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Ellen Meiksins Wood argues that, with the collapse of Communism, the theoretical project of Marxism and its critique of capitalism is more timely and important than ever. Current intellectual fashions of the left which emphasize 'post-modern' fragmentation, 'difference', contingency and the 'politics of identity' can barely accommodate the idea of capitalism, let alone subject the capitalist system to critique. In this book she sets out to renew the critical programme of historical materialism by redefining its basic concepts and its theory of history in original and imaginative ways, using them to identify the specificity of capitalism as a system of social relations and political power. She goes on to explore the concept of democracy in both the ancient and modern world, examining the concept's relation to capitalism, and raising questions about how democracy might go beyond the limits imposed on it by capitalism.
DEMOCRACY AGAINST CAPITALISM
DEMOCRACY AGAINST CAPITALISM Renewing historical materialism
ELLEN MEIKSINS WOOD
| CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS
PUBLISHED BY THE PRESS SYNDICATE OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE
The Pitt Building, Trumpington Street, Cambridge, United Kingdom CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY
PRESS
The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge CB2 2RU, UK 40 West 20th Street, New York, NY 10011-4211, USA 10 Stamford Road, Oakleigh, vie 3166, Australia Ruiz de Alarcon 13, 28014 Madrid, Spain Dock House, The Waterfront, Cape Town 8001, South Africa http://www.cambridge.org © Cambridge University Press 1995 This book is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press. First published 1995 Reprinted 1996, 1999, 2000 A catalogue recordfor this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication data appliedfor
ISBN o 521 47096 x hardback ISBN o 521 47682 8 paperback
Transferred to digital printing 2003
For Peter, Joyce and Robin
Contents
Acknowledgements
page x
Introduction I
i
HISTORICAL MATERIALISM AND THE SPECIFICITY OF CAPITALISM
1 The separation of the 'economic' and the 'political' in capitalism
ig
2 Rethinking base and superstructure
49
3
Class as process and relationship
76
4
History or technological determinism?
108
5
History or teleology? Marx versus Weber
146
II
DEMOCRACY AGAINST CAPITALISM
6
Labour and democracy, ancient and modern
181
7 The demos versus 'we, the people': from ancient to modern conceptions of citizenship
204
8
Civil society and the politics of identity
238
9
Capitalism and human emancipation: race, gender and democracy
264
Conclusion
284
Index
294 ix
Acknowledgements
This volume is, and is not, a collection of essays. It is a collection in the sense that the volume is in large part based on articles already published or in press, but I hope it is more than 'merely' a collection. This is so both because I have not simply included these essays just as they were but have revised and integrated them, or in some cases only parts of them, and also because I regard them as from the start a coherent body of work. The unifying themes and the ways in which one essay builds upon another will, I think, be more or less self-evident, though in the Introduction there are some general reflections on the dominant themes and their historical context, as well as some comments on what I have done to the essays for the purposes of this volume. Here, I simply wish to thank all the original publishers and the many people who have, in one way or another and at one time or another, helped me with one or more of the chapters. Chapter i is a modified version of 'The Separation of the Economic and the Political in Capitalism', originally published in New Left Review 127 (1981); chapter 2 is an edited version of'Falling Through the Cracks: E.P. Thompson and the Debate on Base and Superstructure' from Harvey J. Kaye and Keith McLelland eds., E.P.
Thompson: Critical Perspectives (Oxford: Polity Press, 1990);
chapter 3 is a revision, with some new material, of 'The Politics of Theory and the Concept of Class: E.P. Thompson and His Critics', first published in Studies in Political Economy 9 (1982). Chapter 4 contains new material, together with several combined and integrated essays, or parts of them, from the New Left Review. 'Marxism and the Course of History', NLR 147 (1984); some small sections from 'Rational Choice Marxism: Is the Game Worth the Candle?', NLR 177 (1989), and 'Explaining Everything or Nothing?', NLR (1990). Chapter 5 is a new essay, intended for a volume on Marxist historio-
Acknowledgements
xi
graphy, edited by John Saville and Marcel van der Linden, the fate of which is, as I write, still unknown. Chapter 6 has not yet been published but is a more or less unchanged essay written for volume I (/ Greci e Noi) of a multi-volume work on the ancient Greeks, to be published in Italian by Einaudi. I am very grateful to the publishers for allowing me to include the essay in this volume before the publication of I Greci, contrary to their usual contractual conditions, and am very happy to say that it appears here with the kind permission of Giulio Einaudi editore s.p.a. Chapter 7 is, again, a combination and integration of several articles, or parts of them, together with new material: 'A Tale of Two Democracies', published in History Today, June 1994, and two articles: 'Democracy: An Idea of Ambiguous Ancestry', in J. Peter Euben, Josiah Ober and John Wallach eds., Educating Democracy (Cornell University Press, 1994); and 'Freedom and Democracy, Ancient and Modern', based on a talk given in Washington DC in April 1993, at a conference on Democracy Ancient and Modern, sponsored by the National Endowment for the Humanities, the (edited and enlarged) proceedings of which should be published soon, under the editorship of Josiah Ober and Charles Hedrick. Chapter 8 is a revised and, I hope, improved, version, again with some new material, of 'The Uses and Abuses of "Civil Society'", Socialist Register 1990; and chapter 9 is based, with some modifications, on my Deutscher Memorial Lecture, originally published as 'Captialism and Human Emancipation' in New Left Review 167 (1988). Needless to say, these essays owe much to many people. Some have read several essays, some only one, though the extent of my debt to them does not always correspond simply to the number of essays on which they have commented. It hardly needs saying how much I owe to Neal Wood's help and support. I am grateful to George Comninel, my former student, now friend and colleague, and to Karen Orren, whose friendship extends back to our early (and long-distant) teens, my brother Peter Meiksins and my father Gregory Meiksins, not only for comments but for many years of discussion, argument and encouragement, not to mention their own exciting work. Frances Abele, David McNally and Colin Mooers, whose critical intelligence as students was an inspiration when I first started writing these essays, have continued to be a great help, now as friends, both in discussion and in their own writings. Other friends who have helped with their critical insights on one or
xii
Acknowledgements
another of the essays are John Saville, Harvey Kaye, Norman Geras and Patrick Camiller. Perry Anderson and Robert Brenner each read three or four of the original essays on which this volume is based, and for several years during which I was thinking and writing on the relevant themes were invaluable resources and interlocutors. Ralph Miliband, whose death as this volume was being copy-edited was a very great loss not only to those who knew him but to the whole of the socialist left, commented on two or three of these essays; but my debt to him goes beyond any specific contribution to my work, since, like many others, I owe a great deal to the example of his firm and lucid socialist commitment. I also owe thanks to various other people who made useful comments on one or more of the essays: Chris Bertram, Alan Carling, Paul Cartledge, Diane Elson, Peter Euben, Leo Panitch, Bryan Palmer, Nicholas Rogers, and an anonymous reader for Cambridge University Press. My thanks, finally, to John Haslam at CUP for his friendly and efficient guidance through the publication process, and to the copy-editor, Anne Rix, especially for her patience with my last-minute changes.
Introduction
There is something odd about the assumption that the collapse of Communism represents a terminal crisis for Marxism. One might think, among other things, that in a period of capitalist triumphalism there is more scope than ever for the pursuit of Marxism's principal project, the critique of capitalism. Yet the critique of capitalism is out of fashion. Capitalist triumphalism on the right is mirrored on the left by a sharp contraction of socialist aspirations. Left intellectuals, if not embracing capitalism as the best of all possible worlds, hope for little more than a space in its interstices and look forward to only the most local and particular resistances. At the very moment when a critical understanding of the capitalist system is most urgently needed, large sections of the intellectual left, instead of developing, enriching and refining the required conceptual instruments, show every sign of discarding them altogether. 'Post-Marxism' has given way to the cult of postmodernism, with its principles of contingency, fragmentation and heterogeneity, its hostility to any notion of totality, system, structure, process and 'grand narratives'. But if this hostility extends to the very idea of capitalism as a social system, this does not prevent these intellectual currents from treating 'the market' as if it were a universal and inevitable law of nature while paradoxically closing off critical access to this totalizing power by denying its systemic unity and insisting on the impossibility of 'totalizing' knowledges. Post-modern fragmentation and contingency here join a strange alliance with the ultimate 'grand narrative' the 'end of History'. Intellectuals of the left, then, have been trying to define new ways, other than contestation, of relating to capitalism. The typical mode, at best, is to seek out the interstices of capitalism, to make space within it for alternative 'discourses', activities and identities. Much is made of the fragmentary character of advanced capitalism -
2
Introduction
whether that fragmentation is characterized by the culture of postmodernism or by the political economy of post-Fordism; and this is supposed to multiply the spaces in which a culture of the left can operate. But underlying all of these seems to be a conviction that capitalism is here to stay, at least in any foreseeable historical perspective. The reformulation of the left's relation to capitalism as a making of space within it, rather than a direct challenge to and contestation of it, helps, among other things, to explain the major shifjts from traditional discourses of the left, such as political economy and history, to the more currently fashionable ones: the study of discourses, texts, and what might be called the culture of'identity'. If Marxist political economy and history are intended to challenge capitalism as a totality head-on from the vantage point of its antithesis, socialism, 'cultural studies' (conceived in the 'post-modern' way) and other favoured post-left enterprises are defined by the notion that the terrain of politics is within and between the fragments of capitalism, especially in the academy, where discourses and identities can be deconstructed and proliferated without material constraints. In a fragmented world composed of'de-centred subjects', where totalizing knowledges are impossible and undesirable, what other kind of politics is there than a sort of de-centred and intellectualized radicalization of liberal pluralism? What better escape, in theory, from a confrontation with capitalism, the most totalizing system the world has ever known, than a rejection of totalizing knowledge? What greater obstacle, in practice, to anything more than the most local and particularistic resistances to the global, totalizing power of capitalism than the de-centred and fragmented subject? What better excuse for submitting to the force majeure of capitalism than the conviction that its power, while pervasive, has no systemic origin, no unified logic, no identifiable social roots? In opposition to this dominant trend, I propose to start from the premise that the critique of capitalism is urgently needed, that historical materialism still provides the best foundation on which to construct it, and that the critical element in Marxism lies above all in its insistence on the historical specificity of capitalism - with the emphasis on both the specificity of its systemic logic and on its historicity. In other words, historical materialism approaches capitalism in a way exactly antithetical to the current fashions: the
Introduction
3
systemic unity of capitalism instead of just post-modern fragments, but also historicity - and hence the possibility of supersession instead of capitalist inevitability and the end of History. It is fair enough to say that a body of work produced to deal with capitalism in the nineteenth century cannot be adequate to the conditions of the late twentieth. But it is a great deal less self-evident that anything else has emerged in the interim which provides a better foundation - or even one remotely as good - for a critical analysis of capitalism. The very least that can be said about Marxism is that it has one inestimable advantage over all other systems of economic and social theory that have claimed to supersede it, namely that it subjects to critical scrutiny not only capitalism itself but also the analytic categories associated with it. Other theories have remained enclosed within, and limited by, conceptual categories derived from the specific historical experience of capitalism, together with capitalist assumptions about human nature, rationality, systemic 'laws of motion', historical processes. Classical political economy, however much it may have illuminated the workings of capitalism, could never, in Marx's view, penetrate beneath the surface, beneath (at best) the 'real appear* ances' of capitalism, because its own conceptual framework took for granted the logic of the capitalist system. Even at its best, it was permeated by uncritical assumptions specific to capitalism. This is the sense in which it was 'ideological' even when it was not a 'crude apology'. Hence the need for a critique of capitalism through the medium of a 'critique of political economy' which acknowledged the historical and systemic specificity of capitalism and the need to explain what political economy took as given. An effective critique of capitalism at the end of the twentieth century would have to be conducted along the same lines — and this time, it would have to take into account not only the massive changes that the capitalist economy has undergone but also the new theoretical systems that have evolved to comprehend them. Neoclassical economics, for example, is more rather than less 'ideological' than was classical political economy, more rather than less circumscribed by a conceptual framework that takes the logic of capitalism for granted. But what complicates the matter even more is that varieties of Marxism have developed, and even become dominant within the Marxist tradition, that in their own ways also universalize the logic of capitalism - typically by adhering to some
4
Introduction
kind of technological determinism (which universalisizes the specific drive of capitalism to improve the forces of production) and/or taking over the procedures of conventional economics. The critique of political economy has been set aside, together with the insights of historical materialism - especially its first premise that every mode of production has a specific systemic logic of its own - by treating capitalist 'laws of motion' as if they were the universal laws of history. So the critique of capitalism requires not only adaptations to every transformation of the system but a constantly renewed critique of the analytic instruments designed to understand it. There can never have been a time since Marx's day when such a task needed doing more urgently, as more and more branches of knowledge, both in cultural studies and in the social sciences, are absorbed into the self-validating assumptions of capitalism or at least into a defeatist conviction that nothing else is possible. II
Almost from the beginning, there have been two major theories of history in Marxism. Alongside the critical historical materialism which has its roots in the critique of political economy and has reached its peak in the best of Marxist historiography, there has always existed a contrary tendency to draw out of Marxist theory those aspects that are most compatible with capitalist ideology and to suppress what is most innovative and critical. In particular, there have always been Marxists (not, of course, without encouragement from Marx himself and especially from Engels' 'dialectics of nature') who prefer to forget the critique of political economy and everything it entails in favour of a technological determinism and a mechanical, unilinear succession of modes of production, in which less productive modes are inexorably followed by more productive ones according to some universal law of nature. This version of Marxism has little to distinguish it from conventional theories of social evolution and progress, or the 'stagist' view of history as a succession of'modes of subsistence' associated with classical political economy. In this classical conception of progress, the historical evolution of 'modes of subsistence' had culminated in the current, highest stage of 'commercial society'; but this did not mean that commercial society was, like earlier stages, merely another historical phenom-
Introduction
5
enon, specific and transitory like its predecessors. It had a universal, transhistorical status not only in the sense that it represented the final destination of progress but also in the more fundamental sense that the movement of history itself had from the beginning been governed by what amounted to the natural laws of commercial society, the laws of competition, the division of labour and increasing productivity rooted in the natural inclination of human beings to 'truck, barter and exchange5. There is no doubt that Marx went a long way toward accepting the view of classical political economy and conventional conceptions of progress that history had been on the side of'commercial society'. But the kernel of historical materialism was an insistence on the historicity and specificity of capitalism, and a denial that its laws were the universal laws of history. The critique of political economy was intended to discover why and how capitalism's specific laws of motion operated as laws at all - for example, to find the key to technological determination and the laws of the market as specific imperatives of capitalism instead of taking them for granted as inherent in human nature or in the laws of universal history. This focus on the specificity of capitalism, as a moment with historical origins as well as an end, with a systemic logic specific to it, encouraged a truly historical sense lacking in classical political economy and conventional ideas of progress, and this had potentially fruitful implications for the historical study of other modes of production too. The other, uncritical Marxism effectively repudiated everything Marx had to say against the metaphysical and ahistorical materialism of his predecessors, his insistence on the specificity of capitalism with its drive to improve the forces of production, and his attacks on classical political economy for its tendency to treat the laws of motion of capitalism not as the historical product of specific social relations but as transhistorical natural laws. This other Marxism had several notable features: first, a conception of the economic 'base' in nonsocial, technicist terms, incompatible with anything but the most mechanical application of the 'base/superstructure' metaphor; second, a conception of history as a mechanical, pre-ordained and unilinear succession of modes of production, which had a great deal in common with classical political economy and its 'stages' of civilization; and third, an ahistorical conception of historical transitions in particular, the transition from feudalism to capitalism - which
6
Introduction
assumes precisely what needs to be explained, by reading capitalist principles and laws of motion back into all history. According to this view, for example, capitalism existed within the interstices of feudalism, indeed must always have existed; and somehow it became dominant as it broke through the integument of feudalism, according to some transhistorical necessity, in fulfilment of its natural destiny. This ahistorical version certainly appears in Marx's own work, particularly in those occasional and polemical texts written in a kind of aphoristic short hand. But alongside it, and much more distinctively Marxist, is a historical materialism that allows no pre-ordained and unilinear sequence, in which the origin of capitalism - or any other mode of production - is something that needs to be explained, not presupposed, and which looks for explanations not in some transhistorical natural law but in historically specific social relations, contradictions and struggles. Marxism as an extension of capitalist ideology has then always existed alongside historical materialism as a critical theory; but it was only with the advent of Stalinist orthodoxies that the critical version was threatened with eclipse. For reasons specific to the circumstances of the Soviet Union and the imperatives of rapid economic development, the development of productive forces on the model of industrial capitalism, and in response to the pressures of the international capitalist economy (not to mention geo-political and military pressures), technological determinism took precedence over historical materialism, and history gave way to universal laws. At the same time, this determinist view tended to lapse into contradictory moments of extreme voluntarism, as the drive to leap over stages of development produced an inclination toward detachment from material constraints. Although the critical tradition had continued to flourish in the shadow of Stalinism - notably among the British Marxist historians - the end of Stalinism did not restore the theoretical fortunes of historical materialism. For one thing, the philosophical and cultural preoccupations of'Western Marxism' since the 1920s had by default abandoned too much of the material and historical terrain to Stalinism. Stalinist Marxism had come, for many, to represent Marxist materialism as such; and the alternative appeared to be a distancing of Marxist theory from its materialist self-definition and, in some cases, a wholesale refusal of its materialist preoccupations, in par-
Introduction
7
ticular its focus on political economy. This tendency was often reinforced by a conviction that the 'masses' in advanced capitalist societies, and specifically the working class, had fallen under the more or less permanent hegemonic spell of'consumer capitalism'. At any rate, in the following decades, and especially in the wake of the rupture with Stalinism represented by the Twentieth Party Congress, there emerged a variety of Marxisms in the West, which — often very fruitfully - shifted Marxism onto new 'humanist' or cultural terrains, while leaving unresolved the ambiguities in their relations with the materialism in historical materialism. For that matter, the historical term in the equation was left largely ambiguous too. Although a great deal of first-rate Marxist history was written, the technological determinism of uncritical Marxism, while subject to humanist critique, was never decisively displaced by a comprehensive theoretical alternative — so that for some the only available option appeared to be an escape into pure historical contingency. This is the context in which the last influential current of Western Marxism entered the fray, the Marxism of Louis Althusser. Althusser had described himself as responding to what he considered to be the 'inflation' of 'humanist' tendencies in Marxist theory in the wake of the liberation experienced by Marxists after the Twentieth Party Congress. He claimed to be defending the scientific rigour of Marxist materialism against a reversion to pre-Marxist idealism entailed by the then fashionable Hegelian readings of Marx, and the empiricism and voluntarism which had invaded socialist theory as structural determinations were supplanted by a preoccupation with human agency. He was not, however, prepared to relinquish all the gains of the post-Stalinist liberation and sought other ways of preserving the non-reductivist, non-deterministic, non-economistic impulses of that ideological emancipation. His most notable contribution in that regard was the concept of'overdetermination', which stressed the complexity and multiplicity of social causation, while reserving economic determination to a distant 'last instance'. But more fundamentally, the non-reductionist effect was achieved by establishing a rigid dualism between theory and history (about which more in chapter 2); and, here, there was a paradox, for in his insistence on the autonomy of theory and scientific knowledge - against empiricism, voluntarism, humanism and the 'historicism' which, he
8
Introduction
maintained, relativized theoretical and scientific knowledge Althusser ended by displacing structural determinations from history altogether. Structural determinations might be the proper object of an autonomous theory, but the real historical world, it appeared, remained irreducibly contingent. This Althusserian dualism allowed its adherents both to abandon 'crude economism' and to retain, on the theoretical plane, a fairly crude determinism; and, where the Stalinist mechanical determinism had been interrupted by moments of extreme voluntarism, Althusserians could unite these two contradictory moments in one uneasy synthesis - or rather, juxtaposition. This theoretical juxtaposition was to be short lived. Although not all Althusserians took the same route, there emerged a significant current that seized upon such concepts as overdetermination, 'relative autonomy' and 'social formation' (to which I shall return in chapter 2) as an excuse for effectively repudiating causation altogether, even castigating Althusser for clinging to the last remnant of 'economism' by refusing to relinquish determination 'in the last instance'. In the end, while the 'new social movements' were for some people the main political motivation for abandoning Marxism, Althusserianism became the main theoretical channel through which Western Marxism travelled in its passage to post-Marxism and beyond. And then came the collapse of Communism. The condition of the left today may appear to differ as sharply from its state in 1981, when I published the first of the essays on which this volume is based, as the 'new world order' contrasts with the world before the collapse. Few but the most hardline right-wing critics would venture to deny that this historic rupture has brought about a transformation in the intellectual culture of the left, as people have entered a phase of 'rethinking' and soul searching of a kind unprecedented in the history of socialism. Yet, without wishing to question the impact of these worldhistoric events on the thinking of Western socialists, I have been no less struck by the fundamental continuities between the dominant intellectual culture of the left on the eve of the collapse and the state of that culture today. I do not mean by this the kind of thing that critics of the right are likely to say - namely that, in the face of all the evidence, there are still too many people on the left who refuse to face reality and who cling to discredited old ideas. On the contrary,
Introduction
9
I have in mind the political and theoretical trends which, well before the collapse of Communism and the 'triumph of capitalism' were even a gleam in the neo-conservative eye, were already moving rapidly away from the critique of capitalism and toward its conceptual dissolution in post-modern fragments and contingencies. The 'new world order', together with the restructuration of the capitalist economy, has certainly had profound effects, but current fashions on the intellectual left are in many ways simply exhausting the theoretical and political currents of the sixties and seventies rather than beginning to confront the problems of the late 1980s and 1990s. In this post-modern moment, the ahistorical, metaphysical materialist tradition of Marxism has won a kind of victory. The most recent fashion in academic Marxism, the 'Rational Choice' variety, is deeply indebted to the old technological determinism (while embracing the procedures and many of the premises of conventional economics); and post-Marxist theories with their various successors, having defined themselves in relation to the old brand of uncritical Marxism, have made a simple choice between economistic determinism and post-modern contingency, without ever engaging the more difficult option of historical materialism. It is not so surprising that, for many people, there has been a more or less direct route, with or without a stopover at Althusserianism, from determinist Marxism to what seems the opposite extreme. Determinism is always bound to be disappointed by history. In particular, technological-determinist Marxists, imbued with a teleological conviction that the automatic development of productive forces would mechanically produce a revolutionary working class, were bound to feel betrayed by the real working class responding not to the prophecies of a metaphysical materialism but to the exigencies of history. The intellectual history of the (stunningly rapid) transition from the structuralist Marxism of the sixties and seventies, through the brief moment of'post-Marxism', to the current fashions of 'post-modernism' has in large part been the story of a disappointed determinism. It is by now a commonplace that Western Marxism has been deeply influenced by the default of revolutionary consciousness within the working class and by the resulting dissociation of intellectual practice from any political movement. This seems to have encouraged people not only to seek political programmes less reliant on the working class but also to look for theories of social
io
Introduction
transformation freed from the constraints and disappointments of history. So there has been a wide range of ahistorical theories, from the abstractions of various philosophical and cultural Marxisms to Western adaptations of Maoism. Western Maoists, for example, were particularly attracted to its voluntarism and the suggestion that revolutions can be made by sheer political will, in defiance of material, historical conditions. As Althusser himself illustrated, such an attraction was not incompatible with a theoretical determinism. No doubt, too, the autonomy apparently accorded to ideology, politics and 'cultural revolution' held very particular attractions for intellectuals, situating revolution on their very own terrain. Now, with the decline of even these ahistorical revolutionary aspirations, there has remained an affinity with any theoretical tendency that stresses the autonomy of culture and,finally,discourse. This suggests that the particular flavour of Western Marxism and its successors comes not just from the negative fact of their separation from working-class politics but from a tendency to fill the vacuum by putting intellectual activity in place of class struggle. There has been a kind of self-promotion of intellectuals as world-historic forces; and though this self-glorification has gone through various phases since the 1960s, it has in all its manifestations reinforced the detachment from history. Now, discursive construction has replaced material production as the constitutive practice of social life. There may never be a revolutionary reconstruction of society, but there can always be a ruthless deconstruction of texts. We have gone a long way beyond the healthy and fruitful attention to the ideological and cultural dimensions of human experience exemplified in the best of Marxist historiography or by a theorist like Gramsci. Here is vanguardism with a vengeance. in
This volume is an attempt to shift debate on the left, as well as between socialism and its critics, away from the barren Hobson's choices that have occupied the theoretical terrain for too long, and toward an engagement with historical materialism and the critique of capitalism. This is not a work of technical economics. It is not a critique of neo-classical economics, nor is it an intervention in the long-standing debates on value theory or the falling rate of profit. Instead, its purpose is to define the specificity of capitalism as a
Introduction
11
system of social relations and as a political terrain, while reconsidering the theoretical foundations of historical materialism in general. It is a 'critique' in the sense that it seeks to break those conceptual and theoretical habits that tend to obscure the specificity of capitalism. The issues here are both historical and theoretical. The main historical issue is the widespread tendency, almost universal in non-Marxist accounts of capitalist development and shared by some varieties of Marxism, to read capitalist principles and laws of motion back into all history and to explain the emergence of modern capitalism by assuming the very thing that needs to be explained. The remedy for this essentially teleological procedure is to put history in place of teleology. Theoretically, the principal issues have to do, first, as I suggest in chapter 3, with the difference between two conceptions of theory: 'on the one hand, a view that theoretical knowledge - the knowledge of structures - is a matter of "static conceptual representation", while motion and flux (together with history) belong to a different, empirical sphere of cognition; and on the other hand, a view of knowledge that does not oppose structure to history, in which theory can accommodate historical categories, "concepts appropriate to the investigation of process"'. More specifically, there is a range of questions having to do with the historicity of certain theoretical categories. In particular, our current conceptions of the 'political' and the 'economic' are here subjected to critical scrutiny in order not to take for granted the delineation and separation of these categories specific to — and only to — capitalism. This conceptual separation, while it reflects a reality specific to capitalism, not only fails to comprehend the very different realities of pre- or non-capitalist societies but also disguises the new forms of power and domination created by capitalism. The critical project I am outlining here requires treating capitalism as a system of social relations; and this means rethinking some of the ways in which the principal concepts of historical materialism forces and relations of production, class, base and superstructure, etc. - have been conceived. These are the main themes of part 1. But the original critique of capitalism could not have been conducted without the conviction that alternatives were possible, and it was carried out from the vantage point of capitalism's antithesis, socialism. This demanded a critique not only of capitalism or of political economy but also of the then available oppositions to capitalism,
12
Introduction
which meant subjecting the socialist tradition itself to critical scrutiny. The principal object of this critique was to transform the socialist idea from an ahistorical aspiration into a political programme grounded in the historical conditions of capitalism. My own point of orientation is still socialism, but today's oppositions and resistances are of a different kind and require a 'critique' of their own. If there is now any single unifying theme among the various fragmented oppositions, it is the aspiration to democracy. Part n, then, explores the concept of democracy as a challenge to capitalism, and it does so critically, that is, above all, historically. The volume proceeds as follows. The chapter on 'The separation of the "economic" and the "political" in capitalism' sets the agenda for the whole volume. It is an attempt both to identify what is distinctive about capitalism and the historical process that produced it, and to scrutinize the conceptual categories associated with this distinctive historical pattern. In the process, the fundamental categories of historical materialism - forces and relations of production, base and superstructure, and so on - are also redefined. If I were to start this essay from scratch today, I would stress even more than I did then the specificity of capitalism and its historical development. Since I first wrote it, I have become increasingly preoccupied with the ways in which the retrospective imposition of capitalist principles upon all previous history has affected our understanding of both history in general and capitalism in particular. One product of this preoccupation was my book, The Pristine Culture of Capitalism: A Historical Essay on Old Regimes and Modern States (London, 1991) which distinguishes the historical development of English capitalism from other historical paths out of European feudalism, especially in France, where the outcome was not capitalism but absolutism. Rethinking the history of capitalism in this way involved disentangling the conventional ensemble of 'capitalism' and 'bourgeois society', and raising some questions about our understanding of progress and 'modernity'. Behind all this lay further questions about the connection between markets, trade and towns, on the one hand, and capitalism, on the other - questions that also arise in connection with my discussion of Max Weber in chapter 5. The other essays in part 1 develop themes introduced in the first essay, elaborating on the forces and relations of production, the question of base and superstructure, the concept of class, the problem of technological determinism, the antithesis of history and
Introduction
13
teleology. I should perhaps explain the special role I assign here to E.P. Thompson. In chapters 2 and 3, I use his work as a point of departure for reconstructing some of the fundamental categories of historical materialism - notably the metaphor of 'base and superstructure' and the concept of class. I have been told repeatedly that I read too much of my own theoretical predispositions into his historical writings; but while I would certainly like to take credit for some of the insights I ascribe to him, it still seems to me that, however allusive (and illusive) his own theoretical pronouncements may have been, he remains the closest thing we have to a theorist of historical materialism as I understand it. In chapter 3, I talk about Thompson's conception of class as process and relationship, as opposed to class as a structural location; and I contrast his historical conception to what I call the geological model in conventional theories of 'stratification'. It occurs to me that this distinction - together with the underlying epistemological difference between Thompson's conception of theoretical knowledge as having to do with 'concepts appropriate to the investigation of process' and other conceptions of theory as 'static conceptual representation' - is a very nice way of identifying what I take to be the defining characteristics of historical materialism. Thompson also exemplifies for me the critical role of historical materialism as a way of learning - or relearning - how to think in non-capitalist terms, challenging the universality of its constitutive categories - conceptions of property, labour, the market, and so on. His work has been unequalled in its capacity to undermine capitalist assumptions by a kind of historical-anthropological deconstruction, tracking the transformations, against resistances, which produced this unique social form - the market against the resistance of the 'moral economy'; capitalist definitions of property as against other, earlier and/or alternative definitions, reflecting customs, codes, practices and expectations resistant to the logic of capitalist property relations. His subversive genealogy of capitalist principles, tracing capitalist practices, values and categories to their systemic roots in specific relations of production and exploitation, restores not only the historicity of capitalism but also its contestability. At any rate, my discussion of the fundamental categories of historical materialism leads into the Marxist conception of history and a reconsideration of technological determinism in chapter 4. One issue, again, dominates this discussion of history: the antithesis
14
Introduction
between historical materialism on the one hand, and on the other the teleological tendency to see capitalism in all its historical predecessors, to assume its pre-existence in order to explain its coming into being, and to translate its specific laws of motion into a general law of history. This tendency, I argue in chapter 5, is exemplified even by Max Weber and more than anything else distinguishes him from Marx. The first chapter of the book also lays the foundation for the chapters in part 11, which explore the political implications that follow from the specificities of capitalism. If the defining characteristic of capitalism as a political terrain is the formal 'separation of the economic and the political', or the transfer of certain 'political' powers to the 'economy' and 'civil society', what consequences does this have for the nature and scope of the state and citizenship? Since capitalism entails, among other things, new forms of domination and coercion which are outside the reach of instruments designed to check traditional forms of political power, it also reduces the salience of citizenship and the scope of democratic accountability. Capitalism, to put it simply, can afford a universal distribution of political goods without endangering its constitutive relations, its coercions and inequities. This, needless to say, has wide-ranging implications for our understanding of democracy and the possibilities of its expansion. Throughout this section, democracy is examined in historical perspective. The object is to situate it in specific historical contexts instead of treating it as a socially indeterminate abstraction. Capitalist democracy is scrutinized in contrast to other forms, in the context of different social relations (in particular, the ancient Greek form which gave rise to the concept of democracy itself). In chapter 6, I compare the implications of democracy for the status of labour in ancient Athenian and modern capitalist democracy; and, in chapter 7, I trace the changes in the meaning of democracy and citizenship from classical antiquity, through the redefinition carried out by the founders of the US Constitution, to the modern conception of liberal democracy. I also explore the particular ways in which capitalism both advances and inhibits democracy, raising questions about the possible direction of further advances. 'Formal' democracy and the identification of democracy with liberalism would have been impossible in practice and literally unthinkable in theory in any other context but the very specific
Introduction
15
social relations of capitalism. These social relations have both advanced and strictly limited democracy, and the greatest challenge to capitalism would be an extension of democracy beyond its narrowly circumscribed limits. It is at this point that 'democracy' arguably becomes synonymous with socialism. The question then is what socialist emancipation means beyond the abolition of class exploitation. In chapter 8, I extend the discussion of democracy to current preoccupations with 'civil society' and the 'politics of identity'; and chapter 9 reflects on the prospects and limits of human emancipation in capitalist society and the effects of capitalism on 'extra-economic' goods, not only democracy but racial and especially gender equality. The Conclusion makes some tentative suggestions about the kinds of questions socialist thought should now address. A few final words about the connection between the chapters in this book and the essays on which they are based. Although the essays, published between 1981 and 1994, were written at different times and for various purposes, they seem to me to comprise a coherent set of ideas. I have emphasized that coherence by arranging the essays more thematically than chronologically, by integrating overlapping texts, and by introducing some bridging arguments. Some essays have been more extensively altered than others. Chapters 4 and 7 represent the revision and integration of several essays or sections extracted from them. Elsewhere, I have cut some things and elaborated or clarified others, modifying some particularly leaden prose, incoherence or opacity, or amplifying some point that seemed to me unclear or in need of explication. Although I have sometimes interjected a current observation into an older text, I have tried not to alter the text in such a way as to make myself seem more perspicacious than I was. This, of course, raises questions about whether and how the massive transformations that have occurred in the world between the first and the last of these essays have obliged me to 'rethink', and why I am not ashamed to persist in such unfashionable views. I want to make a few remarks in the conclusion about the 'current conjuncture' and the continuing timeliness of socialist aspirations; but for now, I shall simply repeat that, since historical materialism still represents the most fruitful critique of capitalism, it seems to me that the 'triumph of capitalism' has made it more relevant today than ever before.
PART I
Historical materialism and the specificity of capitalism
CHAPTER I
The separation of the 'economic' and the 'political' in capitalism
The original intention of historical materialism was to provide a theoretical foundation for interpreting the world in order to change it. This was not an empty slogan. It had a very precise meaning. It meant that Marxism sought a particular kind of knowledge, uniquely capable of illuminating the principles of historical movement and, at least implicitly, the points at which political action could most effectively intervene. This is not to say that the object of Marxist theory was to discover a 'scientific' programme or technique of political action. Instead, the purpose was to provide a mode of analysis especially well equipped to explore the terrain on which political action must take place. Marxism since Marx has often lost sight of his theoretical project and its quintessentially political character. In particular, there has been a tendency to perpetuate the rigid conceptual separation of the 'economic' and the 'political' which has served capitalist ideology so well ever since the classical economists discovered the 'economy' in the abstract and began emptying capitalism of its social and political content. These conceptual devices do reflect, if only in a distorting mirror, a historical reality specific to capitalism, a real differentiation of the 'economy'; and it may be possible to reformulate them so that they illuminate more than they obscure, by reexamining the historical conditions that made such conceptions possible and plausible. The purpose of this reexamination would not be to explain away the 'fragmentation' of social life in capitalism, but to understand exactly what it is in the historical nature of capitalism that appears as a differentiation of 'spheres', especially the 'economic' and the 'political'. This differentiation is, of course, not simply a theoretical but a practical problem. It has had a very immediate practical expression
20
Historical materialism
in the separation of economic and political struggles which has typified modern working-class movements. For many revolutionary socialists, this has represented nothing more than the product of a misguided, 'underdeveloped', or 'false5 consciousness. If there were nothing more to it than that, it might be easier to overcome; but what has made working-class 'economism' so tenacious is that it does correspond to the realities of capitalism, to the ways in which capitalist appropriation and exploitation actually do divide the arenas of economic and political action, and actually do transform certain essential political issues - struggles over domination and exploitation which have in the past been inextricably bound up with political power - into distinctively 'economic' issues. This 'structural' separation may, indeed, be the most effective defence mechanism available to capital. The point, then, is to explain how and in what sense capitalism has driven a wedge between the economic and the political - how and in what sense essentially political issues like the disposition of power to control production and appropriation, or the allocation of social labour and resources, have been cut off from the political arena and displaced to a separate sphere. ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL 'FACTORS'
Marx presented the world in its political aspect, not only in his explicitly political works but even in his most technical economic writings. His critique of political economy was, among other things, intended to reveal the political face of the economy which had been obscured by classical political economists. The fundamental secret of capitalist production disclosed by Marx - the secret that political economy systematically concealed, making it finally incapable of accounting for capitalist accumulation - concerns the social relation and the disposition of power that obtains between workers and the capitalist to whom they sell their labour power. This secret has a corollary: that the disposition of power between the individual capitalist and worker has as its condition the political configuration of society as a whole - the balance of class forces and the powers of the state which permit the expropriation of the direct producer, the maintenance of absolute private property for the capitalist, and his control over production and appropriation. In volume I of Capital Marx works his way from the commodity
The 'economic' and the 'political9 in capitalism
21
form through surplus value to the 'secret of primitive accumulation', disclosing at last that the 'starting point' of capitalist production' is nothing else than the historical process of divorcing the producer from the means of production', 1 a process of class struggle and coercive intervention by the state on behalf of the expropriating class. The very structure of the argument suggests that, for Marx, the ultimate secret of capitalist production is a political one. What distinguishes his analysis so radically from classical political economy is that it creates no sharp discontinuities between economic and political spheres; and he is able to trace the continuities because he treats the economy itself not as a network of disembodied forces but, like the political sphere, as a set of social relations. This has not been equally true of Marxism since Marx. In one form or another and in varying degrees, Marxists have generally adopted modes of analysis which, explicitly or implicitly, treat the economic 'base' and the legal, political, and ideological 'superstructures' that 'reflect' or 'correspond' to it as qualitatively different, more or less enclosed and 'regionally' separated spheres. This is most obviously true of orthodox base-superstructure theories. It is also true of their variants which speak of economic, political and ideological 'factors,' 'levels' or 'instances', no matter how insistent they may be about the interaction of factors or instances, or about the remoteness of the 'last instance' in which the economic sphere finally determines the rest. If anything, these formulations merely reinforce the spatial separation of spheres. Other schools of Marxism have maintained the abstraction and enclosure of spheres in other ways - for example, by abstracting the economy or the circuit of capital in order to construct a technically sophisticated alternative to bourgeois economics, meeting it on its own ground (and going significantly further than Marx himself in this respect, without grounding the economic abstractions in historical and sociological analysis as he did). The social relations in which this economic mechanism is embedded - which indeed constitute it - are treated as somehow external. At best, a spatially separate political power may intervene in the economy, but the economy itself is evacuated of social content and depoliticized. In these respects, Marxist theory has perpetuated the very ideological practices that Marx was attacking, those practices that confirmed to 1
Karl Marx, Capital i, (Moscow, 1971), p. 668.
22
Historical materialism
the bourgeoisie the naturalness and eternity of capitalist production relations. Bourgeois political economy, according to Marx, universalizes capitalist relations of production by analysing production in abstraction from its specific social determinations. Marx's approach differs from theirs in his insistence that a productive system is made up of its specific social determinations - specific social relations, modes of property and domination, legal and political forms. This does not mean simply that the economic 'base* is reflected in and maintained by certain 'superstructural' institutions, but that the productive base itself exists in the shape of social, juridical and political forms - in particular, forms of property and domination. Bourgeois political economists are able to demonstrate 'the eternity and harmoniousness of the existing social relations' by divorcing the system of production from its specific social attributes. For Marx, production is 'not only a particular production . . . it is always a certain social body, a social subject, which is active in a greater or sparser totality of branches of production'. 2 Bourgeois political economy, in contrast, achieves its ideological purpose by dealing with society in the abstract, treating production as 'encased in eternal natural laws independent of history, at which opportunity bourgeois relations are then quietly smuggled in as the inviolable natural laws on which society in the abstract is founded. This is the more or less conscious purpose of the whole proceeding.' 3 While bourgeois economists may recognize that certain legal and political forms facilitate production, they do not treat them as organic constituents of a productive system. Thus they bring things that are organically related 'into an accidental relation, into a merely reflective connection'. 4 The distinction between 'organic' and 'merely reflective' connections is especially significant. It suggests that any application of the base/superstructure metaphor that stresses the separation and enclosure of spheres - however much it may insist on the connection of one to the other, even the reflection of one by the other reproduces the mystifications of bourgeois ideology because it fails to treat the productive sphere itself as defined by its social determinations and in effect deals with society 'in the abstract'. The basic 2 4
Marx, Grundrisse tr. M. Nicolaus (Harmondsworth, 1973), p. 86. Ibid., p. 88.
3
Ibid., p. 87.
The 'economic3 and the 'political' in capitalism
23
principle about the primacy of production, the very foundation of historical materialism, loses its critical edge and is assimilated to bourgeois ideology. This is, of course, not to say that Marx saw no value in the approach of bourgeois political economy. On the contrary, he adopted its categories as his point of departure because they expressed, not a universal truth, but a historical reality in capitalist society, at least a 'real appearance'. What he undertook was neither the reproduction nor the repudiation of bourgeois categories but their critical elaboration and transcendence. TOWARD A T H E O R E T I C A L A L T E R N A T I V E ! BASE ' S U P E R S T R U C T U R E ' RECONSIDERED
AND
It should be possible to sustain a historical materialism that takes seriously Marx's own insistence, in opposition to the ideological abstractions of bourgeois political economy, that (for example) 'capital is a social relation of production', that economic categories express certain determinate social relations. There ought to be a theoretical alternative to 'vulgar economism' that attempts to preserve the integrity of the 'mode of production', while working out the implications of the fact that the productive 'base' exists in the shape of specific social processes and relations and particular juridical and political forms. There has been no explicit and systematic account of such a theoretical position (at least not since Marx's own), although something like it is implicit in the work of certain Marxist historians. The theoretical standpoint being proposed here is perhaps what has been called - pejoratively - 'political Marxism'. This brand of Marxism, according to one Marxist critic, is a reaction to the wave of economist [ic] tendencies in contemporary historiography. As the role of class struggle is widely underestimated, so [political Marxism] injects strong doses of it into historical explanation. ... It amounts to a voluntarist vision of history in which the class struggle is divorced from all other objective contingencies and, in the first instance, from such laws of development as may be peculiar to a specific mode of production. Could one imagine accounting for the development of capitalism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries solely by reference to social factors, and without bringing into the picture the law of capitalist accumulation and its mainspring, that is to say the mechanism of surplus value? In fact, the result ... is to deprive the basic concept of historical materialism,
24
Historical materialism
that is the mode of production, of all real substance. ... The error of such 'political Marxism' lies not only in its neglect of the most operative concept of historical materialism (the mode of production). It also consists in its abandonment of the field of economic realities. .. .5 The purpose of my argument here is to overcome the false dichotomy on which this characterization of 'political Marxism' is based, a dichotomy that permits some Marxists to accuse others of abandoning the 'field of economic realities' when they concern themselves with the political and social factors that constitute relations of production and exploitation. The premise here is that there is no such thing as a mode of production in opposition to 'social factors', and that Marx's radical innovation on bourgeois political economy was precisely to define the mode of production and economic laws themselves in terms of'social factors'. What does it mean to talk about a mode of production or an economy as if they were distinct from, even opposed to, 'social factors'? What, for example, are 'objective contingencies' like the law of capitalist accumulation and its 'mainspring', the 'mechanism' of surplus value? The mechanism of surplus value is a particular social relation between appropriator and producer. It operates through a particular organization of production, distribution and exchange; and it is based on a particular class relation maintained by a particular configuration of power. What is the subjection of labour to capital, which is the essence of capitalist production, if not a social relation and the product of a class struggle? What, after all, did Marx mean when he insisted that capital is a social relation of production; that the category 'capital' had no meaning apart from its social determinations; that money or capital goods are not in themselves capital but become so only in the context of a particular social relation between appropriator and producer; that the socalled primitive accumulation of capital which is the pre-condition for capitalist production is nothing more than the process - i.e. the class struggle - whereby the direct producer is expropriated?, and so on. For that matter, why did the grand old man of bourgeois social science, Max Weber, insist on a 'purely economic' definition of capitalism without reference to extraneous social factors (like, for 5
Guy Bois, 'Against the Neo-Malthusian Orthodoxy', in T.H. Aston and C.H.E. Philpin eds. The Brenner Debate: Agrarian Class Structure and Economic Development in Pre-Industrial Europe
(Cambridge, 1985), pp. 115-16. The author is referring specifically to the article by Robert Brenner cited below in note 9.
The 'economic' and the 'political' in capitalism
25
example, the exploitation of labour), evacuating the social meaning of capitalism in deliberate opposition to Marx? 6 To raise these questions and to insist on the social constitution of the economy is not at all to say that there is no economy, that there are no economic 'laws', no mode of production, no 'laws of development' in a mode of production, no law of capitalist accumulation; nor is it to deny that the mode of production is the 'most operative concept of historical materialism'. 'Political Marxism', as understood here, is no less convinced of the primacy of production than are the 'economistic tendencies' of Marxism. It does not define production out of existence or extend its boundaries to embrace indiscriminately all social activities. It simply takes seriously the principle that a mode of production is a social phenomenon. Equally important - and this is the point of the whole exercise relations of production are, from this theoretical standpoint, presented in their political aspect, that aspect in which they are actually contested, as relations of domination, as rights of property, as the power to organize and govern production and appropriation. In other words, the object of this theoretical stance is a practical one, to illuminate the terrain of struggle by viewing modes of production not as abstract structures but as they actually confront people who must act in relation to them. 'Political Marxism' recognizes the specificity of material production and production relations; but it insists that 'base' and 'superstructure', or the 'levels' of a social formation, cannot be viewed as compartments or 'regionally' separated spheres. However much we may stress the interaction among 'factors', these theoretical practices mislead because they obscure not only the historical processes by which modes of production are constituted but also the structural definition of productive systems as living social phenomena. 'Political Marxism', then, does not present the relation between base and superstructure as an opposition, a 'regional' separation, between a basic 'objective' economic structure, on the one hand, and social, juridical and political forms, on the other, but rather as a continuous structure of social relations and forms with varying degrees of distance from the immediate processes of production and 6
See, for example, Weber's Economy and Society (New York, 1968), pp. 91 and 94, and The Agrarian Sociology of Ancient Civilizations (London, 1976), pp. 5 0 - 1 .
26
Historical materialism
appropriation, beginning with those relations and forms that constitute the system of production itself. The connections between 'base' and 'superstructure' can then be traced without great conceptual leaps because they do not represent two essentially different and discontinuous orders of reality. The argument begins with one of the first principles of Marx's materialism: that while human beings work within definite material limits not of their own making, including purely physical and ecological factors, the material world as it exists for them is not simply a natural given; it is a mode of productive activity, a system of social relations, a historical product. Even nature, 'the nature that preceded human history . . . is nature which no longer exists anywhere . . . ';7 'the sensuous world . . . is, not a thing given direct from all eternity, remaining ever the same, but the product of industry and the state of society - and, indeed, in the sense that it is an historical product, the result of the activity of a whole succession of generations, each standing on the shoulders of the preceding one, developing its industry and its intercourse, modifying its social system according to the changing needs'. 8 A materialist understanding of the world, then, is an understanding of the social activity and the social relations through which human beings interact with nature in producing the conditions of life; and it is a historical understanding which acknowledges that the products of social activity, the forms of social interaction produced by human beings, themselves become material forces, no less than are natural givens. This account of materialism, with its insistence on the role played by social forms and historical legacies as material forces, inevitably raises the vexed question of'base' and 'superstructure'. If forms of social interaction, and not just natural or technological forces, are to be treated as integral parts of the material base, where is the line to be drawn between social forms that belong to the base and those that can be relegated to superstructure? Or, in fact, does the base/ superstructure dichotomy obscure as much as it reveals about the productive 'base' itself? Some legal and political institutions are external to the relations of production even while helping to sustain and reproduce them; 7 8
Marx, German Ideology, in Collected Works, vol. v (New York, 1976), p. 39. Ibid., p. 40.
The 'economic' and the 'political' in capitalism
27
and perhaps the term 'superstructure' should be reserved for these. But relations of production themselves take the form of particular juridical and political relations - modes of domination and coercion, forms of property and social organization - which are not mere secondary reflexes, nor even just external supports, but constituents of these production relations. The 'sphere' of production is dominant not in the sense that it stands apart from or precedes these juridicalpolitical forms, but rather in the sense that these forms are precisely forms of production, the attributes of a particular productive system. A mode of production is not simply a technology but a social organization of productive activity; and a mode of exploitation is a relationship of power. Furthermore, the power relationship that conditions the nature and extent of exploitation is a matter of political organization within and between the contending classes. In the final analysis the relation between appropriators and producers rests on the relative strength of classes, and this is largely determined by the internal organization and the political forces with which each enters into the class struggle. For example, as Robert Brenner has argued, the varying patterns of development in different parts of late medieval Europe can be accounted for in large part by the differences in class organization which characterized struggles between lords and peasants in various places according to their specific historical experiences. In some cases, the struggle issued in a breakdown of the old order and old forms of surplus extraction; in others, a retrenchment of the old forms took place. These different outcomes of agrarian class conflict, argues Brenner, tended to be bound up with certain historically specific patterns of development of the contending agrarian classes and their relative strength in the different European societies: their relative levels of internal solidarity, their self-consciousness and organization, and their general political resources especially their relationships to the non-agricultural classes (in particular, potential urban class allies) and to the state (in particular, whether or not the state developed as a 'class-like' competitor of the lords for the peasants' surplus).9 Brenner illustrates how the particular form as well as the strength of political organization in the contending classes shaped relations of 9
Robert Brenner, 'Agrarian Class Structure and Economic Development in Pre-Industrial Europe', in Aston and Philpin, The Brenner Debate, p. 55.
28
Historical materialism
production: for example, how village institutions acted as a form of peasant class organization and how the development of 'independent political institutions in the village' 10 - or the lack of such institutions - affected the exploitative relations between lord and peasant. In cases like this, political organization plays a significant part in constructing relations of production. There are, then, at least two senses in which the juridical-political 'sphere' is implicated in the productive 'base'. First, a system of production always exists in the shape of specific social determinations, the particular modes of organization and domination and the forms of property in which relations of production are embodied - what might be called the 'basic' as distinct from 'superstructural' juridical-political attributes of the productive system. Second, from a historical point of view even political institutions like village and state enter directly into the constitution of production relations and are in a sense prior to them (even where these institutions are not the direct instruments of surplus appropriation), because relations of production are historically constituted by the configuration of power that determines the outcome of class conflict. THE 'ECONOMIC' AND THE 'POLITICAL' IN CAPITALISM
What, then, does it mean to say that capitalism is marked by a unique differentiation of the 'economic' sphere? It means several things: that production and distribution assume a completely 'economic' form, no longer (as Karl Polanyi put it) 'embedded' in extra-economic social relations, 11 in a system where production is generally production for exchange; that the allocation of social labour and the distribution of resources are achieved through the 'economic' mechanism of commodity exchange; that the 'economic' forces of the commodity and labour markets acquire a life of their own; that, to quote Marx, property 'receives its purely economic form by discarding all its former political and social embellishments and associations'.12 Above all, it means that the appropriation of surplus labour takes place in the 'economic' sphere by 'economic' means. In other words, surplus appropriation is achieved in ways determined by the com10 12
n Ibid., p. 42. Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation (Boston, 1957), pp. 57, 69-71. Marx, Capital in, p. 618.
The 'economic9 and the 'political' in capitalism plete separation of the producer from the conditions of labour and by the appropriator's absolute private property in the means of production. Direct 'extra-economic' pressure or overt coercion are, in principle, unnecessary to compel the expropriated labourer to give up surplus labour. Although the coercive force of the 'political' sphere is ultimately necessary to sustain private property and the power of appropriation, economic need supplies the immediate compulsion forcing the worker to transfer surplus labour to the capitalist in order to gain access to the means of production. The labourer is 'free', not in a relationship of dependence or servitude; the transfer of surplus labour and its appropriation by someone else are not conditioned by such an extra-economic relationship. The forfeit of surplus labour is an immediate condition of production itself. Capitalism in these respects differs from precapitalist forms because the latter are characterized by extraeconomic modes of surplus extraction, political, legal, or military coercion, traditional bonds or duties, etc., which demand the transfer of surplus labour to a private lord or to the state by means of labour services, rent, tax, and so on. The differentiation of the economic sphere in capitalism, then, can be summed up like this: the social functions of production and distribution, surplus extraction and appropriation, and the allocation of social labour are, so to speak, privatized and they are achieved by non-authoritative, non-political means. In other words, the social allocation of resources and labour does not, on the whole, take place by means of political direction, communal deliberation, hereditary duty, custom, or religious obligation, but rather through the mechanisms of commodity exchange. The powers of surplus appropriation and exploitation do not rest directly on relations of juridical or political dependence but are based on a contractual relation between 'free' producers —juridically free and free from the means of production - and an appropriator who has absolute private property in the means of production. To speak of the differentiation of the economic sphere in these senses is not, of course, to suggest that the political dimension is somehow extraneous to capitalist relations of production. The political sphere in capitalism has a special character because the coercive power supporting capitalist exploitation is not wielded directly by the appropriator and is not based on the producer's political or juridical subordination to an appropriating master. But a coercive
29
30
Historical materialism
power and a structure of domination remain essential, even if the ostensible freedom and equality of the exchange between capital and labour mean that the 'moment' of coercion is separate from the 'moment' of appropriation. Absolute private property, the contractual relation that binds producer to appropriator, the process of commodity exchange - all these require the legal forms, the coercive apparatus, the policing functions of the state. Historically, too the state has been essential to the process of expropriation that is the basis of capitalism. In all these senses, despite their differentiation, the economic sphere rests firmly on the political. Furthermore, the economic sphere itself has a juridical and political dimension. In one sense, the differentiation of the economic sphere means simply that the economy has its own juridical and political forms whose purpose is purely 'economic'. Absolute property, contractual relations and the legal apparatus that sustains them are the juridical conditions of capitalist production relations; and they constitute the basis of a new relation of authority, domination and subjection between appropriator and producer. The correlative of these private, economic juridical-political forms is a separate specialized public political sphere. The 'autonomy' of the capitalist state is inextricably bound up with the juridical freedom and equality of the free, purely economic exchange between free expropriated producers and the private appropriators who have absolute property in the means of production and therefore a new form of authority over the producers. This is the significance of the division of labour in which the two moments of capitalist exploitation - appropriation and coercion - are allocated separately to a private appropriating class and a specialized public coercive institution, the state: on the one hand, the 'relatively autonomous' state has a monopoly of coercive force; on the other hand, that force sustains a private 'economic' power which invests capitalist property with an authority to organize production itself— an authority probably unprecedented in its degree of control over productive activity and the human beings who engage in it. The direct political powers that capitalist proprietors have lost to the state they have gained in the direct control of production. While the 'economic' power of appropriation possessed by the capitalist is separated from the coercive political instruments that ultimately enforce it, that appropriative power is integrated more closely and directly than ever before with the authority to organize production.
The 'economic' and the 'political' in capitalism
31
Not only is the forfeit of surplus labour an immediate condition of production, but capitalist property unites to a degree probably not enjoyed by any previous appropriating class the power of surplus extraction and the capacity to organize and intensify production directly for the purposes of the appropriator. However exploitive earlier modes of production have been, however effective the means of surplus extraction available to exploiting classes, in no other system has social production answered so immediately and universally to the demands of the exploiter. At the same time, the powers of the appropriator no longer carry with them the obligation to perform social, public functions. In capitalism, there is a complete separation of private appropriation from public duties; and this means the development of a new sphere of power devoted completely to private rather than social purposes. In this respect, capitalism differs from pre-capitalist forms in which the fusion of economic and political powers meant not only that surplus extraction was an 'extra-economic 5 transaction separate from the production process itself, but also that the power to appropriate surplus labour - whether it belonged to the state or to a private lord — was bound up with the performance of military, juridical and administrative functions. In a sense, then, the differentiation of the economic and the political in capitalism is, more precisely, a differentiation of political functions themselves and their separate allocation to the private economic sphere and the public sphere of the state. This allocation separates political functions immediately concerned with the extraction and appropriation of surplus labour from those with a more general, communal purpose. This formulation, suggesting that the differentiation of the economic is in fact a differentiation within the political sphere, is in certain respects better suited to explain the unique process of Western development and the special character of capitalism. It may, then, be useful to sketch this historical process of differentiation before looking more closely at capitalism. THE HISTORICAL PROCESS OF DIFFERENTIATION I CLASS POWER AND STATE POWER
If the evolution of capitalism is viewed as a process in which an 'economic' sphere is differentiated from the 'political', an explanation of that evolution entails a theory of the state and its
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Historical materialism
development. For the purposes of this discussion, the state will be defined in very broad terms as 'the complex of institutions by means of which the power of the society is organized on a basis superior to kinship' 13 - an organization of power which means a claim 'to paramountcy in the application of naked force to social problems' and consists of'formal, specialized instruments of coercion'. 14 These instruments of coercion may or may not be intended from the outset as a means for one section of the population to oppress and exploit the rest. In either case, the state requires the performance of certain common social functions which other less comprehensive institutions - households, clans, kinship groups, etc. - cannot carry out. Whether or not the essential object of the state is to maintain exploitation, its performance of social functions implies a social division of labour and the appropriation by some social groups of surplus produced by others. It seems reasonable to suppose, then, that however this 'complex of institutions' came into being, the state emerged as a means of appropriating surplus product - perhaps even as a means of intensifying production in order to increase surplus - and as a mode of distributing that surplus in one way or another. In fact, it may be that the state - at least some form of communal or public power - was the first systematic means of surplus appropriation and perhaps even the first systematic organizer of surplus production. 15 While this conception of the state implies that the evolution of a specialized, coercive public authority necessarily entails a division between producers and appropriators, it does not mean that private appropriation is a necessary pre-condition to the emergence of such an authority. The two may develop together, and a long historical process may intervene before private appropriation clearly dissociates itself from public power. Propositions about the relation between class and state must, therefore, be cautiously formulated. It may be misleading to suggest, as Marxist arguments often seem to do, that there is a universal sequence of development in which class precedes state. What can perhaps be said is that, whichever came first, the 13 14 15
Morton Fried, The Evolution of Political Society (New York, 1968), p. 229. Ibid., p. 230. See Marshall Sahlins, Stone Age Economics (London, 1974), chaps. 2 and 3, for some illuminating suggestions about how a public authority might emerge as a means of intensifying production.
The 'economic' and the 'political' in capitalism
33
existence of a state has always implied the existence of classes although this proposition requires a definition of class capable of encompassing all divisions between direct producers and the appropriators of their surplus labour, even cases in which economic power is scarcely distinguishable from political power, where private property remains undeveloped, and where class and state are in effect one. 16 The essential point is the recognition that some of the major divergences among various historical patterns have to do with the nature and sequence of relations between public power and private appropriation. This point is especially important in identifying the distinctive characteristics of the historical path leading to capitalism, with its unprecedented degree of differentiation between the economic and the political. The long historical process that ultimately issued in capitalism could be seen as an increasing - and uniquely welldeveloped - differentiation of class power as something distinct from state power, a power of surplus extraction not directly grounded in the coercive apparatus of the state. This would also be a process in which private appropriation is increasingly divorced from the performance of communal functions. If we are to understand the unique development of capitalism, then, we must understand how property and class relations, as well as the functions of surplus appropriation and distribution, so to speak liberate themselves from - and yet are served by - the coercive institutions that constitute the state, and develop autonomously. The foundations of this argument are to be found in Marx's discussion of pre-capitalist formations and the distinctive character of capitalism in the Grundrisse and Capital, especially volume in. In the Grundrisse Marx discusses the nature of capitalism in contrast to, and as a development from, pre-capitalist forms in terms of the gradual separation of the direct producer from the natural conditions of labour. It is characteristic of pre-capitalist forms that producers remain, in one way or another, directly related to the conditions of labour, at least as possessors if not owners of the means of production. The principal case in which the direct producer is completely expropriated — the case of chattel slavery — is itself determined by the typically direct relation of the producer to the 16
Problems may emerge out of such an inclusive definition of class, not the least of which are their implications for the analysis of Soviet-type states, which have been analysed, alternatively, as autonomous from class or as a particular form of class organization.
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Historical materialism
natural conditions of labour, since the slave is seized as an accessory to captured land, rendered propertyless by military means and thus transformed into a mere condition of production. Where a division between appropriators and producers has evolved, surplus appropriation takes 'extra-economic' forms whether it be the outright coercion of master against slave, or, where the labourer remains in possession of the conditions of labour, a relationship of lordship and servitude in other forms. In one of the major pre-capitalist cases, which Marx calls the 'Asiatic', the state itself is the direct appropriator of surplus labour from producers who remain in possession of the land that they work. It is the special characteristic of capitalism that surplus appropriation and the relationship between direct producers and the appropriators of their surplus labour do not take the form of direct political domination or legal servitude; and the authority confronting the mass of direct producers appears 'only as the personification of the conditions of labour in contrast to labour, and not as political or theocratic rulers as under earlier modes of production'. 17 It is in this discussion of pre-capitalist forms and their 'political' modes of surplus extraction, in both the Grundrisse and Capital, that Marx's ill-fated conception of Asiatic societies makes its appearance. This is not the place for a full debate on this contentious issue. For the moment, what is important is that in his discussion of 'Asiatic' forms Marx considers social types in which the state is the direct and dominant means of surplus appropriation. In this sense, the 'Asiatic' type represents the polar opposite of the capitalist case, in that economic and extra-economic, class power and state power, property relations and political relations, are least differentiated: Should the direct producers not be confronted by a private landowner, but rather, as in Asia, under direct subordination to a state which stands over them as their landlord and simultaneously as sovereign, then rent and taxes coincide, or rather, there exists no tax which differs from this form of ground-rent. Under such circumstances there need exist no stronger political or economic pressure than that common to all subjection to that state. The state is then the supreme lord. Sovereignty here consists in the ownership of land concentrated on a national scale. But, on the other hand, no private ownership of land exists, although there is both private and common possession and use of land.18 17
Marx, Capital in, p. 881.
18
Ibid., p. 791.
The 'economic' and the 'political' in capitalism
35
Even if there has never been a perfect representative of this social type - for example, if there has never been a well-developed appropriating and redistributive state in the complete absence of private ownership of land - the concept must still be taken seriously. The state as the major and direct appropriator of surplus labour has certainly existed; and there is considerable evidence that this mode of surplus appropriation has been a dominant, if not universal, pattern of social development - for example, in Bronze Age Greece, as well as in the larger palace-dominated 'redistributive' economies of the ancient Near East and Asia. Whatever other characteristics Marx may have attributed to the 'Asiatic' form, this one, which has sparked the most controversy, needs to be explored for what it may reveal about the process of differentiation that concerns us here. The implication of Marx's argument is that the division between appropriators and producers - a division implied by any form of state - can take different forms, forms to which the notion of 'class' can be applied only with great caution when there is no clearly differentiated 'economic' power. It is, of course, true that only in capitalist society is the economic power of class completely differentiated from extra-economic powers; and there is no intention here of arguing that there is class only in capitalist social formations. But it does at least seem important to recognize the polar extremes: the capitalist mode, in which the differentiation has taken place, and one in which — as in certain bureaucratic, palace-dominated 'redistributive' states of the ancient world - the state itself, as the major direct appropriator of surplus product, is both class and state at once. Marx sometimes appears to suggest that, in the latter case, the dynamic of history has been inhibited, if property and class do not break free and develop autonomously from the 'hypertrophied' state. But to speak here of an 'inhibited' historical process may be misleading, if it implies that the course of development leading to capitalism - which Marx traces from ancient Graeco-Roman civilization through Western feudalism to capitalism - has been the rule rather than the exception in world history and that all other historical experiences have been aberrations. Since Marx's primary object is to explain the unique development of capitalism in the West, and not its 'failure' to evolve 'spontaneously' elsewhere, his project itself implies that - despite some apparently ethnocentric
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Historical materialism
assumptions - for him it is the achievement not the 'failure' that must be accounted for. At any rate, the particular dynamic of the 'Asiatic' form, as Marx's argument implies, may be more common than the movement set in train by the ancient, Graeco-Roman form. If the primitive state was the controller of economic resources and the major appropriator and distributor of surplus product, the advanced 'Asiatic' state may represent a more or less natural development out of that primitive form - the appropriating redistributive public power at its highest stage of development. Seen in this light, it is not so much the 'hypertrophy' of the 'Asiatic' state that needs to be explained. What requires explanation is the aberrant, uniquely 'autonomous' development of the economic sphere that eventually issued in capitalism. 19 FEUDALISM AND PRIVATE PROPERTY
The capitalist organization of production can be viewed as the outcome of a long process in which certain political powers were gradually transformed into economic powers and transferred to a separate sphere. 20 The organization of production under the authority of capital presupposes the organization of production and the assembling of a labour force under the authority of earlier forms of 19
20
Ernest Mandel has criticized writers like Maurice Godelier for extending the meaning of the 'Asiatic mode of production' to include both social formations in the process of transition from classless society to class state and advanced bureaucratic empires with 'hypertrophied' states (Mandel, The Formation of the Economic Thought of Karl Marx [London, 1971], p p . 124 ff.). While M a n d e l is correct to warn against obscuring the differences between, say, simple African kingdoms a n d complex states like that of ancient Egypt, Godelier's formulation is intended to emphasize the continuities between early forms of appropriative a n d redistributive public authorities a n d the advanced 'hypertrophied' state in order to stress that it is the Western case, with its 'autonomous' development of private property a n d class, which needs to be explained. Mandel often talks about the development of capitalism as if it were natural while other historical trajectories have been stunted or obstructed. I would now emphasize the specificity of capitalist development much more than I did when I first wrote this essay. Although I would still say that the particular characteristics of Western feudalism I a m outlining here were a necessary condition of capitalism, I would now also stress their insufficiency. Capitalism seems to me only one of several paths out of Western feudalism (quite apart from the variations within feudalism), which occurred in the first instance in England, in contrast, for example, to the Italian city-republics or French absolutism. These are themes I hope to take u p in the future, but for a discussion of the contrast between English capitalism a n d French absolutism, see my The Pristine Culture of Capitalism: A Historical Essay on Old Regime and Modern States (London, 1991).
The 'economic3 and the 'political3 in capitalism
37
private property. The process by which this authority of private property asserted itself, uniting the power of appropriation with the authority to organize production in the hands of a private proprietor for his own benefit, can be viewed as the privatization of political power. The supremacy of absolute private property appears to have established itself in large part by means of political devolution, the assumption by private proprietors of functions originally invested in a public or communal authority. Again, the opposition of the 'Asiatic' mode of production at one extreme and the capitalist mode at the other helps to place this devolutionary process in perspective. From this point of view, the crucial issue is not the presence or absence of private property in land as such. China, for example, had well-established private landed property from a very early stage; and, in any case, some form of property in land was often a perquisite of office in the 'Asiatic' state. The important point is the relation between private property and political power, and its consequences for the organization of production and the relation between appropriator and producer. The unique characteristic of Western development in this respect is that it is marked by the earliest and most complete transfer of political power to private property, and therefore also the most thorough, generalized, and direct subservience of production to the demands of an appropriating class. The peculiarities of Western feudalism shed light on the whole process. Feudalism is often described as a fragmentation or 'parcellization' of state power; but while this description certainly identifies an essential characteristic, it is not specific enough. Forms of state power vary, and different forms of state power are likely to be differently fragmented. Western feudalism resulted from the fragmentation of a very particular form of political power. It is not here simply a matter of fragmentation or parcellization but also ofprivatization. The state power whose fragmentation produced Western feudalism had already been substantially privatized, located in private property. The form of imperial administration that preceded feudalism in the West, built upon the foundations of a state already grounded in private property and class rule, was unique in that imperial power was exercised not so much through a hierarchy of bureaucratic officials in the manner of the 'Asiatic' state, but through what has been described as a confederation of local aristocracies, a municipal system dominated by local private proprietors
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Historical materialism
whose property endowed them with political authority as well as the power of surplus appropriation. This mode of administration was associated with a particular kind of relationship between appropriators and producers, especially in the Western Empire where there were no remnants of an older redistributive-bureaucratic state organization. The relationship between appropriators and producers was in principle a relationship between individuals, the owners of private property and the individuals whose labour they appropriated, the latter directly subject to the former. Even taxation by the central state was mediated by the municipal system; and the imperial aristocracy was notable for the degree to which it relied more on private property than on office for the accumulation of great wealth. If in practice the landlord's control over production was indirect and tenuous, this still represents a significant contrast to early bureaucratic forms in which typically producers were more directly subject to an appropriating state acting through the medium of its officials. With the dissolution of the Roman Empire (and the repeated failures of successor states), the imperial state was in effect broken into fragments in which political and economic powers were united in the hands of private lords whose political, juridical and military functions were at the same time instruments of private appropriation and the organization of production. The decentralization of the Imperial state was accompanied by the decline of chattel slavery and its replacement by new forms of dependent labour. Slaves and formerly independent peasants began to converge toward conditions of dependence, in which the economic relationship between individual private appropriator and individual producer was at the same time a political relationship between a 'fragment' of the state and its subject. In other words, each basic 'fragment' of the state was at the same time a productive unit in which production was organized under the authority and for the benefit of a private proprietor. Although in comparison to the later developments of capitalism the power of the feudal lord to direct production remained far from complete, a considerable step had been taken toward the integration of surplus extraction and the organization of production.21 21
Cf. Rodney Hilton's discussion of the limited control exercised in practice by feudal lords over the productive process, in 'A Crisis of Feudalism', Past and Present, no. 80 (August 1978), pp. 9-10. It should be noted, however, that in stressing the limited nature of feudal
The 'economic3 and the 'political3 in capitalism The fact that the property of the feudal lord was not 'absolute' but 'conditional' does not alter the fact that feudalism represents a great advance in the authority of private property. In fact, the conditional nature of feudal property was in a sense a hallmark of its strength, not a sign of weakness, since the condition on which the lord held his land was that he must become a fragment of the state invested with the very functions that gave him the power of surplus extraction. The coincidence of the political unit with the unit of property meant also a greater coincidence between the unit of appropriation and the unit of production, so that production could be organized more directly in the interests of the private appropriator. The fragmentation of the state, the fact that feudal relations were at once a method of governing and a mode of exploitation, also meant that many free farmers now became subject with their properties to private masters, forfeiting surplus labour in exchange for personal protection, in a relationship of dependence that was both political and economic. As many more independent producers were brought into dependence, more production fell within the scope of direct, personal exploitation and class relations. The particular nature of the exploitive relation in feudalism and the fragmentation of the state also, of course, affected the configuration of class power, eventually making it both more desirable - in some respects, even necessary - and more possible for private appropriators to expropriate direct producers. The essential characteristic of feudalism, then, was a privatization of political power which meant a growing integration of private appropriation with the authoritative organization of production. The eventual development of capitalism out of the feudal system perfected this privatization and integration - by the complete expropriation of the direct producer and the establishment of absolute private property. At the same time, these developments had as their necessary condition a new and stronger form of centralized public power. The state divested the appropriating class of direct political powers and duties not immediately concerned with production and appropriation, leaving them with private exploitative powers purified of public, social functions. lordship, Hilton is not comparing feudalism to other pre-capitalist formations, but, at least implicitly, to capitalism, where the appropriator's direct control of production is more complete because of the expropriation of the direct producer, and the collective, concentrated nature of capitalist production.
39
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Historical materialism
CAPITALISM AS THE PRIVATIZATION OF POLITICAL POWER
It may seem perverse to suggest that capitalism represents the ultimate privatization of political power. This proposition on the face of it runs directly counter to the description of capitalism as uniquely characterized by a differentiation of the economic and the political. The intention of this description is, among other things, precisely to contrast capitalism to the 'parcellization' of state power which unites private political and economic power in the hands of the feudal lord. It is, after all, capitalism that is marked not only by a specialized economic sphere and economic modes of surplus extraction but also by a central state with an unprecedented public character. Capitalism is uniquely capable of maintaining private property and the power of surplus extraction without the proprietor wielding direct political power in the conventional sense. The state - which stands apart from the economy even though it intervenes in it - can ostensibly (notably, by means of universal suffrage) belong to everyone, producer and appropriator, without usurping the exploitive power of the appropriator. The expropriation of the direct producer simply makes certain direct political powers less immediately necessary to surplus extraction. This is exactly what it means to say that the capitalist has economic rather than extra-economic powers of exploitation. Overcoming the 'privatization' of political power may even be an essential condition for the transformation of the labour process and the forces of production which is the distinguishing characteristic of capitalism. For example, as Robert Brenner has argued where the direct application of force is the condition for ruling-class surplus-extraction, the very difficulties of increasing productive potential through the improvement of the productive forces may encourage the expenditure of surplus to enhance precisely the capacity for the application of force. In this way, the ruling class can increase its capacity to exploit the direct producers, or acquire increased means of production (land, labour, tools) through military methods. Rather than being accumulated, the economic surplus is here systematically diverted from reproduction to unproductive labour.22
22
Robert Brenner, 'The Origins of Capitalism', New Left Review, 104 (1977), p. 37.
The 'economic3 and the 'political9 in capitalism On the other hand, there is another sense in which private 'political' power is an essential condition of capitalist production and, in fact, the form assumed by the 'autonomy' of the economic sphere. The capitalist is, of course, subject to the imperatives of accumulation and competition which oblige him to expand surplus value; and the labourer is bound to the capitalist not simply by the latter's personal authority but by the laws of the market which dictate the sale of labour power. In these senses, it is the 'autonomous' laws of the economy and capital 'in the abstract' that exercise power, not the capitalist wilfully imposing his personal authority upon labour. But what the 'abstract' laws of capitalist accumulation compel the capitalist to do - and what the impersonal laws of the labour market enable him to do - is precisely to exercise an unprecedented degree of control over production. 'The law of capitalist accumulation, metamorphosed by economists into pretended [sic] law of nature, in reality merely states that the very nature of accumulation excludes every diminution in the degree of exploitation';23 and this means firm command of the labour process, even an internal legal code, to ensure the reduction of necessary labour time and the production of maximum surplus value within a fixed period of work. The need for a 'directing authority', as Marx explains, is intensified in capitalist production both by the highly socialized, cooperative nature of production - a condition of its high productivity - and by the antagonistic nature of an exploitive relationship based on the demand for maximum extraction of surplus value. Capitalist production truly begins, argues Marx, when each individual capital employs simultaneously a comparatively large number of labourers; when consequently the labour-process is carried on on an extensive scale and yields, relatively, large quantities of products. A greater number of labourers working together at the same time, in one place (or, if you will, in the same field of labour), in order to produce the same sort of commodity under the mastership of one capitalist, constitutes, both historically and logically, the starting point of capitalist production.24 A fundamental condition of this transformation is capital's control of the labour process. In other words, a specifically capitalist form of production begins when direct 'political' power is introduced into the production process itself, as a basic condition of production: 'By 23 24
M a r x , Capital i, p . 582. Ibid., p . 305. Capitalist production, however, presupposes capitalist social relations. See below, p. 136 n. 35.
41
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Historical materialism
the cooperation of numerous wage-labourers, the sway of capital develops into a requisite for carrying on the labour process itself, into a real requisite of production. That a capitalist should command on the field of production is now as indispensable as that a general should command on the field of battle.' 25 In pre-capitalist societies, cooperative production was simple and sporadic, though sometimes it had, as Marx puts it, 'colossal effects', for example, under the command of Asiatic and Egyptian kings or Etruscan theocrats. The special characteristic of capitalism is its systematic and continuous cooperative production. The political significance of this development in production is expressed by Marx himself: ' This power of Asiatic and Egyptian kings, Etruscan theocrats, etc., has in modern society been transferred to the capitalist, whether he be an
isolated, or as in joint-stock companies, a collective capitalist.' 26 The issue here is not whether capitalist control is more 'despotic' than the harsh personal authoritarianism of the slave driver with whip in hand; nor whether capitalist exploitation is more oppressive than the demands of a rent-hungry feudal lord. The degree of control exercised by capital over production is not necessarily dependent upon its degree of'despotism'. To some extent, control is imposed not by personal authority but by the impersonal exigencies of machine production and the technical integration of the labour process (though this can be exaggerated and, in any case, the need for technical integration is itself to a great extent imposed by the compulsions of capitalist accumulation and the demands of the appropriator). While capital, with its absolute property in the means of production, has at its disposal new forms of purely 'economic' coercion - such as the power to dismiss workers or close plants - the nature of its control of the labour process is in part conditioned by its lack of direct coercive force. The intricate and hierarchical organization and supervision of the labour process as a means of increasing surplus in production is a substitute for a coercive power of surplus extraction. The nature of the free working class is also such that new forms of workers' organization and resistance are built into the production process. In any case, capitalist control, in different circumstances, can be exercised in ways ranging from the most 'despotic' organization 25
Ibid., p. 313.
26
Ibid., p. 316. Emphasis added.
The 'economic' and the 'political' in capitalism
43
(e.g., 'Taylorism') to varying degrees of'workers' control' (though the pressures against the latter inherent in the structure of capitalist accumulation should not be underestimated). But whatever specific forms capitalist control may take its essential conditions remain: in no other system of production is work so thoroughly disciplined and organized, and no other organization of production is so directly responsive to the demands of appropriation. There are, then, two critical points about the capitalist organization of production which help to account for the peculiar character of the 'political' in capitalist society and to situate the economy in the political arena: first, the unprecedented degree to which the organization of production is integrated with the organization of appropriation; and second, the scope and generality of that integration, the virtually universal extent to which production in society as a whole comes under the control of the capitalist appropriator. 27 The corollary of these developments in production is that the appropriator relinquishes direct political power in the conventional, public sense, and loses many of the traditional forms of personal control over the lives of labourers outside the immediate production process which were available to pre-capitalist appropriators. New forms of indirect class control pass into the 'impersonal' hands of the state. At the same time, if capitalism - with its juridically free working class and its impersonal economic powers - removes many spheres of personal and social activity from direct class control, human life generally is drawn more firmly than ever into the orbit of the production process. Directly or indirectly, the demands and 27
Chattel slavery is the pre-capitalist form of class exploitation about which it might most convincingly be argued that the exploiter exercises a continuous and direct control over production; but leaving aside the many questions surrounding the nature and degree of the slave-owner's control of the labour process, one thing is clear: that even among the very few societies in which slavery has been widespread in production, it has never come close to the generality of wage labour in advanced capitalist societies but has always been accompanied, and possibly exceeded, by other forms of production. For example, in the Roman Empire, where ancient slavery reached its culmination in the slave latifundia, peasant producers still outnumbered slaves. Even if independent producers were subject to various forms of surplus extraction, large sections of production remained outside the scope of direct control by an exploiting class. It can be argued, too, that this was not accidental; that the nature of slave production made its generalization impossible; that not the least obstacle to its further expansion was its dependence on direct coercion and military power; and that, conversely, the uniquely universal character of capitalist production and its capacity to subordinate virtually all production to the demands of exploitation is inextricably bound up with the differentiation of the economic and the political.
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Historical materialism
discipline of capitalist production, imposed by the exigencies of capitalist appropriation, competition and accumulation, bring within their sphere of influence - and thus under the sway of capital - an enormous range of activity and exercise an unprecedented control over the organization of time, within and without the production process. These developments betoken the existence of a differentiated economic sphere and economic laws, but their full significance may be obscured by viewing them only in this light. It is at least as important to regard them as a transformation of the political sphere. In one sense, the integration of production and appropriation represents the ultimate 'privatization' of politics, since functions formerly associated with a coercive political power - centralized or 'parcellized' - are now firmly lodged in the private sphere, as functions of a private appropriating class relieved of obligations to fulfil larger social purposes. In another sense, it represents the expulsion of politics from spheres in which it has always been directly involved. Direct political coercion is excluded from the process of surplus extraction and removed to a state that generally intervenes only indirectly in the relations of production, and surplus extraction ceases to be an immediately political issue. This means that the focus of class struggle necessarily changes. As always, the disposition of surplus labour remains the central issue of class conflict; but now, that issue is no longer distinguishable from the organization of production. The struggle over appropriation appears not as a political struggle but as a battle over the terms and conditions of work. THE LOCALIZATION OF GLASS STRUGGLE
Throughout most of history, the central issues in class struggle have been surplus extraction and appropriation, not production. Capitalism is unique in its concentration of class struggle 'at the point of production', because it is only in capitalism that the organization of production and of appropriation so completely coincide. It is also unique in its transformation of struggles over appropriation into apparently non-political contests. For example, while the wage struggle in capitalism may be perceived as merely 'economic' ('economism'), the same is not true of the rent struggle waged by medieval peasants, even though the issue in both cases is the disposition of surplus labour and its relative distribution between direct
The 'economic' and the 'political' in capitalism
45
producers and exploiting appropriators. However fierce the struggle over wages may be, the wage relationship itself, as Marx points out, remains intact: the basis of the appropriator's extractive powers - the status of his property and the propertylessness of the labourer - are not immediately at stake. Struggles over rent, wherever appropriation rests on 'extra-economic' powers, tend more immediately to implicate property rights, political powers and jurisdictions. Class conflict in capitalism tends to be encapsulated within the individual unit of production, and this gives class struggle a special character. Each individual plant, a highly organized and integrated unity with its own hierarchy and structure of authority, contains within it the main sources of class conflict. At the same time class struggle enters directly into the organization of production: that is, the management of antagonistic relations of production is inseparable from the management of the production process itself. While class conflict remains an integral part of the production process which it must not disrupt, class struggle must be domesticated. Class conflict generally breaks into open war only when it goes outdoors, particularly since the coercive arm of capital is outside the wall of the productive unit. This means that when there are violent confrontations, they are usually not directly between capital and labour. It is not capital itself but the state that conducts class conflict when it intermittently breaks outside the walls and takes a more violent form. The armed power of capital usually remains in the background; and when class domination makes itself felt as a direct and personal coercive force, it appears in the guise of an 'autonomous' and 'neutral' state. The transformation of political into economic conflicts and the location of struggles at the point of production also tend to make class struggle in capitalism local and particularistic. In this respect, the organization of capitalist production itself resists the workingclass unity which capitalism is supposed to encourage. On the one hand, the nature of the capitalist economy - its national, even supra-national, character, the interdependence of its constituent parts, the homogenization of work produced by the capitalist labour process - make both necessary and possible a working-class consciousness and class organization on a mass scale. This is the aspect of capitalism's effects on class consciousness that Marxist theory has so often emphasized. On the other hand, the development
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of this consciousness and this organization must take place against the centrifugal force of capitalist production and its privatization of political issues. The consequences of this centrifugal effect, if not adequately accounted for by theories of class consciousness, have often been remarked upon by observers of industrial relations who have noted the growing rather than declining importance of 'domestic' struggles in contemporary capitalism. While the concentration of working-class battles on the domestic front may detract from the political and universal character of these struggles, it does not necessarily imply a declining militancy. The paradoxical effect of capitalism's differentiation of the economic and the political is that militancy and political consciousness have become separate issues. It is worth considering, by contrast, that modern revolutions have tended to occur where the capitalist mode of production has been less developed; where it has coexisted with older forms of production, notably peasant production; where 'extra-economic' compulsion has played a greater role in the organization of production and the extraction of surplus labour; and where the state has acted not only as a support for appropriating classes but as something like a pre-capitalist appropriator in its own right - in short, where economic struggle has been inseparable from political conflict and where the state, as a more visibly centralized and universal class enemy, has served as a focus for mass struggle. Even in more developed capitalist societies, mass militancy tends to emerge in response to 'extra-economic' compulsion, particularly in the form of oppressive action by the state, and also varies in proportion to the state's involvement in conflicts over the terms and conditions of work. These considerations again raise questions about the sense in which it is appropriate to regard working-class 'economism' in advanced capitalist societies as reflecting an undeveloped state of class consciousness, as many socialists do. Seen from the perspective of historical process, it can be said to represent a more, rather than a less, advanced stage of development. If this stage is to be surpassed in turn, it is important to recognize that the so-called 'economism' of working-class attitudes does not so much reflect a lack of political consciousness as an objective shift in the location of politics, a change in the arena and the objects of political struggle inherent in the very structure of capitalist production.
The 'economic' and the 'political3 in capitalism These are some of the ways in which capitalist production tends to transform 'political' into 'economic' struggles. There are, it is true, certain trends in contemporary capitalism that may work to counteract these tendencies. The national and international integration of the advanced capitalist economy increasingly shifts the problems of capitalist accumulation from the individual enterprise to the 'macro-economic' sphere. It is possible that capital's powers of appropriation, which the state has so far left intact, indeed reproduced and reinforced, will be subverted by capital's own growing need for the state - not only to facilitate capitalist planning, to assume liabilities or to conduct and contain class conflict, but also to perform the social functions abandoned by the appropriating class, indeed to counteract its anti-social effects. At the same time, if capital in its mounting crises demands, and obtains, the state's complicity in its anti-social purposes, that state may increasingly become a prime target of resistance in advanced capitalist countries, as it has been in every successful modern revolution. The effect of this may be to overcome the particularism and the 'economism' imposed on the class struggle by the capitalist system of production, with its differentiation of the economic and the political. In any case, the strategic lesson to be learned from the transfer of 'political' issues to the 'economy' is not that class struggles ought to be primarily concentrated in the economic sphere or 'at the point of production'. Nor does the division of'political' functions between class and state mean that power in capitalism is so diffused throughout civil society that the state ceases to have any specific and privileged role as a locus of power and a target of political action, nor, alternatively, that everything is the 'state'. Indeed, the opposite is true. The division of labour between class and state means not so much that power is diffuse, but, on the contrary, that the state, which represents the coercive 'moment' of capitalist class domination, embodied in the most highly specialized, exclusive, and centralized monopoly of social force, is ultimately the decisive point of concentration for all power in society. Struggles at the point of production, then, even in their economic aspects as struggles over the terms of sale of labour power or over the conditions of work, remain incomplete as long as they do not extend to the locus of power on which capitalist property, with its control of production and appropriation, ultimately rests. At the same time, purely 'political' battles, over the power to govern and rule, remain
47
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unfinished until they implicate not only the institutions of the state but the political powers that have been privatized and transferred to the economic sphere. In this sense, the very differentiation of the economic and the political in capitalism - the symbiotic division of labour between class and state - is precisely what makes the unity of economic and political struggles essential, and what ought to make socialism and democracy synonymous.
CHAPTER 2
Rethinking base and superstructure
The base/superstructure metaphor has always been more trouble than it is worth. Although Marx himself used it very rarely and only in the most aphoristic and allusive formulations, it has been made to bear a theoretical weight far beyond its limited capacities. To some extent, the problems already inherent in its original short-hand usage were aggravated by Engels' tendency to use language suggesting the compartmentalization of self-enclosed spheres or 'levels' economic, political, ideological - whose relations with one another were external. But the real problems began with the establishment of Stalinist orthodoxies which elevated - or reduced - the metaphor to the first principle of Marxist-Leninist dogma, asserting the supremacy of a self-contained economic sphere over other passively reflexive subordinate spheres. More particularly, the economic sphere tended to be conceived as more or less synonymous with the technical forces of production, operating according to intrinsic natural laws of technological progress, so that history became a more or less mechanical process of technological development. These deformations of Marx's original historical-materialist insights have fixed the terms of Marxist debate ever since. Both sides of the various disputes that have raged among Marxists in the past several decades have been effectively locked into this theoretical grid. Sometimes there has been a tendency to treat the deformations as the Marxist gospel, and to accept or reject Marxism accordingly. Anyone (like E.P. Thompson) working somewhere in the fissures between the alternatives presented by this theoretical framework is likely to be badly misunderstood by supporters and critics alike, or to be dismissed as an anomaly, a theoretical impossibility. Objections to the base/superstructure metaphor have generally concerned its 'reductionism', both its denial of human agency and its failure to accord a proper place to 'superstructural' factors, to 49
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consciousness as embodied in ideology, culture or politics. Corrections to this reductionism have most commonly taken the form of a so-called Marxist 'humanism', or else an emphasis on the 'relative autonomy' of the 'levels' of society, their mutual interaction, and a deferral of determination by the 'economic' to 'the last instance'. One of the most important developments in contemporary Western Marxist theory, the structuralist Marxism of Althusser, rejected the humanist option and elaborated the other in a number of peculiar and theoretically sophisticated ways. Faced with a choice between a simplistic and mechanical base/ superstructure model, on the one hand, and apparently unstructured 'human agency', on the other, Althusser and his adherents found an ingenious solution. They redefined the relations between base and superstructure in such a way that the vagaries of human agency could be 'rigorously' excluded from the science of society, insisting on completely 'structural' determinations, while at the same time allowing for the unpredictable specificity of historical reality. This they achieved by a certain amount of conceptual trickery; for while a rigid determinism prevailed in the realm of social structure, it turned out that this realm belonged for all practical purposes to the sphere of pure theory, while the real, empirical world - albeit of little interest to most Althusserian theoreticists - remained (all explicit denunciations of contingency notwithstanding) effectively contingent and irreducibly particular. The critical Althusserian distinction between 'mode of production' and 'social formation' illustrates the point. The structurally determined mode of production simply does not exist empirically, while the actually existing social formation is particular, 'conjunctural', and capable of combining the various modes of production, and even various 'relatively (absolutely?) autonomous' structural levels, in an infinite number of indeterminate ways. The consequences of this simple dualism between the determinism of structuralist theory and the contingency to which it relegated history were disguised by the fact that Althusserians wrote very little history, but also by the deceptive rigour of their ventures into the empirical world, where simple description was dressed up as theoretically rigorous causal explanation through the medium of infinitely expandable taxonomic categories derived from the theory of structure.
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Althusserian Marxism, then, did little to shift the terms of Marxist theoretical debate decisively away from the terrain established by Stalinist orthodoxy. The base/superstructure model retained its mechanical character and its conceptualization of social structure in terms of discrete, discontinuous, externally related 'factors', 'levels' or 'instances', even if the mechanically deterministic relation between the base and its superstructural reflections was rendered effectively inoperative in the real world by the rigid separation between structure and history and by the indefinite postponement of economic determination to an unforeseeable 'last instance'. The structuralist conceptual apparatus also tended to encourage the kind of separation of the 'economic' from the 'social' and 'historical' which often entails the identification of the 'economic' with technology; and it is not surprising to find Marxists of structuralist persuasion looking to technological determinism to supply the historical dynamism missing from their view of the world as a series of discontinuous, self-enclosed and static structures. For the time being, then, without abandoning the false alternatives of the debates surrounding Stalinism, Marxists could have their cake and eat it too. They could eschew 'crude economism' or 'vulgar reductionism' without abandoning the crudely mechanical model of base and superstructure. All that was required was that they adopt the sharp Althusserian dualism between structure and history, absolute determinism and irreducible contingency. And despite the Althusserian contempt for 'empiricism' - or precisely because of it (at least, precisely because of the conceptual dualism on which it was based) - it was in principle even possible to engage in the purest theory and the most unalloyed empiricism at once. Yet it was only a matter of time before this uneasy synthesis fell apart. It soon turned out that Althusserianism had simply replaced - or supplemented - the old false alternatives with new ones. Marxists had been offered a choice between structure and history, absolute determinism and irreducible contingency, pure theory and unalloyed empiricism. It is not surprising, then, that the purest theoreticists of the Althusserian school became the most unalloyed empiricists of the post-Althusserian generation, at least in theory. In the work of writers like Hindess and Hirst, formerly the most rabid of anti-'historicists' and anti-'empiricists', the absolute and unconditional determinations of structure gave way to the absolute and
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irreducible contingency of the particular 'conjuncture'. 1 The 'postMarxist' assertion of the 'non-correspondence' between the economic and the political - as well as the abandonment of class politics which this implies - the rejection not only of the crude base/superstructure model but also of the complex historical materialist insights for which that unfortunate metaphor was intended to stand is thus simply the other side of the Althusserian coin. The result has been a completely distorted framework of debate which threatens to exclude Marx himself from the range of theoretical possibility. According to the 'post-Marxist' frame of reference, it is simply not possible, for example, to reject 'crude economism' generally conceived as technological determinism - and still to believe in class politics, the centrality of class conflict in history or the primacy of the working class in the struggle for socialism. If a united, revolutionary working class does not emerge full grown from the natural development of productive forces in capitalism, there is no organic or 'privileged' connection between the working class and socialism, or indeed between economic conditions and political forces. In other words, again, where there is no simple, absolute and mechanical determination, there is absolute contingency. So much for Marx and historical materialism. And so much, too, for Edward Thompson; for perhaps more than anyone else, he has fallen through the cracks of Marxist debate in recent years because he fails to match any of the recognized alternatives. This is, of course, not to say that he has been ignored, discounted or undervalued, but rather that both his critics and his admirers have often misrepresented him by forcing him into one of the available categories. In the opposition between 'crude economism' and 'Marxist humanism', he must be a humanist for whom economic laws give way to an arbitrary human will and agency. In the debate between Althusserians and culturalists, he is a - even the original - culturalist, for whom structural determinations are dissolved in 'experience'. And in current debates, he is perhaps equally likely to be misappropriated by the philosophers of 'discourse', relegated to the camp of'class reductionists', or else dismissed as a theoretical anomaly who, while showing a healthy disdain for 'crude economism' and an appreciation of ideology and culture, still retains 1
These bald assertions about Hindess, Hirst el al. are developed at greater length in my book, The Retreal from Class (London, 1986).
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an irrational belief in the centrality of class. To some extent he invited these distorting classifications by allowing himself to be trapped in the prevailing terms of debate; but in his explicit pronouncements on theoretical matters, and even more in his historiographical practice, can be found the lost threads of a Marxist tradition which these false choices have systematically hidden from view. MODES OF PRODUCTION AND SOCIAL FORMATIONS
Let us approach the question as it were from behind, with Thompson's controversial criticisms of Althusser and in particular his remarks on the Althusserian conceptions of mode of production and social formation. In The Poverty of Theory, Thompson accused Althusser of identifying the mode of production with the social formation - for example, the capitalist mode of production with capitalism - so that an abstract though not crudely economistic account of the laws of capital comes to stand for 'a social formation in the totality of its relations'. 2 In other words, Althusser, like Marx in his 'Grundrisse face', was accused by Thompson of treating capital virtually as a Hegelian Idea unfolding itself in history and embodying within itself the whole of capitalist society, 'capital in the totality of its relations'. This criticism, as it stands, was rather ill-judged; for as Perry Anderson pointed out, Althusser and Balibar took up the concept of social formation, deliberately distinguishing it from 'mode of production', precisely in order to correct the 'constant confusion in Marxist literature between the social formation and its economic infrastructure'. 3 The concept 'social formation' was adopted by the Althusserians in preference to 'society' - a concept that 'suggested a deceptive simplicity and unity . . . the Hegelian notion of a circular, expressive totality' as a forcible reminder that the diversity of human practices in any society is irreducible to economic practice alone. The issue it addressed was precisely that which gives rise to Thompson's anxieties about base and superstructure: the difference between the bare economic structures of 'capital' and the intricate fabric of social, political, cultural and moral life of (French or English or American) capitalism. 4 2 3
4
E.P. Thompson, The Poverty of Theory (London, 1978), p. 346. Perry Anderson, Arguments Within English Marxism (London, 1980), p. 67.
Ibid.I p. 68 .
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In other words, argued Anderson, Thompson had 'contrived to convict his opponents of an error which they were the first to name'. And yet, there remains an important sense in which Thompson was right, because the very form in which the distinction between mode of production and social formation was drawn by Althusser and Balibar reinforced rather than corrected the confusion. In part, their correction simply reproduced the very mistakes in the base/ superstructure metaphor which it was intended to correct; in part, they deprived the metaphor of precisely those valuable insights which it was intended to convey. The 'mode of production' as conceived by Althusserians has theoretically inscribed within it an entire social structure, containing various 'levels', economic, political, ideological. In the case of Althusser and Balibar themselves, it may not be so clear that the concept 'mode of production' is actually synonymous with that totality, but it certainly constitutes the basis from which a social totality - 'capitalism' in the totality of its economic, political and ideological relations - can be theoretically generated. In other prominent theorists of Althusserian provenance - notably Nicos Poulantzas - the 'mode of production' itself explicitly stands for the totality: By mode ofproduction we shall designate not what is generally marked out as the economic (i.e. relations of production in the strict sense), but a specific combination of various structures and practices which, in combination, appear as so many instances or levels, i.e. as so many regional structures of this mode. A mode of production, as Engels stated schematically, is composed of different levels or instances, the economic, political, ideological and theoretical.5 The concept of'social formation' as used by these theoreticians is not intended to deny this relation between the mode of production and the social totality embodied in it - it is not, for example, intended to deny that the capitalist mode of production (CMP) equals capitalism in the totality of its relations. Instead, the concept of social formation simply implies that no historically existing indi5
Nicos Poulantzas, Poltical Power and Social Classes (London, 1973), p. 15. There is, incidentally, little justification for Poulantzas' appeal to Engels' authority for this conception of the mode of production. Engels' reference to 'factors' or 'elements' - however much it may have contributed to the treatment of the 'economic', the 'political', etc., as spatially separate and self-enclosed spheres or 'levels' - applies to the various forces which together determine the history of any social whole; but it does not appear in the definition of the 'mode of production' itself.
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vidual social entity is 'pure'; for example, no existing society represents the CMP pure and simple. Or, to put it another way, 'The mode of production constitutes an abstract-formal object which does not exist in the strong sense in reality.' 6 Only impure 'social formations' actually exist, and these will contain several coexisting modes of production with all their constitutent 'levels', or even several 'relatively autonomous' fragments of modes of production. The various elements comprising a social formation may even be out of phase with one another. So rigidly determined and monolithic structural relations between self-enclosed economic and superstructural levels continue to exist in the theoretically constructed mode of production; but in the historical world, this structural bloc can be fragmented and recombined in an infinite number of ways. It is as if'real, concrete' historical social formations are composed of elements whose inner structural logic is theoretically determined, while historical processes simply break up and recombine these elements in various (arbitrary and contingent?) ways. Historical analysis can, then, do little more than describe and classify the combinations of modes of production and fragments of modes of production that constitute any given social formation. The practical consequences of this theoretical framework are vividly illustrated by Poulantzas's approach to the problem of politics in capitalist society. Having established the principle that an entire social structure - with economic, political, ideological and theoretical levels - is embodied in the 'abstract-formal' mode of production, he proceeds theoretically to construct the 'political instance' of the CMP and to produce a 'type' of state structurally befitting this mode of production. This involves the theoretical construction of connections between the state and different levels of the mode of production, as well as an elaboration of characteristics specific to the capitalist 'type' of state. The effect of this argument is paradoxical. The implication seems to be that the connection among 'levels' of a mode of production, and specifically the correspondence between the CMP and the capitalist 'type' of state, is 'abstract-formal' rather than 'realconcrete', that the components of a mode of production may be related 'structurally' but not necessarily historically. On the one 6
Ibid.
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hand, then, structural logic overwhelms historical fact. On the other hand, it appears that the relations that actually do prevail between the state and the mode of production in historically existing social formations may have little to do with this structural logic and appear almost accidental. The parts of a mode of production, which may be related by an ineluctable structural logic in the 'abstractformal' realm, can be easily detached from one another in historical reality. A state is capitalist, then, not by virtue of its connection to capitalist relations of production but by virtue of certain structural characteristics derived by autonomous theoretical construction from an abstract formal CMP. Thus, it is possible to say that a social formation in which capitalist relations of production do not yet prevail may nevertheless be characterized by a 'capitalist* state. This is, in fact, how Poulantzas describes European absolutism. 7 The absolutist state is designated as a capitalist type of state not because of any actual relation it bears to underlying capitalist relations of production (Poulantzas is at pains to stress that capitalist relations are very rudimentary at this stage) but because it displays certain formal structural characteristics which he has, more or less arbitrarily, established as corresponding in theory to the CMP. 8 There is in these theoretical principles both too much rigid determinism and too much arbitrariness and contingency - that is, too much abstract, almost idealist, theoretical determination and not enough historical causality. On the one hand, the mechanical simplifications of the base/superstructure model have been left intact; on the other hand, the critical questions indicated by that 7 8
Ibid., pp. 157-67. Treating absolutism as somehow a foretaste of capitalism, or as a reflection of a temporary balance between a declining feudal class and a rising bourgeoisie, has been a common practice among Marxists which reflects a tendency to beg the question of the transition from feudalism to capitalism by assuming the existence of capitalism somewhere in the interstices of feudalism, just waiting to be released. This procedure of assuming precisely what needs to be explained is especially pronounced in structuralist Marxism, where bits of any or all modes of production can, as required, be assumed to be present, without explanation and without process, in any social formation, simply waiting to become 'dominant'. The rise of capitalism can be 'explained' simply by asserting, tautologically, that the CMP, or some significant piece of it (like a capitalist 'type' of state?) was already present in the combination of modes of production that constituted the relevant social formations. For a forceful criticism of this aspect of Althusserianism, and of the Marxist tradition from which it arises, together with a powerful argument demonstrating the origins of this view of history in 'bourgeois' historiography and ideology, see George Comninel's Rethinking the French Revolution (London, 1987).
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metaphor about the effects of material conditions and production relations on historical processes have simply been evaded. In fact, a priori theoretical correspondences have been allowed to conceal real historical relations. All this is in sharp contrast to Marx's own account of the connection between production relations and political forms: The specific economic form, in which unpaid surplus labour is pumped out of direct producers, determines the relationship between rulers and ruled, as it grows directly out of production itself and, in turn, reacts upon it as a determined element.... It is always the direct relationship of the owners of the conditions of production to the direct producers ... which reveals the innermost secret, the hidden basis of the entire social structure, and with it the political form of the relations of sovereignty and dependence, the corresponding specific form of the state. This does not prevent the same economic base - the same from the standpoint of its main conditions - due to innumerable different empirical conditions ... from showing infinite variations and gradations in appearance, which can be ascertained only by analysis of the empirically given circumstances.9 Although parts of this passage are much quoted by Poulantzas et al.y it reveals a conceptual framework rather different from the Althusserian distinction between 'mode of production' and 'social formation'. It conveys neither the mechanical determinism of the Althusserian 'mode of production' nor the arbitrary contingency of the 'social formation'. Instead, it suggests both the complex variability of empirical reality and the operation within it of a logic derived from production relations. The difference is further illustrated by Marx's own use of the concept rendered by the Althusserians as 'social formation', a usage that differs substantially from that of Althusser, Balibar or Poulantzas (quite apart from whether the concept was ever intended to carry the theoretical burden it has recently acquired). In a passage that figures centrally in Althusserian theory, Marx writes: In all forms of society [which is in the context a less misleading translation of Gesellschaftsformen than is 'social formation'] there is a specific kind of production which predominates over the rest, whose relations thus assign rank and influence to the others. It is a general illumination which bathes all the other colours and modifies their particularity. It is a particular ether which determines the specific gravity of every being which has materialized within it.10 9 10
Karl Marx, Capital m (Moscow, 1971), pp. 791-3. Karl Marx, Gnmdrisse, tr. M. Nicolaus (Harmondsvvorth, 1973), pp. 106-7.
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It is instructive to note what he means by 'forms of society'. They include 'pastoral peoples', 'antiquity', 'the feudal order', 'modern bourgeois society'. Whatever else this passage may mean — and whatever problems may arise from Marx's formulations - it implies that: 1. 'form of society' refers to something like feudalism (the feudal order) or capitalism (bourgeois society), not simply an individual and unique 'concrete' phenomenon like 'England during the Industrial Revolution' (one of Poulantzas' examples of a 'social formation'), but a class of concrete phenomena which have some kind of common socio-historical logic; and 2. the point of the passage is, if anything, to stress the unity, not the 'heterogeneity', of a 'social formation'. It is not a question of several modes of production dominated by one, but, for example, different branches of production assimilated to the specific character of the branch that predominates in that social form: the particular nature of agriculture in feudal society characterized by peasant production and feudal appropriation - affects the nature of industry; the particular nature of industry in 'bourgeois society' - industry dominated by capital - affects the nature of agriculture. Marx's use of the concept here has a rather limited and narrow application, but one which is not inconsistent with his later, more developed insights as outlined in volume 111 of Capital. Taken together, then, these passages from Capital and the Grundrisse convey that there is a unifying logic in the relations of production which imposes itself throughout a society, in the complex variety of its empirical reality, in a way that entitles us to speak of a 'feudal order' or 'capitalist society' but without depriving individual feudal or capitalist societies of their 'intricate fabric of social, political, cultural, and moral life'. Thompson himself, despite his reservations about Marx's 'Grundrisse face', makes a distinction that nicely sums up Marx's approach. The 'profound intuition' of historical materialism as conceived by Marx, argues Thompson, is not that capitalist societies are simply 'capital in the totality of its relations', but rather 'that the logic of capitalist process has found expression within all the activities of a society, and exerted a determining pressure upon its development and form: hence entitling us to speak of capitalism, or of capitalist societies'.11 There is a critical difference, he continues, between a 11
Thompson, Poverty of Theory, p. 254.
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structuralism which suggests an 'Idea of capital unfolding itself, and historical materialism, which has to do with 'a real historical process'. Thompson was, then, at least half right in his criticism of Althusser, not because Althusser dissolved history into structure, but, on the contrary, because, while indeed adhering to a kind of structuralism, which identified the CMP with capitalism, he reserved its operations for the sphere of pure theory while leaving history more or less to itself. In fact, Thompson himself formulated his criticism of Althusser in almost exactly these terms in an essay far less well known than The Poverty of Theory, but dating from about the same time: in Althusserian theory, he writes, 'with its emphasis upon "relative autonomy" and "in the last instance determination", the problems of historical and cultural materialism are not so much solved as shuffled away or evaded; since the lonely hour of the last instance never strikes, we may at one and the same time pay pious lip-service to the theory and take out a licence to ignore it in our practice'. 12 If there is some truth in the suggestion that the Althusserian distinction between mode of production and social formation was intended to make Marxists, brought up in the shadow of a crudely economistic and reductionist base/superstructure model, more sensitive to historical specificity and the complexity of social life, this too is only a half truth; for the distinction achieved its end simply by driving a wedge between structure and history and creating a rigid dualism between determination and contingency which left structural determinations more or less impotent in the sphere of historical explanation and in effect disabled historical materialism as a way of explaining historical processes. This was simply an evasion of the challenge posed by Marx himself: how to encompass historical specificity, as well as human agency, while recognizing within it the logic of modes of production. HISTORICAL MATERIALISM VERSUS ECONOMIC DETERMINISM
It is precisely this challenge that Edward Thompson tried to meet in his historical writings. His theoretical pronouncements are not Thompson, 'Folklore, Anthropology, and Social History', Studies in Labour History Pamphlet (1979), p. 19 (originally published in Indian Historical Review, 3 (2) (1978), pp. 247-66).
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always helpful in illuminating his historical practice - partly because he occasionally allows himself to be trapped in the false alternatives offered by the prevailing terms of Marxist debate. 13 Even here, however, there is much wealth that could be mined to emancipate Marxist theory from these Hobson's choices and put it back on the fruitful track marked out by Marx himself. One or two things are particularly worth noting in Thompson's explicit remarks on the base/superstructure metaphor over the years. It is well known that he was always concerned to rescue human agency and consciousness from the dead hand of crudely reductionist economisms, and there is no need to rehearse that point here. His preoccupation with 'experience' has received more than enough attention, even if the effects of that attention have often been misleading. 14 What has tended to get lost in this emphasis on Thompson's 'humanism' is that its corollary is often an appreciation of structural determinations in historical processes which is rather more illuminating than that of his structuralist critics. The mechanical base/superstructure model, with its 'levels' conceived as self-enclosed, spatially separate and discontinuous boxes, allows only two unacceptable choices: either we adhere to the 'orthodox' simplistic reductionism according to which the basic 'economic' box is simply 'reflected' in superstructural boxes; or we can avoid 'crude economism' only by postponing determination by the 'economic' to some infinitely distant 'last instance', an effect achieved by rendering the rigid determinations of structure inoperative in history. Between these two extremes, there is little room for 'economic' determinations which, while allowing the full range of 13
14
Nowhere is this more vividly illustrated than in Thompson's distaste for Marx's 'Grundrisse face' and his analysis of Marx's political economy. It is difficult to explain Thompson's failure to see that it is precisely in Marx's critique of political economy that he spells out the fully developed principles of historical materialism. Indeed, it can be argued that this is where Marx laid down the very principles that Thompson has found most valuable in his own historical work. In contrast, the German Ideology, for all its vital contributions to historical materialism, still bears the traces of a relatively uncritical adherence to bourgeois historiography. (This argument concerning the difference between Marx's uncritical historiography, and the critique of political economy in which his own distinctive views receive their fullest elaboration, appears in Comninel, Rethinking the French Revolution.) One possible explanation of Thompson's blind spot is that he has been too ready to accept the dichotomies arising from Stalinist theory, which seem to compel us to choose between a crudely reductionist economism and a complete abandonment of Marx's political economy 'face'. See Harvey J. Kaye, The British Marxist Historians (Oxford, 1984) for an excellent general discussion of Thompson and specifically his relationship to the Anglo-Marxist historiographical tradition of Dobb, Hilton, Hill el al.
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historical complexity and specificity, are nevertheless (to quote Thompson) 'there all the time' - not just 'in the last instance5, not 'thrust back to an area of ultimate causation . . . [which] can be forgotten in its empyrean', not 'operative only in an epochal sense', but all the time.15 This is the difficult dialectic between historical specificity and the always present logic of historical process that historical materialism asks us to comprehend. It requires, as Thompson has always understood, a conception of the 'economic', not as a 'regionally' separate sphere which is somehow 'material' as opposed to 'social', but rather as itself irreducibly social - indeed, a conception of the 'material' as constituted by social relations and practices. Furthermore, the 'base' - the process and relations of production - is not just 'economic' but also entails, and is embodied in, juridical-political and ideological forms and relations that cannot be relegated to a spatially separate superstructure. If the base/superstructure metaphor can be made to encompass these insights, all well and good; but it is, according to Thompson, a bad metaphor because it obscures the nature of the very relations it is meant to indicate. 'We must say', Thompson suggests about this unfortunate metaphor, 'that the sign-post was pointing in the wrong direction, while, at the same time, we must accept the existence of the place towards which it was mispointing... .' 16 That place is the 'kernel of human relationships' embodied in the mode of production, a kernel of relationships that imposes its logic at every 'level' of society. In a comment on Raymond Williams's The Long Revolution, Thompson writes: when we speak of the capitalist mode of production for profit we are indicating at the same time a 'kernel' of characteristic human relationships - of exploitation, domination, and acquisitiveness which are inseparable from this mode, and which find simultaneous expression in all of Mr Williams' 'systems'. Within the limits of the epoch there are characteristic tensions and contradictions, which cannot be transcended unless we transcend the epoch itself: there is an economic logic and a moral logic and it is futile to argue as to which we give priority since they are different expressions of the same 'kernel of human relationship'. We may then rehabilitate the notion of capitalist or bourgeois culture... .17 15 16 17
Thompson, 'The Peculiarities of the English', in The Poverty of Theory, pp. 81-2. 'An Open Letter to Leszek Kolakovvski', in Thompson, Poverty of Theory, p. 120. E.P. Thompson, 'The Long Revolution, 11', New Left Review 10 (1961), pp. 28-9.
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There are undoubtedly pitfalls in the formula that production relations 'find simultaneous expression' at all 'levels' of society, not in an ascending sequence proceeding from a determinative economic 'base' to an epiphenomenal superstructure. 'Simultaneous' determination could be construed as no determination, even no causality, at all. But Thompson's conception of 'simultaneity' is rather more subtle than that. 18 His argument is directed, as we have seen, against both reductionist conceptions of causality that dissolve historical specificity and conceptions of economic determination in which determination is indefinitely postponed. The first conflates cause and effect, the second opens up an unbridgeable distance between them. Neither requires investigation of the relation between cause and effect or the process of determination. What interests Thompson is the relations and processes in which production relations - relations of exploitation, domination and appropriation - shape or exert pressure upon all aspects of social life at once and all the time. The process and relations of production which constitute a mode of production are expressed in a 'moral' as well as an 'economic' logic, in characteristic values and modes of thought as well as in characteristic patterns of accumulation and exchange. It is only in the capitalist mode of production that it is even possible to distinguish institutions and practices that are purely and distinctly 'economic' (in the narrow sense of the word, which is itself derived from the experience of capitalism); and even here, the mode of production is expressed simultaneously in those 'economic' institutions and practices and in certain attendant norms and values that sustain the processes and relations of production and the system of power and domination around which they are organized. These values, norms and cultural forms, argues Thompson, are no less 'real' than the specifically 'economic' forms in which the mode of production is expressed. There are two inseparable and equally important sides to Thompson's argument about the simultaneity of 'economic' and 'cultural' expressions in any mode of production. The first, which is the one most commonly stressed by his critics and admirers alike, insists that ideology and culture have a 'logic' of their own which constitutes an 'authentic' element in social and historical processes. 18
The notion of'simultaneity' is also discussed in Thompson, 'Folklore', pp. 17-18.
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'We may legitimately analyse ideology not only as product but also as process,' he observes in his critical appreciation of Christopher Caudwell, in which he both approves Caudwell's understanding of the 'authenticity' of culture and castigates him for attributing to the logic of ideology an autonomy that suggests 'an idea imposing itself on history'.19 He continues: it has its own logic which is, in part, self-determined, in that given categories tend to reproduce themselves in consecutive ways. While we cannot substitute the ideological logic for the real history - capitalist evolution is not the acting out of a basic bourgeois idea - nevertheless this logic is an authentic component of that history, a history inconceivable and indescribable independent of the 'idea'. The other side of the argument is that, if the determinative effects of the mode of production are simultaneously operative in both the 'economy' and in 'non-economic' spheres, they are also ubiquitous. The intent of the argument is not to deny or play down the determinative effects of the mode of production, but on the contrary, to reinforce the proposition that they are 'operative all the time' and everywhere. In other words, Thompson is perhaps at his most materialist at the very moment when he refuses to privilege the 'economy' over 'culture'. Indeed, the insistence on 'simultaneity' appears not as a departure from, or correction of, classical Marxist materialism but as a gloss on Marx's own words. Commenting on the above-cited 'general illumination' passage of the Grundrisse, for example, Thompson writes: What this emphasizes is the simultaneity of expression of characteristic productive relations in all systems and areas of social life rather than any notion of primacy (more 'real') of the 'economic', with the norms and culture seen as some secondary 'reflection' of the primary. What I am calling in question is not the centrality of the mode of production (and attendant relations of power and ownership) to any materialist understanding of history. I am calling in question ... the notion that it is possible to describe a mode of production in 'economic' terms, leaving aside as secondary (less 'real') the norms, the culture, the critical concepts around which this mode of production is organized.20 We might wish for more precise indications of the boundaries between the 'mode of production' and that which is determined by 19 20
E.P. T h o m p s o n , 'Caudwell', Socialist Register (1977), p p . 265-6. Thompson, 'Folklore', p p . 17-18.
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it, and perhaps something less of a tendency to slide from the proposition that the mode of production is 'expressed' simultaneously in both economic and non-economic spheres, into the rather different suggestion that the mode of production is every social thing at once. But there can be little doubt that the intention of this argument is not only to stress the 'authenticity' of culture but also to rescue a materialist understanding of history from formulations which separate out the social 'levels' in a way that effectively detaches the 'superstructure' from the effects of the material 'base'. It is also an effort to rescue the original Marxist conception of the 'mode of production' from its identification with the capitalist 'economy', as embodied in market relations and/or some abstractly autonomous 'technology'. This is an identification which Stalinist orthodoxy shared with bourgeois ideology; which Althusserian theory perpetuated in its delineation of'levels' or 'instances', in the very process of seeking to detach itself from 'vulgar economism'; and which today's 'post-Marxist' critics of Marxism - so many of whom were formed in the Althusserian school - have repeated, somewhat irrelevantly repudiating their own straw Marxism while reproducing its distortions in their own conceptions of the 'economic' sphere. It may be true that Thompson does not always sustain the clarity of his 'unitary' conception and sometimes appears to allow the 'mode of production' to expand into an indeterminate totality of human relations. But there is a significant difference between the claim that 'base' is also and at the same time 'superstructure', and Thompson's proposition that Production, distribution and consumption are not only digging, carrying and eating, but are also planning, organizing and enjoying. Imaginative and intellectual faculties are not confined to a 'superstructure' and erected on a 'base' of things (including men-things); they are implicit in the creative act of labour which makes man man.21 Another illustration might be his argument that the law does not 'keep politely' to a superstructural 'level' but appears 'at every bloody level' and is 'imbricated within the mode of production and productive relations themselves (as property rights, definitions of agrarian practice .. .)'. 2 2 These propositions do not mean that the base includes all superstructure, or that production relations are 21 22
E.P. T h o m p s o n , 'Socialist H u m a n i s m ' , New Reasoner, 1 (1957), p p . 130-1. Thompson, Poverty of Theory, p . 288.
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synonymous with all social relations structured by class antagonisms. (Isn't this just another way of saying that mode of production equals social formation, a conception to which Thompson strongly objects?) They mean that some so-called 'superstructure' belongs to the productive 'base' and is the form in which production relations themselves are organized, lived and contested. In this formulation the specificity, integrity and determinative force of production relations are preserved; and, in a sense, the requisite distance which makes causality possible, between the sphere of production and other social 'levels', is established, while at the same time the principle of connection and continuity between these separate spheres is indicated by treating the 'economy' itself as a social phenomenon. This brings us to another, especially subtle, reason for Thompson's rejection of the conventional base/superstructure metaphor; and here again the object is not to weaken but to reinforce the materialism in the Marxist theory of history. Thompson has suggested that the metaphor fails to take account of the different ways in which different classes are related to the mode of production, the different ways in which their respective institutions, ideologies and cultures 'express' the mode of production. 23 While the base/ superstructure model may have a certain value as an account of partisan ruling-class institutions and ideologies, the supportive structures of domination and the 'common sense of power', it is ill-suited to describe the culture of the ruled. The customs, rituals and values of subordinate classes can, as Thompson puts it, 'often be seen to be intrinsic to the mode of production' in a way that the dominant culture is not, because they are integral to the very processes of reproducing life and its material conditions. They are, in short, often the very practices that constitute productive activity itself. At the same time, although the culture of the ruled often remains 'congruent' with the prevailing system of production and power, it is because production relations are experienced by subordinate classes in their own particular ways that they can come into contradiction with the 'common sense of power'; and it is such contradictions that produce the struggles which determine the reorganization and transformation of modes of production. 23
See especially Thompson, 'Folklore', pp. 20-2.
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Historical transformations of this kind, argues Thompson, do not occur simply arid spontaneously because (autonomous) changes in the base produce changes in the superstructure (as, for example, in technological determinism). They occur because changes in material life become the terrain of struggle. If anything, it could be said although Thompson does not say it in so many words, preferring to avoid the language of base and superstructure - that if historical transformations are produced by contradictions between base and superstructure, it is in the sense that these contradictions represent oppositions between, on the one hand, the experience of production relations as they are lived by subordinate classes and, on the other, the institutions and 'common sense' of power. But to put it this way is already to acknowledge that the single model of the relations between material 'base' and ideological 'superstructure' suggested by the conventional metaphor is not enough. That model misleads because it universalizes the ruling culture, or, more precisely, the relation between the ruling culture and the mode of production, and conceptualizes away the different kind of relation that generates historical movement. Perhaps Thompson's view can best be summed up as an attempt to reassert Marx's own account of historical materialism as against the mechanical materialism of 'bourgeois' philosophy. His emphasis, like that of Marx, is on 'human sensuous activity, practice' (as Marx formulates his materialism in the famous attack on previous materialisms in the 'Theses on Feuerbach'), instead of on some abstract 'matter' or 'matter in motion'. And like Marx, Thompson recognizes that mechanical materialism is nothing more than another idealism, or the other side of the idealist coin. He recognizes, too, that the framework of contemporary Marxist debate has in many ways reproduced the same false dichotomies of bourgeois thought from which historical materialism was intended to liberate us: we may have been witnessing within the heart of the Marxist tradition itself a reproduction of that phenomenon which Caudwell diagnosed within bourgeois culture: the generation of those pseudo-antagonists, mechanical materialism and idealism. The same subject/object dualism, entering into Marxism, has left us with the twins of economic determinism and Althusserian idealism, each regenerating the other: the material basis determines the superstructure, independent of ideality, while the superstructure of ideality retires into the autonomy of a self-determining theoretical practice.24 24
Thompson, 'Caudwell', p. 244.
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This is not, it must be stressed, simply a demand for a questionbegging 'interactionism', or what Thompson himself calls a 'barren oscillation' between determinants in a process of 'mutual determination'. As Thompson understands very well, 'mutual interaction is scarcely determination'; 25 and it is no more his intention than it was Marx's to evade the issue of determination in this way. His formulation is simply a way of taking seriously the Marxist understanding of the 'material base' as embodied in human practical activity, which, however much it may violate the sensibilities of'scientific' Marxists, requires us to come to grips with the fact that the activity of material production is conscious activity. BASE AND SUPERSTRUCTURE IN HISTORY
The meaning of all this becomes fully apparent only in Thompson's historical practice, and the value of his disagreements with the language of base and superstructure can be tested only by examining what he can perceive through his conceptual prism which others cannot see as clearly through their own. Two aspects of his historical work in particular stand out: a profound sense of process, expressed in an unequalled capacity for tracing the intricate interplay between continuity and change; and an ability to reveal the logic of production relations not as an abstraction but as an operative historical principle visible in the daily transactions of social life, in concrete institutions and practices outside the sphere of production itself. Both these skills are at work in his characteristic 'decoding' of evidence indicating the presence of class forces and modes of consciousness structured by class in historical situations where no clear and explicit class consciousness is available as unambiguous proof of the presence of class. The theme running through The Making of the English Working Class, for example, is how a continuous tradition of popular culture was transformed into a working-class culture as people resisted the logic of capitalist relations and the intensification of exploitation associated with capitalist modes of expropriation. Thompson's critics have tended to focus on the continuities in this process, suggesting that his insistence on the continuity of popular traditions betokens a preoccupation with cultural, 'superstructural' factors at 25
Ibid., pp. 246-7.
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the expense of objective determinations, movements in the 'base' where capitalist accumulation takes place - a criticism I shall take up in the next chapter. The point of Thompson's argument, however, is to demonstrate the changes within the continuities precisely in order to show the logic of capitalist production relations at work in the 'superstructure'. Where a structuralist Marxist, who tends to view history as a series of discontinuous chunks, might see nothing but an ideological 'level' out of phase with the economic, a superstructural fragment left over from another mode of production, a juxtaposition of structural boxes, Thompson sees - and can give an account of - a historical dynamic of change within continuity (which is, after all, the way history generally proceeds, even through revolutionary moments) structured by the logic of capitalist relations. The structuralist, for whom a priori theoretical correspondences would render the actual historical connections invisible (as in the case of Poulantzas and the absolutist state), would be disarmed in the face of non-Marxist historians who dismiss the concept of class as nothing but an abstract theoretical category imposed on the evidence from without, or those who would deny the existence of a working class in this 'preindustrial' or 'one-class' society, citing as evidence the continuity of 'pre-industriaP patterns of thought. Thompson, in contrast, is able to trace the changing social meanings of popular traditions, tracking the operations of class in these changes within continuity. He can account for the emerging working-class formations, institutions and intellectual traditions which, despite their visible presence in the history of the period, are conceptualized out of existence by his adversaries. It is worth adding that, for those who regard the 'base' as something 'material' as opposed to 'social' - which generally means that the base consists of the technical forces of production and history is a technological determinism - the existence of workingclass formations joining together 'industrial' and 'pre-industrial' workers must remain inexplicable. The conceptual framework of technological determinism compels us to place a premium on the technical process of work as a determinant of class, rather than on the relations of production and exploitation which for Thompson (as for Marx) are the critical factors and which alone can explain the common experience imposed by the logic of capitalist accumulation upon workers engaged in different labour processes.
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The principles underlying Thompson's 'decoding' procedures are made more explicit in 'Eighteenth-century English Society: Class Struggle without Class?'. Here his object is, among other things, to demonstrate that class struggle can operate as a historical force even when fully developed notions of class and class consciousness do not yet exist, that '[b]ecause in other places and periods we can observe "mature" (i.e., self-conscious and historically developed) class formations, with ideological and institutional expression, this does not mean that whatever happens less decisively is not class'. 26 This project requires a 'decoding' of evidence which to other historians bespeaks a 'traditional', 'paternalistic' or 'one-class' society, in which the labouring classes lack any class consciousness and social divisions are vertical rather than horizontal. Significantly, here Thompson again invokes the 'general illumination' passage from the Grundrisse, which the Althusserians cite in support of their views on modes of production and social formations. And significantly, too, like Marx but unlike the Althusserians, he stresses the unity, not the heterogeneity, of social forms as they come within the 'field offeree' of a particular mode of production: it seems to me that the metaphor of a field-of-force can co-exist fruitfully with Marx's comment in the Grundrisse, that: 'In all forms of society....' What Marx describes in metaphors of 'rank and influence', 'general illumination' and 'tonalities' would today be offered in more systematic structuralist language: terms sometimes so hard and objective-seeming ... that they disguise the fact that they are still metaphors which offer to congeal a fluent social process. I prefer Marx's metaphor; and I prefer it, for many purposes, to his subsequent metaphors of 'base' and 'superstructure'. But my argument in this paper is (to the same degree as Marx's) a structural argument. I have been forced to see this when considering the force of the obvious objections to it. For every feature of eighteenth century society to which attention has been directed may be found, in more or less developed form, in other centuries.... What then is specific to the eighteenth century? What is the 'general illumination' which modifies the 'specific tonalities' of its social and cultural life?27 Thompson then sets out to answer these questions by examining '(1) the dialectic between what is and is not culture - the formative experiences in social being, and how these were handled in cultural 26 27
E.P. T h o m p s o n , 'Eighteenth-century English Society: Class Struggle without Class?', Social History 3 (2) (1978), p . 150. Ibid., pp. 151-2. Thompson is using a different translation from the one cited above. Thus, the word he renders as 'tonalities' appears as 'colours' in the translation cited earlier.
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ways, and (2) the dialectical polarities - antagonisms and reconciliations - between the polite and plebeian cultures of the time.' 28 Though it would be helpful to have a clearer account of what is 'not culture', the result is an intricate and subtle argument which reveals how 'traditional' patterns of culture, which on the surface remain apparently unchanged, acquire a new social meaning as they come within the 'field of force' of'capitalist process' and capitalist modes of exploitation. Thompson demonstrates how customary behaviour and plebeian culture are shaped by new class experiences, citing as a particularly evocative example the riots for the possession of the bodies of the hanged at Tyburn, 'decoded' by Peter Linebaugh in Albion's Fatal Tree: we cannot present the rioter as an archaic figure, motivated by the 'debris' of older patterns of thought, and then pass the matter off with a reference to death-superstitions and Us rois thaumaturges.... The code which informs these riots, whether at Tyburn in 1731 or Manchester in 1832, cannot be understood only in terms of beliefs about death and its proper treatment. It involves also class solidarities, and the hostility of the plebs to the psychic cruelty of the law and to the marketing of primary values. Nor is it, in the eighteenth century, just that a taboo is being threatened: in the case of the dissection of corpses or the hanging of corpses in chains, one class was deliberately and as an act of terror breaking or exploiting the taboos of another. It is, then, within this class field-of-force that the fragmented debris of older patterns are revivified and reintegrated. 29
What makes the eighteenth century an especially complicated case is that customary behaviour and ritual acquire a particular significance because the logic of capitalism was experienced by the plebs so often as an attack on customary use-rights and traditional patterns of work and leisure - a process vividly described by Thompson in several of his works. Rebellion against the processes of capitalist accumulation, therefore, often took the form of a 'rebellion in defence of custom', creating that characteristic paradox of the eighteenth century, 'a rebellious traditional culture 5.30 Class conflict, then, tended to take the form of 'confrontations between an innovative market economy and the customary moral economy of the plebs'. 31 If there is a danger in Thompson's formulations, it is perhaps that, as some critics have suggested, he is too ready to see opposition and 28
Ibid., p. 152.
29
Ibid., p. 157.
30
Ibid., p. 154.
31
Ibid., p. 155.
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rebellion in popular traditions and customs, and that there is too little room in his account for regressive impulses in popular consciousness or for its frequent penetration by ruling-class ideas. But excessive optimism is not required by his conceptual framework, and it has distinct advantages over theoretical systems which can recognize only 'backwardness' in popular traditions. The argument, of course, belongs to his larger project of rescuing the agency of subordinate classes from analyses which effectively relegate them to permanent subordination, bondage to ruling-class hegemony, ancient superstition and irrationality. But his emphasis on the creative transformation of old traditions to meet new circumstances and resist new oppressions also represents a reaffirmation of materialist principles against theories of history that deny their efficacy in the explanation of historical process. His subtle analysis for example makes nonsense of historical treatments that see in these traditions and customs nothing but cultural remnants or 'debris', or regard their persistence as proof that class has no relevance for these 'traditional' 'pre-industriaF societies or even that culture is completely autonomous from material conditions. It should be said, too, that in this respect Thompson accomplishes what the structuralists cannot with their version of the base/ superstructure metaphor. The latter can have little to say in response to the advocates of the 'debris' theory, which seems remarkably congruent with the Althusserian conception of 'social formation' - or, indeed, to those who deny the efficacy of class (or material conditions in general) in societies where ideological 'superstructures' apparently fail to correspond to the economic 'base'. Such arguments can be met only by acknowledging that history does not consist of discrete and discontinuous structural chunks, with separate and distinct superstructures to match every base; instead, it moves in processes, in which relations of production exert their pressures by transforming inherited realities. It has long been one of Thompson's central projects to respond to historians who deny the existence, or at least the historical importance, of class in cases where clearly defined class institutions or self-conscious languages of class, on the model of industrial capitalism, are not immediately present in the evidence. Critics, and indeed often his admirers, have sometimes been confounded by formulations which appear to suggest that class does not exist for him in the absence of class consciousness. But this is directly contrary
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to his intention of demonstrating the determinative effects of class 'situations' even where 'mature' classes do not yet exist. Perhaps he has adopted these ambiguous formulae because he has always seen himself as fighting on two fronts at once: against the anti-Marxist denial of class, and against those Marxisms that deny the working class its proper self-activity by postulating for it a predetermined ideal consciousness. In any case, his historiographical actions speak - or ought to speak - louder than his theoretical words; and it must be said that, in place of Thompson's very effective demonstrations of class forces operating in the absence of 'mature' class consciousness, his structuralist critics can offer little more than theoretical assertions according to which class may exist by definition but without implications for historical processes. It is instructive to contrast Thompson's approach to that of Gareth Stedman Jones in his most recent study of Chartism. 32 Explicitly disavowing his earlier Marxist belief in the connection between politics and material conditions, Stedman Jones argues here that the politics of Chartism were 'autonomous' from the class situation of the Chartists. His principal evidence for this autonomy is the fact that there was a fundamental continuity between their ideology and an older radical tradition born in very different social conditions. He seems, among other things, to attach little significance to the changes which that radical tradition underwent as it came within the 'field of force' of capitalist relations. Changes there certainly were, as he acknowledges, but they evidently have no implications for the autonomy of Chartist politics or the noncorrespondence of politics and class. In other words, Stedman Jones's reading of evidence is exactly opposed to that of Thompson in similar circumstances: where one 32
Gareth Stedman Jones, 'Rethinking Chartism', in Languages of Class: Studies in English Working Class History, 1832-1982 (Cambridge, 1983). I examine this argument at length in The Retreat From Class. Stedman Jones distances himself from the tradition of historical materialism much more explicitly and emphatically in the introduction to Languages of Class than in the articles compiled in that volume. In the brief survey of his own development which he sketches in the introduction, he identifies 'Rethinking Chartism' as a turning-point marking a 'shift in [his] thinking', not only on the subject of Chartism 'but also about the social historical approach as such' (pp. 16-17). ^ 1S possible that when he wrote the article in 1981 and published it in a shorter version as 'The Language of Chartism', in J. Epstein and D. Thompson eds., The Chartist Experience (London, 1982), he did not intend to go quite as far in renouncing Marxism as he was later to claim, and a reading of'Rethinking Chartism' without the benefit of his own later gloss on it might not be enough to reveal the full extent of his movement away from historical materialism; but in Languages of Class, he has certainly chosen to interpret his own intentions in that way.
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sees the autonomy of ideology from class in the continuity of popular traditions, the other sees the magnetic force of class in the transformation of a continuous popular culture. It is as if Stedman Jones has given up historical materialism because he has discovered that history moves in continuous processes, disappointing his expectation that every new base at least in principle must have a pristinely new superstructure to match. This may have something to do with the fact that, by his own testimony, he was in his earlier (Marxist) days strongly influenced by Althusserian theory. Another flip of the Althusserian coin? Thompson's attempts to refine the base/superstructure metaphor are not simply a matter of supplementing the old mechanical model with an acknowledgement that, even though superstructures are erected upon bases, 'bases need superstructures'. 33 This proposition does not adequately convey, for example, the insights that inform his study of law. Thompson contrasts his own 'older Marxist position' to a 'highly sophisticated, but (ultimately) highly schematic Marxism' for which the law is quintessentially and simply 'superstructural', 'adapting itself to the necessities of an infrastructure of productive forces and productive relations' and serving unambiguously as an instrument of the ruling class.34 His answer to this 'schematic' Marxism, however, is not simply to assert that the law, like other superstructures, is 'relatively autonomous', that it 'interacts' with the base, or even that it acts as an indispensable condition of the base. His argument is more complex, both more historical and more materialist. Accepting at the outset the 'class-bound and mystifying functions of the law', he continues: First, analysis of the eighteenth century (and perhaps of other centuries) calls in question the validity of separating off the law as a whole and placing it in some typological superstructure. The law, when considered as institution (the courts, with their class theatre and class procedures) or as personnel (the judges, the lawyers, the Justices of the Peace) may very easily be assimilated to those of the ruling class. But all that is entailed in 'the law' is not subsumed in these institutions.... Moreover, if we look closely into such an agrarian context, the distinction 33
34
G.A. Cohen, Karl Marx's Theory of History: A Defense (Oxford, 1978). It is worth adding, incidentally, that if Cohen's technological determinism really did represent a n accurate account of Marx's views on base a n d superstructure, then T h o m p s o n might not be so far wrong in his account of Marx's 'Grundrisse face'. E.P. T h o m p s o n , Whigs and Hunters (London, 1975), p . 259.
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between law, on the one hand, conceived of as an element of 'superstructure', and the actualities of productive forces and relations, on the other hand, becomes more and more untenable. For law was often a definition of actual agrarian practice, as it had been pursued 'time out of mind'.... Hence 'law' was deeply imbricated within the very basis of productive relations, which would have been inoperable without this law. And, in the second place, this law, as definition or as rules (imperfectly enforceable through institutional legal forms), was endorsed by norms, tenaciously transmitted through the community. There were alternative norms; that is a matter of course; this was a place, not of consensus, but of conflict.35 The notion of the 'imbrication' of the law 'within the very basis of productive relations' (which, incidentally, illustrates Thompson's point about the difference between those ideas, values and norms that are 'intrinsic' to the mode of production, and those that constitute the ruling apparatus and the 'common sense of power'), while not denying the 'superstructuraP character of some parts of the law and its institutions, is something different from, and more than, the idea that 'bases need superstructures'. It is a different way of understanding the base itself, as it is embodied in actual social practices and relations. Nor is it simply a matter of analytically distinguishing the material base from the social forms in which it is inevitably embodied in the real world. Thompson's conception is, first, a refusal of any analytic distinction that conceals the social character of the 'material' itself (which is constituted not simply by a 'natural' substratum but by the social relations and practices entailed by human productive activity) - a refusal that is indispensable to historical materialism; but, beyond that, it is a way of discouraging analytic procedures that tend to obscure historical relations. As Perry Anderson has pointed out, the principal objection levelled against the base/superstructure metaphor by Thompson and others is that the analytic distinction between various 'levels' or 'instances' may encourage the view that they 'exist substantively as separate objects, physically divisible from each other in the real world', creating a confusion between 'epistemological procedures' and 'ontological categories'. 36 He suggests that Althusser sought to avoid such confusions by insisting on a distinction between the 35 36
Ibid., p p . 2 6 0 - 1 . Perry Anderson, Arguments Within English Marxism ( L o n d o n , 1980), p . 72.
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'object of knowledge and the real object'. And yet, there is a sense in which the Althusserians have had the worst of both worlds; for while their 'instances' and 'levels' tend consistently to slip into 'ontological categories' physically separated from one another in the real world, the relations between these 'levels' have tended to remain in the realm of pure theory, as 'objects of knowledge' that have little connection with 'ontological categories'. For Thompson, it is the relations that count; and if he occasionally errs on the side of allowing 'ontological' relations to become analytic conflations, this mistake is far less damaging than the other to an understanding of history.
CHAPTER 3
Class as process and relationship
There are really only two ways of thinking theoretically about class: either as a structural location or as a social relation. The first and more common of these treats class as a form of'stratification', a layer in a hierarchical structure, differentiated according to 'economic' criteria such as income, 'market chances' or occupation. In contrast to this geological model, there is a social-historical conception of class as a relation between appropriators and producers, determined by the specific form in which, to use Marx's phrase, 'surplus labour is pumped out of the direct producers'. If the second of these conceptions is specifically Marxist, the first covers a broad spectrum from classical sociology up to and including some varieties of Marxism. So, for example, class defined as 'relation to the means of production' can take a form not so very different from the income differentiation of conventional stratification theory; and some of the most recent and influential theories of class elaborated under the rubric of 'Rational Choice Marxism' have deliberately shifted the focus of class away from the social relations ofsurplus extraction to the distribution of'assets' or 'endowments'. Here, as in theories of stratification, the operative principle is relative advantage or inequality, not direct social relations between appropriators and producers but indirect relations of comparison among people differentially situated in a structural hierarchy. 1 By contrast, for 'classical' Marxism the focus is on the social relation itself, the 1
I have discussed Rational Choice Marxism and its conception of class at great length in an article which I contemplated including in this volume: 'Rational Choice Marxism: Is the Game Worth the Candle?', New Left Review, 177 (1989), pp. 41-88. In the end, I decided to extract only a small section of it (in the next chapter), partly because it is already being included in a volume on rational choice Marxism edited by Paul Thomas and Terrell Carver, to be published by Macmillan, but also because debate with this school of theory tends to take discussion off on tangents which seem to me not very fruitful outside their own fairly self-enclosed game-theoretic universe.
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dynamic of the relation between appropriators and producers, the contradictions and conflicts which account for social and historical processes; and inequality, as simply a comparative measure, has no theoretical purchase. This distinctively Marxist conception of class has received remarkably little elaboration, either by Marx himself or by later theorists working in the historical materialist tradition. The most notable exception has been E.P. Thompson; but, while he selfconsciously exemplified this conception in his historical work, he never actually spelled out a systematic theory of class in these terms. The few allusive and provocative remarks he did venture to make on the general definition of class have sparked a good deal of controversy, which has done little to clarify the issues between the dominant geological model and the historical-materialist theory of class. What I sought to do when I wrote this essay was to tease out of Thompson's work a more elaborated theory of class than he ever explicitly outlined, knowing that I was taking the risk of attributing to him some of my own views on class but convinced - as I still am that I was not traducing his. I proceeded by responding to Marxist critics who found Thompson's conception of class insufficiently 'structural'; and while this may seem an outmoded procedure in these post-Marxist days, when he is more likely to be criticized for being too economistic or too class reductionist, it still seems to me to capture the more general issues at stake in the theory of class. There is also another reason for leaving this argument more or less as it was. There has been a curious convergence between Thompson's Marxist critics and current anti-Marxist fashions on the left. When I wrote this chapter originally, Thompson was also being criticized by people who were already moving in a 'post-Marxist' direction. Having conceded that there is no automatic equation of 'structural' class positions and conscious class formations, such critics suggested, he did not go far enough. Thompson was accused of failing to 'face up' to the consequences of his 'non-reductive' Marxism. Once he had opened the floodgates by renouncing 'reductionism', apparently nothing stood between him and post-Marxist contingency. This criticism, as we shall see, paradoxically converged with the Marxist objection that he was guilty of dissolving 'objective' structures in subjective 'experience' and culture, of identifying class with
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class consciousness, of dissolving structural determinations into subjective experience — though where one castigated him for seeing no class where there is no class consciousness, the other accused him of seeing class everywhere, complete and 'at the ready', in all manifestations of popular culture. Both these apparently antithetical criticisms had as their starting point what I would regard as a fundamentally ahistorical view of the world, where there is nothing between structural necessity and empirical contingency, no room for historical determinations, structured processes with human agencies. THE S T R U C T U R A L D E F I N I T I O N OF CLASS! E . P T H O M P S O N A N D HIS CRITICS
Thompson has been accused of mistakenly believing that, because 'production relations do not mechanically determine class consciousness', 'class may not be defined purely in terms of production relations'. 2 In opposition to Thompson, Gerald Cohen argues that class may be defined 'structurally', 'with more or less (if not, perhaps, "mathematical") precision by reference to production relations'. 3 Thompson, he suggests, rejects the structural definition of class and defines class 'by reference to' class consciousness and culture instead of production relations. 'The result', argues Perry Anderson, concurring with Cohen and accusing Thompson of neglecting objective or structural determinations, 'is a definition of class that is far too voluntarist and subjectivist .. .'. 4 Neither Anderson nor Cohen means to suggest that production relations 'mechanically' determine class consciousness or the formation of class organizations. On the contrary, Cohen is here criticizing Thompson on the grounds that he is too ready to jettison the structural definition of class on the mistaken assumption that it necessarily implies this kind of mechanical determinism. Both critics insist that there is, for Thompson, no class in the absence of class consciousness. His conception of class, in other words, does not allow for Marx's distinction between a 'class-in-itself and a 'class-foritself, between a class that exists 'objectively' and a class that exists as an active and self-conscious historical subject, in opposition to other classes. Thompson, according to this argument, insofar as he 2 4
G.A. Cohen, Karl Marx's Theory of History: A Defence (Princeton, 1978), p. 75. Perry Anderson, Arguments Within English Marxism (London, 1980), p. 40.
3
Ibid.
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defines class at all, identifies it with the latter. Before a class exists in this form, it is not a class at all. As I have already suggested in the previous chapter, it can be argued that exactly the reverse is true: the great strength of Thompson's conception of class is that it is capable of recognizing, and giving an account of, the operations of class in the absence of class consciousness; while those who adopt the kind of structural definition his critics seem to have in mind have no effective way of demonstrating the efficacy of class in the absence of clearly visible self-conscious class formations, and no effective response to the claim that class is nothing more than an ideologically motivated theoretical construct imposed on historical evidence from without. I intend to elaborate that argument here but also to suggest that the failure to see this aspect of Thompson's work has less to do with his own neglect of objective structures than with his critics' understanding of what counts as a structural determination. Where Thompson's critics see structures as against processes, or structures that undergo processes, Thompson sees structured processes. This distinction reflects an epistemological difference: on the one hand, a view that theoretical knowledge - the knowledge of structures - is a matter of'static conceptual representation', while motion and flux (together with history) belong to a different, empirical sphere of cognition; and, on the other hand, a view of knowledge that does not oppose structure to history, in which theory can accommodate historical categories, 'concepts appropriate to the investigation of process'.5 It may be true that Thompson tells us too little about the relations of production and that he fails to define them with enough specificity. He may indeed take too much for granted. But to accuse him of defining class 'by reference to' or 'in terms of class consciousness instead of production relations is quite simply to miss the point. It is not at all clear that Thompson's conception of class is incompatible with, for example, the following statement by Perry Anderson, although Anderson intends it as a rejoinder to Thompson, an attack on his excessively voluntarist and subjectivist definition of class, and an expansion of Cohen's criticism: It is, and must be, the dominant mode of production that confers fundamental unity on a social formation, allocating their objective positions to 5
E.P. Thompson, The Poverty of Theory (London, 1978), p. 237.
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the classes within it, and distributing the agents within each class. The result is, typically, an objective process of class struggle . . . class struggle is not a causal prius in the sustentation of order, for classes are constituted by
modes of production, and not vice versa?
Now unless the proposition that 'classes are constituted by modes of production5 means - as in Anderson's case (or indeed Cohen's) it clearly does not - that modes of production immediately constitute active class formations or that the process of class formation is unproblematic and mechanical, Thompson (no doubt with some stylistic reservations) might readily accept it. His historical project presupposes that relations of production distribute people into class situations, that these situations entail essential antagonisms and conflicts of interest, and that they therefore create conditions of struggle. Class formations and the discovery of class consciousness grow out of the process of struggle, as people 'experience' and 'handle' their class situations. It is in this sense that class struggle precedes class. To say that exploitation is 'experienced in class ways and only thence give(s) rise to class formations' is to say precisely that the conditions of exploitation, the relations of production, are objectively there to be experienced.7 Nevertheless, objective determinations do not impose themselves on blank and passive raw material but on active and conscious historical beings. Class formations emerge and develop 'as men and women live their productive relations and experience their determinate situations, within "the ensemble of the social relations", with their inherited culture and expectations, and as they handle these experiences in cultural ways'. 8 This certainly means that no structural definition of class can by itself resolve the problem of class formation and that 'no model can give us what ought to be the "true" class formation for a certain "stage" of process'. 9 At the same time, if class formations are generated by 'living' and 'experiencing', within a complex totality of social relations and historical legacies, they presuppose what is lived and experienced: productive relations and the determinate situations 'into which men are born or enter involuntarily'. 10 In order to experience things in 6 7 8 10
Ibid., p. 55. E.P. Thompson, 'Eighteenth-Century English Society: Class Struggle without Class?', Social History 3 (2) (May 1978), p. 149 n. 36. 9 Ibid., p . 150. Ibid. E.P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class (Harmondsworth, 1968), p. 10.
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'class ways' people must be 'objectively distributed' into class situations; but this is the beginning, not the end, of class formation. It is not a small, or theoretically trivial, point to distinguish between the constitution of classes by modes of production and the process of class formation. Nor is it unimportant to suggest that, however completely we may succeed in deductively situating people on a chart of class locations, the problematic question of class formation will remain and may yield answers that are both theoretically and politically more significant. The crucial point is that the main burden of a Marxist theory of class must be less on identifying class 'locations' than on explaining processes of class formation. In effect, Thompson is being accused of voluntarism and subjectivism not because he neglects the objective, structural determinations of class, but on the contrary, because he refuses to relegate the process of class formation, which is his central concern, to a sphere of mere contingency and subjectivity set apart from the sphere of 'objective' material determination, as his critics appear to do. He does not proceed from a theoretical dualism which opposes structure to history and identifies the 'structural' explanation of class with the charting of objective, static class locations while reserving the process of class formation for an apparently lesser form of historical and empirical explanation. Instead, Thompson, taking seriously the principles of historical materialism and its conception of materially structured historical processes, treats the process of class formation as a historical process shaped by the 'logic' of material determinations. Thompson could, in fact, turn the tables on his critics. One of his major objectives in refusing to define class as a 'structure' or 'thing', as he points out in The Making of the English Working Class, has been to vindicate the concept of class against those, especially bourgeois social scientists, who deny its existence except as 'a pejorative theoretical construct, imposed upon the evidence'. 11 He has countered such denials by insisting upon class as a relationship and a process, to be observed over time as a pattern in social relations, institutions and values. Class, in other words, is a phenomenon which is visible only in process. The denial of class, especially where there is no historical clarity to force its reality upon our attention, cannot be answered simply by 11
Ibid.
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reciting the 'structural' definition of class. This is, in fact, no better than the reduction of class to a theoretical construct imposed on the evidence. What is needed is a way of demonstrating how the structuration of society 'in class ways' actually affects social relations and historical processes. The point, then, is to have a conception of class that invites us to discover how objective class situations actually shape social reality, and not simply to state and restate the tautological proposition that 'class equals relation to the means of production'. The concept of class as relationship and process stresses that objective relations to the means of production are significant because they establish antagonisms and generate conflicts and struggles; that these conflicts and struggles shape social experience 'in class ways', even when they do not express themselves in class consciousness or in clearly visible formations; and that over time we can discern how these relationships impose their logic, their pattern, on social processes. Purely 'structural' conceptions of class do not require us to look for the ways in which class actually imposes its logic, since classes are simply there by definition. Thompson has nevertheless been attacked on the grounds that, by failing to define class in purely 'structural' terms, he has rendered the concept inapplicable to all historical cases in which no class consciousness can be discerned. 12 Yet the emphasis on class as relationship and process is especially important precisely in dealing with cases where no well-defined expressions of class consciousness are available to provide uncontestable evidence of class. This applies in particular to social formations before industrial capitalism, which in nineteenth-century England for the first time in history produced unambiguously visible class formations, compelling observers to take note of class and provide conceptual instruments to apprehend it. In fact, Thompson is arguably the one Marxist who, instead of evading the issue or taking class for granted, has tried to give an account of class which can be applied in such ambiguous cases. His purpose here has not been to deny the existence of class in the absence of class consciousness but, on the contrary, to answer such denials by showing how class determinants shape social processes, how people behave 'in class ways,' even before, and as a pre12
For example, Cohen, Marx's Theory, p. 76; Anderson, Arguments, p. 40.
Class as process and relationship
83
condition to, the 'mature' formations of class with their consciously class-defined institutions and values.13 So, for example, the formula 'class struggle without class', which Thompson tentatively proposes to describe English society in the eighteenth century, is intended to convey the effects of classstructured social relations upon agents without class consciousness and as a precondition to conscious class formations. Class struggle therefore precedes class, both in the sense that class formations presuppose an experience of conflict and struggle arising out of production relations, and in the sense that there are conflicts and struggles structured 'in class ways' even in societies that do not yet have class-conscious formations. To argue that a purely structural definition is required to rescue the universal applicability of 'class' is to suggest that in the absence of class consciousness classes exist only as 'objective relations to the means of production', with no practical consequences for the dynamics of social process. So perhaps it is not Thompson but his critics who effectively reduce class to class consciousness. Thompson, in contrast, seems to be arguing that the 'objective relations of production' always matter, whether or not they are expressed in a well-defined consciousness of class - though they matter in different ways in different historical contexts and produce classformations only as a result of historical processes. The point is to have a conception of class that turns our attention to precisely how, and in what different modes, objective class situations matter. Thompson, then, does indeed say that classes arise or 'happen' because people 'in determinative productive relations', who consequently share a common experience, identify their common interests and come to think and value 'in class ways';14 but this does not mean that classes do not, in any meaningful sense, exist for him as objective realities before class consciousness. On the contrary, class consciousness is possible because 'objective' class situations already exist. His primary concern, of course, is to focus attention on the complex and often contradictory historical processes by which, in determinate historical conditions, class situations give rise to class formations. As for purely 'structural' definitions of class, since they cannot define completed class formations, either they are intended 13 14
Thompson, 'Eighteenth-Century English Society', p. 147. See, for example, Thompson, English I forking Class, pp. 9-10. See also Thompson, Poverty of Theory, pp. 298-9.
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simply to denote the same determining pressures exerted by objective class distributions on variable historical processes - so that the difference between Thompson and his critics is largely a question of emphasis - or such definitions refer to nothing significant at all. THE MAKING OF THE ENGLISH WORKING CLASS
The proposition that Thompson neglects objective determinations in favour of subjective factors has been put to a practical test by Perry Anderson in a particularly trenchant criticism of his major historical work, The Making of the English Working Class. Anderson argues that, in this work, the objective conditions of capital accumulation and industrialization are treated as secondary and external to the making of the English proletariat: It is not the structural transformations - economic, political and demographic - ... which are the objects of his inquiry, but rather their precipitates in the subjective experience of those who lived through these 'terrible years'. The result is to resolve the complex manifold of objective-subjective determinations whose totalization actually generated the English working class into a simple dialectic between suffering and resistance whose whole movement is internal to the subjectivity of the class.15 In fact, suggests Anderson, the advent of industrial capitalism becomes merely a moment in a long and largely 'subjective' process, going back to Tudor times, in which the formation of the English working class appears as a gradual development in a continuous tradition of popular culture. 16 There is, according to Anderson: no real treatment of the whole historical process whereby heterogeneous groups of artisans, small holders, agricultural labourers, domestic workers and casual poor were gradually assembled, distributed and reduced to the condition of labour subsumed to capital, first in the formal dependence of the wage-contract, ultimately in the real dependence of integration into mechanized means of production.17 So, Anderson argues, Thompson provides us with no means of testing his proposition that 'the English working class made itself as much as it was made', since he gives us no measure of the proportional relation between 'agency' and 'necessity'. What would be required is at least a 'conjoint exploration of the objective assemblage and transformation of a labour-force by the Industrial Revo15
Anderson, Arguments, p. 39.
16
Ibid., p. 34.
17
Ibid., p. 33.
Class as process and relationship
85
lution, and of the subjective germination of a class culture in response to it'. 18 By concentrating on the 'immediate experience of the producers rather than on the mode of production itself, Thompson gives us only the subjective elements of the equation. 19 Anderson correctly isolates two of the most characteristic and problematic themes in Thompson's argument: his stress on the continuity of popular traditions cutting across the 'catastrophic' break of the Industrial Revolution; and his insistence on historically situating the critical moments in the formation of the English working class in such a way that the moment of fruition comes in the period 1790-1832, that is, before the real transformation of production and the labour force by industrial capitalism was very far advanced and with no account of the tremendous changes in the working class thereafter.20 Difficulties certainly do arise here, as Anderson suggests. The emphasis on the continuity of popular traditions - older traditions not specifically proletarian but artisanal and 'democratic' - may at first glance make it hard to perceive what is new about the working class of 1790-1832, what is specifically proletarian, or unique to industrial capitalism, in this class formation. What, exactly, has been 'made', and what role has the new order of industrial capitalism played in the making? The temporal parameters may also present problems. To end the process of 'making' in 1832, when industrial transformation was far from complete, may seem to imply that the developments in class consciousness, institutions and values outlined by Thompson occurred independently of'objective' transformations in the mode of production. There are no doubt many historiographical issues to be contested here about the nature and development of the English working class. But the immediate question is whether Thompson's insistence on the continuity of popular traditions and his apparently idiosyncratic periodization of working-class formation reflect a preoccupation with subjective factors at the expense of objective determinations. Is it Thompson's intention to set 'subjective' developments (the evolution of popular culture) against 'objective' factors (the processes of capital accumulation and industrialization)? The first striking point about Thompson's argument is that, for all his insistence on the continuity of popular culture, he considers his 18
Ibid., p. 32.
19
Ibid., p . 33.
20
Ibid., p . 45.
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Historical materialism
argument not as a denial but as a reaffirmation of the view that the period of the Industrial Revolution represents a significant, indeed 'catastrophic', historical milestone, marked by the emergence of a class sufficiently new to appear as a 'fresh race of beings'. In other words, his object is not to assert the subjective continuity of workingclass culture against the radical objective transformations of capitalist development but, on the contrary, to reveal and explain the changes within the continuities. In part, Thompson's emphases are shaped to fit the specific terms of the debates in which he is engaged, debates about the effects of the Industrial Revolution such as the 'standard of living' argument, controversies between 'catastrophic' and 'anti-catastrophic' or 'empiricist' analyses, and so on. He is, among other things, responding to a variety of recent historical - and ideological - orthodoxies which question the importance of dislocations and disruptions entailed by industrial capitalism, or, if they admit to the existence of hardships within the generally progressive and improving tendencies of 'industrialization', attribute them to causes external to the system of production - for example, to 'trade cycles'. Such arguments are sometimes accompanied by denials that the working class, as distinct from several working classes, existed at all. An emphasis on the diversity of working-class experience, on the differences between the 'pre-industriaP experience of domestic workers or artisans and that of factory hands fully absorbed into the new industrial order, can be particularly serviceable to capitalist ideology. It is, for example, especially useful in arguments that confine the hardships and dislocations engendered by industrial capitalism to 'pre-industriaP or traditional workers. In these interpretations, the degradation of such workers becomes simply the inevitable and impersonal consequence of 'displacement by mechanical processes', 'progress', and improved industrial methods, while the modern worker moves steadily onward and upward. Thompson vindicates the 'catastrophic' view, as well as the notion of the working class, by confronting the evidence adduced by their critics. One of his tasks is to explain why, although by certain statistical yardsticks there may have been a slight improvement in average material standards in the period 1790-1840, this improvement was experienced by workers as a 'catastrophe', which they handled by creating new class formations, 'strongly based and self-conscious institutions - trade unions, friendly societies, edu-
Class as process and relationship cational and religious movements, political organizations, periodicals' together with 'working-class intellectual traditions, workingclass community patterns, and a working-class structure of feeling'. 21 These institutions and forms of consciousness are tangible testimony to the existence of a new working-class formation, despite the apparent diversity of experience; and their expressions in popular unrest bear witness against the 'optimistic' view of the Industrial Revolution. Yet Thompson then faces the problem of accounting for the fact that this class formation is already visibly in place when the new system of production is still undeveloped; that large numbers of the workers who constitute this class formation, and indeed initiate its characteristic institutions, do not apparently belong to a 'fresh race of beings' produced by industrialization, but are still engaged in ostensibly 'pre-industriaP forms of domestic and artisanal labour; and that factory hands probably did not (except in cotton districts) form the 'nucleus of the Labour movement' before the late 1840s.22 In light of these facts, it would on the face of it be difficult to maintain that the new working class was simply created by the new forms of production characteristic of industrial capitalism. To account for the incontestable presence of class formations that unite new and traditional forms of labour - artisans, domestic workers, factory hands - it becomes necessary to identify a unifying experience, one which also explains why the 'catastrophic' impact of the Industrial Revolution was experienced in sectors apparently still untouched by the transformation of industrial production. Here Thompson's critics might argue - as Anderson's criticism suggests - that Thompson relies too much on 'subjective' experiences, suffering and the continuity of popular culture to override the objective diversity of artisans and factory hands without giving an account of the processes that actually, objectively, united them into a single class. Indeed, these critics might argue that for Thompson no objective unity is necessary to identify the working class, as long as it can be defined in terms of a unity in consciousness. But criticisms like this concede too much to Thompson's antiMarxist opponents. For example, the 'optimistic' and 'empiricist' arguments rely at least implicitly on setting up an opposition between 'facts' and 'values', between their own 'objective' standards 21
T h o m p s o n , English Working Class, p p . 213, 231.
22
Ibid., p. 211.
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Historical materialism
and merely 'subjective' standards having to do with the 'quality of life'. This opposition can be used to obscure the issues by relegating problems of exploitation, relations of production and class struggle which are the focus of Thompson's argument - to the sphere of subjectivity, while identifying objectivity with 'hard' 'impersonal' factors: trade cycles, technology, wage and price indices, Thompson, while certainly concerned with the 'quality of life', defines its conditions not simply in subjective terms but in terms of the objective realities of capitalist production relations and their expressions in the organization of life. OBJECTIVE
DETERMINATIONS
The single most important objective condition experienced in common by various kinds of workers during the period in question was the intensification of exploitation; and Thompson devotes the second and central section of The Making of the English Working Class, introduced by a chapter entitled 'Exploitation', to a description of its effects.23 He is concerned not simply with its effects in 'suffering' but in the distribution and organization of work (as well as leisure), most especially its consequences for work discipline and the intensity of labour, for example in the extension of hours of work, increasing specialization, the break up of the family economy, and so on.24 He also considers how the exploitive relationship was expressed in 'corresponding forms of ownership and State power', in legal and political forms, and how the intensification of exploitation was compounded by counter-revolutionary political repression.25 These are factors that certainly cannot, from a Marxist point of view, be dismissed as 'subjective'; and Thompson sets them against the 'hard facts' of the 'empiricist' argument, not as subjectivity against objec23
24 25
See, for example: ibid., p p . 217-18, 226. T h e structure of the book as a whole is worth noting. Part O n e describes the political culture a n d traditions of struggle which people brought with them into the transforming experience of 'industrialization'. Part T w o describes in great detail that transforming experience itself, the new relationship of exploitation a n d its multifarious expressions in every aspect of life, in work a n d leisure, in family a n d c o m m u n a l life. Part T h r e e describes the new working-class consciousness, the new political culture, a n d the new forms of struggle that emerged out of that transformation. Part T w o is the pivotal section, explaining the objective influences (as T h o m p son himself describes them), the transformations through which the old popular tradition was reshaped into a new working-class culture. See, for example: T h o m p s o n , English Working Class, p p . 2 2 1 - 3 , 230. Ibid., pp. 215-18.
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tivity, but as the real objective determinations which underlie the Tacts': By what social alchemy did inventions for saving labour become agents of immiseration? The raw fact - a bad harvest - may seem to be beyond human election. But the way that fact worked its way out was in terms of a particular complex of human relationship: law, ownership, power. When we encounter some sonorous phrase such as 'the strong ebb and flow of the trade cycle' we must be put on our guard. For behind this trade cycle there is a structure of social relations, fostering some sorts of expropriation (rent, interest, profit) and outlawing some others (theft, feudal dues), legitimizing some types of conflict (competition, armed warfare) and inhibiting others (trade unionism, bread riots, popular political organization) ... . 26 The underlying objective determinations affecting the developments of 1790-1832 were, then, the working out of capitalist modes of expropriation, the intensification of exploitation this implied, and the structure of social relations, legal forms and political powers by which that exploitation was sustained. The significant point is that these factors affected both 'traditional' and new forms of labour; and their common 'experience', with the struggles it entailed - in a period of transition which produced a moment of particular transparency in relationships of exploitation, a clarity heightened by political repression - underlay the process of class formation. The particular significance and subtlety of Thompson's argument lies in its demonstration that the apparent continuity of 'preindustriaP forms can be deceptive. He argues that domestic and artisanal production were themselves transformed - even when they were not displaced - by the same process and the same mode of exploitation that created the factory system. In fact, it was often in outwork industries that the new relationship of exploitation was most transparent. This is, for example, how he answers arguments that attribute the hardships of 'industrialization' simply to 'displacement by mechanical processes': it will not do to explain away the plight of weavers or of'slop' workers as 'instances of the decline of old crafts which were displaced by a mechanical process'; nor can we even accept the statement, in its pejorative context, that 'it was not among the factory employees but among the domestic workers, whose traditions and methods were those of the eighteenth century, that earnings were at their lowest'. The suggestion to which these statements lead us is that these conditions can somehow be segregated in 26
Ibid., pp. 224-5.
go
Historical materialism
our minds from the true improving impulse of the Industrial Revolution they belong to an 'older', pre-industrial order, whereas the authentic features of the new capitalist order may be seen where there are steam, factory operatives, and meat-eating engineers. But the numbers employed in the outwork industries multiplied enormously between 1780-1830; and very often steam and the factory were the multipliers. It was the mills which spun the yarn and the foundries which made the nail-rod upon which the outworkers were employed. Ideology may wish to exalt one and decry the other, but facts must lead us to say that each was a complementary component of a single process . . . . Moreover, the degradation of the outworkers was very rarely as simple as the phrase 'displaced by a mechanical process5 suggests; it was accomplished by methods of exploitation similar to those in the dishonourable trades and it often preceded machine competition . . . . Indeed, we may say that large-scale sweated outwork was as intrinsic to this revolution as was factory production and steam.27 Thompson undermines the ideological foundations of his antiMarxist adversaries simply by displacing the focus of analysis from
'industrialization' to capitalism.2* In other words, he shifts our attention from purely 'technological' factors, as well as from trade cycles and market relations - the typical refuges of capitalist ideology - to the relations of production and class exploitation. From this (Marxist) standpoint, Thompson is able to account for the historical presence of working-class formations in the early stages of industrialization, on the grounds that the essential capitalist relations of production and exploitation were already in place, and indeed were the pre-conditions for industrialization itself. For a variety of reasons, then, Thompson cannot accept the simple proposition that the factory system produced, out of whole cloth, a new working class, nor the suggestion that the objective 'assemblage, distribution, and transformation' of the labour force had to precede the emergence of a class consciousness and culture 'in response' to it. He cannot accept that the making of the working class out of 'heterogeneous groups' had to await the completion of the process in which they were 'assembled, distributed, and reduced to the condition of labour subsumed to capital, first in the formal 27 28
Ibid., p p . 288-9; s e e a ^ so PP- 2 2 2 - 3 . Elsewhere, Thompson explicitly questions the 'suspect' concept of 'industrialism/ which obscures the social realities of industrial capitalism by treating them as if they belonged to some inevitable 'supposedly-neutral, technologically-determined, process known as "industrialization" ...', 'Time, Work-Discipline, and Industrial Capitalism,' now available in his collection of essays, Customs in Common (London, 1991).
Class as process and relationship dependence of the wage-contract, ultimately in the real dependence of integration into mechanized means of production'. For one thing, if the relations of production and exploitation are the critical objective factors in constituting a mode of production, and if they provide the impulse for the transformation of labour processes, then the 'formal subjection' of labour to capital assumes a special significance and primacy. The 'formal subjection' represents the establishment of the capitalist relationship between appropriator and producer and the pre-condition to, indeed the motivating force for, the subsequent 'real' transformation of production, often called 'industrialization'. It acts as a determinative force upon various kinds of workers, and as a unifying experience among them, even before the process of 'real subjection' incorporates them all and 'assembles' them in factories. In a very important sense, then, it is indeed 'experience' and not simply an objective 'assemblage' that unites these heterogeneous groups into a class - though 'experience' in this context refers to the effects of objective determinations, the relations of production and class exploitation. In fact, the connection between relations of production and class formation can probably never be conceived in any other way, since people are never actually assembled directly in class formations in the process of production. Even when the 'assemblage and transformation' of the labour force is complete, people are at best assembled only in productive units, factories, and so on. Their assemblage in class formations which transcend such individual units is a process of a different kind, one that depends upon their consciousness of, and propensity to act upon, a common experience and common interests. (More on this later.) Thompson is perhaps being criticized for concentrating on the formal subjection at the expense of the real. There are indeed weaknesses in his arguments arising from his focus on the determinative and unifying force of capitalist exploitation and its effects on 'preindustriaP workers, and his relative neglect of the specificity of 'industrialization' and machine production, the further 'catastrophe' occasioned by the completion of 'real subjection'. Perry Anderson, for example, refers to the profound changes in workingclass industrial and political organization and class consciousness after the 1840s, when the transformation was more or less complete — changes which, he suggests, Thompson's argument cannot
91
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Historical materialism
explain.29 But this is not the same thing as saying that Thompson concentrates on subjective rather than objective determinations unless it is from the standpoint of'optimistic' and 'empiricist' orthodoxies or capitalist ideology, in which the very premises of Marxist theory, with its focus on relations of production and class exploitation, can be dismissed altogether as 'subjectivist'. There are other more general theoretical and political reasons for denying that the making of the English working class was the 'spontaneous generation of the factory system'. The basic theoretical and methodological principle of Thompson's whole historical project is that objective determinations - the transformation of production relations and working conditions - never impose themselves on 'some nondescript undifferentiated raw material of humanity' but on historical beings, the bearers of historical legacies, traditions and values. 30 This means, among other things, that there are necessarily continuities cutting across all historical transformations, even the most radical, and indeed that radical transformations can be revealed and substantiated precisely - only? - by tracing them within continuities. Again, his own emphasis on the continuity of popular culture is intended not to deny but to identify and stress the transformations it undergoes. This much is perhaps characteristic of any truly historical account, but there is more to Thompson's argument than this. It is essential to his historical materialism to recognize that 'objective' and 'subjective' are not dualistically separated entities (which lend themselves easily to the measurement of'necessity' and 'agency'), related to one another only externally and mechanically, 'the one sequential upon the other' as objective stimulus and subjective response.31 It is necessary somehow to incorporate in social analysis the role of conscious and active historical beings, who are 'subject' and 'object' at once, both agents and material forces in objective processes. Finally, Thompson's mode of analysis makes it possible to acknowledge the active role of the working class, with its culture and values, in 'making' itself. This role may be obscured by formulations which speak, on the one hand, of 'the objective assemblage and 29
30
Anderson, Arguments, p p . 4 5 - 7 . Anderson refers here to G a r e t h Stedman Jones's discussion of the 're-making' of the English working class in the latter part of the nineteenth century, in 'Working-Class Culture and Working-Class Politics in London, 1870-1890: Notes on the Remaking of a Working Class', Journal of Social History (Summer 1974), p p . 460-508. 31 Thompson, English Working Class, p. 213. Thompson, Poverty of Theory, p. 298.
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transformation of labour force by the Industrial Revolution', and, on the other - sequentially? - 'the subjective germination of a class culture in response to it'. The acknowledgment of working-class self-activity is central not only to Thompson's historical project but to his political one. CLASS AS RELATIONSHIP AND PROCESS
Thompson's concern, then, is to render class visible in history and to make its objective determinations manifest as historical forces, as real effects in the world and not just as theoretical constructs that refer to no actual social force or process. This means that he must locate the essence of class not simply in 'structural positions' but in relationships - the relationships of exploitation, conflict and struggle which provide the impulse to processes of class formation. Yet this very emphasis is often singled out as evidence of his voluntarism and subjectivism, his neglect of objective determinations. Clearly, his preference for treating class as relationship and process - rather than, for example, as a structure which enters relationships or undergoes process — demands closer scrutiny — and here I shall take more than the usual interpretive liberties in elaborating what may be more my own theory of class than Thompson's. 'Class as relationship' actually entails two relationships: that between classes and that among members of the same class. The importance of stressing the relationship between classes as essential to the definition of class is self-evident when considered against the background of'stratification' theories which - whether they focus on income distribution, occupation groups, status, or any other criterion - have to do with differences, inequalities and hierarchy, not relations. It is surely unnecessary to point out the consequences, both sociological and ideological, of employing a definition of class (if class is admitted as a 'category of stratification' at all) which factors out relations like domination or exploitation. Even more fundamentally, such categories of stratification may render class itself invisible altogether. Where is the dividing line between classes in a continuum of inequality? Where is the qualitative break in a structure of stratification?32 32
For an important discussion of this point, see Peter Meiksins, 'Beyond the Boundary Question', Xew Left Review, 157, pp. 101-20, and 'New Classes and Old Theories', in Rhonda Levine and Jerry Lembcke, eds., Recapturing Marxism: An Appraisal of Recent Trends in Sociological Theory (New York, 1987).
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Even the criterion of relation to the means of production is not enough to mark such boundaries and can easily be assimilated to conventional stratification theory. It is possible, for example, to treat 'relations to the means of production' as nothing more than income differentials by locating their significance not in the exploitative and antagonistic social relations they entail but in the different 'market chances' they confer.33 The differences among classes thus become indeterminate and inconsequential. If classes enter into any relationship at all, it is the indirect, impersonal relationship of individual competition in the market place, in which there are no clear qualitative breaks or antagonisms but only a quantitative continuum of relative advantage and disadvantage in the contest for goods and services. It is explicitly against class as a 'category of stratification' that Thompson directs much of his argument about class as a relationship, and precisely on the grounds that stratification theories tend to render class invisible.34 The most obvious target of this attack is conventional anti-Marxist sociology; but Thompson often points out that there are affinities between certain Marxist treatments of class and these sociological conjuring tricks, to the extent that they are more interested in abstractly defined structural class locations than in the qualitative social breaks expressed in the dynamics of class relations and conflicts. While the identification of antagonisms in the relation between classes is a necessary condition for a definition of class, it is not sufficient. That brings us to class as an internal relationship, a relationship among members of a class. The idea of class as a relationship in this sense also entails certain propositions about how classes are connected to the underlying relations of production. The proposition that production relations are the foundation of class relations is certainly the basis of any materialist theory of class; but it does not by itself advance the issue very far. If we cannot say that class is synonymous with production relations, we are still left with the problem (which is generally evaded) of defining precisely the nature of the connection between class and its foundation in production. The relations of production are the relations among people who 33 34
See, for example: M a x Weber, Economy and Society (New York, 1968), p p . 927-8. Rational choice Marxism has some striking affinities with this view. For example, T h o m p s o n , English Working Class, p p . 9 - 1 0 .
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are joined by the production process and the antagonistic nexus between those who produce and those who appropriate their surplus labour. The division between direct producers and the appropriators of their surplus labour, the antagonism of interest inherent in this relationship, no doubt defines the polarities underlying class antagonisms. But class relations are not reducible to production relations. First, the clear polarities (when they are clear) inherent in the relations of production do not account neatly for all potential members of historical classes. More fundamentally, even if individual appropriators owe their exploitive power to the class power that stands behind them, it is not classes that produce and appropriate. To put it very simply: people who are joined in a class are not all directly assembled by the process of production itself or by the process of appropriation. Workers in a factory, brought together by the capitalist in a cooperative division of labour, are directly assembled in the production process. Each worker also stands in a kind of direct relationship to the particular capitalist (individual or collective) who appropriates his or her surplus value, just as the peasant is directly related to the landlord who appropriates his rent. A direct relationship of some kind can also be said to exist, for example, among peasants who work independently of one another but who share the same landlord, even if they do not deliberately combine in opposition to him. The relationship among members of a class, or between these members and other classes, is of a different kind. Neither the production process itself nor the process of surplus extraction actually brings them together. 'Class' does not refer simply to workers combined in a unit of production or opposed to a common exploiter in a unit of appropriation. Class implies a connection that extends beyond the immediate process of production and the immediate nexus of extraction, a connection that spans across particular units of production and appropriation. The connections and oppositions contained in the production process are the basis of class; but the relationship among people occupying similar positions in the relations of production is not given directly by the process of production and appropriation. The links that connect the members of a class are not defined by the simple assertion that class is structurally determined by the relations of production. It still remains to be explained in what sense
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and through what mediations the relations of production establish connections among people who, even if they occupy similar positions in production relations, are not actually assembled in the process of production and appropriation. In The Making of the English Working Class, as we have seen, Thompson addressed himself to this very question. Here, he sought to account for the existence of class relationships among workers not directly assembled in the process of production and even engaged in widely divergent forms of production. In his account, it was indeed the relations of production that lay at the heart of these class relationships; but the determining structural pressures of production relations could be demonstrated only as they worked themselves out in a historical process of class formation, and these pressures could be apprehended theoretically only by introducing the mediating concept of'experience'. Class formation is particularly difficult to explain without resorting to concepts like Thompson's 'experience'. While people may participate directly in production and appropriation - the combinations, divisions and conflicts generated by these processes - class does not present itself to them so immediately. Since people are never actually 'assembled' in classes, the determining pressure exerted by a mode of production in the formation of classes cannot easily be expressed without reference to something like a common experience - a lived experience of production relations, the divisions between producers and appropriators, and more particularly, of the conflicts and struggles inherent in relations of exploitation. It is in the medium of this lived experience that social consciousness is shaped and with it the 'disposition to behave as a class'.35 Once the medium of 'experience' is introduced into the equation between production relations and class, so too are the historical and cultural particularities of this medium. This certainly complicates the issue; but to acknowledge, as Thompson does, the complexity of the mechanism by which production relations give rise to class is not to deny their determining pressure. Thompson has been accused of idealism because of his emphasis on 'experience', as if this notion had slipped its material moorings. But his use of this concept is certainly not intended to sever the link between 'social being' and social consciousness or even to deny the primacy that historical materialism accords to social being in its 35
Thompson, 'The Peculiarities of the English', in The Poverty of Theory, p. 85.
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relation to consciousness. On the contrary, although Thompson sometimes distinguishes among levels of experience ('lived experience' and 'perceived experience'), his primary use of the term is as 'a necessary middle term between social being and social consciousness', the medium in which social being determines consciousness: 'it is by means of experience that the mode of production exerts a determining pressure on other activities'. 36 Experience in this sense is precisely 'the experience of determination'. 37 In fact, since Marx's concept of social being itself clearly refers not simply to the mode of production as an impersonal 'objective structure' but to the way that people live it (one can hardly avoid saying experience it), Thompson's 'experience' substantially overlaps with 'social being'. The concept of 'experience', then, means that 'objective structures' do something to people's lives, and that this is why, for example, we have classes and not only relations of production. It is the task of the historian and the sociologist to explore what these 'structures' do to people's lives, how they do it, and what people do about it - or, as Thompson might put it, how the determining pressures of structured processes are experienced and handled by people. The burden of the theoretical message contained in the concept of'experience' is, among other things, that the operation of determining pressures is a historical question, and therefore immediately an empirical one. There can be no rupture between the theoretical and the empirical, and Thompson the historian immediately takes up the task presented by Thompson the theorist. Neither Marx nor Thompson nor anyone else has devised a 'rigorous' theoretical vocabulary to convey the effect of material conditions on conscious, active beings - beings whose conscious activity is itself a material force - or to comprehend the fact that these effects assume an infinite variety of historically specific empirical forms. But it can surely be no part of theoretical rigour to ignore these complexities merely for the sake of conceptual tidiness or a framework of 'structural definitions' which purport to resolve all important historical questions on the theoretical plane. Nor is it enough just to concede the existence of these complexities in some other order of reality - in the sphere of history as distinct from the 36
37
T h o m p s o n , Poverty of Theory, p . 290; also p p . 2 0 0 - 1 . A conception of 'determination' similar to T h o m p s o n ' s is given a systematic treatment in R a y m o n d Williams, Marxism and Literature (Oxford, 1977), p p . 8 3 - 9 . T h o m p s o n , Poverty of Theory, p . 298.
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sphere of'objective structures' - which belongs to a different level of discourse, the 'empirical' in opposition to the 'theoretical'. They must somehow be acknowledged by the theoretical framework itself and be embodied in the very notion of'structure' - as, for example, in Thompson's notion of'structured process'. Deductive 'structural definitions' of class cannot explain how people sharing a common experience of production relations but not united by the process of production itself come by the 'disposition to behave as a class', let alone how the nature of that disposition - the degree of cohesion and consciousness associated with it, its expression in common goals, institutions, organizations, and united action - changes over time. Such definitions cannot take into account the pressures against class formation - pressures that may themselves be inherent in the structure, the objective determinations, of the prevailing mode of production - and the tension between the impulses towards and against coalescence and common action. The notion of class as 'structured process', in contrast, acknowledges that while the structural basis of class formation is to be found in the antagonistic relations of production, the particular ways in which the structural pressures exerted by these relations actually operate in the formation of classes remains an open question to be resolved empirically by historical and sociological analysis. Such a conception of class also recognizes that this is where the most important and problematic questions about class lie, and that the usefulness of any class analysis - as either a sociological tool or a guide to political strategy - rests on its ability to account for the process of class formation. This means that any definition of class must invite, not foreclose, the investigation of process. Thompson's insistence on class as process again puts in question the accusation that he equates class with class consciousness, that, to put it another way, he confuses the phenomenon of class itself with the conditions that make class 'an active historical subject'. 38 The first point to note about this accusation is that it is itself based on a confusion: it fails to take account of the difference between, on the one hand, class consciousness - that is, the active awareness of class identity - and, on the other hand, forms of consciousness that are shaped in various ways by class situations without yet finding expression in a self-aware and active class identity. Thompson is 38
Cohen, Alarx's Theory, p. 76.
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especially concerned with the historical processes that intervene between the two. More fundamentally, to equate class with a particular level of consciousness, or with the existence of class consciousness at all, would be to identify class with one stage of its development instead of stressing, as Thompson does, the complex processes that go to make up the 'disposition to behave as a class'. Thompson's conception of class as 'relationship' and 'process' is directed against definitions which, at best, imply that there is one point in the formation of classes where one can stop the process and say 'here is class, and not before', or at worst and, perhaps more commonly, seek to define classes outside the medium of time and historical process altogether. This can be done either by 'deducing' classes from 'structural positions' in relation to the means of production or by 'hypostasizing class identities - great personalized attributions of class aspirations or volition - which one knows are at best the metaphorical expression of most complex, and generally involuntary, processes'.39 Thompson's object, then, is not to identify class with a particular level of consciousness or organization which makes it a conscious political force, but rather to focus our attention on class in the process of becoming, or making itself, such a force. Class as 'structure' conceptualizes away the very fact that defines the role of class as the driving force of historical movement: the fact that class at the beginning of a historical mode of production is not what it is at the end. The identity of a mode of production is commonly said to reside in the persistence of its production relations: as long as the form in which 'surplus labour is pumped out of the direct producer' remains essentially the same, we are entitled to refer to a mode of production as 'feudal', 'capitalist', and so on. But class relations are the principle of movement within the mode of production. The history of a mode of production is the history of its developing class relations and, in particular, their changing relations to the relations of production. Classes develop within a mode of production in the process of coalescing around the relations of production and as the composition, cohesion, consciousness, and organization of the resulting class formations change. The mode of production reaches its crisis when the development of class relations within it actually transforms the relations of production themselves. 39
Thompson, 'Peculiarities of the English', p. 85.
i oo
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To account for historical movement, then, means precisely to deny that the relation between class and the relations of production is fixed. The structural definition of class, as Thompson suggests, often tends to attribute a kind of personal volition to class as 'It'. The other side of that coin is the tendency to attribute failures to some kind of personality defect in 'It', like 'false consciousness'. There is more than a little irony, then, in the fact that Thompson, when countering conceptions of this kind, is accused of subjectivism and voluntarism. What is presented as an objectivist alternative to Thompson turns out to be a more extreme and idealist subjectivism and voluntarism, which merely transfers volition from human agency - a human agency bounded by 'determining pressures' and drawn into 'involuntary processes' - to a more exalted Subject, Class, a thing with a static identity, whose will is largely free of specific historical determinations. This transfer upward of subjective volition reaches its highest point in structuralist arguments. Althusserians, for example, purport to expel subjectivity altogether from social theory and deny agency even to class-as-It; but, in a sense, they merely create an even more imperious Subject, the Structure itself, whose will is determined by nothing but the contradictions in its own arbitrary personality. Arguments which appear to Thompson's critics as subjectivist and voluntarist - his conception of human agency and his insistence on historical specificity apparently at the expense of 'objective structures' - are those which he marshals against subjectivism and voluntarism and for a recognition of the objective determining pressures that impinge upon human agency. Far from subordinating objective determining pressures to subjectivity and historical contingency, his point is to set historical investigation against the kind of inverted subjectivism, voluntarism and idealism that creep into analyses which lack a firm historical and sociological ground. THE POLITICS OF THEORY
Thompson has always worked from the premise that theory has implications for practice. His definition of class, with its emphasis on class as an active process and a historical relationship, was certainly formulated to vindicate class against social scientists and historians
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who deny its existence; but it was also intended to counter both intellectual traditions and political practices that suppress human agency and in particular deny the self-activity of the working class in the making of history. By placing class struggle at the centre of theory and practice, Thompson intended to rescue 'history from below' not only as an intellectual enterprise but as a political project against both the oppressions of class domination and the programme of 'socialism from above' in its various incarnations from Fabianism to Stalinism.40 His attacks on Althusserian Marxism were directed equally against what he perceived to be its theoretical deformations and against the political practice he found inscribed in them. Thompson's critics have returned the compliment. In his concept of class and the historical project that rests upon it, they have often found a unity of theory and practice in which his 'subjectivist' theory of class underpins a 'populist socialism'. He has been criticized for being too quick to see, in any form of consciousness touched by class-determined life circumstances, the kind of class consciousness that suggests a readiness to act purposefully as a class. He exhibits, according to this criticism, a kind of 'populism' which treats as unproblematic the construction of a socialist politics out of popular culture. Curiously, this judgment seems to unite defenders of 'orthodox' structural definitions of class with critics who maintain that Thompson has not gone far enough in pursuing the implications of his 'non-reductive' Marxism. So, for example, Stuart Hall has argued that Thompson conflates 'class-in-itself' with 'class-for-itself, and that inscribed in this confusion is a politics of 'too simple "populism"'. 41 The 'catch-all category of experience', Hall argues, 40
41
Bryan Palmer, in his very useful book, The Making o/E.P. Thompson: Marxism, Humanism, and History (Toronto, 1981), has provided an illuminating general discussion of the relationship between Thompson as a social historian and as a political activist. Palmer has warned me against describing Thompson's work as 'history from below', on the grounds that the phrase has misleading 'American populist' connotations and has lost favour with historians. He suggests that it obscures the extent of Thompson's concern for the relations between 'top' and 'bottom' and, in particular his increasing interest in the problem of the state. I accept the warning against misrepresenting the nature of Thompson's concerns, but want to retain the term in the sense in which it is (still) applied to a historiographical movement, deriving much of its early impetus from the British Communist Party Historians Group in the 1940s and 1950s, that has sought to explore the broad social foundations of historical processes and to illuminate the role of the 'common people' in shaping history. Stuart Hall, 'In Defense of Theory', in Raphael Samuel, ed., People's History and Socialist Theory (London, 1981), p. 384.
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conflates the objective determinants of class with their appropriation in consciousness and seems to imply that '"the class" is always really in its place, at the ready, and can be summoned up "for socialism"', without facing up to 'all that is involved in saying that socialism has to be constructed by a real political practice'. Although it may not have been unambiguously obvious at the time of Hall's writing, in retrospect, and especially in the context of his affinities with 'post-Marxist' theories, it seems clear that this argument, which opened a wider gulf between 'objective structures' and class-conscious class formations, was coming close to the absolute 'non-correspondence' between the economic and the political proposed by post-Marxists; yet it is based on much the same account of Thompson's theory of class as that of Anderson or Cohen, and, apparently, on much the same dichotomy between structure and history. It is not insignificant, in view of the Althusserian flip of the coin to which I alluded in the previous chapter, that in this criticism of Thompson, Hall was writing in (qualified) defence of Althusser. If, as I have argued, Thompson's historical project is opposed to the conflation - or, what is in effect the same thing, the simple equation - of objective determinations and their expressions in consciousness, and if his focus on the process of class formation presupposes a distinction between them since it is concerned with the changing relations between them, he cannot be accused of conflating the 'objective' and 'subjective' determinants of class, or structure and consciousness. The distinction between 'class-in-itself and 'class-for-itself is not, however, simply an analytic distinction between objective class structure and subjective class consciousness. It refers to two different stages in the process of class formation and two different historical modes of relationship between structure and consciousness - and, in this sense, Thompson certainly has a conception of 'class-in-itself, to which, for example, he alludes with his paradoxical formula, 'class struggle without class'. The question then is whether Thompson crosses the line between these two modes of class too soon, whether he is too quick, as Hall suggests, to perceive, in any form of consciousness touched by class-determined life circumstances, a readiness to act purposefully as a class. This question is above all a political one, and there is undoubtedly a danger here. Romanticism about the customs and traditions of the 'people' and about the radical promise contained in the mere difference and separateness of popular culture is not the
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soundest foundation for building a socialist movement or assessing and overcoming the 'people's' own resistance to socialist politics. But Thompson surely has no illusions about this, whatever his successors in 'people's history' may think. Thompson's message is indeed political; but there is something else in his recovery of popular consciousness and the 'making' of class than a failure to recognize the difference and barriers between, on the one hand, popular culture, which arises directly out of experience - an experience of work, exploitation, oppression, and struggle - and, on the other hand, an active socialist consciousness which is painfully crafted by political practice. His historical project, his reconstruction of history as it is made by the working class as active agents and not simply as passive victims, grows directly out of the basic political principle of Marxism and its particular understanding of socialist practice: that socialism can come only through the self-emancipation of the working class. 42 This proposition implies that the working class is the only social group possessing not only an immediate interest in resisting capitalist exploitation but also a collective power adequate to end it. The proposition also implies a scepticism about the authenticity - or, indeed, the likelihood - of emancipation not achieved by selfactivity and struggle but won by proxy or conferred by benefaction. There are no guarantees here; but however difficult it may be to construct socialist practice out of popular consciousness, there is, according to this view, no other material out of which it can be constructed and no other socialism that is consistent with both political realism and democratic values. Perhaps the point is simply that socialism will come about either in this way or not at all. HEGEMONY AND SUBSTITUTIONISM
When Thompson launched his controversial attack on Althusserianism, one of his principal concerns was to counter the drift away 42
Thompson, for example, opposes his own work to the 'Fabian orthodoxy, in which the great majority of working people are seen as passive victims of laissez faire, with the exception of a handful of far-sighted organizers (notably Francis Place)' (English Working Class, p. 12). This 'orthodoxy' is, of course, not unrelated to the Fabian political programme, with its view of the working class as passive victims requiring the imposition of socialism from above, not by means of class struggle but through piecemeal reform and social engineering by an enlightened minority of intellectuals and philanthropic members of the ruling class.
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from this democratic understanding of the socialist project on the part of Western Marxism, towards a theoretical abandonment of the working class as the principal agent of social transformation through the medium of class struggle, and a transfer of that role to other social actors, most especially to intellectuals. 'There is no mark more distinctive of Western Marxisms', he wrote, nor more revealing as to their profoundly anti-democratic premises. Whether Frankfurt School or Althusser, they are marked by their very heavy emphasis upon the ineluctable weight of ideological modes of domination - domination which destroys every space for the initiative or creativity of the mass of the people - a domination from which only the enlightened minority or intellectuals can struggle free. ... it is a sad premise from which socialist theory should start (all men and women, except for us, are originally stupid) and one which is bound to lead on to pessimistic or authoritarian conclusions.43 This kind of theoretical 'substitutionism' in its most extreme form can be achieved by doing what Stuart Hall accuses some Althusserians, though apparently not Althusser himself, of doing: treating all 'classes as mere "bearers" of historical process, without agency: and historical process itself as a process "without a subject" \ 4 4 But much the same effect is produced, Thompson suggests, by conceiving of class as a static category, and being less concerned about the historical process of class formation than about the deductive charting of structural class locations or the theoretical construction of an ideal class identity. These are the kinds of formulation that lend themselves far too easily to the dismissal of actual historical, and hence imperfect, forms of class consciousness as 'false5 and therefore in need of substitutes.45 If there is a political message inscribed in Thompson's theory of class, it is against the theorization of a 'substitutionism' in which the working class is not merely represented but eclipsed by its substitute. Much of Thompson's work has been directed, explicitly or implicitly, against the view that hegemony is one-sided and complete, imposing 'an all-embracing domination upon the ruled - or upon all those who are not intellectuals - reaching down to the very threshold of their experience, and implanting within their minds at birth categories of subordination which they are powerless to shed and 43 45
44 Thompson, Poverty of Theory, pp.377-8 Hall, 'In Defense of Theory', p. 383. See, e.g., Thompson, 'Eighteenth-Century English Society', p. 148.
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which their experience is powerless to correct'. 46 This, as he suggests, is a dominant theme in Western Marxism, this tendency to identify hegemony with the thorough absorption of subordinate classes into ruling class ideology and cultural domination (probably with the assistance of Ideological State Apparatuses), so that the construction of a counter-hegemonic consciousness and culture and the establishment of working-class hegemony must apparently be accomplished by free-spirited intellectuals.47 Such a definition of hegemony accords well with theoretical constructions of class in which nothing exists between the objective constitution of classes by modes of production, on the one hand, and an ideal revolutionary class consciousness, on the other, except a vast empirical-historical (and hence impure and theoretically indigestible) spectrum of 'false' consciousness. But there is an added irony here, as I suggested in the previous chapter (and elsewhere): the flip side of this brand of Marxism is the post-Marxist abandonment of class politics altogether and its replacement by the politics of'discourse'. For Thompson, in contrast, hegemony is not synonymous with domination by one class and submission by the other. Instead, it embodies class struggle and bears the mark of subordinate classes, their self-activity and their resistance. His theory of class, with its emphasis on the process of class formation, is intended to permit the recognition of'imperfect' or 'partial' forms of popular consciousness as authentic expressions of class and class struggle, valid in their historical circumstances even if'wrong' from the standpoint of later, or ideal, developments. It is one thing to mistake the mere separateness of popular culture for radical opposition, ready to be harnessed immediately to the struggle for socialism; it is quite another simply to mark out the space where the cultural writ of the dominant class does not run, and to identify 'popular' consciousness - however resistant it may be to the formation of 'true' class consciousness - as the stuff out of which a complete class consciousness must and can nonetheless be made. To deny the authenticity of 'partial' class consciousness, to treat it as false instead of as a historically intelligible 'option under pressure',48 has important strategic consequences. We are invited 46 48
47 Ibid., p. 164. See ibid., p. 163 n. 60. Raymond Williams, 'Notes on Marxism in Britain since 1945', JV«r Left Review, 100 (November 1976-January 1977), p. 87.
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either to look for surrogate agents of class struggle and historical change, or to abandon the field altogether to the hegemonic enemy. It is against these political alternatives, and their theoretical foundations in a concept of class as 'structure' or ideal identity, that Thompson sets his own theory of class as process and relationship. Raymond Williams, in his 'Notes on British Marxism in Britain since 1945', wrote of his own stance in relation to the available choices confronting British Marxists in the 1950s and his rejection of the rhetorical populism which complacently ignored the implications of 'consumer' capitalism and the 'powerful new pull' it exerted upon the people. At the same time, he continued: because I saw the process as options under pressure, and knew where the pressure was coming from, I could not move to the other available position: that contempt of the people, of their hopelessly corrupted state, of their vulgarity and credulity by comparison with an educated minority, which was the staple of cultural criticism of a non-Marxist kind and which seems to have survived intact, through the appropriate alterations of vocabulary, into a formalist Marxism which makes the whole people, including the whole working class, mere carriers of the structures of a corrupt ideology. 49
Against this trend, Williams insisted that 'there were still, and still powerful, existing resources': To stay with the existing resources; to learn and perhaps to teach new resources; to live the contradictions and the options under pressure so that instead of denunciation or writing-off there was a chance of understanding them and tipping them the other way: if these things were populism, then it is as well that the British Left, including most Marxists, stayed with it. 50 Edward Thompson, for one, certainly stayed with it. His theory of class, the discovery of authentic expressions of class in popular consciousness and culture, represent an effort 'to live the contradictions and options under pressure . . . instead of denunciation or writing-off'. His insistence on a historical and sociological account of working-class 'reformism', for example, instead of the ritual excommunication which denounces it from a vantage point outside 49
50
Ibid. For a similar view, see T h o m p s o n , 'Peculiarities of the English', pp. 69-70, where he attacks schematic, unhistorical and unsociological conceptions of class, in particular, those which have produced ritual denunciations of working-class reformism, instead of an understanding of its 'deep sociological roots,' and have thus neglected a vital d a t u m confronting any socialist political practice. Williams, 'Notes on Marxism', p. 87.
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of history as the 'false consciousness' of a working class 'It', implies that we must understand the 'existing resources' in order to 'tip them the other way'. There are, of course, dangers here too. 'To stay with the existing resources' can become an excuse for not looking beyond them; to acknowledge the 'deep sociological roots' of 'reformism' as a political reality that must be confronted may lead to accepting it as a limit on the horizons of struggle. It is one thing to acknowledge the authenticity of working-class 'options under pressure' and to be wary of the notion of false consciousness as an invitation to 'write off'. It is quite another to pass over the failures and limitations in many forms of working-class organization and ideology. There is certainly room for debate on the Left about where the line is to be drawn between accepting 'existing resources' as a challenge to struggle and submitting to them as a limit upon it.
CHAPTER 4
History or technological determinism?
We need to be reminded why Marxism ascribes a determinative primacy to class struggle. It is not because class is the only form of oppression or even the most frequent, consistent, or violent source of social conflict, but rather because its terrain is the social organization of production which creates the material conditions of existence itself. The first principle of historical materialism is not class or class struggle, but the organization of material life and social reproduction. Class enters the picture when access to the conditions of existence and to the means of appropriation are organized in class ways, that is, when some people are systematically compelled by differential access to the means of production or appropriation to transfer surplus labour to others. The compulsion to transfer surplus labour can take different forms, with varying degrees of transparency. Capitalism undoubtedly represents a special case, because capitalist appropriation is not a distinctly visible act - like, say, the serf's payment of dues to the lord, which constitutes a separate act of appropriation, after the fact of the serf's labour and in the context of a transparent relationship between appropriator and producer. In contrast, there is no immediately obvious way of separating the act of capitalist appropriation from the process of production or from the process of commodity exchange through which capital realizes its gains. The concept of surplus value - as distinct from the more general category of surplus labour, which applies to all forms of surplus appropriation - is meant to convey this complex relation between production, realization in commodity exchange and capitalist appropriation. There has been no shortage of critics, including Marxist economists, who have been keen to point out the difficulty of explaining these relations in quantitative terms - that is, of measuring 'value' and 'surplus', or of relating 'value' to 'price'. It is unlikely that 108
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Marx's concept of surplus labour or surplus value was ever intended to provide the kind of mathematical measure these critics require; but, in any case, this shortcoming — if shortcoming it is — has no bearing on the historical significance of'surplus labour'. The fundamental insight encased in this concept concerns the conditions in which people have access to the means of subsistence and reproduction and the proposition that a decisive historic break occurs when the prevailing conditions systematically compel some to transfer part of their labour or its product to others. The critical datum in explaining the role of class in history is not, then, the quantitative measure of the 'surplus' but the specific nature of the compulsion to transfer it and the specific nature of the social relation in which that transfer takes place.1 In cases where direct producers - like feudal peasants - remain in possession of the means of production, the transfer of surplus is determined by direct coercion, by means of the appropriator's superior force. In capitalism, the compulsion is of a different kind. The direct producer's obligation to forfeit surplus is a pre-condition for access to the means of production, the means of sustaining life itself. What compels direct producers to produce more than they will themselves consume, and to transfer the surplus to someone else, is the 'economic' necessity which makes their own subsistence inseparable from that transfer of surplus labour. Wage labourers in capitalism, lacking the means to carry on their own labour, only acquire them by entering into a relationship with capital. This need not, of course, mean that those who are obliged to transfer surplus labour will get only the bare necessities; it simply means that the transfer is a necessary condition for their access to the means of survival and reproduction - and whatever they can acquire above and beyond that with those means. Such relations can be shown to exist even in the absence of any means of quantifying a 'surplus' or measuring the relative gains of producers and appropriators. We need only acknowledge that the producer's self-reproduction has among its necessary conditions a relation to an appropriator who claims part of his or her labour or product. 1
Marx's classic statement of this principle occurs in Capital m (Moscow, 1971), pp. 791-2, where he explains that the key to every social form, 'which reveals the innermost secret, the hidden basis of the entire social structure', is 'the specific economic form, in which unpaid surplus labour is pumped out of direct producers', though the same 'economic basis' can take an infinite variety of empirical forms 'which can be ascertained only by analysis of the empirically given circumstances'.
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It is no doubt possible to identify transfers of surplus labour which are not determined by coercive imperatives (e.g., gifts, the fulfilment of kinship obligations), but these are not the kind to which the concept of class specifically refers. It is also important to acknowledge that class may not always entail direct relationships, in the sense of face-to-face confrontations, between exploiter and exploited, and that in the absence of such confrontations, class relations may not generate conflict as readily as other, more direct non-class antagonisms may do. But class conflict has a particular historical resonance because it implicates the social organization of production, the very basis of material existence. Class struggle has a distinctive potential as a transformative force because, whatever the immediate motivations of any particular class conflict, the terrain of struggle is strategically situated at the heart of social existence. TWO MARXIST THEORIES OF HISTORY
How, then, do relations between producers and appropriators figure in the materialist explanation of historical movement? I shall distinguish between two broad categories of Marxist explanation, illustrated by two of their most important recent exponents. The first situates production relations and class within a larger, transhistorical context of technological development. The other seeks specific principles of motion in every social form and its dominant social property relations. The distinction I am drawing is not simply that between Marxist theories which give primacy to 'forces of production' and those that give priority to 'relations of production' and class struggle. Instead, I want to emphasize the difference between theories that posit some general, transhistorical and universal law of historical change - which invariably means some kind of technological determinism - and those that stress the specificity of every social form - which generally means an exploration of the specific 'laws of motion' set in train by the prevailing social relations between appropriators and producers. Two especially important examples from recent Marxist scholarship will suffice to illustrate the point. From their respective theoretical vantage points, both offer an account of the major historical transformation that has preoccupied Marxist historians, the transition from feudalism to capitalism. The first comes from the influen-
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tial school of 'Rational Choice Marxism', in the person of John Roemer, who has joined his distinctive theory of exploitation and class with a theory of history indebted to G.A. Cohen's powerful defence of Marxism conceived as a technological determinism. 2 The other example is the Marxist historian Robert Brenner and his work on the origins of capitalism. History, according to John Roemer, takes the form of an evolution in property relations, in which 'progressively fewer kinds of productive factors remain acceptable as property'. 3 For example, property in persons is eliminated as slave society passes into feudalism, leaving some property rights in the labour of others and property in alienable means of production. The transition from feudalism to capitalism eliminates property rights in the labour of others while still allowing property in the alienable means of production, and so on. This 'progressive socialization of property' occurs for reasons 'related to efficiency', that is, the advancement of the forces of production. 'The mechanism that brings about this evolution is class struggle', but 'the reason such an evolution occurs lies somewhere deeper: evolution occurs because the level of development of the technology outgrows the particular form of the social organization, which comes to constrain andfetter it\4
The connection between the mechanism (class struggle) and the deep cause (technological determinism) can be explained in the following way. Class struggle serves as a 'facilitator' in the transition from one social form to another, when the 'dissonance' between the level of development of productive forces and the old economic structure reaches a crisis point. So, for example, Roemer asks us to 'imagine' (his word) a feudal system, with lords and serfs, but one in which 'a nascent capitalist economy is emerging alongside' the feudal system.5 'Now there is an option: capitalists and feudal lords can compete for control of the working population. If the technology or forces of production that the capitalists are using enables them to pay higher real wages than serfs can earn, then there is an economic advantage to the liberation from serfdom that did not formerly exist.' Serfs can become independent peasants, taking advantage of 2 3 4
G.A. Cohen, Karl Marx's Theory of History: A Defence (Princeton, 1978). John Roemer, Free to Lose (London, 1988), p. 126. 5 Ibid., p. 6. Emphasis in the original. Ibid., p. 115.
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the trade opened up by the capitalists, or they can become artisans or proletarians in the towns. 'The competition between feudalism and capitalism now enables class struggle against feudalism to be successful even though formerly it was not.5 We now have three levels of explanation: (i) the deep cause (technological determinism); (2) the historical process (the successive elimination of forms of exploitation or the progressive socialization of property); (3) the 'facilitator' (class struggle - though this only 'facilitates' a process that was 'bound to come sooner or later' 6 ). It is not entirely clear at what level the 'rational choice' model should be introduced. The most obvious place is in class struggle, which implies that change occurs when (if not because) people are in a position to choose the available option of the next, more progressive mode of production. At the same time, there appears to be an overarching rational choice, at the level of the deep cause, having to do with 'the ceaseless effort of rational human beings to alleviate their conditions of scarcity' 7 - though they do not actually choose the next available economic structure because it is conducive to technological progress. In either case, the necessary link between the rational-choice model and the theory of history is the presupposition that there is a direct correspondence between the selfinterested actions of individual rational actors and the requirements of technical progress and economic growth. This three-layered structure raises rather more questions than it answers, not least about the connections among its three levels. Are rational individuals, insofar as they are the makers of history (but are they?), motivated by the desire to alleviate scarcity through technological improvement or by the wish to escape exploitation or neither? Is class struggle necessary or not; and if not, what is the mechanism of historical change? Or does the deep cause somehow make mechanisms and facilitators redundant, since change is somehow 'bound to come sooner or later' anyway, behind the backs of rational individuals? And where, in any case, is the struggle in class struggle? We have lords and capitalists competing to give more attractive terms to producers, to serfs who might want to become proletarians; and we have serfs escaping from lords - apparently without constraints, and willingly giving up their rights of possession - as soon as a more attractive option comes along; but struggle....? 6
Ibid., p. 124.
7
Ibid., p. 123.
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What, indeed, is the 'economic advantage' that would impel serfs to prefer a wage which, by some sophisticated statistical measure, was higher than their 'earnings' as serfs, at the cost of losing their rights of possession, giving up the land which provides them with full and direct access to the means of subsistence in exchange for the uncertainties of the proletarian condition? For that matter, even if serfs choose this option, how do they manage to achieve it? If the lords' property 'rights' in the labour of others have anything to do with the 'control' - i.e., the power - that they exercise over the serfs, how is it that when the critical moment of transition comes, serfs can simply choose to escape the lord's control just because a more eligible option has presented itself? Has feudalism no self-sustaining logic and resources of its own to resist this easy transition? All this is quite apart from the fact that the whole edifice is constructed without benefit of evidence. Roemer has chosen his words carefully when he asks us to 'imagine'. We can hardly do anything else. ('Imagine' and 'suppose' are the basic vocabulary of this game-theoretic discourse.) We are not (or not always) being asked to believe that this is how things actually happened, or even that it was historically possible for them to happen in this way, only that it is logically conceivable that they did (though it is never made clear why we should be interested in such imaginary logical possibilities). Indeed, it is very unlikely that Roemer himself believes his own imaginary account of the transition to capitalism; and it is a measure of the price exacted by his game-theoretic model that it obliges him to set aside everything he undoubtedly knows about the power relations between lords and serfs, the dispossession of small producers and the concentration of landlordly property which were the conditions of the transition; everything, that is, about coercion, compulsion, imperatives, or indeed about the social relations of exploitation. This process of transition which Roemer asks us to 'imagine' evidently has little to do with history, and it would serve no purpose to counter this imaginary story with evidence. History is, apparently, a subject about which we can say anything we like. BEGGING THE QUESTION OF HISTORY
There is one thing that Roemer asks us to 'imagine' that is inescapably critical to his argument, an assumption upon which the
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whole shaky edifice rests. We must accept that capitalism already exists as an 'option', that a 'nascent capitalist economy is emerging alongside5 the feudal system. We must also never ask how this came to be so, though for Roemer this evidently presents no problem: According to historical materialism, feudal, capitalist, and socialist exploitation all exist under feudalism. At some point feudal relations become a fetter on the development of the productive forces, and they are eliminated by the bourgeois revolution.... Historical materialism, in summary, claims that history progresses by the successive elimination of forms of exploitation which are socially unnecessary in the dynamic sense.8 He goes on to characterize this interpretation as 'a translation of the technological determinist aspect of historical materialist theory into the language of the theory of exploitation'. According to this interpretation of historical materialism, all successive forms of exploitation are already contained in the preceding ones (his account of the progress from slave society to capitalism suggests that this retrospective analysis goes back beyond feudalism), so that all forms of exploitation which have emerged in the course of history have apparently been present since the beginning; and history proceeds by the process of elimination. Each form of exploitation is in turn eliminated as it obstructs the development of productive forces. In this sense, technological determinism, for Roemer, supplies the mechanism (deep cause?) of elimination. But the irreducible first premise of the argument is that each successive social form exists simultaneously with the one that precedes it. In this respect, Roemer's theory of elimination is simply a more ingenious variation on an old theme. It has been a favourite ploy of theorists who have trouble with process to beg the question of history by assuming that all historical stages - and especially capitalism - have in effect existed, at least as recessive traits, since the beginning. Such accounts of history typically invoke some deus ex machina, some external factor, to explain the process that brings these recessive or embryonic traits to fruition. Traditionally the most popular 'external' forces have been trade (markets enlarging and contracting, with trade routes opening and closing) and/or technical progress, both conceived as exogenous to the systems being transformed, either in the sense that they are determined by alien intrusions such as barbarian invasions, or in the 8
Roemer, A General Theory of Exploitation and Class (Cambridge, Mass., 1982), pp. 270-1.
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sense that they operate according to some universal natural law (progress, the natural development of the human mind, or perhaps, more scientifically, demographic cycles) not specific or instrinsic to the existing social form. Assumptions such as these have been a staple of bourgeois ideology, which I shall take up in a subsequent chapter. For the moment, it is enough to note that Marxists too have often gone in for this kind of thing by conjuring up images of aspirant modes of production lurking in the interstices of previous ones, waiting only for the opportunity to establish their 'dominance' when certain obstacles are removed (it seems so much easier somehow to account for the demise of what already exists than to explain its coming into being). The Althusserian concept of 'social formation', for example, in which any and all modes of production can coexist without any need to explain their emergence, serves exactly this purpose. There can be no doubt that this kind of conceptual conjuring has far too often served in place of a Marxist theory of history; and, no doubt, Marx's more formulaic aphorisms about the stages of history and successive modes of production could be read as invitations to evade the issue of historical processes in this way. It was Marx, after all, who first spoke of'fetters' and 'interstices'. But there is much more in Marx which demands that we look for the key to historical change in the dynamic logic of existing social relations without assuming the very thing that needs to be explained. Robert Brenner's primary purpose has been to break the prevailing