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Dialectic of Action
George T. Rozos
Dialectic of Action
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Mrnim
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mmi
•Hi
KSaSSi
flMMftM
Dialectic of Action
George T. Rozos
Dialectic of Action
«HESTIA» PUBLISHERS & BOOKSELLERS ATHENS 1994
First Edition: September 1994 Published by: «Hestia» Publishers & Booksellers, Athens, Greece Copyright © 1994, George T. Rozos Cover art and photograph: Ellen Looft Cover design: Patricia McLaughlin Technical Consulting: «Politica Themata» Inc. Printing: Photodotis Press, Greece Binding: Hasapakis ISBN: 960-050-584-5
All revolutions, in the sciences no less than in world history, originate solely from the fact that Spirit, in order to understand and comprehend itself with a view to possessing itself, has changed its categories, comprehending itself more truly, more deeply, more intimately, and more in unity with itself Philosophy of Nature
Preface This work returns to the perennial question of the relationship between theory and practice in the hope of adding some light to the related issue of the meaning and justification of radical action. The question is pursued with the help of the dialectic, and especially through an important feature of it, according to which rationality — that which supplies a valid form of justification — is a matter of continuous reinterpretation at various levels, until an all-inclusive level of meaning has been reached. Such structuralization of reason, which combines unity with difference, enables us to deal more effectively with the recurring problem of dualism, whereby practice and theory, action and its justification, belong to different universes, that of action and thought, respectively. Whether the justification of an action is moral or instrumental, it is pursued in the realm of words, concepts, and ideas, whereas action belongs to the realm of physicality. Hegel's Logic is the locus classicus for the development and defense of the dialectical method, as his Philosophy of Nature and Philosophy of Spirit are for its application to the corpus of disciplinary knowledge. All three, and especially the Logic, are used extensively in overcoming the difficulties associated with rigid dualism, and in effecting a synthesis of theory and practice which is logically sound and relevant to recent social and historical experience. All good philosophy is not only true but part of living experience, though the link between the two may not be immediately apparent and must, therefore, be made explicit. Such is the nature of Hegel's philosophy, inasmuch as it is notoriously difficult and the logical chains leading to the all-inclusive context of meaning, wherein all dualities have been overcome, are both long and tortuous. Yet there are ways that this project can be made intellectually more manageable, and educationally more available to a wider public than students of philosophy. One such way is to begin with those aspects of the dialectic of theorypractice which translate most easily into recognizable experience. Having learned from the self-critique of reason that it is not homogeneous, w e must now exercise caution in dealing in the same way with thought-forms (dialectical categories) and language. Granted, as a philosophical discipline, the dialectic shares with other philosophical systems the discursive medium of language. But unlike other systems with objectivist bias in regard to experience, the dialectic has inherited a distinct preoccupation with subjectivity from its romantic and idealist lineage. This, along with the structuralization of rationality, proves a clear advantage in pursuing the intended syn-
thesis and, a unique opportunity to use recent historical experience, such as that of the activists of the 1960s and the terrorists of the 1980s, for illustration. While the romantic impulse provides the activistic impetus of the subject, and idealism supplies the conviction that what appears to be external is in truth the subject's o w n creation, the dialectic serves to employ them at the service of the synthesis of theory and practice. In short, our dialectical strategy consists in transposing action from the objectivist setting of theory-practice — where it is interlinked with other polarities, such as mental-physical, thought-action, internal-external, subject-object — to the humanistic setting of subjectivity as defined by romanticism and idealism. At the same time the dialectic secures the effort against developing into a solipsistic exercise, or a sickly romantic quest, through the hierarchical structuralization of reason, which allows for a continuous reinterpretation of both subjectivity and objectivity, until the all-inclusive context of meaning has been reached. By placing action in the setting of consciousness, reason itself becomes the actor, thus transforming the critique of what is ostensibly external to a self-critique rendering explicit the categorial apparatus and language alongside the content of action. Contrary to the appearance that such a shift may mean fleeing from the exteriority of hard reality to the interiority of consciousness, this move involves graduating from a lower grade of reality shorn of presuppositions, to a higher form which incorporates the presuppositions rendered explicit at the lower stage. Not unlike good theater, and art in general, the distancing from commonsensical reality enhances, rather than diminishes, reality by making us conscious not only of the realistic counterparts of the work of art, but of the moral and epistemological categories of the artist as well. The Dialectic of Action rests heavily on the above features of the dialectic for the justification of radical action. The activistic conception of reason in conjunction with hierarchical structuralization, translates into a progressive reinterpretation of action. But more important for our purposes, the discontinuities implicit in the levels of rationality also imply a discontinuity in the manner whereby activistic reason moves from one level to another. Contingency and irrationality (as defined by scientism) are as much integral parts of dialectical reason as determinacy and scientistic rationality, but this has been obscured in certain lower grades of reason through their one-sidedness. For example, the element of contingency is part of the scientistic setting of theory-practice, but from its standpoint it belongs somewhere "out there," to be domesticated by a more satisfactory, or contingency-free, theory. However, once transposed to the world of enriched subjectivity and dialectically transformed into a higher grade of practice, action is shown to be equally infected by contingency. Indeed, it is the element of contingency (immediacy in the generalized dialectical terminology which applies to both subject and object) in its interplay with determinacy (dialectically generalized as mediation) which makes possible the movement of self-constituting reason. The ascent toward all-inclusiveness
involves both kinds of activity — mediation to promote lateral movement according to a set of rules (rationality) within any given universe of discourse, and immediacy to effect a leap (irrationality, by the prevailing rules of the game), upward to the next. The dialectic of action consists of the interplay of immediacy and mediation — the radical and the conservative (or consolidating) faces of Spirit. Radical action is justified through identification with immediacy as a necessary ingredient of activistic reason. Given the conception of structuralized reason, and the function of immediacy and mediation in propelling it along its activistic path, the dialectic of action can also be exemplified in the more concrete form of institutional organization of intellectual products: knowledge organized along disciplinary lines in an ascending order of dialectical sophistication, coupled with a series of reformulations of the concept of action. The resulting forms of action correspond in turn to discourses appropriate to them: commonsensically pragmatic, scientistic, moral (instrumental and substantive), socio-political, historical, and philosophical-dialectical. This allows for an alternative form of justification of radical action through placement in dialectical context, i.e., by forcing the concept of action to show both of its faces in a more easily recognizable context: its conservative face within any given discourse or disciplinary body of knowledge and its radical face in the transition from the one to the next. The organization of the Dialectic of Action highlights these internal features of the dialectic, while rendering philosophy a living experience by bringing them to bear on easily recognizable social and historical experience. The work has been divided into three parts, the first and last of which are more concrete and the middle more abstract and technical. Part I, titled "Paradigms and Illustrations of Dialectical Synthesis," is devoted to an experiential dialectic of action constructed entirely from disciplinary material, encounters of everyday life and historical experiences of the 1960s. It serves as an introduction to the more demanding Part III and as a fund of illustrations to be used extensively in the course of the latter. Since most of the important ingredients of the dialectic of action — transcendence, presuppositional challenge, circularity, immediacy, mediation, dialectical incorporation and the conception of the absolute — are introduced in Part I, the reader can use it in conjunction with the transitional Part II in order to skip the difficult Part III on first reading, and go directly to the critical and more sensuously concrete Parts IV and V, which deal with applications of the dialectic of action. In Part III, titled "A Hegelian Interpretation of the Dialectic of TheoryPractice", the attention shifts to Hegel's texts, especially the two versions of his Logic, for support of our thesis concerning the philosophical legitimation of radical action. The problem faced here is one of exposition: how to balance economy and clarity while minimizing sacrifice in rigor, given the central importance of action in Hegel's dialectic and the emphasis he places
on internal coherence of his system. This difficulty is compounded by the transposition of theory-practice from a setting involving a rigid definition of externality to that of reinterpreted subjectivity, as outlined earlier. The concluding Parts IV and V return to the level of the historically and contemporaneously familiar, by way of raising the possibility of an "applied dialectic," and returning to the issues of rationality and the nature of radical action raised in Part I. These issues are taken up again, now with the benefit of the intervening formal dialectic of Part III. The meaning of an "applied dialectic" is explored briefly with the help of Hegel's own "application" in his Philosophy of Nature. But now it is done after the danger of relapsing into crude scientistic externality has been overcome in the Logic. The results of this exploration are, in turn, used for a critique of Marx's "dialectic" of theory-practice, which is viewed as a classic case of such a relapse. Finally, the work concludes with some thoughts about the relevance of the dialectic of action for the contemporary scene, both internally, in terms of our liberal culture, and across cultures. "Nothing great," as Hegel put it, "has been and nothing great can be accomplished without passion." Such single-mindedness is exemplified in his work, which turns out to be much more about action than what can be inferred from explicit references to it. Indeed, the dialectic is as much about action as it is action, and radical action at that. In the end the Logic is found to have synthesized (immediacy o f ) action and (mediation by) thought about action, but not before the insuperable barrier of externality has been overcome through its transposition to the stage of elevated subjectivity, or Spirit. A strategy has been devised to highlight this driving force of Spirit while alleviating some the difficulties of exposition: All discussion and references to secondary sources, expository or critical, have been omitted, so that full justice can be done to the unifying theme of action. This reflects no disrespect for secondary works or refusal to admit that I have learned from others. Rather it is a matter of judgment that, given the difficulties of exposition, the supreme importance of the dialectic for the matter at hand, and the long and continuing neglect of Hegel, the marginal returns from dealing solely with him seemed considerably higher than engaging in disputations about him. The judgment about Hegel's thought being still in a state of neglect may seem odd in light of what appears as a veritable renaissance in Hegelian studies. However, it takes far more than a plethora of "scholarly research" on the parts of a dismembered Spirit, to usher in a genuine dialectical renaissance. As Hegel would be first to observe, Spirit, "having a being of its own... is self-particularizing, while it still remains self-identical... It does not manifest, or reveal something, but its very m o d e and meaning is this revelation." A number of expository tactics have been adopted to underscore this holistic animus of Spirit and the pedagogy of consciousness-raising appro-
priate to it: (1) Long quotations were selected with an eye to self-containment and continuity. Once stated, these passages are frequently reused in different contexts, variously reconstructed with the help of added parenthetical statements, and illustrated through material from contemporary experience. (2) Key categories from the Logic are used as dialectical roles in which sub-categories of action are cast for the purpose of eliciting their dialectical development. (3) In the same vein of rendering explicit the unifying presence of action, surrogates of these sub-categories are located in the Logic, and the triadic structure of the dialectic is used to show their interchangeability. (4) Organized along alphabetical lines, indexes are particularly useful for reference and guidance in cases where the discourse is essentially linear and inhabited w i t h proper names and atomic events and/or meanings amenable to concise (dictionary-type) definition. As it will become increasingly apparent, a dialectical discourse is, by contrast, circular, intensively self-referential, and highly coherence-dependent for the determination of meaning. Adapting style to subject matter, the customary index was dropped, and an older device of placing notes in the margins was resurrected, in the hope of accenting internal coherence and facilitating the flow of the argument. The Dialectic of Action is addressed to the student of philosophy and social thought, the philosophically inclined general reader and, not least, the reflective radical who wishes to gain some insight into his action. It fits into the current intellectual climate of (re)discovery of Hegel, which coincides with an increasingly skeptical attitude about Marx's stature as a dialectician, a philosopher of radical action, and a visionary of a n e w humanity. Not accidentally, it also coincides with the dismantling of social systems claiming Marx as their patron saint, as well as with a seemingly independent striving to "deconstruct" systematic philosophy — particularly Hegel's, its most illustrious representative.
Acknowledgements and Dedication The writing of this work has been a product of self-imposed isolation. Working on it was an encounter with a giant — an experience I insisted on savoring alone, rather than in the company of others. Nonetheless, this isolation was also externally reinforced, insofar as the spirit of our age, as reflected in prevailing educational environments and especially academic bureaucracies, is neither stimulating, nor nurturing, to projects like this. I would like to thank a number of individuals who have been generous with their support. George Michalakeas and Damon Kaldelis introduced me to the various uses of the computer without which the production of this work would have been much more cumbersome and time-consuming. During the earliest stage of the project, Eugene Gendlin invested many hours teaching me h o w to effectively translate difficult ideas into easily comprehensible language. To the extent that his investment has not paid off, the blame is all mine. Throughout the years, Richard Swiderski has been particularly generous in sharing with me his erudition and rich intellectual resources across disciplines and cultures. Patricia McLaughlin and Patricio Diaz set and styled the manuscript and designed the cover. They balanced economy and taste to produce something which is both highly functional and aesthetically appealing. In addition to creating the representation of dialectical circularity for the cover, Ellen Looft devoted endless hours in editing and proofing the manuscript. For this, and her continuous warmth and moral support in the course of the final stages of this project, I remain deeply grateful. I wish to acknowledge my debt to the following publishers w h o have generously allowed me to quote from their translations of Hegel's and Marx's works: Oxford University Press (U.K.), George Allen and Unwin, Ltd. (U.K.), Humanities Press (U.S.A.), International Publishers (U.S.A.), and Foreign Language Publishing House (Moscow). In the more intimate family circle of my household, I have been blessed with two wonderful daughters, Maria and Laura, who, in their emotional sustenance and youthful wisdom, have managed to incorporate my long hours of isolated existence into a warm and nurturing environment. Finally, this work has been inspired by the memory of the best of those revolutionaries of consciousness and radicals of the future — the generation of the 1960s — and it is to them, in turn, that it is being dedicated.
Contents Preface
ix
I. Paradigms and Illustrations of Dialectical Synthesis of Action A. Political Praxis
3
B. A Psychoanalytic Paradigm
7
C. Scientistic Paradigm: Theory-Practice in the Service of Politics
13
D. Adam Smith's Invisible Hand: An Economic Paradigm for Dialectical Synthesis at the Level of the Group E. Philosophy as a Paradigm for Dialectical Synthesis through Meaning
23 32
II. Structure and Rhythm of the Dialectic A. Structure
45
B. Interchangeably of Categories
55
C. Strategy
65
III. A Hegelian Interpretation of the Dialectic of Theory-Practice A. Theory-Practice and the Logic of Being i. The Two Faces of Being: Immediacy of Practice and Immediacy of Fact
73
ii. Objectivity and Being
79
iii. Subjectivity and Being
90
iv. Further Self-Differentiation of Being
96
B. Theory-Practice and the Logic of Essence i. Reflection and the Priority of Theory in Essence
101
ii. Identity and Difference
115
iii. Dialectic of Reflection
132
iv. Social Scientism and the Logic of Essence
147
v. Dissolution of Theory-Practice
168
vi. Totalization and Action
173
vii. Actualization, Action, and Freedom
204
C. Action and Subjective Spirit i. Self-Actualizing Spirit
219
ii. Soul as Pre-Existing Unity of Theory and Practice
228
iii. Concrete Consciousness
245
iv. Free Mind (or Free Action) as Mediated Unity of Theory and Practice
258
D. Action and Objective Spirit i. Spirit as Re-Immediated Action
271
ii. Spirit as the Unveiling of Re-Immediation
281
iii. The "Is" and the "Ought" as Elements in the Synthesis of Action
293
E. Dialectical Synthesis of Action in the Logic of the Notion i. The Notion in General
309
ii. The Idea
316
iii. Synthesis of the Absolute Idea
337
TV. Misapplications of the Dialectic of Action A. Transition from Logic to Nature
363
B. Nature as a Field of Misinterpretation of the Dialectic
369
C. Marx's Misunderstanding of the Dialectic of Action i. Marx's Critique of the Absolute Idea
375
ii. Theory-Practice in Natural Philosophy and in Philosophy of Nature
390
iii. Marx's Encounter with Hegel's Concept of Spirit
400
iv. Marx's Version of the Dialectic of Action: Praxis
411
V. Contemporary Applications of the Dialectic of Action A. Dialectical Applications Across Cultures (with Special Reference to Concrete Universality)
435
B. Dialectical Applications in Liberal Culture (with Special Reference to Negativity)
461
I. Paradigms and Illustrations of Dialectical Synthesis of Action
The business of philosophy is only to bring into explicit consciousness what the world in all ages has believed about thought. Philosophy therefore advances nothing new; and our present discussion has led us to the conclusion which agrees with the natural belief of mankind. Logic
A. Political Praxis In order to pursue our claim that the dialectic is about action, and radical action at that, w e shall begin with a preliminary definition of the dialectic in the context of a paradigm from radical politics. Implicit in the dialectic is a procedure of challenging what is presupposed or taken for granted within any given level of discourse. Any challenge, indeed any proposition, presupposes a context or level of meaning, and there is a difference between a challenge within any given context and the challenge of the context itself. The radical function of the dialectic derives from this capacity of going beyond what lies on the surface and getting at the root of things by challenging the underlying context. There are other philosophical systems such as phenomenology and analytic philosophy which share this radical function with the dialectic. However, the dialectic is distinguished from these other forms of presuppositional challenge as a result of this radical function being built-into its most fundamental logical features in a system of closely knit parts. The dialectic can thus be tentatively defined as the process whereby contexts of meaning are established only to be challenged as soon as the elaboration of their implications leads to internal contradictions. This propels them to a more inclusive context of meaning, or a higher level of coherence. In being transcended, the previous level of meaning has become explicit and the rules governing its coherence are no longer hidden or taken for granted. Experience is being reordered at each n e w level of meaning which subsumes the previous one under a new set of rules about coherence. The process leads ultimately to an all-inclusive context, where nothing is left implicit and which is at once both the presupposition and the outcome of the whole process. The dialectic, then, can also be said to form a system of hierarchically arranged contexts of meaning in an order of increased comprehensiveness or coherence. Radical politics can illustrate this simple model of the dialectic if we consider a case in which persistent failures and frustrations in one's efforts may lead either to readjustment of values or goals, or to retracing one's steps in an attempt to find out what went wrong. If the latter course is taken, the probe may
Definition of the dialectic as presuppositional challenge.
Illustration through radical politics and the centrality of theory-practice.
The role of violence in transcending scientistic rationality.
range from a search for errors in the application of a given theory, or theory-like proposition, to the re-examination of the theory itself. If this too proves unsatisfactory, the probe may reach the category of theory-practice itself, which underlies all cases of a similar application. Such a probe would indicate that doubt has reached the level (context of meaning) of fundamental cultural rules of the game which a healthy, stable society normally follows unself-consciously. This sequence of probes w o u l d correspond to the levels of meaning outlined above, while the latest of them would qualify as a radical presuppositional challenge because it would involve a wide range of actual and potential activity encompassed by theory-practice. In other words, it would entail a radical critique on a broad cultural front transcending more customary radical probes, such as those focusing on the socio-economic level. Far from saying that our probe is to bypass social and economic conditions as factors for consideration, our claim is that the detection and evaluation of such conditions, screened through the dual category of theory-practice, have to be re-examined along with the latter which has now come under scrutiny as well. This is not the end of the repercussions of the radical challenge just outlined. For the presuppositional challenge of theory-practice has remained, thus far, on the discursive level and as such it has stopped short of the radical possibilities implicit in the physical aspects of politics. To put it differently, the strict compartmentalization of the discursive and physical aspects of culture, including political activity, is the result of structuring by polar categories such as theory-practice. When deeply embedded polarities are undermined by presuppositional challenges of radical politics the field is left open for other forms of action including physicality and violence. Much of the radical political and countercultural scene of the 1960s consisted of such challenges of basic rules of the establishment, including those liberal values of rationality arid efficiency, as incorporated in the logic of theory-practice. Insa narrow sense the latter is part of a cluster of methodological rules that define rationality in science. But in our modern (post-Renaissance) era, wherein science sets general cultural parameters, theory-practice finds itself embedded in a fundamental context of cultural meaning, as the opening paragraphs of this paradigm clearly indicate. Thus, when, as a result of radical action, a transition is made from discursive to non-discursive (physical) means in politics, it turns out that this is no mere leap into irrationality, as defined by the previous context of meaning or as the opponents of the activists are claiming, but a step toward a possible synthesis of
theory and practice in a dialectically higher form of action. For such a synthesis is nothing less than a challenge of the pre-eminence of the particular (scientistic) structuralization of human action along the familiar dualistic format of theory-practice. Having concluded on a note of confidence in regard to the forthcoming synthesis in the hands of the activists, I will n o w add a note of caution, to which I have already hinted by qualifying such synthesis as "possible." In transcending the scientistic context of theory-practice, the activist has also relinquished the predictive logic that goes w i t h it. A full elaboration of this trade-off of determinacy for freedom has to wait until Part III. Suffice it to say that, as with the rest of the transitions from one context of meaning to another in the dialectic, the synthesis at the new level cannot be carried out according to the rules of the old one without the outcome being self-defeated, i.e., without allowing a tacit reintroduction of the old rules into the new context. In this case, one cannot try to transcend theory-practice through (practically validated) theory or (theoretically guided) practice, without reinjecting the theory-practice dualism into the new level. As the dialectic becomes more advanced in its totalizing (anti-abstractive) effort, the step ahead cannot be predicted and the synthesis cannot be planned w i t h o u t aborting the dialectical effort. Scientism owes its predictive powers to abstractive features which, however, the dialectic has to relinquish in transcending theory-practice for the sake of allinclusiveness. Another feature has to be added to the advanced context of meaning in order to accommodate the new situation: A historical-retrodictive logic supplants the prevailing scientistic-predictive one and the dialectical categories undergo a parallel shift from those appropriate to individuals to those fitting collective entities, i.e., from psychological to those which are more properly sociological. These cautions and qualifications regarding dialectical synthesis can be cast in the more concrete language of the paradigm by saying that as the radical challenge becomes more global or cultural, theorizing becomes increasingly impotent in handling the contingent elements of social experience, which by now begin to fall between the interstices of theory-practice. Consequently, presuppositional challenge manifests itself in the unself-conscious domain of radical politics less in rational deliberation and more as a spontaneous, experiential (total body) response to grievous experience. For example, it is not likely that the paradigm can be exemplified in an individual w h o goes through its levels of meaning self-consciously reformulating the problem of action each step of the way. Rather the self-con-
Dialectical meaning of synthesis illustrated through theorypractice.
Dialectic as a process of totalization, and the transition from predictive to retrodictive logic.
scious challenge of the old structure of action and the formulation of the n e w will be preceded by a period in which groups challenge theory-practice experientially in the various forms it is found embodied in institutions and social practices. Group actions cannot be reduced to sums or multiples of individual ones. Being part of a group action reinforces the lack of individual self-consciousness about one's motives and consequently blunts awareness about the links between motivations and intentions, on the one hand, and their outcomes, on the other. If outcomes of collective actions are difficult to plan, such actions which also claim the status of an dialectical synthesis planned beforehand are impossible. They can only be shown to be so retrodictively. This points to a tentative conclusion — to which w e shall return in more detail later — that the construction of a dialectical synthesis can only be staged ex post facto. In our example, it is the historian-philosopher of the future who will determine whether the countercultural activities of the 1960s constituted genuine syntheses or frivolous actions. He will make explicit what had lain implicit in their experiential challenges, while determining whether a n e w context of meaning has emerged within which theory and practice find themselves ordered under a new set of rules.
B. A Psychoanalytic Paradigm This paradigm picks up where the last one left off: with consciousness used to illustrate the dialectical synthesis of theory and practice into action. The important bearing of consciousness on the issue of dialectical synthesis becomes obvious if w e recall our comments in the Preface about the centrality of subjectivity in the dialectical process. Psychology, more particularly phenomenological psychology and psychoanalysis, centers on self-consciousness with the help of the concept of transcendence. This is also shared by certain brands of philosophy and, of course, by the dialectic. Transcendence is a form of steppingout from a given context of meaning for the purpose of gaining some insight into its structure. Obviously it is a technique of rendering explicit what remains implicit and, as such, it has proved to be a powerful tool in the hands of a wide range of disciplines for challenging ideologies and all forms of unselfcritically held knowledge. But it has shown itself to be especially potent against the most tenacious and all-pervading of modern ideologies — scientism — which has been the target, in one w a y or another, of disciplines as varying as Kantian metaphysics, p h e n o m e n o l o g y , linguistic analysis, s o c i o l o g y of knowledge, and deconstruction. However, as in the case of presuppositional challenge earlier, it has remained on the level of an intellectual critique because transcendence has not reached deep enough into the fundamental logical features of the discourse, thus allowing the theory-practice polarity and its surrogates to remain untouched. Psychoanalysis has, for our purposes of illustration, an advantage over these disciplines in that — as a therapeutic art concerned with modification of behavior — it shares with the dialectic the built-in logical feature that propels presuppositional challenge from a discursive activity to action. Thus our paradigm of what might be called a successfully terminated therapy may also give us a glimpse into the elusive synthesis of theory and practice into action. Needless to add that w e make no special claims about the scientific validity or therapeutic value of the proposed model, which is offered solely for paradigmatic illustration.
The centrality of consciousness for the dialectical synthesis of theory-practice.
Psychoanalysis as a case of dialectical synthesis by way of transcendence of context of meaning.
Transcendence illustrated through the dialectical triad of immediacy— mediation—re-immediation.
If w e suppose that there is a theory of neurosis behind the therapeutic strategy of a behavioral therapist, then the therapist's strategy would be to apply said theory in an attempt to heal his patient's neuroses. But the rules of the game for psychoanalysis differ from those of behavioral therapy. In our dialectical language, the context of meaning for using the expression "to apply" is not the same for the therapist using it on his patient as it is for the patient using it on himself. The analytical context of meaning has resulted from an effort to expand the behaviorist context of meaning so as to include self-application. Assuming that it has resolved any internal contradictions of the expanded context and restored its coherence, the analytical context is more comprehensive and, therefore, dialectically more advanced than the behaviorist. The resolution of the main contradiction is the heart of our paradigm which gives us the promised glimpse into the future synthesis of theory and practice: The patient cannot use the accepted (scientistic) theory-practice meaning of "to apply" on himself without generating an inner self which mediates between a theoretical and a practical part of himself. This is symmetrical to a detached observer of the external world w h o mediates between sensuous experience and theoretical activity, or between practice and theory. In the present case such an application would always all o w a core of the self to be exempt from self-application (the part which does the applying) thus triggering an infinite regress and, in effect, evading the directive about applying the theory on the totality and not on only part of one's self. A shift in the context of the meaning of "application" from the world of things to that of consciousness has dramatically changed the structure of action from scientistic theory-practice to humanistic self-originating action — from one in which mediation was all but synonymous with rationality, and immediacy with irrationality, to one in which mediation breeds irrationality in the form of infinite regress, and immediacy of action points the way to sanity. A qualitative change or a leap into a different universe of discourse, took place at the point where quantitative change led nowhere. No additional empirical evidence adduced by the analyst about the theory's applicability to others, nor any improved theoretical sophistication of the analysand about the nature of his neurosis, would have made the crucial difference between intellectualization of action and action. The new rules of the game could only be interpreted as: to apply the therapeutic model on one's self means simply to act. It was the patient's decision to apply the theory to himself, which in the n e w context of consciousness is equiva-
lent to acting, that made the crucial qualitative difference. He learned to act by acting rather than by reflecting on and perfecting the theory on which to base his action. His theoretical understanding may have prepared him for action, but at the moment of action this understanding was submerged to the immediacy of action, which in effect was purchased at the expense of the mediating capacity of intellectual understanding. So much so, that one can sum up by saying that, whereas theory qua mediation unveils what has lain implicit in experience, action qua immediacy buries it back under a layer of experience to be unveiled in the course of the next round of mediation. In this sense our paradigm can be credited with illustrating another important feature of the dialectic, the interplay of immediacy and mediation. Both involve a two-way process. The way forward is a process of immediation represented by a chain of insightful events or discoveries in therapy, culminating in its successful termination which corresponds to the paradigmatic synthesis of action. The way backward is a progressive mediation (unveiling) of what lies concealed from consciousness — the unconscious of psychoanalysis and its variants of the prereflective, the prepredicative, the prethematic, or the preconscious, among phenomenologists and existentialists. Our paradigm is dialectically instructive on account of both what it omits and what it encompasses. Useful, and even illuminating, as it might be for the dialectic of action, it is focused on the individual. Furthermore, its clinical context is conducive to viewing analytical experience as a tract of time with specified initial and terminal points. Both of these parameters are dialectically one-sided and unstable — suffering from abstraction, as Hegel would say — to be transcended into wider contexts of meaning within which they are eventually incorporated. What is missing here is the transition from individual to group, which is manifested initially in the onto-logic of the dialectic as the relationship between the one and the many. Once these parameters imposed by the clinical context are suspended and the presuppositions about the distinction between healthy and neurotic behavior are being challenged, the double process of veiling and unveiling described above becomes open-ended and the point of departure problematic or even arbitrary. This signals the moment of transition to the next paradigm, or a wider context of meaning, as the case might be. Since philosophy, particularly the dialectic, can take nothing for granted, this question about what, if anything, constitutes a genuine beginning, has to be answered first. For example, to anticipate what is forthcoming while w e still capitalize on our
Lack of completeness propels the dialectic forward.
The dialectical feature of open-endedness and the search for a beginning.
Comparison of the dialectic with other philosophies of transcendence.
investment in this paradigm, action or human existence — which has been defined in terms of action — may be given ontological priority and credited for constituting such a beginning. Sartrean "existence" and Heideggerian Dasein come readily to mind in this connection. But since such point of departure lies on an open-ended axis, w e are dealing here with a kind of advanced human existence, one which has already been mediated. Unlike the scientistic conception of existence, which is appropriate to things, the existentialist, conception involves awareness of what it means to be. To exist in the latter sense is to stand beyond or outside of oneself so that the essence of humanity, according to existentialism, is perpetual self-transcendence. Though immediacy of existence — graphically rendered by Heidegger as Dasein, literally as being there — can be taken as the point of departure, mediation is built into the definition of existence from the outset. Dasein recalls the immediated action of our paradigm which also involves mediation, though it takes the backward trek of the two-way process to activate it in the unveiling of what has been buried under in the course of the forward trek by immediacy. I m p o r t a n t similarities b e t w e e n the dialectic and these philosophies of transcendence should not be allowed to obscure differences suggested by suspending the parameters of the paradigm. For example, the point of departure which for them becomes something of a central importance — Husserl's presuppositionless beginning, Heidegger's Dasein, and Sartre's priority of existence over essence, and of action over reflection — is for the dialectic a matter of thematic convenience. It looks from a dialectical vantage point as if, having challenged the time-constraints in viewing experience as a tract of time with a specified beginning and end, these philosophies have not benefitted from the insight that h u m a n e x p e r i e n c e consists of a t w o - w a y process of veiling and unveiling and that the initial and terminal points are a matter of disciplinary convention. There is another difference between the dialectic and these philosophies of transcendence which can also be illustrated through the analytical model: the transition f r o m the individual to the group which is linked to the suspension of the other parameter of the clinical context, the pre-eminence of the individual in the therapeutic process. The centrality of the individual is so deeply ingrained in modern cultural experience, that any transition from it to the group, which preserves the insights of the analytical process without covertly reasserting the primacy of the individual, requires a radical form of transcendence which is missing in these philosophies. The difficulties they have encountered in
this transition, from Husserl's notorious problems with intersubjectivity to Sartre's questionable synthesis of Marxism and existentialism, attest to such deficiency. Hegel avoided such pitfalls: first, by adopting a more powerful logical apparatus to sustain radical transcendence; second, by shifting from a pseudo-timelessness to a retrospective-historical discourse in which he could demonstrate that, though not apparent without radical presuppositional challenge, the individual remains ingrained in any scientistic discourse claiming objectivity and predictive power because of the built-in subjectobject duality. Thus the shift to an essentially historical discourse becomes pari passu an abandonment of predictive claims, without involving a categorial assimilation of science and philosophy by history resulting in historicism. This is the standpoint of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, wherein historical correlates are found for the modalities of individual consciousness. Transcendence is applied by the retrospective philosopher to unveil segments of historical experience in which the transition from individual to group is an accomplished cultural fact. The categorial apparatus appropriate to each historically given group varies with time and culture as do the ways of transition and integration. This approach enabled Hegel to avoid misdirected quests for a presuppositionless beginning and misplaced hopes for a solution which was based on insufficient transcendence: a transition from individual to group using consciousness (which seems to be a clean start) for a point of departure, but which is actually a historically given form of consciousness. For such a misleadingly fresh point of departure — graphically illustrated in the paradigm as a point on a open-ended axis — Hegel substituted a form of circularity about which more will be said later. The seemingly unmediated form of existence, Being, with which he started his Logic, is also mediated since, in addition to being a category of Logic, it is also part of individual and cultural experience anchored in a historical setting of western culture.
The superiority of the dialectical notion of open-endedness as circularity.
This paradigm will take one step further in expanding the context of meaning of the last one, so that in the following paradigms one can begin to recognize the retrospective philosopher uncovering ex post facto the transition from individual to group. In being transcended, the previous contexts become explicit so that the rules governing them can no longer be taken for granted. Thus the synthesis involved here, as elsewhere in the dialectic, can be viewed as incorporating the old rules under the new expanded context after having rendered them explicit. This Chapter will deal in relatively non-technical terms with the same transition from a relatively crude scientistic context of meaning to a more sophisticated one representing a form of dialectical synthesis. However, whereas in the last paradigm the interplay between opposed standpoints unfolded within the consciousness of the analysand, now it takes the form of a confrontation between two individuals. The approach used approximates the less formal dialectic of Plato, the dialektike: the uncovering of the presuppositions of one's opponent through the process of dialegesthai, i.e., through the give-and-take of philosophical argument. Though not strictly in dialogue form, what follows is structured in terms of a dialektike between a liberal and a radical at the height of the 1960s. The radical challenges, and the liberal defends, the prevailing rules of the game. As the process reaches the presuppositional level, it begins to reveal the scientistic structure of the prevailing (liberal) context of meaning, in particular the rules which govern rational action within that context. Challenge and response vary in being disclosed alternately as immediacy and mediation, intellectual critique and action, or a simultaneous two-way process of veiling and unveiling paralleling that of the psychoanalytic paradigm. Time and again radicals of that period were asked to produce some kind of theory or blueprint of what they offered as a replacement for what they proposed to dismantle. Much of the criticism d i r e c t e d at t h e m was c e n t e r e d n o t so m u c h o n whether what was being attacked deserved it or not, but on the fact that the attack was deemed irrational. The radicals' objec-
Extension of the dialectical context of meaning from the individual to the group.
Rudiments of group in the adversarial relationship between the radical and the liberal.
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This paradigm will take one step further in expanding the context of meaning of the last one, so that in the following paradigms one can begin to recognize the retrospective philosopher uncovering ex post facto the transition from individual to group. In being transcended, the previous contexts become explicit so that the rules governing them can no longer be taken for granted. Thus the synthesis involved here, as elsewhere in the dialectic, can be viewed as incorporating the old rules under the new expanded context after having rendered them explicit. This Chapter will deal in relatively non-technical terms with the same transition from a relatively crude scientistic context of meaning to a more sophisticated one representing a form of dialectical synthesis. However, whereas in the last paradigm the interplay between opposed standpoints unfolded within the consciousness of the analysand, now it takes the form of a confrontation between two individuals. The approach used approximates the less formal dialectic of Plato, the dialektike: the uncovering of the presuppositions of one's opponent through the process of dialegesthai, i.e., through the give-and-take of philosophical argument. Though not strictly in dialogue form, what follows is structured in terms of a dialektike between a liberal and a radical at the height of the 1960s. The radical challenges, and the liberal defends, the prevailing rules of the game. As the process reaches the presuppositional level, it begins to reveal the scientistic structure of the prevailing (liberal) context of meaning, in particular the rules which govern rational action within that context. Challenge and response vary in being disclosed alternately as immediacy and mediation, intellectual critique and action, or a simultaneous two-way process of veiling and unveiling paralleling that of the psychoanalytic paradigm. Time and again radicals of that period were asked to produce some kind of theory or blueprint of what they offered as a replacement for what they proposed to dismantle. Much of the criticism d i r e c t e d at t h e m was c e n t e r e d n o t so m u c h o n whether what was being attacked deserved it or not, but on the fact that the attack was deemed irrational. The radicals' objec-
Extension of the dialectical context of meaning from the individual to the group.
Rudiments of group in the adversarial relationship between the radical and the liberal.
tives, aside from the immediately visible destructive part, were found to be so vague or even non-existent, that one was incapable of rationally evaluating their practice in terms of their theory and their ends in light of their means. Their failure to convince others and successfully carry out their objectives was attributed to their inability, or unwillingness, to adjust theory to empirical fact. The argument of liberal critics seemed tight and their logic impeccable. However, even a gentle presuppositional probe will show that behind their transparently clear demand for reasonableness concealed an impressive hidden agenda of presuppositions, which w e shall n o w take up in order of increasing all-inclusiveness. The underlying The demand for reasonableness amounts to a demand to folscientistic theorylow a domesticated version of scientific methodology. The critic practice of the liberal. is, in effect, asking for something modeled after a scientific theory, like a string of propositions which can be checked against a domain of experience that has already been certified as factual or objective according to a specified set of rules. Theory has to be verified by experience, but the latter is not an undifferentiated domain of experience as it might first appear. It is tacitly preselected, not by the theory which it is being called to validate — for this would constitute self-defeating circularity — but by a wider context of meaning to which the particular theory has tacitly but ultimately to submit its credentials. For example, the corpus of physical or economic theory, including postulates, laws, theories, in their interconnectedness, and the rules according to which theoretical propositions are checked against experience, specify the range of experience acceptable as meaningful in this context. This is a feature of coherence and a criterion for compartmentalization of any given corpus of knowledge which, however, remains most of the time implicit and taken for granted until challenged. It is a feature that enables the corpus in the face of a recalcitrant phenomenon to brand it as a non-fact, or meaningless, and banish it from its domain. Whether, say, a UFO can qualify as a physical object, or a fact, or be dismissed as an illusion, depends on the corpus of knowledge of the discipline and the context of meaning it generates within which something can or cannot be determined to be a fact. The radical as a Strange as it might sound, the radical's domain of experichallenger of the ence, along with his facts, extend into the future, as the dialectic scientistic presupof Actuality will confirm in Part III, so that what constitutes the positions of the painful facts of the present depends to a great extent on his exliberal. periencing future possibilities more intensely than his critic. His blueprint is more like a vision than a theoretical construction and his facts are constituted and validated through the future-
oriented experience he shares with his fellow-radicals. In demanding that the radical submit his vision in the form of a theory, the liberal is also asking that he abandon his presuppositional challenge and adopt the rules of theory-practice into the new context. Assuming that the radical bows to his opponent's request and submits a set of propositions which fulfill the preliminary requirements of a testable hypothesis, the next question of the liberal will be: "Does it fit the facts?" or " H o w do you know it will work in practice?" But terms like "fact," "it works," even 'Ireality" and "truth," which will be used in the ensuing exchange, are to be understood in the context of the scientistic corpus into which the radical has allowed himself to be drawn. These terms are loaded not merely in the positivistic sense (also part of the scientistic ideal) of failing to represent reality because language has not been totally purged of its particularisms; but, more important, in the sense of being part of a self-contained whole of mutually supported elements, which is capable of screening out what is viewed as meaningless or nonexistent and preserving what will cohere with it. In this light, scientistic rigor can be attributed not to its universality, or the fidelity of its propositions to a universally valid notion of reality, but to its abstractive features which enable it to filter out variants of reality or experience which prove disturbing to its coherence. To unload such key terms of their peculiar function is not a matter of banishing them and replacing them with those of a universal language, but of disclosing h o w their being loaded is part of their belonging to a given context of meaning. But in order to do this one has to transcend the prevailing context and its categorial apparatus. The same abstractive features of scientism which fortify it against challenge when they remain concealed in the presuppositional level, also become a source of its vulnerability w h e n they are unveiled through transcendence. Culture as a conception of a whole — i.e., as a supreme example of an all-inclusive context of meaning — is an intricate network of powerful defense mechanisms as long as its fundamental rules of the game remain at the unself-conscious level of its members. But they begin to weaken as soon as self-consciousness about them begins to set in. This is no accident if w e bear in mind that unselfconsciousness assures cultural efficiency, as w e shall see later in discussing dialectical anthropology. Exposing this concealed efficiency through enhancing self-consciousness increases the vulnerability of a culture, whether the enhancement is self- or externally induced by a radical challenge. But an established culture is also vulnerable to a radical challenge of a non-discur-
Parallels to the analytical paradigm.
Differences between the protagonists as a dispute about the meaning of rationality.
sive nature. This is the kind of experiential challenge w e suggested earlier in introducing the element of immediacy in the dialectic of action, whereby the step ahead involving synthesis cannot be consciously planned without negating the dialectical process. Now, with our radical and his opponent locked in confrontation, w e can again put this dialectical insight into use. A defense of the status quo by the liberal would draw upon concealment of presuppositions, rely on the screening mechanism of prevailing categories, and downgrade the importance of experiential elements. The radical, on the contrary, would challenge presuppositions, disclose the role of categories as defense mechanisms, and emphasize the creative role of experiential elements in carrying out the challenge. In terms of the psychoanalytic paradigm, the radical represents the patient's motivation to modify his behavior through action originating in the painful experience of neurosis, while the liberal corresponds to his resistance to therapy manifested as intellectualization of the process and de-immediation of action. The concept of rationalization has its counterpart in established reason, for as the form e r is e x p o s e d t h r o u g h analysis, so is the latter deflated through philosophical transcendence. As rationalization relieves the analysand from facing the connection between his neurotic behavior and concealed parts of his past experience, so does established reason obscure its links with prevailing institutions thus giving it the illusion of timelessness and universality. The patient resists getting at the experiential roots of his behavior as the liberal refuses to face the concealed presuppositions of his rationality. The key issue of the dispute between the protagonists — that which constitutes rational action — is essentially the same as that confronted by the two earlier paradigms. For the most part it was broached in negative terms in the political paradigm: what a genuine dialectical synthesis, which took the form of an exemplary radical action, is not. It was found to be one whose validation does not depend on the rules of the context (of theory-practice) which has been transcended. It was then shown, in the positive terms of the analytical paradigm which followed, what a dialectical synthesis of theory-practice is like, qua selforiginating action, following a shift in the context of meaning. Now, with the gradual disclosure that the context of meaning of liberal's t h e o r y - p r a c t i c e is essentially scientistic, the question about the rationality of the radical's action can be settled in context. In the case of the liberal trying to ascertain the rationality of the radical's action by asking him to produce a theory or theory-
like proposition, the latter is justified in challenging the presuppositional grounds of the theory-practice relationship. For example, the radical can point out that what he is being asked to produce is defined within the context of the theory-practice relationship which, however, cannot itself be derived through theorizing, nor be tested and validated through practice without falling into circular reasoning. Any attempt to validate this relationship as if it were an empirical matter, i.e., by reference to experience through the familiar scientistic procedures, would be begging the question. The empirical test through theory-practice that the liberal is implicitly proposing for the action of the radical is a criterion for a historically and culturally given conception of rationality, i.e., scientistic rationality. In other words, the validation of a principle is something of a different order — dialectically speaking, belonging to a more inclusive context of meaning — than the justification of an action according to the same principle. This is also true in regard to the difference between rationality of action judged by scientistic criteria and that established ex post facto by criteria of cultural and historical coherence. Though the actual dialogue between the two is not likely to move on this level of abstraction, the structure of their respective strategies has been clearly outlined: their attempts to conceal, or conversely, lay bare for inspection the presuppositions of the prevailing context, the hidden agenda of the status quo. The liberal's task is made lighter by the fact that much of the concealment is done automatically by the culture's built-in defense mechanisms, the network of institutions as embodiments of established reason inclusive of language, ethical norms, customs and manners. For example, polite expressions or conciliatory mannerisms of daily discourse may, upon closer scrutiny, be revealed as protective mechanisms by way of removing presuppositions from routine observation. A reasonable, even innocuous, invitation of the radical to "talk things over" usually implies keeping the exchange within certain prescribed limits and not allowing either party to revert to physicality or to shift into such "philosophical," "transcendent," or "academic" issues such as "presuppositions." While on the same level of everydayness and popular wisdom, the liberal may continue that "the situation is more complex than it appears," or that "all facts are not yet in" and that w e should therefore not " f o o l around with mindless experiments." Scientism, in its vulgar version sets the tone about rationality of action even at the level of sub-dialogue, thus providing additional protection to the status quo through the encasement of its presuppositions in everyday speech structures.
Built-in cultural defense mechanisms of the status quo.
Conservative bias of scientistic methodology.
Illustration of cultural defense mechanisms through the rationality of means-ends and substantive-instrumental reason.
Similar tendencies to protect the hidden agenda by concealing it in structures w h i c h w o u l d o t h e r w i s e be vulnerable through visibility can also be mentioned. For example, in separating means from ends and instrumental from substantive rationality, professionals pursue the methodological sophistication of their disciplines. The distinction of the experientially grounded, not so visible domain of ends (values, ultimate concerns and commitments) from that of the visible, intersubjectively capable of validation, ostensibly value-free, and therefore capable of being scientifically grounded, domain of means, has been advanced by aspiring modern disciplines as a credential of their scientific status. Physical science and its emulators deal with chains of means, in the domain of ethical neutrality and efficiency where inter-subjective verification is at home, while the realm of ends is left to the individual and only derivatively to collective choice. The instrumental rationality of science, as in everyman's reasonableness earlier, and the rationalization of the analytical paradigm before that, are screening devices for potentially disruptive experiential elements. The methodological injunction issued to the radical to keep his emotional and ethical bias out of the picture if he wishes a rational assessment of the situation results, if followed, in screening experiential elements. Given this role of scientific methodology in, so to speak, rigging the social system in favor of instrumental rationality, it is no accident that some of the most spirited charges against the radical were mounted from such grounds. He was accused of confusing means and ends to the point of allowing this important distinction to lapse altogether. Being unable, for example, to deal effectively with Dow Chemical Co. (the producer of napalm used against the Vietnamese) through the means-end chain of efficiency, by defining as their proper end the legislative process of Congress, the radicals had collapsed their every action into an end by throwing themselves on the path of the first lowranking recruiting official to visit their campus. They allowed the mediation of the end through means to lapse in the same way that they allowed the mediating role of theory to collapse into their immediacy of practice in dealing with the Dow official. This critical analysis of the radical's action conceals the fact that if he w e r e to comply, he would be renouncing the very possibility of presuppositional challenge which is also the basis for radical action. By separating means from ends and their experiential roots, ends are placed out of range of the function of thought in unveiling what lies hidden in experience. Instead, thought is being reduced to instrumental reason and functions like theory in the theory-practice relationship. With the loss of
reason's capacity to challenge through transcendence goes its capacity to unveil what lies hidden under the layers of institutional facticity. For it is recalled that the t w o are sides of the same coin: it is the elaboration of what is implicit in the prevailing context of meaning which is the other side of its being reordered into a more comprehensive one. Reason qua instrumental rationality is incapable of challenging its own presuppositions — in this case the means-end dualism — in the same sense that scientistic theory was unable to test the principle of theory-practice earlier. Similarly, instrumental reason cannot unveil an institution as its own embodiment without self-transcendence, i.e., without assuming a standpoint outside of itself. Therefore, it is not so much the psychological attributes of individuals as the logical — in this case dualistic — structure of reason into substantive and instrumental, which shields the system from presuppositional challenge. As in the case of preselected experience in deciding the reality of a UFO, the structure of means-end determines which actions are serviceable in terms of its dualistic structure and consigns the rest to the ineffable and the irrational. The status quo protects itself in a most fundamental way by incorporating its presuppositional structure into its institutions and routinely accepted practices. Under these circumstances, physicality and violence against these embodiments of established instrumental reason are challenges against categories of high presuppositional status, which have been embedded in institutional structures through long social practice. For example, ethical and emotional neutrality, the hallmarks of instrumental reason, have been institutionalized in the rules, codes, forms of communication, dress, manners and not least in the design of working and living spaces. Even if our radical is self-conscious about resisting instrumental rationality, it is next to impossible not to succumb to some of these pervasive social forces. Irrational as it might seem to his opponent, when judged by the standards of instrumental rationality, the radical's act of physicality follows a logic which fits our outline of dialectical synthesis so far. He can be viewed as advancing the candidacy of his action as an example of such synthesis, inasmuch as he cannot, as in previous cases, be taken as having planned it without raising all the familiar objections about its status as synthesis. Stated somewhat differently, a dialectical synthesis cannot be accomplished in terms of either of the poles of the dual category which it is supposed to transcend, without reinjecting the dualism into the n e w context. A presuppositional challenge claiming the status of such a synthesis can therefore be neither merely theoretical nor merely practi-
Physicality and violence as presuppositional challenges.
The dialectic is propetted by unresolved issues to higher contexts of meaning.
cal; neither immediacy-free theory, nor unmediated practice, without perpetuating the theory-practice dualism which it is supposed to be transcending in the first place. As the two-way process of the analytical experience has already suggested, theory involves immediacy in the insightful event of positing underived propositions, and practice involves mediation in the form of those layers of embodiment of past experience and routine practices in individuals and institutions. But both of our protagonists seem unaware of this when they emphasize the priority of their favorite term of the polarity at the expense of the other. Though substantial progress has been made by the scientistic paradigm in exemplifying a less abstractive model of a dialectical synthesis of action than the analytical one, old problems remain, and new ones have been generated in trying to answer emerging questions. On the positive side, the restrictive parameters of the therapeutic model have been lifted so that the process has become open-ended. The dialogue has come closer to a dialektike between equals and the foundation for the transition to a more all-inclusive context of meaning has been laid through the mutual disclosure of hidden presuppositions by elaborating upon what remains implicit in the prevailing one. On the negative side, each is remaining irrevocably attached to his polar term, seemingly unaware of the negative effect this entails for dialectical synthesis through the involvement of the opposite term. W e seem to be confirming familiar tentative conclusions via a different route: Unless w e relinquish the standpoint of the individual, and the associated scientistic predictive rationality, and adopt instead that of the group, and the retrospective outlook that goes with it, the dialectical synthesis of theory-practice into action will remain elusive. W e n o w know that self-consciousness in the accepted individual-psychological sense will not get us out beyond the impasse if the subject-object duality is not also transcended. Granted, selfconsciousness was vital in the synthesis at the level of subjectivity in the second paradigm. However, this was a severely abstractive situation which served well as an illustration but will not do for more concrete social situations. Even the most selfconscious radical w h o has effected the synthesis at the individual level described in the analytical paradigm cannot, by the same right, claim to have effected one in the social domain. Whereas in the former case the object is located within himself, in the latter he remains a subject vis-a-vis objects which belong to the outside world. This externality being, along with predictive rationality, the cornerstone of scientism, is in principle in-
compatible with a dialectical synthesis of theory-practice. A radical change in the rules of the game is necessary whereby, with the transition from individual to group, "subjectivity" can apply to a collectivity and "self-consciousness" can assume a different meaning in this new context. The approach utilized in admitting the subjectivity of the psychoanalytic paradigm as the locus of synthesis at the individual level can be used again, this time as an elevated sort of subjectivity involving a collective self-consciousness. As a result predictive rationality, based on scientistic externality and individual consciousness, gradually gives way to a form of historical, or retrospective, rationality. These important steps are the topic of the next paradigm and of much else to come, but in some ways they have already been anticipated in the present one, inasmuch as the interaction between the protagonists supplies the germ of a social system, as individual categories begin to gradually turn into social ones. For example, unlike the patient, whose lapse of memory is individual-psychological, the liberal suffers from a kind of historical or cultural amnesia. Both are displaying lack of insight into their past which appears to them as something alien in need of a value-free objective approach. Whereas what remains concealed from the analysand are layers of repressed individual experience, for the liberal it is the ossified social experience embodied in institutions and social structures. The analyst provides the tools for unveiling the experience of the former, but the latter cannot rely on this because the experience involved is collective and anyone offering assistance is susceptible to the same malaise. The patient's individual rationalizations take social and historical forms in the case of the liberal. They become the categorial structures and prevailing ideologies of established reason and especially of that which is most impervious to unveiling, scientism.
Anticipation of the group as the locus of an elevated subjectivity.
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D. Adam Smith's Invisible Hand: An Economic Paradigm for Dialectical Synthesis at the Level of the Group It is with these important transitions in mind that w e must now turn our attention to the logical features of Adam Smith's doctrine of the Invisible Hand. The acknowledged founder of economics as a separate discipline, Smith stands chronologically in the middle of the eighteenth century whence the transition from the traditional pre-bourgeois to the bourgeois order appears starkly visible because of the social upheaval preceding and following the French Revolution. Thus, if w e allow for a correspondence between this revolutionary transition and our dialectical shifts in contexts of meaning, the logical structure of his economic system (as exemplified in the doctrine of the Invisible Hand) provides the rules for social cohesion in the new bourgeois order. By the middle of the eighteenth century when Smith was working on his system, economic activity in England was sufficiently organized on a mass scale to allow a quantitative treatment modeled after the scientific advances of the preceding century. Moreover, the injection into the social system of the new philosophical conceptions of freedom and individuality, dating from the previous century, required the establishment of a n e w level of social coherence to replace the social bonds of the pre-bourgeois social order. Perhaps one can appreciate h o w chaotic the n e w order must have appeared to a member of the old order by drawing some parallels between features of the cultural revolution of the 1960s, which w e have already used in an earlier paradigm, and those of the 1770s. Separating means from ends and assigning scientific status to instrumental rationality while relegating ends to the publicly unverifiable domain of individual (and only derivatively collective) choice, must have seemed, to a member of the old social order, to be an inducement to social disorder. The realm of ends in a culture placing a premium on individuality and the ethics of conscience is a matter of aggregation of a great number and variety of individual values through a set of rules called democratic. Of course, this does not mean that, having been screened
Dialectical synthesis modeled after economics.
Parallels between bourgeois and countercultural challenges.
Smith's replacement of social (pre-bourgeois), by an economic (modern) transindividual, order.
Individual intentions resulting in unintended social outcomes: Hegel's Cunning of Reason anticipated.
by the institutional net for social power, individual ends come out weighing the same as it may be suggested by the egalitarian nomenclature of liberal democracy. Rather it conveys the view that, with the realm of individual ends removed from that of objectively determinable values, it is no longer possible to assign by objective criteria different weights to individual ends. In the language of the last Chapter, theory having been delegated to instrumental rationality, there is no room left for substantive rationality in the realm of ends. This should not be interpreted as meaning that substantive discourse has lapsed but that its importance has been minimized by the fact that, unlike its prebourgeois status, it is not securely institutionalized and it is therefore manifested at the individual level as personal criticism, opinion, or "just another view." Smith's doctrine of the Invisible Hand was his contribution toward the discovery of a hidden order in such an apparent disorderly state of human affairs: Selfishly motivated individuals seek economic advantage but, given conditions of freedom and equality in competition, the net outcome of their combined efforts leads unintentionally — as if guided by "an invisible hand" of Divine Providence — to the general good. What is interesting from our dialectical standpoint is that Smith meant his work as a scientific contribution in the successful empirical tradition of his times as exemplified in physics. But somehow the "invisible hand" worked behind his back also, turning what he intended as an empirical study into what is essentially a logical construction modeled after the fallacy of composition. For he intended, as did most of the luminaries of the age of reason, a successful scientific explanation of human behavior, but ended up with a prime dialectical paradigm for the transition from the individual to the group and a prototype for Hegel's own counterpart, the Cunning of Reason. For economics as an empirical science, Smith's dialectical discovery was equivalent to an application of the wrong logic to his subject matter. This set his successors and the emulators of the n e w "successful" economic science in other social disciplines on the wrong methodological track. However, for dialectical philosophy the Invisible Hand provided a new level of coherence and a point of departure for the elevated form of subjectivity required in the advanced stages of the dialectic. The elaboration of Smith's System of Needs is a detailed drawing of implications from the economic system in the light of what is called in formal logic (which he also taught at the university) a fallacy of composition: arguing from properties of individuals to those of wholes. The social system was viewed by analogy to
the fallacy of composition, whereby the unintended beneficial outcome corresponds to logical whole and the selfish perceptions and intentions of human individuals to logical individuals. The nature of explanatory power through logical metaphor and the transcendence of the individual into the group was not realized by Smith's successors and, in all likelihood, was partially missed by Smith as well. They mistook his approach for a genuine ground-breaking in empirical explanation and they proceeded to deduce a great variety of increasingly refined corollaries from the social fallacy of composition as if it were a cluster of theoretical propositions. As evidenced by the development of economic theory in the hands of Smith's successors, it was on an economic reality contrary to that stipulated by Smith for the operation of the Invisible Hand (a market blemished by less than the stipulated freedom and knowledge of its participants, and more power than the stipulated impotence of any single participant to affect its free mechanism) that the empirical claims and predictive powers of the new discipline came to sorrow. On the other hand, it was precisely this arena, in which it was discredited by scientistic criteria, that Smith's logical metaphor retained its value by w a y of dialectical standards. While Smith's methodology failed as a set of operating rules within the given scientistic (economic) context of meaning, it succeeded, as will be shown in much detail later, as an operating code for the transition from a scientistic to a humanistic context of meaning. In addition to illustrating dialectical transition the metaphor of the Invisible Hand is an example of all-inclusiveness or, what is known dialectically, as concreteness. For, unlike a theoretical proposition which is an abstraction in search of an empirical correlate, a metaphor, viewed presently as a paradigm for concrete (dialectical) universality, has a life of its own. Using Aristotle's dialectically suggestive definition of a metaphor as the application of a meaning associated with any given level of discourse to another, w e may elaborate that the transference of meaning of the metaphor involves a superimposition of aprioristic elements of one discourse onto empirical ones of the other. By contrast to the scientistic-empirical use of the Invisible Hand by Smith's successors, whereby the propositions derived from it were taken as theoretical and were expected to seek their empirical correlates in the social world, these same propositions, as representative of dialectical concreteness, are self-contained. In the latter case the logical features of the fallacy have their empirical counterparts in the social features selected in effecting the metaphor. Operationally speaking, in terms of research
The logical metaphor of society as an example of dialectical concreteness.
Further illustration of the dialectical integration of the individual into the group through the Invisible Hand.
strategies by economists, a more strictly scientistic interpretation, of the sort that did not take place in the history of economic thought until relatively late. This would have called for successive adjustments of the model of perfect competition (the Invisible Hand) until empirical confirmation was possible or, if this proved unsuccessful, for the model to be dropped. The logical metaphor, on the other hand, self-contained to a degree as it is, can be used as a heuristic device to explore social subject matter by allowing its logical possibilities to unfold. This, in fact, happened for a long time in economic thought, to the detriment of its development as a empirical science. Without trying to minimize the similarities between theories, models, and metaphors in terms of self-containment, capacity for self-selecting empirical data, and heuristic value, the contrast between theories and metaphors above was intended to emphasize the difference between empirical and dialectical concreteness. Whereas scientifically and commonsensically a metaphor is empirically grounded or physically tangible, dialectically it is (albeit at a low level of concreteness) self-complete or, as w e put it above, having a life of its own. Since explicit ness or unveiling of what lies behind the surface is a fundamental value of the dialectic in its quest for all-encompassing coherence, it is weary of a mode of comprehension like the scientistic, which relies on a problematic (dualistic) epistemological structure of mental-physical, as it did w i t h the similar methodological structure of theory-practice. Instead, it opts for a structure of self-containment including both terms of the polarity — what w e have called a "mix" of the aprioristic and the empirical in the case of the metaphor. Recalling the UFO case, it was the lack of explicitness about the high-order (implicit) parameters of reality which resulted in the self-selection of empirical data that "proved" the non-existence of UFO's. It is a similar lack of explicitness leading to self-concealment that the dialectic is avoiding, which is being illustrated through the selfcompleteness of the metaphor. Needless to add that the selfcontainment of the metaphor, and correspondingly of any moment of the dialectical process short of the final one, is not truly all-inclusive, thus allowing for an advance to the next higher context of meaning. We can return to the Invisible Hand for an illustration of the incompleteness of the aggregation of individuals leading to the self-completeness of the group as a result of their satisfactory integration into it. This can also be interpreted as a change in quality as a result of increase in quantity or, better still, as a qualitative leap in a context of meaning by way of a universal-
ization of a feature in the context preceding it. It is the universalization of the knowledge (or ignorance) of all entrepreneurs — given a large enough number of them so that no one can affect the price by controlling output — that makes it possible for the Invisible Hand to work for the benefit of the whole. If one or more participants have superior knowledge about market conditions, monopolies and oligopolies emerge and the universal pursuit of self-interest is no longer conducive to the general welfare, as the Invisible Hand ceases to operate for their benefit without their knowledge. In effect, a more inclusive or secondorder context of meaning has been generated, as the knowledge of the master student of the market system (e.g., Adam Smith) is now being shared by participants who were previously ignorant of it. As one's knowledge of the system increases, so does his capacity to determine, with increasing accuracy, the net effect of his actions on the whole and thereby neutralize the effects of the Invisible Hand. The operation of the latter can now be seen as the result of lack or deficiency in self-knowledge (or self-consciousness in terms of the advanced moments of the dialectic). The fallacy of composition has become inoperative at this level of knowledge (context of meaning) because its logical individuals have become self-conscious beings w h o will not allow themselves to be victimized by the fallacy. To paraphrase the old logic textbook example, people will discontinue going to parades equipped with stools, if they know that any differential advantage will be wiped out when they all try to enjoy it. It may appear, from our treatment of Smith's metaphor of the Invisible Hand as an illustration of a dialectical context of meaning and of the elaboration of its implications as a paradigm for the transition from one context to the next that it is possible to substitute dialectic for empirical theory. In other words, the dialectic might be misconceived (in fact, it has been by some of its critics in the past) as an injunction to deduce empirical features of the world from the properties of logical systems like the fallacy of composition. In our case, pointing to the socio-logical metaphor of the Invisible Hand as a mix of empirical and aprioristic elements might be misconceived as an effort to derive, even in the barest outline, the theory of imperfect competition from the logical exploration of the properties of the Invisible Hand. The detailed explanation of why this is not the case must wait until later, but the basic reason for it has already emerged from the discussion so far. As w e move up the dialectical ladder rigidly dichotomous categories become less reliable. The a pnon-empirical has n o w been added to theory-practice
Anticipation of later dialectical developments by the social fallacy of composition.
and means-end in the treatment of human action by social disciplines. These dual structures are not summarily abolished but are being set up in order to be dialectically synthesized or sublated. Each of their polar terms becomes progressively more concrete through an admixture with elements from its opposite, in the way suggested by the mix of the a priori and the empirical elements in our metaphor, until the moment when they find themselves, almost by surprise, synthesized. Reality comes in many grades w h i c h scientism, in its self-concealment of rigidly polarized categorial structures, tends to overlook. The metaphor was a mix from both aprioristic and empirical elements from the outset, since there was already an empirical element present in the logical metaphor w h e n the latter was dressed up in a social garb in order to serve as a social fallacy of composition. As the logical possibilities of the Invisible Hand began to unfold, new empirical content was introduced to give sensuously concrete form to the illustration of the new possibilities. With each extension the old mix of the empirical and the a priori takes on the role of a new a priori until a higher level of dialectical concretion is reached, and so on. This is a reformulation of the familiar rhythm of the dialectic in terms of the social fallacy of composition, whereby, with every expansion of a context of meaning and the rendering of its implications explicit, the old context becomes incorporated in the new one under a n e w set of rules. But it is also a dialectical response to Kant's question about the possibility of the synthetic a priori. The centrality of self-consciousness for the transition to the next context of meaning (and paradigm).
For example, the textbook's illustration of the fallacy of composition through parade-goers is already a case in low-level concreteness. The choice of illustration is also a preselection of empirical elements which fit the a priori features of the logical structure of the fallacy. A n act of abstraction is being performed: one dimension of individuality is being selected out of a richly concrete social life. Individuals are reduced to the simple function of viewers devoid of other individualizing features, such as social position, income, character, except perhaps for height and physical stamina. But most important, the feature most instrumental for the change in the context of meaning, self-consciousness about one's role in the system, has also been abstracted away. The restoration of these individualizing features means a higher level of concreteness where individuals qua self-conscious beings can better anticipate the net effect of their actions. Thus, they can escape the victimization by a system which is no longer external to them but to which they are related in ways of which they are conscious.
Self-consciousness, the other side of freedom, is the key to the understanding of the final and most embracing context of meaning of Hegel's Logic, the Absolute Idea and, by the same token, the final synthesis of theory and practice. For now, it seems clear that what precedes it according to our paradigm, is a dialectical aggregation of unself-conscious individuals w h o cannot be reduced to a mere quantitative one, without losing its most distinctive quality of having transcended predictive rationality on the part of the individuals composing it. The successful operation of the Invisible Hand depended on the presence of a reduced (abstract) individuality of the members of the economic community. This is also a way of saying that homogeneity is conducive, and differentiation is hindering, to its operation, and that the transition from individual to group entails a genuine loss of individuality before the latter can recoup in the next round as an expanded form of consciousness. In other words, the purging from persisting scientistic elements which threatened the integrity of the new context of meaning of selfconsciousness is being purchased in this stage at the expense of abstract individuality and predictive capacity. Self-knowledge, as w e saw earlier, is particularly inhibiting to the operation of the Invisible Hand because it translates into the differential knowledge (or ignorance) which renders individuals intractable to the abstractive procedures of aggregation associated with scientism. However, this does not mean the abandonment of abstractive procedures, nor the wholesale rejection of scientism for that matter, but rather their reintegration at each level in pace with self-consciousness. The same process can perhaps be conveyed by individuals playing the role of both objects of aggregation according to a prevailing set of rules, and subjects redefining at each level the new set according to which the next round of integration is to take place. It is difficult to overstate the importance of the metaphor of the Invisible Hand as a compact embodiment of ideas about human action at that particular junction of intellectual history. A century earlier the scientific revolution had reached its apex in the major work of Newton. The intervening period between his Principia and Smith's Wealth of Nations was crowded with aspiring Newtons of the social disciplines laboring to subject human action to scientific treatment. It should come as no surprise that the great majority of these efforts in morals and politics were modeled or, more accurately, were thought to be modeled, after physics. The fascinating thing about Smith is that, though an aspiring Newton of the domain of human action, having succumbed to the Invisible Hand, he became an exception by pro-
The dialectical importance of the social metaphor of the Invisible Hand restated.
ducing a non-scientistic and distinctly more advanced position about action. Unlike his economic successors, who at their best dealt with the Invisible Hand as a first approximation of a scientific hypothesis, thus foreclosing on its dialectical possibilities, these were not lost to Hegel w h o incorporated them in his system. His celebrated Cunning of Reason, trans-individual Reason, working behind the back of individual reason and using the latter to accomplish its higher ends, is a generalized version of Smith's Invisible Hand. The role of the Cunning of Reason throughout Hegel's work is not limited to the instances where it is referred to explicitly. It dominates the more advanced stages of the dialectic and its cunning is Hegel's metaphorical way of expressing not only the transition from individual to group, but also a corresponding shift from a rationality appropriate to individual action to that of dialectical Reason peculiar to collective entities or supra-individual social and historical forms. Reason operates with cunning, or so it appears to individuals who are not fully self-conscious. It is only by hindsight that they realize h o w they have been tricked by the Cunning of Reason. Thus, the metaphor conveys not only the transition from individual to group, as in Smith's counterpart, but the nature of the instrumentality of Reason itself through which the transition is being effected, as well as Reason's retrospective approach in its final accomplishment as self-consciousness.
E. Philosophy as a Paradigm for Dialectical Synthesis through Meaning The last Chapter began with economics and ended with philosophy. It started with a model of a relatively unself-conscious kind of social activity and concluded with a species of self-conscious action, in which one's knowledge extends beyond objective conditions and into the effects one's own subjective states (e.g., knowledge, expectations) have on these conditions. But self-consciousness is the standpoint of the context of all contexts and the hallmark of dialectical philosophy par excellence. The question might then be raised at this point: Doesn't this climactic role of philosophy, and philosophy of self-consciousness at that — in our sequence of paradigms — prejudice the issue of dialectical synthesis of theory and practice in favor of theory and against practice? Would this not raise the spectre of a surreptitious reinjection of the theory-practice polarity? This paradigm is taken from philosophy in order to allay such fears and provide an easy transition to the strictly philosophical subject matter which follows. Philosophy, born a long time ago out of both theoretical and practical concerns, has retained, after some extended lapses, its holistic concerns. The theoretical dimension derives from a logical prioritization of metaphysical being over beings, as conceived by various disciplines and common sense. Philosophy places itself at the apex of hierarchically stucturalized being. However, this holistic claim of philosophy, as exemplified by the great metaphysical systems of Antiquity and the Middle Ages, was challenged by modern science beginning with the Renaissance. Science had supplanted metaphysical being with its own operationally tractable and empirically (through theory-practice) testable being, which was congenial to the pragmatic temper of the emerging bourgeois social order. Laboring under a bruised ego and the indignities of division of labor, philosophy retreated into a self-doubting epistemological quest unable to reclaim its privileged holistic position for nearly three centuries. The important break came with a philosophical shift from being to meaning, and from epistemologically certified knowledge to interpretation as the correct approach to cultural
The possibility of the resurfacing of theory-practice polarity considered.
The holistic claim of philosophy buttressed by Vico's epistemological reorientation.
objects. The break was initiated with Vico's cutting of the epistemological Gordian noose from around the neck of philosophy, which ushered in the emancipation of cultural disciplines f r o m the m e t h o d o l o g i c a l t u t e l a g e of physical science. Vico said that w e do not need epistemological certification of our knowledge of cultural matters. We understand such matters for the simple reason that w e made them. The explanation is much more complex than that, but the gist of it is contained in this simple pronouncement. The great edifice of German Idealism is a direct descendant of Vico's Copernican Revolution in the methodology of cultural disciplines. Kant's conception of creative or spontaneous reason and Hegel's central notion of Spirit provide the immediate links between Vico's insight and modernity. The peculiarly humanistic approaches to culture by phenomenology, existentialism and hermeneutics (interpretation), as well as the methodological innovations within social sciences as a result of these approaches, can be traced directly to this final overcoming of epistemological dualism by the persevering holistic commitment of philosophy. Hegel's conception of There is a practical — in both the pragmatic and the selfSpirit as a safeguard originating moral senses of the term — dimension of holistic against the resurfac- philosophy. It follows directly from the reorientation of philosoing of the polarity of phy's holistic claim from being to meaning and from (scientistheory-practice. tic) knowledge to (cultural) interpretation. By contrast to scientistic objects which are "known" because they are external to the subject, cultural objects are "interpreted" because they are clusters of meaning generated by the subject in the course of social interaction with others over the lifespan of a culture. Though cultural objects, cultural complexes, and indeed culture itself, are of our o w n doing, w e are not aware of our roles as their creators because of the limitations of our conceptual grasp and cultural memory. Hegel's conception of Spirit — which will be explored more deeply later — encompasses both the exoteric aspect of our sedimented meanings (Objective Spirit) which renders it independent and even alien to us in its facticity, and Spirit's esoteric side (interpretation), which represents our own effort (Subjective Spirit) at desedimentation of those layers of sedimented meaning which compose it. In other words, there are two complementary aspects of Spirit: On the one hand, an objective side representing culture which, though our creation, confronts us as alien in its sedimented opacity and misleads us to treat it as if it were a scientistic object; and, on the other, a subjective side standing for our quest to comprehend culture, and in doing so, through the desedimentation of our very own sedimented meanings, to comprehend ourselves.
In setting unitary Spirit at the center of philosophical enterprise, while substituting theory and practice for its subjective and objective faces, respectively, one can get still another glimpse of the modern holistic claim of philosophy, as regards the unity of theory and practice, on the basis of meaning. Practice corresponds to the process by which sedimented meanings generate cultural objects, while theory is the way by which sedimented meanings are understood through being rendered transparent by way of desedimentation. The unitary claim of philosophy is not advanced by virtue of any supramundane form of being, but on the basis of the interpretation of cultural objects or other manifestations of commonly shared culture. Contrary to the prevailing view of common sense and scientistic understanding that it is somehow resides in the clouds, philosophy, in its dual capacity as outlined above, has its feet on earth. What of course prevents the perception of philosophy, as bearing on everyday life, from being immediately obvious to common sense as well as to science, is that the logical chains of mediation — the links in the process of unveiling or desedimentation — between philosophy and everyday life are both long and tortuous. However, philosophy is at home with both the world of essences of empirical science and that of appearances of common understanding for the simple reason that it advances nothing new, but merely brings to consciousness through the unveiling of sedimented meaning what common sense and specialized disciplines have all along believed to be true in their circumscribed contexts of meaning. Philosophy, therefore, amounts to no more than self-consciousness of culture or Spirit. Unless this claim is taken seriously, the world appears, from the vantage point of philosophy, as incoherent as it does from that of specialized disciplines which, having carved out from the world their own peculiarly coherent universes of discourse, relegate whatever does not fit into it as belonging to the domain of obscurity or outright irrationality. The remainder of this Chapter is devoted to the illustration of this holistic effort of philosophy with special reference to the unity of theory and practice. The preceding paradigms of their synthesis are viewed from the standpoint of dialectical philosophy as layers of meaning sedimented in psychoanalytic, revolutionary, and economic activity, as a result of the routines of linguistic usage and social practice. Though the dialectically progressive arrangement of the paradigms anticipates the culminating holistic act of philosophy in synthesizing them, there are still pockets of opacity which can only be rendered transparent
Pre-modem view of philosophy qua bearing on everyday life.
with the help of the ultimate tool for overcoming sedimentation, self-consciousness, the privilege of dialectical philosophy. Though the analytical paradigm represented a rudimentary form of social situation consisting of two individuals, their roles were prearranged and one was assigned the important function of guiding transcendence. In this respect the role of the analyst resembled that of the practitioner of the Platonic dialektike, the Socratic philosophos, the lover (philos) of wisdom (sophia). But wisdom is no mere intellectual understanding of virtue, nor routine practice of it, but the dialectical synthesis of them in the person of the sophos. The practice of virtue follows necessarily a deeper form of intellectual-cww-experiential understanding along the lines of the analytical paradigm. The post-Classical change in the meaning of philosophy from love of t h e o r y - W practice of virtue to a mere philosophizing about it, made it almost impossible for the modern student of philosophy to make sense of the Socratic doctrine according to which all it takes is true knowledge of virtue in order to issue in virtuous action. Advanced as it may seem when proposed as a synthesis of theory and practice at the philosophical level, this Greek synthesis of theory and practice stands quite low in terms of the dialectical path traversed by philosophy between Plato and Hegel. In his three-volume Lectures on the History of Philosophy, Hegel opens the discussion w i t h pre-Socratics and proceeds on a course exemplifying temporal advance along with dialectical concreteness, concluding with his own system which he takes to be the dialectical summation of the work of his predecessors. Given his approach, the Greek paradigm, like the analytical, is a preliminary one containing implicitly that which is to become fully explicit at the end of the dialectic. The synthesis of theory and practice comes full circle from the unself-consciously held Greek version to Hegel's o w n fully developed and self-consciously formulated one. For example, from the vantage point of Hegel, scientistically oriented post-Renaissance philosophy, which in one form or another had dominated the scene until his times, seemed incapable of performing the transcendence which would also involve transcending itself qua merely mental activity. This much Hegel was probably intimating in his frequently misunderstood remarks about philosophy ending with him. Once philosophy has made it impossible to think of itself as a species of dialectical synthesis of theory and practice, the way back to synthesis is through the end of philosophy as it is known. In other words, the change in the meaning of philosophical activity, from the Socratic reflection-and-action to the m o d e r n reflection about action, made it impossible for the
philosopher of the modern era to transcend his position without transcending himself qua philosopher practicing only in the reflective mode and becoming also a man of action. Hegel's declaration of being the last of the philosophers in the reflective mode is, at the same time, a claim of having secured a foothold outside that mode through his method of transcendence. But it does not follow, as some Young Hegelians have implied, that he should have put aside reflection and become a man of action, nor that he should have put philosophy in the service of revolutionary action. As w e shall see in detail later — Hegel would have been first to retort — this is a relapse to scientism of theory-practice. It is reminiscent of the demand on the radical to produce a blueprint of action and overlooks the intervening mediations between scientistic predictive rationality and dialectical retrospective Reason. Action comes in different grades in dialectical hierarchy, depending on the context of meaning at which one is operating, as does reflection. As in the preceding paradigms, action at the level of Reason is neither sheer immediacy nor mere ex cathedra theorizing but a dialectical synthesis of the two, to be certified as such by the retrospective philosopher-historian. However, this raises the question: Where is the latter going to stand in order to give us his retrospective account without generating an even more all-embracing context of meaning? So far the difficulties connected with the context of all con- Recapitulation texts has been postponed by moving up the dialectical scale of the preceding with each paradigm. But, having reached the level of philoso- paradigms. phy where nothing can be taken for granted, this issue must be faced if the the dialectic is not to be reduced to another version of historical relativism. The issues surrounding the philosophical paradigm of action in both its Hegelian version and its Marxist aberration, occupy the center of what follows in the main part of this work. A comprehensive answer to the above question has, therefore, to be postponed and a more tentative one given in the remaining pages of this paradigm. In the detailed account which follows in Part III, the disciplines of psychology, politics, economics, and philosophy, from which the paradigms were drawn, represent subject matter for a dialectical treatment of progressive sophistication, with special reference to the category of action appropriate to each. They are separated from each other by a varying number of shifts of contexts of meaning — moments, in dialectical terminology — to which they correspond and which, in turn, they illustrate. We have attempted to show the progressive concreteness of the dialectical moments by referring to the gradual relaxation of parameters in the paradigms as w e move up the scale. Full di-
alectical insight from a paradigm required the gradual suspension of both built-in constraints by the parameters and abstractive features of the concepts involved in it. The modifications undergone in the rigid juxtaposition of the empirical and the a priori, and the shift from reason to Reason in the economic paradigm, were examples of the latter. The change from therapeutic to normal setting, the extension of the end-points on the timeaxis and the foregoing of the prearranged roles in the process of transcendence in the analytical paradigm, were examples of the former. In the analytical paradigm which (because of the severity of constraints) ranked lowest on the dialectical scale of concreteness, the shift in the context of meaning from externally applied to self-applied theory resulted swiftly, and with near-logical necessity, in a synthesis of theory-practice anticipating the final outcome of the dialectic. Not so in the case of scientism in the service of politics whereby, with the relaxation of these constraints and the transition to the more concrete level of politics, a similar synthesis could not have taken place without a good deal more of mediation. The economic paradigm illustrated the transition from individual to group and the succeeding shift from consciousness to self-consciousness: from the situation in which one thinks that the rules are operating in front of one's eyes, but they are, in fact, operating behind his back, to that where they are operating behind his back, but he knows that this is so. Unlike the situation of the analytical paradigm, here no one can be entrusted with guiding transcendence without the risk of reinjecting the old rules into the new context. With the transition from individual to group and from individual reason to trans-individual Reason, there is no one w h o can be trusted as a repository for this function in a way which corresponds to the analyst of the psychological paradigm. The emergence of the group brings an element of contingency regarding h o w transcendence is to be initiated. There is no way of planning the next dialectical step without reinfecting that which was intended as synthesis with the germs of what it was supposed to overcome. As the challenge cannot be planned without aborting the dialectical effort, so is it impossible to assign the role of the challenger beforehand without negating transcendence. The challenge, therefore, has to be left to those experiential elements which are not categorially preselected through scientistic rationality and theory-practice in particular. It can only originate in those undomesticated elements which were branded irrational or non-existent by established reason, but which nevertheless persevered in its interstices.
Philosophy, standing as it does above economics and politics and, therefore, so many more steps removed from science and psychology on the dialectical scale, appears to have inherited from them a rather problematic state of affairs. It may be useful at this preliminary stage to begin defining its role in formulating the elusive synthesis by approaching its final category, Hegel's Absolute Idea, in negative terms. Like the Brahman, the absolute of Indian idealist philosophy with which Hegel's final category has many affinities, it is more instructive to begin by giving an account of it through negative determinations. Ontologically speaking, at the level of the Absolute Idea, there is no experiential element remaining undoriiesticated and thereby capable of mounting a challenge, and logically there is n o longer a correspondingly more inclusive context of meaning. All contingency has ceased, as has all presuppositional challenge, since by definition there is nowhere to go in terms of more fundamental presuppositions or more embracing contexts of meaning. Or, reverting to the logical mode of describing the Absolute, all change in what can be judged by reference to what remains fixed, all successive syntheses in terms of the final one, and generally all relativity, needs to be gauged against an absolute frame of reference. The retrodictive criterion for judging the authenticity of synthesis which was initiated at the level of politics is being finalized at that of philosophy. Yet, the Absolute would be wanting as an absolute frame of reference if it had to be described as merely retrodictive in judging all previous syntheses. For, though dialectically more advanced than the predictive logic of scientism, retrodictive logic entails an unresolved duality. It suffers from the same difficulty as theorypractice earlier, in which w e found that neither of the polar terms could independently constitute an adequate ground for a synthesis while the other was tacitly assumed and, therefore, bound to be surreptitiously reintroduced into the new context. Like any temporal setting modeled after past-future, the retrodictive-predictive structure retains duality at a level which, by the very meaning of the Absolute, is not permissible. The way out of this impasse (too involved for discussion at this early stage) is to provide a context whereby one can meaningfully assert the validity of both the predictive and retrodictive synthesis. Hegel's solution to this problem consists in the circular structure of his dialectical system as a whole. Though forming the initial and the terminal points of his Logic, the first and last categories of this work, Being and the Absolute Idea, constitute in terms of his system as a whole, points on the circumference of a circle. Thus, as was pointed out earlier, the all-
Philosophy on the integrating path of sophia as revised by the Absolute Idea.
Dialectical circularity as the basis for resolving the remaining difficulties.
inclusive context of the Absolute, as indeed every other category of the dialectic, is both a presupposition and an outcome, depending on which way it is facing on the circle. Although the Absolute can go no further in terms of a more all-inclusive context, there is a "forward" in terms of the beginning of the dialectical process — the forward movement of the circular path on the w a y to Being. So the Absolute is the outcome if it is facing backward and is adopting a retrospective standpoint, and a presupposition if it is facing forward and adopting a predictive outlook. The final synthesis as a result of transcendence from object-language to meaning-language.
Possible misunderstandings of meaning-language clarified through the concept of circularity.
However, it should be pointed out that the latter is not the already transcended predictive rationality of scientism, but the predictive capacity implicit in the self-knowledge of an all-encompassing whole. The Absolute has dialectically incorporated the insight that the validity regarding scientism's predictive claims is implicit in the inter-connectedness of its categorial apparatus. But scientism is unaware of what is implicit in its categories and, therefore, labors under the illusion that it make predictions about things external to itself. Its epistemological realism, its ontological dualism, its object-language and its methodological theory-practice, are interdependent elements of a closely knit context of meaning. All of them, but especially its object-language, get in the way of self-consciousness and the process of unveiling what is implicit in the dualistic structure of its categorial apparatus. In the dialectic the transition from scientists to humanistic contexts of meaning is pari passu a shift from object-language to meaning-language. The gradual attainment of self-consciousness, which is characteristic of the later stages of the dialectic, signals a systematic desedimentation of deeper structures of meaning. Significantly, the super-categories which encompass the scientistic and humanistic contexts are called Essence and Notion, respectively, wherein the latter conveys the concern about the meaning of the concept itself, or the concept of the concept. By the time the absolute context has been reached, all traces of object-language have been eliminated along with the remaining dualistic features and the prevailing language is that of meaning alone. As Hegel put it, echoing Aristotle and underlining the feature of self-consciousness, the Absolute thinks and talks about itself. A number of misunderstandings and subsequent criticisms of Hegel's philosophy stem f r o m overlooking the fact that, though clothed in metaphorical, and even anthropomorphic expression suggestive of object-language, his language is preeminently meaning-language or meta-language — not unlike modern philosophies of meaning and transcendence. Common
sense realism and its many variations, pressing from both the cultural and the philosophical front in the last century, have made these misunderstandings difficult to avoid. It takes more than the usual effort and time to convince a contemporary educated audience that Spirit (Geist) and Notion (Begriff), the two super-categories of the later stages of the dialectic, are about meaning rather than disembodied entities and subjective notions. A similar fate may await the present effort to render the universe of meaning through the loaded object-language of the metaphor of a Janus-faced Absolute moving along a circular path. But having gone so far in this mode with the help of paradigms, there seems little choice but to continue and conclude this Part by recalling some cases from these paradigms which deal with fundamental concepts most susceptible to object-language and endeavor to restate them in meaning-language. During our earlier comparison of Hegel's treatment of being with other philosophies of transcendence, w e noted that his point of departure was a matter of convenience rather than a presuppositionless beginning. Being was found to be a form of unmediated existence posited by philosophers w h o are unaware of what is implicit in it as a product of historically given form of consciousness. Like any other form of immediacy, a posit conceals mediation, but this is not realized at the moment it is being posited and has to wait for the next higher context of meaning, wherein the unveiling of what had lain implicit takes place. Thus the earlier context becomes explicit in the later one, and the end is implicit in the beginning. It takes a whole succession of dialectical steps to make fully explicit in the absolute context not only what has been implicit in the previous one, but in the process itself of making explicit. In other words, the full meaning of rendering something explicit is k n o w n only when nothing remains implicit in the succession of contexts of meaning and when, in addition, it has become clear that the process of rendering explicit is circular. There is a qualitative difference between the absolute context and all the rest which has important consequences for the final synthesis of theory and practice. It can be formulated with special reference to being by pointing out that the philosophical examination of what is, leads inexorably to an investigation of what it means to be. But since there are many contexts of meaning, a referential point is necessary, a context of contexts, if there is to be a meaningful discourse about the meaning of a being and ultimately about being itself. The Absolute is such referential context of meaning whose fixity cannot be impugned by retorting that it is time-bound and therefore changeable. For, the concept
Circularity leads to the dialectical fixing of identity through opposition.
of time is itself part of that same universe of meaning and subject to the same rules of the absolute context as being. Recalling the analytic paradigm, w e can point out that with the establishment of the circular pattern of the dialectic, all remaining constraints imposed by the time-axis of analytic experience have been suspended. The initial and terminal points of the axis were first allowed to become open-ended and then, with the introduction of the philosophical paradigm, they were joined in conformity with the circular structure of the dialectic. The dual process of mediation and immediacy, of unveiling what lies implicit and positing, of retroflection and action, is no longer initiated only at select points on the axis. Any point on the circumference can serve as the locus for initiating this process and the resulting movement, the heart of the dialectic, leads back and forth to the point of origin from different directions. If w e wish to relieve this heavily burdened object-language from the load imposed by visual metaphor and gradually shift to the meaning-language appropriate to this advanced stage of the dialectic, w e may say that the feature of a dialectical moment as Janus-faced can be conveyed in meaning-language by saying that the meaning of a term or process is fixed through its opposite. As the all-inclusive context is approached it becomes progressively apparent that hitherto recalcitrant polar terms have all along been on either side of the same two-faced process. Immediacy is shared by both thought and action, and so is mediation. What appears as unmediated thought or action turns out, upon unveiling, to involve mediation, and the converse is true of mediation. Action is implicit understanding and understanding is action m a d e e x p l i c i t . As s o m e o n e w h o posits, the retroflective philosopher is a man of action, and as someone w h o retroflects, the man of action is a potential philosopher. This is not a series of obliterations of distinctions, which might seem to be the case if the object-language of these statements is taken at face value. Hegel would be the first to condemn the flouting of the so-called laws of formal logic or the muddling of distinctions. If taken as elements in the domain of meaning, these statements underline interconnectedness with those in opposition in the formation of the texture of meaning. In the sense that the advanced categories of of the dialectic are about meaning, and that philosophical activity par excellence makes meaning explicit, Hegel has given reflection the privileged standpoint and the last word to the philosopher. But having granted that, w e must also concede in the spirit of the twoway traffic of the dialectic, that the man of action is given the green light in the name of immediacy so that the philosopher
has something to reflect upon. What appears as pure immediacy in the former's impulsive action is revealed, upon philosophical unveiling through mediation, to be a reflection of the age — the man of historical action is a child of his times. To paraphrase Kant's admission that he had to deny knowledge in order to make room for faith, Hegel had to limit philosophy to retroflection in order to leave the future open for the man of action. Significantly, the Absolute Idea, which is the context of meaning for both in the last moment of the Logic, is also the final synthesis of theory and practice.
Part II: Structure and Rhythm of the Dialectic
The science of (Logic) exhibits itself as a circle returning upon itself the end being wound back into the beginning. .. this circle is moreover a circle of circles, for each individual member as ensouled by the method is reflected into itself, so that in returning to the beginning it is at the same time the beginning of a new member. Science of Logic
A. Structure W e are still in the process of introducing the main project Strategy to be and laying down a strategy that will facilitate our task. This Part followed and broad is accordingly divided into three Chapters. The first deals with a description of works to be used. description of the structure of the main works which w e shall be using. The second will be conveying something about the rhythm of the dialectic employing Aristotle's concepts of matter and form as a foil. Finally, the third will deal with matters of strategy to be used in the Parts which follow. In view of the great complexity and close interconnectedness between the different works of the Hegelian system, it is advisable to provide a sense of its structure beginning with the Encyclopedia in which the systematic intent is most visible. This work, by whose structure w e shall be primarily guided, can be viewed as a vast interdisciplinary project cast along dialectical principles and dealing with subject matter which Hegel treated in a more concise manner in separate works. It is divided into three parts: the Logic, the Philosophy of Nature, and the Philosophy of Spirit, corresponding at once to the triadic rhythm of the dialectic and the subject matter of the logico-mathematical, physical-biological, and cultural-humanistic disciplines, respectively. This tripartite division repeats itself, as structure and subject matter divide and subdivide throughout the Encyclopedia and the other of Hegel's major works. The Logic subdivides into Being, Essence, and the Notion, corresponding to quantitative, scientistic, and dialectical rationality, respectively. The Philosophy of Nature subdivides into Mechanics, Physics, and Organics. The Philosophy of Spirit subdivides into Subjective Spirit (anthropology, phenomenology, and psychology), Objective Spirit (law, morality, politics, sociology, and history), and Absolute Spirit (art, religion, and philosophy). Since w e will also deal extensively with Hegel's Science of Logic Subdivisions of the Encyclopedia (a more detailed version of the Logic), the following list of their and the Science combined subdivisions has been created for use as a reference. of Logic. The overarching triad of Being is Quality—Quantity—Measure. Each of these moments contains between two or three subdivisions of which w e give only two. Quality subdivides into Being [(pure) Being—Nothing—Becoming], Determinate Being (Da-
sein) [Somewhat—Finitude (Limit)—Infinity (False and True)], Being-for-self [One—Many (Repulsion)—Repulsion and Attraction], Quantity subdivides into Pure Quantity [Pure Q u a n t i t y Continuous and Discreet Quantity—Limitation of Quantity], Quantum [Number—Extensive and Intensive Quantum—Quantitative Infinity], Degree [Degree—Quantitative Infinite Progression—Quantitative Ratio], Finally, Measure subdivides into Specific Quantity—Real Measure—Transition to Essence. The overarching triad of Essence is Introflection (or Reflection-within-self)—Appearance—Actuality. Again each of these moments sometimes subdivides into three, but for our purposes w e need list only two. Introflection subdivides into Show, or Illusory Being [Essential/Unessential—Illusory Being—Reflection], Essentialities [Identity—Difference—Contradiction], and Ground [Formal Ground—Real Ground—Complete Ground], Appearance subdivides into Existence [Thing/Properties— Thing/Matters—Matter/Form], Appearance Proper [World of Appearance—Content/Form—Correlation], and Essential Relation [Whole/Parts—Force/Expression—Inner/Outer], Actuality subdivides into Absolute [Exposition of the Absolute—Absolute Attribute—Mode of the Absolute], Actuality Proper [Formal Possibility/Contingency—Real Possibility/Real Actuality—Absolute Necessity], and Absolute Relation [Substance/Accident— Cause/Effect—Reciprocity]. The overarching triad of the Notion is Subjective N o t i o n Objective Notion—Idea. The Idea subdivides into Notion as Such—Judgement—Syllogism. The Objective Notion into Mechanism—Chemism—Teleology. The latter subdivides into Subjective End—Means—Realized End. Finally the Idea subdivides into Life [Living Individual—Life Process—Kind], Cognition [Cognition Proper(Idea of the True)—Will(Idea of the Good)] and Absolute Idea. Here w e have completely bypassed the numerous subdivisions of the Subjective Notion, as w e did with the subdivisions of the first two moments of the Objective Notion. The organization of the Philosophy of Spirit is as follows: Subjective Spirit, Objective Spirit, and Absolute Spirit. The overarching triad of Subjective Spirit is Soul—Consciousness—Mind. Soul subdivides into Physical Soul [Physical Qualities—Physical Alterations—Sensibility], Feeling Soul [Feeling Soul in Immediacy—Self-Feeling—Habit], and Actual Soul. Consciousness subdivides into Consciousness Proper [Sensuous ConsciousnessSense Perception—Intellect (Understanding)], Self-consciousness [Appetite—Self-consciousness Recognitive—Universal Self-consciousness], and Reason. Mind subdivides into Theoretical M i n d [Intuition—Representation—Thinking], Practical
Mind [Practical Sense or Feeling—Impulse and Choice—Happiness] and Free Mind. The overarching triad of Objective Spirit is Law (Recht)— Morality of Conscience (Moralitat)—Ethical Life (or Ethical Substance, Sittlichkeit). Law subdivides into Property—Contract— Right and Wrong. Moralitat subdivides into Purpose—Intention and Welfare—Goodness and Wickedness. Sittlichkeit sub-divides into Family—Civil Society (System of Wants—Administration of Justice—Police and Corporation), and State (Constitutional Law—International Law—Universal History). Finally, Absolute Spirit sub-divides into Art—Revealed Religion—Philosophy. The overarching triad of the Encyclopedia itself, Logic—Nature The rhythm of — Spirit, as well as all others subsumed under it, are meant to dialectical concreteconvey an advance not only in logical (dialectical), but also in ness exemplified in sensuous, concreteness. This is difficult to express adequately in the structure of the the linear arrangement of the printed page and the discursive Encyclopedia. medium of language. Not only is the path of the dialectic circular, but every step toward greater concreteness involves a simultaneous operation of immediacy and mediation, both the forward and the backward trek on its circular path. But there is a way of gradually introducing concreteness at the grand scale of the Encyclopedia from the micro-scale of the triad, or even from the concept of polarity itself, short of the technicalities of the dialectic. Aristotle had already noted, in ways that anticipated the Concreteness rhythm of the dialectic, that matter and form are always found introduced through conjoined in a concrete thing, or what he called a substance. In Aristotle's concepts the case of a wooden table, for example, the wood is the matter of matter and form. and the structure of the table is the form. But the w o o d is not pure matter either, since it too has form now expressed as volume, weight and shape, which render it in-formed at the least concrete mathematical level. Already there is the suggestion of the low level of the logico-mathematical moment of Being of the Logic, as it corresponds to the relatively un-informed chunk of wood. What is form in the less sophisticated (dialectically more abstract) mathematical discourse or context of meaning, becomes the new matter for in-formation in the next more sophisticated (dialectically more concrete) context of meaning. Formless matter and matterless form are equally inconceivable because any kind of articulation of form is impossible without a sensuous complement. We hear echoes of the dialectical insistence that the terms of a polarity are not indifferent toward each other, but that together they define reality. The potential table has graduated from a measurable chunk of w o o d in Being, to a technological product in Essence, and from there to a
Parallelism between Aristotle's teleology and Hegel's dialectic,
cultural product, i.e., the table reflecting the artistic style and social norms of the age. In the context of the macro-scale, this interaction between form and matter becomes a line of progression, organically teleological in Aristotle and dialectical in Hegel. In the former's schema of progression, matter is potentially something until is is actualized in a given form which in turn serves as matter for the next form, and so on. In Hegel's dialectical schema also, each step makes explicit what has been implicit in the one before it. But, unlike Aristotle's, where nature provides the movement, here it is dialectical Reason that provides the impetus. Every step up the ladder is a reconstitution of the context of meaning in line with criteria of coherence which Reason imposes on itself as it presses harder on the presuppositions of any given context. As w e m o v e up Aristotle's scale of nature, or Hegel's hierarchy of dialectical moments, there is a progressive determinacy in terms of the pre- or self-selection of form and matter depending on the two thinkers' principles of nature and Reason, respectively. As the form becomes more articulated and the matter more in-formed, the degrees of freedom left for the next step are reduced. What is implicit in each is progressively limited by its increasing internal articulation. The potential uses of wood in a raw state are infinitely more numerous than when used for the construction of a table, and they are further reduced when the table has been made in a specific style for the purpose of being incorporated into a given interior design. For both thinkers the process of realization entails an ultimate point of reference and model of perfection against which it can be measured. In other words, the process of increasing determinacy results into a kind of stasis, a limiting state where all potentiality has been realized, a state in which everything implicit has been rendered explicit. This is God qua pure actuality in Aristotle and the Absolute in Hegel. Unsettling as this conclusion about concreteness as a measure of perfection might be for the modern reader (steeped as he is likely to be in our ideology of linear progress and the meaning of concreteneness as sensuous affinity or tangibility) he should bear in mind the vast differences in cosmological outlook between the classical times and ours. As for Hegel, such position follows directly from his shift from scientistic reason to humanistic (dialectical) Reason, and from predictive to retrodictive rationality in the advanced stages of the dialectic. This is reflected in the transition from Essence to the Notion in the Logic and from Nature to Spirit in the overarching triad of the Encyclopedia.
In drawing upon the comparison b e t w e e n Aristotle and The triadic structure Hegel to shed light on the structure of the latter's opus, and parin the progressive ticularly on whether its organization reflects the dialectical ideal build up ofconof concreteness, the common unit of discourse has been polari- creteness. ty, more specifically that of matter-form. But it is the triadic structure that provides the organizational principle and the rhythm of the movement in Hegel's work. The question naturally arises as to what this portends for concreteness and what is the relationship between it and polarity. Hegel talks about this rather lucidly at the end of the Science of Logic, wherein he takes up the issue of the triadic method used in his work. Thus all the oppositions that are assumed as fixed, as for example finite and infinite, individual and universal, are not in contradiction through, say, an external connection; on the contrary, as an examination of their nature has shown, they are in-and-for-themselves a transition; the synthesis and the subject in which they appear is the product of their Notion's own reflection. If a consideration that ignores the Notion stops short at their external relationship, isolates them and leaves them as fixed presuppositions, it is the Notion, on the contrary, that keeps them steadily in view, moves them as their soul and brings out their dialectic. Now this is the very standpoint indicated above from which a universal first, considered in-and-for-itself, shows itself to be the other of itself. Taken quite generally, this determination can be taken to mean that what is at first immediate now appears as mediated, related to an other, or that the universal appears as a particular. Hence the second term that has thereby come into being is the negative of the first, and if we anticipate the subsequent progress, thefirstnegative. The immediate, from this negative side, has been extinguished in the other, but the other is essentially not the empty negative, the nothing, that is taken to be the usual result of the dialectic; rather is it the other of the first, the negative of the immediate-, it is therefore determined as the mediated — contains in general the determination of the first within itself. Consequently the first is essentially preserved and retained even in the other. To hold fast to the positive in its negative, in the content of the presupposition, in the result, this is the most important feature in rational cognition; at the same time only the simplest reflection is needed to convince one of the absolute truth and necessity of this requirement and so far as examples of the proof of this are concerned, the whole of logic consists of such. Now more precisely the third is the immediate, but the immediate resulting from sublation of mediation, the simple resulting from sublation of difference, the positive resulting from sublation of the negative, the Notion that has realized itself by means of its otherness and by the sublation of this reality has become united with itself, and has restored its absolute reality, its simple, relation to itself. This result is therefore the truth. It is equally immediacy and mediation; but such forms of judgement as: the third is immediacy and mediation,
or: it is the unity of them, are not capable of grasping it; for it is not a quiescent third, but, precisely as this unity, is self-mediating movement and activity. As that with which we began was the universal, so the result is the individual, the concrete, the subject; what the former is in-itself, the latter is now equally for-itself, the universal is posited in the subject. The first two moments of the triplicity are abstract, untrue moments which for that very reason are dialectical, and through this their negativity make themselves into the subject. The Notion itself is for-us, in the first instance, alike the universal that is in-itself, and the negative that is for-itself, and also the third, that which is both in-and-for-itself, the universal that runs through all the moments of the syllogism; but the third is the conclusion, in which the Notion through its negativity is mediated with itself and thereby posited for-itself as the universal and the identity of its moments. (Hegel's Science of Logic, trans. A.V. Miller, London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1969, pp. 833-34, 837-38; subsequently referred to as Science of Logic. Throughout our work all emphases are in the original texts unless otherwise specified. Minor changes in capitalization and spelling have been made for the sake of conformity with the rest of the quoted passages in our text.) Preliminary terminological clarifications and Hegel's own account of dialectical circularity.
Some of the terms used by Hegel such as immediacy and mediation, abstract and concrete, and the first, second, and third moments of the triad, more popularly known also as thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, are already familiar. Others, such as in-itself, for-itself and in-and-for-itself will be clarified in context in the next Chapter. But the detail of the important term "sublation" and the way in which it preserves or retains the essence of what it cancels through the creative use of negation, must wait until the discussion of Essence in Part m. It is worth noting here that "triplicity" reflects the syllogistic form in general, and in this instance that of Universal—Particular—Individual (Concrete Universal). This gives Hegel the opportunity to underline the movement toward concreteness at the micro-level of the triad through the transition from the abstraction of the universal concept to the equally abstract (one-sided) concreteness of something particular, and from there to the synthesis of the two in the self-containment or self-completeness (also known as concrete universality) of the logical individual. The last term that Hegel adds to our familiar polarity is, in effect, a breakdown of the second term — Aristotle's concrete thing or "substance" (ousia) — in order to reveal the inner dynamic that propels the dialectic on its path. In contrast to Aristotle where nature supplies the movement, in Hegel it turns out (after the self-concealment of scientistic reason has been revealed) that it is Reason operating on itself that does so. But the sharing of this feature of reason, i.e., of the formal "triplicity" of the syllogistic form, with traditional logic, also gives Hegel the opportunity to emphasize their difference in terms, of the concreteness of the third term.
This is something that formal logic is "not capable of grasping" because of its abstract use of negativity. Another important function of the third term is to provide the basis for the feature of circularity of the dialectic noted earlier. The key to the understanding of this is the return of immediacy to the third term — which w e shall subsequently refer to as re-immediation — but in a sublated form. This Hegel explicates at some length, beginning with the second part of the following quotation. The joining of the first and last terms of the triad at the micro-level of the syllogism is the model for circularity at the macro-level of the internal structure of the Encyclopedia. Each of the parts of philosophy is a philosophical whole, a circle rounded and complete in itself. In each of these parts, however, the philosophical Idea is found in a particular specificality or medium. The single circle, because it is a real totality, bursts through the limits imposed by its special medium, and gives rise to a wider circle. The whole philosophy in this way resembles a circle of circles. The Idea appears in each single circle, but, at the same time, the whole Idea is constituted by the system of these peculiar phases, and each is a necessary member of the organization. (The Logic of Hegel, trans. W. Wallace, London: Oxford University press, 1950, #15; subsequently referred to as Logic.) It may seem as if philosophy, in order to start on its course, had, like the rest of the sciences, to begin with a subjective presupposition. The sciences postulate their respective objects, such as space, number, or whatever it be; and it might be supposed that philosophy had also to postulate the existence of thought. But the two cases are not exactly parallel. It is by the free act of thought that it occupies a point of view, in which it is for its own self, and thus gives itself an object of its own production. Nor is this all. The very point of view, which originally is taken on its own evidence only, must in the course of the science (of speculative or dialectical philosophy) be converted to a result, — the ultimate result in which philosophy returns into itself and reaches the point with which it began. In this manner philosophy exhibits the appearance of a circle which closes with itself, and has no beginning in the same way as the other sciences have. To speak of a beginning in philosophy has a meaning only in relation to a person who proposes to commence the study, and not in relation to the science as science. The same thing can be thus expressed. The notion of (speculative) science — the notion therefore with which we start — which, for the very reason that it is initial, implies a separation between the thought which is our object, and the subject philosophizing which is, as it were, external to the former, must be grasped and comprehended by the science itself. This is in short the one single aim, action, and goal of philosophy — to arrive at the notion of its notion, and thus secure its return and its satisfaction. (Logic, #17; parentheses added in this case, and in subsequent quotations, unless otherwise specified.)
By virtue of the nature of the method just indicated, the science exhibits itself as a circle returning upon itself, the end being wound back into the beginning, the simple ground, by the mediation; this circle is moreover a circle of circles, for each individual member as ensouled by the method is reflected into itself, so that in returning into the beginning it is at the same time the beginning of a new member. Links of this chain are the individual sciences (of Logic, Nature, and Spirit), each of which has an antecedent and a successor — or, expressed more accurately, has only the antecedent and indicates its successor in its conclusion. (Science of Logic, p. 842; parentheses in the text)
Limitations of the linear discursive medium for dialectical exposition.
Hegel's "single circle" is what w e have been referring to as a context of meaning and, correspondingly, his "circle of circles" is our "context of contexts." His "particular specificity or medium" was sometimes rendered in our discussion as "the rules of the game." Our "leap" from context to context, or the element of "irrationality" involved in action between contexts of meaning, corresponds to his circle's "burst (ing) through the limits imposed by the special medium, and giv(ing) rise to a wider circle." Finally, our two-faced Janus has a concise counterpart in his assertion that the single circle, now a specific discipline, or cluster of related disciplines in the Encyclopedia, "has only the antecedent and indicates its successor in its conclusion." In this case "has" represents backward-oriented mediation; and "indicates" forwardlooking immediacy in our two-way path of the dialectic. Metaphor, with its power to transfer meaning from one level of discourse to another, has served well in explicating dialectical shifts in meaning. But metaphors are rendered in the medium of language, and the discursive language of philosophy in particular, which, to use Hegel's term, has its own "specificity." Part of such specificity is its linearity, which often gets in the way of both explication and understanding of the dialectic. We shall try to anticipate some of the misapplications of the dialectic, with which w e shall be dealing later, by taking up possible misunderstandings due to the linearity of language. The impression is often given that logical structure and subject matter (form and matter) are drawing apart, in spite of Hegel's efforts and assurances to the contrary. More specifically, it may seem that the relationship between the categorial apparatus of the Logic and the disciplinary content of the Philosophy of Nature and the Philosophy of Spirit is one of externality, so that the dialectic is reduced to just another theory in search of an application. The sequential arrangement of Logic, Nature, and Spirit, as well as that of their lesser triads in the Encyclopedia, may suggest such externality due to the linearity of the discursive medium, inasmuch as the linear exposition does not allow a simultaneous development of the
smaller triads and those arching above them. The transitions between larger triads are often laconic and may even appear unwarranted because they seem inadequately necessitated. For example, in the transition from Subjective to Objective Spirit in the Philosophy of Spirit, the preparation for a synthesis (in terms of building up of concreteness) has been going on between the opposing moments of the overarching triad. But it is difficult to make this explicit in a linear mode of exposition without disrupting the sequence of the lesser triads under them. Time and again critics have complained about the abruptness, even arbitrariness, of the transition from Logic to Nature in the Encyclopedia. But, in fact, the ground has been prepared by the lesser categories from behind the surface, so that when the advanced categories of action (Cognition and Will) at the end of the Logic first encounter Nature, it is as if they are meeting someone familiar. This familiarity is, of course, the result of the circular feature of the dialectic, whereby dialectical moments are both presupposition and outcome. For example, theory-practice does not encounter Nature in its scientistic garb, but as highly mediated Cognition and Will which, having dialectically incorporated theory-practice, recognize Nature, not as raw nature, but as dialectically structuralized Nature. The circularity involved here results in discovering as already present in Nature what has all along been thought by scientism and common sense to be a presupposition for the understanding of nature — something derived from logic with an intention to apply to external nature. But there is another important piece without which the nature of dialectical transitions is bound to remain a puzzle: Selfconsciousness, which has been fully attained with the last category of the Absolute Idea in the Logic, is also the synthesis of Cognition and Will. In v i e w of this, the encounter of Nature will be made by the Absolute Idea which contains, in sublated form, the advanced successors of theory and practice — Cognition and Will. The transition from Logic to Nature has, therefore, to be reformulated as follows: Not only is Nature being encountered as familiar, but also in full awareness about the limitations of the scientistic categories of theory-practice. Recalling our UFO illustration, it would be as if, say, a dialectically inclined physicist were to review, in full transparency about presuppositions, the results of some Air Force scientists who, in their self-concealment about the embeddedness of ontological presuppositions into their deeper categorial apparatus, had concluded that certain sightings were unreal. The important consequence of dialectical circularity for our purpose is that, unlike
Misplaced criticisms of the dialectic due to the limitations of the linear medium.
the case between theory and practice in the scientistic context, the relationship between its advanced counterparts, and pari passu that between Logic and Nature, is not governed by externality. Dialectical logic is not applicable to Nature in modo scientific, as the linearity of structure and medium may wrongly suggest, and one should not, therefore, be misled into believing that they are related as are a theory and its application.
B. Interchangeability of Categories Our introduction of the dialectic by way of the Aristotelian concepts of form and matter is already evidence of interchangeability of categories within the dialectical process since these concepts are also important categories of the dialectic. Further hints about interchangeability can be found in what has already been said about immediacy-mediation, externality-internality, and abstract-concrete in terms of features which they share with each other and with theory-practice. This line of thought will be pursued further because interchangeability plays a key role in the strategy to be employed in the following pages. But first a f e w words about the concept of definition itself, which underlies our position on interchangeability, and which, it is hoped, will also help to explain its role of pre-eminence in our treatment of the subject. A dialectically rich category may be compared to a package formed out of layers of meaning accumulated through successive sublations. But its concreteness is not apparent unless one is constantly aware of the process the category has undergone — unless one, so to speak, is willing to untie the package at a moment's notice. This highlights the premium, from a dialectical standpoint, for understanding a concept in context or, more accurately, in process. It also underlines the familiar difficulties generated by the linearity of discursive medium for our reliance on simultaneity. Freedom-necessity, subject-object, and theorypractice, especially the latter's dialectically advanced successors, such as Cognition-Will, are examples of concrete polar categories. In the case of the Will (or the Practical Idea of the Science of Logic), the intervening mediations have eradicated almost all traces of outward resemblance to their ancestry, so that it takes quite a task of unveiling to establish their line of descent. This is not to say that the gradations in the concreteness of concepts are the discovery of the dialectic. The dialectic has simply accented this fact by placing the process of making explicit what remains implicit at the center of its methodology. Not all dialectical concepts are categories of varying concreteness. For example, immediacy-mediation, as well as others to be added to the list later, are operational terms not amenable to development, but cast in
Interchangeability related to dialectical concreteness and illustrated through freedom and immediacy-mediation.
The concept of definition related to dialectical concreteness.
polar form to facilitate the dialectical process by promoting interchangeability between themselves and those subject to concretion. By its very nature, as one term of a dual category, immediacy connotes abstraction, or incompleteness, and points to its polar opposite, mediation, for completeness and concreteness. Immediacy and mediation sift experience between themselves in ways other than traditionally utilized. The former corresponds to the surface as represented by those elements of sensuous experience which lend themselves most readily to description. By contrast, mediation corresponds to exploration of what lies behind the surface, the dominion of scientific theorizing and philosophical speculation. As an illustration of how the onto-logic of dialectical categories such as immediacy and mediation interface with concrete social and historical reality, one can point out that immediacy can be used logically-psychologically in connection with a discourse in order to indicate the function of non-discursive (emotional, intuitive) elements, in contrast to chains of deduction or intellectual argumentation. Or, adding a measure of socio-historical concreteness, immediacy can be used in conjunction with action to refer to speed, abruptness, or surprise, characterizing military force or revolutionary violence, for the attainment of given ends, which could conceivably have been pursued through mediation. Viewed from outside of a dialectical context, dialectically concrete concepts (or categories) seem vague and lacking in precision and tractability which w e associate with scientistic discourse. This is due precisely to their concreteness in conjunction with the limitations of linearity of the discursive medium. Their definition is, in effect, the story of their lives. Take, for example, freedom as a cultural concept by contrast to a precisely defined juridical freedom necessary in the adjudication of a libel suit. The former, though vague and totally intractable for purposes of adjudication, is quite functional within its context of meaning, and dialectically more advanced than the latter, since it incorporates juridical freedom in its definition — contains it in a sublated form, as Hegel would say. As linguistic analysis would state this point, the unsatisfactory outcome of attempting a satisfactory dictionary-type definition of cultural freedom, is not due to the primitive state of the subject matter, nor to our intellectual sloppiness, but to a category-mistake, i.e., to our attempting the wrong type of definition. The concept of cultural freedom is quite appropriate for, say, a historical discourse in which the terms are concrete enough to allow placement in context instead of a dictionary-type definition in order to elicit their meaning. But this operation involves a great deal of over-
lapping and a considerable number of ragged edges in regard to definition of boundaries with equally concrete concepts, such as those of democracy, liberalism, individualism, and so on. With this in mind w e turn to interchangeability which w e shall illustrate by putting our familiar Aristotelian polarities to Hegelian use, and vice versa. The path toward perfection through increasing actualization of potentialities, which w e encountered in the informal dialectic of matter-form, is also the path to freedom, appearances about increasing determinacy within each succeeding form notwithstanding. Hegel's conception of freedom is a continuation and generalization of the classical conception implicit in the doctrine about actualization of potentialities in the scale of nature of which humankind is an integral part. However, unlike classical thought, in which human f r e e d o m is restricted by what is considered to be the nature of all living things, in Hegel it acquires a new dimension because it is not nature, but Reason that provides the propelling force for the actualization of human potentialities. The impetus of the dialectic is Reason's radical habit of challenging its own presuppositions. Hegel's definition of history as the progressive actualization of freedom in terms of the realization of human potentialities follows directly from this operation of Reason on itself and it would be incomprehensible without Reason's self-consciousness. Though the higher stages of the dialectic, such as the later stages of in-formation of the piece of wood-turned-to-table earlier, are characterized by increased determination; the latter, upon closer scrutiny, is revealed to be self-given or self-determination. But this is realized only through the attainment of self-consciousness by Reason, wherein it becomes clear that what had appeared to be external, and therefore as externally necessitated, was, in fact, the result of Reason's free action on itself. Form-matter and its complement, actuality-potentiality, are Interchangeability interchangeable with freedom-necessity within the dialectic, illustrated through until humankind becomes involved. Then, Hegel's superimposi- concreteness. tion of the function of Reason on the Aristotelian schema of nature changes the rules of the game. However, form-matter has not disappeared from the picture, but is preserved in a sublated form, ready to surface and play surrogate for freedom-necessity should the need arise to unpack a concrete version of freedom at a moment's notice. Hegel added a third term to the polarity of potentiality-actuality, which provides their synthesis, while at the same time assuring his contribution to the Aristotelian process of realization. His terminology cast in the form of a triad becomes: In-itself (an sich)—for-itself (fur sich)—in-
and-for-itself (an-und-fur-sich). The first two terms correspond to potentiality (or implicitness) and actuality (or explicitness) respectively, as in Aristotle. But the third term secures the movement which, by Hegel's rules of the game, is provided by Reason and self-consciousness certifying the synthesis after the fact. This can be seen when a subject is cast in the role of the moments of the triad. The first moment indicates lack of selfconsciousness; the second indicates limited self-consciousness (insofar as the subject is aware of himself as he is explicitly and not in terms of his potentialities); and the third moment points to full self-consciousness of both one's actuality and potentiality. Hegel also uses alternatively the expression for-us (fUr-uns) to indicate the standpoint of those who, having attained selfconsciousness by stepping out of the process, are capable of grasping the circular structure of the dialectic as a whole i e the whole range of potentialities. Commonly encountered polarities developed into triads.
Other polarities turned into triads which have been anticipated in the discussion can now be explicitly identified- Immediacy—M e d i a t i o n - R e - i m m e d i a t i o n , Individual (predictive) reason—its negation (as irrationality in the political paradigm and as ignorance in the economic one)-(retrodictive) Reasom Subjective freedom (in which the subject is unaware that determination is self-given) its negation through (external) Determination ( c o n c r e t e ) F r e e d o m ( n e g a t i o n of the negation through Reason's realization [self-consciousness] that determination is the result of Reason's operation on itself [internal or self-determination]); Internality-Externality-Mediated (elevated or enriched) Internality; or, alternatively, (individual) Subjectivity Objectivity Elevated (or trans-individual) Subjectivity; and, last but not least, Theory—Practice (or in reverse order Practice-Theory)—their synthesis in Action. Further development of these triads, in addition to others, is awaiting in Part HI. This will suffice for now if a sense of interchangeability between them is established in v i e w of their concreteness or operational nature. Dialectically concrete concepts like action and f r e e d o m cut across the w h o l e dialectic through interchangeable categories as above, which stand as surrogates for them, while these concepts remain implicit throughout the process and surface only at the end of it. The rest of this Chapter will pursue this issue of interchangeability, using the paradigms of Part I to show that the same material can support categories of high concreteness, in addition to theory-practice The similarity of structure between the polarities of theorypractice and mediation-immediacy extends also to matter-form and freedom-necessity. However, both sets are related to each
other through the polarities-turned-triads of Reason-reason, subject(ivity)-object(ivity) and internality-externality. Practice exchanged roles with immediacy because in contrast to theory, w h i c h represented mediation, it signified challenge w h e n judged according to the prevailing rules. But the feature of immediacy which entitled practice to challenge, also removed the rational ground for knowing beforehand what constitutes a presuppositional challenge leading to a genuine synthesis. For such ground can only be provided by rational activity, such as theorizing, and this involves mediation. No sooner had the priority claim of practice been established through immediacy, than its erosion began with the realization that theory had at least an equal claim through mediation. So far in our re-enactment of the political paradigm through surrogates, immediacymediation carried the burden. But n o w w e can hand this role to internality-externality, C o g n i t i o n - W i l l , s u b j e c t ( i v i t y ) object(ivity), and freedom-determination, as w e allow our protagonists, i.e., theory-practice, to illustrate more advanced segments of the dialectic in which the high concreteness of categories makes their interchangeability more apparent. Externality is manifested differently as an obstacle-to-beovercome in the cases of the liberal and the radical. In the former's universe of discourse reason guides goal-oriented action according to the principles of scientistic theory-practice. In his optimistic world, where every problem is, in principle, remediable through the application of the right principles of reason, externality is represented by the not-as-yet domesticated experience — or recalcitrant to theory practice. For the radical, on the other hand, w h o has with varying degrees of self-consciousness challenged the theory-practice polarity itself, externality is represented by the fact that his action is goal-oriented too, but for a different reason: Action originates in the subject, but it is directed outside of it. In other words, the subject-object polarity is implicit in both, but whereas in the liberal's case it is taken in a theoretical, in the radical's case it is taken in a practical sense. However, now "theoretical" and "practical" are not meant in the familiar scientistic sense, but in the dialectically more advanced one of the cognitive and moral dimensions of human activity — the dialectical successors of theory and practice, Cognition and Will, and the Theoretical and Practical Idea, respectively. As the ideal of knowledge (implicit in the Theoretical Idea) remains elusive for the liberal, so the ideal of action (implicit in the Practical Idea) remains unaccomplished in the case of the radical. Reason, the model of self-containment, cannot fully prevail as long as externality persists at the categorial level, as ob-
Illustrations of interchangeability through theory-practice and internalityexternality.
jectivity in the yet-to-be-fulfilled realm of the Theoretical Idea, and as freedom (in opposition to determination) in the yet-tobe-realized realm of the Practical Idea. As the element of contingency is manifested in the liberal's epistemological universe of discourse as elusiveness of truth qua objectivity, so is it experienced in the radical's practical universe as action of uncertain outcome and stifled freedom qua self-determination. The liberal, in launching his epistemological quest from a set of dualistic presuppositions remains their captive as long as he is insufficiently aware of their implications. So is the radical who, having rejected his opponent's dualistic presuppositions, has nevertheless unself - consciously generated others to which he has become equally bound. The liberal had pursued the ideal of knowledge as he considered it a prerequisite for right action, but it eluded him because of unself-consciously held categories that arrested him at the level of epistemological dualism. Now this ideal is out of reach for the radical also, who, from his standpoint of immediacy, cannot distinguish between the ideal and the liberal's misplacement of it. As a consequence, he too sets himself on a dualistic track, except that now action and freedom are at issue. Action premised on subject-object polarity (external-goal-oriented action), or freedom under conditions of externality (freedom from external determination), are as self-defeating as knowledge and truth under the same subject-object presupposition. The reason for this is that the setting of a new goal involves resetting of just another condition of externality. To put it differently, planning implies externality at both the theoretical and practical levels — as assessment of objective conditions and as goal-orientation — both of which are premised on subject-object dualism. Whereas the radical bypassed the former type of externality through his action's immediacy, he retained the latter and the contingency that goes with it. Interchangeability of theory-practice with in-itself—for-itself and form-matter.
Thus, given the nature of the protagonists' underlying presuppositions, their respective ideals of knowledge and action are not merely left unrealized, but remain, in principle, unrealizable if pursued for-themselves, i.e., as they appear to the protagonists from their individual vantage points. For, not until their methodological individualism and epistemological dualism have been transcended—not merely bypassed as w e witnessed in the case of the radical above—does any ground exist for a final synthesis of theory-practice. If these ideals are to be pursued with any success, they have to be viewed also in-themselves, i.e., as not-yet-in-view potentialities, and not merely not-in-view, as they were previously seen from their respective individual standpoints. But to do this involves shifting to a
standpoint for-us: those w h o stand with Smith's Providence, and Hegel's retrospective philosopher, beyond the domain of the individual and into that of the trans-individual subject. The radical and the liberal were pressed beyond the abstractive constraints of the original paradigm almost to the dialectical conclusion of their dialektike. This was done for the purpose of showing that as categories become concretely rich with the progress of the dialectic, the routes to the Absolute Idea become limited and can be more easily interchanged. The situation can be more easily compared to the climbing of a mountain whereby, as w e get closer to the peak our choice of paths is narrowed down and it becomes easier to interchange the paths (as a result of preselection given the closeness to the peak and the uphill direction of the diminishing number of paths). This is the same process of preselection by the hidden second-order categorial apparatus in the UFO case that sorted out which empirical data were relevant in determining that the sightings were unreal. The process can be traced to the Aristotelian doctrine of the in-formation of matter earlier, according to which there is a predisposition of matter to select its next form as a result of previously embodied forms. It is also the process which operated in the example of the wooden table by progressively limiting the possibilities of actualization as w e moved along the path of information. This process of preselection, or implicit selection, is also behind what was noted earlier about the advanced categories of action (at the end of the Logic) encountering Nature as something familiar. It further manifests itself in the political paradigm, in which social institutions are no mere objects, nor subject matter for the behaviorist sociologist to be dealt with externally, but are already socially in-formed and, therefore, a species of advanced concreteness. Theory-practice could serve liberal's concealment strategy because the latter, being part of the scientistic abstractive enterprise, such as that of the Air Force physicist, had no insight into the function of its own categorial structure of preselecting the range of social phenomena which constituted the testing ground of its own theory. Institutional embodiment adds to presuppositional concealment and social amnesia and, by the same measure, to the illusion of freedom for liberal and radical alike. The former defined his freedom in an institutional setting that he took for granted, while the latter saw the social setting as the institutional embodiment of unfreedom and sought to destroy it. The liberal was unaware of the restrictions he was imposing on his self-determination by allowing the presuppositions of what he perceived as his freedom to remain concealed. The radical, on the
Interchangeability of theory-practice with determination— self-determination (freedom).
other hand, labored under the illusion that by challenging his opponent's presuppositions he was planning his own freedom, rather than merely undermining the liberal's lack of it. He was unaware that in principle it is impossible to plan the outcome of a genuinely radical action (i.e., a dialectical synthesis of theory-practice) without embracing something categorially essential to what was being challenged. The more radical the challenge is, the more one adds to the element of contingency about the final outcome and pari passu to the limitation of one's freedom qua self-determination. Subjectively, he acted in the way expected of him as a radical, but with no assurance that his action would be judged as radical after the fact. He associated the sensation attending the immediacy of action with freedom, but upon closer scrutiny this can be shown to be a species of subjective freedom as is that of the liberal. The liberal lacks insight concerning the ways in which his self-determination is linked to institutions as embodiments of past (concealed) mediations. The radical suffers from a similar lack regarding the link between immediacy of action and the sensation of freedom which comes with it, on the one hand, and the nature of mediated past actions which remain concealed and the reality of freedom, on the other. In Hegelian terminology, it is for-us (as retrospective philosophers) that the radical's action looks as it truly is, in-itself, i.e., potentially or implicitly radical. From his perspective, however, or for-itself, his action appears to be actually or explicitly radical because his view is distorted, and his expectations misplaced, due to lack of self-consciousness. The dialectic of freedom can thus be formulated in terms of the categories of matter-form and potentiality-actuality, as can the dialectic of theory-practice be cast in terms of mediationimmediacy. On the other hand, both freedom and action can be interfaced by virtue of their dialectical links via subjectivity-objectivity and reason-Reason. Conceptual affinity between freedom and action is not the discovery of the dialectic. It was the contribution of Kant in his Critique of Practical Reason and has, more recently, served as the centerpiece of the analytical philosophy of action. The important insight of the dialectic into this, and its affinities with other highly concrete concepts, is turning their interchangeability (due to vagueness of definition and mutual overlapping) into a philosophical advantage. In other words, the dialectic reveals the other side of apparent conceptual flabbiness as the riches of hidden interconnections waiting to be disclosed. In this, it anticipates modern anthropology and sociology at their best, probing into the experiential and the pre-rational with their phenomenological techniques
and unveiling the intricacies of human existence — which appear to the naivete of common sense and scientism alike, as so much confusion and disorder.
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C. Strategy In the last Chapter w e discussed overlapping polar categories which behaved in accordance with what Wittgenstein called "family resemblances." This is the kind of resemblance shared by members of a class in which there is no one common similarity, but their resemblance is based on features shared by some members in one respect, and other members in another. In a dialectical context, this kind of resemblance would characterize a class of highly concrete concepts ("concrete universals" in Hegel's terminology) which have incorporated a number of features through mediation. It would then follow, by their description as concrete, that the resemblance of these entities with other members of their class, would be with respect to one or some, but not all, features. For example, as w e saw in the last Chapter, freedom and action have family resemblances which we established through intermediary concepts, or operational categories. Though not categories in the formal sense of having an assigned position in the list of the last Chapter, these concepts stand as surrogates for more authentic ones. They owe their family resemblances to their logical structure as against their more concrete fellow family members—e.g., cultural complexes such as liberalism, the Baroque, the Third World, and generally entities such as those which inhabit Hegel's domain of Spirit—which owe their interchangeability to high concreteness on the dialectical scale. The short list of polarities given in the last Chapter will be expanded with new ones as they are needed in the following discussion but, most important, the third term will be supplied, thus rendering explicit the contribution of the dialectic. A partial list of triads sharing family resemblances with the super triad of the Logic (Being—Essence—Notion) has been constructed since it, along with the previous list, will be useful for reference throughout Part III: Immediacy—Mediation—Re-immediation, In-itselfness—For-itselfness—In-and-for-itselfness, Intuition— Conception—(dialectical)Thought, Abstract Universality Particularity—Concrete Universality (Individuality), Undifferentiated unity—Differentiation—Differentiated unity, Indifference— Differentiation—Self-differentiation, Internality—Externality—
Surrogate categories and their operationalfunction.
Internality-in externality, Subjectivity—Objectivity Re-instated (or elevated) subjectivity, Idea—Nature—Spirit, Subjective Spirit—Objective Spirit—Absolute Spirit. Sketching the dialecThough it does not formally appear in its most advanced tical path of theoryform of the Theoretical and Practical Idea until the very end of practice in what the Logic and of the Science of Logic (and correspondingly the end follows. of Subjective Spirit), theory-practice runs through these formidable works from the beginning, interfacing with surrogates f r o m the above list as it advances along the dialectical path. This is understandable given its high concreteness and the importance Hegel accords to it by placing it just prior to the final synthesis in these works. But by the same token, this implicitness of theory-practice places a heavy burden on the student of the dialectic, who has to elicit the dialectical progress of theorypractice through surrogates. A strategy has, therefore, been devised, whereby the search and interpretation of the development of theory-practice extends also to the parts of the two mentioned works wherein theory-practice remains implicit. The first two Chapters of Part III are devoted to the first two super-moments of the Logic, Being and Essence. The third Chapter shifts to the Philosophy of Spirit for a brief encounter with theory-practice in its explicit form, as it momentarily surfaces in the first super-moment of the latter work, Subjective Spirit. There is a structural symmetry between these two works which also justifies this shift. Following the familiar tripartite organization, each is divided into three super-moments, Being—Essence—Notion in the Logic, and Subjective Spirit— Objective Spirit—Absolute Spirit in the Philosophy of Spirit. Though by virtue of its placement in the linear arrangement of the Encyclopedia, Subjective Spirit seems more advanced than the Notion, the structural symmetry between the super-moments of each work suggests otherwise. This can also be verified by perusing the list of surrogate categories above, which fit not only super-categories, but lesser ones. The operational triads among them are suited to perform this function of relating different triadic structures of similar, as well as different, orders of comprehensiveness. This shift to Subjective Spirit offers an opportunity to complement the logical concreteness of Being and Essence with the sensuous concreteness which is characteristic of Spirit. The fourth Chapter, Action and Objective Spirit, corresponds structurally to Essence and continues on the same path of sensuous concreteness, though theory-practice has again gone below the surface. Finally, in the last Chapter of Part in, Synthesis of Action in the Logic of the Notion, the focus is shifted back to the Logic and theory-practice, which has resurfaced for the stag-
ing of the final synthesis, but now with the benefit of what has intervened within socially and historically concrete Spirit. It is possible to view Part III as a series of attempts at increasing comprehensiveness of the synthesis of theory and practice. This was also the aim of Part I in which the paradigms and illustrations from sensuously concrete subject matter were used to convey the same. In this sense there is a symmetry between Parts I and III as well, for both contain three types of union of theory and practice in the same ascending order of dialectical concreteness. First, there is the analytical paradigm dealing with the dialectical synthesis of action at the individual level which prima faciae corresponds to the final moment (philosophical psychology) of Subjective Spirit. But by virtue of the symmetry between Logic and Philosophy of Spirit, this fits somewhere at the end of Being. Such a retrograde step is not surprising if we recall that the rather advanced model of synthesis found in the final stage of successful therapy was staged with the help of severe abstractive parameters. Relaxing these constraints led to a more open-ended dyadic structure of the political-scientistic paradigm, which brought us one step closer to the social group, and correspondingly, to early Essence and Objective Spirit. Second, there is the dialectical synthesis of theory-practice at the level of the group found at the heart of Objective Spirit, i.e., the cluster of institutions and the social disciplines belonging to them. To the extent that the latter are pervaded by scientistic methodology, their logic corresponds to the early and middle Essence. The movement toward more complexity and higher integration of the group proceeds gradually within Objective Spirit, as does a parallel movement within the corresponding structures in late Essence and the Notion in the Logic. The humanistic disciplines (except dialectical philosophy, for which is reserved the final moment of both Logic and Spirit) and their methodology belong to these spaces. Part I moved in symmetry with this progressive complexity and integration, by allowing the political paradigm to continue w h e r e the psychological could go no further. The economic paradigm, in turn, exemplified a synthesis approximating social praxis, by way of working out the implications of the dyadic structure of the political paradigm. The dialectical insight into the nature of what appears external to be truly internal dawns midpoint in the course of the paradigms. The economic paradigm marks the emergence of elevated subjectivity (or externality-in-internality) and the dividing line between the logic of parts and the logic of wholes, between scientistic and dialectical rationality, and b e t w e e n Essence and the Notion.
Preview of Part III in symmetry with the paradigms as exemplifying a succession of dialectical syntheses of theory-practice.
Possible misunderstandings regarding the nature of dialectical synthesis.
Third, there is the final synthesis of theory-practice at the level of the Absolute Idea in the Logic, which corresponds to Philosophy, i.e., the last moment of Absolute Spirit in the Philosophy of Spirit. These are the climactic moments of both works, inasmuch as they leave no unsublated residue to propel the dialectical process any further. They are, therefore, truly deserving of the term "synthesis." Furthermore, the absolute moment in both cases is not the locus for the synthesis of theory-practice alone, but of all those highly concrete polar categories sharing its family resemblances. Whereas in the Logic this moment is the synthesis of theory and practice in its most advanced formulation of the Idea of the True and the Idea of the Good, in the Philosophy of Spirit the absolute moment is dialectical philosophy as self-consciousness in the manner of the last paradigm. Misunderstandings concerning the function of Reason in effecting the final synthesis have been at the center of persistent and consistently misplaced criticism of Hegel's dialectic of action from both ideological and philosophical quarters. The difficulty seems to originate in the confusion about "thought" as a term in the polarity of thought-action or theory-practice, and thought qua dialectical thought, which Reason is par excellence. In view of the crucial importance of this point for the radical import of the dialectical synthesis, the first half of Part IV has been almost entirely devoted to its clarification. In the same vein regarding the capacity of thought, it bears repeating that a sense in which a higher category (thought) incorporates a lower one was given in the quotation earlier in which Hegel explicates the structure of the triad. The way Reason incorporates reason or, using a surrogate, a trans-individual subject incorporates individual subjects, was exemplified in the economic paradigm as the logical properties of the metaphor of the Invisible Hand were generalized from economic life to the life of Reason itself. The elaboration of this dialectical rationality in its nature as both embodying lower forms of rationality and being itself a social embodiment — the institution of a free market being the embodiment of the Invisible Hand in the paradigm — corresponds to the later moments of the Notion (Means-End and the Cunning of Reason) just before the Idea in the Logic. The same process corresponds to the later moments of Objective Spirit, and especially Universal History, just before the transition to Absolute Spirit in the Philosophy of Spirit. Reason, on the other hand, in its full-blown state as retrodictive self-containment modeled after self-consciousness, belongs to the absolute moments of the Logic and Spirit, which are the fixed points of reference for all multiplicity and opposition. But reason in its fully developed stage becomes the posses-
sion of relatively f e w individuals capable of practicing retrodictive rationality, repeating, in a manner of speaking, Hegel's "toil of the Notion." For the overwhelming majority, including most of Hegel's critics on this score, Reason is still working behind their backs while they, not unlike Plato's prisoners of the cave, get only a glimpse of its workings.
A Hegelian
Interpretation
of the Dialectic of Theory and Practice
Those who have no comprehension of philosophy shudder, it is true, when they hear
the proposition
Thought is Being. Philosophy of Spirit
that
A. Theory-Practice and the Logic of Being
i. The Two Faces of Being: Immediacy of Practice and Immediacy of Fact Theory-practice is not a category of either Being or Essence, nor is it referred to in any but a peripheral sense in these parts of the Logic. Yet, as noted earlier, with these t w o super-moments being the counterparts in Hegel's work for quantitative and scientistic rationality, the connection is vital though it remains implicit. It is the purpose of this Chapter to render this explicit in the case of Being, by examining the relationship between some of its categories and the basic features of scientism, and by focusing on the logical features shared by both. In order to accomplish this w e shall have to search for family resemblances between the categories of Being and our list of surrogates. The role of theory-practice within scientism is that of a methodological principle whose function is to test theoretical findings against a given kind of reality. As such it operates under ontological and epistemological presuppositions which are usually concealed from those operating within its context of meaning. Lack of self-consciousness regarding its o w n presuppositions is responsible for scientism's compartmentalized view of the ontological, epistemological, and methodological concerns and, as a result, for viewing its own concern as self-contained. As Hegel put it: But there is a fundamental delusion in all scientific empiricism. It employs the metaphysical categories of Matter, Force, those of One, Many, Generality, Infinity, etc.: following the clue given by these categories it proceeds to draw conclusions, and in so doing presupposes and applies the syllogistic form. And all the while it is unaware that it contains metaphysics — in wielding which, it makes use of those categories and their combinations in a style utterly thoughtless and uncritical. (Logic, #38) In addition to the m o r e tactical advantages of w o r k i n g through family resemblances in eliciting theory-practice from under the surface, the use of surrogates from the metaphysical domain will help disabuse scientism of its illusion of self-containment. By contrast, the super-moment under discussion, as
The implicitness of theory-practice in Being disclosed through dialectical circularity.
The logical priority of Being scrutinized in the light of dialectical circularity.
indeed every category of the Logic, is open-ended both ways thus precluding this kind of self-concealment. Essence is open backward to Being and the externality and immediacy it represents, and out of which its o w n differentiation evolves. But it is also open f o r w a r d to the N o t i o n and the more advanced f o r m of unity t h r o u g h r e - i m m e d i a t i o n that it represents, w h e r e i n hidden agendas have been disclosed and illusions about compartmentalized concerns have been removed. Being is open forward to Essence and the internal differentiation it lacks, but also backward to the Absolute qua presupposition of the system as a w h o l e via the circular path of the dialectic. Every moment of the dialectic is an instance of self-scrutiny in light of both what lies ahead and what has been left behind. As in the psychological paradigm, the forward movement represents positing, immediacy, and the unmediated practical term of theory-practice, while the backward one stands for theory qua mediation, and in its more advanced successors for retrospection. The latter is closer to classical theoria, or contemplation, than to scientistic theory. Pursuing the etymological connections between "posit," "position," and "presupposition," the familiar t w o - w a y journey of the dialectic on its circular path can be stated in another way: Every step involves both forward movement in terms of posit(ion) and backward movement in terms of pre-supposition, whose etymology suggests not merely reaching back (pre-) f r o m the present posit(ion), but also reaching beneath it (sup-) to reveal its hidden foundations. In this light, the implementation of our strategy consists essentially in casting scientistic features and concepts in their categorial counterparts of the dialectic so as to remove the effects of compartmentalization and allow the two-way journeying to disclose their presuppositions. The discussion of Being presents all the difficulties common to the beginning of any endeavor. This difficulty is aggravated in philosophy because a beginning has to be justified in a more fundamental way than in other subjects. Hegel devoted a long chapter dealing exclusively with such justification at the opening of the Science of Logic. The logical priority of Being is of special interest to us because it is linked through surrogates to the priority of practice associated with the radical and the priority of fact associated with the liberal. A number of surrogate categories for practice applies in this case: immediacy, externality, undifferentiated unity, intuition, in-itselfness, potentiality, indifference, abstract(ion), and subjectivity of a low grade on the scale of concreteness. Each of these categories is a first term of a triad, w h i c h immediately suggests the application of our
strategy of casting non-dialectical concepts (like our scientistic theory-practice) in dialectical roles in order to render their presuppositional links transparent and expose their self-deceptions. Such application would reveal that first terms do not come without their polar counterpart. It will also reveal what w e have learned from our earlier discussion: that unmediated practice is a case in self-deception, whether it comes on the side of the radical in the form of unmediated subjectivity or immediacy of action; or on that of the liberal as unmediated objectivity or the immediacy of fact. However, as Hegel repeatedly assures us, and as is also suggested by the surrogates of the two faces of Being above, the latter is also the domain of undifferentiated unity lacking internal differentiation. In Being, the form of reference is purely due to our (i.e., for-us as dialectical philosophers capable of viewing the whole process) reflection on what takes place; but it (i.e., the form of reference or interconnectedness characteristic of internal differentiation) is the special and proper characteristic of Essence." (Logic, #111 Zusatz; italics added) A question arises as to how this can be reconciled with the principle of circularity, and more particularly with the fact that the loop is intact between Absolute Spirit and Being. For, it is Absolute Spirit, and specifically its last moment, Philosophy, that serves as both outcome (facing backward the total labor of the Encyclopedia) and presupposition (linked forward to Being, the first moment of both the Logic and the Encyclopedia). The answer lies in the dual path of in-itselfness, i.e., working immanently or within the resources of any given context of meaning (as in the case of Essence in Hegel's quotation), and that of for-us ("to our reflection on what takes place"). In the former sense, which is also a pedagogic strategy of Spirit, there is a beginning and the whole arrangement is more consistent with the linearity of the discursive medium and the temporal sequence of the Encyclopedia than the circular structure which is open only for-us, in Hegel's company. Such a pedagogical device was evident earlier when Nature was confronted by the Absolute Idea at the end of the Logic. At that point, the Absolute Idea had already incorporated not only the scientistic m e t h o d o l o g y f r o m Being and Essence, but also the Notion's insight into the role of meaning for the understanding of cultural and humanistic disciplines. Yet, the Absolute Idea had to somehow play innocent in order to elicit from Nature a degree of dialectical sophistication appropriate to it through the immanent technique.
The immanent technique as pedagogy of Spirit for reaffirming circularity.
The dual path of circularity indicative of both concealment and disclosure of Being as a mediated concept.
What is important and instructive about these two paths is that they reveal both the process of concealment and its transcendence. In the early stages of the dialectic, when a good deal remains implicit, and therefore concealed, they run parallel to each other. But as more is progressively made explicit, they begin to converge until they coincide in the absolute moment. In the case of Being, where they emphatically diverge, the path for-us is most evident and is replete with illustrations of Being from Thales to Kant in both versions of the Logic and in the Lectures on the History of Philosophy. The Absolute Spirit, using Philosophy, its final moment, as its mouthpiece, has. come full circle to ensure that what might appear at first as primary ontological matter and the irreducible beginning of philosophy, is finally understood to be a mediated and advanced concept. Far from being logically primitive, some of the kinds of being chosen by Hegel (e.g., Kant's and Jacobi's) to illustrate his first category belong to the logical future of Being, that is the later moments of the Notion. What makes them appear to be primitive (as in the case of the concepts of being and existence of the existentialists earlier or, for that matter, the concept of the priority of practice of our radical) is that re-immediation has been so effective that the intervening mediations have been concealed even from the thinkers themselves, to say nothing of people of action, such as the radical. But not so for-us as Hegel is ready to tell us. The theory of which we are speaking (i.e., Jacobi's) is not satisfied when it has shown that mediate knowledge taken separately is an adequate vehicle of truth. Its distinctive doctrine is that immediate knowledge alone, to the total exclusion of mediation, can possess a content which is true... But it is characteristic of the view before us to decline to examine the nature of the fact, that is, the Notion of it; for such an examination would itself be a step toward mediation and even toward (philosophical) knowledge. (Logic, #65; see also Science of Logic, pp. 68-72)
The corollaries of such disclosure for theory-practice.
Addressing the psychological aspects of immediate knowledge, which corresponds to our radical's immediacy, or priority of practice, Hegel concludes: Under these circumstances examination is directed to the field of experience, to a psychological phenomenon. If that be so, we need only note, as the commonest of experiences, that truths, which we well know to be the results of complicated and highly mediated trains of thought, present themselves immediately and without effort to the mind of any man who is familiar with the subject... The facility we attain in any sort of knowledge, art, or technical expertness, consists in having the particular knowledge or kind of action present to our mind in any case that occurs, even we may say, immediate in our very limbs, in an outgoing activity.
In all these instances, immediacy of knowledge is so far from excluding mediation, that the two things are linked together, — immediate knowledge being actually the product and result of mediated knowledge. (Logic, #66) In his undialectical outlook Jacobi shows both faces of immediacy of Being: subjectivity and objectivity, the radical's priority of practice and the liberal's priority of fact. With respect to the latter, Jacobi refused to unpack what appeared as solid and irreducible fact. He "decline(d) to examine the nature of the fact, that is the Notion of it" which leads to truth qua interconnectedness. But he also resembles the radical in his failure to see the inseparability of immediacy from mediation in even such spontaneous action as those "immediate in our very limbs, in an outgoing activity." The first kind of failure centers on the unmediated fact on the objective side, while the second refers to the subjective side and the self. Both neglect mediation as inseparable from immediacy, the one in what is given and the other in what is being posited. Both are doomed by lack of insight regarding mediation's role in perpetuating the gap b e t w e e n theory and practice — a gap they wish to close. For, while each may be able to detect the mediations embedded in his adversary's immediacy, he fails to see it operating in his own. Being emerges f r o m this short o v e r v i e w in a state of selfconcealment — or, dialectically speaking, in-itself (in a state of potential self-revelation) — because it lacks the tools for mediation that will give it the capacity to v i e w itself for what it is, or for-itself. H o w e v e r , this concealment is clear for-us w h o , having arrived at Being through the circular path of the dialectic, are familiar with what lies ahead. A similar conclusion was reached about the immediacy of practice as w i t h that of unmediated Being, by casting the former in the roles of its surrogates Nature and Being. The radical's body-knowledge, the sort of practical knowledge present in his " v e r y limbs in an outgoing activity," assures h i m of an u n m e d i a t e d access to truth about action. But this proves to be a self-perpetuating illusion, as w e shall see w h e n practice is cast in the role of the False Infinite, another surrogate category from the realm of Being. The liberal is on a similar track of perpetuated self-certainty coupled with self-concealment, except that n o w the locus of immediacy is not subjectivity but objectivity. But, as w e already know from the application of the principle of circularity, there is no w a y of certifying either the primacy of Being qua experience or the logical priority of Being as fact. There are pauses of self-certainty (for-itselfness) along the dialectical path, as Spirit rediscovers and redefines itself in terms of the categories of
each level. But there is no self-certainty in coincidence with (objective) truth (in-and-for-itselfness) short of the absolute moment.
Having f o r m e d a general sense of what the subjective and objective faces of the immediacy of Being are like, w e can turn our attention to a more detailed v i e w of each, beginning with the objective side. So far, immediacy was located on the positing end, that of the subject side in the subject-object relationship. It will n o w be located on the object side in terms of the immediacy of fact. Until n o w w e have placed "fact" under the general configuration of Being. But Being still remains undefined, which raises a further question about the legitimacy of subsuming something branded "the subjective face of the immediacy of Being" under it. In other words, w e have operated by borrowing f r o m the future, which is allowed for-us on the circular path. Hitherto w e managed to get away without a definition of Being because all w e needed to establish the surrogacy of Being for our immediacy of practice was the concept of an apparently legitimate (unmediated) beginning, or a seemingly "clean start." With these preliminaries out of the w a y w e can get on w i t h the task of Spirit, by s h o w i n g f r o m w i t h i n (without reliance on the standpoint of for -us) the reason that Being as a "clean start" is unwarranted and that mediation is essential to its constitution. W e have, therefore, to turn our attention to the i m m a n e n t track and the p e d a g o g i c a l task of Spirit, by offering a dialectical definition of Being beginning with its objective face. Being, pure Being, without any further determination. In its indeterminate immediacy it is equal only to itself. It is also not unequal relatively to an Other; it has no diversity within itself nor any with a reference outwards. It would not be held fast in its purity if it contained any determination or content which could be distinguished in it or by which it could be distinguished from an Other. It is pure indeterminateness and emptiness. There is nothing to be intuited in it, if one can speak here of intuiting; or, it is only this pure intuiting itself. Just as little is anything to be thought in it, or it is equally only this empty thinking. Being, the indeterminate immediate, is in fact nothing, and neither more nor less than nothing. (Science of Logic, p. 82) Obviously, Being as defined above will not help in the further specification of the objective term because all it amounts to is an undifferentiated continuum. Our tactic of casting scientistic objectivity in the role of dialectical Being in order to reveal its hidden agenda has yielded nothing. For-us, w h o are familiar with the future development of Being, this is no cause for alarm, but if this d e v e l o p m e n t is to b e c o m e m e a n i n g f u l from the standpoint of the immanent path, w e have to allow the dialectic to unfold itself. But before w e proceed with this,
Dialectical definition of Being through its opposite.
w e should note that, disheartening as it might seem to see our hopes dashed for locating an objective correlate for immediacy (as w e did for a subjective one in immediacy of practice earlier), there is an important lesson to be learned from this experience: Do not search Being for any basic irreducible matter on which to build a "clean start" because such matter is the result of mediations; and conversely, any metaphysical or scientific claims about the irreducibility of such matter, are also bound to end in nothing upon disclosure of these mediations.
Transition from (pure) Being to Determinate Being by way of Nothing.
In order to test the value of the dialectical insight about scientistic objectivity for theory-practice, some instances of differentiated Being (or beings) should be cast into dialectical roles whose outcomes are then observed in terms of our polar category. In this respect, not all moments in the self-differentiation of Being are of equal interest to us. But g i v e n our focus on theory-practice, there are t w o classes of candidates from which our selection can be made: First, the progenitors of the scientistic notion of objectivity, the ontological antecedents of concepts such as empirical datum and physical entity in science; and second, the methodological antecedents of scientism in the area of quantification in general. The former are dealt with in the Logic under Quality, and the latter under Quantity, while Measure, which provides their synthesis, lays the ground for the transition to Essence. From the first class of candidates it is the dialectical role of the Other (introduced in the last quotation) that will occupy us the most because it cuts across many moments, and as such, fits well the progenitor of the object in the subject-object relationship, which underlies scientism. T h e f e a t u r e of Being as an u n d i f f e r e n t i a t e d continuum, w h i c h has b e e n articulated in the preceding triad, B e i n g — Nothing—Becoming, already begins to negate itself in the triad under Determinate Being. This is essentially accomplished as Being and Nothing (which, through their lack of determinacy are t w o sides of a coin) neutralize each other, thus resulting momentarily in a stable unity. Both (i.e., Being and Nothing) are the same, Becoming, and although they differ so in direction ( i.e., the one is ceasing-to-be and the other is coming-to-be) they interpenetrate and paralyze each other. Becoming, as this transition into the unity of Being and Nothing, a unity which is in the form of Being or has the form of the onesided immediate unity of these moments, is Determinate Being. (Science of Logic, p. 106) Hegel uses "interpenetration" instead of the usual "sublation" in this transition, but he also points out that Being and Nothing
"are not reciprocally sublated — the one does not sublate the other externally — but each sublates itself in itself and is in its own self the opposite of itself." Nor has negation — which is the one side of sublation, the other being preservation or incorporation — yet attained its important function qua determination. In Determinate Being its determinateness has been distinguished as Quality; in Quality as determinately present, there is distinction — of reality and negation. Now although these distinctions are present in Determinate Being, they are no less equally void and sublated. Reality itself contains negation, is determinate Being, not indeterminate abstract Being. Similarly, negation is Determinate Being, not the supposedly abstract Nothing but posited here as it is in itself, as affirmatively present, belonging to the sphere of Determinate Being. Thus Quality is completely unseparated from Determinate Being, which is simply Determinate qualitative Being. This sublating of the distinction (of reality and negation) is more than a mere taking back and external omission of it again, or than a simple return to a simple beginning, to Determinate Being as such. The distinction cannot be omitted, for it is. What is, therefore, in fact present is Determinate Being in general, distinction in it, and sublation of this distinction; Determinate Being, not as devoid of distinction as at first, but as again equal to itself through sublation of the distinction, the simple oneness of Determinate Being resulting from this is sublation. The sublatedness of the distinction is Determinate Being's own determinateness; it is thus Beingwithin-Self: Determinate Being is a Determinate Being, a Somewhat. Somewhat is the first negation of negation, as simple self-relation in the form of Being...The negative of the negative is, as Somewhat, only the beginning of the subject — Being-within-Self, only as yet quite indeterminate. It determines itself further on, first, as a Being-for-Self and so on, until in the Notion it first attains the concrete intensity of the subject. (Science of Logic, pp. 114-15) These early transitions f r o m the Logic give the reader a sense of the compactness of Hegel's language and the rhythm of the dialectic in what follows. But most important, one can get a glimpse of the creative role of negation — "negation is Determinate Being, not the supposedly abstract Nothing" — in generating through sublation the earliest progenitor of the scientistic object, the Somewhat. Though devoid of differentiation in the familiar sense of qualities and attributes of things, as they are found in its successors (the categories of Essence), Determinate Being displays the first instance of differentiation in the Logic. This is based on the fundamental dialectical principle of determination through negation. The moving force of this differentiation is the distinction between reality and negation which are carry-overs from the previous moments of Being and Nothing, respectively. " N o w although these distinc-
The role of negation in the determination of Being.
Sublation as negation of negation.
Upgrading of Being and the build-up of concreteness.
Consolidation of Being along the dialectical path.
tions are present in D e t e r m i n a t e Being, they are not less equally void and sublated. Reality itself contains negation." The emergence of Somewhat from Determinate Being proceeds in two steps, each involving sublation of distinction in the above sense (i.e., combining negation and incorporation) while the two put together constitute a double negation. First, w e have the distinction of Determinate Being as a species of generalized Quality, as "simply Determinate qualitative Being." This distinction entails the negation of (pure) Being qua undifferentiated continuum. Second, the sublation of this distinction — or the negation of the negation that it entails — so that Somewhat can stand on its o w n feet as Being-within-Self. If w e are to include the first moment of Being in the rhythm of negation, this could be represented triadically as follows: Lack of distinction (of reality and negation) equivalent to very primitive self-relation (pure Being)— Negation of lack of distinction equivalent to imposition of distinction (of reality and negation) in the f o r m of generalized Quality (Determinate B e i n g ) — Negation of the negation of the lack of distinction (of reality and negation) equivalent to the reimposition of self-relation at a higher level (Somewhat as Being-within-Self). The process of sublation ensures that the second negation (the third moment of our schema) is no "mere taking back (to an earlier undifferentiated state) and (an) external omission of it (i.e., of the distinction of reality and negation)," but leads to a situation in which "Determinate Being is a Determinate Being, a Somewhat" which is "again equal to itself (i.e., self-contained or Beingwithin-Self) through the sublation of the distinction." The above transition from Determinate Being to Somewhat is representative of Hegel's dialectical method and especially the role of negativity in building up concreteness. Double negation is used to upgrade self-containment by including any seemingly self-complete entity that lies outside of it. This is the key — to which w e shall be returning time and again in this study — for the understanding of the basic rhythm in the dialectic's quest for a holistic approach to truth and reality. Yet, no illusions should be entertained about the level of self-containment or concreteness of Somewhat at this early stage of the dialectic. This much Hegel also tells us when he continues that "the negative of the negative is, as Somewhat, only the beginning of the subject" of the dialectic. Higher grades of concreteness follow, such as Being-for-Self, but not until the Notion does the principle of negativity "first attain the concrete intensity of the subject." The moments that follow Somewhat continue on the same path of consolidation of rudimentary self-contained entities,
thus setting the stage for encountering externality and abstraction. The highlights between Somewhat and Being-for-Self (for our purpose of tracing dialectical counterparts of the scientistic object in this context) are: the Other, Finitude (Limit), and Infinite (True and False). Somewhat is the negation of the negation in the form of Being-, for this second negation is the restoring of the simple relation to self; but with this, Somewhat is equally the mediation of itself with itself. Even in the simple form of Somewhat, then still more specifically in Being-for-Self, subject, and so on, self-mediation is present; and it is present even in Becoming, only the mediation is quite abstract. In Somewhat, mediation with self is posited, in so far as Somewhat is determined as a simple identity... The mediation with itself which Somewhat is in itself, taken only as negation of the negation, has no concrete determinations for its sides; it thus collapses into the simple oneness which is Being. Somewhat is, and is, then, also a Determinate Being; further, it is in /tee//also Becoming, which, however, no longer has only Being and Nothing for its moments. One of these, Being, is now Determinate Being, and, further, a Determinate Being (i.e., a Somewhat). The second is (as outcome of self-mediation) equally a Determinate Being, but determined as a negative of the Somewhat — an Other. (Science of Logic, p. 116) Taken in c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h the p r e v i o u s transition, this seems quite straightforward. It utilizes Somewhat's feature of self-relation to establish it "as a simple identity," a "simple oneness which is Being." But Somewhat has also dialectically incorporated Becoming, "which, h o w e v e r , no longer has only Being and N o t h i n g for its m o m e n t s . " For, in the m e a n t i m e "Being (has given rise to) Determinate Being, and, further (on to) a Determinate Being," while Nothing has provided the negative element in the self-relation of the Somewhat, the "negative of the Somewhat," thus generating out of it the Other. Here is an example of h o w the power of negativity in building up concreteness is being hidden under layers of mediations even at the outset of the dialectical course. Similarly, one can begin to appreciate the value of the dialectic in unveiling these mediations and, pari passu, the sources of self-deception of scientism in o v e r l o o k i n g w h a t lies buried under its cherished concepts of objectivity and theory-practice. Besides, this school (i.e., the Empirical School) makes sense-perception the form in which fact is to be apprehended: and in this consists the defect of empiricism. Sense-perception as such is always individual, always transient: not indeed that the process of knowledge stops short of sensation: on the contrary, it proceeds to find out the universal and permanent element in the individual apprehended by sense. This is the process leading from simple perception to experience.
Anticipation of the vagaries of the scientistic view of objectivity.
In order to form experiences, empiricism makes special use of the form of analysis. In the impression of sense we have a concrete of many elements, the several attributes of which we are expected to peel off one by one, like the coats of an onion. In thus dismembering the thing, it is understood that we disintegrate and take to pieces these attributes which have coalesced, and add nothing but our own act of disintegration. Yet analysis is the process from the immediacy of sensation to thought: those attributes, which the object analyzed contains in union, acquire the form of universality by being separated. Empiricism therefore labors under a delusion, if it supposes that, while analyzing the objects, it leaves them as they were: it really transforms the concrete into an abstract. And as a consequence of this change the living thing is killed: life can exist only in the concrete and one. Not that we can do without this division, if it be our intention to comprehend. Spirit itself is an inherent division. The error lies in forgetting that this is only one-half of the process, and that the main point is the re-union of what has been parted. (Logic, #38 Zusatz) Corollaries from the abstractive view of objectivity byscientism.
Dialectical transitions to the Limit and the False Infinite.
Granted, empiricism has made many advances since Hegel's time, especially in the field of scientific methodology. But his main criticisms, namely empiricism's ability to "transform the concrete into an abstract," and to raise its compartmentalized results to "the form of universality," still stand today. In the absence of a method that would disclose the hidden articulations of the pre-existing unity of a thing — in this case the Somewhat — its analysis would result in permanent dismemberment raised to the status of universal truth. For example, without the benefit of its pre-existing unity in Being, the newly derived polarity of Somewhat-Other would appear to this version of empiricism as permanently disjoined. So would other polarities, including theory-practice, which would also be viewed in the same light of externality and abstraction. Finitude (or Limit) follows directly from the interplay of Somewhat and the Other, on the one hand; and the principle of negative determination, which launched the process of selfdifferentiation of Being, on the other. Since the l o w level of concreteness prevailing at this early stage involves lack of differentiation at the concrete level — as Hegel put it, "only the mediation is quite abstract" — negation has to carry the full burden of the advance. Hence Somewhat and its alter ego, the Other, are determined by what they are not — by what lies outside of them. In Determinate Being in general, the determinateness is one with Being; yet at the same time, when explicitly made a negation, it is a Limit, a barrier. Hence the Otherness is not something indifferent and outside it, but a function proper to it. Somewhat is by its quality, — firstly Finite, — secondly Alterable; so that Finitude and Alterability appertain to its Being.
In Determinate Being in general, the negation is still directly one with the Being, and this negation is what we call a Limit (boundary). A thing is what it is, only in and by reason of its Limit. We cannot therefore regard the Limit as only external to Determinate Being in general. It rather goes through and through the whole of such existence. The view of Limit, as merely an external characteristic of Determinate Being in general, arises from a confusion of Quantitative and Qualitative Limit. (Logic, #92 and Zusatz) Alterability (a sub-category of Limit omitted from our list for the sake of simplicity) combined w i t h Finitude, or the Limit, give rise to the False Infinite. On the one hand the Limit makes the reality of a thing: on the other it is its negation... A Somewhat is implicitly the Other of itself, and the Somewhat sees its Limit become objective to it in the Other. If we now ask for the difference between Somewhat and another, it turns out that they are the same. Somewhat becomes an Other: this Other is itself Somewhat: therefore it likewise becomes an Other, and so on ad infinitum. (Logic, #92 Zusatz and #93) The Somewhat and the Other, the terms of the False Infinite, turn out to be the same because, lacking internal differentiation, they are indifferent to each other. Yet the illustrations of these abstract moments come mainly f r o m the concrete sphere of Spirit, the logical future of Being. Hegel's illustration of Limit is through the use of the Ought which, as a moral category, belongs to the advanced stages of Spirit. This is of direct interest to us because of its f a m i l y resemblance to practice, which can be established with the help of immediacy. But before w e deal with it in the next Section, it is proper to draw some corollaries with regard to theory-practice from the early moments of Being. Hegel was always aware of the historical correlates of his categories, as is obvious f r o m his illustrations and especially f r o m his Lectures on the History of Philosophy. Officially, Being corresponds to the Greek Pre-Socratic cosmologists. But the differentiation of Being so far can also fit the Cartesian "clean start" with its t w o fundamental substances, mind and extension, and generally the dualistic trend in post-Renaissance thinking under the influence of both Christianity and science. In order for such correspondence to hold w e have to make the assumption, which Hegel also makes throughout his symmetries between his categories and major philosophical thinkers, that such thinkers are operating on the dialectical path of mere for-itselfness. In other words, w e have to assume that in laying the foundations of dualism in modernity and putting forth a claim about a "clean start," Descartes labored under self-con-
Historical counterparts of the "clean start" thesis.
cealment about the pre-existing unity of Being. This is not too wild an assumption to make if w e consider his preoccupations and the dazzling effects of scientific discoveries. The point at w h i c h w e have to place him on the dialectical path, while in his state of relative philosophical amnesia, is where the Other emerges alongside the Somewhat. Descartes' t w o fundamental, but devoid of concrete content, substances can be fitted into the dialectical roles of the equally fundamental and abstract Somewhat and Other. The result will be a confirmation of our familiar but tentative conclusion that a "clean start" is precluded by the circular structure of the dialectic, and that experience does not come raw or irreducible but always involves mediation alongside immediacy. The aspiration for a "clean start" has been shown to be futile, as it leads through mediation back to N o t h i n g (the other side of Being), and f r o m there all the w a y around — to w h e r e w e are headed from the opposite direction — to the Absolute, which, in the end, certifies the futility of such enterprise. Hegel uses some interesting linguistic analysis to expose the hopelessness of non-dialectical means to reach a "clean start." The word 'this' serves to fix the distinction (between A and B) and the Somewhat which is to be taken affirmatively. But 'this' clearly expresses that this distinguishing and signalizing of the one Somewhat is a subjective designating falling outside the Somewhat itself. The entire determinateness falls into this external pointing out; even the expression 'this' contains no distinction; each and every Somewhat is just as well a 'this' as it is also an Other. By 'this' we mean to express something completely determined; it is overlooked that speech, as a work of the Understanding, gives expression only to universals, except in the name of a single object; but the individual name is meaningless, in the sense that it does not express a universal, and for the same reason appears as something merely posited and arbitrary; just as proper names, too, can be arbitrarily assumed, given or also altered. (Science of Logic, p. 117) Had H e g e l b e e n writing a hundred years later, he might have easily included in his illustrations some of the positivist and phenomenalist endeavors to reach pure observables qua "clean starts," such as Russell's sense data or Mach's non-inferred observables. But he has something to say which is quite relevant to modern science and h o w it has communicated its self-concealment to other kinds of endeavors. If we let Somewhat and an Other, the elements of Determinate Being, fall asunder, the result is that Somewhat becomes Other, and this Other is itself Somewhat, which then as such changes likewise, and so on ad infinitum. This result seems to superficial reflection something very grand, the grandest possible...The case is the same with space, the infinity of which has formed the theme of barren declamation to astronomers with a talent for edification.
In the attempt to contemplate such an infinite, our thought, we are commonly informed, must sink exhausted. It is true indeed that we must abandon the unending contemplation, not however because the occupation is too sublime, but because it is too tedious. (Logic, #94 Zusatz) Though some progress has been made in relativistic cosmology toward a conceptual overcoming of certain forms of False Infinite, the contemporary ring of Hegel's observation extends beyond astronomy, indeed beyond science, to endeavors centering on power, production, consumption, and perception of values. In the absence of the standpoint of the N o t i o n (what Hegel calls a " d i a m o n d - n e t " in his Philosophy of Nature) the claim of a "clean start" for the sake of true knowledge, is being debased into the tedium of the False Infinite. Being and the associated problematic of a "clean start" contain, in germ, the solution of the so-called problem of priority in the relationship between theory and practice and the subsequent accomplishment of their synthesis. In its sparsity f r o m the standpoint of sensuous concreteness, Being is a microcosm of what is to follow. Part III can be v i e w e d , in this light, as a series of increasingly elaborate versions of the solution already suggested in the relatively primitive setting of the first f e w categories of Being: The issue of a "clean start" (the issue of priority, as it translates in the case of theory and practice) arises only because of self-concealment — ignorance of the subject's participation — regarding presuppositional links backward as well as forward on the circular path of the dialectic. The problem evaporates at the moment these links become transparent, as can be tentatively seen in the case of the Somewhat and the Other. Rendering the presuppositional links transparent backward toward Being, resulted in the abandonment of the futile search for priority of either theory or practice. Doing the same forward in the direction of Limit, ended with the same hopelessness in reaching a "clean start" by giving the priority to either — or, to paraphrase Hegel's expression, by "let(ting) theory and practice fall asunder." W e took the liberty of paraphrasing because Somewhat and the Other stand as prototypes of our key polarities to be synthesized (i.e., of subject-object and theory-practice). This f o r m of surrogacy stems f r o m their abstract nature, also granted tacitly by Hegel w h e n he introduced S o m e w h a t as " h a ( v i n g ) n o c o n c r e t e d e t e r m i n a t i o n f o r its sides" — acting, in our terminology, as an operational category. Situations in which infinite regress precedes a shift in the context of meaning, or where an obscuring of presuppositional links leads to the misconception of one's fragmentary domain
Corollaries of the dialectic of early Being for theory-practice.
Corollaries of the dialectic of Being for theory-practice reinforced by paradigms.
as self-contained, are familiar to us. The analysand of the earlier paradigm hopelessly reproduced the subject-object dualism that was the source of his neurosis. The remedy was provided by a change in the context of meaning and the emergence of the notionally structured synthesis of theory-practice. So is the overcoming of infinite regress achieved here by the generation of the rudiment of self-containment, first in the True Infinite and then in the Being-for-Self, as w e shall see shortly. In the case of the psychoanalytical paradigm the self-concealment in the methodological domain of theory-practice was locked into a relationship of mutual reinforcement w i t h the ontological self-deception of viewing oneself as a thing. Similarly, w e have a situation n o w in which the supposedly irreducible sensa or facts supply t h e o r y w i t h the ultimate entities for its testing ground of practice. The latter are the ingredients which constitute the objects of science t h r o u g h successive mediation in Essence. But, as in previous cases, mediation is obscured because scientism, in its self-concealment, ignores the dialectical links between moments and mistakes its o w n limited concern as self-contained. For an example f r o m the case of Being, w e can use the surrogate triad Undifferentiated Unity — Differentiation — Differentiated Unity in conjunction with the charge Hegel levels against the Empirical School for "dismembering the t h i n g , " and n e g l e c t i n g " t h e r e - u n i o n of w h a t has been parted." In mistaking its limited concern as self-complete, scientism focuses o n the middle term at the exclusion of what precedes and w h a t f o l l o w s it, thus obscuring the dialectical links backward to the primitive self-containment (pre-existing unity) of (pure) Being and forward to a more advanced form of unity of the True Infinite and Being-for-Self. This was precisely the handicap under which the liberal was laboring in the political paradigm earlier. He was treating cultural objects in modo scientifico by bringing them into the testing range of theory-practice, that is, in separation f r o m their pre-existing unity wherein they have been culturally "loaded."
Cautioning against misguided holistic claims in the name of philosophy.
In concluding this Section it should be pointed out that the criticism against scientism for self-concealment does not imply that it should change its ways and play by the rules of dialectical philosophy. If this w e r e so, science would cease to be what it is and, given the holistic approach of dialectical philosophy, it t o o w o u l d be i m p o v e r i s h e d by the same measure. Indeed Hegel gives empirical science its due for philosophy's rise to maturity. The rise of philosophy is due to these cravings of thought (to learn directly from experience). Its point of departure is experience; in-
eluding under that name both our immediate consciousness and the inductions from it...The sciences, based on experience, exert upon the mind a stimulus to overcome the form in which their varied contents are presented, and to elevate these contents to the rank of necessary truth. (Logic, #12; italics added) The issue with which w e are concerned is highlighted by the emphasis of the conclusion in the above quotation. We do not question the internally established criteria for conducting business in science or, for that matter, in any other discipline claiming (in its self-concealment) self-containment. This they do in ignorance of their presuppositional links and cannot be done otherwise without disruption of the normal flow of business. Rather, it is the open or tacit claim of universality for results or methods which, in view of scientism's compartmentalized approach, remain partial and disjointed in light of the comprehensive view of philosophy. Through pursuit of this latter course, scientism, in effect, elevates indifference and externality to universal truth, whereas the avowed "aim of philosophy is to banish indifference, and ascertain the necessity of things." (Logic, #119 Zusatz) The method of empirical science exhibits two defects. The first is that the Universal...(is) not on its own account connected with the Particulars or the details. Either is external and accidental to the other; and it is the same with the particular facts which are brought into the union: each is external and accidental to the others. The second defect is that the beginnings are in every case data and postulates, neither accounted for nor deduced. In both these points the form of necessity fails to get its due. Hence reflection, whenever it sets itself to remedy these defects, becomes speculative thinking, the thinking proper to philosophy. (Logic, #9)
iii. Subjectivity and Being Clarification of the context of meaning through anticipation of the course of the dialectic.
Historical counterpart of the subjective side of Being located in the "ought" of the radical.
Subjectivity, which so far has been implicit (by contrast to objectivity) in the polarity of Somewhat-Other, is about to become explicit in the most rudimentary form of self-containment, Being-for-Self. But there has also been another side to subjectivity, the trans-individual subjectivity not immanently reached at this early stage, which is represented by those of us w h o observe the immanent process from the outside, standing by so to speak, as repositories for Spirit. It is the former path of subjectivity w e are going to pursue in this Section, while the latter will be serving as a measure of our success in making subjectivity explicit, or determining the extent to which Being, which so far has been only for-us begins also to be for-itself (i.e., Being-for-Self). Dismemberment, as practiced by scientism in the way described earlier, indicates presence of externality or indifference. Categorially, these features belong to Finitude and the False Infinite. Translating their function in terms of scientistic theorypractice, w e may tentatively say that the theorizing subject and the tested object remain external to each other, indifferent with regard to intervening mediations, and self-concealed with regard to presuppositional links. As w e enter Essence this assessment has to be amended to the extent that in the more mature brands of scientism the immanently derived subject gradually supplants the external one — the standpoint for-us is giving way to that of for-itself, with the result that scientism becomes increasingly aware that scientific objects are at least in part products of mediation. However, a core of objectivity — the reflection of the "clean start" of Being — still remains, inasmuch as scientism never transcends the subject-object polarity. This has to wait for the Notion in which the remaining unsublated high-order dualisms, including theory-practice and subject-object, are finally overcome by way of their dialectical synthesis. Similar considerations hold true for certain philosophies of immediacy, such as moral intuitionism, which were exemplified earlier in the case of Jacobi. Though dialectically far ahead of Being in terms of concreteness, they too suffer from a fundamental sort of indifference and Finitude which, as in the case of scientism, are residues of their sojourn with Being. After all, they are the scientistic and the moral, the objective and subjective faces of immediacy, as w e argued in an earlier Section. But there was also an important difference between them as to whether immediacy was located in the positing or the posited end of the subject-object axis. It was an essential fea-
ture of scientistic self-concealment to have overlooked the act of positing on the part of the subject and the mediation that this act entailed, and thus v i e w its object as external. Reverting to our political paradigm for illustration, there is immediacy w h e n the radical posits his "ought," which coincides with his claim about the priority of practice. But there is also immediacy in the scientism of the liberal, w h o in his self-concealment (i.e., his ignorance about his contribution in the generation of the object), overlooks the positing on the part of the subject, and accepts his cultural-political objects as irreducible facts subject to the external treatment of theory-practice. The dialogue between radical and liberal provided a rudimentary dialectic, w h e r e b y each u n v e i l e d for the other that w h i c h he could not reveal for himself in his self-concealment. However, it was the radical's "ought" which provided, through the challenge of socially and physically embodied presuppositions, the main thrust t o w a r d a change in the rules of the g a m e . T h e same is true of the Somewhat and the Other, which w e left in self-perpetuating indifference at the hands of the False Infinite a short w h i l e ago. Though it is a long w a y to the Notion and the group-logic associated with it, the transition from the False to the True Infinite and f r o m there to Being-for-Self, anticipates that development of the complementary roles of opposed sides as they reach a synthesis. This Infinity (i.e., the False one) is the wrong or negative infinity: it is only a negation of a finite: but the finite rises again the same as ever, and is never got rid of and absorbed. In other words, this (false) infinite only expresses the ought-to-be elimination of the Finite. {Logic, #94) This demand is carried out in the next paragraph. What we now in point of fact have before us, is that Somewhat comes to be an Other, and that the Other generally comes to be an Other. Thus essentially relative to another, Somewhat is virtually an Other against it: and since what is passes into is quite the same as what passed over, since both have one and the same attribute, viz. to be an Other, it follows that Somewhat in its passage into Other only joins with itself. To be thus self-related in the passage, and in the Other, is the True Infinity. Or, under a negative aspect: what is altered is the Other, it becomes the Other of the Other. Thus Being, but as negation of the negation, is restored again: it is now Being-for-Self. Dualism, in putting an insuperable opposition between Finite and Infinite, fails to note the simple circumstance that the Infinite is thereby only one of two, and is reduced to a particular, to which the Finite forms the other particular. Such an Infinite, which is only a particular, is coterminus with the Finite which makes for it
The dialectical location of the "ought" in Being-for-Self supplies the germ of its final synthesis with the "is."
a limit and a barrier: it is not what it ought to be, that is the Infinite, but is only Finite. (Logic, #95; emphases added in the last instance) The two faces of Being as prototypes of the penultimate categories of the dialectic.
T h e S o m e w h a t has collapsed into the Other since "in its passing into Other only joins with itself." Thus, through a double negation, the Other returns to itself, but n o w as self-related B e i n g - f o r - S e l f . This also marks the transition f r o m False to True Infinity. As the latter is the precursor of notional structure, a demand for the banishment of the Finite is also a demand of the Other (or Somewhat) for self-completion and the remedy of infinite regress. The "ought to be" at the end of the last quote reaffirms the claim of the priority of Being, but n o w manifested through its subjective face. It may thus be called the progenitor of the demand of reason in the practical sphere, as the Somewhat was the precursor of the demand for objectivity in the realm of theoretical reason. The " o u g h t " poses a demand that the Finite passes to the Infinite, which has no rational foundation in the external w o r l d but emanates totally f r o m w i t h i n itself. A s the p r o t o t y p e of s u b j e c t i v i t y in the sphere Being, the "ought" needs a foothold outside the object in order to proclaim a flaw in it, or in what is. There is further e v i d e n c e of this w h e n H e g e l suggests that "the readiest instance of Being-for-Self is found in the T . " Man, he continues, ...is distinguished from the animal world, and in that way from nature altogether, by knowing himself as T : which amounts to saying that natural things never attain a free Being-for-Self but, as limited to Being-there-and-then (i.e., Dasein or Determinate Being), are always and only Being-for-an-Other. Again, Being-forSelf may be described as Ideality, just as Being-there-and-then was described as Reality. (Logic, #96 Zusatz) If the structure of the Somewhat anticipates theoretical reason and that of the "ought" practical reason, then their synthesis in the Being-for-Self is the prototype of the Absolute Idea, the Notion in its most advanced manifestation. This is already implicit in the synthesis of the Somewhat and the Other in #94 and #95 of the Logic. It becomes more obvious if the demandposing subjectivity is assigned to the f o r m e r as it passes into the latter, w h i c h w o u l d then represent external reality. The m o r e detailed Science of Logic makes the same point more explicit than does the telescoped version of the Logic. In order that the Limit which is in Somewhat as such should be a limitation, Somewhat must at the same time in its own self transcend the Limit, it must in its own self be related to the Limit as to Somewhat which is not. The Determinate Being of Somewhat lies inertly indifferent, as it were, alongside its Limit. But Somewhat only transcends its Limit in so far as it is the accomplished sublation of the Limit, is the in-itself as negatively related to it. And
since the Limit is in the determination itself as a limitation, Somewhat transcends its own self. The "ought" therefore contains the determination in double form: once as the implicit determination counter to the negation, and again as a non-Being which, as a limitation, is distinguished from the determination, but is at the same time itself an implicit determination. (Science of Logic, p. 132) The entry of the "ought," and by implication of the "is," into the dialectic of Being qua surrogates of the Somewhat and the Other makes increasingly apparent the underlying presence of theory and practice. The dialectic of the " o u g h t " and the "is" is central to the final synthesis of theory-practice and a special Section is d e v o t e d to it at the end of Part III. But as with other important elements in the final synthesis, the role of the " o u g h t " is anticipated early in the dialectic of Being. Once the roles of the "is" and the "ought" are assigned to the Somewhat and the Other, negation plays the same important role of determination as it did earlier with their surrogates. W e recall that the followers of scientism, in their self-concealment, v i e w e d the situation m e r e l y f o r - t h e m s e l v e s , in claiming a "clean start" from the objective (at the exclusion of the subjective) side. N o w this is true of the philosophers of immediacy from the subjective (at the exclusion of the objective) side. But the transition to True Infinity unmasked the self-concealment of both. " S o m e w h a t in its passage into Other only joins w i t h itself. To be thus self-related in the passage, and in the Other, is the True Infinity."
The presence of theory-practice in Being by way of surrogacy of the is-ought.
Negation plays the same creative role with the "ought" and the "is" as it did with their surrogates through showing that by virtue of being opposites each is essential to the meaning and i n t e g r i t y of t h e o t h e r . T h e r o l e of n e g a t i o n is m a n i f e s t e d through the f u n c t i o n of the Limit, most significantly in the finding of the first quoted paragraph: since the Limit is part of the determination of the meaning of Somewhat, the recognition of this entails that Somewhat has transcended the Limit and in doing so has transcended itself. The implication f r o m the fact that Somewhat has "transcend(ed) its own self is, that having, so to speak, stepped out of itself, it realized the role of negation in the formation of its meaning and integrity and is now, therefore, in possession of a more complete v i e w of itself. The "Somewhat only transcends its Limit in so far as it is the accomplished sublation of the Limit, is the in-itself (Somewhat in potentia or the 'ought') as negatively related to it (its Limit)." This conclusion is then applied in the f o l l o w i n g paragraph to the "ought" which is n o w in full v i e w of being determined in
The creative role of negation in the case of is-ought.
both a positive w a y "counter to the negation," and negatively "as a non-Being which, as a limitation, is... itself an implicit determination." The continuation of that page of the Science of Logic shows more explicitly the replay of the dialectic of Somewhat as the dialectic of the "ought" (or the dialectic of Somewhat's realized potentiality as an "ought"). What ought to be is, and at the same time is not. If it were, we could not say that it ought merely to be. The ought has, therefore, essentially a limitation. This limitation is not alien to it; that which only ought to be is the determination, which is now posited as it is in fact, namely, as at the same time only a determinateness. Hence as the ought, Somewhat is raised above its limitation, but conversely, it is only as the ought that it has its limitation. The two are inseparable. Somewhat has a limitation in so far as it has negation in its determination, and the determination is also the accomplished sublation of the limitation. (Science of Logic, pp. 132-33) Elucidation of morality and ideals through the concept of negation.
As in cases of other dialectical concepts, there is a positive and negative determination of the "ought." What adds to the importance of the "ought" for morality and the dialectic of action stems f r o m the fact that the positive — w h i c h is being posited in this case by the radical — belongs to the future and as such remains unaccomplished and therefore a negative or a "non-Being." The "ought," as do other concepts, has a Limit, but it also has "essentially a limitation." "The ought... (as positive) is raised above its limitation, but conversely, it is only as the ought that it has its limitation (i.e., that it is a n o n - B e i n g ) . " Since the negation of what is not yet the case is the other side of the posited which is the contents of the "ought," the latter is found wanting by criteria of reality set up by more advanced categories, such as Actuality. Those who attach such importance to the ought of morality and fancy that morality is destroyed if the ought is not recognized as ultimate truth, and those too who, reasoning from the level of Understanding, derive a perpetual satisfaction from being able to confront everything there is with an ought, that is, with a 'knowing better' — and from that very reason they are just as loath to be robbed of an ought — do not see that as regards the finitude of their sphere the ought receives full recognition. But in the world of Actuality itself, Reason and Law are not in such a bad way that they only ought to be — it is only the abstraction of the in-itself that stops at this — any more than the ought is in its own self perennial and, what is the same thing, that finitude is absolute. The philosophy of Kant and Fichte sets up the ought as the highest point of the resolution of the contradictions of Reason; but the truth is that the ought is only the standpoint which clings to Finitude and thus to contradiction. (Science of Logic, p. 136)
For a more sensuously concrete illustration of the dialectic one may again recall the "ought" of the radical, his vision that invited the ridicule of his opponent. The liberal's perception of this vision corresponds to the origin of the "ought" above and its one-sided subjectivity in which case its demand, as w e put it then, rested on no rational foundation in the external world. However, in v i e w of the above dialectic of the "ought," this must be amended accordingly. The radical's vision, his "ought," is an unrealized possibility which, as w e shall see in some detail later in the dialectic of Actuality, serves to fix the reality of " n o w " in the same way that Limit served to turn Somewhat into Being-for-Self. Everything possible partakes through negativity in Being, as it will later partake in Existence and in Actuality. This is part of the more general picture of the successors of Being, to be finally pieced together after the transition from the time-bound Essence to the timeless Idea. Of this w e have had already a hint in the philosophical paradigm, when the issue of relativity of time came up in connection with the role of the Absolute Idea as the context of all contexts — the standard by which all movement and toil is to be measured. This encounter of time with timelessness is already prefigured here in the transition from the time-impregnated False Infinite to the timeless self-completeness of True Infinity and Beingfor-Self. The overcoming of time-bound Essence (and the predictive rationality of scientism) by the timeless structure of self-containment, is the key to resolving the difficulties of the dialectic with the concept of time, and the way to the understanding of the eternity of the Absolute Idea. The respective perceptions of ideals and the future by the liberal and the radical are anchored, from a dialectical standpoint, to different metaphysical grounds. The radical can claim that his "ought" is real because it is defined as real by virtue of the role of negation and the grades of reality involved, whereas in the liberal's w o r l d v i e w of compartmentalized negation and affirmation and his relatively one-dimensional conception of reality, such a claim would amount to nonsense. Suffice it to add, that in the last resort it is the retrospective Notion and the corresponding categories of Objective Spirit, especially the judgment of World History, that decide which of the few, from a multitude of "oughts" posited, are finally actualized. The radical's tragic, but also potentially heroic role, consisted in probing the ways of Spirit without even the logical possibility of prior knowledge about the final outcome of his action.
Illustration of the dialectic of the "ought" through the political paradigm.
iv. Further Self-Differentiation of Being Transition to atomized Being and, by extension, to social atomization and methodological individualism.
N o sooner had Being-for-Self (the prototype of self-containment and subjectivity) emerged than the dialectic reverted to B e i n g at its most abstract a t o m i z e d m a n i f e s t a t i o n , that is, quantitative Being. The sub-triad of Being-for-Self consists of O n e — M a n y ( R e p u l s i o n ) — R e p u l s i o n and Attraction, w h i c h sets the stage for the categories of Quantity. The relation of the negative to itself is a negative relation, and so a distinguishing of the One from itself, the repulsion of the One: that is, it makes Many Ones. So far as regards the immediacy of the self-existents, these Many are: and the repulsion of every One of them becomes to that extent their repulsion against each other as existing units, — in other words their reciprocal exclusion. (Logic, #97) Quantity is pure Being, where the mode or character is no longer taken as one with the Being itself, but explicitly put as superseded or indifferent...the meaning being that, toward whatever side the determination of magnitude be altered, the thing still remains what it is. (Logic, #99 and Zusatz) The chief illustrations of these categories come from atomic t h e o r y in p h y s i c s a n d a b s t r a c t i o n f r o m t h e q u a n t i t a t i v e methodology of mathematics. In both cases Hegel uses the occasion to r e n e w his attack on the scientists for allowing their abstractive m e t h o d o l o g y and implicit philosophizing to lead them to bad metaphysics. Newton gave physics an express warning to beware of metaphysics, it is true; but, to his honor be it said, he did not by any means obey his own warning. The only mere physicists are the animals: they alone do not think: while man is a thinking being and born metaphysician. The real question is not whether we shall apply metaphysics, but whether our metaphysics are of the right kind: in other words, whether we are not, instead of the concrete logical Idea, adopting one-sided forms of thought, rigidly fixed by (the) Understanding, and making these the basis of our theoretical as well as our practical work. It is on these grounds that one objects to the Atomic philosophy. (Logic, #98 Zusatz) If Quantity is not reached through the action of thought (of the logical Idea), but taken uncritically from our generalized image of it, we are liable to exaggerate the range of its validity, or even to raise it to the height of an absolute category. And that such a danger is real, we see when the title of exact science is restricted to those sciences the objects of which can be submitted to mathematical calculation. Here we have another trace of bad metaphysics (mentioned in #98 Zusatz) which replaces the concrete Idea by partial and inadequate categories of (the) Understanding. (Logic, #99 Zusatz: second parenthetical phrase in the text) Social atomism is used as another illustration of Hegel's criticism of the methodology of scientism. Social reality is closer to
the Idea than physical reality, and yet social atomism seeks to understand social reality in terms of the implicit metaphysics of physical atomism. In modern times the importance of the atomic theory is even more evident in political than in physical science. According to it, the will of individuals as such is the creative principle of the State: the attractive force is the special wants and inclinations of individuals; and the Universal, or the State itself, is the external nexus of a compact. (Logic, #98) Some general observations about the place of theory-practice in Being are in order before w e leave this sphere. Perhaps these can be rendered more transparent if w e generate still another surrogate triad for Being — Essence — Notion, reflecting h o w the relationship between our polar terms (not the terms themselves) relate to the members of the overarching supertriad. The terms of this n e w triad will in all instances be theory-practice, but in each case the relationship will be characterized differently depending on the sphere w i t h i n w h i c h they operate. These characterizations are available to us f r o m our earliest list of surrogate triads, since they w e r e generated precisely so they can be interchangeable with the terms of the super-triad by virtue of family resemblances. Thus, selecting from the first terms of the surrogate triads immediacy, externality, and indifference, w e can say that these terms can also apply as characterizations for the relationship between theory and practice under Being, inasmuch as they stand as surrogates for the latter. By contrast, their relationship in Essence will be characterized by mediation. It will not be one of synthesis, but a perpetuation of a relation of duality — for the moment let us call it one of for-itselfness, or reflection b e t w e e n t w o mirrors in which images reduplicate themselves without ever coinciding. Finally, the last moment will be one of genuine unity inclusive of difference. This synthesis will correspond to re-immediation that is returning to the immediacy of unity but preserving the benefits of mediation, as illustrated by the analysand at the climactic m o m e n t of his termination of successful therapy. The result will appear in triadic f o r m as follows: Theory (or Practice) as external or indifferent to Practice (or T h e o r y ) — T h e o r y (or Practice) reflected into Practice (or Theory)—Synthesis of Theory and Practice. With particular reference to Being, this relationship can be confirmed if w e consider that the entities generated out of the process of Being's self-differentiation are the very contents of practice — e.g., the sense-data, the irreducible facts, the results of scientism's quest for a "clean start." The above characteriza-
Implications of the dialectic of Being for theory-practice.
Methodological implications of the dialectic of Being.
tions of Being were deemed appropriate precisely because they corresponded to such entities. For example, indifference is particularly aggravated under Quantity because, as w e have just witnessed, the already abstract entities under Quality, though on the verge of a breakthrough toward further concreteness by way of Being-for-Self, suffer a setback because they have been mediated by Quantity. The domain of objective reality and testing ground for theory under Being is composed of entities which have undergone the most severe forms of abstraction. Furthermore, there is no hope for alleviation from within the immanent track, because the standpoint of theory is for-us. And, it is only we, w h o can see into the future in Essence, who also know that a relief from this abstraction in the domain of objects can only come with a relief from the externality between theory and practice. But this can only come about gradually through the relinquishing of the standpoint for-us — the other side of the in-itselfness, which also characterizes Being — by theory, which then also joins in the immanent track and a progressive rapprochement with practice in anticipation of their synthesis. Another consequence of the mediation of Quality by Quantity — the mathematization of primitive objectivity of Being — that bears directly on our project is the location of the source of the predictive rationality of scientism. In dealing with abstract entities such as those encountered in Being, the predictive power of scientism is potent because theorizing comes in the form of highly abstractive mathematical operations. High predictive power, scientism's single most important criterion of theoretical adequacy, is the result of sublation by Quantity. We recall from the Logic #99 that when Quality was being dialectically incorporated into Quantity, the former lacked internal differentiation and, therefore, anything beyond minimal empirical content — what w e then identified as "generalized quality." As a result, there was little that quantification could do to further dismember through abstraction. However, as the dialectic progresses and empirical content becomes enriched through successive mediations, quantification implies by comparison increased abstractiveness. One may safely conclude that the severity of abstraction is proportional to the level of the dialectic at which quantification takes place. The further w e advance on the dialectical scale, the richer becomes the content and, therefore, the more severe the abstractive process once initiated through quantification. In both the cases of minimal and enriched empirical content, the predictive power of a scientistic system is due to its
built-in abstractive process. If the content is minimal the system approximates an axiomatic one whose predictive value is high in the sense that w h a t is d e r i v e d f r o m it (e.g., proofs, corollaries) is predictably what has been put into it in terms of definitions, postulates, axioms, and rules. As the empirical content becomes enriched, the abstractive process goes into effect by selecting from such content and filling-in according to its conceptual requirements. But, as in previous occasions, it is not the process of self-selecting itself that is being questioned. This has been going on at every level of the dialectic according to the context of meaning prevailing at it. Rather, what is at issue again is scientism's self-concealment in mistaking the object of its o w n activity as something externally given, and the product of its o w n quantification as a faithful reflection of the intricacies of nature. W h a t is being o b j e c t e d to, in H e g e l ' s words, is not doing metaphysics but doing the wrong kind, and "instead of the concrete logical Idea, adopting one-sided forms of thought, rigidly fixed by (the) Understanding." "If quantity is not reached through the action of thought (of the logical Idea, which is also the standpoint of complete self-consciousness), but taken uncritically f r o m our generalized ( c o m m o n sensical) image of it, w e are liable to exaggerate the range of its validity, or even raise it to the height of an absolute category." The self-concealment of scientism is so deeply r o o t e d in the abstractive procedures of quantification, that Hegel goes so far as to warn even empirical scientists against it. If it be the office of comparison to reduce existing differences to Identity, the science, which most perfectly fulfills that end, is mathematics. The reason of that is, that quantitative difference is only the difference which is quite external... It follows from what has been formerly said about the mere Identity of Understanding that, as has also been pointed out (#99 Zusatz), neither philosophy nor the empirical sciences need envy this superiority of mathematics. (Logic, #117 Zusatz; parenthetical phrase in the text) H o w e v e r , scientism i n v o l v e s m o r e than quantitative m e t h o d o l o g y and if w e are prepared to e x t e n d our adopted strategy of exposing its self-concealment beyond its quantitative aspect, w e should be able to carry our strategy into Essence, to which scientism's conceptual apparatus more accurately corresponds, and to which w e must n o w turn our attention.
B. Theory-Practice and the Logic of Essence
i. Reflection and the Priority of Theory in Essence Our strategy of casting scientism in dialectical roles in order to force it to yield its hidden agenda remains in effect. We also continue our search for the implicit theory-practice structures in the scientistic apparatus as the latter becomes disclosed in Essence. As in the case of Being, this will be done by selecting categories which highlight our concern. The criteria of selection will also be the same. First, the progenitor of the scientistic object, and second, the antecedents of scientific methodology, with special reference to theory-practice. This objective has to be revised since, being in Essence where mature scientism feels categorially at home, w e are not dealing so much with abstractive models but with what is closer to the actual conceptions and practices of science. Instead of sense-data and other forms of alleged raw experience and "clean starts," w e are now approximating progressively differentiated entities in the form of empirically defined scientistic objects. Similarly, as the mathematically inclined categories of Being are dialectically incorporated into increasingly concrete levels of meaning, the emerging procedure begins to resemble current scientific methodology. Most important, Essence signals a shift of emphasis f r o m practice to theory and a related change from the standpoint of in-itselfness (or for-us) to that of for-itselfness, as mediation assumes an increasingly leading role. Practice in Being was in a state of self-concealment or, more accurately, one of only potential self-disclosure (i.e., in-itself), because it lacked the categorial equipment (i.e., mediation and reflection) to view itself for what it was or for-itself. This self-concealment was apparent for-us w h o had arrived at that point via the circular path. With the transition to Essence, mediation (as its etymology and common usage also suggest) is equivalent to the intercession between two parties for the purpose of effecting a reconciliation by way of clarifying or making explicit their respective positions. We may recall that the most recent addition to the
Strategy in dealing with Essence.
Distinction of Essence from Being, with special reference to theory, mediation, and reflection.
list of surrogate triads, Being—Essence—Notion, was Immediac y — M e d i a t i o n — R e - i m m e d i a t i o n . But mediation also corresponds to theory as the latter relates to practice by way of reflection. This suggests the key role that the surrogate middle terms t h e o r y and m e d i a t i o n w i l l be p l a y i n g in explicating Essence. Reflection will be carrying most of the burden of mediation and Hegel will be making full use of the both etymological and metaphorical affinities between thought processes and reflection properties of light to secure the role of mediation in this sphere. This is the context in which theory will be taking its turn in claiming priority over practice by virtue of mediation between terms which have hitherto been burdened w i t h externality. The last paragraph of Being and the first of Essence in the Logic summarize this development very well. In Being, the form of reference (or relation) is purely due to our reflection (as travellers on the circular path) on what takes place; but it (i.e., reflection) is the special and proper characteristic of Essence. In the sphere of Being, when Somewhat becomes an Other, the Somewhat has vanished. Not so in Essence: here there is no real Other, but only Diversity, reference of the one to its Other. The transition of Essence is therefore at the same time no transition: for in the passage of different into different, the different does not vanish: the different terms remain in their relation. When we speak of Being and Nothing, Being is independent, so is Nothing. The case is otherwise with the Positive and the Negative. No doubt these possess the characteristics of Being and Nothing. But the Positive by itself has no sense; it is wholly in reference to the Negative. And it is the same with the Negative. In the sphere of Being the reference of one term to another is only implicit; in Essence on the contrary it is explicit. And this in general is the distinction between the forms of Being and Essence: in Being everything is immediate; in Essence everything is relative. (Logic, #111 Zusatz; italics added in the first instance) The terms of Essence are always mere pairs of correlatives, and not yet absolutely reflected in themselves: hence in Essence the actual unity of the Notion is not realized, but only postulated by reflection. Essence, — which is Being coming into mediation with itself through the negativity of itself — is self-relatedness, only in so far as it is relation to an Other, — this Other however coming to view at first not as something which is, but as postulated and hypothesized. — Being has not vanished: but, firstly, Essence, as simple self-relation, is Being, and secondly as regards its one-sided characteristic of immediacy, Being is deposed to a mere negative, to a seeming or reflected light — Essence accordingly is Being thus reflecting light into itself...That reflection, or light thrown into itself, constitutes the distinction between Essence and immediate Being, and is the peculiar characteristic of Essence itself. (Logic, #112) The point of view given by the Essence is in general the standpoint of 'Reflection.' This word 'reflection' is originally applied,
when a ray of light in a straight line impinging upon the surface of a mirror is thrown back from it. In this phenomenon we have two things, — first an immediate fact which is, and secondly the deputed, derivated, or transmitted phase of the same. — Something of this sort takes place when we reflect, or think upon an object; for here we want to know the object; not in its immediacy, but as derivative or mediated. (Logic, #112 Zusatz) The first paragraph describes the transition f r o m Being to Essence in terms of a shift f r o m a pre-eminence of immediacy to that of mediation, and a change f r o m externality to internality. M o r e specifically, the shift takes place between external ( " o u r r e f l e c t i o n " ) and internal reflection or I n t r o f l e c t i o n — "the special and proper characteristic of Essence." As the second paragraph proceeds to show, it is the latter kind of reflection — identified as Introflection ("reflected into themselves") on the part of the dualities ("pairs of corellatives") — w h i c h provides the m o v e m e n t and bears the burden for building-up concreteness in Essence. Hegel also allows us a peek into the future of the process of I n t r o f l e c t i o n , and g e n e r a l l y of the build-up of concreteness through self-relatedness, in the f o r m of the "actual unity of the Notion." Being had gone only as far as a relatively abstract and external "simple self-relation," thus generating, through a quantitative self-duplication, the Other f r o m S o m e w h a t and the M a n y f r o m the O n e . Essence has transcended this "one-sided characteristic of i m m e d i a c y " of Being, through dialectically incorporating what is immediate or apparent, but " d e p o s i n g it) to a mere negative, to a seeming or reflected light" in the mirror-like metaphor of reflection. Finally, the third quoted paragraph makes explicit the dialectically significant reflective properties of thought through the analysis of this metaphor of light. The following version of the same transition f r o m Being to Essence given by the Science of Logic parallels that given above by the Logic. But it has the advantage, for our purposes, of following more explicitly the shift of the theoretical component — as Hegel calls it " t h e external r e f l e c t i o n of the subjective thinker" — from the circular to the immanent path. Absolute indifference is the final determination of Being before it becomes Essence; but it does not attain to Essence. It reveals itself as still belonging to the sphere of Being through the fact that, determined as indifferent, it still contains difference as an external, quantitative determination; this is its Determinate Being, contrasted with which absolute indifference is determined as being only implicitly the Absolute, not the Absolute grasped as Actuality. In other words, it is external reflection which stops short at conceiving the differences in themselves or in the Absolute as one and the same, thinking of them as only indifferently distinguished, not as intrin-
Distinction of Essence from Being in terms of grades of indifference.
sically distinct from one another. The further step which requires to be made here is to grasp that this reflection of their differences into their unity is not merely the product of the external reflection of the subjective thinker, but that is the very nature of the differences of this unity to sublate themselves, with the result that their unity proves to be absolute negativity, its indifference to be just as much indifferent to itself, to its own indifference, as it is indifferent to otherness. (Science of Logic, pp. 383-84)
Preliminary location of theory-practice in the dialectic of Essence.
5
!
As w e recall from our discussion of Being, indifference had been heightened as a result of mediation by Quantity. The category of Measure which, f o l l o w i n g Quantity, contributed the conception of a substrate which laid the ground for the duality of essential-unessential that is characteristic of Essence. Thus, Being bequeathed to Essence "absolute indifference" as exemplified in the presence of an unsublated substrate vis-a-vis "the external reflection of the subjective thinker" — the counterpart of "purely due to our reflection on what takes place" from the p r e v i o u s q u o t a t i o n . The A b s o l u t e first appears a b o v e in its most incipient stage as "absolute indifference" or undifferenti-
I j j j j
ated unity, and not as self-differentiated unity or unity-in-difference — it is " o n l y implicitly the Absolute, not the Absolute grasped as Actuality." At this point it may be useful to refer to the surrogate triads: Indifference—Differentiation—Self-differentiation (or Unity-in difference), and Identity—Difference— Identity-in-Difference, which w e shall encounter shortly. Difference stands dialectically higher than indifference because it admits its opposite in fixing its meaning, while indifference explicitly rejects any such connection.
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In this light, the "external reflection of the subjective thinker"
j
corresponds to theory, while "the differences in themselves (i.e., as they are still in a state of potentiality)... as only indifferently distinguished (i.e., not yet internally differentiated)," provide the contents of practice. This is no different than the case encountered earlier in Being w h e r e i n , though t w o faces of the same coin, the in-itselfness (the "in themselves" here) representing the contents of practice, and the for-us (the "subjective thinker" here) representing theory, are burdened with externality vis-a-vis each other, and are only potentially part of the unity-in-difference which includes them both. In other words, w e are short of the situation in which differentiation builds up f r o m within, whereby "unity is not merely the product of the external reflection of the subjective thinker, but that it is the v e r y nature of the differences of this unity to sublate themselves." W e have not yet reached a genuine form of unity qua unity-in-difference "grasped as Actuality." Since the Absolute is the model for such conception, genuine unity is characterized
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by a coincidence of the standpoint of the external observer, or "subjective thinker," representing the theoretical component; and the differences viewed externally ("in themselves" or "only indifferently distinguished") representing that of practice. Or, better still, rendering the same synthesis in terms of Hegel's terminology of the above quoted passages, it amounts to "conceiving the differences in themselves (as they potentially are) or in the Absolute (i.e., as they have been actualized at the moment of the Absolute of Actuality) as one and the same." In Essence there is more of an anticipation and first approximation of the forthcoming synthesis of theory and practice, but still within a self-perpetuating dualistic context of meaning that precludes the final consummation of the coincidence or synthesis of the two sides. Though the double-mirror analogy takes care of such reduplication of dualism, it misses the qualitative change of the reflected object due to the intervening mediations. It does not account for the fact that each successive act of reflection adds to the internal unity of the object or relation at hand, so that the differences become progressively less "indifferently distinguished," and more "intrinsically distinct from one another. "Thus," it is the very nature of the differences of this (genuine internal) unity to sublate themselves, with the result that their unity proves to be absolute negativity (double negation leading to affirmation of unity of the kind w e witnessed in the transition to Somewhat), its indifference to be just as much indifferent to itself, to its own indifference, as it is indifferent to otherness." The succession of the acts of r e f l e c t i o n w i l l c o n t i n u e throughout Essence until all indifference is banished. Indeed, as is apparent even from perusing the list of the categories of Essence, the dialectical progress within that sphere is equivalent to the gradual convergence of the immanent path of Spirit with the hitherto external path of the "subjective thinker." This progression toward coincidence of the two paths secures a more concrete, or dialectically advanced, standing for theory than it enjoyed under Being from the standpoint of the "subjective thinker." It now possesses a position of incipient unityin-difference — a unity with, coupled with a detachment from, its object (the contents of practice). What unites theory and its object is the operation of the self-selection of the contents of practice — the view of the Other as "postulated and hypothesized." The element of separation, on the other hand, derives from the persisting underlying dualistic structure of Essence. Theory cannot overcome this detachment from its object while still in the sphere of Essence because, being part of the latter's
Determination of the present state of theory-practice through anticipation of what is forthcoming in their synthesis.
Exploration of the mirror-like quality of reflection in order to illuminate thought in Essence.
structure, it cannot transcend the duality that characterizes Essence throughout. Indeed, theory is not yet aware of duality as a hidden agenda, for such an awareness would constitute the first step toward overcoming it. Essence represents for-itselfness, i.e., the capacity to see for itself, by virtue of its built-in duality and reflection, what it looks like. Being, on the other hand, lacking this rudimentary and partly illusory (because of the constantly shifting polar structures of Essence) type of self-awareness, represents in-itselfness or mere potentiality for what is to come. Such potentiality is also for-us, since it is only w e qua philosophical observers w h o are aware of it. Our role as "subjective thinker" (the locus of theory) remains in effect in Essence, but unlike the case of Being, it is shared with the active term of the "pair of correlatives" in the process of reflection. Not until the subject-object polarity (the ultimate ground of the "subjective thinker") has been transcended, with the full development of self-consciousness at the end of the Notion, is the standpoint of for-us also eliminated. The Notion is, accordingly, the stage of the in-and-for-itselfness, for it represents the capacity of Spirit to v i e w itself not merely as it appears to itself, but also as it truly is once its potential is realized. In short, while in Essence thought m e r e l y operates upon itself, in the N o t i o n it also knows that it does so. Reflection in the physical sense has features which serve Hegel's dialectical aims not only in the case of Essence, but also in anticipating what is forthcoming in the Notion. He pursues this by turning the mirror-like capacity of thought qua reflection into an instrument for the exploration of thought itself. The capacity of a body to reflect combines a receiving and an emitting function in one operation — a passive side as inseparable from an active one. Reason qua active is an important feature (which Hegel traced to Aristotle) that distinguishes his o w n dialectical brand from other forms of idealism and from empiricist doctrines that have compartmentalized reason in its passive and active functions. Reflection signals a new situation in which reason qua active can turn upon itself. Given the dialectical context of levels of meaning, this does not represent an endless reproduction of the same image a la double mirrors resembling the False Infinity of the dialectic and the vicious circularity of formal logicians, but a gain in concreteness for each round of self-reflection or self-relatedness. Returning to the mirror-metaphor, the gain in concreteness through dialectical circularity — or, perhaps, spirality if w e abide by Hegel's description of the circularity of his system in Part II — consists
in taking the recurring image as an opportunity and a guide to l o o k e l s e w h e r e f o r the real t h i n g . W i t h the shift f r o m the standpoint for-us to that of for-itself, thought has been given the green light to turn upon itself in the same way. The fundamental insight f r o m the mirror-metaphor, that thought seeks to penetrate behind the surface and l o o k for the essence of things, can n o w also be applied to thought itself. In the case of other instruments, we can try and criticize them in other ways than by setting about the special work for which they are destined. But the examination of knowledge can only be carried out by an act of knowledge. To examine this so-called instrument is the same thing as to know it. But to see