicts between Scripture and science; but i f no solution can be found, the inerrancy of H o l y Scripture is the rock on which he stands In his Literal Exposition of Genesis he protests against the complaint that he has involved himself too deeply i n matters o f no spiritual importance. He replies, in effect, that w i t h practice i t becomes easy to refute the unbeliever 'When they are able, f r o m reliable evidence, to prove some fact of physical science, we shall show that i t is not contrary to our Scripture But when they produce from their books a theory contrary to Scripture, and therefore contrary to the Catholic Faith, either we shall have some ability to demonstrate that i t is absolutely false, or at least we ourselves hold it so without any shadow of doubt A n d so w i l l we cling to our Mediator, in whom are hidden all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge. '
anxieties. B u t there is the countervailing theme that the exercise of human reason is of its very nature a noble task, a theme that was voiced in Aeschylus' Prometheus Bound and was eloquently developed by Sophocles Augustine therefore has no difficulty in adopting f r o m Tertullian or Basil the well-worn argument that the dissensions of the philosophers demonstrate the futility o f their studies; but he can also write w i t h approval of the astronomers and their w o r k ; 'for they investigate these matters by the natural light of the m i n d which Thou hast given them, and discover many secrets; they predict many years in advance the eclipses of the sun and of the moon, and the events accord w i t h their predictions; they have even set down rules w h i c h can still be read, by which one can make [such] forecasts; and i t comes to pass as it was foretold '
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I w o u l d not maintain, however, that Augustine is wholly consistent For all his brilliance and original genius, he is prone to make use of customary themes, or topoi, many of which were adapted by Christian tradition f r o m earlier pagan thought. We can trace back to Epicurus the notion that physical research is a waste of effort unless it brings the spiritual benefit of removing
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Augustine had evidently given thought to cosmology as a young man interested in acquiring a general education; and he emphasised the reliability of its sober-minded exponents, contrasting i t w i t h the extravagant fables of the Manichees, to whose company he was later attracted His tolerance, of course, does not extend to the astrologers, w h o m like almost all the Fathers he denounces Some events, no doubt, can be rationally predicted; but the astrologers assume a total determinism which abrogates human free w i l l , and thereby makes moral judgments absurd and moral conduct impossible In his treatment of the Scriptures Augustine is of course far removed from the modern critic who thinks of a collection of books originally written by a number of authors of different mentalities at different times He assumes, i f not unity of authorship, at least a common m i n d and agreement o f teaching A n d he is right to this extent, that the cosmology of the many different biblical writers is not remarkably dissimilar, just as it was not strenuously thought out B u t it does, of course, differ profoundly f r o m the much more sophisticated theories of the Greek philosophers Augustine therefore has a problem on his hands whose f u l l extent he could not perceive, partly because he was unable to study the O l d Testament writers in their Hebrew original; for the translators had already gone some way towards obscuring the more archaic features of biblical thought A s a sample, we may take the Hebrew assumption that light is an effect w h i c h comes and goes without the need for a source of light - as might be supposed by a child brought up on the fogbound coasts of Newfoundland L i g h t thus existed before the sun and stars, which were created only to serve as indicators Augustine, as we shall see, can evade the drawbacks of this crude assumption; but only by appealing to the Greek usage which could understand the word 'light' in terms o f discovered truth or mental illumination Hebrew cosmology can be found in various books of the Bible; in the 4
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second Isaiah, i n the Wisdom literature, i n some of the Psalms; but i t is o f course the opening chapters of Genesis that provide the richest evidence and pose the most awkward problems Augustine himself devoted three separate commentaries to the beginning of Genesis, of which I have already drawn upon the most extensive, the Literal Exposition; and there are important discussions of particular points both i n the Confessions and i n the City of God The problems presented by Genesis to a literalist expositor do not f o r m part of my subject, on a perfectly strict definition; but I w i l l mention them briefly, to give some notion of the scriptural constraints which bear on Augustine's thinking Rather than f o l l o w the purely logical order, I w i l l begin w i t h the point most familiar to ourselves
but to that w o r k of God which takes place w i t h the unfolding of the ages as He works even now'
To the modern reader i t is clear enough that we have two accounts of the creation, o f which the second, beginning at Genesis 2:4, is plainly the more primitive; i t has been well observed that Genesis 1 stems f r o m Mesopotamia, where the first requisite for ordered life is to gain control of the flood-waters, while Genesis 2:4ff reflects the experience of the desert-dweller, for w h o m nothing w i l l grow until i t begins to rain Augustine observes the duplication when dealing w i t h 2:7, which gives a second account of the creation o f man 'We must see', he says, 'whether this is a restatement intended to describe the manner i n w h i c h man was made; for we have read already that he was made on the sixth day' He decides against this view, for he has akeady concluded that the first creation account does not describe an operation spread out over six actual days, appealing to the text of Ecclus 18:1, 'He created all things together'; whereas in Genesis 2 the man gives names to the animals and to the woman, and (says Augustine) 'whatever syllables were used i n speaking these words, no two syllables o f the utterance could have sounded together'. I n short, this second account records events which need time for their completion But i n any case i t could not have been a mere continuation of the first account, since Genesis 2:1 declares that God had finished his work The problem of the two creation accounts was of course a long-standing puzzle Philo of Alexandria had solved it i n Platonic terms, making Genesis 1 describe the creation of the ideal forms of things, which were later to be embodied i n physical realities But this solution is not available to Augustine, in whose view the ideal forms could not be created, since they must inhere i n the eternal Wisdom of God His solution is to invoke a Stoic conception; Genesis 1 describes the creation, not of things themselves, but of their animating principles or 'seminal reasons'; whereas 'the work whereby man was formed f r o m the slime of the earth and a w i f e was fashioned for him f r o m his side belongs not to that creation by which all things were made 'together' . 6
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A second problem has been touched on already How can we reconcile the narrative of a creation i n six days w i t h the doctrine that God's w i l l to create needs no time at all for its execution? Augustine, we saw, quoted Ecclesiasticus to this effect; more familiar to us is Psalm 33:9, 'He spake and it was done; he commanded and i t stood f a s t ' Instantaneous creation, I believe, also figures i n the early Greek tradition; intended, no doubt, as a reply to objections against crudely conceived creation theories which pictured God at w o r k i n the manner of a carpenter or a potter Augustine here simply develops a position already sketched by Philo; God has no need of six separate days i n which to complete his work, but our minds cannot f o l l o w the process unless it is exhibited to us i n distinct stages. This resembles the arguments used by Platonists to suggest that the creation narrative i n Plato's Timaeus does not really contradict the view that the w o r l d has existed for ever. But Augustine supplements his argument by a fanciful and, to m y mind, unneeded explanation o f the words 'evening' and 'morning' by which the six days are defined Ihese cannot be successive events; they refer, instead, to two manners i n which the angels contemplate the works of their Creator They can intuit either the prototypes which inhere i n the divine Word, or their earthly counterparts Thus 'there is a vast difference between knowledge of a thing i n the W o r d of God and knowledge of the same thing i n itself The first kind of knowledge can be compared to day; the second kind, to e v e n i n g ' 'This knowledge, being of a lower order, is rightly designated by the term evening ' I do not f i n d i t easy to l i k e this bold and imaginative exegesis; it implies that the execution of God's designs is inferior to the designs themselves Either, then, the designs were impractical, or the execution was defective But possibly the difficulty is one that attaches to all creation doctrines; for a God who is ex hypothesi unequalled cannot give rise to creatures whose dignity matches his o w n 9
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Thirdly o f course there is the problem of the first three days of creation, w h i c h are taken for granted as existing before the heavenly bodies were made to define them; and the related problem that God began his work by saying 'Let there be light' 'Why, then', says Augustine, 'was the sun made to rule the day and shine upon the earth i f that other light was sufficient to make the day? D i d that light illumine . only the higher regions far f r o m the earth so that a sun was needed [for] the lower regions?' Or d i d the sun, when it was created, merely increase the brightness of the day? Augustine does not 11
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answer this question, but passes on to a still more awkward problem; i f God began his creative w o r k by saying 'Let there be light', what sort of restraint could obstruct i t and so give rise to an alternation of day and night? He suggests, though not very confidently, that perhaps the primeval light was localized and actually travelled round the unformed earth: 'Although water still covered all the earth, there was nothing to prevent the watery sphere f r o m having day on one side by the presence of light, and on the other side night by its absence Thus in the evening, darkness would pass to that side which the light was vacating by turning to the other ' The obvious objection to this view is that i t makes the primeval light behave so exactly like the sun that one cannot see w h y the sun is needed to replace i t Moreover i t makes nonsense of the view that the succession of days is merely a teaching device to exhibit the complexity of what is really an instantaneous act Augustine himself does not seem to have been satisfied by his suggestions; in the end he falls back on the view that the primeval light must have been the spiritual illumination enjoyed by the angels, w i t h the alternation of higher and lower knowledge which we have already described He does, however, allude to an alternative view put out by St Basil, who writes as follows: 'Ever since the creation of the sun there is day, namely the air illuminated by the sun when it shines in the hemisphere above the earth; and night, the shadow cast on the earth when the sun is hidden But in the beginning it was not the sun's movement, but the diffusion of that primeval light, and its ensuing withdrawal at the moment God appointed, which made the day come and the night succeed it' Augustine himself refers to the theory that light is illuminated a i r , derived perhaps f r o m Aristotle, who holds that light is an activity of transparent media, like air or w a t e r ; but i t may have formed part of a scholarly attempt to rehabilitate the biblical notion of light as an effect which needs no particular source; Basil could have taken i t f r o m the lost Commentary on Genesis by Origen, and Origen, as we know, discussed the Scriptures w i t h learned Jewish rabbis But there is an alternative possibility, which I w i l l explain in due course
objects at a distance. B u t when i t is pulled i n , i t does not altogether stop seeing distant objects, although o f course i t sees them more obscurely than when i t focusses its gaze upon them. Neverthless the light w h i c h is in the eye, according to authoritative opinion, is so slight that without the help of light f r o m outside we should not be able to see anything Moreover; since i t cannot be distinguished f r o m the outside light, it is difficult, as I have said, to f i n d an analogy to prove a diffusion of light to make the day and a contraction to make the n i g h t ' This passage calls for explanation Ancient theories of vision were often dominated by the axiom that like is known by like On this assumption, the eye sees because i t is bright; and the theory developed by Plato suggests that the eye is the source o f a 'visual ray', that is, of a stream of light directed towards the object i t seeks to discern But it cannot do its work unaided; vision is achieved only when the ray f r o m our eye meets w i t h more powerful rays o f light which proceed f r o m the object in view. Plato's theory succeeds, though rather clumsily, i n meeting an obvious objection to the theory of visual rays. Since ex hypotheu they are luminous and resemble the light they apprehend, w h y do we not see these rays of light shooting out f i o m other people's eyes, even i f understandably we cannot perceive our own? The answer - a rather feeble and face-saving answer as I think - is that the rays are i n fact luminous, but too faint to be ordinarily visible; we see by means of them, but we do not see them Augustine has evidently adopted the Platonic theory; but unless I am mistaken, there are traces also of a totally different theory of light and vision deriving f r o m the Stoics. The Stoics, or some of them, regarded rays of light, not as an outgoing stream, but as a sort of tentacle, a static extension of the luminous object, which is at once retracted when a cloud or solid body blocks the direct path to earth (It has to be retracted, of course, because we never come across detached fragments of sunbeam glowing among the flowerbeds) This Stoic theory is mentioned by Marcus Aurelius, and seems to be vaguely familiar to several Christian writers, who remark that the divine Logos is indeed related to the Father as the sun's radiance is to the sun; but we must not think of a radiance w h i c h is put forth and withdrawn; the Logos exists eternally But the Stoics, like the Platonists, appear to have drawn a parallel between illumination and vision; for we learn of a really bizarre theory, by which the eye is said to compress the adjacent air and make of it a kind of antenna, so that we feel for the distant object as if w i t h a stick For
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Augustine's criticism of Basil is brief and perfunctory; perhaps he d i d not fully understand his colleague's proposal B u t the passage is worth quoting, since it leads us on f r o m the theory of light to the theory of human vision. 'No analogy can be offered', he writes, 'to prove such a diffusion and contraction o f the light as w o u l d account for the succession of day and night The shaft of rays f r o m our eyes, to be sure, is a shaft of light It can be pulled in when we focus on what is near to our eyes, and extended when we f i x on
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all its crudity, this theory does offer some sort of account of our ability to focus our eyes at varying distances; and I think Augustine probably has this theory in mind when he talks of the diffusion and contraction of light B u t it is also probable that he has misunderstood St Basil There is no suggestion of Stoic doctrine in Basil's Second H o m i l y ; more probably the Hebrew notion of light has somehow come down to h i m Basil was no great scientist; but he was surely acute enough to see the absurdity of trying to explain darkness in terms of unfocussed vision Augustine's account of sight has the special interest that i t implies an instantaneous process w i t h i n which, nevertheless, one can establish an order o f priorities; and he himself compares i t w i t h creation, understood as an instantaneous act which can nevertheless be described as a set of successive stages Thus 'when we look at the sun rising, i t is evident that our gaze could not reach i t without passing over the whole expanse o f earth and sky that lies between' Our sight, he explains, has to pass through the air spread out over various lands and above the enormous ocean on its way to the sun Yet ' i f we close our eyes and turn towards the sun there w i l l seem to be no lapse of time between the moment we open our eyes and the moment our gaze meets its object. N o w this is certainly a ray of material light that shines forth from our eyes and touches objects so remote w i t h a speed that cannot be calculated or equalled I t is clear that all those measureless spaces are traversed at one time in a single glance; yet i t is no less evident what part of these spaces is penetrated first and what part later '
an inflated ball are both made of skin * I am afraid this looks more l i k e an attempt to save the consistency of Scripture than to follow the writer's intention; but it is fairly evident that in practice Augustine declares for a spherical heaven
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So much for our vision N o w , what does it disclose? 'Heaven and earth', we might answer in brief But what is their f o r m , and what is the substance ol which they are made? Augustine, we noted, has airily dismissed all enquiries into the f orm or shape o f heaven; but in the immediate sequel he has to admit that the problem needs discussion. For the Scripture itself, at least in its Latin version, makes two conflicting impressions; Isaiah 40:22 describes God suspending the heavens like a vault, whereas the 104th Psalm has him stretch them out like a skin. Augustine perhaps conceives the 'skin' - and rightly as the flattened roof of a rectangular tent, which in practice of course would be slightly concave 'For what can be so different and contradictory as a skin stretched out flat', he says, 'and the curved shape of a vault?' He goes on to say that the picture of heaven as a vault does not contradict the view that heaven is a sphere; Scripture simply meant to describe that part which is over our heads 'If, therefore, i t is not a sphere, i t is a vault where i t covers the earth; but i f i t is a sphere, i t is a vault all round ' But the text comparing it to a skin is much more puzzling Augustine's answer is that 'If a vault can not only be curved but be also flat, a skin can surely be stretched out not only on a flat plane but in the form of a sphere Thus for instance a leather bottle and
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He also accepts that the earth is a sphere, though without pushing this opinion; no doubt he was u n w i l l i n g to provoke a controversy on such a point, since his view was by no means universal among Christians Lactantius had declared that the earth is flat; and the literalist expositors of the Antiochene school thought i t rectangular, no doubt inferring this from biblical texts about the four corners of the earth; and the same picture reappears in the Christian Topography of Cosmas Indicopleustes Augustine's opinion leaks out, so to speak, in a passing reference to 'the massive watery sphere' o f the primeval earth, or the 'globe of tempestuous air' that surrounds it; or indeed f r o m his remark that 'for the whole twenty-four hours of the sun's circuit there is always day in one place and night i n another' It can also be inferred from his discussion o f the Antipodes i n the City of God He cannot believe that these people exist, since (assuming the torrid zone to be uninhabited) this would divide the human race into t w o disconnected halves But any belief that the earth was flat w o u l d dispose of the Antipodes at once, for it necessitates an absolute up and down for f a l l i n g bodies; the Antipodes would simply fall o f f the underside of the earth - unless, indeed, they had sticky feet, like the flies that walk on our ceilings; and they would need six feet, or five at the least, i f they were to conduct their affairs w i t h tolerable convenience I am not quoting Augustine here; but I offer this as a fair parody of his style of argument 2 3
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Augustine's views on the substance of the earth are fairly conventional He accepts the theory of four elements, earth, air, fire and water, each constituted by the imposition of a pair of qualities on a primary indeterminate matter; thus earth is cold and dry, whereas water is cold and wet, and so on By reason of the qualities they share, the elements can be transformed one into another The heavier elements tend to f a l l towards the centre of the universe, the earth, whereas the lighter ones tend to move upwards and outwards. He describes a conflict between the tendencies of air and water in a passage which seems to recall his early scientific studies: ' A jar placed upside down into water cannot f i l l up, thus clearly showing that air by its nature seeks a higher place The jar seems to be empty, but it is obvious that it is f u l l of air Then finding no outlet in the higher part of the vessel, and being unable by its nature to break through the waters below the ah fills all the 25
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vessel, withstands the water and does not allow it to enter But place the jar so that the mouth is not downwards but to the side, and the water w i l l flow in below while the air escapes above. ' This theory of natural places - where we w o u l d think of specific gravity leads to some difficulties in dealing w i t h a text like Psalm 136:6, 'He established the earth above the waters', and even more w i t h Genesis 1:6, 'God said, Let there be a firmament in the midst of the waters ' We w i l l come to the firmament presently; meanwhile there is time for a word on the heavenly bodies which circulate in the space between earth and heaven On this subject Augustine is usually content to speak at second hand and quote the opinions of others. He has a certain amount o f sound astronomical knowledge He does not decide for certain whether the moon provides its own light or whether it reflects that of the sun; but on either supposition he can give a correct account of its phases On the former view, the moon is particoloured and, as he says 'is always f u l l ' - viz f r o m some point o f view - 'though i t does not always appear so to people on earth' But i f i t shines by reflected light, then 'when i t is near the sun i t can only appear in the shape of a horn, because the rest of i t , which is fully illumined, is not facing the earth so as to be seen f r o m here. '
w h o m he does not name attempted 'to refute those who say that the relative weights of the elements make it impossible for water to exist above the starry heavens'; the pagans, that is, who object to the biblical notion of waters above the firmament It is apparently agreed by both parties that 'Saturn is the coldest star, and that i t takes thirty years to complete its orbit in the heavens', whereas 'the sun completes a similar orbit in a year, and the moon in a month, requiring a briefer time, they explain, because these bodies are lower in the heavens; and thus the extent of time is in proportion to the extent of space ' I n other words, i t is assumed that all the heavenly bodies move in their orbits w i t h the same velocity
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On the other hand Augustine apparently does not know, or fails to appreciate, the mathematical methods by which astronomers ttied to calculate the relative sizes and distances of the sun and other luminaries One interesting passage refers to a view that perhaps all the heavenly bodies 'are in themselves equally bright, on the supposition that their unequal distances f r o m the earth may cause them to appear w i t h greater or less brilliance to our eyes ' The advocates of this theory no doubt treated the moon as an exception, holding that it is not self-luminous; but 'concerning the stars', says Augustine, 'they go so far as to maintain that many of them are the size of the sun, or even larger, but that they appear small because of their greater distance ' This view, we may note, was still maintained by Sir W i l l i a m Herschel at the end of the eighteenth century It has two remarkable implications, though i t is hardly probable that Augustine discerned them First, the socalled 'fixed stars' would then be at enormously different distances f r o m the earth, to account for their differing brightness, as opposed to the conventional view which saw them as uniformly disposed on the outermost sphere of the heavens Secondly, on any reasonable computation of the sun's distance, the universe would have to be very much larger than any magnitude commonly assigned to it But a quite different picture is given by a bizarre piece of argumentation which Augustine reports without apparent disbelief Some Christian writers 27
The Christian writers now object, how can Saturn possibly be cold, on this assumption? The pagans have attended only to its proper motion; they forget that Saturn travels round the earth once every twenty-four hours; and 'the greater the speed o f an object, the greater its heat' Now Saturn must travel very fast indeed, since i t describes so large a circuit round the earth; and i f it really is cold, the reason must be that ' i t is cooled by the waters that are near it above the heavens' I f we can permit ourselves a little mathematics, this w o u l d mean that Saturn's distance above the earth would be 360 times that of the moon; and assuming the moon's distance were correctly determined, Saturn would be about as far from the earth as we now know the sun is, and the sphere of the fixed stars only a little more distant, thus giving the universe a radius of about 100 m i l l i o n miles B u t such calculations are by no means in the spirit of Augustine, w h o protests i n his most repressive m o o d that 'it is neither necessary nor fitting to engage in subtle speculations about the distances and magnitudes of the stars or to give to such an enquiry the time needed for matters weightier and more sublime ' 29
The firmament, however, must be explained Is i t the same as the 'heaven' mentioned in verse 1 of Genesis? A n d how can there be waters above the firmament i f water, a heavy element, has its natural place below the air? In reply, Augustine argues that the theory of natural places does not hold good universally; he comments on the Psalmist's text 'He established the earth above the water', and shows that this is possible by commonplace examples; for instance 'the promontories that tower over the water or again, the roofs of caverns that rest on solid supports and overhang the waters b e l o w ' . A n d water, also, can be found above the air; Augustine adapts an argument found in St Basil Basil himself had rejected the conventional view of the firmament as a solid crystalline vault, and supposed that it was some sort of consolidated a i r , appealing to Amos 4:13, 'He consolidates the thunder'; air is consolidated in cavities within the clouds, and bursts out to produce the 30
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violent crashing we hear i n thunder-storms Augustine I think does not refer to thunder, and is rather less dogmatic about the firmament itself; he w i l l not decide whether i t is mobile or stationary; the name, he says, indicates 'not that i t is motionless but that i t is solid, and that i t constitutes an impassable boundary between the waters above and the waters below ' He takes f r o m Basil the distinction between 'water i n a vaporous state and water i n a denser state that flows to earth' A n d water-vapour, of course, can be found without penetrating the firmament: 'the clouds', he says, 'according to the testimony of those who have walked through them i n the mountains, have this vaporous appearance', but ' i f further condensation takes place, so that one drop is formed out of many small ones, the air, unable to support i t , yields to its weight as i t travels down, and this is the explanation o f rain Rather surprisingly, Augustine asserts the infinite divisibility of matter, which is clean contrary to the dominant Platonic view, and makes i t harder to explain the unequal densities of the four elements; but i t does enable h i m to argue that there is no problem i n the waters above the firmament; 'if water, as is obvious, can be divided into drops so small that i t moves up i n vapours above the air . why could i t not exist also above that purer heaven on high i n still smaller drops and lighter m i s t s ? '
bodily likenesses' - an example might be St Peter's vision of the dish let down f u l l o f various animals; 'the third, as the objects seen by the m i n d when it has been carried out o f the senses through the love of the Holy S p i r i t ' 'In this way we see also love, joy, peace, longsuffering, gentleness, goodness, faith, meekness, temperance,and the rest, by w h i c h we draw nearer to God; and finally God himself, f r o m w h o m are all things and i n whom are all things' Returning f r o m these heights, as we must, we can see that for Augustine only the lowest, or visible, heaven is conceived as located i n space I t seems also that it is by figurative language that hell is described as the underworld; Augustine does not seriously intend, l i k e M i l t o n , to place i t at the centre of the earth; though i n his Retractations, written towards the close of his life, he seems to think he should have done so
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However that may be, a society of academics must surely warm to the prospect of a heaven i n w h i c h the exercise of the intellect is our only duty and our unending joy B u t I myself would like i t to include, in some appropriate f o r m , the enjoyment of theological wine
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I n the passage just quoted Augustine has identified the firmament w i t h heaven; but he by no means always does so 'Heaven' is for Augustine a word of many senses Thus we are told that 'the birds f l y i n heaven - but i n this heaven near us'; however when Scripture refers to 'the winged creatures of heaven', they are alleged to f l y along, or near, the firmament, not to be i n the firmament A n y such explanation of course conflicts w i t h any possible estimate that makes the firmament 360 times more distant than the moon; in cosmology we f i n d that Augustine solves his problems piecemeal; he has no synoptic view; and such incoherence is the penalty he pays for his dismissive attitude to physical science. I n any case, for his more considered view of heaven Augustine, like many of the Fathers, draws on St Paul's description of the vision whereby he was 'caught up into the third heaven', 2 Cor 12:2 Three heavens, then, there must be; and Augustine is inclined to think that this is their total number, though he knows that some theologians recognise seven, or even as many as t e n He supports his total o f three by an appeal to psychology, where there is a graduation f r o m sense-perception to what we might call imagination, and thirdly to the pure intellect Thus we understand 'the first heaven as this whole corporeal heaven, namely all that is above the waters and the earth; the second, as the object of spiritual vision seen i n 3 4
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XVIII Augustine's «De Magistro»: a philosophers view
A u g u s t i n e ' s De Magistro q u i t e p r o p e r l y counts as one o f his minor w o r k s ; y e t i t was i n f l u e n t i a l i n the M i d d l e Ages and has a t t r a c t e d some interest a m o n g m o d e r n p h i l o s o p h e r s . C e r t a i n l y i t is b y n o means a n e g l i gible p r o d u c t i o n For one t h i n g , i t has l i t e r a r y m e r i t I t was w r i t t e n at Thagaste i n 389, a n d p u r p o r t s t o r e c o r d an actual c o n v e r s a t i o n between A u g u s t i n e a n d his g i f t e d son A d e o d a t u s , w h o died at the age o f sixteen or so i n t h a t year or t h e next O n e c a n n o t be c e r t a i n , o f c o u r s e , h o w closely the c o n v e r s a t i o n was f o l l o w e d , if s o ; b u t at a n y rate t h e style of an actual discussion is v e r y w e l l caught. A p a r t f r o m a l o n g c o n c l u d i n g address b y A u g u s t i n e , t h e t w o speakers deliver their c o n t r i b u t i o n s in a b r i s k e x c h a n g e ; and u n l i k e m a n y dialogues - even Plato's dialogues - i n w h i c h the m i n o r characters act o n l y as a s o u n d i n g - b o a r d for t h e leader, it represents A d e o d a t u s as m a k i n g proposals and objections o f real w e i g h t , even i f A u g u s t i n e h a r d l y appears as r e t r a c t i n g any o f his m a i n c o n t e n t i o n s i n response t o his j u n i o r F u r t h e r m o r e , the b o o k approaches a subject of the greatest p h i l o s o p h i c a l and t h e o l o g i c a l i m p o r t a n c e , namely our k n o w l e d g e of t h e highest r e a l i t y , even i f , as A u g u s t i n e a d m i t s i n Chapter 8, it does so by t h e rather t o r t u o u s r o u t e o f c o n s i d e r i n g the r e l a t i o n s h i p between signs a n d other signs, and again b e t w e e n signs a n d the t h i n g s t h e y signify. A u g u s t i n e , t h e n , is w r i t i n g o n the p h i l o s o p h y o f language; and as p h i l o s o p h e r s o f t e n d o , he has some b o l d and c o n t r o v e r s i a l themes t o propose. T h e r e is some disagreement a b o u t their v a l u e ; a r e c e n t c r i t i c has stated t h a t «the c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n o f l a n g u a g e * f o u n d here and in some related texts «is neither o r i g i n a l nor p r o f o u n d nor correct»; whereas he allows t h a t i t is b o l d ; and i t has been g i v e n a m u c h m o r e sympathetic assessment by P r o fessor B u r n y e a t I am i n c l i n e d t o t h i n k , w i t h great respect, t h a t B u i n y e a t is t o o k i n d . A u g u s t i n e ' s m a i n t h e m e , o f course, is C h r i s t as the teacher o f supreme r e a l i t y , w h i c h points one a w a y f r o m the p h i l o s o p h y o f l a n g u a g e ; b u t o n the w a y t o his c o n c l u s i o n he argues - or seems t o 1
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The critic is Dr C A. KTRWAN, who kindly let me read part of his fotthcoming book on Augustine's philosophy. Contrast Professor M . F BURNYEAT'S Inaugural Address, The Aristotelian
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64 argue - f i r s t , that all sentences are statements; secondly, t h a t a l l w o r d s are n o u n s ; and t h i r d l y , t h a t n o t h i n g is l e a r n t by means o f signs, i n w h i c h , o f course, w o r d s are i n c l u d e d . B u t i f this t h i i d c o n t e n t i o n is t r u e , w h y has A u g u s t i n e given himself t h e t r o u b l e o f w r i t i n g ? A u g u s t i n e begins his a r g u m e n t b y c l a i m i n g t h a t w h e n w e speak, our i n t e n t i o n is always to teach I t is this c l a i m t h a t I have p h r a s e d , m o r e p r o v o c a t i v e l y , i n t h e f o r m t h a t a l l sentences are statements B u t this paraphrase does, I t h i n k , f a i r l y represent A u g u s t i n e ' s use o f the w o r d s and , at least i n the e a r l y chapters o f this book. W h a t he discusses is n o t t e a c h i n g someone h o w t o d o s o m e t h i n g , b u t t e a c h i n g h i m that s o m e t h i n g is the case; and has a c o r r e s p o n d i n g sense; i t is o n l y m u c h later t h a t w e are l e d t o consider t e a c h i n g a n d l e a r n i n g h o w t o d o s o m e t h i n g , a n d t h e n o n l y i n rather specialized i n stances; f o r instance, h o w t o r e c o g n i z e w h a t a w o r d stands f o r ; and bey o n d t h i s , the v e r y special instance o f t e a c h i n g or l e a r n i n g h o w to see t h i n g s as they r e a l l y are I n i t i a l l y , t h e n , t e a c h i n g is represented as an act o f m a k i n g statements T h i s is clearly seen i n the f i r s t f e w w o r d s , w h e r e A d e o d a t u s says i n effect t h a t speech comprises b o t h statements a n d questions; f o r our purpose i n speaking is either t o teach or t o l e a r n , a n d w e learn by asking questions A u g u s t i n e answers b y saying t h a t the sole purpose o f asking questions is to teach ones i n t e r l o c u t o r w h a t one wishes to k n o w O n e can clearly see t h a t this answer is f a u l t y b y t a k i n g a m o d e r n example M y f r i e n d asks me « W h y are y o u g o i n g to the e n q u i r y o f f i c e ? * I r e p l y , «Because I w a n t to f i n d o u t t h e t i m e o f the n e x t t r a i n t o L o n d o n * . I t is clear t h a t this answer tells m y f r i e n d w h a t I w i s h to k n o w ; b u t i t is e q u a l l y clear t h a t I am n o t asking h i m a q u e s t i o n ; I m a y w e l l believe t h a t he does n o t k n o w t h e answer O n the other h a n d m y f r i e n d ' s q u e s t i o n , «"Why are y o u g o i n g .. ?», does i n d e e d t e l l me w h a t he w a n t s t o k n o w ; b u t i t also contains an element w h i c h c a n n o t be r e d u c e d to a statement, n a m e l y a request f o r i n f o r m a t i o n . O n c e requests are m e n t i o n e d , w e can see t h a t speech has m a n y other f u n c t i o n s — c o m m a n d s , encouragements, e x c l a m a t i o n s , w h a t y o u w i l l ; some at least o f these w o u l d be easily f o u n d i n ancient g r a m m a r b o o k s A d m i t t e d l y , a v a r i e t y o f needs m a y be satisfied b y the statement f o r m ; for instance « Y o u m a y go», or « W e l l , I a m s u r p r i s e d * ; b u t one misses their p o i n t if one t h e n assumes t h a t the sole purpose is t o i m p a r t i n f o r m a t i o n , or as A u g u s t i n e says, t o teach 2
A d e o d a t u s answers A u g u s t i n e w i t h an o b j e c t i o n ; he observes t h a t our utterance m a y take t h e f o r m o f s i n g i n g , a n d t h a t w e o f t e n sing w h e n w e are alone, and so c a n n o t be i n t e n d i n g t o teach a n y o n e A u g u s t i n e makes 2
C f e g SVF 2,186-187
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a p a r t i a l concession, suggesting n o w t h a t there are t w o reasons for s p e a k i n g ; w e speak e i t h e r t o teach or t o r e m i n d ourselves or o t h e r s ; perhaps t h e n w e sing t o r e m i n d ourselves A d e o d a t u s r e t o r t s t h a t w e often sing p u r e l y f o r pleasure; b u t A u g u s t i n e replies t h a t w h a t pleases us is the r h y t h m a n d m u s i c , w h i c h is i n d e p e n d e n t o f the w o r d s A d e o d a t u s has made a v a l i d p o i n t ; b u t he c o u l d have chosen a better e x a m p l e ; w h y s h o u l d he n o t take the case o f p o e t t y , or indeed a n y f o r m o f w o r d s i n w h i c h w e take pleasure? I t is surely absurd to argue t h a t we recite such w o r d s i n o r d e r t o r e m i n d ourselves o f t h e m ; no d o u b t we sometimes d o t h i s ; b u t i n most cases we r e c a l l t h e m simply because we e n j o y d o i n g so. T o r e c a l l t h e m b y w a y o f a r e m i n d e r is a special exerc i z e , e n s u r i n g t h a t w e can c o n t i n u e t o recall a n d t o e n j o y t h e m i n f u t u r e A d e o d a t u s h o w e v e r is n o t y e t p r e p a r e d t o accept Augustine's s h o r t list o f t w o reasons f o r s p e a k i n g ; he objects t h a t w e can speak t o G o d i n p r a y e r ; and w e c a n n o t be i n t e n d i n g t o teach G o d a n y t h i n g , or t o r e m i n d h i m , as i f he h a d f o r g o t t e n A u g u s t i n e ' s r e p l y strikes a deeper n o t e than a n y t h i n g he has said so far. G o d , he says, s h o u l d be sought a n d p r a y e d t o «in the silent depths o f the r a t i o n a l soul» T h e r e is n o need o f w o i d s , except perhaps t o r e m i n d others i n public prayer and t o arouse i n them the desire t o p r a y B u t this i m m e d i a t e l y b r i n g s up the p o i n t t h a t w h e n the supreme Teacher t a u g h t his disciples t o p r a y , he d i d so b y t e a c h i n g t h e m a f o r m o f w o r d s . A d e o d a t u s ' r e p l y is t o i n t r o d u c e w h a t becomes a c e n t r a l theme i n the d i a l o g u e : « H e d i d n o t teach t h e m w o r d s , b u t realities b y means o f words» B u t A u g u s t i n e ' s c o m m e n t does not m a k e i t perf e c t l y clear w h a t he understands b y wordless prayer H e says, «Although w e utter n o s o u n d , yet because w e ponder the w o r d s themselves, w e do speak w i t h i n our o w n minds». Prayer thus involves the d e v o u t inner p o n d e r i n g o f c e r t a i n w o r d s ; w h a t is unclear t o me is w h e t h e r this devout p o n d e r i n g simply is the act o f p r a y e r , or w h e t h e r prayer involves some f u r t h e r a c t i v i t y , a d i r e c t i o n o f t h e m i n d t o w a r d s t h e highest reality, w h i c h is p r o m p t e d b y t h e u n v o i c e d w o r d s b u t goes b e y o n d t h e m H o w ever i t be n a m e d , A u g u s t i n e accepts this d i r e c t i o n as o u r greatest o b l i g a t i o n , p r i v i l e g e and f u l f i l m e n t R e t u r n i n g t o p h i l o s o p h y , w e f i n d A u g u s t i n e c o n c l u d i n g that such unu t t e r e d speech serves o n l y to r e m i n d ; our m e m o r y , b y r e c a l l i n g certain w o r d s , brings t o m i n d t h e realities themselves o f w h i c h the w o r d s are signs H e goes o n t o e n q u i r e , i n C h a p t e r 2, h o w the m e a n i n g of w o r d s can be e x p l a i n e d , t a k i n g as an example the verse f r o m V e r g i l «si n i h i l ex t a n t a superis placet urbe ielinqui»; i n the event, h o w e v e r , o n l y the first three w o r d s are discussed A u g u s t i n e seems t o assume t h a t if w o r d s are significant t h e y must represent t h i n g s i n the w a y n o u n s represent things;
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a n d this causes d i f f i c u l t i e s , especially w i t h <si> a n d ; i t m i g h t have been better t o i n q u i r e w h a t their f u n c t i o n is w i t h i n the sentence as a w h o l e A u g u s t i n e tries t o meet the d i f f i c u l t i e s b y a d o p t i n g a suggestion w h i c h goes b a c k t o A r i s t o t l e , t h a t w o r d s s i g n i f y states o f m i n d T h u s signifies d o u b t ; <nothing> signifies the m i n d ' s d i s a p p o i n t m e n t i n its search f o r reality. I n the t h i r d case this m e t h o d is a p p a r e n t l y n o t a d o p t e d ; A d e o d a t u s explains t h a t signifies separation, w h i c h comes rather nearer t o e x p l a i n i n g a w o r d i n terms o f its f u n c t i o n . I n passing, there is l i t t l e t o be said f o r this A r i s t o t e l i a n t h e o r y ; o f course <some> w o r d s stand f o r states o f m i n d , b u t t h e y are the e x c e p t i o n ; w e call t h e m p s y c h o l o g i c a l terms B u t this discussion leads o n t o a m u c h m o r e c e n t r a l point.. W e have t r i e d our h a n d at e x p l a i n i n g w o r d s b y means o f w o r d s , t h a t is, b y signs; b u t can w e d e m o n s t r a t e t h e realities t h e y stand for w i t h o u t using signs? T h i s leads t o a n i n t e r e s t i n g discussion o f w h a t m o d e r n philosophers call means? W e can o f course p o i n t t o a w a l l ; b u t the act o f p o i n t i n g is itself a sign, so t h a t our c o n d i t i o n is n o t f u l f i l l e d I n d e e d , w e c o u l d a d d , the sign is a m b i g u o u s ; w e m i g h t be t a k e n t o m e a n t h a t the w o r d <paries> stands f o r the act o f p o i n t i n g , n o t f o r t h e w a l l I t is c o n c e d e d , h o w e v e r , t h a t w e can e x p l a i n w o r d s w h i c h refer t o actions b y p e r f o r m i n g t h e a c t i o n ; always p r o v i d e d t h a t w e are n o t already p e r f o r m i n g t h e a c t i o n w h e n the q u e s t i o n is asked. B r e a t h i n g , i t f o l l o w s , w o u l d be an a c t i o n w h i c h w e c o u l d n o t d e m o n s t r a t e i n this w a y 3
T h e discussion n o w passes t o a subject w h i c h seems to me rather less i m p o r t a n t , n a m e l y t h e cases i n w h i c h signs are s i g n i f i e d b y signs A u g u s t i n e brings up the case o f the w o r d <nomen>, w h i c h can be translated either or <noun> , he says, q u i t e c o r r e c t l y , stands f o r a class o f w o r d s w h i c h includes itself, f o r the w o r d <noun> is a n o u n ; here t h e n w e have a sign w h i c h signifies a sign. B u t t h e class o f n o u n s i n cludes w o r d s l i k e a n d a n d ; these w o r d s are also signs, b u t the realities t h e y stand f o r are n o t signs. A u g u s t i n e goes o n t o p u t the question w h e t h e r there are signs w h i c h have r e c i p r o c a l significat i o n ^ so t h a t <x> signifies , b u t conversely signifies <x>. H e takes the case o f <noun> a n d <word> () H e is aware t h a t the t w o w o r d s have d i f f e r e n t m e a n i n g s , b u t suggests t h a t t h e d i f f e r e n c e is analogous t o t h a t b e t w e e n a n d ; i n m o d e r n t e r m s , w e w o u l d say t h a t the reference o f t h e t w o t e r m s is the same, t h o u g h their sense is d i f f e r e n t I n other w o r d s , all w o r d s are n o u n s 4
3
4
De Interpretatione 1, 16 a 3 Cf Aristotle, De Anima 2 7, 418 a 27sqq. The distinction between <sense> (Sinn) and (Bedeutung) was introduced by FREGE; see below p. 68, on <nomen> and
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N o w this is t o f l y i n t h e face o f c o m m o n sense T h e dullest g r a m m a r i a n w i l l state, q u i t e c o r r e c t l y , t h a t n o u n s f o r m o n l y one o f t h e six or eight parts o f speech; m o r e o v e r A u g u s t i n e h i m s e l f has a l r e a d y represented A d e o d a t u s as saying t h a t a l l nouns are w o r d s , b u t n o t a l l w o r d s are n o u n s , a n d h i m s e l f r e p l y i n g w i t h the p e r f e c t l y c o r r e c t a n a l o g y of and W h a t has misled h i m ? O n e can perhaps u n d e r stand h o w easily c o n f u s i o n can arise b y q u o t i n g this sentence f r o m mag 5 , 1 1 : «Then y o u k n o w t h a t as <noun> is s i g n i f i e d b y <word>, so <word> is s i g n i f i e d b y <noun> ».. T h i s suggests t h a t t h e r e is a s y m m e t r i c a l r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n t h e m ; b u t w e have a p r i o r assurance t h a t this c a n n o t be t r u e ; a n d w i t h a l i t t l e patience w e can w o r k o u t a c o r r e c t e d paraphrase o f A u gustine's sentence. I suggest the f o l l o w i n g : <Word> stands for a class of signs w h i c h includes the w o r d <noun> and m o r e o v e r includes a l l n o u n s ; but <noun> stands f o r a class o f signs w h i c h includes the w o r d <word> but does n o t i n c l u d e all w o r d s . This satisfies the common-sense assumption t h a t a l l nouns are w o r d s b u t n o t all w o r d s are nouns A u g u s t i n e himself seems t o t h i n k t h a t some f u r t h e r p r o o f of his parad o x is n e e d e d ; a n d he f i n d s i t b y q u o t i n g t h e text o f 2 Cor 1,19, «non erat i n C h r i s t o est et n o n , sed est i n i l l o erat» H e argues, c o r r e c t l y as I t h i n k , t h a t St. P a u l c a n n o t m e a n t h a t the w o r d <est> w a s in C h r i s t , but r a t h e r , w h a t is s i g n i f i e d or n a m e d b y the w o r d <est> T h i s leads h i m to t h e c o n c l u s i o n t h a t the w o r d <est> is a n o u n , because i t names or signifies w h a t was in C h r i s t ; f o r «that b y w h i c h a n y t h i n g is n a m e d is a noun» O n e m i g h t o f course c o m m e n t t h a t St Paul's expression t o w h i c h he appeals is an e x t r e m e l y u n u s u a l use o f l a n g u a g e ; b u t A u g u s t i n e proceeds to b r o a d e n his a r g u m e n t b y s h o w i n g t h a t any w o r d whatsoever can be discussed, a n d can appear as the subject o f a sentence; he p o i n t s t o t w o sentences w h i c h c o n t a i n the w o r d s a n d , a n d argues t h a t we can l e g i t i m a t e l y say « is c o r r e c t , w h i l e is i n c o r r e c t * This leads h i m , n o t t o the w e l l - g r o u n d e d c o n c l u s i o n t h a t a n y w o r d can in c e r t a i n circumstances f u n c t i o n as a n o u n , b u t t o the incautious assertion t h a t «all w o r d s are n o u n s and all n o u n s are w o r d s * T h e f i r s t clause is i n defensible; a n d w e c a n n o t m e n d matters b y t r a n s l a t i n g <nomina> as . I n d e e d is n o t clear even t h a t the class o f n o u n s enjoys a p r i v i leged p o s i t i o n W e m i g h t argue b y t h e same t o k e n t h a t the n o u n <dolor> is r e a l l y a v e r b , since i n the c o n t e x t <proh doIoi> i t is equivalent to <doleo>, or possibly < d o l e n d u m est>; and as w e all k n o w , the n o u n <pax> can be used to f r a m e a request W e classify w o r d s i n terms o f t h e i r p r i m a r y a n d basic f u n c t i o n , w h i l e n o t i n g t h a t v a r i a t i o n s ate possible W e d o n o t quote t h e phrase <But me n o buts> t o argue t h a t is a verb, b u t i t is also a n o u n .
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B u r n y e a t offers an i n t e r e s t i n g defence o f A u g u s t i n e at this p o i n t , s h o w i n g , quite c o r r e c t l y , t h a t A u g u s t i n e recognizes the d i s t i n c t i o n bet w e e n the m e n t i o n o f a w o r d a n d the use o f i t a n d a r g u i n g t h a t a n y w o r d whatsoever can be used t o name itself, or again to name t h e that i t signifies I n the case w e have just c o n s i d e r e d , « is c o r r e c t , w h i l e is i n c o r r e c t * , A u g u s t i n e is n o t m a k i n g a p o i n t a b o u t the t w o L a t i n c o n j u n c t i o n s i n v o l v e d ; i n t h a t case, w e s h o u l d have q u o t e d t h e m v e r b a t i m , instead o f t r a n s l a t i n g t h e m ; he is r e f e r r i n g t o t h e c o n d i t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s i g n i f i e d b y the L a t i n <si> a n d the E n g l i s h , a n d so on. B u t , w e m a y c o m m e n t , he is n o t discussing the f o r c e of these c o n j u n c tions t a k e n i n i s o l a t i o n , b u t i n t h e c o n t e x t o f t w o sentences i n w h i c h t h e y occur M i g h t i t n o t be b e t t e r , t h e n , t o say he is c o n t r a s t i n g t w o sentences in respect o f the single feature by w h i c h t h e y d i f f e r ? T h i s , i t appears, w o u l d m u c h reduce the significance o f B u r n y e a t ' s d e f e n c e ; t h o u g h it w o u l d be v a l i d , no d o u b t , i f A u g u s t i n e w e r e g i v i n g a m o r e generalized t r e a t m e n t o f the t w o c o n t r a s t e d w o r d s 5
I n any case, a l l t h a t A u g u s t i n e has p r o v e d is t h a t various kinds o f w o r d s can be used as n o u n s A n d I d o n o t t h i n k t h a t he is at all clear a b o u t the f o r c e o f his o w n a r g u m e n t s H e has stated p r e v i o u s l y , a n d c o r r e c t l y , t h a t n o u n s , <nomina>, f o r m a d i s t i n c t class w i t h i n the larger class o f w o r d s , ; whereas t h e L a t i n <nomen> a n d the G r e e k are genuine s y n o n y m s . B u t he goes o n t o m a k e t h e q u i t e d i f f e r e n t c l a i m t h a t <nomen> a n d have the same range o f a p p l i c a b i l i t y , or r e f e r e n c e ; i t is their sense t h a t is d i f f e r e n t , b e i n g so c a l l e d because o f sounds w h i c h s t r i k e the ear, , and <nomen> because o f its c o n n e c t i o n w i t h I t seems, t h e n , t h a t t h e y are r e l a t e d l i k e the w o r d s a n d , t w o w o r d s w h i c h have d i f f e r e n t senses or associations, b u t w h i c h b o t h n a m e the same class o f sheep O u r familiar example o f < m o m i n g star> and (evening stai> is s i m i l a r , except t h a t the phrases name one a n d t h e same i n d i v i d u a l , n o t the same class C o u l d A u g u s t i n e have been u s i n g his inconsistency as a p e d a g o g i c device i n t e n d e d t o exercize his readers' w i t s b y c h a l l e n g i n g t h e m to see t h r o u g h his m y s t i f i c a t i o n s ? I d o n o t t h i n k so M o r e p r o b a b l y he t h o u g h t he r e a l l y h a d established his p a r a d o x i c a l c l a i m H e was b y n o means the last great p h i l o s o p h e r t o be ensnared b y a b e g u i l i n g t h e o r y H a v i n g s u m m a r i z e d his c o n c l u s i o n s , A u g u s t i n e seems a l i t t l e uncertain h o w t o resume t h e discussion, t h o u g h he insists t h a t i t has a serious p o i n t i n d i r e c t i n g our t h o u g h t s t o w a r d s e t e r n a l life B u t C h a p t e r 8 c o n tributes l i t t l e b e y o n d r e a f f i r m i n g the d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n signs a n d the realities t h e y s i g n i f y O n c e again i t is n o u n s w h i c h o c c u p y t h e f i e l d , the 5
Op
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9-12
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n o u n b e i n g t a k e n as an e x a m p l e N e w g r o u n d is first a t t a i n e d in the n e x t chapter, w h e r e A u g u s t i n e suggests t h a t realities are m o r e v a l u able t h a n the signs w h i c h represent t h e m A d e o d a t u s objects, q u i t e p r o p e r l y , t h a t bad t h i n g s have a disvalue; t h e y are t h e r e f o r e worse t h a n their signs. T h e discussion t h e n t u r n s t o the k n o w l e d g e w h i c h signs c o n v e y ; is it a g o o d t h i n g t o give b a d things a name? A d e o d a t u s is d o u b t f u l ; but A u g u s t i n e soon persuades h i m t h a t k n o w l e d g e even o f bad realities is g o o d ; i t is better t h a n their signs, w h i c h i n t u r n aie better t h a n t h e bad realities. A d e o d a t u s h o w e v e r p o i n t s o u t t h a t t h e r e are f o u r t h i n g s t o be c o n s i d e r e d : the name, t h e r e a l i t y , k n o w l e d g e o f the n a m e , and k n o w l edge o f the r e a l i t y I n t h e case o f bad t h i n g s , perhaps i t is better simply to k n o w their n a m e t h a n t o k n o w the reality? B u t A u g u s t i n e dissents; he insists t h a t k n o w l e d g e of vices is m o r e valuable t h a n k n o w l e d g e o f their names It is a p i t y t h a t this a r g u m e n t was n o t c o n t i n u e d , a n d the i m p o r t a n t phrases m o r e f u l l y d e f i n e d W h a t does A u g u s t i n e mean by k n o w l e d g e of a w o r d ? Is it e n o u g h , say, to k n o w that the L a t i n w o r d c o r r e sponds t o the G r e e k , or to paraphrase i t as <malitia cordis>? Or does one have t o k n o w w h a t the w o r d represents? I n this case, k n o w l edge o f the w o r d demands at least some k n o w l e d g e of the reality. B u t is it a g o o d t h i n g t o k n o w w h a t , say, lust is, as A u g u s t i n e seems t o insist? A n d i n w h a t sense can one k n o w i t w i t h o u t e x p e r i e n c i n g it? O n e m i g h t perhaps answer t h a t perfect innocence is impossible m this w o r l d , wheie we are members one of a n o t h e r ; the m a n bent o n securing his o w n i n n o cence m a y w e l l be insensitive, and m a y n o t be successful as a pastor The g o o d m a n w i l l have had e n o u g h experience o f lust t o put him o n his g u a r d against i t ; he may perhaps c o m b i n e the m a x i m u m of sympathy w i t h the m i n i m u m o f actual engagement T h e r e is also, no d o u b t , a place f o i the m a n w h o has fallen b u t has n o t been f i n a l l y c o r r u p t e d H e w i l l c o n t r i b u t e his o w n resources o f f e l l o w - f e e l i n g and practical e x p e r i ence Some of these t h o u g h t s w i l l be f o u n d i n A u g u s t i n e ; but n o t , 1 t h i n k , i n the De Magistio W e n o w r e t u r n t o the q u e s t i o n w h e t h e r realities can be demonstrated w i t h o u t the use o f signs The activities of speaking a n d t e a c h i n g , it is agreed, f o r m an e x c e p t i o n , since i n their case the use o f signs is p a i t of the r e a l i t y to be d e m o n s t r a t e d B u t w h y c o u l d not one ha\e a simple dem o n s t r a t i o n , say, o f the act of v, a l k i n g ? A d e o d a t u s sees d i f f i c u l t i e s here; a mere d e m o n s t r a t i o n w o u l d not make it clear whether it was a d e m o n stration of w a l k i n g , or o f w a l k i n g so manv steps H e c o u l d w e l l h a u added t h a t quite a c o m p l e x d e m o n s t r a t i o n w o u l d be needed to explain w h i c h various styles of m o v e m e n t can p r o p e r l y qualify as w a l k i n g ; and c o u l d this be achieved w i t h o u t a sign of n e g a t i o n to disq u a I i f\ tejected
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XVIII 70 examples? B u t A u g u s t i n e overrules his o b j e c t i o n , a n d persuades h i m t h a t an i n t e l l i g e n t m a n c o u l d l e a r n f r o m a d e m o n s t r a t i o n a l l t h a t is n a m e d b y the w o r d ; a n d w h a t can be said o f f o w l i n g must also a p p l y t o walking T h i s , pace B u r n y e a t , is a most u n s a t i s f a c t o r y a r g u m e n t . F o w l i n g seems a c o n v i n c i n g example precisely because i t is a c o m p l e x and s o m e w h a t u n u s u a l a c t i v i t y ; t h e f o w l e r w o u l d have g o o d g r o u n d s f o r supposing t h a t a passer-by w h o stopped and l o o k e d closely at his i n s t r u m e n t s was c u r i ous t o u n d e r s t a n d their f u n c t i o n E v e n so, his d e m o n s t r a t i o n c o u l d n o t m a k e i t clear w h e t h e r he was d e m o n s t r a t i n g the a r t o f f o w l i n g as such, or the l o c a l style o f f o w l i n g , w h i c h is r o u g h l y the p o i n t t h a t A d e o d a t u s has m a d e i n the case o f w a l k i n g B u t A u g u s t i n e has g i v e n n o g r o u n d s at all f o r c o n c l u d i n g t h a t his a r g u m e n t can be g e n e r a l i z e d so as t o apply t o c o m m o n p l a c e activities such as w a l k i n g . "Worse s t i l l , he goes o n t o assert, n o t s i m p l y t h a t some t h i n g s can be l e a r n t w i t h o u t signs, b u t t h a t « n o t h i n g is l e a r n t b y the signs p r o p e r to it»; f o r i f I d o n o t k n o w w h a t t h e sign stands f o r , it is a meaningless s o u n d , a n d i f I d o k n o w , there is n o t h i n g t o be l e a r n t A u g u s t i n e explains this p o i n t b y r e f e r r i n g t o the o b scure w o r d <saraballae>, w h i c h he takes t o m e a n , and t o the f a m i l i a r w o r d . H e concludes t h a t «by means o f w o r d s we learn n o t h i n g b u t w o r d s ; i n f a c t , o n l y the noise a n d s o u n d o f words». B u t w h a t a b o u t the s t o r y o f t h e t h r e e h o l y c h i l d r e n , i n w h i c h the w o r d s <saraballae> a n d occur? D o w e n o t l e a r n o f their adventures b y means o f w o r d s ? A u g u s t i n e has a t w o - f o l d answer t o this quest i o n . First, he says, «we a l r e a d y k n e w t h e m e a n i n g o f a l l those w o r d s ; f o r instance, w h a t three boys are, w h a t a f u r n a c e is, w h a t f i r e is», a n d so o n «But the names A n a n i a s , A z a r i a s a n d M i s a e l c o n v e y e d n o t h i n g t o m e , any m o r e t h a n <saraballae> did». H i s second answer is t h a t the events described i n the s t o r y r e a l l y d i d take place as t h e y are described, a n d t h a t i t is u s e f u l , i n d e e d perhaps o b l i g a t o r y , t o believe t h i s ; b u t t h a t such beliefs d o n o t c o n s t i t u t e k n o w l e d g e K n o w l e d g e involves d i r e c t awareness; o n the one h a n d , k n o w l e d g e o f sense-qualities a n d sensible o b j e c t s ; o n the o t h e r , «those t h i n g s w h i c h w e b e h o l d w i t h the m i n d , t h a t is, w i t h the i n t e l l e c t a n d r e a s o n * ; o r a g a i n , «those t h i n g s w h i c h w e beh o l d i m m e d i a t e l y i n t h a t i n t e r i o r l i g h t o f t r u t h w h i c h effects e n l i g h t e n m e n t a n d happiness i n the so-called inner man». T h e r e is n o l a c k o f c o m m e n t s t o be m a d e at this p o i n t L e t m e t r y t o present m y observations u n d e r t h r e e h e a d i n g s : f i r s t , A u g u s t i n e ' s c o n t e n t i o n t h a t n o t h i n g can be l e a r n t b y means o f w o r d s ; s e c o n d l y , t h e strategy o f his a r g u m e n t at the p o i n t w h e r e he i n t r o d u c e s t h e concept o f belief; a n d t h i r d l y , the i m p r e s s i o n he gives of r a t i o n a l k n o w l e d g e
Augustine's
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First, t h e n , A u g u s t i n e ' s p r o b l e m s i n t h e f i r s t p a r t o f the b o o k are l a r g e l y a r t i f i c i a l ; at least, t h e y arise because he is w o r k i n g w i t h a defective c o n c e p t o f l a n g u a g e H i s discussion o f w o r d s is i n practice m a i n l y concerned w i t h nouns, and moreover w i t h nouns taken in isolation H e does n o t r e c o g n i z e t h a t w e n o r m a l l y gain i n f o r m a t i o n , a n d i m p a r t i t , by means o f c o m p l e x c o m b i n a t i o n s o f signs, so t h a t the i n t e r p l a y o f familiar w o r d s can give us g e n u i n e l y n e w i n f o r m a t i o n ; a n d f o r t h a t m a t t e r , the significance o f a c o m p l e t e l y u n k n o w n w o r d can o f t e n be c o r r e c t l y ded u c e d f r o m t h e c o n t e x t i n w h i c h i t occurs A u g u s t i n e fails t o see this, I t h i n k , because he c o n t i n u e s to conceive t h e p r o b l e m o n the lines o f Plato's Cratylus, w h i c h h a d c o m e t o d o m i n a t e l i n g u i s t i c t h e o r y t o a degree w h i c h was n o longer advantageous, o b s c u r i n g t h e valuable discoveries made later b y A r i s t o t l e a n d especially b y the Stoics; f o r these observed m u c h m o r e c l e a r l y t h a t t h e s i g n i f i c a n t u n i t o f discourse is n o t the w o r d , b u t t h e sentence W e m i g h t perhaps agree w i t h A u g u s t i n e t h a t n o f o r m o f w o r d s can i n t r o d u c e us t o a n experience t h a t is e n t i r e l y u n k n o w n t o us, just as a b l i n d m a n can never k n o w w h a t is r e a l l y meant b y the w o r d B u t even this is n o t b e y o n d q u e s t i o n A f r i e n d ' s w o r d s m i g h t i n d u c e i n us the t o t a l l y u n f a m i l i a r experience of f a l l i n g i n l o v e ; even blindness, i f its cause w e r e p s y c h o l o g i c a l , m i g h t be c u r e d b y a psychologist's i n c a n t a t i o n M o r e o v e r , A u g u s t i n e has p r o b a b l y u n d e r e s t i m a t e d t h e power o f analo g y Suppose he tells us, «Explain t o me t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e o f , if y o u can» E v e n i f we accepted t h e l i m i t a t i o n o f u s i n g o n l y n o u n s , we c o u l d surely c o n v e y some idea o f i t b y saying «Light, f i r e , soap, honey»; it w o u l d be s u f f i c i e n t l y clear t h a t heaven is s o m e t h i n g t o be h o n o u r e d and p r a i s e d ; t h e r e w o u l d be n o danger o f o u r being t a k e n to r e f e r t o the unpleasant taste o f soap or the pervasive stickiness o f h o n e y E v e n the m a n w h o is i n c u r a b l y b l i n d c o u l d be g i v e n some useful i n f o r m a t i o n , if w e w e r e free t o e x p l o i t t h e resources o f n o r m a l l a n g u a g e , since he u n derstands w h a t surfaces a r e , a n d k n o w s t h a t t h e y have d i s t i n c t i v e q u a l i ties l i k e smoothness or hardness W e c o u l d n o t , o f course, give h i m any f i r s t - h a n d k n o w l e d g e o f a visual q u a l i t y ; b u t i t w o u l d n o t be m i s l e a d i n g to e x p l a i n t h a t redness is characteristic o f b l o o d , a n d o f t e n appears o n m i l i t a r y u n i f o r m s , so t h a t i t has associations f o r us a k i n t o those aroused by the sound of a t r u m p e t S e c o n d l y , w e m a y consider the n e w t u r n g i v e n to t h e a r g u m e n t at the p o i n t w h e r e A u g u s t i n e i n t r o d u c e s t h e story o f the t h r e e c h i l d r e n H e has a r g u e d so far t h a t n o t h i n g is l e a r n t b y means o f w o r d s ; and w h e n c o m m e n t i n g o n t h e s t o r y he m a i n t a i n s this c l a i m ; the w o r d brings to m i n d o n l y w h a t w e k n o w a l r e a d y , the w o r d <saraballae> r e m a i n s o b scure Y e t i t seems o b v i o u s t h a t t h e r e is s o m e t h i n g t h a t w e d i d n o t k n o w ,
XVIII
XVIII 72 and o n l y discovered by h e a r i n g the w o r d s o f t h e B i b l e , namely the c o m plex fact t h a t the three boys w e r e p u t i n t o the f u r n a c e a n d sang praises to G o d and suffered n o h a r m A u g u s t i n e claims t h a t this awareness is n o t t o be called k n o w l e d g e ; nevertheless o n his s h o w i n g the s t o r y is t r u e and i t is useful t o believe i t . Some u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f the s t o r y is t h e r e f o r e i m p l i e d ; a n d i f the s t o r y is t r u e , a n d w e c o m e t o u n d e r s t a n d a n d believe i t , this w o u l d satisfy m o s t people t h a t w e have l e a r n t i t . A u g u s t i n e does n o t concede t h i s ; he conceives l e a r n i n g as a process o f c o m i n g to see t h i n g s f o r oneself, a n d t e a c h i n g as a process o f e n a b l i n g someone to d o this T h e r e is a v a l i d p o i n t concealed here, n a m e l y t h a t the teacher c a n n o t d o t h e pupil's l e a r n i n g f o r h i m ; at best he can present the facts i n a f o r m w h i c h t h e p u p i l w i l l easily grasp B u t this useful o b servation is c o n f u s e d b y the i n i t i a l assumption t h a t all t e a c h i n g is done b y means of w o r d s , a n d t h a t all l e a r n i n g involves either seeing or somet h i n g a n a l o g o u s t o seeing I n f a c t , o f course, the u n a v o i d a b l e l i m i t a t i o n s of t e a c h i n g are e q u a l l y pressing i f the teacher w o r k s b y g i v i n g a visual d e m o n s t r a t i o n - w h e r e , as w e have seen, A u g u s t i n e believes m u c h t o o r e a d i l y t h a t the p u p i l w i l l grasp t h e p o i n t he is i n t e n d e d t o grasp. O n c e w e d i s c a r d the assumption t h a t the teacher p r o f f e r s o n l y w o r d s , i t becomes o b v i o u s that w o r d s can e n o r m o u s l y enlarge t h e usefulness o f a visual d e m o n s t r a t i o n A u g u s t i n e i n effect admits this w h i l e c o m m e n t i n g o n our awareness o f sensible t h i n g s : « W h e n w e are asked about t h e m , w e r e p l y if t h e y are present t o our senses; f o r example i f w e are l o o k i n g at the new m o o n and someone asks w h a t i t is or where» T h e curious impression t h a t w e can o n l y answer questions a b o u t t h e m o o n w h e n w e are a c t u a l l y l o o k i n g at i t is soon c o r r e c t e d ; A u g u s t i n e allows t h a t m e m o r y can supplement our o w n d i r e c t experience B u t i t seems o b v i o u s t h a t a m a n can r e c o g n i z e t h e m o o n a n d p o i n t i t o u t even i f he believes, w i t h the M a n i c h e e s , t h a t t h e m o o n is an i n f l a t a b l e bag T h e r e is far m o r e v a lue in t h e belief t h a t t h e m o o n is a spherical b o d y t h a t shines b y reflecti n g t h e sun's l i g h t ; and such a belief can be h e l d by a m a n w h o has never seen the m o o n T h i s brings us, t h i r d l y , t o the contrast w h i c h A u g u s t i n e d r a w s bet w e e n belief a n d k n o w l e d g e I n the De Magistro, belief seems t o be i n t r o d u c e d as an e x p e d i e n t e n a b l i n g A u g u s t i n e t o a d m i t t h a t a b i b l i c a l narrative is i n f o r m a t i v e w h i l e d e n y i n g t h a t i t equips us w i t h k n o w l e d g e B u t this t r e a t m e n t o f i t g r a v e l y underrates the i m p o r t a n c e w h i c h belief s h o u l d have i n his t h e o l o g y , a n d w h i c h he actually gives i t i n several other b o o k s F r o m the s t a n d p o i n t o f e p i s t e m o l o g y there is n o t h i n g i n the story o f the t h r e e c h i l d r e n w h i c h distinguishes i t f r o m other b i b l i c a l narratives; let us say, the n a r r a t i v e o f Christ's R e s u r r e c t i o n B u t f o r a Chris-
Augustine's
«De Magistro*.
a philosopher's
view
73
t i a n i t seems a disastrous u n d e r s t a t e m e n t t o say t h a t the R e s u r r e c t i o n n a r r a t i v e is s o m e t h i n g w h i c h it is useful t o believe. As a matter o f general p r i n c i p l e A u g u s t i n e p l a i n l y h o l d s t h a t k n o w l edge is superior t o b e l i e f ; this is after all suggested b y the b i b l i c a l c o n trast b e t w e e n f a i t h and sight. T h e highest f o r m o f k n o w l e d g e , t h e n , is f o u n d i n those heavenly realities w h i c h w e come t o k n o w d i r e c t l y t h r o u g h the i l l u m i n a t i n g p o w e r o f C h r i s t t h e T e a c h e r , a n d w h i c h w i l l be m o r e p e r f e c t l y apparent i n the l i f e t o come. I n the m e a n t i m e , i t may seem t h a t belief is t o o l i g h t l y r e g a r d e d ; but i t is a fact o f o u r h u m a n c o n d i t i o n t h a t some t h i n g s can at present o n l y be b e l i e v e d ; i n the hereafter these same t h i n g s w i l l be f u l l y k n o w n I n a n y case, A u g u s t i n e is n o t c o m m i t t e d t o the c r u d e idea t h a t a n y a n d every i t e m o f d i r e c t awareness is m o r e valuable t h a n any i t e m o f belief H e h o l d s t h a t i n the use o f our minds w e g a i n a d i r e c t awareness o f i n t e l l i g i b l e realities w h i c h is analogous t o our d i r e c t awareness o f sensible, a n d p a r t i c u l a r l y v i s i b l e , things B u t in o u r present c o n t e x t he does n o t f u l l y develope this idea; so far as I can discover, the o n l y i t e m o f k n o w l e d g e w h i c h he describes us attaini n g b y our i n t e l l e c t u a l v i s i o n is the p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t w i s e men are super i o r t o f o o l s , w h i c h i t h a r d l y needs a n i n t e l l i g e n t reader o f C i c e r o t o discover T h e i n t e l l e c t u a l v i s i o n o f the highest realities is a noble t h e m e ; b u t discussion o f i t w o u l d take us far b e y o n d the De Magistro
XVIII
XVIII AUGUS TINE S DE MAGISTRO:
Augustine's De Magistro: An Addendum I n retrospect I must add a comment on the oddity of Augustine's treatment of the meaning of words He knows the grammarians' distinction between different parts of speech; but this seems to have lodged i n his head as a mere piece of book-learning W e might perhaps excuse h i m for knowing little about the long and elaborate discussion, to w h i c h the Stoics made important contributions, w h i c h led to the recognition of eight parts of speech B u t the veriest tiro should have remembered the passage i n Sophist 2 6 l e , which makes it clear that a meaningful sentence, logos, requires both a noun and a verb (onoma, rhema) Since the word onoma signifies both 'noun' and 'name', i t seems plain common sense that the function o f naming things should be performed by an onoma; whereas a rhema has the function of indicating an 'action or inaction, an existence or non-existence' (262c) Augustine is misled by the fact that any w o r d can be used in a secondary sense to name itself; and this leads, by a further mistake, to the view that any word is normally used to name the state of m i n d that i t expresses There is certainly a very well-known text w h i c h encourages this mistake; i n De Interpretatione 1, 16 a 3 f f , both spoken and written words are 'symbols of affections i n the soul'; but this immediately follows a sentence which claims that the distinction of 'name' and 'verb' is the first point that must be determined I n his generally excellent book on Augustine (Augustine, Ancient Thought Baptized [Cambridge, 1994], pp. 314-16) Professor Rist attempts a defence 'Porphyry', he writes, 'argued precisely that a proposition about the ordinary world consists of a subject plus a concept (noema, or ennoia) w h i c h indicates the special and disambiguating features of the subject in each case Thus the reference of the whole proposition is the same as that of its subjectsign, w h i c h acquires a privileged status such as i t also enjoys i n The Master' I n m y review I considered Rist's discussion of first-order and second-order predicates w h i c h elucidates the fallacy i n (e.g.) ' A lion comes out of your mouth' This, I think, does not call for criticism. B u t the passage I have quoted above seems to me totally misleading, whether or not it correctly rep-
ADDENDUM
2
resents what Porphyry says. For the comment I have quoted only holds good for a particular class of sentences, namely definitions I t does not apply to the vast majority of statements about 'the ordinary w o r l d ' ; to take Plato's own example, ' A man learns' (262d). I t is impossible to take this as a disguised f o r m of definition; say, ' A man, qua rational, is a learner'; f o r Socrates immediately comments ' H e makes a statement about that which is or is becoming or has become or is to be'; and this comment, even i f i t applies to definitions at a l l , as 'that w h i c h i s ' might suggest, clearly does not apply to them exclusively. I t seems obvious that ' A m a n learns' is to be read, like Aristotle's example ' A m a n runs', as referring to an event Thus any theory of the identity of reference of subject and predicate is excluded ab initio I h i s of course does not reduce The Master as a whole to nonsense; it has many interesting and wise things to say. B u t i t is absurd to claim that a patent fallacy 'makes sense of The Master' To repeat what I wrote i n my review, the simple subject-predicate analysis breaks down very obviously in the specimen sentence that Augustine quotes: (Si) nihil ex tanta superis placet urbe relinqui, where (as I said) ' i t is a puzzle to identify the subject' A n d Augustine's theory fails to recognise that some words in their ordinary usage do not have a referential function at a l l ; their function is to quality other words. "The prefixing of Si transforms what would otherwise be a statement into a supposition f r o m w h i c h consequences are drawn, w h i l e non reverses the sense of adjacent words' B y neglecting the functions of words that are not nouns - and thus even of verbs! - Augustine rules out ab initio any satisfactory theory of the sentence A bold man might attempt a defence on some such lines as these: granted that The Master culminates i n a tremendous theme, our knowledge o f the highest realities, Augustine, he might argue, was not obliged to pursue this theme w i t h unremitting seriousness; he might on accasion allow himself to tease, to entertain and to beguile, by way of relaxation B u t I would hesitate to pursue this fancy Augustine was a proud man who did not like being made to look foolish; and he gives himself away by stating, w i t h an explicit warning (§33): ' I f we consider this a little more closely, perhaps you w i l l find that nothing is learnt even by its appropriate sign I f I am given a sign and I do not k n o w the thing of w h i c h i t is a sign, i t can teach me nothing I f I know the thing, what do I learn f r o m the sign?' Augustine does not warn us that his dilemma is exposed as an obvious fallacy at Meno 80e, confirmed by Euthydemus 276d. For a one-time professor of rhetoric this is a serious piece of professional incompetence
XIX
Augustine, the
Meno
and the subconscious mind
A u g u s t i n e ' s v i e w o f m e m o i y has o f t e n b e e n d e s c r i b e d , a n d is k n o w n t o be c o m p l e x
I t can indicate t h e recall a n d r e p r o d u c t i o n o f ex-
p e r i e n c e s a n d r e p o r t s t h a t o n e h a s e n c o u n t e r e d ; b u t i t also ranges m o r e w i d e l y t o i n c l u d e one's h a b i t s o f t h o u g h t a n d p r a c t i c a l a b i l i t i e s , w h e r e ' e x p e r i e n c e ' m i g h t seem t o be a b e t t e r e q u i v a l e n t T h e s e t w o c o n c e p t i o n s a r e v e r y u n e q u a l l y d e v e l o p e d . T h e f i r s t is p r e s e n t e d i n an u n f o r g e t t a b l e s i m i l e i n Confessions
Book 10, comparing memory to
a l a b y r i n t h i n e cave o r s t o r e h o u s e w i t h b r a n c h i n g passages ( 1 0 . 8 , 1 2 ¬ 13, 9.16-10.17) w h i c h contains b o t h items l y i n g ready t o h a n d and o t h e r s w h i c h a r e b u r i e d i n s o m e r e m o t e recess, h a r d t o r e t r i e v e a n d y e t n o t c o m p l e t e l y f o r g o t t e n ; o n e m u s t i n s o m e sense k n o w w h a t o n e is l o o k i n g f o r , o t h e r w i s e w h e n r e m e m b e r e d i t w o u l d n o t be r e c o g n i s e d as t h e o b j e c t o f one's s e a r c h ( 1 0 . 1 6 . 2 4 , 1 8 2 7 , 1 9 , 2 8 ) . S h o u l d w e refer t o t h e c o n t e n t s o f m e m o r y as 'objects'? A u g u s t i n e n o t e s t h a t t h e y a r e n o t ' t h e t h i n g s t h e m s e l v e s ' , ipsa,
( 1 0 . 8 . 1 3 ) ; the
t e r m ' o b j e c t s ' is c o r r e c t i n so f a r as t h e y a r e u s u a l l y seen as i n a n i m a t e , w i t h n o s u g g e s t i o n o f l i v i n g b e i n g s i m p r i s o n e d i n t h e cave. A u g u s t i n e speaks o f t h e m as ' i m a g e s ' {similitudines,
imagines);
but
w e r e m e m b e r n o t o n l y p e r s o n s a n d places w h i c h w e have s e e n , b u t actions a n d e m o t i o n s ( 1 0 8 1 4 ) ; t h o u g h such images d o n o t have the p o w e r o f present sensations
A m e m o r y o f p a s t sadness n e e d n o t
i n d u c e p r e s e n t sadness ( 1 0 . 1 4 . 2 1 - 2 ) , t h o u g h p r e s u m a b l y i t m a y d o so.. A g a i n , w e c a n r e m e m b e r
h o w w e forgot things (10.16.24);
A u g u s t i n e is p u z z l e d h e r e ; p e r h a p s he h a s c o n f u s e d t h e u n p r o b l e m a t i c 'memory o f forgetting something' w i t h the enigmatic 'remembering what
one does
n o t remember'..
There is n o puzzle
f o r g e t t i n g s ; I c a n s e n s i b l y say ' I r e m e m b e r
about
that I forgot
past
x ' and
e x a c t l y d e s c r i b e t h e x w h i c h I f o r g o t . B u t , as A u g u s t i n e h a s n o t e d , i f I now say ' I h a v e f o r g o t t e n x\ I c a n g i v e s o m e i n d i c a t i o n o f t h e x t h a t I have f o r g o t t e n ; b u t I cannot remember i t
s p e c i f y i t e x a c t l y unless I
XIX
XIX 340
Augustine, the Meno and the subconscious m i n d
O n t h e w h o l e , A u g u s t i n e seems t o p i c t u r e a n a c t i v e r e s p o n s i b l e self w h o is f a i r l y s h a r p l y d i s s o c i a t e d f r o m h i s m e m o r i e s
Trinitate
12 1 5 . 2 4 , w h e r e the
Meno
341
is c l e a r l y r e c a l l e d , A u g u s t i n e is
H e operates
s u m m a r i z i n g a v i e w w h i c h h e h a d c o m e t o reject.. B u t i n t h e e a r l y
w i t h t h e m , as w e l l as s e a r c h i n g t h e m o u t ; h e b r e a k s t h e m d o w n a n d
w o r k s , a n d i n d e e d i n t h e Confessions, he is s t i l l s y m p a t h e t i c T h e
(Conf.
reassembles their p a r t s t o p r o d u c e n e w f o r m s
10.8 1 4 ,
Trin.
Confessions
logic o f
1 0 . 2 0 . 2 9 - 3 1 w o u l d suggest t h a t i n s o m e sense
9 6 10, 11,10.17) l i k e a c h i l d p l a y i n g the game o f 'heads, bodies a n d
w e r e c a l l a p r e - A d a m i c h a p p i n e s s w h i c h w e have never e n c o u n t e r e d
tails'
i n o u r p r e s e n t lives.
B u t t h e y m a y also i m p e r c e p t i b l y m e r g e t o p r e s e n t false r e -
collections
(Trin..
12 . 1 5 . 2 4 ,
ad fin.)., T h e y
are s e l d o m c o n s i d e r e d as
A g e n e r a l k n o w l e d g e o f t h e p r e - e x i s t e n c e t h e o r y raises n o p r o b -
a c t i n g o n their o w n e r , or o n o n e another; the m o s t o b v i o u s change
lems.. I t w o u l d p r e s u m a b l y f i g u r e i n q u i t e e l e m e n t a r y l e c t u r e s o n t h e
t h e y u n d e r g o is t o w e a k e n a n d f a d e
(Conf,
1 0 . 1 1 18).. A m e m o r y o f
soul; a n y p r o o f that the soul c a n exist a p a r t f r o m t h e b o d y w o u l d
sensuous e x p e r i e n c e m a y i n d e e d be a p r e s e n t t e m p t a t i o n ( 1 0 3 0 . 4 1 ) ;
serve t o d i s p r o v e E p i c u r e a n m a t e r i a l i s m . B u t c a n w e g o f u r t h e r , a n d
y e t i t n e e d n o t b e ( 1 0 . 21..30); a n d t h e r e is n o s u g g e s t i o n t h a t i t i n t e n d s
suggest t h a t A u g u s t i n e q u i t e e a r l y i n h i s l i f e a c q u i r e d s o m e k n o w l -
to tempt, Augustine makes rather little o f the fact t h a t
unwelcome
edge o f t h e
Conf
10 14 22).
o n Cicero's
m e m o r i e s m a y f o r c e themselves o n our a t t e n t i o n (cf
Meno itself? Jusculans
C o u i c e l l e stated t h a t he is w h o l l y d e p e n d e n t for w h a t
little he k n o w s
A t 1 0 1 9 2 8 , s o m e f o r m o f p u r p o s i v e a c t i v i t y is a s c r i b e d t o m e m o r y
C h a d w i c k seems t o b e a l i t t l e m o r e p o s i t i v e
i t s e l f , as i t seeks t o s u p p l y w h a t is m i s s i n g
passages i n t h e
Buto n the whole, we
s e l d o m hear t h a t a m a n ' s m e m o r i e s h e l p t o m a k e h i m t h e m a n he is. Augustine
o f the
Meno;
2
I s h a l l refer t o some
w h i c h d i r e c t l y o r i n d i r e c t l y m i g h t seem t o have
influenced Augustine..
W h a t o f the c o n t r a s t i n g c o n c e p t i o n , w h i c h w e m i g h t judge t o be e q u a l l y i m p o r t a n t ? T h i s is m u c h less v i v i d l y presented.,
Meno
3
T h e f i r s t c o m e s l a t e i n t h e d i a l o g u e , a t 9 7 a ff„, w h e r e
Socrates
claims t h a t 'men m a y be g o o d a n d useful t o their c o u n t r y ' n o t only
speaks o f 'the s k i l l s a c q u i r e d t h r o u g h t h e l i b e r a l a r t s ' , n o t i n g t h a t i n
t h r o u g h k n o w l e d g e b u t t h r o u g h r i g h t o p i n i o n ( S ô £ a âÀTiÔrjç as o p -
t h e i r case ' I c a r r y n o t t h e i m a g e s , b u t t h e v e i y s k i l l s t h e m s e l v e s '
p o s e d t o EHICTTTIUT)). T h i s passage is n o t e w o r t h y , as i t c o n t r a s t s w i t h
(10. 9 16).. R a t h e r t y p i c a l l y , h e t h i n k s f i r s t o f 'the s k i l l s o f d i a l e c t i c a l
m a n y others i n w h i c h Plato regards o p i n i o n ,
d e b a t e ' , a n d is p u z z l e d t o k n o w h o w t h e y a r e a c q u i r e d ( i b i d , w i t h
i n f e r i o r t o k n o w l e d g e (esp, Rep.. 5 0 9 d f f . , 5 1 1 d e ) . B u t ' b e l i e f
10 1 2 . 1 9 ) . H e d o e s n o t suggest, as w e m i g h t , t h a t w e c a n g e n e r a l i z e
p e r f e c t l y a d e q u a t e t r a n s l a t i o n o f SôÇa (cf PGL
a n d a b s t r a c t l o g i c a l p a t t e r n s e m b o d i e d i n t h e r e p o r t s w h i c h r e a c h us
w o u l d suspect t h a t t h e passage w o u l d b e u s e f u l t o C h r i s t i a n a p o l o -
t h r o u g h t h e senses; h i s a n s w e r is r a t h e r , t h a t t h e i r o r i g i n m u s t be
gists
f o u n d i n some r e m o t e corner o f the m e m o r y ( 1 0 , 1 2 . 1 9 , 1 3 . 2 0 )
This
a b l e a s s u r a n c e s h o u l d b e f o l l o w e d w h e r e c o m p l e t e c e r t a i n t y is i m -
b u t t h e r e is n o sugges-
p o s s i b l e , is c o m m o n e n o u g h , b u t seems t o d e r i v e f r o m s o u r c e s other
is n o t u n l i k e t h e v i e w p r o p o s e d i n t h e
Meno;
56Çcc, as m a r k e d l y 1
is a
s.v., B ) ; a n d o n e
T h e general a r g u m e n t used against t h e sceptics, t h a t reason-
Meno,
t i o n h o w t h e y c a m e t o be t h e r e . A t a h u m b l e r l e v e l 'beasts a n d b i r d s
t h a n the
also h a v e m e m o r y ; o t h e r w i s e t h e y c o u l d n o t r e d i s c o v e r t h e i r dens
t o E u s e b i u s a n d M e t h o d i u s . . B u t t h e r e is a n i n c o n s p i c u o u s
a n d nests' ( 1 0 , 1 7 . 2 6 ) . B u t t h e r e is l i t t l e n o t i c e o f t h e r o l e o f m e m o r y
w h i c h p e r h a p s deserves m e n t i o n . T h e usefulness o f b e l i e f is i l l u s -
in h u m a n p r a c t i c a l activity..
trated in the
I t is i n d e e d o f t e n suggested t h a t A u g u s t i n e ' s v i e w o f m e m o r y a n d r e c o l l e c t i o n is i n d e b t e d t o t h e t h e o r y set o u t i n P l a t o ' s
Meno,
one's i n t u i t i v e k n o w l e d g e
geometrical
o f certain facts ( i n P l a t o ,
4
M o r e o v e r , the dialogue was apparently
Meno
unknown parallel
b y the example o f ' k n o w i n g the w a y t o Larissa'
( 9 7 a f f ). W h e n i n t h e
Confessions
Augustine alludes to the m e m o r y
that
truths) derives f r o m a n exact k n o w l e d g e o f t h e m w h i c h w e a c q u i r e d in a pre-natal existence
A u g u s t i n e , after c a u t i o u s l y a p p r o v i n g t h e
2
d o c t r i n e o f t h e s o u l ' s p r e - e x i s t e n c e , c a m e t o a b a n d o n i t i n his m i d d l e
De Genesi ad Lttteram,
w r i t t e n i n 406..
1
It follows that in
De
3
te Selle, Augustine
the Theologian
( L o n d o n 1970) p p 69-70.
Orations
12 1 5 2 4 , Cicero Tusculan of Hippo
Paris 1 9 4 8 , p. 1 5 8 , réf. Augustine 3 2 2 7 7 See f u r t h e r G. B o n n e r , St
( L o n d o n 1 9 6 3 ) p p 394-5
H C h a d w i c k , Saint Augustine, n
4
E
en occident,
Trin
Augustine
l i f e T e Selle dates t h i s d e f i n i t e r e j e c t i o n o f t h e p r e - e x i s t e n c e t h e o r y t o the
P. C o u i c e l l e , Les lettres grecques
Confessions
( O x f o r d 1 9 9 2 ) pp. 185 n 12, 189
IS
Conf
6. 5 7, Ut Cred.
12,26-7; cf. m y Philosophy
brrdge 1994) p. 112 a n d n. 6; C i c e r o lucullus
m Christian 99-109
Antiquity
(Cam-
XIX
XIX Augustine, the Meno and the subconscious m i n d
342
343
o f beasts a n d b i r d s ( 1 0 1 7 . 2 6 ) i t is n e s t - f i n d i n g , n o t n e s t - b u i l d i n g ,
m a t e o b j e c t s , B u t is i t a n e s s e n t i a l f e a t u r e o f e i t h e r s i m i l e t h a t such
w h i c h s t r i k e s h i m as t h e a p p r o p r i a t e
a l i m i t a t i o n s h o u l d persist?
example
A n o t h e r passage w h i c h deserves n o t i c e is t h e s o p h i s t i c a l a r g u m e n t set o u t a t
Meno
scious.. T h i n g s c a n be t h e r e e v e n t h o u g h u n p e r c e i v e d , or h a l f - p e r -
cannot
c e i v e d , or d i m l y p e r c e i v e d ; i t is t h i s d i m p e r c e p t i o n w h i c h enables
s
w h a t he k n o w s or a b o u t w h a t h e does n o t k n o w . . F o r he
C l e a r l y b o t h w r i t e r s h a v e , i n s o m e sense, a t h e o r y o f t h e s u b c o n -
about
8 0 e : ' A m a n c a n n o t i n q u i r e either
such
u s , so t o s p e a k , t o d r a g t h e m o u t f o r i n s p e c t i o n a n d f u r t h e r d e v e l -
i n q u i r y is n e e d e d ; n o r a g a i n , a b o u t w h a t h e does n o t k n o w ; f o r t h e n
o p m e n t . . B u t t h e r e is n o t m u c h s u g g e s t i o n , so f a r , t h a t these h i d d e n
i n q u i r e a b o u t w h a t he k n o w s ; f o r he k n o w s i t , a n d so n o
he d o e s n o t k n o w w h a t he is t o i n q u i r e a b o u t ' . C l e a r l y t h e s o p h i s m
i m a g e s a n d urges i n t e r a c t o n e w i t h a n o t h e r ; i n d e e d t h i s m i g h t h i n d e r
c a n be a t t a c k e d f r o m b o t h sides. I f o n e k n o w s s o m e t h i n g , o n e c a n
t h e f u n c t i o n i n g o f m e m o r y i n t h e n a r r o w e r sense; w e are a l l a w a r e
nevertheless i n q u i r e i n t o the n a t u r e a n d g r o u n d s o f one's k n o w l -
o f a tendency t o elaborate a n d d r a m a t i z e the experiences w h i c h w e
edge, B u t t h e c o n v e r s e a r g u m e n t is p e r h a p s t h e m o r e i n t e r e s t i n g , I f
p r o f e s s t o r e m e m b e r (cf. Inn..
one does n o t k n o w s o m e t h i n g , this by n o means prevents one f r o m
be t h a t t h i s i d e a o f s u b c o n s c i o u s i n t e r a c t i o n is j u s t w h a t is needed
i d e n t i f y i n g the p r o b l e m i n t o w h i c h one s h o u l d i n q u i r e ; t h o u g h
t o u n d e r p i n A u g u s t i n e ' s c o n c e p t i o n o f memoria
no
1 1 . 1 0 1 7 , 12.1.5 24).. B u t i t m a y w e l l i n i t s w i d e r sense..
that
O b v i o u s l y w e m u s t n o t t h i n k o f t h e s u b c o n s c i o u s as h a r b o u r i n g
for-
a set o f t h o u g h t s , b e l i e f s , w i s h e s , s p e c u l a t i o n s o r w h a t e v e r , w h i c h
m u l a t e d a r e p l y o n s o m e s u c h l i n e s ; a n d t h a t t h i s r e p l y u n d e r l i e s his
are p r e c i s e l y s i m i l a r t o c o n s c i o u s t h o u g h t e x c e p t t h a t t h e y h a p p e n
t r e a t m e n t o f m e m o r y , w h e n he a r g u e s t h a t o n e m u s t i n s o m e sense
t o be g o i n g o n b e h i n d
r e m e m b e r t h e t h i n g s t h a t o n e has f o r g o t t e n , o t h e r w i s e o n e c o u l d n o t
u n d e r l y i n g Freud's n o t o r i o u s theory o f the Oedipus C o m p l e x ; it
i d e n t i f y t h e f o r g o t t e n f a c t or b e l i e f
easily suggested the v i e w t h a t a l l , o r m a n y , m e n h a d an unconscious
doubt
i n some kinds of ignorance
it will.
I t seems t o m e
A u g u s t i n e m a y h a v e k n o w n t h e passage u n d e r d i s c u s s i o n a n d
mains a puzzle at suggested, at
Confessions
' M e m o r y of forgetfulness' re-
1 0 . 1 6 2 4 ; b u t an answer
is
soon
a curtain. This, I t h i n k , was a
mistake
d e s i r e f o r s e x u a l i n t i m a c y w i t h t h e i r m o t h e r s . T h e t r u t h is m o r e p r o b a b l y t h a t s e x u a l desires a n d fantasies are s i m p l y a s s o c i a t e d w i t h
10.18.27
A s w e h a v e o b s e r v e d , A u g u s t i n e p i c t u r e s m e m o r y as a k i n d o f
t h e f e m a l e f i g u r e best k n o w n t o us f r o m c h i l d h o o d . T h i s m i g h t s t i l l
c a v e r n o r store-house, T h i s d e s c r i p t i o n has n o a p p a r e n t c o n n e c t i o n
e m b a r r a s s u s ; b u t i t b y n o m e a n s a m o u n t s t o a f o r m u l a t e d desire
w i t h t h e f a m o u s p a r a b l e o f t h e cave i n Republic
w h i c h is o n l y c h e c k e d b y s o c i a l p r e s s u r e s , i n t e r n a l i z e d as a ' c e n s o r '
5 1 4 a ff..; i t is a 197c ff,,
I t m a y b e , t h e r e f o r e , t h a t A u g u s t i n e ' s cave is b e s t i n t e r p r e t e d o n
w h e r e Plato compares the k n o w i n g m i n d t o a bird-cage; k n o w l e d g e
the analogy o f our d r e a m s ; b e a r i n g i n m i n d the e x t r a o r d i n a r y v a r i -
m a y be p r e s e n t l i k e a b i r d i n t h e c a g e , w i t h o u t b e i n g i m m e d i a t e l y
e t y o f o u r d r e a m s , w h i c h m a y p r e s e n t a t o t a l l y i n c o h e r e n t succession
a c c e s s i b l e , l i k e a b i r d i n t h e hand..
o f i m a g e s , o r o n e i n w h i c h t h e r e is n o a p p a r e n t c o n n e c t i n g t h r e a d ,
distant derivative of that expounded
i n the
Theaetetus
I n p o i n t i n g o u t t h i s p o s s i b l e i n f l u e n c e , w e seem t o be t h i n k i n g o f
b u t s o m e t i m e s o f f e r us a r e l a t i v e l y c o n s i s t e n t , t h o u g h p e r h a p s sur-
m e m o r y i n i t s n a r r o w e r a n d m o r e p r e c i s e sense, as t h e r e c a l l i n g o f
p r i s i n g , e x h i b i t i o n o f a p o s s i b l e e x p e r i e n c e , or a f o r m u l a w h i c h
p r e v i o u s l y k n o w n e x p e r i e n c e s or reports.. C a n i t be r e l a t e d t o t h e
i m p r e s s e s i t s e l f as a u t h o r i t a t i v e . I n m o s t cases, o u r w a k i n g
w i d e r sense w h i c h A u g u s t i n e gives t o memoria,
r e c o g n i z e s t h a t t h i s l a t t e r i m p r e s s i o n is d e l u s i v e ; b u t n o t i n a l l . There
m a k i n g i t t h e gr o u n d
o f a b i l i t y a n d c o n s t r u c t i v e t h i n k i n g ? I t is w o r t h p o i n t i n g o u t
an
i m p o r t a n t l i m i t a t i o n b o t h i n Plato's parable and i n Augustine's. The b i r d s i n P l a t o ' s b i r d - c a g e m e r e l y f l y a b o u t , so t h a t t h e y are s o m e -
mind
are e x c e p t i o n a l cases i n w h i c h d r e a m s p r o v i d e us w i t h t h e s o l u t i o n o f a p r o b l e m , or c o r r e c t l y p r e d i c t f u t u r e events.. We
h a v e suggested
a n i m p r e s s i o n o f A u g u s t i n e ' s cave as
s i m p l y a r e p o s i t o r y o f i n e r t images
m i g h t m a t e a n d p r o d u c e o f f s p r i n g . A n d A u g u s t i n e ' s cave d o e s n o t
e x c a v a t e d , b u t a m e d i u m i n w h i c h a s s o c i a t i o n s o f ideas a r e f o r m e d
c o n t a i n p o t e n t i a l l y a c t i v e p r i s o n e r s ; t h e m a i n s u g g e s t i o n is o f i n a n i -
a n d again dissolved random
or
memories
waiting to
not
t i m e s a c c e s s i b l e , s o m e t i m e s n o t . T h e r e is n o s u g g e s t i o n t h a t t h e y
be
T h i s c o u l d p e r h a p s be seen as a p r o c e s s o f
s h u f f l i n g w h i c h l e a d s , e v e r y so o f t e n , t o a n
association
w h i c h is s u f f i c i e n t l y s t r i k i n g t o h o l d o u r s l u m b e r i n g a t t e n t i o n , a n d Cf. Euthydemus
2 7 6 d f f , presumably u n k n o w n to Augustine
may
indeed
be v e r i d i c a l ; as a v e r y s i m p l e
example, w e
might
XIX
XIX 344
Augustine, the Meno
misremembet a lesson which itself was incorrect, and so come up with the right answer. But perhaps a process of selection and combination could be located below the level of conscious attention (cf Conf.. 10.19.28); even without conscious control we could have some degree of organizing ability resembling that which enables us to coordinate the various muscles involved in executing some complex physical movement. Is this picture recognizable as a legitimate interpretation or supplement of Augustine's conception of memory? It depends, I would think, on which aspect of it we prefer to emphasize. If we reflect that he interpreted memoria in the broadest possible sense, assigning to it out ability to solve new problems and formulate new theories, our view of his cave as a storehouse of active and inter active images and thoughts will be seen as a legitimate development of his theory.. If we concentrate on his interpretation of memoria in the narrower sense, as the recalling of something which has been, or could be, forgotten, then we may note his observation that our subconscious associative power may lead us to 'think false things' (Irin, 11 10.17) or it may be to misremember Yet even thismemoria will be a useful analogy for the process of constructive thought,. Any such theory, however, will be a valuable corrective of the alltoo-common caricature of the intuitive intellect as a magical accomplishment which gets somewhere starting from nowhere at all, a process of creation which is nevertheless veridical.. The Greeks, I believe, were much misled by the analogy so commonly drawn between intellect, nous, and the sense of sight.. They were impressed by its clarity and discrimination as compared with our other senses; it did not, I think, occur to them that vision is a skill which has to be gradually acquired in infancy; at least, I cannot recall any notice of the imperfect vision of infants to compare with the frequent reference to their lisping speech and stumbling gait. We can thus be startled to find Augustine suggesting that ethical concepts and values - in particular, pure love - can be known by a process of pure intuition, analogous, perhaps, to that by which we assent to a geometrical proof.. We might perhaps see this as 6
7
8
s.v 64115.
6
See, f o r instance, the I n d e x t o C o h n a n d W e n d l a n d ' s Pbilo
7
C o n f . 1.6.8 ' p a u l a t i m sentiebam, u b i essem' m a y be n o t e d , b u t is h a r d l y typical.
8
Gen ad Lit. 12 1 1 2 2 Cf M a g 12.40, o n Truth.
a n d the subconscious m i n d
345
confirming the influence of Plato's Meno, But in fact this view of moral knowledge is, I would hold, unplatonic as well as imper fect.. It is admitted, of course, that Plato regarded geometrical knowledge as an ideal, in respect of clarity and certainty, to which our knowledge of transcendent realities may hope to approximate. But he also holds that such knowledge can only be attained by a complex process of dialectic, which in this case would involve compar ing and contrasting the various forms of our experience to which the word 'love' can be applied, and thereby coming to isolate the unique reality to which the word 'love' most properly applies and which articulates all its derivative and improper uses.. It was common ground between Plato and Augustine that there is such a supreme reality, though they do not wholly agree on its proper designation. Plato can speak of an Idea of the Good, which is the source of all goodness, and which - according to the Symposium - can be best approached through purified human affection. Augustine devotes himself to an all-encompassing G o d who unites and fulfils within himself all perfections, intellect, goodness, beauty and love. Using the language of practical devotion rather than philosophy, Augustine finds that this supreme reality can be glimpsed in a flash of illumination of inspiration,. But he also holds that a lifetime of patient discipleship is needed for us to understand it and, in the measure which our mortality permits, to offer ourselves to its transforming power.
XX LOGIC AND T H E APPLICATION OF NAMES TO GOD
M y title seems to c a l l for an e s s a y i n p h i l o s o p h y It hardly relates to the section of G r e g o r y ' s text that w e were a s k e d to e x a m i n e ; it w o u l d indeed a l l o w m e to by-pass G r e g o r y completely and investigate the problem of names for G o d in the context o f modern logical theory.. B u t this I think w o u l d hardly appeal to a company of theologians,. I prefer to begin by showing h o w the problem w a s c o n c e i v e d during the seven centuries extending from Plato to G r e g o r y , - at the risk of some overlap with Professor K o b u s c h , w h o s e contribution was not yet announced when I began to consider this paper T h e first and most i n f l u e n t i a l d i s c u s s i o n of names is found in one of Plato's earlier dialogues, the C r a t v l u s , . T h e q u e s t i o n h e r e p r o p o s e d i s w h e t h e r the c o r r e c t u s e , the • p S 6 T 1~| c;, of names is m e r e l y a matter of c o n v e n t i o n , or whether it has some basis i n nature, B y 'convention' and 'nature' I refer to the contrast between u o p o t ; and i p v j a t c ; w h i c h was already f a m i l i a r , being u s e d foi e x a m p l e by the Sophists w h e n d i s c u s s i n g the basis of morality; u b p o g then stands for accepted custom rather than enacted law,. B r o a d l y s p e a k i n g w e may s a y that Plato takes up a cross-bench position, i n c l i n i n g slightly towards the v i e w that names are significant by nature,. Socrates first interrogates Hermogenes, the champion of convention, A t the outset his position i s not c l e a r l y d e f i n e d ; he maintains that the right use of names i n v o l v e s convention and agreement, but i n the same breath adopts a p u r e l y subjectivist approach; I may c a l l m y slave whatever I l i k e without c o n s u l t i n g anyone. I n the ensuing d i s c u s s i o n Socrates shows that the notion of a purely private language is incoherent; language is a social activity, B u t this still l e a v e s the o b v i o u s point that different societies have different languages I s there any c r i t e r i o n by w h i c h w e can decide that one is better than another?
XX
XX
A t this point the argument i s c o n f u s e d b y a f a l l a c y . Socrates argues that s i n c e statements c l e a r l y c a n be true or false, the same principle should apply to parts of statements, and therefore to n a m e s ; thus there c a n be true a n d f a l s e names ( 3 8 5 c ) W e c a n show that this argument i s . u n s o u n d s i m p l y by extending it; names are c o m p o s e d o f v o w e l s and c o n s o n a n t s ; thus i f S o c r a t e s i s r i g h t , it m u s t f o l l o w that i n d i v i d u a l letters c a n be true or false ( 1 ) N e v e r t h e l e s s the notion of a true n a m e has i n t e r e s t i n g p o s s i b i l i t i e s ; it is suggested that some n a m e s a c t u a l l y ' r e v e a l the e s s e n c e ' o f the things they denote ( 3 9 3 d; cf, 4 2 2 d, 4 2 3 e).. A s a modern e x a m p l e , w e might take the w o r d 'wash-basin ; but later i n the dialogue it is pointed out that s u c h a name i s instructive only i f w e k n o w the m e a n i n g o f its e l e m e n t s , ' w a s h ' and 'basin'; it seems impossible to continue the process by finding s i g n i f i c a n c e i n these elements t h e m s e l v e s . 1
T h e d i s c u s s i o n now turns to the process of d e v i s i n g or choosing names; it is suggested that they were introduced by some individual, the u o p o F J E T ! " ] ( ; , - or possibly by some group of talented men (401 b ) - w i t h an e y e to their purpose and the objective reality to w h i c h they are directed T h e idea that the i n v e n t i o n of n a m e s d e m a n d s an i n v e n t o r i s n a t u r a l e n o u g h , though n a i v e , and I cannot be sure h o w s e r i o u s l y P l a t o intends it; i n G e n e s i s 2 : 2 0 w e f i n d the s a m e r o l e assigned, no doubt s e r i o u s l y , to A d a m . B u t the argument i s r e p e a t e d l y interrupted by p a r o d i e s of a b s u r d attempts to find s i g n i f i c a n c e in names by far-fetched e t y m o l o g i e s , w h i c h in the last resort must be unhelpful even i f they were sound, as w e have j u s t e x p l a i n e d C a n w e then d i s c o v e r some c l a s s of p r i m a r y n a m e s w h i c h are s i g n i f i c a n t i n their o w n right? S o c r a t e s s u g g e s t s that we c a n imitate the s h a p e s and movements of things by gestures, and that hu ma n speech is a form o f v o c a l gesture (426-7) C r a t y l u s now enters the d i s c u s s i o n ; he contends that a true name indicates the nature of a thing, but tries to argue that any other name m u s t be a m e r e u n m e a n i n g noise Socrates r e p l i e s by r e c a l l i n g the picture-theory of n a m i n g ; a portrait c a n be recognizable e v e n if it i s not 100 % perfect W e are then taken back to the theory of names as imitative
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gestures; they c a n be appropriate to their s u b j e c t s without matching them c o m p l e t e l y ; thus the G r e e k w o r d CTKA n p O Q , 'rough', c o n t a i n s the appropriate r o u g h letter p , though the s m o o t h X figures i n i t as w e l l S o c r a t e s then introduces a d i l e m m a , w h i c h leads to a point of great importance to later r e a d e r s of the d i a l o g u e . Assuming a first inventor of language, he must have c h o s e n his n a m e s in the light o f a prior knowledge of the realities to w h i c h they apply; but how could he k n o w them, if he h a d as yet no means of naming t h e m ? C r a t y l u s r e p l i e s by suggesting that s o m e superhuman p o w e r i n t r o d u c e d the o r i g i n a l n a m e s T h i s point is very l i g h t l y s k e t c h e d i n ( 4 3 8 e; s o p r e v i o u s l y , 3 9 7 c ) ; i n d e e d Socrates at once raises an objection; and the dialogue ends by making a point which Plato clearly considered more important, n a m e l y that w e do have a k n o w l e d g e of things w h i c h i s not d e r i v e d f r o m n a m e s , for e x a m p l e true beauty and goodness; w e are thus left ready to attend to the theory of F o r m s . H a v i n g made this b r i e f s u r v e y I w i l l add one or two critical comments. First, some of the d i f f i c u l t i e s are m i s c o n c e i v e d , and a r i s e f r o m the i n t r o d u c t i o n of a 'namegiver', with its c o r o l l a r y that the process of d e v i s i n g a set of names must be either w h o l l y or l a r g e l y completed w i t h i n a s i n g l e life-time, G i v e n a l o n g e r time-span i t b e c o m e s far easier to imagine the business of d i s c r i m i n a t i n g realities and n a m i n g them as two a c t i v i t i e s w h i c h go hand in h a n d and support one another. S e c o n d l y , the theory o f language as i m i t a t i v e gesture i s c r u d e and inadequate, though w e shall meet it again.. A n d the notion that words are l i k e pictures has the o b v i o u s d r a w b a c k of suggesting that w e use language only for making statements; w e need a theory w h i c h c a n deal w i t h q u e s t i o n s , c o m m a n d s , a n d other sorts o f d i s c o u r s e C e r t a i n l y the road s i g n w h i c h c a r r i e s a picture of s c h o o l c h i l d r e n c o n v e y s the injunction ' B e w a r e of school-children'; but it is not clear that m u c h further development is possible; l a n g u a g e h a s d e v e l o p e d i n t o a f l e x i b l e instrument w h o s e resources far exceed those of pictures T h i r d l y , even c o n v e n i e n c e or the reverse attaches to the w h o l e structure of a language rather than to s i n g l e words. T h e r e is c e r t a i n l y some inconvenience i f it is r e a l l y true that in T o n g a the word for 'No' i s ' H o o l i m a kittiluca chee-chee-chee'; but once again,
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this i s an exceptional case.
acquire their
2. W e pass then to Aristotle, w h o approaches the theory of l a n g u a g e , inter a l i a , i n two i m p o r t a n t e a r l y w o r k s , the C a t e g o r i e s and the D e I n t e r p r e t a t i o n e . . H e sets out a distinction w h i c h is not a l w a y s clear i n Plato; the C a t e g o r i e s is intended to deal with realities or notions or w o r d s taken separately, whereas the D e Interpretatipne is concerned with c o n c e p t s or w o r d s connected to f o r m a statement; thus a name is a spoken sound significant by convention (c..2, 16 a 19); but only a combination of n a m e s and v e r b s s i g n i f i e s something true or false (c 1, 16 a 15).. There are a number of p r i m i t i v e features i n Aristotle's treatment of language w h i c h w e r e to c a u s e d i f f i c u l t i e s to later commentators w h o took these words as authoritative, F i r s t , he is handicapped by an e x t r e m e l y limited understanding of grammar. Thus0U0|JCt has to do duty both for what w e c a l l a noun and for a name; there is as yet no sign of a distinction between proper names and common nouns A g a i n , 6uop a contrasts with pf|pa; but this contrast m a r k s the d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n w h a t w e c a l l subject and predicate, whether the latter consists of a verb or of a descriptive term such as 'white' or introduces another noun, as in 'Homer is a poet' Moreover Aristotle sometimes ignores this contrast and suggests that a statement s i m p l y i n v o l v e s the c o n n e c t i n g , or i n d e e d the u n i f i c a t i o n , of two e l e m e n t s , as i f these w e r e s y m m e t r i c a l l y r e l a t e d ; i n other w o r d s , he often ignores the distinction w h i c h w e now mark by s a y i n g that the subject-term r e f e r s to s o m e t h i n g , the predicate describes it A g a i n he says that spoken w o r d s are symbols of affections in the s o u l , and that written marks are s y m b o l s of spoken words. B u t this cuts across our w e l l founded c o n v i c t i o n that the name S o c r a t e s stands for the man himself; for the name was given to h i m , and so not given to s o m e p e r s o n ' s i d e a or c o n c e p t i o n of him. I d e a s and conceptions are no doubt i n v o l v e d i n the p r o c e s s of g i v i n g n a m e s ; but is not to them that the names are attached. In Christian societies, w e baptise our c h i l d r e n , not our thoughts,
3.. T h e S t o i c s are said to have taken over the theory of n a m e s as i m i t a t i v e sounds, w h i c h w e encountered i n the Cratylus, (2) T h e y are generally described as holding that names c o m e into u s e by nature, tp vj a e L ; but perhaps their intention w a s to e x p l a i n only the origin of language, since C h r y s i p p u s points out that i n our c o m m o n usage there i s not a l w a y s the natural correspondence that w e might expect; for s i m i l a r w o r d s denote d i s s i m i l a r things and vice-versa, ( 3 ) B u t there are other more important and v a l u a b l e aspects of S t o i c philology.. F o r one thing, they i n t r o d u c e d a better c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of the parts o f speech.. D i o g e n e s of B a b y l o n mentions a five-fold division c o m p r i s i n g 6 u o p cx npoariyopia pqpa. cnJu6EO-p,oc; and apBpou. Here then we meet for the first time an e x p l i c i t distinction between ouojja, the proper name, and T T p o a T i y o p i a , the common noun; this i s said to have been introduced by C h r y s i p p u s , whereas the older S t o i c s distinguished only ouopa, p f| p: a , aL)u6eo"poc;1 dpBpou T h e s e four words in fact occur with others, in a list set down i n Aristotle's P o e t i p s . . in w h i c h T T p o o ~ r ] y o p i a does not appear, ' Pf|[ja now begins to take on the more restricted sense of the ' v e r b ; CTiliu6£apoc. includes all i n d e c l i n a b l e connecting w o r d s , i„e p a r t i c l e s , prepositions and conjunctions in our notation; apBpou is what we c a l l the a r t i c l e ; there is n o m e n t i o n of p r o n o u n s , a d j e c t i v e s or adverbs
All
these
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but is
a
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must
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pass
on,
advocate 306
require
much
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that
names
significance by
convention,
A n e v e n more important innovation introduced by the Stoic is one whose f u l l significance has only been appreciated fairly recently, namely their theory of X E K T C C , for w h i c h we m a y use the w o r d 'propositions', A n c i e n t s o u r c e s e x p l a i n their distinction between the s i g n i f i c a n t sound and the fact ,npay|jcx, w h i c h it signifies; but this fact, or proposition is not identical with the objective r e a l i t y , T 6 E K T 6 c; ijifOKELfjEuou w h i c h i n this c o n n e c t i o n i s c a l l e d T 6 ruyx^uou> w h i c h exists' or 'occurs'. ( 4 ) T h i s c a n be clearly seen in a case like that of Socrates w a l k i n g , since here we h a v e three entities of s t r i k i n g l y d i f f e r e n t f o r m : the sound-waves in the air, the p r e d i c a t i v e statement, and the human animal in motion. T h e distinction appears again i n the tenet that the sounds and o b j e c t s r e f e r r e d to are both t
n
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m a t e r i a l , and therefore r e a l , w h e r e a s the X , E K T d , being immaterial, are not f u l l y real ( 5 ) It m a y also help to explain the p u z z l i n g distinction d r a w n by S e n e c a between s a p i e n t i a and s a p i e n s e s s e : s a p i e n t i a being a c o l l e c t i v e noun referring to w e l l - s t o c k e d m i n d s i n g e n e r a l , w h e r e a s s a p i e n s esse means the fact that one or more people are wise,. ( 6 ) We note that i n the context of t h i s theory, w o r d s are c o n s i d e r e d s i m p l y as i n d i v i d u a l acts of s p e a k i n g , though e l s e w h e r e the S t o i c s h a v e m u c h to s a y about w o r d s i n a p u r e l y f o r m a l context, as w e have already made clear. A E K T C C , then, seems to be distinguishable f r o m the words that express them, even though the d i s t i n c t i o n i s quite o f t e n ignored. T r a n s l a t i n g X e K T 6 u by the L a t i n word d i c t u m c e r t a i n l y m a k e s for c o n f u s i o n ; but e v e n d i c t u m can be interpreted as 'that w h i c h is signified', not 'that w h i c h i s pronounced'. As u s u a l l y p r e s e n t e d , this theory r e t a i n s the d e f e c t w h i c h w e h a v e already o b s e r v e d ; it applies most e a s i l y to statements, and there are problems i n e x t e n d i n g it to deal with other uses of language. B u t it has important advantages., I n the first p l a c e , it a v o i d s the m i s l e a d i n g suggestion that words are s y m b o l s of thoughts, w h i c h we noticed above; ( 7 ) 'misleading', that i s , as a general doctrine; w e shall not w i s h to deny that s o m e words describe and refer to our thoughts. S e c o n d l y , it s u g g e s t s , c o r r e c t l y , that the n o r m a l u n i t of d i s c o u r s e is the sentence, not the i n d i v i d u a l w o r d Aristotle had begun by c o n s i d e r i n g w o r d s taken separately, and then explained how they can be c o m b i n e d to form a sentence; the S t o i c s keep their e y e s on situations and the sentences that d e s c r i b e them D e t a c h e d parts of a sentence are c a l l e d 'incomplete i e k t a ' , X E K T C L E X X i n f j ; though here admittedly there is a danger of c o n f u s i n g the w o r d s w i t h the meaning w h i c h they express. T h e theory of X E K T d being immaterial is bound to raise problems about the effects they produce. T h e o f f i c i a l S t o i c v i e w i s that c a u s e and e f f e c t are i n t e r a c t i o n s of material things, B u t i f w e act on a command, w e are responding, not to the sounds as s u c h , but to the meaning w h i c h they c o n v e y , the immaterial X E K T 6 u .. T h e r e i s an a l t e r n a t i v e S t o i c treatment of c a u s a t i o n w h i c h m i g h t p r o v i d e the a n s w e r ; i f wood is burnt by f i r e , it i s sometimes argued that both the 308
c a u s e and thing affected are material, but the effect i t s e l f is not; the burning of the wood i s a K a T T y y 6 p F | p a , a stateable fact, and as such immaterial ( S V F 2.341), P e r h a p s , then, an immaterial f a c t o f this k i n d c o u l d be p r o d u c e d b y an immaterial X E K T D U B u t I think there i s a deep-rooted c o n f u s i o n at this p o i n t A changing substance is still a substance; for that matter, burning wood does not immediately cease to be w o o d . A n d i f w e speak of a f i r e , we are n a m i n g this p r o c e s s ; our w o r d s denote a s u b s t a n c e undergoing change, rather than simply expressing the stateable fact that it occurs, O n e c a n p i c k u p a f i r e i n a shovel: I do not see how one c a n shovel up a fact, D e s p i t e a l l s u c h e m b a r r a s s m e n t s , it i s c l e a r that the S t o i c s have e s c a p e d f r o m the n a r r o w h o r i z o n of t r y i n g to e x p l a i n language s i m p l y by a c c o u n t i n g for n a m e s ; they are c o n c e r n e d w i t h situations and events, and are at least trying to distinguish these f r o m the sentences w h i c h describe them. (8) A fortiori, they see the same i n d i v i d u a l c a n be referred to i n different w a y s , ( 9 ) a n d thus either by g i v i n g his name Q U O pet, or by borrowing what is normally a descriptive term, a npoariyopta. I f A l e x a n d e r is k i n g , it makes no difference whether w e say ' A l e x a n d e r i s brave' or 'the k i n g is brave'; but it does not f o l l o w from this that 'king' s i m p l y m e a n s the same as 'Alexander'; for 'the king of Persia' i s a meaningful phrase; 'the A l e x a n d e r of P e r s i a ' is not (
4, I think, then, that it i s probably the S t o i c s who c l a r i f i e d the meaning of a term w h i c h plays an important part i n the controversy aroused by Eunomius, namely the noun E TT C U 0 L a , T h e facts about this w o r d are not very e a s y to d i s c o v e r , partly b e c a u s e the only a v a i l a b l e m o n o g r a p h , the little treatise p u b l i s h e d by A n t o n i o O r b e in 1 9 5 5 , p a y s no attention to pre-Christian authors.. I n popular usage E T U U O L C X seems to have had the fairly ill-defined meaning of a thought or notion; it can also refer to a project, and it i s worth noting that its one occurrence i n the N e w T e s t a m e n t , at A c t s 8:22, refers s p e c i f i c a l l y to the w i c k e d project entertained by S i m o n Magus. In s o m e c o n t e x t s it r e f e r s to the e x e r c i z e of i m a g i n a t i o n , though this m a y be c o n t r o l l e d by the intellect, and thus enable us to a r r i v e at notions for w h i c h sensory
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e x p e r i e n c e provides the material, though it i s not properly speaking the c a u s e of our thinking. T h e k e y passage here, given by von A r n i m , S V F 2.87, is Diogenes Laertius 7.52. T h e same material i s used w i t h p o l e m i c a l intention by S e x t u s Empiricus adv.math. 8.56, and it s e e m s that E u n o m i u s independently drew on D i o g e n e s , though his p o l e m i c a l aims are rather different from those of S e x t u s ; see G r e g o r y of N y s s a c . E u n . 2.179,. Diogenes tells us that our conceptions, T d u o o t i u e u c c , are based either on experience, nEplrrTLocnc;, or on m e n t a l o p e r a t i o n s , w h i c h he e n u m e r a t e s , a n d w h i c h mostly i n v o l v e easily intelligible modifications of experience: l i k e n e s s , analogy, transposition, composition, opposition; thus by analogy w e imagine giants and d w a r f s ; again, death is c o n c e i v e d as the opposite of l i f e (though w h y ? , one might ask; w e can have a direct encounter with death). B u t w e are then told that some things are conceived K a r a pET&Pacuu T i u a , such as XEKTd and r 6 r r o e , ; these w e note belong to the four phenomena w h i c h the S t o i c s describe as incorporeal, arid therefore as not fully real ( S V F 2 331). B u t they are not m e r e i m a g i n a r y f o r m s l i k e centaurs or giants (ibid 3 3 2 ) ; they depend upon a sophisticated process of generalization and abstraction. It appears from Sextus that the phrase r d KaT'ETTLUoiau uooupeua stands for the products of any such process, whether naive or sophisticated, as opposed to what i s k n o w n from e x p e r i e n c e , T O K a r a TTEpLTTTcoo"L U £ y u c o O | J i u o u ; for Sextus is concerned to make the f a i r l y s i m p l e point that both our conceptions and our f a n c i f u l imaginations depend on sense-experience., E u n o m i u s however wants to suggest that things qualified as K a r ' e T T L U D i a u are purely fanciful; he mentions only giants, d w a r f s , many-headed monsters and half-beasts T h i s a c c o r d s w i t h the popular meaning of £ TT i u o i a , but not w i t h its technical usage, as w e can see once again from Sextus 10.7, SVF 2,501; he tells us that if w e imagine all (real) objects abolished, the space w h i c h contains them w i l l still r e m a i n : Kdu K a T ' E T T L U o i a u 6e d n a u r a d u E X c o p E U 6 rorroc; OUK d u a i pEBfjaE r a t EU & fju Td rrduTa dXX'iJTTOjJEUEi ( U T T O U E U E T?). T h i s no doubt postulates an exercise of the imagination; but it is not idle or poetic fancy, but rather a d i s c i p l i n e d thought-experiment.
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reference which
we
have ascribed to the Stoics becomes fairly c l e a r in a much discussed passage of Posidonius, fr„ 92 E d e l s t e i n = D i e l s D G 458; here it i s said that ouaCa and uX.n, are identical K a r a TfjU U T T O C T T a a L U and differ E T T L U O i a pouou, I think this must mean that the r e f e r e n c e of the terms o u a i a and uX,T] is identical; they differ in sense, or i n the description they convey, W e learn from fr.. 9 2 that O U C H a can mean existence as a w h o l e , w h i c h neither i n c r e a s e s nor d i m i n i s h e s , but merely suffers change; while fr. 5, if reliable, indicates that Posidonius thought of uAn, as the passive drrOLoc; ouaCa, distinguishable f r o m the a c t i v e p r i n c i p l e w i t h i n it,. T h e argument, then, is that one and the same reality is c a l l e d O U C H a in that it exists, and uX F] in that it is liable to change.
5,. W e may now turn to P h i l o , who accepts the principle that one and the same thing c a n have various E T T i u o i a L , , and indeed gives it a theological application T h e w o r d itself i s by no means infrequent; L i e t z m a n n ' s i n d e x notes 26 instances, and there are others, less easy to trace, in the Q u a e s t i o n e s In Philo's usage it very seldom refers to mere fantasy, l i k e the invention of centaurs; there i s j u s t one possible e x a m p l e , at Migr. 1 9 2 ; God's m i n d r e a l l y does pervade the u n i v e r s e , unlike man's, w h i c h can only travel round it i n imagination, ÉTTLUOÍa póuou. B y far the commonest meaning is a project, or the means c h o s e n to attain it, a n d not infrequently a w i c k e d project, l i k e that of the tower-builders of B a b e l , C o n f u s . 158, S o m n . 2 , 2 8 5 ; but s o m e t i m e s an admirable human s k i l l , l i k e that of the ship-builder, S p e c . L e g . 1.335 S o m e t i m e s ¿ T T L U O L a denotes theoretical knowledge; it can refer to o r g a n i z e d r e s e a r c h , S o m n . 1.39, or again to the knowledge of m e d i c i n e , E x s e c r . 145. T h i s leaves three contexts to be considered, of w h i c h by far the most important is H e r e s 23. Here P h i l o explains that G o d , as indicated by ó a ' Í T L O c ; , has two appelations (TTpoapu,aEL.t;), namely B E o c a n d KÚpiOC;: but i n the text under d i s c u s s i o n , Gen.. 15:2, the w o r d ÓEanórrjC; is used; and KÚpioc; a n d Ó E o r r ó r n c ; are said to be synonymous P h i l o then continues: d X X ' E L , TD ÚTFOKELUEUOU EU K a l rauTóu Éartu, ÉmuoCaic; ai KXf)0"ELCj ÓLatpÉpoucn the two titles differ i n their descriptive f o r c e , K Ú p i o c; s i g n i f y i n g f i r m n e s s or v a l i d i t y ( K Ü p o c ; ) and ÓEcnÓTrjC, implying a bond, Ó E a p ó c ; , which
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again suggests 6 E O C ; , fear T h e picture i s complicated, and w e should not assume that the two terms K u p t o q a n d 6 £ a n 6 rr)c; have the same relationship as Beog a n d K u p i o c ; . T h i s latter pair are o f c o u r s e related to the one a n d o n l y G o d , but as P h i l o t e l l s u s e l s e w h e r e they n a m e t w o d i s t i n c t p o w e r s ; whereas K u p i o q a n d £i£o"Tr6Tnt; are alternative titles for o n e of these p o w e r s , and it i s this that i s indicated b y saying T O UTTOKEIUEUOU E"u K C C I T C X U T O U £0~TLU.. H o w e v e r at Q u . E x . 2 6 3 the w o r d eniuoia seems to m a r k a contrast between the t w o p r i m a r y p o w e r s t h e m s e l v e s , here d e s c r i b e d as 'the c r e a t i v e ' a n d 'the r o y a l ' p o w e r s ; f o r the G r e e k fragment reads: n p E a f j U T E p a 6E f) T r o i n T i K f ] rf\q f j a a t X i K f j g Kar'¿TTCuoL.au ( A s a rough p a r a l l e l , w e might imagine a n E n g l i s h aristocrat w h o has inherited o r obtained t w o distinct titles, one of them more d i g n i f i e d or actually more ancient than the other, though o f course there i s no difference i n the age of the m a n h i m s e l f ) . T h i r d l y , at S p e q . L e g . 2.29 w e are told that 6 r f | c ; ( p u a E c o c ; opBoc. Xdyoc, has the function both of a father and o f a husband, T T C X T p b c ; 6po\J K C U au6p6cj E " X 6 v j u a u L U , EmuoCaic; fciatpopoic;, i n that he both i m p l a n t s the seeds o f v i r t u e i n the s o u l a n d procreates g o o d designs and a c t i o n s , w h i c h h e subsequently nourishes w i t h refreshing doctrines, T T O r C f J O i C, 66yp:acuu, T h e language i s largely S t o i c , e s p e c i a l l y the phrase 6 opBbr; Xoyoc;: the sequence 6 Tf|Cj t p u a E o o c ; 6pB6c; Xbyoc, i s repeated at O p i f . 1 4 3 , w h i c h m a k e s the c o n v e n t i o n a l S t o i c comparison of the c o s m o s with a well-governed c i t y ; a n d the S t o i c s of c o u r s e d e s c r i b e d the L o g o s a s a n E p u a r i K O C ; , though I have not so far d i s c o v e r e d parallels to P h i l o ' s v i v i d i m a g e s of its intercourse w i t h the i n d i v i d u a l soul Plutarch also quotes from C h r y s i p p u s a reference to b KOLU6C; rfjr; ipuaeojc; Xoyoc;, w h i c h i s identified with E i p a p i J E u r i a n d T T p b u o i a a n d Z e u s ( S V F 2 . 9 3 7 ) ; no doubt the theory of ETTLUOICLL w i l l have been employed in making these equations. E I
A t a l l events, P h i l o c l e a r l y understands that one and the same reality c a n be r e f e r r e d to by alternative designations w h i c h d e s c r i b e its a c t i v i t y under different a s p e c t s o r by different metaphors
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6, O u r account s o far m a y have suggested a continuous p r o c e s s of improvement and c l a r i f i c a t i o n i n terminology; but f r o m about P h i l o ' s time o n w a r d s w e have to r e c o g n i z e an i n f l u e n c e w h i c h c o n t i n u a l l y threatens to o b s c u r e the results so laboriously a c h i e v e d ; I refer to the influence of c l a s s i c i s m , the v i e w that a l l i m p o r t a n t k n o w l e d g e and understanding had already been d i s c o v e r e d by the ancients, a n d the further disposition to select among ancient authors o n the s c o r e of literary merit T h e C r a t y l u s o f Plato and the C a t e g o r i e s and De I n t e r p r e t a t i o n e o f Aristotle now c o m e to b e regarded as standard authorities; A r i s t o t l e ' s T o p i c s a l s o gains more influence than it deserves. T h u s the important progress made by the S t o i c s i n understanding the w a y i n w h i c h language is significant tends to b e o v e r s h a d o w e d b y a return to the old p r o b l e m , do names acquire their m e a n i n g b y nature o r by convention? W h a t w e c o m m o n l y find i s a compromise theory, that names are indeed to be traced to an original name-giver, but that h e s e l e c t e d the n a m e s that had a natural appropriateness to their objects, B u t here the argument all too often stops short, w i t h o u t attempting to enquire what m a k e s n a m e s n a t u r a l l y appropriate P h i l o thus argues that M o s e s d i d better than the G r e e k s in attributing the origin of l a n g u a g e , n o t s i m p l y to w i s e m e n , but to the f i r s t man created; ( 1 0 ) 'for i f many persons h a d a s s i g n e d things their names, these would have been inconsequent and illm a t c h e d , ,.. w h e r e a s n a m i n g b y o n e m a n w a s l i k e l y to h a r m o n i z e w i t h the r e a l i t y , a n d this w o u l d b e a consistent s y m b o l f o r a l l m e n of the fact or the thing signified', r o G Tuyxduouror; f\ T O O a i y i j a i u o u E U O i J , the phrases which w e have already seen in u s e among the Stoics,,
7, T o this theory of the g i v i n g of names there i s of course one major exception, the name of G o d himself, i f it i s right to c a l l it a n a m e T h i s , it i s c l e a r , c a n only be known because G o d h i m s e l f h a s r e v e a l e d i t , B u t w h a t e x a c t l y h a s he r e v e a l e d ? P h i l o ' s difficulty i s obvious, O n the one h a n d , he k n o w s that G o d h a s a n a m e w h i c h must n o t be s p o k e n , 'except by those w h o s e tongue i s purified by w i s d o m i n the holy place', V i t . M o s . 2 114, and that this name i s signified by four H e b r e w characters; he most probably d i d not k n o w how these s h o u l d be pronounced, (11) O n the other h a n d , in
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Philo's G r e e k B i b l e , Moses asks G o d for his name, and is given the reply "EyoJ eCpi ó oóu (Ex„ 3:14); though an alternative is immediately suggested: T h e L o r d G o d of your fathers, the G o d of A b r a h a m this is my name for ever'. W e cannot say that ó 'Qu functions for Philo as a proper name; indeed he says explicitly that God has no need of a name ( A b r . 5 1 ) ; but he c l e a r l y regards it as a uniquely appropriate and revealing title. L e t us note that a l l other appelations w h i c h w e find applied to G o d are in one p l a c e or another referred by P h i l o not to G o d himself, but to one of his ó u u d \i E I e,. T h i s is certainly true of the titles B E Ó C , , KÚpioc;, Fjacn A E Ü C ; , noLf|Tr|c;( ó r | | J i o u p y ó t ; apxwu EUEpyÉTTiq, and I think o f d p x i l B u t the phrase ó ' Q u is never identified w i t h a ó ú u a p t c ; ; it has óuuá|_JEi.c; assigned to it. W e must not enlarge on Philo's theory of God's óuudpEic;, w h i c h has often been described; in his v i e w , G o d i s perfectly simple, but has m a n y ÓuudpEic;; the intellectual apparatus for this doctrine is d r a w n f r o m the G r e e k debate as to w h e t h e r w e c a n consistently describe the s o u l , or the m i n d , as s i m p l e , and also as having parts; i e , can w e harmonize the P h a e d o with the R e p u b l i c ? A commonly-accepted v i e w was that the soul i s s i m p l e , but has v a r i o u s functions, w h i c h can be described as 6 u u d U E l C ; , or again as i n later C h r i s t i a n theology, as EUEpYElCU. P h i l o can therefore be said to anticipate E u n o m i u s i n one respect, namely that he selects one title as uniquely appropriate and indicative of G o d ' s nature., I n other respects he is of course poles apart.. A l t h o u g h he comments on this title, he also explains that God is 'unnameable and indescribable and incomprehensible',. It is presumably because ó f¿u is a completely general expression that he d e s c r i b e s G o d h i m s e l f - as d i s t i n c t f r o m h i s L o g o s - as 'supremely g e n e r a l ' , yEUiKCura roc;, and so comparable with the w o r d r i , w h i c h for the S t o i c s included things that were not even real ( L e g . A l l . 2,86),. P h i l o ' s language, h o w e v e r , is c o n t r o l l e d by the m e t a p h y s i c s o f the P l a t o n i s t s , for w h o m 'being' i s a v a l u e term, and distinct varieties of being arise by some form of limitation OT q u a l i f i c a t i o n , rather as w e now r e a l i z e that c o l o u r s are d e r i v e d f r o m plain white light We therefore h a v e the p a r a d o x that the p u r e l y abstract and u n i n f o r m a t i v e term i s c o n s i d e r e d appropriate to denote the
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i n e x h a u s t i b l e r i c h e s o f the s u p r e m e r e a l i t y , of w h i c h all beauty a n d p e r f e c t i o n that w e c a n o b s e r v e is o n l y a derivative of inferior rank There i s of course one further question to be raised here. P h i l o refers to the supreme being both as 6 cbu and as T O 6u - he w i l l not unfortunately delight those friends of ours w h o think he should have u s e d the designation f| cOca! A r e w e to say that the notion of pure B e i n g is i n some way qualified by the e x p r e s s i o n 6 cou, w h e r e the m a s c u l i n e gender imports s o m e s u g g e s t i o n o f m a l e , and therefore personal, b e i n g , w h i c h is appropriate w h e n w e read of G o d s p e a k i n g , and therefore r e v e a l i n g h i m s e l f to m a n ? O r s h a l l we say that it merely neutralizes the opposite suggestion of i m p e r s o n a l , and so p o s s i b l y sub-personal, b e i n g , w h i c h is encouraged by T O O U , and perhaps also affects the u s e of phrases l i k e T O B E L O U as opposed to 6 8E6C;? I do not know h o w to a n s w e r this question.. I s l i g h t l y p r e f e r the first alternative. I n G r e e k usage, of course, it is by no means true that the m a s c u l i n e gender applies only to h um an males, and the neuter only to inanimate objects; nevertheless the use of the neuter to denote males i s a little unusual; men's names are u s u a l l y m a s c u l i n e in f o r m ; the neuter being u s e d not uncommonly for women's names, and of course for diminutives.
H a v i n g dealt as best I can with Philo's usage, I w o u l d like to continue by tracing the use of the w o r d E T T C U O L c t d o w n to the Fourth Century. B u t time does not allow this; and I must offer some general comments on the logic of nomenclature B u t there i s one passage w h i c h i s important e n o u g h to d e s e r v e mention even in the briefest sketch o f the patristic e v i d e n c e , namely O r i g e n C o m m . J o . 1,20,119, 6 GEOQ pEU
ouu TTaurri E U E O * T I KCXL dnAouu; 6 6E aoorf|p t\[i(ov 6 i d Td noXA.d, E T T E I T T P O E B E T O a u r a u 6 FJEOC; iA.aarfipi.au K a t a n a p x ^ ndarjc; Tfjq KTICTEIJOC;, rroAAd ytUErat K T X . I n the event, of course, it proves that the L o g o s has several distinct r o l e s , for w h i c h O r i g e n uses the term ETTI uot a t , quite apart from the various good o f f i c e s w h i c h he undertakes for the s a l v a t i o n of m e n ; a suggested l i s t is aotpCa, Aoyoc;, scof) and perhaps d A f | B E i a . T h e strong declaration that G o d himself, 6 B E O Q ,
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is t o t a l l y one and s i m p l e m a y p e r h a p s h a v e h e l p e d to c o n v i n c e E u n o m i u s that only one d e s i g n a t i o n for h i m is a l l o w a b l e B u t this of course i s not Origen's v i e w ; he argues that one and the same being is ô r j U L o u p y ô ç and B E O Ç and TT a f f] p , both of C h r i s t and of o u r s e l v e s , and is at least prepared to c o n s i d e r the argument that the titles TT a T f j p and B E O Ç indicate distinct £ T T i U O I a t : C o m m . J o . 19,5 i n i f W e m a y note that i n his use of E T U U O L C X Eusebius conforms fairly closely to Origen f E . T . 2,10.6, 14.22), and A r i u s appears to do so too (Ath. s y n . 1 5 ) ; w h e r e a s A t h a n a s i u s r e p l i e s by t r e a t i n g ÈTTLUOia as a w o r d r e s e r v e d for mere f a n c i e s or fabrications, and to this e x t e n t p r e p a r e s the w a y for Eunomius
8.. I return at last, then, to my ostensible subject, ' L o g i c and the application of names to God', W h a t are w e to understand by the w o r d 'names'? I n the broadest sense ouopcx c a n be e q u i v a l e n t to our w o r d 'noun', and thus i n c l u d e common nouns or d e s c r i p t i v e terms, m o r e accurately d i s t i n g u i s h e d by the w o r d s rrpQOT|YOpi.ai, and npoapfjaEic;.. F r o m these we can distinguish proper nouns or proper names; but w e note at the outset that these are not n e c e s s a r i l y p e r s o n a l names; there are names of countries, l i k e S i c i l y , and of mountains, like E t n a . Indeed in some w a y s these are less problematic; it m a y w e l l be that the island of S i c i l y is the only country to w h i c h this name is attached; w h e r e a s i n h u m a n s o c i t i e s a p e r s o n a l n a m e c a n o n l y p i c k out its o w n e r w i t h i n his immediate c i r c l e ; there are s i m p l y not e n o u g h n a m e s in existence to give e a c h i n d i v i d u a l i n the w o r l d a name of his own.. B u t in discussing personal names w e c o m m o n l y keep up the fiction that someone's name r e a l l y is a proper name in the sense of being peculiar to him A n d we have to recognize another f i c t i o n e n c o u r a g e d by the G r e e k p h r a s e K upt ou 0 U O |J ex, namely that a person's name in some w a y not only denotes that one i n d i v i d u a l , but c o r r e c t l y d e s c r i b e s h i m This is a state of affairs w h i c h w e s h o u l d f i n d it v e r y difficult to bring about, e v e n if w e tried to do s o , w h e r e n a m e s are normally a s s i g n e d to i n d i v i d u a l s b e f o r e their c h a r a c t e r developes W e c o u l d I think i m a g i n e p r o v i d i n g somebody with a n i c k n a m e w h i c h r e a l l y w a s p e c u l i a r to h i m and was also significant to the extent of alluding to some outstanding
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feature of his appearance or h i s character Fictional c h a r a c t e r s , o f c o u r s e , do h a v e n a m e s w h i c h are significant and p o s s i b l y unique; M e d u s a , the c u n n i n g o n e , Prometheus, the forward-looking; and returning to r e a l l i f e , of c o u r s e it c o u l d have been the case that Xenophon's friend Cheirisophus really was c l e v e r with his hands, or e v e n r e c e i v e d this name as a s o b r i q u e t w h e n his s k i l l w a s d i s c o v e r e d , W h a t is i m p o s s i b l e i n the c a s e of h u m a n b e i n g s o r i s l a n d s or mountains i s to p r o v i d e a name f r o m w h i c h a l l their c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s c a n be d e d u c e d , as w e m i g h t c l a i m for g e o m e t r i c a l figures l i k e the triangle; but a n c i e n t theorists, under Plato's i n f l u e n c e , are often haunted by the ghost of this possibility, I n p r i m i t i v e s o c i e t i e s it seems that no e m b a r r a s s m e n t was felt i n designating gods by p e r s o n a l n a m e s T h e early I s r a e l i t e s n a m e d their o w n G o d J a h w e h , a n d w e r e quite prepared to acknowledge Chemosh as the god of the A m m o n i t e s and therefore no c o n c e r n of theirs.. It w o u l d need an O l d Testament specialist to tell us precisely w h y the name J a h w e h c a m e to be regarded as too sacred to pronounce A tentative answer might be that the w o r s h i p p e r s of J a h w e h w e r e c o n c e r n e d that he s h o u l d be p r o p e r l y h o n o u r e d , i,e. concerned about his 'name' i n the sense of his reputation, and i n d e e d attributed a s i m i l a r c o n c e r n to J a h w e h h i m s e l f ; so that the phrase 'his name' c a m e to indicate his real character, a n d . a l s o to be u s e d as a r e v e r e n t i a l e x p r e s s i o n for the d i v i n i t y . B u t there m a y w e l l be a different explanation for the avoidance of the actual name 'Jahweh', as opposed to the d e s c r i p t i v e e x p r e s s i o n 'his name'; for w e n o r m a l l y apply n a m e s to f a m i l i a r things l i k e p e r s o n s a n d places,. T h e Israelites m a y w e l l have felt that to provide the G o d of all the u n i v e r s e with a name w a s to assimilate h i m to the cultic gods of the heathen. More g e n e r a l l y , w e might suppose that it is normally the function of a personal name to pick out an i n d i v i d u a l w i t h i n a c l a s s of similar beings; i n this c a s e , to apply a personal name to G o d would be to suggest that he is not unique. T h i s w o u l d go some w a y to e x p l a i n the special appeal of a distinctively mysterious phrase l i k e 'I am' or 'He W h o Is'.
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9. B u t w e need to come back to E u n o m i u s ; for it is clear that the c o n t r o v e r s y w h i c h he p r o m p t e d d o e s not turn on p e r s o n a l n a m e s ; the q u e s t i o n at i s s u e i s r a t h e r , whether there i s some one descriptive term for G o d w h i c h e n j o y s a p r i v i l e g e d status E u n o m i u s made this c l a i m for the w o r d d y e u u r } T O t ; . . H i s argument, I think, must be that G o d i s p e r f e c t l y s i m p l e as r e g a r d s his e s s e n c e , though he has v a r i o u s operations, p o w e r s , and energies,, H e c a n therefore h a v e o n l y one proper d e s i g n a t i o n ; i f more than one term w e r e applied to h i s e s s e n t i a l nature, this w o u l d i n e v i t a b l y i m p l y that there were distinguishable aspects o f h i s essence named by the different terms, so that it w o u l d be no longer simple I find this argument u n c o n v i n c i n g ; and I think it can be a n s w e r e d e v e n without appealing to B a s i l ' s theory of ETTLUOLCtt ; for it s e e m s to i m p l y that the actual w o r d dyEUUF|TOC; is indispensable. W o u l d E u n o m i u s then insist that no L a t i n or P e r s i a n speaker c a n hold correct theological v i e w s ? B u t ifdy£Uur|TOc; can be translated, w h y should one r e f u s e to admit that it can be r e p l a c e d i n G r e e k by a s y n o n y m w h i c h ' i s e q u a l l y c a p a b l e of r e p r e s e n t i n g G o d ' s perfectly simply essential nature? It may be answered, p e r h a p s , that there is no p e r f e c t l y adequate s y n o n y m ; but then, c l e a r l y , there i s no p e r f e c t l y adequate translation either E u n o m i u s therefore has to c h o o s e ; either he must insist that G r e e k i s the only language i n w h i c h theology can be a c c e p t a b l y stated, or he m u s t admit that roughly s y n o n y m o u s e x p r e s s i o n s may be admitted, w i t h a l l the risk of a variation o f nuance w h i c h w o u l d c o m p r o m i s e the divine simplicity., T h e word ex p X M. . f ° instance, might be suggested as an appropriate s y n o n y m r
E u n o m i u s c o u l d a n s w e r , of c o u r s e , that d p x u. w i l l not do, since it has a wide range of applications; whereas, i n his o w n time and m i l i e u at l e a s t , it c o u l d be argued that d y E u u r y r o c ; - spelt with u u - w a s only used in connection with the divinity A n d its compound, negative f o r m does give it a certain advantage o v e r other d e s c r i p t i v e terms,, If w e take a word s u c h as TT O I T\ T f j c;, it could be argued that w e only l e a r n the use of this w o r d by meeting it in ordinary contexts, and that therefore it must have associations w h i c h render it unfit for describing the unique source of all life and being B u t this argument ignores the f l e x i b i l i t y w h i c h our
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language d i s p l a y s , and the extent to w h i c h it i s affected by its context What i s normally a descriptive term, 'the X ' , can often be understood a s 'the X to w h i c h it is proper to refer in this context'; w i t h i n a f a m i l y , for instance, the word 'Father' quite properly means 'the father of this family', without any sense of a conflict with its use as a common noun. A more sophisticated variant of this is the case where 'the X ' denotes some i n d i v i d u a l K a T ' E ^ O X n > Aquinas refers to Aristotle, c a l l i n g h i m p h i l o s o p h u s . 'the philosopher',, T h i s logic governs our use of the word 'God'; w e learn the use of the word partly by learning what c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s v a r i o u s societies a s c r i b e to their gods; at a later stage we refine our conception, and also understand that the being w h o fulfils our specification must be unique, 'I b e l i e v e i n one G o d ' , w e then s a y , thereby excluding the conceptual possibility of a plurality of gods, It may still be true, h o w e v e r , that this e x c l u d e d possibility has played a part i n our coming to understand the word 'God', u
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10 E u n o m i u s , I think, makes two distinguishable errors. T h e first is to say that only one term i s properly applicable to G o d , as signifying his essence, T h e second is to suggest that this term d y E U U T y r o c ; , is proper i n the sense of g i v i n g a complete specification of what is c o m p r i s e d i n the being of God, T h i s latter point is so generally condemned that I shall not enlarge on it T h e former point has rather more basis in tradition; thus P h i l o maintains that the phrase 6 ' O u i s not really a name, since there is no name at all w h i c h properly applies to G o d - O U 6 E U ouopcx TO r r a p d r r a u ETTEpoO KUpLOXoyELTCXl t j j pOUQJ TTp6aEO"TL T O E l U C t l , . But P h i l o does not develope this last phrase; on the contrary, as w e have seen, he pictures G o d as r e v e a l i n g a name to men, and also as e x e r c i z i n g a variety of functions, 6 U U d p E l c;, in virtue of w h i c h w e may use names l i k e K u p i o c ; and B E or;, Unfortunately these powers often appear to detach themselves as autonomous beings l i k e the angels, who are at least theoretically able to escape from G o d ' s control, l i k e the A e o n s of the G n o s t i c s A t this point a better picture is already outlined by Justin f A p o l . 2,6,2): 'the Father of a l l has no given name, being ingenerate', s i n c e , he adds rather n a i v e l y , this w o u l d imply some more senior divinity who g a v e him s u c h a name; 'but " F a t h e r " and " G o d " and " C r e a t o r " and " L o r d " and " M a s t e r " are not n a m e s , but appellations ( T T p o a p f i C T E L C ; )
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assumption,
namely of
his
being
can
this
tradition. it
uneasy
can
and
Gregory
this
respect I
with
with
regard a
intelligible,
let
the
alone
enormously
P o s s i b l y the
should
plurality
of construing this
to
Eunomius,
exercize
way But
set a s i d e
must end by c o n f e s s i n g , o m n i a
in
share
see no
make
Basil and
nature
not
be
answerable,
exeunt
in
rnysterinm
of
Divine simplicity as a problem for orthodoxy
and
' I h e e v o l u t i o n o f o r t h o d o x y ' m i g h t easily b e u n d e r s t o o d as a process which
belongs
w h o l l y t o the past:
doctrine, o n which
the development
Henry Chadwick
of Christian
has shed s u c h a g r a c e f u l a n d
p e n e t r a t i n g l i g h t , w o u l d t h e n be c o n t r a s t e d w i t h a c o m p l e t e a n d stable 1
Plato himself
later c o i r e c t e d the f a l l a c y ; see T h e a e t e t u s
c o n s t r u c t i o n i n w h i c h C h r i s t i a n i t y has c o m e t o rest. B u t t o c a l l i t
203.
c o m p l e t e a n d stable n e e d n o t m e a n t h a t f u r t h e r p r o g r e s s is e x c l u d e d ; at
2 . S V F 2 146, = Origen C e l s . 1.24; c f . 2 895
t h e v e r y least, n e w challenges are l i k e l y t o arise, a n d o l d t r u t h s w i l l need
3
S Y E 2 151,
4
S V F 2,166; and for X E K T C X
fin.
The
differently
t o be re-stated A n d m o s t o f o u r g e n e r a t i o n , a n d o f o u r j u n i o r s , w i l l t h i n k
same by
threefold
Origen,
5
r d
distinction
Philocalia
(pooufj, d f i L i a i u o L J E u a , KEturai
« n p a y p a
expressed
rather
4; here the terms u s e d are
and
ar||jaıuüLJEua
is
r a , 3 Diog,, 2 0 ad
n p d y u a r a
KaB'&u
; cf, also S V F 2.168,
Ep
7
Cf
8
Cf.SVE
p r o c e s s , i n w h i c h established p o s i t i o n s n e e d t o be c l a r i f i e d a n d some
117 (not in S V F V . but cf. 2.132. S V F 2.167 with the misleading
QxdL
handbook
2.171
beginners
148, L e g . A I l . 2.14 f , M u t . N o m . 6 3 f ; contrast,
11 Cf. V i t . M o s . 115 init: T E T p a y p d p u a r o u ö
BeoXöyoç
a n d better
F r o m such a s t a n d p o i n t o n e can t u r n w i t h a r u e f u l a d m i r a t i o n t o a
168,
h o w e v e r , V i t . M o s . 1.130, D e c a l . 23 cprıaıu
static. I f o r o n e w o u l d c e r t a i n l y w i s h t o see its e v o l u t i o n as a c o n t i n u i n g
a r t i c u l a t e d consensus o f b e l i e f m a y be a t t a i n e d
9. S Y E 2.151. 10
far t o o t a m e : i n t h e i r eyes, o n l y a n o b s t i n a t e a n d
s e c l u d e d m i n d w i l l p e r s i s t i n d e f e n d i n g a n o r t h o d o x y t h a t is p u r e l y
false steps r e t r a c t e d , i n t h e f a i t h t h a t a b e t t e r g r o u n d e d
S Y E 2.166, 170, 331,
6
this p r o g r a m m e
EÎuaı.
6e
rouuoLJd
which
has g i v e n
invaluable
i n t h e o l o g y , t h e Entbiridion
service t o a succession Patrtiticum
of
o f M J R o u e t de
J o u r n e l , c o m p l e t e d i n 191 r a n d a p p e a r i n g i n its t w e n t y - f o u r t h e d i t i o n i n 1969
T h e l e a r n e d a u t h o r has c o l l e c t e d o v e r 2,400 b r i e f passages f r o m
t h e F a t h e r s , a n d offers a g u i d e t o h i s s e l e c t i o n i n a n ' I n d e x A n a l y t i c u s ' , a r r a n g e d so as t o s u g g e s t t h a t t h e F a t h e r s p r o s p e c t i v e l y u p h o l d the e n t i r e s t r u c t u r e o f m o d e r n c a t h o l i c o r t h o d o x y as d e f i n e d i n t h e t r a d i t i o n o f St T h o m a s simpluissimus,
Aquinas tta ut nullum
A s a r t i c l e 97, w e find t h e h e a d i n g omnino admittat
cited include TeituUian, Athanasius,
compontionem.
Deus eit
The authorities
Basil, G r e g o r y o f Nyssa,
John
C h r y s o s t o m , A m b r o s e , A u g u s t i n e a n d C y r i l : and m o s t o f t h e m , i t must be s a i d , a r e c o n s o n a n t w i t h t h e a u t h o r ' s f o r m u l a t i o n a n d seem t o have no
reservations
about
the black-and-white
c o m p o s i t e , o n w h i c h i t is based.
320
antithesis,
simple
or
XXI
XXI Divine simplicity as a problem for orthodoxy
I shall submit that this is an over-simplification: we must not t h i n k that simplicity is itself a simple notion B u t h o w eise can one explain the fact that the theme of divine simplicity has been so little discussed ? I t figures, no doubt, i n text-books of dogmatic theology: but I cannot discover that much detailed attention has been given to the actual usage of the key words baplous and haplofës or to their Latin equivalents. The entry i n H . J Sieben's Voces makes it appear that simplicity has been examined only i n its guise as a moral virtue, i n w h i c h a modest disposition is expressed i n t r u t h f u l unaffected language and unassuming reliability of conduct. The article ' E i n f a l t ' i n the Realiexikon für Antike und Christentum surveys much the same ground Nevertheless there are some unexpected features i n the philosophical use o f the words for simplicity, and some transitions o f thought w h i c h I believe cannot bear the weight that has been p u t upon them
construction which Gregory omits is the doctrine that G o d is strictly immutable: but this is commonly based on a rather different understanding of 'composite b e i n g ' , in w h i c h change is explained as a rearrangement of the minute particles, atoms or otherwise, of which material things ate composed: thus also they w o u l d come t o an end when their constituents lose their cohesion and are absorbed i n t o the surrounding matter Conversely, if G o d is not composed of such particles, he is immune f r o m change. This argument can easily be
We may begin by taking an example of the standard exposition f r o m
The origins of this train o f thought ate clearly pre-Christian, and illustrations can be found i n P h i l o ; but for the moment I w i l l postpone this enquiry, and consider some other, and less rigorous interpretations of simplicity which entered the Christian tradition
Gregory Nazianzen's Second Theological Oration in the Enchiridion)
(Oratio
2 8 ) , 7 (not included
:
For what will you conceive the Deity to be, if you rely on ail methods of reason? A body? How then is he infinite and boundless and formless and intangible and invisible? . For how shall he be an object of worship i f he be circumscribed ? Or how shall he escape being compounded out of elements and resolved into them again, or indeed totally dissolved? For composition is a source of conflict, and conflict of separation, and this again of dissolution ; and dissolution is totally foreign to God and to the first nature So there can be no separation, to exclude dissolution : no conflict, to exclude separation ; no composition, to exclude conflict ; and therefore He is not a body, to exclude composition So the argument is established by going back from the last to the first. The rhetorical and allusive style w h i c h Gregory adopts, while addressing a largely uninstructed congregation, shows that he takes his argument t o be thoroughly established and familiar. The w o r d baplous does not i n fact appear i n this passage, but Gregory makes his point clearly enough by saying that G o d is ' n o t compounded of elements' (ek stoicheidn sugkeistbai) and is immune f r o m composition (suntbesis); composition w o u l d imply conflict (mache). The mention o f conflict suggests that Gregory is using ' elements ' i n the fairly precise sense to indicate the traditional four, earth, air, fire and water, which were thought t o display contrary qualities, h o t and cold, wet and dry : it was a favourite topic o f Christian apologetics t o say that God's wisdom is manifested i n the art w i t h w h i c h he combined potentially discordant elements i n t o an harmonious w o r l d order. One feature o f the traditional 1
256
illustrated (e g. Athanasius Contra gentes 4 1 , De decretis
11);
but i t is not
easy t o see w h y change or dissolution should result f r o m conflict among minute bodies such as atoms: one w o u l d rather t h i n k of a failure to cohere or t o maintain their orderly disposition This may already suggest that the orthodox case is not quite so simple and straightforward as appears at first glance
(1) First of all, a student o f Aristotle cannot read fat w i t h o u t encountering the phrase 'simple bodies', hapla somata. 'Simple' i n this connection means that they do n o t consist of other elements which could exist separately The last four words are important, since the four elements, w h i c h are simple bodies i n this sense, were thought t o result f r o m the imposition of qualities o n formless matter (see e. g Hippolytus, Kefutatio omnium haeresium 1 19 1 for a doxographic account): b u t this is a purely theoretical analysis, as one cannot actually find matter existing w i t h o u t qualities, or vice versa, t o use as ingredients which could actually be combined o r compounded. Further, 'simple bodies' have no structure o r pattern; or more exactly, to say that they are simple makes no stipulations about their location or distribution. I t follows that things which are simple i n this sense need not be indivisible; the element fire, for example, appears i n a multitude of separate places, i n the stars, for instance, and in a modified f o r m i n animal bodies. Arius DkTymus mentions the division o f simple bodies.. 2
W i t h i n the Christian tradition this usage is best illustrated by Tertullian, w h o o f course makes use of stoic teaching o n matter and its qualities The Stoics held that the elements can change one into another ( 5 VT 2 4 1 3 e t c ) , so that none of them is imperishable except the fire f r o m which they originate and t o which they return; while in the short 257
"1
XXI
XXI Divine simplicity as a problem for orthodoxy
run it is admitted that fire itself can be extinguished and ' d i e ' (ibid. 430,
which Christ is anointed (Psalm 4 4 : 8 L X X )
446).
powers and functions are suggested by the composite ointment
The whole process is controlled by ' s p i r i t p n e u m a (ibid
416),
priests
in
Exodus
30:221!
prescribed
(ibid ), sometimes as fire (ibid 4 2 1 - 3 ) or a compound of air and fire
implication is not to be taken seriously, any more than the suggestion
4 3 9 - 4 1 ) ; but i n each case i t functions as the rational directive
that God's w i l l is, so to speak, the matter and substance f r o m w h i c h the
process i n the universe, or G o d (ibid 1045).. G o d , then, is i n some sense
universe is derived. I n Eusebius' view G o d is a unity, monas - indeed he
But
the
physical
surpasses the monad as the source of all creation (ibid. 4.1 5 ) ; and i n a
simple (suneches), but is not unchangeable. These doctrines appear w i t h some variation i n Iertullian's teaching about the soul. He takes i t for granted that the soul is i m m o r t a l ; but i f indissoluble, i t must be indivisible, and therefore simple (singularis simplex,
the
many (muron)
whose status is unclear; it is sometimes identified as a separate element (ibid
for
whereas God's
later w o r k , the Ecclesiastical
Theology (2.14.6) Eusebius insists o n the
absolute simplicity of the divine being
et
De anima 14). But i t is only simple i n a very large and loose sense;
(2)
Iertullian's o p i n i o n that the soul is a simple substance but is also
I e r t u l l i a n immediately notes that i t is commonly divided into ' p a r t s ' ;
subject to change could be endorsed by many thinkers, both Christian
t h o u g h these are more properly called ' faculties' or ' p o w e r s '
and pagan, w h o w o u l d not accept his peculiar doctrine of a corporeal
aulem non tarn partes
14.3)
(huiusmodi
animae habebuntur quam vires et efficaciae et operae, i b i d
soul
I t seems likely, i n fact, that the whole argument about
the
O n the other hand he believes that the soul is corporeal and has
simplicity of G o d begins w i t h a debate about the soul, i n w h i c h Plato
a shape c o n f o r m i n g to that of the body (ibid. 9 ) ; i t is hard to see h o w
played the leading part I n the Phaedo 78a, he draws a distinction between
it can fail to have ' parts' i n the sense o f limbs and other members; and
composite things and those that are uncompounded
if so, i t is ' simple' i n a much weaker sense even than ' simple bodies' like
argues that i t is the former that ate liable t o change, whereas absolute
fire or spirit
Moreover I e r t u l l i a n , while repeating that the soul is
essences, for instance o f beauty or equality, persist unchanging.. B u t the
(22 2), also insists that i t is subject to change ( 2 1 ) ;
sou! is akin to these realities; i t is ' most like the divine and immor tal and
substantia
simplex
(axunthetos),
and
otherwise there could be no possibility of human free w i l l One m i g h t
intellectual and u n i f o r m (monoeides)
compare the stoic doctrines that both G o d and the soul are ' s p i r i t '
(ibid. 80b) The natural inference w o u l d be that the soul can properly be
( 5 I / T 2.1035)
described as simple. O n the other hand, i n the Phaedrus and the
a n
d
t n a t
G o d is subject to change (ibid 1045,
1049!!);
t h o u g h on the latter point I e r t u l l i a n dissents and takes the normal v i e w : only G o d is unchangeable (De anima 21 7 ) ,
and indissoluble and unchanging'
be compared w i t h the ' composite force' (sumphuto(i)
I n other respects, however, I e r t u l l i a n stands apart f r o m the main
Republic
he introduces the well-known theory o f three elements i n the soul: i t can winged
horses
and
their charioteer, w h i c h
dunamei) o f a pair of
represent desire, im-
2 4 6 A ) . Plato is very sparing w i t h
tradition, and I am not clear that the Fathers commonly understood the
pulsiveness and reason (Phaedrus
simplicity of G o d o n the analogy of simple bodies I t m i g h t certainly
technical terms; he does not refer to ' p a r t s ' of the soul, but to 'natures'
have provided an answer to anthropomorphic theories; the idea that
(phuseis)
G o d had man-like limbs and features could be contradicted by p i c t u r i n g
(homophues:
h i m as u n i f o r m l y distributed t h r o u g h the universe, and Augustine tells
discussion by asking whether we learn and lust and rage w i t h three
or ' forms of being' (tide) Republic
w h i c h are not ' identical i n nature'
4 3 9 e , 440c, 441a). H o w e v e r , since he introduces the
us that he came to rest for a time i n a conception of this sort (Confessiones
d i s t i n c t ' t h i n g s ' (trisin ousin, cf trito\t) tint) or w i t h the whole soul - 43 6a
7 1 1-2). Again i t m i g h t seem a natural deduction f r o m the statements
— i t was natural to represent h i m as analysing it into three parts Finally,
that G o d is light, and fire, and spirit (1 John 1:5,
a perplexing passage i n Republic
Deuteronomy 4 : 2 4 ,
John 4 : 2 4 ) ; but i n a well-known passage (De principiis
1.1.4) Origen
10, 61 la-d suggests that the description
of the soul as simple only applies to its ideal condition or ' truest nature'
explains that these words are not to be interpreted i n physical terms, and
(fe(i~) alethestafe(i)
he could probably count on general agreement. Some suggestion of the
chatacteis, i t is t r u l y described as composite, and
'simple bodies' interpretation m i g h t be f o u n d i n Eusebius, w h o argues
compounded (61 i b and c).
(Demonstrate
evangelka
4 15 .16) that God's simple, uncompounded
and
unmixed nature may be symbolized by the simple ' o i l of gladness' w i t h 258
phusei);
i n its actual state, as manifested in disorderly not even
well
Aristotle makes i t clear that i n his day there was a debate as to whether one should refer to ' p a r t s ' of the soul (mere, moria)
or regard i t as 259
XXI
XXI Divine simp/icily as a problem for orthodoxy
undivided but exercising a variety of functions, dunameis. The latter opinion seems to have gained g r o u n d ; at any rate Galen reports that both Aristotle and Posidonius preferred to speak of ' p o w e r s ' in the sou! rather than 'parts '; but arguments about ' p a r t s ' of the soul continued, at least i n the doxographic literature, and are frequent i n P h i l o . Posidonius accepted Plato's threefold analysis and claimed the support of Cleanthes, whereas Chrysippus apparently adopted an intellectualist theory which regarded emotions as judgments and so thought o f all the operations of the soul as proceeding f r o m a single source Posidonius complains that Chrysippus' language is confused, but Tertullian is probably mistaken in saying that he reckoned eight parts in the soul; this was a common Stoic opinion, but not that o f Chrysippus himself 3
4
5
6
7
8
I n the later tradition opinion seems to have veered to the view that is i t correct to speak of ' p o w e r s ' o f the soul rather than ' p a r t s ' ; so I e r t u l l i a n , as noted above: Galen, Alexander of Aphrodisias, Calcidius 223, Porphyry and Severus, in Eusebius, Praeparatio evangelica, 13 17 6, all noted by J H. Waszink ; Iamblichus is inconsistent, but on the whole prefers ' p o w e r s ' . 9
10
Meanwhile i t had become customary to apply the same principle to the d i v i n i t y ; Philo draws a parallel between our m i n d and the divine one (ho huper hemas), explaining that both are w i t h o u t parts and undivided (quit
rerum divinarum
beres?
2 3 4 - 6 ) ; but this apparently applies to
out
m i n d only, as distinct f r o m other 'parts' o f the soul Philo seems to speak of such 'parts' w i t h o u t embarrassment; but his enumeration of these parts can be precisely paralleled i n terms of ' p o w e r s ' , seven lower powers plus the reason (De mutations nominum 110-11). But G o d is a whole in which there are no parts (Deposter itate Caini 3 - 4 , Mut. nom 184); moreover to speak of parts w o u l d suggest the picture o f a G o d in human f o r m , which the scriptures introduce only as a concession to human weakness (De somntis 1 234-6). I t follows that G o d must be seen as operating t h r o u g h his powers 1 1
A similar parallel between G o d and the human m i n d could be drawn by considering not their constitution but their operations I t is a commonplace that the m i n d does not impair its o w n power by expressing itself in words or by making an act of w i l l (so e g Philo, De gigantibus 25). I n the same way Christian theologians could argue that the divine Logos proceeds f r o m the Father w i t h o u t any loss or division, as spoken W o r d or as expressing the Father's w i l l (Justin, Dialogus 61 and 128, Tatian, A d Graecos 5 1, Theophilus, A d Autolycum 2.22 etc.) ' w i t h o u t cutting off any part of the m i n d ' (Origen, De principles 1.2 6). 260
This notion of 'undiminished g i v i n g ' , accepted also by neo-Platonist philosophers, has been much discussed, and probably needs no further illustration F r o m the above reflections it w o u l d seem that there are radical defects in the neat antithesis of simple and compound which is presupposed by Gregory and has been adopted by orthodox Christian theologians. For, i n the first place, an object w h i c h has no parts need not be wholly undifferentiated; i t might have distinguishable features, like the colours of a rainbow, which could not properly be described as parts (whether we think of the colours themselves, or of the coloured areas which merge one into the other) A g a i n , if an object consists o f parts, i t does not f o l l o w that i t is constructed by assembling those parts: a tree has a t r u n k , branches, and twigs, but i t is not brought i n t o being b y taking those parts and p u t t i n g them together, as a house is built by collecting and then assembling bricks, beams and roofing tiles i n the appropriate order. A n d the converse is also probable; i t is not intuitively obvious that physical objects can only perish by the separation of their parts; w h y should not some things simply fade away, like a spark? A g a i n , a tree may die w i t h o u t its branches falling apart f r o m the t t u n k ; this will occur later, i t may be, when b o t h have begun to r o t ; the total dispersal of its constituent atoms w i l l take still longer 12
Where the soul is concerned, i t seems reasonable to use the comparison of a natural organism; and the Stoics may have partly seen this possibility, even though they expressed i t in the rather absurd form (as we w o u l d think) that the universe is a rational a n i m a l ; for they represented the cosmos as an organic whole whose parts reacted one upon another by ' s y m p a t h y ' , and taught that thete is an analogy between the cosmos and man, w h o can be called a 'little universe' or 'microcosm' 13
14
1 5
O n the other hand i t w o u l d seem that a soul which exercises a variety of powers cannot be simple i n any very rigorous sense; for if they are to be powers of the soul, rather than auton6mous agencies that just happen to sympathize w i t h its activities, there must be modifications in the soul w h i c h explain why i t exercises one power rather than another on a given occasion or towards a particular object This w i l l be true, I think, whether the powers are seen as t r u l y intrinsic to the soul or as semi-independent auxiliaries; if such auxiliaries merely go into action on behalf of a rigorously simple soul, the soul itself is not acting.. A n d the same should be true of God, whose action is sometimes seen as delegated to quasi-independent powers or even to angels, w h o can act o n a lower 16
261
XXI
XXI Divine simplicity as a problem for orthodoxy
level (Philo, De opificzo mundi even rebel (Gig. 6.17)
7 4 - 5 ! ) , misunderstand their instructions or
There is of course the alternative of supposing that
To resume: if we now consider a scheme i n v o l v i n g four members, primus,
unicus, simplex,
constans, it w i l l be difficult to resist the claims of
all God's powers are mutually compatible, and that he exercises them all
t w o other candidates, namely bonus and verus, since these constantly figure
perpetually.
A n d this view can be advocated i n impressive terms; G o d
in ancient discussions i n conjunction w i t h the n o t i o n of unity. Plato for
confronts us i n a single undifferentiated blaze of majesty and mercy by
instance argues that a god must be both simple and unchanging, and sees
which we are b o t h humbled and uplifted But this can only be made
i m m u n i t y f r o m change as a sign o f goodness (Rep. 2 380 d-e). Aristotle
17
convincing i f stated as a generality; we have no grounds f o r believing
discusses the relation between unity and t r u t h , w i t h o u t i t seems reaching
that ' G o d opposes the proud but gives grace to the h u m b l e ' ; we have
a final conclusion. O n the one hand he asserts that knowledge implies an
to say that the proud are frustrated because they miss their way to the
identity - at least an identity of f o r m - between the m i n d and its object
goal w h i c h w o u l d truly satisfy them, and, more sadly, that the humble
(De anima 3 5, 430 a 20 etc ) ; on the other hand both truth and falsity
ate uplifted if they can find the confidence to overcome their dejection. The identity of God's attributes and powers cannot be combined w i t h
entail
a composition of thoughts into a unity (ibid. 3 6, 4 3 0 a 2 7 - 8 ) ; o r , w i t h a different emphasis, both t r u t h and falsehood involve a combination of
a genuine doctrine of particular providence
notions (432 a T2).
(3) One reason w h y simplicity is easily misconstrued is that i t is one
relations between the six attributes we have named I n practice, i t would
possible interpretation of the n o t i o n of unity, and is liable to be
I n theory, it w o u l d be an admirable project to consider the logical be an impossibly complex task. A set of six members exhibits 6 x 5 = 30
180-93,
possible combinations, and each of these w o u l d have to be tested i n
I referred to three interpretations of unity w h i c h can be labelled by the
both directions; if a, then b ; but also, i f b, then a B u t what finally puts
catchwords unicus, simplex,
I t m i g h t have been
this project out of court is the fact that several, and possibly all, o f the
to take note of the v i e w ,
attributes in question have been understood and explained i n different
probably Pythagorean in o r i g i n , that the structure o f the universe can
ways by different writers We have been considering simplicity; but this
be explained i n terms o f numbers, and that numbers derive f r o m the
is a minuscule discussion compared w i t h the vast literature devoted to
One, w h i c h is therefore the o r i g i n of all things.
the nature of goodness, and to theories of truth.
influenced by its neighbours I n my book Divine constans (or immutabilis)
helpful to have added a f o u r t h , namely primus,
Substance, pp
W h y ' p r o b a b l y ' Pythagorean? Because Aristotle, our most reliable
I t is possible, however, to say something about the logical links which
witness, represented them as teaching that the One is derivative; see
were thought to connect simplicity in particular w i t h its neighbours;
A 5, 987 a i ; f f - t h e y reach two first principles - and
Metapbyma Ethica
Nicomachea A 4 , 1 0 9 6 b 5, they place the One i n the column of goods
(and so not at its head). But contrast Metaphysica
A 6 , 987 b 231T: Plato
and I w o u l d begin by observing that most of them are pre-Christian, and can be illustrated f r o m Philo Some further precision may have accrued in later discussion; but i n the main they belong to the inheritance, rather
said, like the Pythagoreans, that numbers are to other things the cause
than to the evolution, of Christian orthodoxy I t hardly needs repeating
of their being, but differed f r o m them i n postulating a dyad instead oj the
that Philo takes over the Pythagorean teaching that a simple u n i t y is the
unlimited
source of all reality; at Heres
as a unity
Probably, then, some members
o f the school
190 he recalls the purely arithmetical
reckoned the monad as the first principle. A m o n g later critics, Aetius
doctrine that the monad is not a number (i e. plurality) but the source
seems to make them teach t w o principles, of w h i c h however the monad
of all number; at Somn
has the active and formative role and is identified as G o d ;
in
as to equate the monad w i t h the Maker I t might seem otiose to maintain
omnium
that the monad is unique; but the Pythagoreans exploited the verbal
Hippolytus' account the monad is the sole source (Refutatio haeresium
1.2.6) Philo refers to G o d as monad (e.g. quod Deus
1 8
immutabilis
sit, 11, beres 183), but also teaches that the monad merely symbolizes G o d (Legum
allegoriae
2. 3, De specialibus
legibus
3 180, cf
De praemiis
et
poenis 4 0 ) ; the dyad is, or symbolizes, created and divisible matter (Somn. 2.70, Spec 262
leg. 3 180) and is given a radically inferior dignity.
2.70 he applies this doctrine to theology, so
similarity of monasjmonosjmonimos,
and Philo in t u r n observes that the
monad is like G o d because o f their singularity, monosis (Heres
183, Spec
leg 2.176) A t Somn. 2 221 Philo speaks of the constancy o f the ultimate source; at De confusione linguarum
180 he associates 'the eldest of things
that are' w i t h 'the most perfect g o o d ' ; at De praemiis
et poenis 40 'better 263
XXI
XXI Divine simplicity as a problem for orthodoxy
than the g o o d ' is coupled w i t h 'older than the m o n a d ' cited above Finally the monad is absolute reality (Immut n ) , and De ebrietate 4 ; refers to 'the one true G o d ' I n terms of our catchwords, therefore, the monad is simplex,
primus,
unhus,
constans, bonus, verus
I h e source of these connections must be looked for in a region of ancient philosophy which remains obscure despite intensive discussion: the Pythagorean philosophy before the time of Plato, and the Pythagorean teaching which Plato adapted in his theory of ideal numbers, and above all in his enigmatic lecture on 'the One and rhe G o o d ' We are nor concerned at present w i t h the question, how Plaro thought the numbers are derived f r o m the O n e ; nor w i t h the connections o f thought w h i c h Plato must have tried to establish between individual numbers and basic concepts (of w h i c h the traditional example is that four — justice, i n v o k i n g the 'four-square' right-angle as the basis of exact division, o f equality, and of stable constructions) Our main interest is the One itself; and I suggest that we can trace back to these early discussions t w o principles which came to f o r m part of the Christian tradition The first is that the One is the ultimate source of a multiplicity of Forms which provide the permanent structure of the universe and also the pattern of its values. These Forms themselves exhibit b o t h unity and goodness, but in a lesser degree and a relative mode compared w i t h their source; they are each of them a unity relative to their multiple instances, but they are distinct f r o m each other as contrasted w i t h its absolute u n i t y ; and they are each of them the source of goodness, or pattern of goodness, for some class of beings, 'a good so-and-so', rather than being the sole source of all goodness The second principle is that the One is the highest reality and absolute t r u t h , since it holds the key to the Forms on which all true predication must be based; but i t is a t r u t h which is inconceivable and inexpressible, certainly to us men, and possibly to any being other than itself; the reason being that true statements were conceived on the model of a synthesis of t w o notions (and, for that matter, knowledge was seen as the identification of the m i n d w i t h its object); but in neither case was pure and absolute unity achieved; a true statement could only be significant if t w o distinct notions were brought together (a theory opposed to the view put about by Antisthenes that the only unquestionably true statement was the unqualified identity ' X is X ' ) ; and the mind's ' i d e n t i t y ' w i t h its object could only be an identity of f o r m , not a wholesale coalescence. I t followed that the One had to be exhibited as, on the one hand, good, being the source of all goodness; but contrariwise as unknowable and 19
264
indefinable; not simply devoid of qualities ( e g sense-qualities) but unconditioned by any attribute whatsoever, since any statement about it could not be true unless i t was in formal correspondence w i t h its object (i e simple) and could not be significant unless it were composite, attaching a predicate which was distinguishable f r o m its subject W i t h i n the Platonic tradition, Plotinus made the most sustained and coherent effort to w o r k out these principles, concluding inter alia that the ultimate source could not have knowledge even of itself, since even selfknowledge implied a distinction between the mind as Knower and the mind as K n o w n ; thus the traditional 'scale of being', ascending from inanimate nature to conscious minds and upwards through progressively purer and more penetrating intelligences, was apparently interrupted; not simply lost in the clouds of heavenly glory, but brought to a stand by the paradox of a Being w h o is the source of all goodness but cannot be good.' Christian thinkers, inheriting a richer though far more complex tradition, struck out new lines o f thought w h i c h were never (I think) connected in a logically coherent whole, but which, if pursued, should have exhibited the n o t i o n of w h o l l y undifferentiated divine simplicity as an unwanted survival. 20
W i t h i n the compass of this essay, there are only t w o critical principles which I have space to develop One of these might be labelled 'the diminishing returns of u n i f i c a t i o n ' ; the other I take to be simply an application of a fairly recent movement in philosophy, namely the rejection of the picture theory o f meaning. However, no originality is claimed for the first principle either. It relates to a proposal made by Leonard H o d g s o n , which perhaps never attracted as much attention as it deserved. Hodgson contrasted 'mathematical' w i t h ' o r g a n i c ' unity, explaining that ' A p p r o x i m a t i o n to the ideal o f mathematical unity is measured by a scale of absence of m u l t i p l i c i t y ; but approximation to the ideal o f organic unity is measured by a scale o f intensity o f unifying p o w e r ' (p. 94) Hodgson considers the case of human character, in w h i c h a divided mind or a split personality is a grave disadvantage ' I n the case of the human self, the u n i t y is by no means always perfect . But in whatever measure it is achieved, this is not affected by the cancellation of factors until nothing rs left but an undifferentiated unity. far more intense is the unity manifested in a life which unifies a wider range ' 21
One m i g h t , alternatively, consider the role o f unity in personal relationships, taking a single pair of friends to deputize for the more complex interrelations of a group or of our whole society Clearly there 265
XXI
XXI Divine simplicity as a problem for orthodoxy
must be some correspondence or similarity of interests, fortune or temperament if any personal relationship is to begin; and the process o f g r o w i n g together, of assimilating another's experience and imitating his judgments and values, can be exciting and rewarding. But the partnership needs refreshing by the maintenance o f outside interests and the bringing in of fresh experience by each of the partners and ideally by a love shared by both partners but directed on to another person or cause; for however attractive initially the recognition o f an alter ego provided by fortune, or the attempt to realize it as an ideal, the project is self-defeating: to make one personality an exact replica o f the other is to reduce by one the number of distinct moral agents; and a mutually monopolizing partnership has no great advantage over a self-absorbed individual Hodgson used his concept o f unity to formulate a doctrine of the Trinity in social terms ' I h e true pattern of unity for men w h o are made in the image of G o d is one in which there is a place for all our different selves, so far as they are good selves, a unity in which each is to remain its own self in order that it may play its part in enriching the w h o l e ' (p 185) I w o u l d not follow him at every p o i n t : the sentence just quoted could easily provoke the reply that there can be no analogy of this k i n d w i t h a G o d w h o needs no enrichment, since he is himself the source o f ah good things But the alternative seems to be that we treat the substance or inner being of the Godhead, characterized by mysterious and incomprehensible but absolute simplicity, as something totally unrelated to the Trinity of Persons in w h i c h we believe i t is deployed A n d I w o u l d think also that there is no escaping the conclusion drawn by Plotinus: an absolutely simple Godhead cannot undersrand 01 control the influence and attraction that he exerts M y second point is that i t is a mistake to think that a descriptive sentence can only be true if i t is in a structural correspondence w i t h the reality or state of affairs which it describes L i k e so many philosophical theories, the picture theory of meaning is a Cinderella's glass coach so long as one is content to go along w i t h it and accept it on its o w n terms, but collapses into dust and cobwebs when the spell is broken I t seems beneath the dignity of a serious objection if one observes that, on such a theoty, to state that there are four people i n this room one would have to formulate a sentence embodying four identical symbols- A n d of course the theory can be developed so as to escape such simply conceived objections: we have to incorporate conventions in which ' f o u r ' replaces a symbolism of the f o r m a, b, c, d, and ' i n the r o o m ' is 2 2
266
a conventional equivalent for an ideal symbolism in which the symbols for the four people w o u l d be actually enclosed by the symbol for ' room' Theories of this k i n d , however, seem to have affected ancient discussions on the nature of G o d ; it could be argued, for instance, that G o d cannot be k n o w n because he cannot be defined; he cannot be defined because that w o u l d involve assigning him to a genus within which he is distinguished by a differentia; and this would mean he consisted of t w o distinct elements, and was no longer simple. The answer, reduced to its simplest terms, is that there is no reason to think that a correct description mirrors the structure of the thing described If we describe man as a rational animal, we cannot point to the two elements named by this phrase; and if we tried to do so - perhaps by saying that he has an animal body plus a directing intelligence — we can only make this plausible by ignoring the relatedness o f the two components Man lives his animal life in a way prescribed by reason, but conversely the exercise o f his reason is qualified and sometimes interrupted by his animal nature. Why not then ignore the attempt to conform him to his definition, refer to h i m as a psycho-physrcal unity and be done w i t h it? 23
I t is a mistake of this order which I take to be a peculiar weakness of the Cappadocian theology of the T r i n i t y : the three Persons are defined as possessing the same simple undivided divine substance qualified by three distinguishing peculiarities. But this is not presented only as a way in which they may be conceived; the definitions are supposed to conform TO rheir inner structure, so that the undivided Godhead which they share is not so much manifested in three personal beings o r modes as contradicted by the imposed characteristics by which they are distinguished O n the other hand the Cappadocians most opportunely, though unexpectedly, insist that the simplicity of the Godhead does not preclude a multiplicity o f descriptions, epinoiai These, however, were thought to relate to the energies and relationships of the Godhead, leaving hrs simple substance unaffected; a position which I have given reason to reject To return, in conclusion, f r o m the intricacies o f exact theology to the burdens imposed on our mortality by faith in a transcendent spirit: the concept of divine simplicity should present a challenge to an over-simple faith One cannot help feeling that there is some force in the sceptics' objection to 'God-bothering'; it is less easy for us than it was for an earlier generation t o assert w i t h o u t misgivings that 'the eyes of the Lord 267
XXI
XXI Divine simplicity as a problem for orthodoxy are o v e r the righteous and his ears are open unto their ptayer'. I f w e
11
c l a i m that our prayers are h e a r d and a n s w e r e d , does this mean that w e expect G o d to g i v e us his u n d i v i d e d attention? N o t , surely, in the sense
For which see Quts rerum divinarum beres? 232; De opificio mundi 117;
12 R T WalHs, Neoplatonism, London 1975, pp. 34, 62
C a n w e then imagine a
r ; SVF
2.92, 633-5, 638, etc.
m i n d w h o s e capacities are so vast that it can r e s p o n d to the i n d i v i d u a l
14 SVF
2.475, 534,
that w e ask h i m to neglect all other petitioners
needs of m e n w h o s e n u m b e r s are m u l t i p l y i n g beyond all
capacity o f our o w n minds to c o n t r o l m a n y c o m p l e x m o v e m e n t s
and
activities w i t h o u t a c o n s c i o u s effort of a t t e n t i o n ; w e m i g h t suppose that in some similar way G o d automatically distributes his b o u n t y , ' m a k i n g
546, 1023,
16 C f W
106); Philo, migr
Pannenberg, in Baste Questions in Theology, vol 2, London 197 [, pp
170-1 17 Irenaeus, Haer 2 15 3, see my Divine Substance, Oxford 1977, pp
187-9;
Pannenberg, Basse Questions, p. ¡67. 18 Diels, DG 281a 6-12,
creatively, distributing
19 F o r which consult, e g , W
the help or c o r r e c t i o n that his
( = Posidonius fr
is Philo, Heres 155, cf Migr 219-20
the s u n to rise u p o n the e v i l and u p o n the g o o d ', or m o r e personally and to each m a n
1211
178-80; Marcus Aureiius, 6.38
imagination?
T h e p r o b l e m here is that this is m o r e easily i m a g i n e d if w e note the
Legitw
allegoriae 1 w; Quod deterius potiori insidiari soleat 168; De agrkultura 30 etc
502a
7-10 D. Ross, Plato's Theory of Ideas, Oxford 19; 1,
c o n d i t i o n requires. B u t this still does not suggest a G o d w h o stands in
and the passages collected by C. J. de Vogel, Greek Philosophy A Collection
a caring r e l a t i o n s h i p ; and it m a y p r o v e that the only w a y in w h i c h this
of Texts, vol 1: T'hales to Plato, Leiden 1950, undec the heading ' The Ideal Numbers'
can be u p h e l d is by g i v i n g full w e i g h t to the doctrine that the F a t h e r exercises
this
condescending
grace t h r o u g h
incarnate C h r i s t made m a n for us
his
expression in
the
20 Plotinus himself did of course identify the first principle as 'the G o o d ' , as well as ' the O n e '
T o suggest this puts the o r t h o d o x y
of N i c a e a and C h a l c e d o n under the severest s t r a i n ; w e w o n d e r w h e t h e r
21
it can support the u n i o n
22 I use the phrase rather loosely, without specific reference to Wittgenstein's
intimacy
of
o f infinite, all-regarding majesty w i t h
a man-to-man r e l a t i o n s h i p ; so that
u n d i v i d e d , the majesty u n i m p a i r e d
the operations
by an unlimited
are the
intimacy
preserved without
concern
T h i s is a p r o b l e m o n w h i c h e v e n the A r i a n s , i f g i v e n their due,
m i g h t have s o m e t h i n g
distraction over
distribution,
the
a c o s m i c extension
to teach u s ; and o n w h i c h the e v o l u t i o n
o r t h o d o x y m i g h t b r i n g much-needed
of
The Doctrine of the Trinity, London 1943, pp
ScjrT, esp pp
94-5
theory, for which see G H. R Parkinson, The Theory of Meaning, Oxford 1968, p 5 23 Cf Pannenberg, Basic Questions, p
132.
of
light
N O I ES 1 Methodius, De resurrections 2 10; Eusebius, Laus Constantin! 11 r ; , 12 r i ; Constantine, Ad sanctos 7 3-2;
Athanasius, Contra gentes 27 fin, 36—7; cf
Severus in Eusebius, Praeparatio evangelua 13.17
2
2 Diels, DG, p 449, fr 5 3 See De anima 1 5, 411b
1-19,
2 2, 413b 13ft , 28, cf 2 3 init ; De iuventute 1,
467b 17; Etbica Eudemia 1 1, 1219b 4 Posidonius, fr
;z
142-6 Edelsrein
; Diels, DG, Index, p
781b
6 See J Leisegang's index (vol v n
2, Berlin 1936), 868b 869a, to L Cohn
and P Wendland's edition of Phiio 7 Fr 3 2 — 5 V F 8 F r 34, cf S VF
1 571 2 283.
9 Tertullianus de anima, Amsterdam 1947, p
21;.
to A - M Festugière, L.a revelation d'Hermès Trismègiste, vol 3, pp 194—5. 268
269
INDEX
Abramowski, Luise: fil 140; X 76 Adeodatus, son of Augustine: XVIH 63 64-5 66, 67,69 Adoptionism heresy: IV 30 Aeschylus, Prometheus
Bound:
XVi! 3
Aetius: VI 154; X X I 262 Africanus: III 144, 145 Albinus: II 9; V 44; X V I 6 Alexander of Aphrodisias: III 144; V 47 48; VII 675, 676.. 678.68] 683 684; X X I 260 De Fato:
V 49: VII
674
Alexander, Bishop of Alexandria: IV 24 25,26, 27., 30, 34, 36; V 41, 42, 46,47, 50-51; VI 157; Vlil 51, 5 6 ; X 76. 82, 85-6,90 e philarchos, analysis: X 76-91 Alexander of Lycopolis: V 43, 44 Alexandria: I 177; III 146; XII 248 Ambrose: X V 73; X X I 255 analogy, doctrine of: II 12-13 Anatolius: V 39, 40 Antichrist: X 80 Antinous: IX 231 Antioch, Synod of; III 140; X 76 Antipodes: X V I I 9 Apollinaris the Younger: X I I 233. 234 235; XIII 65, 69, 77 Apuleius: X V 73, 75; X V I 8 Aquinas: X X 319; X X I 255 arche : II
9-10
Archimedes: I 180; VII 680 Arianism; II 14; VIII 51-9 doctrine: X 83-5 see also Arius Aristotle: II 18; VII 680; X I V 154 156: XV 84, X V I 3 : X V I 1 I 6 6 ; XVIII (Add) 2; X X 319 Categories:
X X 306., 313
on change: I 183 De Anima: XVIII 66; X X I 263 268 De Ceneratione
et
Corruptions:
VII 673 De Interpretation:
X X 306
3]3
De luventute: X X ! 268 Elhica Eudemia: XXI 268 Ethica Nitomachea: X X I 262
on on on on on
Forms: I 182 knowledge: II 12 language, theory of: X X 306 light: X V I I 6 logic: I I 77-8
Metaphysics.
II 15; V 49; VII
673:
XXI 262 on names: X X 306-7 on participation: V 48 Physics: Poetics:
II 9 X X 307
on simple bodies: X X I 257 on the soul: X V I 4: X X I 259-60 Topics:W
43,
313
on virtue: I 178-9 Arius: IV 34; X X 316 and the Logos doctrine: I V 25, 26, 2 8 , 3 0 , 3 1 , 3 2 , 3 3 , 3 6 ; V40-41, 45; VI 153-7, VII 671-84; VIII 51-9: X 85 88-90 in Athanasius' De Decretis: VI 154 Letter
to Alexander:
VII 676-7
684
and Neoplatonism: V 39-51 sources on: IV 24-5 Thalia:
IV 24, 25, 27, 28, 29, 33;
V 41. 42.45. 46; VI 153, 154: VII 672, 675 678,681,684; X 82, 85, 86-7.. 88-9,90-91 theology: IV 26.. 32-3;V 47. 51 see also Arianism Arius Didymus: X X I 25 7 Armstrong, A.H : I 185: X V I 9 Aspasius: 111 144, 145 Asterius: IV 25, 29; VIII 53 astronomy, and Augustine: X V I I 10-11 Athanasius: II 14; V 41, 43, 49; VI 157; VII 671; X X 3 1 6 ; X X I 2 5 5 ad Epictetum:
XII 233
as an exegete: XI 174-84 Arius, criticism of: IV 24. 25, 26-7. 28, 29, 31,32. 33, 34: VI 153
2
156; VII 679 681,683. 684; X90 Contra Gentes: IX 230 232, 233, 234, 235,236. 237. 238,239, 240; X 91; XI 178, 179: XII 246, 248; X X I 257, 268 De Decretis: VI 154; X X I 257 De Incarnatione: IX 229, 230. 231, 232, 233,236. 237, 238; X 77-8; X 91; XI 179; XII 246, 248; XIII 71 De Synodis: IV 24, 27, 28; VII 677, 678; VIII 51; X 80, 91; XI 78 Epistula ad Marcellinum: X 78; X I 174. 179, 180; XII 241; XIII 72; analysis: XIII 65-9 74 Epistulae Festales\X\ 175, 178, 180, 182, 183, 184; XII 248 Expositio Fidei: X I 176 Expositions in Psalmos: X I 1 74; XII 235. 236, 237,246,248; XIII 65; analysis: XIII 69- 78 henos somatos analysis: X 76-91 Historia Arianorum: X 80 In Iliud Omnia: XI 175; XIII 74 on knowledge of God: I X 229-42 Orations: XI 175, 179, 182 Plato 's Politikos cited: XI 179 on the soul of Christ: XII 233-50 Tomus ad Antiochenos: XII 233, 247 Vita Antonii: X 80; XIII 71 Athanasius of Anazarba: VI 154 Athenagoras: II 8; XI 181 Atticus: II 8; V 50 Augustine: I 179; II 18; IX 231; X X I 255 Against the Academics: X V 72 on astronomy: X V I I 10-11 on belief: X V I I I 73 cave simile: X I X 339, 343 City of God: X V 75; X V I 13; X V I I 9 Confessions: X V 74, 79; X I X 339. 340,341. 342; X X I 258 on cosmology: X V I I 1-13 De Interpretation: XVIII(Add) 1 De Magistro, analysis: XVIII 63-73 De Trinitate: X I X 340, 341 on Ecclesiasticus: X V I I 4, 5 on the firmament: X V I I 11-12 on the four elements: X V I I 9-10 on Genesis: X V I I 4-6 on heaven: X V I I 12-13 on human life: X V 80-81 on intellect; X V I 1 on the intelligible world: X V I 11-14 on knowledge: XVIII 73
INDEX
3
INDEX
on learning: X V I I I 72-3 life: X V 71-2 on light; XVII 6-7, 8 literal Commentary on Genesis: X V I 1, 13; X V I I 2, 4; X I X 340 on the meaning of words: XVIII 66-72; XVIII (Add) 1-2 on memory: X I X 339-45 on the natural world: X V 74-5; XVI 6 on the nature of God: X V I 13-14 on nouns: X V I I I 66-8 On Free Choice: X V 80 on permanence: X V 83—4 on the philosophy of being: X V 71-84 on the philosophy of language: X V I I I 63-72 on Platonism: X V 72-3, 74; X V I 2-4, 11-14 on seminal reasons: X V 79 on signs: X V I I I 66-70 Soliloquies: X V I 13 on speech: X V I I I 64-5 on spirits: X V 80 on teaching: X V I I I 72-3 Aurelian: III 147
X X I 260 Chrysostom, John: X X I 255 Cicero: I 179; II 9 De Natura Deorum: X V I 8; XVII 5 Horiensius: X V 71 Lucullus:XlX 341 Tusculan Disputations: X I X 341 Cleanthes: X X I 260 Clement: II I I ; III 147; V 43, 44; VII 671, 674; IX 232, 236; XI 181 Codex Alexandrinus: XIII 65 Cohn, L : X X I 268 Colluthus: X 9 1 Constantine, Emperor IV 24: V 39; VII 684; X 90 Adsanctos: X X I 268 Constantinople, Council of: X I V 350 Coquin, R G.: X I 175, 180, 183 Cosmas Indicopleustes, Christian Topography: XVII 9 Cosmology, and Augustine: X V I I 1-13 Courcelie.. P.: X I X 341 Cross, F L : XII 250 Cyprian: I 176 Cyril of Alexandria: XIII 65, 7 7; X X I 255
Bardy, G : III 140-41; IV 36; VI 153, 154; X 76, 91 Barnabas: XI 181 Barnes, T D . : Ill 141; X 76 Basil: I V 28; X V I 6; XVII 3, I I ; X X 3 1 8 , 320; X X I 255 on light X V I I 6 Basi!ides:II 10; VIII 56; X V I 6 Bauer. W : V 48 Beryllus of Bostra: III 142, 148 Bienert. W A : VII 682 Blume, H -D.: II 15; VII 677 Brennecke.. H.C : III 141; IV 35 Bultmann, R K : II 18 Burnyeat, M F : X V I I I 63, 68, 70
Decartes, R : X V 72 demiourgos: I 181 Didymus: XIII 65 77 Dinsen, F : V 49 Diogenes of Babylon: X X 307 Diogenes Laertius: II 9; III 144, 146, 147; X X 310 Dionysius of Alexandria: I V 34; VII 683. 6 8 4 ; X 88 Dionysius the Areopagite: X V I 8 Dionysius of Rome: VII 683: XIII 74 Domnus, Bishop: IV 35 Dorival, G : XIII 65, 75, 77 Dorner. I.A.: XII 249 Dörrie, H : II 9, 15; VII 677 Dyad, The: V 45- 6
Calcidius: X X I 260 Callias: V 48 Calvenus Taurus: X V I 5 Carneades: X V 72 Chadwick, H.: I 185; III 141; X I X 341; X X I 255 Chalcedon, Council of: I 185 Christian thought, Greek influence: I 175-85 Christianity and Platonism: II 2 Chrysippus: I 183; X X 307, 312;
Ecclesiasticus, and Augustine: XVII 5 Elipandus:IV30 Empedocles: VII 672 Epicurus: X V I I 2-3 epinoia: X X 309-10, 3IS-12, 315, 316. 318; X X I 267 Epiphanius: X I 184; X V I I 7 Ettlinger., G H . : XII 249 Euclid, and geometry: I 180 Eudorus: II 9
Eunomius, Bishop : IV 28; X X , 309. 314,316 on names: X X 318-19 Eusebius of Caesarea: II 8; III 140-50; IV 29; V 4 3 , 45, 49; V I 157; VII 674, 683; VIII 53; I X 236; X 81; XII 239, 241.. 242,243, 244, 246, 248; XIII 65, 73, 77. 78; X I X 341; X X 316 Commentaria: XII 247; XIII 74 Demonstratio Evangélica: XII 247, 248; XIII 74; X X I 258-9 Ecclesiastical Theology: X X I 259 Eclogae Propheticae: XII 247 on knowledge of God: IX 229-42 Laus Constantini: X I 2 3 1 , 237; XII 247; X X I 268 Praeparatio Evangélica: V 39; IX 231, 238, 240; X X I 260, 268 on the soul of Christ: X 234 Theophaneia: XII 247, 248 Eusebius of Nicomedia, Letter to Paulinus: VII 671, 677, 682 Eustathius of Antioch: 111 149; I V 33, 35. 36; X I I 234 On the Soul of Christ: XII 247 exegesis, examples: XI 181-4 principles: X I 177-81 existentia/existentialitas: X V I 10-11 Feltoe.. C L : VII 683 Festugiere. A -M : V 4 5 ; X X I 268 firmament, the, and Augustine: X V I I 11-12 Forms. Platonic: I 181-2; V 47; 1X240; X I V 158, 159. 160; X V 79; X V I 3-4; X X 305; X X I 264 Frend, W H C : III 141 Galen: X X I 260 Galtier, P: XII 249 Genesis, and Augustine: X V I I 4-6 geometry, and Euclid: I 180 George of Laodicea: VII 676 Gnosticism: II 5; VIII 56; X X 319 God, immutability: II 14-15 knowledge of: I X 229-42; X X I 267 as mind: II 6; I X 239-40; X X I 268 naming of: X X 314-15 nature of: X V I 11, 13-14 view of prophets: II 7 goodness: X X I 263 Greeks, The, and Christian thought: I 175-85 and mathematics: I 179-80
4
and monotheism: II 6, 17 Gregg, R C : IV 25, 26,28; VI 153; VII 671, 675 Gregory of Nyssa: IX 242: X X 310 320; X X I 255. 261 Ad Eustathium de sancte trinitate: X I V 149-50 AdGraetos: X I V 149 on the Trinity doctrine: X I V 149-63 Gregory Thautnaturgus: I X 236 Grillmeier, A.: [II 141; XII 234, 249 Groh, D : IV 25, 26; VI 154; VII 675 Hadot, P : X V I 2 Hadrian, Emperor: I X 231 Hall, S G : VI 154 Hanson, R P C : III 141; VII 671 Harnack Adolf von: II 1,2, 18 Hatch, E : I 185 Heaven, and Augustine: X V I I 12-13 Hephaestus: 1 176-7 Hera: I 176-7 Heraclides: III 142, 148 Heraclitus, on change: I 181, 183 Hermogenes: VI] 679 Herschel, W : X V I ] 10 Hilary, Pope: XI 181 Hippolytus : HI 144 145: X V I 6; X X I 25 7 Refutatio omnium haeresium: X X I 262 Hodgson, Leonard: X X I 265-6 Homer: I 176, ]77 Hübner, R : VI] 671; X I V 150 hypostasis, meaning: I 183 and the Trinity: I 183-5 lamblichus: V 39, 40 44, 51; X X I 260 On the Mysteries of Egypt: V 50 Theologoumena Arithmeticae: V 46 immutability: II 14-15 Irenaeus, Adversus Haereses: II 8, 11, 16; III 144, 145; VII 671; 1X 232 238: XI 181; X X I 269 Jaeger, W : I 185; 11 4 Jerome: I 176; III 143, 144, 146. 147 Jews. The, and monotheism: II 6 John, S t : I 181 Josephus, Contra Apionem: XI 176 Justin Martyr, St.: 114.8. I I ; X X 319 Dialogus: X X I 260 Kannengiesser, C : IV 27. 28 29; VI )53; VII 675 684; I X 2 3 S ;
INDEX
INDEX
X 7 8 ; XI 177 Kelly, J N D : III 141; X 76; X I V 157-8 Kettler, F.-H : VI 155, 157 Kirwan, C A : X V I I I 63 Klostermann, E ; III 147; VI 156 knowledge, theory of: II 12 Knowles D.: XVI 13 Kohnke, F W : X V I 9 Krämer. H J : X V I 2 Lactantius: 119; X V I I 9 language, philosophy of, and Augustine: XVIII 63-72 Lefbrt, Lh : XI 175, 178 Leisegang, J : X X I 268 Lietzmann, H : X 76 light, and Aristotle XVII 6 and Augustine. XVII 6-7, 8 and Basil: X V I I 6 Hebrew notion of: XVII 6, 8 nature of: X V I I 3 and Plato: X V I I 7 and the Stoics: XVII 7 Livingstone, R.: ] 185 Lloyd, A C : X V 73 logic, and Aristotle; I 177-8 Logos, The and Arianism: I V 2 5 26 28 30 31. 32 33 36; V 40-41 45; VI 153-7; VII 671-84; VIII 51-9; X 85, 88-9 and Marcellus: VI 157; XII 234 and O r i g e n : X X 3 1 5 and Paul of Samosata: IV 34; X 85; XII 234, 249 and the soul of Christ: XII 234, 244 Loofs, F.: II 2; III ]41 Lorenz R.: III 141: IV 25, 26, 27, 29-30,31 3 2 , 3 3 , 3 4 , 3 6 ; V I 154-5: VII 671 672 . 676 677; X 76. 82.. 83-9 Louth, A.: 1X 230 231. 232 Lucan: V 47 Lucas, L : X V 83 Lucchesi, E : IV 28; XI 175 Lucian of Anrioch: ]V 34. 35.. 36; VII 683 Luther: II 11 18 Malchion: III 141 Manichaeism: V 44; VII 684 Manichaeus: VII 677 Manichees: X V 71-2; X V I I 3 Mann. F : II 15; VII 677 Marcellus r III 149; IV 29; VII 675; X 91; XI] 249; XIII 74
and the Logos doctrine: VI 15 7; XII 234 Marcus Aurelius: XVII 7; X X I 269 Margerie, B. de: XI 177 Markus, R A : I 185 Martin, A : IV 24 Mathematics, and the Greeks: I 179-80 Maximus of Tyre: X V I 6 Melissus: II 9 memory, and Augustine: X I X 339-45 Merendino, P : X I 175 Mesopotamia: X V I I 4 Methodius: VII 671; X I X 341 De resurrectione: X X I 268 Meyendorff, J : X V 78; X V I 12 Moderatus: V 44 Möhler, J A : X 76 Monad, The; V 4 5 - 6 monotheism, and the Greeks: II 6, 17 and the Jews: II, 6 Müller, F.: X I V 149 Müller, G : X 78 names, application to God: X X 314-15, 317-20 and Aristotle: X X 306- 7 and Eunomius: X X 318-19 meaning: X X 3 I 6 - 1 7 and Philo of Alexandria: XX313-15,319 and Socrates: X X 303-5 and the Stoics: X X 307, 309 Nazianzen, G., and simple bodies: X X I 256-7 Nebridius: X V 81 Neoplatonism, and Arius: V 39-51 Nestorius: ill 140 Newman, J H : X 76, 80, 81 Nicaea Council of: I 184; IV 24 nomos: X X 303 Nords, F W: III 141 Nouns, and Augustine: X V I I I 66-8 nous: IX 233, 234, 235 numbers, nature of: 1 180; X X I 262 Plato's theory of: XXI 264-5 Numenius: V 44, 45 Oort, J. van: VII 684 Orbe,A:XX309 Origen: II 18; III 142, 145, 146, 147, 148; I V 25; V 45, 50; VI 157; VII 672, 679,682; 1X232-3, 238, 2 4 2 ; X 8 1 ; X I 179, 181; XIII 65, 70, 7 7; X V I I 6; X X 3 1 5 , 316
5
Against Ceisus: I 177; III 144 Commentary on John: VI 155. 156 De Principas: 1 177; IV 32; V 4 4 ; VII 671; 1X239, 240; X I 182; X V I 6; X X I 258; X X I 260 on knowledge of God: I X 239 on the Logos: X X 315 on the soul of Christ: IV 26, 28, 30 31-2, 33; XII 233-4, 245 Ossius of Cordoba, Bishop: X 77 ousia: I 182, 183, 184; V 40, 46, 47,49; X I V 149, 150, 155, 157; X X 311 Pannenberg, W : II 1-18; X X I 269 Parkinson, G H R : XXI 269 Parmenides: I 181, 182; II 9; V I I 672 Paul . St : I 178; IX 231, 236; X V I I 12; XVIII 67 and the Stoics: I 179 Paul of Samosata : III 140, 143, 147-8, 149, 150; IV 26, 30, 34, 35,36; V 4 9 ; V I I 683; VIII, 53 and the Logos doctrine: I V 34; X 85; XII 234, 249 Pease, A.S : X V I 8 Peel, M L : X V I I 7 Pepin, J : X V I 2 Peter of Alexandria, Bishop: I V 33; XIII 76 Peter, St : XVII 13 Pettersen, A : X I I 249 Philo of Alexandria: I 177; II 7-8, 9; V 44, 45; VI 156; I X 230 232, 234, 236, 240, 241.242; XII 248; X I V 159; X V I 6; XVII 4, 5; XXI 257, 262 De agricultura: XXI 269 De confusione iinguarum: X X I 263 De ebrietate: X X I 264 De gigantibus: XXI 260, 262 De mutatione nominum: X X I 260 De opificio mundi: X X I 262, 269 De posteritate Caini: X X I 260 De praemiis etpoenis: X X I 262. 263-4 De Somniis: X X I 260 De specialibus legibus: X X I 262 on epinoia: X X 311—12 Tieres: X X I 263,269 Le gum allegoriae: X X I 262, 269 on names: X X 313-15. 319 Quis rerum divinarum heres?: X X I 269 Quod deter ius potior i mdidiari soleat: X X I 269
INDEX
6
on simple bodies; X X I 259-60 on the theory of Ideas: X V I 5 phusis: X V 75; X X 303 Plantinga, C : X I V 158 Plato : I 176; II 18 Cratylus: XVIII 71; X X 303, 304. 305,307,313 Euthydemus: X V I I I (Add) 2 First Alcibiades: IX 237 on Forms: I 181-2; V 47; IX 240X I V 158, 159, 160; X V 79; X V I 3-4; X X 305; X X ] 264 on God as mind: II 6 on ideal numbers, theory of X X I 264-5 on Ideas, theory of: X V 75, 76-8; X V I 2-3, 4-5 on immutability: II 14-15 on intellect: 1178 on justice: X V 76 on knowledge: II 12 on light: X V I I 7 Meno: XVHI(Add) 2; X I X 340 341-2, 345 on numbers: X X I 264-5 Parmenides: V 44, 45 Phaedo: I 176; IX 234; X X I 259 Philebus: X V I 6 Politicus: X V I 6 Republic: I 176; II 12, 14; IX 233 236, 238; X I X 342; X X I 259, 263 Sophist: X V I 3, 6 8; XVIII (Add) I on the soul: I 178 179; X V I 2; X X I 259 Symposium: I 178; X I X 345 Theaetetus: X I X 342 Timaeus: I 180-181; II 8, 16; V 50; IX 238; X V 73, 74, 77; X V I 2, 4; X V I I 5, 7 vision, theory of: IX 238-9 Platonism, and Augustine: X V 72-3 74X V I 2-4, 11-14 and Christianity: II 2 Plotinus, Enneads: II 4; V 39, 40, 46, 47. 49. 50,51; 1X238, 239; X V 72. 73,77, 78; X V I 3, 5-6, I I , 12' X X I 265,266,269 Plutarch: III 144, 145, 146, 147; V SO VII 674 679; X X 312 Platonic Questions: VII 671 pneuma: X X I 258 Pollard, I" E : X I 1 77, 178, 180 Porphyry: V 39, 43, 44, 48, 50, 51; 1
:
X V 72, 73; XVIII (Add) 2;
7
INDEX
X X I 260 De Abstinentia: V 43 lsagoge: V 40, 41, 42, 47, 49 Tree of: X V I 6, 8, 9; illustration: XVI 7 Posidonius: IX 238; X X 311; X X I 260, 268,269 Proclus: V 45 prophets, view of God: II 7 Psalter: XIII 66-78 Pythagoras: VII 680 Pythagoreans : II 9 and simple bodies: X X I 262-4 Ramos-Lisson, D : V 39 Richard, M : III 141, 142, 143, 144. 145, 146, 147, 148, 150; I V 35; XII 234, 249 Riedmatten, Henri de: III 140, 141. 150; IV 35; XII 234, 247, 249 Rist, J.: X V I 2; X V I I I (Add) 1 RitschI, A : II 2 Ritter, A M : II 2 Robertson, A : VII 675; XI 175; X 76, 81 Rondeau, M.-J : XII 246, 250; XIII 65, 71, 75, 76 Ross, W D : V 45; X X I 269 Rouet de Journel, M.I : X X I 255 Rufinus: III 143, 146, 147; IV 32; IX 239 Russell, B : I 180 Sabellius: III 149 Saffrey, H D : IV 28 Sample, R L : III 141 scala naturae: X V I 6, 8, 9 illustration: X V I 7 Schwartz, E : X 76 Selle, E te: X I X 340 Seneca: X V I 6; X X 308 Severus:XX1260 Sextus Empiricus: III 144, 145; X X 310 Sieben H J.: XI 177, 1 78; XIII 66; X X I 256 signs, and Augustine: XVIII 66-70 Simonetti, M : III 141, 142, 143, 146, 150; IV 35; VII 683; X 76 simple bodies, and Aristotle: X X I 257 and Gregory Nazianzen: X X I 256-7 and Philo: X X I 259-60 and the Pythagoreans: X X I 262-4 and lertullian: X X I 258-9 Simplicius: VII 672 Socrates: [ 182; V 39, 48; 1X237; X 81; XVIII (Add) 2; X I X 341:
X X 307 on names: X X 303-5 Solomon: I 180 Sophocles: X V I I 3 Sorabji, R : II 9 soul: X X I 260 and Aristotle: X V I 4; X X I 259-60; of Christ: and Athanasius: XII 233-50; and Eusebius: X 234; and the Logos: XII 234, 244; in the New Testament: XII 235 and mind: I X 234-5 as mirror: IX 236-7 and Plato: I 178, 1 79; X V I 2: X X I 259 purity: I X 235-6 and the Stoics: X X I 261 Sozomen: V 39 Speusippus: X V I 4 Stead, G C : VII 671, 675, 677; XI 174; X X I 262 Stoics, and light: XVI] 7 and names: X X 307. 309 and 'propositions': X X 307-9 and St Paul: 1 179 and the soul: XXf 261 Stupperich R : VI 155 Tatian, Ad Graecov. X X I 260 Taylor, J H : X V I I 1 lertullian : I 176, 183; II 4; VII 671, 675, 679; X 90; X I 181: X V I I 3; X X I 255; X X I 257 on simple bodies: X X I 258-9 Thagaste: X V 71; XVIII 63 Theodore of Mopsuestia: XIII 70 Theognostus: VII 671 Theophilus : XI 236
AdAutolycum: X X I 260 Thcophrastus: V 45 Ihomson, R.W : XII 250 Iorrance, I F : II 2 Trinity The, doctrine of: I 183-5; X I V 149-63; X X I 266 267 Urbina, I Ortiz de: XII 249 Valentinus: VII 674-5,677 Verbeke. G : VII 671, 672 Vian, G M : XI 174; XII 237. 238 239 243; XIII 65, 70, 73 77 Victorinus, Marius: X V 73 Ad Candidum: X V I 9 on the intelligible world: X V I 9-11 13 on the nature of God: X V I 11 vision , theory of: IX 238-9 Vogel, C.J de: 112, 9; X X I 269 Voisin G : XII 249 Wallis. R I : X X I 269 Walzer. R : II 8 Waszink, J H : X X I 260 Wendland, P: X X I 268 West, M L : IV 27; VI 153 Wickert, U. VII 684 Williams, R D : III 141; VII 682; X 91 thesis on Arius and Neoplatonism: V 39-51 Wittgenstein L : X X I 269 Xenocrates: X V 77; X V I 4 Xenophanes: II 5, 8. 16 Xenophon: III 147 Zeno:l 183:111 146 Zeus: ]176-7
