Developing the Horizons of the Mind: Relational and Contextual Reasoning and the Resolution of Cognitive Conflict

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Developing the Horizons of the Mind

Developing the Horizons of the Mind is the first book on Relational and Contextual Reasoning (RCR), a new theory of the human mind which powerfully addresses key areas of human conflict such as the ideological conflict between nations, the conflict in close relationships, and the conflict between science and religion. K. Helmut Reich provides a clear and accessible introduction to the new RCR way of thinking that encourages people to adopt an inclusive rather than an oppositional approach to conflict and problem-solving. Part one outlines the key aspects of RCR theory and supporting empirical data, and Part two offers examples of its application in the modern world. RCR provides a stimulating and challenging tool to several disciplines, including philosophy, psychology, religious studies and education, and this book will be a valuable resource for cognitive scientists, psychotherapists, theologians, educators and all those involved in conflict resolution. .   has had successful careers as a physicist and as a psychologist, winning the William James Award of the APA for contributions to the psychology of religion in 1997.

Developing the Horizons of the Mind Relational and Contextual Reasoning and the Resolution of Cognitive Conflict K. Helmut Reich

          The Pitt Building, Trumpington Street, Cambridge, United Kingdom    The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge CB2 2RU, UK 40 West 20th Street, New York, NY 10011-4211, USA 477 Williamstown Road, Port Melbourne, VIC 3207, Australia Ruiz de Alarcón 13, 28014 Madrid, Spain Dock House, The Waterfront, Cape Town 8001, South Africa http://www.cambridge.org © K. Helmut Reich 2004 First published in printed format 2002 ISBN 0-511-04275-2 eBook (netLibrary) ISBN 0-521-81795-1 hardback

To my grandchildren Michael, Nicole, Nicolas, Natacha May they grow up in a society in which relationships and contexts become more and more recognised and valued

Contents

List of figures List of tables Acknowledgements Introduction

page x xi xiii 1

Part I The Theory of Relational and Contextual Reasoning (RCR) and its Empirical Study 1. Introduction Caveats The nature of relational and contextual reasoning Previous work on relational thinking Summar y of the introduction

2. Development of RCR Anthropology adopted Theories of cognitive development Cognitive development and RCR Unreflected, object-reflecting, and means-reflecting thought Intra-inter-trans – the ‘logic’ of RCR development Input to the present study from earlier work Summar y of RCR development

3. Metaphysical Assumptions and Theor y of RCR Assumptions adopted from the philosophy of knowledge Theor y of RCR Summar y of the metaphysical and theoretical grounding of RCR

4. Empirical Studies of RCR Over view Methodological commonalities Pilot study 1: RCR level descriptions and RCR effectiveness as pragmatic reasoning schema Pilot study 2: Additional RCR inter view problem Pilot study 3: RCR and Piagetian operations

11 11 12 22 23

25 25 26 27 29 32 33 34

35 35 41 46

47 47 49 50 55 59

vii

viii

Contents Pilot study 4: RCR, Piagetian operations, cognitively complex thinking, and evolved logics Discussion of pilot studies 3 and 4 Summar y of empirical studies and outlook

5. Other Thought Forms and Matching Them to the Problem at Hand Other thought forms relevant to RCR Matching the form of thought to the structure of the problem Summary of other thought forms and matching them to the problem at hand

63 72 74

75 75 91 97

Part II Applications of RCR Over view

6. Methodology Method for applying RCR Demonstration of a par ticular search

7. Religion Religion and the nature of human beings Understanding religious doctrines Co-ordination of religious and scientific world views RCR and religious development Conclusions

8. The Archaeology of RCR Fathers of the Council of Chalcedon Vincent van Gogh William James Rainer Maria Rilke Rober t Musil Niels Bohr Conclusions

9. Psychology Psychology as a discipline The case of individual development Psychophysiological phenomena Which music for which purpose? Conclusions

10. Education Who controls the educational system? Teaching the investiture contest Stimulating RCR in the classroom Concluding remarks

101

103 103 104

116 116 120 126 129 132

133 133 134 136 137 139 140 143

145 145 149 151 152 156

157 157 158 159 163

Contents

11. Social Issues Overcoming illegal use of drugs Nuclear power Ways to solve old problems and create new work Concluding remarks

12. Conclusions This volume Postscript

ix

165 165 174 181 184

185 185 187

Appendix 1: Inter viewing techniques

191

Appendix 2: Scoring manual for RCR

194

References Index

199 219

Figures

2.1 Evolution of cognition 3.1 ‘Figure–ground’ shift of the number of cubes 3.2 Noncompatibility according to Bedau and Oppenheim (reproduced by kind permission of Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, The Netherlands) 4.1 Schematic sketch of the snail task 5.1 Venn diagrams of class sets 5.2 INCR group 5.3 Through becoming, being and nonbeing transform into new being and new nonbeing 7.1 Changes when moving from one to two (reproduced by kind permission of the British Journal of Religious Education) 7.2 Correlation between religious judgement stages and levels of RCR

x

page 30 44

45 60 79 83 86

121 131

Tables

1.1 The four structural levels of the model of thought processes page 18 4.1 Description of RCR levels (reproduced by kind permission of S. Karger A.G., Medical and Scientific Publishers, Basel, Switzerland) 52 4.2 Mean scores of RCR scores of pilot study 1 (reproduced by kind permission of S. Karger A.G., Medical and Scientific Publishers, Basel, Switzerland) 53 4.3 Developmental logic of RCR 54 4.4 Mean scores of RCR scores of pilot studies 3 and 4 58 4.5 Mean scores of RCR scores of pilot study 3 62 4.6 Frequencies of individual scores concerning Piagetian operations and RCR levels (reproduced by kind permission of John Wiley & Sons, Inc., New York [owner of Jossey-Bass, Publishers, San Francisco, the original publisher]; Hogrefe, Verlag fur ¨ Psychologie, Gottingen, ¨ etc.; Ernst-Reinhardt-Verlag, Munich) 63 4.7 Frequencies of individual scores of levels of cognitively complex thought and RCR levels 66 4.8 Frequencies of individual scores concerning levels of (meta-) logical thinking and RCR levels 70 4.9 Minimum stages/levels of other competencies for a given RCR level (reproduced by kind permission of the Ernst-Reinhardt-Verlag, Munich) 72 5.1 Various operations based on formal binary logic 78 5.2 The sixteen binary operations 80 5.3 Level of cognitive complexity from an analysis of diplomatic notes (reproduced by kind permission of Sage Publications, Inc., Thousand Oaks, CA) 85 5.4 Main differences of various forms of thought 89

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List of tables

7.1 Frequencies of individual scores of RCR levels and intelligibility judgement of the Chalcedonian Definition (reproduced by kind permission of the British Journal of Religious Education) 7.2 Frequencies of individual scores of RCR levels and intelligibility judgement of the Doctrine of the Holy Trinity (reproduced by kind permission of the British Journal of Religious Education) 7.3 Frequencies of individual RCR levels and levels of co-ordinating biblical and scientific views (reproduced by kind permission of Pabst Scientific Publishers, Lengerich, Germany) 9.1 Classification of guidelines for functional music

123

125

127 156

Acknowledgements

No book is complete without giving thanks to all those who contributed in one way or another to the work described and the writing of the book. (However, the responsibility for the actual content remains entirely mine.) Thanks are particularly in order in this case, as I embarked upon a new field of inquiry, and thus needed more help and interaction with colleagues than usual. Fritz Oser made available the facilities of the School of Education of Fribourg University, introduced me to actual empirical work in developmental psychology, and was a helpful discussion partner all along. Wolfgang Edelstein, Hans Fischer, August Flammer, Dedre Gentner, Jean-Blaise Grize, Rolf Hagedorn, Siegfried HoppeGraff, Karen S. Kitchener, Deirdre Kramer, Rolf Oerter, Philibert Secretan, Thomas Bernhard Seiler, Victor F. Weisskopf, and Phillip K. Wood were each invaluable in the early stages for critical comments and suggestions for the next steps. Carol Rausch Albright, Henry Babel, Michael A. Basseches, Paul-Richard Berger, Mark H. Bickhard, Ronnie Blakeney, Thomas Bornhauser, Anton A. Bucher, Thomas J. Burke, Michael Chandler, Philip Clayton, Veit-Jakobus Dieterich, Lutz Eckensberger, Helmut J. Efinger, Reto Luzius Fetz, Ernst Peter Fischer, Anne Foerst, James W. Fowler, Peter C. H¨agele, Philip Hefner, Heinz S. Herzka, Stefan Huber, John Hull, Bruce Hunsberger, Michael E. Hyland, Christopher B. Kaiser, Gisela Labouvie-Vief, Thierry Magnin, David Moshman, Ehrhard Muhlich, ¨ W. Jim Neidhardt, Erwin Nickel, Karl Ernst Nipkow, Willis F. Overton, Arthur Peacocke, Martin Rothgangel, Robert J. Russell, George Scarlett, Gerhard Schurz, Friedrich Schweitzer, Kevin Sharpe, Jan D. Sinnott, Bernard Spilka, Maria Spychiger, Peter Suedfeld, Kalevi Tamminen, Eberhard Todt, Peter Valentin, Hendrika Vande Kemp, Harald Walach, Christoph Wassermann, Michael Welker, and David M. Wulff over the years stimulated progress by way of their remarks and suggestions. I learned much from more advanced (anonymous) colleagues through discussions especially after my presentations at various conferences in Europe and North America, and I benefited significantly from relevant Internet discussions. Whenever I quote here xiii

xiv

Acknowledgements

(a large part of ) a pertinent posting (in agreement with the author), I indicate the author’s name. However, in some cases, I simply follow up hints, summarise the gist of a discussion, or use some expressions without individual acknowledgements. I am indebted to all participants of those discussions, especially to Ric Barr, David R. Burwasser, Michael Cavanaugh, Thomas L. Gilbert, Ursula Goodenough, Paul Harrison, William Irons, Rex Kerr, Edwin C. Laurenson, Steve Petermann, and V. V. Raman. My colleagues at the School of Education, in particular Wolfgang Althof, Franz Baeriswyl, Traugott Els¨asser, Aloys Niggli, and Roland Reichenbach, helped in numerous ways to make me a social scientist and educator. Anton Bucher (pilot study 1), Birgitta Michel (now Mrs Thenen – pilot studies 2 and 3) interviewed grade-school children in the local Swiss-German dialect (which I do not speak), an essential ingredient of an interview bringing out the authentic views of these children; both of them and Ornella Di Loreto (now Mrs Miller – pilot study 4) also participated in the scoring. Philip K. Wood, Richard Klaghofer, and Bernd Kersten in succession were instrumental for getting the statistics done. Without Anke Schroder ¨ the classroom work would not have been the opportunity for such a fruitful experience as it has been. And clearly, without all those interview respondents and participating pupils as well as students and older adults, there simply would be no book. My wife Ursula discussed many issues with me, put up gracefully with plenty of unavailability of her husband, and – given our differing biographies, outlooks and temperaments – provided a good number of opportunities to apply RCR and thereby refine it. Without Emily Wilkinson it would have been more difficult to get the book off the ground and flying. Peter F. Bucher-Roth, Michael Cavanaugh, Kristen E. Kann, Bernd Kersten, Hans Koppel, ¨ Ueli Simmel, Geoffrey Scobie, Bernard Spilka, Joy Stephens and the anonymous reviewers gave valuable feedback on earlier versions of the present text. Sarah Caro, Sophie Read and Gillian Dadd dealt gracefully and effectively with my typescript at Cambridge University Press. A number of figures and tables could be included due to the kindness of the permission-granters (pp. x–xii) and the respective authors. Finally, the Hochschulrat of the University of Fribourg provided financial support for this research. I express my special thanks to all of the above.

Introduction

The main purpose of this monograph is to present the findings of fifteen years of continuous research on a particular postformal form of thought, namely, ‘Relational and Contextual Reasoning’ (RCR). RCR is particularly helpful when one seeks to co-ordinate two or more competing theories about the same phenomenon or issue. An example of usefully applying RCR would be when one is debating whether to attribute an outstanding athletic or artistic performance to native endowment or to training. RCR will clarify the extent to which the two kinds of explanations are needed, bring out any links between them, and elucidate the respective explanatory potential in the context considered. Secondary aims of the monograph are (a) to stimulate further study of RCR, (b) to demonstrate its potential for solving particular problems better than other forms of thought, and (c) to encourage use of RCR and its broader application. Given these main and secondary aims, arranging the material in a coherent manner was not obvious, apart from (c), to which Part II is devoted. Considerations (b) were finally moved to a later chapter (Chapter 5), to be presented after the main aim and secondary aim (a) are met. The research on relational and contextual reasoning to be reported was originally triggered by the following observation. Whereas many adolescents espouse either a religious or a scientific world view when trying to understand what goes on around and inside them, some manage to ‘combine’ both views in some fashion. The question that intrigued me was, ‘How do they do it?’ The answer I came to after looking at other possibilities was that those adolescents use relational and contextual reasoning, a term that I adopted after other trials for reasons to be discussed below. Before I fully reached that insight, however, I had first to work my way through theories of reasoning already proposed. Until the 1970s, Piagetian formal operations were considered by many researchers to be the high end of individual development of reasoning. The label formal operations indicates that certain formalisms have been developed by an individual which can be used for solving a class of problems 1

2

Developing the Horizons of the Mind

irrespective of their particular content. Such operations involve a number of aspects, such as exploring possibility space, hypothetico-deductive theory building, and checking a solution for its internal and external logical consistency. As considered here, the exclusive use of formal binary logic constitutes the characteristic core of Piagetian formal operations (but see Labouvie-Vief 1980). This is exemplified by the central system of sixteen binary operations, to which I shall come back in detail in chapter 5. In the early 1980s, a category of more highly developed thought, called ‘postformal operations’, became a topic of interest to a small group of psychologists (e.g., C. N. Alexander, P. K. Arlin, Ch. Armon, P. B. Baltes, M. A. Basseches, A. Blasi, J. M. Broughton, M. J. Chandler, M. L. Commons, C. Gilligan, H. Koplowitz, D. Kramer, G. Labouvie-Vief, E. J. Langer, F. A. Richards, J. D. Sinnott). A number of volumes on that subject were published in fairly rapid succession (e.g., Commons, Richards and Armon 1984; Commons, Sinnott, Richards and Armon 1989; Commons, Armon, Kohlberg, Richards, Grotzer and Sinnott 1990; Alexander and Langer 1990). But those publications appear to have dwindled to a trickle (e.g., Sinnott 1998) without having resolved the central issue of the distinguishing characteristics of postformal operations and their relations with Piagetian formal operations. No consensus currently exists regarding those characteristics and relations. I would argue that insufficient attention is paid to logic in this debate. Postformal operations may in principle share much with Piagetian formal operations, with the exception of formal binary logic. In my view, postformal thinking is based on logics different from formal binary logic. For that reason, as will be shown, fully developed RCR, with its specific logic, is postformal. A further characteristic of postformal thought is suggested by the established use of the word ‘post’ (as in ex post factum) implying that fully developed postformal thinking arises after the Piagetian formal operations are mastered. This, however, does not exclude a development of less developed stages of various other thought forms in parallel with Piagetian stages. I bring to this work thirty years of experience of research in physics and engineering, together with seventeen years in social science, principally psychology. With this background, it is perhaps not surprising that philosopher physicist Niels Bohr came to my mind when I came across the adolescents who ‘combined’ religious and scientific world views. Among other issues, Bohr discussed the paradox of the wave-like and particlelike behaviour of light in terms of complementarity – that these contextdependent behaviours do not contradict, much less exclude each other, but instead ‘complete’ each other, and both pictures are needed for a full explanation in non-mathematical terms. I later became aware of William James’s account of complementary phenomena concerning (a) memory

Introduction

3

and (b) the stream of thought (Reich 1998). Along with these leads, my own career(s) continually encouraged me to look at things from differing points of view and then to work towards a coherent ‘story’. Having become aware of the possible existence of relational and contextual reasoning, I interviewed students and some professional physicists on issues with a ‘structure’ similar to that of religious vs. scientific world views. For example, I asked them (1) about whether the change from the Romanesque to the Gothic church architecture had spiritual, or economic causes; (2) whether kidney pain is best relieved by surgery, or by drinking a certain type of herb tea; (3) whether the reported crash of a glider was due to naturally explainable causes, or to ‘fate’ as foretold by the pilot’s horoscope. Along with collecting these data, I also studied various types of logic, the debates on the interpretation of quantum theory in physics, as well as various views on the relationships between science and religion/theology. Slowly I came to postulate hypotheses about RCR (initially called ‘thinking in terms of complementarity’ – Oser and Reich 1987; Reich 1994b), and then worked on clarifying them through empirical work and analyses of the results. After understanding RCR better, I tried to elucidate its ‘composition’. My current view is that it shares ‘components’ with other thought forms, namely, with Piagetian operations, cognitively complex thought, and dialectical as well as analogical thinking. Therefore, I deal here also with these thought forms after having established the distinctness of RCR. Let me return for a moment to the differing views of religion and science. Is one right and the other wrong? Often both are aiming to ‘explain’ the same phenomenon, as for example in the case of the origin of the universe. Using a Latin term, the phenomenon to be explained – here the origin of the universe – is designated as the explanandum. Whoever works on the explanatory task in the examples given (and in structurally similar ones) and employs relational and contextual reasoning, should keep the competing theories distinct. For instance, when a scientific explanation is (still) missing, to introduce divine action as part of a ‘scientific’ explanation is not appropriate. Yet, all (partial) theories should be used fully (in their context). This may be referred to as ‘both-and’ reasoning. When applying (partial) theories, one may find that one or the other theory has more explanatory power under some conditions, and less under others. In other words, one may find that context affects the explanatory efficacy of a partial theory. Fully developed relational and contextual reasoning will elucidate the relations the partial theories have with the explanandum and with each other as well as the details of the context dependence. These relationships involve a trivalent logic: two statements about the same explanandum are

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Developing the Horizons of the Mind

either compatible (both true concurrently), incompatible (never both true ‘simultaneously’) or noncompatible (not compatible simultaneously, but one is ‘true’ in one context respectively at one point in time, the other in a different context or at a different time). I employ both the terms ‘complementary’ and ‘complementarist’ in this monograph. The distinction between the two terms as I use them here is as follows. Complementary merely indicates that the various parts, aspects, activities, etc. ‘complete’ each other, yet they are inherently independent. By contrast, complementarist refers to aspects, states, activities, events, views, explanations, etc. which are complementary and intertwined, that is inseparable because intrinsically linked (= entanglement as described in quantum physics by Heisenberg’s principle of indeterminacy). Examples of the latter would be native endowment and the efforts to produce fruits of practising an art or skill, or the wave-like and the particle-like nature of light. As these example and others show, as a rule the links are not of the cause–effect type but of other types. A given link may be one of ‘kinship’, of information transfer, of symbiosis, of mutual limitation, and so on. The appeal of studying RCR and using it appropriately goes beyond purely academic intellectual interest. As one looks around, examples abound where either/or thinking (rather than both-and reasoning) has undesirable consequences. I would argue that rigid adherence to either/or thinking has impeded the full realisation of the potential of psychology, education and religion, among other fields, and has hindered better resolutions of societal problems like fighting illicit use of narcotics. In these and other comparable cases, RCR offers a method or a pathway toward more encompassing and fruitful results. In sum, RCR is not needed for solving crossword puzzles nor similar, conceptually simple tasks having just one well-defined solution. Rather, it helps in dealing with highly complex, often controversial problems of the kind just indicated. How does RCR help? RCR helps one to analyse the various aspects of a problem and their ‘internal’ relationships as well as the role of the context and thence to bring out the respective dominant explanation. Doing so contributes to developing the horizons of the mind. This comes about in particular because – where applicable – the use of the ‘structural’ trivalent RCR logic frees one from the limitations of formal binary logic. This may also permit one to resolve cognitive dissonances or even conflicts. Once a teacher grasps the nature of RCR and its developmental logic he or she can stimulate RCR in the classroom step by step. In particular, the teacher can further students’ ability to differentiate and to integrate statements about what is or might be the case, and can help students to become conscious of different types of logic used in establishing and connecting statements.

Introduction

5

Urged on years ago by colleagues and one editor of a leading professional journal to publish this work as a monograph, I deferred doing so until the conceptual basis of RCR was sufficiently clarified, the empirical data well established, and my experience with applying RCR sufficiently promising, particularly in a classroom setting. I am fairly confident that those criteria have now been met. Given RCR’s potentially wide-ranging use, I have written the present volume, in particular Part II, with an audience in mind comprising not merely experts or students of developmental psychology, psychology of education, and cognitive science, but also of interested persons from other fields for whom RCR might be relevant and helpful in practice. A brief discussion of the style of my presentation may be appropriate at this point. Let me begin by citing two exemplars of what I aspire to do in writing this monograph. The first is Ren´e Descartes whose ‘Discourse on Method’ was written in a style that itself illustrated the discourse’s content: his writing was systematic, formal, analytic. The second model is Søren A. Kierkegaard, the Danish philosopher theologian, who documented his revolt against the formal, petrified Church of his day. His writing on that subject is unsystematic, aphoristic, sometimes even disjointed.1 In the same vein, I have attempted to write this monograph in such a way that it expresses RCR stylistically as well as thematically. While the thematic treatment of RCR is fairly obvious, my stylistic demonstration of RCR may require a further word of explanation. The most significant choice a writer may face, apart from the relative formality of his or her style, is whether to proceed deductively after having presented the main thesis ‘up front’ (risking mental overload of the reader), or inductively, presenting the arguments one by one and the resulting thesis as conclusion (risking losing the reader on the way because it is not clear where one is going). In this work exploring RCR, I alternate between partial deduction and partial induction in an effort to emphasise the both-and importance of the two methods for gaining insight. In other words I attempt to make full use of both methods in a complementarist 1

For persons deeply knowledgeable about the Qur’an (which I am not), the style of the holy book of Islam (in Arabic) is another example of a match between content and style: the style is said to express both the sweetness of city dwellers’ sedentary placidity and the forcefulness of Bedouins’ migrating roughness; the rhythm of the syllables echoes that of both prose and poetry – the pauses, while different from those in either prose or poetry, exhibit a harmonious and rhythmic symmetry; the words chosen are neither trivial nor overly rare – they are the expression of an admirable nobility; the sentences are phrased in such a way that the smallest number of words renders thoughts of extreme richness; intellect and feelings/emotions are brought in ‘together’ in such a way that the narration, arguments, doctrines, laws, and moral principles are both intellectually convincing and emotionally engaging (Schimmel 1991, p. 11, quoting an Egyptian scholar; translation from German by K.H.R. as throughout this monograph).

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Developing the Horizons of the Mind

or linked manner, to illustrate how RCR furthers understanding through iterated changes of the viewpoint. Finally, a caveat: this monograph is not necessarily a fascinating read; in fact, some readers may need extra motivation to keep reading. One of the difficulties with RCR is its ‘invisibility’, which is comparable to that of scaffolding: when the building or the renovation is done, almost no trace is left of the scaffolding. Similarly, once RCR has done its work and a solution to the given problem has been found, there is mostly no trace left of how the solution came to be found. To use another rubric, one may compare RCR with the number zero (without claiming for RCR the importance of the zero). Peter Bernstein (1998, pp. 32–3) wrote: The concept of zero was difficult to grasp for people who had used counting only to keep track of the number of animals killed or the numbers of days passed or the number of units travelled. Zero had nothing to do with what counting was in that sense. As the twentieth-century English philosopher Alfred North Whitehead put it, ‘The point about zero is that we do not need to use it in the operation of daily life. No one goes out to buy zero fish. It is in a way the most civilised of all the cardinals, and its use is forced on us by the needs of cultivated modes of thought.’

Similarly, millions live their lives without having heard of relational and contextual reasoning, and without ever using it. My claim is that, were they to use RCR, they would better their chances for improving personal relationships, tackling complex social problems such as getting people to follow good health habits, and dealing more effectively with social and political situations in strife-torn areas such as Northern Ireland, the Balkans, the Middle East, and elsewhere. There is another possible reason for finding this volume off-putting. Many of us egotistically think that anything we say is both complete and consistent (a violation of Godel’s ¨ theorem, by the way), and therefore incorruptible, unchangeable, and not to be questioned. And now comes an author who potentially challenges that view. How does he have the nerve to do that? While understanding such a reaction, I still hope that for serious thinkers, researchers and scholars, the considerations presented here together with the empirical data and their interpretation should open minds to the parameters of organised thought. Some readers may find that I argue like someone for whom everything becomes a nail because I have a hammer in my hands: indeed, I do use relational and contextual reasoning in many different situations, under widely varying circumstances, and in differing modes, for instance to obtain a result of psychological research, to formulate a hypothesis or a desideratum, or to enable a retroduction.

Introduction

7

Although my understanding has reached a level which makes communication of the results reasonable, I do not claim that this volume constitutes the final word on the issues discussed. Rather, I present something to think about, to be explored jointly, this in the hope that others will also contribute to the progress of RCR and its applications. The organisation of the volume is as follows. Chapter 1 presents fully developed RCR in a basic way so that the sequel becomes understandable. It includes a structural analysis of RCR in terms of elementary operations, conjunctive operations, composite operations, and complete forms of thought. Chapter 2 discusses background knowledge needed for understanding the development of RCR: the general ontogenetic development from the child’s searching to understand the world to the adolescent’s argumentative description to the mature adult’s balanced views which imply an awareness of the power but also of the limitations of the human mind. Piaget’s concept of intra-inter-trans, the logic of RCR development, is introduced at that point. Chapter 3 deals with the philosophy of knowledge adopted, and the theoretical underpinnings of RCR. Chapter 4 reports the basic empirical data. Chapter 5 discusses the other thought forms of concern (Piagetian logico-mathematical thinking, cognitively complex thought, dialectical as well as analogical thinking), and expounds on the need to match the type of thought that one uses in analysing and solving a problem to the structure of the problem itself in order to obtain best results. The reason to choose just these thought forms is twofold: on the one hand, as already mentioned, those forms share ‘components’ with RCR. On the other hand, due to their difference in characteristics and ‘performance’, they underline the fact that the choice of an appropriate thought form matters. For both reasons they need to be known in their own right, not just as contrasts to RCR. Part II, that is Chapters 6 through 11, discusses applications of RCR. My conclusions are presented in Chapter 12; the visions of Reginald Victor Jones and of Daniel Goeudevert complete that last chapter. Appendix 1 and Appendix 2 deal with technicalities of RCR interviews and their scoring, respectively. Part II can be read without first reading Part I, but understanding Part II fully might be easier after reading Part I.

Part I

The Theory of Relational and Contextual Reasoning (RCR) and its Empirical Study

1

Introduction

The object of this chapter is, first, to formulate a few caveats in order to lessen the risk of misunderstandings and disappointments, then to delimit the domain to be discussed, and above all, to lay the groundwork for subsequent considerations on Relational and Contextual Reasoning (RCR). This includes the basic nature of RCR, and the meaning of relational, contextual and reasoning, RCR’s underlying logic, its components and internal structure, and its status as postformal theory. There follows an empirical finding as an illustration of the principles set out so far. Finally, other forms of relational thinking and their importance for the present study are discussed before briefly summing up the chapter. Caveats No overarching grand theory exists of everything concerning psychological development of humans.1 Clearly, each of us often (a) perceives, (b) feels, (c) reasons, (d) plans, and (e) acts in an interrelated manner, and not only in mundane affairs of daily life. Yet, present psychological theories mainly deal with only one of the aspects (a) to (e) (or any other, like motivation, e.g., Reiss and Havercamp 1998); this despite their proponents’ awareness of the artificiality of such an isolating procedure. This work is no exception in that regard. It is neither a new nor a contested claim that thought and emotion are ‘inseparably’ linked (e.g., Piaget 1954/1981; Bearison and Zimilis 1986; Cacioppo and Gardner 1999, pp. 194–6). Nevertheless, emotions are very largely neglected here. Cognition (perceiving, appraising, understanding, reasoning, judging, remembering, imagining, etc.) and its development, the general subject matter of this work, is complicated enough. For that reason, I further restricted this work to the development of cognitive thought processes. 1

I write this notwithstanding Wilber’s (2000) A theory of everything, which is more an eclectic vision than an established theory. For the history and prospects of such a theory in physics – a culturally relative priority – see, e.g., Glashow 1980; Greene 1999; Weinberg 1992.

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12

The Theory of Relational and Contextual Reasoning

Likewise, it seems incontrovertible that all thought processes are based on chemico-electric processes in the brain (e.g., Baars 1997; Clark 1997; Damasio 1994, 1999; Edelman 1992; Edelman and Tononi 2000; Gazzaniga 1992; Ramachandran and Blakeslee 1998; Putnam 1999, especially part 2), but again, neurobiology will not be treated here. Interested readers might refer, e.g., to Elman, Bates, Johnson, KarmiloffSmith, Parisi and Plunkett (1997, pp. 2–4, 239–317, passim) and Johnson (1998). Nor will there be much discussion of unconscious or preconscious processes although they play an important role in cognition (e.g., implicit knowledge, Holyoak and Spellman 1993, pp. 278–90; the cognitive unconscious, Lakoff and Johnson1999, pp. 9–15), particularly in its development. As a rule, a person is ‘embedded’ in the current developmental stage, that is, not fully aware of it and therefore not able to deal with it consciously: the person is the stage. When moving to the next stage, the structure of the previous stage becomes the content of the (structurally enlarged) new stage: the person is presently aware of the lower stage characteristics and therefore can have it, that is deal with it, differentiate its characteristics (Piaget 1971, §20iv; Kegan 1982, in particular pp. 146–8).2 Also, cognitive performance and development are not independent of the social context (e.g., Astin 1998; Monteil and Huguet 1999). While acknowledging that fact, social context is hardly dealt with here in any systematic fashion as far as discussing relational and contextual reasoning proper is concerned. The aim of the work described and discussed in this volume was to carry out enough basic research on RCR to enable its targeted effective application, and then to concentrate on applications in various fields; all the same, social context is included in appropriate cases. Given these caveats, we now turn to the basic nature of RCR so as to start with at least an elementary understanding of what will become clearer and more detailed in subsequent sections and chapters. The nature of relational and contextual reasoning Basic features Fully developed relational and contextual reasoning (RCR) is a specific thought form which implies that two or more heterogeneous descriptions, 2

In a different rubric, Gerald Cory (2000) presents a conflict systems neurobehavioural model of the brain: the protoreptilian brain (the evolutionarily oldest) represents the self-preservation programming of human behaviour, the mammalian additions (the limbic system, etc.) the affectional programming, and the (typically human) neocortex the executive programming of human behaviour, which notably co-ordinates the activities of the evolutionarily earlier brain parts, especially in case of (instinctive) conflicts between self-interest and other-interests.

Introduction

13

explanations, models, theories or interpretations of the very same entity, phenomenon, or functionally coherent whole are both ‘logically’ possible and acceptable together under certain conditions, and can be coordinated accordingly (Reich 1995a).3 Although the extent and intent of a given description, explanation, etc. per se play a role, that is less central to RCR than the co-ordination between competing explanations. Examples are the explanation of human behaviour by ‘nature’ (A) and by ‘nurture’ (B), the use of the ‘wave’ (A) and the ‘particle’ (B) picture when explaining light phenomena, the reference to technical malfunctioning (A) and human failure (B) as causes of accidents, the use of scientific (A) and religious (B) interpretations when discussing the origin and evolution of the universe and what it contains, or the investigation of psychophysiological phenomena (e.g., fright) in terms of introspection (A), outward behaviour (B), and physiological data (pulse frequency, skin resistance, etc. – C). As a category, RCR can be classed alongside Piagetian logicomathematical thinking (Piaget 1970), dialectical thinking (Basseches 1984; Riegel 1978), analogical thinking (e.g., Gentner and Markman 1997), cognitively complex thinking (e.g., Baker-Brown, Ballard, Bluck, de Vries, Suedfeld, and Tetlock 1992), systemic thinking (e.g., Chandler and Boutilier 1992), and so on – although to my knowledge this is the first book-length discussion of RCR and it is less established in academe than those traditional forms of thought. They will be compared with and contrasted to RCR in chapter 5. What is the meaning of ‘relational’, ‘contextual’, and ‘reasoning’ in the present context? Throughout this monograph, I refer to the entity, phenomenon, or the functionally coherent whole to be explained as the ‘explanandum’, and to the heterogeneous descriptions, explanations, models, theories or interpretations as ‘A’, ‘B’, ‘C’ . . . In a given case, A, B, C . . . may constitute a description, a causal attribution, a motivation for human action, a prediction, a presentation of a process, an analysis of a structure, an interpretation of meaning, a (partial) theory and so on; this in many knowledge domains. Relational concerns the relations between the explanandum and A, B, C . . . on the one hand, and the relations between A, and B, and C . . . themselves on the other. To anticipate: A, B, and C . . . are internally linked (entangled as understood in quantum physics) in cases where RCR is applicable, but mostly do not constitute a cause–effect relation in the 3

Initially, RCR was called ‘Thinking in terms of complementarity of “theories”’. The name was changed to RCR because, on the one hand, the appropriateness of this label was increasingly appreciated, as was, on the other hand, the ambiguity of the term ‘complementarity’, used very differently in everyday life, in ‘popular’ physics, psychological communication theory, psychotherapy, and so on (Reich in press).

14

The Theory of Relational and Contextual Reasoning

classical sense. The link can consist in mutual enabling or limiting, in an information transfer, or be of further types. Contextual involves taking into account the circumstances, the context of the situation. Regarding nature and nurture, context effects would show up, for instance, when comparing and contrasting the performance at two points in time, or, alternatively, two differing aspects of the same activity like playing the piano (e.g., playing without faults, or playing for the first time from the sheet music). To stay with the first example, if the performance of an athlete in good health and unchanged food intake varies over a matter of weeks, chances are that it has more to do with his or her exercising than with natural endowment. With reference to the wave picture and the particle picture of light, the one-slit (particlelike behaviour) and the two-slit (wave-like behaviour) experiments come to mind. As to accidents, the context may co-determine how technical malfunctioning and human failure condition each other. In regard to the interpretations of the origin and the evolution of the universe, the context could be a pure question of physics (physics contributes more) or the meaning and destiny of human life (religion has more to say). In all pertinent cases A, B, and C . . . have to be taken into account separately and jointly, but their explanatory potential usually varies with the context. As to reasoning, one can differentiate between (a) inferring, (b) thinking, and (c) reasoning (Moshman 1998, pp. 952–3). Inferring involves the generation of new cognitions from old, in other words to draw conclusions from what was already known but had not been ‘applied’. Inferring is often automatic and unconscious, for instance, when an infant, knowing that a toy can be in one of two locations, does not find it in the first location and immediately turns to the second (e.g., Sodian and Wimmer 1987). Thinking deliberately uses the results of inferences to serve one’s purpose, like making a decision, solving a problem, or testing a hypothesis. Given the object of thinking, it is possible eventually to evaluate the result. With experience, it may become clear which thought processes are more successful than others. By applying the corresponding reflections to thinking, it becomes reasoning. Moshman (1998, pp. 953–60) distinguishes different types of reasoning. RCR is a specific, and not a general type of reasoning, applicable to phenomena or events having the particular structure referred to above. Altogether, RCR can be understood as a pragmatic reasoning schema (Cheng and Holyoak 1985). Such a schema consists neither in a set of syntactic rules (e.g., mathematical algorithms) that are independent of the specific content to be treated, nor are they a recipe for one-off decisions such as choosing a profession or a partner, but consist in applying a set of rules for solving a particular class of problems. In the present

Introduction

15

case the issue is to ‘co-ordinate’ two or more ‘rivalling’ descriptions, explanations, models, theories or interpretations (procedure in chapter 6). This, irrespective of whether they are of the ‘nonconflicting’ type, or ‘contradicting’ each other. However, in all pertinent cases they differ categorically, are internally linked, and in a given context one has more explicatory weight than another. As already indicated, in the cognitive-conflict-resolving RCR world, such rivalling descriptions, explanations, models, theories or interpretations of the selfsame entity, phenomenon or functionally coherent whole are accepted which according to RCR logic do not exclude each other, but neither can be derived from each other. Next, then, the question arises, ‘What is RCR logic?’ Preliminary remarks on logic To avoid misunderstanding, I should probably state how I use the terms ‘logic’ and ‘logical’. There are two philosophical schools concerning the applicability of the terms logic and logical. For one school only the classical (Aristotelian) formal binary logic, including its modern symbolic version, is deemed to be universally valid, and therefore alone deserves the designation ‘logic’. All other rules about correct reasoning are termed ‘considerations of a philosophical or psychological nature’ (e.g., dialectical ‘logic’), ‘examples of a particular logical calculus’ (e.g., quantum ‘logic’), but not ‘logic’. For the other school, there exist many varieties of logic from deontic logic to transcendental logic.4 I take my cue from the second school, that is, for me a variety of logics exist. With Michael Basseches (1989, p. 171) I use ‘logic’ as ‘referring to principles and rules governing the proper use of reasoning’. As will be developed in subsequent chapters, there are indeed various types of logic, and depending on the problem under discussion, use of one type is more appropriate than use of another. For instance, in grading a test on arithmetic, formal binary logic is appropriate for assigning a mark (‘correct result’ or ‘wrong result’) to each separate result, but fuzzy logic (Kosko 1994) is usually appropriate for the resulting grading (very good, good, sufficient . . . or equivalent grades), not binary logic. In our Western culture, formal binary logic is held in high regard. One of its central rules is that in case of ‘contradictory’ distinguishing 4

Thomas Balmer (1982, pp. 109–10) writes, ‘There is even no guarantee that utterly incompatible logics may [not] exist, which, by themselves, are sound and complete. In fact, the historical development shows the way. Quantum logic, modal logics, fuzzy logics, context change logics (including dynamic logics), non-monotonous logics, etc. pave the way for quite varied logical systems, which may reach the high standard of classical and intuistic logic.’

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The Theory of Relational and Contextual Reasoning

characteristics A and B (e.g., ‘wet’ and ‘dry’), a given entity can only have one or the other characteristic (the ‘law’ of identity), but not both. Higher stages of reflection among other things may lead to recognising the limits of applicability of that ‘law’ and similar ‘laws’. For example, before a measurement, light or an electron simultaneously ‘has’ both particle-like and wave-like characteristics (superposition of wave functions), that is, no clear identity as just defined. Here is a sampling of views on the stringency of the rule to avoid logical contradiction as understood by formal binary logic (cf. Wason and Johnson-Laird 1972; Holyoak and Spellman 1993, pp. 292–3), first in the words of two respondents interviewed in the study of RCR: ‘It is not logical [= there is a formal contradiction],5 but it is true [= empirically demonstrable]’, and ‘We know it for certain, but we cannot prove it [by applying formal binary logic].’ The American philosopher Ralph Waldo Emerson ([1841] 1903, p. 57) wrote: ‘A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds.’ The Danish philosopher physicist Niels Bohr (1958, p. 66) put it this way: ‘The opposite of a deep truth also contains a deep truth.’ As already indicated in the Introduction, RCR involves a trivalent logic; it will be discussed fully in chapter 3. The third ‘truth value’ (‘noncompatible’) refers to being ‘true’ in one context, but not (or at least much less) in another context. Does not a potential for resolving cognitive dissonance and conflict raise its head? Components of RCR RCR, while being distinct and having ‘unique’ characteristic features, shares structural ‘components’ with other thought forms. As will become clearer further on, these ‘sharing’ thought forms are (a) Piagetian thinking, (b) cognitively complex thinking,6 (c) dialectic thinking, and (d) thinking in analogies. How could one tentatively envisage such a state of affairs? One way to proceed would be to analyse in detail the structural ‘components’ of all forms of thought concerned, and look for overlaps. However, that would vastly exceed the scope of the present work. Instead, I propose a hypothetical model, which is speculatively based on some probability arguments. The model is not indispensable for the sequel, but it constitutes a heuristic framework for future work. The objective is to go beyond the observational features (to be described in chapter 4) and to represent the presumed underlying structure of RCR 5 6

As a rule, phrases in square brackets are my additions/commentaries. The denotation ‘cognitively complex thinking’ emphasises that the focus is on the complexity of a thought form, not primarily on the complexity of the problem structure.

Introduction

17

(and other forms of thought). The emphasis here is on structure, not on its development (although it is true that the structure constitutes itself and evolves from early childhood onward). According to Riegel and Rosenwald (1975, p. xiii), ‘Structures are relational organisations [that relate the different components to each other so that they function as a whole].7 . . . They are the properties that remain partially stable under transformations . . . Changes represent transformation of structures.’ To avoid a misunderstanding: ‘structures’ or ‘forms’ are not properties of a physical reality but the organisational configuration of mental activity (cf. Overton 1975).8 The arguments for the model we are discussing go as follows. (1) There are parallelisms between mental structures and brain structures (e.g., Baars 1997; Clark 1997; Gazzaniga 1992; Johnson 1998). (2) Given the difficulty of disentangling ‘directly’ the complexities of the functioning of the human brain, a more practical way is first to study and analyse one of its ‘productions’, and then (based on the results of those studies and analyses) assume that ‘related’ productions will have a comparable structure. (3) Language is one of the easier-to-get-at productions of the brain (cf. Deacon 1997). (4) Certain isomorphisms between evolving language ‘architectures’ and brain ‘architectures’ are assumed, and similarly for the ‘architecture’ of thinking.9 (5) ‘Language and thought 7

8

9

Structures fall into two broad classes (Overton 1975): (1) elementaristic structures, based on a view of the world as a static mechanism, understandable through analysing its parts and decomposable (linear) interactions between them (‘classical’ computer simulation approaches; information theory; decision theory; cybernetics); (2) holistic structures, based on a view of the world as a complex active organism, understandable through analysing the function of the substructures within the overall structure and the linked (nonlinear) interaction processes (Piaget’s theory; RCR; Bertalanffy’s system theory). Given the development of RCR through interaction with the environment, RCR may be considered as an open system rather than a closed system. According to Terrence W. Deacon (1997, cf. Cavanaugh 1999), another example of a hypothesised structural relation between the brain and its ‘productions’ would be the triad ‘iconical’, ‘indexical’, and ‘symbolical’ representations. For instance, to signify iconically ‘stop moving’, one can depict a policeman’s outstretched hand. That sign is so close to the actual everyday situation of a policeman’s action that the basic brain can immediately understand and react. In contrast, to recognise the standard octagonal stop sign from a distance as an invitation to stop there, asks more from the brain. On the basis of the iconical representation of a policeman’s hand, it has to learn that this octagonal indexical representation has the same meaning. Finally a symbolic representation would combine indexical representations and thus be even more abstract, requiring an even more powerful brain for producing and understanding it. Let us take the symbol of the raised hand when swearing an oath: while the gesture resembles that of the policeman, the meaning is entirely different. The person swearing the oath asks the heavenly powers for help to keep his or her promise (Deuteronomy 32: 40). What, then, is the ‘architecture’ we are looking for? In the case of language, Sidney Lamb (1999, p. 28) considers two different, independent hierarchies of units of different sizes:

18

The Theory of Relational and Contextual Reasoning

Table 1.1 The four structural levels of the model of thought processes. Forms of thought (Piagetian thinking; dialectical thinking; RCR, etc.) are posited to be a combination of operations from three lower structural levels. Structural level

Example

1: Elementary operations

discerning a particular item or event within a larger whole recognising a relationship between two entities analysing the nature of a relationship Piagetian operations, RCR

2: Conjunctive operations 3: Composite operations 4: Complete thought form

correlate in a most realistic manner: language and the biological “hardware” (or more adequate: wetware) of our emotions, sensorimotor controls, and thought are in a tight one-to-one correspondence’ (Ballmer 1982, p. 6). The general scheme is conceived as shown in Table 1.1. At the lowest structural level of thought processes, a large number of elementary operations exist, such as ‘discerning a particular item or event within a larger whole’. When two or more of these elementary operations are combined, thought processes reach the second structural level, which is termed conjunctive operations. An example of conjunctive operations would be ‘recognising a relationship between two entities’. At the third structural level of thought processes, which is termed the composite level, a number of elementary and conjunctive operations work together, as, for example, in analysing the nature of a particular relationship. Specific forms of thought such as Piagetian thinking, dialectical thinking, or RCR, the fourth structural level, are agglomerations of operations from levels (a) phonological units (phonon [quantum of sound energy], phoneme [set of similar speech sounds], syllable, wordP , phraseP ), and(b) grammatical units (morphemes [distinctive arrangement of phonemes that contains no meaningful smaller parts], wordG , phraseG , clause, sentence, discourse/text). Both sets evolve from the elementary to the complex. Thus, if only a general model of the architecture is wanted, either can serve. However, it would be preferable to have also an indication for a ‘reasonable’ number of structural levels. Disregarding the phonon (so to speak a white noise of language production), there are four levels of phonological units. In contrast, the analytical philosophers discern six levels of grammatical units. My impression is that the phonological units, while abstractions (excepting phonon), are closer to ‘natural’ occurrences, to the steps of children’s learning a language (Bloom 1998), than the even more abstract grammatical units. Also, whereas ‘clause’, ‘sentence’, and ‘discourse/text’ are of course different, perhaps less so than the difference between wordG and phraseG . Therefore – without losing sight entirely of the more numerous grammatical units – I posit that the architecture of thinking can be conceived of as a structural four-level model, in analogy to the ‘architecture’ of phonemes, syllables, wordsP , and phrasesP.

Introduction

19

1, 2, and 3.10 It is thinking and reasoning at that fourth structural level which will actually be studied empirically (chapter 4).11 In case reality is somewhat different than hypothesised in Table 1.1, that should not influence the conclusions of this monograph, given that they are not built on the details of the model, such as the exact number of levels, but above all on the ‘overlap’ of the various forms of thought, on their sharing of ‘components’. RCR, a postformal theory In the early eighties, a dissatisfaction with Piaget’s theory (of the development) of thinking grew. The formal features of Piaget’s theory (Piaget 1970) were thought to preclude appropriate reasoning about social issues, and about psychological questions like will, imagination, and creativity. This led to a series of alternative theories, in particular for adult development (e.g., Commons, Richards, and Armon 1984; Commons, Sinnott, Richards, and Armon 1989; Commons, Armon, Kohlberg, Richards, Grotzer, and Sinnott 1990; Alexander and Langer 1990). I consider the theory of fully developed RCR to be a postformal theory. Although not necessarily claimed explicitly, postformal operations also attempt to overcome the limitations of formal binary logic. John Broughton (1984) discussed some of the numerous proposals made in the four volumes just listed. In his view, none represents a good solution likely to become generally accepted. The common effort of the 1980s has not had the success hoped for. In the 1990s, publications on postformal reasoning are rarer – and more radical. For instance, Kincheloe and Steinberg (1993) formulate a theory of postformal development that 10

11

Michael Basseches (1980 p. 408; 1984 p. 74; 1989 pp. 162–3) tentatively lists twentyfour elements of dialectical thinking, which he terms ‘dialectical schemata’. In an exploratory exercise, I had no difficulty in classing those schemata as level 1, 2, and 3 examples, simply using the criteria of ‘elementary schemata’, ‘schemata based themselves on elementary schemata’, and ‘meta-level schemata’. Interestingly, Benack and Basseches (1989, p. 97) order twenty-two of the twenty-four schemata into three developmental phases of ‘emergence’, the last two schemata appearing in the fourth, the final phase. However, after probing empirical studies, Irwin and Sheese (1989, p. 126) concluded that ‘dialectical thinking as a whole [thus posited by Basseches] does not appear to be an empirically robust phenomenon.’ Also, while all schemata were manifest in the study by Irwin and Sheese (1989, pp. 121–6) some of the schemata did not appear to have a time-dependent ‘emergence’ pattern (cf. note 3, p. 56). Unfortunately, I know of no other, more established elements of a thought form, which could be used for a more convincing demonstration of structure levels 1 to 3 of Table 1.1. The unfolding course of an individual’s cognitive development alters the contents of the complete set of thought operations outlined in Table 1.1 in two significant ways. First, new operations appear in the course of cognitive development (e.g., Reich, Oser and Valentin 1994) and second, existing operations become more complex, more sophisticated (Fig. 2.1, p. 30).

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The Theory of Relational and Contextual Reasoning

is informed by and extends critical, feminist, and postmodern thought. Liu and Liu (1997) advocate adopting Confucian thinking, a philosophy of integration and subjective identification, in order to overcome the philosophy of separation and objectification (which underlies Piagetian formal operations). Jan Sinnott (1998) researched the question of how some adults grow wiser as they grow older. Her answer is, in a nutshell, that they have learned how to ‘live in balance’, which is said to mean especially ‘to orchestrate the needs of mind, heart, spirit, body, and others in their lives, despite the conflicting demands that all of us face in adulthood’ (ibid., p. vii). ‘Self-reference’ constitutes an essential ingredient of postformal thought according to Sinnott (ibid., pp. 33–4). Aware that we are all trapped in partial subjectivity, postformal thinkers are said to make a decision about the rules of the game (nature of truth), then to act on the basis of those rules. There are clear commonalities between Sinnott’s objectives and those aimed at in this monograph such as tackling societal problems more effectively, and improving education by means of more appropriate thought forms (Reich, 1996a, 1997, 1999). It is undisputed that in one’s life, situations may arise where no kind of logic is of much help, and self-reference is unavoidable. However, the assumptions made here about matching the thought form to the problem structure (chapter 5) lead one to believe that such situations are the exception rather than the rule. In the overwhelming majority of cases it should be possible to find a form of thought (with its particular logic) that fits the structure of the problem itself; this by means of ‘objective criteria’, as will be discussed in chapters 3 to 5. Having come to the end of the introductory presentation of fully developed RCR, we turn to an illustration of the empirical research. An empirical finding and its first analysis Having tentatively postulated RCR, I studied it empirically through analysing interviewees’ responses to certain problems (chapter 4).12 To illustrate the principles set forth so far, let us look at an excerpt from an interview about a Three Mile Island/Chernobyl type of accident in a nuclear power station (Reich 1995a, p. 2): A TV news station reports on an accident in a nuclear power station. The main cooling pump had stopped working, and the back-up pump did not function. The emergency shutdown did not function either. To add to the difficulties, the operating crew became aware of the danger rather late and then underestimated it. The 12

For years, when I described my work, the reaction was, ‘Oh, you study dialectic thinking . . . No? But what is the difference?’ To answer that question convincingly was one of my early objectives.

Introduction

21

water temperature suddenly rose. A steam pipe cracked and leaked radioactive steam. What or who is to blame? What should be done to avoid another such accident in the future?

A middle-aged adult, whom we call Bertrand, exemplifies RCR: In this accident technical and human failure are interconnected. One has to look at the whole thing as a system, the plant and the operating crew. And one has to study the mutual interaction, the type of effects they have on each other. One really wants to train crew members with the help of a sophisticated simulator so that they become aware of the many ways in which something can go wrong, they experience their individual and collective reactions, and learn how to assess such situations as well as how to deal with them successfully. In such simulations the psychological stress must of course also be generated, not just the sequence of technical events. It is precisely such a chain reaction of technical and human malfunctioning which is so hard to foresee. By the way, I would hire only such persons who are aware of the dangers involved and are ready to face them.

What is special about Bertrand’s response? In what ways does it exemplify RCR? Let us proceed sentence by sentence: In this accident technical and human failure are interconnected. That opening sentence is mental miles away from the classical ‘It was a technical malfunctioning’, or ‘It was a human failure.’ Instead of settling for one or the other of those usual alternatives, Bertrand, searching his enlarged horizon, emphasises that both causes have to be taken into account. In fact, he goes further by stating that they are not independent of each other, but are interconnected. One has to look at the whole thing as a system, the plant and the operating crew. In his second sentence Bertrand reinforces the connection between the technical and the human aspects of the accident: they together in their ‘systemic’ structure and functions account for the event in its various phases. If the accident is to be analysed in depth, the technical and human occurrences have to be considered not only individually, but also together, in their interrelationship. And one has to study the mutual interaction, the type of effects they have on each other. Bertrand implies that the possible effects are of several types. In this and other interviews the following types were evoked: (a) information from the (mis)behaviour of the power plant displayed in the control room and the resulting (re)actions by the operating crew; (b) controlling actions by that crew and their effect on the plant; (c) effects of (abnormal) plant behaviour on the (unintended) emotional response of the crew; (d) (resulting) group dynamic effects within the crew. One really wants to train crew members with the help of a sophisticated simulator so that they become aware of the many ways in which something can go wrong, they experience their individual and collective reactions, and learn how to assess such situations as well as how to deal with them successfully. This

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The Theory of Relational and Contextual Reasoning

sentence shows that Bertrand is aware of the complexity of the respective behaviour of the plant and of the crew (individually and collectively) as well as the connections between both behaviours and their mutual conditioning. In such simulations the psychological stress must of course also be generated, not just the sequence of technical events. Here Bertrand emphasises the context dependence of crew behaviour. While learning about possible technical malfunctioning in a quiet atmosphere is of value, that is not enough. The crew needs also to be trained to stand up to the ‘heat of the battle’ and to overcome undesirable compulsions such as to panic and flee. It is precisely such a chain reaction of technical and human malfunctioning which is so hard to foresee. Bertrand insists once more on the undissolvable connectedness of technical and human factors. It is by far not enough to study and deal with them separately; a major effort needs to be made to understand and optimise their interconnection and interaction. By the way, I would hire only such persons who are aware of the dangers involved and are ready to face them. As his final point, Bertrand addresses the insight and the resulting attitude of the operators: it is not just their technical know-how and social-cognitive competence that are needed for a safe and efficient operation of the plant, but also an appropriate insight and attitude. What does this analysis already confirm about the principles of relational and contextual reasoning as set out above? (a) Bertrand relates two distinct, categorically different causes to the accident and to each other. (b) He brings in and explicates the context dependence of the ‘behaviour’: the functioning of either the plant or the crew is not the same during normal operation and during the various phases of the accident; nor will operators react identically in a quiet operation period or instruction session and in a dramatic accident situation. (c) He deals with the problem at a high level of cognitively complex thinking, and brings in considerations which go beyond the TV news. Points (a) – relations – and (b) – context – illustrate why relational and contextual reasoning got its designation, and point (c) characterises RCR as reasoning aiming at knowledge leading to deeper insights. Furthermore, point (b), context dependence, points to the fact that a logic different from formal binary logic (which is invariant with respect to time and space) is involved. That difference of necessity will occupy us repeatedly. Previous work on relational thinking I am not aware that relational thinking as defined above was discussed prior to this work. Clearly, Piagetian logico-mathematical thinking, dialectical thinking, analogical thinking, and cognitively complex thinking

Introduction

23

each deal with relations (see chapter 5), and systemic thinking even more so. However, these relations exist between particular entities, not primarily between an explanandum and competing heterogeneous descriptions, explanations, models, theories, or interpretations – nor between the latter, in case they exist. Furthermore, the nature of the relations is different. In tasks where Piagetian thinking is applicable, the entities in question are intrinsically independent from each other, and the relations are governed by formal binary logic. Dialectical thinking deals with entities that determine each other and are internally linked in such a manner that a negation of a negation leads to a new situation, involving a logic different from formal binary logic. Analogical thinking is closer to RCR in that two heterogeneous descriptions, explanations, models, theories, or interpretations are used to illuminate mutually two explananda. However, the relation between the two descriptions, etc., is different again, and rather specific: they need to share a certain number of functions (and of attributes) to make the analogy work. Problems to which cognitively complex thought could usefully be applied, may have a variety of internal structures. Systemic thinking in a narrower, more specific sense concentrates on the relations (linear or nonlinear, circular, etc.) between systems components and output, including multiple pathways, and feedback loops. Thus systemic thinking deals with complexity in both reductionistic and holistic ways (Chandler and Boutilier 1992). RCR involves some of that (in particular in the example of the nuclear accident), but not specifically a technical analysis of feedback loops and the like. I prefer to deal with the relevant aspects under the label ‘cognitively complex thought’, and to concentrate on the operations of differentiation and integration involved. In contrast to all of the above, RCR deals with a variety of (mostly noncausal) relations between such A, B, C . . . that are intrinsically linked and where the link – as already mentioned – can consist in mutual enabling or limiting, in an information transfer, or be of further types. Nevertheless, the findings concerning these other thought forms had an impact on the present study because of their sharing of components with RCR. Furthermore, developmental features were taken into account when designing the empirical work (see chapter 2). Summary of the introduction To sum up this introduction: relational and contextual reasoning (RCR) is a specific thought form which implies that two or more heterogeneous descriptions, explanations, models, theories, or interpretations of the very same entity, phenomenon, or functionally coherent whole are both ‘logically’ possible and acceptable together under certain conditions, and

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The Theory of Relational and Contextual Reasoning

can be co-ordinated accordingly. The meaning of the three terms relational, contextual, and reasoning was explained, and the type of underlying logic was indicated as well as the mental structure of RCR. I explicated why fully developed RCR is a postformal form of thought. These principles thus set out were illustrated by empirical findings. Other thought forms involving some kind of relational thinking were shown to be rather different, yet of interest here, in particular because they share components with RCR. Following Gerhard Schurz (1998, pp. 10–11), in subsequent chapters I shall explicate and discuss RCR (a) theoretically, as a scientific model (chs. 2, 3); (b) empirically on the basis of research results (chs. 4, 7), (c) methodologically, i.e. as a procedure, the RCR heuristic (ch. 6); and (d) programmatically, that is, in terms of possible future applications (chs. 9–11). Also on the agenda: matching the thought form to the problem at hand (ch. 5), and the archaeology of RCR (ch. 8). I thereby hope to demonstrate further the value of RCR: rather than turning every interpretative dispute into a war of attrition, it works to hold competing accounts of certain types of issues in an embrace which is sometimes painful to endure, but often fruitful in the end.13 13

In the case of the theory of light, there were 200 years of competition between the particle theory and the wave theory (Baierlein 1992) before the fully satisfactory, consensually accepted theory of quantum electrodynamics (QED) emerged (Feynman 1988). QED not only solved the problem of explaining the behaviour of light, but contributed also to changes in the philosophy of knowledge. ‘Thus quantum mechanics is a wonderful example of how with the development of knowledge our idea of what counts even as a possible knowledge claim, our idea of what counts as even a possible object, and our idea of what counts even as a possible property are all subjects to change’ (Putnam 1999, p. 8; emphasis in original). What a development of the horizons of the mind (triggered by researching natural phenomena)!

2

Development of RCR

To refocus on Bertrand’s response reproduced in the Introduction (p. 21): obviously, it could not have been provided by a seven-year-old. Such a child cannot be expected fully to understand that TV news item, let alone respond to it in a sophisticated way. It will come as no surprise that RCR develops from a rudimentary beginning to intermediate levels before reaching the quality of Bertrand’s response. To anticipate (chapter 4), there are five developmental levels: (i) only one description / explanation / model / theory / interpretation can be right, the other(s) must be wrong; (ii) maybe, there is something valid to both (all) of them; (iii) both (all) are definitely needed to account for the phenomenon under study; (iv) here is how they are related to each other; (v) the overarching synopsis is as follows. In this chapter, I first evoke the anthropology adopted, put in place the developmental background with some general remarks on cognitive development, explicate RCR development against that background, discuss unreflected, object-reflecting, and means-reflecting thought as a particular, not so well-known feature putatively inherent in the development of RCR, continue with the Piagetian concept of intra-inter-trans – the ‘logic’ of RCR development – and indicate the impact of previous developmental work on the design of the present study before summarising. Anthropology adopted Put simply and ideally, the philosopher Daniel Dennett (1996, pp. 83– 101) discerns and describes the following anthropological elements: (1) the ‘native endowment’ has evolved through the ages by way of gene mutation and ‘field tests’; thus humans – like all other living beings – are Darwinian creatures. (2) Some of the mutations led to wired-in ‘reinforcers’, mechanisms that favour actions more beneficial for the individual or the species than the alternatives. Such individuals tried out various kinds of behaviour and reacted to positive or negative signals from the environment by selecting the most successful behaviour and henceforth 25

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going on with it. Thus Darwinian selection was continued by operant conditioning of Skinnerian creatures. Animals and humans learn through associations of ‘ideas’, behaviouristic learning, and connectionism (adjustment of nerve cells as a result of conditioning) – ABC learning. It links natural endowment per se and experience. (3) The next step in cognitive development involved the building up of an ‘inner environment’, in which various surrogate actions could be tried out mentally before taking risks in the real world. Dennett writes that we are also Popperian creatures. (4) Finally, ‘mental tools’ were developed, for instance words, numbers, symbolic logic, and eventually virtual cyberworlds, which all extend the power of the human mind. In honour of the British psychologist Richard Gregory, Dennett refers to humans also as Gregorian creatures. A conclusion is that a complete psychological investigation should in turn look at the biological grounding, the person-centred (conscious and unconscious) factors, and the bio-physical and socio-cultural environments involved in human development, and integrate the findings (Overton 1998, 1999). Theories of cognitive development What is it to be a human thinker and knower? Which knowledge is there ‘from conception’, which is abstracted from experience? Those and related questions have been debated by philosophers for many hundred years, and more intensely with the arrival of psychology (cf. Spelke and Newport 1998). Broadly speaking, psychological theories of cognitive development can be classed under three headings: (1) endogenous theories (development originating from within, e.g., maturation of native endowment), (2) exogenous theories (development originating from without, e.g., socialisation), and (3) interaction theories (development results from interactions both within the organism itself and with the bio-physical, social, cultural, and perceived spiritual environment). What is the meaning of ‘interaction’? In everyday language, it will probably be conceived of as reciprocal ‘causation’. Such an interpretation would apply, for instance, to the moves of two equally strong football teams during a game. The two teams are independent of each other, they are ‘separable’. However, each of their moves either is made as a reaction against an actual move by the opposite team or is planned in view of the anticipated reaction of the adversary. In a looser manner than that just indicated, interaction could signify interdependency of determinants or conjunctive plurality of causes. An example of a ‘loose’ interactive plural causation would be the causal net leading to an influenza as described by psychoneuroimmunology: the type of virus

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involved and its quantity, the state of the psyche, of the nervous and of the immune systems, all play their causal role in an interacting manner. Anastasia’s (1958, p. 197) use of interaction is different still; for her, ‘the nature and extent of the influence of each type of factor [native endowment vs. ‘independent’ acquisition] depend upon the contribution of the other’. This means that the factors are intrinsically linked with each other, they are ‘non-separable’. A given state of one factor unavoidably co-determines (for the most part, limits) the effect of the other factor, yet one cannot speak of causal interaction in the same sense used in referring to the football game.1 Traditionally a debate took place between nativists and empiricists. Elisabeth Spelke and Elissa Newport (1998, pp. 321–9) review the arguments pro and contra nativism in the areas of action, perception, language, and reasoning. While the respective portions of the inherent and the acquired, the inevitable and the coincidental, the constant and the changeable, the universal and the variable differ, all have to be taken into account in order to understand development. After reviewing various theories about children’s knowledge of the mind (the theory theory, the modularity theory, the simulation theory, and others) John Flavell (1999, p. 27) makes the judgement that an adequate theory will finally have to include elements from each of these perspectives . . . (a) that development in this area builds on some innate or early people-reading capacities, (b) that we have some introspective ability that we can and do exploit when trying to infer the mental states of other creatures . . . (c) that much of our knowledge of the mind can be characterised as an informal theory . . . [(d) statements about certain specifics regarding theory of mind], (e) that a variety of experiences serve to engender and change children’s conceptions of the mental world and explaining their own and other people’s behavior.

Although none of these considerations concerns RCR explicitly, and research on the respective contributions of the inherent and the acquired to the functioning and development of the mind (e.g., Perner 1996) continues vigorously (Keil 1998, p. 388), I assume that development of RCR is based on some innate potentialities, and develops within the given constraints through various interactions. Cognitive development and RCR We now come to a sketch outline of cognitive development as it pertains more closely to RCR, a thought form aimed at improving knowledge and 1

To anticipate, the interaction can therefore not be dealt with satisfactorily by formal binary logic (nor analysed by certain linear methods, cf. Overton and Reese 1972).

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insight through more adequate reasoning in terms of ‘theories’ about particular ‘data’, that is, evidence. If one differentiates between (a) the development of descriptive knowledge about objects or events in our world, and (b) attempts to explain their structures and processes/functions, then RCR connects both. From birth we all gain descriptive and procedural knowledge by observing and interacting (often in the sense of mutual causality) with our bio-physical and human surroundings. And then we want to understand and explain, at least to ourselves, what we experience; this often in structural and/or functional terms. One result is a continual reconstruction of the knowledge base (Campbell and Bickhard 1986), and an improvement in (logical) thinking (e.g., Reich, Oser, and Valentin 1994). While these developments are interrelated, and are in fact inseparable, it is useful to make the following conceptual distinctions for the purpose of studying and discussing them. Ontological development concerns the (perceived) existence or nonexistence of various entities and their predicates, more precisely the material categories needed to discuss those predicates. Examples include, ‘Do fairies, quarks, or unicorns exist or not?’; ‘Is that kind person who gives me presents really my uncle or not?’; ‘Are clouds alive or dead?’ As is well known (e.g., Keil 1998; Wellman and Gelman 1998), young children (pre-schoolers) may take years to come fully to grips with such issues. There are four reasons for this: (a) they are understandably inclined to look primarily at the exterior striking features (as distinct from the ‘inner’ or abstract characteristics that are not infrequently used as definition by adults, e.g., metabolism for being alive); (b) they start from their own experiences and make analogical inferences not admitted by adults (‘as a child, I thought that God eats or drinks because I ate and drank’); (c) they often concentrate on just one aspect, presumably due mostly to their limited working memory; and (d) they assume that everybody has the same knowledge and understanding as they have, and therefore do not feel the need to formulate and discuss their views to the extent that older children, adolescents, and adults do (Carpendale and Chandler 1996). Is there evidence that ontological categories and their predicates are not just a philosopher’s playground but have some psychological reality? Michael Kelly and Frank Keil (1985) compared Ovid’s metamorphoses to the fairy tales written up nearly 2,000 years later by the brothers Grimm. They coded all transformations that occurred in terms of the ontological categories implicated in each metamorphosis (e.g., using the Gorgon’s [Medusa’s] head to change a throng of assailants into stone statues). The result was that conscious beings were transformed mainly into animals (51 per cent vs. 52 per cent), into plants (10 per cent both), non-living

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entities (12 per cent vs. 11 per cent), and into liquids (5 per cent vs. 4 per cent), the first percentage number referring to Ovid, the second to the Grimms. A first striking feature is the near constancy of the percentages through the centuries and across (Mediterranean and Nordic) cultures. Second, the hypothesis, that the number of transformations will decrease as the distance between ontological categories increases, is supported by the analysis. Thus, there is some evidence for the existence of ontological categories and even of a ‘family tree’ which orders their degree of closeness. Whereas fantasy can imagine just about any transformation, the ontological tree constrains their number – even during the ‘willing suspension of disbelief ’. Logical arguments are used to elaborate the ontological tree. Logical development has to do with acquiring competence in classical logical operations where applicable (like making a valid inference, making use of transitivity, arguing by means of a logical implication), and gaining knowledge about logical quantifiers and their use (e.g., all, none, some; cf. Putnam 1999, pp. 57–8). It also involves coming to grips with modality logic (necessity, possibility, ‘all’ statements, ‘there exists’ statements – Chinen 1984). Higher developmental stages involve (intuitive) knowledge of other logics such as dialectical logic or RCR logic (chs. 1, 3, 4, 5). Unreflected, object-reflecting, and means-reflecting thought Another perspective for looking at major milestones of cognitive development putatively relevant for RCR consists in examining the degree to which someone is capable of ‘turning back on one’s own thoughts’ (Fetz, Reich, and Valentin 2001). Young children do observe, think, deduce, conclude, and order their knowledge within particular frameworks (e.g., Case 1998). They can be ‘sophisticated’ explorers and experimenters – yet their thinking is basically unreflected. They are not likely to examine their knowledge critically, that is, to turn their thoughts back unto their own thought (e.g., Kuhn 1999). A tentative model of the development from unreflected thought to (domain-dependent) reflections about ‘real’ objects and on to reflecting on one’s cognitive tools is shown in Fig. 2.1. Broadly speaking, (a) refers to the situation in early childhood, (b) to middle childhood/early adolescence, and (c) to adolescence and young adulthood. In all cases, the environment is perceived at knowing level 1 (Campbell and Bickhard 1986, p. 53). The higher knowing levels, to be explained shortly, arise from lower levels via reflective abstraction (if at all – for difficult issues the

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c Reflecting about mental tools c

b Reflecting about real objects b

Reflecting about real objects c

Unreflected thinking a

Unreflected thinking b

Unreflected thinking c

Level 1a

Level 1b

Level 1c

Environment

Environment

Environment

a

Figure 2.1 Evolution of cognition aimed at ‘seizing up’ the environment (perceived reality) in the course of age-related cognitive development. (a) early childhood, (b) middle childhood/early adolescence (onset of reflecting about ‘real’ objects), (c) adolescence and young adulthood (reflecting about objects and mental tools). Explanation in text.

age group indications are lower limits). They then interact with the lower level(s). Thus, development does not just consist in adding levels, but also in a transformation of existing levels (indicated in Fig. 2.1 by adding a, b, c to the level designation). Whereas the basic structure of Fig. 2.1 is taken from the work of Campbell and Bickhard (1986), the content of the upper stages results from our own work (Fetz, Reich, and Valentin 2001). That work concerns notably the rather difficult, abstract concept of God and its development. Figure 2.1, and in particular the age indications, therefore may not be universally applicable. However, it is posited to apply to RCR, and noted that RCR is of interest for gaining deeper insights into complex, controversial issues. The first milestone of turning one’s thought back on one’s own thought is ‘object-related reflection’. Such reflections notably include discovering

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contradictions in one’s world view, for instance (in the words of a bright eleven-year-old), ‘If the world is really infinitely large, it cannot have been made by God, because that would have taken infinite time.’ At one point of cognitive development, fairies, Father Christmas, the Easter Bunny etc. are recognised one by one as figures out of a child’s world, not from the ‘real’ world of adults. The next major milestone in the development we are discussing involves a ‘reflection on one’s mental tools’ for arriving at particular concepts, for instance the use of analogical reasoning for determining the attributes of God: ‘When I was a child, I observed how masons and carpenters built a house, and I was sure that God made the world that way: he made a blue-print, got materials, and did the work according to the blue-print. Now I know that such a conclusion is not warranted [= God is not as I imagined].’ This illustrates a first stage of ‘means-related reflection’, dealing with single concepts. The following developmental milestone, an ‘extended mental meansrelated reflection’, is reached in adulthood (and not shown explicitly in Fig. 2.1). It concerns epistemology in its entirety such as the limitations of our mental power: ‘A ruler can’t measure its own width. Similarly, there are things we simply can’t know. That is why I concentrate on things we can know.’ That empirically demonstrated level of cognitive development (Reich, Oser and Valentin, 1994) shares features with Karen Kitchener’s (1983, p. 225) stage of epistemic cognition, defined as ‘the process an individual invokes to monitor the epistemic nature of problems, and the truth value of alternative solutions. It includes a person’s knowledge about the limits of knowing, the certainty of knowing, and the criteria for knowing’ (King and Kitchener 1994, p. 12; cf. Moshman 1998, pp. 964–5). The development indicated is not about taking into account another person’s mind and being aware that he or she (a) is making a factual statement, (b) is joking, (c) commits an error, (d) is trying to deceive, etc. – four-year-olds can do that. However, they nevertheless believe that all persons having the same information will have the same views about it. Reflection on mental tools may start when one discovers that, where one person sees a vase, another sees two faces although each time both persons look at the same drawing, or where one sees an old woman, somebody else sees a young one (the well-known figure–ground shifts occurring when looking at those particular drawings). Or, when someone discovers that ABC evokes the alphabet for one person, and the American Broadcasting Corporation for another, and so through to Zenith, the highest point reached in the heavens by a heavenly body for one person, and a brand name of home electronics for another. Arthur White gives the following example: ‘“Density equals mass divided by volume,” a child

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is told – and immediately tries to relate this to a firsthand experience attending Sunday “mass”, turning the “volume” knob on the radio, being called “dense” by a sibling’ (White 1999). Reflection on mental tools may well start with questions such as ‘How come we see this differently?’, ‘How is that possible?’ Continuing from there such reflection may lead to differentiation between unreflected perceptions and even unreflected thoughts on the one hand, and a careful examination of the methods used to gain a particular knowledge and to test its veridicality on the other hand. Intra-inter-trans – the ‘logic’ of RCR development Along with seeking the causes of events, infants and children also widen and deepen their knowledge by (a) exploring further afield the nature of the objects or events under study, and (b) by relating objects or events to other objects or events in increasingly sophisticated ways (which is also characteristic of RCR development). Jean Piaget (Piaget and Garcia 1983/1989) describes such a sequence as intra-inter-trans. Jacques Montangero and Danielle Maurice-Naville (1994/1997, pp. 127–9) comment on those terms as follows: [We are discussing] a mechanism that leads from intra-object (object analysis) to inter-object (analysing relations . . . ) to trans-object (the building of structures) levels of analysis . . . ‘it is heavy and red’ is an example of intra-object relations, ‘putting an object’ into two jars simultaneously [= repeatedly one into each jar] and understanding that this produces an equal number of objects in the two jars exemplifies intra-operational relations. As to inter-object relations, natural embeddings (simple class inclusions) come to mind.

The INCR group (the 4 group) structure2 constitutes a transoperational relation in that two forms of partial reversibility (correlation and reciprocity) are now related with full reversibility (inversion, also called double negation) within a single structure (see below, ch. 5, pp. 82–3). 2

The INCR group structure of transformations may be represented graphically by a square (or a rectangle) and two diagonals (see Fig. 5.2, p. 83). Proceeding clockwise from the upper left-hand corner, the disjunction of p and q (p v q), the disjunction of nonp and nonq, (¬p v ¬q), the conjunction of nonp and nonq (¬p · ¬q), and the conjunction of p and q (p · q) occupy the four corners. The diagonals represent the operation of negation, N: it transforms p into nonp (¬p) and q into nonq (¬q) (and vice versa) and a disjunction into a conjunction (and vice versa). The negation of a negation leads back to the origin; the identity, I, is re-established. The vertical sides represent correlational operations, C: disjunctions become conjunctions and vice versa. The horizontal sides represent reciprocal operations, R: p becomes nonp, q nonq, and vice versa. Thus, C followed by R (or R followed by C) is equivalent to N. The basic idea is that a person mastering formal operations visualises the relationships between these transformations without undue difficulties (more in chapter 5, pp. 80–3).

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An everyday example for a development of the intra-inter-trans type would be the evolving understanding of a savings and loan association (Claar 1990). Asked how such an institution works, younger children in Germany answered that ‘they keep your money safe’ (intra), older children opined that ‘they keep some people’s money, and lend it to others’ (inter), and adolescents explained that ‘it’s a system where you get less interest for your deposits than you have to pay for your loans, and that keeps it going’ (trans). A claim about the sequential order of RCR developmental levels from level I to level V is that they progress necessarily from unifocal ‘coordination’ to bifocal (or trifocal) co-ordination, and on to ever-more elaborated bifocal/trifocal co-ordinations, that is from intra to inter to trans. This claim is built on two theoretical arguments: that (1) cognition develops along with the growth and increasing complexity of the brain,3 and (2) each level is logically prior to the subsequent one. Further details of that claim and its empirical support are presented in chapters 4 and 7. Input to the present study from earlier work Whereas the present study is not a direct continuation of earlier work by others, it nevertheless benefited therefrom in various ways. As already mentioned, Piaget’s intra-inter-trans sequence (Piaget and Garcia 1983/1989) provided an overall framework for researching RCR developmental levels. The theory of Campbell and Bickhard (1986) helped us to understand certain aspects of RCR development, such as the role of the increasing sophistication of the nature of knowledge. Thanks to Kitchener (1983), the importance of epistemic cognition was appreciated. The stages of Piaget’s logico-mathematical developmental theory were a continuous challenge in that they share aspects with RCR (such as the developing competence to understand the relation between two ‘entities’), but also differ (e.g., in the underlying logic). The initial research design (pilot study 1, ch. 4), was influenced by several earlier findings. Nicolls (1978) studied how five- to thirteen-yearolds explain ‘attainment’ by the logically not independent concepts of effort and ability. For younger children effort was the prime cause, older children used the concept of ability in addition (intermittently), and for young adults outcomes were seen as determined jointly by effort and 3

At the microlevel the totality of cognitive development can nevertheless be conceived as a network of multiple pathways of structural changes (cf. Table 1.1, p. 18), as distinct from a single path from Piagetian logico-mathematical thinking to a hypothetical ‘fifth stage’ (beyond the sensorimotor, the preoperational, the concrete operational and the formal operational stages – Piaget 1970).

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ability. Mansfield and Clinchy (1985, see below, ch. 5, pp. 91–2 for details) studied children’s epistemology and observed the early growth of multiplicity of judgements with 3- to 10-year-olds. Broadly speaking, the development was from ‘only one position is right’ to ‘other positions are acceptable’. Apart from a general encouragement, these studies, as well as Piaget’s theory, advocated starting empirical work with 6-year-olds (and to design the problems accordingly) for catching the beginnings of RCR, to include adolescents aged 11–16 years or so (supposed to be mastering formal operations), and to turn to mature adults for studying the higher RCR levels. In a wider sense, the current work benefited from the writings of MacKay (e.g., 1974) and Pattee (e.g., 1978). Both authors argue cases from their field of interest in which a satisfactory explanatory knowledge requires the simultaneous articulation of two, formally incompatible modes of description and they indicate some rules for doing so. While I am more concerned with forms of thought rather than theory construction per se, I acknowledge that they stimulated some of my own considerations, in particular with reference to the RCR heuristics (chapter 6). Summary of RCR development RCR development is putatively stimulated by interactions between nature and nurture, whether the interactions occur unconsciously, preconsciously, or consciously. Important milestones are reaching object-reflecting, and, even more importantly, means-reflecting thought. RCR development follows the ‘logic’ of intra-inter-trans. While not a direct continuation of earlier work, studying RCR benefited from such work in various ways.

3

Metaphysical Assumptions and Theory of RCR

RCR implies a certain ontology, that is, it makes assumptions about the nature of reality. RCR also involves epistemological assumptions, those having to do with the process of gaining knowledge in the cases concerned. For these reasons, I begin with assumptions adopted here from the philosophy of knowledge. I continue with a philosophical analysis of RCR as thought form. Finally, there is a discussion of, and an attempt at justifying, the underlying logic. Assumptions adopted from the philosophy of knowledge Why a discussion of the philosophical foundations of the work described in this monograph? Throughout some kind of reality is assumed to exist ‘out there’. That is not undisputed, and needs clarification and justification. In the words of Hilary Putnam (1999, p. 4): ‘And no issue polarises the humanities – and, increasingly the arts as well – as much as realism, described as “logocentrism” by one side and as the “defence of the idea of objective knowledge” by the other.’ Putnam’s solution – and largely mine – is a ‘middle way between reactionary metaphysics and irresponsible relativism’ (ibid., p. 5). Options In view of the importance of the assumptive base for one’s research (Werner [1948] 1973, 1957; Reese and Overton 1970; Overton and Reese 1972; Case 1998, pp. 747–53; Putnam 1999; Fahrenberg and Cheetham 2000), I state my position (Reich 1995c, 2000b) after reviewing some options. Rather than recalling the history of the philosophy of knowledge (e.g., Overton 1998, pp. 127–63), let me simply list some possible assumptive bases, first concerning basic metaphysical orientations and philosophical presuppositions. RCR assumes that there exists a reality ‘out there’. To the question, ‘What can we know about reality, if it exists?’ one summary answer is 35

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provided by radical constructivism: ‘At best we can know what reality is not’ (Glasersfeld 1996). Another broad answer is given by the various shades of realism (e.g., Putnam 1988). Classical realism rests on the following three pillars: (1) there is a reality independent of human ideas and theories; (2) scientific theories and the theoretical entities contained in them purport to refer to those (real) entities, processes, or structures existing independently of the theories; (3) hence scientific theories can be judged to be true or false in some sense larger than ‘they allow one to describe, predict, and organise the experimental data’. Thus, the scientific theories assumed by classical realism involve ontic truth (Kitchener 1988, p. 17), not just the epistemic truth of theories ‘merely’ aimed at describing, predicting, and organising empirical data. ‘Foundationalism’ follows from the purported ontic truth of scientific theories. Laudan (1990, p. 134) enumerates the resulting (foundational) epistemological programme as ‘(1) a search for incorrigible givens from which the rest of knowledge could be derived; (2) a commitment to giving advice about how to improve knowledge; and (3) the identification of criteria for recognising when one had a bona fide claim.’ According to most contemporary philosophers of knowledge, foundationalism can no longer be justified (e.g., Laudan 1990). Indeed, by now it has become clear that (a) all observations are ‘theory-laden’ (influenced by pre-knowledge); (b) scientific theories are underdetermined by facts (several theories may explain ‘equally well’ a given data set); (c) ‘verification’/‘falsification’ of a theory is more complex than thought previously (the experimentum crucis is an exceptional occurrence); and (d) the (unwittingly chosen) underlying assumptive framework provides an influential hermeneutic context for one’s research (cf. Lakoff and Johnson 1999, pp. 74–81). Why, then, not adopt as an assumptive base radical constructivism sensu von Glasersfeld (a kind of instrumentalism) or even a social constructivism1 which holds that both science and the literary novel operate according to the arbitrary rules of a language game (unbridled by ‘what is out there’)? For one thing, radical constructivism, and even more social constructivism, fail to explain the success of science and technology in 1

‘Constructivism’ in the present context is clearly used in the sense of an epistemological orientation, not as a developmental concept. Choosing constructivism or another epistemological orientation (for example empiricism) still leaves one free to opt for constructivism as an ontogenetic developmental category (e.g., in a Piagetian sense) or not (cf. Philips 1995). As to the particular version of social constructivism, one has again to differentiate between the meaning in epistemology (under discussion here), in sociology (e.g., the ‘invention’ of marriage as an institution) and in social psychology (e.g., the co-construction of a world view by mother and child).

Metaphysical Assumptions and Theory of RCR

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coping with, and predicting, natural phenomena. How could astronauts have reached the moon and come back if the results of scientific research were just as independent from any ‘objective reality’ as are certain fictional novels? Why do all Indo-European languages include some saying such as ‘knowing is seeing’ (= seeing something becomes eventually knowing it) if no confirming experiences underlie this saying? Furthermore, turning from the outer world to the inner world: why should the vocabularies of nearly all languages, even those spoken on remote islands and in ‘inaccessible’ mountain valleys, have terms for the basic colours (e.g., Hardin and Maffi 1997), unless those colours have the quality of ‘immanent objectivity’? Present epistemological choice On account of such arguments, instead of adopting a radical, let alone a social constructivism, I opt for a conjectural/hypothetical, sceptical and qualified, critical realism (cf. Putnam 1999, especially part 1).2 According to this view, we are engaging with realities that may be referred to and pointed at, but which are beyond the range of any completely literal description; these realities include thoughts, virtual quantum ‘particles’, and so on. To refer to them, we most appropriately employ metaphorical language3 and describe a given reality in terms of models, which models may eventually be combined into theories. To give an example of metaphorical language: the German poet Eduard Morike ¨ characterises spring as ‘flying its blue ribbon in the air while sweet familiar scents roam about full of foreboding . . . ’, and for the poet Rainer Maria Rilke, in autumn ‘the leaves tumble downward as if coming from far away, as if distant gardens in the skies were withering – they fall with a negating gesture . . . ’ (both my inadequate translation from German4 ). Clearly, no mature adult would expect to find blue ribbons on the streets or in the fields in spring, or to hear about gardens in the sky from astronauts travelling in autumn, yet both poets help 2 3

4

I have justified my choice more at length elsewhere (Reich 1995c; 2000b). In essence, I there present the options in a more fundamental way. Metaphors mainly work by making use of shared attributes of the base concept and the entity or event towards which it ‘points’, the target concept. Examples are, ‘he is a fox’ or ‘she is a whirlwind’ (cf. Goodenough 2000). A number of biblical parables (e.g., ‘The kingdom of heaven is like a mustard seed’, Matthew 13: 31–2; Mark 4: 30–2; Luke 13: 18–19) can be viewed as extended metaphors. By contrast, reasoning by analogy mainly maps functions, that is relational predicates, such as ‘The stem of a flower is like a straw for sucking up a liquid’ – cf. Gentner and Markman (1997). ‘Fruhling ¨ l¨aßt sein blaues Band wieder flattern durch die Lufte, ¨ suße ¨ wohlbekannte Dufte ¨ streifen ahnungsvoll durchs Land . . . ’, respectively ‘Die Bl¨atter fallen, fallen wie von weit weg, als welkten in den Himmeln ferne G¨arten; sie fallen mit verneinender Geb¨arde . . . ’

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their readers to get a sense of what spring and autumn feel like in our latitudes. And here is an example of metaphorical language in physics taken from a news brief of Scientific American on the 1999 Nobel prizes: The humming, beeping, well-lit modern world could not have been built without the knowledge that electric current is a parade of electrons and that those particles are not ricocheting billiard balls but fuzzy clouds of probability that obey odd rules of etiquette as they manoeuvre in a dance of mutual repulsion. (Nobel Prizes 1999, p. 16)

In this passage the terms ‘parade’, ‘ricocheting billiard balls’, ‘fuzzy clouds’, ‘rules of etiquette’, and ‘dance of mutual repulsion’ are all used not literally but metaphorically. Because electrons cannot be apprehended directly by the five senses, metaphors based on actual sensual experiences are used to convey a sense of what electrons are like to those for whom the equations of quantum electrodynamics (Feynman 1988) are not sufficiently telling. Using metaphorical language in effect extends knowledge from known (personal) experience (billiard balls, dance, etc.) to a lesser known case that is often not directly accessible to the senses (behaviour of electrons) – cf. Goodenough (2000). Franz Brentano and his successors broke with the idea of ‘uncertainty’ about coming to grips with the outside world. They posited instead that all contents of mental acts are to be taken as immanently objective, whether or not they have an external referent (cf. Baron-Cohen 1995; Vande Kemp 1996, pp. 166–7; Yates 1985).5 In other words, for the very large majority of persons, his or her ideas and representations usually spring from a sense of utter reality, regardless of what exists externally – theirs is a firstperson ontology.6 Thus, as mentioned above, no person will doubt that 5

6

I am aware that the ‘reality’ of the contents of mental acts, in particular of certain ‘sense data’ (qualia), is debatable (e.g., Putnam 1999, especially lectures 2 and 3, and the second afterword). However, the assumptions stated above seem adequate for present purposes. This, then, raises the question, ‘Whose truth?’ Here are some answers (drawn partly from an Internet discussion): (a) For the individual, observation by a single person (himself/herself) would be sufficient for regarding something as true. (b) For a community which shares a belief system, statements about unusual experiences, interpretations of texts, etc. from one or more trusted persons are enough to be accepted as true. (c) For the justice system, a proposition or fact is more believable if it is supported by several kinds of evidence or several unrelated instances of the same kind of evidence. ‘Opinions’ from single persons are admitted provided that person (i) is an expert, (ii) attempts to provide evidence on the state of mind of the defendant, or (iii) is dying (and therefore likely to speak the truth). (d) For the scientific community, it is in principle not the belief of persons, their mental/emotional state or their number, but the methodology by which the phenomenon is observed, recorded, reproduced, etc. which determines acceptance as ‘true’. What about getting to universal truths accepted by all, given such a state of affairs? In case of a brute fact such as ‘all humans are mortal’, no particular difficulty should

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colours are attributes of the external world unless he or she has learned certain scientific facts about our visual apparatus (cf. Ramachandran and Blakeslee 1998, pp. 72–80, passim). Faced with the loss of foundationalism and the resulting weakening of the correspondence theory of truth,7 what can one say about the truthfulness of a given scientific theory? The answer is ‘little’. But from Laudan’s (1990, pp. 19, 59, 85, 103) discussion one gathers that under the assumptions adopted here (all observations are ‘theory-laden’; scientific theories are underdetermined by facts; ‘verification’/‘falsification’ of a theory is more complex than thought previously), it remains possible to compare rival approaches. The approach, model, or theory considered more effective would – each time compared to its rival – (a) explain broader ranges of different kinds of phenomena, (b) have been tested in more areas, (c) already have led to more unexpected discoveries or applications, (d) yield more precise results, (e) be more dependable, (f) possibly be the only candidate which offers a satisfactory explanation for certain phenomena. When making the comparison between the rivals, it is understood that no criterion (a) to (f) is individually sufficient for a ranking but that all criteria count jointly for a (defeasible) preference. In other words, the ‘victorious’ approach, model, or theory wins a relative victory, not an absolute one, and, in case the comparison is repeated after further work on a non-victorious competitor, it may well win. The basis and results of such comparisons can be agreed inter-individually, and thereby gain scientific credence.8 From the perspective of the critical realist approach we are discussing, the task of science is to come to some (tentative) conclusions concerning

7

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arise. But that is no longer so when the issue becomes ‘communication with deceased persons’, ‘resurrection’, ‘reincarnation’, etc. In such cases the ‘insider’ and the ‘outsider’ interpretations may well stand as antitheses to each other. Then a major principle (incorporated into RCR) should be to respect that the criteria implied in (a) to (d) above cannot – and should not – be forced on the other parties to the discussion (cf. chapter 6, notes 2, p. 106; 5, p. 107; 6, p. 108; and 7, p. 108). If a helpful, progressive dialogue is to take place, criteria for a comparison of conflicting views and their inter-individually acceptable assessment have to be evolved before entering into the search for consensually acceptable ‘truths’. In this context one should also be aware of the following: a social life built exclusively on consensually accepted truths is hardly envisageable. There is always the question of how to deal with the unknown, even the unknowable. And that is where trust, treaties and conventions (e.g., the Mayflower Compact) and the like come in. The correspondence theory of truth is based on a one-to-one relationship between ‘what is really out there’ and statements referring thereto. For instance, ‘This is a woman’ is true if, and only if, what is being referred to is a woman (which can be proven incontrovertibly). Gerhard Schurz (1998) argues contra Thomas S. Kuhn – rightly in my view – that even in ‘non-revolutionary’ times of doing science not just one single paradigm monopolises research activities. Rather, also at that time competing theories exist – not only during scientific revolutions – and moreover are desirable for advancing scientific progress.

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‘order’ or ‘patterns’ with respect to the object of study, to explain them by elucidating the variables involved and demonstrating relationships between them, and finally to understand the underlying mechanisms in depth, whenever possible in terms of a coherent theory. Any such order or pattern and its understanding is neither simply discovered as objectively given, nor constructed purely socially, without any ‘objective’ constraints. Not infrequently, theories evolve by iterative bootstrapping analyses of ever more appropriate data gathered in the light of ever better hypotheses, possibly aided in this by improved reasoning using more appropriate tools of thought, and better empirical methods. Assumptive framework and methodology adopted My assumptive framework is close to that described by Overton (1998), that is to say an inclusive relational frame. In this recent handbook article, Overton (ibid., pp. 111–14) distinguishes between (a) ‘transformational change’ (change in form, pattern, or organisation, e.g., embryological changes, or the successive transformations from action to symbolic thought as a way of gaining insight) and (b) ‘variational change’ (degree or extent that a change varies from an assumed standard such as thinking, e.g., analytic thinking styles and synthetic styles). In a split-based approach, the analytic difference between transformational and variational changes are transformed into ‘true cuts of nature’ (ibid., p. 112) and either transformational or variational change are claimed to be real. In Overton’s relational, both-and approach, transformation and variation represent differing perspectives on the same object of inquiry – developmental change within a framework of inclusiveness. The existence of one type of change is not incompatible with the other type of change, even in the same person. The movement from babbling to language may be profitably understood as sequential and directional and, hence, irreversible (transformational change); however, when the infant has become a student, raising of the grade point average can be reversed some time later (variable change) – there is no contradiction (ibid., pp. 113–14). The point is that ‘casting our fundamental understanding of development into an inclusive relational frame has profound implications for the concepts and theories, as well as the methodology and methods, of developmental inquiry’ (ibid., p. 114). There will be ample opportunity later on to fill that statement with concrete examples beyond the nativism–empiricism debate already briefly referred to. An inclusive relational framework is not the only conceivable framework but one that is consonant with RCR. Summing up, I espouse a critical realist ontology and a nonfoundational epistemology involving a ‘transverse rationality’. The latter permits

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one to build bridges also between disciplines considered incompatible, incommensurable, and the like by some protagonists (see chapters 6 to 11). As I also report on empirical work, here is a word on methodology to close this section. I accept the following methodological stipulations: first, convergence of evidence from as many sources as possible is to be striven for; second, an adequate theory must provide empirical generalisations over the widest possible range of phenomena (Lakoff and Johnson 1999, pp. 79–80). I also subscribe to the triadic network of justification: (1) research aims and theories should normally harmonise, (2) theories justify methods and are in turn justified by them, (3) methods exhibit the realisability of the research and are justified by the aims (Laudan 1984, pp. 62–6). Theory of RCR Philosophical analysis Following the philosopher Philibert Secretan (1987), an analysis of various thought forms leads one to the conclusion that RCR is ‘situated’, if one may say so, between dialectical and analogical thinking and shares some features with each. All three differ from the classical analytical (Piagetian) thinking, and therefore the relationships between those four types of thought need to be clarified. In doing so I draw on Secretan’s argumentation. Given RCR’s acceptance that two or more heterogeneous descriptions, explanations, models, theories, or interpretations of the very same functionally coherent entity or phenomenon are ‘logically’ possible and acceptable under certain conditions, that raises the tricky issue of the excluded middle (chapter 5). The question is whether the maxim of the excluded middle (A must be either A+ or A−, it cannot be anything else) is really universally valid, or whether it is an analytical interpretation of a principle, which may admit of differing interpretations. Affirming the exclusion of the middle is based on a mutual exclusion of being and nonbeing, which implies a classical logical negation (chapter 5). Is that really the only legitimate interpretation? Or is it merely a simplification? The world viewed from the standpoint of the excluded middle is a world of a formal static ontology ruled by an analysing, dissecting logic, thereby creating an impression of order, clarity, and operability. The world viewed by RCR is not the world of the excluded middle. It is incompatible with a strictly analytical view based on that maxim. Given that the analytical view has a long tradition and is well established, where can one look for help to justify and legitimise the RCR view? Can dialectical thinking be of assistance?

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Dialectical thought acknowledges and deals with ‘contradictory’ elements within and between the states of affairs it tackles. It aims – particularly in Hegel’s approach – to overcome any ‘contradictions’ (understood in a more general sense than in formal binary logic) through a process of becoming. It is important to understand the meaning of ‘negation’ in dialectic thought. It is not identical with the meaning of that term in formal binary logic, where a negation of a negation refers to the operation of returning exactly to the initial situation/conditions. In dialectical thought the negation of a negation implies arriving at a new state. That new state may still involve an internal ‘contradiction’, which is not objectionable in itself – but, importantly, is not the case in the RCR world. Thus the detour via dialectical thought has been helpful in that it demonstrates the nonuniversality of classical analytical thinking, but it has not resolved the question of how to justify and legitimise RCR vis-`a-vis the maxim of the excluded middle. To that effect we need to introduce analogical thinking (chapter 5), which accords a central value to analogies. Looking back at its long history, one may say that analogical thinking consists in making a comparison that connects nonequal entities in such a way that either (a) a particular numerical ratio or a common function pertaining to both entities constitute the analogy, or (b) a discrepancy within the common feature(s) of both entities is at the core of the analogy. An example for the latter would be the analogia entis (analogy of being) of the Middle Ages: God’s being is quite different from the being of nature and of humans in particular, yet God’s being shares features with the latter’s being (Fourth Lateran Council, 1215). As these and other examples (chapter 5) show, analogical thought is based on equivocality over against the univocality of analytical thought. Analogical thought de-emphasises full comparisons per se (and a fortiori refuses an elimination of the ‘loser’) while maintaining a beneficial tension between commonalities embedded in differences. In other words, analogical thought is primarily concerned with striking commonalities despite differences between the two entities considered (but not particularly with their ontological status). Thus, analogical thinking is RCR’s ally against analyticity’s univocality (itself a consequence of the excluded middle). How closely are analogical thought and RCR related? To answer that question by way of an example, let us discuss the experience of ‘light’ (cf. Fagg 1999). Using analogical thinking, the experience of physical light (the sun) can be connected with gaining an insight (ex oriente lux – the illuminating message came from the east), with experiencing a divine presence in the soul (the ‘inner light’), with describing the aura and agency of a prominent person (one of the ‘leading lights’). These analogies can be

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studied, for instance, by physicists, phenomenologists, and psychologists. Could RCR justifiably be applied to their findings, the explanandum being light ? RCR is not merely concerned with the rivalling descriptions, explanations, models, theories, points of view, etc., but also with the status of the explanandum itself. In fact, RCR keeps an ‘existential’ distance from the explanandum (and thus shares a feature with analytical thought in regard to the explanandum). In the present case, applying RCR would lead one to the conclusion that the explanandum of interest is not light, but human experiencing. RCR recognises that human beings (a) experience the world around them and inside them, (b) constitute singular individuals living their particular lives in interaction with their bio-physical, social, cultural, and perceived spiritual surroundings, to which life they endeavour to give a meaning, and (c) are objects of scientific research. For RCR, the simultaneous validity of (a), (b), and (c) is not just an expression of synchronicity, but an expression of the wholeness of the human person. Inside this whole, elements of analogical thinking have their place, but to seize up the overarching unity, RCR is called for, not analogical thought per se. Thus, while sharing some features, analogical thought and RCR are different. To sum up what has been said so far: RCR shares certain features with (a) Piagetian thinking (analyticity), (b) dialectical thought (refusing a unique, separable status quo that is constant in time, and claiming the existence of a ‘link’ between ‘rivalling’ entities), and (c) analogical thinking (commonalities imbedded in differences can be held in a fruitful tension, they are somehow ‘linked’). As a result of these shared features, RCR is cognitively complex. Furthermore, it involves a logic of its own. Ontology, epistemology and methodology of RCR Applying RCR in justifiable cases is based on a certain ontology, epistemology, logic, and methodology (Reich 1994b; cf. Fahrenberg 1992; Fahrenberg and Cheetham 2000). Let us again denote by A one description, explanation, model, theory, or interpretation in regard to the explanandum, and by B another, categorically different description, explanation, model, theory, or interpretation concerning the same explanandum. Ontologically, a ‘meta-relation’ is posited between the class of intensions (= contents, meanings) pertaining to A and the class of intensions pertaining to B. An illustration would be ‘ultra posse nemo tenetur’ (nobody should be held morally responsible for failing to perform an act which is beyond his or her capability). That ‘norm’ connects the moral

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Figure 3.1 ‘Figure–ground’ shift of the number of cubes (after rotation of the figure by 180◦ ) as an illustration for noncompatibility.

demands pertaining to a certain act (the ought) with the capability of the actor to meet those aims (the is). Given the hypothetical, critical realism adopted, and previous research on the issue, RCR recognises that both moral norms and human capabilities have a certain existence of their own, but are not independent of each other. The link is considered ‘objectively true’, independent of our individual degree of relevant knowledge. The epistemology calls for ascertaining that the intensions of A and B are co-extensional, that is, they refer to the same explanandum. This, then, is a partial procedure for exploring the explanandum’s ontological status in a new case. There are cases when probing the veridicality of that contention is far from easy. An illustration would be the analysis of psychophysiological phenomena (Fahrenberg 1992; Fahrenberg and Cheetham 2000), for instance of the results of (a) a person’s introspection of his or her fright, (b) the observation of that person’s synchronic behaviour, and (c) the simultaneous measurement of his or her physiological indicators (pulse rate, skin resistance, etc.). A related questions is: do (a) to (c) really refer to exactly the identical phenomenon/explanandum, are their extensions equivalent? If the answer is yes, then the research hypothesis is that (a), (b), (c) are intrinsically linked (entangled). A second epistemological RCR requirement is satisfied in the present case: the three intensions (a) to (c) belong to different categories. That latter condition is also met in the cases nature versus nurture, or moral norm versus individual capability, but is not in the case of the cubes of Fig. 3.1. The underlying logic will be dealt with more extensively in the next subsection. As already indicated, it is neither a formal binary nor a classical dialectic logic.

Metaphysical Assumptions and Theory of RCR

[

(x) (∃C') (∃C'') (t) ¬(C' = C'') .

45

{(x ε nc) ⊃ [{Obs (x, C', t)

⊃[F'(x, t) . ¬F''(x, t)]}

. {Obs (x, C'', t) ⊃ [F''(x, t) . ¬F'(x, t)]}]}] a

Figure 3.2 Noncompatibility according to Bedau and Oppenheim (1961, pp. 213–14). The statement in front of a bracket always refers to the entire content between those particular brackets. Explanation of symbols: x = explanandum, which has the noncompatible features F and F ; ∃ = there exists; C , C = context-related conditions; t = time of observation; ¬ = not; · = and (conjunction); ε nc = belongs to the validity domain of noncompatibility; ⊃ = implies; Obs (x, C , t) = observation of x under the condition C at time t, bringing out F ; F = result of observation under condition C .

The methodology has to meet the categorical specifics of A, B, (C . . . ). For instance, when explaining observations on fright belonging in category (a) above (introspection), one cannot suddenly argue in terms of (b) (behaviour) or (c) (physiology). First, coherent explanations within (a), (b), and (c) have to be found, and only then should possible links to the other categories be looked into systematically. These issues of ontology, epistemology, and methodology are less concerned with the basic characteristics of RCR itself, and more with the RCR heuristics, the potential application of RCR to research issues. That issue is dealt with in chapter 6 and it is hoped that any related question lingering on should be answered there at the latest.

The logic imbedded in RCR I posit that the logic imbedded in RCR is basically that analysed by Paul Bedau and Hugo Oppenheim (1961) regarding quantum mechanical phenomena and their study. The characteristic quantum mechanical features are (a) dependence of the experimental results on the details of the experimental set-up (the context), and (b) the nonseparability of certain variables. Bedau and Oppenheim base their analysis largely on the ‘truth value’ ‘noncompatible’ already indicated in chapter 1: two or more statements about the same explanandum are noncompatible, if they do not (fully) apply concurrently but are fully valid in different situations/contexts.

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The meaning of noncompatible is illustrated in Fig. 3.1. The number of ‘complete’ cubes is different depending on whether one looks at the figure upright as it appears here in the text or upside-down. (Most persons see six and seven cubes respectively.) To re-emphasise: this figure–ground shift is used to illustrate the meaning of noncompatible, not to claim that the content of Fig. 3.1 is an ideal study object for RCR. (It is not because only one category – the number of cubes – is under discussion.)9 Applying formal binary logic to Fig. 3.1 would lead to the stipulation that either 6 or 7 is the true value, the other must be wrong. However, from the perspective of noncompatibilty, either answer is correct in its context. The latter view, resulting from applying RCR logic, may be expressed by a predicate logical statement (Fig. 3.2): in one context one observational result obtains but not the other, and vice versa in a different context. To illustrate the working of the logical relationships shown in Fig. 3.2: taking the case of Fig. 3.1, C would be ‘upright’, C ‘upside down’, F would then be ‘six’, and F would be ‘seven’. Summary of the metaphysical and theoretical grounding of RCR A critical/hypothetical realist stance is adopted, and an inclusive relational framework. By way of analysing dialectical and analogical thinking, it is shown that the univocality of analyticity (e.g., Piagetian logico-mathematical thinking) is not the only way to deal with the excluded middle (through exclusion of one of the competing propositions). That has consequences for the ontology, epistemology, and methodology of RCR. Where RCR is applicable, a more inclusive approach is adopted than with Piagetian thinking. It is based on a trivalent logic which takes into account differing contexts. 9

A genuine study object for RCR would be the one-slit and the two-slit experiments with light ‘rays’, demonstrating particle-like and wave-like behaviour of light, respectively. However, that example is too far removed from cognitive development per se to be immediately helpful.

4

Empirical Studies of RCR

Overview The empirical research proceeded as follows: first pilot study in 1985 (basic nature of RCR and RCR developmental levels), second pilot study in 1988 (new standard interview problem), third pilot study in 1988/1989 (RCR and Piagetian concrete and formal operations), fourth pilot study in 1992/1993 (RCR, Piagetian formal operations, cognitively complex thought, and use/understanding of more than one logic).1 Respondents changed from study to study. All studies are methodologically flawed in several ways, but they do point to the value of considering RCR as a distinct form of reasoning, and demonstrate its developmental levels. A first flaw is that almost all respondents were non-representative. The children and adolescents were all pupils from ‘higher-level’ primary and secondary schools (that is not from ‘lower-level’ schools, let alone school drop-outs), and the adults mostly had university degrees. The adults had been ‘hand-picked’ throughout. Criteria were a ‘scientific’ thinking style as opposed to a dogmatic or an ad hoc style, and the capacity to express one’s thought clearly and fairly rapidly. The reason for wishing to work with specifically chosen (unrepresentative) respondents is as follows. It was suspected that RCR would evolve with cognitive development. In any such development, the tricky, and particularly interesting developmental levels/stages are the higher ones, because the lower ones ‘aim’ at a developmental ‘end point’, which appears the more clearly, the higher the level/stage. Unfortunately, and understandably, the higher the level, the smaller the number of persons found at that level. Hence, it would take quite high numbers of respondents in a representative sample if one were to obtain the same number of high level/stage answers as obtained in the research discussed in this monograph, in particular any relation of RCR with specific age groups. 1

The application studies (e.g., intervention in secondary school classes – not reported here in detail) took place 1994–8.

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Whereas selecting ‘high-level’ participants has the practical advantage of reducing the workload, the disadvantage is obviously that no meaningful statement can be made about a ‘typical’ age distribution of levels/stages, nor about any dependence on education, economic status, and the like. Therefore, such issues – while obviously interesting in themselves – are not discussed in this monograph, in particular not any correlations of RCR levels with specific age groups. A second flaw concerns the number of participants, which in some cases was only about thirty. That still allows one to do some statistics, but is at the lower limit of the desirable. The third flaw has to do with dialectical and analogical thought. Although referred to in the theoretical analysis as being somehow ‘close’ to RCR and sharing components with RCR, these thought forms were not included in any empirical study. The reasons were that (a) their relation to RCR seemed fairly clear from theory, (b) there was no doubt that they represent a form of thinking different from RCR, and (c) the studies actually made were judged to have a higher claim to the limited resources. As a fourth flaw, no systematic longitudinal study was carried out; only a few respondents were followed up. In those cases RCR developed indeed, but these results are too anecdotal to be reported here. An ideal design would aim at a detailed comparison of all the elementary, conjunctive, and composite operations of all the thought forms involved. However, that would be a Herculean task. Only Basseches (1980, 1984, 1989) has tentatively proposed such a breakdown (for dialectical thinking). A comparable amount of work would first be required for the other thought forms. For that reason a study of the situation at level 4 of Table 1.1 (p. 18), the ‘overlap’ of the thought forms themselves was adopted as basic design throughout – not a study of the various operations of levels 1–3 of Table 1.1. If it turns out (as it will) that mastering a particular other form of thought is a necessary condition for mastering RCR, then certain elementary, conjunctive, and/or composite operations are necessarily shared between these thought forms. All results referred to here have been ‘published’ in one way or another (as internal institute reports, in scientific journals, as a book chapter). The choice then is (a) to assume that the reader of the present monograph is knowledgeable about all these publications or at least ready to consult them, or (b) that such is not the case, given the difficulty of access to some of them (and maybe a problem of language exists). I opted for (b), and hence will present all results, basically in an archival type publication approach, at least as far the data proper are concerned. However, whereas all data are presented unchanged, their discussion is occasionally updated when helpful for getting into view what may not have been so obvious, or

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simply unavailable at the time. Such updating will be indicated. Occasionally, the reader is referred to the original publication for further details. Methodological commonalities The basic methodology was to infer the characteristics of RCR (and of the other thought forms studied) as well as the developmental level from the observed use in the interviewee’s dealing with a particular kind of problem. The emphasis is on use, not primarily on the resulting product. To be clear, the RCR interviews do not consist in merely recording answers to a set of preformulated questions, nor to respond to self-selected items from such a set (which responses could then be treated with standard statistical methods), but to deal reflexively with a story. Hence, the scoring in essence is not based on quantifiable behaviour, nor on right or wrong answers, but on an ensemble of statements by the interviewee; it is a hermeneutic enterprise. The detailed procedure of the individual interviews is described in Appendix 1 (pp. 191–3), and the scoring procedure for RCR in Appendix 2 (pp. 194–8). Throughout all studies, scoring was based on actual, demonstrated competence, not on (meta-) statements about that competence (we know and can do more than we can say/explain). Thus, where applicable, tacit rather than explicitly justified thinking was rated. All problems used in the various interviews were formulated ad hoc, except the Piagetian tasks. The main criterion was to conceive and present a given problem in such a way that only one thought form would provide the best solution (cf. ch. 5). As will be understandable from the foregoing considerations, problems to do with nature–nurture, mind–body, and the like were good candidates for elucidating the level of interviewees’ RCR argumentation. The continuity of the four pilot studies was notably ensured by using throughout two identical RCR problems termed pianist (nature–nurture) and model of humans (mind–body). These problems were administered from age six years onward. For children up to ten years or so – but not for older interviewees in studies 2, 3, 4 – the rivalling explanations/‘theories’, were spelt out orally, and briefly summarised in large letters on a half a page, displayed in front of the respondent. The scoring procedure as such was independent of the age of the interviewee. All interviews were audiotaped and transcribed. In pilot studies 2, 3, and 4 the problem Accident in a nuclear power plant (already presented in chapter 1, pp. 20–2) was used in addition. It was introduced because that issue was less ‘part of the culture’ than either the pianist or the mind–body problem. The hope therefore was that it would bring out RCR even more convincingly. To avoid repetition later

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on, these three standard problems are now reproduced (in the version for adolescents and adults): Pianist (nature–nurture). The young pianist is fully immersed in her playing: her fingers speak to the chords via the keys, the movement of her body follows the music’s rhythm, and her mimic gestures express her intense inner participation. After she has played the last note, the audience applauds enthusiastically. The pianist is satisfied with her performance, but wonders whether it is more due to her practising or to her natural endowment. What is your view? Model of humans (mind–body problem). Since Antiquity it is recognised that human beings have a body, a mind, and a soul/a spirit. What is at issue in philosophy, and lately also in various sciences, is the nature of the relationship between the body and the other parts. How do you see that? Accident in a nuclear power plant. A TV news station reports on an accident in a nuclear power station. The main cooling pump had stopped working, and the back-up pump did not function. The emergency shutdown did not function either. To add to the difficulties, the operating crew became aware of the danger rather late and then underestimated it. The water temperature suddenly rose. A steam pipe cracked and leaked radioactive steam. What or who is to blame? What should be done to avoid another such accident in the future?

The task of the interviewer was first to present the problem at hand (orally to younger children, in written form to older participants) and then to find out about the interviewee’s capacity to ‘co-ordinate’ the two explanations/‘theories’ (cf. Appendix 1, pp. 191–3). This was done using questions such as ‘Who is right (the protagonist of “theory” A or that of “theory” B)?’; ‘Why?’; ‘What is the relationship between A and B?’; ‘How do you know?’; ‘How sure are you?’ These questions (and further requests for clarification) aimed at unearthing the structure of the respondent’s thinking, the co-ordinating and argumentative processes, over against his or her sheer knowledge about the particular issue, let alone his or her linguistic competence. Pilot study 1: RCR level descriptions and RCR effectiveness as pragmatic reasoning schema Based on the principles and considerations presented in chapters 1 to 3, this study aimed at testing the hypothesised basic features of RCR, the posited development, and the scope of RCR applicability. Method In this first pilot study (Oser and Reich 1987), we presented nine problems, with two explanations each, individually to twenty-four nonrepresentative respondents aged 6–25 years (12 m., 12 f.) and to four senior

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physicists (mean age 54 years), and interviewed them about their solution of these problems in the way already explained. The interview lasted about three-quarters of an hour (age 6–25) or longer (physicists). The interview problems of this pilot study came in three groups: I. Social science, architecture, and physics: (1) Performance of a concert pianist, A: practising explains it all, B: native endowment determines everything; (2) Evolution from Romanesque to Gothic church architecture, A: economic reasons were decisive (less building material), B: a change of religious feeling provided the motivation (pictures of the interior of a Romanesque and a Gothic church were shown); (3) Weather forecast, A: it is sufficiently well computable to justify making extra provisions for snow-clearing ahead of time, B: it is subject to chance and does not provide a basis for (costly) arrangements. II. Matter vs. human spirit (mind, soul). (4) Obesity of a student, A: physiological cause, B: psychological reasons; (5) Healing kidney pain, A: a surgeon carries out surgery, B: a healer prescribes a herb tea; (6) Model of humans, A: humans are cell agglomerations, comparable to a clockwork, B: the mind/soul is in command (free will). III. Matter vs. ultimate being. (7) Crash of a glider, A: natural causes, (B) fate (horoscope); (8) Miraculous braking of a car on ice, A: chance, B: God’s hand; (9) Origin of the universe, A: Big Bang, B: God’s creation. Two of the events were actual contemporary local occurrences (snow clearing, crash of a glider). Results All in all 216 statements plus 36 from the physicists were obtained. These statements were used to establish two results: (a) a description of RCR levels (see discussion section below for the choice of ‘level’), and (b) RCR scores for each problem (individually, and by age group – neither presented here – and averaged across all ages); this by means of a provisional scoring manual based on (a). The descriptions of RCR levels resulting from the theory-guided content analysis of the 216 + 36 transcribed interview responses are shown in Table 4.1. The formulation is the latest, taking into account the insight gained since 1987. However, the description in Oser and Reich (1987, p. 182) is already quite close to that of Table 4.2. Also shown are the intrainter-trans levels according to Piaget and Garcia (1983/1989), introduced in chapter 2 (pp. 32–3). As to the rating of individuals’ answers according to a provisional version of the scoring manual of Appendix 2, sublevels were used for greater precision. Whenever the development had gone beyond a given level, the

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Table 4.1 Description of RCR levels. The characterisation of the developmental logic in terms of intra-inter-trans is taken from Piaget and Garcia (1983/1989). (Early level descriptions in Oser and Reich 1987, p. 182 – see note 3, p. 13 for change of name to RCR.) Level

Description

I intra

A and B (and C . . . ) are considered separately; only one of them is declared correct. The (implicitly) reigning concept is that A and B (and C . . . ) are alternatives, not complementarist aspects. Usually single-track choice of A or B, (or C . . . ), occasionally tentatively both (without offering a detailed justification), depending on chance knowledge or socialisation.

II

The possibility that A and B (and C . . . ) might both (all) be right is considered. A may be right, B may be right, (C . . . may be right), both (all) may be right, possibly with rather different weighting factors.

inter

III trans-intra

The necessity of explaining the given phenomenon with the help of A as well as by means of B (and C . . . ) is affirmed globally. After examination, neither A nor B (nor C) is considered quite correct as individual explanations, both (all) are needed for a full explanation. The limits of formal binary logic begin to be overstepped (intuitively).

IV trans-inter

Conscious connecting of A and B (and C . . . ), explicit evocation of their relationship. Affirmation that neither A alone explains the explanandum of itself nor B alone (nor C . . . alone). The relationship between A and B is analysed (e.g., ‘B permits making use of A’, ‘B cannot exist without A’, etc.). Any context dependency of the explanatory weight of A, B, (C . . . ) is (dimly) perceived. The use of RCR logic is more frequent. Although the argumentation may have some arguments in common with those of level II and/or III, it is markedly more complex.

V trans-trans

Encompassing ‘theory’, or at least synopsis, featuring (reconstructed) parts of A, B, (C . . . ) possibly supplemented by D, . . . , the various relations and context dependencies being fully understood from a multi-perspective viewpoint. Use of RCR logic has become a routine.

next higher level was added in parenthesis, e.g., II (III). Approaching, but not yet quite reaching the next level is indicated similarly, e.g. III (II). Thus there are ten levels and sublevels from level I to level IV, including both these full levels. The statistics shown in Table 4.2 were done using the (sub-)levels, in particular for computing the mean scores for all participants regarding a given problem. For instance, a mean score of 6 indicates that the average RCR developmental level of the participants concerned is III (II).

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Table 4.2 Mean scores of RCR (sub-)level, variance, and correlations between problem scores and total scores for the 9 problems and the 24 respondents aged 6–25 years.2 (1 = level I, 10 = level IV, see text – source: Oser and Reich 1987, p. 184.)

Problem 1 Pianist 2 Architect 3 Weather 4 Obesity 5 Healing 6 Humans 7 Plane crash 8 Braking 9 Origin

Mean scores

Variance

5.83 14.67 5.71 8.47 6.13 10.63 5.96 12.74 6.38 8.41 5.96 11.49 4.83 10.67 4.67 9.10 4.58 10.95 Internal consistency alpha (Cronbach) = .97

Corrected correlations .95 .81 .92 .89 .87 .93 .83 .82 .88

The interrater agreement was 77 per cent, if a difference of one-third of a level between their scoring results was ignored. Such a difference is considered an acceptable error limit of scoring single responses. Mean values plus some others are reproduced in Table 4.2. As regards the statistics of the (acceptable) internal within-subject consistency across the various problems, and the within-problem variation of the scores across each age group, the reader is referred to the original publication (Oser and Reich 1987, pp. 183–4). Consistency is also indicated by the value of Cronbach’s α (.97). No gender effects were observed. Therefore, in the subsequent studies, a gender imbalance was accepted. Discussion To emphasise the ‘developmental logic’ of RCR, the core differences of the level descriptions of Table 4.1 are abstracted in Table 4.3, with the intra-inter-trans ‘development logic’ added again. Thus, the expectations from the foregoing theoretical considerations were met, namely that (a) RCR development proceeds in an orderly, systematic fashion; (b) consistent with other cognitive developments, RCR becomes ever more differentiated and integrated; and (c) RCR appears 2

Given the ordinal scales, the results of the statistical treatment are used only for comparison purposes, not as absolute values.

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Table 4.3 Developmental logic of relational and contextual reasoning. (Cf. Table 4.1, p. 52, for level descriptions.)

Level of RCR

Core characteristic of level

Stage according to Piaget & Garcia (1983/89)

I II III IV V

A or B (or C) A, but also B (C) A and B (and C) Logic of and (context) Synopsis/theory

intra inter trans-intra trans-inter trans-trans

in particular to be consonant with the intra-inter-trans sequence of Piaget and Garcia (1983/1989). From the state of affairs presented in Table 4.1 (p. 52), the question arose whether to designate the differences in RCR development as ‘levels’ or as ‘stages’. Stages in a narrow sense (hard stages), as defined by Piaget, Kohlberg, and others, refer to organised systems of action (e.g., logicomathematical operations), are qualitatively different from each other, and follow each other in an unchanging order with a clear developmental logic. If that were the only criterion, the differences in RCR development could arguably be declared stages. However, the term (hard) stages also implies the existence of a structured whole, a monolithic view of specific cognitive processes. In view of that particular (controversial) point, and the as yet unclear inner structure of RCR, the designation ‘level’ was retained for the five ‘milestones’ in RCR development. Now that the internal composite nature of RCR has become clearer, that choice is reaffirmed. On examining Table 4.2 (p. 53), one is immediately struck by the relative uniformity of the mean scores as well as the high values of the correlations between the problem scores and the total scores, not forgetting the high value of coefficient alpha. This was hoped for, yet the high numerical values were somewhat unexpected, given the vast differences between the nine problems, concerning in particular (a) the knowledge domain, and (b) the kind of explanation/‘theory’ involved (causal attribution, motivation for human action, prediction, presentation of a process, analysis of a structure, interpretation of meaning). The conclusions drawn first tentatively and then more and more confirmed in the course of the studies 2, 3, and 4 include the following: (1) to assess a person’s RCR level, presenting, say, three problems is enough.

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Problems 1 (pianist) and 6 (humans) of Table 4.2 seem particularly suited (good mean scores and highest correlation values; they can be administered in slightly simplified form to grade-schoolchildren). (2) The mean scores and correlations of problems 7–9 are markedly lower. As studied in more detail later (chapter 7), one reason is a competence-performance discrepancy: for a variety of reasons the respondents do not produce their best. Nevertheless, based on the data of Table 4.2 (p. 53), RCR can be considered as a pragmatic reasoning schema (Cheng and Holyoak, 1985); this was hypothesised in chapter 1 (p. 14). Summing up the results of pilot study 1, it can be said that they support the basic features of RCR as explicated in chapters 1, 2, and 3, and clarify the number of developmental levels consistent with Piaget’s intra-intertrans sequence. A main open question remained: what is the relationship between RCR and Piagetian logico-mathematical thought? Pilot study 2: additional RCR interview problem For the subsequent studies, it seemed desirable to construct a supplementary RCR problem, preferably one that was not as ‘solved’ by the current culture as the problems pianist and humans. Therefore I chose a more controversial subject, an accident in a nuclear power plant, already presented in chapter 1 (pp. 20–2), being a scaled-down version of the Three Mile Island or the Chernobyl type accident. An additional aim was to look for such elements in the answers as would point to other thought forms. Administration The suitability of this problem was explored in a small test run. Not unexpectedly, the youngest age of respondents able to come up with scorable answers was not six years as for the other two standard RCR problems ( pianist and humans), but usually a little older, namely about nine years. Apart from that difference, as a rule the interviewing proceeded as in the first pilot study. The results of using the new problem in pilot studies 3 and 4 are presented below. Typical results and analysis This section is devoted to the traces of other forms of thought found in the responses to the nuclear accident problem. Technical malfunctioning

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is labelled A, human failure B. Five excerpts, chosen among other comparable ones, are ordered according to the developmental level of the respondents (I to V). Applying all that was said earlier, each excerpt will be analysed in turn. Here are prototypical answers I–V and their discussion (Reich 1995a, reproduced in parts with the kind permission of the Institute for the Advancement of the Philosophy of Children, Montclair State University): I. That technology was not reliable [A]. The operating crew is not to blame [not B] – they have done their duty, day in, day out (respondent aged 11 years).

The author of this first quotation (RCR level I) argues clearly at the Piagetian intra level. There is no indication of Piagetian concrete, let alone formal operations, nor of cognitively complex thought (level 1 – see p. 84 for levels 1–7), or real comparisons (no dialectical or analogical thinking), just the exclusion of B using an idiosyncratic argument. All this indicates, by the way, that the respondent performs somewhat below the average of his/her age level. Granting the benefit of doubt, one may discern a beginning of Basseches’s (1980, p. 408; 1984, p. 74; 1989, pp. 162–3) schema no. 9 (‘locating decisive elements within a whole’).3 II. It is true that a technical breakdown has occurred for starters [A]. But it appears that the operating crew has not been up to it either. That made it much worse [probably also B] (bright 8-year-old).

In this excerpt, we witness an enlargement of the observational horizon (RCR level II): in addition to the technical failure (A), the possibility of a mismanagement of the accident situation comes into view (B); the Piagetian inter level raises its head. There are indications of Piagetian concrete operations (working with two variables) and of differentiation (level 2 of cognitively complex thought). In a way, analogical thinking comes into the picture in that the common feature of (A) and (B) is identified as ‘involved in the accident/damage to the plant’ but then the difference is also recognised. In fact, there is an onset of a comparison of the respective weights in the damage assessment. Dialectical schema no. 9 is better developed, and schema no. 10 begins to appear (‘description of a whole in functional terms’). III. In the beginning a malfunctioning occurred. But then, such systems can’t work without human control. The operating crew has simply not noticed that the 3

Of the seven schemata to be referred to in the present analysis, Irwin and Sheese (1989, pp. 122–4) class nos. 10, 11, and 24 as used increasingly with better education/age, nos. 9, 12, and 14 as having a questionable pattern of emergence, and no. 15 as not appearing to have a developmental pattern. (However, their interview results indicate that dialectical thinking changed – became more powerful – across their educational/age groups; ibid., p. 119.)

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instruments indicated a problem. Or perhaps they have seen it but not taken the right countermeasures. The people were excited. The accident involves both a technical and a human deficiency [A and B] (14-year-old).

The third quotation is from a person who is clearly at a more advanced development stage (RCR level III). The argumentation is at the transintra level, the variables are dealt with at a confirmed level of concrete operations with an indication of the formulation of a tentative hypothesis (‘perhaps . . . ’). An element of integration (level 4 of cognitively complex thought) appears, ‘The people were excited [on account of the accident]’. Likewise, Basseches’s module no. 12 (‘assertion of relations’) comes into view. This indicates the transition toward Piagetian formal operations (dealing with the functioning of systems). One also may note that a logic different from that of formal binary logic is used: the events in the power station and the psychological state of the crew are not separable, and the latter is not reversible, at least not instantaneously. IV. Such accidents are very rare. So one can understand that it may have taken time before the crew realised that something was amiss. But then they may well have done the wrong thing. And the situation got worse. Maybe they quarrelled about the right action to take. Maybe they even panicked when the steam came out. And they never called in a specialist who might have been able to get the situation under control. Such crews need training with a simulator under as realistic conditions as possible [relations between A and B, context dependency] (25-year-old).

The author of the fourth quotation has progressed to the trans-inter level (RCR level IV). One is immediately struck by the use of elements of Piagetian formal operations: hypotheses are formed and argued about in an abstract way. The integration is stronger (level 5–6 of cognitively complex thought). There appear three new schemas, nos. 14 (‘two-way reciprocal relationship’), 15 (‘assertion of internal relations’), and in a rudimentary way no. 11 (‘assumption of contextual relativism’). The latter finds its expression in the statement ‘Such accidents are very rare. So one can understand that it may have taken some time before the crew realised that something was amiss.’ V. In this accident technical and human failure are interconnected. One has to look at the whole thing as a system, the plant and the operating crew. And one has to study the mutual interaction, the type of effects they have on each other. One really wants to train crew members with the help of a sophisticated simulator so that they become aware of the many ways in which something can go wrong, they experience their individual and collective reactions, and learn how to assess such situations as well as how to deal with them successfully. In such simulations the psychological stress must of course also be generated, not just the sequence of technical events. It is precisely such a chain reaction of technical and human

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Table 4.4 Mean scores of RCR (sub-)level, variance, and correlations between problem scores and total scores for 3 problems and 63 respondents aged 9–68 years (1 = level I, 13 = level V).

Problem 1 Pianist 2 Accident 3 Humans

Mean scores

Variance

9.11 5.23 8.46 5.96 9.14 4.46 Internal consistency alpha (Cronbach) = .93

Corrected correlations .90 .77 .89

malfunctioning which is so hard to foresee. By the way, I would hire only such persons who are aware of the dangers involved and are ready to face them [all RCR characteristics] (middle-aged adult).

As to answer V (already analysed in chapter 1, pp. 21–2 in a preliminary way), finally everything falls in place. The respondent argues at a transtrans level (RCR level V ). What are commonalities and differences with respect to Piagetian operations? As regards commonalities, one observes the systematic approach, the formulation of hypotheses, the search for effective ‘variables’, and the tendency to generalise. With respect to differences, the underlying logic is not the formal binary logic: one notes that for the respondent the sequence of events is not reversible, the different interventions of the crew and the respective state of the power plant do not commute (that is their sequential order makes a difference), and the psychological state of the crew members is considered not to be separable from the way the accident situation evolves. Obviously, there is plenty of differentiation and integration (level 7 of cognitively complex thought). Furthermore, relevant aspects are mentioned which were not indicated in the problem description as presented. This is consonant with Basseches’s schema no. 24 (‘multiplication of perspectives to get as inclusive a view as possible’). After inspecting next what became of the new problem, we turn to the study of the relation between RCR and Piagetian operations, and then to the inclusion of cognitively complex thought, and ‘logics’. Subsequent performance of the new problem This problem was used in pilot studies 3 and 4. The combined results are shown Table 4.4, using the format of Table 4.2 (p. 53) for comparison purposes. The mean values are higher (and the variance smaller) on account of the different sampling of participants. A mean score of 9 corresponds to RCR

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level IV (III). As before, the mean scores and correlations for problems 1 and 3 are remarkably close; the values for the more unfamiliar problem no. 2 stay fully acceptable. Pilot study 3: RCR and Piagetian operations Method Participants were thirty-eight nonrepresentative children, adolescents, and young adults (10 m. and 28 f.) from the local area, aged 7–22 years. The procedure for ascertaining the RCR levels was essentially the same as before, that for the Piagetian task as stated in the literature. The total interview lasted about one hour.4 RCR problems: the problem presented first was always that of the pianist because even grade schoolers were somehow ‘familiar’ with playing an instrument, so that it made for a good start in the otherwise unfamiliar situation of the interview. The second problem was that of the power plant accident (administered to respondents from 9 years onwards), and the third the humans one. They were administered in between Piagetian tasks. For participants younger than 9 years the RCR level was determined using the results from the interview about the pianist and the humans problems. Piagetian tasks: these tasks were taken from the literature, but (slightly) modified for increasing the difficulty and thereby providing a better (sub)stage discrimination. Also, for convenience, the numbering of the stages was made uniform and changed compared to Piaget’s numbering, namely IIa, b for preoperational substages, IIIa, b for substages of concrete operations, and IVa, b for substages of formal operations, a indicating an initial, and b a confirmed substage. Snail task (Piaget et al. [1946] 1972, pp. 95–109 for principle; details were modified as described below), see Fig. 4.4. The four subtasks consist in adding (or subtracting) displacement distances, respectively displacement speeds, either by actually carrying out the displacements or effecting them purely mentally. A snail (symbolised by a snail house) moves on a board, on which seven ‘milestones’, each time separated by one unit, are recognisable. (The extreme milestones on either side coincide with the edges of the board.) The board rests on a table, and is displaced itself. Both movements are either parallel or antiparallel. A scale extending from 3 units left to 3 units right is fixed on the table in such a manner that the board displacement can be read off. The units on the board (milestone separations) and on the scale are of the same size. The snail always starts from the central milestone (central position) and moves up to three milestones either to 4

Additionally, problem 9 of pilot study 1 (see ch. 7, p. 126) was proposed on a voluntary basis to the participants of pilot study 3.

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Milestones

Snail

Board

Scale 3L

2L

1L

0

1R

2R

3R

Table

Figure 4.1 Schematic sketch of the snail task. L = left; R = right. (Shown as viewed by the participant; the table is larger than the frame of Fig. 4.4; explanation in text.)

the right or to the left. Initially, the board is located with the snail at position zero of the scale. The task is to indicate where the snail finds itself at the end of the displacements with reference to the scale on the table. The participant is free to move both the snail and the board, but a higher score (IV) is obtained for doing it all in the head. (All this and the given subtask is explained to the participant.) The four subtasks are: (a) Snail one unit to the right Board two units to the right (b) Snail two units to the left Board one unit to the right (c) Snail three units to the right Board to the left with a third of the snail’s velocity (both starting together) (d) Snail continuously to the left Board to the right with half the snail’s until it leaves the board velocity (both starting together). (last milestone)

The solutions are (a): 3R; (b): 1L; (c): 2R; (d): 1 12 L. And the scores: IIa: IIb: IIIa: IIIb: IVa:

Irrelevant, confused answers, possibly description of snail motion Description of one displacement or the other, but no combination Dimly aware of principle; perhaps one of (a)–(d) solved correctly More competent; two or more of (a)–(d) solved ‘manually’ Principle understood; three or more subtasks solved, mostly in the head IVb: All subtasks (a)–(d) rapidly solved in the head without mistakes ‘Principle understood’ means that the participant argues in terms of adding/subtracting directly the displacements in question (subtasks a and b) or transforms first the velocity differences into displacement differences (subtasks c and d) and then proceeds as before.

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Plant task. This task tests the capacity to separate the variables and to determine the ‘operative’ ones. The original task (Kuhn and Brannock 1977) comprised four pictures, two of healthy plants (one with a full glass of water and white plant food; one with half a glass of water, white plant food, and leaf lotion), and two of unhealthy plants (one with a full glass of water, black plant food, and leaf lotion; one with half a glass of water and black plant food). The interviewer explains to the respondent that the water, plant food, and leaf lotion (if so depicted) are given each week to the plant in the quantities pictured. The task is to find out what it takes to grow healthy plants. This version is easy to solve in that only the white plant food is effectively operative. Deirdre Kramer (private communication) therefore extended the problem by making also the leaf lotion operative, and provided a total of eight corresponding pictures. I extended the plant task further by adding two pictures of unhealthy plants (with leaf lotion, either a full glass or half a glass of water, and no plant food) to Kramer’s eight. These two pictures were not displayed, but delivered on the request, ‘I do not know whether the white food is good for the plant, or the black food is bad; I need to see what happens without plant food.’

The correctness of the solution ‘white plant food and lotion’ as well as ‘between one half and one glass of water’ can be proven convincingly with the ten pictures; in particular the hypothetical possibility that the white plant food is ineffective and the black food a poison can demonstrably be excluded. The scoring was as follows (on account of the more difficult task, involving more criteria, stages III and IV were subdivided into three substages, a, b, c): IIa: IIb: IIIa: IIIb: IIIc: IVa:

Irrelevant, confused answers Separation of variables unknown (idiosyncratic explanations) Beginning of separation of variables, but no correct solution Water level excluded as operative, but no correct solution As IIIb, but in addition correct operative variables found As IIIc plus explicit demonstration of plant’s tolerance for water level IVb: As IVa, but more spontaneous search for finding and justifying necessary conditions (leaf lotion, plant food) IVc: As IVb plus request for information on state of plant without food. Pendulum task (Inhelder and Piaget [1955] 1958, pp. 67–79). The task is to find the operative variable determining the pendulum’s oscillation frequency. The participants were individually given four pendulums (two long and two short ones, each time with a light and a heavy weight), and a stopwatch. What determined the pendulum’s oscillation frequency, the length of the suspension, the weight, or the impetus of setting it in motion? Experimenting was supplemented by asking questions provided by Kuchemann ¨ (1977, 1979), which assess the capacity to test relevant hypotheses ‘in one’s head’, i.e. without actually experimenting with real pendulums.

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Table 4.5 Mean scores of RCR (sub-)level, variance, and correlations between problem scores and total scores for 3 problems and 30 respondents5 aged 9–22 years (1 = level I, 10 = level IV). (Source: Reich and Oser 1990, p. 53)

Problem 1 Pianist 2 Accident 3 Humans

Mean scores

Variance

7.37 2.79 6.90 3.68 7.63 1.90 Internal consistency alpha (Cronbach) = .89

Corrected correlations .85 .70 .79

The solution is, ‘only the length of the suspension determines the frequency. The longer the suspension, the lower the frequency (inversely proportional to the square root of the length).’ In this task the scoring was: IIa: IIb: IIIa: IIIb: IVa: IVb:

Irrelevant, confused answers Separation of variables unknown (idiosyncratic explanations) Beginning of separation of variables, but principle not grasped On the way to understanding the principle, partial separation Separation of variables found eventually but not spontaneously Separation of variables and exclusion of inoperant variables Results and discussion

RCR problems. For comparability, the mean scores for the participants 9 years old or older are presented in Table 4.5, using the format of Table 4.2 (p. 53). The values for the nuclear plant accident are less good than those for pianist and humans, but still acceptable. As a comparison with the relevant values of Table 4.2 shows, the mean values of Table 4.5 are higher (and variances smaller) on account of the higher starting age for the nuclear accident problem. A mean value of 7 corresponds to RCR level III. Piagetian tasks. The values of Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients of the various scores were: snail–plant: .77; snail–pendulum: .73; plant– pendulum: .68 (p = .01 or smaller in all cases). In case of discrepancies between the three individual scores, the highest score was used subsequently, as competence, not performance, was the issue. 5

As a rule, the nuclear accident problem was administered to participants 9 years old or older – here to thirty-one persons, but only thirty records were fully usable.

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Table 4.6 Frequencies of individual scores concerning Piagetian operations and RCR levels. Level I (II) is somewhat above level I, level II (I) somewhat below level II, etc. N = 38, age 7–22 years. (Source: Reich and Oser 1990, p. 54; reproduced in Reich 1991, p. 85, and in Oser and Reich 1992, p. 90). RCR level Piagetian operations

I

I (II) II (I) II II (III) III (II) III III (IV) IV (III) IV IV (V)

Early concrete 2 Confirmed concrete 2 Transition Early formal Confirmed formal (Transition?)

1

1

2 1

1 2 8

6

2 3

3

3 1?

Piagetian operations and RCR. The frequencies of interest are shown in Table 4.6. No scores are found in the upper right-hand corner. Thus no interview participant argued at a low (sub-)stage of Piagetian operations and at a high RCR level. In contrast, a high (sub-)stage of Piagetian operations did not ensure an equally high RCR level. This state of affairs can be interpreted as follows: Reaching a given (sub-)stage of Piagetian operations is necessary but insufficient for reaching a given RCR level. (The insufficiency indicates a lack of performance in one or more of the other components involved in RCR.) The conclusion is that Piagetian concrete and formal operations and RCR are really distinct, yet structurally interconnected. In particular, the Piagetian stage actually reached limits the attainable RCR level, at least up to the confirmed formal stage. From there onwards, RCR seems to free itself from the ‘Piagetian’ embrace. This supports the foregoing considerations, especially those about Fig. 2.1 (p. 30), and about a differing RCR logic. Pilot study 4: RCR, Piagetian operations, cognitively complex thinking, and evolved logics Pilot study 4 was an extension of study 3 to include cognitively complex problems, and evolved logics. The procedure was essentially that of pilot study 3. As the participants were different, the Piagetian tasks were included again; however, the lengthy pendulum task was replaced by the balance scale task.

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Hypotheses Pilot studies 3 and 4 jointly tested the following four hypotheses: H. 1: RCR shares elementary/conjunctive/composite operations with Piagetian operations and with cognitively complex thinking. H. 2: The chain of RCR levels I–V and the sequence of levels 1–7 of cognitively complex thinking (p. 84) share commonalities regarding the respective measures of differentiation and integration. H. 3: The development of RCR involves transcending the limits set by formal binary logic, and hence by certain partial Piagetian operations (cf. Table 5.4, right-hand column – p. 89). H. 4: Higher levels of RCR involve a logic other than formal binary logic. These hypotheses can be tested as follows. If the interviews of a statistically significant number of participants demonstrated competence with RCR, but neither with Piagetian operations nor with cognitively complex thinking, then H. 1 would be falsified. If all RCR problems were treated at low RCR levels (II or III), but the problems assessing cognitively complex thinking at high levels (6 or 7 of that thinking), or vice versa, then H. 2 would be falsified. If the RCR problems were dealt with at lower levels (II or III) without using formal binary logic, then H. 3 would be falsified. If no other logic than formal binary logic showed up in respondents’ RCR argumentation at levels III and up, then H. 4 would be falsified.

Method The sample consisted of thirty-two nonrepresentative participants from the local region (17 m., 15 f.), aged 13–68 years. The interview (about the nine [unique solution] tasks / [ill-defined] problems) lasted about one hour. As far as the pilot study 4 per se is concerned,6 the nine tasks/problems were: the standard set of three RCR problems, a set of three Piagetian tasks, a set of two problems for assessing cognitively complex thinking, and one problem for assessing competence with logics. The problems were administered in one or the other of a mixed, partly counterbalanced order. Piagetian task. In addition to the snail task and the plant task, the following task was used: 6

Additionally, two religious doctrines and problem 9 of pilot study 1 (see chapter 7) were proposed to participants of pilot study 4.

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Balance scale task (Inhelder and Piaget [1955] 1958, pp. 164–81). The interviewee was presented with a picture of a balance scale and the invitation to describe how the equilibrium condition can be worked out.

As RCR and Piagetian operations had been the object of pilot study 3 and those results (Table 4.6, p. 63) were to be analysed jointly with the results of study 4, it was only necessary to ascertain whether the present participants mastered Piagetian formal operations, and thence the indicated use of the balance scale task, its scoring being an additional check on the results of the two other Piagetian tasks used in study 4. Problems for assessing cognitively complex thinking. Despite a literature search, no suitable problems were found. In constructing two problems, a supplementary condition was that they could also serve in the task of assessing logical competence. Here are the two problems: Filling a post. Mr Boschung [all names are typical local names for added reallife feeling] heads a laboratory in a successful technical firm. He has just been given a new post, and wants to fill it rapidly despite a shortage in the labour market. He offers the post to Franz Riedo, a competent young collaborator of his colleague Zosso who heads another laboratory in the same company. Boschung has not informed Zosso about his offer. When Zosso learns about it, he asks their common boss, Mr Gotschmann ¨ to prevent Boschung from hiring Riedo. Interviewing. When interviewing a person, on the one hand one wants him or her to be as spontaneous and self-organising as possible in order to learn authentically a maximum about that person. On the other hand, the interview does serve a specific purpose, which requires a certain degree of directivity. What problems result from that situation in your view?

Clearly, the logical structure of these problems is quite different compared to that of the Piagetian tasks: no single correct answer exists; at best probabilistic scenarios can be depicted. The reason for such a state of affairs does not reside primarily in a lack of information (the respondent could and sometimes did ask for more), but in the intrinsic uncertainties involved. Regarding the filling of the post, the attitudes and opinions of the protagonists are not necessarily fixed once and for all, in particular not that of Franz Riedo. In respect to interviewing, the contrasting, even contradictory objectives can only lead to a more or less successful compromise. Also, the context conditions (possibly unfamiliar surroundings, noise, presence of third persons, nervousness of the interviewee on account of unfamiliarity with the interview theme or the particular interview method, etc.) usually have a marked influence on the result. For these two problems the scoring followed the manual of BakerBrown et al. (1992), with level 1 corresponding to no differentiation and

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Table 4.7 Frequencies of individual scores of levels of cognitively complex thought and RCR levels. Fractional levels/levels as before. N = 32. (Source: Reich 1995d, p. 12.) Level of cognitive complexity (Baker-Brown) 3(4) 4(3) 4 4(5) 5(4) 5 5(6) 6(5) 6 6(7) 7(6) 7

RCR level III

III (IV)

IV (III)

IV

IV (V)

V (IV)

3 3 1 2 2 1

1 2 2 2

1 1 1 2 1 2 1

3 1

no integration and level 7 to full differentiation and integration (see chapter 5 for details, p. 84). Problem for assessing the (meta-)logical competence. Empirically, levels of (meta-)logical competence were assessed as follows. The respondents were asked to analyse and to class the eight tasks/problems administered up to that point (three RCR problems, three Piagetian tasks, two problems for assessing cognitively complex thinking) according to the logic involved. Five developmental levels were defined as follows: (1) No coherent, pertinent answer (2) Only one logic class identified (here that of the Piagetian tasks) (3) At least one further class (dimly) identified, first class identified more accurately (4) First class fully identified, other classes more fully characterised (5) All three classes clearly distinguished and fully characterised Results The results were as follows. Levels of cognitively complex thought and RCR. The frequencies of individually assessed levels of cognitively complex thinking and RCR levels are shown in Table 4.7. The same general appearance is observed as was

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discussed for Table 4.6 (p. 63). Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient has the value rs = .68, p < .01.7 The aggregated answers (N = 32) to the problem Filling a post were as follows, ordered according to four self-revealed categories (a)–(d): (a) Expression of a personal viewpoint of the respondent: To ‘steal’ an employee from a colleague is simply not right. That cannot be a normal procedure for filling a post. The way hiring is done should be fully transparent and above board. All the people immediately concerned have misbehaved. If Mr Gotschmann ¨ had really known his collaborators, and knew what was going on in his department, he would have given clear instructions as to the procedure for filling the new post; that would have avoided the present mess. But simply to undo the hiring will not work either. Having had such an experience of promotion changes a man, he is no longer the same as before. One can understand that Mr Zosso complains. But the conflict cannot simply be solved by invoking certain principles. In particular, Mr Gotschmann ¨ should not simply impose a solution thought out by him in his lonely corner. A reflection is needed in order to do justice both to the persons involved and to the interests of the company. (b) Immediate considerations of Mr G¨otschmann (before acting): Franz Riedo will not be much more productive in Boschung’s laboratory than in Zosso’s laboratory. However, if he changes laboratories, then Zosso is short of a collaborator. So, that change is not really in the interest of the company. Furthermore, such ‘hijacking’ should not be encouraged because it leads to an undesirable overbidding between our laboratories. Nevertheless, Mr Boschung should not lose face. It remains true that the post has been offered to Franz Riedo. He now knows that he is deemed capable to tackle more demanding jobs. Having seen that possibility in front of him, he will not want to stay in his former less promising post. He has also become aware that right now professionals like himself are in short supply. Probably he already has told others about his promotion, and has made plans based thereupon. At least, that is how it goes in general. If I just stop him from taking on the new post without offering an equally attractive alternative, then he is probably mad, feels pushed around, blames Zosso for the step back, works less well than before the offer, and possibly even joins one of our competitors. Perhaps the first thing to do is to talk to Riedo to find out what attracts him to the new post, whether the work itself, the salary, the promotion prospect, or what else. I also want to know why he has not talked to Zosso before accepting Boschung’s offer. Maybe he needs to be encouraged to look at the dealings also from the company’s perspective. Furthermore, I have to be sure about his competencies, and as to whether there will not soon develop a possibility for promotion either in Zosso’s laboratory or in my third laboratory. I will do that 7

A post hoc Kruskal-Wallis analysis of variance (H test) for levels 4 to 7 further supported the findings of the correlation computation: the mean ranks of levels of cognitive complexity ‘connected’ to the various RCR level scores differed (chi2 = 11.9, df = 3, p < .01). The corresponding U-Test (Mann-Whitney) showed that the significant differences were between levels 4 and 7 (U = 0, p = .05), and levels 5 and 7 (U = 4.5, p < .01).

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immediately. Apart from that, I sit on the fence for the time being, and suggest to Messrs Boschung and Zosso to find a solution that is acceptable to all concerned. (c) Subsequent steps: In the unlikely case that such a solution comes about, Mr Gotschmann ¨ invites Boschung, Riedo, and Zosso to a meeting. He makes sure that all involved have understood what is being proposed, and are in full agreement; he then communicates the result to all ‘his’ employees, if only to stop rumours. In case no solution comes forth, he looks for one together with the two laboratory heads, Boschung and Zosso; this with the guiding criteria of (i) serving the company’s interests, (ii) strengthening or least maintaining the previous good ‘climate’ in his department, (iii) sustaining the positive motivation of all collaborators, and (iv) furthering Franz Riedo’s career prospects. In case no agreement comes forth, Gotschmann ¨ single-handedly takes a decision and proceeds as described for the solution by Boschung and Zosso. (d) Administrative improvements: In the future, a job description will be produced for all open posts, specifying in particular if candidates from the department or from the company may apply, or only outside candidates. Furthermore, the personnel administration makes known afresh the rules for filling a post (which expressly exclude internal ‘hijacking’) and ensures their strict application.

The aggregated answers (N = 32) to the problem Interview were as follows, again ordered according to four self-revealed categories: (a) Description of the problem: This is a problem of communication and coordination. The actual interview ‘frame’ must have the right size: small enough to keep the interview on track, but not so small that it hampers spontaneity. Basically, interviewing presents an insoluble dilemma: hold the reins loosely, yet steer the horse to where you want to go. The two desiderata are almost incompatible. It only works with luck. Somehow, the interviewer is walking on a tightrope. In case the interviewee says something of importance to him or her, but which does not stay within the research frame, that person needs to be nudged gently back into that frame. Most interviewees will answer straightforwardly the question as to when they last ate in an Italian restaurant. But if the interviewer wants to know, for instance, the degree of patriotism of the interviewee, the answer may be more guarded. No matter how much the interviewers are burning to advance the research at hand, for ethical reasons they have to respect an interviewee’s unwillingness to communicate what they consider as private, even intimate information. Contrary to the balance scale experiment, where one can immediately observe what happens, in the case of an interview one mostly can only progress by way of inferring, namely from the kind of answer given to the views or the personality of the interviewee. The interpretation of the data is difficult in any case. The balance scale reacts only to the weights and their distribution. The interviewees respond not only to the questions, but also to the way the interviewer puts them, to his or her attitude, body language, and so on; this possibly in a rather idiosyncratic manner. In fact, different interviewers may well obtain differing answers from the same person about the same issue.

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(b) Specific difficulties: The interviewers experience certain mental associations, and the interviewees possibly different ones. For instance, in the case of the plant task, the interviewers base themselves strictly on the pictures presented, while the interviewees may remember their garden, and their own experience with the effects of water, earth, fertiliser, and so on, and start from there. The interviewers have perhaps a research frame before their mind, and only want answers which fit inside. It may be that in fact they pay no attention to what falls outside that frame. The interviewees are likely to notice such an attitude and change their answering strategy accordingly, thereby falsifying the interview. Sometimes, journalists almost manipulate the person(s) they interview. If one knows that it is an interview for a particular purpose, spontaneity may suffer. One may feel that certain answers are expected, and that they should be ‘correct’. Strange surroundings and the presence of other persons also might falsify the result. One gives one’s best only when interviewed for a first time. When the interview is repeated, boredom may result, and rather than repeating the same answers, one just says what comes to mind and is more amusing. (c) Differences between the persons interviewed: Some interviewees like perhaps to help the interviewer and say what they feel the interviewer wants to hear, or what is ‘correct’, that is, socially desirable. Others would like to get the interview over with and say the first thing that comes to mind. Some persons are more given to moods (and that might make for differing views on the same event) than others. Again, different persons may require differing ‘treatments’ to give their best. An introverted person needs encouragement and stimulation, a extrovert possibly a little calming down (and an encouragement to think more deeply). Some talk immediately, simply just as it comes to them; others first think very hard before speaking, perhaps too hard. Some uncover themselves, others are more secretive. The interviewers need to diagnose whom they have in front of them and act accordingly. (d) How to conduct interviews: As much as possible interviewing volunteers (who are motivated). The atmosphere should be open and confidence-inspiring, the environment familiar and friendly, speaking in a dialect admitted, data protection assured, and the allocated time fully sufficient. In case the interviewee looks nervous or timid, one should begin by relaxing/warming him or her up, and only then begin with the interview proper. As a general rule, the interviewer should not put questions answerable simple by ‘yes’ or ‘no’, not use multiple choice questions, and avoid suggestive questions. By going once more over some of the ground already covered, the interviewer should make sure that the answers were genuine and complete. Maybe the interviewer should see the interviewee again a few days later in order to find out whether new answers did occur to the interviewee, or corrections came to mind. Possibly the interviewer can invite the interviewee to read the transcript of the interview and to comment on it. In case one wants to compare the answers from several persons, then the interview must be more structured, that is, be more like an oral questionnaire. In contrast, to learn the most about an individual, the interview should not be structured; it is ideally of the narrative variety. In case a person having little experience is to be interviewed publicly, it seems fair to indicate ahead of time the theme of the interview so that he or she can make preparations.

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Table 4.8 Frequencies of individual scores concerning levels of (meta-)logical thinking and RCR levels. N = 31. (Source: Reich 1995d, p. 13.) RCR level Levels of (meta-) logical thinking 3(2) 3 3(4) 4(3) 4 4(5) 5(4) 5

III

III (IV)

1

1 1

IV (III)

3 1

IV

IV (V)

3 2

1

1 1

3 3 2 1

V (IV)

2 2 2 1

Clearly, a person coming anywhere near these integrated answers was answering at level 7. (Meta-)logical competence and RCR levels. These results are collected in Table 4.8. Once more, no values are found in the right-hand upper corner. Again, for a given level of (meta-)logical competence, e.g. 4(3), various RCR levels pertain, namely IV(III), IV(V), V(IV). Thus, the competence under discussion can also be regarded as a necessary yet insufficient condition for RCR. Kendall’s rank correlation coefficient had the value .52, p < .01.8 The thirty-one scorable participants (one audiotape was partly faulty) distinguished three logical cases: (1) tasks, whose solution is simply correct or wrong (snail, plant, balance scale); (2) problems, where various aspects might be considered contradictory, other aspects seemingly as completing each other, and all aspects are needed for an explanation (pianist, nuclear accident, model for humans); and (3) problems, where the individual attitude and likely action of the protagonists are the most important considerations for finding a solution (filling a post, interview). The aggregated answers (N = 31) to the problem logical classes were as follows, ordered according to the three classes indicated: 8

A post hoc Kruskal-Wallis analysis of variance (H test) further supported the findings of the correlation computation: the mean levels of (meta-) logical thinking related to the various RCR level scores differed (chi2 = 11.7, df = 2, p < .01). The corresponding U-Test (Mann-Whitney) showed that the significant differences were between levels 3 and 4 (U = 33, p < .01), and to a lesser degree between levels 3 and 5 (U = 1.5, p < .05).

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Class 1: Here we are dealing with natural laws in the domain of physics and biology, which are unchangeable and reproducible. The physical systems are not capable of learning; they do not develop. All these tasks primarily have nothing to do with me. One can focus one’s imagination and reflections onto concrete entities. We are dealing with clear initial conditions and well-defined objectives. Using the right method leads to a single correct solution. The task is to establish mathematical relations between the variables. Thus the competence for scientific work is tested. The solution can be justified by logical arguments. Once a mathematical solution is found, predictions can be made. Therefore, the answers of various persons are surely similar, if not identical. And in the cases of the snail and the balance scale, the solution does not depend on the environment. In all cases, one can repeat a trial or experiment without intrinsic limitations. Class 2: The task is to harmonise two statements, to create a link, to put them under one umbrella, to find out whether they support each other or not. Both aspects often ‘collaborate’. Even if some statement is not ‘logical’, it may be true. Native endowment and the effects of exercising cannot be separated, nor mind and body; they are intrinsically linked. Probably, such states of affairs can be researched further, because certain regularities obtain despite the complexities involved. The environment may play a certain role in these problems. For instance, the pianist may be influenced by the audience, the operating crew may panic when the reactor explodes, and a person’s mind and body are influenced, for instance, by the weather. Class 3: Humans can act according to the most diverse criteria ranging from the cold logic of focusing on gaining an advantage to the warm logic of decent behaviour. But humans also react. Contrary to the experiments with the balance scale, one can’t do experiments with humans as one fancies. When humans are concerned, a different scale of values applies. When the psyche is involved, the situation often becomes irreversible. There are no solutions which are a priori correct or wrong, because the idiosyncratic reaction of each individual counts. People do not all react in the same way. It may be helpful to reflect how one would react oneself. Such a reflection may further progress with understanding. Decisions have to worked out by way of dialogue. In such discussions the aims and wishes of all persons involved should be put on the table, including emotions that play a role. Persons react differently, because they are aware that their experience of life differs from that of others. Sometimes differing moral values play a role. And the actors may change on account of how events unfold. One knows a lot about single factors, but not how they relate to each other: usually many solutions can be envisaged in principle, but none predicted with a high probability. At best one can make statements beginning with ‘probably’ or ‘possibly’, which indicate a tendency. At issue are not logical necessities, but reaching an optimised solution for the future. That requires the capacity to sort out the essentials and calls for social sensitivity and creativity. Not infrequently, the core issue resides in conflicting interests, in the difficulties having to do with living together. There exists no universally agreed sure method for arriving at a solution satisfactory to all persons involved. Moreover, the objective is not always clear, progress towards it not easily measurable. It may be that both maintaining the status quo and making changes in all likelihood will lead to future problems.

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Table 4.9 Minimum stages/levels of other competencies for a given RCR level. Appropriate partial levels of dialectical and analogical thinking are also required. (Source: Reich, 1999, p. 145)

RCR

Piagetian operations

Complex thinking

(Meta-)logical competence

II III IV V

concrete operations transition to formal op. established formal op.

level 2 level 3 level 5− level 7

level 1 level 2+ level 3 level 5

But once a decision has been taken, it cannot be fully reversed, one cannot start afresh from scratch. As a rule, the solution depends on many things, all the more if many persons are involved, and is likely to be tailor-made. Therefore, different persons will propose different solutions. At issue is the black box individual, whose behaviour often is not reproducible, and who is given to emotional whims.

lf a third of the difference between levels is ignored, the inter-rater agreements were 97 per cent (RCR), 81.8 per cent (complex thought) and 81.8 per cent ([meta-]logical thought). Discussion of pilot studies 3 and 4 By retroduction RCR was demonstrated to involve (1) elementary, conjunctive, and/or composite operations singly or plurally shared with Piagetian operations and cognitively complex thinking, as well as (2) a logic different from formal binary logic. The respective minimum levels are listed in Table 4.9. These results support H. 1: there are (developmental) commonalities between the thought forms/competencies under discussion. However, RCR is not reducible to any one of the others. How about H. 2, the development of RCR and of cognitively complex thought? Given the quite significant value of the correlation coefficient (rs = .68, p < .01) and the high chi2 values of the Kruskal-Wallis test, H. 2 is supported by the empirical results: the levels of cognitively complex thought may also be interpreted as a developmental sequence. This is in agreement with the notion that during the life course reasoning becomes more and more general, abstract, differentiated, integrated, and structured (Seiler 1994, p. 79; cf. Werner [1948] 1973, 1957).

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To reach RCR level III, the lowest ‘real’ RCR level, ‘almost’ formal operations and (meta-)logical competence at level 2+ are required. These findings support H. 3 and H. 4, in that below RCR level III formal binary logic is used, and at that level it is transgressed, at least in a rudimentary way. From the manner the ‘logic’ of the RCR problems was described by the participants, it is also clear that at least some of them understand (more or less well) the notion of noncompatibility, even if they do not know that term. The results shown in Tables 4.6 (p. 63), 4.7 (p. 66), and 4.8 (p. 70) furthermore shed light on another issue debated currently. As discussed by Bjorklund (1999, p. 34), in middle childhood psychometric IQ and results of Piagetian reasoning tests correlate at the .4 level. If both tests measure some generalised intelligence, and given that the IQ increases continuously – that is not stepwise – Bjorklund doubts the correctness of Piagetian stage theory. From the present data it appears that stages or levels are indeed just milestones within an ongoing development. The very notion underlying the present level notation, namely level I (II), etc. indicates a more or less continuous change (as does Piaget’s notion of substages). However, at a level/stage milestone, the sum of earlier small developmental steps has led to a noticeable qualitative change, a marked transformation of the mental structure. How does RCR actually develop? A robust answer remains to be researched. The impressions gained from the present study are twofold: on the one hand an increase of factual knowledge may well be one of the causes. That would be consistent with other studies showing the importance for development of prior knowledge as distinct from a higher IQ (Weinert, Bullock, and Schneider 1999, pp. 334–5). On the other hand increased epistemic cognition seems required, in particular reflection on the means of thinking and reflecting (cf. ch. 2, pp. 29–32), including the nature and use of various logics. At least as a temporary strategy, at the current degree of understanding, it may be advisable to study in more depth the underlying complex processes (Reich, Oser, and Valentin 1994) as against searching for nomothetic relations. In his considerations on spiritual intelligence, Robert Emmons (2000, p. 49) evokes four empirical criteria for determining whether a particular candidate for a different type of (multiple) intelligence makes the grade. It seems to me that, mutatis mutandis, these criteria are also applicable to thought forms, and I do so for RCR: (1) The thought form should be translatable into performance, that is, a person possessing it should be able to solve specifiable problems that someone without it cannot. The data presented here, in particular those on the understanding of religious doctrines (chapter 7), clearly show that this criterion is met by

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RCR. (2) The thought form must be applicable to a diversity of content domains, not just one (narrow) domain. Pilot study 1 (Oser and Reich, 1987) – demonstrating that RCR can be considered as a pragmatic reasoning schema – the archaeology of RCR (chapter 8), as well as the applications in this monograph demonstrate that criterion no. 2 is met by RCR. (3) The thought form under discussion should be similar enough to other thought forms to be recognisable as such, but different enough to be worth studying. The considerations (chapter 5) and the data presented here document that this criterion too is met by RCR. (4) The thought form must develop from infancy to adulthood. Again, the data of chapters 4 and 7 are evidence that RCR also meets this last criterion. Summary of empirical studies and outlook The existence of the postformal thought form RCR and its developmental levels, having been explained theoretically in previous chapters, were demonstrated empirically. Furthermore, there is empirical evidence that RCR shares ‘components’ with other thought forms, but not their logic, and that (ideally) it can develop from rudimentary stages in childhood to a fully developed stage in adulthood. Development of RCR implies corresponding levels of Piagetian thinking, cognitive complex thought, and putatively of dialectical and analogical thought as well as at least a ‘feel’ for, and minimal use of different types of logic. Additional studies would usefully focus on competence with RCR as a function of age, education, socio-economic status, etc., and on longitudinal studies to ascertain the present level descriptions and the sequencing of the levels. Exploring further the relation of RCR with dialectical and analogical thought would also be desirable.

5

Other Thought Forms and Matching Them to the Problem at Hand

In chapter 1 (pp. 16–19) RCR was hypothesised to share elementary, conjunctive, or even composite operations with other forms of thought. In chapter 3 (pp. 41–3) arguments were provided that Piagetian operations, dialectical thinking, analogical thinking, and cognitively complex thought were relevant other thought forms. This was broadly supported empirically (chapter 4). It is therefore justified to compare and contrast them with RCR and with each other. A second reason is that they are sufficiently different from each other and RCR to serve for a demonstration of the thesis that for best results the thought form employed must be matched to the problem structure. That will constitute the second section of this chapter. Other thought forms relevant to RCR Piagetian logico-mathematical thinking Rather than covering Piagetian logico-mathematical thinking1 in its entirety (cf. Fondation Archives Jean Piaget 1989), after a short recap I concentrate on its critical aspect in regard to RCR: the logic involved. Some core characteristics of thinking according to Piaget (1970) were already indicated in previous chapters. At the formal operational stage, the overall challenge of Piagetian tasks consists in formulating hypotheses, testing them, and coming to a conclusion. Specific objectives are (a) to find out which are the ‘true’ (active) variables (e.g., task ‘combination of coloured and colourless chemical bodies’); (b) to combine variables (e.g. the ‘snail’ task – see Fig. 4.1, p. 60), or (c) to elucidate natural laws (e.g., tasks ‘floating bodies’, ‘balance scale’). 1

I do not enter into the debate on the validity of some of Piaget’s findings and interpretations as well as their amelioration (e.g., Barrouillet and Poirier 1997; Bickhard 1997; Goswami 1998, ch. 8). The portions of Piaget’s work I make use of seem undisputed (cf. Bond 1995).

75

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Task Here I focus on the balance scale task (Inhelder and Piaget [1955] 1958, pp. 164–81) with a view to bringing out the structure of a Piagetian task, which among other things ‘justifies’ the application of the logic involved in logico-mathematical thinking. The balance scale task consists in finding out how to balance the scale by adjusting the various weights and their distance from the fulcrum on either side of the beam.2 Two essential, ‘obvious’, yet crucial points are (1) the ‘truth value’ of the variables is time-independent (a weight or a fixed distance over time stay the same weight and the same fixed distance) and (2) the variables are intrinsically independent from each other (a given weight is unchanged at whatever distance it is put, and a given distance stays exactly the same whatever weight is put there). From (1) and (2) and the definition of a balance scale it follows that (3) the situation is strictly reversible (by reversing any change made, the former situation is re-established exactly). Underlying logic Those three conditions (well-defined, time-constant entities; separability of variables; reversibility) are precisely among those which authorise the use of formal binary logic in reasoning about the tasks under discussion. To clarify the foundations of that logic (Kainz 1988, pp. 14–21), a small excursion is necessary. The three pillars holding up formal binary logic are: (1) the maxim of identity: everything is identical with itself, A = A; A cannot at the same time be A and nonA; (2) the law of non-contradiction: a notion cannot possess neither nor both of two relevant mutually exclusive predicates; (3) the maxim of the excluded middle: A must be either A+ or A−, it cannot be anything else. It may be helpful to go a little further into those maxims/laws. Whereas philosophers like Hegel, Wittgenstein, and Kainz find faults with the identity maxim (Kainz 1988, pp. 9–10),3 it is accepted as such in everyday life. In practice, there may be problems of the exact determination of the limits of the categories concerned (such as ‘when does the night end and the day start?’), but it is clear that the day is not the night and the night is not the day. Readers interested in a philosophical discussion of the law of noncontradiction are referred to the considerations of Eric Toms (1962) – summarised by Kainz (1988, p. 18). At a practical level, there are clearly 2 3

The solution is that for equilibrium the sum of the torques [torque = weight × distance from the fulcrum] on the one side has to equal that on the other side. One argument is that one cannot fully know a given entity unless one knows its limits, i.e., what is ‘outside’ of it. Therefore, so goes the argument, that ‘other’ is also part of it.

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difficulties: is a hermaphrodite not both male and non-male, an ambivert not both extrovert and non-extrovert, and does light not behave in wavelike and non-wave-like ways? As regards the excluded middle, Toms (1962) again discusses the philosophical point of view (Kainz 1988, pp. 18–19). At a practical level, according to the maxim under discussion: ‘Either this is a butterfly or this is not a butterfly.’ What about the egg, the chrysalis? Again, ‘legally’, ‘Either a cow is holy or it is not holy.’ What about the views of Hindus (for whom a cow is holy) and of non-Hindus; is one view to be accepted and the other rejected? ‘Either this neutron is about to disintegrate or it is not about to disintegrate.’ (We only know the answer once the neutron has disintegrated; before that disintegration the state is indeterminate.) Once more, formal binary logic does not fit the logical structure of these and of other cases arising in real life. Applications of formal binary logic If the problem structure is such that formal binary logic is applicable (e.g. Newtonian physics problems, that is Piagetian tasks) then the following operations are valid: use of transitivity, association, commutation, distribution, use of reversibility, solving of syllogisms, working with conditionals, manipulating sets of data (Table 5.1). In other cases (e.g., problems in quantum physics, biology, psychology, sociology, dialectical problems, RCR problems, etc.), the applicability of Table 5.1 cannot be assumed. In many such cases most of those operations will lead to wrong results; the detailed applicability must first be tested. To illustrate the importance of the separability (locality) of the (identical, unchanging) elements to which formal binary operations are applicable, Errol Harris (1987, pp. 34–7) discusses a material implication, a conditional (penultimate example of Table 5.1): ‘If p (the antecedent), then q (the consequent)’ which is understood as a separation of relations. No essential connection is required (and in fact admitted) between the truth or falsity of the two propositions concerned. The implication is true whenever both propositions are true, or both are false, or p is false and q is true: (a)If it rains, the street is wet; (b)if it does not rain, the street is not wet; (c)it does not rain, yet the street is wet are all logically acceptable. The only unacceptable case would be: (d) it rains, yet the street is not wet. That would be a genuine logical contradiction, provided the truth of an implication is accepted as a principle. Harris’s (1987, pp. 36–7) counter-example is the following: If Newton’s mother is a woman, then Newton is a man. Whereas cases (a) (Newton’s mother is a woman, and Newton is a man), and (b) (Newton’s ‘mother’ is not a woman, and Newton is not a man) above work out all right, case

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Table 5.1 Various operations based on formal binary logic. Operation

Description/Characteristics

Example

Use of transitivity

Use of logic to avoid a further comparison measurement The result is independent from the grouping The result is independent from the order of the elements The result is independent from the order of the operations Reversing an operation will re-establish the initial situation Drawing conclusions from the premises Drawing conclusions for different situations Sets are dealt with as wholes

a > b; b > c → a > c

Association Commutation Distribution Use of reversibility Solving syllogisms Working with conditionals Manipulating sets of data

(x + y) + z = x + (y + z) (x · y) · z = x · (y · z) x+y=y+x x·y = y·x x · (y + z) = x · y + x · z x+y−y=x x·y : y = x All men are mortal; Socrates is a man; Socrates is mortal If p, then q . p, but not q: logically not possible Set B is a subset of set A; set A and set B overlap

(c) now presents a problem: If Newton’s mother is not a woman, then Newton is a man. The problem arises, because mother and son are not logically independent, they are not separable. Another way to look at this is to appreciate that a conditional of this type states a sufficient condition, not a necessary one. Before concluding this section on logic, a brief discussion of class sets will prove useful later (chapter 6). The possible relationships of class sets according to formal binary logic are shown in Fig. 5.1. According to Venn ([1881] 1971, p. 7), the four basic possibilities can be described as follows: in case 1 both classes are logically identical, they overlap completely. Their extensions are identical, but not their intensions. An example would be the class of equilateral triangles (A), and the class of equiangular triangles (B). In case 2 one class is a subset of the other class. For instance, if A is the class of religious norms, and B the class of moral norms, then 2a would mean that moral norms are a subset of religious norms (theological view), and 2b that religious norms are a subset of moral norms (view of humanistic philosophy). In case 3 the two classes overlap. An example would be the class of automobiles (A) and the class of vans (B) A car-a[nd]-van transports persons and therefore belongs to class A, but it also transports goods and hence also belongs to class B. Case 4 depicts the situation where independent classes are totally separated, no interaction is assumed. An example would be a scientific world view determined by a ‘rational’ investigation of nature (A), and a

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1

A

2a

A

B

B

3

A

2b

A

B

4

B

A

B

Figure 5.1 Venn diagrams of class sets.

religious world view determined by religious feelings and mystical experiences (B). A helpful point – but also a limitation – of Fig. 5.1 is that (within formal binary logic) no other relations exist. Dialectical and RCR-type ‘relations’ are excluded on principle, because they do not meet the above conditions underlying the use of set theory (well-defined, time-constant entities; separability of variables; reversibility). The diagrams of Fig. 5.1 help to clarify class relations and are therefore often more useful in (controversial) discussions than mere words (Reich 1996c). However, one has to be aware that they depict essentially class extensions (and intensions by implication, at least in case 1), but not the nature of any interaction. If that also needs depicting, a second set of diagrams may be used to depict the relationship, for instance the nature of any hierarchy in case 2, the kind of interaction in a common ‘area’ in case 3, etc. The exact nature of the interaction might still not be depictable though: is it causal, one of information transfer, dialectical, appropriate for applying RCR? Summing up this subsection in the words of John Macnamara (1994, p. 150): classical logic is ill equipped to handle logic of ordinary discourse precisely because classical logic derives mainly from an analysis of arithmetical sentences. Arithmetic is an unusual domain of discourse because (a) the objects in the domain are eternal and unchanging. All properties are necessary ones. And (b) only a single basic count noun is required in arithmetical sentences: number or set depending on the level of one’s work. Any other count noun can be

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Table 5.2 The sixteen binary operations. p, ¬p, q, ¬q = independent variables; x = dependent variable. T = true; F = false. (Explanation in text.) x if

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

p&q ¬p & q p & ¬q ¬p & ¬q

T T T T

T T T F

T T F F

T F F F

F F F F

T T F T

T F T T

F T T T

T F T F

F T T F

T F F T

F T F T

F F T T

F T F F

F F T F

F F F T

defined as a subset of numbers or sets – for example prime number, finite set. (emphasis in original)

Examples of formal binary logical operations The concept formal operations refers to operations that abstract from the substantive content of knowledge. If they are governed by binary logic, one lives in a dichotomous world of yes or no, true or false. One guide in that world is the set of sixteen operations, presented in Table 5.2. To understand the nature of Piagetian formal operations further, and to contrast them with RCR, we shall discuss Table 5.2 in some detail. Before that let me emphasise, however, that I am not entering into the debate as to whether Piaget had an adequate grasp of logic, or whether the sixteen operations are a correct model of his understanding of formal operations (e.g., Smith 1987). Above all, the point is to compare and to contrast formal binary operations with dialectical, analogical, cognitively complex thinking, and RCR ‘operations’ after going through the examples of the next several pages. Readers who want to relax for a moment can go right on to the amusing story on page 83 (‘A Piagetian task from the Internet’). Table 5.2 shows the sixteen different possibilities of how one of the two dichotomous values (x, ¬x) of the dependent variable x might be a function of the dichotomised independent variables p and q (p, ¬p; q, ¬q, where ¬ means not). The table was created by starting (column 1, on the left) purely formally with four times T (= ‘true’, i.e., probability 1), then in the columns 2 to 5 each time replacing one T by an F (= ‘false’, i.e., probability 0), next varying the position first of one F, then of two Fs, and finally of three Fs.4 4

In the literature, the content of Table 5.2 is often organised differently, for instance, with rows 2 and 3 inverted, or with a different order of the columns. However, that does not change the truth functions of a given column, which is the core content of Table 5.2.

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Column 1 represents the case of ‘complete affirmation’ (four times true): whatever the combination of p, ¬p and q, ¬q values, x has the same (dichotomous) value (not a very likely situation in the real world – the conclusion might be that the ‘wrong’ variables were studied). According to column 2,5 x keeps the value of column 1, except for the combination ¬p, ¬q (‘disjunction’ of p and q; ‘inclusive or’). Column 3 indicates a combination where only q determines x (‘affirmation of q’), column 4 that where the combination (conjunction) of p and q6 is decisive. Column 5 is the inverse of column 1 (all truth values are inverted), its logical complement (‘complete negation’). As to the truth values of column 6, only the combination p, ¬q does not lead to x (‘implication’); in the case of column 7 the combination ¬p, q (‘converse implication’) has the same effect. Column 8 (‘incompatibility’; ‘alternative or’) represents the logical complement of column 4.7 In column 9, p determines x, irrespective of q (‘affirmation of p’), in column 10 either p alone, or q alone takes that role (‘reciprocal exclusion’; ‘exclusive or’). Column 11 indicates the reign of either p and q or neither of them as determinants of x (‘equivalence’ of p and q), in column 12 it is q alone or neither p nor q (‘negation of p’), in column 13 either p or neither p nor q (‘negation of q’) determines the overall truth value. Columns 14–16 refer to the reigns of only q (‘converse nonimplication’), only p (‘nonimplication’), and neither of them (‘conjoint negation’).8 As already indicated and a closer inspection shows in detail, certain relationships obtain between the columns, that is between the truth functions represented in the various columns of Table 5.2. Thus, an inversion, 5

6

7

8

Column 2 represents the truth function termed ‘disjunction’, a function often written as (p v q). In that expression v stands for vel, the Latin term for or. As is apparent from column 2, a disjunction has the truth value 1 (= true) if either p is true, or q, or both (inclusive or). An everyday example for such a state of affairs would be, ‘automobiles have either hub brakes (p) or disk brakes (q), or hub brakes on one pair of wheels and disk brakes on the other’. In electronic circuitry, the corresponding Boolean function is termed ‘OR’. This truth function is called ‘conjunction’, and may be written p · q. An everyday example would be, ‘Getting a driver’s license requires us both to have the required age, and to have passed the tests.’ In electronic circuitry, the corresponding Boolean function is termed ‘AND’. This truth function is called ‘incompatibility’, and may be written as ¬p v¬q. It is true, if either p, or q, or neither p nor q obtains (alternative or). An example would be, ‘The car under that tarpaulin is either a Chevy, or a Ford, or something else.’ In electronic circuitry, the corresponding Boolean function is termed ‘NAND’, the logical complement of AND (column 4). This truth function may be called ‘conjoined negation’, and be written as ¬p · ¬q. An example would be, ‘This pendulum (dichotic weight ¬p, and dichotic length of suspension ¬q) has neither the weight p nor the length of suspension q.’ In electronic circuitry, the corresponding Boolean function is termed ‘NOR’, the logical complement of OR (column 2).

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transforming all Ts into Fs, and all Fs into Ts, that is into their logical complements, represents a ‘negation’, N. Examples are the transformations 1 → 5; 2 → 16; 3 → 13; 4 → 8 and vice versa. A correlative transformation, C, is concerned with functions having the same truth values in the first and the last rows of Table 5.2. That transformation changes the T and F values of the middle rows into F and T values, respectively. For example, a conjunction (column 4) is the resulting ‘converse’ of a disjunction (column 2), and vice versa. A reciprocal transformation, R, relates a proposition to its ‘obverse’. This concerns functions which share the truth values of the middle rows of Table 5.2; in the first and last rows that transformation entails a change of T into F, and vice versa. An example is the transformation of a disjunction of p and q (column 2) into an incompatibility (disjunction of ¬p and ¬q – column 8), and vice versa. An affirmation of p, q is transformed into a negation of p, q, and vice versa. To see the formalism of Table 5.2 at work, we use it to assist with solving a simplified, dichotomised pendulum task (cf. ch. 4, p. 61). Two pendulums have a heavy weight (p), and two a light weight (¬p). In each weight category, one pendulum has a long suspension (q), the other a short suspension (¬q). The question is, ‘What are the conditions for obtaining a high oscillation frequency of the pendulum (x)?’ Experimenting with the four pendulums yields the empirical answer: ‘The pendulums with the short suspension (¬q) exhibit the high frequency.’ A look at Table 5.2 shows that the result is represented by column 13. Having understood the formalism of the sixteen operations, one can surmise that the condition for ¬x, the low frequency, is represented by the logical complement of column 13, that is by column 3. An experimental check will rapidly confirm that conclusion. A conscientious researcher would now look at the other fourteen truth operations and check whether he or she has tested them empirically, or whether they can be considered irrelevant for the present case (e.g., nos. 1 and 5). If both issues are settled, the researcher can be certain that he or she has obtained the correct result. The INCR group We have just seen that through a correlative transformation (C) disjunctions can transform into conjunctions, and vice versa. Affirmation and negation of p or q can be transformed into each other through a reciprocal transformation (R). A negation (N) leads simultaneously to both transformations. The three types of transformations constitute the INCR group depicted in Fig. 5.2. There are three ways to get from p v q to ¬p · ¬q: via (1) a negation, (2) a correlative transformation followed by a reciprocal transformation of the result, or (3) by a reciprocal transformation followed by a correlative transformation.

Other Thought Forms p v q

83 p v

q

R C

C

N R

p q

p

q

Figure 5.2 INCR group. I stands for identity transformation (resulting, e.g., from a double negation), N for negation, C for correlative transformation, and R for reciprocal transformation (explanation of transformations in text).

As an example, generalising the relations depicted in Fig. 5.2 can be used for assisting in a modified version of the snail task (Piaget [1946] 1972, pp. 59–109). A snail moves on a board, which is displaced on a table (cf. Fig. 4.1, p. 60). These double movements go on for some time. The task is to find a way for reconstituting exactly the situation reigning at the start. Obviously, one way is simultaneously to reverse exactly all the movements made, to operate a negation. However, according to Fig. 5.2, and if the movement of the snail is represented by C and that of the board by R, then one can immediately discuss two more possibilities, namely, to correct separately the movements of the snail and of the board, this in either order. Many similar examples can be found from balancing a scale to making up a seating order for a dinner party using two criteria. A Piagetian task from the Internet The following story from the Internet provides, I hope, an enjoyable example of Piagetian formal operations at work, that is applying the formalism just reviewed to a hypothetical case: ‘Is Hell exothermic (releases heat) or endothermic (absorbs heat)? Support your answer with proof.’ Most of the students wrote proofs of their beliefs using Boyle’s Law (gas cools off when it expands and heats up when it is compressed) or some variant. One student, however, wrote the following: First, we need to know how the mass of Hell is changing in time. So, we need to know the rate that souls are moving into Hell and the rate they are leaving. I think that we can safely assume that once a soul gets to Hell, it will not leave. Therefore, no souls are leaving. As for how many souls are entering Hell, let’s

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look at the different religions that exist in the world today. Some of these religions state that if you are not a member of their religion, you will go to Hell. Since there are more than one of these religions and since people do not belong to more than one religion, we can project that all people and all souls go to Hell. With birth and death rates as they are, we can expect the number of souls in Hell to increase exponentially. Now, we look at the rate of change of the volume in Hell because Boyle’s Law states that in order for temperature and the pressure in Hell to stay the same, the volume of Hell has to expand as souls are added. This gives two possibilities: (1) If Hell is expanding at a slower rate than the rate at which souls enter Hell, then the temperature and pressure in Hell will increase until All Hell breaks loose. (2) Of course, if Hell is expanding at a rate faster than the increase of souls in Hell, then the temperature and pressure will drop until Hell freezes over. So which is it? If we accept the postulate given to me by Ms Therese Banyan during my Freshman year, ‘That it will be a cold night in Hell before I sleep with you’, and take into account the fact that I still have not succeeded in that area, then (2) cannot be true, and so Hell is exothermic. This student got the only A.

Having discussed the nature, the potential as well as the limitation of Piagetian operations to cases where formal binary logic applies (as allegedly in the Hell task), we come to cognitively complex thinking, another major ingredient of RCR.

Cognitively complex thinking Cognitively complex thinking originally was dealt with as an instance of information processing (Schroder, Driver, and Streufert 1967). This type of thinking involves differentiation (bringing out differences of fact, of possible interpretations, and valuing) and integration (attempts at linking various elements in order to arrive at an overall assessment). The seven-level scale for assessing degrees of cognitively complex thinking (Baker-Brown, Ballard, Bluck, Vries, Suedfeld, and Tetlock 1992) is reflected in the five levels of RCR (Table 4.7, p. 66). The seven-level scale can be described briefly as follows: level 1, no differentiation or integration (only one point of view, no other comes into the field of vision); level 2, beginning of differentiation; level 3, clear differentiation (at least two approaches to dealing with the information received; ‘either/or’ is in view); level 4, beginning of integration (both-and becomes a [weak] possibility); level 5, explicit integration; level 6, systematic approach including an evaluation of the different possibilities and a comparison of their likelihood to be most promising; (7) elaboration of a framework that can ‘house’ the various considerations of the lower levels. One can appreciate the importance of the cognitive complexity of reasoning (and thence of RCR) from a study by Peter Suedfeld and Philip Tetlock (1977). They graded sets of diplomatic communications

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Table 5.3 Level of cognitive complexity resulting from an analysis of diplomatic notes exchanged during five international crises.

Crisis

Result

Mean level of complexity

1911 1914 1948 1950 1962

peace war peace war peace

4.64 1.95 2.75 1.71 4.71

Source: Suedfeld and Tetlock (1977, p. 182).

in particular during the following five crises: (1) Agadir (1 July–4 Nov. 1911), (2) outbreak of First World War (26 June–4 August 1914), (3) Berlin Blockade (22 June–18 Sept. 1948), (4) outbreak of Korean War (25 June–4 July 1950), and (5) the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. Results are presented in Table 5.3. In view of the striking differences, an argument can be made that cognitively complex thinking should be encouraged (and thence RCR) if one wants a more peaceful world. The counter-argument one sometimes hears (but about which I have reservations) is that in times of adversity persons thinking in an undifferentiated way are better fighters – maybe that the resoluteness of the ‘kamikaze fighters’ in war or warlike action explains how one can get to such a view. Dialectical thinking Dialectical thinking has a long history; it was notably practised by Greek philosophers. In the course of the centuries, it took on many shades of meanings, and different schools define and practise it differently (e.g., Harris 1987; Kainz 1988; Reese 1982). When Basseches (1984, p. 20) started his work, he looked among others at the writings of Hegel, Marx, Darwin, von Bertalanffy, and at Piaget’s theory of adaptation through assimilation and accommodation.9 His general description of dialectical thinking ‘in the broadest sense’ is said to be applicable to the published works of the authors named and to ‘the way in which ordinary adults confront common problems of living’. 9

The paradoxical situation is that Piaget could not have worked out fully his ‘complete’ theory of cognitive development by using exclusively formal binary operations (which are at the pinnacle of cognitive development according to that theory). Dialectical thought is involved in the description of the development itself as distinct from the description of a given stage and the logico-mathematical thinking at that stage.

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Figure 5.3 Through becoming, being and nonbeing transform into new being and new nonbeing.

Dialectical thinking is related to ‘here-and-now’ thinking in the same way that a motion picture is related to a still photograph. The motion picture does not ‘contradict’ the still photograph but combines a series of them according to the laws of motion. Dialectical thought acknowledges that a change of quantity may become a change of quality. The dialectical ‘conflict’ of content and structure eventually leads to a restructuring. Thus, dialectical thinking also deals with the interruption of continuity. With Basseches (1984, pp. 21–30), dialectical thinking, as understood here, is based on an ontology of wholeness and of change, in which old structures (systems) give way to new structures (systems). Wholeness means that first, entities are emphasised over against monadic, independent elements, and second, the entities themselves are de-emphasised relative to the process of existence as a whole. Dialectical change is depicted in Fig. 5.3. As will be apparent from Fig. 5.3, the dialectic outlook emphasises intrinsic internal relations. The relations among parts within a whole make the parts what they are, and thus the relations are ‘internal’ to the nature of the parts. At the same time, the relations form the internal structure of the whole . . . as these relations change, fundamental change in what exists occurs . . . Thus the emphasis on change, wholeness, and internal relations are interconnected in dialectical ontologies. (ibid., p. 22)

Examples of corresponding dialectical analyses may be found, for instance, in the works of Karl Marx and of Thomas S. Kuhn.

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Basseches (ibid., p. 29) points out that dialectical analyses are not without costs. The ‘willingness to question the permanence and intransigence of the boundary conditions of a problem, and to ask about situations which lie beyond those boundaries’ might endanger intellectual security. It will depend on each individual, whether trading off such a security for freedom from intellectually imposing limitations on oneself and other people is considered worthwhile or not. I do not want to close this subsection without referring to Klaus Riegel, who revitalised the study of dialectical thinking (e.g., Riegel 1978), but unfortunately left us much too young. Jack Meacham (1999) sees the current importance of dialectical theory in its facilitating the understanding of issues in multiculturalism. From that perspective he reviews Riegel’s work and in particular its commonalities with the work of the Russian psychologist Rubinstejn. Riegel’s dialectical psychology was motivated in particular by the observation that ‘traditional psychology retains a strong commitment to the belief that traits and abilities remain stable, and to the concepts of balance and equilibrium’ (Meacham 1999, p. 135). Actually, imbalances, disequilibria, questions, doubts, and challenges may provoke developmental changes and therefore need study. A major point is to consider changes not just within a given domain, but to pay attention ‘to transactions occurring among major developmental progressions – biological, psychological, and culture-historical’ (ibid., p. 138). A view inspired by Fig. 5.3 is probably better able than other approaches to understand racial strife and to devise medium-term and long-term remedial measures with a view to achieving a viable multiculturalism. The lesson is clear: a complex understanding of relationships and their evolving nature is a core issue. Dialectical thought is geared to tackle it, and therefore needs to be supported. Notice too that this is already an example of matching the thought form to the problem structure. Analogical thinking Not only for children do analogical arguments play key roles for finding a mental way when facing a new problem (cf. Gentner, Brem, Ferguson, Markman, Levidow, Wolff and Forbus 1997; Moshman 1998, pp. 954– 5). That remains true even for scientists (Oppenheimer 1956). In the laboratory, four-year-olds can complete analogies such as ‘bird is to nest as dog is to?’ (bird:nest::dog ? – Goswami 1998, p. 223). To come to the solution, children must map the relation lives in that links bird to nest to the item dog in order to find kennel.10 With development, more 10

Goswami (1998, pp. 223–4) had presented the task to 4-year-old Lucas as a picture of a bird and that of a nest with three eggs in it, and told a story around those pictures,

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complex relational mappings can be carried out. Goswami’s (ibid., p. 253) example is to use an analogy from the mental representation of familiar height relations such as Daddy > Mummy > Baby as a basis for mapping to a transitive inference problem such as ‘Tom is happier than Bill, Bill is happier than Mike, who is happiest?’ The solution involves mapping Tom to Dad, Bill to Mummy, and Mike to Baby. As Daddy is the tallest, Tom is the happiest. Whereas in the first example (bird:nest::dog?) the mapping referred to a single relation, now the mappings refer to an ordered pair of relations. For RCR, only some of the operations composing analogical thinking are required, namely searching for commonalities and differences (cf. Medin, Goldstone, and Gentner 1990). Concluding remarks The characteristics, and main differences of the four thought forms, and RCR, can be summarised as shown in Table 5.4. Having discussed the characteristics of the four thought forms under discussion, and earlier those of RCR I finish this section by applying all five in turn to a micro-analysis of an impending partnership break-up (cf. Basseches 1984, pp. 26–7). In real life hardly anybody will argue in that way (and certainly not for so brief a time), people being more pragmatic, but to use pure forms of thought in this illustration might help to get a better sense of what each brings out. John and Barbara are Piagetians. ‘It’s all your fault, Barbara, you never understood me.’ ‘And you John, what did you really do to make me happy? I am deeply disappointed.’ ‘Well, maybe we were never meant for each other!’ For John and Barbara only black and white exist in their dichotomous world, only fully right or fully wrong, in short the break-up is to be analysed in terms of the sixteen binary operations of Table 5.2. The result is likely to lead singly or in combination to (a) a lowered selfesteem, (b) anger at the partner, (c) devaluing the relationship as long as it lasted, and (d) a hesitancy to make future commitments. Dick and Joan are cognitive complex thinkers: ‘You know, Dick, I shall miss sailing with you, we were really a good team.’ ‘Yes, and we always knew where we wanted to go. But then, you were too easy with spending money, and that put a strain on our relationship.’ ‘Well, I thought that with all the raises you told me about we could afford it.’ ‘Now Joan, there is a lot I could say to that and to other things. Nevertheless, I keep some including a dog. Lucas argued that birds lay eggs and dogs ‘lay’ puppies, so he insisted that the missing analogue was puppy! In any event the answer shows analogical thinking exploring far afield and coming up with a solution.

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Table 5.4 Main differences of (1) Piagetian operations, (2) cognitively complex thinking, (3) dialectical thinking, (4) analogical thinking, and (5) RCR. A, B, C, D are the ‘variables’, ‘dimensions’ or characteristic ‘aspects’ concerned. No.

Nature of aspects A, B, (C, D)

Relationships between A, B, (C, D)

1

A, B, (C . . . ) are part of the same conceptual system; are intrinsically independent from each other; they can variously be ‘linked externally’ with each other. Piagetian tasks often involve the elucidation of such relationships within a given closed system, for instance in the case of the pendulum task or the balance scale task. Not defined; a large variety pertains as in the case of human relationships. That large variety invites wideranging exploration (differentiation and integration). Within an open system, A and B belong to different subsystems; they determine each other as do ‘being’ and ‘nonbeing’, ‘as such’ and ‘for us’, ‘assimilation’ and ‘accommodation’. A, B are part of one reference system, C, D of another system. Properties/ functions of A and B correspond to analogous properties/functions of C, D: in the case of linked traffic lights, a car driver ‘surfs’ along like a surfer on the ocean waves.

In agreement with (time-independent) formal binary logic (tertium non datur) transitivity, associativity, distributivity, commutativity, reversibility (the negation of a negation leads exactly back to the origin) pertain. Logical contradiction is not to be tolerated; the overall system is of a static and synchronous nature. Experience of human life, recognition of protagonists’ motivations, of their objectives, of personality variables, etc. are more helpful for insights than ‘logics’. Relationships are dynamic and have to do with change and development. The negation of a negation leads to something new: through becoming, nonbeing turns into new being and being into nonbeing. In order for the analogy to work (enlarged search space, better understanding), the similarities of the properties/functions need to be sufficiently strong and evident. Nevertheless, almost by definition there will always also be marked differences. Negations mean an iterative refocusing from A onto B and so on, with ideally each time a gain in understanding of their relationship – based on a logic of non-compatibility (which is not incompatibility).

2

3

4

5

A, B, (C . . . ) belong to different categories within the frame of a given explanandum; they are ‘permanently’ linked intrinsically; ‘completely understandable’ in their own context; all needed for a genuine insight.

(Source: Reich 1999, p. 139)

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good memories, and anyway, next time, I shall know better.’ Dick and Joan clearly differentiate and integrate their experience considerably more than our Piagetians. The break-up is less traumatic for them than for John and Barbara, and possibly Dick and Joan will still meet occasionally to speak about their respective new partnerships. Ron and Liz are dialecticians. ‘Now Ron, who would have thought when we first met that it would end with us this way? Do you remember how happy we were, the things we did together?’ ‘Of course I do, Liz, and I shall go on valuing those times. But then, we have changed since. You have started your new career.’ ‘And you have developed new interests I simply cannot share.’ ‘Well, maybe, Liz, one day we will move closer together again, but for the moment a separation seems the most reasonable thing to do, don’t you agree?’ Looking thus for changes in either partner within and outside the relationship embeds the break-up into the flow of life. It could even appear as a gate towards further development, and would leave positive remembrances intact. Walt and Anne often use analogies to explain things. ‘You know, Walt, this is just like what happened with your brother Ted. One day he had enough and just broke up with his partner, I never understood why.’ ‘No Anne, that is the wrong comparison. Rather take Frank and Nancy. They were together for quite a while until it became clear to them that their partnership was nor really fulfilling. So they parted ways in mutual agreement.’ The good aspect of this discussion is that both partners try to understand what happened (and they do it without directly attacking each other). However, as no two cases of human relationships are identical, there are limitations to this approach. Walt and Anne may never get to the bottom of their impending break-up unless they really focus on their personal case. Bob and Betty favour RCR. ‘Bob, it seems to me as if lately we have a problem with our relationship.’ ‘Oh, why do you say that? We still like to travel together to interesting places and we have a good time sharing our impressions, don’t we?’ ‘Yes indeed, but for one thing, I enjoy less and less jogging or skiing with you, you are just too strong for me.’ ‘Well, should I admit that your love of going to concerts and expecting me to come along each time is getting a bit much for me? I am not against concerts, but there has to be a measure to everything.’ ‘I am glad you are so frank about it, Bob. Maybe we should do more things we like to do together, and learn how not to get on each other’s nerves by either reducing or transforming those less pleasant occasions.’ ‘That may not be easy, Betty, but let’s try!’ By way of bringing in the context and differentiating their respective experiences, Bob and Betty give their partnership a second chance.

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If any conclusions can be drawn from these imagined, much too rudimentary ‘vignettes’, it is clearly that Piagetian operations are of limited helpfulness in this context. The other thought forms have more to offer, each in its own way. After this interlude we are ready to see all five forms fully at work, each where it can serve most. Matching the form of thought to the structure of the problem Development of children’s natural epistemology When one reads about the various stages of development of epistemic competence (e.g., King and Kitchener 1994; Kohlberg’s 1984, pp. 432– 6 summary of Perry’s work), one might get the (mistaken) impression that at a given stage, the mental tools, the epistemic approach characteristic of that stage is applied globally, no matter what the logical structure of the problem may be. This monograph contends, rather, that for optimal results, the particular thought form (with its inbuilt logic) used to reason about a given problem should match that problem’s structure (cf. Wood 1983). This matching may succeed more or less well, depending on the person’s developmental stage, but that variation in itself is not an argument against the principle of matching the ‘right’ thought form to the structure of the problem about which one is thinking. In other words, irrespective of the approach used most often at a given age/developmental level, several approaches should be available, and the most appropriate used in a given case. Thus, the thrust of this section is to argue for a person’s development and targeted use of a variety of thought forms over against cultivating one or perhaps two, and ‘adapting’ them pragmatically if forced by ‘reality’. Are there any empirical grounds for the possibility of implementing such a stipulation? Annick Mansfield and Blythe Clinchy (e.g., 1985) reported several studies on the development of children’s natural epistemology. The tasks assigned to children in these studies were to decide (1) whether a particular item floats or sinks (verifiable fact), (2) whether a dog can understand human language or not (debatable fact), (3) whether a new boy is ‘yucky’ or nice (interpretation), (4) whether a new food tastes good or not (personal taste). These researchers found that (a) young children (age 3 to 4 years) exhibited an absolutist epistemology (one with no concept of subjectivity), (b) children aged 7–10 years displayed a dichotomous epistemology (one able to differentiate between objective fact and subjective opinion), (c) adolescents and young adults evidenced an integrated epistemology (one in which subjectivity plays a role even in matters

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of ‘fact’, and in which inferential knowledge and expertise can be brought to bear even on matters of taste) – note the implicit development of RCR when going from (a) to (b) to (c). The young children relied mostly on their own experience or on ‘reason’ (= trial) to justify their judgement. In middle childhood, children still relied prominently upon personal experience, but they offered subjective justifications for their judgements regarding issues 3 and 4 (interpretation and personal taste) and appealed to outside authority to judge the correct answer to issue 2 (debatable fact). College students invoked personal experience and subjectivity in much the same way as the 10-year-olds did. Unlike the children, however, they referred more often to outside authority regarding both verifiable and debatable facts, as well as matters of taste. Thus, at least one series of studies demonstrate that children aged 7 and up discriminate between different issues/problems as regards (a) the possibility of a consensual ‘true’ statement vs. a personal opinion, and (b) the optimal way to reach such a consensual statement. To cite an example from an RCR interview with a 9-year-old girl (‘On the wall before us we see two paintings. Can we argue which is more beautiful?’): ‘Not really, that is a matter of personal taste. But we can argue as to whether either picture is damaged or not.’ As this example also demonstrates, children already have a sense at that age for matching their approach to ‘reasoning’ about a problem to the problem structure, at least in certain cases. Five examples of matching the thought form to the problem The problems To exemplify and concretise the issue of this section – matching the thought form to the structure(s) of the problem at hand – we will analyse five problems, which look more or less alike, but whose solutions involve different logics (= principles or rules governing the proper use of reasoning, cf. ch. 1, pp. 15–16). These logics are embedded in five thought forms, the fifth being RCR. The first problem poses the question, what determines the frequency of a pendulum’s oscillations: (a) the weight of the pendulum, (b) the amplitude (range) of the oscillation (whether originating from releasing the displaced pendulum from varying heights or giving it a more or less strong push from the resting position), (c) the length of the suspension, or (d) something else? The second problem involves a scenario: a woman’s husband is an alcoholic. He has recently returned home from a clinic after a second attempt at curing his alcoholism. His wife tells him, ‘The first treatment

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had no effect. If you come home drunk one more time, I’m going to leave you!’ He then comes home drunk. What will the wife do? In the third problem’s scenario, a trade union demands a 6 per cent wage increase, arguing that higher wages will spur greater consumption, thereby creating new jobs and driving down unemployment. The employers respond by offering the union a wage increase of 2 per cent. The employers argue that increased consumption will only lead to higher levels of imports, while higher wages will make exports less competitive, so that as an overall effect no net decrease in unemployment will be achieved. They claim that only by producing marketable, competitively priced products and services will they be able to hire additional workers. Does this mean a stalemate? Or is there a way to negotiate between these two positions? The fourth problem involves a teacher who wants to assist students with learning about the functions of flower stems. With that aim in mind, she invites the students to compare the flower stem to a drinking straw. The question is, why could that be helpful to the students? In the fifth problem’s scenario (already introduced in chapter 1), a TV news station reports on an accident in a nuclear power station. The main cooling pump had stopped working, and the back-up pump did not function. The emergency shutdown did not function either. To add to the difficulties, the operating crew became aware of the danger rather late and then underestimated it. The water temperature suddenly rose. A steam pipe cracked and leaked radioactive steam. What or who is to blame? What should be done to avoid another such accident in the future? In each case, one is being asked to find a solution to the problem presented, a process that involves analysing, possibly experimenting, reasoning, judging, and drawing conclusions. But there are important differences between the structures of the five problems, and therefore different thought forms have to be applied for best results. The Piagetian task The first task is of a physico-mathematical nature. One expects a single, clear-cut solution, which can be expressed in the form of an equation for the frequency of the pendulum. One might find this equation inductively by a method based upon experimentation, making many precision measurements of pendulum oscillation frequencies under widely differing, strictly controlled conditions which are varied singly, each in turn. One would then infer from the experimental data the answer to the problem, that is to say, the best possible relation between the independent variable(s) and the frequency of the pendulum’s oscillation. Formal binary logic is helpful, even indispensable (Inhelder and Piaget [1955], 1958, pp. 67–79), in reaching this solution (cf. ch. 4, p. 61; ch. 5, p. 82).

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The cognitively complex problem If one attempted to apply the same kind of logic to the second problem, i.e., to infer from the ‘data’ – here the wife’s statement – what is the most likely conclusion, the answer clearly would be, ‘The wife will leave her husband.’ After all, she has told him that if he came home drunk one more time, she would leave him; he has done so and thus, she must leave, at least according to the classical logic of conditionals. But when we presented this problem to participants in our interviews, only a 9-year-old boy gave that categorical a response. By contrast, an 11-year-old girl said, ‘Maybe she was just menacing.’ And we might predict that an experienced social worker would want to know much more before hazarding a guess about the wife’s behaviour, if he or she were willing to guess at all. The social worker might ask such questions as, ‘Was this the first time she had threatened to leave?’; ‘Did she really mean it or was this a self-protective move that would allow her to say to herself, “I tried. I did the best that I could”?’; ‘What is her relationship with her husband really like?’; ‘Was her father perhaps an alcoholic?’; ‘Do she and her husband have children?’; ‘If so, how does the father treat them when he is drunk?’; ‘What alternatives to living with her husband are actually viable for her?’; ‘Could she earn a living?’; ‘Does she have friends and relatives who support her?’ Clearly, one could posit at best a probable outcome given an intimate knowledge of the family concerned and a rich personal experience of human life. Piagetian formal operations would hardly help one to solve this problem, because the wife’s attitude does not appear unambiguous; that is, it does not appear to carry a time-independent ‘truth’ value. Nor is the wife’s attitude, presumably, fully reversible. Therefore no simple, straightforward cause–effect relationship exists comparable to what obtains in the pendulum case. The social worker’s questions differentiate between several possible causes and motives, weighing the ‘data’ from a number of perspectives. In short, solving problem no. 2 requires one to differentiate between various aspects of the problem and to integrate the partial results. Cognitively complex thinking (and experience of human life) is called for, not applying formal binary logic. The dialectical problem As regards problem no. 3, the negotiation between a trade union and the employer(s), everyday ‘real world’ experience teaches one that in the end, unions and employers usually achieve some sort of resolution, stalemates between the two sides do not extend ad infinitum. The resolution is often unpredictable, however. At least, one cannot predict it with precision. One reason for this lies in the multitude of variables and the diversity of influences that co-determine any outcome. Another reason lies in the fact

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that intermediate steps in the process of negotiation are often irreversible steps that change the ‘givens’ or ‘data’. Indeed, the eventual solution may well emerge out of a series of provisional iterations, possibly influenced by strike action, pressure of public opinion, government intervention, etc. In order to ‘solve’ this problem, both negotiating parties must understand the dynamics of the process, its dialectics. And one salient feature that distinguishes dialectical logic from formal binary logic is that ‘a negation of a negation does not lead back to the original position/situation (as in the case of formal binary logic), but to something new’. The analogical problem What kind of logic is involved in problem no. 4, learning about the flower stem? Evidently, the teacher wants to ground the children’s thinking initially in something that they know from their daily life, a drinking straw. When students begin to compare the shapes of the stem and the straw, they will presumably notice the straightness of both and perhaps also the fact that both are hollow. Noting these shared traits might lead them to recognise that both serve to transport a liquid. Pushing the comparison further, the students might even venture to surmise that the stem serves to convey nourishment to the flower, as a straw conveys nourishment to a human being. Seeking out differences, the students might note the difference in material, in the stem’s status as (no longer) alive vs. the (synthetic) straw’s status as never alive, and in the stem’s quality of being an integral part of a plant vs. the straw being an independent artefact being used as an implement, or again in the stem holding itself up vs. the straw being held by a person. Thus far, this type of reasoning has shown little use of formal binary logic. Such a logic may nevertheless come into play when students undertake an independent study of the stem either to confirm or reject the clues gleaned from analogical thinking. However, the reflective analogical thinking proper relies upon its own form of logic, which involves looking for potential analogues and then judging whether clear, strong and plentiful functional commonalities exist that make a given analogue useful and persuasive. The RCR problem Finally, we come to problem no. 5, the accident at the nuclear power plant. A ‘solution’ was already presented in chapter 1. So let us see whether another form of thought could have done better than RCR. This problem resembles the pendulum task in terms of considering the relative importance of three variables: what are the contributions of (a) the plant behaviour, (b) the actions of the operators, and (c) the operators’ group

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dynamics to the final outcome? Indeed, in principle one can formulate hypotheses regarding both problems no. 1 and no. 5 and can then test them until one arrives at a satisfactory answer. But the differences between the two problems immediately surface: (i) the study of the pendulum can be repeated ad infinitum using the same pendulum, which is not true in the case of the power plant; (ii) the pendulum variables can be varied one by one at will, whereas a simulation of the power plant accident can hardly be expected to reproduce the original event, let alone to permit variation of the variables step by step; (iii) physics alone is involved in the pendulum task, while the power plant task also involves human behaviour; (iv) in the pendulum task the three potential variables are separable, independent of each other, whereas in the plant accident at least some of the variables are inseparable. Thus, while some components of Piagetian operations clearly apply to problem no. 5 (such as constructing a hypothesis in possibility space), once again formal binary logic does not. Might one take a cue from problem no. 2, the story of the alcoholic and his wife? Both problems no. 2 and no. 5 involve human beings. The differences are that (a) problem 5’s outcome is already known, while one must speculate about the wife’s decision in problem 2; (b) the human beings working at the power plant are trained professionals doing their job, not a wife involved in a personal relationship with its problems; (c) problem 5’s outcome is co-determined by the plant’s behaviour, while problem 2 involves only human behaviour. Nevertheless, one might reasonably expect some components of cognitively complex thinking to play a role in the solution of problem no. 5. Might one consider the problem-solving process of no. 3, the wage negotiation, as being of any help? Both problems 3 and 5 have in common that (a) the situation at the end is different from the situation at the beginning; and (b) the ‘actors’ involved are somehow linked together; they react to what is happening before their eyes – and which may well not be anticipated. As to differences, (i) the power plant has less ‘freedom of manoeuvre’ than do problem 3’s negotiating parties, and (ii) the outcome of problem 5 is possibly even further from anyone’s expectations than is the outcome of problem 3’s negotiation. Nevertheless, one might expect to find some elements of dialectical thinking involved in finding a solution to problem 5. What might problem 4’s analogical thinking contribute to answering problem no. 5? Both problem 4’s plant and problem 5’s operating crew age and eventually ‘die’. Both need ‘nourishment’ and ‘maintenance care’. There are clear differences, however, including (a) non-living vs. living entities; (b) ‘behaviour’ that is narrowly bound by natural laws vs. behaviour that allows for some free choice; (c) non-emotional (plant)

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‘behaviour’ vs. potentially emotional (human) behaviour, and (d) morally neutral (plant) ‘behaviour’ vs. legally and morally responsible (human) behaviour, to name a few. Analogical considerations (‘what are commonalities and differences?’) are helpful when battling to answer the questions posed by problem no. 5, but of themselves will not fully answer the questions. Nevertheless, elements of analogical thinking might help one methodically when seeking answers to the questions raised by problem no. 5. Concluding remarks Closing this section, I hope to have demonstrated that a single thought form cannot solve optimally problems that have such different structures as nos. 1–5. Rather, problem 1 was best solved by Piagetian logicomathematical thinking, problem 2 by cognitively complex thought, problem 3 required dialectical thinking, problem 4 needed analogical thinking, and problem 5 was optimally solved by RCR. On the assumption that these results can be generalised, the application of RCR, the RCR heuristic is presented and multiply illustrated in Part II of this monograph. Summary of other thought forms and matching them to the problem at hand This chapter consists of two distinct, yet related main sections. Both have to do with Piagetian thinking, cognitively complex thinking, dialectical thinking, analogical thinking, and, in a different way, with RCR. In the first section, the characteristics of the first four forms of thought were compared to and contrasted with RCR. The main difference was found to be at the level of logic. In the second section five differing (uniquesolution) tasks/(ill-defined) problems were used to demonstrate matching the thought form to the problem structure.

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Overview The natu re of the variou s chapters of Part II is diverse. Chapter 6 illu strates the application of RCR, first pu rely formally, and then tow ays of relating science and religion/theology, thereby highlighting, among other things, the symbolic meaning of the cover pictu re. Chapter 7 reports mainly empirical stu dies in the area of religion/theology. Chapter 8 endeavou rs to u nearth u se of RCR at earlier times invariou s su bject domains (Christian doctrine, painting, psychology, poetry, literatu re, physics). From chapter 9 onward, considerations become yet more specu lative. Each time, I attempt to apply RCR to a given issu e (in psychology, edu cation, nu clear energy, illegal u se of narcotics, rehabilitation of depressed areas), and then I discu ss the cu rrent state of the (pu blic) discu ssion of that issu e against the backgrou nd of RCR desiderata, and draw some conclu sions. Readers who are mainly after robu st evidence for RCR will have seen what I have to offer by the end of chapter 7; they may want to go from chapter 8 or even from chapter 7 immediately to chapter 12, the conclu sions. Nevertheless, I hope to have provided su fficient circu mstantial evidence and argu mentative plau sibility in chapters 8 to 11 to make their reading worthwhile.

6

Methodology

Method for applying RCR This chapter aims to demonstrate how RCR can be used to gain a deeper understanding of a (controversial) complex issue, the ‘explanandum’ which is subject to rivalling descriptions, explanations, models, theories, and/or interpretations. At first blush, applying RCR, the RCR search heuristic, may be somewhat hard to understand. I first present it formally, as a series of eight abstract steps. Readers who prefer to see immediately each step applied to a concrete case may want to turn to page 104 after reading the next paragraph. Before going into the actual procedure, a word needs to be said about the explanandum. Basically, there are two cases: (i) it is a given (e.g., the nature of light, taking remedial action after a nuclear accident) or (ii) it needs to be determined (e.g., when entering a ‘new’ field such as science and religion/theology – to be dealt with momentarily). In the latter case, the explanandum has to be ‘cut out’ such that it contains the ‘control centre(s)’ (Reich 1995b). For instance, if one wants to improve the understanding of blood circulation in vertebrae, it is not sufficient to consider the heart and the vascular system; one needs to include equally the relevant parts of the nervous system. Delimiting a coherent functional whole as explanandum implies that one can envisage with some confidence developing its overarching theory in the (distant) future, even if it is (by far) not clear at present what it will look like (e.g., mind and brain). Going through the sequence of the first seven steps represents what I call the RCR heuristic. Whereas applying RCR ‘tacitly’ may already be quite helpful, its full potential becomes fruitful when the RCR heuristic is applied systematically. Here are the complete eight steps (Reich 1990b, 1990d): (1) clarifying and defining, at least tentatively, the entity, the phenomenon, the event, the functionally coherent whole which constitutes the explanandum; 103

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(2) listing all descriptions/explanations/models/theories/interpretations A, B, C . . . of the explanandum, even if they are considered incompatible or incommensurable by the ambient culture, possibly adding new ones, and dealing with any conflicts and contradictions arising (which may mean throwing out either A or B or C – it is possibly not a case for RCR) (mastering different logics and means-reflecting thought, cf. ch. 2, pp. 29–32, is particularly important for dealing with this step); (3) ascertaining that A, B, C . . . are genuinely coextensive, that they refer to the identical explanandum; (4) establishing the circumstances, the context, under which A, B, C . . . describe or explain particular aspects of the explanandum, and, if a genuine understanding does not come forth, reconsidering A (B, C . . . ) as approximation only; (5) discovering and describing any (including unexpected) links between the respective attributes/features of A, B, C . . . , as well as any coinherences (mutual pointers); (6) exploring the extent to which the (relative) explanatory power of A (B, C . . . ) depends on the current strength of B (A, C . . . ), etc.; (7) developing a complete synopsis or theory that explains all features of the explanandum under differing contextual conditions; (8) explaining any shifts in the meaning of the concepts needed to explain the explanandum, A, B, C . . . , and the new synopsis or theory. Demonstration of a particular search To clarify the heuristic indicated, the example chosen is ‘ways of relating science (A) and religion/theology (B)’. Before doing this step by step, proceeding from (1) to (8) above, some background knowledge is required. Background knowledge about science and religion/theology In the Middle Ages science and religion/theology were in consonance, for instance in the writings of Thomas Aquinas. Along with the growing success of inductive science (e.g., Galileo’s works), that consonance gradually weakened from the Renaissance onward, the split between science and theology widened in the eighteenth century with the advent of the philosophy of the Enlightenment (e.g., Voltaire’s writings), and became even more marked with the ascent of (first Comtean and then Logical) Positivism (e.g., Haeckel’s materialistic monism). Given the recently changed philosophy of knowledge discussed in chapter 3 (pp. 35–7), and the partial dissatisfaction with science and technology on account

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of its danger for the environment and potentially for human health, the intellectual climate concerned has somewhat ‘warmed up’ during the latter part of the twentieth century: here and there a dialogue between science and religion/theology has been rekindled (e.g., Byers 2000; Grenz 2000; John Templeton Foundation 1996; Numrich and Numrich 2000; Polkinghorne 1996; Richardson and Wildman 1996; Southgate, DeaneDrummond, and Murray 1999). Nevertheless, the clash between creation/intelligent design scientists on the one hand, and evolutionists (Darwinians) on the other, persists.1 Also to be noted: besides Christianity, other religions join the discussion (Stannard 2000), for instance Islam (e.g., Golshani 2001) and Buddhism (e.g., Ricard and Thuan 2000). The topic under discussion therefore remains of actual interest. Ian Barbour (1990, p. 3), professor of science, technology and society, in his Gifford lecture at Aberdeen in 1989, stated the following: 1

The following Internet news brief of Saturday, 13 May 2000 (copyright Chicago SunTimes Inc.), titled ‘Intelligent Design meets Congressional Designers’ (courtesy of Davis Wald at Caltech) illustrates the latter statement: On May 10th, a House Judiciary Committee hearing room was the site of a three-hour briefing on palaeontology, biology, and cosmology. Although presentations were at times quite technical, the speakers were not there to discuss the latest research in these fields. They were on Capitol Hill to promote intelligent design (ID) theory, to debunk Darwinian evolutionary theory, and to expose the negative social impact of Darwinism. Entitled ‘Scientific Evidence of Intelligent Design and its Implications for Public Policy and Education’, the briefing was sponsored by the Discovery Institute, a Seattle-based think tank (http://www.discovery.org), and its Center for the Renewal of Science and Culture. The afternoon briefing was preceded by a private luncheon in the US Capitol for Members of Congress and was followed by an evening reception. . . . Main speakers were biology professor Michael Behe, philosophy professor Stephen Meyer, Discovery Institute Fellow Nancy Pearcey, and law professor Philipp Johnson. Until now, the creation–evolution debate has primarily been active at the state and local level, but this event may represent the start of a new effort to involve Congress in efforts to oppose the teaching of evolution. Whether by chance or by design, the briefing took place as the Senate entered its second week of debate on overhauling federal K-12 education programs. Both houses are expected to work throughout the summer on reauthorization of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act. N.B. (K. H. R.): The Kansas Board of Education members explicitly cited Behe’s book on Intelligent Design as influencing their decision of August 1999 no longer to require examinations about Darwinian evolution. (A newly elected Board revised that decision in February 2001.) Intelligent design has been critiqued by the numerous authors presented on the (continuously updated) website http://www.world-of-dawkins.com/box/behe.htm. Competition and debates are good for science, and in the long run ‘nature’ will show who ‘is right’. My objection to ID ‘theory’ is not primarily to this conceptualisation per se, but to its misuse (although not necessarily by the authors) as an argument for preventing students forming their own judgement about the evolution of human beings and related issues (cf. Working Group on Teaching Evolution, [US] National Academy of Sciences 1998). And then there is a possible effect on the public school system if parents disagree to the point of turning to private schools or to home schooling.

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The first major challenge to religion in an age of science is the success of the method of science. Science seems to provide the only reliable path to knowledge. Many people view science as objective, universal, rational, and based on solid observational evidence.2 Religion, by contrast, seems to be subjective, parochial, emotional, and based on traditions and authorities that disagree with each other.

Barbour groups the current options for viewing the relation between the two fields as (a) conflict, (b) independence, (c) dialogue, and (d) integration. I shall use these categories as a standard3 for a comparison with the result of applying RCR to the issue at hand. Irreconcilable conflict arises from the side of science through the claim that the ‘scientific method’ is the only reliable path to genuine knowledge (e.g., Jacques Monod, Carl Sagan),4 religion being declared as poetry or something similar, and from the side of religion especially by biblical literalists who hold that the overriding statements from scripture about the natural world (in particular its creation) are incompatible with the claims of modern science, notably those of evolutionists. In the Scopes trial in 2

3 4

However, as V. V. Raman remarked in an Internet discussion: in cosmogonic/cosmological matters, science uses some non-observables that cannot be related to observables in a welldefined way. ‘Worm-holes’, Hawking’s imaginary time, certain constructs in string and superstring theories, belong to this category. They have interest and relevance largely in their mathematical consistency, and relate only in very round-about and indirect ways to observable features of the world. While other classifications exist (Reich 1996c), Barbour’s is quoted and used widely. Persons holding such a view not infrequently also refuse to consider the possibility that there might be something to parapsychology, or that another logic than formal binary logic might be admissible (e.g., Breuer and Springer 2000 – see note 2 p. 117), let alone preferable in a particular case. There are indeed various ways to respond to ‘anomalous data’ (Chinn and Brewer 1992), some more fruitful than others. In the interest of authenticity, let me quote Paul Harrison, a religious naturalist (http://members.aol.com/Heraklit1/index.htm) from a recent Internet exchange: ‘In short, there is no limit to the religious assertions, however wild, that cannot be disproved. In fact it is much harder to think of ones that can be disproved. In view of this it seems preferable to adopt a “no benefit of the doubt” principle. If someone asserts that something exists or has happened, or is happening, or will happen, which is outside of all common or thoroughly documented human experience and of science, and which neither I nor anyone else on earth has any possible means of disproving, then it is reasonable to place the entire onus on those who make these assertions to prove them with the rigorous evidence that the religious naturalist (as well as atheists and humanists and other sceptically minded folk) will demand. Until they do so it is reasonable to assume that these assertions are false until proved correct.’ My question was, ‘Why should the other side accept those standards of “rigorous evidence”?’ Harrison answered, ‘The standards are those that the naturalist applies to her/his own reasoning before she/he will believe something that is prima facie incredible. We know that faith-based believers do not and mostly will not adopt these standards, but we would hope they would accept our right to apply them in deciding on our own beliefs. Of course, we might (and often do) believe the world might be a better place if everyone applied more rigorous standards of evidence before believing things, and we would argue this point in public, just as faith-based believers argue for faith.’ (Cf. note 6, p. 38; and note 6, p. 108 for a contrasting view.)

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1925 at Dayton, Tennessee (e.g., Larson 1997), the view of biblical literalists (written into a Tennessee law) was upheld (and John T. Scopes, a high school teacher, found guilty for not having observed that law by teaching the theory of evolution, was fined a sum of $100, and subsequently had to leave his teaching post), but the Tennessee law was disregarded after 1968 when the US Federal Supreme Court ruled that a similar Arkansas law was unconstitutional because contrary to the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the US Constitution. All the same, the battle for parallel teaching of both ‘scientific creationism’ and ‘(neo-)Darwinian evolution’ continued until the Supreme Court ruled again in 1987 that creationism is a religious idea that cannot be mandated in public education (but see note 1, p. 105). Barbour (1990, pp. 4–10) presents in extenso the arguments of both scientific materialism and biblical literalism. His conclusion is – and I fully agree – that each oversteps the proper boundaries of their discipline: science in the direction of natural philosophy and metaphysics, biblical literalism by making undue scientific claims (ibid., p. 3). Basically, conflict may mean that only A or only B is recognised as being true. Independence implies that science and religion/theology concern different domains (explaining objective, public, repeatable data vs. experiences of inner life such as guilt and forgiveness, meaninglessness and wholeness) and have different languages (scientific language used for prediction and control vs. religious language used for recommending a way of life, eliciting a set of attitudes – ibid., pp. 10–16). Taking an independence position avoids conflict, but (a potentially fruitful) dialogue is also ruled out. The other position is acknowledged (perhaps only grudgingly) as existing, but there is no real desire to know more about it. Dialogue implies that the methods in science and religion/theology have something in common (e.g., interpretation of the ‘data’5 and commitment 5

The methods used for collecting ‘data’ differ though (Reich 1995c, pp. 394–5). Scientific standards require (a) the complete and precise indication of the conditions under which an experiment/experience occurred, (b) willed repeatability, (c) testability by any (competent) third person, (d) generalisable significance. Theologians, apart from pointing out that such standards are inapplicable to contemplative, aesthetic, and similar experiences, explain that (a) to (d) are inappropriately maximised requirements as far as religious experiences are concerned (cf. Watts and Williams 1988, especially ch. 9). However, weaker forms are maintained. In particular, appropriate testimony of witnesses from both earlier and present times is considered epistemologically adequate as justification for the veridicality of ‘data’, even if not everybody has had or will in all likelihood ever have the witnesses’ experiences. Religious learning from experience is based less on the robustness of single facts and more on an ensemble of experiences, accumulated across situations and events with time. This poses the question of an ‘absolute’ third-person versus a ‘restricted’ third-person ontology on the one hand, and a third-person ontology vs. a first-person ontology on the other. How many witnesses and with which characteristics are needed to turn their witnessing into credible evidence? Among other things, the

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of the practitioner), and there are some overlapping claims about reality (e.g., about the world’s origin) (ibid., pp. 16–23).6 Many of the more recent contacts between the protagonists of the two fields involved a dialogue position with the hope of benefiting theology, but also science.7

6

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answer probably also depends on the knowledge domain under discussion (cf. note 6, p. 38). Argyris, Putnam, and McLain-Smith (1985, p. 238) indicate the following conditions for a fruitful dialogue (especially between participants tending to be defensive): ‘Participants must be able to retrieve largely tacit inferential processes; they must be able to deal openly with challenges and conflicting views; they must reveal information that might expose their own and others’ vulnerabilities; they must be able to recognise and acknowledge when they are wrong; and they must feel free to choose among competing views.’ To which I would only add at the end, ‘where appropriate’ (cf. notes 13, p. 24, and 16, p. 113), and also that participants should strive to understand why the other persons hold the views they hold, why they consider them justified. The debate reported by Breuer and Springer (2000) shows that non-observance of these conditions nevertheless can bring out the characteristics of the respective positions (and their weak points), but the example due to Paloutzian (2000) of (multiple) dialogues in which they are observed shows in addition how fruitful such dialogues can be. To quote Ric Barr, an Internet discussion partner who expressed rather well my own view: ‘Philosophically, one can see and be convinced of the reality of a broad, universal purpose which gives meaning and direction to life and maintain that this meaning will not and cannot be found within the limited constraints of knowing characterised by the scientific method. Personally, I use the image of a supernatural God (as a being who can hear, feel, respond) as an imaginative construct to provide a working model for my spirituality, knowing full well that my image of a “supernatural God” does not do justice to what I perceive intuitively as the profound ground of the universe, which I call God. This image/idea enables me to pray, to give praise and thanks, to affirm value and to understand suffering in a way not possible (at least for me) through an impersonal view of the universe. This view is compatible with science but certainly not provable by it. I do not like the term “supernatural” much because it implies a certain amount of arbitrariness in the way “God acts” . . . God is the same God everywhere or he/she is not God. I therefore like terms like Tillich’s “Being itself” or Weiman’s “Source of Human Good” [or Brahman for Hindus]. My image of God is grounded and immanent with the natural world, though not fully contained by it (I am not a pantheist). I am not a creationist though I do believe that the universe is best explained by a mind-like intelligence from which all the possibilities which we see derive. I am not a deist because I believe that this source is still present, actively sustaining the universe in being. It is this reality which (most?) practising Christians, Muslims, Jews, Hinduists [and others] worship and in which we have our trust. I part company with many of my fellow Christians in that I have no issue what-so-ever with evolution, the big bang, and the full reliance of the human self on its physical/chemical/biological substrate.’ And I can also share V. V. Raman’s (forthcoming) Internet response: ‘When I see a fragrant flower and admire its beauty, when I pick up a shell from the sea shore and marvel at its pleasing symmetry, or when I read about the tardy tortoises on Galapagos, and am intrigued about how all these came to be, I tell my biologist friend about my wonderment, and she explains to me in fascinating detail how we can make sense out of the apparent biodiversity that is splashed all over the planet. When I see the diamond sparkle and the multicoloured rainbow arch the sky, when I see the silent stars up on high and observe dry sheets of plastic stick to my clothes, I recall the patterns and principles of physics from which emerge all the magnificence in the range and variety of perceived reality. I am grateful to science for these insights and enlightenment. But in all of this I also experience a mystery that is beyond my intellectual grasp. It is like the pleasures of poetry, the joy of music, and the ecstasy of meditative merger with the world at large.’

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There is now a wish to learn more about the ‘other side’, and perhaps also to contribute to its progress. Barbour’s integration comes in three versions. (i) In natural theology8 it is claimed that the existence of God can be inferred from the evidences of design in nature.9 (ii) A theology of nature draws on sources outside the sciences, but takes scientific findings into account. (iii) In a systematic synthesis (e.g., the process theology of Birch and Cobb), both science and religion/theology contribute to the development of an inclusive metaphysics (ibid., pp. 23–30). The danger with integration is that either scientific or religious ideas are distorted to fit a preconceived schema claimed to encompass all of reality. What can one say about Barbour’s classification (apart from admiring its impressive scope) when looking at it from a RCR perspective? First, the question arises as to the explanandum. If it is taken as knowledge and insights by humans situated in the bio-physical world and being part of human society with its history, social relations, and culture, a first observation is the ‘static’, time-invariant nature of almost all of Barbour’s categories and sub-categories (cf. Reich 1996c). (The explicit exception is process theology in the category integration.) Set-theoretical considerations of categories are therefore applicable. Referring to Fig. 5.1 (p. 79), one sees that conflict is represented by diagram no. 2 (where B may become 8

9

V. V. Raman provides a sense of natural theology in an Internet posting ‘When there is a sudden spewing of matter or passion, of disease or destruction, there is an eruption. Volcanoes erupt, as do anger and fury and an epidemic of plague. When something appears, and retains its entity in form and substance, there is emergence. A flower emerges and so does a sonnet or a work of art. But when what emerges is governed by law and principle, and it evolves too, we have creation: the launching of something that never existed before and that does not remain the same. From this perspective, and in this terminology, the big bang was not a mere eruption, nor the universe a mere emergence: the cosmos was created. What is created has an existence of its own. More importantly, others things appear from it: it too creates. The theologian Phil Hefner (1993) speaks of human beings as co-creators, for we create: ideas and things, values and works of art, and much more. ‘I would like to extend this insight: We may look upon ourselves as conscious co-creators. For it would seem that there are unconscious and semiconscious co-creators too. The matter and energy that were created from the big bang were unconscious co-creators, for they led to atoms and molecules, to elements and compounds, to planets and stars: each a created entity in its own right. And when the self-replicating macro-molecules of life arose, another level of co-creation arose: for evolution is a creative process too. This biological evolution is different from the unconscious formation of atoms and stars, and it may be described as semiconscious co-creation, for there is a fine difference between crystal growth and cell-division. Finally, with the onset of mind, creation leaps, as it were, to a higher level: the level of self-awareness. The creation from now on is conscious, and what is created is not just machines and bridges, but ideas and ideals, values and morals. This constitutes what may well be called conscious co-creation. Such a perspective can be part of natural theology.’ It is not quite clear why natural theology thus defined is classed as integration, given that only one source is indicated.

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unimportant, even vanishing in the eyes of A and vice versa), independence by no. 4, dialogue by no. 3, and integration by no. 1. This being all the logical possibilities according to formal binary logic, Barbour’s classification is exhaustive within that framework. A second (arguable) observation is that at first blush conflict could be interpreted as an expression of (the descriptive, not normative) RCR level I, independence as that of level II, dialogue as implying RCR levels III or IV, and integration as an expression of level V. On second thoughts, the step from level II to level III is not just developmental; it may well require a (conscious) decision and commitment. It is difficult in today’s world to ignore totally either science or religion and their workings, and therefore one can understand the reason for making the mental step from conflict to independence. However, even somebody capable of arguing intellectually at level V of RCR may still prefer to stay with independence for his or her own good reasons.10 Further observations will emerge when applying RCR to science and religion/theology. 10

In case a reader finds this second observation absurd, consider Kohlberg’s (1984) stages of moral cognition. There figures not simply one single argumentation, justification and motivation with respect to acting morally but a variety, depending especially on the levels of ‘ego-centredness’ of social cognition: a person at stage 1 of moral judgement is egoistically motivated, which involves arguments of external rewards and punishments. Stage 2 implies an enlightened egoism. Stage 3 is based on being accepted by one’s immediate social circle as moral reason and motivational factor. Stage 4 enlarges that circle to one’s own society. Stage 5 is characterised by a philosophy favouring the greatest good for the greatest number (social contract). Now, I am aware that moral cognition is not the same as assessing the relation of science and religion/theology. No society can survive without some moral rules – they are a necessity. In contrast, assessing the relation of science and religion/theology in a way is a luxury indulged in by a small number of enthusiasts (but potentially a useful one, given the large numbers of religious believers the world over, and the partly unhappy history of the relation of science and religion/theology). Also, I do not ignore the criticism levelled against Kohlberg’s stages (mostly not really pertinent here). However, moral judgement and assessing science-and-religion/theology both involve cognition, and both deal with the relation between two entities (the individual and society in the case of morality). As I attempt to show throughout this monograph, our judgements and insights are not produced automatically from sense data and other input, but (partly) (re)constructed according to our level of cognitive development (which continues in adulthood). The parallelism between ‘science-and-religion/theology’ and ‘moral judgement’ goes even further. Just as persons refuse to proceed from independence to dialogue for their own reasons, not all are willing to make the step from moral stage 2 (an egoistic position) to stage 3 (acknowledging a person’s social embeddedness and hence justified arguments for a certain amount of ‘solidarity’), in particular not Ayn Rand (1964) in her Virtue of selfishness. Kohlberg (1984, pp. 429–31) encountered a number of students who, at a particular point in their life, rejected the demands of society and valued their unbridled self-fulfilment and self-development higher. One college sophomore said, ‘[In high school] I was trying to please the norms of society, and in essence, conforming to the prevailing thought about moral right. I was concerned about other people and society in general when I was younger. Now I think more of a moral responsibility to oneself. Self-concern takes precedence over morals’ (ibid., p. 444). A well-developed moral cognition was not in doubt, these students having argued

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Applying RCR to science and religion/theology As it will turn out, this is not an ideal case for demonstrating RCR at work per se. For one, it is too vast a case to be dealt with in any depth in the present context. However, the overriding advantage is that Barbour’s ‘standard’ exists to which the result of applying RCR can be compared. Also, the result can be checked against the results of the corresponding empirical study presented in chapter 7. We proceed according to the eight formal steps delineated above: (1) (clarifying and defining, at least tentatively, the entity, the phenomenon, the event, the functionally coherent whole which constitutes the explanandum). The general procedure is to assume that the explanandum is suitable for study by RCR, and then to find out whether that is so by going through the next six steps. To begin with, ways of relating science and religion/theology does not appear to be a proper explanandum, because it is not a functionally coherent whole (Reich 1995b). There are quite a few areas where science is of little or no concern to theology (e.g., inorganic chemistry) and vice versa; in other issues science supports religion/theology (e.g., by demonstrating the beneficial effects of religious life11 – Gorsuch 1995); in yet others it weakens it (e.g., heliocentrism versus medieval Christian teaching). Also, historically, the relation has changed and still changes, as indicated earlier. Furthermore, there is not just one theology, but a diversity, even in Christianity (Fulljames and Stolberg 2000). As a consequence, the explanandum has to be more restricted, better focused. The proposal is to concentrate on ‘Understanding the origin of the universe, its changes until today, and the resulting lessons for leading a human life’ (which is still simplifying considerably the actual state of affairs, e.g., Reich 1995c).

11

previously at stage 4, but a corresponding commitment was lacking. In other words, cognitive competence explains much, but not all. As further evidence for such a view, notice the results of the relevant empirical study on science-and-religion/theology reported in chapter 7 (pp. 126–9). From the present perspective, one explanation could be that (some of ) the persons under discussion have reached the stage of reflecting about mental tools (discussed in chapter 1, pp. 29–32), and from there question the validity of (meta)ethical principles. Just to keep the record complete: later in life those former ‘self-concerned’ students returned to a stage 4 or even a stage 5 argumentation (ibid., pp. 430, 445). To be fair, cases of unhealthy religions/sects need to be recognised too, e.g., collective suicides/murders of persons belonging to new religious movements such as suffered by the 909 members of the People’s Temple led by the Reverend Jim Jones (Guyana, November 1978), by the several dozens of the members of the Order of the Solar Temple led by Joseph Di Mambro and Luc Jouret (Canada, France, Switzerland, 1994/1995), by the 39 members of the Heaven’s Gate led by Marshall Applewhite (California, March 1997), and finally by hundreds of persons adhering to the Movement for the Restoration of the Ten Commandments of God (the Doomsday sect – Uganda, March/ April 2000).

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(2) (listing all descriptions/explanations/models/theories/interpretations A, B, C . . . of the explanandum). The following convention will be used throughout this section (cf. Barbour 1990, p. 3): A = science (empirical study of the order and patterns of nature); B = theology12 (critical reflection on the life and beliefs of the religious community); C = philosophy (analysis of the characteristics of inquiry and knowledge as well as analysis of the most general characteristics of reality). Regarding the explanandum under discussion, A involves cosmogony and cosmology, neo-Darwinian evolution, and biological/sociological anthropology; B refers to the theology of creation (in Christian terms, or to the equivalent in other religions), to that of divine providence, and to theological anthropology; C involves an analysis of methods admitted in A and B for gathering, analysing, and interpreting evidence, a procedure for dealing with (perceived) transcendent reality (e.g., Reich 2000b), and philosophical anthropology. (3) (ascertaining that A, B, C . . . are genuinely coextensive, that they refer to the identical explanandum). This is a much larger task than can be tackled here. At first glance one might say that individually A, B, C will not have something to say to each and every aspect of the explanandum. That explanandum is clearly a weaker functional whole than, for instance, a single human being. However, that is probably not strong enough a reason to stop the application of RCR at this point. (4) (establishing the circumstances, the context, under which A, B, C . . . describe or explain particular aspects of the explanandum). Again, this is a lengthy study in itself. The suspicion is that A will provide the most relevant explanation of the actual changes of the universe and what it contains from the big bang until today,13 B on the lessons to be drawn, 12

13

In which cases is it more appropriate to discuss science and religion, and in which science and theology? There is no single, consensual answer. If religion is judged to be motivational, experiential, and prescriptive, then (scientific) anthropology, psychology and sociology are ‘immediate’ discussion partners. If theology is taken as descriptive, explanatory, interpretative, then it is a more appropriate discussion partner for cosmology, biology, and medicine than religion. However, it is also true that for science it is easier to get a clear idea of the origin and the functioning of religion (authority, ritual, speculation, tradition, God’s sovereignty and grace, mystery – Smith 1965, pp. 101–4) than of theology. And, theology is not recognised by all religions as even existing. In any case, the ‘best’ of religion/theology should be introduced into the science-religion/theology debate, not some caricature (as unfortunately still happens). David R. Burwasser wrote in an Internet discussion (cf. Reich 2000b): ‘Almost by definition, science should not be interested in anything more than its methodology and the consistency of its results [cf. note 6, p. 38]. It ceases to be science if it becomes captive to any social agenda, even a democratic or spiritual agenda. However, scientists need to be concerned for human impact, but as the human beings under the lab coats. The two must be kept separate just to preserve the integrity of both.’

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in particular regarding the inner life of humans14 (but will possibly also contribute to the presuppositions of A and C), and C on the validity of the ‘truth’ claims of A and B, on the limits of their ‘legitimacy’, and possibly on anthropology. (5) (discovering and describing any (including unexpected) links between the respective attributes/features of A, B, C . . . , as well as any coinherences). A furnishes B with detailed knowledge about the wonders of the universe and all it contains so that B can go on from there. Historically, B has supplied A with a world view which made research possible and attractive; if needed, B reminds A of its responsibility for the environment and human welfare. C furnishes to A and B a base for a rational discourse using consensual categories and procedures. (6) (assessing the extent to which the (relative) explanatory power of A (B, C . . . ) depends on the current strength of B (A, C . . . ), etc.). In the present case, the clearest case is probably the dependence of C, but also of B, on A (e.g., brain research). If B weakens, the lessons drawn by A (and perhaps by C) may be too one-sided.15 If C were to drop out, the quality of the dialogue might suffer. (7) (developing a complete synopsis or theory that explains all features of the explanandum under differing contextual conditions). Given the difficulties evoked all along in this section, that task will take time.16 RCR proceeds by keeping A, B, C distinct, and iterating the sequel from (1) to (7), feeding in each time any new insight gained. (8) (explaining any shifts in the meaning of the concepts needed to explain the reference, A, B, C . . . , and the new synopsis or theory). In the present case there is no obvious candidate for meeting point (8). One 14

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Religions/theologies may be classed as collectively evolved encyclopaedias of human characteristics, actions, and events. Believers turn to the accumulated wisdom of a religious symbol system when they feel the need to get in touch with their deepest self (cf. Hefner 1996). As Carol Albright has observed, ‘choices persons make about the answers to “unprovable” questions may depend more than one would like to admit on unconscious inclinations. The need to be independent or dependent, related or detached, hopeful or resigned, affect (lay) theology. Nevertheless, cognitive checks and balances are needed too, or at least by some persons’ (from an Internet posting). Like other human enterprises, science has a tendency to establish, and even increase its influence and power, sometimes in not very ethical ways (e.g., Toulouse 1998). While others may and do oppose that tendency, religious believers/theologians carry their oppositional share, in particular when it comes to protecting the environment, biodiversity, and so on. The 200-year struggle to get to a satisfactory theory of light, incorporating both the light-as-corpuscle model and the light-as-wave model, was already evoked in note 13 (p. 24). Or take Darwin’s ‘theory’ of evolution. At the time neither Mendel’s laws nor the role of DNA was known, let alone the detailed working of mutations. Hence, a really informed debate about the respective roles of chance and necessity in evolution had to wait for another century.

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could possibly argue for writing science-and-theology(-and-philosophy) in order to emphasise the links found. To sum up the result: Science-and-theology(-and-philosophy) ‘jointly’ contribute to Understanding the origin of the universe, its changes until today, and the resulting lessons for leading a human life. While each discipline contributes something to most issues, science provides the most relevant explanation of the actual changes of the universe and what it contains from the big bang until today, theology (potentially) contributes most to the lessons to be drawn, in particular regarding the inner life of humans (but possibly contributes also to the presuppositions of science and philosophy), and philosophy is most knowledgeable about the validity of the ‘truth’ claims of science and philosophy, on the limits of their ‘legitimacy’, and possibly on anthropology. While clearly distinct, on account of certain links each discipline can benefit from the others for flourishing optimally. Actually, the foregoing result is more of a programme for further work than a complete achievement. However, it is sufficiently different from the above ‘standard’ due to Barbour (1990) to warrant a discussion. What are the differences? (a) The focus is narrowed. As already indicated, in an RCR approach, the entire field is carved up into appropriate domains, and the exercise repeated until the entire field is covered. It is not clear whether an overall summary could then be made in the present case, but if so, it would be more differentiated than the ‘standard’ classifications. (b) Applying RCR results in a single (idealised) category, not four. From a developmental point of view, it is assumed to be a description of a stage which is likely to be reached more widely in the future, given the existence of exemplars (e.g., John Templeton Foundation 1996; Richardson and Wildman 1996; Southgate, Deane-Drummond, and Murray 1999) – but see the caveat of the second part of note 4, p. 106. (c) The context dependence of the explanatory power of science, theology, and philosophy is emphasised over against a universal contextindependent evaluation of their respective contributions/explanatory power. (d) The links between science, theology and philosophy are made explicit. (e) Overall, an attitude of mutual collaboration is fostered, given that neither side can prove the other side ‘wrong’ as far as discipline-specific, (peer-reviewed) established findings are concerned. If examples of the latter are wanted, I would name biologist Kenneth F. Miller’s (1999) book, Finding Darwin’s God, and theologian John F. Haught’s (1999) book, God after Darwin (without necessarily endorsing

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all views expressed by these authors). While belonging to different disciplines, both authors come to similar conclusions: (neo-)Darwinian evolution does not exclude religious beliefs; on the contrary, both views can enrich each other (cf. Ruse 2000). In case this exercise has been too difficult to follow or is not convincing, more (partial) exercises applying RCR are coming up in chapters 7, 9, 10, and 11.

7

Religion

The four issues of this chapter are: (1) religion and the nature of human beings, (2) understanding Christian doctrines, (3) the co-ordination of religious and scientific world views, and (4) religious development; this each time from an RCR perspective. The first section applies RCR afresh to a particular domain of the science–religion debate. It is therefore comparable to the exercise in chapter 6, but focused yet more narrowly. Religion and the nature of human beings Religion and its truth claims Across the ages there have been human groups on our planet without agriculture, without the wheel, without writing, without formal laws, but ‘neither history nor anthropology knows of societies from which religion has been totally absent’ (Rappaport quoted by Burkert 1996/1998, p. 1).1 Palaeolithic sacrificial rituals existed more than 20,000 years ago (ibid., p. 39) and traces of ritual burials are even older. This is not the place to discuss the origins of religion (e.g., Burkert 1996/1998), nor its diversity within and across various cultures (e.g., Wulff 1997), its psychological multidimensionality (e.g., Hood, Spilka, Hunsberger, and Gorsuch 1996, pp. 8–12), or its possible role for human development (e.g., Peck 1997, especially pp. 241–306). The assessment of a transcendent religious ‘reality’ is a great cognitive challenge (in particular when only formal binary logic is admitted 1

In a seven-page summary, Derek Stanesby (2000) reviews and comments/critiques the meaning of the term ‘God’ and the various arguments for God’s existence (the ontological and the cosmological arguments, those from design and from experience – cf. Vardy 1990). Neither the existence of God nor God’s non-existence can be proven irrefutably. However, ‘the human need to search for some meaning and purpose in life is unquenchable, and to the extent that we are rational creatures, then we will endeavour to support our beliefs with good reason’ (Stanesby 2000, p. 7). It is also noted that in the Western word about half of the people believe in the existence of a ‘higher being’, and a higher percentage in developing countries (e.g., Argyle 2000, chapters 14, 15).

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for a reality check2 ) – cf. Vardy 1990/1997.3 Among others, two authors of encompassing works have set themselves that task: the Christian theologian Hans Kung ¨ ([1978], 1994) with his Does God exist? and the self-declared atheist Michael Shermer (1999) with his How we believe. The scholarship of both authors is impressive, their enterprises illustrate the vastness of the field, and the difficulty of coming to convincing conclusions (cf. Reich 2000b). On the last page Kung ¨ concludes his critical evaluation of the works of Descartes, Pascal, and Hegel as well as those of Feuerbach, Marx, Freud, and Nietzsche; this after further considerations in the fields of theology and religious studies. Kung ¨ states that the evidence allows one on rational grounds to answer the question ‘Does God exist?’ in the affirmative. And according to Kung, ¨ that constitutes a solid foundation of an enriching religious life. In contrast, Shermer (1999, p. 236) relates that for him, ‘The conjunction of losing my religion, finding science, and discovering glorious contingency was remarkably empowering and liberating. It gave me a sense of joy and freedom . . . I was free to live my life to the fullest.’ Can RCR help to clarify the dissonance between the views expressed by Kung ¨ and by Shermer? 2

3

In a debate in Germany (Breuer and Springer 2000) between the self-declared atheistic philosopher of science Bernulf Kanitscheider and the theistic philosopher of religion Ulrich Luke, ¨ Kanitscheider challenged the latter as follows (ibid., p. 85): ‘Would you agree that binary Aristotelian logic is applicable to basic theological statements and Christian doctrines?’ Luke ¨ answered (and I agree), ‘The reach of our [Aristotelian] logic, which is always finite and mediated by language, is insufficient to capture a comprehensive knowledge about God. Using such an approach, one can perhaps become an atheist [gottlos werden], but not get rid of the question of God [Gott los werden].’ Kanitscheider’s answer, ‘Escape into mystery does not solve the problems of logic.’ To which I would respond with, ‘But why should there be only a single logic applicable everywhere and all the time?’ This state of affairs constitutes a particular difficulty for the psychology of religion, which may lead one to work in mixed teams of theists and atheists (Reich 2000b – see Breuer and Springer 2000, for a possible, though not optimal result). Michael Argyle (2000, pp. 239– 40), after working for more than forty years in the field, sees it as follows: ‘The traditional solution to the science vs. religion problem was to say that science deals with the material world and religion with the subjective world; but psychology claims to deal with the inner world too . . . What seems to be wrong . . . is a failure to take seriously the experience of those concerned, to recognize the power of metaphors and symbolic behaviour, which are felt to express some kind of truth . . . In contrast, psychologists have not tried to “explain” mathematics, which is recognized as having an independent existence . . . Worship and sacrifices are pervasive aspects of religious behaviour throughout the ages . . . ; psychology has had no success in explaining them . . . beliefs about religion are unlike beliefs about the physical world: they are not verifiable in the same way, they are couched in symbols and myths, they represent commitment and relationship, and they need to be measured and studied in a different way from other kinds of belief.’ Hartmut Beile (1999, p. 115), a believing Christian, reported that his thesis work on religious emotions benefited from the fact that the supervisor was a self-professed atheist.

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Applying RCR RCR was already applied to a co-ordination of science and religion/ theology (ch. 6, pp. 111–14), and that co-ordination will be taken up again in the third section below. In this section, the central issue is a particular aspect of anthropology as viewed by (Christian) religious beliefs and by neurobiology (e.g., Shermer 1999, pp. 65–9). Warren Brown and Malcolm Jeeves (1999, p. 139) put that issue as follows: Proposition 1: Humans are physical beings who also have non-material souls. It is through our souls that we experience and relate to God. Proposition 2: Humans are neurobiological beings whose mind (also soul, religious experience, etc.) can, in theory, be exhaustively explained by neurochemistry, and ultimately by physics.

Clearly, these propositions, representing traditional Christian theology (proposition 1) and (reductive) scientific physicalism (proposition 2) are dissonant. In particular, (1) intimates free will, and the possibility of eternal life, (2) holds that behaviour is determined (exclusively) by the laws of biology, chemistry, and physics. Applying the RCR heuristic of chapter 6 (pp. 103–4) to that dissonance, the first task is to determine the explanandum. It shall be: The nature of human beings and their capacity to relate to a perceived transcendent (God for the adherents to a monotheistic religion). As to step two (listing all descriptions, explanations etc.), we already have proposition 1 above (= A) and proposition 2 (= B). I add a third (= C): Humans are naked animals who share capacities with other animals, in particular with their nearest primate relatives. However, in humans some of these capacities are more enhanced, for instance ‘language’, a ‘theory of mind’ (hypothesising what is going on in another person’s mind), ‘episodic memory’, ‘conscious top-down agency’ (conscious mental control of behaviour), ‘future orientation’ (mental scenarios of future implications of behaviour and events), and ‘emotional regulation’ (cf. Brown and Jeeves 1999, pp. 144–5). The enhanced capacities have enabled human culture to evolve; it co-determines human behaviour – as does the proximate human group.

Simplifying, A emphasises the spiritual aspect of human beings4 , B their biological aspect, and C the social aspects. 4

Close to the time of her death, adolescent Anne Frank wrote to herself: ‘I have found that there is always some beauty in life – in nature, sunshine, freedom, in yourself; these can all help you. Look at these things, then you find yourself again, and God, and then you regain your balance’ (Frank 1993, p. 14). Marsha Sinnetar (2000) quotes this and many other testimonials of spirituality and spiritual intelligence (cf. Paloutzian 2000).

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As the next step, (3), the question has to be answered whether A, B, C are coextensive. If the extension is given by C, then the coextensionality of A and B with C seems debatable. C considers four explanatory levels: (i) the biological level, (ii) the individual psychological level, (iii) the social (group) level, (iv) the cultural (societal) level. A deals primarily with level (ii). It does not explicitly rule out the other levels (except the biological for the soul), but they remain hazy at best. B deals exclusively with the biological level; the other levels are declared epiphenomena (by implication). From this short comparison, a few questions arise, which would be put to the protagonists: to A, How does the soul communicate with the memory – and with the body? To B, How do social and cultural influences, and in particular those which go against the biological grain (e.g., devotion to visions, ideals) get into that neurochemical system? To C, Exactly at which level(s) are religion and religious experience located, and in particular the perceived transcendence? To do things properly, these questions should be answered before proceeding further. That cannot be done here, but we shall nevertheless continue. As step 4, we look for circumstances, the context, under which A, B, C explain best particular aspects of the explanandum. A opens the door to a spiritual life, possibly lasting beyond the death of the body. B makes a rudimentary ‘religion’ of animals understandable such as the ‘religious’ devotion of dogs to their masters, the sun ‘worship’ of baboons, the ‘ritual dances’ of anthropoids, and further animal ritualised behaviour (Wulff 1997, pp. 146–55). C lets one get a sense of the multivariate nature of religion and religious experience. Next (step 5), we look for links between respective attributes/features of A, B, and C. Even if A and B seem to be incomplete according to the foregoing considerations, there should nevertheless be links between one or more of their attributes/features and C, for instance concerning the psychosomatic nature of human beings. Step 6 concerns the relative explanatory power of A as a function of (B) and vice versa, and so on. At this stage of the debate with the protagonists of (A) and (B), that question cannot be answered satisfactorily because (A) and (B) practically exclude each other as to explanatory claims. (C) could benefit from (B) regarding any biological roots of perceived transcendence. Next, the penultimate step 7 involves a synopsis. To my mind that critical summing up has to be based on (C). The most difficult part is presumably to explain the relations/connections between the (neuro-) biological level and the individual psychological level, in particular as far as perceived transcendence is concerned (e.g., Zygon 1999). One would

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have to go into the ergotropic and the trophotropic forms of arousal (Wulff 1997, pp. 109–19), and into the latest results of brain research (e.g., Ashbrook and Albright 1997; d’Aquili and Newberg 1998, 1999; Persinger 1993; Ramachandran and Blakeslee 1998; Saver and Rabin 1997), being aware though of the speculative nature of some of this writing. Presumably, part of the arguments will centre on the issue as to whether a first-person ontology of the mental is acceptable, or whether only a third-person ontology makes the grade (chapter 3, note 6, p. 38). As regards the important relations/connections between the individual psychological level, the social level, and the cultural level, much material exists, given the longer history of the corresponding research. Thus at least a descriptive synopsis should be possible. Finally, (8), any shift in meaning of the terms used should be explained. That concerns primarily the soul. Brown and Jeeves (1999, p. 145) find it attractive to view it as emerging from the experience of personal relatedness. I would say ‘relatedness to other people, to nature, and to what is transcendent as perceived by the person concerned’. Such relatedness can be considered a core characteristics of spirituality (Reich, Oser, and Scarlett 1999). Once more, RCR’s contribution was to determine the explanandum in terms of a functionally coherent whole, to add a further description/ explanation, to uncover missing information, to discover links between A, B, C, and to thematise the context dependence of the respective explanatory power (cf. Sharpe 2000, for an example of seeing the RCR heuristic (tacitly) at work). Of course, the real work remains to be done by the experts in the various disciplines. Understanding religious doctrines Religious doctrines are not infrequently held to be irrational, to be understandable only to believers, if at all. Examples would be (a) the human and divine nature of Jesus Christ, (b) the three personae of the single Trinitarian God, (c) God’s interaction with a world governed by natural laws, etc. Theoretical and empirical research has shown that RCR can contribute to overcoming some of these cognitive hurdles (Reich 1989, 1990b, 1991, 1994a, 1996b), in particular because it is not tied down to the limitations of formal binary logic (cf. Kaiser 1996). Hence, it seems worthwhile, on the one hand, to stimulate such thinking, in particular in the context of religious education (Reich 1996a – cf. ch. 10, p. 162 below) and, on the other hand, to review here briefly the work on (a) and (b) above.

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A

A

B

B

(a) Two or one? (b) A, B seen as parts

A

B

(c) Focus on relationship between parts (d) Plus relationship

A

B

between each part and the whole

Figure 7.1 Complexification and conceptual changes when moving from one to two. (Source: Reich 1994a, p. 116)

The two natures of Jesus Christ The historical part, the proceedings at the Council of Chalcedon (451 AD), are dealt with in the next chapter. As a result of those proceedings, the assembled Fathers declared that our Lord Jesus Christ is . . . truly God and truly man . . . made known in two natures [which exist] without confusion, without change, without division, without separation.

On account of the exemplary value of the issue of the two natures, some background knowledge will be provided first. One essential basic difficulty concerns the move from one to two. That move does not represent a linear addition of more of the same, but means a profound complexification and conceptual change, and correspondingly requires a different logic and epistemological approach. To understand what is involved in going from one to two, we take the cue from John Puddefoot (1992). The one is assumed to be primitive, indivisible, and complete in itself. Something new occurs as we move to two, a plurality of scales: Are we now dealing with a doublet of ones or with a unity, ‘the unity of two’? Which one is it to be? The answer to this ‘simple’ question (and where ‘one’ should not be identified with plain concrete things) depends on one’s stage of complex reasoning. An unsophisticated reasoning will presumably settle for one of these alternatives, often without deeper reflection. A more complex reasoning will view the situation as schematically depicted in Fig. 7.1.

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Going from one to two thus introduces a plurality of languages, and possibly a scheme of ‘levels’ of reality: The movement from one to two is no mere aggregation, as if complexity were only the sum of simples; it is a movement from indivisibility to divisibility and structure: the movement from one to two alters the one, for now the one is not only related to itself, in itself, and even for itself; it is also to, in, and for the other: The other in the sense of the other part, and the other in the sense of the whole of which the one is itself part. In moving from one to two the being of one is no longer complete in itself; its totality involves the other. (Puddefoot 1992, p. 16)

The empirical study In the laboratory study (Reich 1994a), twenty-eight volunteers (from the sample of thirty-two respondents of the pilot study 4), aged 13 to 68 years, both religious believers and nonbelievers, about half male and half female, were interviewed individually. These participants were not representative, as explained in chapter 4 (pp. 47–8). The shortened Chalcedonian Definition was presented in written form, reading (in translation): The Fathers who met in 451 at the Council of Chalcedon declared notably that ‘Our Lord Jesus Christ is truly God and truly man . . . made known in two natures [which exist] without confusion, without change, without division, without separation.’ What do you think about this Chalcedonian Definition?

To assess their level of RCR, all respondents furthermore were interviewed about the three standard themes ( pianist, accident in a nuclear power station, and humans, the mind–body problem), presented and discussed in chapter 4. The results were as follows. About a third of the respondents (group 1) could not make sense of the doctrine. About another third (group 2) said that on first thoughts it all looked confusing, but on second thought it made some sense, and they explained how. The remaining respondents (group 3) explained why that particular wording of the doctrine was the most appropriate if not the only possible way to explain the state of affairs concerned. The inter-rater concordance concerning group assessment was 90 per cent. The individual scores of RCR and understandability of the doctrine are shown in Table 7.1. All participants who responded below level IV of RCR belong to group 1. (This statement is not reversible though; in that group were also respondents who were capable of higher level reasoning, yet they lacked religious knowledge or had reserves about the two natures.) Respondents in group 2 reasoned at least at level IV, those of group 3 at least at level

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Table 7.1 Frequencies of individual scores of RCR levels and intelligibility judgement of the Chalcedonian Definition. Level III(IV) is somewhat above level III; IV(III) is somewhat below IV, etc. Ntot = 28; age 13–68 years; mean 33 years, 8.4 months; SD 15 years, 2.3 months. Source: Reich 1994a, p. 121. Is the Chalcedonian Definition rationally understandable?

Np

Level of RCR

Group 1 (‘no’)

1 1 8 12 6

III(IV) IV(III) IV IV(V) V(IV)

1 1 2 4 1

6 4 1

4 4

9

11

8

28

Group 2 (‘partly’)

Group 3 (‘yes’)

IV (V), which is somewhat above level IV. Kendall’s rank correlation coefficient has the moderate but significant value rK = .40, p < .02.5 To get a sense of what respondents in group 3 said, here are two excerpts (Reich 1994a, p. 121). Ariane (23 years, 11 months; henceforth 23; 11) explained: You can’t judge this by the usual rationality nor by arguing from personal experience. Jesus has to be human, otherwise he could not suffer [and wouldn’t be close to us]. And he has got to be God, otherwise atonement wouldn’t work. And because both [natures] have to come together in a single person, you get this helplessness with the usual notions. . . . [The difficulties] stem from the habit of imagining things on a scientific or human base.

Rainer (28; 9) said: Without separation – that makes sense if one can say that it belongs together naturally, it is not thinkable that the one exists without the other. But now, without confusion – that is again what is without separation – that means the two natures can all the same be analysed separately . . . Now it makes sense to me, without confusion, without separation.

The three personae and the single Trinitarian God The Trinitarian Godhead, the Holy Trinity (three personae yet one God) involves a further complexification (Reich, 1994a): As there are now three 5

A post hoc Kruskal-Wallis analysis of variance (H test) further supported the findings of the correlation computation: the mean RCR ranks of the members of groups 1 to 3 differed (chi2 = 7.87, df = 2, p = .02). The corresponding U-Test (Mann-Whitney) showed that the significant differences were between group 1 and group 3 (U = 14, p = .02), and between group 2 and group 3 (U = 14, p < .01).

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‘entities’, different groupings of the type ‘two versus one’ can be imagined. In fact, for more than a thousand years the Roman Catholic Church and the Eastern Orthodox Churches cannot agree on the procession of the Holy Spirit. For Catholics (and Anglicans as well as many Protestants) the so-called Nicene Creed (adopted by the Ecumenical Council of Constantinople, AD 381) reads in part, ‘The Holy spirit . . . who proceedeth from the Father and from the Son ( filioque) . . . ’ In contrast, the Orthodox Church did not accept the addition of filioque to the original creed. As a result, for the Catholics, in a way the Son is ‘closer’ to the Father than the Spirit, and for the Orthodox, the Son is ‘closer’ to the Spirit than the Father. However, these theological disputes were not the object of an empirical study. Rather, the aim was similar to that concerning the Chalcedonian Definition, namely, to find out whether respondents arguing at a higher RCR level about the three standard nonreligious problems would understand the doctrine of the Trinity better than respondents who argued at a lower RCR level. The procedure was the same as in the case of the Chalcedonian Definition (except that two respondents of that study did not participate and two new ones joined). The interview text submitted to the respondents reads: Christian theology teaches the Doctrine of the Holy Trinity: the Father, the Son, the Holy Spirit. What is your opinion about this doctrine?

The result of this study was similar to that of Table 7.1 in that again three groups emerged, and the understanding of the doctrine correlated with RCR (sub-)levels (Table 7.2). Kendall’s rank correlation coefficient has the moderately high value rK = .56, p = .001.6 Here again are some interview excerpts, first of a group 2 respondent (Reich 1994a, p. 123). Peter (17; 0) said: Well, that is another problem you can’t really grasp nor picture. But it shows our relationships: God the Father, the creator – you imagine what you feel for your own father but projected onto God. Then the Son, he is the mediator, he is much closer. He has reconciled us with the Father. And then the Holy Ghost, the wisdom, the love, [is] really humanity’s ideal. It is almost as if God has personally cut this up for us . . . Depending on the problem, we address ourselves each time to another ‘person’ in quotes [sic]. That simply is a help for us.

The scoring was group 2, because Peter had not yet fully grasped the intrinsic relationship between the three personae (the perichoresis): his 6

A post hoc Kruskal-Wallis analysis of variance (H test) further supported the findings of the correlation computation: the mean RCR ranks of the members of groups 1 to 3 differed (chi2 = 10.17, df = 2, p = .006). The corresponding U-Test (Mann-Whitney) showed that the significant differences were between group 1 and group 3 (U = 9, p < .01), and between group 2 and group 3 (U = 19, p = .02).

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Table 7.2 Frequencies of individual scores of RCR levels and intelligibility judgement of the Doctrine of the Holy Trinity. Ntot = 28; age 13–68 years; mean 32 years, 0.3 months; SD 15 years, 4.9 months. (Source: Reich 1994a, p. 122) Is the Doctrine of the Trinity rationally understandable?

Np

Level of RCR

Group 1 (‘no’)

1 2 1 8 12 4

III III(IV) IV(III) IV IV(V) V(IV)

1 2 1 3 1 1

28

9

Group 2 (‘partly’)

5 6

11

Group 3 (‘yes’)

5 3 8

Trinity evokes more tritheism than monotheism. Here are three answers from group 3 respondents: Jean-Luc (46; 7) emphasised: ‘Our mind can’t seize up God as creator in his entire dimension. But our mind grasps certain aspects. God, the wholly other, if he wants to reveal himself to us, then he must do it in a manner that we can understand. Moreover, the formulation [of the doctrine] matches our mental reception capacity.’ Oskar (53; 8) opined: ‘The Trinity somehow combines the human longing for community with the longing for individuality.’ Richard (64; 8) added: ‘It does not bother me that in different situations there are different aspects which you can’t really combine. I always remember that light has to be pictured as wave-like and as corpuscle-like.’

Conclusions The main finding of both studies on the intelligibility of Christian doctrines is that RCR appears to be a necessary but insufficient condition for an intellectually acceptable understanding of the doctrines studied. Specific knowledge and interest (motivation) are needed in addition if the potential competence is to show up in the actual performance (Reich 1994a, p. 124). In a wider context, and taking up an issue discussed earlier, these results indicate that an understanding of Christian doctrines requires one to transgress the limits of formal binary logic (as already known to Thomas Aquinas). Richard expresses this by evoking a parallelism between the

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‘logic’ of the relationship between the three personae and the logic of quantum mechanics. Furthermore, these studies bring out particularly well the means-reflecting thinking (chapter 2, pp. 29–32) at high RCR levels. For instance, Jean-Luc not only evokes the limitations of the human mind (Our mind can’t seize up God as creator in his entire dimension), but also points out that God took them into account (God . . . if he wants to reveal himself to us, then he must do it in a manner that we can understand ).

Co-ordination of religious and scientific world views This section is based on a summary of my related research (Reich 1998). The change of people’s world views as they grow up is a particularly informative developmental instance. Here world view means the way a person pictures the origin of the universe, the way it evolved until the present time, the origin of life, the place of human beings in the universe, etc. There exist purely religious, purely nonreligious, and mixed world views (Fetz, Reich, and Valentin 1989; 2001; Reich 1989, 1990a, 1996b). In a constructivist conception of cognitive development an individual as a rational agent constructs new and/or more dependable views on the basis of his or her own observations and reasoning (e.g., Reich, Oser, and Valentin 1994). In fact, studying the world views of children and adolescents led to my involvement with RCR. I interviewed children, adolescents, and adults aged 7–68 years about statements from a scientist and from a church minister about their respective world views (Reich 1989, 1990a, 1996b). For the scientist the theories of the big bang and of evolution explain all that one would like to know. The minister recognises these contributions to our world view, but adds that for him God is still the ultimate explanation as to why there is a universe altogether. Also, he senses God in nature and in other human beings, and experiences God’s assistance when he has to make morally difficult decisions. The participants were invited to judge who was right, the scientist or the minister. From the answers, five developmental levels could be extracted: Level 1. Only one world view comes into the field of vision: ‘I believe that the minister is right’, or ‘The scientist is right, he can prove it.’ Level 2. Both views are tentatively put side by side: ‘I believe that animals and humans would not have come into existence without God.’ [‘Does that mean science is wrong?’] ‘I would say, maybe there really was a big bang. So the minister is right, and maybe the scientist a little too.’ Level 3. Both world views are considered necessary for a full explanation: ‘Well, to my mind, both are right. The scientist must have developed his views according

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Table 7.3 Frequencies of individual RCR levels and levels of co-ordinating biblical and scientific views on the world’s origin. 1(2) means a level somewhat above level 1, 2(1) a level somewhat below 2, etc. N = 67, age 7–68 years. (Source: Reich 1996b, p. 132)

Levels of RCR I I(II) II(I) II II(III) III(II) III III(IV) IV(III) IV IV(V) V(IV)

Level of co-ordination of the two world views 1

1(2)

2 1

2

2 2 1 1

2(1)

2

2(3)

2

1

1 1

4

3 2 1

3(2)

1

3

3(4)

2 4 1 1 1

2 3 2

4(3)

4

4(5)

5(4)

4 4

3 3 2

4 1

3

to the results of scientific research. And the minister is right in that there would be no world if it were not for God. I do not see any contradiction.’ Level 4. The relation between both world views is thematised: ‘The two statements do not exclude each other. The minister speaks about his conscience, his feelings when looking at nature, about human encounters and the like. The scientist explains how the stars came about, and so on. If God had created the preconditions for those processes to occur, then the two views would supplement each other. The world came into being rather suddenly, perhaps somehow through an energy created by God, which enabled matter to come into existence. I am unsure how to understand symbolically Genesis in the Bible. Anyway, nobody can visualise the time scales involved.’ Level 5. A synopsis is endeavoured: ‘If I were the third person in that discussion between the minister and the scientist, I might say the following: Maybe things occurred as stated by the scientist. He has presented a model that explains plausibly how things evolved from the big bang until today. But of course, we cannot be absolutely sure about it. But I also have to side with the minister, and even to support him: Maybe in the future even more convincing models will come about. Anyway, they will not explain why there is a world altogether, and why our life proceeds as it does, and not differently. I too believe that one can sense God in nature, in human encounters, and in one’s conscience.’

At first blush, that sequence from level 1 to level 5 resembles that of RCR levels I to V. RCR levels were assessed employing the standard procedure (also used, e.g., in the preceding studies on the grasp of the two Christian doctrines; see Table 4.4, p. 58 for all of the results underlying Table 7.3).

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However, the two types of levels were not ‘the same’ throughout when the ‘nonreligious’ RCR scores were compared individually to the world view scores (Table 7.3). For instance, some interviewees who argued about the nonreligious issues at RCR level III, ‘co-ordinated’ the world views at level 1, and so did even a respondent at RCR level IV. Hence, the intra-individual variance was larger when religious issues were included. Indeed, for eighteen out the sixty-seven participants (27 per cent) the difference between their RCR level score and the co-ordination score was at least one full level. Is the difference due to the characteristics of the religious domain? One explanation would indeed be ‘segmentation’ (Piaget’s ‘d´ecalage’), that is the developmental time delay between reaching a given level in one domain, and later reaching the same level in a different domain, the size of the delay depending on the particular issue or domain. Alternatively, lack of pertinent knowledge or perhaps insufficient motivation for applying the existing competence could be a reason (Reich 1996b). Notice, however, that nobody argued the case of co-ordinating different world views at a higher level than the nonreligious RCR issues. It therefore appears that basically the same form of reasoning is at work. (Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient has the high value rs = .84, p < .001 – and rs = .94, p < .001, if the eighteen ‘deviant’ cases are discounted). In chapter 6 (pp. 109–10), I commented on Barbour’s four categories characterising the relation between science and religion/theology to the effect that they could be considered as RCR developmental levels. I also contended that eventually the solution resulting from applying RCR presented there would be accepted more generally (p. 114). The present empirical study supports this contention in that the answers at level 5 (having come about by reasoning at RCR level V) are ‘isomorphic’ with the result of the exercise of chapter 6: throughout, (a) A, B, (C) are considered necessary for elucidating the explanandum; (b) the links between A, B, (C) and (c) the context-dependence of their explanatory power are explicitly thematised. The present study (Table 7.3) has been ‘replicated’ several times (Reich 1996b, p. 128). As to the actual results of questioning various specific samples of adolescents and young adults, mostly about science and religion (apprentices, high school students, university level students), the proportion of respondents arguing at least at coordination level 3 ranged from a few per cent ( Jablonski and Gryzmala-Moszczynka 1995, p. 53; Nipkow and Schweitzer 1991, pp. 96–7) to about 40 per cent (Tamminen 1991, p. 128). In the studies of William Kay and Leslie Francis (1996, p. 100), 33 per cent of the 11- to 14-year-olds functioned at level 2 and an equal proportion at level 3. (Eighty per cent of the 21- to 25-year-olds were found at level 4. Peter Fulljames and his colleagues made comparable

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studies and also interpreted certain results in terms of RCR – Fulljames 1996, p. 259.) How can one understand such divergencies? I have no robust explanation, but note that (a) none of these studies used exactly the interview method described here, (b) in case questionnaires were used, the items were phrased differently, and (c) in one case (Nipkow and Schweitzer 1991) the data resulted from a secondary analysis of answers to questionnaires designed for a different purpose. While all these studies can be interpreted as a (weak) support of the thesis argued here, they illustrate the need to ‘harmonise’ the methodology if results are to be compared in a convincing way. Finally, the present study also confirms the earlier statement that cognitive development is not necessarily synonymous with railroading a person to ‘more developed’ views. To espouse a particular developed view, a corresponding level of cognitive development is necessary, but insufficient. In cases where one’s established positions come into play, a decision may well be needed to apply one’s competence for furthering development, and then to keep on applying it. RCR and religious development What is the essence of ‘religious development’? Already Paul of Tarsus was aware of it: ‘When I was a child, I spoke like a child, I thought like a child, I reasoned like a child. When I became an adult, I put an end to childish ways’ (First Letter to the Corinthians 13: 11, NRSV), and he drew the conclusion: ‘We must no longer be children, tossed to and fro and blown about by every wind of doctrine, by people’s trickery, by their craftiness in deceitful scheming’ (Letter to the Ephesians 34: 14, NRSV). Thomas Aquinus (1225–74) wrote in his Summa theologica (1273, part I, question 75, article 5, second of his arguments concerning objection 4): ‘Omne quod recipitur in aliquo, recipitur in eo per modum recipientes’ (‘Whatever is received into something is received according to the condition of the recipient’). In other words, it depends on the (developmental) state of the receiver’s (epistemic) cognition how the sense perceptions are analysed and interpreted. At present, notably James W. Fowler’s theory of ‘faith development’ and Fritz K. Oser’s theory of ‘religious judgement’ describe religious development. Both are stage theories, and RCR plays a role in both. Fowler’s stages of faith Fowler’s (1981, 1987, 1996, 2001) seven stages of faith (and selfhood) are labelled (1) primal faith, (2) intuitive-projective faith, (3) mythic-literal faith, (4) synthetic-conventional faith, (5) individuative-reflective faith,

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(6) conjunctive faith, and (7) universalising faith. The seven dimensions of faith are taken to be (a) form of logic, (b) perspective taking, (c) form of moral judgement, (d) bounds of social awareness, (e) locus of authority, (f) form of worlds coherence, and (g) symbolic function (Fowler 1981, pp. 243–57). RCR has mainly to do with (a), the form of logic, specifically with that of stage 6 (and stage 7): In the transition to Conjunctive faith one begins to make peace with the tension arising from the fact that truth must be approached from a number of different directions and angles of vision. As part of honoring truth, faith must maintain the tensions between these multiple perspectives and refuse to collapse them into one direction or another. In this respect, faith begins to come to terms with dialectical dimensions of experience and with apparent paradoxes: God is both immanent and transcendent; God is both an omnipotent and a self-limiting God; God is sovereign of history while being the incarnate and crucified One. In physics, in order to account for the behavior of light, two incompatible and unintegrable models must be employed – one based on the analogy with packets of energy, and the other upon the analogy with wavelike motions somewhat as in sound. Similarly, many truthful theological insights and models involve holding together in dialectical tension the ‘coincidence of opposites’. (Fowler 1987, p. 72)

Does that not read like a description of RCR at work, more specifically RCR levels III and IV? (Even if Fowler originally labelled the underlying form of thought as dialectical thinking, he now agrees that my analysis of ‘the relations between Fowler stage six and Oser/Gmunder ¨ stage five is on target’.) As to his stage 7, Fowler (1987, p. 75) writes: ‘In this stage we see persons moving beyond the paradoxical awareness and the embrace of polar tensions of the Conjunctive stage.’ As there are very few persons at stage 7, it is hard to know eactly what that means. Fowler postulates synthetic/unitive thinking at this stage. That is not in contradiction with RCR level V (assuming an everyday awake state of consciousness and not an enlarged, altered state of consciousness – Reich, 2001a). Oser/Gm¨under’s stages of religious judgement ‘Religious Judgement’ (RJ) involves the interpretation of a given experience from the perspective of the personal relationship to an Ultimate Reality, God for religious believers. The five experimentally observed stages are labelled (1) Deus ex machina, (2) Do ut des (give so that you may receive), (3) Deism, (4) Divine plan, and (5) Universal solidarity (Oser and Gmunder ¨ 1991; Oser and Reich 1996). The dimensions of the religious judgement are so-called polar pairs, for instance the ‘immanent’ and the ‘transcendent’. Religious development translates as, and stipulates, a

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5.0 RCR

4.5

4.0

3.5

3.0

2.5 2.0

2.5

3.0

3.5 RJ

4.0

4.5

5.0

Figure 7.2 Correlation between religious judgement stages (RJ) and levels of relational and contextual reasoning (RCR). Kendall’s tau = 0.70; p < .01. N = 30.

changing equilibrium between these poles: ‘Psychologically, this means that persons produce stage-specific equilibria between the immanent and the transcendent . . . ’ (Oser and Gmunder ¨ 1991, p. 27). At RJ stage 1, the immanent and the transcendent are seen as totally separate. At the highest stage, ‘the transcendent becomes evident in the immanence of human communication, and vice versa’ (ibid.). To take another pair, ‘freedom’ and ‘dependency’: at RJ stage 1, these concepts mutually exclude each other – freedom is conceived as freedom from dependency. At the higher stages, freedom is conceived progressively as freedom for something and interrelated more and more with dependency. Finally, freedom is recognised as being grounded in dependency on God (ibid., pp. 27–8). For these and further reasons (Oser and Reich 1996), a case can be made that RCR development is important for religious development. To test this hypothesis empirically, I interviewed, in a pilot study carried out in Germany and Switzerland, thirty adolescents and adults, aged from 13–79 years (Schenker and Reich, forthcoming). Their religious

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judgement was assessed using the modern Job dilemma about the church minister who becomes blind (cf. Oser and Gmunder ¨ 1991, p. 173), and RCR using the standard problem of the power plant accident (pp. 20 and 55). The results are shown in Figure 7.2. The correlation between RJ and RCR is high and significant, Kendall’s tau = 0.70; p <.01. The most outstanding result is that reaching RJ stage 4 requires at least RCR level IV. The reverse is once more not true. For instance, a respondent arguing at RCR level IV(III) – somewhat below level IV – only scored at RJ stage 3(2) – somewhat below 3, another respondent argued at RCR level IV(V), but only at RJ level 3. This is a well-known phenomenon (Reich 1989, 1991, 1996b): to raise the RCR performance to the competence level, motivation to apply one’s competence and a basic knowledge about religious issues are also required (cf. Table 7.3, p. 127). (An alternative explanation would be to assume segmentation, Piaget’s d´ecalage horizontale.) Given that this was an exploratory pilot study, a full study with more respondents and more dilemmata would be warranted. Conclusions Religion is a domain where use of formal binary logic is not infrequently inappropriate, and use of RCR logic helpful for gaining understanding. (The same remark applies to art.) Especially, this state of affairs was shown to be the case for the Christian doctrines of the two natures of Christ, and of the Trinitarian Godhead as well as for the relation of science and religion. Therefore, various discussions of RCR have found their entrance into a number of religion-related works other than my own (cf. Oser and Reich 1996). For instance, they figure in the considerations of the well-known German theologian Karl Ernst Nipkow (1998a, p. 218; 1998b, pp. 270–7, passim) on moral and religious education, in Martin Rothgangel’s (1999) Habilitationsschrift (advanced thesis, a condition for obtaining a professorship) on ‘Natural science and theology’, and in Thomas Bornhauser’s (2000, ch. 3, passim) doctoral thesis on ‘God for adults’.

8

The Archaeology of RCR

In chapters 4 and 7, empirical evidence for the use of RCR was presented. Given that evidence, the question arises whether traces can be found at earlier times. Obviously, this is a somewhat speculative endeavour as I could not interview any of the persons to be discussed, and hence have not assessed their level of RCR via the standard interview procedure. Candidates for earlier use of RCR are (i) Fathers of the Council of Chalcedon of 451, (ii) Vincent van Gogh (1853–90), (iii) William James (1842–1910), (iv) Rainer Maria Rilke (1875–1926), (v) Robert (Edler von) Musil (1880–1942), and (vi) Niels Bohr (1885–1962). Fathers of the Council of Chalcedon In 451 at the Fourth Ecumenical Council of Chalcedon, the assembled Fathers unanimously adopted the Chalcedonian Definition declaring notably that our Lord Jesus Christ is the one and the same Son . . . truly God and truly man . . . made known in two natures [which exist] without confusion, without change, without division, without separation; the difference in nature having been in no way taken away by way of reason of the union, but rather the properties of each being preserved, and (both) concurring into one person (prosopon) ˆ and one hypostasis. (Sellers 1953, pp. 210–11)

I hypothesise that this was an early application of RCR. The arguments (Reich 1990b) are mainly that (1) the above wording was formulated by a few ‘expert’ bishops within a few days, the centrepiece being the ‘paradoxical’ expressions without confusion, without change, without division, without separation. The emphasis is first put on the distinctness, the separateness of the two natures (‘without confusion, without change’), and then on the concurrence in the person of Jesus Christ (‘without division, without separation’) – this in consonance with the RCR heuristic. (2) The wording of the four adverbial expressions avoids carefully both a fusion 133

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of the two natures and neglecting one or the other (which were all current in the fifth century but are proscribed by RCR). (3) In Jesus’ life, the divine and human natures became ‘visible’ in different contexts (e.g., John 8: 58 (‘before Abraham was, I was’, NRSV) vs. Matthew 27: 50 (‘Then Jesus cried again with a loud voice and breathed his last’, NRSV). Corresponding considerations fit the predicate logical statement (Fig. 3.3) on pages 122–3, which epitomises the trivalent logic of RCR. (4) The laboratory studies (Reich 1994a) reported in chapter 7 (pp. 000–000) demonstrate that persons arguing at high RCR levels did not find the Chalcedonian Definition ‘paradoxical’, but quite understandable, and in fact appropriate. For a more detailed argumentation the reader is referred to the original publication (Reich 1990b). Vincent van Gogh The contention is that Vincent van Gogh applied RCR, not that he was fully aware of it as a form of thought and used it consciously and systematically, for instance as discussed in chapter 6. What is the evidence for such a thesis? First, on 28 June 1890 – a few weeks before his death – van Gogh wrote a letter to his brother Th´eo about his painting of Mademoiselle Gachet (Fischer 1992, pp. 8–9).1 That painting is named Marguerite ¨ Gachet at the piano2 (Basel, Switzerland, Offentliche Kunstsammlung, Kunstmuseum). Vincent’s considerations are not just concerned with this painting, but also with a possible companion piece. The painting of Mlle Gachet is of a high format (vertical dimension larger than horizontal). According to the letter, the features of interest to van Gogh are the following: Yesterday and the day before I painted Mlle Gachet’s portrait, which I hope you will see soon; the dress is red, the wall in the background green with orange spots, the carpet red with green spots, the piano dark violet; it is 40 inches high by 20 inches wide. It is a figure that I enjoyed painting – but it is difficult. I have noticed that this canvas goes very well with another horizontal one of wheat, as one canvas is vertical and in pink tones, the other pale green and greenish yellow, the complementary of pink. (Vincent [1890]1999) 1

2

Van Gogh (1988, pp. 647–9). Unfortunately, this particular letter is not included in the currently available English-language edition (Roskill 1997). Nevertheless, the latter edition provides a vivid picture of van Gogh and also of Dr Gachet, his country doctor at Auvers-sur-Oise (pp. 12, 81, 82–5, 336), this both via the memoir of van Gogh’s sisterin-law, J. van Gogh-Bonger, and his own letters. However, the letter we are discussing is reproduced on the Internet (Vincent [1890], 2001). See Internet display http://www.vangoghgallery.com/painting/p 0772.htm Marguerite Gachet at the Piano, oil on canvas, 102.6 × 50.0 cm, Auvers-sur-Oise, June 1890; F 772, JH 2048.

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He sees the ‘fitting’ companion painting as of a ‘horizontal’ format (horizontal dimension larger than vertical), and featuring fields of wheat in pale green and greenish yellow. Possible candidates are: (1) Wheat Field at Auvers with White House (Washington D.C., The Phillips Collection), ¨ (2) Wheat Fields near Auvers-sur-Oise (Vienna, Austria, Osterreichische Galerie in der Stallburg), both painted in the same month of June 1890 the letter was written, or (3) Wheat Fields at Auvers under Clouded Sky (Pittsburgh, PA, Carnegie Museum of Art),3 finished in July 1890. Note, however, that the reference to ‘fields of wheat in pale green and greenish yellow’ fits (1) and (3) but not so well (2). Conversely, (2) matches best the 2:1 ratio of the dimensions of the painting of Mlle Gachet. It could be, of course, that van Gogh was referring to an earlier painting, wheat fields being a recurrent theme, or even just to his imagination. On the surface, one could think that van Gogh argued at level III of RCR, that he had in view the full range of possibilities for ‘constructing’ a painting, and simply put them into differing, complementary mental boxes, namely the two usual formats (vertical or horizontal – there are few square paintings), portrait or landscape, dark or light colours, red or green, blue or yellow. However, if one reads on, it becomes clear that he argues at least at level IV, a genuinely complementarist level: but we are still far from the time when people will understand the curious relation between one fragment of nature and another, which all the same explain each other and enhance each other. But some certainly feel it, and that’s something. (Vincent [1890] 1999)

The significant words here are those about the relation between one fragment of nature and another which all the same explain each other and enhance each other. Explain each other could refer to analogical thinking, and enhance each other to dialectical thinking. But it could also mean the iterative refocusing from A on to B and so on, with ideally each time a gain in understanding of their relation, which is characteristic of RCR. Second, there is van Gogh’s masterpiece, the Starry Night (New York City, Museum of Modern Art, painted at Saint-R´emy, June 1889; oil on canvas, 73 × 92 cm; F 612, JH 1731).4 That painting has some of the 3

4

See Internet display http://vangoghgallery.com/painting/p 0804.htm for (1), oil on canvas, 48.6 × 83.2 cm, F 804, JH 2018. For (2) idem, 50.0 × 101.0 cm, F 775, JH 2038, see http://vangoghgallery.com/painting/p 0775.htm, and for (3) also oil on canvas, 73.0 × 92.0 cm, F 781, JH 2102, July 1890, see http://www.vangoghgallery.com/ painting/p 0781.htm. Roskill (1997, plate XII) shows a drawing much like the Starry Night but which is referred to as Cypresses and Stars (until its loss: Bremen, Germany, Kunsthalle; the drawing is said to have been lost during the war). Van Gogh has repeatedly painted cypresses, also together with a sky, but Starry Night is the acclaimed masterpiece, see http://vangoghgallery.com/index.html.

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complementary features just referred to such as a dark landscape with (vertical) dominating high cypresses and a church featuring a pointed spire on the one hand and a limitless (horizontal) sky illuminated by untold galaxies and the moon. But, then, there is more. The Starry Sky was painted at a time (1889) when there was great interest in the rotational movement of the (spiral) galaxies. To express his complementarist aesthetic and scientific views, van Gogh put those movements into the picture in an artistic manner. As a whole, then, the painting stimulates impressions and reflections about heaven and earth, about religion and science, and about the relations between them. (For those reasons it figures partly on the cover of Fischer, Herzka and Reich 1992.) William James As a first intimation of William James’s implied use of RCR, I quote from the published version of the Hibbert Lecture ( James, 1909): rationality has at least four dimensions, intellectual, aesthetical, moral, and practical; and to find a world rational to the maximal degree in all these respects simultaneously is no easy matter. (ibid., p. 175)

Is this not consonant with RCR’s considerations on constituting an explanandum? For the next indications I draw on my previous writing (Reich, 1998). In chapter VIII of his first volume on The principles of psychology, William James (1890, pp. 202–5) analysed the ‘split’ consciousness of certain hysterics: the partial consciousnesses coexisted, but ignored each other. For instance, if one whispered a question behind the back of such a hysterical person while he or she was in conversation with another, and the hysteric had a pencil to hand, then he or she wrote down the answer without the ‘upper’ consciousness which was involved in the conversation being aware of that writing. An awareness would only arise if the pencil came into the field of vision, which implies the context-dependence of the phenomenon. From such findings James drew the following conclusions: It must be admitted, therefore, that in certain persons, at least, the total possible consciousness may be split into parts which coexist but mutually ignore each other, and share the objects of knowledge between them. More remarkable still, they are complementary. Give an object to one of the consciousnesses, and by that fact you remove it from the others. Barring a certain common fund of information, like the command of language, etc., what the upper self knows the under self is ignorant of, and vice versa. (ibid., p. 206; italics in the original)

What James seems to have had in mind is a kind of class logic: barring the common fund, the total is split up in such a way that there is no

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duplication; a particular item belongs in one ‘bin’, and not in the other, and vice versa. However, for a total understanding, the contents of all ‘bins’ must be taken into account. This would be consonant with RCR level III. In the next chapter of the same volume, ‘The stream of thought’, James refers to the breaks in the stream of thought that are produced by sudden contrasts in the quality of successive segments. James likens them to an alternation of a bird’s perchings and flights. He calls the resting place, the perching, the ‘substantive’ segment, and the flight the ‘transitive’ segment of the stream of thought. In a presumed contrast to what happens in a bird’s case, according to James a person cannot become aware by introspection of the content of the transitive segment. Trying to do that would be like ‘trying to turn up the gas [light] quickly enough to see how the darkness looks’ (ibid., pp. 243–4). A certain mutual exclusiveness reigns. However, both segments of the stream are needed for full comprehension of the phenomenon. Again, that is consonant with RCR level III in that A and B are considered separately, but both taken into account. As will be recalled shortly, Niels Bohr emphasised the same point, possibly inspired by James. Rainer Maria Rilke So far we have not yet applied RCR to gender issues. What should the relationship between a man and a woman be like in the progressive twentyfirst century? What can it be between two autonomous individuals who each want both independence and community? In his letters to the young poet Franz Xavier Kappus, Rilke writes that the nature of love (all texts taken from Fulleborn ¨ 1992; translations by K. H. R.) which we prepare with effort as wrestlers . . . consists in that two solitudes protect, limit, and greet one another.5

In what ways are those two lines an expression of RCR? Let us first look at the relationship between men and women in traditional terms. Even if only fully apparent in ‘patriarchal’ societies, was the underlying social, and even legal structure not for a long time (and in some societal settings still is) one where a man ‘owned’ his wife? One may even quote from the Bible, ‘You shall not covet your neighbour’s house; you shall not covet your neighbour’s wife, or male and female slave, or ox, or donkey, or anything that belongs to your neighbour’ (Exodus 20: 17, NRSV). Over against such a state of affairs Rilke affirms the autonomy, the basic 5

‘die wir ringend und muhsam ¨ vorbereiten . . . darin besteht, daß zwei Einsamkeiten einander schutzen, ¨ grenzen und grußen’. ¨

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equality of men and women as human beings, yet who protect, limit and greet each other, that is, care about a mutual relationship. The other conceptualisation against which Rilke demarks himself is that of romantic love, which leads a man and a woman to fuse into becoming One. Here Rilke (as an expression of RCR) insists on the distinctness of men and women and the need to preserve that distinction if a durable, developing relationship is to be possible. I do not discuss the practicality of Rilke’s view. His own attempt at marriage did not last long, and many present-day marriages (which are more or less conceived in accordance with Rilke’s model) end up on the rocks. So, maybe RCR should be applied further to find out what is missing in order to fit the needs and possibilities of the average person (cf. the RCR analysis of an impending partnership break-up on pp. 89– 91 above). But that subtracts nothing from the fact that Rilke pioneered an RCR view of a gender issue. Looked at differently, Rilke’s readiness to explore new territory may also have been motivated by a desire to leave Descartes’s strict subjectobject relations behind. Instead, Rilke tends towards a generalised complex relationship. The last lines of ‘Sonette an Orpheus’ express that view: And if all that is earthly passes you over, say to the quiet earth: I flow gently. To the water flowing swiftly say: I am.6

Rilke has explained that these lines are primarily addressed to himself. The first line reflects his experience of having been excluded from normal life to the point of almost ceasing to exist (starting with his suffering at and the forced exit from a military preparatory school as a young adolescent). His message is to react, to remind one’s entire surroundings that one is part and parcel of it, that one belongs to it. However, if so, one does not hide that one is different. Vis-`a-vis the static earth the poet emphasises his (gentle) dynamism. To the water flowing swiftly, he explains his simply being there (without moving). For Rilke, all that is earthly includes both earth and water, lasting and passing away. Once more, RCR becomes ‘visible’ especially clearly in the opposition of ‘I flow gently’ (ich rinne) and ‘I am’ (ich bin). That is the RCR feature of ‘keeping A, B, . . . distinct’. Where is the bridge-building part, the search for links between A, B, . . . ? According to Rilke it comes in through the alternation of both phases in time. When one is in one phase, the other is absent, but to be fully oneself, one has to experience both in succession. In that way one avoids both being petrified because one is too static, and 6

‘Und wenn dich das Irdische vergaß/zu der stillen Erde sag: Ich rinne./Zu dem raschen Wasser sprich: Ich bin.’

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losing a sense of direction and purpose because one is all the time in a (partly uncontrolled) movement. In other words, Rilke approaches the issue under discussion not metaphysically but existentially. And despite all its difficulties and suffering (such as the shock of the First World War even if only experienced as an observer) life is affirmed as worthy to be lived. Fulleborn ¨ provides further examples from Rilke’s poetic writings, but let us concentrate on how he views Rilke’s approach: In the vast majority of cases Rilke does not make statements about an anthropological or ontological state of affairs but first of all he gives witness to contradictions experienced existentially. That all contradictions nevertheless constitute a whole in a complementarist manner seems to be a desideratum arising from necessity or desirability. (Fulleborn ¨ 1992, p. 152)

Robert Musil In his novel Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften (A man without qualities), Musil writes about the incestuous relationship of the siblings Agathe and Ulrich who live in a world full of possibilities, which is all along contrasted with the lives of persons living in a world of the more usual realities. Another relevant feature of the novel is the use of two types of language to refer to the same explanandum: (a) a precise, down-to-earth technical language, and (b) the evocative language of a writer. The opening sentence of the novel provides an illustration: The low pressure over the Atlantic moved eastward toward the high pressure over Russia; nothing as yet announced its tendency to circumvent the high pressure on its northern edge. The isotherms and isothers did their duty . . . To use a word which describes well the reality referred to, although that word is somewhat oldfashioned, it was a beautiful August day in the year 1913.7

That passage illustrates one of Musil’s major themes: precision and soul, facts and emotions. The event which occurred on that August day in 1913 provides a second example of facts and emotions: a car accident. A woman standing by is emotionally seized by the accident and sympathises with the victims. She regains her composure when a man next to her explains (a) the significance of the lengths of the traces on road resulting from an attempt to brake the car in the last minute, and (b) statistics about car accidents in the USA, and when furthermore the ambulance arrives 7

¨ ‘Uber dem Atlantik befand sich ein barometrisches Minimum; es wanderte ostw¨arts, einem uber ¨ Rußland liegenden Maximum zu, und verriet noch nicht die Neigung, diesem nordlich ¨ auszuweichen. Die Isothermen und Isotheren taten ihre Schuldigkeit. . . . Mit einem Wort, das das Tats¨achliche recht gut bezeichnet, wenn es auch etwas altmodisch ist: Es war ein schoner ¨ Augusttag des Jahres 1913.’

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and deals with the wounded in a matter-of-fact routine way. Finally the woman loses the feeling of having witnessed something unusual which merits reflection, and that is wrong in Musil’s eyes. Musil’s solution: the scientist has to become something of a poet, and the poet something of a scientist. Of course Musil himself was such a person, as were and are others including to some extent Thomas Mann (who studied scientifically the themes of his novels). Their task is to create a language which is both precise and supportive of a moral and emotional life (cf. note 1, p. 5). The objective of writing was to gain insights into various contemporary human interrelationships in order to assess what they might be like in the future. Thus Musil produced several utopias around his hero Ulrich and examined them. One of these utopias was the incestuous attempt of Ulrich and Agathe to break all social taboos. One of the (foreseeable) difficulties they encountered was that they could either move ahead and experience the unknown, or reflect upon and speak about it, but not both simultaneously. When they speak, Ulrich uses more a scientific language and Agathe one of emotions and feelings. Their difficulties in speaking to each other can be understood as symbolising the ‘two cultures’ situation (C. P. Snow) of twentieth-century society. Scientific language needs to open itself up to emotions, and the language of emotions has to become more precise. That will not lead to a single mixed language, nor will it get all difficulties out of the way. It is simply the best that can be done. Summing up, both Rilke and Musil sent a message for a new relationship, a getting away from one-sided approaches, from unbalanced dominance by one side and towards an encompassing wholeness which takes into account various perspectives and a beneficial, fruitful relation between them. Has the message been received? Yes, to some extent, I would say. But as discussed in previous chapters, there are still many for whom it is too new, perhaps too demanding, too much ‘against nature’ to be acceptable. Niels Bohr In the public mind, the Danish physicist Niels Bohr is often associated with the complementarity of the particle-like and the wave-like behaviour when explaining the nature of light (‘seemingly irreconcilable points of view need not be contradictory’).8 Actually, he introduced the idea of 8

As a matter of record (e.g., Beller 1992, p. 154), to ‘visualise’ the nature of light, Bohr favoured neither the picture of a single continuous wave nor that of a localised point-like particle, but one of a wave-packet, a superposition of waves trains of different vibrational frequencies.

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complementarity – in my view an expression of RCR – quite differently. The objective was not to ‘combine’ what had been considered as mutually exclusive, but to keep distinct what had been ‘confounded’. At the congress of physics held in September 1927 in Como, Italy, Bohr for the first time introduced in a public lecture his formulation of complementarity. To understand that introduction, some background knowledge is needed. In 1913 Bohr had presented his heuristic ‘planetary’ model of atoms: the electrons were supposed to circulate on stationary orbits around the atomic nucleus without emitting (or absorbing) energy/light. This was coupled with the quantum postulate: when absorbing or emitting light, the electrons ‘jumped’ from one well-defined discrete orbit to another well-defined discrete orbit.9 The ‘stationary’ orbits had an angular momentum which was an integral multiple of the value h/(2π ), where h = Planck’s constant. The difference between the energy of orbit n, En , and that of orbit n + x, En + x , corresponded to the vibrational frequency ν of the light waves absorbed or emitted by the ‘jumping’ electron7: En+x − En = ν h. In absolute terms, the energy of the ground state (smallest radius), En0 , is the smallest. Absorption of energy translates as ‘jumping’ to a larger radius and ‘jumping’ from an orbit with a larger radius to one with a smaller to emission of radiation. Thus, the space–time description (the orbits) was confounded with the energy balance.10 Bohr’s model was incomprehensible in terms of classical physics (cf. Beller 1992, p. 155), but produced the correct numbers of the spectral frequencies of atomic hydrogen. After quantum mechanics had been developed, the model faced opposition from two camps (Beller 1992, pp. 152–63). On the one hand, Schrodinger ¨ insinuated that his own (continuous) wave mechanics explained light emission and absorption without recourse to stationary states (fixed orbits) and quantum jumps (cf. Bohr 1985, p. 47). On the other hand, Heisenberg wanted to do away with a space–time description altogether, claiming that his matrix mechanics and his particulate-kinematical interpretation of atomic systems did not need it (Beller 1992, p. 156). Bohr’s solution at Como was as follows (Bohr 1985, p. 115 [= p. 567 of Atti, 1928, the Italian conference proceedings]): The very nature of the quantum theory thus forces us to regard the space–time co-ordination and the claim of causality, the union of which characterises the 9

10

See http://www.colorado.edu/physics/2000/quantumzone/bohr.html for a model and http://dbhs.wvusd.k12.ca.us/Chem-History/Bohr/Bohr-1913a.html for Bohr’s original publication. A causal space–time co-ordination is natural (and appropriate) for billiards players: they interpret a successful strike which propels the ball to where it is wanted as having been hit with just the right energy (and direction).

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classical theories, as complementary but exclusive features of the description, symbolising the idealisation of observation and definition respectively.

Hence Bohr insisted that a simultaneous consideration of the space– time vector and the energy–momentum vector was prescribed. In other words, he gave up the possibility of observing and describing the space– time behaviour of the electrons inside the atom, thereby avoiding any disturbance of their energy and therefore removing a major objection to a stable electron energy. Bohr thus saved a basic feature of his model of stationary states and quantum jumps, although not in the original form of the ‘planetary’ model. On the debit side, without a space–time description, the ‘jump’, the mechanism of the transition from one energy state to the next could not be elucidated, in particular not the exact time of its likely occurrence. Summing up his Como lecture, Bohr said (Bohr 1985, p. 135 [Atti 1928, p. 587]): the concepts of stationary states and individual transition processes within their proper field of application possess just as much or as little ‘reality’ as the very idea of individual particles. In both cases we are concerned with the demand of causality complementary to the space–time description, the adequate application of which is limited only by the restricted possibilities of definition and observation.

I close with three remarks. (1) This not being a physics text, I have simplified the presentation considerably, as a perusal of Bohr (1985) and Beller (1992) will easily show. (2) The RCR features standing out are Bohr’s insistence (a) on keeping distinct appropriate (idealised) aspects11 and (b) on their context dependence. (3) Bohr’s interest clearly 11

Robert Russell (1989) applied Bohr’s insight to the problem of understanding God’s providence (cf. Reich 1991, pp. 80–1). Russell suggests that any causal explanation involving God should be kept separate from a personal or historical space–time description of what happened: God’s action cannot be merged point-by-point with a diachronic event description into a unified picture. However, a sequence of events can be explained ex post facto as when Joseph tells his brothers (Genesis 50: 20 NRSV): ‘Even though you intended to do harm to me, God intended it for good, in order to preserve a numerous people, as he is doing today.’ In other words, Joseph concentrates on the causality of the outcome, and does not question (as is often done in everyday life) why God let it happen that he was sold as a slave to the Egyptians, that Potiphar’s wife tried to seduce him, that he had to go to prison although innocent, and so on. Markus Muhling-Schlapkohl ¨ (2000) takes up that issue from the perspective of individuation (= identity of an entity) and identification of that individuation. Until recently, spatio-temporal location was a condition sine qua non identification was not possible. Furthermore, identification implied individuation, and therefore spatio-temporal location of individuation (a sufficient condition, not a necessary condition). As we have seen from Bohr’s considerations, electrons inside an atom cannot be located spatio-temporally with precision, and therefore their individuation is limited (if possible at all). Another example given by Muhling-Schlapkohl ¨ concerns the very first moments after the big bang: as long as the universe was smaller than the Planck length of 1.616 10−35 m,

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was physics, not thought forms. However, one may well ask why his colleagues, who struggled with the same issues (see letters in Bohr 1985) were not driven to Bohr’s insights by the empirical findings. Did Bohr perhaps use a more appropriate thought form in his analysis? Conclusions What can be learned from the foregoing case studies? Each time, the descriptions, explanations, models, theories, or interpretations A and B were kept distinct, yet somehow linked. That is true too for Piagetian operations, and dialectical as well as analogical thought. However, those three thought forms deal with the ‘simultaneous’ presence of A and B, be it in the same time frame or the same space frame. Not so RCR: the contributions of A and B to the elucidation of the explanandum are context sensitive. In one context (time frame, space location, situational circumstance), A is more ‘real’, respectively ‘visible’, explains more, in another B. The second difference concerns the nature of the link between A and B. In cases where Piagetian operations apply, A and B are intrinsically independent yet imbedded in an unchanging mathematical or logical relation involving the explanandum. In dialectical thinking, A and B are ‘opposites’ that ‘condition’ each other and evolve dialectically. In analogical thinking, A and B share commonalities and exhibit differences; they stay the same. RCR does not exclude A and B evolving, but usually focuses on one or a few more points in time, space locations, or situational circumstances. The expectation is that (statistically) the ‘truth’ value stays the same for the same ‘context’ (time, space, situation). The link between A, B, C . . . requires a few extra words. In cases where RCR is applicable, the nature of the link (the entanglement in quantum physics) is diverse. Let us look at the five case studies. For the Fathers of the Council of Chalcedon of 451, the link between the divine and the human nature of Jesus Christ doubtless existed (‘without division, without separation’), yet was mystical (‘without confusion, without change’). Van Gogh described the link between A and B as between ‘one fragment of nature and another, which all the same explain each other and enhance each other’. For James, A and B both limit and complement each other. Rilke took a similar view in regard to men and within the Planck time of 5.391 10−44 sec, it does not make sense to speak about space–time, and therefore not about identification/individuation if they depend on spatiotemporal location. Given that it makes sense in quantum mechanics to speak about an individuation which cannot be located in space–time, why not grant the same to God? Theologically speaking, that is indeed unavoidable if God is to be the creator of space and time.

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and women. Musil dealt with the mutual limiting and enhancing of the emotional and the cognitive domains. Finally, for Bohr the link between the space–time vector and the energy–momentum vector is constituted by Heisenberg’s indeterminacy principle. All these findings support the claim explained previously (pp. 14, 55, 74) that RCR is a pragmatic reasoning schema (Cheng and Holyoak 1985) which allows for case-to-case differences within a ‘loosely’ yet clearly determined framework of cognitive activity.

9

Psychology

Chapters 9–11 have the following format. First, I apply ‘tacitly’ RCR according to the eight steps of chapter 6 (pp. 103–4), and summarise the results here as desiderata. Then I compare the actual (or sometimes the past) state of affairs with those desiderata, and draw some conclusions, mainly as to the degree of overlap of the two. In this chapter four issues are considered: (a) the discipline as a whole, (b) human development, (c) psychophysiological processes, and (d) functional music. That list could be lengthened without difficulty. The aim is not to cover psychology in its entirety, but to illustrate the potential of RCR by means of a few (otherwise arbitrary) examples. Psychology as a discipline Desiderata resulting from applying RCR To begin with a statement from chapter 2 (p. 26): ‘a complete psychological investigation should in turn look at the biological grounding, the person-centred (conscious and unconscious) factors, and the bio-physical and socio-cultural environments involved in human development, and integrate the findings’ (Overton 1998, 1999). Applying RCR to that statement, (1) a more narrow, ‘internal’ desideratum, and (2) a wider, ‘external’ desideratum result. The idea is that the effects would be markedly positive if psychological research were inspired by these two desiderata. Here they are: (1) Given the unavoidable specialisation of present-day research and the (narrowly) targeted application of its results, a concerted effort is required (a) to create and maintain active contacts between the practitioners of the various schools of psychology, (b) to study the commonalities and differences of their knowledge and insights, (c) to search for intrinsic links between the findings of those schools, (d) to elucidate possibilities for mutual fertilisation, (e) to establish the explanatory/beneficiary 145

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potential in function of various contexts, and (f ) to strive toward an overarching synopsis/theory. (2) Biology (including neurobiology and the evolution of life) may be considered the (lower) antidiscipline to psychology,1 and the various subdisciplines of psychology (social psychology, educational psychology, political psychology, clinical psychology, psychology of religion, cultural psychology) seen as the antidiscipline to sociology, education, political science, medicine, religion/theology, culture theory, respectively. A concerted effort is required (i) to create and maintain active contacts between the practitioners of biology, those of a given branch of psychology, and the practitioners of the related discipline to which that branch of psychology is the antidiscipline, (ii) to study the commonalities and differences of the respective knowledge and insights, (iii) to search for intrinsic links between the findings of those disciplines, (iv) to elucidate possibilities for mutual fertilisation, (v) to establish the explanatory/beneficiary potential in function of various contexts, and (vi) to strive towards an overarching synopsis/theory. Meeting the desiderata Collecting the empirical evidence for RCR presented in chapters 4 and 7 was a decade-long uphill struggle. To cover the much larger field of psychology as a discipline in any comparable manner would vastly exceed the scope of this chapter. In fact, my treatment here (and in the next section) will be impressionistic – and sketchy. No doubt other workers in the field will have different impressions or views. Under these conditions, is it worthwhile to go on? My answer is ‘yes’, if the attention of some seasoned psychologist could be caught and at least a few younger colleagues were encouraged to get into RCR. Beginning with the ‘internal’ desideratum (1), and taking a ‘bird’s-eye view’ over the history of psychology, one notes that in the last hundred years a number of psychological schools have succeeded and in some cases dominated each other rather than growing up together.2 That is also true for other disciplines (e.g., the school in physics that explained the nature 1

2

The notion of ‘antidicipline’ implies a hierarchy of knowledge levels, broadly speaking from physics, chemistry and biology to psychology, sociology and other social and human sciences to philosophy. Hierarchy merely indicates the order of the levels; it corresponds largely to the chronology of the evolution of the universe (and of human culture). The ‘lower antidiscipline’ figures just one rank below the given discipline under discussion, for instance physics in relation to chemistry. Clifford Geertz (1997, p. 22 – as quoted by Putnam 1999, p. 129) writes: ‘The wide swings between behaviourist, psychometric, cognitivist, depth psychological, topological, developmentalist, neurological, evolutionist and culturist conceptions of the subject, have made being a psychologist an unsettled occupation, subject not only to fashion, as are

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of light in terms of tiny corpuscles, and the school of physics that explained the nature of light in terms of waves), although the time frames may be different (cf., note 13, p. 24). However, Liu and Liu (1997, p. 159, passim) argue that in psychology revolutions have not been of a scientific but of a social kind. According to these authors, the result has been and is a non-cumulative discipline.3 A few of their examples may illustrate that claim. In the late nineteenth century both Freud and Wundt set much store by the detailed analysis of an individual’s reports of mental events: free association, dream analysis, and in-depth interviews being preferred by Freud (for studying the negotiation between the conscious and the unconscious), experimental methods of introspection by Wundt (for studying perception, sensations and feelings). Despite such a basic methodological commonality, there was next to no discussion between the Freud and Wundt schools, no interchange and mutual fructification between the two endeavours, no common striving for developing a broadbased understanding of the possibilities and limitations of introspection. (That does not mean, of course, that other persons did not appreciate the value of both Freud’s and Wundt’s work.) When behaviourism took over after the First World War, introspection was declared as not part of a scientific methodology. In fact, behaviourists did not form a unified school, but believed different things. Nevertheless, they were united by the belief that overt behaviour can be observed and measured, but intuition, introspection, etc. often cannot. The opportunity was missed to explore any potentially fruitful commonalities or links between introspection and behaviourism, even at the level of methodology. Nevertheless, behaviourism changed from the Stimulus-Response (SR) theory to the Stimulus-Organism-Response (SOR) theory. Some decades later, behaviourism was largely replaced, mainly by social and cognitive theory. Basically, the cognitive revolution was an uprising against behaviourists’ belief that animal learning could be translated directly into human behaviour. In this case of change-over there was more

3

all the human sciences, but also to sudden and frequent reversals of course. Paradigms, wholly new ways of going about things, come along not by the century, but by the decade; sometimes, it almost seems, by the month.’ While this is obviously a somewhat polemical statement, the ‘conceptions’ listed overlap, and refer to different aspects of psychology, there is a certain amount of overlap between Geertz’s ‘enthusiastic’ views and those of Liu and Liu (1997). That phenomenon exists also in other disciplines. Hillary Putnam (1999, p. 3) opens his considerations on philosophy as follows: ‘The besetting sin of philosophers seems to be throwing out the baby with the bath water. From the beginning, each “new wave” [marks in original] of philosophers has simply ignored insights of the previous wave in the course of advancing its own. Today we stand near the end of a century in which there have been many new insights in philosophy; but at the same time there has been an unprecedented forgetting of the insights of previous centuries and millennia.’

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‘continuity’ in that the Organism (O) also plays a role in social and in cognitive psychological theory, and in the understanding of individual differences. However, little attempt was made to build an encompassing accumulation of insights, or to explore links and possible mutual fertilisation between behaviourism, social psychology and cognitive psychology – this with the possible exception of learning theory. All the same: who would deny that the policy of the carrot and the stick (explainable by behaviourism) has a long history, surely not because of its total inefficacy? In sum, much of the past history can be characterised as having taken place at level I or level II of RCR, if that is an admissible way of putting it, and little mutual exploration, let alone in-depth stimulation took place. All is not bleak, of course. Some bridge-building has been tried by individuals. An example would be Hans G. Furth’s (1987) essay on Freud and Piaget, aimed at allowing their theories to illuminate each other, and similarly Seymour Epstein’s (1994) work. Cichetti and Cohen (1995) bridge developmental and clinical psychology, Noam and Roper ¨ (1999) bring developmental aspects to bear on psychotherapy. An even more recent, ‘collective’ example (Paloutzian, 2000) is the fruitful discussion of ‘spiritual intelligence’ by Emmons (personality psychology, especially ultimate concerns), Gardner (cognitive and educational psychology), Kwilecki (empirical religious studies) and Mayor (personality psychology, especially emotions). Summing up, the record seems to show that initially desideratum (1) was hardly met in psychology as a discipline, but with time the subdisciplines interacted more (partly guided more by pragmatism than principle). Meeting desideratum (1) was more frequent at the level of individual researchers and in applied psychology such as psychotherapy (e.g., Grawe 1998), all with good results. As regards desideratum (2), many positive examples spring to mind. The entire nature–nurture debate centres on both biology and psychology. In the beginning, there was much rivalry between the proponents of each view.4 It was felt that only one of the explanations could be significant, not both. Yet neither side could triumph definitely over the other. Finally that debate led to questions such as, ‘How do the two factors operate?’ (Anastasia 1958), ‘Are their effects additive or interactive?’ (Overton 1973), ‘How does that affect mental development?’ (McCall 1981). As evidence accumulated, for example when training top athletes (Andersen, Schjerling and Saltin 2000; Niemitz 1987), the common view changed: ‘either nature or nurture’ gave way to ‘both nature and nurture’. 4

A militant rivalry still seems to exist between biological and cultural anthropologists (Stanford 2000, p. 39).

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More specifically, Piaget (1971) always linked cognitive development in a general way to its biological base. Today, desideratum (b) is largely met (e.g., Kirsch and Hyland 1987; Elman et al. 1997, p. 23; de Waal 1999, and, above all, evolutionary psychologists such as Buss 1999), and the actual knowledge and research benefit correspondingly. In time, it also became clear that one of the causes for the difficulty of collaboration between the various protagonists was divergent philosophical groundings. ‘Such presuppositions ultimately determine the types of questions that will and will not be asked, and the types of methodologies that will and will not be employed’ (Overton 1973, p. 78). In particular, the additive camp (nature and nurture show up in separable components, with can be added together) had adopted a mechanical world view, and the interactionist camp (nature and nurture are non-separable, and interact strongly) an organismic world view (ibid., p. 79).5 Preserving/regaining health is another area of evidence for the positive effects of a situation referred to by desideratum (b), this time involving psychology and medicine (e.g., Robins and Rutter 1990; Del Volgo, Gori and Poinso 1994). Psychology and physics also have their area of mutual fruitfulness (e.g., Baird 1997). Baird starts off explicitly with a discussion of complementarity, and treats issues like the sensory aggregate model, and the psychophysics of memory. In brief, to judge tentatively from this anecdotal evidence, a case could be made that meeting the desiderata resulting from applying RCR is beneficial to psychology as a field. The case of individual development In this case, A stands for a development of the individual based on group characteristics, and B for a development drawing on his or her inner abilities and own dynamic. The desideratum from applying RCR is the standard one, namely to consider A and B ‘together’ while keeping them distinct, elucidate any links between them as well a context-sensitivity of their explanatory power, and after all other steps have been achieved successfully, to construct an overarching synopsis or theory. 5

This is by no means an exceptional instance. The foreground/surface dispute is not infrequently about one thing, while the real issue is about another: the underlying philosophy of knowledge. A classic case of this is the decades-long, sometimes acrimonious debates on the epistemological status of quantum theory (e.g., Heisenberg 1958, pp. 128–46), in particular the exchanges between Bohr and Einstein (Bohr 1958, pp. 32–66). The suspicion is that (perhaps unwittingly) Bohr defended a phenomenological world view, and Einstein the pantheistic philosophy of Spinoza (deus sive natura).

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Hamilton Cravens (1987, p. 327) makes the following observation: ‘developmental science appears inherently more controversial than many other sciences’. Cravens ascribes this to the tension between the development of the individual and that of the group to which ‘science’ or ‘society’ assigns the individual. Has an individual only those characteristics or patterns of behaviour, A, that were generic to the group to which he or she had been assigned (within individual differences as found in that group)? Or, B, could an individual develop outside that range according to his or her own dynamic of inner abilities and outer stimuli? One issue in that context is the (tacitly) assumed taxonomy of natural and social reality which exerts its effects at a deep structural level of the scientific community. In contrast, the events, which people see and in which they participate, exist at a ‘surface’ level. According to Cravens, from 1870 to 1920 the question of an outstanding individual in practice was not in the foreground because a much more mosaic view of development reigned, with many detailed preoccupations such as the importance of the body, nutrition, etc. Mental testing presupposed that also intelligence was inborn, biological (B dominated). From 1920 onwards a significant change took place in that a more holistic view took over, the whole was now thought to be greater than the parts. During that period it was no longer biology but the group which gave the individual his or her lifetime identity (A dominated). Contrary to the prior period, the deep-lying taxonomy now put the social reality above the natural reality. Any contrary findings therefore provoked much controversy. However, with time, the idea of a whole greater than the parts weakened. Each part now has to be understood on its own terms. From such a perspective, a child developing outside the range of his or her group becomes more acceptable. Once more, we witness a development which parallels the sequence of RCR levels, and brings the situation closer to the desideratum. What does all this tell us? That fashions are at work in psychology as distinct from paradigm changes forced on the discipline by the exhaustion of the contemporary paradigm, by clear evidence that it is no longer fruitful? Maybe, but I would rather attribute such a state of affairs to a lack of a deep-seated conviction that any scientific endeavour gains from a (fair-minded and competent) competition and interaction between differing approaches, models or even theories. Perhaps it is unavoidable that a group of researchers carrying out a difficult lengthy investigation also engage themselves emotionally in that enterprise with the effect that incorporating other points of view into the programme becomes difficult. However, an undue singular focus may not be in the best interest of the research in question. A more pragmatic view of what happens

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actually in the field would be that – contrary to abstract subdisciplines per se – individual researchers are basically ready to improve their approach wherever the ideas come from. Maybe the reality of ‘isolation’ vs. ‘collaboration’ is co-determined by the local culture, personal dispositions and attitudes – and possibly age. There are no doubt hurdles on the way to adopting an RCR heuristic (see pp. 159–60), but that does not make it less attractive from the perspective of potential positive results. Psychophysiological phenomena Here is another field of investigation where meeting desideratum (b) above looks fruitful (Jackson [1884] 1958; Edelheit 1976; Fahrenberg 1992). A central research question is how best to study and understand phenomena like pain, fright, and the like. Generally speaking, these phenomena are perceptible at three levels: (i) introspection by the persons concerned; (ii) observation of their behaviour; and (iii) measurement of physiological changes, for instance brain activity, heart beat frequency, and/or skin resistance. Problems arise because (i), (ii), and (iii) traditionally use differing methods, and are based on different theories. Briefly: (i) values fairly open interviews and their interpretation using hermeneutics, (ii) specifies datataking, for instance with video cameras, and their ‘objective’ quantitative analysis, and (iii) involves appropriate medical tests and measurements as well as their comparison with the base line values concerned. How does RCR desideratum (2) – p. 146 – come in here? In two ways: first, through insisting that (i), (ii), and (iii) should be kept distinct, as far as both data-taking and initial explanations are concerned. Often, that is indeed already the case in practice, although occasionally explanations are immediately taken from another level, which is not admissible. Second, after going through the first six steps of chapter 6 (pp. 103–4), an overarching theory might suggest itself in outline. Equipping respondents with recording equipment and with measuring devices and then taking data both from introspection and from those devices during normal working activities is a practical step in the indicated direction, even if the results are not error-free. A successful extension consists in considering psychotherapy as a field viewed from the perspectives of, first, fundamental psychological knowledge and, second, research into the efficacy of the various psychotherapeutic methods, and then to propose the most suitable method(s) for a given diagnostic (Grawe 1998).

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Which music for which purpose? You are sitting in a dentist’s waiting room. You are somewhat apprehensive: ‘how painful will the treatment be?’ But then a relaxing music takes over; soon after, your apprehension is practically gone. There is no known society which does not have some type of music. The general issue of this section is to determine which type of music best suits a given function. In other words, how is one to classify functional music, music that enhances a person’s mood, and possibly fosters action? In some cases the answer is obvious because the music has evolved or has been composed for a particular purpose such as a lullaby, a dance music, or a military music. The overall answer – if it exists – cannot be just formal – in each case it also depends on the particular culture, the context, the personality and motivations of listeners and other intervening variables. Elsewhere (Reich 1990c), I have analysed the Live Aid rock marathon of 19856 from the perspective of the diversity (a) of listeners’ motivations to participate, and (b) of the effects of the concert on the listeners. I do not claim expertise in this area, but simply want to show that RCR can nevertheless offer insights, in particular if one enters the field as a newcomer. In contrast to previous examples of applying RCR, the task now is to understand the reasons for a solution already provided, not to find a solution. The claim is that the RCR heuristic is helpful for reaching this objective fairly rapidly, mainly thanks to determining appropriately the partial reasons A, B, C for the extant ‘guidelines’ about providing functional music, and working from there. The explanandum is, Why are the guidelines (see p. 155 below) for providing functional background music in shopping malls, waiting areas, work places and similar locations as ‘flat’, as ‘inexact’ as they are? Tentatively, the competing reasons are conceived as follows: A, the physiological response of humans to various sounds, B, the emotional response to various types of music, and C, musical preferences in various contexts. The task is to understand the explanandum by considering A, B, and C ‘together’ (yet keeping them distinct), elucidating any links between them as well as any context-sensitivity involved, and so on (steps 2– 7 of chapter 6). What is this all about? It is well known that the use of functional music has a long history, starting with ‘ritual’ music, which dates back thousands of years. Whatever its cultural setting, ritual music is said to be powerful, meaningful, mediatorial, and transformative, and to be ‘a path for human and 6

This rock concert collected some £50 million for needy children in Africa; a number of the biggest names in rock music participated and donated their earnings to the good cause.

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divine meeting’ (Collins 1989, p. 3). Also, ‘music is a way of inhabiting the body and of situating a self or a people in time and space’ (Power 1989, p. 149). However, this does not mean that all problems have been solved by choosing the ‘right’ ritual music. Not only do cultures change, but also ideas about rituals, and reactions to a given piece of music. And there is ‘technological’ development: from the Gregorian chant to the electronic organ and the synthesiser. One particular issue is whether in ritual, words come first and the music should suit them or whether it is the other way around. Also, where deep cultural differences exist, the suitability of a particular music for a given purpose will be questioned (cf. Power, Collins and Burnim 1989). For instance, some traditional Christian churches restrict music appropriate for church services to spiritual music. In contrast, for some tribal religions use of sensual music is equally appropriate. Another long-standing use of music is ‘music while you work’. In this case a differentiation imposes itself between (a) spontaneous singing and the like for accompanying and enjoying the work, and (b) externally targeted music for raising workers’ output. Here we are concerned with (b). Europeans used music as early as the fifteenth century to activate workers, and Jesuit missionaries in Latin America used it to induce natives to do manual labour (Rosenstiel 1997, p. 159). In the last decades detailed studies were made which elucidate the effect of music on the quantity (more effective during night shifts) and quality (less clear) of work. Results indicate the best effect, that is higher productivity, was obtained when music was played for 10 per cent of the time during the day, and 50 per cent during evening and night shifts (ibid., pp. 161–2). As far as the ‘listener’ is concerned, there are at least seven ways to listen to music7 : (a) ‘motor’ (music resonates with the desire to move continually), (b) compensatory (music makes one feel less lonely), (c) vegetative (music gets under the skin), (d) diffuse (listening to music with one ear only), (e) emotional/sentimental (bathing in the music, dreaming), (f ) associative (linking music with visual representations) (g) distanced (trying to understand the structure of that particular piece of music) 7

According to David Hargreaves (1986, pp. 105–42), listeners’ responses depend in particular on the state of three psychic levels. (a) The most stable level, that of taste response, reflects long-term predilections honed by activities like concert-going and record-buying. This response is under a high degree of conscious control. (b) Preference response resides at a medium level between instant reaction to music and long-term commitment. (c) Mood/emotional responses are of a short-term nature; they are least internalised in the sense that listeners exert little control over them (ibid., p. 108). That construct shares features with Simon Epstein’s (1990, 1994) ‘cognitive-experiential self-theory’ (CEST). Epstein posits that personality emerges as the product of (i) the Freudian and Jungian unconsciousness (c above), (ii) conscious processing of information in a rational manner (b), and (iii) an experiential system operating preconsciously that interprets reality and directs behaviour in everyday life yet does not exclude control (a).

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(Rosing ¨ 1997, p. 116). For instance, the composers of film music base their work on (f ), associative listening. Their music ‘explains’ the emotions of the actors like love or hate, awe and joy, that is it helps the spectators to understand the feelings of the protagonists. Alternatively, the music prepares the spectators for what is coming: an eerie music precedes an encounter of the third kind, a horribly frightening music leads up to a murder, and so on. From the side of the music producer and that of the music seller, effective functional background music should (i) create an ‘atmosphere’ (acoustical ornamentation); (ii) ‘cover’ disturbing noise produced by work in progress (absorption of unwanted din); (iii) activate the tired and calm the nervous (conditioning and influencing subjective psychic states); (iv) stop reflection by way of spreading well-being through a familiar music (mental stabilisation through emotional synchronisation) (ibid., p. 122). Obviously, much more could be said (the handbook of the psychology of music I am using has about 700 pages), but let us see whether we can summarise something as to specifics of A, B, and C above in order to advance with applying RCR to the explanandum. Since A, the physiological response of humans to various sounds, has not yet been considered, the pertinent information is provided directly. Relevant studies show in particular that the left ear is better at recognising bits of music played on the piano, the violin, and the organ, and the right ear better at recognising rhythms (Fassbender 1997, p. 624). There exists also much knowledge as to how sounds ‘penetrate’ the limbic system and the cerebral cortex, and influence the vegetative neural system. How about B, the emotional response to various types of music? From the foregoing it seems likely that no single answer can be given. Even without the extra complication of different types of music (including that of high culture, folk culture, and mass culture), and listeners’ personality and socialisation as well as their developmental stage (Hargreaves 1986), not forgetting their attitude towards and their experience with music, the several ways to listen to music (a) to (f ) (p. 153 above) bring in extra diversity. C, musical preferences for various contexts, presents a similar problem. Again, no unique answer seems possible beyond some general considerations. The volume of sound needs to be appropriate for each occasion: softer in waiting rooms, caf´es, etc., many decibels at rock concerts. Neither a totally unknown piece of music nor a piece which is currently popular is likely to be pleasant for very many persons.8 By the way, that 8

How does the pleasantness of a piece of music develop with time? That relation takes the form of an inverted U shape: something entirely new and unfamiliar is rarely experienced as pleasant, and a music heard ‘too often’ is not very pleasant anymore; the optimum lies between the two. The happy-medium situation for experiencing pleasantness seems

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immediately creates a problem. If a shopping centre wants to attract customers for extended Christmas shopping, familiar Christmas music is the order of the day. But what about the sales staff? How long can they stand the continuous repetition of a limited series of tunes? Where does that lead us with regard to understanding the explanandum (Why are the guidelines for providing functional background music in shopping malls, waiting areas, workplaces and similar locations as ‘flat’, as ‘inexact’ as they are?)? These guidelines are as follows: (a) the basic recipe is to use well-known pieces of music in a new arrangement; (b) to use a very simple structure (short motifs, their multiple repetition, simple harmonies); (c) the basic ‘frequency’ is 70 beats per second (the average human heart beat), any variation being slow and gradual; (d) solo singers are disfavoured on the grounds of being possibly too involving; (e) the volume is more or less invariant throughout a musical programme – in shopping centres and restaurants it is three dB above the general noise level, in working areas seven dB; (f ) unusual sound combinations are avoided, a ‘blended’ type of music produced by synthesiser is preferred. Furthermore, when actually playing the music, the following is considered ideal: (i) the sources are distributed so that their location can hardly be recognised; (ii) the audio frequencies are limited to about 80 to 4000 Hz (neither very low nor very high notes); (iii) the music is not necessarily played continuously – interruptions create an impression of no beginning and no end; (iv) single pieces of music are assembled into programmes providing some variation in the musical sound characteristics (harmony, melody, timbre), and the rhythm (Rosing ¨ 1997, pp. 119–20). How do these guidelines (a)–(f ) and (i–iv) connect with the reasons A (physiological response), B (emotional response), and C (preferences) (Table 9.1)? We begin with the clear cases: Under A come (c – 70 beats/sec), and likely also (b – simple structure), (e – invariant volume), and (f – blended music) as well as (i – distributed sources) and (ii – limited frequency range). The frequency of 70 beats/sec, (c), positively reinforces bodily the stability of (involuntary) music consumers. We class such a guideline as justified by a ‘positive’ reason. The other guidelines (b, e, f, i, ii) are designed to minimise unbalance and instability (‘negative’ reason). To B (emotional reactions) pertain guidelines (d – no solo singers), (i – distributed sources), (iii – no beginning, no end), and (iv – programmes with variety). Rule (iv) is a positive compromise to meet the multivariate diversity of B for which no single ‘right’ answer is possible. to be a familiar piece of music of medium complexity, as subjectively perceived, listened to from time to time. However, experts will analyse the issues involved in a much more finely grained way (e.g., Hargreaves 1986, pp. 110–22).

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Table 9.1 Classification of the guidelines (a) to (iv) for functional background music according to the reasons A (physiological response to music), B (emotional response to music), and C (musical preferences). Positive guidelines are designed to reinforce desirable behaviour, negative guidelines to minimise undesirable behaviour. Further explanations in text. Reason

A

B

C

Positive guideline Negative guideline

c b, e, f, i, ii

iv d, i, iii (a)

a, iv d (e, f )

Guidelines (d), (i), and (iii) are ‘negative’ compromise solutions to minimise unwanted behavioural effects. For C (preferences) a similar state of affairs is true; consequences are guidelines (a – known pieces in a new arrangement) and (iv – programmes with variety) as positive compromises, and (d – no solo singer) as prevention. But then, apart from (d), (i), and (iv), there are further overlaps: (a – known pieces in a new arrangement) could also be justified by B (negatively), and (e – invariant volume) as well as (f – blended music) by C (negatively). One result of this exercise is to have become aware in more detail that the explanandum is not a well-defined ‘functional whole’. Nevertheless, the exercise has been worth the effort, at least for me, in that a sense of the multivariate nature of the guidelines and of their interconnections has been gained. Once more, that is partly due to determining the explanandum appropriately (Reich 1995b) as well as A, B, C . . . , and looking for relations between A, B, C and the explanandum as well as between A, B, C themselves. Conclusions If any conclusion can be drawn from such impressionistic and sketchy evidence, it would be as follows. Several examples were used to demonstrate the usefulness of RCR in various areas of psychology, be it for starting research, determining an appropriate methodology, or interpreting results. Not unexpectedly, the field as a whole started at low RCR levels, with a correspondingly low effectiveness as a consequence. By now, higher RCR levels have been reached, and that proves mutually beneficial for the subdisciplines concerned. Where not yet done, it is to be hoped that RCR will be applied more and more in appropriate cases.

10

Education

Once more, many examples could be dealt with under this heading. Three were chosen, partly for their diversity: (a) who controls the educational system?; (b) teaching the investiture contest; (c) stimulating RCR in the classroom. Who controls the educational system? Since the dawn of humanity, the question of who is in control, that is, who is the more powerful, has, as a rule, been decided by an open or a covert fight, from which a victor emerges. Not infrequently, that also goes for the educational system. Dictatorships use it to produce obedient followers. But even in democracies ideological fights about the access conditions and the curriculum are not uncommon (e.g., note 1, p. 105). What should be done according to the RCR heuristic? Inspired by the issue of the investiture contest (see below), the desideratum would be to give roughly ‘equal’ power and responsibilities to the state authorities, the school itself (including some sharing with the students), and the parents. What is the actual situation? In most countries monolithic solutions are more visible as regards the control of the educational system(s) than stipulated by the desideratum. In other words, either the state, often a ministry of education or another administration such as a municipality, controls everything (finance, staffing, curriculum, entrance test and examination procedures, etc.) or the control is largely in the hands of a school or university itself, particularly if it is private. In the first case the system may well suffer from sclerosis; in the second case a lack of common standards, and even of effectiveness, may hamper education, in particular in the case of children who need to change schools repeatedly because of their parents’ mobility. A system meeting the above desideratum is the Dutch educational system (Liket 1993). In the Netherlands practically three out of every four schools are ‘private’. Public and private schools have equal rights 157

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before the law. The consequence is that the founding and the orientation of a given school (or university) is largely unrestricted, yet it is publicly financed. Nevertheless, all institutions of learning are subject to three restrictions: (1) they must conform to the rather general state laws on education; (2) all schools and other institutions of learning have to accept inspection by national inspectors; (3) all students must take a national examination at the end of the obligatory school attendance, the result of which counts for 50 per cent of their total grades. ‘Institutions of learning’ in this context include universities; their external inspection has existed for more than ten years. What are the advantages of this system? (a) On account of the greater responsibility given to individual schools/institutions – which includes general educational policy, curriculum, hiring of staff, and budget administration – they are motivated to develop an identity, to innovate, and attract students. This has led them to propose detailed educational programmes to prospective attendees, in order to facilitate their choice. Also, the schools/institutions recognise their duty to account for their use of taxpayers’ money. (b) Nevertheless, the state retains the power of a selective control (e.g., of the educational programme) as opposed to either full control or total deregulation, and in particular the power to sanction abuse. The outcome is a broad curricular spectrum, yet standards are preserved and moving from one institution to another does not present major difficulties. Teaching the investiture contest The reason for including the following example is that RCR can bring out the full meaning of the conflict and its solution – and thereby improve its teaching – and this conflict was an important one; it had widespread consequences. The example concerns the investiture contest, which took place in Europe from 1075 to 1122 (e.g., Roberts 1985, pp. 470–2; Kinder and Hilgemann 1984, p. 148). It was solved in 1122 by taking into account the complementarity of the different powers involved. Otto I (912–73), Holy Roman Emperor (936–73), had granted worldly power to the bishops, thereby making them his vassals. Along that line he also took a hand in investing clerics with a bishopric. This went on until Pope Gregory VII (1073–85) in 1075 claimed the sole right to appoint to a vacant bishopric, that is, to implement the investiture, and contested the right of kings or even emperors to do it. The pope’s decision led to extreme consequences, including deposition of the pope by a German synod, excommunication of King Henry IV (1056–1106) and his humiliation at Canossa, nomination of the rival Pope Clement III, conquest of Rome,

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the crowning of Henry IV as emperor by Clement III (while Gregory VII maintained himself solitarily in his Roman fortress), more strife and wars. Finally, in 1122, the Concordat of Worms was concluded, which put an end to the investiture contest. How was the solution brought about? First, a third party was introduced into the procedure, the chapter of canons of the cathedral pertaining to the vacant bishopric (= A). It was up to that chapter to propose a candidate. The chosen candidate was then invested with his temporal (worldly) power by the king/emperor or his representative (= B), symbolised by the handing over of the sceptre, and finally with his spiritual (ecclesiastical) power by the pope or his representative (= C), symbolised by the handing over of the staff and the ring. Thus, each of the three parties co-acted in the investiture. To come to a full understanding of what is involved, outsiders (but also insiders) have to consider that investiture procedure from the standpoint of each party A, B, C and its context, and they need to consider the subtle links between the outlook and interests of A, B, C. Also to be noticed are the additional possibilities which were opened up through adopting such an approach. The chapter had basically three choices: a ‘neutral’ candidate, one who was more inclined towards the king/emperor, or one who was more inclined toward the pope. Depending on the situation, the chapter could elect one or the other, and try to get some ‘compensation’ from the advantaged party. The king/emperor would insist that the bishop engaged himself fully in his worldly affairs, and he could hope that the bishop would also bring his spiritual experience and ecclesiastical powers to that task. The pope from his side insisted on the priority of the spiritual and ecclesiastical tasks and hoped that they would be facilitated through the bishop’s worldly power. In any event it is clear that this solution in the RCR spirit was less socially disruptive than the foregoing state of affairs. Playing the roles A, B, C in the classroom can help students to appreciate the full significance of the Concordat of Worms, and pari passu to get into the RCR spirit. Stimulating RCR in the classroom Hurdles on the way to RCR Before describing the explicit stimulation of RCR in the classroom, it is useful to have likely obstacles in mind (Reich 1990b, pp. 154–5; 1991, p. 87; 1996a, pp. 135–6). These are discussed by going from the more general to the more specific. They apply less, the further a person has advanced in mastering RCR.

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Either/or orientation: (a) For more than 90 per cent of their existence as a species, humans were hunters (and gatherers). ‘To fight or to flee’ was and is a question when facing a sudden danger whose answer may decide survival. (b) Such an either/or action pattern may (unwittingly) be transferred into a thought pattern. In present everyday life, the alternatives are usually less dramatic, but still of the alternative variety: yes or no, right or wrong, good or bad? (c) Such either/or thinking, which has of course its proper place, in our culture is encouraged to overstep the boundaries of its legitimate application by a deep-seated bias towards formal binary (Aristotelian) logic. ‘Paradox’, a ‘non-excluded third’ and the like are intellectually suspicious, are assumed to indicate a lack of a deeper analysis which would eliminate them (or even indicate a person with a weak character who is afraid of taking decisions!). (d) From a different perspective, either/or choices help to buttress one’s identity in an ambiguous or even hostile environment, to put solid foundations under one’s ideology, and so on. Particularly in the latter cases, such an either/or position may even be unconscious. Lack of motivation: Apart from a general resistance to newness and change, there are specific explanations for a lack of motivation to become familiar with RCR and to develop it. Point (d) just made indicates one reason for a lack of interest in entering into a dialogue about alternatives. Why waste time, when one has made up one’s mind about who one is, and what one believes and wants to achieve in life? A different reason is a marked unfamiliarity with the topic under discussion to which RCR is to be applied. One simply does not know where to start and how to proceed. So one simply drops out. Yet another reason could be that a sufficient level of cognitive development has not yet been reached, leading to a similar (re)action. Specific shortcomings: Table 4.9 (p. 72) lists some requirements for reaching a particular RCR level. Before reaching that level, one or more of those requirements were not met. Likely candidates (i) are insufficiently competent to differentiate, (ii) lack competence to integrate, (iii) are at too low a Piagetian (sub)stage, (iv) fixate on formal binary logic. General approach in the classroom Stimulating RCR in the classroom seems most appropriate for grades 5– 12. Starting with indirect methods in grade 5 (like letting students draw pictures on an ‘RCR theme’ and comparing them), the stimulation can become more explicit with increasing age. Nevertheless, for effectiveness, it should be based on a particular subject. In physics, one could start, for instance, with the so-called one-slit and two-slit experiments, which demonstrate that light has a particle-like or a

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wave-like behaviour, respectively. The discussion of these empirical facts could then follow roughly the steps (1)–(7) of chapter 6 (pp. 103–4). In history, one might begin with the struggle between King Henry IV and Pope Gregory VII (the investiture contest, discussed above). Again, steps (1)–(7) could be used more or less to ascertain to what extent the students could find a solution which would be similar to that of the Concordat of Worms. Hurdles on the way would be systematically discussed and dealt with. In religious studies, a creation myth versus the big bang and Darwinian evolution would be a good starting point (Reich 1996a). Once more, after establishing the issues, the procedure would be as in the two foregoing examples. These introductory approaches are designed not only to find out what the actual knowledge of the class is, but above all what the actual difficulties with RCR are in terms of the three major hurdles listed above (either/or orientation, lack of motivation, specific shortcomings). The next steps, then, are based on targeted remedial actions to be based on the actual findings during the initial exploration just referred to. I indicate three steps in particular (Reich 1996a). Specific stimulating actions Differentiating: a simple example, usable from 8 or 9 years of age onward, is provided by the figure–ground shift of the well-known instances ‘two human faces – a vase’; ‘young woman – old woman’; ‘rabbit – duck’. Thus the idea is introduced that two people can see something different although starting from the same picture. Another simple example would be to have students study and describe different types of cross (Archiepiscopal cross, Calvary cross, Celtic cross, Chi-rho cross, Greek cross, Jerusalem cross, Latin cross, Maltese cross, Patriarchal cross, swastika, and Tau cross). Again, different persons will visualise something different when the word ‘cross’ comes up. A somewhat more demanding task is to compare Salvador Dali’s ‘melting’/‘dripping’ clock to a regular classroom clock (from grade 5 onwards). Without much help students usually find out that the artist wanted to visualise human time, life time (which may be quite nonlinear, and is reversible in thought), whereas the regular clock indicates mechanical, linear time (Reich 1996a, p. 138). The context dependence of the meaning of time would be a further step which offers itself as a sequel. Integrating: a simple example would follow from the above discussion about time. When do we use the one or the other time concept? What do the two have in common? What happens if we confuse them?

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A more controversial example would be to examine the arguments for and against abortion from the perspective of the child, the mother, and society. The fighting of illegal drugs, another possible theme, will be discussed shortly (chapter 11). Sometimes, unexpected results provide an immediate opportunity for a little exercise in integration. In a religious education class, the opportunity arose from the narrative of the prodigal son (Luke 15: 11–31).1 When asked to find a title, the pupils (aged 16) split spontaneously into two groups: ‘The tale of a large-hearted father’ versus ‘The tale of the son believed to be lost’ (Reich 1996a, p. 139). There was a competition as to which title was the most fitting with arguments going to and fro but no single attempt at integration. After some prodding came a first answer indicating integration: ‘The tale of the son believed to be lost and his return to his large-hearted father’. As it turned out, this was just a peacemaking move without a real conviction behind it. The discussion therefore continued as to the meaning of the ‘and’. The students finally understood that the ‘and’ was not just a grammatical conjunction but involved an intrinsic link: the son had returned not just because he had fared ill but because he knew his father was large-hearted. Different logics: this is probably the most difficult issue of the three. To begin with, the adolescents may take ‘logic’ to mean ‘as commonly understood’, ‘as empirically tested’, ‘in accordance with common sense’ or the like over against ‘referring to principles and rules governing the proper use of reasoning’. If no agreement can be obtained to use logic in the latter sense, it may be useful to use a term such as ‘philosophical logic’ in order to distinguish the meaning we are discussing from the meaning the pupils imply spontaneously. The next difficulty may well be their narrow but strong either/or orientation. Then, a dispassionate discussion aiming at demonstrating the validity limits of formal binary logic probably will not lead far. A surprise of some kind is required to ‘unbalance’ a deep-rooted orientation or rather conviction. In one case, involving the adolescents in a discussion about who was at fault when a boy and a girl their age (who went with each other) quarrelled seriously, did the trick. After a heated discussion about who was to blame, the pupils concluded that the future of the relationship was not foreseeable by logical argument but its future was open 1

Similar narratives (learning from leaving home, experiencing various occurrences, and finally returning home) exist worldwide, not last in Zen Buddhism. To remember, Gautama Siddartha of the Sakyas (who became the Buddha), according to legend was transformed from an heir to a king’s throne into a spiritual leader after encountering the Four Passing Sights, (i) a decrepit, broken-toothed, grey-haired trembling old man, (ii) a body racked with disease lying by the road, (iii) a corpse, and (iv) a monk with shaven head, ochre robe, and a bowl (Smith 1965, p. 92).

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because ‘the confidence had been shaken’ and it was not possible to know ahead of time how the relationship would evolve after that event (Reich 1996a, p. 140). It may also be helpful to look at the difference between ‘where is smoke, there is smoke’ and ‘where is smoke, there is fire.’ The first statement, an identity, is valid at all times and in all conceivable universes. However, not much can be learned from it. The second statement is probabilistic; underlying it is a ‘weaker’ logic. That statement is not true all the time but when it is true it is helpful. Once an opening has been achieved, the usual classroom approaches should lead towards an understanding of different logics as discussed in chapters 3 and 5. However, such an understanding is unlikely to arise by a sudden ‘conversion’. Rather, it will need time and ever-renewed efforts using differing cases for a deeper understanding to arrive and become ingrained. Does all this sound like a detour? Yes, it is a detour. But according to my (limited) classroom experience (in Germany) it may save time in the end because some of the above hurdles have been overcome. Concluding remarks So far I have written about (1) the organisation of teaching and learning in terms of sharing the responsibility between the public and the private sector, (2) teaching a subject where RCR makes a difference, and (3) stimulating and supporting RCR itself. I could have gone into more issues in order to illustrate the role and the breadth of applicability of RCR in education. For instance, what is the relation between teaching methods, classroom climate, and pupils’ progress? Or, how are ‘method and manner’ of teaching in the classroom interrelated (Fenstermacher 1992)? The method is geared to increase the effectiveness of teaching content, the manner to developing pupils’ valued dispositions and traits of character. However, these two objectives cannot be put into watertight compartments. To learn content, pupils are not just challenged at the intellectual level, but also at the dispositional and motivational levels, which are affected by the manner of teaching. To develop their valued dispositions and traits of character does not simply involve habituation and training, but also reasoning about intentions and actions, an intellectual pursuit requiring effective teaching methods. Another example could have been ‘leading’ or ‘letting grow’ as educational approaches (Reich 2000a, 2001b): should the teachers do all they can to rid children as fast as possible of childish views and ways, or should children set their own pace to grow out of them? Yet another

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example would be the composition of the curriculum: which and how much subject matter should there be on account of its usefulness for future professional life and which subject matter and how much because of its value for furthering students’ personality, social competence, and ethical values? Both intercultural and anti-racist education are educational activities that should benefit from applying RCR. A hundred years ago, many countries were strictly monocultural, e.g., Japan, Ireland, Norway. Then, the transmission of the culture and civic education went hand in hand: becoming an adult immersed in the local culture as part of one’s identity blended perfectly with growing into a citizen who values and supports the political system. However, at present, with immigration, refugees, the worldwide web, postmodernism and other developments, in many countries pluralism reigns, at least as far as culture (and religion) are concerned. Education then should serve two masters: ‘democracy’ (equality and justice for all; government by the people, etc.) and ‘ethnicity’ (growing deep roots in a supporting community of ‘likes’; communicating in one’s native tongue; celebrating important events in a particular, emotionally satisfying manner; and so on). Why does RCR come in here? Because both aspects are indispensable for living together in peaceful and mutually beneficial ways, yet may come into conflict or at least be in competition: how to teach history, which languages to learn at what age, how to balance the scientific and the spiritual, what to do about moral and civic education, in sum, in which context to emphasise which aspect. As to religious education (cf. chapter 7), a further promising theme would be Martin Luther’s ‘semper justus et peccator ’. How can a person be at the same time a ‘saint’ and a ‘sinner’?

11

Social Issues

Three issues are discussed in this chapter: (a) overcoming illegal use of drugs; (b) dealing with nuclear energy; (c) rehabilitating depressed areas. The common thread is again what RCR-inspired solutions would look like vs. the actual current state. Overcoming illegal use of drugs RCR desiderata Abuse of drugs, illicit narcotics and other health-impairing substances is unfortunately a real problem in many countries. What can be done about such a state of affairs? On the one hand there are the answers of extremists: (a) make available to every adult what they want, let them be the judge of what is right for them; (b) fight harder, make stricter laws, put more police on the job, punish more heavily, eradicate the evil. Clearly, experience shows that neither (a) nor (b) alone is the solution. In fact, some countries which had moved markedly towards liberalisation have reversed that tendency. Where suppression alone was applied, substance abuse has hardly lessened, if at all. What would desiderata inspired by RCR look like? The explanandum would be something like, ‘What does it take to maintain physical and mental health of the greatest number of people despite the menace from substance abuse?’ The various partial measures would be, A, prevention (in the family, at school, by various communities, by the state, by the media – reaching both non-consumers of dangerous substances and consumers); B, repression (e.g., fighting the traffic in illegal drugs); C, therapy (dishabituation/severance and rehabilitation of substance users); D, social reinsertion; E, survival of persons for which C does not work (e.g., methadone programme and comparable programmes, clean rooms, exchange of hypodermic needles); such a programme will also be likely to lower the rate of crime related to illicit drug use. A major effort should concern A, because in case of success, B, C, D, and E become 165

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unnecessary. Lessons learned in C, D, and E should be fed into A. B needs to be a wide-ranging, international effort. A point of attention: as some drug users are also dealers, the police measures should not discourage those persons from turning to C (which implies a certain confidence towards the ‘authorities’). C will much depend on motivating the potential participant; only committed participation will result in success. D is indispensable to make an initial success last. E is probably contentious. These considerations apply to various substances likely to be abused (including alcohol); however, in the following I shall concentrate on narcotics. What are the practical difficulties? We look first at the situation in Switzerland, not only because I know it best (without being an expert) but above all because it meets several – but not all – of the RCR desiderata, and then at Frankfurt am Main, Germany. The emphasis here is (1) on the thought processes of the persons responsible for those programmes which (by retroduction) are probably of the RCR type, and (2) on the beneficial aspects. However, we are not dealing with Ohm’s law, but with a complex, multivariate, changing phenomenon. The statistics are not always accurate (for instance, the numbers of deaths due to drug abuse) and the explanations of a given state of affairs and its changes may only be more or less correct approximations. Nevertheless, the main lesson should become clear: complex situations call for complex, differentiated, and integrated solutions involving an appropriate logic, which is not necessarily of the binary kind. The situation in Switzerland What is the situation in Switzerland? From the mid-1980s drug addicts came out more and more into the open, in particular in Zurich ¨ and even in Bern, the federal city, creating public pressure for remedial action. (According to survey polls, in the mid-1990s, the drug problem came second only to unemployment on the Swiss scale of worry.) At the time, dealing with drug problems was the responsibility of the twenty-three confederate states (of which three are further divided into ‘half-states’). Given the ubiquity and the importance of the problem, the federal government started decreeing its first measures in 1991, and subsequently developed a policy, which will be described momentarily. However, according to the Swiss constitution, the political power is with the people. Whenever 100,000 registered voters sign an initiative, it has to be voted on nation-wide, and, if successful, parliament has to legislate accordingly. The initiators of a first initiative, ‘Jugend ohne Drogen’ (‘Adolescents and youth without drugs’), collected 140,949 signatures, and presented them on 22 July 1993 to the authorities. The objective was a strong reduction

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of illegal drug consumption, ideally its complete eradication; this through an all-round repressive approach, the abolition of controlled medical administration of drugs to certain narcotic addicts, etc. The Swiss rejected that initiative on 28 September 1997, with 70.6 per cent voting ‘no’. The initiators of a second initiative ‘Fur ¨ eine vernunftige ¨ Drogenpolitik’ (Droleg – ‘For a reasonable narcotics policy’) collected 107,699 signatures and presented them on 1 November 1994. That initiative proposed the complete decriminalisation of (so far illegal) possession and consumption of narcotics, the authorisation to cultivate the pertinent plants in one’s garden, the (controlled) possibility of buying narcotics legally in pharmacies, and so on. This time, 73.9 per cent of the Swiss voters said ‘no’ on 29 November 1998. That left intact the ‘Four-point-programme’ of the federal government: (a) prevention (to keep the number of new addicts as low as possible – primary prevention – but also to limit the slide to total addiction – secondary prevention); (b) survival help for addicts in a critical state (to minimise damage); (c) therapy (medical, psychological, social) and reinsertion into a normal life (as much as possible); (d) active repression (in particular of the activity of dealers) (Dreifuss 1995, p. 33). The Swiss governmental programme How was that programme devised and implemented? The Swiss minister for justice and police, Bundesrat Arnold Koller, characterised the issue as follows: By now we all know that overcoming illicit use of drugs is a difficult, multifaceted, lengthy undertaking, for which no patented recipes are available, nor simple solutions free of contradictions. Therefore we need to be modest as to our expectations . . . We are dealing with complex social, political, legal, economic and medical problems. (Koller 1995, p. 15)

On 18 February 1995, a National Drug Conference took place in the parliament building at Bern. Present were members of the federal, state, city governments and agencies, relevant private organisations, representatives of parents of drug addicts, and former addicts. The four-point programme was discussed in eight working groups (four in German and four in French), and proceedings issued (Eidgenossisches ¨ Departement des Inneren [EDI – ministry of the interior] 1995). The discussion in the working groups illustrated (in my judgement), among other things, the well-foundedness of the above desiderata, and the potential benefit of applying RCR to the problems on hand. I report the problems point by point.

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The prevention first of all needs to be specified as to its aims: eradication of illicit drug use (an utopian objective?) or limiting detrimental effects as much as possible? (In the latter case, secondary prevention gains weight.) Next, the substances to be covered have to be agreed upon: ‘soft’ narcotics, ‘hard’ narcotics, other psychotropic drugs, alcohol, tobacco? A third issue is the scope of the prevention: (a) providing information on drugs to adolescents and youths, parents, schools, political decisionmakers, the media; (b) furthering personal competence of adolescents and youths in the social and emotional domains as well as for making decisions to lessen the danger of falling prey to drug use as a way out of situations perceived as insoluble; (c) advertising the beneficial effects of youth centres, sports clubs, and the like; (d) demonstrating the increased risks due to unemployment, ostracising addicts, and cutting relations with them. Then there is the choice between the carrot and the stick (or both): strengthening the will to live a healthy fulfilling life versus focusing on the likely negative consequences of taking illicit drugs (ill-health, social stigma, possibly prison). Among the difficulties prevention has to grapple with are the following: (i) To what extent should responsibility be shared with the potential addict (primary prevention) or the actual addict (secondary prevention)? If too much is done for the person concerned, will that not lessen his or her motivation to take responsibility? And if too little is done, could that lead to disaster? (ii) How can one convince anybody to make a personal effort, to abstain from consuming certain substances, when living in a society built on consumption, and with advertisements for alcohol and tobacco everywhere? (iii) What should repression look like so as not to be detrimental to prevention? For prevention to be effective, some confidence regarding the authorities is needed. If repression is too indiscriminate and brutal, then at least the addicts who are small-time dealers will not have enough confidence to listen and reflect. (iv) Strapped of sufficient financial means, authorities have a tendency first to cut the budget for prevention rather then the other three budgets. In brief: there is plenty of scope for looking into mutual relations, respective effectiveness, and context dependence of the various aspects and factors involved. Survival help is partly a result of the acknowledgement that drug addiction cannot be eradicated and will be with us in the future. Initially, survival help was limited to addicts who agreed to a cure. With time, the insight grew that such a restriction was counterproductive at least in some cases. Longitudinal studies yielded the following insights (EDI 1995, p. 43 [German], p. 50 [French]): addiction develops in three/four stages (1) pharmacological effects; (2) psychological dependence (addiction); (3) reduction of previous social integration (work, home), possibly

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leading to homelessness and abandonment by society; (4) after a variable time (up to many years), in many cases turning one’s back on drugs and returning to a ‘normal’ life (about 30–40 per cent of longterm addicts). The justification for survival help is provided by stage (4): the objective is to get through stages (2) and (3) without irreparable damage (HIV, hepatitis, or death – about 10–20 per cent of longterm addicts die; 30–40 per cent continue a life as addicts more or less well, without reaching phase 4). Actual measures include hypodermic needle exchange programmes (used needles for new needles), methadone programmes, heroin programmes for addicts who would not survive otherwise, and resocialisation programmes (work, housing, leisure). Some of the difficulties facing prevention apply also to survival help, in particular the need to motivate the addict to take things in hand himself or herself, and the co-ordination between survival help and repression from the perspective of creating and preserving sufficient confidence in the authorities. The difficulties with the heroin programme are discussed below. Therapy has obvious medical and psychological features, but also educational aspects. The aim is not only to heal the addicts, to strengthen their health and social integration, but also to prevent lapsing back into an addiction (tertiary prevention). The latter aim is facilitated if supported by society. People should understand that ex-addicts need to be accepted, integrated, and supported. The therapy has to take into account the particular situation of the client concerned and to respond flexibly. However, in all cases the aim is to regain and strengthen normal functioning of the client in daily life. To be effective, therapy has to have a low access threshold. Collaboration with prevention can make prevention more effective through better targeted, more realistic actions. Collaboration with survival help can lead to a more effective therapy of a given survivor. Repression concerns combating drug dealers, preventing certain areas from becoming a dealers’ and addicts’ ‘paradise’, and protecting citizens’ property and security against illegal acts by addicts. One difficulty resides in the narcotics law, which stipulates that the possession of even small doses of ‘soft’ drugs is a criminal offence. The consensus was that such a possession for the purpose of personal consumption should be taken out of the law to free the police for more important tasks, and avoid antagonising addicts, whom one wants to free themselves from their plight by undertaking a cure in one of the specialised rehabilitation centres (12,000 ‘slots’ for oral methadone treatment; 1,300 residential ‘slots’ in 1993). These institutions are mostly privately owned but subsidised by the state.

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The overall consensus was that the four ‘pillars’ are all important and the federal programme should be implemented throughout Switzerland, even if the authority of the twenty-six states and half-states is recognised, and it is acknowledged that their policies differ (so far). Implementation requires co-ordination and flexibility, given the ‘internal’ links between the four programmes. This was/is recognised, for instance, in the halfstate ‘Basle City’ (the other half-state being ‘Basle Countryside’), where a ‘Drogenstammtisch’ (round table on drugs) held a series of meetings for that purpose. Some reservations concerned and still concern the heroin programme of survival help, which was formally illegal according to the narcotics law then in force. Consequently, the Swiss government on 18 February 1998, changed that law through a decree legalising the heroin programme, whose validity is time-limited until a new narcotics law is in force. Citizens not agreeing with that decree (which is not consonant with recommendations by the UN World Health Organisation) successfully launched a referendum against it (requiring 50,000 signatures), and voting was fixed for 13 June 1999. The government explained its policy in a fifteenpage brochure (Bundesamt fur ¨ Gesundheit 1999). Two main points were: (i) medical treatment involving the administration of heroin is strictly limited to persons who have been heroin addicts for at least two years, have unsuccessfully followed a cure at least twice, are 18 years of age or older, and exhibit damages due to heroin in the medical, psychic, and social domains; (ii) the pilot studies carried out during the first two years of the programme clearly showed positive results, as certified by extensive medical studies. In particular, homelessness of addicts was markedly reduced, job-related activities increased, friends were more frequently non-addicts, physical and mental health improved to some extent, the number of delinquents strongly diminished (by about 40 per cent) – as did the number of punishable misdeeds (by about 70 per cent) – and about a third of the participants at some stage went into a cure with the aim to become ‘clean’. The Swiss voters accepted the governmental decree, and thence the continuation of the heroin programme, by a majority of 54.3 per cent. Nevertheless, as the weak majority shows, the opposition is not convinced of its justification. Counter-arguments ¨ are (Schweizer Arzte 1999): (a) while the programme is clearly applicable, and its success undeniable, the proof has not been established that the success is due to the heroin per se, and not to the accompanying psychosocial measures, medical treatment, etc.; (b) if a heroin treatment is imperative for survival, the maximum duration should be about six months (followed by a different programme more likely to lead to eventual abstinence); (c) one does not know for certain what became of a number of participants who are said to have gone into a cure;

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(d) putting the emphasis on ambulant treatment by controlled heroin injection disfavours institutions working with stationary addicts but who are determined to become fully ‘clean’ through abstinence (a more strenuous and costly procedure but likely to be more effective in the long run). Concluding, the following may be said. The number of drug addicts in Switzerland increased markedly between the end of 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s to about 30,000 addicts, whose activities were more and more visible in public. The yearly death rate due to drugs went from 85 in 1978 to 205 in 1988 and to 419 in 1992 (Gervasoni, Dubois-Arber, Benninghoff, Spencer, Devos, and Paccaud 1996, p. 52). A strong public concern resulted. Among other measures, it led to a first-time involvement of the federal government, which proposed a programme closer to the RCR desiderata than the ‘extremist’ initiatives proposed by particular groups. This led to a vast public debate, sometimes heated, but in the end beneficial. The Swiss people decided to support the government’s programme. It is now being consolidated through appropriate legislation and financing (about $700 million per year, of which about half is for repression, but only 3 per cent for prevention). One can ascribe the stabilisation of the number of addicts and the decrease of drug-related deaths (to 205 in 2000 – Bundesamt fur ¨ Polizei 2001, p. 36) at least partly to that programme, in particular to the new pillar, the survival help. An unanticipated side-effect of the heroin programme seems to be that it helps to prevent adolescents from being tempted by drugs: the adventure of experimenting with a forbidden, exciting drug was great, but who wants to go into unglamorous medical treatment two or three times a day, demonstrating, among other things, that he or she is ill? (That the heroin programme is not uncontested has been made clear, I hope.) All the same, not to paint too rosy a picture, it has to be said that it remains difficult to come to a fully consensual solution, given the various medical, social, and political forces pulling and pushing in diverging directions, not to mention the debatable funding (or rather lack thereof ) of some activities. Recently, the state parliaments of Basle City and of Zurich ¨ requested that the Swiss Federal Congress should legalise the use of cannabis when re-enacting the Swiss federal narcotics law, currently under revision. Both houses seem in favour, but wish to exclude legalising the use of ‘hard’ drugs. The new narcotics legislation is scheduled to be enacted in 2002. The programme of the city of Frankfurt am Main, Germany As we have seen, one of the conclusions of the Swiss experience was to emphasise the importance of co-operation. Following the 1989 ‘Frankfurt Resolution’, the city of Frankfurt took measures (Drogenreferat 1994,

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1995) in consonance with the above RCR desiderata (formally unknown to the city fathers), and developed an ever widening co-operation. That policy starts from the recognition that our culture seems incapable of eradicating illegal use of narcotics. The objectives were and are therefore to minimise the risks involved, to limit the damages, and to reduce human suffering through a common effort. Only a limited overview focusing on the differentiation and the integration of the measures taken is provided here. Since the early 1990s, the Office for the Prevention of Drug Abuse (Drogenreferat), the Public Health Service (Stadtgesundheitsamt), the Office for Adolescents and Youth (Jugendamt), the Social Services (Sozialamt), the relevant Municipal Administrative and Legal Services (Ordnungsamt, Rechtsamt), the Police Commissioner (Polizeipr¨asident), the (private) Associations for Assistance to Addicts (Tr¨agerrunde der Drogenhilfe), the Frankfurt Attorney General (Staatsanwalt), and the Railway Police (Bahnpolizei) meet each Monday (Montagsrunde) to discuss and propose measures, evaluate their effects, and recommend improvements. These meetings continue to be held fruitfully (in 2001). Since the early 1990s the Municipality has notably provided appropriate medical services, exchange facilities for hypodermic needles (5,000 daily, corresponding to the number of heroin addicts), possibilities for methadone-assisted therapy, shelters for homeless drug-addicts, training facilities and a labour office for ex-addicts. Thanks to more sophisticated police actions, the number of dealers and of drug-related crimes has declined – as has the number of newly HIV-infected persons (mainly on account of the needle exchange programme). Apart from the main effects of improved health and diminished criminality, a welcome side-effect occurred: the population, and in particular the business community, fully support the programme of the Frankfurt Municipality. Nobody wants a return to the situation of the 1980s, when the police chased addicts through downtown Frankfurt, addicts administered narcotics to themselves while in public view, and drug-related violence was a daily occurrence. Also to be noted: when the majority in Frankfurt changed from the Social Democrats/Greens to the Christian Democrats, the programme was continued unchanged. A particularly controversial issue was the provision of appropriately equipped rooms where drug addicts can exchange needles, inject substances, and so on. However, given the beneficial effects, they were more and more accepted by the taxpayers, and in 2001 were open twelve to thirteen hours per day, time-shifted between 6 a.m. and 12 p.m. Frankfurt’s municipality has introduced a heroin programme (1 November 2001), Swiss style. They have battled for years with federal agencies and law courts to that

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effect; the federal government elected in September 1998 introduced this possibility nation-wide. Now that the basic programme is established, attention has turned to many detailed improvements, particularly in the area of co-operation (Drogenreferat 1998). A major drive goes towards the co-operation with youth centres and the like. That is in line with a policy change from ‘let the addicts come to us’ to ‘let us go out to meet potential and actual drug addicts where they are’. Of late crack presents a new problem, and gave rise to a crack street programme. As far as one can judge, the success of the multifaceted, co-operative programme in Frankfurt is reflected in the diminishing numbers of deaths linked directly with illicit drug use: from 147 in 1991 (the high point) to 68 in 1993, 47 in 1995, 22 in 1997, then roughly stabilising with 34 in 1998, 26 in 1999, and 30 in 2000; actually, some of the victims were ‘tourists’, that is, they did not live in Frankfurt. Summing up, the similarities, even isomorphisms between the independently formulated RCR desiderata on dealing with the menace from illicit use of narcotics and the actions in the field (formally not guided by those desiderata) are striking. One reason is presumably that the issues we are discussing cannot be dealt with by using exclusively formal binary logic: the variables are multiply connected in not too clear ways, the various situations are hardly fully reversible, some variables have more weight in one context than in another, yet it is important that all are considered and attention is paid to all of them. Therefore, the RCR logic looks like doing the job. Furthermore, cognitive complex thinking, a major ‘component’ of RCR (Table 4.7, p. 66), is called for when dealing with the complex problems on hand. While most of the desiderata are being tackled, the difficulty of giving a high priority to prevention should nevertheless not be overlooked. Maybe the other measures are closer to the state of public opinion.1 1

After the unprecedented attacks on New York and Washington (11 September 2001), President George W. Bush declared ‘war on terrorism’ in terms of diplomacy, finance, military action, etc. Developing the horizons of the mind and applying the RCR heuristic should be helpful also in that case, proceeding mutatis mutandis as in the case ‘Overcoming illegal use of drugs’ just dealt with. Particular attention needs to be paid to the battle for the hearts and minds of the world population by way of television pictures (and speeches). Taking the cue from Michael Sells (Haverford College), I observe that Western TV stations offered to Osama bin Laden (and the Taliban) free of charge plenty of possibilities for image associations (Bin Laden = pure Islam, defender of the poor and the wronged, leader of jihad, etc.) for which the tobacco industry in their case (Marlboro Man, Sexy Man, Sophisticated Woman, Liberated Woman, Thoughtful Man, Social Man, Powerful Woman) has to pay many hundred millions in cash. Following Bernard Haykel (New York University), this dangerous game has to be opposed notably in the following way: (1) publishing a list of all Muslims, women and children who died in the World Trade Centre attack, possibly with photographs; (2) inviting Muslim leaders to discuss these facts with impartial and respected Islamic legal scholars, also in the Middle East (Cairo,

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Nuclear power RCR desiderata Who is not aware of the nuclear accidents at the Three Mile Island (TMI) nuclear power station near Harrisburg in the USA (28–29 March 1979), at the Ukrainian Chernobyl reactor no. 4 (26 April 1986), and at the Japanese uranium-processing plant at Tokai-mura (30 September to 1 October 1999)? The Tokai-mura accident (class 4 event on the seven-point ‘International Nuclear Event Scale’ (INES) of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), in Vienna, Austria – INES 1992) caused much less, and less lasting damage and human suffering than the class 7 Chernobyl accident (Bojcun 1991; Fritsch 1992; Gonz´ales 1996; Rich, 1991), with the class 5 Harrisburg accident somewhere in between (United States 1979), yet closer to the Tokai-mura accident as far as classification according to the IAEA INES (1992) is concerned. The commonalities of the three accidents are at two levels: (a) all involved serious human errors; (b) many public and media reactions were at a rather low RCR level (when compared to Bertrand’s answer above, p. 21), not infrequently of the type ‘Stop nuclear energy now. Close down all nuclear power plants!’ What does an RCR approach look like in this case? There are two desiderata, a narrower desideratum, (1), and a wider, (2). The explanandum for (1) reads considerations and actions to minimise accidents in existing nuclear power installations. The parts which make up this functional Mecca, Medina, Riyadh, etc.) and Asia (Pakistan, Indonesia); (3) given the teachings of Islamic law (also concerning jihad) the ensuing fatwas (legal opinions) can only be unfavourable to Bin Laden and unrestricted violence of the World Trade Centre horror kind. They should be used (together with other means) to make clear that the image associations with which Bin Laden and the Taliban invaded the world do not correspond to reality and that their acts are in fact contrary to Islamic teachings. The importance of image associations was also brought home to me through the following experience. Four weeks after the beginning of the war on terrorism in Afghanistan, a thoughtful, trusted colleague wrote an e-mail to the effect that the war should be stopped immediately because it had no effect on the Taliban but killed many innocent women and children. When I reminded him of this mail after the collapse of the Taliban regime was clearly visible, he explained that he had been under the strong grip of the pictures showing wounded children in hospital (rather than remembering, e.g., the bombardments in Serbia which led to the downfall of the Miloˇsevi´c regime). Could it be that after a period of a literary culture we revert to the older pictorial and symbolic culture although in new clothes? RCR also leads to the insight that one side’s terrorists may be the other side’s freedom fighters and correspondingly to a preference of the label perpetrators of unrestricted violence or equivalents. Beyond this particular aspect, RCR advocates putting oneself into the shoes of the perpetrators and their sympathisers, and then into the shoes of those they blame and accuse; this in order to get an understanding for the changes and actions likely to lead to long-term solutions.

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whole are A the plant (operation and maintenance), B the operating crew (operating instructions and continued education/training), and C the interface between A and B (control-room layout and instrumentation, actual controls and indications). The explanandum for (2) reads long-term provision of economic and ecologically acceptable energy. The relevant considerations include A, safety of various forms of energy, B, economics of various forms of energy (including availability), C, ecological aspects. As before, I shall compare and contrast these desiderata with what actually happened in the field. I present separately (a) event descriptions, (b) dealing technically with existing nuclear power stations, (c) human aspects; this with respect to desideratum (1). I continue with (d) coming to grips with certain wider human problems, and (e) the question of energy for the future; this with respect to desideratum (2). Although being distinct, the four points (b), (c), (d), and (e) are clearly linked. To avoid misunderstandings: what follows are not technical proposals; that is the task of the many experts of the various national and international agencies, and of the industry concerned. Rather, it is one more illustration of the potential of an RCR perspective. Event descriptions As the root cause assessment brought out, the TMI accident at Harrisburg was a particularly telling example of an interwoven net of technical malfunctioning and decisive human errors. Therefore, an attempt to present a linear sequence analysis is not really helpful, even if it were possible. First, there were design errors and weaknesses. In the control room they included: (a) the controls and indications for the various plant systems and subsystems were not grouped organically; (b) for a given malfunctioning, a confusing flood of alarms lit up; (c) routine indicators signalled, for instance, the change of the status of a control switch or button, but not the result of pressing it (i.e., the closing or opening of a valve); (d) the dials of critical meters were too limited, making it impossible to read off to what extent safety limit values had been overrun. Second, in a different rubric, the quality management of the maintenance had not detected setting errors of safety relevant components, such as closing valves in a standby cooling circuit, which thereby blocked its automatic coming on line when needed. Third, under the heading of operator training, it turned out that the operators had been taught to work with procedures based on checklists, as distinct from malfunction analysis together with devising and applying direct counter-measures and wider remedial action. The actual radiation danger arose from the spilling of radioactive water through an overpressure valve which had stayed open. That safety valve

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had opened due to an overpressure caused by malfunctioning of the water system. For hours, the operators did not understand what was amiss, were confused by the numerous malfunction indications in the control room, yet did not call for assistance when things became suspect. They tried several interventions until finally they brought the situation under control, by which time among other damaging and endangering effects some radioactive substances had escaped into the air from an auxiliary building. The trigger of the Chernobyl accident was the desire of some engineers, reasonable per se, to study as rapidly as possible the behaviour of the power generator under non-standard operating conditions. That involved switching off the reactor, or at least diminishing very markedly the power output. To gain time, they attempted to do that (unreasonably) in a way which was against the operating rules, and in addition they switched off safety circuits which would have stopped their manoeuvres. A Russian expert illustrated their behaviour by referring to a pilot flying at 30,000 feet who shut off all jet engines and ordered the entrance doors to the plane to be opened. What else than total disaster is to be expected thereafter? At Tokai-mura, the critical process involved mixing the correct quantities of uranium-oxide powder and nitric acid, and agitating the mixture until uranium nitrate was formed. There were two distinct procedures (which were programmed at different times), namely (a) for preparing fuel for regular nuclear power plants using low enriched uranium, LEU, and (b) for preparing fuel for Japan’s experimental fast breeder reactor using medium enriched uranium, MEU. Procedure (a) requires 16 kg LEU, that is 238 uranium enriched to contain about 3 per cent of fissionable 235 uranium (of which 0.7 per cent occurs naturally in 238 uranium). Procedure (b) uses 2.4 kg of MEU, containing 15–25 per cent 238 uranium. After the formation of uranium nitrate in either process, it was to be collected in a precipitation tank and finally processed to become the actual fuel. According to the plant designers, the introduction of uranium-oxide powder and nitric acid into the mixer is to be done by a fail-safe metered pumping system. The transfer to the precipitation tank through a filtering process is again automated in principle. However, to gain time, on instruction by their superiors, the three technicians cut out the first (slow) automated phases, prepared the MEU uranium oxide solution in a stainless-steel bucket and poured it directly into the precipitation tank (which is normally closed but was opened for that purpose). Also, instead of putting in the prescribed 2.4 kg of MEU, they put in 16 kg, the appropriate quantity of LEU. In fact, for two out of the three technicians, it was the first time that they worked with medium enriched uranium, yet they

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had not been instructed properly about the difference. As a result, they unwittingly transformed the tank into ‘a makeshift nuclear reactor – one with none of the shielding or safety controls that form part of a more conventional reactor’ (The Economist 1999). We note among other points the (partial) non-observance of the safety rules, and the insufficient training of the technicians. Dealing technically with existing nuclear power installations From the three major accidents already referred to, at least five valuable lessons have been learned. (i) The Harrisburg accident has demonstrated that a containment vessel keeps outside contamination at levels which are no cause for alarm, even in the case of a (partial) core meltdown. The negative proof of that statement came from Chernobyl: the absence of such a containment vessel was the major reason why the core meltdown led to a contamination of most of northern Europe. (ii) A water-moderated reactor is to be preferred to a graphite-moderated reactor (Windscale and Chernobyl), at least from the safety point of view, because if the water-coolant is lost, the moderator is lost too ipso facto, and the water-moderated reactor stops automatically.2 (iii) The negative reactivity of the Three Mile Island reactor (the power decreases with higher coolant temperature) contributed to limit the gravity of the accident, whereas the positive reactivity of the Chernobyl reactor (the power increases with higher coolant temperature) contributed to a dramatic power increase, which reached about 100 times the nominal power, and this despite the (manual) operation of the emergency stop of the reactor. (iv) Several safety systems, working independently from independent power sources (absent at Chernobyl), increase reactor safety. The authority to switch them off should be restricted to experts who know fully what they are doing (which was not the case at Chernobyl). (v) The ergonomics of the plant operation, and in particular the plant– operator interface, turned out to be a weak element which needed much strengthening, including operator-friendly status indicators. While points (i) to (v) are important (e.g., Nicolet, Carnino, and Wanner 1989; United States 1979), and much attention was subsequently paid in particular to point (v), equally important lessons concern the human operators (and their supervisors) as well as other persons involved, to whom we now turn. 2

A graphite moderated reactor simply continues operation after the loss of cooling water – and furthermore the graphite may catch fire (as it did in 1957 at Windscale, a class 5 accident, and at Chernobyl). In contrast, the Tokai-mura ‘reactor’ was stopped by emptying the cooling jacket water from the precipitation tank.

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Human aspects As we have seen, in all three accidents under discussion the operating crew turned out to be unreliable. In particular, they did not follow operating rules, at Chernobyl to an extreme degree (switching off safety devices, etc., cf. Reason 1987), and almost as badly in Tokai-mura (The Economist 1999). Obviously, operators must follow safety rules. That is also true in other occupations, and maybe some inspirations could be gained from there how to improve the relevant operator motivation. Furthermore, operators should not only be cognitively and emotionally knowledgeable and basically accept their work (Nicolet et al. 1989), but also be unlikely to fall victim to malfunction-induced aberrant behaviour (Reason 1987). Their continued training needs to involve simulations under ‘realistic’ conditions. To sum up, there is again much overlap between desideratum (1) and actions in the field, in particular after the TMI and Chernobyl accidents. As a matter of record, no comparable accidents in nuclear power stations have happened since, although their number is on the rise (outside the USA and western Europe), and if the remaining reactors at Chernobyl have been shut down after lengthy negotiations, others of the same type are apparently still in operation.

Coming to grips with certain wider human problems Desideratum (2) – long-term provision of economic and ecologically acceptable energy – ideally asks for an emotion-free, scientific-technical evaluation and discussion. However, as for instance the large use of nuclear power in France and the decision to terminate its use in Germany show, reality is quite distinct from the ideal. Political considerations come in strongly, and hence public opinion. As it happens, the public has a rationality of its own, which does not necessarily help. The mining industry has had about 100,000 fatal accidents in the twentieth century, about 500 deaths yearly at present, but hardly anybody makes a fuss about it. And who demonstrates against grave medical errors, the murderous highways, alcohol, tobacco and drug overconsumption, and the like, all causing suffering and deaths? That attitude to is be set against the reactions to the Contergan drama, the Bhopal catastrophe, and accidents at nuclear installations, in the latter case even if nobody is hurt. It seems that humans get careless about frequently occurring risks, and risks they enter into voluntarily. In contrast, unexpected risks coming from the outside arouse emotions (e.g., Grob 1991, 1995) and are violently denounced. An emotion-free risk assessment would calmly contemplate risks, then

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order them on a scale and attribute numbers, taking the cue from the Richter scale for the strength of earthquakes or the IAEA nuclear event scale. Rationally, risk reduction would then start with the highest risks. In the meantime, social acceptability remains a factor in any decision about nuclear energy, along with the other factors.3 Another curious fact: ten years after Chernobyl, fifteen power stations of that very same type were still in operation. Why does the experience with nuclear power not facilitate spending more money for reducing its dangers? How about politicians and industrialists responsible for nuclear energy? In the past, some of them – helped, I am sorry to say, by a number of scientists – have since the 1950s told untruths, wittingly or unwittingly.4 In particular, they have exaggerated the benefits of nuclear energy while minimising or even denying detrimental effects and negative aspects, especially in the area of waste disposal. The design of safer reactors has not been supported appropriately (for instance, a prototype of the German high temperature reactor (Kugelhaufenreaktor) was scrapped before its research potential could be fully made use of), and the work leading to final storage areas for radioactive waste does not get the required priority. After the Chernobyl accident, two attitudes could be observed in particular: on the one hand minimising the event (in the first place by the Soviet authorities, see Chernosenko 1991, but also – although to a lesser degree – by the French authorities, who are responsible for a national electricity production which is based overwhelmingly on nuclear energy), and on the other hand bending over backwards to underline the gravity of the immediate consequences of the accident.5 A result of either behaviour has been that the public – who can rarely really judge for themselves the complex issues involved – have largely lost trust in the persons we are discussing (e.g., Der Spiegel 1991; Editorial comment 1991; 3

4

5

In that context I have some apprehensions though. To my dismay I learned from a TV interview that a Swiss nuclear power plant operator never mentioned his occupation when on holiday, because he feared that nobody would talk to him any more. Would a positive operator image not be more motivating than a negative one? If society would really set its mind and will to get the most competent and responsible operators possible, and would accord them a corresponding social prestige (as was done to put a human being on the moon), should it not be possible to count on really ‘safe’ operators? One result has been the public’s loss of trust in politicians, and to a lesser degree of trust in scientists. In a different rubric, Robert Park (2000) describes how the US government’s secrecy and lying led to a build-up of ufo-logy, and a loss of trust in official reports concerning UFOs, even in cases when they are entirely true. For instance, the government of the state (land) of Hessia lowered the maximum admissible radiation intensity of one litre of milk to 20 Becquerel (= number of disintegrations per second), about one-twentieth of the values set by the German federal and the Swiss confederate governments. One hundred measurements of milk radioactivity in the Weser/Ems district – which was supposed to have received more than the average fallout from the Chernobyl accident – in no case yielded values in excess of 20 Becquerel/litre.

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Vrijdaghs 1988). This is not helped by the sensationalism of the media (e.g., Kepplinger 1989). For instance, right after the Chernobyl accident, all sorts of recommendations were made in Germany such as ‘Stop your children playing outside’, etc., creating the impression of a huge danger for one’s life. After the event, it turned out that apart from some regions in the north of Scandinavia and Great Britain, the additional radiation due to Chernobyl was of the order of what each person receives anyway or even less. And then, as to be expected, there are some black sheep among the industrialists, who try to cut safety corners in order to make money, and even use bribes to prevent detection (Vrijdaghs 1988). Admittedly, in many western countries the government’s task is not easy, given the current, often negative social climate in regard to nuclear power. However, that is not a good argument not to try one’s best to deal rationally and honestly with the issues discussed. Energy for the future The energy issue is often treated controversially, not to say ideologically. This state of affairs has unfortunately not furthered an ‘objective’ examination (e.g., Goldemberg 2001; Kepplinger 1989), nor a process for reaching a consensus. Such an examination would consider, in the various regions of the world, all possibilities of energy use (e.g., Stegelmannn 1984) particularly from technical and economic perspectives as well as the impact on the environment (e.g., Heinloth 1987) and on the standard of living. If, for instance, the industrialised countries decided to change over rapidly from nuclear plants to oil- and gas-fired plants, how would that affect the oil and gas prices, and hence the chances of poorer countries to satisfy their energy needs?6 Admittedly, an overall examination is not easy: How will the cost for solar and wind energy develop? Will fusion energy become practical? Can nuclear reactor safety and waste disposal be improved significantly? How much energy saving is socially achievable? What other possibilities are there, for instance using fuel cells? These are important open questions. In my view that is not a reason, however, not to try to do one’s best to clarify them progressively (Functowicz and Ravetz 1992). In the meantime, the existing solutions need improvement. Furthermore, the creative study of waste disposal needs to get more attention and support. 6

Another issue in that event is the increase of CO2 pollution of the atmosphere due to burning more traditional fuel and the resulting danger of damage to the ozone layer and hence increased UV radiation. A German newspaper titled the recent decision of the government to terminate the operation of nuclear power plants (in thirty years or so), ‘Extra hundreds of millions of CO2 into the atmosphere!’

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Once more, there is some overlap between desideratum (2) and what actually happens in the field, although less than in other cases already discussed. The existence of cognitively conceivable approaches is visibly not sufficient to come to improved solutions. But that does not speak against their potential. Why not try to make more use of that potential? Ways to solve old problems and create new work Rehabilitation of depressed areas Under this heading I refer briefly to a pilot project of the Hessian Institute for Habitation and Environment (Wohnen und Umwelt – Muhlich ¨ 1995) at Darmstadt as a lesser known, yet intriguing example of applying RCR. In contrast to several cases already dealt with (psychology as a discipline, the organisation of education, fighting substance abuse, dealing with nuclear energy), the RCR heuristic was consciously ‘built’ into this project, including my lecturing at Darmstadt. The initiators of that project had observed for some time the decrease of the volume of manufacturing work in the area. Before acting, they analysed the situation. They found mainly two shortcomings: first, the flow of information and the transfer of know-how between the successful research institutes in the area and manufacturing enterprises was insufficient; and second, the same was true for the information flow and the transfer into creating public works aimed at providing jobs to the unemployed. There is a clear link between these two problems: if the new, promising information does not reach the manufacturing enterprises, the chances are that these enterprises are not so successful and more persons will lose their jobs, thereby increasing the number of unemployed. In the view of the initiators, an RCR-type approach was called for to remedy the shortcomings indicated. The circle of pertinent factors taken into account and actors involved in remedial actions had to be drawn widely enough, and the fundamental question of co-operation and competition between the various players be addressed, that is between private enterprises, public administrations, educational institutions, etc. The interactions between them (or the lack thereof ) were important elements, as well as answering the question of the respective political/economic weights in a given situation. Apart from concrete proposals addressing the insufficient information flow indicated above, a kind of round-table co-ordination was proposed, which reminds one (on a larger scale) of the drug-fighting Drogenstammtisch in Basle or the Monday meetings in Frankfurt (see p. 172); this for both fact finding and setting up remedial measures.

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Employment via a ‘third system’ Once these first insights gathered, the state of Hessia took part in a project of the European Union, labelled ‘Third System and Employment’ (Muhlich ¨ and Muhlich-Klinger ¨ 1999). Classically, socialists favour state employment, and more rightist ‘conservative’ parties the free market, each claiming their choice to be the best solution. As in other cases, RCR is not so limited and looks further afield, beyond the existing horizon (cf. the title picture of this monograph). The third system, neither state nor free market, is of the co-operative kind, and is ‘located’ in the space between the state system, the market system, and cultural activities. A better name would therefore be ‘Intermediate System’. The initiators of particular projects are private co-operative associations, foundations, and other non-profit organisations. Potential project contents are wideranging: health-related services, neighbourhood rehabilitation, protection of the environment, improvement of transport, providing food, waste management, starting up new small firms, and so on. Partial projects in four Hessian neighbourhoods made up the total project with a budget of about $600,000. The scientific analysis of the project aimed at (1) clarifying the aims (a) of satisfying local demands and (b) of concomitantly creating new work; (2) evaluating to what extent these two aims were being met; (3) pointing out hurdles on the way. To benefit from similar work elsewhere, an exchange with the city of Liverpool, UK, was organised in addition. Social problems in the neighbourhoods concerned arise in particular from the following causes: (i) many inhabitants are not active economically, either because they are unable or unwilling to compete in the current ‘knowledge’ economy or they are retired; (ii) the inhabitants belong to several nationalities and/or ethnicities; (iii) given inhabitants’ lack of adaptedness to the current economic conditions, and the resulting material difficulties, there exists a certain amount of jealousy and ungenerousness with regard to the ‘favoured’ (who enjoy lower rents, higher unemployment or retirement benefits, etc.); (iv) in a situation experienced subjectively as unpromising and/or unjust, some inhabitants tend to cling to their nationality or ethnicity, and furthermore, together with other dissatisfied inhabitants fight bitterly perceived ‘injustices’. Such a state of affairs not only makes neighbourhood-wide co-operation difficult but also may worsen the ‘objective’ (material) situation. The political need for intermediate systems results mainly from the complexification, the rapid technological change, and the increased importance of the new knowledge economy compared to old-style industries. Take Silicon Valley as an illustration: success arose from the

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free enterprise of outstanding visionaries and their intense creative work, the local and global synergies, and of course favourable boundary conditions. Nobody claims that a problem neighbourhood could be turned into another Silicon Valley. However, based on the experience of that outstanding economic success story, it is at least clear that overcoming the ‘hopeless’ situation of a problem neighbourhood realistically can be entrusted neither to a government bureaucracy, nor to an oldstyle industry. If there is any chance at all, making a new promising start needs an organised ‘round table’ with all actors involved: local people, future-directed industry, administration, institutions of learning and culture, and so on. The objective is not just to find a compromise between diverging interests, but primarily to understand the interrelations between the various actors and factors, and to match to each other’s competencies and opportunities, resources and promising possibilities. In Hessia, a main thrust is towards the rehabilitation of housing and related facilities in problem neighbourhoods (see above). A quite different effort is centred on biotechnology, involving notably the Hoechst corporation, various research centres, and small (new) enterprises. Another effort goes towards providing affordable help to low-income families and single persons, in particular to retired seniors. In that effort an established non-profit organisation took the role of Hoechst in the former effort. A further example is in the area of public transport: maintaining and improving installations at bus and tramway stops and at park-andride locations, organising car-sharing, and so on. Part of the effort was/is to create an information network between all involved in a particular effort/programme. However, once more not to paint too rosy a picture: at this stage an open point concerns the democratic justification of intermediate systems. Who takes part and who is not admitted? Through which procedure? Is there any possibility for appeal? Once more experience with such systems is gained, these questions and related ones need satisfactory answers. Also, if inducing persons to co-operate who are not in the habit of doing so is difficult, that turned out to be little in comparison with effecting the required organisational and even more structural (power) changes. Nevertheless, progress so far is encouraging. There is a greater awareness of who and what is involved, and what the respective roles and effects are in a given context. As neither the state nor the free market is believed to solve all problems and provide work for all, intermediate system activities should have a future, particularly if conceived in an RCR spirit, that is, a collaboration built on agreed goals, constructive mutual interaction, and context relevance.

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Concluding remarks The examples discussed so far will have made clear the gist of this chapter: whenever several categorically/logically differing aspects characterise a given phenomenon or task, each aspect should be studied in its own right, related aspects added in (even if not consensual to begin with) and links between them searched for, in particular those that are not of a causal nature. Importantly, any context dependence should be brought out. The results need to be integrated into a synopsis before judgements can be passed and conclusions drawn. It was striking to see to what extent successful endeavours incorporate (unwittingly) RCR desiderata.

12

Conclusions

This volume Having presented in Part I the arguments and evidence for the existence of RCR, its nature and its development, in Part II I have discussed a number of cases in support of the claim that applying RCR can further (1) scientific insights and (2) social integration, or at least diminish social strife and disruption. The status of the various examples in Part II is visibly quite different, ranging from the tentative explicatory (e.g., ‘functional background music’) to the inferential (e.g., the relation between RCR and religious judgement, the Swiss and the Frankfurt experience with fighting illegal use of narcotics) to the empirically supported (results of interviews on ‘nuclear accidents’, ‘the two natures of Jesus Christ’, and on the ‘Holy Trinity’), to initial projects (‘rehabilitation of depressed areas’). Each time, by applying RCR a more complete, more encompassing yet more differentiated view is searched for or results together with internal links and context dependences. In that process three differing concerns require attention (Fahrenberg 1992, pp. 52–9 – see pp. 43–5 above): the methodological, the epistemological, and the ontological. Methodologically, each categorically distinct aspect calls for an appropriate research approach (cf. the example of researching anxiety, p. 151 above), which includes its own verification procedures and terminology. Epistemologically, one wants to keep each aspect separate, in particular as regards causal explanations, yet take all (linked) aspects into account for a synopsis or even an overarching theory. Ontologically, one needs to demonstrate (1) that all aspects pertain to the same phenomenon, in other words they are coextensive, and (2) they are subject to a meta-relation, that is mutually linked/entangled/constrained. The approach indicated may go against the grain of our Western culture, but, in appropriate cases, seems to lead to better results than a single-aspect approach (e.g., Fischer, Herzka, and Reich 1992). The effort to swim against the cultural stream – which may be considerable (see postscript below) – therefore seems worthwhile in such cases. However, it is important always to 185

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observe carefully step 2 of the RCR heuristic, and especially the last part (ch. 6, p. 104): listing all descriptions/explanations/models/theories/ interpretations A, B, C . . . of the explanandum, even if they are considered incompatible or incommensurable by the ambient culture, possibly adding new ones, and dealing with any conflicts and contradictions arising (which may mean throwing out either A or B or C – it is possibly not a case for RCR). In other words, RCR is not an excuse for unjustified indecision, opportunistic compromises, and the like. Also, a successful, widely accepted application at one point in time does not guarantee eternal validity of the result. For instance, many physicists today consider Bohr’s explanations of the nature of light in the 1920s and 1930s as being mainly of historical interest. Looking back at the entire volume, what more can be said? First, while much evidence has been provided, RCR theory remains incomplete. To obtain more robust data, field studies and longitudinal laboratory studies should be carried out, preferably in different cultures.1 Second, intervention studies in several domains (cf. chapters 9 to 11) could provide further evidence for the possibility of stimulating RCR and thereby enhancing its usefulness. It is hoped that progress to date will induce others to participate in those endeavours. All the same, it seems to me that I have honoured my engagement to explicate and discuss RCR (a) theoretically, as a scientific model; (b) empirically on the basis of research results; (c) methodologically, i.e. as a procedure, the RCR heuristic; and (d) programmatically, that is, in terms of possible future applications. As regards RCR in relation to education, the following programme outlined by Deonna Kuhn (1989, p. 266) is relevant: I would claim that the role of cognitive development researchers in defining thinking skills should be a fundamental one and that it is their essential contribution that has been missing from the thinking skills movement. There are two important ways in which cognitive development researchers can and should ground curriculum developers’ efforts in appropriate empirical evidence. First, they can do research that would help define thinking skills explicitly, through careful empirical observation of the thinking strategies people actually use (whether sound or faulty), conducted across a range of contexts that make up people’s lives. Second, they can examine the directions in which such thinking skills develop naturally, with age and with practice.

Clearly, the present work is also a contribution to Kuhn’s programme. 1

Recently, I had an opportunity to collaborate with several colleagues from different cultures in writing an article about the effect of cultural differences on research in psychology of religion (Khalili, Murken, Reich, Shah, and Vahabzadeh, forthcoming), also a great occasion for developing the horizons of the mind and applying RCR. It took a good number of alterations before the draft reached a stage that all could put their name to as a joint paper but that objective was finally achieved.

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Postscript This monograph is meant to be scientifically factual, and occasionally speculative, yet based at least on circumstantial evidence and argumentative plausibility. However, certain visionaries go much further in their claims of the benefits of RCR and their exhortations to apply it more massively – even if they label RCR differently. I present two of these visionaries, Jones and Goeudevert; their ideas understandably have my full sympathy.

The visions of Reginald Victor Jones The British physicist Reginald Victor Jones (1911–97) headed scientific intelligence for the British Air Staff in the Second World War and served as scientific adviser to the Scientific Intelligence Service. He contributed two chapters to the centenary volume in honour of Niels Bohr, the Danish philosopher physicist. In the first chapter ‘Meetings in wartime and after’, Jones described his exchanges with Niels Bohr. Jones’s second chapter ‘Complementarity as a way of life’ ( Jones 1985), occupies us here. Being familiar with Bohr’s concept of ‘complementarity’ (cf. ch. 8, pp. 140–3 above), Jones is on the lookout for wider applications. In my terms, he emphasises the needs (a) to keep differing categories distinct, (b) to look for relationships between them and, most importantly, (c) to understand their appropriateness in particular contexts. As mentioned before, I consider understanding complementarity in Bohr’s sense (there are many other senses – Reich in press) to be a result of RCR. According to Jones, Bohr’s introduction of complementarity was triggered by Werner Heisenberg’s indeterminacy principle: two conjugate canonical variables (such as spatial location and momentum or temporal ‘location’ and energy of elementary particles) do not have simultaneously highly precise values. The product of their indeterminacies is always larger than a fixed threshold value. Depending on the experiment, it is more appropriate to measure one variable or the conjugate variable. Jones (1985) applied these findings to other issues. He discusses, for instance, the issue ‘obedience’ vs. ‘initiative’. Clearly both are needed in a functioning society. However, in long periods of quiet, obedience can lead to stagnation, and in unruly times initiative can lead to chaos. A similar analysis can be made about ‘tradition’ and ‘innovation’. As regards scientific laboratory work, the authority regarding research issues should rest with those who know best, even if they are young; however, the effective running of a laboratory requires that as a rule the administrative authority of the head is not to be questioned. Again, in unusual critical situations, decisions by one competent person may be

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the best, but when diverging interests are to be taken into account, and all persons involved have to live with the decision and support it, a decision by a representative committee may be the better choice. Yet another complementarist issue of behaviour is ‘involvement’ vs. ‘withdrawal’: Every prophet has to come from civilisation, but every prophet has to go into the wilderness. He must have a strong impression of a complex society and all that it has to give, and then he must serve periods of isolation and meditation. This is the process by which psychic dynamite is made. (ibid., p. 323)

Once more, both the individual and the community have important roles to play. The desirable balance of these roles changes with circumstances. In sum, Jones pleads for changing the focus from ‘this is the single right solution’ vs. ‘that is the single right solution’ to a life recognising that both solutions have their merits and reflecting which is more appropriate in the current context. The visions of Daniel Goeudevert The second visionary is Frenchman and European Daniel Goeudevert (1942– ). He worked for car makers Citro¨en and Renault in France, and held top management positions with Ford, Germany, and Volkswagen. His best-selling autobiography is titled Ein Vogel im Aquarium (A bird in an aquarium), indicating how he felt as a member of a high-level management ‘team’ given to radical neoliberalism and to achieving short-term profits. Since leaving Volkswagen, Goeudevert is attempting to set up a private university-cum-research and technology centre embodying his visions (at Dortmund, Germany), is active in a foundation for the lasting development of European regions, and advises the Director General of UNESCO. His objective is a long-term future-directed capitalism with a human face. In his volume Mit Tr¨aumen beginnt die Realit¨at (Reality begins with dreaming) Goeudevert (1999, pp. 194–204) has a chapter ‘Die Sowohlals-auch-Gesellschaft’ (The both-and society), from which I take most of what follows, ending with a few items from the preceding chapters. As a European by conviction and experience, Goeudevert first discusses the issue ‘National state or European Union?’ He rejects the notion that these two groupings are mutually exclusive alternatives (which they are in the eyes of a fairly large number of persons), and points out that both are needed, yet fulfil differing functions. The European history of the last fifty years clearly demonstrates that the quality of life improves as one communicates better with one’s neighbours. And one communicates the better, the more one reminds oneself of communalities, and the less one turns one’s own ‘treasures’ into separations, for instance by

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considering one’s language, one’s culture, one’s economy as superior . . . We have to evolve from an either-or society toward a both-and society, in which different cultures can benefit from mutual exchanges without losing their identity. (ibid., pp. 195–6)

Such a living together needs both (passive) tolerance and active solidarity. Goeudevert illustrates this by referring to an apartment building, in which live persons of rather varied backgrounds who differ greatly as to how they dress, what they cook, which music they listen to, what they do to celebrate, when they go to bed and get up, and so on. For the ordinary days ‘live and let live’ is a good guide, but when the basement gets flooded, a fire breaks out or another major calamity arises, active mutual help is called for. So once again, not either-or set behaviour but both-and context-related conduct is the order of the day. Extending the spatial, temporal, and cultural dimensions, Goeudevert recalls life in Granada (or Cordoba or Toledo for that matter) from the thirteenth to the fifteenth centuries, where Muslims, Jews, and Christians lived together (under Arabic rule) and benefited from each other’s culture and mutual exchanges. It all ended with the ‘reconquista’ by the Spaniards in 1492, a most unfortunate example not to be followed again. While the European Union has progressed in many ways, Goeudevert sees the need for more both-and actions. Economic considerations, (mega-)mergers (such as Chrysler-Daimler), are an unavoidable reality in a global world, but social policies are also needed. A ‘reasonable’ national social security system is to be welcomed, but if free movement throughout Europe is to be achieved, an overall system is required so that moving to another European country does not entail a loss of social benefits and pension entitlements. Again, a mother tongue is a precious asset, but if really free movement within Europe is to be achieved, a lingua franca is required, to be taught as a communication facilitator in all schools from early on. Elsewhere in the book Goeudevert pleads for linking learning, working, continued training and education, researching, and living over against keeping these activities in tight compartments (ibid., p. 149). In Dortmund he tries to put these novel ideas into practice, a difficult enterprise. As to his views on the managers of large corporations, Goeudevert (ibid., p. 98) argues that they should take into account considerations of social well-being and the common good along with aiming at top financial benefits for their own corporation. Sufficient weight should be given to the ‘why’ of any decision, not just to the ‘what’ and ‘how’. Concerning the internal organisation, Goeudevert uses the analogue of a vehicle with a four-wheel drive: (1) marketing, (2) personnel and finance, (3) production and planning, and (4) research and development all need

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to have a certain autonomy, but must work synchronously hand in hand, with (1) and (2) determining the direction in which the corporation is headed (pp. 99–101). Similarly, innovative teams should be composed of persons of both genders, with different ages, and coming from different cultures (p. 102). Finally, if it is not considered too frivolous to refer in a scientific monograph to a publicity text, I would quote the punchline of Deutsche Bank’s advertisement in Forbes Global, of 1 May 2000: ‘Look beyond the Age of Either/Or.’ As will be obvious from the dedication of this volume, I do hope that these visions will become more and more a reality for the benefit of all.

Appendix 1 Interviewing techniques

Preparations This appendix focuses on the type of interview used for ascertaining the RCR level at which the interviewee argues, not on interviewing in general. To produce satisfactory interviews for the stated purpose, a future interviewer needs to be trained threefold. First, he or she needs to learn how to encourage the interviewee to present his or her genuine views as distinct from what just comes to mind, is thought to be the desired answer, or is a repetition of something heard or read. Second, the future interviewer needs to learn RCR theory, and have the level descriptions (see Table 4.1, p. 18) firmly in mind, this in order to ask clarifying questions in case of ambivalent answers regarding discriminating level criteria. Third, the interview dilemmas need to be known from all angles and ‘interiorised’. For convenience, the three standard dilemmas are reproduced below: Pianist. The young pianist is fully immersed in her playing: her fingers speak to the chords via the keys, the movement of her body follows the music’s rhythm, and her mimic gestures express her intense inner participation. After she has played the last note, the audience applauds enthusiastically. The pianist is satisfied with her performance, but wonders whether it is more due to her practising or to her natural endowment. What is your view? Accident in a nuclear power plant. A TV news station reports on an accident in a nuclear power station. The main cooling pump had stopped working, and the back-up pump did not function. The emergency shutdown did not function either. To add to the difficulties, the operating crew became aware of the danger rather late and then underestimated it. The water temperature suddenly rose. A steam pipe cracked and leaked radioactive steam. What or who is to blame? What should be done to avoid another such accident in the future? Model of humans (mind–body problem). Since Antiquity it is recognised that human beings have a body, a mind, and a soul/a spirit. What is at issue in philosophy, and lately also in various sciences, is the nature of the relationship between the body and the other parts. How do you see that? 191

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Taking into account the age of the interviewee Questions to children need to be more concrete and explicit than to older persons. Also, some children may need to get acquainted with the interviewer and the interviewing situation. Letting them tell a story about their home or their pet, and the like, may help to make the transition. Again, doing the interview in two or three parts, separated by a day or two, may be helpful in that respect. As to the particular dilemma on which the interview focuses, the ‘conflicting’ aspects need spelling out, perhaps even in writing on a card to be put before the interviewee. Thus, for the pianist, the card might read: A: The pianist plays well because she practises a lot. B: The pianist plays well because her talent is inborn. Similarly, in the accident dilemma (A) would be a technical failure and (B) a human error. Children change their minds during the interview more often than older persons. Therefore it is particularly important to check in between and perhaps at the end whether they are still of the same opinion. With adolescents and adults, the spelling out of the dilemma is not indicated, because they are potentially able to do that by themselves, and the way it is done, or not, immediately gives an indication of their cognitive competence. Particularly in the case of the power plant accident, it may be necessary to nudge the interviewee towards the actual problem as distinct from general philosophising about nuclear energy. The actual interview The text of the chosen dilemma is read to grade-school children (or told as a story to the younger ones), and given to older interviewees for them to read. The interviewer’s task is then to bring out the responses characteristic for a particular level of RCR : does (A) or (B) explain the whole story; if so, is the other reading really wrong? Are they perhaps both needed for a full explanation; if so, how do they hang together; how about any context dependence? Too precise questions at an early stage of the interview are to be avoided, particularly if they would give away a stage-determining answer. Good questions are: ‘Why do you say that?’; ‘Would any other answer be wrong?’; ‘You said (A) is correct; does that mean (B) is quite wrong?’ If an interviewee, for instance, argues only for (A) as correct (or only for B), one could argue for (B) (respectively A), and see how firm the interviewee’s opinion really is. To see here means to probe ever more firmly, without, however, upsetting the respondent. In another case, if

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the immediate answer is ‘Both A and B are right’ (an answer at stage III), then one could ask for more explanations, and gradually find out how far that participant has advanced towards level IV. A helpful question could be, ‘Is that true always and everywhere?’ It is useful to take some notes during the interview or immediately afterwards: what was the general impression of the respondent and his or her developmental stage, were the answers already at hand or were they worked out for a first time during the interview, were there any special occurrences? This is in addition to the standard data such as name, date of birth, location and date of interview, name of interviewer, etc.

Appendix 2 Scoring manual for RCR

Brief summary of RCR levels Scoring of the interview transcripts involves (a) a knowledge of the theory of RCR, (b) a precise understanding of level differences, (c) checking the provisional result against the template answers below, and (d) comparing the scores with those of a second, independent rater. To be accepted, the interrater agreement has to be about 80 per cent or better, disregarding a third of a level difference (the base scoring uncertainty). For a first impression, the schema of Table A1 (a reproduction of Table 4.3, p. 54) is helpful: Table A1 Developmental logic of relational and contextual reasoning (RCR) RCR involves describing/explaining certain explananda (entities, functional wholes, phenomena) with the help of competing descriptions/explanations/ theories/interpretations A, B, C, . . .

Level of RCR

Core characteristic of level

Stage according to Piaget and Garcia

I II III IV V

A or B (or C) A, but also B (C) A and B (and C) Logic of and (context) Synopsis/theory

intra inter trans-intra trans-inter trans-trans

Level I: Only one aspect considered in isolation Level II: A further aspect comes into the field of vision Level III: All aspects are needed for a full understanding Level IV: The relations between the various aspects come into view as well as the context dependence of their explanatory weight Level V: Completion of level IV; a synopsis or perhaps a theory obtains. 194

Appendix 2

195

Looking at the complexity of the argumentation (differentiation and integration) may be of help in deciding on a particular RCR level. At level I the argumentation is simplistic, at level V sophisticated and complex (cf. Table 4.1, p. 52, for a level description). Investigating the logic(s) used can further assist the elucidation of the RCR level of the interviewee’s argumentation.The limits of classical binary logic are transcended from level III upward (‘It is not logical but it is true’). Also, a respondent arguing at a higher level usually brings in more factual knowledge about the matter at hand than a participant at a lower level. This obtains in addition to the more developed forms of thought displayed in the interview. RCR also involves a certain amount of procedural knowledge. Some clues as to the approximate RCR level may be gained from observing how the interviewee deals with unfamiliar issues: at lower levels ‘I don’t know’ is more likely than at higher levels. Interviewees at higher levels will venture into unknown territory more systematically and confidently. Exemplars of interview excerpts as a help for scoring These exemplars are listed in Table A2, separately for the three standard dilemmas. If one starts reading with the level-V examples, then one acquires immediately a yardstick for the full measure of RCR. Continuing with levels IV–III–II–I, one notices each time what is missing compared to full RCR at level V. All excerpts are taken from genuine interview transcripts and in case of need (slightly) edited (see Oser and Reich 1987, pp. 182–3 for more excerpts from the ‘pianist’ interview). Depending on the RCR level, the following differences of the exemplars are noted. At level I, contradictory statements (a), (b), (c) from different interviewees are reproduced; this in keeping with the characteristics of the level I structure. A given person will produce one answer or the other, but, as a rule, not both. At levels II and III, several statements (from different interviewees) are again shown, but at these levels they do not disagree contentwise (nor structurally) with each other. At levels IV and V, a (composite) single, longer answer is reproduced. Supposedly it touches on all the relevant issues. For scoring, the entire given interview is used, affirmations as well as negations, statements about relations, dependences, and so on. Each scorable partial answer is assessed, and a total score established by weighting the partial scores. All examples refer to full levels. Not reaching a level fully is indicated by adding the lower level, e.g., III (II), transcending it by adding the next higher level, e.g., III (IV).

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Table A2 Excerpts from interview transcripts about three standard RCR interviews (translated from German and slightly edited) Level

Pianist

Power plant accident

Mind–body problem

I

(a) If it is inborn, then a little practising does the trick; you then can play real good. Her father already played well. (b) Practising does it. If you practice a lot, then you play very very good.

(a) That technology was not reliable. The operating crew is not to blame – they have done their duty, day in, day out. (b) It’s the operators’ fault: they did not pay attention.

(a) People are like machines.The body acts the same way as a robot. (b) It’s the head which keeps us going, it gives the orders. (c) It’s really the heart which does it all. No heart, no life.

II

(a) ‘Practising explains it all’, maybe – if you do a lot. Inborn ability, maybe that’s important too. But practising is more important; without practising nothing goes. (b) Inborn ability and practising are important. You need to practice, but being gifted also helps.

(a) It is true that a technical breakdown has occurred for starters. But it appears that the operating crew has not been up to it either. That made it much worse. (b) It’s due to a technical breakdown. But the operating crew is also at fault. They did not pay enough attention.

(a) It’s the body. Every living creature is made up of cells. But the mind and the soul exist too. The body determines what a person looks like, mind and soul what she does and feels. (b) Without a body you can’t move about. The soul keeps you from being afraid all the time.

III

(a) If you are not gifted, then it doesn’t go so well. If you are gifted, but do not practise, then it doesn’t go well either. You start to play, and then you do not know how to continue. You need both, being gifted and practising. (b) Practising is important. One can also be gifted, of course. But being

In the beginning a malfunctioning occurred. But then, such systems can’t work without human control. The operating crew has simply not noticed that the instruments indicated a problem. Or perhaps they have seen it but not taken the right countermeasures. The people were excited. The

(a) Body and mind are different things. But the one can’t do without the other. If such a situation occurs, then something is absolutely wrong. (b) That’s simple: the body does not depend on the mind but they both belong to humans. You cannot exist without a mind, a soul or the like.

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Table A2 (cont.) Level

Pianist gifted does not determine your life entirely. If you practise more, you have more success.

Power plant accident

Mind–body problem

accident involves both a technical and a human deficiency.

(c) The body consists of cells but a soul is also needed to guide you if you will.

IV

Both, being gifted and practising, are needed. If you are gifted, then practising produces faster and better results; that is the relation. And therefore, practising is more fun, you like it better. And you become a much better pianist. The audience? Of course, the pianist feels confirmed by their enthusiasm. Being gifted counts more when you improvise. Practising makes for a faultless performance. Everything is just right. If you are gifted, and have practised, then you enjoy playing, and your joy gets transmitted to the piano. And to the audience!

It began as a technical breakdown, but, then, the plant was built by people. Lots of stuff fouled up. The operators were stressed. Maybe they reacted different from normal. Perhaps they should be trained for facing such situations. The second time you react better. When they are all together, they confuse each other, and make faults. Typically, when such rare accidents occur, they do not notice or do the wrong thing because they lack experience. The more complex the system, the greater the potential danger. They were not aware of that danger.

You can’t separate body and mind. They belong together. You can see the body but not the mind. And then, you also have a soul. It can influence the body, for instance when you are somehow very unhappy. I think that the links often are much stronger than you think. Apart from illness of the body, there are illnesses where your psyche comes in. At the university your mind usually counts more. But in the dreamless phase of sleep even the psyche takes a rest, l believe. And sleeping, that is a different world. Body and soul then organise a world that has little to do with that of daytime consciousness.

V

If the native endowment is too weak, then progress towards perfection will be arrested somewhere along the line. Certain techniques can’t be learned. You cannot replace lack of giftedness by practising more. A gifted person

In this accident technical and human failure are interconnected. One has to look at the whole thing as a system, the plant and the operating crew. And one has to study the mutual interaction, the type of effects they have on each

I situate this issue at two levels, first at the philosophical. The question is, then, how much of the body and of the soul appear to be acting in a particular situation. Second, the pragmatic level in the sense of wholeness and completeness: Now the

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Appendix 2

Table A2 (cont.) Level

Pianist

Power plant accident

Mind–body problem

learns rapidly to get something out of playing the piano. Playing will become part of her identity. She will meet other pianists and get more stimulated by such contacts. The audience mostly consists of music enthusiasts, who will encourage her to become an even better pianist. To a small extent, being gifted and practising can replace each other, but only a little. Their effect depends on the task. To play well from the sheet music for the first time is more a matter of being gifted. To play without a glitch at an examination has more to do with practising. The two do not add arithmetically.

other. One really wants to train crew members with the help of a sophisticated simulator so that they become aware of the many ways in which something can go wrong, they experience their individual and collective reactions, and learn how to assess such situations as well as how to deal with them successfully. In such simulations the psychological stress must of course also be generated, not just the sequence of technical events. It is precisely such a chain reaction of technical and human malfunctioning which is so hard to foresee.

question is how body and mind/soul influence each other. What is still missing, is a third consideration, namely the respective expressions via acts. Often, both are in it together. Clearly, feelings express themselves via the body; they may even originate within the body. That enables one to make friends, to live together with a partner in marriage. In some jobs the body is more important, in others the mind or the soul. The respective weights shift in other situations like at a cocktail or a dinner party, on the operating table in a hospital, when skiing or jogging, when playing chess or when seeing a movie.

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Index

aims of this monograph, 1 analogical thinking break-up of a partnership, viewed by, 90 concept, 42–3, 95 general, 13, 23, 28, 31, 87, 88, 90, 135, 143 problem for probing interviews, 95 RCR, and, 3, 22, 41–3, 46, 48, 56, 74, 89, 95–7 anthropology, 25–6, 112 application of RCR break-up of a partnership, to the, 90 Chalcedonian Declaration, to the, 121–3 coordination of worldviews, to, 126–9 doctrine of the Holy Trinity, to the, 123–5 education, other examples, 163–4 employment via a third sytem, to 182–3 illegal use of drugs, to, 165–73 individual psychological development, to, 149–50 learning about functional music, to, 152–6 methodology, 103–4 nuclear and other energies, to, 21–2, 55–8, 174–80, 191, 196–8 psychology as a discipline, to, 145–9 psychophysiological phenomena, to, 151 rehabilitation of depressed areas, to the, 181, 183 religion and the nature of human beings, to, 118–20 responsibility for the educational system, to the, 157–8 science and religion, to, 111–15 teaching the investiture contest, to, 158–9 understanding religious development, to, 129–32 war on terrorism, 173 (n.1)

Baker-Brown, G. (et al.), 13, 65, 84, 199 Barbour, I. G., 105–10, 114, 128, 199 Basseches, M. A., 13, 15, 19 (n.10), 48, 56, 57, 86, 87, 88, 199 Bedau, H., 45, 200 Beller, M., 140, 141, 200 Bickhard, M. H., 28–30, 33, 75 (n.1), 200, 201 Bohr, N., xvii, 2, 16, 140–2, 144, 186, 200 Boutilier, R. G., 13, 23, 201 Brannock, J., 61, 208 Brown, W. S., 118, 120, 201 Bundesamt fur ¨ Gesundheit, 170, 201 Bundesamt fur ¨ Polizei, 171, 201 Campbell, R. L., 28, 30, 33, 201 Carpendale, J., 28, 201 Chandler, M. J., 13, 23, 28, 201 Chinen, A. B., 29, 201 Claar, A., 33, 202 Clinchy, B., 34, 91, 209 cognition (see also development) cognitive unconscious, 12 concept, 11 development, of, 11, 29–31, 34 epistemic, 31, 33, 129 general, 14, 116, 120, 129, 147, 148 logico-mathematical (see Piaget) cognitive complex thinking (see also development) concept, 84–5, 92–3, 94 data, empirical, 66–9, 85 development, of, 64, 72 general, xviii, 3, 13, 16, 22, 23, 55–8, 65–70, 84–5, 94, 96, 97 problems for probing interview, 65 RCR, and, 56–8, 64–70, 89, 96 complementarist, 4, 5, 52, 135, 136, 139, 188 complementarity, 2, 3, 13 (n.2), 140, 141, 149, 158, 187

219

220

Index

constructivism (in epistemology, in psychology), 36–7 Deacon, T. W., 17, 202 Dennett, D. C., 25–6, 202 development (of forms of thought) cognitive complex thinking, of, 64, 72 concept, 26–33 dialectical thinking, of, 19 (n.10), 85–7 general, 1, 2, 12, 19, 26–7, 29–31, 47, 126, 129–32, 149–51, 186 logical, 29 ontological, 28 reflection, of, 29–31 RCR, of, 25, 27–33, 53–5 dialectical thinking concept, 19 (n.10), 23, 42, 85–7, 90 development, of, 85–7 RCR, and, 13, 42, 48, 56–8, 84, 89 dialogue, fruitful, 108 (n.6) Dreifuss, R., 167, 203 Drogenreferat, 172, 173, 203 EDI, 167, 168, 203 ego-centredness, effect of, 110 (n.10) Emerson, R. W., 16, 203 Emmons, R. A., 73, 148, 203, 211 epistemology children’s, 33–4, 91–2 concept, 31 RCR, of, 44, 46, 185 Epstein, S., 148, 203 Fahrenberg, J., 35, 44, 151, 185, 203 faith stages (Fowler), 129–30 Fathers of the Council of Chalcedon, 121, 122, 133–4, 143 Fenstermacher, G. D., 163, 204 Fetz, R. L., 29, 30, 126, 204 Fischer, E. P., 134, 136, 204 Flavell, J. H., 27, 204 Fondation Archives J. Piaget, 75, 204 forms of thought, 1–2, 13, 16–20, 23–4, 41–3, 64, 72–4, 88–97 concept, 18–20, 89 foundationalism, 36 Fowler, J. W., 129–30, 204 Francis, L. J., 128, 207 Frank, A., 118 (n.4) Fulleborn, ¨ U., 137, 139, 205 Fulljames, P., 111, 129, 204, 205 Garcia, R., 32, 51, 54, 194, 212, Geertz, C., 146 (n.2), 205

Gentner, D., 13, 34 (n.3), 87, 88, 205 God, 28, 30, 42, 51, 108 (n.7), 109, 114, 117, 118, 120–30, 131, 142 (n.11) Goeudevert, D., 187, 188–90, 205 Goswami, U., 75 (n.1), 87, 206 Heisenberg, W., 4, 141, 144, 149 (n.5), 167, 206 Holyoak, K. J., 12, 14, 16, 55, 144, 201, 206 INCR group, 32, 110–11 INES, 174, 206 Intelligent Design, 105 (n.1) intra–inter–trans, xxv, 25, 32–3, 51, 52, 53, 54 James, W., xviii, 2, 136–7, 207 Jeeves, M. A., 118, 120, 201 Jones, R. V., 187–8, 207 Kainz, H. P., 76, 77, 207 Kaiser, C. B., 120, 207 Kay, W. K., 128, 207 Keil, F. C., 27, 28, 207 Kelly, M. H., 28, 207 Kitchener, K. S., 31, 36, 91, 208 Kitchener, R. F., 167, 208 Koller, A., 167, 208 Kuhn, D., 29, 61, 186, 208 Lamb, S. M., 17 (n.9) Laudan, L., 36, 41, 209 location, spatio-temporal, 141 (n.10) logic analogies, of, 95 assessment, 66, 70–2 concept, 15, 41–4, 76–8, 121 data, empirical, 70–2 dialectical, 23, 29, 42, 94–95, 143 formal binary (classical, Aristotelian), 1–2, 15, 16, 27 (n.1), 29, 41, 44, 57, 58, 64, 71, 75–84, 89, 92, 93, 95–6, 106 (n.4), 110, 116, 132, 143, 160, 162, 166, 173, 195 fuzzy, 15 general, xvi–xviii, 2–3, 15–16, 20, 28, 29, 41–3, 58, 70–2, 79, 80, 89, 91–2, 97, 103–4, 125, 130, 134, 136–7, 143, 162–3 RCR, of, 1–4, 12–13, 15–16, 22, 23, 34, 41–3, 45–6, 52, 56–8, 63, 64, 70–2, 89, 100–4, 132, 134, 173, 195 trivalent, 3, 16, 46, 134

Index Mansfield, A., 34, 91, 209 matching thought form to problem structure, 92–7 Meacham, J., 87, 209 metaphor, 37, 38, 117 (n.3) methodology adopted here, 41, 59–60 concept, 41 RCR, of, 45, 129 scientific, 41, 147, 156 Montangero, J., 32, 209 Moshman, D., 14, 31, 87, 309 Muhlich, ¨ E., 181, 182, 209, 210 Muhlich-Klinger, ¨ I., 182, 210 Muhling-Schlapkohl, ¨ M., 142 (n.11), 210 music, functional, 152–6 Musil, R., 139–40, 143 naturalism, 106 (n.4) ontology adopted here, 40 concept, 28–9 general, 120 RCR, of, 35–7, 40, 43–4 Oppenheim, P., 45, 200 Oser, F. K., 28, 31, 51, 52, 53, 62, 63, 73, 74, 120, 126, 129, 130–2, 195, 210, 211 Overton, W. F., 17, 26, 35, 40, 145, 148, 211, 212 partnership break-up and forms of thought, 90–1 philosophy of knowledge adopted here, 37–41 concept, 35–7 evolution, 36, 104–5, 147 (n.5) Piaget, J., 1–2, 11, 13, 32, 34, 51, 52, 54, 55, 59, 61, 73, 76, 83, 88, 93, 128, 148, 194 Piagetian thinking/operations, 1–3, 13, 18–20, 22–3, 33, 43, 46, 47, 56–9, 62–5, 71–3, 74, 75–84, 88, 89, 91, 93, 95–6, 143 data, empirical, 62–3, 72, 73 development of, 2, 19, 73 RCR, and, 33–4, 41–3, 59–65, 72, 74 stages, characteristics of, 54, 56, 57, 58, 63, 72, 73 tasks for probing interviews, 59–62, 64–5, 76, 83, 93 postformal thought, 2, 19–20

221 pragmatic reasoning schema, 14, 144 psychology, 4, 26, 77, 87, 145–9, 154 religion, of, 117 (n.3), 129–32 Putnam, H., 12, 24 (n.13), 29, 35, 36, 37, 212 Qur’an, 5 (n.1) Raman, V. V., 108 (n.7), 109 (n.8), 212 RCR (see also application of RCR) components, 16–19 concept, 12–15 development levels, 52 logic, 32–3 epistemology, 44 heuristic, 103–4 interviewing techniques, 191–3 limitations of empirical studies, 47–8 logic, 45–6 methodology applying RCR, 45, 103–4, 185 studying RCR, 49–50 ontology, 43–4 philosophical analysis, 41–3 pilot study 1, 41–3 pilot study 2, 50–5 pilot study 3, 55–9 pilot study 4, 59–63 problems for probing interviews, 50, 191 relations with other thought forms, 18, 72, 89, 95–7 scoring manual, 191–8 stimulation in the classroom, 160–3 structure, 18 realism (naive, critical, etc.), 35–41 reflection, definition of, 14 reflection, modes of object-reflecting, 29–31 means-reflecting, 29–32 unreflected, 29–30 Reich. K. H., 3, 13, 19 (n.11), 20, 28, 30, 31, 35, 37 (n.2), 50, 52, 53, 56, 62, 63, 66, 70, 72, 89, 103, 106 (n.3), 109, 111, 117, 126, 121, 122, 123, 125, 126, 127, 128, 130, 131, 133, 134, 136, 152, 156, 159, 161, 162, 163, 185, 186 (n.1), 195, 204, 210, 211, 212–14 religion, 1, 3, 14, 84, 103, 104–11, 112 (n.12), 115, 119, 126–8, 129–32, 146, 164

222

Index

religious judgement (Oser/Gmunder), ¨ 130–2 Riegel, K. F., 13, 17, 87, 214 Rilke, R. M., 137–9, 143 Russel, R. B., 142 (n.11) ¨ Schweizer Arzte, 170, 215 science, 3, 38, 50, 51, 103, 104–15, 126–9, 132, 136, 146, 150 concept, 39–40 religion, and, 104–10, 126–9 applying RCR, 111–15 Secretan, P., 41, 215 Sellers, R. V., 133, 216 Sinnott, J. D., 2, 19, 20, 202, 216 son, prodigal, etc., 162 Spelke, E. S., 26, 27, 216 structure, brain, of the, 17–18 concept, 17 general, 18, 28, 30, 32, 36, 54, 86, 122, 137 mental, 12, 13, 14, 16–19, 50, 54, 95

problem, of, 2, 3, 20, 21, 23, 65, 75–7, 87, 88, 91, 93 Suedfeld, P., 84, 85, 216 Tetlock, P., 84, 85, 216 theology, 3, 103, 104, 105, 107–10, 113 (n.14), 114, 117 (n.2), 118, 124, 128, 146 concept, 107 theory CEST, 153 (n.7) cognitive development, of, 26–7 light, of, 24 (n.13), 46 (n.9), 113 (n.16) postformal, 19 RCR, of, 41–6 truth, whose, 38 (n.6) Valentin, P., 28, 30, 31, 73, 126, 204, 214 Van de Kemp, H., 38, 217 van Gogh, V., 134–6, 143, 217 Venn, J., 78, 217 Wellman H. M., 28, 217 Wulff, D. M., 119, 218