Discourse, Beliefs and Intentions: Semantic Defaults and Propositional Attitude Ascription (Current Research in the Semantics Pragmatics Interface, 2)

Discourse. Discourse, Beliefs. Beliefs, and and Intentions Intentions

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DISCOURSE, BELIEFS, AND INTENTIONS Semantic Defaults and Propositional Propositional Attitude Ascription K.M. Jaszczolt University University of of Cambridge, UK

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Current Research Semantics/Pragmatics Interface Current Research in the Semantics/Pragmatics Interface (CRiSPI)

Series Editors: K. M. Jaszczolt, University K.M. University of Cambridge, UK, UK, and Turner, University of K. Turner, of Brighton, UK Editorial Advisory Board: N. Asher, Asher, USA J. van der Auwera, Auwera, USA C. Casadio, Casadio, Italy M. Oascal, Dascal, Israel B. Fraser, USA USA T. Fretheim, Norway B. Gillon, Canada P. Gochet, Belgium J Groenendijk, The The Netherlands PRC Yueguo Gu, PRC A. Kasher, Israel M. Krifka, Krifka, USA Susumu Kubo, Kubo, Japan Chungmin Lee, Lee, Korea S. Levinson, The Netherlands T. McEnery, McEnery, UK F. Nemo, France P. Pelyvlas, Pelyvlas, Hungary Czech Republic J. Peregrin, Czech A. Ramsay, UK R. van der Sandt, The Netherlands R. Stalnaker, Stalnaker, USA M. Stokhof, The Netherlands G. Ward, USA The aim aim of this series series is to focus upon the relationship relationship between semantic and pragmatic theories for a variety of natural language constructions. constructions. The boundary boundary can be drawn in many various ways, the relative between semantics and pragmatics can benefits benefits of each each gave gave rise rise to a vivid theoretical theoretical dispute in the literature literature in the last two two decades. decades. As a side-effect, this variety has has given rise rise to a certain amount of confusion and purpose in the extant publications on the topic. and lack of purpose This series provides a forum where the confusion within existing literature can be removed and the issues raised raised by different different positions positions can be discussed with a renewed sense of purpose. The The editors intend the contributions to this series series to take take further further and cautious consensus. strides towards clarity and consensus.

Contents

Preface

xi Xl

List of Abbreviations and Symbols

xv

Introduction

XVll xvii

Semantic Ambiguities Ambiguities and Semantic Semantic Underspecification 1. Semantic 1.1. Discourse? 1. 1. Ambiguous Discourse? 1.2. Highlights from the Ambiguity Ambiguity Debates 1.2.1. Logical Form and Propositional Representation 1.2.2. Ambiguity Tests of if i f. .. . . then? then! 1.2.3. Ambiguity of Ambiguity of of Negation? 1.2.4. Ambiguity 1.2.5. Ambiguity of of and? and? 1.2.6. Ambiguity Ambiguity of Number Terms? 1.2.7. Ambiguity Ambiguity of Definite Noun Phrases? 1.2.8. Ambiguity Ambiguity of Indefinite Indefinite Noun Phrases? 1.2.9. Ambiguity Ambiguity of Propositional Attitude Sentences? Interim Conclusions 1.2.10. Interim 1.3. What Is Said 1.4. Towards Towards Delimiting Implicatures Ineradicable Conventions 1.4.1. Neo-Griceans and and Ineradicable 1.4.2. Relevance Theory and Frames 1.5. Conclusions

11 2 5 5 9 11 11 13 13 18 18 20 23 24 26 26 27 37 37 37 42 44

2. Semantic Semantic Defaults 2.1. Setting the Scene 2.2. Intentions in Communication 2.3. The Primary Intention Principle and Definite Descriptions 2.4. The Principle of the Parsimony of Levels 2.5. Default Semantics?

47 48 49 51 51 56 58

vii

viii

Contents

2.5.1. 2.5.2. 2.5.3.

Default Reasoning Reasoning Defeasible Defeasible Knowledge Knowledge Defaults for Definite Descriptions: Interaction of Interaction of Intentions 2.5.4. Defaults for Indefinite Descriptions 2.6. Other Applications 2.6.1. On Semantic Representation Representation and Negation Again 2.6.2. And, or, and and if if 2.6.3. Number Terms 2.7. Defaults Defaults in Dynamic Semantics 2.8. Interim Conclusions Conclusions 2.9. The Doubly-Dynamic Approach: Assumption Recovery or Creation? Creation? 2.10. 2.10. Conclusions

58 60

62 65 66 66 67 68 70 75 75 76 85

3. Intentionality and Propositional Propositional Attitudes Attitudes 87 Consciousness: The Phenomenological 3.1. 'Directedness' of Acts of Consciousness: Phenomenological Tradition 88 3.2. Intentional Intentional Relation and Defaults 92 3.3. Intentionality and Voluntariness 94 Voluntariness 3.4. Intentions 96 Intentions and Intentionality Intentionality 3.5. De Re, De Dicto, Dicto, and the Horizons 99 of Intentionality? 3.6. Speech Speech Acts: Double Level of Intentionality? 104 3.7. Are Intentions in the Head? III 1ll 3.8. Intentionality and Ambiguity: Ambiguity: Concluding Remarks Remarks 119 119 4. The Default De Re Principle 121 Principle 121 4.1. Propositional Attitudes: A Close-Up 122 122 4.1.1. Propositional Propositional Attitudes, Attitude Attitude Sentences, and Attitude Reports 122 'Ortcutt Puzzle' and Its Interpretations 124 4.1.2. The 'Ortcutt 124 and Non-Factives 130 4.1.3. Factives and 130 4.1.4. The 131 The Object of of Belief 131 4.1.5. Defaults for Belief Reports or Defaults Defaults for Referring Expressions? 133 133 4.1.6. Varieties 135 Varieties of De Re and De Dicto 135 4.1.7. Substitutivity? 137 Substitutivity? 137 4.2. 142 4.2. Whose Meaning? On Sense and Mode of Presentation 142 Defence of Speaker-Dependent Senses 142 4.2.1. In Defence 142 and Default Semantics 147 4.2.2. Types of Modes of Presentation and 147 158 4.2.3. The Persistence of Sense 158 4.2.4. Sense-Based Semantics? 161 161 166 4.3. De Re, De Dicto1, Dictob and De Dicto Proper 166

Contents

ix

4.4. Red Giants and White Dwarfs: Dwarfs: Context-Dependence Context-Dependence of Attitude Ascription 176 176 4.5. Default De Re 183 183 4.6. Interim Conclusions 192 192 4.7. Loose Ends: Context and Presupposition Projection 194 194

5. The 5.1. 5.2. 5.3. 5.4. 5.5. 5.6.

203 204 205 211 211 215 215 216 223 223 227 230 232 234

Vehicles of Thought Attitude Ascription Ascription 6. Vehicles Thought in Attitude 6.1. Thoughts and Acts of Thought 6.2. Vehicles of Thought 6.3. Vehicles and Attitudes 6.3.1. Beyond Language 6.3.2. Language: The First Vehicle Vehicle and the Identification Identification of of the Referent 6.3.3. Concepts and the First Vehicle Second Vehicle Vehicle 6.3.4. Mental Images: The Second Actions: The Third Vehicle 6.3.5. Actions: 6.4. Default Interpretations 6.5. The Core of Meaning 6.6. Summary

237 238 244 249 249

RepresentationTheory Theoryand andPropositional PropositionalAttitudes Attitudes 7. Discourse Representation 7.1. Semantics and and Pragmatics Revisited 7.2. Context Context and Belief Reports in DRT 7.3. Belief Expressions and 7.4. DRT and Intentions Concluding Remarks 7.5. Concluding

277 277 278 280 284 296 298

Reports in a Contrastive Contrastive Perspective Perspective 8. Belief Reports 8.1. Belief, Belief, Culture, and Translation 8.2. Contrastive Semantics and Pragmatics

301 301 302 306

Lexicon and the Power Power of Referring An Overview Redefining Referring Referring Expressions Proper Names and Modes of Presentation Degrees of Referring: A Unified Approach Referring by Indexicals Referent Accessibility Accessibility and the Strength of Referring Referring 5.6.1. The Givenness Hierarchy 5.6.2. Accessibility Accessibility Theory 5.6.3. Classification Classification and Explanation 5.6.4. Intentions Again 5.7. Conclusions

251 251 256 262 267 271 271 272 274

x

Contents

8.3. Context Context and Markedness Markedness 8.4. Complementizer That in Contrast 8.4.1. English and Polish: A Surface Overview 8.4.2. Degree of of Clausiness 8.4.3. A Lambda-Categorial Lambda-Categorial Language and Sensitivity to Structure 8.4.4. The Application: Application: Defaults and Clausiness 8.5. Final Remarks: Remarks: What Languages Reveal and Hide

310 310 306 311 311 311 311 320 324 332 332

9. Denouement: Denouement: Double Occam's Razor Common Sense 9.1. The Semantics Semantics of Common 9.2. Beyond Propositional Attitudes 9.3. Final Remarks

335 335 336 337 337 338

Bibliography

341 341

Index

357

Preface The theory presented in this book is a voice in the ongoing debate concerning the semantics/pragmatics semantics/pragmatics interface which was set off by the controversy controversy ambiguity back in the early surrounding the cases of the so-called semantic ambiguity summarized as follows. 1970s. The main gist of my approach can be summarized Conversation relies on default interpretations, the hearer arrives at such a default interpretation without going through through the stage of choosing choosing between understandings of a 'semantically ambiguous' sentence. Pragmatic aspects of what is said are already present at the basic semantic level of utterance of interpretation. Together with the logical form understood as the output of grammar, they constitute the semantic/propositional representation of the utterance. This is what I call Default Default Semantics. Semantics. This semantic representation can be overridden, leading to various degrees of departure from the default. The Default Semantics is a reflection of intentionality that characterizes all mental acts. For the purpose of utterance interpretation, I demonstrate how intentionality intentionality can be translated into various types of intentions in communication. This theory sits mid-way between semantic semantic ambiguity and under'monoguist' label and 'pragmatic 'pragmatic specification but falls happily under the 'monoguist' perceived in dynamic approaches to communication intrusionism' as perceived communication such as Discourse Representation Theory. Theory. The approach is spelled out in the example of sentences reporting on propositional attitudes, and in particular reports on beliefs. The main ambiguity ambiguity I am concerned with is, is, naturally, the ambiguity exhibited by expressions used by speakers to refer, and the related species of the de re/de re/de dicto ambiguity ambiguity of belief reports. Hence, the book presents the theory of Default Semantics applied to puzzles associated with referring, signals its applicability to natural language negation and, albeit tentatively, other sentential connectives, as well as instances where where the more tentatively, completion of the sentence is needed before the hearer can arrive expansion or completion at a plausible candidate for what is said. It is hoped that future detailed studies phenomena classified as instances instances of semantic ambiguity or of particular phenomena underspecification will further strengthen its appeal. should be of interest interest to linguists of postgraduate and advanced advanced The book should philosophy undergraduate level, as well as other researchers in linguistics, philosophy of language, social anthropology and cognitive science. science. It can be read by xi

xii

Preface Preface

anybody interested of interested in the subject who has some elementary knowledge of linguistic balance between linguistic semantics, semantics, pragmatics, and first-order logic. The balance review sections and the exposition of the new theory makes it possible to level. All symbols use the book on a more advanced as well as a more basic level. and abbreviations used are listed below. Many people contributed contributed at various stages to the crystallization of this research conducted beginning with my doctoral research work, beginning conducted between 1988-1992 1988-1992 at the University of Oxford up to the present day. day. lowe I owe thanks to Kent Bach, Gordon Baker, Gillian Gillian Brown, Brown, Billy Clark, L. L. Jonathan Cohen, David Cram, Richard Richard Dammann, Michael Dummett, Vicky Escandell-Vidal, Rom Harre, Roman Kalisz, Ewan Klein, Barbara Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk, Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk, Peter Stephen Schiffer, Pieter Matthews, Richard Richard Matthews, Stephen Pieter Seuren, Barry Smith (SUNY), Timothy Williamson, and Deirdre Wilson. Wilson. My particular thanks go to Ken Turner, Turner, the co-editor co-editor of CRiSPI, CRiSPI, for reading the first draft and supplying some useful publications. To To Chris Pringle from Elsevier Science I am grateful for his support for the CRiSPI series. series. Finally, lowe I owe thanks husband Charles Berthon to my husband Berthon for his encouragement. encouragement. Some of the ideas included in this book, including including Default Semantics, have crystallized over the period period of several years of thinking about these issues. The consecutive stages of this research were reported in several journal articles. I owe thanks to several publishing houses for granting permission to adapt purpose of this relevant ideas and/or relevant sections sections of the papers for the purpose below. The book. In particular, I would like like to thank the publishers listed below. bibliographical details of the relevant papers are given in brackets. bibliographical Elsevier Science (,Relevance ('Relevance and Infinity: Implications for Discourse Discourse Interpretation'. Pragmatics 25 (1996), 703-722; 'The Interpretation'. Journal of of Pragmatics The "Default of De Re" Principle for the Interpretation Interpretation of Belief Utterances', Journal of Pragmatics 28 (1997), 315-336; 'Default Semantics, Semantics, Pragmatics, Pragmatics, and Intentions', Interfacefrom Intentions', in K. Turner (ed.), 1999, The Semantics/Pragmatics Semantics/Pragmatics Interface from Different Points of Different of View. CRiSPI, CRiSPI, vol. vol. 1, 1, 199-232);

Walter de Gruyter Gruyter (,Discourse ('Discourse about Beliefs', Beliefs', Theoretical Linguistics 24 (1998), 1-28); Julius Groos ('Reports ('Reports on Beliefs: Default Interpretations and Default of Literary Semantics 27 (1998), 31-42; 'Referring 'Referring in Intentions', Journal of Discourse: Referential Intention Intention and the "Taking for Granted" Principle', Principle', Journal of of Literary Semantics 27 (1998), (1998), 96-109);

Poznan (,De ('De Re/De Dicto: A Semantics of Adam Mickiewicz University, University, Poznan of Belief Sentences', Belief Sentences', Papers and and Studies in Contrastive Linguistics 28 (1993), 39-64).

Preface Preface

xiii

Semantics should should be seen as a step in the ongoing ongoing The proposed Default Semantics discussion rather than an attempt to overturn accepted truths. The affinities affinities neo-Gricean theory of implicature, default with the extant proposals of the neo-Gricean reasoning, and the neo-Fregean neo-Fregean approach to reference should be obvious. obvious. reasoning, To anticipate possible criticism, I should add that Default Semantics is theory. It is presented here as a new programme, an alternative not a complete theory. underspecification on the other. to semantic ambiguity on the one hand and underspecification It is a proposal of a theory and an attempt at its application to one area of language. It is hoped that this proposal will meet with some interest application to various and support and will be subsequently tested in its application fragments of various natural languages. 'Default intentions' and 'vehicles of thought' must remain partly justified theoretical proposals until humans can look into their neural states and say say with certainty what they see there. Cambridge, January 1999

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List of Abbreviations Abbreviations and Symbols 'conversationally implicates' truth-functional truth-functional negation truth-functional conjunction & & conjunction truth-functional -+, :) ->, 3 truth-functional implication V V universal quantifier (cf. (cf. 'all', 'every') existential quantifier (cf. 3 (cf. 'a', 'some') lSg ISg firstfirst person singular number 3Sg 3Sg third person singular number

+ +>>

accusative case Ace accusative with infinitive construction (fzccusativus ACI (accusativus cum infinitivo) infinitivo) demonstrative pronoun Dem DI Degrees of Intentions principle DRT Discourse Representation Theory DRS Discourse Representation Representation Structure fn footnote FoL first-order first-order logic generalized conversational implicature GCI genitive case Gen iff and only if iff if and if ILF interpreted logical form Ind Ind indicative mood Inf infinitive Inf instrumental case Instr logical form LF locative case Loc MoP mode of presentation MOR Modified Occam's Razor NP noun phrase Past past tense Pple past participle Past Pple PI Primary Intention principle POL Parsimony of Levels principle Pres present tense xv

xvi

Refl Refl Subj Subj SVO TCS VP wff wff

List of of abbreviations and and symbols

reflexive pronoun reflexive pronoun subjunctive subjunctive mood subject-verb-object word order subject-verb-object Theoretical Contrastive Studies verb phrase phrase well-formed formula well-formed formula

Introduction "We shall never get rid of the temptation temptation to perceive the universe as a secret script to which we stubbornly try to clue:' Kolakowski (1988: 118) find the clue." Kolakowski

Other people's beliefs can be creatures of darkness but only insofar as they are not expressed. This book is about ambiguities, beliefs, language, communication communication and cognition. It deals with the fundamental fundamental issue of the interpretation of the speaker's utterance expressing a belief and reporting on beliefs of other people in the form of oratio obliqua. obliqua. The main objective interpretation of of is to dispel the mystery associated with the process of interpretation utterances expressing beliefs and belief reports. The sentences under consideration consideration are of the form of (1) (1) and and (2). (1) (1) is an instance of an expression of of belief and (2) is a report on a belief. (1) (1)

The man in the brown hat is a spy. spy.

(2)

spy. Ralph believes that the man in the brown hat is a spy.

An utterance of (1) (1) potentially exhibits an ambiguity between a referential and nonreferential (attributive) reading of the definite description, and the belief report in (2) belief belief (2) is potentially ambiguous between reporting on a belief concerning a particular particular person that he is a spy (the de re re reading) and on Proper names, the belief about the situation situation as a whole (the de dicto reading). Proper although normally not analysed in terms of referential and nonreferential reading, are also used in referring to a known or an unknown individual, and this situation is reflected reflected in belief reports. Like definite descriptions, they can also be used in a mistaken act of referring, i.e. referring to somebody who does not hold that name. So far the problem of referential referential ambiguities has remained largely unresolved. Linguists tend to adopt one of the available stands ranging from the semantic ambiguity to the generality of sense. I develop here Kent ...) is ((...) ...) not part of of Bach's idea that "an expression's expression's referring function ((...) its semantic contribution to the sentence" (1987a: 58). I demonstrate that xvii

xviii

Introduction Introduction

referring is the default function function guaranteed by the referential referential intention (embedded (embedded in the communicative intention) and is transported transported to semantics by the intrusion of pragmatic processes before the propositional representation is formed by the hearer. This standpoint has far-reaching far-reaching implications for the notion of reference, reference, the sense of the term 'referring 'referring expression', and the theory of intensional contexts. The category of referring expressions has been a matter matter of controversy at least since Frege and Russell brought it to the fore. Definite descriptions, for instance, are sometimes classified together with quantifiers few, all, ...) and sometimes with quantifiers ~ome, (pome, few, all,...) with referring expressions (proper (proper names and pronouns). I follow Bach (l987a) (1987a) in classifying classifying them as referring referring expressions, for reasons to be spelled out shortly. shortly. On the topic of referring, it is argued here that it is a pragmatic phenomenon and it helps establish the semantic representation of a sentence by means of the intrusion of pragmatic processes. This intrusion is guaranteed by a communication, namely its intentionality. Intentions very important feature of communication, Intentions help establish one propositional form and enable an unambiguous unambiguous semantics. By semantics I mean here a semantic theory applicable to the particular speaker - an idea based on the following proposal from Larson and Segal (1995: 187):

important aspect of deciding when a semantic theory applies ""... ... an important to a given speaker will lie in deciding whether an axiom may truly be associated with a concept in the speaker's speaker's mind ((...) ...) and when it may not." This choice between axioms is in fact performed instantaneously by the hearer by means of intention recognition: the default interpretation guaranteed guaranteed by intentionality intentionality is always always tried first. In other words, it is presumed. (I) and (2) Differences in referring which are exemplified by the readings of (1) Differences These give rise to puzzles that are ample in the philosophical literature. These differences give grounds to the view view that belief expressions and reports on beliefs are referentially referentially ambiguous, the first as extensional contexts where individual or name whoever the expression used to refer can either refer to an individual or whatever holds the name, and the other as intensional contexts where the substitution substitution of coreferential expressions may produce a sentence with a different truth value. value. The referential referential ambiguity ambiguity in (I) (1) is is well acknowledged acknowledged names, in the case of definite descriptions but also seems to occur with proper names, no matter how directly referential referential we try to make them for semantic analyses. incorrectly, in the latter case In addition, both can be used correctly or incorrectly, engendering referential Now, the semantic/pragmatic perspective referential mistakes. Now, of discourse representation representation as opposed to a semantics of isolated sentences allows one to use information from intentions intentions in communication (Grice 1969;

Introduction

xix

Strawson 1964a; Recanati 1993; Burkhardt, ed.1990; ed. 1990; Bach 1987a, b, 1994a, b), default reasoning (Bach 1984; 1984; Lascarides and Oberlander 1993; 1993; Levinson 1995) 1995) and assumption recovery performed by the hearer (Sperber and laszczolt 1996a) in establishing the semantic representation Wilson 1986a; Jaszczolt of of these problematic constructions. I propose and defend the idea of default interpretations of belief reports and expressions of belief. Potential semantic ambiguities caused by referring terms do not in fact take place and this is due to the interaction of the semantic information (semantic representation of the sentence) and intentions in communication. This interaction produces a default interpretation, which which in practice reduces the putative semantic ambiguity to the case of (a) defaults in understanding and (b) overridden defaults producing a justified justified marked interpretation. Looked at more closely, defaults in the interpretation of belief expressions are ensured by intending intention. Naturally, to refer refer which I call the primary referential referential intention. Naturally, this primary intention interacts with other intentions in communication, to be spelled out in more detail in what follows (see also laszczolt Jaszczolt 1997a, 1999). Default Semantics is governed by three main principles which I call the Parsimony of Levels Levels (POL), Degrees of Intentions (DI), and the Primary Intention (PI):

POL:

Levels of senses are not to be multiplied beyond necessity. Levels

DI:

Intentions come in various sizes, i.e. they allow for degrees.

PI:

The primary role of intention in communication is to secure the referent of the speaker's utterance.

These principles summarize the idea introduced above, namely that the semantic representation of belief utterances is the product of the logical form (LF) and intentions in their default and non-default values. Some linguists call this level of representation propositional, to distinguish it from the underspecified semantics. In my account, these two levels are conflated and underspecification disappears, but so do ambiguities. If, as I hope to saying. The proposal show, this account works, works, its advantages go without saying. of the Default Semantics for apparent apparent semantic ambiguities is carefully defended throughout this book and is given formal support in the Discourse Representation Theory (DRT) of Kamp and Reyle (1993) (1993) which is a suitably 'intrusionist' model in that it allows for the incorporation incorporation of the pragmatic information in the semantic analysis (see Levinson 1988; 1988; laszczolt Jaszczolt 1998a). The reasons for utilizing utilizing DRT are twofold. First, it allows for a formal presentation of the dynamism of utterance interpretation that comes from the flow of conversation and the availability availability of new contextual information. Second, the idea of the interaction of intentions intentions in communication with the semantic representation is an improvement on DRT itself. It narrows

xx

Introduction

down the possibilities possibilities of interpretation interpretation of the speaker's utterance to one. Defaults in interpretation interpretation organize the multiple multiple possibilities of discourse discourse representation representation in DRT in a systematic way. Instead of talking about alternative we can now talk about the default discourse representation structures structures (DRSs), we DRS and departures departures from the default. In the research on referential referential ambiguities to date, attention has been focused on intra-theoretic philosophers (here principally the truthintra-theoretic concerns of philosophers preserving substitutivity of coreferential coreferential expressions, i.e. substitutivity salva veritate) and model-theoretic model-theoretic solutions in formal linguistics linguistics which which allow for a varying varying degree of contribution from pragmatics. The latter is still frequently voiced more as a credo than a sound proposal. A conversational approach approach that would account for the roles of the speaker and the hearer in meaning construction construction is badly needed. By By this I mean an approach that would reveal and utilize aspects of conversation that have have been neglected both in formal semantics and in philosophical discourse on the de re/de re/de dicto ambiguity of prepositional propositional attitude reports. Intentions Intentions in communication are one such aspect, vehicles of thought are another, and conversational data in a contrastive perspective yet another. This book deals with all three. In belief utterances utterances are analysed as sentences, other words, belief sentences, activities and cognitive processes, to allow for a wide wide understanding understanding of context. In this way, way, context acquires an epistemological grounding in corresponding corresponding carriers of thought: language, mental images, and actions. It goes without saying saying that this analysis analysis requires requires an important assumption of the universality universality of the semantics and pragmatics of language systems, or what Turner and laszczolt Universals Jaszczolt (1996: (1996: 5) discuss as the Semantic Universals Hypothesis and the Pragmatic Universals Universals Hypothesis: the semantic, as well as pragmatic, pragmatic, systems of the world's natural languages share at least some properties. This is a condition sine qua non for any semantic or pragmatic analysis which which aspires to cross-linguistic status. The intrusion of pragmatics, in the form of intentions, into establishing the semantic representation representation is at the same time a voice in the dispute concerning the semantics/pragmatics interface, interface, and a fortiori the dispute concerning the boundary between the two.

*** In more detail, the content of the chapters is as follows. The topic of the first chapter is the state-of-the-art in the semantics-pragmatics debate, followed by a critical assessment assessment of ambiguists and monoguists, culminating culminating in a proposal of the Default combination combination of the strengths of the two camps in the proposal Semantics in Chapter 2. 2. It is suggested that the POL principle restricts the usefulness of the concept concept of underspecified sense and leads to its replacement with the interaction of intentions of intentions with the LF on the level of

Introduction

xxi

semantic representation. Unambiguous semantics acquires a new meaning, dissociated from underspecification. Chapter 2 spells out the idea of semantic defaults and introduces the types types of intentions in communication. communication. It contains contains a discussion of the PI principle and the tenet that intentions allow allow for degrees, summarized in the DI principle. These degrees account account for various readings for potentially semantically ambiguous utterances. The idea of semantic defaults and principled departures from these defaults is dubbed the Default Semantics. It follows with the application application of the Default Semantics to definite of descriptions and signals its application application to other problematic domains of language. The POL principle is applied to definite descriptions, juxtaposing them with bona fide fide referring expressions and stressing their similarities. The referential referential intention is said to play an important important role in communication communication and secure the unmarked interpretation of a potentially semantically ambiguous sentence, which is summarized in the PI principle. This intention interacts with other intentions to produce a range of marked interpretations. It is also argued that meaning is established neither by the speaker nor by the hearer but rather in-between, in the process of assumption recovery and assumption construction construction in what is called here a 'doubly-dynamic' perspective of 'attack and and defence'. The proposal of the 'default de re' re* reading of belief reports receives epistemological support in Chapter Chapter 3 in the presentation of the association of intentions in communication with the intentionality tionaliry of mental acts. Intentionality secures default interpretations interpretations or 'jumping to conclusions' instead of 'thinking twice' or considering possible paths in which potential semantic ambiguity would, putatively, putatively, otherwise lead the interpretation. 'Putatively', because conversation without intentionality is inconceivable. Indeed, relevant mental states without intentionality are hardly conceivable either. Chapter propositional attitude Chapter 4 gets to the core of prepositional ascription. It contains a critical assessment of the debates surrounding the failure of truth-preserving substitutivity of expressions in the subject position of the embedded sentence of belief belief reports and combines it with a proposal proposal of the 'default de re' reading. This reading is supplemented with the enumeration enumeration of possible forms that the departure from the default can take. It is suggested that the substitutions made in conversation differ differ from the truth-preserving substitutions discussed in the philosophical philosophical literature. Some notion of sense is shown to be indispensable for the semantics of attitude reports and it is suggested that it takes the form of modes of presentation (MoPs) that can be of various degrees of detail and can make various degrees of contribution contribution to the semantic representation. Chapter 5 puts together the findings concerning referring properties of expressions and redefines the class of referring expressions by including definite descriptions in their default, unmarked reading. It contains some arguments for the degrees of strength of referring. Default Semantics is juxtaposed with the theories of Referent Accessibility and the Givenness Hierarchy. Hierarchy. Chapter Chapter 6 takes the lesson from from

xxii

Introduction Introduction

intentionality further into a discussion of the relation between utterances and beliefs. Language turns out to be one of the vehicles of thought, which allows practical sphere of conversation and answer the question us to jump to a more practical of of 'How do 1I know what you mean?' without the help of notoriously inapplicable inapplicable sociolinguistic generalizations. Meaning is carried by linguistic expressions, mental images, and actions and these vehicles ofthought of thought interact. As a result of this 'going beyond language', the notion of sense is extended to cater for all these vehicles vehicles and Husserl's term noema is adopted for it. The universality and culture-dependence of concepts concepts are also taken on board. Chapter Chapter 7 presents the theory of Default Semantics in the framework of DRT, emphasizing the strengths of intrusionism in dynamic semantics, as well as the weaknesses of DRT as a model that assigns equal status to all possible understandings of a potentially semantically ambiguous sentence. I1 understandings demonstrate how DRT can avoid this weakness when combined with the proposal of the Default Semantics. The degrees of referential intention are proposal translated into the levels of embedding of the discourse referent that stands for an individual in the DRSs. Continuing on a practical note, Chapter Chapter 8 looks into the properties of that-clauses in a contrastive Polish-English Polish-English perspective to find independent evidence for the default semantics of sentences reporting beliefs. This independent support is found in the unmarkedness of the Polish construction English construction which corresponds corresponds to the de re reading of English «>s." Here 1I make use negative sentences of the type "I don't believe that B cps." of of the idea of 'structured compositionality' and ditTerent different sensitivity to the structure of the that-clause exhibited exhibited by the complementizer that in its ditTerent different understandings. The final chapter sums up the results, points out plausibility of the Default Semantics, and otTers the common-sense plausibility offers some guided speculations speculations concerning other domains of apparent semantic ambiguity, with directives for the application of the approach developed here to their analysis.

CHAPTER 1

Semantic Ambiguities and and Semantic Underspecification "Razor, where is thy sting? Parsimony, where is thy victory?" victory?" Horn (1989: 432). 432).

Contents 1.1. Ambiguous Discourse? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2. Highlights from the Ambiguity Ambiguity Debates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2.1. Logical Form and Propositional Prepositional Representation ................... 1.2.2. Ambiguity Tests Tests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2.3. Ambiguity Ambiguity of of if i f ...... then? then! . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2.4. Ambiguity Ambiguity of of Negation? .................................... 1.2.5. Ambiguity Ambiguity of of and? and! . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 1.2.6. Ambiguity Ambiguity of Number Terms? Terms? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 1.2.7. Ambiguity Ambiguity of Definite Noun Phrases? .......................... 1.2.8. Ambiguity of Indefinite Indefinite Noun Phrases? ......................... Prepositional Attitude Sentences? Sentences? ................... 1.2.9. Ambiguity of Propositional 1.2.l0. 1.2.10. Interim Conclusions. Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 1.3. What Is Said . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 1.4. Towards Towards Delimiting Implicatures Implieatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 1.4.1. Neo-Griceans and and Ineradicable Conventions Conventions ..................... 1.4.2. Relevance Theory and Frames . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 1.5. Conclusions .................................................

DISCOURSE, BELIEFS, AND INTENTIONS Vol. 2 Current Research in the Semantics/Pragmatics Interface, Vol. K.M. Jaszczolt 1999 Elsevier Science Ltd. Ltd. All rights reserved © 1999 1

2 5 5 9 11 11 13 13 18 18 20 23 24 26 26 27 37 37 42 44

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Chapter Chapter 1I

1.1. Ambiguous Ambiguous Discourse? The invocation invocation in the motto sums up the current state of affairs in approaches approaches to ambiguities in utterance utterance interpretation. The boundary between 'what is said' and 'what is communicated' is drawn in a variety of ways. ways. The major standpoints standpoints can be classified as follows: (i) Some sentences are semantically ambiguous; (ii) There is no semantic ambiguity and the differences differences in meaning between understandings can be attributed the two (or more) understandings attributed to implicated information; (iii) There is no semantic ambiguity and the differences differences in meaning belong to what is said rather than what is implicated. Semantics is underspecified as to these aspects of meaning; (iv) There is no semantic ambiguity, ambiguity, semantics semanticsisisunderspecified, underspecified, but butthe the difdifferences in meaning belong to the middle level located between what is said and what is implicated. prominently, by Russell, the second The first standpoint standpoint is represented, most prominently, second by Grice, the third by Atlas, Kempson, Sperber and Wilson and their acolytes, and the fourth by Bach and Levinson, Levinson, albeit interpreting interpreting the middle level rather differently. The affinities affinities between (iii) (iii) and (iv) (iv) are significant. significant. The more so that the status of the 'middle level' is as yet somewhat dubious. Semantic ambiguity or underspecification has to be distinguished from lexical ('Let's go instances of grammatical ambiguity which which can be either lexical relatives can be boring'). Grammatical to the bank') or syntactic ('Visiting relatives ambiguity groups instances where the grammar provides two (or more) distinct interpretations. In the case of semantic ambiguity ambiguity or underspecification, the grammar renders one representation that corresponds of corresponds to various conditions of truth and falsity, i.e. various states of difference can be summarized as follows: whereas lexical lexical and affairs. The difference syntactic ambiguities result in sentences which can be unrelated and cannot be traced traced back to one meaningful representation, the so-called semantic ambiguities are characterized characterized by a general semantic representation from proposition can be derived by means which a truth-conditionally evaluable proposition of pragmatic pragmatic rules. rules. This avoidance of unnecessary ambiguities is best spelled out in Grice's (1978) Modified Occam's Razor (1978) principle of parsimony called Modified (henceforth: MOR): meanings) are not to be multiplied beyond MOR: Senses (linguistic (linguistic meanings) necessity.

Section 1

Semantic Semantic ambiguities and semantic semantic underspecification underspecification

3

(See Recanati 1989a, b; 1994 for a discussion). The merits of this methodological methodological principle are not to be doubted. However, its functioning functioning in utterance interpretation is unclear. Is it a rule that guards a semanticist from postulating unwanted entities or is it a generalization generalization on a stage in the process by which hearers arrive at a correct interpretation interpretation of an utterance? If If If the first, then it has not been successful, as the motto from Horn indicates. If the latter, what is the use of spelling out what is not there? The main objective of this chapter is a critical assessment of both the underspecification (sense-generality) (sense-generality) and ambiguity positions. It is argued here that neither is successful and neither of them is needed. The ambiguity ambiguity by followers of underspecification but it stance has been taken on board is time to critically assess the latter as well. Once the position of semantic underspecification is challenged, the rest of the book will be devoted to introducing a more successful alternative which is the theory of default interpretations and default semantics. One of the standard examples of alleged semantic ambiguity discussed in the literature involves involves negation. Sentence (1) (1) has two readings. (1) (1)

The present king of France is not bald.

of According to one, the existence of the king is negated. There is no king of France and hence he cannot be bald and the proposition is true. According to the other, more natural, reading, the property of being bald is negated and the sentence is sometimes seen as lacking truth value (Strawson 1950). According to Russell's standard interpretation, the sentence is ambiguous due to the fact that negation can take a wide or narrow scope as represented in (la) and (lb), (Ib), where where 'x' is an individual variable (cf. (cf. e.g. Neale 1990). (la)

-.3x --ix (King of France (x) (x) & Vy Vy (King of France (y) (y) -+ -* y = = x) x) & Bald (x» (x))

(lb) (Ib)

3x (King of France (x) (x) & & Vy Vy (King of France (y) -+ y = x) & & -.Bald -Bald (x» (x))

But (la) is not a good representation of the first reading. The wide-scope correspond to both readings: 'It is not true that that...' negation can correspond ...' can mean an objection due to the non-existence of the person as well as due to the fact that he has hair on his head. In fact, since the two types of negation are not logically independent but rather the second entails the first, first, semantic ambiguity should not be postulated postulated (cf. (cf. Kempson 1979). 1979). Instead, the hearer relies on pragmatic processes in establishing which understanding was intended by the speaker. In a more theoretical jargon, the semantic form is either general, underspecified, or corresponds to the logical form with

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Chapter 1I

the negation taking a wide scope (1 a). Pragmatic processes (la). processes work on it and establish the unique propositional prepositional representation. This propositional prepositional representation representation is an 'enriched' variant of the semantic representation representation and it is this propositional prepositional representation that can be assessed as to its truth and falsity. In current pragmatic pragmatic research, it has been widely acknowledged that the semantic representation representation can be underspecified and can be further further enriched by pragmatic processes according to Atlas's pastiche of Kant: "Pragmatic inference without sense-generality is blind, but senseAtlas (1989: generality without pragmatic inference is empty." empty." 124). 1997 for discussion.) Instead of selecting (See also Atlas 1979 1979 and Turner 1991, 1991,1997 multiple readings of a sentence, the hearer relies on the context in constructing one interpretation interpretation by filling in what is missing in the sentence meaning revealed by its grammar and lexicon. This is how pragmatic inference prevents ambiguities from arising. In fact, on this account, it does not make sense to say what it would mean for semantic ambiguities to arise: they are exorcized globally by means of a theory of discourse interpretation which assigns a (I) does not have a single powerful role to pragmatic processes. Sentence (1) set of truth conditions that could be assigned to it prior to pragmatic inference. An interpretation is assigned first and then truth conditions are clear. So, So, the fact that a sentence can be assigned two logical forms as in (1a) (la) and (1b) (Ib) does not yet mean that it has these logical forms, neither does it mean that it is ambiguous (cf (cf. Bach 1987a: 207). Now, we can go further and argue, by the same non sequitur, that the possibility of assigning more than one logical form does not yet mean that underspecified as to the meaning meaning and truth the semantic representation is underspecified underspecified sense seem an easy conditions. Underspecified semantics and underspecified (1). When a sentence has two readings as in (la) (1a) solution to cases such as (1). (Ib), and (1 b), and no satisfactory explanation of this situation is provided by spelling spelling out the logical form, i.e. by the scope of negation, there is no semantic ambiguity. It is assumed that semantic ambiguity ambiguity should rely on the existence of two independent of independent logical forms (see Kempson 1977, 1977, 1979; Kempson and Cormack 1981). 1981). Even if one accepts this theoretical assumption, one is forced Cormack to take a big leap from there to claim that the semantic representation is are only general, underspecified, underdetermined, vague, neutral - these are adjectives used in the relevant literature (see Zwicky and Sadock some of the adjectives 1975: 2 and Green 1996: 1). 1). In effect, one is committed committed then to the claim that there is no unique sentence meaning, and all there is, is, is utterance meaning arrived at through pragmatic processing. This seems to make the semantic layer somewhat weak and insignificant, as well as contradict contradict the common-sense intuitions concerning sentence meaning. While the rejection

Section 2

Semantic Semantic ambiguities ambiguities and and semantic semantic underspecification underspecification

5

of the semantic ambiguity of negation seems justified, it also seems to call for a more extreme move, that is a rejection of the level of underdetermined underdetermined semantics. It is easy to see the need for it when one entertains the possibility lunderdetermination dilemma is a wrongly posed posed problem. that the ambiguity ambiguity/underdetermination Horn's concern Returning to the success in implementing Grice's MOR, Horn's about parsimony parsimony seems to be justified. Ambiguity is exorcized exorcized from semantics, only to appear appear in the form of multiple possibilities of pragmatic pragmatic enrichment of the semantic representation. If If one avoids calling the relation (1) to its meanings by its name, one is forced to group (1) (1) together together with of (1) such instances of underspecification as (2) or (3), which is equally unparsimonious in that it places even more burden on pragmatic processes. (2)

I haven't eaten.

(3)

Steel isn't strong strong enough.

(from (from Bach 1994a: 268). At the same time, one pours out ambiguities together with the useful distinction between having two or three salient readings on the one hand, as in (1), (1), and having an infinite number of context-dependent enrichments as in (2) and (3). Parsimony, Parsimony, where is thy victory?

1.2. Highlights from the Ambiguity Debates 1.2.1. Logical Form and and Propositional Representation

In order to stress the drawbacks of postulating ambiguities, ambiguities, I would like to begin with the opening passage of Empson, Seven Seven TYpes Types of of Ambiguity: "In a sufficiently sufficiently extended sense, any prose statement statement could be called ambiguous. In the first place it can be analysed. Thus, 'The The brown cat sat on the red mat' may be split up into a series: 'This is a statement about a cat. The cat the statement is about is brown', and so forth. Each such simple statement may be translated translated into a complicated statement statement which employs other terms; thus you are now faced with the task of explaining what a 'cat' is; and each such complexity may again be analysed into a simple series; thus each of the things that go to make up a'cat' a 'cat' will stand stand in some spatial relation to the 'mat'. 'Explanation', by choice of terms, may be carried in any direction the explainer wishes; carried wishes; thus to translate and analyse the notion of 'sat' might involve a course of anatomy; 1). the notion of 'on' a theory of gravitation." Empson (1930: (1930: 1).

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Chapter 1

The debate concerning the relative limits of semantics and pragmatics exemplified by the heterogeneous set of examples including including quantifiers, negation, conjunction, conjunction, disjunction, disjunction, and implication, has been brought to the fore and and maintained by arguments of Wilson 1975; 1975; Kempson 1975, 1975, 1977, 1979, and Sadock 1975; Sadock 1984; Atlas 1977, 1979, 1989; 1979, 1986; Zwicky and Kempson and Cormack 1981; Sperber and Wilson 1986a; Carston 1994, Carston 1988, 1988,1994, 1996; Recanati 1989b, 1993, 1994; van Deemter and Peters, eds, 1996, to name 1993,1994; only a small representative sample. The commitment to sense-generality varies within this group and seems to be lower-bounded by an attempt to explain away 1985, 1988, 1989; Levinson 1988; unwanted ambiguities (Grice 1978; 1978; Horn 1972, 1972,1985,1988,1989; Atlas and Levinson 1981). First, a terminological clarification is due. The terms logical form, semantic representation and proposition have been used with various shades of meaning and scope. Logical form has undergone an interesting transformation since the introduction of intensional intensional logics to linguistics in the 1970s, primarily by Montague and Hintikka Hintikka (see Lycan 1984: 7-15). Sentence meaning was more and more often analysed in terms of of possible worlds. Logical forms written in terms of intensional intensional logic resemble the representations representations of surface surface grammar. Their raison detre dietre is to provide an unambiguous representation of the sentence. This representation makes it possible to specify what the world would have have to be like for the sentence to be true and what it would have have to be like for it to be false. In other words, logical give access to the theory of truth for the language. This theory of truth is forms give founded on Tarski's so-called 'convention T': it must contain instances of 'x 'jc is true if and only if p', where 'x' is replaced by a name that describes the logical if/?', form ofa (cf. Lycan Lycan of a sentence's'ofthe sentence V of the object language, and 'p' is replaced by's' (cf. 1984: 15; 15; adapted adapted from Harman). In other words, to follow Davidson's 1984: formulation, to know the meaning of a sentence is to know know the conditions under which the sentence would be true. A theory of truth constitutes a successful theory of meaning for Davidson (cf. (cf. e.g. 1984a), all we have to do is assign truth conditions to every sentence. There are two main problems with this account and both have to do with the meaning of 'meaning'. First, if 'means that' equals 'is true if and only if' if (henceforth: iff), iff), then not every declarative sentence will license such a substitution.1l The logical form may have have to be made more precise before truth conditions can be assigned. This was the case with examples (1)-(3) (l)-(3) above. Second, the psychological plausibility plausibility of the move of equating the theory of meaning with the theory of truth is somewhat strained. In Putnam's (1975b, (l975b, 3.7 below) below) example of H 20O and its Twin-Earth Twin-Earth equivalent equivalent see also Section 3.7 which has the chemical composition XYZ, XYZ, the sentence (4) (4) corresponds corresponds to the same content in the head of the Earthling and the Twin-Earthling.

1

I

Problems with with imperatives imperatives and interrogatives interrogatives will be left aside aside here. here.

Section Section 2

(4)

Semantic ambiguities ambiguities and semantic underspecification underspecification

71

Water is wet.

So, So, meaning is not in the head and semantics is not part of psychology. We require a theory of truth which will tie sentences with facts. Solipsistic semantics will not do (cf. (cf. Lycan 1984: 1984: 240). An independent motivation for this requirement requirement comes from the fact that natural languages languages are normally normally public, are shared in a linguistic community and one needs a common tool Davidson's to talk about about the content content of our propositional attitudes. Hence, Davidson's realism about truth seems to win over methodological solipsism. However, difficulty with the psychological significance the difficulty significance of this move has to be emphasized. The more so that if to know the meaning is to know the truth conditions of a sentence, then, as Davidson concludes, speakers would have to have tacit knowledge of these truth conditions. And yet there are many undecidable sentences, to mention only (5). (5) (5)

A city will never be built here.

1984: 251). 251). So, So, if meaning cannot always be explained with truth (from Lycan 1984: conditions, it presumably cannot cannot be equated with truth conditions either. The first difficulty difficulty is attended to by the followers of semantic underspecification in distinguishing semantic representation/logical form from from the enriched enriched propositional representation. representation. In fact, it was was also attended attended to by Grice (1975: (1975: 25) who recognized a limited amount of pragmatic processing that is necessary necessary before truth conditions are assigned. This processing processing consisted of reference assignment and disambiguation of grammatical grammatical ambiguities. So, So, propositional propositional representation differs from the semantic representation/logical form in that it is enriched by pragmatic processing. The second difficulty, i.e. of i.e. the psychological plausibility plausibility of the level of logical/semantic form, is not successfully attended attended to. to. There is no certainty that hearers go through the stage of an underspecified semantic representation which they subsequently fill in by pragmatic pragmatic processing. processing. The conflating of these two levels seems then a justified hypothesis hypothesis worthy worthy of closer terminological distinction, I shall investigation. Hence, as a preliminary terminological try the following. Semantic representation and logical form are not distinguished for the purpose of utterance interpretation as separate levels, but neither is propositional propositional representation. All of the terms are needed, we talk about semantic though. Whereas in utterance interpretation we representation, representation, or, in DRT terms, discourse discourse representation, representation, in analysing sentences we talk about logical forms as the output of grammar. Hence, there can be more than one logical form corresponding to the sentence sentence but only one logical form qua semantic representation corresponding to an utterance. This theoretical setup prevents one from saying that a sentence can be semantically ambiguous. Semantic ambiguity ambiguity means a commitment to the effect effect that a

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Chapter 1I

sentence has more than one semantic representation and this commitment is theorists. 2 And yet, rejected in agreement agreement with the underspecified-semantics theorists. ambiguity, no commitment to this underspecificity is made here. Logical ambiguity, on the other hand, is used with respect to sentences which allow for more representation in the language of first-order logic. This term does than one representation not involve any epistemological epistemological commitment: commitment: the fact that a sentence sentence can be ascribed ascribed a logical form does not yet mean that it has this logical form. Kempson (1986: that "... a sentence is ambiguous if with respect to (1986: 79) says that"... a single set of circumstances it can be both true and false". This is is not yet a semantic semantic ambiguity, ambiguity, although although we can freely call it an interpretative ambiguity. non-theoretic term (as 'Interpretative ambiguity' is intended as a loose, non-theoretic far as it is possible) meaning a difficulty difficulty with assigning a unique interpretation to an utterance, at least when taken out of context. Semantic form and logical form have to be distinguished distinguished for yet another another reason. On this account, semantic form, enriched by pragmatically pragmatically derived information, remains semantic form, when enriched a semantic form. Calling it by a different name (propositional (prepositional form) would signal a psychological reality reality of these two levels and force one to treat them as consecutive utterance interpretation. consecutive stages in utterance interpretation. This is too important important a commitment to be accepted without support, and in fact the onus of proof commitment proof seems to be on the side of the dualists. dualists. Hence, instead, we shall entertain the possibility that semantic representation can be enriched and remain semantic representation, representation, in contrast to logical form where talking of any enrichment would be nonsensical. nonsensical. LF is tied to the grammar of the sentence enrichment sentence whereas semantic representation is tied to utterance interpretation. Preserving which, in Sadock's this distinction is a remedy to radical pragmatics which, Sadock's words, confuses functional functional (pragmatic) descriptions of language with its structure, and attempts, mistakenly, to choose between the two: attempts, quite mistakenly,

... the radical pragmatist would be like an anatomist who, who, realizing ""... fly, loses all interest in the structure of their wings." that birds fly, Sadock (1984: 142). Sadock

Now, what does it mean to say say that semantic representation remains semantic when enriched? In a coarse generalization, it means that there are some general rules that make one of the interpretations unmarked, other interpretations. default, arrived at prior to (and instead instead of) any other interpretations. Independent support for the theory of semantic defaults constitutes the rest of of what follows. 2 2

See See laszczolt Jaszczolt 1999. 1999.

Section 2

Semantic ambiguities semantic underspecification Semantic ambiguities and semantic underspecification

9

1.2.2. 7.2.2. Ambiguity Tests Tests

Although underspecified semantics ended up confiating conflating Russellian bona fide underdetermination, ambiguities of the King of France type with bonafide there is no shortage of criteria for telling ambiguity and underspecification apart. But first, first, some more terminological clarification. Underdetermined Underdetermined sense and underdetermined underdetermined semantic semantic representation were explained explained above with reference to example (1). (1). When a sentence has two readings and the explanation of these two readings cannot be provided by two independent logical forms, then there is no ambiguity ambiguity but rather some other difficulty difficulty which is of an interpretative nature and which we tentatively called interpretative ambiguity in 1.2.1. Zwicky and Sadock in their seminal paper way, namely on ambiguity tests (1975) define ambiguity in precisely this way, namely as having several underlying semantic/logical representations. This is opposed to generality in the case of which the sentence has one single representation representation corresponding different states of affairs. The terms 'generality', 'vagueness', corresponding to different 'indeterminacy', 'non determination', 'indefiniteness of reference', 'neutrality', 'nondetermination', 'unmarkedness', 'lack of specification' (jbid.: (ibid.: 2) are treated as names for essentially the same phenomenon. Over two decades later, terminology still gives rise to confusions33 but some order seems to be emerging: sense-generality seems to signal the epistemological commitment to the inference into the truth-conditionally relevant intrusion of pragmatic inference (cf. Atlas 1989), underspecification is used with reference reference to representation (cf. logical forms (cf. (cf. van Deemter and Peters, eds the information carried by logical 1996), indeterminacy indeterminacy and underdetermination underdetermination tend to be used when utterance hearer is analysed (cf. interpretation as performed by the hearer (cf. Bach 1994a). But this is only a rough intuitive guide and the differences between the terms do not seem to carry any theoretical load. (8). Zwicky and Sadock (1975: 2-3) 2-3) contrast (6) and (7) with (8). (6)

They saw her duck.

(7)

He cooked her goose.

(8) (8)

My sister is the Ruritanian secretary of state.

of The first two are instances of ambiguity, ambiguity, whereas (8) involves involves a lack of specification as to the properties of the sister: sister: Is she younger or older than the speaker? When did she take up the post? And so on, perhaps ad infinitum. All of these examples involve involve differences in understanding and infinitum. difference is only a necessary but not a sufficient sufficient condition hence this difference condition 3

As a striking example of this see Zhang 1998.

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Chapter Chapter 1I

for ambiguity. of ambiguity. Zwicky and Sadock proceed to discussing various types of ambiguity tests. The Semantic Difference Difference test requires that the readings of the sentence have have very little in common for the sentence to count as ambiguous. The test of Contradiction Contradiction is more precise: 'dog' is ambiguous privative opposition4 to 'dog' as a male because 'dog' as a species stands in privative of representative of the species. Inconstancy Under Substitution Substitution of semantically related lexical lexical items also signals ambiguity. They add to this syntactic tests such as an argument from having two syntactic structures, disambiguation by transformation transformation (e.g. (e.g. 'Her duck was seen by them' as passivization applied to example example (6)), and, perhaps most importantly, importantly, the Test. According to the latter, conjunction reduction should be Identity Test. when the conjoined constituents have matching possible only when which is a result of the application of this test understandings, as in (10) which to (6) and (9).

(9) (10)

They saw her swallow.

They saw her duck and (her) swallow.

not arise for (from Zwicky and Sadock 1975: 1975: 18). 18). Crossed understandings do not ambiguous sentences, while while they are freely permitted for underspecification. 5 None of the tests is reliable, though. Identity tests prove to be too strict privative oppositions, for some types of constructions, constructions, including privative oppositions, neither do they work for some adverbials, metaphors, irony, jokes, or exaggeration. Crossed understandings are sometimes sometimes excluded although there is no of ambiguity involved and this fact is attributed to the interference of pragmatics.6

4 4 Privative opposites are terms joined by by the relation relation where one understanding understanding includes a specification specification which the other lacks. 5 5 This test has close affinities to G. G. Lakoff's Lakoff 's (1970: 357) test using the following following type of reduction: reduction: ''... ... and so did George','... George', '... and the same goes for for George','... George', '... but George wouldn't do so'. 6 6 This point was was elaborated elaborated further e.g. by Lascarides et al. al. 1996 who who claim that word punning effect effect in conjunction reduction (zeugma) is not a satisfactory test for lexical ambiguity. ambiguity. Some examples of juxtapositions juxtapositions of two senses work better better than others, which suggests that there is no ambiguity involved; the punning effect effect may be caused caused by syntactic or pragmatic factors as well as lexical-semantic. lexical-semantic. The authors authors allow for the 'pragmatic ambiguity' instead, perhaps perhaps better called called underdetermination of coherence coherence or an uncertainty of the rhetorical connection. connection. throughout Chapter 2, pragmatic ambiguity is an unjustified postulate However, as I demonstrate throughout discovering rules according to which default interpretations work. and can be avoided by discovering work. The explanation why why certain analysis of rhetorical structure structure of discourse falls short of providing an explanation certain interpretative rules are followed rather than others. Intentionality of mental states and a fortiori interpretative fortiori of linguistic linguistic expressions provides this explanation. of

Section 2

Semantic semantic underspecification Semantic ambiguities ambiguities and and semantic underspecification

11 11

1.2.3. Ambiguity of of if. i f . .... then?

The early history of the ambiguity debate also features features solutions to conditional conditional ....then') then') is frequently taken to mean a perfection where a conditional ('if ('if.. biconditional biconditional ('if ('if and only if') if) as in (11) (11) and (12). (11)

If five dollars. If you mow the lawn, I'll give give you five

(12)

If five dollars. If and only if you mow the lawn will I give give you five

(van der Auwera 1997: 1997: 169, 169, after Geis and Zwicky 1971). Sentence (12) (12) has an equivalent in a more common idiom of (13). (13)

I'll give five dollars just in case/only if you mow the lawn. give you five

This enrichment does not signal an ambiguity of implication implication in English. Geis and Zwicky claim that (11) (11) invites an inference inference to (14) (14) and this inference can be analysed as a straightforward Gricean implicature, triggered by Grice's (1975) Co-operative Principle. 7 (14) 7 7

If you don't mow the lawn, I won't give five dollars. 8 give you five

The Co-operative Principle: "Make your conversational contribution such as is is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged." Grice (1975: (1975: 26). The Maxims Maxims of Quantity: 1.1. Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of the exchange). 2. Do not make your contribution more informative than is required. The Maxims of Quality: Try to make your contribution one that is true: 1. Do Do not not say what you believe believe to be false. 2. Do not say that for which which you lack adequate evidence. The Maxim of Relation: Be relevant. The Maxim of Manner: Be perspicuous: 1. Avoid obscurity of of expression. 2. Avoid ambiguity. ambiguity. 3. Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity). prolixity). 4. Be orderly. orderly. Grice (1975: (1975: 26-27). 8 8 Van Van der Auwera Auwera discusses discusses conditionals that refer to states of affairs rather than epistemic or speech act conditionals (respectively) (respectively) of the following sentences (1997: (1997: 170): (i) If she's divorced, she's been married. married, (ii) John has left, in case you haven't heard.

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Chapter Chapter 11

pragmatic strengthenings which do not warrant Now, these inferences inferences are pragmatic semantic ambiguity. Van der Auwera (1997: 172) uses the idea of scalar ambiguity. Van implicature (see Section Section 1.4 1.4 and Levinson 1983: 132-147) to account account for this strengthening. His scales, however, are somewhat idiosyncratic. idiosyncratic. They contain contain whole sentences rather than a list of relevant expressions arranged arranged from the strongest to the weakest, because, as he says, pragmatic pragmatic scales cannot rely on units smaller than a sentence. Sentences (15) (15) and (11) (11) constitute such a scale: (15)

Whatever may be the case, I will give you five five dollars.

(11)

If five dollars. If you mow the lawn, I'll give you five

The fact that (15) (15) could have been used but was not, constrains the interpretation interpretation of (11). The reconstruction reconstruction of the interpretation interpretation of a sentence conditional looks as follows: if p, q, implicates that not: if p, p, q, p, q with a conditional r, q; if p, q and if s, q; q; etc.9,, that is only only if p, q. q. In neo-Gricean neo-Gricean and if r, pragmatics, this verbal parsimony is explained by Horn's pragmatics, Horn's (1984) Principle of Relation and Atlas and Levinson's Levinson's (1981) Priniciple Priniciple of Informativeness which limit the conversational contribution to what is necessary, i.e., to put it very crudely, crudely, to saying no more than one must. But resorting to informativeness is not very interesting because the sentence which is higher on the scale (here, (15» (15)) relies on the 'only' implicature implicature spelled spelled out as (13). 'Only' implicatures are derived from scales and from the principle of of Quantity, saying that the speaker says as much as he/she can, given the counter-balancing counter-balancing effect effect of the Principle of Relation. For example, the existence of the quantifier 'all' strengthens the meaning of 'some' to 'some and only some, not all'. In terms of the above reconstruction, reconstruction, we can say that 'if' 'if is strengthened to if and only if p, q, q, not if r, q; if s, 5, q; and so on. may, implication in English is not ambiguous, it is Be that as it may, pragmatically conditioned. conditioned. The speaker said as much as he/she could by indicating that p (here: mowing the lawn) five dollars. that/? lawn) will ensure the hearer five According income According to van der Auwera, no other activity will ensure this income because if it did, it would be suggested by the speaker. According to Horn activity will ensure this income because and Levinson no other activity because this particular activity was selected as salient and because this is how 'if' tends particular to work. The intricacies of this difference difference will not be relevant until Section 1.4. 9

Cf. van der Auwera (1997: (1997: 172-173) for acknowledgements to Horn, Ducrot and Cornulier.

Section 2

semantic underspecification Semantic ambiguities ambiguities and and semantic underspecification

13 13

1.2.4. Ambiguity of of Negation?

The identity test, and in particular Lakoff's version of it, is sometimes overly stretched to fit the current dogma. Atlas (1977, 1989) argues for the so-called (1977,1989) Atlas-Kempson Thesis, that is that sentences of the form 'The A is not B' 10 are not ambiguous but semantically general, non-specific or vague. vague.lO It is so because the narrow-scope predicate-negation predicate-negation entails the wide-scope sentence-negation. Now, Now, Lakoff's test is used in sentence (16): (16)

The King of France is not wise, and the same (thing) goes for the Queen of England.

(from Atlas 1977: 1977: 326; 1989: 1989: 76). 76). Atlas allows allows here for the crossed understanding and claims that (16) (16) is not anomalous. Atlas's intuitions on this point are by no means universally universally shared. If were, and if in addition If they were, the test was decisive, he would have a powerful argument against semantic presupposition that the King of France exists presupposition. For the presupposition exists to be present, negation has to be ambiguous and the test would clearly show that it is not. Facing the sea of uncertainties, Atlas maintains that the propositions corresponding corresponding to the sentence of the form 1\ A is not B' are Now, whether not its meanings; the sentence has one meaning and two uses. Now, the logical form of the sentence corresponds to the wide scope negation remains controversial. Atlas (1989: (1989: 69) concludes that sentences of the type 'The F is G' and 'The F is is not G' do not have traditional Russellian logical forms and their semantic representations are not logical forms. If If we were to go one step further and put forward a hypothesis of defaults in interpretation, the discrepancy between the logical form and the semantic representation would not have to be preserved and parsimony would win. The referential referential reading of definite descriptions would be produced automatically and so would the narrow-scope predicate-negation. predicate-negation. But all we can do at this stage is signal the hypothesis and point out its methodological strength by appealing to MOR and POL, also maintaining the definitions definitions of semantic representation and logical form put forward forward in Section 1.2.1. As was remarked earlier, the Russellian logical forms of sentences of the form in (1), presented in (1a) (la) and (lb) (Ib) above, reflect the difference difference in the scope of negation but cannot be treated as representations of the two readings: the wide-scope negation is compatible with both readings. Moreover, these logical forms are not utilized as steps in utterance interpretation. The speaker uses the sentence with the referential or the attributive understanding and 10

Atlas (1977) attributes these terms to Quine, Zwicky and Sadock, and G. LakotT, Lakoff, respectively.

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Chapter 11

these are not represented in the logical forms (1a) referential (la) and (1b). (Ib). The referential reading assimilates the description to the status of a proper name and, for our purposes, can be represented as (1c) (Ic) where 'k' is an individual constant constant standing for the person who is the king of France (cf. (cf. laszczolt Jaszczolt 1999). (1 c) (Ic)

-. - Bald (k) (k)

Russell's account does not provide for this reading. As it in addition places a strong requirement of uniqueness generally uniqueness on the described entity, it is generally regarded regarded as untenable. (1c) is theoretically theoretically important. It is also frequent in The representation in (Ic) the practice of utterance interpretation. This referential reading seems to have a different status from the wide-scope reading. reading. The suggestion suggestion that this interpretation is the default one conforms conforms to the intuition intuition that the sentence is problematic: either outright false, or neither true nor false due to not having having a referent. In a sense, the scope of negation comes later. later. Unlike the interpretation in (Ic), (Ie), the attributive reading with the narrow scope of of negation has to be justified by contextual information, information, and so does the attributive reading with the wide wide scope of negation. negation. The intuition intuition seems to support support the conjecture that the readings of (1) (1) do not have equal semantic standing. Hence, looking for supporting arguments for default readings readings is justified, and so is the search for default semantics semantics which, which, by MOR, if true, would be the best solution. To sum up, the semantic ambiguity ambiguity of negative negative sentences is a standpoint represented by several philosophers and linguists linguists such as Russell, Russell, Karttunen and Peters, and proponents of three-valued three-valued logics. It has its respectable roots in Aristotle's work. unitary work. But the dominant position nowadays nowadays is that of unitary semantics for negation, which which is a truth-functional or at least sense-general operator (cf. (cf. Horn 1989: 1989: 362). The rejection of ambiguity, as well as semantic presupposition and truth-value 1979, truth-value gaps, can be attributed to Atlas Atlas (1977, 1979, 1989), Kempson (1975, 1986), 1986), Gazdar Gazdar (1979), (1979), Carston (e.g. (e.g. 1996), 1996), and many others. Semantic presupposition has been successfully successfully accommodated accommodated to pragmatic presupposition or entailment entailment and implicature implicature (see Horn 1996). Now, Horn (1989: (1989: 308-309) argues that humans humans have have a tendency tendency to assign a lower-clause reading to a higher-clause higher-clause negation. negation. For example, (17) (17) normally normally requires a reading of (17a) (17a) rather than (17b). (17b). This is a psychological psychological trait, generalized in syntax syntax as a Neg-raising phenomenon. (17)

X does not believe that p. p.

(17a)

X believes that not-po not-/?.

(l7b) (17b)

It is not the case that x does believe believe that p. p.

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Semantic semantic underspecification Semantic ambiguities ambiguities and and semantic underspecification

15 15

In other words, contraries become assimilated assimilated to contradictories: p v q --. p, i.e. obeys the law of of becomes reinterpreted reinterpreted in speaker's mind as p vv-ip, excluded middle. In other words again, if something is not good, it is bad; there is a tendency towards simple contrast in our psychology. psychology. From the position of the hearer, then, contradictories contradictories are read as contraries. As Horn remarks, the embedded placement of negation may not be available at all, as indicated by the pair of French sentences in (18a) and (18b). (18a) (18a)

Je ne veux pas que vous sortiez. I don't want you to leave.

(18b) (18b)

??Je veux que vous ne sortiez pas. I want you not to leave.

(from Horn 1989: 1989: 311). 311). Since the lower-negation meaning entails the of higher-negation one, we have an instance of privative opposition opposition here, of Zwicky and Sadock's 'dog-canine' vs. of vs. 'dog-female' type. type. And in the case of privative oppositions, ambiguity is difficult difficult to maintain. The strengthening from the contradictory to the contrary performed by the hearer is said to be pragmatic, i.e. an instance of an implicature. It occurs frequently with 'weak', non-factive propositional attitude verbs, such as 'believe' or 'want'Y 'want'.11 This implicature does not have to be arrived at in utterance processing but rather is the default understanding (or, in the common jargon, the implicature is 'short-circuited' 12 and becomes a convention).13 'short-circuited'12 convention).13 The conclusion drawn above that neither the sense-generality sense-generality nor the ambiguity accounts are satisfactory satisfactory is not new. new. Horn signals clearly that both are partially correct. "Both views contain much insight and some truth, yet both are incomplete. While two distinct uses of sentential negation must indeed be admitted, the marked, nondescriptive variety is not a truth-functional or semantic operator on propositions, but rather METALINGUISTIC NEGATION an instance of the phenomenon of METALINGUISTIC NEGATION -- a device for objecting to a previous utterance on any grounds whatever, including the conventional or conversational implicata it potentially induces, its morphology, morphology, its style or register, or its Horn (1989: phonetic realization." (1989: 363). 11

As opposed to 'claim', 'regret', 'know'. Cf. Horn (1989: 325-6; 325-6; 345). The term was first used by Morgan. Morgan. See Horn (1988: 138). 13 13 It can also be seen as a result of application of Horn's R principle (Principle of Relation) 1.2.3 and discussed in more detail in Section 1.4 1.4 below. mentioned briefly in Section 1.2.3 11

12

12

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Chapter 11

Although there are two types of it, negation is not semantically ambiguous. ambiguous. Instead, there is a "built-in duality of use" (Horn 1985: 1985: 132), 132), or pragmatic pragmatic Instead, ambiguity. Context helps decide whether negation is descriptive or metalinguistic. Metalinguistic negation, a notion revived from Ducrot, does not fare well with the positions of Kempson, Wilson-Carston, Cormack, Wilson-Cars ton, Cormack, or Burton-Roberts, called by Horn the London London School of Parsimony (see truth-functional: it is Horn 1989: 432). The latter group see negation as truth-functional: the one-place propositional connective of Fregean semantics. The differences differences of interpretation of interpretation are said to contribute to the propositional form by means of pragmatic processes. Horn opts for what he calls the Mill-Grice view. By By metalinguistic negation, the speaker producing metalinguistic ""... ... conveys conveys an unwillingness to assert a sentence that would induce even though this sentence would be true a misleading implicatum, even Horn (1989: under these circumstances." (1989: 384).

Metalinguistic negation is then submitted to a battery of tests, e.g. from the behaviour of morphologically incorporated incorporated negation, polarity items, and the behaviour of 'but' (see ibid.: 392-413).14 392-413).14 Its main advantage over the sense-generality position is supposed to be eliminating of eliminating the multiplicity of thepropositions that can be engendered by various readings of negation: the multiplicity which is, in fact, a (semantic or pragmatic) ambiguity ambiguity in disguise. Ambiguity disappears for negation, only to reappear on the level of of propositions. However, whether there are strong advantages of postulating propositions. ambiguity another negation operator operator for English is not certain. After all, ambiguity reappears on the level of sentential operators operators and calling calling it pragmatic rather Finally, the difference will not yet get rid of it. Finally, than semantic semantic will difference between the metalinguistic negation and that of truth-functional negation position of metalinguistic operating operating on enriched propositions (Carston 1996) is not as important as truth-functional but operates it is claimed to be. Carston Carston says that negation is truth-functional operates on 'echoic use' of language. For example, example, the behaviour of polarity items items in (19a) and (19b) signals that in (19b) material is 'put in quotes' and then (19b) material negated: the negative polarity item 'ever', otherwise otherwise standard in such sentences, is not present. (19a) is an instance of descriptive descriptive negation, i.e. descriptive use of the material in the scope of the negation operator. 14 14

Cf. (i) and )\ is not X but Y'construction Y' construction is admissible for and (ii) (ii) of of Horn (1989: 408). Only the 'A metalinguistic metaJinguistic negation. (i) He's not tall, but very tall. (ii) *He's not tall, tan, but he's very tall. McCawley (1993: 190) observes, (i) is standardly negation and hence But, as McCawley standardly used for contrastive negation the duality of the operator is dubious, as his example in (iii) (iii) demonstrates (p. 190). (iii) John drank not coffee coffee but tea. tea.

Section 2 Section

Semantic ambiguities and and semantic underspecification underspecification

(19)

Mary is sometimes late.

(19a)

She isn't ever late; she's always always punctual.

(19b)

She isn't sometimes late; she's always always punctual. punctual.

17 17

(from Carston Carston 1996: 324, my emphasis). We We are still left with descriptive or of echoic negation, redefined as the 'duality of use'. This time the focus of explanation explanation falls on the negated material, material, i.e. the. the use of a proposition. truth-functional The major weakness weakness of this account is obvious. Negation is truth-functional on one hand, but operates on propositions which can be enriched by just about any type of information: information: intonation, register, grammar, non-linguistic communication, and so on, perhaps ad infinitum. infinitum. And, ... when ""... when we we bear in mind what a truth function must be a function function view that negation is of, we recognize the implausibility in the view truth-functional." (1989: 434). invariably truth-functional." Horn (1989:

ambiguity from semantics and both admit a All in all, both solutions eradicate ambiguity duality of use: one assigns it to the negation operator, and the other to the prepositional content of the negated material. As McCawley (1993: (1993: 204) propositional observes,'metalinguistic' & function of negation rather than than rightly observes, 'metalinguistic' seems to be a/unction operator when when one wants its form and it is only natural to employ the negation operator to convey convey objection to the proposition proposition on any grounds. We We can conclude that semantic ambiguity ambiguity is either still there in a new disguise, or dispensed with at the cost of opening the Pandora's box of heavy context-dependence. In sense-generality necessary. neither case is sense-generality A different different attempt attempt to eradicate eradicate ambiguity has been very recently proposed proposed (1998: 293, 293, fn 17). 17). He suggests an improvement to Carston's Carston's by Geurts (1998: and Horn's proposals and says that negation negation of the linguistic form of an is not just echoic use or metalinguistic negation but rather negation expression is aimed both at 'linguistic objects' and 'objects in the world'. It seems that levels of senses are treated with parsimony here. As a result, negation is not However, it is as yet necessary to wait for further developments ambiguous. However, of this idea in order to assess its validity. The idea may prove to draw on the common-sensical claim in cognitive linguistics that negation is a cognitive universal.15 IS Negation is a universal concept which, although further divisible or gradable, does not allow for ambiguities. 15 15

Cf: Cf: ""... ... negativity may be partly (...) in terms of spatial/topological relations partly conceptualized (...) relations and BLOCKAGE or RESISTANCE, RESISTANCE, ABSENCE ABSENCE rather rather than PRESENCE, image schemas such as BLOCKAGE rather than MORE, DISJOINING rather than CONJOINING, SPLITTING rather rather than LESS rather Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk (1996: 34). COMBINING, etc." Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk

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Chapter Chapter 1I

1.2.5. 7.2.5. Ambiguity of of and? and ?

In addition addition to implication and negation, sentential conjunction also seems to invite a conclusion conclusion of ambiguity. ambiguity. Sentences (20a) and (20b) clearly differ differ in truth conditions. (20a)

They got married and had a baby.

(20b)

They had a baby and got married. married.

The test of of embedding p&q and q&p q&p under the scope oflogical of logical operators operators such as implication implication and negation negation demonstrates demonstrates it even more clearly, as in example (21): (21):

(21) (21)

If the old king died of a heart attack and a republic was declared If Sam will be happy, happy, but if a republic was declared and the old king died of a heart attack attack Sam will be unhappy.

Carston 1988: 1988:172; 1971: 54). In addition addition to the straightforward (from Carston 172; cf. Cohen 1971: logical conjunction, the sentential connective and can mean a temporal conjunction ('and then') and consequential or causal conjunction ('and conjunction is exemplified in the therefore', 'and as a result'). The logical conjunction standard standard understanding of sentence (22), (22), and the causal one in (23): (22) (22)

I ate cheese and drank wine.

(23) (23)

key and the engine started. started. I turned the key

exorcized here rather As in implication and negation, ambiguity is exorcized consistently across the board, albeit by means of different different tests and solutions. The particular meaning of the connective and can be arrived at through pragmatic enrichment. The logical conjunction reading and the temporal/causal, temporal/causal, enriched, meaning are not functionally independent, the latter development of the prepositional propositional form of the first, and hence, latter is the development 1.3 by this criterion (Carston (Carston 1988, 1998a), there is no ambiguity.16 ambiguity.16 Section 1.3 flaws in this criterion, but this weakness does not change will expose some flaws change the orthodoxy concerning the unary, unary, non-ambiguous semantic status of and. and. always work or Since the test of functional independence either does not always 16


Section 2

Semantic ambiguities ambiguities and and semantic underspecification underspecification

19 19

has to be regarded as rather vague and intuition-based intuition-based (cf. (cf. Carston 1998a), Recanati (1989b) proposes an overtly intuitive criterionY criterion.17 Recanati agrees with Grice that postulating semantic ambiguity is methodologically pragmatic processes unsatisfactory and says instead we should allow for pragmatic to contribute to the semantic representation of the utterance. In other words, we can only tell whether pragmatic he subscribes to MOR. But he says that we pragmatic information is necessary as enrichment if we already know what is said. intuitively: And this is circular. Instead, the enrichments are determined intuitively: of "In deciding whether a pragmatically determined aspect of utterance meaning is part of what is said, that is, in making a always try to preserve decision concerning what is said, we should always our pre-theoretic intuitions on the matter." Recanati (1989b: 106).18 106).18 He calls this suggestion the Availability Principle. Its usefulness for drawing the boundary between semantics and pragmatics need not interest us until Section 1.3. In addition, Recanati revives revives the so-called Scope Principle suggested by Cohen in 1971 1971 (see example (21)) and accepts the following: following: "Scope Principle: A pragmatically determined aspect of meaning is part of what is said (and, therefore, not a conversational implicature) if - and, perhaps, only if - it falls within the the scope of logical operators such as negation and conditionals." conditionals." (1989b: 114). Recanati (1989b:

Sentential conjunction is not so straightforwardly truth-functional, truth-functional, though. A propositional representation was needed in great deal of adjustment of the prepositional order to accommodate accommodate the thesis of unitary semantics. Carston (1988, (1988, 1994) resorts to the argument from the enrichment of the original logical form constraint (functional dependence of the two prepositional propositional forms) and to the constraint" 17 17

Recanati rejects Carston's Independence Independence Principle because it seems seems not to work for some examples. For instance, in the example below, below, talking about a party, B replies to A and the reply carries an implicature which entails what is said: 'Somebody was there'. So, implicature which So, the Independence Principle does not work (adapted from Recanati 1989b: 111). 111). there, Jim was there. A: If If anybody anybody was there, was there - I saw B: Somebody was saw John going there. Implicature: Jim was there. 18 18 So, we appeal to common sense, as So, what is said is consciously accessible accessible - and in delimiting delimiting it we 1997. This conclusion is undermined some experiments seem to prove, cf. Gibbs and Moise 1997. by another set of experiments, cf. cf. Nicolle and and Clark 1999. 1999. Also, we must allow for speakers' intuitions to be fuzzy at times.

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Chapter Chapter 1I

on this enrichment coming from relevance theory. theory. Sperber Sperber and Wilson's communication that keep the (1986a) two counter-balancing principles in communication processing effort effort and the cognitive effect effect in tandem, ensure that the effort effort of processing the utterance is not unnecessarily great but rather is constrained constrained by the informative value of the communicated assumptions: any expenditure utilize knowledge of of must be justified. In such processing, we are said to utilize stereotypical stereotypical situations, frequently used scripts (Carston 1994: 691). 697). I shall say more about the role of this principle in Section 1.4.2 1.4.2 (see also e.g. Wilson and Sperber Sperber 1986a).

1.2.6. Ambiguity of of Number Terms?

Numerals are also potential candidates for semantic ambiguity. ambiguity Sentence (24) can correspond correspond to the state of affairs in which Max has three or more children, or only exactly three, as the respective developments in (24a) and (24b) demonstrate: (24)

Max has three children.

(24a)

Max has three children, and in fact he has four altogether. altogether.

(24b)

Max does not have have three children, he has four.

It is commonly held that e.g. 'three' in (24) is logically bound to mean 'at least pragmatically bound to mean 'at most three' or 'exactly three' (cf. three' and pragmatically e.g. Horn 1985; 1985; Levinson Levinson 1988; 1988; Kempson and Cormack 1981). On the other numerals a weak, weak, underdetermined hand, the sense-generality sense-generality account allows allows numerals underdetermined sense and accommodates the natural, upper-bounded 'at most' understanding understanding of of (25).

(25) She can have have 2000 calories without putting putting on weight. weight. It also accommodates the necessity necessity of the punctual 'exactly n' of «' meaning of

'three' in (26) which would be nonsensical nonsensical if 'three' meant 'at least three'. (26) which (26)

More than three people came.

(both examples from Carston 1998b: 1998b: 204). However, sense-generality sense-generality is not the most successful option. Punctual «') seems to work at least equally equally well, semantics for numerals ('exactly n') and in addition it seems to be more in the spirit of MOR by avoiding avoiding the postulate of an additional level of generality. First, if n had the semantics of symmetrical of 'at least n', «', then 'at most' and 'at least' would not have symmetrical

Section 2

Semantic ambiguities and semantic semantic underspecification underspecification

21 21

functions: 'at most' would mean the numbers below and including the stated number, and 'at least' would suspend the implicature derived from Grice's first maxim of Quantity (or its neo-Gricean derivatives, see Section 1.4.1 below). Sentence (24) also fares happily with the punctual semantics, and so do sentences with obvious collective readings such as (27) where downward entailments do not arise: (27)

Three boys carried a sofa up the stairs.19

Distributive readings may not carry downward entailments either, as in example (28). (28). And yet, sentence (28) has upward entailments: failing four or five five times will also exclude the addressee. (28)

If If you fail three times, you're excluded. excluded.

(both examples from Koenig 1993: 143). Punctual 1993:143). Punctual semantics is best suggested by sentences expressing expressing measurements measurements such as (29) and (30) which do not seem to have downward or upward entailments, although judgements here may vary: vary: it is possible to think up situations where the entailments will hold. (29)

John weighs weighs 200 lbs. Ibs.

(30)

This book costs $20.

(both examples from ibid.: 144). Koenig argues that punctual semantics is also a satisfactory point of departure for interval interpretations. If we we interpret interpret 'three' in terms of a set of cardinality 3, 3, downward entailments will follow (cf. ibid.: 146-147). anyway: the predicate holds for each element of the set (cf. Greater informativeness informativeness is tied to the property of being a proper proper subset of Greater of set, so Grice's submaxim "Make your contribution as informative as is a set, required" (cf. (cf. 1975: 26) is satisfied for the set reading?O reading.20 "Submaxim of Quantity: If If the truth set of a sentence A is a proper proper subset of the truth set of a sentence B, B, A is more informative than B." Koenig (1993: (1993: 147).

So, So, uttering (24) implicates that Max does not have four children. Finally, involving the relative scope of numerals also seem to point to examples involving punctual semantics. Sentence (31) is said to have four readings (Kempson 19 19 20 20

(27) does not entail that two or one boy carried the sofa upstairs: they carried it together. The relevant neo-Gricean neo-Gricean principle, Horn's Q Principle is also satisfied. It essentially says 'Say as much as you can (given that you shouldn't say more than you must)'. See Section 1.4.1.

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Chapter Chapter 1

and Cormack 1981: 267). The two most obvious ones are listed as (31a) (3Ia) and (3Ib). (31b). The collective meaning in (3Ia) (31a) appears appears to be more natural than the other. In (31a), 'between them' sounds sounds redundant, redundant, whereas 'each' in (31b) is informative. But this judgement, like many other intuitions on ambiguity, ambiguity, contexts (31) will perfectly well be taken has a very limited use. In some contexts to mean (31b), (31b), for example as an answer to (32): (31)

Two Two examiners marked six scripts. scripts.

(31a)

Two Two examiners marked (a set of) six scripts between them. them.

(31b)

Two examiners examiners marked (some or other) six scripts each. each. Two

(32)

How many examiners managed to mark more than five five scripts in a day?

The set reading of (31) (31) consists of a group of exactly exactly two people marking a group of of exactly six papers. By Koenig's Submaxim of Quantity, Quantity, this is the most plausible reading. Also, intuitively, (3Ib) (31b) only makes sense as an answer to (32) if 'six' means 'exactly SiX'.21 six'.21 Permutations of scope and collective and distributive distributive readings also render other, more context-dependent, possibilities (see ibid.: 267). Other natural language quantifiers quantifiers are also potential candidates for semantic ambiguity. ambiguity. 'Some' can mean 'some but not most/all' or 'some and perhaps most/all', that is it can be bilaterally (cf. 'exactly n') «') or bilaterally bounded (cf. respectively. The analysis of 'some'does 'some' does not quite quite follow that lower-bounded, respectively. (25)) of the number terms, though. Scale-reversal to 'at most' (as in sentence (25}) does not seem to occur (Carston 1998b: 1998b: 211) 211) and the 'not all' meaning may well be a mere implicature. However, intuitions intuitions do not seem to be reliable as in here: we can envisage a situation is which which'some' 'some'means means'some 'some or or less' less'as in (33): (33): (33)

Some small bars of chocolate are allowed allowed every now and then without making you put on weight.

heavily: there is Examples of the type (25) and (33) should not be relied on too heavily: a sense of negation or denial in this type of construction ('You mustn't eat than... . . if you don't want to get fat.') and hence the implicature may more than. be derived from the construction construction as a whole whole or from the verb 'allow' instead. 21

Kempson and Cormack adhere to the 'at least' interpretation and an underspecified semantics. Cf.: [31] is true if for at least two examiners examiners there is some relationship "We wish to say ((...) ...) that [31] relationship between specifying that there is between them and at least six scripts that were marked but without specifYing a necessary relationship between any any particular members of the set of examiners examiners and any particular members of the set of scripts." Kempson and Cormack (1981: 270). particular 21

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Semantic ambiguities and semantic underspecification underspecification

23

In fact, it has also been claimed that different different types of expressions allow for different semantics: some default to the 'exactly' meaning and some to 'at least'. different Geurts (1998) ascribes this alleged state of affairs to the 'semantic transfer' of transfer'of meaning which may result in lexicalization. For some expressions, ... the 'exactly' sense is primary, while in others it is the 'at least' ""... category I would place cardinal sense which is basic. Into the first category expressions and perhaps determiners like afew, a few, while while adjectives like warm, warm, bad, and intelligent would go into the second category!' Geurts (1998: category." (1998: 296). So, five', while 'an intelligent woman' is not So, 'five books' means 'exactly five', incompatible with her being a genius. genius. Expressions under discussion are standardly called scalar in that an assertion of a weaker expression, e.g. e.g. 'hot' (see Section 'warm' implicates that the stronger does not hold, e.g. 1.4 1.4 below for a discussion of scales). Now, postulating different different default senses for different different expressions may seem a costly move. move. Geurts convincingly convincingly argues, however, however, that the lexicon allows for such varieties of senses and we must not expect uniformity with respect meaning. There is is nothing methodologically to the 'at least' and 'exactly' meaning. unparsimonious with simply admitting that this is what the language is like. But it seems doubtful that predicates really conform to Geurts's classification. classification. lexeme-specific precision of meaning seem difficult difficult to Unitary negation and lexeme-specific reconcile on the basis of arguments such as that denying that it is warm does five sisters may mean not mean that it is hot, whereas denying that one has five five. More about it in Section 2.6 that one has more than five. 2.6 below.

1.2.7. Definite Noun Phrases? 7.2.7 Ambiguity of of Definite

Throughout this chapter discussing and in effect effect contesting the chapter I have been discussing idea that the underspecified semantic representation always always functions as a interpretatively ambiguous cognitively viable step in the analysis of interpretatively expressions. The MOR indicates that semantics is uniform and is supplemented with accounting for any differences in meaning meaning by means of pragmatic principles. principles.22 Definite descriptions, that is definite noun phrases in sentences sentences of the type (34), allow for two interpretations: the referential referential proper names (about a particular particular person, e.g. one which makes them akin to proper 22

22

Gricean, neo-Gricean, neo-Gricean, or relevance-theoretic, to be discussed in more detail in Section 1.4.

24

Discourse. beliefs, beliefs. and and intentions Discourse, intentions

Chapter Chapter 11

Mr Jones), and the attributive one which makes them about whoever or whatever satisfies the description description (about whoever Smith's murderer may be. See Donnellan 1966; Neale 1990). (34) (34)

The murderer of Smith is insane.

The ambiguity of reading is best seen as an interpretative ambiguity. ambiguity. It has been regarded as pragmatic (see e.g. Kripke 1977), 1977), although the exact pragmatic component placement of the pragmatic component differs among current approaches approaches (cf. Schiffer Schiffer 1995a). According to the sense-generality account, definite descriptions have have a unique, underspecified semantic representation which which is further pragmatically pragmatically enriched into a prepositional propositional form before being assigned a truth value. But postulating indeterminacy here is equally unsatisfactory as maintaining semantic ambiguity. ambiguity. Before resorting to indeterminacy, it has to be investigated indeterminacy, investigated whether both readings have equal semantic status. If one is unmarked and more basic than the other and if if this unmarkedness manifests itself on the level of semantics, sense-generality is a redundant redundant level of interpretation. interpretation. This markedness is investigated in Section 2.5.3.

1.2.8. Ambiguity of Indefinite Noun Phrases? of Indefinite

Indefinite noun phrases are mainly used as indefinite descriptions. The latter are sometimes claimed to have even more readings than definite descriptions. For instance, sentence (35) (35) is frequently said to have a specific reading which is postulated as a reading intermediary intermediary between the referential and the attributive. It describes the case where where the speaker does not intend the hearer to individuate the person (cf. (cf. Ludlow Ludlow and Neale 1991; Larson and Segal 1995). (35) (35)

visit. A friend of mine from Oxford paid me a visit.

The use of an indefinite signals that the identity of the person spoken of is not relevant for the purpose purpose of the conversation. However, However, indefinites indefinites do not seem to exhibit semantic ambiguity. ambiguity. The use of an indefinite serves [1] the identity of the referent is unknown the purpose of saying either either that [1] to the speaker or [2] [2] it is known to the speaker but irrelevant for this particular discourse either because the hearer would not know the referent referent particular anyway, or because whoever it is, it is only the indefinite description that matters. Therefore, rather than postulating manifold ambiguities, MOR and POL suggest two interpretations: specific and nonspecific, which is, after after all, a well well acknowledged acknowledged and established established distinction distinction (see Kamp and Reyle 1993). So, So, indefinite descriptions can be used specifically or

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25

nonspecific ally. The specific use signals that the speaker is talking about a nonspecifically. individual or object and that this individual individual or object particular, known individual is either taken to be new to the hearer or its identity is irrelevant for the conversation. The nonspecific use signals that the speaker is talking about an unknown individual or object. The difference between the specific and nonspecific nonspecific use is truth-conditionally decisive in the examples where it triggers the ambiguity ambiguity of scope as in (36) (from Kamp and Reyle 1993: 1993: 279), where on one reading there is one particular particular problem that preoccupies all politicians, and on the other reading every politician has some problem or other that preoccupies him or her. (36)

A problem about the environment preoccupies every serious politician.

However, the ambiguity of scope seems to be engendered here by the quantified expression 'every politician'. Therefore the argument about the truth-conditional impact of the reading of an indefinite NP is not decisive. Hence, Ludlow and Neale's (1991) (1991) distinction into referential, attributive, and specific use of indefinites appears rather contentious. In order to postulate it, the authors had to interweave interweave a change of perspective from that of the recognition of the speaker's intentions by the hearer to that of the speaker's background knowledge, knowledge, which is methodologically spurious. Attributive and referential readings are presented as straightforward straightforward cases of the recognition of the speaker's intentions intentions by the hearer. In the specific use, more than the intention has to be recognized: the hearer knows that the speaker knows the person talked about and that the speaker does not intend to communicate this information. Ludlow and Neale distinguish here the speaker ground, the proposition meant, and the proposition expressed. A different different account will be tried in Section 2.5.4, according to which the change of perspective is unnecessary. communication in terms of the unnecessary. It is an account of communication referential, communicative and informative intentions. After all, the aim is to analyse the process of utterance interpretation and the establishment of meaning by the speaker and not the differences between the speaker's background knowledge and speaker's meaning. The perspective is that of the hearer recovering the speaker's intentions and thus of the language use rather than that of the totality of cognitive processes involved in utterance interpretation. In other words, there are only two readings that specific and matter: specific and nonspecific nonspecific seen as intended intended as specific and nonspecific. nonspecific. The totality of the speaker's thoughts and attitudes is irrelevant. The confusion confusion is still rife in the literature but it is important not to run the two perspectives together.

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Chapter Chapter 1I

of All in all, the grounds for ambiguity are even weaker in the case of indefinites than in that of of definites. But equally weak are the reasons for underspecification.

1.2.9. Sentences? 7.2.9. Ambiguity of of Propositional Attitude Sentences?

Sentence (2) of the Introduction, repeated repeated here as (37), is commonly regarded readings. 23 A similar question as ambiguous between the de re and de dicto readings. should be asked here: are propositional propositional attitude sentences semantically ambiguous? Are they underdetermined? The common, albeit not fully reliable, intuition seems to be that sentences of the type of (38) and (40) are standardly known person: standardly taken by the hearer to be about a particular, known referential and the belief report report in (40) is de reo the description description in (38) is referential re. (38) and (40) would normally trigger trigger a question as in (39): (37)

Ralph believes that the man in the brown hat is a spy.

(38)

The best architect designed this church.

(39)

Really? Who was it?

(40) (40)

Sally believes that the best architect designed this church.

(cf. ambiguity (cf. laszczolt Jaszczolt 1998d and Klein 1981). 1981). This seed of doubt concerning ambiguity and at the same time underspecification is all that is required to trigger an default, intention-based semantics, investigation into our third possibility: possibility: default, 3. to be returned to in Chapters 2 and 3.

1.2.10. Interim Conclusions Conclusions

conclusion that emerges from this section is that both ambiguity ambiguity accounts accounts The conclusion and underspecification accounts have their weaknesses. There is a third position available, that is the one according to which which there are default interpretations of seemingly semantically ambiguous sentences. Presenting interpretations the case for these defaults will will constitute most of what follows. 23

See Introduction and laszczolt Jaszczolt 1997a. 1997a, 1998d.

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Semantic ambiguities ambiguities and semantic semantic underspecification underspecification

27

1.3. What Is Said

This section is essentially a review review of the current standpoints concerning what is said. said. The status of what is said is still subject to debate. Grice (1978) suggested that in the case of utterances that exhibit an ambiguity of of interpretation which cannot be attributed to the lexicon or grammar, what is said should be regarded as the same in the two readings, whereas the conversational implicatures are different. It has been argued since then that what is said is better seen as semantically underdetermined. So, So, for instance, the difference between the referential referential and the attributive reading of definite descriptions is placed on the level of what is said because what is said is underdetermined (Recanati 1989b). The degree to which semantics is reduced and pragmatics enlarged remains in dispute. I have introduced briefly the idea of traditional semantic ambiguity, ambiguity, as well as unitary semantics supplemented of by implicatures, and sense-general semantics where pragmatic aspects of meaning contribute to what is said. A distinction is made here between the semantics of natural language and the semantics of the conceptual conceptual representation system, with pragmatic factors factors bridging the gap. gap. Pragmatic Pragmatic factors are understood as contextual information plus the pragmatic principle of co-operation, including an account of speaker's intentions. The process of of supplementing the semantic representation is called completion (or saturation) and expansion (or strengthening; strengthening; Bach 1994b; Recanati 1989b 1988). I shall examine the ideas of expansion respectively. See also Carston 1988). and completion, as well as arguments in favour of and against placing them concluded in this section that expansion under what is said. It will be concluded sense-generality.As Asaaresult, result,aafourth fourth solution solution and completion do not warrant sense-generality. is required and here I shall propose non-ambiguous, unitary semantics achieved through the interaction of the speaker's intention with the logical form of the expression, as put forward in Chapter 2. We have established that the boundary between semantics and pragmatics is difficult 157) exposition, some ofthe difficult to draw?4 draw.24 To To use Lyons's (1987: (1987:157) of the options can be put as follows: follows:

(1) (1) (2) (3) (3) (4)

24

SEMANTICS SEMANTICS concerns meaning concerns competence concerns conventional aspects of meaning is a matter of rules

Cf. also the discussion in Cole (1981: xiv). xiv).

PRAGMATICS PRAGMATICS concerns use concerns performance concerns non-conventional aspects of meaning is a matter of tendencies, principles, maxims or strategies

28

(5) (5)

(6) (7) (8)

Discourse, beliefs, beliefs, and and intentions

Chapter 1I

deals with truth-conditional deals with non-truth-conditional non-truth-conditional meaning meaning; PRAGMATICS == MEANING MEANING -- TRUTH TRUTH CONDITIONS deals with non-literal meaning deals with literal meaning concerns the interpretation of concerns concerns the meaning of interpretation of sentences utterances utterances deals with context-dependent deals with contextcontext-dependent independent meaning independent meaning

Most of the pragmaticists pragmaticists I have discussed assume (5) (5) and distinguish between truth-conditional truth-conditional semantics and a narrower linguistic linguistic semantics which is the output of grammar: word meaning plus the structure structure in which the words are involved. Unless stated stated otherwise, semantics will mean here the wider, truth-conditional semantics. semantics. of Grice distinguished three types of implicature which differ differ in the degree of departure departure from the semantic content of the utterance. First, particularized particularized conversational conversational implicature is the furthest from the semantic content as it depends on the situation. Second, generalized conversational implicature is closer closer to the semantic content, being context-independent. Finally, conventional implicature takes care of the lexical meaning which does not conventional contribute contribute to truth conditions and hence it properly belongs to linguistic semantics. I shall now discuss this distinction between what is said and what is implicated implicated in more detail, beginning with an attempt to define what is said. said. Kent Bach (l994a) (1994a) observes that people often speak loosely, loosely, non-literally, appropriate and efficient efficient to do so. so. To To repeat a familiar and it is often more appropriate example: the mother utters (41) (41) to reassure a child who cut his finger: finger: (41)

You're not going to die, Peter.

(from Bach 1994a: 267). It is unlikely that the child will conclude that he is add "... going to live forever. Why didn't the mother add" ... from this cut"? Because it was obvious that this is what she meant. But the point remains that what she said differs from what she meant; she was not speaking literally. She used the sentence non-literally, non-literally, although she did not use any figures of speech; speech; no part of the sentence was used non-literally. This type of leaving words sentence-nonliterality literality or 'loose talk'. Similarly, sentence (42) out is called sentence-non means that the speaker hasn't eaten recently, in the past few few hours, rather than ever in his or her life: (42)

I haven't eaten.

(from Bach 1994a: 268). It is quite a common feature of talk that we leave words out and rely on the hearer to infer their meaning.

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ambiguities and and semantic underspecification underspecification Semantic ambiguities

29

In the case of the two examples just mentioned, we say that the sentences proposition with clear truth conditions: that have literal meaning, express a proposition respectively. This the boy is immortal, and that the speaker has never eaten, respectively. is called the minimal proposition, expressed by the sentence but not identical with what the speaker meant. The speaker meant an expansion expansion of this minimal respectively. proposition, such as these in (41a) and (42a) respectively. (41 a) (41a)

You are not going to die from this cut, Peter. You

(42 a) (42a)

I haven't eaten breakfast today.

Bach also distinguishes another phenomenon, quite similar to expansion, exemplified in (43). (43)

Steel isn't strong enough.

(from (from 1994a: 268). This sentence does not express a complete complete proposition, proposition, there is no way of specifying its truth conditions. It is semantically underdeterminate. This is an instance of semantic generality, generality, non-specificity, non-specificity, better known as semantic underdetermination. underdetermination. Naturally, we assume that indexical references are fixed, fixed, and ambiguity and vagueness are resolved in all these examples. The meaning of the sentence provides here only a propositional radical, which requires completion to become a full so-called propositional proposition. For (43), this completion completion involves stating: strong enough for Underdetermination differs in this respect from non-literality, where what? Underdetermination proposition expressed is complete, but minimal. Here, what the speaker the proposition propositional radical, and what the speaker means is the completed says is the propositional proposition. A slogan from Bach (1994a: 269) renders it most succinctly: ... with sentence non-literality a minimal proposition proposition is fleshed fleshed ""... out; with semantic underdetermination a propositional radical is filled in." Grice, in distinguishing what is said and what is implicated, did not not talk about expansion and completion. But the recognition of the material required for expansion and completion completion relies on the same pragmatic process as the 269-270). So, recognition of the implicature (cf. (cf. Bach 1994a: 269-270). So, before the hearer said. calculates the implicature, he or she may have to flesh out or fill in what is said. This is done by means of the same pragmatic, inferential inferential processes. All that Grice observed (1975: (1975: 25) is that we need some pragmatic processes on the level of what is said to assign reference to indexicals and disambiguate expressions. The rest, including expansion and completion, he would classify as implicature. This does not satisfy satisfy post-Griceans:

30

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Chapter Chapter 1I

""... ... there is no line to be drawn between what is said and what is implicated. implicated. Instead, there is considerable middle ground between them:' them." Bach (l994a: (1994a: 270).

We have three options as to the classification of expansions and completions saturation): (also known as strengthening and saturation): (i) Gricean, as implicature (Grice 1975); (ii) Relevance-theoretic, Relevance-theoretic, as explicit content of utterances (Sperber and WIlson Wilson 1986a; Carston 1988); (iii) Bach's, as middle ground (Bach 1994a). For Grice, what is said is closely related to the conventional meaning of the sentence, and hence he has to treat these elaborations as implicatures. For relevance-theorists, these elaborations elaborations are not implicatures; they are explicit Carston 1988), they belong to what is said. Here we can include Sperber Sperber (cf. Carston and Wilson, Carston, and Recanati. This seems intuitively intuitively plausible. Grice's notion of what is said is rather narrow: as what is said is always always close to the word meaning and sentence meaning, metaphor metaphor and irony are classified by him as "making as if to say" (Grice 1975: 1975: 30). So, So, we have (a) what is said, (b) making as if to say, say, and (c) (c) implicatures - including including even conventional meant. And, implicatures which do not belong to what is said but to what is meant. for Grice, what is said entails entails what is meant. Hence, he suggests 'making saying one thing and meaning another, in the case as if to say' instead of saying of metaphor. metaphor.25 In fact, what Grice calls 'what is said' is better named 'what explicitly stated', extending the notion of saying saying to allow allow for saying saying that is explicitly (i) the speaker means what he says says plus something else, (ii) (ii) says one thing and means something else, or (iii) anything. (iii) says says something without meaning anything. Now, Bach says says that expansion and completion on the part of the hearer which is richer than the explicit result in the hearer constructing a proposition which explicit explicitly stated by the speaker. He calls this enriched content of what was explicitly proposition impliciture, comparable to the relevance-theoretic explicature, proposition but defined by Bach not as part of what is said:

"Implicitures go beyond what is said, but unlike unlike implicatures, which are additional propositions propositions external to what is said, implicitures are built out of what is said." Bach (l994a: (1994a: 273). 25 25 Nota bene, bene, for Grice, metaphor is an implicature, which is puzzling, puzzling, because it is not an (cf. Bach 1994a: 272). 'addition' to what is said (cf. 272).

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Semantic ambiguities ambiguities and and semantic semantic underspecification underspecification

31 31

They constitute the middle ground: they are not implicatures, but neither do they belong to what is said. There is another problem with Grice's notion of what is said. He claims that the essential meaning of certain lexical items constitutes a conventional implicature rather than part of what is is said - e.g. in 'but', 'therefore', and perhaps also 'manage'. And it is so because these words do not contribute contribute to truth conditions of the sentence. Bach claims that, in fact, what is said does include the connective 'but': comparing 'but' with truth-functional conjunction is unnecessary. unnecessary. Also,

"For example, in 'Bill managed to finish his homework', the "For truth-conditional content includes both the finishing finishing and the entailed difficulty." Bach (1994a: 289, 289, fn 14). In the case of connectives, we can quite successfully successfully say that they convey some (cf. ibid.: 277). illocutionary act (cf. So, So, the main criticism of Grice's notion of saying is that it is too strong: it saying something and meaning something. does not distinguish between saying If we weaken the notion of saying, saying, we can include non-literal utterances as acts of saying something, rather than 'making as if to say'. But this is not to deny that saying is closely related to sentence meaning: it should normally be arrived at compositionally, with added disambiguation and reference assignment to indexicals, if needed. All the rest of what we called filling fleshing out belongs to the 'middle level' - between what is filling in and fleshing is said and what is implicated. It is this middle level that Bach calls an impliciture. Let us now have a closer look at this middle level of meaning. The minimal proposition in (44) is obviously true. What is meant is stronger, provides more information. In (45), (45), the minimal proposition is obviously false. What is meant is logically weaker. (44)

I have had breakfast.

(45)

Everybody went to Paris.

278). This process of fleshing out a minimal proposition proposition (from Bach 1994a: 278). (or: expansion, lexical strengthening) amounts to logical strengthening in first, and logical weakening in the second case, or some other process the first, as in (46) that adds presumed 'before': (46)

I have eaten chocolate [[+ + before].

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Chapter Chapter 1I

(from ibid.: 279). The middle level level is not unanimously recognized. To To repeat, repeat, Recanati Recanati (l989b) (1989b) and Carston (1988), (1988), and, generally, generally, pragmaticists working within relevance theory, theory, subsume it under 'what is said'. Recanati calls it 'pragmatic constituents of what is said', and Sperber and Wilson, and mainly Carston, call the enriched proposition an explicature. Bach argues that we need to preserve the middle level in order to be able to distinguish between saying and and stating - and and between sentence meaning and and speaker's meaning. There are also other problems with subsuming subsuming the middle middle level under what is said. Let us imagine imagine that by uttering (42) (42) the speaker means (42b). (42) (42)

I haven't eaten.

(42 (42b)b)

I haven't ever eaten in my life.

So, So, the minimal proposition is (42c): (42c) (42c)

There is no time prior to the time of utterance at which which the speaker ate.

Here we we are made to imagine that these words are uttered by a robot in a science-fiction story. story. Then, what is said would would have have to differ differ from one case to another, or, if what is said is the expanded proposition, then what is meant counterintuitive. So, is less than what is said. And this is counterintuitive. ""... ... I am not disputing the idea that underlies [the] [the] contention that there are pragmatic aspects to what is said as well as to what is implicated ((...), ...), but in my view view these aspects are properly regarded as pertaining to what is implicit in what is said." Bach (l994a: (1994a: 280)26 280)26 The category of filling in, i.e. semantic underdetermination, is rather hazy. It is defined as sentences expressing expressing propositional radicals as in (47): (47) (47)

I am too tired

for what?] [+ for

(1994a: 286) do not seem to be Some examples used by Bach (l994a: underdeterminate: (48) (48)

The lamp is old

[+ relative relative to what?]

(49) (49)

John wants a taxi

[+ to do what with?]

26

References to Recanati and internal quotation are omitted.

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33

Sentences (48) and (49) seem to be less plausible examples of the category than 'I am too tired', which is very obviously incomplete. incomplete.27 So, So, Bach concludes that Grice's distinction between what is said and what is implicated requires amending. It can be done by adding the middle level of of expansion or completion. But his classification of types of expansion and completion is at best ad hoc and controversial (see ibid.: 284-287). 284-287). As a result, allocating these pragmatic processes to a putative 'middle level' seems to be insufficiently insufficiently supported. supported. Let us now have a look at the approaches which include the expansion and completion in what is said instead of postulating the middle level. level. According to Grice, the propositional of propositional form results from the conventional meaning of the sentence, as well as disambiguation and reference assignment assignment to referring expressions. But as we know from Bach, propositions propositions may require expanding or completing, so these processes have to be added to those recognized by Grice. Carston (1988) handles the problems with the proposition explicitly proposition explicitly expressed (explicature) as follows. follows.28 The discussed additions are not merely implicatures; without the completion, it would not be possible to tell what would make the sentence true or false. Hence, they belong to the explicature (or impliciture). As was mentioned in Section 1.2.5, Carston suggests that explicatures are functionally independent from implicatures, and also that the process of enrichment of the logical form should not be extended unnecessarily so as not to include what is truly an implicature (cf. (cf. Carston Carston 1988: 156). This independence means that the truth conditions of the explicature and the implicatures are independent of each other. Sentence (51) (51) is an answer to (50) (50) and utilizes utilizes an implicature in (52). (52). It is called an implicature because (51). its truth conditions differ differ substantially from these of (51). (50)

Have you read Susan's book?

(51)

I don't read autobiographies. autobiographies.

(52)

The speaker [of 51] 51] hasn't read Susan's book.

In general, implicatures are said to have distinct propositional propositional forms and function independently of the explicature. The question remains, how big a contribution pragmatic processes make to the propositional propositional form (explicature). (explicature). As was demonstrated demonstrated in Section 1.2.5, even the meaning of and can be regarded as part of an explicature. If If the 27

Semantic underSemantic underdetermination underdetermination has to be distinguished distinguished from ellipsis. ellipsis. Semantically underdeterminate sentences sentences do not have have syntactic gaps. 28 28 Explicature is also known as the propositional form of the utterance, which is a narrower term of Sperber and Wilson's. 27

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Chapter 1I

temporal meaning was an implicature, then the implicature would entail the more general (logical '&') explicature and there would be no need to store both in memory. of memory. Therefore, instead, it is better to assume the criterion of functional independence independence and say say that 'and then' belongs to the explicature. Now, Now, Carston says that causal and also exhibits sense-generality and allows for pragmatic contribution to the logical form, although it would be difficult difficult to envisage any slots in the logical form which require filling in. in.29 In general, there need not be such slots for adding information to the logical form. form. The propositional prepositional form may be syntactically syntactically complete, and fully fully truth-evaluable. But the proposition proposition expressed is very likely to be more precise, so the form requires (in Bach's terms) further expansion as in (53) (53) and (54): (53) (53)

The park is some distance distance from where where I live.

(54) (54)

It will take us some time to get there.

164, my emphasis). So, (from Carston 1988: 1988:164, So, the explicature intuitively requires examples. Otherwise the speaker this specification of distance or time in these examples. would not be co-operative, i.e. relevant or informative. Now, Now, calling all this embellished content 'proposition expressed' or 'what is is said' just because because explicature may seem somewhat the implicature should not entail the explicature (1986a: 182) 182) say, unnatural. On the other hand, as Sperber and Wilson (l986a: say, explicitly communicated assumptions are these which are developments of of the utterance's logical form - its is its semantic representation. And this this is we can go on adding details. intuitively plausible but not formally constrained: we Hence, they employ the principle of relevance to constrain this elaboration of of the logical form: the effort effort spent in processing the utterance and the gain in 30 information must go hand in hand. hand.3o relevance does not seem This postulate of constraints imposed by relevance sufficiently sufficiently informative in that it is difficult difficult to see how the postulate of of which is tied to the principle principle of relevance relevance can be used the upper bound which in practical calculations of pragmatic effects. And, neither Bach's middle level suffice for postulating postulating the level of of nor the above suggestion seem to suffice intrusion a underdetermined semantics. Whether we call the pragmatic intrusion middle level or pragmatic aspects of the explicature, explicature, the semantics remains a separate, underspecified, level of analysis. analysis. If it is is to be regarded as a mere theoretical construct, it is uninteresting uninteresting and methodologically methodologically redundant. If If it aspires to a psychologically psychologically plausible plausible stage in utterance processing, then psychologically redundant. redundant. Psychologically, it is both methodologically and psychologically Psychologically, because there is no independent support for its existence. 29 29 30 30

For temporal and, such slots are easier to envisage: envisage: we we can quantifY quantify over times. More discussion of relevance relevance theory theory will follow in Sections 1.4.2 1.4.2 and 2.9.

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35

Carston sees linguistic semantics as a sub-part of truth-conditional semantics. The linguistic sense (also known as logical form, semantic propositional form which is representation) often does not give a full prepositional truth-evaluable. Expanded or completed completed logical form does, but expansion and completion are pragmatic processes. They are pragmatic and at the same time subsumed under truth-conditional semantics. She evokes another standard standard test to support her point, namely falling within the scope of logical operators such as negation, disjunction and the conditional (see example (21) in 1.2.5 above). This does not prove the correctness of the explicature view either. This test was used by Cohen (1971) to propose rich semantic content of e.g. 'and' with cancellable features of 'then' or 'as a result'. So, So, the test is not conclusive. As was signalled in Section 1.2.5, the principle of functional independence is not a precise criterion; in fact, it does not always work. work. Recanati (1989b) approaches the issue of implicature in the following way. way. He agrees with Grice that when the sentence seems semantically ambiguous, then rather than assuming two two literal meanings, we we prefer a pragmatic account - this is dictated by MOR. Then, these pragmatic aspects may have to contribute to what is said:

"."... .. it is no longer possible to contrast 'what is said' with those aspects of the interpretation of utterances that are pragmatically rather than semantically determined; for what is said turns out to be, in a large measure, pragmatically determined. Besides the conversational implicatures, which are external to (and combine with) what is said, there are other nonconventional, non conventional, pragmatic aspects of utterance meaning, which are constitutive of what is said." (1989b: 98). Recanati (1989b:

There are three levels of meaning: sentence meaning, what is said, and what is communicated. So far Recanati agrees with Carston. Now, Now, as to the criteria for distinguishing conversational implicatures from pragmatic constituents of what is said, he opts for an intuitive basis of recognition of what is said 31 1.2.5 above and his Availability ).). All in all, Recanati (cf. Section 1.2.5 Availability Principle31 disagrees with Bach's claim that we should take the minimal proposition as what is said and say that the speaker speaks non-literally. 31 31

The Availability Principle Principle accounts accounts for what was standardly standardly called generalized generalized conversational conversational implicature, subsuming subsuming it under implicature, under what is said as in (i) and (ii): (i) Tom has [exactly] three children. children, (ii) Tom Tom studied studied at Oxford or Cambridge Cambridge [but not both].

Discourse. beliefs. Discourse, beliefs, and and intentions

36

Chapter 1I

Levinson (1995: (1995: 90) also talks about three levels levels of meaning but the processes of utterance interpretation are classified in yet another way: way: (a) sentence meaning, (b) utterance-type meaning, and (c) (c) utterance-token meaning. The middle level level consists of, among others, generalized conversational implicatures:

"This third layer is a level of systematic pragmatic inference inference based not on direct computations about speaker-intentions, but rather on general expectations expectations about about how language is normally normally used. These

expectations give rise to presumptions, default inferences, inferences, about both content and force ..." Levinson force..." Levinson (1995: (1995: 93).

This level also includes conventions of language use. When the default meaning is conveyed, conveyed, the hearer stops at the level of utterance-type, i.e. the default, preferred interpretation, without going to the effort effort of considering the speaker's intentions. Levinson of Levinson talks here about default interpretations of utterance-types, governed by his heuristics heuristics of the type: type: "Marked descriptions descriptions warn 'marked situation'" (f.bid.: (ibid.: 97), as in sentence (55). (55). In (55), the degree reliability is lower than in (56): of reliability (55)

The mail is not unreliable.

(56)

The mail is reliable.

(from ibid.: 105). In view of this addition of the level of of default meaning, the differences between the views of Carston, Recanati, and Bach are considerably reduced: conventions may may have to be allocated a more considerably significant place. To sum up, the controversies in the semantics/pragmatics boundary dispute concern solutions to the following problems:

(i) how many levels of meaning there are; (ii) how they are to be defined; and (iii) what criteria to use to distinguish distinguish implicature from what is said. As yet, we have have found no sufficient sufficient argument in support of the thesis of the lavish pragmatic input into what is said. A fortiori, the questions (i) to (iii) different answer to the ones discussed above. And, with with a different different beg for a different kind of answer, answer, we may try a different different kind of theory which which does have independent independent support, such as Default Semantics suggested in Chapter Chapter 2.

Section 4

Semantic ambiguities and and semantic underspecification underspecification

37

1.4. Towards Delimiting Delimiting Implicatures 1.4.1. Neo-Griceans and and Ineradicable Conventions

In the preceding sections, occasional vague reference has been made to Grice's principle of co-operation, Levinson's principle of Informativeness, and Horn's principles of Quantity and Relation. These and other post-Gricean approaches require a more detailed discussion in order to delimit implicatures with respect to what is said. Only then can we attempt the semanticization of the contentious layer that falls between bona fide fide implicatures and bona fide fide semantic content. 18) Discussing the role of context in the study of meaning, Stalnaker (1998: (1998:18) observes that the traditional Gricean view is still very plausible, namely that one should invest in the study of conversation as a rational activity activity instead of overburdening semantic theory. But overburdening semantics does not ambiguities. Allowing Allowing context to necessarily mean positing semantic ambiguities. contribute to the semantic representation in an unguarded manner is equally overburdening as unjustified unjustified ambiguities. For Grice, the boundary between what is said and what is implicated was quite clear. What is said contains meaning, what is implicated is truth-conditional aspects of meaning, non-truth-conditional. Implicatures can be conventional, attached to particular words words such as 'but' and 'manage', or, more importantly, non-conventional with a sub-category sub-category of conversational conversational implicature. These can arise either independently independently of the context or be engendered by the contextual information.32 Conversational implicata are calculable through the Co-operative Principle and the maxims of conversation. 33 Now, even if the general idea retains its appeal, the strict boundary between the propositional prepositional content and implicatures proved to be untenable. The only pragmatic processes allowed by Grice to contribute to the semantic representation were reference assignment and grammatical disambiguation (see Section 1.2.1 1.2.1 above). above). As we know now from the attempt to delimit what is said, the pragmatic intrusionism is much more omnipresent if we want to retain the idea of semantic representation as a truth-conditional representation. The subsequent attempts to improve on the set of Grice's maxims also had to account for this difficulty. difficulty. Horn (1984) (1984) revives Zipf's Principle of Least Effort Effort from the 1940s to generalize over the tendencies in human communication and stresses the dialectic opposition between 'speaker's economy', using as few few words for

32 32 33 33

See th~ 121). the diagram in Horn (1988: 121). See fn 7 in Section 1.2.3 1.2.3 above.

38

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Chapter Chapter 1I

concepts as necessary, and 'auditor's economy', using as many expressions expressions as messages to make the communication clear. This revival results in the Q messages revival Principle and the R Principle, briefly referred to in Section 1.2.3: 1.2.3: The Q Principle: Principle: Make your contribution sufficient. Say as much as you can (given R) The R Principle: Principle: Make your contribution contribution necessary. Say no more than you must (given Q). (adapted 13). The Q Principle is a lower-bounding principle: (adapted from Horn 1984: 1984:13). if the speaker speaker says that some people came to the party, an upper-bounding upper-bounding implicature implicature to the effect effect that not all (invited) people came is induced. It is a principle of maximization of the informational content and it gives rise upper-bounding: saying that I broke to scalar implicatures. The R Principle Principle is upper-bounding: a finger implicates that the finger was mine. mine. It is is a principle of minimization of form. According to this principle, the use of a marked expression such as a renders a marked complex, more effortful effortful one when a simple one is available, renders marked Now, whether the scales that arise interpretation, interpretation, i.e. gives rise to implicatures. Now, out of Horn's Q principle such as < ....>, >, < < .... . . two, three, four, four,.. < and, or> are truly context-independent context-independent is a moot point. Matsumoto Matsumoto (1995) (1995) stresses that the choice of a weaker expression over a stronger one can sometimes be attributed attributed to the observance observance of maxims other than Grice's Quality and Quantity-I, Quantity-1, and then the implicature does not arise. The critique is perhaps perhaps not a very powerful one since Grice's sub-maxims seem to be well distributed between Horn's two principles34,, but the allocation of an arising implicature between implicature to Grice's sub-maxims does not seem to be testable anyway anyway once we assume Horn's over-arching principles. The pragmatic theory would have to be overly Horn's methodological point point of view to fine-grained and overly transparent from the methodological keep delivering explanations below the level of Q and R. Levinson (1987) (1987) follows the same pattern of amendments to Grice, adding a distinction distinction of the minimization of form and minimization of content. content. Semantically general expressions are said to be preferred to specific expressions, and shorter expressions to longer ones. The Q-implicature is taken from Horn (1972) (1972) and Gazdar Gazdar (1979), and I-implicatures are the result of the Principle of Informativeness Informativeness of Atlas and Levinson (1981): "The "The 'best' interpretation of an utterance is the most informative one consistent with what is non-controversial" non-controversial" (Levinson 1987: 1987: 66). His Q-Principle says the following: following:

34 34

The Q Q Principle replaces Grice's Quantity I1 and andManner Manner -- )\void 'Avoidambiguity, ambiguity,avoid avoidobscurity', obscurity', and the the R principle replaces Grice's Grice's Relation, Quantity 2 and Manner - 'Be brier. brief.

Section 4

39

Semantic Semantic ambiguities ambiguities and semantic semantic underspecification underspecification

"Speaker's Maxim: 'Make your contribution as informative as is required required for the current purposes of the exchange: Specifically: exchange.' Specifically: don't provide a statement statement that is informationally weaker than your knowledge of the world allows, allows, unless providing a stronger statement would contravene the I-principle:' Levinson (1987: 67). I-principle." For example, sentences sentences (57) and (58) have have conversational implicatures marked by '+ >': (57)

I often take sugar in my coffee.

+> +

(58)

believe that John is away. I believe

+ > not know +>

not always always

(from ibid.: 64-65). 64-65). The hearer infers on the basis of this principle that the speaker made the strongest strongest statement statement consistent consistent with his/her knowledge. The I-Principle works as below: "Speaker's Maxim: Maxim: The maxim of Minimization. 'Say as little as necessary' i.e. produce the minimal linguistic clues sufficient to achieve your communicational ends, bearing Q in sufficient mind." (1987: 68). Levinson (1987: The hearer will normally enrich the content of the utterance up to the most specific interpretation that is judged to be intended. intended. For example, example, (59) '+>'. and (60) become enriched as signalled by '+ > '. (59)

key and the engine engine started. John turned the key

+ > and then +>

(60)

Harry and Sue Sue bought a piano.

+ > together +>

(from ibid.: 65). distinction into minimization of content and minimization of Following his distinction of speaker does not use form, Levinson adds the M-Principle which says that the speaker expression without reason: ifhe/she if he/she does so, so, then a prolix, obscure or marked expression implicatures implicatures are inferred: "Try letting the I-principle win in the first instance, i.e. go for minimal forms; if that doesn't work escalate step by step towards a Q-principle solution." (1987: 119). Levinson (1987:

40

Discourse, beliefs, Discourse, beliefs, and and intentions

Chapter 1I

Implicatures are ordered propositional ordered on a scale of adding them to the prepositional content: Q precedes M which precedes I. The order of adding information to the prepositional propositional content content extends beyond implicatures. First, background assumptions are added, then semantic entailments, followed by assumptions conversational conversational implicatures: Q-clausal (cf. (cf. example (58», (58)), Q-scalar (cf. example (57», (57)), M-implicatures, I-implicatures, and finally finally presuppositions, presuppositions, if distinguish them as a separate category category (cf. (cf. Gazdar 1979: 135. if we distinguish 135. Adapted Adapted to Levinson's Levinson's taxonomy of principles by Huang 1994: 15). 15). This is also an cancellation procedure: if added material is inconsistent with ordering of cancellation what had already been added, it becomes cancelled. Generalized Generalized conversational conversational implicatures obtain strong support in conventions of language Levinson's middle level of meaning, the level of conventions of use (1995: 93). This middle level seems to defend itself itself from objections of other other orientations: orientations: "."... .. that intermediate level is constantly under attack by reductionists seeking to assimilate assimilate it either either to the level of of sentence-meaning or to the level of speaker-meaning; speaker-meaning; thus, for sentence-meaning example, in the case of the inferences we are calling GCls, GCIs, many theorists (Kamp, Peters, Barwise and others) have suggested that they should be in effect effect semanticised, while Sperber and Wilson and some so-called local-pragmatics local-pragmatics theorists have presumed presumed that of on the contrary they should be assimilated to matters of nonce-inference at the level of speaker-intention. But generalised generalised implicatures are not going to reduce so easily in either direction, for they sit midway, systematically systematically influencing grammar and semantics on the one hand and speaker-meaning speaker-meaning on the other. I shall therefore therefore presume that we do indeed need such a three-tiered theory of communication." theory communication." Levinson (1995: (1995: 95).

The semanticization of the middle level of meaning is best represented in DRT, DRT, although at present DRT lacks a satisfactory account of the mechanism that triggers this semanticization. semanticization. And it is this semanticization semanticization that seems to be the most adequate solution. It avoids the unnecessary proliferation oflevels of levels of analysis and hence adheres to MOR and POL. It is economical and simple and seems to work well for prepositional propositional attitude sentences once it is merged with an intention-based account, as the analysis in Chapter 7 demonstrates. Now, delimitation of what is said fare with the neo-Gricean neo-Gricean Now, how does the delimitation amendments to the maxims? maxims? Horn opts for generalized conversational implicatures, implicatures, some of which become 'short-circuited', then further further conventionalized, as from use convention to meaning convention, metaphor to idiom, or rhetoric to grammar (cf. (cf. Horn 1988: 139). Levinson stresses

Section Section 4

Semantic Semantic ambiguities and semantic semantic underspecijication underspecification

41 41

the level of conventions in a similar way, way, taking it out of the semantics-pragmatics semantics-pragmatics dispute. However, However, the internal coherence of this middle level cannot be taken for granted. There is evidence to the effect effect that scalar implicature is more context-dependent, or at least structure-dependent than Horn admits (Matsumoto 1995, and in particular particular van Kuppevelt 1996). Van Kuppevelt (p. 393) points out some serious problems with scales, the need to reduce, reverse or suspend suspend (not activate) a scale, as well as with scale coherence. He suggests that the generation of scalar inference may depend on the construal of the topic as indicated by topic-forming questions. For example, in (62), (62), the scalar implicature of 'no more than four' is suspended and this fact is indicated by the topic-forming question in (61). (61)

Who bought four books?

(62)

Harry[comment] bought four books. In fact he bought seven. HarrY[comment]

The implicature implicature goes through in (64), though. (63)

How many books did he buy?

(64)

*He bought four[comment] four[comment] books. In fact he bought seven.

1996: 411). 411). In (64), the quantifying term 'four' has (from van Kuppevelt 1996: comment status and gives upper-bound scalar inference. inference. This test rise to an upper-bound comment does not work for all constructions but it certainly indicates a form of of (1985) is much more context-dependence of scalar inference. Hirschberg (1985) generous towards context-dependence and simply states that there are no defaults in generalized implicatures. Instead, they are all context-dependent. She suggests a list of orderings that generalize generalize over instances, such as set/proper subset; whole/part; whole/part; type/subtype; type/subtype; entity/attribute but admits that they do not constitute a theory and can perhaps be created created ad hoc hoc and ad infinitum infinitum (1985: (1985: 114). 114). Also, listing of scales is impossible because speakers can form unpredictable scales in which items are hardly related. Instead, Hirschberg suggests 'partial ordering' that is salient in a particular context ibid.\ 65). 65). An instance of an implicature arising out of the entity/attribute (see ibid.: ordering hoc, non-linear scale is presented in (66). ordering is (65). An instance of an ad hoc, (65)

A: Are you you a doctor? B: I have a PhD.

1985: 112). (from Hirschberg 1985: (66)

A: Did you get Paul Newman's autograph? autograph? B: I got Joanne Woodward's.

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Chapter Chapter 1I

(from ibid.: 50). There are a number of other more or less destructive counter-arguments counter-arguments to context-free implicatures implicatures (Green (Green 1995; Carston 1988, 1998b). They all point to the weakness of the current analyses of the 'middle level' of meaning. They do not seem to endanger endanger the existence of the middle level as such but, if its assimilation assimilation to semantics semantics proves satisfactory satisfactory (as it is beginning to be for the fragments fragments of natural languages analysed in DRT and File Change Semantics (Heim 1988», 1988)), the defence of the middle become redundant. level will become redundant.

1.4.2. Relevance Theory and Frames Theory and

Sperber of Sperber and Wilson (l986a) (1986a) analyse human communication communication as a process of construction construction and recovery of assumptions. An assumption is said to be relevant in a context just in case it has cognitive (contextual) (contex~ual) effects in this context context (cf. (cf. ibid.: 122). The more cognitive cognitive effects an assumption assumption has, and the less processing effort effort it requires, the more it is relevant. relevant. In this way way Gricean maxims are replaced by one principle, the principle of relevance. Every communication carries with itself itself a utterance which is an act of ostensive communication presumption of its optimal relevance (cf. presumption (cf. ibid.: 158).35 158).35 This radical reductionism reductionism is certainly methodologically appealing. However, However, in its present state, it subsumes some claims which still require further scrutiny. scrutiny. For example, it subscribes to sense-generality which possibly leaves leaves too great a role to contextual contextual diversity, diversity, as the attempt attempt to constrain constrain it to defaults presented presented in the following chapters will demonstrate. Next, it provides no precise mechanism for measuring efforts and effects which would yield successfully successfully (cf. Levinson 1989). Finally, depicting depicting utterance to computer modelling (cf. utterance interpretation as a process of the recovery of speaker's assumptions may interpretation be overly constraining, as demonstrated in my reanalysis of this process in terms of meaning-construction which happens in-between the interlocutors in laszczolt Jaszczolt 1996b and Section 2.9 below. interlocutors Now, the inference from 'and' to 'and then' and 'and therefore' can be accounted accounted for in two ways. First, we can postulate stereotypical situations neo-Gricean manner. The situations can be either listed and the speaker's speaker's in a neo-Gricean knowledge of them is assigned conventions which have very little assigned to acquired acquired conventions (cf. Levinson 1988, 1988, 1995), or, they in common with semantics or pragmatics (cf. can be generalized over by over-arching scales. The first, if present, pertains at least to informativeness, informativeness, if not all generalized implicatures. The other pertains, if at all, to scalar Q-implicata. 'If 'If present', 'at least' and 'if 'if at all' 35 35 Ostensive-inferential communication points out to the addressee the communication means that the speaker speaker points which further implicatures implicatures can be drawn (cf. (cf. Sperber Sperber intention to convey information, from which and Wilson 1986a: 54).

Section 4

Semantic ambiguities and semantic underspecification underspecification

43

signal here the plethora of counterexamples and contrary intuitions. Alternatively, we we can analyse the frames or scripts to which the hearer refers in terms of processing effort effort and cognitive effect: 'and' is used instead of 'and then' because it takes less effort effort to process and produces the same effect effect (cf. Carston 1994). 1994). But this is so because the hearer refers to such scripts. The will not do as a successful explanation question arises whether scripts alone will of this parsimony. parsimony. Wilson and Sperber (1998) (1998) claim that (67) (67) normally has to be interpreted as a statement that the speaker has had breakfast within the past few few hours as otherwise otherwise it would not have have any cognitive effects. effects. On the other hand, (68) imposes no such interval constraint and is happily interpreted as a statement that the speaker has visited Tibet some time in the past: past: (67)

have had breakfast. I have

(68)

I have have been to Tibet.

of (from ibid.: 11). 11). In order to find the suitable interval for the interpretation interpretation of such sentences, the hearer has to have have some general, encyclopaedic knowledge of what people normally do and say. say. In other words, he/she has to have access to schemas of previously previously encountered events, events, states, and sequences of these. knowledge about such frequently encountered situations Encyclopaedic knowledge triggers some interpretations, or, in Wilson and Sperber's terminology, terminology, makes some assumptions more accessible (cf. (cf. ibid.: 15). Occasionally, scripts pertaining to world knowledge seem to be supplemented by linguistic devices that do not contribute to the propositional propositional content of an expression but rather provide instructions as to the way way in which the utterance should be interpreted. Blakemore (1987, (1987, 1989) 1989) lists here 'so', 'moreover', 'you see', 'after 'after all', 'but', and many other discourse connectives. Hence, it is not only the case that the sentence requires further contextual embellishment before the proposition is recovered, but some parts of this sentence may have have to be classified as part of what we would call here information: they direct the process of interpretation, constrain contextual information: the derivation of implicatures. This division into truth-conditionally relevant and irrelevant items is not as straightforward straightforward as it would seem from the analysis of connectives: there can be truth-conditionally relevant elements elements that correspond to processes rather than concepts, such as personal pronouns, and non-truth-conditional elements that are conceptual such as illocutionary adverbials, e.g. e.g. 'frankly', 'confidentially', 'unfortunately' (see Wilson and 1993). Hence, scripts appear to operate on a rather diversified Sperber 1993). material. Semantic representation can be enriched by truth-conditionally relevant elements that are not conceptual but signal the need for pragmatic processes to operate (as in the case of reference resolution for pronouns),

44

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Chapter Chapter 1I

and the procedural procedural non-truth-conditional elements further direct the recovery (or production) of implicatures. As relevance theorists say, say, they clarify the relevance of the utterance. Scripts seem to fit in rather freely at more than process.36 They can be activated as soon as one place of this many-stage process. particular script becomes salient to the hearer, which, relevance to the particular naturally, defies any more radical constraints and ordering. It appears from these two analyses analyses that schemas or frames serve a very important role in utterance interpretation. They are relied on both by neo-Griceans neo-Griceans and relevance theorists and it seems that for both they are not reducible to the pragmatic theory. theory. Wilson and Sperber (1998: (1998: 17) 17) claim that the temporal and causal interpretations of sentences conjoined by 'and' general are engendered by the interaction between sentence meaning, meaning, general cognitive factors, factors, and the criterion of consistency of consistency with the principle principle of 1998b: 197). 197). It seems that the cognitive cognitive factors relevance (see also Carston 1998b: have to operate prior to the assessment of the consistency with the principle of relevance and the output of their help is assessed by subjecting subjecting it to the principle itself. This temporal precedence seems to make them an independent stage in utterance processing: a stage which which is perhaps hastily defined by Levinson as pragmaticized by relevance theorists. 37 All in all, whether we accept the neo-Gricean neo-Gricean informativeness informativeness principles and special status of generalized implicatures or follow optimal relevance as a route to pragmatic inference in general, there are some presumptions about what the world is like like which are a part sine qua non of utterance like, includes what speakers are interpretation. And, what the world is like, predisposed to do, perhaps by the way way intentions normally normally work. work. In what follows, I shall try to explore the middle level of meaning without without making an assumption that it is an irreducible level, level, neither that it belongs to irreducibility,'semanticity'or 'semanticity' or 'pragmaticity' will semantics or pragmatics. The irreducibility, be the result of the investigation into how intentions work work in communication.

1.5. Conclusions Semantic ambiguity of ambiguity seems to have been successfully successfully exorcized by means of MOR. The unitary semantics complemented with conversational implicatures was not a powerful enough replacement because it did not account for the diversity of pragmatic processes that help semantic representation become 36 36 See also Rieber Richer 1997 who suggests that discourse connectives work as so-called parenthetical performatives: 'but' is interpreted as the truth-functional &' plus performative truth-functional connective •'&' plus a performative utterance 'I suggest that these two propositions contrast', or 'I ask you you to notice that this this contrasts'. classification of discourse connectives as uniformly procedural (cf. (cf. ibid.: 68). He objects to the classification 37 37 See quotation from Levinson (1995: (1995: 95) in Section 1.4.1.

Section 5

ambiguities and semantic semantic underspecification Semantic ambiguities underspecification

45

truth-evaluable. In order to accommodate accommodate this intrusion, the clear-cut boundary between semantics and pragmatics had to be abandoned. It was boundary replaced by underdetermined semantics according to which sentences can be sense-general and pragmatics contributes widely to what is said. Other variants include the middle level of pragmatic aspects of what is said or the middle level of conventions of language use which is neither semantic possibility nor pragmatic. I have signalled in this chapter that there is a possibility of of another approach approach which is worth scrutinizing. This approach approach does not postulate a level of sense-generality but rather semanticizes the pragmatic contributions to the semantic representation in the form of default interpretations or departures from the default. I have not said much about this fourth view as yet. The purpose of the first chapter was to prepare weaknesses of the current dogmas such the ground by pointing out some weaknesses as the methodological weakness inherent in postulating an unnecessary level of representation. The difficulties difficulties of accounting for semantic underspecification, as well as the expansion of the minimal proposition propositional radical without giving way to a flood and completion of the propositional of pragmatic processes on the one hand, and/or postulating a non-linguistic of level of conventions on the other, raise doubts as to the adequacy of underspecification for the analysis of utterance interpretation. The more so that conventions or schemas seem to give rise to default interpretations and there is only one step from there to saying that these conventions and schemas can sometimes operate on the level of semantics. Underspecification can thus be suspected of being parasitic on tidy and predictable world underspecification should knowledge. If If this view is sufficiently sufficiently supported, underspecification be exorcized.

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CHAPTER 2

Semantic Defaults meaning should be a theory of "The theory of utterance-type meaning interpretation". Levinson (1995: 109-110). default interpretation". Levinson

Contents 2.1. 2.2. 2.3. 2.4. 2.5.

2.6.

2.7. 2.8. 2.9. 2.10.

Setting the Scene . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. Intentions in Communication ............. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. The Primary Intention Principle and Definite Descriptions ................ The Principle of the Parsimony of Levels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. Default Semantics? ............................................ 2.5.1. Default Reasoning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 2.5.2. Defeasible Knowledge ..................................... Definite Descriptions: Interaction of Intentions . . . . . . . . . .. 2.5.3. Defaults for Definite 2.5.4. Defaults for Indefinite Descriptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. Other Applications ............................................ 2.6.1. On Semantic Representation and Negation Again. Again . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 2.6.2. And, or, and and if if .......................................... 2.6.3. Number Terms Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. Defaults in Dynamic Semantics ................................... Interim Conclusions ........................................... The Doubly-Dynamic Approach: Assumption Recovery or Creation? ......... Conclusions .................................................

DISCOURSE, DISCOURSE, BELIEFS, AND INTENTIONS Interface, Vol. Vol. 2 Current Research in the Semantics/Pragmatics Interface, Jaszczolt K.M. laszczolt 1999 Elsevier Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved © 1999 47

48 49 51 51 56 58 58 60 62 65 66 66 67 68 70 75 76 85

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Chapter 2

2.1. Setting the Scene

Semanticization Semanticization of the middle level level of meaning can easily result in concealing concealing ambiguities under a new label. ORT, DRT, by providing analyses of problematic expressions such as number terms, assigns them various discourse discourse representation representation structures (ORSs) (DRSs) and makes the choice context-dependent context-dependent (see Kamp and Reyle 1993). This need not be so. so. In stressing the need for a better understanding of utterance-type meaning, meaning, Levinson Levinson (1995: (1995: 93) appeals to people's general expectations about how language is commonly used in given situations. Pragmatic inference performed by the hearer is based on these expectations rather than on the calculation of speaker's intentions. That is a reasonable starting point for an analysis analysis of this underdeveloped level of meaning and one can anticipate that, once it is better known, known, it will cease to be seen as an isolated curiosity, curiosity, i.e. as a mysterious mysterious level level between sentence-meaning and speaker-meaning. speaker-meaning. As was noted earlier, both pragmatization and semanticization have been tried. The first one led to letting pragmatics loose on a weak semantic form and the other led to hidden ambiguities, albeit attended to under context-shifts context-shifts of dynamic dynamic semantics. In this chapter, I try another approach. It consists in a non-ambiguous semantics achieved through the interaction of the speaker's intentions intentions with the logical form of the expression. The problem of ambiguity ambiguity will not arise because intentions 'intrude' into the semantic representation. The view is thus ism of dynamic-semantic compatible with the pragmatic intrusion intrusionism dynamic-semantic approaches such as ORT DRT (Kamp and Reyle Reyle 1993), 1993), where pragmatic factors factors 'intrude' into a unitary semantic domain. domain. There is is one, discourse-level representation, to which syntax, semantics and pragmatics contribute. contribute. However, However, whereas ORT DRT treats all possible resulting resulting representations equally, the account proposed here orders them on the scale of salience and predictability from proposed from the default one to the furthest departure from the default. I suggest that well with MOR, enjoys the idea of default semantics, semantics, in addition addition to faring well an indelible psychological plausibility. plausibility. Intentions Intentions in communication direct utterance interpretation to the correct semantic representation. Hence, I suggest an unambiguous and unitary unitary semantics, obtained essentially essentially along the lines of Kamp's (1984) dynamic dynamic semantics. semantics. However, However, I also attempt to resolve the problem of the various possible interpretations of such 'interpretatively ambiguous' sentences which which are assigned to them by Kamp's ORT. A proposed addition will be employed to perform DRT. addition to Occam's Razor will this task. This 'addition' consists of the principle of economy with respect to the postulated postulated levels levels of interpretation, so far mentioned very briefly as POL and to be elaborated on in Section 2.4 below. below. First, it is necessary to decide what types of intentions are involved involved in the communication process and what exactly exactly their role is.

Section 2

Semantic defaults defaults

49

2.2. Intentions Communication Intentions in Communication As was discussed at the beginning of Section 2.1, 2.1, there are cases of utterance utterance interpretation interpretation which do not rely on a computation computation of speaker's intentions. What this means is is that this computation computation can be 'short-circuited', preempted by conventions. However, However, the difference between the two ways of arriving at speaker meaning need not be theoretically significant. significant. The calculation calculation of intentions retains its explanatory value even when it ceases to happen in practice. The more so that this reliance on intentions intentions often decreases gradually, following the increase of our world knowledge and world experience. Hence, as a theoretical tool, intentions remain indicative of of utterance interpretation whether they are relevant for a particular particular situation or not. Conventions enter the picture only at the stage of explaining how information was communicated communicated rather than what was communicated. communicated. And sense-generality And it is the first that we are interested in while weighing weighing sense-generality and semantic semantic defaults against each other. After all, it is widely widely acknowledged acknowledged that sentence meaning ultimately has to be analysed in terms of intentions 1989; Sperber and Wilson 1986a; and other psychological states (Grice 1989; Recanati 1993). A brief 1969) says brief recent history of intentions looks as follows. Grice (1957, (1957,1969) that the hearer understands the speaker's utterance by recognizing the speaker's intention. As Bach and Harnish (1979: ... a (1979: xi) xi) put it, ""... communicative fulfillment consists communicative intention has the peculiar feature that its fulfillment in its recognition".l recognition".1 Sperber and Wilson (1986a) (1986a) add here the distinction informative intention, the second between the communicative and the informative embedded in the first. The communicative intention is defined as making communicator that the communicator communicator it "mutually manifest to audience and communicator 61). Bach and has this informative intention." (Sperber and Wilson 1986a: 61). Harnish (1979: (1979: 7) do not distinguish a separate informative informative intention. They intention guaranteed by the talk about the illocutionary-communicative intention 'communicative presumption': that whenever the speaker says something to the hearer, he/she is doing so with some (illocutionary) intention. Bach (1987a) adds here the referential intention. He develops Grice's (1969) original account of intentions in communication and calls the basic intention speaker account (communicative) intention (Bach 1984, 1987a): "Which thought an utterance of a sentence expresses depends not speaker's only on the meaning(s) of the sentence but also on the speaker's communicative intention. If the sentence is ambiguous, the speaker's intention determines which of its meanings is operative 1

1

See See also also discussion discussion in Bach Bach 1987b. 1987b.

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((...). ...). If the sentence is not being used literally, that is because of the

speaker's intention. In this case he must intend the hearer hearer to recognize a certain connection between what the sentence means and what he means in order for the hearer to identify the latter ((...). ...). And if the sentence contains an indexical, its meaning underdetermines what the speaker means (even if the sentence is unambiguous and is being used literally), and how the gap is to be filled depends on the speaker's referential referential intention." intention!" Bach (1987a: (1987a: 65-66; my emphasis).

The referential intention intention constitutes a part of the communicative communicative intention. intention. The fulfilment fulfilment of the communicative intention consists in its recognition by the hearer (cf. (cf. Bach 1987b). 1987b). Also, "".. ....what what is said, to the extent that it is not fixed by linguistic linguistic meaning, is determined by speaker intention, which itself can include the intention to refer to what one is demonstrating." Bach (1992: (1992: 140).

Intending means essentially acting out of one's beliefs and desires. Grice observes that for for a speaker to mean something by uttering a sentence he/she has to intend the hearer to [1] [1] produce a particular response (cognitive or physical, as Strawson 1964a emphasizes), [2] [2] think that the speaker intends that the hearer produces produces a response and [3] [3] produce produce the theresponse responseon onthe thebasis basis of thinking that this is what the speaker intends (see Grice 1969: 92). 92). Except for some sophisticated sophisticated situations where there is a need to step down to the nth wth level sub-intentions, the schema seems to work, work, although in the case of conventionalized procedures, such as bidding in a game of bridge, conventions are said to do the job and secure the uptake of the intention of automatically (see Straws on 1964a). Whether one agrees with the role of Strawson conventions so assigned or not, it is conspicuous that one essential element is missing missing in these accounts and that is the explanation of what exactly it means to secure a response, according to what procedure and by means of what information. An account account of speaker meaning that espouses intentions espouses intentions stopped before letting the idea of intentions perform its task. And is wasted if stopped the task, as I see it, can extend to resolving the problem of interpretative interpretative so, we have to say more about intention as securing ambiguity. In order to do so, the referent in conversation.

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In other words, the fact that a speaker means something by uttering a sentence is equivalent to saying that he/she utters it with ""... ... the intention of inducing a belief by means of the recognition of this intention" (Grice (Grice 1957: 219). 219).22 First of all, the speaker speaker intends the object or person spoken spoken about to be easily individuated by the hearer. This is the main preference in communication of communication and the main point of reference reference for evaluating the role of referring and quantified expressions in utterance interpretation. In what follows, the referential referential intention will be tried out as a criterion for deciding between various interpretations of an utterance involving an expression expression that is used to refer. 3 It will be demonstrated that the referential referential intention helps to order these interpretations according to their salience. To sum up: across the board, there have been three major types of intentions distinguished in the literature: communicative, informative, informative, and referential. syntactically and semantically semantically The simplest case of referring is when the syntactically simplest expression (i.e. simplest among its functional functional equivalents) is used communicate that the referent is to be recovered and with the intention to communicate account makes use of such to inform about this very referent. The present account types of intentions: reference-securing, reference-securing, a combination of three types communicative, and informative. communicative,

Primary Intention Intention Principle Principle and and Definite Descriptions 2.3. The Primary The role of the referential intention intention in communication communication is best observed in the interpretation of definite definite descriptions. In the referential referential use of definite descriptions, the intention to refer is present: the speaker intends to make merely talk about a state of affairs. affairs. a certain individual salient rather than merely always, As can be observed in conversational practice, the hearer often, if not always, presumes intention is present when a definite noun phrase was was used presumes that this intention by the speaker, unless the context makes it clear that this was not the intended To give this intuition some theoretical support, we can posit with meaning. To some initial plausibility that perhaps this presumption of the referential intention is derived from the intentionality intentionality of the underlying mental act. of Intentionality is a property of mental states that makes them about, or of objects and states of affairs (cf. (cf. also Searle 1983, 1983, 1990a). Only some mental opposed to nervousness states are intentional: beliefs, hopes and fears are, as opposed or elation that are not. The claim goes back at least to the nineteenth-century idea of intentionality, intentionality, put put forward forward by Brentano (1874) (1874) and developed by Husserl (1900-1901, 19l3), 1913), although although the connection between contemporary Husserl 2

For examples of meaning that cannot be straightforwardly explained by an intention to produce produce a (cognitive or linguistic) response, see see Avramides Avramides (1997: (1997: 76-78). 76-78). 3 3 The term 'referring expression' is is deliberately avoided at this stage. 2

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studies of intentions in communication communication and the phenomenological phenomenological tradition is not always acknowledged and not always appreciated, always acknowledged always appreciated, perhaps because because Husserl's HusserPs philosophy had undergone many turns. Intentionality says that acts acts of consciousness are directed towards an object. These objects trigger a objects trigger semantic interpretation. 4 Meaning is seen here as social, established in meaning-giving acts. Knowing the object depends the process of social, meaning-giving on fulfilling fulfilling intentions either by thought, by perception, or by imagination. As language language is one of the possible (Jaszczolt 1992, possible vehicles of thought (Jaszczolt 1996a), intentionality also governs its use. Some beliefs (thoughts) are externalized by means of language. This is how intentionality intentionality becomes becomes a property oflinguistic 'inherited' from mental acts). of linguistic acts (by being, so to speak, speak,'inherited' Hence we can say say that some intentional states are linguistic. linguistic. And just as intentionality means aboutness, aboutness, so there is an intention to speak about an object. On uttering a sentence, the speaker intends a particular object or person person to be salient to the hearer and this intention constitutes the internal, undetachable property of the constructed representation. representation. Intentionality of securing a referent ensures that semantics is atomistic, about the real world, and that acts of meaning are acts of experience of of the real world, about the objects of the world, and primarily aimed at the Intentionality objects of the real world (in agreement with Husserl 1913). Intentionality so perceived perceived incorporates the workings of intentions in communication, communication, since language is one of the vehicles of thought (pace W Lyons (paceW. Lyons 1995). 1995). The speaker's speaker's intentions to communicate something and to inform the hearer about something also rely on this primordial intention to secure the referent. So, the referential referential intention can be tested for its default properties in utterance interpretation. interpretation. This thesis was put forward in the Introduction as the Primary Intention principle (PI): The primary role of intention in communication is to secure the referent of the speaker's utterance. The 'referent' is understood understood as a eventuality result of intentionality and hence can be either an entity or an eventuality (state, event, or process, after Kamp and Reyle 1993: 509).5 509).5 Following Kent Bach, I distinguish a special kind of intention that performs the reference-securing reference-securing task. Naturally, instances Naturally, one has to allow for the instances where this intention is absent either by force of the type of the expression used or by force of particular circumstances. circumstances. Not every sentence sentence concerns concerns an individual. individual. But we shall entertain the thesis, to be tested in various referential interpretation interpretation examples below, below, that whenever a possibility of a referential is viable, it is secured by the referential intention which which is assumed by the hearer to be present. This is the general idea behind PI. It has to be pointed out that the claim made in PI is considerably stronger than the current speech 4 4

What What Husserl Husserl earlier called called objectifying, objectifying, meaning-giving acts. acts. See See laszczolt Jaszczolt 1996a 1996a and Chapter 3 below. 5 5 The term 'eventuality' is is due to Emmon Bach (see Bach 1981: 1981: 69). 69).

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act/intentionality tradition allows for. for. Bach (1987a: (1987a: 52), when discussing propositional prepositional attitude contexts, admits that when the speaker expresses an attitude towards an individual, the referential intention must be present. However, this claim does not yet aid the indiscernibility problem of referential and attributive readings of definite descriptions. Other works in the intentionality tradition follow suit. The general idea is this: as long as communication communication is said to incorporate incorporate only the need to inform or perform any other illocution (using illocutionary intention) on the part of the speaker, assumed by the hearer to be present, then the fact that the hearer normally normally comes up with only one interpretation remains unexplained. After all, whether one subscribes to the underspecified semantics view view or not, one has only very vague explanations available of the fact that although there is more than one of interpretation interpretation of an utterance involving involving the interpretative ambiguity of negation, the hearer does not hold all of them in the mind, pondering which one to choose. 6 The referential referential intention, when present, seems to explain this fact of instantaneous interpretation. The device of referential of referential intentions, suggested for the cognitive level of interpretation, opens the possibility possibility of maintaining it for the semantic level as well. well. Some theorists would not see a problem with having a technical technical device in their semantics that does not serve a cognitive explanation, i.e. i.e. does not have a psychologically psychologically plausible equivalent? equivalent.7 Hence, they see no danger in multiplying levels of explanation and adding underdetermined representations. But this is methodologically ill-founded. ill-founded. On the other hand, the price to pay for our rigid semantic parsimony may be high as we may have to revindicate some long abandoned abandoned ideas of speech act theory such as the default correlation between an utterance and a speech act. However, the referential intention makes only a small demand in this contentious revival: there is no direct correlation correlation between sentence types types and speech acts. Instead, there is a correlation correlation between utterances and default situations they are used to describe. Moreover, defaults defaults are rather weak: weak: they are easily easily overridden when contextual information makes them so. so. Or, rather, from the processing point of view, they do not arise then. After all, PI allows for nonreferential interpretations interpretations which perform the same speech act as the referential referential reading of of the same utterance, as in example (38) of Chapter Chapter 1, 1, repeated here as (1):

6 I mean here here the incremental incremental nature of utterance interpetation and post-Gricean accounts of conversational inference. 7 7 Victoria Escandell-Vidal (personal communication) says: ... I would probably still prefer a says: ""... two-layered model without claiming any psychological reality ...), at least until a way of reality ((...), way out of the problems of the notion of speech act is found." ... what you gain in psychological found." and: ""... verisimilitude gets somewhat lost in theoretical elegance; elegance; and vice versa, what you gain in reality." theoretical elegance you lose in psychological psychological reality."

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The best architect designed this church.

The problem problem under discussion concerns only the class of representatives. In addition, the issue of indirect speech speech acts remains open to interpretations; it can also be left untouched. All in all, if intentions contribute to the semantic interpretation, they render render the reading that depends on the presence or absence of the referential referential intention and this fluctuation has an indirectness flavour itself. 8 In sentence (1), (1), when the speaker is taken to be talking about a particular, known individual, e.g. Christopher Christopher Wren, the referent is easily secured. secured. But when the speaker talks about whoever happened happened to have have designed the church and who is otherwise unknown to him/her, him/her, then the intentions involved seem to be aimed at a person but fail to provide an identifiable identifiable referent. And, finally, finally, one has to establish the object of the utterance when the speaker is obviously referentially referentially mistaken. mistaken. This would be the case if in (1) (1) the speaker was taken by the hearer to be talking talking about John Smith thinking mistakenly that Smith designed the church. Since the social, recognizable act (speech act) secures reference, reference, Smith should be the referent. However, one may also say that since intentionality is social, it reflects the use of language in a linguistic community community and thus that intentions intentions proceed bearer of the name or description description because because this is what they towards the bearer normally do for a hearer who is not referentially mistaken. mistaken. But let us suppose that the hearer is not sure whether the speaker meant Smith or Wren, i.e. the true architect of the church. This confusion confusion may be engendered by the prior assertion of the speaker to the effect effect that Wren Wren is known known to the speaker as an eminent architect. To systematize these differences in interpretation one can again resort to the PI and see it as a matter of degree, as in the principle of the Degrees of Intentions (01) (DI) introduced earlier. The principle says that intentions allow for degrees. It accounts for the ordering of the three readings of definite descriptions in the following way. way. In the case of (i) a referential use of the description in (1), (1), intentions intentions are the strongest strongest and the referent is secured secured outright, as if by default. default. In the case of (ii) (ii) a referential mistake, intentions proceed towards two different different objects, one along the path of 'social intentionality' and one along the 'individual path'. By By 'social intentionality' Bach and Harnish (1979: 93) 93) say on this point that there is no standard strategy for recovering illocutionary intention. My addition to this minimalism minimalism is to claim that although there is the illocutionary no general recipe for interpretation, there is one for the standard interpretation in sentences that involve the mUltiplicity multiplicityof ofsenses, senses, secured secured by bythe the interaction interaction of of intentions, intentions,and, and, where whereapplicable, applicable, (l987a: 66) recognizes by the referential intention. intention. Bach (1987a: recognizes the referential intention in the case intention of the speaker. From here there of indexicals: their meaning depends on the referential intention things get complicated in interpreting informationally fuller fuller is only one step to saying that if things referring terms (descriptions, (descriptions, proper names), names), the hearer also resorts to the speaker's intentions. 8

Section Section 3

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I mean here the route which would be representative of an average native speaker agreement with the common speaker who refers correctly, in agreement common wisdom. An 'individual path' represents the intentionality as it really occurs in the particular case of a particular particular speaker who who can be referentially referentially mistaken. The gap between them is reduced by utilizing contextual clues and one intended referent is established. In the case of (iii) an attributive use of (1), the referential intention sets off as normal, but does not reach any particular particular referent. We We can say that here we deal with the weakest type type of intention. The intention is still there: in the attributive reading, the speaker still intends a referent to exist, exist, whoever whoever it might be. be. The particulars are irrelevant until 9 Chapter 3. Chapter 3. All in all, the basic idea is this. The semantics allows for the intervention pragmatics to various degrees. It is essentially a dynamic semantics, of pragmatics semantics, exemplified in the 'intrusionistic' models of Kamp (1984); (1984); Kamp & & Reyle (1993); and Heim (1988) but differs from them in supplementing supplementing POL with an ordering of resulting interpretations. In other words, the degree to which present has its direct bearing on the semantic the referential intention intention is is present semantic representation of the utterance of the sentence, which can be summed up as follows. follows. The referential intention in its strong form secures the referent by its intrusion into semantic representation. The weaker the intention, the more information has to be read off the rest of the semantic representation.

(1) where the semantic The ultimate case is the attributive use of (1) referent, whoever he or she might be. Now, representation alone secures the referent, saying 'the utterance of the sentence' may seem like another guise of an ambiguity: after all, sentences, not utterances, are said to have logical forms and semantic representations. But utterances have them by simple transitivity: they are utterances of sentences that have have semantic representations. And, as sense-generality debates, has been known since Grice and certainly since the sense-generality important for the semantics as the sentence because the utterance is equally important primary pragmatic processes in utterance interpretation interact with the lO logical form.10 All that I have done here is conflate confiate the levels of underspecified 9 9 I developed this proposal in detail in Jaszczolt 10 10 Turner (1997: 167) summarizes Carston's (1988)

I developed this proposal in detail in Jaszczolt 1997a. follows: Turner (1997:167) summarizes Carston's (1988) account of utterance interpretation interpretation as follows: Linguistic Meaning -+ —>• Primary Primary Pragmatic Pragmatic Processes Processes -+ —>• Truth-conditional Semantics -+ —> Secondary Pragmatic Processes Processes Secondary The diagram depicts clearly the process of utterance interpretation, albeit without giving due attention to the differences in status of these components.

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semantics semantics and primary pragmatic pragmatic processes. Let us say, say, at least some primary pragmatic processes for the time being, that is the ones that rely on the workings of the referential intention.

2.4. The Principle Principle of the Parsimony of Levels

section further develops the idea of pragmatic intrusionism. intrusionism. As was This section discussed in Chapter 1, 1, context aids in establishing establishing the propositional form of an expression to a much larger extent than Grice originally suggested.11 II In addition to lexical and syntactic disambiguation, there is a plethora of of pragmatic pragmatic processes processes that are activated before the propositional propositional representation representation is complete. Here we also have to include expansion of minimal minimal propositions propositions and completion of propositional radicals. They ensure that MOR is satisfied as semantic ambiguities are exorcized. My problem with this picture concerns different level from the justification for semantic representation as a different propositional representation. In other words, must semantic representation processes that be seen as underdetermined and separate from the pragmatic processes enrich it? This generosity can be dispelled dispelled with the help of intentions. Some sentences require further embellishment on the level of semantics but this does not yet guarantee the leap from this incompleteness to the epistemological commitment that semantics is underdetermined. From the methodological point of view, the question arises as to what advantage is gained from maintaining an underdetermined underdetermined semantic advantage representation which is prior in the order of cognitive representation cognitive processing and the order of explanation to a representation with a truth value. value. If intentions are let in, there is a reading of interpretatively interpretatively ambiguous sentences in which the distinction between the semantic form and the truth-evaluable propositional form is redundant. If there are such defaults, the reasons difficult for maintaining the above distinction will have to be reassessed. It is difficult to envisage what these reasons would be. It is possible to give an equally adequate account of sentence meaning in terms of a sole representation. This parsimony of levels levels of analysis can be seen as an extension to, or application of, MOR and has been briefly referred to in the Introduction Introduction as the Parsimony of principle says that levels of sense of Levels principle (POL). To To repeat, the principle 12 are not to be multiplied beyond necessity. necessity.12 POL boils down to a restriction on postulating the two levels of sentence interpretation: semantic representation (here equated with logical form), and propositional representation as separate contributions to meaning (sense) when they are not discernible discernible with cognitive plausibility. If If what is said was interpreted as a form that is 11

11

12

12

See Grice (1975: 24; 1978: 46); Recanati 1989a, 1994. The principle, together with the DI and PI principles, originated in Jaszczolt 1999.

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transitional between the semantic form and a truth-conditionally identifiable content, then POL would be violated and, in the most radical case of of underspecification requiring both completion completion and expansion, we would have to distinguish between (1) (1) semantic form, (2) 'propositional' 'prepositional' content of what is said, and (3) propositional form which contains all the necessary (3) the 'true' prepositional value. 'Necessary' rather than 'all' information for the assignment of truth value. propositional form would contain too much because otherwise the prepositional information. Here we require a separation separation between truth-conditional and non-truth-conditional meaning by shifting some implicatures below the line non-truth-conditional of prepositional propositional content. In other words, we require only that part of of pragmatic information which contributes to truth conditions. This much is widely widely acknowledged. 13 After After all, if any meaning that is not derived by linguistic decoding was implicated (as Grice claims, see Carston Carston 1988), then proposition since in many cases we would not be able to arrive at a single proposition decoding need not necessarily always always precede inferential processes. Or even, as Escandell-Vidal (1996 (1996 and personal communication) claims, decoding is always preceded by inferential processes which result in building a schema schema always preceded or frame, ready to admit decoded information. information. To sum up, what is communicated communicated by the utterance of of (1) (1) may differ differ depending on the context of interpretation. In order to account for this difference, one could follow either of two procedures: follow the radical pragmatics path and approve of the generality of sense, or construct an account of intentions that secure reference. In order to avoid being between Scylla and Charybdis, a convincing decisive decisive argument is required. Both plausibility, one traditions are acclaimed to enjoy a certain psychological plausibility, derived from Chomsky's account of Universal Grammar and the other of acts of of from the idea of phenomenology including the intentionality of consciousness. Both pertain to innate abilities of the mind, with the different different scope attributed of attributed to linguistic phenomena.14 So, So, if we begin the account account of utterance interpretation with the specification of intentions, we obtain, in propositional form as the first-level first-level sense most cases, a truth-evaluable level of prepositional because the referent is secured. In other words, POL is satisfied. The level of an underdetermined semantic representation is then excluded by definition: securing reference is the most natural and expected process in utterance interpretation interpretation performed at an early stage, after after some initial pre-decoding

13

Cf.: ''A "A number of philosophers have contended that Grice completely overlooked the fact that inferential processes of essentially essentially the same sorts as those involved in implicature implicature enter into determining 269-270). determining what is said." Bach (l994a: (1994a: 269-270). In other words, what is implicit in what is said differs from implicature sensu stricto. 14 14 For an account of the vehicles of thought see Chapter 6 and also Dummett 1991a; laszczolt 1991a; Jaszczolt 1996a. 13

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inferences, and necessarily simultaneously with decoding.15 decoding.15 'Necessarily', because securing the referent is automatic on hearing the expression that is used to refer, just as the quantifier analysis is automatic on hearing an indefinite description. description. And this tendency to secure a default, unambiguous of interpretation has to be captured captured by any cognitively plausible theory of communication. communication. Kamp and Reyle (1993: (1993: 288-304) call it a general tendency of a type of expression that has to be captured captured by construction construction rules for discourse discourse representations, i.e. rules for building their intrusionistic semantic representations representations of utterances. The conjecture to be made at this point is that the underspecified semantic representation may lack psychological plausibility: normally, normally, intentions secure the object of the discourse and the unique reading of an utterance. propositional representation The idea behind POL is that full prepositional representation can be equated equated with the semantic representation. This proposal was tested here on definite descriptions. But this formulation of the idea is only the tip of of an iceberg and thus requires detailed justification. justification. I have indicated that the core of this justification lies in intentions in communication as discussed by Grice (1969) on the one hand, and the tradition in the speech act theory (cf. e.g. Searle 1983,1992; Bach and Harnish 1979). The resolution on the other (cf. is given in the following section, followed by a presentation of its application to some chosen examples.

2.5. 2.5. Default Semantics?

2.5.7. Default 2.5.1. Default Reasoning Reasoning The idea of semantics based on default interpretations interpretations appears to be not so controversial when derived from the account of default intentions and default reasoning. It is founded directly on Grice (1978) (1978) and Bach (1984). (1984). Over a decade ago, Bach argued that utterance interpretation is governed by the principle of default reasoning and 'jumping to conclusions' because we 'know belief when to think twice'. The view was based on the postulate of degrees of belief and intention but has never been developed into a fully-fledged of fully-fledged account of utterance interpretation. The present account provides the missing theory.16 theory16 It is demonstrated of demonstrated that degrees of intentions account for the existence of more and less salient interpretations of potentially potentially referentially ambiguous utterances. 15 15 As Escandell-Vidal (personal communication) observes, pure decoding may have no place in this account. 16 16 On the proposed development of Bach's account see Jaszczolt Jaszczolt 1998e.

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Bach observes that in order to work out his sketch of default interpretations into a full theory of default reasoning one needs an account interpretations account of beliefs and intentions because beliefs and intentions influence reasoning way. Here he suggests the "degree of strength of belief belief in an important way. without elaborating on this suggestion. and intention" (1984: 49), without suggestion. Now, putting POL, PI and DI together provides such a development. They account for a salient interpretation interpretation which constitutes the 'first unchallenged 17 alternative'.17 proposed that in the case of referring to an entity, there is a referential referential Bach proposed intention present which constitutes a part of the communicative intention (Bach 1987a), and that reasoning is principally governed by a 'taking for granted' principle, it proceeds to the first unchallenged alternative (Bach 1984), i.e. to the first sense of the utterance that springs to the hearer's mind refuted in another thought. Default reasoning is and is not immediately refuted automatic, it relies on generalizations and stereotypes of everyday life. People normally take it for granted that the interpretation that springs to mind is correct; no further reasoning process is involved. involved. They do so in accordance accordance with the rule that makes them calculate costs and effects effects of making of judgements and decisions. In other words, in answering the question of priorities of interpretation of utterances with referring expressions, one is governed by the rule that there should be no expenditure of processing effort effort in utterance utterance interpretation if it does not come with an additional gain in cognitive, information-providing or information-enriching effects. This balance is guaranteed by the principle of co-operation co-operation in conversation, be it Gricean (1975), neo-Gricean (Levinson (Levinson 1987), or relevance-theoretic relevance-theoretic (Sperber and Wilson 1986a). The compatibility of Bach's account of of co-operation is evident from the following conversation with the principle of co-operation statement: ""... ... I take for granted that the first thought that comes to mind is the right one one - unless some reason against that or some alternative mind:' comes to mind." Bach (1984: 45).

17 17 The intention-based account of meaning illustrates one general point remarked upon by p does not differ Thomason: if intending to assert assert/? differ from intending to assert q, q, then the meaning of p and q is the same. Intensionality of meaning and intensionality of intention go hand in hand of;? 1990: 349). 349). As Thomason (see Thomason 1990: Thomason observes, Grice's maxims are too loose to account for intentions in conversation. He suggests a theory of shared plans and goals. Thomason hopes for a theory of default reasoning that would be on a par with conversational implicatures. implicatures. It is my belief that such a theory has to be based on intentions in communication, default reference, MOR, POL, and above all parsimony of processing, controlling and controlled by gained information.

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Jumping to conclusions is a cost-avoiding and effective effective default. It is effective effective when to jump to conclusions because, in Bach's terms, the hearer knows when conclusions and when to think twice. There are shortcuts in reasoning, the hearer takes things for granted and proceeds proceeds to the default interpretation, unless he/she has evidence that the 'marked' interpretation may be the case. As Bach (1984: 46) puts it, most things we we do because we we do not decide not to do them. Equipped Equipped with PI and 01, DI, we can also say that defaults correspond correspond to the strongest intentions, undipped unclipped by any conditions governing governing their fulfilment. fulfilment. Ceteris paribus, the interpretation of definite descriptions proceeds proceeds as referential because people normally talk about other individuals: individuals: we jump to conclusions, there is no need to think twice.

2.5.2. Defeasible Defeasible Knowledge Knowledge

The idea of taking semantic forms together with other knowledge knowledge sources in order to draw inferences inferences has been formalized formalized with a high degree of success in defeasible logic. In defeasible defeasible logic, conclusions may follow from a. a set of premises but not from a superset. Applied to causal and temporal interpretation interpretation of events described in text, defeasible defeasible logic gives gives as an output the fixed interpretation. The relation between the descriptive order of events in text and the temporal order can be described in terms of two sets of of defeasible rules: world knowledge knowledge pertaining to causal relations between events and states, and linguistic linguistic rules pertaining to Gricean maxims. maxims. For example, in (2) where the events are falling and pushing, pushing, world knowledge tells us that normally pushing causes falling (cf. (cf. Lascarides and Oberlander 1993: 13). 13). (2)

Max fell. John pushed him.

(from ibid.: 2). of 2). This interpretation of (2) shows the backward movement of time in narration. It is an instance of a causal rule. rule. It is a 'ceteris paribus law' and may not hold in some circumstances. Defeasible logic also uses, for example, a Narration Rule which which says that p. q normally means that the eventuality immediately the sentence order p.q eventuality p immediately plausibly go either precedes eventuality eventuality q. q. Causation Causation in (3) may equally equally plausibly way and the Narration Rule is responsible for not allowing ambiguity allowing an ambiguity to arise by specifying the order of precedence of eventualities: eventualities:

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The bimetallic strip changed shape. The temperature fell.

(from ibid.: 4). Another rule says says that states overlap.I8 overlap.18 So, So, if the sentence order is that of an event followed by a state, the direction of causation causation can be inferred from this rule and the state causes the event as in (4): (4)

Max opened the door. The room was pitch dark.

(from ibid.: 2, see also p. 21 21 for discussion). discussion). Lascarides and and Oberlander conclude that there is no ambiguity on the level of sentence/utterance sentence/utterance interpretation interpretation because world knowledge (called the 'knowledge base') and linguistic knowledge do not allow it to arise. The only sense in which it is plausible to talk about ambiguity is that (2) (2) can have different different interpretations interpretations relative to differences in the knowledge base. But even on this level there are default interpretations. In the absence of information to the contrary, (2) is interpreted as a reversal of the causal order. This default can easily be overridden and (2) (2) can be interpreted as conforming to the Narration Rule. This possibility is guaranteed by the theory with its assumption of of non-monotonic inference: the inferred temporal order of eventualities may non-monotonic change as the context becomes enriched. Lascarides and Oberlander entertain three classical possibilities as far as the semantic representation of text (and by extension discourse) is concerned: concerned: (i) (i) the semantic structure (and logical form) is neutral as to the relation of between the eventualities eventualities and pragmatics secures the ordering of eventualities; (ii) the ambiguity position, where there are as many logical forms as possible connections between eventualities and the choice between them is left to pragmatics and the reader; and (iii) the logical form of the text is constructed dynamically as a pair of sets. The first set is a set of logical forms of sentences, sentences, and the other is a set of relations between the eventualities depicted in the first set. In dynamic semantics, discourse interpretation interpretation is incremental. For instance, we we obtain p, and then q, q, from the first set and I9 Defeasible defeasible logic. 19 supplement them with the rule coming from defeasible logic ceases to be a pragmatic phenomenon phenomenon and instead actively constructs constructs the semantic representation (see also Lascarides and Copestake 1998 1998 on defaults coming from the lexicon). This idea of dynamic logical forms is an instance of the semanticization of semanticization of primary pragmatic processes also advocated by DRT and by the present account. Lascarides and Oberlander end on a non-committal note; all three placements of the boundary between semantics and pragmatics are possible. 18 19

See also Dowty 1986 1986 on a more detailed analysis analysis of temporal relationship and aspectual class. For the precise logical forms in dynamic dynamic semantics see Lascarides and Oberlander (1993: (1993: 33).

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However, it is signalled that the preferences for (iii) (iii) are rather stronger than for the other two options, at least on the part of one of the authors (see ibid.: 33 33).20 ).20 Indeed, the dynamic dynamic perspective best fares with default interpretations. Intentions and other contextual information information fit fit in as interpretation proceeds and intrude into the process of constructing the semantic representation. This standpoint standpoint bears obvious affinities affinities to the position defended in this book.

2.5.3. Defaults Defaults for for Definite Definite Descriptions: Interaction of of Intentions It was pointed out above that the referential use of definite descriptions makes

them akin to proper names in their referring properties. Let us now have a look at these two types of expressions. I claimed that the degrees of referential intention indicate the 'degree of referentiality' of the interpretation, or the degree of remoteness from the referential interpretation of the utterance under 21 as scrutiny. These would include utterances of sentences with proper names21 well as definite descriptions in the subject NP position in extensional extensional contexts as in examples (5)-(6), and in sentences embedded under the prepositional propositional attitude verb, as in (7). (5)

Ortcutt is a spy. spy.

(6)

The man with a martini is flirting with your sister.

(7)

Ralph believes believes that ... + (5) (5) or (6).22 (6).22

It was proposed proposed that the referential reading corresponds corresponds to the strongest

referential intention. Intuitively, this reading constitutes the presumed, salient interpretation. The reading that involves involves sorting out the speaker's referential mistake corresponds corresponds to a 'weaker' referential intention. intention. It is the reading in which, so to speak, something goes wrong wrong in the act of referring. The nonreferential reading corresponds corresponds to the lack of referential intention. intention. This reading is only activated activated when the salient, default one is contextually prevented from being the case. In the latter case the speaker does not talk 20 20

In subsequent papers, Lascarides researched rhetorical structure of discourse in terms of a theory. See e.g., Asher and Lascarides 1995. version of discourse representation theory. 1995. The paper also includes some general heuristics for the disambiguation disambiguation of of lexical expressions, albeit amounting to spelling out what is common-sensically well known rather than to novel rules. They pertain reinforcement of rhetorical connections. to avoiding incoherence incoherence and the reinforcement 21 21 Proper Proper names are normally regarded as directly directly referential terms. However, they can also be accompanied intention. accompanied by a stronger or weaker referential intention. 22 22 Pronouns and demonstratives are left left out of the picture because they pose slightly slightly different different referring and, in any case, the referential intention is there assumed problems of referring assumed to be present (see (see Bach 1992 on intentions and demonstrations).

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about any particular entity but rather about the event or state as a whole. Then, if referring to the state or if one can speak about referring in such cases, it is referring event. Referring to an eventuality corresponds corresponds to a 'weaker' referential intention referring to the constitutive parts of the eventuality. than referring eventuality. It can be graded as corresponding referring corresponding to the weakest form of intentionality because in referring to an individual, the speaker, so to speak, refers both both to the eventuality and to the individual as a constitutive part of this eventuality. audio eventuality. One could even say that referring referring to an eventuality eventuality is in fact equivalent to the lack of a referential intention. According to Bach, the communicative intention accounts for transmitting propositions propositions between interlocutors (see also referential intention makes laszczolt Jaszczolt 1996b, 1997a). The presence of the referential the communicative intention 'stronger': referring adds to the overall strength of intending to communicate and thus to the conversational value of the recognition of the intention (as well as to the conversational value of the communicated communicated attitude). By the conversational value I mean here informativeness, or a ceteris ceteris paribus informativeness, informativeness, presuming that both referential and nonreferential interpretation of the speaker's utterance are relevant to the hearer. It remains to be seen how this account of referential referential intentions fares with the semantics/pragmatics interface. interface. By entertaining the presumption that the referential form, the hearer referential intention is present in its strongest form, supplements the linguistic meaning with the referent as if if this reference belonged to the linguistic meaning, if nothing in the context indicates otherwise. There is a gradation of attachment attachment (or, perhaps, incorporation) incorporation) of the referential referential intention to the linguistic meaning and the possible interpretations are not equally salient: the strongest referential referential intention corresponds to the default reading. In the default referential referential case, the linguistic meaning leads directly to the propositional form as far as reference reference concerned if no further expansion or completion completion is required. The further further is concerned the interpretation interpretation is from the default, default, the smaller role can be ascribed to referential intention. In this way we have the discourse representation the referential as a sum of the syntactic, semantic and pragmatic information in the form defaults and less accessible departures from defaults. defaults. Intuitively, of accessible defaults Intuitively, one can concede that on most occasions we talk about real people and real objects and refer to them explicitly. presumption that explicitly. So, So, there is a tacit presumption referential referential interpretation is the default. the referential default. Now, why the strongest referential intention corresponds corresponds to the default reading can only be answered by negative arguments at this stage, that is envisaging envisaging the difficulties difficulties with postulating the opposite or no defaults. defaults. The positive psychological argument from intentionality and the workings of our mental states, signalled only briefly above, has to wait until Chapter 3. 3.

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Coming Coming back to Donnellan's Donnellan's distinction, it has been remarked about it that ""... ... in some cases, we we use the description to get to the referent and then throw away the description description as it were" (Levinson 1988: 47). The hearer does so in the case of a referential interpretation of a mistaken description. In a sense, he/she does so in all cases of referentially used definite descriptions. He/she gets to the object as if if by default: default: normally, normally, people talk about known, known, existing entities. Thanks to the presence of such preferences in conversation, we we can say that this process belongs to dynamic, context-sensitive semantics. Levinson (1988: 62) gives here a convincing example to illustrate the thesis that enriched semantics is preferable to post-semantically, pragmatically resolved reference: (8)

The ham sandwich is getting restless.

In (8), the definite noun phrase refers, obviously, obviously, to a client who ordered ordered a ham sandwich. Levinson claims (after Sag, for references references see ibid.: 62) that denotations denotations should be allowed to change within semantics, for instance along Kaplan's (1989a) distinction between character, which the lines suggested by Kaplan's is a function from contextual indices to contents, and content. content.23 As is well known, instead of talking about reference, reference, Donnellan suggests reference attribution by the speaker. He adds that the referent talking about reference should be "historically or ((...) ...) causally connected to the speech act" act" 1970: 356). But the theoretical explanation of this this link is not (Donnellan 1970: provided. A theory of the recovery of the intended referent founded on a theory of intentionality can fulfil this role. After all, who (if anybody) anybody) the speaker referred to is is a matter of the speaker's intentions, intentions, or rather their 1966: 297). 297). And so is the referential recognition by the hearer (Donnellan 1966: or attributive use of a definite description. So, So, the ambiguity ambiguity of sentences 24 It is a semantic such as (6) is neither properly semantic nor pragmatic. pragmatic.24 ambiguity only when we we accept a 'static' semantics that lists the truthincluding conditional impact a description can have have in all sorts of contexts, including intensional ones such as (7). (7). The seeming interpretative ambiguity ambiguity is successfully accounted for by the dynamic semantic representation that allows successfully for default interpretations of the utterance. The utterance is normally unambiguous and its interpretation proceeds towards the default reference, impediments stop it from doing so. so. And I have unless some contextual impediments suggested that in the case of definite descriptions intentions intentions are strongest when the speaker communicates a proposition known proposition about an individual known 23 23 24

Cf. also laszczolt Jaszczolt 1997a, fn 4. I discuss this issue in more detail in Chapter 4. In one of my earlier earlier papers (laszczolt (Jaszczolt 1993) I claimed claimed that in Polish there are lexical and individual syntactic means of distinguishing between talking about a known and an unknown individual in belief belief reports Vie (de re re and de dicto). However, the use of this distinction is also pragmaticallypragmaticallydriven to some extent. 24

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hearer automatically processes the utterance as if it to the hearer. The hearer concerned particular, known individual. Nota bene, both the comconcerned a particular, municative and the informative intention intention are in their strongest form: the particular person person is spoken of and particular and it is intended that this information is recovered by the hearer. If, on the other hand, the speaker communicated communicated a proposition fits the description, the informative proposition about whoever fits informative intention intention would make the process of reference assignment stop at a certain certain stage: either at the very beginning, if the informative intention was strongly supported supported by the communicative communicative one, or later on, if the communicative communicative intention intention was weaker. This is due to the interaction interaction of of the primary, communicative and informative informative intentions. intentions.The The strongest strongest intentions intentions correspond correspond to tothe the smallest smallest effort processing the message on the part of the hearer. This is the default effort in processing situation: the message is optimally informative, informative, minimally demanding in assumption assumption recovery, and thus the situation is optimally advantageous for securing relevance and informativeness. informativeness. Intentionality, directedness at a referent, is secured without going through an intermediate, intermediate, underspecified stage in utterance interpretation: the person or object is intended and this message 'automatically' gets through to the hearer.

Defaults for for Indefinite Indefinite Descriptions 2.5.4. Defaults

descriptions such as sentence (35) from Chapter 1, 1, In utterances with indefinite descriptions repeated here as (9), when accounted repeated accounted for by means of primary, communicative and informative informative intentions, it seems natural to admit that the nonspecific interpretation is rendered as a default: interpretation (9)

A friend of mine from Oxford paid me a visit.

Indefinites are not referring expressions, the primary intention is missing and information off the semantic this fact allows the hearer to read more information semantic representation than would be the case when the primary intention was in representation operation, i.e. in the case of definite descriptions. The semantics is not ambiguous: indefinites indefinites do not exhibit referential properties. They can, however, be specific. Even then their aim is not to secure a referent but rather by their means the speaker communicates communicates to the hearer an event, at the same time making the hearer alert to the fact that no stronger statement was necessary or possible. possible. The specific and nonspecific readings readings can be explained explained as follows. follows. The thought of the speaker exhibits intentionality because all acts of consciousness do. weaker. However, the utterance do. This intentionality can be stronger or weaker. primary intention securing the referent. The primary does not exhibit the primary intention of securing intention does not interact with the informative and the communicative

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intentions. This situation can be engendered either by the weakness of the primary intention of the mental act (the nonspecific reading of the indefinite) or by the conflict between the primary intention of the mental act and the informative intention (the specific reading; the referent may not be of of interest in the conversation). In any case, the utterance is permeated with the primary intention of the speaker's thought and the specific or nonspecific interpretation interpretation is established between the speaker and the hearer. To To repeat, the nonspecific interpretation interpretation occurs in the case where, where, according to the hearer, the intentionality of the mental state of the speaker is the weakest, weakest, i.e. i.e. it fails to reach the object. The specific reading is rendered when the speaker's speaker's thought is recognized as strongly intentional but the utterance fails to reflect this primary intention due to the interaction of the communicative communicative and informative intentions that signal the irrelevance irrelevance of any precise act of referring for the particular particular purpose at hand. In other words, the underlying underlying thought is either general and the primary intentionality is unrealized, unrealized, i.e. i.e. does not reach the object, or the thought concerns an intentional object but this fact is not communicated value. communicated at its face value. Let us take stock. Ludlow and Neale (1991: 184) assert that the uses of of indefinite descriptions do not prove the existence existence of a separate, 'semantically' referential interpretation. That is is true. And so is the claim that 'donkey' -sentences of the form as in (10) 'donkey'-sentences (10) are not ambiguous between the of the description (cf (cf. ibid.: 198). singular and plural interpretation of (10)

Every man who buys Every buys a donkey vaccinates it.

But proceeding to assigning assigning one of the possible readings readings has to be more fine-grained, level-neutral, and allow for the dynamism dynamism of semantic fine-grained, representation and, a fortiori, interpretations.25 Sense need not representation fortiori, for default interpretations. be unspecified, unspecified, it just needs to be constructed in situ as default sense or departures from the default, default, predicted by the recovered degrees of intentions. way will one avoid multiplying multiplyingthe thelevels levelsof ofsenses sensesbeyond beyondnecessity. necessity. Only in this way

2.6. Other Applications Applications 2.6.1. 2.6.1. On Semantic Representation and and Negation Again It remains to demonstrate that the defaults are indeed semantic. In Chapter 1, 1, I suggested that sentences involving involving negation such as (l) (1) can have have a semantic 25

There are serious implications here for for the distinction between being a Russellian Russellian and being a referentialist. See Neale 1990. But the opposition may after all boil down to being founded on a terminological mismatch. mismatch. For arguments in favour of such a reconciliation see Recanati 1993. 25

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representation as in (1c) (Ic) repeated here as (11): (11) (11)

-. (k) - Bald (k)

where 'k' is is an individual constant. This seems to be a truly referential reading of the definite description that accommodates it to proper names. The referential reading is also the presumed default interpretation as it of corresponds to the strongest primary intention. Hence, the intrusion of the referential intention into the semantic representation seems to signal that there is no separate level of under specificity: there is no obvious route from underspecificity: from (11) other than the representation with the wide scope of the quantifier to (11) by instantiation, instantiation, and allowing for instantiation would mean letting in semantic ambiguity. ambiguity. The seeming circularity of this reasoning is prevented by the intentionality which is an inherent feature of acts of consciousness.

2.6.2. 2.5.2. And, or, or, and and if if DI as formulated here also allows for intentions other than the referential to be gradable. This feature enables an explanation of the interpretative ambiguity of some other sentential connectives such as conjunction, conjunction, disjunction and implication. In sentence (20b) from Chapter 1, 1, repeated here as (12), we can conjecture that the strengthening of the meaning of the connective & corresponds to the strongest communicative and informative intentions. (12) (12)

They had a baby and got married.

then'or or 'and as a result'. Similarly, Similarly, if if will As a default, and will mean 'and then' render 'iff', and or will stand for the exclusive exclusive disjunction. In such an interpretation, the contextual effect effect is strongest and the intention to inform of the situation is also strongest. If If we took the semantically poorer sense to be the default, ambiguity would flourish and the corresponding intentions would be present in their crippled, inhibited form. The third option, that of no defaults, defaults, is eliminated by force of MOR and POL, and because an interpretation tends to be easily secured by the hearer, as confirmed by common-sense, everyday everyday observation. But this is only a temporary suggestion. (13), one would be in need of postulating a rule for After all, in (13), non-sequentiality non-sequentially (cancelling 'and then') and non-consequentiality (cancelling 'and as a result') of of and, perhaps coming from the fact that it is immediately diaphanous diaphanous to the hearer that no sense-connection is meant between the conjuncts: (13) (13)

He is a novelist and he has three children.

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2.6.3. Number Terms

believe they can conform to default Numerals are equally problematic but I believe semantics. Sentence (24) from Chapter Chapter 1, 1, repeated here as (14), (14), can have a default default interpretation interpretation arrived at through POL and 01: DI: (14)

Max has three children.

In this interpretation, 'three' means 'exactly three' as this is the case of the strongest informative the highest informative informative intention - and, of course, the By definition, content. By definition, quantifier expressions of this sort do not exhibit a primary intention. However, by reasoning analogous to that for the three communicative connectives above, we can have an instance of the strongest communicative and informative relevant types of of informative intention. It is so because, by 01, DI, both relevant intentions allow for degrees. Meaning 'at least three' is also possible. Let us imagine a context where a parent who has three children children qualifies for social benefits. On this reading, the object of the predication is only partially weaker. The situation can be explained as revealed and intentionality is weaker. follows. Although PI does not apply to numerals, the referential referential intention frequently accompanies accompanies a predication. Uttering (14) (14) is quite likely to induce (15) or (16) in the hearer who is presumed to be acquainted with Max and his family: family: (15)

What are their names?

(16)

What do they do?

If the postulate of the strength of intentions incorporated incorporated into semantics is on If the right track, then perhaps they can be seen as standing in a fixed inverse relation to processing effort. And intentions are best seen as being directly relation proportional in their strength to the informative content of the expression, as strengthening of and best demonstrates. demonstrates. anything about the resolution of the relative scope of the I have not said anything quantifiers if more than one is involved, involved, and with the collective and distributive reading as posed by (17). (17). (Again, the ambiguity ambiguity of reading is there only in theory because even here defaults defaults seem to shine through.) (17)

Six men carried carried two pianos upstairs.

This delimitation of the number of readings is only a preliminary step. Yet, Yet, the fact that the addition of 'each' would be meaningful seems to suggest, in agreement with the Co-operative significant Co-operative Principle, that its omission is significant and points towards the collective reading. Kamp and Reyle Reyle (1993: 321) 321) point

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out that any satisfactory paraphrase paraphrase of a collective reading would have to refer to the fact that the effort effort of the individuals is is combined combined - either physically or in its outcome. They quote examples where the collective reading is obligatory or at least is strongly preferred and argue that the distributive reading is best regarded as obtained through an optional further further step after the collective reading has been obtained (see ibid.: 320-330). The intention-based intention-based account succumbs to this strength of the collective interpretation and makes it a default by attributing a primary referential intentions which are not intention to a set, thus incorporating collective intentions reducible to individual intentions. One can plausibly argue that collective intentions can be shown to interact with the other three dominant intentions in communication communication and strengthen them by strengthening the primary, referential intention. As a result, the default interpretation interpretation is produced produced and it is the collective one. The route to the default interpretation can be directly derived from the interaction interaction of intentions presented in the case of definite descriptions, with the addition of the collective intention. At the moment, this is as far as the account account leads, extending Searle's (1990b) view on collective intentions. These are only tentative proposals. The difficulty difficulty lies in the fact that intentionality is to no avail. It is simply not decisive. I shall have no more to say about this type of 'ambiguity' and will mainly concentrate on the referential intention for referring expressions in extensional workings of the referential and prepositional propositional attitude contexts instead. As a final positive note, however, it has to be pointed out that there is significant progress in accepting the theory of default semantics. Geurts (1998), for example, tries to reconcile sense-generality and Horn's pragmatic ambiguities of negation by saying that while some expressions have punctual semantics, others have the 'at least' meaning. As was discussed in Section Section 1.2.6, he ascribes these differences differences to the lexicalization of scalar implicatures, for example in numerals, and the lack of this lexicalization in, for example, adjectives such as 'warm' which Qbid.: 298-299) defends has semantic semantic meaning of 'at least warm'. Now, Geurts (ibid.: this diversity by saying saying that it does not go against Occam's Occam's razor because the lexicon just is like that and polysemy has nothing in common with methodological parsimony. parsimony. In any case, even polysemy is excluded because methodological lexicalizations lead to default meanings. But we have gone further than that. Instead of resorting to 'this is what the world is like', we have elaborated here a constructive explanation why why the world, world, and the lexicon, are like like that: they communication, conform to and reflect the interaction of intentions in communication, and at the same time they reflect the workings of the intentionality intentionality of mental mental Chapter 3. 3. states attended to in Chapter

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Defaults in Dynamic Semantics 2.7. Defaults Defeasible logic introduced introduced in Section Section 2.5.2 was demonstrated to fare well with logical forms forms constructed constructed according to the incremental rules of dynamic semantics. Sentences Sentences have default default semantic representations representations and these are constructed as discourse proceeds, proceeds, with the help of ever increasing contextual information. In this section it is suggested that the same rule of default interpretations interpretations can be applied to accounts within within Discourse Discourse Representation Representation Theory. An analysis of referring constructions in DRTwill have to wait until Chapter Chapter 7. First, I discuss the notion of a propositional prepositional form that constitutes part and parcel of an 'intrusionistic' 'intrusionistic' dynamic semantic representation. I shall again take on board the theses of semantic ambiguity ambiguity and underdetermination and demonstrate demonstrate that, to a large extent, the polemic is driven by a terminological terminological vagueness and confusion. confusion. I shall also summarize the advantages of building a semantics around the idea of default interpretation. The difficulty difficulty with defining semantic representation is engendered by the fact that there is no uniform connection between the output of grammar of and the situation referred referred to by the linguistic string. The interpretation of the linguistic string does not undergo any strict semantic rules. But since neither does the situation itself, what is required is a restatement of the relation in more dynamic terms. The reality changes by the moves and actions of the participants and the interpretation interpretation of a linguistic linguistic string changes with more information becoming available, available, along the lines described by Heim's (1988) File Change Semantics where where the task of the hearer is, is, so to speak, to file and regularly update it so that it contains all the necessary construct construct a file information revealed by the speaker. So, So, for indefinite expressions the speaker starts a new file file card (introduces a new discourse referent, referent, cf. cf. Karttunen 1976), and for a definite, definite, an existing file file card is updated, according to the conditions specified in the semantics. Files, interpretive devices that mediate between the language and the world, perform the role of a monitor that records all the non-linguistic changes of the situation, including including both linguistic linguistic and non-linguistic information such as that from perception and background knowledge. knowledge. They do not rely on logical forms (in Chomsky's sense) but rather overlap with them since logical form contains a lot of grammatical information which information which is irrelevant for constructing constructing meaning. Lappin (1991) (1991) makes an even stronger claim that the LF is redundant as a level level separate from the S-structure to satisfy MOR and, as we can infer, POL as well. One of the main arguments for this standpoint comes from the ambiguity ambiguity of the scope of quantified noun phrases that do not seem to require a unified LF in order for one or the other semantic representation to be assigned to them (cf. (cf. ibid.: 310-313. 310-313. See also

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Kempson 1991/92 1991/92 on how syntax and semantics are intertwined). So, So, even within the domain of syntactic analysis, logical form may be overly informative. Changes affect the truth value of an utterance. They Changes in the situation situation may affect cannot be recorded after the propositional propositional form has been constructed because they affect affect the truth-conditional meaning of the utterance. Heim's Heim's solution evades this difficulty difficulty by introducing a level on which both utterances and other sources of information write down anything that is required. Essentially the same relation between the two components is proposed proposed by Kamp's DRT. Levinson calls this perspective 'pragmatic intrusionism': ""... ... there is a common slate, a level of propositional representation, upon which both semantics and pragmatics can write .. ;' (Levinson 1988: write..." 1988: 22). 22). Pragmatic Pragmatic intrusionism is a more cognitively plausible model of utterance interpretation interpretation with its semantic and pragmatic aspects assigned an equally privileged status. Discourse Discourse representations are mental representations and are, so to speak, two-aspectual: they rely on model-theoretic semantics but also concern the meaning meaning grasped grasped by the hearer hearer on hearing hearing an utterance. The theory theory thus has to be composed composed of three stages: a generative syntax, rules deriving representations sentations from syntactic syntactic constructions, constructions, and mappings mappings from representations representations to a model, supplied with a definition of truth. Logical ambiguities vanish on the level of deriving a representation, thanks to the various possibilities possibilities of applying DRS construction rules that account for the diversity of meanings (cf. Kamp and Reyle 1993). 1993). A discourse representation shows what the world would have to be like for the sentence to be true. Its construction rules account for the introduction of new referents and for adding properties (or, generally, generally, DRS-conditions) DRS-conditions) to the existing referents, which is essentially based on the linguistic linguistic representation. When more information becomes available as the discourse proceeds, the representations are filled in with more properties properties and and referents (see ibid.: 59). This pragmatic intrusionism intrusionism into semantic representations can be partial or semantic representations total. Levinson (1988: (1988: 22) uses the following metaphor. The semantic and pragmatic contributions to the 'common slate' can be distinguished distinguished by the pragmatic colour of the ink: "Semantics and pragmatics remain modular 'pens' as it were: 'pens'as were: they are separate devices making distinctively distinctively different different contributions to a common level of representation." This is partial intrusionism. Total intrusionism would not preserve the two colours' colours of the ink but rather mix them into one resulting colour. 'Two colours' means 'two modules', whereas there is no reliable evidence that pragmatics is a module, while while there is is significant evidence to the contrary (cf. (cf. e.g. e.g. Wilson jargon for discussing and Sperber 1986b). So modules may not be a suitable jargon

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intrusionism. Levinson (1988: (1988: 78, 78, fn 29), while while defending modularity of of pragmatics, claims that rejecting it does not alter the story: semantics pragmatics, and pragmatics remain different different 'pens'. But 'different 'different pens' and resulting colours of the ink are not the same thing. After all, once the semantic semantic representation representation has been embellished with with results of pragmatic processing, the colours may merge and there may may not be any need to postulate separate separate components components in utterance interpretation. The existence of default interpretations pretations guaranteed by intentions in communication seems to point towards a merger rather than intrusions: intrusions: intentions intentions accompany an act of reference rather than follow it. This is so both for the order of explanation explanation and the psychological psychological order. order. Levinson (!bid.: (ibid.: 60) rejects such a merger26 because semantics is monotonic and pragmatics why the difference in pragmatics non-monotonic. non-monotonic. But it is not clear clear why monotonicity should be an obstacle. If discourse processing is incremental, then surely monotonic and non-monotonic contributions can cohabit the 'common slate'. All that is sacrificed seems to be modularity, modularity, which is a controversial property anyway. A DRS is true if there are individuals individuals in the universe universe of discourse that correspond correspond to the discourse referents, and the conditions of that DRS predicate something something that can be truthfully said about these individuals. However, the interpretative ambiguity ambiguity ambiguity remains here as a full-blown ambiguity of processing processing options: in the case of indefinite indefinite NPs, for instance, the hearer can process the utterance to render the specific or the nonspecific nonspecific reading, x' is introduced. depending on the DRS in which a discourse referent for 'an jc' The appropriate appropriate reading can thus be achieved by means of choosing the appropriate appropriate order of rule application or by postulating into which DRS (in the case of embedded DRSs) the referent is to be introduced (see Kamp and Reyle 1993: 288-293; laszczolt Jaszczolt 1998d). 1998d). The theory theory does not predict under what circumstances circumstances the hearer will follow one or the other option, but neither does it postulate an ambiguous unit or an underspecified representation. Whether there are defaults defaults or merely merely contextual preferences, preferences, the process of utterance interpretation relies on the whole whole discourse situation that is available and avoids multiplying stages through through which which this this interpretation must proceed. Ambiguity Ambiguity is present because the sets of information contributing contributing to each of the alternative DRSs are different different in various various respects, both semantic utterance. and pragmatic. But it is an ambiguity of the sentence rather than the utterance. Given a sentence, the interpretation of its various utterances can go either of of ways. Given an utterance, it proceeds the prescribed prescribed ways. proceeds along one particular which is engendered by the joint way because of the default interpretation which 26 Called by him 'pragmantics' and attributed to generative generative semanticists. It should be clear that a principled intrusion intrusion of intentions into semantic representation representation is far from the type of merger principled advocated advocated by generative generative semanticists semanticists in the 1970s.

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commitment, i.e. by sharing of of the discourse referents referents between the interlocutors (Kamp 1990) and, if applicable, because of overriding the defaults. According to Kamp, there are also devices of of formal and and external anchors for directly referential terms in the semantic interpretation: in order for a representation (DRS) to have truth conditions of a singular proposition, the DRS has to have a clear referent, i.e. be connected connected with an entity entity by an external anchor. Kamp (1984) believes that the structures that people form during the cognitive process of utterance interpretation interpretation resemble the representations of DRT. In cognitive processing, as in DRT, building an interpretation can proceed in referential various ways. For instance, anaphoric pronouns introduce referential ambiguities. Background assumptions about the world help select referents in such problematic cases. Principles of inference in communication, forming intentions out of beliefs and desires, resemble principles of inference in formal logic and are applied to items with syntactic structure, i.e. logical formulas (Kamp 1990). Now, these items do not yet constitute a semantic representation. Discourse Now, understanding is incremental, proceeds bit by bit and in the process it accommodates accommodates changes of the context. In our account, some of these bits are inherently inherently equipped with triggers of intentions, and intentions prevent the semantics from being ambiguous. Instead, they secure the reading either as the default, strongest one or a weaker one when intentions are weaker. For instance, who is meant by using a proper name which has many potential the context - including the the speaker's intentions (Kamp bearers depends on the and Reyle 1993: 1993: 62). 62). Also, in (18), (18), the indefinite description can be represented differently differently in the DRS depending on the context. The discourse referent for the indefinite description a Porsche has to be introduced in the main, transparent, transparent, superordinate DRS which corresponds corresponds to the widest scope of the existential quantifier that handles 'a Porsche': (18) (18)

John doesn't like a Porsche. He owns it.

(from ibid.: 106). But there are no strict conditions for when this should be done. Perhaps the issue would be less complicated complicated if intentions were fully fully applied in a sense of using the fact of reading information off the world or the inherent lack of this process. Then the hearer can be said to arrive at default readings and consecutively weaker readings that correspond correspond to weaker intentions. Only if this schema is of no help, true communicative, communicative, interpretative interpretative ambiguity ensues. The problem also arises in sentences of the type (36) from Chapter 11 repeated here as (19), (19), as well as (20) and and (21):

(19) (19)

A problem about the environment preoccupies every serious politician.

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(20)

Every boy in Mary's class fancies know. fancies a girl who Mary doesn't know.

(21)

Bill doesn't know a book that I have have read during the past four weeks.

(from ibid.: 279, 279, 288, 303 respectively). Different Different readings of of these sentences sentences owe their existence to the different different scopes taken by the indefinite noun phrase. Kamp and Reyle suggest here two possibilities of accounting for the phenomenon: relaxing the order of application application of rules for constructing DRSs or externally imposing a status of a quantifier or a referring expression on the indefinite, indefinite, according to the hearer's judgement. Since such judgement is decisive in the theory, theory, we can infer that it has a role to play in DRS construction construction and as such it prevents the occurrence of an ambiguity. It does so because the (cognitive) process of DRS construction intentionally intentionally aims at one DRS, the one that represents the reading recognized as intended by the speaker. This reading is congruent with the intentions of the speaker speaker but also is collaboratively achieved by the speaker and the hearer in the process of communication. So although ""... ... the processing of indefinite noun phrases must allow for a considerable spectrum of alternatives" (Kamp and and Reyle Reyle 1993: 1993: 292), 292), these are alternatives alternatives to the default default reading which is obtained by the ordinary, default default application application of of construction rules. rules. By default, quantifiers. There is no reference-securing reference-securing intention indefinites are treated as quantifiers. involved which would signal direct referentiality as is the case in the default proposed above, this intention may be present reading of definites. But, as was proposed in other non-default readings, although in competition with the informative intention for a surface appearance. It is sometimes signalled by the presence as'certain','particular','given', of words such as 'certain', 'particular', 'given', and relative clauses. The authors say that in such cases indefinites are processed processed as definites and obtain their default, referential interpretation. I have have suggested that they are still processed processed as indefinites but the primary intention of the mental act affects the informative intention intention of the utterance. Reyle admit that they do not know how to distinguish between Kamp and Reyle different different scope readings, i.e. between 'long' and 'short' indefinites indefinites and they have no good processing rule to account account for this distinction. All they do is to postulate various processing options available to the hearer. However, the hearer 'chooses' the processing option automatically of automatically in the context of the conversation, conversation, not as one of the possible two. Since there are various reasons for scope ambiguities, one cannot fit the examples into one standard standard mould of logical variations of scope. There is no unique rule they would to. Any such rule would have to be psychologically plausible and conform to. the translations from natural language into first-order logic are not sensitive to this plausibility plausibility (cf. (cf. ibid.: 304). The ambiguity ambiguity is thus relegated to the level of utterance and resolved by utterance processing that relies on dynamic way the ambiguityambiguitysemantics allowing for pragmatic intrusionism. In this way

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nonambiguity dilemma is exorcized for these cases. It can be successfully successfully replaced with dynamic semantics, combined combined with contextualism contextualism and intentionality. I shall return to the contextualism --— anti-contextualism debate below. in Section 7.5 7.5 below.

2.8. Interim Conclusions To sum up: I have proposed proposed an account of utterance interpretation which default reasoning. It conforms develops the ideas of referential intention and default to the Gricean principle of not multiplying senses beyond necessity. necessity. It does not postulate referential ambiguities but rather utilizes intentions in a way way which allows for the discrimination between more and less salient interpretations of potentially referentially ambiguous expressions. Semantics remains uniform, unambiguous, but fully truth-conditional thanks to securing a unique reading of a sentence by means of intentions incorporated incorporated in the dynamic framework. framework. Rather than underdetermination and underspecification resolved later on by pragmatics, what we get is default interpretations. Only by accepting this standpoint standpoint can we explain the attributive use and referential mistakes of definite descriptions, as well as the multiple logical ambiguity ambiguity of numerals. The alternative readings are primary, referent-securing intention simply the weaker cases of intentions: primary, in the case of definite descriptions, and communicative and informative informative intention in the case of indefinites, numerals, and other cases where where the Primary Intention principle is not applicable. They 'mix in' various degrees of information read off the semantic form and intentions in order to render flexible and dynamic: a truth-evaluable representation. The semantics is is thus flexible dynamic: the semantic representation can be strengthened or weakened by intentions and the process is not temporal. In the default case there is no underdetermination as a step in the ladder. Kamp (1984) (1984) and Kamp and Reyle (1993) allow for the dynamism to be achieved by contextual specification; methodological contextualism, that is a weak Recanati (1994: 166) opts for methodological version of contextualism according to which the linguistic meaning of an expression is not the same as the contribution contribution the expression makes to the proposition expressed. And as it has been demonstrated demonstrated here with help intentions, the dynamism can be taken 'higher up' in the from intentions, proposition-implicatures schema, to affect proposition-implicatures affect the semantic representation. As an additional bonus, we we can now observe that the ambiguity-nonambiguity dilemma disappears and turns out to be merely a terminological mismatch. flexible (and hence In our analysis, analysis, ambiguity is precisely such a flexible uninteresting) construct. For example, example, referring in discourse yields yields to a unitary semantics, blurs the distinction between linguistic meaning and primary pragmatic processes and adds salient, default interpretations and

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departures from the default that correspond correspond to the strength of the referential intention intention with which the utterance was conveyed to the hearer and understood understood by the hearer to be conveyed.

2.9. The Doubly-Dynamic Doubly-Dynamic Approach: Assumption Recovery or Creation? If the communicative of communicative intention is envisaged envisaged in the light of the theory of relevance, then what is communicated communicated is entirely hearer-dependent. However, it seems at least equally plausible to conceive of conversation as a process process of assumption assumption creation performed in-between the speaker and the hearer, assigning to the hearer a more responsible role than just recovering the already existing assumptions. In fact, Bach and Harnish (1979) treat communication communication as a co-operative co-operative process, based on Grice's idea of speaker's speaker's intentions addressed addressed at the hearer. I am not sure whether, whether, if the above is true, one has to dispose of the default role of the communicative communicative intention intention in constructing constructing meaning or make it intersect with the informative one, since the fulfilment fulfilment of the communicative intention is its recognition (Bach 1987b). It is certain, however, that the hearer hearer is also invited to construct meaning rather than merely recover it (Levinas 1961; 1961; laszczolt Jaszczolt 1996b), and thus that the communicative intention may matter to a lesser degree in communication: making it manifest that 'this is is what I want to say' can perhaps be overridden by a principle of how exactly the speaker and the hearer contribute to the meaning that is being established between them in the process of of conversation. 27 It is important important to get this perspective on utterance interpretation right. The judged differently differently according to the adopted strength of intentions may be judged perspective and, above all, the degree to which the hearer is free to construct construct assumptions is an important claim of any pragmatic theory. theory. Sperber and Wilson (1986a) suggest that the role of the hearer is rather passive in that the hearer's aim is to recover the speaker's assumptions. This suggestion is worth a closer look as it may not stand up to scrutiny. scrutiny. I suggest in this section that processes other than intention recognition affect affect the derivation and creation of assumptions. The process of discourse interpretation is 'doubly-dynamic', i.e. interpretation is created in-between the interlocutors and the hearer may be given freedom to create assumptions rather than recover them. I propose to bring together two theories coming from quite different traditions: relevance theory on the one hand, and the theory of of different conversation included in Levinas's Totality Infinity (1961) on the other. Totality and and Infinity While the first is a theory of human cognition and communication, the other 27

A similar standpoint standpoint is signalled by Bird 1994.

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French phenomenological tradition and addresses the issues comes from the French of of the structure of being and the lack of mastery of a person over him/herself. It is the latter issue that for Levinas finds its explanation explanation in conversational conversational which, rather inadvertently, interaction and which, inadvertently, finds finds its application application to the reanalysis of the speaker's and hearer's role in meaning-construction. According to relevance theory, theory, relevant information is derived from the memory, observation, and the process of inference. However, utterances, memory, the theory leaves leaves the process by which such an interpretation is reached largely unexplained. The authors pose two unanswered questions, namely (i) how assumption schemas are filled out, i.e. what is the mechanism of of providing an utterance with the interpretation, and (ii) what determines the order of accessibility of hypotheses in the process of utterance affect the fact that interpretation, i.e. what factors in the discourse situation affect certain interpretations come to the hearer's mind earlier than others and seem to be more natural than others (Sperber and Wilson 1986a: 1986a: 170). 170). The answer should communicative should be expected expected along the lines of the relation between communicative behaviour and psychological states such as intentions. Sperber and Wilson Recanati (1993), and many others stress that meaning (1986a), Grice (1989), Recanati should be analysed in terms of psychological properties, along the path sentence meaning, through utterance meaning and comleading from sentence behaviour, to psychological states (cf. municative behaviour, (cf. Recanati 1993: 1993: 20). As yet no successful account account of psychological belief psychological states has been given. It is my belief that states such as fear, anger, annoyance, etc., as well as many non-emotional states cannot be excluded from the study of intentions. They affect affect assumption recovery, assumption creation and assumption 'pruning', and hence pertain to the problems in (i) (i) and (ii). In communication, we do not aim at the identity of thoughts, similarity is say, the interlocutors enlarge their mutual sufficient. As relevance-theorists relevance-theorists say, thoughts. Mutual knowledge knowledge cognitive environments instead of duplicating thoughts. is not attempted, it does not even exist (see Sperber and Wilson 1990). Instead, manifestness of what happens around us and communication relies on mutual manifestness knowledge. But how exactly what can be non-demonstratively inferred from knowledge. speakers access assumptions assumptions remains an open question. In order to answer speakers it one must analyse examples where the speaker's intention to convey certain particularly difficult difficult to pinpoint. In (22), Mary's answer information is particularly can be deliberately ambiguous: (22)

Peter: Do you want some coffee? coffee? Mary: Coffee would keep me awake ... [flat intonation]

(adapted from Sperber and Wilson 1986a: 34). Mary may not be sure whether she wants coffee coffee or not, she may rely on Peter's further reaction. She may know that no additional assumptions are available for Peter concerning

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her decision decision on coffee-drinking, coffee-drinking, or that there are conflicting assumptions available such as that she normally drinks coffee coffee when when she wants to stay awake to revise before an exam and that she realizes she should have have a good night's Now, it seems sleep before the exam. So, So, she may have have conflicting conflicting motives. Now, plausible to say say that there are no assumptions to be recovered concerning this occasion of coffee-drinking. Assumptions are left left for the hearer to create. The general rule in such difficult difficult cases of interpretation would be to judge the strength of the assumptions. It is a relatively relatively easy task for referring expressions (including definite descriptions) because the referential referential intention secures the referent of the referring term in accordance with the PI principle. principle. However, judging the strength of assumptions is more difficult difficult in the cases where the primary intention is not applicable. Moreover, it seems that before we attempt the task of tracing the process of assumption recovery, recovery, an important important methodological assumption is needed. Namely, we have to assume propositions are that the objects of beliefs are propositions and that these propositions recognizable cross-culturally, cross-culturally, i.e. we have have to accept cultural cultural rationalism. Sperber Sperber (l985a, (1985a, b, 1996, 1997) 1997) says that culture culture is formed through through the propagate easily, such as religious transmission of ideas which which propagate religious beliefs or scientific hypotheses. He calls these ideas 'contagious' and dubs the study of the process an 'epidemiology of representations'. During the process of transmission, the original information information is affected affected by the hearer's memory and extant assumptions and becomes transformed. transformed. In this way way ideas can become misunderstood or half-understood. The ideas that we we hold are not always always propositional. prepositional. There are propositional prepositional representations that correspond to fully understood ideas, and semiprepositional representations which correspond correspond to ideas that are not fully propositional humans are capable of mentally representing not only understood. Moreover, humans facts, but also their own representations and mental mental states. These metarepresentations are not factual beliefs, but representational beliefs. The first are based on perception and inference, and the latter are, so to speak, put put 'in quotes', in a symbolic form, for future understanding (cf. (cf. Sperber 1975). They are believed because they are embedded in factual beliefs. Factual beliefs prepositional and have strong criteria of rationality, rationality, or can be either propositional semi-propositional. semi-prepositional. Similarly, representational beliefs can have have either propositional prepositional content (like (like scientific assumptions) assumptions) and be weakly weakly rational, or semi-propositional semi-prepositional content and be held as if they were rational. rational. The latter religious category includes includes mysteries mysteries and other cultural cultural beliefs, as well as religious beliefs (Sperber (Sperber 1985a: 58, 58, 1996: 73; 73; 91-92). It is perhaps worth noting that talks instead of factual and representational beliefs, Sperber 1996 1996 and 1997 1997 talks about intuitive intuitive beliefs (common-sense beliefs derivable derivable from perception) and reflective reflective beliefs. But this amendment does not have have a significant impact Now, the assumption of universalism and rationalism is on the approach. Now, required in order to talk about universal processes of assumption recovery.

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It is also useful for another reason. It demonstrates that there are degrees of of

strength of the hearer's beliefs tied to the degree of understanding of the 28 speaker's utterance. utterance.28 problematic for two Coming back to intention recognition, its study is problematic reasons. First, there are sources of assumptions utilized by the hearer which have not yet acquired an analysis. Second, there are psychological processes that affect affect intention recovery which may be too situation-specific to allow for a theory of this interaction. There can be no doubt that anger or fear affect the utterance interpretation. Such of the speaker or the hearer may affect psychological states or processes which cause the state of anger, amazement, fear, or non-emotional states such as incredulity, incredulity, scorn, admiration, regret, or satisfaction, can help or hinder intention recovery. recovery. Generally, Generally, this influence can be classified as acceleration or impairment of intention recovery (cf. laszczolt Jaszczolt 1996b). 1996b). These forces depend on various aspects of discourse such as the source of assumptions, the place and time of conversation or the personal characteristics of the speaker or hearer. Peter's question in (22) may be recognized as a friendly offer, an attempt to distract the hearer from from an important situation, or even to poison her. It is to be doubted, however, that a theory of such an interaction of psychological states with assumption recovery is ever to be attained. This example clearly demonstrates that the process of utterance interpretation cannot be seen as a straightforward straightforward recovery of assumptions but has to be given some flexibility instead. This conclusion is not incompatible with relevance theory. theory. According to Wilson and Sperber (l986b), (1986b), pragmatics is not a module in Fodor's sense,29 sense,29 it involves interaction of grammar, logic, and memory. the interaction memory. Pragmatic processes are informationally unencapsulated, they have access to contextual information and can allow the hearer to assess the assumptions and intentions. Hence theory, be psychological states and processes including intentions can, in theory, incorporated incorporated into a theory of discourse interpretation. In practice, they may not yield to generalizations. Assumptions have the following sources: perception, linguistic decoding, memory, and deductive process. The choice of context depends encyclopedic memory, Now, the hearer, knowing to some extent on the choice of these assumptions. Now, the source of assumptions, may also know possible problems with assumption recovery. For example, example, if it is linguistic decoding, how does it proceed? Sperber and Wilson (l986b) (1986b) say say that discourse interpretation is incremental, constrained by the central processes, but how does the hearer know what constitutes a unit for parsing? For example, in the case of a propositional prepositional attitude expression, how does the hearer know whether the attitude is held 28 28 The weaknesses weaknesses of this approach are discussed in laszczolt Jaszczolt (l996b: (1996b: 707 707 and Recanati 1997) 1997) but they are not relevant relevant to the present discussion. 29 29 See Fodor 1983, 1983, 1989.

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about the state or event as a whole represented by the embedded sentence sentence ({hat-clause) (f/j0r-clause) or about an individual represented by a referring referring term and its having a certain property (i.e. de dicto or de re)? Parsing into smaller or larger

30 constituents this.30 constituents will depend on this. Bearing all these difficulties difficulties in mind, let us try another solution. Utterance interpretation interpretation does not consist of the hearer's recovery of the speaker's speaker's assumptions assumptions but rather is an interactive process. The hearer plays an active role in changing the speaker's assumptions about the world during the conversation conversation and it is so because the speaker assumes that these assumptions of are subject to change. This suggestion is compatible with Sperber's Sperber's idea of metarepresentations (ideas about other people's people's and one's own metarepresentations representations) and it well explains the lack of clear assumptions to be recovered from Peter's utterance in (22). (22). The suggestion finds support in Levinas (1961) (1961) according to whom meaning is created between the interlocutors. It is not the whole whole truth to say say that the aim of the hearer is to recover and enrich the speaker's assumptions, they can also be created. The hearer's interpretation affects the conveyed information information to a greater or lesser extent and it is so due to, among other factors, intervention factors, the intervention of psychological states. This explanation seems to be compatible with Sperber's idea of epidemiology of representations, the theory of how cultural beliefs propagate. Sperber and Wilson correctly observe that there is no algorithm for recovering the intended recovering intended interpretation interpretation of an utterance. Hypothesis Hypothesis formation is based on non-demonstrative inference and this is where the theory ends. possible to go a little further in spelling out the principles Nonetheless, it is possible principles for this inference. inference. Firstly, Firstly, it is so because there are defaults of interpretation guaranteed by the intentions in communication, and second, because the guaranteed speaker's and hearer's hearer's psychological states allow for some predictions as to the degree of departure from standard standard utterance encoding and processing. In addition, the authors of relevance admit that there may be no definite demarcation point between assumptions intended by the speaker and those derived independently by the hearer. The next question to ask is whether the speaker takes this into account and whether we can call these independent inferences utterance meaning. Now, as I argue elsewhere (Jaszczolt 1996a and Chapter 6 of this book), beliefs are conveyed by means of the following vehicles: vehicles: language, mental images, and non-linguistic actions, all with the help of background background knowledge. Intention recovery uses the same sources of information, with the added obvious condition that the linguistic linguistic vehicle vehicle has to be used. The vehicles, as well as their interaction with psychological interaction of these vehicles, 30 30 Cresswell (1985) talks about different different sensitivity sensitivity of the complementizer complementizer that to the structure of of the embedded sentence. See Chapter 8 below.

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states producing acceleration or impairment, constitute of constitute a general outline of an answer to (i) propositional content of the utterance may have (i) and (ii). The prepositional to be enriched with information coming from background knowledge in accordance with the view of semantic underspecification. But the influence of psychological states and personal differences is harder to generalize. Concerning the latter, people seem to be prepared to go to different different lengths 31 to recover speaker's intentions.31 All in all, the selection of context for utterance interpretation interpretation may not be solely determined by the search for relevance as proposed proposed by Sperber and Wilson. It was pointed out to me by an anonymous reviewer of one of my articles (Jaszczolt 1996b) that the idea of psychological states impairing and accelerating intention recognition bears some affinities affinities with Lindsay and Gorayska's (1993), (1993), Lindsay et al. al. (1993) (1993) and Gorayska and Lindsay's (1993) proposal of broadening relevance to accommodate non-linguistic plans and goals. The latter say qbid.: (ibid.: 319) 319) that relevance theory accounts only for the communicative-cognitive goal, consisting in improving the hearer's knowledge of the world. world. Goals are said to be "[c]ognised motivations or ends" and encompass aims, objectives, wishes, wishes, desires, interests, intentions, and wants (jbid.: qbid.: 303). They are immanent in the producing and recovering of Now, instead of broadening relevance, I propose seeing of assumptions. Now, motivations as inherent in intention production production and intention recovery. Goals are motivations for action that are a type of psychological states impairing or accelerating intention recovery, recovery, so to speak, 'from within'. It is also unclear whether goals mean what the speaker, or the hearer, wants to achieve. Gorayska and Lindsay are committed to the hearer's perspective, the hearer who performs the interpretation. This would be correct if the hearer's sole role was to recover what the speaker intended. But as we have seen, assumptions and intentions do not always go hand in hand: assumptions can be created rather than recovered, and they can be intended to be created. of The hearer's perspective is also undermined by the fact that now, now, in view of the recognition of various vehicles vehicles of thought, we have to see relevance as based on the intention to perform a certain action, not necessarily linguistic. And if the goal is not linguistic, the role of the hearer can be far less significant: the hearer may not be required for the fulfilment fulfilment of the plan. Hence, the result is that Embedding communicative intention (when present) in the over-arching intention to act shifts the perspective from the hearer to the speaker in utterance interpretation. interpretation. 31 31

This was recognized by Sperber and Wilson 1986b.

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If If linguistic actions are only a subclass of actions, then the speaker does not necessarily try to be relevant in Sperber necessarily Sperber and Wilson's terms. He/she only attempts this when the hearer is required for the fulfilment fulfilment of the plan. So, Communication Communication is neither totally dominated dominated by the hearer and recovery, nor by the speaker's his/her assumption recovery, speaker's communicative intention relative to his/her present goals. The agent's assumptions are created either for the addressee or without regard to the observers. After all, there may not be any assumptions to recover. The balance of the After interactants' roles is further affected affected by the presence of of emotional and other of psychological states which affect affect assumption creation and the lack of assumption assumption creation creation on the part of the agent, as well as assumption recovery, assumption creation, and the lack of assumption recovery or creation on the part of the addressee. All in all, the balance of of responsibilities for assumptions that relevance theory places on the speaker and the hearer has to be redrawn. Communication is not like dancing where one partner leads and the other follows. Assumptions are not simply created created and recovered but rather created between the two in a dynamic dynamic manner. non-linguistic actions and Naturally, this broadening of the perspective to non-linguistic goals requires a rethinking of the modularity hypothesis. But with the recent revival of non-modular approaches to language such as parallel distributed processing (Rumelhart and McClelland 1986), a plausible alternative to modularity has arisen. The choice between the two standpoints will not be discussed here. effort differ differ from person to person. The The limitations in processing effort question to pose at this point is to what extent the speaker takes into consideration the role of the hearer in his/her life while coding the message. consideration It is a widely held philosophical view that the other person is perceived by the ego as an object in the ego's world, an object with a place and function function in this world. Levinas (1961) challenges this idea in his approach approach to verbal communication. He argues that we coexist with 'the other' but also leave this We do not superimpose our own picture of the person's 'otherness' intact. We characteristics onto our reality. This is possible thanks to language. Now, Now, characteristics proposal does not boil down to an ethical or social rule of a preferred the proposal linguistic behaviour. Levinas merely says that in order to survive, to coexist knowledge, we have invented self-defence with other humans and to acquire knowledge, self-defence mechanisms such as conversation. Speaking allows allows us to reveal our world and experience to the hearer without endangering ourselves. Words can be of interpreted in many ways, are not always planned in advance, and, first of all, they are not the genuine'!' presentation to the other genuine T but rather its its 'revised' presentation person. The idea of infinity infinity is the core of Levinas's view. Infinity means that

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thought cannot be assessed through adequation adequation with an object. Thought Thought is creating meaning through events events and actions, i.e. through infinity. The rough application application of the idea of infinity, contrasted with totality, totality, goes as follows. Totalizers are people satisfied with themselves, seeking power and control in life, whereas infinitizers infmitizers strive for freedom, freedom, creativity, creativity, for what is 'other', different from oneself. different oneself. Varying Varying compositions of these tendencies are also possible. Infinity, striving for something other than oneself, is a precondition precondition for intentionality, the directedness of acts of consciousness towards objects, developed in the phenomenological tradition. 32 Hence, infinity is a theory of intentions, also intentions in communication: ... intentionality, ""... intentionality, where thought remains an adequation adequation with the object, does not define consciousness at its fundamental fundamental level. All knowing qua intentionality already presupposes the idea of of infinity, which is preeminently non-adequation." non-adequation!' Levinas (1961: (1961: 27). Levinas sees the relation between interlocutors as dynamic, involving involving 'creating one another' in the process. This claim seems to be congenial with the relevance-theoretic denial of mutual knowledge and the claim that the speaker makes things mutually manifest in the process of conversation. of Levinas says that conversation always always means going beyond the limits of the self and this reaching beyond is infinite, does not stop where the hearer's hearer's assumptions or knowledge end. Neither the speaker nor the hearer are responsible for the infinity. Rather, it is the conversation that brings it about. As a result, the speaker may not be so important important for recovering meaning: meaning is created instead (cf. (cf. ibid.: 76). 76). Thoughts are dynamic, are conveyed, uttered, rather than entertained in advance and exchanged. I called Levinas's view on conversation doubly-dynamic (JaszczoIt 1996b). The hearer consults doubly-dynamic (Jaszczolt the available sources of information for intention recovery, recovery, including psychological processes of what I called acceleration acceleration and impairment, and assigns attributes to the speaker, or 'creates him/her anew'. This 'creation' is not recovery: "Language "Language does not exteriorize a representation representation preexisting in me: it puts in common a world hitherto mine;' Levinas (1961: mine." (1961: 174) and: 32

The phenomenological idea of intentionality is the topic of Chapter 3 below.

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"In speaking I do not transmit to the Other Other what is objective for me: the objective becomes objective only through communication." communication." Levinas (1961: (1961: 210). Communicating Communicating is co-temporal co-temporal with changing the state of the speaker's speaker's knowledge. So, So, the speaker may not presume what interpretation the hearer will assign to the utterance but instead rely on this dynamism. dynamism. This would explain the lack of recoverable assumptions in example (22). This dynamism is best seen in the example of referentially mistaken descriptions. If the speaker utters (23) making making salient the individual individual present who is in fact the woman's brother, the hearer does not normally adjust his/her referring expression to that of the speaker but instead provides additional information as in (24): (23)

Her husband is kind to her.

(24)

Yes, Yes, her brother, the man over there, is always always kind to her.

(from Linsky, quoted after Donnellan 1966). This is a general tendency of of referential truthfulness, spelled out in Grice's Grice's maxim maxim of quality and it operates operates even when the intelligibility intelligibility has to be sacrificed. Now, why why doubly-dynamic? doubly-dynamic! Sperber and Wilson's (l986a) (1986a) metaphor of of conversation as dancing is singly-dynamic: they say that context is created, conversation not given, and it is not established before relevance is assessed. Double dynamism means that interpretation interpretation is created interlocutors, created in-between the interlocutors, rather unlike unlike dancing which which requires a leader and a follower. 33 So, So, utterance recovery and is largely largely co-temporal with interpretation is not assumption recovery incremental and (b) context is constructed speaking as (a) interpretation is incremental in situ. situ. To conclude, let us retrace Peter's steps in the processing processing of Mary's response response in (22). (22). First, he evokes evokes the sources of assumptions such as perception, linguistic decoding, decoding, encyclopedic encyclopedic memory and deductive processes. Next, he responds to Mary's (observable or inferrable) psychological psychological states which normal34 intention intention recovery. recovery. He also exhibits exhibits may accelerate or impair normal psychological states other than intention intention himself and may take some into consideration. The second and third points are suggested by Levinas's idea of dynamic 'self-creation' in conversation. dynamic'self-creation' conversation. All in all, communication communication appears less dependent on assumption recovery; relative recovery; the speaker gives the hearer relative freedom of interpretation. interpretation. 33 33 According According to Levinas, the objective becomes objective through communication communication rather than through imposing imposing on the hearer what is objective for the speaker. speaker. through 34 34 I.e. ceteris paribus. ceteris paribus.

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This, not uncommon, intuition of the active role of the hearer can be pronounced philosophical traditions. Recently, pronounced with support support from other philosophical Fredsted (1998) backed arguments from Kierkegaard backed it with arguments Kierkegaard according to i.e. communication communication through implicatures whom indirect communication, i.e. and ambiguous discourse, aims at leaving the 'creation of meaning' to the recipient (cf. (cf. ibid.: 540). The interpretation of the utterance is deliberately proposal supports my left open, to be created by the interlocutor. This proposal doubly-dynamic approach based based on Levinas's Levinas's view of conversation. conversation.

2.10. Conclusions The analysis in this chapter adhered to the rejection rejection of semantic semantic ambiguity but underdetermined one further step was taken to demonstrate that the level of underdetermined semantics can be disposed of as well. This level is unnecessary due to the influence that intentions exert on the semantic representation. The main message is that the ambiguity-underdetermination dilemma is only the result of a wrongly posed problem. problem. classify readings of referentially ambiguous Degrees of intentions help classifY constructions as to their accessibility to the hearer. The referential intention, embedded in the communicative one, is present in any of the full spectrum of degrees from its absence to unproblematic referring. People arrive at an Which interpretation is it? If there is a reasoning. Which interpretation by default reasoning. systematic answer, it comes from the juxtaposition juxtaposition of the two ideas discussed here: [1] [1] types and degrees of intentions on one hand, and [2] [2] default reasoning on the other. As I have demonstrated, putting the two together, one is led to conclude that the referential interpretation interpretation of utterances involving expression (including (including a definite description) description) is is the more salient one. one. a referring expression This interpretation interpretation is accompanied accompanied by the strongest intentions and the effort effort required on the part of the hearer to recognize these intentions is the smallest. When the intentions are weaker, the object of the utterance is less exposed to interpretation, as in the case of referential mistakes. In the case of the lack effort involved is the greatest: the intentionality of the referential intention, the effort of mental states makes the hearer look for the referential interpretation interpretation and the latter is not found. It has also been signalled that the degrees of intentions may help decide on the default readings of other expressions where the primary intention is not applicable. Finally, Finally, it was stressed that utterance interpretation interpretation is a creative process to a degree much higher than is standardly standardly admitted in pragmatics. This claim was discussed with the example of of relevance theory.

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CHAPTER 3

Intentionality Intentionality and and Propositional Attitudes "... there are many descriptions of happenings happenings which are "... directly dependent of dependent on our possessing the form of description description of intentional actions. It is easy not to notice this, because it is perfectly possible for some of these unintentionally. For descriptions to be of what is done unintentionally. example 'offending 'offending someone'; one can do this unintentionally, but there would be no such thing if it were never the description of an intentional action." Anscombe (1957: 83).

Contents 3.1. 3.2. 3.3. 3.4. 3.5. 3.6. 3.7. 3.8.

'Directedness' 'Directedness' of of Acts of Consciousness: The Phenomenological Tradition 88 Intentional Relation and Defaults .................................. 92 Intentionality Voluntariness ................................... 94 Intentionality and Voluntariness Intentions and Intentionality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 96 Dieto, and the Horizons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 99 De Re, De Dicto, Speech Acts: Double Level of Intentionality? .......................... 104 of Intentionality? Are Intentions in the Head? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 111 Ill Ambiguity: Concluding Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 119 119 Intentionality and and Ambiguity:

DISCOURSE, BELIEFS, AND INTENTIONS DISCOURSE, INTENTIONS Current Research in the Semantics/Pragmatics Interface, Interface, Vol. Vol. 2 K.M. Jaszczolt © 1999 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights rights reserved 87

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3.1. 'Directedness' 'Directedness' of Acts of Consciousness: The Phenomenological Tradition Default Semantics and intentions on which it is founded founded are derived from the intentionality of mental states. In this chapter I present the connection between intentions and intentionality. intentionality. In Section 2.9 2.9 I looked at the process of utterance interpretation from the perspective of the 'double dynamism' of Levinas's view. I concluded that assumptions are created, as well as recovered, by the hearer and both processes are compatible compatible with intention recovery. Now, Now, if intentions accommodate accommodate creation of the assumptions by the hearer and the construction construction of meaning between the speaker and the hearer, acts of consciousness consciousness must also depend on this dynamism. dynamism. It is so because they are intentional and intentionality intentionality of acts of consciousness, as Levinas says says (1961: (1961: 27, 27, quoted in 2.9 above), presupposes presupposes this dynamism. Bearing this in mind, I shall now discuss this intentionality intentionality as represented twentieth in the phenomenological tradition of the nineteenth and early twentieth century, with particular particular reference reference to belief ascription. The Latin word intendere means to aim in a particular direction, to direct the thoughts to something (Simpson 1959), similar to drawing drawing and aiming a bow at a target (Harland 1993: 1993: 71). 71).Traditionally, forms of 'being'are divided into esse naturale, naturale, natural objects, and esse intentionale, intentionale, such as thoughts and mental images (W Lyons Lyons 1995: 1995: 1). 1). Intentionality Intentionality means here the property of mental acts of having having content, being about something. Mental acts include such attitudes as belief, desire, want, need, expectation. Taken Taken from Aristotle through Avicenna Avicenna and the medieval medieval doctrines of knowledge and experience, intentionality was later developed in nineteenth-century nineteenth-century phenomenology. At present, intentionality of intentionality is also known known in some circles under a guise of representationality representationality (cf (cf. Woodfield 1994: 1705). 1705). /\boutness' Aboutness' or 'direction' mean 'orientation' of mental acts towards objects. Intentional Intentional acts provide the meaning of expressions. This is best seen in the example of indexicals indexicals that exhibit acts of demonstration as part of their meaning. meaning. For example, example, the meaning of the pronoun 'he' is not entirely present in the word but requires (cf an additional act of the assignment of meaning to this open symbol (cf. Osborn 1934: 1934: 95). In contemporary terminology, terminology, this meaning is called procedural and is distinguished from conceptual meaning (Wilson and Sperber Sperber 1993). 1993). The idea of intentionality was brought to the fore by Brentano (1874, 1874a) and his students, most notably Husserl (1900-1901, 1900-1901a), (1874,1874a) (1900-1901,1900-1901a), Meinong and Twardowski. Twardowski. Phenomenology is the study of forms of conscious conscious experience, including the ways things things (,phenomena') ('phenomena') are presented in consciousness. It is also sometimes regarded as a philosophical method used by Husserl or Heidegger but it is not the sense in which the word is used here. Brentano proposed that objects of consciousness are all in the mind. When John sees a red square, intentionality intentionality does not amount to a relation

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between John and an object (here: a red square), but rather to the act of seeing (1) whose feature feature is spelled out by the adverbs 'redly' and 'squarely' as in (1) and (2): (1)

John sees redly. redly.

(2)

John sees squarely. squarely.

(from Smith and Woodruff Smith 1995: of and Woodruff 1995: 14). 14). This adverbial theory of intentionality did not account for the fact that mental acts are about things in the world and that we can talk about someone else's mental acts.1 It was subsequently replaced with a relational account, according to which intentionality is a relation between the experiencer (thinking subject) and Alternatively, it was also defined as a relation between an act an object. 2 Alternatively, object. Husserl went further and rejected immanent, mental objects, and its object. replacing them with real things as correlates of perception. distinction between subjective subjective The idea of intentionality presupposes a distinction ideas in our mind and objective objective ideas, attributed to Bolzano (1837, 1837a). Thinking means having an idea of something, or having subjective imperfect phenomena present in the mind. These phenomena are imperfect counterparts of the objective 'meaning'. Objective of Objective ideas are constituents of propositions. The latter exist independently of the mind and can be entertained, brought to the mind in a judgement:

thought, and also to those "Existence belongs only to propositions thought, to be true, true, i.e. to judgements, but not to the propositions in held to themselves which are the material a thinking being grasps in his judgements:' Bolzano (1837a: thoughts and judgements." (1837a: 167). distinguishes objective objective entities which are ideal, present 'outside the Bolzano distinguishes mind' and their counterparts present in the mental processes. In Husserl's Husserl's (1900-1901) terminology, terminology, there are objective objective meanings or thoughts, and acts of meaning, or acts of thought that bring these thoughts to consciousness. of Consciousness is understood in the Brentanian tradition, as a totality of experience. Meaning is given to linguistic expressions by language users 1987: 211). 211).This This view viewof ofmeaning meaningwas waslater later modified modified in mental acts (see Smith 1987: by Husserl and replaced by the idea that meaning is contained in the noema, noema, the objective objective content of consciousness (Husserl 1913: 304; 1913a: 368). lCf.: 'Cf.: "The embarrassment for adverbial theories is ((...) ...) that they are not well placed to account for the objective aspects of intentional mental acts and states." Bell (1990: (1990: 134). 2 extended by Alexius Alexius Meinong. Meinong. See See Smith and 2 This step is attributed to Kazimierz Twardowski, extended Woodruff Smith (1995: Woodruff (1995: 15) 15) for references.

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The noema noema is an intentional intentional object, the content of an act, it functions functions as the meaning or sense. In virtue of this content an act achieves an intentional relation to an object. In other words, an act is directed toward an object through (cf. Woodruff Smith and Mclntyre through a mediator mediator called called noema noema (cf. McIntyre 1982: 87). This direction or intention is always always definite, aimed at a specific object determined noemata. 3 determined by the noemata. Now, linguistic meaning, i.e. meaning expressed in language, is a sub-type of noematic meaning, i.e. meaning attached to relevant mental acts. This is how language becomes becomes one of the carriers of meaning, and sense becomes becomes meaning is developed one of the kinds of noemata. The idea of carriers of meaning further in Chapter Chapter 6. The property of directedness of thoughts and other mental acts was a natural distinction between thoughts thoughts and acts of of natural consequence of Bolzano's distinction thoughts. It was developed by Brentano (1874a: (1874a: 324) as the idea that "[a]1l "[a]ll our thinking has a thing as an object". This 'thing' can be the subjective or the objective idea and this dilemma was well discussed in the phenomenological phenomenological literature of the period, with with the natural development towards the acceptance acceptance of real instead of mental objects. objects.44 In the post-Brentanian tradition, intentionality has been regarded either as a 1992), or as really present feature of conscious states (Searle (Searle 1983, 1983,1992), present in the head, head, 1981; see in the computations computations in the brain, as in Fodor's realism (Fodor 1975, 1975,1981; latter stance, there are no mental acts W Lyons 1995). According W. According to the latter informational independent independent of the brain: there are only brain states with informational content (representations), (representations), and intentionality is the feature of the brain that allows for this informational content to be present. Approaches to intentionality are ample in the literature and they will not be reviewed reviewed here. I shall accept the dominant realist stance that originated in Brentano's intentionality and derive the theory of intentions in communication from this account. account.5 I shall also accept Brentano's Brentano's confinement of intentionality to consciousness. consciousness. This confinement is by no means universal. universal. For example, W Lyons (1995) puts forward a theory of how intentionality developed W. developed in evolution and can be classified on three levels: levels: (i) (i) the primitive primitive intentionality intentionality processed by means of representations representations of the brain where information is not processed but rather as an 'analogue imprint', similar to a footprint in sand; (ii) 'proto-interpretive' 'proto-interpretive' intentionality intentionality on the level of sensory experience, where experiences are 'about' something, they have content. This is the prelinguistic prelinguistic 3

But see see Section Section 3.2 3.2 on the content-object content-object distinction applied to indexical expressions. expressions. Indexical expressions can lead to different objects. 4 Woodruff Smith (1995: 21-22) for for the status of objects. objects. 4 See Smith and Woodruff 5 5 For example, Millikan Millikan naturalizes intentionality intentionality in saying that intentional intentional acts are comparable to activities of organs and limbs. Dretske naturalizes naturalizes it in saying that humans humans are physical physical the activities information-processing information-processing systems. See W W. Lyons 1995. 3

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level of intentionality, for example of associating sounds with situations or objects at the 'pre-speaking' stage of the end of infancy. Finally, there is (iii) linguistic intentionality and intentionality of prepositional propositional attitudes. attitudes. Propositional attitudes are intentional in the (a) linguistic sense, i.e. with Prepositional respect to the properties of that-clauses in attitude reports such as the lack of substitutivity, as well as the (b) non-linguistic sense. The latter comprises comprises of the perspective, angle of looking, or guise under which things reveal themselves when we perceive them and form concepts of them, as well as a disposition, the totality of the characteristics attributed to the holder of Lyons 1995: 217-219). the attitude (see W Lyons 1995: 217-219). Now, this expansion of intentionality to the three levels is rather contentious and unnecessary. unnecessary. For example, on the third level of intentionality intentionality and assigning dispositions to the believer, it seems plausible to conflate linguistic and non-linguistic intentionality, intentionality, or, in other words, it seems plausible not propositional attitude, to distinguish them. Language, as a standard vehicle of propositional is normally present in processing the output of perception and awareness of of oflooking things. It is also present in attributing beliefs to people; the 'angle' 'angle'of looking at things. representations are frequently formed in the linguistic means and externalized, or brought to consciousness, to awareness (as phenomenologists vehicle. They are normally further conveyed would say) by the linguistic vehicle. between individuals also by means oflanguage. of language. Treating beliefs as dispositions to certain behavioural manifestations manifestations is also a result of this broadening of of intentionality beyond consciousness. This result is, however, rather harmful and confining. Beliefs need not be dispositions, they need not produce gestural, linguistic, or other physical results.6 Deriving intentionality of beliefs from the two lower levels of intentionality distorts the picture and necessitates this confinement of the account account to those attitudes that result in something physical. The extension of intentionality is therefore either harmful or otherwise at least not needed. Not all mental states are intentional: feeling dizzy, for example, is not. Also, not all intentional mental states are conscious: there can be unconscious beliefs or desires. desires. These will not be discussed here. The category under discussion is conscious intentional states, sometimes called experiences (Woodruff (Woodruff Smith 1989), such as perception, recollection, thought, or conscious desire. For example, when I look at Botticelli's La Primavera, Primavera, I 6 6

Lyons tries to dissociate this standpoint from behaviourism by pointing out the difference difference between dispositions and their resultant observable effects. But retaining the dispositional account does not seem to be defensible. Cf: "A '~ belief is a disposition. It is the whole parcel of perceptual input, of inner states or linguistic, facial, gestural, and any other processes, and their output in terms of behavioural, linguistic, But dispositions are not their manifestations manifestations - or even their behavioural manifestations. But manifestations in the light of input - for to say say that would be to fall back into behaviourism." W. Lyons (1995: 231). 231). W

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perceive not only patches and shapes of different different colour, but I have a visual experience of a painting of an orange grove with a goddess-like figure in the centre, a beautiful flowery dress to her right, all surrounded beautiful woman in a flowery by nymphs and other figures. So, So, perception is about something, something, represents firstly, something, or is intentional. This is the sense of intentionality that is, is, firstly, the least contentious, and, secondly, secondly, useful for the investigation investigation of the semantics/pragmatics semantics/pragmatics interface.

3.2. Intentional Intentional Relation Relation and and Defaults Propositional Prepositional attitudes that are intentional intentional experiences have have an object and a content. The object is that which which the attitude is about. When I think think of a La Primavera, the object is the painting of beautiful painting of Botticelli's Botticelli's Primavera, beautiful nymph-like figures in an orange grove. grove. The content of an experience is not the object; it is rather the way way the object presents itself to the experiencer, it is a 'mode of presentation' (henceforth: (henceforth: MoP). For example, when I think that Botticelli was a great painter, the content of thought is not Alessandro di Mariano di Vanni Filipepi himself but rather, the author of the beautiful paintings I saw in Florence. The distinction between object and content is very important. For instance, if the belief is about Santa Claus, it has no object but it clearly has content. Or, a belief about Evening Star the Morning Star has the same object as a belief about the Evening while their contents clearly differ differ due to the difference in the mode in which the planet Venus is presented. Or, if I think think I am tired and you think you are tired, the content of our beliefs is the same while the object differs (cf. Woodruff Woodruff Smith 1989: 1989: 8-9). A similar similar distinction between between the object and content is forced by cases where where the object of experience changed unbeknownst to the experiencer: the content of experience remains the same while when while the object has changed, like, for example, example, in the case when I see a French one franc coin and, after someone has replaced it with an identical coin while while I looked away for a couple of seconds, I again see a French one franc coin. Experiences Experiences with content and no object and pairs of experiences experiences with different different content and the same object have been the focus of phenomenological debates since Husserl. Husserl. They are intensional contexts because they illustrate illustrate important in the semantics of intensional reference to a real object and how meaning how meaning is possible without reference can differ coreferential differ although the referent does not in sentences with coreferential expressions content and expressions which are otherwise identical. The case of same content different different objects (cf. (cf. the coin example) example) is more contentious and pertains indexical expressions in semantics. This to the discussions on the status of indexical issue will not be discussed here. Now, Now, MoPs will be tied here to referring expressions. In other words, a referring expression has one object revealed

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to the speaker under different different MoPs, just as the object is revealed to the believer under different different MoPs. This part of the phenomenological MoP propositional attitude is of interest for the semantic ambiguity debates of prepositional attitude sentences. 10) distinguishes intentional intentional Consequently, Woodruff Woodruff Smith (1989: (1989:10) character of experience, i.e. its having content, and intentional intentional relation, relation, i.e. being about a particular object. object. Intentionality means having intentional character, and, if successful, also intentional relation to an object. object. The of expression 'if 'if successful' carries an enormous weight for the discussion discussion of semantic ambiguities. ambiguities. It supports the idea that being about something is the optimal type of experiencing, experiencing, and, when experiencing experiencing involves involves language Now, (language of thought), it is also the ultimate type of using language. Now, transitivity, it is also the optimal type of use of oflanguage by transitivity, language in communication. communication. It follows from this that utterances with referential referential intention are the optimal of type of communicating and hence if there is a choice of interpretations of an utterance, the referential interpretation, of interpretation, pertaining pertaining to the presence of the strongest referential intention, is the most optimal interpretation, or the default. Content Content is very important important for intentionality. The content content of my thinking that the author of of of La Primavera was a great painter is the thought that the author of La Primavera was a great painter, where where the definite description is represented as a concept pertaining to this description. This content makes it possible for the thought to be about an object: object: content picks out the object (see Woodruff Smith 1989: 20). 20). Again, Again, the route through content to the object as an ultimate, successful intentionality signals the default status of 'being about an object', referring to a real entity exhibited by a thought or an act of language use.7 It is so in spite of the fact that phenomenology abstracts from the real world and a mental act has an object, object, in a sense, even if the object does not really exist. But the intricacies intricacies of phenomenological phenomenological reduction reduction will not concern concern us here. 8

7 7 Woodruff Woodruff Smith (1989: (1989: 13) 13) points out that in addition to the traditional Husserlian content intentionality there are other other theories, theories, for example an object theory of intentionality theory of intentionality such as Russell's theory of acquaintance where belief 'prepositional attitude' sensu stricto: belief is a 'propositional it is a relation relation between a believer and a series of objects. 8 8 See See Simons (1995: (1995: 116). 116). For the exegesis of Hussed's Husserl's idea of the real, common~sense common-sense world see Smith 1995.

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3.3. Intentionality and and Voluntariness The widely accepted property property of intentionality of beliefs raises a question as to whether the believer has the belief voluntarily, whether whether he/she is aware of having it, and whether believing that p means accepting it in further further voluntary reasoning. Are there involuntary beliefs? Or are beliefs always always voluntary and amount to an acceptance acceptance of certain propositions? propositions? Does the speaker's speaker's utterance give give evidence to the speaker's belief or acceptance acceptance of the corresponding Cohen's (1992) arguments corresponding proposition? proposition? In this section I review review Cohen's for the involuntary involuntary character character of beliefs and for the need to postulate two separate mental acts that underlie sentences, namely namely beliefs and acceptances. acceptances. The decision on this issue is essential for the interpretation of belief belief expressions and reports on beliefs. Beliefs have been traditionally considered to be either a voluntary of voluntary act of judgement or an involuntary involuntary feeling. Beliefs are also taken to be dispositions to feel something something because they can be assented assented to or dissented dissented from without the concurrent feeling being present. Now, Now, distinguishing distinguishing beliefs from from acceptances is quite straightforward at first glance but going beyond the obvious folk feelings on the subject subject may prove to be a more complicated exercise than the gains would justify. Beliefs are normally reasons for a mental act of acceptance acceptance but not everything everything believed ends up being accepted accepted by the believer (cf. Cohen 1992: 19). So, (cf. Cohen So, if beliefs are intentional, must they be voluntary or should we we employ the concept of acceptance acceptance for the latter purpose instead? Unfortunately, Unfortunately, we we cannot employ it. The reasons for accepting a proposition may have have nothing nothing in common with believing believing it. These reasons can be ethical, social, or practical in some other sense (cf. ibid.: 20). But contrasting the two terms is useful. It demonstrates that while accepting a proposition means accepting its logical consequences (deductive closure of propositions about acceptances), believing believing a proposition has no such necessary property. 9

99 Cf.: Cf.:

"Acceptance is objectively Ph P2 objectively closed under deducibility deducibility if and only if necessarily. necessarily, for any anyp!, p2... ... is deducible from the conjunction conjunction of of Ph p}, pP22 ... ... and p and p Pnn and for any q that is Pm n, anyone who accepts Ph P2 ... Pm deducibility pi, P2 ... and p q. Acceptance Acceptance is is subjectively subjectively closed closed under deducibility m accepts q. p\, P2 p2 ... ... and pPnn and for for any q, q, anyone who who accepts both if and only if necessarily for any Ph p\, pP22 ... •.. and pn and the deducibility of q from that conjunction, also the conjunction conjunction of Ph accepts q." Cohen (1992: q." (1992: 28-29). Acceptances are subjectively closed: p and you accept accept/?, ought always always to accept accept q. q. But "Of course, where q is deducible from P p, you ought you actually actually do so or not depends on whether whether you also accept that q is deducible whether you p." (ibid.: 29). from p"

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Beliefs may not, after all, be directly expressed in assertions: assertions: ""... ... it is hardly deniable that, in quite a wide range of familiar belief indicative-mood indicative-mood speech-acts, saying saying that p does not imply belief that p. Rather it implies there a mental act of acceptance acceptance that p." Cohen (1992: p? (1992: 72). So, So, utterances give evidence to acceptance rather than to a belief. belief. This is Cohen's view. Now, Now, it is also widely widely accepted accepted that an assertion is an expression of belief and this is the view view we have adhered to so far, far, seeing linguistic meanings as sub-species of the genus called noema. The broadening of meanings the perspective to include acceptances is important. For example, a sentence such as (3) (3) can express either an involuntary disposition (Cohen's 'belief') or a voluntary acceptance acceptance of a judgement or of principles for further further reasoning: (3)

People should always always tell the truth.

And, ""... ... we we should expect that the semantics of the natural-language sentence will be adequately understood understood only when the underlying mental duality is properly grasped." Cohen (1992: (1992: 77). This duality is important when one views views beliefs, expressions of belief or reports on beliefs in the context of, of, respectively, respectively, other beliefs, expressions or reports. While beliefs can be inconsistent in that they are not subject to deductive closure, acceptances cannot. Knowledge can rely on either beliefs or acceptances acceptances and thus does not exhibit deductive closure either: logical consequences of beliefs may not be believed believed and consequently consequently are not present in belief-based knowledge (cf. (cf. ibid.: 99). Now, it seems that the overall consistency of beliefs is a matter of degree. Cohen makes the following two claims: "It is certainly impossible for the same person at the same time to 10 (jbid.: 85). 85). believe firmly both that p and that not-p." not-/?." 10 (ibid.:

and 10

But it can happen when beliefs are weak. See ibid.: 132.

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"Since beliefs are not deductively closed, they cannot cannot be intrinsically subject to any holistic requirement for overall ...). And at the heart of this willingness to tolerate consistency ((...). inconsistencies of belief, in certain cases, is the implicit awareness that belief is involuntary." (ibid.: 105). involuntary." Since beliefs are beyond the believer's choice, they need not undergo rationality. But the direct contradiction p & p is excluded, it normally contradiction/? & ...., —>p normally does is some degree of rationality and the boundary not occur. Hence, there is boundary of of this rationality seems to lie somewhere in the infinite set of less and less obvious logical consequences of beliefs. In other words, beliefs are rational to a degree and when when one holds a belief, one holds some of its logical consequences. consequences. Furthermore, considering Furthermore, considering that

memory, a person's person's possession possession "In ordinary cases of perception and memory, of a belief belief that p is a presumptive reason for him to accept that p." /?." (ibid.: 130), the distinction between belief belief and acceptance seems to boil down to a acceptance common-sensical boundary between 'standard' beliefs that lead to acceptance and are closed under deduction, and 'nonstandard' beliefs that do not exhibit these properties. Since, in addition, the overt contradiction p & & -. -*pp is excluded, we we shall continue discussing language expressions as expressions departures from this connection. of belief, bearing in mind the departures connection.

3.4. Intentions Intentions and and Intentionality Intentional ity

communication cannot be The next step is to demonstrate that intentions intentions in communication separated separated from the intentionality of cognitive processes. Intentionality will be shown to be best suited to explain the significance of the degrees of strength ll of (pace W Lyons of intentions11 (pace W. Lyons (1995: 1) 1) who challenges challenges its connection with intentions in action or communication saying, saying, rather short-sightedly, that intentionality has little little in common with people's intentions to do something). Chapter 2, the relation between the To repeat what was briefly stated in Chapter referential intention and intentionality intentionality proceeds proceeds as follows. The referential 11

11

Cf.: "The theory of intentionality intentionality can be compared compared with the theory of linguistic linguistic sense and "The reference in the tradition of Frege and Husserl. As every meaningful expression in a language has a sense and if successful a referent, so every intentional experience has a content and if if which it 'refers'." successful an object to which Woodruff Smith (1989: 11). 11).

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intention is directed at an object (cf. of (cf. Bach 1987a: 52), just as intentionality of the underlying mental act is directed directed at an object. Intentionality Intentionality of, of, let us say, a belief is its essential property: a belief belief is always always formed as intentional in this sense, that is it necessarily has the feature of 'aboutness'. Now, Now, the of 'aboutness' may not stand up to scrutiny when the linguistic expression of belief is confronted with the situational context. In other words, although belief situational although the speaker's belief 'intends' to be intentional, it does not always always succeed so. Similarly, Similarly, utterance interpretation interpretation 'sets off' as if the utterance in being so. conveyed a strongly intentional state, a belief directed at a particular particular object. interpretation Only further evidence to the contrary changes this default to an interpretation according to which the referential referential intention is not present. Or, it is present, but the speaker committed a referential mistake by using an incorrect incorrect name or Jaszczolt 1997a, description. This is also a departure from the default (see laszczolt 1998d). About the use of proper names, Husserl (l900-1901a: (1900-1901a: 496) remarks the following:

"Using the proper name significantly, significantly, we must present to ourselves the subject named ((...), ...), and as endowed with some defectively, vaguely, vaguely, definite content or other. However impalpably, defectively, indefinitely we may think of [it], presentational presentational content cannot be wholly lacking."

There is some degree of inevitable vagueness in the use of a proper name way in which real things present themselves to the mind is always because the way incomplete. But this incompleteness can be further completed, the object can be further determined to make the content of this presentation more adequate. adequate. This statement taken from Investigation IV is typical of Husserl's approach to referring. It suggests that the object of intentionality can be revealed to a greater or lesser extent in thought and communication. In other words, referential intention the referential intention is present to a greater or lesser degree. degree. The possibilities of further determination of the object of experience culminate in the absolute correspondence correspondence of the act of meaning and the object itself itself which, once again, demonstrates the privileged, unmarked, default status of this full correspondence referential intention (see ibid.: correspondence and the strongest referential 497). Investigation VI, Husserl talks about intuitions Now, in Investigation intuitions and calls them intentions that require fulfilment fulfilment (cf. (cf. ibid.: 699-701), 699-701), as in the case of a perceived with intuitions slowly fulfilled melody that is perceived fulfilled as the music progresses. And,

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'~n "An intentional act may intend its object emptily emptily or with evidence. If the evidence presents the object intuitively, precisely as it is of described or meant, then the act is 'fulfilled'. 'fulfilled'. Paradigmatic of the latter sorts of acts are those in which which an object is seen as such and such." Mohanty (1983: 4).

Meaning-intentions and acts of meaning-fulfilment meaning-fulfilment belong to so-called so-called 'objectifying 'objectifying acts', or meaning-giving meaning-giving acts. An act is objectifying objectifying if it playaa part in the acquisition can play acquisition of knowledge (cf. (cf. Mohanty 1964: 46). These acts can be expressed when when the meaning-giving meaning-giving intention intention is fulfilled fulfilled in 'intuition', realized as perception or imagination.12 Objectifying Objectifying acts can be placed in the wider perspective of intentional intentional acts as follows. An intentional act in the widest sense pertains pertains to an object given (later called noema, noema, see Husserl 1913, 1913, 1913a) 1913a) in the act of intending intending (later called noesis).13 noesis).13 In the more specific sense, intentional acts comprise (i) objectifying acts which amount amount to thought ~ignitive (pignitive acts) acts) meaning-giving, objectifying intuitive acts) as well as (ii) or perception or imagination (both called intuitive not-objectifying not-objectifying acts, such such as will, desire, desire, or hope, that do not establish (cf. Husserl 1929, 1929, 1929a, and the diagram in Mohanty Mohanty 1964: 1964: 47). meaning (cf. So, meaning is composed of meaning-intention meaning-intention and meaning-fulfilment. meaning-fulfilment. So, And, when when this intention intention to represent has been fulfilled, notably notably in And, rei et intellectus is achieved. achieved. The intention perception, the adaequatio rei intention is directed at a real object and is fulfilled, the degree degree of referentiality is the highest. The object is 'given', referred to in the strongest, (cf. Husserl 1900-190la: 1900-1901a: 762). 762). All thoughts thoughts are carried unambiguous way (cf. by these acts.

12 12 Intuition (perception (perception or imagination) can be either of real objects (sensory) or of universals adequate or inadequate. Perception and imagination are opposed (categorial). It can also be adequate to 'mere thinking', 'signifying' meaning (cf. (cf. Osborn Osborn 1934: 107). 13 13 Cf.: "The process, i.e., of the concrete "The noema of of the judging process, concrete experience of the judgment, is the 'judged content judgment as such'. (...) ( ...) The judged content judgment is content of the judgment content of the judgment with the matter judged about." (1913a: 272). not to be confused with Husserl (l913a: And, "The uttered word, the actually spoken locution, locution, taken as a sensuous, specifically "The specifically an acoustic, we distinguish distinguish from the word itself or the declarative declarative phenomenon, is something that we sentence itself, itself, or the sentence-sequence sentence-sequence itself that makes up a more extensive locution." Husserl (l929a: 19-20). Husserl (1929a:

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3.5. De Re, De Dicto, and and the Horizons Meaning-giving acts have been tried in the literature as a criterion criterion for distinguishing de re and de dicto acts, and and in particular particular de re and and de dicto beliefs. The distinction will be properly attended attended to in Chapter Chapter 4. 4. At present I shall look at its relation to intentionality in phenomenology. (1983: phenomenology. Mohanty (1983: 5-6) entertains the following following possibility: ... an act is de dicto if and only if it is unfulfilled, ""... unfulfilled, empty, empty, merely signitive, and Fulfilled and an act is de re if and and only if it is fulfilled. Fulfilled acts, as it were, were, put us in touch with the real thing itself." In the next move Mohanty entertains the possibility that an act is de re re when it is verified, p'. verified, confirmed, or 'fulfilled', 'fulfilled', that is when the experiencer 'knows that that/?'. This equating of de re re with knowing proves to be unsatisfactory, unsatisfactory, though. 'Knowing that p' is a factive attitude, an attitude that presupposes that it is true that p. But there is a whole gamut of non-factive attitudes such as beliefs that/?. that can be either de re re or de dicto. dicto. In other words, I can believe something about somebody de re re without knowing this thing about the person. Hence, there are two binary distinctions involved: involved: factive/nonfactive, factive/nonfactive, and de re/de re/de dicto, and only one theoretical tool in Husserl to deal with them, namely dicto, fulfilment fulfilment of intention. Mohanty correctly correctly concludes that the 'empty/fulfilled' 'empty/fulfilled' distinction does not help with the de re/de re/de dicto one. However, he forgets that knowing someone may also be fulfilled, for example the intention to refer to Bernard J. Ortcutt can be fulfilled fulfilled in perception. So, So, although the fulfilled fulfilled act is 1. fulfilment in perception perception normally guarantees beliefs de not a de re belief, fulfilment re, whereas fulfilment fulfilment of intention in imagination renders beliefs de re but but re, about an individual that is difficult difficult to identify intersubjectively. intersubjectively. Expressions referential mistakes. De of belief that are based on such acts can contain referential re can be 'about someone else' (or, no real living person for that matter). Mohanty resorts to 'perceptual sense' instead (jbid.: (ibid.: 7): ""... ... an intention whose sense is articulated in a definite definite description description does individuate its object for the speaker, provided the sense contains a perceptual perceptual component component such as 'The person over also contains there ... '. We of there...'. We thus come back to the phenomenological phenomenological idea of 'perceptual sense':' sense'."

Now, the perceptual sense advocated by Mohanty will not do either. De re belief can be based on perception perception or imagination (in the latter case including belief re), but it need not not be so based. 'de re about someone else', opaque de re), referent thanks to some reliable The believer may be able to individuate the referent

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knowledge of it. So, So, instead, it seems necessary to amend Husserl's HusserFs classification of objectifying objectifying acts and add the referential referential intention which which is derived from the original knowledge-belief (factive-nonfactive) (factive-nonfactive) distinction. distinction. It is derived by way of specifying that referential when referential intention is fulfilled fulfilled when the referent is known, known, or mutually manifested (in Sperber Sperber and Wilson's 1986a 1986a terminology) to the speaker and the hearer. Moreover, the fact that Husserl eliminates mental objects from his model and regards the real world as a correlate of our factual factual experience constitutes an important contribution to the semantics of referring referring expressions. Perception is directed at objects rather than sensations. We We see things, we we see something something real. And this is what gives de re beliefs their privileged, unmarked status. The referential intention is a part of the informative intention and is itself satisfied either through perception or through other mental acts that sum up to some knowledge. perception This totality of mental acts that are involved and that constitute background knowledge for subsequent subsequent acts, is attended attended to by Husserl in his proposal of various 'horizons', possible states of affairs, distinguished with respect to objects, acts, people, and times. Background knowledge knowledge of the holder of a belief helps explain the contradiction contradiction in belief expressions such as in (4) (4) and (5) (5) where the definite (4) and the proper proper name in (5) (5) are coreferential and both description in (4) (4) and (5) (5) are uttered by the same speaker: (4)

The man in the brown hat is a spy. spy.

(5)

spy, he is an honest Ortcutt is not a spy, honest citizen! citizen!

In the light of (4), an utterance of (5) (5) may be taken to mean that someone else, e.g. Mr Smith, is a spy spy and the speaker attributed an incorrect incorrect name to him. Similarly, in the light of (5), an utterance of (4) (4) may be taken to be about someone of someone else, for example due to a mistake caused caused by poor visibility of interlocutors' visual field. the person in the interlocutors' field. The hearer is aided here by information, by contextual assumptions. Juxtaposing the the background information, old and the new information yields yields a potential clash that can only be avoided by adhering to the underspecification of content. This underspecification, or, rather, possibilities offurther furtherspecifications, specifications, Husserl Husserl sums sums up up ininthe the idea idea possibilities of of the horizon developed in his later works works (1939, (1939, 1950). 1950). He says that our experience of objects is always always perspectival and is surrounded by a horizon or other. Further information about the object comes to light incrementally, incrementally, as experience progresses, and the gained information information has to be compatible with the one already added to the context. Every mental act has a horizon of other possible acts directed at the object of the original act. These acts information, further determination of the object. In may provide further informatio~ addition addition to the act-horizon, there is also a horizon of the object which is

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associated associated with the original act, a horizon of further properties properties and characteristics characteristics ofthe of the object (cf. Woodruff Woodruff Smith and and McIntyre Mclntyre 1982: 1982: 227, 227, 240). The totality of the speaker's experience, including the totality of beliefs, is present in every particular particular act of experience of the speaker's speaker's (see laszczolt Jaszczolt 1996a: 127). 127). It follows, for example, that a belief is de re not not because it is founded on clear, unproblematic perception but because in addition it fits in with the network of beliefs. Beliefs are consistent, we we can draw on our past knowledge, beliefs, perceptions perceptions and other experiences. This act of perception perception 'co-present margin' is a part of reality; the latter constitutes constitutes a context called called aa'co-present (Mitgegenwiirtige, (Mitgegenwdrtige, Husserl 1913). What people see is always always fragmented, fragmented, incomplete, and surrounded by the unperceived or imperceptible things, states, events and processes. As Husserl (1913a: (1913a: 102) 102) says, says, "What "What is actually perceived, and what is more or less clearly co-present and determinate (to some extent at least), is partly pervaded, partly girt about with a dimly apprehended of apprehended depth or fringe of indeterminate reality". The temporality of this world is infinite, the world has its temporal horizon.14 This horizon aids a particular experience: knowledge gained from other acts and possibilities of other acts is accessible. of Generally, the horizon horizon of of an object object is thus the sum of of possible experiences of an object. The act's horizon horizon is the sum of of expected expected experiences, those which are founded on the experiencer's background beliefs about similar objects. The range of possible horizons is itself very large and diversified because they are theoretical constructs that are to account for the penumbra of meanings with reference reference to the experience, other experiences, the experiencer, other experiencers, the object of experience, other objects, and time. In Experience Experience and and Judgment, Husserl (1939: (1939: 27-29; 27-29; 1939a: 32-33) 32-33) says that every experience of a particular particular object has a horizon of other experiences of the same object. This is an internal horizon of experience. It comprises comprises the possibilities possibilities of and capacities of the experiencer. This horizon is not a 'real' horizon of any mental act. Instead, it is a device of talking about clustering of future future experiences and about their being affected affected by the previous ones. The internal horizon of experience is a rather weak construct because it merges the real context and the possibilities of context: things co-given and things anticipated anticipated (cf. laszczolt Jaszczolt 1996a: 129). 129). This merger is particularly unwelcome when the discussed possibilities of the experiencer pertain to the external horizon of the object. In other words, the problem arises when we talk about the possibilities of the person's experiencing different different objects. objects. These possibilities seem to be infinite, we can encounter new things every moment and have 14

In HusserI's of HusserPs phenomenology, phenomenology, the eXlstmg existing time is the immanent time of the flow of subjective time (see (see HusserI Husserl 1928 1928 and consciousness. The objects of perception appear in this subjective 1950 and 1950a). 1950a). It seems, however, however, that the horizon is infinite no matter what measure 1928a; 1950 and ontology of time we accept. 14

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them. Husserl recognizes this infinity as the "total horizon mental states about them. of the world in its infinity" (HusserlI939a: (Husserl 1939a: 36 and 1939: 33), approached approached in our throughout the lifetime. experience of real things throughout In addition, every experience is placed within a class of experiences aiming aiming at other objects. In other words, other objects may affect affect the original experience. This "aiming-beyond to other objects of which we we are aware at (l939a: 33 the same time" (1939a: 33 and 1939: 28) is an "external "external horizon horizon of objects objects cogiven". These objects are only co-present co-present rather than intentional but the believer may focus his/her differently and experience experience these things believer his/her attention differently which, in the former belief, were only co-present. It is an over-arching horizon enables the internal limits of experience which enables experience called the internal horizon. It is also called a 'second-level' horizon as it is built upon the internal one. The example 3.4 is relevant here. Every example with proper names used in Section 3.4 determinations of meaning further determinations experience has its content and its possible further experience contains and reference, which also constitute a horizon. Every experience the possibility of obtaining new information information about the object of experience. amount of this information depends on the experiencer experiencer and the direction The amount direction in which this revealing process process progresses is determined by the reality, the itself (cf. (cf. Husserl 1939: 27-28; 1939a: 32). Every experience experience has its object itself internal horizon in that the experiencer may either stop or continue the experience in the subsequent, more precise experiences of the same thing. In his later work, Husserl develops this horizon in discussing potentialities, possibilities perception, the ways perception would have possibilities of perception, have happened happened had we turned our eyes Meditations, Husserl eyes in a different different direction. In Cartesian Cartesian Meditations, (1950: 81-82; 1950a: 44-45) talks about the forthcoming parts of the particular experience, an intentional horizon of reference (cf. (cf. also Bell 1990: 1990:190). 190). This is a horizon of anticipating, for example, seeing the whole whole object after having caught a glimpse of its part. Both the object's internal and external horizons contribute to the system of of experiences that determine the particular belief. belief. However, However, the distinction between them seems of limited importance to Hussert. Husserl. He talks about possible experiences on the one hand, and the horizon of recollections and past experience on the other, without specifying their exact role in forming the context. It is easy to see how the possibilities such as a different different point from which we perceive an object or a different different set of circumstances can be used in semantics: after all, primitive all, this is nothing else but an early, primitive version of the possible-worlds approach to meaning. meaning. So, So, while the real experiences constitute the context, the possible ones delimit delimit the semantics of the expressed content of an experience experience in question: they provide the default. This interpretation is also in agreement with Husserl's early view of Logical Investigations:

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""... ... certain objects or states of affairs of of whose reality someone has knowledge indicate to him him the reality of actual knowledge of certain other objects objects or states of of affairs, affairs, in the sense that his belief belief in the reality of of the one is experienced experienced (though not at all evidently) evidently) as motivating a belief belief or surmise in the reality of of the other." other? Husserl (1900-1901a: 270). The idea of real and possible context is also congruent with Husserl's § 16) discussion of the association (1939 and and 1939a, §16) association of beliefs where one eventuality eventuality recalls another. This storage of information is what in terms of modern computational computational linguistics would be called the knowledge base. So, the meaning is unravelled through the multiplicity of different different acts and So, every belief is determined by other beliefs held by the person. The act of of perception, such as the act of seeing the person called Ortcutt, presupposes some other mental acts which constitute its background. The background is constitutive of the meaning: it is what makes seeing someone seeing rtcutt , as Smith or as someone or other. Applied to beliefs, it is him as o Ortcutt, belief is de re, re, de re the totality of the experience that decides whether the belief 15 about someone else (a case of a referential referential mistake15 ), or de dicto. The ), (belief reports) can be drawn by extension. distinction on the level of sentences (belief extension. The idea is best demonstrated when applied in building the discourse structures of DRT in Chapter 7. 7. representation structures To account for the context-dependence of departures from default interbelief reports and expressions expressions of belief, one has to delimit pretations of belief the horizon of possible experiences to the expected expected experiences of other affect the particular belief belief on which the speaker speaker wishes objects that may affect to report. In other words, we need a link between a belief about Ortcutt background information concerning concerning Ortcutt as well as other and the background potential candidates for the referent. This is what I called the external of the act, a horizon horizon not distinguished distinguished by Husserl Husserl but very useful horizon of as a device for delimiting reference (see laszczolt delimiting reference Jaszczolt 1996a: 129). This device is, in fact, used in DRT as the choice of placement placement of discourse discourse referents in particular representation structures (see Chapter 7). 7). In general, the similarities between the horizons similarities horizons on the one hand and possible possible worlds semantics on the other are self-evident. There are possibilities of going beyond the act of meaning, further experiences, experiences, possible possible states of affairs beyond affairs that, so to speak, provide 'more meaning', further determinations. These similarities also signal a very useful application of the horizons to the similarities semantics of prepositional propositional attitude reports. 15 15

To To be discussed at length in Chapter 4.

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All in all, what it means is that the thing, the real object, is always always in the centre of belief belief or other experience. experience. It can be thought of as known, transparent, transparent, to a smaller or greater extent, and this boundary of knowledge or 'acquaintance' with the object differs with time, just as the Earth's horizon moves forward forward when we walk. walk. But a real thing is always always presented to consciousness as one thing, referential mistakes do not occur on the level level consciousness of mental experiences. experiences. Intentionality may simply be weak enough to render render referential mistakes in utterances but but this misfiring of of intentions is in fact the fringe of information that is hidden beyond the horizon. It is not a different different mental object without a real correlate: misfired intentionality simply means weaker intentionality and the first degree of departure from the default interpretation of an utterance utterance discussed in Chapter 2. To sum up, meaning-giving meaning-giving acts, supplemented by a gamut of horizons, seem to point to the availability of a wide range of information to the holder of the belief because this belief belongs to a network of other experiences - real and and potential, of various various objects. objects. Meaning-giving Meaning-giving acts are are fulfilled fulfilled imagination and the horizons (or: potentialities) in thought, perception, or imagination potentialities) further allow for further experiences of this and other objects that sum up to further development of the experiencer's experiencer's knowledge, should this be necessary for development utterance interpretation. interpretation. As a result, the belief normally normally exhibits exhibits a strong identification of its object, so to speak, by default. intentionality and a clear identification This clarity is passed on to linguistic expressions. expressions. The way way in which which it is passed on is discussed in the following section.

3.6. Speech Acts: Double Level Level of Intentionality? The intentionality of mental states has been commonly regarded as more basic prior to, to, the intentionality of linguistic expressions. 16 It has been than, and prior intentionality operates prior to language argued that the non-linguistic intentionality and hence leads to more basic meaning. meaning. Hence, the meaning of speech acts belief, desire, or can be analysed in terms of intentional states such as belief, intention. It would seem that since the intention to represent is prior to the intention to communicate, there is some ground for this conjecture, which was in fact entertained both by Husserl and later by Searle, bearing also some affinities with Grice's account of speaker's meaning. Allegedly, the mind imposes intentionality on linguistic expressions expressions that are not intrinsically intrinsically intentional. intentional. Searle (1983: (1983: 165-166) 165-166) distinguished distinguished two types of meaning intentions: an intention to represent, and an intention to 16 16 I shall utilize intentional utilize now more contemporary contemporary terminology terminology and talk about conscious, intentional mental states (psychological will be reserved reserved for stressing the act (psychological states). The term 'mental act' will of aiming at an object.

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communicate. communicate. Speaker's meaning is inherent in the intention to represent and the latter reflects the intentionality, or aboutness, of its mental correlate, a mental state. For Searle (1983), the parallel between the referential intention intention and intentionality is sufficient sufficient for constructing speech act theory based on the idea of the inheritance of the conditions of satisfaction of a speech act from the intentionality of the underlying mental state. Utterances Utterances have derived intentionality, whereas beliefs have intrinsic intentionality (Searle 1991: derived 84). This 'derivation' proceeds as follows: "The "The mind imposes Intentionality on entities that are not intrinsically Intentional by intentionally conferring the conditions of satisfaction of the expressed psychological state upon the external physical entity. The double level of Intentionality in the speech act can be described by saying that by intentionally uttering something with a certain set of conditions of satisfaction, those that are specified by the essential condition for that speech act, I have made the utterance Intentional, and thus necessarily expressed the corresponding corresponding psychological state. I couldn't make a statement without expressing a belief or make a promise without expressing an intention because the essential condition condition on the speech act has as conditions of satisfaction the same conditions of of satisfaction satisfaction as the expressed Intentional state. So I impose Intentionality on my utterances by intentionally conferring on them certain conditions of satisfaction which are the conditions conditions of satisfaction of of certain psychological states:' states." Searle (1983: (1983: 27-28, my emphasis) In other words, Searle's account conforms to the so-called so-called 'double intentionality', the utterance is intentional because conditions conditions of satisfaction psychological of a speech act make it express a psychological state and the psychological state is itself intentional. So, So, intentionality oflinguistic of linguistic expressions is inherited from the intentionality of corresponding psychological states by means of the imposition of conditions of satisfaction (see Searle 1983: 1983: 27-28; Harnish 1990: 188). According to Searle, mental states (specifically: intentional states of of consciousness) such as wishes or hopes, determine the conditions of of satisfaction for speech acts. These conditions conditions help establish the meaning of a speech act. For example, a mental state of desire can imprint conditions conditions of satisfaction on the command command uttered by the holder of this desire. of imposition for that matter, is an enigmatic magic Inheritance, however, however, or imposition wand here. The problem is that of transfer: how does the mind transfer 'aboutness' from mental acts to sentences? How does the mind transfer conditions of satisfaction? satisfaction? Harnish (1990: 189) entertains several possibilities and all of them fall seriously short of providing a satisfactory answer.

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One cannot intentionally transfer the conditions just by intending to do it because it should be possible to intend and fail. If If so, so, what would it mean to fail to transfer the conditions from mind to language? This view of transfer leads to an obvious trivialization:"... trivialization: "... can one intentionally confer conditions of satisfaction on anything, a dog, on the birth of a dog?" (ibid.). (ibid). Arriving at a parallel does not suffice. Perhaps one should not envisage transfer or conferment as a movement in time or space, or even a move from the mental domain to the physical, because, firstly, firstly, no Cartesian Cartesian dualism of mind and body is assumed here and, secondly, secondly, Searle talks about the same conditions (see emphasis in the quotation above). Moreover, the double level present in the speech act rather than between the mental and the linguistic. is present The obvious conclusion to draw is that 'transfer' or 'conferment' are just unfortunate terms signifying identity, sharing, rather than inheritance or derivation. This possibility is entertained in the account account of language as subsumed under the mental, as one of the vehicles of thought, sketched below and elaborated in detail in Chapter Chapter 6. The act of uttering a statement and the content of the statement are the two entities that were confused in philosophical texts for a long time, with a strong emphasis placed placed on the latter aspect (see Smith 1990: 31-32). of 31-32). The aftermath of this confusion is still present. It is only in Bolzano's, Brentano's and Husserl's writings that an act of saying and a concept concept became distinguished on psychological grounds. As Husserl says (1900-1901), psychological says in his early work (1900-1901), terminology, the meaning is created in intentional acts. So, So, in our terminology, propositional form depends on the physical and psychological acts of of prepositional utterance production and comprehension. Intentions and other psychological states are, so to speak, read off the world, as Reinach says (Smith off"the (Smith 1990: 54) and propositional form. 'The they provide vital information for the construction of prepositional The world' includes language use. In other words, properties of language are not linguistic meaning is social derived from properties of mental states. Instead, linguistic and primary, primary, established in language use. As a result of Searle's proposal, speaker's meaning is derived from the proposal is intentionality of mental states. On the one hand, this proposal common-sensically common-sensically correct. One has to have a desire first, and subsequently one can express it. An intentional link between the two can be easily surmised. 41) suggests, the meaning of a desire, But on the other hand, as Apel (1991: (1991: 41) conviction or any other state is intersubjective intersubjective and hence the conditions of satisfaction of the mental state may to some extent depend on the meaning of the associated linguistic expression. This is so because of the a priori priori of language: the representation of the world through language, through the propositions propositions with a structure, is unavoidable. This thesis permeates Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and is also the foundation 1979). This reversed for Tarski's semantic theory of truth (see e.g. Platts 1979). linguistic dependence, i.e. the dependence of the meaning of mental states on linguistic

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meaning, is also manifested in the conventions of language use and in early Husserl's HusserFs social theory of concepts. Apel proposes that the meaning of speech acts (the propositional prepositional content and the illocutionary force) can be dependent dependent on the conventional use of sentences and phrases in a language. This conventionalization conventionalization can be either linguistic, e.g. an utterance of (6) corresponds to a promise, or it can be social, e.g. an utterance of (7) (7) counts as a resignation: (6)

I hereby promise never to use swear words.

(7)

I hereby resign from the membership of the Committee of Global Global Happiness.

Now, just as speech acts depend on linguistic conventions, so do mental states. Normally, Normally, hearers have no difficulty difficulty with associating a heard speech act with the speaker's mental state. This association association may not yield to a one-to-one correspondence, as, for example, a wish may correspond correspond both to a request and a command,17 command,17 but no real ambiguity ensues here. This reversed dependence can be easily explained when we think of the role language plays in bringing about the mental state. Intentional Intentional mental states are regarded as psychological equivalents of utterances, they express the 'directedness', the relation toward the world that Searle calls the 'direction fit': the situation adjusts to the speech act or the speech act follows the of fit': situation, as in the case of a promise and a complaint respectively. respectively. Utterances are composed of propositional prepositional content and illocutionary force, just as intentional mental states are composed of representative content and the psychological MoP (cf. (cf. Baumgartner and Klawitter 1990: 213). 213). Now, instead of postulating double intentionality, we can plausibly infer from the similarity of the two types types of acts to the hypothesis that language plays a role in intentional mental states. Desires, for example, can be held in language, they can be represented to the holder of the desire in a linguistic form. They need not necessarily be linguistic but they are commonly so. so. The same holds propositional for other mental states, and hence, what concerns us most, for propositional attitudes and specifically beliefs. It is so because intentionality means speak,'read off the world', they directedness at the world. Intentions are, so to speak, 'read off concern situations. They do not take a trip from the mental to the linguistic, they are mental and linguistic in the first place. This view has strong advantages over Searle's approach. First, there is no convincing evidence in support of the duality of level of intentions. Second, intentionality is preferred over a multiplication by Occam's razor, unitary intentionality 17 17

This is an important strand of Apel's argument by which he demonstrates that mental states are too coarsely-grained to provide adequate conditions of satisfaction for speech acts.

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of levels. And finally, language is one of the vehicles of thought and one of the carriers of meaning of mental states and hence should not be separated from from them. The latter argument is attended attended to in detail in the discussion discussion of vehicles of thought in Chapter Chapter 6. Subsuming language under the mental is suggested by the similarity of similarity of intentional intentional states and speech acts. For example, Moore's paradox normally extends to them. Normally, Normally, though not always, always, one would not utter (8) successfully: (8)

Please open the door but I do not wish the door to be open.

Sentence (8) (8) seems anomalous because the speech act of requesting comes together together with the mental act of wishing. wishing. Searle (1983: (1983: 9) makes an even stronger claim in saying that "[t]he performance of the speech act is eo ipso ipso an expression of the corresponding corresponding Intentional state". The word 'corresponding' may require a qualification here. Mental states are not sufficiently sufficiently finely-grained finely-grained to allow for a one-to-one one-to-one correspondence. correspondence. States do not individuate speech acts and there are occasions when it is not obvious what exactly the underlying state is, as, for example, in the case of congratulating congratulating a person on something. This strong connection between the mental and the linguistic signals that the linguistic may in fact be a component of the mental, a carrier of meaning-intentions, a vehicle of thought.18 All in all, if one accepted accepted Searle's double intentionality and his arbitrary (though conventional) constitutive rules, one would have to, firstly, explain to, firstly, the transition transition of intentions, and secondly, secondly, prove the reality of this transfer or a methodological methodological advantage in postulating it. Neither has been achieved, the postulate is largely ad hoc, hoc, it is epistemologically dubious and methodologically costly. costly. In addition to flouting Occam's razor, Searle's Searle's methodologically postulate does not comply with the POL principle either. Searle created created a superfluous level of explanation between reality and the act of speaking. Neither is his 'intentionality as a whole' consistent with POL. It takes a long route in making coarse ontological commitments to the mental and separately to the linguistic, which Husserl successfully successfully avoided by locating meaning in the mind and at the same time in the world. world. Real objects are intended, and this objectivity gives gives mental states their intersubjective intersubjective status (see also 3.7 3.7 below). The conclusion seems to be that, instead of merely comparing intentional states and linguistic expressions and postulating arbitrary conditions, conditions, one should specifY specify what role language plays in intentional states. states. It is the role of a vehicle of thought as spelled out by Husserl and subsequently by Frege and Dummett. 18 18

For a comprehensive summary summary of similarities similarities between speech acts and intentional states see diagrams in Baumgartner and Klawitter KJawitter (1990: 213-214). 213-214).

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Compelling evidence for subsuming language under the mental comes of from demonstratives that are used to refer to perceived objects. The use of demonstratives, according to Searle, is only possible because the meaning of the demonstrative combines with the intentional content of the perceptual act (cf. (cf. de Mulder 1994). Instead ofthe of the widely accepted view of direct reference according to which the referent is part of the proposition proposition expressed (as advocated by Kaplan and Perry), Searle proposes a combination combination of the linguistic and the perceptual. Together they fulfil fulfil the meaning-intention, meaning-intention, the intention to represent. Since demonstratives are often, so to speak, 'completed' by perceptual experience, the proposition proposition expressed contains the intentional content of the perceptual experience (cf. (cf. de Mulder 1994: constructs 21-22). No direct reference, reference, no presence of entities in the semantic constructs has to be evoked. Meaning, as the Fregean sense or the linguistic sub-type of Husserlian Husserlian noema, is given by the complex of the lexical meaning and the context. So, So, instead of direct reference, we have a cognitive correlate of demonstratives - a noema, sense, or discourse referent of DRT. This of cognitive construct construct is possible when we subsume the linguistic under the mental as one of the ways in which thought is represented in the mind and, in the case of speech acts, also conveyed to the hearers. It has to be noted, however, that intentionality is not necessarily linguistic: intentional states can be displayed by babies (e.g. wanting milk) milk) or dogs (e.g. wanting to be let out, examples from Searle 1983: 1983: 5). 5). In fact, humans who are in possession of language can also display non-linguistic intentional mental states, for example a driver's sudden terror caused by a child running in front of his/her fast moving car. These states seem to rely on a pictorial, rather than a linguistic, vehicle of thought.19 To sum up, the intentionality of a speech act depends on the intentionality of of the corresponding corresponding mental state because, for example, normally one has to have a wish before one utters a request. But also, conversely, conversely, the intentionality of the mental state depends on the meaning intention (intentionality) of the linguistic expression in that language makes it an intersubjectively intersubjectively recognizable mental state. The dependency here is a dependence on a language system rather than on the physical act of speech. In effect, it is a dependence on the linguistic a priori, priori, on the fact that language reflects the states of affairs (as in truth-conditional semantics) and there is nothing beyond beyond that which can be expressed in language: there is no way round representation of the world through language. In addition, the meaning the representation of a mental act is intersubjective of intersubjective because it reflects the meaning of illocutionary force indicators such as 'I promise that...' that ...' present in a language

19

The types of vehicles vehicles of thought are further discussed in Chapter 6.

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system. This dependence dependence makes the speaker's speaker's promise a promise to the hearer, and the desire a desire. The hearer reconstructs a mental state of the speaker as if if there was such a link from the type of a speech act to the type of mental state. We can also infer this dependence dependence from Searle's Searle's principle of expressibility anything that can be meant can be said. (Searle 1969: 19-21) which says that anything The dependence of the linguistic linguistic and the mental is clearly mutual and it seems seems to be so because they are not two separate species: language should be subsumed subsumed under carriers of meaning in mental states, or, in Husserlian terms, as a component component of an objectifying objectifying act. It is a component component because objectifying objectifying acts are either linguistic themselves, or operate operate with horizons. We We perceive a shape as a tail of a cat whose body is is hidden from sight behind a bush, we perceive three sides of a figure as a cube although the other sides are hidden. There are other acts that function as background knowledge and information. Perception is not just a separate act, enable this synthesis of information. component of a knowledge dossier and this dossier standardly, or it is a component involves language as its means of representing at least more often than not, involves and storing information. Horizons, and in particular particular the external horizon horizon of the act, are also present in Searle's account of collective intentions, for orchestra's intention to perform a piece of music. This collective example an orchestra's intentionality is not reducible to intentions of individual individual players or to the knowledge of their respective respective intentions and yet it is present mutual knowledge present in the individuals' heads as an intention to do something by means of the individual's contributing a component component of the activity (cf. (cf. Searle 1990b: 407). Collective activities require some idea of the other person, a "preintentional sense of 'the other'" (jbid.: (ibid.: 413). This idea seems to be a version of Husserl's Husserl's horizon, potentialities of actions performed by other persons all aimed at one object. So, So, collective intentionality, intentionality, similar to background knowledge, is an example of integration, synthesis of information, information, or meaning holism. In his later work, Husserl (1913, 1913a) stresses that intentionality, or the orienting at the object, happens automatically to the experiencer. Searle (1980) talks about about intentionality as a biological phenomenon which also seems to indicate its automatic character. If If directedness is automatic. automatic, then it is difficult linguistic. difficult to divide it into stages or components, components, the mental and the linguistic. Searle's main argument for this separation seems to be the difference between speech acts and mental states, or expressions and beliefs. He also stresses stresses problems with the connection connection between between mental states and behaviour: problems behaviour: behaviour (including linguistic) linguistic) is not a sure guide to mental states (Searle 1992: 22). If If intentionality intentionality is biological, this connection should be diaphanous. On the other hand, since for Searle intentionality intentionality is biological, he stresses its import and classifies intentionality of speech acts as derived from this biological phenomenon, trying trying to overcome the fact that the relation between mental states and behaviour is contingent.

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I extended here Apel's argument that mental states are affected by language language because they are intersubjective to the proposal proposal that language is one of the media in which beliefs are represented in people's minds. Beliefs and other mental states need not be linguistic but they very often are. And whatever language they are represented in, this language is either a natural language or a language of thought that, in principle, shares the principles of of propositional propositional structure laid out in the language of first-order logic. This generalization is all that matters for the present discussion of how beliefs are represented; the intricacies of the discussion of the language of thought 20 are of no importance here. here.2o Now, since the intended object is by default a real object, referential object, the referential independent support from the intention of the speech act achieves independent intentionality of the mental state. By the same move of subscribing to directedness at the world, semantic ambiguities between referential referential and nonreferential interpretations of definite descriptions and de re and de dicto interpretations of belief reports are merely merely cases of stronger and weaker intending and undergo an explanation in terms of default intentionality. intentionality. And, by the same move again, they require an explanation in terms of default intentions that contribute to the semantics of these constructions and render ambiguities (or underspecifications for that matter) superfluous. superfluous. Since mental states can be presented in language to their holder, their intentionality ends up as the strongest intention that can be assigned to the corresponding speech informative act, that is as a communicative intention that subsumes an informative intention that subsumes a referential referential intention, if applicable. Q.e.d.

3.7. Are Intentions Intentions in the Head?

Intentionality appears to be a convenient term for a connector between mental states and real situations, including states, events, processes and their component parts. For Husserl, intentionality intentionality is non-natural, it concerns consciousness rather than physical world and real situations: it is directed at objects objects but it is directed 'indirectly', through a mediator of sense or noema. For Heidegger, it is part of the world. world. Husserl overcomes the dualism of the mental and the physical by saying saying that the human being includes something from nature, something from humanity, humanity, and something from consciousness. This allows him a non-committal approach. In other words, meaning is in the mind but it is also in the world (cf. (cf. Woodruff Woodruff Smith 1994).21 1994).21 20 20 21

The literature literature on the topic is ample. See e.g. e.g. Fodor 1975; 1975; Gumperz and Levinson Levinson (eds) 1996. The construct of the human being is heavily theory-driven, theory-driven, though. though. On the status of 'ego' see Kotekowski 1975. Kolakowski 1975.

21

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Intentionality cannot cannot be called a process, process, it is an instantaneous instantaneous 'firing at', 'targeting' objects. Hence, it is not a process of passing through sense to the referent, it is not arriving at the meaning through the way way the objects present present themselves to the mind. Great Great care must be taken not to reify way so as not to multiply beings beyond necessity. intentionality in this way The use of intentionality in semantics can be best assessed assessed in the example of options of options of interpretation interpretation of referring expressions. The property of 'aboutness' allows for degrees of this aboutness, as well as for the degrees degrees of sensitivity to the real situations with all their inhabitants, their properties properties and relations between them. Weak aboutness aboutness concerns a situation (or: (or: eventuality as a whole); whole); strong aboutness picks out constituents of this eventuality, and in particular particular it reaches real people, animals and things. For example, (9) can be believed as a, so to speak, whole whole proposition proposition or as a property predicated predicated of a known or otherwise identifiable painter: (9)

Botticelli painted Flora. Flora.

Similarly, (10) can be uttered, and for that matter interpreted, as a propositional prepositional attitude report report about Tom's belief in a past activity activity of the known concerning some person painter or about a past event concerning person or other (called (called 'Botticelli') who painted some character character or other (called 'Flora'): (10)

Tom believes that Botticelli painted Flora. Flora.

content of the embedded embedded clause is better better seen in sentence This sensitivity to the content sentence (11) which states on one reading that Johnny believes a proposition remembered from a science-fiction science-fiction story, story, without without knowing knowing what 'red giants' and 'white dwarfs' dwarfs' are. Alternatively, Alternatively, on the other reading, he believes, on the basis of extensive reading of astronomy books, that one particular, familiar type of star transforms into another. another. (11)

Johnny believes that red giants become white white dwarfs.

A formal formal semantic account of this sensitivity sensitivity to the constituents of the proposition is developed developed in Chapter 8. 8. What is of interest for the present present analysis is the dependence of dependence of these interpretative options on the degrees of 'aboutness' and the strength of intentions, intentions, including including the referential intention. Now, the question to ask is, is, how does the mental correlate of experience, that is sense or noema, end up being about these real eventualities. eventualities. And, indeed, can it succeed in being so? There are two avenues avenues to pursue here. Firstly, it seems to succeed because, in intensional intensional contexts such as (11), (11), there are ways, ways, modes of presentation presentation (MoPs) in which which the object (here: Botticelli) is known to the holder of the belief, and these MoPs rely on intentions

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and intentionality. In other words, the referential referential intention individuates the particular painter, known, mutually available for the speaker's and the particular hearer's knowledge dossier. The lack of this intention corresponds corresponds to the capable speaker's entertaining a representation representation or other which makes him/her capable of of using the proper name. So, So, MoPs, or their 'fineness of detail', aid the referring process (see Schiffer Schiffer 1992; 1992; Jaszczolt 1998a).22 1998a).22 On the other hand, MoPs need not fit the person or object named, they can correspond to a different different individual, be mistaken, or they may not fit any individual at all. So, perhaps MoPs and intentions never leave leave the mental after all? Perhaps So, re, and otherwise strongly transparent readings they render referential, de re, knowledge, or horizons with only because of the dossier, background knowledge, which they interact? In fact, Husserl, and before him Kant, are commonly regarded as precursors of cognitivism in the study of meaning. Phenomenology, with its insistence insistence on contents contents of mental acts (or: noemata), noemata), succeeds in relegating real objects and eventualities to a secondary role; reality is cognized through mental correlata. This is essentially the idea of phenomenological reduction which was a direct predecessor of of methodological solipsism associated with arguments laid down by Hilary Putnam and Jerry Fodor Fodor (cf. (cf. Dreyfus 1982). Methodological Methodological solipsism is an assumption that no mental state presupposes an existence presupposes existence of any individual individual other than the holder of that mental state - or even, even, other than the 'disembodied mind' of this holder (cf. Putnam 1975b: 220). According to methodological methodological solipsism, attitudes are 'in the head' and are individuated by objects and propositions internal to the organism, by the so-called so-called narrow content. Searle's intentionality can reconstructed as solipsistic if one follows a strong interpretation of his be reconstructed intentionality, i.e. the separation of mental states and speech double level of intentionality, discussed above, this strong interpretation is unfounded, though. acts. As was discussed Firstly, in the long passage quoted in the preceding section, Searle says that the same conditions of of satisfaction pertain to both domains. Secondly, Secondly, I suggested that language 'belongs' to the mental by being one of the vehicles of thought. Language establishes the intersubjectivity which would otherwise be lacking. In other words, words, if not for language, solipsism would ensue in the manner spelled out by Apel (1991: (1991: 40): "My language-independent language-independent laying-down and testing of the conditions conditions of satisfaction of my fact-intention would in a certain methodical (sic) solipsism of sense be carried out in terms of the methodical of evidence-phenomenology of Edmund the pre-linguistically oriented evidence-phenomenology Husserl." 22 22

Schiffer's Schiffer's theory of types of MoPs is discussed and further developed developed in Chapter 4.

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There would be no mediation of language, no intersubjective component of component of mental states. Moreover, the solipsistic solipsistic stand does not explain attributing beliefs to people, neither does it help with explaining cases of the lack of bi-uniqueness (one-to-one (one-to-one correspondence) correspondence) between the real referent and the mental equivalent, as in the case of the ancients' ancients' belief in the existence of the Morning Star and the Evening Star while while in reality they both correspond correspond to the planet Venus, or, in the mismatch going in the opposite direction, calling a substance substance 'water' while in reality there is H2O 0 on Earth and XYZ on Twin-Earth as in Putnam's example discussed in the following paragraphs. In other words, it is the object that causes the mental state that brings about the differences differences through a mental mediator, MoP or sense. Hence, methodological solipsism is called called into question. proceeding with the argument, two essential terms require a Now, before proceeding brief introduction. I have referred so far to intensional contexts as sentences brief in which substitutivity of coreferential coreferential expresions does not hold. Further examples and properties of intensional contexts will not become relevant until Chapter Chapter 4 but the term intension, intension, as opposed opposed to extension, is necessary. Generally, the extension of an expression is what the expression refers to. The intension is the manner in which the referent is presented. Hence, intension in its wide sense has close affinities affinities to MoPs. The extension of a value. In extensional sentence is often often equated with its truth value. extensional semantics, the meaning of a sentence consists in its truth conditions, i.e. the conditions which the eventuality has to satisfY satisfy for the sentence to be true. For problematic contexts, like the ones of prepositional propositional attitudes, we also need intensions as playaa part in meaning. Standardly, they play Standardly, in Montague semantics, intensions are defined as functions from contextscontexts to extensions in a context. So, So, the of intension of a common noun is a function from possible worlds to sets of individuals, while the proposition, or the intension of a sentence, is a function function from possible worlds to truth values. In other words, we take a sentence, 'check' sentence,'check' if if it is true or false in different different possible states of affairs and arrive at a classification of these states of affairs with respect to this sentence. In Montague semantics and its current derivatives, derivatives, intensions constitute the core of of the meaning of expressions (cf. (cf. van der Does 1994a: 1699-1700; 1994b: 1702). Searle (1983: 203-204) adheres to the slogan that meanings are in the head because intensions, which are in the head, determine extensions. This is his response to Putnam's (1975b) objection. Putnam presented a well known thought experiment to prove that it is possible for a person to experience involved the same mental state on two occasions occasions and yet a different different object is involved in each. Knowing the meaning is not just having the corresponding corresponding concept or intension, it is also knowing that this concept concept is a correlate of a particular Now, mental states may not determine concepts object. Now, concepts (intensions), or

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concepts may not determine objects (extensions). Putnam's Putnam's famous example of water having the chemical composition of XYZ on Twin-Earth chemical demonstrates that an Earthling and a Twin-Earthling who are not aware of this chemical composition composition have the same thoughts concerning the relevant substances, even though their thoughts are directed at two different different objects. Hence, mental states do not determine objects. In a different different thought experiment, I may not be able to tell the difference between an elm and a experiment, beech tree, have the same concepts for both, and yet hold that 'elm' means a set of elm trees, while 'beech' means a set of beech trees. So, So, "[c]ut the pie any way way you like, 'meanings' just ain't in the head!" Putnam (1975b: (1975b: 227). We know that there are elms and beeches because we can consult the experts, that is we know it through the 'division of linguistic labour', and we know the meaning of 'tiger' when we we know what the stereotypical tiger is like (see also Putnam Putnam 1970; for criticism see e.g. Crane 1991 1991 and Beattie 1993). Now, Searle advocates advocates instead a Fregean Fregean internalism internalism about meaning. meaning. A speaker and a hearer have mental states with some intentional contents and this enables them to understand linguistic reference (cf. 198). (cf. Searle 1983: 1983:198). Searle opposes the predominant predominant idea of direct reference of indexical expressions with its claim of the redundancy of Fregean sense in the case of indexicals, de re beliefs and other attitudes, as well as referential use of definite descriptions. In other words, he opposes the claim that no mental intentional states are needed intentional needed for their explanation. explanation. Searle's Searle's (1983: 201) argument for meanings in the head is that intensions are more powerful than Putnam admits. Intension or Fregean sense is abstract abstract and can be perfectly or imperfectly grasped by the speaker and hearer. Hence, not knowing the intension is not an argument against the route from intentions of mental states to extensions (objects): intentions, so to speak, override the lack of a concept (intension) (intension) and provide meaning anyway. anyway. 0 and XYZ In fact, intentional intentional mental mental states do distinguish distinguish between H 2O in that intentional states are directed at a particular particular object causing the experience. Water is whatever is identical with the stuff stuff that causes the particular particular experience, hence either XYZ or H H2O, By the same 2 0, not both. By argument, intentionality is sufficient sufficient to individuate beliefs. Beliefs can be about a real object or not, but they always involve a Mop, MoP, sense, or noema, i.e. a mediator, content of the mental state. Now, if language, a public, state.23 Now, intersubjective system can be part of the mental, or, as Apel's discussion discussion indicates, be a pre-condition for some mental states, then methodological methodological solipsism is avoided. There is an objective reality at the objective target of of the 'aboutness'. 'aboutness'. 23 23

That is why for Searle (1983: 215) reo 215) all beliefs are de dicta, dicto, and some of them are additionally de re. We shall not adopt this terminology. terminology.

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Arguments against methodological of methodological solipsism solipsism are in fact ample. The role of the 'broad content', the real world, is acknowledged more and more often in the literature. Fodor Fodor (1994) takes the intentionality of mental states further further and reconciles it with the computational character of mental processes. The content content of mental states is intentional and does, somehow or other, depend on situations and objects in the real world. This relation of relation is of particular importance particular importance to Fodor. He uses it as a tool against the idea that meaning arises out of relations between thoughts, i.e. against semantic holism. Instead, he defends atomism which, which, in semantics, amounts to the idea that small units of meaning can be conceived of and acquired in separation from experiences are other units. The equivalent in psychology is the idea that experiences composed composed of such small, indivisible indivisible mental entities. What is important here is that the real world matters for meaning. In the past Fodor Fodor (e.g. 1980) maintained that the relation of thoughts to the world is not of any importance to psychology: truth and reference are not psychological categories. This is known as the idea of narrow content. content. He subsequently abandoned narrow content and admitted that truth and reference do matter for psychology and for mental states: the content of mental states is broad. Mental processes processes are computational and yet they have access to the real world. In other words, the content as information information and thinking as computation are reconcilable, reconcilable, although the relation between them is contingent on the laws and structure of the world. The way way the world is organized organized determines determines this relation. relation. The main argument in support of this view goes as follows. Mapping from referential content to computation computation is essentially unproblematic, the relation is bi-unique. There are occasional departures from this common-sensical state of affairs in that, for example, example, the ancients believed that two different different planet Venus Venus were instead occurrences of the planet instead two separate separate planets (the repeated ad nauseam nauseam Morning Star and Evening Star). On the other hand, in theory, two different 0 and XYZ, can be both different chemical substances, substances, H 2O referred to as 'water' prior to the sufficient sufficient advances in chemistry. chemistry. So, So, Fodor also recognizes the role of intentionality in semantics, denied in Fodor 1975. Sometimes the broad content and computations are not bi-uniquely mapped. But this anomaly is very rare, it is controlled by the way the world is organized and, in any case, it only seems to cause theoretical rather than practical problems because at a given time t,/, it is not known known that 'both planets' are Venus or that 'water' is in fact two natural kinds. The world is very well organized, computations and content 'stick together', so to speak, by nature. Putnam's 'water' example and and Frege's Morning Star - Evening Evening Star Star are, en masse, masse, prohibited. There isn't any XYZ, there isn't any half-Venus because propositional attitudes involve MoPs of objects, neither is there any prepositional (cf. laszczoIt Jaszczolt 1995a). 1995a). In a sense, Fodor fights with straw 'elm-beech' species (cf. men. Intentionality Intentionality pertains to mental states and, a fortiori, also to language. It does reach real objects. Meaning pertains to linguistic linguistic expressions that have

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this intentionality and hence to deny it is is to put the cart before the horse. It is to deny the objective component component of mental states in order to preserve the computational character character of the processes in the mind. Fodor's readmission of broad content can be seen as a commendable move to put the horse back before the cart again. So, of So, are intentions in the head? And are meanings there as well? In spite of Searle's convincing internalism, the answer is probably 'yes and no'. They are between the mind and the world: they are on the path of intentionality, intentionality, through the noema, ending with the real objects objects when those are available. And, if the mind (or mental phenomena) are a feature of the brain, then they are in the brain and henceforth in the world. world. This chapter should thus bear a sub-title: "How to Putnam a Searle and how how to retaliate". retaliate". This conclusion has serious consequences for the role of intentions in semantic theory. As was suggested in Chapter 2, sentences that have more than one interpretation and that were were traditionally described as semantically ambiguous and more recently as semantically semantically underdetermined, are better viewed as allowing allowing for default interpretations that are achieved through the proposed approach of Default Semantics. Semantics. This semantic theory relies on the contribution of intentions to sentence meaning. Now, Now, intentions are neither in the world nor in the head because mental states have have an over-arching property of intentionality intentionality directed at the real objects. This directedness gives gives them a high degree of objectivity objectivity and as a result it imposes this degree of objectivity on sentences expressing these states, as well as on sentences reporting on them. Directedness at objects, objects, realized as a referential referential intention, also renders default interpretations of such sentences. Intending to communicate, to inform, inform, and to do so about something are crucial components of utterance meaning, but also, and what is more important, of sentence meaning. This is how semantics is intention-based, while while intentions are in-between in-between 'the head' and 'the world'. A word of caution is due at this juncture. Intention-based semantics is is not a new concept, in contemporary pragmatics it originated in Grice's work on Grice's meaning and the present proposal is not the only development of Grice's approach. Schiffer Schiffer (1982), (1982), for example, derives derives intention-based semantics as follows. First of all, semantic and psychological psychological facts facts are all entirely physical facts and the semantic facts are likely to be reducible dependent on physical of to psychological psychological properties, in line with Grice's (1957) reductionism reductionism of meaning to intentions (cf. (cf. Schiffer Schiffer 1982: 1982: 119-120). 119-120). Schiffer's Schiffer's intuitions, however, receive only limited support in his account. Intention-based Intention-based semantics should rely on psychological properties founded founded on belief, desire and intention. In order to demonstrate that these are not in turn determined belief and other by semantic properties, one has to have a successful theory of belief attitudes. Such theory has not yet been proposed (and hence had not been

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proposed by 1982),24 1982),24 as can be seen from the discussion of the state-of-the-art state-of-the-art in propositional prepositional attitude research in Chapter Chapter 4. So, So, Schiffer's Schiffer's task is confined to arguing that the putative correct theory of belief has to be compatible with intention-based semantics. One of the main problems with such a semantics seems to be the following. following. A linguistic act is successful successful when when both the speaker and the hearer agree to some large extent about word meaning and syntactic structures, and as a result about sentence meaning. meaning. In other words, their knowledge knowledge of the above is similar, they know the language. language. Intention-based semantics has to account for this knowledge knowledge and, a fortiori, for the principle of forming and understanding understanding new sentences which which is founded founded on (albeit not exhausted by) the principle of compositionality. In other words again, the speaker believes that the hearer believes that the word 'dog' stands for or means in English any member of the class of dogs. The speaker also believes believes that the hearer would interpret an utterance 'dog' a such. This reductionism has sometimes been misunderstood in the literature. For example, Grandy (1982: (1982: 331) 331) identifies it with the postulate of 'behavioral dispositions' dispositions' that identify the mental state without without the mediation of language. He rejects it and says says that in fact the content of belief can frequently be fixed only through the mediation of language. For example, if one believes believes that having seen the city, this belief Cambridge is a beautiful town without ever having belief is likely to be held as a result of a heard or read linguistic linguistic expression rather of than any other form of acquaintance. This behavioural interpretation of reductionism reductionism that leads Grandy to its critique is unwarranted, unwarranted, though. though. A belief can be arrived at, held and expressed through various carriers or belief vehicles, of which language is only one type. type. The fact that some beliefs linguistic are language-based language-based need not yet mean the lack of reducibility of the linguistic reducibilityof the psychological to the linguistic. to the psychological, nor the reducibility linguistic. Grandy (ibid.) says that "[i]n many cases the state that is being portrayed in a belief report can only be fully identified by reference to language". This is belief plainly false. Even beliefs de dicto, dicto, beliefs about unknown unknown individuals, individuals, about whoever or whatever happens to have have a certain property, property, or beliefs with a (12), are not fully analysable analysable as content that is not fully understood as in (12), expressions of belief by reference reference to language alone: (12) (12)

Red giants become white dwarfs.

Sentence (12) (12) requires some knowledge knowledge of astronomy to be at all understood. understood. Sentence Reports on such beliefs are potentially ambiguous, have at least the de re and de dicto interpretations, and this choice of interpretation is resolved 24

24

For a dicussion of Schiffer's Schiffer's recent work see Section 4.2.2.

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precisely, it is thanks to the reliance on intentions in communication. communication. More precisely, resolved because the speaker and the hearer both know how intentions work and the meaning of an expression of belief belief is established thanks to this reliance on the knowledge of this process. For example, in (12), on one scenario the default referential intention is absent since the speaker does not know what red giants are, neither does he or she know what the property overriding of the default presence of becoming becoming white dwarfs means. And this overriding of the referential referential intention is already a partial reductionism of the semantic to the psychological. It is in fact better to use a different different term than 'reductionism' here. In Chapter Chapter 2, 2,1I used the term 'contribution of intentions to the semantics' which is more non-committal while allowing for this partial reductionism. So, the fact that some beliefs are linguistic does not preclude that the So, linguistic in them, i.e. i.e. their vehicle, vehicle, has an intention-based semantics. Although Although this conclusion may at first glance look like infinite regress, it is only a move of stepping down one level to the properties of that carrier of belief, the vehicle of thought. Expressions of beliefs de re are even more If one believes something de re, re, the reduction of the meaning straightforward. If to intentions is automatic: one believes of of something (or someone) that it (or he or she) has certain properties. The linguistic is partly reduced to the physical so to speak automatically, automatically, through the representation of the object. problem with discussions around reductionism is even deeper than But the problem discussions around that. In fact, whether this reducibility is total or partial is beside the point. It was only an insignificant insignificant theoretical exercise of the past to try to reduce psychology. The true question is how they interact and how meaning to psychology. intentions contribute theory. There are linguistic contribute to meaning and to semantic theory. as well as non-linguistic thoughts, beliefs and desires but this is not an So, Schiffer's Schiffer's (1982) (1982) reductionism is only one side of the interesting fact. So, enterprise enterprise of intention-based semantics. semantics. It is the side which is tangential to the present investigation. investigation. It develops only one of many possible questions that stem out of the Gricean Gricean programme developed in his seminal article 'Meaning' (1957). To sum up, semantics can be intention-based without being totally reducible to psychological states or, what is more important, without this question having to be addressed.

3.8. Intentionality and Ambiguity: Concluding Remarks and Ambiguity: The arguments presented above seem to seriously undermine Searle's as-if intentionality. Searle distinction between intrinsic intentionality and as-if argues that if we abandon this distinction, everything becomes mental: water flowing downhill downhill seems to display intentionality flowing intentionality by 'trying' to get to the bottom of the hill and 'seeking' the easiest route to do so (example after after Searle

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1990a: 274). This is a non sequitur. Speech acts are intentional because because they use language which is also a standard standard component component of mental states and enables their intentionality. Water flowing flowing in a stream is not intentional in this sense. Neither water as a natural kind nor a stream are pre-conditions pre-conditions or constitutive parts of mental states, unless we want to push biology extremely extremely far and look at the chemical intentionality as a chemical composition of the human body and at intentionality biological property of the brain. But then we we can invent an example of a rubber biological ball thrown up in the air and rest safe. Besides, mental states are conscious or potentially conscious conscious (cf. (cf. Searle 1992, 1994; Fodor Fodor and Lepore 1994) and so are speech acts, while a stream and a rubber ball can be safely classified as devoid of this remarkable property - at least in the possible world in which writing these words. So, So, the I am sitting at my desk in Cambridge and writing conclusions of this chapter chapter are as follows. conclusions (i) Our beliefs and other experience are 'about' something, are 'directed at' mediated by a mental content objects, and this 'aboutness' is mediated content before reaching reaching the real object. 'Before' is not to be understood in a temporal sense. If If the object is there to be targeted, intentionality is the strongest. (ii) Intentionality plays plays an important role in the semantics of natural language. It underlies (and enables discourse of) intentions in communication. As a result, it provides interpretations of utterances, ranging from the default to various cases where this default cannot be reached. reached. Finally, a tentative conclusion conclusion that will be further tested in Chapter 6: (iii) Intentionality of mental states subsumes intentionality intentionality of speech acts because language language constitutes constitutes one of the possible vehicles of thought.

CHAPTER CHAPTER 4

The Default De Re Principle "If "If two things don't fit, fit, but you believe both of them, thinking that somewhere, hidden, there must be a third thing that connects connects them, that's credulity." Eco (1988a: 49).1 49).1

Prepositional Attitudes: A Close-Up ................................ 4.1. Propositional 4.1.1. Propositional Prepositional Attitudes, Attitude Sentences, and Attitude Reports . . . . . .. 4.1.2. The 'Ortcutt 'Ortcutt Puzzle' and Its Interpretations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 4.1.3. Factives and and Non-Factives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 4.1.4. The The Object of of Belief. Belief . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. Defaults for Referring Referring Expressions? ...... 4.1.5. Defaults for Belief Reports or Defaults of De Re and De Dicto 4.1.6. Varieties Varieties of Dicto . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 4.1.7. Substitutivity? ........................................... 4.2. Whose Meaning? On Sense and Mode of Presentation Presentation ................... 4.2.1. In Defence Defence of Speaker-Dependent Senses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. Presentation and and Default Semantics . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 4.2.2. Types of Modes of Presentation 4.2.3. The Persistence Persistence of Sense ................................... 4.2.4. Sense-Based Semantics? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 4.3. De Re, De Dictoi, Dictol> and De Dicto Proper . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 4.4. Red Giants and White Dwarfs: Context-Dependence Ascription .... Context-Dependence of Attitude Ascription .... 4.5. Default De Re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 4.6. Interim Conclusions ........................................... 4.7. Loose Ends: Context and Presupposition Projection .....................

122 122 122 122 124 124 130 130 131 131 133 133 135 135 137 137 142 142 142 142 147 147 158 158 161 161 166 166 176 176 183 183 192 192 194 194

DISCOURSE, DISCOURSE, BELIEFS, AND INTENTIONS INTENTIONS Current Research in the Semantics/Pragmatics Interface, Vol. Vol. 2 K.M. laszczolt Jaszczolt 1999 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights rights reserved © 1999 1 1 "Di due due cose che che non stiano insieme, insieme, crederle crederle tutte ee due, due, ee con l'idea 1'idea che che da quaIche qualche parte ve ve ne ne sia una terza, occuIta, occulta, che Ie le unisce, questa e e la credulita." Eco (1988: (1988: 47).

121

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The aim of this chapter chapter is to present and defend the view that the referential intention that interpretation interpretation of belief reports is governed by the referential assigns the default status to the de re interpretation. In the preceding chapters I made frequent frequent reference reference to intensional contexts, substitutivity of coreferential of expressions, MoPs, and the de relde re/de dicto distinction. These terms are of primary importance for any analysis analysis of reports on people's beliefs and require a more detailed discussion at this this point.

Propositional Attitudes: Attitudes: A Close-Up 4.1. Prepositional 4.1.1. Prepositional Propositional Attitudes, Attitudes, Attitude Sentences, Sentences, and and Attitude Reports Reports

A propositional attitude is is a relation between a person (or other organism) and a piece of information in the language of thought, be it natural language as Chomsky suggests, or a universal universal language of the brain that is used for maintains. This relation can be regarded mental computations, computations, as Fodor maintains. as computational and holds between the organism and a formula coded in the system used by this organism. The role of real world situations in individuating such mental states or processes is still a moot point, although methodological solipsism is found untenable, as the discussion of Fodor's Chapter 3 points out. (1994) recent research in Chapter It was also established in Chapter Chapter 3 that beliefs have direct affinities affinities with affinities pertain to their shared property linguistic expressions and these affinities of intentionality. Beliefs are intentional intentional states (or: experiences, see Woodruff Woodruff Smith 1989: 11) 11) and intentional states have content. They can also have a which they refer. Similarly, every linguistic referent, an object to which linguistic expression has meaning (or: sense, albeit not necessarily Fregean) and can also have a referent. referent. In fact, intentionality intentionality as a theory is is not remote from the theory linguistic expressions are both of sense and reference: reference: mental states and linguistic directed at objects and have meaning: "Intentionality theory may thus be viewed as the 'semantics' of of intentional thought or experience, encompassing the theory of intentional content, or 'sense', and the theory of intentional intentional relations, or 'reference'. (But the concern is experience, not language, which is the subject matter of semantics in the usual sense.)" Woodruff Smith (1989: II). Woodruff (1989: 11).

As a result, one can formulate formulate conditions of satisfaction for mental states which parallel truth conditions for sentences in Tarskian Tarskian semantics. Now, Now, Woodruff Smith (ibid.: 16) Woodruff 16) admits that there is a problem at this juncture of experience and language because the latter may express the first with

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different different degrees of accuracy. accuracy. This problem disappears when language is regarded as one of the carriers of thought. This idea is developed in Chapter Chapter 6 below. below. All that matters for for the present discussion is is that by looking at the properties of beliefs one can reveal some relevant properties of sentences sentences that express them - a platitude often neglected in the research on expressions of propositional propositional attitude. Beliefs have also other features in common with linguistic expressions. Utterances contain, so to speak, or carry in themselves certain attitudes to their contents. Belief Belief is the most basic of these attitudes. No other clues are necessary to attribute a belief to a person than the mere fact that the person uttered a sentence in the indicative mood. In other words, words, there is no need to express by lexical means that the statement represents a belief. effect is derivable in a process of inference from from An assumption to this effect the mere syntactic form of the uttered sentence. Sperber and Wilson (1986a: fundamental factual assumption present in the mind. 73) say that belief is a fundamental Another example of an attitude conveyed by syntactic means is desire which corresponds to the indicative mood. So, So, the scope of analysis analysis is large indeed: is an expression in the indicative mood. mood.2 a belief expression is The main focus of this chapter is the relation between beliefs, such as for instance the belief that the author of David was the best Italian sculptor, expressions of belief, such as (1), (1), and reports on beliefs, such as (2):

(1) (1)

The author of David was the best Italian sculptor.

(2)

Kasia believes that Michelangelo was the best Italian Italian sculptor.

naturally, depend on many factors. The The appropriateness of (2) will, naturally, factors on the semantics and pragmatics of propositional impact of these factors attitude reports is, is, in a great approximation, the topic of what follows. The topic is vast because there is no one-to-one one-to-one correspondence correspondence between types; there are many ways of expressing mental states and speech act types; a belief (cf. (cf. Mey 1993: 1993: 156). 156). It is is also central to current debates because context-dependence of attitude ascription attempts at incorporating the context-dependence in the theory have not been entirely successful (see Richard 1990, 1995; Soames 1995).

2

However, However, in the tradition derived from Plato (cf. (cf. Lee 1953), belief has also been regarded as a certainty state weaker than knowledge, or as failed knowledge, knowledge, an attitude that lacks the sufficient sufficient certainty knowledge. See also Wierzbicka (1988: (1988: 132-136) 132-136) on the primary role of the verb in order to be knowledge. 'know'. 2

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4.1.2. The 'Ortcutt Puzzle' and and Its Interpretations Interpretations It seems that an investigation of attitudes if attitudes and reports can only be successful if it commences, so to speak, at the chronological end of the belief—> belief ~ expression expression ~ report report scenario, -> scenario, that is with sentences of of the type (3), as exemplified in (2):

(3)

qJS. A believes that B
To present present the problem, I shall utilize an example that originated originated in Quine (1956: 404) and is known as the 'Ortcutt puzzle'. The example has been extensively modified for the purpose purpose of this study since Quine's aims in presenting it were rather different.33 In Situation A, two friends, presenting friends, Ralph and John meet on the beach. They both have another person in their visual fields fields who appears appears to be wearing a brown hat. Ralph utters (4). John, subsequently recognizing the figure in the distance as Bernard 1. J. Ortcutt, subsequently reports to his wife Mary on the event by uttering (5): Situation A

The man in the brown hat is a spy.

/". Ralph

X

J:

Ortcutt

John

Ralph believes that Ortcutt is a spy.

John

Mary

3 concerned with with the problem of quantifYing quantifying into so-called so-called 'propositional 'prepositional attitude 3 Quine is concerned idioms' and specifYing specifying what exactly is referentially opaque, i.e. why 'quantifying in' does not why 'quantifYing in'does work, or, why saying that there is a certain person why we cannot always always paraphrase paraphrase a report by saying B about whom A believes that he/she cps. s. Quine (1956: (1956: 406) distinguishes distinguishes intensions intensions of of degree o0 (propositions) and of degree I1 (attributes, e.g. x ex(v is a spy». spy)).

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(4)

The man in the brown hat is a spy. spy.

(5)

spy. Ralph believes that Ortcutt is a spy.

125

B. Later on that day, Now let us imagine Situation B. day, John and Ralph are sitting on deck chairs on the beach and reading newspapers. John suddenly sees an interesting piece of news in the paper and utters (6), to which Ralph, rather shocked, replies by (7). (7). Subsequently, Subsequently, John reports the event to Mary by uttering (8): Situation B

Bernard J. Ortcutt was arrested today and accused of espionage.

But Ortcutt is not a spy! He is an honest citizen!

.>r!

,.:""-

'./\

,1"" Ralph

John

Ralph believes that Ortcutt is not a spy. I

/~

John

-~ TT'

Mary

(6)

Bernard 1. J. Ortcutt was arrested today and accused of espionage.

(7)

But Ortcutt is not a spy! spy! He is an honest citizen!

(8)

spy. Ralph believes that Ortcutt is not a spy.

And And this is where the scenario goes wrong. In reality, before uttering (8), John refrained from uttering would have recollected his previous utterance (5) (5) and refrained two inconsistent statements and accusing Ralph of holding clearly p & --. p. Assuming that situations A and B inconsistent beliefs of the form p&->p. really happened, though, we would infer that at least one of John's reports is incorrect since, ceteris paribus, paribus, Ralph does not hold such contradictory contradictory beliefs about one person. In other words, it cannot be correct to ascribe to a person overtly inconsistent beliefs, there has to be an explanation of of inconsistency. the apparent inconsistency.

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On closer inspection, however, saying saying that we we can hold contradictory contradictory beliefs or that we terminology. we cannot may be a matter of agreement on terminology. It is obvious that once the person is aware of the contradiction, he/she withdraws one belief (see Dummett 1973: 1973: 288). 288). So, So, in a sense, Ralph may utter (4) (4) and (7) but it is very unlikely that he would not notice the contradiction contradiction himself and immediately immediately attend to it by giving further further qualifications. qualifications. Since he has not done so, so, John is likely to assume that Ralph meant two different different people in uttering uttering (4) (4) and (7) or, perhaps, on at least one of the occasions he did not mean anybody in particular. Be that as it may, it seems that common sense dictates an acceptance of a requirement requirement of consistency of people's beliefs. This requirement requirement is widely advocated in the literature, e.g. by Hintikka (1962), (1962), Montague (1970a), (1970a), as well as by folk psychology where it is stressed that beliefs constitute a network network (see Stich 1983). There seems to be no other other viable alternative. Even Even when, according according to John, Ralph appears to hold two inconsistent beliefs, John will reject this interpretation because overtly inconsistent if inconsistent beliefs are very unlikely. And if Ralph's beliefs are not overtly overtly inconsistent, inconsistent, then Ralph's deception requires mentioning in John's report to Mary. Mary. It is, however, however, even more likely that at least one of Ralph's beliefs is not about Ortcutt or is not a part of his network of of beliefs. beliefs has wide-ranging Now, the acceptance of the overt consistency consistency of beliefs theoretical implications. It is possible to believe believe two contradictory things belief is not aware that the beliefs holder of the belief about a person when the holder are in fact about one person, as in examples (9) and (10) (10) where Twain and Clemens are names of the same person, a well known known American American novelist: (9)

Odile thinks that Twain is dead.

(10)

Odile thinks that Clemens is alive.

199). This commits us to objects of beliefs which (adapted (adapted from Richard 1997: 1997:199). are more finely-grained than real objects. In other words, it commits us to psychological objects of belief, objects which which include the way in which which they present themselves to the holder of the belief. 4 There is no overt inconsistency between (9) and (10), although although to an observer observer who is aware of the coreferentiality of the proper proper names, the inconsistency inconsistency is obvious. This requirement requirement of consistency seems acceptable. After all, since beliefs seem to constitute a network, or in other words a belief has access to other beliefs which constitute its 'horizon' (see Chapter 3), 3), consistency has to be assumed. This consistency can be called consistency in a weak sense as it amounts 4 4 The question as to whether whether meanings meanings are in the mind mind is is addressed addressed later on in this chapter. See also Section 3.7 3.7 above.

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to the claim that people do not normally hold contradictory contradictory beliefs which are part of their mental dossier and which enter into relations with other elements in that dossier. Consequently, the conclusion to be drawn from situations A and B is that, since Ralph's beliefs constitute a dossier and overt inconsistency is excluded, 5 Ralph does not know that he speaks about the same individual in both judgements (from the point of view of word reference rather than speaker reference) and so Ralph Ralph must speak about what for him are two different different people, despite the fact that the man in the brown hat is Ortcutt. The MoPs of the individual differ differ in these situations. In other words, whereas in Situation A Ralph perceives the object of his belief, in Situation B he may only know it by description, or may merely know the name and a property of spyhood associated with it, which may not suffice for picking picking out the correct referent. + B can be multiplied. multiplied. For example, Ralph The possibilities of interpreting A + can be correct in B and mistaken in A when, in A, he thinks that he sees Mr Smith. An additional difficulty difficulty is posed by the interpretation of John's (5) and (8), (8), Mary will have a problem with inferring reports. On hearing (5) contradictory pair of statements. statements. In uttering uttering (5), anything at all from this contradictory for example, does John assume that (a) (a) Ralph knows that the man in the brown hat is Ortcutt, does he assume that (b) Mary knows it too, or rather (c) it does not matter what Ralph's background assumptions are, as long (c) as John's 'Ortcutt' and Ralph's 'the man in the brown hat' in fact refer to Ralph may not associate the same individual? Moreover, (d) (d) Ralph associate the name 'Ortcutt' with anybody in particular or (e) (e) he may associate it with the person who is in fact called Mr Smith ... etc. The ways in which the hearer of of the report (in our example: example: Mary) individuates the referent also have to be considered, for example when it is obvious from the scenario that the speaker speaker (John) knows from the previous conversation conversation or from any other other source that she might be mistaken as to Ortcutt's identity. There are various scenarios and combinations of scenarios that can be invented with respect to situations A and B. B. In addition, there is a theoretical problem of whether reports are speaker or hearer oriented. This issue was attended to in Section doubly-dynamic perspective 2.9 where the doubly-dynamic perspective was suggested. Suffice Suffice it to say that reports in (11) (11) and (12) (12) are not easier to interpret than (5) (5) or (8). (8). Sentence (11) belief (11) does not reveal the original MoP under which the holder of the belief thought of the referent, and sentence (12) does not exclude a referential ostension:6 mistake, in spite of the act of visual perception and, perhaps, also ostension:

5 5

Accepting the requirement of consistency consistency of beliefs does not, however, however, mean that we we assume that people believe all consequences of their beliefs. See Section 3.3 3.3 above. 6 6 An utterance of 'that man' accompanied by an act of pointing is is not a reliable guide to beliefs either. Perry's (1979) discussion of indexicals is relevant at this point.

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(11) (11)

Ralph believes that your husband is a spy. spy.

(12) (12)

Ralph believes that a certain man whom Ralph saw on the 27th of of February on the beach wearing a brown hat is a spy.

However, reports in (13) (13) and (14) shed more light on people's people's practices practices in relating attitudes. 7 If If John disagreed with Mary's conviction that the man in the brown hat is Ortcutt (or her husband, respectively), he would not utter utter (5) but would rather say something similar to (13) (13) and (14): (13) (13)

Ralph believes that the man whom you believe to be Ortcutt, although I believe he is Smith, is a spy.

(14) (14)

Ralph believes that the man whom you call your husband, although spy. to my knowledge knowledge he is his twin-brother, twin-brother, is a spy.

These reports reports demonstrate that it is not the preservation of Ralph's MoP that guides John's selection of expressions to refer to the object of the belief. Instead, Instead, it is the clarity of the message, the communicative intention that is guided by the strong referential referential intention. In other words, where reo background background knowledge (i.e. true assumptions) allow it, the report is de re. Here we can also subsume de re ascriptions of of de dicto beliefs (cf. (cf. Burge 1977: unmarkedness of the de re re reports constitutes constitutes most 346). The defence of the unmarkedness of of what follows. follows. All in all, there are at least two points of reference reference with respect to the belief. Firstly, Firstly, Ralph may hold the belief about individuation of the object of belief. a salient, known known individual individual or about whoever whoever undergoes the name or description. Secondly, John may report on the belief being himself aware of which 'type of belief' belief Ralph holds but, in addition, he may himself be able to identify the object of Ralph's belief belief or merely merely know the name or description of whoever might be referred to in this way. feature in way. Now, Now, Ralph's MoPs feature John's reports only if they differ differ from John's and this happens when when John has grounds for believing that Ralph is either referentially mistaken or lacks some essential knowledge about the subject of his belief expression. Otherwise, he would simply simply assume that for Ralph the man in the brown hat is Ortcutt, since he is indeed Ortcutt. This seems to be common practice in everyday everyday conversation, or, in Bach's (1984) (1984) words, we we jump to conclusions when there is no need to think twice. twice. 7 7 This discussion is based on invented examples, as has been common common practice in the philosophy philosophy of language. The functioning of these examples examples in conversation conversation has been judged on the basis Some advances have been made in corpus-based of what seems intuitively correct and natural. Some problems with direct research on referring (e.g. Brown 1995) which sheds some light on the problems reference but studies studies of belief belief reports are still not sufficiently supported by empirical empirical evidence.

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129

In other words, the question is how does a hearer understand understand reports of the form in (3), what interpretative interpretative processes are involved: (3)

A believes that B cps. cps.

Are such reports ambiguous? If not, what is their semantics? And, to what extent do pragmatic processes help establish this semantic representation? representation? These questions also necessitate an answer to the problem problem of how the hearer realizes that the reporter reporter on a belief does not know who/what he is talking about, or that the holder of the belief did not know who/what the belief belief expression uttered was about. On similar lines, it also necessitates an expression he uttered answer to the problem of how the hearer realizes that the reporter or the holder of the belief are referentially referentially mistaken. All these interpretative options have to acquire answers in the semantic-pragmatic semantic-pragmatic theory. theory. The sentence P p need not have the same meaning when free-standing free-standing and when embedded construction of the type in (3). (3). Therefore, when the reporter merely in the construction 'embeds' the expression of belief in the report, the meaning of of p need not be preserved and the report report need not be correct. Hence, the theory will have to what features the reports in oratio obliqua to answer the question as to to sensitive. This is where intentionality (Chapter (Chapter 3) and vehicles of thought are sensitive. (Chapters 3 and 6) come to the rescue. rescue. & .....,BaP ->Eap (where BaP Eap To sum up, a person can believe a conjunction E BaP &p & />'), as long as the subject of the stands for 'the person a believes that p'), proposition proposition P p is presented to him/her under different different MoPs and the holder of the belief does not realize that the beliefs concern the same individual. The difference between proper names, which are commonly considered to be directly referential, i.e. have individuals as their semantic values, and definite descriptions is not significant in this respect, they both create problems of reference in the interpretation of attitude contexts (cf. (cf. Burge 1977: 342).8 342).8 The properties of expressions that are used to refer are attended to in Chapter 5. The problem with propositional prepositional attitudes is tri-partite. Firstly, Firstly, there is a problem of belief ascription or, in the above example, with determining, Secondly, there on the basis of his belief expression, what Ralph believes. Secondly, is a problem with reporting on this belief without distorting the original belief. Thirdly, there is a problem with the interpretation interpretation of a belief report. This is the setting of the scene for semantics and pragmatics, large as it may seem. The tradition in the philosophy of language narrowed the field substantially and concentrated concentrated on the formal formal semantic properties of sentences reporting on beliefs. It is perhaps this narrow focusing and a virtual neglect of of 8

For a discussion discussion of some problems problems with direct reference see Section Section 4.2.3.

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pragmatics, as well as the neglect of addressing the issue of the interaction of pragmatics, interaction of semantics and pragmatics that have led to repeated repeated failures in providing a propositional attitude sentences. sentences. This successful account account of the meaning of prepositional chapter chapter signals how to remedy this state of affairs and, at the same time, demonstrates how attitude sentences yield to the Default Semantics sketched Chapter 2. in Chapter

4.1.3. 4.1.3. Factives and and Non-Factives

In Chapter Chapter 3, 3, the de relde re/de dicto distinction was contrasted contrasted with the distinction non-factive attitudes and attitude verbs. To between factive and non-factive To repeat briefly, factives are those verbs which which generate propositions whose truth entails entails that p' embedded proposition is itself true. For example, 1\ the embedded A knows that />' verb. On the presupposes that p is true. 'Know' is an example of a factive verb. contrary, non-factives non-factives do not require that the embedded proposition is true. 'Believe' and 'think' are examples of non-factive verbs. Moreover, 'wish', are sometimes called contrafactives 'hope', or 'imagine' 'imagine'are contrafactives or counterfoctives counterfactives since they can be said to presuppose the falsity of the expressed embedded proposition (cf. proposition (cf. Crystal 1980). 1980). Other classifications classifications are also present in the literature, for example Partee's (1973) (1973) distinction between emotives (e.g. 'regret'), verbs of inference (e.g.'deduce'), (e.g. 'deduce'), verbs of communication (e.g. 'say'), 'whisper') and epistemic predicates (e.g. manner-verbs of communication (e.g. (e.g.'whisper') 'believe', 'know'). They have have different different grammatical grammatical properties but, in the case of the latter latter group, the distinction into factives and non-factives is not preserved.9 It has been common practice in the studies of attitude ascription to stress particular belief. belief. The the problems posed by non-factive attitudes, attitudes, and in particular The same same principle is adopted in this work. This practice is dictated by the fact that in the case of belief there is no commitment on the part of the holder of the 9 9

Some other typologies of attitude verbs have been proposed. One of the more interesting ones is established on the basis of (1) (1) exhibiting by these verbs anaphoric anaphoric properties, that of Asher (1987), established properties. and (2) observing observing the rules oflogical of logical inference. inference. The The property property (1) (1)means means that that certain certain attitude attitude verbs verbs such as believe barrier to anaphoric believe contain contain a logical barrier anaphoric relations. Sentence (i) (i) is obviously problematic. problematic. (i) Tom believes (i) believes that unicorns exist. One of them is behind the sofa. He suggests parallel divisions of attitude verbs into: (1) (1) factives ('know') and non-factives ('believe'); (2) negative negative and positive; definite and indefinite indefinite (definites require some background justification, their truth (3) definite conditions conditions require another another attitude as their justification). This leaves e.g. 'believe' and 'think' as positive indefinite non-factives, and e.g. 'expect' and 'decide' e.g.'believe'and 'think'as e.g.'expect" as positive definite non-factives - along with seven other categories which are oflesser of lesser importance importance for the present present concern. concern.

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I3l 131

belief or the reporter reporter on the belief belief to the truth of the proposition proposition expressed or belief incorporated respectively. Hence, these attitude expressions incorporated in the report, respectively. are the most interesting ones through being the most difficult difficult ones to analyse.

4.1.4. The The Object Object of of Belief Belief

The object of belief has been a subject of controversy at least since Frege propositional attitudes to the centre of· attention. In Chapter 3, brought prepositional of-attention. 3, it was accepted that beliefs are directed to real objects through mental constructs called noemata. They have also been regarded regarded as relations relations between the believer and a proposition, a sentence, statement, fact, state of affairs, affairs, or some other entity.lO entity.10 In fact, states of affairs are compatible with directedness at an object. I suggested that when the phenomenological directedness referential intention is weak or non-existent, the belief is directed at the situation as a whole. whole. This plurality of views should not be a hindrance, though. Ifbeliefs If beliefs are intentional and intentions, according to the DI principle, come in whole or (ii) an degrees, then the object is either (i) (i) a proposition as a whole individual referred to, depending on the strength of the referential intention. Construing propositions as objects of the attitudes has been rather unfortunate. It may be useful for discussing discussing properties of the embedded thatclauses, especially as far as substitutivity of coextensive terms is that-clauses, concerned, but from the point of view of intentionality and the psychosemantics of beliefs, 'proposition' is a confusing term. It has been defined, among others, as (i) a state of affairs; (ii) a sentence; sentence sentence; (iii) sentence meaning; (iv) (iv) Fregean sense; (v) (v) mental representation; or (vi) (vi) a set of possible 11 worlds. Moreover, opinions differ differ as to whether propositions are constant, constant, worldsY that is whether their truth value can change with time and location. At least this issue has been resolved in pragmatics by postulating the widely widely propositional form of a acknowledged intrusionism of pragmatics into the propositional propositional forms of of sentence. In other words, it is widely accepted that propositional specification, including indexical sentences require further pragmatic specification, reference, before they are truth-evaluable (see Section Section 1.3 1.3 above). All in all, it can be safely assumed that propositions are theoretical constructs made up for semantic purposes and have no ontological status. The embedded proposition contributes some meaning to the whole expression. But it is not the smallest, indivisible entity which can legitimately be called an object 10 10 There are a variety of standpoints on this issue and some of them are discussed below. below. For 1971,1976; classical arguments for and against a proposition proposition as an object of attitude see e.g. Prior 1971, 1976; Harman 1968-69, 1968-69, and Quine 1960. 11 11 It has also been claimed that an object of propositional propositional attitude is a property property of inhabiting a possible world where the embedded proposition proposition holds. Cf. Lewis 1979.

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of attitude. The name 'propositional 'prepositional attitude' seems to be retained in the technical parlance for historical reasons and is, strictly speaking, a 12 misnomer.12 which may mayor Acts of consciousness are directed at objects which or may not exist in something. Brentano (1874: 124-125; reality. In other words, we always believe something. (1874:124-125; 1874a: 88) 88) calls it 'reference to a content', 'direction toward an object', or 'immanent objectivity'. And every, as he calls it, 'mental phenomenon', thinking we grasp a sense, and in the contains something of an object. In thinking justified to say that we think a proposition or a theoretical analysis it is justified sentence. It is, so to speak, a shortcut in interpretation which should indeed merely as a shortcut.13 Propositions and their parts are constructs be regarded merely constructs that function as mediators between objects of attitudes (states of affairs and their inhabitants) and linguistic, linguistic, syntactic units (sentences and their parts). precarious looking basis, 'believe' can be called a propositional propositional verb. On this precarious For the same reasons, the standard form of propositional attitudes is that in (3), where the verb is followed followed by a that-clause. //iaf-clause. In other words, all sentences sentences reporting beliefs are translatable into )\ 'A believes believes that /?' p' constructions (see Montague 1973). have been made to dispose of a proposition as an Numerous attempts have ultimate object of attitudes and introduce its 'parts' 'parts'as as objects. These attempts meaning which says that conform to Frege's principle of compositionality of meaning the meaning of a sentence is composed of the meanings of the words involved. Russell Russell (1912) claimed that and the structure in which which they are involved. we are acquainted with parts of propositions. He later added that beliefs are many-termed relations (Russell (Russell 1984), and subsequently subsequently dubbed of complex images when when they appear propositions 'psychological occurrences' occurrences'of in attitude contexts (Russell 1940). 1940). More adequately, adequately, Cresswell Cresswell (1985) suggested a semantic account of belief reports based on 'structured meanings', the sensitivity of the complementizer that to the structure of of the following that-clause. f/za/-clause. This account is used in Chapter 8 for the contrastive, cross-linguistic analysis analysis of belief reports. But breaking a proposition into pieces will not suffice. A proposition is a semantic semantic object

12 12

proposition as an Fodor (1978: 520) points out a different different problem connected with accepting proposition object of attitudes. Propositions do not have forms, they are 'sheer contents', the contents of what is conveyed through different different lexico-syntactic forms. In other other words, there are various ways disregarded in propositions. The problem arises when of saying the same thing and these ways are disregarded public, one tries to compare these contents with mental representations. Propositions are pUblic, representations are private, and hence the public meanings have to be acquired and made private, or grasped like Platonic ideas. According to Fodor, the system of such representations constitutes a language of mental operations. 13 13 Brentano Brentano and Frege rely on a mysterious procedure procedure of 'grasping' sense. This idea will not be developed developed here. See Dummett 1991b.

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physical one, mediated by a mental whereas intentionality requires a physical mental why we shall need Husserl's noema (see Chapter representation. That That is why Chapter 3) and sense or MoP discussed in Section 4.2. The view that the verb 'believe' expresses a relation between between an individual individual proposition and a proposition proposition can only be defended when the structure structure of this proposition is recognized as part of this proposition, i.e. as part of the informational content of the that-clause (cf. (cf. McKay 1991: 726). Attitude reports with personal personal pronouns as subjects of the that-clause that are coreferential with the expression in the subject position of the main clause are good proof proof that-clauses of this, and so are thatclauses with reflexive pronouns. In addition, the contrast between de re re and de dicto reports also relies on the degree to which contrast the that-clause that- clause is transparent. In other words, the contrast contrast depends on (i) so, whether it is a correct one, whether the referent is assigned, and if so, and (ii) whether the expression is understood by the speaker or merely repeated 'whatever it may mean', as in the example with red giants becoming 3, example 12). This discussions (cf. red dwarfs used in earlier earlier discussions (cf. Chapter 3, information from the structure of the that-clause that- clause varies from one interpretation of attitude report to another and from one situation to another. another. interpretation Sometimes Sometimes more information is relevant, sometimes sometimes less. For example, a de that- clause dicto belief report exhibits a small sensitivity to the structure of the that-clause compared with its de re re equivalent. By 'the equivalent' I mean a belief report as compared developed in that has the same linguistic linguistic form as the first one. This topic is developed more detail in Chapter Chapter 8 and in laszczolt Jaszczolt 1993. To sum up, prepositional propositional attitudes, like other intentional mental states, are relations established in Chapter 3. relations to real objects, as was established 3. They are relations mediated by noema or sense, sense, but in semantic discourse they can be conveniently regarded as attitudes to propositions or their parts. But, until of we know how to classify the possible objects of attitudes attitudes as to fineness of objects), the interpretation grain (states of affairs, construed objects and real objects), of prepositional propositional attitudes remains a clandestine enterprise. This is where unmarkedness unmarkedness and default in interpretation come in.

Expressions? 4.1.5. Defaults Defaults for for Belief Belief Reports Reports or Defaults Defaults for for Referring Referring Expressions? The options of interpretation of propositional attitude reports have close affinities affinities to the choices of interpretation interpretation of expressions that are used to refer such as proper names and definite descriptions. Other expressions in the subject position of the embedded embedded sentence sentence do not create such problems. problems. For example, sentence (IS) (15) can be taken to be about a specific cat, or the indefinite noun phrase can be taken in a nonspecific nonspecific sense as in (l5a) (15a) and (l5b) (15b) respectively:

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(15) (15)

Ralph believes that a cat talks.

(15 (15a)a)

There There is a cat about about which Ralph believes that it talks.

(15 (15b)b)

Ralph believes that there is a cat such that it talks.

Chapter Chapter 4

The readings of (15) differ differ in the relative scope of the indefinite noun phrase and the belief operator. The readings of reports reports with proper names and descriptions are slightly different different from (15). (15). They also involve definite descriptions involve the instances instances of referential referential mistake, and hence the choices of interpretation referential reading, the attributive referential involve the referential attributive reading, and referential including a referential referential mistake. So, of So, we can conclude that the choices of interpretation of belief choices of interpretation of of the interpretation belief reports follow the choices embedded embedded sentence. sentence. Following Burge (1977: 342), definite descriptions and proper names are Following regarded Despite regarded as posing similar problems of individuation of the referent. referent. Despite their acclaimed differences attended to in Chapter 5, 5, they, sense, they, in a sense, constitute individual names, in that they constitute one category of what Mill calls individual are ideally ideally affirmable affirmable truly of only one thing. However, whereas, according whereas, according information to Mill, proper names are non-connotative, i.e. they do not carry information as to the attributes of the individuals (which is why why they may be said not to carry meaning), definite descriptions do more than merely denote an object. proper names, the definite For Frege (1892), definite descriptions belong with proper article makes a proper name out of a concept (Begrijf).14 (Begriff).14 It seems that a moderate Namely, proper proper names moderate solution in-between the two is preferable. Namely, descriptions exhibit similar problems of interpretation but and definite descriptions reference (or Frege's neither is a sub-class of the other. Denotation, reference Frege's Bedeutung, see Section Section 4.2 below) makes them similar. Both definite descriptions and proper proper names are, according to Frege, what we can call terms entity, they also have sense, as in logic. They are expressions referring to an entity, well as its subjective correlate, MoP. Sense, or meaning, determines reference reference but it is possible to know the meaning without knowing the reference. Both proper names and definite descriptions can have different proper different referents (if any) 15 in various situations.15 They are not rigid designators, they can have different different referents in different different possible worlds (pace (pace Kripke 1972 1972 on proper proper names). It is so due to their context-specificity. context-specificity. In short, proper names have MoPs which may explain the apparent inconsistency of beliefs. The MoPs may be mistaken and lead to referential mistakes in the use of proper names, just 14 14 In languages which which do not have articles the role of the definite article is said to be fulfilled fulfilled by suppositio ^implex or orpersonalis). razor: suppositio "'imp/ex personalis). However, this solution seems not to conform to Occam's Occam's razor: supposition is not a constituent of the sentence. 15 15 This is independent of the speaker's intentions according to Frege. Sense is objective, not speaker's intentions individual. See Section 4.2 below. below.

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as they may do in the case of definite descriptions. The believer's MoPs in oratio recta (the belief expression) may not be the same as the reporter's MoPs in oratio obliqua (the belief report). Similarities are important important for the present concerns because we we are interested in the ways people refer rather than the ways expressions refer. The differences are attended to in Chapter 5. 5.

4.1.6. 4.1.6. Varieties of of De Re and and De Dicto

The distinction between de re re and de dicto readings of belief reports is standardly tied to the difference between talking about a person, so to speak, independently of the names the person possesses and the description he/she undergoes, and talking about a person with respect to one particular name or description, whoever it may be. In other words, a belief report is de re when it is uttered about a particular (res) and its having a certain particular thing fyes) property, properly, and it is de dicto when the believer is merely able to assert that a certain proposition (dictum) Dictum) is is true. true. The distinction also holds for for beliefs: beliefs: there are beliefs de re re and beliefs de dicto, dicto, although the distinction pertaining to beliefs is a matter of controversy in the literature.16 Searle (1983: (1983: 208-209), for example, claims that all beliefs are constituted by their intentional content and their psychological psychological mode and since both of these are in the head, all beliefs are de dicto and the distinction is redundant. All there is to the distinction is that some beliefs are additionally about real things and hence de reo re. De re re beliefs are a subclass of de dicto beliefs. This objection to the distinction is, is, however, however, a result of redefining redefining the purpose for which the distinction is used. It is used primarily for distinguishing between holding a belief about a known, known, salient individual and holding a belief, so so to speak, 'second-hand', about whoever undergoes a name or description used in the source of the belief such as a newspaper article, information delivered by a friend, a teacher, heard on the radio, etc. It is true that all beliefs contain MoPs of their objects but the role this mode plays in the individuation of of the object differs. Similarly, of the individual referred to in the subject Similarly, the MoP MoPof position of the embedded sentence of a belief report can be more or less vital for the content content of the report. And And this is what the de re/de re/de dicto distinction is supposed to grasp. It does not mean, however, belief however, that one is a belief concerning a thing and the other a belief concerning a proposition. Instead, it is the amount of information concerning the possible guises of the 16 16 The standardly accepted 18 accepted definitions of of de re and and de dicto come from Hintikka 1969a, esp. fn 18 on p. 443: is obviously the distinction ((...) ...) between "One thing at which this old distinction aims is statements about whoever or whatever meets a description and statements about the individual who in fact does so."

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individual about which/whom the belief is held that constitutes constitutes the difference. difference. This emphasis of emphasis on the amount amount of information is reflected in the definition of de re and and de dicto in terms of substitutivity of of coreferential expressions discussed discussed in the following section. section. There have been many other attempts to undermine the usefulness usefulness of this distinction. De re beliefs have frequently been reduced to de dicto. dicto. Dennett (1982: 82-84), for instance, argues that there cannot be any de re beliefs because in many cases the believer cannot because cannot identifY identify the object although he/she is under the impression of being able to do so. of so. He gives an example of believing that a certain penny coin is a lucky charm when unbeknownst to the believer the coin has been replaced by another identical one. Similarly, Schiffer Schiffer (1978: 203-204) talks about there being no interesting de re/de re/de dicto distinction distinction due to the role MoP plays in attitude reports. Assuming that an object of belief is always always given to the believer under a certain MoP or Fregean sense, this is not surprising. On the other hand, Bach (1982: 121) (1982: 121) observes that if people had no de re people's knowledge re beliefs about objects, people's would be acquired acquired merely by description description and this is certainly not the case. We can think of objects directly. directly.We Wecan, can, so so to to speak, speak, have havean an object object in in mind mind rather rather than merely think in concepts concepts associated associated with it. it. In other words, people are capable of pointing to an object of their belief when they see it and this requires de re beliefs. In a similar spirit, Burge (1977: (1977: 349) argues for the necessity and the fundamental character character of beliefs de re as follows: follows: ""... ... having de re attitudes is a necessary condition for using and understanding language - in fact for propositional underunderstanding for any any prepositional standing - and and for for acquiring empirical knowledge." Now, even if beliefs de re are a Beliefs de dicto dicto are not equally necessary. Now, sub-species sub-species of of de dicto, dicto, they are so only on one rather stretched understanding of de dicto, dicto, namely as having MoP or sense. Since Fregean senses are public and objective meanings anyway anyway (see Section 4.2 below), this is not a serious obstacle. De dicto dicto means that belief is a sentential rather than predicate operator and hence the difference of difference lies not in the presence or absence of MoP or sense, but rather in the damage this presence causes to the transparency, clarity and intersubjectivity of this belief belief. In order order to elaborate elaborate on this technical sense of de re/de re/de dicto, dicto, some historical facts are required. The distinction as such comes from medieval logic, it is attributed to Abelard (see Honderich, ed. 1995: 1995: 188) 188) and was originally applied to modalities. When modal terms such as 'it is possible', 'it is necessary' apply to the subject and its possessing possessing a certain attribute, the modality is called de re ('concerning the thing'). When the modal term

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applies to the whole statement (proposition), (proposition), the modality is called de dieto dicto ('concerning the statement'). When we think of sentence (16) as of a de re one, the sentence is true because it amounts to saying that nine is necessarily nine. (16)

The number of planets of our solar system is necessarily nine.

dieto reading, (16) is false. It is not true that this number However, on the de dicto of planets is necessary. necessary. In the de re reading substitutivity of coreferential 17 expressions is possible, whereas in the de dicto die to reading it is not.17

4.1. 7. Substitutivity? Substitutivity? 4.1.7.

The problem with belief constructions is usually classified in the literature as a problem with the applicability of Leibniz's Law. Law. Leibniz's Law states that two things are identical with each other if they are substitutable preserving the truth of the sentence, or, in Leibniz's original formulation, "Eadem sunt, quae sibi mutuo substituipossunt, 1892: 64). This substitui possunt, salva veritate" (quoted after Frege 1892: identity formulation of the law is based on the more general claim dubbed the identity of of indiseernibles: indiscernibles: if things have all properties in common, then they are identical, they are one thing (see Lacey 1976: 1976: 124). 124). Two Two observations have to be made before we we proceed proceed to discussing the applicability of this law. law. Firstly, Firstly, substitutivity in belief reports, we talk about words, terms, when we talk about substitutivity or expressions that are substituted for each other rather than 'things'. In other words, if all that can be said of one thing can be said of another, then it is said about one thing under two guises. Secondly, Secondly, there is another part of what is nowadays called Leibniz's Law which is in fact due to Quine. It states that if things are identical (i.e. if they are one), then they have all properties in indiscernibility of of identieals. identicals. So, So, if we take common. This law is dubbed the indiseernibility one thing described in different different ways, all that can be said of the thing under one guise can also be said of it under the other guise. Leibniz's Law is frequently confined to the latter principle, with no regard for the historical facts. In other words, ""... ... if A and B are identical, then anything that is true of one is true of the other: "Ix Vx Vy Vy (x = y ~ -> (F(x) ~ -> F(y)))"

Neale (1990: 124).

17 17 There is also a third group of beliefs, distinguished e.g. by Castaneda and Perry, called called beliefs de se. These are beliefs about oneself oneself which are not merely beliefs de re about oneself. oneself.We Weshall shall not not be be concerned with this category. category. See e.g. Lewis 1979 and and Cresswell 1985.

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Chapter 4 Chapter

Left between Scylla and Charybdis of historical truth and contemporary Left contemporary use, law, allowing for its extension to the we shall adopt adopt the wide sense of the law, indiscernibility of identicals of identicals and to the applicability to the substitution substitution of terms, remembering, remembering, however, however, that this was not the intent of the original law put put forward by Leibniz. Sentences ascribing propositional attitudes have sometimes been called ascribing prepositional called hyperintensional in that expressions that can be substituted salva veritate outside prepositional propositional attitude contexts and direct quotations cannot always constructions (see Richard 1997: be substituted substituted for one another another in attitude constructions 198). These expressions have have the same possible-world intension and yet are not substitutable. For example, example, proper names of the same individual substitutable salva veritate in modal contexts but not in the context of are substitutable of attitude reports. Even apparent synonyms, have identical synonyms, words which seem to have 18 semantic properties, are not always substitutable.18 However, instead of of However, multiplying types of intensional intensional contexts by adding 'hyperintensionality', it may be more economical to look into intensionality more carefully carefully and distinguish degrees to which the MoP of the individual individual is relevant for its semantics. This is what I attempt below. For the purpose purpose of semantic attempt to do below. analysis of prepositional propositional attitude expressions, the de re/de re/de dicto dieto distinction began to be redefined, rather unfortunately, as distinguishing between the co extensional terms holds and those where it does cases where substitution substitution of coextensional 19 not.19 (1956) saw de re beliefs as relations between believers Quine (1956) believers and real objects, and hence as relations that can be captured by the logical form of the report in which 'quantifying possible, as in of 'quantifying into' the belief context is possible, (17a) (cf. 210). (cf. also Searle 1983: 1983: 210). (17)

Anne believes that Einstein is a film film director. director.

(17a)

3x (Einstein (x) & BelA Director (x))) (x))) & Bel A (Film Director

This is a de re reading. Anne believes believes something about Einstein. Einstein. In contrast a), the reading in (17b) dieto. Anne believes believes something about to (17 (17a), (17b) is de dicto. somebody whom she calls 'Einstein' in her belief somebody belief world. 18 18

Richard (1997: (1997: 199) gives the following example: yell. (i) Tyler thinks that some doubt that all who shout yell, (ii) Tyler thinks that some doubt that all who shout shout. (ii) is false. This also presents a problem for the compositionality of Sentence (i) may be true while (ii) of semantics. 19 19 It is sometimes claimed that substitutivity holds in attitude reports but this fact is obscure to the believer. Cf. Barwise and Perry's (1983) semantic innocence, and the original account of 'saying that' in Davidson (1968-69: 142-143). 142-143). Davidson proposes that the embedded sentence has no semantic connection sentence expressing the act of saying. For criticism connection with the main sentence criticism see Platts forthcoming. 1979; Cresswell forthcoming.

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BelA Director (x))) Bel (x) & & Film Director A (3x (Einstein (x)

Naturally, on this account, names are not rigid designators. designators. The same analysis analysis concerns definite descriptions such as in the example (18): (18)

Anne believes that the man whom she saw in the coffee coffee shop is Tom's Tom's uncle.

The referring expression may refer to the person whom she in fact met or to the man whom she thinks she has met. re/de dicto distinction with the difference Equating the de re/de difference of scope will belief not do, do, though. There are three interpretative options for beliefs and belief re, de dicto, and de re about someone someone else in the case reports, namely de re, of referential referential mistakes. This tri-partite distinction cannot be captured captured by differences differences in scope. It is a well known fact that truth-preserving extensional terms does not hold for intensional contexts substitutivity of co coextensional including belief reports. But it is frequently forgotten that the law works belief reports that allow for such substitutivity. to some extent, that there are belief Unfortunately, equating these cases where the law holds with de re reports is a frequently made mistake and a cause for confusion. confusion. Reports can be de re substitutivity without being transparent with respect to substitution. If substitutivity was the criterion for assigning the de re or de dicto status to belief reports, someone else would the case of a referential mistake called here de re about someone have to be renamed a sub-type of de dicto because substitutions cannot guarantee preserving the meaning of the original report. They cannot guarantee preserving the truth value, neither can they guarantee preserving the believer's consent to the report. An alternative account, taking these three options options of interpretation interpretation onto consideration, consideration, is developed developed in Section Section 4.3 below. below. To sum up, the problem of substitutivity salva veritate differs from the problem of context-dependent context-dependent substitutivity in discourse. The interpretation interpretation of of belief reports is a much wider problem than the narrowly focused intra-theoretic problem problem posed posed by Frege, Carnap, or Quine. Philosophers frequently presuppose that it is clear whether or not the speaker can truthfully '~ believes that p" or "A '~ believes that q" in the circumstances which they say "A describe. They are interested in the relation between p and "A '~ believes that '~ believes that q" where p and q have the same truth value p", and p and "A about the same object. But the or, at best, predicate the same thing about conversational (and hence semantic and pragmatic) problem of interpreting belief reports is not not founded on the search for reasons of the failure of belief failure of substitutivity of coextensional terms. Rather, it is founded on the criteria for distinguishing between the readings where the speaker talks about the salient, known individual, commits a referential mistake, and talks about individual, commits about

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whoever fits the name of description. Substitutivity salva veritate comes in later. It comes in as a result of the transparency of the report, that is as a result of the situations where where the speaker is capable of individuating individuating the object of of belief belief to the extent in which which substituting substituting coreferential expressions would still trigger the believer's consent to the report. 'To To the extent' is is vital here ... there are sentences where because ""... where substitutivity fails at the surface level, but which which are nevertheless nevertheless de re." re" (Burge (Burge 1977: 1977: 341) 341) - in the sense of being about a particular res. res. In fact, not only the conversational substitutivity, but also the substitutivity of substitutivity salva veritate has to rely on a certain degree of context-dependence. This context-dependence is by now a standard feature of dynamic semantic theories (see Chapter 8 on DRT) and accounts of of attitude ascription (see Richard 1995; 1995; Soames 1995). 1995). That is not to say that it does not cause problems. The degree of this semanticization of contextual information still poses problems for the latter (see Soames 1995: 1995: 540) and requires a theory - perhaps the theory of degrees of MoPs from Section 4.2 below. In brief, the goal of the semantic-pragmatic analysis analysis is not to specity specify conditions under which which '~ "A believes that p" is synonymous synonymous with "A "A believes that q", neither is it to produce a principle of substitution for oblique constructions to replace Leibniz's Law. Law. The data is constituted by an belief and a report on a belief, rather than by a pair of belief expression of belief belief reports which differ differ with with respect to the form, but not reference, reference, of the expression in the subject position of the embedded sentence. It also has to be emphasized that the expression which of which leads to options of interpretation interpretation need not be in the subject position of the embedded sentence. Sentences (19) (19) and (20) (20) yield to the de re/de re/de dicto duality of of reading equally easily:

(19)

Ralph believes that he can see Ortcutt.

(20)

Ralph believes that Jane and Mary met at John's.

Hence, defining the puzzle in syntactic terms is overly confining. preoccupation with Tarski's theory of This confinement stems out of the preoccupation of meaning and truth (see Platts 1979; 1979; Wojcicki Wqjcicki 1994) and the conviction that the structure and properties of neat and regular formal languages open a window for an analysis of unorderly and fuzzy natural languages. The structure of sentences of both types of languages is delineated by the distinction between predicates and their arguments. Sentences are composed composed of, first of all, predicates predicates and arguments. arguments. Predicates Predicates take a certain number of arguments, and arguments are realized as logical variables or constants constants

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that stand for objects. Further, they are also composed of quantifiers quantifiers and 20 2o connectives. connectives. The theory of truth of the sentence relies on the correspondence correspondence of the sentence with reality. reality. This theory is the basis of the theory of meaning. Truth defined for a particular particular formal formal language is a point of departure for a semantic analysis of truth: a sentence p of a language L is true iff iff it is the case that P, P, where where P is the translation of of/?p from L into a metalanguage ML which which is is at least as rich as L. L. This is is Tarski's Tarski's Convention T (cf. (cf. Tarski Tarski 1933, 1933, 1944; 1944; Wojcicki Wqjcicki 1994: 1994: 430). Now, formal languages differ differ significantly from a natural language such as English. They are extensional in that the meaning of the terms can be identified with their referents and hence substitutivity of coreferentials coreferentials is truth-preserving, it preserves the logical value (truth or falsity) ofthe of the sentence. In natural languages, the sense (or meaning) of an expression depends on the context of utterance. This meaning can sometimes be vague or underdetermined, as was discussed at length in Chapter Chapter 1.1.In Inaddition, addition,natural natural languages can be used self-reflexively, for talking about themselves. themselves. As a result of these characteristics, the syntax of formal languages is useful for the analysis of English and other natural languages only to a certain extent. There is meaning that can be reached only through an analysis of mental states: beliefs, desires, or intentions. Context-dependence plus (or: including) meaning derived from what is 'in the head' have been frequently dubbed by logicians logical pragmatics and ignored as inaccessible, not yielding to any formal analysis. analysis. Philosophers of language in the Fregean and neo-Fregean tradition made significant progress by assigning an important role to sense or MoP. But even then context in the wide sense of a situation was not assigned a clear semantic role. This role of MoP is the topic of Section 4.2. By vindicating mental states to the role of a component of semantic theory, logical pragmatics becomes an overly coarsely-grained coarsely-grained term. It becomes evident that it comprises in fact two separate stages of utterance interpretation: (a) part of sentence meaning in the theory of Default Semantics as sketched in Chapter Chapter 2, and (b) implicatures. implicatures. This state-of-the-art thatTarski's is not a departure from Tarski's semantics, though. It means rather that Tarski's theory of meaning and truth is assigned a more appropriate, albeit more modest (and ever decreasing), place and role. It is so because the point of departure of semantic analysis analysis is not language and its reflection of reality, but rather representations that belong to the language user and the way way these 20 20

On the preference for generalized generalized quantifiers see Barwise Barwise and Cooper 1981; 1981; Neale 1990, 1990, and Kamp and Reyle 1993.

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representations reflect reality. language is modest: reality. In this account, the role of oflanguage it is one of the vehicles of thought. And if language shapes representations, representations, then it moulds our understanding of the reality in the Whorfian sense (see Whorf 1956: 214; 214; Gumperz and Levinson 1996: 21)?1 21).21 But this is a separate separate Whorf topic discussed in Chapter Chapter 6.

4.2. Whose Meaning? Meaning? On Sense and and Mode of Presentation 4.2.1. In Defence Defence of 4.2.1. of Speaker-Dependent Speaker-Dependent Senses

always see things under an aspect. The famous famous duck-rabbit figure People always (cf. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein 1953: 194) is the best example of this feature of our perception. 1953:194) of the drawing, The intentional object of our seeing is either the 'duck aspect' aspect'of (cf. Searle 1983: 52). The same concerns beliefs beliefs and or its 'rabbit aspect' (cf. We always believe something other mental states. We something under an aspect. As was established in Section 3.2, propositional attitudes have have content, or Mop, MoP, which differs from their object. It was noted that two mental states can allegedly have the same content but different different objects as in the case of of indexical expressions but that this case will not interest us here because this approach to indexicals is not totally satisfactory satisfactory and because in the present approach content that one linguistic analysis we want to look at the differences in content expression can bring about to the content of the belief belief. In other words, we shall confine confine the study to MoPs of a referent, or concepts associated with a single referent. referent. The first question to ask is whether whether the speaker's MoPs can be known known by the intersubjective. For Frege, they are and they are hearer, i.e. whether they are intersubjective. called senses. The sense of a sentence is that part of its meaning meaning that determines its truth value; value; reference alone does not suffice. It is the way in which the referent is given, known, to the speaker (cf given, or known, (cf. Evans Evans 1981). So, sentences have have both reference and sense. Reference is equivalent equivalent to So, extension and sense is a way of thinking about the referent, or its intersubjective MoP. MoP. As a result, there is a representation of the object in the speaker's mind. According to the compositionality principle, principle, the hearer has to determine the sense of each word in a sentence. sentence. In extensional extensional contexts, the reference of a proper name, for example, is the object designated by using it. Speakers also have subjective ideas associated with the use of proper subjective idea nor the object; it is somewhere names. But sense is neither a subjective 21

21

Cf.: Cf.: "We are thus introduced to a new principle principle of relativity, which holds that all observers are not led by the same physical evidence to the same picture of the universe, universe. unless their linguistic backgrounds are similar, Whorf (1956: 214). similar, or can in some way way be calibrated." (1956: 214).

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in-between and is an objective MoP attached attached to the object. Sense does not vary from context context to context. According to Dummett's interpretation, it is a property of a word itself (cf. (cf. Dummett 1973: 1973: 268). Since sense is a property of of the word, it does not vary from speaker to speaker. Instead, speakers have representations or ideas. And, as Frege clearly private 'replicas' of senses, their representations private'replicas'of impossible to compare compare the images of sense (or: ideas) of two warns, it is impossible different different people. Every representation (Vorstellung) (Vorstellung) has one owner, and no two people have the same representation (Frege 1918-19: 1918-19: 42; 19l8-l9a: 1918-19a: 335). One word may have different different senses and there are three degrees to which words differ from one another: they may differ differ in ideas, sense, or sense and may differ reference. So, So, it is possible for two expressions to have the same referent but differ differ in sense. Coreferential expressions cannot be substituted in some contexts precisely because of this difference. In Frege's words, sense, or thought, usually becomes the (indirect) reference in such constructions. Thoughts are complex and not very clear entities but they seem to be objective in that they can 'inhabit' various people's minds:

""... ... thoughts are neither things in the external world nor ideas. A recognized:' third realm must be recognized." Frege (19l8-l9a: (1918-19a: 336-7).

They are objective objective correlates of representations, or objective meanings in the head, essentially similar to those advocated advocated later by Fodor (1981). (1981). They are the objective content of thinking and can be shared shared by several thinkers. On the Fregean semantics, attitudes are relations to propositions propositions which are abstract entities that have truth conditions conditions and constitute extralinguistic, abstract contents of of attitudes (cf. (cf. Schiffer Schiffer 1982: 1982: 137). 137). It is difficult difficult to reconcile this picture with an account of belief as a relation to some internal representation ofthe of the believer's. The notion of sense would have to be individualized, individualized, objective sense will not do. do. But it has to be remembered that people can share MoPs; MoPs are conditioned by language, society, circumstances, and mental background. Hence, they are not entirely subjective. subjective. On the other hand, MoPs can, so to speak, 'attach themselves to wrong objects' in the case of referential speak,'attach mistakes. For both these reasons, Frege's sense has to be made more finely-grained and more speaker-oriented to be useful in semantic theory finely-grained is, given a sample of of conversation where and theory of communication. As it is, a report must be made on somebody's belief, the notion of sense proves to be a non-starter. Substitution of referring terms performed in conversation is a problem linguistic problem which can and should should be approached with respect to the linguistic practice of how people normally do it, not merely with respect to Leibniz's Law and substitutivity salva veritate. veritate. And in order to know how people commonly understand a sentence structure corresponding to reports on

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attitudes, attitudes, we require a theory of interpretation interpretation that accounts accounts for the relative priority of available interpretations. interpretations. This is where intentions fit in and where the theory of Default Semantics sketched in Chapter Chapter 2 is required. required. precedent for a To sum up, Frege's Frege's theory of sense could not be a direct precedent theory of attitude attitude ascription ascription for at least one basic reason. It concerns concerns substitutivity salva veritate and ignores the cases of referential mistakes or using the same name without preserving sense or reference reference between the belief and the report. In order to incorporate these cases, expression expression of belief we need a believer-oriented approach approach rather than the language-oriented language-oriented one. possible of the linguistic to In other other words, we we have to reduce as much as possible the psychological. psychological. Referential mistakes were not interesting for Frege. Although he says that the verbal expression of thought is incomplete and must be supplemented by the specification of context, the procedure of recovering sense with which the speaker used the expression is not provided. Presumably, Presumably, Frege sees way the role of context as a source of further information information concerning the way in which the referent is given given to the speaker or holder of the attitude, rather than as a source of information information for the assignment of reference reference to the expression expression by the hearer. There is is one further obstacle to the proper proper treatment of context. In Frege's account, the specification of the speaker, time and place of utterance, audience, subordinate to one vehicle audience, and other other parameters parameters is is subordinate of thought, namely namely language. The uttered proper name, e.g. 'Smith', is the attitude has to select starting starting point on the basis of which the reporter on the attitude select the MoP of the referent. referent. But would it mean that uttering 'Smith' can be say, associated associated with a certain way way of picking out a person who is in fact, say, Bernard 1. and 'Smith' be said to be substitutable salva J. Ortcutt? Can 'Ortcutt' 'Ortcutt'and veritate once the referential referential mistake of the believer's has been revealed? Even if so, it is an uninteresting question. It only serves as an illustration illustration of the point that binding senses to referents referents is overly overly restrictive. restrictive. If one continued to use Frege's theory having having located located such instances as the one above, one would have to say say that the reporter reporter may use the name 'Smith' in his report although although he knows that the believer meant Ortcutt. Frege says that the sense of the belief expression often becomes the reference reference of the report. But the sense is is tied to the referent and there is is no principle that would guide the change of the proper name from 'Smith' to 'Ortcutt'. Moreover, trading off ofT reference for sense is not what people do in practice. Firstly, the rule for substituting 'Ortcutt' for 'Smith' cannot come from Frege's theory, 'Smith'cannot theory, and neither can the rule which which makes the believer use the name 'Smith' to mean Ortcutt. Secondly, there are belief expressions and belief reports where sense is not relevant and preserving sense is not a necessary condition for the report to be successful; de re re beliefs are the best proof proof of this. In the case of de re beliefs, no reference reference to MoP is needed. The reporter has no difficulty, difficulty, so to speak, in recognizing who the believer spoke about. Finally. confining Finally, confining

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the analysis to one vehicle of thought, namely language, seems to be the over-arching source of Frege's problems. Language is neither the unique, nor the epistemologically epistemologically prior carrier of thought, albeit perhaps it is the most important one. Let us take stock. Frege held the view that proper proper names, demonstratives, demonstratives, and other indexical singular terms are descriptional, descriptional, i.e. they have sense. Sense has three roles to play. It is a conceptual Mop, MoP, a way of securing a referent, as well as an informational value of the expression. This view has been challenged since the mid 1960s by many defenders of direct reference such as Donnellan, Kaplan, Kripke, Putnam and others (see Salmon 1986: 65). For instance, a version of Putnam's Twin-Earth Twin-Earth argument discussed in Chapter 3 demonstrates that the conceptual conceptual content is not the total meaning of proper names. The next question to ask is whether there are objective senses at all. Salmon (1986: 121) theory, in using a name, the reporter 121) argues that, in Fregean theory, refers to his or her own sense or MoP. MoP. But this does not seem to be correct. intersubjective senses. We refer to our MoPs only if we take them to be intersubjective This is confirmed by the presence of the communicative, informative and acknowledged in Default referential intention present in communication and acknowledged intersubjectiviry is also in agreement with common sense Semantics. This intersubjectivity intuitions concerning the practice of discourse. The intended meaning is successfully because of the presumption of this intersubjectivity. conveyed successfully But frequently, there is no 'typical', 'conventional' sense attached to an object. Sense varies intersubjectively. This seems to be the main drawback of Frege's proposal. There are two obvious ways out of it. Either we bind sense to the speakers and hearers rather than objects, objects, or we bind it to objects but allow for context-dependence of reference (cf. (cf. Anduschus 1997). Since Frege made difficult to assess his view. He talked only cursory remarks on context, it is difficult about context in his discussion of connections between thoughts and how thoughts can affect affect one another (Frege 1892). 1892). But later on, sense as a way way of thinking about an object was developed as a more detailed account of of context e.g. by Forbes (1990; (1990; for criticism see Crimmins 1993 1993 and Richard 1993. See also Forbes 1997 1997 on logophor). Forbes says that people receive re information and their operating system creates a dossier where this de re information is added. This idea seems information is held and where further information to be akin to dynamic semantic theories such as DRT (Kamp and Reyle 1993 1988) which take the and Chapter 7) and File Change Semantics (Heim 1988) contribution of contribution of context to semantics much further thanks to the idea of pragmatic intrusionism and context- updating. However, instead of making heavily context-dependent, we should make the notion of sense more reference heavily flexible. flexible. Firstly, it is a device used by speakers and hearers to arrive at correct referents and it should remain as such. Secondly, Secondly, its objectivity is a matter of degree. It is shared by speakers insofar as language is shared and

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conventions of social behaviour including linguistic behaviour are shared. shared. They are shared while also allowing for idiosyncrasies, individualism, unpredictability and creativity. put it in terms of the Default Semantics unpredictability creativity. To To put of Chapter 2, while while there are default interpretations, these defaults can be overridden overridden when the situation gives gives us clues to do so. All in all, there have been numerous attacks on Frege's notion of sense from truth-conditional semantics and direct reference. reference. The main the front of truth-conditional referent, it is supposed drawback of sense seems to be that sense is tied to the referent, supposed referent, but no way way back from reference reference to sense is admitted. to determine the referent, Now, in utterance interpretation, there are no objective senses that fix a referent. There are subjective MoPs that may even be mistaken. This was not Frege's concern and Frege's theory of sense and reference should not be stretched to account for utterance interpretation. The concern in truth-preserving substitutivity leaves leaves aside the whole range of situations in conversation conversation where substitutions are made in reports and go through unnoticed, irrespective of the consent or its lack on the part of the believer. simply means that It seems that neo-Fregeanism neo-Fregeanism in semantics and pragmatics simply there is a need for some mental representations that would fix fix the reference reference in problematic constructions. The role of the speaker of a belief report is reference rather than sense. Sameness of sense seems to be a to preserve reference sufficient condition for substitution of coreferentials but it is not a necessary sufficient one. Sense may be a useful device to talk about such qualitative differences differences as that between the Morning Star and the Evening Evening Star on the one hand, different when and Venus on the other. The situation is different when there is an unspecified knowing who Ortcutt is, referent such as, on one reading of Situation B, B, not knowing is, or not knowing the name of the object of belief as it may be the case in Situation A. Frege's account is too general: in Situation A, the name 'Ortcutt' in John's sentence has to have the sense of 'the man in the brown hat' of Ralph's Now, sameness expression as reference in order for the report to be true. Now, sufficient, is not necessary for substitutivity. There are other of sense, although sufficient, relying on sameness of of types of cases of attitude ascription than merely those relying sense, i.e. sameness of the way of identifying the referent. referent. It is obvious that some version of sense or its psychological equivalent is needed to account for belief reports and whatever it is, it plays a role in the semantics of these constructions. way, and not constructions. But Frege's sense is too restricted in one way, sufficiently sufficiently pliable in another. It cannot be more or less finely-grained, neither can it be speaker or believer-oriented, with its binding to the referent sacrificed. MoPs, mental correlates of sense, have been extensively extensively tried for this role, mainly with an aim to preserve the compositionality of semantics. So, So, the main objection to Frege's senses comes from their being too finely-tuned. perfectly possible to form a correct report on somebody's finely-tuned. It is perfectly belie( I shall belief without preserving the original MoP of the holder of the belief. belief repeated objection (see e.g. Richard 1997: 203) now deal with this often repeated

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Schiffer's account of types of MoPs. Here the by presenting my development of of Schiffer's priority of the de re reading of belief expressions and reports seems a plausible surmise. If If senses can be as finely-grained as is required, they can also be ignored agreement with the Default Semantics, ignored when required. In agreement Semantics, as long as there is no evidence to the contrary, reference will do. contrary, preserving reference do. But this cannot be achieved in Frege's theory in which, so to speak, de dicto is the reference; no suspension default. It is a default in that sense is always always a route to reference; of of sense is allowed. In this respect, conversational routines lie outside Frege's we want domain, they require a speaker-oriented approach. approach. 22 In other words, we specification to know how to extract sense only when sense is necessary for the specification of the referent.

1j;pes of Default Semantics 4.2.2. Types of Modes of of Presentation and and Default

My solution to the lack of pliability and orientation to speakers of Fregean notion of sense is an elaboration of Schiffer's Schiffer's idea of the type of MoP. This account account was first introduced in laszczolt Jaszczolt (1998a). (1998a). It can be best summed up as a further voice in the discussion between Schiffer Schiffer (1992, 1995a, 1996) (1995,1996) 1996) concerning the hidden-indexical theory of meaning and Ludlow (1995, of of belief reports. The first of the main problems mentioned by Schiffer Schiffer is the so-called so-called meaning-intention discussion on that meaning-intention problem. I shall focus this discussion problem. According to the hidden-indexical theory, theory, belief reports of the form (3) contain an unarticulated, hidden constituent whose content is in (3) established by the practice of discourse interpretation. (3)

A believes that B cps.

different semantic role to MoP than The hidden-indexical theory assigns a different the Fregean solution of substituting substituting sense for reference in attitude reports. Fregean solution theory, the embedded sentence refers to the same According to the theory, proposition as does the same sentence when unembedded. The proposition proposition proposition is the same, but the belief report also contains an unarticulated constituent. This constituent is a way of thinking about the proposition, a way way which is implicitly referred to. to. So, So, the proposition expressed expressed is the same, but the 22 22 Nota bene, bene, Cohen (1962: (1962: 13-14) argues in favour of a temporal concept concept of meaning. The meanings a word expresses are historical phenomena and one does not need the Fregean concept of eternal meaning and objective sense. Similarly, Similarly, semantics is temporal: language should be seen as a combination of events and states rather than a system of rules. Then various sources of of information can be taken into consideration in order to deal with non-extensional contexts.

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price to pay is compositionality ofthe of the expressions of the type type (3): no successful syntactic equivalent of the unarticulated constituent has been proposed proposed to date. I suggest that only on some occasions of use belief reports of this form form contain a hidden constituent. constituent. Only when the identification of the referent poses a problem for the hearer way the referent hearer does the hearer resort to the way is given to the speaker. An external justification of the restricted restricted role of this constituent comes from the default semantics and the proposal of salient interpretations interpretations based on the degrees of intentions in communication, communication, as developed in Chapter 2. As was discussed in Section 4.1, 4.1, belief ascriptions are infamous for not conforming to the compositional compositional theory of meaning and truth. In order to vindicate compositionality, one has to demonstrate that sentences sentences expressing reports on beliefs beliefs have a logical form which which makes their meaning compositional. And this is where where hidden indices indices fit fit in. Schiffer Schiffer (1977, 1992) suggests that if natural languages have belief have a compositional semantics, then belief reports require a hidden-indexical theory. theory. His version version ofthe of the theory theory is based on the tenet that believing is a three-place relation of the form Bel Bel (x, p, m) where 'x' stands for for the believer, 'p' is is the structured structured proposition, proposition, and 'm' the MoP believes p. In agreement with Frege, the MoP of a proposition under which x believes/?. proposition proposition is determined determined by the MoPs of the objects and properties properties of the proposition which as well as by the place they occupy in the structure of the sentence by which the proposition is expressed. So, So, for example, example, sentence (21) (21) has the logical (22), where where <1>* O* is "an implicitly referred to and contextually form as in (22), contextually determined type type of mode of presentation" (Schiffer (Schiffer 1992: 1992: 503), a property of MoPs. of (21)

Ralph believes that Fido is a dog.

(22)

(, doghood>, m» m)) (3m) (*m

*m essentially O*m essentially resembles Crimmins and Perry's (1989) and Crimmins's Crimmins's (1992a) notion, notion, an unarticulated constituent of the proposition and a mental representation of an object, and Kaplan's (1989a) thinking (1989a) character, a way way ofthinking about an entity. But Schiffer's SchifFer's version has one advantage that makes it 23 more resistant to objections. Namely, Namely, it introduces the idea of types types of MoPs. MoPs.23 The MoP to which reference is made varies from utterance to utterance and is functionally as follows: defined functionally follows: 23 23 This improvement Crimmins and improvement is very important. Cf. Clapp's (1995: 552, fn fn 27) criticism of Crimmins Perry's (1989) notions and ideas, where, by analogy analogy to notions, ideas are mental representations representations relations: of n-ary relations: ""... ... it is incorrect to interpret ordinary speakers uttering ordinary attitude ascriptions ascriptions as 'tacitly referring' to anything like particular particular notions and ideas." ideasr

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""... ... a mode of presentation presentation of an object or property is whatever can propositional mode of presentation, play a role in determining a prepositional presentation, presentation is whatever can play and a propositional mode of presentation belief the role defined by the mode-of-presentation place in the belief relation:' Schiffer relation." Schiffer (1995a:108). reporter on a belief may merely know the type of MoP under which the The reporter believer holds the belief. Schiffer Schiffer (1995a: 113) 113) also claims that sometimes the speaker makes vague (indeterminate) reference to several possible, contextually relevant, types of MoPs that are available to the speaker and Now, the problem of of the hearer and of which they are mutually aware. Now, not intend to refer to meaning-intention is as follows. Belief ascribers may not MoPs, and, on the other hand, it may be the case that no one MoP is sufficiently sufficiently salient to be referred to and to be taken by the hearer to be referred to by the speaker. speaker.24 But the story seems to require some tightening at this point. Schiffer Schiffer says that the types of MoP constitute a scale from referring uniquely to a MoP to indicating merely that the speaker believes a proposition proposition under some unspecified MoP. The middle cases include the situations where the reporter refers to the types that do not uniquely determine a MoP. There is no further specification in Schiffer's Schiffer's exposition as to what these intermediate cases are, neither is there any clarification as to how this scale is rendered in natural language. Once an attempt is made to demonstrate this, it can be seen that the device elaborated by Schiffer Schiffer is too finely-tuned. There are situations in which preserving the believer's MoP or even one of the MoPs mutually available to the speaker and the hearer is unnecessary for the report to be successful. These are the cases where referring is performed in an unproblematic, socially accepted accepted and socially recognized way which I call 'default referring' and 'default interpretation' in accordance accordance with the Default Semantics of Chapter Chapter 2 and laszczolt Jaszczolt 1999. 1999. In other words, when there is no evidence to the contrary, the MoP need not be considered considered normally, by default, by the reporter of a belief sentence. In other words again, normally, the type of MoP assumes the value zero as a constituent of the logical form. interpretation This classification in the order of priority or markedness in interpretation seems to be a necessary supplement to types of MoPs and conforms to the requirement of the gradation of their 'fineness of grain'. This gradation gradation of fineness of the MoP is a suggestion for discourse Mop, including the value interpretation interpretation but at the same time such types of MoP, propositional attitude expressions. As zero, contribute to the semantics of propositional was demonstrated demonstrated in Chapter Chapter 2, the theory of meaning has to be compatible with the theory of discourse interpretation. It constitutes its core by providing 24 24

287. Cf. here Schiffer's Schiffer's example in 1994: 1994: 287.

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interpretation which is only overridden particular contextual the default interpretation overridden when particular information indicates that this departure departure from the default is indeed the case. To repeat, this postulate postulate of conversational defaults defaults is derived from an account of the workings of intentions in communication. As a result, the MoP of the referent is utilized to different different degrees for the interpretation of reports on beliefs. And, as an additional bonus, this gradation may shed some light involves on the problem of the logical form of belief reports. This problem also involves the issue of adicity, i.e. the question of the number of arguments required by belief predicate, which I shall come to later on. the belief All in all, the hearer of an expression of belief frequently is in a position to utter only sentences of the type in (23) (23) and (24) and other variations along these lines (cf. (cf. Ludlow 1995: 1995: 105): (23)

Ralph believes, in a sense, sense, that Fido is a dog.

(24)

Ralph believes, so to speak, that Fido is a dog.

The hedging devices such as 'in a sense', 'in effect' effect' signal that something went referring and, according to the reporter on the belief, the default wrong with referring may not hold. So, So, the logical form of a belief report is said to contain a constituent ... under the mode of presentation m". In spite of its superficial constituent ""... artificiality, this device is neither awkward, awkward, nor counterintuitive. counterintuitive. In English, hedges such as "so to speak", "in a sense", "something to the effect", "but he calls him 'y'" 'y'" are not uncommon and although such natural-language equivalents of this constituent do not correspond correspond bi-uniquely to the types of modes, they perform their job job sufficiently sufficiently well in discourse. The only problem is to decide how detailed m should be to fulfil fulfil its role. Schiffer Schiffer observes that MoP is too strong, too finely-tuned a device as a hidden constituent of belief reports. His example quoted here as (25) demonstrates that there may be more than one MoP of Madonna or musicality involved in this proposition. proposition. (25)

Everyone who has ever known her has believed that Madonna was musical.

of (from (from Schiffer Schiffer 1992: 507).25 507).25 However, Schiffer Schiffer fails to observe that types of MoPs are also too finely-grained for instance for the cases in (23) (23) and (24). After all, MoPs are functionally defined and are there to play a functional After 25 25 On the other hand, this sentence with a universal universal quantifier quantifier isisnot not aa good good example. example.ItItisisrelatively relatively various MoPs: 'For all xs such that an .v x knows easy to demonstrate that it can distribute distribute over various knows Madonna Madonna there is a MoP of Madonna and a MoP of musicality such that x believes that Madonna is musical under this MoP.'

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role in utterance interpretation. Where they are not needed, MoPs should not figure. Where only some parts of MoPs are semantically relevant, only these parts should figure. In Soames's words (1995: (1995: 524), applied to singular terms, this means that "The challenge is is to develop a theory in which Russellian truth conditions conditions are assigned to attitude ascriptions in certain contexts ((...), ...), while while non-Russellian truth conditions are assigned to ascriptions in other contexts, thereby vindicating the Fregean intuition that substitution of coreferential coreferential singular terms is not always guaranteed to preserve truth value." Definite descriptions are a much less contentious subject of this contextdependence. Postulating the MoP or the type of MoP as an argument in the believing relation has to be compatible with the theory of discourse interpretation applied to expressions of propositional propositional attitude. And the practice of discourse interpretation seems to suggest that an appeal to interpretation MoP (Schiffer's m) rri) or *m O*ra is made when the default, default, standard, socially accepted referring is not the case and additional additional information has to be provided in the report for the benefit of the hearer. So, So, if types of MoPs are not always always required, perhaps we we should appeal to a coarser-grained device of meta-types in order to allow for the non-existence of MoP (or its value zero) in the semantics of the report. To To sum up, the reasons for this are as follows. follows. Firstly, speakers may not be aware of referring to any MoPs, and perhaps all they can be aware of is whether their belief is de re or de die to. In other dicto. words, the speaker may be talking about the particular individual known to him or her in one way way or another, or may be just subscribing to the proposition. Similarly, Similarly, the hearer may construct the belief report as de dieto dicto or de re, re, supplementing this distinction with the information of any referential mistakes that the speaker may have committed. Secondly, Secondly, discourse is governed by a principle of economy according to which information is conveyed by the speaker in the form which requires minimal processing effort effort from the hearer for the purpose at hand. In other words, utterance interpretation adheres to the balance of cost (processing effort) effort) and effects effects (information, cognitive benefits), as suggested by Grice's maxims and in particular particular (in the above form) by the theory of relevance of Sperber and Wilson (1986a). (1986a). So, So, in order to accommodate accommodate the cases where the MoP is not relevant, relevant, we need some sort of a coarsely-grained device of meta-types of modes of presentation, defined functionally for belief reports. They are required because when MoP is irrelevant or non-existent, the hidden index in the logical form of belief belief reports has the value 0. O. It is difficult difficult to assign this value to types types of MoPs directly, it is much easier to do so when the

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gradation gradation of the fineness of grain is shown to go in tandem with the gradation gradation of the departure departure from the default. The types become meta-types of the fineness of of grain. grain. Now, the only interesting difference difference between the competing competing MoPs of a proposition hinges on referring referring and will concern the MoP of individuals proposition properties or propositions. Naturally, Naturally, the MoP of the rather than MoPs of properties rather proposition, compositionally proposition, compositionally calculated, will be affected, in accordance accordance with Frege's principle of compositionality. So, So, the coarsely-grained coarsely-grained distinction distinction leaves us with the choice between (a) referring referring uncontroversially to an individual; (b) referring referring to an individual referential mistake, individual and committing a referential e.g. referring referring to Fido while meaning Toby, or referring to Fido only on some 26 occasions, twilight;26 and (c) occasions, e.g. when Fido appears in the dusk twilight; (c) referring 27 27 to whoever/whatever the expression used to refer picks out correctly. These meta-types have the advantage of corresponding corresponding directly, directly, although not bi-uniquely, to the strategies in reporting on beliefs. In the situation (a), reporter says something of the type in (26). In (b), the report resembles the reporter (27) and (28), and in (c), the reporter utters a sentence of the type (29), (30) or uses similar strategies to these two: (26)

Ralph believes that Fido is a dog.

(27)

Ralph believes that Toby thinks he is called Fido. Toby is a dog but thinks

(28)

Ralph believes and does not believe that Fido is a dog, depending on the circumstances.

(29)

effect that Fido is a dog. Ralph believes something to the effect

(30)

Ralph believes that some creature or other called Fido is a dog.

These are, naturally, naturally, only approximate examples of the strategies the hearer can use and it also has to be borne in mind that the notorious overlap overlap between these strategies is an empirical fact: whether Ralph's belief is about particular dog or not, the reporter may may use the same words in both cases a particular to report separate issue. report on it. This is, however, a separate We should either accept Now, the problem with the logical form is this. We accept the hidden-indexical theory of belief reports and admit the MoP of the proposition (22), or not allocate MoP proposition believed into the logical form as in (22), 26 26

In accordance re, de dicto, dicto, and de re about accordance with my distinction between de re, aboutsomeone someone else. else. See See also also laszczolt Jaszczolt 1997a and Section 4.3 below. 27 27 To To repeat, the term 'referring expression' is avoided here as I advocate a unitary pragmatic account of proper names and definite descriptions as expressions that can be used to refer. Direct referentiality is merely tangential tangential to the present concern. The topic is attended to in more detail in Chapter 5.

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any semantic semantic role and perhaps perhaps admit that belief belief reports express a two-place two-place relation between the believer and the proposition proposition expressed. expressed.28 Moreover, if one accepts the hidden-indexical theory of belief reports, one is bound definite descriptions and perhaps to accept the hidden-indexical theory of definite indexicals, i.e. regard also the hidden-indexical hidden-indexical description theory of indexicals, indexicals as disguised incomplete descriptions. descriptions.29 It seems, however, that these problems of choice would disappear if we ceased to regard direct reference and hidden-indexicality as complementary options but rather saw them as points on a scale. The continuity represented represented by the scale is guaranteed by the fact that the referential intention can be present present to a greater guaranteed or lesser extent in a particular communicative act. This proposal of varying fineness of grain of MoP and its varying varying logical form has certain certain affinities affinities with that of Ludlow's. relevance for the logical Ludlow's. Ludlow (1995) correctly correctly remarks that the reporter reporter does not normally know the MoP of the reported belief but may merely know that the believer holds two seemingly of seemingly inconsistent beliefs and explain this fact by the presence of different MoPs of the individual in the beliefs. two different beliefs. This is often as far as the reporter reporter can reach. So, So, the contextually determined determined kind <1>* * O* that corresponds coarsely-grained functionally with respect coarsely-grained and defined functionally respect to the naturalnaturallanguage reports that it is capable of explaining. explaining. The role of <1>*m
Cf. Schiffer Schiffer (1995a: 128) for the problem with sentences sentences of the type "Ralph "Ralph believes believes that no is a groundhog". woodchuck is 29 29 Schiffer Schiffer (l995a: (1995a: 117-118) suggests suggests that "he" is synonymous synonymous with with "the male" and obeys obeys the hidden-indexical theory of descriptions. descriptions.

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are of little explanatory power. The presence of hedges indicates indicates explicitly that the default interpretation interpretation is not the case and that, for instance, the definite description description is not to be interpreted interpreted referentially. referentially. Hedges also indicate that MoP is not a default constituent belief indicate constituent of the logical form of belief reports. In default interpretations, interpretations, MoP need not be preserved. preserved. Ludlow (1996) suggests that the debate as to the adicity of 'believes' may be beside the point: whether there are two or three arguments, the theory goes through unharmed. suggestion seems to be correct. The adicity is a unharmed. This suggestion decision as to the semantic status of MoPs, i.e. their matter of theoretical decision role in semantic semantic theory. The MoP need not always always be regarded regarded as an argument in the believing relation: the meta-types include the de re re reading of reports, and in the case of the de re reading, the MoP is irrelevant for the semantics. semantics. When the MoP does not contribute to truth conditions, then postulating dissenting from Grice's Grice's MOR and from from it as an argument would mean dissenting any methodologically plausible theory of utterance interpretation. The presence of the MoP would involve greater processing effort effort on the part of the hearer and result in no additional benefit. In those cases, referring unaffected by m. m. is unaffected hidden-indexical theory's logical form problem that The solution to the hidden-indexical postulates the meta-types meta-types that can take the value value zero as in the case of de re readings seems to be the most plausible one thanks thanks to the support it acquires from the theory of intentions and Default Semantics, as well as proposals.'In sense','so speak'and any other post-Gricean proposals. 'In a sense', 'so to speak' and other discourse markers are hedging devices that act as adverbials but also imply that there is a way of believing which, which, when expressed in the report, would make make the believer assent to that report. So, So, m may be an implicated adverb, adverb, implicated by an 'implicature' that contributes contributes to the truth conditions of the expression, be it Carston's (1988) explicature or Bach's (1994b) impliciture. The hiddencompositional semantics, but indexical theory can be saved and so can compositional the discourse discourse interpretation interpretation has to differentiate differentiate between the MoPs that are the constituents constituents of semantics semantics and the ones that are pragmatic. The problem is engendered by the lack of a bi-unique mapping between the strategies that hearers use to report on what they hear and the interpretations interpretations that correspond to the degrees of intentions in communication. But this fact is not surprising: there is more to natural language than unarticulated unarticulated personalized senses. (1992: 516) realizes that the speaker who says "The A is B" need Schiffer Schiffer (1992: have to have have one particular type of MoP saliently saliently in mind. mind. There may not have types simultaneously simultaneously present. Neither is the reporter to be many such types situation. But Schiffer Schiffer be expected to recover a particular MoP from the situation. does not offer offer a solution, solution, presumably presumably because of the focusing of his theory requiring the on beliefs rather than utterances reporting on them, and requiring remain constant: a fluctuation between adicity of the predicate 'believe' to remain

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a two- and three-place relation is is unwelcome for compositional compositional semantics. semantics. MoPs are of of propositions, individuals individuals and properties that constitute the content of the belief of of and and for the believer. But types of MoPs are not necessarily linguistic entities. They are indeed necessarily indeed functional notions that are defined from the linguistic pragmatic perspective and only as such do they work in the hidden-indexical theory. However, they may pertain of to information which is carried by a non-linguistic vehicle, by one of the other carriers of thought discussed in Chapter Chapter 6. 6. As an additional, additional, 'quantitative' characteristic, types types of MoPs are truly coarsely-grained: they distinguish between what is relevant, what would make the difference difference to *m would. They can be the meaning, and not everything in O*m coarsely-grained because the interpretation interpretation of attitude utterances proceeds proceeds unproblematic reference reference assignment through the most salient, default, unproblematic and only departs from the default, step by step, if there is evidence of of a problematic problematic interpretation. So, So, to have have a belief belief about a thing does does not necessarily mean having a belief under a MoP (pace (pace Schiffer Schiffer 1977: 1977: 65), unless we redefine MoP as (pzeta-)type (meta-)\ype of MoP and allow it to take the value zero. Intentions in communication communication guarantee possibilities of of Intentions guarantee such a gradation gradation of possibilities interpretation. The utterance comes with the communicative intention which frequently includes the referential intention. Since all mental acts are intentional, this referential referential intention is assumed by the hearer to be present, unless the context of utterance specifies otherwise. The overall communicative intention is thus the strongest when the referential referential intention is present and is unimpeded by referential mistakes or referring restricted to several guises such as the dusk twilight. If If the communicative intention includes such an unimpeded referential intention, the belief belief is recovered by the hearer as de re, uncontroversial and this is the default case of utterance re, referring is uncontroversial interpretation. interpretation. The weakened referential intention of the intermediate case gives rise to reports with an incorporated correction of the type as in (27) and (28). (28). The weakest communicative intention does not contain contain the referential intention. I have have been concerned concerned mainly with one of the two problems of the hiddenindexical theory, namely the meaning-intention problem. It is necessary to point out that the other problem that triggered so much discussion, namely 1996; Schiffer the problem of the logical form of belief reports (Ludlow 1995, 1995,1996; Schiffer 1996), cannot cannot be resolved until the meta-types of MoPs are described. In order to argue as to whether m behaves like an argument or an adjunct, one has to decide upon the meaning of of *m. So, So, the two problems for of the hidden-indexical theory can be reduced to one problem of the type type of m and are equally solvable by means of saying what this type is. is. Once we make the type dependent on the principles of discourse interpretation, interpretation, that is to say once we make it sufficiently diaphanous sufficiently finely-grained to be (i) diaphanous

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to the reporter and (ii) (ii) expressible in English, but not overly subtle to distinguish what makes no difference difference to the truth value, the logical form can be allowed to include *m only when *m O*m is required. The meaninghidden-indexical theory subsumes the problem of of intention problem of the hidden-indexical logical form and the solution to the former former is the solution to the the latter: intentions interact with the logical form to produce a unique interpretation. justifY this step of taking Default intentions and departures from the default justify MoP into consideration only when the need for it arises. POL, the principle parsimony of levels of interpretation, in conjunction conjunction with DI and PI that of parsimony theory, account for this move sum up the gradation of intentions in semantic theory, (see Chapter Chapter 2). 1995a) denied the compositionality of propositions and Now, Schiffer Schiffer (1994, (1994,1995a) "... propositions the structural structural supervenience of propositions on that-clauses: thai-clauses:"... are mere shadows of the sentences sentences contained in that-clauses" (1995a: 129), ... noncompositionally-determined noncom positionally-determined hypostatizations of our thatthey are ""... clause-invoking linguistic linguistic and conceptual practices" (ibid.: 128). 128). But this By global denial of compositionality of propositions is not necessary. By arranging utterance interpretations on a scale dictated by the richness of of detail of the propositional MoP, Mop, we we can account for the case of interpretation in which the MoP is not a required constituent of the logical form. At the same time, the theory is unharmed by the change of the adicity of the predicate 'believes' because the referential intention that corresponds corresponds to the 'no MoP' reading is in its default value and the default setting does not require further further justifications. It is only the departure from the default that triggers the justifications. increase of adicity and the gradual increase of the fineness of grain of the fortiori) the type type of the MoP of the referring expression and (perhaps a fortiori) of MoP of the proposition. It can be concluded that (i) the hidden-indexical hidden-indexical theory is psychologically justification of hidden constituents plausible, there is justification constituents that comes from the contribution contribution of intentions to the semantics of belief reports; (ii) (ii) this theory requires meta-types of MoPs. These types are defined functionally for discourse analysis belief analysis and correspond to the three types of readings of belief someone else. They need not be more reports: de re, re, de dicto, dicto, and de re about someone finely-grained; (iii) the types of readings of belief reports correspond to intention the degrees of communicative intention, incorporating a referential intention that also allows for degrees, including the value zero. This role of MoP points out to the default status of the de re re reading. In the de re reading, the role of MoP is negligible negligible for semantics and the degree to which the referential intention contributes to the semantic representation is merely merely nominal: the strength of this intention is assumed. assumed. It is so because semantics is intentional on the one hand, but on the other the context mutually mutually manifest

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to the speaker and the hearer, or the conventions of the use of the name or description make reference sufficiently sufficiently clear for the semantic representation representation to be created?O created.30 Although the variable contribution of MoPs to the semantics is not novel to the hidden-indexical theory, theory, the default values are. In Jacob's Jacob's (1997) version, of belief for example, MoPs also contribute to the semantics semantics belief reports when this is necessary, but Jacob relies on the pragmatic enrichment in attitude necessary, pragmatic ascription ascription (jbid.: (ibid.: 238), in the spirit of Carston (1988) (1988) and Sperber and Wilson (1986a). This enrichment means that the specification of MoPs is left left to the hearer and is not always always necessary for successful communication. So far so good. But his position is difficult difficult to defend as it binds MoPs to referents erroneous assignments assignments of and does not account for referential mistakes and erroneous MoPs. If the referent is the starting point and it is embellished by the specifications of sense, we have put the cart before the horse and lost the very raison detre dletre of sense as a device that helps establish the referent of a linguistic expression - a device on a par with Husserl's noema that helps establish the real object. The remedy is simple. simple. The recognition of the referent is the recognition, there presumption in conversation. conversation. If there are problems problems with its recognition, are contextual pointers towards the individual which/who which/who should be taken as referent in its stead, or there are contextual pointers to the effect effect that nothing or nobody in particular particular was meant. This is, is, in essence, the solution suggested by Default Semantics. Unarticulated constituents, pertaining to MoPs or some meta-types of MoPs, are a way way of articulating these pointers in our semantic semantic metalanguage. metalanguage. There is a final caveat, however. of however. Hidden constituents are only one way way of saying that intentions contribute to the semantic representation to various degrees, depending on the type of reading of the expression. If the latter formulation suffices suffices for the theory of Default Semantics, there may not be any need for the discourse about hidden constituents. Intention recognition hidden-indexical beings do and it seems to be a more explains all that these hidden-indexical economical alternative. Ordinary speakers are rather unlikely unlikely to 'refer' implicitly in attitude reports to types of MoPs, characters, notions, or senses. They intend them. And since the hearer need not know exactly how the speaker intends them, the tri-partite surface distinction into de re, dicto, re, de dicto, and de re about someone someone else is sufficient. Hidden constituents, in order to conform to Occam's figures of Occam' s razor and POL, have to be regarded regarded as figures discourse about intentions and nothing else.

30 30

Cf. also Burge's (1977: 361) 361) suggestion: "Improving on Frege's view of belief belief depends partly on attending to the variety variety of phenomena that he tried to explain with his single idealization, idealization, sense, and partly on recognizing recognizing the fundamental character of de re attitudes."

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4.2.3. 4.2.3. The Persistence of of Sense

In this section I take a closer look at some objections to the semantic role of of sense coming from the camp of direct reference reference theorists, as well as at the way way of reconciling sense with direct reference reference proposed proposed by Recanati (1993). In spite of all the weaknesses, Fregean senses are a useful device in our theory of Default Semantics. They allow for talking about representations of objects as their MoPs, capturing the intuition intuition of default interpretations interpretations through the intersubjectivity of sense, and at the same time the intersubjectivity of language and discourse strategies. And yet, yet, they have frequently been understood as obstacles in semantic theories, notably in the semantics of directly referring expressions. This rejection of senses requires a closer look. ways in which the referent is given to us, they are not Even if senses are ways intentional objects that lead to a referent (cf. (cf. Dummett 1993b: 227). 227). But they have frequently been construed as such objects, and as a result they have have been construed construed as incompatible with referring directly directly by a class of expressions comprising proper names, demonstratives and other indexicals. To To repeat, having an individual individual as a semantic value. value. This attack referring directly means having on senses from the direct referentialists referentialists is unfounded. unfounded. Let us retrace its fragility. Frege argued as follows: follows: (a) If If two terms, say, say,'Cicero' 'Cicero'and and 'Tully' 'Tully'share share the the same same reference, reference, then for sentences of of the form 'X qJs' (/>s' that differ differ only in that 'Cicero' has been replaced by 'Tully', the propositions expressed by them are the same. (b) If If 'C qJs'
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to this reference, 'existence-dependent' (Evans 1981: reference, they are, so to speak, speak,'existence-dependent' 1981: 302). So, So, they can pertain pertain to singular terms as well as to descriptions. descriptions. Fregean Fregean sense need not be an entity which is ""... ... intermediary between ...) something between thinker thinker and referent, ((...) something which must, from a certain certain point of view, get in the way, or anyway render indirect what might be direct. A way of thinking Away thinking of an object object is no more obliged to get in the way of thinking of an object, or to render thinking of an object indirect, than is a way way of dancing liable to get in the way way of dancing, or to render dancing somehow indirect." Evans (1981: 302-303).

Having sense appears to be an advantage for directly referring expressions rather than a hindrance. All expressions expressions that are used to refer can afford afford having Fregean Fregean sense. sense. And considering that all types of expressions that are used to refer to objects may cause in one way or other problems for attitude reports, the distinction between directly referential referential and descriptive terms is less interesting than the contemporary contemporary tradition makes it to be. The notion of sense enters theories of propositional prepositional attitudes in various guises and on different different levels of analysis. Kaplan (1989a) also defends the view that certain expressions, notably demonstratives and indexicals, refer directly without the mediation of Fregean sense because referring expressions have individuals rather than senses as their semantic values (cf. also Recanati 1993; 1993; Barwise and Perry 1983; 1983; Davidson Davidson 1968-69). There are many problems with this view and it can be easily called called into question Firstly, it just seems to make no sense to by common-sense arguments. Firstly, say that a person, animal animal or thing is the semantic semantic value of an expression. expression. For instance, if the holder of the belief that Cicero was an orator orator does of not assent to the claim that Tully was one, the thesis of the identity of truth conditions of the two sentences containing these two names and otherwise identical is seriously undermined. Speaker's intuitions seriously identity. What is said and what is meant conflict with the postulate postulate of such identity. would have to diverge to an unnecessarily great extent and the intuitive reliance of what is meant meant on sentence meaning meaning would be lost. The proposition is believed is dubiously relegated information about how a proposition pragmatics (cf. (cf. Richard Richard 1997: 1997: 202). 202). Now, Now, marrying this to the black box of pragmatics view with the intention-based intention-based semantics developed in Chapter 2, it would 31 mean that people have individuals in their heads.31 Instead, they have representations. representations. People believe that individuals have certain certain properties properties 31 31

Searle (1983: 259) raises similar similar objections. objections. In order for a name to be used to refer it must come with a representation of the object.

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but they always always have some aspectual knowledge of this individual. referring expressions did not require MoPs or senses Secondly, even if referring for their semantics, belief sentences do and these MoPs or senses are senses that do the job that referents alone could not do in intensional contexts. It seems more common-sensical to postulate, so to speak, an idea of a person which is a constituent part of the proposition proposition and corresponds corresponds to Fregean sense, mediated by a subjective subjective idea which which corresponds corresponds to the speaker's MoP of the individual. individual. This picture, congenial to Frege's, allows allows for people's beliefs beliefs to be sometimes sometimes about the world, and sometimes to go astray and be either about their own representations or nobody in someone particular. particular. In other words, it allows for default default de re, re, de re about someone else, and and de dicto. dicto. It seems then that senses or MoPs are rejected in Kaplan's account. account. However, Kaplan introduces introduces the distinction between an expression's content content and character, where the first is the thing that the directly referential expression has as its referent and the latter, introduced briefly above, is understood as sentential meaning. Belief Belief becomes a relation between a understood person, character, and a proposition: propositions are believed 'under' sentential meaning (see also Richard 1983: 173). 173). In other words, the sentential proposition proposition is the content of a belief and meaning is the way way in which the belief is held. Be that as it may, belief may, the way way in which which the belief is held has to whenever it enter at least some of its ascriptions. It has to be specified whenever can cause a mistaken ascription. This is how Fregean sense is revindicated. The importance importance of the manner of believing is also emphasized emphasized in beliefs about oneself, (31): oneself, i.e. beliefs de se reported as in (31): (31)

believes herself to be a genius. Mary believes

belief differs from the belief belief that Mary is a genius reported in (32). For This belief example, in (32), (32), Mary can be reading a novel novel and thinking thinking that the author is a genius, without realizing that she is reading one of her own early novels: (32)

believes that she (Mary) (Mary) is a genius. Mary believes

Or, she may be looking at a reflection of herself in the mirror without realizing that she is looking at an image of herself (although the credibility of this particular particular scenario is somewhat stretched; see also Richard 1983: 1983: 184). 184). In other words, de re re belief ascriptions about oneself do not imply de se ones. The object of the de se belief belief has certain properties for the believer which re belief lacks. So, So, although although reports are made primarily the object of the de re primarily about the content of beliefs, beliefs, the manner in which the belief belief is held can also it. The semantic and the psychological are both be relevant and included in it. relevant (cf. (cf. Richard 1990: 1990: 57). 57). Now, Now, although this particular tradition rejects

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Fregean objective sense and the direct role it plays in the semantics of attitude constructions, constructions, it has to retain something something that would stand in its stead. 32 It seems that it has to be a notion of MoP that appears whenever it is required, that is whenever belief whenever the discrepancies discrepancies in MoPs between the original belief and the situation of reporting on the belief belief may be too great to be neglected Richard (1990) challenges many without harm for the conveyed meaning. Richard prepositional attitude lore. He agrees with Russell that bastions of the propositional attitudes are characterized by what they are about, but also agrees with Frege 33 that the object and properties are insufficient insufficient for characterizing attitudes. attitudes.33 The main challenge is congenial with these launched from many diversified angles and stresses the contribution contribution of context, including intentional states, qbid.: 265-267; Richard to what is said (ibid.: Richard 1995). In particular, particular,

affect the semantic value of a verb ""... ... not only can our intentions affect like 'believes' (by contributing restrictions on how we represent beliefs), but they can affect affect the very syntax of our sentences (by affecting affecting the distribution of quantifiers quantifiers over correlations correlations...)." ...)." Richard (1990: (1990: 266). The mIssmg missing theory of intentions and their recognition recognition has been, it is hoped, supplied by the present theory of Default Semantics. Intentions in communication communication founded on the recognition recognition of intentional states allow for classifying and ordering the possible readings of attitude reports. A detailed classification of these readings, matched with a classification of beliefs and expressions of belief, is presented in Section 4.3.

4.2.4. 4.2.4. Sense-Based Semantics? It was observed in Section 4.2.2 that MoPs are too finely-grained for semantic semantic

purposes and that all that is needed is a device to distinguish between the readings de re, re, de dicto, dicto, and and de re about someone someone else of belief reports. Now, the fact that Fregean senses do not have their semantic correlates is well acknowledged (cf. (cf. Schiffer Schiffer 1982 1982 or Taylor 1995). 1995). Taylor (1995: (1995: 138) 138) says: 32 32

Cf.: day-to-day practice of attitude ascription that could be construed ... there is nothing in our day-to-day ""... similarity of sense, as a basis for our ascriptions. as looking for evidence, for sameness or similarity We just listen and look: If B utters 'Tully say, Tully is tubby' and we think him sincere, sincere, we will say, 'He thinks thinks Tully is tubby'. What does similarity similarity of sense have to do with itT' it?" Richard (1990: 83). 33 33 Instead of Fregean sense, sense, Richard (1990: (1990: 137) 137) uses a match between the speaker's and the believer's 'Russellian annotated annotated matrixes', complexes of the constituents of the sentence and their Russellian interpretations. For a discussion see e.g. Falkenberg 1994 and and Soames 1995. 1995.

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""... ... if we we try to slice public meanings finely enough to correlate differences of meaning with differences of cognitive content ...) content ((...) there turn out to be, in a sense, too many meanings to allow us to make the psychologized Fregean Fregean picture good." In other other words, the content of thought permits much more detail than the linguistic meaning of sentences. We We have managed so far to skip through the problem problem of, of, so to speak, 'grouping' senses under their types by allowing for a significant departure Namely, sense was redefined as departure from Frege. Namely, MoP that is tied to the speaker and that only happens happens to be objective objective in most cases, rather than being objective by definition as Frege stipulated. It 'happens' to be objective because language happens to be a social phenomenon, a shared system, Saussurean langue, langue, used by members of a linguistic community community as a common tool in communication. This amendment to Frege's definition allows for the occurrence occurrence of referential mistakes that are caused by a faulty attachment of a MoP to an entity. It also allows allows for the speech acts which attachment do not make use, or do not make an extensive extensive use, of MoPs. This is the case with de re belief expressions and de re belief reports. De re 'proper' does does not not rely on Mop, MoP, and de re about someone someone else only requires some discourse discourse about MoP for the interpretation of such an expression by the hearer, in order to determine determine the referential mistake. Even then only the fact that the MoP is erroneously attached is relevant, although in practice the hearer will know more. He or she will be in a position to say say what MoP the speaker attached attached to the entity because, in the case of beliefs expressed in language, he or she will know the expression expression which was erroneously erroneously used, e.g. the name 'Ortcutt' for Smith, or the description 'the man in the brown hat' for Smith rather than for Ortcutt, or the description 'the man in the brown hat' for rather the man in the black hat. So, although our MoPs are on the whole too detailed for our semantics, they So, must not be less detailed. Sometimes the semantic representation is sensitive to more detail, at other times to less or none. In other words, apart apart from from binding senses to speakers plus conventions, the other departure from Frege in the present proposal proposal is that the semantics can make use either of MoPs, or make some more general reference to types of MoPs, or no MoPs at all. Now, Recanati (1993) distinguishes between the proposition expressed and the proposition proposition as a semantic content of an utterance. The theoretical background to this is as follows. It has frequently been argued that people background believe singular, Russellian propositions. The way way in which the belief is held, or the MoP of the individual, belief individual, does not belong to the content of our belief 1987; Crimmins 1992a, b). b). Singular propositions are proposed proposed in (Soames 1987; view of the direct referentiality of proper names, indexical indexical expressions and demonstratives: the truth of the proposition expressed by using using them depends on the individual referred to (see Kaplan 1989a, b; Recanati 1993: 135-167; 296-297). So, of So, the meaning of the sentence involves involves the MoP of

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whereas the proposition expressed is singular and involves the referent, whereas involves only the referent. In the case of a sentence with a proper name in the subject position, the proposition expressed is a singular proposition, whereas the semantic content is a so-called quasi-singular proposition, probably better called neoquasi-singular, that includes a so-called linguistic MoP which is truth-conditionally irrelevant. irrelevant. I called it 'neo-quasi-singular' because it differs differs from the quasi-singular proposition that is the content of a corresponding 34 belief as discussed below. below. 34 Recanati is able to make this distinction thanks belief to a magic wand: he introduces a semantic feature 'REF' 'REF' that accompanies directly referential expressions expressions (ibid.: (j.bid.: 26), 26), as well as the distinction between psychological and linguistic MoPs. For him, the MoP pertaining to the meaning. By the same thought differs from the MoP on the level of linguistic meaning. move he reconciles the neo-Fregeans and neo-Russellians: the same proposition is expressed by 'Cicero is bald' and 'Tully Tully is bald' but they are understood under different different MoPs. The proposition expressed is not the complete content of propositional attitude (cf. (cf. ibid.: 36-37). 36-37). The proposition said is singular, but the complete content of the proposition also includes the truth-conditionally irrelevant linguistic linguistic MoP. MoP. The corresponding content of of a belief is a quasi-singular proposition that includes a psychological MoP. The linguistic MoP differs from Frege's psychological MoP used for the contents of thoughts. For example, example, 'he' can have a linguistic MoP "a contextually contextually salient male". In the sentence (33), where 'he' is inadvertently inadvertently used by the speaker to refer to one person in both occurrences of use, the speaker can believe that p and not p under the same linguistic MoP: (33)

He was there, but he wasn't.

(from Schiffer Schiffer 1995b: 1995b: 98). The corresponding thought contains two distinct psychological semantics of belief psychological MoPs. Moreover, in the semantics belief reports, belief where the hidden-indexical theories introduce a third relatum into the belief relation making it a relation between a believer, believer, a singular proposition and a MoP under which the believer believes it, Recanati retains the two-place belief belief relation but makes that-clauses refer to quasi-singular propositions (see 1996). Directly referential terms refer to a referent plus its MoP. also Recanati 1996). This theory suffers from the same difficulty difficulty as the hidden-indexical one?5 one.35 The fact is that the speakers need not refer to MoPs, they need not refer to types types of MoPs either. The hidden-indexical theory at least allows for types 34 34 For the criticism of the idea that the proposition said is the singular proposition see Schiffer Schiffer (1995b: 97). 35 35 For discussion un articulated constituents see e.g. Crimmins 1992a; Bach discussion of other postulates of unarticulated and Reimer 1995. 1993, and

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of MoPs, while Recanati's theory does not (but see Schiffer forthcoming on Schiffer forthcoming quasi-quasi-singular propositions). But both seem to require an even coarser-grained coarser-grained device of meta-types of MoPs that renders the distinction belief reports de re, someone else - and between belief re, de dicto, dicto, and de re re about someone nothing else than that. Now, if we subscribe to singular propositions, we have to say that believers may fail to recognize singular propositions that they in fact believe. Whoever believes that the Morning Star is the Morning Star, also believes that the Morning Star is the Evening Evening Star (cf. (cf. Salmon 1986: 1986: 118). 118). But this is a high price to pay for singular propositions, even if we supplement them with quasi-singular propositions as contents of beliefs. transformed MoPs are: are It remains to establish what kind of entities such transformed they semantic or psychological? The answer relies on the discussion from Chapter Chapter 3 concerning the placement of meaning meaning and intentions. It was decided there (in Section 3.7) that meanings are neither 'in the head' nor of 'in the world' but somewhere in-between. They rely on the objectivity objectivity of language and the conventionality while also conventionality of people's discourse strategies while of allowing for departures from such 'default presumptions', in the spirit of Default Semantics. MoPs are constructs of the same ilk as meanings: meanings: they contain the psychological 'way of givenness' of the object which which comes from givenness'of the relevant mental state, as well as, if applicable, the linguistic expressions pertaining to the objects. The linguistic linguistic constituent is important. It guarantees communicative, informative and referring communication thanks to its communicative, functions. It also enables the recognition of referential mistakes, and as a result it contributes to the determination as to whether the attitude report should be someone else. The psychological interpreted as de re, re, de dicto, dicto, or de re about someone mode does the rest and enables access to the interpretation de dicto. dicto. distinction of The question has to be posed as to whether whether the tri-partite distinction of interpretations of belief expressions and belief reports is arrived at through interpretations While the answer is 'yes', the distinction between the meta-types of MoPs. While there is one leap of faith to be taken here. Namely, the de re reading MoP, but how do we know that a particular utterance is does not rely on Mop, rel The answer promoted here is that one has to assume the meant as de re? directly to which leads us directly intentionality of mental states and speech acts, which the default semantics that pertains to the strongest intentionality intentionality and So, we know that an utterance is meant as de re because its default intentions. So, semantics is de re. reo have said that MoPs do not necessarily necessarily contain a linguistic linguisticconstituent constituentbut but I have rather they contain the linguistic linguistic constituent 'if 'if applicable'. It is so because a belief need not be linguistic if belief linguistic in order to be held with a Mop, MoP, and even if it is linguistic, the MoP need not be linguistic. of linguistic. Language is only one of the possible carriers of meaning or vehicles vehicles of thought. MoPs are in fact noemata (see Chapter 3), 3), Frege's confinement of Husserl's HusserFs noemata to senses

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is unjustified. Meaning can be revealed through language, but need not be so permeates many discussions in this revealed. This sweeping answer that permeates chapter chapter is developed in Chapter 6. The hybrid linguistic-psychological MoP is not a novelty in the literature, it is Recanati's Recanati's division between the linguistic and the psychological psychological that is novel. However, the question concerning the validity of this hybrid formation is rarely addressed. For instance, Larson and Ludlow (1993) subscribe to LF s). ILFs are phrase-markers so-called Interpreted Logical Forms (I (ILFs). phrase-markers composed of linguistic forms and extralinguistic objects. But it is difficult difficult why a semantic construct, a logical form, should contain expressions to see why and things. ILFs are said to resemble Fregean senses but they lack a theory of their constituents. They are said to give MoPs of referents by pairing the referent with an expression. Our proposal suggests a different different organization of the playground. MoPs are partly linguistic and it is through MoPs that linguistic forms enter logical forms. Instead of worrying about the constituents of ILFs, we simply impose compositionality on MoPs in agreement with Frege (senses are for him compositionally derived) and Schiffer, and arrive at a proposition proposition avoiding at the same time the problem of of constituents of ILF:

"A '~ mode of presentation of a proposition is determined by (a) the modes of presentation contained in presentation of the objects and properties properties contained the proposition (b) the place of those things in the proposition and (b) proposition." Schiffer (1992: 501). proposition." Schiffer And it is the prepositional propositional form, not the incomplete logical form as the output of of syntax, that is subject to the assessment of truth conditions (see Chapter Chapter 2). In addition, Larson and Ludlow's pairing of linguistic expressions with objects leads to the obliteration of logical equivalence of meaning of pairs synonymous expressions, or pairs of sentences in which of sentences with synonymous each sentence belongs to a different way out could different language. No successful way be proposed of the hybrid object-word proposed because the linguistic expression is part ofthe (cf. 1993: 1993: 334-5 334-5 and and 339). Similarity of sense, or same-saying, construct (cf. becomes a matter of usage rather than content, which is an unwelcome conclusion. So, So, MoPs are neither in the world, nor in the head. Similarly, they are neither in language, nor in thought. Recanati's (1993) distinction between linguistic and psychological MoPs is a useful device to preserve the direct reference of some expressions, but apart from that it is an artificial and unjustified After all, the referent is given to the holder of an attitude unjustified move. move. 36 After 36

36 Nota bene, bene, Schiffer of Schiffer (l995b: (1995b: 99) calls Recanati's insistence insistence on the 'default' direct reference of expressions "doctrinaire and implausible".

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by means of various, including linguistic, characteristic characteristic clues. Opposing Opposing the linguistic clues to the rest means opposing the clues handed in in one vehicle vehicle handed in by means of any other. This is too high a price to to the clues handed pay for direct reference. To sum up this discussion of MoPs, they they reveal themselves themselves as ways in which we comprehend things and refer to things. They are mental content, belong Thanks to mental states, but need not be 'in the mind' (cf. be'in (cf. Dummett 1986: 1986: 256). 256).Thanks to the conventional character character of discourse and the intersubjectivity oflanguage, of language, they are also (and primarily) 'in the world'. They need not be linguistic, and unlike Fregean Fregean senses, they need not be objective, objective, although in their most standard standard form (or even sometimes the default form, where present) they are objective. Finally, it has to be noted that, in Dummett's (1990: 276) interpretation, without interpretation, Frege seems to suggest that a speaker can use a word without being aware of its sense. This observation has far-reaching consequences that have been neglected neglected in approaches to attitude reports. It has been attended attended to in Default Semantics in the form of the postulate of meta-types of MoPs which can assume the value zero. The speaker and the hearer need only be confident that they can attend attend to the sense when the need for it arises. This necessity arises, for example, when the hearer has to judge whether whether the speaker used the name or description correctly in the case of two contradictory beliefs. The need to attend attend to sense also arises when it becomes obvious to the hearer that the speaker holds the belief about whoever whoever holds the name or undergoes the description, even should no contradiction ensue. Unarticulated constituents, constituents, or even types of MoPs in the most successful version of the hidden-indexical theory to date, do not enjoy the benefits of any comparably of flexible flexible device. The Default Semantics and the gradation of sensitivity of the semantics semantics to MoPs seem to emerge as superior superior to them.

4.3. De Re, De Dicto\, Dictoh and and De Dicto Proper belief expressions and belief belief In this section I develop a classification classification of beliefs, belief introduced in reports that makes use of the degrees of referential intention introduced 2. To To sum up the discussion the theory of Default Semantics in Chapter 2. of prepositional propositional attitude reports so far, far, we can say that it is widely repeated below, below, aJlow acknowledged acknowledged that reports of the type (3), repeated allow for de re and de dicto readings:

(3)

A believes that B q>s. cps.

This duaJity duality of interpretation has normally normally been regarded as a semantic ambiguity and has inspired inspired extensive research research in the areas of philosophy linguistic semantics and pragmatics. As was of language but less so in linguistic

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167 167

conceded conceded in Section 4.2, the meaning of a referring referring expression is too often often 'tied to the referent', so to speak, to be of use for explaining referential mistakes. And yet, such mistakes are frequently performed by speakers in conversation. Let us come back to situations A and B from Section 4.1.2. Suppose that using the description 'the man in the brown hat' in (4), repeated below, below, Ralph intends to refer to Smith: (4)

The man in the brown hat is a spy. spy.

If If the hearer of (4) (4) realizes the mistake, he will report on (4) (4) as in (34), perhaps adding (35): (34)

Ralph believes that Smith is a spy. spy.

(35)

He thought that the man wearing a brown hat was Smith.

Similarly, in Situation B, B, Ralph may be thinking of Smith but mistakenly call him 'Ortcutt'. Putting all particular contextual clues aside, it is possible to classify in a systematic way way the possibilities of interpretation interpretation of a use of a definite description or a proper name as to reference reference assignment. In what follows, I propose a new classification of belief reports which has a clear advantage over the extant ones in that it takes into account mental representations both of the holder of the belief and the reporter on it, including also referential referential mistakes and the lack of identifying knowledge of what/who the belief is about, pertaining both to the believer and the reporter. This exhaustive perspective yields yields an initially complicated complicated typology which, however, will soon appear appear to be very simple when checked against discourse strategies. Fig. I1 presents the possibilities of interpretation that are open to the hearer of (4). (4). A similar diagram can be drawn for a speaker's use of a proper name, such as Ralph's use of the name 'Ortcutt' in Situation B. B.

'the man in the brown hat'

1. a man known to Ralph

2. a man unknown to Ralph

~

a.Ortcutt a. Ortcutt

b. Smith Fig. 1 (from laszczolt Jaszczolt 1997a: 317).

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Now, by using the name 'Ortcutt' in his reports on Ralph's belief, John can refer to a man of whom Ralph has the knowledge summarized by any of of the three options b), and (ii): options (i.a), (i. (i.b), (i. a) a man whom Ralph knows personally and who, according to (i.a) Ralph, is called Ortcutt; Ortcutt; (i.b)

a man whom Ralph knows personally and who, according to Ralph, is called Smith;

and (ii)

a man whom Ralph does not know.

The case (i.b) is possible when Ralph or John are mistaken. It shows that the referential mistake can be attributed either to the believer (the speaker of of belief expression) or the reporter reporter (the hearer of the belief expression). the belief Similarly, the lack of knowledge of the referent can be attributed either to the believer or to the reporter. As a result, the options (i.a)-(ii) can be repeated, when carefully of carefully amended, with respect to John's knowledge of the referent of of Ralph's expression of of belief. So far we have considered re, de dicto, dicto, considered three readings of belief reports: de re, and de re about someone else. In the latter case, we have not specified who the referential referential mistake should be attributed to: the holder of the belief belief or the reporter on the belief. belief. It can belong to either. In both cases there is a discrepancy between the original expression of belief and the belief report as far as the referent correctly identified by the use of the name or description is concerned. I have called the interpretation (i.a) the de re reading, (i.b) was classified as de re about someone else, dicto. However, However, (i.b) seems else, and and (ii) (ii) de dicto. to be a hybrid between the de re and de dicto dicto properties. It concerns a particular res, particular res, an individual (albeit the one incorrectly matched with a name or description) and hence it is de re. reo On the other hand, it is not transparent to substitution. If If the holder of of the belief belief was referentially mistaken in his belief and belief expression, the reporter would normally normally substitute a correct belief correct name or description in his report. This substitution substitution of non-coreferential expressions signals that the belief report is de dicto dicto in that it repairs some essential lack of knowledge knowledge on the part of the believer and the substitutivity between the belief expression and the report does not hold. It corrects corrects an individual. It is even attribution of an incorrect name or description to the individual. dicto when it is the reporter who is referentially mistaken. mistaken. more obviously de dicto This hybrid de re/de re/de dicto reading of (i.b) is very confusing but it will be simplified simplified shortly. shortly. In order to clarify clarify its properties and classify classify it with the least possible confusion, it is necessary to juxtapose expressions of belief with of belief the classification of beliefs and belief reports. The properties of being de re or

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169

being de dicto apply to various kinds of entities. I suggest that the distinction distinction belief can apply to: (1) (1) beliefs (or thoughts), (2) belief belief expressions, and (3) belief reports. Definitions Definitions of these terms in the literature are ample but not (cf. e.g. Recanati 1993; Bach 1987a). Let us first consider exhaustive (cf. consider beliefs. A belief belief is de re re when it is about a particular particular thing and its having a certain certain property, and it is de dicto when the believer is merely able to assert assert that a certain proposition is is true. It is is sometimes sometimes said that all beliefs are de de re because because they are about somebody, or that all beliefs are de dicto because they all involve involve the MoP of the individual, or that such a distinction on the level of beliefs does not not make sense (cf. (cf. e.g. Searle 1979). 1979). But usually, belief de re means a belief about a particular person or thing, independent of the particular particular way way in which this person or thing is referred to in the utterance, whereas a belief de dicto means a belief held with respect to one particular particular fits the expression, about whoever or whatever undergoes the name or fits distinction into 1 description. This definition is reflected in Fig. 1 as the distinction example, "[b]elieving, and 2. So, So, generally, there are two types of beliefs. For example, of of God, God, that he is benevolent benevolent is different different from believing that God God is benevolent" benevolent" (in Honderich, ed. 1995: 188). De re re belief belief is also frequently characterized characterized as a belief that is backed by the amount of knowledge which is sufficient sufficient to individuate the object of belief. belief.37 The distinction on the second level in Fig. 1,1, i.e. that into La, band l.a, 1.l.b and 2, reflects the distinction drawn between the uses of belief expressions. In dicto, the belief expressions de dicto, belief is attributed attributed to the whole assertion, whereas attributed to a thing's possession possession of a certain in a de re re expression, it is attributed certain property (cf. also Flew, ed. 1979: 235). This level of belief expressions is the most belief expressions most controversial one in the present present classification. classification. The distinction distinction into de re and de dicto is normally said to concern modalities modalities and propositional prepositional attitude reports, and, at best, also attitudes themselves. themselves. Expressions of the form 1\ A cps' q>s' exhibit problems with reference reference ascription which are attributed attributed to the referential properties of definite descriptions, proper proper names, and other expressions that are used to refer and that can stand in the position occupied by A. On the other hand, these expressions, as a whole, whole, can also be 'about the thing' or 'about whoever fits fits the name, description, etc.'. Hence, I shall re and de dicto classification based incorporate them into the classification based on the terms de re so as to avoid multiplying terminological terminological distinctions without without necessity. advantages ofthis of this move will be seen shortly when the terms are juxtaposed juxtaposed The advantages with the terms that signify the properties of referring terms in Table Table 2. Now, in belief reports, if the process of referring referring ends up picking out the re, as in (i.a). If the correct individual, the belief report can be called de re, referentially mistaken, as in (1.b) (l.b) in Fig. 1, 1, the belief report will believer is referentially 37

'Individuate' in Hintikka's (1962) (1962) sense. Individuation is a vast philosophical philosophical topic that need not be discussed for the present purposes. 37

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either reiterate the mistake or it will repair it, as in (i.b). While the original belief someone else, the corresponding corresponding report should belief was called de re re about someone introduces referential be properly called a sub-type of de dicto because it introduces opacity. Similarly, if the reporter is referentially mistaken and assigns an reporter are incorrect incorrect name or description, description, or if both the believer and the reporter Finally, mistaken, then there is referential opacity. opacity. Let us call it de dicto dictO].J. Finally, if belief without being clear as to the identity of the if the believer forms the belief belief concerns reporter does person or object whom this belief concerns as in (ii), or if the reporter belief expression reported reported on was about, such not know who or what the belief 38 a report is also de dicto. To dicto.38 To differentiate it from the case of a referential mistake, let us call it de dicto proper. To sum up, I have drawn way. Beliefs are drawn the distinctions in the following way. de dicto when when they concern an unknown unknown individual. belief individual. Expressions of belief are de dicto when they are about an individual unknown to the speaker. individual unknown way Now, reports on beliefs are de dicto when the socially recognisable way of referring referring is not present due to either [1] knowledge on [1] the lack of knowledge the part of the holder of the belief and his holding a belief de dicto or [2] referential mistake on the part of the holder of the belief while holding [2] a referential a belief de re, re, or [3] [3] and [4] [4] the lack of knowledge on the part of the reporter analogous reporter analogous to [I] [1] and [2]. The cases [I] [1] and [2], if known to of the reporter, are normally attended attended to in the report by a substitution of a correct correct expression, by additional hedging and qualifications, so they can be eliminated Other combinations of the believer's eliminated from the discussion. Other and the reporter's beliefs can also be eliminated. As a result, de dicto referentially reports normally correspond correspond to [3] [3] and [4]. When the speaker is referentially mistaken and the reporter reiterates the mistake due to failing to recognize recognize individual different different it, miscommunication occurs and the report is about an individual belief. This point is very important as it from the object of the original belief. sub-types of de dicto which which could not eliminates some of the confusing sub-types be ignored earlier because the analysis analysis is founded on mental representations. They can now be excluded as they do not pose a problem for discourse. Languages have ways of distinguishing distinguishing them overtly. correspond to [1] [1] and [2] [2] are only known known by However, the situations that correspond the reporter if contextual clues suggest any such problems with the knowledge of the referent on the part of the holder of the belief. Otherwise, we assume the default which is the correct match between expressions and the individual about individuals, as well as some l'de de re acquaintance' with the belief is held. I shall say more about defaults in Section which/whom the belief Now, hedges can take many forms, two of which are exemplified exemplified in 4.5. Now, (36) and (37): 38 38

cr. Cf. Evans 1982, esp. pp. 64-85 on individuation and 305-342 on invoking possessed information in utterance interpretation, interpretation, and Dummett (l993c:143). (1993c:143).

Section 3

default de re principle The default

171 171

(36)

whatever it means to Ralph believes the fact that Ortcutt is a spy, spy, whatever him.

(37)

believes that Smith is a spy, spy, although he mistakenly mistakenly calls him Ralph believes 'Ortcutt'.

The report (36) exemplifies [1], of [1], while the report in (37) (37) is an example example of [2]. The nuances nuances of the de re/de re/de dicto distinction attended to above above are standardly neglected in analyses of attitude ascription. In this account, remedy comes the remedy conies with seeing the varieties of interpretation as a conof versational problem that cannot be exhausted in the semantics of propositional attitudes and the semantic problem of substitutivity salva prepositional perspective means means the concern with the veritate. The 'conversational' perspective difficulties that interlocutors encounter in understanding each other's difficulties of utterances and in reporting on each other's beliefs. The ambiguity ambiguity of utterances can be called a pragmatic ambiguity ambiguity because it concerns reference assignment assignment as performed by a speaker in a conversation. conversation. The speaker either refers correctly, refers incorrectly, or uses a name or correctly, incorrectly, description without being able to individuate the individual about whom belief The semantic merely tangential he/she holds the belief. semantic debates debates are thus merely to the present concern. From our perspective, both proper names and definite descriptions descriptions are expressions expressions used to refer. Even if descriptions refer only with the aid of context rather than directly,39 directly,39 one should still pose a question as to whether whether this referring role is their salient (or default) role in conversation. This is attempted in Section 4.5, with the help of intentions and intentionality. I proposed that referential mistakes mistakes and referring to an unknown unknown person, part of the reporter as in [3] [3] and [4], render de dicto reports, both on the part namely its two sub-cases. sub-cases. It is only in de dicto proper where res is not known to the reporter. But the tri-partite distinction in Fig. 1I requires cognitive justification. a further cognitive justification. In order to present the relation between cognition and its objective objective correlate, let us assume for a moment, to simplify simplifY the discussion on representations from Chapter 3, 3, that the reality is represented in the mind in the form of what Fauconnier (1985) (1985) calls 39 39 According According to the theories of direct reference, proper names always 'refer' directly, i.e. their conditions (cf. (cf. Recanati 'descriptive content' is irrelevant irrelevant for truth truth conditions Recanati 1993: 297-298), whereas definite context (situation) (situation) makes them do so. so. Be that as it may, may, the speaker descriptions only do when the context still uses both types of expressions to refer and to say something something about a known individual, about whoever undergoes the description/holds misdescribed/misnamed description/holds the name, or about a misdescribed/misnamed individual. Descriptions referentially and express a singular proposition. proposition. This is Descriptions can be used referentially achieved by means of contextual contextual information. So, " ... descriptions can only be 'token-referential', achieved So,"... demonstrative expressions whereas proper names and demonstrative expressions are 'type-referential' 'type-referential'".". (Recanati 1993: 31).

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Chapter 4

mental spaces. Mental spaces are linguistic representations, representations, linguistic structures attributed to the speaker and to the hearer, hearer, so they will do well 40 for beliefs formed with the use of the linguistic medium. medium.40 Table I1 presents reference assignment, where where 'x' and 'y' are variables standing for the reference y. two different different referents, i.e. i.e. x#x^y. Table 1I (adapted (adapted from laszczolt Jaszczolt 1997a: 320).

hearer's referent

speaker's referent

hearer's belief report

II

xX

xX

de re

II III III

yy 0 0

xX

dictoi de dicto/

xX

de dicto proper

II

Only in (I) was the act of referring performed accurately; the other cases represent certain amounts of lack of knowledge on the part of the reporter. Now, I have promised to simplify simplify the controversial application of the de re/de dicto distinction on the level of expressions of belief to the more standard re/de distinctions that pertain to the expressions of expressions with referring properties. First of all, the ambiguity41 ambiguity41 of beliefs is directly related to the ambiguity of expressions of that are used to refer. Donnellan's (1966) referential and attributive attributive uses of definite descriptions correspond in Fig. 1 to the two nodes giving giving 1 I and 2. believer The choice seems to depend on the reporter's decision as to what the believer would attribute the predicate to on a particular occasion (cf. (cf. also Stalnaker 1970). The reporter assigns kinds of use of the definite assigns one of the two kinds description to the believer: attributive use. In the case description believer: a referential or an attributive B, the story is similar: the hearer has to of proper names as in Situation B, answer the question "To "To what would [the speaker] speaker] on this occasion attribute the predicate 'is q/?" '?" (Donnellan 1970: 1970: 357). 357). Proper names and definite descriptions are similar in that they both can assume MoPs. This is not the place to develop between them, they acquire develop a comparison between acquire a more detailed 40 40 Fauconnier's idea of spaces is used here merely as a technical device for representing the for representing mapping between language and reality. Other commitments are not followed. The following quotation best summarizes the idea of spaces: "Language (. ..) is not merely interpreted with respect to worlds, models, contexts, situations, (...) situations, forth. Rather, it is involved involved in constructions and so forth. constructions of its own. own. It builds up mental spaces, To the extent that relations between them, and relations between elements within them. them. To linguistic and pragmatic data, two of us build up similar space configurations from the same linguistic we may 'communicate'; communication is a possible coroJlary corollary of the construction process." Fauconnier (1985: 2). 41 41 In the sense of options of interpretation. interpretation.

Section 3

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The default default de re principle principle

analysis in Chapter 5. of 5. Suffice Suffice it to say that proper names serve the purpose of ways, as presented presented in Table referring in two ways, Table 2. One is to pick out an individual spoken about, and the other to denote whoever holds that name. Speakers Now, incorrect name or description. Now, can be referentially mistaken and use an incorrect reporter also uses names and descriptions in the report. Since the the reporter involve mistaken reference, reference, referential use of a description or name may involve resulting belief report may be opaque. It is a de dicto report that the resulting corresponds to a de re belief, i.e. i.e. de dicto], dicto7, by force of the definitions accepted above. So, presented in the So, now belief reports exhibit a tri-partite distinction presented report corresponds re belief belief bottom row of Table Table 2. De dicto] dictoj report corresponds to a de re and hence is what we have so far called de re about someone someone else. The corresponding belief is indeed de re but, as has been argued earlier on in corresponding this section, the report is not transparent to substitutions, substitutions, neither is it identification of reference in conversational transparent to the identification conversational practice. As a linguistic linguistic expression expression corresponding corresponding to a mental mental state, state, it is is thus thus better dubbed as a variety variety of of de dicto. dicto. Table 2 sums sums up the distinctions distinctions on the level of beliefs, expressions of belief, and reports on belief introduced above. Table 2 (adapted from Jaszczolt 1997a: 1997'a: 320).

Ralph's Ralph's belief belief

de re

de dicto

Ralph's expression of belief belief Ralph's use of the a. description b. name

de re

de dicto

referential (correct or incorrect) incorrect) referential (correct or incorrect)

attributive attributive pure denotation

report on belief John's report belief

de re, re, de dictot1

de dicto dicto proper

John's use of the description or name exhibits exhibits the same characteristics as that Table 2. of Ralph presented in Table 2. The break marked by dots depicts the lack of direct correspondence correspondence between the assignment of a referent by Ralph and infer Ralph's Ralph's reference assignment and the principles by John. John has to infer principles of this inference are laid down in what follows. In other words, words, the dots will be filled in later on in this chapter. where the reporter, the speaker of the We shall confine de dicto] dictoj to the cases where attitude report of the form in (3) mistaken. (3) repeated below, is referentially mistaken. (3)

A believes believes that B cps. cps.

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Chapter 4 Chapter

When the referential mistake is on the part of the holder of the belief belief and this mistake is recognized recognized by the hearer, an ensuing report report does not present mistake present any difficulty difficulty of interpretation. interpretation. If If the reporter realizes the mistake, he normally uses a correct name or description description instead, frequently adding a further hedging clause or other other clarification as in (37) above. Both a description description and a proper name can be either disambiguated in a situation connected in one way way or another another with the information or, if it is not the case, connected provided by the previous discourse. provided discourse. De dicto proper pertains to the lack of individuating information on the part of the reporter. If If the lack of knowledge of the referent can be attributed attributed to the belief and the reporter realizes that this is how the belief belief is holder of the belief held, he normally adds a clarification clarification to the form in (3), as exemplified in reporter lacks (36) above. But we have to beware that, in practice, if the reporter knowledge of the referent, he normally normally also qualifies his the individuating knowledge by, for example, 'someone called a\ a', 'somebody whom use of the expression by, a' and other So, this pattern is less reliable in he calls d other similar indicators. So, mistakes. The qualification qualification practice than the one pertaining to referential mistakes. is not always always required for conveying the meaning successfully successfully and can be omitted. If If it is omitted, then de re and de dicto proper are indistinguishable. indistinguishable. If discourse was governed by strict left with the form in If discourse strict rules, we would be left (3) as a report exclusively re beliefs, beliefs, by a reporter reporter who has exclusively exclusively exclusively on de re de re knowledge about the object of the report. But this idealization goes this idealization far too far. far far. However, ambiguity of interpretation interpretation normally does not ensue. In (3), we can presume the existence existence of a possible law or discourse principle specify one of the readings as the more salient, or even which would specify beliefs, intentionality of mental states unmarked, default one. On the level of beliefs, signals that de re beliefs are the default. As a result, on the level of utterance interpretation, the unmarkedness and priority seems to be attached interpretation, attached to the de re interpretation. Example (38) can have have all three interpretations presented in Table 2. (38) (38)

vandalized the phone booth is Ralph believes that the person who vandalized an under-age criminal.

dicto J interpretation interpretation that pertains to the referential referential mistake To repeat, the de dicto/ on the part of the believer is eliminated as it is normally hedged. The de dieto dicto/I interpretation that pertains to the referential mistake on the part of the reporter, reporter, on the other hand, poses the problem of interpretation. In theory, it can be analysed as the believer's referential use embedded in a de dieto dicto report, or as the believer's attributive use embedded in a de dicto die to report. incorporates a referential referential mistake of the believer's that goes The first also incorporates miscommunication. So, through unnoticed by the reporter and renders miscommunication. options of interpretation the options interpretation are numerous. And yet, sentences of the type

Section 3

The default default de re principle

175 175

(38) are normally understood understood without a problem, they do not give rise to ambiguities. Depending on the situation, it may have been the case that it was appropriate for the speaker of (38) to substitute the description for the original first name and surname of the child, or he may have retained the original description. Reporters do perform such substitutions in conversation and it is difficult difficult to give any rules as to when they happen. The only reliable rule seems to be the calculation calculation of the communicative value of the expression and the ease of interpretation, or, in more familiar terms, the calculation of costs and effects of the process of interpretation. The standard standard assumption on the part of the hearer seems to be that the speaker is talking of about a known individual. individual. This assumption is signalled by the balance of costs and effects (or Sperber and Wilson's 1986a processing effort effort and cognitive effect).42 effect).42 The information value is then the highest and the processing effort effort is smaller than the one hearers would have to put in if there was an ambiguity ambiguity of referring, be it semantic or pragmatic. This appeal to intuition is best justified in the following test. Sentence (39) of Chapter Chapter 1 Chapter repeated here as (40) seems to be a natural answer to sentence (38) of Chapter 1, repeated here as (39): (39)

The best architect designed this church.

(40)

Really? Really? Who was it?

The speaker of (40) takes it for granted that the speaker of (39) knows who he i.e. is using the description referentially, and that or she is talking about, i.e. he or she is also able to tell the name of the architect. Similarly, in the case of proper names, the referential referential reading of (41) (41) and the (42) seem intuitively to be more natural, more salient and de re reading of (42) particular primary in the order of occurrence to the hearer. Referring to a particular person is clearly intended. intended. (41)

Jimmy is an under-age criminal.

(42)

Ralph believes believes that Jimmy is an under-age criminal.

This salience of de re re is even more obvious than in the case of descriptions descriptions which are, after all, normally regarded as not directly referential. referential. They refer directly only in some contexts and with the help of the context. The intuitions priority, naturalness and unmarkedness of the referential concerning the priority, 42

'Cognitive effect' was called 'contextual effect' in the first, 1986 edition of Relevance. Relevance.

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Chapter 4

interpretation of such belief belief expressions as well as the de re interpretation of interpretation of belief reports have their theoretical confirmation. This question of defaults belief is addressed in more detail in Section 4.5. We should take stock. The de re/de re/de dicto distinction on the level level of of beliefs differs from the tri-partite distinction on the level belief level of belief reports. A belief de re may result in a de dicto report when the reporter reporter is referentially referentially mistaken or lacks individuating knowledge, i.e. forms a belief de dicto. Now, dicto. Now, although the holder of the belief must know whether he or she holds a belief belief de re or de dicto, of dicto, his or her distinction need not match the classification of the corresponding corresponding report as de re or de dicto because either the holder of the belief or the reporter reporter on it can be referentially mistaken. mistaken. Moreover, the believer's thoughts are not diaphanous to the reporter and they are interpreted interpreted by the reporter according to some pragmatic/cognitive rules that govern conversation. conversation. I suggested that these rules cannot be very strict but they must rely on the gradation gradation of the status of various interpretations with respect to the default interpretation. If If conversation was not governed by priorities and defaults but instead participants relied on context for priorities recovering a semantically semantically underspecified message, interlocutors would spend a vast percentage of their time and effort effort trying trying to decide what or who the conversation is about. Alternatively, a vast number of of conversations would break down due to referential ambiguities, ambiguities, which, which, as we know, is not the case. Generally, Generally, it is precarious to claim that pragmatic processing either disambiguates or fills in the semantic representation in way or another, depending on the context. It is frequently the case that one way the paucity of contextual contextual information makes such disambiguation or 'filling in' unfeasible. unfeasible. So, So, rather than ambiguity ambiguity or underspecification, defaults are a better bet.

Attitude 4.4. Red Giants and White White Dwarfs: Dwarfs: Context-Dependence of Attitude Ascription It appears that in our account of the interpretation of belief belief reports in

discourse the role of of context is defined somewhat negatively. It is defined as the bulk of information that prevents default inferences inferences from going through. considered by the 'Prevents' does not mean that the default interpretation interpretation is considered hearer and then rejected. It means rather that the contextual clues fill fill in different from the one that the semantic representation in a direction which which is different would have been assumed had the context not intervened. In other words again, sometimes hearers leap to conclusions as to the interpretation of of an utterance: they rely on default reasoning. At other times, however, however, the context becomes significant and such default reasoning is prevented. I have suggested that the de re interpretation of belief reports is such a default

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interpretation and this suggestion stems out of the intentionality of mental states and the resulting intentions in communication. But before before this default Section 4.5, it is necessary to have a closer look value is further justified in Section at the inference process that uses uses this information. this contextual contextual information. For example, in Situation B, B, how does John infer that Ralph ascribed a whom he held the belief that he was wrong name to the individual about whom an honest citizen? It seems that Situation A provides the necessary context. In Situation A, Ralph talks about a person who who is perceptually salient, field of both interlocutors. interlocutors. Hence, the identification identification who is in the visual field of the individual is easier and more reliable than in Situation B where Ralph's reaction is based on having heard a piece of news from a newspaper article. But it has to be remembered that in Situation B it need not be the case that to Ralph is thinking about a wrong individual; he may hold a belief de die dicto instead. In fact, it does not really matter so much for reporting whether Ralph to in Situation B. B. In both belief de re about someone else or de die held a belief dicto report would have to include an enrichment as in (43) and (44). cases, the report where John is not in a Nota bene, bene, (44) can also be used for the situation where position to individuate Ortcutt, so the mapping between the hedges and other position explanations on the one hand, and interpretations of belief reports is not bi-unique. (43)

Ralph believes that Smith is an honest citizen but he mistakenly calls him 'Ortcutt'.

(44)

Ralph believes that somebody whom he calls 'Ortcutt' is an honest citizen.

A similar context-dependence context-dependence affects the interpretation interpretation of John's reports as de re or de dicto. dieto. Now, Now, how does this context-based inference fare with default interpretations? interpretations? Our mind processes only what is useful. Proper names would not be processed and remembered if they did not lead to individuals, to acquiring more information about the objects they denote. Their connotative value is minimal (albeit not non-existent, their role is not exhausted in have default referential referential properties, they referring) and hence if they did not have would be useless. As Ryle (1979) (1979) observes, there are factors preventing inference such as distance in time or low gossip value of information. Low gossip value, value, or information information value, value, is associated with talking about whoever undergoes the name of description. description. High information value pertains to talking about people, animals, or things that can be individuated and shared between discourse participants. Similarly, Similarly, a long time interval dividing two utterances may prevent inference if there is no incentive to hold the content of the first utterance in memory, and at the same time to make effort to process the other utterance. This incentive, again, comes with an effort

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talking about things. The default aboutness of conversation is in fact another guise of the intentionality of mental acts discussed in Chapter 3. 3. This This aboutaboutness is conveyed, conveyed, which which can be summarized as a common-sensical, common-sensical, presumed rule of discourse: whatever "When the speaker refers to a specific individual, individual, by whatever means, he tacitly accepts the convention that he will provide any information information (not given in the context) context) that is necessary for individual in question." the addressee to identify the individual (1977: 655). Lyons (1977: Applied to Situations A and B, B, this generalization amounts to saying saying that make since reference assignment is context-dependent, context-dependent, the hearer has to make information, but also of all use not only of linguistic means of conveying conveying information, the available non-linguistic means. The primary one among them seems informato be ostension and, as Lyons (1977: (1977: 63) 63) suggests, the paralinguistic information (from ostension) takes precedence. So, So, if, for instance, Ralph points at Smith and says "Ortcutt is a spy", he will be taken to believe believe that Smith, rather than Ortcutt, is a spy. spy. If in Situation A Ralph makes makes it obvious that he is talking about Bernard Bernard 1. J. Ortcutt by some some gestures gestures or even by looking at a person in the perceptual field of both interlocutors, the belief is taken re and about Ortcutt. It is quite possible that Ralph does not know to be de re the name of the man in the brown hat but this lack of knowledge is irrelevant re is the default assigned to the belief. belief. Using the name and concealed: de re 'Ortcutt' in the report on Ralph's belief may be going too far, far, but it is unquestionable that Ralph's belief is about Ortcutt. Reporting that he believes that Ortcutt is a spy spy would would mean subscribing subscribing to semantic semantic innocence innocence (cf. Barwise and Perry 1983): Ralph may believe that Ortcutt is a spy although he may not know avoided as a result of of know it. This type of parlance has been avoided the incorporation incorporation of MoPs to the semantics of belief reports (in Section 4.2). Just as de re is the presumed default interpretation of beliefs, the referential interpretation interpretation is the presumed default assigned by John to Ralph's expression re is the presumed default assigned to John's report on it. In of belief, and de re B, would have been other words, both beliefs, beliefs, in Situation A and in Situation B, different people or had they initially tried as de re re had they occurred to two different been reported on by two different different people who, who, in addition, had no contextual clues that would prevent them from interpreting the belief as de reo re. Similarly, Similarly, both reports would have been tried as de re. reo In some languages, there are linguistic means of differentiating differentiating between de re and de dicto reports. In Polish, for instance, in the belief reports in the form of negative sentences, the subjunctive subjunctive is used in the complement clause marker and it is introduced by a complementizer complementizer which which incorporates a mood marker type of clause is that indicates that a subjunctive subjunctive clause is required. This type

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not unique to Polish, it also appears e.g. in French French and Spanish. In Polish, it is a marked clause, it is is used only when the reporter has some doubt as to the reference assignment assignment to the referring expression expression used in his or her report. unmarked that-clause There is also a corresponding corresponding that- clause in in Polish Polish that that does does not undergo similar restrictions in use. use. When the marked clause is used, the de dicta dicto reading normally ensues. So, So, the form of the report may suffice suffice for the interpretation as de re re or de dicta. dicto. This intuition also acquires a theoretical syntactic support in Chapter Chapter 8 where it is demonstrated that in proposition matter less to the subjunctive subjunctive clause the constituents of the proposition the overall meaning than they do in the corresponding indicative that-clause. that- clause. And And if they matter less, then the belief is not de reo re. The embedded sentence does not undergo substitutivity, it has to be taken as a primitive, i.e. i.e. as one unit that corresponds to a state or event rather than to an individual's having certain properties. Or, as it is argued in Chapter 8, 8, the sentence has a higher 'degree of clausiness', the constituents are bonded more strongly than is the case in the corresponding clause in indicative mood. In English, the strength of bonding of constituents of the that-clause is a matter of an interpretative decision of the hearer. There are no syntactic clues that would help in the interpretation. There is a semantic-cognitive clue, based on default intentions. however, and this clue comes from defaults based 3, repeated here But let us now consider examples (12) and (11) of Chapter 3, as (45) and (46) respectively: (45) (45)

Red giants become become white dwarfs.

(46) (46)

Johnny believes believes that red giants become white white dwarfs.

It can be argued that there is no indication in (46) that the speaker understands what kind of entities entities he or she is talking about. Indeed, there is no indication that Johnny knows knows it while while uttering (45). Now, in (47), (45). Now, similarly, there is no indication as to how to interpret the relative scope of the indefinite descriptions 'a farmer' and 'a donkey':

(47) (47)

If a farmer owns a donkey, donkey, he is usually rich.

(from Heim 1990: 1990: 150). 150). This example, albeit originally used for a more anaphoric technical discussion of the semantics of indefinite NPs and anaphoric pronouns, clearly demonstrates the need of having the picture of a situation 43 before attempting to interpret it. In sentence (47), the adverb can quantify quantify it.43 over the farmer-donkey pairs, over the instances of the first indefinite, or over instances of the second indefinite. When we imagine 99 poor farmers who own 43

See also Lyons Lyons (1999: 31-32) on types of anaphoric links.

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one donkey each and one farmer with 200 donkeys, the difference difference becomes becomes can be attached obvious: 'usually' 'usually'can attached to farmer-donkey pairs or to donkey-owning farmers. It can also be attached attached to farmer-owned farmer-owned donkeys. One of these readings, namely the second, is intuitively more correct. Heim suggests that the topic-focus distinction distinction helps with the choice of the correct interpretation. interpretation. The situation situation has to be constructed constructed before the semantic interpretation interpretation is provided. How exactly exactly the interpretation is chosen remains only a vague suggestion concerning the role of stress, topic and focus. What is interesting, however, is that the context has to be construed before the interpretation 44 is attempted. This necessity is avoided by Heim by postulating unmarked unmarked attempted.44 interpretations, albeit with only tentative theoretical support. The theoretical theoretical support support for the default de re reading of (46) is easier easier to obvious. 'Red giants' and 'white dwarfs' obtain, although it is not immediately obvious.'Red giants'and are natural kinds, they are names of types of stars. As natural kinds, they are part of language system. The knowledge of language requires knowing their meaning. However, they are not words of a common, everyday everyday parlance, parlance, it is perfectly possible to be a successful member of a linguistic community community and yet not be able to use them with some essential degree of understanding. The situation is not even of Fodor's Fodor's (1994) type. In Fodor's (1994) elms elms and beeches type. Fodor's example, although the speaker cannot tell between elms and beeches, he different species of trees and that consulting or she knows knows that they are two different conSUlting a tree guide or an expert botanist will confirm this this and equip him or her with more information. On the other hand, the speaker of (45) need not know this much. He or she may merely, information merely, for instance, instance, repeat a piece of information after a teacher (1975,1985a, after teacher at school, and, to use Sperber's (1975, 1985a, 1996) explanation, store it in memory in some 'semi-propositional form', so to speak, 'put in quotes', for future understanding (cf. Yet it would be rather (cf. Section 2.9 above). Yet implausible to insist that it is a normal, unmarked move in conversation to put propositions 'in quotes', to store them in a semi-understood or totally undigested way, way, hoping that some time in the future they will become clear. interpretation. Instead, It is certainly not the default scenario of utterance interpretation. it seems to be the last resort open to hearers who have no source of of available to resolve immediately when information available resolve the meaning meaning problem immediately So, it can be tentatively proposed proposed that although (46) can be taken it occurs. So, 44

Studies of implicature show how the referent can be specified by the context. About example (i), Hobbs (1987: 2) says that in order to find the referent of ·the 'the engine', the interlocutor has to rely on contextual contextual information and mutual knowledge that cars have engines. (i) I bought bought a car last week. The engine is already giving me trouble. trouble. This information implicature information is necessary to provide provide a referent for 'the engine'. Without Without such an implicature context that makes the referent available, reference would fail. Sometimes it is the cultural context being available, accessible. According to Givon (1992), the 'cultural context' is the world view shared by members members of a culture or a speech speech community. The referent referent can can also also be be accessed accessed from from the the shared shared cultural cultural of community. The and 5.6.1 below. and contextual information. See Section 5.6.1 44

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as a report de re re or de dicto, dicta, and at the same time a report on the de re re or de belief, the de re interpretation is much more likely to be the case, dicta dicto re interpretation likely and possibly is the default one. Intentions in communication provide the strongest support reo All in all, it can be suggested that, support for this status of de re. contribution of context is limited to the departures from the although the contribution default reading, its relevance goes far beyond that because context includes intentions. Since intentions are one of the aspects of context of utterance and intentions account for the default reading as well as the departures from the default, this aspect of context performs a crucial role in the interpretation interpretation of belief reports. Finally, I would like to assess briefly some arguments for and against an extensive role of context in attitude reports that have have appeared in some recent accounts. I shall confine the assessment to two two suggestions: Bezuidenhout's heavy context-dependence and Devitt's mild context-dependence. In her recent work, Bezuidenhout (1997) uses Bach' s idea of semantic underdetermination of expressions to argue that belief reports require pragmatic enrichment of the meaning of the embedded sentence. This enrichment allows for the speaker's MoP to be recovered. Enrichment, and afortiori a fortiori context-dependence, are said to be a common, general feature of utterance interpretation. She She resorts for this purpose to Sperber and Wilson's (1986a) account of the semantic content of utterances called explicature. Heavy context-dependence of interpretation interpretation is possible because enrichment is non-modular and can draw on other beliefs and knowledge. knowledge. Now, Now, while Bezuidenhout is correct about the access to background information and she assigns too great a role the need for some enrichment, at the same time she to context. It has to be remembered that not all belief ascriptions require the MoP of the referent to be known and that sometimes it is not possible MoP. In fact, the assumption that MoP is not relevant to pinpoint a particular particular MoP. for truth conditions is the default idealization that governs discourse participants. If there is no evidence to the contrary, the hearer believes that the speaker knows knows enough about the object of his or her belief to be able to identify the object comfortably in various situations of discourse. Hence, Bezuidenhout's enrichment is too strong a condition. Types of MoPs graded from MoPs 'proper' to the value zero are more truthful to discourse practices. practices. Bezuidenhout's heavy heavy context-dependence of attitude reports is a reaction (1996) mild context-dependence, as he himself himself calls it (jbid.: (ibid.: 197). to Devitt's (1996) 197). Devitt favours Quine's ambiguity instead. instead. Sentences Sentences of the type (3) (3) are context, and notably by the speaker's intention, intention, as either established by the context, context-dependence of of that-clauses transparent or opaque. He argues that the context-dependence is limited by the literal meaning sentence: meaning of the sentence:

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')\ t[hat]-clause can only ascribe a meaning that is closely related to "A t[hat]-clause one of the meanings of its content content sentence; there is an 'intimate link' between the two meanings. '" ... [T]he link is often the closest identity:' relation of all: identity." Devitt (1996: 197-198).

Just as Bezuidenhout's heavy contextualism was too strong, so Devitt's mild restrictive. About sentence (48), he says the following: contextualism is too restrictive. following: (48) (48)

It is raining.

""... ... in understanding the utterance, the hearer must supplement it, (ibid.: 199). 199).. guided by what is obvious in the context."

And what is obvious is the location, e.g. 'in New York'. Further, "The morals to be drawn from this brief reminder are first, the "The heavily on the meaning of a token utterance (normally) depends heavily conventional meaning of its type, type, and second, insofar as the hearer's understanding must be guided by some aspect of the context, that hearer." (ibid.: 199). aspect is usually accessible to the hearer." Devitt concludes that the more the meaning of a belief belief report report departs from the meaning of the that-clause, f/za 7-clause, the more difficult difficult the interpretation. He also concludes that the more different different meanings the that-clause f/ia/-clause has, the more concludes difficult interpretation. It is so presumably because the interpretation difficult the interpretation. becomes heavily heavily context-dependent. It is true that de re readings do not require much contextual enrichment of the meaning meaning of the referring term, unless the term is itself an indexical indexical or is otherwise otherwise context-dependent. context-dependent. De re relies on 'jumping to conclusions', it is the default interpretation. interpretation. interpretations are not the literal meaning, the However, these default interpretations re, de dicto meaning of the sentence. Instead, all of the interpretations, de re, dicio/l and de dicto proper, are semantic representations representations because the context, in the form of intentions in communication, contributes contributes to the semantics of of attitude reports. Hence the gradation of context-dependence is not a departure from the sentence meaning as Devitt has it, but rather a departure default sentence meaning. meaning. The difference vast. It is a difference from the default difference is vast. difference of analysis. of the level of of analysis. The claim that the more meanings the sentence has, the more difficult difficult the interpretation interpretation is rather contentious. There is extensive evidence that utterance interpretation is incremental and proceeds, so to speak, 'bit by bit', using interpretation contextual clues in the process, rather than relying on the choice of an interpretation from a pool of possible readings of a sentence. Devitt is tied interpretation

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to the latter because he advocates the ambiguity of belief belief reports. He looks into context for their disambiguation. This stance is methodologically unparsimonious, as was demonstrated in an extensive discussion in Chapters 1 and and 22 (see (see also also Bezuidenhout's Bezuidenhout's 1997 1997 comments). comments). Namely, ambiguity does Devitt has problems problems of his own with his account. Namely, not yield easily to any syntactic or lexical explanation. So, So, the context has a role in disambiguating disambiguating a sentence that is is not even clearly 'unambiguously' 45 To ambiguous. ambiguous.45 To evoke Kripke's (1977:19) (1977:19) criticism of Donnellan, "[i]t is very much the lazy man's approach in philosophy to posit ambiguities when in trouble." And it is very much so when it involves ambiguity trouble."And involves adding new types of ambiguity that do not even yield clear definitions. definitions. There is an advantage of Devitt's negligible, though. He allows allows for MoPs to take the value account that is not negligible, zero, which is still shunned by the hidden-indexical theory (although to a lesser and lesser extent, extent, see Devitt 1996: 1996: 202, fn 63). 63). This move would, however, be better exploited if it was paired with an account that does resolving putative ambiguities but rather not confine the role of context to resolving assigns to it a more positive role of pointing to the suitable interpretation. Default Semantics offers this improvement. improvement. all, the adequate account of belief reports seems to lie closer to the All in all, hidden-indexical hidden-indexical theory than Devitt's 'sort-of-ambiguity' view. However, the hidden-indexical theory has to strengthen the account of the 'value zero' Mop, or, in other words, of the cases where MoP does not matter to of MoP, semantics. After all, these cases turn out to be the default, as is argued in more detail in the following Devitt's mistake is to think that the role following section. Devitt's of context is to lead the hearer to the relevant MoP (ibid.: 205). 205). Then he encounters the problem because context cannot do that. The context need not fulfil this role. role. Context performs performs the semantic task of enrichment when it is required. But this is not required by default, unless unless the expression contains other context-dependent elements or features such as indexicals, ellipsis or ambiguity. It is part of the definition definition of the de re syntactic or lexical ambiguity. interpretation that MoPs are mutually known and need not be specified.

Default De Re 4.5. Default The default status of the de re re reading of belief reports is not a novel idea. For interpretation, Burge example, Klein (1981) talks about its unmarkedness in interpretation, (1982) stress the fundamental fundamental role of de re beliefs in the (1977) and Bach (1982) 45 45

Cf.: ...) I do not know." Devitt (1996: 61). "Is the ambiguity ambiguity syntactic syntactic or lexical? lexical? ((...)! know." (1996: 200, fn 61). assigning an ambiguity ambiguity of a 'special sort' to attitude reports, which which is, is, clearly, an Devitt resorts to assigning escape rather than a solution, dictated dictated by a conviction that ambiguity ambiguity is definitely there.

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acquisition of knowledge about the world. Two Two things have to be discussed here. Firstly, the claim that the de re reading is indeed the default requires stronger theoretical theoretical support, and secondly, the extent of the contribution of pragmatic processes to the semantics of belief belief reports has to be assessed. of pragmatic assessed. Solutions to both problems problems will be shown to rely on intentions intentions in communication. In discourse, we normally regard constructions constructions of the type (3) as expressing B. People People normally report on people's beliefs as if Leibniz's something something about B. Leibniz's Law held, unless they have evidence that the holder holder of the belief belief was referentially mistaken or otherwise lacking in essential knowledge knowledge about the individual. Substitutivity salva veritate is a common fact of conversation and as such is uninteresting. What is interesting interesting is how it happens that reporter ascribes so much relevant knowledge knowledge to the holder of the belief, the reporter so to speak, by default. It is also interesting what mechanisms underlie the decision decision to depart from this default situation and how exactly they function. Chapter 2 that there are three types of intentions that It was suggested in Chapter accompany people's utterances: the referential intention which is an intention to secure the referent of an utterance; utterance; the informative intention which is an intention intention to convey a certain certain set of assumptions assumptions to the hearer hearer or make the 46 previously held tentatively; tentatively;46 hearer accept accept a certain set of assumptions previously and the communicative intention which is an intention to make it mutually mutually speaker has this informative obvious to the speaker speaker and the hearer hearer that the speaker intention. In Chapter 3, 3, it was suggested that the intentionality of mental acts makes these acts, and a fortiori linguistic expressions, about certain objects, fortiori linguistic and normally about real objects, where applicable. This property of mental accompanies utterances. utterances. acts is reflected in the referential intention which accompanies So, referential intention makes the referential interpretation of potentially So, the referential referring terms the norm. There are numerous partial arguments in favour of of the referential interpretation interpretation of definite descriptions descriptions and the de re interpretation interpretation of belief belief expressions expressions as the unmarked, more salient, or default one, i.e. the one that comes first to the hearer's mind.47 Now, it cannot be denied that on occasions like the Situation B following the Situation A, the hearer can be faced with potentially more than one reading of of Situation belief. There is an interpretative ambiguity the expression of belief. ambiguity there, perhaps better dubbed a multiple choice of interpretation, although the existence of this choice does not exclude the possibility that one of the readings of privileged as a more salient may be privileged salient or default one. Let us retrace the arguments for default interpretations of Chapter 2 in the example example of Bach's 46 46

In Sperber and Wilson's (1986a) terminology, this is an intention to make manifest or more manifest manifest to the hearer a certain set of assumptions. 47 47 Cf. also Salmon Salmon (1986: 121) 121) on what we called called de dicto/. dictoj.

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claim of underspecification. Sentence (49) is standardly regarded as interpretatively interpretatively ambiguous between the two readings: the transparent one, paraphrasable as in (49a), and the opaque one, paraphrasable as (49b): (49b): (49)

Mary believes that the present present king of Sweden is bald.

(49a) (49 a)

Mary believes of the present present king of Sweden that he is bald.

(49b)

Mary believes believes that there is a king of Sweden Sweden and that he is bald.

Bach (1987a: 206-207) argues that the distinction holds only for sentence use rather than for the semantic interpretation. He argues that although sentences of the type exemplified here by (49) can be assigned two representations representations in first-order logic that differ differ in the scope of the existential quantifier applied applied first-order king of Sweden' (ranging over the belief predicate and being within to 'the king belief predicate predicate respectively), this fact does not suffice to the scope of the belief fortiori, that it infer that this sentence has these two logical forms and, a fortiori, is ambiguous. I am inclined to agree with the latter claim but I have also argued that this consent does not yet mean that semantic representation has to be underspecified as to the particular meaning and as to truth representation of such conditions. Before reaching the verdict on the semantic representation interpretatively ambiguous sentences, sentences, it is necessary to investigate whether there are any general operational principles that would render one interpretation as primary, unmarked, that would under normal conditions conditions standard semantic representation function as the standard representation of the sentence. When an expression has two readings, such as a transparent and an opaque one in (49), caused by two different different occurrences of a definite description, the case of (49), the explanation explanation of these two readings is not provided by the logical form, i.e. by the scope of the existential quantifier. quantifier. The narrow scope reading can still be either transparent or opaque, depending on the particular occasion of its use. And, if there is no such logical explanation of the ambiguity, ambiguity, there is no semantic ambiguity either. Now, Now, those who exorcize the ambiguity view representation take a big leap from there to the claim that the semantic representation of (49) has to be indeterminate, underspecified, underspecified, unfit to be assigned truth conditions (see Bach 1987a: 1987a: 206-212). 206-212). It is also sometimes said that only underdetermined sentence have truth conditions, and thus the uses of an underdetermined the study of reference belongs to pragmatics. My standpoint represents a standpoint represents ambiguity thesis and the indeterminacy of sense. middle ground between the ambiguity To repeat the conclusions from Chapter 2, in my view a sentence of the type representation that corresponds corresponds to the standard, standard, (49) has a unique semantic representation default reading of the sentence and is achieved with the help of intentions intentions that 'intrude', so to speak, in the semantic representation. This representation

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assigned truth conditions and is fully operational on the level level of of can be assigned sentence use in some (default) cases. Other cases can be accounted for by the non-standard non-standard workings workings of intentions in communication. Now, in interpreting an utterance, the hearer is So much for the reminder. Now, not concerned with the question as to whether whether somebody is being referred to by a referring term. After all, in the phenomenological explanation, objects invoke acts and give give rise to ideas. This much is taken for granted. Rather, the normally hearer is interested in who this this person is. is. Even this question is not normally asked. The speaker relies on the knowledge of language and the world in his or her use of names and descriptions, as well as on the presumption that this knowledge is common or shared. Expressions are said by Husserl (1900-1901) to be applicable to objects as their 'clothing'. Knowing Knowing the object perception, or imaginadepends on the fulfilment fulfilment of the intentions in thought, perception, perception is the tion. They constitute acts of 'meaning formation' and perception meaningstrongest among them, it gives gives the strongest fulfilment fulfilment of the meaningintention, or, in other words, the most reliable knowledge. It also leads to belief beliefs with the highest degree of objectivity, beliefs de re re and hence also belief corresponding utterances about expressions with referential significance. The corresponding beliefs are thus de reo re. So, So, meaning meaning is provided at its best in perception; connect this claim warranty for a belief. belief. When we connect perception gives the best warranty with the one of Ideen (HusserlI913) (Husserl 1913) that intentionality of experience makes it a consciousness of the real world world (as a special case, so to speak, of possible particular object becomes becomes a default. worlds), then the priority of referring to a particular However, it has to be noted that to recognize recognize this role of perception is not perception are the only the same as to claim that acts that are fulfilled fulfilled in perception sources of reo of beliefs de re. Let us move on. Intentionality is said to be a social phenomenon. Meaning is not private, and yet it pertains to mental representations. It is so because because language gives gives thoughts some objectivity, without without precluding idiosyncrasies, referential mistakes, incorrect incorrect use of words, and the like. like. So, So, we can say that intentionality is social and individual at the same time. time. These features go neck and neck in the majority of cases but referential referential mistakes ocasionally happen and are a problem. Fig. 2 summarizes this case. The diagram juxtaposes juxtaposes the physical world and the mind in a way way loosely modelled on Fauconnier's (1985) mental spaces. Language is a vehicle of thought that builds its own constructions called mental spaces. The opaque and transparent readings of intensional contexts are explained by the ability ability of language to construct different different spaces, where objects are linked by 'pragmatic functions' (see ibid.: 4, 22). 22). In other words, a name that refers to an element element of one space, the world, can also refer to an element of the other space, the mind. The element of the mental is linked with with its real counterpart by a connector. But a name corresponding element exists can also set up an element in the mental if no corresponding in the world. However, However, Fauconnier's Fauconnier's approach does not explain the

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ontological ontological status of his constructs. constructs. Hence, instead of his mental spaces and a connector, I shall use the idea of intentionality which relates mental representations to the world, in accordance representations accordance with the phenomenological phenomenological tradition. In my diagrams, the ovals depict (i) (i) the totality of the mental representations of the holder of the belief and (ii) the world, the everyday experience. The connection between them common-sense reality of everyday has a clear epistemological status of intentionality of mental acts or corresponding states, and, in my account, it can be weaker or stronger. A mental act is about the word in, so to speak, two ways. For example, referring by the name 'Ortcutt' reaches Ortcutt Ortcutt because this is the correct individual that undergoes the name and this fact is mutually known to the interlocutors. It is caused by the initial act of naming the person as Ortcutt, community, etc. On the other hand, it spreading of this information in the community, is possible that the speaker can be referentially mistaken and then the belief belief is inherently about someone else, e.g. Smith. Hence, two'paths'of two 'paths' of intentionality have to be recognized: the social and the individual one. As a result of the discrepancy, the strength of intentionality as a semantic, meaning-giving tool is dispersed between 'intending Ortcutt' and 'intending Smith,.48 Smith'.48

intentionality social path

49 world49 the world

the mind Fig. 2 (from (from laszczolt Jaszczolt 1997a: 324).

correlate of the mental contains objects that are In Fig. 2, the world as a correlate correspond to other people's intersubjective, social, in that they correspond people's objects of of intentions. Yet Yet they need not correspond way correspond to them in a straightforward way of associating names and descriptions with objects, as the dispersion dispersion demonstrates. Now, Now, Husserl's idea of the horizon (see Section 3.5) secures 48 48 49 49

lowe I owe this idea to a discussion with Barry Smith. This is the common-sense world rather than the physical reality per se. se. See Smith 1994.

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the possibility of acquiring more knowledge about the object and filling the gaps or changing the set of properties assigned to the object. As a result, intentionality that has been weakened in its semantic function by the dispersion, dispersion, can become stronger and stronger as the distance between the social and the individual paths gradually disappears. The strongest strongest intentionality is the case of referring de re where the individual and the social correspond, Fig. 2 corresponds belief correspond, so to speak, to the same path. Fig. corresponds to the belief someone else. If the dispersion pertains to the reporter's mental de re about someone dicto J. The weakest case states, then Fig. Fig. 2 corresponds corresponds to the belief report de dictoj. of of intentionality is the belief de dicto where intentionality intentionality is dispersed to Fig. 3.3. the extent that it does not reach an object, as in Fig.

act of

intentionality

consciousnes~s~-\-_------F

the world

the mind Fig. 3 (from (from laszczolt Jaszczolt 1997a: 326).

This dispersion of intentionality intentionality has further consequences for MoPs. It is often say, often said that mental states relate to an object via an aspect, or we can say, a MoP (c( (cf. Searle 1983: 1983: 52). 52). But it is not always always necessary necessary for the hearer which the speaker intends an object in his or to know the aspect aspect under which belie( On the other hand, the aspect alone may not suffice her expression of belief. suffice for individuating the intended object. Unlike Unlike Fregean senses, aspects, like MoPs, should not be regarded as bound to individuals individuals because otherwise they other words, being recognized as cannot account for referential mistakes. In other Ortcutt has to, somehow or other, lead the reporter to recognizing that the belief can be about Smith when the holder of the belief is referentially mistaken. So, So, I suggested that when intentionality intentionality is the strongest and the uncontroversially about a certain intersubjectively mental state is uncontroversially intersubjectively recognizable object, the MoP need not be recovered recovered by the hearer because this

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189 189

recognition does not contribute anything to the semantics of the sentence. When the intentionality is dispersed between the wrongly intended individual Mop, individual properly properly picked out by the term, then the type of MoP, and the individual notably the information that there is a referential referential mistake involved and a 'pointer' at the intended individual is required. De dicto requires a more finely-grained finely-grained type of MoP or even full MoPs. Intentionality viewed viewed in this way performs another useful function. Frege says that there is no road back from the reference reference to the sense of an expression. This claim is too strong. In the case of referential referential mistakes, the mistaken referring term is itself a road back, if not to sense, then at least to the type of MoP. MoP. Frege posited objective objective senses and hence he could not see the road back: free MoPs were beyond his reach. Moreover, since utterances come with corresponding mental states to which the hearer can have some degree of access through the access to various vehicles vehicles of thought, then individuating the referent need not mean rejecting rejecting the accompanying MoPs just as we are we reach the referent (in that supposed to reject senses, like a ladder, when we psychology. But there sense replaces the reference where required). This is psychology. is in fact no such rejection in semantic theory either. As the theory of Default Semantics has it, MoPs and types types of MoPs are relevant for the semantics just as intentions are. They lead to the appropriate semantic representation for the sentence, the utterance of which is the starting point for the semantic analysis. One important caveat is needed at this point. To To approach approach the puzzles about propositional attitude contexts by looking at sentences and their putative prepositional ambiguities is is putting the cart before the horse. There are conversations conversations and utterances in the world, world, just as there are people, animals and things. The rest is the road from the physical to the mental and should remain as such. Hence, we should not shun the talk about utterances when looking theory. Utterances have their semantics. Ultimately, for a successful semantic theory. the semantic representation of the belief report is assigned thanks to pragmatic information, information, be it the default intentions or contextual clues pointing to other choices, namely de dicto dictoj1 or de dicto proper. The sentence uttered by the speaker does not provide sufficient sufficient information concerning reference assignment. The semantic representation, at the stage of LF, LF, requires a further determination coming from the speaker's referential referential intention, embedded in the informative informative and communicative intentions. Neither does the LF provide any indication concerning the correctness of the name or description used by the speaker. All in all, the truth conditions of the expressed proposition can only be stated had the LF been supplemented with a pragmatic resolution as as to whether the referring was was performed or not, and if so, so, whether it was performed correctly. correctly.Various Various degrees degrees of of pragmatic pragmatic contribution to the semantic representation are required for this, depending contribution on the degree of the departure of the interpretation from the default de

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reo re. In other words, intentions interact with the semantic representation, representation, they become a constitutive part of this cognitive representation representation and allow for the crucial 'disambiguating' (or: completing, fulfilling) information to be read off this complete cognitive, semantic representation. They also secure certain interpretations interpretations as unmarked and easily accessible to the hearer. This is, essentially, essentially, how intentions intentions 'interweave' with the LF and how utterances matter for the semantics. I have begun this section by repeating the well acknowledged claim that belief belief states are intentional and are normally directed towards objects in the world. If If it is so and if intentionality is a necessary precondition to call a state a belief, then de de re re beliefs are the default, natural ones. De re re reports reports are also conversationally more salient and unmarked. Other types of beliefs and reports are, so to speak, 'faulty' as far as the intentionality intentionality that accompanies accompanies them is concerned. De dicto beliefs are not properly about an object; de dicto dictoj1 reports pertain to the intentionality intentionality that is dispersed between the intended object and the intentional object assumed by the hearer, and the report de dicto proper is, individuated is, again, not about any particular, individuated object. The 'intention of intentionality' is satisfied there in that the state "sets 'sets off' as intentional but for some reason or other which which pertains to the background knowledge of the speaker, intentionality intentionality becomes dispersed and does not reach any individual. individual.The The object objectwas wasonly only weakly, weakly, "insufficiently' 'insufficiently' intended. In other words, intentionality intentionality is a matter of degree and although every belief state originates as intentional, not all of them turn out to be that way. De dicto reports are the extreme case of such a failure of of intentionality intentionality as a semantic tool. tool. So, So, it can be concluded that the intentionality intentionality of mental states provides an indelible argument for the default de re belief re readings readings of belief reports. Let us call this conclusion the Default De Re principle. principle.

re reading of sentences The Default De Re principle: The de re ascribing beliefs is the default reading. Other readings constitute degrees of departure from from the default, arranged on the scale of the strength of intentionality of the corresponding mental state. The principle can be expanded as follows: follows: (i) The hearer of an expression of belief of the form "8 'B qJs'
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The default default de re principle principle

191 191

(ii) The hearer hearer of a belief belief report of the form :.\ 'A believes that 'B qJs'
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is undoubtedly the case of the strongest informative informative and communicative intention, involving involving a strong referential referential intention. It is also the case of the strongest strongest cognitive effect effect achieved with claiming the smallest smallest processing processing effort effort from the interlocutor. So, So, although it seems possible to argue that the de dicto reading is the default because smaller effect corresponds corresponds to less effort, it would be difficult difficult even to think up examples of what hedges and explanations leading to the marked, de re interpretation interpretation would look like. Now, Now, it has to be remembered that relevance theory makes use of the balance of costs and effects effects in conjunction with the idea of underspecified semantics. Hence, defaults are excluded. Arguments against underspecificity were put forward in Chapter 2 and will not be discussed here. here. To To say the least, underspecificity is also a costly move. To sum up: people normally entertain entertain thoughts about objects of some sort. For instance, although someone may not know that 'Yr Wyddfa' is coreferential with with 'Snowdon' 'Snowdon' and 'the Morning Star' is coreferential coreferential with 'the Evening Star', the person is likely to act as ifhis/her if his/her 'Yr Wyddfa' was Snowdon Venus, i.e. the celestial and 'the Morning Star' was Venus, celestial body that is the referent of of both names. This presumption of unproblematic reference is made by the hearer and subsequently utilized in the belief report. If it is not the case, something connection and the default does not apply. something went wrong in the connection This seems to be the meeting point of the two ends of the 'default de re' re* argument. Doing something by "anything goes as long as it is not misleading" meets with "this is what intentionality makes us do". The failure failure to see that a is of de dicto J.j. But as long as b is not an object of identical with b is an instance of the believer's thoughts while a is, is, 'default de re' re9 goes through since a is a MoP (albeit (albeit coarsely-grained) coarsely-grained) of what in reality is an object 'a + + b' (such as e.g. Snowdon or Venus). normally provides an All in all, it can be concluded that the discourse normally object of reference reference for belief expressions and by default it provides the de re interpretation belief reports. People normally talk about known interpretation of belief individuals that can be identified somehow or other by both interlocutors. defaults in Misunderstandings are avoided in conversation thanks to the defaults utterance utterance processing. processing. There is ample evidence that discourse is governed by the Default De Re principle. It has also been suggested that belief reports intentionality is either dispersed (cf. (cf. Fig. 3) or 'proceeds are de dicto when intentionality towards two objects' objects' (cf. (cf. Fig. 2).

4.6. Interim Conclusions

I argued in this chapter that the solution to the problem of the semantics of belief reports does not rest on the putative solution to the lack of substitutivity belief Philosophical debates on substitutivity salva veritate in these constructions. constructions. Philosophical

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The default principle default de re principle

193 193

salva veritate in intensional contexts consider consider only the aftermath of the conversational problem of how belief reports are actually interpreted. They under which substitutivity goes through. In reporting consider conditions under truth-preserving, on beliefs, people's people's substitutions are not necessarily truth-preserving, especially mistakes to be repaired. repaired. Moreover, it especially that there are referential mistakes has been argued that it will not do to say that in belief contexts substitutivity does not hold. The situation is not of the all-white or all-black type. Let me explain in the example of Bach's recent suggestion. way. He says Bach (1997) approaches attitude attitude contexts in the following way. says that specify what people believe but merely describe or belief reports do not specify belief characterize the content of beliefs (cf (cf. ibid.: 225). For the report to be true, the believer has to believe something whose truth requires the truth truth of the proposition embedded in the belief Now, the lack of substitutivity proposition embedded belief report. Now, in reports is explained thus. If If I say that x cps, the name I use for x does belief. But reports are different not affect affect the belief. different from beliefs. Reports describe beliefs, the name used is relevant. explanation is not complete and rests on intuitively intuitively dubious This explanation re or de dicto and their being one or the other assumptions. Beliefs can be de re type, the name or description affects the content. In the case of the latter type, under which the person believes something is relevant to the content of of the belief. belief Just as the name can be relevant for the belief, so it can be relevant Putting the blame on describing as opposed to specifying specifying for the report. Putting the content will not do. belief do. Sometimes the substitution substitution goes through in belief reports and this fact has to be acknowledged. acknowledged. And it can only be acknowledged if we accept the gradation of the contribution of the MoP to the semantics semantics of attitude attitude reports that yields de re, re, de dicto dictoj1 and de dicto proper. rephrasing someone's belief There is no universal strategy for rephrasing someone's expression of belief. way in which This fact has been widely acknowledged for a long time. The way 50 an expression can be rephrased depends on the purpose at the moment. moment. 50 In other words, it depends on the context including the speaker's intentions. All in all, propositional propositional attitudes and their reports should be analysed with respect to reference, as well as mental states, actions, situation, and background knowledge. knowledge. Most of all, belief utterances and beliefs have to fit in one theory (cf. (cf Recanati 1993:21 1993:21 on utterances and thoughts in pragmatics).

50

Quine discusses this in 1960 and 1969.

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4.7. Loose Ends: Context and and Presupposition Projection This section contains some brief brief remarks remarks on the relationship relationship between between presupposition presupposition research research and the search for the semantics and pragmatics of belief always seemed to be of belief reports. The studies of presupposition presupposition have always tangential to the latter. However, they made use of the same advances in processes to the semantics. The contribution of context and pragmatic processes semantics affected progress in both areas. Various Various attempts to exorcise affected the progress semantic presupposition presupposition came close to the attempts to see the semantics of prepositional propositional attitude sentences as the matter of the choices of interpretation affected which, somehow or other, fills pretation affected by the context of utterance which, in the skeletal semantic representation. Presuppositions have been classified classified 1979; Kempson 1975, 1979; Boer with entailment and implicature (Atlas 1977, 1977,1979; 1975,1979; and Lycan 1976; Wilson 1975) or as pragmatic or otherwise contextual contextual (Stalnaker 1973, 1973, 1974; 1974; Gazdar Gazdar 1979).51 1979).51 In this section, I shall remark on the connection between the presuppositions of the complement sentence belief reports and the verb 'believe' and comment comment on the impact of of of belief presupposition research on the Default De Re principle. presupposition First, some terminological remarks are in place. Presupposition is standardly standardly defined as a relation between two sentences such that when one sentence presupposes presupposes another, then if the second one is false, the first account is one is neither true not false. Instead, it lacks truth value. This account due to Strawson (1950), whereas the notion of truth-value truth-value gaps comes from Quine 1960. I960.52 For example, sentence (50) presupposes (51): (50)

The president of Poland is a young man.

(51)

There is a president of Poland.

Attitude reports with factive verbs presuppose presuppose what the complement sentence complement clause to states. They also allow the presuppositions of the complement percolate to the whole attitude sentence. For example, (52) presupposes presupposes (53) percolate and (54):53 (54):53 51 51 For a defence 151) defence of of semantic presupposition see Burton-Roberts 1989. Burton-Roberts (ibid.: 151) talks about presupposition as default implication. implication. For a discussion see Turner 1992. 1992. See also Carston of logic see Seuren 1990 and Burton-Roberts Carston 1996. On trivalence vs. vs. 'gapped bivalence' of 1990. 52 52 Cf. also Strawson 1964b on the limitations truth-value gaps. limitations of truth-value 53 53 Karttunen (1973) classifies predicates into three groups: (i) those that block off all the plugs; (ii) presuppositions of the complement sentence, called plugs; (ii) those that let all such matrix sentence, called holes; and (iii) presuppositions become presuppositions of the matrix (iii) those that cancel only certain presuppositions of the complement sentence, called filters. filters. He claims claims that non-factive attitude verbs should be classified as plugs. of plugs. Arguments Arguments against this treatment of 'believe' are laid down in what follows.

Section 7

The default default de re principle

(52)

Mary knows that John stopped smoking.

(53)

John stopped smoking.

(54)

John used to smoke.

195 195

Presupposition can be contrasted with entailment which is the relation where if one sentence entails another and the entailed one is false, the first one is also false. Presupposition as defined above is the logical presupposition of a sentence and one of several possible understandings understandings of the sentential presupposition. The problems with this account are ample and will not be repeated here save for the fact that (55) can be plausibly regarded as having a truth value, value, namely namely being true rather than truth-valueless. truth-valueless. The intuitions are strengthened when 'not' is stressed (cf. (cf. Horn 1985 1985 and 1989 1989 on metalinguistic negation). (55)

The present king of France is NOT bald, there isn't any king of of 54 France!54 France!

presupposition goes as follows. A sentence A less formal definition of presupposition presupposes another sentence when uttering it the speaker presupposes this other sentence. This definition has a more pragmatic flavour. flavour. In this account, presuppositions seem to be all those beliefs of the holder of the original belief belief expressed by the analysed sentence which have to be held together with this belief. But whether these are actual beliefs or, perhaps, dispositions particular belief. dispositions to act as if one held these beliefs or expressions one would assent to when asked, is a moot point (see Stalnaker 1973, 1973, 1974, 1998). So, So, presuppositions can be tied to the sentence or to the speaker, they can be context-dependent, or even reduced implicature and entailment. There are many reduced to the notion of implicature classifications and theories of presupposition, a discussion of which will not not be attempted here (see e.g. Beaver 1997; Gazdar 1979; Seuren 1989; Appendix Appendix to Jaszczolt 1992). It is self-evident that for the semantics of attitude contexts it is the existential presupposition that is of primary interest, as well 'believe'can as an inquiry into whether 'believe' can behave as a factive verb in that it allows of presuppositions to go through. It is also evident that an intuitive notion of presupposition is needed which encompasses statements to which the holder of beliefa is committed by force of holding the belief beliefa. This set of propositions of belief constitutes part of context, always always changing and affecting affecting the semantics of the analysed expression, expression, in accordance with dynamic semantics. Speaker's 54 54

non-truth-functional aspects of negation negation see also Wilson's (1975:150) example in (i). For non-truth-functional (i) He didn't lose his little finger: they removed arm. removed his whole arm.

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presuppositions, understood in this way, are predictable predictable to a degree by means presuppositions, of of pragmatic principles of interpretation, including conventions, conventions, knowledge of the world, and default intentions. Presuppositions Presuppositions and de re re are intertwined in various ways. Heim's belief reports is essential suggestion suggestion goes as follows. An adequate adequate theory of belief essential because intuitions alone about unmarkedness in belief contexts are not reliable. Heim (1992) (1992) claims that "".... .. common wisdom certainly has it the other way way round: de dicto readings are the unmarked choice" (ibid.: 210), giving Quine's example of 'the man Ralph saw at the beach' in support. This however, is the starting point for arguing for the priority of of de intuition, however, reo re. She concedes that the de re reading should be defined as 'standing in a relation of acquaintance'. acquaintance'. Existential Existential quantification quantification over acquaintance relations is too strong: ""... ... there is not really just one de re re reading (for (for a given given constituent), but there are are many - one one for for each acquaintance acquaintance relation that the context might supply." Heim (1992: 210-211). supply." (1992: 210-211).

Further, if the description (say: MoP) used by the reporter and the one used Further, says, de re for the individuation by the believer coincide, then, as Heim says, resembles de dicto in that it entails it. Although her classification is based functional principles and lacks the cognitive support we assigned to on functional re/de dicto earlier, it captures some intuitions intuitions on the matter. In practice, practice, de re/de frequently impossible to tell whether the holder of the belief belief thinks about it is frequently MoP. So, So, MoPs do not matter for the an individual under any particular MoP. semantics by default; they only matter on some occasions. occasions. concerning the The default status of de re re also supports supports the intuitions concerning percolation of presuppositions from the embedded sentence to the attitude percolation report as a whole. non-factive verb and, in the standard view, whole. 'Believe' is a non-factive blocks otT off the presuppositions of the complement sentence. But this claim 214), observes, following Karttunen 1974, is far too strict. As Heim (ibid.: 214), percolation from the embedded presupposition projection, including percolation embedded sentence sentence to the whole whole attitude report is a matter of plausibility and common sense. She accounts for it by the change of context in her version of dynamic semantics, similar to the way it is performed in DRT in Chapter similar Chapter 7. 7. In other other words, whether the presuppositions of the complements permeate to the main clause is a matter of expectations and default situations. For example, (56) is taken to presuppose that it was raining because the embedded sentence presupposes presupposes it presuppose as a matter of its semantics and because the most natural source of John's belief is the fact that is was indeed raining. Observing that it is raining is belief the most natural condition under which which John can form his belief. (56)

John believes that it stopped raining.

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197 197

(from Heim 1992: 206). In other words, (56) should should presuppose (57), whereas it seems, intuitively, intuitively, to presuppose (58): (57)

John believes that it was raining.

(58)

It was raining.

The only explanation of this is context-change, plausibility, intuitions, the source of belief, and the like. like. Heim uses here Stalnaker's (1973, 1974) idea of presuppositions as background background beliefs of the speaker's, as dispositions to behave as if one held certain assumptions. Presupposition Presupposition is not defined conditions. Instead, constraints on presuppositions can vary in terms of truth conditions. from context to context (cf. (cf. Stalnaker 1974: 1974: 212). 212). Beliefs and intentions of of the speaker's 55 speaker's explain his or her presuppositions.55 It seems that this percolation percolation of presuppositions presuppositions relies on a high degree of of acquaintance acquaintance with facts and objects talked about. The speaker and the holder of the belief are assumed to share beliefs as long as the context does not below, not only (5 a), but even the indicate otherwise. So, So, in (5) (5) repeated below, (5a), existential presupposition (5b) goes through through because the holder of the belief existential presupposition belief is assumed to be like the rest of us and is assumed to be sufficiently sufficiently acquainted with the object of his belief belief to hold a belief belief de re: re:

(5)

Ralph spy. Ralph believes that Ortcutt is a spy.

(5 a) (5a)

somebody called Ortcutt. Ralph believes that there is somebody

(5 b) (5b)

There There is somebody somebody called Ortcutt. Ortcutt.

The percolation percolation of (5b) from the embedded sentence in (5a) to the whole report in (5) (5) seems to indicate that unless the context dictates otherwise, the de re reading is assumed. Van Van der Sandt (1988) (1988) gives gives an argument similar to Heim's which can also be used in support support of the Default De Re principle. Van der Sandt advocates a contextual account of presupposition. Similar to Heim, he claims that presuppositions of the sentence sentence embedded embedded under the 'believe' verb in (59), such as (60) and (61), percolate to the whole attitude percolation is of an intuitive kind, or, in other words, (59) report. This percolation 'strongly suggests' (60) and and (61) (61) (ibid.: 226): 55 55

When presupposition presupposition is defined denned as a disposition to act as if what is presupposed was the case as Stalnaker (1973) (1973) suggests, suggests, a set of such presuppositions should, common-sensically, common-sensically, be seen to be consistent and deductively words, it should be possible to characterize deductively closed. In Stalnaker's words, it in terms of a set of possible worlds. worlds. Although it may be a moot point whether this ideal is whether it can be reached at all, it seems to reflect human rational normally reached, or even whether behaviour. In order to act consistently, consistently, or, perhaps, to act at all, presuppositions should not be contradictory. contradictory. So, So, consistency consistency of beliefs is not merely merely a vague assumption.

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(59)

John believes that the chief chief of Buru Buru has eaten three more missionaries. missionaries.

(60) (60)

There is a chief of Buru Buru.

(61)

chief of Buru Buru has eaten some missionaries missionaries before. The chief

(from (from van der Sandt 1988: 1988: 223). He says that the presuppositions embedded under non-factives are, so to speak, "indexed for the subject of the attitude" ({bid.: (ibid.: 226). Presuppositions that are not embedded embedded are indexed for the speaker. Now, Now, if the presuppositions presuppositions in (60) and (61) do not conflict with other presuppositions indexed for the speaker that are already accepted of presuppositions accepted as part of knowledge, then they can be added to the context. So, the background knowledge, So, if there is no conflict, then these presuppositions percolate as in (59). They become unaffected by embedding embedding under a belief belief (or other other non-factive prepositional propositional unaffected attitude) verb. What is more important, this situation appears to be the default. The presuppositions presuppositions normally normally percolate, unless unless the context suggests otherwise. 'Context' includes here the presuppositions presuppositions already added to it, i.e. the ones coming from extensional sentences. sentences. Hence, by force of the percolation of (60), the de re reading is vindicated as a default. Although, percolation as I indicated above, the de re re reading requires requires acquaintance acquaintance rather than presupposition of existence, the presupposition existence, the presupposition of existence points very strongly to the case of 'knowing who' the discourse discourse is about. In other other words, it points to having sufficient knowledge of the individual individual to be able to hold sufficient knowledge a belief about this individual's individual's having having certain properties. properties. To To sum up, unless knows who and the context suggests otherwise, the holder of the belief knows By 'knowing who' I mean the individuation knows what he is taking about. By of the referent, and by 'knowing what' a state (or event) (61) event) as in (60) and (61) re, and since respectively. Default percolation is thus entailed by default de re, independently supported by van der Sandt's contextual theory, theory, the first is independently Heim's context-change and also by empirical and common-sense common-sense evidence, considerably strengthened. default de re is considerably strengthened. On the other hand, in the discussed accounts, the permeability permeability of of presuppositions to the main clause of the attitude report is context-dependent re/de dicto dicto distinction. The compatibility of the to an extent greater greater than the de re/de presuppositions has to be checked first with the extant believer-indexed presuppositions context before they are added to it. But the difference difference may be only in the plausibly mean adding manner of speaking. Checking with the context can plausibly to the context unless there is some indication in the context that this incrementation cannot go through. There seems to be no reason not to amend incrementation cannot Stalnaker's picture in this way. way. Now, let us consider (62). Now, (62). It presupposes that Ortcutt was rich in the past but this state of being rich ended.

Section 7

(62)

The default default de re principle

199

Ortcutt is rich again.

Sentence (63) also presupposes that, although it need not presuppose presuppose that Ralph knows that Ortcutt Ortcutt had been rich at least once before. The reporter reporter may add 'again' because he or she knows it. (63)

Ralph believes believes that Ortcutt is rich again.

In interpreting (63), one has to rely on contextual information. information. Fauconnier Fauconnier (1985: 105-108) and Sweetser and Fauconnier (1996: 15) use a similar example (1985:105-108) (1996:15) with reference reference to pictures. 'Picture spaces' can include more than what the picture represents. Similarly, here the 'belief 'belief space' may include more than the actual belief. belief. The presupposition connected with the word 'again' may hold in the original space but not in the belief space, although it appears appears to belong there. It may only result from the way way the speaker describes describes Ralph's belief. The connection between the presupposition and the belief report is clearly context-bound. It remains to assess more carefully the evidence for the unmarkedness of of the de re interpretation that comes from the existential presupposition. presupposition. The de re/de re/de dicto distinction clearly does not correspond to the distinctions of scope of the existential existential quantifier quantifier for definite descriptions. There are referential mistakes that correspond correspond to beliefs beliefs de re about someone someone else referential mistake and at the same time, in our account, to expressions with a referential dictoj.1. There is no formal formal marker in English sentences that and reports de dicto indicate which of the readings, i.e. which type of referring, was would indicate above, the existence of the individual intended. Moreover, as it was observed above, is not a condition for a de re belief. Rather, having having sufficient sufficient knowledge of the individual to hold beliefs about this individual is such a condition. Heim (1992: 210-211) 210-211) ties a de re re reading to a relation of acquaintance. Existence is too weak a notion, although undoubtedly it overlaps with the acquaintance relation in that the existential presupposition such as (60) helps make the individual intersubjectively recognizable, or, so to speak, ties the description individual. On the other hand, we we should probably to some or other real individual. extend the notion of existence to 'having reference' since it is perfectly perfectly possible for somebody to hold beliefs de re re about non-existent objects. Imaginary Imaginary objects that are common to the linguistic linguistic community, community, such as Santa Claus or Snow White do not create problems of interpretation. Sentences involving involving these creatures will presumably have presuppositions of the type type 'Snow White has a referent' (in the world of the community's shared beliefs). These presuppositions can be cancelled in the process of conversation but initially, the hearer of the report thinks that there is an object (a representation) in the speaker's speaker's mind, a well as in the believer's believer's mind, that satisfies the description or name used by the speaker.

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All in all, presuppositions presuppositions fare better in semantics when they are construed construed as intuitively recognized beliefs. If at all present, they are attached recognized beliefs. attached to utterances utterances of sentences and appear, so to speak, when context allows them to appear as Heim's and van der Sandt's approaches demonstrate. Sentences do not have stable and definable sets of presuppositions. presuppositions. Moreover, logical implication implication and entailment entailment do not seem to be very helpful for analysing presuppositions. presuppositions. When sentence b is logically logically deducible from sentence a, then a entails b. b. But in discourse there are limits to this deducibility. deducibility. Not all that 56 is entailed is necessarily believed. Deducibility should be confined to, so believed.56 to speak, 'straightforward deducibility', to pairs of sentences that are somehow speak,'straightforward connected connected in meaning and relevant to each other. This relation depends on the background knowledge and intentions and attitudes of the holder of the belie( belief. Seen in this way, way, entailment ceases to be a logical relation and pertains to cognitive science instead. Now, Now, coming back to Karttunen's (1973) (1973) distinction into plugs, holes and filters, non-factive non-factive attitude verbs seem to behave as plugs only when the context makes them do so, so, just as Gazdar's (1979) (1979) so-called so-called 'potential presuppositions' can be cancelled in the context. context.57 Letting the default go through or preventing it from doing so is performed by clues coming from very different different sources that sum up to contextual information. coming However, it seems to be possible to order propositional prepositional attitude verbs on according to the degree to which which they tend to a scale, albeit imprecise, according preserve presuppositions of the embedded sentence. Attitude verbs appear appear not to undergo the binary factive/non-factive distinction. distinction. Just as defining 'believe' as a plug is incorrect, so is defining it as non-factive. non-factive. After all, the de re re reading is the default, and existential existential (or otherwise referential referential58)) presupposition presupposition is linked to it. It seems that the study of the behaviour of presuppositions is of limited use for the semantics of attitude contexts. Neither the existential existential presupposition presupposition (if any) any) linked with the definite description, nor the permeability permeability of some presuppositions presuppositions to the main clause of the attitude report point to the use presupposition research for the semantics of attitude constructions. of the presupposition 56 56

Hintikka (1962, 1975) talks about about believing the 'surface consequences' of a belief together together with holding holding the belief. Knowledge Knowledge and belief are invariant invariant to equivalences equivalences "necessary "necessary for understanding what what is being believed" (1975: 190), 190), although although they are not invariant to logical equivalence. Cf. also: "Notice that I am not saying saying that nobody will be found who will sincerely sincerely say that he fails to "Notice believe that q even when he believes believes that p and when (p::) (p D q) is a surface tautology at have done is to provide provide a sense of understanding in which such a the depth of p. What I have failure ipso facto shows saying.... shows that he does not fully understand understand what he is saying." Hintikka (1975: (1975: 190). 57 57 Gazdar suggests a strict 'order of incrementation': clausal implicatures implicaturesare areadded addedto tothe thecontext context first, then scalar implicatures, and presuppositions. 132. presuppositions. Cf. ibid.: 132. 58 58 This amendment amendment comes from Seuren (1989: (1989: 10).

Section Section 7

The default default de re principle

201 201

Presupposition, re/de dicto distinction, Presupposition, just as the de re/de distinction, relies on contextual contextual information. The choice between de re re and de dicto relies on whether the individual is known known to the believer or the reporter rather than whether it exists, exists, just as the property of permeability of presuppositions relies on common knowledge rather than the LF. LF. Presupposition Presupposition appears to be tangential to the interpretation of belief belief reports and other non-factive attitude reports alike. Presupposition Presupposition projection is a separate issue that affects affects attitude reports just as it affects affects other types of sentences.

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CHAPTER 5

The Lexicon Lexicon and the Power of Referring "If God had looked into our minds he would not have been able to see there whom we of:' we were speaking of." 217e)11 Wittgenstein (1953: 217C)

Contents 5.1. 5.2. 5.3. 5.4. 5.5. 5.6.

An Overview ................................................ 204 Redefining Referring Referring Expressions Expressions .................................. 205 Proper Names and Modes of Presentation 211 Proper Presentation ............................ 211 Degrees of Referring: 215 Referring: A Unified Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 215 Referring by Indexicals ......................................... 216 Referent Accessibility Accessibility and the Strength Strength of Referring ..................... 223 5.6.1. The Givenness Hierarchy ................................... 223 5.6.2. Accessibility Accessibility Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 227 5.6.3. Classification Classification and Explanation ............................... 230 5.6.4. Intentions Again .......................................... 232 5.7. Conclusions ................................................. 234

DISCOURSE, BELIEFS, BELIEFS, AND INTENTIONS DISCOURSE, Current Research in the Semantics/Pragmatics Semantics/Pragmatics Interface, Vol. Vol. 2 K.M. Jaszczolt Jaszczolt 1999 Elsevier Elsevier Science Science Ltd. Ltd. All rights rights reserved © 1999 1 "Gott, wenn wenn er er in in unsre unsre Seelen Seelen geblickt geblickt hatte, hatte, hatte hatte dort nicht nicht sehen sehen konnen, konnen, von von wem wem wir 1 "Gott, sprachen:' Wittgenstein (1953: 217). sprachen."

203

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5.1. An Overview

It appears from the discussions in Chapter 4 that proper names and definite descriptions exhibit more similarities similarities than is customary to admit. They engender similar difficulties interpretation in belief reports. As difficulties of interpretation a result, definite descriptions which which are often classified with with quantifiers rather than with referring expressions expressions are here classified as referring expressions. This chapter provides further support for this theoretical decision by considering reference reference both in intensional and extensional contexts. In Section 5.2, I argue exhibit argue that although definite descriptions exhibit an ambiguity of use between between the referential and the attributive attributive reading, they also exhibit the property of having an unmarked, salient interpretation interpretation referential terms. This salient reading which makes them akin to directly referential is the referential interpretation, arrived at with the help of the hearer's presumption of the presence of a strong referential intention that presumption accompanies the speaker's utterance. The argument here is the same as that used for the default status of the de re interpretation of of belief reports. In this section I also discuss the concept concept of referring and some properties of of expressions that are normally used to refer to individuals. Section 5.3 puzzle and the use 5.3 follows suit with a brief discussion of Kripke's puzzle of of proper names. In Sections 5.4 5.4 and 5.5, 5.5, expressions expressions that are used to refer, including indexicals, are shown to exhibit various degrees of referring referring expressions properties. These properties yield a classification of referring which is compatible with a scale of referential properties proposed by the Givenness Hierarchy (Gundel, Hedberg and Zacharski 1993; Gundel 1996) and Accessibility Theory (Ariel 1988, 1990, 1991, 1991, 1994, 1996), discussed in Section 5.6. 5.6. I propose that expressions expressions that are used to refer differentiated by this gradation constitute one category that is internally differentiated of of referring referring properties. It is demonstrated that the adopted classification is compatible, and even improved, by a merger with the theory of Default Semantics proposed in Chapter 2. 2. The use of a particular referring expression by the speaker is guided by the salience of the referent in referent by the hearer is guided Similarly, the recovery of the referent the discourse. Similarly, by the degree of accessibility accessibility associated with the referring expression used by the speaker. According to Gundel (1996), the Givenness Hierarchy does not 'explain', it merely 'classifies'. Instead, I argue that the form of an expression and how it is chosen by the speaker (and interpreted by the hearer) are two aspects of the same explanation. This explanation is derived from the referential intention, based on the idea of of recognition of the degree of referential recognition the intentionality of mental states developed in Chapter 3. 3. I conclude with degrees of intentions intentions to a wide range of referring an attempt to assign degrees of expressions and, at the same time, with disclosing some limitations of

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the elaborate scale of expressions in the Accessibility Theory. The hierarchy confirms that expressions that are used to refer do not fall into two categories of directly referring expressions and quantifiers but rather form a continuum. In other words, instead of the dichotomy of the direct/contextual reference, reference, there is a gradation of referring properties. I call this explanation explanation a unified approach. Section 5.7 5.7 summarizes the results and signals possible future developments.

5.2. 5.2. Redefining Referring Expressions

everyday discourse, we constantly refer to objects and people in an almost In everyday way.When the speaker uses a proper name or a description as automatic way. 'Ludwig Wittgenstein' and 'the author of The Language Instinct' in (1) (1) and (2), (2),'Ludwig Wittgenstein'and respectively, to the bearer of the name and the bearer of the are used to refer, respectively, description:2 description: (l) (1)

Ludwig Wittgenstein lived in Cambridge.

(2)

The author of The Language Instinct is visiting Scotland.

Expressions used by speakers to refer are commonly divided into two categories: that of directly referring expressions and that of expressions whose referring function is secured by the context of utterance. Let us recall 4. Directly referring (or: their properties that were set out in Chapter 4. 1993: 31) 31) expressions are said to contribute an 'type-referential', Recanati 1993: object rather than their descriptive meaning to the proposition proposition expressed. Their descriptive meaning is external to the proposition expressed by the utterance. They are normally said to include ordinary proper names, some pronouns including demonstrative, and demonstrative phrases (cf. (cf. Neale 1990: 1990: 15). 15). Direct reference is often equated with rigidity. An expression that if, in every counterfactual counterfactual situation, refers to an individual is rigid if and only if, involving this expression involve involve this the truth conditions of a sentence involving individual. But then, some definite descriptions are also rigid. rigid. For example, 'the cube root of 27' is rigid. It picks out the same object in all possible worlds 1993: ll)? II).3 A great majority of definite descriptions, (example after Recanati 1993: directly. They refer when the context allows them to however, do not refer directly. do so. so. In other words, they are 'token-referential' (jbid.: (ibid.: 31). 31). But then, some proper names also refer by tokens rather than types. types. As names, they can 2 2 In this discussion I shall not talk about the formal semantic accounts of the determiner 'the' in the framework of generalized quantifiers. For an introduction and references see Keenan 1996. 3 3 Cf. Cf. also Kripke's 1972 1972 solution solution and Recanati 1981, 1981, 1988, 1988, 1989a.

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be applicable to many individuals. Both these categories have been discussed in the (neo-)Fregean and (neo-)Russellian traditions for almost a century but their semantics is still unresolved. To To repeat, Frege assigned descriptions descriptions to the category of referring expressions and claimed that, in ordinary, extensional contexts, the proposition proposition expressed contains both the reference and the MoP of the referent. referent. Russell (1905, 1919) 1919) classified them with quantifiers and separated which separated them from directly referring expressions, which led to counter-arguments from Strawson (1950), (1950), Donnellan (1966) (1966) and many others (see also Neale 1990; Ludlow and Neale 1991). In Russell's account, definite descriptions are existentially existentially quantified NPs with a uniqueness condition that can be formalized in the ways presented below (cf. (cf. Neale 1990: 45). 3x(F(x) & Vy(F(y) --+ & G(x» 3x(F(x)&Vy(F(y) -» Y y == x) x)&G(x)) '[the x: x: Fx] Fx] (Gx)' is is true itT iff IF |F - GI G| == 0 and IFI |F| == 11 where F is is the set of all things that are F, F, analogously for for G, G, and F - G is is the set of things that are F and not-G. IFI |F| is the cardinality cardinality of F. The strict binary distinction seems rather difficult justify in natural natural difficult to justify language and in particular in the analysis of discourse (see also Larson and Segal 1995; Salmon 1986; 1986; Bach 1987a; 1987a; laszczolt Jaszczolt 1997a; Brown Brown 1995). and Proper names and definite descriptions are both used to refer in a conversation. Definite descriptions can be used referentially or attributively. But even though descriptions need not come with the referential function function and can merely merely ascribe some attributes to whoever whoever undergoes this description, this duality duality of use is not in itself proof proof of their ambiguity. proof of their qualitative qualitative distinction distinction from proper names Neither is it proof indexicals. Their referring function may merely merely be, so to speak, slightly and indexicals. less salient salient than that of proper names names and indexicals. indexicals. A similar similar gradation of salience can be perceived perceived throughout the range of expressions that speakers use to refer. In demonstrating the plausibility of such a scale, I shall begin by discussing discussing three connected tenets of Kent Bach's (1987a): (i) "[T]he "[TJhe study of reference belongs not to semantics but to pragmatics" (p. 61); (ii) "[S]peaker reference linguistic reference is a more fundamental notion than linguistic reference" (p. 49); and simply not (iii) "[A]n expression's referring function, when it has one, is simply part of its semantic contribution to the sentence" (p. 58).

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It follows that the differences in the referring referring function between different different types

of expressions that are used to refer4 do not pertain pertain to the differences in their Now, the ambiguity between referential and attributive attributive uses of semantics. semantics. Now, definite descriptions descriptions may seemingly point in the direction direction of such a difference. difference. However, the principles of co-operation co-operation in conversation, such as Levinson's (1987) I, Q, and M principles, Sperber and Wilson's (1986a) presumption of relevance or any other developments of Grice's Co-operative Co-operative Principle, Principle, guarantee that the ambiguity does not arise. But this does not normally guarantee yet mean that the contribution contribution of the definite description description to the semantics semantics of the sentence is the same no matter in what way it was used. Although reference is a pragmatic notion, it is also a semantic one to the extent to which, so to speak, information from the referential referential intention is required. In other words, when the description description is used referentially, the default semantics ensues, description 'stands for'an for' an individual. A referential mistake results in that is the description contribution of pragmatic processes to the semantic representation representation of a larger contribution the sentence, and the attributive use in the largest since the MoP or MoPs of of relevant. So, So, although reference reference is a pragmatic concept, concept, the individual are relevant. it is also semantic in this intrusionist-semantic account. referential and attributive uses of definite Searle's (1979) discussion of referential descriptions descriptions makes it clear that there are degrees of relevance of MoP for the proposition proposition expressed. He says that the referential use expresses the so-called 'secondary aspect', while the attributive use the 'primary aspect'. In other words, if the utterance is about whoever the described individual might happen to be, the primary aspect of the description is used. Truth conditions conditions of the statement depend on the aspect. And yet descriptions descriptions are not ambiguous. The secondary secondary aspect coincides with the case when the speaker speaker means more than what he says. says. The type of use depends on Now, the speaker's intentions intentions (ibid.: 200). Now,

we report someone's reference we are often in varying ""... ... when we degrees committed to reporting the aspects under which the (ibid.: 201). reference was made:' made." In reporting reporting on the attributive use, the reporter normally preserves the believer's aspect. In the case of the referential use, the reporter typically typically uses one of the aspects (i.e. (i.e. MoPs) that are available to the believer. believer. But this is not a reliable, steadfast rule. Both uses are in a sense referential as they mean referring to objects to some extent. They differ differ in the degree of this referring intention. and hence in the degree of referential intention. 4 4 Although in Chapter 4 I have have extended the category of referring expressions expressions to include include definite descriptions, at present I shall shall use instead the non-committal term 'expressions that are used to refer' for the reason of clarity in surveying surveying extant approaches.

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Conversational Conversational practice practice seems to confirm this theory. theory. In her data-based research, Brown (1995) demonstrates that the hearer does not aim at a correct Brown (1995) interpretation; interpretation; an adequate interpretation interpretation suffices suffices for the realization of conversational conversational goals. This interpretation is based on default expectations, expectations, such as the referential referential use of an expression which can standardly be used to refer (ibid.: 73). This adequate interpretation is achieved on the basis of sentence meaning, context and co-text, an account of mutual beliefs and relevant intentions of the speaker. The analysis analysis of this connection seriously undermines the need for ambiguities of definite descriptions, be it semantic or pragmatic. It appears that the binary distinction into directly and contextually contextually referring terms is rather counterintuitive and inadequate. It is easy to observe that proper names are subject to referential referential mistakes mistakes and, moreover, moreover, that on some occasions they may not give the hearer any indication as to the recovery of of the referent. referent. Hence, referential referential uses that involve involve a referential mistake are possible, and so are purely purely denotative uses that correspond to attributive attributive uses of definite definite descriptions. Pronouns and demonstratives normally normally presuppose the referential referential intention but even in their case there are exceptions (see Section 5.5). In any case, since proper names seem to behave similarly similarly to definite descriptions in this respect, I call all of the terms that are used to refer referring expressions, in agreement with with Bach 1987a. largely common-sensical definition of a referring expression Bach accepts a largely as an expression standardly used to refer to an individual. individual. This class comprises proper names, definite descriptions, and pronouns. In his account, account, a referring expression may fail to refer when when there is is no single single referent that can be recovered from the utterance. His common-sensical definition was recently given empirical support in a data-based data-based discourse-analytic approach to 1995 (see also laszczolt Jaszczolt 1997b). Bach (l987a: (1987a: 195) 195) says says that referring in Brown Brown 1995 the distinction between referential and non referential occurrences of referring nonreferential expressions is pragmatic rather than semantic, 5 and so is is the distinction between referentially referentially transparent transparent and opaque interpretations interpretations of propositional prepositional attitude constructions. constructions. In other words, the reading is specified on the level of speaker intention. It seems more plausible to abandon the semanticssemanticspragmatics pragmatics boundary dispute for the benefit of this analysis. In fact, what we can do at this stage is to use the classification proposed in Chapter Chapter 4 and extend the proposal concerning the de re re and de dicto interpretations interpretations referring expressions, expressions, of belief belief reports to extensional contexts in which which referring including definite definite descriptions, appear. According to the PI principle 5

For references references to authors regarding it as semantic or pragmatic see see Neale (1990: 8-9). Bach (1987a: 84) defends Russell in saying that the definite definite description description can have a Russellian meaning (l987a: speaker does not mean what the sentence means. However. However, extending in the sentence but the speaker sentence non-literality thus far seems rather dubious. dubious. 5

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presented presented in Section 2.3, the basic intention is the intention to secure a referent in communication. communication. This referential referential intention comes in degrees and it helps establish the semantic representation. It guarantees guarantees the default semantics for definite definite descriptions and both the ambiguity view view and the underspecification can be replaced replaced with default semantics which for definite descriptions means the referential reading, and the pragmatically conditioned conditioned departures from the default. The speaker's intentions are very important important for the study of reference. Referring The verb 'to refer' has been used in the literature in many ways. Referring is frequently associated with such terms as 'denote', 'designate', 'stand for', 'talk about', 'mention', 'apply to' and others. Speakers refer by using expressions but expressions do not refer; they are used to refer by people and this reference usedto differs with the particular circumstances of a conversation. At best, expressions can be said to 'denote'. The debate concerning referring referring and denoting of does not require a review. review. Suffice Suffice it to say that it is the use people make of expressions that makes them referential referential or non-referential. non-referential. Or, as Donnellan (1970: 356) 356) observed, one should ask to whom the speaker speaker refers on a given satisfies the description. description. occasion rather than look for the object which satisfies The referring properties of definite descriptions and (grammatically6) (grammatically6) proper names depend on this act of referring performed by the speaker. It has to be remembered that definite NPs can also be used generically. generically. Sentence (3) (3) is an example of the generic generic use: (3) (3)

The The penguin is a bird, not a mammal. mammal.

Such uses are not uniquely referring referring and they will not be considered here. Moreover, a definite description may become a proper name when it is used is a proper proper name, and possibly as such. For example, 'The United Nations' is so were were 'The Evening Star' and 'The Morning Star' (cf. (cf. Neale 1990: 58, 58, fn 42). So, So, there are two caveats to be made. First, not all expressions of the type 'the + (adjective (adjective +) noun' are definite descriptions, and second, the boundary between definite descriptions and proper names is not sharp sharp and may be a matter of a historical fact or an arbitrary decision rather than the lexicon and grammar. referring expressions seem to be a larger category than they are All in all, referring normally taken to be and seem to benefit from an intuitive definition. I define the category as follows: follows: Referring Referring expression: an expression capable capable of being used to refer refer to individuals. It is is instantiated by a proper proper name, a an individual or individuals. demonstrative noun phrase, a definite description, or a pronoun. 6

As opposed to Russellian Russellian logical proper names.

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Theoretical and empirical support for this classification constitutes the remainder remainder of this chapter. propositional Now, as was seen in the discussion in Chapter Chapter 4, the opacity of prepositional attitude contexts is caused by the limited intersubjectivity of the use of such referring expressions. What is so specific about referring referring expressions that they are said to cause referential referential opacity of attitude contexts? It would seem that the failure of substitutivity need not be confined to referring expressions, other terms should also be affected. In sentence (4), (4), the adjective adjective 'fantastic' may not be substitutable with, for example, 'terrific', 'great', 'amazing': (4)

Ralph believes that Mary is fantastic.

In sentence (5), how does the hearer hearer know that by 'dissolvable in water' Ralph does not mean that rock breaks into pieces in water or that it is dissolvable in a certain chemical which which his colleague scientists call in their jargon 'water'?

(5)

Ralph believes that this rock is dissolvable in water.

The difference difference between these cases and the problem of substitutivity in the case of proper names and definite descriptions is quite obvious. obvious. In (5), the reporter would have to use language in a figurative way reporter have figurative way or lack some essential knowledge knowledge of language to commit the suggested mistake. Alternatively, Ralph would have to exhibit exhibit either of these things things and use English in a non-standard way. way. In (4), the fuzziness of the concept concept allows for some discrepancies between Ralph's and the reporter's attribution of some property to Mary and this vagueness is an inherent feature property feature of language, language, something that the speaker's knowledge knowledge cannot override. Hence, in (4) and (5), (5), the problem is posed by the use of language and has nothing in common with the substitutivity of substitutivity issue which which is tied to objects and ways of individuating them by the hearer on the basis of the referring expression used by the speaker. Referring Referring is a matter of pragmatics and psychology rather than lexicon and its acquisition. If a person is is using using a name or description mistakenly referring to a wrong individual, it is not the knowledge of language Naturally, a version of the that is lacking but rather factual factual knowledge. knowledge. Naturally, substitutivity problem arises for these cases as well. For example, example, is the report in (7) justifiable information information about the belief expressed in (6)? (6)

My garden is round.

(7)

Mary believes that her garden has an equal distance from the middle to the edge at all points.

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The answer is negative for two reasons. Firstly, (7) creates unjustified unjustified conversational conversational implicatures. irnplicatures. Secondly, Secondly, as was discussed in Chapter Chapter 4, people do not believe all the logical consequences consequences of their beliefs and hence Mary may not consent to (7). (7). People seem to believe only some obvious consequences, including necessary for understanding the including the ones that are necessary meaning of the expression? expression.7 The definition of 'round' is not such a necessary problems of a piece of information. So, So, it seems that referring terms pose problems different different kind for belief reports than other parts of the lexicon. These problems are beyond the language system in that they are neither lexical nor grammatical. They are semantic and epistemological. Both names and descriptions pose such problems. Although names tend to occur transparently, they need not do so. so. They tend to convey shared information, refer to an object, rather than to the object plus the MoPs of the holder of the belief or the MoPs of the reporter. But they can convey functions other than picking out the referent. To sum up, expressions that are normally used to refer exhibit more essential of similarities than differences and can be plausibly classified as one category of referring expressions. Since many objects do not have associated proper names, descriptions are necessary means of talking about them. Pronouns are not always sufficient individuating information sufficient as they contain less individuating information and rely heavily on ostension, perceptual perceptual clues, and other features of context. All these referring expressions expressions perform essentially the same function of referring to an individual by means of revealing in the utterance the referential referential communicate and to intention of the speaker, as well as the intentions intentions to communicate inform. Their 'ability to refer', so to speak, is a matter of degree rather than of a binary distinction, as is demonstrated demonstrated in the remainder of this chapter. First, the rigidity of proper names requires a more careful consideration.

5.3. Proper Names and and Modes of Presentation For Kripke (e.g. 1971, 1972), names are rigid designators. In other words, they 1971,1972), denote the same individual in all possible worlds. worlds. Descriptions Descriptions are not rigid, they have sense. Kripke (1971: 83) 83) says that proper names intuitively intuitively appear to be rigid designators because, for instance, when one uses the name 'Bill Clinton', one is referring to the same man whether he is a president or not. In a counterfactual world in which Clinton lost the election, 'Bill Clinton' still picks out the same individual. The description 'the president of the United United States' is not rigid even when indexed to time: it might have been someone else on 18 18 September 1998 as I am writing these words. 7 7

Or necessary fixing a stereotype (see Putnam 1975b). necessary for fixing

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According to the tradition tradition derived from Mill (1959: 20), proper names are denote an object. They are grouped only 'marks' in discourse in that they denote grouped in a category of non-connotative expressions together with expressions that imply an attribute. 'London', 'virtue', or 'whiteness' belong here. Connotative expressions, on the other hand, both denote an object and imply imply an attribute. attribute. proper names 'White', 'long', or 'man' belong there. So, So, it seems that a proper contribute only the referent to what is said. Russell and Kripke continue this tradition, albeit Kripke (1972: (1972: 20-21) 20-21) recognizes the fact that since belief contexts, the MoP coreferential names are not freely substitutable in belief has some epistemic epistemic significance. However, However, this significance is not necessarily necessarily a semantic one. The question of the semantics of proper names remains open. open. He agrees with Mill on proper names being rigid designators, while disagreeing on the category of connotative names and their implying implying an attribute attribute or property. Kripke (1977: (1977: 12) 12) emphasizes that while a description description does not attach itself, so to speak, permanently permanently to an object, a proper name Clinton'and States' does, as the example of 'Bill Clinton' and 'the president of the United States' demonstrates. One may argue that this particular description signifies a role that is assigned assigned to different different individuals by its very nature. So, So, let us consider consider another example. If Copernicus turned out not to be the discoverer discoverer of of another If Copernicus individual, heliocentrism, the name 'Copernicus' would still be valid of this individual, whereas the description 'the discoverer ofheliocentrism' of heliocentrism' would now correctly be attached attached to someone else. This is also how Kripke demonstrates demonstrates that names are not merely abbreviated abbreviated descriptions. One can add here Quine's Quine's argument to the effect effect that, when when people discovered that Hesperus is the same planet as the one called Phosphorus, the discovery was empirical: empirical: a new fact was discovered and it has nothing to do with the descriptions associated associated with Hesperus and (cf Kripke 1971: 73 and 1972: Hesperus and Phosphorus Phosphorus (cf. 1971: 73 1972: 100). Now, since coreferential coreferential proper names are not substitutable substitutable in belief belief explained. Kripke Kripke says that the reference contexts, there is a puzzle to be explained. of a name is determined by a so-called chain of of communication. communication. The community establishes a norm for using a name and every particular particular speaker standardly adheres to the norm. But that does not prevent occasional 119-120) presents a puzzle puzzle problems with reference assignment. assignment. Kripke (1979: (1979:119-120) that does not even invoke invoke the principle of substitutivity. His puzzle goes as lives in France, holds a belief follows. Pierre, a speaker of French who lives belief about some distant city called Londres that it is pretty. As a result, he utters (8): (8)

Londres est jolie.

This belief can be reported by an English sentence (9): (9)

Pierre believes that London London is pretty.

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The report in (9) (9) is adequate because two principles are at work here. The first one is the so-called disquotational disquotational principle that says that if a speaker assents to 'p', then he or she she believes that p. In the sentence replacing replacing 'p' 'p',, indexicals indexicals of and ambiguities are removed. The second one is the so-called so-called principle of sentence in a particular language translation. It says that if a sentence language is true, then any of its translations into any other language is also true (see Kripke 1979: 114). Now, Now, the story continues follows. Pierre continues as follows. Pierre moves from France France to England, lives in London and acquires a belief that London is not pretty. belief In other words, he is ready to assent to (10) while still holding the belief expressed in sentence (8). (10)

not pretty. London is not

contradictory. Belief These two beliefs are obviously contradictory. Belief in (10) can be reported on by sentence (11): (11)

Pierre believes believes that London is not pretty.

Kripke offers no solution to the puzzle and it seems that the only solution would be to admit that just as coreferentiality coreferentialiry of names does not suffice suffice for substitution, so translation is unreliable. In fact, considering the differdifferences of the contribution of context to the semantic representation, there reason why is no reason why a sentence should be synonymous with its translation.8 Hence, the puzzle has to be taken as proof proof that (i) (i) the problem with reporting on beliefs is not confined to definite descriptions descriptions and indexicals indexicals but encomencompasses proper names as well, well, and (ii) proper proper names, like definite descriptions and other expressions expressions that are used to refer, convey MoPs that exhibit a varying degree of contribution to semantics, depending on the reading. So, So, the way way out is, pace Kripke, to accept accept the contribution contribution of MoPs to the semantics of belief reports. It is to accept some form of representation London's pulchritude. As under which Pierre holds his beliefs concerning London's (1997: 212) 212) says, says, there are restrictions on translation which have Richard (1997: sufficient similarity similarity to be preserved. In other words, sameness or perhaps sufficient of MoPs can be imposed as a requirement of substitutivity of names. names. This requirement makes names akin to definite descriptions. Kripke (1979) considered sameness of Fregean sense as a criterion but rejected it as unusable in practice because no sufficient sufficient conditions for sameness of sense or legitimacy of translation (in the case of the puzzle of Pierre's beliefs) are bene, he uses Fregean sense to mean the way way the reference known. Nota bene, of a term is determined, determined, but not to mean the meaning of the term. Frege, 8

This is also Putnam's Putnam's (1954) standpoint. standpoint.

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on the other hand, assigned to sense both of these roles. As was mentioned mentioned before, in Kripke's account, the connection connection between a name and an object is established established by an initial introduction introduction of the name and subsequent history of its use called a chain of communication. communication. The act of conferring meaning mediated by Fregean Fregean sense. But, as Dummett (1973: upon a proper name is mediated 148) convincingly argues, the chain of communication can rarely be reconstructed and even where it can, the etymology reconstructed etymology of a name has little bearing on its current use. Moreover, shifts of reference occur and have to bearing by, presumably, the introduction of subsequent chains be accommodated accommodated by, referential mistakes, 'sub-chains', i.e. very short chains, or, in the case of referential or even idiosyncratic idiosyncratic usages that have to be recognized by the hearer in order for the report to preserve preserve the speaker's referent. It is difficult difficult to tell what the role of sense would amount to in Kripke's account. account. If If sense is used only to determine the reference reference and only in the initial initial coarsely-grained a device to account for speaker's act of naming, then it is too coarsely-grained use of proper names. Now, become Now, with the suggested suggested 'sub-chains', senses become individual MoPs. But then they are too finely-grained a device because every difference in individual individual ascription of a referent to a name is such an act difference of of naming, unless we could afford afford an overview and 'grouping', so to speak, speak, of people's use of names as identical or different. Such a device would not be theoretically interesting as we would have poured the baby out with we would have departed the bath water in that we departed from the original idea of initial baptism, only subsequently subsequently followed followed by an intersubjective, community-wide proper name. What is needed is a device in-between senses and use of a proper Namely, we require individual MoPs, such as the one postulated postulated in Chapter Chapter 4. Namely, MoPs and types of MoPs, the gradation gradation of fineness of detail that culminates in the value zero for default referential or denotative expressions. denotative uses of referring expressions. Proper Proper names are here no exception in requiring this device. proper name was to stand for an Now, if the whole semantic role of a proper object, then empty names would have no semantic semantic role. However, as was argued in Chapter 'Santa Claus' has has a semantic role - perhaps expressing Chapter 4, 4,'Santa imaginary Fregean sense, and perhaps the speaker's representation of some imaginary object, i.e. some intersubjectively recognizable type of MoP which is not quite according to Frege, sentences as objective as Frege's sense. sense.9 Although, according sentences with empty names are devoid of truth value, value, they express some sense.

9 9

Cf.: Cf.: example, that the sense of the name expresses something something like the "We may suppose, for example, following criterion criterion of identification: x is Santa Claus only if x is a jolly red-suited, red-suited, white-bearded man, who who lives at the North Pole, and delivers toys to children on Christmas day." Taylor (1998: 11).

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All in all, it remains remains to confirm the suggestion suggestion from Chapter 4 that proper names are not free from referential referential puzzles, from connoting connoting some properties properties and from contributing more than the referent to the semantics of the sentence sentence when the default semantics is not the case. The problem of rules for translation translation and the possibility of translation is further attended Chapter 8. attended to in Chapter

5.4. Degrees Approach Degrees of Referring: Referring: A Unified Approach The tenet different from definite tenet that proper names are not qualitatively different descriptions as far as their referring referring power is concerned concerned has a very important important significance for all referring expressions understood understood widely as expressions that are used to refer. Proper Proper names are the central type of expressions usually categorized as directly referential. referential. Demonstrating Demonstrating that their referring properties do not depart significantly properties significantly from these of definite descriptions descriptions which are only context-referential or token-referential token-referential signals that, instead of the standard binary distinction, of distinction, there may be differences differences of degree of referring properties referring properties between various referring expressions. This placement category under of all expressions used to refer in one category under the label of referring expressions I shall call a unified unified approach approach (see laszczolt Jaszczolt 1998b). This quantitative difference can theoretically be of three types, the first two of which are obvious. The difference can pertain to the discourse situation and go across (i.e. independently of) lexical types of referring referring expressions such as pronouns, proper names and definite descriptions. Or it can go hand in hand with the type of referring expression. The third option is more theory-laden. established that descriptions and names allow for various various We have already established types of use and various degrees of contribution of their MoP to the semantics of the sentence in which they occur. Among these possibilities possibilities of interdefault. This default pretation there is one which is primary, primary, unmarked, or default. reading corresponds to the highest degree of referential referential intention that can accompany accompany this expression. Other readings correspond correspond to a 'weakened' referential intention. If the scale of referring referring strength of particular particular readings expression could could be superimposed on the scale of of a particular type of expression referring properties of various referring referring expressions, then the referring power expressions would constitute constitute a scale. This idealized idealized picture is of referring expressions rather dubious, though. When, for instance, a definite description description is used referring power is nil, but so is the referring power of a proper attributively, its referring name used by the speaker about whoever or whatever holds this name. The fact that the referent referent may be easier to recognize intersubjectively when the speaker uses a name than when he or she uses a description significant. description is not significant. It is the recognition of the speaker's intention that matters for sentence meaning and if this recognition recognition does not take place, the default referential, referential, referring reading is assigned to both. So, So, the fact that proper i.e. strongly referring

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names require less contextual information than many descriptions descriptions does not mean that they cannot have the same referring power. As a result, the scale of referring referring properties properties will have to rely on the admixture of contextual clues referring rather than the default, referring. to the act of referring default, highest strength of referring. It can also contain the frequency of use of a particular particular type of expression for referring directly, 'transparently', so to speak. But the latter is unreliable since pronouns pronouns and demonstrative demonstrative NPs are also in the considered considered group, albeit the frequency frequency guide may work for names and descriptions. This comparison, however, would have have to rely on extensive comparison, however, extensive empirical empirical evidence from which as yet is not available. various types of discourse which available. All possibilities considered, it seems that referring expressions expressions can be ordered ordered on a scale which other words, the takes into account their own, context-free referring power. In other more admixture of the contextual clues is required for the default referring by of the type of an expression, the further this expression is placed on the scale of referring. This scale is discussed further in Section 5.6 5.6 together with the idea of referent accessibility. Firstly, however, the properties properties of the remaining types expressions require a closer closer look as so far I have concentrated of referring expressions concentrated only on definite descriptions and proper names.

5.5. Indexicals 5.5. Referring by Indexicals

Before discussing discussing pronouns and demonstratives, some terminological proper names, remarks are in order. Unlike definite descriptions and proper heavily pronouns (including demonstrative) and demonstrative NPs rely heavily on context in their interpretation. In an utterance of the sentence (12), the pronouns '1', T, 'it', and 'him' refer to some individuals. (12)

I gave it to him.

But the information who and what they refer to can be retrieved only from the context of utterance, not from the sentence. Such contextually bound expressions are called deictic. Deixis (<>EIKVUJ.11) (SeiKvu^i) means in Ancient Greek 'to show', 'to point out'. In other words, "Essentially, deixis concerns the ways in which languages encode or grammaticalize utterance or speech grammaticalize features of the context context of utterance speech ways in which the interpretation event, and thus also concerns ways interpretation of utterances depends on the analysis of that context of utterance." utterance." of (1983: 54). Levinson (1983:

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Deictic expressions are also sometimes called indexicals or indexical expressions and this is where the confusion begins in the literature. Some 'I' philosophers of language language confine the term 'indexical' only to pronouns T and 'you' and adverbs 'here' and 'now'. It is so because the role these words play in a sentence is constant constant (cf. (cf. Larson Larson and Segal 1995: 1995: 215). 215). I shall not use the term in this narrow sense. In the wide sense of the term, an 'indexical' term is an expression whose content is context-dependent. It includes also demonstratives, i.e. expressions whose content is fixed when the demonstration, the act of pointing at a certain object (in one way way or another) occurs. 'This' of This' and 'that' are examples of demonstratives. There are also other uses of the term 'demonstrative' in the philosophical literature but these will not be reviewed here. The referent of the demonstrative is fixed by a demonstration. A demonstration has sense, sense, it is not unlike the attributive use of a definite description (see Taylor 1998: 1998: 295). 295). For example, (13) (13) can be an informative statement. (13)

That star is identical with that star.

Two demonstrations can have the same value but 'demonstrate' it in different different ways, just as there can be two different different coreferential coreferential descriptions. The sense of a demonstration of demonstration is not normally regarded as part of the meaning of the demonstrative expression - at least not by by Kaplan and other direct referentialists. Now, it may seem that pronouns are different different from proper proper names and definite descriptions in that they do not denote any individual in a contextindependent scenario and sentences containing them have variable truth conditions. However, ordinary proper names and definite descriptions do not always always yield sentences with absolute truth conditions either. Hence, I shall concede that all referring expressions expressions rely on the speaker's referential intention in conveying the referent. This proposal is generally in agreement with Bach, but Bach (l987a: (1987a: 175) 175) states that the speaker's intention is not part function of the context. Also, while while he claims that indexicals have a referring function likewise for definite descriptions as part of their semantics, he denies that it is likewise and proper names. The latter have a referring function in their pragmatics, that is language use, rather than semantics, that is linguistic meaning. This division of the playground is somewhat confusing. Firstly, himself Firstly, as Bach himself observes, pragmatics is frequently employed to mean 'context-dependence', while he employs it as language use. A sentence with a proper proper name, for while the singular statement instance, expresses a uniqueness proposition, while about a particular particular individual is expressed. Pronouns, on the other hand, are 'wholly contextual' in that without indexing them for an object, they do not convey any referential clues. They may convey some descriptive descriptive information. Their descriptive function will be discussed shortly within

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the hidden-indexical theory. theory.Yet, Yet, as as Bach Bach further further argues, argues, the the referring referring function function of pronouns depends on the speaker's intention associated with the occasion of use. to When, for instance, the speaker points at a picture on the wall use.10 behind him and utters (14) (14) while, while, unbeknownst to him, the picture of Monet that used to hang there has been replaced with with that of Debussy, Debussy, the referential intention does not suffice suffice to pick out Monet as the referent:

(14)

ll He was the greatest Impressionist painter.11

Bach (l987a: (1987a: 184-5) suggests that the speaker's referential intention is to refer to a picture behind him rather than to the picture of Monet. But this is plainly plainly false. The referential intention, by definition, definition, is the intention to convey the identity of a certain individual. individual. It contains the strongest identifYing identifying guaranteed by information that is in possession of the speaker. This is guaranteed intentionality of mental states discussed in Chapter 3. 3. Hence, the speaker intends to refer to, to, and to communicate something something about Monet and this referential intention fails to secure the referent. The communicated message will depend on other contextual clues, for instance whether the hearer accepts it that according according to the speaker Debussy was a painter, whether the speaker knew that the picture of Monet used to hang on that wall, and so forth. Intrusionist contribution of information information from Intrusionist semantics allows for such a contribution from the referential intention. Demonstratives and personal pronouns are slightly different different in their referring properties. While personal pronouns are normally normally used to refer to individuals individuals already salient in the discourse, demonstrative pronouns 'this' for new or 'that' and demonstrative NPs such as 'this building' are used for So, their referring properties differ differ objects, objects that are not yet salient. So, as far as the required degree of contribution of context to the semantics is However, personal pronouns and demonstratives demonstratives need not be concerned. However, (15), the speaker may refer to whoever used referentially. For instance, in (15), whoever is the author of the sculpture he is currently currently looking at: 12 (15) (15)

He must be a famous famous artist.

10 \0 This view is supposed to contradict Kaplan's (1978) idea that the meaning meaning of indexicals, in the (1989a) character, is a function from context to content. But it works works only sense of Kaplan's (1989a) if the speaker's intention is not construed as part of the context. context. For Bach's reasons for construing if construing 178). it so see Bach (1987a: (1987a: 178). 11 11 This type of of scenario derives derives from Kaplan (1978: 302-303). 12 12 Bach (l987a: (1987a: 194) 194) makes a distinction distinction between objectual objectual and descriptive use, as well as not referring at all.

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The account account developed here differs from Bach's in several ways. First, intentions are part of a widely understood context. It seems that it is advantageous to make context encompass all sources of background background interpretation. information that are available to the hearer during utterance interpretation. Second, definite proper names and other referring expressions definite descriptions, proper have their default semantics that is guaranteed by the referential intention. This referential referential intention, by default, default, accompanies the use of referring expressions. No distinction between names and descriptions on the one hand, and pronouns on the other is justified. As a result, Bach's commitment commitment to a so-called 'nominal description theory' is not followed followed here. Nominal description theory is a version of Russell's description theory that says that a name 'X' is is semantically equivalent to the description "the individual called we accept the claim that the sentence 'X'''. Neither do we 'X'". Neither sentence with a definite description expresses a uniqueness proposition proposition while the speaker may assert a singular proposition. Instead, the default referential referential intention secures the referent by intruding into the semantics. why the Apart from intuitive plausibility, plausibility, there is another good reason why speaker's intentions intentions should should be included included as part of the context. The identification of the referent is the outcome of all contextual clues, not merely intentions. The referential referential intention is the default but, as all defaults, defaults, it can be overridden. For example, in (16), (16), the recognition of the intention is not independent of other contextual clues: (16)

Another Jones joined the club today.

(from Platts 1979: 158). If 1979:158). If the speaker uttered (16) (16) as a result of having seen the members' list, then the nonreferential nonreferential use is suggested. name 'Jones' on a club members' suggested. way. When In fact, many utterances with referring referring expressions work in this way. When put into question, the recognition of the speaker's referential referential the default is put intention proceeds through all available contextual clues.13 clues.13 To sum up, as a result of the unified approach, it is denied that names, pronouns (including (including demonstrative) demonstrative) and demonstrative demonstrative NPs contribute only referents to the informational content of the sentences in which they occur. referential mistakes and using pronouns and names Arguments from referential nonreferentially signal that direct reference always hold. And if reference does not always it does not always hold, then 'direct referentiality' ceases to delineate a semantic category of expressions. Now, Now, Richard manages to retain direct reference while acknowledging the sensitivity sensitivity of the semantics of belief belief ascriptions to some form of MoPs. 13 13 In discussing discussing proper names, Platts (1979: (1979: 159) 159) talks about the appearance appearance of of non-ambiguity non-ambiguity because the nonreferential nonreferential use is very very uncommon.

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""... ... ascriptions of belief belief are, to a limited extent, used to report how how of belief ( ... ), belief is held. Indeed, in the semantics for ascriptions belief (...), beliefoperator is construed as operating the belief operating on sentential sentential meanings, meanings, and not simply as an operator operator on the propositions which meanings, relative to context, have as values." Richard (1983: 192). Richard For example, beliefs beliefs de se differ differ from beliefs beliefs de re about oneself. In the first, the holder of the belief knows that the belief is about himself or herself rather than about someone else. The way way the individual individual is represented to the holder of the belief is important for the determination of this fact and, intuitively, also for the determination of the truth value value (but see McKay McKay 1991: 1991: 738 738 on all beliefs de se being primarily de reo re. De se is a special case of de re re and there are no unambiguous de se expressions.). However, However, it seems more natural to surmise surmise that the difference between beliefs de se and beliefs de re about about oneself oneself points to the contribution of MoP to the semantics rather than to the difference between sentences sentences and propositions. propositions. Let us retrace a by now famous famous example of a woman in a phone booth. A man looks at a woman in a phone booth and sees that she is in some danger. He wants to warn her. At the same time, time, he is speaking to her on the phone, without without knowing knowing that it is the same woman. He utters (17): (17)

I believe that she is in danger.

This expression clearly differs in truth value from (18): (18)

I believe that you are in danger.

(from Richard 1983: 185). In our account, pace Richard, sentences (17) 1983:185). (17) and (18) do not express the same proposition proposition and they differ differ in truth value. value. The test, which is the most reliable and theory-independent of all tests, is the speaker's speaker's assent to (17) (17) and dissent from (18). (18). This does not mean a rejection of direct reference but rather treating direct reference reference as one of the options for the semantics semantics of referring expressions, expressions, namely the default semantics. semantics. The situation depicted in (17) (17) and (18) (18) is out of the ordinary and hence the contextual contextual clues override the default. Pronominalization is not not free from degrees of referring and from referential mistakes. For example, Linsky's (19), uttered by the speaker speaker who sees attentive (21): behaviourofa behaviour of a man towards a woman, woman, can evoke evoke responses as in (20) and (21): (19)

Her husband is kind to her.

(20)

No, he isn't. The man you're referring to isn't her husband. No,

(21) (21)

He is kind to her, but he isn't her husband.

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(cf. Kripke 1977: 1977: 21). 21). In (20), (20), the pronoun 'he' refers to the bearer of the description 'her husband'. In (21), it refers to the person who is mistakenly taken to be the woman's husband by the speaker of (19). So, referential mistakes ensue. This example demonstrates that pronouns So, can be involved in situations where the degree of referring is weaker than the default. Now, Afterthoughts, Kaplan (1989b) states that intention determines the Now, in Afterthoughts, meaning of the demonstrative. It seems that one can extend this proposal proposal to other expressions that are used to refer, called here jointly referring expressions. The role of this intention will conform to the intention-based intention-based Default Semantics Semantics in Chapter 2, 2, founded on POL, PI and DI. An additional bonus is the lack of artificial divisions divisions among types types of expressions that are used to refer which have permeated permeated the literature literature in the past several decades of the dominance of direct reference. Let us briefly go back to the hidden-indexical discussed in hidden-indexical theory discussed Chapter 4. Schiffer Schiffer (1995a: (1995a: 117-118, 124) 124) states that if one holds the hidden-indexical theory of descriptions, one should not hold the direct-reference theory of indexicals. Instead, one should hold the hidden-indexical hidden-indexical description theory of of indexicals, that is to claim that indexicals are disguised incomplete descriptions. For example, 'he' is difficult to give synonymous with 'the male'. On the other hand, it is difficult up direct reference because in using an indexical expression, the speaker does not seem to mean any object-independent, description-theoretic description-theoretic proposition. Schiffer Schiffer (Ibid.: (ibid.: 125-126) proposes proposes that (22) and (23) require the same theory of reference because speaker meaning supervenes supervenes on the speaker's propositional attitudes: attitudes: (22)

The guy is drunk. drunk.

(23) (23)

He is drunk.

(from ibid.: 120). 120). And, if (23) expresses expresses an object-dependent proposition, proposition, then so does (22) if produced in an analogous situation, i.e. i.e. where where the description is used referentially. The propositional attitudes can plausibly be regarded as the same in both instances. When the speaker uses a definite description description referentially, he or she means a proposition proposition that is object-dependent, just as if the speaker was using an indexical expression. Equally, indexicals have attributive uses, as example (15) (15) demonstrates. One can utter (15) (15) without sculptor is. knowing who the sculptor Schiffer draws draws rather radical As was discussed in Section 4.2.2, Schiffer conclusions from this similarity of pronouns and descriptions. He undertheory, favours direct reference, and construes mines the hidden-indexical theory, propositions to which that-clauses refer as noncompositionally-determined

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representations, whatever that may mean (cf. (cf. quotation in Section 4.2.2 from from representations, ibid.: 128). But it seems that letting propositions propositions loose by freeing freeing them from from the bond with sentences is too radical a move. move. Instead, allowing allowing the type of MoP to acquire varying fineness fineness of grain, all the way way to zero, seems to do the trick. The price to pay is is to assume intentionality and the ensuing referential intention potential constituents of the semantic representation. intention as potential representation. belief This reconciliation would also help the hidden-indexical hidden-indexical theory of belief reports. If the direct reference reference theory of indexicals indexicals and definite descriptions captures their default semantics, and the hidden-indexical hidden-indexical theory allows for this default through allowing for the value zero of the type of Mop, MoP, then 'direct reference' is the special case of hidden-indexicality. The same goes for belief reports where 'direct reference' is the default, albeit a frequently overridden one. Although calling this sub-case of hidden indexicality 'direct reference' may be misleading, misleading, the basic idea remains remains the same. The expressions are directly directly about an individual, individual, and they they are directly about something when the referential referential intention intention is the strongest. The intention intention is intentionality of the corresponding mental the strongest when the natural intentionality state allows for it to go through unimpeded. hidden-indexicalityand and direct directreference referencecould could be be To sum up, it seems that hidden-indexicality reconciled. It seems possible to regard them not as separate options but rather as points on the scale. An object-independent object-independent proposition proposition is is stated stated when intentions are weak, weak, and an object-dependent proposition is stated when intentions are strong. Although this this proposal muddles muddles the semantics somewhat, there seems to be no need to preserve the slot for the 'hidden index' when its value equals zero. It is cancelled cancelled out in view view of its nil value and the arity (also known known as adicity, the number number of required arguments) arguments) of the predicate concerned changes. 14 14

14

Instead Instead of our 'value zero', Schiffer Schiffer (l995a: (1995a: 109) suggests the following: following: "In a limiting case, the type of mode of presentation presentation may may be vacuous, so that the speaker's import import in uttering ~ 'A believes that S' is merely that A believes the proposition proposition that Sunder S under presentation or other, while in an opposite sort of limiting case the type some mode of presentation presentation to which the speaker refers may determine a unique unique particular particular of mode [of] presentation mode of presentation." we add the value zero for the Mop, MoP, the hidden constituent becomes optional. Allowing for When we the type of MoP to be irrelevant for the semantics means allowing for it not to be present in the semantic representation, representation, which seems to reconcile direct referentiality and hidden-indexical theories. 14

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5.6. Referent Accessibility and and the Strength Strength of Referring 5.6.1. The Givenness Hierarchy It has been demonstrated demonstrated through wide-ranging data-based data-based research that

noun phrases present a continuum of referentiality, from the lack of referring to full, salient referring. This scale is called by Given Givon (1993: 224) "a continuum of referential referential intent". intent". It is reflected in English grammar. Given Givon (1983b) presents a partial implicational hierarchy for natural languages, based on the predictability of the topic, from the highest to the lowest, as reflected reflected in the type of a referring expression: zero > unstressed/clitic pronoun pronoun> pronoun> > stressed/independent pronoun > full DEF-NP> DEF-NP > modified modified DEF-NP (from Given predictability, or, continuity, of Givon 1983b: 1983b: 359). 359). This predictability, continuity, of the topic of discourse is tied to the previous occurrences of the referent or the topic, the strength strength of the competing competing topics, and the importance of the subject (see (see Given Givon 1983a). 1983a). This claim seems to corroborate the proposal from from Section 5.4 5.4 that the referential intention is a matter of degree and proceeds according to the default interpretations of grammatical categories of referring expressions. Given's of Givon's hierarchy establishes such thresholds on the scale of referring. Given become accessible accessible thanks to the Givon (1992) says that the referent may become generic-cultural context, or the textual context, as in (24) and (25) respectively: (24) (24)

The sun came out all of a sudden.

(25) (25)

She went into a restaurant restaurant and asked to see the menu. menu.

(from Given 13). In (25), 'the menu' has an accessible referent because 'a Givon 1992: 1992:13). (25),'the restaurant' is present in the immediately preceding context and because of of the shared cultural knowledge (or: 'frame', 'schema', 'script', cf. cf. ibid.) ibid) to the effect effect that 'a typical restaurant has a menu'. So, So, on the one hand, the cognitive cognitive referring form, but on the other status of an expression is tied to the type of a referring there is a considerable flexibility flexibility within the lexical categories themselves, as demonstrated by various readings of referring expressions discussed in the previous sections. It will be suggested in what follows that the semantics pertaining to the distinctions which are not lexicalized has to be tightened by adding the theory of intentions intentions in communication to the extant hierarchy of accessibility. of accessibility.

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Gundel, Hedberg and Zacharski (1993, henceforth: henceforth: Gundel et al) a/.) further further of developed Givon's implicational hierarchy hierarchy into a fuller scale of degrees of givenness of the referent. Their scale is based on the assumption shared by Givon, namely that there is a fairly reliable correlation between the form of the referring referring expression and its cognitive By 'cognitive status' they cognitive status. By mean "information about location in memory and attention state" (Gundel 1996: 145). They argue as follows. "It is widely recognized recognized that the form of of referring expressions, expressions, like such other aspects of language as word order and sentence intonation, depends on the assumed cognitive cognitive status of the referent, i.e. on assumptions that a cooperative speaker can reasonably make regarding the addressee's knowledge knowledge and attention state in the particular particular context in which the expression is used." Gundel et af. 275). al. (1993: (1993: 275).

They suggest that there are six cognitive statuses that correspond correspond to the forms of referring expressions in English, English, or even in natural language discourse in 15 general:15

type in focus > activated > familiar > uniquely uniquely > referential referential > identifiable identifiable {it}

[ that that this {I this I this this N

}|

[ J

{that N} N}

{the N} N}

{indefinite this N} N} this

{a N}

(from way. (from Gundel et af. al. 1993: 275). They explain the diagram in the following way. "Each status on the hierarchy is a necessary necessary and sufficient sufficient condition condition ...) In using using for the appropriate use of a different different form or forms. ((...) signals that she assumes the a particular form, a speaker thus signals associated associated cognitive status is met and, since each status entails all lower statuses, she also signals that all lower statuses (statuses (ibid.: 275-6). to the right) have been met."

In other words, when the referent, let us say, say, a dog is e.g. uniquely identifiable, the speaker can say 'the dog' but it would not be confusing confusing to say say 'this dog' (as in 26) or 'a dog'. 15 15 Gundel et af. explicitly say "in natural naturaIlanguage generalization is etal. language discourse" (1993: 275) but this generalization research that involves Mandarin highly contentious in spite of being based on some empirical research Chinese, English, Japanese, Russian and Spanish.

Section 6

(26) (26)

The lexicon and and the power of of referring referring

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There is this dog there that barks all nights.

'The The dog' is preferred as more informative informative and less troublesome for the hearer who has to recover the intention of the speaker. After After all, the hearer may have to recover the degree of the referential referential intention on the basis of the form used and some other contextual clues if the default does not hold. The detailed meaning of the particular particular statuses will not be fully explained here, the reader is referred to the cited work. work. The choice of the leftmost expression from among the suitable ones is independently supported supported by Grice's Maxim of Quantity and its neo-Gricean neo-Gricean variants. It is in the interest of the speaker to adhere to the relevant degree of informativeness informativeness (see also Chapter Chapter 2 and Levinson 1987 on the interaction ofthe of the Q, Q, I and M principles). The use of an expression which corresponds to the 'activated' status implicates by Quantity 1 ("Make your expression as informative informative as required") that the referent is not 'in focus'. The boundary between 'familiar' and 'uniquely identifiable' is also explained with the help of implicatures. Since on most occasions 'uniquely identifiable' is also 'familiar' (i.e. (i.e. familiar to the hearer), then by Q2 ("Do ("Do not make your contribution contribution more informative informative than is required") a definite description 'the N' will do and becomes associated associated with the 'familiar' status. This explanation, however, however, can easily be turned round. In the above example, the status expressed is lower than the status implicated, but the informational content of the linguistic expression seems to be higher, if indeed the inverse proportion proportion of accessibility and semantic content holds here. So, So, although the cognitive status conforms conforms to Q2, the semantic content does not. In spite of some problems with the universality of the categories (cf. (cf. the table on p. 284 in Gundel et al. universal fact that the forms which al. 1993), 1993), it is a universal correspond to the referent being in focus always contain the least semantic, and even phonetic, content. Examples are unstressed pronouns, clitics and zero pronominals. However, Gundel et al. al. (ibid.: 286) observe that while pronominals and the definite article enjoy a stable correlation with their respective cognitive statuses across the investigated investigated sample of languages, demonstratives and indefinite articles do not. For instance, although English, Japanese, Russian and Spanish require the demonstrative determiner to be familiar, Chinese allows for a distal correlated with the status of at least familiar, demonstrative determiner 'nei' in the contexts where the referent is only demonstrative uniquely identifiable identifiable but not familiar. Moreover, only Chinese, English and Spanish out of the five five analysed languages have an indefinite article languages. There are also other and its distribution varies somewhat in these languages. cross-linguistic differences concerning the status of proximal, medial (if any) and distal demonstratives demonstratives but these will not concern us here (see ibid.: 287). Incidentally, some of these differences between languages as to the number devices are explained with the help of historical and distribution of referring devices

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changes. In the contexts where the indefinite article is obligatory in Modern English, it was optional in Old English. English. Spanish is not qualitatively qualitatively different. different. The indefinite indefinite article is simply 'still' optional in some contexts such as some non referential uses, and in Chinese it is 'still' optional everywhere and largely nonreferential restricted restricted to referential uses. Another explanation of the differences may come from the fact that although the boundaries between 'in focus', 'activated' and 'familiar' are not clear-cut, these statuses are forced 'familiar'are forced into a stiff stiff mould in order to correspond to discrete linguistic forms. forms. All in all, it seems that the postulate of the hierarchy hierarchy and a coarse-grained correlation correlation between cognitive statuses and linguistic linguistic expressions are of some interest for our theory of degrees of referring but the vagueness of this correlation correlation has to be borne in mind. mind. The statuses reflect the natural fuzzy fuzzy boundaries to be found both in natural language and in the levels of cognitive processing, i.e. i.e. the assumptions made by the speaker about the addressee's knowledge and interest. This tendency is corroborated corroborated by the analysis analysis of data presented in Gundel et al. al. 1993. 1993. Moreover, the use of referring expressions is directly related to other aspects of the use of language that follow from from the speaker's orientation at the hearer's knowledge knowledge and interest such as intonation, markers for topic or focus and the choice of syntactic structures. As a result, the lack of a strict correlation is only natural. To sum up, the Givenness Hierarchy essentially essentially demonstrates that referring expressions come with different different degrees of information information that enables the hearer to pick out the referent. referent. Differences Differences in use internal internal to the referring expression also signal that the degree of information may differ differ within the referring expression, on different different occasions of its use. This is compatible with the default semantics and the departures from the default proposed proposed earlier. So, So, only some 'thresholds' of informativeness are lexicalized, lexicalized, leaving leaving the rest to be recovered from the default semantics and the context. context. The fact that among the various uses of, of, e.g., a definite NP there is a core one, namely the one corresponding to the 'uniquely identifiable' cognitive cognitive status, signals that we can reasonably accept that there are default interpretations interpretations of these expressions and departures from these defaults. few comments on the place of proper names in the hierarchy Finally, a few are needed. This category is conspicuously absent from Gundel et a/.'s hierarchy but Mulkern Mulkern (1996) (1996) subsequently subsequently suggests that it can easily be incorporated. incorporated. Full names are said to refer to entities entities which are at least 'uniquely identifiable', and single names to entities entities which which are at least 'familiar'. So, proposed between the use of proper names and So, no essential distinction is proposed definite descriptions, which independently which is the conclusion we have have reached independently in Section 5.2. 5.2. Mulkern Mulkern (1996: (1996: 239) supports her claim by the following examples:

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(27) (27)

I'll bet fifty fifty dollars that the woman from New New York will will win the dance dance contest.

(28) (28)

I'll bet fifty fifty dollars that Tracy Andrews will win the dance contest.

If If the list of contestants contains only the information about the sex and place of residence of the participants, participants, then the speaker may utter (27). If it contains names, the speaker will utter (28). (28). In both cases the speaker may equally uniquely. plausibly expect the hearer to identify the referent uniquely. Generally, the distribution of names is predicted by the Givenness Hierarchy and Grice's maxim of Quantity, backed backed by social and cultural cultural information carried by some names. So, referent So, the mechanism of referent identification is qualitatively the same as that used in the case of other identification referring expressions. This proposal confirms our findings from the previous sections concerning concerning the similarity of behaviour behaviour of proper names and definite referential descriptions as far as their correlation with the degree of the referential intention is concerned.

5.6.2. Accessibility Accessibility Theory Theory

Givan's Givon's (1983a, b) work on topic continuity in discourse led to the development of a fully-fledged fully-fledged hierarchy of referring expressions expressions based on development the degree of the accessibility of the referent to the hearer formalized formalized in theory. Ariel Conditions of Chomsky's Government and Binding theory. the Binding Conditions (1994, 1996) sets off off to demonstrate that there is no need to postulate a clear-cut distinction distinction between coreference and disjointness of reference. Formally and semantically minimal expressions correspond correspond to highly accessible referents. referents. There is no need to postulate in addition that they correspond to coreferential readings, as opposed opposed to expressions which are formally and semantically richer and not coreferential. coreferential. For example, definite descriptions and proper proper names are frequently interpreted coreferentially, coreferentially, ... natural languages do not which blurs the binary distinction. Generally, Generally, ""... draw a sharp line between expressions specialized ...) specialized for direct reference ((...) as opposed to anaphora" (Ariel 1994: 1994: 19).16 19).16 processing anaphoric expressions, In processing expressions, the accessibility accessibility of NP antecedents is said to be affected affected by four main factors: factors: (i) (i) the distance between the of antecedent and the anaphor, (ii) the number of competitors for the role of the antecedent, (iii) the importance of topicality, (iv) the role of frames topicality, and (iv) 16

Here Ariel challenges Levinson's binary distinction between coreference and disjoint reading. See Ariel 1994 and and 1996 for references. 16

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in identifYing identifying antecedents antecedents (cf. (cf. Ariel 1988: 65). For instance, pronouns correspond to a short distance distance and definite descriptions descriptions to the case where the antecedent is outside the sentence. antecedent The postulate is highly plausible and it receives independent support from from intentions and intentionality in the account developed in Chapter Chapter 3. 3. However, Ariel introduces introduces one claim that requires a closer closer analysis. It is is the assumption assumption that referring of referring expressions are linked with mental entities. As the history of phenomenology demonstrates, real entities are a better bet. An example is provided by Brentano's well-supported rejection of directedness directedness of mental states at mental objects. Perception Perception refers to things, not to the sensations of things. Things, not the ideas of things, are intended. Things give rise to states, acts and ideas. This is the standpoint recognized by phenomenologists since the later work of Brentano (see laszczolt Jaszczolt 1996a). It is possible that Ariel means the role of representations of objects. But instead of multiplying beings beyond necessity, one should obey Occam's razor and admit that it is the degree of intention that differs rather than the objects. objects. And the degree differs differs because the objects can be intended by the speaker to be fully or partly identifiable by the hearer. Nonexistent entities can also be accommodated. accommodated. It is an object in a belief-world that is intended intended rather than merely an image in the head. In this way, way,we wecan canretain retainreferring referring totoobjects objectswith withaaproviso provisothat that nonexistent objects are 'created' in belief-worlds. There is no harm in calling these objects 'representations', as long as the notion of a representation representation is not extended needed. extended to the cases for which it is not needed. Referring expressions are said to conform to a scale of Accessibility, Accessibility, arranged from high to low. low. One version of the scale looks as follows: follows:

agreement markers < cliticized pronouns unstressed zero < reflexives < agreement pronouns < unstressed pronouns << stressed pronouns << stressed pronouns + gesture << proximal demonstrative ((+NP) +NP) << distal demonstrative ((+NP) +NP) << proximal (+NP) (+NP) NP) + modifier << distal demonstrative (+ NP) + modifier demonstrative (+ < first name << last name << short definite description description << long definite < description << full name << full name + + modifier description (from Ariel 1994: 30). Degrees of accessibility break down into the categories categories of so-called (i) informativity, that is lexical information content, rigidity, content, (ii) rigidity, or accuracy in denoting one entity, and (iii) attenuation, i.e. reduction in length categories are not without their and wording (see also Ariel 1990). These categories internal problems. Referents Referents of full demonstratives are more accessible than those of definite descriptions, although definite descriptions are more (cf. Ariel 1994: attenuated attenuated (shorter in form) and equally informative and rigid (cf. 32). "... there is some free variation among referring expressions" (ibid.: 32). So, So,"... (ibid.: 38). As a result of these heavy allowances for exceptions, similarly similarly to the case of the Givenness Hierarchy of Gundel et al. (1993), we shall consider etal. consider the scale

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to be an approximation approximation whose main strength lies in demonstrating demonstrating the continuum of referring properties and the approximate correlation between the linguistic form and the hearer's processing effort. It is also worth noting al. talk about the implicational hierarchy of cognitive that, whereas Gundel et al. cognitive statuses and linguistic forms, Ariel sees these forms, forms, as well as the statuses, as independent, independent, mutually exclusive. But this claim does not carry any particular particular weight. All that the difference between the options amounts to seems to be granting or denying the appropriateness appropriateness of use of a more informative expression where a less informative informative one would do. Ariel (1988, 1990) makes a notable attempt to dispel the correlation (1988,1990) correlation between the types of context referred to and the type of referring expression used. Traditionally, pronouns are said to refer to the linguistic context, demonstratives to the physical context and proper names to general knowledge (cf. (cf. Clark and Marshall 1981: 1981: 42). Instead, Ariel finds a gradation gradation of accessibility: accessibility: "It is the specific degree of Accessibility of mental entities [sic] attributed by the speaker to the addressee which is the crucial (...) [A] criterion determining the forms of retrieval marking. (...) speaker signals to her addressee how easy/automatic the retrieval is. The various types of referring expressions, then, each represent is. different different sets of instructions for the search process. We We could almost say that they represent represent different different 'price tags', indicating the processing effort effort (i.e. cost) involved in the retrieval of the intended entity." Ariel (1990: 16).

The neurolinguistic explanation explanation comes from Parallel Parallel Distributed Distributed Processing models and the degrees of activation of the units of information information (see Rumelhart and McClelland, Rumelhart McClelland, eds. 1986). The correlation between the type of expression and the degree of accessibility is presented as being rather strict. accessibility or But, as we know from the previous discussion, discussion, the degree of accessibility the cognitive status is not the sole information information encoded by the referring expression. The degree to which the referent is intended intended by the speaker to be salient to the hearer is also relevant. Examples that do not conform to the scale are explained as deliberate violations by the speaker of the degree of accessibility accessibility of the entity to the hearer. Such floutings are claimed to aim at the production of contextual implicatures (Ariel 1990: 199). 199). This is not the full story, story, though. For multifarious reasons, expressions very often do not conform to the scale. But this, as I have argued, is not an insurmountable weakness of the theory. By the same reasoning, neither is the contentious claim, based mostly on Hebrew and English data, that full names are lower accessibility accessibility markers than

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definite descriptions. properties in descriptions. It is the proposal proposal of the scale of referring properties of general that is theoretically interesting rather than the exact ordering of the referring terms. accessibility theory is that referring To sum up, the overall claim of the accessibility expressions that serve as antecedents and those which which are always always anaphoric should be treated in the same way, way, as degrees on one scale. This claim should has its indubitable strength, confirmed by the data-based data-based analysis analysis that makes it a strong competitor competitor to the philosophers' philosophers' distinction between directly-referential terms and contextually-referential contextually-referential ones. The claim that definite descriptions belong with quantifiers quantifiers seems also to have have been challenged. The scale of given ness, supported of givenness, supported by our scale of degrees of intentions, strongly undermines undermines the view that there is a qualitative qualitative semantic definite descriptions. The example difference between proper names and definite ofa of a scale that Ariel (1988: (1988: 84) gives gives in support of this continuity continuity is intuitively valid, in addition addition to being empirically supported: supported: Joan Smith, the president > > Joan Smith >> the president >> Smith > Joan ... etc. Joan... Now, this scale is only useful as long as it is utilized by hearers in a Now, conversation. If one could demonstrate that hearers are guided by the degree of accessibility accessibility in retrieving the referent, the theory would be supported. supported. However, the available evidence is only indirect. It comes through through correlating forms of expressions with stipulated stipulated statuses across a range of languages. Apart from a classification, classification, one needs an explanation from cognitive cognitive science. This, I argued, can be accomplished through the merger of the scale of of accessibility with the scale of degrees of the referential intention intention delineated by the 01 DI and the PI principles.

5.6.3. Explanation 5.6.3. Classification Classification and and Explanation

explain how the Gundel remarks that the Givenness Hierarchy does not explain hearer grasps the intended interpretation of a referring expression. Perhaps, Perhaps, the hierarchy merely of merely classifies. She concludes that we need two types of (l) "a theory of how the form of an expression constrains constrains possible theories: (1) possible interpretations it can have" and (2) "a more general theory of utterance interpretation interpretation which explains how people choose the intended interpretation 1996: 151). 151). Gundel proposes her from among the possible ones" (Gundel 1996: reference (Gundel et al. al. 1993) supported by relevance theory. theory of reference But the Givenness Hierarchy, Hierarchy, combined with Gricean maxims maxims or the relevance-theoretic claim of the balance of costs and benefits in utterance interpretation (Sperber and Wilson 1986a) seems to account only for (1).

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The order of accessibility of~ of' hypotheses hypotheses and the process of constructing assumptions lie beyond relevance theory. (2) is supplied by our account account of the interaction of intentions with the semantic form in utterance interpretation, and in particular particular by the degrees to which the referential intention can be present. In fact, we need only (2). The form of an expression, the way it is chosen by the speaker, and the way way it is interpreted interpreted by the hearer are aspects of the same explanation. This explanation relies on the recognition of the degree of referential intention, founded on the default semantics and the intentionality of mental states, i.e. 'aboutness' 'aboutness' of acts of consciousness and derivatively speech acts. This unified approach seems much more plausible than Gundel's postulate of two separate theories. When the speaker uses a referring referring expression, he or she considers two factors: factors: the viability viability of the correct recovery of the referent by the hearer (and here the givenness/accessibility scale fits fits in) and the degree to which the referent is salient to the speaker (and here intentions and intentionality fit in). However, as was remarked earlier, the degree to which the referential intention intention is present present does not stand in one-to-one correspondence with the grammatical categories on the scale. scale. For example, the pronoun 'it' can equally well be used (a) (a) to refer to a known, known, individuated referent as (b) to refer to whoever or whatever had been referred to by the use of, of, let us say, say, a proper name or a definite description in the previous sentence. Similarly, Similarly, demonstrative NPs can be used to refer to the antecedent which can be referentially salient to various degrees, although although we know independently that they usually usually correspond to a highly highly unambiguous physical context (Clark and Marshall 1981 1990). ~boutness' of speech and 1981;; Ariel 1988, 1988,1990).'Aboutness'of thought guarantee guarantee that the referential reading is the default one. Where this is not the case, the departure from this default is often lexicalized as in indefinite descriptions, 'a N'. Intentionality, Intentionality, or 'aboutness', answers (2) (2) in that it explains how hearers choose the intended interpretation. interpretation. In a sense, the idea of referent accessibility and scale of accessibility accessibility rely on the default referential referential intention in that it is already assumed in the accessibility theories that the referent individuated by the hearer when the referring expression is to be individuated expression is used. Gundel et al.'s a/.'s (1993) (1993) cognitive statuses presented in Section 5.6.1 5.6.1 above only summarize what we have said in Section 5.5, 5.5, namely that personal pronouns are referential by default and they are very likely to be intended intended as referring to an individual or individuals. individuals. Demonstrative pronouns and demonstrative NPs are also referring by default but they rely on a physical or linguistic act of demonstration demonstration (and the MoP or sense that this act conveys). Demonstrative NPs, due to having having more lexical content than demonstrative pronouns, seem more likely to lead to referential referential mistakes. Definite descriptions descriptions are also referring by default but they are more likely to be used attributively than the categories to their left. Indefinite Indefinite NPs including the indefinite 'this N' are normally not referring expressions although they can,

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on occasions, be used specifically specifically (or, in the tri-partite distinction, even of referentially). Referent accessibility with its cognitive statuses is a way way of saying that the referential referential intention is manifested manifested through various means and can be more, or less, likely to be recovered from the context. So, So, to recapitulate, there is one item missing in the Givenness Hierarchy and the Accessibility Accessibility Theory. On the one hand, the speaker speaker has to assess the degree degree of accessibility accessibility with which the hearer hearer holds the referent in his memory, memory, but on the other, he or she has to judge whether referring is is to be performed or not. Indefinite noun phrases can be referential, referential, and some other categories to their left left in Gundel et al.'s a/.'s hierarchy hierarchy need not be so. so. Hence, accessibility, accessibility, based on knowledge and information, is interwoven interwoven with the conversational needs (i) (i) to refer to an individual or (ii) to ascribe attributes attributes to whoever undergoes undergoes the name or description description when the speaker talks about the state or event accounted for by the cognitive in general. The use of an expression is not fully accounted statuses/degrees of accessibility. accessibility. The interaction of accessibility and intentionality requires its own theory founded founded on the recognition of the speaker's speaker's intentions. Moreover, Moreover, the ambiguity ambiguity within a type type of referring expression such as definite descriptions has to be replaced by the order internal to that referring expression. In other other words, degrees of intentions supply the missing information in the hierarchy and introduce the differences which are not differences which lexicalized. lexicalized. This order order means the unmarkedness, saliency and frequency of one interpretation and comes from the default value highly value of referential, highly intention intentional interpretations. The absence of the default referential intention can also be lexicalized as in 'a N' or 'some N'.

5.6.4. Intentions Again Again 5.6.4. Intentions

Givan's Givon's (1993) 'continuum of referential intent' is a conversational conversational necessity. If If speakers were always using the full, semantically semantically and phonetically rich expressions, the effort effort needed to process the utterances would would be draws on the salience unnecessarily great. The scale of 'referential intent' draws of the information for the hearer and obeys the principle of the least effort effort and maximal gain, espoused espoused in Grice's Co-operative Co-operative Principle and in all its derivatives, and particularly brought to the fore by Sperber Sperber and Wilson's (1986a) relevance theory. Now, Now, Givan's Givon's 'referential intent' is not Bach's 'referential intention'. The degree to which which the referent is to become salient is not at stake in the hierarchy. It is assumed that the referent is identifiable, identifiable, unless it is only only type-identifiable al. 1993: 276). So, So, referential intention is presumed as a natural (Gundel et al. feature of speech ness' of mental acts. This speech acts, stemming from the 'about 'aboutness' intention has a different intention different role to play, namely it intrudes in the hierarchy interlocutors in their choice of interpretations when, and guides the interlocutors

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theoretically, an ambiguity or underdetermination is possible. In discourse theoretically, discourse interpretation, interpretation, there is normally no such ambiguity because of the recognition overridden defaults. If If ambiguities ambiguities arise though, they have to of defaults and overridden be attributed to some failures (deliberate or accidental) in the communicative and informative intention and they may give rise to implicatures. implicatures. al. (1993) Before concluding, let us tie up some loose ends. Gundel et al. (1993) claim that their work is tangential to, or even totally independent of, of, the philosophical debates on the semantics of referring expressions because they are concerned concerned with uses of referring expressions. This disclaimer is rather spurious or at least limiting and seems to act as an emphasis emphasis on the role of of of pragmatic processes rather than a declaration of independence of semantics and pragmatics which it can superficially be taken to be. The intrusion of pragmatic processes into the semantic representation is assumed in this analysis of referring expressions and hence there is no strict separation separation between semantics and pragmatics. As the unified approach approach demonstrates, demonstrates, it is the same debate all the way from Mill, through Brentano, Frege and Husseri, to the neo-Fregeans neo-Fregeans and neo-Russellians on the one hand, and Husserl, empirically-minded discourse analysts such as Givan, Givon, Ariel, Gundel, and Brown (1995) on the other. The hidden secret is not to lose this thread and continue theorizing about reference to objects and people in the medium of language and in the domain of discourse. Now, of Now, Kasher Kasher (1991: 381) distinguishes linguistic pragmatics, which is a component of grammar, and general pragmatics, which is ""... ... related to general cognitive systems, such as that of intentional action in general". Ariel (1991: 462-3) adopts this distinction and says that accessibility theory belongs to linguistic pragmatics. communication further However, as I have demonstrated, intentions intentions in communication further alls disambiguate the cognitive statuses of Ariel's scale (or Gundel et al.'s hierarchy). So, So, intentionality would have to be said to intervene in linguistic pragmatics. This seems untenable. Rather, it seems, general, intentional cognitive processes subsume the lexicalized cognitive differences (i.e. the expressions on the scale) and, freely, add to them the additional gradation, gradation, i.e. that of the strength of intentions. This model is compatible with the research which has findings of discourse discourse analysts involved in the Map task research as its component a study of referring in a problem-solving discourse situation According to Brown, correct reference is not the hearer's aim. (Brown 1995). According Instead, successful reference is. is. In the Map task research, the participant B had to update the map of an area on the basis of the conversation with participant A. It was demonstrated that providing the listener with a the participant totally referentially unambiguous expression is not a necessary condition for the successful use of of a referring expression. The referential function of, NP is normally taken for granted. The default referential e.g., the definite NP findings: intention presumed in the discussion intention seems to be presumed discussion of their findings:

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"We, as analysts, are in exactly exactly the same position as B, B, in that we cannot know whether or not A intended to refer on any particular particular occasion. However, However, the default expectation listener must expectation of any listener always be that, if A utters what appears to be a rational utterance, utterance, containing an expression which which could be understood as a referring expression, A does intend to refer." Brown (1995: (1995: 73).

This default presumption which replaces traditional traditional semantic ambiguities still adhered to by some philosophers, suggests that the general pragmatic pragmatic mechanisms indeed indeed intervene in the interpretation interpretation of linguistic expressions. expressions. If our Default Semantics is on the right tract, they also intervene intervene in the If semantics. Now, Fretheim and Gundel (1996) also stress that the form of a referring expression rarely or never determines a unique interpretation interpretation and, similarly, a thing can be referred referred to by using different linguistic forms. "Given this, the fact that people actually manage to understand one another most of of the time seems almost magical." (ibid.: (fbid.: 7). 7). In this section, I hope to have dispelled this magic and provided a unified approach to referring in discourse which draws draws on the psychological idea of the intentionality of mental states, the psychosemantic psychosemantic idea of the cognitive force of linguistic expressions, expressions, and the pragmatic idea of intentions in communication. I also hope to have demonstrated that the strict framework of philosophical discussions on reference is frequently not applicable to referring in discourse. Direct quantifier-based logical form is not a tenable reference as opposed to quantifier-based distinction. Rather, there is a continuum of 'referential intent'. Defaults defaults come to the rescue where the scale of referring and overridden defaults expressions is not sufficiently sufficiently finely-grained to match the scale of cognitive statuses. Hence, referential ambiguities are not the norm but rather an infrequent of infrequent departure from the norm. The norm is set by the degree of referentiality of linguistic linguistic expressions, expressions, further strengthened by default interpretations where, where, otherwise, ambiguities would would arise.

5.7. Conclusions It seems that whatever type of referring expression the speaker uses, the hearer may have have to recover the information information as to whether the expression was used to pick out a particular person or perhaps to denote whoever or whatever it stands for, for, and if it was used to refer, then whether it was used correctly or mistakenly. primarily applicable to definite mistakenly. This distinction, although primarily indexical referring expresdescriptions, also applies to proper names and indexical sions. The latter, however, however, exhibit such weakened weakened reference less often than two. In other words, the default, the first two. default, strong referring can normally be

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assumed. Since indexicals rely heavily heavily on the context for their semantic content, they obtain a strong contextual setting in their referring referring function and turn out to be, normally, normally, referentially referentially used. All this points to the plausibility of the suggestion that referring referring expressions can be ordered on a scale of referring referring properties from the weakest weakest referring to the strongest, default value of each grammatical category of referring expression as far as the default is concerned. Departures from the default exhibit their own hierarchies of referential intention that pertain to the particular expression and are inherent to it. have the property of referring referring which Demonstratives and pronouns have which is sufficiently sufficiently salient not to arouse doubts as to their reading, save for very exceptional circumstances exemplified 5.5. Demonstrative NPs exemplified in Section 5.5. involve a referential referential mistake, but they are not likely to are more likely to involve be used attributively. attributively. Proper names allow for differences in reading more Indefinites, that are readily, and definite descriptions even more naturally. naturally. Indefinites, not referring referential) referring expressions, only occasionally have a specific specific (or referential) Ludlow and Neale 1991). function (see Ludlow 1991). The exact placements of these categories on the scale were were discussed in Section 5.6. It is sometimes argued that attributing too much weight to intentions and intentionality of mental states is dangerous because the hearer has access to the speaker's intentions only through what the speaker says (Brown, personal communication). But a principled account of intentions need not be confined to inference from what is said. The default settings of intentions in utterance interpretation are taken for granted by the hearer and adjusted accordingly when when a prompt from the context of utterance suggests such a need. And, as was referential was suggested in this chapter, the referential intention is applicable to a whole referring expressions. whole wide wide range of referring Moreover, the hearer has access not only only to what the speaker says, but also to how he or she behaves. behaves. Various Various carriers of information are the topic of the next chapter. It is hoped that empirical research of spoken and written discourse will further corroborate the theory of defaults defaults and degrees of referring. referring. The methodology of such research will will have have to be carefully thought out. Counting the frequencies of occurrence of particular categories of referring expressions in their various (default and non-default) interpretations will will not do. do. The study will have to investigate investigate the hearer's interpretation of a referring expression, the circumstances interpretative circumstances that led to assigning assigning a particular interpretative dependencies between choice, and finally a generalization generalization over observed dependencies circumstances and interpretative interpretative choices. choices. Utilizing Utilizing a dynamic dynamic semantic approach to discourse discourse such as DRT may make make this this task feasible.

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CHAPTER CHAPTER 6

Vehicles of Thought in Attitude Ascription "Polish painter, Leon Chwistek published published in "Polish logician and painter, 1921 a book, The Plurality of of Reality, in which he suggested that there are four kinds of mutually independent, independent, and presumably non-interfering, realities: of things, as they are discerned discerned by common common sense; of physical science; of impressions; impressions; and of imagination. imagination. They are artistically expressed as primitivist, naturalist, impressionist, and futurist painting respectively. respectively. But then, of indefinite number of he argued, this plurality justifies an indefinite equally valid world views, views, none of them provable, but each acceptable on the condition that it does not try to establish a monopoly of truth for itself." Kolakowski Kotekowski (1988: (1988: 103).

Contents 6.1. Thoughts and Acts of Thought ................................... , 6.2. Vehicles Vehicles of Thought . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ., 6.3. Vehicles Vehicles and Attitudes .......................................... 6.3.1. Beyond Language ........................................ 6.3.2. Language: The First Vehicle Vehicle and the Identification of the Referent ...... 6.3.3. Concepts and the First Vehicle ............................... 6.3.4. Mental Images: Images: The Second Second Vehicle Vehicle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 6.3.5. Actions: The Third Third Vehicle Vehicle .................................. 6.4. Default Interpretations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 6.5. The Core of Meaning .......................................... 6.6. Summary ...................................................

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6.1. Thoughts and and Acts of Thought The central topic of this chapter is an attempt at a reconstruction of the process of interpretation process interpretation of belief reports. In this section, I suggest the media verbalized belief belief is formed by a person and conveyed to other in which a verbalized people. These media are derived from the phenomenological idea of what came to be known as 'vehicles of thought'. Section 6.2 6.2 deals with the three proposed types of vehicles in more detail and attempts a classification of these vehicles according according to the order in which they are considered considered by the hearer. In Section 6.3, this process of utterance interpretation is applied specifically belief reports reports are explained with belief reports. Default interpretations interpretations of belief to belief the help of this ordering of the vehicles in Section 6.4, and Section 6.5 discusses the role of context of interpretation that includes these vehicles. Section 6.6 6.6 summarizes the results. terminological reminder is due here. It concerns concerns the relation between A terminological because the expressions of beliefs and thoughts. It is important important because expressions 'vehicles of interchangeably. thought' and 'vehicles', or 'carriers', of beliefs are often often used interchangeably. Beliefs are here considered to be, so to speak, 'containers' of thoughts. Beliefs are not as clearly contrasted with knowledge as non-factives with factives. knowledge and ignorance, Belief is not 'failed knowledge', a state between knowledge Belief as Plato says in the Republic (see Lee 1953: 273). The question as to whether whether 1953: 273). all knowledge, or only failed failed knowledge, is a belief belief is wrongly posed. Knowledge cannot be assumed of the speaker, it has to be inferred in confrontation with the facts, whereas a belief confrontation belief can. These two terms cannot compared because because they do not belong to the same epistemological be easily compared epistemological We do not talk of evidence for beliefs in the same way in which which category. We we talk of evidence for knowledge. knowledge. 'How do you know?' is possible, but not 'How do you believe?'. 'Why do you believe?' is common, whereas 'Why do you know?' is not. Ascribing beliefs beliefs is a semantic problem, whereas know ascribing knowledge is not. 'How does he know?' and 'What does he know when he knows different types of of research. On the other x?' are questions for different knows jc?' knows it may also hand, saying that someone believes that p when he or she knows be misleading. But this does not mean that when one knows something, one does not at the same time believe it. What can be misleading misleading is the fact that the speaker did not say as much as was required in the conversation, sufficiently informative. that is the speaker was not sufficiently informative. In other other words, the speaker flouted Grice's first sub-maxim of Quantity. Quantity. And this is how I shall speaker use the term belief: in the wide sense of thinking thinking that something is the case, i.e. as a container container of thought. Until recently, recently, there was a strict division of semantic theories into truth-conditional and non-truth-conditional. The first group of approaches normally subscribe to model theory and possible worlds in line with would normally Montague semantics, whereas the second second would rely instead on meaning

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being dependent dependent on the structure and operations operations of the brain, as is the case for example in Lakoff's (1987) of (1987) approach. In cognitive theories, the problem of reference does not occur but is replaced with reference to a mental representation perhaps most salient in Fauconnier's 1997) mental representation that is perhaps Fauconnier's (1985, (1985,1997) spaces. This strict division of standpoints standpoints no longer holds. As has been argued throughout this book, both reference and concepts concepts contribute to sentence meaning. I have suggested that the contribution contribution of MoP to the of semantic representation representation of a belief report can assume various degrees of detail, including the value zero. But the value zero alters the arity of the belief belief predicate. So, So, it remains to tie up some loose ends concerning this freedom freedom of arity, or to answer the question of how to reconcile compositional compositional semantics with this contribution contribution from mental representations. representations. Attempts by of Schiffer Schiffer and Ludlow were critically discussed in Section 4.2, the role of representations in reference in extensional contexts was discussed in Chapter Chapter 5, and the interaction interaction of the meaning derived from non-linguistic means of conveying thoughts thoughts with the meaning meaning of lexical items is attempted in what follows. The choice of the aspects of belief which are analysed is based on the tradition derived from Bolzano, Brentano and Husserl. To To repeat, according according to this tradition, thoughts are objective and are not contents of consciousness. Thoughts have to be discovered; they are not inhabitants of the mind but have objectifying acts discussed in to be brought to the mind by acts of meaning, objectifying Chapter Chapter 3. 3. Hence, there must be events that embody thoughts. These events, (1991b) vehicles of of thought, thought, can be either which I shall call after Dummett (199lb) linguistic expressions, non-linguistic actions, or mental images. They are called by Husserl 'acts of meaning'. For Bolzano, 'objective ideas' are propositions and they are not in our mind; propositions propositions exist constituents of propositions independently of our mind, they can be maintained by us or not, and can be 'brought before the mind' by a judgement. thoughts existing judgement. This view on thoughts independently of our consciousness is developed later in Frege's account account of thoughts, although his philosophy is, undoubtedly, remote from the principles of phenomenology. Brentano expressed a similar view taking mental phenomena, phenomena, i.e. experience, rather than thoughts, as objects of consciousness.} consciousness.1 For Husserl contrasted with acts of meaning. They thoughts are also objective meanings, contrasted are not in the mind; they have to be discovered. Similar to Brentano, he understands consciousness as the sum of our experience. In other words, fulfilment; we have both thoughts and acts of thoughts (acts of meaning fulfilment;

1

See See also the introduction by by Kraus Kraus (Brentano 1874: 1874: LXV-LXVI). LXV-LXVI). Having Having something something as as object object means having it before the mind (yorstellen). (vorstellen). 1

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fulfilment fulfilment of intentions). Thoughts are carried carried by acts and these acts are expressed expressed in language, embodied embodied in an action, or are an event of of mental life (or: a mental image). In Dummett's words,

... a thought requires a vehicle: vehicle: it is not possible for someone to ""... have a thought at a particular time without there being some event, overt in his actions or interior to his mental life, that embodies it." Dummett (l991b: (1991b: 322-323).

For Frege, vehicles are needed because thoughts are objective and have to be 'grasped'. But, as I shall argue shortly, shortly, even if thoughts are seen as private rather than objective, they also require vehicles in that they require the means by which they are formed. It may seem a truism to say that in order to establish what statement statement has have to take the context into consideration; been made by a sentence we have problems with the boundary boundary between semantics semantics and pragmatics pragmatics have been the problems addressed However, there is more to the addressed in detail in Chapters I1 and 2. However, Husserlian framework of carriers of thought than just the recognition of these extra-linguistic carriers. He provides an actual procedure which which has to be followed in unravelling unravelling the speaker's thoughts in the Situations Situations A and B from Chapter re, because Chapter 4. In A, we can say that the belief is either [I] [1] de re, the thought is carried by the three types of acts and is conveyed as (a) the sentence 'The man in the brown hat is a spy.'; (b) being present on the beach at the same time as Ortcutt and having having Ortcutt in the interlocutor's visual field; field; and (c) (c) the act of perceiving Ortcutt as the man in the brown hat.2 The belief in A could also be [2] die to, should the relevant carriers of of [2] de dicto, thought be suitably different. Therefore, in addition to stressing the role of of thought context, Husserl provides a framework in which which it is shown how the linguistic linguistic and extra-linguistic carriers of meaning interact. Husserl indicates indicates the order of information and also shows how to 'sum of application of the sources of information vehicles in up' information provided by the three generically generically different different vehicles deciding between de re and to. 3 and de die dicto. I shall now consider the 'embodiments of thought' in the analysis analysis of verbal expressions of thoughts. Husserl's notion of meaning meaning (his: (his: noema) extends 2

Cf. Hussed Husserl 1900-190Ia, 1900-1901a, Investigation VI: perception is an ultimate fulfilment fulfilment of 'meaning intentions' (thought intentions) and both meaning intentions and acts of meaning fulfilment fulfilment are 'objectitying 'objectifying acts', i.e. acts of meaning, carriers of meaning (especially pp. 709-710). 709-710). 3 3 Cf. Cf. also: also: "This man [act of ostensionJ ostension] is a spy." spy" and "But Ortcutt Ortcutt is not a spy.", spy", as in Situation B from Chapter 4 where the lack of a correct (or any) any) mental picture of Ortcutt can be inferred from Situation A and from the principle of the interaction of beliefs. 2

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vehicle. He applies it to other vehicles vehicles as well. well. 4 Events beyond the linguistic vehicle. 5 that embody thoughts do not have to be linguistic events. events. Extending the idea of sense beyond language expressions is the main achievement of the Husserlian approach: there are events other than the utterance utterance that express a thought and which, which, in the case of verbalized beliefs, contribute to expressing the belief on .a par with language. Therefore, Therefore, they all have to be taken into consideration in approaching the problem of belief ascription and the semantics of prepositional propositional attitudes. This is a gross oversimplification of the view of thoughts requiring vehicles. The gist of it is the following. following. Thoughts have have to be carried, carried, embodied in something in order to be externalized, 'brought before the mind'. Beliefs are such containers of thoughts. In order to analyse beliefs, beliefs, one has to attend to all three types different types of embodiment of thought and also, a fortiori, utilize different theories to study them. This framework requires a tri-partite division of the analysis is not as extensive extensive as it investigation of belief reports. The field of analysis may seem. Dummett (1990, (1990, 1991b) suggests suggests that only verbalized thoughts are worth investigating because, as he says, we have have a systematic says, only then do we background (i.e. language) to make judgements about thoughts and beliefs. justified: beyond This confinement of the field of investigation is fully justified: reports on beliefs, the access to mental states is expressions of beliefs and reports severely constrained. constrained. Be that as it may, may, it is the semantics and pragmatics of propositional attitude sentences that is of interest here anyway and hence the confinement to verbalized thoughts thoughts will do. Externalization of thought is a dubious metaphysical concept, though. though. It dubious metaphysical invites an assumption that thoughts inhabit a 'third realm', so to speak, and are carried carried before the mind by some vehicles (cf. (cf. Dummett 1986). Frege phenomenological claim. However, there is a more also subscribed to this phenomenological plausible way way of interpreting it. Namely, Namely, thoughts have to be formed formed in some thought, 6 medium. This medium can be language - natural or the language of thought, or it can be a mental image which does not utilize any operations on symbols. 4 4

Cf.: "In the period following his Logische Untersuchungen, Husserl's Hussed's fundamental fundamental thought was that the notion of sense could could be generalized from expressive (linguistic) acts to all mental generalized he termed 'noema'." Dummett acts: the notion thus generalized Dummett (1990: 271). Cf. also Fdlesdal F011esdal 1982. 5 5 We We do not have to ask what thoughts are, where they exist and where they come from. It is sufficient to look at the types of acts of thought. This is the only aspect of phenomenological phenomenological sufficient reduction reduction which is of any (albeit marginal) interest for our methodology. 6 6 For the present discussion discussion of the vehicles the difference is is immaterial. Both are understood understood as operations operations on symbols and it does not bear much significance on our analysis whether we natural language or a special language of mental operations. The language of thought think in natural understood as structurally natural languages, languages, in agreement is understood structurally similar similar to natural agreement with Fodor (1975). Two possibilities of construing the language thought with respect to the vehicles vehicles are presented language of thought in Section 6.3.3 below.

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It can also be an inner disposition to act, physically, in a certain way. way. Philosophical discussions of the vehicles of thought are ample in the literature and a review will not be attempted here. Instead, I shall put forward some proposals of the interaction of these carriers of thought that underlie an production and interpretation. Hence, 'externaordinary act of utterance production lization'means belief by using certain lization' means for my purpose two things: (i) (i) forming a belief media, and subsequently subsequently (ii) conveying conveyingititto tothe the interlocutor interlocutorby bythe thesame sametypes types of media. 'The same' because the hearer assumes that linguistic expressions, physical actions and mental images (as far as they they can be externalized) sum up to convey certain information. information. This assumption assumption is based on the Gricean idea of co-operation including the presumption Gricean co-operation in conversation, including of the communicative communicative and informative intentions. vehicles do not come Now, the exact distinction and names of the vehicles directly from Husserl. Husser!' They can be arrived at from HusserI's Husserl's discussion of words, the understanding understanding of an expression having of the meaning of words, expression as having a mental picture, and, generally, generally, what what he calls 'objectifYing 'objectifying acts', acts of 'meaning fulfilment'. Dummett in his analysis of Husserl distinguished (i) (i) language, language, (ii) mental images, images, and (iii) actions as carriers, saying that However, a thought is carried by the same medium medium in which which it is expressed. However, Dummett also adds that language, so to speak, 'takes over' once it becomes a vehicle vehicle of thought. thought. I do not share this this view. Other vehicles vehicles seem seem to work alongside it, as the pragmatic intrusions into the prepositional propositional representation best demonstrate.7 There is no clear-cut boundary between the meaning derived derived from linguistic linguistic expressions expressions and that derived derived from context. Utterance interpretation can only be successful when it accounts for the variety of vehicles: vehicles: there are ambiguous ambiguous sentences, sentences, sentences in need completions or expansions. expansions. Moreover, of reference assignment, and other completions Moreover, speaker's sentences are interpretations rather than descriptions of the speaker's thoughts, there is no direct one-to-one correspondence correspondence due to the use of metaphor or other non-literality (see the diagram on p. 232 232 of Sperber and Wilson 1986a). I propose that vehicles vehicles interact according to a certain schema. schema. In other which they externalize beliefs and in which they words, there is an order in which are interpreted. Language comes first, mental images, to the extent to which which they are revealed, revealed, are considered next, next, and physical actions further fill in the missing information. The interpretation of misused indexicals also points

7 7 In agreement with Dummett Dummett (1990), it is is assumed here that there are also languageless thoughts, thoughts, i.e. thoughts thoughts that occur without having a linguistic expression of expression as their carrier. Cf. §330 of Dummett (personal communication) Wittgenstein's (1953) Investigations. Dummett communication) gives here an example example of of forming forming a thought while driving, the moment when a child child runs in front of of the car and the situation situation requires a sudden decision. This thought can have a mental image as its vehicle.

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in the direction of such ordering. For example, example, in sentence (19) from Chapter repeated below as (1), 'her husband' said of the woman's brother is more 5, repeated likely to be taken to apply to her brother (i.e. the person in the interlocutors' interlocutors' fields) than to her husband. husband. In other words, (21) visual fields) (21) repeated here as (2) is more natural than (20), repeated repeated here as (3): (1) (1)

Her husband is kind to her.

(2)

He is kind to her, but he isn't her husband.

(3) (3)

No, he isn't. The man you're referring to isn't her husband.

Answers in (2) and (3) are only possible when the referential mistake is spotted by the hearer, i.e. when the meaning derived from the content of the sentence alone, plus reference assignment to the possessive adjective 'her', is overridden. Sentence (3) (3) seems to include an intended distancing distancing or shocking effect effect due to the change of the referent from the obvious, obvious, shared one (the man standing over there and appearing attentive woman) to attentive to the woman) of the description 'her husband'. Ifutterance interpretation the correct bearer correct description If utterance interpretation was confined to the understanding of the content of the utterance, then (3) could not be reached, and (2) even less so. so. The interaction of the vehicles explains how the literal content content of the description description can be overridden overridden by the salience of the speaker's mental representation associated with the speech act. The linear ordering of the sources of information for belief reports is corroborated by the process of utterance interpretation. interpretation. In the ideal scenario, corroborated scenario, the linguistic linguistic expression provides a logical form, mental images attend to the potential interpretative interpretative ambiguity between de re and de die to readings by potential dicto interpretation where relevant, and causing the overriding of the default interpretation actions attend to the potential interpretative ambiguity ambiguity between the types of de dieto dicto reading by revealing the cases of referential mistakes. This is Chapter 4. 4. The ordering of these the role of the parts of context analysed in Chapter if sources shows information if shows that the hearer resorts to looking for more information the amount provided by the basic source, i.e. the linguistic expression, is So, the distinction distinction between the vehicles is not a classification insufficient. So, of equally potent contributions to utterance interpretation. By pursuing the idea of vehicles of thought in the example of an expression of a we can arrive at a set of criteria determining what belief belief propositional attitude we prepositional the person holds and whether it is de re or de dicto. dieto. At the same time, we should arrive at a set of criteria applicable to the interpretation of the report on this belief. I shall have more to say about the ordering of the vehicles in the following section.

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6.2. Vehicles Vehicles of Thought In discussing MoPs, we we have have not confined the sources of information about the referent. These sources require a closer look because they constitute elements of context of utterance interpretation. interpretation. For Husserl, acts of thought are the 'fulfilment 'fulfilment of intentions'. They are not necessarily necessarily expressed in image. 8 language. They can be embodied in language, action, or a mental image. belief In reporting on people's beliefs, reporting reporting on the expression expression of belief may not suffice. In order to preserve the speaker's meaning, taking other necessary. Although, Although, as vehicles of thought into consideration may be necessary. Dummett (1991b) sufficient (l991b) claims, only verbalized thoughts provide a sufficient systematic background for judging about beliefs, all three carriers have was not accessible to Fregean to be considered. This comprehensive inquest was approaches because Frege applied the notion of sense only to one vehicle, namely language. In the form of Husserlian (1913) (1913) noema, it applies to all contributing acts. There are also noematic Sinne Sinne not expressed (and perhaps not expressible) in language, there are cases of so-called so-called 'wordless known and recognized although the name knowing' when the object is known acts.9 As a result of the is not recalled. Language plays no role in such acts. extending of the notion of sense beyond language, it appears that it is not the case that words and sentences have a sense (or an individual MoP). Instead, there is is an act that bestows a MoP on a sentence. It bestows a subjective, it is MoP rather than sense because the bestowed meaning is subjective, aa'personal' 'personal' thought, so to speak, of the holder of the belief, whereas Fregean sense is an intersubjective, intersubjective, socially accepted meaning. meaning. Husserl's Husserl's generalization when we we want to explain substitutivity generalization to noema is essential when beliefs. A thought that accompanies an utterance is private, in reporting on beliefs. formed thanks to various acts that are not necessarily linguistic. In order to report correctly on one's utterance, the hearer may may have to go beyond the speaker's expression of belief and rely on other contextual clues, such as actions that accompany the utterance, utterance, or other utterances and aspects of the situation that reveal something about the mental representation of of relevant for the belief report, then so are the speaker's. If the MoPs are relevant vehicles of thought other than language. Now, the priority of the linguistic vehicle vehicle is sometimes understood as its omnipresence among the vehicles of thought. But this interpretation is unwarranted. Woodruff Woodruff Smith and Mclntyre McIntyre (1982: 154) 154) argue that since linguistic sense determines the act's intentional relation to an object and 8

Or an event of mental life. life. This point is 170) say is contentious. contentious.WoodrutfSmith Woodruff Smith and and McIntyre Mclntyre(1982: (1982:170) saythat that every every noematic noematic Sinn Sinn Smith (1982: 81) 81)say saythat that every everynoematic noematicSinn Sinnisis is expressible in language. language. Mclntyre McIntyre and Woodruff WoodrutfSmith a linguistic linguistic meaning. meaning. For a discussion discussion see see below. below. 8

9 9

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sense is a component of the noema, then noemata are meanings meanings expressed expressed in language. They say that since every linguistic meaning is a noematic sense and every noematic sense is expressible, then senses (Sinne) and meanings (JJedeutungen) (Bedeutungeri) are the same thing. It is so because meanings expressed in language are the noematic senses of the meaning-giving acts of of consciousness (ibid. (ibid.:: 179). However, we have to remember that expressibility fact of expressibility does not mean the fact of being expressed. So, So, the inference Moreover, 'expressible' need not mean 'expressible in does not hold. Moreover, language'. Meanings are not linguistic senses, they are more likely to rely individual MoPs or types of MoPs that are not confined to linguistic on individual linguistic McIntyre and Woodruff Smith (1982) means of presenting the object. Mclntyre (1982) cite of several passages from Husserl's Ideen that allegedly lead to the thesis of sameness of sense and meaning. But none of the passages seems to corroborate corroborate unequivocally the inference cited above. They admit that acts are not intrinsically linguistic but rather are expressed in language. And, after after all, being expressed in language is not a necessary feature of an thought (or mental mental state). There are thoughts and beliefs that are act of thought not expressed, even if not inexpressible, and language may not be among participated in forming this act of thought. Husserl merely the vehicles that participated says that expressing a thought is generally done in words, which is a well of known truism. Relying on potential expressibility in the discussion of the necessity or contingency of language as a vehicle seems pointless. Expressibility is not the actual vehicle of thought, the act of expression, and is beside the point. The fragments fragments of the Ideen that directed some Husserl scholars to the conclusion that language privileged position among the vehicles seem conclusion language has a privileged to be the ones where Husserl (19l3: (1913: 288 and 19l3a: 1913a: 349) talks about expressions having linguistic parts ('phases of expressions'). For intensional intensional contexts, for example, we need MoPs (or Schiffer's Schiffer's types of of MoPs or my degrees of fineness of MoPs), and hence we need noemata. So, So, by inference, these should be linguistic. However, it does not mean that the role of noemata is confined to providing the semantic representation representation of sentences expressing intensional again under intensional contexts. This would mean subsuming subsuming them again linguistic sense, perhaps as non-linguistic context of utterance. As such, they book I am become uninteresting. uninteresting. On the other hand, since in this book would become concerned concerned with utterance interpretation, interpretation, I use only this section of Husserl's notion of context of utterance. Special noema that fits comfortably in the notion care has to be taken not to equate this confinement with epistemological claims of noemata being necessarily linguistic. For semantics and pragmatics, no grave error would ensue from this confusion but the used terms should be used without the unnecessary narrowing to language. The object (noema) can be intended intended in a meaning-giving meaning-giving act (noesis) which is not linguistic.

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of the act (Gegebenheitsweise) is a part Now, the so-called so-called 'way of givenness' givenness'of of the noema (see laszczolt Jaszczolt 1996a for a more detailed account). When the act is expressed in language, these parts are normally said not to enter the meaning of the expression, just as MoP is said not to enter the semantics meaning semantics of a sentence. But, as we we know from attitude expressions expressions and other intensional contexts, sometimes the way of givenness givenness affects the meaning of statements, and, on our 'intrusionist semantic' account, it contributes to the semantic 1O This seems to be a way way of saying representation as well.10 representation saying that the fact that a meaning-giving act is is of a certain type affects the meaning of the linguistic expressions. In other words again, the interaction interaction of the vehicles of thought believed to hold produces a certain belief, in which which some properties are believed of someone or something and this individual individual is apprehended under certain MoPs. This seems correct. The meaning of a linguistic linguistic expression depends on the interaction of the vehicles that led to this expression. belief and belief belief expression is very close To sum up, Husserl's view on belief contemporary pragmatic theories such as contextualism (see Recanati to contemporary 1994) and Gricean and relevance-theoretic relevance-theoretic emphasis on conversational, context-based implicatures. Thoughts are about real objects, these objects are thought about under various guises, guises, and the guises can be inferred from the context of of utterance. Moreover, Moreover, all of these approaches allow allow for some contribution of information from context to the semantic representation, representation, either going the whole hog on context (as relevance theory does) or searching for conventions and defaults like neo-Griceans and the Default Semantics proposed in this book. In addition, Default Semantics Semantics borrows intentionality as the foundation foundation for these defaults. The vehicles are evoked by the reporter in a particular order. A word or a (cf. Husserl 1929: 24 and sentence can give rise to different different actualizations actualizations (cf. 1929a: 19-20). A person person believes something about a situation rather than about a sentence and hence various various aspects of this situation may be relevant for the hearer of the expression of belief. The contribution contribution from these aspects aspects can be explained as follows. The so-called meaning-intention determines so-called meaning-intention the referent and the guise under which it is given. given. Fulfilling this intention occur no matter whether the linguistic expression occurred or not. may occur The object can be intended in an act which which is not linguistic. linguistic. It can be a physical action not involving a linguistic linguistic passing mental image or a sudden physical formulation of the belief. So, So, the intention to refer can also be realized by the collaboration vehicles. Since we are only interested in collaboration of these three vehicles. linguistic expressions of belief, we have narrowed the field to the hearer's hearer's utterance and his forming forming a belief accordingly. recognition of the speaker's utterance recognition In other words, the hearer recovers the meaning meaning of the words, and,

10

Cf. §99 §99 of Husser! Husserl (1913, 1913a) on the 'mode of givenness'.

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compositionally, the logical form, to be further filled in by pragmatic pragmatic according to the intrusionist intrusionist semantics. Sometimes, the recovery processes according of the sentence renders a complete proposition proposition because, among other reasons, reference assignment is straightforward. straightforward. At other times, when the suspicion suspicion of the referential mistake or the lack of referring arises, further information is required. The hearer wants to know who the speaker is talking about or whether the speaker is talking about anybody in particular particular at all. In other words, ascribing a mental representation representation of the situation to the speaker allows someone else or de dicto to the the hearer to assign the belief de re about someone speaker. This indicates that mental images come next in the order of application to utterance interpretation application interpretation and help the hearer distinguish dicto 1 and de dicto proper. between reports de dictoj proper. The hearer does not consider all possible options of interpretation interpretation of a interpretation through referring expression. Instead, he or she arrives at one interpretation the linguistic form and, if required, through other contextual information. The totality of readings of an expression is not important important in the process of interpretation. The situation, including the physical actions of the speaker, such as an act of ostension, helps the hearer arrive at the intended meaning. This is the role of the other vehicles, vehicles, namely mental images and physical actions. The latter may seem a dubious choice as vehicles of thought. However, there are activities that are clearly intended although they are not preceded preceded by a clearly formulated thought. Thought and action are almost simultaneous. To To confusion with the behaviourist term 'a disposition to act', I shall talk avoid confusion about actions rather than the the last moment preceding the the action - the 'motivation', need, certainty that the action will follow, and the like. Where formation) and the distinction between the first externalization (thought formation) the second externalization (conveying (conveying the thought) is discussed, I shall talk about 'motivation' for action in the first, and action in the second case. Husserl's order of explanation, explanation, actions stand after expressions expressions because In HusserI's sense. They also stand after mental images actions are capable of giving them sense. 11 It seems since the latter make precise.l1 make the signitive act precise. seems plausible to assume this ordering of the vehicles of thought for the interpretation of an that this externalization, i.e. expression of belief is the same as the order in the first externalization, in the forming of the belief. In other words, words, it is the same for the phenomenological level of internal reflection ~poche) (epoche) and and for discourse analysis. Now, Now, in his early work, work, Husserl indicates indicates this interaction of vehicles way. in the following way.

11

According to Husserl, HusserI, a signitive intentional, meaning-intending According signitive act is an intentional, meaning-intending act that can be a component of knowledge (is a type of 'objectifYing 'objectifying act'). A signitive act is a thought, it constitutes the meaning of expressions. For a classification of intentional acts see Section 3.4 3.4 and Mohanty (1964: 47). 11

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"If we perform the act and live in it, as it were, we we naturally refer to "If we its object and not to its meaning. If, e.g., we make a statement, statement, we judge about the thing it concerns, and not about the statement's statement's meaning, about the judgement in the logical sense. This latter first becomes objective to us in a reflex act of thought, in which we becomes not only look back on the statement statement just made, but carry out Ideation) demanded." the abstraction abstraction (the Ideation) demanded." HusserI Husserl (l900-1901a: (1900-1901a: 332).

Knowing the object and fulfilling fulfilling the intention are two names for the same act. Perception Perception leads to the most reliable recognition recognition of the referent (in HusserI's beliefs de re, Husserl's words, to the ultimate meaning fulfilment). So, So, beliefs re, beliefs belief where the intention about a known individual, seem to be the type of belief is the strongest, or best fulfilled. They are also the most natural ones, and, a fortiori, fortiori, so are the de re re interpretations of belief reports. reports. Chapter 3 I discussed the idea of the horizon or possibilities of further further In Chapter experience. particular sentence is unravelled through experience. The meaning of a particular the multiplicity of different different acts pertaining to the belief belief expressed expressed in this sentence, sentence, as well as other beliefs that are also held by the person. A belief belief is normally determined beliefs with which it constitutes determined by other beliefs constitutes a network. It seems that acts that carry these background beliefs constitute vehicles of thought that work work alongside the three pertaining to the belief in question. Hence, they also contribute to this belief and can potentially be recovered as part of the context of interpretation. Naturally, these acts are of the same interpretation. Naturally, three types as the ones pertaining to the belief in question. 12 Now, Now, Dummett says the following: following:

""... ... whatever actions, mental images, or the like constitute constitute the vehicle of the thought, they cannot cannot be identified with it, in the strong sense that to do or have them is, in itself, to have have that thought: it is only when they occur against a complicated background that they warrant our ascribing the thought to the subject." Dummett (1991b: (l991b: 323).

12 12

Cf.: Cf.: ""... ... for Husserl the 'predelineation' of an act's horizon is fixed fixed by the act's Sinn only together together 'predelineation'of with certain of beliefs, or their Sinne." of the subject's relevant background beliefs. Woodruff Smith and McIntyre Mclntyre (1982: 249). Woodruff

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Dummett calls belief ascription reporter has ascription 'interpretation' because the reporter to 'sum up', so to speak, information from various sources, including background beliefs. This information cannot be directly 'read off' the belief background belief or its expression. However, Dummett Dummett restricts the 'background' to beliefs carried carried by the linguistic vehicle. 13 This seems overly restrictive. The reporter is normally guided by the believer's behaviour and other situational clues as well as other belief expressions. Hence, three vehicles, vehicles, their combinations, and the horizon pertaining to the three vehicles all constitute the context of interpretation. I have restricted restricted the original object of analysis to verbalizaexpression of belief belief and the report on a belief belief but this tions, namely to the expression is to be taken as a deliberate deliberate restriction of a larger field. field. The object is so restricted not for simplicity or any epistemological reasons but because such is the material on which semantics and pragmatics operate. operate.

6.3. Vehicles and and Attitudes

6.3.1. Beyond Language Belief demonstrate that the intentions intentions and other mental states Belief reports clearly demonstrate affect the meaning of the sentence, including the value of of the speaker affect of the attitude verb. They may also affect affect the syntax of the sentence since the distribution ofthe of the quantifiers may be affected affected (see quotation from Richard 1990: 266 in Section 4.2.3 above). It is part of the semantic theory then to suggest how speakers make use of intentions, conventions and contextual information. section is confined to expressions of belief The topic of this section belief and reports on beliefs. This does not mean that all beliefs contain a linguistic component or that all beliefs are dispositions to assert something. The objective objective of this section is to provide evidence for the default status of belief of de re readings of belief of reports and it is only to this end that vehicles of thought (or: carriers of meaning) are used in what follows. These vehicles will be shown to have correlates in the sources sources of utterance (i) other correlates utterance interpretation interpretation such as (i) utterances; (ii) background background knowledge; (iii) mental states; (iv) non-linguistic utterances; non-linguistic 13 I3 As was briefly indicated indicated above, according to the Frege-Dummett Frege-Dummett view, language has a privileged position as a vehicle conies prior to thought in the order of vehicle of thought. It also comes of explanation explanation because to grasp the thought is to know what it would be for the sentence expressing it to be true. In order order to grasp that, in turn, one has to grasp the constituents constituents of the sentence sentence that expresses that thought. In other words, the sentence and its constituents are linguistic expressions and these linguistic expressions are conditions on grasping the thought. But, it seems verbalized thoughts, other vehicles would have to be that, had Dummett Dummett not limited limited the analysis to verbalized acknowledged as prior prior to thought in the order of explanation, on a par with language. And this 316-317). brings us back to HusserI's Husserl's objectifYing objectifying acts and his noema. Cf. Dummett (l991b: (1991b: 316-317).

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actions. There are many alternative ways of reporting on beliefs. One can, for example, utter (4), or one can draw a picture, tell a story about Ralph's opinion about Ortcutt and thereby communicate (4) (4) by an implicature: (4)

For Ralph, Ortcutt is a spy. spy.

Similarly, there are many ways in which which the belief can be conveyed to the interlocutor. I shall now consider such means of externalization of beliefs. belief There is no necessary logical or conceptual connection between a belief and a sentence sentence expressing it, the first being an inner mental state that is partial externalization. externalization. There is not directly expressible, and the other its partial no direct direct connection connection between beliefs and actions either. It is possible for belief all his life and die without revealing it. it. It is is also a person to hold a belief possible facts, acquire information possible to notice facts, information and form beliefs which which are too trivial to be registered registered as new beliefs and to affect affect behaviour or other (cf. Kenny 1963: 63). Thoughts, which constitute constitute the content content mental states (cf. of beliefs, beliefs, are not normally searched searched for by the hearer in utterance interpretation. speaker's utterance by processing processing interpretation. The hearer interprets the speaker's information through either assuming the sentence, filling in the missing information default referring or following following contextual clues and rejecting these defaults. sentence is part of the context. Linguistic meaning is clearly All that is not the sentence rule-governed interpretation. Gricean Gricean utterance interpretation. rule-governed and is the main material for utterance account for these defaults and for the contribution contribution rules of co-operation account of context, some of which belongs to the semantic representation representation (see Chapter Chapter 2). In expressing expressing a belief, 2). belief, the speaker presents a certain state of affairs as actual and hence communicates what is to be taken as a true statement. statement. In other words, the interlocutors interlocutors agree on the truth conditions conditions of the content utterance and the hearer attempts to recover these truth conditions. conditions. of the utterance But the proposition proposition may only be true in the opinion of the believer. believer. Hence, rather, the interlocutors agree that for all the speaker knows, knows, he is telling telling the truth. According to Frege, this is a pre-condition for grasping the speaker's thought (cf. (cf. Dummett 199Ib). Without this agreement on the truth conditions, there would be no common ground for communication. for communication. Now, it is frequently said both in possible-worlds, truth-conditional Now, cognitive theories that it is language language that creates ambiguities ambiguities semantics and in cognitive dicto. of interpretation such as the one between de re and de die to. As soon as the ambiguity disappears. hearer gets to the language of mental states, the ambiguity But if it is so, then language merely merely reflects the choices of interpretation rather than causes them. After all, de re re and de dieto dicto apply equally equally to beliefs, belief expressions and belief reports. Hence, the choice of interpretation is belief caused, so to speak, by all the vehicles vehicles of thought because the thought itself re or de die dicto, to, and can be about someone other than the referring can be de re expression of the corresponding sentence would make make it appear to be about.

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Stalnaker (1984: 18-20) claims that there is nothing linguistic about beliefs. (1984:18-20) They take possible states of affairs as objects, rather than propositions or sentences. Belief is said to instantiate the propositional prepositional relation called 'indication': the reason for believing something is being in a state in which we are only if this object of belief is the case, or if something that entails it is the case. Stalnaker discusses beliefs and desires by evoking evoking causation. However, it has to be stressed that belief is not a disposition to action. We We always act according to our beliefs and believing is not acting in a do not always certain way. way. Be that as it may, may, there are reasons to agree at least with the weaker claim, namely that there may not be anything anything linguistic about a belief. It is so when it uses different different vehicles. But, obeying the field constraints of semantics and pragmatics, only the verbalized beliefs interest us. Other vehicles are interesting insofar as they are present alongside the linguistic one. believing rather than a state of belief. Now, Stalnaker talks about an act of believing These two points, namely regarding beliefs beliefs as acts and making them non -linguistic are hardly compatible. If non-linguistic If a belief is formed or carried by mental images or actions, then it is still a state of being in a certain frame of mind, being in a certain mental state rather than a mental activity activity of believing something - the more so so that a person may may not realize some of the beliefs Therefore, I shall confine the discussion discussion to language, mental images held. Therefore, as vehicles vehicles of verbalized thoughts - 'vehicles' in the sense of and actions as of forming a belief and conveying conveying it to the hearer, i.e. in the double sense of of 'externalization' introduced above.

6.3.2. Language: The First Vehicle and Identification of 6.3.2. Language: and the Identification of the Referent Referent

vehicle of thought and recall the ways In this section I discuss language as a vehicle in which it conveys reference. The borderline between the linguistic and non-linguistic information information in utterance interpretation is rather fuzzy. There are propositions that require expansion or completion (cf. (cf. Chapter Chapter 2), 2), there are figures figures of speech, echoic utterances, or information information carried by the manner of speaking. There are also aspects of the situation of discourse that contribute to utterance interpretation. All these aspects should be viewed as information, albeit perhaps not as sources with complementary sources of information, the same epistemological status. Mental images can be accessed only indirectly, whereas whereas actions can be perceived and interpreted, just as sentences can be heard and understood. Neither are they to be regarded as aspects of vehicles of thoughts for which beliefs are, beliefs. Instead, they are carriers, vehicles so to speak, containers. Since we we have confined the analysis to verbalized beliefs, the linguistic linguistic expression is the rough material on which we have work, supplanting it with the other vehicles as required. required. to work,

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Most of the semantic theories of attitude expressions utilize the concept concept of of 14 Possible worlds are normally regarded possible worlds. worldS. 14 regarded as theoretical constructs, ways things could have been, or unactualized constructs, possibilities, ways options. Pace Lewis (1973: (1973: 84-86), they are not existing situations but only about the meaning meaning of sentences.15 15 Sometimes methodological tools for talking about Sometimes parts of such worlds are used, namely situations or states of affairs. The differences differences between these constructs are immaterial here. These worlds or situations referent, and ultimately ultimately for situations are used for the identification of the referent, saying what it would mean for the sentence to be true. In model theory, specitying specifying alternative alternative individuals as referents (so-called (so-called 'doxastic alternaalternatives') is also practised. For Hintikka (1962), (1962), possible worlds are possible 'courses of events' of which only one can become actual. Possible worlds, distinguished for the particular language, can be divided into those distinguished compatible Hintikka (1969a: compatible and those incompatible with the given given attitude. Hintikka 436) defines defines believing as follows: "a believes that/? that p = = in all the possible worlds compatible with what a believes, it is the case that /?; p; a does not believe that/? that p (in the sense 'it is is not the case that aa believes that /;') p') = in at least one possible world compatible with what a p." believes it is not the case that /?."

So, understanding a report means an ability to discriminate So, understanding discriminate between possible worlds compatible with the person's belief and those incompatible with it. In other words, the semantic semantic theory would have to provide a function that assigns a set of possible worlds to a person. A person may have different different beliefs in different different worlds and the function has to reflect this possibility. It is accounted for by a so-called 'alternativeness 'alternativeness relation'. The function is thus individual and to a given possible world J1p ... a relation which to a given individual ""... associates associates a number of possible worlds which we shall call the alternatives JL" (fbid.: BaP to /i" ({bid.: 438). A belief report B ifpp is true a/? is true in a possible world if in the alternatives to it. Now, Now, there has to be a way way of identifying identitying an individual across such situations. Without going into unnecessary distinctions,16 Hintikka (1970: 412) distinctions,16 Hintikka (1970: 412) suggests 'continuity plus similarity', or the common-sense idea of the laws of laws of 14 14

Cf.: ""... ... everyone everyone ought to believe in some kind of entities that do the job possible worlds do...' do .. .' Cresswell (1985: 65). 15 15 Cf. also Quine (1969: 154) on 'centered possible worlds', relating relating to the object spoken of, used to (1969:154) provide an 'extensional 'extensional ontology'. 16 16 Hintikka Hintikka (l969b: physical methods but these are irrelevant irrelevant (1969b: 170-173) talks about perceptual and physical here.

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nature that guarantee the persistence of objects in time and space. The methods of identification of the individual depend on our mental states. When we hold a belief, we are also aware aware of the way way in which we determine belief. Hintikka suggests the reference reference of the term used in our expression of belief. here so-called 'individuating functions'. If If an individual constant constant is associated associated with such a function, it specifies the same individual across possible worlds. function, Not all individuating functions pick out an individual in attitude contexts reo as not all such contexts are de re. Frege's sense or other people's MoPs figure in this semantics in a way. way. (1969b: 180) says the following: following: Hintikka (1969b: "Our "Our intensional entities (remember that they are functions, not way their references individuals) can be said to include not the way references but the way in which they are (or (or can be) are given to us, but individuated." individuated'' But what we need is a more modest use of individuating functions. After all, sometimes they are not needed. And, as was argued in Chapter 5, Chapter 5, referring expressions constitute a scale of referring properties rather than undergo a binary distinction into 'proper', rigid referring expressions and the contextually referring ones. So, So, this use of possible worlds is a non-starter. Identification across possible worlds is only possible when relativized to knowledge, including MoPs, of the person performing performing this crossthe knowledge, rejecting the rest identification. And this amounts to retaining MoPs and rejecting mechanism. of the mechanism. It has sometimes been said that the choices of interpretation of attitude reports are there because this is what the English language is like. like. Montague places the de re/de re/de dicto ambiguity in the English language. In his PTQ syntax of (Montague 1973: 1973: 223), 223), he distinguishes a category of 'IV/t' which is a class of verb phrases taking sentences as complements. 'Believe-that' is treated as primitive and belongs to this category. category. But the embedded sentence does not receive receive sufficient sufficient treatment there to account for the ambiguity ambiguity of reading. The ambiguity is left left as a feature of these constructions. 'Believe-that' creates an oblique context and is accounted for in Montague's intensional logic by means of an oblique-context-creating operator ('!\')p ('A').17 Attitude verbs are said to denote a relation between individuals and propositions. The 17

Montague's intensional logic is a formal system system that ""... ... employs employs a type hierarchy hierarchy (with expressions expressions for each of the denumerably denumerably infinite set of types), higher-order higher-order quantification quantification (variables (variables and quantifiers for each type), type), lambda-abstractypes, tenses, tenses, modal operators, and and finally, means for forming A1\\1 oc from from any tion for all types, expression \1 from any intension-denoting expression expression p." /3." Dowty et al. (1981: 154). 154). a and VY P/3 from 'v' ' v ' is is aa reversing reversing operation to to ''''. 'A'. 17

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substitutivity problem is accounted accounted for by possible worlds: worlds: there are some worlds where '(1.' 'a' and '(3' 'P' refer to the same object and other worlds where they do not. Substitution is only valid if the expression is not in the scope of of A ", , necessity, necessity, future or past tense. When (1.a and J3P have the same intension, then the restriction does not apply.

(Dowty et al. al. 1981: 165), where where '<pr 'q>p' means the result of of substituting J3P for all the the occurrences of (1.a in <po q>. The de re and and de dicto readings can be easily easily given different different representations now, now, using lambda-abstraction. lambda-abstraction. Sentence (5) (5) read as de re can be formalized formalized as in (5a) that corresponds corresponds to (5b): (5) (5)

John believes believes that Miss America is bald.

(5 a) (5a)

A.X Xx [Bel [Bel (j, (j, A"[B(x)])] [B(x)])] (m)

(5 b) (5b)

The individual denoted by m is such that John believes the proposition that that individual individual is bald. proposition

al. 1981: (from Dowty et al. 1981: 166). Here m does not stand in the oblique-contextoblique-contextcreating operator '" 'A'.'. But this this is is only a formalization formalization of the distinction. intensional logic, Apart from providing a formal representation in intensional Montague does not discuss these two readings. He assumes that it is an ambiguity and that it belongs to language, 18 language, and he gives gives it a semantics.18 As I have argued throughout this book, in view of contemporary dynamic ambiguity is not an developments of Montague semantics, postulating ambiguity adequate solution. The interpretation of an utterance of an attitude sentence uses information information from the context and this this context may contribute to the semantics of the sentence. The semantics has to follow the process of of arriving at one interpretation interpretation by the hearer. And, as I have proposed in the Default Semantics, there is a default reading, the default semantics of attitude reports. In addition, other vehicles vehicles of thought help arrive at 'non-default' interpretations. Hence, looking looking at one vehicle vehicle in isolation is unproductive. Dynamic semantics better accounts for this of this new role of 18

For other accounts see Montague 1970a, 1970a, 1970b 1970b and Montague Montague and Kalish Kalish 1959. 1959. In the latter the so-called 'naming functions', i.e. i.e. replacing replacing the occurrences occurrences of 'that + noun' authors propose the so-called with 'that + No', NO', 'that + N N,', I ', etc. 18

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context, as is demonstrated demonstrated in Chapter Chapter 7, 7, although by itself itself it does not eradicate ambiguities. Even there we need help from intentions and intentionality.19 19 So, So, it turns out that in semantic theories that make use of possible worlds, the de re/de re/de dicto ambiguity is assumed and is located located in language. Attitude representation is reports can have two formal representations. But which representation chosen by the hearer, and, first of all, rules that govern the hearer in this choice, are left out of the theory. theory. Now, Now, if we incorporate the study of context, including other vehicles of thought and intentions in communication, then postulating ambiguities is no longer needed. The linguistic vehicle contains the possibilities of utterance interpretation interpretation that may have to be supplied by contextual information. Since intentions belong to the semantics, they vehicle. And if they belong to this vehicle, then language belong with this vehicle. does not 'contain' ambiguities but rather leads to one default interpretation of the sentence, guaranteed by the referential referential intention. This default is the only interpretation that relies solely on the linguistic vehicle. vehicle. Partee's (1979: 10) 10) suggestion that the psychological representation may be relevant for the semantics of prepositional propositional attitudes appears to be a common necessity in order to go beyond the default, to context-driven interpretations. interpretations. If there was indeed the de re/de re/de dicto ambiguity of attitude reports, the reporter would have to know whether the holder of the belief would consent to the report. And this amounts to knowing whether the believer possesses the same, or sufficiently sufficiently similar, information about the object of belief as the reporter. Instead, the hearer does not normally worry about such re, unless he or she is similarity and reports on the belief as if it was de re, prevented by ensuing contradictions. The interpretation of animals' and children's beliefs gives reo gives further evidence of the priority of de re. There have been attempts to go beyond the sentence in possible worlds semantics and ask whether the proposition expressed depends solely on the sentence. Situations proved to be a useful theoretical construct. A situation identity of the person comprises the time and place of utterance and the identity uttering it. In situation situation semantics (Barwise and Perry 1983; Perry 1986), situations, rather than worlds, are taken as primitives. primitives. Situations are abstracted from and generalized over real situations that are parts of the world (cf. Barwise Barwise and Perry 1983: 8). 8). Propositions are true relative to situations. The meaning of a simple declarative sentence is said to be a relation between utterances and situations. The context-dependence allows for logically differ semantically. semantically. Now, equivalent propositions to differ Now, Perry (in Barwise and 19 19 There are various dynamic-semantic dynamic-semantic developments of the Montagovian approach that will not reviewed here, except for DRTused in Chapter 7. be reviewed 7. An assessment of the present developments in dynamic semantics is not the purpose of this work and the choice of DRT has to be accepted either on trust or as arbitrary. arbitrary.

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Perry 1985: 149) says that holding a belief means being in a certain frame of of mind. Concepts and ideas are in some way 'anchored' to the world. Concepts way 'Event-types' are 'conditions on anchors'. A believer realizes that he or she believes a certain certain 'type of event'. These event-types event-types are composed composed of ideas of things. But, as in other discussed views, views, there is a gap here between the linguistic linguistic and the mental that is left unexplained. In order order to arrive at interpretation de dicta dicto1i or de dicta dicto proper, the hearer may need more than an interpretation individuals, properties, relations Barwise and Perry's situations with their individuals, location as building blocks. If these were to suffice, how would the hearer and location draw a link between these objects and the 'degree of referring' intended by the have to be recovered from the speaker? This degree of referring, the MoPs may have dicto/1 or de dicta dicto proper. We We need situation in order to report it correctly as de dicta more finely-grained situations that, in addition, pertain not only to language speaker's representations, representations, links between utterances and the world, but also the speaker's utterances 20 in discourse, and the information non-linguistic activities. information from non-linguistic activities.20 And this brings us back to Husserl's noema which is an extension of sense beyond the linguistic linguistic vehicle, and, also, to dynamic semantics that accounts accounts for 7. the incremental nature of discourse, to be discussed in Chapter 7.

6.3.3. Concepts and and the First Vehicle Vehicle 6.3.3.

There are more concepts than corresponding words. Some concepts are not lexicalized and it is easy to observe this fact in everyday everyday speech. Sometimes we have to use a several-word long description to convey a concept. In other have a concept without having having a corresponding word. words, a person can have There are two explanations of this. Either there is a corresponding 'word' vehicle other than in the language of thought, or the concept is 'carried' by a vehicle language. The second possibility possibility seems more plausible since otherwise the language of thought would have to be enormously rich and include 'words' for all possible concepts in all possible cultures unless we we relativize relativize this cultures - unless inner language to the corresponding culture or natural language and, at the same time, make it extend beyond this natural language. But there are no strong theoretical arguments arguments or empirical evidence for this hypothesis. Also, prior to such a relativization, relativization, we have to answer the question as to universal, that is whether whether they can be found in all whether concepts are universal, 20 20

Situations are rather unfortunately tied up with semantic innocence, the claim that by using referring expressions expressions speakers speakers always refer to individuals rather than to senses or meanings, meanings, and hence substitutions salva veritate Referring veritate are admissible admissible (cf. (cf. Barwise and Perry 1983: 176). 176). Referring referential and some attributive uses of definite expressions expressions comprise comprise here names, pronouns, and referential descriptions - the so-caned how the believer thinks so-called 'outer attributive' uses that do not describe how about about the object (cf. (cf. ibid.: 201).

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cultures. Or perhaps there is a subset of of universal concepts. For example, there is no single word for camel in Arabic, no single word for snow in Eskimo, and no single word for sand in some Australian aboriginal languages. Instead, Instead, different kinds of camels, snow and sand there are different different words for different respectively. In Russian, there are two words corresponding corresponding to 'blue'. The different different ways in which languages reflect reality are important for attitude ascription ascription for the following two reasons: (i) (i) the belief is dependent on the linguistic vehicle because it is carried carried in a way of 'cutting reality up' into connatural language with its specific way cepts, and (ii) the belief is not fully externalized by language because there are concepts that are not lexicalized.

Even if thinking uses a system different different from natural language and (i) and (ii) do not apply, apply, there are other problems with cross-linguistic differences differences in conceptualization. Beliefs are expressed in natural language and natural vehicle of the second externalization, namely of conveying language is also the vehicle the belief to another person. Problems in (i) (i) and (ii) will thus apply to the reconstruction of someone's belief, if not to belief formation itself. reconstruction relativity of Edward Sapir The postulate in (i) reflects the idea of linguistic relativity and Benjamin Lee Whorf Whorf according to which languages divide up reality 21 in different nature :21 different ways. Language is, so to speak, a mirror of nature: ""... ... no individual is free to describe nature with absolute impartiality but is constrained constrained to certain modes of interpretation even while he thinks himself most free. The person most nearly free in such respects would be a linguist familiar with very many widely widely different linguistic systems. different linguistic systems. As yet no linguist is in any such 22 Whorf (1956: 214).22 position." Whorf (1956: 214). Sapir and Whorf Whorf suggested that our perception of reality is shaped by the hypothesis, language language we speak. In the strong version of the hypothesis, determines our thought because we can think only in the categories available in this language. Relativity Systems of tense Relativity is not restricted to nouns. Systems and aspect also vary between languages and reflect the perception perception of the world relativity. by their speakers. However, there is an ongoing debate concerning relativity. Concepts may not be wholly wholly arbitrary, universal. Brent arbitrary, some may even be universal. 21

21 The idea of linguistic linguistic relativity was present in the writings writings of earlier scholars such as Wilhelm Wilhelm von Humboldt and Franz Boas. 22 22 Cf. also quotation in Chapter 4, fn 21. 21.

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Berlin and Paul Kay (1969) largely undermined the relativity relativity of concepts working in the field of colour terms. They demonstrated that conceptualzation is not totally arbitrary. arbitrary. They worked on 98 languages, using standardized standardized colour samples differentiated differentiated according to hue, brightness and saturation. of saturation. Their Their 329 329 colour colour chips represented represented 40 hues in 8 levels levels of brightness (320 chips), as well as neutral hue of white, white, black, and greys (9 chips). Berlin, Kay and their co-workers co-workers asked speakers speakers of 20 languages languages to provide a simple, basic colour term in their language and, next, to point colour term, including the most to the chips that corresponded to a particular colour focal focal representatives for a particular colour word. The result was that focal colours were very similar across languages. So, So, categorization of colours revolves round focal colours whose number but not quality differs from language to language. In the early 1970s, Eleanor Rosch also experimented perceptually more salient with focal colours colours and she found that colours are perceptually than non-focal non-focal colours. The experiment was then extended to shapes, where foci or prototypes prototypes were also found. found. Berlin and Kay demonstrated that there is a regularity interlingual regularity to these interlingual differences. If of If the language has two colour terms, like some languages of Papua New Guinea, then they are equivalents equivalents of black and white white (or light and dark); if it has three, then black, white white and red, and so on up to eleven basic colour colour terms. Such regularity constituted constituted a good argument against against relativity in the late sixties. Whorf sixties. Since then, the appeal of the Sapir and Whorf hypothesis has faded even more, especially especially as a result of the development hypothesis development of cognitive science. According to cognitivists, cognitivists, the structure and operations of the brain determine the structure of the language, i.e. i.e. its grammatical and semantic structure (cf. (cf. 1. J. Lyons Lyons 1995: 1995: 97). Paul Kay (1996) (1996) also continued his battle for universalism, universalism, claiming that having having semantically different different expressions phenomenon or object in different expressions for a phenomenon different languages does not necessarily mean different different concepts, and that even in one language speakers have access to various ways ways of conceptualizing conceptualizing things: "In pursuing a deeper understanding of linguistic relativity, we might do well to remain aware, as every of every translator must be, of the large amount of alternative alternative schematizing of a given event there is available within each language and hence within within each speaker of Kay (1996: 111). of that language." (1996: 111).

Now, if the mind determines language, it is only one step from there to claim that not all mental processes need language and that there possibly is is a special system) that people use for thinking. thinking. This language (or computational system) system can be Fodor's of Fodor's (1975) (1975) language of thought (or Mentalese). One of the arguments for the language of thought comes from the fact that natural languages are ambiguous and vague; vague; quite often, what is said involves involves not

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only the meaning of the sentence but also some additional implied information. Yet Yet it seems that this universal computational computational system system can be reconciled with relativity. There is a middle solution in allowing computations computations to be universal, while also allowing for a different different fineness of grain of conceptualizations for different different systems. systems. What is lexicalized or grammaticalized in one language, can be accepted as salient in another that does not have this lexeme lexeme or grammatical distinction. I shall not go into this proposal here. Chapter 8 shows how it works works for belief reports de re and and de dicto in Polish and English. The result is a form of universalism, universalism, provided we include default meanings on a par with lexicalizations. Universalism is also represented by linguists who base their claims on physical, empirical evidence. Anna Wierzbicka looked at many different different languages for support to her thesis that there are conceptual primitives, i.e. i.e. primitive, simple concepts that can be found lexicalized in all languages. So, So, there is one, universal set of basic concepts, semantic primitives, realized in all languages. These primes are innate. Apart from these, there are also many culture-specific culture-specific concepts and words. words. They can be defined in terms of the semantic primes, whose number is estimated at about fifty fifty (see (see Wierzbicka 1996, 1997). 1997). These universal conceptual primitives combine to form conceptual conceptual structures, also universal. On the whole, we have a language-like innate conceptual system. system. So, So, which standpoint is correct, cognitivism with its universal concepts or relativism of concepts? There work, both have been serious objections to Berlin and Kay's early work, methodological and factual. factual. Russian has twelve methodological twelve basic colour terms, with two words for blue; kinship terms are difficult difficult to place on any universal scale; and, first of all, the method was under attack. Using colour samples may defeat the object of any generalization by imposing a way of classifying classifying anun 60, a colours which is alien to the analysed culture. For example, H Hanunoo, language of the Philippines, has four colour terms translated as white, black, green and red, but they really mean lightness, darkness, wetness, dryness. Zuni, of the American Southwest, Southwest, has two terms for yellow and dryness. one for for becoming yellow yellow through ripening or or ageing and and the the other other - one for things coloured yellow or yellow substances. The first one is a verb, (cf. Lucy 1996: 46). The conclusion seems to be that the other an adjective (cf. languages differ differ in their semantic structure, but there is no evidence that this semantic structure determines thinking, perception, perception, cognition, or memory: "The idea that language could determine (however weakly) weakly) the nature of our thinking nowadays nowadays carries more than a faint whiff of anachronism; rather it seems to belong to an altogether different different age, prior to the serious study of mind as an information processing processing age, (1996: 22). device." Gumperz and Levinson (1996:

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The properties properties of this device are genetically encoded. According to Fbdor's Fodor's (1983) influential hypothesis, the mind is composed composed out of modules, modules, specialized visual, auditory and other information. specialized to process visual, information. The output of where thinking of this processing is submitted to the central processing system system where thinking takes place. The modules are now understood to be in fact clusters of of modules, input-output devices (cf. that is specialized input-output (cf. Gumperz and Levinson 1996: 22). On the other hand, recent work by Lucy (1992, 1996) has shown shown large differences differences between the ways speakers of of different different languages classify classify objects - differences that are are said to to affect their cognition. cognition. Moreover, it has to be asked at this point whether it is language that affects affects conceptualization merely a correlation between linguistic linguistic conceptualization or, rather, there is merely and non-linguistic conceptualization. On the basis of their cross-cultural study of spatial conceptualization, Pederson et al. (1998) concluded that the variation in observed languages corresponds corresponds to conceptual conceptual variation. For example, if the language renders space as north and south, the conceptual, non-linguistic equivalent will also be absolute; if a language uses projections from the human body such as 'in front of me' or 'to my right', will also be relative. the conceptual, conceptual, non-linguistic equivalent in that culture will Linguistic Linguistic and non-linguistic non-linguistic behaviour match each other, but drawing any conclusions beyond the correlation would be unfounded. unfounded. The direction of of causation has not been established. Differences in conceptualizations conceptualizations signal that various parts of reality are not reflected in languages. As a result, they cannot be easily conveyed in an expression of belief. These missing missing distinctions can be present in mental equally, images or 'motivations' for actions in the first externalization and, equally, they can be expressed by actions and by making mental images salient in certain context in the second externalization. Now, Now, since the language a certain of thought is still only a theoretical construct of an unsupported (albeit of influential) hypothesis, we can amend it somewhat to make it more amenable to testing. Construing the language of of thought narrowly or widely widely would look as Construing follows. Language, as an abstract object, existing independently ofthe of the fact that it is used, can be defined as a mapping of things and sequences of things onto meaning. 23 Normally it means a function from sentences to propositions meaning. Firstly, for the language of thought, but there are two options options for extending it. Firstly, 'sequences of things'can things' can incorporate images and actions. Let us surmise that English, Polish the language of thought is in fact a natural language such as English,

23 23 Cf. cr. Schiffer, Schiffer, e.g. e.g. 1993, 1993, on a compositional supervenience theory that replaces compositional semantics. representations and physicalistic semantics. Supervenience Supervenience means a correlation correlation between mental representations states of of affairs. I accept both supervenience supervenience and compositional semantics. semantics. See Section Section 6.4.

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or Akkadian, and other carriers of thought that act on a par with it. Together they undergo conceptual conceptual universalism. There are differences differences between ways of expressing thoughts when we take vehicles in separation, separation, but all together together amount to universal patterns of cognition, thought, and expression of thought. This is the wide construction. construction. In the narrow construction construction accepted accepted above, the language of thought is a function from inner sentences to propositions, propositions, but vehicles where a function 'from there are two other vehicles 'from things to meanings' also Language corresponds to the language thought (see Schiffer applies. Language language of thought Schiffer 1993 on this correspondence), while actions and mental images are separate vehicles. So, So, there is a wide and a narrow construal construal and I have chosen the After all, the narrow one. Not much hinges on this theoretical decision. After language of thought, or Mentalese, is a metaphor for a neural state of belief. relations between them, just as natural natural language This neural state has parts and relations language proposition: does. The structure formed by these parts represents a certain proposition: "Talk of a 'language of thought' is simply a useful metaphor for an inevitable view about the nature of the neural states that realize our propositional attitudes, attitudes, and when glossed glossed in the minimal way just offered offered is even compatible, I dare say, say, with connectionist Schiffer models of mental representation." Schiffer (1993: 245). Propositional Propositional attitudes can be realized by various neural states and hence, it metaphor can be extended extended beyond the mental equivalent equivalent of natural seems, the metaphor natural ... language, notably to mental images and 'motivations' for actions as vehicles of of thought. Generally, the existence of a language of thought that would be so different different (1986) sees problems with the from natural languages is doubtful. Cohen (1986) semantics of such a language, Fodor (1975) argues for computations that semantics resemble sentence processing and, in effect, also natural language syntax and semantics. Wittgenstein goes further. He says that we do not need a language of mental representations because there are no mental representations that would be separable from their expressions. We We can have the same thoughts are not private sense-data, thought as somebody else, thoughts sense-data, and the possibility of holding a belief and the possibility of expressing it are the same (cf. Wittgenstein 1988: 1988: 11). 11). There are no mental states and no private objects. It is not the case that thinking happens 'in one room' and speaking 'in another'. He adds that if there were private objects or impressions, anything Wittgenstein 1984: 131). And And so, could could count count as their description (cf. (cf. Wittgenstein so, as he says (1953, § 318, 318, 329), 329), there are no meanings in one's mind that would accompany one's expressions. Beliefs are not hidden behind belief expressions (cf. also Wittgenstein 1980, §585). And And yet this does not preclude the possibility of mistakes in attitude ascription. Once the thought is uttered, there is nothing left for putative other other vehicles to externalize. But then, does an expression expression with

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many interpretations indicate that the corresponding thought thought is vague, 'unfinished'? It seems doubtful. doubtful. It seems more plausible that mental states states may not be exhausted Naturally, Wittgenstein's Wittgenstein's view exhausted in the verbalization. verbalization.24 Naturally, is not compatible proposal of vehicles of thought presented presented in this compatible with the proposal chapter. belief ascription chapter. Since there are referential mistakes and problems of belief ascription that would disappear disappear once the reporter reporter could ask the holder of the belief for 25 further information, other vehicles are justified. justified.25 Finally, Carruthers Carruthers (1996) offers an argument that natural language is involved in conscious conscious thinking by pointing out that human linguistic and cognitive development normally proceed proceed hand-in-hand and so it is possible that they are interdependent. He supports this claim with evidence from from aphasia, in which conceptualization conceptualization is often affected, as well as from the development of normal and abnormal children. No decisive evidence against Mentalese, thought is presented, though. The intuition, Mentalese, a separate language language of thought however, is plausible: ""... ... when early hominids debated debated with one another about the best way to hunt an elephant, elephant, for example, and one of them said, 'We should attack from both flanks', there would have been some advantage advantage in this statement statement figuring immediately as an item in practical reasoning, to be considered, manipulated, accepted, accepted, or rejected, without having to be translated translated into a wholly wholly different different system of (ibid.: 232). of representation representation (Mentalese).' Hence, using language in thinking thinking is said to have some survival survival value. Ending with an alternative is not satisfactory, satisfactory, but neither are expeditious decisions. The content of language of thought is an open question. Vehicles Vehicles of thought can be represented represented by either metaphor without vitiating vitiating the account belief. The choice account of their interaction in forming and conveying belief. of the narrow construal is dictated by the naturalness of the correspondence correspondence between natural language and the language of thought, and hence also by the conceptual simplicity simplicity of this metaphor.

6.3.4. Images: The Second Vehicle 6.3.4. Mental Images: tehicle

Apparently contradictory beliefs lead to additional processing effort effort on the part of the hearer who tries to find an explanation for this apparent

cr. also Dummett 1990 and Peacocke (1983: 215). Cf. I shall not review review here the philosophical debates on private language language that complicate the matter further. It would require a historical perspective perspective of going back to Thomas Thomas Aquinas's view view that the mental word exists as a result of the person's person's own understanding (cf. (cf. Nuchelmans 1973: 1973: 197). 24 24 25 25

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inconsistency. This explanation can be, for example, that perhaps some different clusters beliefs constitute a network, while other beliefs belong to different (cf. Bonevac 1984: 198). The believer sees logical relations between the we do not know of any principles principles that constituents of this network. As yet we would guide people in making connections between attitudes. Some vague hypotheses concerning the degree of importance of the information, distance in time between acquiring the two relevant pieces of information, and other such obvious factors proposed (cf. factors in drawing inferences inferences have been proposed (cf. e.g. Ryle 1979: 127). Now, in Situation B from Chapter 4, taken in the context of of 127). Now, Situation A, the reporter is faced with a pair of contradictory expressions of belief, namely that Ralph believes that a Bernard 1. J. Ortcutt is and is B, he does not a spy. spy. In A, Ralph sees the person and utters a description. In B, not see the person and utters his name. Knowing who Ralph referred to, in the sense of intending to refer to, requires further clues. Perhaps in A Ralph was mistaken because of poor eyesight eyesight or heavy fog. fog. Perhaps he thought that Bernard was called Smith. Smith. Perhaps he did not know the name of the person all. In B, B, perhaps Ralph did not know (or: did not know that he knew) at all. Ortcutt but merely read about him in newspapers. Perhaps he confused confused Mr Ortcutt with, with, say, say, Mr Dortcutt. Perhaps he fell victim to a slip of the tongue. All this can be inferred from the situation. Or, if no relevant information is available, one of the possible scenarios will be assumed by John. Which scenario it is depends on the strength and reliability reliability of the type of identification of the individual. We We can surmise that since perceptual perceptual individuation individuation is the strongest strongest source of reliable information, or, in Husserl's Husserl's was talking about terms, the most adequate adequate meaning-giving act, then Ralph was about Ortcutt Ortcutt in A, without knowing, however, that the man he talks about is called re is assumed Ortcutt. Belief de re assumed by the hearer in this scenario. scenario. This belief belief comes with a referential intention intention that is slightly 'weakened' due to the fact that there is important important individuating information, namely the name, that know. This weakening is revealed through the the speaker speaker does not know. juxtaposition Situation B. ignorance of the name is not the case juxtaposition with Situation B. The ignorance of a referential mistake but it is the case of a belief belief in which MoP plays a significant role. That it plays this role can be corroborated corroborated by the fact that John cannot cannot truthfully report on A using the name 'Ortcutt', without falling 26 B. 26 So, into contradiction contradiction with B. So, it is in general possible to lack some essential belief and the belief can still be de re, re, as long information about the object of belief 26 26

(1979: 156-157) goes further and suggests suggests that the reporter can use indirect speech only if Rundle (1979:156-157) he or she has enough relevant knowledge knowledge to judge about the ascription of referents to names by the person uttering the sentence. If the reporter lacks such knowledge, knowledge, he or she should use either .. .', etc. But such caution direct direct speech speech or some further explanation explanation such as 'someone called called...', caution does practice. As I have argued people seem to be governed not seem to be common common practice. argued here, people governed by the Default De Re principle.

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as the believer can individuate the object deictically. Substitutivity in reports reports may not hold, but the belief is de reo re. This scenario provides further evidence for the gradation of referring referring properties of referring terms. 'The man in the brown hat' is referential but it does not automatically lead to a transparent, transparent, de re report.27 27 I shall not have have much to say say here about mental images as a vehicle of thought. The topic of carriers of thought is still highly highly contentious and is a case of theoretical assumptions assumptions and sometimes speculations. The aim of this chapter is merely merely to signal that language may not exhaust the tools of for forming forming and conveying conveying beliefs, and to point out that the process of interpretation belief reports reaches beyond language to contextual clues interpretation of belief how people behave and that require a theory of intentions and looking at how beliefs must be fully interpretable. act. At the level of mental representations, representations, beliefs interpretable. linguistic expressions, then, If they are not fully interpretable at the level of linguistic assuming that the language of thought is similar to natural language (cf. (cf. Fodor 1975), there must be representations in the form of images, or non-verbalized non-verbalized 'motivations' to actions, that conduct conduct the remaining content of thought (but To repeat, Cohen's 1986: 228 see also Cohen's 228 rejection of an internal language). To repeat, 'motivations' or 'causes'does 'causes' does not mean dispositions. dispositions. The idea is that actions actions may reveal what is going on at the mental level, level, the level of thought. It is easier to acknowledge acknowledge mental mental images and actions as vehicles vehicles of thought in the case of language less thoughts. Since language is excluded languageless by definition as a vehicle, there has to be something else that carries carries the thought. But even in the case of verbalized thoughts there are reasons to postulate other postulate other vehicles. It is clear that language does not externalize thoughts faithfully, unambiguously. unambiguously. So, So, there must be some other vehicles acting simultaneously, language does not 'take over'as a vehicle. Now, if we accepted vehicle. Now, accepted the language of thought as a fully disambiguated disambiguated language language of mental processes, then the role of the other vehicles vehicles would would be considerably diminished. If If the language of thought does not exhibit the de re/de re/de dicto ambiguity, there is no need to evoke images and actions as further vehicles for attitude contexts. But we do not know what the language of thought is, know whether the brain performs operations is, and, indeed, neither do we we know revival of connectionism, it is possible to on symbols. In the times of the revival surmise that operations in the brain are not computations on symbols symbols (cf.

27 27

cr.: Cf.:

"I may mention someone to you by name, and you may not know who it is. is. But when a strength speaker makes an identifying identifYing reference to a particular, and his hearer does, on the strength of it, identify identifY the particular referred to, then, I shall say, say, the speaker not only makes an identifies, that particular. So we have a hearer's sense, sense. identifYing reference reference to, but also identifies, identifying and a speaker's sense, of 'identifY'." Strawson (1959: 16). 'identify'." reo In this trivial sense such beliefs are de re.

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e.g. Bechtel and Abrahamsen Abrahamsen 1991; Bechtel 1994: 200-210; Maloney 1994: propose that in the case of 401-407). Hence, it is safer to propose of some beliefs, images and actions act as vehicles of thought, but without giving any rule as to when it happens. In principle, the vehicles can act as disambiguating devices in whenever an uncertainty utterance interpretation but they cannot be invoked whenever of referring arises. This is the option of the narrow construal of the language of thought that we chose in the previous section. All in all, language often supplies incomplete meaning, an incomplete proposition, due to, possibly, externalizing only the content formed by this vehicle. There are several approaches to mental representations particular vehicle. that can be used to trace the contribution of other vehicles to meaning. For example, there is Langacker's (1983, 1991) cognitive grammar, Johnson-Laird's (1983) mental Fauconnier's (1985, 1997) mental spaces, Johnson-Laird's Fauconnier's Idealized Cognitive Models. models, or Lakoff's (1987) Idealized Models.28 Integrated with mainstream possible worlds semantics, there are, among others, Kamp and Reyle's (1993) DRT and Heim's (1988) File Change Semantics. All of these have further offsprings, the latter latter in dynamic semantic theories, theories, accounts of categorization, concept formation and the former in the accounts including metaphor (cf. (cf. an introduction Ungerer and Schmid including the role of metaphor introduction in Ungerer 1996; Lakoff Lakoff and and Johnson Johnson 1980; Lakoff Lakoff and Turner 1989; Johnson Johnson 1987; Sweetser 1990). Now, Now, these mental representations representations are not restricted restricted to language as a vehicle if the language of thought is regarded regarded as structurally structurally similar natural languages. They make use of images and 'motivations' similar to natural representations are constructed for action action as well. Such mental representations constructed not only from words. A mental model has to 'fit inside anyone's head' and it comprises the totality of the state of affairs compatible compatible with, e.g., a certain assertion. This model, or mental representation, is a schematic assertion, a sample that can be used in different different ways. People build such models in order to communicate, to understand utterances, because words and sentences alone do not suffice suffice for a full understanding of conveyed propositional thoughts (cf. (cf. Johnson-Laird 1988: 1988: 338-343). 338-343). After all, prepositional attitudes are not attitudes to sentences. They require an object (proposition) 29 that, so to speak, comprises sentences expressing the same thought. The thought.29 hearer does not 'grasp' such a proposition. The content of thought is formed by means of various possible tools and then recovered from various possible clues.

28 28 29 29

3. For a detailed review see Jaszczolt 1992, Section 2, Chapter 3. Jackendoff (1985: 27) says that mental representations representations 'group' real world situations Jackendoff(1985: situations by imposing similarities because we are constructed similarities on them: "These situations situations are alike for us because constructed to be able to construe them as alike". This is also a criticism of Barwise and Perry's (1983) realism realism of situations situations that are out there in the world and to which speakers speakers 'attune'.

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There is one essential difficulty difficulty with adopting a version of mental models for the semantics of attitude reports. Although Although the hearer apparently constructs a model of the speaker's beliefs, he or she is not able to check the validity of this construct prior to forming the report and putting it forward for the believer's potential assent or dissent. The hearer cannot, so to speak, 'remain within the speaker's model'. Instead, the hearer has to construct his/her own model. model. The access to supporting vehicles vehicles of thought is not explained as part of this process of model construction. Mental models do not distinguish between our vehicles of thought. They are compatible with them all and underlie them all. all. For example, Johnson-Laird Johnson-Laird says says that mental images are views of models; they represent represent through perception or imagination (1983: IS7). 157). Other vehicles distinguished here are also such views of models. Hence, we have to look somewhere vehicles somewhere else else for a solution as to how the vehicles interact. relativity, ififaathought Now, as was pointed out in the discussion of linguistic relativity, thought or its aspect is not carried by language, then, depending on how we we set the terminology, it may not be conceptualized. Lakoff Lakoff (1987) (1987) and Lakoff Lakoff and (1980) allow Johnson (1980) allow for such preconceptual structures. structures. They talk about a so-called Experiential Hypothesis. Children have certain preconceptual preconceptual ability to move and perceive experiences such as body movements or an ability objects. They also have have so-called so-called 'image-schemata' such as things as containers; movements movements as paths; directions up and down; part and whole relations; location offront of front and back.30 back.30 These preconceptual structures seem to be shortcuts in reasoning. Such structures can be assimilated to the type of vehicle called here mental images. all, the problem with reporting on beliefs All in all, beliefs can be summed up as follows. If states of affairs are thought of in images and actions (or prompts to act, act,'motivations' 'motivations' for for action) action) as as well well as as sentences, sentences, then thenwe wecannot cannot always always substitute one expression for another because, while the described situation is the same, the images and resulting actions can differ. Both images and actions have been subsumed here under contextual clues.31

30 30 Abstract concepts are said to arise from from these preconceptual experiences by metaphorical projection, as in (i): (i) The prices are going up. up. Cf. also Goatly (1997: (1997: 41-42). 31 31 This interaction of vehicles seems to be compatible with Sperber and Wilson's (I986a: (1986a: 232) and (1988: 139) 139) idea that the prepositional Wilson and Sperber's (l988: propositional forms of utterances are thOUghts that interpretations interpretations rather than descriptions descriptions of thoughts. Utterances may represent thoughts are merely merely similar to them in prepositional propositional form. This similarity can be developed into the contribution of other vehicles vehicles to the externalization of thought.

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6.3.5. Actions: The Third 6.3.5. Actions: Third Vehicle Vehicle It is a platitude to say that beliefs are connected with actions. Although a

of belief need not necessarily necessarily lead to action, an action can be evidence of belief the actor's belief. In other words, actions constitute one of the ways of of externalizing thoughts. thoughts. Beliefs can be stronger or weaker and these different different degrees of belief are associated with different (1973) different behaviour.32 Armstrong (1973) compares what he calls a 'full belief belief' to a map we we use to steer, a 'mere belief' to a map used only thought' to an unused map, and a 'partial belief in certain circumstances. The degree of belief, belief, however, however, cannot be easily compared to the number and type of circumstances in which the belief belief is activated and triggers an action. This behaviourist simplification will not do. belief does not equal predicting that In simpler terms, grasping someone's belief person's behaviour. But observing observing behaviour may shed more light on the interpretation person's utterance utterance or, in general, may help in reconinterpretation of that person's structing that person's actions structing person's belief. The connection connection between beliefs and actions depends, to some extent, on what is believed. Some beliefs bear directly on actions, others person believes, say, others do not. When a person say, that there are wolves careful in the woods, he or she will normally either avoid going there or be careful person desires not to fall and well equipped equipped against against them - naturally, if the person victim to them. If Ralph Ralph believes Ortcutt Ortcutt to be a spy, spy, he will probably report him to the police, tell someone that he is a spy, spy, or try to catch him spying. connection in the above sentences signal that The adverbs that qualify the connection there is no necessary link there but merely inference from conventions and life experience. On the other hand, believing that Frege wrote Uber Sinn und Bedeutung und Bedeutung may not bear directly on actions. In general, people tend to act in a certain way that agrees with their belief. But this agreement does not mean that acting is the belief, as Ryle (1949) (1949) has it, or that a belief is 33 a disposition to act as Stalnaker (1984) People take it for (1984) claims. claims.33 for granted

32 32

108-109) says that belief belief ranges from a perfect certainty that a proposition proposition is Armstrong (1973: (1973:108-109) true to a perfect certainty that it is false. In this account, belief comprises knowledge on one end, and disbelief disbelief on the other other end of the spectrum. 33 33 The behaviourist behaviourist thesis that is relevant here says that to believe that/7 that p is to hold a belief belief that p and to be disposed to act as if if p was true. Stalnaker (1984: 15) 15) is not far from this tenet: disposed to act in ways that would tend to satisfY satisfy one's desires, "To believe that P is to be disposed whatever they are, in a world in which P (together with one's other beliefs) were true." Also, "We believe that P just because we we are in a state that, under under optimal conditions, we we are in only if P, if P, and under optimal conditions, we are in that state because P, P, or because of something p''' (jbid.: that entails P." (ibid.: 18). beliefstates explain the apparent beliefs: beliefs can belong to Nota bene, bene, belief apparent contradictions contradictions between beliefs: different belief belief states. different

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in their activities that the world is like the world of their beliefs. Since activities activities possible to think up an and beliefs are empirically connected,34 connected,34 it is possible experiment to check whether, and to what extent, knowing the believer's behaviour would contribute to belief ascription. But since this connection is well tested in everyday 35 everyday life, a common-sensical observation will do. do.35 observer knows an intention with which a person person performed Now, once the observer reason for this action. Davidson an action, action, he or she knows that person's reason (1963: 91) 91) says that, in analysing actions, actions, apart apart from recognizing a reason reason for an action, one also has to evaluate the beliefs and other attitudes that lead to a certain action. A person may have several reasons for an action and which one led to the actual performance. performance. Davidson (ibid.: 93) be unaware which gives the following following example. When you poison someone someone and think that your reason was to save him pain, you may be mistaken as to your reasons. reason reasons. reason may have been to get him out of the way. way. While The other reason While the the first first was erroneously selected reason was pleasing, the other was not. The first was selected as a salient motive that, you think, made you poison the man. So, So, the connection between reasons and actions may be less revealing revealing than the ones among the vehicles vehicles of thought. Thoughts that are externalized in actions seem to distinguish a class of of Thoughts events that are performed with a pro-attitude to them. This is a class of of intentional intentional activities. Again, the criterion criterion for distinguishing this class is required. Unless we accept that the information information coming from all the vehicles of thought is accumulated during the process of belief ascription, there is a danger of circularity: intentional intentional activities activities are distinguished distinguished as the ones with intentions, while thoughts are recognized recognized on the basis underlying beliefs and intentions, belief expression, searches of activities. When the observer, or the hearer of a belief searches for information to ascribe a belief, activities are assumed to be intentional. If If a person moves his hand towards a painting by Vermeer and says that Rembrandt was an astonishing painter, the movement of the hand is very Rembrandt likely to be taken as an act of ostension, and the referring expression is very likely to be taken as used to refer to Vermeer even if it was an unintentional unintentional gesture.

34 34 35 35

Stalnaker would also add desires. 169-170) claims that the correspondence between between belief belief and action can be put into Stich (1982: (1982:169-170) rules: "In identifying a belief belief as the belief belief that p, we are picking out the belief belief by producing producing an example of the effect effect it typically typically has among us, where'typically' where 'typically' is construed not statistically, statistically. typical causal pattern and a special role within that pattern." but by appeal to a typical based on the conviction that action alone identifies belief and. However, this statement is based identifies a belief and, rather as what the observer moreover, it identifies it not as the genuine mental state but rather observer takes to be one's belief, which is, in Stich's Stich's view, the only reality.

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There are two questions to be addressed concerning the role of actions. Firstly, how and to what extent actions help in belief ascription, and secondly, interpretation of belief belief reports. how and to what extent they help with the interpretation reports. A formal description of human actions is a difficult difficult task, though. The interpretation interpretation is largely dependent on the specific situation, the 'there and then', while the rest relies on conventions, customs and habits. Actions are disambiguating device in referential puzzles. Even if Ralph rarely decisive as a disambiguating round the street was waiting for someone someone round street corner with a gun in his hand or with a policeman policeman accompanying him, and the person approaching approaching was was Ortcutt, the observer still would not be in a position to conclude with certainty that by 'The The man in the brown hat is a spy' Ralph referred to Ortcutt, unless he knew for Ortcutt. And this requires knowing the intentions that the speaker waited for and beliefs. In practice, such an inference would have normally been performed, unless another situation ensued in which Ralph explicitly denied spy. But this caveat shows that the inference is not always that Ortcutt was a spy. valid. Similarly, Similarly, if a man is walking with an umbrella open although it is not raining, the observer may infer that he believes that it is raining. But such an inference inference is not always valid. It is based on common knowledge that people normally open their umbrellas when it is raining. In this instance, instance, however, the man may be trying to protect himself against the sun or against a neighbour watering plants on the terrace. Similarly, seeing a boy praying in the chapel, the observer observer may feel justified in his inference that the boy believes that God God exists. exists. But what ifthe if the boy is only trying to please his parents by kneeling there and saying his prayers? It seems that knowing the beliefs and intentions is indispensable. Actions are a useful source of information provided that they are not the only source of information. They can hardly provided ever, or perhaps never, be conclusive, although they are frequently decisive in practice due to people's reliance on conventions and, so to speak, jumping belief ascription to conclusions. Coming back to the role of actions in belief ascription and in the interpretation interpretation of ascriptions, we can safely surmise that it is equally important vehicle leaves important in the first and in the second, when the linguistic vehicle speaker's reference unresolved. The lack of activity is also relevant. It is as action itself. Not doing something, something, resisting or postponing informative as the action postponing something, also provides useful information. The order of application of these vehicles is an approximation approximation rather than a steadfast rule. If, say, say, Ralph points at Smith and says 'Ortcutt is a spy', the pointing does not 'cancel' the linguistic action of pointing linguistic vehicle. It adds further clues which can only result in the lack of certainty who Ralph intended to refer to. It is possible that neither vehicle takes over. Ralph may have had blurred to. vision, but equally he might have been mistaken as to Smith's Smith's name. One people's absent-mindedness has to account account for people's absent-mindedness and 'slips of action' such as forgetting forgetting that a certain action has already been performed and performing it again, forgetting the aim or the order of the activities, activities, confusing two

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different unconsciously, to old habits. All this different activities or switching back, unconsciously, often happens when the processes become automatic Cohen 1989: 18-19). automatic (cf. (cf. Cohen 1989:18-19). other people may be distorted. Moreover, people's memory for events or for other distinguish between reality (perception) It is possible not to be able to distinguish (perception) and imagination, especially when the event is not worth remembering or when when emotions, emotions, including stress, prevent one from remembering correctly. It is possible to forget or change the picture of a past event when a new event or piece of information affects memory. The same concerns recognizing affects the memory. people's faces or names. It is possible to mistake one person for another, forget people's who someone is, remember only certain facts about him or her but not others, identity, or fail to identify be unsure about the identity, identify the person at all. Considering Considering all these weaknesses, actions actions turn out to be only partial evidence for attitude ascription. Delineating the role of actions would be easier easier if behaviourism was a correct theory. In other translatable into other words, if mental states were always translatable dispositions to certain certain behaviour, or were this behaviour, then observing observing this 36 behaviour would be more reliable evidence for belief belief ascription. ascription. 36 behaviour But mental states coexist and influence one another, and intentional action ensues from way of talking about this totality of mental states rather than being another way a particular state. Moreover, there are unintentional unintentional activities activities that have have to be, in some way or other, clearly distinguished from actions. information from various vehicles, vehicles, the reporter reporter may Finally, in integrating information realize that the speaker's expression was an echoic utterance or an instance of sentence non-literality. This interpretation interpretation can be arrived at through the blinking of of observation observation of the speaker's non-verbal behaviour such as the blinking an eye, smiling in a revealing way way and other other facial expressions expressions and gestures. gestures. utterance to belief belief from These expressions expressions may prevent an inference from utterance So, there is a high degree of situation taking place. So, situation dependence dependence in the interaction discovered. interaction of the vehicles but some general patterns can be discovered. utterance comes first, it is processed processed in the context of discourse that The utterance reveals other thoughts as well as the thought corresponding to the utterance, and in the context of non-verbal actions. But, But, in spite of the possibility of of ordering, there is a significant difference difference between actions and utterances. meaning, Utterances have default meanings that correspond correspond to sentence meaning, enriched, where necessary, to speaker meaning. meaning. Actions do not always have such conventional significance. movements may not even be significance. Physical movements intentional actions by default. default. They can be interpreted as such or not, depending on the circumstances.

36 36 According According to Ryle (1949: 57), "... the styles and procedures of way 57),"... of people's activities are the way their imperfect equivalents. their minds work" rather than being their

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possibilities of interpretation All in all, despite despite the differences, multiple possibilities are present both in language language and in actions. They may have to be combined as sources of information about the belief in order to be reliable externalizations of a belief. In isolation, all the sources of information for attitude ascription have limited attitude limited power and may not be sufficient sufficient to allow for an adequate report. Linguistic and non-linguistic actions are all subject to different different kinds of errors. Therefore, any ascription of attitude must be regarded as adequate to a higher or lesser extent, at least as long as there hidden factors not accounted accounted for in formulating the report. can be some hidden The same goes for the interpretation interpretation of belief reports. Language, as analysed e.g. in Fauconnier's Fauconnier's mental spaces, allows for possibilities of of interpretation interpretation but does not specify specify when these possibilities occur, i.e. Actions indicate how to choose between them. Actions indicate possible motives for them and possible possible associated beliefs but are not a reliable guide to them, to evoke only the example of opening an umbrella when it is not raining. Thinking in images may also add to the construction of the belief but accessible one during the reconstruction of the this vehicle is the least accessible of remembered that vehicles are evidence of belief. Moreover, it has to be remembered a thought only when they occur against a background of other beliefs, utterances and situations. The influence of these is incorporated incorporated in the 7. Chapter 7. DRT account in Chapter utterance is a trustworthy form of externalizing a Normally, though, the utterance belief because there are default interpretations and the multiple possibilities belief of reading are only theoretical possibilities. In practice, default intentions and conventions of use lead the hearer to one interpretation. Additional Additional clues thought does resorted to when required. So, are only resorted So, the question question of vehicles of thought not frequently arise in practice. Enough said. Some important important cross-linguistic differences are considered in Chapter Chapter 8.

6.4. Default Interpretations The intentionality of mental states is prior prior in the order of explanation to the intentionality of the vehicles. It also guarantees guarantees it, as the intentionality intentionality of of guarantees the the intentionality intentionality of its its parts - or the the intentionality the totality guarantees intentionality of the phenomenon guarantees the intentionality of its instantiations. Intentional utterances, intentional actions and intentional mental images are similar in that they all convey meaning. They all undergo the PI and DI principles principles and so they have stronger stronger and weaker interpretations interpretations as far interpretation is the default. as the reference is concerned, and the strongest interpretation A mental image of, say, say, a frog in danger of being squashed by my foot includes the default matching with the real, small, green and slimy creature on the path of lifting the frog to move it to a safe place off off the path in front of me. An action oflifting

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is an action action directed directed at this very animal. It is in this naive sense that default intentionality works for vehicles number two and three. Language, the vehicle number one, requires default intentionality more urgently than these. Defaults are less obvious there to a researcher researcher who who lists the possible possible interpretations. These defaults are only obvious when one realizes how little has to be said hearer to pick out the referent correctly. for the hearer Similarly, directed at objects by force of their intentionality. Beliefs are directed intentionality. Similarly, utterances are about things. The referential intention is the strongest utterances strongest when aboutness amounts to a clear correlation correlation between physical objects (where this aboutness applicable) and relations between them on one side, and the sentence on the applicable) other. This is a common-sensical, weak version of supervenience, used here for a different different purpose from that in Schiffer's Schiffer's supervenience supervenience theory proposed proposed work. While Schiffer throughout his work. Schiffer uses it as a replacement, so to speak, for compositional compositional semantics, our supervenience supervenience strengthens the compositionality of semantics by allowing allowing for this supervenience supervenience to be weaker or stronger. Supervening Supervening on physical objects and relations between them can be direct or obfuscated, correct or incorrect. This obfuscation, obfuscation, in the form of of sensitivity to structure, is taken up in Chapter 8. 8. Gradation is caused by the variable suitability of meaning-giving acts to result in direct reference. Among HusserI's'shallow thinking'on thinking' on these acts, perception is on the strong end, and Husserl's'shallow the weak one.

Meaning 6.5. The Core of Meaning

There is no common content or object shared by attitudes. There is no proposition towards which beliefs, doubts, or fears are attitudes. There cannot ways of thinking about the object, be one because MoPs, 'personalized' ways are context-dependent. context-dependent. Geach's famous famous example (here: 6) demonstrates that the reporter has to take these MoPs into consideration consideration in attempting any substitutivity of coreferentials. It also demonstrates demonstrates that this attention to MoPs is assumed by the hearer to have taken place. (6)

Hob thinks a witch has blighted Bob's mare, and Nob wonders whether she (the same witch) killed Cob's sow.

(after Geach 1967: (after 1967: 147). 147). The binding of the pronoun by the antecedent expression results in either transparent or opaque readings: Nob may mayor or may not be aware that it is the same witch in both cases. On one hand, binding by an antecedent should create a transparent reading, but on the other, binding by an indefinite noun phrase does not. No reference to a specific And yet, yet, a hearer would would not have any difficulty witch is made. And difficulty in inferring that sameness of the witch with that of Hob's is part of Nob's MoP of the

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character. This reading seems to be the default interpretation and is arrived arrived at, of presumably, through the assumption of the interaction of various sources of information in context. information context. Mental states are individuated by intentionality. As a result, it seems, disambiguates utterances. utterances. In fact, what knowing the degree of intentionality intentionality disambiguates remains to be disambiguated is merely insignificant remnants in enormous task that the grammar grammar of English comparison with the enormous English has already done for the speakers. Nota bene, this role of grammar grammar should not be ignored in the somewhat expeditious attempts to deny compositional semantics to natural languages. Most referring expressions are perfectly clear and come with a standard standard referring function which stems out of the hierarchy of referring properties of these expressions which is at the same time the hierarchy of givenness/accessibility of the referent (discussed in Chapter 5). 5). Language is the first vehicle but other vehicles can act alongside it and interact with it. 37 37 Instead of Procrustean Procrustean efforts efforts to make natural language match sequences of things thought about, one should let in other vehicles of thought. representation of of Now, utterances convey messages through the semantic representation to. Some of these inferences the sentences and the inferences they lead to. result in enriching enriching the LF, LF, others add new messages. There is a steady core of meaning on which speaker meaning is founded. This steady meaning is unmarked. For the linguist, this meaning can be incomplete incomplete until he or she considers default intentions. For the interlocutors, the contribution of intentions intentions is part and parcel of the process that also LF. This process was discussed in the includes the recognition of the LF. proposal Chapter 2. There are no stages involved, proposal of Default Semantics in Chapter no transition from the underspecified LF to the fully truth-conditional propositional representation. This leads to the conclusion that, although prepositional suffice as a vehicle of thought, it frequently suffices suffices language does not suffice in practice because some interpretations are unmarked, default, and context-independent.

37 37 If the interaction reconciled with Fodor's modularity modularity of mind, the interaction of vehicles were to be reconciled interaction would would have to take place in central cognitive systems that are not modular, i.e. 101-103). Generally, these not domain-specific, informationally informationally encapSUlated, encapsulated, etc. (see Fodor 1983: 1983:101-103). boil down to thought central, pragmatic pragmatic thought or problem-solving. See also Kasher Kasher (1991: 389-391) on central, knowledge based based on general principles principles such as the principles principles governing rational rational intentional knowledge intentional evidence for and against against lateralization grammar and action. Kasher also reports on some evidence lateralization of grammar pragmatics left and right hemisphere pragmatics - in the the left hemisphere respectively.

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6.6. Summary Summary Let us take stock. Language does not reflect intentional experience faithfully. faithfully. There is a distance between language and experience that has to be filled in by other other vehicles. This 'filling in' works works on two levels levels that I called the first and the second second externalization. externalization. The first externalization means forming a thought, or, or, in a more theory-laden, phenomenological phenomenological picture, it means bringing the thought from the 'third realm' to consciousness. The second externalization means conveying conveying one's own thought to the observer. Language, mental images and actions play a role in both externalizations. interpretation of the resulting expression, They are equally important important in the interpretation expression, forming a belief report and the interpretation of this report by the hearer. There is one item that spoils the symmetry, symmetry, though. In the second externalization, belie( externalization, actions allow the observer observer to judge about someone's belief. In the first externalization, externalization, there are mental or neural 'motives' for actions instead. These are changes in the brain that may make the thinking thinking person perform a physical action - naturally, naturally, not to be confused confused with behaviourists' dispositions. dispositions. In other words, it was suggested in this chapter chapter that reporting reporting on beliefs belief may sometimes require a consideration consideration of all the means by which which the belief is formed (or brought before the believer's mind) and by which which it becomes known to the reporter. The interpretation of a belief report may may also require this information about the vehicles of thought. These vehicles include a linguistic expression, mental image, and non-verbal action. I have have suggested a paradigm of their ordering and interaction that is is based on Husserl's idea of meaning-giving meaning-giving acts. The meaning meaning of a belief expression or belief report beliefs that belong to a network. The impact is also determined determined by other beliefs of other beliefs and other meaning-intending meaning-intending acts is summed up in Husserl's notion of a horizon. The priority of perception among meaning-intending meaning-intending of belief belief acts confirms the idea of the unmarkedness unmarkedness of the referential reading of expressions belief reports. expressions and the de re re reading of belief Vehicles of thought also account for the pragmatic contribution to the semantic representation of propositional prepositional attitude constructions in that they allow for MoP to include non-linguistic forms of presentation of the object. The linguistic vehicle does not exhaust the truth-conditionally relevant aspects of meaning and the semantics of propositional attitude expressions requires this systematic treatment of non-linguistic Meaning-giving non-linguistic context. context. Meaning-giving acts and the horizon of the act provide an easily utilizable and largely largely ignored framework for the semantics and pragmatics. pragmatics. After all, a good semantic and pragmatic theory has to explain not only how the hearer interprets an utterance, but also why why he or she does it this way. way. Or, in Dummett's (1975: 4-5) 4-5) words, words, the theory of meaning meaning has to perform at least the following three tasks: (i) (i) to explain the meaning of expressions of the language; (ii) to explain

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what it is to have have the concepts which which can be expressed expressed by the analysed whether language; and (iii) to associate concepts with words. (iii) words. And concepts, whether private or public, belong to thoughts.

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CHAPTER 7

Discourse Representation Theory and Propositional Attitudes

Contents 7.1. 7.2. 7.3. 7.4. 7.5.

Semantics and and Pragmatics Revisited Semantics Revisited ................................ Context .................................................... Belief Expressions and Belief Reports in DRT ......................... DRT and Intentions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. Concluding Remarks ...........................................

DISCOURSE, DISCOURSE, BELIEFS, AND INTENTIONS INTENTIONS Current Current Research Research in the Semantics/Pragmatics Interface, Vol. Vol. 2 K.M. Jaszczolt © 1999 1999 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved 277

278 278 280 284 296 298

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7.1. Semantics and Pragmatics Revisited

I argued in the previous chapters that all referring expressions have have to have intentional content in order to be used to refer to objects because intentionality secures reference. reference. The The shift shift of of interest interest from from the the fact fact that that Ralph Ralph made made reference reference how it happened happened that he attempted to somebody to how attempted to make reference to somebody somebody leads to an answer through a theory of intentionality. intentionality. The next step is to give which intentionality give a formal DR-theoretic account of the ways in which secures discourse referents.11 belief is the most prominent Reports on propositional attitudes, of which belief of representative, have had the unfortunate fate of being the object of representative, intra-theoretical disputes of philosophers philosophers and logicians, and only indirectly permeating to linguistic pragmatics. The move towards pragmatic explanation permeating or, indeed, blurring the boundary between semantics and pragmatics happened through the disillusionment of some scholars with semantic happened ambiguities, to mention only Davidson (1968-69, 1970, 1974) 1974) or Donnellan of (1966, 1970). Semantic underspecification followed suit as a symptom of belief the tendency to shift more and more responsibility for puzzles with belief attribution attribution from semantics to pragmatics. In other words, the ongoing trend participant in the study was to see the study of language use as the legitimate participant of sentence meaning. Traces of this tendency are already visible in continental phenomenology from the turn of the century, phenomenology century, and notably in Husserl's Husserl's Investigations (1900-1901) where language is discussed discussed as a social phenomenon, as well as in Frege's insistence on an intersubjective component phenomenon, component in semantics in the form of objective sense, grasped by language users (see Dummett 1986: 251). 251). It was brought back to the fore by Strawson's (1950) emphasis emphasis on speaker meaning and by other authors who either (1) (1) revive the importance proposition, although importance of MoP and stress its contribution to the proposition, not necessarily to its content or, (2) immersed in the linguistic theoretical debate instead, allow pragmatic information in general to play a role in the semantic semantic content of an utterance. The first trend was reviewed and discussed in Chapters 4 and 5. The latter trend, discussed in Chapters I1and and2,2,has hasevolved evolved into several streams such as the neo-Gricean neo-Gricean approaches, relevance theory and approaches such its kin the theory of impliciture, as well as dynamic-semantic approaches as DRT. These tendencies helped redefine the role of pragmatics from a magic wand excluded even from the study of intensional contexts (Quine 1956 is theory. a classic example) to a component component of a semantic theory. In this chapter chapter I demonstrate demonstrate that DRT provides an adequate framework for representing sentences that express reports on beliefs but it requires one belief report that discriminate discriminate essential addition. All the possible readings of a belief

1

1

The main main tenets and terms of DRT were were introduced in in Section 2.7 2.7 above. above.

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different ways in which the individual is known to the believer are between different treated equally, equally, which is is not satisfactory. satisfactory. As I have argued in the preceding preceding chapters, some of these readings are more salient to the hearer than others and the systematic systematic gradation of this salience salience is parallel to the degrees of referential intention involved in uttering the belief report. So, So, this gradation should be reflected in the discourse representation structures. I demonstrate how an account of intentions intentions supplements supplements DRT and disposes disposes of the need to postulate ambiguities or underdeterminacy. underdeterminacy. I distinguished two stages of this project. Firstly, Firstly, one has to estimate the extent to which the semantic representation representation of an utterance guides the hearer hearer towards the recognition recognition of the communicated content, and secondly, secondly, one requires a theory of what supplements semantic representation before it becomes a truth-conditional of propositional propositional representation. The first is provided by any theory of implicature and the need for the distinction between what is said and what is implicated implicated does not arouse particular controversies. controversies. The second problem problem is the subject of the ongoing debate concerning the content of what is said, to which my solution was presented in Chapter Chapter 2. 2. I shall now use this of the interaction of intentions with the semantic representation, solution, solution, interaction intentions representation, in the DR-theoretic analysis analysis of belief expressions and belief reports. Dynamic-semantic approaches are particularly prone to such amendments because they have have a means of incorporating the changes of context into the representation. And, as I argue in Section 7.2, 7.2, the context includes redundant category category of a intentions. Hence, instead instead of an epistemologically epistemologically redundant vague, underspecified representation, there is an interaction of the output of grammar (the logical form) and the intentions that accompany the utterance producing an adequate, single propositional representation. utterance in producing representation. of DRT easily allows The 'pragmatic intrusionism' intrusionism'of allows for this move. move. Intentions, allowing for default values, also reflect the role of conventions in people's people's inferences. These conventions conventions and default interpretations are emphasized in neo-Gricean pragmatics and provide another shortcut for semantic theory. theory. To use Fodor's (1994: 45) slogan, "Most people do not marry their mothers; that, "Mostpeople surely, should define the norm". Or, in other words, ...) sustains "The world ((...) sustains a harmony between the (extrinsic/ historical) properties historical) properties in virtue of which a Mentalese sentence is a mode of presentation of the proposition that P and the (intrinsic/ syntactic) properties in virtue of which a Mentalese sentence is reliably a cause of the sorts of behavioral proclivities that the laws of psychology say that P-believers share." qbid.: (ibid.: 53-54). Conventions and intentions intentions are the devices I propose for improving the account DRT gives of belief constructions.

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7.2. Context The basic advantage of DRT is that, in a discourse, a sentence is interpreted in the context of preceding sentences. The interpretation of a new sentence relies on the syntactic structure of the sentence and the structure that represents the context, the earlier sentences sentences (cf. (cf. Kamp and Reyle 1993: 59). In other other words, the context is updated updated with the information coming from this new sentence sentence (see van Eijck and Kamp 1997: 181). 181). The content content of this new sentence sentence draws content of previously interpreted interpreted sentences, on the content sentences, which has important important implications for the semantics of the whole language and is perhaps particularly salient in the analysis analysis of anaphoric expressions. Discourse referents enable the representation of coreferentiality, they capture the fact that sentences can be linked by having the same reference. Concerning the role of context in semantics, it has also been suggested that the focus/background structure of a sentence has semantic effects and helps determine the structure structure of the discourse discourse (see Asher 1995 and Kubofi Kubon 1995, negation). 2 the latter with respect to its role in negation). The novelty of this perspective perspective is its dynamism. While While traditionally meaning was tied to truth with respect to models, now it is tied to truth defined with respect to conditions of context-change. This is also how Montague semantics became dynamic and has allowed for the inclusion of pragmatic processes. processes. DRT copes easily with anaphoric links that were problematic for static approaches, such as in (1)-(6): (l)-(6):

(I) (1)

A man entered. He smiled.

(2) (2)

Every man who meets a nice woman smiles at her.

(3) (3)

If a man enters, he smiles.

(4) (4)

Hob believes a witch blighted his mare. Nob believes she killed his sow.

(5)

John entered the room. He switched on the light.

(6)

Whenever John entered the room, he switched on the light.

2

2

(1995: 199). Concerning anaphora and the topic/focus topic/focus distinction, she says: says: Pace de Swart (1995: "The "The reasoning is that a topic is interpreted in the top box [of a DRS], and a referent in the top box is available as the antecedent antecedent of a discourse discourse anaphor. Being a topic is thus a sufficient. sufficient, but necessary condition to license discourse discourse anaphora." not a necessary

Section 22 Section

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281 281

(from van Eijck and Kamp Kamp 1997: 1997: 182-183). 182-183). Since Since the interpretation of the first first sentence sentence or clause then becomes becomes aa context for for the interpretation of the other, other, the anaphoric dependencies concerning objects (in (in 1-6) 1-6) and tenses (in (in 5 and 6) 6) can be captured. For example, example, in (1), (1), the anaphoric link between the indefinite NP and the pronoun is is captured by by the DRS condition as in Fig. 1: 1: y == x as

xx y

man (x) man entered (x) y=x

smiled (y)

and Kamp 1997: 185)? Fig. 1 (adapted from van Eijck and 185).3

Now, the notion of context is quite far-ranging in DRT. Van Eijck and Kamp sentences of the type (7), the definite description (1997: 189-190) say that in sentences 'the street' may not have an antecedent in the previous discourse or text but instead it can be salient to the interlocutors due to sharing common assumptions called 'common ground': (7)

A man was walking down the street.

shared background background makes the discourse discourse referent for 'the (from ibid.: 189). This shared (from anchored to an object, a particular, known street. DRT represents this street' anchored street' of a referent referent as a type of of an anaphoric link. Van Eijck Eijck and and Kamp salience of referent for the street street in question and and next, by means means introduce a discourse referent ofthe equational condition, link the referent referent of ofthe expression 'the street' from of rather roundabout roundabout route, though. sentence (7) with that referent. This seems a rather 3 For For DRS-conditions DRS-conditions see see Kamp Kamp and and Reyle Reyle (1993: (1993: 63). 63). For For formal formal details details of of DRT DRT and and the the translation translation to to FoL FoL see see e.g. e.g. van van Eijck Eijck and and Kamp Kamp 1997, 1997, Section Section 4. 4.

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Instead, perhaps the scale of salience of referring expressions, such as the accessibility or givenness givenness hierarchy hierarchy (see Section 5.6) would better handle the shared availability availability of the referent.4 Although Although extending anaphora thus far may be somewhat contentious, the intuition behind it is correct. Context is not merely the preceding preceding sentences but also shared knowledge, beliefs, assumptions, and all the situational and cultural background. Kamp (1990: 53) 53) explicitly explicitly allows allows for non-verbal non-verbal information to enter context. context. In terms of the approach developed developed here, it means means allowing allowing information coming from from vehicles of thought other than language and, necessarily, necessarily, from intentionality. Kamp (1984: (1984: 1) 1) advocates the merger of meaning meaning as truth conditions with meaning as hearer's understanding. conventions understanding. In other words, there are conventions of language use and they are brought into the semantics. This perspective which, after all, both lead has proven to be a natural locus for intentions which, to the hearer's understanding understanding of an utterance and explain how how a particular interpretation of the sentence affects truth conditions. So, So, representations in the form of DRSs depend on a variety of information. We should also include include in this information the very specific properties of the involved concepts (cf. (cf. Kamp and Rossdeutscher 1994). The very general properties of concepts must also contribute to DRSs. And it can be said without doubt that intentionality is such a universal and omnipresent property of the concept of belief. It follows from this of this summary summary of sources of information that intentions that accompany sentences, as well as intentionality that is part and parcel of thoughts thoughts and beliefs, are also part of of context of interpretation and may enter DRSs. This inclusion of intentions in DRSs will become particularly important in belief expressions and belief reports in the following section. the analysis of belief section. Although it seems to be a natural consequence of Kamp's approach to draw on intentions, they have have not been used as yet to discriminate among possible belief contexts. I demonstrate in Section 7.3 7.3 how it can be achieved. readings of belief Now, once all this contextual contextual information is used for the analysis analysis of the compositional? content of the current sentence, is such a semantics semantics still compositional? Van Eijck and Kamp demonstrate that it is but add that sentences with the same truth conditions may differ have differ in their semantics because they have (8) and (9): a different ability to affect the context, as in ability (8) (9): (8) 4

Someone didn't come to the party. He was ill.

Cf.: "When the context available to the hearer does not contain a representation of the referent of of a definite definite description, he may accommodate accommodate this context so that it now now does contain such a proceed as if the representation representation, and then proceed representation had been there an all along. However, precise1y accommodation is possible is still a largely unresolved under what conditions precisely unresolved van Eijck and Kamp (1997: problem." (1997: 190).

Section 2

(9)

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283

Not everyone came to the party. *He was ill.

Dynamic semantics can capture these differences in the context-change potential through (i) its sequential composition composition ('sequential merge') of representations ('proto-DRSs'), strategies strategies for which are provided provided in van Eijck and Kamp 1997, 1997, or through (ii) analysing analysing every next sentence 'within' the DRS already present as in Kamp 1984 or Kamp and Reyle 1993. 1993. In this chapter I adopt the latter method. Discourse referents can be shared between chapter such representations. In other words, the reading of the quantified expression 'someone' contributes to the semantics. semantics. Although in my account these sentences also have different different truth conditions, this discrepancy is not significant here. What matters is that pragmatic pragmatic processes processes and conventions conventions of language use are let in. 'Someone' obtains a discourse referent and can act as an antecedent for the pronoun 'he'. The dynamic perspective of DRT does not in itself suffice suffice to solve the problem of readings of belief belief reports and belief belief expressions. It only provides provides a linguistic linguistic semantics and vague principles for supplanting it with with the outcome of browsing through the context. The theory of how reference works in such contexts would strengthen strengthen these vague principles.Van Eijck and Kamp Kamp (1997: 221-222) 221-222) make similar claims concerning anaphora resolution: "It would be unreasonable linguistic unreasonable to demand demand of a theory of linguistic semantics - and and it it is is that which which DRT DRToriginally originallyaimed aimed atat -- that that it incorporate a detailed account of anaphora anaphora resolution, which would have to rely on a host of pragmatic principles as well as on an indefinite amount of world knowledge. It seems not unreasonable, however, however, to demand of such a theory that it offer offer a suitable suitable interface to other (pragmatic and/or extralinguistic) components of a comprehensive comprehensive theory of meaning which ...) and to allow are designed to deal with anaphora resolution ((...) these other components to come into action at those points when the information needed for anaphora anaphora resolution has become available and the resolution resolution is necessary for interpretation to proceed."

Only after the pragmatic processes have been employed does the assignment of anaphoric indexing proceed. A similar strategy seems to apply to propositional attitude and attitude reports. Once the expressions of propositional information from intentions intentions (including (including the default value of the referential intention) has been utilized, one can provide the semantics, and complete the DRS, of the sentence in question. question. In other words, words, the information from from

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the utterance of the sentence contributes to its semantics. semantics. Intentions and conventions, conventions, being part of context, determine the content of this semantic semantic representation.

7.3. 7.3. Belief Expressions and and Belief Reports Reports in DRT DRT, and place in The readings of belief belief reports that we we have to represent in DRT, the order of accessibility, can be distinguished by the following LFs in (10) to (12). Representations Representations in (10) and (12) are alphabetic alphabetic variants of each other and are y. are contrasted as as descriptions descriptions of different different situations, situations, x =I/ y.

(10)

(3x) (Ralph believes that x is a spy)

(11)

Ralph believes that (3x) (x is a spy)

(12)

(3y) (Ralph believes believes that y is a spy)

In either (10) or (12), (12), Ralph is referentially mistaken. Let us say that he is mistaken in (12). (12). (11) is a representation of a proper de dicto report. Although the distinction between de re re and de dicto cannot be adequately adequately captured by the difference in the scope of the traditional existential existential quantifier, quantifier, this is a good enough approximation approximation for now. now. Its role is merely merely to start off the have to reflect the fact that building of DRSs. The correct representation will have interpretations de re re and de dicto depend depend on the speaker's intentions and that there are degrees to which MoPs matter for the semantics. The distinction distinction appears to be pragmatic, pragmatic, while, while, at the same time, accountable in semantic semantic theory. The intrusion intentions to DRSs accounts accounts for the degrees of of intrusion of intentions salience salience of these readings and, as a part of the same job, wipes off ambiguities 5 re, de dicto proper, and and de dicto dicto/. between de re, J. relies on the notion of eventuality, The treatment of belief reports in DRT relies or state and event. event. Events originate with Davidson (1967, (1967, 1969), 1969), at least in modern philosophy of language. They give rise to discourse referents and are themselves themselves referred to. to. To To repeat, a discourse referent stands for an individual, including state or event, or for a group of individuals. individuals. It is a way of of representing the individual formally. Davidson (1970: (1970: 58) incorporates incorporates time and place indexicals into truth-conditional semantics because the truth value of a sentence sentence may vary depending on the time of utterance, the speaker, speaker, and the audience. Events are like 'concrete individuals', to name only births, explosions. The differences differences between eventualities represent movements, or explosions. represent the differences presented in Figures 5-8. belief reports, as is presented differences of reading of belief 5

See See Chapter 4 for this tri-partite distinction. distinction.

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Dealing with attitude reports involves involves an assignment of a theoretical theoretical status to the embedded embedded sentence. One can regard it either as a sentence (utterance) (utterance) of of the holder of the belief or as a proposition. Davidson (1968-69), similar similar to Hintikka (1962), regards the complementizer complementizer that as a demonstrative. Although it is a rather radical theoretical commitment, perhaps some traces of this demonstrative meaning are useful to retain. Then we can take what follows 'that' to be an utterance of the reporter that is in itself an interpretation interpretation of the original belief expression. This utterance may already include corrections of the referring expressions that were wrongly wrongly used, disambiguation disambiguation and enrichment of what was said, to the extent to which the reporter was able to add them. These pragmatic processes are at work prior to the formulation of the belief formulation belief report and hence contribute to the semantics, as was observed already by Davidson in 1968-69. 1968-69. Davidson (1974: 144) is sceptical, though, about the use of beliefs and intentions for interpreting belief belief reports because they are all so tightly interrelated. However, as was discussed in Chapter Chapter 4, the theories of both use MoPs and the main difference is that whereas the theory of beliefs must specify the MoP of the individual, the theory of ascription resorts to coarser-grained distinctions. It requires only those MoPs and types of MoPs that make a difference to truth conditions of sentences. And these pertain to the tri-partite distinction between de re, to proper, and to1. re, de die dicto and de die dictoj. Discourse interpretation interpretation is incremental in the sense that the meaning recovered from the utterance relies on the foundations prepared by the understanding of previous utterances, non-linguistic context, and the interaction of the recovery of the speaker's assumptions by the hearer with the creation by the hearer of new assumptions. This last tenet I have called a doubly-dynamic approach (in Section 2.9 2.9 and laszczolt Jaszczolt 1996b), as opposed opposed to singly-dynamic approaches where context is established after its relevance for the interpretation interpretation has been assessed. DRT well reflects this dynamism. Rules, Rules, called a construction algorithm, represent a discourse as a DRS with its truth conditions. As was mentioned in Chapter 2, discourse representations are mental representations formed by the speakers and hearers as a result of the utterances to which they are exposed (cf. (cf. Kamp 1984: 5). 5). A DRS consists of two components: a set of discourse referents (the universe of the DRS) and a set of DRS-conditions (cf. (cf. Kamp and Reyle 1993: 63). A DRS is true iff iff there are individuals in its universe that correspond to the discourse referents and these individuals satisfy the DRS-conditions. The different different readings of belief reports are represented by the selection and placement of discourse referents that stand for individuals, here in the subject position of the embedded sentence. sentence. I shall now demonstrate that the construction construction of the context, that tells us which readings are more and which less salient, is tied with the role of intentions in semantics as presented in the theory of Default Semantics in Chapter Chapter 2.

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Kamp (1990: 41) 41) argues as follows. We We cannot cannot specify specify the truth-conditional truth-conditional content of individual individual beliefs, so we have to look for the intentionality of a complex attitudinal state whose complexity can be grasped by constructing representations representations of sharing intentional elements in the DRS. In other words, people are in certain cognitive states which have the structure of a DRS (cf 1990, in progress) and truth conditions can be specified (cf. Kamp 1984, 1984,1990, specified only for these states as a whole rather than for particular attitudes. But these states comprise attitudes that are connected connected according to certain rules, and notably by sharing discourse referents. referents. Discourse Discourse referents can act as links between conditions that come from different propositions - as contents different sentences (or (or propositions of particular particular constituents of attitudinal states).6 Now, the discourse analyst states).6 Now, normally focuses focuses on the interpretation of a single belief report report and we ultimately want to know the truth conditions of such reports on single attitudes. Conventions of language use seem to fill fill the missing gap. In using language, the interlocutors operate largely on the principle of making predictions from past linguistic experience and on the conversational principles which specify specify how much and how little little we ought to say, say, such as Levinson's (1987) I, Q, and M principles, relevance theory, theory, or other derivatives derivatives of Grice's Co-operative Co-operative Principle. Therefore, the reporter, on hearing (13), (13), is very likely to be able to recover the speaker's intentions intentions because he is guided by some such principles of co-operation. (13)

The best Italian painter painted this picture.

A DRS of a report on (13), (13), such as in (14), (14), has two properties that make it doubly-dynamic: (i) it gathers all that there is to be recovered from the conversation conversation up to utterance (14), (14), and (ii) (ii) it gives gives options as to the placement of the discourse referent in the DRS. (14)

Mary believes that the best Italian painter painted this picture.

levels were introduced for other types The options of placement at subordinate levels of contexts in Kamp and Reyle (1993: 298). These options are marked in Fig. 2 possibilities of placement placement of the by a broken line that delineates the range of possibilities discourse referent in the universes of various DRSs. The three DRSs in which y can can be be placed placed correspond correspond to the the readings de re, de dicto] dicto I and and de dicto proper. The distinction is made by means of the depth of embedding of y. y. 6

Strictly speaking, beliefs and other attitudes are not relations between between the holder of the attitude cognitive states that can be represented as DRSs (cf. (cf. Kamp and a DRS. Instead, people are in cognitive 1990: 42). 6

Section 33 Section

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Discourse Discourse representation representationtheory theory and and propositional propositional attitudes attitudes

r---------------------, I I

m m Xx s : I

y

: I

: best Italian painter (y) :

, I

I

Mary (m) picture (x)

I

e m believes e s

I

I I

e -y-p-ru-'n-te-d]J

Fig. 27

respectively. This is a partial 's' and 'e' stand for a state and an event respectively. representation, the temporal reference reference is not represented in the DRS as it relevant for the present present purpose (see Kamp and Reyle 1993, Chapter is not relevant The depth depth of of embedding of of the discourse referent referent y is inversely inversely 5). The proportional to the degree of referential referential intention that accompanies accompanies the proportional of the referring expression standing for y. y. In other words, the deeper use of is in in the the DRSs, DRSs, the the less less referential referential intention intention accompanies accompanies the the use use of of the y is corresponding expression. The degree of of their intensionality is tied to the corresponding of their intentionality. And, as we know from from Default Semantics degree of Default De Re principle, principle, the least least depth depth of of embedding embedding marks marks the and the Default default, de re interpretation. I retrace the steps that that led to Fig. 2 below. below. It has to be demonstrated demonstrated next to what representation representation these degrees of of It present representations representations of of the the readings de re, re, intentions apply. We have to present dicta proper proper and and de dictoi dicta1 and and then show what makes them ordered ordered on de dicto of utterance utterance interpretation. interpretation. I shall abandon the salience scale for the process of for this purpose purpose Kamp's Kamp's complex complex attitudinal attitudinal states and and instead instead of of looking for pairs, I shall look look at one pair pair of of a belief belief indicator indicator (Bel) (J3el) and and a at many pairs, In fact, I shall look look just just at the content content rather DRS representing its content. In 7 7

This This DRT DRT account account of of belief belief reports reports originated originated in in Jaszczolt Jaszczolt 1998d.

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than a pair because the object of analysis is linguistic linguistic expressions. This analysis of belief expressions expressions is founded founded on the analysis of beliefs for the following reason:

...) is a theory of belief which does justice both to "What "What is needed ((...) (i) the intentionality of beliefs and (ii) to the fact that their identity of conditions are stricter than those of the corresponding sets of worlds." Kamp (1990: 30).

This should be founded founded on a theory of practical practical reasoning, including beliefs, assumptions, assumptions, and resulting intentions. Kamp is saying saying here that while sets of worlds are traditional constructs constructs for the semantics of sentences, they are too coarsely-grained for mental states. More finely-grained devices are needed. But, as was discussed discussed in Chapter 4, expressions expressions and reports on beliefs also need a more finely-grained device. device. While While beliefs always always have have to be analysed in terms of MoPs, belief expressions and reports sometimes do, i.e. when the default reading is not the case. So, So, they may need MoPs or types We seem to have a scale of fineness here. In other words, to represent of MoPs. We represent the meaning of belief sentences and reports, we need the same devices as for representing beliefs, only slightly coarser-grained: not all the MoPs have to be relevant for the semantics. Now, Now, beliefs that underlie belief expressions are recovered with the help of default intentions. Intentions indicate how the discourse referents referents are connected with the belief belief. In other words, they indicate how to choose from within within the box marked by the broken line in Fig. 2. 2. As a result, we obtain a DRS that is fully determined as to the use of the referring referring expression. Let us examine the possibilities possibilities of referring in more detail, beginning with expressions of belief belief. As ever, ever, I concentrate on definite descriptions and proper names. When the NP denotes uniquely, the proposition is normally proper normally called singular and the DRS and the referent are 'externally anchored', they are directly about the object in the world (cf. (cf Kamp 1990: 51 51and and ininprogress). progress). As was discussed in Chapter Chapter 5, 5, proper names are quite often singular singular terms, uniquely when they pronouns normally are, and definite descriptions denote uniquely are used referentially. In (13), (13), if 'the best Italian painter' refers uniquely, then it acts as a directly referential referential term similar to an indexical indexical or a demonstrative Naturally, the description may NP (cf. (cf. 'this picture' represented in Fig. 2). 2). Naturally, require expansion to, to, e.g., 'the best Italian painter according to the speaker', 'the best Italian Renaissance painter', etc. These pragmatic processes are ignored here. This reading is represented in Fig. 3. referents 3. The discourse referents anchored to the real entities for 'the best Italian painter' and 'this picture' are anchored b. - the the person aa and and the the object object b.

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289 289

xx yy ee

best Italian Italian painter painter (x) (x) best picture (y) (y) picture

{<x,a>, }

Fig. 3

External anchoring, however, however, is is not always always the case and it can only be regarded as a norm because the referential referential reading of definite descriptions is the default. Other readings readings also have have to be represented. If the description referentially 'the best Italian painter' is used referentially but the speaker is referentially mistaken, then there are no external external anchors. The only available available information specifies how discourse referents are taken by the speaker, i.e. delineate MoP. At best, this is done by means of the so-called internal anchors the MoP. (formal conditions), as in Fig. 4 (cf. Kamp 1990: 1990: 55 55 and and in progress). C Cn(x) n(x) stands for an n number of descriptive conditions C that describe the knowledge about the referent, such as 'the man I met at an speaker's knowledge is exhibition', 'the person on this photograph', etc. The person the speaker is thinking of may not not be a painter at all. x y ee

best best Italian Italian painter painter (x) (x) picture picture (y) (y)

{}

Anch [x] Anch el x painted y

I I

I

Co (xl

Fig. Fig. 44

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Perhaps this case of a referential mistake is more plausible in instances of of perceptual perceptual mistakes such as in uttering 'the man in the brown hat', who is in fact Ortcutt, and thinking of Smith. This situation, discussed discussed as A and B in Chapter Chapter 4, is followed followed up later on. I am modifYing modifying Kamp's external and formal formal anchors somewhat in order order to account account for the tri-partite distinction in referring properties properties of definite 75) uses the device of sharing the discourse descriptions. Kamp (e.g. 1990: 75) referents in order order to represent belief ascription. Sharing reflects the hearer's hearer's assumption assumption that the speaker and the hearer think about the same individual. This device is too strong and unnecessarily complicated, though. Firstly, reference it seems to assume the identity of descriptive conditions that lead to reference assignment both by the reporter and the believer. believer. Secondly, it does not capture capture correctly the spirit of de re beliefs and expressions being directly directly about an individual and de re re reports being directly about the shared individual. 8 Now, Now, definite descriptions can be used referentially and correctly, correctly, as in Fig. 3, referentially and incorrectly, as in Fig. 4, or they can be used attributively and not anchored. anchored. By default, default, they are used as in Fig. 3. 3. The distinction into singular and general reference reference adopted adopted in Kamp 1990 is not very useful now because we have degrees of referential referential properties instead and three readings to place on the scale of salience. On these terms, Fig. 3 represents represents the 'strongly' referential referential reading, whereas Fig. 4 depicts the 'weakly' referential one, the one allowing for a referential referential mistake. mistake. The attributive reading is not represented represented here, the description simply simply remains unanchored for the reasons to be explained shortly. shortly. Proper Proper names can also be intended to pick out a person person or object and the intention can be either strong or dispersed due to a referential referential mistake. But they can also be intended as constituents of a proposition proposition which cannot be further divided but instead is to be taken as an eventuality eventuality rather than a predication about an individual individual (see Cresswell 1985 1985 and Chapter Chapter 8 below). By By this reorganization reorganization of the playground I have adhered to the distinctions postulated in Chapter 4 and brought them into DRT. To sum up, the referring referring function of descriptions and names is taken to be pragmatic and has to be captured by drawing links between DRSs and making choices between the possible anchorings. This placement, as well referents, is guided by the recognition as linking DRSs that share discourse referents, of the speaker's speaker's intentions in communication. It is not a semantic distinction recoverable from the LF but it belongs to the DRS. Now, Now, although Kamp and Reyle observe that who is meant by a proper proper name depends on the context, including the speaker's intentions, intentions, there are no rules as to how to incorporate this information into semantics. Ambiguities Ambiguities of scope are said incorporate

8

This weakness was attended to in Kamp Qn (In progress: I) 1) but also left left open there.

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291 291

not to to arise because proper names refer directly. directly. But, But, as as was was argued in Chapter 5, 5, proper names names can be used with with aa referential referential mistake mistake or without aa referential referential intention, intention, similar similar to to definite definite descriptions, descriptions, and and this this use use affects affects the semantics of the sentences. sentences. Direct referring is is merely merely the default. default. Hence Hence we need possibilities of placement in multiple-embedded DRSs and and intentions to to discriminate between between these these possibilities. possibilities. Intentions also explain the tendency of definite descriptions and names to to trigger the de de re re interpretation. In Fig. 2, 2, I translated the types types of anchoring anchoring into levels levels of embedding of the discourse referent in the DRSs. Let us analyse detail. this translation in more detail. Kamp (1990: (1990: 60) 60) says says that, analogously to formal formal and external anchors, anchors, there are formal formal and true de re re beliefs. This is is incontestable: incontestable: a belief can be taken to be de re re but still pose referential puzzles, as was instantiated in Situations A and B in Chapter 4. 4.We We are interested in tying tying this distinction with the process of interpretation of belief expressions and reports of the form 'A A believes believes that B cps'. We We want to know how the hearer decides that the speaker holds a belief de re, re, de re re about someone someone else (here: formally anchored), or de dicto. dicto. Now, Now, a belief report reports on , K>, where referentially used Bel is the attitude and K is the DRS. In the case of strongly referentially expressions, K is externally anchored9 and the DRS of the celebrated report on Ralph's belief looks as in Fig. 5. 5. The proper name 'Ortcutt' is strongly referent 'o' '0' is placed placed in the main DRS. referential here and the discourse referent

r o0 s Ralph (r) Ortcutt Ortcutt (o) (0) s'

r believes s'

s s'

0

is a spy

Fig. 5 (adapted (adapted from from Jaszczolt Jaszczolt 1998d: 14). 14). Fig. 9 9

Externally and formally, because because 'No external anchor anchor without without a formal anchor' (Kamp (Kamp 1990: 61). In In other other words, words, there there are are always always MOPs MOPs that that lead lead to to the the individuation individuation of of the the referent. referent. But, But, 61). as as II argue argue below, below, the the formal formal conditions conditions do do not not contribute contribute to to the the semantics semantics on on the the default default reading.

292 292

Discourse, Discourse, beliefs, beliefs, and and intentions intentions

Chapter Chapter 77

When the proper name is is used referentially but mistakenly, mistakenly, the DRS isis only formally anchored. II have have translated this this anchoring of of belief into into the second second level level of embedding embedding in the belief report, as as in Fig. Fig. 6. 6. The discourse discourse referent '0' 'o' is is introduced in in the middle box box that represents represents the world of Ralph's Ralph's belief belief rather than the objective objective reality. reality.

r s

Ralph (r) S' s1 0o

s

r believes S' s' Ortcutt (0) (o)

s S'

o is a spy 'ois

I

laszczolt 1998d: 14). Fig. 6 (adapted from Jaszczolt

represents a DRS for a belief report report with a de dictoj dicto J reading, Fig. 6 represents corresponding to a belief belief de re about someone else, formally formally anchored. anchored. Similar corresponding to Fig. 2, Figures Figures 3-6 are only partial partial DRSs DRSs as they do not represent represent the temporality of of the eventualities. Now, although according to DRT optimally referents in the referring expressions normally establish their discourse referents of the main main DRS (Kamp and and Reyle 1993; Reyle 1993), this default default universe of Instead, the expression expression can be used without the backing may not take place. Instead, of the necessary necessary individuating information but with mistaken information information of sufficient information at all. This This means a departure departure from from direct or no sufficient reference and and adopting instead instead direct direct reference as a default reading reading which which reference can, nevertheless, not of use. not happen happen on a particular particular occasion occasion of and formal anchors anchors in beliefs account account for the readings de re and and de External and of belief belief reports. De dicto proper requires a different treatment. On this dicto J of dictoj interpretation, the believer holds an attitude towards the proposition proposition as a interpretation, that 'red giants become become white dwarfs' or or that that 'Botticelli painted whole, e.g. that whatever the entities entities referred to are. As was indicated indicated above, above, here Flora', whatever ofsharing discourse discourse referents between various Kamp (1990) proposes proposes the the idea idea of Kamp

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holders holders of attitudes. attitudes. For instance, instance, aa belief may may be inherited from someone someone else, else, together with with the assumed reference reference of the potentially referring referring expressions. expressions. But it seems seems that sharing, albeit psychologically correct, will will not suffice suffice in pragmatic theory. theory. It It can be taken for for granted that someone else's utterance utterance 10 or other behaviour acted as as an instigator in forming forming this semi-propositional lO belief but this fact is is not interesting. interesting. The source of the belief may may no longer be accessible to the speaker or the hearer. The referents, to all intents referents, intents and purposes, remain oblique and unidentified. unidentified. The belief is is about the eventuality as a whole. whole. Naturally, Naturally, if information about sharing is is available, available, the DRS of the the source's belief belief will contain this this information. But what really matters is is what particular belief state in question, inherited or not, is like. like. It is is de dicto the particular and can be represented as in Fig. 7: 7:

s r S Ralph (r) 1

s' s

r bbelieves >elieves s' s

s'

o (0) Ortcutt (o) o is a spy

Fig. 7 (adapted (adapted from from Jaszczolt laszczolt 1998d: 16). 16).

anchoring that that accounts accounts for various types of of beliefs can can be disposed of of So, the anchoring in belief belief reports because it has been translated into the levels of of embedding of of the discourse referent. referent. Anchors function function in belief belief interpretation. interpretation. Beliefs Beliefs have have MoPs that that are important important for their content. For linguistic expressions, a more of levels of of embedding embedding will suffice. suffice. I have suggested coarsely-grained device of the form form of of degrees of of fineness of of types of of MoPs, in Chapter this device, in the development of of Schiffer's Schiffer's types of of MoPs. The The depth depth of of embedding 4, as a development of opacity and, and, more directly, the the degree of ofreferential referential represents the degree of intention intention with which the referring expression was used used - or taken taken by the the 10

In In Sperber's Sperber's sense. sense. See See Chapter Chapter 2.9 2.9 above. above.

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hearer to have been used. It can be seen that Kamp (1990, in progress) provides hearer an account belief account of beliefs that is immensely valuable for my account account of belief expressions and belief reports. My levels of embedding are a direct levels consequence consequence of types of conditions conditions (anchors), with the small proviso that direct reference reference in its standard standard form has to be rejected in favour of degrees of of intentions. The gist of my proposal is as follows. follows. In our Default Semantics, Semantics, there are (including degrees of 'being de re'. re'. The three different different cases of anchoring (including no anchoring) do not reflect these degrees very well. Instead, they seem To remedy this, to indicate three totally separate options of interpretation. interpretation. To way. External anchors are the ultimate, we should think about them this way. objective type of link between an entity and a representation. As Kamp says, they require the co-presence of formal anchors. One has to have sufficiently sufficiently knowledge of the referent to individuate solid and and effective effective knowledge individuate it correctly. correctly. In other words, one has to have have enough sufficiently sufficiently detailed MoPs to hold a referentially, or utter a de re belief de re, belief re, use a term referentially, re report. But in the de re Ireferential case, these MoPs, or descriptive conditions acting as formal re/referential anchors, can be ignored for the semantic purposes. This is the case of the default direct reference and the external anchor 'overrides', so to speak, the need for any descriptive conditions. The referential mistake mistake also relies on some formal anchors, but these do not lead to external external anchors. They, or rather rather MoPs or types of MoPs, are in fact relevant to the semantics of of the expression in question. They explain the problem of the lack of of substitutivity of coreferential expressions in such cases. Finally, thinking or talking about whoever undergoes the expression relies on a particular particular MoP that is present in the sentence itself. There are no anchors other than the very sentence. Hence, although the MoP matters very much to the semantics referent unanchored. This is a semantics in this case, I call the discourse discourse referent departure from Kamp's more extensive extensive use of formal anchors but it seems accurately. to render the differences between the readings more accurately. sentences in a discourse In DRT, sentences discourse can be linked through their referents, as the notion of sharing indicates. Attitudes Attitudes are linked analogously:

contents that are connected connected in much "Distinct attitudes may have contents the same way as the DRSs for the different different sentences of a cohesive text." Kamp (in (in progress: 6). attitudinal states through discourse Similarly, discourse is linked with attitudinal result, if beliefs are connected referents. As a result, connected with intentions, intentions, then so are belief belief expressions expressions and belief belief reports. Intentions are even more suited expressions because they as a device for the interpretation of linguistic expressions belong, so to speak, 'one level higher' than expressions, expressions, whereas with beliefs they simply enter into complex attitudinal states. Moreover, only the

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295 295

intention intention to to refer refer has has to to be· be considered, considered, all all the the other other intentions intentions being being taken taken for for granted, granted, assumed assumed to to accompany accompany aa speech speech act. act. To To sum sum up, up, the the options options of of interpretation interpretation of of the the report report on on Ralph's Ralph's belief belief are are analogous analogous to to the the ones ones in in Fig. Fig. 22 and and are are presented presented in in Fig. Fig. 8.8. Proper Proper names names behave behave in in this this respect respect analogously to to definite definite descriptions. descriptions. analogously

r s

,...-----------

o o

Ortcutt (0) (o)

Ralph (r)

1

s' s

s

1

believes ss' r b~ieves ,

s1 |o is a spy

(adapted from Jaszczolt laszczolt 1998d: 1998d: 16). 16). Fig. 8 (adapted

instantiation of of the options options of ofplacement placement of of the discourse referent in Fig. 88 The instantiation in the outer, middle or inner box depends on the referential intention that accompanies the utterance. This referential intention guides the hearer in accompanies interpretation. The hearer hearer is also guided by the conventional, utterance interpretation. default status of of the de re interpretation interpretation that that corresponds corresponds to the placement default ofthe the discourse referent referent 'o' '0' in the outer outer box. This default reading was proposed of proposed Chapter 4 as the Default De Re Re principle and and the arguments for its its in Chapter acceptance will not not be repeated repeated here. The The objective of of this analysis was to acceptance demonstrate that that the the intention-based intention-based semantics semantics is compatible compatible with with DRT DRT and, demonstrate in fact, improves the the latter latter theory theory in that that the the possibilities possibilities of of reading reading of of in referring expressions expressions are are not not treated treated as as aa case case of of ambiguity ambiguity or or indeterminacy indeterminacy referring but but instead instead they they are are classified classified on on aa scale scale of of salience. salience. The The sole sole enumeration enumeration of of the the readings, readings, without without the the intention-based intention-based classification, classification, would would be be uninuninteresting teresting from from the the point point of of view view of of discourse discourse interpretation. interpretation. The The device device of ofthe the box box marked marked with with aa broken broken line line was was initially initially introduced introduced by by Reyle Reyle (1993: (1993: 129) 129) to to mark mark the the underspecified underspecified meaning meaning of of NPs. NPs. Reyle Reyle attempts attempts to to represent represent scope scope ambiguities ambiguities by by adopting adopting underspecified underspecified structures. structures. For For

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example, he says that the meaning of an indefinite indefinite NP is underspecified as to the positioning positioning in the multiply-embedded DRSs. But it seems that these options options need not necessarily mean semantic underspecification. After incorporating incorporating intentions into the context of interpretation it becomes clear that, although his device of of representing possibilities of reading is very useful, underspecification does not follow suit. As I have demonstrated, underspecification demonstrated, in intensional contexts of belief reports, the broken line is a result of of superimposing possibilities of reading. The relative salience of these superimposing various possibilities readings and their semantics are a separate story. In other words, there is more to the semantics semantics of belief belief contexts contexts than Figures 2 and 8 demonstrate. demonstrate. These figures are theoretical constructs. 'Real' semantics is presented in the remaining figures figures and is intention-based. This account also reflects the conclusion we reached independently independently in Chapter Chapter 4 that a unitary formal account of attitudes and reports cannot be provided. The account of reports is much less finely-grained, finely-grained, MoPs are considered only when when they are required for explaining explaining why the default interpretation interpretation is not the case. Also, sometimes only some elements of full full MoPs can be relevant, i.e. the types types of MoPs. On the contrary, contrary, an account of beliefs should incorporate the MoPs of the objects. Who is meant by 'Ortcutt' or 'the man in the brown hat'depends hat' depends on the context (cf. (cf. Kamp and Reyle 1993: 62, 62, 253). But this context may not be relevant to the semantics of the belief expression or the belief report either because it is the case of the default reading or, simply, because this context context is not simply, because known to the hearer. In the DRSs of reports, the position of the discourse referent for the referring expression reflects the conditions for finding which the name applies and these conditions contribute the individual to which to the truth conditions of the represented proposition. Only to the extent of selecting the appropriate appropriate conditions does the MoP matter to the (15), these conditions will select semantics of these expressions. Similarly, in (15), the reading where 'the professor who supervises his dissertation' has, or does not have, have, the scope ranging ranging over 'every student' (with 'his' as the so-called 'dangling pronoun'): (15) (15)

Every student student fears fears the professor who supervises supervises his dissertation. dissertation,

(from Kamp and Reyle 1993: 297).

and Intentions 7.4. DRT and Intentions This merger of the theory of intentions with DRT is an extension of of incorporate Kamp's (1990: 30) suggestion that a theory of belief should incorporate the intentionality of beliefs, as well as the fact that the sets of worlds

Section 4

and propositional propositional attitudes Discourse representation theory and

297

corresponding corresponding to these beliefs do not suffice suffice for providing their identity conditions. Since the theory of belief attribution attribution is merely a coarser-grained coarser-grained version of the theory of beliefs, both of them founded on grades of MoPs, So, a pragmatic account account of belief intentionality of beliefs figures in both. So, belief belief reports has to presuppose the intentionality intentionality of beliefs expressions and belief and use information coming from intentions in communication. However, although Kamp clearly states that a theory of propositional propositional attitudes must account for their intentionality, intentionality, he allocates intentions a rather insignificant role (see ibid.: 85-87). He adopts complex attitudinal states as the object of analysis beyond which we cannot reach, or rather we do not yet know how to reach. To To repeat, the states combine beliefs, desires, intentions and other modes and there is no way way of distinguishing particular particular components for a truth-conditional interpretation, although some attempts at representing the interrelations among them have been made (see Kamp in progress). These states, coming coming with the lack of discrimination of intentions, intentions, do not suffice suffice for the analysis of attitude expressions. Intentions clarifY clarify the belief, knowing the speaker's intentions helps ascribe beliefs to the speaker. So, So, a complex attitudinal state cannot really be a primitive, primitive, the interpretation interpretation of expressions of the type 'A believes that B (ps' of
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Now, when Kamp and Reyle (1993: 292) talk about the processing of of Now, indefinite NPs that it must allow for "a considerable spectrum of alternatives", it looks like these are alternatives to the defoult. default. This default representation representation is that indefinite indefinite NPs establish a discourse referent in the current DRS. Short and relatively uninformative uninformative indefinite NPs as in (16) normally acquire a nonspecific interpretation interpretation and narrow scope: (16) (16)

Every Every boy in Mary's class fancies a girl.

(from Kamp and Reyle Reyle 1993: 1993: 293). 293). These constructions were were discussed discussed in more detail in Section 2.7 2.7 above (cf. (cf. example 20 there). Since there is no formal rule as to when narrow and wide wide scope ensue (also called 'short' and 'long' indefinites), indefinites), then all we have have is a disjunction disjunction of processing options for the hearer hearer to choose from. This is not satisfactory. Processing Processing options will not do, neither will they do for referring referring expressions in attitude reports. for, and so The default reading is always always present present and has to be accounted accounted for, of must the non-default readings. This is why why intentions (and the lack of intentions) intentions) are crucial.

7.5. 7.5. Concluding Remarks Remarks Conversation Conversation requires sharing of meanings, which which entails sharing of discourse discourse referents. Conversation also presupposes presupposes the concept concept of other person with his/her intentionality. Since the other person is necessary for communication, communication, intentionality then so is that person's intentionality which which becomes shared intentionality (cf. Searle 1990b: 415). 415). To To summarize the role of sharing would be nothing else but evoke Grice's Co-operative Principle. The hearer makes assumptions about the speaker speaker which serve as premises in inference. However, intentionality has to be assumed. It has been smuggled into DRT just as it has been smuggled into Default Semantics. Intentionality, as a property of mental states and in particular mental acts, is prior to the meaning of linguistic expressions expressions in the order of explanation explanation and hence fits the role very well. As the property of aboutness, it accounts for the major property of speech acts, that is referring to objects. Since it seems to be gradable, it allows for the classification of DRSs of a sentence on a scale of this aboutness. aboutness. All in all, since it fits fits the purpose so well, well, and as a property of mental acts is almost a platitude, there seems to be no harm in assuming it. Demonstratives provide some evidence that intentionality intentionality of mental states does not differ differ principally from the intentionality intentionality of linguistic linguistic expressions. Demonstratives refer because their meaning is a combination of the meaning of the demonstrating word and the intentional content of the act of perception. And perception, like thought, is one of Husserl's meaning-giving meaning-givingacts. acts.This This

Section 5

and propositional propositional attitudes Discourse representation theory and

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identity of genus of intentionality oflinguistic of of linguistic expressions and intentionality of Mulder 1994: 6-38), perceptual acts, adopted adopted since by Searle 1983 (see also de Mulder signals that many different different mental states have it, and hence so does language, as a vehicle of thought. To sum up, I have demonstrated demonstrated in this chapter chapter that the pragmatic intrusionism to which DRT subscribes includes intentions in communication communication and that the referential referential intention contributes to the DRSs. As a result, it referring expressions on enables the ordering of readings of sentences with referring the scale of their salience in utterance interpretation. DRSs take the best together: model-theoretic model-theoretic semantics semantics and the of the two worlds and put it together: hearer's utterance processing. In this chapter chapter I have concentrated concentrated on latter and its impact impact on the first. Intentions explain improving the view of the latter why neither ambiguities nor underspecification have to arise. I have departed from Kamp's theoretical theoretical commitments commitments at some places, while retaining most of his DRT apparatus. For example, he maintains that externally anchored discourse referent for a proper proper name is always externally the discourse anchored (cf. van Eijck and 247-8). This and Kamp 1997: 1997: 191; 191; Kamp and and Reyle 1993: 1993: 247-8). is a common common practice for direct-referentialists. direct-referentialists. However, since we have taken speaker's referring as the starting assumption in building our semantics, the salient to a certain degree to the speaker and this is reflected referent can be salient in the placements of the discourse referent in the multiple embedded DRSs anchoring (including for belief belief reports, reports, or in the types of anchoring (including none) for extensional contexts. The device of degrees of embedding replaced sharing discourse referents which was found to be overly finely-grained to render discourse render the three readings of belief reports. Also, the role of formal anchors in dicto1 and other expressions semantics reduced here to the case of de dictoj semantics was reduced expressions mistakes. As was argued in Section 7.2, of with referential mistakes. 7.2, the inclusion of the speaker's speaker's perspective perspective on referring is justified in DRT through through the inclusion of intentions, including the referential intention, in the construal context. of context. Finally, let me place this intention-based DRT in a wider perspective. There traditions in the philosophy philosophy of language called are two traditions called contextualism contextualism and anti-contextualism (see Recanati 1994: 1994: 156-157). Contextualism allows for the contribution of contextual contextual information to the propositional form. For example, in this account, the meaning of the natural language connective meaning of truth-functional truth-functional conjunction and differs from the meaning conjunction in first-order first-order logic. Anti-contextualism treats contextual information as implicatures that propositional form. form. It merely allows for reference are separate separate from the propositional assignment to indexical expressions. According to anti-contextualism, there are context-independent, context-independent, 'eternal' sentences, sentences, i.e. sentences sentences whose truth conditions can be formed without taking the context of utterance into consideration. subscribes to contextualism. consideration. DRT subscribes contextualism. The truth-conditional representation requires the resolution of reference that can be provided by

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ll It may also require the standard indexical resolution, lexical and the context.11 syntactic disambiguation, as well as completion and expansion of the proposition expressed (discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, see also Bach 1987a; Levinson 1988; Recanati 1981, 1981, 1989b). All these processes contribute to shown the truth-conditional representation and therefore their effects effects are shown in the ORSs. DRSs. ORT, DRT, a dynamic dynamic approach, shows shows how to incorporate information from other utterances and from conventions conventions of language use. I have have suggested here how to add information from intentions and beliefs. I have not made use of the full possibilities between possibilities of ORT DRT in capturing capturing links between utterances in discourse. This aspect has been well researched and is continued continued to be so for example in the studies of anaphora. Instead, I concentrated concentrated on the links between utterances and attitudinal states. I have extracted beliefs and intentions from the latter and proposed an analysis expressions analysis of belief expressions and belief reports in terms of (some of) the distinctions distinctions Kamp proposes for them, such as external and formal anchors. These anchors proved to translatable into levels of embedding be easily easily translatable embedding of the discourse referent in ORSs DRSs for belief reports.

11 II Although it may not require knowing the MoPs. To To repeat, this would be an overly purposes. finely-grained account for semantic purposes.

CHAPTER 8

Belief Reports in a Contrastive Perspective Belief "How can I stick to a particular language language (or to an angle from which the world is seen, or to a rule of interpretation of the whole of experience) and not endow it with a privileged cognitive prowess? And if I pretend to have at my disposal a higher, higher, or even an absolute, language, then it either would be suitable only to talk about other languages but not about the reality they refer to, to, or it would be a standard standard language other[s] are incomplete incomplete dialects. If language of which the other[s] If it is the latter, it is really a divine absolute tongue, embracing all conceivable points of view. Such a tongue is impossible impossible ((...). ...). If If it is the former, my particular particular language (of the first degree, the language of things), may not indeed make claims to any privileged position, but I would not be capable of explaining explaining in it the absence of this privileged position: abandon my position: to do that I should abandon my language and turn to a super (or meta) language in which my particular Kolakowski position is inexpressible." inexpressible." Kotakowski (1988: 102).

Contents 8.1. 8.2. 8.3. 8.4.

Belief, Culture, and and Translation. Translation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. Contrastive Contrastive Semantics and Pragmatics Pragmatics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. Context and and Markedness ........................................ Complementizer That in Contrast .................................. 8.4.1. English and Polish: A Surface Overview ......................... 8.4.2. Degree of Clausiness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 8.4.3. A Lambda-Categorial Lambda-Categorial Language and Sensitivity to Structure Structure ........... 8.4.4. The Application: Defaults and Clausiness ........................ 8.5. Final Remarks: Remarks: What Languages Reveal and Hide ......................

INTENTIONS DISCOURSE, BELIEFS, AND INTENTIONS Vol. 2 Current Research in the Semantics/Pragmatics Interface, Vol. K.M. Jaszczolt © 1999 1999 Elsevier Science Science Ltd. Ltd. All rights rights reserved 301 301

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Translation is important for the semantics of belief reports for one Whereas in English attitude attitude reports yield a choice choice of of fundamental reason. Whereas interpretation interpretation between de re re and (varieties of) de dicto, dicto, this need not be the case in other languages. languages. If de re and de dicto dicto are overtly, overtly, lexically or grammatically, differentiated, differentiated, then this distinction may shed some light on the semantics of belief reports in general. In this chapter'I chapter I take up the claim reports exhibit that the de re and de dicto readings of belief reports exhibit different different sensitivity varying amount of of to the structure of the embedded clause. In other words, a varying syntactic information information is relevant for their semantics. semantics. This claim is supported by the analysis of the Polish equivalents equivalents of these constructions where the different different meanings are grammaticalized and lexicalized. lexicalized. The de re reading, which exhibits the greatest greatest sensitivity, will again turn out to be the default one. The structure of this chapter chapter is as follows. First, I introduce some common problems with the criteria for adequate translation, including the notion of of problems adequate translation, unit of comparison comparison or tertium comparationis. Next, I discuss the translation of propositional and implicated content of utterances by distinguishing of the prepositional semantic and pragmatic pragmatic equivalence in translation. In Section 8.3 8.3 the question of markedness and non-bi-unique translation is taken up, followed by a contrastive belief reports in English and in Polish in Section Section 8.4. contrastive study of belief Polish has been selected because it exhibits marking exhibits a lexical/grammatical lexical/grammatical marking of of the de dicto reading of of attitude reports in negative sentences. This study confirms the default status of the de re reading, which strengthens the ideas of of the intention-based intention-based Default Semantics. Section 8.5 8.5 assesses the role of this contrastive study for the semantics belief reports and sums up the findings. contrastive semantics of belief

8.1. Belief, Culture, Culture, and and Translation Translation It has been well acknowledged that faithful, adequate translation includes translating the intentions behind the production production of the sentence rather than translating sentence rather merely translating the structure and style (cf. (cf. Gentzler 1993: 58; de Beaugrande 1980: 291; and, originally, originally, Nida 1964). The equivalence of the beliefs and intentions that underlie a sentence and its translation is essential. of belief reports, reports, But before we use evidence from translation for the semantics of theoretical commitment. This is a tenet that propositions we have to accept a theoretical cross-culturally, or, in other words, we have to accept can be recognized cross-culturally, cultural rationalism and realism based on the tenet that the criteria of of rationality do not differ differ from culture to culture.) culture.1 According to the opposite standpoint, that of cultural relativism, relativism, people of different different cultures live in different worlds, a translation translation of a sentence would have to consider consider the different 1

I

This discussion originated in laszczolt Jaszczolt 1998c.

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differences between these cultural cultural worlds and, in effect, would be impossible. On the other hand, once we we have accepted accepted cultural rationalism, we have allowed for language-independent language-independent propositions propositions and for pragmatic pragmatic equivalence based on universal rules of inference captured by the Gricean Gricean or post-Gricean theories of implicature. This assumption of rationalism rationalism and universalism of universalism was defended in Section 2.9 above in the discussion of Sperber's 1997) idea of the 'epidemiology of representations'. Sperber's (1985a, b, 1996, 1996,1997) representations'. To repeat, Sperber Sperber argues that some ideas are 'contagious' and spread spread more easily than others. Humans are naturally disposed to form certain concepts that subsequently spread spread across the community. These 'basic concepts' are similar across cultures, they are formed by means of combining ostension with some innate schemata. They are easy to translate. Ultimately they lead to the skill of interpreting utterances through forming hypotheses about meaning (cf. (cf. Sperber 1996: 1996: 69; 1985b: 1985b: 81-82). 81-82). On one end of the spectrum, spectrum, representations representations can use these concepts concepts and be transparent to their holder, holder, while on the other they can be symbolic and stored for future understanding. Although the original original idea is frequently transformed during the process Although process of transmission due to the differences in memory and assumptions among the interlocutors, the essential point is that it can spread, be understood, understood, and that the same mechanism is followed in all cultures. Generally, Generally, people have representations of states of affairs in the form of memory, memory, beliefs, or intentions. Representations that have become public are repeated more often than others, they have become shared beliefs, norms, myths, myths, techniques, or classifications. They can be communicated communicated by a representation representation that is either a description or an interpretation of this shared belief. Interpretation occurs when, for example, the communicator communicator has to expand expand and clarify the original original belief belief in order to make it understandable to the hearer. hearer.2 So, So, interpretations of other people's people's beliefs are possible, they are often speculative when conducted cross-culturally, but they adhere to the principle that people of are rational and have rational beliefs. Translation is here the formation of a belief similar to the original one. In other words, "The ...) go beyond mere translation: "The anthropologist must ((...) translation: only then can she hope to understand what she hears, and thus be genuinely able to translate it. She must speculate, synthesize, reconceptualize." Sperber (1996: (1996: 39). This 'going beyond' means either generalization to similar phenomena, phenomena, finding common common patterns, making a comparison comparison with a familiar phenomenon which is similar in function, or explaining why why this particular idea became became 2

2 This is based on Sperber and Wilson's (1986a: (1986a: 232) 232) idea of mental representation as an interpretation of a representation or a description of a state of affairs. See their diagram in ibid. ibid.

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'contagious' (cf. (cf. ibid.: 50). 50). Semantic and pragmatic equivalence, discussed discussed in the following following section, is founded on such universal schemas for the Now, since humans can represent represent not only interpretation of beliefs. Now, experience but also other people's representations or mental states, they can represent attitudes towards representations or the lack of understanding of someone's representation. As was discussed in Section 2.9, this metarepresenting representing accounts for apparently irrational irrational beliefs that spread through the community in the form of mysteries. But it also accounts for the lack of of a full understanding understanding of of the sentence due to not knowing knowing the identity identity of of the referent. referent. This is very important for de dicto proper belief reports. If this lack of individuating information information is lexicalized or grammaticalized, then the belief reports becomes language-specific potential ambiguity of belief language-specific due to its absence in some languages, notably the ones in which such overt marking absence of the type of reading occurs. The interpretative ambiguity ambiguity is no longer semantic if semantics is based on universal universal principles. principles. This languagedependence raises hopes for finding some marking of the readings in languages such as English where the marking of the de re/de re/de dicto distinction distinction is neither lexical nor grammatical. And perhaps it strengthens strengthens the thesis of Default De Re. But this is the task for Section 8.4. To To sum up, people can hold attitudes towards propositions that they do not fully understand. As objects of attitudes, these propositions allow for differing fineness of detail. In other words, a person may hold a belief belief about a state of affairs that is whose structure is either relevant relevant or irrelevant expressed in a proposition whose for the belief. belief. In the case of de dicto beliefs, propositions can be taken as undifferentiated objects. De re beliefs are about an entity primitive, further undifferentiated and its having certain properties. This proposal of the 'sensitivity to structure', based on Cresswell (1985), is applied in Section 8.4. All in all, reporting on beliefs, as well as translating belief reports, may require knowing knowing how the belief was acquired and how it was communicated. The reporter and the translator have have to look at the speaker's behaviour in the context of his or her anthropological anthropological culture. This is essential in the case representations of ideas whose sense is not fully understood, understood, as well as of representations individuating knowledge knowledge representations that are de dicto due to the lack of individuating So, in order to arrive arrive at what is said and what is implicated, about the referent. So, knowledge and the assumption of cultural rationalism are essential. world knowledge What is said and what is implicated are in principle available cross-culturally. of There is no strict boundary between between the two due to the pragmatic processes of (cf. Bach 1994a: 270). expansion and completion of the propositional content (cf. This fuzziness is not a hindrance. After all, in reporting a belief and translating the report, the speaker tries to preserve what is said. If the hearer with understanding the minimal minimal can be presumed to have problems with proposition or the propositional radical that underlies underlies the uttered sentence, then an expansion or completion, respectively, respectively, have to be explicitly stated.

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Now, this generalization would be adequate were it not for implicatures. report or the translation. They may have to be communicated communicated explicitly in the report translation. For example, in sentence (41) (41) of Chapter Chapter 1 repeated here as (1), (1), attaining pragmatic equivalence requires preserving obvious implicatures such as 'there is no need to worry', 'the wound will heal', 'it is not serious', etc. To To repeat, the sentence is uttered by a mother to a boy who cut his finger: (1)

You're not going to die, Peter.

While recovering these implicatures is not a problem for reporting on her sentence, it may become a problem for translation to preserve the salience of these implicatures. implicatures. Here semantic equivalence may have to be compromised compromised in order to preserve the pragmatic one. For example, an equivalent of (2) may have to be uttered: (2)

There is nothing to worry about, Peter.

So, So, in translation, these two levels of equivalence have to be weighed against each other. The importance of pragmatic equivalence has been widely recognized since (1969: 24) talk about at least the 1960s. Nida (1964) and Nida and Taber (1969: dynamic sentence dynamic equivalence, measured by the similarity of responses responses that a sentence (1991: 21-22) and its translation engender in their respective cultures; Gutt (1991: talks about translation as communication communication rather than encoding and decoding messages. linguistically implicit information messages?3 Now, Now, Nida and Taber allow only linguistically implicit information to become explicit. explicit. They exclude cultural background from contributing to translation. But as Sperber's account of cultural rationalism demonstrates, expansions and completions may be required to report on a belief in a different language. After different After all, the pragmatic processes that are responsible for such embellishments are universal and, through being pragmatic, they abandoned. If If beliefs are also linguistic. Hence, the earlier constraint has to be abandoned. intentions are to be rendered faithfully, artificial constraints are not and intentions helpful. communication has respectable roots in the philosophy of Translation as communication of language, notably in the work of Rudolf Rudolf Carnap that dates back to the 1940s. Carnap (1942, 1947) approached (1942,1947) approached semantic meaning as follows. Intralingually, two sentences are equivalent if both are true or both are not true, and the individual expressions are equivalent, stand for the same thing. Equivalence can be of three types. types. It can be material, of objects and facts; logical, where the truth of the sentence can be deduced from the semantic rules; and we 3 Krzeszowski (1989) distinguished seven types of equivalence. equivalence. Pragmatic equivalence, equivalence, applied to 3 Krzeszowski texts, means there evoking 'maximally similar cognitive reactions' (ibid.: 65).

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also require the equivalence of intentions, of the way way of thinking about objects and eventualities. For this stronger equivalence one requires also the equivalence of structure, i.e. intensional isomorphism. For example, 'three' and 'the square root of nine' are not equivalent in the strong sense because because Now, Carnap went wrong they do not have the same intensional structure. Now, in defining belief in that the belief that p was for him a disposition to assent to sentences intensionally isomorphic with p. But although this behaviourist approach approach failed, intensions survived into contemporary possible worlds semantics and the notion of semantic equivalence. A complete adequacy in translation may not always be attainable. And even when it is, there may not be steadfast rules that govern this practice. The question as to whether to follow semantic, pragmatic, syntactic or stylistic equivalence may not perhaps have an answer; the preferences preferences may change even within one text. text. But if translation aims at successful communication, semantic and pragmatic equivalence relevant. In the same way, way, equivalence are both relevant. in the earlier chapters I took on the claim that semantics and pragmatics are intertwined and a large part of pragmatic processes during utterance interpretation interpretation belongs to semantics. In other words, these processes contribute to the semantic representation of the sentence. It is also essential to consider consider conventions and defaults. Some expansions and completions may proceed through default interpretations, guaranteed by socio-cultural and linguistic conventions, as was discussed in the example of Levinson's (1995) heuristics. This problematic boundary between the two in contrastive studies is the topic to which I now turn.

8.2. Contrastive Semantics and and Pragmatics I begin with some terminological remarks. The term 'contrastive analysis' stands for applied contrastive studies that subsume a theoretical linguistic component. This theoretical component component gave rise to theoretical contrastive studies (TCS). TCS can be performed on any level of linguistic linguistic analysis such as phonology, lexicon, semantics, pragmatics, or text linguistics. Theoretical Theoretical studies have as the unit of analysis a universal universal category and as their objective the investigation of of how this category is realized in the contrasted contrasted languages (see Fisiak et al. al. 1978; laszczolt Jaszczolt 1995b: 1995b: 2). 2). This ensures the equal treatment of both analysed languages. According to TCS, the differences between contrasted contrasted languages Ll LI and L2 L2 can be generally allocated to the following disallowing three categories: (i) structural contrast (e.g. (e.g. allowing for or disallowing subjectless sentences); (ii) (ii) categorial contrast (e.g. adjective in Ll L! but adverb in L2 L2 is used); or (iii) functional contrast (e.g. subject in Ll L! becomes an object in L2)' L2). Languages can also differ differ in word order. English English is SVO, SVO, while Polish

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has free order and a rich inflection system. TCS concentrate on the syntactic, semantic semantic and pragmatic contrast. These differences are also exemplified in attitude constructions. constructions. In TCS, languages languages have to be contrasted by means of using a stable tool, a platform of reference for comparison, comparison, frequently called tertium tertium comparationis (Krzeszowski 1990: 15; laszczolt 2, 1995c: 562; Fisiak 1990). The (Krzeszowski 1984, 1984,1990:15; Jaszczolt 1995b: 2,1995c: tertium comparationis is determined by the purpose of contrast. Syntax, semantics, pragmatics, and every other level of analysis have their own criteria of comparison comparison and two expressions may appear appear similar or different different depending frequently on the assumed level. In pragmatics, illocutionary force is frequently contrasted. For example, while in English a compliment normally requires a speech act of thanking as a response, in Polish it often requires self-denigrating. The resulting sentences may be very different different semantically syntactically, and yet create an interesting pair for a comparison because and syntactically, they both constitute speech act. constitute equivalent responses responses to the same type of speech Normally equivalence on one level of analysis is investigated, although claims of different have been made in the literature literature that these 'equivalences' 'equivalences'of different levels may 'add up', so to speak, to an overall equivalence, or, rather, the latter is the section I concentrate concentrate on the function of the first (see Kalisz 1981). In this section semantic and pragmatic equivalence equivalence in translation and the overlap between the two. The first attempt at a contrastive pragmatics may look as follows. The effects an utterance produces in a context should be kept constant between the situations in the two languages, and we should look for differences differences and similarities in the ways the two contrasted languages achieve these effects. effects. But we would have to know how to pinpoint pinpoint these effects. Illocutionary Illocutionary effect effect particular speech act may require different different types of of will not do because a particular contrasted languages, as the example speech acts as responses in the two contrasted of complimenting demonstrates. Also, if we compare the ways of realizing a particular speech act (cf. (cf. Oleksy 1984), then indirect indirect speech acts would difficult to classify. Moreover, an illocution in one culture can be a be difficult perlocution in another another (cf. (cf. Wierzbicka Wierzbicka 1991). Finally, as Sperber Sperber and Wilson perlocution (l986a: (1986a: 245) observe, some speech acts can be successful without being classified by the hearer as belonging to a particular particular type. For example, (3) need not be recognized as a prediction: (3)

The weather will be warmer tomorrow.

(from ibid.). finely. Calling it an ibid). Naturally, speech acts need not be cut so finely. assertion may suffice suffice instead. But the indeterminacy surrounding the classification of speech acts certainly does not help found the equivalence on their types. types. Moreover, as a result of the collapse of the performative hypothesis, there is no reliable connection between the sentence sentence and the

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speech speech act type. The literal force hypothesis (see Levinson 1983) also had to be abandoned: the performative verb is no clear indicator indicator of the type of the speech act performed with its help. Instead, pragmatic equivalence will have to be founded on the semantic equivalence. It will have have to rely on the propositional form of the utterance, entertained by the speaker speaker with a particular type of attitude so that it resulted in an assertion, a question, a particular request, an advice, and so on. on.44 So, So, it is perhaps best to conclude that pragmatically equivalent if they communicate utterances are pragmatically communicate the same same content. In looking at belief reports, we we shall not be interested in metaphors metaphors and other other non-literal use, and hence for our purpose pragmatic equivalence will presuppose presuppose semantic equivalence. The overlap between semantic and pragmatic equivalence can be safely predicted to follow that of semantics and pragmatics. For example, generalized generalized conversational conversational implicatures implicatures as from 'three' to 'exactly three' can be regarded either as semantic, as in DRT, DRT, or as pragmatic, pragmatic, as in relevance theory. theory. This overlap is an expected and satisfactory outcome. Semantic Semantic equivalence equivalence is the equivalence of the propositional propositional representation, representation, often equated with what is said, and the propositional representation representation often requires pragmatic processes, processes, including including expansion Pragmatic equivalence equivalence remains as the equivalence of what and completion. Pragmatic is implicitly communicated. Although pragmatic processes involved involved in the production and recovery of implicatures are the same as those contributing production contributing to what is said, implicatures are easy to keep apart because they have their own logical forms. Since what is said has been subject to extensive extensive studies particular Turner, ed. 1999), we can in recent recent years (see Chapter 1 and in particular simply draw on this research in the semantics/pragmatics interface. interface. It is important important to take sides in the semanticization/pragmaticization controversy. Similar Similar to DRT, in Default Semantics Semantics the pragmatic pragmatic processes that contribute contribute to the propositional form are semanticized. And this is the tenet I shall accept accept in contrastive studies. studies. Now, as is well known, known, some philosophers of language claim that objective translation is impossible. For Quine (1960) translation is dependent on a theory theory or 'translation scheme' and since there are many such translation strategies, we are left with the indeterminacy indeterminacy of of radical So, in translating a sentence, we have to follow one of many translation. 5 So, selected the one that is common common in society. strategies, hoping that we have selected 4 4 See 5 5 Cf.: Cf.:

Sperber and Wilson's diagram in 1986a: 1986a: 232.

""... ... manuals for translating one language into another can be set up in divergent ways, all compatible compatible with the totality of speech dispositions, yet incompatible with one another." Quine (1960: 27). bene, for Quine this was a theoretical theoretical problem and his theory is applicable applicable to the analysis of of Nota bene, knowledge. But since Quine does not say that we need a special language for expressing theories. intention to utilize his claim for the analysis of discourse. it is not against against Quine's intention

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Then we regard it as the universal strategy, strategy, ignoring all the rest. But this would not lead us very far. far. It seems more adequate to accept accept a level of language-independent language-independent meanings. Quine thinks of beliefs as of attitudes attitudes sentence. In other words, they are relative to the particular towards a sentence. particular language-independent units of language language of the holder of the belief. Yet Yet language-independent meaning, that is propositions, propositions, have been widely accepted. Being language-independent, propositions constitute the required required platform of of comparison, comparison, or tertia comparationes, a universal semantic category that sentences in particular languages. languages. Also, Lakoff's is instantiated as sentences Lakoff's preconceptual experiences discussed in Section 6.3.4 suggest that language preconceptual uses some general, cognitive categorization categorization mechanisms. 6 Putnam's stereotypes can also be regarded as constraints on translation. They make translation more reliable and less dependent on the selection of a strategy. Since the stereotypical meaning of a word must be known in order to use the word correctly, there are therefore some limits on the divergence of possible translations. Similarly, Similarly, there are conventional and default meanings that are, so to speak, extralinguistic and that constrain constrain the translation. I shall return to this point below in comparing comparing English and Polish belief reports. independent, underlying level of propositions as The existence of the independent, objects of attitudes rules out the complications of language dependence. dependence. All the translator translator has to do is to find a sentence in his or her language language that expresses the same proposition as the reporter's reporter's sentence. But it is not an easy task. Sentences Sentences have a logical logical form that may require further propositional form. This prepositional propositional form expansion or completion into a propositional semantic equivalence in translation. In other other words, this is the unit of semantic semantic equivalence cannot be derived from syntactic constructions alone. It has to be text, or even context-bound context-bound rather than systematic, where 'systematic' means the comparison of grammatical and lexical systems (cf. laszczolt 1995b: 2). 2). This conclusion is an instantiation Krzeszowski 1989; Jaszczolt of a general claim that semantics has to incorporate incorporate the outcome of some pragmatic processing. pragmatic appropriate All in all, instead of talking about translation, it is more appropriate to use the TCS-term 'contrasting' languages. After all, we investigate how a universal category of the de re/de re/de dicto distinction is instantiated in the two contrasted languages, giving them equal importance and attention.

6 6

The existence existence of universal concepts is is directly proportional to the extent to which which languages are shaped by human nature rather than by culture. See Wierzbicka 1992, 1996, 1997.

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8.3. Context and and Markedness Quine divides sentences into 'standing' (e.g. 'Snow is white') and 'occasion' demand less effort effort from (e.g. 'It is snowing'). Occasion sentences sentences seem to demand from the hearer as they are immersed in the current situation that is shared by If the speaker and the hearer both perceive the object of the interlocutors. If of the speaker's belief, then this object is usually referred to by an identifying identitying description or an indexical expression, sometimes accompanied accompanied by an act description of ostension. Using a proper name would be redundant, overly informative for this point on the scale of referent accessibility. An act of ostension ostension accompanied accompanied by a proper proper name seems to carry an implicature to the effect effect that, in addition to predicating something about its bearer, the speaker wants to ascertain ascertain the correctness of calling the person by this name. In effect, effect, ostension and the name clash. Two Two vehicles in the case of a referential mistake, ostension of thought, action and language, point to different different persons. This situation can be called called double referring. Context, in the form of the act of ostension, makes demonstrative an unmarked case and the proper proper name marked, the use of a demonstrative carrying additional implicatures. The two utterances are exemplified in (4) and (5):

(4)

That man [act of pointing] is a spy! spy!

(5)

Ortcutt [act of pointing] is a spy! spy!

They can be thought of as modifications to Situation A from Chapter 4. The observation of markedness also agrees with with Levinson's (1987) minimization observation discussed in Section 1.4.1, as well relevance-theoretic account account of the well as the relevance-theoretic effort and cognitive effect. effect. balance between processing effort Now, while while pronouns, demonstratives, demonstrative NPs and perceptionbound definite descriptions descriptions do not normally engender engender choices of interpretation, proper names and other definite descriptions do as they can be used, respectively, respectively, purely denotatively denotatively or attributively. attributively. In belief contexts, they may engender engender (proper) (proper) de dicto readings. Here another another recourse recourse to conventions and intentions, markedness is required. Context, in the sense of conventions referential Ide re reading unmarked. unmarked. Translation has to preserve makes the referential/de ways this default status. If it does, then it corroborates corroborates it. Polish has two ways negative sentences sentences of belief reports. of expressing disbelief in the form of negative If of If one of them is proven to be unmarked, unmarked, the default, then the reading of the English translation translation to which it corresponds, i.e. de re re or de dicto, dicto, is also very likely to be the default.

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8.4. Compiementizer Complementizer That in Contrast Contrast English and Surface Overview 8.4.1. English and Polish: A Surface

The main difficulty difficulty with analysing the meaning of sentences in reported speech is that oratio obliqua lacks the context the original communication communication was placed in. in. The sentence reports on a state or an event, not being a part of it itself. A report is more objective in that it adds the reporter's perspective perspective on the situation, but it also provides less information than direct speech which feelings, personality personality and mood mood of the speaker. Reported speech is reflects the feelings, Reported speech usually regarded as depicting the reporter's reporter's view on the event and uses expressions from the vocabulary the reporter ex~mple, reporter normally uses. So, So, for example, if the report is de dicto, dicto, then it is the reporter reporter who lacks the individuating information rather than the holder of the belief.7 Moreover, languages can vary as to the degree of discrepancy discrepancy between direct and indirect indirect speech. speech. One of the factors here can be the number of different different complementizers used in attitude attitude contexts where they are not exact synonyms. English has one, Polish Polish has several, as is discussed below. Principles differ from language to language. I Principles for reporting on attitudes differ shall now discuss the ways they are rendered in Polish and contrast contrast the structures of Polish examples with their English equivalents. Situation B' is the Polish version of Situation B from Chapter Chapter 4.

Situation B' Situation

'Bernard J. Ortcutt ZOStM zostatdzisiaj aresztowanyX Bernard J. dzisiaj aresztowany J pod zarzutem szpiegostwa.

AId Ortcutt nie jest szpiegiem! /Alez szpiegiem On jest uczciwym \Qn uczciwym obywatelem I

\

'.

. ''\ Ralf

Jan

Ralf wierzy, ze Ortcutt nie jest szpiegiem szpiegiem..

..

Jan

~

Maria

7 7 Albeit it is is not a steadfast steadfast rule. See See Chapter 4. 4. These characteristics of reported speech in Polish are discussed in B~k Bak (1977: 465) and Doroszewski and Wieczorkiewicz, Wieczorkiewicz, eds (1959: 290-291).

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Chapter 8

The utterances are repeated as (6)-(8) below 8 :: (6)

(7) (7)

(8) (8)

Bernard 1. J. Ortcutt

zostat zosta*

dzisiaj aresztowany

Bernard Bernard 1. J. Ortcutt Ortcutt

become-3Sg become-35g Past

today

pod

zarzutem

szpiegostwa.

under

accusation-Instr accusation-//wfr

espionage-Gen

Alez Ortcutt Ortcutt nie

jest

But

be-3Sg Pres spy-Instr be-3Sg spy-Instr

Ortcutt not

uczciwym

obywatelem!

honest-Instr

citizen-Instr

Ralf wierzy,

ze

szpiegiem! On jest

Ortcutt nie jest

Ralph believe-3Sg beJieve-3Sg Pres that

Ortcutt

arrest-Past arrest-Paw PPle

He be-JSg be-3Sg Pres

szpiegiem.

not be-3Sg Pres Pres

spy-Instr spy-Instr

When we compare the use of (8) with that of its English English equivalent equivalent in (9), it turns out that (8) (8) is more restricted in its application. Namely, Namely, if Jan had taken Ralf's belief belief to be de die to, or, indeed, did not possess dicto, individuating information concerning concerning Ortcutt, he would have uttered (10) rather than (8):

(9)

(10)

spy. Ralph believes believes that Ortcutt is not a spy.

Ralf utrzymuje,

jakoby

Ortcutt nie byl by*

Ralph maintain-3Sg Pres Pres

as+Subj as+Subj

Ortcutt

not be-3Sg Past

szpiegiem. spy-Instr spy-Instr

Through its use of subjunctive mood, sentence (10) (10) conveys the attitude of the speaker's distancing himself from the statement. Subjunctive Subjunctive constructions with the verb 'wierzyC' 'wierzyc' (believe) are introduced below (cf. (cf. example 36). As will be proved by the syntactic analysis, the use of the subjunctive in Polish is strong evidence that the attitude is not held about the person person referred to in the subject position of the embedded sentence, but rather about the proposition as a whole. whole. The embedded sentence does not have have strong links proposition with the main clause. On the contrary, contrary, the use of a ze-clause in negative 8

Only the relevant grammatical features features have been marked in the translations. translations.

Section 4

Belief reports in a contrastive perspective perspective Belief

313 313

constructions often indicates the 'acquaintance' with the referent and the de re attitude. 9 By uttering (10), the speaker communicates that either (i) he does not share Ralf's belief, or (ii) Ralf Ralf does not know who he is talking about, or (iii) (iii) the speaker does not know who Ortcutt is, is, or (iv) (iv) the speaker suspects Ralf is referentially referentially mistaken. In other words, in spite of the newspaper that Ralf report, Ralf Ralf maintains that somebody called Ortcutt is not a spy. spy. This may be a different different person than the one meant in the newspaper report, or somebody called Ortcutt Ortcutt and otherwise unknown to Ralf Ralf or Jan. In other words, the possibility of either of of the de dicto readings (de (fife dicto proper or de dicto 1) is very strong. dictoi) strong. Negative constructions with the subjunctive, subjunctive, as opposed to those in the indicative mood, tend to express this distancing. In English, this distancing would have to be communicated descriptively, descriptively, in a more elaborate way as, for example, example, in (11): (11)

Ralph believes that the person whom he believes to be Ortcutt is not a spy. spy.

There is a strong reason to suppose then that the construction in the indicative mood in (8) (8) normally corresponds to English (9), whereas (10) cannot be faithfully faithfully rendered by (9) without a further descriptive comment concerning (11). Nota bene, bene, (11) has a slightly stronger the distancing from the claim as in (11). de dicto flavour than (10). Now, if Jan used a demonstrative or a personal (10). Now, pronoun as in (12), (12), then the subjunctive subjunctive mood would indicate lan's Jan's detachment from the truth of Ralf's statement rather than the lack of identifying information information about the referent. Let us assume that the anaphoric link to the previous text or situation is clear. (12)

Ralf utrzymuje, jakoby on byl szpiegiem. he

Naturally, both (8) and (9) can be used in the de re and de dicto sense. However, the existence of the subjunctive mood signalling detachment (8) as the natural rendering of and the de dicto sense as in (10) leaves (8) 9 9

To To compare, the subjunctive in German, and also in English English where where it is is realized as past tense constructions such as in (i), also seems to signal a lack of individuating information about Vp, thus serving the referent and the 'nonreferential' use of the VP, serving the purpose of creating a distance between the speaker and the uttered statement (see Rundle 1979: 1979:166). 166). However, the NP is usually still used referentially. (i) Ralph believed that Ortcutt had seen him before. distancing can be marked on theVP the VP without being being marked on the NP. The lack of information or distancing Rundle (Ibid.: between noun and verb. (ibid.: 185-186) calls it an asymmetry asymmetry between verb.Where Where the the type type of of the the NP NP isis standardly used referentially (e.g. names), detach(e.g. in the case of personal pronouns and proper names), ment from this default has to be signalled descriptively.

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equivalent of of (8), (8), then its de re the de re sense. If If (9) is indeed indeed the English equivalent sense is the natural, prior, unmarked, or default reading. This suggestion will be strengthened below by the analysis of constructions where where the attitude verb is negated. By By 'unmarked' I mean two things. Firstly, that constructions constructions of the type type )\ A believes that B q>s' cps' are normally de re re and only to (in other words, de re is their in clearly indicated indicated circumstances de die dicto unmarked unmarked interpretation), and secondly, that they are lexically unmarked as opposed to de dicto that require a descriptive comment. Analogously, Polish constructions in the indicative mood are de re by default default and they dieto that requires the are grammatically grammatically unmarked as opposed to de dicto subjunctive mood. As this comparison demonstrates, reports on attitudes differ differ from language to language. Polish is by no means the only language that uses the subjunctive for distancing. The phenomenon has been widely discussed in French (see Fauconnier 1985; 1985; Sweetser and Fauconnier 1996: 1996: 19). 19). About Spanish, Mejias-Bikandi (1996: 173) 173)says saysthat that "".. ....when when the indicative mood is used instead of the subjunctive subjunctive mood in a particular context, the speaker assumes some responsibility over, or feels closer to, the content of the proposition expressed by the complement clause."

and (14): He exemplifies it in (13) (13) and (14): (13)

Juan no cree que tu hijo esta enfermo.

(14)

Juan no cree que tu hijo este enfermo.

doesn' t believe that your son is-Ind \s-Ind sick. John doesn' John doesn't believe that your son is-Subj is-Subj sick.

phenomenon in terms of of (from ibid.). ibid). Mejias-Bikandi explains this phenomenon Fauconnier's mental spaces as follows. The negation no sets up a reality counterfactual space M, different different from the space of the speaker's reality R. The indicative indicative mood signals the accessibility accessibility of information from M to R. The use of the subjunctive, subjunctive, on the other hand, signals that there is no such accessibility. This explanation captures the intuition correctly but does not go far beyond the intuition. The choice of the grammatical mood produces an effect effect which is said to be "".. ....very very difficult which can be informally difficult to state explicitly, but which characterized characterized as the speaker feeling closer to the propositional content of the clause in the indicative mood." (ibid.: 175). 175).

Section 4

Belief reports in a contrastive perspective Belief

315 315

In order to go further beyond intuitions in the analogous Polish examples, I analyse their structure in terms of a lambda-categorial lambda- categorial language and discuss them in terms of the well established de re/de re/de dicto distinction. I shall now use the distinction made in Polish negative constructions constructions and compare their structure with the structure of the English belief report in unmarked interpretation and, in practice, order to look for for a possible unmarked further test the Default De Re principle. This contrasting exercise has to be so designed as to allow for the information from vehicles of thought other than language to be included in utterance interpretation. Moreover, languages differ differ as to the degree of discrepancy between direct and indirect speech. In other words, the boundary between the extensional and intensional contexts is not sharp. In Polish, the complementizers are information as not all exact synonyms. Some of them convey additional information compared with the basic complementizer that. Whereas Polish makes use of a few jakoby . .. ), there is only few variants (.ie, (ze, .ieby, zeby, aby, aby, a.ieby, azeby, i.i, iz, by, by, jakoby...), one lexical equivalent 'that' in English and the additional information descriptively. On the other hand, to some extent, the has to be added descriptively. differences between the Polish complementizers are regional variations iz is a more archaic version of ze, or historical variations. For instance, i.i .ie, intersubstitutable intersubstitutable with it in nearly all contexts. All these forms are still used in contemporary contemporary Polish. The complementizers aby, aby, .ieby, zeby, jakoby, by subjunctive mood marker 'by'. I shall say say more below about contain the subjunctive the types types of clauses they introduce. It is also worth noticing that certain English sentences of this type do not seem to allow for the omission of 'that'. Notably, it happens when the main clause and the subordinate clause contradict each other, i.e. (15) is acceptable, (16) one seems to deny what the other affirms. While (15) and (17) (17) are not: (15)

I believe he'll do it.

(16)

*1 *I disbelieve he'll do it.

(17)

??It's inconceivable /wconceivable he meant it.

(from Bolinger 1972: 1972: 40, my emphasis). Bolinger observes that negative sentences of this type require the presence of the complementizer 'that'. This if, indeed, the intuitions are correct, seems comparable comparable with phenomenon, if, using the subjunctive subjunctive in other languages in order to signal detachment such as Polish 'ze + + by' complementizer complementizer that includes includes the mood marker 'by' and is used only in negative constructions, as is discussed below. below. However,

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Chapter 8

incorporated incorporated negation in English does not have as strong an effect effect as the subjunctive in Polish. Also, to some native speakers, (16) (16) is unacceptable even with 'that' inserted, while IO while (17) (17) seems correct.10 Belief Belief constructions in English and in Polish exhibit exhibit a number of structural differences. Some of these differences signal that the links links between the embedded embedded sentence and the main clause are weaker in Polish than in English. According to Kalisz (1981: (1981: 110), 110), Polish ze-clauses have a more independent clause status and a looser clause union with the main clause. Let us compare compare and contrast contrast some of the grammatical characteristics. Firstly, Polish ze-clauses ze- clauses occur occur more often than their English counterparts because there are no synonymous synonymous constructions. Sentences (18), (18), (19), (19), and possibly also (20) have have only a that-clause f/za/-clause equivalent equivalent in Polish as in (21) (21) since construction in Polish and since (22), the literal translation there is no ACI construction of awkward: of (21), (21), sounds awkward: (18)

I believe believe Ortcutt to be a spy. spy.

(19)

I believe that Ortcutt is a spy. spy.

(20)

I believe believe in Ortcutt's spy. Ortcutt's being a spy.

(21)

Wierze, Wierz~,

ze Ortcutt

jest

szpiegiem.

Believe-ISg Believe-7Sg Pres

that Ortcutt Ortcutt

be-3Sg be-3Sg Pres

spy-Instr spy-Instr

?Wierze ?Wierz~

w

Ortcutta bycie szpiegiem.

Believe-ISg Pres Pres Believe-/5g

in

Ortcutt-Gen being spy-Instr spy-Instr

(22)

content of the that-clause cannot be rearranged In other words, the content that-c\ause cannot rearranged in the sentence. Next, in Polish, there is a 'zeby' complementizer. It belongs to the category category of complementizers complementizers that introduce the subjunctive mood. It is composed of 'ze', a clause compiementizer, complementizer, and 'by', the mood marker. marker. It is followed by an infinitive only in purpose clauses and adjective phrase complements. In belief constructions, where where 'zeby' occurs only in negative negative sentences, it is followed by a clause with the subjunctive verb form as in (23). (23). The fact

10 IOPointed Pointed out to me by Billy Clark (personal (personal communication). In fact, the rules are not strict here. cr.: Cf.: Frequency might well well disqualify disbelieve disbelieve even if the sense of of the "Other factors interfere. Frequency not." Bolinger (1972: 41). word did not." Bolinger Moreover, of Moreover, if the main verb means astonishment astonishment and the that-clause thai-clause expresses expresses a high degree of astonishment, 'that' can be omitted as in (i). Weak astonishment astonishment does not allow for this omission, astonishment,'that'can as exemplified in (ii). (i) It's inconceivable inconceivable he even looked looked at her. (ii) *It's inconceivable he saw the picture. (from ibid.: 41).

Section Section 4

317 317

Belief Belief reports in a contrastive perspective

that the subjunctive ranges over both the complementizer and the verb of the embedded clause makes the that-clause a closely integrated unit. It is an optional form of (24): (23) (23)

wierzg, Nie wierz~,

(24) (24)

Ortcutt byt byf

szpiegiem.

Ortcutt

spy-Instr spy-Instr

zeby

believe-/^ Pres thaHSubj that+Subj Not believe-ISg

be-3Sg Past

wierzg, Nie wierz~,

ze

Ortcutt jest

szpiegiem.

believe-lSg Pres Not believe-ISg

that

Ortcutt Ortcutt

spy-Instr spy-Instr

be-3Sg Pres

There is also a difference in topicalizing the complement. There is no passive (25) as attempted of 'believe' in Polish and consequently no equivalent of (25) (26). At best, a subjectless subjectless reflexive construction construction is used, as in (27): in (26). (25) (26)

Ortcutt is believed to be a spy (by Ralph).

*Ortcuttjest *Ortcutt jest Ortcutt Ortcutt

(27) (27)

wierzony wierzony

bye

szpiegiem przez Ralfa.

be-3Sg Pres Pres believe-Past believe-Pas? PPie PPle be-Inf be-Inf spy-Instr spy-Instr

?Wierzy ?Wierzy

sie, si~,

ze Ortcutt jest

Believe-JSg Pres Reji Reft that Ortcutt Ortcutt Believe-3Sg It is believed that Ortcutt is a spy. spy.

by

Ralph-Acc Ralph-Ace

szpiegiem.

spy-Instr be-3Sg Pres spy-Instr

The complement NP can be topicalized in Polish by moving its subject to the initial (not subject) subject) position of the main clause as in (28) (28) and (29): (28) (28)

oO

Ortcuccie Ralf

ze jest

myslat, myslal,

Ralph think-3Sg think-3Sg Past About Ortcutt-Loc Ralph is a spy. About Ortcutt Ralph thought that he is spy.

(29)

szpiegiem.

that be-3Sg Pres spy-Instr spy-Instr

To To 0o Ortcuccie Ralf myslat, myslal, ze jest szpiegiem. Dem about Ortcutt Ortcutt that Ralph Ralph thought thought that he is a spy. It is about

Sentence (29) implies contrast. It implies that it was Ortcutt, and not, for instance, Smith who was taken to be a spy. spy. These sentences use the verb 'mysleC' 'myslec' (to think) rather than 'wierzye' 'wierzyc' (to (to believe). believe). In the case of 'wierzyC' 'wierzyc' awkward. Moreover, English (30) the topicalization would look much more awkward. has two possible translations into Polish as in (31) (31) and (32): (30)

John believes believes that Ortcutt is not Ortcutt. Ortcutt.

(31)

Jan wierzy, Jan

ze

John believe-3Sg believe-JSg Pres that

(32)

Ortcutt nie jest

Ortcuttem.

Ortcutt

Ortcutt-Instr

Jan

wierzy,

John

believe-3Sg Pres Pres that Ortcutt

not be-3Sg Pres

ze Ortcutt to

nie Ortcutt.

Dem not Ortcutt Ortcutt

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Chapter 8

Sentence Sentence (31) is more adequate than (32) since (32) is more likely to have the contradictory inflected contradictory reading. It can be argued that the requirement of the inflected form also makes the clause more closely-knit. Finally, in English the complementizer complementizer 'that' can nearly always be omitted, except for the contentious constructions as in (16) (16) and (17) (17) and when it occurs occurs at the beginning of the sentence introduced by 'the fact (that) ... '. In Polish, Polish, on (that)...'. the other hand, it can be omitted only before the 'by' particle as in (33) where 'by' remains to function as the full complementizer. Nota bene, bene, 'jakoby' does not undergo a similar division. division. Also, the parenthetic construction in (34) is very uncommon: (33) (33)

wierz~, fzejby [ze Jby Ortcutt by! byl szpiegiem. Nie wierze,

(34) (34)

Ortcutt, wierz~, Ortcutt, wierze, Ortcutt

szpiegiem. jest believe-ISg Pres be-3Sg Pres spy-Instr believe-7Sg spy-Instr

This last observation observation indicates more clearly than the others that the Polish English ze-clause is not as strongly connected connected with the main clause as the English that-clauseY Polish that- clause.11 The use of a comma before the complementizer in Polish and the lack of the sequence sequence of tenses seem to point to the same conclusion. conclusion. While these observations allow one only to speculate informally about the strength of the clausal links, the analysis of the structure in Section 8.4.4 corroborates corroborates it more formally. This is where the role of the subjunctive subjunctive fits in. The subjunctive subjunctive in the Polish zeby-clause makes it less permeable than the ze-clause from the position of the subject of the main clause. This means having certain that the attitude is not held about an individual individual and its having die to. On the other hand, belief belief properties but instead it is likely to be de dicto. re, about a particular reports in the indicative mood express a belief de re, individual. In other words, the constituents of the embedded sentence in (35) are relevant for the content of the attitude, while while in the case of the subjunctive have to know know clause as in (36), the speaker, or the holder of the belief, does not have who Ortcutt Ortcutt is. 12 The clause is taken as the content of the belief without being dieto proper: broken down into constituents. This is an instance of the de dicto

(35)

Ralf nie wierzy, wierzy, ze Ortcutt jest szpiegiem. Ralf szpiegiem.

(36) (36)

byl szpiegiem. Ralf nie wierzy, zeby Ortcutt byt

Sentences (35) and (36) will now be analysed as typical examples of reports in Polish, with their single English English equivalent in (37): 11

For more arguments see Kalisz 1981. 'The speaker or the holder of the belief, belief', because the report can render the lack of individuating information on the part of either, either, as was discussed in Chapter 4. 11

12

12

Section 4

(37) (37)

Belief Belief reports reports in a contrastive perspective

319 319

Ralph does not believe that Ortcutt is a spy.

Since (36) does not have have an affirmative affirmative counterpart counterpart in the subjunctive mood, we shall confine the discussion to negative sentences. Sentences (35) (35) and (8) will be treated as interchangeable, expressing the same meaning, although (8) may be felt by some native speakers to be somewhat stronger as an assertion and more clearly de re. reo Now, the presence of 'Zeby' and its other subjunctive equivalents in Polish Now, 'zeby' clearly demonstrates why compositionality of belief reports is such a problem. why There are two embedded clauses, as in (38) (38) and (39), and the choice is meaningful: (38)

ze Ortcutt jest szpiegiem

(39)

zeby Ortcutt Ortcutt byl szpiegiem szpiegiem

Both forms are widely used and both allow for choices of interpretation. interpretation. However, there is a strong tendency for (38) to be used in de re re reports, and (39) in de dicto. dicto. Since there is no steadfast rule for their use and no bi-unique match of form and meaning, the problem with compositionality compositionality remains and is only brought to the surface by the fact that both (38) and (39) correspond correspond to a single construction (40) in English: (40) (40)

that Ortcutt Ortcutt is a spy

subjunctive Let us now try to list some of the possible translations of the subjunctive construction construction (36). (36). In English, the de dicto reading is normally rendered descriptively as in (41)-(44): (41)

Ralph does not believe that somebody called Ortcutt is a spy. spy.

(42)

Ralph does not believe that a man called Ortcutt is a spy. spy.

(43) (43)

Ralph does not believe that it is Ortcutt who is a spy. spy.

(44) (44)

Ralph does not believe that Ortcutt could be a spy. spy.

While (41) (41) and (42) are strongly de dicto, dicto, (43) (43) signals a referential referential mistake or at spy. (44), the closest in least that Ralph believes that someone else is a spy. grammatical of grammatical form to Polish (36), is, is, however, neutral as to the degree of referring, signalling distancing from the proposition for whatever reason. In English, it is not the complementizer that triggers the differences. differences. Sentences (41) (41) to (44) are certainly not as similar to one another another in form and content as are Polish (35) (35) and (36).

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8.4.2. 8.4.2. Degree of of Clausiness

To recapitulate, recapitulate, Kalisz (1981: (1981: 22) suggests that the relation between the main and the subordinate clauses is stronger stronger in English than in Polish. The complementizer complementizer can be more easily deleted in English, English, the sentence can be passivized, there is a sequence of tenses, and there is only one main way of expressing belief reports in Polish, Polish, i.e. in the form )\ A believes that B
8.4.3. A Lambda-Categorial and Sensitivity Sensitivity to Structure 8.4.3. Lambda-Categorial Language and Structure In order to capture capture the possible interpretations of belief reports, I shall use categorial grammar and in particular a lambda-categorial /a wfo/a-categorial language presented in Cresswell 1985. 1985. The choice of the framework is dictated by the fact that categorial grammar clearly marks the derivational history of history of its categories and hence is best suited for discussing compositionality of of relatively unthe analysed constructions. The grammar used here is relatively sophisticated sophisticated in comparison with more recent developments developments (cf. (cf. e.g. Moortgat suffices for our purpose. 1988 on the Lambek calculus) but it suffices Sentences, a syntactic category, are equal in this approach with 'well-formed with'well-formed corresponding semantic category to a sentence/wff sentence/wff is a formulae' (wffs). The corresponding proposition proposition which is marked by the number '0'. So, So, '0' is used for sentences since propositions propositions are their intensions. Building the categorial language proceeds as follows. 'Not' is a functor that makes a sentence (0) out of another follows.'Not' sentence (0) (0) and thus its category is 0/0; 'and' makes a sentence out of two

Section 4

Belief reports in a contrastive perspective perspective Belief

321 321

sentences and its category is 0/00. A name is "an expression whose semantic function will be to do no more than denote something" (Cresswell 1985: 96), it denotes things and and is of category 1.1. In Cresswell's semantics, senses or MoPs are not allowed. This view of names can only be made compatible compatible with the place we assigned earlier to MoPs thanks to Cresswell's idea of the 'sensitivity to structure'. Although an expression is directly referential, it need not act as such on the particular particular reading of the sentence. Some of the structural structural distinctions can be 'ignored', so to speak, and opacity may ensue. Categories Categories o0 and I1 are basic; other categories are derived. For example, one-place one-place of predicates (e.g. 'sleep') are assigned 011 0/1 since they make a sentence out of a name. In order order to make complex predicates out of sentences, the lambdaabstraction mechanism is needed. Cresswell (1985: (1985: 97) gives the following example. The formula in (45) is an abstract of 'is an x such that x does not whistle', where x is an individual variable:

(45)

< 1, A, x, <not, <whistles, x»>

By forming such complex predicates Cresswell tries to get rid of the difficulties with intensional contexts. 13 His categorial language falls in the tradition tradition of Montague's Montague's intensional logic, although the language of of the semantic representation is simpler here and his sense/reference distinction is idiosyncratic. He says that the whole semantics is referential, referential, there are no Reference of a linguistic expression is an intension, senses in semantics. Reference and senses are complex structures of these intensions. The semantics is compositional, proposicompositional, taking these references into account. As a result, all preposistructurally ambiguous. ambiguous. He achieved this by tional attitude reports are structurally postulating that the complementizer 'that' belongs to different different syntactic categories. These categories differ differ in the amount of the structure of the embedded different embedded proposition considered in a given sentence. Postulating different 'thats' stands in contrast to Russell's view that it is the predicate 'believe' that is ambiguous. Cresswell founds this proposal proposal on the observations that (i) an attitude (belief) is a relation that includes the meaning, i.e. interpretation, of of the sentence to which the believer stands in this relation; and (ii) meaning 13

Cf. also: categorial language is to test a semantic theory, ... a XA-categoriallanguage theory, in the sense that if the theory is to be ""... Cresswell (1985: 98), plausible, it must be formalizable formalizable in such a language." Cresswell and "In using a /I-categorial A-categorial syntax we are not claiming that the syntax of a natural language works in just this way...". way ... ". Cresswell Cresswell and von Stechow (1982: 516). 13

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Discourse. belieft. Discourse, beliefs, and and intentions intentions

Chapter Chapter 8

depends on the structure structure of the sentence. 14 In other words, attitude reports are structurally ambiguous structurally ambiguous and this ambiguity ambiguity is engendered engendered by the complement clause rather than by the attitude verb.15 Using Cresswell's CresswelPs categorial language does not mean that we shall follow all of his theoretical theoretical assumptions. Instead, I call these readings semantic of possibilities of of interpretation interpretation since there is nothing overt in the structure of expressions of this type that would warrant the strong claim of structural ambiguity. Moreover, there is no way way of representing de dicto dicto/,/, the reading with the referential mistake, as a separate separate structure, different different from de re and de dicto dicto proper. Hence, the degrees of intentions do not strictly match the degrees of the sensitivity sensitivity to structure. Translating degrees of reference into degrees of sensitivity sensitivity has its limitations. I believe that this difference is not significant for the present analysis, although it is not merely terminological either. By allowing in MoPs and information from other vehicles, I preclude the possibility of calling the differences of interpretation structural, as well as do without postulating ambiguities. ambiguities. All in all, all, the choices of interpretation can be called 'structural ambiguity' only in a broad understanding understanding of the terms. There is no essential difference in the structure between the de re and de dicto dicto readings, as is shown in the tree diagrams in Section 8.4.4. The only difference is caused merely merely by 'ignoring', so to speak, the relations between the constituents of the embedded embedded sentence in the de dicto dicto case, and taking them into consideration consideration in de reo re. In other words, the relations between the constituents differ differ only with respect to the 'sensitivity' of the complementizer complementizer to the structure of the following clause. Nota bene, bene, the structure structure as such remains the same in both readings. Whether this makes the alleged ambiguity syntactic is rather contentious and, certainly, certainly, depends on theoretical theoretical commitments. Whether this makes it an ambiguity ambiguity is a separate separate story, answered negatively throughout Chapters 1-7. 1-7. Diagrams Diagrams in the following section demonstrate demonstrate how this sensitivity sensitivity to structure works in practice and how it supports supports the Default Semantics of belief reports. Now, that-clauses are assigned category 1, 1, they are regarded regarded as names. The intuition behind this move can be captured in sentences (46) to (48):

(46)

Mary believes what John told her.

(47)

Mary believes what she is expected to believe.

14 14 15 15

See also Cresswell 1980 and Cresswell and von Stechow 1982 1982 on the topic-focus distinction. Cresswell (1985: 105) says that V(says), where 'V' 'V is a meaning assignment, is a function from from 0 DI1 x 0DI1 into Do, DO,where where'0' 'D' isisaadomain. domain.InInother otherwords, words,ititisisaatwo-place two-placeoperation. operation.The Thefirst first argument is an entity entity capable of saying saying something and the other is 'anything capable of being the meaning of a that-clause" thai-clause" (ibid.: 106). The meaning meaning of say can operate on the intension of the complement sentence, but that can also be sensitive sensitive to the structure of the complement sentence (cf. (cf. ibid.: 114).

Section 4

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Belief Belief reports in a contrastive perspective

323

Mary believes something.

(cf. Cresswell 1985: 1985: 29). The complementizer complementizer that turns the embedded sentence into a NP, expression of the same syntactic NP, i.e. into an expression syntactic category category as 'something', 'what John told her', etc. In other words, that is a 'name-forming operator'. In the simplest simplest case, where the structure of the embedded proposition proposition is not relevant, 'that' is of category 1/0. It is marked 'thato0' because it operates on the sentence as a whole. whole. So, So, '. When the intensions of the parts are relevant for the reading of the sentence, 'that' is category 1/(01)1, ofaa predicate and a name: of the category 17(01)1, that is it makes a name out of ''. Here the meaning of the embedded sentence is composed composed out of the intension intension of 'sleep' and the intension of 'John'.16 'John'.16 Since no symbol should be in more than one syntactic category, category, 'that' is indexed. 'That' seems to be regarded as a grammatical marker; it is not a unique symbol and a unique lexical unit. The postulate of the differing sensitivity differing sensitivity of the complementizer can be attacked on the grounds that to allow that implausible from the language to belong to many categories is implausible language system and cognitive points of view, especially in view of its omissibility.17 omissibility.17 Since the complementizer complementizer can be omitted, it seems unlikely that it is an ambiguous ambiguous lexical item. On the other hand, when one compares the range of application application of the English complementizer 'that' with that of the Polish equivalents, the first turns out to be much wider, wider, at least for the reason that it has no kins in the system of English with which it could enter into the division of labour. In view of this range of application application and in view of the fact that blaming the varieties of reading on the attitude verb is even less plausible due to the need for awkward ontological ontological commitments, commitments, I shall use Cresswell's Cresswell's semantics. But I shall use it in order to depict the degrees of information taken from the embedded sentence, without placing much weight on the categorial categorial status of the complementizer. 16

Cf.: expressions that by themselves themselves can combine "The idea is that any that operates separately on expressions sentence, making out of them a name of the sequence consisting consisting of the meanings of to form a sentence, the separate parts." Cresswell Cresswell (1985: (1985: 102-103), and different contexts contexts ""... ... an embedded embedded that-clause always contains a whole sentence, but ((...) ...) different require different or 'form plus meaning') different aspects of the semantic potential (or 'total meaning' meaning'or account." (1973: 335). of the sentence to be taken into account:' Partee (1973: Nota bene, bene, separate intensions are structured intensions: operating separately does not mean operating in an optional order. However, However, sometimes this order may have have to be ignored as in some instances of a&b which which equals in sense b&a (Richard 1990: 1990: 20-29 criticizes criticizes Cresswell for not taking this up). 17 17 Omissibility Omissibility was pointed out to me by Richard Matthews (personal communication). 16

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Chapter Chapter 8

8.4.4. Defaults and 8.4.4. The Application: Defaults and Clausiness

For Cresswell, meanings are not in the head, they are not internal represenbelieved. So, Cresswell's tations. The that-clause that- clause of the report is what is believed. So, CresswelPs analysis concerns ready products, products, it concerns fits in at concerns semantic semantic units. It fits a late stage of the theory of belief ascription and it is relevant relevant only only for the discussion discussion of possible, default or non-default interpretations of such complementizer's sensitivity sensitivity to the reports. Indeed, proposal of the complementizer's Indeed, his proposal structure ofthe of the clause gives gives evidence of such a default role of the de re reading. Let us take sentence (9) (9) again: again: (9)

Ralph believes that Ortcutt is not a spy. spy.

In the case of the weakest sensitivity sensitivity of of that, that, the attitude verb is related to the complement sentence as a whole. whole. This situation can be represented informally spy, Ortcutt))', with '0' standing for the semantic semantic category category of of as 'thato (not (be a spy, a proposition. But, as we we have have said, that that can be sensitive sensitive to the parts of the proposition. The intermediate case of sensitivity proposition. sensitivity is that sensitive sensitive to the negation, i.e. belonging to category (0/0)0: 'that«o/o)O) 'that((0/o)0) not (be a spy, spy, Ortcutt),. Ortcutt)'. The that most sensitive sensitive to the structure can be represented as'that«O/O)(OIl)I) as 'that ((0 /o)(o/i)i) three-place operator. In this way way not, be a spy, spy, Ortcutt', with 'that' as a three-place we can represent the differences between the de re and de dicto readings 18 as taking more, or less, of the structure into account.18 differing from our semantics This account, albeit differing semantics in several points such as flexible to depict the differences the treatment of proper names, is sufficiently sufficiently flexible differences of reading of belief belief reports that we have independently attributed to the degree we have different readings, using, using, so to speak, of referential intention. There are three different three different different 'thats'. When instead of attributing the tri-partite distinction we agree that sensitivity to structure need not be to the lexical ambiguity we blamed on any particular unit but rather on intentions intentions in communication, the hybrid analysis looks as below. The analysed pairs of sentences are the following:

18 18 '< >' are used for senses of expressions. For example, the structure <<5,7, 5, 7, + >'are +>> is the sense of the expression '5 + + 7', while while 12 12 is the reference. reference. Cf. Cresswell (1985: 26). To To repeat, Cresswell's terminology terminology differs from Frege's sense/reference distinction. Reference is an intension, and senses cois aa spy ; are structures of intensions. In Cresswell (ibid.: 86-87), the intension of 'is a spy' is marked COis spy; the intension of 'not' is is Olnot. (On0t. The most sensitive sensitive 'that' takes the intension , (0», and and the thebasic'that' basic 'that'
Belief reports in a contrastive perspective perspective Belief

Section 4

(49)

spy. Ralph believes that Ortcutt is a spy.

(50)

Ralf wierzy, ze Ortcutt jest szpiegiem. Ralf

(9)

spy. Ralph believes that Ortcutt Ortcutt is not a spy.

(8)

Ralf wierzy, ze Ortcutt Ralf Ortcutt nie jest szpiegiem.

(37)

spy. Ralph does not believe that Ortcutt is a spy.

(35)

Ralf nie wierzy, wierzy, ze Ortcutt jest szpiegiem. Ralf

325

and (36)

Ralf nie wierzy, wierzy, zeby Ortcutt byl szpiegiem. Ralf szpiegiem.

Sentence (35) is used interchangeably with (8), and (37) with (9), with a slight difference difference of emphasis depending on the placement of the negation operator. operator. Let us have a look at the English sentences first. first. Sentence (49) has two re and and de dicto, dicto, corresponding to two levels of sensitivity of of readings, de re 19 2.19 We We shall the complementizer that. that. They are represented in Figures I1 and 2. ignore the possibility of a referential referential mistake and de dicto/ dicto 1 for the moment.

o (0111) (0/11)

1

~ 1 (011) (0/1)

(11(011) 1) (1/(0/1)1)

believes

that Ortcutt is a spy Ralph

believes, (that(ojl)l, Fig. 1:1: de re (Ralph, (Ralph, believes, (that(o/i)i, Ortcutt, is a spy))

19

The diagrams in this chapter are adapted from the earlier version in laszczolt Jaszczolt 1993.

326

Chapter Chapter 8

Discourse, beliefs, beliefs, and and intentions

o (0/11)

1

/~0

(1/0)

,

,

believes that

Ralph

Ortcutt is a spy

Fig. 2: de dicto (Ralph, believes, believes, (thato, Fig. {thato, (Ortcutt, is a spy))) spy}))

In the de re reading in Fig. 1, 1, that operates separately on the name and on the predicate, which signals that substitutivity substitutivity is possible. In the de dicto reading whole. The outer brackets round in Fig. 2, it operates operates on the proposition as a whole. the labels of the nodes signify that the form denotes a category. category. The trees analogously, with the negation operator placed for sentence (9) are drawn analogously, in the structure, as in Figures 3 and 4.

o

----------~

(0111) (0/11)

1

(1/(0/0)(0/1) 1) (1/(0/0)(0/1)1)

believes

I

(0/0) (0/0)

11

I'

that

1

(011) (0/1)

,

not Ortcutt is a spy

Ralph

Fig. 3: de re (Ralph, believes, (that(%)(o/I)I, Fig. (Ralph, believes, (that ( o/o)(0/i)i> not, Ortcutt, Ortcutt, is a spy))

u

_____--------I (0/11)

1

~0 /~0 (010)

1

(1/0)

believes

that

I

not

I

Ortcutt is a spy

Fig. 4: de dicto (Ralph, believes, believes, (thato, (not, Fig. (not, (Ortcutt, (Ortcutt, is a spy))))

Ralph

Section 4

327

Belief reports in a contrastive perspective Belief

Other values of sensitivity sensitivity are also possible. Polish sentences (50) (50) and (8) are analysed analogously. Now, Now, sentence (37) (37) also has the de re and de dicto readings. II shall select this sentence in order to compare compare its two readings with those of (35) and (36). Our Our standing hypothesis is that (35), with the ie-clause, ze- clause, will resemble the de re re reading of (37) due to the default status of de reo re. The (37) looks as in Fig. 5. structure of the de re reading of of (37) Fig. 5.

o

___________r-------____ o

010

(0/11)

1

1

~ 1 (0/1)

(1/(0/1)1)

not

I

believes

I

that

\

Ortcutt

is a spy

Ralph

Fig. 5: de re (not, (not, (Ralph, believes, (that(o/I)I, (that(o/i)i, Ortcutt, is a spy))) spy}}}

Let us now see what structure should be assigned to (36). (36). Firstly, the complementizer ieby zeby has to be assigned a place. Let us hypothesize that 'that Subj corresponds to the structure in (51). (51). Ortcutt is a spy' + + Subj <Subj, ie, ze, Ortcutt, jest szpiegiem» szpiegiem»

(51)

Sub} is realized as 'Past + by'. Then (36) would have the structures as in Figures Subj 6 and and 7.

o

_____--------l (0/0)

0 (0111)

1

~1

(1/1)

~

.

(1/(011) 1)

nie

wierzy Subj Subj

I

'i.e ze

1

(011)

I

I

Ortcutt jest szpiegiem szpiegiem Ralf Ralf

(Subj, (ze(o/I)I, (ze(o/i)i, Ortcutt, jest szpiegiem)))) szpiegiem}}}} Fig. 6: de re *(nie, (Ralf, wierzy, (Subj,

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Discourse, beliefs, beliefs, and and intentions

o 0/0

0 1

(0/11 )

~

(Ill)

~0

(1/0)

nie

wierzy

.I

' Subj Sub']

ze

I ..

0

. rtcutt Jest szpleglem Ortcutt jest szpiegiem

Ralf Ralf

Fig. 7: (Die, (Ralf, wierzy, (Subj, 7: de dicto **(nie, (Subj, (zeo (Ortcutt, jest szpiegiem))))) szpiegiem)))}}

The way subjunctive subjunctive is depicted in Figures 6 and 7 suggests that the complementizer zeby gives Subj affects gives the sentence the de dicto sense because Subj affects both the complementizer complementizer and the embedded embedded clause: the first one by adding the particle -by and the other by imposing the past tense form on the verb. verb. But these structures are not wholly satisfactory. satisfactory. The mood marker of 'ieby' 'asby' and the past tense form of the verb of the embedded sentence are both Subj and this fact has to be acknowledged in the structures. realizations of Subj we have to depict the fact that Subj Subj operates on 'ze' and In other words, we the verb. Subjj Subh will not do, neither will Subj^/o^ Subj(l/o)O as in Fig. 8.

(1/(1/0)0) (17(1/0)0)

I Subj Subj

(1/0)

,

o

I

ze Ortcutt jest szpiegiem ie Fig. 8

In Figures 6-8, Subj Subj has no access to the constituents of the category 0 and cannot affect whereas past tense marking affect the tense of the clause, whereas marking is one satisfactory to of the two realizations of Subj. Moreover, it does not seem satisfactory preserve 'regular'construction Ortcutt is a spy', adding Subj preserve the 'regular' construction 'that Ortcutt Subj in front because the complementizer contains the mood marker. marker. The representation in (52) seems more adequate as it leaves the subjunctive clause inside, in the scope of the complementizer, complementizer, which reflects the ordering of 'ze', 'by', and the past tense marker.

Belief reports in a contrastive perspective Belief

Section 4

(52) (52)

329

szpiegiem>»»

In this way Sg Past) wayboth both'ze' 'ze' + + 'by' 'by'and and 'by!' 'byt' (be-3 (be-3Sg Past) are are accounted accounted for. for.Nota Nota bene, bene, the category of the complementizer has changed here as compared compared with that szpiegiem' seems to be of category of the English 'that' since 'by Ortcutt by! byf szpiegiem' category 1, leaving 'ze' the category Ill. 1/1. This change is important important and, indeed, requires further justification. Analogously to the English examples, I regard the construction 'zeby Ortcutt by! by! szpiegiem' as being of the category I1 on the basis of the comparison comparison with the constructions such as (53) and (54). (53)

(54)

Chce Chc~ want-lSg \vant-lSg Pres I want a cake.

ciastko.

Chce, Chc~,

zeby

cake-Ace

Ortcutt

want-lSg that+Subj want-lSg Pres that+Subj I want Ortcutt to be a spy. spy.

Ortcutt

by! byl

szpiegiem. szpiegiem.

be-3Sg be-3Sg Past

spy-Instr spy-Instr

We could have assigned to Sub} Subj the category 0/0 and consequently treated ze as of category 1/0 or 1/(0/0)(0/1)1. 1/(0/0)(0/1)1. However, since not only 'zeby Ortcutt by! byl szpiegiem' functions similarly to 'ciastko' but 'by Ortcutt Ortcutt by! byf szpiegiem' alone as well, the category 1 seems most appropriate for them and well, appropriate ze is assigned 1/1 in sentences involving the subjunctive. This consequently consequently assigned 1/1 decision means rejecting, rejecting, for Polish, Cresswell's CresswelPs claim that that always always takes a category which is generally O. 0. Sub} Subj extends the number of combinations combinations into which that may enter. Then, sentence (36) (36)can canhave havethe thestructure structureasas Sub} is realized realized as a particle in Fig. Fig. 9. 9. This structure reflects the fact that Subj -by (that follows 'ze') and past tense form of the verb of the embedded sentence.

o

________----I (0/0) (0/0)

0 \

(0/11)

1

~1

(1/1)

~0

(1/0)

nie me

wierzy

Ze ze

slj

Subj Fig. 9 Fig.

jest szpiegiem Ortcutt Jest

Ralf Ralf

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Discourse. beliefs. Discourse, beliefs, and intentions intentions

Chapter 8

Fig. 9 shows that in the .ieby-clause zeby-clsuse the proposition is embedded embedded in 1 and preceded by 110, itself embedded embedded in 1 and preceded preceded by 111. 1/0, which is itself 1/1. This multiple embedding signals the high degree of clausiness of the .ieby-clause zeby- clause and its detachment detachment from the main clause. Substitutivity and the de re reading are unlikely because because of this weak link of the embedded embedded sentence sentence with the rest. Fig. 9 is likely to represent dieto reading and the de dicto dieto translation translation of of represent the de dicto the English sentence (37). It would also represent the de dieto if dicto reading if we tried to make Subj Subj sensitive sensitive to the parts of the proposition that follows it. No matter how much of the structure of the embedded '0' we we take into account, the very presence presence of Subj Subj seems to signal the marked, de dieto dicto reading. The ':ie' 'ze' translation, i.e. i.e. sentence (35), (35), remains remains as the neutral, unmarked one, tending to yield yield the de re re interpretation. interpretation. It also seems that the English sentence (37) is more likely to yield yield the de re re reading since its semantic and syntactic properties properties are identical to those of the de re (35) tends to be de re re because there interpretation of (35). (35). In other words, (35) is another way, to. And way, exemplified in (36), (36), of representing representing de die dicto. And if (35) (35) tends re, then it is plausible to surmise that so does (37), albeit less reliably to be de re, dicto form in English. 'Less reliably', but enough due to the absence of a de dieto interpretation. to call it the unmarked interpretation. In reports with .ieby-clauses zeby-c\auses the proposition is multiply multiply embedded. Even if we accepted the analyses in Figures 6 and 7, 7, the strong integrity integrity of the zeby- constructions would also be visible. The position of Subj Subj in these .ieby-constructions integrity through its category 1/1. diagrams also signals this strong integrity Structures of reports in Polish are, however, however, not bi-uniquely tied to senses. negative constructions .ie-clauses ire-clauses can have have the de dieto dicto reading, Even in negative and in .ieby-clauses, zeby-c\auses, the lack of the identifYing identifying information about the referent can lie either on the part of the holder of the belief belief or the reporter. I have study has discussed this 'double opacity' in Chapter 4 and this contrastive study remedy to offer offer and no markedness to assign. Our intuitive suggestion no remedy conversation is that if John knows knows who Ortcutt has been that what happens in conversation is but he suspects that Ralph does not, or is referentially mistaken as in information about the lack of knowledge knowledge on Situation B of Chapter 4, the information the part of the holder of the belief is added descriptively. descriptively. Here we have have a de re belief - or, alternatively, belief de re report report of a de dieto dicto belief alternatively, of a belief de re re about someone else. else. This contrastive analysis supports the Default De Re principle. First, it unmarkedness of the de re interpretation of the belief reports indicates the unmarkedness with .ie-clauses ze-clauses in negative sentences. There seems to be a de relde re/de dieto dicto distinction in Polish negative belief belief reports that is confirmed by the analysis distinction of the structures corresponding to these readings. The high degree of of clausiness of Polish subjunctive subjunctive .ieby-clauses zeby- clauses signals signals that they render the de dieto leaving the indicative .ie-clause dicto belief report, leaving ze-clause to be, by default, de reo distinction is not rigid, it is rather a tendency but it can be used re. The distinction

Section 4

Belief reports in a contrastive perspective perspective Belief

331 331

to differentiate differentiate between the English homophonous de re re and de dieto dido constructions. constructions. And since the division of labour in Polish negative sentences belief signals the unmarkedness of of de re, re, then we can extrapolate from there to belief reports in affirmative belief affirmative form and, by comparing the structure, also to belief re beliefs reports in English. As a result, reports appear to report on de re by default, default, leaving de dieto dicto to be rendered by further descriptive comments. All in all, since contrasts and distributions in a language language tend to, to, or perhaps have to, to, be meaningful meaningful and have their purpose, the grammatical and lexical difference in expressing negative belief reports in Polish constitutes a strong argument for the systematic difference in belief reports between the de re and de dicto dieto readings. A fortiori, it is also an argument argument for their their duality of of contrasts in form bring about contrasts in interpretation in English. If If contrasts meaning, then when one form has a certain meaning, the other will have a different one, or at least a different scope of meaning. In particular, ze reports can be either de re or de die to, while zeby reports strongly signal dicto, 20 the de dieto The fact that not all languages exhibit such a difference dicto reading. reading.2o difference in form is not an obstacle to their semantics. Now, as was remarked earlier, Cresswell's way of placing the ambiguity in the complementizer complementizer that is not very plausible from the points of view of the language system or utterance processing. It is even less so now as a result of the proposal of assigning reports with the assigning it the category category 111 1/1 for Polish reports subjunctive forms. But even if we reject the multicategorial status of that, that, our conclusions remain unharmed. In Fig. 9, ze does not change the category 9, ze and yet it signals strong links within the embedded clause and a detachment from the main clause. Moreover, the de re and de die to readings of (37) dicto differ in structure apart do not differ apart from the fact that one of them takes more information from the structure than the other. In other words, the structure semantics differs. There is no need remains the same, only its relevance to the semantics sensitivity of the complementizer complementizer in order to to assign this relevance to the sensitivity preserve the explanatory value of the gradation of importance of the logical form. Indeed, if we free the complementizer complementizer from being the culprit, we obtain the representation to the structure of the embedded embedded sensitivity of the semantic representation referential intention that clause that is matched by the strength of the referential accompanies the utterance of the sentence. Strong sensitivity and strong strong intentions go hand in hand, and so does no sensitivity referential sensitivity and no referential dicto interpretations. As far as referential referential mistakes are intention in de dieto concerned, they lie beyond the scope of this analysis as it concerns the 20 20

It may also be the case that the detachment reflected in the use of 'zeby' has to do with the strength of the commitment to the truth of the embedded proposition on the part of the reporter. Sentence (36) may imply: 'and neither do I!', while sentence sentence (35) may imply: 'but 1I do!'. Both reo readings are then de re.

332 332

Discourse. beliefs, beliefs. and and intentions Discourse, intentions

Chapter 8

structure representation derived from it. structure of the sentences and the semantic representation This omission points to the limitations of Cresswell's attempt at translating senses into structured structured intensions. method of TCS encourages The standard method encourages using Polish constructions as a means of information for the English counterparts. counterparts. In other words, an phenomenon as it is realized in two different analysis of a universal phenomenon different languages is a method method normally used as supportive evidence in semantics and we, nevertheless, choose to disregard this argument from pragmatics. If we, pragmatics. contrastive studies, Cresswell's categorial studies, Cresswell's categorial grammar grammar can still successfully handle the cases ofthe of the weakest and the strongest referential referential intention. In other words, we can represent degrees of sensitivity as degrees of importance importance of of the of structure and call it an alternative presentation of the same phenomenon of default de re. reo The intention-based semantics turns out to be more successful, successful, though, as it accounts for the 'middle' de dicto dictoj.i.

8.5. Final Final Remarks: Remarks: What Languages Reveal and Hide

Concerning the use of translation semantic analysis of belief translation for the semantic belief reports, I have have concluded concluded that it is methodologically sound because semantic equivalence in translation is attainable and is founded founded on the sameness of of propositional form, enriched through pragmatic processes processes when the prepositional necessary. The next step was to contrast belief reports in Polish and English to shed some light on their semantics, semantics, and in effect effect to test the Default De Re principle and the DI principle. No account account of attitude reports should ignore the fact that in some languages de dicto beliefs are overtly marked. I have suggested in this chapter that in Polish they are conveyed by using a special complementizer that requires a special type of clause, i.e. zeby and the subjunctive mood marking on the verb. The syntax of these clauses shows shows the impermeability impermeability of the zeby-c\ause zeby-clause from the position of the subject of the main clause, which also signals that it is impermeable to the holder of the belief. belief. In other words, the subject ofthe of the main clause does not stand in any relation to the constituents embedded sentence. Instead, of the embedded Instead, it stands stands in a relation to that sentence sentence as a primitive. Extrapolating from the Polish de re/de re/de dicto indicators, it seems sensitivity to structure structure to English that-clauses plausible to apply a similar sensitivity //ifl/-clauses where analogous grammatical indicators do not occur. In exposing a loose clause zeby-sentence with the main clause and linking it to the de dicto union of the ze£y-sentence established an analogy between the ze-clause and the English report, I have established that-clause. re interpretation that-clause. This analogy strongly suggests that, just as the de re is standard for reports with ze-clauses, so it is for that-clauses. //!a/-clauses. The de re permeability of reading turns out to be the one with total permeability ofthe theembedded embedded clause. clause. Our lambda-categorial analysis of the relevant relevant structures confirms the default

Section 5

Belief reports in a contrastive perspective perspective Belief

333 333

status of the de re interpretation of interpretation by (i) deriving it from the fineness-of-grain fineness-of-grain of the structure, and (ii) superimposing it on the proposal of the degrees of of referential intention. All in all, it appears that the basic, unmarked belief belief report tends to express the de re re meaning. This conclusion agrees with the Default De Re principle, arrived at independently through the intentionof based semantics and the discussion of the interaction of the vehicles of re reading thought. It has to be borne in mind that the primacy of the de re does not mean its logical or ontological primacy, i.e. the possibility of of describing de dicto as 'de re re plus something else'. Rather, it is the primacy belief. in the formation and the primacy in the interpretation of expressions of belief Cresswell's sensitivity sensitivity to structure, structure, albeit contentious in its treatment of the complementizer, can be traced back to a well acknowledged tradition. It has its origin in Husserl's account of the content of mental acts (noema, see Chapter Chapter 3). 3). The noema can be analysed into a set of predicate senses senses. In other words, noema has its logical form and a bearer of these senses. and the object of the intentional act is an argument for certain predicates. When the meaning-giving meaning-giving act is perceptual, then the object and its predicate given: 'an x that is F, F, G, H H...'. senses are clearly given: ... '. This is the standard intentionality. The object is transparent, the corresponding mental state is de reo re. By analogy, analogy, the standard readings of belief reports are also de re and the transparency of the structure is optimal. This is how Husserl's idea of the so-called independent and non-independent meanings, called now 21 basic and derived categories, gave rise to categorial grammars. 21 Husserl (1900-1901a: 496-497) says that when a person uses a proper name, he or (l900-190Ia: she must, so to speak, present the holder of the name to himself or herself. Although this presentation is always always fragmentary, it has to take place. The presentation presentation"".. ....involves involves possibilities of further determination" (ibid.: 496). Similarly, in the structure, there are coarsely-grained and finely-grained divisions that give simple and complex meanings guided by the principle of compositionality. This difference in the fineness of grain is compatible with the differences in the fineness of MoPs (or types of MoPs) that accompany the utterance and its interpretation, including its value zero proposed proposed in Section 4.2.2. Sensitivity to the structure and the strength of clausiness are useful terms for the classification classification of reports. But in the practice of attitude ascription and the interpretation of the reports, they help only with the final product. In the previous chapters I was concerned with the process of belief ascription and the interpretation of a belief report. I concluded that in order to recover the intended interpretation, the hearer follows the default meaning and, if if necessary, also draws inferences from the information coming from other

21

See HusserI Husserl 1900-1901, Investigation Investigation IV; Smith 1987 1987 and and Mohanty 1983.

334

Discourse. beliefs. Discourse, beliefs, and and intentions intentions

Chapter 8

vehicles of Now, does the fact that some languages mark de re of thought. Now, re and de dicto reports as preferred interpretations of certain grammatical structures mean that the interaction of the vehicles vehicles is language-specific? language-specific? It does not. preference is not an absolute link between form and meaning. The The preference subjunctive clause may be used for purposes other than expressing expressing the de dicto sense, and the indicative clause can be used for both de re and de dicto - as it always alwaysis is in affirmative sentences where where the subjunctive is is not permitted preferences of of by the grammar. Although the grammar of Polish reveals some preferences the de re or de dicto reading for two different different types types of constructions, these clues equally are not reliable in themselves. themselves. The information information from other vehicles vehicles is equally important for the interpretation of English English and Polish attitude reports. There dicto7, and our success in accounting for it in Default is a need to depict de dicto}, Semantics and the DRTanalysis is the best proof proofthat that this need can be fulfilled. fulfilled.

CHAPTER CHAPTER 9

Denouement: Double Occam's Razor

""... ... every explicit and detailed account of prepositional propositional attitude ascriptions that I know of has some counterintuitive consequences; and in the end we may well be forced to revise some of our Soames (1995: pretheoretic intuitions." (1995: 549).

Contents 9.1. The Semantics of Common Sense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 336 9.2. Beyond Beyond Prepositional Propositional Attitudes Attitudes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 337 337 9.3. Final Remarks ............................................... 338

DISCOURSE, BELIEFS, AND INTENTIONS Current Research in the Semantics/Pragmatics Interface, Vol. Vol. 2 K.M. K.M. Jaszczolt laszczolt © 1999 Elsevier Science Ltd.. All rights reserved 335

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9.1. The Semantics of Common Common Sense In this final section section I attempt attempt to assess the applicability of Default Semantics to the theoretical theoretical description description of the process of utterance interpretation interpretation and draw some general conclusions concerning concerning the status of the varieties of interpretation interpretation in the example of attitude sentences. The referential reading of referring expressions, the de re reading of belief belief reports, and the dominance of of de re re beliefs are all parts of the same tendency tendency in communication communication and cognition, namely to think and speak about individuals. Default reasoning and default speaking come from automatic generalizations generalizations and stereotypes, or 'taking things things for granted'. It is so because because acts of consciousness consciousness have their inherent property of 'aboutness', 'aboutness', direction, orientation at an object - or intentionality. There are of are an abundance of cognitive, philosophical, philosophical, semantic, syntactic and discourse-analytic partial arguments reo arguments for the markedness of de dicto and the unmarkedness of de re. Utterances Utterances expressing beliefs and belief belief reports usually concern concern objects about which the believer has sufficient sufficient knowledge knowledge to be able to talk about them under various guises. It is sometimes argued that the thesis of the priority of the de re re reading has a counterexample in sentences such as (1): (1): (1) (1)

Harry believes that the owner of this yacht is a very rich man.

But it has to be noted that (1) (1) has a counterpart counterpart in (2): (2)

Harry believes that the owner of this yacht must be a very rich man.

Compared with (2), sentence (1) (1) has a more obviously referential interpretation of the definite description, albeit this interpretation need not always pretation be intended. By By the division of labour, (1) (1) indicates the strong possibility possibility of a de re Naturally, we are dealing here with strong tendencies, re reading. Naturally, probability and intuitive judgements that only partially yield to a semantic theory. This is a healthy situation, though. De re re and de dicto are by no means unrelated meanings of a sentence. They are closely related in that the difference between them pertains to the degree of the information about the referent that the speaker is prepared prepared to reveal. of reveal. It is not a weakness of the English language that there are no separate constructions to reflect these constitutes a sound degrees. Rather, the sentence with its logical form constitutes foundation to which intentions that accompany the particular utterance of of this sentence can contribute the missing aspects. Neither is it the fault of of the Polish language that the de re/de re/de dicto distinction is signalled only in negative constructions constructions and is is only a strong tendency rather than a rule. Once the semantics-pragmatics boundary is redrawn in accordance with the

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intrusionist Default Semantics suggested here, the naturalness naturalness of this contribution becomes obvious. Postulating ambiguities proves to be an unnecessary effort effort to keep semantics and pragmatics separate. On the other popular recently, recently, proves not to go hand, postulating underspecification, so popular contribution of pragmatic processes far enough in their merger. Although the contribution proponents of of to the prepositional propositional representation representation is allowed by the proponents underspecification theories, they fail to go all the way. way.They They fail fail to to recognize recognize that these pragmatic pragmatic processes can be of different different degrees of importance importance for the semantic representation. In other words, underspecification is not an all-or-nothing phenomenon. In other words again, not only should the senses not be multiplied, but also the levels of analysis should be kept to the minimum. This is our 'double Occam's razor' or POL. Although pragmatic razor'or processes are often relevant, even more often than not they do not add anything to the semantic representation because there are default meanings that govern language use. They necessarily govern sentence meaning and hence belong to the semantic theory. theory. Whenever this default meaning is recovered, there is no job left for further inference in the domain of the propositional prepositional representation.

Beyond Propositional Prepositional Attitudes 9.2. Beyond This book is not intended to provide an ultimate solution to the problem of the processing of interpretative ambiguities. Intention-based Intention-based Default Semantics is not yet a complete theory, although it is being corroborated corroborated more and more strongly through projects in computer computer science, information technology and cognitive science.1 In linguistic semantics and pragmatics, it is a theory that implements intuitions concerning the role of conventions and intentions in utterance interpretation, as well as espousing the proposal of pragmatic intrusionism. In practice, it can take the form of amending existing dynamic semantics by adding the default interpretations and degrees of departure from from of the default as a replacement for the various unordered options of analysis of a sentence offered at present. This amendment was was attempted in Chapter Chapter 7 in the example of DRT. DRT. The advantages of such a merger of DRT and and the defaults are enormous. The theory is then directly usable for utterance interpretation, it is parsimonious, reflects the speakers' intuitions and ranges over entities that used to be relegated to speculations beyond the theory's 1

Cf. Cf. e.g. e.g. Thomason (1990: (1990: 358): 358): we need a theory of default reasoning. ((...) we badly need such a theory ((...) ""... ... we ...) we ...) in logic, cognitive psychology, psychology, and artificial intelligence. intelligence. My hope is that these disciplines can be made to work together in accounting for conversational implicatures." happening in the past few few years. See also Schiffer Schiffer (1987: (1987: 271). 271). This in fact has been happening 1

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limits. It is perhaps time to recognize intentions and conventions as concepts of semantic theory, theory, just as over three decades ago they were recognized in speech act theory and several decades before in phenomenological psychology.22 psychology. I have have concentrated in this book on one, reputedly the most difficult, difficult, example of the implementation of Default Semantics. The application to other areas of of the 'semantic ambiguity/underdeterminacy' is the next step to make. The referential/attributive distinction does not depart from the de re/de re/de dicto one in approach intention. approach in that they both rely on the degrees of referential intention. But negation and other sentential connectives will require paying paying attention to the communicative and informative intention instead, perhaps stressing intention. If the analysis proves to be successful successful the role of the informative intention. while making use of of the three types types of intentions recognized so far, far, it is very likely that it can be used for any other cases of interpretative ambiguity. ambiguity. But if one had to postulate more types of intentions, then one would would risk an infinite regress. Further research will have of have to delineate the range of application of intention-based semantics.

9.3. Final Remarks The main objective of Chapters 1 and 2 was to draw attention to the fact that psychological plausibility and semantic parsimony should go hand in hand. Grice's principle of Modified Occam's Razor has been shown to be effective effective Levels. To only in conjunction with a principle called here Parsimony of Levels. recapitulate, I suggested that, in the case of constructions traditionally traditionally regarded as semantically semantically ambiguous, the distinction between the semantic form and the truth-evaluable prepositional propositional representation need not be made, and provided criticism of some approaches that rely on underdetermined underdetermined where pragmatic semantics. I suggested instead a Default Semantics where information is naturally incorporated incorporated into semantic/cognitive semantic/cognitive constructs way, reflecting the dynamism dynamism of conversation. The main in a dynamic way, arguments came from the analysis analysis of the referential/attributive referential/attributive distinction distinction re/de dicto distinction distinction of prepositional of definite descriptions and the de re/de propositional attitude reports. 'Believe' turns out not to trigger ambiguous sentences, neither neither type. It was also signalled that there are is it a vague predicate of the Sorites type. 2 2

Computational modelling modelling of discourse often resorts to units units larger than intentions. These units are plans: plans: constructed of intentions, intentions, and we recognize intentions by fitting them into "Plans are wholes constructed recognized plans." Thomason (1990: 342). Plan construction and recognition is also said to be useful for discourse modelling modelling because plans aid the recovery of implicatures.

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strong arguments supporting the claim that this semanticization of intentions may extend to all language constructions. This approach approach supplements the existing dynamic semantics (e.g. DRT) by a principled principled account of intentions. It is argued that ambiguity can be accounted for by means of introducing degrees of intentions that help construct the intended DRS, i.e. to reach the intended interpretation. Instead Instead of sense-generality, sense-generality, there are defaults and overridden defaults, recovered in a principled way. principled way. I have have also suggested that beliefs and expressions of belief should be analysed in terms of vehicles vehicles of thought that beliefs require. Since verbalized beliefs are not externalized by language alone but also by other vehicles, the information from other vehicles vehicles has to be considered. Language does not, so to speak, take over. In verbalized verbalized beliefs, language language is the first vehicle in the order of explanation, mental images and actions follow. The explanatory order delineates the direction of the analysis of analysis and mirrors the order of application. In other words, words, if a linguistic expression gives a sufficient sufficient account account of the belief, other vehicles vehicles need not be considered. I have demonstrated that in the case of referentially opaque belief reports, the further sources of of information often contribute contribute successfully successfully to the interpretation. The information from various sources has to interact and the superimposing of information from these sources resembles resembles the cancellation cancellation of assumptions, although in practice the hearer does not go through these stages one by one. So, So, the constructive solution to the so-called referential referential ambiguity lies in unifying the analyses analyses of the output of these media into one theory. theory. This achieved in adopting HusserI's can be achieved Husserl's noema noema which is a wide-ranging wide-ranging notion of of sense. Reference proved to be fundamental fundamental for the semantics of attitude constructions. Their meaning turned out to be composed of the conditions conditions of reference as well as instructions for the interlocutor as to how the sentence is to be be used in communication - perhaps best described as as 'instructions to construct a representation'. This representation assigned a semantic representation was was assigned semantic status in agreement with dynamic semantics and pragmatic intrusionism. The discourse-analytic problem of reporting on beliefs was shown to extend far beyond the traditional philosophical discussions of substitutivity salva veritate. The emphasis shifted from truth conditions to preserving the veritate. speaker's intentions. The referential mistake in what I called de dicto], dictoh as well assigned to de re, re, de dictoj dicto 1 and de dicto proper as the scale of intentionality assigned clearly demonstrate the reasons behind this shift. In other words, preserving the truth does not have to be the condition for conversational substitutivity substitutivity because there are instances of the lack of knowledge knowledge and referential referential mistakes. I also claimed that the consistency of one's beliefs is is a necessary requirement in communication and that it is more than an assumption. Beliefs constitute are accommodated or withdrawn a network and 'disconnected' mental states are once they are confronted with this network.

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The support support for the Default De Re principle came from two independent sources: sources: the theory of intentions implemented implemented in DRT, DRT, and the investigation of the that-clause into the degree of 'clausiness' 'clausiness'of f/za/-clause embedded in the belief report, report, performed in a simple categorial categorial grammar. Now, in setting the defaults, defaults, I used two contentious lines of argumentation: default reasoning and a theory of intentions in communication that assumes the phenomenological of phenomenological idea of intentionality of mental acts. Neither of them can be empirically corroborated, corroborated, although they can be empirically supported. Default reasoning is supported both by intuitions and some some empirical evidence. However, However, on closer inspection they merge into one: default reasoning assumes an account of beliefs and intentions. intentions. The need for a development of this idea in pragmatic theories is frequently reported in the literature (see e.g. Bach 1984). It seems that the only suitable account that captures both the similarities and the differences between the resulting readings of an utterance with a referring expression is an account based on the directedness of acts of consciousness, with implications implications for the degrees of strength of intentions. The inference from intentionality intentionality to intentions intentions was the first of the two big steps to make, while the other one was the inference from intentions to the propositional prepositional representation. Finally, if, as it is sometimes claimed by creators of new approaches to meaning, propositional prepositional attitude constructions are a criterion of adequacy of semantic theories, then we theory. we have have a sketch of an adequate semantic theory. But proving that they do constitute constitute such a criterion and proving the semantics semantics to be correct correct seem to require the same amount of effort effort and perhaps are the far, we have have here a new paradigm for the analysis analysis of of same enterprise. So far, this paradigm recognizes different different means sentences reporting beliefs and this of externalizing belief. belief. Extrapolating to a semantic theory for the whole language would be perhaps premature. On the other hand, it is not difficult difficult to predict how other 'semantic ambiguities' can be approached approached in the intention-based Semantics. intention-based Default Semantics.

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Index referent), xxi, 85, accessibility (of referent), 85, 204, 205, 207,216,223,225,227-233,273,282,310 207, 216, 223, 225, 227-233, 273, 282, 310 action, xx, xxii, 80-82, 87, 233, 87, 96, 110, 110, 193, 193, 233, 239, 240, 240, 242-244, 246-248, 250, 250, 251, 251, 261, 264-274, 264--274, 310, 310, 339 260, 261, xiii, xvii-xxii, xvii-xxii, 2-20, 2-20, 22-27, 29, 29, ambiguity, xi, xiii, 37, 38, 44, 48, 50, 53, 53, 55, 55, 56, 60, 61, 61, 64, 64, 37, 67-75, 85, 93, 107, 107, lll, 111, ll9, 119, 166, 166, 171, 171, 172, 172, 174--176, 204, 206, 206, 174-176, 181, 181, 183-185, 189, 189, 191, 191, 204, 209, 213, 213, 219, 219, 232-234, 243, 250, 208, 209, 253-255, 279, 284, 290, 297, 297, 253-255, 264, 269, 269, 278, 279, 299, 304, 304, 322, 322, 324, 324, 331, 331, 337-340 attitude, belief), xxi, ascription (of attitude, xxi, 88, 123, 123, 128-130, 140, 140, 144, 144, 146, 146, 148, 148, 151, 151, 157, 157, 160, 160, 161, 171, 219, 220, 241, 249, 249, 257, 257, 171, 176 176 181, 181, 219, 261, 262, 268, 270, 271, 285, 290, 297, 324, 261,262,268,270,271,285,290,297,324, 333, 335 ID., 2, 4, 6, 9, Atlas, J.D., 9, 12-14, 38, 194 attitude (propositional), xi, xx, xxi, xxi, 7, 7, 15, 15, 26, 40,53,62,69,79,88,91-93,99103, 40, 53, 62, 69, 79, 88, 91-93, 99 103, ll2, 112,113, 113, 115-118, 115-118, 122-124, 122-124, 128-133, 128-133, 136, 138, 138, 140, 142-144, 146, 146, 148, 148, 149, 149, 151, 151, 153, 153, 155, 155, 157, 157, 159, 161, 182, 189,189, 161, 163-165, 169, 169, 171, 171,173, 173,181, 181, 182, 193-198,200,201,208,210,221,241,243, 193-198, 200, 201, 208, 210, 221, 241, 243, 252-255, 257, 257, 261, 261, 263-266, 268, 249, 252-255, 270-272, 274, 278, 283, 285, 286, 291-294, 270-272,274,278,283,285,286,291-294, 296-298 302, 304, 307-309, 311-314, 318, 296-298302,304,307-309,311-314,318, 322, 332, 332, 334-337, 339, 339, 340 321, 322, (vs. referential), xvii, 14, 27, attributive (vs. 14, 24, 25, 27, 64,75, 206-208, 55, 64, 75, 134, 134, 172-174, 176, 176, 204, 204,206-208, 217, 221, 221, 231, 231, 235, 256, 290, 310, 215, 217, 310, 338 Principle, 19, Availability Principle, 19, 35 xix, 2, 2,4, 9, 27-36, 27-36,49, Bach, K., xvii, xix, 4, 5, 9, 49, 50, 52-54,57-60,62,63,76,97,128,136,154, 52-54, 57-60, 62, 63, 76, 97, 128, 136, 154, 163, 169, 169, 181, 181, 183-185, 183-185, 193, 193, 206, 208, 232, 300, 217-219, 232, 300, 304, 304, 340 belief belief ascription see ascription expression, xvii, xvii, xviii, xix, xix, 97, 97, 99, 100, 103, 119, 123, 150, 123, 124, 124, 128, 128, 129, 129, 135, 135, 144, 144, 147, 147, 150, 357

161, 162, 164, 176, 164, 166, 166, 168-170, 172, 172, 173, 173, 176, 184, 186, 246, 247, 247, 186, 188, 188, 190, 190, 192, 192, 193, 193, 244, 246, 249, 250, 250, 260, 260, 261, 261, 263, 263, 268, 268, 274, 274, 279, 279, 288, 290, 290, 291, 291, 294, 294, 296, 296, 297, 297, 282-285, 288, 300, 333, 333, 336, 339 report, xi, xvii-xix, xxi, 64, 103, 103, 111, xxi, 26, 26,64, HI, 122-124, 128, 128, 129, 129, 132-135, 137, 137, 139, 139, 140, 161, 162, 162, 164, 144, 146-148, 150-157, 161, 166-169, 170, 170, 172, 172, 173, 173, 176-178, 181-184, 188-194,196,199,201,204,208,211,213, 188-194, 196, 199, 201, 204, 208, 211, 213, 238, 239, 239, 241, 241, 243, 244, 248-250, 222, 238, 248-250,

259, 264, 269, 271, 274, 278, 279, 282-288, 25~264,26~271,274,278,27~282-288, 296, 297, 297, 299, 299, 300, 290-294, 296, 300, 302, 302, 304, 305,308-310, 305, 308-310, 318-320, 322, 322, 324, 324, 330-333, 330-333, 339, 340 336, 339, Bezuidenhout, A., 181-183 181-183 Bolzano, B., 89, 89, 90, 106, 106, 239 F., 51, 228, 233, 233, 239 Brentano, E, 51, 88, 90, 106, 106, 132, 132, 228,

Carston, R., 6, 14, 27, 30, 32-36, 14, 16-20, 22, 27, 42–44, 154, 157, 157, 194 42-44, 55, 57, 154, character (vs. (vs. content), content), 64, 148, 148, 157, 157, 160, 160, 218 clausiness, 179, 179, 320, 320, 324, 324, 330, 333, 333, 340 340 c1ausiness, Cohen, L.J., 18, 19, 19, 35, 94, 95, 147, 147, 261, 264 LJ., 18, 261, 264 complementizer see that, ze, zeby completion, xi, 27, 29, 30, 33, 33, 35, 45, 56, 57, 57, 63, 251, 300, 242, 251, 300, 304-306, 308, 308, 309 ll8, 132, 142, compositionality, xxii, 31, 118, 132, 138, 138, 142, 148, 152, 152, 154--156, 154-156, 165, 165, 221, 146, 148, 221, 239, 239, 247, 247, 260, 272, 272, 273, 273, 282, 319-321, 333 (vs. character), character), 64, 160 content (vs. 75, 182, 182, 246, contextualism, 75, 246, 299 contrastive (studies), (studies), xxi, xxi, xxii, 132, 132, 302, 306-308, 330, 332 332 Co-operative Principle, 11, 207, 232, 11, 37, 37, 68, 207, 286, 298 286,298 126, 213, 280 coreferentiality, 126, 213, 227, 227, 280 M.I, 80, 132, 252, 290, Cresswell, M.J., 132, 137, 137, 138, 138, 252, 329, 331, 331, 333 304, 320-324, 329, Crimmins, M., 145, 145, 148, 148, 162, 162, 163

358

intentions Discourse, beliefs, beliefs, and and intentions

0., 6, 138, 278, 284, 285 Davidson, D., 138, 159, 159, 268, 278, de dicto (vs. (vs. de re), xvii, 26, 103, lll, 115, 103, 111, 115, 118, 118, 122, 128, 151, 152, 128, 130, 130, 133, 133, 135-140, 147, 147, 151, 152, 156, 157, 157, 160, 160, 161, 161, 164, 164, 166, 166, 168-174, 199, 176-179, 181, 181, 184, 184, 188-193, 196, 196, 198, 198, 199, 201,208,240,243,247,250,253,254,259, 201, 208, 240, 243, 247, 250, 253, 254, 259, 264,284,291,293,302,304,309-314,318, 264, 284, 291, 293, 302, 304, 309-314, 318, 319, 324-328, 330-332, 334, 334, 336, 336, 338 de dicto,, dicto], 174, 174, 182, 182, 188, 188, 189, 189, 190, 190, 192, 192, 193, 193, 199, 199, 247, 256, 256, 284-287, 292, 292, 299, 299, 312, 312,322, 322,325, 325, 332, 334, 339 de dicto proper, 166, 170-174, 182, 182, 189, 189, 190, 193, 247,256,284-287,292,304,310,313,318, 247, 256, 284-287, 292, 304, 310, 313, 318, 322,339 322, 339 de re (vs. 64, 80, (vs. de dicto), xi, xvii, xx, xxii, 26, 26,64,80, lll, 113, 115, 118, 99-101, 103, 103, 111, 113, 115, 118, 119, 119, 122, 122, 128, 128, 130,133,135,136-140,144,145,147,151152, 130, 133, 135, 136-140, 144, 145, 147, 151152, 186, 154-157, 160-162, 164, 166, 168-184, 186, 188-193,196-199,201,204,208,220,240, 188-193, 196-199, 201, 204, 208, 220, 240, 24~247-250,253-25~25~263,264,274, 243, 247-250, 253-255, 259, 263, 264, 274, 284-287, 290-292, 294, 294, 295, 295, 302, 302, 304, 309, 310, 310, 313-315, 319, 319, 320, 320, 322, 322, 324-328, 330-334, 336, 336, 338, 338, 339 de se, 160, 160, 220 Default De Re principle, xxi, xxi, 183, 183, 190-192, 263, 287, 295, 304, 332, 194, 197, 197, 263, 287, 295, 304, 315, 315, 330, 330, 332, 333,340 333, 340 xii, xiii, xix, xix, xx, xxi, xxi, Default Semantics, Semantics, xi, xii, 117, 130, xxii, 3, 14, 14, 36, 48, 58, 68, 69, 88, 117, 130, 141, 144-149, 154, 166, 154, 157, 157, 158, 158, 161, 161, 164, 164, 166, 183, 189, 207, 209, 209, 215, 226, 189, 204, 207, 215, 219-222, 226, 231,234,246,254,273,285,287,294,298, 231, 234, 246, 254,273, 285, 287, 294, 298, 302, 308, 322, 322, 334, 336-338, 340 definite (noun phrases, descriptions), xvii, xxi, 22-24, 27, xviii, xxi, 27, 51, 51, 53, 53, 54, 58, 60, 62, 64, 64, 65, 67, 69, 70, 74, 75 78, 93, 99, 100, 100, Ill, 111, 115, 129, 133-135, 151-154, 167, 169, 171, 172, 169,171,172, 184, 185, 200, 204,-210, 213, 213, 215-217, 185, 199, 199, 200, 219,221,225-228,230-233,235,256,281, 219, 221, 225-228, 230-233, 235, 256, 281, 282, 288-291, 295, 295, 297, 297, 310, 310, 336 Degrees of Intentions Intentions principle, principle, DI, DI, xix, xix,xxi, xxi, 54,56,59,60,67,68, 131, 156,221,230,271, 54,56,59,60,67,68,131,156,221,230,271, 332 demonstrative (fee 109, 145, (pee also indexical), indexical),62, 62,109,145, 158, 159, 159, 162, 162, 171, 171, 205, 205, 208, 208, 209, 209, 216-219, 221,225,228,229,231,235,285,288,298, 221, 225, 228, 229, 231, 235, 285, 288, 298, 310, 313 denoting, 209, 209, 228 Devitt, M., 181-183 discourse referent, xxii, 70, 72, 73, 73, 103, 103, 109, 109, 278, 280, 280, 281, 281, 283-300

discourse representation structure, DRS, xx, xxii, 48, 71-74, 279-288, 290-294, 339 296-300, 339 Discourse Representation Theory, DRT. DRT, xi, 103, xix, xxii, 7, 7, 40, 42, 48, 61, 62, 70, 71, 71, 103, 109, 140, 140, 145, 145, 196, 196, 235, 235, 255, 255, 265, 265, 271, 271, 290, 292, 292, 294-300, 278-281, 283-285, 290, 294-300, 308, 334, 334, 337, 337, 339, 339, 340 Donnellan, K., 24, 64, 84, 145, 145, 172, 172, 183, 183, 206. 206, 209, 278 doubly-dynamic, xxi, xxi, 76, 83-85, 127, 127, 285, 286 M., 57, 166. Dummett, M., 57, 108, 108, 126, 126, 132, 132, 143, 143, 158, 158, 166, 170,214,239-242,244,248-250,262,274 170, 214,239-242,244,248-250,262,274 dynamic semantics, xxii, 48, 55,61,70,74,75, 55, 61, 70, 74, 75, 195,196,235,254-256,265,278-280,283. 195,196, 235, 254-256,265, 278-280, 283, 337, 339 enrichment, 5, 8, 11, 11, 18-20, 33, 157, 157, 177, 177, 181-183, 285

equivalence (in TCS), 302-309, 332 302-309, 332 expansion, xi, 27, 29-31, 33-35,45,56,63,242. 27,29-31,33-35,45,56,63,242,

251, 288. 288, 300, 304-306, 308. 308, 309 115, 142 extension, 114, 114, 115, factive/non-factive, 15, 196. 15, 99, 100, 100, 130, 130, 194, 194, 196, 198, 200, 200, 201, 201, 238, 238, 320 172, 186, 199. 239, 265. 271, Fauconnier, G., 171, 171,172,186,199, 239,265, 271, 314 Fodor, lA., J.A., 79, 90, 90, lll, 111, 113, 113, 116, 116, 117, 117,120, 120,122. 122. 132, 143, 180, 241, 260, 261, 261. 264, 264. 273. 132,143,180, 241, 258, 258, 260, 273, 279 Frege, G., G., xviii, 16,96, 16, 96, 108, 108, 109, 109, 115, 115, 116, 116, 122, 122, 131, 132, 132, 134, 134, 136, 136, 137, 137, 139, 139, 141, 141, 142-148, 151, 152, 206. 152, 157-159, 160-166, 188. 188, 189, 189, 206, 213, 214, 253. 214, 233, 233, 239-241. 239-241, 244. 244, 249. 249, 250, 250, 253, 267, 278, 278, 324

generality see sense-generality, Givenness Hierarchy, xxi, xxi, 204, 223, 223, 226--228, 226-228, 232, 273, 230, 232, 273, 282

Givon, T, T., 180, 223, 224, 224, 227, 227, 233 180, 223, H.P., xviii, 2, 2. 5, 6, 6. II, 19. 21, 21. 23. Grice, H.P., 11, 16. 16, 19, 23, 27-31. 33, 27-31, 33, 35, 35, 37, 37, 38,42,49-51, 38, 42, 49-51, 53, 55-60, 76, 77, 84, 84, 104, 104, 117, 119, 119,151. 151,154, 154,207, 207,225. 225, 227, 230, 232, 238. 242. 246, 250, 286. 297, 297. 227,230,232, 238,242,246,250,286, 303, 338

Hintikka, J., 6,126,135,169,200.252,253.285 6,126,135,169,200,252,253,285 Hintikka,l, horizon, 99-104, 1l0, 110, 113. 113, 126. 126, 187. 187, 248. 248, 249. 249. 274

Index

Horn, L.R., 1, 1, 3, 5, 6, 12, 14-17, 20, 21, 21, 37, 37, 38, 40, 41, 69, 195 Husserl, E., E, xxii, 51, 51, 52, 52, 88, 89, 89, 92, 93, 93, 96-104, 96-104, 187, 106-108, 110, 110, 111, 111, 113, 113, 157, 157, 164, 186, 187, 239-242, 244-249, 244-249, 256, 263, 263, 272, 233, 239-242, 274, 278, 278, 298, 333, 333, 339

12, 14, 15, 19, 21, 22, 27-31, implicature, xiii, xiii, 11, 11,12,14,15,19,21,22,27-31, 211, 33-44, 57, 59, 69, 141, 141, 154, 154, 180, 180, 194, 194, 211, 225,22~233,246,250,29~303,30~308, 225, 229, 233, 246, 250, 299, 303, 305, 308, 310, 337, 337, 338 impliciture, 30, 31, 31, 33, 34, 38, 75, 75, 85, 195, 195, 200, 278, 279 25, indefinite (noun phrase, description), 24, 25, 58,65,66,70,72-75, 133, 134, 179,224,231, 58,65,66,70,72-75,133,134,179,224,231, 232, 235, 235, 272, 272, 281, 281, 296, 296, 298 indexical ~ee (pee also demonstrative), demonstrative), 29, 31, 31, 50, 54, 88, 90, 92, 115, 147, 115, 127, 127, 131, 131, 142, 142, 145, 145, 147, 148, 152-159, 162, 162, 163, 163, 166, 182, 182, 204, 206, 213, 216, 216, 218, 218, 221, 221, 222, 222, 234, 234, 235, 235, 242, 242, 284, 284, 288, 300, 310 300, 310 intension, 114, 114, 138, 138, 253, 253, 254, 254, 320-324, 332 intensional context, context, xviii, 92, 112, 112, 114, 114, 122, 138, 139, 160, 186, 193, 204, 245, 245, 246, 278, 138,139,160,186,193, 298, 315, 315, 321 intensionality, xi, 59, 59, 138, 138, 287 intention, xi, xiii, xviii, xix, 36, xix, xx, xxi, xxi, 25-27, 25-27,36, 40,44,48-60, 62-64, 66-69,72-77,79-81, 40,44,48-60,62-64,66-69,72-77,79-81, 83-85, 88, 90, 96-99, 104-113, 104-113, 117-120, 122, 124, 124, 131, 131, 141, 141, 144, 144, 147-150, 154-157, 159,161,164,171,177,179,181,182,184-186, 189, 190, 215, 190, 193, 193, 196, 196, 197, 197, 200, 200, 207-209, 215, 221, 222, 222, 225, 225, 228, 228, 230-235, 240, 217-219, 221, 244, 246, 248, 249, 255, 264, 268, 269, 271, 244,246,248,249,255,264,268,269,271, 273, 279, 279, 282-288, 290, 290, 291, 291, 294-300, 302, 303, 303, 305, 305, 306, 306, 310, 310, 320, 320, 322, 322, 324, 331-333, 336-340 25, 49, 50, communicative, xviii, xix, xix, xxi, xxi, 25, 51,59,63,65-68,75,76,81,82,111,128,145, 51,59,63,65-68,75,76,81,82, 111, 128,145, 155, 156, 156, 184, 184, 189, 189, 192, 192, 211, 211, 233, 233, 242, 242, 338 informative, 25, 49, 51, 100, 51, 65-68, 74, 75, 75, 100, 111, 145, 145, 184, 184, 189, 189, 192, 192, 211, 211, 233, 233, 242, 242, 338 65, 66, 68, 69, 75, primary, xix, xix, 65, 75, 78 xxii, 49-56, 59,62,63, referential, xviii, xxi, xxi, xxii, 105, 67-69, 75, 75, 76, 78, 85, 93, 96, 97, 100, 100, 105, 111, 112, 113, 117, 119, 128, 131, 145, 153, 155, 112,113,117, 119,128,131,145,153,155, 156, 166, 166, 184, 184, 189, 189, 204, 204, 207-209, 211, 211, 215, 215, 222, 223, 223, 225, 225, 227, 227, 230-233, 235, 235, 217-219, 222, 272, 279, 279, 283, 287, 287, 291, 291, 293, 295, 255, 263, 272, 299, 324, 324, 331-333, 338

359

intentionality, xviii, xxi, xxii, 10, 57, 10, 51-55, 57, 63-69, 75, 104, 75, 83, 83, 85, 85, 88-94, 96, 97, 97, 99, 104, 105, 107, 122, 107, 109-113, 115-117, 119, 119, 120, 120, 122, 129, 131, 131, 133, 133, 164, 171, 171, 174, 174, 177, 177, 178, 178, 184, 186-190,192,218,222,228,231-235,246, 186-190,192, 218, 222, 228, 231-235, 246, 255,271-273,278,282,286-288,296-29~ 255,271-273,278,282,286-288,296-299, 333, 336, 336, 339, 339, 340 340 intrusionism see pragmatic intrusionism

26,42, Jaszczolt, K.M., xix, xix, xx, 8, 14, 14, 26, 42, 52, 55-58,63,64,72,76,79-81,83,97,101,103, 55-58,63,64,72,76,79-81,83,97,101,103, 113, 116, 133, 147, 149, 152, 167, 172, 173, 187, 113,116,133,147,149,152,167,172,173,187, 188, 195, 206, 188,195, 206, 208, 208, 215, 215, 228, 228, 246, 246, 265, 265, 285, 285, 295, 302, 306, 307, 307, 309, 325 287, 292, 295, Kalisz, R., 307, 307, 316, 316, 318, 318, 320 Kamp, H., xix, xix, 24, 25,40,48,52, 25, 40, 48, 52, 55, 55, 58, 68, 71-75, 141, 141, 145, 145, 265, 265, 280-283, 285-292, 294, 296-299 Kaplan, 0., 64, 109, 145, 148, 159, 160, 162, 217, D., 64,109,145,148,159,160,162,217, 218, 221 221 Kempson, R.M., R.M., 2-4, 6, 8, 13, 13, 14, 14, 16, 16, 20-22, 20-22, 71, 194 Kripke, S.A., 24, 134, 134, 145, 145, 183, 183, 204, 205, 221 211-214, 221 LakofT, Lakoff, G., G, 10, 10, 13, 13, 239, 239, 265, 265, 266, 266, 309 lambda-categorial language, 315, language, 253, 253, 254, 254, 315, 321, 332 320, 321, language of of thought, 93, 111, 111, 122, 122, 241, 256, 258, 260-262, 264, 264, 265 ~ee also substitutivity, salva Leibniz's Law (see veritate), 137, 137, 140, 140, 143, 143, 184 Levinas, E., 76, 77, 77, 80, 82-85, 88 S.c., xix, 2, 6, 12, 20, 36-40,42,44, Levinson, S.C., xix, 2,6,12,20,36-40,42,44, 47,48, 59, 64, 71, 72, 111, 207, 216, 225, 59,64,71,72, 111,142, 142,207,216, 225, 227, 259, 310 259, 260, 260, 286, 286, 300, 300, 306, 308, 308, 310 logical form, LF, 13, 14, 19, 27, 27, LF, xi, xix, xix, xx, 3-9, 3-9,13,14,19, 33-35,48, 55, 56, 61, 61, 70, 71, 33-35, 48, 55, 71, 148-156, 148-156, 165, 185, 189, 201, 234, 243, 243, 247, 247, 273, 273, 279, 279, 189, 190, 190, 201, 284, 290, 290, 308, 308, 309, 309, 331, 331, 333, 333, 336 165, Ludlow, P., 24, 25, 66, 147, 147, 150, 150, 153-155, 165, 206, 235 marked (interpretation), xix, xix, xxi, 179, xxi, 38, 60, 179, 192, 330, 330, 332 markedness, 24, 149, 149, 302, 302, 310, 310, 330, 330, 336 mental xxi, 51,52,66,74,88-90,93-95,97,100, 51, 52,66,74,88-90,93-95,97,100, act, xxi, 101, 103-105, 103-105, 108, 113, 113, 155, 155, 178, 178, 184, 232, 241, 298, 298, 333, 333, 340

360

belieft, and and intentions Discourse, beliefs,

image, xx, xxii, 80,239-244,246-248,251, 80, 239-244, 246-248, 251, image, 271, 274 274 260-262, 264, 266, 271, model, 265, 266 xix, 71, 71, 131-133, 146, 148, 148, representation, xix, 167, 170, 186, 187, 239, 239, 243, 244, 247, 247, 260, 167,170,186,187, 261, 264, 265, 287, 287, 303 172, 186, 187, 187, 239, 265, 271, 314 space, 172, state, xxi, 10, 51, 51, 63, 69, 85, 88, 102, 104, 123, 133, 141, 141, 1I3-1I8, 120, 122, 122, 123, 105-111, 113-118, 173, 174, 177, 177, 188-190, 193, 142, 164, 166, 173, 218, 222, 228, 231, 234, 235, 241, 245, 271, 273, 261, 262, 268, 270, 271, 249-251, 253, 261, 273, 299, 304, 333, 339 288, 298, 299, 195 metalinguistic negation, 15-17, 195 29, 31,32, 31, 32, 35,45, 56, 304 minimal proposition, 29, of presentation, MoP, Mop, xxi, xxi, 92, 93, mode of 112-116, 112-116, 122, 127-129, 127-129, 133-136, 138, 140, 169, 172, 172, 178, 181, 181, 183, 142-157, 160-166, 169, 142-157, 189, 192, 192, 193, 196, 206, 207, 211-215, 188, 189, 219,220,222,239,244-246,253,256,263, 279, 285, 288, 289, 291, 293, 272, 274, 278, 279, 321, 322, 333 333 297, 300, 321, 294, 296, 297, Modified Occam's Razor, MOR, 2, 5, 5, 13, 13, 14, 19, 35, 40, 44, 56, 57, 67, 70, 338 19, 20, 23, 24, 24,35,40,44, 57,67,70, Montague, R., 6, 114, 114, 126, 126, 132, 132, 238, 238, 253-255, 321 280, 321 Neale, S., 3, 25, 66, 137, 141, 204, 206, 3, 24, 24,25,66,137,141, 206, 208, 209,235 209, 235 negation, xi, 3-6, 13-18, 22, 23, 23, 35, 35, 53, 53, 66, 69, 195, 280, 314, 314, 316, 316, 324-326 neo-Gricean, xiii, xiii, 12, 12, 21, 21, 37, 37, 40, 42, 44, 59, 225, 278, 278, 279 noema, xxi, 90, 95, 98, 109, 111-113, 115, 117, xxi,89, 89,90,95,98,109,111-113,115,117, 131, 133, 164, 240, 241, 133, 157, 157,164, 241, 244-246, 249, 256, 333, 339 numerals, 20, 21, 21, 68, 69, 69, 75 objectifYing objectifying (act), 52, 52, 98, 100, 110, 110, 239, 239, 240, 240, 242, 247, 247, 249 opacity, 170, 170, 210, 210, 293, 293, 321, 321, 330 opaque (vs. 124, 173, 181, 185, (vs. transparent), transparent), 99, 99,124,173,181,185, 186, 208, 208, 272, 272, 339 Parsimony of Levels Levels principle, principle, POL, xix, xix, xx, xxi, 13, 108, 156, 13,24,40,48,55-59,68,70, 24,40,48, 55-59, 68,70,108, 157, 221, 221, 297, 297, 337, 337, 338 338 pragmatic intrusion ism, xi, xix, intrusionism, xix, xxii, 37,48, 55, 55, 56, 56, 58, 71, 71, 74, 131, 131, 145, 145, 279, 279, 299, 299, 337, 337, 339 339

processes (primary and secondary), secondary), xviii, xviii, processes 3-5,16,19,29,33,35,37,43-45,55,56,61, 3-5,16,19, 29, 33, 35, 37,43^5, 55, 56,61, 75,79, 129, 184, 194, 207, 233, 247, 280, 283, 75,79,129,184,194,207,233,247,280,283, 337 285, 288, 300, 304-306, 308, 332, 337 13, 14, 40, 194-201 presupposition, 13, Primary Intention principle, PI, xix, xix, xxi, xxi, 59,60,67,68, 75, 156, 156,208, 51-54, 56, 59, 60, 67, 68, 74, 75, 208, 271 221, 230, 271 proper name, xvii, xviii, 14, 14, 23, 54,62,67,73, 54, 62, 67, 73, proper 97, 100, 102, 113, 126, 129, 133, 134, 138, 142, 97,100,102,113,126,129,133,134,138,142, 167, 169, 144, 145, 152, 158, 162, 163, 167, 177, 204-206, 208, 217, 217, 219, 219, 226, 171-175, 177, 227,229-231,234,235,288,290-292,295, 310, 313, 313, 324, 333 299, 310, prepositional propositional attitude see attitude (representation), xi, xviii, xix, xix, 4, 5, 7, 7, form (representation), 8,16,18,19,24,33-35,56-58,63,70,71,78, 106,131, 165,242,266,273,279,297,299. 106,131,165, 242, 266, 273, 279, 297, 299. 337, 338, 340 308, 309, 332, 337, 29, 32, 45, 56, 304 radical, 29, H., 6, 113-117, 145, 145, 211, 211, 213, 213, 309 Putnam, H., quantifYing quantifying in(to), 124, 124, 138 Quine, W v. 0. , 13, 193. Quine,W.V.O, 13, 124, 124, 131, 131, 137-139, 181, 181, 193, 194, 196, 196, 212, 212, 252, 252, 308-310 F., xix, 19, 27, 49, Recanati, E, xix, 3, 3, 6, 6,19, 27, 30, 32, 35, 35, 36, 36,49, 171. 56, 66, 66, 75, 77, 158, 158, 159, 159, 162-165, 162-165, 169, 169, 171, 193, 205, 246, 299, 299, 300 300 reference, xiii, xviii, 7, 7, 9, 29, 33, 33, 37, 37, 43, 52, 54. 54. 57, 63-65, 72, 74, 96, 102, 103, 109, 116, 57, 59, 59,63-65,72,74, 96,102,103,109,116, 122, 127-129, 131, 131, 134, 140, 142-147, 153. 155, 157-159, 157-159, 166, 166, 167, 167, 169, 169, 171-173, 178-180, 185, 185, 189, 189, 192, 192, 193, 193, 199. 199, 204-207, 212-214, 219-222, 227, 227, 230, 230, 233, 233, 234, 234, 239, 242, 243, 243, 247, 247, 251, 251, 253, 253, 264, 264, 269, 269, 271, 271, 272. 272. 278,280,283,290,292-294,299,321.322. 278, 280, 283, 290, 292-294, 299, 321. 322, 324,339 324, 339 referential (vs. 14, 23-26, (vs. attributive), attributive), xvii, 13, 13,14, 31, 53-54, 60, 62-67, 62-67, 74, 85, 85, 113. 113, 115, 115, 134 170-175, 178, 178, 204-209, 204-209, 215, 215, 218, 218, 221, 221, 226, 226, 230-232, 230-232, 235, 235, 256, 256, 264, 274, 274, 288-292. 288-292, 294. 294, 297, 297, 310. 310, 313, 313, 321, 321, 336, 336, 338 intention see see intention expression, xviii, xxi, xxi, 33, 33, 51, 51, 59, 59, 65, referring expression, 69,74,78,84,85,92,100.112.139.152,156. 69, 74, 78, 84, 85, 92, 100. 112, 139. 152, 156. 167, 179, 179, 204-206, 204-206, 208-211, 208-211, 158-160, 167, 214-217, 214-217, 219-221, 223, 223, 224, 224, 226-235, 247, 250,253, 256,268, 273, 278. 282.292.293, 250,253,256,268.273,278.282.292.293. 295, 298, 298, 299, 299, 324. 324. 336. 336. 340 340 295,

Index relevance (theory), 20, 23, 23, 30, 32, 32, 34, 42, 44, 59, 76, 77, 79-85, 152, 152, 275, 275, 192, 192, 207, 310 230-232, 246, 278, 278, 286, 308, 310 representation see semantic, prepositional, propositional, representation mental M., 126, 138, 140, 145, 146, 159-161, Richard, M., 219, 220, 249, 249, 323 213, 219, rigid (designator), 139, 205, 211, 211, 212, 228, rigid (designator), 134, 134,139, 253 Russell, B., xviii, xviii, 2, 3, 13, 14,66,93, 132, 151, 3, 9, 9,13,14,66, 93,132,151, 161-163, 206, 208, 209, 219, 233, 233, 321 321 209, 212, 212, 219, Ryle, G., 177, 177, 263, 263, 267, 267, 270

Law, salva veri/ate veritate (see (fee also Leibniz's Law, substitutivity), 137-140, 143, 144, 171, 184, 137-140,143,144,171,184, 192, 256, 339 Schiffer, Schiffer, S., 24, 113, 113, 117-119, 136, 143, 147-151, 153-155, 161, 163, 165, 221, 222, 239, 245, 337 261, 272, 272, 293, 337 260, 261, scope (ambiguity 13, 14, 25, 68, 70, 74, (ambiguity of), 3,4, 3,4,13,14,25,68,70,74, 134, 139, 290, 295, 295, 296, 296, 139, 179, 179, 185, 185, 199, 199, 284, 284, 290, 298 Searle, IR., JR., 51, 51, 58, 69, 69, 90, 104-110, 113-115, 117, 119, 119, 120, 120, 135, 135, 138, 138, 142, 142, 169, 169, 188, 188, 207, 207, 298, 299 semantic innocence, 138, 178, 256 innocence, representation (form), xi, xviii, xix-xxi, 2-9, 13, 19, 23, 24, 27, 27, 34, 35, 35, 37,43-45,48, 37, 43-45, 48, 2-9,13,19, 55-58, 60-62, 64-67, 70-73, 75, 75, 85, 85, 129, 156, 157, 194, 157, 162, 162, 176, 176, 182, 182, 185, 185, 189, 189, 190, 190, 194, 213, 222, 233, 239, 239, 245, 245, 246, 246, 250, 250, 273, 209, 213, 222, 233, 273, 274, 279, 284, 297, 297, 306, 279, 284, 306, 321, 321, 331, 331, 337, 337, 338 semi-propositional (thought, representation), xix, 78, 180, 180, 293 sense, xvii, xvii, xx-xxii, 90, 96, 109, 114, 109, 111, 111, 112, 112, 114, 115, 122, 131-134, 136, 141-147, 154, 157-162, 165, 166, 185, 188, 189, 189, 211, 213 214, 217, 241, 244, 245, 256, 278, 321, 323, 214,217,241,244,245,256,278,321,323, 324, 332, 333, 333, 339 9,15-17, sense-generality, 3,4,6, 9, 15-17, 20, 24, 27,34, 27, 34, 42, 45, 49, 55, 55, 69, 339 sensitivity (to structure), xxii, xxii, 80, 112, 132, 133, 80,112,132,133, 272, 302, 304, 320-325, 327, 327, 330-333 Sperber, D., xix, xix, 2, 6, 18-20, 30, 33, 33, 34,40, 34, 40, 42-44, 49, 59, 59, 71, 71, 76-82, 84, 88, 100, 123, 157, 175, 175, 180, 180, 181, 181, 184, 191, 191, 207, 151, 157, 207, 230, 242, 266, 293, 293, 303, 305, 307, 308 232, 242, Stalnaker, 172, 194, 195, 197, 197, 198, 251, Stalnaker, R., R., 37, 37, 172, 267,268 267, 268 SUbjunctive, subjunctive, 178, 179, 312-319, 327-332, 334

361

substitutivity (see also Leibniz's Law, Law, salva veritate), xx, xxi, 91, 91, 122, 122, 131, 131, 136-141, 143, 144, 144, 146, 146, 168, 168, 171, 171, 179, 179, 184, 184, 192, 192, 193, 193, 210,212,213,244,254,264,272,294,326, 210, 212, 213, 244, 254,264,272,294,326, 330, 339 Tarski, A., 6, 106, 122, 140, 141 141 tertium comparationis, 302, 307, 309 that, xxii, 80, 132, 285, 311, 311, 315, 315, 316, 318, 321-326, 329, 331 329, 331 that-clause, 131-133, 156, 163, 179, that-clause, xxii, 80, 91, 91,131-133,156, 163,179, 181, 182, 182, 221, 221, 316, 316, 317, 317, 322-324, 332, 340 340 translation, 74, 213, 213, 215, 215, 302-310, 332 transparent (vs. (vs. opaque), 113,133,139,168,173, 181, 185, 211, 216, 216, 264, 272, 272, 333 185, 186, 209, 211, 35, 55, 55, 109, truth-conditional semantics, 28, 35, 146, 279, 279, 284, 286, 299, 299, 300 31, 33, 33, 57, 57, truth conditions, conditions, 4, 6, 7, 7, 18, 18, 28, 29, 31, 73, 75, 114, 171, 114, 122, 143, 143, 151, 151, 154, 154, 159, 159, 165, 165, 171, 181, 185, 185, 186, 186, 189, 189, 197, 197, 205, 207, 207, 217, 217, 238, 250, 273, 283, 285, 273, 274, 274, 282, 282,283, 285, 296, 297, 297, 299, 339 148,57,163,166 unarticulated constituent, 147, 147,148,57,163,166 xviii, xix, xix, xxi, xxi, 2, 3, 5, underspecification, xviii, 5, 7, 7, 9, 10, 26, 45, 57, 57, 75, 81,100, 81, 100, 111, 185, 191, 111, 176, 176,185,191, 299, 337 337 209, 278, 296, 299, underspecified, xi, xix, xx, 2-4, 7-9, 7-9, 22-24, 55, 58,65,72,176,185,192, 58, 65, 72, 176, 185, 192, 273, 279, 34, 53, 55, 295 100, unmarked (interpretation), xxi, 8, 24, 97, 97,100, 174, 179, 215, 179, 180, 180, 184, 184, 185, 185, 190, 190, 196, 196, 204, 204, 215, 273, 310, 310, 314, 314, 315, 315, 330, 330, 333 128, 133, 174, 175, 183, unmarkedness, xxii, 24, 24,128,133,174,175,183, 196, 232, 232, 274, 274, 330, 330, 331, 331, 336

(of thought), xiii, xx, xxii, 52, 57, 57, 80, vehicle (of 81,91,106,108,109,113,118-120,129,142, 81, 91,106,108,109,113,118-120,129,142, 144, 145, 155, 164, 166, 186, 189, 189, 238-251, 262, 264-274, 282,299, 282, 299, 310, 254-257,261, 262,264-274, 315, 320, 322, 333, 333, 334, 339 27-37,40,45, 57, what is said, xi, 2, 19, 19, 27-37, 40, 45, 50, 56, 57, 161, 212, 212, 235, 258, 279, 279, 304, 308 308 159, 161, 235, 258, Wierzbicka, A., 123, 123, 259, 259, 307, 307, 309 Wilson, D., xix, 2, 6, 16, 16, 18,20,30,33,34,40, 18, 20, 30, 33, 34, 40, 42-44, 49, 59, 59, 71, 71, 76, 77, 77, 79, 80, 81, 81, 84, 88, 42^4, 123, 151, 157, 175, 181, 184, 191, 194, 195, 100, 100,123,151,157,175,181,184,191,194,195, 232, 242, 266, 266, 303, 307, 308 207, 230, 232, 261, Wittgenstein, L., 106, 142, 203, 205, 242, 261, 262

362

Discourse, beliefs, Discourse, beliefs, and and intentions

Woodruff Smith, D., 89-93, 96, 101, Woodruff 101, 111, 111, 122, 122, 244, 245, 248 Zwicky, A. and and 1. J. Sadock, 4, 6, 9, 9, 10, 10, 13, 13, 15 15

ie, ze, 315, 315, 316, 328-331 328-331 ze-c1ause, ze-clause, 312, 312, 316, 316, 318, 320, 327, 327, 330, 332 zeby, 315, 315, 316, 319, 319, 327, 327, 328, 331, 331, 332 zeby-c1ause, 318, ze-clause, 318, 320, 330, 332