Diderot and the Metamorphosis of Species (Studies in Philosophy)

Studies in Philosophy

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Diderot and the Metamorphosis of Species

Mary Efrosini Gregory

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© 2007 by Taylor & Francis Group, LLC Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa business Printed in the United States of America on acid‑free paper 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 International Standard Book Number‑10: 0‑415‑95551‑3 (Hardcover) International Standard Book Number‑13: 978‑0‑415‑95551‑5 (Hardcover) No part of this book may be reprinted, reproduced, transmitted, or utilized in any form by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying, microfilming, and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without written permission from the publishers. Trademark Notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. Library of Congress Cataloging‑in‑Publication Data Gregory, Mary Efrosini. Diderot and the metamorphosis of species / Mary Efrosini Gregory. p. cm. ‑‑ (Studies in philosophy) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0‑415‑95551‑3 (alk. paper) 1. Diderot, Denis, 1713‑1784‑‑Criticism and interpretation. 2. Evolution in literature. 3. Nature in literature. 4. Human evolution‑‑Philosophy. 5. Philosophy of nature. I. Title. PQ1979.A1 2006 848’.509‑‑dc22 Visit the Taylor & Francis Web site at http://www.taylorandfrancis.com and the Routledge Web site at http://www.routledge‑ny.com

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Contents

Introduction

1

Chapter One Chaos, Flux, Time, and Probability

19

Chapter Two Embryology, Epigenesis, and the Metamorphosis of Species

53

Chapter Three Spontaneous Generation

79

Chapter Four The Chain of Beings

101

Chapter Five The Mutability of Species

119

Chapter Six The Ascent of Consciousness

147

Conclusion

163

Notes

167

Bibliography

203

Index

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v

Introduction

Who knows the races of animals that came before us? Who knows the races of animals that will succeed ours?1 —Denis Diderot, D’Alembert’s Dream (1769)

During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, observations of rock strata and a plethora of fossil discoveries provided evidence that the earth was much older than had previously been thought.2 Richard Harter describes the impact that the increase in field geology had on contemporary thought thus: It became clear that there had been significant changes in the Earth’s topography over time and that these changes could neither be accounted for by natural processes operating during the brief nor by the postulated Noachian flood. Notable observations included: • Studies of strata suggested that they were laid down by natural processes in which the sea and land had changed places several times. • Studies of earthquakes and volcanoes showed that the surface crust is subject to massive natural transformation. • Observation of rain, wind, water erosion, and sea erosion in action showed that they were forces capable of reducing mountains and creating valleys.3

Michon Scott offers the following timeline that reveals how scientific advances aided the progressive disestablishment from Genesis chronology: • 1697-Scandinavian historian Olof Rudbeck publishes his attempt to chronologically measure sedimentary deposits, laying the foundations for the field of stratigraphy.

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Diderot and the Metamorphosis of Species • 1715-Edmund Halley lectures the Royal Society that the age of the earth could be calculated by measuring the ocean’s salinity since ocean salts result from sediments carried by rivers and streams. • 1720-René Réaumur submits a report to the Paris Academy of Sciences proposing that a brief Noachian flood cannot account for the thick sedimentary layers (composed largely of broken shells) underlying the region of Tours. He suggests instead that the region was once covered by the sea.4

A wealth of fossil discoveries suggested that the physical characteristics of fish and animals that had lived long ago were not the same as those of modern species. As early as 1668 Robert Hooke read his “Discourse of Earthquakes” to the Royal Society in which he noted that some fossils seem to have no living equivalents. The curled shells of ammonites resembled the modern pearly nautilus, but they were not the same. He concluded “that there may have been diverse species of things wholly destroyed and annihilated, and diverse others changed and varied, for since we find that there are some kinds of Animals and Vegetables peculiar to certain places, and not to be found elsewhere; if such a place have been swallowed up, ’tis not improbable but that those Animal Beings may have been destroyed with them.”5 The fossils suggested that the populations of animals and plants were not the same as those produced by God at Creation. Hooke conceded that they were a form unknown on the earth during that time and hence, must have become extinct. In 1669 Steno recognized the animal origins of fossils and extrapolated that Noah’s flood could not account for their presence in diverse places: the flood had been too brief and too violent to cause the presence and placement of all of the petrified shells.6 The regular arrangement of rocks beds in superimposed strata implied that sedimentary rocks were slowly deposited from calm waters, which was incompatible with the violence of the flood. Steno posited that the upper layers must have been deposited after the lower layers and that therefore, it was possible to establish a relative chronology of the geological layers. The eighteenth century also saw the discovery of intact mammoths in northern Siberia and the New World. The Oxford English Dictionary indicates that several earlier forms of the term “mammoth” existed at least as far back as the early seventeenth century.7 The OED states that in 1618 Richard James had described the maimanto as “a sea elephant, which is never seene, but according to the Samyites he workes himself under grownde and so they finde his teeth or hornes or bones in Pechore and Nova Zemla”;8 that in 1698 Heinrich Wilhelm Ludolf mentioned the mammotovoy, “which is dug

Introduction

3

out of the Earth in Siberia”;9 that in 1706 Evert Ysbrandszoon Ides and Nicolaas Witsen stated, “The old Siberian Russians affirm that the Mammuth is very like the Elephant”;10 and that in 1736 Philip Johann von Strahlenberg observed, “The Russian Mammoth, certainly came from the Word Behemot.”11 Naturalists on both sides of the Atlantic had puzzled over the bones ever since a giant tooth on the banks of the Hudson River was discovered in the eighteenth century. Discoveries of intact mammoths made northern Siberia famous as the domain of “rats beneath the ice.” The articles “Mammoth,” “Fossil” and “Ivory Fossil” in the Encyclopedia, of which Denis Diderot and Jean Le Rond d’Alembert were the chief editors, indicate that the French were well aware of the mammoth bones in Siberia. The unsigned article “Mammoth, bone of, (Nat. Hist. Mineral.)” [Mammoth, os de (Hist. nat. Minéral.] states, “Mammoth . . . name that is given in Russia and Siberia to bones of a very considerable size, that are found in great quantity in Siberia . . . The Russians call these bones mammotovakost.”12 In the article “Fossil” [Fossile], d’Holbach declares that naturalists have erroneously hypothesized that the Noachian flood caused fossils that originally belonged to other kingdoms to end up as mineral substances. He dismisses the Noachian flood as a probable cause for the fossils for several reasons. First, a forty day flood is too short to cause the massive upheavals that have occurred. Secondly, scientific observation indicates that marine fossils have not been thrown in various places by chance, since “there are individuals that are constantly found together with others.” Thirdly, they have not sunk to certain depths because of their specific weights because heavier fossils are found in higher places than smaller, lighter fossils. D’Holbach concludes that the ancients were right in their theory: the ocean once occupied the European continent.13 In “Ivory Fossil” [Ivoire Fossile], d’Holbach discusses giant ivory tusks found in Russia and Siberia. He notes that in St. Petersburg, Russia, in the imperial curiosity cabinet, there is an ivory fossil tusk that weighs 183 pounds. D’Holbach discusses the enormous lengths and weights of the tusks and concludes that they do not belong to the species of elephants that are currently living. He surmises that they must have been left by animals that lived a long time ago: “We must conclude, then, that in times in which history has not preserved the memory for us, Siberia enjoyed a gentler sky, and was inhabited by animals that some general revolution of our globe buried in the depths of the earth, and that this same revolution has entirely changed the temperature of this region.”14 This geological and fossil evidence caused naturalists to reconsider the age of the earth. It became clear that a sequence of populations of animals

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Diderot and the Metamorphosis of Species

and plants had appeared and disappeared one after the other. The idea of divine Creation could only be defended by abandoning the biblical model of a single episode of Creation and invoking a succession of creative acts over eons. This is what Buffon did: in 1749 he proposed that the six days of Creation may have been six long epochs of time and that the earth’s surface had been shaped and reshaped by processes still going on. For Buffon, the appearance of humans marked the seventh and last epoch of the earth’s development: human history occupied only a small proportion of the history of the earth. Buffon asked how many species had been perfected or degenerated by the vicissitudes of the earth and oceans or by the long influence of a hostile or favorable climate, and were no longer the same as they once were. He speculated on the reason for the extinction of huge animals: as humans spread out over all the earth and proliferated, they gradually pushed back huge, ferocious beasts whose enormous bones were being unearthed.15 Buffon excluded the flood from the physical history of the earth and established an independence from theology. He wrote that the causes of rare, violent, and sudden effects must not concern the naturalist; they are not found in the ordinary workings of nature. It is with effects that happen every day—movements that succeed one another and renew themselves without interruption, constant and always repeated operations—that scientists must use as causes and reasons.16 In order to ascertain what has happened and what will happen, one needs only to examine that which normally occurs.17 Buffon rejected catastrophism and accepted only causes that can be observed at work in nature. Hence, he excluded both miracles and catastrophes. Francis Haber examines the influence that the discovery of fossils had on eighteenth century thought.18 He discusses how d’Holbach’s article, “Fossils” [Fossiles] (1757), in the Encyclopedia, influenced Diderot’s concept of the metamorphosis of species. Haber states, “Of all the phenomena presented by natural history, none attracted the attention of naturalists more than the prodigious quantity of marine shells to be found in the depths of the earth and in the highest mountains . . . Holbach noted further that there was a multitude of works on fossils, but that in explaining them, naturalists, even some who were otherwise enlightened, continued to be partisans of plastic forces or of the Noachian Deluge, despite observational evidence which controverted both views.”19 Haber discusses Buffon’s attempt to explain fossils by natural processes over time and his censure by the Faculty of Theology at the Sorbonne: “He attempted to solve the fossil enigma by natural processes, and as a result he postulated that strata had been deposited slowly in the course of time. The

Introduction

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previous attempts of Burnet, Whiston, Woodward, Bourguet, Scheuchzer, Steno, Ray, and Leibniz to explain the presence of shells on continental lands were reviewed, and he attributed their failure to a reliance on the authority of Scripture, adding ‘The notion that shells were transported and left upon the land by the Deluge is the general opinion, or rather superstition, of naturalists.’”20 Haber adds, “Buffon’s attempt to elevate Scripture out of natural science did not impress the Faculty of Theology at the Sorbonne, which took action and in 1751 furnished Buffon with a list of reprehensible statements in his cosmogony. Buffon published a retraction in the fourth volume of his Natural History, saying that he believed very firmly in the text of the Scripture and all that is reported in it about creation, both as to order of time and matters of fact.”21 Haber says that d’Holbach, in his 1757 article “Fossiles,” “had expressed his sympathy with those ancients who believed that the sea had formerly stayed on our continents for a long course of ages. Any other system, he felt, was subject to insuperable difficulties in explaining the fossil strata of the earth. He developed his own views at greater length in two sections of the article “Terre” (1765) on the strata of the earth and the revolutions of the earth.”22 Maupertuis, too, referred “to the fossil masses as an indication of great catastrophism which might have broken the continuity of civilization.”23 The Encyclopedia featured a vast wealth of articles addressing contemporary fossil discoveries. The artifacts were called figured stones [pierres figurées] because there were figures inside the stones. They were also called fossils [fossiles] and fossil bones [ossemens fossiles]. The article “Cavern” [“Grotte”] discusses Baumann’s Cavern in Germany that contains animal bones that are so large that it was believed that they were the bones of giants. The cavern also has the unicorn fossil, which resembles the skeleton of the fabulous unicorn, but which is actually a horned fish called the narwal. The articles on fossils include “Arcy” [“Arcy”], “Shell” [“Coquille”], “Crystal, Crystals, or Crystallizations” [“Crystal, Crystaux, ou Crystallisations”], “Flood” [“Déluge”], “Figured Things” [“Figurés”], “Fossils” [“Fossiles”], “Mammoth” “Mammoth”], “Oryctology” [“Oryctologie”], “Fossils Bones” [“Ossemens fossiles”], “Petrifications” [“Pétrifications”], and “Turquoise” [“Turquoise”]. The Encyclopedia’s Collection of Plates provides illustrations depicting the wealth of fossils that had been discovered. In the article “Fossil (Nat. Hist. Mineralogy.)” [“Fossile (Hist. nat. Minéralogie.)”], d’Holbach declares that Noah’s flood, which was fleeting, was not the cause for the marine bodies that had been formed deep in the earth.24 The enormous quantity of shells and marine bodies that filled the earth provided evidence that the water had lasted for many centuries, rather

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Diderot and the Metamorphosis of Species

than 40 days and nights, as Genesis claimed. Moreover, if these fossil shells had been swept by a sudden and violent inundation, like that of the Noachian flood, they would have been thrown haphazardly across the surface of the earth, which is contrary to observation. Finally, if they had been carried by a catastrophic flood, they would sooner be found in the bottom of valleys than in the mountains; however, one nearly always finds the opposite. He concludes that the ancients were right when they said that the sea once occupied the European continent. As chief editor of the Encyclopedia, Denis Diderot was continually on the vanguard of scientific theories explaining rock strata and the proliferation of fossils in diverse places. With this geologic and biological evidence before him, Diderot was certain that all species had undergone successive metamorphoses over millennia. Pouring over texts from Lucretius, Buffon, Maupertuis, and articles on probability theory in the Encyclopedia, Diderot found credible explanations justifying the hypothesis that species are mutable, rather than fixed; he borrowed texts, imagery, and metaphors from these sources to articulate the notion that species are not fixed, but rather, that they have undergone metamorphoses over time. His view that species are variable, rather than unchanging, is based on the following concepts: 1. The notion that random chance governs molecular interaction, and therefore, the origin of all life. 2. Epigenesis (the theory that the germ is brought into existence by successive accretions and not merely developed from a preformed seed). 3. Spontaneous generation (the belief that living things are born of inanimate matter). 4. The observation that physical characteristics overlap among species led Diderot to hypothesize that all beings can be traced back to one original prototype. Diderot expanded the two dimensional, linear chain of beings into a three dimensional network in which characteristics overlap among species, and he added a fourth dimension, time, to show that physical characteristics change very gradually over millennia. 5. Buffon’s observation that species ameliorate, degenerate or are rendered extinct by geography, climate, food, domestication, and crossbreeding. 6. Maupertuis’ theory that errors occur in the arrangement of parental elements during the generative process and that these errors are transmitted from generation to generation. 7. The hypothesis that consciousness and motion are inherent in all matter at every level of organization, and that this consciousness permits threads to organize into bundles of fibers, fibers to form a network, and organs to

Introduction

7

function as entities, both independently, and in concert with the brain; Diderot concluded that as matter reorganizes into more complex structures, a higher form of consciousness emerges that is greater than that of the sum of its parts.

Diderot embraced Buffon’s thesis that organic molecules rained down from the sky into a primordial ocean at a time when the earth was cooling, and that these organic molecules became the basis of all living things. However, he went much farther than Buffon had done: he derived from Maupertuis the notion that these organic molecules possessed an inherent, rudimentary consciousness (aversion, desire, memory, and intelligence) that permitted them to organize into larger bodies (ie: threads eventually combined to form bundles of fibers and then these bundles formed organs). In the Letter on the Blind (1749) Diderot reiterated Lucretius’ thesis that at the time of creation, beings whose organs permitted them to survive did, while those with organs ill suited to survival, died. He demonstrated that individuals that possessed no internal contradictions left offspring, while those that had physical defects that did not permit survival, had no progeny. By 1753 Diderot had also embraced Maupertuis’ theory that the great variety that exists in nature is due to errors that occur in the arrangement of parental elements during the generative process. These errors are due to lapses in the memory of conscious matter. Parental elements derived from both the father and mother do not retain the memory of their former arrangement, but rather, form a new pattern that cause a new trait in the offspring. These errors are random in nature and they are passed on to offspring. It is these errors in the reproductive process that are responsible for the appearance and disappearance of species. This study will examine how Diderot borrowed from Lucretius, Buffon, Maupertuis, and probability theory, and combined ideas from these sources in an innovative fashion to hypothesize that species are mutable and that all life arose randomly from a single prototype. We will examine how Diderot’s thought developed during the period 1746–1769 in four works: Philosophic Thoughts (1746), the Letter on the Blind for the Use of Those who See (1749), Thoughts on the Interpretation of Nature (1753), and the trilogy, Conversation between d’Alembert and Diderot (1769), D’Alembert’s Dream (1769), and the Sequel to the Conversation (1769). Sources of his theories will be limited to Lucretius’ On the Nature of Things, Buffon’s Natural History, Maupertuis’ Essay on the Formation of Organized Bodies, probability theory, and articles from the Encyclopedia. The dissertation will be divided into the following six chapters that will address Diderot’s key concerns:

8

Diderot and the Metamorphosis of Species 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

Chaos, Flux, Time, and Probability Embryology, Epigenesis, and the Metamorphoses of Species Spontaneous Generation The Chain of Beings The Mutability of Species The Ascent of Consciousness

Taken together, these six chapters will illustrate Diderot’s thought on the successive reorganization of matter from the atom to man, as well as his belief that consciousness and motion are innate qualities of all matter, and that as matter successively metamorphosed into more complex organizational structures, higher and higher forms of consciousness emerged, as well. Each chapter will trace the concretization of Diderot’s thought during the period 1746–1769 through an examination of selected passages from his four works. This topic is critical to an understanding of the French Enlightenment because Diderot opened the door to the mutability of species and digressed from the long held belief that the chain of beings is fixed. Although he had only philosophy and a very rudimentary science on which to base his theories (ie: Buffon, Maupertuis, and Trembley’s polyp), he departed from the closed, two-dimensional, linear chain of beings (that did not permit the appearance of any new species since Genesis) and opened the door to continual, random, open-ended metamorphosis. OVERVIEW Chapter One (“Chaos, Flux, Time, and Probability”) examines the fulcrum of Diderot’s biological theory: the notion that random chance governs molecular interaction, and therefore, the origin of all life. Diderot derived from Epicurus, via Lucretius, the notion that all matter in the universe is comprised of tiny, invisible, and indivisible atoms.25 Because motion is an inherent characteristic of atoms, they randomly collide with one another and continually recombine to form everything in the universe. Diderot seized upon this notion of the random movement of atoms and made it the foundation of his view of the universe: motion is inherent in all matter, atomic motion is random, and hence, everything in the universe, including man, animals, and celestial bodies, are merely the products of random atomic collisions. The Epicurean view that everything is the result of random atomic activity was concretized by the study that Pascal and Fermat did on games of chance in 1654. In their study of card games, dice, and roulette, the mathematicians

Introduction

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observed the following principle: as numbers become larger and infinity is approached, every possible outcome manifests itself. In addition to Pascal and Fermat’s study on probability, Diderot was influenced by the articles that the mathematician d’Alembert wrote for the Encyclopedia. Richard J. Pulskamp says that d’Alembert authored the following articles on games of chance and probability: “Absent” [“Absent”], “Advantage” [“Avantage”], “Basset” (card game) [“Bassette”], “Tile” [“Carreau”], “Heads or Tails” [“Croix ou pile”], “Die” [“Dé”], “Wager” [“Gageure” and “Pari”], and “Lottery” [“Loterie”].26 Pulskamp goes on to say that Diderot is believed to have authored the following articles, although they are unsigned: “Probability” [“Probabilité”] and “Play” [“Jouer”].27 In 1761 Diderot wrote On Two Treatises by d’Alembert, One concerning the Computation of Probability, the Other, Inoculation. Diderot’s interest in games of chance and probability theory caused him to consider the idea that perhaps randomness and a continual stream of events (flux) may be the basis of the origin of all life on earth. In Philosophic Thoughts, Thought 21, Diderot’s atheist argues that according to the study of games of chance, it is not surprising that unusual outcomes happen, because the rarity of the event is compensated by the quantity of throws. Diderot presents the reader with three metaphors-atoms [atomes], printer’s type [caractères], and dice [dés]. First, atomes—the continual motion of atoms eventually results in the organization of matter. Second, caractères—the continual and random keystrokes on a printing press will eventually result in the creation of a literary masterpiece. Third, dés—the casting of dice eventually yields patterns. After Diderot presents the three metaphors, he demonstrates that given an infinite number of events or flux (ie: a continuous stream of molecular motion and collisions, type on a printing press or castings of dice) and an eternal time frame, all imaginable outcomes or combinations will occur. In the Letter on the Blind (1749), Thoughts on the Interpretation of Nature (1753) and D’Alembert’s Dream (1769), Diderot ties this notion of randomness to species and posits that given enough time, every viable species will pass in and out of existence. The observation that physical characteristics overlap among species indicates that nature creates every possible variation (no two leaves are the same shade of green). The mutability of species is not impossible, but rather, the predictable outcome of the continual stream of random atomic collision and an infinite time frame within which continued change works. In the Letter on the Blind, Diderot emphasizes the role that random chance has played in man’s origins. The blind geometer, Nicholas Saunderson, argues (just as the celebrated professor in Philosophic Thoughts, Thought 21, had done) that any combination of molecules is theoretically possible, that nature has always created monsters that could not survive,

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Diderot and the Metamorphosis of Species

and that even the survival of the human race may have been no more than a matter of chance. The key concepts in Saunderson’s deathbed scene are molecules, monsters and chance: everything is merely the result of the random collision of molecules, nature is continually creating new variations, many of which are errors or monsters (ie: blind men or Siamese twins), and this random activity explains man’s appearance from chaos. Chapter Two (“Embryology, Epigenesis, and the Metamorphosis of Species”) demonstrates that embryology and epigenesis concretized the notion of randomness that Diderot derived from Epicurus, Pascal, and Fermat. During the eighteenth century epigenesis was the chief theory that rivaled preformation. Preformation is the notion that all parts of an organism exist previously formed in the germ and that they are merely developed or unfolded during gestation. An analogy can be made to Russian dolls, where one doll is encased in another doll—similarly, it was believed that a fully formed organism is encased in the germ of a plant, animal or person. Diderot ridiculed the idea and championed, instead, the mechanistic theory of epigenesis posited by Harvey, Maupertuis and Buffon: isolated particles gathered together to form a germ, which then needed only to develop. While Aristotelian preformation posits that a finite number of species existed since Creation, epigenesis allows for particles to come together to form beings different from either parent. Because epigenesis proposes that the organism is newly created in each generation (the egg is initially undifferentiated and development occurs as a series of steps), it opens the door to open-ended metamorphosis: it allows for the creation of new species, the extinction of others, errors in the generative process that result in the appearance of new characteristics, the regeneration of polyps, teratism (ie: Siamese twins, dwarfism, cretinism), and hybrids (ie: donkeys possess characteristics of both parents, not just the one that donated the egg.). Diderot championed epigenesis because it relied on the mechanism of the seventeenth century, empiricism, rationalism, and the scientific method, and because it was monistic, rather than dualistic. Chapter Three (“Spontaneous Generation”) acknowledges that unfortunately, Diderot also embraced the erroneous theory of spontaneous generation and used it to bolster his philosophy. Because he was swayed by the faulty experiments performed by Buffon and Needham, Diderot believed that living organisms develop from nonliving matter. Therefore, when he observed animalcules under a microscope, he concluded that they are continuously born of dead or inanimate material. He used spontaneous generation to explain the origin of life on earth. Diderot viewed spontaneous generation as a microcosm of the metamorphosis of species and illustrative

Introduction

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of the transition of nonliving matter to living beings. In D’Alembert’s Dream Diderot affirms that the animalcules observed on a microscopic slide provide a small scale picture of what happened on a large scale at the beginning of time: the original fermentation process may still be going on. He refers to Epicurus, who affirmed that the earth contains the germs of all life and that the animal world is a product of fermentation. The fermentation process is continual and nothing is permanent in nature. The microscope holds the secrets of life: spontaneous generation illustrates that just as there is an infinite succession of animalcules in one fermenting speck of matter on a microscopic slide, so there is an infinite succession of species on earth over the millennia. Diderot found spontaneous generation as a useful illustration to demonstrate on a small scale what happened on a larger scale over millennia. Further, if living matter can arise from non-living, the need for divine agency is eliminated. Chapter Four (“The Chain of Beings”) discusses the great impact that Buffon’s work had on Diderot’s biological theory: from Buffon Diderot had learned that physical characteristics overlap among species. For example, the structure of the human hand is similar to that of a bat’s wing. This observation was not new: Leonardo da Vinci had placed a human leg next to a horse’s leg and had noted their similarities. These similarities in structure caused Buffon to discard the strictly linear chain of beings (vertical) in favor of a horizontal schema: he posited the interconnectedness of species. From this Diderot hypothesized that nature is continually creating new variations, that the change in variations is very gradual, that it takes millennia, and that as time elapses, every possible variation that is viable will manifest itself. He extrapolated that in the beginning there was a single animal that served as a prototype for all others. In Thoughts on the Interpretation of Nature, Thought 12, Diderot says, “It seems that nature has taken pleasure in varying the same mechanism in an infinite number of different ways. It does not abandon one kind of production until after it has multiplied individuals in every possible aspect.”28 He expanded the two dimensional, linear chain of beings into a three dimensional network in which characteristics overlap among species, and he added a fourth dimension, time, to show that species change over millennia. Chapter Five (“The Mutability of Species”) addresses the factors that Diderot believed modify species’ physical characteristics over time: climate, geography, food, way of life, degeneration, amelioration, crossbreeding, and errors in the generative process that are passed on from parents to offspring. Current events in the biological sciences promoted the credibility of the epigenesis theory and played a role in Diderot’s thought. The phenomena

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Diderot and the Metamorphosis of Species

of partial regeneration (ie: Trembley’s polyp) and teratism (monstrous fetal disorder such as that of Siamese twins and dwarfs) put the partisans of preformation and preexistence in an embarrassing position by raising questions that they could not answer without engaging in long winded, convoluted reasoning: where did the preformed seed exist and how many preformed seeds are there in a polyp that can always regenerate after being cut into pieces? If the seed is a copy of a parent, why don’t Siamese twins, dwarfs or cretins resemble their parents? How can sighted people have blind offspring and the blind have sighted children? If we are all preformed from Adam and Eve, why do millions of people have different physiognomies? Furthermore, heredity and hybrids also posed serious difficulties for apologists of preformation: the preformed seed did not explain the fact that a hybrid, such as a donkey, acquired ears from one parent and the tail of the other. Diderot, who espoused epigenesis, pointed to partial regeneration and teratism as scientific evidence that epigenesis is the true theory that explains generation. As the editor of the Encyclopedia and an avid reader of newspapers and scientific treatises both foreign and French, he kept abreast of discoveries and theories that supported epigenesis; epigenesis opened the door for the appearance, mutability, and extinction of species over millennia. Diderot’s theory of the continual metamorphosis of species was also influenced by Maupertuis, who hypothesized that the great variations in physical forms that occur in nature are due to errors that occur in the arrangement of parental elements during the generative process. When Diderot wrote Thoughts on the Interpretation of Nature in 1753, he had read the hypothesis of the unique origin of all living forms, which Maupertuis had proposed in 1751 in the Inaugural Dissertation on Metaphysics. Instead of positing degeneration under the influence of climate, as Buffon had done, Maupertuis declared that errors occur in the patterns of parental elements at the time of and after conception, and that these errors are transmitted to descendants. Diderot cites the passage from Maupertuis in which the latter asks whether these errors would not explain how all of nature developed from one original prototype, or how dissimilar species could result from only two individuals. New species would owe their origin to a few fortuitous reproductions, in which the elementary parts had not retained the order that they had in the father and mother animals. Each degree of error would create a new species, and with the multiplication of repeated deviations, the infinite diversity of animals that we see today would arise.29 Diderot seized upon this hypothesis because it explains the appearance of a new species from just two parents. It predicts that with additional errors in the reproductive process, an infinite diversity of species would arise.

Introduction

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Maupertuis’ theory that an accident occurs in the reproductive process concurs with the Epicurean notion of randomness and with Pascal and Fermat’s observation that with the additional tossing of dice, more outcomes occur. In Thoughts on the Interpretation of Nature, Thought 12, Diderot said, “It seems that nature has taken pleasure in varying the same mechanism in an infinite number of different ways. It does not abandon one kind of production until after it has multiplied individuals in every possible aspect. When we consider the animal kingdom, and we see that, among the quadrupeds, there is not one that does not have the functions and parts, especially the interior ones, entirely resembling those of another quadruped, wouldn’t we willingly believe that there has only ever been one first animal, a prototype of all animals, in which nature has merely lengthened, shortened, transformed, multiplied, obliterated certain organs?”30 Although Diderot cited Buffon’s Natural History and Maupertuis’ Inaugural Dissertation on Metaphysics, he carried the notion of overlapping physical characteristics among species much farther than either of his contemporaries: successive metamorphoses bridge the three kingdoms and they allow for rocks to become plants and plants to become animals. He wrote, “When we observe the successive outward metamorphoses which take place in this prototype, whatever it may be, pushing one realm of life closer to another by imperceptible stages, and populating the regions where these two realms border on each other (if they can be referred to as ‘borders’ in the absence of any true divisions); and, populating, as I said, the border regions of the two realms with vague, unidentifiable beings, largely devoid of the forms, qualities and functions of one region and assuming the forms, qualities and functions of the other; who, then, would not be persuaded that there had never been more than one single prototype for every being?”31 In 1769 Diderot reiterated his stance of 1753 by challenging the heterogeneity of kingdoms in D’Alembert’s Dream once more: marble can become flesh via pulverization, integration with soil, feeding it to plants, and ingesting the plants. Because Diderot regarded nature as being in a continual state of flux and organic molecules as malleable, he believed that man could engineer improved species by cross-breeding. While he recognized that members of different species had not produced any fertile offspring to date, he advised that more experimentation was needed. In the Sequel to the Conversation (1769) he expressed confidence that scientific inquiry and empiricism could eventually result in the creation of hybrid species that would be useful to man. Chapter 6 (“The Ascent of Consciousness”) will trace the progression of events that permitted Diderot to resolve the problem of human consciousness. In 1751, Maupertuis, under the pseudonym Baumann, had published

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the Inaugural Dissertation on Metaphysics. Diderot cited this work in a footnote to Thought 12 in the Thoughts on the Interpretation of Nature (1753). It was from Maupertuis’ Inaugural Dissertation on Metaphysics that Diderot derived the hypothesis that as molecules combine and matter becomes more complex, an emergent consciousness arises that is superior to that of the sum of its components. In 1753 Diderot accepted Maupertuis’ premise that consciousness is intrinsic to matter: all molecules have aversion, desire, memory, and intelligence. During conception, when parental elements combine to form the embryo, each element loses its memory of self and acquires the consciousness and memory of the larger unit that is formed. By 1769 Diderot identified these embryonic components as fibers [brins], threads [fils], and bundles of threads [faisceaux de fils]: as these are formed, each successive organizational structure has a consciousness of its own that is greater than that of the sum of its parts. This made Diderot a pioneer in his time: he recognized that an emergent consciousness arises and that this new consciousness is stronger and of a higher form than that of the total of its constituents. By proposing a mechanical assimilation of molecular consciousness, Diderot bridged the chasm between contiguity and continuity. Particles may be contiguous, but they lose their sense of self and memory of the past, and their consciousness becomes continuous. Once their consciousness becomes one, then their physical parts work as one, as well. Diderot proposed an ascent up the organizational structure of conscious matter than culminates in human consciousness. He had a holistic view of consciousness: the conscious whole is unlike any of its constituents and greater than that of their sum. This comes about because when conscious molecules combine, they lose their memory of their former state and acquire the consciousness of the new composite that is formed. The following paradigm illustrates the series of events that takes place: random motion of conscious atoms > organized matter > life > human thought. In 1753 Diderot asked a series of questions about the difference between inanimate matter and living beings. In Thought 58, Questions 3– 15, he asked whether one can turn living matter into dead matter and dead matter into living matter. He posed the question because if Maupertuis was right and all matter is conscious, then there is no such thing as dead matter; therefore, there is no such thing as death, merely a change in form and consciousness. In question 15, Diderot asked whether living molecules can return to life after losing their lives, only to lose them again, ad infinitum. By 1769 he had the solutions to all of his questions: the hypothesis of a consciousness that arises that is greater than that of the sum of its parts explains the transition from the mineral to the vegetable to the animal kingdoms. In

Introduction

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1769 Diderot gave instructions on how to transform inanimate matter into living matter, marble into human flesh. If we pulverize marble, turn it into humus, feed the humus to plants, and allow the animal kingdom to consume the plants, we will have transformed latent consciousness into active consciousness. The transformation works because motion and consciousness are intrinsic to all matter, at every level of organization. Because molecules are conscious, they can be reorganized to form entities belonging to any kingdom. By 1769 Diderot was able to answer the question that he had raised in 1753: dead matter is never really dead, it can be transformed into living matter, and vice-versa, ad infinitum. Because consciousness is the by-product of the organizational structure of matter, perceptions can be impaired due to modifications in the developing embryo (such as destroying or rearranging the fibers, threads or bundle of threads) or diseases of the brain of the adult being. WHAT CRITICS HAVE WRITTEN ON DIDEROT’S TRANSFORMISM To date, there exists a substantial body of research that addresses individual elements of Diderot’s biology, but an overview on how Diderot synthesized his contemporaries’ ideas to create a composite transformist philosophy is exceedingly rare. There are no studies that focus on the influence of probability and games of chance on Diderot’s notion of the metamorphosis of species from the mineral kingdom over millions of years. This study will attempt to fill that void. There is only one article that addresses the development of Diderot’s thoughts about transformism during the years 1746–1769, and that is Lester Crocker’s “Diderot and Eighteenth Century French Transformism.” In thirty pages Crocker outlines the salient points in the contributions that Leibniz, La Mettrie, Maillet, Buffon, Maupertuis, Robinet, and Bordeu, made to Diderot’s transformism. Having summarized the contributing elements of antecedent thinkers, Crocket then examines key passages from 1746, 1749, 1753 and 1769. Crocker highlights the contemporary works that impacted on Diderot’s thought during the three critical years in which he evolved from deist to Spinozist to atheist, specifically, an atheist who viewed matter as self-sufficient, with motion and consciousness and capable of organizing itself. Crocker concludes with the impact that La Mettrie had on Diderot’s transformism: “Nature had to be conceived of as a selfcreating, self-patterning force, as an experimenting—and a blindly experimenting—force.”32

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Diderot and the Metamorphosis of Species

Several articles have been written on Diderot’s monsters: Emita Hill’s two articles, “Materialism and Monsters in Diderot’s Le Rêve de d’Alembert”33 and “The Role of ‘Le Monstre’ in Diderot Thought,”34 Gerhardt Stenger’s, “L’ordre et les monstres dans la pensée philosophique, politique et morale de Diderot,”35 and Aurélie Suratteau’s, “Les hermaphrodites de Diderot.”36 In addition, critics have addressed the legacy that Diderot owes specifically to Lucretius’ monsters: Johan Werner Schmidt’s, “Diderot and Lucretius: The De Rerum Natura and Lucretius’ Legacy in Diderot’s Scientific, Aesthetic and Ethical Thought”37 and Christine M. Singh’s, “The Lettre sur les aveugles: Its Debt to Lucretius.”38 The critics agree that Diderot’s monsters are iconic representations of nature’s flux: no two molecules are the same, nor do they remain the same. Nature is continually creating new variations of existing entities and so, in eternal flux, the appearance of anomalies is normative. Henri Coulet is one of the few critics who examines the importance of flux in Diderot’s thought. In “Diderot et le problème du changement,” Coulet observes that during the eighteenth century, men were ready to “tolerate contradictions” and accept the fact that “they have been immersed in the changing flux of phenomena and the inexhaustible chain of causes and effects.”39 Coulet asserts that for Diderot, the difference between monsters and normality is purely statistical—in the Dream, Bordeu discusses all of the things that can possibly go wrong in the developing embryo; Julie marvels that the delicate fibers that constitute the developing embryo do not get mixed up more often, like the silk threads on her spindle. Coulet notes that in the article “Fœtus” in the Elements of Physiology, Diderot shows that if monsters were those that do not last, then everyone is a monster because no one is immortal.40 Critics have also written articles on the influence that the works of Maupertuis, Buffon and La Mettrie, have had on Diderot’s thought. Articles on Maupertuis’ study of heredity demonstrate that it was Maupertuis’ Essai sur la formation des corps organisés that taught Diderot that fortuitous digressions in the arrangement of parental elements explains how all species derived from one original prototype. Bentley Glass has done a noteworthy study on Maupertuis and Diderot in his article, “Maupertuis and Heredity,”41 as has Aram Vartanian, in his article, “Diderot et Maupertuis.”42 Glass examines how Maupertuis’ study of polydactyly in the Berlinese Ruhe family proved that it was possible to predict the probability that member of a family would be born with the anomaly. Maupertuis showed that parental elements contributed to the fetus by both the father and mother, statistical probability, and birth anomalies, were intimately intertwined. Glass notes that not only did Maupertuis demonstrate that birth defects

Introduction

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could be predicted, but that too many or conversely, missing, parental elements caused “monsters with deficiencies” [monstres par défaut] and “monsters with extra parts” [monstres par exces]. Glass declares, “Even Mendel did not foresee that deficiencies and duplications of the hereditary material might constitute a basis of abnormal development . . .”43 Glass also addresses the role that random chance plays in Maupertuis’ explanation of heredity. While Glass highlights the innovative contributions that Maupertuis made to the fledgling science of heredity in the eighteenth century, he does not relate Maupertuis to Diderot. This study will attempt to show the influence that Maupertuis’ studies on heredity had on Diderot’s hypothesis that random chance brought about life on a planet where originally there was only the mineral kingdom. Regarding the influence of Buffon’s landmark ethnographic tour of the world, Natural History, on Diderot, there exists articles by Michèle Duchet, “L’anthropologie de Diderot,”44 Jean Ehrard, “Diderot, l’Encyclopédie, et l’Histoire et théorie de la Terre,”45 Arthur O. Lovejoy, “Buffon and the Problem of Species,”46 Jacques Roger’s book, Buffon: A Life in Natural History,47 his article, “Diderot et Buffon en 1749,”48 and Roger’s seminal volume, The Life Sciences in Eighteenth-Century French Thought,49 and Aram Vartanian’s article, “Buffon et Diderot,”50 This study, unlike that of previous critics, will provide an in-depth examination of how Buffon influenced Diderot in 1746, 1749, 1753, and 1769. Several articles have also been written on La Mettrie’s influence on Diderot: Jean E. Perkins, “Diderot and La Mettrie,”51 Ann Thomson, “La Mettrie et Diderot”52 and “L’unité matérielle de l’homme chez La Mettrie et Diderot,”53 Aram Vartanian, “La Mettrie and Diderot Revisited: An Intertextual Encounter”54 and “Trembley’s Polyp, La Mettrie, and EighteenthCentury French Materialism,”55 and Marx W. Wartofsky, “Diderot and the Development of Materialist Monism.”56 Wartofosky discusses Diderot’s monism and the importance of the property of motion in atoms to the metamorphosis of inanimate matter to animate matter. Wartofsky says that La Mettrie taught Diderot that consciousness is the product of motion. Diderot concluded that consciousness arises in the egg after the motion of atoms has successively caused various levels of organization to occur. Because the motion in atoms eventually leads to consciousness, all life could have resulted from the mineral kingdom. Wartofsky also points out that in Diderot’s universe “the general order is constantly changing” and hence, in the Dream, d’Alembert asks, “Who knows what species of animals have preceded us? Who knows what species of animals will follow ours?”

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This study is significantly different from that of antecedent criticism because it addresses the composite of different sources that Diderot used to arrive at his notion of the metamorphosis of species. This study does not focus on one source, such as Buffon, La Mettrie, Lucretius or Trembley’s polyp, but rather, addresses the various texts that made Diderot’s transformism the mosaic that it is. Unlike previous criticism, this study will place a unique emphasis on the role of chaos, flux, time and probability on the metamorphosis of species, specifically addressing the laws of probability in games of chance. Significant arguments from critics on specific topics (for example, Diderot’s monsters and Trembley’s polyp) will be interspersed throughout the body of this text.

Chapter One

Chaos, Flux, Time, and Probability

According to the laws of the analysis of chances (he would say) I ought not to be surprised that a thing happens, when it is possible and the difficulty of the result is compensated by the number of throws.1 —Denis Diderot, Philosophic Thoughts, Thought 12 (1746)

Throughout his literary career Diderot maintained that the universe and everything in it are the results of random chance. As early as 1746, in Philosophic Thoughts, and then in the Letter on the Blind (1749), Thoughts on the Interpretation of Nature (1753), and D’Alembert’s Dream (1769), Diderot posited that atoms are constantly in motion and that given eternity, all possible combinations of atoms will eventually occur. Continual atomic motion, having eternity within which to work, will eventually dispel chaos. This can be predicted by the study of games of chance such as cards and dice. Diderot’s hypothesis can be capsulized in the following formula: flux + time = dispersion of chaos. Chaos is derived from the Greek χάος, through the Latin chaos, meaning a vast gulf or chasm, nether abyss, infinite darkness, empty space, the first state of the universe. In ancient Greek philosophy χάος was the general disorder or disarray of matter’s elements before the creation of the world, the formless void, great deep or abyss of primordial matter out of which the cosmos or order of the universe was formed, the infinite space that preexists all things. In the Encyclopedia Diderot says about chaos, “Ancient philosophers understood, by this word, a muddled mixture of particles of every kind, without form or regularity, in which they supposed inherent motion, attributing to it the resulting formation of the universe.”2 During the eighteenth century, the primary dictionary definition of chaos was intertwined with the belief in God: “Confusion of everything. In a literal sense it is used to denote the state of all things at the instant of Creation, before 19

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God arranged them in the order that they are.”3 The secondary definition was “It is figuratively used to denote every kind of confusion. His business is in dreadful chaos. His library is in chaos.”4 The primary definition indicates the extent to which religion played in the understanding of the word—in the Bible chaos is the disordered state of the world before the intervention of God, as in Gen 1:2, “And the earth was without form, and void; and darkness was upon the face of the deep.” In that verse, the Hebrew tohu (emptiness) and bohu (desolation) are rendered in the Bible of 1611 as “without form and void.” One of tohu’s meanings is the chaotic state before Creation (Job 26:7); in this sense it can be paired with bohu (Gen 1:2, Is 34:11, Jer 4:23). It was against this biblical concept of chaos, tohu and bohu, that Diderot directed his polemics. Early in his literary career, in Philosophic Thoughts (1746), Diderot argued that the epoch of chaos that preceded biblical Creation is fictitious because atoms have always existed, motion is a property intrinsic to atoms, and motion causes atoms to continually combine, disassemble and recombine into new forms. Diderot posited that chaos never existed because random molecular motion dispels it, and in 1746 he referred to chaos as la durée hypothétique (Philosophic Thoughts, Thought 21). Because time is eternal and the universe has no beginning and no end, there was no single act of Creation, as indicated in Gen 1, and hence, a pre-Creation, chaotic state of the universe is fictitious. Three years later, in the Letter on the Blind, Diderot modified his thought: he hypothesized that because atoms are always in motion and continually assembling and disassembling, chaos randomly comes in and out of the existence; it may currently exist somewhere else in the universe, and one day things may return to chaos on earth. He considered teratisms and physical anomalies and concluded that nature is perpetually chaotic. By 1749 Diderot accepted the notion that chaos existed in the past, but he rejected the idea that it existed only before Creation and that God dispelled it forever. In the Letter on the Blind Diderot illustrates his point by using chaos in its mythological sense and providing a glimpse of how the Greeks and Romans viewed it: Saunderson’s description of monsters and malformed beings lacking stomachs and intestines is borrowed from Lucretius’ imagery in On the Nature of Things (V, 838–50, 855–6). The Lucretian imagery of monsters and Saunderson’s own blindness leave the reader with the impression that chaos is fluid, that it randomly comes in and out of existence, and that it was not eliminated forever, as the Bible teaches. In 1769 in D’Alembert’s Dream, Diderot uses the Siamese twins of Rabastens and the reversed position of Jean-Baptiste Macé’s internal organs to reiterate that if teratism is a manifestation of the perpetually chaotic state of nature, then chaos still exists and it always will. Teratism, a metaphor for

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chaos, randomly passes in and out of existence, and it was not eliminated forever at some point in the distant past. Intertwined with the appearance and dissolution of chaos is the notion of flux or a continuous stream of events: flux dispels chaos and then it recreates it. Flux is derived from the Latin fluxus (genitive fluxus), which comes from the past participle of fluere (Latin root flugv-), to flow. During the eighteenth century the primary definition had physiological connotations: “FLUX also means the flow of excrement that has become too fluid, and signifies loose bowels.”5 The secondary definition connoted a stream of words or loquaciousness: “It is figuratively used to denote a great talker, that He has a flux of the mouth, a great flux of the mouth. One also says, flux of words, flux of beautiful, useless words, to mean, excess Abundance of words.”6 The tertiary definition identified a stream of purchases: “And proverbially & commonly, of A spendthrift who ruins himself with extravagant expenditures, that He has flux of the purse.”7 The fourth definition connoted a stream of events in games of chance: “FLUX also means in certain card games, having a sequence of cards of the same color. To have flux in fifty-five. To have great flux. To be in flux.”8 In 1746, 1749, and 1753, Diderot conveyed the concept of a general stream of events to the reader without using flux because in the French language, flux was not yet used to convey that meaning. By utilizing word pairs, Diderot conveyed the notion of a continuous succession of changes of condition, composition or substance. Diderot attributed flux to everything in the universe—to atoms that are perpetually in motion, to the continuum of creatures that are born, live and die, to species (that may change in characteristics over millennia), and to stars (that pass in and out of existence, as do creatures). For example, in Philosophic Thoughts (1746), Thought 21, Diderot conveys the notion of a continuous stream of events by utilizing word pairs in which the first word connotes quantity and the second, the object ie: la quantité des jets, nombre de coups, somme de caractères, somme de jets, multitude des atomes, multitude des jets, somme de combinaisons, nombre d’arrangements, and multitude de ceux. In the Letter on the Blind (1749), Diderot evokes a universe that is in continual flux. Paul Vernière says that the blind Saunderson “evokes a universe in perpetual flux, prey to chance, eliminating its monsters and saving its best rough drafts.”9 There is flux as individuals come into being; those that are not self-contradictory survive and those having inherent self-contradictions disappear: “une multitude d’êtres informes; les monstres se sont anéantis successivement; subsister; et se perpétuer.”

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In Thoughts on the Interpretation of Nature (1753), Thought 58, Question 2, Diderot suggests a stream of change of condition with a series of verbs (“Un individu commence . . . s’accroît, dure, dépérit et passe . . .”), nouns that connote movement and change of events preceded by hyperbole such as “infinité” (“L’embryon . . . a passé par une infinité d’organisations et de développements . . .”), and nouns that connote motion in tautological constructs (“ . . . d’autres développements à subir, et d’autres accroissements à prendre . . .”). By 1761 Buffon used the term flux to connote a stream of events in nature: “ . . . Nature, I declare, is in a movement of continual flux; but it is enough for man to seize it in the instant of his century, and to throw a few glances behind and ahead, in order to try to catch a glimpse of what it might have been, and what it could become in time.”10 In this passage, Buffon utilizes flux to identify a stream in which man is the event and subject to change over millennia. After Buffon began using flux to convey a general stream of events, the term began to appear in Diderot’s writing, also in the context of the metamorphosis of beings over time. For example, by 1769, in D’Alembert’s Dream, Diderot uses flux twice, both times to convey a general stream in nature in which living beings are the events. D’Alembert says, “and if everything is in general flux, as the spectacle of the universe shows me everywhere, what wouldn’t the duration and vicissitudes of a few million centuries bring about?”11 D’Alembert also posits, “ . . . tout est en un flux perpétuel . . .” This is reminiscent of Buffon’s passage cited above, in which the author uses flux to identify a stream in which man is the event and subject to change over millennia. Diderot combines flux with the notion of time: together, flux and time dispel chaos. In the Letter on the Blind Diderot evokes time with the terms à la fois, infini, existe de toute éternité, ancien et premier état, la naissance des choses et des temps, la condition présente des choses, leur condition passée, les premiers instants, la durée, ont cessé, se perpétuer, le premier homme, serait resté, pour toujours, jamais, and de temps en temps. The notion that time is eternal is central to Diderot’s evolutionist philosophy. It is eternity that gives random events the opportunity to eventually form patterns and successful outcomes. If time were not eternal, life would not exist. Probabilité is derived from the Latin probabilitatem (nominative probabilitas), credibility, probability, from probabilis, probable. In eighteenth century France, the term probabilité connoted the quality or fact of being probable, the appearance of truth, or likelihood of being realized, which any statement or event bears in the light of present evidence; likelihood.12 Diderot’s interest in the mathematical principles underlying probability in games of chance was influenced by articles on the subject that appeared

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in the Encyclopedia. The Encyclopedia addressed probability in the following articles: “Absent” [“Absent”], “Acatalepsy” [“Acatalepsie”], “Advantage” [“Avantage”], “Annuity” [“Annuité”], “Basset” (card game) [“Bassette”], “Certainty” [“Certitude”], “Chances” [“Hazards”], “Combination” [“Combinaison”], “Die” [“Dé”], “Discount” [“Escompte”], “Doubt” [“Doute”], “Etymology” [“Etymologie”], “Faro” (card game) [“Pharaon”], “Game” [“Jeu”], “Heads or Tails” [“Croix ou pile”], “Innoculation” [“Inoculation”], “Life” [“Vie”], “Life Annuities” [“Rentes viageres”], “Lottery” [“Loterie”], “Odd or Even” [“Pair ou non”], “Play” [“Jouer”], “Probability” [“Probabilité”], “Tile” [“Carreau”], “Wager” [“Gageure” and “Pari”], and “Vitri-le-François” [“Vitri-le-François”]. Richard Pulskamp identifies many unsigned articles that were written by d’Alembert: Of his contributions to this work, the most important articles are these two: Croix ou Pile (Heads or Tails) and Gageure (Wager) which appeared in 1754 and 1757 respectively. Several other articles written by d’Alembert are Absent, Avantage, Bassette, Carreau, Dé, Loterie and Pari. It is worthwhile to note that the article Jeu does not concern itself with games of chance at all, but rather refers the reader to the article Jouer. This latter article is unsigned and therefore not written by d’Alembert. The article Probabilité is also unsigned. It is therefore likely that both were the work of Diderot.13

In 1761 Diderot wrote a lengthy piece on probability entitled, On Two Treatises by d’Alembert, One concerning the Computation of Probabilities, the Other, Inoculation. The work is a response to two of d’Alembert’s memoirs on probability, namely, Reflections on the Computation of Probability (Treatise 10) and On the Application of the Computation of Probability to Inoculation against Smallpox (Treatise 11). Diderot’s response is divided into three sections: “On Probability,” “A Few Observations on this Treatise,” and “On Inoculation.” The first two sections are a highly detailed analysis of games of chance and their complexity and would lead the reader to think that a mathematician had written them. Diderot acknowledged the highly technical nature of the work and in a reference to it, he wrote to Sophie Volland, “The piece On Probability is in obscure language that will not entertain you.”14 In Philosophic Thoughts, Thought 21, Diderot evokes probability by utilizing terms such as la possibilité, fortuit, fortuitement, combinaisons possibles, and nombre des possibles. The study of games of chance indicates that as the number of throws of dice becomes larger, patterns begin to randomly emerge. As we approach

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an infinite number of throws, all possible outcomes appear. This principle of probability is central to Diderot’ transformist philosophy: since atoms are perpetually in motion and they have eternity within which to randomly collide with one another, probability dictates that random collisions will eventually form minerals, vegetables, animals, and finally, man. We find in Diderot’s works, from Philosophic Thoughts (1746) through D’Alembert’s Dream (1769), that flux and time dispel chaos and bring about everything in the universe. The random collision of atoms can lead to organization that is progressively more complex or less complex. Diderot offered examples of instances in which matter becomes organized into a higher order and they include 1) the combination of atoms into more and more complex life forms over millennia and 2) the ascent from mineral to vegetable to animal through the processes of soil fertilization, the harvesting of plants, eating, digestion, and nutritive assimilation. Conversely, Diderot’s examples of a transition from higher to lower organization are 1) the extinction of species, 2) the diminution of larger species to smaller species over time, and 3) the transition of food to waste material through the digestive and elimination processes. Diderot used the concepts of chaos, flux, time, and probability to build a transformist point of view. He gradually refined his thought about man’s appearance on earth: in 1746 he established the relationship between chaos, flux, time, and probability as a means to explain the origin of the universe— he was just beginning to address the molecular composition of all matter, the perpetual motion of molecules, the origin of life, and ask why some matter is alive, while other is not. Diderot begins Thought 21 of Philosophic Thoughts by stating, “I open the pages of a celebrated professor . . .”15 Paul Vernière notes, “All annotators after Brière believe that the ‘celebrated professor’ is D.F. Rivard, philosophy professor at the collège de Beauvais.”16 Dominique François Rivard (1697–1778) taught philosophy and mathematics. Vernière continues, “Diderot was, in fact, his student and praises his pedagogic intelligence many times (cf. Plan d’une université, A.T., t. III, p. 436, et II, p. 452). He introduced mathematics to the University of Paris. (Elements of Mathematics, 1740-Geometry, 1732-Arithmetic, 1747). Diderot could only allude to the Philosophy of Education suitable for School Use, a collection of his works published after his death by his friend, Monniotte (1778–1780).17 Diderot refers to his professor when he mentions “the first principles of arithmetic, algebra and geometry, whose instruction I owe to one of my former teachers.”18 Diderot praises Rivard in this paragraph:

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The same man of judgment, Mr. Rivard, who introduced the study of mathematics into our public schools and substituted questions for argumentation, intended to teach, in place of bad scholastic moral philosophy, good elements of public and civil law.19

It is significant that Diderot begins Thought 21 by opening the notebook of the professor who introduced him to mathematics: the central thesis of the chapter will be that the universe is the result of random chance and the entire apologetic will be based on the fledgling mathematical science of probability theory (the study of games of chance). In “ . . . je vous accorde que le mouvement est essentiel à la matière . . . ,” Diderot introduces the first technical vocabulary in the chapter—the language of physics: le mouvement, essentiel, and la matière. In his notebooks Rivard posits as an indisputable fact that motion is a fundamental property of nature. Diderot will use this fact, taken from Greek physics, as the basis of his argument that the universe is the result of the random motion of atoms. The throw of dice will become a metaphor for the random movement of atoms. The concepts that motion is intrinsic to the atom, and that atoms randomly collide and form everything in the universe, date back to the works of Thales (6th century BC), Leucippus (5th century BC), Democritus (460–370 BC), and Epicurus (341–270 BC). Lucretius’ On the Nature of Things (first century BC) is the fullest extant statement of the physical theory of Epicurus. Epicurus’ theory that the universe came into being through the random collision of atoms (described in Book V of Lucretius’ On the Nature of Things) is the basis of the question that Diderot finds upon opening Rivard’s notebook: since motion is a fundamental property of matter, may one deduce that the universe came into being through the random collision of atoms? Diderot answers the question by combining the terminology and imagery of games of chance with the language of physics. For example, he combines jet fortuit [lucky toss] with atomes and creates the phrase jet fortuit des atomes. The language and concepts of games of chance are mathematical; matière and atomes are terms germane to physics. Diderot combines the two sciences, mathematics and physics, to establish his cosmological perspective, namely, that the universe is the result of random chance. Thought 21 is rich in metaphors, concepts and hypotheses tangent upon probability theory. Mathematicians who study probability observe the following principle: as numbers become larger and we approach infinity, every possible outcome will manifest itself. Diderot’s atheist argues that according to probability theory, it is not surprising that unusual outcomes happen, because the rarity of the event is compensated by the quantity of throws. He states the

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concept twice. First he says, “ . . . la difficulté de l’événement est compensée par la quantité des jets.” Then he reiterates,” . . . la difficulté de l’événement est plus que suffisamment compensée par la multitude des jets.” The tautology in literary style hyperbolizes a basic rule of higher mathematics, namely, that as the number of events increase, there will be more outcomes, and ultimately, given an infinite number of tries, every possible outcome will occur. The tautology is also an iconic representation of flux: events can be either identical or similar to preceding ones. Hence, the repetition of words is illustrative of the recurrence of events in games of chance. The objective of Thought 21 is to answer the question as to whether the world results from the random motion of atoms. Diderot utilizes three metaphors to prove that the answer is yes: 1) atomes [atoms]-the continual motion of atoms will eventually result in the organization of matter, 2) caractères [printer’s type]—continual and random keystrokes on a printing press will eventually result in the creation of a literary masterpiece, and 3) dés [dice]— the casting of dice will eventually yield patterns. After Diderot presents the three metaphors, he demonstrates that given an infinite number of events or flux (ie: a continuous stream of molecular motion and collisions, characters on a printing press or tosses of dice) and an eternal time frame, all possible outcomes will eventually manifest themselves. By the end of the passage it is obvious that the atheist, who argues that life is the result of random chance, wins the argument. The terms that Diderot uses in Thought 21 are intrinsic to probability theory: accorder, amener, analyse, arrangements (2x), arriver, avantage or avantageuse (3x), aveux réciproques, caractères (2x), cent mille dés, cent mille six, chaos, combinaisons possibles, compensée (2x), coups, se démener, difficulté (2x), durée, engendrer, ensuivre, éternité (2x), événement (2x), à la fois, fortuit (2x), fortuitement (2x), gager, hypothétique, infinie (6x), jet or jets (6x), jeu, lois, multitude (3x), multitude de ceux, multitide des jets, nombre (2x), ordre, petit, point de bornes, possible, possibilité, proposer, proposition, quantité (3x), quantité des jets (3x), réelle, résultat, somme finie (2x), somme infinie, sorts, and supposition. These terms transform the argument into a mathematical problem that can be proven true or false. The apologetic is based on the language of games of chance: sorts, jets and fortuit. During the eighteenth century, sort was defined as “the manner of deciding something by chance. Fortune has fallen on such a one. The die has been cast. Sometimes officers, elections are decided by lot, by chance. There were three condemned soldiers, they got out of it by sheer luck. One says figuratively, The die is cast, to mean The course has been set.”20 Sort connoted random chance, as did its synonym, hasard. Phrases derived from sort included au

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sort, être son sort, le sort des armes, le sort en est jeté, and tirer au sort. Jet connoted castings or throwing. From jet were derived the expressions le jet de dés, d’un seul jet, and du premier jet. During the eighteenth century, fortuit was defined as “what happens by chance, fortuitous. By mere chance. It is an accident. It is a lucky thing. Chance encounter. Chance event. One is not held back by luck.”21 Fortuit connoted random chance; cas fortuit, chose fortuit, rencontre fortuit, and événement fortuit were derived from it. Selon les lois de l’analyse de sorts identifies the specific science that le professeur célèbre taught, namely, the calculation of probability. Flux or a continuous stream of events is central to probability theory. For Diderot the event is the collision and subsequent combination of atoms. Having established that motion is a fundamental property of atoms, Diderot then infers that this perpetual motion leads to combining and organizing: he utilizes the phrase la somme infinie des combinaisons possibles. Combinaisons (the combination or organization of atoms into matter) is hyperbolized by somme infinie de and possibles. It refers back to and reiterates quantité de jets, tel nombre de coups, telle somme finie de jets, and la quantité de jets est infinie. Combinaison is hyperbolized by un nombre infini d’arrangements admirables that immediately follows. Thus, Diderot brings the notion of flux or the unceasing stream of molecular motion to the reader’s attention. There is another factor, mutually exclusive, yet intimately intertwined with flux: time. Diderot utilizes éternité to hyperbolize and render time absolute: la matière existe de toute éternité and la matière s’étant mue de toute éternité. Time is a key factor in the origin of the universe: given an infinite number of collisions among atoms (an infinite number of opportunities for organization to occur) and an infinite span of time, probability dictates that some organization (arrangements admirables) must occur. In the climax of the passage, “Therefore the mind ought to be more astonished at the hypothetical duration of chaos than at the actual birth of the universe,” Diderot articulates the conclusion to his reasoning; the material presented therein is hyperbolized by its final position in the chapter.22 Chaos is negated by la durée hypothétique. Matter has always been in motion and therefore, chaos has never existed. In other words, the universe has always existed and it never had a naissance. The science of numbers indicates that eventually all patterns will manifest themselves as time progresses. Given molecular flux and infinite time, the birth of the universe was inevitable. The conclusion is that the duration of chaos is hypothetical and that therefore, it has never existed. Eternité, by definition, has no beginning (Diderot uses éternité twice), and therefore, the universe is eternal. Molecular motion and subsequent organization, arising from random collision, have always

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occurred. Hence, one must necessarily extrapolate that the notion of chaos is purely fictitious and suppositional. Diderot supports this conclusion by contrasting durée hypothétique du chaos with la naissance réelle de l’univers. Naissance is real, but durée is hypothetical. The universe is here, but chaos is not. “Matter being in motion from all eternity” implies that chaos has never existed.23 Thus, Diderot demonstrates that during a period of time that is eternal, Homer’s Iliad or Voltaire’s la Henriade can, indeed, result from random keystrokes on a printing press, and the universe, as complex as a watch, can come into existence without a watch maker. The debate of whether a literary masterpiece can emerge randomly on a printing press is an entrée to the real question: Was the universe created or was it the result of random chance? As early as in 1746, Diderot turned to the science of physics for the answer: atomes (2x), chaos, matière (3x), mouvement (2x), se mouvoir, and univers (2x). Diderot uses the science of large numbers to illustrate that the universe is the result of random chance; instead of printing characters, the set of figures is atoms. If the period of time is eternity, then eventually, every possibility will show itself. What is repugnant to reason is the supposition that an infinite number of admirable arrangements does not result from an infinite number of possible combinations, if eternity is the amount of time that is allotted for them to occur. The climax of the passage and the full force of Diderot’s advocacy of random chance are in the last sentence: “Donc, l’esprit doit être plus étonné de la durée hypothétique du chaos que de la naissance réelle de l’univers.” This is his response to the question posed in the first sentence of the passage, “que le monde résulte du jet fortuit des atomes?” Having set for the doctrine of large number, the answer is yes. Three years later, in the Letter on the Blind (1749), Diderot again intertwines the concepts of chaos, flux, time, and probability to explain the existence of the universe. Once again, a professor of mathematics speaks: this time it is Nicholas Saunderson, Lucasian Professor of Mathematics at Cambridge, who had contracted smallpox at the age of one and had been blind since then. In the Letter on the Blind, the blind geometrician evokes a universe in perpetual flux, prey to chance, eliminating its monsters and saving creatures whose bodily mechanisms do not have significant defects. In five pages Saunderson declares that random chance is the reason for the origin and continuity of the universe. There are similarities between Thought 21 and the Letter on the Blind in how the transformist material is presented. For example, one of the key themes in the Letter is mathematics and the persona is Nicholas Saunderson,

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the blind Cambridge mathematician (1682–1739). Whereas three years previous, probability theory was presented through the notebooks of a celebrated mathematics professor, Dominique François Rivard, now the protagonist is another mathematics professor, this time from England. The terminology and concepts are the same as they were in 1746. Some similar key phrases are: 1. La naissance des choses et des temps (Letter); la naissance réelle de l’univers (Thought 21). 2. Un ordre admirable (Letter); arrangements admirables (twice in Thought 21). 3. Chaos recurs: le chaos se débrouiller (Letter); la durée hypothétique du chaos (Thought 21). 4. Combinaisons, from the study of games of chance, recurs: Toutes les combinaisons vicieuses de la matière ont disparu (Letter); la somme infinie des combinaisons possibles (Thought 21). 5. The notion of flux recurs: une multitude d’êtres informes (Letter); la multitude des jets (Thought 21). While the event, formally, was molecular interaction, now it is malformed creatures.

As he does in Thought 21, Diderot makes mathematics a key theme in the Letter because of its precision, consistency, and reliability. Numbers are the only reliable means by which both the blind and the sighted can make positive sense of the physical world. Saunderson’s calculating pins are a means by which he can reliably convert the world of unseen phenomena into mathematical terms. Numbers can be made to operate consistently, and be perceived accurately, through constant repetition, by the sense of touch. Diderot proclaims his faith in the power of mathematics to solve philosophic problems. The very fact that the structure of natural objects is ephemeral and unpredictable (as Saunderson’s comments on monsters indicate) shows the difficulty of attempting to find any simple principle that will explain the workings of external nature. Diderot finds in mathematics the means by which man can reduce disparate phenomena to the unity of numbers. In addition, numbers make sense only if the mind can, through repetition, perceive their consistency. Diderot emphasizes the importance of repeated experience, both in his presentation of Saunderson’s system and in his discussion of Molyneux’ problem. Having established the reliability of mathematics, Diderot creates a solid foundation for his probability based evolutionist philosophy. In the Letter, we again find chaos, flux, time, and probability:

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Diderot and the Metamorphosis of Species 1. Chaos: nous sentissions . . . la chaos se débrouiller 2. Flux: a continuous stream of motion is evoked in la matière se mouvoir. Diderot goes a step further than he did in Philosophic Thoughts: we also have a continuous stream of beings—une multitude d’êtres informes, les monstres se sont anéantis successivement, subsister, and se perpétuer. 3. Time: la naissance des choses et des temps, la condition présente, leur condition passée, les premiers instants, la durée, ont cessé, le premier homme, pour toujours, jamais (2x), and de temps en temps 4. Probability: many phrases have counterparts in the study of games of chance. For example, la naissance des choses et des temps (the arrival of an event), le chaos (a stream of events that yields no pattern), se débrouiller (the appearance of a pattern), nous rencontrerions une multitude d’êtres informes pour quelques êtres bien organisés (flux), la durée, ont cessé, successivement, toutes les combinaisons, ont disparu, il n’est resté que celles où, cela supposé, peut-être pour toujours, nombre des possibles, and l’ordre n’est pas si parfait qu’il ne paraisse encore de temps en temps.

Concerning the dispersion of chaos and the birth of the universe, Diderot revisits the question of whether chaos ever existed. In 1746 he ends Thought 21 concluding, “Donc, l’esprit doit être plus étonné de la durée hypothétique du chaos que de la naissance réelle de l’univers.” La durée hypothétique du chaos indicates that chaos has never existed, that matter has always existed, and because motion is intrinsic to matter, the universe has always existed. By 1749, however, Saunderson, picks up where that statement leaves off: “. .et que si nous remontions à la naissance des choses et des temps, et que nous sentissions la matière se mouvoir et le chaos se débrouiller . . .” Chaos and naissance again appear in the same sentence, but this time Diderot has chaos disperse only to give rise to multitudes of beings, many of them teratisms. Diderot has relinquished the notion that chaos has never existed and that the universe always was: by 1749 he embraces Lucretius’ view that random molecular motion brought the universe into existence and dispersed chaos. By 1769 he will conclude that chaos perpetually comes into and out of existence, both in this world and throughout the universe. Regarding . . . si nous remontions à la naissance . . . , during the eighteenth century remonter was defined thus: One says in the same sense, Return to the source, to the origin, to the cause, to the beginning, to mean, Consider a thing in its origin, in its beginning, in its commencement. Return to the source, return to the origin, to the beginning of such thing, & you will find that . . . 24

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In referring to a family tree, on says, that It goes back in time, that its genealogy goes back to such a person, to such a year, to mean that the lineage of this House has been proven to go back to such a person, to such a time period.25

Both definitions apply to Diderot’s use of the verb remonter. The first definition applies in the sense that man’s presence in the universe is a mystery that requires an investigator who can remonter to solve the case. The second definition applies in that Diderot is alluding to climbing Aristotle’s chain of being and ascending to the very top, to the first living form that was created. There is a climbing to the top of a summit that is suggested, evoking Aristotle’s chain from bottom to top. La naissance is hyperbolized by des choses and des temps. More than one event was born; matter and time. Furthermore, matter and time are both pluralized, and this hyperbolizes each event. This pluralization evokes a geometric or exponential birth; more than one event was born, and each of these events is in the plural. Thus, the pluralization is an iconic representation of the exponential evolutionism that is being discussed. Diderot borrows his imagery of monsters from Lucretius’ On the Nature of Things, V, 838–46, and the concept of the multitude from V, 799 and V, 838. For example, “nous rencontrerions une multitude d’êtres informes” is taken from V, 838–850, in which Lucretius portrays multitudes of creatures arising randomly from the earth, many of them deformed and monstrous. Lucretius declares that some had no feet and others had no hands, some were dumb without mouths, or blind without eyes, or their limbs adhered to their bodies. Similarly, Diderot maintains that during the first instants of the formation of animals, some had no head and others had no feet, some had no stomach and others no intestines, and those to whom a stomach, palate and teeth seemed to give promise of survival, were eliminated by a heart or lung defect. Diderot presents a nature that continually brings forth everything into existence. He gives the explanation as to why there are no headless or footless animals today: they cannot subsist on their own and multiply. This explanation is taken directly from On the Nature of Things, V, 846–77. The notion of spontaneous generation is also taken from Lucretius. In II, 872, Lucretius declares that we may see worms come forth alive from dung when the earth is soaked and rotted from immeasurable rain. Diderot argues that living beings originated directly from the ground when he says that matter in fermentation hatched the universe. The image is concretized in the Rêve in the image of the bull pressing his feet against the ground and rising up from the soil. The image can be understood as a metaphor for

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spontaneous generation and also for transformism, as the two give rise to life, one quickly and the other, over millennia. Spontaneous generation was useful to Diderot because it eliminated the need for a Prime Mover. All that was needed was the premise that motion is intrinsic to the atom, and given eternity and flux, life would inevitably arise from inanimate matter. Hence, spontaneous generation is a microcosm of transformism: in the former, microscopic life is believed to arise from the mineral kingdom and from dead matter; in the latter, all life arises from the mineral kingdom over millennia. Not only does Diderot take his imagery of spontaneous generation, defective creatures, and the dispersion of chaos from Lucretius, he also borrows his reasons for the survival of certain species, namely, the absence of any significant physical defect, the ability to survive, and the ability to perpetuate one’s kind. Lucretius’ flux of creatures, some defective, some normal, is based on probability theory that requires a multitude of throws or events to yield patterns. Thus the multiplicity of throws (flux or continuous stream) of probability theory concurs with Lucretius’ multitudes of atomic clashes (many first-beginnings of things driven on by blows from time everlasting until now (V, 421–2), and yielding many animals (V, 799). Henri Coulet addresses the importance of flux in Diderot’s thought.26 Coulet says that in the eighteenth century, men were ready to “tolerate contradictions” and accept the fact that “they have been immersed in the changing flux of phenomena and the inexhaustible chain of causes and effects.”27 Coulet mentions that before Diderot, Fontenelle had declared that the apparent permanence of the universe is illusory.28 In A Conversation on the Plurality of Worlds, Fontenelle surmises, “If roses, which last but a day, could write histories, and leave memoirs one to another, and if the first rose should draw an exact picture of his gardener, and after 15,000 rose-ages, it should be left to the other roses, and so on still to those that should succeed, without any change in it; should the roses hereupon say, We have seen every day the same gardener, and in the memory of roses, none ever saw any gardener but this; he is still the same as he was, and therefore certainly he will not die as we do, for there is no change at all in him. ‘Would not these roses, Madame, talk very foolishly?’”29 Diderot uses Fontenelle’s roses as a metaphor to hyperbolize his point that species, too, have a finite life span and also to point out that men, who are ephemeral, should not be so arrogant as to think that they can comprehend the eternal or posit that God exists. The sleeping d’Alembert warns, “ . . . steer clear of the fallacy of the ephemeral . . .”30 Bordeu explains to Julie that the fallacy of the ephemeral is the error that occurs when a short-lived being believes in the immortality of things.31 Julie, who like Bordeu, is articulating

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Diderot’s philosophy, further elucidates, “Fontenelle’s rose who used to say that in the memory of a rose no one had ever seen a gardener die?”32 Roses, species, animalcules under a microscope, human beings, are all metaphors for the events that flux delivers. The events are random. Flux + time = the dispersion of chaos. Coulet observes that before Diderot, Fontenelle had demonstrated “that the apparent permanence of the universe is an illusion: ‘when there is motion somewhere, changes must occur’; that there has not been change without motion . . . it was a bold idea; the moved thing has not only changed its position, but its nature, as well, and the possibility of motion was incompatible with the fixity of Creation.”33 Coulet shows that in 1746 Diderot compared conflicting ideas: in Thought 21, nature plays dice; in Thoughts 18 and 19, there are God the engineer, a Creation that is forever static, and preexisting germs of perfect beings that God had created. Diderot is a deist, but he is toying with atheism. By 1749 Diderot had resolved the conflict: he concluded that motion does not come from God, but rather, from matter.34 It is this motion that comes from matter that causes nature to multiply an infinite number of variations. Coulet points out that in 1753, in Thoughts 11 and 12, Diderot declares that nature has created multitudes of variations from a single act, and that this notion is “clearly formulated” again in the Elements of Physiology: “Nature has only made a very few number of beings that it varied an infinite number of times, perhaps just one by combining, mixing, dissolving, of which all the others were formed.35 Coulet relates monsters to flux in Diderot’s transformism. Coulet asserts that for Diderot, the difference between monsters and normality is purely statistical-flux delivers events and monsters appear less frequently than do normal beings. In the Dream, Bordeu discusses all of the things that can possibly go wrong in the developing embryo, but that usually do not; Julie marvels that the fibers comprising the developing foetus do not get mixed up more often, like the silk threads on her spindle. Coulet notes that in the section “Fœtus” in the Elements of Physiology, Diderot maintains that if monsters are defined as beings that do not last, then everyone is a monster because no one is immortal.36 Coulet reiterates the sleeping d’Alembert who declares, “Everything changes unceasingly . . . Everything is in perpetual flux. There is nothing fixed in nature.”37 Coulet notes that species are a little less ephemeral than individuals and monsters.38 Paul Vernière observes that Diderot’s account of “the first living beings and monsters is, in 1749, still purely literary; Lucretius is his master here, and not the anatomists of his time, who, however, with Winslow and Lémery, were interested in teratology. Should we think of the Telliamed, published

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in 1748? Nothing is less certain . . .”39 Lucretius’ verses illustrate that the swiftest and most cunning creatures and those without significant physical defects were the ones that survived; Diderot borrows these concepts in his portrayal of the dispersion of chaos. Lester Crocker declares that in the Letter on the Blind, Diderot shows that the “universe is not an orderly clock-mechanism, but a chaotic force in which everything is the result of blind randomness plus necessity. There is a cosmic order, but it is the transient outcome of trial and error in an endless process devoid of final causes.”40 In On the Nature of Things, Lucretius enumerates teratisms that the earth had once created and that were ill suited for survival.41 For example, creatures without hands or feet could not hunt for food or protect themselves from predators, and so, they became extinct. Beings born dumb without mouths could not ingest food, and therefore, due to lack of nutrition, they necessarily died soon after birth. Creatures born blind without eyes were unable to hunt for food, and hence, they starved. Creatures disabled by the adhesion of their limbs to their bodies had no mobility: if the defect was in their legs, they were unable to flee from their enemies, or hunt for food; if their arms were defective, they could not hunt, carry food to their mouths, or fight in battle. These teratisms were ill suited to their environment and therefore, either perished soon after birth, or became easy prey for their predators. Lucretius identifies the characteristics that permit creatures to survive and proliferate: cunning, courage, and speed.42 In addition, because certain animals are protected by humanity, they do not have to hunt for food or fall prey to their predators.43 Diderot borrows Lucretius’ reasons for extinction and survival: he demonstrates that certain defects prevent the assimilation of food or air (a lack of a mouth, stomach, intestines, or lungs) and that some creatures fall prey to their predators (les monstres se sont anéantis). Diderot attributes survival to those physical characteristics that make it possible for them to subsist on their own and proliferate. In the Letter on the Blind, Diderot returns to the language of probability theory, but he combines it with the language of Lucretian monsters. For example, he reiterates the notion of having to cast dice a multitude of times in order to get a few desired outcomes: “nous rencontrerions une multitude d’êtres informes pour quelques êtres bien organisés.” We have the arithmetic notion of multitude again and it is the opposite of quelques. Multitude connotes flux: there must be flux or the continuous flowing of events for a few desirable events to occur.

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Etres is repeated to bring attention to the adjectives that follow, informes and bien organisés. Informes and bien organisés are antonyms, as are multitude and quelques êtres. The appearance of quelques êtres bien organisés is inevitable because all possibilities will become manifest after a multiplicity of throws. “Nous rencontrerions une multitude d’êtres informes pour quelques êtres bien organisés” is reminiscent of Thought 21, “la difficulté de l’événement est compensée par la quantité des jets.” In the Letter on the Blind, the event is êtres and flux is indicated by multitude. Diderot does not view the chain of beings as a straight line, but rather, as a branch or tree of possible outcomes. In the sequence of events articulated in “ . . . si le premier homme eût eu . . . que devenait le genre humain?” we find that every event is the result of circumstances immediately preceding it, and that those circumstances are, in turn, defined by antecedent events. Hence, the chain of being is the product of random chance. Diderot is very modern in that his examination of the consequences of a defect early in the chain of beings concurs with modern chaos theory. A key principle in modern chaos theory is the premise that small changes in initial conditions or parameters of a system will often be magnified considerably over time and may have an enormous influence on the long-term behavior of a system. For example, the butterfly effect, in which a butterfly that flaps its wings in South America causes atmospheric perturbations such as to cause a snowfall in Alaska, is often cited as illustrative of this notion. Modern chaos theory recognizes that one random event could give rise to a stream of events (ie: one random mutation could give rise to a new species). Diderot gave a great deal of thought to the mechanics of chaos and its consequences. He recognized the critical nature of a single event that is born of chaos: he argued that if the first man had had significant defects, mankind would have never had arisen; he would have disappeared as do the defective creatures in Lucretius’ writing. However, man’s molecules would have remained in the universe and eventually would have formed something else (“dissous et dispersé entre les molécules de la matière . . .”). Diderot returns to the language of probability theory: “serait resté, peut-être pour toujours, au nombre des possibles.” The uncertainty connoted by peut-être and possibles, coupled with the arithmetic noun nombre hyperbolizes the randomness of creation. Thus, Diderot evokes trees or branches of possible outcomes, in place of a chain of being. There are an infinite number of possible outcomes. Each random event has consequences; one successful event may give rise to a whole host of complex systems. The phrase “qu’il ne paraisse encore de temps en temps des productions monstrueuses” indicates that chaos was not totally eradicated at some

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time in the past: it coexists with order. The fact that teratism recurs with statistical frequency indicates that chaos is born of order or that chaos coexists with order. In “combien de mondes estropiés, manqués, se sont dissipés . . . où je ne touché point, et où vous ne voyez pas,” Diderot makes an analogy between complex animal systems and complex star systems. He recognizes that there are hierarchies in systems that arise randomly. For Diderot, atoms and galaxies belong to systems that change internally. Not only are atoms and galaxies subject to metamorphoses, as are animals and men, but they, too, are part of the conscious hierarchy. For Diderot, all matter is conscious at every level of organization. Hence, atoms undergo changes, as do the mineral kingdom, plants, animalcules, animals, human beings, planets, and stars. “Combien de mondes estropiés, manqués, se sont dissipés” anthropomorphizes planets and star systems. Celestial bodies, like men and animals, pass in and out of existence, and if they are inadequate or defective in some particular way, will disappear from existence. The phrase faisait éclore l’univers attributes animal qualities to the universe: it hatches. Ce que je crois des animaux refers back to éclore. The tautology hyperbolizes the analogy between the universe and animals and it erases the distinction between an internally nonadaptive system and an internally adaptive system. For Diderot all systems are hatched, all are conscious, even molecules, planets, and the universe itself. Eclore evokes the metaphors of birds hatching and flowers blooming. The birth of the universe is caused by la matière en fermentation. Diderot combines the chemical expression fermentation with éclore to demonstrate that the origin of everything can be explained by scientific means. Everything has a gradual unfolding: in D’Alembert’s Dream Diderot embraces epigenesis and describes d’Alembert’s birth by purely biological means. Hence, fermentation faisait éclore l’univers is an iconic representation of monistic Enlightenment thought: the birth of human beings as well as the origin of the universe can be explained in purely physical terms and processes (ie: fermentation). The verb éclore also indicates that Diderot recognized that there are complex systems within complex systems and that their functioning is similar: the universe was hatched as birds, fish, and animals are hatched. Diderot envisages a whole that functions like its parts. This is similar to modern fractal theory for two reasons. First, many fractals possess the property of selfsimilarity. A self-similar object is one whose parts resemble the whole. This reiteration of details or patterns occurs at progressively smaller scales and can, in the case of purely abstract entities, continue indefinitely, so that each part of each part, when magnified, will look basically like a fixed part of the

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whole object. A self-similar object remains invariant under change of scale ie: it has scaling symmetry. While the universe does not physically resemble a bird, a fish or an animal, its reproductive process is similar: both are hatched. The universe is hatched from inanimate matter as spontaneous generationists believed that animalcules are hatched from inanimate matter. The universe is a macrocosm of spontaneous generation; spontaneous generation is a microcosm of the birth of the universe. Eclore implies that the universe is like one its smallest parts, a bird’s egg. Fermentation implies that the living arises from the nonliving (spontaneous generation). The whole (universe) ferments as does each of its smallest parts. The fact that Diderot telescopes from the larger entity to the smaller and that he implies that the whole is similar to its parts, indicates that he had the uncanny ability to foresee the symmetry that modern chaos theory recognizes in fractals. Furthermore, modern chaos theory posits that small changes in initial conditions or parameters of a system will be magnified considerably over time, as in the butterfly effect. Diderot contemplated this principle when he posited that the random fermentation of molecules in the beginning had far reaching consequences. Diderot returns to the beginning and shows the importance of initial conditions: this, too, concurs with modern fractal theory. Diderot ruminates on the possibility of life on other planets: since the random collision of molecules can bring about life on this planet, it most certainly can on others, as well. Diderot is very modern in supposing that transformism happened throughout the universe. Diderot posits that life may occur throughout the universe: hence, there is a predictable, recurrent population that is distributed throughout a system, as occurs in fractals. Diderot provides a three pronged lens for the reader: a microscope, a telescope to see distant worlds, and a view of the past. He goes from the microcosm to the macrocosm, from the atom to planets. Atoms collide and change form, living beings change in form, and worlds change. “Combien de mondes estropiés, manqués, se sont dissipés . . .” evokes a planet that did not develop to its full potential, just as Lucretius’ monsters. It anthropomorphizes mondes and suggests that worlds, like people or animals, can be crippled, paralyzed, and deformed at birth. Estropier is to mondes as éclore is to univers, as both demonstrate that cosmic bodies have animal or human qualities: they are both hatched, can be deformed at birth, and die. The notion that the larger body is comprised of smaller constituents that resemble it concurs with modern fractal theory. The reflexive verb se reformer connotes a rebirth, a new beginning, and thus nullifies the condition evoked by estropiés, manqués, and dissipés immediately preceding it. Then se dissiper is repeated, completing the cycle of birth,

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death, and renewal: just as atoms and molecules reorganize themselves in the cycle of the birth, life, and death of a living being, so does organization at the level of planets and solar systems. This process is hyperbolized by à chaque instant. It is the rule of the universe, not something rare and unusual. This happens across the universe, out of the reach of telescopes, “où je ne touche point, et où vous ne voyez pas.” Diderot repeats the life cycle presented in dissiper, se reformer and se dissiper in “où le mouvement continue et continuera de combiner des amas de matière.” The tautology hyperbolizes the eternal nature of the cycle and brings time to the reader’s mind. . . . continue et continuera is tautological and hyperbolizes the preceding à chaque instant. The concept of flux from probability theory is presented here, and there are several kinds of flux. First, there is the continuous reorganization of molecules at the microscopic level. There is continual motion, combination, and recombination of the very small. Secondly, there is a continuous stream of time periods, albeit infinitely minute: à chaque instant indicates a small instant; continue et continuera indicates eternity. Thus, there is a small time frame and the vast composite, eternity. Thus, we have a flux of physical objects (molécules) and parcels of time (instants). To this Diderot adds probability: “jusqu’à ce qu’ils aient obtenu quelque arrangement dans lequel ils puissent persévérer.” The subjunctive mood in jusqu’à ce qu’ils aient obtenu evokes random chance, as it does in jusqu’à ce que cela soit fait. We see arrangement again, as we did in Thought 21. “Jusquà ce qu’ils aient obtenu quelque arrangement dans lequel ils puissent persévérer” is reminiscent of Lucretius’ statement that multitudinous atoms came together in every possible way and tested every possible combination; over a vast period of time these multitudinous, random clashes resulted in the beginning of the earth, sea, sky and living creatures.44 Diderot provides a concept of chaos that comes in and out of existence, not a one time phenomenon that existed before the creation of the universe and was then dispersed forever: at every instant chaos exists somewhere in the universe, and organization is born out of it; conversely, organization degenerates into chaos at every instant, as well. In “Qu’est-ce que ce monde . . . Un composé sujet à des révolutions, qui toutes indiquent une tendance continuelle à la destruction . . . ,” Diderot compares the world to a giant clock: it is Un composé sujet à des revolutions. During the eighteenth century, composé was defined thus: “Said of A machine, for whose works and performance many different pieces are required, that it is adjusted, finely tuned. And in Mechanics, What results from several other movements is called, an adjusted Movement.”45 A giant

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clock is metaphorized here subject to the revolutions of its cogs and wheels, as clocks are, but there is a surprise: this clock is continually moving towards destruction. Rather than gaze at the universe with awe and wonder, Diderot sees the seeds of destruction sown at every instant: chaos is continually coming into existence. This is diametrically antithetical to Newton’s symmetrical universe, created by God, made to work perfectly. Diderot’s universe is winding down, falling into disarray and disharmony. That is because chaos and order are a throw of the dice, instants in a continual flux of events. Diderot demonstrates a prescience of entropy (decay), as described in the second law of thermodynamics. This second law, which was not formulated until the nineteenth century, states that in all energy exchanges, if no energy enters or leaves a system, the potential of the state will always be less than that of the initial state. For example, a watch spring-driven watch will run until the potential energy in the spring is converted, and not again until energy is reapplied to the spring to rewind it. Diderot progresses from the macrocosm to microcosm, from the universe to the animal kingdom. Just as worlds progress toward destruction, so do living things, both individuals and species. Diderot leaves the cosmological macrocosm to discuss living beings in “une succession rapide d’êtres qui s’entre-suivent, se poussent et disparaissent.” The triad s’entre-suivre, se pousser, and disparaître hyperbolizes the notion of flux at the next level of organization, at the level of living beings. The triad s’entre-suivre, se pousser, and disparaître is a repetition of mondes estropiés, manqués, dissipés, se reforment et se dissipent. Diderot’s tautology is an iconic representation of flux or the continual organization and reorganization of matter at every level (whether it is at the level of atoms, molecules, living beings, planets, or solar systems). Groups of matter, like Diderot’s phrase, appear, disappear, and reappear again. Twenty years later Diderot will use literary style again to illustrate the concept of random chance being the governing force of transformism when Diderot tells d’Alembert, “Mais cela va nous écarter de notre première discussion” and d’Alembert replies, “Qu’est-ce que cela fait? Nous y reviendrons ou nous n’y reviendrons pas.” Here, the digression in the topic of conversation is an iconic representation of the digression that nature takes over time. Having addressed flux, Diderot turns to the other key element in the metamorphosis of species, time. In l’existence successive, he dissects time into parcels, as he has done with matter. Time becomes an event: it is comprised of moments or instants, just as matter is comprised of atoms. Time is a continuous stream of moments, or l’existence successive. A man lives in a larger parcel of time than does the fly. Some time frames are greater than others. Thus, he attributes flux to time by magnifying it and examining it. Holmes

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assumes that the universe is eternal. Saunderson points out that Holmes is not qualified to make that statement because he, himself, is ephemeral. Diderot gives a new twist to Fontenelle’s fable of the rose: instead of a beautiful, fragrant rose, he uses an ugly, parasitic fly as the persona (comme la mouche éphémère). He uses the fly to contrast sharply to Fontenelle’s rose. As ugly as it is, the fly is even more fragile than the rose, more short lived, and hence, a better metaphor for the ephemeral being than is the rose. Diderot emphasizes the compartmentalization of time in the conclusion to the paragraph: time, matter and space may be only points in the streams of flux, suggesting that perhaps even time undergoes change. The fact that Diderot observes that time, matter and space may be only a point, indicates that he is examining the issue of continuity versus contiguity. Continuity is defined as uninterrupted in extent or substance, having no interstices or breaks, the uninterrupted connection of parts, connectedness, unbrokeness. Contiguity is the condition of touching or being in contact. In 1749 Diderot was beginning to ponder the possibility that matter, time, and space may each exist in small packets or parcels that are part of a continuum. Twenty years later he would re-examine continuity and contiguity in greater detail: in D’Alembert’s Dream, Diderot would discuss the connectedness of parcels of matter at the atomic level (the fable of the bees becomes a metaphor for atoms), at the level of bodily organs (the spider and its web become a metaphor for the central nervous system linked to organs), at the level of species (characteristics overlap among species; hybrids share characteristics), at the macroscopic level (if you extend a pole from here to Sirius, you would hear conversations over there). Four years later, when he wrote Thoughts on the Interpretation of Nature (1753), Diderot again pondered the relationship of chaos, flux, time, and probability. In Thought 12, he says, speaking of nature, “Il semble que la nature se soit plus à varier le même mécanisme d’une infinité de manières différentes.” Varier implies flux. Varier is hyperbolized by infinité de manières différentes. As he did in 1746 in Thought 21, Diderot uses the mathematical term infinité to show that “la difficulté de l’événement est compensée par la quantité des jets”—except that the event here is manière rather than jet. Nature is constantly creating new things and there is a continual stream of events. “Varier le même mécanisme d’une infinité de manières différentes” suggests that flux + time dispel chaos. Diderot uses the word mécanisme again, as he did in the Letter on the Blind (“et qu’il n’est resté que celles où le mécanisme n’impliquait aucune contradiction importante, et qui pouvaient subsister par elles-mêmes et se perpétuer”). Mécanisme evokes the seventeenth century conception of the

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universe as a watch, composed of springs and pulleys. However, this clock is the result of random chance: Diderot understood that it is flux, time, and random chance that dispel chaos and govern creation, rather than a Supreme Geometer. “ . . . en avoir multiplié les individus sous toutes les faces possibles” hyperbolizes varier and infinité de manières différentes. The tautology is an iconic representation of flux. Faces are metaphors for events in a continuum of nature’s throws. In Thought 12 Diderot narrows the field from nature to règne animal to quadrupèdes. He becomes more and more specific and reduces his field of vision as if he were standing at a telescope, adjusting the lens. As he magnifies the field of vision at the level of quadrupeds, he notices that quadrupeds have similar body parts, especially internal body parts: “il n’y en a pas un qui n’ait les fonctions et les parties, surtout intérieures”). He dispenses with the idea of a linear chain of beings and embraces Buffon’s matrix theory. The matrix theory acknowledges that beings overlap in their construction (i.e: a man’s leg is similar to a horse’s leg, a man’s hand is similar to a bat’s wing). The matrix hyperbolizes flux because it sets it in three dimensions, rather than two: beings have similar body parts and are related as in a network, a matrix, or a 3-D figure. Thus, Diderot not only magnifies quadrupeds under a lens, he sets them in 3-D with stereoscopic vision. Intérieures further increases the reader’s vision by lending it X-ray capability and noting similarities within the inside of the animal. Diderot’s prototype is not situated on top of a linear chain of beings, but rather, it is on top of a cone, as its descendants have similar body parts, external and internal, and are related to one another in varying degrees. Diderot offers a 3-D cone, rather than a straight line of descent from the first being. The conclusion that all beings have descended from a single prototype is quite radical and Diderot erases the boundaries between kingdoms. Flux and time have caused the progression from mineral to vegetable to animal. The implication is that man has descended from the mineral kingdom, via the vegetable and animal kingdoms. The notion of a single prototype for all beings is the fulcrum of Diderot’s metamorphosis of species. He went a step further than Buffon, who had envisaged the prototype only in the cadre of the species. Buffon asserted that each species had its own prototype: There is in nature a general prototype in each species upon which each individual is modeled, but which seems, upon realization, to alter or perfect itself according to circumstances . . . 46

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Diderot surpassed Buffon, not even accepting the heterogeneity of kingdoms. He blurred the distinction between kingdoms: the mineral kingdom gave rise to the vegetable, which, in turn, birthed the animal. In Thought 58, Question 2, of Thoughts on the Interpretation of Nature, Diderot says that it happened that constituent elements come together in an animal only because it is possible for them to do so; the implication is that combinations that do not work do not come together, and all that we see is the outcome of random combinations that happen to work in nature: Diderot narrows the field of vision on his lens from entire species to the individual living beings, and then widens it again to that of entire species. First he evokes the flux of individual beings in “un individu commence, pour ainsi dire, s’accroît, dure, dépérit et passe.” Then he widens the scope to entire species in “n’en serait-il pas de même des espèces entières?” The series, s’accroît, dure, dépérit et passe, provides a feeling of rapid flux or momentum. The event is the stage or time frame in the individual’s life. The individual is a microcosm of the species. The species, too, is subject to flux and has stages or a time frame leading to its extinction. Diderot evokes the matrix or interrelatedness of characteristics, rather than a linear pattern going back to the first being. The matrix indicates that flux is going on at an infinite number of levels ie: at the level of every physical characteristic possible, thus producing an infinite number of variations within each species and, on a grander scale, among species. “ . . . parce qu’il était possible que cela se fît . . .” is reminiscent of Philosophic Thoughts (“une chose arrive lorsqu’elle est possible”) and the Letter on the Blind (“qui pouvaient subsister” and “jusqu’a ce qu’ils aient obtenu quelque arrangement dans lequel ils puissent persévérer”). The potentiality suggested by the verb pouvoir is actualized by flux and time. An infinite variety is possible because 1) the multiplicity of events allows it and 2) those beings without serious defects can live and multiply. Sixteen years later in the Conversation between d’Alembert and Diderot (1769) Diderot again posits that flux and time dispel chaos. He discusses flux at all levels of organization: the events are the formation of molecules, individual living beings, species, planets, and stars. He begins at the intramolecular level: first he establishes that the potential for motion exists within every molecule. The concept that motion is intrinsic to matter is seen in “The transport of a body from one place to another is not motion, it is merely the effect. Motion resides in both the transported body and the stationary body. Remove the obstacle that hinders the local transport of the stationary body and it will be transferred.”47 Diderot maintains that flux works because motion is inherent in all matter. Motion is an innate property of matter and

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if one removes the obstacles that prevent the transport of an object, it will move by itself. To support his thesis, Diderot provides the example of removing the air surrounding the huge trunk of an oak tree—in this instance the water that the trunk contains will suddenly expand and cause the trunk to explode in a hundred thousand splinters. Diderot adds that the same would hold true of d’Alembert’s own body. This is a scientific fact: mountain climbers who ascend a summit too quickly risk having their brains explode inside their crania because of the sudden decrease in air pressure. The same holds true for skin divers who ascend too rapidly. Having established that motion is an innate quality of the molecule, and that this innateness is the driving force behind all motion in the universe, Diderot goes on to demonstrate that the continual stream of motion exists at many levels—the molecular, and those of living beings, planets, and stars. Diderot provides examples of all of these. First he offers an example of molecular motion: the molecules in Madame de Tencin and La Touche continually reorganized until they became d’Alembert. They succeeded in becoming a person by their inherent motion, heat, nourishment, and time. Next Diderot provides an example of flux at the level of living beings. The reader feels that the author has switched lenses on his microscope and that now he is viewing matter at an enlarged magnification—a continual stream of living beings has come into view. Furthermore, this level of magnification is supplemented by the element of time: the event occurs within the framework of millennia. In the text Diderot warns d’Alembert not to make the false assumption that animals were in the beginning what they are at present. . . . you assume that animals were originally what they are now. What folly! We do not know any more about what they have been than about what they will become. The imperceptible worm that stirs in the dirt may be making its way towards becoming a large animal; the enormous animal, that frightens us by its size, may be proceeding towards becoming a worm, may be perhaps a singular and momentary production of this planet.48

This passage is a restatement of the hypothesis of the metamorphosis of species that Diderot had articulated in 1749 and 1753. Twenty years earlier, Saunderson imagined the first monstrous creations of nature (“ . . . nous rencontrerions une multitude d’êtres informes pour quelques êtres bien organisés . . .” The passage also articulates the flux of animal and vegetable kingdoms that Diderot had portrayed in Thoughts on the Interpretation of Nature in 1753 in Thought 58, Question 2: “ . . . the embryo has passed

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through an infinite number of arrangements and developments . . . millions of years have passed between each of these developments . . . it [the embryo)] may have other developments to undergo, and other growths to acquire, that are unknown to us.”49 Diderot was influenced by Buffon, who, relying on emerging paleontology and the study of fossils, had stated, “ . . . how many other species, being denatured, that is to say perfected or degraded by the great vicissitudes of earth and water . . . , by the long influence of an adverse or favorable climate, are no longer the same as they were before?”50 The difference is that Buffon had pointed to climate as the cause of the mutability of species, and Diderot had pointed to the inherent motion in matter that was the engine that causes flux. Vous, while identifying d’Alembert, one of the parties in the conversation, is pointing to all who espoused preformation and creationism. This position was diametrically antithetical to that of the Church, and typical of why this work could not be published until after Diderot’s death. Supposer connotes an error, a false belief that requires correction. Animaux establishes the level of magnification at that of living beings, as opposed to molecules, planets or stars: Diderot will discuss flux at the level of living beings. The passé composé of être, ont été, establishes a time frame in the past. This is done so that there will be a point of reference from which to move, as Diderot wishes to establish movement through time. Originairement in apposition to ont été hyperbolizes it and transports the reader to the first epoch, the time frame that precedes all others. The present tense of être, ils sont establishes a second time frame, that of the present. This is done to establish two distinctly different points in time between which matter (in this case at the magnification of animals) can travel. The apostrophe Quelle folie! hyperbolizes the error evoked by supposer. It is a criticism of the fixist view of creationism that does not allow for open-ended evolution. While vous supposez merely suggests or implies error, Quelle folie! is a value judgment and hence, a direct criticism, of the creationist view. Diderot utilizes repetition to further emphasize the error of creationism. For example, on ne sait is stated twice: while savoir connotes truth and fact, ne savoir indicates the absence of truth, fact, and knowledge. Furthermore, the tautology “on ne sait . . . ce qu’ils . . . on ne sait ce qu’ils . . .” brings to the reader’s attention that which is different in the sentence; namely, ils ont été and ils deviendront. They stand out in stark contrast to the redundancy. The reader’s attention is drawn to the distinction between the two time frames, to that of the past versus that of the present. This distinction is hyperbolized by the fact that it is a repetition of the previous sentence that distinguishes between ont été originairement and ils sont à présent.

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The passage is characterized by antitheses: ont été/sont, originairement/à présent, ils ont été/ils deviendront, vermisseau/grand animal, and animal énorme/vermisseau. The antitheses hyperbolize the great variety of beings found in nature and render the continual stream more vivid, colorful, and fascinating. They provide a kaleidoscopic effect, a changing scene, backwards and forwards in time. This backward and forward movement occurs on the levels of both space and time: in space, by vermisseau/grand animal, enorme/ imperceptible, and in time, by the past, present, and future tenses. There are many antitheses: vous supposez/on ne sait, ont été/sont, originairement/à présent, ont été/deviendront, vermisseau imperceptible/grand animal, and animal énorme/l’état de vermisseau. The antitheses hyperbolize the ignorance of creationists, the faulty reasoning in vous supposez, the enormous variety of beings found in nature, and they portray flux as a colorful, fascinating, kaleidoscopic stream of events. There is ample tautology: supposez/folie/on ne sait non plus, on ne sait non plus/on ne sait, vermisseau/imperceptible, s’agite/s’achemine, énorme/nous épouvante/par sa grandeur, and particulière/momentanée. The repetition slows the pace and causes the reader to focus on an image for a longer period of time. For example, originairement is a long word: it hyperbolizes ont été, and it forces the reader to pause for a moment and remain in the past that is suggested by ont été. The repetition of on ne sait/on ne sait and ce qu’ils/ce qu’ils also slows down the action and gives the reader time to absorb the information. It is very much like a dialogue because in conversations people lengthen their sentences as they think and concretize their ideas. They are thinking and talking at the same time. Long sentences also give the listener time to absorb the information. Because on ne sait/on ne sait and ce qu’ils/ce qu’ils are identical, they draw the reader’s attention to what is different in the sentence—what is different is ont été and deviendront. Thus, the repetition hyperbolizes the two time frames on opposite sides of the spectrum, the past and the future, and makes the difference more striking. Vermisseau evokes an image of a worm in the reader’s mind; what follows is tautological: imperceptible is the quality of a worm that one would expect, it hyperbolizes the worm and renders it more striking in the reader’s mind, but it also slows down the action, and forces the reader to remain with the worm a while longer. Similarly, qui s’agit and dans la fange are tautological, they serve to lengthen the sentence, force the reader to remain with the worm a while longer, and also provide a stereoscopic view of the worm by placing it in a 3-D environment. Diderot’s originality is seen in that he extended the chain of beings to the vegetable and then to the mineral realms. For Diderot it was possible that

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rocks became vegetables, then animals, and finally, man. He illustrates this concept when he shows d’Alembert how to make flesh from marble. He says that he would pulverize a statue, mix the powder with humus, water it, give it time, feed it to plants, and eat the plants. After Diderot presents his thesis, d’Alembert asks him what he means. Diderot hesitates, replying, “Mais cela va nous écarter de notre première discussion.” D’Alembert casually replies, “Qu’est-ce que cela fait? Nous y reviendrons ou nous n’y reviendrons pas.” In this brief digression Diderot cleverly provides an iconic representation of the open ended metamorphosis that is the subject of the discussion. The element of chance is illustrated by the suggestion that where the conversation will proceed will be random or fortuitous. The thread of the characters’ conversation is open ended, subject to random digressions, just as the development of life forms on earth. Thus, literary style serves to hyperbolize the concepts in the discussion: the herringbone style of the progression of subjects is like the metamorphosis of life forms itself—it follows diverse paths, and ebbs and flows at random. Then Diderot magnifies flux at the level of stars: “Vous consentez donc que j’éteigne notre soleil? . . . ce ne sera pas le premier qui se soit éteint.” The sun undergoes the processes of birth, life, and death, and thus, it is established that the formation of stars is an event in a continual stream, just as are molecules and living beings. The extinction and reillumination of the sun is representative of flux at the level of stars. This concurs with fractal theory: the larger body resembles its components. For Diderot, the larger and smaller undergo the same processes and are comprised of ever smaller, similar, constituent parts. Diderot employs a series of questions and answers to slow the pace and force the reader to dwell on the new time frame, thousands of years in the future. D’Alembert’s question “Pourquoi non?” is followed by the answer that he himself provides, “Le temps n’est rien pour la nature.” Then another question and answer follow, “Vous consentez donc que j’éteigne notre soleil?” followed by “D’autant plus volontiers que ce ne sera pas le premier qui se soit éteint.” This brief dialogue hyperbolizes quelques milliers d’années by slowing the pace and forcing the reader to dwell on the future time frame. Hence, the literary style is an iconic representation of the subject matter, namely, a long period of time. It also negates the creationist view that the earth has special significance in the universe; it carries the model of the heliocentric universe a step further: not only has the earth lost the significance that it had in geocentric cosmology, but the sun has lost its significance, being just one of many stars that are born, exist for a duration, and die.

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Flux on one level is dependent upon flux at another level: the continual stream of animal and vegetable life on this planet exists solely because stars pass in and out of existence. If it were not for the fact that the sun has currently passed into existence, there would be no flux on earth at the level of vegetable and animal life. Since flux at the level of stars permits flux at the level of living beings, probability dictates that life exists on other planets in our solar system. Diderot extends this continual stream of beings to other planets in our solar system. Since everything in the universe is a product of random chance, there may be life on other planets; these life forms are probably very different from those one earth, and we would barely recognize them. In Mlle de l’Espinasse’s short sentence, “Cela est passé ou cela viendra,” flux and time are intimately intertwined. Cela is an event. Cela repeated (Cela . . . cela . . . ) evokes a flux of events. This continual stream of events of things is set in the dimension of time, which is evoked by the passé composé of passer (est passé) and the future tense of venir (viendra). The verbs passer and venir are opposites—the close proximity of these two opposites gives the impression of motion, first in one direction, and then in another: Cela, which is an event, first moves away from the reader and then is moving towards him. Thus, this short sentence suggests flux, movement, first away from the reader and then towards him, and it is set within the framework of time. Diderot demonstrates that patterns, growing out of chaos, repeat themselves across the solar system. The image of tiny men that are kept between sheets and who become butterflies suggests the possibility of the random distribution of life throughout the solar system. Diderot illustrates that random order emerges from chaos, and the pattern is fractal: the examination of parts indicates that each part is identical or similar to any other part. For example, the examination of any planet in Diderot’ solar system reveals life. This indicates that parts are the same. The fact that the men on Jupiter and Saturn are tiny, while men on earth are large, is also characteristic of fractals: fractals show similarity of their components at all levels of magnification. Diderot frequently plays with levels of magnification and shows that the same processes occur at different levels of magnification. For example, molecules are in flux and organize, come apart and reorganize, living beings are in flux and are born live and die; species are in flux and they come into existence and disappear; stars like the sun are born, live and die. Diderot shows that patterns of organization at all magnitudes are random and in flux. Polypes humains is a reference to Siamese twins, the subject of which he goes on to discuss in further detail later in the Rêve. The occurrence of

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Siamese twins in nature indicates that nature is continually creating new things and that anything can happen in la multitude des jets. Since molecules are randomly reorganizing, teratism is bound to occur a percentage of the time. There are water polyps or hydras that Trembley discovered on the shores of Lake Geneva. Diderot is original in that he associates water polyps with Siamese twins and that he views it as a variation of nature. “Les mâles se résolvant en mâles, les femelles en femelles” is a variation on the platonic myth of the androgyne. Androgyne is derived from the Greek α̉νδρόγυνος, male and female in one, from α̉νδρο- male, + γυνή, woman, female, via the Latin androgynus. Plato postulated that in the beginning, all beings were androgynous and that they were then split in half. Diderot takes this myth and creates a variation on it, positing that on Jupiter or Saturn, the human polyps are comprised of two men or two women. This variation within the whole is also characteristic of fractals: for example, when a mountain terrain is examined closely, it is comprised of smaller parts that are different from one another, although similar when viewed from afar. Thus, an amplitude in magnification depicts a difference between earthly Siamese twins and Jovian or Saturnian polyps. Furthermore, the fact that half a Jovian polyp is identical to its other half is also characteristic of fractals: portions of fractals are similar or identical. In “L’homme se résolvant en une infinite d’hommes atomiques . . .” the concept of infinity recurs. Here infinity is presented on three levels: again we are presented with the mathematic premise that “la difficulté de l’événement est compensée par la quantité des jets.” The quantity of nature’s tries at organization is infinite; there are an infinite number of events. It is also true that there are an infinite number of atoms. These are more than atoms—they are atoms that have become organized into tiny men. Thus, there are three levels of infinity—an infinite number of atoms, an infinite number of events or attempts at organization, and an infinite number of successful outcomes. Time gradually proceeds forwards in increments, but then it suddenly reverts backward: Diderot begins with the second stage of development, proceeds forwards, and saves the first stage of development for last. The tiny men are metaphorized as tiny insect eggs, then they spin their cocoons, penetrate their cocoons, are transformed into butterflies, form a society, populate an entire province, and then suddenly, Diderot catapults the reader backwards in time, to the instant of conception, before the moment of œufs d’insectes, to the stage of débris d’un seul. Débris is both the time that precedes œufs d’insects, and also the next stage of development, after province entière. Thus, time is cyclical and we have returned to the beginning, while at the same

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time having progressed to the next stage. Débris is pejorative and it reduces conception from a miracle to the reorganization of debris. The image of tiny men (“L’homme se résolvant en une infinité d’hommes atomiques”) is characteristic of the fractal: order randomly arises from chaos, and similar patterns are seen at various levels of magnification. However, here, the patterns are different and not the same as those on earth: on earth there are no men who are butterflies. This shows that nature is always creating new things, just as it creates Siamese twins on earth. The fact that the tiny men resemble silkworms, spin cocoons, and become butterflies, is taken from the principle that species often share characteristics ie: men’s legs resemble horses’ legs and human hands resemble bats’ wings. Having provided a specific example of metamorphosis, the character Bordeu states the general underlying principle, “Cette extravagante supposition est presque l’histoire réelle de toutes les espèces d’animaux subsistants et à venir.” Extravagante supposition is reminiscent of the professor’s question in Thought 21, which is also an extravagant supposition (“que le monde résulte du jet fortuit des atoms? . . . que l’Iliade d’Homère, ou la Henriade de Voltaire, est un résultat de jets fortuits de caractères”). The elements of game theory inherent in the supposition are the same: given flux and time, all possibilities manifest themselves, and the difficulty of the event is compensated by the quantity of throws. “L’histoire réelle de toutes les espèces” suggests that perhaps human beings evolved from silkworms. It refers back to the passage in the Conversation between d’Alembert and Diderot that says “vous supposez que les animaux ont été originairement ce qu’ils sont à présent . . . Le vermisseau imperceptible qui s’agite dans la fange, s’achemine peut-être à l’état de grand animal . . .” In the Conversation the earthworm became a large animal; in D’Alembert’s Dream the silkworm becomes man. It also may reflect the future of man, referring back to the Conversation, “ . . . l’animal énorme, qui nous épouvante par sa grandeur, s’achemine peut-être à l’état de vermisseau, est peut-être une production particuliere et momentanée de cette planète.” The metaphor of the worm humbles man from the elevated position that Aquinas gave him (higher than animals, but lower than angels) in the same way that débris d’un seul did in the previous passage. L’histoire réelle is a play on words referring to Buffon’s Histoire naturelle. Buffon showed the interconnectedness of species in his matrix theory: different species share characteristics. Diderot sets forth his histoire réelle and demonstrates the same thing except that he carries it further and ascribes life elsewhere in the solar system. He also carries it further by speculating on the future, not just the past and present as Buffon had done.

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Furthermore, l’histoire réelle opens up the previously fixed chain of beings to allow for open ended metamorphosis. Species are not fixed and static, but rather, they continually change and the changes are subject to their environmental conditions. The notion that metamorphosis is influenced by environment is seen in the passage that immediately follows: Subsistants et à venir evokes two time frames; present and future. Having expanded the two-dimensional, linear chain of beings into a threedimensional cone, now Diderot adds a fourth dimension, time. Hence, transformism takes place over time. In d’Alembert’s question, “If a distance of a few thousand leagues changes my species, what wouldn’t the distance of a few thousand of the earth’s diameters do?”51 Diderot introduces the elements of climate and geography to transformism. Buffon had shown that species vary from climate to climate and concluded the climate impacts upon the mutability of species. Diderot carried the notion of geography farther than Buffon had done—he extends it to outer space. Il a fallu que je fusse tel establishes that climate determines a man’s size, weight, height, way of life, and customs. Au pôle? Mais sous la ligne? evokes a frigid climate and a torrid zone. The statements are deterministic and germane to chaos theory: one random event creates a subset of random events; geography influences physical characteristics, way of life and customs of beings that randomly evolve in a specific locale. Diderot carries the notion of geographical influence to the farthest degree that he can—to Saturn, the outermost planet in the solar system that was known at the time that D’Alembert’s Dream was written (Uranus was not discovered until 1781 by William Herschel). In the eighteenth century it was known that at that distance from the sun there was little heat or light. Noting the direct relationship of climate to the characteristics of species, he suggests that species that live at several thousand earth diameters must be hardly recognizable. In summation, Diderot based his philosophy that order arises randomly from chaos on the physical principle that motion is an inherent characterstic of matter. Everything in the universe is the result of continual molecular motion and given eternity, all possible combinations of atoms will eventually manifest themselves. Flux + time disperse chaos. Diderot relied on analyses of games of chance to posit that as the number of the throws of dice increases and there are more outcomes, patterns begin to randomly emerge. Similarly, atoms have always existed, and given eternity, it was inevitable that they would randomly form the mineral kingdom, and then the vegetable, and then the animal. Diderot examined the notion of chaos carefully and he noted that small changes in the initial conditions of a system could be considerably magnified

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over time and could have far reaching consequences. In the Letter on the Blind Saunderson argues that if the first man had had significant defects, mankind might never have arisen; he may have disappeared from the planet as have so many of Lucretius’ teratisms. However, implicit in the argument is the notion that given enough time, another permutation would have arisen. Diderot observed that in systems that arise randomly from chaos, there is symmetry and self-similarity. In D’Alembert’s Dream the sleeping d’Alembert notices the following resemblance: “Suite indéfinie d’animalcules dans l’atome qui fermente, même suite indéfinie d’animalcules dans l’autres atome qu’on appelle la Terre.” Patterns recur in nature. The atom is a cog in a larger organizational structure, as are the earth and sun. Spontaneous generation is a microcosm of the metamorphosis of species. The animalcule is an ephemeral phenomenon as are plants, animals, men, planets, and stars; each is subject to organizational permutation. Diderot’s metamorphosis of species does not rest on natural law in the Newtonian sense, but rather, on a synthesis in which there is added random or uncertain elements. In the next chapter we shall see that the randomness is carried to the womb: it is random errors in the order of parental elements that cause birth defects. Since one random event that takes place at an early point in time may cause a wave of subsequent events, a single random error could eventually lead to the metamorphosis of a species. D’Alembert’s Dream shows that chaos is continually coming in and out of existence: the discussion of the Siamese twins of Rabastens and Mlle de Lespinasse’s observation that hermaphroditic births are the results of the organizational permutations in the bundles of threads in the developing embryo indicate that there was not a first chaos that nature dispersed, little by little, eliminating monsters and defective combinations. Teratism and blindness are created everyday. Diderot, influenced by Maupertuis’ thesis that errors occur in the generative process, recognized that normal and defective creations continually arise, and it is this creative process, fueled simply by the inherent motion of matter, that has created the vast heterogeneity that is evident in the world today.

Chapter Two

Embryology, Epigenesis, and the Metamorphosis of Species

Certain elements will have necessarily acquired a prodigious facility for constantly uniting in the same way; from there, if they are different, there will arise the formation of infinitely varied microscopic animals . . . —Denis Diderot, Thoughts on the Interpretation of Nature, Thought 50 (1753)1

The Encyclopædia Britannica states, “A question posed by Aristotle was whether the embryo is preformed and therefore only enlarges during development or whether it differentiates from an amorphous beginning. Two conflicting schools of thought had been based on this question . . .”2 The preformation theory held that a fully formed organism is encased in the germ of a plant, animal or person and then develops into the adult stage. An analogy can be made to Russian dolls, where one doll is encased in another doll. Conversely, “the epigenesis school believed that the egg is initially undifferentiated and that development occurs as a series of steps.”3 The debate can be summarized thus: the embryo develops vs. it is all there from the outset. Epigenesis is derived from the Greek ε̉πί, upon, + γένεσις, generation. The term epigenesis was used by William Harvey; he defined the word as “partium superexorientium additamentum,” holding that the germ is brought into existence by the addition of parts that bud out of one another or by successive accretions.4 Harvey rejected preformation and advanced the theory that all living beings derive from the egg by the gradual building up and aggregation of its parts. The theory departed from the fixity of preformationism that did not allow for any new species to arise since Creation. It was a milestone in biology because it permitted new characteristics to arise in the organism and 53

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ultimately, opened the door to the appearance of new species. Epigenesis was embraced by Diderot, Maupertuis, Buffon, Needham, and La Mettrie. It was challenged by Haller and Bonnet. The eighteenth century saw an increasing interest in epigenesis and the prenatal development of the fetus. By 1762 embryologie appeared in the French dictionary; it was defined as “Medical Term. The study of the fetus during its stay in the womb.”5 Diderot kept abreast of the latest discoveries in embryology: he had conversations with the greatest doctors of his time—Petit, Tronchin, Roux, and Bordeu (who had given him his theory of two nervous systems). He took courses with the surgeon Verdier and he lived near the hôpital de La Charité where Bordeu was a resident doctor-Bordeu invited him to observe teratological births and assist in surgical procedures. He also benefited from the twenty-two doctors who collaborated on the Encyclopedia. An article addressing embryology appeared in the Encyclopedia. In the article “Embryo” [“Embryon”], the encyclopedist, d’Aumont, distinguishes among the various definitions that scientists have given the term.6 For example, Marcellus used embryon to identify a being the entire time that it is contained in the womb. However, Drelincourt used the term to identify only the rudiments of the body of an animal enclosed in an egg whose placenta has not yet cast roots to implant it in the womb; as soon as the placenta is attached there, the term fétus is assigned to it. Boerhaave and Fizes used embryon to identify the animalcule at the time that its growth begins in the womb; as soon as it is developed, they called it a fétus and no longer used embryon, although they used fétus from the moment of conception. The article also examines the size of embryos that have been observed and recorded in medical literature of the period. Ruysch observed an embryo that was not larger than the head of a pin; Mattmugham reported having seen a six day old embryo that was the size of a grain of barley; Dodart mentioned an embryo that had a length of seven lignes and in which one could distinguish its members.7 Because Diderot was the chief editor of the Encyclopedia, kept abreast of the medical literature in contemporary journals, attended dissections and surgery, and witnessed anomalous births, he was apprised of the most recent developments in embryologic study. He valued experimentation on miscarried embryos because it held the promise of unlocking the secrets of life. It was based on empiricism and the scientific theory, and, like many of the fledgling sciences of the eighteenth century, it was the result of the Newtonian view that the universe operates according to certain laws that may be understood through systematic observation, measurement, and experimentation,

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and the formulation, testing, and modification of hypotheses. Experimentation offered proof that life could be explained through laws, that preformation was erroneous, and that if anomalies occurred, they could be explained solely by the physiology of the embryo. In Thoughts on the Interpretation of Nature (1753), Thought 32, Parts 1 and 2, Diderot examines, in great detail, a specific kind of embryo, the moal or ectopic pregnancy. In 1762 mole was defined as “Mass of shapeless and lifeless flesh that women sometimes give birth to instead of a child. This woman that was thought to be pregnant for six months, gave birth only to a moal.”8 In the eighteenth century the mole was called a false conception [faux germe], which was defined as “the shapeless matter proceeding from a defective conception.”9 David Adams says that in this malformation, “the sac (known today as a blastocyst, or blastoderm) contains some parts of a normal fœtus, but has no placenta, and is attached directly to the womb. As is confirmed by contemporary sources such as John Memis’ The Midwife’s Pocket-Companion (1765), medical science at that time was unable to say unequivocally” how the mola was formed. Adams goes on to say, “Indeed, the article ‘Mole,” by the surgeon Louis, which appeared in 1765 (X, 626– 27), quotes at length from this section of the Interpretation, and refers the reader to its.”10 In Thought 32, Parts 1 and 2, Diderot explains ectopic pregnancies in purely scientific terms, offering possible rational explanations for the anomaly. In Part 1 he addresses the question of whether the moal is a result of parthenogenesis or the combination of male and female elements. Hence, the issue here is that of preformation versus epigenesis. Arguing the latter, Diderot establishes that the production of this teratism is governed by laws as invariable as those of generation and that it is merely the result of the arrangement of parental elements. He does not know whether the moal arises from maternal elements, paternal elements, or a combination of the two. He is certain, however, that the combination of elements is governed by laws as invariable as those that govern generation. Diderot declares that dissection is the key to unraveling the mystery of the origin of the moal. He beseeches the reader to take a scalpel, open some moals, and take a look. Teratisms can be explained by natural means, through epigenesis, and scientific investigation is the only means to learn about them. In Thought 32, Part 2, Diderot explains the origin of the ectopic pregnancy as purely the result of biological processes, specifically, epigenesis. By supporting the view that male and female elements are necessary in the production of the teratism, he implies that it is not the result of preformation (ie: a malformed egg as an ovist would claim). Diderot provides a detailed,

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epigenetic explanation of the mechanics of the moal: he describes the placenta as a tissue comprised of bloody vessels and metaphorizes it as a kind of mushroom that adheres, by its convex part, to the womb during pregnancy. Diderot posits that all beings are only that which resistance, the laws of movement, and universal order determine them to be. Depicting the moal purely in epigenetic terms, he describes in detail a scenario that he believes illustrates how a moal might form. He demonstrates that the organization of the teratism, like that of a normal being, is effected by the gradual formation of organs from an undifferentiated mass. In the moal, the umbilical cord, pulled by two opposing forces, is much shorter than normal and there comes a time when its two borders unite and form a mass, at the center of which, one finds a deformed, constrained, and suffocated fetus. His conjecture is based on Harvey’s observation that the formation of the embryo is a progressive formation starting with undifferentiated matter, an epigenesis. Harvey had established that the parts of animals are formed one after another, and then they are nourished, grow, and take shape from the same matter; therefore, animals have parts that are formed earlier, and others that are formed later. Their formation begins with the part that is their origin, and with the help of that part, they receive all of their other members. Similarly, Diderot posits that the moal gradually develops from the pulling of opposite forces that cause the umbilical cord to disappear. Everything proceeds from that, and the ectopic pregnancy is the result of a series of events that can be observed and explained in purely physical means. As he had shown four years earlier in the Letter on the Blind, Diderot stresses the point that monsters are engendered by nature and that they obey the laws of nature. His purpose is not only to communicate his view that nature can be explained by purely scientific means, but also to undermine the belief in mythical creatures. The unsigned article “Unicorn” [“Licorne”] in the Encyclopedia similarly ridicules the belief in fabulous creatures such as the unicorn. Diderot demonstrates that epigenesis alone explains teratism while preformation cannot. Teratism poses a problem for preformation precisely because the teratism is a creature that does not resemble its parents. The polyp also creates problems for preformation. For, as Abraham Trembley had shown, if a polyp loses a part of its body and regenerates it, does that mean that there are an infinite number of seeds planted all over its body waiting to regenerate that part of the body which may become severed? Diderot provides the answer in Thought 50: when parental elements in the generative process retain their memory, they duplicate themselves, as seen in the regeneration of polyps. In Thought 50 Diderot posits that basic elements in the generative

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process tend to remain in a certain order because they have memory: they are like bees, infinitely minute, perched on a branch in a certain sequence. Remove their memory of their position, take them out of sequence, and a variety of creations will result, as varied as the animalcules under the microscope. If they retain their memory, remain in the same sequence, they can reproduce identical copies of body parts, as in Trembley’s polyp. The regeneration of polyps is an iconic representation of the memory and positioning of the basic reproductive elements. In Thought 50, Diderot again staunchly supports epigenesis and challenges preformation. He uses Thought 50 as a platform to prove, beyond all doubt, that the egg utilizes material supplied by both the father and mother to differentiate into a unique being that is not a copy of either parent. Many of his arguments are taken verbatim from Pierre-Louis Moreau de Maupertuis’ Inaugural Dissertation on Metaphysics. In 1751, Maupertuis, under the pseudonym Baumann, had published a work, entitled, Inaugural Dissertation on Metaphysics. The Inaugural Dissertation was an essay on organized bodies and the problem of resemblance [ressemblance]. During the eighteenth century ressemblance was defined as “Resemblance, conformity between persons, between things.”11 Examples of usage were “It is your son, I recognize him by the resemblance. One says that A son is the true likeness of his father, that it is his likeness, to mean, that There is much resemblance between them. I recognized your son at first sight, he has your likeness.”12 Maupertuis speculated on the nature of biparental ressemblance based on his study of the occurrences of polydactyly in several generations of a Berlin family. He demonstrated that polydactyly could be transmitted by either the male or female parent, and explained the trait as the result of an error in the parental elements (Maupertuis used the term trait). In his Letters (1752), Letter 14, he calculated the mathematical probability of the trait’s future occurrence in new members of the family. In this research Maupertuis produced a scientifically accurate record of the transmission of elements that permit ressemblance. Bentley Glass provides an in-depth examination of how Maupertuis’ theory of heredity impacted on the eighteenth century.13 Maupertuis studied polydactyly in the Berlinese Ruhe family and was able to predict the probability that offspring would be born with the anomaly. Glass says, “He was also the first to apply the laws of probability to the study of heredity . . . He believed that heredity must be due to particles derived both from the mother and from the father, that similar particles have an affinity for each other that makes them pair, and that for each pair either the particle from the mother or the one from the father may dominate over the other, so that a trait may

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seemingly be inherited from distant ancestors by passing through parents who are unaffected. From an accidental deficiency of certain particles there might arise embryos with certain parts missing, and from an excess of certain particles could come embryos with extra parts, like the six-fingered persons or the giant with an extra lumbar vertebra whom Maupertuis studied.”14 Glass praises Maupertuis for having brilliantly hypothesized that there may be an extra element or a missing one that causes deformities: “To begin with, he was faced with the problem of accounting for supernumerary digits, albinism, and other hereditary anomalies on the basis of his theory of generation. This he solved ingeniously. ‘If each particle is united to those that are its neighbors, and only to those, the child is born perfect. If some particles are too distant, or of a form too little suitable, or too weak in affinity to unite with those with which they should be united, there is born a monster with deficiency (monstre par défaut). But if it happens that superfluous particles nevertheless find their place, and unite with the particles whose union was already sufficient, there is a monster with extra parts (monstre par exces).’15 Even Mendel did not foresee that deficiencies and duplications of the hereditary material might constitute a basis of abnormal development, a sort of mutation!”16 Glass discusses the fortuitousness or random chance in Maupertuis’ explanation of heredity: “Maupertuis thus came to the conclusion that hereditary variants are sudden, accidental products-mutations, to use the modern term . . . To Maupertuis, exactly as to Hugo de Vries a century and a half later, a species was merely a mutant form that had become established in nature. The evidence for this was clear from the artificial breeds of domestic animals . . . And then Maupertuis wonders seditiously why this art should be restricted to animals . . . Had not Frederick William of Prussia built an armed force of giant soldiers, and thereby, thought Maupertuis, singularly increased the stature of the Prussian people?”17 Diderot read Maupertuis’ Dissertatio and he referenced it in a footnote to Thought 12 of the Interpretation. In his footnote Diderot states that the book had been published in Erlangen in 1751 and brought to France in 1753 by M. de M*** (he preserves Maupertuis’ anonymity). Diderot speaks highly of Maupertuis in Thoughts 4, 12, 50, 51, and 55 without mentioning that he authored the book. When he enumerates the foremost thinkers of the eighteenth century, he includes Maupertuis (Thoughts 4 and 55). Diderot praises Maupertuis repeatedly in Thought 50: he begins by lauding the work of the “Doctor of Erlangen” as “filled with unique and new ideas.” He continues, “His object is the greatest that human intelligence can undertake . . .” At the end of the first paragraph of Thought 50 he further commends Dr. Baumann

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by stating, “One must read his book to learn to reconcile the boldest philosophical ideas with the deepest respect for religion.” This sardonic statement alerts the reader to the atheist, materialistic underpinnings of the treatise. Thought 50 is a three page synopsis of the key ideas in Maupertuis’ 79 page Inaugural Dissertation. Diderot summarizes Maupertuis’ explanation of ressemblance, he agrees with it, and he urges the reader to investigate the new work. Diderot is methodical in the manner that he presents Maupertuis’ material: he discards theses that are erroneous, presents other theses that are true, but lacking requisite elements, and finally, articulates the missing components that are required to fully explain generation. Diderot’s method of explaining ressemblance can be likened to gutting the interior of a house, leaving the shell, and rebuilding the interior. In Thought 50 Diderot enumerates and then ridicules four metaphysical theories that preformationists used to substantiate their belief system, namely, plastic nature [natures plastiques], subordinate intelligent substances [substances intelligentes subalternes], the simultaneity of creation and the formation of substances [simultanéité de la creation et de la formation des substances], and the extemporaneousness of their production [extemporanéité de leur production]. Diderot derides the metaphysical system of plastic nature set forth by Henry More in Enchiridion metaphysicum (1671) and Ralph Cudworth in True Intellectual System of the Universe (1678). More and Cudworth’s plastic nature is a hypothesis that posits that God is separate from matter, which has its own laws of organization ordained by Him. More and Cudworth supposed plastic nature to be an unconscious, incorporeal substance that controls and organizes matter (in the manner of the plant soul in vegetation) and thus produces natural events as a divine instrument of change. Diderot dispenses with metaphysics and dualism. He uses imaginer to ridicule plastic nature: More and Cudworth imagine that plastic nature, without intelligence and without matter, can execute only that which matter and intelligence can accomplish. The second item, substances intelligentes subalternes, is a denunciation of Leibniz’ Discours métaphysique (1686). Leibniz, too, resorted to hypothesizing that an incorporeal substance acts upon matter. That it acts “d’une manière inintelligible” ridicules Leibniz’ long winded and obscure reasoning. The enumeration of failed systems leads to the ultimate goal: an attack on the preformation of the germ: “ . . . with the simultaneousness of creation and the formation of substances, which, contained in one another, develop in time by the combination of the first miracle . . .”18 Diderot ridicules preformation by suggesting that the first miracle, Creation, is continually occurring over and over again, each time life is generated. He intersperses words

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that connote that which cannot be proven (ie: premier miracle, enchaînement de miracles, and inconnue) with the highly technical and verbose language of preformation apologists (ie: a series of long, nebulous, and technical terms such as la simultanéité de la création et de la formation des substances and l’extemporanéité de leur production). He hyperbolizes the ridicule by underlining the long, technical phrases of preformationism. The series of long, nebulous, and technical terms are iconic representations of the hypotheses’ empty assertions and invalidity. Thus, Diderot ridicules preformation, as well as its basis, the premier miracle, and takes a stance against the position held by his Christian contemporaries, such as Haller and Bonnet. Although Diderot guts the house, he leaves the skeletal structure: scientific principles such as extension (the occupation of space) and motion are necessary and true, but are lacking in certain elements: l’insuffisance de leurs principes make it impossible to explain generation. The debate of the role of extension and movement in shaping the physical world was endless: it was addressed by Descartes, Newton, Locke, Berkeley, Leibniz and Malebranche, among others. For example, Descartes discussed the physics of extension and motion in Principles of Philosophy (1644). In Book I he conceived of nature as a system and said that Creation was the imparting of movement to extension; movement must produce a vortex system and this is the world. Newton rejected this as a hypothesis and accepted space and time as the background of movement, the velocity of which might be infinite. Diderot recognized that although the debate of the role of extension and motion in nature is endless, these two components are not enough to explain ressemblance. “D’autres,” who added impenetrability, mobility, and inertia to extension and motion, is a reference to Isaac Newton. In the beginning of Book III of the Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy, Rule 3 of Rules of Reasoning in Philosophy, Newton stated, “The extension, hardness, impenetrability, mobility, and force of inactivity [vis inertiæ] of the whole, result from the extension, hardness, impenetrability, mobility, and forces of inactivity [vires inertiæ] of the parts; and thence we conclude the least particles of all bodies to be also all extended, and hard and impenetrable, and moveable, and endowed with their proper vires inertiæ. And this is the foundation of all philosophy.” Newton’s physics was central to the Enlightenment: it held the promise that all of Creation could be explained by physical laws. D’Alembert modified Newton’s passage and used it in the article Matter [“Matière”] in the Encyclopedia (1751): he stated that impenetrability, motility and divisibility are the essential qualities of matter. Diderot demonstrates that physical phenomena, used by physicists and chemists, do not explain the generation of plants and animals. Uniform and blind attraction spread out among all particles of matter, does not explain

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how these particles arrange themselves to form a body with the simplest organization. If all particles have the same tendency, the same force to unite themselves together, why do some form eyes and others, ears? Why do some unite in a pell-mell fashion to give rise to birth anomalies? While Diderot respected and adhered to the principles of physics, he recognized that they are merely the skeleton of the house: it is now necessary to build the walls. Diderot borrows Buffon’s organic molecules to explain resemblance among the races, the production of monsters, and crossbreeding, but he goes much farther than Buffon: he attributes desire, aversion, memory and intelligence to every part of matter, no matter how small, living or non-living. Unlike Buffon, Diderot does not distinguish between brute matter and organized matter: all matter, animate and inanimate, has consciousness, retains its consciousness when it combines to form larger molecules, and it is this consciousness that causes children to resemble their parents. The hypothesis that molecules have desire, aversion, memory, and intelligence, explains why molecules unite in certain ways, why some form the eyes of the fetus and others the ears. Diderot takes his material directly from Maupertuis, who, in opposition to Descartes, had declared that animals are much more than machines: animals see, hear, desire, fear, and remember. Maupertuis had asked that if one can attribute intelligence to animals, why not accord it to the smallest particles, as well? If organization makes the difference, can organization never give rise to a thought? To alleviate any concerns about censorship, Maupertuis cautiously asked whether there is any danger in supposing that intelligence resides in the smallest particle of matter. The peril, if it existed, would be just as great to admit that an elephant or monkey has intelligence, as to admit it in a grain of sand. There is no danger in according to matter some degree of intelligence, desire, aversion, and memory. No one has ever explained the formation of any organized body by the physical properties of matter alone. This reasoning seemed perfectly logical to Diderot: he adopted the theory that all particles of matter have consciousness, intelligence, desire, aversion, and memory, and he made it the cornerstone of his biological theory. Diderot accepted Maupertuis’ definition of elements [élémens]: they are the smallest parts of matter in which division is possible. While the formation of the first individuals was miraculous, those that succeeded them are merely the effects of the properties of desire, aversion, memory, and intelligence that the smallest parts of matter have. Hence, all of the insurmountable difficulties of previous systems disappear: resemblance to parents, the production of monsters, and the birth of crossbred animals, are all easily explained. Diderot identified four factors that can explain all biological phenomena: the consciousness of parental elements, their arrangement, quantity, and habit.

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In the eighteenth century, arrangement was defined as “Order, state of the which is arranged.”19 Examples of usage were “Arrangement of books. Arrangement of vases, porcelain, paintings.”20 Habitude was defined as “Custom, habit, acquired disposition by many repeated acts.”21 Examples of usage were “Good habit. Bad habit. To manage by habit. To acquire a habit. Old habit. A long habit. Sinned by habit. To form a habit. The repetition of acts formed by habit.”22 Habitude was also used in physics and medicine in the phrase habitude du corps to mean “The constitution, the disposition of the body, the temperament.”23 In Thought 50 Diderot accepts Maupertuis’ position that generation can be explained by the arrangement of elements provided by either or both parents. Elements that will eventually give rise to the offspring’s physical characteristics circulate throughout the blood and lymph of the parents. Eventually they find their way into the male and female semen. After the male and female semen mix, a fetus is created. Parental elements, from both the father and mother, are taken from the part resembling that which they form. They retain a memory of their former situation and take it up again as many times as they can to form the same part in the fetus. This explains the conservation of species and resemblance to parents. In addition, quantity is important: if some elements are missing or cannot unite, monsters are born that lack some part. If the elements are found in too great a quantity, so that some remain after their ordinary union, the extra elements cause monsters with extra parts ie: polydactyly. Further, each species has its own arrangement or order of parental elements. If the elements come from animals of different species, some come from the father and others from the mother to create the crossbred animal. If the elements come from animals which do not have sufficient similarity, the elements cannot take hold, cannot maintain a convenient arrangement, and generation becomes impossible. Here, habitude is important: if parental elements have not acquired the habit of uniting in a certain order over a long sequence of couplings, the hybrid offspring is sterile. Diderot utilized some of Maupertuis’ language to indicate the sequential arrangement of parental elements. Maupertuis had used arrangement, position, situation, and ordre to indicate that parental elements must occur in a certain sequence to create a viable organism; Diderot used situation (6x), ordre, and meme manière. If the memory of the elements is confused, a sequence of new animals will arise, like the wide spectrum of eels that arise from moistened flour and so many other animalcules that liquids provide. The system also explains certain phenomena that other systems cannot, such as resemblance to parents. It is common to see a child resemble one of his grandparents, rather than his parents. The elements that form these traits perhaps have better conserved the propensity (habitude) of their position in the grandparent

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than in the parent. Diderot (Maupertuis) uses situation, which indicates that he understands that the element resides in a specific site or position. He uses habitude to connote propensity, constitution. Conversely, total forgetfulness of the first position will give rise to monsters where the elements are topsyturvy. When Diderot (Maupertuis) uses the term oubli, he literally means forgetfulness because he accords memory to parental elements. A phenomenon that is more difficult to explain is the sterility of crossbreeds. Experimentation has shown that no animal, born of different species, can reproduce. The arrangement of parental elements can explain the sterility of the mule: the parental elements taken from the parents have a certain habit of arrangement that is very strong, having been contracted by a great number of generations, and they remain in a certain equilibrium and do not unite either in one way or the other. Diderot concludes that by virtue of the arrangement of parental elements, one can explain how, from two individuals, the proliferation of the most dissimilar species has resulted. It is random errors in the arrangement of parental elements that has caused the variety of species, and it happened from one original prototype. Maupertuis had declared: Could one not explain by that how from two single individuals, the multiplication of the most dissimilar species could have resulted? They would owe their first origin only to some chance productions in which the elementary parts would not have retained the order that they had in the father and mother animals: each degree of error would have made a new species; and with repeated deviations there would arise the infinite diversity of animals that we see today, which perhaps will increase more with time, but to which the course of centuries will perhaps bring only imperceptible developments.24

Maupertuis had a profound influence on Diderot’s thinking for the rest of his literary career: the philosophe embraced his epigenetic explanation of conception, the emphasis that he had placed on random chance, and the view that new species arise when random errors occur in the generative process. While Diderot remained faithful to the mechanistic, rational, and scientific theory of epigenesis (isolated particles gather together in order to form a germ which then needs only to develop), he departed from traditional mechanism: he affirmed that epigenesis works because all molecules have innate consciousness. By attributing an elementary psychic existence to all particles, he renounced traditional mechanism and delved into the realm of consciousness. He extended consciousness to animals, plants, and the mineral kingdom. By

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attributing desire, aversion, memory, and intelligence, qualities recognizable in animals, to all molecules, he posits that consciousness is present in all matter, from the smallest particle of matter to the largest of animals. Diderot extends this awareness to the vegetable kingdom (La Mettrie, in the Treatise on the Soul, arrived at the same conclusion). Diderot finds the notion of universal consciousness exciting because it explains why molecules come together and form an embryo without the need for divine agency. Diderot borrowed Maupertuis’ thesis that epigenesis works because parental elements come from the parts of the body resembling the parts that the elements will later form in the animal; parental elements feel and think and retain some memory of their origins—this explains the preservation of species and the resemblance that children have to their parents. This theory explains teratism (something that preformation cannot explain): it may happen that there is either an excess or a lack of certain elements and that, as a result of a lapse of memory, these elements cannot unite; it may also happen that strange combinations of superfluous elements are formed, resulting either in an inability to reproduce, or in the creation of every possible type of monstrosity. Diderot goes on to demonstrate how epigenesis explains the presence of infinitely varied creatures on earth: certain elements always combine in the same way; it follows that infinitely varied microscopic creatures will be formed if the elements differ, and polyps if they are alike; the latter may be compared to a cluster of infinitely small bees which can store only one position in their memory, clinging to one another and remaining in that position. The image of the beehive was taken directly from Maupertuis: “ . . . in this way, a swarm of bees, when they are assembled and united around the branch of a tree, appear to be only a body that bears no resemblance to the individuals that formed it.”25 For Diderot epigenesis allows for open-ended metamorphosis or the continual creation of new species. The primary components that form the embryo are conscious and can radically diverge from their original patterns or paths. Diderot asks: What will prevent intelligent and conscious elementary parts from infinitely digressing from the order that constitutes the species? From there, an infinite number of species of animals arising from a first animal; an infinite number of beings emanating from a first being; one single act in nature.26

The rhetorical question implies that there is nothing to prevent the conscious molecules that form the embryo from diverging from their original

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patterns. Epigenesis explains the great diversity of species. It also provides for an infinite number of different species to derive from one original being. Thus, epigenesis opens the door to open-ended metamorphosis. In the Essay on the Formation of Organized Bodies, Chapters 11 and 12, Maupertuis had explained the existence of new species by a succession of chance digressions in the original order of parental elements, and he refers to each divergence from the original as an error. Diderot does not judge that these divergences from the original pattern are errors: he recognizes that they are departures from the original or changes, but he makes no value judgment. Nature is continually creating and does not stop making new varieties until all possible combinations have been exhausted. The notion of the metamorphosis of species had been previously set forth in Maupertuis’ writings. In Physical Venus, Maupertuis had envisaged that the order of parental elements is responsible for resemblance, the creation of new breeds of dogs, pigeons, and canaries, and accidental varieties.27 Maupertuis explains that epigenesis works because all matter is endowed with consciousness. Diderot ends Thought 50 by quoting Maupertuis’ statement in Latin that asserts that when the consciousness of each individual element is brought together, the result is a single perception that is much stronger and more perfect than any of the elementary perceptions. Thus, because molecules themselves are endowed with an elementary consciousness, they can arrange themselves and unite in a particular fashion to form a healthy offspring; just as molecules unite, so does the consciousness of the molecules and thus, the offspring is endowed with an awareness that is greater and that surpasses that of molecules. Having established that epigenesis is the true explanation of the origin of the fetus, and having shown that epigenesis opens the door to the formation of new species, Diderot proceeds to the next step: the metamorphosis of man as a species. Thought 58 is comprised of 15 questions about the origin and nature of life. In Question 1 Diderot asks a lengthy question that culminates in speculating that man has metamorphosed over millennia. He begins by asking whether metals have always been and always will be just as they are now; then he asks whether plants have always been and always will be just as they are now; then he asks whether animals have always been and always will be as they are now. Crucially, he ends the lengthy sentence with “etc.,” thus stopping short of asking whether humans have always been and always will be as they are now. The implication is that humans, too, are in the midst of flux and this implication was substantiated by recent archaeological evidence. The caves at Arcy-sur-Cure, near from Auxerre, had yielded a large number of prehistoric animal remains. Diderot’s article, “Arcy” [“Arcy”] in the Encyclopedia,

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had suggested that scientific evidence disproves the Church’s position that the earth is only 6,000 years old (set forth by Bishop Ussher, and also discussed by Diderot in the article “Age (Mythology) [“Age (Mythologie)”]. Diderot was also influenced by Buffon, who had acknowledged that the remains of ancient species show that they were generally larger than their modern descendants. Buffon had attributed these changes to climate and diet, and he wrote that changes in climate and diet can be responsible for significant variations between individuals of the same species. Crucially, however, he did not go on to say that these changes are then perpetuated in succeeding generations. Diderot ponders the issue in Question 1. In Question 2 Diderot answers the rhetorical question that he posed in Question 1. In Question 1 “etc.” prompts the reader to ask whether human beings, the next step in Diderot’s chain, have always been and always will be just as they are now. In Question 2 Diderot begins with the answer to that question: just as vegetables and animals are born, grow, and die, so it is with an entire species. Then Diderot sets epigenesis within the framework of time, demonstrating that the molecular arrangements arising from epigenesis change over millennia. He begins with a description of epigenesis, identical to the one that he would repeat in the Dream when describing d’Alembert’s conception and birth: epigenesis is comprised of constituent elements, scattered and intermingled throughout the body, and these constituent elements come together because it is possible for them to do so. Thus, Diderot defines epigenesis thus: molecules come together because there is nothing preventing their union. As molecules combine and molecular organization becomes more complex, consciousness also develops and becomes more complex: it is through the innumerable arrangements and developments that the embryo undergoes that allow it to acquire movement, feeling, ideas, thought, reflection, consciousness, feelings, emotions, signs, gestures, sounds, articulate sounds, language, laws, and arts and sciences. Diderot’s hypothesis is surprisingly modern: millions of years pass between each of these developments, and there may be more developments and growth in the future. Hence, Diderot solves the riddle of man’s origin by focusing first on the infinitesimally small, and then telescoping to the level of minerals, plants, and animals. He declares epigenesis to be the true explanation of prenatal development, and then sets it in the dimension of time, demonstrating that molecular organization changes over millennia, thus providing for the amelioration of species or their extinction. For epigenesis to work, living matter must arise from molecules that are present in food (animal and vegetable matter) or soil (used by plants as

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nutrition, and in turn, consumed by humans). However, the question arises as to what set life in motion if originally, the mineral kingdom was all that there was. Diderot found spontaneous generation useful in bridging the gap between the animate and the inanimate. In Question 3 Diderot asks whether living matter can arise from dead matter and whether dead matter can arise from living matter. He recognized that for the vegetable kingdom to metamorphose from the mineral, living matter must, indeed, arise from nonliving matter. Diderot asks whether living matter is always alive, and whether dead matter is permanently dead. If matter can change from living into nonliving and then back into living, that would explain the growth of an organism from nutrients in the soil that are ingested by plants, and in turn, consumed by humans. Although the issues raised here are put forward in the form of questions, it is clear that Diderot envisages matter as containing its own energy, as self-propelled, and that he rejects the idea that any matter can be truly dead. In Question 11 Diderot challenges Buffon’s attempt to explain embryological development with the interior mold [moule] theory. Buffon had deduced that there is an interior mold that exists in the very mass of matter and that guides the embryological and subsequent growth of animals. He posited that each interior mold admits only the organic molecules that are proper to it; when development and growth have been completed, surplus of organic molecules are sent from each of the individual’s parts to one or several places where they can be used for nutrition. Therefore, it was necessary to admit not only that the existence of organic molecules was a fact, but also, that there existed an interior mold, prototype or force, that preadapted these molecules to the diverse organs of the organisms whose development and reproduction they assured. Diderot challenged Buffon’s interior mold hypothesis by asking whether the moule is a real and preexisting entity, and if so, how it as formed. Diderot did not believe that there exists an interior mold. Without directly attacking Buffon, Diderot scorned the speculative nature of this hypothesis. Buffon’s mold [moule] theory could not account for the fact, acknowledged by Buffon in the Epochs of Nature, Volume 1, that the remains of ancient species show that they were generally larger than their modern descendants; such generalized changes, whether due to climate or to diet, would imply a permanent change in the moule, for which his theories cannot readily account. Buffon had envisaged a prototype for each species: he stated that there is in nature a general prototype on which each individual is modeled, but which seems to be altered or to perfect itself according to circumstances.28 Maupertuis carried the notion further and extrapolated that random errors in the prototype explain how from two individuals the multiplication of the

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most dissimilar species could follow: diverse species owe their origin to random chance and to situations in which elementary parts do not adhere to the order they had in the father and mother germs. Maupertuis had also posited that each degree of error creates a new species; and by virtue of repetition, the infinite diversity of animals that exist today would arise.29 Diderot accepts the theory that errors that have arisen since the prototype explains diversity, but he carries it a step further: he does not accept the heterogeneity of kingdoms; for Diderot kingdoms arise from one another. Robinet returned to this theme: he declared that a rock, an oak, a horse, a monkey, and a man, are gradual variations of the prototype that began to realize itself by the small possible elements.30 Diderot again engages in embryological discussion in the Conversation between d’Alembert and Diderot (1769) and D’Alembert’s Dream (1769). In these two works he resolves many of the questions tangent upon epigenesis that he asked in 1753 (ie: whether living matter can arise from nonliving). For example, in the Conversation the character Diderot reiterates that conception is no miracle and that reproduction is a matter of organization of molecules. D’Alembert’s birth is an example of latent (potential) awareness being converted into active awareness—this transformation is accomplished by the random collision of conscious molecules. When the character Diderot declares that one of the greatest geometricians of Europe was originally nothing, the character d’Alembert exclaims, “Why nothing! Nothing is made from nothing.” The phrase, “Nothing is made from nothing,” is a basic materialist principle. The article “Chaos” cites the philosophy of the ancients, “nothing is made from nothing” [ex nihilo nihil fit], to show that it is the motion of molecules that is perpetually bringing the universe into existence.31 The article shows that motion is intrinsic to molecules and since molecules always existed, the universe has always been. Diderot uses “On ne fait rien de rien” to show that it is the motion and collision of conscious molecules that brings life into being. Diderot explains that the molecules that were to form the first rudiments of the geometrician were scattered throughout the bodies of his parents, filtered themselves with the lymph, circulated in the blood, and eventually formed the germe. Diderot engages in an embryological discourse describing the germ’s journey through the Fallopian tubes to the womb, its attachment to the womb by a long cord, and its development into a fetus. Diderot again elaborates on his disputation of the notion that nothing comes from nothing on the first page of D’Alembert’s Dream. Diderot demonstrates that one can make something out of nothing: he explains that first there is nothing; then there is one molecule (“un point vivant”) that is living and has an innate, elementary awareness. This one conscious molecule

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combines with another conscious molecule because there is nothing to prevent it from doing so. Two molecules that have combined have a consciousness that is higher and more developed than the consciousness of one molecule. As molecules combine and form a more complex organization, consciousness develops and becomes more sophisticated, giving rise to feeling, thoughts, language, and the arts and sciences. Mlle de l’Espinasse’s statement, “Rien d’abord, puis un point vivant” may have been inspired by Harvey’s rising point [punctum saliens]: Harvey had performed numerous dissections on dogs from royal parks and had been able to discern, two months, five days after conception, a rising point or the fetus’ first heartbeat.32 Haller also observed and recorded the first heartbeat in the development of the chicken.33 In the Conversation Diderot explains d’Alembert’s conception and birth as the combination of conscious molecules that combine and absorb heat; as they organize and form more complex molecules and tissue, give rise to an embryo and then a baby that has consciousness, memory, and the ability to learn. He negates preformation by demonstrating that there are no preformed seeds in either the mother or the father, but rather, molecules that circulate in the blood and lymph. He supports Harvey, who posited that the organization of the embryo was effected by the gradual formation of organs from an undifferentiated mass. Rather than believing that the organs were preformed, Harvey asserted that they formed themselves. Harvey had observed that the heart was the first to be formed, and concluded that the formation of the embryo was a true progressive formation starting with undifferentiated matter, an epigenesis. Like Harvey, the character Diderot declares that purely mechanical means (epigenesis) can explain the rise, from a single molecule that combines with another molecule, of a conscious being that can feel, think, and resolve the problem of the precession of the equinoxes. When d’Alembert asks Diderot whether he believes in preexisting germs, Diderot summarizes his stance on the preformation vs. epigenesis debate in one word: “Non.” Diderot’s hostility to encasement [emboîtement] is also seen in his correspondence. He spoke of it at Grandval, witnessed by an undated letter reported by Naigeon: “We fell upon the question of preexisting germs. Do you know what these beasts are? It is you, it is me, it is all men who are, who have been and who will be, encased in one another going back to Eve’s ovary and Adam’s testicle, who were the first two cases from where so many fools arose with time, without counting the defenders of this system.”34 The reference to Adam and Eve ridicules all preformationists, including Swammerdam, who, in 1669, in the Historia Insectorum Generalis wrote that there

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is no generation, only the growth of parts; hence, he explained original sin, as all men were contained in the loins of Adam and Eve [“Quidquid est hominum in lumbis Adami et Evæ occusulum fuit”]. It is also an attack on Diderot’s contemporaries who defended preformation: on the ovists Haller and Bonnet, who held that the fetus is preformed in the egg, and on the animalculists Andry and Geoffroy, who, on the contrary, posited that it was the first man who held all of posterity, since the preformed fetus is found in the interior of sperm. It was also an attack on Haller and Bonnet, who defended the infinite divisibility of matter. Diderot stands in the camp of Maupertuis and Buffon, who both denounced the divisibility of matter to infinity as an abstraction and a mathematical illusion that does not exist in the nature of things.35 Maupertuis and Buffon pointed to heredity (ressemblance) and crossbreeding as evidence that disproves preformation. In the Conversation Diderot returns to the egg several times in his defense of epigenesis: he holds up an egg and declares that with that one egg, one can overturn all the schools of theology and houses of worship on earth. In 1651 William Harvey coined the frequently quoted phrase, “everything comes from the egg” [ex ovo omnia], which appeared on the title page of various editions of the Exercitationes. Harvey stated that all animals are begotten the same way, beginning with the “first oviform element.”36 He described “oviform” not as having the shape of an egg, but rather, possessing the egg’s composition and nature.37 Harvey concluded that in all animals there is a first element, whether it is an egg or oviform matter that possesses the nature and composition of an egg.38 Diderot’s uses the egg to directly attack the fixity of the chain of beings as described in Genesis. Religious apologists thought that God had handed down the prototypes of all species and that no new species had metamorphosed since Creation. The study of embryonic development in the egg furnished important arguments to the partisans of both sides of the debate. The fact that Diderot returned to the egg illustrates the central importance of the egg given by scientists during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. For example, in 1672 Malpighi used the egg to set forth the theory of the preformation of the germ.39 In 1758 the physiologist Haller examined the yellow membrane and embryonic intestine of the egg and deduced that the chicken itself exists in the egg before fertilization.40 In 1762 Charles Bonnet confirmed these views after his examination of the egg.41 Diderot, on the contrary, remained faithful to epigenesis and he used the egg to defend the theory in the Encyclopedia. In the article “Spinozist” [“Spinoziste”] he saw in the autonomous development of the embryo the essential argument of modern materialism, of contemporary Spinozists.

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“The general principle of the latter, is that matter is conscious, which they prove by the development of the egg, an inert body, which only by gradually increasing warmth passes to the state of a conscious and living beings, and by the growth of every animal which in its beginning is only a point, and which by the nutritive assimilation of plants, in one word, of all the substances that provide nutrition, becomes a large, conscious and living body in a large space. From there they conclude that there is only matter, and that it is enough to explain everything . . .”42 Here Diderot articulates his neoSpinozism. All molecules are conscious and when they randomly assemble, they acquire the consciousness of the newly organized body and lose the memory of their former state. All matter, at every level of organization, is conscious and “suffices to explain everything.” In fact, he will turn to the egg again in the Refutation of Man: “I clearly see in the development of the egg and a few other workings of nature, matter that is inert in appearance, but organized, passing via purely physical agents, from the inert state to the state of consciousness and life, but the requisite juncture of this passage escapes me.”43 In the Conversation Diderot declares that the egg is nothing more than an unperceiving mass, both before and after the germ is introduced into it. It begins to reorganize when heat is introduced into it, and heat is produced by motion. Hence, he begins his explanation of epigenesis by framing it in purely Newtonian terms ie: heat and motion. The molecules that were to form the first rudiments of d’Alembert’s body were scattered throughout his mother and father, were filtered with lymph and circulated in the blood. In 1746 he had established that molecules combine because there is nothing preventing them from doing so. Now Diderot reiterates the purely mechanist foundation of regeneration by asking, “How is that done?” and answering, “By eating and other purely mechanical operations.” However, he departs from a strictly physical explanation when he states that all molecules have consciousness and thus enters the realm of the speculative. He ends by substituting the metaphysics of the Church with his own brand of metaphysics, borrowing from Maupertuis and Spinoza. Molecules have consciousness as does every succeeding level of organization (fibers, bundles of fibers, organs, even the universe itself ). Diderot speaks volumes when he uses one word to answer d’Alembert’s question “Then you do not believe in preexisting germs?” With one word, “No,” Diderot challenges the Genesis account of Creation, the teachings of the Church, and he widens the Aristotelian chain of beings to make it open ended and in continual flux. With one word he takes a stance opposite his contemporaries, Haller and Bonnet, and all naturalists who sought to combine Christian apologetics with contemporary science. There was ample evidence

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to substantiate “No.” For example, heredity, the regenerative ability of polyps, crossbreeding, teratisms (ie: Siamese twins or those blind from birth such as Saunderson) made the flaws in preformation evident. “That is contrary to experimentation and reason: contrary to experimentation that would search in vain for these germs in eggs and in most animals before a certain age . . .” challenges the veracity of experiments performed by preformationists Swammerdam (on pupæ and larvæ), Malebranche (on tulip bulbs), Mariotte (on tulip bulbs), and Dodart (on narcissus bulbs and germs of wheat).44 It also questions Réaumur’s explanation for the regeneration of crayfish, starfish and earthworms after they are severed: Réaumur held that there is no place in the leg of the crayfish where there is not an egg containing another leg. Diderot invalidates these explanations as “contrary to experimentation.” It also attacks Haller and Bonnet, who defended the divisibility of matter ad infinitum and allowed for fully preformed figures of animals within seeds, like Russian dolls, going back to Creation. Diderot argues the position of Maupertuis in 1745 (Physical Venus) and Buffon in 1746 (History of Animals) who denounce divisibility to infinity an illusion that does not exist in the nature of things. When d’Alembert posits that without preexistent germs, the original genesis of animal life is inconceivable, Diderot replies that it is because he assumes that animals were in the beginning what they are at present. Here Diderot ties epigenesis to the metamorphosis of species and demonstrates that epigenesis is its foundation. It is precisely because each being is created anew from an undifferentiated mass that a slow change can occur in species over millennia. He owes this to Maupertuis’ deduction that polydactyly arises from errors in the regenerative process and Buffon’s observation that species were once larger than they currently were. The moment that one dismisses the fixity of the Genesis tale as erroneous, one accepts the geological evidence that the earth is much older than had been previously thought, and the archaeological evidence that indicates that animals were once much larger than they presently are. Phenomena such as heredity, regeneration of polyps, crossbreeding, and teratisms, can be explained by purely physical, mechanistic, Newtonian means. Diderot describes the conception of a chick as beginning with a single point that moves about. Once again, conception and gestation are discussed in purely Newtonian terms: motion creates heat and heat permits growth. First, a point moves about and then a thread grows and takes color. Motion allows the transformation of a single point into a thread; with more motion, and subsequently the generation of more heat, the thread becomes flesh. Diderot demonstrates that each stage is successive: the organization of the

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embryo is effected by the gradual formation of organs. As Harvey posited, rather than believing that organs are preformed, Diderot maintains that they form themselves. Harvey had observed that the heart was the first to be formed, and he concluded that the formation of the embryo was a true progressive formation starting with undifferentiated matter, an epigenesis. Diderot begins from an earlier stage: a point that becomes a thread and then flesh, because motion is innate to all matter. Diderot depicts consciousness inside the egg: the chick is conscious. The progression from a gathering of specks to an animal that has five senses is a matter of the organization of molecules. Because molecules are conscious, there are an infinite number of degrees of consciousness just as there are an infinite combination of molecules. The molecule is the simplest form of consciousness; the thread is also conscious because when molecules combine to form a thread, a new consciousness arises, separate from that of its constituent parts. Hence, epigenesis gives rise not only to more complex combinations of matter, but also to more and more sophisticated forms of consciousness: from that of the molecule to that of the human being. Diderot articulates the Spinozist, pantheist views, that, taken to the nth degree, the universe (the greatest organization of matter) is conscious, and that one can call this consciousness God. The fact that plants and animals arise from epigenesis illustrates that there is only one substance in the universe that comprises everything—conscious molecules. Conscious molecules are the only logical explanation for epigenesis. Diderot argues that it would be unreasonable to suppose that a hidden element, the soul, finds its way into the egg at some particular moment in the process. Diderot asks, “But what is this element? Did it occupy space or did it not occupy any space? How did it come about? Where did it disappear, without motion? Where was it? What was it doing there or elsewhere? Was it created the moment that the need arose? Did it exist?”45 Diderot demonstrates the absurdity of dualism and invalidates the existence of the soul. Hence, epigenesis points to conscious molecules as the basis of life. The notion that the conscious molecule is the basis of life and the reason that epigenesis works, is early in D’Alembert’s Dream (1769). Mademoiselle de l’Espinasse says, “Nothing at first, then a living point . . . To this living point, another attached itself, and again another; by these successive applications there results a whole being, for I am quite whole, I wouldn’t doubt it . . .”46 Life is the successive accretion of a living point. After Mademoiselle de l’Espinasse identifies “rien” and then “un point vivant” as the start of life, Bordeu examines what happens before there is “un point vivant.” Before the “point” there is a breeding ground of conscious molecules, in the earth, the

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remains of prior civilizations, that will nourish plants and vegetables, and, in turn, be consumed by humans; the conscious molecules will circulate in the blood and lymph systems of the humans, randomly collide and organize, and, through epigenesis, perhaps gradually yield a new species over millennia. We see here that unlike the fixity and closed nature of preformation, epigenesis allows for the open ended metamorphosis of species. The notion that life is the successive accretion of a single living point is derived directly from William Harvey: “A rising point becomes visible in the offspring, which is why it is now set in motion (Aristotle states)” [“Apparet punctum sanguineum saliens, quod jam movetur (ait Aristoteles)].”47 The rising point [punctum saliens] is defined as the first trace of the heart in an embryo, appearing as a pulsating point or speck. Harvey found the rising point or first heartbeat in the embryo of a dog four days after conception. The punctum saliens is discussed in the Encyclopedia: “At first it is merely a point, but a point that is living, a rising point, and around which all other parts arrange themselves, soon completing the formation of the animal.”48 Harvey’s observation of the punctum saliens is very useful in Diderot’s epigenetic argument: the successive accretion of parts is evidence of conscious molecules combining and acquiring a greater mass consciousness and losing the memory of their former state. It is epigenesis that explains errors that occur in the generative process. Diderot, via Maupertuis, observed that characteristics acquired from either parent, can be passed from one generation to the next and can metamorphose species over a period of time. Physical characteristics acquired by this means can lead to the improvement or the degeneration of a species. Over the millennia, armless generations can develop arms; organs degenerate or perfect themselves through necessity and habitual functioning. Man thinks so much, that he may end by being nothing but a head. The character Bordeu declares that he has seen two stumps finish by turning into two arms. First there is a long succession of armless generations; then there are pincers where there was once nothing; then the pincers get longer and longer, cross each other at the back and come around to the front again; they may possibly develop fingers at the extremities and so make new arms and hands. The original shape of a creature degenerates or perfects itself through necessity and habitual functioning. The changes are incremental, inherited, and may be advantageous or disadvantageous, an improvement or a degeneration. They may lead to the appearance of a new species or the extinction of an existing one. Diderot was influenced by Buffon’s notion of degeneration of species. Buffon had posited that the domestication of animals causes their degeneration

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because it prevents them from exercising and eating properly in the wilderness, which is their natural habitat. Their weakened state is thus passed on to their offspring through inheritance. Thus, Buffon believed that acquired characteristics are passed on to offspring. Diderot accepted the notion of degeneration. For him metamorphasis did not always necessarily yield an improvement, but since everything is random and subject to an infinite number of factors, species can degenerate, become smaller, weaker, and extinct. In D’Alembert’s Dream Dr. Bordeu disputes preformation once more. Dr. Bordeu tells Mlle de l’Espinasse that he will guarantee that she has been thinking that, at the age of twelve she was a woman half the size she is now, and at four, half as small again, at the fetal stage a miniature woman and in her mother’s ovaries a minute woman, she was always a woman with the same form as she has now, so that only the successive stages of growth she has been through have made the difference between her at her origin and her as she is now. Mlle de l’Espinasse admits that that is true. Here we see renewed criticism directed against preformation. Diderot challenges a contemporary theoretician of preformation, Charles Bonnet, among others. Bonnet had written, “As for me, I prefer to extend the boundaries of Creation as far back as possible. I take pleasure in considering this magnificent succession of organized beings, enclosed like little worlds, in one another.”49 Diderot maintains that nothing is more false than preformation; Julie was once an imperceptible speck, made of even smaller particles, dispersed in the blood and lymph of her mother and father. This speck became a fine thread, then a bundle of threads; each thread was fed and became an organ. In Bordeu’s monologue, “D’abord vous n’étiez rien,” Diderot elaborates upon epigenesis in great detail. He reiterates the idea that at first there was nothing. Then, after nothing there was “un point imperceptible” comprised of molecules circulating in the blood and lymph (as he had said of d’Alembert in the Conversation. Then there was a thread, and then a bundle of threads. The bundle becomes an organ with a specific function. The bundle of threads has consciousness, and therefore it knows what pattern to take to form an organ. David Adams explains that Diderot was describing the development of the egg and its subsequent growth.50 Adams says: With this is intermingled a conception of the development of the nervous system. To express these conceptions only a few non-technical words were used by Diderot: (a) ‘ . . . that speck became a loose thread, then a bundle of threads,’ (ce point devint un fil délié, puis un faisceau de fil ). The ‘bundle of

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It is significant that in this exposé on epigenesis, the notion of organic molecules, which is owed to Buffon, is replaced by that of brins, each brin forming un faisceau de brins, which, in turn, forms organs. Diderot, in his theory of brins, is directly influenced by Haller’s theory of fibers.53 Diderot borrowed the notion that the fiber is a living element, the common element of all living matter. Each of the fibers of the bundle of threads is transformed, solely by nutrition, into a particular organ. Each bundle of fibers is a conscious system. When bundles join to form an organ, each organ becomes a conscious system. When organs work together to form a system, that system has an individual consciousness all of its own. Epigenesis permits the metamorphosis of species: man is a complicated machine that advances towards perfection through countless, successive stages, and whose formation depends on fine, slender threads that cannot be broken. If the slender threads are broken, it results in serious consequences to the organism (ie: blindness, deafness or deformity). Diderot defines metamorphosis as the advancement towards perfection by an infinite number of successive developments. He also posits that ressemblance is contingent upon epigenesis. The character Mademoiselle de l’Espinasse declares that is man is often prenatally damaged. Unlike preformation, epigenesis can explain teratism. Preformation, which posits that each offspring is a copy of the parent, cannot explain radical departures from the norm such as birth anomalies. Examples of prenatal deformities that Diderot gives are hunchbacks, cripples, Siamese twins, and Jean-Baptiste Macé, who was born with his heart on the right side of his body. The character Bordeu explains that if Jean-Baptiste Macé had lived, his grandchildren would have the same deformities because deformities skip a generation and go in leapfrog jumps. Bordeu speculates that the reason for these leaps may be that a descendant of the abnormal strain predominates and governs the pattern of the network. This is a reiteration of Maupertuis’ Inaugural Dissertation, which had shown that polydactyly skips a generation. Maupertuis had attributed anomalies to errors that are transmitted in the generative process. While Maupertuis’ polydactyly skips a generation, Mademoiselle de l’Espinasse speculates that perhaps geniuses and fools skip generations. These anomalies, that skip a generation, are iconic representations of the fact that physical form is not static, but that it is changing. In summation, Diderot recognized that epigenesis is the fulcrum of the biological process that permits the open-ended metamorphoses of species. He

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owes to Harvey the observation that the germ is brought into existence by the addition of parts that bud out of one another or by successive accretions. He owes to Maupertuis the observation that this process of successive accretions can be flawed by random errors that occur in the organization of parental elements. It is these random errors that have been observed to cause birth anomalies that skip a generation, which, over repeated generations, give rise to new species or cause the extinction of others. Errors that occur in the epigenetic process are responsible for the metamorphoses of plants, animals and man; these errors connect kingdoms. In the next chapter we will see that Diderot’s belief in spontaneous generation led him to believe that all living beings must have metamorphosed from the mineral kingdom at some point in history and that the process continues today. Spontaneous generation of animalcules from dead matter is a microcosm of the metamorphoses of species.

Chapter Three

Spontaneous Generation

If when Epicurus asserted that the earth contained the germs of everything, and that the animal species was the product of fermentation, he had proposed to show a microcosm of what happened on a grand scale at the origin of time, how would one have responded to him?1 —Denis Diderot, D’Alembert’s Dream (1769)

Spontaneous generation is the theory that living organisms develop without the agency of pre-existing living matter. The ancient Greeks and Romans believed that flies and other small animals arose from mud at the bottom of streams and ponds by spontaneous generation. The theory was supported by Epicurus and it was set forth in Lucretius’ On the Nature of Things. The belief persisted through the Middle Ages, when it was thought that pieces of cheese and bread wrapped in rags and left in a dark corner produced mice, because after several weeks, there were mice in the rags. During the seventeenth century, scholars and scientists believed in spontaneous generation because there was no reason not to. Jacques Roger says, “The fact [of spontaneous generation] itself was not seriously questioned by anyone. It had in its favor the unanimous authority of the ancients, as well as innumerable proofs drawn from everyday experience. It is not surprising, then, to find that neither Father Marin Mersenne, Harvey, nor Descartes questioned it.2 Jan Baptista Van Helmont believed that from soiled shirts and wheat arise full grown mice. Jacques Roger says, “Similarly, undertaking in his Quæstiones in Genesim to calculate the tonnage of Noah’s Ark, Father Marin Mersenne omitted ‘animals that are born from putrefaction, such as mice, lice, flies, etc.’”3 Fortunio Liceti surmised that because mice are imperfect animals, they are susceptible to spontaneous birth. William Harvey wrote that some animals are born spontaneously, whether from the intention of matter or concocted by chance.4 79

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René Descartes posited that so little is needed to make an animal, that it is not surprising to see so many animals, worms, and insects take form spontaneously in all matter in putrefaction.”5 In 1674 Antonie van Leeuwenhoek’s discovery of animalcules in rainwater, pond and well water, and in samples taken from the human mouth and intestine, demonstrated the existence of a densely populated, but hitherto invisible world of organisms. His discovery of microscopic animacules further fueled the belief in spontaneous generation. During the eighteenth century, spontaneous generation became intimately intertwined with the polemics of atheist materialism. Atheists made spontaneous generation the fulcrum of their polemics: life comes from nothing all the time, as the animalcules that were seen in vegetable broth had indicated, and hence, there is no need for divine agency. Atheists also supported spontaneous generation because it refuted preformation: beings arise from that which does not resemble them and hence, emboîtement falls, Adam and Eve are not the parents of all humanity, and life arises randomly. Conversely, deists argued vehemently against spontaneous generation: life cannot arise from nothing because only God can create life, and empiricism and the scientific theory have demonstrated the wonders that God has created; therefore, experiments substantiating spontaneous generation must be flawed. Spontaneous generation is also wrong because preformation is true: everything issued directly from the hands of the Creator and preserved the form it was given. Both sides used empirical science to advance their causes. Unfortunately, one side did not know that its investigators had not properly sterilized and sealed their flasks. In 1746, while he was still a deist, Diderot refuted spontaneous generation because he believed that only God could create life. Philosophical Thoughts, Thoughts 18 and 19, taken together, encapsulate the deists’ arguments against spontaneous generation. In Thought 18 Diderot marvels at the wonders of God’s universe, which he likens to a finely tuned clock that the Prime Mover has set in motion. He refers to Isaac Newton, Pieter van Musschenbroek6, Nicholas Hartsoeker7, Bernard Nieuwentyt8, and Malpighi9. Diderot declares that it is in the works of these great men that one finds satisfying proofs of the existence of a sovereignly Intelligent Being. Diderot takes a deistic stance and denounces Spinoza’s pantheism: is it because of the legacy of these scientists that the world is no longer thought to be a god. He espouses the Newtonian view that the universe is a finely tuned clock, whose wheels, cords, pullies, springs, and weights, point to the magnificence and intelligence of a Supreme Being. Having set the stage for a deistic world view in Thought 18, Diderot proceeds to denounce spontaneous generation in Thought 19. He clearly

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refutes the notion: “ . . . all experiments agree in proving to me that putrefaction alone never produced any organism.”10 Hence, although he was to change his mind over the next three years, in 1746 Diderot still believed that it is impossible for living beings to be born from dead flesh and he polemicized spontaneous generation to promote deism. In arriving at this position, he pondered the role of motion and the effects of motion in determining whether matter is alive or inanimate. Diderot concluded that atomic motion, whether innate (essentiel) or the result of collision with other atoms (accidentel), does not cause spontaneous generation. He acknowledged the physical principle that motion is intrinsic to the atom, but he concluded that the effects of motion stop with the death of the organism, rather than metamorphose the organism into another living being. In Thought 19 he ridicules the theory of spontaneous generation with metaphors of men rising from the earth and insects arising from dead flesh. He makes a joke at the conclusion of Thought 19: “If an atheist had maintained, two hundred years ago, that some day perhaps people would see men spring full-formed from the bowels of the earth just as we see a mass of insects hatch from putrefying flesh, I would like to know what a metaphysician would have had to say to him.”11 Diderot uses éclore, to hatch, because it connotes the opening of eggs or the blossoming of flowers. It is used in phrases such as to hatch birds [faire éclore des oiseaux], the chickens are beginning to hatch out [les poussins commencent à éclore], fresh-blown lilacs [lilas frais éclos], a conspiracy ready to break out [une conspiration près d’éclore]. The comparison of spontaneous generation with things hatching ridicules the former and is evidently pejorative. Diderot ridicules both atheists and metaphysicians: scientific observation has demonstrated the existence of God (and hence, the fallacy of atheism) and the visible absence of any metaphysical realm (and hence, the fallacy of superstition). Diderot derived the metaphors of men born fully formed from the earth and insects arising from dead flesh from Lucretius’ On the Nature of Things. This theme recurs in Lucretius’ work. Lucretius repeatedly declares that we can see with our eyes that conscious beings arise from the insensate. For example, he states that we can certainly see with our eyes live worms coming forth into existence from foul manure when the earth is soaked and rotted by unseasonable rain (II, 872–4). He maintains that we may also infer that the conscious arises from the insensate because we see with our eyes birds’ eggs turn into living fledglings and worms swarm forth from the earth when it has been rotted by unseasonable rain (II, 926–30). The earth that had once generated every living species and brought forth huge beasts, now scarcely has the strength to generate tiny creatures (II, 1150–3). Even now multitudes of animals are formed out of the earth with the aid of rain and

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the sun’s warmth (V, 799–800). The earth passes through successive phases, so that the earth which used to be able to bear can longer do so (V, 834–6). Although in 1746 Diderot borrowed the Lucretian image of the earth bearing animals in order to ridicule spontaneous generation, three years later, after experiments performed by Needham and Buffon would convince him of the theory, Diderot would use the same Lucretian imagery in support of spontaneous generation. Scientific verification of spontaneous generation caused one of the arguments in favor of deism to fall: if the theory is true, then life is no longer a miracle, but rather, inevitable. Spontaneous generation was a feather in the cap of the atheists. A series of events transpired between 1746 (when Diderot dismissed spontaneous generation as an impossibility) and 1749 (when he defended it in the Letter on the Blind) that caused him to change his position. In 1746 John Needham traveled to France to work with Buffon. By a series of experiments Needham and Buffon set out to prove that every vegetable or organic infusion produces animalcules resembling tiny eels (and hence, the derisive name “eel-monger” [anguillard] that Voltaire gave Needham in the Questions on Miracles). Buffon and Needham devised a biological theory to explain spontaneous generation. The theory held that all living things contain, in addition to inanimate matter, special vital atoms that are responsible for all physiological activities. They postulated that after death, the vital atoms escape into the soil and are taken up again by plants. The two scientists claimed that the small, moving objects seen in pond water and in infusions of plant and animal matter are not living organisms, but merely vital atoms escaping from the organic material. In 1747 there appeared a French translation of John Turberville Needham’s An Account of Some Microscopical Discoveries Founded on an Examination of the Clamary and its Wonderful Milt Vessels.12 The work is a defense of spontaneous generation based upon Needham’s scientific experiments. Needham had found that large numbers of organisms developed in prepared infusions of many different substances that had been exposed to intense heat in sealed tubes for thirty minutes. Assuming that the heat treatment had killed any organisms present, Needham explained the presence of the new population on the grounds of spontaneous generation. Needham’s work seemed convincing and as a result, there grew support for spontaneous generation, most notably, first from George-Louis de Buffon and then by Diderot. By 1749, due to the work of Needham and Buffon, Diderot was convinced that living organisms are born of nonliving material. By then Diderot had become an atheist,13 and he exploited the experiments to advance his

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cause. In order to understand why Diderot changed his mind about spontaneous generation, it is necessary to examine his evolution from a deist (who believed that only God can create life via an egg) to an atheist in three short years. Vartanian addresses Diderot’s rapid evolution from deism to atheism during the critical three year period 1746–1749, and shows how this change in thought influenced his beliefs about spontaneous generation. Vartanian, as many critics do, believes that in 1746 Diderot truly was a deist: he prefaced the Philosophic Letters with “I write about God.”14 Soon Spinozism (the notion that God and the universe are one and the same and that God does not exist outside the universe) replaced Diderot’s deism. However, by 1749, La Mettrie’s materialism convinced Diderot to embrace atheism. When Diderot sat down to write the Letter on the Blind in 1749, atheism had replaced Spinozism. Vartanian says that Diderot embraced “Nature capitalized . . . and endowed with several of the creative powers formerly reserved to God.15 Vartanian points out that La Mettrie, who in Man machine, published a year before the Letter on the Blind, declared: “Let us not limit the resources of Nature; they are infinite.”16 Vartanian shows that two examples that convinced Diderot that nature’s resources are infinite are spontaneous generation and the regenerative powers of Trembley’s polyp.17 Needham and Buffon’s experiments with spontaneous generation, however, flawed, seemed to substantiate La Mettrie’s view that nature’s resources are infinite. Further, in 1740, Trembley discovered a fresh water polyp that regenerated itself when body parts were cut off. Vartanian discusses the impact that Benoît de Maillet’s Telliamed had on Diderot’s notion of the metamorphosis of species. Vartanian demonstrates that the fact that Telliamed was published in 1748 and Diderot wrote the Letter on the Blind in 1749 indicates that “Diderot was quick to seize upon its bold suggestions.” Vartanian summarizes the salient feature of the Telliamed thus: “It contended, among other things, that the present state of man was derived from simpler forms of life by gradual adaptations, over an incalculable interval of centuries, to an ever-changing environment.”18 Vartanian establishes a causality between the transformism of the Telliamed in 1748 and Diderot’s statement in the Letter on the Blind in 1749 that during the first instants of creation there existed creatures lacking heads, feet, arms, legs, intestines, stomachs, palates, teeth, etc., and that creatures that were not self-contradictory survived. Lester Crocker also provides a background on the contemporaries who influenced Diderot.19 In thirty pages he outlines the salient points in the contributions that Bordeu, Buffon, La Mettrie, Leibniz, Maillet, Maupertuis, Robinet, and Trembley, made to Diderot’s transformism. It was La Mettrie

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and Maupertuis, in particular, who caused Diderot to conclude that “Nature had to be conceived of as a self-creating, self-patterning force, as an experimenting-and a blindly experimenting-force.”20 Crocker says, “In 1746 . . . Diderot is still a deist, but is clearly tempted by atheism . . . If Diderot clings to his deism, it is partly because he has not yet reached this concept of nature as a self-sufficient All, containing within itself the origin and the explanation of all its phenomena. His position may be termed anti-evolutionary. Spontaneous generation is rejected as the source of higher forms of life. Only an act of creation can explain the existence of germ cells from which we come. The wing of a butterfly, the eye of a mitethese are sufficient to prove intelligent design. Yet, at the some time, Diderot is strongly drawn to the atheist’s argument: if we concede matter to be eternal, and if we grant that movement is inherent in matter, an infinite number of ‘throws of the dice’ was bound to bring about the combination which is our universe. It should be noted that there is nothing evolutionary in this thought; it is a quantitative mechanism that offers no perspective of qualitative change. The inclusion of motion as essential to matter is, however, a first step in that direction.”21 Crocker summarizes the works of many of the authors who impacted on Diderot’s thought during the three years in which he became an atheist. Crocker attributes the evolution in thought to the many books that he read: “He had read Nieuwentijdt, Nollet, William Derham; Bonnet’s and Réaumur’s works on insects. Needham’s Account of Some New Microscopical Discoveries seemed to him a convincing demonstration of spontaneous generation . . . A particularly important influence was that of Trembley’s memoir on freshwater polyps (1744)22 Trembley’s discovery of the regenerative powers of the polyp threw the biological world of France and England into a ferment; his conclusions were taken up by Bonnet, Réaumur, and others. Maupertuis, as early as 1745, expressed his amazement and saw new perspectives opening up. The philosophical repercussions were even more startling. The animal soul was clearly shown to be material . . . Bonnet suggested that the polyp bridged the animal and vegetable kingdoms, nullifying their supposedly complete separation. Later he declared the polyp to be the key to the interpretation of nature.23 The most radical conclusions were drawn by La Mettrie, in his notorious L’Homme machine, published towards the end of 1747. In this work, La Mettrie excludes any spiritual principle from the universe . . . Trembley’s polyp, he states specifically, proves that nature (read: matter) contains within itself the power that produces its activity andmost important-its organization.”24 Crocker, in a footnote, cites La Mettrie: “We do not know Nature at all; hidden, inner causes may have produced

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everything. Just look at Trembley’s polyp! Doesn’t it contain within itself the causes which give rise to its regeneration? . . . to destroy chance is not to prove the existence of a Supreme Being since there may be something else which would be neither chance, nor God, I mean Nature . . .”25 Crocker also shows that Diderot was influenced by Leibniz, who said that, “the natural changes of the Monads come from an internal principle, since an external cause can have no influence upon their inner being” Monadology, (Par. 11). All simple substances “have a certain self-sufficiency which makes them the sources of their internal activities and, so to speak, incorporeal automata” Monadology, (Par. 18).26 Crocker finds that Diderot, from his reading, had no choice but to conclude that “Nature had to be conceived of as a self-creating, self-patterning force, as an experimenting-and a blindly experimenting-force.”27 Crocker concludes that Diderot migrated from being a deist to an atheist, specifically, an atheist who viewed matter as self-sufficient, with motion and consciousness and capable of organizing itself. In the Letter on the Blind Saunderson maintains that in the beginning, matter, in a state of ferment, brought this world into being. Fermentation is synonymous with spontaneous generation [générations spontanées]. The image is Lucretian and evokes beings that arise from fermenting ground: “I conjecture, then, that in the beginning, when matter in a state of ferment brought this world into being, creatures like myself were of very common occurrence.”28 This statement indicates a clear conversion to the theory that Diderot had dismissed as implausible three years earlier in Thought 19. Diderot found the metaphor of spontaneous generation useful to promote atheist materialism: the theory permits life to originate randomly from nonliving matter without the intervention of God, and hence, the argument became part of his view that flux and time disperse chaos. Spontaneous generation was also a useful polemical tool in the battle against preformation: in the former, beings are born from that which does not resemble them. By proving spontaneous generation, Needham had also demonstrated the error of assuming that in every being there is a germ that resembles it in miniature. Hence, Diderot, who was an atheist and an epigenesist, was able to employ spontaneous generation as a polemical tool. Diderot evokes the metaphors of fermenting wine and frothing beer in the beginning, “when fermenting matter hatched the universe.” Fermentation is the foaming that occurs during the manufacture of wine and beer, a process at least 10,000 years old; during the eighteenth century it was recognized that the frothing results from the evolution of carbon dioxide gas. Diderot provides a lively and colorful image of the universe, frothing and foaming

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like fermenting wine and beer, and he maintains that this process faisait éclore l’univers. Eclore evokes the metaphors of birds hatching or flowers blooming. The birth of the universe is caused by la matière en fermentation. Diderot used fermentation in the chemical sense (atoms colliding, changing matter, and bringing forth something new and different from the original components). “Hatch” and “universe” demonstrate that Diderot recognized that there are systems within systems and that they are similar in function (like fractals). Animalcules hatch, birds hatch, planets hatch, and the universe hatches. Diderot considers the possibility that spontaneous generation has caused the development of life on other planets: “How many faulty and incomplete worlds have been dispersed and perhaps form again, and are dispersed at every instant in remote regions of space which I cannot touch . . .”29 Since the random collision of molecules can bring about life on this planet, it probably can on others, as well. Diderot considers the metamorphosis, over millennia, of star systems, planets, species, and animalcules. Diderot switches lenses and moves from the microscope to the telescope; he alternates from the microcosm to the macrocosm, from the atom to planets. The spontaneous generation of tiny animalcules becomes a metaphor for the development of solar systems and planets. Atoms collide and change form, living beings change, worlds change. He will return to the symmetry of the metamorphosis of forms among different levels of magnification in D’Alembert’s Dream. Worlds are anthropomorphized by the adjective estropiés, which evokes a crippled man and disabled limbs. Estropiés evokes a planet that did not develop to its full potential, just as Lucretius’ monsters. The adjective manqués evokes a miscarriage, an abortive attempt at creating life. Manqués is tautological when combined with estropiés and hyperbolizes it. The reflexive verb se dissiper is also tautological in the sequence estropiés, manqués, se sont dissipés, and it serves to hyperbolize estropiés and manqués. The anthropomorphosis of worlds, suggested by estropiés, manqués, se sont dissipés indicates that spontaneous generation occurs at every level of organization, on the microscopic and macroscopic levels. The reflexive verb se reformer connotes a rebirth, a new beginning, and thus nullifies the condition evoked by estropiés, manqués, se sont dissipés immediately preceding it. Then se dissiper is repeated, completing the cycle of birth, death, and renewal: just as atoms and molecules reorganize themselves in the cycle of the birth, life, and death of a living being, so does organization at the level of planets and solar systems. This process is hyperbolized by à chaque instant. It is the rule of the universe, not something rare and unusual. This happens across the universe, out of the reach of telescopes, “où je ne touche point, et où vous ne voyez pas.”

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Diderot repeats the life cycle presented in dissiper, se reformer, se dissiper in “où le mouvement continue et continuera de combiner des amas de matière.” The tautology hyperbolizes the eternal nature of the cycle and brings time to the reader’s mind. Continue et continuera is tautological and hyperbolizes the preceding à chaque instant. Diderot returned to the subject of spontaneous generation in 1753, this time carefully examining the science behind it. In Thoughts on the Interpretation of Nature, Thought 58, Diderot debated whether it is possible that living matter could be born from dead matter. In Thought 58, Question 3, he uses Lucretius’ argument that we can see with our eyes that dead matter produces and surrounds living beings: “If we cast our eyes over . . . microscopic insects, and over the matter that produces and encompasses them, it is evident that matter is generally divided into dead matter and living matter.”30 He begins with jeter les yeux, a proof that was central to Lucretian metamorphosis: Lucretius had used video and cerno to prove spontaneous generation.31 Similarly, Needham and Buffon’s experiments were based on the visual inspection of laboratory samples. Diderot was satisfied with their work because scientific verification through observation was part of empiricism and the scientific method and it was supported by Locke’s view that we can know reality only through our senses. Jeter les yeux provides the evidence for the deduction that follows: la matière qui les produit et qui les environne. Diderot would adhere to spontaneous generation the rest of his life because 1) experimentation provided convincing evidence, 2) it supported by the materialist view that everything in the universe is merely a result of the organization of molecules, and 3) it is useful in his quest to find a means of creation without God. In Question 3 Diderot rejects the strict division of matter into two categories, living and dead. Diderot takes a stance against Buffon, who had differentiated between living and dead matter in Volume 1 of Natural History. By asking whether living matter is always alive, he suggests that if its is ever dead, then it must find a way to come to life; if living matter is not always alive, then matter eternally oscillates between the living and dead states. If matter oscillates between the living and dead states, then the creation of the universe was not such a miracle after all, as chaos and organization oscillate back and forth. The question of whether matter always remains alive or dead and whether it can change between the two states, would become the basis of Diderot’s metamorphosis of species: first there was the mineral kingdom, then the vegetable, and then the animal. He had faith that scientific experimentation and physics would elucidate on the behavior of molecules and nullify the strict division between kingdoms. In Question 4 Diderot asks whether there are any other factors, other than organization and motion, that could explain the difference between

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living and dead matter. Hence, he acknowledges two scientific facts: first, that everything is merely a matter of organization, and secondly, that everything is in perpetual motion. He reduces the physical universe to these two common denominators-arrangement and motion. Assignable indicates that this is a rhetorical question and that the answer is no; otherwise, he, himself, would have noted that there are other ascertainable differences that must be noted. In Question 5 Diderot defines the terms matière vivante and matière morte. The definitions are contingent upon motion: living matter moves by its own innate motion and dead matter is also perpetually in motion, but is moved by other matter. Hence, Diderot believes that all matter is in motion and that therefore, there is life in all matter. There is thus no need for God to give any impetus to matter, and the unity of nature in purely material terms is strongly implied. In Question 6 he asks a rhetorical question that clearly has an answer: if living matter moves by itself, how can it stop moving without dying? Diderot believed that atoms are perpetually in motion, as taught by Epicurus, Lucretius, Gassendi, and the materialists. Therefore, although he asks a question, the inference is that he rejects the idea that matter can be truly dead (as atoms are never still). The inference is that all matter has life in it. This notion would become the crux of spontaneous generation and the perpetual metamorphosis of living beings, at every level of magnification, whether animalcules or elephants. In Question 15 Diderot asks whether it is possible for matter to oscillate between the living and inanimate states. If it could, it would confirm his view that the universe is eternal and that living things randomly come into existence from the void, only to return to it. If matter changes back and forth between the living and inanimate states, it is indeed a unity and operates according to universal law (ie: all matter is comprised of molecules that randomly collide). If, at the microscopic level, the inanimate becomes animate and vice-versa, then what we take to be distinct states of matter may be only different stages of its development. This notion of momentary stages of matter’s development would be expanded upon in the Dream to include the metamorphosis of species , planets, star systems, and even God Himself. The question of whether dead matter ever begins to live would be taken up again in 1772 when Diderot would reiterate the formation of animals by fermentation et putréfaction.32 Spontaneous generation was to remain the fulcrum of Diderot’s metamorphosis of species for the rest of his life. The polemics between atheists and deists heated up during the mid eighteenth century and by the time that Lazzaro Spallanzani conducted his own

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experiments on spontaneous generation, the atheist materialist camp was so deeply entrenched in its belief system, that it did not believe that his findings were valid. In 1767 Lazzaro Spallanzani published his first biological work in which he attacked Buffon and Needham’s theory that vital atoms are responsible for all physiological activity. Spallanzani studied various forms of microscopic life and confirmed the views of Antonie van Leeuwenhoek that such forms are living organisms. In a series of experiments he showed that gravy, when boiled, did not produce these forms if placed in vials that were immediately sealed by fusing the glass. As a result of this work, he concluded that the objects in pond water and other preparations were living organisms introduced from the air and that Buffon and Needham’s views were without foundation. Spallanzani’s work did not influence Diderot to change his position. Voltaire, on the other hand, who was a fervent deist, added the work of Spallanzani to his arsenal in his war against atheists and spontaneous generation. Jacques Roger states, “Voltaire threw himself upon Needham, never to let go.”33 In his seminal book, The Life Sciences in Eighteenth-Century French Thought, Roger carefully and painstakingly documents the multitude of works in which Voltaire ridiculed Needham for his belief in spontaneous generation. Roger shows that during the thirteen year period spanning 1765–1778, Voltaire had devoted twenty-five works to attacking atheism and its scientific basis and that he satirized Needham and his experiments in ten of them.34 Roger states, “Voltaire made it clear once and for all that Needham had imagined ‘he had discovered, with his microscope, that flour made from grain attacked by ergot, steeped in water, immediately turned into tiny animals resembling eels. The fact is false,’ Voltaire added, ‘as an Italian scientist has demonstrated’; and this was to be the only specific allusion to Spallanzani’s experiments, which Voltaire was already aware of, but that he did not bother to set forth in detail.”35 Roger goes on to cite Voltaire who had declared that the fact “is false by virtue of a much higher reason, that is, that it is impossible. If animals were born without seed, there would no longer be a cause for procreation; a man could be born from a clump of earth just as well as an eel from a piece of dough. This ridiculous system, moreover, would inevitably lead to atheism. It happened, in fact, that certain philosophers, putting faith in Needham’s experiment without having witnessed it, claimed that matter could organize itself; and Needham’s microscope was reputed to be the atheists’ laboratory.”36 Voltaire noted that Needham had made a little reputation for himself among atheists for having made eels with flour and concluded that if flour produces eels, then every animal, starting from man, must have been born the same way. Voltaire quipped that the only difficulty is that remained was to find out how flour existed before there were

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men.37 The deist reiterated several times in his writing that Lucretius, albeit so profound a moralist, had always been wrong about the physical world38 and his explanation about the birth of animals through the fortuitous motion of matter, with the elimination of nonviable monsters, was ridiculous; he added that atheists like Diderot should not resuscitate it.39 Jacques Roger remarks, “ . . . Voltaire was to avenge the honor of God on the backs of eels, mountains, and shells. He would even perform some hasty ‘experiments’ in order to persuade himself more firmly that the lime pits of Touraine were not the result of fossilized shells and that the polyp was not an animal. For he understood that these wretched little details called into question the existence of God.”40 Voltaire fully realized that science could be used by atheists in their polemics. The battle over spontaneous generation continued to heat up and by 1769 Diderot solidly supported spontaneous generation and profusely praised Needham. In D’Alembert’s Dream, Diderot begins his staunch support of spontaneous generation by having d’Alembert visually demonstrate that the microscope proves the spontaneous generation of animalcules. The sleeping d’Alembert positions his right hand to simulate the tube of microscope and his left hand to represent the mouth of a receptacle, and Diderot aims a jibe directly at Voltaire: d’Alembert pretends to look down the tube into the receptacle, and exclaims: Mademoiselle de l’Espinasse: “Voltaire can joke all he wants, but the eel-monger is right; I believe my eyes; I see them: how many there are! How they go! How they come! How they jump about!”41

This quote may be understood as Diderot’s direct response to Voltaire’s recent flurry of satirization of Needham as the eel-monger in the Questions on Miracles (1766), Defense of My Uncle (1767), Pecularities of Nature (1768), Man of Forty Crowns (1768), ABC (1768), Snails of Reverend Father DungBeetle (1768), and the Summary of the Century of Louis XV (1768): Diderot demonstrates that science is on Needham’s side, he can prove spontaneous generation, and like Lucretius, who repeatedly used video (to see) and cerno (to distinguish, to perceive) to prove that the conscious arises from the inanimate, Needham, too, has sensory proof: scientific experimentation is on his side. Diderot hoped that the microscope would prove, once and for all, that living beings randomly come into and out of existence and that animalcules are iconic representations of metamorphoses that continually occur at all levels of magnification. Diderot supports his statement that the eel-monger is right with the scientific principle of observation. He relies on the Lucretian approach, video

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and cerno: Lucretius repeatedly states that we know that the conscious arises from the insensate because we see with our eyes the beings that appear in nonliving matter. The imaginary microscope that Needham is holding in his sleep is an iconic representation of and hyperbolizes voir. The dreaming d’Alembert relies on his senses and emphasizes the importance of sight in scientific investigation with yeux and voir. Yeux and voir also emphasize the importance of the senses in scientific inquiry in the tradition of John Locke. Je les vois is tautological-it hyperbolizes yeux and reinforces the role of observation in scientific inquiry. A series of apostrophes follows that hyperbolizes the act of observation. The verbs aller, venir, and frétiller suggest the transitory nature of all life, not just the microscopic-human beings are born, live and die, species appear, last for a period of time and become extinct, and stars are born, last for an epoch, and become extinguished, as well. Thus, spontaneous generation becomes a metaphor for life at all levels of magnification, from the very small to the cosmological, as in the case of a star system. The sensation of bustling activity and commotion, of running back and forth, is conveyed by the consonance of the dental sounds v and f in vois . . . vont . . . viennent . . . frétillent and the repetition of c in combien . . . comme . . . comme . . . comme. The sound is made by rapid oscillation between striking the soft palate at the rear of the mouth and the dental sounds at the lips: v . . . c . . . c . . . v . . . c . . . v . . . c . . . f. The strident sounds created by oscillating between the rear of the mouth and the front give the impression of movement. Thus, Diderot’s literary style provides an iconic representation of the bustling movement of the animalcules that is described and of the cyclical nature of life and death at all levels of magnification. Diderot introduces the importance of time in the metamorphosis of microscopic beings: “In Needham’s drop of water, everything is achieved and is over in the wink of the eye. In the world, the same phenomenon takes a bit longer; but what is our lifetime in comparison with all eternity?”42 Here Diderot provides four different levels of magnification and three distinct time frames. First, on the microscopic level, animalcules arise from nonliving material, live and die in the wink of an eye. At the level of larger life forms, species gradually become larger or smaller and pass in and out of existence over millennia. Diderot provides the Lucretian metaphor of the bull pulling itself out of the ground to represent the transition between kingdoms: out of the mineral kingdom (the soil), arises the animal kingdom, and the intermediary vegetable kingdom is implied. The third level of magnification is that of planets and star systems, which come into existence and die, as well. There is also a fourth level of magnification: he also toys with the notion of pantheism, and considers that perhaps at the cosmic level, even God passes

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in and out of existence. Perhaps God is born of matter, and like other forms of molecular organization, is born, grows old, and dies. Diderot also presents four distinctly different time frames. He enlarges time itself just as the microscope enlarges physical objects. He considers 1) the infinitesimally small amount of time that it takes for animalcules to arise from inanimate matter, 2) the life span of human beings (notre durée), 3) the millennia that it takes for sweeping changes to occur in higher animals, and 4) the notion that perhaps even eternity is not absolute and that God is temporal. Spontaneous generation becomes a metaphor for all four time frames, as Diderot believes that at some stage in the past or in the future, the animate can arise from the inanimate, in the twinkling of an eye, during the human life span, or God’s eternity. No molecule resembles another, none remain the same for a moment. Flux is metaphorized in the uniqueness of the molecule: Diderot posits that just as there is an infinite succession of animalcules in one fermenting speck of matter on a microscopic slide, so there is an infinite succession of species over the millennia; hence, there is a succession of kingdoms. Since the nonliving can arise from the living, he says, “Rerum novus nascitur ordo.” The new order of things that comes into being may be animalcules, rocks, plants, animals, people, planets, stars like the sun; the old order was dead matter (as in the case of the animalcules arising from inanimate matter or the elephant that arises from fermentation) or living things (as in the example of the worm that is on its way to becoming an elephant and vice versa). The animalcules on the microscopic slide become a metaphor for spontaneous generation. The microscope holds the secrets of life. The reference to Needham’s microscopic experiments with animalcules are held up as examples of the unity of matter, the universality of motion, spontaneous generation, and hence, a continual bringing forth of life from the inanimate, from chaos, and a return to it. Diderot views spontaneous generation as a reality at many different levels of magnification: just as there is an infinite succession of animalcules in one fermenting speck of matter on a microscopic slide, so there is an infinite succession of species on the earth over the millennia: “The vessel in which he caught sight of so many momentary generations, he compared to the universe; he saw in a drop of water the history of the world . . . endless succession of animalcules in the fermenting atom, the same endless succession of animalcules in the other atom that we call Earth. Who knows the races of animals that have preceded us? Who knows the races of animals that will succeed ours? Everything changes, everything dies, only the whole remains. The world begins and ends unceasingly; it is at every instant at its beginning

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and its end . . .”43 Spontaneous generation becomes a microcosm of eternal creation, organization, destruction, and reorganization. The animalcules become a metaphor for the ephemeral, like Fontenelle’s roses. Diderot demonstrates that the changes that occur on a microscopic slide provide a small scale picture of what happened on a large scale at the beginning of time: the original fermentation process may still be going on. As Lucretius had done, he views life as a fermentation process: Mademoiselle de l’Espinasse: “If, when Epicurus asserted that the earth contained the germs of everything, and that the animal species was the product of fermentation, he had proposed to show a microcosm of what happened on a grand scale at the origin of time, how would one have responded to him? And you have this picture beneath your eyes, and it teaches you nothing . . . Who knows whether fermentation and its products have ceased? . . . the elephant, this enormous , organized mass, the sudden product of fermentation! . . . What a comparison of a small number of elements having begun to ferment in the palm of my hand, and this immense reservoir of diverse elements scattered in the bowels of the earth, on its surface, in the midst of the seas, in air currents! . . . Why do we no longer see bulls pierce the ground with their horns, prop themselves up against the soil, and struggle to extricate their heavy bodies ?”44

In the passage cited above, fermentation appears four times. It has two meanings: it literally means the spontaneous generation of animalcules and it is also a metaphor for the metamorphosis of species over millennia. Fermentation is a process resulting from the operation of leaven on dough or on saccharine liquids. The features characterizing the process are an effervescence (or internal commotion), the evolution of heat in the substance operated on, and a resulting alteration of its properties. In the eighteenth century the term was applied to all chemical changes exhibiting these changes; in alchemy, it was the name of an internal change thought to be produced in metals by a ferment, operating after the manner of leaven. “ . . . la terre contenait les germes de tout” takes its authority both from the ancients (Epicurus via Lucretius) and modern scientific experimentation. Buffon and Needham hypothesized that spontaneous generation takes place because vital atoms occur everywhere in nature and they can be transformed into living matter. Thus, fermentation occurs at the microscopic level as spontaneous generation. What happens on a microscopic slide is a microcosm of what happened all over the earth in the beginning-vital atoms were transformed into living matter.

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Fermentation is also used as a metaphor for the metamorphosis of species, as seen in “Qui sait si la fermentation et ses produits sont epuises?” Here fermentation evokes changes that occur over millennia and indicates that the metamorphosis is a continuing, never ending process. Fermentation is a key element in Diderot’s polemics against the Church: it eliminates the chain of being and makes metamorphosis open ended. There is no longer one original man and woman, but rather, life simultaneously sprang up from the earth, slowly, first as animalcules, and then they metamorphosed into larger beings. The climax to the passage is the metaphor of the bull arising out of the earth, as tiny animalcules arise out of mud and stagnant rainwater. The metaphor of the bull is an iconic representation of fermentation. He asks the question, “Why do we no longer see bulls pierce the ground with their horns, prop themselves up against the soil, and struggle to extricate their heavy bodies?”45 The answer is in Lucretius’ On the Nature of Things: the earth’s life force is broken and “the worn-out earth scarce creates tiny animals, though once it created all the tribes, and brought to birth huge bodies of wild beasts.”46 Lucretius goes on to explain that even now multitudes of animals are formed out of the earth with the aid of immeasurable rain and the sun’s warmth.47 So it would not have been surprising if more and bigger ones had taken shape and developed in those days, when the earth and air were young.48 It was then that the earth brought forth the first mortal beings; there grew up wombs, clinging to the earth by roots; when the time was ripe, they burst open by the maturation of the embryos.49 The bull is a metaphor for the spontaneous generation of animalcules and for the metamorphosis of larger beings. The analogy with spontaneous generation is clear: Diderot continually makes analogies of phenomena in nature at different levels of magnification or size. He is intrigued by the Lucretian notion that a large animal like a bull may have once emerged directly from the ground millennia ago. The culmination of the speech that begins “Si lorsque Epicure . . .” and that uses fermentation four times is the metaphor of the bull pulling itself out of the ground. The positioning at the end of the passage hyperbolizes Lucretius’ belief that the earth has become weakened it its generative powers and it can now produce only small worms. The transition itself from producing, elephants, worms, and large bulls is an iconic representation of how the metamorphosis of species is in continual flux and that the sizes of the earth’s creations change over millennia. Diderot borrows heavily from Lucretius and utilizes his imagery to furnish arguments to defend the thesis of spontaneous generation. The influence

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of ancient materialism, and above all, Lucretius, is constant in the Rêve. Diderot intertwines the concepts of the metamorphosis of species, spontaneous generation and the transition from inanimate, nonliving matter to conscious beings. Diderot borrows a variety of images and arguments from Lucretius: regeneration in the form of eggs hatching into birds, spontaneous generation in the form of worms emerging from the earth, the imagery of large animals coming out of the ground, the argument that the transition from the inanimate to the conscious states is possible because of the continual collision of molecules, and the emphasis on the fact that we can see with our eyes, and the metaphor of the earth as a uterus having viviparous births. First, there is the Lucretian association of spontaneous generation with the mechanistic development of the egg. Lucretius said that we may infer that the conscious arises from the insensate because we see with our eyes “the eggs of birds turn into living chickens, and worms swarm out when mud has seized on the earth owing to immoderate rains.50 Diderot also believed that the conscious is derived from the insensate: “Do you see this egg? . . . What is this egg?”51 and “Man dissolving into an infinite number of atomic men, who are folded between sheets of paper like insect eggs that spin their cocoons . . .”52 The egg may be the beginning of life, but it is derived from inert, nonliving material. Since the egg comes from the inert, then the spontaneous generation of animalcules is not only plausible, but probably the origin of life on earth: “ . . . Let great inert sediment act for a few million years . . . You have two great phenomena, the passage from the inert state to the state of consciousness, and spontaneous generation.”53 Secondly, there is spontaneous generation in the form of worms arising from the earth. Lucretius said that we “may see worms come forth alive from noisome dung, when the soaked earth has gotten muddiness from immeasurable rains”;54 these substances, “when they are, as it were, made muddy through the rains, they give birth to little worms . . .”;55 we see with our eyes “the eggs of birds turn into living chickens, and worms swarm out when mud has seized on the earth owing to immoderate rains.”56 Diderot used the worm as a metaphor for the metamorphosis of species over millennia: “The imperceptible worm that stirs in the dirt . . . the enormous animal . . . is perhaps proceeding towards the state of the worm . . .”57 and “The comparison of this great quadruped to its mother’s womb is less than that of the worm to the flour molecule that created it; but a worm is only a worm . . .”58 Diderot uses the worm as a metaphor, rather than as an example of spontaneous generation. Thirdly, there is the imagery of large animals coming directly out of the ground. Lucretius said that “streams, leaves, and glad pastures change themselves into cattle”;59 the earth once “created all the tribes, and brought to birth huge bodies of wild beasts”;60 “And even now

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many animals spring forth from the earth, formed by the rains and the warm heat of the sun; wherefore we may wonder the less, if then more animals and greater were born, reaching their full growth when earth and air were fresh;61 “And many monsters too earth then essayed to create”;62 “for whatever animals you see feeding on the breath of life, either their craft or bravery, aye or their swiftness has protected and preserved their kind from the beginning of their being”;63 their bravery has protected, foxes their cunning, and deer their fleet foot”; the surly breeds of lions; the fox; the intelligent dog; fleecy sheep and horned cattle; they escaped from predatory beasts.64 Diderot mentions the deformed biped who is four feet high, the elephant and the bull: these beings are iconic representations of a slow metamorphosis over millennia. He believed that all life came from a single prototype; hence, the spontaneous generation of animalcules from the earth eventually led to the appearance of large animals on earth. Fourthly, Lucretius reiterates the transition from the inanimate to the conscious states: they lead us by the hand and compel us to believe that the animate is born from the insentient;65 so nature transforms all foods into living bodies and generates from them all the senses of animate creatures;66 do you not believe that the sentient is generated by the insentient?;67 wood or clods of earth when well rotted by rain cause inanimate objects to result in conscious beings because of the size and shape of sense-producing atoms;68 we may infer that the conscious may be generated from the insentient;69 the earth generated every living species.70 Mademoiselle de l’Espinasse says, “ . . . let great inert sediment act for a few million centuries” and “You have two great phenomena, the passage from the inert state to the state of consciousness, and spontaneous generation.” The passage from the inert to the conscious is possible because of the vital atoms that are present in all matter: all matter is conscious and therefore, the inert or insensate does not exist. Fifthly, Lucretius stresses that we can see with our eyes: “we may see worms come forth alive from noisome dung”;71 “we may see all things in like manner change themselves”;72 “we perceive the eggs of birds turn into living chickens, and worms swarm out”;73 and “whatever animals you see feeding on the breath of life.”74 Diderot also uses sight as proof that an alleged phenomenon is factual: the sleeping d’Alembert peers into an imaginary microscope, which hyperbolizes the sense of sight, and exclaims, “ . . . j’en crois mes yeux; je les vois . . .” The association between voir and spontaneous generation is borrowed from the Lucretian video and cerno and living worms. In Diderot’s work, the verb voir recurs: in the Entretien he holds the egg up and asks, “Voyez-vous cet œuf?” Again, there is the Lucretian correspondence between sight and the mechanistic development of the egg. Sometimes voir has two meanings, to see and to understand, and both apply, as in a play on words: “ . . . je ne vois pas trop comment on

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fait passer un corps de l’état de sensibilité inerte à l’état de sensibilité active” and “C’est que vous ne voulez pas le voir.” Here Diderot makes a pun, implying that both meanings apply. Voir recurs both in the Entretien and in the Rêve: “ . . . est-ce que vous ne voyez pas que toutes les qualités,” “Soyez physicien et convenez de la production d’un effet lorsque vous le voyez produit . . . ,” and “Philosophe, je vois bien un agrégat . . .” The reliance on sight is partly Lucretian, partly the scientific revolution. Sixthly, Lucretius portrays the earth as a large uterus producing live animals or viviparous births. We have the association of the earth to birth: logs and sods give birth to little worms;75 worms swarm out of the earth;76 the earth “once created all the tribes, and brought to birth huge bodies of wild beasts” and the earth is worn out by old age (the earth undergoes menopause);77 more and greater animals are formed out of the earth;78 the earth, which used to be able to bear can no longer do so (again, the earth is in menopause);79 the earth created teratological births-monsters, hermaphrodites, beings without feet or hands, mutes without mouths, blind beings without eyes, and creatures whose limbs adhered to their bodies;80 the offspring (of the earth is implied) draw the breath of life.81 Diderot uses Lucretius’ image of the earth as a giant uterus as a metaphor for the metamorphosis of species over millennia: Diderot says, “ . . . the earth contained the germs of everything,” “the animal species was the product of fermentation,” and he asks, “Why do we no longer see bulls pierce the ground with their horns, prop their feet up against the soil, and try to extricate their heavy bodies?” Here, the bull pulling himself out of the earth is a metaphor for the metamorphosis of large animals from previous species over millennia. Diderot borrows three key concepts from Lucretius: regeneration in the form of eggs hatching into birds, spontaneous generation in the form of worms emerging from the earth, and the transition from insentience or the inanimate state to the conscious state. When Diderot borrows this triune association in “You have two great phenomena, the passage from the inert state to the state of consciousness, and spontaneous generation; they are enough . . .” he combines the transition from insentience to consciousness with spontaneous generation. Elsewhere in the Dream he combines the development of the chick within the egg and its emergence from the shell to the gradual development of consciousness from insentience. The key that allows for all three to work is the hypothesis of conscious molecules. Diderot believed that all molecules have an innate, elementary consciousness and that organization becomes more complex, so consciousness becomes more sophisticated. All molecules are conscious and there are a infinite number of molecules: therefore, there are an infinite number of combinations and transitional states-transitions from the mineral to the vegetable kingdoms

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and from the vegetable to the animal kingdoms are merely a matter of the organization of molecules. Diderot compares the gradual differences between the kingdoms to Father Castel’s ribbons. Father Castel, a Jesuit, had created a system of colored ribbons to represent musical notes for the benefit of the deaf. In his ocular clavecin, multicolored ribbons were combined in color harmonies by striking a keyboard. Diderot uses it as a metaphor for the indefinite and interchangeable in nature, where one thing merges into another. For Diderot there is a similarity between everything in nature and differences are due to amounts and the organization of constituent elements. Diderot believed that spontaneous generation works because the difference between living beings and nonliving matter is contingent upon molecular organization. Therefore, spontaneous generation is an iconic representation of the fact that life arises from the random collision of conscious molecules. Given eternity, every possible combination of atoms will eventually occur. Life has been reduced to a mechanistic, materialistic process, and no divine agency is required. Spontaneous generation is a metaphor for the metamorphosis of species: the changes that occur on a microscopic slide provide a small scale picture of what happened on a large scale at the beginning of time. The original fermentation process may still be going on; we are a link in the sequence of animal generations; men in the polar regions may be on their way to extinction. All animal species may be on their way to extinction. All life may degenerate and then may return. The huge elephant may be the product of sudden fermentation. In summation, during the period 1746—1749 (the time between the Philosophical Thoughts and the Letter on the Blind) Diderot underwent a conversion to spontaneous generation. In 1746 it did not seem plausible to him that putrification alone could produce anything organized, and he articulated this view in the Philosophical Thoughts, Thought 19. However, the translation of Needham’s An Account of some New Microscopical Discoveries . . . in 1747 and Needham’s collaboration with Buffon in Paris during the period 1746–1750 lent new credibility to the theory. By 1749 Diderot accepted the idea and expounded on it using Lucretian imagery. Saunderson maintains that in the beginning matter, in a state of ferment, brought this world into being. Fermentation is synonymous with spontaneous generation. The imagery in the Letter on the Blind is Lucretian and suggests that beings arose from fermenting ground, and that many of them were crippled, disabled and mangled. Only those whose physiology permitted survival did survive. In 1754 Diderot asked detailed questions about the transition from inanimate matter to living matter. His questioning whether living matter is

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always living and dead matter is always dead indicates that he is considering the implications of a transition between the two states: if living matter can die, return to life, and then dies again, then life can arise without the need for God’s intervention. By 1769 Diderot was firmly convinced that spontaneous generation was a fact and he developed it beyond Epicurus: all matter is conscious and therefore, dead matter does not exist. The transformation of expired flesh into vermin is merely the reorganization of living, conscious molecules. The hypothesis of spontaneous generation fit in perfectly with the notion that all matter possesses innate consciousness, with the Lucretian notion that all matter arises from the random collision of atoms, as well as with current events in science—Buffon’s travels shows that there is a wide diversity of species in nature and there were discoveries of fossils at the caves of Arcy suggesting that the earth is much older than the Genesis account of the Creation claims. Given eternity and flux, every possible combination of atoms will occur, including the transition from the inanimate to the conscious, from the earth to life.

Chapter Four

The Chain of Beings

When we see successive metamorphoses . . . approach one kingdom from another kingdom by gradual degrees and populate the borders of these two kingdoms . . . who would not be led to believe that there was not ever only one first prototype for all beings?1 —Denis Diderot, Thoughts on the Interpretation of Nature, Thought 12 (1753)

THE TWO DIMENSIONAL, LINEAR CHAIN OF BEINGS The Oxford English Dictionary defines “chain of beings” as “(a conception of the universe as) a continuous series or gradation of types of being in order of perfection, stretching from God as the infinite down through a hierarchy of finite beings to nothingness.2 This theory of the hierarchical arrangement of nature is a straight line or two dimensional, ranging from the most complex to the simplest creature. Plato believed that the real world is a realm of unchanging forms or archetypes that may be apprehended solely by thought. The Platonist notion of the chain of beings was incorporated in this belief in a fixed and unchanging ειδος (form, type or idea). In Platonism there is an immutable, ideal chain of beings comprised of unchanging, ideal species. These were to be contrasted to the imperfect chain of beings and the imperfect species that existed in the world. Everything perceived by the senses are imperfect copies of forms and are less than fully real. This notion of the fixity of species did not allow for any metamorphosis to occur. Plato’s conception of living organisms held that the characteristics and functions of beings are to be explained by resemblance to ideal archetypes, not by the metamorphoses of ancestors who had undergone changes of form and function over long periods of time. 101

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This Platonistic conception became the basis for classical taxonomy in which plants and animals were classified into kinds that are sharply demarcated and allow no intergrading. It also acted as a block to the idea of a gradual transmutation of one species into another. Aristotle perpetuated the concept of a great chain of being and reiterated the Platonistic idea that the chain of beings and the species within it are immutable or fixed. However, in his biological writings, he recognized that living organisms are not sharply classifiable into kinds, for there are many intermediate types which blur the lines of demarcation. He stated that nature passes from lifeless objects to animals in an unbroken sequence. However, he did not believe in the metamorphoses of species. Even though he affirmed the continuity of beings, he still held a belief in sharply discrete kinds. Aristotle did not think that the metamorphoses of organisms had come about historically. It was inconceivable to him that one species of animal could slowly change into another species, just as it would have been inconceivable that the complex hierarchy of nature could have been gradually developed from simple beginnings. For Aristotle the universe was eternal and unchanging and every being had a fixed nature that remained unaffected by the motion which had brought about its actuality from a state of potentiality. According to the Genesis account of Creation, the universe was brought into being by an all-powerful God who had made it complete in every detail, with each kind of creature occupying its proper place in the whole. The period since Creation was relatively brief, being only a few thousand years (Bishop Ussher pegged the date of the creation of the universe at 4004 BC). Adam, the first man, was created by God in His image, and hence could not possibly have had ancestors. Hence, the notion of the fixity of species continued in Judaeo-Christian cosmology: in the Bible God created species in perfect form and as distinct entities, and He preserved their original forms on Noah’s ark; His creations have continued down through history, unchanged since they were formed by the hands of the Creator. Intrinsic to the notion of a chain of beings are two features of the universe: plenitude and continuity. The principle of plenitude states that the universe is “full,” exhibiting the maximum diversity of kinds of beings; everything possible (ie: not self-contradictory) is actual. Plato answered the question, “How many kinds of temporal and imperfect beings must this world contain?” with the answer “All possible kinds.” In the Timaeus Plato says that it must not be thought that the world was made in the likeness of any Idea that is merely partial; for nothing incomplete is beautiful. We must suppose that the world is the perfect image of the whole of which all animals-both individuals and species-are parts. All species that the Demiurge (the maker

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or creator of the world in Platonic philosophy) conceived of in his mind, were created and held their fixed place in nature. The Demiurge would not have conceived of a species and then not created it. The notion of plenitude dictates that as many organisms that could exist, did exist. Extinction was not possible because the Demiurge would not have allowed it. Diderot was to challenge the concept of plenitude by pointing to fossils that had been discovered in the eighteenth century. The principle of continuity asserts that the universe is comprised of an infinite series of forms, each of which shares with its neighbor at least one attribute. Aristotle posited that all quantities-lines, surfaces, solids, motions, and time and space-must be continuous, not discrete.3 Aristotle said that nature passes so gradually from the inanimate to the animate that their continuity renders the boundary between them indistinguishable. Plants come immediately after inanimate things. The transition from plants to animals is continuous. One might question whether some marine forms are animals or plants, since many of them are attached to the rock and perish if they are separated from it.4 Again, although he recognized a spectrum of gradual differences, he retained a belief in sharply distinct species; the notion of the transmutation of species was foreign to him. The great chain of beings is also tied to the notion of perfection: Christians held that God created all beings in perfect form and that they have remain so, unchanged, since they left the hands of the Creator. This was articulated in exactly those words by Buffon. Diderot targeted his polemics against this two dimensional, linear chain of beings, with its implied notions of perfection and plenitude. He held that species are not all perfect: teratological births occur every day, just as they have been since the beginning of time. Furthermore, there is no plenitude: we know that the universe does not exhibit the maxim diversity of kinds of beings because beings come into and go out of existence every day, as fossil evidence shows. Diderot does agree with continuity: there are not now and never have been, strict divisions between species; he went even further and erased the delineation between kingdoms by showing that there were intermediary creatures that bridge the gap between the mineral and vegetable kingdoms and the vegetable and animal kingdom. We can chronologically trace Diderot’s thought regarding plenitude and continuity in the chain of beings: the seeds of this philosophy were sown as early as 1746 in Philosophical Thoughts. In Thought 21 Diderot posits that given an eternal time frame, every possible combination of atoms will occur from their random collision, just as every combination of dice will occur from random throws in games of chance. This is the fundamental building

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block of the philosophy that Diderot would espouse throughout his literary career. The notions of plenitude and continuity are implicit in games of chance because flux + time deliver every combination. Hence, a study of games of chain indicates that a seamless spectrum of beings is not only possible, but inevitable. All events will eventually actualize and implicit within the notion of infinite kinds is that they can be arranged in a seamless continuum. We see then the influence that mathematics and the study of games of chance had on Diderot early in his literary career. Three years later, in the Letter on the Blind he would argue the Lucretian notion that all possible combinations of creatures were tested by nature at the beginning and only those that were not self-contradictory survived. By 1751 in the article “Animal,” he would boldly eradicate all divisions between the kingdoms and view all organization as a continuum, without delineation, that resembles the spectrum of colorful ribbons in Father Castel’s ocular clavecin. In 1769 in D’Alembert’s Dream he would view everything within the three kingdoms as the organization of conscious molecules, some having more air, fire, earth, and water than others. In the Letter on the Blind (1749) Saunderson denies the perfection that historically had been implicit in the chain of beings: he doubts that every species left the Creator’s hands perfect at the beginning of time. Here Diderot stood in opposition to his contemporaries: Buffon affirmed that all species left the Creator’s hand in perfect form, just as did the Genevan naturalist Charles Bonnet. Saunderson doubts that this is true: he declares that if we were to return to the time of Creation, we would find a multitude of teratisms for each well organized being. It was only those creatures that did not have serious defects that survived and left progeny. Saunderson declares that there were all kinds of teratisms at the time of Creation: beings without heads, feet, stomachs, intestines, palates or teeth, heart and lung defects. Nature was flawed from the very beginning and it continues to be today, as evidenced by birth defects, teratisms, and handicaps such as blindness and deafness. Diderot negates the Christian notion that there is a single, perfect chain of beings leading back to Creation. For Diderot flux delivers an infinite number of variations, some viable, others not, some teratisms that manage to survive. The imagery of monsters and Saunderson’s own blindness are iconic representations that the Christian view of a perfect chain of beings is flawed. Species were flawed and defective from the beginning: Diderot adopts the Lucretian view that at the beginning monsters arose and they fought each other to the death or else they died because their physiology did not permit survival. Only those whose physiology permitted survival did survive. Furthermore, for

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Christians the chain of beings is comprised of a finite number of organisms that God had created perfectly at the beginning of time; for Diderot the number of organisms is infinite, as nature is continually creating new things. Flux continues to delivers an infinite number of events, the actualization of events did not stop on the sixth day of Creation. Diderot asserts that in the beginning, matter, in a state of ferment, brought this world into being. Incomplete worlds have been dispersed and perhaps form again, and are dispersed at every instant in remote regions of space. Not only has there never been a chain of beings on earth, there is no chain of beings in outer space, either. The changes that took place on earth due to random chance take place throughout the universe. Molecules are randomly colliding and reorganizing throughout the universe. There is a reference to spontaneous generation: “ . . . dans le commencement où la matière en fermentation faisait éclore l’univers, mes semblables étaient fort communs.” Diderot was not only influenced by Lucretius (On the Nature of Things, Books II and V), he was also swayed by Needham and Buffon’s experiments on spontaneous generation. In 1749 Diderot returned to the spontaneous generation that he had denied in 1746 (in Philosophic Thoughts, Thought 20). During the interim, Needham’s experiments converted him, as did the publication of his works.5 The notion of spontaneous generation destroys the concept of a chain of beings: living matter randomly emerges from nonliving matter and a chain descending from Adam and Eve is no longer necessary to explain the presence of life. In the spontaneous generation of animalcules, as in the imperfect creations that Saunderson relates, there is a continual tendency towards creation and destruction; a rapid succession of beings appear, flourish, and disappear. There are an infinite number of phenomena that arise, albeit ephemerally, in nature. The great chain of beings becomes an erroneous concept because species are not perfect and the series of gradations that are observed are only those that have survived and are not self-contradictory. DIDEROT ADOPTS BUFFON’S THREE DIMENSIONAL MATRIX Diderot acquired from Buffon the notion that the chain of beings is not comprised of strict divisions between species because characteristics among species overlap. In Buffon: A Life in Natural History, Jacques Roger states, “Buffon, therefore, did not abandon the conviction he expressed in 1749, that ‘Nature works by unknown degrees’ and can pass ‘from one species to another species, and often from one genus to another genus through imperceptible gradations.’

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Throughout the Natural History, he insisted on the fact that certain species ‘bridge the gap’ between one species and another. Thus the shrew came between the rat and the mole . . . monkeys tend to approach man . . . ; bats are like monkeys among the birds . . . ; porcupines and hedgehogs, by the spines that cover them, seem to indicate to us that feathers could belong to others than birds; armadillos with their scaly shells come close to turtles and crustaceans; beavers with scales on their tales resemble fish . . .”6 Not only did Buffon observe that characteristics among species overlap, he went further and speculated that perhaps there are beings that bridge kingdoms. Buffon said that if man “put himself at the head of all created beings, he would see with astonishment that one can descend in almost imperceptible degrees from the most perfect creature to the most shapeless matter, from the highest organized animal to the most brutish mineral.”7 Buffon went on to say,” But nature advances by unknown gradations, and as a consequence, it cannot lend itself to these divisions since it passes from one species to another species and from one genus to another genus, by obscure nuances; so that there is found a large number of intermediate species and midway objects that one does not know where to place, and which necessarily disturbs the project of the general system . . .”8 Jacques Roger describes Buffon’s definition of the chain of beings thus: “In short, it held that all created things, from stones to angels, constituted an uninterrupted series, passing imperceptibly from one degree to another. There were therefore, ‘organized stones’ (for example, asbestos) and ‘lithophytes’ (or stoneplants) that ‘form a transition’ between mineral and vegetable. There were even ‘zoophytes’ (or animal-plants, like the sponge) which serve as a bridge between plants and animals.”9 Although Buffon observed that nature works by unknown degrees and can pass from one species to another, and often from one genus to another, through imperceptible gradations, he also held that nature has separated the kingdoms.10 The question arises, “Did Buffon believe in the strict delineations between the kingdoms, or not?” Jacques Roger answers the question this way: “The difficulty was that Buffon had just affirmed that if man put himself ‘at the head of all created beings, he would see with astonishment that one could descend by almost imperceptible degrees from the most perfect creature to the most shapeless matter, from the most organized animal to the crudest mineral; he would recognize that these imperceptible nuances were the greatest works of Nature.’ An excellent definition of the chain of being. Which text is to be believed? In fact, both of them, and Buffon explained why. We do not know of any lithophytes or zoophytes. Therefore, the three kingdoms of nature were well separated.”11 Although Buffon was to later deny that he had implied that kingdoms are

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homogeneous, he had left an indelible print on Diderot, who saw the theory, corroborated by Trembley’s polyp that was part vegetable, part animal, as true. Hence, Diderot, with Buffon’s influence, conceived of a chain of beings that is conical, rather than linear, three dimensional, rather than two dimensional. Arthur O. Lovejoy also examines the impact that Buffon’s notion of species had on eighteenth century thought.12 Lovejoy emphasizes the fact that Buffon did not believe that species come into and fall out of existence, but rather, they left the hands of the Creator in perfect condition and that the species that exist today are the same ones that God made. Lovejoy cites Buffon: “Species are the only entities of nature (les seuls êtres de la nature)-perduring entities, as ancient, as permanent, as Nature herself. In order to understand them better, we shall no longer consider species as merely collections or series of similar individuals, but as a whole independent of number, independent of time; a whole always living, always the same; a whole which was counted as a single unit among the works of creation . . .”13 Glass says that Buffon reiterates the unchanging nature of the principle characteristics of species elsewhere: “Each species of both animals and plants having been created, the first individuals of each served as models for all of their descendants . . . the type of each species is cast in a mold of which the principal features are ineffaceable and forever permanent, while all the accessory touches vary.”14 However, Buffon held that variations occur within each species over time. He believed in intra-species change but not in changes so great as to change a species itself. Lovejoy quotes Buffon: “Though Nature appears always the same, she passes nevertheless through a constant movement of successive variations, of sensible alterations; she lends herself to new combinations, to mutations of matter and form, so that today she is quite different from what she was at the beginning, even at later periods.”15 On the other hand, May Spangler examines in detail the effect that the discovery of Trembley’s polyp had on Diderot’s observation that the borders between kingdoms are blurred.16 Spangler beings her article by stating that the polyp or freshwater hydra is a remarkable being: “it can be decapitated, have its arms cut off, cut into pieces, gorged with food, starved, forced to eat another polyp, or turn him inside out like a glove, he always bounces back whole, living and ready to reproduce.”17 Spangler discusses Trembley’s discovery of the polyp in 1740 and the fact that he saw that the polyp spans the animal and vegetable kingdoms. Spangler notes that although Leeuwenhoeck classified it as a vegetable in 1703, Trembley observed that it has “characteristics of animals in its behavior: it can move about and change position, catch prey with eight or ten small arms around its mouth, and then eat and

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digest them.”18 It is proof that there are beings that span two kingdoms. Trembley discovered that if he cut a polyp into several pieces, each piece regenerated itself into a separate, whole polyp. Spangler observes that eighteenth century thinkers rushed to examine the implications of this discovery. Bonnet thought it was the missing link between the animal and vegetable kingdoms.19 Materialists used it to prove the veracity of monism in that it permits the continuity between kingdoms and matter only changes form.20 La Mettrie declared that it proves that each little fiber moves according to a principle that is inherent within it (motion is a property of all matter).21 Spangler points out that Vartanian had observed that for La Mettrie, the polyp proved that “an animal’s soul was divisible along with its body; that is, its soul was material and indistinct substantially from its physical organization . . . Such a statement, if understood by some to mean that the animal-soul is merely a function of matter, could easily suggest a dangerous analogy applicable to the human soul.”22 Spangler shows the relationship between La Mettrie’s polyp, that he claimed proves that the animal soul is merely a function of matter, and the human polyps in Diderot’s Dream. Julie asks Bordeu if he imagines that there are polyps in every species, even human polyps. Spangler believes that it was the regeneration of Trembley’s polyp that inspired Diderot to write about the vials in a warm room containing warriors, magistrates, philosophers, poets, courtesans, harlots and kings. Spangler suggests that since the molecules in a polyp can regenerate themselves, perhaps Diderot got the idea that someday the molecules in human beings can regenerate themselves and we can have professionals of all kinds made to order. DIDEROT INTRODUCES THE FOURTH DIMENSION: TIME Paul Vernière observes that Diderot derived from Buffon the notion that the chain of beings in space is intertwined with time.23 Diderot had gleaned from Buffon that the great worker in nature is time: it takes time for the continuous effect of climate to take effect and propagate variation. The changes occur slowly and imperceptibly; time always moves with an equal, uniform, and regulated pace, it performs all changes, at first imperceptible and then noticeable little by little, and finally leave results about which one cannot be mistaken. Living forms continue to be transformed, much as the history of the earth continues before our eyes. Buffon affirmed that nature is in continual flux. While Buffon had developed the chain of beings from a linear, two dimensional paradigm to a three dimensional matrix in which characteristics

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overlap among species. Diderot develops the schema further by introducing time, and thus making the diagram four dimensional. Like Buffon, Diderot held that species change over time and they are not the same physiologically as they were at the time of Creation—species become larger or smaller, they come into existence or they become extinct (as the discovery of fossils at the caves of Arcy indicated), and body parts change in characteristic features and functions. Further, the changes are due to accidents in the generative process (he owes the notion of accidents that cause sudden changes to Maupertuis). Diderot used the Encyclopedia to showcase many of the chapters in Buffon’s Natural History. For example, the article “Animal,” was a long, annotated extract from Chapters 1 and 2 of Buffon’s History of the Animals.24 Italicized text distinguishes Diderot’s views from Buffon’s text. In his italicized text Diderot adds to and frequently contradicts what Buffon has written. In the lengthy first paragraph of “Animal,” which is italicized, Diderot carried the notion of infinitely minute gradations that bridge species to its logical conclusion: there are intermediary creations that bridge kingdoms. Diderot declares that all beings progress above or below one another by imperceptible degrees so that there is no gap in the chain, just like the colorful ribbon of the celebrated Father Castel, where one passes from white to black gradually, nuance by nuance, with perceiving it. Father Castel’s ribbon is an iconic representation of nature’s progress: it is impossible to define the two limits where animalité begins and ends. Any definition of animal would be too general or too narrow, would embrace beings that it should exclude and exclude others that it should embrace. The more one examines nature, the more one sees that there need be as many designations as there are individuals. Lines of demarcation between kingdoms do not exist in nature: there are animals that are neither animal, nor vegetable, nor mineral and that one would vainly try to categorize. Diderot holds up Trembley’s water polyp as an example, which defies categorization as an animal or vegetable. Diderot reiterates many times the notion that “Nature advances by nuanced and often imperceptible degrees.”25 Diderot enumerates in plain text the similarities between the animal and vegetable kingdoms from Buffon’s text, but immediately afterwards, he adds his own views, in italics, to negate what Buffon had written: “But we must not forget that the number of these similarities is infinitely varied.”26 Later on Diderot says in italics, “We well understand that all of these truths become muddled at the borders between the kingdoms, and we would scarcely be able to perceive them distinctly at the crossing from mineral to vegetable, and from vegetable to animal.”27 Diderot relates Buffon’s examination of whether animals are conscious, but he changes the conclusion by adding his own text. Diderot parts company

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with Buffon by declaring that one cannot deny that animals have the faculty of sentir. Sentir can be understood to mean conscious. Buffon had observed that sentir embraces such a great numbers of ideas that one must analyze it before using it: if by sentir one means to react with motion to a shock or a resistance, we would find that some plants (those that are called sensitives) are conscious, as are animals. If, on the contrary, by sentir one means to perceive and compare perceptions, we are not sure that animals have this faculty. If it should be allowed to dogs and elephants, whose actions seem to proceed from motives similar to those of men, it must be denied to other species that do not appear to possess the faculty of progressive motion. If an oyster’s consciousness differed only in degree from a dog’s, why do we not attribute consciousness to vegetables, though in a degree still inferior? Hence, the distinction between the animal and vegetable kingdoms cannot be determined. Diderot adds, in his own italicized words, to Buffon’s observation that there are two attributes of consciousness, namely, a reactive motion upon a shock or resistance and perceiving and comparing perceptions. Diderot points out that pleasure and pain and consciousness of his existence is neither a reactive motion, nor a perception, nor a comparison of perceptions. These belong to a third category, like thought, that one cannot compare to anything and that animals may well have. Diderot concludes that animals may possess the ability to think and with it, consciousness of their existence; he obliterates all psychic distinctions between man and animals. In 1753 Diderot returned to the notion that the distinctions between kingdoms are artificial and non-existent in nature. In Thoughts on the Interpretation of Nature, Thought 12, Diderot observed that nature has taken pleasure in varying the same mechanism in an infinity of different ways. Citing Buffon’s famous passage from Natural History, Volume 4, “History of the Ass,” Diderot reiterates that nature creates an infinite number of variations of the same theme: nature does not abandon recreating a characteristic among species until it has explored every possible variation. Body parts are related: every quadruped possesses functions and internal and external parts of other quadrupeds. All nature does is lengthen, shorten, transform, multiply or obliterate certain organs. If one were to unite the fingers of the human hand and cover it with the substance of nails, one would have a horse’s hoof. The variations that exist are due to errors in the generative process. In Thought 12 Diderot mentions Buffon and Doctor Baumann (Maupertuis’ pen name) by name, to whom he owes the basic building blocks of the metamorphoses of species. Diderot declares that when we observe the gradual metamorphoses of beings from one kingdom to another kingdom, we would conclude that there was originally one prototype for all beings. Here he goes further than

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Buffon, who had imagined that a prototype exists for each species. Buffon surmised that there is in nature a general prototype on which each individual is modeled, but which seems to be altered or to perfect itself according to circumstances (Natural History, Volume 4, “The Horse”). Maupertuis went much further than Buffon and Diderot’s idea of one prototype for all species is attributable to him: Could one not explain by that how from two single individuals, the multiplication of the most dissimilar species could have resulted? They would owe their first origin only to some chance productions in which the elementary parts would not have retained the order that they had in the father and mother animals: each degree of error would have made a new species; and with repeated deviations there would arise the infinite diversity of animals that we see today, which perhaps will increase more with time, but to which the course of centuries will perhaps bring only imperceptible developments.28

External characteristics of species overlap and that is why both Buffon and Diderot criticized Linnaeus’ system and all other systems of classification that depended only on external characteristics. Buffon had posited that to force individual objects into a set of categories was to impose an artificial construct on nature. Buffon had argued that characteristics among species overlap: nature’s paradigm is that of a matrix, not a line. He echoed Locke’s arguments that were based on the conception of the great chain of being as a continuum, not as a sequence of discrete steps. Diderot recognized the overlapping of characteristics among species and he agreed with Buffon that organisms cannot be confined to categories or classified. Hence, he scorned Linnaeus and all naturalists who sought to classify plants and animals according to characteristics. In Thought 48, Diderot demonstrates contempt for the methodistes. He used the term methodistes to designate Linnaeus and all natural scientists who classify or arrange according to a particular method or scheme (ie: external characteristics). Diderot begins Thought 48 by declaring that when one takes the wrong road, the faster one walks, the farther off course one goes. After a person has walked a long distance on the wrong road, both sheer exhaustion and vanity prevent him from retracing his steps. Diderot makes an analogy between a person who chooses the wrong path on a road and a classifier of species: instead of modeling our ideas on real beings, we try hard to construe beings according to our ideas. He denounces the méthodistes’ classification according to external characteristics because their system leads to erroneous conclusions. Diderot asserts that natural classifiers

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see man as nothing more than a four-footed animal, when in truth, man has an incomparable reasoning faculty that shows that he should not be labeled as an animal; while nature makes a man look heavenwards, Linnaeus’ method of classification bends man’s body towards the ground. In Thought 49, Diderot cites a passage from the preface of Linnaeus’ Fauna Suecica to use Linnaeus own words against him and show the absurdity of his method of classification. Linnaeus declared that man is neither a stone, nor a plant, and therefore, he must be an animal. He does not have only one foot, so he cannot be a worm. He has no antennae, so he is not an insect. He has no fins, so he cannot be a fish. He has no feathers, so man is not a bird. Linnaeus concludes that man, because he has a mouth like a quadruped and four feet (two with which to touch and two with which to walk), he must be a quadruped. Diderot continues by citing Linnaeus’ own conclusion and using it against him. Linnaeus admitted that it is true that he is unable to distinguish a man from an ape because there are certain apes that have less hair than certain men and these apes walk on two feet and use their hands as men do. Diderot cites Linnaeus’ admission that he does not consider speech to be a distinguishing characteristic because his method considers only characteristics based on number, contour, proportion, and situation; hence, the logician concludes that his method is wrong and the naturalist is led to believe that man is a four-footed animal. In Thought 49 Diderot accurately cites the preface to the Fauna Suecica, but he omits Linnaeus’ eulogy of human reason, which significantly modifies the conclusion that man is a four-footed animal. Diderot derived his ideas from Buffon, who, starting with the First Discourse, attacked Linnaeus and all classifiers. One of the hallmarks of Natural History is that characteristics among species overlap and one cannot classify by external characteristics alone. Diderot did not believe that species can be categorized by characteristics because nature delivers infinite flux. In Thought 50, he uses the term infini four times to reiterate that the metamorphoses of species is open ended and that nature is continually producing new creations: infinitely varied microscopic creatures will be formed if parental elements differ in the order of their organization; polyps regenerate the same portion of a severed part because they are like a cluster of infinitely small bees that retain only one position; when conscious components differ from their original pattern, there result an infinite number of animal species derived from one original animal; an infinite number of beings deriving from one original being. The tautology of infini hyperbolizes the conclusion: a single act of nature or a single prototype created all that there is. Here we see that a slight perturbation in an original system can have far reaching consequences: a single prototype has set a process in motion that

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has culminated in the three kingdoms and the vast variety in nature that we see today. This observation is reminiscent of the question that Saunderson asked four years earlier: if the first man and the first woman had had significant defects, what would have happened to the human race? In Thought 58, Question 1, Diderot once again declares that all phenomena are interconnected and that what we take for natural history is only the incomplete history of a single moment. He opens the door to extending the chain of beings to the mineral kingdom but he stops short of actually stating it. Rather, he suggests it in a series of questions: he asks whether metals have always been and always will be as they are now. He also asks whether plants have always been and always will be as they are now. Buffon had spoken of bridges between kingdoms such as lithophytes (stone-plants) that form a transition between mineral and vegetable. Diderot bridges kingdoms and he regards the difference between the animate and the inanimate as a matter of the organization of conscious molecules. Entire species are born, grow old and die. In Thought 58, Question 2, Diderot posits that the development of the embryo changes over millions of years: “ . . . that the embryo formed from these elements has passed through an infinite number of organizations and developments, that it has had, successively, motion, consciousness, ideas, thought, reflection, conscience, feelings, passions, signs, gestures, sounds, articulated sounds, language, laws, sciences, and the arts; that millions of years have elapsed between each of these developments; that it may still have other developments to undergo and other growths to take, that are unknown to us . . .”29 Again, he uses infinité to describe the gradual increments in man’s successive developments. In Question 11 Diderot asks whether interior molds, posited by Buffon, really exist. Buffon proposed that there exists an interior mold that guides the embryological development and subsequent growth of animals. Although the interior mold was unchanging, the resulting animal could be modified by the environment (ie: by climate, diet, and/or domestication). In Question 11 Diderot asks whether interior molds are real, preexisting forms. If they do exist, how are they formed? Diderot is attempting to solve the problem raised by epigenesis, namely, why do offspring resemble their parents? If there are no preexisting seeds, is there some other form that permits heredity? Since Diderot believed that molecules have consciousness and that each more complex organization of molecules (ie: fibers and bundles of fibers) has a consciousness all of its own, he wonders whether there is an interior mold based on consciousness. Although the interior mold theory attempts to explain why each species has a particular form, it does not explain why new variations arise. It

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implies either that each new variation has its own interior mold, or that each interior mold is infinitely variable in unpredictable ways. It does not account for the fact, acknowledged by Buffon (in Epochs of Nature, Volume 1) that the remains of ancient species show that they were generally larger than their modern descendants; such generalized changes, whether due to climate or to diet, would imply a permanent change in the interior mold, for which his theories cannot readily account. In the article “Human Species (Nat. Hist.)” [“Humaine espece (Hist. nat.)”] (1765), Diderot takes the reader on an ethnographic tour of the world. Working from Buffon’s Varieties in the Human Species [“Variétés dans l’espece humaine”], Diderot describes the distinguishing physical characteristics, customs, and belief systems of peoples residing in different climates. What is significant is his conclusion: having enumerated the differences of peoples around the world, Diderot concludes by affirming the unity of the human race and that there is only one human species, comprised of people who are more or less tanned: “Therefore, everything goes to prove that humankind is not comprised of essentially different species. The difference between whites and browns arises from food, morals, customs, climate; that between browns and blacks has the same cause. Therefore, originally, there was only one race of humans.”30 Diderot concludes that the different races of humans all stem from the same origin and that differences that have come about are directly related to climate. However, he conjectures that the differences among peoples residing in various latitudes would eventually vanish if they were relocated to more favorable climates. What climate can do, it can also undo. Diderot’s conclusion emphasizes the unity of the human species and the fact that humans are distinct from animals because of their intellectual and moral capacities. There is a reaffirmation of the unity of the human race previously articulated in works that posit monogenesis or the descent of all beings from a single source. Diderot had been seduced by the notion of extending consciousness to the animal, vegetable and mineral kingdoms for some time. In 1765 he continued to ponder the idea: in a letter of October 10, 1765 to Duclos, relating a conversation with the marquis de Ximènes, he affirmed that he believed that consciousness is a universal property of matter.31 In the Conversation between d’Alembert and Diderot (1769) Diderot once again extends consciousness all along the chain of beings. In the opening paragraph, d’Alembert, in stating that stone must be conscious [il faut que la pierre sente], extends the chain of beings down to stone and declares that consciousness exists all along the gamut, from man all the way down to the mineral kingdom.

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Diderot says that he can turn marble into flesh. To convert latent (potential) awareness into active awareness, one can place a statue in a mortar, pulverize it, mix it with humus or compost, allow time for decay, feed it to plants, and eat the plants. Hence, consciousness can be transferred from the mineral to the animal realm by purely physical means and the introduction of time. This can be done because molecules have a rudimentary consciousness when they unite to form a compound; the compound, in turn, also has a degree of consciousness. Consciousness exists at every level of organization and that is why it can be transferred from the mineral kingdom to the animal kingdom via the vegetable kingdom (the latus). From the microscopic or chemical, Diderot carries his argument to the macroscopic, again, introducing the notion of time. Animals were not in the past what they are at present. We have no idea what they will become. The tiny worm is on its way to becoming a large animal. The huge beast may be becoming a worm. Diderot criticizes d’Alembert for embracing the notion of preexisting germs and supposing that animals were originally when they presently are. He equates such a presumption with madness. We do not know what they were in the past and we do not know what they will be in the future. He establishes that the chain of beings is not static, but fluid. He uses antithesis to demonstrate that physical form is in flux: the imperceptibly small worm that grovels in the dirt may be on the road to becoming a large animal. Conversely, the large animal that terrifies us by its enormity may be on its way to becoming a small worm. A species may occupy only a particular point in time; species may be a momentary phenomenon. Hence, we see a continuation of the transformist hypothesis that had been running through Diderot’s mind for a long time: in 1749 Saunderson imagined the first monstrous effects of nature and declared that if we were to return to the origin of things and of time and feel mater move and chaos unfold, we would encounter a multitude of unformed beings for every few well organized beings. In 1753, in Thoughts on the Interpretation of Nature, Diderot asks whether entire species, like individual beings, grow, live a certain duration, degenerate, and die; he declares that the embryo, too, passes through an infinity of organization and developments and has unfolded from millions of years between each of these developments. The embryo may have perhaps other developments to undergo and other growths to make that are unknown to us. Hence, Diderot’s originality is to extends the chain of beings to the embryo and suppose that it, too, changes over time. In D’Alembert’s Dream (1769) Diderot reaffirms continuity: continuity between the inorganic and organic, between vegetables and animals, between animals and man, and continuity in the stream of events that nature delivers

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(flux): “All beings move about in each other . . . everything is in perpetual flux . . . Every animal is more or less a man; every mineral is more or less vegetable; every plant is more or less animal. There is nothing exact in nature . . .”32 The changes that occur on a microscope provide a small scale picture of what happened on a large scale at the beginning of time. The original fermentation process may still be going on. We are a link in the sequence of animal generations. Men in the polar regions may be on their way to extinction. All animal species may be on their way to extinction. All life may degenerate and then may return. The huge elephant may be the product of sudden fermentation. Diderot defends spontaneous generation because it is useful to discredit the fixed, static chain of beings and show that new species continually arise. In Mlle de l’Espinasse’s long monologue, “If when Epicurus . . . ,” Diderot again uses the very large creature and the very small, the elephant and the worm, to show that the chain of beings is continually in flux. Millions of years are required for the metamorphoses of species. Environment contributes to the formation of a species—if a few thousand leagues can change us into another species, then the distance of several times the earth’s diameter will create even greater differences; perhaps Saturnians have more senses than we do. Diderot surmises that the chain of beings exists in outer space, as well. Adopting Buffon’s view that geography determines physical characteristics, d’Alembert addresses the differences that exist among inhabitants of the poles and the equator. Hence, if beings exist on Saturn, their geography would dictate their physical characteristics, as well. In the prescient sentence, “ . . . organs produce needs, and reciprocally, needs produce organs,” d’Alembert recognizes that over time species develop characteristics that enhance the chance of survival.33 Bordeu’s affirmation that d’Alembert is correct, and his reiteration that organs produce needs and needs produce organs, hyperbolizes the observation that there exists an upward direction that nature takes to ameliorate its creations. Over the millennia, armless generations can develop arms: organs perfect themselves through necessity and habitual functioning. A long series of armless generations can, through nature’s continual efforts, produce arms and hands. Change the whole and one changes the individual. All creatures are involved in the life of all others, and consequently, all nature is in a perpetual state of flux. Father Castel’s system of colored ribbons is an iconic representation of plenitude and continuity: the chain of beings is not comprised of entities that are distinct, but rather, it is a three dimensional network where characteristics blend, combine, and overlap. Father Castel, a Jesuit, had devised a system of colored ribbons to represent musical notes for the benefit of the

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deaf. The system is used as a symbol of the indefinite and interchangeable in nature, where one thing merges into another. Species, too, merge into one another, indeed, as kingdoms do. Diderot erased the boundaries between kingdoms and declared that gradations exist even between them. In summation, Diderot’s originality is evidenced by the manner in which he opened up the two dimensional, linear chain of beings into a three dimensional and then four dimensional paradigm: he began with resources from the ancients (Aristotle’s two-dimensional chain of beings and Epicurus’ view of nature’s origins by way of Lucretius) and added Buffon’s observation that characteristics and functions among species overlap (he developed the line into a three-dimensional schema or matrix).34 Then he added time, positing that species change over millennia and further developed the matrix into a four-dimensional schema or cone.35 Recent fossils that had been uncovered in the caves of Arcy corroborated the four dimensional paradigm of the chain of beings.

Chapter Five

The Mutability of Species

The imperceptible worm that stirs in the dirt is perhaps on its way to becoming a large animal; the enormous animal, that frightens us with its size, is perhaps on its way to becoming a worm . . . 1 —Denis Diderot, Conversation between d’Alembert and Diderot (1769)

One of the things that made Diderot a pioneer in his time was his view that species are mutable, rather than fixed. He identified several factors, which he derived from Buffon and Maupertuis, that modify species’ physical characteristics over millennia. Buffon, who had traveled around the world, had observed that climate, geography, food, way of life, and crossbreeding can cause the degeneration or amelioration of a species; Diderot accepted Buffon’s hypothesis that these external influences alter physical characteristics and he incorporated it into his philosophy. Maupertuis, on the other hand, was the one who had uncovered the mechanics of mutability: he had studied polydactyly in a Berlin family, observed that the anomaly skips a generation and concluded that errors that occur in the arrangement of parental elements in the generative process are passed on from parents to offspring; he posited that over time, these cumulative errors are responsible for producing the vast variety of beings that we see in nature today. He surmised that these errors explain how all of nature proceeded from one original prototype. Diderot seized upon Maupertuis’ conclusion that errors in the pattern of parental elements explain the great variety that we see in nature. However, in 1753 Diderot did not call the changes errors, but rather, lapses in the memory of conscious molecules. It was not until 1769 that he called them hereditary defects. This chapter will address how Buffon and Maupertuis’ observations contributed to the mutability of species in Diderot’s universe. 119

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The mutability of species is intimately intertwined to the notion of a prototype, a concept that Diderot borrowed from Buffon, but that he developed much further. In the History of the Horse, Buffon had established that there exists in nature a general prototype of each species on which every individual is modeled and that this prototype can alter or perfect itself through circumstances. For example, the first horse was the model on which all horses are formed. This prototype, that we can know about from its copies, was able to modify or improve itself in communicating its form from one generation to the next and self-replicating. Because it was healthy, strong, and agile, it was able to protect itself from its enemies and live long enough to reproduce. Diderot contemplated Buffon’s idea that a prototype had once existed for each species and his theory that specific factors (ie: climate, geography, food, way of life, and crossbreeding) can cause changes, in successive generations, within a species. In Natural History, Volume 4, The History of the Ass, Buffon carries the notion further and comments upon the fact that characteristics among kingdoms overlap, as well. Diderot carefully considered the notion that given enough time, metamorphosis would span kingdoms and he incorporated it into his philosophy. In Thoughts on the Interpretation of Nature, Thought 12, Diderot borrows material from the History of the Ass to demonstrate that characteristics among kingdoms overlap: “When we observe the successive outward metamorphoses which take place in this prototype, whatever it may be, pushing one realm of life closer to another by imperceptible stages, and populating the regions where these two realms border on each other (if they can be referred to as ‘borders’ in the absence of any true divisions); and, populating, as I said, the border regions of the two realms with vague, unidentifiable beings, largely devoid of the forms, qualities and functions of one region and assuming the forms, qualities and functions of the other; who, then, would not be persuaded that there had never been more than one single prototype for every being?”2 Quand on voit indicates Diderot’s reliance on the scientific method and establishes the factual nature of the material that will follow. Its position at the beginning of a very long sentence that occupies 7 ½ lines hyperbolizes the eighteenth century view that the observation of nature will lead to a true understanding of it. Diderot’s biological perspective was based on the observation of nature, the results of scientific experiments of the day, and the proofs that they rendered. Quand on voit at the beginning of the sentence hyperbolizes Locke’s view that all knowledge is derived from the five senses. Métamorphoses successives connotes incremental changes in the physical characteristics of species. Diderot utilized this phrase to articulate a gradual change in species’ physical characteristics over millennia, at a time when no

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single word existed to denote this meaning in the French language. He hyperbolized it by pluralization: the pluralization of métamorphoses hyperbolizes métamorphose and successives hyperbolizes métamorphoses even further. The tautological relationship that exists between the pluralization and successives further hyperbolizes the quantity of metamorphic occurrences. In 1694 metamorphose was defined as “the change of one form into another. This word is used literally only when referring to changes from one form into another, as the ancient Pagans believed that their gods would do. The Metamorphosis of Daphne into a bay-tree. Most metamorphoses have hidden allegorical meanings, either in Physics, or in Moral Ethics.”3 In 1762 the same definition existed. The concept of crossing over into other kingdoms is intrinsic to the dictionary definition of the term: Daphné crossed over into the vegetable kingdom (laurier). Thus, Diderot combined a word that connotes the metamorphosis of pagan gods into beings of other kingdoms (animal or vegetable) with successives that introduces the concept of time. Hence, he implied a slow transformation over millennia of members of different kingdoms. Diderot posits that there is no such thing as borders between kingdoms. The physical characteristics of members of various kingdoms overlap so frequently, that it would be erroneous to delineate kingdoms. Peupler suggests a population that pyramids from two beings. Degrés insensibles repeats and hyperbolizes métamorphoses successives. This tautology is an iconic representation of and hyperbolizes flux. There are an infinite number of events because insensibles is an absolute term. Diderot carried the notion of métamorphoses successives to the limit: a concept of slow change existed, not only within a species, but also between species. Diderot points to similarities between species and deduces that all species must have come from the same form. Diderot envisaged inter-kingdom transitions, and he believed that since everything is the result of the organization of conscious molecules, organisms could cross kingdoms in time. Diderot italicizes confins and presents a diagram of kingdoms whose borders blend into each other. This paradigm of overlapping kingdoms is taken directly from Buffon’s paradigm of overlapping species. Buffon had observed that certain species bridge the gap between one species and another. Buffon presented the paradigm of circles: if each species is represented by a circle, then the circles overlap at their peripheries. For example, some quadrupeds push toward the outside of their circles and seem to branch out in order to create other classes of nature; monkeys tend to approach man; bats are like monkeys among the birds; porcupines and hedgehogs, by the spines that cover them, indicate that feathers could belong to others than birds; armadillos with their scaly shells come close to turtles and crustaceans;

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beavers with the scales on their tails resemble fish; finally, seals, walruses, and manatees are a separate group that form the most prominent branch leading to the cetaceans. Diderot extended this paradigm to entire kingdoms, a concept that he owes to Maupertuis, who, having discussed errors that occur in the arrangement of parental elements in the generative process, added, “Could we not explain from that how from two single individuals, the multiplication of the most dissimilar species could have resulted?”4 While Buffon stressed that characteristics among species overlap, he mentioned that in nature, physical characteristics are also shared between kingdoms. He makes reference to organized stones (ie: asbestos) and lithophytes (stone-plants) that form a transition between the mineral and vegetable kingdoms. There were even zoophytes (animal-plants like the sponge) that serve as a bridge between plants and animals. While Buffon was to later deny the notion that kingdoms are mutable, Diderot embraced this concept and made it the cornerstone of his biological theory. Diderot attributed the mechanics of metamorphosis to the motion of conscious molecules. In Thought 50, Diderot asks what there is to prevent rudimentary, intelligent, and conscious particles from creating an infinite number of variations of each species, or from creating an infinite number of species from a single prototype. Conscious molecules, like bees sitting in alignment on a tree branch, retain the memory of their position. When, because of motion, they realign to form a larger entity, they lose their memory of their original selves and acquire the consciousness of the new, larger entity which has been formed. He attributes the great variety that we see in nature to lapses in the memory of conscious molecules: it is such lapses that cause conscious molecules to arrange themselves differently than they had been in the parent organism. They result is the great variety of species that exists in nature. CLIMATE, GEOGRAPHY, FOOD, AND WAY OF LIFE Diderot embraced Buffon’s notion that climate, geographical terrain, food, and way of life, determine man’s physical characteristics (ie: climate determines skin color and it makes species larger or smaller over time, food influences physical shape, and country air and fertile soil cause men to be agile, full of energy, well built, and spirited). Diderot, who, in D’Alembert’s Dream, declared that needs create organs, posited the notion of adaptation to environment. Throughout his literary career he stated that nature generates flux and that given enough time, events in the environment will create changes in the physical characteristics of species. Diderot demonstrated that climate

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can, given millions of years, make a species much larger, smaller, extinct, transform it into another species, or even cause it to cross over into another kingdom. Climate and geography are two factors among many that cause the metamorphosis of physical characteristics. In D’Alembert’s Dream (1769) Diderot discusses the effect of geographic location upon the changes in the physical characteristics of species. He demonstrates that environment is determinative of the formation of a species-if a few thousand leagues can change us into another species, then the distance of several times the earth’s diameter will create even greater differences; perhaps Saturnians have more senses than we do. D’Alembert asks why he is the way he is and immediately he answers his own question: “I had to be like this . . .”5 This immediate answer to the question hyperbolizes the determinism of geography. There was no doubt; the explanation is instantaneous. “ . . . il a fallu . . .” indicates the determinism of climate and geography. D’Alembert’s formation, physical characteristics and number of senses are all determined by his geographical location. Diderot carries the notion to its limit by positing opposites: ici/ailleurs, pôle/ligne, and ultimately, terre/ Saturne and lieues/diamètres terrestres. Diderot employs ten question marks in one paragraph. Five question marks follow different geographical locations: elsewhere? the North Pole? the equator? Saturn? the distance of a few thousand earth diameters?6 The question marks hyperbolize the determinism of geographical location upon physical characteristics. With each succeeding geographical location, the reader is taken further from the point where d’Alembert is standing. The reader journeys from ici to the north pole, then south beneath the equator, then having exhausted the reaches of the earth, Diderot moves out into the solar system to Saturn. Saturne hyperbolizes to the maximum extent the effect that geography has on physical characteristics: in 1769 Saturn was the farthest known planet from the sun. Diderot carries the notion of the determinism of geography on the physical characteristics of species to its limit: he posits the analogy of the effect of several thousand leagues to several thousand earth diameters. Hence, the concept of the determinism of climate and geography on physical characteristics is very clear to the reader. First, d’Alembert examines the effect of geography on species: then he puts it in the context of time. Hence, he adds the fourth dimension to metamorphosis: quelques millions de siècles. Again, we see the intimate intertwining of the language of games of chance with naturalism and the study of species. In quelques millions de siècles time is compartmentalized into parcels and each

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century becomes an event. The stream of packets of time approaches eternity and provides an environment in which every outcome will eventually occur. While Buffon posited that taking species out of their natural environment causes degeneration, for Diderot, such degeneration does not necessarily mean extinction. Nature is continually trying new combinations and those that are not self-contradictory will survive. In D’Alembert’s Dream, the wild polar biped that hardly resembles a man may be on the way to extinction or amelioration. What we see as degeneration during the interim of our life time is a brief moment in eternity: the wild polar man may be on the road to perfection, and, like Fontenelle’s roses, we who are ephemeral, cannot tell. From Buffon Diderot derives the notion that geography determines skin color, body build, and way of life. Diderot posits the modern notion that physical characteristics are adaptations to environment: the distance of a few thousand leagues determines physical characteristics. Diderot takes this a step further and asks what the distance of several thousand earth diameters would do to physical characteristics. Then he ponders what physical characteristics and needs Saturnians might have-here he is truly modern in demonstrating adaptiveness to environment. The concepts of degeneration or improvement are lost here; the only thing that matters is adaptiveness to environment. His question about what the thinking and conscious being on Saturn is like indicates that he believes that geography determines consciousness (sentiment) and thought. People experience life differently in different geographical locations and experience is based on the five senses (Locke) and thought (Descartes-Je pense, donc je suis.). The reference to l’être sentant et pensant is a reference to Locke and Descartes. Diderot shows that perception is relative. Locke thought that all knowledge is derived from the five senses. Diderot carries the notion further-geography determines senses and senses determine consciousness. The implication is that a Saturnian must have different consciousness than we do. TO DEGENERATE DEGENERER AND TO PERFECT PERFECTIONNER In 1762 dégénérer had the following definition: “It is also said, that Animals degenerate, to mean, that They do not have the same beauty, that they do not have the same good qualities as their predecessors.”7 Buffon and Diderot used the word to denote a change in structure by which an organism becomes less elaborately developed and assumes the form of a lower type. Conversely,

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perfectionner was defined as “To make more perfect” and “To become more perfect.”8 Buffon and Diderot used the term to connote a change in structure by which a species becomes more developed and assumes the form of a higher type. In the Letter on the Blind (1749), Saunderson asks what would have become of the human race if the first man had had serious physical deformities or lacked food. He would have been enveloped in the general chaos of the universe and perhaps remained a possibility rather than a realization. Here we have the possibility of extinction because of the inability to adapt to the environment. Diderot does not imagine a perfect prototype at the time of Creation, but rather the possibility of a deformed man. Both functional human beings and deformed ones are the products of random chance. Flux generates all possibilities and only those that can survive, do. The imagery is Lucretian: in On the Nature of Things Lucretius portrays deformed beings at the time of creation who could not survive because they were physically defective: only the strongest survived and reproduced. The fact that functional human beings arose at the time of creation is purely fortuitous and it does not indicate divine design. The probability of games of chance governs here. Given enough throws of the dice and eternity, molecules, that are continually colliding with one another, will eventually yield functional human beings. Flux generates all possibilities and the only reason we are here is because flux randomly generated some beings that were functional and could reproduce. Diderot sets himself apart from creationists and from Buffon, who posited that there existed perfect prototypes at the time of creation. Diderot, on the contrary, imagined degeneration at the time of creation, rather than unblemished perfection. In these sentences he reveals his understanding that random chaos was the creator, rather than an Intelligent Architect. Adam and Eve are defective beings incapable of perpetuating their species. Diderot takes an antithetical stance to the perfect prototype in order to posit flux and random casting of dice. “If shapeless creatures had never existed, you would not fail to assert that none will ever appear, and that I am throwing myself headlong into chimerical fancies, but the order is not even now so perfect as to exclude the occasional appearance of monstrosities.” Then, turning towards the clergyman, he added, “Look at me, Mr. Holmes. I have no eyes. What have we done, you and I, to God, that one of us has this organ while the other has not?”9 He utilizes the language of games of chance: jamais (2x), paraisse, and de temps en temps. Flux continually generates beings, and hence, degeneration of an original prototype is rendered meaningless. The blind Saunderson is an

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iconic representation of nature’s randomness, as is the sighted Holmes. One was born blind, the other was born sighted; monsters and perfect beings are the results of random chance. Diderot combines the random chance of Pascal and Fermat with Lucretius’ deformed beings in De rerum natura. While Buffon saw hybrids as examples of degeneration of an original prototype, Diderot views them as iconic representations that nature is continually creating new variations. He does not make any judgments on nature by pronouncing any of its creations as degenerate. In D’Alembert’s Dream (1769), Bordeu states that we do not know what species were like at Creation. Animals were not in the past what they are at present; we have no idea what they will become; the tiny worm is on its way to becoming a large animal; the huge beast may be becoming a worm. “ . . . the enormous animal, that frightens us by its size, is perhaps on its way towards the state of the worm . . .” is not degeneration in a chain of beings created by nature’s design or upward movement.10 Rather, flux delivers new events which may be perceived by us to be taking a direction; however, there is no design in Diderot’s universe. Conversely, “The imperceptible worm that stirs in the dirt, may be on its way to the state of the large animal . . . ,” which could be viewed as amelioration, is also the result of random chance, and not nature’s design.11 Nature is continually improving itself haphazardly, only to undo the improvements. Repetition is an iconic representation of continual flux. It suggests a continual chain of events: animal énorme/grand animal, énorme/épouvante/ grandeur, vermisseau/imperceptible/fange, and s’achemine/s’achemine. The flow of similar phrases and synonymous terms illustrates that some events in the chain of flux are similar. Sometimes related words appear close together as énorme/épouvante/grandeur, and other times, synonymous terms appear far apart, as in l’animal énorme and grand animal. This is also an iconic representation of the randomness of flux. Similar words, like similar beings in time, sometimes are side by side, or sometimes they digress and then come together. Diderot’s digressive literary style is an iconic representation of open ended metamorphosis. When d’Alembert asks Diderot to clarify what he has just said, Diderot hesitates, replying that it would take them away from their original discussion. D’Alembert answers, “So what? We will return to it or else we will not return to it.”12 Here Diderot provides an iconic representation of open ended metamorphosis by digressing from the original subject matter. The thread of Diderot’s thought is open ended, subject to random digression, just as the development of life forms on earth. Thus, literary style serves to hyperbolize the concepts in the discussion: the herringbone style of

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the progress of subjects is like the metamorphosis of beings, which follows diverse paths, and ebbs and flows. Since nature is continually creating new variations, it creates polyps of all kinds, even human ones. As an example of a human polyp, Diderot cites the case of the Siamese twins who were connected by the head, shoulders, back, buttocks and thighs, lived in that condition until the age of twentytwo, and then died within a few minutes of each other. He does not label them as degenerative-he considers them to be a variation, one of an infinite number of variations that occur continually in nature. Maupertuis, whom Diderot praises and cites in Thoughts on the Interpretation of Nature, had posited that birth anomalies are due to random errors that occur in the arrangement of parental elements in the generative process. Diderot labels these errors as vices héréditaires and explains that monsters occur when the smallest fiber in the developing embryo is cassé, rompu, déplacé or manquant. Diderot considers Siamese twins to be iconic representations of an infinite continuum of events. For Diderot the microscope also illustrates this: just as there is an infinite succession of animalcules in one fermenting speck of matter on a microscopic slide, so there is an infinite succession of species over millennia. The succession is neither an amelioration, nor a degeneration, but random change without design. In D’Alembert’s Dream (1769) d’Alembert mutters, “de differentes races d’animaux successifs qu’il voyait naître et passer . . .” Flux generates an infinite variety of beings, and hence, dégénérer and perfectionner have no meaning because each species has not proceeded from its own prototype, but rather, all species have metamorphosed from one common prototype. Mademoiselle de l’Espinasse: “Endless succession of animalcules in the fermenting atom, the same endless succession of animalcules in the other atom that we call Earth. Who knows the races of animals that have preceded us? Who knows the races of animals that will succeed ours? Everything changes, everything dies, only the whole remains. The world begins and ends unceasingly; it is at every instant at its beginning and its end; there has never been another, and there will never be another.”13

Repetition provides an iconic representation of flux and suggests that each event may be slightly different from the preceding one or may be identical to it. The tautology of suite indéfinie d’animalcules is an iconic representation of the repetition that occurs randomly in flux. L’atome/l’autre atome is an iconic representation of slight variations that occur: sometimes events are similar, rather than identical. The use of the word tout three times—

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tout change, tout passe, tout qui reste—in phrases that slightly change is also emblematic of slight variations that occur in events as they continuously stream in and out of existence. Again the slight change in the phrase commence et finit and commencement et à sa fin is emblematic of the metamorphosis of events as they come forth into existence. The slight change in n’en a jamais eu d’autre, n’en aura jamais d’autre—only the verb etre changes—is indicative of the repetitive nature of flux. “Suite indéfinie . . . suite indéfinie,” “commence et finit sans cesse,” “à chaque instant à son commencement” and “il n’en a jamais eu d’autre,” negate a prototype: flux eternally generates beings—there was no beginning. These phrases negate the perfect prototype and the idea that everything left the Creator’s hands in a perfect condition at Creation. The notion of flux as an antiprototype is hyperbolized by the tautological relationship between commence et finit and à son commencement et à sa fin, sans cesse and à chaque instant, and n’en a jamais eu d’autre and n’en aura jamais d’autre. The tautology is an iconic representation of flux and the continuum of events, continually proceeding slightly differently than before, never in exactly the same way. The tautology negates the judgments upon nature imposed by the Buffonian notion of degeneration and amelioration of a perfect prototype by hyperbolizing flux and infinite throws of dice. The metamorphosis of animalcules is a microcosm of the change that occurs on a larger scale. Animals, plants, people, stars, planets, and star systems metamorphose on a grander scale. The changes that occur on a microscopic slide provide a small scale picture of what happened on a large scale at the beginning of time. The original fermentation process may still be going on at the microscopic level, the level of men and animals, and the macroscopic level (stars and planets). The animalcules pass in and out of existence as flux randomly generates them at their level of molecular organization, animals (ie: the elephant and the worm) pass in and out of existence as they gradually metamorphose (the elephant may be on its way to becoming a worm and vice-versa), and on the macroscopic level, entire star systems and planets pass in and out of existence (our sun would not be the first star to lose its light). We are a link in the sequence of animal generations where beings continually degenerate or ameliorate. Men in the polar regions may be on their way to extinction. All animal species may be on their way to extinction, as is evidenced by their degeneration (“Who knows whether this deformed biped, that is only four feet high, that is still called a man in the area of the North Pole, and who will soon lose this name by degenerating a little more, is not the picture of a species that is dying?”).14 However, this polar man is not a degeneration of a perfect prototype that originally left the Creator’s hands

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in perfect condition, rather he is a link in an infinite chain of beings and is currently deformed. This polar man is a microcosm of all beings: “Who knows if such is not the case of all animal species?”15 All life may degenerate and then may return. The huge elephant may be the eventual outcome of the fermentation of animalcules and it may return to that state. Over millennia, armless generations can develop arms. Organs degenerate or perfect themselves through necessity and habitual functioning. Man thinks so much, that he may end by being nothing but a head: “ . . . I saw two shoulder-blades lengthen, act in concert like tweezers, and become two stumps” and “Suppose a long succession of armless generations, suppose continued efforts, and you will see the two sides of these tweezers lengthen, lengthen more and more, cross around the back, return to the front, perhaps sprout fingers at their extremities, and create arms and hands again.”16 Diderot attributes the changes in physical characteristics to necessity and habitual functions. Degeneration and amelioration can be summarized in d’Alembert’s statement “tout est en un flux perpétuel.” This flux causes beings to cross kingdoms: every animal is more or less man, every animal is more or less a plant, every plant is more or less an animal. Diderot metaphorized each link in the chain of metamorphoses as Father Castel’s ribbon. The Jesuit Castel had invented a system of colored ribbons to represent musical notes for the benefit of the deaf. Diderot describes it in an undated letter to Sophie Volland in which he tells her to imagine little, colored ribbons that unfurl in the measure that fingers travel on the keys of a piano.17 He returns to this ocular clavecin in the article, “Harpsichord” [“Clavecin”] in the Encyclopedia. Color and sound are comprised of steps that incrementally change in their respective spectra. These incremental changes in color and sound are representative of the metamorphoses of beings on their evolutionary path. What distinguishes each life form from all others is that it has more or less earth, water, air or fire, more or less the characteristics of one kingdom or another. Plus ou moins suggests that precise differences from antecedent beings can be identified by quantifying components-each life form has more or less of each basic element. We can processes degeneration or amelioration when we compare beings to their antecedents, but this labeling is arbitrary because we, who are ephemeral, do not know the final outcome of the metamorphoses. CROSSBREEDING The dictionary definition of mulet changed to incorporate more combinations as scientific experimentation showed that more and more animals could

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be crossbred. In 1694 mulet was defined as an “animal begotten of a donkey and a mare, and which is sterile.”18 In 1762 mulet was defined as “Animal begotten of a donkey and a mare, or of a horse and a she-ass, & which is sterile.”19 By 1798 the following secondary definition appeared: “One generally attributes the word Mule to any animal proceeding from two animals of different species, and which is sterile.”20 In the Sequel to the Conversation (1769), the visionary Diderot opens the door to the modification of existing forms via crossbreeding. Diderot got many of his ideas on crossbreeding from Buffon. Diderot agreed with Buffon that man could assist nature in perfecting itself by crossbreeding: the horse is a perfected ass and the sheep is a more delicate species of the goat that man has domesticated. Nature alone is not able to do as much as nature and man combined. To say that sheep were perfected goats, it was first necessary to prove that interbreeding took place between the two species. Buffon stated that we know too little about the interbreeding of neighboring species and it would be necessary to do a fair number of experiments to prove anything on this subject. Since the Encyclopedia and Buffon’s Natural History were both ongoing projects that spanned decades, the subject of crossbreeding was continually in front of Diderot. In 1753, the relations between species were very simple: Buffon held that the sterility of crossbreeds proved that they were foreign to one another. In 1755, the Natural History of the Goat stated that since sheep and goats had never produced intermediate species, they had to be considered distinct. By 1764, things became more complex: Buffon still considered the two species as distinct, but admitted that crossing was possible and could produce fertile offspring. The biological barrier of hybrid sterility thus no longer existed between the two species. Still, crossing was possible in only one direction: the billy goat reproduces with the ewe, whereas the ram is incapable of reproducing with the nanny goat. Hence, in the Sequel to the Conversation (1769) Diderot repeats Buffon’s statement: prolonged experiments on crossbreeding are necessary. Diderot begins the Sequel to the Conversation by stating that the crossbreeding of species is permissible from the moral and ethical points of view. Bordeu attacks man’s civil and religious laws on breeding: they alone impede the progress of scientific experimentation. Diderot uses the great chain of being to promote crossbreeding. Diderot satirizes extending the great chain to the supernatural realm by having Mademoiselle de l’Espinasse state that one of Bordeu’s friends, who was looking for a husband for her younger sister, her older sister, and herself, would have married Julie’s younger sister to a sylph and her older sister to a great Angel of the Annunciation. Here,

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Diderot criticizes civil and religious proscriptions against crossbreeding to the limit by satirizing the supernatural end of the great chain. There is no physical evidence that angels exist, and even if they do exist, they are spiritual beings and not physical beings, and hence, they do not have the physical bodies required to have offspring. The purpose of crossbreeding is to create more perfect beings, to improve, with man’s intervention, what nature cannot improve by itself. Bordeu cites Horace: “ . . . the supreme merit is to have combined the pleasurable with the useful. Perfection consists in reconciling these two points.”21 This is the rationale for crossbreeding: breeding for the purpose of the useful (improving nature) with the ultimate goal of reaching perfection. Diderot suggested that man tamper with nature for the purpose of improving his species. He had previously promoted this idea in the Reve, when d’Alembert dreams of a room full of flasks-one for philosophers, one for kings, one for judges: “A hot room, covered with little flasks, and on each of these flasks an identification tag: warriors, magistrates, philosophers, poets, flask of courtesans, flask of harlots, flask of kings.”22 May Spangler believes that it was the regeneration of Trembley’s polyp that inspired Diderot to write about the vials in a warm room containing warriors, magistrates, philosophers, poets, courtesans, harlots and kings. Spangler suggests that since the molecules in a polyp can regenerate themselves, perhaps Diderot got the idea that someday the molecules in human beings can regenerate themselves and we can have professionals of all kinds made to order.23 Bordeu pleads a case for more crossbreeding experiments: due to man’s laws and prejudices, very few experiments have been performed on crossbreeding. We need varied and prolonged experiments to learn what species would result and which combinations would be sterile. This comes verbatim from Buffon: Buffon states that we know too little about the interbreeding of neighboring species and it would be necessary to do a fair amount of experiments to prove anything on this subject. Bordeu states that actual experimentation is the only way to find out whether fauns are real or imaginary and whether the hybrids that we know about are truly sterile. Dr. Bordeu proposes crossbreeding men and goats in order to obtain a vigorous, intelligent, tireless, and fleet-footed race that man could train to become servants. Here Diderot explores the social consequences of crossbreeding men with animals: “ . . . nous en tirerions une race vigoureuse, intelligente, infatigable et véloce dont nous ferions d’excellents domestiques.” However, the first consequence of creating such a hybrid race may be a rise in crime. Julie fears that goat-men would be terrible lechers, immoral,

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and that there would be no safety for women. The second consequence is that it raises religious issues. When Bordeu and Julie joke about baptizing goat men, they raise the religious issue of whether a goat-man would have a soul that requires redemption from original sin. This raises the question of exactly how highly organized a being must be before it is endowed with a soul that requires forgiveness of sin and salvation. It also implies that animals are conscious, as Diderot had declared in the article “Animal.” The reader is reminded that man is a link in the great chain of beings, and as such, he is a highly developed animal that can be crossbred with lower animals. RESSEMBLANCE Eighteenth century biologists had studied problems involving heredity— which they called la ressemblance (similitudo) of children to their parents. In 1762 the substantive, ressemblance, was defined as “Resemblance, likeness between persons, between things. There is a great, perfect resemblance between these two things. It is your son, I recognize him from his likeness to you. There is a great resemblance between their temperaments, between their personalities. This copy hardly resembles its original. There is a resemblance between the copy and the original. This portrait is very well painted, but the resemblance is not there. One says that A son is the true likeness of his father, that he has his likeness, to mean, that There is a great likeness between them. I recognized your son at first glance, he has your likeness.24 Ressemblance was used to connote both the similarity in physical characteristics, personality or mannerisms to a parent and also in a more general sense to identify the similarity in characteristics between members of a species or of different species. Diderot devoted an article to the first sense of ressemblance in the article “Hereditary (Medicine)” [“Héréditaire (Médecine)”] in the Encyclopedia. Maupertuis, who had written extensively on heredity, greatly influenced Diderot’s thought. He had studied a case of sexdigitism (an extra digit of the hand or foot) in a Berlin family and showed that the anomaly was hereditary. He posited that changes in successive generations were the result of cumulative differences in the molecular make-up of individuals. These he ascribed not to climate or to diet (as Buffon had done), but rather, to chance errors in the arrangement or patterns of parental elements in the generative process. Maupertuis extended this principle to explain the existence of new species by a succession of chance errors. He referred to each digression from the original as an error. Eighteenth century physicians had already been concerned for quite some time with the hereditary natural of many illnesses.25

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In Thoughts on the Interpretation of Nature, Thought 12 (1753), Diderot observes that physical characteristics are sometimes repeated in nature and at other times, they are not: “For it is evident that nature could not have preserved so much resemblance in its various parts, and have effected such variety in forms, without often having attributed to one organized being what it removed from another.”26 Diderot uses ressemblance in the general sense to connote similarity in characteristics between members of a species or of a different species. He believed that ressemblance is attributed to molecules sensibles: molecules are conscious, fibers are conscious and entire organs are conscious. Physical characteristics are shared by different species because conscious molecules retain the memory of their position in the arrangement of parental elements and pass it on through heredity. The concept that ressemblance is intimately intertwined with molecular consciousness recurs in Diderot’s work because he believed that molecules have desire, aversion, memory, and intelligence. In Thought 50, Diderot posits, “The seminal element, drawing from a part of the body resembling that which it must form in the animal, being conscious and thinking, will have some memory of its former arrangement; for this reason, there arises the preservation of species and resemblance to parents.”27 L’element seminal must be sentant et pensant and must harbor memory within itself in order to exist, conserve the species, and perpetuate familial resemblance. On this point, Diderot was influenced by Maupertuis, who attributed psychic qualities to molecules. The Essay on the Formation of Organized Bodies had taken up this theme: elements themselves endowed with intelligence arrange themselves and become united to carry out the Creator’s view. It is this intelligence within molecules that permit metamorphosis: in Physical Venus he envisages varieties that perpetuate themselves by the repeated generation of individuals, the artificial creation of new races of dogs or of pigeons and along with this process, accidental varieties and the destruction of entire species, when a monstrous character takes away their lives. Diderot explains the phenomenon of conscious molecules that self replicate and pass on their characteristics to posterity by comparing them to bees: Certain elements will have necessarily acquired a prodigious facility for constantly uniting in the same way; for that reason, if they are different, there will arise the formation of infinitely varied microscopic animals; for that reason, if they are similar, polyps, that we can compare to a cluster of infinitely small bees, which, having the active memory of only a single position, cling to and live hanging on according to this position which is the most familiar to them.28

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These conscious molecules, metaphorized as tiny bees, have an innate memory that causes them to remain in the same position. Conversely, if they lack memory, they arrange themselves differently, and thus create the varieties in nature. This paradigm opens the door for open ended metamorphoses. An infinite number of creations can occur from one prototype. In Thought 12, Diderot asks what would prevent rudimentary particles that are intelligent and conscious from creating an infinite variety within a species. Then he extends that line of thought to an infinite number of species descended from the first animal. Diderot concludes that a single, random act of nature resulted in a chain reaction that resulted in the variety of life that currently exists. He agrees with Buffon that originally there was one prototype and that the chain of beings proceeds from it. In Thoughts 11, 12, and 50, we also see the influence of Maupertuis, who had explained the existence of new species by a succession of chance mutations, and who had referred to each divergence from the original as an error. Diderot makes no such judgment on the workings of nature. Hence, Diderot posits that inheritance works through epigenesis, not preexistence/preformation. Life begins with conscious molecules that course through the blood, and its replication, therefore, is also brought about by conscious molecules. In the Conversation between d’Alembert and Diderot, Diderot explains that d’Alembert’s origins as “les molécules qui devaient former les premiers rudiments de mon géomètre étaient éparses dans les jeunes et frêles machines de l’une et de l’autre.” It is epigenesis that explains selfreplication. The conscious molecule is the key to heredity and man can control it. In D’Alembert’s Dream, Diderot speculates that someday man will master the secrets of nature to the extent that he will be able to breed people that will excel at specific occupations: “A hot room, covered with small flasks, and on each of these flasks, an identification tag: warriors, magistrates, philosophers, poets, flask of courtiers, flask of harlots, flask of kings.”29 Over millennia, armless generations can develop arms. Organs degenerate or perfect themselves through necessity and habitual functioning. Man thinks so much, that he may end by being nothing but a head. David Adams explains that Bordeu’s monologue on epigenesis depicts the successive accretion of tiny constituent parts: during gestation, conscious molecules assemble together to form fibers (brins), fibers combine to form loose threads (fils déliés), these threads, in turn, group together to form bundles of threads (faisceaux de fils), and thus the embryo grows.30 Adams says, “With this is intermingled a conception of the development of the nervous

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system. To express these conceptions only a few non-technical words were used by Diderot: (a) ‘ . . . that speck became a loose thread, then a bundle of threads,’ (ce point devint un fil délié, puis un faisceau de fils). The ‘bundle of threads’ here suggests the collection of cells at early stages of growth of the egg, rather than an allusion to nerve fibres, which is the sense in which it is used again later.31 Diderot’s scientific vocabulary, like that of his contemporaries, is simple. In his exposé on epigenesis, he replaces Buffon’s organic molecules with threads or fibers that eventually combine to form organs. Diderot derives his theory of fibers (brins) from Haller’s theory of fibers.32 The fiber is the first living element, the common element of all living matter. Until the discovery of the animal cell, the notion of the fiber was the preferred hypothesis of physiologists. Each of the fibers in the bundle of threads is transformed, solely by nutrition and according to its conformation into a particular organ; an exception is made for those organs in which the germs themselves are reproduced. Brin, which literally means shoot, spring, blade of grass, stick, bit, is used to denote a subdivision of thread (fil). Brin, which also means a staple of rope, also connotes the fiber or unit from which a thread is made by taking many fibers together. Diderot attributes the metamorphoses of species over time to brins: man is a complicated machine that proceeds towards perfection through countless, successive stages, whose formation depends on fine, slender threads that can be mutilated: “where the least important fiber cannot be broken, ruptured, moved from its original position, without a problematic consequence for the whole, is bound to get twisted, entangled even more often in the place of its formation than my silks on my skein-holder.”33 We see Maupertuis’ influence here. There are errors that can occur in the process that can result in teratisms and the development of new species over time. Diderot cites examples of prenatal deformities such as hunchbacks, cripples, Siamese twins, and the man who was born with the heart on the right. If Jean-Baptiste Macé had lived, his grandchildren would have the same deformities because deformities skip a generation and go in leapfrog jumps. Diderot speculates on the reason for these leaps. He suggests that perhaps one of the parents fixes the defect in the other and the defective network is not reborn until the moment when the descendent in the family with the monstrosity predominates and determines the formation of the network.34 The bundle of threads is the basis for the original prototype that was the basis of all living things. Variation in the order of parental elements in the bundle accounts for the vast variety in nature that we see today.

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MONSTERS MONSTRES Monstre is derived from the mid-twelfth century French, mostre, meaning prodigy, marvel, which, in turn, comes from the classical Latin mōnstrum, meaning portent, prodigy, monstrous creature, wicked person, monstrous act, atrocity, from the base monēre, to warn. In 1762 the substantive monstre was defined as an “Animal that has a structure contrary to the order of nature. Horrible, frightful monster. Frightful, dreadful, hideous, terrible monster. A monster with two heads. This woman gave birth to a monster. This child has three eyes, it is a monster. MONSTER also means that which is extremely ugly. This woman is horribly ugly, she is a monster. One says in this sense, A monster of deformity. It is figuratively used to denote a cruel and barbaric person. Nero was a monster, a monster of nature. It is a monster that must be suppressed. It is also said of A person, He is a monster of ingratitude, a monster of greed, a monster of cruelty. It is said that One served monsters on the table, to mean, Fish of extraordinary size.”35 Regarding teratisms, Diderot was influenced by both Buffon and Lucretius. Buffon had noted that teratological offspring have existed since the creation of the earth. He posited that during the cooling of the earth, a temperature was reached suitable to the appearance of life-to the formation of living, organic molecules, which had existed ever since the elements of a gentle heat were able to become incorporated with the substances that constitute organized bodies.36 These aqueous, oily, malleable substances fell with water at the moment when the earth had cooled enough to receive them.37 The existing molecules immediately combined to form animals and plantsnot elementary, simple entities, but like those familiar to us, just as perfect and complex. These combinations occurred in all possible fashions; Buffon said that it seems that everything that can be, is. Certain combinations had succeeded and survived, others had not. Buffon alludes to the monsters by defect, those imperfect sketches planned and executed a thousand times by nature, which, barely having the faculty of existing, must have continued only for a time, and then to have been erased from the list of beings.38 Buffon, like Diderot (taking his cue from Lucretius) in the Letter on the Blind, was thinking of nonviable teratisms that were no sooner formed than doomed to disappear or to die without progeny. Thus, the South American sloths were the last stage of existence in the order of flesh and blood animals; one more defect would have kept them from surviving. Buffon was also thinking of the rivalry of species; the sloths had survived only for lack of an enemy.39 In the Letter on the Blind, the blind Saunderson argues (as did the atheist in Philosophic Thoughts, Thought 21) that any combination of molecules is

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theoretically possible, that nature has always created monsters that could not survive, and that even the survival of the human race may have been no more than a matter of chance. Saunderson declares that if we were to return to the time of Creation and experience matter move and chaos unfold, we would encounter a multitude of teratisms for every few well organized beings. He enumerates specific kinds of physical defects at length: beings without a head, without feet, without a stomach, without intestines, with heart defects, and with lung defects. For Diderot monsters were not the exception at the time of Creation, but rather, the rule. Only those beings without serious defects, were able to find food, survive, and leave progeny. The source of Diderot’s teratological imagery is Lucretius’ On the Nature of Things, Book V. In V, 418 Lucretius declares that at the time of Creation, atoms did not position themselves according to any act of intelligence, but rather, multitudinous atoms, swept along in multitudinous directions over an infinite period of time, eventually combined in an infinite number of combinations. In V, 799 Lucretius declares that it would not be surprising if more and larger animals developed in the early days when the earth was young. In V, 837 the earth produced many monsters that were grotesque or androgynous, creatures that lacked feet or hands, that were dumb, that lacked mouths or eyes, or were severely handicapped by the adhesion of their limbs to their bodies, and that were unable to do anything, go anywhere, keep out of harm’s way, or take what they needed. These and other bizarre and unfortunate births occurred. Because of their deformities, nature prevented them from finding a food supply and ultimately, leaving progeny. In V, 855 Lucretius surmises that at the time of Creation many species must have died out completely and failed to have offspring. All species that managed to survive and which we see today have survived by cunning, courage, swiftness, or through the protection of man. Diderot insists that monsters are not a degeneration in the chain of beings, but rather, that blind chance presides over life. Diderot’s association of the variety of nature with the plurality of throws in games of chance is also derived from Lucretius. In On the Nature of Things, V, 418, multitudinous atoms, swept along multitudinous courses through infinite time, form every kind of combination. Saunderson speculates on what might have become of the human race if the first man had been born with a closed larynx, lacked food, or had defects that prevented reproduction—he would have remained a possibility, not an actuality. Hence, the continued appearance of man on earth is the result of nothing more than fortuitous random chance. Saunderson goes on to point out that teratisms continually occur in nature. If teratisms had never

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occurred in the past, one might posit that they never will. However, order is not perfect and teratisms do occur from time to time. He points to himself, who has been blind from birth, as an iconic representation of the fact that teratisms have occurred from the beginning. In Thoughts on the Interpretation of Nature (1753), Thought 32, Parts 1 and 2, Diderot examines a specific teratism, the moal or ectopic pregnancy. In 1762 mole was defined as “Mass of formless and lifeless flesh, that women sometimes deliver instead of a child. This woman that had been thought to be pregnant for six months, only delivered a mole.”40 In the eighteenth century the mole was called a faux germe, which was defined as “the formless matter that issues from a defective conception.”41 David Adams says that in this anomaly, “The sac contains some parts of a normal foetus, but has no placenta, and is attached directly to the womb. As is confirmed by contemporary sources such as John Memis’ The Midwife’s Pocket-Companion (1765), medical science at that time was unable to say unequivocally” how the malformation was caused.42 Adams goes on to say, “Indeed, the article ‘Mole,’ by the surgeon Louis, which appeared in 1765 (X, 626–7), quotes at length from this section of the Interpretation, and refers the reader to it.”43 In Thought 32, Parts 1 and 2, Diderot explains ectopic pregnancies in purely scientific terms, offering possible rational explanations. In Part 1 he addresses the question of whether the moal is a result of parthenogenesis or the combination of male and female elements. Hence, the issue here is that of preformation versus epigenesis. Arguing the latter, Diderot establishes that the production of this teratism is governed by laws as invariable as those of generation and that it is merely the result of the organization of molecules (“Therefore, the mole will have a constant arrangement.”).44 Dissection is the key to unraveling the mystery of the origin of the mole: “Let us take up the scalpel, open some moles, and let us see . . .”45 Teratisms can be explained by natural means, through epigenesis, and scientific investigation is the only means to learn about them. In Thought 32, Part 2, Diderot again explains the origin of the ectopic pregnancy as purely the result of biological processes, specifically, epigenesis. By supporting the view that male and female elements are necessary in the production of the teratism, he implies that it is not the result of preformation (ie: a malformed egg as an ovist would claim). Diderot provides a detailed physical explanation of the mechanics of the moal, epigenetic in character. He describes the placenta as a tissue comprised of bloody vessels and metaphorizes it as a kind of mushroom that adheres, by its convex part to the womb during the entire pregnancy. Diderot posits that all beings are only that which resistances and the laws of movement and universal order

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determine them to be. He describes in detail a scenario that he believes illustrates how a moal might form. He depicts the moal purely in epigenetic terms. He demonstrates that the organization of the teratism, like that of a normal being, is effected by the gradual formation of organs from an undifferentiated mass. In the moal, the umbilical cord, pulled by two opposing forces, is much shorter than normal and there comes a time when its two borders would unite and form a kind of egg, at the center of which, one finds a deformed, constrained, and suffocated fetus. His conjecture is based on Harvey’s observation that the formation of the embryo is a progressive formation starting with undifferentiated matter, an epigenesis. Harvey had established that the parts of some animals are formed one after another, and then they are nourished, grow, and take shape from the same matter; therefore, animals have parts that are formed earlier, and others that are formed later, and at the same time the animals grow and are formed. Their formation begins with the part that is their origin, and with the help of that part, they receive all of their other members. Similarly, in the conjecture, Diderot states that the moal gradually develops from the pulling of opposite forces that cause the umbilical cord to disappear. Everything proceeds from that, and the ectopic pregnancy is the result of a series of events that can be observed and explained in purely physical means. As in the Letter on the Blind, Diderot stresses the point that monsters are engendered by nature and obey its laws. His purpose is not only to communicate his view that the laws of nature encompass all of creation, but also to undermine the belief in fabulous creatures, such as those with which the Church frightened the faithful into compliance with its doctrines. The unsigned article “Unicorn” [“Licorne”] in the Encyclopedia also undermines the belief in mythological creatures such as the unicorn. Emita Hill did a study on monsters in D’Alembert’s Dream (1769).46 She points out that for Diderot the universe is a dangerous place because there is no one at the helm: “Moreover, here in the Rêve, oppressed by his vision of a materialistic universe, one with no visible controls, subject to unpredictable hazards . . . Man, like the universe, may beget monsters. Monsters are omnipresent in the Rêve, abnormal births, strange hybrids . . . Man, like the universe, produces new life with no assurance of what it will be nor how it will survive.”47 Hill observes that Diderot marveled at the fact that although there are so many things that can go wrong with a fetus, so many people are nevertheless born normal: “The consistent production of normal creatures from these sketchy and undetermined rudiments seems nothing snort of miraculous, while the production of monsters as the result of confusion, diminution, or

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multiplication of the usual number of fibres seems very probable indeed.”48 Hill cites Julie’s statement that she is amazed that a machine as complicated as a man, whose formation depends on the organization of slender threads, in which the smallest thread cannot be broken, displaced or missing without disastrous consequences for the whole, does not get mixed up more often like the silks on her spindle. “Bordeu cites numerous examples of recent monsters to support his view: a modern Cyclops with only one optic nerve; a pair of Hippocratic twins, two bodies fused with a single set of organs to serve both; a carpenter whose internal organs were completely reversed from side to side. The number and kinds of monsters are apparently unlimited.”49 Hill quotes the passage from the Elements of Physiology in which Diderot observes that there are as many monsters as there are organs and functions in man: monsters of eyes, ears, the nose who survive, as well as those who do not survive-monsters due to too many parts, too few, or inversion or wrong positioning of parts.50 Bordeu tells Julie twice to do mentally what nature sometimes does. They imagine stripping developing organs of their fibers, reducing them to an inert mass, and then reconstructing them. Hill remarks that Diderot makes teratisms understandable and explainable: “Against this background monsters are easily comprehended; they appear no longer as deviations, but merely as the more eccentric variations in a scheme which depends on no fixed model, but only on a flexible bundle of fibres . . . Monsters threaten every man in his daily life. No one is secure; we could all share Saunderson’s plight.”51 Hill discusses the fact that Diderot observed that nature explores every possible form: “That individual forms are ephemeral and no two identical becomes not a cause for anxiety and insecurity, seen in this light, but a tribute to the fullness, richness and rightness of the universe . . . In a world that is changing and evolving continually, matter must assume all possible shapes and undergo infinite alterations. There can be no gap, no missing link in the chain of being, or the universe itself would be defective and could cease to be.”52 Hill highlights the importance of perpetual flux in Diderot’s universe: “not one molecule that resembles itself for one instant. A new order of things is born, that is its eternal inscription . . .”53 Everything is continually in motion, continually changing and does not stop for a moment. Hill states, “Movement is essential; it is tantamount to life itself and it cannot be interrupted, lest it not resume.”54 Hence, Hill posits that “all matter is eternal and cannot perish or be destroyed.”55 She quotes Diderot as saying that to live and die is merely to change forms.56 Since molecules are in flux, nature is continually creating new things: perhaps males are merely malformed females or females are merely malformed

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males. This is very insightful as all differences among beings arose somehow, at some point in time. Hill declares, “The molecule has taken the place of the soul as that part of us which is eternal and Diderot is quick to inject into this inert, isolated particle the full strength of his human personality, his desire for survival, his unwillingness, after the inevitable dissolution of the body, to surrender his memory and emotions, despite his belief that memory and emotions are material in origin and inseparable from the physical organism.”57 Here Hill observes that it can be said that Diderot merely substituted the conscious, immortal soul for the conscious, immortal molecule! Hill cites a romantic letter that Diderot wrote to Sophie Volland in which he says that he hopes that some day, the molecules of their ashes may intermingle, unite, and retain the consciousness and memory of their original state.58 In D’Alembert’s Dream, Bordeu explains teratisms in purely rational terms by making the analogy of the fable of the bees. Molecules are arranged in certain patterns and they either retain a memory of their original position or else they lack that memory, like clusters of bees. The difference between the cluster of continuous bees and the cluster of contiguous ones is precisely the same as that between ordinary animals and polypous creatures. Teratisms are merely the result of the organization of molecules. Diderot carries this concept to the extreme by joking that perhaps man is a malformed woman or woman is a malformed man. Diderot demonstrates that epigenesis alone explains teratism while preformation cannot. Teratisms pose a problem for preformation precisely because the teratism is a creature that does not resemble its parents. The polyp also creates problems for preformation. For, as Abraham Trembley had shown, if a polyp loses a part of its body and regenerates it, does that mean that there are an infinite number of seeds planted all over its body waiting to regenerate that part of the body which may become severed? Diderot shows that in nature there are polyps of all kinds, even human ones. An example of a human polyp is Siamese twins. He cites the case of the two girls who were connected by the head, shoulders, back, buttocks, and thighs, and lived in that condition, joined together, up to the age of twentytwo, and then died within a few minutes of each other. Nature is continually producing new creations, some of them can survive and some of them cannot. Diderot carries the notion of variety in nature to the extreme: he speculates that perhaps there are human polyps on Jupiter and Saturn, where men are born as are silkworms, spin cocoons, and become butterflies. The sleeping d’Alembert wonders what the state of affairs is like on other planets: perhaps there are human polyps on Jupiter or Saturn, with male pairs splitting up into

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males and female pairs, into females. He visualizes man splitting up into myriad men the size of atoms that can be kept between sheets of paper like insect eggs, that spin their own cocoons, stay for some time in the chrysalis stage, then cut through their cocoons and emerge like butterflies, in fact, a ready made human society, a whole province populated by the fragments of one individual. If there is a place where man can divide himself up into myriad, microscopic men, people there should be less reluctant to die, for the loss of one man can so easily be made up that it must give rise to little regret. Diderot demonstrates that all of nature, including teratisms, polyps, and extraterrestrial variations, are governed solely by nature’s immutable laws. Diderot states that the changes that occur on a microscopic slide provide a small scale picture of what happened on a large scale at the beginning of time. The original fermentation process may still be going on. From this we may infer that the microscope holds the secrets of the teratism as it does of all life. More experimentation is needed at the microscopic level to learn about how teratisms may have originated at the time of Creation. Diderot cites the example of the monstrous polar man, who is also governed by the laws of nature: “Who knows if this deformed biped, who is only four feet high, who is still called a man in the vicinity of the North Pole, and who will soon lose this name by degenerating a bit more, is not the image of a dying species?”59 Some teratisms, then, may be evidence of transitory species. Carrying this notion to its limit, Diderot states that all animal species may be on their way to extinction. All life may degenerate and then may return. The huge elephant may be the product of sudden fermentation and on its way to extinction. Since flux delivers every combination, nature must necessarily be kaleidoscopic, and teratisms are inevitable. Diderot states that organs produce needs and needs produce organs; more needs, more senses, and vice versa. Over millennia, armless generations can develop arms. Organs degenerate or perfect themselves through necessity and habitual functioning. Man thinks so much, that he may end by being nothing but a head. In 1769 Diderot is already positing the adaptation of organs to climates and the conditions of life in the phenomena of degeneration or regeneration. This implies that monsters may only be nature’s response to needs, and if their physical characteristics are useful, these monsters may last or even dominate. We see the influence of Buffon, who in 1766, in The Degeneration of Animals, portrays metamorphosis based on paleontology, comparative anatomy, and the geographic distribution of animals. However, Diderot parts company with Buffon, who had limited change to being an intra-species phenomenon. Diderot carried it further and thought that the changes would create new species and eventually, span kingdoms.

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Diderot also explains teratisms by epigenesis: nature can form a bundle with a peculiar thread that gives rise to a new teratological organ. Hence, a sixth sense or a true hermaphrodite may exist and they are part of the variety that nature produces. To study the origin of the metamorphosis, we must go back to prenatal development, when the being is “ . . . une substance molle, filamenteuse, informe, vermiculaire, plus analogue au bulbe et a la racine d’une plante qu’a un animal.” Bordeu explains the formation of teratisms in purely epigenetic terms: each thread in the bundle will form a specific organ. The text suggests that a dissection is taking place: mutilate an optic fiber and the offspring will be a Cyclops. Remove a thread from the bundle, the thread that forms the nose, and the animal will have no nose. Remove the thread that forms the ear and the animal will have no ears or will only have one, and the anatomist will not find in his dissection olfactory threads, auditory threads, or only one of the latter. Continue removing the threads and the animal will be without a head, without feet, without hands, its lifespan will have been short, but it will have lived. This hypothetical dissection indicates that teratisms are variations that occur in nature and that they obey nature’s immutable laws. Diderot uses the term inherited defect [vice héréditaire]: Mlle de l’Espinasse asks, “Are there notable examples of these original deformities, other than hunchbacks and cripples, to whom one could attribute the malignant state to some inherited defect?”60 Monsters are caused when the smallest thread in the developing embryo is broken, ruptured, moved from its original position or missing; such an occurrence is a vice héréditaire.61 Here he does make a judgment on nature: nature does make mistakes and it makes them more frequently than one would think. Diderot uses vice again when Bordeu explains why anomalies skip a generation: “Perhaps one of the agents repairs the defect of the other . . .”62 Diderot labels the anomalies as defects and he does make a judgment upon nature. Having explained the effect of removing threads from the embryo, Diderot goes on to consider what will happen if threads are added: duplicate a thread in the bundle and the creature will have two heads; double other threads and the animal will have two heads, four eyes, four ears, three feet, four arms, six fingers on each hand. Mix up the threads in the bundle and the organs will be displaced: the head will occupy the middle of the chest, the lungs will be on the left, the heart on the right. Join the two threads together, and the organs will be mixed together; the arms will be stuck to the body; the thighs, limbs and feet will be joined together, and every kind of monster imaginable will arise. His hypothetical experimentation is coupled with accounts that have actually occurred. He stresses the notions that scientific

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experimentation will elucidate the mystery of monsters, as well as the fact that monsters are subject to nature’s immutable laws. Diderot posits that man is a complicated machine that advances towards perfection through countless, successive stages, whose formation depends on fine, slender threads that cannot be broken. Diderot uses perfectionner/perfection, a concept that he had derived from Buffon: “The original structure degenerates or perfects itself through need and habitual acts”63 and “a machine that moves towards perfection through an infinite number of successive growths . . .”64 Diderot believed that there is a continual drive in nature to improve because man is “une machine qui s’avance à sa perfection.” Monsters, then, are caused by errors in the reproductive process that are passed on from parents to offspring. Teratisms can be explained in purely biological terms, as errors that occasionally occur during nature’s continual advance towards perfection. Regarding the prenatal development of monsters, Diderot says that man is a machine that is often damaged in the womb. He cites hunchbacks and cripples as examples of prenatal deformities. He also mentions the example of Jean-Baptiste Macé, a carpenter born in Troyes, who was born with the heart on the right side, the liver on the left, and all of his other internal organs reversed, as well. He notes that if Jean-Baptiste Macé had lived, his grandchildren would have the same deformities because deformities skip a generation and go in leapfrog jumps. Diderot derives this notion from Maupertuis, who had observed that after an interruption, anomalies reappear, and who had seen children that did not resemble either their father or mother, but rather, had the traits of their ancestors” (Physical Venus). Diderot considers the possibility that the reasons for these leaps may be that a descendant of the abnormal strain predominates and governs the pattern of the network: perhaps one of the agents repairs the error of the other and the defective network is reborn only when the offspring of the deformed race predominates and gives the instruction to the formation of the network. He derived the notion that a descendant of the abnormal strain predominates from Maupertuis’ Essay on the Formation of Organized Bodies. Diderot was especially interested in the question of consciousness concerning the Siamese twins of Rabastens: one of the twins appeared to lose consciousness while the other remained fully alert and then they alternated and the one who had been unconscious regained consciousness and the one who had been alert, lost consciousness. Diderot relates consciousness to brain activity and the fact that the brain controls the body’s nervous system. In the case of the Siamese twins, there are two brains that are communicating

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with one another, since the twins are taking turns in remaining conscious. It appears that the two brains are competing with one another for control of the entire organism. Diderot marveled at the fact that there was one animal that had a double sensory system and two centers of awareness. He asks what might have happened if this creature had lived. He wonders what sort of communication might have been established between the two brains by the experiences of every moment in life and the strongest imaginable force of habit. The tautology of double is an iconic representation of flux that is delivering a specific variation of a combination, namely, duplication what already exists: “Des sens doubles, une mémoire double, une imagination double, une double application . . . la vie doublée d’un être doublé.” Moitié is also repeated to show that patterns a duplicated in systems that arise chaotically: “la moitié d’un être qui observe, lit, médite, tandis que son autre moitié repose : cette moitié-ci . . .” Since, given time, nature brings about everything that is possible, it will sooner or later produce some such strange composite. The tautology demonstrates that Diderot had observed that patterns recur within systems and that these combinations affect consciousness. Halves of parts are similar and when they are multiplied, consciousness is experienced differently by the whole. Mlle de l’Espinasse speculates that perhaps such a creature is superior precisely because it does have two of every organ: “Que nous serions pauvres en comparaison d’un pareil être!” The Siamese twins are iconic representations of the fact that nature is continually producing new combinations. Although these twins did not survive because they were self-contradictory, the implication is that perhaps some day, because nature is continually advancing towards perfection, a human polyp that has a double brain and double senses will survive and flourish. In summation, Diderot’s originality is seen in his visualization of species as entities that are continually changing, rather than remaining fixed. Flux + time delivers every combination of conscious atoms. Combinations that are not self-contradictory remain viable, while those with inherent self-contradictions are rendered extinct. In D’Alembert’s Dream, he observes that man is continually advancing towards perfection. Man is a “machine qui s’avance à sa perfection par une infinité de développements successifs . . .” Hence, Diderot makes it clear that humanity has a direction and that that direction is upwards. Species attain perfection “par la nécessité et les fonctions habituelles.” Further, needs produce organs. It is necessity and habitual functioning that are the driving forces that direct nature towards amelioration. Beings that are slow to move, so that they cannot escape their predators, or are dim witted, will be rendered extinct, as Lucretius had shown.

Chapter Six

The Ascent of Consciousness

But will each element lose, while accumulating and combining, its small degree of consciousness and perception? Not at all . . . From these perceptions of assembled and combined elements, There will result a single perception, proportionate to the mass and arrangement . . . 1 —Denis Diderot, Thoughts on the Interpretation of Nature, Thought 50 (1753)

One of the things that made Diderot a pioneer in his time was his observation that as molecules combine and matter becomes more complex, an emergent consciousness arises that is superior to the sum of that of its components. For this reason, he attributed consciousness to rocks, plants and animals, as well as man. Diderot’s views on consciousness were influenced by the materialists2 and by the numerous articles addressing consciousness in the Encyclopedia.3 This chapter will address Diderot’s thought on the passage from particular consciousness to the general consciousness, from contiguity to continuity, from the conscious molecule to the living being. During the eighteenth century the adjective sensible was defined as “That which is aware, which easily receives the impression that objects make. The eye is a very sensitive part. The nervous parts are the most sensitive. The horse has a very sensitive mouth. A horse aware of the spur. To be moved by sorrow. He has delicate health, he is sensitive to the smallest draft. Sensitive to cold, to heat.”4 The noun sensibilité was defined as “Quality by which a subject is aware of the impression of objects. He has a great sensitivity to drafts. To have an equal sensitivity to cold and heat. The sensitivity of nervous parts.5 Hence, sensible meant having internal perception of a) a fact or b) of one’s sensations, feelings, or thoughts, or being endowed with sensibilité. Sensibilité is the totality of the impressions, thoughts, and feelings that make up a person’s conscious being. 147

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The Encyclopedia defined sensibilité as “a property that certain parts have to perceive the impressions of external objects, & to consequently produce motions proportionate to the degree of intensity of this perception.”6 Therefore, sensibilité was synonymous with perception and it was measured by the ability of a being to respond to stimuli with movement. This definition was repeated in the article “Animal,” in which Diderot distinguishes among three kinds of consciousness. First, sentir is defined as making a motion at the occasion of a shock or resistance; this is a physical reaction to an external stimulus. Diderot notes that there are certain plants (les plantes sensitives) and animals that meet the first definition of consciousness. The second kind of sentir is the ability to perceive and compare perceptions; Diderot remarks that we are not certain that animals possess this ability. Thirdly, there is the sentiment of pleasure, pain, and awareness of one’s own existence; in this category of consciousness there is neither movement, nor a perception of an external stimulus, nor a comparison of perceptions. Diderot concludes that animals may well have this kind of consciousness. The first kind of consciousness that Diderot mentions in “Animal,” that which is characterized by making a motion on the occasion of a shock or resistance, is fully elaborated upon in the article “Sensitive, (Botan.).” This latter article is significant because in it, Jaucourt demonstrates that the vegetable kingdom is conscious and reacts to external stimuli. The article addresses a certain species of plante sensitive, the mimosa or mimosa, frutex sensibilis herba viva. The nomenclature is derived from mimosa, feminine of mimosus (
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under the title Treatise on the Soul (1750): in this work La Mettrie posited that matter contains a moving force that animates it and that matter is endowed with consciousness.7 La Mettrie addresses the brain’s functioning in order to try to explain everything by matter alone. In this work, as in Man-machine (1747), he replaces the immortal soul with the brain as the cause of consciousness and he tries to show how matter can be the cause of all the functions of the human being, including man’s consciousness. The difference between man and animals is the level of organization of the brain. While Descartes viewed animals as machines, La Mettrie extends this idea to man: for La Mettrie man is a machine comprised of matter alone; consciousness is a by-product of molecular organization. He asserts that matter as one observes it in organized bodies always possesses certain properties, including motion and consciousness. He demonstrates that the joint sensorium, or the seat of the soul, at the origin of the nerves in the brain, occupies the entire brain. Thought is the product of a particular organization of matter. Diderot explored the mechanics of consciousness in great detail in Thoughts on the Interpretation of Nature (1753). In Thought 12, Diderot observes that characteristics overlap not only among species, but even among kingdoms: he asks that when we see these metamorphoses bridge kingdoms by small increments, who would not believe that has always been one prototype for all beings? The full force of this question is seen in its implications: if all of nature is derived from a single prototype, then consciousness, too, must have developed from a single entity. This question with its far reaching implications lays the groundwork for the explanation of consciousness that will be given in Thought 50: the question implies that if all of nature is derived from a single prototype, then perhaps all three kingdoms may possess consciousness to some degree. While the issue of consciousness bridging kingdoms is alluded to in Thought 12, the mechanics of consciousness is elaborated upon in great detail in Thought 50. Diderot’s purpose, in Thought 50, is to show how consciousness originates in the developing embryo. In order to do this, he goes back to a time preceding conception, when the parental elements are circulating in the blood of the parents. In Thought 50, he agrees with Maupertuis, who had attributed desire, aversion, memory, and intelligence to the smallest particle of matter as in the largest animal. When these smallest particles of matter, which are conscious and thinking, retain the memory of their original position, the offspring resembles his parents. When these parental elements cannot unite because of a lapse of memory (ne puisse s’unir par oubli), birth anomalies result.

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Diderot uses “memory” [mémoire] five times in Thought 50: “these modifications are desire, aversion, memory and intelligence,” “The seminal element . . . will have some memory of its first situation,” “a swarm of bees . . . having the active memory of only one situation,” “When the impression of a present situation will balance or extinguish the memory of a past situation,” and “each element will have lost its memory of self.”8 The tautology serves to hyperbolize the original premise that memory exists at the level of the smallest particle and that it is this memory that is the foundation of all ressemblance; conversely, it is a lapse in the memory of the smallest particle that is the reason for the great diversity that we see in nature. Parental elements, like bees on a branch, have the memory of a single position—if they retain their memory, the offspring resembles his parents; if they forget their position, a teratism results. Diderot reiterates Maupertuis’ assertion that when parental elements combine to form a composite, each element forgets its memory of self and acquires the consciousness and memory of the whole. Diderot quotes from Chapter 52 from Maupertuis’ Inaugural Dissertation in Metaphysics in the original Latin: “It seems that from all of the perceptions of the elements having been gathered together, there results a single perception that is much stronger, much more perfect than any of the constituent perceptions and which is perhaps analogous to each of these perceptions as the organized body is to the component part. Each element, in its union with others, having mingled its perception with theirs, and having lost its consciousness of self, we have lost the memory of the original state of the elements, and our origin must be entirely lost for us.”9 Hyperbole is intrinsic to “all” [omnes] because it is a generalization. The initial positioning of “all” [omnes] further hyperbolizes the notion of unity, which is the theme of the passage. “Of the elements” [Elementorum], because it is the genitive case of “element” [elementum], builds suspense: it flags that the elements possess something, but the reader does not yet know what that thing is. Further, “of the elements” [elementorum] is not the nominative case, so the reader does not yet know that the subject of the sentence is. “Perceptions” [Perceptiones] appears as the third word in the sentence, after suspense and hyperbole and it is the theme of the entire passage, namely, consciousness. Conspirare literally means “to breathe together” (cum/spīro) and is the derivation of conspiracy. While it also means to unite, as it does in this passage, the imagery is graphic: each element possesses consciousness and this consciousness literally “breathes together” with the consciousness of every other element. Hence, a tautological relationship exists between perceptiones and conspirare because historically, in the western world it was thought that

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God breathed life into Adam and thus gave him consciousness. Then there is a comma, which further builds suspense, because it signals that this is not the end of the sentence, but rather, that what we have read is merely a clause that is contingent upon something that is to come. “A single perception that is much stronger and much more perfect” [Unam fortiorem et magis perfectam perceptionem] is Diderot’s statement of emergent consciousness: as elements unite, something radically new and different emerges, different from any of its components. This made Diderot a pioneer in his time: he recognized that a random, emergent consciousness arises and that this new consciousness is not equal to the sum of its components; it is stronger and more perfect than the sum of its constituents. “To be seen” [Videntur] in the final position of the sentence hyperbolizes the scientific method and the importance of visual inspection of laboratory results. It also has a tautological relationship with perceptiones and perceptionem because it connotes one of the five senses and Diderot believed that all consciousness is derived from the five senses, as he had held in the Letter on the Blind. The person who is seeing, namely, the speaker, is thus the product of the unity of the perception of each of the smallest particles in his body. The next sentence reiterates the notion that what is created by the union is greater than the sum of its parts: if the new consciousness that arises stands in the same relationship to the constituent perceptions as the organized physical body does to the molecule, and the physical body of a plant, animal or human is so much more than the sum of its parts, then how much greater is the consciousness of man, who can think and reason, is who is aware of self and others than the sum of the consciousness of the particles that comprise his body. The third sentence repeats what was said in the first sentence: again each element unites with others and blends its consciousness with theirs. However, instead of conspirare we have copulationem and confudit. We see that there is a passage from self to a group consciousness: the elements are no longer “breathing together,” but rather, they are united and blended, which now indicates that they are no longer aware of their “selves” working in harmony with others, but rather, they are unaware of their “selves,” and they are now aware only of the greater whole. Sui conscientiam is italicized, hyperbolizing the consciousness of self, but this presence of self is obliterated in the word that immediately follows, perdidit. Hence, perdidit is hyperbolized in many ways: first, it is the final word in the clause. Secondly, it immediately follows a phrase that appears in capitals, but it meaning, to lose, undercuts that phrase instantly. Memoria indicates that one of the properties of all matter, memory, is exchanged for the memory of the new entity that arises. Although

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the memory of the primitive state ceases, the memory of a new state arises. Hence, the conclusion of the passage, our origin must be entirely lost to us. Man is aware of self and of others, but he is not aware of each molecule that constitutes his body. The notion that the unity of self is assured by memory will be explored at length in D’Alembert’s Dream. There is more than contiguity here: there is continuity. Diderot is exploring contiguity vs. continuity, unity vs. heterogeneity, the particular vs. the general. By proposing a mechanical assimilation of molecular consciousness, he is resolving the conflict between contiguity and continuity. Particles may be contiguous, but they lose their sense of self and their consciousness becomes continuous. Once their consciousness becomes one, then their physical parts work as one, as well. Diderot is proposing a random, emergent ascent of conscious matter that culminates in human consciousness. He is positing that consciousness emerges in a way underivable from its constituent parts, just as the property of wetness cannot be derived from the hydrogen and oxygen alone. Diderot had a holistic view of consciousness: the conscious whole is very different from any of its constituents. This is because when conscious molecules combine, they lose memory of their former state and acquire the consciousness of the new composite that is formed. What Diderot is positing is a series of chronological events that culminate in the creation of conscious entities unlike their constituent parts. The series of events may be illustrated in the following paradigm: random motion of conscious atoms>organized matter> life>human thought. Diderot’s emergent metamorphosis of consciousness is derived partly from Lucretius, partly from Maupertuis and the materialists: it is to Lucretius that he owes the notion that atoms randomly collide and create new forms; it is Maupertuis who hypothesizes that they create new forms because each constituent element loses the memory of its former self and becomes conscious only of the new entity that is formed. Hence, complex chemical compounds have emerged from the conjunction of simpler chemical compounds. Plant and animal life emerged from the mineral kingdom. Man emerged from the chaotic combination of body parts and functions. Thought and consciousness emerged as something new when its constituent parts were sufficiently developed. As matter metamorphoses into more complex forms of organization, consciousness, too, changes, permitting self-awareness, awareness of others, the ability to think and reason. The notion that every living organism is an aggregate whose consciousness is the sum of the consciousness of each of its smallest particles has an implication that Diderot exploited to the limit: is the world not a great animal endowed with consciousness of self? Is the world

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not, so to speak, God? He derived this pantheist notion from Spinoza’s God or Nature. If each succeeding level of organization possesses its own consciousness, then the world has its own consciousness as if it were a great animal; one might call this world-consciousness God. A logical corollary to this notion is that the universe, which is a consciousness that is metamorphosing just as all lesser entities are, may well have a beginning, a life span, and an end. In Thought 58, Questions 3–15, Diderot asks whether one can turn living matter into dead matter and dead matter into living matter. He would return to this theme in the Entretien when he asserts that he can make flesh from marble and marble from flesh. The question whether living matter can die and dead matter can return to life suggests that perhaps consciousness, which is a property of all matter, may reside in dead matter and in living matter alike. If Maupertuis is right and all matter is conscious, then there is no such thing as dead matter. Therefore, there is no such thing as death, merely a change in form and consciousness. A logical corollary is that there is never an end to consciousness, but rather, that consciousness changes, perceptions change, but do not cease entirely. In Question 15 Diderot asks whether living molecules can return to life after losing their lives, only to lose them again, ad infinitum. The implication is that perhaps consciousness is eternal and undergoes changes, as molecular organization changes. Although the issues raised here are put forward tentatively in the form of questions, it is clear that Diderot envisages matter as containing its own energy, as self-propelled, and that he rejects the idea that any matter can be truly dead. There is thus no need for God to give any impetus to matter and the unity of nature in purely material terms is strongly implied. In the Conversation between d’Alembert and Diderot (1769) Diderot addresses the problem of consciousness extensively: in this work sensibilité occurs 21 times, sensible, 15 times, mémoire, 10 times, and insensible, twice. The inherent consciousness in all matter is the philosophy of the Conversation and the succeeding Dream, both of which are devoted to exploring the nature of consciousness and its ascent up through the chain of beings. In these two works, Diderot supplied answers to the questions that he had raised in 1753. In the opening monologue, the character d’Alembert articulates the fundamental thesis of Diderot’s materialism, namely, that consciousness is a fundamental property of all matter and that therefore, the mineral kingdom is conscious. The character Diderot reiterates the statement by positing that stone cries out when it is cut, chiseled or crushed. Since consciousness resides in all matter at every level of organization, flesh can be made from marble and vice-versa without the intervention of God. Diderot carries to its logical

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conclusion the idea of the chain of beings and extends consciousness to the vegetable and mineral kingdoms. The notion that all three kingdoms are conscious is elaborated on in the first dialogue and reiterated in the second. He argues that all matter possesses two properties: consciousness and motion. Diderot makes an analogy: just as there is active force and inanimate force (actual energy and potential energy), so there is active consciousness and inert consciousness. First, he gives an example of converting potential energy to actual energy: a huge oak tree is an example of potential energy. We can convert potential energy to actual energy by rarifying or reducing the pressure of the air surrounding the trunk of the tree: if we lower the pressure outside the tree substantially, the water contained within it will suddenly expand and the tree will burst apart. Diderot is careful to note that the same holds true for the human body. This alludes to why skin divers must rise to the surface slowly and why mountain climbers must ascend a mountain slowly: in the former the lungs will burst, in the latter, the brains will burst inside their crania. Diderot then makes the analogy of converting the latent consciousness of marble to the active consciousness of a human being: a statue, which belongs to the mineral kingdom, has latent consciousness. If we pulverize the marble, turn it into humus, feed the humus to plants, and allow the animal kingdom to consume the plants, we will have transformed latent consciousness into active consciousness. Both transformations work because motion and consciousness are intrinsic to all matter, at every level of organization. Hence, since all matter, even the smallest particle possesses the properties of consciousness and motion, given flux and time, the transformations continually occur in nature. Hence, Diderot supplies the answer to the questions that he had asked in 1753: dead matter is never really dead, it can be transformed into living matter, and vice-versa, ad infinitum. Diderot’s conclusion is stated in his daughter’s supposition that he has created âme: âme is utilized synonymously with consciousness. Diderot is a monist and believes that there is only one substance in the universe, namely, matter. Since all matter possesses consciousness, when Diderot transforms matter into a higher level of organization, he is creating a higher level of consciousness. The epigenetic account of d’Alembert’s birth is a reiteration of Maupertuis’ description of conscious parental elements that combine to form a higher consciousness in the Essay on the Formation of Organized Bodies. Diderot demonstrates that consciousness resides in matter at all levels of organization and that as matter becomes more complex, so does consciousness. Conception is no miracle, but rather a matter of the organization of conscious molecules that have forgotten their sense of soi upon union with each other and have

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acquired a higher consciousness of the whole. Furthermore, d’Alembert’s birth is an example of the latent (potential) consciousness of the food that his parents have eaten being converted into the active consciousness of the growing embryo. It is via material agents that there is successively formed an inert being, a conscious being, a thinking being, and a being solving the problem of the precession of the equinoxes. Diderot develops Maupertuis’ notion that consciousness is based on the memory of elements: when elements unite, they lose their memory of their former selves and acquire a new memory that is the composite of their union. Diderot examined consciousness at the level of the human being: without memory, there would be no identity: life would be an interrupted series of sensations with nothing to connect them. Memory arises from the organization of matter-it develops, grows weaker, and can be lost entirely. If a being can feel and has memory as well, it can form a connection of the impressions it receives that is the story of its life, and so acquires an identity. Diderot offers another analogy: memory works because the fibers of our organs are like conscious, vibrating strings. Because matter at all levels of organization is conscious, so is a vibrating string. A vibrating string oscillates and resonates a long time after it has been plucked. It is this oscillation, this inevitable resonance, that hold the present object in the mind’s eye so that the mind can think about the object. In addition, vibrating strings have the property of making other strings vibrate: this is how an idea recalls a second, the two of them a third, these three a fourth, and so on. Likewise, the human mind may be compared to a harpsichord. A man is conscious: he is at the same time the musician (who presses his ear against the vibrating strings and who makes judgments about their consonance or dissonance) and the instrument. Because man is conscious, he has the momentary consciousness of the sound he is making; he produces the melody and holds it there. If an inanimate object such as a keyboard were endowed with consciousness and memory, it would know and repeat on its own the melodies that the musician played on its keys. The human mind is like a keyboard endowed with consciousness and memory: it can hold an idea in place while it is analyzing it at the same time. The difference between a harpsichord, a bird-organ, a bird, and a man, is the degree of consciousness and memory. What they all have in common is that they are comprised of matter (there is only one substance in the universe). In D’Alembert’s Dream (1769) Diderot explores the nature of consciousness more fully. D’Alembert talks in his sleep about living points that join with other living points to form a being. He begins by positing that the organization of matter works because there is continuity as well as contiguity: just as

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a drop of mercury fuses itself with another drop of mercury, so one conscious molecule fuses itself with another conscious molecule. After assimilation there is only one molecule and consciousness becomes common to the combined mass. Each molecule loses its original consciousness and takes on the consciousness of the combined mass. It is this combining of molecules that results in identity and continuity, action and reaction. Again, we have the theme of an emergent consciousness or a consciousness that is greater than that of the sum of its constituents. The metaphor of the bees is another example of how consciousness works. The metaphor is another attempt by analogy to resolve the problem of individuality, personal identity in a creature made up of a multitude of individual particles. A man is like a long cluster of bees perched along a tree branch. All the little bees are hooked to one another by their feet. If one bee decides to pinch the bee to which it is hanging, the second bee would pinch the one next to it, and there would be a ripple effect throughout the entire cluster. This is illustrative of continuity and contiguity and is how consciousness arises. In the Conversation Diderot had sketched the general principle of how memory works: the fibers of our organs are like vibrating strings that resonate long after they have been plucked. In the Dream it is as if he has a microscope and he is examining the process with increased magnification: each vibrating string is comprised of small units that retain the memory of their organizational patter. This is straight out of Maupertuis’ Essay on the Formation of Organized Bodies. Contact alone is sufficient to transform the consciousness of molecules. Bordeu asks the question that if each conscious molecule had its own identity before combining with others, how does it lose it and how, from all of these lost identities, does one end up with the consciousness of a totality? Julie furnishes the answer: contact alone is sufficient. When she places her hand on her thigh, at first she senses that her hand is not her thigh. However, after a certain length of time, when the temperature is the same in both of them, she can no longer distinguish between them-the boundaries of the two parts meld and she experiences them as one. This is illustrative of how two molecules lose their individual identities and take on the identity of the whole when they combine. Diderot posits that the ascent of consciousness is contingent upon the metamorphosis of species: in d’Alembert’s monologue, “Why am I as I am?” he hypothesizes that because geography determines physical characteristics, it also determines consciousness.10 D’Alembert assumes that there are thinking and feeling beings on Saturn and that there is no reason to suppose that there are not. It is possible that life forms on Saturn have more than five senses.

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The implication is that consciousness depends on the five senses, which in turn, are determined by environment. This is a reiteration of the Letter on the Blind, in which the senses determine consciousness: the blind man perceives the world and morality differently because he is lacking the sense of sight. The metaphor of Father Castel’s ribbons illustrates not only the interrelatedness of physical characteristics among species and even kingdoms, but also the degree of consciousness among the three kingdoms. The statement that every animal is more or less a human being, every mineral is more or less a plant, and every plant is more or less an animal, indicates that the consciousness of every animal is more or less the consciousness of a human being, the consciousness of every mineral is more or less the consciousness of a plant, and the consciousness of every plant is more or less the consciousness of an animal. Each form, whether animal, vegetable or mineral, experiences happiness or unhappiness appropriate to it-from the elephant to the aphid, from the aphid to the single, conscious, living molecule, everything experiences pain and pleasure. In the Dream Diderot explores more fully the physiology of the vibrating strings that he had mentioned in the Conversation. In the Conversation he demonstrated that memory works because the fibers of our organs are like conscious, vibrating strings. In the Dream he posits that consciousness is attributable to the nervous system which is like a spider’s web. The spider resides at the center of its web just as the brain is the central command of the nervous system. If one shakes a strand of the spider’s web, the spider will rush up on the alert. Similarly, all of the sensations that the nervous system receives are brought to the meninges portion of the brain. He makes an analogy among vibrating strings, the cluster of bees, the meninges portion of the brain, and the spider’s web. They all transmit sensation. They are all a thoroughfare or highway of impressions received from surrounding nature. All of the parts of a human being are the basic developments of a network which is formed, grows, extends itself, and throws out a multitude of imperceptible threads. The meninges is like the spider or controlling portion of the brain which we can hardly touch without knocking the entire machine unconscious. Diderot returns to the theme of emergent consciousness and develops it more fully in the Dream. In the Conversation it was the progressive building of elements that caused a new emergent consciousness to arise that was fortiorem et magis perfectam than that of the sum of its constituents. In the Dream, the sum is once more greater than the whole, but this time the terminology is more specific than the generic elementum: this time Diderot uses three different terms to identify three different levels of biological organization:

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brin, fil, and faisceau de fils. The brin (sprig, bit, jot, staple) is the smallest particle; several brins comprise a fil (thread); several fils make up a faisceau de fils (bundle of threads). Each level of organization has consciousness; when it combines with other units of a similar level to form a larger organizational group, it loses its memory of soi and acquires the memory of the new entity that is formed.11 The character Bordeu explains to Julie that at first there is nothing. Then there is an imperceptible point formed of molecules scattered throughout the lymph of the father and mother. This explanation of conception is called pangenesis. Diderot and Maupertuis developed the pangenesis theory that the offspring inherits particles originating from all parts of his parents. Bordeu goes on to explain that once this imperceptible point has been formed, it then becomes a slender thread, and then a bundle of threads. Each section of this bundle of threads is changed merely by nutrition. He points out that this bundle of threads is a purely conscious system. He calls it a system: during the eighteenth century système was defined as “an assembly of bodies. The planetary system.”12 Hence, Diderot considers the bundle of threads a set or assembly of things that are connected, associated or interdependent, so as to form a complex unity. He goes on to says that if this bundle were to remain at its present level of organization, it would be conscious of cold, heat, softness, and roughness. Its successive impressions would form a memory, consciousness of self, and reasoning. However, it does not remain at its present level of organization, but rather, diversifies into the different organs of the body. Hence, we see that the developing embryo is conscious, even from the moment of conception and during its earliest stages of development. Diderot emphasizes that consciousness is contingent upon the senses and the senses are dependent upon physiology. The sense of sight exists only because, in the developing embryo, there is a bundle that forms the eyes. Without these organs, the person would experience reality differently from sighted individuals. Cut through one of the sections of the bundle and the animal may have no eyes at all or it may have only one eye. Bordeu notes that scientists who have dissected such a monstrosity have found only one optic thread. Consciousness is contingent upon physiology-if physiology develops normally, a person will have five senses and be normal. The logical corollary is that there is no consciousness apart from the physical body. Each strand of this sensitive network can be injured or tickled along its entire length. The sensation of pain or pleasure is carried back to the brain which is like the spider that receives all of the vibrations on its web. The brain establishes that the pain or pleasure is at such and such a pace without experiencing the pain or pleasure itself. It is this continual interaction

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between all impressions and the common origin that constitutes the unity of the animal. It is the memory of all these successive impressions that creates for each animal the history of its life and of its individuality. It is the memory and the comparisons that come after all these impressions that create thought and reason. The comparison is made at the center of the network. The center of the network cannot see or hear and it does not suffer. It is nourished and it listens, judges, and pronounces. It suffers no pain. With the slightest impression on the center of the network it stops responding and the animal falls into a death-like trance. It one makes the impressions stop, it returns to its functions. Diderot gives several examples of changes in consciousness that arise from brain malfunctions. For example, Bordeu gives the example of La Peyronie, a surgeon, who visited a patient with an abscess on the brain. When the doctor opened his skull, inserted a syringe into the abscess, and injected fluid into it, the patient closed his eyes, his limbs became immobile, and he appeared to have died. When the doctor pulled back on the syringe and relieved the weight and pressure of the injected fluid on the center of the network, the invalid reopened his eyes and came to life. Diderot demonstrates that consciousness is purely a byproduct of brain activity. Diderot examines instances where people’s perceptions of reality were impaired. He explains the altered perceptions by purely physiological means. For example, people feel pain in a limb that they do not have anymore. It can cause a person to imagine that he is larger or smaller than he is. The brain can give an almost infinite volume to an individual or shrink the individual down almost to a point. Julie has dreamt several times that she was getting huge, that her arms and legs were getting infinitely larger, that the rest of her body was acquiring a proportional volume, that she was approaching the sky and embracing both hemispheres. Invalids suffering from gout imagine that their feet are touching the canopy over their beds. Conversely, Bordeu relates the story f a woman who imagined that she got smaller to the point where she felt herself as tiny as a needle. She had a mortal fear of losing herself. She trembled when the smallest object came near her. This lasted one or two hours, after which she returned in stages to her natural size. Bordeu explains this change in consciousness by purely physiological processes. The threads of the bundle have a certain tension and because this tension or tone is variable, our bodies are not always the same volume. Cold makes us smaller, heat makes us larger, and an individual can believe all of his life that he is smaller or larger than he actually is. If the mass of the bundle goes through a state of extremely violent irritation, the threads begin to stand up and the countless multitudes of their extremities begin to push themselves out beyond their customary limits, then the head, feet, other limbs, and all

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points on the surface of the body will be shifted an immense distance, and the individual will feel himself gigantic. The reverse phenomenon will occur if insensibility, apathy, and inertia take over the extremity of the threads and move them gradually towards the center of the bundle. Bordeu concludes that it is impossible to be absolutely certain of the nature of reality because we are dependent upon our senses and they may be mistaken. Consciousness is contingent upon physiology and if our brain or sensory organs are malfunctioning, our perceptions will err. Diderot, who was interested in the physiological basis of altered perceptions, was particularly fascinated by the unique consciousness of the Siamese twins of Rabastens. In this particular anomaly, one twin lost consciousness while the other remained awake and alert. After a period of time, they traded their states of awareness and the one who had been awake fell unconscious and the unconscious one returned to life. Diderot explains the phenomenon thus: the networks in the two children were so thoroughly mixed together that they acted upon and reacted to each other. When the center of the bundle of one had the upper hand, it took control of the other child’s network and she blacked out. When the network of the second child dominated their common system, the situation was reversed. Pressure came up from below through tension in a certain number of threads in the network: this is why their navels alternated between inward and outward movements. If they had lived, their brains might have communicated and they might have had double senses, a double memory, a double imagination, a double ability to focus-one half of a being that observes, reads, meditates, while the other half rests. Since, with time, nature brings about everything that is possible, so it produces strange compound creations from time to time. D’Alembert’s dreaming poses an interesting problem: d’Alembert does not remember that he was dreaming-Julie tells him that he was dreaming all night long. She says that it was so much like a delusion that she sent someone to find the doctor. Diderot raises the question of what the difference is between dreaming, delirium, and the normal waking states. He asks whether people can be delirious in their sleep. Can they be dreaming when they are really awake and vice-versa? If we are dependent on our brain, our senses, what if they are mistaken? D’Alembert asks how is it that he can retain his identity for others and for himself. Bordeu explains that through memory a person retains his identity. Without memory one would pass in the wink of an eye from youth to old age without ever connecting any experiences. Furthermore, the first three years of life are never in the conscious history of one’s life. Without memory, the old d’Alembert would not remember the young d’Alembert.

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Diderot examines changes in consciousness that can come about through psychological or physical trauma. First he gives an example of psychological trauma: a college pedant was humiliated during a lecture, in front of a crowded assembly, in front of his students. It was so psychologically damaging, that he lost his memory and had to be taught to speak and read again. He died just as he was beginning to spell reasonably well. This is comparable to physical trauma: M. de Schullemberg from Winterthur, when he was 15 or 16 years old, fell and got a concussion. As a result of the injury, he regressed to his boyhood and forgot everything that he knew. He returned to his childhood and had to be reeducated, taught to read and write and walk all over again. Eventually he became a man again and left a work on natural history. This illustrates that sometimes the brain can recover fully from physical injury. If one disturbs the center of the bundle, one changes the animal. The being of the whole animal resides in the center of the bundle, sometimes dominating the various branches and sometimes being dominated by them. When the center of the bundle is in command and the rest obeys, the animal is mentally well balanced. However, fits of passion and delirium arise when all of the threads of the network rise up against their commander and there is no longer a supreme authority. Julie asks why she cannot think all over her body.13 Bordeu explains that it is because the consciousness of an animal can reside in only one location, at the common center of all sensation, the place where memory sits and comparisons are made, namely, the brain. Each thread is susceptible only to a certain fixed number of impressions. The center is susceptible to everything. It is the registry. It retains all memories, all a person’s entire identity resides there. Memory is a property only of the center just as sight is a property of the eye. The eye has no memory and the ear has no sight. Reason, judgment, imagination, madness, imbecility, ferocity, and instinct are the consequences of the original relationship or something acquired by habit between the center of the network and its branches.14 If the principle part or trunk is too vigorous n relation to the branches, we get poets, artists, people with imagination, timid people, zealots, and fools. If it is too feeble, we get brutes, ferocious animals. If the total system is lax and soft, without energy, we get imbeciles. If the whole system is energetic, harmonious, and well ordered, we get the good thinkers, philosophers, and wise men. According to which branch dominates other branches, we get different instincts in animals and special abilities in men-the sense of smell in the dog, the sense of hearing in fish, the sense of sight in the eagle, d’Alembert’s talent for mathematics, Vaucanson’s talent for mechanical things, Grétry’s musical

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ability, Voltaire’s talent for poetry. These are all effects of one bundle in the network being more energetic in them than others.15 Julie concludes that by a sequence of purely mechanical operations, one can reduce the greatest genius in the world to a mass of unorganized flesh that can be aware of only each particular moment; then we can again transform the mass back to a man of genius. This can be accomplished by mutilating threads in the primitive bundle and mixing other ones up. The reverse phenomenon would require us to restore the threads that we had detached and to allow the organism to develop properly. For example, if one removes auditory threads, the person will no longer have the sense of hearing, the olfactory threads, no more sense of smell, the optic threads, no more sense of color, the gustatory threads, no more sense of taste. If one cuts out or mixes up the others, there will be no more organic structure of the brain, memory, judgment, desires, aversions, passions, willing, consciousness of self, but rather, an unformed mass that has only life and sensation of each particular moment. Restore every thread (the olfactory, the auditory, and the optical) and one will recover the man of genius. In summation, Diderot proposed an emergent metamorphosis of species: as matter combines to form more highly organized entities, a consciousness arises in the new entity that is greater than that of the sum of its parts. This emergent consciousness is also evident in the successive development of an embryo, as well as in the formed being. As fibers, threads, and bundles of threads are formed, each successive organizational structure has a consciousness of its own that is greater than that of the sum of its components. In the formed being, organs have their own consciousness, but they must fall within conformity to the will of the brain, otherwise, the being will experience conflicts (ie: the stomach will be hungry, but the palate will be full). Diderot demonstrated that consciousness is merely the by-product of the organizational structure of matter. Perceptions can be altered by causing modifications in the developing embryo or diseases of the brain of the adult being.

Conclusion

The intermediary between man and other animals is the monkey.1 —Denis Diderot, Elements of Physiology (1774–1780)

Diderot’s theory of the metamorphoses of species was the result of a synthesis of the following eighteenth century currents: 1. Pascal and Fermat’s study of probability in games of chance ie: given an infinite number of random events, all outcomes will eventually occur. 2. Epigenesis: Harvey’s hypothesis that the germ is brought into existence by the addition of parts that bud out of one another or by successive accretions. 3. Spontaneous generation ie: all life proceeded from the mineral kingdom. 4. Buffon’s paradigm of a matrix illustrating overlapping characteristics among species 5. Maupertuis’ hypothesis that species are modified when errors that occur in the arrangement of parental elements in the generative process are passed on from parents to offspring. 6. Buffon’s observation that species are modified through climate, geography, food, way of life, and crossbreeding. 7. The notion that matter is conscious at all levels of organization, from the molecule to the universe itself, and that as matter arranges itself into higher forms of organization, a new consciousness emerges that is greater than the sum of its parts.

Drawing from the vast wealth of his eighteenth century toolbox, Diderot synthesized the latest mathematical, biological and anthropological information to conclude that all three kingdoms were originally derived 163

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from a single prototype. First, Pascal and Fermat’s study of games of chance proved that in dice and card games, events are random, and that given flux and time, more outcomes will occur; an extension of this principle indicates that given flux and eternity, all outcomes will occur. Diderot transposed this principle to the random collisions and combinations of atoms and applied it to the origins of man: flux and eternity permit all possible outcomes to occur, including life itself. He arrived at this conclusion by infusing Epicurean atomism into probability theory and substituting atomic collisions for cards and dice. Diderot posited that man is the result of the fortuitous collision of atoms and molecules, and that given eternity, it was inevitable that life would eventually emerge, not only on earth, but elsewhere in the universe, as well. Secondly, Maupertuis, Buffon, and experiments and observations on hybrids, teratisms (ie: blind men and Siamese twins), and the regeneration of polyps presented convincing arguments in favor of epigenesis. Diderot embraced epigenesis because, unlike preformation, it permits new variations to occur in nature (ie: hybrids and teratisms). Hybrids and teratisms are an iconic representation of the fact that offspring have their own characteristics and that they are not merely copies of the first creations. Taking this notion to the limit, Diderot posited that nature is continually creating new variations and the creation is open ended and not closed. Thirdly, Diderot embraced the theory of spontaneous generation and regarded the appearance of animalcules in broth as proof that living matter can arise from inanimate matter without the agency of God. Spontaneous generation provided a purely mechanistic means by which life can be created without divine intervention. Furthermore, a purely mechanistic means of generation is monist, and not dualist, and this suited Diderot, who did not believe in the existence of the immortal soul. Fourth, Buffon had expanded the two dimensional, linear chain of beings into a three dimensional matrix: he observed that characteristics among species overlap and thus, there is a network or matrix of shared characteristics. Discarding the linear chain of being was the key to open ended metamorphosis because it allowed the possibility that new species had been created since the beginning. Diderot embraced Buffon’s three dimensional matrix, and added a fourth dimension, time, to show that species change over millennia. The fifth factor that influenced Diderot’s thought was Buffon and Maupertuis’ view that species can be modified. From Buffon Diderot derived the notion that the mutability of species can be effected by geography, climate, available food, way of life, degeneration (either through migration or

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at the hands of man), and crossbreeding. From Maupertuis he gleaned that chance errors in the generative process that perpetuate themselves cause species to metamorphose. Finally, Diderot believed that matter is conscious at all levels of organization, from the molecule to the universe itself. All molecules have desire, aversion, intelligence, and memory. As conscious molecules combine, a new emergent consciousness arises that is greater than the that of the sum of its parts. The ascent of consciousness occurs simultaneously with the metamorphosis of the physical body. Taken to the limit, the universe itself is conscious, and this consciousness may be called God (a concept that he derived from Spinoza). The Elements of Physiology (1774–1780) was the culmination of Diderot’s lifelong investigation into the metamorphoses of species. This work, like his biological theory itself, is a mosaic of many ideas: from the first paragraph Diderot reiterates several statements that he had made in the past about man’s origins. The first sentence of the Elements reaffirms his position of 1753 that all beings have emanated from a single source: “Nature has made only a very small number of beings that she has infinitely varied, perhaps from a single one, by combining, mixing and dissolving from which all the others have been formed.”2 This is a reiteration of his statement of 1753, “When we see the successive metamorphoses of the prototype’s exterior, whatever it may have been, approach a kingdom from another kingdom by imperceptible degrees . . . who would not be led to believe that there was ever only one first prototypical being for all beings?”3 Diderot reaffirms Lucretius’ view that nature extinguishes all beings that are self-contradictory, i.e., lacking organs to eat, subsist, and reproduce: “We call contradictory beings those whose organization is not adapted to the rest of the universe. Blind nature that produces them, destroys them.”4 At the bottom of the chain of beings is the inert molecule. Because he has erased the delineations among kingdoms and because he feels that all matter is conscious, life on earth began with the inert molecule: “We must classify beings from the inert molecule, if there is one, to the living molecule, to the animal-plant, to the microscopic animal, to the animal, to man.”5 The progression up the chain of beings is seamless and there are no missing links. In fact, Diderot uses the phrase link that appears to be missing [chaînon qui paraît manquer]: “ . . . and the link that appears to be missing resides perhaps in a known being, to whom the progress of comparative anatomy has not yet been able to assign its true place.”6 He also reaffirms his belief in spontaneous generation. The transformation of dead matter into living matter is analogous to the change in form that

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insects and animals undergo: the butterfly progresses through the stages of worm, caterpillar, and butterfly; the mayfly remains in the chrysalis stage for four years; the frog begins by being a tadpole. How many metamorphoses escape us! He asks, “Who knows what becomes of the insensate molecules of animals after their death?”7 He accepts the notion that all beings proceeded from a single antecedent source. He asks, “Why wouldn’t the long succession of animals be developments from a single one?”8 As proof, he uses Camper’s facial line, which shows the gradual progression in physiognomy across species: Camper originated from a single model, in which he changed only the facial line, all the animals, from man to the stork. One must not believe that animals have always been and will always be just as we see them today. It is the effect of an eternal lapse of time, after which their color, their form seems to remain unchanging; but this state is only an appearance.9

Diderot learned of Camper’s facial line when he visited the Dutch anatomist at the Hague. While Camper’s work was not published until 1789, Diderot was the first to get the news. Diderot found the drawings useful to proclaim monogenesis or the descent of all species from a single source. Camper’s drawings are proof of the unity of all of Creation and of their common origin. Diderot frequently mentioned that it is impossible to ascertain whether species are ascending up the chain of beings towards perfection or descending in degeneration. The outcome cannot be known because we, like Fontenelle’s roses, are ephemeral beings. Here Diderot distances himself from Buffon, who had stressed that anomalies are signs of degeneration. Diderot is not so sure: it is futile to try to reason that the wild polar man has degenerated, as we do not know the outcome of his journey along the chain of beings. Hence, avoiding any claim at the ability to predict the future, Diderot humbly admits that the end result of the polar man’s journey is unknown. However, he is optimistic: man is a complicated machine that proceeds towards perfection through countless, successive stages, whose formation depends on fine, slender threads that can be mutilated. While the outcome of the polar man’s journey is unknown, man does continually proceed in the direction of perfection.

Notes

NOTES TO THE INTRODUCTION 1. This is my translation. Unless otherwise noted, all translations are my own. “Qui sait les races d’animaux qui nous ont précédés? qui sait les races d’animaux qui succèderont aux nôtres?” Denis Diderot, Rêve de d’Alembert, in Œuvres complètes de Diderot, edited by Jean Assézat and Maurice Tourneux (Paris: Garnier, 1875–1877), 2:132. 2. In the Judeao-Christian world view, based on the chronologies in the Bible, the universe was believed to be less than 6,000 years old. In 1644 John Lightfoot calculated that the world was created at the equinox on 9 AM in September 3298 BC. In 1650 James Ussher reckoned that the universe was formed on Sunday, October 23, 4004 BC. 3. Richard Harter, “Changing Views of the History of the Earth.” http://www. talkorigens.org/faqs/geohist.html. 4. Michon Scott, “Strange Science Timeline,” http://www.strangescience.net/ timeline.htm (April 3, 2006). 5. Robert Hooke, Discourse of Earthquakes in The Posthumous Works of Robert Hooke, M.D., ed. Richard Waller (London: S. Smith and B. Walford, 1705), 327. 6. Nicolaus Steno, De Solido intra Solidum Naturalitur Contento Dissertationis Prodromus (Florence: Typographia sub signo Stellæ, 1669). [The Prodromus to a Dissertation Concerning Solids Naturally Contained within Solids (London: J. Winter, 1671). English translation.] 7. “Mammoth,” Oxford English Dictionary Online, http://www.oed.com (April 3, 2006). 8. Ibid. Richard James, The Russian-English Dictionary of Richard James (1618– 1619), reprinted in B. A. Larin, Tri inostrannykh istochnika po razgovornoi rechi. St. Petersburg: Izd-vo S.–Peterburgskogo Universiteta, 2002. 9. Ibid. Adam Brand, A Journal of the Embassy from their Majesties John and Peter Alexievitz, translated and edited by H. W. Ludolf (London: D. Brown and T. Goodwin, 1698), 122.

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10. Ibid. Evert Ysbrandszoon Ides and Nicolaas Witsen, Three Years Travels from Moscow overland to China (London: W. Freeman, J. Walthoe, T. Newborough, J. Nicholson, and R. Parker, 1706), 26. 11. Ibid. Philip Johann von Strahlenberg, An Historico-Geographical Description of the North and Eastern Parts of Europe and Asia (London: W. Innys and R. Manby, 1736), 403. 12. “Mammoth . . . nom que l’on donne en Russie & en Sibérie à des ossemens d’une grandeur très-considérable, que l’on trouve en grande quantité dans la Sibérie . . . Les Russiens appellent ces ossemens mammotovakost.” “Mammoth, os de (Hist. nat. Minéral.),” Encyclopédie, ou Dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers, edited by Denis Diderot and Jean Le Rond d’Alembert (Paris: Briasson, David, Le Breton, Durant; Neuchâtel: S. Faulche, 1751–1765), 10:7. 13. Paul Henri Thiry d’Holbach, “Fossile,” Encyclopédie, ou Dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers, edited by Denis Diderot and Jean Le Rond d’Alembert (Paris: Briasson, David, Le Breton, Durant; Neuchâtel: S. Faulche, 1751–1765), 7:209–211. 14. “Il faudra donc conclure que dans des temps dont l’histoire ne nous a point conservé le souvenir, la Sibérie jouissoit d’un ciel plus doux, & étoit habitée par des animaux que quelque révolution générale de notre globe, a ensevelis dans le sein de la terre, & que cette même révolution a entièrement changé la température de cette region.” Paul Henri Thiry d’Holbach, “Ivoire fossile,” Encyclopédie, ou Dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers, edited by Denis Diderot and Jean Le Rond d’Alembert (Paris: Briasson, David, Le Breton, Durant; Neuchâtel: S. Faulche, 1751–1765), 9:64. 15. Georges-Louis Leclerc de Buffon, Histoire naturelle, générale et particulière (Paris: Imprimerie royale, 1749–1767), 4:173. 16. Georges-Louis Leclerc de Buffon, “Histoire et théorie de la terre” Histoire naturelle, générale et particulière, 1:99. 17. Ibid., 96. 18. Francis Haber, “Fossils and the Idea of a Process of Time in Natural History” in Forerunners of Darwin: 1745–1859, edited by Bentley Glass, et al, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1959), 222–261. 19. Ibid. Paul Henri Thiry d’Holbach, “Fossiles,” Encyclopédie, ou Dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers, edited by Denis Diderot and Jean Le Rond d’Alembert (Paris: Briasson, David, Le Breton, Durant; Neuchâtel: S. Faulche, 1751–1765), 7:209–11. 20. Ibid., 232. Haber cites the English translation of Buffon’s text, Natural History, edited by William Smellie (London: Strahan and Cadell, 1791), 1:130–31. 21. Ibid., 233. Haber refers the reader to Œuvres complètes de Buffon, edited by Pierre Flourens (Paris: Garnier, 1853–4), 12:350–55, and Jean Piveteau,

Notes to the Introduction

22. 23.

24.

25. 26.

27. 28.

29.

30.

31.

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Œuvres philosophiques de Buffon (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1954), 106–9. Ibid., 238. Ibid., 239. Haber footnotes Maupertuis, Essai de cosmologie in Œuvres de M. de Maupertuis (Lyon: J.M. Bruyset, 1756), 1:71–72 and Système de la nature, ibid., 2:153–54. “Fossile (Hist. nat. Minéralogie.),” Encyclopédie, ou Dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers, edited by Denis Diderot and Jean Le Rond d’Alembert (Paris: Briasson, David, Le Breton, Durand, 1757), 7:211. Lucretius’ De rerum natura is the greatest extant version of Epicurus available. Richard J. Pulskamp, “Jean Le Rond d’Alembert on Probability and Statistics,” http://www.cs.xu.edu/math/Sources/Dalembert/index.html (April 24, 2006). Ibid. “Il semble que la nature se soit plue à varier le même mécanisme d’une infinité de manières différentes. Elle n’abandonne un genre de productions qu’après en avoir multiplié les individus sous toutes les faces possibles.” Denis Diderot, De l’interprétation de la nature, Pensée 12, in Œuvres complètes de Diderot, edited by Jean Assézat and Maurice Tourneux (Paris: Garnier, 1875–1877), 2:15. Pierre-Louis Moreau de Maupertuis, Essai sur la formation des corps organisés (Berlin, 1754), 41. [Originally published as Dissertatio inauguralis metaphysica, de universali naturæ systemate, pro gradu doctoris habita (Erlangen, 1751).] “Il semble que la nature se soit plue à varier le même méchanisme d’une infinité de manières différentes. Elle n’abandonne un genre de productions qu’après en avoir multiplié les individus sous toutes les faces possibles. Quand on considère le règne animal, et qu’on s’aperçoit que, parmi les quadrupèdes, il n’y en a pas un qui n’ait les fonctions et les parties, surtout intérieures, entièrement semblables à un autre quadrupède, ne croirait-on pas volontiers qu’il n’y a jamais eu qu’un premier animal, prototype de tous les animaux, dont la nature n’a fait qu’allonger, raccourcir, transformer, multiplier, oblitérer certains organes?” Diderot, De l’interprétation de la nature, Pensée 12, in Œuvres complètes de Diderot, edited by Jean Assézat and Maurice Tourneux (Paris: Garnier, 1875– 1877), 2:15–16. “Quand on voit les métamorphoses successives de l’enveloppe du prototype, quel qu’il ait été, approcher un règne d’un autre règne par des degrés insensibles, et peupler les confins des deux règnes (s’il est permis de se servir du terme de confins où il n’y a aucune division réelle), et peupler, dis-je, les confins des deux règnes, d’êtres incertains, ambigus, dépouillés en grande partie des formes, des qualités et des fonctions de l’un, et revêtus des formes, des qualités, des fonctions de l’autre, qui ne se sentirait porté à croire qu’il n’y a jamais eu qu’un premier être prototype de tous les êtres?” Ibid., 16.

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32. Lester Crocker, “Diderot and Eighteenth Century French Transformism” in Forerunners of Darwin: 1745–1859, edited by Bentley Glass, et al, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1959), 118. 33. Emita Hill, “Materialism and Monsters in Diderot’s Le Rêve de d’Alembert,” Diderot Studies 10 (1968): 67–93. 34. Emita Hill, “The Role of ‘Le Monstre’ in Diderot’s Thought,” Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century 97 (1972): 148–261. 35. Gerhardt Stenger, “L’ordre et les monstres dans la pensée philosophique, politique et morale de Diderot” in Diderot et la question de la forme (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1999), 139–157. 36. Aurélie Suratteau, “Les hermaphrodites de Diderot” in Diderot et la question de la forme (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1999), 105–137. 37. Johan Werner Schmidt, “Diderot and Lucretius: The De Rerum Natura and Lucretius’ Legacy in Diderot’s Scientific, Aesthetic and Ethical Thought,” Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century 208 (1982): 183–294. 38. Christine M. Singh, “The Lettre sur les aveugles: Its Debt to Lucretius,” Studies in Eighteenth-Century French Literature Presented to Robert Niklaus, edited by J.H. Fox, M.H. Waddicor and D.A. Watts (Exeter: University of Exeter, 1975), 233–242. 39. Henri Coulet, “Diderot et le problème du changement,” Recherches sur Diderot et sur l’Encyclopédie 2 (April 1987): 59. 40. Ibid., 63.Coulet cites Diderot, Eléments de physiologie in Œuvres complètes, 15 volumes, edited by Roger Lewinter (Paris: Le Club Français du Livre, 1969–1973), 13:764. 41. Bentley Glass, “Maupertuis and Heredity” in Forerunners of Darwin: 1745– 1859, edited by Bentley Glass, et al (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1959), 51–83. 42. Aram Vartanian, “Diderot and Maupertuis,” Revue internationale de philosophie 148–149 (1984): 46–66. 43. Bentley Glass, “Maupertuis and Heredity” in Forerunners of Darwin: 1745– 1859, edited by Bentley Glass, et al (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1959), 74. 44. Michèle Duchet, “L’anthropologie de Diderot,” Anthropologie et histoire au siècle des Lumières: Buffon, Voltaire, Rousseau, Helvétius, Diderot (Paris: Maspéro, 1971), 407–75. 45. Jean Ehrard, “Diderot, l’Encyclopédie, et l’Histoire et théorie de la Terre,” Buffon 88 (Paris: Vrin, 1988), 135–42. 46. Arthur O. Lovejoy, “Buffon and the Problem of Species” in Forerunners of Darwin, 1745–1859, edited by Bentley Glass et al. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1959), 84–113. 47. Jacques Roger. Buffon: A Life in Natural History (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997).

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48. Jacques Roger, “Diderot et Buffon en 1749,” Diderot Studies 4 (1963): 221– 36. 49. Jacques Roger, The Life Sciences in Eighteenth-Century French Thought (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997). 50. Aram Vartanian, “Buffon et Diderot,” Buffon 88 (Paris: Vrin, 1988), 119– 33. 51. Jean E. Perkins, “Diderot and La Mettrie,” Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century 10 (1959): 49–100. 52. Ann Thomson, “La Mettrie et Diderot,” http://www.sigu7.jussieu.fr/ diderot/travaux/revseance2.htm (Jan. 24, 2006). 53. Ann Thomson, “L’unité matérielle de l’homme chez La Mettrie et Diderot,” Colloque International Diderot (1985): 61–8. 54. Aram Vartanian, “La Mettrie and Diderot Revisited: An Intertextual Encounter,” Diderot Studies 21 (1983): 155–97. 55. Aram Vartanian, “Trembley’s Polyp, La Mettrie, and Eighteenth-Century French Materialism,” Journal of the History of Ideas 2 (1950): 259–86. 56. Marx W. Wartofsky, “Diderot and the Development of Materialist Monism,” Diderot Studies 2 (1952): 279–329.

NOTES TO CHAPTER ONE 1. Denis Diderot, Philosophic Thoughts, Thought 21, in Diderot’s Early Philosophical Works, translated and edited by Margaret Jourdain (Chicago and London: The Open Court Publishing Company, 1916), 38–39. “Selon les lois de l’analyse des sorts, me dirait-il, je ne dois point être surpris qu’une chose arrive lorsqu’elle est possible, et que la difficulté de l’événement est compensée par la quantité des jets.” Denis Diderot, Pensées philosophiques, Pensée 21, in Œuvres complètes de Diderot, in Œuvres complètes de Diderot, edited by Jean Assézat and Maurice Tourneux (Paris: Garnier, 1875–1877), 1:135–36. 2. “Les anciens philosophes, ont entendu, par ce mot, un mélange confus de particules de toute espèce, sans forme ni regularité, auquel ils supposent le mouvement essentiel, lui attribuant en conséquence la formation de l’univers.” “Chaos,” Encyclopédie, ou Dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers, edited by Denis Diderot and Jean Le Rond d’Alembert (Paris: Briasson, David, Le Breton, Durant; Neuchâtel: S. Faulche, 1751–1765), 3:157. 3. “Confusion de toutes choses. Il se dit au propre, De l’état où toutes choses étoient dans l’instant de la création, avant que Dieu les eût arrangées dans l’ordre où elles sont.” “Chaos,” Dictionnaire de L’Académie française (Paris: Brunet, 1762), 277. 4. “Il se dit figurément De toutes sorte de confusion. Ses affaires sont dans un chaos épouvantable. Sa Bibliothèque est un chaos.” Ibid.

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5. “FLUX se dit aussi De l’écoulement des excrémens devenus trop fluides, & signifie, Dévoiement.” “Flux,” Dictionnaire de L’Académie française (1762), 755. 6. “On dit figurément d’Un grand parleur, qu’Il a un flux de bouche, un grand flux de bouche. On dit aussi, flux de paroles, flux be belles paroles inutiles, pour dire, Abondance superflue de paroles.” Ibid. 7. “Et proverbialement & populairement, d’Un prodigue qui se ruine en folles dépenses, qu’Il a un flux de bourse.” Ibid. 8. “FLUX se dit aussi en certains jeux des cartes, d’Une suite de plusieurs cartes de même couleur. Avoir flux. Faire flux. Avoir flux par cinquante-cinq. Avoir grand flux. Etre à flux.” Ibid. 9. “ . . . et l’aveugle d’évoquer un univers en flux et sauvant ses meilleures ébauches.” Paul Vernière, “Introduction à la Lettre sur les aveugles” in Œuvres philosophiques, introduced and annotated by Paul Vernière (Paris: Garnier, 1998), 77. 10. “ . . . la Nature, je l’avoue, est dans un mouvement de flux continuel; mais c’est assez pour l’homme de la saisir dans l’instant de son siècle, & de jeter quelques regards en arrière & en avant, pour tâcher d’entrevoir ce que jadis elle pouvoit être, & ce que dans la suite elle pourroit devenir.” Buffon, “Des animaux communs aux deux continents,” Histoire naturelle, générale et particulière (Paris: Imprimerie royale, 1749–1767), 9:127. 11. “Et si tout est en flux générale, comme le spectacle de l’univers me le montre partout, que ne produiront point ici et ailleurs la durée et les vicissitudes de quelques millions de siècles?” Diderot, Le Rêve de d’Alembert, in Œuvres complètes de Diderot, edited by Jean Assézat and Maurice Tourneux (Paris: Garnier, 1875–1877), 2:137. 12. “Probabilité,” Dictionnaire de L’Académie française (1762), 474. 13. Richard J. Pulskamp, “Jean Le Rond d’Alembert on Probability and Statistics,” http://www.cs.xu.edu/math/Sources/Dalembert/index.html (April 24, 2006). 14. “Le morceau Sur les probabilités est un grimoire qui ne vous amusera pas.” Diderot, “Lettre à Sophie Volland du 25 octobre 1761,” Œuvres complètes, edited by Jules Assézat and Maurice Tourneux (Paris: Garnier, 1875–1877), 19:74. 15. Diderot, Philosophic Thoughts, Thought 21, in Diderot’s Early Philosophical Works, translated and edited by Margaret Jourdain (Chicago and London: The Open Court Publishing Company, 1916), 38. “J’ouvre les cahiers d’un professeur célèbre . . .” Diderot, Lettres philosophiques, Pensée 21, in Œuvres complètes de Diderot, edited by Jean Assézat and Maurice Tourneux (Paris: Garnier, 1875–1877), 1:135. 16. “Tous les commentateurs depuis Brière voient dans le ‘professeur célèbre’ D.F. Rivard, professeur de philosophie au collège de Beauvais.” Diderot, Pensées philosophiques in Œuvres philosophiques, introduced and annotated by Paul Vernière (Paris: Garnier, 1998), 21, note 2. 17. “Diderot fut en effet son élève et vante plusieurs fois son sens pédagogique (cf. Plan d’une université, A.T., t. III, p. 436, et II, p. 452). Il se

Notes to Chapter One

18.

19.

20.

21.

22.

23. 24.

25.

173

fit l’introducteur des mathématiques à l’université de Paris. (Eléments de Mathématiques, 1740-Géométrie, 1732-Arithmétique, 1747). Diderot ne peut faire allusion qu’aux Institutiones philosophiæ ad usum scholarum accomodatæ, recueil de ses leçons publié après sa mort par son ami Monniotte (1778–1780).” Ibid., 21–22. “ . . . des premiers principes de l’arithmétique, de l’algèbre et de la géométrie, dont l’enseignment est dû à un de mes anciens maîtres.” Diderot, Plan d’une université pour le gouvernement de Russie, in Œuvres complètes de Diderot, edited by Jean Assézat and Maurice Tourneux (Paris: Garnier, 1875–1877), 3:436, footnote. “Le même homme de jugement, M. Rivard, qui introduisit dans nos écoles publiques l’étude des mathématiques et substitua les questions à l’argumentation, s’était proposé d’enseigner, à la place de la mauvaise morale scolastique, de bons éléments du droit public et du droit civil. Diderot, Réfutation de l’homme, in Œuvres complètes de Diderot, edited by Jean Assézat and Maurice Tourneux (Paris: Garnier, 1875–1877), 2:452. “ . . . la manière de décider quelque chose par le hasard. Le sort est tombé sur un tel. Le sort en a décidé. Quelquesfois les Officiers, les Elections se font au sort, par le sort. Il y avoit trois soldats condamnés, on les fit tirer au sort. On dit figurément, Le sort en est jeté, pour dire, Le parti en est pris.” “Sort,” Dictionnaire de L’Académie française (1762), 742. “ . . . qui arrive par hasard, casuel. Par cas fortuit. C’est un cas fortuit. C’est une chose fortuite. Rencontre fortuite. Evénment fortuit. On n’est point tenu des cas fortuits.” “Fortuit,” Dictionnaire de L’Académie française (1762), 769. Diderot, Philosophic Thoughts, Thought 21, in Diderot’s Early Philosophical works, translated and edited by Margaret Jourdain (Chicago and London: The Open Court Publishing Company, 1916), 39–40. “Donc, l’esprit doit être plus étonné de la durée hypothétique du chaos que de la naissance réelle de l’univers.” Diderot, Pensées philosophiques, Pensée 21, in Œuvres complètes de Diderot, edited by Jean Assézat and Maurice Tourneux (Paris: Garnier, 1875–1877), 1:136 Ibid., 39. “ . . . la matière s’étant mue de toute éternité . . .” Ibid. “On dit dans le même sens, Remonter à la source, à l’origine, à la cause, au principe, pour dire, Considérer une chose dans son origine, dans son principe, dans son commencement. Remontez à la source, remontez à l’origine, au principe de telle chose, & vous trouverez que . . .” “Remonter,” Dictionnaire de L’Académie française (1762), 588. “En parlant De l’ancienneté d’une Maison, on dit, qu’Elle remonte, que sa généalogie remonte jusqu’à un tel homme, jusqu’à un tel temps, pour dire, que La descendance de cette Maison est bien prouvée, depuis un tel homme, depuis un tel temps.” Ibid.

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Notes to Chapter One

26. Henri Coulet, “Diderot et le problème du changement,” Recherches sur Diderot et sur l’Encyclopédie 2 (April 1987): 59–67. 27. “Selon Jean Deprun, dans l’introduction à son grand ouvrage sur La Philosophie de l’inquiétude en France au XVIIIe siècle . . . les hommes . . . voyant le Dieu paternel et créateur s’éloigner d’eux de plus en plus, ils se sont sentis abandonnés; chassés du centre de l’univers dont ils n’étaient plus la fin, ils ont été immergés dans le flux changeant des phénomènes et dans les enchaînements inépuisables de causes et d’effets.” Ibid., 59. 28. Ibid., 60. 29. Bernard Le Bouyer de Fontenelle, A Conversation on the Plurality of Worlds, translated from the French (London: J. Dursley, A. Millard, E. Jobson, D. Evans, and R. Newton, 1783), 119–120. “Si les Roses qui ne durent qu’un jour faisoient des Histoires, & se laissoient des Memoires les unes aux autres, les premieres auroient fait le portrait de leur Jardinier d’une certaine façon, & de plus de quinze mille âges de Rose, les autres qui l’auroient encore laissé à celles qui les devoient suivre, n’y auroient rien changé. Sur cela elles diroient, Nous avons toûjours vû le même Jardinier, de memoire de Rose on n’a vû que lui, il a toûjours été fait comme il est, assurément il ne meurt point comme nous; il ne change seulement pas. Le raisonnement des Roses seroit-il bon?” Bernard Le Bouyer de Fontenelle, Entretien sur la pluralité des mondes (Paris: Michel Brunet, 1724), 201–2. 30. “ . . . garantissez-vous du sophisme de l’éphémère . . .” Denis Diderot, Rêve de d’Alembert in Œuvres complètes de Diderot, edited by Jean Assézat and Maurice Tourneux (Paris: Garnier, 1875–1877), 2:134. 31. “C’est celui d’un être passager qui croit à l’immortalité des choses.” Ibid. 32. “La rose de Fontenelle qui disait que de mémoire de rose on n’avait vu mourir un jardinier?” Ibid. 33. “Avant Diderot, Fontenelle avait fait voir, par l’apologue des roses et du jardinier (auquel il est fait allusion dans le Rêve de D’Alembert), que la permanence apparente de l’univers est une illusion: ‘dès qu’il y a mouvement quelque part, il faut qu’il arrive des changements’; qu’il n’y eût pas de changement sans mouvement, cela allait à peu près de soi, mais qu’il n’y eût pas de mouvement sans changement, c’était une idée hardie; la chose mue changeait non plus seulement de situation, mais de nature, et la possibilité du mouvement était incompatible avec la fixité de la création.” Henri Coulet, “Diderot et le problème du changement,” Recherches sur Diderot et sur l’Encyclopédie 2 (April 1987): 60–61. Coulet cites Fontenelle, Entretiens sur la pluralité des mondes, edited by A. Calame (Paris: Didier, 1966), fifth evening, 135–6. 34. Ibid., 62. 35. Ibid. Coulet cites Diderot, Eléments de physiologie in Œuvres complètes, 15 volumes, edited by Roger Lewinter (Paris: Le Club Français du Livre, 1969–1973), 13:651.

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175

36. Ibid., 63. Ibid., 13:764. 37. Ibid. Coulet cites Diderot, Le Rêve de d’Alembert in Œuvres complètes, 15 volumes, edited by Roger Lewinter (Paris: Le Club Français du Livre, 1969– 1973), 8:97. 38. Ibid. 39. “L’information de Diderot sur les premiers êtres vivants et sur les monstres et encore en 1749 purement littéraire; c’est Lucrèce qui est ici son maître, et non les anatomistes de son temps, qui pourtant, avec Winslow et Lémery, s’intéressent à la tératologie. Faut-il penser au Telliamed édité en 1748? Rien n’est moins sur . . .” Paul Vernière’s notes in Diderot, Lettre sur les aveugles in Œuvres philosophiques (Paris: Garnier, 1998), page 121, footnote 1. 40. Lester Crocker, “The Idea of a ‘Neutral’ Universe” in Diderot Studies 21 (1983): 67. 41. Multaque tum tellus etiam portenta creare conatast mira facie membrisque coorta, androgynem, interutrasque nec utrum, utrimque remotum, orba pedum partim, manuum viduata vicissim, muta sine ore etiam, sine voltu cæca reperta, vinctaque membrorum per totum corpus adhæsu, nec facere ut possent quicquam nec cedere quoquam nec vitare malum nec sumere quod foret usus. cetera de genere hoc monstra ac portenta creabat-nequiquam, quoniam natura absterruit auctum, nec potuere cupitum ætatis tangere florem nec reperire cibum nec iungi per Veneris res.

And many monsters too earth then essayed to create, born with strange faces and strange limbs, the man-woman, between the two, yet not either, sundered from both sexes, some things bereft of feet, or in turn robbed of hands, things too found dumb without mouths, or blind without eyes, or locked through the whole body by the clinging of the limbs, so that they could not do anything or move towards any side or avoid calamity or take what they needed. All other monsters and prodigies of this sort she would create; all in vain, since nature forbade their increase, nor could they reach the coveted bloom of age nor find food nor join in the work of Venus.

(V, 837–48) Titus Lucretius Carus, De rerum natura, edited by H.A.J. Munro (London: George Bell and Sons; Cambridge: Deighton Bell and Company, 1905), 1:229.

(V, 837–48) Titus Lucretius Carus, On the Nature of Things, translated by Cyril Bailey (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1910), 214.

176 42.

43.

44.

Notes to Chapter One nam quæque vides vesci vitalibus auris, aut dolis aut virtus aut denique mobilitas est ex ineunte ævo genus id tutata reservans; (V, 857–9) Ibid.

For whatever animals you see feeding on the breath of life, either their craft or bravery, aye or their swiftness has protected and preserved their kind from the beginning of their being (V, 856–9) Ibid.

Principio genus acre leonum sævaque sæcla tutatast virtus, volpes dolus et fuga cervos. (V, 862–3) Ibid., 230.

First of all the fierce race of lions, that savage stock, their bravery has protected, foxes their cunning, and deer their fleet foot. (V, 862–3) Ibid.

multaque sunt, nobis ex utilitate commendata, tutelæ tradita nostræ. (V, 860–1) Ibid. at levisomna canum fido cum pectore corda, et genus omne quod est veterino semine partum, lanigeræque simul pecudes et bucera sæcla, omnia sunt hominum tutelæ tradita, Memmi; nam cupide figere feras pacemque secuta sunt et larga suo sine pabula parta labore, quæ damus utilitatis eorum præmia causa. (V, 864–70) Ibid.

And many there are, which by their usefulness are comended to us, and so abide, trusted to our tutelage. (V, 860–1) Ibid. But the lightly sleeping minds of dogs with their loyal heart, and all the race which is born of the seed of beasts of burden, and withal the fleecy flocks and the horned herds, are all trusted to the tutelage of men, Memmius. For eagerly did they flee the wild beasts and ensure peace and bounteous fodder gained without toil of theirs, which we grant them as a reward because of their usefulness.

sed quia multa modis multis primordia rerum ex infinito iam tempore percita plagis ponderibusque suis consuerunt concita ferri omnimodisque coire atque omnia pertemptare, quæcumque inter se possent congressa creare, propterea fit uti magnum volgata per ævom, omne genus coctus et motus experiundo,.

but because many first-beginnings of things in many ways, driven on by blows from time everlasting until now, and moved by their own weight, have been wont to be borne on, and to unite in every way and essay everything that they might create, meeting one with another, therefore it comes to pass that scattered abroad through a great age, as they try meetings and motions of every kind, at last those come together, which, suddenly

(V, 864–70) Ibid., 214–5.

Notes to Chapter One tandem conveniant ea quæ convecta repente magnarum rerum fiunt exordia sæpe, terrai maris et cæli generique animantum. (V, 422–31) Ibid., 215.

177 cast together, become often the beginnings of great things, of earth, sea and sky, and the race of living things. (V, 422–31) Ibid., 200.

45. “On dit d’Une machine, pour le mouvement & pour l’exécution de laquelle il faut beaucoup de pièces différentes, qu’Elle est composée, fort composée. Et l’on appelle en Mécanique, Mouvement composé, Celui qui résulte de plusieurs autres mouvemens.” “Composé,” Dictionnaire de L’Académie française (1762), 351. 46. “Il y a dans la Nature un prototype général dans chaque espèce sur lequel chaque individu est modelé, mais qui semble, en se réalisant, s’alterer ou se perfectionner par les circonstances.” Buffon, “Le Cheval,” Histoire naturelle générale et particulière (Paris: Imprimerie royale, 1749–1767), 4:215. 47. “Le transport d’un corps d’un lieu dans un autre n’est pas le mouvement, ce n’en est que l’effet. Le mouvement est également et dans le corps transféré et dans le corps immobile.” Diderot, Entretien entre d’Alembert et Diderot, in Œuvres complètes de Diderot, edited by Jean Assézat and Maurice Tourneux (Paris: Garnier, 1875–1877), 2:106. 48. “ . . . vous supposez que les animaux ont été originairement ce qu’ils sont à présent. Quelle folie! On ne sait non plus ce qu’ils ont été qu’on ne sait ce qu’ils deviendront. Le vermisseau imperceptible qui s’agite dans la fange, s’achemine peut-être à l’état de grand animal; l’animal énorme, qui nous épouvante par sa grandeur, s’achemine peut-être à l’état de vermisseau, est peut-être une production particulière momentanée de cette planète. Ibid., 110. 49. “ . . . l’embryon formé de ces élements a passé par une infinité d’organisations et de développements . . . il a peut-être encore d’autres développements à subir et d’autres accroissements à prendre, qui nous sont inconnus.” Diderot, De l’interprétation de la nature, Pensée 58, Question 2, in Œuvres complètes de Diderot, edited by Jean Assézat and Maurice Tourneux (Paris: Garnier, 1875–1877), 2:57–58. 50. “ . . . combien d’autres espèces, s’étant dénaturées, c’est-à-dire perfectionnées ou dégradées par les grandes vicissitudes de la terre et des eaux . . . , par la longue influence d’un climat devenu contraire ou favorable, ne sont plus les mêmes qu’elles étaient autrefois?” Buffon, “Animaux communs aux deux Continens,” Histoire naturelle, générale et particulière, (Paris: Imprimerie royale, 1749–1767), 9:126. 51. “Si une distance de quelque mille lieues change mon espèce, que ne fera point l’intervalle de quelques milliers de diamètres terrestres?” Diderot, Rêve de d’Alembert, in Œuvres complètes de Diderot, edited by Jean Assézat and Maurice Tourneux (Paris: Garnier, 1875–1877), 2:137.

178

Notes to Chapter Two

NOTES TO CHAPTER TWO 1. “Certains éléments auront pris nécessairement une facilité prodigieuse à s’unir constamment de la même manière; de là, s’ils sont différents, une formation d’animaux microscopiques variées à l’infini . . .” Diderot, De l’Interprétation de la nature, Pensée 50, in Œuvres complètes de Diderot, edited by Jean Assézat and Maurice Tourneux (Paris: Garnier, 1875–1877), 2:47. 2. “Biological Sciences,” Encyclopædia Britannica, 15th edition (Chicago: Encylcopædia Britannica, Inc., 1976), 2:1024. 3. Ibid. 4. William Harvey, Exercitatione de Generatione Animalium. Quibus accedunt Quædum de Partu: De Membranis ac Humoribus Uteri et de Conceptione (London: Octavius Pulleyn, 1651), 148, and the English translation, Anatomical Exercitations concerning the Generation of Living Creatures: To which are added Particular Discourses, of Births, and of Conceptions, translated by Martin Llewellyn (London: Octavian Pullen, 1653), 272. 5. “Terme de Médecine. Traité sur le fœetus pendant son séjour dans la matrice.” “Embryologie,” Dictionnaire de L’Académie française (1762), 606. 6. “Embryon,” Encyclopédie, 5:561–2. 7. One ligne=1/12 inch; the embryo was 7/12 inch in length. 8. “Masse de chair informe & inanimée, dont les femmes accouchent quelquefois au lieu d’un enfant. Cette femme que l’on a cru grosse durant six mois, n’est accouchée que d’une mole.” “Mole,” Dictionnaire de L’Académie française (1762), 159. 9. “ . . . la matière informe provenant d’une conception défectueuse.” “Faux,” Dictionnaire de L’Académie française (1762), 726. 10. Diderot, Thoughts on the Interpretation of Nature and Other Philosophical Works, introduced and annotated by David Adams (Manchester: Clinamen Press, 1999), p. 82, footnote 45. “Mole,” Encyclopédie, 10:626–7. 11. “Rapport, conformité entre des personnes, entre des choses.” “Ressemblance,” Dictionnaire de L’Académie française (1762), 618. 12. “C’est votre fils, je le reconnois à la ressemblance. On dit, qu’Un fils est la vraie ressemblance de son père, que c’est sa ressemblance, pour dire, qu’Il y a beaucoup de ressemblance entre eux. J’ai d’abord reconnu votre fils, c’est votre ressemblance.” Ibid. 13. Bentley Glass, “Maupertuis and Heredity” in Forerunners of Darwin: 1745– 1859, edited by Bentley Glass, et al (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1959), 51–83. 14. Ibid., 60. 15. Pierre-Louis Moreau de Maupertuis, Vénus physique (The Hague, 1745), 106–7. 16. Ibid., 74. 17. Ibid., 75.

Notes to Chapter Two

179

18. “ . . . la simultanéité de la création et de la formation des substances, qui, contenues les unes dans les autres, se développent dans le temps par la continuation d’un premier miracle . . .” Diderot, De l’Interprétation de la nature, Pensée 50, in Œuvres complètes de Diderot, edited by Jean Assézat and Maurice Tourneux (Paris: Garnier, 1875–1877), 1:46. 19. “Ordre, état de ce qui est arrangé.” “Arrangement,” Dictionnaire de L’Académie française (1762), 102. 20. “Arrangement de livres. Arrangement de vases, de porcelains, de tableaux.” Ibid. 21. “Coutume, accoutumance, disposition acquise par plusieurs actes réitérés.” “Habitude,” Dictionnaire de L’Académie française (1762), 857. 22. “Bonne habitude. Mauvaise habitude. Tourner en habitude. Contracter une habitude. Vieille habitude. Une longue habitude. Péché d’habitude. Former une habitude. La répétition des actes formés d’habitude.” Ibid. 23. “La compléxion, la disposition du corps, le tempérament.” Ibid. 24. “Ne pouroit-on pas expliquer par-là comment de deux seuls individus, la multiplication des especes les plus dissemblables auroit pu s’ensuivie? Elles n’auroient dû leur premiere origine qu’à quelques productions fortuites dans lesquelles les parties élémentaires n’auroient pas retenu l’ordre qu’elles tenoient dans les animaux peres & meres: chaque degré d’erreur auroit fait une mouvelle espece; & à force d’écarts répétés seroit venue la diversité infinie des animaux que nous voyons aujourd’hui, qui s’acroîtra peut-être encore avec le tems, mais à laquelle peut-être la suite des siecles n’aporte que des acroissemens imperceptibles.” Maupertuis, Essai sur la formation des corps organisés (Berlin, 1754), 40–1. 25. “ . . . c’est ainsi qu’un essaim d’abeilles, lorsqu’elles se sont assemblées & unies autour de la branche de quelque arbre, n’offre plus à nos yeux qu’un corps qui n’a aucune ressemblance avec les individus qui l’ont formé.” Ibid., 47–8. 26. “Qui empêchera des parties élémentaires, intelligentes et sensibles de s’écarter à l’infini de l’ordre qui constitue l’espèce? de là, une infinité d’espèces d’animaux sortis d’un premier animal; une infinité d’êtres émanés d’un premier être; un seul acte dans la nature.” Diderot, De l’Interprétation de la nature, Pensée 50, in Œuvres complètes de Diderot, edited by Jean Assézat and Maurice Tourneux (Paris: Garnier, 1875– 1877), 2:47. 27. Pierre-Louis de Maupertuis, Vénus physique (1745), 140. 28. Buffon, “Du cheval,” Histoire naturelle, générale et particulière, 4:215–16. 29. Maupertuis, Essai sur la formation des corps organisés (Berlin, 1754), 40–1. 30. Jean-Baptiste-René Robinet, Considérations philosophiques sur la gradation naturelle des formes de l’être (Paris: Saillant, 1768), 7. 31. “Chaos,” Encyclopédie, 3:157.

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32. William Harvey, Exercitatione de Generatione Animalium. Quibus accedunt Quædum de Partu: De Membranis ac Humoribus Uteri et de Conceptione (London: Octavius Pulleyn, 1651), 149. 33. Albrecht von Haller, Sur la formation du cœur dans le poulet; sur l’œil; sur la structure du jaune &c., translated by J.-R. d’Arney (Lausanne: Bousquet, 1758). 34. “Nous tombâmes sur la question des germes préexistants. Savez-vous ce que c’est que ces bêtes-là? C’est vous, c’est moi, ce sont tous les hommes qui sont, qui ont été et qui seront emboîtés les uns dans les autres jusqu’à l’ovaire d’Eve et au testicule d’Adam, qui furent les deux premières boîtes d’où sortirent avec le temps tant de sots, sans compter les défenseurs de ce système.” Diderot, “Lettre à Sophie Volland” in Correspondance inédite, ed. Babelon (Paris: Gallimard, 1931), 2:266. 35. Pierre-Louis Moreau de Maupertuis, Vénus physique (1745), 17 and GeorgeLouis Leclerc de Buffon, “Histoire des animaux,” Histoire naturelle, générale et particulière (Paris: Imprimerie royale, 1749–1767), 2:157. 36. Ibid., ex. 62, p. 216. 37. Ibid. 38. Ibid. 39. Marcello Malpighi, “Dissertatio epistolica de formatione pulli in ovo” in Opera omnia, 2 volumes (Leyden: Petrum vander Aa, 1687), 2:54. 40. Albrecht von Haller, Sur la formation du cœur dans le poulet; sur l’œil; sur la structure du jaune &c., 2 volumes, translated by J.-R. d’Arney (Lausanne: Bousquet, 1758), 2:186, 188. 41. Charles Bonnet, Considérations sur les corps organisés, 2 volumes (Amsterdam: Marc-Michel Rey, 1762), 1:186. 42. “Le principe général de ceux-ci, c’est que la matière est sensible, ce qu’ils démontrent par le développement de l’œuf, corps inerte, qui par le seul instrument de la chaleur graduée passe à l’état d’être sentant & vivant, & par l’accroissement de tout animal qui dans son principe n’est qu’un point, & qui par l’assimilation nutritive des plantes, en un mot, de toutes les substances qui servent à la nutrition, devient un grand corps sentant & vivant dans un grand espace. De-là ils conclurent qu’il n’y a que de la matière, & qu’elle suffit pour tout expliquer . . .” Diderot, “Spinoziste,” Encyclopédie, 15:474. 43. “Je vois clairement dans le développement de l’œuf et quelques autres opérations de la nature, la matière inerte en apparence, mais organisée, passer par des agents purement physiques, de l’état d’inertie à l’état de sensibilité et de vie, mais la liaison nécessaire de ce passage m’échappe.” Diderot, Réfutation de l’homme in Œuvres complètes de Diderot, edited by Jean Assézat and Maurice Tourneux (Paris: Garnier, 1875–1877), 2:301. 44. “Cela est contre l’expérience et la raison: contre l’expérience qui chercherait inutilement ces germes dans l’œuf et dans la plupart des animaux avant un

Notes to Chapter Three

45.

46.

47.

48.

49.

50.

51. 52.

181

certain age . . .” Diderot, Entretien entre d’Alembert et Diderot in Œuvres complètes de Diderot, edited by Jean Assézat and Maurice Tourneux (Paris: Garnier, 1875–1877), 2:110. “Mais qu’est-ce que cet élément? Occupait-il de l’espace, ou n’en occupait-il point? Comment est-il venu, où s’est-il échappé, sans se mouvoir? Où étaitil? Que faisait-il là ou ailleurs? A-t-il été créé à l’instant du besoin? Existaitil?” Ibid., 2:116. “Rien d’abord, puis un point vivant . . . A ce point vivant il s’en applique un autre, encore un autre; et par ces applications successives il résulte un être un, car je suis bien un, je n’en saurais douter . . .” Diderot, Rêve de d’Alembert in Œuvres complètes de Diderot, edited by Jean Assézat and Maurice Tourneux (Paris: Garnier, 1875–1877), 2:124. William Harvey, Exercitatione de Generatione Animalium. Quibus accedunt Quædum de Partu: De Membranis ac Humoribus Uteri et de Conceptione (London: Octavius Pulleyn, 1651), 149. “Ce n’est d’abord qu’un point, mais un point qui a la vie, punctum saliens, & autour duquel toutes les autres parties venant s’arranger, achevent bientôt la formation de l’animal.” D’Aumont, “Génération,” Encyclopédie, 7:565. “Pour moi j’aime à reculer le plus qu’il m’est possible, les bornes de la création. Je me plais à considérer cette magnifique suite d’êtres organisés, renfermés comme autant de peitits mondes, les uns dans les autres.” Bonnet, Considérations sur les corps organisés (Amsterdam: Marc-Michel Rey, 1762), 1:89. Diderot, Thoughts on the Interpretation of Nature and Other Philosophical Works, introduced and annotated by David Adams (Manchester: Clinamen Press, 1999), page 145, note 13. Ibid. Alberto Haller, Elementa Physiologiæ Corporis Humani (Lausanne: Bousquet, 1757), 1:2.

NOTES TO CHAPTER THREE 1. “Si lorsque Epicure assurait que la terre contenait les germes de tout, et que l’espèce animale était le produit de la fermentation, il avait proposé de montrer une image en petit de ce qui s’était fait en grand à l’origine des temps, que lui aurait-on répondu?” Diderot, Rêve de d’Alembert in Œuvres complètes de Diderot, edited by Jean Assézat and Maurice Tourneux (Paris: Garnier, 1875–1877), 2:133. 2. Jacques Roger, The Life Sciences in Eighteenth-Century French Thought, edited by Keith R. Benson and translated by Robert Ellrich (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997), 61. [Jacques Roger, Les Sciences de la vie dans la pensée française au XVIIIe siècle (Paris: Armand Colin, 1963].

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3. Ibid., p. 569, note 92. Roger advises that the passage appears in the original Latin in Robert Lenoble, Mersenne, ou la naissance du mécanisme (Paris: Vrin, 1943), 234. 4. William Harvey, Exercitatione de Generatione Animalium. Quibus accedunt Quædum de Partu: De Membranis ac Humoribus Uteri et de Conceptione (London: Octavius Pulleyn, 1651), 122. 5. René Descartes, “Primæ Cogitationes,” Œuvres, edited by Charles Adam and Paul Tannery (Paris: Léopold Cerf, 1897–1913), 2:50. 6. Pieter van Musschenbroek invented a device for storing static electricity in 1746. 7. Nicholas Hartsoeker invented a simple screw-barrel microscope in 1694. 8. Bernard Nieuwentyt was an advocate of Descartes and opponent of Spinoza who declared that the wonders of God are seen in His universe; L’Existence de Dieu démontrée par les merveilles de la nature (Paris:Vincent, 1725). This is a French translation of the original Dutch, first published in 1715. 9. Marcello Malpighi founded the science of microscopic anatomy and identified taste buds, the optic nerve, fat reservoirs, deep layers of the skin, and red blood cells. 10. Diderot, Philosophic Thoughts, Thought 19, in Diderot’s Early Philosophical Works, translated and edited by Margaret Jourdain (Chicago and London: The Open Court Publishing Company, 1916), 35. “ . . . toutes les observation concourent à me démontrer que la putréfaction seule ne produise rien d’organisé . . .” Diderot, Pensées philosophiques, Pensée 19, in Œuvres complètes de Diderot, edited by Jean Assézat and Maurice Tourneux (Paris: Garnier, 1875–1877), 1:133. 11. Ibid. “Si un athée avait avancé, il y a deux cents ans, qu’on verrait peut-être un jour des hommes sortir tout formés des entrailles de la terre, comme on voit éclore une foule d’insectes d’une masse de chair échauffée, je voudrais bien savoir ce qu’un métaphysicien aurait eu à lui répondre.” I took the libery of substituting “hatch from” for the phrase “swarm in” that appears in Margaret Jourdain’s 1916 translation because the difference is significant here. Diderot, still a deist in 1746, is using éclore to ridicule spontaneous generation. 12. The book had originally been published in English in London in 1745 and then translated into French in Leyden in 1747 and in Paris in 1750. 13. Aram Vartanian. “From Deist to Atheist: Diderot’s Philosophical Orientation, 1746–1749,” Diderot Studies, ed. Otis E. Fellows and Norman L. Torrey (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1949), 1:46–63; Lester Crocker, “Diderot and Eighteenth Century French Transformism” in Forerunners of Darwin: 1745–1859, edited by Bentley Glass, et al (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1959), 114–143.

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14. Aram Vartanian, “From Deist to Atheist: Diderot’s Philosophical Orientation, 1746–1749,” Diderot Studies, 1 (1949): 55. “J’écris de Dieu . . .” Diderot, Pensées philosophiques in Œuvres complètes de Diderot, edited by Jean Assézat and Maurice Tourneux (Paris: Garnier, 1875–1877), 1:127. 15. Ibid. 16. Ibid., 56. Julien Offray de La Mettrie, L’Homme machine, introduced and annotated by Maurice Solovine (Paris: Bossard, 1921), 80. 17. Ibid., 57. 18. Ibid., 59. 19. Lester Crocker, “Diderot and Eighteenth Century French Transformism” in Forerunners of Darwin: 1745–1859, edited by Bentley Glass, et al, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1959), 114–143. 20. Ibid., 118. 21. Ibid., 115–16. 22. Crocker cites Mémoires pour servir à l’histoire d’un genre de polyps d’eau douce, à bras en forme de cornes (Paris: Durand, 1744; Leiden: Jean and Herman Verbeek, 1744). Crocker refers the reader to Aram Vartanian, “Trembley’s Polyp, La Mettrie, and Eighteenth Century French Materialism,” Journal of the History of Ideas 11 (1950): 259–86. 23. Crocker cites Bonnet, Œuvres d’histoire et de philosophie de Charles Bonnet (Neuchâtel: Samuel Fauche, 1779–1783), 4:340. 24. Ibid., 116–17. 25. Ibid., footnote 4. Julien Offray de La Mettrie, L’homme machine, introduced and annotated by Maurice Solovine (Paris: Bossard, 1921), 108–9. 26. Ibid., 117–8. 27. Ibid., 118. 28. Diderot, Letter on the Blind in Diderot’s Early Philosophical Works, translated and edited by Margaret Jourdain (Chicago and London: The Open Court Publishing Company, 1916), 113. “Je conjecture donc que, dans le commencement où la matière en fermentation faisait éclore l’univers, mes semblables étaient fort communs.” Diderot, Lettre sur les aveugles in Œuvres complètes de Diderot, edited by Jean Assézat (Paris: Garnier, 1875), 1:310. 29. Ibid. “Combien de mondes estropiés, manqués, se sont dissipés, se reforment et se dissipent peut-être à chaque instant dans des espaces éloignés, où je ne touche point . . .” Ibid. 30. “Si l’on jette les yeux . . . sur les insectes microscopiques, et sur la matière qui les produit et qui les environne, il est évident que la matière en général est divisée en matière morte et en matière vivante.” Diderot, De l’Interprétation de la nature, Pensée 58, Question 3, in Œuvres complètes de Diderot, edited by Jean Assézat and Maurice Tourneux (Paris: Garnier, 1875–1877), 2:58. 31. Titus Lucretius Carus, De rerum natura, video is used in II, 865 and 871, and cerno, in II, 928.

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32. Denis Diderot, Eléments de physiologie in Œuvres: Philosophie, edited by Laurent Versini (Paris: Robert Laffont, 1994), 1:1275. 33. Jacques Roger, The Life Sciences in Eighteenth-Century French Thought, edited by Keith R. Benson and translated by Robert Ellrich (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997), 522. 34. Ibid., pp. 522–29 and pp. 687–89, notes 320–71. Voltaire directly attacked Needham in the Questions sur les miracles (1766), 4th letter, “Avertissemnt,” 5th letter, 6th letter, and 7th letter; La Défense de mon oncle (1767), ch. 19 “Des montagnes et des coquilles”; Singularités de la nature (1768), ch. 20 “De la prétendue race d’anguilles formés de la farine et de jus de mouton”; Homme aux quarante écus (1768), ch. 6 “Nouvelles douleurs occasionnées par de nouveaux systèmes”; Les Deux Siècles [the Siècle de Louis XIV (1751) and Supplément du siècle de Louis XIV (1753)]; L’ABC (1768), 17th discourse; Les Colimaçons du révérend père L’Escarbotier (1768), 3rd letter “Dissertation du physicien de Saint-Flour”; Précis du siècle de Louis XV (1768), ch. 43; Questions sur l’Encyclopédie (1770–72) “Dieu” §4; Dialogues d’Evhémère (1777), 9th dialogue (“Sur la génération”). 35. Jacques Roger, The Life Sciences in Eighteenth-Century French Thought, 522. On page 687, note 321, Roger cites Lazzaro Spallanzani [Lazzaro Spallanzani, Sàggio di osservazioni microscopiche concernanti il sistema della generazione de’ signori di Needham e Buffon (Modena: B. Soliani, 1765)] and René Pomeau, La Religion de Voltaire (Paris: Nizet, 1956). 36. Ibid., 533. Roger Cites Voltaire’s “Questions” (1766), 4th letter, “Avertissement” in Œuvres complètes, edited by Louis Moland (Paris: Garnier, 1872– 82), 25: 393–94. 37. Voltaire, “Questions sur les miracles,” 5th letter, “Du proposant à M. Needham, jésuite.” 38. Voltaire, Singularités de la nature, ch. 22 “Des anciennes erreurs en physique;” Questiones sur l’Encyclopédie, s.v. “Curiosité, Le système vraisemblable,” §2; Dialogues d’Evhémère, 8th dialogue (against Epicurus). 39. Voltaire, Questions sur l’Encyclopédie, s.v. “Athéisme,” §, and “Atome;” Lettres de Memmius, 3rd letter; Dialogues d’Evhémère, sixth dialogue. 40. Ibid., 522. 41. “Le Voltaire en plaisantera tant qu’il voudra, mais l’Anguillard a raison; j’en crois mes yeux; je les vois; combien il y en a! comme ils vont! comme ils viennent! comme ils frétillent!” Diderot, Rêve de d’Alembert in Œuvres complètes de Diderot, edited by Jean Assézat and Maurice Tourneux (Paris: Garnier, 1875–1877), 2:131. 42. “Dans la goutte d’eau de Needham, tout s’exécute et se passe en un clin d’œil. Dans le monde, le même phénomène dure un peu davantage; mais qu’est-ce que notre durée en comparaison de l’éternité des temps?” Ibid. 43. “Le vase où il apercevait tant de générations momentanées, il le comparait à l’univers; il voyait dans une goutte d’eau l’histoire du monde . . . Suite

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indéfinie d’animalcules dans l’atome qui fermente, même suite indéfinie d’animalcules dans l’autre atome qu’on appelle la Terre. Qui sait les races d’animaux qui nous ont précédés? Qui sait les races d’animaux qui succéderont aux nôtres? Tout change, tout passe, il n’y a que le tout qui reste. Le monde commence et finit sans cesse; il est à chaque instant à son commencement et à sa fin . . .” Ibid., 131–32. 44. “Si lorsque Epicure assurait que la terre contenait les germes de tout, et que l’espèce animale était le produit de la fermentation, il avait proposé de montrer une image en petit de ce qui s’était fait en grand à l’origine des temps, que lui aurait-on répondu? . . . Et vous l’avez sous vos yeux cette image, et elle ne vous apprend rien . . . Qui sait si la fermentation et ses prduits sont épuisés? . . . L’éléphant, cette masse énorme, organisée, le produit subit de la fermentation! . . . Quelle comparison d’un petit nombre d’éléments mis en fermentation dans le creux de ma main, et de ce réservoir immense d’éléments divers épars dans les entrailles de la terre, à sa surface, au sein des mers, dans le vague des airs! . . . Pourquoi ne voyons-nous plus le taureau percer la terre de sa corne, appuyer ses pieds contre le sol, et faire effort pour en dégager son corps pesant?” Ibid., 133–34. 45. “Pourquoi ne voyons-nous plus le taureau percer la terre de sa corne, appuyer ses pieds contre le sol, et faire effort pour dégager son corps pesant?” Ibid., 134. 46. iamque adeo fracta est ætas effetaque tellus vix animalia parva creat, quæ cuncta creavit sæcla deditque ferarum ingentia corpora partu. (II, 1150–2) Titus Lucretius Carus, De rerum natura, edited by H.A.J. Munro (London:George Bell and Sons; Cambridge: Deighton Bell and Company, 1905), 1:119.

Yea, even now its life is broken, and the worn-out earth scarce creates tiny animals, though once it created all the tribes, and brought to birth huge bodies of wild beasts. (II, 1150–2)

47. multaque nun etiam existunt animalia terris, imbribus et calido solis concreta vapore; (V, 797–8) Ibid., 228.

And even now many animals spring forth from the earth, formed by the rains and the warm heat of the sun; (V, 797–8) Ibid., 212.

48. quo minus est mirum si tum sunt plura coorta et maiora, nova tellure atque æthere adulta. (V, 799–800) Ibid.

Wherefore we may wonder the less, if then more animals and greater were born, reaching their full growth when earth and air were fresh. (V, 799–800) Ibid.

Titus Lucretius Carus, On the Nature of Things, translated by Cyril Bailey (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1910), 104.

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49. tum tibi terra dedit primum mortalia sæcla; multus enim calor atque umor superabat in arvis. hoc ubi quæque loci regio opportuna dabatur, crescebant uteri terram radicibus apti; quos ubi tempore maturo patefecerat ætas infantum, fugiens umorem aurasque petessens, (V, 805–10) Ibid.

Then it was that the earth first gave birth to the race of mortal beings. For much heat and moisture abounded then in the fields; thereby, wherever a suitable spot or place was afforded, there grew up wombs, clinging to the earth by their roots; and when in the fullness of time the age of the little ones, fleeing moisture and eager for air, had opened them, (V, 805–10) Ibid., 212–3.

50. quatinus in pullos animalis vertier ova cernimus alituum vermisque effervere terra, intempestivos quam putor cepit ob imbris, scire licet gigni posse ex non sensibu’ sensus. (II, 927–30) Ibid., 1:110.

Then, moreover, as we saw before, inasmuch as we perceive the eggs of birds turn into living chickens, and worms swarm out when mud has seized on the earth owing to immoderate rains, we may know that sensations can be begotten out of that which is not sensation. (II, 927–30) Ibid., 97.

51. “Voyez-vous cet œuf? . . . Qu’est-ce que cet œuf?” Diderot, Entretien entre d’Alembert et Diderot in Œuvres complètes de Diderot, edited by Jean Assézat and Maurice Tourneux (Paris: Garnier, 1875–1877), 2:115. 52. “L’homme se résolvant en une infinité d’hommes atomiques, qu’on renferme entre des feuilles de papier comme des œufs d’insectes, qui filent leurs coques . . .” Diderot, Rêve de d’Alembert in Œuvres complètes de Diderot, edited by Jean Assézat and Maurice Tourneux (Paris: Garnier, 1875–1877), 2:130. 53. “ . . . laissez agir le grand sediment inerte quelques millions de siècles . . . Vous avez deux grands phénomènes, le passage de l’état d’inertie à l’état de sensiblité, et les générations spontanées.” Ibid., 134. 54. quippe videre licet vivos existere vermes stercore de tætro, putorem cum sibi nacta est intempestivis ex imbribus umida tellus; (II, 871–3) Titus Lucretius Carus, De rerum natura, edited by H.A.J. Munro (London: George Bell and Sons; Cambridge: Deighton Bell and Company, 1905), 1: 108–9.

Why we may see worms come forth alive from noisome dung, when the soaked earth has gotten muddiness from immeasurable rains; (II, 871–3) Titus Lucretius Carus, De rerum natura, translated by Cyril Bailey (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1910), 95.

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55. et tamen hæc, cum sunt quasi putrefacta per imbres, vermiculos pariunt . . . (II, 898–9) Ibid., 109.

and yet, when they are, as it were, made muddy through the rains, they give birth to little worms . . . (II, 898–9) Ibid., 96.

56. quatinus in pullos animalis vertier ova cernimus alituum vermisque effervere terra, intempestivos quam putor cepit ob imbris, (II, 927–9) Ibid., 110.

Then, moreover, as we saw before, inasmuch as we perceive the eggs of birds turn into living chickens, and worms swarm out when mud has seized on the earth owing to immoderate rains, (II, 927–9) Ibid., 97.

57. “Le vermisseau imperceptible qui s’agite dans la fange . . . l’animal énorme . . . s’achemine peut-être à l’état de vermissseau . . .” Diderot, Entretien entre d’Alembert et Diderot in Œuvres complètes de Diderot, edited by Jean Assézat and Maurice Tourneux (Paris: Garnier, 1875–1877), 2:110. 58. “Le rapport de ce grand quadrupède à sa matrice première est moindre que celui du vermisseau à la molécule de farine qui l’a produit; mais le vermisseau n’est qu’un vermisseau . . .” Diderot, Rêve de d’Alembert in Œuvres complètes de Diderot, edited by Jean Assézat and Maurice Tourneux (Paris: Garnier, 1875–1877), 2:133. 59. vertunt se fluvii, in frondes et pabula læta in pecudes, vertunt pecudes in corpora nostra (II, 875–6) Titus Lucretius Carus, De rerum natura, edited by H.A.J. Munro (London: George Bell and Sons; Cambridge: Deighton Bell and Company, 1905), 1: 109.

Streams, leaves, and glad pastures change themselves into cattle, cattle change their nature into our bodies (II, 875–6) Titus Lucretius Carus, De rerum natura, translated by Cyril Bailey (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1910), 95.

60. iamque adeo fracta est ætas, effetaque tellus vix animalia parva creat, quæ cuncta creavit sæcla deditque ferarum ingentia corpora partu. (II, 1150–2) Ibid., 119.

Yea, even now its life is broken, and the worn-out earth scarce creates tiny animals, though once it created all the tribes, and brought to birth huge bodies of wild beasts (II, 1150–2) Ibid., 104.

61. multaque nun etiam existunt animalia terris, imbribus et calido solis concreta vapore; quo minus est mirum si tum sunt plura coorta

And even now many animals spring forth from the earth, formed by the rains and the warm heat of the sun; wherefore we may wonder the less, if then

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61. et maiora, nova tellure atque æthere adulta. principio genus alituum variæque volucres ova relinquebant exclusæ tempore verno, (V, 797–802) Ibid., 228.

more animals and greater were born, reaching their full growth when earth and air were fresh. First of all the tribe of winged fowls and the diverse birds left their eggs, hatched out in the spring season, (V, 797–802) Ibid., 212.

62. Multaque tum tellus etaim portenta creare Conatast mira facie membrisque coorta androgynem, interutrasque nec utrum, utrimque remotum, (V, 837–9) Ibid., 229.

And many monsters too earth then essayed to create, born with strange faces and strange limbs, the man-woman, between the two, yet not either, sundered from both sexes, (V, 837–9) Ibid., 214.

63. nec potuisse propagando procudere prolem. nam quæcumque vides vesci vitalibus auris, aut dolus aut virtus aut denique mobilitas est ex ineunte ævo genus id tutata reservans; (V, 856–9) Ibid.

and could not beget and propagate their offspring. For whatever animals you see feeding on the breath of life, either their craft or bravery, aye or their swiftness has protected and preserved their kind from the beginning of their being (V, 856–9) Ibid.

64. Principio genus acre leonum sævaque sæcla tutatast virtus, volpes dolus et fuga cervos. at levisomna canum fido cum pectore corda, et genus omne quod est veterino semine partum, lanigeræque simul pecudes et bucera sæcla, omnia sunt hominum tutelæ tradita, Memmi; (V, 862–7) Ibid., 230.

First of all the fierce race of lions, that savage stock, their bravery has protected, foxes their cunning, and deer their fleet foot. But the lightly sleeping minds of dogs with their loyal heart, and all the race which is born of the seed of beasts of burden, and withal the fleecy flocks and the horned herds, are all trusted to the tutelage of men, Memmius. (V, 862–7) Ibid., 214–5.

65. sed magis ipsa manu ducunt et credere cogunt ex insensilibus, quod dico, animalia gigni. (II, 869–70) Ibid., 108.

but rather themselves lead us by the hand and constrain us to believe that, as I say, living things are begotten of insensible things (II, 869–70) Ibid., 94–5.

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66. ergo omnes natura cibos in corpora viva vertit et hinc sensus animantum procreat omnes, (II, 879–80) Ibid., 109.

And so nature changes all foods into living bodies, and out of food brings to birth all the senses of living things, (II, 879–80) Ibid., 95.

67. ex insensilibus ne credas sensile gigni? (II, 888) Ibid.

that you may not believe that the sensible is begotten of the insensible? (II, 888) Ibid.

68. sed magni referre ea primum quantula constent, sensile quæ faciunt, et qua sint prædita forma, motibus ordinibus posituris denique quæ sint. quarum nil rerum in lignis glæbisque videmus; et tamen hæc, cum sunt quasi putrefacta per imbres, vermiculos pariunt, quia corpora materiai antiquis ex ordinibus permota nova re conciliantur ita ut debent animalia gigni. (II, 894–901) Ibid.

but it is of great matter, first of what size are these bodies, which create the sensible, and with what form they are endowed, then what they are in their motions, arrangements and positions. And none of these things can we perceive in logs and sods; and yet, when they are, as it were, made muddy through the rains, they give birth to little worms, because the bodies of matter stirred by the newcomer from their old arrangements are brought into union in the way in which living things are bound to be begotten (II, 894–901) Ibid., 95–6.

69. scire licet gigni posse ex non sensibu’ sensus. (II, 930) Ibid., 110.

we may know that sensations can be begotten out of that which is not sensation (II, 930) Ibid., 97.

70. iamque adeo fracta est ætas, effetaque tellus vix animalia parva creat, quæ cuncta creavit sæcla deditque ferarum ingentia corpora partu, (II, 1150–2) Ibid., 119.

Yea, even now its life force is broken, and the worn-out earth scarce creates tiny animals, though it once created all the tribes, and brought to birth huge bodies of wild beasts (II, 1150–2) Ibid., 104.

71. quippe videre licet vivos existere vermes stercore de tætro . . . (II, 871–2) Ibid., 108.

Why we may see worms come forth alive from noisome dung . . . (II, 871–2) Ibid., 95.

72. præterea cunctas itidem res vertere sese: moreover, we may see all things (II, 874) Ibid., 109. in like manner change themselves (II, 874) Ibid.

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73. quatenus in pullos animalis vertier ova cernimus alituum vermisque effervere terra, (II, 927–8) Ibid., 110.

inasmuch as we perceive the eggs of birds turn into living chickens, and worms swarm out (II, 927–8) Ibid., 97.

74. nec potuisse propagando procudere prolem. nam quæcumque vides vesci vitalibus auris, (V, 856–7) Ibid., 229.

and could not beget and propagate their offspring. For whatever animals you see feeding on the breath of life, (V, 856–7) Ibid., 214.

75. quarum nil rerum in lignis glæbisque videmus; et tamen hæc, cum sunt quasi putrefacta per imbres, vermiculos pariunt . . . (II, 897–9) Ibid., 109.

And none of these things can we perceive in logs and sods; and yet, when they are, as it were, made muddy through the rains, they give birth to little worms . . . (II, 897–9) Ibid., 95–6.

76. cernimus alituum vermisque effervere terra, (II, 928) Ibid., 110.

we perceive . . . worms swarm out . . . on the earth (II, 928) Ibid., 97.

77. iamque adeo fracta est ætas, effetaque tellus vix animalia parva creat, quæ cuncta creavit sæcla deditque ferarum ingentia corpora partu. (II, 1150–2) Ibid., 119.

Yea, even now its life is broken, and the worn-out earth scarce creates tiny animals, though once it created all the tribes, and brought to birth huge bodies of wild beasts (II, 1150–2) Ibid., 104.

78. quo minus est mirum si tum sunt plura coorta et maiora, nova tellure atque æthere adulta. (V, 799–800) Ibid., 228.

Wherefore we may wonder the less, if then more animals and greater were born, reaching their full growth when earth and air were fresh. (V, 799–800) Ibid., 212.

79. mutat, et ex alio terram status excipit alter, quod tulit ut nequeat, possit quod non tulit ante. (V, 835–6) Ibid., 229.

changes . . . and one state after another overtakes the earth, so that it cannot bear what it did, but can bear what it did not of old. (V, 835–6) Ibid., 213.

80. conatast mira facie membrisque coorta, androgynem, interutrasque nec utrum, utrimque remotum, orba pedum partim, manuum viduata vicissim, muta sine ore etiam, sine voltu cæca reperta, vinctaque membrorum per totum corpus adhæsu, (V, 838–42) Ibid.

born with strange faces and strange limbs, the man-woman, between the two, yet not either, sundered from both sexes, some things bereft of feet, or in turn robbed of hands, things too found dumb without mouths, or blind without eyes, or locked through the whole body by the clinging of the limbs, (V, 838–42) Ibid., 214.

Notes to Chapter Four 81.

nec potuisse propagando procudere prolem. nam quæcumque vides vesci vitalibus auris, (V, 856–7) Ibid.

191 could not beget and propagate their offspring. For whatever animals you see feeding on the breath of life, (V, 856–7) Ibid.

NOTES TO CHAPTER FOUR 1. “Quand on voit les métamorphoses successives . . . approcher un règne d’un autre règne par des degrés insensibles, et peupler les confins des deux règnes . . . qui ne se sentirait porté à croire qu’il n’y a jamais eu qu’un premier être prototype de tous les êtres?” Diderot, De l’Interprétation de la nature, Pensée 12, in Œuvres complètes de Diderot, edited by Jean Assézat and Maurice Tourneux (Paris: Garnier, 1875–1877), 2:16. 2. “Chain,” Oxford English Dictionary Online, 4a, http://dictionary.oed.com (Apr. 12, 2006). 3. Aristotle, “Quantity,” The Categories, edited and translated by Harold P. Cooke (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1938), chapter 6, 5a15, pp. 36–39. 4. Aristotle, History of Animals, edited by D. M. Balme (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991), book VII (VIII), chapter 1, 588b-15, pp. 60–63; Parts of Animals, translated by A. L. Peck (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1937), book IV, part 5, 681a 10–681b 15, pp. 332–37. In the latter, Aristotle discusses the shared forms and functions of various species of animals. 5. John Turberville Needham, An Account of Some New Microscopical Discoveries founded on an Examination of the Calamary and its Wonderful Milt-vessels, (London: F. Needham, 1745). [French translations, Leyden, 1747, and Paris, 1750.] 6. Jacques Roger, Buffon: A Life in Natural History, translated by Sarah Lucille Bonnefoi and edited by L. Pearce Williams (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1997), 289–90. In footnotes Roger cites Buffon, “Premier discours,” Histoire naturelle, générale et particulière, 1:13; Buffon, “La musaraigne” (1760), Histoire naturelle, générale et particulière, 8:57; Buffon, “Les phoques,” Histoire naturelle, générale et particulière, 13:330. 7. “Parcourant ensuite successivement & par ordre les différens objets qui composent l’Univers, & se mettant à la tête de tous les êtres créez, il verra avec étonnement qu’on peut descendre par des degrés presqu’insensibles, de la créature la plus parfaite jusqu’à la matière la plus informe, de l’animal le mieux organisé jusqu’au minéral le plus brut; il reconnoîtra que ces nuances imperceptibles sont le grand œuvre de la Nature; il les trouvera ces nuances, non seulement dans les grandeurs & dans les formes, mais dans les mouvemens, dans les générations, dans les successions de toute espèce.” Buffon, “Premier discours” in Histoire naturelle, 1:12–13.

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8. “Mais la Nature marche par des gradations inconnues, & par conséquent elle ne peut pas se prêter totalement à ces divisions puisqu’elle passe d’une espèce à une autre espèce, & souvent d’un genre à un autre genre, par des nuances imperceptibles; de sorte qu’il se trouve un grand nombre d’espèces moyennes & d’objets mi-partis qu’on ne sçait où placer, & qui dérangement nécessairement le projet du système général . . .” Ibid., 13. 9. Roger, 87–88. “Cet examen nous conduit à reconnoître évidemment qu’il n’y a aucune différence absolument essentielle et générale entre les animaux et les végétaux, mais que la nature descend par degrés et par nuances imperceptibles d’un animal qui nous paroît le plus parfait à celui qui l’est le moins, et de celui-ci au végétal. Le polype d’eau douce sera, si l’on veut, le dernier des animaux et la première des plantes.” Buffon, “Comparaison des animaux et des végétaux” in the “Histoire des animaux,” Histoire naturelle, générale et particulière (Paris: Imprimerie royale, 1749–1767), 2:8–9. 10. Roger, 88–89. 11. Ibid., 89. Roger cites “Premier discours,” Histoire, naturelle, générale et particulière (Paris: Imprimerie royale, 1749–1767), 12. 12. Lovejoy, “Buffon and the Problem of Species,” Forerunners of Darwin: 1745–1859, edited by Bentley Glass, et al (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1959), 84–113. 13. Ibid., 101. Lovejoy cites George-Louis Leclerc de Buffon, “De la Nature, seconde vue” in Histoire naturelle, générale et particulière, 15 volumes (Paris: Imprimerie royale, 1749–1767), 13:i. 14. Ibid. Ibid., vii, ix. 15. Ibid., 104. Ibid., 3. 16. May Spangler, “Science, philosophie et littérature: le polype de Diderot,” Recherches sur Diderot et sur l’Encyclopédie 23 (October 1997): 89–107. 17. Ibid., 89. 18. Ibid., 90. 19. Ibid. 20. Ibid. 21. Ibid., 91. Spangler cites La Mettrie, L’homme machine in Œuvres philosophiques (Paris: Fayard, 1987), 1:100. 22. Ibid. Spangler cites Vartanian, “Trembley’s Polyp, La Mettrie, and Eighteenth-Century French Materialism,” Journal of the History of Ideas 2 (1950): 264. 23. “ . . . il doit à Buffon l’idée . . . où il ajoute à la notion d’une chaîne des êtres dans l’espace celle d’un lien des êtres dans le temps.” Paul Vernière, “Introduction” to Diderot, Œuvres philosophiques, introduced and annotated by Paul Vernière (Paris: Garnier, 1998), xiv. 24. The article “Espèce (Histoire naturelle)” reproduced the definiton of species that Buffon gave in the Histoire de l’âne between quotations marks and with a reference. The articles “Homme (Histoire naturelle)” and “Humaine,

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25.

26. 27.

28.

29.

30.

31. 32.

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espèce (Histoire naturelle),” both signed by Diderot, used much material from the “Histoire naturelle de l’homme.” “ . . . la marche de la nature se fait par des degrés nuancés, & souvent imperceptibles . . .” Diderot, “Animal,” Encyclopédie, ou Dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers, edited by Denis Diderot and Jean Le Rond d’Alembert (Paris: Briasson, David, Le Breton, Durant; Neuchâtel: S. Faulche, 1751–1765), 1:469. Mais il ne faut point perdre de vûe que le nombre de ces rapports varie à l’infini.” Ibid. On conçoit bien que toutes ces vérités s’obscuricissent sur les limites des regnes, & qu’on auroit bien de la peine à les appercevoir distinctement sur le passage du minéral au végétal, & du végétal à l’animal.” Ibid., 1:471. “Ne pouroit-on pas expliquer par-là comment de deux seuls individus, la multiplication des especes les plus dissemblables auroit pu s’ensuivie? Elles n’auroient dû leur premiere origine qu’à quelques productions fortuites dans lesquelles les parties élémentaires n’auroient pas retenu l’ordre qu’elles tenoient dans les animaux peres & meres: chaque degré d’erreur auroit fait une nouvelle espece; & à force d’écarts répétés seroit venue la diversité infinie des animaux que nous voyons aujourd’hui, qui s’acroîtra peut-être encore avec le tems, mais à laquelle peut-être la suite des siecles n’aporte que des acroissemens imperceptibles.” Maupertuis, Essai sur la formation des corps organisés (Berlin, 1754), 40–1. “ . . . que l’embryon formé de ces éléments a passé par une infinité d’organisations et de développements, qu’il a eu, par succession, du mouvement, de la sensation, des idées, de la pensée, de la réflexion, de la conscience, des sentiments, des passions, des signes, des gestes, des sons, des sons articulés, une langue, des lois, des sciences, et des arts; qu’il s’est écoulé des millions d’années entre chacun de ces développements; qu’il a peut-être encore d’autres développements à subir et d’autres accroissements à prendre, qui nous sont inconnus . . .” Diderot, De l’Interprétation de la nature, Pensée 58, Partie 2, in Œuvres complètes de Diderot, edited by Jean Assézat and Maurice Tourneux (Paris: Garnier, 1875–1877), 2:57–58. “Tout concourt donc à prouver que le genre humain n’est pas composé d’especes essentiellement différentes. La différence des blancs aux bruns vient de la nourriture, des moeurs, des usages, des climats; celle des bruns aux noir a la même cause. Il n’y a donc eu originairement qu’une seule race d’hommes.” Diderot, “Humaine espece (Hist. nat.),” Encyclopédie, 8:348. Diderot, Correspondance inédite, edited by André Babelon (Paris: Gallimard, 1931), 299. “Tous les êtres circulent les uns dans les autres . . . tout est en un flux perpétuel . . . Tout animal est plus ou moins homme; tout minéral est plus ou moins plante; toute plante est plus ou moins animal. Il n’y a rien de précis en nature . . .” Diderot, Rêve de d’Alembert in Œuvres complètes de Diderot,

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edited by Jean Assézat and Maurice Tourneux (Paris: Garnier, 1875–1877), 2:138–39. 33. “ . . . les organes produisent les besoins, et réciproquement les besoins produisent les organes.” Ibid., 137. 34. “ . . . il doit à Buffon l’idée . . . où il ajoute à la notion d’une chaîne des êtres dans l’espace celle d’un lien des êtres dans le temps.” Paul Vernière, “Introduction” to Diderot, Œuvres philosophiques, introduced and annotated by Paul Vernière (Paris: Garnier, 1998), xiv. 35. Ibid.

NOTES TO CHAPTER FIVE 1. “Le vermisseau imperceptible qui s’agite dans la fange, s’achemine peut-être à l’état de grand animal; l’animal énorme, qui nous épouvante par sa grandeur, s’achemine peut-être à l’état de vermisseau . . .” Diderot, Entretien entre d’Alembert et Diderot in Œuvres complètes de Diderot, edited by Jean Assézat and Maurice Tourneux (Paris: Garnier, 1875–1877), 2:110. 2. “Quand on voit les métamorphoses successives de l’enveloppe du prototype, quel qu’il ait été, approcher un règne d’un autre règne par des degrés insensibles, et peupler les confins des deux règnes (s’il est permis de se servir du terme de confins où il n’y a aucune division réelle), et peupler, dis-je, les confins des deux règnes, d’êtres incertains, ambigus, dépouillés en grande partie des formes, des qualités et des fonctions de l’un, et revêtus des formes, des qualités, des fonctions de l’autre, qui ne se sentirait porté à croire qu’il n’y a jamais eu qu’un premier être prototype de tous les êtres?” Diderot, De l’interprétation de la nature, Pensée 12, in Œuvres complètes de Diderot, edited by Jean Assézat and Maurice Tourneux (Paris: Garnier, 1875–1877), 2:16. 3. “ . . . changement d’une forme en une autre. On ne se sert de ce mot au propre qu’en parlant des changements d’une forme en une autre, que les anciens Payens croyoient avoir esté faits par leurs Dieux. La Metamorphose de Daphné en laurier. La pluspart des metamorphoses cachent des sens allegoriques, soit pour la Physique, soit pour la Morale.” Dictionnaire de L’Académie française (Paris: Baptiste Coignard, 1694), 52. 4. “Ne pouroit-on pas expliquer par-là comment de deux seuls individus, la multiplication des especes les plus dissemblables auroit pû s’ensuivie?” Maupertuis, Essai sur la formation des corps organisés (Berlin, 1754), 40. 5. “C’est qu’il a fallu que je fusse tel . . .” Diderot, Rêve de d’Alembert in Œuvres complètes de Diderot, edited by Jean Assézat and Maurice Tourneux (Paris: Garnier, 1875–1877), 2:137. 6. “ . . . ailleurs? au pôle? mais sous la ligne? mais dans Saturne? . . . l’intervalle de quelques milliers de diamètres terrestres? . . .” Ibid. 7. “On dit aussi, que Les animaux dégénèrent, pour dire, qu’Ils ne sont pas de la même beauté, qu’ils n’ont pas les mêmes bonnes qualités que les animaux

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8. 9.

10.

11. 12. 13.

14.

15. 16.

17.

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dont ils viennnent.” “Dégénérer,” Dictionnaire de L’Académie française (1762), 484. “Rendre plus parfait” and “Devenir plus parfait.” “Perfectionner,” Dictionnaire de L’Académie française (1762), 349. Diderot, Letter on the Blind in Diderot’s Early Philosophical Works, translated and edited by Margaret Jourdain (Chicago and London: The Open Court Publishing Company, 1916), 112. “S’il n’y avait jamais eu d’êtres informes, vous ne manqueriez pas de prétendre qu’il n’y en aura jamais, et que je me jette dans des hypothèses chimériques; mais l’ordre n’est pas si parfait, continua Saunderson, qu’il ne paraisse encore de temps en temps des productions monstrueuses.” Puis, se tournant en face du ministre, il ajouta: “Voyez-moi bien, monsieur Holmes, je n’ai point d’yeux. Qu’avions-nous fait à Dieu, vous et moi, l’un pour avoir cet organe, l’autre pour en être privé?” Diderot, Lettre sur les aveugles in Œuvres complètes de Diderot, edited by Jean Assézat and Maurice Tourneux (Paris: Garnier, 1875–1877), 1:310. “ . . . l’animal énorme, qui nous épouvante par sa grandeur, s’achemine peut-être à l’état de vermisseau . . .” Diderot, Entretien entre d’Alembert et Diderot in Œuvres complètes de Diderot, edited by Jean Assézat and Maurice Tourneux (Paris: Garnier, 1875–1877), 2:110. “Le vermisseau imperceptible qui s’agite dans la fange, s’achemine peut-être à l’état de grand animal . . .” Ibid. Ibid. “Qu’est-ce que cela fait? Nous y reviendrons ou nous n’y reviendrons pas.” Ibid., 111. “Suite indéfinie d’animalcules dans l’atome qui fermente, même suite indéfinie d’animalcules dans l’autre atome qu’on appelle la Terre. Qui sait les races d’animaux qui nous ont précédés? Qui sait les races d’animaux qui succéderont aux nôtres? Tout change, tout passe, il n’y a que le tout qui reste. Le monde commence et finit sans cesse; il est à chaque instant à son commencement et à sa fin; il n’en a jamais eu d’autre, et n’en aura jamais d’autre.” Diderot, Rêve de d’Alembert in Œuvres complètes de Diderot, edited by Jean Assézat and Maurice Tourneux (Paris: Garnier, 1875–1877), 2:132. “Qui sait si ce bipède déformé, qui n’a que quatre pieds de hauteur, qu’on appelle encore dans le voisinage du pôle un homme, et qui ne tarderait pas à perdre ce nom en se déformant un peu davantage, n’est pas l’image d’une espèce qui passe?” Ibid., 133. “Qui sait s’il n’en est pas ainsi de toutes les espèces d’animaux?” Ibid. “ . . . j’ai vu deux omoplates s’allonger, se mouvoir en pince, et devenir deux moignons” and “Supposez une longue suite de générations manchotes, supposez des efforts continues, et vous verrez les deux côtés de cette pincette s’étendre, s’étendre de plus en plus, se croiser sur le dos, revenir par devant, peut-être se digiter à leurs extrémités, et refaire des bras et des mains.” Ibid., 138. Diderot, “Lettre à Sophie Volland,” Correspondance inédite, edited by André Babelon (Paris: Gallimard, 1931), 2:278.

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18. “ . . . animal engendré d’un asne & d’une cavale, & qui n’engdendre point.” “Mulet,” Dictionnaire de L’Académie française (1694), 103. 19. “Animal engendré d’un âne & d’une jument, ou d’un cheval & d’une ânesse, & qui n’engendre point.” “Mulet,” Dictionnaire de L’Académie française (1762), 186. 20. “On donne en général le nom de Mulet, à tout animal provenu de deux animaux de différente espèce, et qui n’engendre point son semblable.” “Mulet,” Dictionnaire de L’Académie française (1798), 140. 21. “Omne tulit punctum qui miscuit utile dulci; le mérite suprême est d’avoir réuni l’agréable à l’utile. La perfection consists à concilier ces deux points.” Diderot, Suite de l’Entretien in Œuvres complètes de Diderot, edited by Jean Assézat and Maurice Tourneux (Paris: Garnier, 1875–1877), 2:183. Horace, Ars poetica, Verse 343. 22. “Une chambre chaude, tapissée de petits cornets, et sur chacun de ces cornets une étiquette: guerriers, magistrats, philosophes, poëtes, cornet de courtisans, cornet de catins, cornet de rois.” Diderot, Rêve de d’Alembert in Œuvres complètes de Diderot, edited by Jean Assézat and Maurice Tourneux (Paris: Garnier, 1875–1877), 2:131. 23. May Spangler, “Science, philosophie et littérature: le polype de Diderot,” Recherches sur Diderot et sur l’Encyclopédie 23 (October 1997): 94. 24. “Rapport, conformité entre des personnes, entre des choses. Il y a grande, parfaite ressemblance entre ces deux choses. C’est votre fils, je le reconnois à la ressemblance. Il y a beaucoup de ressemblance entre leurs humeurs, entre leurs caractères. Il n’y a guère de ressemblance de cette copie à son original, entre la copie & l’original. Ce portrait est fort bien peint, mais la ressemblance n’y est pas. On dit, qu’Un fils est la vraie ressemblance de son père, que c’est sa ressemblance, pour dire, qu’Il y a beaucoup de ressemblance entre eux. J’ai d’abord reconnu votre fils, c’est votre ressemblance.” “Ressemblance,” Dictionnaire de L’Académie française (1762), 618. 25. Maupertuis, Essai sur la formation des corps organisés (Berlin, 1754), 40–41 and “Héréditaire (Médec.),” Encyclopédie, 8:156–7. 26. “Car il est évident que la nature n’a pu conserver tant de resemblance dans les parties, et affecter tant de variété dans les formes, sans avoir souvent rendu sensible dans un être organisé ce qu’elle a dérobé dans un autre.” Diderot, De l’Interprétation de la nature, Pensée 12, in Œuvres complètes de Diderot, edited by Jean Assézat and Maurice Tourneux (Paris: Garnier, 1875–1877), 2:16. 27. “L’élément séminal, extrait d’une partie semblable à celle qu’il doit former dans l’animal, sentant et pensant, aura quelque mémoire de sa situation première; de là, la conservation des espèces, et la ressemblance des parents.” Ibid., Pensée 50, 46–47. 28. “Certains éléments auront pris nécessairement une facilité prodigieuse à s’unir constamment de la même manière; de là, s’ils sont semblables, les

Notes to Chapter Five

29.

30. 31. 32. 33.

34. 35.

36. 37. 38. 39. 40.

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polypes, qu’on peut comparer à une grappe d’abeilles infiniment petites, qui, n’ayant la mémoire vive que d’une seule situation, s’accrocheraient et demeureraient accrochées selon cette situation qui leur serait la plus familère.” Ibid., 47. “Une chambre chaude, tapissée de petits cornets, et sur chacun de ces cornets une étiquette: guerriers, magistrats, philosophes, poëts, cornet de courtisans, cornet de catins, cornet de rois.” Diderot, Rêve de d’Alembert in Œuvres complètes de Diderot, edited by Jean Assézat and Maurice Tourneux (Paris: Garnier, 1875–1877), 2:131. Diderot, Thoughts on the Interpretation of Nature and Other Philosophical Works, introduced and annotated by David Adams, p. 145, note 3. Ibid. Haller, Elementa physiologiæ corporis humani, 8 volumes (Lausanne: Bousquet, 1757–1766), 1:2. “ . . . où le moindre brin ne peut être cassé, rompu., déplacé, manquant, sans conséquence facheuse pour le tout, devrait se nouer, s’embarrasser encore plus souvent dans le lieu de sa formation que mes soies sur ma tournette.” Diderot, Rêve de d’Alembert in Œuvres complètes de Diderot, edited by Jean Assézat and Maurice Tourneux (Paris: Garnier, 1875– 1877), 2:149. Diderot derives his hypothesis from Maupertuis’ Essai sur la formation des corps organisés (Berlin, 1754), 37–38. “Animal qui a une conformation contraire à l’ordre de la nature. Monstre horrible, effroyable. Monstre affreux, épouvantable, hideux, terrible. Un monstre à deux têtes. Cette femme accoucha d’un monstre. Cet enfant a trois yeux, c’est un monstre. MONSTRE se dit aussi de ce qui est extrêmement laid. Cette femme est horriblement laide, c’est un monstre. On dit en ce sens, Un monstre de laideur. Il se dit figurément d’Une personne cruelle & dénaturée. Néron étoit un monstre, un monstre de nature. C’est un monstre qu’il faudroit étouffer. On dit aussi d’Une personne, C’est un monstre d’ingratitude, un monstre d’avarice, un monstre de cruauté. On dit, qu’On a servit des monstres sur une table, pour dire, Des poissons d’une grandeur extraordinaire.” “Monstre,” Dictionnaire de L’Académie française (1762), 163. Buffon, Epoques de la nature, “3e époque,” Histoire naturelle, générale et particulière; Supplément, 5:115. Idem, “5e époque,” 5:185. Buffon, “L’Unau et l’ai,” Histoire naturelle, générale et particulière, 13:40. Ibid. “Masse de chair informe & inanimée, dont les femmes accouchent quelquefois au lieu d’un enfant. Cette femme que l’on a cru grosse durant six mois, n’est accouchée que d’une mole.” “Mole,” Dictionnaire de L’Académie française (1762), 159.

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41. “ . . . la matière informe provenant d’une conception défectueuse.” “Faux,” Dictionnaire de L’Académie française (1762), 726. 42. Diderot, Thoughts on the Interpretation of Nature and Other Philosophical Works, introduced and annotated by David Adams, page 82, note 45. “Mole,” Encyclopédie, 10:626–7. 43. Ibid. 44. “La môle aura donc une organisation constante.” Diderot, De l’Interprétation de la nature, Pensée 32, Partie 1, in Œuvres complètes de Diderot, edited by Jean Assézat and Maurice Tourneux (Paris: Garnier, 1875–1877), 2:26. 45. “Prenons le scalpel, ouvrons des môles, et voyons . . .” Ibid. 46. Emita Hill, “Materialism and Monsters in Le Rêve de d’Alembert” in Diderot Studies 10 (1968): 67–93. 47. Ibid., 78–9. 48. Ibid., 81–2. 49. Ibid., 82. 50. Ibid. 51. Ibid., 82–83. 52. Ibid., 86. 53. Ibid. “pas un molécule qui se ressemble à elle-même un instant. Rerum novus nascitur ordo, voilà son inscription éternelle . . .” 54. Ibid. 55. Ibid., 88. 56. Ibid. 57. Ibid., 88–89. 58. Ibid., 89. “Peut-être leurs cendres se pressent, se mêlent et s’unissent. Que sçais-je? Peut-être n’ont-elles pas perdu tout sentiment, toute mémoire de leur premier état?” Diderot, “Letter to Sophie Volland of October 15, 1759” in Correspondance, introduced and annotated by Georges Roth (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1955–1970), 2:283–4. 59. “Qui sait si ce bipède déformé, qui n’a que quatre pieds de hauteur, qu’on appelle encore dans le voisinage du pôle un homme, et qui ne tarderait pas à perdre ce nom en se déformant un peu davantage, n’est pas l’image d’une espèce qui passe?” Diderot, Rêve de d’Alembert in Œuvres complètes de Diderot, edited by Jean Assézat and Maurice Tourneux (Paris: Garnier, 1875–1877), 2:133. 60. “A-t-on des exemples remarquables de ces difformités originelles, autres que les bossus et les boiteux, dont on pourrait attribuer l’état maléficié à quelque vice héréditaire?” Ibid., 149. 61. “ . . . cassé, rompu, déplacé, manquant . . .” Ibid. 62. “Peut-être qu’un des agents répare le vice de l’autre . . .” Ibid., 150. 63. Ibid., 138. 64. “ . . . une machine qui s’avance à sa perfection par une infinité de développements successifs . . .” Ibid., 149.

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NOTES TO CHAPTER SIX 1. “Mais chaque élément perdra-t-il, en s’accumulant et en se combinant, son petit degré de sentiment et de perception? Nullement . . . De ces perceptions d’éléments rassemblés et combinés, il en résultera une perception unique, proportionnée à la mase et à la disposition . . .” Diderot, De l’Interprétation de la nature, Pensée 50, in Œuvres complètes de Diderot, edited by Jean Assézat and Maurice Tourneux (Paris: Garnier, 1875–1877), 2:47. 2. Julien Offroy de La Mettrie [Histoire naturelle de l’âme (1745), L’Hommemachine (1747), L’Homme-plante (1748), L’Homme plus que machine (1748), Le Système d’Epicure (1750), Réflexion philosophique sur l’origine des animaux (1750), Vénus métaphysique ou Essai sur l’âme humaine (1751)]. Paul-Henri Dietrich d’Holbach [Le Christianisme dévoilé (1761)]. D’Holbach contributed 376 articles to the Encyclopédie, which were translations from German texts, mostly on chemistry and allied scientific topics. Etienne Bonnot de Condillac [Essai sur l’origine des connoissances humaines: Ouvrage où l’on réduit à un seul principe tout ce qui concerne l’entendement humain (1746), Traité des systèmes (1749), Traité des sensations (1754), Cours d’études pour l’instruction du Prince de Parme (1755), and Traité des animaux (1755)]. Although Condillac did not directly contribute articles to the Encyclopédie, some of its entries are textually very close to his works. 3. Jaucourt contributed the articles “Sens moral, (Moral.),” “Sens externes (Physiol.), “Sens internes, (Physiol.), “Sens (le bon), Gout (le bon), (Belles— Lettres), “Sensibilité, (Morale), “Sensitive, (Botan.), and “Sensualité (Morale.). Henri Fouquet, medical doctor on the faculty at Montpellier, contributed “Sensibilité, Sentiment, (Médecine).” Unsigned were “Sens, (Métaphysique), “Sens commun,” “Sensations, (Métaphysiq.), and “Sensorium.” 4. “Qui a du sentiment, qui reçoit aisément l’impression que font les objets. L’œil est un partie fort sensible. Les parties nerveuses sont les plus sensibles. Ce cheval a la bouche fort sensible. Un cheval sensible à l’éperon. Etre sensible à la douleur. Il a une santé délicate, il est sensible aux moindres impressions de l’air. Sensible au froid, au chaud.” “Sensible,” Dictionnaire de L’Académie française (1762), 710. 5. “Qualité par laquelle un sujet est sensible aux impressions des objets. Il est d’une grande sensibilité à toutes les impressions de l’air. Avoir une égale sensibilité pour le froid & pour le chaud. La sensibilité des parties nerveuses.” “Sensibilité,” Dictionnaire de L’Académie française (1762), 710. 6. “ . . . une propriété qu’ont certaines parties de percevoir les impressions des objets externes, & de produire en conséquence des mouvemens proportionnés au degré d’intensité de cette perception.” Henri Fouquet, “Sensibilité, Sentiment, (Médecine),” Encyclopédie, 15:38. 7. Julien Offray de La Mettrie, Traité de l’âme in Œuvres philosophiques, 3 vols. (Amsterdam: 1774), 1:82.

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8. “ces modifications sont le désir, l’aversion, la mémoire et l’intelligence,” “L’élément séminal . . . aura quelque mémoire de sa situation première,” “une groupe d’abeilles . . . n’ayant la mémoire vive que d’une seule situation,” “Quand l’impression d’une situation présente balancera ou éteindra la mémoire d’une situation passée,” and “chaque élément aura perdu la mémoire de soi.” Diderot, De l’Interpretation de la nature, Pensée 50, in Œuvres complètes de Diderot, edited by Jean Assézat and Maurice Tourneux (Paris: Garnier, 1875–1877), 2:46–47 9. “Omnes elementorum perceptiones conspirare, et in unam fortiorem et magis perfectam perceptionem coalescere videntur. Haec forte ad unamquamque ex aliis perceptionibus se habet in eadem ratione qua corpus organisatum ad elementum. Elementum quodvis, post suam cum aliis copulationem, cum suam perceptionem illarum perceptionibus confudit, et sui conscientiam perdidit primi elementorum status memoria nulla superest, et nostra nobis origo omnino abdita manet.” Ibid., 47. The French translation of Maupertuis’ Inaugural Dissertation in Metaphysics, entitled, Essai sur la formation des corps organisés (Berlin, 1754), rendered the passage thus: “Mais chez nous, il semble que de toutes les perceptions des éléments rassemblés, il en résulte une perception unique beaucoup plus forte, beaucoup plus parfaite qu’aucune des perceptions élémentaires, et qui est peut-être à chacune de ces perceptions dans le même rapport que le corps organisé à l’élément. Chaque élément, dans son union avec les autres, ayant confondu sa perception avec les leurs, et perdu le sentiment particulier du soi, le souvenir de l’état primitif des éléments nous manque, et notre origine doit être entièrement perdu pour nous.” 10. “Pourquoi suis-je tel?” Diderot, Rêve de d’Alembert in Œuvres complètes de Diderot, edited by Jean Assézat and Maurice Tourneux (Paris: Garnier, 1875–1877), 2:137. 11. Diderot’s theory of brins is directly influenced by Haller and his theory of fibers. [Elementa physiologiæ corporis humani, 8 vols., Lausanne: Bousquet, 1757–1766).] 12. “ . . . un assemblage de corps. Le système planétaire.” “Système,” Dictionnaire de L’Académie française (1762), 790. 13. “En effet, pourquoi ne pensé-je pas partout?” Diderot, Rêve de d’Alembert in Œuvres complètes de Diderot, edited by Jean Assézat and Maurice Tourneux (Paris: Garnier, 1875–1877), 2:168. 14. “La raison, le jugement, l’imagination, la folie, l’imbécilité, la férocité, l’instinct . . . toutes ces qualités ne sont que des conséquences du rapport originel ou contracté par l’habitude de l’origine du faisceau à ses ramifications.” Ibid., 169. 15. “Et selon la branche tyrannique qui prédomine, l’instinct qui se diversifie dans les animaux, le génie qui se diversifie dans les hommes; le chien a l’odorat, le poisson l’ouïe, l’aigle la vue; D’Alembert est géomètre, Vaucanson

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201

machiniste, Grétry musicien, Voltaire poëte; effets variés d’un brin du faisceau plus vigoureux en eux qu’aucun autre et que le brin semblable dans les êtres de leur espèce.” Ibid., 170.

NOTES TO THE CONCLUSION 1. “L’intermédiaire entre l’homme et les autres animaux, c’est le singe.” Eléments de physiologie in Œuvres: Philosophie, edited by Laurent Versini (Paris: Robert Laffont, 1994), 1:1278. 2. “La Nature n’a fait qu’un très petit nombre d’êtres qu’elle a variés à l’infini, peut-être qu’un seul par la combinaison, mixtion, dissolution duquel tous les autres ont étés formés.” Ibid., 1261. 3. “Quand on voit les métamorphoses successives de l’enveloppe du prototype, quel qu’il ait été, approcher un règne d’un autre règne par des degrés insensibles . . . qui ne se sentirait porté à croire qu’il n’y a jamais eu qu’un premier être prototype de tous les êtres?” Diderot, De l’interprétation de la nature, Pensée 12, in Œuvres complètes de Diderot, edited by Jean Assézat and Maurice Tourneux (Paris: Garnier, 1875–1877), 2:16. 4. “On appelle êtres contradictoires ceux, dont l’organisation ne s’arrange pas avec le reste de l’univers. La nature aveugle qui les produit, les extermine.” Diderot, Eléments de physiologie in Œuvres: Philosophie, edited by Laurent Versini (Paris: Robert Laffont, 1994), 1:1261. 5. “Il faut classer les êtres depuis la molécule inerte, s’il en est, jusqu’à la molécule vivante, à l’animal-plante, à l’animal microscopique, à l’animal, à l’homme.” Ibid. 6. “ . . . et le chaînon qui paraît manquer réside peut-être dans un être connu, à qui les progrès de l’anatomie comparée n’ont encore pu assigner sa véritable place.” Ibid. 7. “Qui sait ce que deviennent les molécules insensibles des animaux après leur mort?” Ibid. 8. “Pourquoi la longue série des animaux ne serait-elle pas des développements d’un seul?” Ibid., 1275. 9. “Camper fait naître d’un seul modèle, dont il ne fait qu’altérer la ligne faciale, tous les animaux, depuis l’homme jusqu’à la cigogne. Il ne faut pas croire que les animaux ont toujours été et qu’ils resteront toujours tels que nous les voyons. C’est l’effet d’un laps éternel de temps, après lequel leur couleur, leur forme semble garder un état stationnaire; mais cet état n’est qu’apparent.” Ibid. Assézat and Tourneux footnote that Diderot met Camper at the Hague and praised “the good and celebrated” naturalist in the Voyage en Hollande (A-T, 9:264n1).

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Index

A Accidents, hereditary 12–13, 51, 57, 63, 65, 68, 109–111, 119, 122, 127, 132–135, 144, 163, 165 Adam and Eve 12, 69, 70, 80, 102, 105, 125, 151 Adams, David 55, 75, 134, 138 Age of the earth 2–3, 66 Alembert, Jean Le Rond d’ 3, 9, 23, 43, 60, 161 Amelioration of species 11, 41, 58, 66–67, 74, 111, 116, 119, 120, 124– 129, 131, 134, 142, 144–145 Ammonites 2 Androgynes 48, 137 Andry de Bois-Regard, Nicolas 70 Animalcules 10–11, 33, 36–37, 51, 53–54, 57, 62, 77, 92–96, 105, 127– 129, 164 Animal kingdom 13, 15, 39, 91, 103, 115, 154 consciousness of 63–64, 109–110, 132, 147–162 passim extinction of 4, 10, 12, 24, 34, 42, 66 fossils of 2–6, 44, 72, 99, 103, 109, 117 prototype of 13 Animal-plants 106, 113, 122 Aristotle 11, 74, 102–103 Arrangement of parental elements 6–7, 12, 16, 38, 42, 55, 61–63, 119, 122, 127, 132–133, 138, 147, 163 Asbestos 106, 122

Atomes, see Atoms Atoms (atomes) 8–9, 14, 17, 19–21, 24–28, 36–40, 48–50, 81–82, 86, 88– 89, 93, 96, 98–99, 103, 137, 142, 145, 152, 164 consciousness of 7, 14, 17, 61, 96, 99, 133, 145, 149–150, 152, 165 Epicurus/Lucretius and 8, 88 indivisibility and 8 motion and 8–9, 17, 19–21, 24–27, 88 random collisions of 8, 24–27, 37, 49, 51, 81, 86, 99, 103, 137, 152, 164 vital 82, 89, 93, 96 Aumont, d’ 54

B Baumann, Dr. (Maupertuis’ pseudonym) 13, 57–58, 110 Berkeley, George 60 Birth defects 7, 9–10, 12, 16–18, 20–21, 28–37, 42, 48, 51, 55–56, 58, 61–64, 72, 76, 86, 90, 96–97, 104, 113, 119, 125–127, 135– 144, 150, 164 Boerhaave, Hermann 54 Bohu, see Desolation Bonnet, Charles 54, 60, 70–72, 75, 84, 104, 108 Bordeu, Théophile de 15, 54, 83 Bourguet, Louis 5 Brain 7, 15, 144–145, 149, 157–162 Breathe together, to (conspirare) 150–151

213

214 Brins, see Fibers Buffon, Georges-Louis Leclerc, comte de 4–8, 10–12, 15, 17–18, 22, 41–42, 44, 49–50, 54, 61, 66–67, 70, 72, 74–76, 82–83, 87, 89, 93, 98, 103, 105–114, 119–122, 124–126, 130–132, 134, 136, 142, 144, 164, 166 age of the earth and 4–5 animalcules and 10, 82–83, 87, 89, 93, 105 chain of beings and 103, 105–106, 108, 134 climate and 4, 12, 44, 50, 66, 119, 132 cosmogony and 5 consciousness and 110 crossbreeding and 70, 119, 126, 130–131 degeneration and 12, 44, 74, 119, 124, 126, 166 diet and 66, 74–75, 119, 132 domestication and 74–75 epigenesis and 10, 54, 70, 76 flux and 22, 108 fossils and 44, 66 heredity and 70, 74–75 interior mold and 67 matrix theory and 49 mutability of species and 6–7, 50, 107, 109, 119, 122, 164 Needham and 10, 82–83, 87, 89, 93, 105 organic molecules and 7, 76, 136 overlapping physical characteristics and 11, 49, 105–106, 108, 111, 113, 121, 164 prototype and 41, 67, 111, 125–126, 134 species and 17, 41, 44, 50, 104, 107 spontaneous generation and 82, 89, 93, 98 time and 108 vital atoms and 89, 93 Bull, metaphor of the 31, 91, 94, 96–97 Burnet, Thomas 5 Butterfly effect 35, 37

C Camper, Pieter 166 Caractères, see Printer’s type

Index Castel’s ribbons 98, 104, 109, 116, 129, 157 Catastrophism 4–5 Chain of beings 101–117, 126, 129–132, 134, 137, 140, 153–154, 164–166 continuity and the 103–104, 108, 115– 116, 147, 152, 154, 156 definition of 101 divisions between kingdoms 13, 103– 106, 113, 120, 122 plenitude 102–104, 116 Chance, games of 8–9, 15, 18–19, 21–23, 25–26, 29–30, 33–34, 39, 50, 84, 103–104, 123, 125, 128, 137, 163–164 Chance, random 3, 6, 8–10, 13, 17, 19, 21, 25–28, 34–35, 38–39, 41, 47, 51, 58, 63, 65, 68, 79, 85, 105, 111, 125–126, 132, 134, 137, 165 Chaos (chaos) 8, 18, 19–51 passim, 68, 87, 92, 115, 125, 137 butterfly effect and 35, 37 definition 19 20 Genesis and 20 origin of the universe and 24, 27, 36, 68, 125, 137 probability and 8–9, 15, 19–51 passim, 125, 163–164 Chaos theory 35, 37, 50 Characteristics, overlapping physical 6, 11, 13, 40, 42, 49, 105–106, 108– 112, 116–117, 120–122, 129, 133, 149, 157, 163–164 Charity Hospital (hôpital de La Charité) 54 Chicks and Diderot 72–73 Classification Buffon and 111 Diderot and 111–112, 165 Linnaeus and 111–112 Climate 4, 6, 11–12, 44, 50, 66–67, 108, 114, 119–120, 122–123, 132, 163–164 Clock metaphor of the universe 28, 34, 38–39, 41, 80–81 Conception 12, 14, 40, 48–49, 54–55, 63, 66, 68–69, 72, 74–75,

Index 101–102, 111, 134, 138, 149, 154, 158 Conception, false, see Moals Conscious (sensible) 7, 14–15, 36, 64, 68– 71, 73–74, 76, 81, 90–91, 95– 99, 104, 109–110, 113–114, 119, 121–122. 124, 132–134, 141, 145, 147–162 definition of sensible 147 molecules 14, 64, 68–69, 73–74, 97–99, 104, 113, 120–122, 133–134, 145, 152, 154, 165 Consciousness (sensibilité) 5–8, 13–15, 17, 61, 63–66, 69, 71, 73–76, 85, 95–97, 99, 110, 113–115, 122, 124, 133, 141, 144–145, 147–162 ascent of (emergence of ) 8, 13–14, 147–162 of animals 109–110, 132 definition of sensibilité 147–148 of keyboards 155 of the mineral kingdom 63, 114–115, 152–154, 163 universal 64 of the vegetable kingdom 64, 97–98, 104, 113–115, 121, 148, 154, 157, 165 Conspirare, see Breathe together, to Contiguity 14, 40, 141, 147, 152, 155–156 definition 40 Continuity 14, 40, 102–104, 108, 115–116, 147, 152, 154–156 definition 40 Coulet, Henri 16, 32–33 Crayfish and preformation 72 Creation 2, 4–5, 7, 10, 13, 19–20, 33, 38, 53, 59–60, 70, 72, 75, 83–84, 87, 99, 102, 104–105, 109, 125–126, 128, 136–137, 142, 166 dating of 4–5, 66, 102 Cretins 12 Crocker, Lester 15, 34, 83–85 Crossbreeding 6, 10–12, 14, 40, 61–63, 70, 72, 119–120, 126, 129–132, 139, 163–165

215 Cudworth, Ralph 59 Cyclops 140, 143, 158

D d’Alembert, see Alembert, Jean Le Rond d’ d’Aumont, see Aumont, d’ 54 Da Vinci, Leonardo 11 Defects, birth 7, 9–10, 12, 16–18, 20–21, 28–37, 42, 48, 51, 55–56, 58, 61–64, 72, 76, 86, 90, 96–97, 104, 113, 119, 125–127, 135– 144, 150, 164 monsters with deficiencies 17, 58, 64 monsters with extra parts 17, 58, 64 Degeneration 11–12, 74–75, 119, 124–129, 137, 142, 164, 166 domestication and 6, 74, 113, 130 extinction and 2, 4, 6, 10, 12, 24, 34, 42, 46, 67, 74–75, 77, 91, 98, 103, 109, 116, 123–125, 128, 142, 145 Democritus 25 Dés, see Dice Descartes, René 60–61, 79–80, 124, 149 Desolation (bohu) 20 Dice (dés) 8–9, 13, 19, 23, 25–26, 34, 39, 50, 84, 103, 125, 128, 164 Diderot, Denis classification and 111–112 Conversation between d’Alembert and Diderot 7, 13, 42, 49, 68–71, 75, 114, 119, 134, 153, 156–157 D’Alembert’s Dream 1, 7, 9, 11, 13, 16– 17, 19–20, 22, 24, 33, 36, 40, 49, 50–51, 66, 68, 73, 75, 79, 86, 88, 90, 97, 104, 108, 115, 122–124, 126–127, 134, 139, 141, 145, 152–153, 155–157 deistic period (1746) 15, 33, 80, 83–85 eggs and 10, 17, 37, 53–55, 57, 70–73, 75–76, 83, 95–97, 135, 138– 139 Elements of Physiology 16, 33, 140, 163, 165 Encyclopedia and 3–7, 9, 12, 19, 23, 54, 56, 60, 65, 70, 74, 109, 129– 130, 132, 139, 147–148

216 epigenesis and 6, 8, 10–12, 36, 53–77, 113, 134–135, 138–139, 141, 143, 154, 163–164 final causes and 34 Letter on the Blind 7, 9, 19–22, 28–29, 34–35, 40, 42, 51, 56, 82–83, 85, 98, 104, 125, 136, 139, 151, 157 letters to Duclos 114 letters to Sophie Volland 23, 129, 141 mechanism and 10, 14, 34, 63, 69, 71, 84, 152, 162 On Two Treatises by d’Alembert,One concerning the Computation of Probability, the Other, Inoculation 9, 23 opposition to Voltaire 90 pantheism (Spinozism) and 15, 70–71, 73, 83, 91–92, 153, 165 Philosophic Thoughts Thought 18 80 Thought 19 80–81, 85, 98 Thought 20 105 Thought 21 9, 20, 23–26, 28–30, 35, 38, 40, 49, 103, 136 Plan for a University 24 probability theory and 6–7, 9, 25–27, 29, 32, 34–35, 38, 164 Refutation of Man 71 Sequel to the Conversation 7, 13, 130 Thoughts on the Interpretation of Nature Thought 4 58 Thought 12 11, 13–14, 19, 40–41, 58, 101, 107, 110, 120, 133– 134, 149 Thought 20 105 Thought 32 55, 138 Thought 48 111 Thought 49 17, 112 Thought 50 53, 56–59, 62, 65, 112, 122, 133, 147, 149–150 Thought 51 58 Thought 55 58 Thought 58 14, 22, 42–44, 65, 87, 113, 153 Diet 6, 11, 66–67, 74–75, 113–114, 119– 120, 122–124, 132, 163–164

Index Doctors of Montpellier 54 Dodart, Denis 54, 72 Domestication 6, 74–75, 113, 130 Drelincourt, Charles 54 Duchet, Michèle 17 Duclos, Charles Pinot 114 Dwarfism 10, 12

E Earth, age of 1–6, 66, 102 Ectopic pregnancy (moal) 55–56, 138–139 Eggs and Diderot 10, 17, 37, 53–55, 57, 70–73, 75–76, 83, 95–97, 135, 138–139 Ehrard, Jean 17 Elements, parental errors in the arrangement of 6–7, 12, 16–17, 51, 55, 57, 62–63, 65, 77, 112, 119, 122, 127, 132, 135, 163 consciousness of 7, 14, 56, 61–64, 133, 149–150, 154 Elements, seminal 133, 150 Emboîtement (encasement), see Preformation Embryos epigenesis of 6, 8, 10–12, 36, 53–77, 113, 134–135, 138–139, 141, 143, 154, 163–164 false conceptions (moals) 55–56, 138–139 nourishment of 43, 67, 71, 76, 135, 158 preformation of 10, 12, 44, 53, 55–57, 59–60, 64, 69–70, 72, 74–76, 80, 85, 134, 138, 141, 164 Embryology 10, 53–77 passim Emergent consciousness 14, 147–162 Emptiness (tohu) 20 Encasement (emboîtement), see Preformation Encyclopedia articles on animals 109, 130 chaos 19, 68 consciousness 147–148 embryos 54, 70–71 fossils 3–6, 65–66 harpsichords 129 heredity 132 matter 60, 70–71

Index probability 9, 22–23 Spinoza 70–71 unicorns 56, 139 Environment 34, 50, 83, 113, 116, 122– 125, 157 Ephemeral, fallacy of 32 Epicurus 8, 10–11, 25, 79, 88, 93, 99, 116–117 Epigenesis 6, 8, 10–12, 36, 53–77, 113, 134–135, 138–139, 141, 143, 154, 163–164 Errors, hereditary 12–13, 51, 57, 63, 65, 68, 109–111, 119, 122, 127, 132–135, 144, 163, 165 Eternity 19, 22, 24, 28, 32, 38, 50, 91–92, 98–99, 124–125, 164 Extinction 2, 4, 6, 10, 12, 24, 34, 42, 46, 67, 74–75, 77, 91, 98, 103, 109, 116, 123–125, 128, 142, 145

F Facial line 166 Faisceaux de fils, see Threads, bundles of False conception, see Moals Fermat, Pierre 8, 10, 126 Fermentation 11, 31, 36–37, 79, 85–86, 88, 92–94, 97–98, 105, 116, 128–129, 142 Fetus 16, 54, 56, 61–62, 65, 68–70, 139–140 Fibers (brins) 6–7, 14–16, 33, 71, 76, 113, 133–135, 140, 155–158, 162 Figured stones (pierres figurées), see Stones, figured Fils, see Threads Final causes 34 Fizes, Antoine 54 Flux 8–9, 13, 16, 18–51 passim, 65, 71, 85, 92, 94, 99, 104–105, 108, 112, 115–116, 121–122, 125–129, 140, 142, 145, 154, 164 Fontenelle, Bernard Le Bouyer de 32–33 Fontenelle’s roses 32–33, 40 Food 6, 11, 24, 34, 66, 74–75, 107, 114, 119–120, 122, 125, 137, 155, 163–164

217 Fossils 2–6, 44, 99, 103, 109, 117 Fractals 36–37, 46–49, 86

G Games of chance 8–9, 13, 15, 18–19, 21– 23, 25–26, 29–30, 34, 39, 50, 84, 103–104, 123, 125, 137, 163–164 Gassendi, Pierre 88 Generation, spontaneous, see Spontaneous generation Genesis 1, 6, 8, 12, 20, 69–72, 79–80, 99, 102, 105, 125, 151 Geoffroy, Etienne-François 70 Geography 6, 11, 50, 116, 119–120, 122– 124, 156, 163–164 Glass, Bentley 16–17, 57–58, 107

H Haber, Francis 4–5 Haller, Albrecht von 54, 60, 69–72 Halley, Edmund 2 Harter, Richard 1 Hartsoeker, Nicholas 80 Harvey, William 10, 53, 56, 69–70, 72–74, 77, 79, 139 Helmont, Jan Baptista Van 79 Hereditary defects 12–13, 51, 57, 63, 65, 68, 109–111, 119, 122, 127, 132–135, 144, 163, 165 Hermaphrodites 16, 97, 51, 143 Herschel, William 50 Hill, Emita 139–141 Holbach, Paul Henri Thiry d’ 4 Hooke, Robert 2 Human polyps 10, 48, 72, 108, 127, 141 Hybrids 6, 10–12, 14, 40, 61–63, 70, 72, 119–120, 126, 129–132, 139, 163–165

I Ides, Evert Ysbrandszoon 3 Inherited defect (vice héréditaire) 143 Interior mold (moule intérieure) 67, 113–114

J James, Richard 2

218 K Kingdoms animal 13, 15, 39, 91, 103, 115, 154 mineral 15, 17, 32, 36, 41–42, 50, 63, 67, 77, 87, 91, 113–115, 152–154, 163 vegetable 64, 67, 91, 115, 121, 148

L La Mettrie, Julien Offray de 15–18, 54, 64, 83–84, 108, 149 La Touche (Chevalier Louis-Camus Destouches-Canon) 43 Latus 115 Leeuwenhoek, Antonie van 80, 89 Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm 5, 15, 59–60, 83, 85 Leucippus 25 Liceti, Fortunio 79 Linnaeus, Carolus 111–112 Literary style herringbone 39, 46, 126 iconic representation 26, 31, 36, 39, 41, 46, 57, 91, 94, 98, 109, 116, 121, 126–128, 138, 145, 164 pluralization 31, 121 tautology 22, 26, 36, 38–39, 41, 44–45, 86–87, 91, 112, 121, 127–128, 145, 150–151 Lithophytes 106, 113, 122 Living point (point vivant) 68–69, 71–75, 135, 158 Locke, John 60, 91, 124 Louis (surgeon) 55 Lovejoy, Arthur O. 17, 107 Lucretius Carus, Titus 6–8, 16, 18, 20, 25, 30–35, 37–38, 51, 79, 81, 86–88, 90–91, 93–97, 105, 117, 125–126, 136–137, 145, 152, 165 Ludolf, Heinrich Wilhelm 2

M Macé, Jean-Baptiste 76, 135, 144 Magnification, levels of 43–44, 47–49, 86, 88, 90–91, 94, 156

Index Maillet, Benoît de 15, 33, 83 Malebranche, Nicolas 60, 72 Malpighi, Marcello 70 Mammoths 2–3, 5 Marcellus 54 Mariotte, Edme 72 Materialism 16–17, 70, 80, 83, 85, 95, 153 Materialists 88, 108, 152 Matrix theory 41, 49 Matrix paradigm 41–42, 49, 105, 108, 111, 117, 163–164 Mattmugham 54 Maupertuis, Pierre-Louis de 5–8, 10, 12–17, 51, 54, 57–59, 61–65, 68, 70–72, 74, 76–77, 83–84, 109–111, 119, 127, 132–135, 144, 149–150, 152–156, 158, 163–165 Memis, John 55, 138 Mendel, Gregor Johann 17, 58 Mersenne, Father Marin 79 Metamorphosis of Daphne 121 Methodists 111 Mimosa 148 Mineral kingdom 15, 17, 32, 36, 41–42, 50, 63, 67, 77, 87, 91, 113–115, 152–154, 163 consciousness of 63, 114–115, 152–154, 163 Moals 55–56, 138–139 Mold, interior 67, 107, 113–114 Molyneux, William 29 Monkeys 61, 68, 106, 112, 121, 163 Monniotte 24 Monsters 7, 9–10, 12, 16–18, 20–21, 28–37, 42, 48, 51, 55–56, 58, 61–64, 72, 76, 86, 90, 96–97, 104, 113, 119, 125–127, 135– 144, 150, 164 More, Henry 59 Motion 6, 8–9, 14–15, 17, 19–22, 24–28, 30, 32–33, 38, 42–45, 47, 50–51, 56, 60, 66–68, 71–74, 80–81, 84–85, 87–88, 90–92, 102, 107–108, 110, 112–113, 122, 126, 138, 140, 148–149, 152, 154

Index Movement, see Motion Musschenbroek, Pieter van 80 Mutability of species 8–9, 11–12, 44, 50, 119–145, 164

N Naigeon, Jacques-André 89 Nature, plastic 59 Needham, John Turberville 10, 54, 82–83, 85, 87, 89–91, 93, 105 Needs produce organs 116, 142, 145 Neo-Spinozist 15, 70–71, 73, 80, 153, 165 Network, three dimensional 6, 11, 41, 116, 164 Newton, Isaac 39, 51, 54, 50, 71–72, 80 Nieuwentyt, Bernard 80 Noah 1–6, 79, 102

O Organic molecules 7, 13, 61, 67, 76, 135–136 Organization 6, 8–9, 14–15, 17, 24, 26–27, 36, 38–39, 42, 47–49, 51, 56, 59, 61, 66, 68–69, 71–73, 77, 84, 86–88, 92–93, 97–99, 104, 108, 112–113, 15, 121, 128, 138–141, 149, 152–158, 162–163, 165 Organized stones 106, 122 Origin of the universe 24, 27, 36, 38, 87, 102 Ovid 121

P Pantheism 15, 70–71, 73, 80, 91, 153, 165 Parental elements errors in the arrangement of 6–7, 12, 16–17, 51, 55, 57, 62–63, 65, 77, 112, 119, 122, 127, 132, 135, 163 consciousness of 7, 14, 56, 61–64, 133, 149–150, 154 Pascal, Blaise 8–10, 13, 126, 163–164 Perfection of species 11, 41, 58, 66–67, 74, 111, 116, 119, 120, 124–129, 131, 134, 142, 144–145 Perkins, Jean E. 17

219 Perturbations 35, 112 Petit, Antoine 54 Physical characteristics, shared 6, 11, 13, 40, 42, 49, 105–106, 108–112, 116–117, 120–122, 129, 133, 149, 157, 163–164 Planets 36–39, 42–44, 47, 51, 86, 88, 91–92, 128, 141 Plante sensitive 148 Plastic nature 59 Plato 48, 101–103 Plenitude 102–104, 116 Point, living (point vivant) 68–69, 71–75, 135, 158 Polar man 98, 116, 124, 128–129, 142, 166 Polydactyly 16, 57, 62, 72, 76, 119, 132, 143 Polyps 8, 10, 12, 17–18, 48, 56–57, 64, 72, 83–85, 90, 107–109, 112, 127, 131, 133, 141–142, 145, 164 Trembley’s 48, 56, 83, 107–108, 141 Preformation 10, 12, 44, 53, 55–57, 59–60, 64, 69–70, 72, 74–76, 80, 85, 134, 138, 141, 164 crayfish and 72 definition 10, 53 Dodart and 54, 72 Malebranche and 60, 72 Mariotte and 72 ovism and 70, 138 Réaumur and 72 Russian dolls, paradigm of 10, 53, 72 Swammerdam and 69, 72 Pregnancies, ectoptic, see Moals Printer’s type (caractères) 9, 21, 26, 49 Probability theory 6–7, 9, 25–27, 29, 32, 34–35, 38, 164 Pulskamp, Richard J. 9, 23 Punctum saliens, see Rising point Putrefaction 79–81

Q Quadrupeds 13, 41, 95, 110, 112, 121

R Rabastans, Siamese twins of 20, 51, 144, 160 Random chance, see Chance, random Ray, John 5

220 Réaumur, René-Antoine de 2, 72, 84 Resemblance 57, 61–62, 64–65, 101, 132–135 definition 57, 132 Rising point (punctum saliens) 69, 74 Rivard, Dominique François 24–25, 29 Robinet, Jean-Baptiste-René 15, 68, 83 Roger, Jacques 79, 89–90, 105–106 Roux, Augustin 54 Rudbeck, Olof 1 Ruhe family 16, 57, 119, 132 Russian doll paradigm of preformation 10, 53, 72 Ruysch, Frederik 54

Index Spinoza, Benedict de 15, 70–71, 73, 165 Sponges 106, 122 Spontaneous generation 6, 8, 10–11, 31–32, 37, 51, 67, 77, 79–99, 105, 116, 163–165 Stenger, Gerhardt 16 Steno (Niels Stensen) 2, 5 Stone-plants 113, 122 Stones, figured (pierres figurées) 5 Strahlenberg, Philip Johann von 3 Stratigraphy 1 Strings, vibrating 155–157 Substances, subordinate intelligent 59–60 Suratteau, Aurélie 16 Swammerdam, Jan 69, 72

S Saunderson, Nicholaus 28–29 Scheuchzer, Johan Jakob 5 Schmidt, Johan Werner 16 Scott, Michon 1–2 Sensibilité, see Consciousness Sensible, see Conscious Sexdigitism 16, 57, 62, 72, 76, 119, 132, 143 Siamese twins 10, 12, 20, 47–49, 51, 72, 76, 127, 135, 141, 144–145, 160, 164 of Rabastans 20, 51, 144, 160 Siberian mammoths 2–3 Singh, Christine M. 16 Spallanzani, Lazzaro 88–89 Spangler, May 107–108, 131 Species amelioration of 11, 41, 58, 66–67, 74, 111, 116, 119, 120, 124–129, 131, 134, 142, 144–145 climate and 4, 6, 11–12, 44, 50, 66–67, 108, 114, 119–120, 122–123, 132, 163–164 extinction of 2, 4, 6, 10, 12, 24, 34, 42, 46, 67, 74–75, 77, 91, 98, 103, 109, 116, 123–125, 128, 142, 145 overlapping physical characteristics of 6, 11, 13, 40, 42, 49, 105–106, 108–112, 116–117, 120–122, 129, 133, 149, 157, 163–164

T Tencin, Claudine-Alexandrine Guérin, Marquise de 43 Teratisms 7, 9–10, 12, 16–18, 20–21, 28–37, 42, 48, 51, 55–56, 58, 61–64, 72, 76, 86, 90, 96–97, 104, 113, 119, 125–127, 135– 144, 150, 164 Thales 25 Thomson, Ann 17 Threads (fils) 6–7, 14–16, 33, 51, 72–73, 75–76, 134–135, 140, 143– 144, 157–162, 166 bundles of (faisceaux de fils) 6–7, 14, 51, 71, 76, 113, 134, 162 Time 19–51 passim Tohu (emptiness) 20 Trembley’s polyp 48, 56, 83, 107–108, 141 Tronchin, Théodore 54

U Ussher, James 66, 102

V Vartanian, Aram 16–17, 83, 108 Vegetable kingdom 64, 67, 91, 115, 121, 148 consciousness of the 64, 97–98, 104, 113–115, 121, 148, 154, 157, 165 plante sensitive 148 Verdier, César 54

Index Vernière, Paul 21, 24, 33, 108 Vibrating strings 155–157 Voltaire, François-Marie Arouet de 82, 89–90

221 Whiston, William 5 Winslow, Jacques-Bénigne 33 Witsen, Nicolaas 3 Woodward, John 5

W Wartofsky, Marx W. 17 Watch metaphor of the universe 28, 34, 38–39, 41, 80–81 Way of life 11, 50, 119–120, 122, 124, 163–164

X Ximènes, marquis de 114

Z Zoophytes 106, 122